

Rebellion, Resistance and Restoration: Strategies of Limited Violence in Late Anglo-Saxon England, 1042–1066

Matthew Strickland

To cite this article: Matthew Strickland (2023): Rebellion, Resistance and Restoration: Strategies of Limited Violence in Late Anglo-Saxon England, 1042–1066, Global Intellectual History, DOI: [10.1080/23801883.2023.2201951](https://doi.org/10.1080/23801883.2023.2201951)

To link to this article: <https://doi.org/10.1080/23801883.2023.2201951>



© 2023 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group



Published online: 02 Jun 2023.



Submit your article to this journal [↗](#)



Article views: 10



View related articles [↗](#)



View Crossmark data [↗](#)

Rebellion, Resistance and Restoration: Strategies of Limited Violence in Late Anglo-Saxon England, 1042–1066

Matthew Strickland

Department of History, University of Glasgow, Glasgow, UK



ABSTRACT

A comparative analysis of the series of aristocratic rebellions which punctuated the reign of the penultimate Anglo-Saxon king Edward ‘the Confessor’ (1042–1066), and in particular the better documented case study of the revolt of Earl Godwine in 1051–1052, reveals how violence might be limited and controlled in regard both to mechanisms of armed opposition against the king and to the ruler’s reaction towards dissident nobles. It explores a pattern whereby an exiled noble sought refuge abroad, there raised a force of mercenaries or allies, then engaged in limited and indirect acts of hostility, usually on the peripheries of the kingdom, to exert pressure upon the king to negotiate whilst avoiding a direct attack on the monarch. Reconciliation was not inevitable, but in the majority of cases revolts succeeded in achieving a complete restoration to lands and position, with comparatively little bloodshed having occurred. It is argued that the period 1042–1066 marks a crucial transition between the more extreme violence of earlier rulers, who inflicted death or mutilation on dissidents, and the Normans’ introduction from 1066 of more restrained conduct towards political opponents.

KEYWORDS

Rebellion; feud; late Anglo-Saxon England

The Norman conquest of England from 1066 witnessed fundamental changes in attitudes to violent conduct. It marked ‘the introduction of chivalry’ into England, as the new Franco-Norman aristocracy brought with it a warrior code in which the ransoming, rather than the habitual killing, of high status opponents became the norm, and which turned its face against the enslaving of women and children, a practice that was still ubiquitous in Britain, Ireland and the Scandinavian world.¹ But hand-in-hand with this seismic shift came, it has been argued, an equally radical change in attitudes towards the violent treatment of political opponents. Whereas in Anglo-Saxon England and in the Celtic and Scandinavian lands the fate of defeated dynastic rivals or rebels was usually death or mutilation, Norman rulers showed far greater constraint towards political rivals, limiting (save in exceptional cases) punishment to imprisonment, fines, forfeiture of lands or exile.² Being reversible, such measures could be effective mechanisms to

CONTACT Matthew Strickland  matthew.strickland@glasgow.ac.uk  University of Glasgow, 10 University Gardens, Glasgow, G12 8QQ, UK

© 2023 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives License (<http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/>), which permits non-commercial re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited, and is not altered, transformed, or built upon in any way. The terms on which this article has been published allow the posting of the Accepted Manuscript in a repository by the author(s) or with their consent.

control the loyalties and conduct of individuals or families. Yet they also reflected a general acceptance that the bodies of the nobility should generally be immune from harm to life or limb, and that open, armed resistance by aristocrats should not be punished in the same manner as acts of what would later be termed ‘privy treason’, such as plots to kill the ruler, which demanded the death penalty by brutal and shaming forms of execution.³

Yet as John Gillingham has suggested, ‘very likely the chivalrous “Europeanization of England” would have happened without the 1066 factor – there are signs that it was beginning to happen in late Anglo-Saxon England south of the Humber’.⁴ Exploring this contention further, this paper takes as its focus the series of aristocratic revolts which were such a marked feature of the reign of the penultimate Anglo-Saxon king, Edward the ‘Confessor’ (1042-1066). Examined together and set within the wider context of the relationship between violence and order in late Anglo-Saxon England, these offer valuable perspectives on how violence might be limited and controlled in regard both to mechanisms of armed opposition against the king and to the ruler’s reaction towards dissident nobles. Such an approach serves to highlight the particular significance of the period 1042–1066 in the broader chronology of shifting patterns of political violence.

The political volatility of the Confessor’s reign stemmed in considerable measure from the unusual circumstances of Edward’s accession after a long exile in Normandy, which had left him as a stranger in his own kingdom, without an established power base and in a weaker position than his predecessors in relation to a small number of very powerful and entrenched families controlling great earldoms, above all that of Godwine, earl of Wessex. The greatest crisis in the reign came when in 1051 his attempt to break free of Godwine’s influence initially succeeded in bringing about the family’s fall and exile, only for the earl and his sons to launch a powerful armed *revanche* the following year resulting in their enforced restoration.⁵ The magnitude of these events is reflected in the unusually detailed treatment afforded them in the extant sources, and as such they will form the principal case study here. The resistance of the Danish earl Osgod Clapa in 1049, and the two rebellions of Aelfgar of Mercia in 1055 and 1058, are not recorded in anything like the detail given to the events of 1051-1052: even the reasons for their banishments are never explained. Aelfgar’s strategies of revolt, however, are reasonably clear.⁶ Outlawed in 1055, he raised a mercenary fleet in Ireland and in alliance with the Welsh king Gruffydd ap Llewelyn, sacked the town and minster of Hereford after routing local forces in battle. This was a major show of force, but the allies then withdrew and entered into peace negotiations with Godwine’s son Earl Harold, acting as King Edward’s deputy, which resulted in Aelfgar’s complete restoration.⁷ Exiled a second time in 1058, Aelfgar again ‘came back forthwith by violence through Gruffydd’s help’. Nothing more is known, save that he again achieved complete restoration.⁸ Though only glimpsed in the sources, these revolts, together with the rising of the northern shires in 1065, nonetheless offer important comparisons and contrasts regarding the nature of armed resistance to the ruler.

In examining these episodes together, two main themes emerge. First, despite the high incidence of armed resistance by leading nobles, there are no recorded cases of the execution or mutilation of defeated rebels or of dynastic rivals ordered by King Edward between 1042 and 1066. This stands in notable contrast to the frequent

mutilation, execution or assassination of rivals or dissident nobles which marked several preceding reigns.⁹ Second, the rebellions between 1042 and 1066 reveal a striking pattern: an exiled noble sought refuge abroad, there raised a military force of mercenaries or allies, and then engaged in limited acts of hostilities, usually on the peripheries of the kingdom, in order to pressure the king into negotiation and ultimate restoration. Reconciliation was certainly not inevitable, but in the majority of cases the revolts succeeded in their aim and the magnates were restored to their lands and positions, with comparatively little bloodshed having occurred. The rising of the northern shires in 1065 differed in its causation, being a regional rebellion against the misrule and oppression of a royal representative, Earl Tostig, and differed also in its method of prosecution: the insurgents slew those of the earl's men they could find then led what amounted to an armed invasion as far as the Midlands, involving ravaging and the seizure of captives.¹⁰ As in 1051 when Godwine's forces confronted the king, civil war seemed possible, yet this revolt was also ended by negotiation and avoided an open conflict between the royal forces and those of the rebels. Such a dispute settlement stands in marked contrast to the series of brutal reprisals inflicted after 1066 by William the Conqueror or his commanders following a series of northern insurrections.

These revolts reveal how armed force might be carefully applied and contained in order to attain a negotiated outcome. Their pattern, together with a notable absence of violent punishment inflicted by the ruler on dissidents, raises a number of important questions. How did these mechanisms of armed resistance operate, and what was the place of violent action within them? How does the application of force in such cases compare with the nature and extent of other forms of violence actions witnessed in this period? Why were the revolts of dissident magnates often successful in attaining their aims, in marked contrast to many post-Conquest rebellions? What factors encouraged negotiated settlement over armed struggle, and how far was the absence of punitive royal violence related to the aims and methods of the insurgents?

For the study of all these events we are reliant primarily on the vernacular *Anglo-Saxon Chronicle*, the most important narrative source for the period, which from a common origin in the late ninth century was compiled progressively in a number of different versions at various monastic houses.¹¹ Of these, three versions are extant which cover the period from the 1040s to 1066. While they generally follow the same basic narrative, some give fuller accounts of certain events and each displays varying degrees of bias for or against house of Godwine, shaped by the geographical location of the monasteries in which they were produced and by influences of patronage and politics to which each was subject.¹² In addition, the later Latin chronicle of John of Worcester is based on another lost recension of the *Anglo-Saxon Chronicle* but with considerable additional information.¹³ Still more valuable is the anonymous *Vita Edwardi*, begun in the 1060s by a cleric from Lotharingia or Flanders in the service of Edith, Edward's queen and the daughter of Godwine.¹⁴ In giving an unusually detailed justification for why Edith's father and brothers were forced to take up arms against her husband the king, it offers a rare voice from the opposition's perspective, while its narrative is sympathetic to the main target of the northern rising of 1065, Earl Tostig.

Such texts render acts of armed opposition by leading nobles to the ruler more clearly visible between 1042 and 1066 than in preceding centuries. In exploring the extent to

which Edward the Confessor's reign represented a period of transition in patterns of political violence, it is thus important to sound a note of caution. The incidence and nature of armed aristocratic resistance to the king in Anglo-Saxon England in the century before 1042 is made very difficult to discern because of the extreme paucity of sources.

