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The Question of Pakistan's National Identity: A Study of Islamist and Secularist Narratives

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Statement of Authentication

To the best of my knowledge and belief, the work presented in this thesis is original except as acknowledged in the text. I hereby declare that I have not submitted this material, either in full or in part, for a degree at this or any other institution.

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Dedication

To my loving parents

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List of Abbreviations

AIML	All-India Muslim League
BJP	Bharatiya Janata Party
EIC	East India Company
FATA	Federally Administered Tribal Areas
INC	Indian National Congress
JUH	Jamiat Ulema-i-Hind
JUI	Jamiat-i-Ulema-i-Islam
KPK	Khyber Pakhtunkhawa
MQM	Muhajir Qaumi Movement/Muttahida Qaumi Movement
NWFP	North-West Frontier Province
ONE-UNIT	Administrative Unification of Four Provinces in West Pakistan (1955)
PML-N	Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz)
PPP	Pakistan People's Party
PTI	Pakistan Tehrik-i-Insaaf
UP	United Provinces

Abstract

Pakistan has been grappling with the question of its national identity since its establishment in August 1947. Pakistan was created as a result of an immense political movement based on the two-nation theory. Since its creation, the question of Pakistan's future national identity has been the central debate in the country. Following the Objectives Resolution in 1949, Pakistan's National Assembly established that sovereignty belongs to God and that the principles of democracy, equality, tolerance, freedom, and social justice shall be fully observed as "enunciated by Islam". Moreover, Muslims shall be enabled to order their lives individually and collectively according to the Holy Qur'an and the Sunna. Minority groups can profess and practise their religions and develop their cultures freely.

Further, Pakistan became an 'Islamic Republic' on 23 March 1956, 16 years after the Lahore Resolution in 1940 called for a sovereign, independent homeland for Indian Muslims. However, the notion of an 'Islamic Republic' has created a debate between Islamists and secularists regarding what Pakistan should be and what it actually is. Therefore, this research aims to identify why Pakistan was created, what national identity means for Pakistan's national discourse, and what challenges are associated with Pakistan's national identity formation.

This thesis argues that Pakistan's national identity is Islamic and not secular. This is based on three facts: subcontinental Muslim Nationalism; Jinnah's Islamic national paradigm; and Pakistan's Islamic-based constitution. In an attempt to develop this argument, this study addresses the main research question: *"How do Islamists and secularists define and interpret Pakistan's national identity in light of Pakistan's colonial history and the events surrounding its creation?"*. This study uses a qualitative approach employing semi-structured interviews and secondary data from official documents and Jinnah's speeches to investigate the research

problem, which is the crisis of Pakistan's national identity. This qualitative research approach helps to understand Muslim nationalism in the subcontinent and the reason for partition, particularly Pakistan's national identity. This research finds that Pakistan's national identity is predominantly Islamic and not secular. The findings of this study also clarify that Islam has been the definitive source of Pakistan's national identity and legitimacy since the independence movement and its creation in August 1947. All of Pakistan's constitutions (1958, 1962, and 1973) purify Pakistan's Islamic identity. However, at the same time, Pakistan faces disorientation regarding its national identity and a persistent conflict with multiple ethnic identities. For example, the separation of East Pakistan (Bangladesh) was the direct outcome of Bengali nationalism that was boosted in the 1960s. This research finds that all of these identity crises have resulted from the dysfunction of the constitution and have polarised politics. However, all major stakeholders of Pakistan (Islamists and secularists) agree on the 1973 constitution. Therefore, the solution to Pakistan's national identity issue lies in implementing the constitution in its true spirit.

Key words: Nationalism, Nation, National Identity, Ethnicity, Two-nation Theory, Islamists, Secularists, Democracy, Pakistan.

Chapter 1: Introduction

1.1 Introduction

Ideological confusion and the question of identity have followed Pakistan since its creation in 1947. Many of Pakistan's domestic problems (e.g. poor governance, economic woes, and political instability) and foreign relations problems arose amid this confusion. Did Muhammad Ali Jinnah, the founder of Pakistan, want a secular state or an 'Islamic state' based on Islamic principles where other minorities also have equal rights? After decades of independence from the British Raj, Pakistan is facing an identity crisis. Islamists[1] claim that Jinnah and his All-India Muslim League (AIML) party wanted an Islamic state—a country for subcontinent Muslims with a system based on Islamic principles. However, secularists[2] believe Pakistan to be a secular state, and Jinnah favoured Pakistan as a secular state. This debate on whether Pakistan should have a secular or Islamic identity has intensified over the past several years. Primarily, both Islamists and secularists use Jinnah's speeches to support their narratives. During Pakistan's early years of independence, a fierce debate about national identity and the state's nature kept both actors engaged, and the country could not chart a viable course ahead (Binder, 1961). However, in 1949, Islamists had their most tremendous success when they successfully lobbied for and passed the Objective Resolution, a 'supra-

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[1] "The 'Islamists' refer to those who associate themselves with the revivalist ideology of Mawdudi and the political practice based on or inspired by him within the geographical boundaries of Pakistan" (Amin, 2010, p. 14).

[2] 'Secularists' refer to those who associate themselves with secularism as a political ideology. As scholars mentioned, "The concept of 'the secular' today is part of a doctrine called secularism" (Asad, 2003, p. 192). "Secularist concedes that religious beliefs and sentiments might be acceptable at a personal and private level, but insists that organized religion, being founded on authority and constraint, has always posed a danger to the freedom of the self as well as to the freedom of others" (Asad, 2003, p. 186).

constitutional' resolution prohibiting the adoption of every law contradictory to the Qur'an and Sunnah.

Decolonisation was the leading force in Africa, Asia, and other parts of the world in the aftermath of WWII, and nationalism at that time was seen as a universal optimal solution for enabling former colonial states to reclaim their history, values, and identities. However, the identity crisis arose because of the post-colonial circumstances and the difficult conditions that newly independent nations and states encountered in their search for and construction of national identity. Primarily, identity comprises two components: identification and recognition, and a sense of belonging. Initially, the question of identity was a matter of classical thought and rationality in psychology. Later, Erikson argued that identity is the explicit or undefined response to the question, "Who am I?" According to Erikson's doctrine of identity, identity includes individual identity and social and collective identity. Thus, identity is primarily defined as the distinction, character, and sense of belonging seen in interpersonal interactions and connections between groups (Erikson, 1968).

Further, identity arises from the self-views that emerge from the reflexive activity of self-categorisation or identification in terms of membership in particular groups or roles (Stets and Burke, 2000). Another scholar defined identity as "the way individuals and groups define themselves and are defined by others on the basis of race, ethnicity, religion, language, and culture" (Deng, 1995, p. 1). Greenfeld (1993) applies a very restrictive, subjectivist definition of what constitutes identity, hence a national identity. According to Greenfeld (1993), identity is self-perception that "either exists or does not" and cannot be "asleep and then be awakened" (p. 13). She treats identity as a self-definition that "defines a person's position in his or her social world" and "carries within itself expectations from the person and from different classes of others in the person's surroundings, and thus orients his or her action" (Greenfeld, 1993, p. 13). Further, she believes that while different identities have defined

people's essence throughout history and in distinct societies, the national identity represents people's essence in the modern world and hence is "the most powerful" (Greenfeld, 1993, p. 20).

National identity is the product of the development of modern nationalism. After the French Revolution, modern nationalism evolved as an ideology and a political and social movement, and modern nation-states are the direct political product of contemporary nationalism. Modern nation-states include two essential aspects: the nation-state system and the inhabitant's national identity in the state's territory (Zheng, 2004). Cultural identity as a manifestation of human beings' social attributes is also an important medium that affects the identities and national identities of individuals and ethnic groups (Han, 2010). Therefore, national identity refers to citizens' identity with their country's historical and cultural traditions, moral values, ideals, beliefs, and national sovereignty. It manifests when individuals or groups believe they belong to a country as a political community (He and Yan, 2008). National identity has been essential to the destinies of modern states. It is initiated with mutual faith in the legitimacy of the country's political system.

Further, it can be embodied in the institutions and formal laws that command, for instance, which language should be considered the country's official language or what curriculum should be taught to children about their country's past. National identity extends into values and cultures and is critical to maintaining a successful modern political system. National identity boosts physical security, inspires good governance, enables economic development, and promotes trust among citizens (Fukuyama, 2018).

A nation is a community of people with similar cultures, languages, and beliefs (Anderson, 2006; Quackenbush, 2015; Smith, 1991). However, this definition is somewhat misleading because although all citizens within a nation share common traits, this idea cannot be

verified. For this reason, a nation is considered an "imagined political community" that is large enough that no member knows all other members, even though it is finite in size (Anderson, 2006, pp. 6–7). Nations form around a singular identity of who citizens are and who they are not. National identity involves a sense of belonging to a political, cultural, and linguistic community (Anderson, 2006; Smith, 1991); it is as fluid as the culture that defines it. No nation always has been or is biologically determined. National identities are created and form communities that are imagined (Anderson, 2006). People identify themselves as belonging to communities, and communities identify territories as their own. As people inhabit locations, the locations become part of the people's identity—a homeland. People's conceptualisation of being a nation comprises more than just the cultural markers that make up their communal identity (Poole, 1999). Specific attributes develop that form the cultural separation of people before they desire territorial separation. The most common markers of national identity are language, ethnicity, culture, shared economy, and religion.

The question of identity is the most contentious issue in post-colonial countries highlighted in the literature. Therefore, it can be regarded as the most critical concern because of identity crisis in post-colonial communities; because of the post-colonial era's circumstances and the problematic conditions that faced newly freed nations and countries seeking and forming a national identity. During World War II, the decolonisation and liberation of nations under colonial rule led to an extraordinary move towards recreating social and collective identities. The period was also marked by the struggle for decolonisation in all areas of life (e.g. culture, the economy, and the arts) and the demand to regain identity lost in colonisation. Said (1993) argues that it is a historical truth that the restoration of nationalism, declaration of identity, and the emergence of new cultural practices as a mobilised political power initiated and then increased the struggle against Western authority in the non-European world.

On 14 August 1947, after a continued struggle, the people of the subcontinent finally succeeded in gaining independence from the British Empire. However, Pakistan's dream was mixed with the substantial migration and violence that attended the partition and birth of the two independent states of Pakistan and India. Moreover, during the colonial era, the subcontinent Muslims faced distinctive challenges. Before the British ruled over the subcontinent, Muslims were the dominant ruling power for more than eight centuries (Ahmad, 2006). However, British colonial rule introduced a new economic and political landscape system with landlords controlling the agricultural sector and a unique educational system replacing the traditional education approach (Ahmad, 2006).

Further, during colonial rule, the subcontinent Muslims were divided into different political and cultural groups, which extended political and cultural uncertainty. Politically, the Muslims of the subcontinent separated into three major groups. The first group was associated with Congress, and the Congress party favoured territorial nationalism. The second group was associated with the Muslim League led by Jinnah, who stressed that subcontinent Muslims had a distinct ideology and culture that would be in danger in a Hindu-majority country. The third group of Muslims largely comprised religious clerics who opposed an independent country's demand to avoid separating the Muslim community. Culturally, the Muslims of the subcontinent were divided between the tradition of Ali Gar and Deoband. The tradition of Ali Gar was in favour of adopting the Western concepts and values of modernity. However, the tradition of Deoband rejected Western ideas and values of modernity and adopted the religious line of argument.

Two developments were significant: first, the advent and predominance of Western concepts, the separation of politics and religion, and the ideologies of secularism and nation-state; and second, the development of democratic institutions based on secular and liberal ideas (Ahmad, 2006). In addition, the revivalism of Hindu religious sentiment was also an

important historical factor (Housego, 1997). These significant incidents sparked and contributed to the rise of Muslim nationalism across the subcontinent. However, two conditions had to be met to crystallise the idea of a separate Muslim state: first, national identity was essential for the political mobilisation of subcontinent Muslims; and second, a territorial boundary that they could claim as their homeland was required (Ahmad, 2006). For many religious clerics, this situation was incompatible because they wanted to relive their medieval past. They considered India their rightful heritage and seemed oblivious to their present predicament in the face of Indian nationalism.

Consequently, the Muslim League and Jinnah's political strategies had to evolve to convince the British of the necessity of a homeland for the Muslims and to stem the tide of Indian nationalism. To mobilise the polarised Muslim community, the name Pakistan ('Land of the Pure') focused Muslims' attention on a conceptual plane, while the Lahore Resolution of 1940 united Muslim factions behind Jinnah's declaration that "Muslims were a nation by any definition" (Yusufi, 1996, p. 1183). Having observed the force of Islam in the Khilafat movement, the leadership of the Muslim League knew that any "movement which could … attract the Muslims as Muslims" could be successful (Russel, 1972, p. 23). Thus, they drew on the resources of religion to reach the Muslim masses. Further, the influence of Jinnah's charismatic leadership was essential in unifying the Muslim factions across the subcontinent. While the Muslim League was busy with the Muslim masses' political mobilisation, it is worth noting how the British colonial administrators were politically operating in what is now Pakistan. They divided and ruled this troublesome part of their empire by designing various government administrative practices, varying from the governor and chief commissioner provinces to tribal territories and princely states. Further, fearing Muslim revivalism in this predominantly Muslim area, they encouraged the growth of ethnic identities (Singh, 2009).

Thus, while Muslim nationalists were striving to stir Islamic consciousness and develop a national identity among the Muslim masses during the colonial period, the British encouraged boundary maintenance of ethnic identities to suit their purposes. This colonial political strategy was so successful that, depending on the degree of identification with the colonial centre, some ethnic communities considered themselves superior to others. With Pakistan's creation in 1947, Pakistan's political elites believed that Islam had saved Muslims from Hindu domination and given them a national identity. At the end of World War II, with European empires falling apart globally, several new nation-states appeared on the world political map deriving from territorial nationalism ideas and with different ethnicities and languages. However, Pakistan and Israel are simply two modern states that formed in the name of religion. According to Ahmad (2006), Pakistan's struggle was based on distinct ideological and civilisation overtones challenging contemporary politics as two dominant concepts: secularism (the separation of religion and politics) and territorial nationalism (conceptualisation of the national identity based on geography rather than a faith-based framework). Therefore, Pakistan differs from most post-colonial governments because it was founded on identity instead of colonial territorial schemes (Schuman, 1972). The first argument characterises 75 years of Pakistan's history in relation to ideology or national identity—that is, whether Pakistan should be an Islamic state (based on Sharia law) or a secular state.[3] Although the two-nation theory had inspired the idea of an independent state for the Muslims of the subcontinent, the leadership of the Pakistan Movement used religion to justify the independent movement (Ahmed, 2008).

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[3] During a Pakistan National Assembly session, Maulana Shabbir Ahmad Osmani explained that "an Islamic State is not a State in its own right, with authority inherent in it. It is a State to which authority has been delegated. The real sovereignty belongs to God. Man is his vicegerent on Earth and discharges his obligations in this respect alone with other religious duties on the principle of a 'State within a State' and within the limits prescribed by God" (Constituent Assembly of Pakistan Debate, 1949, p. 45).

After a state comes into being, it has to devise a national identity to distinguish itself from other states. In the case of a newly established post-colonial state, constructing a cohesive national identity is crucial. In the long run, no state survives only through the practice of force or threats (Ahmed, 2008). After nearly seven decades of independence, two questions remain unanswered: "Who is a Pakistani?" and "What describes the Pakistani national identity?" These questions have drawn the attention of researchers. Under the successors of Jinnah, the state of Pakistan chose to highlight Islam as the basis of Pakistan's identity. Thus, Islamists claim that Pakistan's identity was shaped and influenced by Islam-based nationalism (two-nation theory). Therefore, Muslims of the subcontinent sacrificed their lives, properties, and futures by migrating to Pakistan to embrace its ideology.

In contrast, secularists claim that Pakistan should be a secular state because Jinnah wanted a secular vision for Pakistan. Many scholars have engaged in this debate since Pakistan's independence, and it has received more attention as time has passed. For example, Shaikh (2018) states that Pakistan is "an enigma" that failed to choose between being an Islamic state or a Muslim state, between democracy and dictatorship, and between the constitutional politics of the West and political Islam.

Further, Haqqani (2005) refers to Pakistan in terms of Islam as the uniting element, India as the continuing threat, and the United States as the supplier of material economic resources. A prominent historian, Jalal (2014), argues that religion was not an ideology to which Jinnah was ever committed or even sought to use as a device against rival communities; it was simply a way of creating a semblance of unity and solidarity among his divided Muslim constituents. Jinnah needed a precisely ambiguous and imprecise demand to command general support—something that was explicitly Muslim but unspecific in every other respect. The intentionally vague call was to design Pakistan to meet this requirement (Jalal, 1994). Before the partition in the 1945–1946 elections, this ambiguity was shown when the AIML

proved that it was the only representative of the subcontinent Muslims. Further, the Muslim League's leadership invoked Islam to justify Pakistan's case during the elections: "If you want Pakistan, vote for the Muslim League candidates. If we fail to realise our duty today, Islam will be vanquished from India" (Sayeed, 1968, p. 199).

Supporters of Jinnah's vision of a secular Pakistan frequently refer to his speech delivered on 11 August 1947 and believe that Jinnah wanted a secular model of the state:

> You are free, free to go to your temples; you are free to go to your mosques or to any other places of worship in this state of Pakistan. You may belong to any religion or caste, or creed that has nothing to do with the business of the state. (Yusufi, 1996, pp. 2601–5)

In contrast, Islamists claim that Jinnah favoured Islamic rule in Pakistan. For example, in June 1945, during a speech to Muslim students, Jinnah declared:

> Pakistan not only means freedom and independence but the Muslim ideology, which has to be preserved, which has come to us as a precious gift and treasure and which we hope others will share with us. (Yusufi, 1996, p. 2010)

Further, during Jinnah's visit to Karachi in October 1947 as governor-general of Pakistan, he stated that:

> The establishment of Pakistan for which we have been striving for the last ten years is, by the grace of God, a fact today, but the creation of a State of our own was a means to an end and not the end in itself. The idea was that we should have a State in which we could live and breathe as free men and which we could develop according to our own lights and culture, and where principles of Islamic social justice could find free play. (Ahmad, 1976, p. 373)

Researchers rely on Jinnah's concept of a state that is based on Islamic principles; he desired an "Islamic state" and a "nation-state" to eliminate any ambiguity about the factors that distinguish Muslims from Hindus as a separate nation (Ahmad, 2006; Karim, 2010; Mahmood, 2002). Some scholars argue that the reason for the confusion about Pakistan's identity was because Jinnah "left us a legacy of confusion … Not being sufficiently well-versed in Islamic history or theology" (Hoodbhoy, 2007, p. 3303). However, the secularists'

argument—based on Jinnah's 11 August speech that Pakistan was a secular state—is not convincing. For example, after that speech, Jinnah used Islamic references in his general discussions and asked the legislators to develop an Islamic banking system. Moreover, in February 1948, during his radio broadcasting, he stated:

> This Dominion, which represents the fulfilment, in some measure, of the cherished goal of 100 million Muslims of this subcontinent, came into existence on August 15, 1947. Pakistan is the premier Islamic State and the fifth largest in the world. (Yusufi, 1996, p. 2692)

Further, Yusufi (1996) notes that Jinnah explained Pakistan's distinctiveness in April 1948 to Edward college students as "Islamic, Muslim rule, as a sovereign independent state" (p. 2761). Moreover, some claim that Jinnah spoke about the rights of minorities, but discussing minorities does not imply that Jinnah wanted a secular state.

1.2 Problem Statement

In 1949, after Pakistan's National Assembly passed the Objectives Resolution, the nature of the discussion around Pakistan's state and identity received more attention. The Objectives Resolution laid out the values and moralities for Pakistan's prospective constitution, emphasising the concept of a state wherein "the principles of democracy, freedom, equality, and tolerance, as enunciated by Islam, shall be fully observed". Moreover, "the Muslims shall be enabled to order their lives in the individual and collective spheres in accordance with the teachings and requirements of Islam as set out in the Holy Qur'an and Sunnah" (Constitutional Assembly, 1949, pp. 1–2). However, the controversy over Pakistan's national identity worsened as time passed, creating intolerance, deviation, and arrogance in Pakistan. This is reflected in Ayub Khan's secular development state approach in the 1950s, Zia's Islamist initiatives in the 1977–1989 period, and Pervez Musharraf's "enlightened moderation" after 1999—all of which attempted to define and redefine the state of Pakistan, and enhanced debates on Pakistan's national identity. Thus, Pakistan is a state searching for a

nation, an unfinished nation and state, a nation searching for identity, and people searching for a state. Sayeed (1998, cited in Jaffrelot, 2002, p. 8) asks, "Pakistan, with all its weaknesses, has a state but does it have a nation?"

Islam is the national religion of Pakistan, and from the beginning, non-Muslims were regarded as minorities. The prevalence of minorities and the state's recognition of them were symbolised in the national flag. The Pakistan flag's green colour signifies Islam, whereas the white strip denotes the country's non-Muslim residents. In Pakistan, non-Muslims have allocated parliamentary seats within a distinct electorate and vote solely for their nominees. In addition, the Pakistan Government has a separate Minister for Minority Affairs. However, in actuality, non-Muslim minorities in Pakistan have been continuously marginalised and restricted, even though the constitution states that every individual has the freedom to profess, exercise, and promote their religion (Bhargava, 2004; Malik, 2002).

Some scholars have questioned Pakistan's claim that it is an exemplary Islamic model of state (Alavi, 2002; Jalal, 1994, 2014; Page, 1982). These intellectuals have examined the perceived links between Islam and Pakistan's independence movement by pointing to the primarily secular character of Pakistan's independence movement leaders. They have also discussed the criticism levelled against Pakistan's campaign by religious clerics (*Ulama*). These researchers have demonstrated that the independence movement leaders intended Pakistan to be a secular state. Despite Islam's prominence in debates relating to the creation and construction of Pakistan's nation-state, this secular vision of Pakistan is a paradox that requires additional explication through a revised narrative.

Further, many analyses are hampered by their dependence on a narrative that stresses the secular leadership's subservient use of Islam to motivate a fundamentally religious population. Even if nationalism is an elite initiative, primarily in the colonial environment, it

is incorrect to believe it is exclusively a top–down project imposed on the unsuspecting populace (Cevik, 2015). Therefore, these analyses overlook Pakistani nationalism's persistence in facing multiple alternative and structural elements. After the euphoria of independence had dissipated, the transfer of citizenship from primordial to national levels proved difficult. The demands made on ethnic groups to transfer their loyalties were immediate and lacked any platform for negotiation. In the post-colonial period, the critical question was: "Since Islam had been in danger and was saved by Pakistan's creation, was Pakistan then going to be an Islamic state?" Different perceptions of this question led to confusion surrounding Pakistan's national identity.

The secularists claimed that the founder of Pakistan had stated that religion, caste, or creed would have "nothing to do with the business of the state" (Yusufi, 1996). This was further reinforced in the 1949 Objectives Resolution, which stated that the people's chosen representatives would exercise authority and power in the state of Pakistan. In contrast, the Islamists believed that sovereignty rested with God. Therefore, for Pakistan to be an Islamic state, the state should govern as its agent through the Shariat (Muslim Law) as given in the Qur'an by the Prophet Muhammed (Peace-Be-Upon-Him) (Binder, 1961).

This state nature and identity controversy was debated for several years, leaving the state polarised between Islamists and secularist factions. The 1956 Constitution labelled Pakistan an "Islamic Republic", but the 1962 Constitution removed that label initially, rationalising that the state could not be theocratic because there was no priesthood in Islam, and as such, it was "theocratic only to the extent that real sovereignty belongs to God" (Report of the Constitution Commission, 1961, pp. 72–6). The 1973 constitution again made Pakistan an "Islamic Republic". This label-changing indicated severe internal contradictions within the national identity of Pakistan. According to scholars, Pakistan has remained an "ideological state" but with no "known ideology" (Rahman, 1973, p. 201). This crisis has never been

resolved, and the state's national identity has varied from one constitution to another. These contradictions led to internal dualism—the ethno-Islamic and the ethnonational. Within the ethnic-Islamic framework, the national identity of a citizen of Pakistan fluctuated between their religion and their state: if a citizen was a Muslim first and a Pakistani second, they transcended national boundaries and were sympathetic to Pan-Islamism; if they were a Pakistani first and a Muslim second, the basis of their identity was ethnicised—as a Pakistani, they could be a Punjabi, a Baluchi, a Sindhi, a Pathan, or a Muhajir. Within the ethnonational framework, the internal dualism oscillated between citizens' ethnicity and nationality: were they a Punjabi, Baluchi, Pathan, or Sindhi first, or a Pakistani? In 1947, the Bengalis chose to be Pakistani first and Bengalis second; in 1971, they decided to reverse the order through the force of ethnic nationalism and created Bangladesh. Ethnic nationalism had developed strong enough dimensions to defy national identity and devastate the state.

1.3 Statement of Purpose

Islam played an essential role in Pakistan's establishment. As a result, division (Pakistan and India) was planned on ideological grounds, whereby Pakistan was founded by merging the subcontinent's Muslim-majority provinces of the former British Raj. The population inside Pakistan's borders spoke many distinct languages (almost 32) and belonged to five significant linguistic groups at the time of Pakistan's establishment. Further, Pakistan was divided into five provinces, each with strong regional and ethnic loyalties (Esposito, 1980). Therefore, Islam was the only common element that brought this diverse society together. As a result, Islam and Muslim nationalism have been inextricably linked to Pakistan's nationalism concept (Baxter et al., 2002). Although religion is believed to be necessary for national identity, there is not enough consensus on what that entails. Therefore, Pakistan's vision reflected diverse characteristics in its varied constituencies. As a result of this ambiguity, Pakistani politics have been plagued by a persistent identity crisis, leading to the country's

separation in 1971 and continuous conflicts. For instance, Esposito and Voll (1996, p. 102) emphasise that "Pakistan has struggled throughout its history with the meaning of its Islamic identity".

The continuous argument about Pakistan's identity and the position of religion in state activities is intrinsically tied to and expressed in the historiographical argument about Islam's role in Pakistan's formation. According to traditional Pakistani historians, Pakistan is the climax of a centuries-long Muslim presence in the Indian subcontinent (Aziz, 1967; Qureshi, 2006). Islamic-oriented academics understandably endorse this viewpoint (Ahmad, 2006; Mujahid, 2001). However, this viewpoint is not limited to Islamists alone; it can also be seen in the studies of numerous researchers who believe religion played a significant role in separation (Ahmed, 2020; Gilmartin, 1988; Malik, 1963; Metcalf, 2014; Minault, 1999; Sayeed, 1968; Shaikh, 1986). In addition, a new school of scholars have questioned this Islamic interpretation of Pakistan's founding (Alavi, 1988, 2002; Ali, 2011; Jalal, 1994; 2014; Malik, 2008; Page, 1982), asserting that division could have been described without reference to religious ideology.

Consequently, the attention has focused on British political aspirations, Indian subcontinent elite politics, and perhaps a sequence of historical coincidences. Moreover, through the South Asian studies literature, a detachment has been observed between:

> Those who maintain that the role of Islamic ideology in the conduct of Indian Muslim politics was either illusory or wholly instrumental, and those who argue that Islam was the only explanatory factor behind partition and Pakistan. (Shaikh, 1986, pp. 539–40)

This distinction also denotes the well-known discussions between Francis Robinson and Paul Brass (1974, 1977, 2000) that emerged as one of the central arguments on nationalism discourse.

Discussions about Jinnah reflect the difference in Pakistan concerning secularists and Islamists, with each group having their particular Jinnah interpretations (Ahmed, 2005). Criticism and questions about Jinnah's life and speeches have considerably affected contemporary Pakistan's politics. For many, Jinnah is "an Islamic visionary who created the first Muslim nation-state, or he is the arch-secularist who, by some ironic twist of fate, managed to create a confessional state" (Sayyid and Tyrer, 2002, p. 57). Jinnah referred to and used Islamic references during Pakistan's independence movement and even after Pakistan's establishment. Secularists frequently referred to Jinnah's speech at the opening session of the Constitutional Assembly on 11 August 1947. However, Islamists argue that this speech should be contextualised within his speeches devoted to Pakistan's vision of an 'Islamic state'. In his famous speech on 11 August, Jinnah stated:

> Now, if we want to make this great State of Pakistan happy and prosperous, we should wholly and solely concentrate on the people's well-being, especially of the masses and the poor. If you work in co-operation, forgetting the past, burying the hatchet, you are bound to succeed. If you change your past and work together in a spirit that every one of you, no matter to what community he belongs, no matter what relations he had with you in the past, no matter what is his colour, caste, or creed, is first, second, and last a citizen of this state with equal rights, privileges, and obligations, there will be no end to the progress you will make … Now I think we should keep that in front of us as our ideal, and you will find that in the course of time, Hindus would cease to be Hindus, and Muslims would cease to be Muslims, not in the religious sense, because that is the personal faith of each individual, but in the political sense as citizens of the state. (Yusufi, 1996, pp. 2601–5)

In fact, according to Misaq-i-Madina, it is challenging to see within which scale Jinnah's pivotal speech of 11 August could be construed other than standing as a precise speech. Further, it is equally valid that Jinnah made various references to Pakistan's Islamic nature both before and after this speech. However, the central importance of the debate about Jinnah's righteousness and religious ideas for Pakistan's national identity stem from the notion that merely religious persons can attribute religion to construct a national identity based on a binary interpretation of either Islamism or secularism. As a result, the important

role of religion in forming secular national ideologies is sometimes disregarded. Thus, in Pakistan, the debate about the relationship between national identity and Islam is falsely placed in a nexus of exchange versus synthesis. Further, it appears that the more meaningful discussion in the study of nationalism is trapped in a similar opposing context (Cevik, 2015).

The best way to understand the problem of national identity is to examine it as multifaceted and shaped in concentric circles so that approaching one would open the door to another. In Pakistan's case, the innermost circle is Islam, which is the centre of values, equality and justice, respect for women, defence of minority faiths, dissent, and the underprivileged—that of Pakistan's ancestral culture and folk heritage. It is a critical component of identity creation, whereby regional languages and folk cultures compete and converge to shape Pakistan's national identity. The outermost circle is Pakistan's territoriality, cultural past, and shared heritage. Nevertheless, a certain number of Pakistanis feel strongly about another ring, which is very symbolic: the notion of the Muslim Ummah, a group of believers bound together not by land or race but by Islamic faith and brotherhood (Shafqat, 2007). Thus, various identities are part of the broader Pakistani nationality; they work, battle and evolve within its boundaries.

This study considers two essential and relevant interpretations of the research questions: the Islamist and secular narratives of Pakistan's national identity. The first school argues that the foundation principles of Pakistan were based on Islam, which remains the only unifying force. According to this school, pursuing and embracing the centralising position of Islam is the solution to all of the problems facing Pakistan. This school of thought advocates Islamic doctrine as a panacea for racial discrimination and political and socioeconomic ills. This school invokes Muslim nationalism (two-nation theory) and Objectives Resolution (12 March 1949) and argues that Pakistan was "established in Islam's name". Javid Iqbal has made a revisionist interpretation of the two-nation theory, claiming that Islam has produced a "simple

theological aspiration". Thus, he argues that the question of national identity needs to be resolved in light of Islamic values (Iqbal, 2003). The second group contends that the two-nation theory was no longer relevant in the Pakistani state after Pakistan's independence (Ali, 2011; Jalal, 1994). Therefore, Pakistan's national identity should not be based on Muslim nationalism (two-nation theory).

It is clear that both schools of thought accept the territorial basis of Pakistan's national identity; the debate is about choosing Islam's position and its degree of Islamisation, course, and orientation. Wilcox (1977) made a strong argument for Pakistani nationality, which continues to resonate today. He said:

> If Pakistan was tenuous at birth, so too are most other new countries. If Pakistan lacks a settled national patriotism, so too do many countries much longer in history … What Pakistan continues to have is faith made the more poignant by desperation. This was the promised land and the only land as well. (Wilcox, 1977, pp. 25–39)

This makes it even more necessary to consider the significance of the ties and connections between ethnicity, Islam, and territoriality to understand the interplay of the social and political forces that influence the cycle of nation-building and identity-building. Pakistan's national identity is multilayered and multilingual. The complexities and issues are mainly domestic, although international factors stir up nationalist fervour in Pakistan (during the Cold War and post-9/11). Ethnic contestation and assimilation are continuous and simultaneous processes representing the dynamism of Pakistan's identity. What is exciting and inspiring is that both internal and external forces compete, informing Pakistan's national identity in tandem with tribal, Muslim, and ethnic/cultural Pakistan. However, this research is focused only on one paradigm: the domestic question of Pakistan's national identity in the context of Islamist and secularist narratives.

This study aims to provide a new framework for thinking about the long-term political implications of partition and the creation of Pakistan as a modern nation-state, with a new approach to investigate the secular and Islamist standpoints regarding Pakistani national identity and the present nature of Pakistan as a state. Therefore, Muslim nationalism, Jinnah's leadership, and Pakistan's constitution are crucial elements that will be examined as part of Pakistan's national identity. However, these questions about Pakistan's nature create misperceptions and confusion among citizens about Pakistan's national identity. For example, the people of Pakistan consider Jinnah a saviour and the most celebrated leader, called Quaid-e-Azam. But, since 1947, every citizen, from ordinary to highly educated, has asked despairingly: Is it not Pakistan that Quaid-e-Azam wants?

Every political party makes slogans and promises to make Pakistan a 'Quaid-e-Azam Pakistan' during election campaigns. However, sadly, Pakistanis are fragmented due to ignoring the guidance of Quaid-e-Azam. This study will analyse the question of Pakistan's national identity, how Islamists and secularists define Pakistan's national identity, and the vision of Quaid-e-Azam and Allama Iqbal for Pakistan. Moreover, this study will discuss the two-nation theory's role in Pakistan's independence, especially East Pakistan's separation (Bangladesh). A clear understanding of the national identity could help remove politicians' and policy-makers' reluctance to resolve this problem in their fragile-state programs. However, identity is a sensitive and complicated problem, an ever-changing reality in people's lives, and is difficult to manage or control.

1.4 Pakistan: Some Basic Facts

The history of modern Pakistan can be traced back 4,500 years to the advent of the Indus Valley civilisation, one of the world's ancient, most advanced civilisations. When the Indo-Aryan peoples moved to Punjab and Sindh's modern-day territories in the Indus Valley, they introduced the earliest Sanskrit language and beliefs into Hinduism (Wynbrandt, 2009). After

another, one imperial power attempted to invade the region, including Alexander the Great and the Mauryan Empire. Numerous civilisations emerged, such as the Greco-Buddhist Gandhara, which persisted for many centuries. Invaders and traders from the south landed in Sindh throughout the eighth century and introduced Islam. Many Muslim rulers successively controlled these lands until the fall of the Great Moghul Empire in the eighteenth century (Wynbrandt, 2009). Today, Pakistan is the only recognised Muslim nuclear power in the world. Pakistan occupies an important strategic location in South Asia and shares its borders with India, Iran, Afghanistan, and China.

This research is essential for several reasons. First, since its beginning, there has been a continuing debate regarding Pakistan's national identity; however, few academic studies have been conducted: see National Identity Formation in Pakistan: Analysis of the Anti-Secular Narrative (Ahmed, 2008, 2017). Second, some scholars have debated the relationship between Islam, democracy, and secularism in Pakistan (Ahmed, 2004; Akhtar, 2009; Haqqani, 2005). Third, other scholars have paid attention to Pakistan's secular vision, Jinnah's vision of Pakistan, Pakistan's struggle movement and nationalism without a nation (Ahmar, 2012; Hoodbhoy, 2007; Jaffrelot, 2002, Mahmood, 2002;2011; Jalal, 1994;2014).

In fact, no studies have described the structure, conflict, and process of Pakistan's national identity in the literature vacuum based on the various definitions of nationalism and identity. Despite its relevance and importance, this area has not received the consideration it deserves. Further, the previous studies have to the processes and challenges associated with Pakistan's national identity based on the various definitions of nationalism and identity and the different narratives of Islamists and secularists. For this reason, the present study will be the first of its kind to investigate both secularist and Islamist narratives about the question of Pakistan's national identity. Theoretically, this study will examine how the two-nation theory developed and encouraged subcontinent Muslims to support the Pakistan Movement and how secularists

and Islamists define Pakistan's national identity. What is the process involved in national identity formation, and what challenges are associated with Pakistan's national identity?

1.5 Nation and National Identity: An Overview

Given that this thesis primarily studies national identity in Pakistan, it is logical to examine nation and national identity definitions. Hutchinson and Smith (1994) argue that reaching a consensus on proper definitions of essential terms, including nation and nationalism, is a complex undertaking that presents a significant impediment when studying nations and nationalism. Tilly (1975) argues that the concept of 'nation' is worthless and that the focus should be on exploring the state. Hobsbawm (1992) contends that it is impossible to define a nation in the same vein. Instead, he argues that any analysis of nations and nationalism should begin with an analysis of nationalism rather than the nation (Hobsbawm, 1992). This is because a group of people becomes a nation only through the ideology of nationalism. In this thesis, I rely on Gellner's definition of nationalism as "primarily a political principle, which holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent" (Gellner, 1983, p. 1). This definition links nationalism to the state as a political unit because the nation-state defines the nation.

Nationalism represents a new iteration of the relationship between the modern state and its subjects, who are collectively defined as a nation only because of this new form of relationship. Thus, national identity is tied to the modern state's institution and desire to control and regulate its subjects. Breuilly (1994, p. 220) argues, "the idea of the nation as a single, geographically bounded group derives from the idea of the state as a single, geographically bounded territory". Breuilly (1994) also observes that this new state, with its previously unseen control and power monopoly over its borders, is no longer an agent between others but rather an institution that enforces a definitive will on all others. As a result, a new relationship emerges between the state and the subjects, with far greater

competence, authority, and legitimacy to the state. This new relationship establishes direct contact between the subject and the state. Traditionally, the subject's relationship with the state was retained through communal mediators. In addition to this vertical bond between the state and the subject, the modern state fosters horizontal cohesiveness between its subjects (formerly divided into groups), turning them into a nationality. This horizontal unity is preserved by new institutions, including mass education and school systems, a strong military, solid borders, levy stations, and national media (state media). These vertical and horizontal relationships of solidarity lead to the nation's formation as an imagined community. The state administration's uniformity maintains this imagined community's homogeneity.

1.6 Research Question

The question related to identity, especially in the past few decades, is one of the most critical problems in the field of relations between individuals and communities. The research question is the primary basis for a research project; it guides the project and all study stages. Once the researcher classifies a particular research issue, they understand the study's key objective. The aim is set as the researcher raises interest in the examined topic and establishes a study framework (Yin, 2014). Moreover, the research questions are the most crucial stage in the research design after selecting the research subject. According to Creswell (2007), research questions must be straightforward, precise, easy to understand, and distinct to obtain the projected data.

The issue of Pakistani identity, especially in the past few decades, is important in public discourse and institutional and policy discussions. Nation-building initiatives require collective action, emphasising a shared identity and shared destiny. Nonetheless, after independence in 1947, Jinnah was the head of a Muslim nation-state with a strong legacy of sovereign polity and law in the subcontinent. Islam and sharia were frequently raised in

Jinnah's speeches on Pakistan's future in the final seven years following the 1940 Lahore Resolution, which he claimed would give Pakistan a distinctive national identity (Ahmed, 2020). Therefore, Muslim nationalism, religion, and history, combined with an explicit reference to a Muslim society declared by Jinnah and the All-India Muslim League, paved the way for Pakistan to have a predominantly Islamic national identity. However, significant ambiguity had been created by the secularists in Jinnah's 11 August 1947 speech, which, in terms of terminology and vocabulary, represents a substantial departure from the tradition of an Islamic state and instead seeks to offer Pakistan as a secular state founded on territorial nationalism. A scholar described that:

> This speech has been the subject of great controversy in Pakistani politics. It seems that Jinnah wanted to supplant the notion of 'Muslim nationalism' with 'Pakistani nationalism'. The change was most significant, but it was not consistent with the main argument upon which the separatist demand had been justified: that Muslims were a nation in their own right. (Ahmed, 2004, p. 19)

Therefore, to understand the problem of Pakistan's national identity, this study will deal in three dimensions: subcontinental Muslim Nationalism, Jinnah's Islamic national paradigm, and Pakistan's constitution. Therefore, the research question is: "How do Islamists and secularists define and interpret Pakistan's national identity in light of Pakistan's colonial history and the events surrounding its creation?"

This research question will not only provide the political history of Pakistan's movement, but it will also facilitate an understanding of the processes and reasons behind the emergence of Muslim nationalism that led to an independent state from a highly diverse subcontinent. It will also determine how this Muslim nationalism, religion, and history, combined with an explicit reference to Muslim society, paved the way for Pakistan to have a predominantly Islamic national identity.

Further, the research question will examine Jinnah's vision[4] for Pakistan and how the Islamists and secularists interpret it to support their narratives. It aims to explain why Jinnah mobilised Indian Muslims to support his call for the creation of Pakistan through the partition, and why Pakistanis have continued to debate Jinnah's vision of the nation and state since Pakistan's creation. Further, to achieve the objectives of this study, a sub-question is posed: "What is the current state of affairs of the national identity debate between Islamists and secularists?"

This research question will examine two perspectives: 1) the ethnic identity challenges to Pakistan's national identity; and 2) how Islamists and secularists define the contemporary debate of Pakistan's national identity.

1.7 Thesis Organisation

This thesis consists of nine chapters, including the introduction and conclusion. The introductory chapter is split into the introduction, background of this study, objectives, research questions, and thesis outline. A brief overview of the rest of the thesis is as follows.

Chapter 2 presents the theoretical framework of this study, including definitions of key concepts. It seeks to set out the academic context in which the research on nationalism and national identity occurs. Thus, to guide this study, this chapter reflects on nationalism and the emergence of Muslim nationalism in the subcontinent, and it focuses on identity and national identity by discussing different approaches to understanding and establishing the theoretical framework of national identity. Finally, the chapter describes the two-nation theory and its role in the Pakistan Movement for independence.

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[4] Jinnah's vision for Pakistan was an Islamic identity based on Islamic principles (see Ahmad, 2006; Ahmed, 2005; Karim, 2010; Mahmood, 2002, 2011). However, secularists believed it was a secular identity (see Ali, 2009; Malik, 2008; Munir, 1980).

Chapter 3 follows the broader historical and socio-political circumstances in which different responses from Muslims emerged and flourished in colonial India. The chapter emphasises the surviving legacy of the Mughal Empire, the war of 1857, and the Muslim identity question in colonial India. Further, the Muslim intellectual responses in colonial India's socioeconomic scarcities appealed to different kinds of intellectual responses divided into Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan, the Ali Garh group, and Ulama. Further, this chapter sheds light on how and under which circumstances the AIML emerged and how Pakistan became a reality in 1947.

Chapter 4 discusses the overall research design adopted for this research and develops the research approach, procedure, and data collection process. Further, this chapter addresses the experimental case study as a research tool within a qualitative approach framework. It presents the sampling methods and discusses issues related to the data collection process and the research participants. The chapter also highlights the research tools used for data collection and the approach to data analysis. Finally, the chapter concludes with a summary of the ethical problems involved.

Chapter 5 discusses Jinnah's reflection on Pakistan's vision and identity. In Pakistan, people who are categorised as secularists and Islamists use Jinnah as a model to justify their respective narratives. Therefore, this chapter examines Jinnah's nationalism and analyses how Jinnah became Quaid-e-Azam and advocated for the two-nation theory in the subcontinent. At the same time, he was called the ambassador of Hindu–Muslim unity. Further, the chapter analyses Jinnah's 11 and 14 August speeches at the National Assembly. Finally, the chapter explores the national identity formation process, focusing on the Objectives Resolution of 1949 and Pakistan's constitutions.

Chapter 6 explores the roots of the identity crisis in Pakistan. First, the chapter examines how Bengali subnationalism developed in East Pakistan and became separated (now Bangladesh). It then examines the challenges associated with Pakistan's national identity, including ethnic conflict, controlled democracy, and a dysfunctional constitution.

Chapter 7 explores the contemporary debate regarding Pakistan's national identity. It analyses the qualitative data using an approach corresponding to the research themes. The chapter also explores the *raison d'être* of Pakistan using historical facts and conducting a comprehensive analysis of whether Pakistan's national identity is Islamic or secular. Finally, the chapter provides a detailed investigation of the present state of Pakistan's identity.

Chapter 8 presents the discussion, findings, and future research directions, and Chapter 9 presents the conclusion.

Chapter 2: Theoretical Framework of the Study

2.1 Introduction

Researchers of the humanities and social science disciplines have been interested in questions concerning identity for many years. Some have argued that identity plays a central role in nationalism and ethnic conflict (Deng, 1995; Horowitz, 2000; Laitin, 1999; Smith, 1991). This chapter sets out the academic context in which nationalism and national identity research occur. Given the nature of the investigation, it is essential to address a wide range of areas that directly affect the current inquiry. First, the concept of nationalism and the emergence of Muslim nationalism in the subcontinent are considered. Second, to guide this study, attention is paid to identity and national identity by discussing different approaches to understanding and establishing the theoretical framework of Pakistan's national identity. Third, an overview of the two-nation theory is presented, and its role in the Pakistan independence movement is discussed.

2.2 Nation and Nationalism

Nationalism emerged as a new shift in the twentieth century. People have been attached to their native land and their parents' traditions and have established territorial authorities throughout history. However, by the end of the eighteenth century, nationalism had become a well-known moulding of public and private life and a big, if not the biggest, determining factor of modern history. Nationalism is often regarded as very old because of its dynamic vitality and all-pervading nature; it is mistakenly considered a constant political behaviour factor. The American and French revolutions could be regarded as their first powerful manifestation. However, at the beginning of the nineteenth century, nationalism spread to Central Europe, and then to Eastern and South-eastern Europe in the middle of the nineteenth century. Nationalism flourished in Asia and Africa at the beginning of the twentieth century.

Thus, in Europe, the nineteenth century was called the Age of Nationalism, while powerful national movements throughout Asia and Africa were observed in the twentieth century.

Nationalism, transliterated into global politics, means that a state or nation is identified with the people or that the state's size can be determined according to ethnography principles. In the era of nationalism, the general principle was that every nationality should make up its state and that all nationality members should be included in it. Previously, states or territories under one government were not defined by nationality. People did not lose loyalty to the nation-state but to other political forms, such as town-states, feudal fiefs and lords, dynastic states, religious groups, and sects. The nation-state did not exist throughout most of human history and was not even regarded as an ideal for a long time. During the first 15 centuries of the early medieval period, the model was the universal world state, not any distinct political entity's loyalty. The Roman and Ottoman Empires are examples of the universal world state.

Nationalism is one of the most perplexing phenomena of the modern world. Great tomes have been written declaring that "nationalism is one of the most powerful forces in the modern world" (Hutchinson and Smith, 1994, p. 3). Further, that it has been "a system of belief, an ideology, and as a political movement has been one of the formative processes in the creation of the contemporary world" (Baylis and Smith, 1997, p. 359). However, despite the apparent importance of nationalism, it has proved enduringly resistant to a concrete definition. This is exacerbated because nationalism is unlike most other political doctrines in that it has no clear founding theorist or classical text to provide an orthodox narrative (Halliday, 2000). In a sense, nationalism is like life itself: we all know it exists, but somehow we cannot arrive at a universally accepted definition of what it is.

Many scholars have attempted to describe the complexity of nationalism. Kedourie (1960) defines nationalism briefly because his doctrine holds that humanity is naturally divided into

nations that are known by specific characteristics that can be ascertained and that the only legitimate type of government is national self-government. Gellner (1983) writes that nationalism is essentially a theory of political legitimacy that requires that ethnic boundaries should not cut across political ones: "Nationalism is primarily a political principle, which holds that the political and national unit should be congruent" (Gellner, 1983, p. 1).

British historian and scholar Seton-Watson (2019) captures the duality of nationalism as both a sentiment and a political movement. He explained that the term 'nationalism' has two distinct interpretations. One of these interpretations is a doctrine regarding a nation's nature, interests, rights, and responsibility. The second definition is a well-organised political movement to further nations' ostensible goals and interests (Seton-Watson, 2019). According to Breuilly (1994), nationalism refers to political movements chasing or using state power while explaining such activities with nationalist reasons.

However, it appears that the more scholars attempt to define nationalism authoritatively, the more slippery the semantic slope becomes. As Connor (1978, p. 378) observes, it would be "difficult to name four words more essential to global politics than are state, nation, nation-state, and nationalism … but despite their centrality, all four terms are shrouded in ambiguity".

The term 'nation' was first used in the thirteenth century to demarcate students as nations based on language and their place of origin. Students from various foreign countries studied at some of the oldest European universities (Connor, 1978; Seton-Watson, 2019). Guibernau (1996, p. 47) defines the nation as "a human group conscious of forming a community, sharing a common culture, attached to a demarcated territory, having a common past and a common project for the future and claiming the right to rule itself". Therefore, territory, history, culture, language, and religion are all important. However, according to Anderson

(2006, p. 6), nations are "an imagined political community—and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign". This image exists in three realms: limited boundaries, sovereignty, and political communities. Smith (1991, p. 43) describes a nation "a named human population sharing a historic territory, common myths and historical memories, a mass, public culture, a common economy and common legal rights and duties for all members".

Nations have created modern nation-states to allow people with a universal language and cultural qualities to rule as they choose. Countries protect themselves against perceived threats; in return, they can ask their citizens to perform tasks such as military service. The stronger a nation's military and economic power, the more its interests can be promoted. Nations have formed in several ways throughout history. Some have been determined by geographical isolation (e.g. England), while others have been created as a result of emigration (e.g. Australia). Further, some have been developed from the breakup of larger empires or peace treaties (e.g. Croatia). This study will discuss Pakistan as a nation.

2.2.1 Nationalism and Religion

The modernist school's contention that nationalism arose in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries has conditioned many nationalism scholars' views on the relationship between nationalism and religion. For instance, according to Hutchinson (1994, p. 68), nationalism "has succeeded in the great religions as the primary legitimation of the social order across the globe". However, by subscribing to the view that nationalism emerged from the Enlightenment, which elevated the power of human reason over divine omniscience, many scholars have constructed an oversimplified chronology whereby nationalism has replaced religion as the preeminent human matrix affair. The French Revolution, in particular, has provided much of the inspiration for this modernist thinking; Robespierre's Cult of the Supreme Being was an apparent attempt to supplant Christianity with a civil religion predicated on the 'worship' of the nation. In the revolutionary frenzy of de-

Christianisation, God was replaced by the nation as the supreme object of worship and adoration. Given this historical example, scholars such as Elie Kedourie claim that nationalism and religion are ultimately incompatible because the former is an avowed modern and secular ideology dedicated to sweeping aside the enervating superstitions of the latter. Humans no longer had to seek salvation through God but could instead achieve salvation in their nation. That is, nationalism meant emancipation from the tyranny of religion (Kedourie, 1960). At first glance, the historical record supports Kedourie's contention that religion has little importance in the development and spread of modern nationalism. The major nationalist movements in France, Turkey, Mexico, Cuba, and the numerous anti-colonial nationalisms of the developing world were, after all, profoundly secular, often anti-clerical, and steadfast in the belief that their newly liberated nations were far more relevant than the old deities. Kedourie's view of the incompatibility of nationalism and religion is subscribed to by later modernists such as Gellner, Breuilly, Hobsbawm, Naim, Hechter, and others for whom "nations and nationalism are treated as wholly recent, and novel phenomena, and a secular, anthropocentric, and anti-clerical modernity is always counter-posed to tradition and traditional society with its emphasis on custom and religion" (Smith, 2003, p. 10). However, such a convenient theoretical bifurcation flies in the face of numerous examples of symbiosis between religion and nationalism throughout history. While the French Revolution's radical wing may have been defiantly secular, many subsequent nationalist movements openly asserted the intimate ties between religion and their national movements. The case of Israel is a prominent case of an intertwining of national identity, religion, and nationalism; for a while, Zionism was, on the surface, a secular movement. Its central tenet—that the Jewish people were ordained to return to the Holy Land and found a new nation—was patently suffused with religious undertones (Smith, 2003). Afrikaner nationalism was also underlain by a religious verve in which the Protestant Afrikaners saw themselves as the new Israelites,

establishing their own Kingdom of God deep in Southern Africa (Templin, 1984). Catholicism was similar to the national feeling in European countries such as Ireland, Poland, Croatia, and Lithuania (Lukowski and Zawadaki, 2001; O'Brien, 1994).

Likewise, Orthodox Christianity fuelled national sentiment in Bulgaria and Serbia, while in Lebanon, Christianity proved a touchstone of national identity among Maronite Christians, particularly in the country's civil war (Phares, 1995; Ramet, 1989). Finally, Hindu nationalism has become a major political force in India in recent decades. It has steadily chipped away at the secular, non-sectarian nationalist legacy of the Indian National Congress (Van dee Veer, 1994). Thus, while the great religions claim universality, these examples demonstrate that there has been a tendency to fuse the universal and the particular across history.

2.2.2 Nationalism in the Muslim World

The question of nationalism in the Islamic world provides a fascinating case study of the relationship between religion and nationalism in the modern world. The development of nationalism in the Islamic world was closely linked with the West's rise and imperialism's advance. As Cleveland (2000) notes, by the end of the nineteenth century, most of the significant political units of Islam languished under some form of European political or economic control, with even nominally independent states such as Iran subject to extensive European control over their economies. The West's overwhelming military, political, and cultural dominance provoked deep soul-searching among Muslims. The challenge of confronting this leviathan became the primary preoccupation of thinkers and activists within the Islam community (Ruthven, 2000).

