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INTERGROUP RELATIONS AND STRATEGIES OF MINORITIES

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“Inter-group relations is a two-way affair. This means that to improve relations between groups both of the interacting groups have to be studied”.
(Lewin, K., 1946, p.151)

Introduction

Often we have the impression that the way things are is not the way things should be. We feel that we are members of a disadvantaged group and that we should do something about it. The history of mankind is full of examples of how certain groups try to influence status and power inequalities in intergroup relations in order to change the ingroup's disadvantaged social position. Recent examples that received large media attention are the uprising of people in northern Africa and the Middle East and huge manifestations in southern European countries that are not any longer ready to accept strong austerity measures taken by their governments. However, there are other less visible and less spectacular processes of social change that are going on permanently in all parts of the world.

The current chapter is dedicated to a deeper understanding of the social psychology of socially disadvantaged or devalued groups, particularly if they are minorities (e.g., Blanz, Mummendey, & Otten, 1995). We think that such a contribution is the best way to honour Maria Benedicta Monteiro, who herself has dedicated large part of her research to the question how relative status influences intergroup perceptions (Guinote, Mouro, Pereira, & Monteiro, 2007) and intergroup attitudes (Alexandre, Monteiro & Waldzus, 2007; Feddes, Monteiro, & Justo, 2013; Guerra et al., 2010; Monteiro, Guerra, Rebelo, 2009), research that has inspired the authors of this chapter in their own work over many years.

In this particular chapter we approach this issue by examining intergroup judgements of both minority members and members of their more powerful outgroups, in the light of often pervasive social reality constraints related to shared collective representations of social status or/and power inequalities (Alexandre, 2010; Ellemers, van Rijswijk, Roefs, & Simons, 1997; Waldzus, Mummendey, Wenzel, & Boettcher, 2004).

As group-based social hierarchies are characteristic of most human societies (e.g., Blumer, 1958; Bobo & Hutchings, 1996; Sidanius, Levin, Federico, & Pratto, 2001), a distinction can be made between groups that are considered as having a higher status position, which are usually perceived as valued, dominant and/or powerful, and groups that are considered as having a lower status position, which are usually considered as socially devalued, disadvantaged and/or powerless and that hold less privileges or resources (e.g., Tajfel, 1978, 1981; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Often, particularly in interethnic contexts, such status and power asymmetries co-vary with groups' size, for instance if in a certain country a majority dominates one or several less numerous minorities culturally, linguistically and politically (Tajfel, 1981). Differentiation based on relative status and/or power positions influence how these groups perceive themselves and how they are perceived by others (Verkuyten, 2000). In the current chapter the focus is on intergroup relations in which such minorities of lower status are involved in intergroup relations with higher status majorities.

Is There Power In The Few? Minorities And Their Challenges

An important milestone in research on minority groups was Moscovici's work on minority influence in the 1970's. His work made it clear that majorities do not just exert social influence over minorities, but that minorities and majorities can simultaneously exert influence over each other (Moscovici & Personnaz, 1980). This scientific move was important and still is, as apart from some exceptions (e.g. Barreto & Ellemers, 2009; Bergsieker, Shelton, & Richeson, 2010; Goffman, 1968; Major & O'Brien, 2005; Schmitt &

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Branscombe, 2002; Schmitt, Ellemers, & Branscombe, 2003; Tajfel, 1978; Wright, Taylor, & Moghaddam, 1990; Wright & Tropp, 2002) social psychological research has traditionally treated lower status minorities as rather passive targets (Lorenzi-Cioldi, 1988). Their point of view in the analysis of the nature of intergroup dynamics has typically been considered to be of less importance than the attitudes of majority group members (Alexandre, 2010; Demoulin, Leyens, & Dovidio, 2009; Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006; Shelton, 2000; Ryan, Hunt, Weible, Peterson, & Casas, 2007). More recently, there has been an increasing interest in minorities' points of view (e.g., Outten, Schmitt, Garcia, & Branscombe, 2009). However, even these attempts rarely go beyond the role of disadvantaged groups as victims of discrimination. For instance, in 2008 the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA, 2009) conducted the first European Minorities and Discrimination survey on experiences of discriminatory treatment, racist crimes, and the report (or not) of complaints or incidents. What has been neglected so far is how minorities can actively influence the construction of social reality, that is, of large scale contexts and standards, thereby changing frames of reference that perpetuate their relative disadvantage (Howarth, Wagner, Kessi, & Sen, 2012).

When studying minority members as agents in behalf of their group it is important not to limit such research to the rather specific phenomenon of collective action, which directly challenges asymmetric power and status relations, as is the case in the above mentioned examples (Dixon, Levine, Reicher & Durrheim, 2012). Collective action is not the only response to inequality that minorities have at their disposal. It is also important to take into account that intergroup relations do not exist in a vacuum (Tajfel, 1981). Intergroup relations play out on the backdrop of a collectively constructed social context. This social context includes, allegedly shared standards, values and norms that help maintain the system of stratified social structure (Turner & Reynolds, 2001). While the context might be consensual to a degree, it can also serve as a playground of disagreement.

The analysis of such disagreements is particularly relevant, as a growing body of research shows that higher and lower status groups endorse different perspectives or ideologies on intergroup relations, such as differences in the endorsement of diversity/pluralism and multiculturalism versus assimilation and colour-blindness or differences in the endorsement of asymmetric status hierarchies and inequality (e.g., Deaux, Reid, Martin, & Bikmen, 2006; Demoulin et al., 2009; Dovidio et al., 2009; Farley, 2005; Hehman et al., 2012; Ryan et al., 2007). Therefore, a full understanding of intergroup relations can only be accomplished by encompassing multiple perspectives (e.g., Dafflon, 1999; Demoulin et al., 2009; Lewin, 1948).