The turbulent reign of Aethelred II had witnessed a series of blindings and killings of some of the very greatest nobles, largely it seems as the result of political machinations at court.¹⁵ In a differing context, the conquest of England in 1017 by the Danish king Cnut was marked by a spate of killings in a purge of leading Anglo-Saxon nobles, including the beheading of the repeated turncoat Eadric Streona, earl of Mercia.¹⁶ This was matched by the ruthless eradication of those surviving members of the West Saxon royal house within Cnut's reach, a circumstance which had led to King Aethelred's sons Edward and Alfred taking refuge at the Norman ducal court.¹⁷ An abortive challenge in 1036 by Alfred, with Norman support, to the succession of Cnut's son Harold 'Harefoot' (r. 1035-1040), graphically reveals the fate which still awaited defeated rivals: Alfred, seized by Harold's men, was blinded and died soon after being sent to confinement in the monastery of Ely; captured members of his expeditionary force variously suffered execution, mutilation or enslavement.¹⁸ Anglo-Saxon law codes were unambiguous in regarding *hlaforðsweyde*, or betrayal of one's lord, as a terrible crime that was unatoneable or bootless (*botleas*) by fine or clearing oneself by oath, and deserving only of death. But it is far from certain how far there was any judicial element in the punishment of Alfred and his companions.¹⁹

The more peaceful resolution of major disputes between kings and greater magnates may well have occurred but gone largely unrecorded precisely because such events were deemed less noteworthy. A suggestive exception is the *Anglo-Saxon Chronicle's* bare statement that in 1023, Thorkell the Tall, the Scandinavian earl of East Anglia who had been exiled by Cnut in 1021, was reconciled to the king and was even made regent of Denmark.²⁰ The entire episode, however, is obscure: how far his restoration was due to hostile actions by Thorkell during his period of banishment is unknown, though the *Chronicle's* statement that in 1022 'King Cnut went out with his ships to the Isle of Wight' – a location for royal naval forces guarding against invasion – suggests that Thorkell may have gathered the kind of powerful fleet he had formerly commanded and was threatening to raid the coast of England.²¹

Before 1042, Anglo-Saxon rulers had used banishment as well as the more extreme measures of killing or mutilation.²² Yet in Edward's reign, exile was not only used frequently, but almost exclusively as the key tool of political coercion against dissident nobles.²³ Whereas Cnut had ruthlessly hunted down members of the West Saxon royal house, Edward merely banished Cnut's niece Gunnhild, together with her sons Hemming and Thurkil, in 1044.²⁴ Though a declaration of outlawry placed the life of the condemned in peril should they linger in the kingdom or return without its revocation, the sentence presupposed flight and thus at least bodily safety, as well as the possibility of return.²⁵ The *Vita Edwardi* believed that in 1051, when he fell from power, Godwine's life had been in danger had he not escaped abroad. Diplomatically, however, it portrayed any mortal enmity as stemming not from the king but from Godwine's great rival at court, Robert of Jumièges, the archbishop of Canterbury, and cast such extreme vindictiveness as a form of madness (*dementia*).²⁶ Yet whatever the king's personal animosity towards the earl for real or alleged complicity in the death

of Edward's brother Alfred, it seems unlikely that the other major earls, who held the balance of power in 1051, would have tolerated the killing of so great a figure, and that in reality the king found Godwine's escape politically expedient.²⁷ The events of 1051, moreover, appear exceptional: although very little is known of the circumstances of the banishments of Earl Osgod in 1049, and of Aelfgar in 1055 and then again in 1058, there is nothing to suggest that their lives were ever at risk before leaving the country.

1. The Wider Landscape of Violence

Before turning to examine what the fall and restoration of the Godwine family in 1051–2 reveals about the role of force in relations between the ruler and dissident nobles, it is important to first contextualize such measures within the wider relationship of violence and order. Historians of later Anglo-Saxon law and society have in general been less concerned with armed resistance to the king than with the vexed question of the feud and the extent of royal control over homicide.²⁸ The 'maximalist' view of tenth and eleventh-century England has characterized the kingdom as a remarkably developed and centralized state, in which the authority of the king and his officers was great and wide-reaching, and where royal legislation had increasingly attempted to curb acts of homicide and revenge killings.²⁹ By contrast, it has been argued that such royal authority 'operated within a culture permeated and informed by a resistant notion of feud', and that laws sought more to constrain and channel rather than completely prohibit acts of personal vengeance.³⁰ Thus kings sought to significantly limit the opportunities for attack by extending the royal peace to all homes, churches and major roads.³¹ Nevertheless, the legitimacy of violent revenge was assumed, though its threat was an important factor in encouraging settlement through compensation which saved the honour of offended parties and curbed the escalation of violent enmity.³²

The conduct of one of Godwine's sons, Tostig, more closely approaches the violent methods of dealing with rivals seen in earlier reigns. As earl of Northumbria from 1055, he was widely hated for his oppressive rule and punitive taxation, and was accused of having two thegns, Gamel son of Orm and Ulf son of Dolfin, treacherously murdered in his own chamber while under the supposed protection of a peace treaty.³³ Tostig's conduct was deemed unacceptable and resulted in a powerful uprising in the north in 1065 and in his permanent expulsion from the earldom. It seems no coincidence that Tostig's violent acts took place in the lands north of Humber, where the power of the kings of Wessex was weaker and in a region which had witnessed a notorious series of reciprocal revenge killings, set in motion in 1016 and still ongoing in the 1070s.³⁴

Although it has been argued that the north was not exceptional in regard to the persistence of the feud in the eleventh century, there is little hard evidence elsewhere in Edward's kingdom for equivalent conflict between rival magnates.³⁵ Rulers of late Anglo-Saxon England may well have been unwilling or unable to preclude all forms of violent self-help, yet where glimpsed such acts of violence appear as individual acts of homicide or conflicts involving only a limited number of individuals,³⁶ and aggression often took place by surprise or guile.³⁷ Attacks on houses by surprise and during feasting appear as a recurrent feature of such violence.³⁸ There were sound practical reasons for

such tactics, as Richard Fletcher notes: 'Prospective victims were conveniently (from the killers' point of view) gathered together, they were unarmed, unsuspecting, relaxed. With luck and good timing they might be bloated and fuddled with food and drink as well'.³⁹

Yet this form of violence also stands in marked contrast to the kind of warfare that characterized much of the ubiquitous localized conflict between noble families in the territorial principalities of tenth and eleventh century Frankia, which contemporaries would have regarded as *werra*.⁴⁰ The England of Edward the Confessor witnessed nothing comparable to the recurrent warfare between competing noble families in Normandy during the 1030s and 1040s, which had led William the Conqueror to restrict castle building and to forbid the wearing of armour and military equipment when seeking out an enemy.⁴¹ Unlike in Frankia, pre-Conquest kings never felt the need to promulgate the ecclesiastical legislation known as the Peace and Truce of God which attempted to restrict localized warfare, to help curb internal hostilities,⁴² and appear to have enjoyed a far more effective control over the deployment of large-scale armed force and war making – except when facing revolt. Such a context throws into sharp relief the extent to which the raising of stipendiary fleets by dissident magnates or the mustering of their followers and allies in strength, challenged these norms of royal authority.

That contemporaries assumed such royal control is suggested by the reaction of the *Anglo-Saxon Chronicle* to seemingly unaccustomed incidents of violence perpetrated by aliens. Thus to the author of the D version of the *Chronicle*, the establishment of one of the first castles on the Welsh march by Edward's Norman colonists in the 1040s was synonymous with conflict and aggression, and a contributing factor to the political crisis of 1051.⁴³ A similar attitude pervades the *Chronicle's* accounts of the so-called 'affray at Dover' in 1051, which sparked off the events culminating in Godwine's fall and exile. Returning from visiting his brother-in-law, King Edward, Count Eustace of Boulogne had attempted to billet his men on the townspeople of Dover, but they did so 'in a stupid and insolent manner'.⁴⁴ According to the pro-Godwine chronicler of the E version, probably written at Canterbury and thus with access to more local knowledge, a householder was attacked by one of the Boulonnais for refusing lodging and killed his assailant, whereupon in revenge 'Eustace got upon his horse, and his companions upon theirs, and went to the householder and killed him upon his own hearth'. A widespread skirmish then broke out, in which another twenty or so townsmen were killed but also nineteen of Eustace's retinue.⁴⁵ The E chronicler blamed Eustace, whose men from the outset had provocatively arrived in arms in a hostile manner.⁴⁶ The D chronicler believed that the fighting continued 'until the people assembled' – perhaps of the local levy – whereupon Eustace and his men fled.⁴⁷

The sequel reveals, however, that the king himself might choose to deploy what were in effect forms of warfare against his own subjects as a mechanism of royal discipline. When Eustace 'went back to the king and gave him a very prejudiced account of how they had fared', Edward angrily ordered Godwine, in whose earldom Dover lay, 'to carry war into Kent to Dover' to punish the town.⁴⁸ Acts of punitive ravaging by kings – effectively the harrying of a locality as if in open warfare – were no novelty. In 952, the *Anglo-Saxon Chronicle* records how King Eadred 'ordered a great slaughter to be made in the borough of Thetford in vengeance for the abbot Eadhelm who they had slain', while in 969, King Edgar 'ordered all Thanet to be ravaged' for unknown reasons.⁴⁹ King Aethelred II even responded in a similar fashion to a dispute with the bishop of Rochester by laying

waste his diocese.⁵⁰ When in 1041 the men of Worcester slew two royal household retainers attempting to collect a heavy and unpopular tax, King Harthancnut took vengeance by sending a powerful force ‘to slay all the men if they could, to plunder and burn the city, and to lay waste the whole area’. The ravaging continued for four days, although few people were actually killed. This was in part because many of the citizens of Worcester took refuge on an island in the Severn, which they fortified; but it may also be that the punitive action was targeted more at property than lives.⁵¹ After the city of Worcester had been burned and the royalist forces had taken great booty, peace was formally declared again and the citizens were allowed to return home freely.⁵² Such actions were the stark inverse of the king’s bestowal of his ‘hand-given peace (*handgrith*)’ or the extension of his special protection (*grith*, or *mund*) to persons or places.⁵³

2. Godwine’s Revolt in 1051: Failed Confrontation and Denial of Legal Process as Royal Aggression

From his accession in 1042, King Edward had been under the influence of the powerful Earl Godwine, a situation reflected by the marriage of Godwine’s daughter Edith to the king in 1045, and by the promotion of Godwine’s sons to earldoms. As Edward sought greater independence, he had increasingly turned to a small but influential group of Norman advisers who had followed him from the duchy. Most prominent among these was Robert of Jumièges, who in 1050 was promoted to the archbishop of Canterbury over Godwine’s own candidate, and who sought with increasing success to undermine his rival’s position with the king.⁵⁴ The affray at Dover was thus the catalyst for a major dispute. The *Vita Edwardi* believed that Archbishop Robert had sowed the seeds of discord by poisoning the king’s mind against the earl with accusations that the killing of Alfred and his men in 1036 had been on the advice of Godwine, and the false charge that he was now planning on attacking Edward himself.⁵⁵ Accordingly, Godwine not only refused the king’s order to ravage Dover but also summoned his own men to arms.

