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Master's Thesis of International Studies

A Comparative Study on the DPRK's Foreign Policy Toward Africa

- During the Kim Il Sung and the Kim Jung Un Eras

김일성과 김정은 시대 북한의 아프리카 정책 비교 연구

February 2021

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The Comparative Study on the DPRK's Foreign Policy Toward Africa

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February 2021

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ABSTRACT

North Korea, an isolated and impoverished nation, still maintains its relatively stable regime despite all the international sanctions and punitive measures. The deep analysis of the hidden foreign relation between the DPRK and Africa could extend our existing perceptions and offer alternative perspectives to handle continuous threats posed by this secretive country in different ways. In this background, crucial external reasons for the reorientation of North Korean foreign policy in Africa will be analyzed by a comparative study between the Détente period (1960-1979) during the Kim Il Sung era and the Kim Jung Un eras (2011- present).

Why does the foreign relation between North Korea and African nations matter? In the past, North Korea pursued amicable diplomatic relations with African nations for decades ultimately to obtain reliable supports from them on the international stage in the diplomatic competition with South Korea. Besides promoting the ideology “Juche (self-reliance)” and providing infrastructure and military assistance to African countries, North Korea passionately tried to bond close ties with the African counterparts to escape from its isolated international position.

Even until Nowadays, some African countries have still functioned as financial lifelines for the benefits of the DPRK against severe sanctions imposed by the U.N. and the United States, the official diplomatic exchanges between the two regions have significantly decreased. The difference in the previous and current North Korean foreign

policy strategies in Africa can be more clearly presented by comparing the détente period when North Korea established the most robust diplomatic relations with African nations and the recent Kim Jong Un regime when its whole external relation is greatly limited under the unprecedentedly severe international sanctions.

Firstly, the shifted North Korean foreign policy in Africa during the two different periods will be measured by two indicators: the exchange of high-level officers and the military assistance from North Korea to African nations. Secondly, the four external factors that have been influencing North Korea's foreign policy were selected: international sanctions, military assistance from the DPRK, the Hallstein doctrine of South Korea, and the solidarity of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). By closely reviewing these factors individually and analyzing what influence they have had on the diplomatic relation between the DPRK and Africa, it will be revealed how the reorientation of the DPRK's foreign policy in Africa has been evolved.

Keywords: North Korea, Africa, diplomatic relation, military exchange, international sanction, Hallstein doctrine of South Korea

Student Number: 2017- 20782

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CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION

1. Research Background

While the hegemonic competition between China and the United States is getting serious via the trade war, North Korea has still been a severe threat to international society with mass destruction weapons. Apparently, it was a massive disappointment to international society that the two U.S. and the DPRK summits, held in Singapore on June 12, 2018, and in Hanoi on February 27–28, 2019, respectively because no tangible outcome can be seen in terms of addressing the North Korean nuclear threat yet.

At the early phase of the Covid-19 pandemic that has been an unprecedented challenge to the world, North Korea had launched two unidentified projectiles on March 2, 2020. It seems reasonable to assume that the DPRK has an intention to advance its military nuclear weapon programs continuously. On the other hand, Pyongyang simultaneously keeps its desperate demands for sanctions relief and economic aids from international society, ultimately to continue its regime.

How has this isolated and impoverished nation still kept its regime stable despite all the international sanctions and punitive measures? Furthermore, is this way of surviving possible even after China, the biggest ally, also joins the international efforts against the North's nuclear provocation? What should we do to transform this dictatorial and oppressive nation into a more open one?

A rigorous analysis of the hidden parts of the DPRK's international relations could make us find a clue to handle this secretive country in different ways.

As far as the geopolitical situation is concerned, China has been the most important and only major ally of North Korea in Northeast Asia. The close Beijing-Pyongyang relationship is based on the ideological affinity and intertwined geopolitical strategies of both countries, reflecting the security concerns. It has also been maintained due to the significant military and economic assistance from China to North Korea since the Korean war.

Since the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, North Korean economic dependence on China has continuously increased. According to the Congressional Research Service (CRS) report for the U.S. Congress in 2010, since late 2008, China has been the largest and dominant trade partner and donator to North Korea.¹ However, at the same time, China and North Korea's unique alliance has been seriously challenged as You Ji already mentioned below.

“In reality, beneath the surface of the alliance relations, the two counties share very few common interests. In fact, the two countries can hardly agree to any matters between them, be it historical ties, ideological stance, political and economic programs, or

¹ <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41043.pdf>

diplomatic interactions. This heralds an uncertain future for the bilateral relations and thus may further complicate the security situation in the Korean Peninsula.” (You Ji, 2001)²

Besides, international pressure on China to cease economic interactions with North Korea has been massively increasing. The U.S. administration and international society do not show any intention to lift any sanction unless the DPRK takes verifiable, irreversible, and complete steps for its denuclearization. To overcome these challenging obstacles, North Korea could attempt to find alternative allies that can be used as a lifeline for maintaining the status quo of its regime. In that case, countries already having the experience of long-standing diplomatic relations and military and economic cooperation with the DPRK could be on the top list.

Among those countries, why should we need to examine the North Korea-Africa relationships more than others? For decades, North Korea has tried to keep African nations as reliable advocates on the international stage by emphasizing their shared ideological tendencies for the North Korean ideology “Juche (self-reliance)” and providing infrastructure and military assistance to African countries. Moreover, recently, some African nations played a role as financial lifelines to the DPRK when the international sanctions restricting the DPRK’s international trade with other nations have been getting enhanced gradually since 2016.

² Ji, Y., 2001. China and North Korea: A fragile relationship of strategic convenience. *Journal of Contemporary China*, 10(28), pp.387–398.

The diplomatic relations between the DPRK and African nations have significantly deteriorated under the influence of the U.N. sanctions and pressures from the United States. These external factors negatively influenced the overall trade between African nations and North Korea.

However, Pyongyang has been continuously involved in selling weapons and other military equipment to Africa regions even when the sanctions mounted extensively against its authoritarian regime. Compared to China, which is by far North Korea's largest trading partner as the trade dependence rate of North Korea upon China reached 95.4% in 2019³, the economic contribution of Africa to North Korea seems relatively insignificant.

However, this contribution could be a vital source of profits to North Korea as it could make the DPRK survive while its leaders keep advancing nuclear weapons programs in defiance of the international community. This paper will research the relations between the DPRK and African nations to shed light on this matter. There are two main goals in this dissertation. First goal is to examine the sudden redirection of North Korean foreign policy in Africa by comparing Kim Il Sung and Kim Jung Un eras. Second goal is to analyze external influences that have affected the change.

In the analyzing part, the main assumption is that a number of African countries are still maintaining considerable military and economic relations with the DPRK despite many negative influences driven by external variables. In this part of paper, external factors

³ The Korea Trade- Investment Promotion Agency (KOTRA) 2019 annual report on North Korean international trade trends, page 1
<https://news.kotra.or.kr/user/globalBbs/kotranews/787/globalBbsDataList.do?setIdx=249>

that triggered reorientation in the DPRK's foreign policy towards Africa will be examined thoroughly.

2. Research Questions

Q1. How has North Korean foreign policy towards Africa evolved between the Kim Il-sung and Kim Jung-un eras?

Q2. What are the most influential external factors that have triggered North Korean foreign policy shifts towards Africa?

Q3. How have these external factors led to the reorientation in the relation between North Korea and Africa?

In Kim Il Sung's era, North Korea and many African countries established close comradeships. It was possible because they believed that they shared similar historical experiences of resistance to invasive imperialism. Furthermore, struggling to keep their national independence and ideological identity against superpowers, they also clung together to communism. When North Korea aggressively expanded its diplomatic relations with African nations in the 1960s to predominate its diplomatic recognition and legitimacy against South Korea, there were particularly robust military and economic exchanges between the DPRK and African countries.

Since China joined the United Nations in 1971 and also normalized diplomatic relations with the United States after the visit of President Nixon to China and Shanghai Communiqué,⁴ North Korea reinforced the anti-imperialistic and anti-colonial solidarity with newly independent nations in Asia and Africa from the 1960s to 1970s. However, when North Korea became isolated in international society after the Soviet Union collapsed, it started to enhance largely its nuclear capability threatening the international community. Consequently, the international community and the United States have imposed severe restrictions and sanctions on North Korea to condemn its continuous provocations.

Rapidly shifted external circumstances made the diplomatic relations between the DPRK and African nations have become weakened that broadly had expanded and enhanced in the past. Moreover, the deepening economic difficulties of North Korea and its brinkmanship tactics with its nuclear capacity triggered further worsened them. However, surprisingly a certain degree of military assistance and exchanges with some African nations such as Mozambique, Tanzania, and Zimbabwe seem to be still going on. Against this backdrop, the below hypothesis was driven.

Hypothesis: North Korea has reoriented its foreign policy direction in Africa from an aggressively active approach to a passive one as it has been interacting with external factors. On the other hand, while maintaining its passive policy in Africa, the DPRK has

⁴ <https://history.state.gov/countries/issues/china-us-relations>

been still able to maintain economic and military exchanges with a certain number of African countries enough for its secretive economic profits making.

In this background, it can be assumed that external variables such as increasing U.N. and U.S. sanctions, weakened military assistance from the DPRK, severe Hallstein doctrine of the South Korea Government, and the loosened solidarity of Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) have largely caused the significant changes in North Korean foreign policy toward Africa. Throughout the analysis part in Chapter 5 of this thesis, the influences of the external variables which have profound impacts on the reorientation of North Korean foreign policy toward African countries will be examined and analyzed respectively.

3. Literature Review

This paper attempts to shed light on the dynamic of foreign relations between African countries and North Korea. Because, with this comparative analysis on shifted foreign policy strategies of two different North Korean regimes, the hidden driving force can reveal that has made the dictatorial authority in Pyongyang sustainable despite international menaces of punitive measures and sanctions against its nuclear weapons program.

However, this relationship has been relatively neglected in the previous studies of international relations. The influence of the external variables on the reorientation of North Korean foreign policy in Africa between the Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Un periods has been hardly touched on.

In 2018 Lenka Caisova published a research book analyzing the orientations of North Korean foreign policy since 1994. This study examines North Korea's relationship with the U.S. and South Korea. Additionally, it also shows the interaction between external pressures, including international sanctions, conflicts, and characteristics of North Korean foreign policy. This research assumes that the more external pressures have increased against North Korea, the more this nation has become confrontational, isolated.

However, this book mainly focused on analyzing the development of the DPRK's changed interaction with the United States, its main foe, and South Korea from the 1990s when the communist block dissolved, and Iron Curtain was lifted. So, the entire foreign policy flows of North Korea with other countries and the underlying causes of redirection in its external policy are not fully covered. (Lenka Caisova, 2019)⁵.

The thesis of Virginie Grzelczyk (2019)⁶ offers a close evaluation of the changing relationships between the DPRK and African countries in the face of the severe international sanction regime. It claims that North Korea has maintained long-standing

⁵ Caisova, L., 2019. *North Korea's foreign policy: the DPRK part on the international scene and its audiences / Lenka Caisova.*,

⁶ Grzelczyk, V., 2019. From Balancing to Bandwagoning: Evaluating the Impact of the Sanction Regime on North Korea–Africa Relationships. *North Korean Review*, 15(1), pp.9–33.

diplomatic relations with African countries based on military and economic exchanges, but the relations have become worse mainly by the imposed sanctions of the United Nations against Pyongyang from 2006 to 2017.

As the changed behaviors of African states following the increasing international sanctions have mainly drawn the interests of the international society, the diversified motivations of North Korean foreign policy modification in Africa, and the external factors maintaining the close diplomatic relations between the DPRK and African nations haven't been deeply analyzed.

In the literature review for the analysis part of this thesis, several previous studies were found dealing with the motivation and external factors of North Korean foreign policy. For instance, Lee Gi Jong (1997)⁷ analyzed the foreign policy of the DPRK toward the third world, mainly focusing on the motivation of North Korea's keen intention to establish an amicable relationship with Africa. But as the research overly generalized the African regions, the different positions of individual African nations haven't properly been revealed in detail, and additionally, even though the author mentioned the military cooperation between North Korea and African countries, not enough exemplary data or cases are presented to support the claim.

⁷이기중 1997. 북한의 대제 3 세계비동맹외교정책. 시민정치학회보(고황정치학회보), 1, p.187.

Lee, Yong Suk (2018)⁸ analyses the periodical development of sanctions against North Korea and its economic effects on North Korean society. The author points out that even though the initial intention of international society was to punish the ruling elites enjoying their hierarchical privileges in the closed society, the international sanctions rather have worsened domestic inequality. Especially in the already marginalized inland area of North Korea mainly because the ruling people have a power to put the limited resources in regions where they economically or politically rely upon without considering the public interests.