Social Fight Or Flight: Coping With Minority Status

Social reality that is characterized by status and/or power asymmetries impacts intergroup dynamics in general. For example, majority group members tend to dislike practices reflecting minorities' unique values (Saroglou, Lamkaddem, van Pachterbeke, & Buxant, 2009). It can also make it more difficult for members of minority groups to consider their ingroup's values and attitudes as universal and superior, when compared to relevant majority outgroups' values and attitudes (Axelrod & Hammond, 2003). Socially valued majorities holding a dominant and powerful social position often develop a sense of "ownership" over a self-relevant inclusive category that they share with devalued minority groups (Deaux, 2006a, 2006b; Hornsey & Hogg, 2000). For example, in the U.S. White Americans often see themselves as being more "American" than racial minorities (Doanne, 1997). Therefore, they tend to feel more entitled to privileges and resources (Wenzel, 2004). Even when these assumptions are challenged, it is easy for members of dominating groups to endorse belief systems supporting the preservation of social inequalities (e.g., Alexandre, 2010; Blumer, 1958; Dovidio et al., 2009; Morrison, Fast, & Ybarra, 2009). Such belief systems often encourage negative attitudes, stereotypes, and/or feelings towards devalued or disadvantaged minority groups (e.g., Stephan & Stephan, 1985; Deaux, 2006a, 2006b), and further legitimize their negative treatment within society (e.g., Deschamps, Vala, Marinho, Costa Lopes, & Cabecinhas, 2005; Ellemers & Barreto, 2001; Pettigrew, 1998).

Such minority groups are often under a cognitive-affective crossfire (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). As Lewin (1948) puts it, "one of the most severe obstacles in the way of improvement seems to be the notorious lack of confidence and self-esteem of most minority groups. Minority groups tend to accept the implicit judgment of those who have status even where the judgment is directed against themselves. There are many forces which tend to develop in the children, adolescents, and adults of minorities deep-seated antagonism to their own group. An over-degree of submissiveness, guilt, emotionality, and other causes and forms of ineffective behaviour follows" (p. 151).

The degree to which minorities accept the judgements of the higher status majority varies from case to case. Following Tajfel (1978), a *continuum* can be defined in minority members' behaviour and attitudes, where acceptance of inferiority and rejection of the own group's inferior status can be considered the two extremes. Research has been providing evidence for both: On the one hand, Social Identity Theory postulates a degree of so-called consensual discrimination (Rubin & Hewstone, 2004) and there is evidence suggesting that members of devalued groups at times accept group-based inequalities and the relative superiority of members of higher status groups, a phenomenon that some scholars interpret as 'system-justification' or as ideologies that legitimize group-based inequalities (e.g., Jost, Banaji, & Nosek, 2004; Major & Schmader, 2002; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999; see however, Brandt, 2013). Indeed, social inequalities can become "self-fulfilling prophecies" for minorities (e.g., Snyder, Tanke, & Berscheid, 1977): It has been shown that negative attitudes towards certain social groups lead members of these groups to behave in a way that confirms such negative expectations (e.g., Word, Zanna, & Cooper, 1974; see also Major & O'Brien, 2005), presumably because they internalize inferiority or face additional concerns resulting from those expectations. Moreover, the acceptance of relative social inferiority (e.g., Allport, 1954; Jost & Banaji, 1994; Tajfel & Turner, 1979) has often detrimental consequences for self-efficacy and performance (e.g., Steele, 1997; Steele & Aronson, 1995), well-being and psychological distress (e.g., Broman, Mavaddat, & Hsu, 2000; Crocker & Major, 1989; Barreto & Ellemers, 2003; Outten et al., 2009; Richman & Leary, 2009; Twenge & Crocker, 2002).

One might be tempted to consider such accepting of relative inferiority simply as "false consciousness" (Adorno, 1954/2003; Marx, 1872/1969), however, it is often hard to avoid due to reality constrains in everyday life (Ellemers et al., 1997; Spears, Jetten, & Doosje, 2001; Yzerbyt & Corneille, 2005). That is, to ignore such reality constraints minority members would have to disconnect themselves from socially relevant belief-systems that are behind the social organization of large sectors of society. We will come back to such a solution later on when addressing minorities with strong belief systems.

However, even if minorities partially accept relative inferiority, it does not mean that lower status groups cannot at the same time display "reality-constrained ingroup favouritism" (Ellemers et al., 1997, p. 188), that is, using more subtle ways of achieving ingroup positive distinctiveness (Oldmeadow & Fiske, 2010; Tajfel & Turner, 1979).

Tajfel and Turner (1979) have addressed some of the psychological and behavioural strategies that minority members use to face or to change their (negative) social position (Blanz et al., 1998; Ellemers, 2001) and thereby achieve self-enhancement. These so called *identity management strategies* depend on the ideological context (Turner, 1999; Turner & Reynolds, 2001; Verkuyten & Reijerse, 2008) shaping group members shared beliefs about the socio-structural characteristics of the intergroup relation they are in: When status differences between groups are perceived as stable and legitimate, but, members are believed to be able to move freely between groups, these permeability of boundaries promotes an individualistic strategy of social mobility. In this case, individuals can distance themselves from their devalued ingroup which in some cases means that they can identify with the valued outgroup (see also Verkuyten & Reijerse, 2008)². When intergroup boundaries are perceived as impermeable, as is often the case with ethnic and racial groups, minority individuals tend to be more inclined to adopt collective strategies, rather than pursue individual mobility. These collective strategies generally fall under two categories: social competition and social creativity. Social competition includes collective action, open hostility and conflict, whereas social creativity involves rather a reframing of the intergroup relation that allows for positive intergroup comparisons. For the purpose of this chapter we will mainly focus on the latter (i.e., social creativity), as it has found less attention so far in the literature.