As Esposito argues, Islam has possessed a revival and reform tradition since its earliest days. Since the eighteenth century, several revivalist movements have advocated returning to

Islam's primary tenets, as exemplified by the Prophet Muhammed (PBUH) in seventh-century Arabia. These two fundamental principles underlaid Muslims' response to the West's rise and the Islamic world's terminal decline (Esposito, 1988).

In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the most prominent revivalist trends in the Muslim world preached that Islam's decline was less because of the European powers' perniciousness and more because Muslims had allegedly strayed from Islam's original message. Accordingly, these movements urged the solution to purge Islam of superfluous accretions such as superstition and the mindless imitation of corrupt orthodoxy that had robbed Islam of its original dynamism and invited Western encroachment (Choueri, 1990; Esposito, 1988).

In the second half of the nineteenth century, as the pace and scope of European colonialism exposed the deep malaise within the Islamic world, another vein of thinking emerged that sought to confront Western supremacy, but in an entirely different fashion—the belligerent and self-belief of the revivalist movements. Islamic modernism sought to chart a middle course between the uncritical acceptance of Western civilisation and the total rejection of it. Upholding Islam's other great intellectual legacy—reformism—Islamic modernists pointed to Islam's inherent capacity for dynamism and flexibility, which they claimed provided the basis for religious tenets to be continually reinterpreted as modern conditions dictated. By selectively adopting elements of Western civilisation that accorded with Islam's fundamental precepts, the Islamic modernists maintained that Muslims could be faithful to their religion and arrest the Islamic world's downward trajectory (Esposito, 1988). Unfortunately, Islamic modernism was also the intellectual parent who gave birth to modern nationalism in much of the Islamic world (this aspect is explored below). This dilemma of Islamic modernism—the knowledge that fusing Western and Islamic values might further divide the ummah—was evident in the legacy of the famous Islamic modernist Jamal ad-Din al-Afghani (Esposito, 1988). Throughout the second half of the nineteenth century, al-Afghani travelled across the

Islamic world, preaching Pan-Islamism and enjoining Muslims to unite and resist Western Imperialism (Keddie, 2001). Like the Young Ottomans, al-Afghani believed the Islamic world could shake off its torpor by rediscovering Islam's original dynamism and progressive nature, allowing Muslims to re-embrace reason, science, and technology in the manner that the West had so successfully demonstrated. By his reckoning, Muslims could reassert their religious identity and selectively adopt aspects of Western modernity that would allow the Islamic world to confront the West on its terms. Reformed and revitalised from within, al-Afghani believed the Islamic world could throw off the yoke of colonial rule and interference (Keddie, 1969).

While al-Afghani adopted the Pan-Islamic message, his relentless refrain of agitation for independence and the elimination of oppression provoked more localised desires for national liberation, which fed the example of European nationalism. Anti-imperialist al-Afghani's activism was a kind of proto-nationalism that later served as an essential stage in training minds and spirits for local nationalism (Keddie, 1969). As strange as the epithet sounds to the great exponent of Pan-Islamism, Esposito (1988) calls al-Afghani the "father of Muslim nationalism". Al-Afghani was also the mentor of many of his followers, who would become some of the greatest thinkers in the Islamic world. They were the ones who would fight for the argument of reconciling Islam and nationalism.

2.2.3 Muslim Nationalism in the Subcontinent

The fusion of Islam and nationalism in the subcontinent is another instructive example. The Muslim leadership and traditional ulama were divided on the question of nationalism. Some condemned nationalism and described it as an insult to Islamic universalism. In contrast, Jinnah and the poet–philosopher Mohammad Iqbal were initially Indian nationalists who were committed to expelling the British Raj and establishing a multi-faith India. However, by the 1930s, fears of post-independence Hindu domination led both to call for a Muslim

homeland, 'Pakistan', for the subcontinent's Muslims. For Iqbal, in particular, the situation posed a serious problem. In a united India, only a secular nationalism could guarantee the rights of the Muslim minority amid a Hindu majority. Still, such polity would, by definition, restrict the role of Islam in public life. Thus, the only solution to the conundrum of Indian nationalism was Muslim nationalism in Pakistan (Esposito, 1984). The idea of a separate Muslim homeland in South Asia was first articulated by the great poet Mohammad Iqbal as president of the Muslim League in December 1930. Further, in the Lahore Resolution of 1940, the Muslim League's leadership demanded that "the areas in which the Muslims are numerically in the majority, as in the north-west and eastern zones of India, should be grouped to constitute independent states in which the constituent units shall be autonomous and sovereign" (Jaffrelot, 2002, p. 12).

Indeed, the origins of Muslim nationalism in South Asia were not in the Muslim-majority provinces of Punjab and Bengal but in the United Provinces (UP), where Muslims were not in the majority (Jalal, 1994, 2014). Although the AIML was established in Bengal in 1906 to represent Muslims, an Indian Muslim identity was forged in the Mohammedan Anglo-Oriental College established by Sir Syed Ahmad Khan in Aligarh in 1869. The pivotal role played by the Aligarh alums in both the Muslim League and the Khilafat movement reflects the importance of UP Muslims in the genesis of Muslim nationalism in India. The question is: Why did the Muslim minority provinces feel the need to articulate an identity that their co-religionists in the Muslim majority provinces to the West did not share until the 1930s, and what circumstances sparked this Muslim nationalism?

Two competing ideas have sought to explain the answers to these questions about Muslim nationalism in South Asia. The first idea was that Muslim nationalism was the Muslim elite's intention to protect their interests, and the second was the need for time, and all Muslims supported this idea. Paul Brass (1974, 1977, 1979) and Francis Robinson (1974, 1977, 1979)

have debated the question of Muslim nationalism in South Asia. Brass argues that there were few objective differences between Hindus and Muslims in the UP regarding language and culture, and that secular Indian nationalism threatened the status of the traditional Muslim landed elite. According to Brass (1974, p. 140), in the late nineteenth century, "Muslim leaders in North India did not recognise a common destiny with the Hindus because they believed they were in danger of losing their privileges as a dominant community". Therefore, they emphasise "a special sense of history incompatible with Hindu aspirations and a myth of Muslim decline into backwardness" (Brass, 1974, p. 140). Further, Brass (1991) describes that Muslim nationalism resulted from the "conscious manipulation of selected symbols of Muslim identity by elite Muslim groups in economic and political competition with each other and with elite groups among Hindus" (Brass, 1991, p. 76).

Moreover, Brass (1991) mentions three main symbols over which Muslims and Hindus clashed: the cow, the Sharia, and Urdu. Although cattle slaughter was not a central concern of Muslim political elites, preserving the Shari'a was. The body of laws that make up the Shari'a binds all Muslims and regulates most areas of social interaction, including marriage, divorce, and inheritance. Brass maintains that its interpretation and application by the *ulema* is one of the principal mechanisms whereby the latter retain their control over Islamic society and is the main symbol of conflict (Brass, 1991). Brass argues that it is a symbol that Muslim religious elites use to constrain Muslim political elites who, in turn, have found it helpful as a symbol in their conflicts with Hindu elites for political influence in the Muslim community (Brass, 1991). Brass mentions the example of the *Jami'yat-al-ulama-i-Hind*—a Muslim group founded to safeguard the Shari'a—which chose to form a strategic alliance with the Congress to constrain the Muslim League's freedom movement and contest its claim to speak on behalf of all Muslims. Thus, the League was forced to protect Muslim personal law in its demands and accept the ulema's continued influence over the Muslim masses. The concern of

Urdu's adoption as a symbol of Muslim identity by Muslim political elites in North India is perhaps Brass's most poignant example. Brass points out that both Muslims and Hindus in the UP communicated daily in Hindustani in the nineteenth century. Hindi and Urdu were mutually intelligible, and Persian or Arabic, not Urdu, was taught in Islamic schools. However, Urdu became a symbol of Muslim identity when the British decided to admit Hindi as a language of administration in the UP under pressure from Hindu elites (Brass, 2000). According to Brass (2000), the Muslim elites mobilised to defend Urdu as its replacement or use Hindi in conjunction, thereby threatening their interests by making it more difficult for Muslims to seek government employment. Thus, Urdu's choice as a symbol of Muslim identity had a material basis "arising out of elite competition for economic advantage" (Brass, 1991, p. 84).

As with the instrumentalist approach in general, this theory's weakness is in the excessive weight given to elite actions. Although Brass (1977) later acknowledges that elites are undoubtedly limited and constrained by the groups' cultures, they hope to represent them. However, his theory fails to explain why the Muslim masses later responded as enthusiastically as they did to the appropriation of religious symbols by the Muslim League after the 1940 Lahore Resolution. As a result, Muslim nationalism's religious dimension is emptied of all significance, becoming merely a marker used by self-interested elite groups claiming to represent Muslim interests. Thus, in Robinson's words:

> Muslims who write about the history of Islamic civilisation rather than that of the Mughals, who move to defend Urdu rather than let its cause go by default, who direct their thoughts to men of their faith rather than to the Indian nation, is made to do so not because it might have been religious instinct or at least a cultural preference, but because, from a choice of possibilities, they saw these policies as the best mobilisers of support for their interests. (Robinson, 2000, p. 922)

In Robinson's response to Brass, the second argument contends that there were genuine cultural differences between Hindus and Muslims in the nineteenth century (Robinson, 2000).

These differences, particularly in relation to 'idol worship' and 'cow protection', were essential and constrained the possibilities of Hindu–Muslim cooperation in the UP. The Muslims of that province "feared that the Hindu majority would not interfere with their religious practices such as cow sacrifice, but also … discriminate against them" (Robinson, 1974, p. 13).

Moreover, "Islamic ideas and values, then, both provide a large part of the framework of norms and desirable ends within which the UP elite take their rational political decisions and act on occasion as a motivating force" (Robinson, 2000, p. 181). Further, the Muslims of UP shared with their co-religionist a sense of belonging to a universal community of believers, the *umma*, which overrode the regional and ethnic ties that bound them to their Hindu neighbours (Robinson, 2000). This sentiment peaked during the Khilafat movement, which was "the greatest mass movement India had yet seen" (Robinson, 1979, p. 96).

Further, after centuries of Islamic rule, Muslims in South Asia still constituted a small minority in a Hindu and polytheistic population—*kafir* by the strictest tenets of the faith (Robinson, 1979)—and they troubled the Muslim UP elite. The fear that Muslims would be swamped by the Hindu majority after the British left was a motivating factor behind the rise of Muslim nationalism. This helps explain Sir Syed Ahmed Khan's attempt to rehabilitate the Muslims in British eyes after the 1857 revolt and his unwavering loyalty to the British Raj. That is why the Muslim minorities inside India supported creating a Muslim state in Muslim-majority areas that patently did not serve their own material interests. Therefore, the Muslim League viewed South Asia's Muslims as constituting a nation defined as sharing a common religion, history, culture, and language. This definition emerged as the 'two-nation theory', explained later in this chapter. Finally, this Muslim nationalism successfully mobilised the Muslim masses behind the movement for a territorially defined Muslim homeland within South Asia.

In the case of Pakistan, there are two dominant narratives. The significant difference between the narratives is whether Islam's role in state nationalism has always been dominant or whether it has only been so since the late 1970s. Islam is represented as the critical component of Pakistani state nationalism, and it is argued that Jinnah wanted to establish an Islamic state. However, opinions differ on whether the objective was a modern or traditional Islamic state (Ali, 1967; Mujahid, 1999; Zaman, 1985). Because Pakistan was created based on Muslim nationalism, denying or lessening Islam's role in Pakistani state nationalism, according to this narrative, means rejecting Pakistani nationalism. General Zia argued in 1981, "take the Judaism from Israel, and it will fall like a house of cards. Take Islam out of Pakistan and make it a secular state; it would collapse" (Tharoor, 2014).

Jawed (2010, p. 15) calls believers of this narrative Islamic nationalists and argues that "to many Islamic nationalists, it was not a matter of choice for the Pakistanis whether to build their nationhood on the foundation of Islam or on a common and truly secular cultural heritage: the latter, in their view, simply did not exist".

2.3 Conceptualisation of Identity

Identity emerged in ancient Greece and has had a long history in Western philosophy. However, in the 1960s, it began receiving more social-analytical use in the United States. It was extraordinarily influential and quickly spread through academic disciplines and across national boundaries. It was rapidly incorporated into the journalistic lexicon, including social and political practice and analysis vocabulary. 'Identity talk' continues to grow, with many writers whose primary interest lies beyond the conventional 'identity field' writing extensively on identity (Brubaker and Cooper, 2000). Identity can be defined by a wide range of approaches depending on the research context, such as national identity, questions of Englishness and Britishness, multiculturalism, national identity, and geopolitics (Byrne, 2007; Dijkink, 1996; Morris, 2005; Parekh, 2000). Identity has been investigated on several

levels, ranging from identities of individuals (identity at a personal level) to that of citizens and organisations (identity at a structural level), and from identities of nations or countries to collective identities, such as Australian identity and European identity. Further, identity can be viewed as a "relational term" and is thus characterised as the "relationship between two or more related entities in a manner that asserts a sameness or equality" (Wodak et al., 2009, p. 11).

Scholars in the social sciences and humanities have focused on the question of identity. For example, in political science, the idea of identity is at the core of lively discussion in any significant subfield. In comparative politics, identity takes a strong position in nationalism and ethnic conflict studies (Deng, 1995; Laitin, 1999; Smith, 1991). Identity can be described as an expression of existence and belonging; it is a social phenomenon that starts with the process of identity formation by connection with the 'other' or against the 'other'. However, few researchers have categorised identity as 'personal' and 'social' identity (Fearon, 1999). According to Hogg and Abrams (1988), identity is a person's perception of who they are, how they view others and themselves, and where they are in the world. Deng (1995) explains that identity defines how individuals and groups define themselves and others based on class, race, faith, language, and culture.

Scholars have defined social identity as the desire for group differentiation, integrity, and position on politics and the economy's character, structure, and boundaries in historically relevant discourses (or frames of understanding) (Herrigel, 1993). In its historical sense, identity definition stems most from Erik Erikson's work in the 1950s. Now, the word 'identity' has acquired a life of its own in many social science disciplines.

Further, identity can be categorised as individual or collective (Wodak et al., 2009). An individual's identity is considered an identity within the person's sense of self. This term is

often referred to as "social identity". The object of identity has social characteristics such as age, class, and sex. For example, it has unique external features and a special role in one's vision of oneself. Collective identity concerns structures (e.g. groups, associations, classes, and communities) rather than persons. Holzinger (1993 p. 12) points out that "individual and system-related identities overlap a great deal in the identity of the individual".

Thus, persons and social groups, such as nations, cannot have homogeneous identities (Wodak et al., 2009). In the era of global change driven by cultural intermixes and individual identity, group identities can be considered hybrids of identity (Hall, 1996). As a result, individuals and collective groups are composed of multiple identities, of which national identity is just one part. According to Peters (2002), collective identity should be viewed as a community field or as a fundamental parameter of cultural elements. A social unit's cultural aspects, such as its present state, character, challenges, past or future, form a collective identity. Collective identity may have a narrow or 'thin' nature (e.g. when a group or association shares a limited set of shared goals or objectives). Conversely, it may be rich or 'thick' with significant historical depth, comprehensive group-character conceptions, and collective unity.

2.3.1 National Identity and Its Origin

In both social science and public discourse, the terms 'national identity' and 'collective identity' are frequently used and discussed (Peters, 2002). Peters presents a multidimensional study of aspects of national identity and defines ethnic, cultural, and political identities. The terms 'ethnocultural' and 'civic' are used to identify two types of nationhood. The term 'ethnocultural' suggests that common ancestors, similar history, and shared cultural customs and traditions are essential components of a 'nation' or 'national identity'. In contrast, 'civic' views the nation as a 'political community' and a sovereign democrat entity with political and legal equivalence between citizens (Peters, 2002; Smith, 1991). The ethnocultural idea of

nationhood may be divided into ethnic and cultural components; however, this distinction is somewhat hazy because the ethnic component frequently draws on cultural similarities. In examining the development of ethnocultural and civic identities, Peters (2002) points out that in identity literature, France and the United States are portrayed as civic conceptions of nationhood, but Germany continues to be influenced by ethnic concepts.

National identity is complicated and multidimensional in its definition. Naturally, the sense of belonging to one nation or state is called national identity. Similarly, cultural and political reflection with a specific territory is called national identity. According to the political scientist Emerson (1960, p. 102), national identity is a "body of people who feel that they are a nation". Social historian Anderson (1991) explains that national identity is a socially constructed trait. The idea of national identity is widely used and heavily contested in social science and public discourse (Peters, 2002). Although all disciplines derive from similar historical foundations, there is excellent philosophical diversity within literature and national identity research. Imperial loyalties date back to the Roman Empire; however, group and individual affiliation with nation-states arose in the twentieth century as a result of worldwide wars of independence from colonial rulers. After the Ottoman Empire's defeat and the subsequent divide between the British and French in much of the Middle East and North Africa, identification was more common. This identification became more popular in the post-Soviet vacuum—the further break up of Europe and Asia. The nation-states have increasingly carried on the leading position in world society and its people's lifestyles and influenced many threads of discourse that concentrate on this intense feeling of 'collective identity'.

National identity has been defined at the nation-state level as a collective identity. It is often used in combination with or in the form of nationalism, which simultaneously has some internal homogeneity or 'collective identity' and external distinctions among itself and

'other' states (Anderson, 1983; Brubaker, 2012). Further, Anderson (2006, p. 3) finds the nation-ness to be "the most universally legitimate value in the political life of our time", in which nations have a rich, dynamic legitimacy. Kunovich (2009) suggests that it is a social construction, and Anderson (2006, p. 7) explains that "regardless of the actual inequality and exploitation that may prevail in each, the nation is always conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship". This study conducts a review that considers national identity as a collective identity within officially recognised nation-states, sharing common institutions, symbols, and an overall political framework within the broad literature of nationalism. As Smith (1991) describes, members believe they belong to the territory and aim for national unity, autonomy, brotherhood, and authenticity. This unifying power holds nations united and prevents minority groups from desiring or seeking autonomy from the state. Thus, nationalism refers to a common identity of various ethnic groups that are typically minority groups within a nation-state and do not have their own separate nation-state (e.g. the Kurds living within the borders of the nation-states of Iraq, Syria, and Turkey, or the Basques living within the nation-states of France and Spain). However, my conceptualisation of national identity would reinforce the nation-state's cohesive collective identity, transcending cultural, ethnic, political, and other disparities within its borders. Hence, the focus of this research is Pakistan's national identity in the context of the nation-state.

Building on the general definition and putting together the advantages of national identity, I will briefly identify the origins of the two central national identities to clarify their structure and facilitate my research. A discussion of ethnic and civic national identity will provide the basis for the research approach to this study and its structural composition. The national identity of most nation-states is based on either shared ethnicity, shared values and beliefs, or a mixture of both. Smith (1991, p. 41) indicates that national identity is composed of a variety of interdependent elements—ethnic, cultural, geographical, economic, and legal–political—

requiring five main features: historical territory/homeland; common myths and historical memories; traditional mass public culture; common legal rights and responsibilities for all members; and a shared territorial mobility economy.

Many states, including the multi-ethnic states of today, initially developed as a single culture community around a core ethnic group (Gellner, 1983). Around this dominant group, states have developed their legislative, judicial, economic, and military structures and are generally granted robust political control, thereby benefiting the majority groups (Smith, 1991). This socially constructed trait can either unite a nation by homogenising it or separate it by encouraging heterogeneity. Therefore, the state must concentrate on conscious and adaptable civic nationalism to integrate the people inside its geographic boundaries. For example, in sub-Saharan Africa, "colonial states had to foster purely territorial patriotism, a sense of political loyalty to the newly created states and their embryonic political communities" (Smith, 1991, p. 41). Their national existence and unity, as well as those of others, depended on the ability to forge "out of whatever cultural components were available a coherent mythology and symbolism of a community of history and culture became everywhere paramount as a condition of national survival and unity" (Smith, 1991, p. 42). In areas with great ethnic rivalries, the dominant ethnic group encounters stiff resistance. This shows the lack of a unifying political culture that could transcend the ethnic majority and minority groups (Smith, 1991).

In particular, within multicultural populations, the state plays an essential role in defining its national identity by seeking or establishing a unifying force or a social bond (Miller, 1995) that holds people united despite cultural and social heterogeneity. This ideology is often called civic nationalism and is based on shared ideals, symbols, and traditions (Smith, 1991). States intentionally emphasise the natural features of the homeland (lakes, mountains, rivers, and valleys, as well as human sculptures and monuments); myths of origin and descent;

periods of liberation, migration, tyranny, and resistance; heroes, chosen citizens, and icons; and traditions and ceremonies—all of which unite the pride and sense of shared heritage and belonging among the people. The state's public education system is the most commonly used tool for creating a national identity through the deliberate use of symbols and the ever-growing and far-reaching mainstream media. Although each national identity may be slightly distinct in nature—given its unitary symbols and historical legacies, how people are incorporated into politics, and the focus on the ethnic or civic basis of national identity—all frameworks perform the function of homogenising one cultural component of their substantially heterogeneous population—their national identity. Religion can be considered a significant social force in organising nation-states and citizens' identities. It could be one type of traditional value that could complement or even allow a state's national identity and transcend cultural and ethnic differences. Although several scholars assume that ethnic or civic homogeneity is sufficient for a cohesive or more robust national identity, Lapidus (2001) concisely explains the involvement of religion in its elaborate structure:

> National identity is neither rigorously secular nor exclusively religious. Nationality involves concepts of citizenship, concepts of ethnicity and concepts of religion in an ambiguous connection to each other so that it is possible for different people to participate in the same nationality based on one or another of these factors or some combination of them, or a changing combination of factors. (Lapidus, 2001, pp. 47–8)

He added that:

> National identities are not only political identities but, like religions, are comprehensive systems of meanings and values. They fuse personal and collective identities. National and religious symbols have the power to invoke deep loyalty, devotion, sacrifice, love of community and a sense of the fulfilment of transcendental purposes. Religion and national identity work together because they overlap systems of meaning. (Lapidus, 2001, p. 51)

Although the meanings derived from religion vary from person to person, it is a significant factor in many nations and people's lives, even in the contemporary modern world.

2.3.2 Why is National Identity Important?

Understanding national identity should be explored in terms of interstate confrontation and regional chaos in the modern world. Taken briefly from the psychological perspective, greater levels of group identity promote loyalty between citizens and their government bodies (Miller, 1995). Further, national identity enhances the consideration of community welfare over each member's own identity (Kramer and Brewer, 1984) and reduces rivalry between subgroups (Gaertner and Dovidio, 2000). Therefore, a more robust national identity would mitigate the chances of riots, civil disputes, and wars of secession in nation-states. However, an inclusive definition of nationality in diverse modern societies is essential for social cohesion (Wright et al., 2012). Therefore, understanding national identity and its meaning to citizens will enlighten states regarding uniting their citizens.

In addition to fostering social unity and cohesion, national identity can drive citizens to play a role in their country's better interests. Moreover, national identity would never imply renouncing other familial, religious, and ethnic identities. Peek (2005), a sociologist of religion, interprets many instantaneous identities, indicating that all identities have a specific salience. Thus, one identity would have higher significance than other identities that build up selfhood (Peek, 2005). Further, Peek stated:

> As individuals become more committed to a given role, that role will assume a higher identity …
> the higher the identity in the salience hierarchy, the more likely the identity will be established in a
> given situation or in many situations. (Peek, 2005, p. 217)

Thus, despite the diversity of culture, faith, and ethnicity within nation-states, national identity encompasses people's ability to regard the state as a legitimate component of their own identity.

2.3.3 National Identity and the Modern Nation-State

National identity consists of the elements of collective identity that are present or circulated among members of a state-bounded society. In this sense, national identity should be regarded as a specific part of the public culture of modern state-bounded society (Peters, 2002). However, it is not necessarily true that all public members share the same conception of national identity; it does not mean that it is consensually accepted or internalised (Peters, 2002). Further, according to Peters (2002), a nation is a political organisation and a political collectivity for which membership implies specific rights and duties. Some values and principles relate to the political order but rarely stand alone; instead, they are mixed with others (e.g. national economy, national scientific achievements, high culture, and national cuisine). From a historical perspective, a nation is an entity with a past and a future that transcends individual lifespans. Peters (2002) comments on acquiring cultural heritage by understanding, accepting, sharing, and practising it and discusses collective orientations towards the future. This implies that people can actually develop another's identity if they adopt it.

For Colls (2002), identities are never imposed; they require consent or accommodation. According to him, nation-states must build a collective identity as a counterweight to individualism. Further, Colls (2002, p. 174) claims that "people can be many things in different circumstances, but they have to decide who they are in sum" at some point. Another scholar, Weight (2003), explains that national identity is the sum of the forms of national consciousness. Finally, Bourdieu (1994) asserts that the state performs a significant role in national identity formation. He further states that "through classificational systems inscribed in law, through bureaucratic procedures, educational structures and social rituals … the state moulds mental structures and imposes common principles of vision and division … And it thereby contributes to the construction of what is commonly designated as national identity

(or, in a more traditional language, national character)" (Bourdieu, 1994, p. 7). Thus, "national identity is shaped by state, political, institutional, media and everyday social practices, and the material and social conditions which emerge as their results, to which the individual is subjected" (Wodak et al., 2009, p. 29). In the process of shaping national identity, it is important to recognise the role of national symbols in developing the spirit of national identity: National identity describes that condition in which a mass of people have made the exact identification with national symbols—that is, they have internalised the symbols of the nation—so that they may act as one psychological group when there is a threat to, or the possibility of enhancement of, these symbols of national identity (Bloom, 1993).

2.3.4 Challenges in Studying National Identity

Summing up lessons from previous works on national identity and its role in human minds and societies, Mandler (2006) criticises the social science of the 1950s and 1960s for being too handicapped by its laboratory conditions. He acknowledges the works published in the 1970s to explain collective identity (e.g. Stryker and Burke, 2000; Tajfel, 1982). However, Mandler (2006, p. 274) still considers them laboratory-orientated and not applicable to 'real life', especially at macro levels such as national identity.

Mandler (2006) refers to Phillip Gleason (1983), who, in the 1980s, warned about two meanings of national identity: psychological and sociological. Mandler (2006, p. 271) claims that social scientists working with identity "have puzzled its possible meaning and utility". Therefore, Mandler (2006) attempts to examine what social scientists think national identity is, and its role in human minds and societies. For Mandler (2006, p. 276), "identity is just one form of national consciousness which exists alongside other forms, such as ideologies, patriotism, nationalism and the idea of national character, which may or may not be incorporated into identities". However, Cohen (1986) distinguishes between the 'private face'

and 'public face' of group identification, suggesting that identity construction is both psychological and social.

Conversely, social psychologists argue that people are midway between the consciousness of their individual uniqueness and the consciousness of their group identities. Therefore, nationhood shapes our daily social veracity equally at the institutional and personal levels. Reicher and Hopkins (2001, p. 281) point out that "identity is an important but elusive quality, and national identity is even more so. What goes on in people's heads is complicated for historians to pin down. We do have evidence, at least about the public faces of people's identities". However, the processes by which those identities are constructed are complex and involve many psychological and sociological mechanisms that vary according to context and situation.

As pointed out above, national identity is a complex and elusive concept. Nevertheless, it has been demonstrated that various approaches can be employed in attempts to understand it. For example, to understand social processes, national identity (acting as a category of analysis) can be seen as strong or weak, individual or collective, or perceived as having the potential for mobilising individuals for action. In Pakistan's case, it appears that Pakistani intellectuals and policy-makers have not helped imagine and build a strong, coherent Pakistani identity. However, a fragmented and disputed self-definition has allowed 'others' to become more robust in defining Pakistani identity.

The best way to understand the problem of national identity is to examine it as multifaceted and shaped in concentric circles so that an individual approaching one would open the door to another. The innermost circle is that of Islam, which is the centre of values, equality and justice, respect for women, defence of minority faiths, dissent, and the underprivileged—that of Pakistan's tribal culture/ethnicity and folk heritage. It is a critical component of identity

creation, whereby regional languages and folk cultures compete and converge, leading to Pakistan's national identity. The outermost circle is Pakistan's territoriality, cultural past, and shared heritage. Some Pakistanis feel strongly about the fourth circle, which is abstract and symbolic: the notion of the Muslim Ummah—a group of believers bound together not by land or race but by Islamic faith and brotherhood. Various identities are part of the broader Pakistani nationality; they work, battle, and evolve within its boundaries. Cogent Pakistaniat is in the cycle of evolution, and Pakistanis are learning to appreciate and embrace diversity. However, this synergistic perspective does not mean there is no controversy or disagreement about the question of identity.

Rather than race, Islamisation's degree and scale inspire passion and rivalry for national identity. The American political scientist Stephen Shulman (2002, p. 559) developed the model that identified three critical elements in national identity (civic identity, cultural identity, and ethnicity). Shulman developed this model in response to the civic/ethnic dichotomy introduced by Hans Kohn in his research in the 1940s regarding European nationalism. Kohn distinguished a national civic identity in Western Europe and an ethnic, national identity in Eastern Europe. His model presents civic and ethnic as opposed to frameworks with the tacit connotations of modern versus traditional, liberal versus illiberal, and civilised versus non-civilised. This covert judgement is often still present in public and political identity discourse. This judgement introduces a bias in program design for fragile states: everybody wants to be perceived as modern, trying to make fragile states fit for modernity (Grotenhuis, 2016). Shulman then developed a new model that presents national identity as explicitly multifaceted. People have multiple identities that are dear to them and play a role in building their national identity. The model, developed through his reflections on the European and North American nation discourse, makes space for salient notions about the nation-building of fragile states, such as ethnicity, language, traditions, religion, and ancestry.

It combines the elements of civic identity that the international community promotes in its state-building programs with the cultural and ethnic factors that define many of the identity struggles in fragile states. Shulman's three main elements (civic identity, cultural identity, and ethnicity) and their underlying components are the building blocks of national identity, but their relative importance or weight is not defined in advance. It is an open model that leaves space for a contextual and diverse understanding of national identity.

Is Shulman's model applicable to the case of Pakistan? Shulman developed his model based on his research on national identity in Europe and the United States. Therefore, it is not self-evident that the same model applies to fragile states. Cultural and ethnic identities are often strongly developed in many nation-states, while a civic identity is generally weak. In Pakistan, civic identity is weak, while ethnic identities are often substantial.

2.4 An Overview of Islamism and Secularism

With the advent of modern nation-states, the Muslim world's disagreement between religion's role in the state and politics intensified. In the case of Pakistan, the drift between secularists and Islamists on Pakistan's identity and Islam's role has continued since its inception. Secularism and Islamism are variable terms with many definitions; however, this study only deals with those that are relevant to the aim and purpose of this research project. In the context of secularism, it is critical to distinguish first between two significant concepts: secularity and secularism. Secularity represents one of the characteristics of modernity, including social differentiation, the establishment of positivistic sciences, and the formation of the modern state (Taylor, 2007). Conversely, secularism is a political ideology—or, in its ultimate form, a worldview—that embraces these cognitive and socio-political shifts as a political mission. As Asad (2003, p. 1) described, "secularism as political doctrine arose in modern Euro-America".

This study involves secularism as a political ideology and the changes that made the Church an integral part of the political order only to become marginalised by the sovereign state. As scholars have mentioned, "secularism here just meant that the role of religion was defined by the political body, not that religion was pushed outside the public space" (Roy, 2013, p. 10). However, in this regard, the Islamic position typically makes two primary points: theologically, Islam rejects the idea of separating politics and religion; and culturally, Islam is more than a religion in the sense that it is understood in the West (Roy, 2007). According to Roy (1994), "Islam was born as a sect and as a society, a political and religious community" (p. 12). Thus, it is argued that the word secularism is to be used in the context of a 'political ideology' that seeks to use the modern state as an instrument of secularisation to spread and cement these changes because its adherents believe in their ultimate value (Abdul-Wahab, 2013).

Islamists, 'Islamism', and 'political Islam' are modern phenomena used in Western scholarship to describe persons and social and political movements working to preserve and establish Islamic order in both the private and public spheres. Thus, Islamism can be defined as either a political ideology or a social movement, because an ideology implies "presenting Islam as the guiding principle, even the blueprint, of government" (Akbarzadeh and Saeed, 2003, p. 2). Shepard (1987) explains "the tendency to view Islam not merely as a religion in the narrow sense of theological belief, private prayer and ritual worship, but also as a total way of life with guidance for political, economic, and social behaviour" (p. 308).

Islamism as a social movement is "a modern intellectual and political movement that seek to bring society and politics into agreement with Islam" (Selvik and Stenslie, 2011, p. 128). Aktay (2013) defines it as "an effort to render Islam sovereign to all domains of life from faith and thought to politics, administration and law, and the quest for arriving a solution to the problem of underdevelopment of the Muslim countries against the West by establishing

among Muslims unity and solidarity" (p. 114). This study considers Islamism a socio-political movement. As scholars have stated, "Islamism is a socio-political manifestation of Islam in the modern era" (Affan, 2020, p. 38). Secularism has been similarly defined. Therefore, Islamism and secularism are not merely concepts attempting to describe socio-political/sociological trends linked to modernity; rather, both are ideologies about which fierce discussions have turned for decades in Muslim countries.

In conclusion, the above definitions of the ideas of Islamism and secularism perhaps provide decent insights into these terms. Both terms are two conflicting 'political ideologies', or world views in their utmost forms. Islamism and Islamist movements portray the modern socio-political manifestation of Islam. Although Islam as a religion focuses on faith and looks ahead to the hereafter, Islamism is more concerned with the structure of society at present, as well as constructs and theories of Islam's political, legal, economic, and social systems. Similarly, the meaning of secularism defined and contended to be suitable in the context of this study is a 'political ideology' or world view "that aims to remake religion on the conditions of modernity and to confine and control its social functions and manifestations in both public and private spheres" (Affan, 2020, p. 54). Further, Islamists accept the nation-state structure and want to operate through it, which is fundamental to the Muslims' predicament (Asad, 2003). The individual's right to pursue self-creation—a tenet freely accepted by secularists—is addressed by Islamists first by Muslims' responsibility to God's submission as prescribed by Sharia law (Asad, 2003, p. 198). Therefore, it is necessary here to provide an overview of the nation-state debate in secular and Islamist discourse, and how both ideologies view the nation-state and want to operate the state.

2.5 The Nation-State Debate in Secular and Islamist Discourses

The state is the most fundamental community institution for collective life connection and civilisation. It is the political entity through which a country's people build their shared

border amid a stable government. Therefore, people have recognised the need for a state from the beginning of civilised life and throughout human history, including the foundation and stability of the state and the history of its development and evolution. The scope of the state is expanding evenly in modern times because of the growth of practical procedures and the path of new complications in communal life. In nearly every country today, the state's job is to preserve law and order and build collective justice and social welfare (Modudi, 1963).

In general discussions, a nation-state is variously called a 'country', 'nation', or a 'state', but technically, it is a specific form of state entity in a territory that governs a nation and derives its legitimacy from successfully serving all of its citizens, and 'state' implies that a state accords with a nation (Anderson, 2006). The modern nation-state is relatively new in human history and was created after the Renaissance and Reformation. It is based on the idea that the state can treat large numbers of people equally by applying the law through bureaucratic machinery. Moaddel (2020, p. 85) argues that "in liberal democratic theory, the modern state is considered legitimate insofar as it represents the common interests of the individuals living within the national borders". When some modern nation-states prospered in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, they were promoted as a model form of governance. For example, the League of Nations and the United Nations were predicated concepts of a community of nation-states (Anderson, 2006).

The idea of a nation-state is associated with the rise of the modern system of states, usually dated to the Westphalia treaty (1648). The spread of the national idea was aided by developments of mass society, such as mass literacy and mass media. The printing press made it possible to publish literature in national languages. The rise of democracy, the idea of self-rule, and checks on the power of kings by parliaments also aided the formation of nationalism and patriotism. Nationalism requires faith in and loyalty to the state (Anderson, 2006). Wimmer (2013) argues that the idea of a territorial and national state spread like a

contagion, borne on the backs of the successful warfare of states against empires. Love (2010) argues that three trends—changes in technologies, economies, and societies—brought about the sovereign state system.

The territory's entire population pledges allegiance to the national culture of the nation-state. Thus, the people can be considered homogeneous on the state level, even if there is diversity at lower social and political organisation levels. The state not only houses the nation but protects it and its national identity. Traditionally, the term 'nation-state' has been used imprecisely for a state that attempts to promote a single national identity, often beginning with a single national language, government, and economic system. Moreover, the modern nation-state is more extensive and populous than the 'city-states' of ancient Greece or Medieval Europe. Those 'states' were governed through face-to-face relationships among people who often lived within the city's walls. Further, the nation-state differs from an 'empire', which is usually an expansive territory comprising numerous states and many nationalities united by political and military power and a common currency.

The question of Islam's relationship to the modern sovereign state is not new. It has been discussed in the Muslim world with the rise of modern states since the twentieth century. However, the writings of prominent Islamist thinkers, including Syed Mawdudi, are characterised by a much more explicit concern with discussing the concept of political legitimacy, sovereignty, and 'divine sovereignty' in the nation-state context. These are the substantial differences that exist between Islamist politics and modern secular conceptions of the state. States in the contemporary era have embraced a form of sovereignty that is absolute within a given territory and limited outside it (Nolte, 2017).

Given the academic disagreements between Islam's political theory and the secularists' idea regarding the modern sovereign state, one would reasonably expect that states within the

Muslim world would confine Islam's political notions out of self-interest if nothing else. Yet, we know that at least some post-colonial state-making elites genuinely sought to forge secular states (Turkey under Ataturk) free of any Islamic influence (Nolte, 2017). Indeed, the Turks were not alone in opposing Islam's political philosophy among post-colonial proto-nationalists. Not only did many state-making elites in post-colonial states recognise the threat of what 'political Islam' might pose to their state-making projects, but they also vigorously attempted to counter it (Nolte, 2017). In Pakistan's case, the central question that Islamists and secularists still debate regards the role of Islam in state affairs, including political legitimacy and sovereignty.

2.5.1 Defining Sovereignty in Political Discourses of Secularists and Islamists

The Quran repeatedly speaks of the power and authority of God, as "authority (al-hukm) belongs to God alone" (Quran, 12:40). Yet, it is not mere quibbling to observe that the idea of sovereignty has a particular history in European political thought and that it emerged in tandem with the rise of the modern state. For Muslims of the twentieth century, writing under the promise of the modern nation-state, the idea of sovereignty conjures up precisely the sort of things that Bodin and Hobbes had theorised. The question for them is often related to whether such sovereignty can belong to a mere human being, a collection of people—the 'artificial person' of the state (Hobbes, 1996)—or whether it properly belongs only to God. How did this idea become such a crucial part of Islamist discourse? How, and to what purpose, has it been invoked in religious and political argument, and what might the contestations over it tell us about competing conceptions of the law and politics of Islam in the modern world? Before examining such questions, it is necessary to take a quick measure of what pre-modern commentators discussed when they explained passages that Islamist ideologues take as central to the idea of the sovereignty of God.

Islamists have sovereignty as a political concept in mind when they speak of God as the exclusive locus and source of all power. This idea of the sovereignty of God lies at the heart of Islamist conceptions of the state, law, and Islam itself. Thus, an 'Islamic state' is based on recognising God's sovereignty, which entails that no law other than God's is to have any claim on people—that any failure to submit to this conception of sovereignty of God is unbelief (Zaman, 2015).

However, in political science, the term 'sovereignty' is used in the sense of 'absolute overlordship or complete suzerainty'. Thus, if a person or an institution is to be sovereign, it follows that the word of that institution or person is the law, and a "sovereign has an undisputed right to impose his will on his subjects, and the subjects are under complete obligation to obey him". Krasner (1999, p. 30) succinctly describes it thus: "The fundamental norm of Westphalian sovereignty is that states exist in specific territories, within which domestic political authorities are the sole arbiters of legitimate behaviour".

Sovereignty resides in the people of a nation, and as a community of people and as sovereigns, we assume that they have the right to change the fundamentals of law when they deem it necessary. Thus, scholars have defined sovereignty as a political and legal concept. However, as Grimm (2007) notes, it is a "basic legalo-political concept", and Mahlmann (2007, p. 207) states that the "concept of sovereignty is a basic concept of law and politics". Further, a dictionary entry on sovereignty by Nieson (2008, p. 1205) sums up the inseparable link between the political and legal contents:

> Sovereignty means the capability to make collectively binding decisions autonomously for a number of persons. In the history of political thought, Sovereignty is, therefore, primarily identified with the legislature as the supreme state authority. This underlines that sovereign power is exercised by means of positive law.

In understanding the development of Islamic conceptions of sovereignty and government throughout Muslim history, it may be helpful to examine transitions that were triggered by significant events, after which a new equilibrium was established within Islamic political thought. Both the dynamic times of change and more static periods of the caliphate and empire led to critical developments in Islamic political thought, even as many thinkers sought to preserve the spirit of a 'golden age' identified with the faith's origins.

Secular politics is an essential component of liberal values and the most contentious issue in cultural warfare between secularists and Islamists in the contemporary period. In places like Pakistan, this issue is at the centre of a significant ideological struggle over the country's future. The formation of modern states in the Muslim world in the 1920s was the political outcome of the nationalist movement that began in the late nineteenth century. These states, in turn, provided further support for creating and maintaining a new cultural environment in which secularism was the dominant discourse, shaping the view of intellectual leaders and informing state policies. Connected to these developments were (1) the rise of an assertive critical attitude towards Islam, Islamic institutions, and traditional culture, and (2) the implementation of a series of policies that purportedly aimed to modernise and standardise the court system in order to establish and foster secular education (Moaddel, 2020).

However, these changes spawned fundamentalist reactions from religious activists. Moreover, state-initiated and sponsored cultural programs to promote secular institutions and endorse national identity in contradistinction to religious and institutional laws that ran contrary to the Sharia appear to have contributed to the perception among the faithful that their religion was under siege. As a result, their core values were offended, and their freedom to engage in religious rituals was frustrated. This historical background has examined the changes in the Islamic theory of government, ranging from belief in the caliphate as unifying religious and political authority to acceptance of the institutional separation of religious and

political leadership (which had become the *modus operandi* of Muslim politics in the pre-modern period), and to the embrace of constitutionalism and parliamentary democracy by Muslim theologians in the early twentieth century.

In Pakistan's case, Mawdudi uses modern political terms for communication facility, which was initially a contemporary understanding of Muslim thought such as state, sovereignty, democracy, and the constitution. But what does it mean to him? Mawdudi also provides meanings for all of these terms and criticises their definitions, which are prevalent in Western political thought.

Sovereignty (*Hakmiyyah*) became Mawdudi's central political concern regarding statecraft, and his innovative interpretation of sovereignty contextualised it as a modern political concept. Mawdudi (1963) suggests that absolute sovereignty belongs to God the Lawgiver, such that vesting sovereignty in any other entity amounts to idolatry (*shirk)*. Therefore, Mawdudi demands that the state of Pakistan be rooted in the principle of divine sovereignty, and all legislation should be aligned according to the dictates of this principle (Rehman, 2018). Accordingly, in 1949, the Objectives Resolution was adopted by the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan, which, among other things, declared sovereignty as God's prerogative. In his book *Islami Riyasat* chapter *Islam, ka nazriya I siyasi* (The Political Concept of Islam), Mawdudi (1963, pp. 137) argues that "sovereignty (*hakimiyyat*) rests only with God. God alone is the lawgiver. No human being, not even a prophet, has the right to command and prohibit on his own".

It is clear from these explanations that the concept of Mawdudi's *Hakim-e-Ala* (sovereignty belongs to Allah) and the legislature is, in fact, a refutation of Western notions. On these points, he further claims that the Islamic system is not a Western-style secular democracy. In Western democracies, sovereignty is in the hands of the people, and laws are made and

changed according to their wishes and opinions. In contrast, Allah makes a higher law through his Messenger Prophet (PBUH), which the state and the nation must obey. It cannot be called a democracy because Islam sets the boundaries for enslaved people, and they cannot transgress them.

On the contrary, there is a concept of 'theocracy', but there is no room for it here. However, Mawdudi eventually coined the term 'theo-democracy' for Islam's political ideology, in which Muslims have limited popular sovereignty under God's supreme authority. In this ideology, the executive and the legislature are formed by the opinion of the Muslims, and only they have the power to remove it (Mawdudi, 1967).

According to the Quran, the proper form of human government is the Khilafah. In the previous lines, it has become clear that Mawdudi (1966) refers to a 'democratic government' as a system of government based on Muslims' consensus under the sovereignty of God, in which Muslims collectively live individual life. Mawdudi, further explains that, according to the Qur'an, the command of God and the Messenger is the supreme law against which believers can only adopt the attitude of obedience. In matters in which God and the Messenger have given their verdict, no Muslim is allowed to make their own decisions, and it is against the law to deviate from this (Mawdudi, 1966).

The basic principle, then, is that no coercion is allowed to rule Muslims; it is evident that this is the spirit of the Islamic style of governance. Therefore, Mawdudi describes the Khilafah Rashida as a 'democracy', even though it has all of the features mentioned above. Explaining this principled style of governing, Mawdudi writes the only true form of human government, according to the Qur'an, is for the state to recognise the legal supremacy of God and the Prophet, relinquish sovereignty in its favour, and accept the status of "caliphate"

(representation) under the absolute ruler. Whether legislative, or judicial, or administrative, its powers must be limited to the limits [set by God] (Mawdudi, 1966).

Thus, according to Mawdudi, the ordinary person has an equal share in forming the collective system of Muslims, which Maulana calls the "collective caliphate". Moreover, this principle separates the Islamic Khilafah from class rule and religious leadership and turns it towards democracy.

Mawdudi agrees with the principle of democracy that the formation and replacement of the government should be by the will of the people. But the people are not absolute in terms of the state's law, principles of life, and internal and external politics. The supreme law of God and the Prophet (PBUH) maintains control over people's desires with its principles, limits, and moral precepts. The state follows a set path, and the administrator, judiciary, legislature, and the nation do not have the power to pass a bill unless the nation decides to break its own covenant—that is, to get out of the faith.

2.6 The Two-Nation Theory

The two-nation theory was one of the Pakistan Movement's founding concepts (i.e. Pakistan's ideology as a Muslim nation-state in South Asia). In perhaps the most definitive way, the two-nation theory implies social, cultural, religious, and political distinctions between the two dominant communities of the Hindus and Muslims of the subcontinent. These divergences were instrumental in establishing two distinct political ideologies that were responsible for partitioning the subcontinent into two separate states—Pakistan and India—in 1947. The exact chronology of how the two-nation theory developed is often debated and is often associated with Sir Syed Aḥmad Khan, the founder of Ali Gar University. However, some identify the scholar Sirhindi, who opposed Din-Ilahi during Emperor Akbar's era as the theory's 'chief architect'. In addition, Allama Iqbal is often

credited with explicitly proposing India's geopolitical partition into two separate states—a proposition that Syed Maududi also supported in the two-nation theory (Nasr, 1994).

The term 'two-nations theory' is a literal translation from an Urdu term, *Do-Qaumi Nazria*, where the word 'Qaum' stands for the nation. In tracing the genesis of Hindu–Muslim discord in the Indian subcontinent, the primordial model first presents the idea that both groups have different religions, and their cultures always had distinct identities. In 1817, James Mill, in his book *History of British India*, first observed that two different civilisations and nations lived together in India (Mill, 1826), which indicates the two-nation theory. Robinson (1974) argues that Indian Muslims were always different from their Hindu counterparts in terms of religion, culture, and civilisation; therefore, the Muslim community was bound to become a separate nation (Robinson, 1974). A famous Pakistani historian, Aziz (1967, p. 143), supports this argument, stating that "the Hindu-Muslim conflict was not merely religious, but it was the clash of two civilisations, of two peoples who had different languages, different literary roots, different ideas of education, different philosophical sources and different concepts of art". Sayeed (1968) uses the metaphor of two parallel but not-mixable rivers for Hindus and Muslims in the subcontinent. These views are commonly referred to as the two-nations theory.

With the growth of Muslim nationalism in the Hindu-dominated area, the two-nation theory evolved and persisted throughout the period, even though the Hindu and Muslim communities had lived together for centuries. Therefore, their integration was inconceivable, and even the Mughal emperor Akbar's efforts to unify the Hindus and Muslims into a single nation failed (Sethi, 1958). The downfall of the Mughal Empire was, in fact, the end of the Muslims' rule over India, and during the early period of the British government, the Muslims lagged far behind in comparison with Hindus in educational, economic, political, administrative, and professional fields (Dumont, 1970).

With time, the Indian Muslims realised that they could not coexist with the Hindus, who were poles apart in their beliefs, traditions, and outlook on life. In the words of Quaid-i-Azam, "Muslims are a nation according to any definition of a nation" (Yusufi, 1996, p. 1183). Congress tried to find a Muslim for Hindu–Muslim unity and succeeded in influencing Muslim leaders like Allama Iqbal and the Quaid-e-Azam. But this situation did not last long and was soon under the influence of the Muslim League. The majority of the Muslim leaders who had been lured by Indian nationalism became upholders of the two-nation theory (Bolitho, 2006). Jinnah had no confusion about the Hindu tactics—he was finally convinced that the Hindu majority wanted to coerce and dominate the Muslims and had no desire to give them fair treatment. At this, at the AIML's historic annual session at Allahabad in 1930, Allama Iqbal declared:

> I would like to see the Punjab, NWFP, Sindh and Baluchistan amalgamated into a single state. Self-government within or without the British Empire and the formation of consolidated North-West Indian Muslim state appears to me to be the final destiny of the Muslim at least of North-West of India, got his attention. (Ahmad, 1979, p. 80)

Jinnah was also influenced by Iqbal's letter written to him in June 1937, in which he wrote: "Why should not the Muslims of North-West India and Bengal be considered as a nation entitled to self-determination just as other nations in India and outside India are" (Afzal, 1980, p. 84). These words had new meaning for Jinnah. He was convinced that the Muslims of India could never live with Hindus. He knew that when the British left, the Hindus would not tolerate the Muslims. Therefore, addressing a historic public meeting at Lahore in March 1940, Quaid-e-Azam said:

> It is extremely difficult to appreciate why our Hindu friends fail to understand the real nature of Islam and Hinduism. They are not religions in the strict sense of the word, but are, in fact, different and distinct social orders; and it is a dream that the Hindus and Muslims can ever evolve a common nationality; and this misconception of one Indian nation has gone far beyond the limits and is the cause of more of our troubles and will lead India to destruction if we fail to revise our notions in time. The Hindus and Muslims belong to two different religious philosophies, social

customs, and literatures. They neither intermarry nor interdine together, and, indeed, they belong to two different civilisations which are based mainly on conflicting ideas and conceptions. Their aspects on life and of life are different. It is quite clear that Hindus and Mussalmans derive their inspiration from different sources of history. They have different epics, their heroes are different, and different episodes. Very often the hero of one is a foe of the other, and likewise their victories and defeats overlap. To yoke together two such nations under a single state, one as a numerical minority and the other as a majority, must lead to growing discontent, and final destruction of any fabric that may be so built up for the government of such a state. (Yusufi, 1986, p. 1181)

Jinnah further went on the discourse of Muslims are a nation and right to have a state:

Mussalmans are a nation according to any definition of a nation, and they must have their homelands, their territory and their state. We wish to live in peace and harmony with our neighbours as a free and independent people. We wish our people to develop to the fullest our spiritual, cultural, economic, social and political life in a way that we think best and in consonance with our ideal and according to the genius of our people. (Yusufi, 1996, p. 1183)

The Muslims of the subcontinent responded very well to the Lahore Resolution of 1940. The demand of Pakistan not only meant freedom from the oppressive Hindus but also presented the concept of a separate and completely independent state wherein the Muslims were free to live according to the principles of Islam. Further, in an interview with the representative of the London *News Chronicle* in October 1944, Jinnah said*:*

There is only one practical, realistic way of resolving Hindu–Muslim differences. This is to divide India into two sovereign parts of Pakistan and Hindustan … and for each of us to trust the other to give equitable treatment to Hindu minorities in Pakistan and Muslim minorities in India … the fact is that the Hindus will not reconcile themselves to our complete independence. (Ahmad, 1968, p. 46)

Pakistan's achievement was undeniably the result of Jinnah's capable leadership. Jinnah founded a new country based on the idea that British Indian Muslims needed their own country. Despite having lived in proximity to the Hindus, the Muslims never lost their separate identity. They could practise their religion and develop their culture and society without worrying about the Hindu majority's social and cultural weight. This was possible

because, most of the time, after the arrival of Islam in South Asia, India was ruled by Muslims.

2.7 Concluding Remarks

This chapter provided a detailed theoretical and conceptual framework for this study. It thoroughly examined the terms 'nation' and 'nationalism' and discussed the relationship between nationalism and religion. Further, this chapter described the rise of Muslim nationalism in the subcontinent based on work by Brass and Robinson. Moreover, this chapter discussed the terms 'identity' and 'national identity', as well as different concepts of national identity, its origin, its importance in modern nation-states, and the model for this research. Further, this chapter discussed the idea of the state in Islamic and secular discourse, sovereignty, and Mawdudi's political interpretations of sovereignty and state. Finally, this chapter provided a detailed study of the two-nation theory, described how it evolved in the subcontinent, and defined Muslims as a distinct nation.

Chapter 3: The Emergence of Muslim Nationalism in the Colonial Era and the Birth of Pakistan

3.1 Introduction

Chapter 3 attempts to trace the relationship between the evolution of Muslim nationalism and Pakistan's formation in the context of the modern nation-state in the subcontinent. The aim is to contextualise the emergence of religiously based nationalism through specific conditions that led to Pakistan's emergence on the world map. At the outset, the idea that a particular ideology of Islam created Pakistan appears obvious. Thus, this chapter will explore a genealogy of identity politics associated with Muslims in colonial India. Muslims from the subcontinent demonstrated extraordinary diversity regarding geographic, socioeconomic, linguistic, and sociocultural considerations. Muslims, who made up more than one-quarter of the Indian population, were dispersed across the subcontinent. Many Muslims lived in the subcontinent's northwestern and northeastern regions. However, in the Punjab and Bengal regions, they were a small majority, and in Sindh and the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP), they constituted an absolute majority.