Even though this research is also covering how international sanctions significantly contributed to enhancing the economic reliance of North Korea on China, this study largely concentrates on the negative influence of the U.N. sanctions on the domestic economic activities in North Korea. Except for China, it didn't extend its research boundary to other nations that North Korea might utilize as useful channels to offset the sanction effects.

Most of the existing researches related to the foreign policy of North Korea have covered the influence of individual external factors separately, such as the reasons for increased dependence of North Korea on China, the alliance of the DPRK with third nations through non-alignment movement (NAM), and the effects of international sanctions on North Korea. However, not enough attention has been given to how North

⁸Lee, Y.S., 2018. International isolation and regional inequality: Evidence from sanctions on North Korea. *Journal of Urban Economics*, 103, pp.34–51.

Korean foreign policy towards Africa has been developed in different periods and what kind of external variables have influenced the modification.

4. Methodology⁹

James N. Rosenau presented four variables consisting of societal variables, systemic variables, governmental variables, and individual variables, including role variables as important determinants of foreign policy decision making.¹⁰ This concept was adopted as a theoretical foundation in this research. Rosenau also claimed that the ranking among the essential factors influencing the establishment of foreign policy could be modified depending on national conditions such as the territorial size of a nation, state of the economic development, the openness of the political system.¹¹

According to Rosenau's theory, it can be assumed that as North Korea is a small underdeveloped, and closed country, its foreign policy decision-making is mostly influenced by individual, systemic, governmental, and societal variables in order. As the leader of North Korea has absolute power in internal and external matters, individual

⁹ It means a theory and analysis of how research does or should proceed (Tickner 2005).

¹⁰ James N. Rosenau, "Pre-Theories and Theories of Foreign Policy," *The Scientific Study of Foreign Policy* (N.Y.: Nichols Publishing Company, 1980), pp. 128 ~ 133.

¹¹ *ibid*

variables are surely most important, but given the fact that North Korea has been one of the world's most secretive countries, in-depth research on the leadership is hugely limited.

In this background, the influence of systems, the second important variable of Rosenau's foreign Policy theory, on North Korea's foreign policy has been alternatively analyzed. The definition of the system in this theory includes external factors such as international sanctions against the DPRK, a Hallstein doctrine upheld by the South Korean government, and solidarity among the Non-Aligned Movement member nations.

On the other hand, to track the trajectory of the changed DPRK's foreign policy in Africa influenced by the shifted external factors, the analytical comparison of the two North Korean regimes, Kim Il Sung and Kim Jung Un eras, were adopted. The diplomatic relation and military exchanges between the DPRK and African countries have greatly shifted between the two North Korean regimes. This fact could offer valuable clues regarding the perspectives of the North Korean leaders on international affairs indirectly.

Indicators such as the exchanges of high-level officers, the military or economic assistance from North Korea, and the characteristic of bilateral trade will be thoroughly analyzed mainly based on document analysis of currently disclosed diplomatic documents, the historical records, and relevant journals and news articles.

In terms of research material, the research analysis largely relies on the original research, and the primary documents were selectively collected from (1) the United States Department of State Central Foreign Policy Files (CFPF) (2) documents from the Diplomatic Archives of ROK's Ministry of Foreign Affairs (3) annual reports on the North

Korean trade volumes published by KOTRA (Korea Trade-Investment Promotion Agency (4) collections of the North Korea International Documentation Project at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington, D.C.(5) documents of the online archive of the United Nations including U.N. Security Council Resolutions (6) CRS Reports for U.S. Congress (7) collections of North Korea's official government statements and articles from North Korean periodical Rodong Sinmun. Additionally, relevant academic papers and news articles also have been utilized when necessary.

The above materials are the best available resources, given the fact that North Korean governmental and official data are inaccessible. To examine the diplomatic position of the DPRK toward African countries, occasionally, the relevant declassified diplomatic documents of the United States Department of State Central Foreign Policy Files were referred to. And to check the characteristic of trade between North Korea and Africa, data from the U.N. Comtrade website was used. But as there are no officially announced trading figures from North Korea, these data were created based on the North Korean trade partners' voluntary reports.

CHAPTER II. DEFINITION OF FOREIGN POLICY

1. The differentiation between Foreign Policy and Diplomacy

There are different arguments and perspectives among scholars or practitioners of international relations studies regarding the definitions of diplomacy and foreign policy and their interrelationship. Frequently the concept of Foreign Policy is used as a synonym for diplomacy. However, as Christer Jönsson argued, the words “diplomacy” could be considered as a tool or as an instrument of foreign policy or be regarded as a universal institution between nations (Jönsson 2016:242).¹² And also, Hans Morgenthau described the organically linked relations between diplomacy and foreign policy as below,

“While the foreign office is the brains of foreign policy, the diplomatic representatives are its eyes, ears, and mouth, its fingertips, and, as it were, its itinerant incarnation” (Morgenthau 1966: 542).¹³

Like Morgenthau and Jönsson, diplomacy is generally considered as an instrument of foreign policy and a part of state power. In the case of foreign policy, the dictionary meaning is that “general objectives that guide the activities and relationships of one state

¹² Hellmann, G., Fahrmeir, A. & Vec, M., 2016. The transformation of foreign policy: drawing and managing boundaries from antiquity to the present / edited by Gunther Hellmann, Andreas Fahrmeir, Milos Vec.

¹³ Morgenthau, H.J., 1960. Politics among nations: the struggle for power and peace / by Hans Joachim Morgenthau.

in its interactions with other states. The development of foreign policy is influenced by domestic considerations, the policies or behavior of other states, or plans to advance specific geopolitical designs.”¹⁴ In this context, it can be defined that whereas foreign policy is one nation’s external strategy reflecting national policy orientation and priorities, the diplomacy of one nation is an instrument for interaction with other performers in international politics and ultimately pursuing the successful implementation of the national strategies.

Petric, Ernest ¹⁵defines that country’s foreign policy is closely influenced by its geopolitical status, its national power, its internal social and political situation. Especially in cross-border relations, one nation’s foreign policy demonstrates its acknowledgment of other nations and occasionally redefines the diplomatic relations depending on the perception. Christer Jönsson emphasized the importance of state’s recognition as below,

“If foreign policy is understood as boundary drawing, one of its most fundamental manifestations is recognition, that is, the act of accepting other actors as legitimate players. In contemporary practice, statehood is a prerequisite of diplomatic recognition, and recognition is a ticket of general admission to the international arena (Christer Jönsson 2016:243).”

¹⁴ <https://www.britannica.com/topic/foreign-policy>

¹⁵Petric, E., 2013. Foreign policy: from conception to diplomatic practice / by Ernest Petric.,

In short, in the establishment of diplomatic relations with other recognized states or other equivalent actors, one nation's foreign policy reflects national diplomatic priorities established considering internal and external conditions of the state. Obviously, as foreign policy is an act of the state, it reflects the top prioritized national policy directions. It means that with a thorough analysis of one nation's foreign policy, the true essence of its national policy direction could be revealed.

2. The Determinants of Foreign Policy

The decision-making process of foreign policy is intertwined with mixed influences driven by various internal and external determinant factors that one nation is facing. McGowan and Shapiro (1973)¹⁶ described how the external factors of one nation, such as other nations' foreign policies or international system, make interactions with internal factors of the nation, including individuals, political, governmental, economic, and social factors when it comes to establishing its foreign policy.

In the case of North Korea, as there has been no capable political party against the Worker's Party of North Korea, it is considered a de facto one-party dictatorship. As a result, there also has been no significant internal change in Pyongyang during the reigns

¹⁶ DeHaven, M.J., 1991. Internal and External Determinants of Foreign Policy: West Germany and Great Britain during the Two-Track Missile Controversy. *International studies quarterly*, 35(1), pp.87–108.

of three generations of Kim's family. Under this circumstance, the influence of external factors on the orientation of the DPRK's foreign policy could outweigh than internal ones.

In general, as foreign policy reflects the national positions established in response to interaction with international society, external factors play crucial roles in determining one state's foreign policy. They consist of the international system, international norms, international institutions, alliances between nations, other nations' foreign policy and disparity in military power, etc. Among the external factors, international institutions significantly influence one nation in shaping its position in the international arena.¹⁷

In light of this, the causing effects of U.N. sanctions on the reorientation of DPRK's foreign policy will be analyzed in the latter part of this research. Also, another important external factor, the shifted alliances with African nations between Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Un, will be reviewed.

¹⁷ Ryan Beasley & Jeffrey S. Lantis, *Comparative Foreign Policy Analysis*. Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics, pp. Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics

CHAPTER III. GENERAL REVIEW

1. The outlook of foreign relations between North Korea and Africa

The power struggles between China and the Soviet Union were worsening in the 1960s, and under this circumstance, the DPRK was able to acquire increased political autonomy from the two giant close allies. Having this extended autonomy, North Korea eagerly attempted to outreach diplomatic relations with countries in Africa and Asia to form a close alliance with them based on its self-reliance ideology.¹⁸

In Kim Il Sung's period, Africa became an important region in terms of the diplomatic strategy of North Korea. Because the newly decolonized African countries and North Korea not only shared the concept of anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism but also, both of them wanted to establish their alliance aside from interference of any superpowers such as the Soviet Union and the United States. In addition, as many African countries joined the United Nations after obtaining independence between 1955 and 1968, their influence largely increased in the international arena in the 1970s.¹⁹

It can be assumed that in the initial phase of the establishment of diplomatic relations with Africa, North Korea was able to establish amicable diplomatic relations with the African countries using its military advantages over them. For example, the former Prime Minister of Zimbabwe, Robert Mugabe, and the leader of North Korea, Kim Il Sung, were

¹⁸ P240 -p241,p 271 김응서 2012. 1960년대중반북한의자주외교노선채택에관한연구.

¹⁹ Kay, D.A., 1969. The Impact of African States on the United Nations. *International organization*, 23(1), pp.20-47.

able to establish such a close bilateral military cooperation because Kim Il Sung offered military supports and Assistance to Zimbabwe.²⁰ Especially the Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front (ZANU–PF) received weaponry and military trainings from North Korea. The DPRK publicly also supported Egypt in the Suez Crisis of 1956 and North Korean instructors trained Egyptian force. Additionally, not only the DPRK helped to develop facilities for short–range ballistic missiles²¹ but also it also offered economic assistance to Egypt under the Nasser government.²²

During Kim Il Sung’s reign, North Korea also put significant efforts into strengthening and extending its foreign diplomatic relations. Even Pyongyang openly declared the year 1972 as “the Year of Diplomacy” dispatching various forms of delegations to all around the world. Based on its active foreign policy strategy accompanied by full national supports, North Korea was able to successfully establish diplomatic relations with 98 countries until 1980.²³ Under this circumstance, the diplomatic relations between Africa and North Korea also extensively enhanced in the Kim Il Sung period.

At the end of the 1980s, however, the diplomatic relationship between North Korea and Africa weakened when North Korea started to face a severe economic depression mainly driven by the weakened alliance with Eastern Europe and other communist blocks. Furthermore, its economic difficulties became more severe right after the fall of the

²⁰ <https://www.cnn.com/2018/07/17/north-korea-and-zimbabwe-a-friendship-explained.html>

²¹ Hoog, T.A.van, 2018. Uncovering North Korean forced labour in Africa: towards a research framework. In Uncovering North Korean forced labour in Africa: towards a research framework. LeidenAsiaCentre.

²² <https://thediomat.com/2017/08/the-egypt-north-korea-connection/>

²³ <https://nkinfo.unikorea.go.kr/nkp/overview/nkOverview.do?menuId=PO017>

Soviet Union in 1991 as the communist blocks were the most important trading partners and economic aids contributors for Pyongyang. Besides, when both Koreas joined the United Nations simultaneously in 1991, stimulated by the end of the Cold war, the importance of African countries' supports in the competition with South Korea greatly diminished. Consequently, in the latter part of Kim Il Sung's period, the dynamic of diplomatic relations between North Korea and Africa weakened.

During Kim Jong Il's period from 1994 to 2011, North Korea put the least efforts into the diplomatic relations with Africa. North Korea closed up about 30 percent of its diplomatic missions between 1998 and 2001, following the Foreign Ministry of North Korea's announcement to reduce its overseas missions in March 1998 due to worsening economic conditions. In Africa, seven North Korean diplomatic missions closed between 1998 and 2001. It was the largest number of closed diplomatic missions compared to other regions in the world. During the same period, only six of the diplomatic missions of the DPRK in European countries, two of them in Middle Eastern regions, two of them in Latin American countries, and one of them in the Asian region were shut down.²⁴

As we can assume by this diplomatic action of North Korea, Africa wasn't the top priority in the foreign policy of Kim Jong Il's period. On the other hand, it priorly focused on the diplomacy with China and the United States using its development of nuclear and missiles as a negotiation card for economic aid. In 1994, Pyongyang declared to leave the

²⁴ <https://nkinfo.unikorea.go.kr/nkp/overview/nkOverview.do?menuId=PO017>

Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), and this provocation resulted in agreements between the U.S. and North Korea to stop the plutonium weapons program of the DPRK.