Social Creativity

One type of social creativity strategy involves avoiding comparisons that are unfavourable for the ingroup, by attempting to create new comparison dimensions that are favourable (see also Lemaine, Kastersztein, & Personnaz, 1978). Such a strategy allows group members to see the ingroup more positively without necessarily questioning the superiority of the outgroup on the status-relevant dimensions (see also Mummendey & Schreiber, 1983). One of the classical studies showing the use of a social creativity strategy

² However, there are psychological boundaries for social mobility, such as high ingroup identification that prevents people from trying to change their group membership, especially when such membership is chosen (e.g., Jetten & Branscombe, 2009).

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was conducted by Lemaine (1974). He engaged two groups of children that were camping in a competition that aimed at building the best hut. For one of the groups only a set of inappropriate materials was provided, which put its members in a disadvantaged position for winning the competition, compared to the members of the other group of children. As a consequence, he found that children that belonged to this group created new dimensions of comparison with the outgroup that favour their ingroup (e.g., making a good garden). Such socially creative strategies have the effect of redefining the position of the group using unorthodox dimensions that tend to favour the ingroup without directly challenging the outgroup as would happen in social competition strategies (Douglas, McGarty, Bliuc, & Lala, 2005). They are based on a motivation to reduce the impact of lower status groups' negative social identity, especially if the status relation is perceived as legitimate and stable (Rubin & Hewstone, 2004).

Social creativity can serve both individual and collective functions. For example, if creativity is about changing comparison dimensions, it is group level social creativity, whereas focussing on areas in which oneself performs better than other members of one's ingroup is more an individual level strategy (Branscombe & Ellemers, 1998). In the same vein, processes and outcomes of social creativity can be looked upon at individual or collective levels. Crocker and Major (1989) suggest that devaluing dimensions selectively, that is, valuing more the dimensions in which the ingroup is better, is related to higher levels of group members' individual self-esteem. For instance, researchers studying ego-defence (e.g., Crocker & Major, 1989) or ego-justification perspectives (see Major & Schmader, 2002) postulate that members of devalued groups tend to devalue domains in which their own group has poor or negative outcomes (e.g., showing academic disengagement). However, social creativity can also have political implications. The use of creativity strategies can imply rejecting mainstream norms and thereby differentiating one's group from more privileged groups (e.g., Schmitt & Branscombe, 2002), therefore, strengthening the ingroup collective esteem and members' well-being (Outten et al., 2009; Outten & Schmitt, 2014).

Social creativity can also correspond to attempts to enhance the ingroup's social position through comparisons with third groups that are not the majority, particularly with other devalued groups. Brown (1978) analysed an intergroup setting involving three groups from an engineering factory, one with a higher status position and two with a lower status position. Generally, results showed that all the three groups tend to favour the ingroup through a positive differentiation process: The higher status group distanced itself from the other two, whereas members of the other two groups minimized the difference between the ingroup and the higher status group while at the same time trying to distance themselves from the other lower status group.

There is evidence that positive differentiation with other devalued groups occurs at early ages. Alexandre et al (2007) found that 9-13 year-old black Portuguese, white Portuguese and gypsy Portuguese children use this social creativity strategy. The authors asked children from all three groups to indicate their preferences for contact with ingroup or outgroup members. Children of all the three groups showed preference for contact with children of the higher status group (white-Portuguese), but the children of the minority groups showed a similar pattern as the workers from Brown's (1978) study. They expressed an equally strong preference for ingroup targets but less preference for targets of the other devalued outgroup. The same pattern was found for internal (vs. external) attribution of success to targets from the three groups involved (Figure 1). That means that the expressed high preference for the ingroup does not only result from some closeness or familiarity, but indeed indicates a positive ingroup evaluation rather than internalization of the devaluation that these minority children experience from outgroup children. Parts of these results were replicated more recently (Feddes et al., 2013)

[Insert Figure 1]

Prototypicality Matters: The Role Of Superordinate Categories

Traditionally, social creativity strategies have been considered as less effective for the promotion of social change than social competition, because they presumably only change minority members' representations instead of directly changing asymmetrical power relations in society (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). However, recent research on the role of more inclusive, superordinate categories that include several subgroups (i.e., both minority and majority groups) seem to suggest that creative contributions of minorities to the collective construction of such superordinate categories might actually carry the potential to trigger social change as well (Subasic, Reynolds & Turner, 2008).

To understand this potential of social creativity, it is important to analyse status and/or power asymmetries in terms of prototypicality differences within social categories. Minority groups have often to

deal with their alleged lack of prototypicality. For instance, when people think of US-Americans they might rather imagine a White, Christian, male American, rather than a Black, Muslim or female American. Following the Ingroup Projection Model (Mummendey & Wenzel, 1999; Wenzel, Mummendey & Waldzus, 2007), such prototypicality constructions are often dominated by majorities, but even if the odds are not very high, minorities might be able challenge such ethnocentric prototypicality constructions, which, as we will see, can have tremendous consequences for minorities' self-definition.