More importantly, in terms of communal representation, federation, centralisation, autonomy, and distinct electorates, Muslims' interests in Muslim majority and minority provinces were in contradiction (Cevic, 2015). Consequently, in Muslim majority and minority areas, Muslim opinions on nation formation politics were opposed. Therefore, the Muslims of the subcontinent did not form a cohesive and coherent population of interest that justified their compartmentalisation into a distinct all-India communal division for political representation reasons (Jalal, 1995). However, Pakistan's eventual creation in the face of such oddities is a testimony to the power of religion as a source of national identity and political legitimacy.

Since the subcontinent partition in 1947, different explanations have been proposed to understand the emergence of Muslim nationalism and the creation of Pakistan. One answer is the British colonial policy of divide and rule (Chandra, 2008; Page, 1982; Sarkar, 2014). In this narrative, the British purposely stressed Muslim identity and backed the Muslim elites as a benefactor to hinder the emergence of Indian nationalism. Further, the British believed that Muslims would establish a unique identity distinct from the composite Indian nationality by instituting institutional arrangements like separate electorates. Of course, this is the official narrative of Indian nationalism (Nehru, 1936). According to the second narrative, Pakistan is an inherent and unavoidable outcome of Muslim history in the subcontinent, and Muslims have always retained their distinct and definite identity. As a result, it was logical for them to seek their independent political institutions and, ultimately, their separate independent state (Aziz, 1967; Qureshi, 2008; Robinson, 1974; Shaikh, 1986). The two-nation theory supports this narrative. Finally, a third narrative explains Pakistan's birth as a product of India's Muslim elite politics. According to this viewpoint, it was not a historically constituted Islamic identity; instead, the foundation of Pakistan was perpetuated by the instrumental decisions of Muslim elites, which Hamza Alavi (1988) identifies as salariat. Concerned that their privileges would be lost in a Hindu majority India, these individuals asserted that they would be a dominating force inside a small but Muslim-dominated country (Alavi, 1988; Brass, 1974). A fourth narrative blames Hindu exclusivity rather than Muslim emphasis on separation. According to this viewpoint, Hindu leaders in Congress were reluctant to embrace, or incapable of embracing, India's religious plurality and the ensuing Muslim demands. This narrative is mainly used by the Muslims in Congress, like Azad, as well as later Muslim academics in India, such as Mushir-ul Hasan (Azad, 2009).

All of these narratives partly capture reality, and it is difficult to rule out any one of them. However, it should be noted that an approach is not proposed here that would combine these

four meta-narratives, mainly because they are clearly incompatible and were developed in opposition. The reason for the abundance of narratives is that they examine different aspects of nation formation. In the case of the formation of Pakistan, we are faced with at least two entirely separate phenomena: 1) the formation of Muslim identity as a social and political category, and thus as a community, and 2) the transformation of this community into a nation with the political ambitions of a state.

This chapter aims not to provide a political history of the Pakistani movement per se but to understand the processes and reasons behind the emergence of a religiously-based nationalism that led to an independent state from a highly diverse subcontinent. Muslim nationalism in India emerged as a counter-nationalism to the congress nationalism, which emerged as an attempt to power-share and eventually captured the colonial state. Thus, to understand the emergence and success of India's Muslim nationalism, we must also examine the emergence and organisation of the modern state in India and the emergence and organisation of the congress movement. However, the primary focus of this research is Muslim nationalism; thus, this study will examine the Congress movement for aspects that are relevant to the emergence of Muslim nationalism.

Moreover, the two alternative forms of nationalism—Hindu nationalism and Muslim nationalism—are related to modern colonial state formation. It is not that the colonial state created these divisions: India was always a multi-religious society with sporadic communal tensions. Yet, the politicisation of this religious plurality and the emergence of religious nationalism were modern phenomena that took shape under the colonial state's political framework. Muslim nationalism also emerged in this colonial context as anti-colonial subnationalism. Anti-colonial nationalism, which started to appear towards the end of the nineteenth century and was represented by the Congress movement, succeeded in terminating India's British rule. Yet, it failed to prevent the evolution of an anti-Congress Muslim

nationalism represented by the Muslim League (Muslim separatism). Thus, the Pakistani movement's eventual success resulted from two interconnected phenomena: the failure of Congress nationalism to keep Muslims in and the success of the Muslim League nationalism based on religion.

This chapter is split into three sections. The first section defines the disorder of the subcontinent in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, emphasising the surviving legacy of the Mughal Empire, the First War of Independence in 1857, and the hold of the British on the subcontinent. The second section examines the lasting intellectual and political trends of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in colonial India. It describes the Muslim society's philosophical reactions according to modernist Sir Sayed Ahmad Khan and traditionalists Ulama and Syed Maududi. The third section analyses Pakistan's political struggle and the emergence of different perspectives of post-colonial problems that led to Pakistan's independence.

3.2 The Surviving Legacy of the Mughals and British Raj

Islam's origins in the subcontinent go back to the most primitive period of Islam, when traders were the primary source of introducing Islam. Spannaus (2018, p. 218) acknowledged that "merchants and mendicant Sufis have been the main drivers for the spread of Islam". Muslims started to obtain political presence after conquest campaigns conducted by the Arabs in the eighth century. However, the real influence began in the eleventh century, when Muslim rulers from Central Asia entered the subcontinent from what is now Pakistan. For almost 500 years, a succession of Muslim dynasties—the Ghaznavids, the Ghaurids, and the Delhi Sultanate—ruled the region's landmarks, battling the regional kingdoms and evading the nomads (Spannaus, 2018). The Mughal Empire was an immense period in the history of the Indian subcontinent (Wynbrandt, 2009), with governance, military actions, cultural achievements, and trade policies having significant effects on the region. Mughal rule

emerged from the decline of the Delhi Sultanate, an institution that had never fully recovered from its defeat by Timur in the late fourteenth century. Paradoxically, one of Timur's grandsons, the great Babur (1483–1530), spurred the Mughal's ascension (Wynbrandt, 2009).

The empire flourished through an enlightened bureaucratic structure, *mansabdari*, which included development practices based on skills instead of birth, and religious freedom for Hindu devotion and Shi'i ritual words. Among the numerous achievements of Akbar, three performances stand out. First, in the era of Akbar, the Mughal Empire was turned into a subcontinental power by forming stronger relations with non-Muslim people. Second, Akbar established a robust institutional structure in the civil administration that sustained the dynasty for a long time. Third, he implemented the acceptance and cultural convergence policy that indicated a golden era in the Indo-Islamic sphere (Malik, 2008). This has become one of the biggest centralised states in pre-modern history. The golden age of the empire lasted until the eighteenth century (Wynbrandt, 2009).

A number of eighteenth-century events associated with European expansion in the Muslim world spread feelings of frustration, resentment, and humiliation among Indian Muslims. The Mughal Empire was fragmenting into independent principalities, while England and France competed to expand far-flung coastal trading posts. It was believed to be India's first tremendous empire since the Gupta Empire, and the Mughal Empire was India's most prominent, most prolific, and longest-lasting Muslim dynasty. The Mughal emperors, with few exceptions, were among the most innovative rulers in the world, renowned for building and controlling one of the largest empires. Many causes may have contributed to the prolonged life of the Mughal Empire, which has given the history of India a chapter full of significant achievements and immense strength. Unfortunately, all of these successes disappeared because of the Mughal emperors' irreversible errors.

The Mughal Empire reached its height during the era of Aurangzeb, who was the last great emperor of Mughal. In India, he governed a vast landmass that was under Mughal rule. Various regions became autonomous, with no need for a central government after the death of Aurangzeb. As a result, the Mughal Dynasty eventually disintegrated (Berndl, 2005). Aurangzeb left a will that divided his kingdom among his successors, but his heirs fought a war for the throne despite this. As a result, a line of rulers who were incompetent in the face of the massive wave of growing discontent came into power, which ended the Mughal rule (Berinstain, 1997).

Long before 1857, when the curtain was drawn on Mughal India, the dynasty had suffered severe setbacks. Finally, Aurangzeb's death in 1707 signalled the end of the Great Mughals and secured the fate of a prosperous time in the Indo-Muslim culture. But, as in the past, external forces again reshaped South Asia's map, although this time, the intruders arrived from the sea rather than the steppes of Central Asia.

3.3 The War of 1857 and Its Consequences

The Indian–British War of 1857 was a defining moment in the subcontinent's history because Indians fought to free themselves from British dominance. This war was given names such as the War of Independence, Mutiny, and Indian Revolt. The main causes of the war were political, social, economic, military, and religion in origin. The 1857–1858 Indian Mutiny, which ousted the Mughal emperor and established British authority, marks the beginning of modern India (Metcalf and Metcalf, 2006). Muslims and other Indian communities took part in the revolt. (Metcalf, 1964, p. 61) mentioned that:

> No one conceived of India as an independent state on the European model … Some would revive the Mughal Empire; others, the followers of Nana Saheb, dreamed of a new and powerful Maratha state; still others, from the Rani of Jhansi to the 'king of fourteen villages' in Mathura District, celebrated their own independence and prepared to fight against all comers.

By 1837, the British East India Company (EIC), which entered the subcontinent in the 1600s as a trading company during the reign of Elizabeth I, had effectively become an agent of Queen Victoria (Harris, 2001). Concerning the political role, the British EIC also acquired authority to collect revenue/land taxes (Sanyal, 2005; Zaman, 2002). After assuming power to manage and control revenue, the judicial system also came under the EIC's influence, and this steadily reduced the rank of qazis (Muslim judge's) to assistants to British legal staff (Zaman, 2002).

The Mughal Emperor Bahadur Shah Zafar-II assumed the position of the company's puppet in Delhi. In 1835, the company decided to issue coins without the last Mughal king's name, which displeased the Indian Muslims (Harris, 2001). In addition, the company's continuing attempts to exert more power over regions, introduce higher taxes, engage in substandard conduct with locals, encourage missionary efforts, and implement controversial policies on the part of British officials precipitated widespread resentment against the colonial government (Harris, 2001). These developments played a significant role in invoking the peoples of the subcontinent against the British.

Sir Sayed Ahmad Khan, an educationist and philosopher who served the British EIC in 1838–1876, published an article titled 'The Causes of the Indian Revolt' in 1858, soon after the riots had ended. Although Sayed Ahmad Khan remained loyal to the British government throughout the revolt, he never failed to point out the underlying reasons for the Indian rebellion, which challenged the British colonial government's very foundation in North India. Sayyid Ahmad Khan referred to the uprising as a reaction to "multiple grievances", including "British cultural policies", "insolence and contempt for the Indians by the British", the exclusion of locals from the "consultative process", and "severity of revenue assessments" (Metcalf and Metcalf, 2006, pp. 100–1).

On 10 May 1857, the Meerut sepoys rebelled, and the insurgency spread rapidly through the North Indian region, notably in the Bihar, Oudh, and Central Provinces of the North-West. The population of these areas rose in the fight against British rule. The severity of the dissatisfaction against the British was demonstrated by the speed with which the war spread throughout the subcontinent regions. Exiled Zamindars, chiefs and religious figures, and their supporters led the uprisings (Wynbrandt, 2009).

In Rohilkhand, prominent Muslim figures, such as Bahadur Khan, Begum Hadrat Mahall, Ahmad Allah Shah in Oudh, Nana Sahib in Kanpur, and the last emperors, Bahadur Shah II in Delhi, supported the uprising (Wynbrandt, 2009). The revolt crossed gender, ideological, and linguistic boundaries. Paradoxically, the uprising brought Muslims and Hindus together against the British. Muslims in Delhi had to give up the slaughter of cows, and they expressed gratitude towards the Hindus, who expressed their interest in Muslim religious feelings. The war lasted until 1858, when the uprising failed, and hope of independence was ruined. Lord Canning declared peace on 8 July 1858. However, the British took quick measures to reaffirm the rule of law and punished many people. In April 1859, Tantia Topi was arrested and hanged. Emperor Bahadur Shah II was exiled in Burma, and his sons were killed. The Sepoy Mutiny was catastrophic for the Muslims in British India. The British authorities blamed the Muslims for the insurrection and, as a result, they hindered the Muslims' opportunities for advancement. In contrast, the Hindus benefited from the British, which widened the gap between the two nations. William Wilson Hunter from the British Orientalist (1840–1900), as quoted by James Wynbrandt in his book *A Brief History of Pakistan*, stated that:

> There is no use shutting our ears to the fact that the Indian Muhammedans arraign us on a list of charges as serious as have ever been brought against a government. They accuse us of having closed every honourable walk of life to the professors of their creed. They accuse us of having introduced a system of education which leaves their whole community unprovided for and which landed it in contempt and beggary … They accuse us of having brought misery into thousands of families by abolishing their law officers, who gave the sanction of religion to marriage, and who

from time immemorial have been the depositories and administrators of the Domestic Law of Islam. They accuse us of imperilling their soul by denying them the means of performing the duties of their faith … Above all, they charge us with deliberate malversation of their religious foundations and with misappropriation on the largest scale of their education funds. (Wynbrandt, 2009, p. 119)

Following the failure of the Indian uprising in 1857, the British Crown took complete control of the subcontinent in 1858, replacing the Mughal Dynasty, which had lasted for 300 years (Metcalf, 2006; Sanyal, 2005). Indian Muslims experienced strong feelings of loss, shock, discomfort, and sorrow as a result of the defeat.

3.4 Muslims' Search for Identity in Colonial India

The British rule had seen the emergence of new identities in major communities (Muslims and Hindus) of the subcontinent. In the case of Muslims, their religious identity became their primary identity and provided a base for Muslim political ideology in the subcontinent. The development of British rule over the subcontinent was a gradual process, incorporating a dynamic change in society and consistent forces of modernity and tradition. Nevertheless, it was a historical period during which a robust European power, at a reasonable time and prepared with suitable strategies and tools, was able to take advantage of the differences in a massive subcontinent of different ethnicities (Malik, 2008).

The British impact on the subcontinent—notably during the nineteenth century, and especially after the war of 1857—resulted in different experiences and responses. People's reactions initially reflected curiosity and interest, while frustration and sorrow characterised collective attitudes in the nineteenth century. However, discomfort, embarrassment, and a feeling of failure gradually resulted in cooperating at some levels. In particular, in many regions, the subcontinent citizens collaborated with the British and were often resistant to political and cultural ascendancy. They also resisted foreign influences such as missionaries, the English language, modern education, natural sciences, and industrialisation by British and

other Western powers (Malik, 2008). This situation was more evident around the mid-nineteenth century, but there was an increase in differences of their worldviews and opinions after the 1857 war, when India found itself at the crossroads between old and new.

Reform, rejection, and restoration were tactics that Indian Muslims embraced in their search for identity and self-recognition. These cultural and social influences took on political forms in the twentieth century. One policy that was adopted by political parties such as the AIML sought a territorial solution to the Muslim problem through a separate, independent Muslim state. However, many others from religious and ethnic backgrounds thought a united India would still ensure their cultural and political wellbeing (Aziz, 1967). This theological division—either founding a separate homeland or remaining with the rest of the country—divided Muslim opinions until the departure of the British in 1947.

The rise of the modern state system introduced by the British in terms of new knowledge, the emergence of capitalism, and communication networks throughout the subcontinent enabled the establishment of all identities at local and regional levels. As a result, Muslim identity developed as a unique identity (Robinson, 1998). Moreover, following the failure of the Indian rebellion of 1857, the Government of India Act of 2 August 1858 abolished the EIC and transferred sovereign rule over India to Queen Victoria (Ingram, 2019). Thus, the British government's era, which gradually became a British Empire, added new ideas and even stronger edges to shape different identities.

However, as a result of religious Revivalism and the British policy of treating Muslims differently from others, a sharp distinction arose between Muslims and other communities, particularly Hindus. Moreover, a separate Muslim political identity emerged in response to claims of an all-inclusive Indian national identity. Simultaneously, during the last phase, a

Pan-Islamic dimension emerged within the Indo-Muslim consciousness and threatened to overtake Muslim politics between 1919 and 1924 (Robinson, 1998).

Of the problems facing Indian Muslims in the nineteenth century, the threat of Western modernity was the most overwhelming. The British colonial rule in India adversely affected Muslims' socio-economic status in several respects. Moreover, because British agricultural policies differed across provinces, it fundamentally altered the "relationship of the landed classes in some provinces in others less or not at all" (Hardy, 1972, p. 39). Writing about the miserable state and misery of the Muslim nobility in Lower Bengal, W. W. Hunter states: "One hundred and seventy years ago, it was almost impossible for a well-born Musalman in Bengal to become poor; at present, it is almost impossible for him to continue rich" (Hunter, 1876, p. 158).

Under British rule, the military services and the accumulation of land revenue, which was the primary source of income and resources, fell out of Muslims' hands. Some fiscal policies "deprived many Muslim landowners of their estates", and with the elimination of Persian as an official language, "Muslims have lost their fortress in administration" (Sayeed, 2000, pp. 13–4). The Hindus had already mastered English, and the elimination of Persian as a court language in 1837 meant that the Muslims were less successful (Hardy, 1972). Such initiatives by the British rule, which the Hindus welcomed, weakened the Muslims in India. Ahmed (2005, p. 43) describes that India's Muslims "lost their kingdom, their Mughal Empire, their emperor, their language, their culture, their capital city of Delhi, and their sense of self". Along with socio-economic challenges, Muslims confronted psychological distress. Muslims were compelled "to realise not only that the British were in India to stay, but also that they intended to stay on their own terms" (Hardy, 1972, p. 61). All of these circumstances, whether socio-economic or religious, hurt Muslims terribly.

3.4.1 Formation of Muslim Political Identity in the British Raj

The emergence of a new Muslim political identity in colonial India responded to both the British Empire and the Hindu ascendancy. This highlights how the empire created social divisions by expanding knowledge to pit these two classes (Muslims and Hindus) against one another (Robinson, 1998). The British Raj maintained a policy of divide and rule throughout the late nineteenth century. In the 1880s, Sir John Strachey stated that "nothing could be opposed to the policy and universal practice of our Government India than the old maxim of divide and rule" (Robinson, 1974, p. 131). Sir Antony Macdonell explained that "we are far interested in a Hindu predominance", he wrote in the 1890s, "than in a Mahomedan predominance, which, in the nature of things must be hostile to us" (Robinson, 1974, p. 134).

Muslims had their identity swept away, and India's fundamental political, social, and economic structures were rearranged in a way that gave Muslims few socioeconomic opportunities and no political control. Further, after the 1857 revolt, "the Indian establishment switched entirely to speaking English. Muslim ways of dress, style, food were also put aside. Muslims now felt not only politically vulnerable but concerned for their very identity" (Ahmed, 2005, p. 46). These British perceptions and British forms of rule have formed the Muslims' political identity.

However, the claim of constructing a Muslim political identity cannot be primarily attributed to British authority; the internal structures of society must be given due consideration. There had been a Hindu revival and reform movement, similar to the Muslim reform movement, spurred on by the desire for colonial control and Western knowledge. Significant fermentation of action was stimulated. In North India, this resulted in the propagation of distinct Hindu icons such as the Nagri format of 'Sanskrit' instead of the Persian format of the Muslims' Urdu language. The rising 'Sanskritisation' of Hindi to separate it from Urdu, along with the reinforcement of Hindu interests in various areas, such as cows and religious

festivals, caused conflicts between them. In 1869, the Hindus' discontent prompted Syed Ahmad Khan to speak for the first time about working exclusively for Muslims (Robinson, 1974).

Moreover, in the late nineteenth century, the Muslims of Bengal were banned from quoting God as '*Sri Iswar*' in place of Allahu-Akbar and Muslim surnames in favour of Hindu variants (Ahmed, 1996). The Muslim delegation's backdrop for the monarch and requests to safeguard the rights of India's Muslims included attempts to turn Nagri into a government script that would drive Muslims out of employment, as well as intense disputes over religious prejudices in various regions. Indeed, the consistently strong relationship between Hindu revivalism and the Congress contributed to a complicated relationship between Muslims and Indian nationalism (Robinson, 1987).

3.5 Role of Muslim Intellectuals in Addressing the Muslim Identity Question in Colonial India

The revolt in 1857, or the Indian rebellion, resulted from the growing frustration and resentment of the British, and their reforms played a vital role in the subcontinent's history. The British administration shattered many of the pillars upon which Islamic civilisation was formed. Since the 1820s, the Muslim elite in Upper India has been perceived as a challenger to the rentier class in their domination, mostly Hindus who were part of the EIC's burgeoning commerce and commercial agriculture. As intellectuals, administrators, and teachers, Muslim leaders suffered even more after the British abolition of Mughal income-free grants. Moreover, they found that Islamic law, which was reduced to life laws, was frequently substituted by British law. Simultaneously, only the Islamic Personal Law (known as the Anglo Muhammadan Code) persisted. In response, Abdul Aziz, son of Shah Wali Ullah, stated a fatwa at the beginning of the eighteenth century that:

> If the state cannot provide and establish a judicial system to administer Muslim law, it becomes the duty of the Ulama to come forward and fill the gap. For sure, without the state authority, the Ulama cannot compel people to abide by the law they interpret to them, but they at least direct them on civil behaviour, trade, family relations, and inheritance etc. Thus the Ulama can become the custodian and centre of an ideology that can give meaning and strive to the lives of the faithful Muslims in India, a Darul Harb. (Metcalf, 1982, pp. 51–2)

After the failed uprising in 1857, the dispersed identity of Muslims and their desire for land and forced concentration into regional constellations were of concern to many Muslim intellectuals. In addition, the advance of European powers posed a challenge to Muslim behaviour regarding Islamic practices across the Muslim world. There were two types of Muslim responses: Western-style modernisation and opposition to modernist concessions and the notion that the future of Islam hinged on restoring essential purity. Accordingly, Muslim intellectuals in the subcontinent reacted as described above.

3.5.1 Sir Sayed Ahmad Khan and Ali Garh

Sir Sayed Ahmad Khan (1817–1898) was a leading advocate of Islamic modernism in the subcontinent. He was the founder of different educational and philosophical developments during his fruitful life and an eyewitness to a genuine Muslim dilemma, particularly after the disaster of 1857 and the ensuing British anger. Sayed Ahmad Khan was involved in talks and writings intended for British and Indian Muslims, respectively. He was an intelligent scholar who witnessed a Muslim wake up from a logical spirit seeking and integrating ethics and Western education (Malik, 2008). Hence, some scholars refer to him as "hailed, and assailed, as the founder of Muslim separatism on the subcontinent" (Gandhi, 1987, p. 19).

Sayed Ahmad Khan was more than just a college founder; he "undertook a task of social and religious reform involving a Westernization of his coreligionists' education … he also drew inspiration from Western science to show that it was not at all incompatible with Islam" (Jaffrelot, 2015, pp. 30–31). In the second half of the nineteenth century, he interfered in his period's social narrative, particularly that of the Muslim community, and left it forever

changed. He became a leading advocate of Muslim society, or perhaps more accurately, of the Muslim elite, at a time when the Muslim community was under British rule. To Sayed Ahmad Khan's credit, he contributed to a new identity against British colonial rule.

Sayed Ahmad Khan understood that the future of his fellow Muslims relied on two factors: Western education and the opportunity to understand and interact with the British to maintain dignity and a respectable position for Muslims in India (Guha, 2010). Therefore, after his father died in 1838, Sayed Ahmad Khan joined the EIC (Jaffrelot, 2015). Like many others in his social milieu, he was given the option of serving in Mughal court. However, against his family's wishes, Sayed Ahmad Khan refused the offer. He was well aware that the Mughal Empire's reign was coming to an end and that the EIC would rule the region for decades. Therefore, he served the EIC in different districts of UP in the judicial hierarchy (Jaffrelot, 2015). Eventually, in 1876, Sayed Ahmad Khan retired from government service.

Sayed Ahmad Khan constantly told the British government that their flawed policies towards Muslims had aroused a sense of hatred, while simultaneously addressing the existing negligence among Muslims. He also sought to infuse Muslims and British officials with a loyal spirit (Metcalf and Metcalf, 2006). Sayed Ahmad Khan aimed to improve personal morality and change the moral framework. He attempted to turn the ethical framework based on ancient traditional traditions (*rasm wa riwaj*) into a rational individual character as the social foundation for the betterment of Indian Muslim society. Sayed Ahmad Khan launched Tahzeeb al-Akhlaq to teach new social principles concerning Muslims. Further, he imparted three critical ideas in the political realm for Muslims: that the political awakening was necessary, that the British should be dealt with as friends, and that joining Congress would not serve the interests of the Muslims (Qureshi, 2006).

As a religious scholar and a social reformer, Sayed Ahmad Khan was the key contributor to political, social, and religious debates. He wrote widely on religious topics, especially his views on the Quran and the Bible. In interpreting the Quran, he sought to use rational methods on issues such as polygamy, slavery, jihad, miracles, angelology, demonology, and Gog and Magog (Ahmad, 1967). Although enormously controversial and sometimes linked with Ulama's rationalism, it provides vitality and inspiration to successive modernist generations. Sayed Ahmad Khan used his vision and ideas and founded many educational institutions and communities as a modernist. He indicated that modern education had been a panacea for the rebirth of the Muslim community. Similarly, as a rationalist thinker, he sought to balance Islam with rational demands.

In 1864, Sayed Ahmad Khan launched the Scientific Society (Jaffrelot, 2015), which aimed to integrate Western science and translate scientific inquiry from English into Urdu. In 1875, he founded the Anglo-Muhammad Oriental School, which was transformed into the Anglo-Muhammad Oriental College in 1878. The college aimed to liberalise conceptions, expand humanism, promote a rational worldview, and take a pragmatic approach to politics. It also sought to develop the government sector continuously for educated Muslims (Metcalf and Metcalf, 2006). The founding of Muhammad's Anglo-Oriental Educational Conference in 1886 was another landmark along this line. In addition, the conference planned to enrich the Urdu language by translating other contemporary languages in the Indian public and private schools as a secondary language.

In Sayed Ahmad Khan's religious thinking, the word of God (*wahi*) and the function of God (nature) could not be contradicted. For humans and society, the rule of revelation inherently follows human rationality. Therefore, wahi and reason are identical in human society. As a natural realisation impulse, the reason exists in humankind's scientific study and definition of

God, the contrast between good and evil, the understanding of divine judgement and vengeance, and the belief in life after death (Ahmad, 1967).

Sayed Ahmad Khan was worried about the All-India National Congress's declared position in defence of Muslims' rights. According to Sir Sayyid, the Hindu–Muslim political partnership indicated that the latter would be subjected to numerically powerful and economically stable friends. However, in his opinion, Muslims were numerically smaller than Hindus, had poor educational opportunities, were politically immature, and lacked economic resources and industry (Ahmad, 1967). He further said that:

> So long as differences of race, and creed, and the distinctions of caste form an important element in the socio-political life of India and influence her inhabitants in matters connected with the administration and welfare of the country at large, the system of election pure and simple cannot safely be adopted. The larger community would totally override the interests of the smaller community, and the ignorant public would hold the Government responsible for introducing measures which might make the differences of race and creed more violent than ever. (Devji, 2013, p. 54)

He was concerned about Muslim rights from the majority, and he was more explicit about rising Hinduism:

> I consider the experiment which the Indian National Congress wishes to make is fraught with danger and suffering for all the nationalities of India, especially Muslims. The Muslims are a minority but a highly united minority. At least traditionally, they are prone to take the sword in hand when the majority oppresses them. If this happens, it will bring about disasters greater than the ones which came in the wake of the happenings of 1857. (Mahmood and Zafar, 1968, pp. 53–54)

Sayed Ahmad Khan's political separatism projection for Indian Muslims would eventually promote the AIML's foundation in 1906.

3.5.2 Traditionalist Ulama

The most crucial reformist and progressive Islamic movements began in South Asia in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The context was partly ongoing Islamic revivalism,

transformation, and the British rule principally. The first reform leader in South Asia was Shah Waliullah (1703–1762), who had witnessed the Mughal Empire's decline from India's supremacy to a few square miles across Delhi (Spannaus, 2018). He dedicated his life to the kind of Islam that could resist enduring a political decline: "he stressed the study of the textual sources of the faith, the Quran and the Hadiths, rather than the study of logic and philosophy at that time, that was widespread; he worked to create unity between Muslims". Scholars claim that 'the Ulama warned India's people of the colonial British's challenges to cultural life, liberty, and political influence. They arrived to seek trade opportunities, using the rifts between chiefs and local authorities to take control of the area. The impact of India's British conquest was understood by the Ulama (Goyal, 2004).

After the first independence battle in 1857, the Deoband movement was the first to gain traction. Muhammad Qasim Nanautvi and Rashid Ahmad Gangohi were its leaders (Faruqi, 1963). He was educated in the pre-mutiny reform atmosphere of Delhi and was keen for his traditions to continue in the post-mutiny period. Muslims who wanted to be Muslims without political interference were prompted to seek education. The first madrasa was founded in Deoband, a Qasba (country town inhabited by Muslim gentry) in the District of Saharanpur, some 90 miles northeast of Delhi (Rizvi, 1980). This madrasa gradually grew to the point that it is now often regarded as the Islamic world's most important classical university along with Al-Azhar in Cairo. The movement was primarily extended by establishing madrasas affiliated with Deoband (Robinson,1998).

Deoband had provided a means of becoming Muslim with the least possible ties to the state. Scholars described this as "preserving the learned tradition and providing a structure of religious leadership for Muslims without the support of the state" (Metcalf, 1982, p. 110). Although they continued the reformist trend, the focus was placed on closer adherence to Sharia law, which had been closely linked to reliance on the study of the revealed sciences,

and thus opposed to rational views. It accepted only a restricted Sufi activity that did not admit any indication of intercession. It called for the prevention of all types of behaviour that may reflect Shia, Hindu, or British influences. Overall, it was a scriptural religion: it was essential to know God's word to understand how to function as a Muslim. The fundamental sanction is the wishes of individual human awareness. People must gather knowledge for themselves and be self-disciplined when they are not in command of society.

The Deoband movement aimed to preserve Islamic society individually outside the colonial state in its framework and strategies and collectively "a commitment to reformed religious practices, knowledge of a common language, and bonds of affection and common purpose with their teachers and fellow students" (Metcalf, 1982, p. 136). The madrasa was dependent on public subscriptions because government assistance ('*waqf-fund*') was frequently denied (Spannaus, 2018). Further, unlike earlier Muslim institutions, which appeared to exist in a greater institution, the Deoband institution was bureaucratic; various lessons were learned via mission schools and before the Delhi College mutiny (Spannaus, 2018). Much work was dedicated to proselytisation; debate was a part of Deobandi learning, while vast quantities of Arabic and Persian books were translated into the vernacular and distributed extensively using the printing press. A traditional Deobandi book is the still-successful *Bihishti Zevar* by Maulana Ashraf Ali Thanvi, which was first published in the 1890s and gave women complete instructions on how to act as a Muslim.

As for the Ulama's role in the struggle for freedom and politics in unified India, Darul-Uloom Deoband India's official website argues that:

> Ulama's Deoband associates, with commitment and faith in Allah, have not only been actively engaged in the fight and movement for Indian independence but have been leading the movement for quite some time. In reality, they were the first and the initiators who took the whole idea of democracy into being. They should be remembered for their tenderness, energy and catholicity created in this campaign. Many of these Ulama and other allies hoisted the flag of rebellion

against the British administration, fought with the imperial army and spent a substantial portion of their lives in prisons. In reality, the history of the Indian independence movement is so intermingled with the history of the Ulama and religious figures that it is hard to differentiate between them. (Darul Uloom-i-Deoband, 2016)

Consequently, until 1919 when Jamiat Ulama-i-Hind was established, the ulama did not begin a formal and organised form of political struggle. In contrast, they favoured the (political) status of the Indian National Congress (INC), established in several places in 1885. Importantly, after the ulama began appearing on the political spectrum, they started facing other religious and political parties, particularly the Muslim League. The Jamiat Ulema-i-Hind (JUH) leadership claimed that Britain's total independence is a sacred purpose and that even the Hindus and Muslims cannot take it from them while they struggle separately. Therefore, to accomplish this holy purpose, all of the groups in the Indian subcontinent must align and topple the British regime, regardless of their faiths and beliefs (Robinson, 1988).

In response to Molana Madni, Molana Azad, and JUH's pro-Congress stand, several other ulama agreed to set up the All-India Jamiat Ulama-i-Islam organisation of like-minded ulama. Maulana Shabir Usmani was elected president (in his absence), Maulana Zafar Ahmad Usmani was elected vice president, and Maulana Quraish Shamsi was elected general secretary. A 12-member consultative committee was formed to advise and support the organisation's office-bearer in religious and political matters (Pirzada, 2000, p. 10). At the organisation's first formal meeting, the members agreed and declared the Muslim League's unconditional support for Pakistan's demand. The Shura named Maulana Usmani to be the Muslim League's religious affairs advisor (Tirmidhi, 1977).

Under the badge of Jamiat Ulama-i-Islam, Maulana Usmani and other ulama propagated and successfully protected the struggle to establish Pakistan. They made the people realise that if they wanted to practice the Islamic divine style of living as guided by the Holy Quran, it would only be possible by establishing a separate centre of Islam (Pakistan). Only if they

succeeded in having Pakistan for themselves could Muslims in India live as Muslims. In his speech at Deoband on 25 December 1945, Maulana Usmani stated that he had left politics after the failed Khilafat restoration movement. However, after considerable deliberation, he concluded that their suffering would not be eased unless India established a separate nation for Muslims. As a result, the establishment of Pakistan became his ultimate goal, which he would not resist even if it meant shedding his blood (Mazher, 1990). In the 1945–1946 elections, the tireless campaign of the ulama and the Muslim League achieved tremendous success. Jinnah praised the ulama's role in the election campaign in response to Maulana Uthmani's remarks on the Muslim League's performance (Zafar, 2005).

The establishment of the Barelvis can be traced back to Delhi in the early nineteenth century, although they are found not so much in the restoration and reform movement as in opposition to it. In the late nineteenth century, the movement crystallised around the philosopher and polymath Ahmad Riza Khan of Bareilly (1856–1921). He used his Hanafi legal scholarship to defend Islam as it was passed down, a custom-laden Islam firmly connected to the shrines' Sufi realm, where followers wanted saints to intercede with God on their behalf (Metcalf, 2014). If the Deobandis wanted to retain Islam as found in Islamic Middle Ages Hanafi law books, the Barelvis wanted to preserve it as contained in India in the nineteenth century. In the same way, they proselytised their stance and considered themselves Ahl-i Sunnat Wa Jamaat—that is, as the actual Sunnis (Robinson, 1988). Predictably, considering their focus on mediation and neglect of personal responsibility, their relationships with the Ahl-i Hadith and the Deobandis from the late nineteenth century to the present are a polemic and a conflict often reflected in street disturbances.

First, Ahmad Riza Khan's instruction places a strong focus on the supremacy of the Prophet. He emphasised the Sufi idea of the light of Muhammad (Nur-i-Muhammadi), which had been created from God's own light and had developed as the term in Christian theology since the

beginning of existence (Metcalf, 2014). It played a part in every phase of creation; it was omnipresent and indicated that the Prophet, however human, was indeed more than human. He also had a unique understanding of the hidden (ILM al-ghaib) and was therefore asked to intercede with God for man. Similarly, Ahmad Riza Khan believed that saints could see through God's light (Nur-i-Khuda) and that their intercession could be called upon not only in shrines but everywhere.

In keeping with these beliefs, the leader of Barelvis showed tremendous appreciation for the Prophet in his religious practice, paying significant interest to the *Melad* celebrations (ceremonies of the birth of the Prophet) and to the time of qiyam during the *Melad* when the Prophet was believed to be alive. He further followed the annual festivities of the death of several saints (known as Urs or the moment when saints were joined to God), observing, in particular, the eleventh of each month in remembrance of Abdul Qadir Gilani, who was the most esteemed of all Sufis (Robinson, 1988). In addition, he justified a wide variety of usual practices, from amulets to Saturday's blood drawing. In his comfortable endorsement of the Islam of the shrine, Ahmad Riza Khan achieved broad public support and widespread popularity, at least initially, from the illiterate and villagers rather than from the educated Qasba and the town (Robinson, 1988). At a time when Muslims did not rule the state, he provided Islamic guidelines for the rural Muslim community.

After his death, several schools were established—in particular, the Jamiat-Manzir-i-Islam in Bareilly and the Dar ul-Ulum Hizb ul-Ahnaf in Lahore. Ahmad Riza Khan led the movement, and there was relatively minor institutional development during its existence. In politics, the movement was, in fact, pro-British, which assisted them during World War I and mobilised the ulama to resist the Khilafat movement from 1919 to 1922 (Robinson, 1974). Barelvis joined Pakistan's effort, much as other ulama from a non-reform background observed independence in Muslims' relations with political forces. The trend has grown both within

and outside South Asia over the past 40 years. The Jamiat Ul-Ulama-i Pakistan organisation in Pakistan has at least one significant political figure in Maulana Noorani.

3.5.3 Syed Abul Ala Mawdudi and Muslims' Identity Formation in Colonial India

After the end of the Mughal rule and war of 1857, the Muslims of the subcontinent were divided and had no shared objective or manifesto until the Lahore Resolution (1940) for Pakistan was approved. The Khilafat movement (1924) and Hijrat project in the 1930s had collapsed. Prominent Muslim scholars Molana Hussain Ahmed Madani and Mufti Kifayatullah from Jamiat Ulama-e-Hind supported Congress, and a leading Muslim intellectual, Molana Azad, joined Congress. During that time, the most important topic that concerned Mawdudi was the religious and national identity of Indian Muslims and their place in prospective India (Mohomed, 2014).

Sayyid Abu'1-A'la Mawdudi was born in Aurangabad, Deccan, on 25 September 1903, in Ahmad Hasan Mawdudi's home. Osman (2003, p. 465) states that "Mawdudi would appear to be much the most systematic thinker of modern Islam". Along the same lines, he has been hailed as "one of the first Islamic thinkers to develop a systematic political reading of Islam and a plan for social action to realise his vision" and "without doubt the most influential of contemporary Islamic revivalist thinkers" (Nasr, 1996, p. 3).

The Mawdudis shared a proud legacy, and they originated from one of the most influential Chishti Sufi order groups (Rizvi, 1991). Mawdudi wrote in 1932 that "I belong to one such family that has 1,300 years of guidance, asceticism and Sufism" (Nizami, 1991, p. 24).

The thoughts of Mawdudi arose at a moment of uncertainty in the context of the Indian Muslim community. His ideas were shaped by the deep desperation that afflicted society, and he strove to find solutions to its woes. There was a lack of political unity and unified leadership among Muslims (until 1940, after the majority of Muslims united under the

leadership of Jinnah and the Muslim League). Instead, they were segregated along ethnic and linguistic lines and governed by traditional authority structures. Mawdudi's goal, much like that of the Khilafat activists, was to seize this collapse of Muslims' identity and reassert their position of authority. He tried to emphasise Muslim identity and encourage solidarity and consensus to meet Muslims' needs at a national level. After this had been established, the group would then be able to create viable political institutions based on Islamic cultural symbols, which would support a massive uprising in such a modern political sense (Lapidus, 1998).

Mawdudi's initial step was to re-establish the Indian Muslim identity in the context of the colonial system and the rising political ambitions of the Hindu majority. His concept was based on Indo-Muslim cultures, political aspirations, and the history of Muslim rule that formed Muslims' identity and set the rules for Muslim politics in India (Nasr, 1996). In Mawdudi's view, humans could only realise their spiritual potential if the community did, and the community could do so if it were purely Islamic. These concerns became more important to the ruling minority, which was worried about the possibility of political subjugation. They emerged from the impulse of self-preservation and the response to the insecurity of life in Hindu India (Sayeed, 1968).

In presenting the revivalist understanding of Islam, Mawdudi fused the Islamic order and the normative norms of the Indian Muslim culture into a different plan. As his theories grew, his attention changed from widespread Indo-Muslim practices to narrowly interpreted Islamic doctrines. He offered a vision of Islam with a resistant, uncompromising, and intractable viewpoint that would make Muslims a religiously uniform, politically unitary community that asserted its rights and remained committed (Nizami, 1991). Therefore, Mawdudi regarded Islam as a 'complete code of life' that contained the solution to resolving the spiritual, political, and social difficulties that Muslims faced (Nasr, 1996; Roy, 2011).

Syed Mawdudi was engaged in the Khilafat campaign by collaborating with Jamiat Ulama-e-Hind and being associated with the activities and thoughts of Khilafat figures such as the Ali brothers and Abu'l-Kalam Azad (Jameelah, 1987). However, in October 1924, the Khilafat campaign dissolved after the Turkish state removed the caliphate. For Mawdudi, this incident changed his thoughts on religion's importance to politics. He witnessed the caliphate's abandonment due to Westernised Turkish nationalists' machinations and the characteristic of Arab nationalists to Islam who had rebelled against the Ottomans in collaboration with Europeans (Nasr, 1996). Therefore, he developed a deep feeling of Western nationalism and was sure that nationalism would never protect Muslims' rights and identity status.

Meanwhile, Mawdudi discovered that Hindu leaders were using nationalism to promote their agenda. Under Gandhi's leadership, Congress established a progressively Hindu identity after the Swaraj attempt in 1919. Therefore, Mawdudi believed that only the Hindu community would benefit from the democratic policies pursued by Indian nationalistic efforts. Consequently, he was alarmed in later years when Gandhi ridiculed the Muslims in 1929 and said: "We will win freedom with you or without you, or in spite of you" (Aydin, 2017, p. 153). As Mawdudi lost trust in Congress and its Muslim allies, he turned more towards Islam and the rebirth of its institutions to devise a political policy to defend Muslim interests and rebuild their identity. Thus, Mawdudi started an academic path that would lead him from his faith to communalism and eventually to Islamic revivalism. From 1932, Mawdudi's work became focused on the Muslim plight, and he had begun to seek Islam for answers, progressively adopting a revivalist perspective. As scholars mentioned, his focus was on "purifying the Islamic faith, explicating its ethos, and putting its teachings into practice, all with a view to modernizing Islam while extracting Western influence from Muslim minds" (Nasr, 1996, p. 56). As a result, Mawdudi's supporters view the movement as the successor to

the heritage of Islamic *tajdid* (revival) and its most visible reflection in modern days (Mohomed, 2014).

Mawdudi argued that nationalism is the West's concept in two of his masterworks, as was secularism. In his opinion, European colonialism and secular nationalism were two faces of the same coin. According to Maulana Mawdudi, the civilisational ascendancy of the liberal and secular West and the self-made and self-perceived national ideals of the Indian National Congress are mere deceptions for Indian Muslims (Maududi, 1940). In Mawdudi's opinion, all religiopolitical movements in British India should be based on Islamic universalism's theory and ideology (Mawdudi, 1963). He was a stern critic of recent religiopolitical activities, as they had nothing to do with Islam's universal message. Nationalism, which he termed a disease, made Arabs and Turks staunch enemies and consequently ruined the Khilafat, the symbolic institution of Muslim unity.

In his writings, Syed Mawdudi began his political forays by claiming a Muslim communal identity as a counterpoint to the Congress party's secular nationalist stance long before it was observed by the Muslim League. His initiative was first presented in several essays in *Tarjumanul-Quran* and then publicised in *Musalman Aur Majudah Siyasi Kashmakash* (Muslims and Contemporary Political Struggles) and *Masala-e-Qaumiyat* (Nationality Question), in which he criticised Congress and his former mentors, Ubaidullah Sindhi, Abul Kalam Azad, and JUH leaders supporting Congress (Nasr, 1994). Syed Mawdudi, who had previously respected Azad and thought he would become the subsequent prominent Muslim intellectual, was shocked by Molana Azad's support of Congress, referring to it as the century's biggest disaster (Modudi, 1963). Moreover, Syed Mawdudi had no trust in Congress's planned 'composite nationalism',[5] which he strongly opposed. Congress aimed to

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[5] Composite nationalism (*Mutahida-qaumiyat*) defines all Indians as united in one nation, regardless of their faith (Mohammad, 2014; Shail, 1997).

bring Indians together, regardless of caste, faith, geography, or religion, in order to attain *Puran Swaraj* (complete independence) under composite nationalism. Bahadur (1998, p. 33) defines composite nationalism as:

> One of the two was the dominant ideology of composite nationalism represented by the Indian National Congress. It was based on the belief that India, with its vast diversities of religions, creeds, castes, sub-castes, communities, and cultures, represented a composite nation.

Mawdudi did not consider that Muslims of the subcontinent formed a single nation with other fellow Indians. Instead, he argued that Muslims constituted their distinct identity and nationality, which would have been Islamic, comprising their determination to obey God's will in their lives, not just by ethnicity, territory, language, economy, and even culture (Mawdudi, 1963). Further, Congress planned 'composite nationalism' and a future democratic and secular government. Mawdudi states that inside a unified India, where everyone was Indian, Muslims attempting to retain their distinct identity and feeling of a nation would be considered treacherous, and they would be forced to acknowledge and express the Hindu majority's identity (Modudi, 1963).

Further, in *Islam and Composite Nationalism* (1938), Molana Madni claims that nations are formed from the homeland/territorial boundaries, and he supports Congress's composite nationalism idea. Therefore, regardless of the traditional, religious, and linguistic differences, India's people were a single nation, and any effort to split Indians based on religion, race, culture, nationality, or language was a political stunt by the governing force. Syed Mawdudi strongly rejects Molana Madni's claim that the "nations are formed by homeland". He argues that this is a baseless claim and asks: "Which of them is a nation? Are American Abyssinians, Red Indians, and Whites a Nation? Are German Jews and Germans one nation?" (Mawdudi, 1963, pp. 317–8). Therefore, Muslims, Hindus, and others who have lived in India for centuries cannot be considered one nation; they all are distinct nations. Mawdudi states that

the difference between Congress and us is not merely a difference of 'means and methods'; however, there is a fundamental difference between principle and purpose and policy. We want to change Congress's principles of nationalism and democracy completely. We cannot accept its goal, namely the establishment of a national democratic secular state. We cannot accept its policy of gradually gaining political power and, with its help, establishing Hindu supremacy in practice (Mawdudi, 1963, p. 468).

Thus, although Mawdudi wanted to be free of British colonial rule, he advised Muslims not to join the Congress and his Muslim nationalist allies in their fight for independence. Moreover, concerning composite nationalism, the question on Mawdudi's mind was whether freedom from British rule in India would offer religious, social, and political sovereignty to the Muslims? What would be the position of Muslims and Islam if a democratic, nationalistic secular state were founded? There are only two possibilities once this is accepted. First, if we (Muslims) want to be active participants in governance, we must abandon our distinct identity. Second, if we keep our privileged identity, we should be effectively ejected from the government because Muslims were in the minority (Mawdudi, 1963, p. 480). After the fierce criticism and total rejection of 'composite nationalism', Mawdudi made it clear in principle that Muslims could not associate with a movement claiming to be composite nationalism. Mawdudi further made three suggestions for the solution to the political problem of India: 1) "Establishment of an international federation based on cultural autonomy and equal partnership", 2) "separate territorial boundaries with population change", and 3) "separate nation-states and a kind of confederacy between these states" (Mawdudi, 1963, pp. 485–92).

Mawdudi acknowledges his concerns with the Muslim League's notion of nationalism. Mawdudi, being a Muslim thinker, defines the Muslim nation in the Islamic context. Although Mawdudi criticises nationalism in the Western context, he favours the two-nation theory and makes a more substantial rational justification. Although Hindus and Muslims

have coexisted for seven centuries, he says their practices, cultures, sentiments, and attitudes are significantly dissimilar. From the perspective of Hindus, for example, something holy is vice versa in the Muslims' view. He says that Hindus commemorate their festivities with Hindus and Muslims with Muslims throughout all celebrations and everyday rituals from the day of birth to the day of death (Mawdudi, 1963). The Muslim League benefited from the writings of Maududi, which supported their claim and two-nations theory—that is, that Muslims in India constitute a separate nation that is distant from other non-Muslims in many respects and characteristics (Haqqani, 2005). Therefore, the Muslim League propagated and widely publicised Maududi's ideas and his criticism of JUH leadership regarding political and religious issues.

Mawdudi's writings *Masala-e-Qaumiyat* (Nationality Question) were widely circulated between 1937 and 1939 in the Muslim League sessions (Nasr, 1994). This initiative was efficient in Amritsar in 1939 due to the distribution of numerous copies of *Musalman Aur Majudah Siyasi Kashmakash* (Muslims and Contemporary Political Struggles) (Haq, 1986). A similar mindset was evident in 1939 within the League Central Committee, which approved the widespread writings of Mawdudi's religious decrees against the representatives of Jami'at-i Ulama (Ansari, 1960). In a retrospective of Mawdudi, a representative of the Muslim League wrote that "the venerable Mawlana [Mawdudi's] Tarjumanu'l Qur'an writings made a considerable contribution to the religious and national demands of the League" (Nasr, 1994, p. 86). The Jama'at contribution to the League's enterprise is likely the strongest indication of part of the development of assistance to Pakistan in India's north and northwest that has not yet received publicity.

In the face of Jama'at's stance on Muslim separatism, the issue of harmonising the position of the holy communities and political parties unravelled. He stated that the spirit of the Muslim political debate, as expressed in the profoundly chiliastic program of the Muslim League,

consistently referred to the need for such a state of the Muslim community. There would be no point in merely replacing the Hindu rule with the godless one: "If I could ensure one square mile of land in which none other than God would reign supreme, I would cost every speck of its dust more than the total of India" (Nasr, 1994, p. 88).

In Tonk (Rajasthan) in 1947, Mawdudi proclaimed that "[if the Muslim League] were to stand up honestly as the actual representative of Islam, the whole of India would be Pakistan" (Nasr, 1994, p. 89). Thus, Jamaat stressed the difference between Islam and Muslim, and more specifically Islam and secular, from the outset. However, Mawdudi had not promulgated an uncontroversial anti-Pakistan platform as he had in his Muslim League writings and criticisms. On the contrary, his oratory against the League has always come in tandem with support for the Pakistan Movement and Muslim League (Nasr, 1994).

Since both essentially strove to guarantee Muslims' communal rights, Jama'at and the Muslim League legitimised each other's political position to further their mutual communalist cause:

> It was the structure of this relationship that determined the interactions between the Jama'at and the fruit of the League's toil—the Pakistan state—more than their bickering over the nature of that state may suggest. The Jama'at legitimated communalism in Islamic terms and helped the League find a base of support by appealing to religious symbols. (Nasr, 1994, p. 85)

Soon after Jama'at was established in 1941, Qamaru-Uddin Khan, Jama'at secretary-general, was sent to Delhi to meet Jinnah. Via the offices of Raja Mahmudabad, a strongly religious and charitable supporter of the League, a meeting was held between Qamaru-Uddin Khan and Jinnah at his home. During the 45-minute meeting, Qamaru-Uddin Khan described the political platform of Jama'at and directed Jinnah to dedicate the League to the Islamic state. Jinnah answered that he had seen no incompatibility between the position of the Muslim League and Jamaat. Instead, the quick pace at which the events took place did not support the

League to pause there merely to describe the essence of the future Muslim state: "I will continue to strive for the cause of a separate Muslim state, and you do your services in this regard; our efforts need not be mutually exclusive" (Nasr, 1994, p. 92).

It was a strange feature of those ties described by the critics of Jama'at as opposition to the Pakistan Movement. The Jama'at did not oppose Pakistan as such; rather, they opposed the League's leadership on the issue of nationalism. Mawdudi admitted that he was opposed to the Muslim League and later regretted that Jinnah's successors had interpreted all of the League's criticisms as Jinnah's criticisms and all of the criticisms of Jinnah as disloyalty to Pakistan. Malik Ghulam' Ali, an enthusiastic devotee of the Pakistan Movement, stated that Mawdudi was not considered anti-Pakistan, but he regarded his position as representing the foresight of a "true Pakistan" (Nasr, 1994). Further, Mawdudi wrote a public letter in June 1947 to India's Muslims urging them to select Pakistan rather than the Indian Republic. Consequently, Mawdudi suggested in July 1947 that the Muslims should cast a vote in favour of Pakistan in the referendum scheduled for the province's fate:

> If I had been a resident of NWFP, my vote in the referendum would have been in favour of Pakistan. Because India is divided based on Hindu and Muslim nationality, every area where the Muslim nation has a majority should be included in this division with Muslim nationalism. (Mawdudi, 1963, p. 288)

3.6 The Road to Independence

The AIML was formed in 1906 and was a political organisation that would play an essential role in the progress of subcontinent Muslims (Ahmed, 2005). Established at Dacca (now Dhaka) at the Muhammadan Educational Conference's annual meeting, it was formed in fear that the Hindu majority would persecute the Muslims if Britain ever left the subcontinent. A delegation of Muslims in 1906 had visited Lord Minto, the viceroy, and specified:

> The representative institutions of the European type … place our national interests at the mercy of an unsympathetic majority … we Mohommadans are a distinct community with additional interests of our own which are not shared with other communities. (Enver, 1990, p. 13)

The League's principles were laid out in its Green Book, although its aims did not initially include a separate state for Muslims in the subcontinent. Instead, the party's philosophy emphasised "protecting Muslim rights and liberties, and encouraging understanding between Muslims and other Indian people" (Wynbrandt, 2009) instead of independence. Indeed, its initial forum intended to foster sentiments of loyalty to the British government among Muslims, which prompted some of the more radical voices in the group to reject membership.