Yet in adopting a policy of direct military confrontation, the earl had badly miscalculated, as was graphically revealed by the rapid collapse of his position. The E version of the *Anglo-Saxon Chronicle* protested that Godwine and his sons had mustered their forces only

intending to go to their royal lord and to all the councillors who were assembled with him, so that they should have the advice and support of the king and all of the councillors as to how they should avenge the insult to the king and to all the people.⁵⁶

But though they were only acting thus in self-defence, ‘the foreigners’ had come to Edward first, and laid charges that the Godwines had come to betray the king, so that he refused to see them.⁵⁷ Yet even though his actions may have been directed primarily towards the king’s Norman advisors, these were few in number and in mobilizing forces from as many as twelve shires under the control of himself and his sons, Godwine was in reality directly threatening Edward. As the neutral D version of the *Chronicle* noted, the Godwines had gathered ‘a great and innumerable force all ready to do battle against the king (*to wige ongean þone cyng*) unless Eustace were surrendered’.⁵⁸ Caught momentarily without sizeable forces of his own, Edward felt himself to be ‘in great danger’ and quickly sent for aid.⁵⁹ Accordingly, the other great earls moved to support the king and, on

realizing the gravity of the crisis, 'had a great army called out for the help of their liege lord'.⁶⁰ The threat posed by Godwine to the king united the other earls in common cause: 'they were all so much in agreement with the king that they were willing to attack the army of Godwine if the king had wished them to do so'.⁶¹ At a great council at the royal palace of Gloucester, however, wiser counsel prevented an open conflict, so hostages were exchanged⁶² – a normal feature of such negotiations – and the issue postponed to a new council to be held in London. Yet as Edward had doubtless calculated, the delay proved fatal to Godwine's position. He exploited the conflicting loyalties of the Godwines' supporters by summoning the army of all the kingdom, a manoeuvre which forced many, including many of the thegns of Godwine's son Earl Harold, to the king's side.⁶³ Though Godwine brought his forces to Southwark, from where he could menace London, 'his force dwindled more and more as time passed'.⁶⁴

As the earl's support waned, so Edward's stance became more aggressive. With hindsight of the earl's fall, the E version of the *Chronicle* complained that the king had given 'the peace of God and his complete friendship to both sides', but if so, this was only a pretence on the king's part to appear conciliatory to speed up the demobilization of the Godwine family's supporters.⁶⁵ According to the *Vita Edwardi*, when charges had been first brought against Godwine at the Gloucester council, Edward had refused to allow Godwine to clear himself of the charges by swearing an oath of innocence.⁶⁶ According to the Worcester chronicle, Godwine had already performed just such a purgation in 1040 when King Harthacnut had charged him with complicity in Alfred's death.⁶⁷ Faced now with Edward's anger, Godwine had offered 'to satisfy the king in accordance with the law or beyond it (*cum iure et ultra ius*)', suggesting he made a proffer of tribute to regain the king's goodwill – but he sought the king's peace in vain.⁶⁸

As scholars such as Gerd Althoff and Geoffrey Koziol have shown, carefully choreographed rituals of submission, often brokered by third parties and agreed in advance, played an important part in dispute settlement between dissident magnates and rulers in early medieval Europe.⁶⁹ Acts of abasement and public acknowledgement of a ruler's authority would be performed in the expectation that they would result in clemency, reconciliation and restoration. Yet the application of such 'rules of the game', as Althoff has termed these mechanisms, was not inevitable, and Edward's actions in 1051 offer a prime example of how they might be swept aside by royal anger – the *ira regis*, which added a dangerous dimension of unpredictability.⁷⁰ By not permitting Godwine either to swear to his innocence or undertake the ordeal, Edward was effectively denying him any legal process. Moreover, although Godwine had 'asked for safe-conduct and hostages, so that he could come to the meeting, and leave it, without being betrayed', the king refused to grant him any such safety.⁷¹ To the *Vita*, Edward's intransigence was the work of Archbishop Robert, 'who stood fiercely (*hostiliter*) in the way of the earl', and was responsible for the king's chilling judgment 'that he could hope for the king's peace when and only when he gave him back his brother alive with all his men and all their possessions intact which had been taken from them quick or dead'.⁷² When Godwine failed to attend, 'the king held a meeting of his council and he and all the army declared him an outlaw, and all his sons with him', and all their lands were declared forfeit.⁷³ Godwine had effectively been condemned without hearing, and realizing his peril, he fled precipitously to the port of Bosham, from where he and his wife Gytha and three of his sons, Svein, Tostig and Gyrrh, took ship to Bruges, where they received protection

from Count Baldwin of Flanders.⁷⁴ His other sons, Harold and Leofwine, sailed from Bristol to Ireland, where they found refuge with Diarmait, king of Leinster.⁷⁵ From a position of initial vulnerability, Edward had skilfully exploited Godwine's rash resort to an armed threat, which forced the other great earls to rally firmly behind the king and to tolerate the king's aggressive manipulation of the law.

The king's vengeance extended to women. To complete the Godwine family's downfall, Edward deprived his own wife Edith of all her possessions, 'land and gold and silver and everything', and had her confined in a nunnery.⁷⁶ The use of religious houses to imprison dynastic rivals was a common enough feature of politics in early medieval Europe, but it was an extraordinary act to so incarcerate one's own wife and, as the *Vita Edwardi* protested, 'the lady who was consecrated as his queen'.⁷⁷ Such ruthlessness echoed Edward's earlier actions in 1043 towards his mother, the dowager queen Emma, whom he deprived of all her lands and treasure for her suspected support of a planned invasion by King Magnus of Norway, though she was not banished and kept her liberty.⁷⁸ Yet in Edith's case there is no mention of any judicial process, and she would presumably have been confined indefinitely had not her father's return with armed force brought about the restoration of the family's fortunes.

3. Resistance and Restoration

If the swiftness of Godwine's fall amazed contemporaries,⁷⁹ what was equally remarkable was the speed and success of the family's revanche in 1052. Their actions reveal how political pressure could be applied through violence, but violence that was limited, controlled and, until the final stand-off at London, aimed only indirectly at the person of the king. In the summer of 1052, Godwine and Harold joined forces with mercenary fleets raised in Flanders and Ireland respectively, and embarked upon a co-ordinated campaign along the south coast of England.⁸⁰ Godwine raided the Isle of Wight together with selected manors of the king's supporters on the south coast, while Harold launched more aggressive attacks on the coast of Devon and Somerset.⁸¹ After displaying their military potential, however, their subsequent actions revealed a conscious restraint of force and a diplomatic campaign to win hearts and minds. As even the hostile C chronicler admits, after Godwine and Harold effected a rendezvous off the Isle of Wight, 'they would not do any great harm afterwards, except they lived off the countryside'.⁸² No doubt locals had little choice but to provide the Godwines' fleet with supplies when faced with such overwhelming power, and hostages were given by the men of Dover and Sandwich.⁸³ Yet the *Anglo-Saxon Chronicle* stresses that persuasion was key: Godwine sought to exploit his longstanding position as earl of Wessex, which then covered much of southern England, and according to the D version of the *Chronicle*, successfully recruited men and sailors from Kent, Sussex, Essex, Surrey, and other southeastern regions; 'And they said that they would live and die with him'.⁸⁴ The *Vita* similarly notes that 'some sent messages that they were ready, should he want to return, to receive him with the aid of force (*cum violentia*) in the country, to fight for him, and, if need be, they were willing to die for him as well'.⁸⁵

There is evident hyperbole in the *Vita*'s claim that 'Godwine was revered by all Englishmen as a father',⁸⁶ but he was shrewd in depicting himself as a suppliant, seeking only lawful redress and the king's good will. He is said to have sent messengers to Edward 'to

ask for peace and mercy (*pax et misericordia*), while this diplomatic offensive was supported by ambassadors from the king of France, Henry I, and from Godwine's powerful ally, Count Baldwin of Flanders.⁸⁷ That the earl's stress on the injustice of the arbitrary judgment passed on him played on mounting resentment towards the undue influence at court of certain Normans, especially Archbishop Robert, is suggested by the fact that the council which subsequently established peace between the king and Godwine 'promised a just law to the whole people, and outlawed all the Normans who had devised evil laws and pronounced unjust judgments and given the king much bad counsel, to the prejudice of the English'.⁸⁸

It was the same judicious combination of the threat of armed force with negotiation that secured Godwine the crucial support of the powerfully defended city of London, whose citizens were influential in the affairs of the realm. Just what the promises were that the earl is said to have made to the Londoners is unknown, but the result was decisive: they permitted Godwine safe passage under the heavily fortified London bridge, allowing him to encircle the king's forces by river and land.⁸⁹ According to the *Vita Edwardi* Edward wanted to fight, 'as he was of passionate temper and a man of prompt and vigorous action'.⁹⁰ But the earls of Mercia and Northumbria and the majority of the nobles with the king would not countenance joining battle with Godwine, and without their backing, Edward's position was untenable.