The Ingroup Projection Model was developed by Mummendey and Wenzel (1999). It adopts self-categorization theory's (Turner, 1985; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987) assumption that the evaluation of intergroup similarities and differences is only possible if one's ingroup and a relevant outgroup are compared with respect to a broader category in which both groups are included. Thus, part of the devaluation of minorities results from social comparisons within a larger categorical context (e.g., Black and White Americans are compared as Americans). The prototype of a superordinate category provides the norms or standards according to which the subgroups are compared and evaluated. Relative ingroup prototypicality is defined as "the degree to which the ingroup is perceived to be more (or less) prototypical for a given superordinate group than the outgroup" (Wenzel et al., 2007, p. 336). Because "self-categories tend to be positive" (Turner et al., 1987, p. 58-59), the more similar a subgroup is to the prototype of the superordinate category, the more positively it will be evaluated. Moreover, the Ingroup Projection Model also adopts Social Identity Theory's (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) assumption that groups tend to strive for a positive social identity. Therefore it postulates that superordinate categories may trigger ethnocentric intergroup comparisons (Gumpłowicz, 1883, 1887; Sumner, 1906). Other groups are evaluated not according to neutral standards, but according to the standards that reflect the own group's characteristics and values (e.g., Boen, Vanbeselaere, & Wostyn, 2010; Devos & Banaji, 2005; Devos, Gavin, & Quintana, 2010; Imhoff, Dotsch, Bianchi, Banse, & Wigboldus, 2011; Paladino & Vaes, 2009; Ufkes, Otten, Van der Zee, Giebles, & Dovidio, 2012; Waldzus et al. 2004; Wenzel, Mummendey, Weber, & Waldzus, 2003), thereby rendering the outgroup more negative, as it naturally deviates from these standards. In other words, group members tend to *project* distinctive ingroup attributes onto the inclusive category and therefore the ingroup (its attributes and values) is considered to be more similar to the prototype of the (positive) inclusive category than the outgroup (*ingroup projection*)³.

Ingroup projection is not an inevitable process, which means that not every group perceives itself to be more prototypical than other groups. Several predictors of ingroup projection have been studied, particularly social identification (e.g., Wenzel et al., 2003), the cognitive representation of a given superordinate category (e.g., Waldzus et al., 2004; Wenzel et al., 2003), as well as its valence (Wenzel et al., 2003, Study 3)⁴.

While there are differences in the extent to which groups project, depending on the above-mentioned moderators, ingroup projection is a pervasive tendency. It partly results from cognitive biases (e.g., Machunsky & Meiser, 2009, 2013; Rosa & Waldzus, 2012), but to be prototypical is also highly desirable, particularly when superordinate categories are positive. Prototypicality leads to more security in the ingroup's position (Jetten, Branscombe & Spears, 2002), and it gives the ingroup more power to define the prototype of the superordinate category (Reicher & Hopkins, 2001). This motivational hypothesis is conceptually similar to positive distinctiveness (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) and goes in line with Turner et al.'s (1987) argument that "ethnocentrism (...) depends upon the perceived prototypicality of the ingroup in comparison with relevant outgroups (relative prototypicality) in terms of the valued superordinate self-category that provides the basis of the intergroup comparison" (p. 61). Research has found that the higher the ingroup's relative prototypicality, the more negative is the evaluation of outgroups that are different from the

³Ingroup projection is similar to, but not the same as, the false consensus effect (Ross, Green, & House, 1977) and social projection (Allport, 1924; Krueger 2007). At a group level, it corresponds to an overestimation of ingroup prototypicality (Kessler & Mummendey, 2009; Mark & Edward, 1995), and differs from *social projection* not only theoretically but also empirically (Bianchi, Machunsky, Steffens & Mummendey, 2009; Machunsky & Meiser, 2009). Whereas ingroup projection describes a generalization process that is made from the ingroup to the superordinate category (of attributes and values) with important implications for intergroup evaluation (intergroup level), social projection implies a generalization of the individual self to the ingroup (see also Waldzus, 2009) and is relevant for the representation of an ingroup's prototype (interpersonal level).

⁴ Other predictors have also been tested, though it is not our purpose to discuss them deeply: intergroup threat (Ullrich, Christ, & Schlueter, 2006), conditions of information processing (e.g., Machunsky & Meiser, 2009, 2013; Rosa & Waldzus, 2012), and group goals (Sindic & Reicher, 2008).

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ingroup(e.g., Alexandre, 2010; Boen et al., 2010; Hahn, Judd, & Park, 2010; Kessler et al., 2009; Machunsky, Meiser & Mummendey, 2009; Tseung-Wong & Verkuyten, 2010; van Leeuwen, van Knippenberg, & Ellemers, 2003; Waldzus et al., 2003; Waldzus & Mummendey, 2004; Waldzus, Mummendey, & Wenzel, 2005; Wenzel et al., 2003). This is especially consequential in cases of status asymmetry because, through projection, high status groups will tend to perceive the asymmetry as justifiable and legitimate (Weber, Mummendey, & Waldzus, 2002; Sibley, 2010).

Ingroup Projection In Asymmetric Intergroup Relations

Because groups disagree in the extent of prototypicality they assign to ingroup and outgroup(s) (Imhoff et al., 2011; Waldzus et al., 2004), the perception that being different means being worse is likely to be reciprocal for both ingroup and outgroup(s). However, in asymmetric intergroup relations minorities seem to have fewer possibilities for ingroup projection. It is not yet completely clear why this is the case, but some prototypicality cues that seem to be used by many people to infer prototypicality make it more likely that majority prototypes come into people's minds when they think about the superordinate category. Such cues are for example being simply more people (e.g., heterosexuals as compared to homosexuals), having been member of the superordinate category for a long time (e.g., local population as compared to immigrants) or simply overlap in the names of the subgroup and the superordinate category (e.g. European Union and Europe; Americans of the US and Americans of the American continent; men when used to talk about humans). Some majorities even get so used to take their subgroup as *pars-pro-toto* that their subgroup identity, such as Non-disabled people, West-Germans or ethnically White Americans, somehow fades away or becomes very implicit (Doanne, 1997) Thus, "(...) it is minorities in particular who are likely to find social reality to be a stumbling block for claims of prototypicality" (Wenzel et al., 2007, p. 364). In line with this reasoning, research has shown that ingroup projection is affected by reality constraints, that is, by status and power asymmetries between groups (e.g., Devos & Banaji, 2005; Waldzus, 2004, Study 3). Minorities often consider the majority outgroup to be more prototypical than the own minority group.