In late 1913, Jinnah returned from London and officially joined the AIML with encouragement from his colleagues (Malik, 2008). This unusual cross-representation attracted a probing response from Sarojini Naidu, with Jinnah's sense of honour forcing his sponsors to make a formal, tentative commitment that "loyalty to the Muslim League and to the Muslim interest would in no way and at no time imply the shadow of disloyalty to the larger national cause to which (Jinnah's) life was dedicated" (Singh, 2009, p. 76).

In 1913, the League shifted its plan from the support of British rule to the purpose of subcontinent self-governance. Sir Sultan Muhammad Shah (1877–1957), Aga Khan III, the first president of the League, resigned in 1914 because he was annoyed with its anti-British stance. Jinnah was elected president of the League in 1916 and continued to play a leading role in forming an independent Pakistan (Waynbrandt, 2009). In Pakistan, he is popularly recognised as Quaid-e-Azam, or Great Leader, and is considered the nation's father.

In October 1916, a coalition of 19 elected Muslim and Hindu members of the Imperial Legislative Council submitted a memorandum of change to the viceroy. The British rejected the paper, but it became the basis for an agreement on voters and representation reached by the Congress representatives and the Muslim League in Calcutta in November 1916. The

contract formed a partnership between the Muslim League and the Indian National Congress, known as the Lucknow Pact (Ahmed, 2020; Jalal, 2014). In India, self-government required separate Hindu and Muslim electors and promised a minimum number of adherents in areas with minority communities. In addition, Muslims were expected to have a one-third presence in the central government. In exchange for the guarantee of extra seats in Muslim minority regions, the Muslim League dropped its claim to majority prominence in Punjab and Bengal (Ahmed, 2020). Thus, while the spirit of collaboration was comparatively short-lived, Congress acknowledged the Muslim League as a credible representative of the Muslim community for the first time (Waynbrandt, 2009).

In August 1917, Britain agreed to a change to self-governance of the subcontinent to recognise its people's contribution to the war effort. At the end of the war, the *Defense of India Act* would lapse, and conscripts in the subcontinent would return home from work and fighting, exhausted. Thus, it may not be necessary to maintain the dominance of the subcontinent. Edwin Samuel Montagu (1879–1924), Indian Secretary of State (1917–1922), introduced his constitutional amendments in 1918 after six months in India, adopted by the Viceroy, Fr. John Napier Thesiger, Third Baron, Chelmsford (r. 1916–1921). Parliament approved the amendments under the 1919 *Government of India Act*, generally known as the Montagu–Chelmsford Reforms. They also adopted diarchy (a form of double rule) for the territories of British India. This marked the introduction of democratic values within the executive branch. The democratic values would be extended in the coming years before the subcontinent finally gained independence. However, these initial changes were minimal. The Muslim League and Congress supported the institutional amendments proposed by the British.

At the end of 10 years, the Montagu–Chelmsford Reforms had set up a commission to examine the effects of reforms (Ahmed, 2020). The commission then prescribed the next

steps for the self-government of the subcontinent. The Simon Commission (named after British chairman John Allesbrook Simon [1873–1954]) elected an all-British delegation in 1927. It was generally viewed as a self-serving attempt by the British to prevent substantive reform. No Indians were assigned to the board. As a result, several political groups declined to engage in the activity of the commission. The Muslim League divided the issue in 1927 into two factions: the Jinnah League and the Shafi League (Ahmed, 2020).

The president of the organisation, Mian Muhammad Shafi, Allama Iqbal, and Agha Khan, advocated collaboration with the commission (Afzal, 2013); however, Jinnah and his supporters and other Muslim organisations favoured a boycott. The visiting British delegation was met with protests. Nearly all mainstream political parties decided to boycott the commission's meetings, and their work ended in disappointment. At the end of 1927, the Congress party announced its objective of absolute independence from Britain. As the Simon Commission failed to develop a compelling political reform strategy, the British handed the issue over to local political leaders. About 100 members of Muslim political groups and Congress gathered at the All Parties Conference in February 1928 to draft a new constitution (Ahmed, 2020). As expected, it was challenging to overcome the contradictions between Muslim and Hindu politicians. The main point of dispute was minority rights—independent electoral representation for minority groups—endorsing Muslims and opposed by Hindu politicians who dominated Congress. The second meeting of the Conference of All Parties took place in March (Ahmed, 2020), with the same lack of progress. At the third All Parties Meeting, which took place in Mumbai in May 1928, delegates formed a small committee, led by Motilal Nehru (1861–1931), to draft a Constitution. Two Muslims were on the committee of nine people. Around three months later, the committee released the Nehru Report, which proposed the abolition of separate electorates, eliminating all weightings granted to minority groups and minorities, and the nationalisation of Hindi. It also called for a reduction in

Muslim representation in the Central Assembly (from one-quarter to one-third) and opposed Congress's recent approval of the Delhi proposals (Waynbrandt, 2009). The Muslim League Sir Shafi group rejected the Nehru report, and an effort to find a suitable solution failed. However, according to Afzal (2013, p. 177), "the Jinnah League neither accepted nor rejected the report but wanted a few major changes in its contents".

The Nehru Report brought together the Muslim League's Jinnah and Shafi groups, which had been separated since 1924, to adopt a joint stand against the proposals. At the beginning of 1929, under Aga Khan, the All-Party Muslim Conference was held in Delhi to address the study with Muslim demands (Ahmed, 2020). The conference reflected a defining moment in Muslim political views and expressions. Jinnah, who had advocated collaboration with Hindus, declared the separation between Hindus and Congress.

In March 1929, in a series of tenets that had become famous as the 14 Points, Jinnah formulated an alternate course (Afzal, 2013). The facts suggested that the government must be centralised, and provinces can exercise residual powers. Further, they called for all legislators in the country and other elected bodies to be established based on the principle of appropriate representation of minorities, without limiting the majority in any province to a minority or even equal status. These precepts became a model for Muslim political ambitions for much of the next decade. The Muslim League incorporated the Fourteen Points as a precondition for their consent to any constitution (Waynbrandt, 2009).

Given the foundation of the Fourteen Points, which Muslims now clung to, others began to suspect that any accommodation would never be achieved, given Hindu intransigence and British aversion to Muslim demands. At the AIML meeting in Allahabad in 1930, the president, Allama Muhammad Iqbal (1877–1938), a well-known poet and philosopher, floated the idea that reconciliation between Muslims and Hindus would be unlikely unless

Muslims were granted the status of an independent country (Ahmed, 2020). He believed that the Muslim majority northwest area of the subcontinent was fated to form a self-government entity (Sherwani, 1995). For the Muslims of the subcontinent, it was the first public call for statehood.

Great Britain hosted a Round Table Conference with Hindus, Muslims, Sikhs, and Christians in London in November 1930 to discuss new constitutional amendments. However, all Congress party leaders were in prison on charges relating to civil disobedience (Ahmed, 2020). They conveyed the message that they would reject any potential constitutional debate until the Nehru Report as India's constitution was enacted in its entirety. Even so, 73 delegates, including Jinnah, attended the meeting. The Muslims maintained a weighted and distinct electorate, whereas the Hindus wished to abandon such electoral processes (Waynbrandt, 2009). The Hindus wanted a stable central government, with the Muslims favouring a flexible federation of independent provinces. The Muslim majority's status in Punjab and Bengal had been a point of contention, with Hindus opposed to their imposition. The conference concluded in January 1931 with an agreement to include protections for minorities in the constitution beneath the federal rule-making system. The second meeting of the Round Table Conference was held in London in September 1931 to discuss the nature of the central administration and, vexatiously, the rights of minorities or, as it is known, the communal issue. Jinnah, Iqbal, Aga Khan, and Gandhi attended the conference (Ahmed, 2020). However, the conference ended with no decisions being made. According to Shahnawaz (2002), the Muslim delegation had eased their demands to reach an acceptable formula, but Gandhi believed quite an inflexible stance. In response to the delegation, Gandhi stated: "Gentlemen, I am sorry to report that I have failed in my effort for settlement. The Sikhs and the Mahasabhites are not prepared to accept the terms decided upon by us"

(Shahnawaz, 2002, p. 122). Upon his arrival in India, Gandhi resurrected the civil disobedience campaign.

The Communal Award grants in August 1932 extended the rights of a separate electorate to all minority groups—not just Muslims. However, the immediate acknowledgement of the political status of Untouchables and Lower Castes was far more disturbing for the Hindus than the Muslims' rights, according to the Communal Award. Meanwhile, in Punjab and Bengal, the weighting principle had been misapplied, granting majority Muslims minority status in the provincial assemblies (Ahmed, 2020). In general, the Communal Award was controversial among all Indian political groups. However, the Muslim League decided to embrace it while maintaining the right to seek future changes.

Nevertheless, the privileges it would award to lower castes caused the award to be unacceptable to Hindu political parties. In November 1932, at the Third Round Table Conference, the final session reviewed findings from the committee and achieved little. Jinnah had not been called to the conference because the Conservatives, who had been returned to government in England, considered him anti-British because of his focus on equality and self-regulation in the subcontinent. A White Paper that was issued in March 1933 and provided the basis for a reform Constitution resulted from the Third Round Table Conference. Two years later, the parliament passed legislation as the *Government of India Act, 1935* (Waynbrandt, 2009).

Elections took place in the winter of 1936–1937. The Congress party won approximately 70% of the popular vote and 40% of provincial government positions; however, coalitions were dominant in most provinces. The Muslim League captured just 4.4% of the overall Muslim vote (Jalal, 2014)—not even a single region—along with the Muslim majority provinces, where regional parties (in Bengal, Punjab, and Sind) and Congress (in NWFP)

took power. The Congress party was reluctant to have Muslims in its government. Congress declined to cooperate with Muslims at the national level until they withdrew from the Muslim League: "no Muslim was taken in the Ministry unless he (members of Muslim League) abandoned the Muslim League and joined the Congress" (Munir, 1980, p. 21). An Indian writer, politician, and jurist, Dr Ambedkar, described this declaration of Congress as "the Muslims' political death as a free people" (Ambedkar, 2015).

The turnaround of Muslim fortunes paradoxically revitalised the Muslim League. Between 1937 and 1938, the membership of some thousand followers increased to several hundred thousand, and by the end of 1939, there were around three million registered voters (Wynbrandt, 2009). At the end of the decade, World War II began in Europe. Victor Alexander John Hope (r. 1936–1943) declared that India would participate in the Allied cause despite consultation with the Indian government (Wynbrandt, 2009). Congress replied by seeking practical independence in exchange for the alliance's approval. Britain denied it, which led to Congress resigning on 22 December 1939 (Ahmed, 2020). Jinnah asserted this a day of celebration and deliverance, marking the dissolution of the rule of Congress.

3.6.1 The Lahore Resolution 1940

In March 1940, at a public hearing in Lahore, Jinnah declared that "Muslims are not a minority as it is commonly known and understood … Muslims are a nation according to any definition of a nation, and they must have their homelands, their territory, and their state" (Yusufi, 1996, p. 1183). As the Lahore Resolution, this stance became the policy of the Muslim League on 24 March 1940. The Resolution specified that:

> No constitutional plan would be workable or acceptable to the Muslims unless geographical contiguous units are demarcated into regions which should be so constituted with such territorial readjustments as may be necessary. That the areas in which the Muslims are numerically in the majority, as in the North-Western and Eastern zones of India, should be grouped to constitute

independent states in which the constituent units shall be autonomous and sovereign. (Yusufi, 1996)

The Indian press called the Pakistan Resolution 'the address', even though the speech never mentioned the word 'Pakistan' (Jalal, 2014). The dynamics and terms of the political discourse on the future of the subcontinent were irrevocably altered (Wynbrandt, 2009). In exchange for its support for the British war, the Muslim League agreed with British members on the conditions of a possible Constitution and Muslim representation. The viceroy gave the August Offer of 1940, which agreed that no Constitution would be implemented without Muslim India's approval, while at the same time refusing to represent the Muslim League equally as Congress in the Defense Council, which was an advisory war council under creation (Ahmed, 2020). The Muslim League refused to consider the bid.

In March 1942, Richard Stafford Cripps (1889–1952) was on a high-level mission to resolve India's problems (Ahmed, 2020). At the time, there were more than 1 million soldiers in the British Indian Army from the subcontinent, and most were Muslims. Cripps established freedom for the subcontinent, a legislative legislature, security for minorities, and a regional option regarding whether a new Indian state should be formed at the end of the war. However, the Muslim League refused Cripps' bid without any promise for an autonomous Muslim state (Lumby and Mansergh, 1970), and Congress opposed the proposal, respectively.

Against the backdrop of war and drought, the Muslim League gained more influence in the Muslim majority regions with its strong claim for independence. By the spring of 1943, it was the leading force in Punjab, Sind, Assam, and Bengal (Ahmed, 2020). Most people in the subcontinent were keen to end the conflict between Muslims and Hindus. Gandhi, who had just been released from prison, strongly rejected a two-nation solution. He suggested a meeting with Jinnah in July, and in September 1944, the two leaders met 14 times altogether

in Bombay (Ahmed, 2020). Jinnah said that Gandhi had arrived on a personal mission, not as a Congress or Hindus delegate. Gandhi managed to persuade Jinnah of the folly of Muslim calls for a separate state; he argued that the subcontinent Muslims were the Hindus' ancestors and confirmed the historical unity of the subcontinent. Gandhi was also afraid that other ethnic groups would pursue freedom if Muslims pressed their demands (Wynbrandt, 2009).

It was very clear that Jinnah wanted independent Pakistan. In January 1945, the British War Cabinet advised Archibald Wavell, the first viscount Wavell, the Viceroy of India (r. 1943–1947):

> The declarations of His Majesty's Government in favour of the establishment of a self-governing India as an integral member of the British Empire and Commonwealth remains our inflexible policy. You will make, as occasion warrants, any proposals which you may consider may achieve that end. (Mansergh and Moon, 1974, p. 443)

Wavell returned to London in May 1945, after the war had ended in Europe, to speak about the future of the subcontinent (Wynbrandt, 2009). The Viceroy's Council requested the absolute status of dominion. However, the Council stressed that the British must hold its military command in India for the next 20 years (Mansergh and Moon, 1974). Instead, at a conference held in Shimla in northern India at the end of June 1945, Wavell proposed the so-called Wavell Scheme. With the war finished, the British did not feel the need to please the Muslims, who made up a considerable part of the subcontinent troops. The British chose to return to the role of the Congress party as the only Indian delegate (Wynbrandt, 2009). Solid relations between UK Labor and Congress party leadership backed this choice.

In addition, all parties at the Shimla Conference agreed, as was anticipated, that general elections for central and provisional assemblies must take place (Singh, 2009). However, the Congress Party declined to accept the Muslim League's assertion that it was the primary leader of Muslim political ambitions; the Congress preferred to be able to appoint Muslim

candidates in council (Ahmed, 2020). Meanwhile, the Sikh group Akali Dal and the Panthic Group resisted the elections, which they viewed as a step towards independent Pakistan. These groups believed that a subcontinent split between Muslims and Hindus along religious lines would have less respect for the interests of other religious and ethnic groups in the subcontinent than a united country. Additionally, more Pashtun political groups had closer links to the Congress party, of whom the Khudai Khidmatgar was an ally, instead of the Muslim League pro-partition (Wynbrandt, 2009). These and many other disputes and issues hindered the meeting, and Wavell proclaimed it to be a failure (Ahmed, 2020). While there was no consensus on the subcontinent's political future, central and regional legislative elections were announced for the winter of 1945 (Mansergh and Moon, 1976). Wavell's proposals included creating an executive council and a post-election committee responsible for writing a constitution. Jinnah opposed the proposal because it did not allow for a Muslim state, and Congress also opposed it. Yet, the outcome of the forthcoming elections would be crucial for both parties to develop their authority and role in the subcontinent's future. The primary campaign platform of the Muslim League was an autonomous Muslim statehood, whereas the Congress party ran on a united India basis (Wynbrandt, 2009). The members of the Muslim League claimed all 30 seats in the Central Assembly reserved for Muslims (Ahmed, 2020). Congress also performed well and secured 80% of the general seats.

3.6.2 Cabinet Mission Plan

Three cabinet ministers were sent by the British in 1946 to resolve the conflict between the Muslim League and the Congress party (Ahmed, 2020). First, the envoys established that the creation of two separate states was not a negotiable choice. The Cabinet mission suggested a single country with a central government that would effectively leave the provinces independent and empowered to construct their own constitutions (Wynbrandt, 2009). The Muslim League essentially "agreed to a Federal Union government concept" (Singh, 2009,

p. 363), but when Congress refused to offer the League what it thought was an acceptable role in the new interim government, the Muslim league declined to support the initiative. In May 1947, Cabinet Mission rejected the League demand for Pakistan and claimed that many non-Muslims were included in the proposed state of Pakistan (Mansergh and Moon, 1977). Further, Cabinet proposed a plan of Indian union; includes both princely states and British India and power retained to princely states and free provinces for groups (Muslims, Sikhs, and others). Further, Cabinet stated that:

> The constitutions of the Union and of the Groups should contain a provision whereby any Province could, by a majority vote of its Legislative Assembly, call for reconsideration of the terms of the constitution after an initial period of 10 years and at 10 years intervals thereafter. (Mansergh and Moon, 1977, pp. 586–87)

The British Congress approved the creation of a provisional government without the involvement of the AIML. However, some members of the League had agreed to form part of its final constitution. Muslim leaders bitterly objected. On 16 August 1946, the League called hartals a Day for Direct Action, massive shows of non-cooperation to avoid business and trade, demonstrations, strikes, marches, and conferences (Singh, 2009). There was a backlash against the Hindus by the Muslim Unity Front. Sectarian strife, which was popularly called Calcutta Killing, erupted in Calcutta, where Muslims were a minority (Singh, 2009). There were as many as 4,000 deaths in both religions. Around 15,000 people were wounded, and 100,000 were internally displaced (Wynbrandt, 2009). The violence continued to spread and to fall.

At the end of August 1946, Wavell met with Gandhi, Jawaharlal Nehru, and the Congress president and accused the Congress party of renouncing its promise to include the League in the national coalition government. He demanded their undertaking in writing. Gandhi and Nehru refused the appeal and requested that Wavell be recalled. The British instructed Wavell to form a provisional government instead. In October 1946, he declared that he had

been named vice president for Nehru and had given one of the three prominent cabinet positions—the finance portfolio—to Liaquat Ali Khan (Mansergh and Moon, 1979), who was a member of the AIML from 1896 to 1951.

Further, the Constituent Assembly was called for a meeting on 9 December 1946 (Ahmed, 2020). Congress remained against the power-sharing system that led the League, the principal states, and the Sikhs to refuse to participate in the Constituent Assembly (Wynbrandt, 2009). Before the assembly began, the British Prime Minister called Viceroy Jinnah, Liaquat Ali Khan, Nehru, and political leader Baldev Singh (1902–1961) to a power-sharing agreement in London (Ahmed, 2020). Congress approved the proposal that the leadership agreed to, but the consensus was again not implemented. Many parties from minority groups boycotted the meeting.

The British committed themselves to hand over power no later than June 1948, although it was unclear who would take control and whether one or more governments would be in force (Wynbrandt, 2009). The British launched a campaign to suppress Muslim and party demonstrations. In January 1947, the Muslim National Guard—the Muslim League's voluntary corps—was barred, the League's leaders were arrested in Lahore (Ahmed, 2017), and the offices of the League in Punjab were raided. The AIML asked for a civil disobedience movement. The British outlawed demonstrations and greeted the demonstrators with tear gas. However, the Pakistan movement became an irresistible force and spread throughout Muslim society.

3.6.3 Lord Mountbatten's Plan

In March 1947, Lord Mountbatten was appointed as the last viceroy to the subcontinent (Ahmed, 2020). On his arrival, he toured the subcontinent and met with the leaders of the major political organisations; some of what he witnessed, like large-scale border protests,

convinced him of the profundity of Muslim nationalism (Wynbrandt, 2009). Jinnah also told Lord Mountbatten that independent Pakistan had the support of Muslims all over India and that Jinnah could not give up. Even the Hindu political community recognised the strength of Muslim determination. On 8 March, Congress requested that Punjab be divided (Ahmed, 2020). This was a kind of retaliation for the subcontinent's separation. Congress did not want to deal with the League but knew it was strong enough to thwart all of its goals. The lesser of two evils was that the Muslims were neglected to obstruct their state's growth and progress while doing all they could.

Lord Mountbatten developed an alternative strategy to divide India, called 'Union' and 'Balkan' plans (Ahmed, 2020). The proposals were finalised in April 1947 at the Conference of Governors and accepted by the British government in May. The plan called for Indian provinces to have the option of independence (Singh, 2009). The specifics of what was called the June 3rd Plan were to be kept secret until they were publicly revealed. However, Nehru saw it before it was released. Some scholars mentioned that V.P. Menon[6] had informed Nehru and Patel respectively regarding the scheme (Mansergh and Moon, 1981). As the scheme was proposed, Nehru opposed the Balkanisation of the subcontinent. The plan was soon updated and expanded by Lord Mountbatten and a Hindu staff assistant to suggest a transition of powers to the Separate Dominions of India and Pakistan. Lord Mountbatten took this to London, where Prime Minister Clement Attlee (r. 1945–1951) and his cabinet immediately accepted the partition scheme (Ahmed, 2020). Congress and the United Kingdom decided to reduce Pakistan's border—Pakistan's size was to be less than the five states that the Muslim League had agreed to incorporate into the new country (Wynbrandt, 2009).

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[6] "V. P. Menon, had been working on an earlier transfer of power long before Mountbatten had arrived in India. Indeed, Menon worked as reforms commissioner under Wavell, and the Breakdown and Demarcation plans were prepared by him under the direction of the penultimate viceroy" (Ahmed, 2020).

On 4 June 1947, in a radio broadcast, Jinnah, Nehru, Baldev Singh, and Lord Mountbatten announced plans to create boundaries for the two new countries. Elected members in Sind, West Punjab, and East Bengal would define their provinces' territorial boundaries. At the same time, a referendum was to be conducted in the NWFP and parts of Assam. A consultative agreement would decide the boundaries of Baluchistan, and a commission would be formed in Bengal and Punjab to delineate the borders between Muslim and non-Muslim regions (Singh, 2009). Border decisions were to remain hidden until independence. Mountbatten made an early announcement to speed up the transition of power. The transition would take place on 15 August 1947, just over one month from the announcement date, rather than in June 1948, as was previously scheduled (Ahmed, 2020). At the end of June 1947, Baluchistan voted to formally recognise Pakistan, as did the NWFP in a referendum at the beginning of July 1947 (Wynbrandt, 2009). After Bengal agreed to join Pakistan, Assam agreed that Bengal would participate in a referendum in Sylhet.

British Parliament passed the *Indian Independence Act* on 18 July to establish Pakistan and India as realms of the British Commonwealth (Mansergh and Moon, 1983). The Act stated: "As from the fifteenth day of August, nineteen hundred and forty-seven, two independent Dominions shall be set up in India, to be known respectively as India and Pakistan" (Mansergh and Moon, 1983, p. 234). The Act also set up the office of governor-general for each of the two independent territories. With imminent partition and sectary tensions further intensified, violence erupted. But the path to freedom now shifted to just one direction (Waynbrandt, 2009). The first session of the Pakistan Constituent Assembly, which was both the federal legislature and the constitutional founder, was held on 11 August. On 13 August, Lord Mountbatten arrived at Karachi with a letter he read to King George's assembly. Pakistan and India became independent on 15 August (Wynbrandt, 2009). The dream of freedom was fulfilled, but the new nation of Pakistan faced new challenges ahead.

The new federation's turbulent, violent structure provided little cause for celebration. Born in the spasms of massacre and flight, Pakistan was a physically divided country, with its East Wing (now Bangladesh) and West Wing separated by some 1,000 miles (1,600 km).

Figure 1. Pakistan's Political Map, 1947–1971

Source: https://www.sott.net/image/s21/420810/full/partition_of_india_1947.jpg

The problems facing the new Pakistan state raised several questions: Will all Pakistanis become a nation, and how will the state address ethnic diversity? Was Pakistan a secular state or an Islamic state? How would it cope with the refugee crisis?

3.7 Concluding Remarks

Chapter 3 provided a detailed study of the actions that led to the emergence of Muslim nationalism and the birth of Pakistan as a modern nation-state. In particular, it focused on events that occurred during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, including the downfall of the Mughal Empire and the rise of British rule. Further, this chapter conducted a detailed study of the Muslim question of identity in colonial India and how Muslim identity transformed into a political identity that demanded a separate homeland for Muslims. The role of Muslim intellectuals was also discussed in terms of how they have addressed the Muslims' question of identity. Finally, this chapter ended with a detailed review of the politics of the Pakistan Movement and the partition plans that led to the independence of Pakistan and India.

Chapter 4: Research Methodology

4.1 Introduction

Chapter 4 focuses on the general research design and the methods used to conduct this study. In social sciences, research methods depend on the nature of the research and the types of research questions posed. Thus, it is always challenging to select an appropriate research strategy and methods to answer the specific research questions and provide a comprehensive understanding of a social phenomenon in a particular context (Bryman, 2004). Moreover, in social sciences such as education, politics, and sociology, case studies have been used to identify individual and social contextual dynamics that quantitative techniques cannot address (Chadderton and Torrance, 2011; Hall, 2008). Yin (2014) describes a case study as an "empirical inquiry" that examines a contemporary trend within its real-life context. Qualitative research promises to depict life-worlds "from the inside out" through the participants' perspectives. This approach comprehensively addresses the collected empirical evidence and theoretical approach, contributing to the research's core aim. Therefore, this study has employed qualitative research methodology to address this research question. The chapter is split into three sections. The main objective of this chapter is to explain the research process to build a research design that is appropriate for addressing the concerns set out to achieve the purpose of this study. The first section provides a brief summary of the research model employed in this study and the ontological and epistemological positions that drive it. This leads to the research approach, procedure, sampling technique, and data collection procedure. Next, the section explores the case study as a research tool within the framework of a qualitative approach. It then presents the sampling techniques and explores difficulties linked to the procedure of data collection and the research participants. The second section describes the research techniques used for data collection and the data analysis

approach. Finally, the chapter concludes with a summary of ethical problems related to the research.

4.2 Research Problem

As discussed in Chapter 1, this study explores the question of national identity in Pakistan. Pakistan was founded on the two-nation theory and a separate state where Muslims could live according to their beliefs while preserving and promoting their distinct identity. However, after the formation of Pakistan as an independent state, national identity became an ongoing debate. In general, Pakistanis have been divided into two groups: those who have established their views on Pakistan's national identity based on Islamic teaching, values, and practice and those who have a secular ideology regarding the development of national identity (Shafqat, 2007). Further, confusion regarding Pakistan's national identity has deepened over time, and debates around the subject have attracted significant attention (Ahmed, 2008, 2017). Thus, the question of Pakistan's national identity became more complex between Islamists and secularists, and the debate divided Pakistan's society.

The Islamic sectarian divide, ethnicity, and social and cultural practices also contributed to the ongoing national identity debate. Given the background of this complex issue, this study seeks to understand the question of Pakistan's national identity and how Islamists and secularists interpret their narratives of national identity. To explore and understand this phenomenon, the study sought to answer small questions directly or indirectly related to this debate, which can help understand various dimensions of this complex national issue in Pakistan. These questions include: What is the national policy towards forming national identity? What is the historical background of national identity formation in Pakistan? What international sociocultural, religious, and ethnic factors play a role in national identity formation? What are the study participants' perceptions of identity formation, how do they

view the current form of national identity, and what are their views about the national identity they want to form or see in Pakistan?

Some international factors may play a role in the process of identity formation; however, this study only focuses on internal factors. The next section explains the research question and objective. Figure 4.1 outlines the overall research process for this study.


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
Figure 2. Overall Research Process for This Study (Gray, 2004, p. 4)

4.3 Research Question and Objectives

This research investigates the question of Pakistan's national identity by focusing on the Islamist and secularist narratives. The study explores and understands Pakistan's national identity to answer this question. Different narratives of Pakistan's national identity have existed since the country's inception. Pakistan was established based on Muslim nationalism (two-nation theory). The connection between the state and Islam was intimate and formed an intrinsic element of Pakistan's ideological basis and Islamic identity. Thus, Pakistan was

destined to be a modern Muslim nation-state (based on Islamic principles)—some called it an 'Islamic state' (Karim, 2010). This confirms that Pakistan was not to be a secular state. According to Ahmed (2020, p. 12), "the ideological thrust of the two-nation theory and its popular form of Muslim nationalism was the antithesis of secularism". However, secularists have manipulated Jinnah's 11 August 1947 address, suggesting a shift in Jinnah's stand from Pakistan being an Islamic state to a secular state (Ali, 2009; Munir, 1980). Therefore, to understand the question of Pakistan's national identity in the context of the narratives of Islamists and secularists, the main research question is:

"How do Islamists and secularists define and interpret Pakistan's national identity in light of Pakistan's colonial history and the events surrounding its creation" ?

This research question will provide an understanding of the processes and reasons behind the emergence of Muslim nationalism that led to an independent state from a highly diverse subcontinent. Further, this research question will examine Jinnah's vision for Pakistan and how the Islamists and secularists interpret Jinnah's vision to support their narratives. To achieve the objectives of the study, this study also poses a subquestion:

What is the current state of affairs of the national identity debate between Islamists and secularists?

This research question will examine two perspectives: 1) the historical event interpreted by the Islamists and secularists in the national identity debate (e.g. whether the two-nation theory is invalid since the inception of Bangladesh in 1971, before East Pakistan), and the ethnic identity challenges to Pakistan's national identity; and 2) how Islamists and secularists define the contemporary debate of Pakistan's national identity.

These research questions need a research approach and design. Yin (2003, p. 26) states that a research design is "the logical sequence that connects the empirical data to a study's initial

research questions and, ultimately, to its conclusions" to deal with the main facets of the critical research question.

4.4 Research Method: An Ethnographic Approach

In social sciences, the selection of the research method is directly related to the nature of the study and the types of research questions the researcher wants to investigate. Therefore, it is important to choose appropriate research methods to achieve the research objectives for a social research project. In social research, researchers usually have three ways to study a social phenomenon: (a) qualitative approach, (a) quantitative approach, and (c) mixed-methods approach (mix of qualitative and quantitative methods) (Bryman, 2004).

Gray (2004) discusses how a researcher's theoretical (epistemological) approach is linked to selecting an overall research strategy and appropriate research methods for a particular project.

Given the nature of the research question for this study, it is clear that this study is subjective. Therefore, a constructivist and interpretive approach has been adopted for this study to explore the views of various participants to understand the overall concepts, evaluation of national identity formation, and factors involved in the Islamic and secular narratives of national identity formation in Pakistan. As a result, this study employs a qualitative/ethnographic research approach and methods.

In social research, it has been suggested that the ethnographic approach is more relevant when understanding a social phenomenon in a particular setting. It helps to understand a social phenomenon relating to various social, cultural, religious, and other communal practices (Gray, 2004).

4.4.1 Qualitative Research Design and Data Collection Methods

A qualitative case study research design has been adopted to investigate the research questions:

> Research design is a plan for collecting and analyzing evidence that will make it possible for the investigator to answer whatever questions he or she has posed. The design of an investigation touches almost all aspects of the research, from the minute details of data collection to the selection of the techniques of data analysis. (Ragin, 1994, p. 191)

Qualitative research promises to depict life-worlds "from the inside out" through the participants' perspectives. It hopes to determine the effectiveness of social reality by drawing attention to procedures, trends in meaning, and structural characteristics. This approach comprehensively addresses the empirical evidence collected, and the theoretical approach contributes to the research's core aim. Denzin and Lincoln (2017, p. 10) describe that:

> Qualitative research is a situated activity that locates the observer in the world. It consists of a set of interpretive, material practices that makes the world visible. These practices transform the world. They turn the world into a series of representations, including field notes, interviews, conversations, photographs, recordings and memos to the self. At this time, qualitative involves an interpretive, naturalistic approach to this world. This means that qualitative researchers study things in their natural settings, attempting to make sense of, or to interpret, phenomena in terms of the meanings people bring to them.

According to Berg (2001, p. 7), "qualitative research properly seeks answers to questions by examining various social settings and the individuals who inhabit these settings". Moreover, it "provides textual data that can be used to complement quantitative data or to test the research hypothesis directly" (Hall, 2008, p. 196). This study uses two critical qualitative methods: semi-structured interviews and a secondary data method that includes documents and archival files. Literature regarding research methodologies has underlined the weaknesses and strengths of qualitative methods. According to Pierce (2008, p. 45), an advantage is "its unique capacity, through in-depth interviewing and observation, to learn and understand the underlying values of individuals and groups. It better enables theory to be

created by induction". Qualitative research aims to help researchers understand people and the social and cultural environments in which they live (Myers, 2009). This approach also allows researchers to understand group dynamics by using an interpretive method of observing the relationships and agreements between individual members within the same communities and with external communities (Berg, 2001; Pierce, 2008). However, various weaknesses of qualitative approaches have also been noted. They are often criticised for being sensational, anecdotal, lacking in rigour, and being subjective and biased, and therefore subjected to a high level of misrepresentation (Pierce, 2008). All of these weaknesses were taken into account when developing this research methodology. This thesis uses multiple sources to investigate the same phenomenon, thereby reducing the probability of mistakes, invalidity, and data unreliability; improving data reliability and analysis quality; and comprehensively covering all aspects of the research. In the literature, this is described as data triangulation (Hall, 2008; Ritchie, 2001; Yin, 2003). In this case, documents, interviews, observations, and archive records "are all frequently used in combination, with each technique complementing the other" (Ritchie, 2001, p. 132).

A case study is used in a research approach to investigate a social phenomenon in its natural environment (Yin, 2014). Further, it is an investigative technique that seeks to answer particular research questions concerning individuals, groups, organisations, and communities using numerous sources of information (Gillham, 2000). Finally, it is an empirical investigation that has been defined as being the "preferred strategy when 'how' or 'why' questions are being posed, when the investigator has little control over events, and when the focus is on a contemporary phenomenon within some real-life context" (Yin, 2003, p. 13). It is suggested merely as "a 'sample of one' event, instance, state or sub-unit one point in time" (Pierce, 2008, p. 51). However, it is a comprehensive process supported by numerous theoretical streams that begin with design reasoning, progress through selecting data

gathering tools, and end with defining specific data analysis approaches (Chadderton and Torrance, 2011; Yin, 2003, p. 14).

Case studies have been used in social science subjects such as education, sociology, and politics to comprehend better the complexity of individuals and societal contexts for which quantitative approaches cannot account (Chadderton and Torrance, 2011; Hall, 2008). However, it can provide much information on individual examples of communities and institutions (Burnham et al., 2004). A number of academics have highlighted the advantages of the case study technique. For instance, Yin (2003, p. 8) describes the "unique strength of case study of being unconventional research method to elicit a variety of data beyond the ability of those conventional methods". Further, using the case study technique allows for in-depth research of one element of an issue by giving detailed descriptions and comprehensive instances of phenomena within a brief period (Bell, 2010; Bloor and Wood, 2006; Hays, 2004). In short, the case study's detailed description of the social phenomenon, comprehensive representation of the participants' viewpoints, and consideration of contextual influences made it appropriate for the current research, which aims to examine Pakistan's national identity in the context of Islamist and secularist narratives.

4.5 Justification of Chosen Methods

The objective of the current research is to investigate Pakistan's national identity question concerning the Islamist and secularist narratives. As discussed earlier in this chapter, this research adopted a qualitative approach to achieve the research aims. There were different reasons for choosing qualitative research. For example, it helped the researcher to depict the complexities of lived experiences rather than offer a generalisable narrative or predict others' experiences (Talburt and Stewart, 1999). Silverman (2000) suggests that qualitative methods may be favoured if the researcher is interested in people's life histories or everyday behaviour. Therefore, the qualitative approach helps elicit an in-depth, socially constructed

reality. Cresswell (2007, p. 35) equates qualitative research with "an intricate fabric composed of minute threads, many colors, different textures and various blend of materials" that provides a richness of the data and a deeper insight into the realities of the participants' lives and experiences.

Additionally, a qualitative research approach facilitates in-depth analysis of the phenomenon being researched. For example, the research question I have asked (the question of Pakistan's national identity) has never been examined in detail in the context of Islamist and secularist narratives. The qualitative approach helps generate intensive and extensive data to analyse the phenomenon comprehensively. It can be argued that a qualitative approach is particularly appropriate when the researcher determines that quantitative measures cannot adequately describe or interpret a situation (Bryman, 2012). Given this study's time and resource limitations, it was not possible to use quantitative methods such as surveys or the mixed-methods approach.

4.6 Sampling Procedures

In the literature, two types of sampling practices have been considered: "probability (or random sampling) and non-probability (or non-random) sampling" (Burnham et al., 2004). They are constructed on unique sampling design forms. Indeed, sampling techniques begin with identifying target populations or interest communities (Filmer, 1998). For this research, the defined population of interest is individuals from three groups: politicians, academics, and journalists. In addition, this research uses the purposive sampling method, which is more appropriate for the research design of this study. This sampling strategy allows "interviewees to be selected purposively in terms of criteria that were central to the main topic of research" (Bryman, 2012). It also involves identifying and selecting people or groups who are particularly aware of or experienced in a remarkable phenomenon (Cresswell and Clark, 2011).

Moreover, this method is cost- and time-effective, and the "resulting samples often look rather similar to probability sample data" (Fowler, 2014). Snowballing strategies are used to gather a sample of persons or groups that are "more suited to in-depth interview research" (Burnham et al., 2004) and that would otherwise be unreachable. The sampling size depends on different aspects and the actual study design (Fowler, 2014) and accessibility to prospective participants. The sample size comprised 18–20 participants who agreed to participate in an interview. Although the researcher conducted 17 interviews to ensure adequate data validity and representation, the study also aimed to equalise the number of participants between the Islamist and secularist groups.

Table 1. Participants' Profiles for Research Interviews

Participant	Place	Interview date	Face-to-face interview	Number of participants
Journalist	Islamabad	4 October 2019	Semi-structured interview	1
Academic	Islamabad	4 December 2019	Semi-structured interview	1
Academic	Islamabad	20 December 2019	Semi-structured interview	1
Political analyst, journalist	Lahore	29 December 2019	Semi-structured interview	1
Politician	Lahore	29 December 2019	Semi-structured interview	1
Historian	Lahore	11 January 2020	Semi-structured interview	1
Academic	Islamabad	27 January 2020	Semi-structured interview	1
Academic	Islamabad	3 February 2020	Semi-structured interview	1
Politician, writer	Lahore	7 February 2020	Semi-structured interview	1
Academic	Islamabad	13 February 2020	Semi-structured interview	2
Academic	Islamabad	17 February 2020	Semi-structured interview	1
Academic	Islamabad	21 February 2020	Semi-structured interview	1
Social-activist, academic	Islamabad	21 February 2020	Semi-structured interview	1
Journalist	Islamabad	23 February 2020	Semi-structured	1

Participant	Place	Interview date	Face-to-face interview	Number of participants
			interview	
Politician	Lahore	26 February 2020	Semi-structured interview	1
Journalist	Lahore	26 February 2020	Semi-structured interview	1

4.7 Data Collection Methods and Process

According to Diekmann (1995, p. 274), "data collection designs are a means to the end of collecting meaningful data". Some researchers argue that the qualitative approach refers to some of the most common sources of evidence used in case study research (i.e. interviews, documents, archive records, and observation) (Bergen and While, 2000; Gillham, 2000; Yin, 2003). This study uses interviews, documents, and archive record techniques to collect the data. In the meantime, the study considers the above two techniques as one method. 'Written' proof includes both electronic and hard copies of published and unpublished reports and documents (Gillham, 2000). The interviews are primary data sources, while the documents and archive records are secondary sources. Semi-structured interviews are frequently used in sociopolitical studies (Pierce, 2008).

Semi-structured interviews are widely used in case study research because they enhance the research with specific data from interviewees and simultaneously provide more details on the subject (Hall, 2008). Chadderton and Torrance (2011) note that semi-structured interviews "offer an insight into respondents' memories and explanations of why things have come to be what they are, as well as description of current problems and aspirations". Interviewing is an efficient non-scheduled strategy that, unlike structured data collection methods, is sensitive to contextual changes in understanding and providing in-depth information in a guiding and questionable way (Filmer, 1998).

Moreover, according to Foddy (1993, p. 1), "asking questions is widely accepted as a cost-efficient (sometimes the only) way, of gathering information about past behaviours and experiences, private actions and motives, and beliefs, values and attitudes". The researcher uses interviews to explore and gain a deeper understanding of interviewees' experiences. Despite the above assertion, interviews do not include just the asking and answering of questions. Still, it implies an "active interaction between two (or more) people leading to negotiated, contextually based results" (Fontana and Frey, 2008). From this, it can be inferred that interviewing is a social process involving social actors, blending perfectly with the chosen paradigm's subjective part. In qualitative interviewing, Bryman (2012) states that "there is much greater interest in the interviewee's point of view".

However, this approach has also been criticised. For example, Travers (2006) notes that generalisation cannot be accomplished by interviewing a small number of people. This could lead to misleading or biased information, the interviewer could shape the interview or influence the findings, and the interviews could not provide an in-depth interpretation of the social context being sought. Therefore, to prevent these weaknesses, the methodological design in the present study uses the data triangulation method. This data collection approach helps gather detailed information and helps the researcher maintain the validity and reliability of the information collected (Robson, 2002). Moreover, the interview questions are open-ended in order to "challenge the preconceptions of the researcher, as well as enable the interviewee to answer questions within their own frame of reference" (May, 2001). Open-ended questions provide the interviewee with a forum to deliver responses that the interviewer has not expected; to provide a more in-depth view of the facts; to elicit personal feedback from participants in their own words rather than those of the researcher; and to be more suitable with multiple answers (Fowler, 2014).

Bryman (2012) argues that, before conducting semi-structured interviews, a list of questions or topics that need to be covered should be drafted. However, both the interviewee and the interviewer will have the liberty to repress or ask more questions. Therefore, this research uses a detailed interview question sheet and a consent form signed by each participant.

4.8 Data Analysis Process

4.8.1 Transcription of Interviews

The data collected through the interviews were audio-recorded in Urdu and English. The researcher manually transcribed the interviews into English, and all details of the 16 interviews were saved electronically. A lack of access to software that would allow the transcription of different Urdu dialects into English was the reason for the manual transcription. Manual transcription is time-consuming; however, an in-depth and correct description of the participants' ideas and views is one of the advantages. Because it is difficult to note all of the features of speech in a recorded conversation, the transcriptions include only the questions and answers and use a selective process by transcribing certain phenomena or characteristics of discussions and interactions, because "a more useful transcript is a more selective one" (Ochs, 1979, p. 44). The researcher who conducted the interviews is a native Pakistani–Urdu speaker; therefore, he was capable of mastering the analysis at a later stage. This is significant because the transcription phase added many valuable insights, including the metaphors mentioned during the discussions. If a non-Pakistani–Urdu speaker were to transcribe the same audio-recorded materials, unlike a native speaker, they would not be able to convey the exact meanings of the terms and metaphors used by the participants. Therefore, for secondary data, there was no need for transcription because the analysis of the documents took place directly from Urdu to English.

4.8.2 Data Coding and Analysis Method

According to Gibbs (2012), coding is "how you define what the data you are analysing are about" in qualitative research. Whether a quantitative or qualitative method, coding data provides meaning to help understand and make sense of the larger picture (Willis, 2006). Coding refers to the "marking of segments of data with symbols, descriptive words, or category names" (Willis, 2006, p. 266). This researcher arranged all of the data systematically using a discourse analysis approach.

According to Hall (2008), qualitative research is versatile and accessible to the various choices and approaches that deal with valuable textual data. Further, the reliability, accuracy, integrity, and validity of the data obtained in qualitative research are essential in establishing relevant inferences (Kelly, 1998). Technology has contributed significantly to the coding and analysis of large volumes of data by offering electronic tools, including NVivo and similar software. However, the data were entered and analysed manually because of the relatively small amount of data gathered in this research. It is also argued that programs like NVivo should not circumvent the researcher's awareness generated by the data and the normal process of creating and preserving the data collected (May, 2001). As pointed out earlier in this chapter, the researcher's manual transcription and analysis added a great deal of value by providing in-depth and insightful information. The composition of the analysis preceded a pattern corresponding to the main research questions on Pakistan's national identity. The analysis, which was conducted using Microsoft Excel, has created several descriptive statistical methods. Descriptive statistics are compelling and expressive ways "of measuring, analysing and presenting" attitudes and sociopolitical trends (Burnham et al., 2004, p. 114). This research refers to two qualitative methods: interviews, which are the primary data source, and archival documents (mainly Jinnah's speeches), which are considered secondary data sources. While this research uses semi-structured interviews and maximises the

reliability of the findings, several categories have been developed based on the initial transcripts. Systematic content analysis is conducted for each interview using the types and data extracts produced to support written analysis.

The qualitative method of data analysis is generally divided into two categories: manifest and latent analysis. The manifest analysis focuses on what the document means. It deals with material that defines tangible, visible elements. In contrast, the latent analysis does not concern the words used, but their significance explores fundamental concepts and relations within the text (Graneheim and Lundman, 2004). A manifest analysis is applied in this research through a discourse analysis approach, as Brown and Yule (1983) describe that discourse analysis concentrates on the words used to express meaning. Scholars describe discourse analysis as an interpretive approach that comprehensively interprets social and political events, attitudes, or acts focused on the dialect used (Burnham et al., 2004; Walter, 2006). Mills (2004, p. 64) describes discourse analysis as "statements which deal with the same topic and which seem to produce a similar effect, grouped together because of some institutional pressure or association, because of similarity of origin, or because they have similar function". The literature has presented many approaches to discourse analysis applied in social, political, and economic studies. This research involved the discourse analysis approach of Foucault (Gillen and Petersen, 2005).

Foucault's concept of power recognises the complex effects of sociopolitical relations on policy. Foucault (1980, p. 93) observes that "there are manifold relations of power which permeate, characterise and constitute the social body, and these relations of power cannot themselves be established, consolidated nor implemented without the production, accumulation, circulation and functioning of a discourse". His idea of power provides ways of observing and executing a comprehensive policy dialogue to grasp the current actions of resistance, cooperation, or collaboration. Foucault's notion of power separates him from

several other contemporary thinkers. To him, power is not 'owned', for instance, by governments, organisations, or persons, to be enforced on other people; however, "power is everywhere, not because it embraces everything, but because it comes from everywhere" (Foucault, 1990, p. 93).

Power is not a finite resource that can be held by some and taken away from others. Foucault (1990, p. 101) explains that "discourse transmits and produces power; it reinforces it, but also undermines and exposes it, renders it fragile and makes it possible to thwart it".

Power relations mediated by social practices at play in power struggles within and between discourses are fundamental to Foucault's discourse analysis. Consequently, discourse analysts often focus on points of conflict and change in their research field, because they are indicators of power relations. Flyvbjerg (2001a, p. 98) notes that Foucault's "work reflects a sophisticated understanding of Realpolitik" and that his "emphasis on marginality and domination makes his thinking sensitive to difference, diversity, and the politics of identity, something which today is crucial for understanding power" (Flyvbjerg, 2001a, p. 104).

Foucault's ideas challenge the notion that policy-making is a rational process based on incontrovertible evidence or truth. Instead, evidence or information used in policy-making is created within the confines of the discursive formations so that the truth conforms to the rules and norms of the discourse. Foucault terms these processes "the will to truth", the effect of which is to mask the discursive formations: "Thus all that appears to our eyes is a truth conceived as a richness, a fecundity, a gentle and insidiously universal force, and in contrast we are unaware of the will to truth, that prodigious machinery designed to exclude" (Foucault, 1970, p. 56).

This research uses the Foucauldian approach to analyse Jinnah's idea's power relationship between secularists and Islamists. Mills (2004) describes that "discourse does not simply

translate reality into language; rather, discourse should be seen as a system which structures the way that we perceive reality" (p. 55). Instead, the researcher became acquainted with the data and created preliminary basic categories to represent the emergence of patterns, unexpected components, and contradictions. These were then examined and revised in an iterative procedure. The researcher continually returned to the data to identify themes that might be used to better comprehend the participants based on Jinnah's idea and Pakistan's national identity.

4.9 Trustworthiness

Various strategies are used in qualitative research to assess the research's authenticity and quality (Golafshani, 2003; Patton, 2015). The trustworthiness touchstone can be used to evaluate the quality and credibility of any research project. A similar approach was used in this research. According to Seale (1998), for qualitative research, the investigation of trustworthiness is required. Reflexivity, audit trials (Creswell and Miller, 2000), triangulation, extensive description, and member verification are some of the processes that strengthen the trustworthiness of qualitative research (Merriam, 2009). This research uses Lincoln and Guba's technique to boost the trustworthiness of the study. In a qualitative research approach, trustworthiness strengthens the claim that the research findings are "worth paying attention to". Research trustworthiness can be attained in any qualitative study through credibility and transferability (Lincoln and Guba, 1985). The term "credibility" refers to whether the research findings indicate or do not indicate a "credible" conceptual understanding of the data derived from the participants' original data (Lincoln and Guba, 1985). The extent to which the research findings can be used or transferred beyond the project's scope is referred to as transferability. Similarly, trustworthiness was increased in this study by implementing the strategies outlined below.

4.9.1 Credibility

The triangulation technique has been applied to improve the study's credibility. Triangulation is the practice of cross-checking information from various aspects to strengthen the results of qualitative research (Potter, 1996). A researcher who claims that their results are founded on numerous types of people in multiple different scenarios will become more persuasive than a researcher who claims that their results are derived from one person's views in one context. Triangulation can be classified into four categories: a) triangulation of methods, b) triangulation of sources (data triangulation), c) triangulation of analysts, and d) triangulation of theory/perspective (Patton, 2015). This study employs triangulation of data and triangulation methods. Data triangulation was applied to understand a specific phenomenon by referring to data from multiple sources. For instance, data were collected from different participant cohorts to evaluate the phenomenon from several angles and compare differences and similarities under the same situation (Oslen, 2004). Data collection methods such as interviews and observations were used in the triangulation approaches to explore the specific phenomenon under examination. Methodological triangulation aided in establishing research validity by evaluating the results and findings produced from individual tools.

4.10 Ethical Consideration

Ethical issues have continually been one of the most critical concerns among academic researchers worldwide, and these considerations have become vital elements of research design and methodology (Hall, 2008). However, the amount of attention paid to ethical concerns depends on the nature of the proposed research (Kelly and Moira, 1998b). This thesis considered the Australian and Western Sydney University's basic ethical standards and followed a comprehensive evaluation process. The National Ethics Application Form was sent to the Ethics Committee. Approval was obtained to conduct fieldwork in Pakistan to acquire primary and secondary data (see Appendix B).

This study was guided by an ethical framework that was constructed to manage the entire research process. Berg (2001) suggests that it is a professional responsibility of researchers to search for knowledge, but they also have an ethical responsibility to ensure that the participants in their studies are not exposed to potential harm during the conduct and dissemination of the research. It is relatively easy to assess short-range consequences, but it is highly problematic and necessary to evaluate the possible long-range implications of social research participation (Berg, 2001). Moreover, Sultana (2007, p. 375) proposes that "ethical concerns should permeate the entire process of the research, from conceptualisation to dissemination, and that researchers are especially mindful of negotiated ethics in the field". Therefore, a fundamental concern for this researcher was to develop an ethical framework to manage the entire research process, from the data collection and analysis to the dissemination of the findings. Therefore, the researcher had to make certain ethical decisions by evaluating numerous aspects of specific complex political and social situations to conduct this research (Piper and Simons, 2005).

The researcher worked to reduce any risk that could be expected to hurt or distress participants. Potential hazards include threats to the researcher and the participants. Thus, the study process is structured to ensure the safety and wellbeing of the researcher and participants. The applicant's high safety measures also protect the ethical framework through the consent process, individuals' anonymity, and data protection. Participants gave consent by signing consent forms that have been coded, scanned, and securely kept in a password-protected system. Participants were interviewed in public, secure locations, including interviewees' offices, institutions, and residential sites chosen by the interviewees. The interviews are audio-recorded, transcribed and stored on a secure, password-protected device.

4.11 Concluding Remarks

This chapter addressed the methodological approach that has been used to examine the development of the Pakistani national identity. The design uses a case study approach with qualitative, triangulation methodological tools. Primary data were collected from 16 participants (mostly male), including politicians, academics, and journalists. Secondary data were obtained from government documents and archive information. The data were transcribed and analysed manually.

Further, discourse analysis was applied to analyse the data for this study. The interview data were analysed using discourse analysis. This approach is founded on Foucauldian views of power relations, discourse practices, and non-discursive domains of power and discourse; politics and power; and social disciplinary power. This chapter describes the empirical characteristics of fieldwork in Pakistan, which have enabled the researcher to carry out the data elicitation procedure and develop the findings more easily.

Chapter 5: Jinnah's Vision and National Identity of Pakistan

Few individuals significantly alter the course of history. Fewer still modify the map of the world. Hardly anyone can be credited with creating a nation-state. Mohammad Ali Jinnah did all three. (Wolpert, 1984, p. vii)

5.1 Introduction

One of the significant problems that former colonial states obsessed over was searching for their own identities in the twentieth century. Scholars have offered diverse viewpoints and conclusions regarding the question of identity. The crises are often tied to the fact that cultures and citizens were once colonised and confused in discovering their true identities. Since independence in 1947, the Pakistani nation has faced ambiguity and distress over its national identity. Is its identity retained in the old question of Jinnah being secular or religious? Was he interested in Pakistan being a secular or Islamic nation-state?

Both secularist and Islamist political groups[7] view Jinnah as their leader. Secular parties do not explicitly condemn faith but claim that religion should be kept private. In contrast, Islamist groups stress the role of Sharia (Islamic law). This intense discourse about Muslim nationalism, Jinnah's idea of Pakistan, is not limited to political parties; it is a critical component of scholarly discussions on Pakistan's identity.