However, North Korea announced to withdraw from the nuclear treaty again in January 2003 and reoperated the nuclear facilities of it. From this point, the Six-Party Talk system was introduced in August 2003 in which six main nations such as China, Japan, North Korea, Russia, South Korea, and the United States discussed and negotiated about North Korean nuclear programs. This system broke up once again after disagreements among the six nations over the verification process and the rocket launch of Pyongyang in 2009.²⁵

Against this backdrop, in the Kim Jong Il era, relations with the United States and traditional allies such as China and Russia were considered as the top foreign policy priority of North Korea. And It also actively engaged in diplomatic activities with Southeast Asian countries, including Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, as well as improving relations with Japan and the European Union (EU).

On the other hand, North Korean relations with non-aligned countries, including Africa were soured since its missile launch and the first nuclear test in 2006. Furthermore, the relations with non-aligned nations became worsened when the U.N. Security Council adopted a resolution against North Korea for its long-range missile launch and second nuclear test in 2009.²⁶

²⁵ <https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/dprkchron>

²⁶ 2020 북한 이해_ 통일부

Unavoidably, the diplomatic relation with Africa also deteriorated markedly during this period, largely caused by the North Korea's enhancing nuclear weapons development. Also, the diplomatic significance of the African region dramatically decreased to North Korea compared to the two superpowers, China and the United States or neighboring countries in this period. In this context, the foreign policy of Kim Jong Il's period in Africa will not be deeply reviewed in this paper.

During the Kim Jong Un regime from 2011 up to the present, North Korea has been actively utilizing summit diplomacy with China, the United States, and the south counterpart in the Korean peninsula to stabilize its regime and address difficulties caused by international sanctions against the North. However, simultaneously the Kim Jong Un regime has also constantly promoted non-aligned diplomacy to offset the negative effects of the international sanctions against North Korea and to break away from the isolation in the international community.

There have been continuing diplomatic efforts from North Korea to maintain amicable relations with Africa. For example, Kim Yong Nam, Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme People's Assembly of the DPRK, toured African countries in October 2014, and He also gave a speech at the Asia-Africa Summit (the 60th anniversary of the Bandung Conference) in April 2015 and attended the 17th summit of the Non-Aligned Movement in September 2016 with the Foreign Minister of North Korea Ri Yong-ho.²⁷

²⁷ ROK Ministry of Unification Weekly Report on North Korea_ no.1327(2016.09.17. ~09.23.)

In April 2018, the North Korea Foreign Minister Ri Yong-ho attended the 18th Ministerial Meeting of the Non-Aligned Movement member nations in Azerbaijan. Additionally, Song Se Il, the DPRK director-general of the Foreign Ministry, toured seven African countries, including Kenya, South Africa, the Democratic Congo, the Republic of the Congo, Zimbabwe, Togo, and Mali, during the same month.²⁸

2. A comparative study between Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Un Eras

As we can see in the overall review of diplomatic relations between North Korea and Africa in the previous section, the foreign policy of North Korea toward Africa in Kim Il Sung's period pursued a clear and urgent diplomatic goal to obtain African supports in the severe diplomatic competition with South Korea in the international arena. As a result, there were vibrant exchanges of diplomatic missions and military assistance between North Korea and Africa.

Meanwhile, when the economic situation of North Korea became worse, and its development of nuclear weapons was accelerated in Kim Jong Il's period, the African region was left out of the DPRK's diplomatic priority. At the same time, as North Korea has continually been advancing its nuclear weapons posing threats towards the

²⁸ 2020 북한 이해_ 통일부

international community, the general diplomatic relations with other non-aligned nations also deteriorated.

However, on the other hand, Pyongyang has also been keeping its continuous diplomatic and unofficial efforts to maintain its relations with African countries under the Kim Jong Un regime. The main purpose of this thesis is to demonstrate the main reasons for the shifted foreign policy of North Korea in Africa and analyze the implications that are contained in this policy change. For, this paper will review external factors that triggered the changed foreign policy of North Korea and uncover the changes more clearly by comparing different periods of two North Korean regimes.

The first chosen period is the Détente period from 1960 to 1979 because this time was when the North Korean self-reliance doctrine had been actively applied to its foreign policies. From 1966 to 1976, the Kim Il Sung regime strongly emphasized its willingness to strengthen economic and political ties with developing nations. More importantly, coping with the easing atmosphere of international tensions during the period, the DPRK dramatically extended its diplomatic relations with African nations in this early stage of the diplomatic relations with Africa.

The second chosen period is the Kim Jong Un era from 2011 to 2020. As the regime has faced severe international criticism and sanctions on its continuous nuclear development since its inauguration, strengthening its foreign policy in Africa has many external obstacles inevitably. However, in spite of its difficulties, there also have been continuing diplomatic efforts from North Korea to maintain amicable relations with Africa.

In this comparative study, the influence of external factors on North Korean Foreign policy towards Africa will be analyzed, and also the status quo of the diplomatic relation between them will be demonstrated. As I already mentioned above, the two different periods have been chosen to reveal the stark difference between the most robust period in terms of diplomatic relationship with Africa and the recent period when North Korea has been trying to enhance amicable relations with African nations again. Against this backdrop, the contrasts and similarities between the two different periods of North Korea when they had quite different national strategies towards Africa will be more precisely revealed with policy comparative methods.

CHAPTER IV. REDIRECTION OF NORTH KOREAN FOREIGN POLICY IN AFRICA

How has the North Korean foreign policy toward African countries evolved differently between the two North Korean leaders' regimes? In this chapter, indicators such as official exchanges of high-level officers and military assistance from the DPRK will be carefully reviewed to measure the level of policy changes between the two different periods. Two research periods were chosen to demonstrate the clear contrasts or similarities between the periods. The first period covers the early stage of the DPRK foreign policy toward Africa in the Kim Il Sung regime from 1960 to 1979, and the second period shows current foreign policy toward Africa in the Kim Jong Un regime from 2011 to 2020.


1. Official exchanges of high-level officers

- The *Détente* period (1960 to 1979) in the Kim Il Sung era

In contrast to the well-known external image as a secretive nation, North Korea aggressively and expanded its diplomatic relations in African regions when the Cold War tension was suddenly eased in the *Détente* period from 1960 to 1979. During the same period, Pyongyang also openly promoted its "Juche Ideology," emphasizing self-reliance policy to Africa's newly independent countries.

These diplomatic efforts from Pyongyang were made to obtain diplomatic support from African nations for its state recognition and legitimacy in the international arena while severely competing with South Korea and to extend its economic boundary aside from communist allies such as China and the USSR. It seems that North Korea considered that the establishment of strong Non-Aligned alliances with the African nations as a crucial foreign policy strategy for its political and economic benefits. The below graph presents a dramatic increase in the number of African nations having diplomatic relations with North Korea during the Détente period from 1960 to 1979.

Figure 1. The Number of African nations having diplomatic relation with the DPRK during the Détente period (1960 – 1979)



Source: The Diplomatic Archives of the ROK Ministry of Foreign Affairs

<http://diplomaticarchives.mofa.go.kr>

As we can see from the above graph, Pyongyang impressively extended its diplomatic relation with African nations during the Détente period (1960 to 1979). To examine the official exchange of high-level officers between North Korea and African countries during this Détente period (1960 to 1979) in the Kim Il Sung regime, this part of research mainly relied on recently unclassified diplomatic files from the U.S. National Archives²⁹ and the Diplomatic Archives of South Korea Ministry of Foreign Affairs.³⁰

Any significant diplomatic exchange of high-level officers between North Korea and the African regions during the Détente period can be observed in the table of the chronologically ordered summary below. This table indicates the diplomatically meaningful official visits from North Korean delegations to African countries and a certain number of diplomatic visits from African countries toward the DPRK during the Détente period in the Kim Il Sung's regime. As the data originated from the Department of State's classified documents, the summary in the table consists of facts and interpretations of the diplomatic activities.

In observation of the selected diplomatic exchanges between North Korea and African nations on the below lists, the cases revealing the main objectives of the dispatched North Korean delegations in African countries will be mainly focused. Through this close document analysis on the top-secret papers from the U.S. government, the foreign policy strategies of North Korea in African regions during the Détente period (1960 – 1979) could be uncovered more clearly.

²⁹Record Group 59, General Records of the Department of State Central Foreign Policy Files, 1967-1968, 1970-73

³⁰http://diplomaticarchives.mofa.go.kr/dev/open_document_list.go

Table1. The Exchange of High-Level officials between the DPRK and African nations during the Détente period (1960 – 1979)

Document Date	Main Activity	Visiting Nations
1964	The North Korean delegation headed by Yun Gibok, the education secretary of DPRK visited African countries such as Senegal, Niger, Ghana and Burkina Faso (formerly Upper Volta) from March 25 1964 to April 18 1964. - Attempts to open the diplomatic relation and ask supports for DPRK's position in UN	Senegal, Niger, Ghana and Burkina Faso
1967.3.18	Burundi received a visiting of the North Korean delegation headed by Vice-President Kang Ryang Wook who was the maternal uncle of North Korean dictator Kim Il-sung from March 4, 1967 to March 11, 1967.	Burundi (GRB)
1967.4.11	A North Korean delegation headed by Vice President Kan Wang WUK made a friendship visit to the Yemen Arab Republic from March 29 to April 7. - To emphasize Solidarity with the Yemeni people's struggle against imperialism	Yemen Arab Republic (YAR)
1967.6.5	The March visit of the North Korean goodwill delegation here produced few noteworthy public statements by either host or visitors. - The efforts of North Korea for diplomatic recognition	Zambia
1967.8.23	North Korean delegation visit Monrovia presumably part of continuing effort North Korean Government (DPRK) gain favor among African nations.... - seeking diplomatic recognition and support for or perhaps acquiescence in issue of admission DPRK to UN.	Liberia
1968.9.11	On September 7 President Nyerere sent a congratulatory message to North Korean Premier Kim Il Sung on the occasion of North Korea's Twentieth Anniversary.	North Korea
1969.4.21	April 17, one of North Korean news agency, said NK and Zambia had agreed exchange embassies.	Zambia
1969.6.11	Qahtan al-Shaabi, President of Southern Yemen, completed a state visit to North Korea on June 6, 1969.	North Korea
1969.6.13	A newspaper photograph showing President DIORI with three of the members of the five-man North Korean mission which visited Niamey May 14-22, 1969.	Niamey
1969.9.11	According to local Radio SEPTEMBER 8, GOCAR (The Central African Republic) and North Korea agreed to establish diplomatic relations and exchange Ambassadors.	The Central African Republic
1973.3.15	North Koreans Press Botswana for Diplomatic Relations and Support in UN	Botswana
1973.3.22	The Vice President of North Korea, Kang Ryang Uk, visited Tanzania - To ask Tanzania's support for the reunification of Korea and the expulsion of American troops from South Korea	Tanzania
1973.03.25	The Government Delegation of DPRK led by Vice-President Comrade Kang Ryang Uk paid a friendly visit to the Somali Democratic Republic from March 7 to 11, 1973.	Somali
1974	The North Korean delegation headed by ministerial and working-level officials visited African countries.	African countries

Source: (1) Record Group 59, General Records of the Department of State Central Foreign Policy Files <https://www.archives.gov/research/foreign-policy/state-dept/rg-59-central-files>

(2) The Diplomatic Archives of the ROK Ministry of Foreign Affairs
<http://diplomaticarchives.mofa.go.kr>

The first noticeable record is an aerogram dated April 11, 1967, from the U.S. Embassy in Yemen (Sana) to the U.S. Department of State. It informed about a North Korean delegation's visit to the Yemen Arab Republic (YAR) from March 29 to April 7. This intelligence document describes a North Korean delegation headed by the Vice President of the DPRK Kang Ryang Wuk and his opening speech at the Yemen airport. In his first speech in Yemen, the high official of North Korea externally emphasized the necessity of the close solidarity between the DPRK and Yemen against the imperialistic invasion from the United States and Great Britain. At the end of this visit, the North Korean delegation donated £1,000 to relieve the fire victims in Al Hudaydah.

Interestingly, in the official statements during the diplomatic visit, the North Korean delegation mentioned that "the North Korean people cannot achieve national unity until we free our land from the presence of American imperialist forces in the Korean peninsula." Ultimately, this North Korean announcement suggests that the main purpose of the DPRK delegation's visit to Yemen was to emphasize the solidarity between the DPRK and the Yemeni people in the struggle against any imperialism and to create an opportunity to obtain Yemen's diplomatic support regarding the reunification issues of the Korean peninsula in international arena.