Minorities' Ingroup Projection

Members of minority groups are often perceived to deviate more from desired societal norms and values, relative to members of majority groups (Turner, 1985). These social asymmetries can lead to an intergroup consensus in terms of prototypicality perceptions, as both minorities and majorities might agree that minority members are less prototypical for a common superordinate category, and therefore inferior to members of the majority. Supporting this notion, Waldzus et al. (2004, Study 3), examined prototypicality perceptions among East and West Germans, and found that members of both groups agreed that West Germans were the more prototypical subgroup for the superordinate category Germans. Such findings suggest that ingroup projection can be viewed as an adaptive perception that takes into account social reality asymmetries. Most importantly, however, in this study there was still a divergence between both subgroups. The constraints posited by social reality lead members of the lower status minority to recognize the relative superiority of the outgroup but groups disagreed about the difference in typicality between East Germans and West Germans for Germans in general. The minority perceived a smaller prototypicality difference between the groups than the majority did.

Devos and Banaji (2005) found similar results in the U.S. with White and Black participants. Black Americans considered White Americans to be highly prototypical of the superordinate American category, likely due to reality constraints (Yzerbyt & Corneille, 2005). Nevertheless, there was disagreement between the two groups when came to the relative prototypicality assigned. Black Americans did not rate their ingroup as low in prototypicality as Whites did, suggesting that Blacks participants might have engaged in ingroup projection.

Hence, although minorities often take into account social reality in their relative prototypicality judgements (Alexandre, 2010), disagreement about such aspects might indicate some resistance of the minority to completely accept the status quo defined by the majority. Such disagreement, if expressed persistently, might contribute to a change in social discourse and thereby promote social change in the long run, particularly when minorities advocate increasing tolerance rather than through conversion strategies (e.g., Prislín & Fielson, 2009). Accordingly, Waldzus et al. (2004) assume "that strategic concerns about the positive identity, status and power of one's group should render claims for prototypicality an argument in a discourse, be it with ingroup members, outgroup members or external observers" (pp. 397-398). Although we

are not aware of respective research in these contexts, one can easily imagine how important such prototypicality claims are for various minority groups such as homosexual couples claiming their rights to marry and to adopt children, disabled persons claiming their right to have public spaces adapted to their needs or women claiming equal recognition for their work.

The Role Of Complexity

Questioning asymmetric prototypicality constellations and disagreeing with the majority's view is one step. Is it possible, however, to convince majorities and even some members of the own minority group that consensus is possible about equal prototypicality between minorities and majorities? A partial answer to that question comes from research on the cognitive representation of superordinate categories. Like social categories in general, superordinate categories are mentally represented, at least partly, as prototypes (Turner et al., 1987). According to Rosch (1978) the prototype of a category can be described as "those members of a category that most reflect the redundancy structure of the category as a whole" or "the clearest cases of category membership defined operationally by people's judgements of goodness of membership in the category" (pp 36-37). As long as there is a clearly defined prototype, minorities are at disadvantage when it comes to being perceived as the subgroup most representative of superordinate category. However, Mummendey and Wenzel (1999) argue that relative ingroup prototypicality may be dependent upon the definability of the superordinate category. A relatively undefined prototype can undermine ingroup projection as it does not provide a sufficient basis for claims of high prototypicality. Under certain circumstances superordinate categories can be assumed to be relatively weakly defined (Rosch, Mervis, Gray, Johnson, & Boyes-Braem, 1976), and they can vary in their degree of clarity (Hogg, Cooper-Shaw, & Holzworth, 1993) or definition. Apart from low clarity or vagueness (Waldzus et al., 2003), the complexity of the representation of superordinate categories has been found to influence relative prototypicality judgments (Peker, Crisp, & Hogg, 2010; Waldzus et al., 2003, 2005). Mummendey and Wenzel (1999) suggest that the representation of a certain superordinate category can be *complex*, if the "distribution of representative members on the prototypical dimension is (...) multimodal" (p.167); that is, "distinctive positions on the dimensions of the prototype can be perceived as equally prototypical or normative" (p. 168; see also Waldzus, 2010). If superordinate categories are complex, they are explicitly diverse and different groups can be considered prototypical and normative for that category (Mummendey & Wenzel, 1999; Waldzus et al., 2003; Meireles, 2007). Thus, a complex representation might mitigate the existence of a simple or clearly defined prototype (e.g., Machunsky et al, 2009)⁵. For instance, in one study with Germans and Poles as sub-groups and Europe as the superordinate category (Waldzus et al., 2003, Study 2), complexity was manipulated by asking German participants to write about the diversity (vs. unity) of Europe, assuming that this kind of manipulation would generate the activation of different dimensions of the superordinate category and therefore a more diverse representation of this category (see also Waldzus et al., 2005). As predicted, they found that in the high complexity condition relative prototypicality of Germans compared to Poles was lower than in the control condition (see Peker et al., 2010 and Waldzus et al., 2005 for replications).

Although related in several ways, complexity as it has been defined within ingroup projection research should be distinguished from *multicultural ideologies* (e.g., Wolsko, Park, Judd, & Wittenbrink, 2006; Verkuyten, 2005; Verkuyten, & Brug, 2004). Whereas the former corresponds to a cognitive representation of a given group, multicultural ideologies refer to belief systems about a given society as a whole (Waldzus, 2010). Both concepts are, though, related insofar as endorsement of a multicultural ideology might facilitate the establishment of complex representations of superordinate categories and vice versa.