Nevertheless, despite the realities of the military situation, Godwine astutely appeared as a suppliant, humbling himself before Edward and throwing himself on the king's mercy. If the rituals of submission and reconciliation had been denied Godwine in 1051, he now deployed them to great effect to deflect the reality of his *coup de main*. According to the *Vita Edwardi*, when Godwine entered the king's presence:

he immediately cast away his weapons and threw himself at his feet, and begged as a suppliant that in the name of Christ, whose kingdom's sign was on the crown he wore on his head, he would grant him permission to purge himself of the crime with which he was charged, and bestow the grace of his favour on him when cleared.⁹¹

Godwine's visual acts of abasement, combined with an appeal to the king's Christian kingship which tempered might with mercy, allowed King Edward to save face and assigned to him a power which in the circumstances he did not in reality possess. Edward had no option but to accept the rebels' restoration, and, after the earl had been permitted to expound his case before the assembly

Godwine was given his earldom unconditionally, and as fully and completely as he had ever held it, and all his sons all that they had held before, and his wife and his daughter as fully and completely as they had held it before.⁹²

Yet this theatre of submission permitted the king to appear as a clement and gracious lord in restoring the Godwines.⁹³ In turn, Edward signalled the restoration of order by returning the suppliants their arms and entering the palace of Westminster with Godwine. There, noted the *Vita*, the king 'with the advice of his *witan* [council], gave the earl the kiss of peace, condoned all offences, and also granted his full favour both to him and all his sons'.⁹⁴ The kiss of peace was a crucial symbol of the restoration of favour and royal goodwill, though evidently Edward had not given this spontaneously but had needed to be persuaded by his assembled magnates.⁹⁵

Not all, however, had been free from the threat of violence: Robert of Jumièges and some of Edward's other Norman followers, who clearly feared for their lives with Godwine's return, fled abroad. Their absence facilitated the reconciliation between Godwine and the king, while their subsequent outlawry by the council helped to shift responsibility for the crisis away from the king and onto these alien advisors.⁹⁶

4. A Pattern of Limited Violence? Some Reflections

If certain aspects of noble resistance can be glimpsed earlier, the reign of Edward certainly seems to have witnessed an intensification of the attempted return of exiled noblemen through armed force. Reviewing the nature of such rebellions, a number of key points emerge. The aid of powerful allies was a major factor in the success of several, notably that of the Welsh in the case of Aelfgar's two risings, and of Flanders in that of Godwine in 1052, while Count Baldwin also gave his son-in-law Tostig refuge and support in 1065-1066.⁹⁷ A closely connected factor was the ready availability of mercenary fleets, which allowed the rebels speed of movement and the ability to strike at carefully chosen targets before moving rapidly on. Such stipendiaries, moreover, were not affected by any scruples of loyalty to the king; their backing allowed Godwine to finally confront Edward at London in 1052 with greater confidence than in 1051, where ties of duty had ultimately favoured the king.⁹⁸ Nevertheless, the naval forces of the English king were potentially a formidable defence against such rebel fleets,⁹⁹ and much of Godwine's success in 1052 lay in his ability to win over the crews of the maritime towns of the south coast. The family's control of ports such as Bosham and Bristol and their own ships, moreover, proved their salvation in 1051.

By contrast, armed opposition by nobles between 1042 and 1066 never made use of fortifications as bases for resistance or aggression, unlike in eleventh-century Normandy, where castles served as a crucial mechanism for rebellion by individual lords.¹⁰⁰ Though towns might be targets – as Hereford was in 1055 – no known attempt was made by dissident earls to hold such a burgh against the king. This may be in part because of the large scale of these urban defences, requiring a very sizeable garrison, or of the degree of control exercised by sheriffs or other royal officials within them. Strategies of rebellion regarded attack by fleets or fast-moving campaigns on land as more effective and militarily pragmatic than the risk of siege and a long campaign of attrition.

The most striking feature of these events, however, is the propensity to negotiate by both sides. In 1055, Earl Harold had led the royal army into Wales in pursuit of Earl Aelfgar and King Gruffydd and fortified Hereford after its sack by the allies, but simultaneously peace was discussed. At a conference at Billingsley, Shropshire, they 'confirmed peace and friendship between them', Aelfgar disbanded his mercenary fleet and 'was reinstated and given all that had been taken from him'.¹⁰¹ In 1065, Edward's initial reaction to the northern rebels mustered at Oxford, or so the *Vita* claimed, was to order them to desist and instead 'receive right and justice for every injury which they could prove against him'.¹⁰² When they demanded the removal of Tostig, he twice more sent messengers 'and by every kind of effort of his counsellors tried to turn them from their mad purpose'. Only after the witan had met, and when many subsequent attempts to negotiate through messengers had failed, did the furious king order the army to be raised throughout the kingdom 'to crush their impudent contumacy by force'.¹⁰³

Nevertheless, in 1065, just as in 1051 and 1052, battle was never joined between the king and the rebels. A number of factors help explain this. Although the northern rebels had threatened King Edward that unless Tostig was banished, the king ‘would be treated as an enemy and have them all as enemies’,¹⁰⁴ the reality was that many insurgents harboured a deep-seated unwillingness to attack directly the person of the king, who was an anointed ruler. As the E version of the *Anglo-Saxon Chronicle* noted, although in 1051 Godwine and his sons had mustered their forces, they were nevertheless ‘reluctant to have to stand against their royal lord’.¹⁰⁵ Likewise, in its treatment of the *revanche* of 1052, the *Vita Edwardi* made much of Godwine’s refusal to bear arms against the king, having him hold back those in his forces who wished to attack Edward at London and have him profess that ‘I would rather die than have done, or do, or, while I am alive, allow to be done, anything unseemly or unrighteous against my lord the king’.¹⁰⁶ Concluding his narration of the events of 1051–1052 with a poem, the author compared Godwine to the biblical figure of David, who spared King Saul when he had the opportunity to kill him, through reverence to his status as the Lord’s Anointed.¹⁰⁷ The *Vita* doubtless protested too much, but the events of 1051, when the forces of the Godwines fell away when confronted by the summons to the royal army and to the superior loyalty they owed to the king, indicates how deep such sentiments really ran.

In 1051, when Godwine’s forces faced those of Edward and the other earls near Gloucester,

some of them thought it would be a great piece of folly if they joined battle, for in the two hosts, there was most of what was noblest in England, and they considered that they would be opening a way for our enemies to enter the country and to cause great ruin amongst ourselves.¹⁰⁸

The same considerations held sway at London in 1052, for although Edward had a considerably army, ‘it was hateful to almost all of them to fight against men of their own race, for there was little else that was worth anything apart from Englishmen on either side’.¹⁰⁹ In 1065, Edward’s attempts to raise forces against the northern rebels met with resistance, ‘because in that race horror was felt at what seemed civil war’ and he was forced to accept the rebels’ demands.¹¹⁰

The limited aims of the insurgents, moreover, was crucial to the ultimate success of peace talks. For while all of the principal revolts used the threat of force, and engaged in raiding or ravaging, all but that of Tostig in 1066 had the limited aims of negotiating a return to the political status quo, rather than attempting dynastic change or fundamentally challenging the kingship of the ruler. Such essentially conservative demands, aiming only at restoration of lands and office, doubtless helped facilitate negotiation and to win the acquiescence of many of those nobles who had sided with the king. Even the great rising of the north in 1065 was not a rejection of Edward’s authority, but rather a demand that the king replace Tostig with an earl of their choosing. Albeit reluctantly, the king agreed to the appointment of Morcar, Aelfgar’s son, and renewed the laws of King Cnut to safeguard their distinctive regional customs which Tostig was held to have violated.¹¹¹ Except in 1051, when the king was bent on the ruin of the Godwines and would not heed intercession, the role of key intermediaries was significant: thus, for example, the *Anglo-Saxon Chronicle* noted the part of Stigand, bishop of Winchester,

in defusing the stand-off at London in 1052, while the considerable political wisdom and diplomatic skills of Earl Harold, acting as King Edward's deputy, was probably a key factor in reaching terms with Aelfgar in 1055 and 1058, and with the northern rebels in 1065.

Attempted revanches were not, however, invariably successful, either because the military threat was inadequate, or because of a failure of necessary diplomacy. Thus Osgod Clapa, a leading Danish noble exiled in 1046, raided the south coast of England in 1049, but his powerful fleet was destroyed by storms and he failed to obtain restoration.¹¹² Similarly in 1049, Swein Godwineson attempted to return from exile in Flanders, perhaps not coincidentally just at the time that his former ally King Gruffydd of Gwynedd was raiding with an Irish Viking fleet in the Severn estuary (part of Svein's former earldom). Landing with seven ships at Bosham, Sussex, Swein travelled to see the king, hoping for pardon. The king's council was divided, however, with his brother Harold and cousin Beorn Estrithsson (both of whom had received part of Swein's forfeited earldom) vehemently opposing Swein's restoration, and so the king sent him back into exile.¹¹³ But the failure of such bids tended to result in heightened violence. In Swein's case, he promptly seized then murdered Beorn, for which act of treachery he was branded a *nithing* and an outlaw.¹¹⁴

More dangerous was the reaction of Tostig Godwineson in 1066. Expelled from the earldom of Northumbria in 1065, he returned the following year from exile in Flanders and launched raids on the south coast of England, clearly as a prelude to demanding restoration by his brother Harold, who was now king, and whom Tostig blamed for failing to support him in the crisis of 1065.¹¹⁵ Harold, however, was either unable or unwilling to find Tostig a new earldom, and as a result Tostig threw in his lot with the Norwegian king Harald Hardraada. Their attempted invasion of England met its bloody end at the great battle of Stamford Bridge in Yorkshire, where both Tostig and Hardraada perished at the hands of King Harold's victorious army. Yet as the *Vita Edwardi* lamented, their fraternal strife proved catastrophic to both, and to the kingdom, for it greatly aided the success of William's invasion and triumph at Hastings.¹¹⁶ Tostig's actions in 1066 stand apart as the one rebellion between 1042 and 1066 whose aim was the deposition of the king, but it seems clear that this was an act of desperation, and that initially at least he had hoped to replicate the success of his family's *revanche* in 1052, or the successful restorations of Earl Aelfgar.