The second important record is the air letter dated June 05, 1967, from the U.S. Embassy in Seoul to the U.S. Department of State. It depicts another North Korean delegation's visit led by North Korean vice president Kang Ryang Wuk to Zambia from March 29 to April 7. This visit of North Korean high-level officers seems to be planned to attract Zambia's political support for diplomatic recognition of North Korea in the international society. This document from the U.S. government concretely informs that the North Korean mission repeatedly asked the Zambian government to recognize the DPRK diplomatically.

Additionally, according to a telegram from the U.S. Department of State dated August 23, 1967, from the U.S. Department of State to the U.S. Embassy in Liberia, the North Korean delegation visited Monrovia, the capital city of Liberia. By this visit, the DPRK intended to gain Liberia's support for its admission to U.N. and diplomatic recognition. This report also commented that the delegations continuously emphasized the "independence" of North Korea from the previous communist allies, Chinese and USSR influence, and anticipated that North Korea's efforts for diplomatic recognition expected to be continued.

The fourth secret record is an intelligence note dated June 11, 1969, sent to the U.S. Department of State from the director of Intelligence and Research (INR) in the State Department, Thomas L. Hughes. It demonstrates the state visit of Qahtan al Shaabi, President of Southern Yemen, to North Korea. The document confirms that this visit was made to strengthen the solidarity with southern Yemen against imperialism. Importantly,

this intelligence note analyzed that the North Korean economic aid to Southern Yemen was the main reason enhancing the alliance between the two nations.

Lately, according to an aerogram of the U.S. Department of State dated March 22, 1973, a North Korean delegation headed by the Vice President of North Korea, Kang Ryang Uk, visited Tanzania for a week in the middle of March 1973. Both nations even agreed to issue together a Joint communique highlighting Tanzania's support for the reunification of Korea and the expulsion of American troops from South Korea. During the visit, the DPRK high officials met North Korean students who were studying English and Swahili in Tanzania for five years.

This aerogram commented that the already closed ties between the two nations were further cemented by this visit and revealed that the Tanzanian government-owned News media announced right after the Joint communique that the strengthened political and ideological affinities and between North Korea and Tanzania. And the commitment of them to build a socialist society based on the shared principle of self-reliance. Additionally, the 5-year educational exchange programs for North Korean students in Tanzania imply the fact that how much North Korea considered the bilateral relation important.


The above documents demonstrate the prioritized foreign policy targets of North Korea in Africa during the Détente period from 1960 to 1979. First of all, the DPRK sought diplomatic supports from its African counterparts to take an advantageous position in competition with South Korea regarding Korean issues. Secondly, based on sharing brutal experience under colonial rule, it seems the North had a strong aspiration to establish

solidarity with newly independent African against imperialism. Consequently, Pyongyang frequently dispatched diplomatic missions to Africa and offered economic or military assistance ultimately to establish a solid foundation for amicable relations with future major allies in Africa.

- The Current period (2011- 2020) in the Kim Jong Un regime

While international society has imposed incremental sanction measures on North Korea, Kim Jong Un, the leader of North Korea, has been actively engaged in diplomatic activities with non-aligned countries in Africa to overcome the negative effects of sanctions. The below graph presents the stable number of African nations having diplomatic relations with North Korea during the Kim Jong Un period from 2011 to 2020.

Figure 2. The Number of African nations having diplomatic relation with the DPRK during the Kim Jong Un regime (2011- 2020)



Source: The Diplomatic Archives of the ROK Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Compared to the Détente period from 1960 to 1979 in the Kim Il Sung era, North Korea's diplomatic relation with African nations seems to become less dynamic and significant in the Kim Jong Un era. In comparison, the relations with other superpower nations such as China, the U.S., and Russia have been more emphasized and focused when Pyongyang has been desperately trying to keep its nuclear capability against international criticism.

On the surface, the inclination of the foreign policy of North Korea in the African region has become passive and gotten less priority as the diplomatic relations with other super nation such as China and the U.S. have attracted more attention. However, as we can see in the above figure 2, the number of African nations having diplomatic relations with the DPRK in the Kim Jong Un regime has not been dramatically changed despite escalating international sanctions. On the contrary, high-level official exchanges between the DPRK and African nations seem stably continuous.

In fact, to preserve the status quo or reestablish friendly relations with Africa, Pyongyang has continued to dispatch high-level officials toward Africa in the Kim Jong Un era. The chronologically ordered table below indicates North Korea's continuous diplomatic efforts to bolster ties with African nations once again by increasing the number of diplomatic mission visits headed by North Korean high-level officers in the Kim Jung Un government.

Table 2. The Exchange of High-Level officials between the DPRK and African nations during the Kim Jong Un (2011- 2020) regime

Reports on North Korea	Main Activity	Visiting Nations
From May 30 to June 6, 2011 (No. 1050)	Vice Chairman of North Korean Presidium of the Supreme People's Assembly visits Africa Vice Chairman of the North Korean Presidium of the Supreme People's Assembly, Yang Hyong-sop, left to visit Africa on May 26 and had a face-to-face meeting with the president of Nigeria.	Nigeria
From August 10 to August 16, 2013 (No.1165)	A North Korean delegation led by Minister of Foreign Affairs Pak Ui Chun visited African countries from August 10 to 15.	Guinea
From August 17 to August 23, 2013 (No.1166)	A North Korean delegation led by Foreign Minister Pak Ui Chun visited African countries, including Guinea, Benin, Republic of Congo and Cameroon from August 17 to 24.	Guinea, Benin, Republic of Congo and Cameroon
From September 13 to September 19, 2014 (No.1222)	From September 14 to 19, North Korean Foreign Ministry officials and Ri Su yong visited Iran to participate in the 53rd meeting of the Asian-African Legal Consultative Organization. They also had a meeting with the President of Iran.	The 53rd meeting of the Asian-African Legal Consultative Organization.
From October 18 to October 24, 2014 (No.1227)	From October 17 to 23, Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme People's Assembly of North Korea visited African countries.	African countries
From October 26 to October 31, 2014 (No.1228)	From October 25 to 31, Kim Yong Nam, Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme People's Assembly of North Korea visited African countries.	Sudan, Congo, Uganda
From April 18 to April 24, 2015 (No.1253)	On April 22, North Korean media reported that Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme People's Assembly Kim Yong Nam delivered a speech at the Asian African Summit Meeting(60th anniversary of the Bandung Conference).	The Asian African Summit Meeting (60th anniversary of the Bandung Conference)
2017.7.22	According to Korean Central News Agency, the delegation of the Labor Party headed by Ryu Myeong-seon, the deputy chairman of the Workers' Party's Central committee, visited Mozambique and Iran after attending the 14th Congress of the Communist Party in South Africa.	The Republic of South Africa
2019.11.20	Jeon Dong Cheol, Ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary of DPRK, residing in the Republic of Nigeria met the Science and Technology Minister of Nigeria on November 15.	Nigeria
2019.11.9	Kim Chul Ho, Ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary of DPRK, residing in the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia visited the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Ethiopia on November 5 for farewell.	Ethiopia
2020.2.15	Chung Dong Hak, Ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary of DPRK, residing in the Republic of Uganda met the deputy prime minister of Uganda Republic to have a conversation on February 12.	Uganda

Source: (1) https://www.unikorea.go.kr/eng_unikorea/relations/infoNK/weekly/
(2) Korean Central News Agency
(3) <https://www.mk.co.kr/news/politics/view/2017/07/493027/>

Among North Korean missions' visits to Africa, the first noticeable diplomatic activity is that Kim Yong Nam, the chairman of the Standing Committee of the Supreme People's Assembly, toured several African nations, including Sudan, Congo, and Uganda, in October 2014. During his visits, the high officer from Pyongyang discussed with his African counterparts about potential ways to strengthen their cooperative relations and to revitalize the non-aligned movements.

Kim Yong Nam also attended and delivered a speech at the Asia-Africa Summit (marking the 60th anniversary of the Bandung Summit) held in Indonesia on 22 April 2015. In his speech, the North Korean high-official initially blamed the U.S for its military threats and economic sanctions. Later, he also emphasized that the North Korean government has a strong wiliness to enhance the amicable relations with African counties.³¹

The second important visit of North Korea was that according to Korean Central News Agency, the delegation of the Labor Party headed by Ryu Myeong Seon, the deputy chairman of the Workers' Party's Central Committee, visited Mozambique and Iran after attending the 14th Congress of the Communist Party in South Africa in 2017. During his

³¹ The ROK Ministry of Unification <https://nkinfo.unikorea.go.kr/nkp/main/portalMain.do>

tour in Africa, he met Blade Nzimande, the General Secretary of South African Communist Party, and Aida Libombu, the Secretary for International Relations of Mozambique Liberation Front Party, individually. In the official meeting with the American countries, the North Korean high-level official emphasized the importance of cooperative relations between North Korea and African nations.³²

The diplomatic mission visits from Pyongyang in African nations during the Kim Jong Un period seemly have less international political reasons in comparison with the Détente period in the past because the current North Korean government seems rather focused on rebuilding close diplomatic relations with African countries that could be an essential foundation when the North pursues national interests with the African allies in future.

For example, Pak Ui Chun, the North Korean Foreign Affairs Minister, visited African countries from August 10 to 15 in 2013, including Guinea. The North Korean minister shared opinions with African counterparts about enhanced cooperation strategies and the detained ways for improved bilateral relations. Besides, when Kim Yong Nam, Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme People's Assembly of North Korea, visited Sudan on 24 October 2014, both high officials talked together about practical measures of strengthening bilateral relations, development plans, and other common interests. Right after the visit, the DPRK chairman Kim Yong Nam also visited Congo on 27 October 2014,

³² 대한민국 통일부 <https://nkinfo.unikorea.go.kr/nkp/main/portalMain.do>

and the main discussion topics of this visit were international affairs, strengthening bilateral cooperation, and vitalization of the Non-Aligned Movement.

2. The military assistance

The Détente period (1960 to 1979) in the Kim Il Sung era

Particularly, from the 1960s to the 1970s in the Kim Il Sung era, North Korea applied very active foreign policy in Africa, emphasizing that shared strong nationalism originated from historical experience as an independent country that escaped from colonialism. Shortly after Pyongyang initiated its active diplomatic approaches in Africa, North Korea rapidly expanded its diplomatic relations with African countries. During this period, North Korea established diplomatic relations with non-communist nations in Africa, such as Uganda, Yemen, Mauritania, Congo, Ghana, Burundi, and Somalia.³³

Applying active foreign policy strategies to establish diplomatic relations with African nations, Pyongyang ultimately tried to obtain more diplomatic supports from its African counterparts for its diplomatic recognition and also in severe diplomatic competition with South Korea. After it joined U.N. to take an advantageous position over South Korea in the General Assembly of U.N. whenever there were discussions on reunification issues

³³ 이기종 1997. 북한의 대 제 3 세계 비동맹 외교 정책. 시민정치학회보(고향정치학회보), 1, p.187.

over the Korean peninsula. Finally, the DPRK intended to build a new political and economic alliance with African nations.³⁴

Table 3. The Military Exchange between the DPRK and Africa during the Kim Il Sung regime

Countries	The military exchanges between the DPRK and African nations during the Kim Il Sung regime
Burkina Faso	In late 1970s-1980s, North Korea sent around ten to twenty military professionals and weapons for the government of Burkina Faso.
Libya	In 1982, when Muammar Qaddafi visited to the DPRK, the two nations settled a cooperation agreement to increase the exchange of professional military instructors and equipment.
South Africa	In the 1970s - 1980s, North Korea provided military assistance to newly-independent countries in southern Africa, supporting forces fighting against South Africa-backed troops.
Egypt	In the 1970s, North Korea offered military training to Egypt, and reportedly deployed a squadron of MiG-21 fighter jets and pilots to Egypt during the 1973 Yom Kippur War.
Mozambique	North Korea and Mozambique ties were initiated from the latter's independence movement, when North Korea offered military assistance for the Mozambique Liberation Front. In 1984, there were at least 100 North Korean military advisers stationed in Mozambique.
Zimbabwe	In the mid 1980s, approximately 100 North Korean military advisors were sent to Zimbabwe.
Equatorial Guinea	In the 1970s, North Korea signed economic cooperation plans with and sent military advisors to Equatorial Guinea.
Ethiopia	During the 1970s and 80s, North Korea provided agricultural, economic, and military aid to Ethiopia.
Madagascar	From 1975 to 1993, there was robust economic and military cooperation between Madagascar and North Korea.
Uganda	In the 1970s and 1980s, North Korea supplied arms and military training to Uganda.

Source: (1) <https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/new-documents-the-two-koreas-and-the-third-world>

(2) <https://www.northkoreaintheworld.org/>

³⁴ 국가 기록원 <http://theme.archives.go.kr/next/unKorea/diplomacyUn.do>

In this process, the military assistance of North Korea towards African nations was the crucial means of keeping their amicable diplomatic ties. The above table shows the robust military exchanges between the DPRK and African countries when Kim Il Sung led the North Korean diplomacy. In this period, the military exchanges were mainly focused on military training or assistance from North Korea, contributing to African countries' military capability.