Complex representations, in particular, can play an important role in the identity management of members of lower-status minority groups. They may be a way to turn a secure (stable, legitimate) asymmetric intergroup relation into an insecure one, by providing a desirable alternative to the status quo. Moreover, they

⁵Complexity as it was conceptualized within ingroup projection research is conceptually different from (work-group) *diversity* as it is defined in organizational science (e.g., van Knippenberg, de Dreu, & Homan, 2004): Generally, the latter refers to two major aspects, *social category diversity*, that is, differences in visible attributes (e.g., gender, race/ethnicity, age), and *informational/functional diversity*, which is related to less detectable attributes (e.g., educational background). Diversity in that sense corresponds to characteristics of the members, which is also closer to the idea of variability or heterogeneity postulated by several researchers (e.g., Judd, Park, Ryan, Brauer, & Kraus, 1995; Park & Judd, 1990). The focus is mainly on differences between (sub)groups rather than a particular representation of a given superordinate category (e.g., organization).

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allow for such social change to be achieved without necessarily generating intergroup conflict, as they also affect intergroup perceptions of majority members for whom complex representations of superordinate categories might be more acceptable than a simple loss of the dominating position. For instance, Prislun and Filson (2009) found that minority-effected social change that undermined the majority's dominating position affected majority members' identification less negatively if it was achieved via advocating tolerance for diversity of possible viewpoints, which corresponds to a complex representation of superordinate categories, than when it was achieved by converting majority members to the minority's position. Such research can help to understand several historical developments that have led to more equal intergroup status positions, such as reduction in institutionalized racism and sexism and the emancipation of homosexuals in several societies (e.g., Subasic et al., 2008).

In sum, there are reasons to assume that inducing complex representations of superordinate categories as part of a shared overall belief system can reduce prejudice among members of the dominant group (Waldzus et al., 2005) and increase social identity of minorities, without undermining the positive social identity of the majority. Is there any empirical evidence that complex representations actually lead to consensus about more or less equal prototypicality between minority and majority members? For such balance in prototypicality judgments it would not only have to decrease the relative prototypicality of the majority from the point of view of majority members, but also to increase relative prototypicality of minority members from their own point of view. Across three studies Alexandre (2010) examined whether the effect of complex representations of (positive) self-relevant superordinate categories on relative ingroup prototypicality is moderated by status. Using both natural (Study 1) and with artificial groups (Studies 2-3), she found that when minority groups are presented with a more complex representation of a positive superordinate category, they tend to increase the degree to which they perceive their ingroup as prototypical of the superordinate category, more than majority groups do (Figure 2).

[Insert Figure 2]

Negative Superordinate Categories

The same logic seems to work when negative instead of positive superordinate categories are used as frame of reference for intergroup comparisons. Although prototypes of social categories representing ingroups are usually positive (Hogg et al., 1993) and although self-categories "tend to be evaluated positively and that there are motivational pressures to maintain this state of affairs" (Turner et al., 1987, p. 57) it is true that sometimes people can belong to social categories that have a negative connotation. Groups can be reference groups (Allport, 1954) even if they are negative, and they can also be used as a comparison frame for intergroup evaluations. Under some circumstances people do identify with social categories that are negatively evaluated (e.g., Mlicki, & Ellemers, 1996). After the 9/11 terrorist attack countries with a strong Islamic influence were more negatively than positively evaluated by North Americans and Western Europeans reflecting concerns about terrorism (e.g., Kalkan, Layman, & Uslaner, 2009). What can we expect in terms of prototypicality judgements when more inclusive categories have a negative connotation? Wenzel et al. (2003) suggested that when inclusive categories are negatively evaluated the meaning of prototypicality changes. Being prototypical for a negative superordinate category should have negative implications for the ingroup. Wenzel et al. (2003, Study 3) found support for this hypothesis. In a computer-based experiment they found that the evaluation of the reference standard moderated prototypicality perceptions. More concretely, they manipulated the valence of Europe by asking German participants (one of the subgroups) to type into an open text-field their thoughts about either the positive or the negative aspects of the inclusive category (Europe). In the positive condition they found the usual positive and negative relations of relative ingroup prototypicality with ingroup identification and attitudes towards the outgroup, respectively. In the negative superordinate category condition, however, these relations were reversed. The less German participants identified with Germans, the more they saw them relatively prototypical, and the more they saw them as prototypical, the more positive were their attitudes towards Poles (outgroup)⁶.

⁶More recently, Bianchi et al. (2009, Study 2) showed that ingroup projection depends not only on the valence of the superordinate category, but also on the valence of the ingroup: participants (German students) were first asked to think about Germans in general, then, the positivity of the image of such category was manipulated. Following Schwarz, et al.(1991) half of the participants were asked to write down three positive aspects of Germans (positive ingroup image condition), and the other half to write down twelve positive aspects of the same group (less positive ingroup image condition; note that the method is based on the difficulty that members will have to list twelve instead of only three

Alexandre (2010) tested whether complexity will also lead to consensual equal prototypicality for minorities and majorities when the superordinate category is negative. More specifically, in two studies (Study 4 with Black and White Portuguese and Study 5 with artificial groups) she tested the interaction of group status and complexity of superordinate categories in perceptions of relative ingroup prototypicality when those categories are negative. In a context in which a superordinate category is negatively evaluated (e.g., criminals in Portugal in Study 4), members of a devalued group (Black Portuguese) might perceive themselves to be more prototypical than the advantaged outgroup (White Portuguese). The question was whether this unfavourable negative prototypicality decreases when the representation of the superordinate category is complex. Overall she found in both studies that prototypicality perceptions were constrained by status differences. Lower-status minority groups perceived themselves and were perceived by the outgroup as less prototypical of a positive, but as more prototypical of a negative superordinate category than members of the higher-status majority group. Most importantly, complexity helped members of the lower status groups distance themselves from the negative superordinate category by claiming less relative ingroup prototypicality (Figure 3).