This study argues that the process of Pakistan's national identity is rooted in Muslim nationalism in the colonial context, Jinnah's vision, and Pakistan's constitution. Muslim nationalism in the colonial period was discussed in Chapters 2 and 3. Therefore, this chapter examines Jinnah's nationalism and his vision for Pakistan. This section will discuss and evaluate Jinnah's idea of Pakistan and analyse Jinnah's 11 and 14 August speeches concerning Pakistan's identity. This chapter will then examine the Objectives Resolution

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[7] Political groups such as Jamat-e-Islami, Pakistan's people's party, portray Jinnah as the leader of the nation.

passed in 1949 by the Constitutional Assembly of Pakistan and its effect on national identity formation, politics, society, and Pakistan's constitution.

5.2 The Question of the Identity of Pakistan

After 75 years of independence, debate continues about the state's political and ideological structure and Islam's position. As Cohen (2002, p. 113) states, "the most significant struggle in Pakistan is not a civilisational clash between Muslims and non-Muslims but a clatter between diverse conceptions and interpretations of Islam, predominantly how Pakistan should implement Islamic identity in State's outlook". Thus, the idea of Pakistan's nationhood had become a contested concept (Cohen, 2002, 2011). However, the secular ideas of the 1960s, socialism of the 1970s, Islamisation of the 1980s, and enlightened moderation years from the 2000s onwards have maintained the debate of the fundamentals of Pakistan's identity. As a result, policy-makers remain embroiled in issues that have become very sensitive, are debated heatedly, and have made society intolerant while distracting from other core issues affecting socioeconomic prosperity and development. However, Pakistan's identity remains firmly rooted in its Islamic character. Such debates have invariably cast negativity and been sources of persistent societal friction, keeping the nation divided along national identity lines.

On 14 August 1947, the movement initiated by Indian Muslims for an independent homeland under the flag of the Muslim League and the visionary leadership of Quaid-i-Azam Jinnah emerged on the world map in the form of a sovereign state, Pakistan. However, Pakistan began its existence in a challenging environment and had to fight for survival. As a result, the challenge of nation-building and a cohesive national identity remained, driven by evolving circumstances. At the domestic level, subnationalist trends supported by foreign powers, socioeconomic inequalities, and political instability were the main factors that contributed to Pakistan's identity crisis. However, the Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan in the 1980s

and the Iranian revolution in 1979 were regional factors that diverted governments from resolving core issues and deliberating a consultative and negotiated settlement. The socioeconomic inequality, political instability, and underlying ethnic conflicts further affected Pakistan's national integration and identity crisis.

5.3 Muhammad Ali Jinnah's Idea of Pakistan

Over the past seven decades, Pakistan's identity has been questioned: Should Pakistan embrace an Islamic or secular national identity? Yet, paradoxically, the self-consciously secular political parties and the Islamist political parties equally argue that Jinnah is their champion. Therefore, Jinnah's media impressions have become important in terms of what he displayed, what he stated, and how he appeared (Ahmed, 2005). Therefore, it is necessary to examine Jinnah's nationalism and his political career. This study has adopted a chronological approach to exploring Jinnah's idea of nationalism. In addition, the study will analyse Jinnah's idea of nationalism as an 'Indian nationalist' and representation of Hindu–Muslim unity, as well as how he became Quaid-e-Azam and how he came to champion the two-nation theory in the subcontinent.

5.3.1 Muhammad Ali Jinnah's Nationalism

Jinnah quickly discovered that he had inherited the leadership of a vast network of Muslim communities spread over a continent. These communities did not possess their territories because they lacked a shared territory, leadership, and political organisation, and their Islamic teachings sometimes conflicted with each other. In addition to his well-known abilities as a political strategist and constitutional lawyer, Jinnah's brilliance promoted the construction of a modern Muslim state to serve a modern Muslim nation and embody its essence while offering identification and unity. This was the advent of a new age of Muslim mass politics all over the Muslim world—the dawn of a new political uprising.

Over the past 70 years, historians and scholars have debated the enigma of Jinnah's political 'transition' from Indian nationalism to Pakistan separatism. It seemed paradoxical that he was the ultimate proponent of the two-nation theory, which held that Hindus and Muslims were two distinct nations that could not coexist peacefully. After all, he was once the ambassador of Muslim–Hindu unity. He asked Indians to put their communal concerns aside and struggle for Indian independence from British rule as a unified nation. However, this same man eventually demanded separation, and from the time he voiced the demand, he insisted that Pakistan would be a state founded on 'Islamic ideals' (Karim, 2010). As a result, the focus is very much on Jinnah's apparently 'ideological' persuasion: Was he a communalist or a secularist? Had an actual inward, cognitive change accompanied his apparent 'transition' to the two-nation theory? If that was true, what form of Islam had he pursued? If it was not true, did he really want separation?

Jinnah was born into a moderate Muslim family on 25 December 1876. The young Jinnah was educated at the Sindh Madrasatul Islam and in the Christian Missionary Society High School (Singh, 2009). He married with his a distant cousin, shortly before being sent to London in 1893 to join Graham's Shipping and Trading Company, which began trading with Jinnah's father (Jinnah, 1987). Jinnah quit the business to join Lincoln's Inn and study law within months of his arrival. At the age of 20, Jinnah became the first Indian to pass at Lincoln's Inn. As a barrister, Jinnah cultivated a sense of theatre in his bearing, attire, and delivery that would place him in high regard in the future.

Further, while staying in London, Jinnah developed an interest in nationalist politics and backed the first Indian Member of Parliament, Dadabhai Naoroji (Singh, 2009). Upon returning to India, he became painfully aware of racial discrimination; however, in 1896, he started his law career at the Bombay Bar shortly after returning to the Indian subcontinent. He was the only Muslim barrister in Bombay (Ahmed, 2005).

5.3.2 Muhammad Ali Jinnah: Ambassador of Muslim–Hindu Unity

Jinnah joined the Indian National Congress on his return from England in 1896. In 1906, he attended the Calcutta conference as secretary to Dadabhai Naoroji (Singh, 2009), who had become president of Congress. G. K. Gokhale, a prominent Brahmin, was one of his mentors and friends, and described Jinnah as the "ambassador of Hindu–Muslim unity" (Malik, 2008, p. 104). In 1908, Bal Gangadhar Tilak, a Hindu nationalist, asked Jinnah to defend him during a treason trial. As a result, Jinnah was elected as the 'Muslim member from Bombay' to the 60-member Legislative Council of India in Delhi on 25 January 1910 (Bolitho, 2006). Whatever concerns the Viceroy, Lord Minto, had about the young Westernised advocate as a potential ally were swiftly dispelled. When Minto rebuked Jinnah for using the words "harsh and cruel" (Singh, 2009), to express the treatment of Indians in South Africa, Jinnah responded:

> My Lord, I should feel much inclined to use much stronger language. But I am fully aware of the constitution of this Council, and I do not wish to trespass for one single moment, but I do say that the treatment meted out to Indians is the harshest, and the feeling in this country is unanimous. (Wolpert, 1984, p. 33)

From the outset, Jinnah was an influential and valuable member of the Indian Congress and avoided joining the Muslim League until 1913. Yet, Jinnah always advocated for Muslim rights. For instance, in 1913, he piloted the Wakf Validating Bill through the Viceroy's Legislative Council, and it obtained broad support among the Muslims (Bolitho, 2006). In Jinnah, Muslims saw a contender. Although Jinnah believed that the Muslim League would soon be a vital force in the birth of a united India, he observed that separatism's accusation, which was often levied at Muslims, was far from the mark. Jinnah was hit with 'grief and sorrow' when his mentor Gokhale died in 1915 (Bolitho, 2006). Later, in a letter to *The Times of India*, he stressed that the Muslim League and National Congress needed to interact

to talk about India's future, calling on Muslim leaders to maintain peace with their Hindu colleagues.

The Muslim League (Lucknow chapter) elected Jinnah as its president in 1916. In the same year, Jinnah's political theory was unveiled at the Lucknow Conference and helped Congress and the League to compromise on a shared reform plan (Bolitho, 2006). Muslim representation in provincial councils was promised at 30%. Against British colonialism, a standard front was established that resulted in the Lucknow Pact between the two parties. Jinnah described himself as a staunch Congressman presiding over the extraordinary session who had no love for sectarian cries (Afzal, 1966), and the British remembered Jinnah's ability at that time. Secretary of the State for India, Edwin Montagu in 1917, argued that: "Jinnah is a very clever man, and it is, of course, an outrage that such a man should have no chance of running the affairs of his own country" (Sayeed, 1968, p. 86).

In contrast, Gandhi's arrival in the 1920s and the significantly different type of politics he developed drew the masses in alienated Jinnah. As a result, Jinnah was concerned about the increased emphasis on Hinduism and the resulting increase in sectarian violence (Ahmed, 2005). For 10 years, he served as president of the Muslim League; however, the organisation was practically non-existent. Moreover, Congress was no longer patient with him, and his unwavering opposition to British colonialism did not win him respect with the executives (Ahmed, 2005).

5.3.3 Muhammad Ali Jinnah: Transition to Quaid-e-Azam (The Great Leader)

> You are the only Muslim in India today to whom the community has a right to look up for safe guidance through the storm which is coming. (Iqbal's letter to Jinnah, 21 June 1937)

Jinnah's speech at Lahore in March 1940 explained the underlying philosophy and reasoning behind the two-nation theory:

It is extremely difficult to appreciate why our Hindu friends fail to understand the real nature of Islam and Hinduism. They are not religions in the strict sense of the word, but are, in fact, different and distinct social orders; and it is a dream that the Hindus and Muslims can ever evolve a common nationality, and this misconception of one Indian nation has gone far beyond the limits and is the cause of more of our troubles and will lead India to destruction if we fail to revise our notions in time. The Hindus and Muslims belong to two different religious philosophies, social customs and literatures. They neither intermarry nor interdine together, and, indeed, they belong to two different civilisations, which are based mainly on conflicting ideas and conceptions. Their aspects on life and of life are different. It is quite clear that Hindus and Mussalmans derive their inspiration from different sources of history. They have different epics; their heroes are different, and different episodes. Very often, the hero of one is a foe of the other, and likewise, their victories and defeats overlap. To yoke together two such nations under a single state, one as a numerical minority and the other as a majority, must lead to growing discontent and final destruction of any fabric that may be so built up for the government of such a state. (Yusufi, 1996, p. 1181)

The question arose: Why did Jinnah become an advocate of the Muslim cause given his status as an 'ambassador of Muslim–Hindu unity?' As Wolpert (1984, p. 162) asks, "What made him decide to abandon hope of reconciliation with the Congress?" Further, how much of Gandhi's success can be attributed to the rise of Hinduism in politics during the 1920s? What effect did Iqbal have on Jinnah? Was the Pakistan Movement an impulse response to Hinduism's gradual and inevitable increase in the 1930s and 1940s? The rediscovery of Jinnah's own origins, identity, history, and culture had been evolving gradually during the last few years of his life. Jinnah was not the only one to experience this transformation. Muslim campaigners, including Muhammad Ali Johar, Allama Iqbal, and Sir Sayyed Ahmad Khan, carried out a similar conversion process. In Jinnah's case, following the death of Gokhale and other Hindu leaders, the subsequent growth of Hindu nationalism and the transformation of Congress towards Hinduism were the initial elements that helped Jinnah's thinking about his position. A tendency towards riots was caused by Jinnah's resignation from the Imperial Legislative Council and the Congress, Gandhi's arrival, the demise of the Khilafat movement, the emergence of Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh, organised communalism, and the Nagpur communal unrest. Further, the 1928 Nehru Report

antagonised many Muslim views; these events occurred within the period that changed the Indian subcontinent's history (Ahmed, 2005).

What still concerns many is Jinnah's transition from an apparently secular politician—a liberal and anglicised man who maintained a prudent position as an ambassador for Hindu–Muslim unity and who spent his early political life campaigning for an undivided India—to a defender of exclusive Muslim identity. It is a fascinating aspect of modern South Asian history and one of the least researched (Ahmed, 2005). This study does not imply that there was a sudden transition; there appears to be no specific significant incident or turning point. Rather, this study explores the overall political and cultural changes in the subcontinent around 1920 in an attempt to help explain Jinnah's transition. After denying Gandhi's appeal for non-cooperation, Jinnah talked to Durga Das, a notable writer, in a session in December 1920 after he was first appointed president of the Muslim League. Jinnah said, "Well, young man, I will have nothing to do with this pseudo-religious approach to politics. I part company with the Congress and Gandhi. I do not believe in working up mob hysteria. Politics is a gentleman's game" (Wasti, 1994). Jinnah's and Gandhi's views on national issues were already diametrically opposed. Therefore, when British soldiers opened fire on a gathering of Indian nationalists at Amritsar Jalianwala Bagh in April 1919, killing many, Jinnah did not accept Gandhi's appeal for a widespread Satyagraha or passive resistance movement (Wolpert, 1984).

It is also notable that many other prominent Muslim leaders, such as the brothers Shaukat Ali Johar and Muhammad Ali Johar, fought alongside Gandhi throughout the Khilafat movement, and the campaign for independence reversed its position. As Shaukat Ali Johar states: "For any honourable peace and pact we are always ready but not for the slavery of the Hindus the Congress has ceased to be National now. It has become an adjunct of the Hindu Mahasabha" (Mujahid, 1988, p. 244).

When Gandhi joined the Congress after World War I, the Hindu community was unified behind anything other than a local village and caste politics for the first time in history. There was an attempt to reach a national consensus. At first, it focused on the hazy idea of independence promoted by the British. As it progressed, it became more concerned with the question of identity. Gandhi's own identity struggle, intertwined with moral issues, entranced millions of Hindus. For them, the struggle for independence became a quest to reclaim a missing Hindu identity (Ahmed, 2005). As would be observed later, one strain of this discovery resulted in increasingly aggressive community politics. Many of the former leaders in Congress, including Jinnah, now believed they could not fit in (Singh, 2009). As a result, in 1920, Jinnah quit Congress.

In the 1920s, it became clear that the British would have to share power with the Indians sooner rather than later. Congress evolved as India's prominent representative due to Gandhi's excellent media visibility and widespread public reach (Singh, 2009). It had already begun to plan for a more centralised India. Moreover, the future leadership that would lead India to freedom was starting to take shape—for instance, Gandhi, the saintly politician and personification of a resurgent India; Nehru, the cultured, dynamic Congress spokesman; and Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel.

The determined Hindu nationalist and political leader was a bitter rival and always opposed Nehru's position, and Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, the intellectual and kind Muslim representation in the Congress. Muslims claimed that Congress had become arrogant after gaining power in the 1920s. It discarded their concerns, overlooked their feelings of unease, and decided to advocate for them. Many Muslims feared that their culture and religion were under threat, and they might be treated as second-class nationals (Ahmed, 2005). For example, the Urdu language, which is generally but not solely linked with Muslims, has been

an increasing 'foreign' victim of communal Hindu organisations. Its script would eventually be modified, and it would no longer be taught in many areas (Ahmed, 2005).

Jinnah returned to India from London in 1934 and was unanimously elected head of a reformed Muslim League (Ahmed, 2020). Aga Khan spearheaded this initiative. Jinnah had great regard, and at the moment of his election, several Muslim members of the Central Assembly proposed leaving for Jinnah (Mujahid, 1981). The year 1937 had been a defining moment in Jinnah's life and indeed the Pakistan campaign. It was not only the year that Iqbal exchanged letters with him just before his death, but it was also the year when several other important political and personal events occurred. First, when the year had begun, Jinnah had just turned 60 years old. Second, his health had started to deteriorate by then, heightening his feeling of urgency in completing his objective; it was now or never, regardless of the personal sacrifice. Third, contrary to her father's objections, Jinnah's daughter Dina decided to marry (Ahmed, 2020). Jinnah's family life had deteriorated significantly when his wife died, and his bond with his lone child had broken down. His energies had been forwarded to the struggle of the Muslims. In addition, it was the year of the momentous Muslim League meeting in Lucknow in October. In his address, Jinnah mentioned Muslims' "magic power". The audience was well aware that something exceptional was taking place. British India's political weights—Punjab, Bengal, and Assam chief ministers—supported the League and agreed to Jinnah's leadership. Jinnah had been told by the Punjab leaders a few years before to "keep his finger out of the Punjab pie" (Jalal, 1994, p. 21). In addition to the prestige it provided him, their backing was enormously influential because Jinnah now finally had access to the Muslim majority provinces. The Muslim League had evolved into a legitimate all-India political force.

For the first time, Jinnah appeared publicly with a completely new dress. He proudly wore it, and it eventually became the Muslim national dress. Jinnah wore it to important events during

Pakistan's independence movement and subsequently. Before the meeting, Jinnah received a black karakuli sheepskin cap from Nawab Ismail Khan. The meeting became known as the 'Jinnah cap' and became a renowned icon of the Muslim League, much like the '*Gandhi cap*', which distinguished members of the Congress party (Ahmed, 2005). In addition, a green flag that included an Islamic crescent and star was raised for the first time, representing Pakistan's national flag. The features of a future Pakistan were evident.

In his address, for the first time, Jinnah questioned Congress's nationalist character, raising questions regarding its ability to represent minorities. In a similar vein, Jinnah articulated a Pan-Islamic viewpoint. Unlike the previous decade, when he appeared uninterested in the Khilafat movement, he pledged to defend Muslims wherever they were persecuted in the Lucknow session. Thus, Jinnah lifted Muslim passions: "I want the Mussalmans to believe in themselves and take their destiny in their own hands. We want men of faith and resolution" (Kaura, 1977, p. 187). He further informed Muslims that they "must first recapture their own souls" and finished his address by stating that the 80-million Indian subcontinent Muslims "have their destiny in their hands" (Kaura, 1977, p. 192). Destiny, faith, magic, soul, and belief: Jinnah's language was no longer a lawyer but a visionary leader. However, the success of the Lucknow meeting in 1937 cannot be explained solely in terms of fantasy and magic. As he outlined during his presidential address, Jinnah had spent the preceding year restructuring the Muslim League. The party attempted to expand across the elite and into India's districts for the first time. Muslims, disappointed by Congress's first rule after the 1937 elections (1937–1939), watched the Muslim League with increased enthusiasm. One resolution passed in the Lucknow session called for the total independence of an Indian federation to protect the rights of minorities.

Moreover, Jinnah called Gandhi "the one man responsible for turning the Congress into an instrument for the revival of Hinduism and for the establishment of Hindu Raj in India"

(Gandhi, 1986, p. 150). In that year, the Muslim League transformed itself from a small group of concerned and influential Muslims into a national movement. Thus, from 1937 until the League formed Pakistan, Jinnah was known as the Muslim League. Further, Jinnah was assisted by the experience in India under the Congress regime, which was ironic. A scholar states that:

> Hindi is to be the national language of all India, and "Bande Mataram" is to be the national song and is to be forced upon all. The Congress flag is to be obeyed and revered by all and sundry. On the very threshold of what little power and responsibility is given, the majority community have clearly shown their hand that Hindustan is for the Hindus; only the Congress masquerades under the name of nationalism, whereas the Hindu Mahasabha does not mince words. (Kaura, 1977, p. 186)

Further, Beverley Nichols' explanation of the situation following the 1937 elections under Congress rule verifies Jinnah's claims:

> The Act received the royal assent on the 2nd of August, 1935; elections for the new legislatures were held in the winter of 1936–7; Congress found itself in a large majority in seven out of the eleven provinces. As soon as it was in power in these provinces, it dropped the mask. Instead of inviting the Muslims to share the fruits of office, it rigidly excluded them from all responsibility instead of attempting any form of coalition. But it did not confine its autocracy to political matters; it proceeded to attack the Muslims in every branch of their material and spiritual life. A great campaign was launched to enforce the use of Sanskritized Hindi at the expense of the Persianized Urdu; the schools were dominated in a manner so ruthless that it would have aroused the admiration of the Nazis, Muslim children being compelled to stand up and salute Gandhi's picture; the Congress flag was treated as the flag of the whole nation; justice was universally corrupted, and in some provinces, the police were so perverted that to this day the Muslims refer to them as "the Gestapo"; and in business matters, the discrimination against Muslims, from the great landowners and merchants to the humblest tillers of the soil, was persistent and pitiless. (Nichols, 1944, pp. 182–3)

Jinnah became the undisputed champion of the two-nation theory from that point forward. The man who formerly characterised himself as an "Indian first and a Muslim afterwards" now rejected the concept of India as a unified country: "I don't regard myself as an Indian" (Ahmad, 2020).

5.3.4 Muhammad Ali Jinnah Jinnah's Inspiration: Allama Muhammad Iqbal

> For thousands of years, a nation may lament & remain groping in darkness … Only then a visionary leader may be born to guide the nation. (From *Bang e Dara* by Allama Iqbal)

Iqbal's influence on Jinnah is unquestionable. In the 1930s, Jinnah did not wholeheartedly support Muslims' separate homeland demands, viewing them as a mere political 'safeguard' (Ahmad, 2005; Karim, 2010). In fairness to Jinnah, provincial autonomy was purely a political pursuit even for many Muslim leaders who demanded it at the time. However, Iqbal's support of these same demands was based on his far-sighted philosophy, so his peculiar position was somewhat misunderstood. In 1930, Iqbal spoke of securing independence in India's northwest, focusing on the Muslim majority areas and particularly Punjab. In contrast, Jinnah had hitherto always focused on the centre, which, in theory, would look after Muslim interests throughout India (Ahmed, 2020).

Iqbal's friendship with Jinnah is observed in his letters that convey his dynamism on various occasions. Iqbal wrote 19 letters to Jinnah, of which eight have since become famous. At the Round Table Conference in 1932, Iqbal met with Jinnah and discussed Muslim political conditions in India (Ahmed, 2020). At this meeting, Iqbal persuaded Jinnah to return to India and take up the Muslims' liberation cause from British imperialism. As stated in the preceding paragraph, Jinnah took a unique approach to the Muslim cause. However, Iqbal persuaded Jinnah to use the proper strategy of appealing to Muslims to unite to obtain freedom from British domination (Ahmad, 2005). It was likely Iqbal's intellectual calibre that ultimately convinced Jinnah to rethink his approach. The right approach was to invoke the Islamic spirit and appeal to Muslims to devote their energies to restoring Islamic rule in the subcontinent. Jinnah was thus inspired by Iqbalian thought when he said:

> The ideology of the League is based on the fundamental principle that Muslim India is an independent nationality … We are determined, and let there be no mistake about it, to establish the

status of an independent nation and an independent State in this subcontinent. (Yusufi, 1996, p. 1386)

Jinnah adopted Iqbal's ideas of a separate Muslim state, promoted an Islamic identity, and built a destiny and pride in Muslims' heritage and culture (Ahmad, 2005). Thus, he not only embraced Iqbal's political philosophy but also consciously absorbed his conceptual framework. After this time, Jinnah could not put a foot wrong as far as the Muslim community was concerned. He also expressed his strong affiliation with Iqbal. Jinnah was passionately moved by the death of Iqbal and paid homage to his spiritual guide in the following words in a public speech in 1938:

> The sorrowful news of the death of Dr Sir Muhammad Iqbal had plunged the world of Islam in gloom and mourning. Sir Muhammad Iqbal was undoubtedly one of the greatest poets, philosophers and seers of the humanity of all times. To me, he was a personal friend, philosopher and guided and, as such, the main source of my inspiration and spiritual support. (Khan, 2010, pp. 151–152)

Jinnah expressed his preference for Iqbal's works over a state's rulership in another speech:

> If I live to see the ideal of a Muslim state being achieved in India, and I was then offered to make a choice between the works of Iqbal and the rulership of the Muslim state, I would prefer the former. (Khan, 2010, p. 152)

His speeches, behaviours, statements, gestures, and public dress form would harmonise with his community. He had finally, unequivocally, arrived home.

5.4 Interpreting or Misinterpreting Jinnah's Speeches: Analysis of the Contesting Narratives

Jinnah has never been absent from the pages of newspapers, television shows, or from the discourses of those seeking fame or even truth, but never in the manner witnessed in contemporary Pakistan. During the years of struggle for Pakistan, Jinnah faced many opponents and critics who disagreed with his arguments and challenged his conclusions. But it was rare that anyone found him doubtful or ambiguous in his vision. Contemporary debates

regarding Jinnah exemplify the division between the Islamists and secularists in Pakistan, who each had their vision of Jinnah (Ahmed, 2005). For instance, critiquing and questioning Jinnah's speeches and lifestyle have significantly affected contemporary Pakistani politics. For many, Jinnah is either "an Islamic visionary who created the first Muslim nation-state, or he is the arch-secularist who, by some ironic twist of fate, managed to create a confessional state" (Sayyid and Tyrer, 2002, p. 57).

Understanding Jinnah's vision of Pakistan requires relying on his statements and speeches, which he expressed during Pakistan's independence movement and after independence as head of Pakistan's state. His vision for Pakistani society, including its social, constitutional, political, and administrative systems, may be found. However, Jinnah's statements as the governor-general of Pakistan reflect a greater religious propensity than previously (Mahmood, 2002). Jinnah's presidential addresses on 11 and 14 August 1947 to Pakistan's Constituent Assembly were among the most consequential pronouncements in Pakistan and South Asia's history. Even 75 years later, the debate of narratives persists in seriousness and significance because it touches the state's building blocks.

The 11 August speech is more famous because it was made extempore (without notes) (Karim, 2010). Scholars from all camps have noted that Jinnah's words were spontaneous and spoken from the heart. In this speech, some scholars have stated that Jinnah revealed his preference for a secular Pakistan (Ahmed, 2004; Munir, 1980). Justice Munir claimed that the 11 August speech was his "clearest exposition of a secular state" since Jinnah advocated protecting minorities (Munir, 1980, p. 29). The 'establishment' has transformed Jinnah's image from a secularist to a deep-thinking Islamic scholar (Hoodbhoy, 2007).

5.4.1 The 11 August Speech: Does it Define a Secular Pakistan?

Although Jinnah had not written any books by himself, he delivered many speeches during the Pakistan independence movement and after independence in 1947 as the first governor-general of Pakistan. However, the August 1947 addresses in Pakistan's Constitution Assembly were the most impressive and meaningful. These two speeches were an outpouring of thoughts on the nature of the state and society. On 11 August 1947, Quaid-e-Azam Jinnah was elected as the first president of the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan. Quaid-e-Azam provided guidelines for Pakistan's new state and laid down its policy towards minorities. In his inaugural speech, he said:

> You may belong to any religion or caste, or creed that has nothing to do with the business of the state. We are starting in the days when there is no discrimination between one community and another, no distinction between one caste or creed and another. We are starting with this fundamental principle that we are all citizens and equal citizens of one state … You will find that in the course of time, Hindus would cease to be Hindus and Muslims would cease to be Muslims, not in the religious sense because that is the personal faith of each individual, but in the political sense as citizens of the state. (Yusufi, 1996, pp. 2601–5)

In this speech, Jinnah did not mention Islam in his opening address but touched on equality and equal opportunities for all citizens. He also spoke against bribery, corruption, black-marketing, nepotism, and jobbery, urging the assembly to take strong measures against these evils. In such a speech, the omission of the word Islam was surprising for many. This was based on the fact that Muslim nationalism (and the two-nation theory) was founded on the belief that Islam is a distinct way of life, and departure from it would result in the calamity of Muslims in the subcontinent (Ahmed, 2020). When Pakistan was established, Muslims finally had their own country. Many criticised Jinnah's 11 August 1947 speech because they were considered a departure from his earlier stand before the creation of the nascent state. In some quarters, many argued that Jinnah neglected the two-nation theory, and his vision of a state was secular Pakistan (Ahmed, 2020; Zaman, 1961). G. M. Sayed, a nationalist leader from

Sindh who had voted against Pakistan in the Sindh Assembly (Awan and Ayaz, 2019), stated that Jinnah's speech created a "chastened mood" and neglected the basic principles on which the Muslim League carried out its plan—the struggle for Pakistan (Sayeed, 1960).

Justice Munir stated that Jinnah's speech was "one of the clearest expositions of a secular state" (Munir, 1980, p. 29). The question arises: What was the essence of Jinnah's 11 August speech? Does it mean that Jinnah wanted a secular state? Or that the 'Islamic principle' would not be the basis of the future constitution of Pakistan? If not, what did he mean by saying that "Hindus would cease to be Hindus and Muslims would cease to be Muslims not in the religious sense, because that is the personal faith of each individual but in the political sense as citizens of the state" (Yusufi, 1996, pp. 2601–5)? It is important to remember that Jinnah made this speech when the whole Indian subcontinent was swayed by communal frenzy; millions of people, both Muslims and Hindus, were victims of communal riots (Awan and Ayaz, 2019; Karim, 2010). The Quaid-i-Azam stressed communal harmony and peace for the progress of the new nation. Jinnah repeatedly emphasised in this memorable speech that there would be no distinctions made between Hindus and Muslims on the grounds of religion, caste, or creed, and they would be treated as equal citizens. Still, Jinnah did not say that 'Islamic principles' should not guide Pakistan's constitution. Interviewee Dr Safdar Mahmood (29 December 2019), a political analyst, explained that:

> The vision of Quaid Azam was an Islamic democratic and welfare state. He continued by saying that Pakistan's constitution and the law and Pakistan's political structure will be based on democratic and Islamic principles.

In fact, he was only speaking against recent communal bitterness between Hindus and Muslims and said that Hindus would have equality as citizens (Choudhury, 1969). Jinnah's declaration was warmly welcomed by minorities (Choudhury, 1969) whose leaders, defending their claims in the Constituent Assembly and elsewhere, have referred to this

memorable speech on many occasions. It is regarded as the '*Magna Carta*' of Pakistan's minorities (Choudhury, 1969). Before the creation of Pakistan, he had assured the non-Muslims that they would be treated equally in the state of Pakistan.

Along the same lines, Dr Anis Ahmed (4 December 2019), Vice-Chancellor of Riphah International University, Islamabad, stated that:

> He begins by saying, I'm putting in front of you the phenomenon of England for quite some time. Catholics and Protestants were killing each other. Until they learn how to live under one law and constitution, they are all citizens. Then he says, Now Pakistan has been created. You are no more just Hindu. No more just Muslim. You are citizens; where is secularity? You can go to your mosque or church, which means the state will not persecute you because of your faith. It is very different from what is drawn out of it without reading it. If you only read the whole speech, there is no basis for secularism. It is entirely out of context to say that he spoke about secularity in the 11th August speech.

Therefore, Jinnah's 11 August speech followed the spirit of Islam. Islam gives freedom of belief to all human beings. Muslims ruled India for 1,000 years and did not forcibly convert any Hindu to Islam (Ahmed, 2005). Therefore, those who try to give a secular or liberal meaning to this speech of Jinnah are doing an injustice to Jinnah's honesty and integrity. Dr Anis Ahmed (4 December 2019) explained that:

> you would read all statements and speeches of Jinnah. In none of the speeches he has ever used the word secular. what he said very clearly in the 11th August speech, but is not read and understood honestly. Honesty means academic honesty. You cannot take a sentence from a written speech and assume that is what he's saying.

Notably, there are dozens of speeches by Quaid-e-Azam in which he has interpreted Pakistan's identity in the context of Islam. For example, in one speech, he said that Pakistan had come into existence the day that Muslims first set foot on the subcontinent (Ahmad, 1976).

In fact, Jinnah made this statement because, as in the history of many countries, the religion of the majority has led to discrimination against other religions and minorities; the same is

true of some countries even today. Jinnah spoke of the dangers of sectarian bias. Of course, this is the known history behind the development of the secular state, which is designed primarily to prevent sectarian tyranny. However, while today's secular countries may or may not enforce this principle depending on the mindset of their peoples, in a systemic expression of Islam, the enforcement of the code of universal civil rights is mandatory because it is a core principle of the Qur'an (Karim, 2010). A bona fide Islamic state is duty-bound to protect the rights of all human beings, whatever their colour, caste, or creed: "We have conferred dignity on the children of Adam" (17:70).

Further, it appears that Jinnah was also answering a statement made that day by Mr K. S. Roy, leader of the Pakistan Congress party, who reported in the *Pakistan Times* as follows. Mr Roy said that "if Pakistan meant a secular democratic state, a state which would make no difference between citizen … irrespective of caste, creed or community, he would assure him that he (Mr Jinnah) would have their utmost cooperation". It is evident that Mr Roy sought assurance from Jinnah that Pakistan would be a state where there would be no discrimination based on religion. It could also be that he was pushing for Jinnah to explicitly confirm that Pakistan would be a secular state (Karim, 2010). However, Jinnah assured all minorities of equality before the law, which was enough to satisfy Roy and other non-Muslims. But Jinnah nevertheless did not say that Pakistan would be a secular democratic state. He had always said that it would be an Islamic democracy, and he never moved from this position (Karim, 2010).

5.4.2 The 11 August 1947 Speech in the Context of Misaq-i-Madina

It follows that none are forced to believe in the sanctity of the law following the Quranic injunction: "Let there be no compulsion in deen" (2:256). That guarantees universal civil equality and leaves personal faith (Mazhab) out of the political sphere, which is what Jinnah meant by his immortal words: "Hindus would cease to be Hindus, and Muslims would cease

to be Muslims, not in the religious sense, because that is the personal faith of each individual, but in the political sense as citizens of the State" (Yusufi, 1996, pp. 2601–5).

However, while this principle is undoubtedly one of an ideal secular state—a state based on Islamic polity—the same directive is founded on an entirely different worldview. For this reason alone, the above is more accurately described as an Islamic statement (Karim, 2010). Further, Jinnah's speech is no different in content or spirit from those of early Muslim historical rule and the very first Muslim political document—the Misaq-i-Madina (the Compact of Medina) is said to have been penned by the Prophet of Islam in around 622 AD and is arguably the first constitution in the world that laid down rules for "a political unit (umma) as distinct from all the people (of the world)" (Mujahid, 2009, p. 62). Significantly, the various Jewish tribes were declared to be "one community (umma) with the believers", and it was added "to the Jew who follows us belong help and equality … and the Jews have their religion and the Muslims have theirs" (Ibn Hisham et al., 2007, pp. 232–3). This made them equal before the law, a principle usually attributed to a secular state (Karim, 2010). As Prof. Sharif al Mujahid (2009, p. 62) remarked, "the Misaq (Madina) conceded to the Jewish tribes the same rights, the same privileges and the same obligations as were accorded to the believers". The Misaq-i-Madina guarantees social, legal, and economic equality to all loyal citizens of the state without discrimination regarding caste, colour, creed, and community (Mahmood, 2002).

Likewise, religious freedom was assured under Misaq-i-Madina. Similarly, on 11 August 1947, Jinnah stated that every citizen of Pakistan is free: a Hindu is free to go to the temple, a Muslim is free to go to the mosque in Pakistan (Jinnah, 1989). However, the most controversial line in the speech occurred when Jinnah said: "Hindus would cease to be Hindus, and Muslims would cease to be Muslims, not in the religious sense, because that is the personal faith of each individual, but in the political sense as citizens of the State"

(Yusufi, 1996). Some commentators believe that this is a secular statement because of an implied separation of religion from politics (Karim, 2010). However, this is untrue.

Interviewee Khalid Rahman (3rd February 2020), chairman of the Institute of Policy Studies, Islamabad, responded:

> There are many statements of Jinnah's. Sometimes there are apparent answers regarding Pakistan's identity and no ambiguity in reading his speeches to understand his point of view. Even if the 11th August speech has been examined on an Islamic scale, there is no doubt that he was still speaking in the overall Islamic framework. Quaid-e-Azam says that Pakistan is becoming a subcontinent for Muslims. Of course, there are political and economic interests, but as a result, they want to lay the foundation of a country where Islam can be implemented as a way of life.

For one thing, to read the sentence correctly, we find that Jinnah has not separated religion from politics (i.e. in the sense of separating spiritual or Quranic law from politics); instead, he said that people would be equal (citizens) irrespective of faith. Moreover, in his statement, Jinnah clarified that this was political and not religious, the same as prescribed in Misaq-i-Madina, where Muslims and Jews were treated as equal citizens of the first Islamic state—Madinah (Kamali, 1993). In the meantime, it is worth noting how one biographer of the Quaid-i-Azam has interpreted the speech. Hector Bolitho, in his book *Jinnah: Creator of Pakistan*, commented that:

> The words were Jinnah's: the thought and belief were an inheritance from the Prophet who had said, thirteen centuries before. All men are equal in the eyes of God. And your lives and your properties are all sacred: in no case should you attack each other's life and property. Today I trample under my feet all distinctions of caste, colour and nationality. (Bolitho, 2006, p. 176)

Bolitho (2006) quoted from the well-known final *khutba* (sermon) of the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) shortly before his death. That is what the Qur'an teaches about the treatment of fellow human beings socially, economically, and politically. Therefore, Jinnah's speech on 11 August 1947 was not against Islamic principles, but in favour of them, as prescribed by Misaq-i-Madina, the first constitution of the Islamic State created under the leadership of

Prophet Muhammad (PBUH). Interviewee Dr Safdar Mahmood (29 December 2019), explained:

> In fact, 11th August speech contained guiding and leading principles for the future state of Pakistan. He mentioned that many things like provincialism, corruption, nepotism, and religion would not be allowed to influence the political rights of minorities. My fundamental question is, where does Islam stand in the way of minorities? Remember the Islamic governance structure; the best example is the khulafa Rashideen. Islam has given love to the minorities; they are free to go to their worship places in common and have equal opportunities in deployment in economic life in every national life.

Further, on 13 August, Mountbatten flew to Karachi to celebrate the formal power transfer. In his eloquent speech on 14 August to the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan, Mountbatten offered the example of Akbar the Great Mughal as the model of a tolerant Muslim ruler to Pakistan (Ahmed, 2020). Akbar, the Great Mughal, had always been a favourite of those who believe in the synthesis, or what in our time passes for secular (Ahmed, 2005). However, in his reply, Jinnah pointed out that Muslims had a more permanent and more inspiring model to follow, that of the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH). Jinnah said that:

> The tolerance and goodwill that great Emperor Akbar showed to all the non-Muslims are not of recent origin. It dates back thirteen centuries ago when our Prophet, not only by words but by deeds, treated the Jews and Christians after he had conquered them with the utmost tolerance and regard and respect for their faith and beliefs. The whole history of Muslims, wherever they ruled, is replete with those humane and great principles which should be followed and practised. (Ahmad, 1976, pp. 408–9)

In this statement, Jinnah clearly explains that the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) had not only created a new state in Madinah but had laid down the principles on which it could be organised and conducted. Along the same lines, interviewee Professor Fateh Malik (21 February 2020), ex-rector of International Islamic University Islamabad, explained:

> Mountbatten delivered his speech on the day of the power transfer; he said, "I hope that the Hindus in Pakistan will be treated as they were under King Akbar." Quaid-i-Azam replied that "good treatment of non-Muslims in Islam is not a few years old but 1300 years old since the time of the Holy Prophet".

These principles were rooted in a compassionate understanding of society and the notions of justice and tolerance. Further, Jinnah emphasised the special treatment that the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) accorded to the minorities, including morality, righteousness, human tolerance, and a society where colour and race did not matter. Indeed, it was a charter for social behaviour 13 centuries before the United Nations was established (Ahmed, 2005).

Pakistani–American scholar Akbar S. Ahmed stated that Jinnah's speeches on 11 and 14 August 1947 to Pakistan's Constitutional Assembly must be read together. He called these speeches 'Gettysburg Address' (Ahmed, 2005). This Gettysburg Address reveals vital themes that are repeated frequently: the unequivocal Islamic nature of Pakistan, drawing its inspiration from the Qur'an and the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH), and the vision of an Islamic society that would be equitable, compassionate, and tolerant. However, Jinnah's leadership believed it was better to recognise the realities and provide adequate guarantees to the non-Muslim minorities based on an ideology (Islam) in which the majority of the population in Pakistan believed strongly (Khel, 1984). Thus, on 27 March 1947, during his speech to the Memon Chamber of Commerce at Bombay, Jinnah stated, "we assured the Hindus that in Pakistan the minorities would be treated justly, fairly, and generously" (Yusufi, 1996, p. 2538). Jinnah further stated that:

> In Pakistan, we shall have a state which will be run according to the principles of Islam. It will have its cultural, political and economic structure based on the principles of Islam. The non-Muslims need not fear because of this, for fullest justice will be done to them, they will have their rich culture, religious, political and economic rights safeguarded. As a matter of fact, they will be more safeguarded than in the present-day so-called democratic parliamentary form of Government. (Harris, 1976, p. 173)

Whenever Jinnah spoke of Pakistan's Islamic character, he always laid any notions of religious discrimination to rest immediately by reminding those present that Muslim society was duty-bound, taking its lesson from the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) no less, to treat its minorities "not only justly and fairly but generously" (Karim, 2010, p. 51).

It is evident now that in his well-known and renowned 'Gettysburg Address', Jinnah stressed the importance of minority rights and promised religious freedom as a matter of Muslim duty. However, this address does not disclose a secular state at any level. Pro-secularist commentators have stated that in the 11 August speech, Jinnah revealed his preference for a secular Pakistan. However, Jinnah never used the word 'secular' (Awan and Ayaz, 2019; Karim, 2010; Khel, 1984; Murtaza, 2012). In contrast, Jinnah referenced Islam (e.g. 'Islamic principles', 'Islamic Ideals') 101 times in his speeches before and 14 times after Pakistan's independence (Mahmood, 2002).

Further, pro-secularist scholars claim that Islam was just a propaganda tool to win the support of the masses (Ahmed, 2002; Hoodbhoy and Nayyar, 1985; Jalal, 1994; Talbot, 1984). Indeed, a question remains regarding whether Jinnah used Islamic slogans to win the Muslims' support? If so, what was the right time for him to reveal his objective for a secular state? Further, after Pakistan attained independence, Jinnah should have stopped using Islamic slogans. However, Jinnah's use of these slogans continued in the new state of Pakistan, even after the speech of 11 August 1947, which is considered "one of the clearest expositions of a secular state" (Munir, 1980, p. 29). Jinnah's actions as governor-general of Pakistan until his death in 1948 reflects this. The following examples are dated after partition. The first is addressed to an American audience: "The constitution of Pakistan has yet to be framed by the Pakistan Constituent Assembly … I do not know what the ultimate shape of this constitution is going to be, but I am sure that it will be of a democratic type, embodying the essential principles of Islam" (Yusifi, 1996). The next is addressed to foreign journalists: "The constitution of Pakistan will be based on Islamic principles and tenets" (Yusufi, 1996). These statements do not fall into the category of electioneering slogans and are dated post-partition (Karim, 2010).

In Pakistan's case, the religious freedom and rights of minorities were assured by the Objectives Resolution of 1949 and subsequently by Pakistan's constitution 1973. The Objectives Resolution granted freedom of worship, which was later enshrined in Article 20 of Pakistan's 1973 Constitution. Further, the Objectives Resolution highlighted that minorities are to be granted sufficient provisions to profess openly and exercise their religion; this was later enshrined in Article 36 of the Pakistan Constitution 1973. Moreover, the 1973 constitution chapter of fundamental rights mentions that all the citizens, irrespective of their religion, have been given equal rights and protection (Khel, 1984).

5.4.3 Jinnah's Stance on Theocracy and the Secular State

Together, Jinnah's speeches of 11 and 14 August 1947 reveal several themes. The first is Pakistan's clear Islamic character, drawing inspiration from the Qur'an and the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) traditions. It is the vision of an Islamic society that would be equitable, compassionate, and tolerant, and from which the 'poison' of corruption, nepotism, mismanagement, and inefficiency would be eradicated (Ahmed, 2005). Pakistan itself would be based on the high principles (Misaq-i-Madina) laid down by the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) in Arabia in the seventh century. Although Jinnah had pointed out the flaws in Western-style democracy, at the same time, he unequivocally did not want a theocratic state. Jinnah expressed his views in a radio talk to Australia's people in February 1948, saying that "Pakistan is not a theocracy or anything like it. Islam demands from us the tolerance of other creeds" (Ahmed, 1960, p. 98). Jinnah also addressed the people of the United States in February 1948:

> The constitution of Pakistan has yet to be framed … I am sure that it will be of a democratic type, embodying the essential principles of Islam. Today they are as applicable in actual life as they were 1300 years ago. Islam and its idealism have taught us democracy. It has taught equality of men, justice and fair play to everybody … in any case, Pakistan is not going to be a theocratic State to be ruled by priests with a divine mission. We have non-Muslims-they are all Pakistanis. They will enjoy same rights and privileges as any other citizen. (Burke, 2000, p. 125)

Secular analysts and scholars point out that Jinnah's speeches clearly stated that "he [Jinnah] was opposed to a theocratic government … he wanted a secular democratic government" (Munir, 1980, p. 32) and to "show his preference for secularism over theocracy" (Hoodbhoy, 2007, p. 3301). However, this narrative relies on a misunderstanding about a state line with Islamic ideals and a theocracy because this is generally assumed.

Before analysing Jinnah's speech, it is important to understand what a theocracy is and the guidance of Islam in this respect. Theocracy is defined as "a system of government in which priests rule in the name of God or a god" (Oxford Dictionary). In Islam, theocracy is not possible because it negates the Qur'ans guide of human/civil equality (Karim, 2010). The Quran states that "it is not appropriate for someone who Allah has blessed with the Scripture, wisdom, and prophethood to say to people, Worship me instead of Allah" (3:79). In Pakistan, secularist scholars view theocracy in the context of European history and believe that a state line with Islamic principles is actually a theocracy; however, this is not true. Muhammad Asad (1961, p. 21) explained that "no person or group can legitimately claim to possess any special sanctity by virtue of the religious functions entrusted to them. Thus Theocracy, as commonly understood in the West, is entirely meaningless within the Islamic environment". Islamic thinker and advocate of an Islamic state in Pakistan, Syed Maududi, also criticised theocracy. He stated that Europe is aware of the theocracy in which a particular religious group (priest-class) enforces its own laws in the name of God. However, the theocracy built up by Islam is not ruled by any specific religious (priest) class. Instead, the whole community runs the state following the Book of God (Qur'an) and Sunnah of His Prophet Muhammad (PBUH). This is a 'theo-democracy' because citizens have been given 'limited popular sovereignty' under the 'sovereignty of God', and the willpower of ordinary Muslims chooses the executives and legislators, who are accountable to them (Maududi, 1967, p. 140).

The Qur'an explains this clearly: "So woe to those who write the 'scripture' with their own hands, then say, this is from Allah, in order to exchange it for a small price. Woe to them for what their hands have written and woe to them for what they earn" (2:79). This proves that the Islamic government system is neither a theocracy nor an oppressive government of any particular religious sect (priest-class). Instead, it is in the name of the implementation of the highest human moral principles of Sharia.

Now, if we examine both of Jinnah's broadcast speeches in 1948 to the people of Australia and the United States, three points are clear. First, the Constituent Assembly is still working on the constitution, so the constitution's final form will be what the assembly decides, but whatever form it takes will be based on Islam's eternal principles. Second, the political system of Pakistan will not be found in the so-called theocracy. Instead, the state will adhere to Islamic principles but will not follow any particular sect (priest-class). Third, non-Muslims will have all of their rights and protections in the Islamic system of the state. These are the three main points repeated in the Qur'an and Sunnah—that sovereignty belongs to the Almighty Allah (God) and cannot belong to any human group or party. Further, the Qur'an and Sunnah give non-Muslims complete freedom in their religious affairs and protection of fundamental human rights such as life, property, honour, and religious liberty as the goals of Sharia. However, in the same speech, Jinnah stated that "Pakistan is the premier Islamic state" (Yousafi, 1996, p. 2692).

5.5 Constitutional Process of Pakistan's Identity

The constitution recognises modern states and describes the collective wishes, aspirations, and ideals of a nation. Further, the constitution shows the priorities and goals for a nation and country. In the context of Pakistan's national identity question and how the constitution described it, this study will analyse it in two periods: Objectives Resolution of 1949 to 1971 and from the 1971 constitution to 2021.

5.5.1 Objectives Resolution 1949–1971

The subcontinental Muslims recognised Pakistan's concept as a land where they would be granted more opportunities to grow as free citizens and prosper economically. They also realised that resources would be available because they are a numerical plurality and that the country's constitution would ensure it, consistent with Islamic principles: "Whether or not anyone today believes that a political expression of Islam can actually make this guarantee, there can be no doubt that this is what the masses believed, and to a large extent still believe" (Karim, 2010, p. 43). The Objective Resolution was submitted on 7 March 1949 by Liaquat Ali Khan, prime minister of Pakistan, and was passed on 12 March 1949 by the Constitutional Assembly of Pakistan after intense debate on the Resolution.

The Resolution includes the following:

> In the name of Allah, the Beneficent, the Merciful;
>
> WHEREAS sovereignty over the entire universe belongs to God Almighty alone and the authority which He has delegated to the State of Pakistan through its people for being exercised within limits prescribed by Him is a sacred trust; This Constituent Assembly representing the people of Pakistan resolves to frame a constitution for the sovereign independent State of Pakistan;
>
> WHEREIN the state shall exercise its powers and authority through the chosen representatives of the people;
>
> WHEREIN the principles of democracy, freedom, equality, tolerance and social justice, as enunciated by Islam, shall be fully observed;
>
> WHEREIN the Muslims shall be enabled to order their lives in the individual and collective spheres in accord with the teachings and requirements of Islam as set out in the Holy Quran and the Sunna;
>
> WHEREIN adequate provision shall be made for the minorities freely to profess and practise their religions and develop their cultures;
>
> WHEREBY the territories now included in or in accession with Pakistan and such other territories as may hereafter be included in or accede to Pakistan shall form a Federation wherein the units will be autonomous with such boundaries and limitations on their powers and authority as may be prescribed;

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WHEREIN shall be guaranteed fundamental rights including equality of status, of opportunity and before the law, social, economic and political justice, and freedom of thought, expression, belief, faith, worship and association, subject to the law and public morality;

WHEREIN adequate provision shall be made to safeguard the legitimate interests of minorities and backward and depressed classes;

WHEREIN the independence of the Judiciary shall be fully secured;

WHEREIN the integrity of the territories of the federation, its independence and all its rights including its sovereign rights on land, sea and air shall be safeguarded; So that the people of Pakistan may prosper and attain their rightful and honoured place amongst the nations of the world and make their full contribution towards international peace and progress and happiness of humanity. (Constituent Assembly debates, 1949, pp. 1–2)

The Resolution served as a guide to the constitutional process to ensure the state followed the absolute principles of democracy, equality, and social justice as "enunciated by Islam". In his inaugural address to the assembly, Prime Minister Khan mentioned the Resolution as "next in importance only to the achievement of independence" (Choudhary, 1967). The secularists blamed all of this progress on the first Constitutional Assembly of Pakistan for adopting the Resolution. A paper featuring the 'Aims and Objectives of the Constitution' in 1949 was the top initiation towards the constitution (Karim, 2010). Further, the secularists argued that the Islamists had built a back door in the Resolution for a future theocracy. Therefore, the Resolution's whole spirit contradicts the vision of Jinnah, who died around six months before the Resolution was accepted (Munir, 1980).

The Resolution has received continued criticism, mainly because of its preamble sovereignty clause. This intellectual critique was turned into action in 2007, when a minister tried to reduce the significance of the Resolution by inserting the speech of 11 August 1947 into the constitution and placing it above the Resolution in order of appearance (Karim, 2010). His goal was to put a 'secular' speech above the unquestionably Islamic Resolution, and then to say that the constitution had been secularised with the mark of Jinnah on it. Therefore, it is

important to consider the original debates held in the Constitutional Assembly on the Resolution, not only because of the constitutional and historical significance of the Resolution, but primarily because of the controversies around it and, in particular, because of the claims made by secular ministers and the fact that they sought to avoid it being adopted in the assembly. However, because this study is mainly focused on the much-debated subject identity of Pakistan, this debate is restricted to the concerns posed and the comments provided by various personalities on the matter of the Resolution.

5.5.2 Objectives Resolution: Critique and Defence

When the Objectives Resolution was submitted to the assembly by Prime Minister Khan on 7 March 1949, it received much criticism, mainly from non-Muslim members of the assembly. Although a few Muslims outside the assembly were also unhappy with the Resolution, we will leave aside their criticisms because the nature of their criticisms differed from those of the non-Muslims (Choudhury, 1959). As already mentioned, the main issue is related to the sovereignty of God versus that of the people. The first paragraph of the Resolution reads:

> Whereas sovereignty over the entire universe belongs to God Almighty alone and the authority which he has delegated to the State of Pakistan through its people for being exercised within limits prescribed by Him is a sacred trust. (Constituent Assembly debates, 1949, p. 1)

The response from the non-Muslims was that this particular clause "ought to be deleted" (Karim, 2010). In his speech at the assembly, Mr Chattopadhyaya, the leader of the opposition party (Pakistan Congress party) and the chief dissenter, maintained that all powers should rest with the people, and the inclusion of God in the Resolution negated this. He also questioned what was meant by 'limits' and who would decide these limits. Further, Chattopadhyaya suggested that in the future, a despotic Muslim could abuse the clause to establish the Divine Right of Kings afresh (Karim, 2010). That is, Chattopadhyaya treated the idea of the sovereignty of God as it is understood in the West (Binder, 1961). The non-

Muslim members also criticised the fourth paragraph of the proposed Resolution, which stated: "Wherein the principles of democracy, freedom, equality, tolerance and social justice, as enunciated by Islam, shall be fully observed" (Constituent Assembly debates, 1949, p. 1). The objection was to bring Islam into the clause, as mentioned earlier.

Further, another member of Mandal alleged in his speech at the assembly that the Resolution went against the wishes of Jinnah, who had "unequivocally said that Pakistan would be a secular state". Chattopadhyaya again mentioned that Jinnah had intended to "separate politics from religion" in Pakistan (Karim, 2010). Therefore, the non-Muslim members introduced Jinnah's speech of 11 August 1947 as their solid argument to substantiate their claims against the Resolution in assembly debates. On these grounds, the non-Muslim members opposed the Islamic connotations of the Resolution and any move to make Pakistan an Islamic state (Karim, 2010).