Taken together, these considerations equally help explain the absence of violent punitive measures such as execution or mutilation taken against dissident nobles or their supporters by the king between 1042 and 1066. In practical terms, Edward's power to express the *ira regis* through such sentences was constrained by the power of the great earls. To this may perhaps be added a further cultural dimension, for Edward – whose mother Emma was Norman (and the sister of Duke Richard II) – had been raised as an exile in Normandy.¹¹⁷ There, he undoubtedly witnessed the norms of more restrained interaction between the ducal rulers and their rebellious kinsmen and magnates.¹¹⁸ Although rebellion was a recurrent feature of Norman politics, the duke rarely if ever punished dissident lords by execution or mutilation, complying with wider trends in France which had come to regard such conduct as barbarous, and instead employed banishment, forfeiture and imprisonment.¹¹⁹ Even when faced by attempts at his overthrow, as occurred with the rebellions of Guy of Burgundy in 1047 and of William of Arques in 1053, Duke

William only exiled his turbulent kinsmen.¹²⁰ Edward may well have assimilated such values, and in this context it is important to remember that his reign saw sustained political and cultural contact with Normandy, probably including the consideration of Duke William as a candidate for the succession to the English throne.¹²¹

As his orders in 1051 to lay waste Kent indicate, King Edward was no less aware of the methods used by his royal English predecessors to express the *ira regis*, yet he did not imitate their resort to executions, blindings or other violent measures against insurgents. If this in part may have reflected his comparative political weakness in relation to the great magnates, here again the limited aims of the revolts he faced must also be seen as a key factor in the propensity to accept a negotiated settlement and restoration. The pattern of an exiled nobleman raising a fleet or mustering allies, then deploying limited acts of warfare to attempt to force negotiation and obtain political rehabilitation, may not have been novel before 1042, yet its occurrence intensified during the Confessor's reign; its very recurrence may have helped to shape both the strategies and expectations of dissidents and the king's likely reactions. Harold's leading role as earl of Wessex in the peaceful resolution of the revolts of 1055 and 1065 strongly suggests that such a trend would have continued into his kingship, had it not been cut short by the catastrophe of the Norman invasion. It was no small irony that the one conflict he had not been able to resolve, that with his brother Tostig, helped bring about his downfall and that of the kingdom.¹²² While it is undoubtedly true that 'after the Conquest political *mores* in England came to be distinctly more chivalrous than they had been before 1066',¹²³ it was the reign of Edward the Confessor which marked a crucial moment in the transformation of rulers' conduct towards political opponents.

Notes

1. J. Gillingham, '1066 and the Introduction of Chivalry into England', *Law and Government in Medieval England and Normandy*, ed. J. Hudson and G. Garnett (Cambridge, 1994), 31–55; M. Strickland, 'Slaughter, Slavery or Ransom? The Impact of the Conquest on Conduct in Warfare', *England in the Eleventh Century*, ed. C. Hicks (Stamford, 1992), 41–60; idem., 'Killing or Clemency? Changing Attitudes to Conduct in War in Eleventh and Twelfth-Century Britain and France', *Krieg im Mittelalter*, ed. H.-H. Kortüm (Academie Verlag, Berlin, 2001), 93–122; D. Wyatt, *Slaves and Warriors in Medieval Britain and Ireland, 800–1200* (Leiden, 2009); and see also J. Gillingham, 'Christian Warriors and the Enslavement of Fellow Christians', *Chevalerie et christianisme au XIIe et XIIIe siècles*, ed. M. Aurell and C. Girbea (Rennes, 2011), 237–56; idem., 'Women, Children and the Profits of War', *Gender and Historiography: Studies in the Earlier Middle Ages in Honour of Pauline Stafford*, ed. J. L. Nelson, S. Reynolds and S. Johns (London, 2012), 61–74.
2. Gillingham, '1066 and the Introduction of Chivalry', 31–55; J. Gillingham, 'Killing and Mutilating Political Enemies in the British Isles from the Late Twelfth to the Fourteenth Century: a Comparative Study', *Britain and Ireland, 900–1300. Insular Responses to Medieval European Change*, ed. B. Smith (Cambridge, 1999), 114–34.
3. M. J. Strickland, *War and Chivalry. The Conduct and Perception of War in England and Normandy, 1066–1217* (Cambridge, 1996), 230–47.
4. Gillingham, 'Killing and Mutilating Political Enemies', 114.
5. F. Barlow, *Edward the Confessor* (London, 1970); idem., *The Godwins. The Rise and Fall of a Noble Dynasty* (Harlow, 2002); E. Mason, *The House of Godwine. The History of a Dynasty*

- (London, 2004); and see now T. Licence, *Edward the Confessor* (New Haven and London, 2020), an important new study which appeared after this paper was completed.
6. For Aelfgar and the probable context of his revolts see A. Williams, 'Ælfgar, earl of Mercia (d. 1062?)', *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*; S. Baxter, 'MS C of the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle and the Politics of Mid-Eleventh-Century England', *English Historical Review*, 122 (2007), 1189–1227; idem., *The Earls of Mercia: Lordship and Power in late Anglo-Saxon England* (Oxford, 2007).
 7. *The Anglo-Saxon Chronicle. A Collaborative Edition*, vol. 5, MS C, ed. K. O'Brien O'Keefe (Cambridge, 2001); ibid., vol 6, MS D, ed. G. P. Cubbin (Cambridge, 1996), and ibid., vol 7 MS E, ed. S. Irvine (Cambridge, 2004), *sub anno* 1055. Translations of the *Anglo-Saxon Chronicle* (hereafter ASC) are taken from *English Historical Documents, I, c.500-1042*, ed. D. Whitelock (2nd edn., London, 1979), and *English Historical Documents, II, 1042-1189*, ed. D. C. Douglas and G. W. Greenway (London, 1981). For what little is known of the context of the revolt, Barlow, *Edward the Confessor*, 193–7; Mason, *The House of Godwine*, 89–91; K. Maund, 'The Welsh Alliances of Earl Aelfgar of Mercia and his family in the mid-eleventh century', *Anglo-Norman Studies*, 11 (1988), 181–90; and M. J. Strickland, 'Military Technology and Political Resistance: Castles, Fleets and the Changing Face of Comital Rebellion in England and Normandy, c. 1026-1087', in *The Making of Europe: Essays in Honour of Robert Bartlett*, ed. J. Hudson and S. Crumplin (Brill: Leiden and Boston, 2016), 145–183, which explores the nature of Aelfgar's revolts more fully.
 8. ASC, D, 1058; Barlow, *Edward the Confessor*, pp 206–10; Mason, *The House of Godwine*, 93–4.
 9. Gillingham, 'Introduction of Chivalry', 38–40.
 10. ASC, C, D, E, 1065; B. Wilkinson, 'Northumbrian Separatism in 1065 and 1066', *Bulletin of the John Rylands Library*, 23 (1939), 504–26; Mason, *The House of Godwine*, 123–30.
 11. See *The Anglo-Saxon Chronicles*, tr. M. J. Swanton (revised edn., London, 2000), pp. xi–xxxv; and P. Stafford, 'The Making of Chronicles and the Making of England: the *Anglo-Saxon Chronicles* after Alfred', *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, 27 (2017), 65–86.
 12. Manuscript 'C' (composed from the 1040s in the West Midlands) reflects a marked sympathy to the earls of Mercia and hostility to the Godwines; 'E' (based on a version compiled at Canterbury) is notably favourable to Godwine; while manuscript 'D' (possibly written at Worcester or York) maintains a more neutral stance. For more details, see *English Historical Documents, II*, 103–104; Baxter, 'MS C of the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle', 1189-1227; D. Bates, *William the Conqueror* (New Haven and London, 2016), 112–13.
 13. *The Chronicle of John of Worcester* (hereafter JW), ed. R. R. Darlington and P. McGurk, 3 vols (Oxford, 1995–).
 14. *The Life of King Edward who Rests at Westminster*, ed. F. Barlow (2nd edn., Oxford, 1992). As well as Barlow's extensive introduction to this text, see R. W. Southern, 'The First Life of Edward the Confessor', *English Historical Review*, 58 (1943), 385–400; E. K. Heningham, 'The Literary Unity, Date and Purpose of the Lady Edith's Book "The Life of King Edward who Rests in Westminster"', *Albion*, 7 (1975), 24–40; J. L. Grassi, 'The *Vita Aedwardi Regis* : The Hagiographer as Insider', *Anglo-Norman Studies*, 26 (2004), 87–102; and T. Licence, 'The Date and Authorship of the 'Vita Edwardi Regis'', *Anglo-Saxon England*, 44 (2015), 259–85. For Edith, see P. Stafford, *Queen Emma and Queen Edith. Queenship and Women's Power in Eleventh Century England* (Oxford, 2001); and *eadem*, 'Edith, Edward's Wife and Queen', in *Edward the Confessor. The Man and the Legend*, ed. R. Mortimer (Woodbridge, 2009), 119–38.
 15. Gillingham, 'Introduction of Chivalry', 38–9. For the political context of these acts of violence see S. D. Keynes, *The Diplomas of Aethelred 'the Unready', 978–1016* (Cambridge, 1980); R. Lavelle, *Aethelred II, King of the English, 978–1016* (Stroud, 2002); and L. Roach, *Aethelred the Unready* (New Haven and London, 2016).
 16. J. P. Gates, 'A Crowning Achievement: The Royal Execution and Damnation of Eadric Streona', *Heads Will Roll : Decapitation in the Medieval and Early Modern Imagination*, ed. L. Tracy and J. Massey (Leiden: Brill, 2012), 53–72; idem., 'The 'Worcester' Historians