[Insert Figure 3]

Minorities' Claiming Higher Prototypicality

In none of the cases with positive superordinate categories that we have discussed so far did minorities find conditions to perceive themselves as more prototypical than majorities. The reason, we propose, lies in the reality constraints discussed above. However, is it possible that minorities can stay unaffected by such reality constraints and freely engage in ingroup projection? Despite an observable tendency of minorities to share part of the majorities view, it is also possible to identify particular minority groups that perceive themselves to be superior or more prototypical of a certain inclusive category that they share with a higher status group (e.g., Rosa, 2011; Rosa, Alexandre, & Waldzus, 2011).

Examples of such groups are those with strong beliefs and groups that consider themselves to be representative of social change on the level of more inclusive, superordinate categories. For example, a strong belief system can be a form of social identity (Ysseldyk, Matheson, & Anisman, 2010) which is self-selected. Therefore one can expect strong identification (an important moderator of ingroup projection, e.g. Ullrich et al., 2006; Wenzel et al., 2007) within strong belief groups (Jetten & Branscombe, 2009). Rosa (2011) hypothesized that unlike most minorities that show outgroup rather than ingroup projection, minorities whose group is based on a strong belief (e.g., religious groups, political/environmental activists, etc.) should consider themselves highly prototypical for a superordinate category that is belief-related.

Consistent with that reasoning, in a study with Catholics (majority) and Evangelical Protestants (minority) in Portugal, she found that, although members of the Protestant minority perceived their status, as well as meta-perceptions of relative prototypicality (i.e., how they are seen by the others), to be lower, they considered themselves even more prototypical than the Catholic majority for the superordinate category of Christians in Portugal. Interestingly, the Protestant minority showed the pattern usually found in unquestioned majorities. Rosa and Waldzus (2012) had shown different sources of ingroup projection among majorities, depending on perceptions about the security of the intergroup context. For secure majorities, whose higher status is not challenged, ingroup projection stems from a cognitive bias (i.e., reduced under high accuracy instructions, when participants are instructed to think twice before they answer), driven by rather unspecific motives such as cognitive efficiency. In contrast, for insecure majorities, whose higher status is questioned and instable, ingroup projection is the result of socially motivated cognition (e.g., defense motivated and therefore not reduced or even increased under high accuracy instructions).

For the strong belief minority (Protestants in Portugal), relative ingroup prototypicality was reduced under high accuracy instructions, indicating that it was a bias motivated by cognitive efficiency rather than identity defense (Figure 4). These data suggest that this minority group is unaffected by the reality constraints that minorities usually face.

[Insert Figure 4]

How is that possible? Does the strong belief of these people make them blind to social reality, so that they are unable to adapt their prototypicality judgments to the social context? Rosa (2011) hypothesised

positive aspects. Participants displayed more ingroup projection, that is, they considered their ingroup to be more relatively prototypical, in the positive ingroup image condition than in the less positive image condition.

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that this is not the case. She conducted a similar field experiment with another sample of Evangelical Protestants, in which the same minority (Evangelical Protestants) was comparing to the dominant majority (Catholics) based on a belief-unrelated superordinate category (Portuguese) or a belief-related superordinate category (Christians in the Portuguese context). It was found that the so called “reality constraints” were only ignored in the belief-related context. Although in both superordinate category conditions Protestants perceived their status and meta-perceptions of prototypicality to be lower than those of the majority, they only showed strong ingroup projection in the belief-related superordinate category condition, and again this was reduced by high accuracy instructions, replicating the finding of the previous study. In the belief-unrelated superordinate category condition, the same Protestant minority showed the pattern usually expected for minorities. Their prototypicality judgments corresponded with reality constraints, such that they perceived minorities to be less prototypical than majorities (Figure 5).

[Insert Figure 5]

Thus, the high relative prototypicality claimed by strong belief minorities – which seems to indicate that the group is immune against shared collective constructions of social reality that are dominated by the majority outgroup – do not constitute a lack of social adaptation. On the contrary, it is highly specific and adaptive. One might speculate whether such superiority claims might put such groups in a good position to induce social change in the long run. Particularly the kind of minority influence Moscovici had in mind when developing his research programme.

Minorities claiming superiority in the sense of being even more prototypical than the majority outgroup might consider themselves as *avant-garde*, as being the for-runners of a better future compared to the current state of affairs. Rosa et al., (2011) conducted research that provides some evidence for this idea, even for minority groups that are not based on strong shared beliefs. In one study, they manipulated perceptions of future betterment by presenting Portuguese participants with a fake newspaper article that either contained information about prospective growth in the Portuguese economy (e.g. more exportation) or information about the ongoing poor economic climate of the country. Participants who were members of a minority group (Portuguese from Oporto) perceived their ingroup to be more prototypical of the superordinate category Portuguese than the majority (Portuguese from Lisbon), but only when the superordinate category was portrayed as improving in the future (Figure 6)⁷.

[Insert Figure 6]

Taken together, these results challenge the common understanding of minorities as complying with reality constraints and acknowledging inferiority. The results suggest that minorities can regain a sense of positive social identity if they are groups with strong beliefs or if they see themselves as contributing to the improvement of the superordinate category.