Rodong Sinmun³⁵ published on 14 April 2017, announced that North Korea had supported several independent movements in Algeria, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Uganda, Namibia, Angola from the 1960s to 1970s and had offered development assistance to Togo, Tanzania, Guinea in the past. Furthermore, this paper also claimed that the amicable diplomatic relations between North Korea and Africa have continued even in Kim Jong Un's period.


However, in the late 1980s, the collapse of the Soviet-led socialist bloc was accelerated with political mass demonstrations demanding independence of individual nations and liberalization, such as the Baltic Way in 1989. Finally, these sudden external changes led to a severe and deepening economic crisis in North Korea, which had relied on the communist economic system consisted of the Soviet Union and its satellite eastern European countries.³⁶

³⁵ The official newspaper of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of North Korea

³⁶ Gills, B., 1992. North Korea and the crisis of socialism: The historical ironies of national division. *Third world quarterly*, 13(1), pp.107–130.

Against this backdrop, the total arms transfer deliveries from the DPRK towards the world dramatically declined from 1986 to 1996, according to the World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers report in 1997.³⁷ The below graph demonstrates that the total import and export arms trade volume of North Korea. From the late 1980s, both of the trade amounts rapidly declined. By observing this decreasing arms trade of the DPRK, we can assume that losing the previous communist block and following economic difficulty damaged the arms transfer capability of North Korea significantly.

Figure 3. The Total Arms Transfer Deliveries from North Korea towards World from 1986 to 1996



Source: The U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the 1997 World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers report. <https://2009-2017.state.gov/t/avc/rls/rpt/wmeat/c50834.htm>

³⁷ The World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1997 report from U.S. Department of State <https://2009-2017.state.gov/t/avc/rls/rpt/wmeat/c50834.htm>

In the Kim Jong Un regime (2011- 2020)

Throughout the whole hereditary ruling period in North Korea, the secretive country's underpinning principles have been concepts of Juche (self-reliance ideology) and Songun (military-first politics). As North Korea has isolated itself further and further from the international community, mainly driven by its continued nuclear weapons program without fulfilling its denuclearization pledges, enhancing military capability, including its nuclear arsenal, has been North Korea's top national priority to guarantee its regime's survival.

However, in terms of conventional military strength, the DPRK cannot excel its counterparts such as South Korea and the United States, which already have a decades-old alliance cooperation system with high-tech military equipment. Under this circumstance, North Korea advanced and intensified the nuclear weapon and ballistic missile programs, chemical weapons programs, and cyber warfare capacity to utilize them as its asymmetric capabilities.³⁸

The continually enhanced military strength of North Korea has enough capacity to fully meet African nations' military demands by offering military buildup assistance. In Africa, mainly driven by ongoing armed conflicts in certain areas, many African countries' total military expenditure has increased. For example, in the Central African region, the military spending of all countries involved in armed conflict increased in 2019. The

³⁸ The Council on Foreign Relations, North Korea's Military Capabilities
<https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/north-koreas-military-capabilities>

countries concerned are the Central African Republic (8.7% increase), the Democratic Republic of the Congo (16% increase), and Uganda (52% increase).³⁹

Recently, the report of the United Nations Security Council in 2019 unveiled that the DPRK had constantly violated the regulation of U.N. arms embargo by offering military equipment to African nations. According to the U.N. report, North Korea had supplied light weapons and other military equipment to the Houthi rebels of Yemen, as well as to Libya and Sudan. Additionally, the U.N. panel investigation report discovered the involvement of North Korea in the process of extracting gold in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the construction of a military camp in Sierra Leone with other prohibited activities around the world.⁴⁰

The below table evidently shows various examples of military deals between the DPRK and African countries during the Kim Jong Un regime from 2011 to 2020. Despite tight international sanctions and regulations, there have been continuous formal and informal military exchanges between North Korean and African countries, including military training, arms trades, military technology transfers, and human interchanges to promote mutual military capacities. Such military exchanges have been continued based on the solid diplomatic ties initiated from the Kim Il Sung era.

³⁹ Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)

<https://www.sipri.org/media/press-release/2020/global-military-expenditure-sees-largest-annual-increase-decade-says-sipri-reaching-1917-billion>

⁴⁰ United Nations Security Council, Report of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1874 (2009) https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2019_171.pdf

Table 4. The Military Exchange between the DPRK and African nations during the Kim Jong Un regime from 2011 to 2020

Countries	Military Exchange between the DPRK and African nations during the Kim Jong Un regime
Egypt	The UN report of the expert panel published on 27 February 2017 uncovered that on 11 August 2016, Egypt caught a North Korean boat named 'Jie Shun' which was en route from the DPRK towards the Suez Canal. It had 30,000 PG-7 rocket-propelled grenades and related subcomponents in wooden crates concealed under about 2,300 tonnes of limonite (iron ore).
Mozambique	<p>The UN expert panel report in 2018 said that there was suspected military cooperation between the North Korean Haegumgang Trading Corporation and the Mozambique company "Monte Binga". It contains a \$6 million contract that included surface-to-air missiles, P-12 air defence radar, tank refurbishment, and man-portable air defence systems.</p> <p>The UN panel has evidence such as invitation letters to Mozambique in October 2015 for radar technicians. And this trip was planned by the Economic and Trade Representative Mission of the DPRK in Mozambique.</p>
Angola	According to the UN expert panel report in 2016, the panel visited Angola in September 2016 to investigate the training of North Korea. Angola informed that the training had been initiated around 1990 and confirmed that Mansudae had involved in more than 56 construction projects until February 2015.
Ethiopia	UN panel report in 2017 uncovered Mansudae exported statues and other monuments to at least 15 African nations. the export items were liberation memorials, independence statues, and statues of leaders. Ethiopia is one of the African nations and Mansudae built the Tiglachin monument in Ethiopia.
Sudan	According to the UN expert panel report in 2017, North Korea was suspected of supplying 100 122-mm precision-guided rocket control sections and 80 air attack satellite-guided missiles (AGP-250, for ground attack) to Sudan.
Togo	In 2018, The UN expert panel report revealed that togo-flagged North Korean ships were sailing.
Tanzania	The UN expert panel report in 2017 uncovered that around 50 ships of North Korea being flagged with the United Republic of Tanzania. in compliance with UN resolution 2321 and 2270, UN member nations need to deregister any vessel that is owned, controlled, or operated by North Korea.
Zimbabwe	In 2014, North Korea's Mansudae Art Studio was suspected to sign a contract to build two large statues of Robert Mugabe for \$5 million. In 2018, The UN Expert Panel investigated the Mansudae Overseas Project Group working in Zimbabwe.
Uganda	In the 2017 UN Expert panel's investigation, Uganda confirmed that North Korea trained its air force pilots and technicians under a bilateral contract which would expire in March 2018. It also added that there were two police training contracts involving 45 personnels between North Korea and Uganda in 2016.

Source: (1) The United Nations Security Council Panel of Experts report

https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/1718/panel_experts/reports

When North Korea offered generous military assistance to African nations during the détente period (1960 to 1979) in the Kim Il Sung era, the firstly prioritized foreign policy objective of Pyongyang was to foster political ties with African counterparts in general, utilizing its military superiority over newly independent countries in Africa. Because based on the cordial relations with African countries, the DPRK ultimately wanted to acquire reliable diplomatic support from Africa for its national recognition issue in international politics and get advantages in severe diplomatic competition with South Korea.

On the other hand, the DPRK's current military activities with African countries in Kim Jong Un's have become more commercially focused and non-official. Nevertheless, this military deals with Africa actually have been generating considerable economic profits for North Korea compared to Kim Il Sung's period. One recent U.N. Security Council report, published on 5 March 2019, uncovered frequent commercial activities of Mansudae Overseas Project of North Korea in African counties such as Algeria, Botswana, Namibia, Zambia, Zimbabwe for construction projects hiring North Korean workers.⁴¹

Enhanced international sanctions have substantially adverse effects on North Korea and Africa's relations in the Kim Jong Un era. However, even though formal ties between North Korea and Africa have become less prioritized and less vibrant diplomatically, their military and commercial relations are still going on with less official and more informal channels.

⁴¹ United Nations Security Council, Report of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1874 (2009) https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2019_171.pdf

Chapter V. Analysis of the external factors

In this chapter for analysis, the three crucial external factors assumed to lead the dynamic redirection in the foreign policy of North Korea towards the African continent will be thoroughly studied. First of all, the international sanctions will be reviewed among the important outside factors, focusing on its adverse impacts on diplomatic relations between the DPRK and African nations.

International sanctions have been imposed on North Korea to stop its continuous nuclear weapons development programs. The sanction intensity has unprecedentedly increased since resolution 2270 of the United Nations Security Council was passed in 2016, condemning Pyongyang's fourth nuclear test. Especially Since the UNSC resolution 2321 in 2016 and resolution 2356 in 2017, the leading trade items of North Korea, such as mineral exports including copper, nickel, silver, coal, and iron.

Secondly, the aggressive Hallstein doctrine upheld by South Korea will be closely reviewed as an important external factor of North Korea's foreign policy. Because this excessively confrontational diplomacy of South Korea against the DPRK caused enormous interruptions in diplomatic relations between North Korea and its counterparts in Africa, South Korea actively prevented African nations from establishing diplomatic ties with Pyongyang. This political stance of South Korea continued until both Koreas became members of the United Nations at the end of the Cold war.

Thirdly, the changed solidarity of the Non-Aligned Movement members will be focused on as the hidden political assets having the potential to heal the reduced diplomatic relations of North Korea in the future.

1. Sanctions on the trade between the DPRK and African nations

Background

Until the early 1970s, the foreign trade of North Korea heavily depended on the economic block of communist countries. Even North Korea did not join the CMEA (Council for Mutual Economic Assistance) of the Soviet bloc to avoid the political subjugation to the former Soviet Union, but the North Korean trade system was still closely related to the CMEA system.⁴² Even though it had a fundamental limitation in increasing economic productivity, based on the economic supports from its communist allies, North Korea managed to maintain its centrally planned economy system without a big crisis up to 1980. In this economically stable period, the diplomatic relations between the DPRK and African countries dramatically improved.

However, in the aftermath of the sudden dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, Pyongyang faced severe economic hardship as its essential commodities were no longer

⁴² 고일동., 고일동 & 한국개발연구원 2008. 북한의 무역구조 분석과 남북경협에 대한 시사점 / 고일동 [외저]. Page 265

able to be imported from Eastern Europe and other communist blocks, which had been the DPRK's most important trading partners and financial aid countries.⁴³ Facing its close allies' permanent loss, North Korea started to depend upon nuclear weapons development to continue its regime survival.⁴⁴ In this background, the international community's long-lasting effort to persuade Pyongyang to abandon its nuclear weapons program initiated and still goes on.

International Sanctions

From 2006 to 2017, the U.N. Security Council (UNSC) has passed ten international resolutions to condemn North Korea's continuing nuclear tests and to block its economic exchanges with other nations as a punishment. Also, by imposing a series of strict international sanctions on the DPRK, the global community has tried to stop North Korea from proliferating the weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile programs to any dangerous political groups in the world, especially by achieving fully verified denuclearization on the Korean peninsula.

Even though the constantly enhancing international sanctions have been imposed more than a decade to stop North Korea from taking economic advantages in international trade and financial activities, international society couldn't entirely prevent North Korea

⁴³ 박석삼 & 한국은행. 금융경제연구원 2004. 북한경제의 구조와 변화 / 박석삼 [저].

⁴⁴ The Wilson Center <https://www.wilsoncenter.org/event/revisiting-history-north-korea-and-nuclear-weapons>

from strengthening the WMD technology. As a result, North Korea has been conducting several nuclear tests and developing nuclear bombs continuedly, and it seems that the international sanction against Pyongyang will, unfortunately, go on in the future.⁴⁵ In this regard, the U.N. Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR)'s impacts that have negatively shifted North Korea's trade and economic relation with African nations will be analyzed in this chapter.