- and Eadric Streona's Execution', *Capital and Corporal Punishment in Anglo-Saxon England*, ed. J. P. Gates and N. Marafioti (Woodbridge, 2014), 165–80.
17. S. Keynes, 'The Aethelings in Normandy', *Anglo-Norman Studies*, 13 (1991), 173–205.
 18. ASC, C, D, 1036; JW, II, .522–25
 19. For 'bootless' crimes, W. C. Brown, *Violence in Medieval Europe* (Harlow, 2011), 198–9.
 20. ASC, C, 1021, 1022. R. Abels, 'Thorkell the Tall [Porkill inn Hávi], earl of East Anglia (fl. 1009–1023), viking leader, magnate, and regent', *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*.
 21. ASC, C, 1022. An isolated earlier example of the use of naval forces by a dissident noble is the ravaging of the south coast by Wulfnoth Cild, possibly Godwine's father, in 1009. See ASC, C, 1009; JW, II, 460–1; Mason, *The House of Godwine*, 24–6.
 22. Thus, for example, the *Anglo-Saxon Chronicle* laconically records the exile of Earl Oslac in 975 on the accession of King Eadwig (ASC, C and D, 975), and of Ealdorman Aelfric in 985 (ASC, C, 985), but not the reasons.
 23. External enemies, however, notably leading Welsh opponents, continued to be treated with great ruthlessness; in 1053, King Edward was presented with the head of Rhys, brother of Gryffdd ap Llewelyn, king of Gwynedd, and in 1065 with that of Llewelyn himself (ASC, D, 1053 and 1065).
 24. ASC, D, 1044; JW, II, 540–41.
 25. See K. F. Meredith, *The Penalty of Banishment in Medieval France and England* (unpublished PhD thesis, University of Virginia, 1978), 258–317; and E. van Houts, 'The Vocabulary of Exile and Outlawry in the North Sea Area around the First Millennium', in *Exile in the Middle Ages*, ed. E. van Houts and L. Napran (Turnhout, 2014), 13–28.
 26. *Vita*, 36–7.
 27. Compare ASC, D 1051 to ASC, E, 1051.
 28. Brown, *Violence in Medieval Europe*, 197–99; J. Hudson, 'Faide, vengeance et violence en Angleterre (c.900-1200)', in *La Vengeance, 400-1200*, ed. D. Barthélemy, F. Bougard, and R. Le Jan (Rome, 2006), 71–98.
 29. J. Campbell, 'The Anglo-Saxon State: a Maximum View', in J. Campbell, *The Anglo-Saxon State* (London, 2000), 1–30.; P. Wormald, 'Giving God and King Their Due: Conflict and its Regulation in the Early English State', in *La Giustizia nell'alto medioevo (Secoli ix-xi)*. Settimane di studio del centro italiano di studi sull'alto medioevo, 44, 11–17 April 1996 (Spoleto, 1997), 549–90; and cf S. Baxter, 'The Limits of the Late Anglo-Saxon State', in *Der frühmittelalterliche Staat – europäische Perspektiven*, ed. W. Pohl and V. Weiser (Vienna, 2009), 503–514.
 30. P. Hyams, 'Feud and the State in Late Anglo-Saxon England', *Journal of British Studies* vol. 40 (2001), 1–43, at 43; idem, *Rancor and Reconciliation in Medieval England* (Ithaca, NY, and London, 2003), 71–110 for an important discussion of feud in pre-Conquest England, and especially pp.109, 98–101 for the relationship between royal power and the feud; and for a recent more sceptical view of the existence of feud in late Anglo-Saxon England see J. D. Niles, 'The Myth of the Feud in Anglo-Saxon England', *Journal of English and Germanic Philology* vol. 114 (2015), 163–200.
 31. T. Lambert, *Law and Order in Anglo-Saxon England* (Oxford, 2017), 183–90.
 32. Lambert, *Law and Order*, 35–9, 104–10, 181–3, 227–30, 350.
 33. JW, II, 598–9. John of Worcester adds that Queen Edith herself had a Northumbrian thegn, Gospatric, assassinated at the king's Christmas court 'on account of her brother Tostig' (JW, II, 598–9).
 34. For further discussion, see R. A. Fletcher, *Bloodfeud: Murder and Revenge in Anglo-Saxon England* (London, 2003); W. Kapelle, *The Norman Conquest of the North* (London, 1979), 14–49, 127, 134–7; Hyams, *Rancor and Reconciliation*, 75–6, 277–9.
 35. Hyams, *Rancor and Reconciliation*, 76–77.
 36. As, for example, in the case in Aethelred's reign of two brothers slain in a fight while defending one of their men accused of stealing a horse's bridle (Hyams, *Rancor and Reconciliation*, 268–9). The attack on Earl Uhtred, slain with forty of his men in an ambush on Cnut's orders in 1016, appears closer to a larger scale military encounter, while in 1073 or 1074,

- Waltheof sent 'a large band of young men (*multa juvenum manu*)' to slay the sons of Carl (Simeon of Durham, *Opera Omnia*, ed T. Arnold, 2 vols (London, 1882–1885), I, 218–19).
37. Simeon, *Opera*, I, p. 219; Hyams, *Rancor and Reconciliation*, p. 77; Fletcher, *Bloodfeud*, 121–22, 187–93.
 38. Simeon, *Opera*, II, 198, 209; Hyams, *Rancor and Reconciliation*, 270–71; Lambert, *Law and Order*, 184–8; and R. V. Coleman, 'Hamsocn: Its Meaning and Significance in Early English Law', *American Journal of Legal History*, 95 (1981), 95–110.
 39. Fletcher, *Bloodfeud*, p.189. Hyams, *Rancor and Reconciliation*, 270–7.
 40. D. Barthélemy, 'Feudal War in Tenth Century France', in *Vengeance in the Middle Ages: Emotion, Religion and Feud*, ed. P. R. Hyams and S. A. Throop (Farnham, 2010), 105–114; C. H. Haskins, *Norman Institutions* (Cambridge, Mass., 1918), 38, and for the *Consuetudines et Justicie* in which these ducal customs were later recorded, *ibid.* 282–3; Jean Yver, "L'interdiction de la guerre privée dans le très ancien droit normand," in *Travaux de la Semaine d'histoire du droit normand tenue à Guernesey du 26 au 30 mai 1927* (Caen, 1928), 307–47.
 41. Haskins, *Norman Institutions*, 38; D. Bates, *William the Conqueror* (London and New York, 2017), 51–4.
 42. A. Harding, *Medieval Law and the Foundations of the State* (Oxford, 2002), 79.
 43. ASC, D, 1051. For the context, J. H. Round, *Feudal England* (London, 1895), 308–19, 'Normans under Edward the Confessor'; Barlow, *Edward the Confessor*, 93–4.
 44. ASC, D, 1051; JW, II, 558–9, but here preferring the translation of the Worcester chronicle in *EHD*, II, 218. Eustace had married Edward's sister Godgifu.
 45. ASC, E, 1051. The Worcester chronicle plays up the excessive violence of Eustace's men, who 'slew many men and women with their swords and crushed their children and babies beneath their horses' hooves' (JW, II, 558–590).
 46. ASC, E, 1051. The fact that the count and his retinue felt the need to arm before entering Dover suggests there had been some earlier trouble, possible when they had first landed to see the king (Barlow, *The Godwins*, 57).
 47. ASC, D, 1051.
 48. ASC, E, 1051.
 49. ASC, D, 952 and 969.
 50. ASC, C, 986; Osborn, *Life of Dunstan*, in *Memorials of St Dunstan*, ed. W. Stubbs (Rolls Series, London, 1874, 117; and on the context for the ravaging of Rochester, for which Aethelred later made reparation, see Lavelle, *Aethelred II*, 46, and C. R. Cubitt, 'Archbishop Dunstan: a Prophet in Politics?', in *Myth, Rulership, Church and Charters: Essays in Honour of Nicholas Brooks*, ed. J. Barrow (Aldershot, 2008), 145–66.
 51. ASC, C, D, 1041; JW, II, 532–3, who reveals the scale was that of a military operation, undertaken by earls Leofric, Godwine, Siward, Hrani and Thored, 'and all the other English ealdormen and all most all his [the king's] housecarls' (*ibid.*).
 52. JW, II, 532–33.
 53. Harding, *Medieval Law* 79–81; and Lambert, *Law and Order*, 183–92, for a detailed survey of royal protections.
 54. For a detailed account of these developments, Barlow, *Edward the Confessor*, 73–109; *idem*, *The Godwins*, 47–68.
 55. *Vita*, 32–35.
 56. ASC, E, 1051.
 57. ASC, E, 1051; *Vita*, 34–5.
 58. ASC, D, 1051; and JW, II, pp. 560–1, noting that Godwine demanded the surrender of Eustace 'on threat of war'.
 59. JW, II, 558–59.
 60. ASC, D, 1051.
 61. ASC, D, 1051.
 62. JW, II, 560–61, makes Earl Leofric prominent among those seeking to avoid open conflict. It was probably at some stage in these proceedings that Edward obtained Godwine's son

- Wulfnoth, and his grandson Hakon, son of Swein Godwineson, as hostages, who he subsequently handed over to Duke William of Normandy in whose custody they were to remain. For the role of hostages, see A. J. Kosto, *Hostages in the Middle Ages* (Oxford, 2012).
63. ASC, D, 1051.
 64. ASC, D, 1051.
 65. ASC, E, 1051.
 66. *Vita*, 34–5. F. M. Stenton, *Anglo-Saxon England* (3rd edn., Oxford, 1971), 316–17. The law code of Aethelred II of 1008 stated that a man charged with plotting against the king's life, for which the penalty was death, could clear himself 'by the three-fold ordeal' – a more exacting form of the normal ordeal by hot iron or water – or by an oath to the value of the king's wergild (or man-price): that is he had to procure oath helpers whose wergilds (assessed by rank), when added together, equalled that of the king (V Aethelred, c.30, in *English Historical Documents*, I, 446); and F. Pollock and F. W. Maitland, *The History of the English Law before the time of Edward I* (2nd edn., Cambridge, 1911), 52, for the 'three-fold ordeal'. In Cnut's law code of 1020–1023, however, the oath is removed and only the three-fold ordeal permitted (II Cnut, c. 57).
 67. JW, II, 530–533.
 68. *Vita*, 34–5. In 1040, Godwine had sought to win Harthanut's favour with a gift of a magnificent longship with a fully armed crew, and apparently made a similar gift to Edward on his accession (JW, II, 530–33; *Vita*, 20–21).
 69. G. Althoff, *Spielregeln der Politik im Mittelalter: Kommunikation in Frieden und Fehde* (Darmstadt, 1997); idem, *Rules and Rituals in Medieval Power Games: a German Perspective* (Leiden, 2019); G. Koziol, *Begging Pardon and Favor. Ritual and Political Order in Early Medieval France* (Cornell, 1992); and see Brown, *Violence in Medieval Europe*, 135–64.
 70. See G. Althoff, 'Ira Regis: Prolegomena to a History of Royal Anger', in *Anger's Past. The Social Uses of an Emotion in the Middle Ages*, ed. B. Rosenwein (Ithaca, NY, 1998), 59–74.
 71. ASC, E, 1051.
 72. *Vita*, 34–7.
 73. ASC, D, 1051.
 74. ASC, C, D, E, 1051. Baldwin's daughter Judith had married Tostig.
 75. According to ASC, D, 1051, they took 'the ship which Earl Swein had equipped and provisioned for himself, ready at Bristol.
 76. ASC, D and E, 1051; JW, II, 562–63; *Vita*, 36–7.
 77. *Vita*, 36–7. The *Vita* awkwardly offered some exoneration of Edward by noting that he refused Archbishop Robert's urging to divorce Edith and that the king had supposedly only intended her to remain cloistered 'to await the subsidence of the storms over the kingdom'.
 78. ASC, C, D, E, 1043. The *Translation of St Mildred* noted that Emma was judged guilty of treason to her son and the kingdom (T. D. Hardy, *Descriptive Catalogue of Materials relating to the History of Great Britain and Ireland to the End of the Reign of Henry VII*, 3 vols (London, 1862–1871), I, 381; *English Historical Documents*, II, 105 n.7).
 79. ASC, D, 1051.
 80. The decision to split up the family between refuges in Flanders and Ireland suggests that beyond the immediate considerations of safety, they may have already conceived of an attempt to gather forces as widely as possible for a subsequent campaign on two fronts. Harold's fleet was probably supplied by the Hiberno-Norse of Dublin.
 81. ASC, C, D, 1052. He may have targeted the lands of Odda, Edward's new earl of these counties, but won a sizeable engagement against local forces, who suffered heavy casualties.
 82. ASC, C, 1052.
 83. ASC, E, 1052.
 84. ASC, D, 1052.
 85. *Vita*, 40–1, modifying Barlow's translation of 'receive him forcibly'.
 86. *Vita*, 40–1.
 87. *Vita*, 40–1.