Based on these concerns, another leading member of the Congress party, Mr Dutta, moved two amendments to the Resolution: 1) to have the first paragraph removed entirely; and 2) to edit the fourth paragraph, which contained the words "as enunciated by Islam", to include "other religions". Other suggestions for amendments included that the Resolution should reference the fundamental Human Rights of the United Nations organisation, and that the word 'democratic' should be inserted into the document (Karim, 2010).

The members of the ruling Pakistan Muslim League defended the Resolution. Prime Minister Khan and Sardar Abdur Rab Khan Nishtar made a strong case favouring the Resolution and did their best to allay the non-Muslim members' fears. The Muslims' arguments are important because they give us a good idea of how they understood the Resolution's implications and, most importantly, how they viewed the essence of an Islamic state. On the day Prime Minister Khan moved the Resolution, he had already given a speech that provided

a clear and unambiguous explanation of what the Resolution meant. Before any objections to the sovereignty question were raised, he said:

> It has been made clear in the Resolution that the state shall exercise all its powers and authority through the people's chosen representatives. That naturally eliminates any danger of the establishment of a theocracy … In its literal sense, theocracy means a Government of God; in this sense, however, it is patent that the entire universe is a theocracy, for is there any corner in the whole creation: where His authority does not exist? But in the technical sense, theocracy has come to mean a government of ordained priests who claim to derive their rights from their sacerdotal position … I cannot overemphasise the fact that such an idea is absolutely foreign to Islam. Islam does not recognise either priesthood or any sacerdotal authority; therefore, the question of a theocracy does not arise in Islam. (Constituent Assembly debates, 1949, p. 3)

Similarly, Mian Mohammad Iftikhar Uddin said that, contrary to concerns that the Resolution gave the constitution a 'theocratic approach', it was not "any more theocratic, any more religious than the Resolution or the statement of fundamental principles of some of the modern countries of the world" (Constituent Assembly debates, 1949, p. 5). He reminded the House that referring to God in a constitution was not without precedent and listed Ireland as an example of having a constitution that "starts with somewhat similar words about God". He also referred to the British Empire nations, practically all of which derived their authority "through the king's agency from God" (Constituent Assembly debates, 1949, p. 52). All of the Muslim Leaguers were also unanimous that there is no official priesthood or 'licensed ulema' in Islam. Thus, the Muslims can appeal to no other authority on earth than the people (Karim, 2010). In response to the suggestion to insert the word 'democratic' (to supersede 'Islam') in the Resolution, Sardar Nishtar said:

> I do not think, Sir, there can be genuine doubt in the mind of any person that what is meant by the Mover of this Resolution is a democratic constitution in the real sense of the term. It might be said then: why don't you accept the word "democratic"? Let me tell my friends that I think very right on the part of the Mover of the Resolution that he has avoided this word … The word democratic has lost all its meaning in the present-day world. (Constituent Assembly debates, 1949, p. 58)

This was an echo of a similar statement made in 1940 by Jinnah when he criticised the Congress's idea of democracy in India by explaining that democracy means different things in different countries: "They have kept sixty million people as untouchables; they have set up a system which is nothing but a 'Grand Fascist Council' … They set up dummy ministries that were not responsible to the legislatures or the electorate but to a caucus of Mr Gandhi's choosing. Then, generally speaking, democracy has different patterns, even in different countries of the west" (Yusufi, 1996, p. 1159). Sardar Nishtar continued:

> Now how do you interpret this word "democratic" in the present-day world? How to interpret it when kings and no kings, presidents and no presidents, a parliamentary system of government and a nonparliamentary system of government and even a state like Russia, which is accused by the so-called democracies of being a dictatorship—all claim to be democratic states. I think it was better to avoid the word "democratic", give the state's real features, and leave it to the people to judge for themselves whether ours is a good constitution or a lousy constitution … The state's nature has not been described, but the features of the essential elements have been given. If the word democratic had been used, it would have been interpreted in the light of the multifarious present-day interpretations of this word that exist in the world in different manners by different people. (Constituent Assembly debates, 1949, p. 58)

In a similar vein, he negated the allegation that the words "as enunciated by Islam" would create Patrician and Plebeian classes, saying that the concept of higher and lower levels was 'anti-Islamic' (Karim, 2010). These arguments supported Prime Minister Khan's contention in his opening speech of 7 March 1949:

> Sir, you would notice that the Objectives Resolution lays emphasis on the principles of democracy, freedom, equality, tolerance and social justice and further defines them by saying that these principles should be observed in the constitution as Islam has enunciated them. It has been necessary to qualify these terms because they are generally used in a loose sense. For instance, the Western Powers and Soviet Russia alike claim that their systems are based on democracy, and, yet, it is common knowledge that their polities are inherently different. (Mahmood, 1975, p. 18)

Regarding the suggestion that the Resolution should contain a reference to the United Nations Declaration on Human Rights, Nishtar pointed out that comparing the text of the whole UN document with a single clause of the Resolution revealed that it already contained much more

than the UN document (Karim, 2010). This was a fair claim. The UN document's guidelines notwithstanding, this was a period when apartheid was coming into force in South Africa, when non-white citizens in the United States had fewer rights than white citizens, and when many countries had still not offered suffrage to women. The constitution was looking to make better guarantees for its people than other nations offered their people at that time (Karim, 2010).

Responding to the allegation that the Muslim members were going against the wishes of Jinnah, Nishtar remarked that "Pakistan was demanded with a particular ideology" and that the Resolution did not go "against the declarations of Quaid-i-Azam" (Constituent Assembly debates, 1949, p. 62). Again, this supported a statement of a similar sentiment in Prime Minister Khan's opening speech. On the last day of the debates over the Resolution, Prime Minister Khan tackled Chattopadhyaya's contention that no non-Muslim could be head of state. He explained why the claim was wrong:

> Sir, my friend, said that these people told him that in an Islamic State, that means a state established following this Resolution—no non-Muslim can be the head of the administration. That doesn't seem right. A non-Muslim can be the head of the administration under a constitutional government with the limited authority given under the constitution to a person or an institution in that particular state. (Constituent Assembly debates, 1949, p. 95)

Prime Minister Khan informed Chattopadhyaya that the material he had used to "support his objections had been produced by" so-called ulemas who had "misrepresented the ideology of Islam" and were "out to disrupt and destroy Pakistan" (Constituent Assembly debates, 1949 p. 94). He further reminded Chattopadhyaya that these views did not represent those of the vast majority of Mussalmans (Constituent Assembly debates, 1949, p. 95). Prime Minister Khan's sentiments stemmed from the fact that these theocratic ideas came from the same religious parties that had opposed Pakistan's creation and therefore had no public support. Overall, the Muslim members were adamant that the Resolution was not a prelude to a

theocracy. It may appear that the non-Muslim members were refusing outright to listen to them, but this is not necessarily the case. Here are the remarks of Datta, another non-Muslim member who expressed his opposition to the Resolution, but having heard Prime Minister Khan's opening speech, he conceded:

> It is a constitution meant for the people of Pakistan—Muslims and non-Muslims. As has been said, I must say the expression is a happy one in the Resolution's preamble. The Almighty Allah has delegated authority to the State of Pakistan through its people … It has not been limited to any one faith but to anyone and everyone who claims to be a citizen of Pakistan. If I am not a Muslim, I understand that the government system is also intended to be democratic … Islam recognises no distinction based upon race, colour or birth. (Constituent Assembly debates, 1949, p. 21)

Similarly, although the Muslim members generally supported the Resolution in principle, they were not quite unanimous about the content. For instance, Mian Iftikhar Uddin criticised its wording. Moreover, although he understood the spirit of the first paragraph, he felt that it lent itself to 'mischievous interpretations':

> The authority descends to the people and not to the state and says that the state is all right through the people it comes to the state, but why mention the state separately? We know that the final authority to decide about the limits … the final authority to interpret the rights of the people, is the people themselves … To bring in, therefore, the agency of the state is to confuse the issue. (Constituent Assembly debates, 1949, pp. 51–2)

Uddin's primary concern was that a government in power could misuse the preamble to justify a dictatorship: "An occasion may arise when the state may give an excuse or the party in power may say that the people have exceeded the limits prescribed by the Almighty, and it may refuse to obey the people" (Constituent Assembly debates, 1949, p. 52). On that count, he was only reiterating the feelings of non-Muslims such as B. C. Manda, who felt that while the present members may have been reassured and made to understand the true spirit of the Resolution, there was still a danger that "posterity may misinterpret it" (Karim, 2010). Uddin was the only vocal critic among the Muslims in the assembly, although, unlike the non-Muslim members, he supported the sovereignty clause (Choudhury, 1959). In fact, he was

more concerned that the assembly was failing to put into place the beginnings of "a proper Islamic constitution, a sufficient ideology, a new way of achieving real democracy". He said there was nothing in the Resolution to make it a "real Islamic democracy and constitution that would have been for the people and the people" (Constituent Assembly debates, 1949, p. 55). Instead, he wanted the Constituent Assembly to "incorporate those principles which will make real democracy possible. And if it fails to do so that at this stage, I do hope it will do so in the actual constitution and then the world will know what we really meant by the Islamic conception of democracy and social justice" (Karim, 2010, p. 50). Did Liaquat Ali Khan disregard Jinnah's vision of an Islamic state in the Objectives Resolution? No, he did not; in fact, he supported Jinnah's vision.

5.5.3 Academic Debate on Objectives Resolution

Uddin's warning notwithstanding, in the end, the Constituent Assembly voted in favour of the Resolution. Unfortunately, the Muslim members' best efforts had done little to allay the non-Muslim members' fears. The Muslims voted in favour, and the Hindus, being the only non-Muslim group, voted against (Karim, 2010). It is unclear whether this is because the non-Muslims remained in doubt about the Resolution's implications or whether it was because none of the amendments they had suggested were adopted (Karim, 2010).

Scholars writing shortly after 1949 have different views about what the Resolution actually meant for Pakistan. Prof. G. W. Choudhury (1959, p. 59) noted that it was widely welcomed in the country because it reflected "the aspirations and ideals of the people". He also observed that the Resolution "did not give any special privilege to the ulema, much less be run by them", and that the Constituent Assembly "was quite explicit in resolving that if Pakistan was to become an Islamic State, it should do so by choice of its citizenry" (Choudhury, 1959, p. 51). Another scholar, Prof. Leonard Binder, had opinions that paralleled Choudhury's but ultimately disagreed. To Binder and Choudhury, the Resolution implied a constitution for

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Pakistan that would not be identical with traditionalist and static concepts of Sharia law envisioned by the ulema; hence, it suggests Binder, the absence of the word Sharia in the Resolution (Binder, 1961).

Further, Binder notes that the main difference in opinion between the Muslim and non-Muslim members was centred on how each side interpreted 'sovereignty in God'. The non-Muslims were treating it in this way: "If sovereignty belongs to God, it does not belong to the people; thus Pakistan would not be a democratic state" (like a theocracy), whereas the Muslims understood it either as a "polite nod in the direction of the mosque" or a "moral force joined to politics" (Binder, 1961, pp. 144–5). He further states that the Resolution was sufficiently vague to appeal to most sections of Muslims. He draws particular attention to the haziness of the sovereignty clause, remarking that the Resolution makes "God sovereign, the people sovereign, parliament sovereign, and the state sovereign in Pakistan", adding that "it would indeed be a narrow-minded person who was not satisfied with such a compromise" (Binder, 1961, p. 149). Thus, he cynically implies that the Resolution was created for everyone's appeasement, but it was satisfactory to no one.

Here, it is necessary to add the views of the late Chief Justice of Pakistan, A. R. Cornelius. The cornerstones of his legal philosophy may be summarised in three points: (a) law has a moral function in society; (b) law should be culture-sensitive, and (c) Islam is a good foundation for a universal society (Shafique, 2011). As a Christian, Cornelius was well-versed in Islamic law and doubted a purely materialistic society's long-term success. For this reason, he believed that Islamic values should be incorporated into Pakistan's legislation. In a personal letter in 1965, he wrote:

> I have learnt that a non-Muslim can only be a full citizen of Pakistan if, on the secular's side, he conforms to the requirements of the Objectives Resolution. As far as I can see, this is entirely possible and would be easy … if there were some formulation of the basic principles contained in the Scriptures of Islam regarding equality, tolerance, social justice. (Braibanti, 1999, p. 184)

Cornelius was not disconcerted by the Islamic content of the Resolution. On the contrary, like Uddin, he identified the key to resolving the whole issue: the need to isolate the core principles of the Quran that guarantee civil equality, social justice, freedom of conscience, etc., and to incorporate them into the constitution to prevent misuse and misinterpretation.

5.5.4 1973 Constitution Onward

After the separation of East Pakistan (now Bangladesh), Zulfiqar Ahmad Bhutto, who assumed power as Pakistan's first democratically elected prime minister, encapsulated the new Pakistan's mood. He steered the country, perhaps more clearly than any leader before him, in the direction of closer relations with the Muslim heartland that lay to the west of its borders. He did so while consciously observing that "the severance of our eastern wing … has significantly altered our geographic focus … At the moment, as we stand, it is within the ambit of South and Western Asia. It is here that our primary concern must henceforth lie" (Bhutto, 1973, p. 13). Internally, Bhutto signalled changes that confirmed the newfound importance of Islam in public affairs. He openly proclaimed the power of Islamic socialism to drive his populist program.

On the contrary, Bhutto took credit for promulgating the country's most explicitly Islamic constitution yet. The 1973 constitution, which remains in force, reiterated Pakistan's Islamic identity. The objective resolution was incorporated in the *preamble* of the 1973 constitution; it affirms that sovereignty belongs to Almighty Allah. Further, the Constitution states that "The Islamic Republic of Pakistan" and "Islam shall be the state religion of Pakistan" (The Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973). In addition, the teaching of Islam was made compulsory, and a Council of Islamic Ideology was established to advise the national and provincial governments on legislation in keeping with the Quran and Sunna. In a further unusual and equally unprecedented move, the constitution required the state to "endeavour to

preserve and strengthen fraternal relations among the Muslim countries based on Islamic unity" (The Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973).

5.6 Conclusion

Chapter 5 provided a detailed analysis of Jinnah's ideas and his reflections on Pakistan. In particular, Jinnah had a vision for Pakistan and its identity, and he transformed from the ambassador of 'Muslim–Hindu unity' to the champion of two-nation theory and became Quaid-e-Azam. Further, this chapter provided a detailed discourse analysis of Jinnah's speeches on 11 and 14 August 1947 that he delivered to Pakistan's National Assembly. Notably, the 11 August speech was analysed in the context of the Misaq-i-Madina. Further, the chapter included a detailed study of the 1949 Objectives Resolution, a critique of and debate on the Resolution, and the role of the Resolution in the future constitution-making identity of Pakistan. Finally, the chapter discussed the 1973 Constitution supporting Pakistan's Islamic identity nature.

Chapter 6: Pakistan's National Identity: Issues and Challenges

Unity, faith and discipline.

(Jinnah's motto for Pakistan)

6.1 Introduction

Like many other post-colonial states, Pakistan has faced persistent national identity problems. Scholars have mentioned that making a cohesive national identity out of different communities that were put together primarily to support colonial interests proved to be a challenging experience (Ezrow and Frantz, 2013). It often appears distant when a consensus-based political system is needed for cohesive nationhood. The leading indicators of this malaise are the repeated dictatorship rule, corruption, and the separation of East Pakistan, which led to the creation of Bangladesh as a sovereign state in 1971. Nevertheless, more than seven decades after independence, Pakistanis share a sense of common nationality, use Urdu as a national language, and have become economically interdependent owing to the historical and ecological features of the Indus Valley region. However, ethnic and regional tensions and dissent between secular elements and their Islamist counterparts have kept the country engaged in a long-running ideological debate. Despite the severe economic, structural, and geopolitical handicaps that the country has faced since 1947, its record in institution building, financial performance, and a frontline role in international affairs remains significant. Moreover, social and political theories suggest that national identity can foster a sense of social harmony, loyalty, and cohesion in the national community.

For instance, Mill (2001, p. 288) argues that "the boundaries of governments should coincide in the main with those of nationalities" because a state with several nationalities is one in which members are "artificially tied together" (2001, p. 288). In Pakistan, these arguments resurfaced with a new emphasis on national unity in public and political discourse through Islamist and secularist narratives, which were increasingly viewed as divisive. Further, the

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scholars argue that "Islam created Pakistan, but it now divides Pakistan" (Hoodbhoy, 2011, p. 68), and the two-nation theory was no more valid after the separation of East Pakistan. Further, scholars state that "Jinnah and the Muslim League leadership emphasised Islam and the unity of the Muslim nation, but this proved to be a transitional strategy in developing national cohesiveness after independence" (Faiz, 2021, p. 50). However, this is not the reality; the ethnic division existed even during British Raj, and they fuelled it (Faiz, 2021) to protect their interests. Islam was the uniting tool during the independence movement, and even today, Islam is the only bonding and unifying tool in developing national cohesiveness. Therefore, this chapter argues that the rise of ethnic subnationalism and East Pakistan's separation resulted from political, social, and economic deprivation.

Further, this chapter will analyse Pakistan's national identity and the conflict of ethnic identities based on post-colonial nationalism and the approach offered by Barrington (2006). The chapter further discusses that controlled democracy and dysfunctional constitution are significant challenges to Pakistan's national identity.

6.2 Pakistan's National Identity: Issues and Challenges

After Pakistan achieved independence, the government gave priority to the development of national identity. However, Pakistan has faced many problems since partition in 1947. During the subcontinent's partition, Pakistan inherited British India's more economically 'backward' and politically 'underdeveloped' provinces. Some writers have referred to it as a 'democratic deficit', which helps to explain why it has been challenging to establish a democratic system (Talbot, 2009). This inheritance was exacerbated by the disruption caused by partition. Millions of refugees had to be fed, clothed, and housed by the fledgling government (Talbot and Singh, 2011). It has been claimed that this massive and unexpected task accentuated the tensions between political participation and state consolidation (Jalal, 1990), and continual

military intercession has also been identified as an underlying cause of Pakistan's geostrategic situation.

Pakistan's history is littered with disagreements between Pakistan's nationalism, ethnic identity, and linguistic loyalties. In contrast to the state-centred identity, their influence was summed up in the 1980s by the great Pushtun nationalist Wali Khan: "I have been a Pushtun for thousands of years, a Muslim for 1,300 years, and a Pakistani for just over forty" (Ahmed, 1997, p. 14). The Pakistani state has demonstrably failed to manage diversity. The failure of state construction was due to its reliance on centralised solutions in a setting of financial restriction and strategic insecurity. Attempts to construct a centralised state based on the Muslim League's supremacy and the unification of Urdu caused difficulties with ethnic groups in the country, except for Punjab, which gradually emerged as the new state's core.

The nation-state of Pakistan is fragmented. It is a society made up of a diverse range of ethnic groupings in all provinces, and all ethnic groups share their culture with societies in different regions. For example, Baluchis and Pashtuns migrated to Sindh and Punjab, and Punjabis have been assimilated in Karachi. As a result of their movements, ethnic groups have emerged in all provinces of Pakistan. Many post-colonial states' collective nationhood experiences present conflicting evidence of the success of fostering national cohesion and a feeling of collective national identity. Nevertheless, not all states have succeeded or failed in constructing nations based on appropriate dissemination of power or representation of every group.

Pakistan has long been ruled by the military or by those who are backed by the military. East Pakistan declared independence in 1971 as a result of ethnic strife. Since then, the ethnic strife in Balochistan has restarted, and sectarian violence has arisen in the state of Pakistan. Recently, to hold state control and battle with militants threatened state sovereignty over

Afghanistan's neighbouring tribal areas. Tensions with India have also persisted, occasionally escalating into armed warfare. The Kashmir issue continues to be a symbol of distrust and hatred. Although contemporary studies of the country have not expounded Pakistan's resilience, many studies have focused on the issues of civil-military ties, ethnic disputes, and militancy. This introduction analyses these issues to provide a framework for understanding the findings of this research.

6.3 Bengali Subnationalism, Two-Nation Theory and Separation of East Pakistan

Following Pakistan's independence in August 1947, based on the two-nation theory, there was a nationwide belief in Islam's religion, although the country was made up of people who spoke different languages, followed different customs, and belonged to different ethnic groupings (Islam, 1984), yet the only binding factor was Islam. Further, the geographical separation of Pakistan's eastern and western parts, with over 1,000 miles of hostile territory between them, gave the country a distinct character. However, after the emergence of Bangladesh in 1971, questions emerged regarding the two-nation theory and Islam's position regarding national unity and identity. Does Bangladesh's creation indicate that the two-nation theory is no longer applicable? Or did the two-nation theory appear to be a fallacy after the founding of Bangladesh? These questions have arisen in Pakistan since 1971. After the collapse of Dhaka, not only in Pakistan but also in India, critiques stated that Jinnah's two-nation theory skunk's in the Bay of Bengal (Saday, 2020).

If Bengalis had chosen to join India in 1971 instead of becoming an independent country, the two-nation theory would have failed or become irrelevant or discarded. However, the Bengalis did not join India. A survey using a group of 1,001 factory workers and peasants in East Pakistan was conducted in 1963–1964 and showed that 48% of respondents described

themselves as Pakistanis, while only 11% considered themselves Bengalis (Schuman, 1972). The remainder identified with their villages or districts. Another survey was undertaken at the Dacca Technical College and showed that 74% of respondents considered themselves Pakistanis and only 24% as Bengalis. These results revealed that, as late as the mid-1960s, there was little understanding of the fundamental dispute between the concepts of Bengali and Pakistani identity by ordinary people in East Pakistan (Schuman, 1972). In his research, Schuman (1972, p. 295) concludes that "it seems clear that in 1964 there was little or no awareness by the ordinary man in East Pakistan of a conflict between his identity as a Bengali and his identity as a Pakistani".

Further, the people who may see beyond the borders of their villages and districts are more likely to perceive their identity as Pakistani. Since the creation of Pakistan in 1947, the development of Bengali subnationalism was based on several political, economic, cultural, and sociological factors, but not related to the two-nation theory. Of all of the provinces that formed Pakistan during the struggle for independence, Bengal supplied Jinnah with remarkable support in his fight to build an independent Muslim state on the subcontinent. Still, in the space of two decades of independence, the Bengalis began to have second thoughts. While in Pakistan, they had been the majority group; however, they suffered from deep-rooted distrust of West Pakistan's dominance.

This chapter will examine the causes that triggered Bengali subnationalism. The first is the political factor: Pakistan's political model was modelled on the Western parliamentary system and federal constitution. However, neither the parliamentary system nor the federation was genuine in their implementations and outcomes. Instead, these democratic trappings provided a cloak of authority for a select elite who were capable of consolidating power in their own hands. Moreover, no single Pakistani politician could claim a national-level plurality after the deaths of Jinnah and Liaqat Ali. As a result, politics became fragmented,

especially in West Pakistan, where landlords extended financial resources to the local and national political discourses (Sayeed, 1967).

During the first 11 years of independence (1947–1958) in a so-called parliamentary democracy, the country did not hold a single general election, while the provincial elections were defined in the 1956 Report of the Election Reform Commission as "a farce, mockery and fraud toward the electorate" (Choudhury, 1969). The failure of this parliamentary democracy resulted in the emergence of a robust ruling class that was supported and assisted by a strong bureaucracy. The rise of this all-powerful ruling class later had a significant effect on East Pakistan's separatist movement. Further, this governing class abolished the parliamentary representation that East Pakistan had before 1958 (Nasir, 1984).

During the Ayub dictatorship (1958–1969), the military–bureaucratic hierarchy became anchored in Pakistan's political framework. Not only did it monopolise government services, but it also seized on the political functions of interest aggregation, interest articulation, and political socialisation. However, it could not facilitate national integration (Nasir, 1984). Moreover, in the Ayub era, the military–bureaucratic–industrial complex was almost nonrepresentational of the East Pakistanis: these groups were never trusted by the people of East Pakistan (Jahan, 1972). As a result, the call for regional autonomy became louder and more potent, eventually resulting in the Mujibur–Rahman six-point plan. Two independent currencies, provincial foreign exchange regulation, and no taxation authority for the central government were included in the six points, keeping only the national government's defence and foreign affairs (Islam, 1981). Of course, these points were unacceptable to the central government.

The central government's attempt to impose Urdu as the national language and the denial of representation based on the population of West Pakistan led Bengalis to distrust the central

government completely. Thus, the Bengalis began to demand a weaker centre and stronger provinces in the country's future constitutional setup (Islam, 1981). This was the beginning of the demand for regional autonomy. As a result, the Muslim League gradually lost support in East Pakistan. In the 1954 provincial election, it was completely wiped out by the United Front Party, which won the election on a program of regional autonomy (Islam, 1981). However, the central government did not approve of this program, and the governor-general dismissed the popularly elected Ministry of the United Front (Sayeed, 1967).

It is now well-documented that the economic policies of the various central governments in Pakistan led to a sharp increase in regional and social disparities. Business interests, civil servants, landlords, and the middle classes benefited from national policies. Most of these people were centred in relatively backward regions of the country, particularly in West Pakistan. A well-documented account of economic disparity between East and West Pakistan is evident in the statistics of the allocation of expenditures in public–private investments and growth in the gross domestic product in both parts of the country (Jahan, 1972). Power was concentrated in a few hands within the Western part because of the economic policies of various governments. These policies created severe problems, not only in terms of regional integration but also for elite–mass integration. It appears that there was a direct relationship between the country's economic disparity between the two parts (West and East) and regional autonomy demand. As the difference became more profligate, the demand for regional autonomy grew stronger. Students, politicians, economists, the press, and intellectuals effectively used the economic argument to mobilise mass support for regional autonomy in East Pakistan (Islam, 1981). However, Pakistan's elitist political system barely responded to the growing unrest and the demands to share economic and political power.

Therefore, the creation of Bangladesh is not related to the fallacy of the two-nation theory but is related to how West Pakistan handled East Pakistanis. It was not because of the idea either,

but Pakistan's approach to over-centralising and negating Bengal economically and politically. This bigotry triggered and contributed to the secession of Bengali nationalism.

Interviewee Dr Safdar Mahmood (29 December 2019), explained that:

> the two-nation theory is not refuted because Muslims still are a distinct and separate nation from any point of view from the Hindus. East Pakistan wanted independence because they feared they were not given political and economic justice, which is not equal to participation. But how does that deny the two-nation theory? The two-nation theory is still delivered. And Pakistan is based on the two-nation theory. East Bengal, which was Bengal land at the time of partition, had become an independent country like Pakistan. Would the two-nation theory be denied or condemned? Why partition happened in east and west Bengal because of two nation theory. The separation of east Pakistan was the failure of our political institution. It resulted from certain political moves in the United Pakistan, which led to the separation of East Pakistan. It was political and economic injustice that led to the creation of Bangladesh.

Once again, the identity of Islam and Bengali ancestry decided the option of becoming an independent country, rather than merging with India because the mass mood of what became Bangladesh may have been loyal to the 'idea of Pakistan' (Schuman, 1972). Before the civil war began and India intervened in East Pakistan, what had historically driven the Bengali people to vote for Pakistan drove them to become Bangladesh. This independent state was the identity of Islam and Bengali heritage.

Figure 3. Pakistan's Population, 1951 Census (Government of Pakistan, 1951)

Note: Population in millions.

6.4 Ethnicity and Pakistan's National Identity

Many of Pakistan's issues, including longstanding civil conflicts, persistent political instability, and an uncertain economy, are usually blamed on weak civic nationalism and robust ethnic identities. But, as scholars have argued, "a society can function perfectly well if its citizens hold multiple identities, but problems arise when those subnational identities arouse loyalties that override loyalty to the nation as a whole" (Collier, 2009, p. 50). Thus, the prevailing idea is that connection to the state-instituted national identity, sometimes known as 'territorial nationalism' (Young, 2004), is weak and unrelated to subnational ethnic identification.

Pakistan is a diversified or plural society in terms of its religious, ethnic, and linguistic composition. Based on this perspective, Cohen (2005, p. 201) states that "Pakistan is one of the world's most ethnically and linguistically complex states". Pakistan consisted of five significant ethnicities at the time of its formation: Bengalis, Punjabis, Pathans, Sindhis, and

Baluchs. The imbalance between Pakistan's diversity and its political institutions is at the root of much of its ethnonational strife. Pakistan's dominant ruling elite has been resistant to accepting 'social pluralism'. They are unwilling to share authority with either minority or majority groups, as in the case of Bengal. As a result, it became the first post-colonial state to face a secessionist movement in 1971, leading to Bangladesh's establishment (Mushtaq, 2009).

The Muslim League's leaders wildly miscalculated or ignored the power of regional and linguistic allegiances during the pre-independence period because of the unifying factor of Islam. However, the Muslim nation's uniting element (Islam and Urdu) disintegrated soon after Pakistan's establishment, eventually leading to ethnic and sectarian groupings that claimed recognition and accommodation in the country's constitutional and political frameworks (Nazir, 2001). Despite some gradual progress towards provincial autonomy and redistribution since its founding in 1947, Pakistan has failed to build an organic and sustainable bond between the federal entities (Ahmad, 2010). In 1940, the Lahore Resolution stipulated federalism as one of the conditions for establishing Pakistan. However, federalism was not encouraged when constructing a nation-state symbolising shared sovereignty and national identity. In actuality, the state's unitarian nature has triumphed. Despite the evident federal qualities that the various constitutions implied, Pakistan's political climate remained authoritarian and centripetal throughout both the democratic and military administrations. The Pakistani elite suppressed a desire for regional autonomy among the different ethnic groups to preserve national unity, viewing federalism as a precursor to secession. Consequently, the Pakistani political elite did not consider these emergent subnational identities in its national structure. From the beginning, as Rais (2012, p. 1) states:

> The political design of the state and nation-building strategy placed greater trust and powers with the federal structure than the provinces, even ignoring their genuine identity, economic and political concerns. Far from achieving any meaningful integration, centralisation of power only alienated the provinces and resulted in disputes that involved the use of force.

Therefore, the dominant ruling elite of Pakistan has been unwilling to recognise the diversity of society and has reduced it to matters of law and order instead of an element of governability (Malik, 1997). Pakistan was divided ethnically into Bengalis (almost half of the population), Punjabis, Pakhtuns, Sindhis, and Balochs, and was soon joined by Mohajirs (migrants) from India's Muslim minority areas (Lieven, 2011). Geographically, Pakistan is one of the most unusual states in contemporary history; it is highly vulnerable to further separation, significant ethnic diversity, and two nearly equally populous wings separated by 1,000 miles of Indian territory (Lieven, 2011). In East Pakistan, even though they were in the majority, Bengalis were underrepresented in Pakistan's dominant social institutions. Likewise, the military is dominated by Pakhtuns and Punjabis, whereas Sindhis and Punjabis primarily represent landowners, and the civil bureaucracy, businesses, and middle-class political leadership are dominated by Punjabis and Mohajirs (Alavi, 1988; Jalal, 1994; Lieven, 2011). Moreover, the West Pakistani elites intended to negate the Bengali numerical superiority by sabotaging democracy early (Ali, 1970; Cohen, 2006). As a result, these ethnic differences and anxieties harmed the emerging Pakistani nationalism's cohesion, integrity, and formation of decent governance.

Figure 4. Pakistan's Languages, 2017 Census (Pakistan Bureau of Statistics Census, 2017)

6.4.1 Sindhi Ethnic Conflict

Sindh is the third-largest province in Pakistan by total land mass and, following Punjab, the second-largest province by population. Since independence, a visible element of Pakistan's political history has increased assistance for frequently contesting so-called ethnic nationalism in the Sindh province. Thus, apart from the creation of a *Muhajir Qaumi Movement* (MQM) political identity among the Urdu-speaking population of the province's urban areas beginning in the 1980s, the region has faced a challenge to Sindhi nationalism (similar to its Bengali equivalent) because of the ideological foundations on which Pakistan was established in 1947.

Sindhi subnationalism first appeared in the news in the early 1970s following Bangladesh's separation. However, some observers have suggested that this transition was initially motivated by Bengali subnationalism and nationalist politicians like G. M. Syed (1904–1995), who retroactively traced their roots to the pre-independence post-colonial period. That

is, they read history backwards (Ansari, 2016). However, this section focuses on a distinct Sindhi sense of identity and sentiment rather than the prior questions. After partition, events before independence were subsequently reinforced by events that added weight to Sindhi accusations of economic, political, and cultural inferiority. As Faiz (2021, p. 11) states, "identity politics in modern Sindh cannot be imagined without the input of the colonial state which created the cultural, economic, and administrative variables central to the rise of Sindhi nationalism".

One of the most significant historical aspects is how the region has fuelled the politicisation of Sindh's identity since the British Raj acquired it. Sindh was initially part of Bombay's presidency during the colonial era before becoming a separate province in 1936 (Faiz, 2021). When Pakistan was established in 1947, Sindh remained a separate province until 1955. It was later incorporated into the One Unit of West Pakistan, which was formed that year as a counter-balance to East Pakistan, which was more heavily populated (Talbot, 2009). However, Sindh's independent position was restored by the early 1970s.

Meanwhile, East Pakistan's separation and Punjab's continued dominance inside what remains of Pakistan set the stage for Sindhi dissatisfaction with the status quo, which harmed regional Sindhi concerns. In fact, this history reinforced beliefs among politicised Sindhis that their rights had been frequently and consistently surrendered to others both before and after independence. Therefore, this encouraged a political notion of Sindhi's identity. Sindhi nationalism has thus been described as a "sons of the soil" movement, with language serving as a crucial marker of identity in many cases (Ansari, 2016). In the period after 1947, Sindhi nationalist sentiment gained an institutional form, driven by a fusion of four primary elements. Therefore, it is necessary, as Das (2001) argues, to understand how and why Sindhi nationalism arose in Pakistan to take demographic, economic, cultural, and political overlaps into account.

Demographically, the large-scale migration of refugees and migrants from various parts of Pakistan influenced this sentiment. Scholars have observed that the "major variable that contributed to the construction of Sindhi identity was migration and demographic change" (Faiz, 2021, p. 16). Aside from large numbers of Urdu speakers migrating (approximately 20% of the total provincial population by the mid-1950s), there have been serious concerns in some quarters about the growing population in the Sindh region due to the ongoing flow of the Punjabi population to various areas of the region. (Ansari, 2016). At the beginning of the 1980s, more than 50% of Karachi city citizens spoke Urdu, while more than 13% spoke Punjabi. Second, land allocation to non-Sindhis and Punjabis in rural regions accelerated throughout the Ayub tenure. Many Sindhis suffered economically because of shifts in the economy's urban and rural sectors, as well as accusations of a "calculated perpetuation of regional inequalities". Third, the Sindhi people believed that the central government of Pakistan was implementing initiatives to weaken the cultural identity of Sindhis (Ansari, 2016).

In particular, they considered Urdu, the country's primary language, a threat to their Sindhi language. 'Urduisation' policies appeared to reinforce the dangers of Sindhi culture and their population status as second-class citizens. Some critics consider this a form of cultural genocide conducted by federal authorities. Finally, from the formative days of Pakistan's independence, political decisions strengthened Sindhi sentiments that they were losing the end of the new compositions developed after 1947. Das (2001) explains that in 1948, Karachi city became part of the federal government territory (before it was part of Sindh); in 1955, the establishment of One Unit, followed by martial law in 1958, were viewed by Sindhis as the extent of outsiders' purposes. The list of concerns from Sindhi people grew over time, resulted in tendency to distrust with the central government. However, scholars noted that "the perceived Punjabi–Muhajir alliance at the helm of affairs adopted various administrative,

political, economic, and cultural measures that led to deep resentment and insecurity amongst Sindhis" (Faiz, 2021, p. 49). Officially, there were allegations that the federal government treated Sindhis unjustly compared with other provinces, particularly Punjab, awarding loans for development projects. Sindhi political leaders urged 'new Sindhis' (after 1947, residents were commonly referred to as 'new Sindhis') to integrate with the society as soon as possible, "for they could not expect discrimination in their favour against 'old Sindhis'" (Ansari, 2016, p. 107).

Further, Sindh witnessed the rise of provincialism in the early days. Naturally, some newspapers criticised this 'provincialism' of the Sindh authorities, while the Sindh Muslim Students Federation repeated its appeal for 'Sindh for Sindhis' (Ansari, 2005). However, early in 1948, the Minister for Refugee Rehabilitation advised against the "virus of provincialism", which he claimed went against both the teachings of Islam and the ideals on which Pakistan had been founded, and which, if allowed to continue unchecked, would destroy the fundamental foundations of the newly created state (Dawn, 1994).

Politically, Sindh has seen numerous coalitions and efforts to reclaim its self-assumed identity. Thus, for example, the *Sindh Awami Mahaz (SAM)* to *Jiye Sindh*, giving Sindhi ethnonationalism a more defined focus, even though it remained an umbrella organisation representing a wide range of interests from cultural circles to leftist political organisations. However, in 1972, the stakes were heightened when, through its student wing (Jiye Sindh Student Federation [JSSF]), G. M. Syed founded Jiye Sindh Mahaz and built strong support in the province's educational institutions. This movement had undoubtedly been encouraged by the previous events that led to the establishment of Bangladesh in East Pakistan. Its prime objective was to secure Sindh's independence from Pakistan. Jiye Sindh Mahaz aimed to establish a *Sindhu Desh* (Sindhi Nation or Land of the River Indus) (Faiz, 2021) and had a

relatively significant support base in rural regions, among students, and among the rapidly growing Sindhi middle classes.

Subsequently, in 1972, the Sindh assembly, led by Mumtaz Ali Bhutto, passed the Teaching, Promotion, and Use of Sindhi Language Bill. This made Sindhi (the local language) the province's only official language and Sindhi a compulsory course for students in grades IV to XII (Faiz, 2021). As a result, during this period, politics were heavily influenced by language issues (which helped to form a so-called Muhajir ethnicity in the province's major cities). Further, Karachi was re-established as Sindh's capital, and Sindhi people were offered several lower- and mid-level government positions. In contrast, Sindh government employees of all ethnic backgrounds were expected to acquire the Sindhi language within a set timeframe of three months (Faiz, 2021). A new quota system was also implemented to address the under-representation of Sindhi people in the local educational and civil service departments. Further, while jobs in the private sector were previously bound to quotas, the nationalisation in 1972 of vital industries resulted in the expansion of the ethnic quota system (Talbot, 2009).

In contrast, G. M. Syed's groups were not the only ones advocating for Sindhi interests and rights. Sindh Awami Tehreek, founded by Rasool Bux Paleejo, was another advocate for Sindh. Unlike G. M. Syed, who had been willing to forego socioeconomic rehabilitation until political change occurred, Paleejo pushed for greater provincial autonomy and land reforms, thereby advocating a much more aggressive vision of the nationalist narrative (Ansari, 2016). However, the emergence of the Pakistan People's Party (PPP) in politics undoubtedly obscured the prospect of Sindhi nationalism from the 1970s. In fact, support by the Sindhi electorate to the PPP appears to have made it difficult to achieve the degree of support between the electorates that Sindhi nationalist parties were aiming at in a "hard" statistical way. However, this does not negate the reality that several Sindhis sympathised with

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nationalist groups. They viewed it as contesting what seems to be the second class of the region—its citizens, its culture, and its language in today's Pakistan.

Moreover, in cities like Karachi and Hyderabad in the late 1980s and early 1990s, there was a significant outbreak of violence involving Sindhis, Muhajirs, Punjabis, and Pathans. This polarisation resulted in numerous deaths and more division in ethnicity. In contrast, during G. M. Syed's birthday gathering in Karachi in 1992, Jeay Sindh activists waved party flags and chanted "G. M. Syed is our leader, Sindhu Desh is our destiny". In 1993, during the PPP government, G. M. Syed was placed under house arrest and died in 1995 (Das, 2001).

With coalitions formed and broken, increasing establishment participation in Pakistan's politics, and the ongoing restoration to civilian democracy, the picture has become even more complicated in recent years. After a PPP-dominated federal government took office in 2008, the Pakistan Muslim League (PML-N) reclaimed power in 2013, and the Pakistan Tehrik-i-Insaaf (PTI), led by Imran Khan, took control after the 2018 general election. As a result, Sindhi nationalism had the problem of determining its place in the political landscape at the provincial and national levels. It appears that nationalists are fragmented at present and hence on the back foot. For example, G. M. Syed's Jiye Sind movement has been split. In contrast, Jalal Shah, his grandson, has re-established the Sindh United Front party (Faiz, 2021). In addition, new organisations have been formed. One such example is the Sindh Democratic Forum.

Indeed, most of today's Sindhi nationalist discourse relies on the province's long-term environmental devastation resulting from irrigation programs, demographic decline, and development projects (Faiz, 2021). The Green concerns may divert attention away from more typical political grievances by mobilising rural Sindhis to preserve valued local resources. As a result, in recent years, Sindhi nationalist sentiments have evolved into more complicated

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phenomena. Therefore, Sindh nationalism undoubtedly has many similarities with other 'sons of the soil' movements that have developed in various regions of South Asia in the decades of post-independence. In this regard, it fits within a larger pattern of ethnonationalist reactions to the changing conditions of the last several years. For example, political scientists have pointed out that ethnic conflict became more prominent during the 1980s, contradicting widely held beliefs that ethnicity belonged to a previous transition period and that it was destined to fade away as countries were restructured into the modern nation-states (Ansari, 2016). Sindhi nationalism, like many other late-twentieth-century ethnic nationalisms, has failed to follow this ostensibly progressive paradigm. However, as experienced in Pakistan, the imperfect process of modernisation and state-building has led to the appearance of political movements that focus on ethnic identities and concerns rather than replacing them. Many states have struggled to achieve the secure squeeze within country and nation that the West hoped to pass on to other areas of the world during the time of independence. Of course, the connection between ethnicity and politics fluctuates their attraction as a symbol of political identity. However, most case studies demonstrate that this does not stay constant but is primarily influenced by degrees of wellbeing and security ('feel-good factor') that people of a specific group collectively experience. One characteristic of Sindhi nationalism that distinguishes it from others is its ability to transcend the comparatively new national lines established as a result of partition. Unlike most other ethnic nationalisms on the subcontinent, Sindhi Hindus moving to India in 1947 indicates a constituency outside Pakistan that supports Sindhi nationalist sentiment and values the province's distinct cultural and linguistic heritage almost as much as its Pakistani counterparts. Moreover, the global Sindhi diaspora helps to keep the spotlight on Sindh nationalistic issues. Even though Sindhi nationalist organisations do not have the electoral influence they would like, Sindhi nationalist sentiment is firmly embedded in the society of this region of Pakistan as a cultural phenomenon.

6.4.2 Balochi Ethnic Conflict

Balochistan is the largest and least populated province in Pakistan, with a wide range of cultures. Balochistan's literacy level is relatively low compared with other provinces, and as a result of political instability, the number of development schemes is insignificant (Express Tribune, 2015). Over the last 70 years, Balochistan has experienced five insurgencies, highlighting the deteriorating relationship between the central government and Pakistan's largest province (Ahmed, 2015). In Pakistan, the Baloch dispute has been considered a leading internal security challenge. A robust separatist movement indicates a weak national identity and solid ethnic identity in the province. Pakistan's critical national interests are centred on the province's enormous natural resources and strategic access provided by the essential Gwadar seaport and Iran–Afghanistan border. Following partition in 1947, the Khan (ruler) of the princely state of Kalat, which included a large portion of modern-day Balochistan, sought to keep his realm's independent position. Initially, Jinnah supported the Khan, but Pakistan's federal army annexed Baloch and shut down the Kalat riots within a few months. Thus, the struggle with Balochistan started before the official Pakistani state appeared, and the riots in Baloch did not end with the foundation of Pakistan. In 1948, a second rebellion was more violent than the first, and the Khan of Kalat was arrested by the state in 1958. Another four-year-long uprising erupted in Balochistan, and the struggle among Ayub Khan's administration and Balochi rebels continued for almost six years. In 1973, Zulfiqar Bhutto fired the province's local administration, sparking the third insurgency. At the height of the insurgency in 1973, 55,000 insurgents faced 80,000 Pakistani troops supported by the Pakistani Air Force and the Iranian Air Force. More than 5,000 insurgents and 3,300 soldiers died in the protracted insurgency, which continued throughout 1977. The Baloch people became distanced from the Pakistani national identity as a result of Balochistan's violent conflict with the central government, and the Baloch ethnic identity has

become crucial in Balochistan. In 2004, the Baloch resistance movement resurfaced to claim more provincial autonomy (Malik, 2013). In contrast, the Balochistan Liberation Army and the Baloch Liberation Front have strengthened their political and military regional dominance.

The present situation in Balochistan emerged after the murder in 2006 of Nawab Akbar Bugti (a tribal leader, Governor of Balochistan and Member of the National Assembly in 1993 and 1997). As a result, the province became more politically fractured and plunged into a new insurgency phase (Samad, 2016). Further, the insurgency shifted its focus to secessionist goals and increased the frequency of anti-government actions. This time, a massive Baloch uprising extended across the region, fuelling growing enmity towards Pukhtuns and Punjabi populations as well as sectarian violence. There may be multiple factors in the Baloch ethnic case, but this study focuses on identifying the primary factors that have sparked the continuing conflict.

An establishment point of view claims that the system and culture of the sardars and nawabs (tribal) is the fundamental reason behind the Baluchistan conflict. According to Noraiee (2020), Baloch nationalism emerged from within tribal structures and is advocated by some elites as sardars and nawabs, most of whom studied in British institutions. This is reflected by Shah (2007) and Hasnat (2011), who view the sardar system of Balochistan's internal politics as the root cause of the province's issues. Further, it is believed that the Baloch conflict is fuelled by the sardar's inflated authority, which opposes the extension of educational opportunities and progress and is perceived as a challenge to the tribal leaders' power, linked with foreign interference. For example, Dunne (2006) examines the Baloch chiefs' importance to their political concerns, the cultural rift concerning Balochs and Punjabi, and in what way the sardars have diverted Baloch attention away from themselves.

In this argument, many themes need to be addressed. The first is how the Pakistani state dealt with the sardari tribal system, how it is changing, and how inter-tribal rivalry defines in favour of government and anti-government positions. The province of Balochistan has split into two sections: 'A' and 'B' regions. The army, coast guard, navy, police, and Frontier Corps all have control over 'A' regions surrounding the cities and towns. Except for the army and paramilitary forces, which have played a prominent role in Pakistan's history of violence, this direct control structure may be found elsewhere in the country. The 'B' regions are villages and rural districts monitored by regional levies recruited from the local community. Levies are a kind of community protection that functions within the tribes' traditions and customs boundaries. Their ability is that they are supported by the community in stopping and detecting crime. However, they might become a platform from which the sardars exercise their dominance over the region, a power in inter-tribal strife, or, in the worst-case scenario, a nucleus from which to launch an insurgency (Dawn, 2012). Thus, there have been attempts to remove the B regions by imposing state control directly and weakening the sardars' authority. For instance, the Zulfikar Ahmed Bhutto party, PPP government passed the *Sardari Abolition Ordinance* in 1976. In addition, in 2006, General Pervaiz Musharraf summoned the *Qaumi Bugti Jirga*, which was primarily intended to eliminate the Bugti tribe's Sardari system and substitute it with the District Commissioner framework (*Daily Times*, 2006).

However, political expediency and inconsistency have marred the state's role. The tribal leader Akbar Bugti sided with the government during the insurgency in the 1970s and was appointed governor of Balochistan. Other leaders were imprisoned, including Ghous Bukhush Bizenjo and Ataullah Khan Mengal. The dissolution of the Sardari system was primarily extended to the regime's foes, while the proponents were exempt from its remittance (Samad, 2016). Similarly, the reform program of Musharraf was intended only to punish Bugti tribespeople who backed the insurgency and was not extended to Bugti pro-government

tribespeople or other places where sardars pledged loyalty to the regime, illustrating the political essence of this strategy and the contradictory manner in which it was used (Samad, 2016). Tribal structures are evolving rapidly, and some groups are considerably more substantial in power than they were in the past. According to Pakistan's Human Rights Commission (2011), the constraint and inability to enforce the democratic process of provincial autonomy delays the social change process and strengthens the tribal structure despite its discontent. The relationship between tribal systems and the current insurgency is complicated because the instability correlates with inter-tribal and political rivalry. There are around 60 tribes in Balochistan, but only three of the major tribes—the Bugti, Marri, and Mengal—are primarily active in the insurgency. The areas that are most heavily affected by the insurgency are the Bugti and Marri regions, where the tribal system is robust and headed by sardars (Samad, 2016).

In particular, it is not a compelling reason to blame the insurgency on the Baloch tribal system. However, because sardars have become a dominant component of Baloch society, they still play a significant submissive role in provincial political situations. Balochistan is a case of unstable federalism in which Baluch ethnic sentiment is apparently on the rise, showing considerable suspicion of the federal government over the division of power and resources. The feeling of inherent unfairness and inequity in power-sharing and their traditional rights over natural resources has been the most important element in inspiring and encouraging Baloch ambitions ranging from provincial autonomy to political independence (Jetly, 2009). Federalism provides a consistent and balanced outlook and equal chances for the economic wellbeing of constituent units/provinces. However, with its high infant mortality rate (130 deaths per 1,000 live births) and poverty levels (63%), Balochistan remains one of the country's most deprived provinces. Compared with the rest of the country, Balochistan has the lowest adult literacy rate (41%) (Pakistan Economic Survey, 2016–2017),

with a general literacy rate of 58%. Pakistan's central government and the Balochistan ruling elite have been inattentive to the province's social and economic problems (Ahmed, 2018a). As a result, its natural resources have been excessively expropriated and mismanaged; they have never been exploited to pave the way for long-term economic development and growth (Gazdar, 2007). The Sui gas field is an example of how natural resources are exploited. In 1952, the gas was found in the Balochistan region of Dera Bugti and was later distributed to businesses and households in other provinces. Ironically, it was not available in Balochistan until 1982. Bengali (2018) argued that Balochistan used 7.1% of total natural gas usage in 2014, despite producing two-thirds of the total.

Moreover, the gas from Balochistan is cheaper for other provinces (Punjab and Sindh), disguising the royalty payments from the federation to the province (Khwaja, 2009). Therefore, Balochistan's province relies heavily on gas royalties for revenue. Sui gas's lack of social protection and its persistent underdevelopment and service imbalances exemplify federalism's failure in Pakistan. Balochistan is suffering from economic and social degradation as a result of the power elite's wilful indifference (Bengali, 2018). This could have fuelled the province's pervasive ethnic nationalism and sparked disputes with the state. These authoritarian quirks of the central government have kept Balochistan from assimilating with Pakistan, resulting in a more significant impression of ethnic nationalism. In contrast, the tribal sardars have exploited ordinary Balochs' understanding of political–economic deprivation to maintain their hold on provincial political power.

Despite having earned a small amount of foreign direct investment, Balochistan argues that the central government has ignored the province's economic growth. The centre has failed to implement policies that could improve the conditions of the Baloch. Balochs feel little loyalty towards the Pakistani regime and resist a national identity.

6.5 From a Post-Colonial Nationalism Perspective: Analysis of the Ethnic Conflict and National Identity of Pakistan

Many countries have witnessed direct colonial domination as a political and intellectual movement supported by social elites. Nationalist leaders from all backgrounds share a desire to free the nation from colonial rule and create an independent nation-state with a distinctive, cohesive identity. However, after gaining political sovereignty, in most cases, the unifying bond that existed throughout the independence movement was challenged by divisive trends, some spontaneous and some with historical roots. As a result, the once-unifying connection of nationalism has become challenging to maintain. The growth of different internal nationalisms—frequently within a shared ethnic paradigm—advocating for special rights or separation has become an increasingly prevalent sort of polarising force. However, along with the approach offered by Barrington (2006), this thesis proposes a broader analytical distinction across post-colonial nations that have continued to construct national cohesion and those nations distinguished by inner ethnonationalist conflicts.

In the first example, political systems remain dominated by the formation (although unequal) of a strong civic sense of nationalism, generally reflecting relationships between political leaders from disparate ethnic and political roots who agree to devotion to shared political institutions and rules (Barrington, 2006). In the cases of Botswana, Namibia, Mauritius, and possibly South Africa, we argue that such elites have established inclusive, polyarchical regimes centred on accommodation, negotiations, and the inherent legitimacy of independent social interests that are nearly consociational in structure (Rothchild, 1997).

In the aftermath of parochial "ethnic nation-protecting" political claims, the deterioration of civic nationalist unification has become the second pattern in post-colonial societies. At the same time, patrimonial governments with a small base cling to power by employing a

praetorian, centralist, and exclusivist governing pattern (Rothchild, 1997). Under the worst circumstances, such as Somalia, Sudan, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the nation-state disintegrates (officially or de facto) into either distinct communal movements with ethnonationalism aggrandisement goals or melded inter-ethnic movements with secessionist aims throughout both contexts, with adequate social support and military resources to guarantee the continuation of comparatively bounded ethno-political and territorial objectives (Rothchild, 1997).

A potential strategy for nationalism following independence is to concentrate on civic nation-building. The process of nation-building refers to a state's population developing a strong sense of national identity. A collective of people in a given state becomes self-aware and united, accepts this group identity as its overarching political identity, and develops a feeling of the collective's right to control an assigned territory politically. Further, nation-building entails infusing "discrete communities or groups within a political framework with an understanding and a sense of national consensus or identity" (Islam, 1988, p. 64). In the literature on political development, the terms 'nation-building' and 'national integration' are frequently used interchangeably. This indicates that nation-building typically necessitates the uniting of communities with disparate cultural, economic, and geographical identities (Islam, 1988).