There are divergent opinions about the effectiveness of the United Nations Security Council resolutions targeting Pyongyang. However, it is an undeniable fact that the sanctions have dramatically shifted and damaged the overall trade structure of North Korea by thoroughly prohibiting its trade activities related to vital trade items. As an important indicator, North Korea's trade total volumes have considerably declined for three consecutive years, from 2016 to 2018. The total annual trade volume of North Korea reached \$2.84 billion in 2018, and this figure decreased by 48.8 percent in comparison with that of 2017.⁴⁶

The below table shows the chronological list of U.N. Security Council Resolutions imposed on North Korea from 2006 to 2017 with the reactions of the main countries involved in the nuclear talk, such as Japan, China, and South Korea, against North Korea's continued nuclear development. Since 2016, UNSC sanctions have become intensive and increased, and most recently, international society applied more extended resolution 2397,

⁴⁵ German Institute for International and Security Affairs
<https://www.swp-berlin.org/en/publication/facets-of-the-north-korea-conflict/#hd-d34190e4124>

⁴⁶ The 2018 Korea Trade-Investment Promotion Agency report, page 1
[/http://125.131.31.47/Solars7DMME/004/192018%EB%B6%81%ED%95%9C%EB%8C%80%EC%99%B8%EB%AC%B4%EC%97%AD%EB%8F%99%ED%96%A5.pdf](http://125.131.31.47/Solars7DMME/004/192018%EB%B6%81%ED%95%9C%EB%8C%80%EC%99%B8%EB%AC%B4%EC%97%AD%EB%8F%99%ED%96%A5.pdf)

imposing new sanctions on oil imports as well as metal, agricultural, and labor exports of North Korea.

Table 5. The Chronological list of U.N. Security Council Resolutions on North Korea and the reactions of major nations from 2006 to 2017

YEAR	ACTORS	ACTIONS
2006	UN	October 14, 2006, UN Security Council (UNSC) passed Resolution 1718. It criticized the first nuclear test of Pyongyang and imposed sanctions on North Korea, restricting weapons and luxury goods trade. Financial transactions and travel are also prohibited.
2006	Japan	Japan imposed its multi-dimensional sanctions due to the first missile launch.
2006	US	The US froze assets of US entities dealing with North Korean entities.
2007	US	The US imposed license requirements for export to North Korea, and travel further regulated.
2008	ROK	ROK stopped traveling into Kum Kang Mt. after one South Korean tourist was dead by a North Korean soldier shooting.
2009	UN	June 12, 2009, UNSC adopted Resolution 1874. It prohibited the North's activities further after North Korea's second nuclear test.
2010	ROK	ROK imposed trade and investment sanctions after the North's attacks on South Korean navy vessel in November.
2010	US	US restricted individual property related to North Korea (US Executive Order 13551)
2011	US	US further transactions restriction with North Korea and ensure import restrictions (US Executive Order 13570)
2013	UN	January 22, 2013, UNSC adopted Resolution 2087 caused by the North's satellite launch and proliferation activities in 2012. March 7, 2013, UNSC passed Resolution 2094 furthering sanctions in response to Pyongyang's third nuclear test in 2012.
2013	China	China issued a list of sanctioned goods against North Korea and ordered local governments to adopt the sanctions.
2016	UN	March 2, 2016, UNSC adopted Resolution 2270 condemning Pyongyang's fourth nuclear test and its 2015 submarine-launched missile test. Sanctions are enhanced, including banning states from supplying aviation fuel to the DPRK.
2016	UN	November 30, 2016, UNSC passed Resolution 2321 expanding sanctions after the DPRK's fifth nuclear test, including a ban on mineral exports such as copper and nickel, silver and the selling of statues and helicopters.
2017	UN	June 2, 2017, UNSC adopted Resolution 2356 condemning intensively the nuclear weapons and ballistic missile development activities including a series of ballistic missile launches and other activities conducted by Pyongyang since 9 September 2016.
2017	UN	August 5, 2017, UNSC adopted Resolution 2371 extending sanctions after the DPRK's two intercontinental ballistic missile launched in July, including a ban on coal and iron exports.
2017	UN	September 11, 2017, UNSC passed Resolution 2375 to develop up sanctions after North Korea's sixth and largest nuclear test.
2017	US	US Executive Order 13810 increased financial pressure on the North stopping all North Korean property, and applying broad prohibitions on the export, re-export or transfer of any goods, services or technology from the United States or by a U.S. person to North Korea.
2017	UN	December 22, 2017, UNSC passed Resolution 2397 imposing new sanctions on oil imports, as well as metal, agricultural, and labor exports.

Source: (1) securitycouncilreport.org

(2) Lee, Y.S., 2018. International isolation and regional inequality: Evidence from sanctions on North Korea. *Journal of urban economics*, 103, pp.34–51.

The table above shows how the international sanctions have become intensified from 2006 to 2017. The UN Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR) against North Korea issues have been adopted ten times from 2006 to 2017. Initially, UNSCR 1718 in 2006, UNSCR 1874 in 2009, UNSCR 2087 and 2094 in 2013 were applied at intervals of several years. Most importantly, since UNSCR 2270 and 2321 in 2016, the sanctions started to regulate more extended trade items, and international society decided to pass tightened four resolutions in 2017, including UNSCR 2356, 2371, 2375, and 2397.⁴⁷

The U.N. Security Council adopted resolution 2087 and 2094 in 2013. First of all, Resolution 2087 was adopted condemning the satellite launch of Pyongyang on December 12, 2012. Because this launch apparently violated the previous U.N. resolutions and other North Korea's proliferation activities were uncovered. Later, resolution 2094 was also passed, imposing more harsher sanctions than ever against North Korea's provocative third nuclear test.

Before UNSCR resolution 2270 in 2016, the previous four international sanctions were so-called smart sanctions (targeted sanctions) intensively prohibiting conventional weaponry or weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The main goal of these previous resolutions was to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. However, since

⁴⁷ Security Council Report, North Korea
<https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2020-11/dprk-north-korea-8.php>

resolution 2270 in 2016, in the face of Pyongyang's continuous provocations with nuclear tests, the purpose of sanctions has significantly modified to regulate and press the overall economic system of North Korea.

U.N. unanimously passed Resolution 2270 in 2016 after North Korea's fourth nuclear test, and it started to ban the main exported items from Pyongyang, such as coal, steel and iron ore, gold, titanium ore.⁴⁸ This U.N. resolution also decided to prevent any sales or supply of aviation fuel to North Korea from other nations. Furthermore, UNSCR 2321 in 2016, after the fifth nuclear test from North Korea, aimed to strengthen and extend the application of all previous sanctions.⁴⁹

Under the escalated tension driven by the continuous missile tests from North Korea in 2017, the UNSC resolution 2371 was adopted on August 5, 2017. It declared to prohibit U.N. member nations from importing coal, iron ore, and seafood from North Korea. Right after this strong sanction, Resolution 2375 was also passed on September 11, 2017 against Pyongyang's sixth and largest test. It strongly banned any purchase of textiles from North Korea and sales of natural gas condensates and liquids to the regime.

Later, the international community once again decided to adopt Resolution 2397 in December 2017. This action broadly extended the international sanction's scope by prohibiting the sales of industrial machinery and vessels to North Korea. It also imposed new sanctions on oil imports as well as agricultural and labor exports related to North

⁴⁸ United Nations Meetings Coverage and Press Releases
<https://www.un.org/press/en/2016/sc12267.doc.htm>

⁴⁹ UN Security Council Report, North Korea [https://www.undocs.org/S/RES/2321\(2016\)](https://www.undocs.org/S/RES/2321(2016))

Korea. Because of this resolution 2397, North Korea's total importation rate of steel and metal products, machinery and electrical machinery, and transportation equipment sharply dropped up to 0%.

The critical point to notice is that North Korea's major export items have significantly changed from 2018 to 2019, mainly due to resolution 2371 and resolution 2375 that was adopted in 2007. The mineral products (HS 25-27), which was the most heavily exported item in the past, have dramatically decreased in 2018 up to -92.4%. It seems that the enhanced restrictive influence of resolution 2371 mainly caused the decrease of trade items by prohibiting any importation of anthracite, iron, iron ore, lead, lead ore, and marine products from North Korea.⁵⁰

The shifted trade between North Korea and African nations

For ten years, from 2006 to 2015, four U.N. resolutions were passed to restrict Pyongyang's economic exchanges with the international community. These economic sanctions aimed to make North Korea give up its nuclear development and prevent it from proliferating nuclear weapons technology. On the other hand, there were six U.N. resolutions in just two years, from 2016 to 2017. It clearly shows that international pressure against Pyongyang has noticeably intensified more recently.

⁵⁰The Korea Trade-Investment Promotion Agency 2018 report, page 6
<https://news.kotra.or.kr/user/globalBbs/kotranews/787/globalBbsDataList.do?setIdx=249>

Against this backdrop, the detailed trade patterns between North Korea and the African regions and the influence of U.N. sanctions on it will be analyzed in this part, focusing on the Kim Jong Un period starting from 2011. The below graph shows the total trade volumes between North Korea and the entire African region from 2009 to 2019, compared with periods when the most critical international sanctions were applied that assumed to influence the trade volume between North Korea and African nations.

Figure 4. The total trade volume of African nations with the DPRK from 2009 to 2019




Table 6. The total trade volume of the DPRK with Africa from 2009 to 2019

	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
African export to the DPRK	5,689	2,261	489	12,581	3,252	5,898	3,863	8,705	3,773	3,661	4,544
African import from the DPRK	12,847	13,683	3,841	36,722	39,561	26,561	24,739	26,283	21,915	12,051	12,193
Total trade volume	18,536	15,944	4,330	49,303	42,813	32,459	28,602	34,988	25,688	15,712	16,737

Source: (1) The annual reports of North Korea's trade volumes published by KOTRA (Korea Trade-Investment Promotion Agency)

The country-by-country mirror trade data of the Korea Trade-Investment Promotion Agency (KOTRA) from 2009 to 2019 were utilized to analyze two parties' trade trends. In the above graph, there are two main points needed to examine closely.


The first point is that the timing when the trade volume between them rapidly declined is overlapped with points when the intensive international sanctions were applied. It demonstrates that international sanctions significantly harmed the trade relation of North Korea with Africa. The total trade volume of North Korea towards African countries rapidly decreased when Kim Jong Un was officially declared as the Supreme Leader of North Korea after his father's death in 2011. This downward trend was accelerated when the U.N. Security Council passed the resolutions 2087 and 2094 within three months in 2013. Even though the trade volume gradually increased from 2015 to 2016, this trend sharply dropped again when U.N. decided to adopt resolutions 2270 and 2321, containing more strengthened and extended sanctions in 2016.

The second point is that while the international sanctions have negatively influenced both export and import in the total trade between North Korea and Africa in general, the imports volumes of Africa have consistently exceeded one of the African exports to North Korea from 2009 to 2019. This trend of trading figures is a notable fact compared to the trade pattern of North Korea with other trade partners in the world such as the Middle East, Europe, the Americas, CIS, and Asia. The total import volumes from North Korea to

these countries had become significantly lower than the exports to the DPRK since 2016, when the sanctions started to be intensified unprecedentedly.

As it has maintained stable import transactions with North Korea, in 2019, Africa was ranked the second-largest importer to North Korea right after Asia among the six regions in the world. On the contrary, the total import volume of Asia from North Korea declined around 37% in 2017 and 88% in 2018 compared to previous years. It is a significant decrease given the biggest portion that Asia is taking in the total trade volume of North Korea despite a slight increase of around 18% in 2019.⁵¹

Figure 5. The total trade volume of the DPRK with the world from 1992 to 2018



⁵¹ The Korea Trade-Investment Promotion Agency(KOTRA) 2019 annual report on North Korean international trade trends. Page 13
<https://news.kotra.or.kr/user/globalBbs/kotranews/787/globalBbsDataList.do?setIdx=249>

Source: (1) the annual reports of North Korea's trade volumes published by KOTRA
(Korea Trade-Investment Promotion Agency)


The above graph shows the general flows of North Korean total trade volumes with the world from 1992 to 2018. It presents that the intensified U.N. resolutions in 2016 and 2017 accelerated the downward trends of the North Korean trade flows not only with Africa but also with the world market. Even though Africa only takes up 0.52% portion of the North Korea's total trade volume with the world market in 2019, tracking the trade flow of them is still meaningful. Because first of all, it is a crucial fact that African regions always have had more imports from North Korea compared to the exported volumes, and the accumulated trade surplus of the DPRK that created in this trade with Africa could function as a financial lifeline for the survival of Kim's regime.

Consequently, the two significant points indicate that the more tighten approaches of international society, including much firmer economic, political and military sanctions against North Korea, greatly hindered and decreased the trade deals between North Korea and African nations. Otherwise, their trade deal could be potentially more robust. However, it seems that sanctions have not prohibited the entire trade relations between Africa and North Korea. On the contrary, the imports of the African region from the DPRK seem less affected than other trade partners in the world.

Also, there is a critical conflicting phenomenon in the declining trade volume trend between Africa and the DPRK compared to its averagely rising trade trends of African nations with the rest of the world market. The below graph shows the total trade trends

of African regions with the world from 2008 to 2019. In this figure, the whole African trade flow with the world increased from 2016 to 2018 when its trade volume with North Korea rapidly declined.

Figure 6. The total trade volume of Africa with the world from 2008 to 2019




Source: (1) <https://unctadstat.unctad.org/EN/Index.html>

There are some cases of individual African nations having interesting trade trends with North Korea. Most of them seem to have similar declining trade trends like other African regions' total trade volume with North Korea. But, at the same, they also show unexpected rebounds under the international sanctions. The below graph 7 demonstrates the total

trade volume between North Korea and South Africa, one of the African leading trade partners, between 2000 and 2019. As we can see, the whole export volume in the total trade has dramatically increased in 2006, and the increasing trend lasted up to 2010.