88. JW, II, 570–71.
89. ASC, C, D, 1052; JW, II, 568–69.
90. *Vita*, 42–3.
91. *Vita*, 42–3.
92. ASC, D, 1051.
93. *Vita*, 42–5.
94. *Ibid.*, 44–5.
95. H. Vollrath, ‘The Kiss of Peace’, *Peace Treaties and International Law in European History. From the Late Middle Ages to World War One*, ed. R. Lesaffer (Cambridge, 2004), 162–83.
96. ASC, E, 1052; *Vita*, 44–45.
97. Maund, ‘The Welsh Alliances of Earl Aelfgar of Mercia’, 181–90; and for Baldwin V of Flanders, P. Grierson, ‘The Relations between England and Flanders before the Norman Conquest’, *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, 4th series, 23 (1941), 72–6; E. Oksanen, *Flanders and the Anglo-Norman World, 1066–1216* (Cambridge, 2012), 11–14; K. De Vries, ‘Count Baldwin V of Flanders: Broker of Eleventh-Century power’, *Military Cultures and Martial Enterprises in the Middle Ages*, ed. J. D. Hosler and S. Isaac (Woodbridge, 2020), 81–98.
98. Thus ASC, E, 1052, noted that at London ‘the men who were with the earl were so incensed against the king and against his men that the earl himself had difficulty in calming those men’.
99. Hence, for instance, in 1049, King Edward’s mustering of the royal fleet may have deterred an attack by the exiled earl Osgod Clapa, who commanded a significant naval force (estimated at 29 or 39 ships) and he returned to Denmark (ASC, C and D, 1049; JW, II, 550–51).
100. For further discussion, see Strickland, ‘Military Technology and Political Resistance’, 145–83.
101. ASC, C, 1055; JW, II, 578–79.
102. *Vita*, 78–9.
103. *Vita*, 78–81.
104. *Vita*, 78–9.
105. ASC, E, 1051.
106. *Vita*, 42–3.
107. *Vita*, 45–7. The analogy equally allowed oblique criticism of the king by implying that Edward was like Saul, who fell from God’s favour through misdeeds and, in his periodic insanity, persecuted his righteous servant David.
108. ASC, D, 1051.
109. ASC, C, D, 1052.
110. *Vita*, 42–3, 78–81.
111. ASC, D, E, 1065.
112. ASC, C, D, 1049.
113. ASC, C, D, E, 1049.
114. ASC, C, 1049; JW, II, 550–51, 570–71.
115. The *Vita*, 78–81, recorded, though it professed to disbelieve it, Tostig’s public accusation that Harold had been instigator of the rising against him. Harold cleared himself with oaths, and historians have inclined to regard the charge as untrue. For details of Tostig’s actions in 1066 see Mason, *The House of Godwine*, 142–3, 147–52; K. De Vries, ‘The Conflict between Harold and Tostig Godwinson’, *Scintilla*, 1 (1984) 48–62; M. W. Campbell, ‘Note sur les déplacements de Tostig Godwinson en 1066’, *Annales de Normandie*, 22 (1972) 3–9.
116. *Vita*, 58–61, 84–89.
117. Barlow, *Edward the Confessor*, 34–52; Keynes, ‘The Aethelings in Normandy’, 173–205.
118. For examples see M. J. Strickland, ‘Reconciliation ou humiliation? La suppression de la rébellion aristocratique dans les royaumes anglo-normand et angevin’, *La contestation du pouvoir en Normandie (Xe–XVIIIe siècles)*, ed. C. Bougy and A-S. Poirey (Université de

- Basse Normandie, Caen, 2007), 65–78 ; and idem, ‘Military Technology and Political Resistance’, 153–55.
119. Gillingham, ‘The Introduction of Chivalry’, 37–8; and for banishment, see L. Musset, ‘Autour des modalités juridiques de l’expansion normande au XIe siècle: le droit d’exil’, in *Autour du pouvoir ducal normand, Xe-XIIe siècles*, ed. L. Musset, J.-M. Bouvris and J.-M. Maillefer (Caen, 1985), 45–59.
120. Strickland, ‘Military Technology and Political Resistance’, 155–60.
121. On this much debated issue see S. Baxter, ‘Edward the Confessor and the Succession Question’, in *Edward the Confessor. The Man and the Legend*, 77–118; and T. Licence, ‘Edward the Confessor and the Succession Question: A Fresh Look at the Sources’, *Anglo-Norman Studies*, 39 (2017), 113–28.
122. As the *Vita*, 58–61, lamented at length in verse.
123. Gillingham, ‘Introduction of Chivalry’, 33–4.

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank colleagues at the Borchard Foundation symposia and the editors for their valuable input to this paper. I am also grateful to Hans Jacob Orning and John Hudson for their helpful comments.

Disclosure Statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Bibliography

- The Anglo-Saxon Chronicles*, trans. Michael. J. Swanton (Revised edn. London: Phoenix, 2000).
- Abels, Richard. “Thorkell the Tall [Þorkill inn Hávi], earl of East Anglia (fl. 1009–1023), viking leader, magnate, and regent”, *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*.
- Althoff, Gerd. *Spielregeln der Politik im Mittelalter: Kommunikation in Frieden und Fehde*. Darmstadt: Primus Verlag, 1997.
- Althoff, Gerd. “Ira Regis: Prolegomena to a History of Royal Anger.” In *Anger’s Past. The Social Uses of an Emotion in the Middle Ages*, edited by Barbarah Rosenwein, 59–74. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998.
- Althoff, Gerd. *Rules and Rituals in Medieval Power Games: A German Perspective*. Leiden: Brill, 2019.
- Simeon of Durham, Opera Omnia*, ed Thomas Arnold, 2 vols. London: Longman, 1882-1885.
- Barlow, Frank. *Edward the Confessor*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997.
- Barlow, Frank. *The Godwins. The Rise and Fall of a Noble Dynasty*. Harlow: Longman, 2002.
- Barthélemy, Dominique. “Feudal War in Tenth Century France.” In *Vengeance in the Middle Ages: Emotion, Religion and Feud*, edited by Susanna A. Throop and Paul R. Hyams, 105–114. Farnham: Ashgate, 2010.
- Bates, David. *William the Conqueror*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2016.
- Baxter, Stephen. *The Earls of Mercia: Lordship and Power in late Anglo-Saxon England*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007.
- Baxter, Stephen. “MS C of the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle and the Politics of Mid-Eleventh-Century England.” *English Historical Review* 122 (2007): 1189–1227.
- Baxter, Stephen. “The Limits of the Late Anglo-Saxon State.” In *Der frühmittelalterliche Staat – europäische Perspektiven*, edited by Walter Pohl and Veronika Weiser, 503–514. Vienna: Verlag der österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 2009.