Nationalism pursues greater development of national identity among the masses to build an overarching national identity between the new state's absolute population. While civic nationalism is often portrayed as 'good' nationalism, it is not necessarily a straightforward nationalism project. Therefore, myths and symbols that highlight routine experiences and backgrounds help to create harmony and cohesion in a population that may otherwise be quite distinct (Zelinsky, 1988). However, many groups are likely to believe that not enough of their symbols have been highlighted, while far too many others have. This is particularly true for

ethnic minorities, who frequently perceive civic nation-building as an assimilation exercise rather than a melting pot. If the membership boundary question (Who is the nation?) had been addressed civically during the struggle for independence, a unified form of nationalism would have been more likely to occur. However, as many examples in this study show, nationalism that started out as more ethnic than civic can transform into the opposite. This may be the only option to unify the new state and avert ethnic violence in ethnically split states. This is most frequently the case when nation-building and state-building are necessary simultaneously, as is usual in post-colonial states. In this situation, leaders not only worry about (ethnic) national identity issues, but must also worry about state-building (Barrington, 1995). This dual role leads to what Barrington (1995) calls the "nation builder's dilemma" in newly independent states. The problem is that although emphasising an ethnic approach to national identity might facilitate the nation-building process, it complicates the state-building process. This problem often drives subnationalist movements when the concerns of state-building take primacy over ethnonationalism ones, especially when it involves a progression from ethnic to civic nationalism.

Barrington also separates post-colonial nations into two types. The first type consists of nations that are capable of forging national unity by using political systems that strengthen solid civic nationalism. This also suggests that connections between political leaders representing various political groups or ethnicities play an important role. In such nations, political leaders have created inclusive governments that share power through negotiations, accommodation, and autonomy in numerous situations. A further concern is the existence of parallel civic and ethnic identities. The nationalist movement and its successes depend, in this respect, on whether national leaders can engage people in their chosen political direction (Barrington, 2006).

The second type consists of nations that, in the light of ethnic nationalism, weaken the cohesiveness of civic nationalism over time. As Barrington states, this can occur because of the contradiction between national/territorial and ethnonationalism during colonial times, and it continues following independence. He also considers the colonial administration's ill-advised plans and the demarcation of political boundaries for modern state borders responsible for developing nationalism and ethnic disputes in the post-colonial era. The Indian subcontinent serves as an example of how the 580 princely kingdoms inside India's territorial boundaries were suddenly annulled, and new provinces were established that did not correspond to the previous boundaries. Initially, this caused a few uprisings, but the new border system appears to have reduced hostility between the different political and ethnic groups over time.

Simultaneously, since its foundation, modern Pakistan has retained much of the original British-dominated boundaries. The province of Khyber Pukhton Khah (KPK), which was originally known as the NWFP during the British rule, is a good example. The problems in Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) emerged as a result of the newly founded country's failure to make it a separate province until 2018; FATA is now officially part of the KPK province. The difficulty in the FATA scenario was that the populace was socially and culturally extremely similar to Pashtuns.

The Sindh province is another example of the British divisions that the new state did not change. The complexities have already been discussed, and ethnic tensions have remained strong since the 1980s. Sindh is Pakistan's second-most populous province. According to the 2017 census of Pakistan's Bureau of Statistics, Karachi city alone comprises more than 16 million people. However, in terms of politics or administration, Karachi is not the same as other parts of the Sindh province. One of the primary reasons for the power struggle in Sindh is that Karachi is usually controlled by *Muhajir*-based MQM. The Sindh government was not

elected by the people of Karachi but won the remaining majority Sindh province. Therefore, it contributed to the rise of ethnic (Sindhi, Muhajir) conflicts in Karachi and other major cities of the Sindh province. Barrington's explanation remains valid in this case. Another feature shared by such nations is that the ethnic communities in power prioritise or promote persons of the same ethnicity, while other ethnic communities feel underprivileged and discriminated against. As a result, tensions arise between ethnic communities, with the weaker ethnic communities demanding more powers, autonomy, or independence (Barrington, 2006).

Another example of Pakistan's country ruling class is that most of the bureaucracy and administration were migrants (Urdu speaking). Ethnic communities such as Bengalis and Sindhis had little or no representation in Pakistan's government, bureaucracy, and military. In contrast, Punjabis and Pushtuns make up a significant portion of the military and bureaucracy. East Pakistan faced a severe dilemma, mainly because ethnic Bengalis accounted for more than half of the country's population and were severely underrepresented in any power-sharing arrangement. The majority of prominent Pakistani bureaucrats were ethnic migrants, none of whom were from the Bangali community. The military functions along the same lines. Pakistan's military maintained the British tradition of martial races while also limiting Bengalis from serving in the armed forces. As a result, no Bengal officers were in the senior military leadership during the 1971 East Pakistan operation (Choudury, 1972). We can explain Pakistan's condition by examining what Barrington (2006) argues in relation to post-colonial nations. By using their populous statistics, specific ethnic communities—notably the Bengalis—began to demand language recognition, more autonomy, and political representation. In contrast, the central government did not respond appropriately to this demand, and East Pakistan split from West Pakistan and established Bangladesh.

A further point to consider is that the misalignment between national/territorial and ethnic nationalism that existed during the colonial period continued post-independence. A similar tendency in Bangladesh, Baluchistan, and the FATA/tribal territories can be observed in Pakistan's case. With the British colonial rule, the ties of numerous ethnic groups were already tense. However, instead of governing based on democratic norms, the new state of Pakistan continued to follow the same British policy of rule and control. The way the Pakistani state has handled the tribal regions over time is an excellent example of this. The tribal region had been under the supervision of Frontier Crimes Regulation since 2018. This particular collection of regulations was devised by the British to suppress the rebellion in the region. However, the Pakistan Government did not attempt to modify this policy until 2018.

In contrast, consider how the regions (some parts of Punjab and Sindh) that were predominantly loyal to the British were treated. The British compensated them by providing them with large amounts of land and enlisting more people in military and government jobs than any other ethnic group. After the partition, the same patterns and strained relationships persisted, causing ethnic tensions.

6.6 Polarised Politics: A Challenge to Pakistan's National Identity

Polarised politics has significantly affected the Pakistani nation and threatens state tranquillity, social cohesion, and democracy. However, internal pressures are also pushing Pakistan towards conflict. By engaging in state-building and encouraging national integration, Pakistan and other third-world countries' ruling elites have apparently adopted the Western concepts of the nation-state and centralism. Therefore, two interconnected tenets are at the root of this nostalgia: a state shaped like a modern nation-state, and centralisation, which denotes modernism. However, the nation-state's European pattern, or even the fashioning of a uniform nation-building model for all developing countries, is dangerous and might lead to self-destruction. There is considerable evidence and numerous explanations for

this warning, but one will suffice to highlight the dangers of advancing nation-building programs through a powerful central government. The fact that many post-colonial states like Pakistan have acquired a diversity of religious, ethnic, and linguistic communities with a proud history, intense feeling of ethnic identity, and a culturally rich tradition is a historical accident. Needless to say, these communities possessed semi-autonomy, if not self-government, for centuries before European colonisation. Therefore, the formation by the central state of a unified national identity, primarily through the development of "primitive power accumulation" (Cohen, Brown and Organski, 1981), and deprived of political legitimacy would rather trigger resistance, alienate critical segments of society, and weaken the state's legitimacy. In Pakistan, state elites have been affiliating with different ethnic groups for their own political interests. This diminishes the sense of equal justice and state legitimacy. The creation of a nation-state is a historical process that may take a long time to complete. That does not imply that Pakistan or other developing nations must go through the same state-building formation processes as Europeans did. Instead, the numerous challenges and restrictions facing Pakistan when it first began in 1947 have to be highlighted. Although internal challenges to national identity and cohesion are well-known, the geopolitical influences from regional and global contexts must also be considered (Booth,1991).

6.6.1 Controlled Democracy and Dysfunctional Constitution

A government democracy is not merely defined in terms of the rule of the majority or elections. Modern democracy includes the rule of law, accountability, and justice in all state institutions. Unfortunately, Pakistan has never fully realised democracy. Further, it has suffered from an excess of centralism and a lack of democratic values. The nation has always made sacrifices to promote democracy and the supremacy of law, but it has never tasted its fruit. The process of national identity and nation-building requires the progress of democracy. However, in Pakistan, political leaders have assumed power through dubious means and then

employed more dubious means to sustain their influence, and others come to power through legal and constitutional means but perpetuate their rule by subverting all routes for orderly and legitimate political change (Akhtar, 2009).

In Pakistan's case, democracy has been controlled by both civil leadership and a dictatorship. The elites created the impression that people cannot sustain democracy, and they need to implement their political vision to run the institutions (Ziring, 1997). From Pakistan's independence in 1947 until the fall of East Pakistan in 1971, ethnocentrism prevailed as a result of a controlled democracy and dictatorship that acted as encouragement to Bengali nationalism. The discriminatory resources distribution by the central government had isolated Bengali from the state, especially after 1954, when the overall economic situation deteriorated. East Pakistan's share was only 22.1% of the total development fund, and non-Bengali business people, financed by capital from West Pakistan, had set up most manufacturing enterprises (Ali, 1970).

In fact, the limited Bengali representation in the central government had increased the sense of deprivation, suppression, and exploitation (Akhtar, 2013). East Pakistan's fragile economic situation made the Bengali people anti–West Pakistan and enhanced their ethnic distinctness in Pakistan's unequal federal structure. The Bengali move towards provincial autonomy encouraged other ethnic communities in West Pakistan (Akhtar, 2013). The separation of East Pakistan amply demonstrated that faith and political interests are two different matters.

In contrast, the process of cohesive national identity cannot be achieved without a state's legal functions. If a state has become dysfunctional or is not functioning under the constitution, national unity cannot be promoted. This is not just a theoretical statement but a practical requirement; societies and states are interlocked. The state of Pakistan's institutional and political capacities has declined sharply over the past quarter-century (Rais, 2008). The

state's role in nation-building is inevitable yet takes on a different character when hijacked by undemocratic forces. Since the 1950s, the military has dominated Pakistani politics. It has conducted foreign policy directly or indirectly (Akhtar, 2008). Political parties in Pakistan reached a consensus on the parliamentary form of democracy, which the constitutions of 1956 and 1973, drafted by the two respective constituent assemblies, amply reflect. Pakistan's colonial political heritage and its post-independence development of institutions are responsible for this consensus. The British introduced political institutions and practices in the subcontinent, rooted in its own history. Because of their personal political experience, including learning in British constitutional law and being steeped in the practice of its institutions, the leaders struggling for Pakistan could not imagine any other political system (Akhtar, 2008). On three occasions, a military dictatorship sought to realign Pakistan's political system to a presidential style of government. Field marshal Ayub Khan was the first to amend the parliamentary setup, and in 1962, he replaced the 1956 constitution with his own. Ayub Khan was elected president of Pakistan indirectly through a councillor's electoral college (Akhtar, 2013). Following self-claimed to stabilise East Pakistan's condition, which had worsened to a complete collapse of authority, the country's second military dictator, Yahya Khan, planned to implement his vision of a presidential form of government. However, the country fell apart as a result of the widespread insurgency and Indian interference. With his departure from power, Yahya Khan's aim of establishing a stable presidential system perished. Subsequently, two successive military dictators, General Zia-ul-Haq (1977–1988) and General Pervaiz Musharraf (1999–2008), have attempted to modify the constitution's parliamentary form, presumably to balance the prime minister's executive power (Akhtar, 2013). With the provision of Article 58-2(b) powers in the president's hands, Pakistan's political system is closer to an executive presidency in its functioning than to parliamentary democracy. According to Article 58-2(b), Pakistan's political system functions

more like an executive presidency than a parliamentary system. Article 58-2(b) has often been used as a political weapon to destabilise democratically elected governments (Akhtar, 2013). However, in 1997, by enacting the two parliamentary constitutions, eliminating 58-2(b) and employing the Thirteenth Amendment to Pakistan's constitution, the mainstream political parties (including religious and regional) had announced their preference (Akhtar, 2008).

Further, during Musharraf's regime, the ruling elite abandoned a deal with democratic forces to form the National Security Council and reintroduce 58-2(b) powers in the Seventeenth Amendment in 2003. However, the same parliament that backed 58-2b's deletion in 1997 supports the Seventeenth Amendment, which returned that power into the hands of the president. It is a substantial flaw of the political system in Pakistan. Parliamentary democracy cannot gain traction if parliamentarians constantly sell out for political advantage and corrupted patronage (Akhtar, 2013). The establishment and vested interests that wished to make artificial political groups have rescinded laws and perhaps even constitutional changes to discourage floor-crossing (e.g. the Fourteenth Amendment). However, floor-crossing for corrupt reasons is only one of the elements undermining parliamentary democracy. There have been numerous explanations, possibly more important, for the parliamentary system's derailment in Pakistan. In Pakistan's history, the army has taken power four times; however, the civil political leadership intention to remain in power as viable by political institutions manipulating has resulted in institutional degradation, including political parties (Akhtar, 2008).

Further, dictatorship rule was a deliberate and well-planned attempt to segregate political parties by paying those who backed their administration and persecuting those who failed to provide the complete political tasks (Akhtar, 2008). In Pakistan's political history, the state power's centralisation did not consider the ethnic, cultural, and regional realities. Although

the Pakistani leaders, both dictators and civilians, accepted federalism, they worked against its spirit and turned Pakistan into an authoritarian state. Moreover, the elected government's frequent dissolution by the powerful governor/president and provincial assemblies, as well as the enforcement of the governor's rule, has adversely affected nation-building and implementing a cohesive national identity approach in Pakistan. Over-centralisation and frequent intervention by the central government have been the norm. The PPP leader, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, was the first elected prime minister who removed the Balochistan government of the National Awami Party in February 1973. The practice of removing unwanted governments continued. Nawaz Sharif, who formed his government in the Centre in 1996, dismissed the Sindh Assembly in August 1999.

Further, in October 1999, General Musharraf seized power and dismissed the elected Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, the federal and provincial governments, and suspended the assemblies and senate, declaring that the constitution would stay in abeyance. General Musharraf, who toppled the Nawaz government, became the chief executive on 12 October 1999. He announced a seven-point plan for his government that centred on economic revival, law and order, good governance, accountability, and eradicating corruption, with no timeframe for restoring democracy (Akhtar, 2009). Moreover, in 2000, the Supreme Court of Pakistan announced that General Mushar's extra-constitutional coup d'etat of 12 October 1999 was justified based on the doctrine of state necessity (Nawaz, 2008). Therefore, when elected officials fail to control the situation politically, the army is justified in taking control to restore order.

By repealing or suspending the constitutions, the dictators acquired vast powers to remove and, if necessary, eradicate all sources of societal opposition. Political parties that have been dominated by the landlord class or single, foremost individuals and institutions of the civil society have proved too weak to offer any resistance to unconstitutional rule. So fragmented

is political life in Pakistan that those in opposition have hailed the elected governments' removal (Akhtar, 2009). Such celebrations over the downfall of the governments of other parties have anticipated the reduction of the same parties on the same grounds.

The feudal political culture has strengthened the view that democracy has only legitimised the power of the most influential classes. As a result, the political crisis has deepened, and the development of institutions necessary to support democratic governance is delayed (Akhtar, 2009). Moreover, the dictators took away whatever autonomy the provincial elites had acquired under the Constitution of 1973. The Musharraf regime used coercion against Akbar Bugti, who demanded provincial autonomy. Consequently, authoritarian rule has strengthened ethnic identities more than building the intended unified nation (Amin, 1988).

In Pakistan's most recent parliamentary election, the PTI was elected, led by former cricketer Imran Khan. It was the second peaceful transition of power, which political scientist Huntington (1992) regarded as the minimum threshold for democratic consolidation. However, after eight years (1999–2008) of authoritarian rule by General Pervez Musharraf, the dictatorship returned power to civilian representatives in 2008 after mobilising opposition in civil and political society (Shah, 2014). As a result, the PPP captured the majority in the 2008 general elections and took charge in federal office.

Pakistan approached the crucial milestone of its first democratic turnover of power in 2013 when the PPP transferred power to the Pakistan Muslim League Nawaz (PML-N) after gaining the majority in the 2013 general elections (Shah, 2014). Comparably, Pakistan has made some democratic gains since the transition from Musharraf's dictatorial rule in 2008 to the 2018 general elections, including the landmark Eighteenth Amendment. But despite passing the two-turnover test of democratic consolidation, "the country's political system may be most accurately classified as a pseudodemocratic façade" (Shah, 2019, p. 141)

because serious charges of fraud and manipulation marred the election. Independent observers reported that the establishment had interfered by backing Imran Khan's political party (PTI) and stopping the Pakistan Muslim League (PML-N) of former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif from coming to power. These charges indicate that Pakistanis must work harder to stabilise their democracy and the rule of law. In the current situation, the opposition political parties, including the PPP and PML-N, formed a coalition of Pakistan Democratic Movement against the Imran Khan administration with the slogan of *Vote ko izzat do* (honour the vote) and demanded Khan's resignation. Pakistan's main opposition parties have united to launch a new movement against Prime Minister Imran Khan's government and the powerful military's political involvement (Daily Times, 2020).

In fact, much of the post-colonial states' collective nationhood experience provides mixed evidence of success in creating national solidarity and a sense of shared national identity. However, not all states have succeeded in nation-building based on the equitable distribution of power or representation of all groups—nor have they all fallen apart.

6.7 Concluding Remarks

Chapter 6 conducted a comprehensive study of Pakistan's national and ethnic identities conflict and its challenges. In particular, the chapter focused on how Bengali subnationalism arose in Pakistan and succeeded in separating East Pakistan (now Bangladesh). Further, this chapter provided a detailed study of how ethnic conflicts present significant challenges to Pakistan's identity and analysed ethnic conflict and post-colonial nationalism. Finally, Chapter 6 explored how polarised politics (controlled democracy and dysfunctional constitution) challenge Pakistan's cohesive national identity.

Chapter 7: Analysis of Contemporary Debates About Pakistan's National Identity

7.1 Introduction

Ideological, identity, and sociopolitical indecision are deeply rooted in Pakistan. The construction blocks that have shaped Pakistan's idea, community, and a nation well-versed in Islam are ideas that were strongly contested from the beginning of Pakistan's independence movement. The many points of view, which were voiced during intensive intellectual and political discussions between South Asian Muslims in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, have revealed a remarkable lack of agreement on the meaning of Pakistan. As a result, different concepts of Pakistan's nation, ideology, and identity have emerged. The history of these opposing ideas has significantly affected Pakistan, particularly in overcoming its "consensus problem" (Sheikh, 2018).

Following this study's central objective and aims, Chapter 7 emphasises the essential themes of this research:

1. Why was Pakistan created, and for whom?
2. What was the two-nation theory's role in making Pakistan and its relevance after independence?
3. Does Pakistan have a national identity? Is it secular or Islamist?
4. What is the nature of the Pakistani state at present?

This chapter analyses the qualitative data using an appropriate approach that corresponds to the research themes. First, the research interviews conducted in Islamabad and Lahore (Pakistan) are analysed. The analyses are based on the primary data collected from 16 participants, including academics, journalists, and politicians (secular and Islamist). The

interview questions stimulated the participants to discuss their knowledge, opinions, and suggestions and overcome the disputes associated with Pakistan's national identity.

This chapter is divided into three parts. The first part, with historical facts, provides a detailed analysis of the *raison d'être* of Pakistan. Further, this chapter analyses the two-nation theory's role in the Pakistan Movement and its relevance in contemporary Pakistan, especially after separating East Pakistan, now called Bangladesh. The second part of this chapter provides a comprehensive analysis of Pakistan's national identity question: whether it is Islamist or secular. Finally, the last part of this chapter provides a thorough investigation of the current nature of the Pakistani state.

7.2 Pakistan in the Context of Its *Raison D'être*

What is undeniable and unique is that the questions of 'Why Pakistan?' 'And for whom?' still need to be answered when discussing Pakistan's national identity, even after more than 70 years of history. In contrast, why is an analysis of Pakistan's historical significance important for understanding Pakistan's current crises, including its national identity question and perhaps its future direction? Attempting to answer these issues entails recognising the Pakistani people's belief that something has gone wrong with the country's goals and aspirations. Primarily, Pakistan was founded for the Muslims of the subcontinent. The great philosopher and poet Allama Muhammad Iqbal expressed his views in a letter to Jinnah in 1937, writing that the Muslim nation wanted to live in a territory where they would live following Islamic ideals rather than merely following the beliefs of Brahminism (Sherwani, 2008). Thus, Pakistan's movement towards statehood was actually a historical and natural process. Therefore, before discussing the motivations for becoming Pakistan, it is important to examine the territory of united India and the Muslims' response to the Pakistan Movement.

7.2.1 Was Pakistan Created to Break United India's Power?

A common conception is that the Indian subcontinent was a country that was divided into Pakistan and India in 1947. Therefore, scholars have argued that a separate independent Pakistan was not Jinnah's actual demand (Jalal, 1994, 2014). Historically, united India or Hindustan is not proven under one unified state, except for the Mourya, Mughal, and British Empires. Historically, there have been hundreds of empires in South Asia, and respectively, it was a continent that did not recognise or encompass a single country.

Interviewee Syed Shahid Hashmi (29 December 2019), a scholar of political science and director of Islamic research academy, claimed that:

> As many kingdoms as there were in Europe, the same were in South Asia. He added that in the last three thousand years of history in South Asia, for a total of 300 years, a large part of South Asia has been under one emperor. Otherwise, there were many, either small or large kingdoms. And whoever would have become more powerful conquered the rest of the territories. Therefore, South Asia was a collection of different nations that could not say it as a single country; their generations were different, and traditions were also different.

Moreover, the northwestern part of the Indian subcontinent (now Pakistan) has always possessed an ethnically, linguistically, and culturally distinct identity. However, in the last 5,000 years, this region (now Pakistan) has been politically part of India for only 500 years. In his book *The Indus Saga*, the politician and prominent lawyer of Pakistan, Aitzaz Ahsan, claimed:

> Nor must the Indian continue to deny the distinct and separate personality that Indus (Pakistan) has had over millennia … This distinct identity is primordial … Indus (Pakistan) would always have remained distinct and different from India regardless. (Ahsan, 2005, p. iv)

Now, considering the picture of South Asia as explained, the argument that the British made to Pakistan to break India's united power was wrong because the British did not capture India from one king or a central government. Interviewee Syed Shahid Hashmi (29 December 2019) responded that:

There were many kingdoms, and the British took a hundred years to defeat the various kings, the Salatin's and the Nawabs. Then, the British established a central government in the sub-continent. Similarly, when Muslims came, they faced the same situation, and their government was not even in India's entirety. However, the Mughals had included most of India's territory in their empire for the first time. In that sense, Pakistan was not created to break the united power of India. However, as mentioned earlier, that of Pakistan was the natural process and the demand of sub-continent Muslims. Therefore, it is totally wrong to say India was divided and created by Pakistan.

It is evident that both Pakistan and India came into being together; before 1947, India was an assemblage of many states under the control of the British Raj (directly and indirectly). There was no central government that had its own political structure and was controlled by a political system at the central level. The fact is that the two countries together became independent of the British Raj. As far as the partition is concerned, no country was divided, two countries became independent, and only two provinces (Punjab and Bengal) were divided.

7.2.2 Why Could Muslims and Hindus Not Merge Into One Single Nation?

When the creation of Pakistan and India are discussed as independent states, the question arises as to why Muslims and Hindus could not merge into one nation after living together for centuries. In 1944, during a speech at Aligarh, Jinnah stated:

> Pakistan's movement started when the first non-Muslim was converted to Islam in India long before the Muslims established their rule. As soon as a Hindu embraced Islam, he was an outcast not only religiously but also socially, culturally and economically. As for the Muslim, it was a duty imposed on him by Islam not to be merged his identity and individuality in an alien society. Throughout the ages, Hindu had remained Hindu, and Muslims had remained Muslim. (Ahmad, 1976. pp. 246–7)

Interviewee Dr Safdar Mahmood (29 December 2019), a political analyst, responded that:

> Muslims are a different and distinct nation by any definition. Their religion, culture, history are different in every way from the Hindus with whom they lived in India for centuries. And despite the centuries of coexistence, they have never been able to merge; they have never been able to mix. Muslims and Hindus never married; they didn't even eat together.

The Muslims' distinct identity (Islam) had compelled them to believe in a distinctive identity that defined all other areas of social and political distinction. The fundamental significance of this identity rested in Muslims' apparently different status, which was based on their predominant claim to authority (Sheikh, 2018).

7.2.3 What Factors Defined the Transition of the British Raj Muslims Into a Nation With Political Ambitions?

What differentiated Pakistan's movement were the principles that marked the transformation of British India's Muslims into a nation with political ambitions (Sheikh, 2018) to "win territorial sovereignty" (Jalal, 2014, p. 12). Traditionally, the Muslim nation concept in the Indian subcontinent ascended in the framework of the claim that the British colonial empire pushed the narrative of a unified Indian nation; moreover, it fractured that nation, presenting India as a place of different and apparently incompatible religious and ethnic groups. As a result, a few of them, such as Muslims, had been able to form a distinct political identity as a nation (Sheikh, 2018). However, the Congress's Indian self-government campaign, which began in 1885, and the recognition of a distinct subcontinent Muslim political entity during the 1909 reforms, highlighted the tensions between developing nations and emerging Muslim identities (Rahman, 1970; Robinson, 1974). Therefore, many factors were involved; however, the primary factor was claiming that a distinctive identity based on Islam (formally entitled two-nation theory) played a significant role in making the subcontinent's Muslims into a nation that won the sovereign country (Pakistan) in 1947. Interviewee, Dr Sajid Mehmood (17 February 2020), Director of the National Institute of Historical and Cultural Research, Islamabad, explained that:

> The two-nation theory simply means that Hindus and Muslims constitute two separate and independent nations. The genesis of the two-nation theory comes from the Quranic teachings with Surah Al-kafiroon, you have your own path, and we have our own. So, that is basically Parting of

the Ways. Parting of the Ways means that Muslims cannot intermingle or merge with other communities, particularly those not revealed religion like Hinduism.

The two-nation theory developed a homogeneous community predisposing Muslims to assert a distinct identity, thereby determining social and political differences. In the interview, Dr Anis Ahmed (4 December 2019), Vice-Chancellor of Riphah International University, Islamabad, stated that:

> The concept of the two-nation theory is very simple. Nationalisms are based on soil, ethnicity, or the language of people. Muslim nationalism or Islamic nationalism is based only on faith. Therefore, the founder (Quaid-e-Azam) said very clearly that when we talk about Islam. Islam means a complete code of life. Islam means economic system. Islam means social system. Therefore, Muslim nationalism or separate nationhood means those people who subscribe to Islam are one umma one nation. Those who don't subscribe to it are a separate nation.

The significance of this identity is rooted in Muslims' ostensibly privileged position, which was primarily decided by their prehistoric right to self-determination. Thus, Baylay (1998, p. 106) suggests that any understanding of the transition of the Muslim nation would have to be "epistemologically and socially rooted in these inheritances".

Historically, the Muslims ruled over the subcontinent for centuries, although they were not in the majority. As mentioned earlier, the advent of Muslim political power resulted from many factors, including the absence of a robust and central authority. However, after the war of 1857, "the Muslims of India lost their kingdom, their Mughal Empire, their emperor, their language, their culture, their capital city of Delhi, and their sense of self" (Ahmed, 2005, p. 46). Culturally and politically, forfeiture was traumatic for the Muslims who, regardless of status, could associate with the Mughal Empire or those more minor but still sizable Muslim princely states that had not yet been integrated into the Mughal structure. All of this was immediately swept away, and India's fundamental political, social, and financial systems were rearranged to give Muslims minimal social and political control.

Moreover, after the war of 1857, "the Indian establishment switched entirely to speaking English. Muslim ways of dress, style, food were also put aside. Muslims now felt not only politically vulnerable but concerned for their very identity" (Ahmed, 2005, p. 46). Further, at the outcome of the war of 1857, the British re-examined their policies towards colonial India and implemented a new act known as the *Government of India Act 1858* (Wynbrandt, 2009). W. W. Hunter (1871), in *The Indian Musalmans*, discusses the dilemma of the subcontinent Muslims, who were practically unseen in the public services and not visible in influential positions.

In contrast, the Hindus formed themselves on an ideological basis that prioritised the Muslims as their opponents. Therefore, following 1857, the *Anandamath* novel emerged, along with *Tilak* activism, religious *Ganpati* festivities, and the *Arya Samaj* socio-religious movement. Further, shortly after the Delhi riots, the Hindu idea of the Muslim as *mleccha*, or "unclean", became widespread (Ahmed, 2005). Thus, a study of India's three significant populations in terms of their historical relationships during the mid-nineteenth century shows that the Muslims aspired to reclaim their lost dignity. But, in contrast, the British tried to protect and strengthen their rule, and the Hindus were assured of their domination over the subcontinent. Thus, there are three distinct nations, historical sets, and three destinies parallel to each other, often conflicting, sometimes overlapping, but essentially with different perspectives.

After the British established control over the subcontinent, Muslims were pushed back politically, socially, and economically. Interviewee Syed Shahid Hashmi (29 December 2019) indicated that:

> When the British realised that the Muslims were the main problem, they moved back to the Muslim's politically and financially. However, the British created new landowners, snatching the lands from the Muslims. Some were also Hindus. All this resulted in a severe dissonant feeling within Muslims. On the other side, the foundation of Hindu nationalism was also laid down;

> Muslims feared that the Muslim population has never been more than 30 per cent, even less in the sub-continent. And under the democratic system, there are always mostly Muslims who must strive against Hindus, as during Congress rule after the 1937 elections, the Congress humiliated Muslims and discriminated against them. That was not wrong. As is the situation in India today, the majority of Muslims are facing Hindu extremism. However, the ideal concept of democracy is to protect all groups' interests, including their religions, languages, and cultures.

These were the underlying conditions that led Muslims to begin thinking of their future. The formation of the INC in 1885 marked a turning point in developing a new Muslim nationalism narrative. It was sparked by a distinct vision of India's history shaped by a collective consciousness of Muslim domination in India and concerns about best reconciling with the prevalent Muslim identity and culture. Further, the subcontinent Muslims' situation was a concern, and many had grown fearful of Congress's nationalist vision. Sayed Ahmed Khan articulated Muslims' concern by arguing that Muslims and Hindus were not one nation but two (Muhammad, 1972, p. 184), even if their blood had mixed at times (Muhammad, 1972, p. 160). They shared little except a common territorial homeland, Hindustan. However, Iqbal's criticisms of the Congress's creed were motivated not only by his dislike of a strange philosophy, but by his fear of what majority Hindu control would mean for Muslims' authority; thus, Islam as a "cultural force" was at least as necessary (Sheikh, 2018).

Further, Iqbal's political discourse focused on providing a safe haven for Islam in the subcontinents rather than ensuring the economic, social, or political privileges of Indian Muslims. Iqbal undoubtedly did more than anybody else to plant the idea that the call for an independent Muslim state was basically a need for a Muslim enclave wherein Islamic principles would dominate. As a result, Iqbal outlined his plan for a territorially delimited and centralised Muslim state in India's northwest in 1930; he justified its creation not because Muslims constituted a nation, but because "the life of Islam" depended on it (Pirzada, 1970).

Iqbal was not the only one to embrace the idea of an independent Muslim state as a home for Islam. Mawlana Syed Mawdudi (1903–1979), the founder of the Jamaat-i-Islami, a revivalist

movement in the subcontinent, also supported this viewpoint. Syed Mawdudi became deeply engaged in an institutional framework of Islamic revivalism to promote the creation of a Muslim national homeland throughout a decade-long interaction with Iqbal in the late 1920s and 1930s (Nasr, 1996). Syed Mawdudi's definition of the two-nation theory, which he developed to counter the Congress party's supported secular nationalism version, featured all the hallmarks of a crude binary antagonism between a purported Hindu nation and its Muslim equivalent. Scholars also characterised Mawdudi's "binary view of the world as sacred and profane" (Nasr, 1996, p. 109). Mawdudi outlined the two-nation theory in 1938, claiming that Muslims are distinct individuals, and their social lives are founded on a specific cultural and ethical pattern, imagining a state within a state, which echoes Iqbal's idea of a "Muslim India within India" (Nasr, 1996). For both Iqbal and Mawdudi, the necessity of restoring Muslims' power privilege was what drove the need for an autonomous Muslim state. Both thought it was a divinely granted right. At first, Jinnah was hesitant to embrace Iqbal's territorial concept, which had been proposed in 1930, believing that it would split Indian Muslims and spark civil conflict. Therefore, Ziring (2003, pp. 13–14) argues that "Jinnah could not envision a viable Muslim state as described by the renowned poet Iqbal". However, a significant surge took place after the elections of 1937, when the Congress party held power. Interviewee Dr Safdar Mehmood (29 December 2019) explained this:

> Muslims were humiliated and denied job and education opportunities during the Congress rule. They even had the political agreements that the Muslim League and Congress had signed before the election, but Congress rejected them. Furthermore, Muslims were denied entirely by the Congress regime for any political role or political participation in the provincial government. The doors of employment or jobs were utterly closed to the Muslims, and most of the vacancies advertised by the government clearly said that Muslims were not eligible. In the education system, fundamental changes were made, which went absolutely against the Muslim students' religious principles. "Bande Mataram" is a very famous term for Hindus, which creates hatred against Muslims. That became the school's anthem, and in the morning assembly, Muslim students were forced to sing it. Moreover, Gandhi's statue was placed in the schools where students were

expected to worship the statue. Muslims cannot do this by religion. That hostile and wicked atmosphere existed during two and a half years of Congress government.

This was the turning point in Jinnah's thought. He then contemplated reconciliation or coexistence with Congress because Muslims needed to be given a concrete assurance of their rights and future. However, after these events, Jinnah and the Muslim League agreed to demand an independent country.

Jinnah articulated the two-nation theory during his presidential speech in March 1940, which became known as the Lahore Resolution. He stated: "The Hindus and Muslims belong to two different religious philosophies, toms, literatures. They neither intermarry nor dine together, and they different civilizations which are based mainly on conflicting" (Ahmad, 1970, p. 380). Further, Jinnah expressed that Muslims and Hindus describe themselves not only as distinct religious groups but equally separate political nations that in no way could join together to form a unified, cohesive nation (Ahmed, 2020). Based on this assertion, he started the campaign for an independent Pakistan with remarkable enthusiasm and persistence, achieving its mission in seven years (1940–1947). This was the accomplishment of Jinnah and the Muslim leaders in creating a contemporary political discourse that combined the concepts of 'Islamic nationhood' and 'modern state' to establish evident and believable arguments for Pakistan's foundation (Dhulipala, 2015, p. 4). However, scholars have claimed that the Lahore Resolution (and two-nation theory) was a tool or 'bargaining counter' to exert a 'power-sharing' arrangement with the British Raj and Congress in the future constitutional units (Jalal, 1994, 2014; Talbot, 1984). According to them, the Muslim League and Jinnah claim "that Indian Muslims were a nation entitled to equal treatment with Hindus in all future constitutional negotiations. However, the demand for a separate sovereign state was kept open for negotiation" (Jalal, 2014, pp. 32–3). Interviewee Prof. Tahir Malik (21 February 2020) stated the same:

New research has highlighted that it was Congress policies, the failure to satisfy Muslims that it is a secular party not protecting Hindu interest. This gap between Hindu and Muslims was unbridgeable. Also, Congress leadership's inability to give them constitutional guarantees that their interest will be safeguarded within undivided India. This led to dividing India.

However, it is evident in Jinnah's words, messages, and statements that when he referred to 'partition', he envisaged a separate homeland for subcontinent Muslims (Ahmed, 2020). For example, on 25 March 1940, at the end of the Muslim League Lahore session, Jinnah stated in a press conference that:

The declaration of our goal, which we have definitely laid down, of the division of India, is, in my opinion, a landmark in the future history of the Mussalmans of India … I thoroughly believe that the idea of one united India is a dream. Given goodwill and a friendly understanding, Muslim India and Hindu India can live as most friendly neighbours free from clashes and friction to their respective spheres and peacefully develop the government of their States to their own satisfaction, respectively. (Yusufi, 1996, pp. 1186–7)

Further, Jinnah frequently denounced as absurd the notion that he had used the desire for Pakistan as a negotiating tool. On 23 November 1940, while addressing Muslim students at Delhi, Jinnah strenuously denied that the Muslim League or he had used the desire for Pakistan as a negotiating card. Jinnah stated:

The Hindus must give up their dream of a Hindu "Raj" and agree to divide India into Hindu homeland and Muslim homeland. Today we are prepared to take only one-fourth of India and leave three-fourth to them. "Pakistan" was our goal today, for which the Muslims of India will live for and, if necessary, die for. It is not a counter for bargaining. (Yusufi, 1996, p. 1280)

Therefore, that claim is not valid. Neither Jinnah nor the Muslim League sought any safeguards for any constitutional (power-sharing) negotiations after 1939. As Ahmed (2020, p. 688) states, "after 22 March 1940, Jinnah never hinted, even obliquely, that he was prepared to agree to a power-sharing deal with the Congress". However, Pakistan's territorial boundaries (not an independent sovereign state demand) always remained open to discussion (particularly Punjab and Bengal). Moreover, the issue of population allocation and minorities

rights (both in Muslim- and Hindu-dominant provinces) were always in negotiation (Karim, 2010).

It was evident that March 1940 was the turning point when Jinnah declared that Muslims were a separate nation by any definition of the nation, and they were clear about their goal (Pakistan). Jinnah's two-nation theory represents a profound transformation in Muslim nationalism from a community desiring constitutional protection (until 1939) to a nation demanding an independent sovereign state. As a result, Jinnah, Muslim League leaders, and the Muslim people became passionate advocates of the idea of Pakistan. Thus, Shaikh (2018, p. 40) states that "by defining Muslims as a nation, Jinnah was able both to encompass their entitlement to political power and to establish their parity with a putative Indian nation, thereby at a stroke affirming their potentially sovereign status". This situation changed the Muslims into a political nation, therefore equipping Pakistan's *raison d'être*.

7.2.4 Definition of Pakistan; Different Narratives

There are various definitions and narratives regarding the creation of Pakistan. Scholars from various backgrounds have different viewpoints on the origins of the Pakistan independence movement, Muslim League leadership, and Jinnah. Some view Jinnah as the 'man of destiny' and their 'hero' for granting independence (Ahmed, 2005; Hayat, 2014; Karim, 2010; Mahmood, 2002); however, some view him as a 'main character' who was responsible for the partition of united India (Collins and Lapierre, 1997; Khan, 1987; Krishan, 2012; Zakaria, 2011). However, it is evident that Pakistan was established based on the two-nation theory. As Sherwani (2008, pp. 18–9) states, "the Pakistan idea was based on the Two-Nation theory; the Muslim nation wanted to live in a territory in which they would live in accordance with Islamic ideals rather than the ideals of 'Brahminism'". Therefore, Pakistan's *raison d'etre* was based on a distinct Muslim identity (Islamic) accentuated by the two-nation theory. However, the different narrations of Pakistan's conception are rooted in the colonial period.

As a matter of concern, there were many Muslim versions during Pakistan's independence movement. Interviewee Khurshid Nadeem (23 February 2020), a journalist, explained:

> There were many Muslim's versions at the time; the Jinnah Muslim League, the Nationalist Ulema (Jamiat-Ulema-I-Hind), and the Syed Modudi–Jamat-e-Islami ideology, which was the third. The Nationalist ulema and Khan brothers (Pashtun belt) supported the point of view of Congress. However, Syed Modudi's perspective was very distinctive. Syed Maudidi's response to Maulana Madani was comprehensive and to the Congress's concept of composite nationalism. In that sense, he provided firm ground for the Muslim League and empowered the idea of two nations.

Pakistan was created for the subcontinental Muslims to secure their political and economic interests and practise their self-determination according to Islam. The Islamists also claimed that there were political and economic interests, but as a result, they wanted to lay the foundation of a country where Islam could be implemented as a way of life (Mahmood, 2002). Further, there are more narratives that another interviewee, Dr Sajid Mehmood (17 February 2021), Director of the NIHACR, Islamabad, described in relation to Pakistan's creation:

> 1. the international rivalry between communism and capitalism, 2. the "divide and rule". Aitzaz Ahsan (2005) considers it a division between the Indus (now Pakistan) and gigantic valley. 3. The controversy between the agricultural (Muslim League) and industrialist (Indian national congress) block, and the last one is the two-nation theory.

The so-called nationalist point of view about Pakistan is that the British Raj used Jinnah and the Muslim League. Scholars such as Khan (1987) have claimed that the British exploited Jinnah to undermine the Congress-led independence struggle. Along the same line, Krishan (2012) emphasises Jinnah's collaboration with the British Raj, which began in 1942 with the Cripps Mission. Interviewee Dr Naazir Mahmood (13 February 2020), academic, claimed:

> The standard official version of Pakistan responses: it was created for Muslims of the subcontinent. However, the explanation failed. If Pakistan was created for the subcontinent Muslims, all Muslims could have come: they didn't. So, this explanation that Pakistan was created for the Muslims is wrong. The total population of Muslims, around 250 million, live in India. 180 Muslim million Muslims live in Bangladesh. If you combine these, the number of Muslims is

double the Muslims who live in Pakistan. Therefore, the explanation that it was created for the subcontinent Muslims is wrong.

In his response to the question, 'Why was Pakistan created?', Dr Mahmood stated that:

> The official explanation is that the Muslim League made it. However, in his book facts or facts, Khan Abdul Wali Khan proved that it was actually created by the British because, in 1939, the Indian National Congress refused to support war efforts when the Second World War started. Congress said, unilaterally, the British government could not declare war on India's behalf because India was a different country. So they were opposed, and they resigned from their ministries in 1939. At that time, the Britishers were facing a challenging time; they did not want to commit to independence or grant freedom. At that time, the Muslim League came to support the British, and Congress resigned from their ministries, and a very close collaboration began between the Muslim League and the British. So, it was a combined effort by both the British and the Muslim League. It was not the effort of all the Muslims of India.

However, there are shreds of evidence that reject this claim. For example, scholars like Reid (2016) and French (1997) indicate that in 1943, when Lord Wavell was appointed as viceroy of the Indian subcontinent, he learned that the British Government intended to stay in the Indian subcontinent for at least another three decades. The British Raj did not want to abandon control of India but was compelled to do so because of the disastrous consequences of World War II (Reid, 2016) and the massive independence movement by the subcontinental people. Another point of view was explained by interviewee Farrukh Sohail Goindi (7 February 2020), a political activist:

> Pakistan was created by the Muslim League's educated people who believed that we would enable the subcontinent Muslims to enjoy political and economic freedom creating a separate state. Interestingly, most of them were not from the region where Pakistan came into being. They believed that political and economic prosperity would follow.

However, the Pakistan Movement began with the aim of spreading consciousness and awareness in subcontinental Muslims who wanted to have their own cultural, religious, and social identity, which was not possible without a separate homeland. As the interviewee Dr

Anis Ahmed (4 December 2019), vice-chancellor of Riphah International University Islamabad, answered:

> The creation of Pakistan and the beginning of the Pakistan Movement was not inspired by nationalism in the sense of the Western concept of nationalism, nor in the mind of economic prosperity for the Muslims, but virtually, self-awareness and consciousness as a separate, religious, cultural, social identity. And these three aspects made them a Muslim community of the subcontinent.

Jinnah's Lahore Resolution address provides strong evidence for the argument that Muslims are a distinct nation (socially, culturally, and religiously). Further, in 1943, during Jinnah's address at Peshawar, he stated that "the league stood for carving out states in India where Muslims were in numerical majority to rule thereunder Islamic Law" (Dar, 2014, p. 121).

7.3 Perspectives of Pakistan's National Identity

Understanding contemporary Pakistan's national identity question is problematic without a historical analysis of the power struggle between Islamists and secularists soon after Pakistan's National Assembly passed the Objectives Resolution in 1949. However, the two-nation theory had clearly articulated Pakistan's national identity as Islamic by then. Its ideological orientation included its populist manifestation that "Muslim nationalism, was the antithesis of secularism" (Ahmed, 2020, p. 12). However, some scholars have claimed that Pakistan was destined to remain a secular state and Islam was used as a political tool to mobilise the Muslim masses. Like Jalal (2014, p. 29), "Jinnah's recourse to Islam was a product of political necessity—the need to win the support of a community (Muslims)". Therefore, before analysing Pakistan's national identity perspectives, it is important to understand that, if Pakistan was created for the Muslims, what status do the minorities in Pakistan have? Who was living in that area for ages?

7.3.1 Status of Minorities

Fundamentally, the idea of Pakistan was the direct outcome of Muslim nationalism based on religion (Islam). The leaders of the Pakistan independence movement demanded a separate homeland for the Indian Muslims in areas that constituted a considerable majority. The apparent reason was that they did not feel that their religious, economic, cultural, and political rights were secure under Hindu domination. As Chaudhury (1969, p. 60) explains, "in this sense, Pakistan itself was the creation of a minority problem".

Interviewee Dr Safdar Mehmood (29 December 2021) responded in this way:

> The question arose with Pakistan's creation: did it mean that the minorities living in the Muslim majority area will be denied equal citizenship or be subjected to any prejudice? No, not at all. These areas in which Pakistan consists of more than a 95% Muslim majority only involve the formation of Pakistan, that no law shall be inactive against the Quran and the Islamic principles in the Muslim majority areas: it didn't mean that minorities will not be given equal status. According to the Islamic teachings in a Muslim country, examples (Khulafa e Rashidin, Muslims rule even in sub-continent) show that religious minorities are given equal citizenship rights, religious freedom and are free to go to their places of worship. Therefore essentially, Pakistan was created for the Muslims. However, the assurance provided that religious minorities will be given equal status because Islam guarantees them, the Islamic state ensures them.

The constitution of Pakistan guaranteed minorities equal opportunities for jobs and education, and all rights available to Muslim citizens were given to non-Muslim citizens. Before arriving in Pakistan, Jinnah spoke at a press conference in July 1947:

> Let me tell you that I shall not depart from what I said repeatedly with regard to minorities. I meant what I said and what I said I meant. They will have their protection with regard to their religion, faith, life and culture. They will be the citizens of Pakistan without any distinction of caste or creed. (Yusufi, 1996, p. 2587)

Many non-Muslims, including Hindus, Sikhs, Christians, and Parsis, live in Pakistan; they are all Pakistanis. They have the same rights and privileges as any other citizen and play their rightful part in the affairs of Pakistan. The Objectives Resolution that the first Constituent Assembly of Pakistan passed in March 1949 paved the way for establishing an Islamic state

in Pakistan that was compatible with the present-day problems. Regarding the status and rights of non-Muslim minorities in Pakistan, the constitution ensured that adequate provisions would be made for the minorities to profess and practise their religions freely and develop their own cultures. It also laid out that proper provisions would be made to safeguard the legitimate interests of minorities in Pakistan. Further, non-Muslims were guaranteed fundamental rights on par with the Muslim citizens of Pakistan, including equality of status and opportunity; social, economic, and political justice; and freedom of thought, expression, association, belief, faith, and worship. Moreover, article 27 states that "No citizen otherwise qualified for appointment in the service of Pakistan shall be discriminated against in respect of any such appointment on the ground only of race, religion, caste, sex, residence or place of birth" (The Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973).

Further, the constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan 1973 states that "adequate provisions shall be made for the minorities freely to profess and practise their religions and develop their cultures and to safeguard the legitimate interests of minorities" (The Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973) to observe how the interests and rights of non-Muslim minorities have been protected and how religious freedom has been given to them in the Islamic Republic of Pakistan.

It is important to note that, in addition to civil and religious rights and freedoms, non-Muslims in Pakistan have been granted political rights under the country's constitution. In all of the constitutions (1956, 1962, and 1973), a clause states that the head of the state must be a Muslim. The constitution of 1973 goes a step further by providing that the working head of the state (the prime minister) must also be a Muslim and believe in the unity of God and the finality of the Prophethood of Muhammad (PBUH) (The Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973). However, Pakistanis feel that including this provision in the constitution is an honest and pragmatic approach to the question. It is no use working under the pretence

that a non-Muslim can become the head of the state or head of government in Pakistan, where the bulk of the population consists of Muslims, because real power will always remain with the Muslims. Further, given that Pakistan is based on the Islamic ideology, the nominal head of the state (the president) and the working head of the state (the prime minister) must be Muslims so that the ideological nature of the state is not compromised.

7.3.2 Pakistan's National Identity in the Context of the Islamist and Secular Narrative

Does Pakistan have a national identity? Because Pakistan was established based on Muslim nationalism (two-nation theory), it was natural to become a state with an Islamic national identity. However, the secular camp's misinterpretation of Jinnah's 11 August 1947 speech and the questions concerning the relevance of the two-nation theory after independence have created a debate around Pakistan's identity. This is despite a dozen other speeches by Jinnah after 11 August indicating Pakistan's Islamic identity. Further, the Objectives Resolution of 1949 that was passed by Pakistan's constitution and 1973 constitution confirms the Islamic identity. However, the debate around Pakistan's national identity has never reached a consensus.

National identity is simply defined as the 'sense of belonging' to a nation or a state. Some scholars have defined national identity as a collective identity in the form of nationalism (internal sameness, external distinctions between itself and others) in nation-states (Anderson, 2006; Brubaker, 2012). Therefore, nationalism refers to a common identity of various ethnic groups within a nation-state, and despite the diversity of culture, faith, and ethnicity within nation-states, national identity encompasses people's ability to regard the state as a legitimate component of their own identity. As Weight (2003) explains, national identity is the sum of the forms of national consciousness. Bourdieu (1994, p. 7) asserts that the state performs a significant role in national identity formation:

> Through classificational systems inscribed in law, through bureaucratic procedures, educational structures and social rituals … the state moulds mental structures and imposes common principles of vision and division … And it thereby contributes to the construction of what is commonly designated as national identity (or, in a more traditional language, national character).

Pakistan's national identity is based on three main elements: 1) Muslim nationalism (shared history during the colonial era); 2) Jinnah's leadership (common hero); and 3) Pakistan's constitution. Muslim nationalism (two-nation theory), Jinnah, and the constitution have described Pakistan's Islamic national identity. Even Jinnah, as Pakistan's Governor-General, stated that "Pakistan is the premier Islamic state" (Yousafi, 1996, p. 2692). Interviewee Dr Anis Ahmad (4 December 2019), a prominent scholar and vice-chancellor of Riphah University Islamabad, said that:

> Nationalism is based on soil, ethnicity, or people's language. However, Muslim nationalism or Islamic nationalism is based only on faith. Therefore, the founder (Jinnah) not only once, but in several statements said very clearly (and people find it challenging to understand) when we talk about Islam, it means a complete code of life, an economic system and a social system. Therefore, Islam is not a matter of just religion alone. He further added that Islam is the Identity of Pakistan and the future inspiration of Pakistan's Muslims because 97% of the population subscribe to one faith.

Along the same lines, interviewee Khalid Rahman (3 February 2020), chairman of the Institute of Policy Studies, Islamabad, responded to the question regarding Pakistan's identity:

> National identity means all in a particular nation join hands by considering common thoughts, perceptions, ideology, and geography. Concerning Pakistan's identity, every community and even a single person has multiple identities: their colour, name, and height detail individual identity. Pakistan geographically comprises different ethnic backgrounds and traditions of people who have lived there for many centuries. However, the overriding element and most dominant identity is Islam—the bonding factor for Pakistan. There can be no better referral for this than Quaid-e-Azam. Quaid Azam says Pakistan is being made for the subcontinent Muslims. Khalid Rahman added that there were undoubtedly political and economic interests, but as a result, they want to base a country on factors through which Islam can be implemented: Islam is also a life system.

However, scholars state that although Pakistan was founded on the ideals of Muslim nationalism (two-nation theory), after its creation, that theory was no longer relevant (Ali, 2011). Moreover, some scholars claim that Islam was being used as a political tool during Pakistan's independence movement (Ali, 2011; Alvi, 2001; Jalal, 1994; 2014). For example, Jalal (2014, p. 29) states that:

> Jinnah's recourse to Islam was a product of political necessity—the need to win the support of a community that was a distinctive category in official and popular parlance … He could not dilate on his real political objectives because what could rouse Muslims in the minority provinces would put off Muslims where they were in a majority.

Interviewee Wajahat Masood (25 February 2020), a prominent journalist, responded to Pakistan's identity question, saying:

> The day Pakistan was founded, it was destined to be a nation. So the two-nation theory was irrelevant after Pakistan's independence. He went on to say that Pakistanis are a divided nation, and we are facing an identity crisis because Pakistan is a diverse country, and we fail to respect diversity, which is not necessarily an antithesis of national unity. A respect for diversity is to accept the strength of our nation. So we cannot have national unity by imposing a non-organic narrative.

Another interviewee, Dr Mubarak Ali (11 January 2020), a prominent historian in Pakistan, responded that:

> The nation's formation foundation is predicated on the nation-state, which means that the state is secular. And whoever lives in it geographically, irrespective of their religion, is part of the nation. That was not possible in Pakistan. Under the two-nation theory, Muslims were considered one nation and the rest of the Christians and Hindus were expelled. It is only possible when the state is secular that all minorities can be part of one nation, but if it is a religious state, the minorities are expelled. The state of Pakistan says that there is an Islamic identity, but it is not a definition of complete identity. A nation cannot be formed here unless the state is secular. The main problem with Pakistan is that the nation has not been developed under the national state. Therefore, the state should be secular and neutral in terms of religion. Today, in this age of globalisation and democratic values, where institutions are decision-makers, Pakistan should consider whether the state should be built on a religious or secular basis. And 72/73 years of history have proved that Pakistan could not function on the foundations upon which it was built. So what is needed now are new foundations to become a developed nation in the world.