Figure 7. The trade volume between South African and North Korea from 2000 to 2019



Source: (1) U.N. Comtrade Database <https://comtrade.un.org/>

However, these upward trends suddenly stopped, and the rate sharply dropped in 2011, and this low trade flow in the bilateral trade continued up to 2019. It seems South Africa was also greatly affected by international sanctions. Simultaneously, a slightly increasing trend was also shown between 2015 and 2016, even though it declined again in 2016. These changes were relatively quite a small fluctuation compared to the dramatic

drop in the trade volume in 2011. By analyzing this conflicting correlation between the trade pattern between South Africa and North Korea, and international sanctions, we could draw a new perspective regarding the hidden influence of international sanctions against North Korea.⁵²

Interestingly, those opposite trends of trade volumes coincided with the international sanctions imposed upon North Korea's total trade. When South Africa's trade amounts started to increase in 2006, U.N. Security Council passed resolution 1718 on October 14, 2006, condemning North Korea's first nuclear test. This resolution conveyed sanctions aimed to restrict the trade of weapons and luxury goods with North Korea. Additionally, financial transactions and travel were also limited.


And another UNSC resolution 1874 was adopted on June 12, 2009, with more restriction measures. However, the bilateral trade balance ultimately returned to low trade trends with a series of international sanctions and it shows that the DPRK lost its supplying country which had offered necessary commodities.

As you can see in the below graph, in 2016, the trade volume between South Africa and North Korea significantly decreased when the enhanced U.N. Security Council sanction 2270 was applied in response to the North Korean fourth nuclear test and its 2015 submarine-launched missile test. Not only the total trade volume between the two nations has been dramatically reduced, but also trade items also have been limited in

⁵²<http://news.kotra.or.kr/user/globalBbs/kotranews/786/globalBbsDataView.do?setIdx=247&dataIdx=1776>
39

mineral fuels only excluding any grains, crude oils. However, the total trade volume started to increase in 2018. It is an interesting point to notice.

Figure 8. The trade volume between South African and North Korea from 2016 to 2019




Source: (1) U.N. Comtrade Database <https://comtrade.un.org/>

Another comparative trade is the below Mozambique’s case. The graph below shows a markedly decreased trade volume between North Korea and Mozambique since 2014, another crucial trade partner to DPRK, in the Kim Jong Un regime. This trade pattern is similar to the previous South African case especially the total trade volume between the two nations has massively declined, between 2016 and 2017. At the same periods, the import volume of Mozambique dropped around 45.7%. It can be assumed that international resolutions especially including resolution 2270 passed by UNSC on March 2, 2016, influenced the trade relations adversely given that the timing of the decline overlapped

with the period when UN sanctions began. However, the total trade volume highly increased in 2018, similar to the upper South African case.

Figure 9. The trade volume between Mozambique and North Korea from 2000 to 2018



Source: (1) U.N. Comtrade Database <https://comtrade.un.org/>

The decreased trade volumes of the DPRK's two major trade partners South Africa and Mozambique, demonstrate that the international sanctions against the DPRK seem significantly effective in reducing overall trade volume and regulating trading items. At the same time, the total trade volume of North Korea's crucial two trade partners in Africa suddenly increased in 2018 after declining trends over the years. This fact suggests that struggling under the international sanction regime, Pyongyang has continually sought alternative ways to keep some African nations as its crucial trade partners.

2. The Hallstein doctrine of South Korea

During the Cold War period, South Korea upheld the Hallstein doctrine and did not develop diplomatic ties with the countries already having official ties with North Korea. Additionally, South Korea also promoted a foreign policy that opposing any North Korea's participation in any conference of international organizations. This aggressive foreign policy of South Korea based on this Hallstein doctrine was withdrawn officially in 1973 as part of the 1973 joint agreement between South and North Korea regarding peaceful reunification.

However, unlike other confronting regions in the world where ideological conflicts between communism and democracy were decreasing, the confrontation of the two Korea continued strengthening the Cold War system in the Korean peninsula beyond the détente period. The excessively confrontational diplomacy of South Korea against North Korea continued until both Koreas joined the United Nations simultaneously in 1991, stimulated by the end of the Cold war, and South Korea started to imply the diplomacy focused on practical interests in Africa nations after the end of Cold War.⁵³

In the Kim Il Sung era, the purpose of most high-level visits from the DPRK to African regions was to reduce its international isolation and win in the diplomatic competition with South Korea by acquiring more diplomatic supports from African allies. During the same period, South Korea initialed aggressive foreign policy towards African regions, mainly stimulated by the diplomatic competition with the DPRK. In the below table, the

⁵³채리아 2015. Making the cold war their own: inter-Korean relations, 1971-1976 / Ria Chae.

examples of South Korea's hostile activities demonstrate how South Korea actively applied its foreign policy based on the Hallstein doctrine in Africa.

Table 7. The Hallstein doctrine of South Korea in Africa during the détente period
(1960 to 1979)

Date	The relevant Region	The Hallstein doctrine related activities of ROK
1967.06.22	BENIN	South Korea's ambassador Choi reported that he was confident the Benin government would not accept visits by North Korean delegation. He added that the president Soglo and the Chief of Staff Alley of the republic of Benin confirmed they would never agree any visit from the DPRK.
1967.07.05	Haute-Volta (Burkina Faso)	The North Korean delegation departed from Ouagadougou for Bamakow on July 3 after a 10-day visit. On June 29, the delegation received a short reception from the president Lamizana. North Korea offered rice development aids, but President Ramizana did not give a definite answer. No public statements were exchanged. There was no diplomatic celebration, and the North Korea's visit did not draw much attention.
1969. 5. 29	Morocco	South Korea's ambassador Shin stated he had seen Morocco's Secretary-General Sijilmassi in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and had expressed hope the Moroccan government would not receive North Korean delegations.
1969. 6.12	Haute-Volta (Burkina Faso)	Haute-Volta's president Lamizana confirmed that North Korean delegation pressured the haute-Volta government to establish diplomatic relations with North Korea. The president said that he told the DPRK delegation that Haute-Volta could not break relations with the friendly country, South Korea.
1969.09.09	Central African Republic	Centra Africa Republic announced that it decided to establish diplomatic relations with North Korea. This decision was made immediately after the president Bokassa expressed its assurances to support South Korea and just before the annual discussion of UN General Assembly on Korean question.

Source: (1) Record Group 59, General Records of the Department of State Central Foreign Policy Files, <https://www.archives.gov/research/guide-fed-records/groups/059.html>

By analyzing the above list of South Korea's diplomatic activities in Africa, we could imagine how the diplomatic competition between the two Koreas over Africa was severe.

They frequently interrupted each other's diplomatic approach towards nations in Africa to persuade more African countries to their side. For example, according to the U.S. Department of State's confidential documents published on June 22, 1967, South Korea's ambassador Choi asked the president of the Benin Republic not to accept the North Korean delegation's visit. This evidence demonstrates how the South Korean government closely monitored North Korea's every movement in Africa and how South Korea swiftly responded to them in close interaction with its African allies.

Secondly, the document dated July 05, 1967, on the above list, shows how North Korea actively suggested to Haute-Volta to accept its development aids. Despite North Korea's sincere efforts, the president of Haute-Volta refused to have it as this African nation already had an amicable relationship with South Korea. But North Korea didn't give up and continued its attempts to extend its diplomatic relation with African countries. According to another confidential document from the U.S. Department of State dated June 12, 1969, North Korea once again firmly asked Haute-Volta to establish diplomatic relations with it, and Haute-Volta rejected it once again.

Even after the détente period, South Korea maintained its aggressive foreign policy direction in Africa, enhancing its amicable diplomatic relations with many African countries in the 1980s. In 1982, President Chun Doo Hwan of South Korea visited Kenya, Senegal, Gabon, and Nigeria, and nine leaders from the African nations when to the Republic of Korea vice versa. Additionally, the South Korean government sent special presidential envoys, goodwill envoys, and other experts to Africa frequently to sign diplomatic agreements with many African allies. It also provided free aids and dispatched

Taekwondo instructors and agricultural investigation teams to African nations. With these efforts, the ROK government aimed to develop further economic and technical cooperation with African counterparts.⁵⁴

As the DPRK and the ROK were simultaneously admitted to the United Nations (UN) in October 1991, no more overheated diplomatic competition between the two countries was needed not as much as in the past. Seemingly both Koreas were finally able to promote pragmatic diplomacy for their benefits free from excessive inter-Korean confrontation diplomacy in Africa. However, mainly because of the keen competition with the South counterpart, Africa became a strategically important region to North Korea for its international recognition and diplomatic supports.

Over the decades, North Korea has maintained the eagerly established diplomatic relations with African nations. Their relations were developed as diplomatic ties at the beginning and later when North Korea became an isolated nation under the pressure of international sanctions, the maintained diplomatic relations with a certain number of African nations have become a lifeline making North Korea survive. Because North Korea's economic profits generated from the trade deal with Africa is considerable and significant for the isolated nation.

⁵⁴ 대한민국외교부 http://www.mofa.go.kr/www/wpge/m_3551/contents.do

3. The solidarity of NAM (Non-Aligned Movement)

In the mid-1950s, North Korea applied so unprecedentedly active foreign policy in extending its relations with non-aligned movement member countries. This policy stance was necessary because Pyongyang sought an opportunity to break away from the intra-communist diplomacy prioritizing connection with the previous close communist allies such as the Soviet Union, China, and Eastern Europe.

The particular two timely facts triggered this reorientation in North Korea's foreign policy regarding the non-aligned movement members. The first opportunity is the Bandung Conference held in April 18-24 1955 for developing countries to establish a strong alliance among the non-aligned countries. Participants in the conference mainly discussed about the role of the Third World and economic development. And the second fact is that the Soviet Union's first secretary Khrushchev openly advocated peaceful coexistence with the West at the 20th Congress of the Communist Party in 1956.⁵⁵

Kim Il Sung cited Khrushchev's speech at the Third Congress of the Korean Workers' Party on April 23, 1956 and emphasized the peaceful coexistence among nations respecting various social systems. Kim Il Sung strengthened the importance of robust political and business exchanges with all countries in the world. But he also stressed that all nations should respect each other's sovereignty and equality. In the same speech, pointing out the importance of the Bandung Conference, Kim Il Sung welcomed this

⁵⁵ 대한민국 통일부. 북한정보포털

<https://nkinfo.unikorea.go.kr/nkp/term/viewNkKnwldgDicary.do?pageIndex=1&dicaryId=266>

conference as a created opportunity for reconciliation between the socialist and non-socialist countries.⁵⁶

The DPRK continuously strengthened this relation with the members of the Non-Aligned Movement until the 1970s and North Korea launched its most vigorous non-aligned diplomacy in the 1960s and 1970s under the atmosphere of détente periods. In August 1975, North Korea joined the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), which is consisted of 120 developing world states which are not formally aligned with or against any major power bloc, as a full-fledged member through the Non-Aligned Foreign Ministers Conference held in Lima, Peru.

On the other hand, South Korea's entrance was rejected by the member nations of NAM. This fact demonstrates that North Korea succeeded in the establishment of firm bonds with the NAM members and it was targeted by the DPRK to obtain enough supports to pass the Korea-related agenda favorably to North Korea in the United Nations.

Entering in the early 1980s when North Korea emphasized the basic foreign policy principle of self-reliance, North Korea extended its diplomatic relations with non-communist nations, including western capitalist countries. In particular, diplomatic relations with non-aligned countries have become more crucial for the survival of the North Korean regime when the Cold war ended in 1991 right after the collapse of the socialist bloc.

⁵⁶ Wilson Center Digital Archive <https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/120185>

However, North Korean economy faced difficulties as it lost the close communist allies that were indispensable supporters in the DPRK economy, North Korea's diplomatic policies towards the members of the Non-Aligned Movement also encountered its limitation.⁵⁷ But still, even after the 2000s, North Korea has continued its diplomatic activities to obtain the support of non-aligned members including African that is necessary to overcome the national difficulties driven by international sanctions on the DPRK's nuclear weapons and missiles.⁵⁸

The below table summarizes the DPRK's main diplomatic activities relevant to the Non-Aligned movement in Kim Il Sung and Kim Jung Un periods respectively.