- Baxter, Stephen. "Edward the Confessor and the Succession Question." In *Edward the Confessor. The Man and the Legend*, edited by Richard Mortimer, 77–118. Woodbridge, Suffolk: Boydell Press, 2009.
- Brown, Warren C. *Violence in Medieval Europe*. Harlow: Longman, 2011.
- Campbell, Miles W. "Note sur les déplacements de Tostig Godwinson en 1066." *Annales de Normandie* 22 (1972): 3–9.
- Campbell, James. "The Anglo-Saxon State: A Maximum View." In *The Anglo-Saxon State*, edited by James Campbell, 1–30. London, 2000.
- Coleman, Rebecca V. "Hamsocn: Its Meaning and Significance in Early English Law." *American Journal of Legal History* 95 (1981): 95–110.
- The Anglo-Saxon Chronicle. A Collaborative Edition, vol. 6, MS D*, ed. G. P. Cubbin. Cambridge: Brewer, 1996.
- Cubitt, Catherine R. "Archbishop Dunstan: A Prophet in Politics?" In *Myth, Rulership, Church and Charters: Essays in Honour of Nicholas Brooks*, edited by Julia Barrow and Andrew Wareham, 145–166. Aldershot: Ashgate, 2008.
- The Chronicle of John of Worcester*, ed. Reginald R. Darlington and Patrick McGurk, 3 vols, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995
- De Vries, Kelly. "The Conflict between Harold and Tostig Godwinson." *Scintilla* 1 (1984): 48–62.
- De Vries, Kelly. "Count Baldwin V of Flanders: Broker of Eleventh-Century power." In *Military Cultures and Martial Enterprises in the Middle Ages*, edited by John D. Hosler and Stephen Isaac, 81–98. Woodbridge: Boydell, 2020.
- English Historical Documents, II, 1042-1189*, ed. David C. Douglas and George W. Greenway. 2nd edn. London: Routledge, 1981.
- Fletcher, Richard A. *Bloodfeud: Murder and Revenge in Anglo-Saxon England*. London: Penguin, 2003.
- Gates, Jay P. "A Crowning Achievement: The Royal Execution and Damnation of Eadric Streona." In *Heads Will Roll : Decapitation in the Medieval and Early Modern Imagination*, edited by Larissa Tracy and Jeff Massey, 53–72. Leiden: Brill, 2012.
- Gates, Jay P. "The 'Worcester' Historians and Eadric Streona's Execution." In *Capital and Corporal Punishment in Anglo-Saxon England*, edited by Jay P. Gates and Nicole Marafioti, 165–180. Woodbridge: Boydell, 2014.
- Gillingham, John B. "1066 and the Introduction of Chivalry into England." In *Law and Government in Medieval England and Normandy*, edited by John Hudson and George Garnett, 31–55. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994.
- Gillingham, John B. "Killing and Mutilating Political Enemies in the British Isles from the Late Twelfth to the Fourteenth Century: A Comparative Study." In *Britain and Ireland, 900-1300. Insular Responses to Medieval European Change*, edited by Brendan Smith, 114–134. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999.
- Gillingham, John B. "Christian Warriors and the Enslavement of Fellow Christians." In *Chevalerie et christianisme au XIIe et XIIIe siècles*, edited by Martin Aurell and Catalina Girbea, 237–256. Rennes: Presses Universitaires de Rennes, 2011.
- Gillingham, John B. "Women, Children and the Profits of War." In *Gender and Historiography: Studies in the Earlier Middle Ages in Honour of Pauline Stafford*, edited by Janet L. Nelson, Susan Reynolds, and Susan Johns, 61–74. London: University of London Press, 2012.
- Grassi, John L. "The Vita Aedwardi Regis: The Hagiographer as Insider." *Anglo-Norman Studies* 26 (2004): 87–102.
- Grierson, Philip. "The Relations Between England and Flanders Before the Norman Conquest." *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society* 23 (1941): 71–112. 4th series.
- Harding, Alan. *Medieval Law and the Foundations of the State*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002.
- Hardy, Thomas D. *Descriptive Catalogue of Materials relating to the History of Great Britain and Ireland to the End of the Reign of Henry VII*, 3 vols. London: Longman, Green, Longman, and Roberts, 1862-1871.
- Haskins, Charles H. *Norman Institutions*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1918.

- Heningham, Eleanor K. "The Literary Unity, Date and Purpose of the Lady Edith's Book 'The Life of King Edward who Rests in Westminster'." *Albion* 7 (1975): 24–40.
- Hudson, John. "Faide, vengeance et violence en Angleterre (c.900-1200)." In *La Vengeance, 400–1200*, edited by Dominique Barthélemy, François Bougard, and Regine Le Jan, 71–98. Rome: École française de Rome, 2006.
- Hyams, Paul. "Feud and the State in Late Anglo-Saxon England." *Journal of British Studies* 40 (2001): 1–43.
- Hyams, Paul. *Rancor and Reconciliation in Medieval England*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003.
- The Anglo-Saxon Chronicle. A Collaborative Edition, vol. 7 MS E*, ed. Susan Irvine. Cambridge: Brewer, 2004.
- Kapelle, William. *The Norman Conquest of the North: The Region and its Transformation, 1000–1135*. London: Croome Helm, 1979.
- Keynes, Simon D. *The Diplomas of Aethelred 'The Unready', 978-1016*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980.
- Keynes, Simon D. "The Aethelings in Normandy." *Anglo-Norman Studies* 13 (1991): 173–205.
- Kosto, Adam J. *Hostages in the Middle Ages*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012.
- Kozioł, Geoffrey. *Begging Pardon and Favor. Ritual and Political Order in Early Medieval France*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992.
- Lambert, Tom. *Law and Order in Anglo-Saxon England*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017.
- Lavelle, Ryan. *The Life of King Edward Who Rests at Westminster*. 2nd edn. ed. Frank Barlow. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992.
- Lavelle, Ryan. *Athelred II, King of the English, 978-1016*. Stroud: The History Press, 2002.
- Licence, Tom. "The Date and Authorship of the 'Vita Edwardi Regis'." *Anglo-Saxon England* 44 (2015): 259–285.
- Licence, Tom. "Edward the Confessor and the Succession Question: A Fresh Look at the Sources." *Anglo-Norman Studies* 39 (2017): 113–128.
- Licence, Tom. *Edward the Confessor: Last of the Royal Blood*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2020.
- Mason, Emma. *The House of Godwine. The History of a Dynasty*. London: Hambledon Continuum, 2004.
- Maud, Karen. "The Welsh Alliances of Earl Aelfgar of Mercia and His Family in the Mid-Eleventh Century." *Anglo-Norman Studies* 11 (1988): 181–190.
- Meredith, Kenneth F. "The Penalty of Banishment in Medieval France and England." Unpublished PhD thesis, University of Virginia, 1978.
- Musset, Lucien. "Autour des modalités juridiques de l'expansion normande au XI^e siècle: le droit d'exil." In *Autour du pouvoir ducal normand, Xe-XIII^e siècles*, edited by Lucien Musset, Jean-Michelle Bouvris, and Jean-Marie Maillefer, 45–59. Caen: Annales de Normandie, 1985.
- Niles, John D. "The Myth of the Feud in Anglo-Saxon England." *Journal of English and Germanic Philology* 114 (2015): 163–200.
- The Anglo-Saxon Chronicle. A Collaborative Edition, vol. 5, MS C*, ed. Katherine O'Brien O'Keefe. Cambridge: Brewer, 2001.
- Oksanen, Eljas. *Flanders and the Anglo-Norman World, 1066-1216*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012.
- Osborn. "Life of Dunstan." In *Memorials of St Dunstan*, edited by William Stubbs. London: Longman, 1874.
- Pollock, Frederick, and Frederic W. Maitland. *The History of the English Law Before the Time of Edward I*. 2nd edn. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1898.
- Roach, Levi. *Athelred the Unready*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2016.
- Round, John H. *Feudal England: Historical Studies on the XIth and XIIth Centuries*. London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co., 1895.
- Southern, Richard W. "The First Life of Edward the Confessor." *English Historical Review* 58 (1943): 385–400.

- Stafford, Pauline. *Queen Emma and Queen Edith. Queenship and Women's Power in Eleventh Century England*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001.
- Stafford, Pauline. "Edith, Edward's Wife and Queen." In *Edward the Confessor. The Man and the Legend*, edited by Richard Mortimer, 119–138. Woodbridge: Boydell, 2009.
- Stafford, Pauline. "The Making of Chronicles and the Making of England: The Anglo-Saxon Chronicles after Alfred." *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society* 27 (2017): 65–86.
- Strickland, Matthew J. "Slaughter, Slavery or Ransom? The Impact of the Conquest on Conduct in Warfare." In *England in the Eleventh Century: Proceedings of the 1990 Harlaxton Symposium*, edited by Carola Hicks, 41–60. Stamford: Paul Watkins, 1992.
- Strickland, Matthew J. *War and Chivalry. The Conduct and Perception of War in England and Normandy, 1066-1217*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.
- Strickland, Matthew J. "Killing or Clemency? Changing Attitudes to Conduct in War in Eleventh and Twelfth-Century Britain and France." In *Krieg im Mittelalter*, edited by Hans-Henning Kortüm, 93–122. Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2001.
- Strickland, Matthew J. "Reconciliation ou humiliation? La suppression de la rébellion aristocratique dans les royaumes anglo-normand et angevin." In *La contestation du pouvoir en Normandie (Xe-XVIIIe siècles)*, edited by Catherine Bougy and Anne-Sophie Poirey, 65–78. Caen: Université de Basse Normandie, 2007.
- Strickland, Matthew J. "Military Technology and Political Resistance: Castles, Fleets and the Changing Face of Comital Rebellion in England and Normandy, c. 1026-1087." In *'The Making of Europe': Essays in Honour of Robert Bartlett*, edited by John Hudson and Sally Crumplin, 145–183. Leiden: Brill, 2016.
- van Houts, Elizabeth M. C. "The Vocabulary of Exile and Outlawry in the North Sea Area Around the First Millennium." In *Exile in the Middle Ages*, edited by Elizabeth van Houts and Laura Napran, 13–28. Turnhout: Brepols, 2014.
- Vollrath, Hanna. "The Kiss of Peace." In *Peace Treaties and International Law in European History. From the Late Middle Ages to World War One*, edited by Randall Lesaffer, 162–183. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004.
- English Historical Documents, I, c.500-1042*, ed. Dorothy Whitelock. London: Eyre Methuen, 1979.
- Wilkinson, Bertie. "Northumbrian Separatism in 1065 and 1066." *Bulletin of the John Rylands Library* 23 (1939): 504–526.
- Williams, Ann. "Alfgar, earl of Mercia (d. 1062?)" *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*.
- Wormald, C. Patrick. "Giving God and King Their Due: Conflict and its Regulation in the Early English State." In *La Giustizia nell'alto medioevo (Secoli ix-xi). Settimane di studio del centro Italiano di studi sull'alto medioevo*, 44, 11-17 April 1996, 549-90. Spoleto: Presso la Sede del Centro, 1997.
- Wyatt, David. *Slaves and Warriors in Medieval Britain and Ireland, 800-1200*. Leiden: Brill, 2009.
- Yver, Jean. "L'interdiction de la guerre privée dans le très ancien droit normand." In *Travaux de la Semaine d'histoire du droit normand tenue à Guernesey du 26 au 30 mai 1927*, edited by Havilland De Sausmarez and Henry Nézard, 307–347. Caen: A. Olivier, 1928.