Summary And Concluding Remarks

In the current chapter we presented an original approach to minorities’ strategies in intergroup relations. In contrast to previous projects of that kind, which emphasize more the important role of collective action and open confrontation as path of emancipation (e.g., Wright & Baray, 2012; Wright, & Lubensky, 2009), we focused on social creativity strategies in which minorities exercise social influence by contesting shared belief systems that are dominated by majorities’ points of view. In the center of our analysis was the concept of relative ingroup prototypicality (Turner et al., 1987; Mummendey & Wenzel, 1999), because it represents on the cognitive level the essence of a group’s value and recognition in the social arena. Research of the last four decades has shown that people’s need to be valued as a group, is crucial for fostering a sense of positive and meaningful social identity (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). In the constant race for recognition, minorities rarely start off in the pole-position. On the contrary, relative status is often used as a cue or reason (Rosa & Waldzus, 2012) to determine what is normative, and thus minorities are often perceived (Devos & Banaji, 2005; Waldzus et al., 2004), as non-prototypical of higher order categories that define what is

⁷When interpreting these results one has to take into account that the dimension of improvement in the future fitted the minorities self-stereotype (i.e., being strong in industrial production). Corresponding to the adaptive nature of prototypicality judgments we would not expect the same results for dimensions that do not fit the self-stereotype of the minority.

considered desirable within the broader social context. Shared beliefs of that kind, such as Americans are typically White (Devos & Banaji, 2005) or that Germans are more prototypical Europeans than Poles (Waldzus et al., 2003, 2005), contribute to the disadvantaged position that minorities usually occupy. To function in such a social context, minorities often have to swallow “reality constraints” (Ellemers et al., 1997; Waldzus et al., 2004; Yzerbyt & Corneille, 2005). However, these same shared belief-systems, that perpetuate their disadvantage in society, might also create opportunities for minorities to exercise social influence and potentially better their relative standing in society.

In the current chapter we discussed research showing that there are several conditions under which minorities can emancipate themselves from the stigma attached to being relatively disadvantaged. Such strategies have a broad range. First, there are self-serving attempts to – collectively or individually – climb up the social hierarchy by differentiating oneself from other disadvantaged groups (Alexandre et al., 2007; Feddes et al., 2013). Second, this emancipation can be achieved via reliance on strong ingroup beliefs that ignore the majority’s perspective on identity-relevant dimensions (Rosa, 2011). Third, one’s minority groups can contribute to a more complex, multifaceted definition of superordinate categories (Alexandre, 2010; Waldzus, 2010). Finally, some minorities can be understood as an *avant-garde* representing the betterment of the superordinate category in the future (Rosa et al., 2011). We do not consider this list to be complete. Other conditions enabling minorities to see and present themselves as highly prototypical may exist, and it will be an important task of future research to discover them.

The history of social change almost always involves minorities actively challenging the status quo, to create a place where their disadvantage is at least diminished. In our opinion the role of social creativity strategies as strategies of actual social change has been underestimated thus far within social psychological (for exceptions see Prislis & Filson, 2009; Subasic et al., 2008). One reason might be that they are less visible than some forms of spectacular collective action. Moreover, as they do not directly challenge existing power asymmetries between groups of different social status and therefore might be considered ‘opportunistic’ from a revolutionary point of view. However, one has to keep in mind that revolutions are mostly carried out by mobilizing majorities (which can be temporary alliances of various minority groups) against illegitimately ruling elites and that the competition for recognition and the fight for minorities’ rights is far from over after the break down of old oppressive political systems.

On the contrary, historical examples such as the break-down of the colonial system after World War II and of the communist system at the end of the 20th century, but also recent revolutions in several North-African and Middle-East countries are blatant examples of on-going post-revolutionary struggle. We suspect that prototypicality is a key issue in such struggles as it renders one’s group representative of larger society and thereby informs feelings of social (in)justice (Wenzel, 2004) and provides legitimacy for power claims (Weber et al., 2002). Minorities will only be able to be included in institutions of political representation if they can convince other members of the society, most of them majority members, that they are an integral part of society and therefore to a certain degree also prototypical or at least indispensable (Tseung-Wong & Verkuyten, 2010).

Moreover, in more stable societies many social inequalities are perpetuated as long as minorities are considered non-prototypical. The miserable situation of Roma in many European countries is just one example (FRA, 2012). At the same time there is evidence for slow and continuous social change due to minorities’ struggle for recognition. Homosexuals can meanwhile marry in many countries, and European politicians have started to recognize that Muslims are part of Europe. Recent projections indicate that in 30 years minorities will be more than 50% of the U.S. population (Richeson & Craig, 2011) and needless to say that the election and even re-election of a president who has an African father was unthinkable in the United States 30 years ago.

In some cases minorities’ ambitions can be highly problematic, particularly if they base their claims on rather exclusive strong beliefs that immunise them against majority driven public discourse. However, often they contribute to a more just and inclusive society by permanently influencing beliefs that these minorities share with majorities within larger societal contexts (Hopkins & Kahani-Hopkins, 2006). The relevance of taking into account their perceptions, their interactional concerns and their opportunities and strategies of social influence is more important than ever, not only for understanding intergroup relations, but also in order to develop intergroup interventions that intelligently accompany on-going social change.

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CHAPTER THREE

Figure 1. Effects of 9-13 year old children's ethnicity on internal and external attribution when facing successful white, black and gypsy targets. Note: Error bars are 95% confidence intervals (CI). Figure based on data from Alexandre et al. (2007), p. 207.





Figure 2. Relative ingroup prototypicality (difference between ingroup and outgroup prototypicality) for majority (high status) and minority (low status), depending on the complexity of the superordinate category representation Note: Figure from Alexandre (2010), p. 88.



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Figure 3. Estimated marginal means and standard errors of perceptions of prototypicality of the ingroup (IG) and outgroup (OG) as a function of status and complex representations of a negative superordinate category (criminals in Portugal). Note: Figure from Alexandre (2010), p. 105.





Figure 4. Estimated marginal means and standard errors of the difference between ingroup and outgroup prototypicality (relative ingroup prototypicality) depending on group membership and accuracy motivation. Note: Figure from Rosa (2011) Study 4, p. 120.



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Figure 5. Estimated marginal means and standard errors of the difference between ingroup and outgroup prototypicality (relative ingroup prototypicality) depending on group membership and accuracy motivation. Note: Figure from Rosa (2011), Study 5, p.141.




Figure 6. Estimated marginal means and standard errors of the difference between ingroup and outgroup prototypicality (relative ingroup prototypicality) depending on group membership and superordinate category change. Note: Figure from Rosa et al (2011).