What if Jinnah only employed Islam to gain the support of the Muslim population? Why did he wait until independence was achieved to disclose his goal of establishing a secular state? In that case, according to Karim (2010, p. 139), "we could have accused him of being a dictator imposing his personal whims upon his people, not to mention a manipulative and dishonest leader". But, in contrast, he repeatedly stated that:

> In Pakistan, we shall have a state which will be run according to the principles of Islam. It will have its cultural, political and economic structure based on the principles of Islam. (Harris, 1976, p. 173)

Further, Jinnah had to stop referring to Islamic mottos when Pakistan gained independence. However, Jinnah referred to Islam persistently, even after the speech on 11 August 1947, which was regarded as "one of the clearest expositions of a secular state" (Munir, 1980, p. 29). Here, I have included only two pieces of evidence from Jinnah's speeches after Pakistan:

> It is my belief that our salvation lies in following the golden rules of conduct set for us by our great lawgiver, the Prophet of Islam (PBUH). Let us lay the foundation of our democracy on the basis of truly Islamic ideals and principles. (Yusufi, 1996, p. 2656)

> The constitution of Pakistan has yet to be framed … I do not know what the ultimate shape of this constitution is going to be, but I am sure that it will be of a democratic type, embodying the essential principles of Islam. Today they are as applicable in actual life as they were 1300 years ago. Islam and its idealism have taught us democracy. It has taught equality of men, justice and fair play to everybody. We are the inheritors of these glorious traditions and are fully alive to our responsibilities and obligations as framers of the future constitution of Pakistan. (Burke, 2000, p. 125)

Therefore, Jinnah constantly referenced Islam (e.g. 'Islamic democracy' and 'Islamic principles') after Pakistan gained independence. Thus, another question arises here: If the two-nation theory was no more relevant in Pakistan after its independence, what was Pakistan's purpose? Interviewee Syed Shahid Hashmi (29 December 2019) responded that:

Strong foundations sustain any country to live as a nation and grow, such as French nationalism and German nationalism. Historically before 1947, today's areas of Pakistan were not a country, although the basis of Pakistan's existence is Islam and Muslim nationalism, including the Urdu language. He asked in addition, what is the justification that in 1947 without Islam and Muslim nationalism, divided Punjab and Bengal into two parts? Why didn't Punjab and Bengal become one country? Even after East Pakistan became Bangladesh in 1971, East and West Bengal could not join together. There are different ethnicities and languages for Pakistan, but the commonality is Islam, and Muslim nationalism, which can grow and maintain a united Pakistan and Pakistan must maintain its Islamic identity to grow as a stable and peaceful country.

Therefore, the two-nation theory is still relevant, and justification of Pakistan's existence and record proved it. For example, the fear of minorities (categorically Muslims) in today's *Hindutva* regime has proved the two-nation theory. The *Citizenship Amendment Bill*, accepted by the Indian state, clearly discriminates against Muslims. Mukul Kesavan (2019), in an article published in *The Telegraph Online*, states that it is "couched in the language of refuge and seemingly directed at foreigners, but its main purpose is the delegitimisation of Muslims' citizenship". Further, some scholars have referred to Jinnah's 11 August speech as favouring secular identity, because Jinnah announced protection for minorities (Ali, 2011; Hoodbhoy, 2007), and interpreted it as "one of the clearest expositions of a secular state" (Munir, 1980, p. 29). Interviewee Farrukh Sohail Goindi (7 February 2020), a political activist and writer, responded that:

We (Pakistanis) still have an identity crisis. The Islamists bring out many of Jinnah's speeches; however, the actual address is that of the legislature (the 11th of August speech at National Assembly); in that speech, Jinnah says the state will provide religious freedom and protection to the minorities.

Dr Mubarak Ali (11 January 2020) added that:

The state of Pakistan says that there is an Islamic identity, but it is not a definition of complete identity. What would Christians, Hindus, and Parsis call themselves? They will think of the nation as separate. A nation cannot be formed here unless the state is secular. The main problem with Pakistan is that the nation has not been developed under the national state. Therefore, the state should be secular and neutral in terms of religion.

Interviewee Professor Fateh Malik (21 February 2020), ex-rector of International Islamic University Islamabad, responded to Pakistan's identity question:

> All the ideological groups inside Pakistan talked about their politics after becoming Pakistan. What is essential is to see the vision of the leaders and the founders of Pakistan. Pakistan's movement was wholly democratic and secular, and secular means you should stick to your religion and respect the religion of others. The first three pages of Iqbal's sermon in Allahabad have discussed secularism, and Iqbal mentioned that "All that is Secular is secret in the roots of its being". Therefore, Quaid-e-Azam, Allama Iqbal, and their companions are all against the mullahs. Quaid-e-Azam's speech of the 11th of August in which he spoke about secularism that respects the religion of those who are not Muslims.

Jinnah had indeed stressed minorities' rights; however, does it mean that Jinnah envisioned a secular state, and where does Islam stand in the way of minorities? Although Jinnah had talked about minorities' rights on various other occasions, there is no doubt that Jinnah was still speaking within the overall Islamic framework. Therefore, it was actually according to the Islamic spirit of Misaq-i-Madina (see Chapter 5). Interviewee Dr Anis Ahmad (4 December 2019) discussed the meaning of Jinnah's 11 August speech:

> Jinnah has never used the word 'secular' in his speeches, and his address of the 11th of August 1947 to the National Assembly was precise in its meaning; however, it is not always read and understood with academic honesty. Jinnah said that now Pakistan has been created, you are no more just Muslims and Hindus, but you are citizens: Where is secularity? You can go to your mosque and your church and synagogue, whatever it is, which means that we will not persecute you because of your faith.

Regarding the question of whether Jinnah made a secular claim in his 11 August speech, interviewee Dr Safdar Mahmood (29 December 2019) replied that:

> Quaid Azam has never used the word 'secular'. As for the 11th of August speech, it was a pervasive speech and covered many arguments. In fact, that speech contained guiding and leading principles for the future state of Pakistan. And he (Jinnah) mentioned many things, like provincialism and rejected corruption and nepotism. The central concept of the 11th of August speech is that religion would not be allowed to influence the political rights of minorities in Pakistan who have equal status as Pakistani citizens. They are free to go to their temples, and they are free to go to their worshipping places. Remember that in the Islamic structure of governance, minorities have all their rights. And incidentally, though the Islamic principles, there are principles

of secularism, such as accountability, equal justice, and the rule of law: they are the Islamic principles, even before secularism came into existence.

Therefore, the 11 August speech was in the context of the Islamic framework and did not mean a secular identity. Further, the Objectives Resolution was adopted by the Pakistan legislative assembly in 1949, and later, Pakistan's constitution confirmed the Pakistani nature of the Islamic identity. Interviewee Dr Mubarak Ali (11 January 2020) indicated that:

> When the time came to make the constitution, the question arose: Will it be according to the Sharia law or not? Then Objectives Resolution 1949 sealed that there should be Islamic laws. The 1973 constitution made Pakistan a religious state. However, in the constitution of 1956, the Islamic Republic of Pakistan was also used.

7.3.3 What Does Pakistan's National Identity Mean?

From the analysis of the Islamist and secularist narratives and Jinnah's speeches (see Chapter 5), it is evident that Pakistan's national identity is Islamic rather than secular. Interviewee Dr Safdar Mahmood (29 December 2019) explained that:

> Pakistan is a Muslim country, and Jinnah's vision was of an Islamic democratic and welfare state. Jinnah continued saying that Pakistan's constitution and the law and Pakistan's political structure will be based on democratic and Islamic principles. Therefore, Pakistan's national identity is an Islamic democratic and welfare state, which is the concept that Jinnah propounded, and he received the majority of votes in the 1945–46 elections.

Religion and national identity are not against; however, both are useful to bond the nation. As Lapidus (2001, p. 51) mentioned:

> National identities are not only political identities but, like religions, are comprehensive systems of meanings and values. They fuse personal and collective identities. National and religious symbols have the power to invoke deep loyalty, devotion, sacrifice, love of community and a sense of the fulfilment of transcendental purposes. Religion and national identity work together because they overlap systems of meaning.

The secular camp refers to Jinnah's 11 August speech as a reference for a secular Pakistan. However, a fundamental weakness in the dialogue of the secular narrative is that it relies too much on the 11 August speech of Quaid-e-Azam and perhaps even totally relies on that one

statement and its particular interpretation. For example, the Quaid-e-Azam 11 August speech states that "Hindus would cease to be Hindus, and Muslims would cease to be Muslims, not in the religious sense, because that is the personal faith of each individual, but in the political sense as citizens of the State" (Yusufi, 1996, p. 2601). Analysis of this speech proves that Jinnah believes that no one is forced to believe in the sanctity of the law following the Quranic injunction: "Let there be no compulsion in deen" (2:256). Instead, Jinnah meant that universal civil equality should be guaranteed, and personal faith (*mazhab*) should be kept out of the political sphere.

Further, Jinnah's 11 August speech is no different in content or spirit from early Muslim historical rule and the first Muslim political document, called the Misaq-i-Madina (Compact of Medina), which is said to have been penned by the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) in around 622 AD and is arguably the first constitution in the world that laid down rules for "a political unit". The Misaq-i-Madina guarantees social, legal, and economic equality to all loyal citizens of the state without discrimination regarding caste, colour, creed, and community (e.g. Muslims, Jews). Jinnah made the same point in his speech of 11 August 1947—that is, that every citizen of Pakistan is free, Hindus are free to go to the temple, Muslims are free to go to the mosque, and all are equal citizens of Pakistan. Jinnah clarified this in his statement:

> You will find that in the course of time, Hindus would cease to be Hindus and Muslims would
> cease to be Muslims, not in the religious sense because that is the personal faith of each individual,
> but in the political sense as citizens of the state. (Yusufi, 1996, pp. 2601–5)

This statement by Jinnah is the same as that prescribed in Misaq-i-Madina, whereby Muslims and Jews were treated as equal citizens of the first Islamic state of Madinah. Therefore, it is apparent that Jinnah's speech on 11 August 1947 is not against Islamic principles and does not propagate a secular state. However, it was prescribed in Misaq-i-Madina, the early Islamic state's first constitution created under the Prophet Muhammad's (PBUH) leadership.

In the analysis of Jinnah's speech, the whole secular narrative falls apart. Therefore, secular intellectuals need to diversify their reasoning because reliance on a one-point argument signifies weakness rather than position maturity. Extending the same idea, the shift from secular to Islamic in state identity is justified in the secular narrative by post-partition events and political dynamics, especially the Objectives Resolution and its role in the constitution of Pakistan. However, this argument also has weaknesses from a historical point of view because the secularists started the debate from the 11 August speech. Therefore, all dialogues and discussions that evolved during Pakistan's independence movement (particularly between 1937 and 1947) are assumed to be null and void.

Further, the secular camp justified the 11 August speech as a final and decisive answer to their narrative. However, this research shows that Jinnah's speech is not justifiable as a secular narrative even if we consider post-partition events. Incredibly, Jinnah's statements as the governor-general of Pakistan reflect a greater emphasis on Islamic ideals than before the partition. For example, on 14 August 1947, during the address to the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan, Lord Mountbatten offered the example of Akbar the Great Mughal as the model of a tolerant Muslim ruler to Pakistan. Mountbatten suggested the Akbar regime because Akbar has always been a favourite among those who believe in the 'synthesis', or what passes for secular in our time. However, in his reply, Jinnah pointed out that Muslims had a more enduring and more inspiring model to follow, namely, the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH).

7.4 Nature of Pakistan's State and Constitution

The constitution recognised the nature of modern states and described a nation's collective wishes, aspirations, and ideals. The constitution outlines the priorities and goals of a country. The present 1973 constitution declared Pakistan the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, and the Objectives Resolution became part of the constitution.

Interviewee Khalid Rahman (13 February 2020), chairman of the Institute of Policy Studies, Islamabad, said that:

> As far as a constitution is concerned collectively, it is Islamic, and the livelihood of many citizens is based upon Islamic values and culture, irrespective of area. Another debate is about the extent to which it is being implemented since its formation (1973 constitution). However, by and large, predominantly Islamic identity is described in the constitution.

Interviewee Qaiser Sharif (26 February 2020) responded that:

> A constitution governs nations and countries, and our constitution has the status of an Islamic constitution. However, the shortcoming is that the spirit of the Constitution of Pakistan is not being implemented as it should have been.

Interviewee Dr Anis Ahmad (4 December 2019) responded to the nature of Pakistan's state question:

> The constitution says Pakistan is the Islamic Republic and the state of Pakistan shall ensure the will of Pakistan fully observe the ways of Quran and Sunnah, and no law against Sharia should be made. He further stated that if the constitution has defined the country's nature, can we raise the question, who are we? Therefore, nationhood in Pakistan is nothing other than what the constitution of Pakistan defined as Islam with an Islamic identity that makes our culture and nationhood.

Although the constitution of Pakistan describes an Islamic democratic country and assures rights and protection for minorities, Pakistan faces persistent issues related to polarised politics (leading to governing and economic weakness), dysfunctional constitution, and ethnically strong identities that often surpass Pakistan's national identity. This shows Pakistan's weak civic nationalism and strong ethnic identities in many parts of Pakistan. Another interviewee, Dr Mojeeb Afzal (3 February 2020), responded to the question regarding the nature of Pakistan's state:

> Although Pakistan's constitution has described the nature of Pakistan and Pakistan's identity as Islam and Urdu, the structure of Pakistan' state is modern, but society is a hybrid society. He argued that Pakistan combines a modern state and a traditional society.

Interviewee Prof. Tahir Malik (21 February 2021) described another perspective on the nature of Pakistan's state question, as follows:

> Pakistan's elite relied on religion instead of nationalism for their own interest. Consequently, the state moved from social welfare to a security state. He added that they always have created a religious narrative just for public support and to overcome legitimacy crises, and there are contradictions in the 1973 constitution. There is pressure from religious people in Pakistan who mobilise people because Islam is in danger and has street power. They pressure the elite saying that the state should not be secular or modern.

Overall, the Pakistani state has been moving forward and experiencing continuity in the democratic process since 2008. However, Pakistan lacks in the implementation of the constitution, which has led to an identity crisis.

7.5 Agreement Between Islamists and Secularists

The controversy over Pakistan's identity is not new; it began after the creation of Pakistan. However, Pakistan has had major achievements in the past 70 or so years—for example, the 1973 constitution. This section argues that both the Islamists and secularists had decided the 1973 constitution, which has become even more substantial since the Eighteenth Amendment (which provides more provincial autonomy) was passed by Pakistan's National Assembly in 2010. Interviewee Farrukh Sohail Goindi (7 February 2020) indicated that:

> Both Islamists and secularists had decided the constitution of 1973 unanimously, and the 1973 constitution is Islamic. So the issue is about the implementation of the constitution.

This analysis shows that the implementation of the constitution in its true spirit could lead to developing a stronger sense of Pakistan's national identity and, accordingly, the process of nation-building. Moreover, this research, which includes both Islamist and secularist, shows that the majority of both camps can see the solution to the identity question in implementing the constitution. Interviewee Wajahat Masood (26 February 2020) stated:

The country's constitution is a social contract, which can be the basis of our national identity. So we have to respect diversity, find out the commonalities between people and follow the constitutions.

7.6 Concluding Remarks

Chapter 7 analysed the varied questions associated with Pakistan's national identity. First, it proved that Pakistan was created based on Muslim nationalism (two-nation theory) for the Muslims of the subcontinent. Therefore, the creation of Pakistan has not resulted in the breaking of a united Indian power. Then again, Pakistan's demand was natural, and the two-nation theory is still relevant and justifies Pakistan's existence. Second, the identity of Pakistan is Islamic rather than secular. Finally, all three elements—Muslim nationalism, Jinnah's vision, and Pakistan's 1973 constitution—confirmed that Pakistan's national identity is Islamic.

Chapter 8: Discussion and Findings

Chapter 8 discusses the results of this research within the relevant historical, theoretical, and conceptual framework. Moreover, it presents the main findings of this research and discusses directions for future research.

8.1 Future in History

This study finds that Muslims in the Indian subcontinent faced a specific challenge. They were the subcontinent's dominant force for more than 800 years before the British took control in the nineteenth century. Moreover, political, societal, and economic landscapes were profoundly changed during the era of the British Raj, and a new class of landlords was established to maintain and regulate the agriculture system. In the towns, a new bourgeoisie arose, comprising mainly Hindu merchants—a modern educational model replaced with an existing education system. As a result, after 100 years of British administration, a country where Muslims had nearly 100% literacy could only keep 20% literacy and 2% education (Ahmad, 2006).

Further, as Macaulay predicted, they formed a 'new class' of citizens who were Indian in ethnicity and origin but British in culture and taste. As a result, a new type of administrative service (civil and military) arose that was equipped to serve as an agent of the colonial rule while destined to play an essential role in the post-independence era. The rise and dominance of Western European political and religious separation concepts and the ideologies of secularism, liberalism, and the nation-state were the most crucial breakthroughs in constructing quasi-democratic institutions through which authority began to shift towards the dominating nation. Hindu revivalism was a vital historical force, as indicated by the development of the Hindu Mahasabha, Rashtriya Savak Sangh, and Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP).

The Congress party gave its intellectual allegiance to British colonial power and other Western powers that advocated the liberal values of post-enlightenment Europe. This is how a new political and philosophical link was formed between the leadership of the Indian National Congress and the colonial authorities. After many years of useless struggle, Muslims—who had initially been assumed to preserve their different religious, linguistic, and political identities under cover of Hindu–Muslim solidarity within the framework of a collective fight versus the colonial power and beyond—were terribly disappointed. The Muslims realised they were facing a terrible situation regarding their future.

In addition, after years of agonising contemplation, assessment, and argument, they determined that their identity could not be protected and promoted in a political system that depends on composite nationalism and that the system had been not equipped to consider the legitimate diversity of religious, cultural, and political identities. Thus, Syed Mawdudi opposed it and did not believe that Muslims of the subcontinent could form a single nation with other Indians. Instead, he argued that Muslims had a distinct identity and nationality, which would have been Islamic, comprising their determination to obey God's will in their lives through their ethnicity, territory, language, economy, and culture (Mawdudi, 1963). Therefore, Mawdudi argues that the concern of subcontinental Indian Muslims was not simply to overthrow the colonial rule; they equally sought to guarantee that the Islamic community was independent to make its own decisions based on its own system of values and sociopolitical aspirations based on Islam. Thus, the Muslims' political future comprised two different but vital dimensions: first, the restitution of Muslim political authority within the Indian subcontinent in an area where the Muslims wanted the power to handle their own matters; and second, the formation of a Muslim state in the Indian subcontinent, in which Muslims would be free to practise their religion, live their lifestyle and develop their civilisation to establish a nation constructed on their ideals, morals, beliefs, and aspirations.

Political authority and religious–social identity are two critical and interdependent components of Pakistan's idea and vision. The leadership of the Pakistan Movement was undoubtedly devoted to this idea. Therefore, this vision and destiny have driven, encouraged, and inspired the Muslim nation to fight, sacrifice, and suffer to construct the new state of Pakistan. Throughout the last 70 or so years, the people have been sustained by the idea of Pakistan. Despite the ups and downs in the political and ideological spheres, Pakistan's vision continuously inspires them.

Jinnah's political career began in 1906, when he pursued a place in public life as a successful and ambitious lawyer before joining the Indian National Congress. In the Indian subcontinent, the rise of nationalism was an unexpected consequence of the British colonial regime's modernisation. After the war of 1857 ended, it led to the end of the EIC's rule. In 1858, the British Crown took direct charge of India and set up modernisation processes that, notwithstanding imperial objectives, brought about interconnectivity among the subcontinent people hitherto unknown in history. The founding of the Indian National Congress in 1885 was an initiative of liberal British civil servants, who, much to the chagrin of the sceptical conservative colonial establishment, believed that a platform was needed to facilitate communications between educated Indians and the state so that British authority was considered legitimate and benevolent.

Congress became the national voice of educated Indians who demanded further admirable Indian representation at all administration and government levels and became the harbingers of nascent Indian nationalism. But, in social or class terms, it was the modern-educated upper-caste Hindus, the smaller stratum of educated Muslims of the coastal cities, and the tiny but economically most advanced Parsi entrepreneurs and intellectuals who began to claim a more significant share in representation and power.

Jinnah was a man of principles and a charismatic political leader in the Indian subcontinent's history. He was qualified in law and opposed the rule of the individual. Jinnah was a devout Indian nationalist who fought for a united India for many years. He was once regarded as the 'ambassador of Hindu–Muslim unity' because he asked Indians to put their communal conflicts to the side and fight for independence from colonial rule as one nation. However, Jinnah did not fully back Muslim independence ambitions in the 1930s, considering them a purely political 'safeguard'. Jinnah did not wholly abandon Indian nationalist views until 1936; however, he demonstrated transition indications. Iqbal's influence on Jinnah is unquestionable. He had met with Iqbal several times in England, and they had long been colleagues. But 1936–1938 was a period in which Iqbal became Jinnah's self-attested spiritual support. Jinnah came to the same position Iqbal had reached concerning the concept of a separate Muslim nation. Although Congress dominated the 1936–1937 elections, Jinnah remained optimistic about the outcome. According to the numbers, Congress obtained a majority in seven of the 11 provinces, while the League did not secure a single province.

Meanwhile, Congress had won the election, which showed that it alone represented the authority of the Indian people. Therefore, Congress declined to cooperate with Muslim members at the national level until they withdrew from the Muslim League. Further, now that it had established its political dominance, Congress turned its attention to the social system. In the Congress-ruled provinces, the *Wardha Scheme of Education* and Hindi were implemented. In addition, all schools were required to sing Bande Mataram, and all students were obliged to salute Gandhi's portrait, which Muslims regarded as idolatry. Jinnah talked about this when he criticised Congress for being "absolutely determined to crush all other communities and cultures in this country and establish Hindu Raj" (Karim, 2010, p. 22). From then on, Jinnah became the leading proponent of the two-nation theory, which held that Hindus and Muslims represented two different nations that could not coexist peacefully.

Eventually, Jinnah sought separation, and he insisted from the beginning that Pakistan would be a state established on Islamic principles.

This research shows Jinnah's idea that Pakistan would not be a secular or theocratic state where only Muslims would be full citizens and non-Muslims would be second-class citizens. He stressed that Islam requires tolerance towards all religions. Therefore, Islam warmly welcomes all individuals of any faith who are committed and willing to serve as dedicated and loyal citizens of Pakistan in a strong connection with Islam. In Jinnah's opinion, Pakistan could not be a state based on Sunni or Shia. However, he anticipated that Muslims would need to establish Pakistan as a fortress for Islam, and he obtained a promise from them that they would respect and safeguard minorities' rights.

When Jinnah pledged freedom of religion for everyone in Pakistan and said that all citizens were allowed to visit their places of worship and that there would be no prejudice towards Muslims and non-Muslims as citizens of the state, he was not breaching any Islamic ideal or presenting Pakistan as a secular state. Therefore, this study demonstrates that Jinnah's addresses on 11 and 14 August 1947, known as the Gettysburg Address, reflect Pakistan's explicit Islamic nature, which derives from the Quran and Sunnah of the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH). This is the Islamic society's vision of fairness, compassion, and tolerance. It would eliminate the 'poison' of corruption, nepotism, mismanagement, and incompetence. Pakistan would be founded on the Prophet's noble principles from the seventh century in Arabia.

Despite Jinnah's criticism of Western-style democracy, he believed it was the most acceptable form of governance to Muslims. Another subject in his speeches was tolerance for minorities. Jinnah consistently repeated to Muslims what Islam asserted: "Our own history and our Prophet have given the clearest proof that non-Muslims have been treated not only justly and fairly but generously" (Merchant, 1990, pp. 10–11).

This study demonstrates that Jinnah's speech on 11 August cannot be clarified as a declaration of secular beliefs. However, it indicates that the Holy Prophet (PBUH) provided Islamic principles and guidance for minority rights 1,300 years ago (Misaq-i-Madina). Further, Jinnah's speeches and statements show that Pakistan should be an Islamic democratic country founded on Islamic ideals of justice and fair play. Moreover, this study indicates that Jinnah's vision of an Islamic democratic state is evident in his statements. The fundamental themes of his speeches were Islam and Pakistan, which are like two sides of the same coin. Islam's ideology was the main factor that united the Indian subcontinent Muslims and pushed them to establish an independent Muslim state.

In most of Jinnah's speeches, he emphasised Islamic principles and the Qur'an, which he believed would be the foundation of Pakistan's Islamic Constitution. However, like all true believers, Jinnah thought that Islam is more than just a religion; it is also about rules, law, politics, and philosophy. For example, in a speech in Gaya in January 1938, Jinnah stated:

> When we say that the flag of Muslim League is the flag of Islam, they think that we are introducing religion into politics … A fact of which we are proud, Islam gives us a complete code. (Ahmed, 2005, p. 356)

His viewpoint was that of a modest Muslim who had seen the idea of the state in Islam as encompassing new concepts such as the nation-state, right of self-determination, democracy, and constitutionalism, as well as the rule of law, human rights, social justice, and equality of all citizens. In brief, Jinnah hoped to construct a Muslim democratic and welfare state based on Islamic principles in Pakistan. His increasingly religious speeches towards the end of his life indicate not a political tactic to rally communal support, but rather the fact that he had acquired a deeper and more conscious understanding of Islam. The proof of this comes from the fact that Jinnah continued to refer to Islamic idealism in virtually every post-partition speech until he died in 1948, and the fact that he carried out his duties as head of state in an

Islamic fashion, upholding the principle of Muslim unity first and foremost, as well as the principles of justice and fair play, among others. Thus, Jinnah may have abandoned his honorary post, but not his principles. He never changed as a beacon of human rights. True to his convictions until his last day, the former ambassador of Hindu–Muslim unity simply became the ambassador of Pakistani unity instead.

8.2 Future in Present

This research strongly believes that a solid sense of national identity is a sense of cohesiveness that unites citizens who believe that they form a nation intended for collective statehood, regardless of the regional diversity. Diverse communities may also want to join in a standard system for economic and other reasons. However, if the benefits are doubtful and social cohesion is lacking, the state will be forced to rely on its coercive power to survive. This may prove to be a self-defeating approach in the long term: the more the state uses force, the more it alienates citizens (Etzioni, 1965). In a culturally homogeneous society like Pakistan, alienation may provoke rebellion against the rulers, and it may give an impetus to secessionist movements in a culturally diverse community. Thus, the sense of a solid Pakistani national identity would significantly contribute to the state's survival. To emphasise Pakistani nationhood's potential is not to diminish the power of Muslim nationalism. On the contrary, the Pakistani people's shared religion in Islam provides a firm foundation for the elite to develop a strong national identity and cohesion. Historically, Muslim nationalism has served as an energising and unifying force, allowing Indian Muslims to secede from the Hindus and establish Pakistan.

This research provides evidence that Pakistan's national identity is Islamic, not secular. Jinnah made the first authoritative statement on Pakistan's national identity on 11 August 1947. However, Jinnah functioned within an ideal Islamic context of tolerance and fairness for non-Muslims within an Islamic state (Shah, 1998).

On 7 March 1949, Prime Minister Liaqat Ali Khan introduced the Objectives Resolution in the Pakistan Constituent Assembly, which affirmed the fundamental notion that God had sovereignty over the entire universe and that democracy should be exercised within "Islamic limits". Further, minorities were promised that their legitimate rights would be safeguarded and that they would have provisions to freely practise their religion and culture in accordance with Islam (Constituent Assembly debates, 1949, pp. 1–2). It is worth highlighting that the commitment to adhere to the mentioned principles is based on Islamic requirements. Liaquat Ali Khan and the Constitution Assembly did not see any contradiction in prioritising Islam and maintaining basic democratic principles. As Liaquat Ali Khan stated on 3 May 1950:

> We pledge our loyalty to the principles of democracy, freedom, equality, tolerance and social justice in accordance with Islam. This does not mean theocracy. Islam does not imply that the clergy has the leading role … No, our concept of democracy is even more comprehensive than the one based on universal suffrage and government by the majority. We call all of this the Islamic way of life, and we adhere to it because, as Muslims, we cannot follow any other ideology. (Khan, 1950, pp. 119–12-)

According to Jinnah's vision of Pakistan, these steps proved to be a source of legitimation. As a result, Pakistan's first constitution, adopted in 1956, includes a pledge to bring all legislation into compliance with Islam. Unfortunately, the government was ousted in a military coup in October 1958, and it was never put into operation. General Ayub Khan's government delivered Pakistan's second constitution, reaffirming adherence to Islamic-compliant laws. In 1973, Pakistan's National Assembly passed its third constitution, which was more Islamic in nature. Apart from the first two constitutions, which required that the only president of the republic be a Muslim, the third mandated that the prime minister be a Muslim as well. It obliged both the president and the prime minister to testify their belief in the finality of the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) according to the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan.

This research has referred to historical documents to prove that early Islamic civilisation treated non-Muslims as equal citizens and gave them positions of responsibility in the government. In the case of Pakistan, the constitution guaranteed religious freedom to all citizens and allowed them to profess their religion freely. Further, Pakistan provided opportunities to all minorities. For example, Justice Carnel (Christian) served as Chief Justice of Pakistan from 1960 to 1968, and Justice Bagwandas (Hindu) served as Chief Justice of Pakistan in 2007. Islam does not teach a specific class of Muslims to act as rulers over the rest of the people. Rather, it declares that all humans have equal civil rights in the eyes of the law, and a stable society requires all citizens to fulfil their civil obligations regardless of their race or personal faith.

Jinnah not only provided the subcontinent's Muslims with their own territory (Pakistan), but he also instilled in them feelings of pride, dignity, and identity. Today, most Pakistanis are unconcerned about the former and have forgotten about the latter. Pakistani society has never been, and is not now, homogenous or monolithic. Diverse ethnic and social communities had different ties with one another, and these ties varied over time. Therefore, Pakistan lacks a strong sense of identity or nationhood. Since their supreme leader, Jinnah, departed when they wanted him the most, they have faced a leadership dilemma. Pakistanis are distrustful of those in positions of power. They believed that the viceroy, the person who held the highest post of power in the Indian subcontinent, was a liar. In the summer of 1947, he redesigned boundaries, intended to airlift forces to Kashmir, and tried everything he could to weaken Pakistan. They have witnessed district and subdivision changes from one region to another at the last moment, and they have seen mass killings and fatalities, all of which could have been prevented had those in power been more careful and honest.

Pakistan was created in 1947 with the impetus of the Muslim community; however, nations cannot succeed on enthusiasm alone. Therefore, following Jinnah's death, the new state's

challenges increased, including ethnic conflict, corruption, nepotism, incompetence, and relapse to previously established tribal and feudal structures in the regions that became Pakistan. Nevertheless, all of these problems could solidify Pakistan's identity and nationhood. Moreover, in the first two decades of Pakistan's creation, it lost half of the country following the secession of East Pakistan (now Bangladesh). Today, Pakistanis are struggling with what remains and striving to overcome ethnic conflicts.

This research agrees that Jinnah's idea of Pakistan as "the rising moon" (Ahmad, 2005) is buried underneath the rubble of nepotism, populism, and corruption. Jinnah's belief in the Islamic values of justice, fairness, and equitable civil rights to all citizens, including non-Muslims—ideas that were extracted from the broader view of Islam—is not entirely evident in today's Pakistan. It is not just an identity and political issue; it is also a severe moral disaster. Critics say that the Islamic Republic of Pakistan is not Islamic, republican, or much of a state: it is also not the Pakistan that Jinnah envisioned.

Further, this study shows that ethnicity, culture, and language contain both diversity and commonality elements. As a result, they can be used to promote national integration, secession, and separatism. However, beyond regulating the use of Urdu as a medium of instruction in schools, the ruling class has not prioritised national integration as a national priority. This requirement was removed during the Bhutto government. Like its predecessors, it appears to have felt that once the state and the elite had established control of the command posts in the government, national integration could be left to its own destiny. As a result, Pakistanis are much more divided than they were before.

In Pakistan, polarised politics has resulted in a lack of democratic, economic, and political development in the country. The civilian and military elites of the state have failed to create a democratic state structure and a solid political system. The constitution's spirit was therefore

never put into practice. Thus, constitutional politics and power relations are required in which the state ensures social, economic, and political rights. A new social contract is formed in exchange, and constituent units acknowledge the nation's institutional and territorial legitimacy. Currently, Pakistan is passing through the gravest period of its history. So-called religious extremists, nationalists, and ethnic groups are the most significant threat to Pakistan's solid national identity.

By examining Pakistan's political structure and history, it can be seen that over-centralism cannot overcome the forces of nationalism, ideology, and identity. The state elites must accept and respect constitutional rights to disengage the undemocratic political parties and regain legitimacy. We must recognise that identity politics and ideology are primarily about self-preservation as a cultural entity and about economic and political rights. Since global media has changed the world, information about nations, states, and movements for self-preservation cannot be suppressed. The state can no longer hide the truth from citizens. Thus, the state needs to respect the constitution, and constitutionalism must be seen in all state institutions to promote an honest and legitimate government.

Democracy and federalism are essential to Pakistan's identity; however, provincial autonomy should be considered. Dictatorships and political repression pose the most severe threats to national identity. Even civil rulers adopt this view when they have fallen from power; Nawaz Sharif's advocacy of democracy is a case in point. Democracy, too, can agitate centrifugal forces, but since it has not been practised in Pakistan for nearly a quarter-century, one cannot say how many divisions it may compare with the disruptions of national unity caused by the dictatorship.

Democracy is not simply defined as the rule of the majority or elections to form a government. Modern democracy includes the rule of law, accountability, and justice in all

state institutions. This has never been fully realised in Pakistan, where power politics, personalities, injustice, and inequity have prevailed. The nation has always made sacrifices for promoting democracy and the supremacy of law but has never tasted its fruit. As mentioned earlier, the nation-building process requires the actual development of democracy. In Pakistan, rulers assume power through dubious means and then employ more dubious means to sustain their power.

8.3 Main Findings

The idea of Pakistan was based on the two-nation theory; the Muslim nation wanted to live in a territory where they could live following the Islamic ideals rather than the 'ideals of Brahminism'. Jinnah's vision of Pakistan is very definite in that all aspects of the new state—political, social, and economic—were to be built on Islamic ideals, and Pakistan would have a democratic government, guaranteeing freedom of speech and conscience and full equality to all regardless of caste, creed, or colour. These ideas would be embodied in the constitution. As an Islamic polity, Pakistan would be a non-sectarian state; it would not be a theocracy, secular (atheistic nationalism), or a product of 'synthesis' (secular Islam). Further, its exact political shape would not matter if it was ethically or spiritually Islamic. Pakistan's national identity is an Islamic rather than secular identity. The Objectives Resolution in 1949 sealed that the laws shall be made following Islam and Sharia, and all minorities are guaranteed to profess and practise their religions and cultures freely. The Islamists and secularists unanimously agreed on the constitution of 1973, which confirmed the Islamic identity of Pakistan.

The limited Bengali representation in the central government and the fragile economic situation in East Pakistan increased the sense of deprivation, suppression, and exploitation; it made the Bengali people anti–West Pakistan and enhanced their ethnic distinctness. Moreover, the Bengali move for provincial autonomy encouraged other ethnic communities

in West Pakistan. Therefore, the two-nation theory did not end in 1971. However, the dogma of the two countries ended (Pakistan was created to divide India). The subcontinent has now become three countries instead of two (Pakistan, India, and Bangladesh). Bangladesh has always been an Islamic country. If the people of Bangladesh had reunited with India instead of maintaining their independence and separate status, we would have assumed that the two-nation theory had failed.

The Pakistani state has failed to implement the constitution in its true spirit and accommodate ethnic groups socially, economically, and politically. Therefore, the civic identity of Pakistan is weaker and ethnic identities are more potent in some cases. These ethnic identities challenge a strong sense of Pakistan's national identity and nation-building process. The polarised political consequences in Pakistan are that the nation has not developed democratically, economically, and politically. Further, state elites—both civilian and dictatorships—have failed to promote a democratic state structure and political system in Pakistan.

The major obstacle in democracy and promoting national identity is the lack of democratic values in state institutions and the democratic approach in Pakistan's leadership. Further, the undemocratic and authoritative nature of Pakistan's top leadership of mainstream political parties is another major factor that divides Pakistani society into ethnic groups. In contrast, all major stakeholders of Pakistan, including Islamists and secularists, agree on the 1973 constitution, especially since the Eighteenth Amendment, which made the constitution more substantial. Therefore, the only way to minimise the identity controversy is to implement the constitution and promote the democratic institution in Pakistan.

8.4 Future Research Direction

This research has focused on Pakistan's identity question, considering Jinnah's vision of Pakistan and Islamist and secularist narratives.

In the future, Pakistan's identity question should be investigated from the perspective of international dynamics—that is, how global and regional decisions affect and fuel Pakistan's national identity (e.g. the Cold War and post-9/11 war on terror, and the role of Saudi Arabia and Iran).

Chapter 9: Conclusion

This study explored the question of Pakistan's national identity and the accompanying challenges, revealing that Pakistan's vision was never that of a theocratic or secular state. Pakistan was established on Islamic principles and Pakistan's constitution endorsed the rule of law, human equality, Shura-based government, social justice, and political accountability. Therefore, throughout the subcontinental Muslims' struggle for independence, these universal Islamic principles served as guiding lights. Moreover, it was not primarily one man's response to the significant historical dilemma that affected the Muslims' identity; rather, it reflected the soul of the vast majority of Muslims, regardless of whether they sought to benefit individually or not, and whether or not they lived in the region of the subcontinent that would constitute Pakistan. Therefore, Pakistan has been more than a 'piece of land' or another state on the world's political map; it is an ideology, vision, and destiny to those who have fought for it. Whatever the shortcomings and failures, and there have been many, this vision and idea have kept people's spirits up and determined the future course.

Pakistan emerged as an independent state, supposedly through peaceful negotiations and understanding between British representatives and Muslim and Hindu leaderships; however, millions died or migrated during partition. The idea of Pakistan was based on Muslim Islamic nationalism, which differentiated Muslims from other nations culturally, socially, and in every other aspect of life. Further, religious–social identity and the need for political authority to live according to the Muslims' beliefs were two critical and interdependent components of Pakistan's idea and vision. The leadership of the Pakistan Movement was undoubtedly devoted to this idea. This vision and destiny have driven, encouraged, and inspired the Muslim nation to fight, sacrifice, and suffer to construct the new state of Pakistan.

Jinnah believed in democratic principles and wanted to safeguard minorities' rights; however, he did not seek a secular state just because he advocated for minorities' rights. Jinnah never used the word 'secularism' in his speeches; instead, Islamic references are the central character of his speeches. Jinnah's speeches reflect Pakistan's explicit Islamic nature, which derives from the Qur'an and Sunnah of the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH), and indicates that the Pakistan he envisaged was an Islamic democratic welfare state wholly dedicated to treating its citizens equally in accordance with Islamic democracy, Islamic principles, social justice, and tolerance. Therefore, he favoured neither a secular nor a theocratic state. However, Jinnah believed that the Islamic society's vision of fairness, compassion and tolerance would eliminate the 'poison' of corruption, nepotism, mismanagement, and incompetence.

Further, when Jinnah pledged freedom of religion for everyone in Pakistan and stated that all citizens were allowed to visit their places of worship and that there would be no prejudice towards Muslims and non-Muslims as citizens of the state, he was not breaching any Islamic ideal or presenting Pakistan as a secular state. Therefore, this study demonstrates that Jinnah's addresses on 11 and 14 August 1947, known as the Gettysburg Address, reflect Pakistan's explicit Islamic nature, which derives from the Qur'an and Sunnah of the Prophet (PBUH). This is the Islamic society's vision of fairness, compassion, and tolerance. It would eliminate the 'poison' of corruption, nepotism, mismanagement, and incompetence. Pakistan would be founded on the Prophet's noble principles from the seventh century in Arabia. Further, Jinnah never used the word 'secular' in his speeches, but he constantly referred to Islamic principles.

In most of Jinnah's speeches, he emphasised Islamic principles and the Qur'an, which he believed would be the foundations of Pakistan's Islamic Constitution. On 7 March 1949, Prime Minister Liaqat Ali Khan introduced the Objectives Resolution in the Pakistan

Constituent Assembly, which affirmed the fundamental notion that God had sovereignty over the entire universe and that democracy should be exercised within "Islamic limits". Further, minorities were promised that their legitimate rights would be safeguarded and that they would have provisions to freely practise their religion and culture in accordance with Islam (Constituent Assembly debates, 1949, pp. 1–2). It is worth highlighting that the commitment to adhere to the mentioned principles is based on Islamic requirements.

Pakistan's first constitution, adopted in 1956, includes a pledge to bring all legislation into compliance with Islam. General Ayub Khan's government delivered Pakistan's second constitution in 1962, which reaffirmed adherence to Islamic-compliant laws. In 1973, Pakistan's National Assembly passed its third constitution, which was more Islamic in nature. Apart from the first two constitutions, which required that the only president of the republic be a Muslim, the third mandated that the prime minister be a Muslim as well. It obliged both the president and the prime minister to testify their belief in the finality of the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH). According to Jinnah's vision of Pakistan and Muslim nationalism (two-nation theory), these steps proved to be a source of legitimation.

Jinnah provided the subcontinental Muslims with their own territory (Pakistan) as well as feelings of pride, dignity, and identity. However, diverse ethnic and social communities had different ties with one another, and these ties varied over time. Therefore, Pakistan lacks a strong sense of identity or nationhood. Moreover, in the first two decades of Pakistan's creation, it lost half of the country following the secession of East Pakistan (now Bangladesh). Today, Pakistanis are struggling with what remains and striving to overcome ethnic conflicts.

In Pakistan, polarised politics has resulted in the nation's lack of democratic, economic, and political development. Pakistan has witnessed numerous major political transformations since

its inception in 1947, as different democratic and military governments ruled. However, Pakistan has been in the process of moving to parliamentary democracy since 2008. The Eighteenth Amendment passed in 2010 by the National Assembly is a significant move forward in fostering democracy, provincial autonomy, and good governance.

Pakistan has failed to develop a comprehensive framework for an efficient and honest government. The constitution's spirit was therefore never put into practice. As a result, most of Pakistan's governance indicators provide a gloomy picture of the country's situation. Reports show that corruption is still persistent, widespread, and systematic, as is the situation of other aspects of good governance, such as the rule of law, regulatory quality, efficacy, political stability, and accountability. Currently, Pakistan is passing through the gravest period of its history. So-called religious extremists, nationalists, and ethnic groups are the most significant threat to Pakistan's national identity. What is required are constitutional politics and power relations in which the state ensures social, economic, and political rights. A new social contract is formed in exchange, and constituent units acknowledge the nation's institutional and territorial legitimacy.

Finally, this research proves that Pakistan's national identity is Islamic, not secular. All three components (Muslim nationalism, Jinnah's vision, and Pakistan's constitution) of Pakistan's identity proved it. The secular camp refers to Jinnah's 11 August speech as a reference for a secular Pakistan. However, a fundamental weakness in the dialogue of the secular narrative is that it relies too much on the 11 August speech of Quaid-e-Azam and perhaps even totally relies on that one statement and its particular interpretation. Analysis of this speech proves that Jinnah believes that no one is forced to believe in the sanctity of the law following the Quranic injunction: "Let there be no compulsion in deen" (2:256). Instead, Jinnah meant that universal civil equality should be guaranteed, and personal faith (mazhab) should be kept out of the political sphere. Further, Jinnah's 11 August speech is no different in content or spirit

from early Muslim historical rule and the first Muslim political document, called the Misaq-i-Madina (Compact of Medina), which was said to have been penned by the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) in around 622 AD and was arguably the first constitution in the world that laid down the rules for "a political unit".

The Misaq-i-Madina guaranteed social, legal, and economic equality to all loyal citizens of the state without discrimination regarding caste, colour, creed, and community (e.g. Muslims, Jews). Jinnah made authoritative statements on Pakistan's national identity during his address to the National Assembly on 11 and 14 August 1947. Therefore, Jinnah functioned within an ideal Islamic context of tolerance and fairness for non-Muslims within an Islamic state. This research analysis proved that the implementation of the constitution in its true spirit could lead to developing a stronger sense of Pakistan's national identity and, accordingly, the process of nation-building.

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Glossary

BRITISH RAJ	British Colonial Rule
HAKMIYYAH	Sovereignty
HAKIM-E-ALA	Sovereignty Belongs to Allah (God)
ILM	Knowledge
MANSABDARI	Administrative System
MAZHAB	Religion
NAZRIYA	Ideology
QAZI	Judge
SARDAR	Tribal Chief
SIYASI	Political
SHIRK	Idolatry
SHARIA	Islamic Law, Jurisprudence
SULTAN	King
ULAMA	Islamic Scholars

Appendices

Appendix A: Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah Complete Address

to Pakistan's Constitution Assembly, 14 August

Mr President, Ladies and Gentlemen, "I cordially thank you, with the utmost sincerity, for the honor you have conferred upon me—the greatest honor that it is possible for this Sovereign Assembly to confer—by electing me as your first President. I also thank those leaders who have spoken in appreciation of my services and their personal references to me. I sincerely hope that with your support and your co-operation we shall make this Constituent Assembly an example to the world. The Constituent Assembly has got two main functions to perform. The first is the very onerous and responsible task of framing our future constitution of Pakistan and the second of functioning as a full and complete Sovereign body as the Federal Legislature of Pakistan. We have to do the best we can in adopting a provisional constitution for the Federal Legislature of Pakistan. You know really that not only we ourselves are wondering but, I think, the whole world is wondering at this unprecedented cyclonic revolution which has brought about the plan of creating and establishing two independent Sovereign Dominions in this sub-continent. As it is, it has been unprecedented; there is no parallel in the history of the world. This mighty sub-continent with all kinds of inhabitants has been brought under a plan which is titanic, unknown, unparalleled. And what is very important with regards to it is that we have achieved it peacefully and by means of a revolution of the greatest possible character.

"Dealing with our first function in this Assembly, I cannot make any well-considered pronouncement at this moment, but I shall say a few things as they occur to me. The first and the foremost thing that I would like to emphasize is this—remember that you are now a Sovereign legislative body and you have got all the powers. It, therefore, places on you the gravest responsibility as to how you should take your decisions. The first observation that I would like to make is this. You will no doubt agree with me that the first duty of a Government is to maintain law and order, so that the life, property and religious beliefs of its subjects are fully protected by the State. "The second thing that occurs to me is this. One of the biggest curses from which India is suffering—I do not say that other countries are free from it, but, I think, our condition is much worse—is bribery and corruption. That really is a poison. We must put that down with an iron hand and I hope that you will take adequate measures as soon as it is possible for this Assembly to do so. "Black-marketing is another curse. Well, I know that black-marketers are frequently caught and punished. According to our judicial notions sentences are passed, and sometimes fines only are imposed. Now you have to tackle this monster which today is a colossal crime against society, in our distressed conditions, when we constantly face shortage of food and or the essential commodities of life. A citizen who does black-marketing commits, I think, a greater crime than the biggest and most grievous of crimes. These black-marketers are really knowing, intelligent and ordinarily responsible people, and when they indulge in black-marketing, I think they ought to be very severely punished, because they undermine the entire system of control and regulation of food-stuffs and essential commodities, and cause wholesale starvation and want and even death. "The next thing that strikes me is this. Here again is a legacy which has been passed on to us. Along with many other things good and bad, has arrived this great evil— the evil of nepotism and jobbery. This evil must be crushed relentlessly. I want to make it quite clear that I shall never tolerate any kind of jobbery, nepotism or any influence directly or indirectly brought to bear upon me. Wherever I find that such a practice is in vogue, or is continuing anywhere, low or high, I shall certainly not countenance it. "I know there are people who do not quite agree with the division of Indian and the partition of the Punjab and Bengal. Much has been said against it, but now that it has been accepted, it is the duty of every one of us to loyally abide by it and honorably act according to the agreement which is now final and binding on all. But you must remember, as I have said, that this mighty revolution that has taken place is unprecedented. One can quite understand the feeling that exists between the two communities wherever one community is in majority and the other is in minority. But the question is whether it was possible or practicable to act otherwise than has been done. A division had to take place. On both sides, in Hindustan and Pakistan, there are sections of people who may not agree with it, who may not like it, but in my judgment there was no other solution.

and I am sure future history will record its verdict in favor of it. And what is more it will be proved by actual experience as we go on that that was the only solution of India's constitutional problem. Any idea of a United India could never have worked and in my judgment it would have led us to terrific disaster. May be that view is correct; may be it is not; that remains to be seen. All the same, in this division it was impossible to avoid the questions of minorities being in one Dominion or the other. Now that was unavoidable. There is no other

solution. Now what shall we do? Now, if we want to make this great State of Pakistan happy and prosperous we should wholly and solely concentrate on the well-being of the people, and especially of the masses and the poor. If you will work in co-operation, forgetting the past, burying the hatchet, you are bound to succeed. If you change your past and work together in a spirit that every one of you, no matter to what community he belongs, no matter to what community he belongs, no matter what relations he had with you in the past, no matter what is his color, caste or creed, is first, second and last a citizen of this State with equal rights, privileges and obligations there will be no end to the progress you will make. "I cannot emphasize it too much. We should begin to work in that spirit and in course of time all these angularities of the majority and minority communities—the Hindu community and the Muslim community—because even as regards Muslims you have Pathans, Punjabis, Shias, Sunnis and so on and among the Hindus you have Brahmins, Vaishnavas, Khatris, also Bengalese, Madrasis and so on—will vanish. Indeed if you ask me, this has been the biggest hindrance in the way of India to attain its freedom and independence, and but for this, we would have been free peoples long ago. No power can hold another nation, and specially a nation of 400 millions souls in subjection; nobody could have conquered you, and even if it had happened, nobody could have continued its hold on you for any length of time but for this. "Therefore, we must learn a lesson from this. You are free; you are free to go to your temples, you are free to go to your mosques or to any other places of worship in this State of Pakistan. You may belong to any religion or caste or creed—that has nothing to do with the business of the State. As you know, history shows that in England, conditions some time ago were much worse than those prevailing in India to-day. The Roman Catholics and the Protestants persecuted each other. Even now, there are some States in existence where there are discriminations made and bars imposed against a particular class. Thank God we are not starting in those days. We are starting in the days when there is no discrimination, no distinction between one community and another, no discrimination between one caste or creed and another. We are starting with this fundamental principle that we are all citizens and equal citizens of one State. The people of England, in course of time, had to face the realities of the situation and had to discharge the responsibilities and burdens placed upon them by the government of their country and they went through that fire step by step. Today you might say with justice that Roman Catholics and Protestants do not exist: what exists now is that every man is a citizen, an equal citizen, of Great Britain and they are all members of the Nation.

"Now, I think we should keep that in front of us as our ideal, and you will find that in course of time Hindus would cease to be Hindus and Muslims would cease to be Muslims, not in the religious sense, because that is the personal faith of each individual, but in the political sense as citizens of the State. "Well, gentlemen, I do not wish to take up any more of your time and thank you again for the honor you have done to me. I shall always be guided by the principles of justice and fair-play without any, as is put in the political language, prejudice or ill-will, in other words, partiality or favouritism. My guiding principle will be justice and complete impartiality, and I am sure that with your support and co-operation, I can look forward to Pakistan becoming one of the greatest Nations of the world.

"I have received a message from the United States of America addressed to me. It reads: I have the honour to communicate to you, in your Excellency's capacity as President of the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan, the following message which I have just received from the Secretary of the State of the United States:

On the occasion of the first meeting of the Constituent Assembly for Pakistan, I extend to you and to Members of the Assembly the best wishes of the government and the people of the United States for the successful conclusion of the great work you are about to undertake" (*Source: Ahmad, Khurshid Khan Yusufi, Speeches, Statements & Messages of the Quaid-e-Azam, vol. IV, Lahore: Bazm-i-Iqbal, 1996, pp. 2601–5*).

Appendix B: Ethics Approval

WESTERN SYDNEY
UNIVERSITY

HUMAN RESEARCH ETHICS COMMITTEE

6 November 2019
Doctor Jan Ali
School of Humanities and Communication Arts

Dear Jan,

Project Title: "Pakistani National Identity Formation: A Study of Secular and Islamist Narratives"

HREC Approval Number: H13416
Risk Rating: HREC - Moderate

I am pleased to advise the above research project meets the requirements of the National Statement on Ethical Conduct in Human Research 2007 (Updated 2018).

Ethical approval for this project has been granted by the Western Sydney University Human Research Ethics Committee. This HREC is constituted and operates in accordance with the National Statement on Ethical Conduct in Human Research 2007 (Updated 2018).

Approval of this project is valid from 6 November 2019 until 6 November 2022.

This protocol covers the following researchers:

Jan Ali, Amjad Amjad, Drew Cottle

Summary of Conditions of Approval

1. A progress report will be due annually on the anniversary of the approval date.

2. A final report will be due at the expiration of the approval period.

3. Any amendments to the project must be approved by the Human Research Ethics Committee prior to being implemented. Amendments must be requested using the HREC Amendment Request Form.

4. Any serious or unexpected adverse events on participants must be reported to the Human Research Ethics Committee via the Human Ethics Officer as a matter of priority.

5. Any unforeseen events that might affect continued ethical acceptability of the project should also be reported to the Committee as a matter of priority.

6. Consent forms are to be retained within the archives of the School or Research Institute and made available to the Committee upon request.

7. Approval is only valid while you hold a position or are enrolled at Western Sydney University. You will need to transfer your project or seek fresh ethics approval from your new institution if you leave Western Sydney University.

8. Project specific conditions:
There are no specific conditions applicable.

Please quote the registration number and title as indicated above in the subject line on all future correspondence related to this project. All correspondence should be sent to humanethics@westernsydney.edu.au as this email address is closely monitored.

Yours sincerely

Professor Elizabeth Deane
Presiding Member,
Western Sydney University Human Research Ethics Committee