Table 8. the DPRK's main diplomatic activities with member nations of NAM

Periods	North Korea's diplomatic activities with members of NAM
Kim Il Sung era (the Détente period from 1960 to 1979)	In August 1975, the DPRK joined the Non-Aligned movement as a member nation at the second Non-Aligned Foreign Ministers Conference held in Lima, Peru.
	In September 1979, North Korea was elected as a member of the coordinating committee at the 6th Non-Aligned Movement Summit in Havana, Cuba.
Kim Jung Un (2011- present)	After the 2013 nuclear test, North Korea's Chief of the General Staff Kim Kyok Sik visited Cuba in June, and Foreign Minister Pak Ui Chun attended the 20th ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) to strengthen friendly relations with countries having existing diplomatic relations.
	In October 2014, Kim Yong Nam, President of the Presidium of the Supreme People's Assembly, toured African countries.
	In April 2015, Kim Yong Nam, President of the Presidium of the Supreme People's Assembly, attended the Asia-Africa Summit (the 60th anniversary of the Bandung Conference) and gave a speech.
	In September 2016, Kim Yong Nam, President of the Presidium of the Supreme People's Assembly, and RI Su Yong, the director of International Affairs, attended the 17 th Non-Aligned summit in Margarita Island, Venezuela.

⁵⁷ 이기종 1997. 북한의 대제 3 세계비동맹외교정책. 시민정치학회보(고향정치학회보), 1, p.187.

⁵⁸ 대한민국 통일부. 북한정보포털

<https://nkinfo.unikorea.go.kr/nkp/term/viewNkKnwldgDicary.do?pageIndex=1&dicaryId=266>

	In 2017, Vice Minister Ryu Myung-sun also visited South Africa and Iran, while Foreign Minister Ri Yong Ho also visited Cuba to meet with Cuban President Raul Castro.
	In 2018, Cuban Prime Minister Miguel Diaz-Canel visited Pyongyang for talks and exchanges with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un.
	In 2019, Kim Jung Un met with Vietnamese President Nguyen Phu Trong and confirmed friendly and cooperative relations when Kim Jong-un visited Hanoi for the North Korea-U.S. summit.

Source: (1) the Ministry of Unification (South Korea) 대한민국 통일부. 북한정보포털

https://nkinfo.unikorea.go.kr/nkp/overview/nkOverview.do?sumryMenuId=MENU_34

<https://nkinfo.unikorea.go.kr/nkp/term/viewNkKnwldgDicary.do?pageIndex=1&dicaryId=266>

In the détente periods of the Kim Il Sung, the DPRK intentionally opened and enhanced its relations with many nations in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, including the member countries of the Non-Aligned movement, ultimately to establish a favorable diplomatic with those nations and attract their support in Korean questions to the advantage of the DPRK. Especially, in 1973 North Korea dispatched diplomatic delegations and presidential envoys to over 80 nations.⁵⁹ This fact shows that DPRK's offensive diplomatic offensive was initially applied to win the competition with South Korea. However, consequently it resulted diplomatic foundations that have helped North Korea escape from international isolation in later years.

Since Kim Jong Un took power after his father's death, he has been actively engaged in diplomatic activities to maintain or strengthen the diplomatic relation with non-aligned countries. These efforts aim to overcome international sanctions against North Korea because of its nuclear weapons development or launching missiles. Therefore, the more

⁵⁹ Wilson Center Digital Archive <https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/116004>

the United Nations Security Council sanctions are imposed on North Korea, the more efforts North Korea might make to improve the diplomatic relations with non-aligned countries, including African regions.

Chapter VI. CONCLUSION

This dissertation reviewed unfocused parts of Pyongyang's diplomacy with Africa to know how this isolated nation has been able to keep its regime survival facing all the international sanctions and punitive measures. Specifically, the DPRK's reoriented diplomatic targets in African nations have been analyzed through a comparative study between the Détente period from 1960 to 1979 during the Kim Il Sung era and the Kim Jong Un eras from 2011 to the present. First of all, the Détente period was chosen, because it was when North Korea aggressively expanded its diplomatic relations in Africa to obtain its state recognition and legitimacy against South Korea, to compare this most robust period in terms of diplomatic perspective with the current Kim Jong Un regime facing unprecedentedly severe international sanctions.

North Korea's changed diplomatic strategy in the African region during the two different periods have been presented by indicators such as mutual visits of high-level officers and the frequency of military assistance-related activities from North Korea to African nations. The first main finding of this dissertation regarding diplomatic relations between the DPRK and Africa is that diplomatic relations and military exchanges with Africa were so important to Pyongyang during the Détente period (1960 to 1979),

however, still North Korea has maintained practical diplomatic channels and military cooperation with the counterparts in Africa until nowadays.

In the case of a high-level official exchange, Pyongyang extended its diplomatic relation with African nations aggressively during the Détente period (1960 to 1979) according to recently uncalcified diplomatic files from the U.S. Department of State. The purpose of these visits mainly to stress the solidarity with each other or ask for political supports from African regions for North Korea in the international arena regarding diplomatic recognition of the DPRK or Korean agendas.

On the other hand, compared to the Détente period, the diplomatic relationship with African nations seems to become a lower priority to North Korea in the Kim Jong Un era as the diplomacy with superpowers are more emphasized. However, the number of African nations having diplomatic relations with the DPRK in the Kim Jong Un regime hasn't been dramatically changed. Additionally, even not robust as much as in past but North Korea has continuously dispatched high-level officials with Africa to maintain already established diplomatic relations.

In the case of the military assistance, when North Korea succeeded in the rapid expansion of its diplomatic relations with African countries, the military assistance of North Korea towards African nations was the crucial means of keeping their amicable diplomatic ties. There were many robust military exchanges between the two regions in the Kim Il Sung era. In this period, the military exchanges were mainly focused on military training or assistance from North Korea contributing to the military capability of African countries. In the late 1980s, the collapse of the Soviet-led socialist bloc led to a serious

economic crisis in North Korea. Against this backdrop, the total arms transfer deliveries of North Korea from 1986 to 1996 declined rapidly.

However, the constantly enhanced military strength of North Korea in the Kim Jong Un regime has enough capacity to assist African nations in accelerating their military buildup. Despite tight international sanctions, there have been continuous formal and informal exchanges with African countries including military training, arms trades, technology transfers, and human interchanges to promote mutual military capacities.

The second main finding of this dissertation related to three external factors is that whereas all of them have significantly contributed to the deteriorated diplomatic relation between the DPRK and Africa in each way, they also have unexpectedly helped to build a foundation of cooperation between the two sides.

First of all, the international sanctions imposed on North Korea to stop it from keeping or proliferating the weapons of mass destruction seem to have been significantly effective in reducing overall trade volume and regulating trade items. However, it did not prevent completely North Korea from having WMD technology or trading with a few African countries avoiding the regulation. On the contrary, the total trade volume of North Korea's crucial two trade partners in Africa suddenly increased in 2018 after declining trends over the years. This fact implies that under the international sanction regime, the DPRK is continually seeking a way to keep the trade deal with the African nations.

Secondly, In the Kim Il Sung era, North Korea put massive efforts on African regions to reduce its international isolation and win in the diplomatic competition with South Korea. As the confrontational diplomacy of South Korea based on the Hallstein doctrine was

maintained until both Koreas joined the United Nations in 1991. To overcome the severe diplomatic competition with South Korea in Africa, North Korea set up many diplomatic relations with African nations and established a diplomatic base. And later when North Korea became an isolated nation because of the international sanction, the reliable diplomatic relations with a certain number of African nations became a lifeline to North Korea in the Kim Jung Un era.

Lastly, North Korea launched its most vigorous non-aligned diplomacy in the 1960s and 1970s under the atmosphere of détente periods. But in the late 1980s North Korean economy faced difficulties and North Korea's diplomatic efforts towards the members of the Non-Aligned Movement also diminished. In the Kim Jong Un era, the DPRK again actively engaged in diplomatic activities to maintain or strengthen diplomatic relations with non-aligned countries. These efforts aim to overcome international sanctions against North Korea. Expectedly, the more efforts North Korea might make to improve the diplomatic relations with non-aligned countries including African regions in the future.

The limitations of this dissertation

The first limitation of this paper is the fact that the dependence of North Korea's total trade volume on China is dominant. In 2019, North Korea's trade dependence rate on China was 95.4%, and the whole export volume of the DPRK towards China was \$ 220 million, increased by 10.7%, and the total import was \$ 2,880 million, increased by 13.9%

compared with the previous year. Compared to North Korea's heavy dependence on China, the trade volume between North Korea and African nations could be considered insignificant in the North's overall economy.

However, the top priority of North Korea is the continuation of the Kim family's regime rather than improving its general economy for the people. The excessive obsession with maintaining power, the North Korean authority irrationally distorted its economy for the survival of the ruling class. As a result, in terms of keeping Kim's family in power, African nations could be significant and vital future allies.

Because diversifying its financial resources is a necessary strategy to avoid any potential dangers that North Korea might face in case the close relation with major trading partners, including China and South Korea, deteriorate. Given the historically boned alliance between the two parties, Africa could be a crucial trading partner to North Korea in the future.

The second point is that further studies on the close relationships between the North Korean leaders and African counterparts would grasp the full reality of the relations. In this regard, individual African nations' case studies could be a valuable opportunity to discover specific cooperation programs and processes between North Korea and Africa. Furthermore, based on observing the existing systems, plausible prediction on the future development of the relation between the DPRK and Africa might be possible.

Thirdly, even though this paper covers the relationship between South and North Korea in the chapter on South Korean Hallstein doctrine in Africa, the essential role of South Korea's assistance in North Korea's economy should be reviewed further to

measure its actual influence inside North Korean society. This effort might make us understand why North Korea has been showing remarkable resilience from external pressures.

Despite these limitations, this paper attempted to analyze the reasons that caused the reorientation of North Korean foreign policy in Africa in terms of diplomatic, military, and economic perspectives. The diplomatic documents and data from the U.S. and South Korean governments having more objective views were used. I hope this attempt contributes to attracting more attention to the current state between North Korea and Africa. (end)

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국문 초록

(ABSTRACT IN KOREA)

핵무기 보유를 견제하기 위한 국제사회의 제재와 징벌적 조치에도 불구하고, 국제사회에서 고립되어 있으며 재정으로도 열악한 북한은 여전히 상대적으로 안정적인 정권을 유지하고 있다. 북한의 국제 관계 연구에 있어 자세히 연구되지 않았던 비주류에 속하는 외교적 현상에 대한 정밀한 분석은 국제사회에 위협이 되는 북한 문제를 다른 방식으로 다룰 수 있는 대안적인 관점을 제공할 수 있다. 이러한 배경에서 아프리카에 대한 북한 대외정책의 방향 전환의 배경과 구체적인 외부요인이 김일성 시대 데탕트 시대(1960~1979)와 김정은 시대(2011~2011년)의 비교연구를 기준으로 본 논문에서 분석된다.

어떤 측면에서 북한과 아프리카 외교 관계 연구가 의미가 있는 것인가? 우선, 김일성 통치 시기에 속하는 데탕트 시대의 경우, 북한은 주체사상을 기반으로 군사 및 인력 그리고 재정적 지원을 아프리카에 제공하는 등 안정된 외교 관계를 아프리카 국가와 맺기 위해 적극적인 외교적 노력을 기울였다. 이후에도, 고립된 국제적 위치에서 벗어나기 위해 수십 년 동안 북한은 아프리카 국가들과 우호적인 외교 관계를 유지했다. 또한, 김정은 시대에 들어서서 일부 아프리카 국가와의 지속적인 경제적 교류는 유엔과 미국의 제재로 인해 궁핍한 재정을 보충하는 중요한 기회를 제공하였다. 북한의 아프리카 외교 정책이 가장 활발했던 시기와 전례 없이 심각한 국제적 제재에 직면한 김정은 정권 시대의 아프리카 외교를 비교하면 북한의 외교정책변화를 가장 극명하게 살펴볼 수 있을 것이다.

서로 다른 시기에 변화된 북한의 아프리카 외교 정책 연구는 양측간의 고위급 간부의 상호 방문의 빈도와 방문목적 그리고 북한의 아프리카 국가들에 대한 군사적 지원 행태 분석 등의 지표로 측정될 것이다. 북한 대외정책에 영향을 주고 있는 4 가지 주요 대외적 요인에는 국제사회의 제재와 아프리카에 대한 북한의 군사적 지원, 남한의 할슈타인(Hallstein Doctrine)원칙에 기반한 외교정책 그리고 비동맹운동(NAM) 연대 등이다. 이와 같은 대외적 요인이 실제로 북한과 아프리카의 외교 관계에 어떤 영향을 미쳤는지, 또한 북한의 아프리카 대외정책의 시기별 전환 과정은 어땠는지 자세히 검토할 예정이다.

Key words :북한,아프리카,외교 관계,군사교류,국제 제재,남한의 할슈타인(Hallstein Doctrine) 원칙

Student Number: 2017- 20782

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I would like to deliver my deepest gratitude to the Seoul National University's Graduate School of International Studies (GSIS). The research and study experience in GSIS enormously extended my intellectual horizon and deepened my international affairs knowledge.

I especially owe a huge debt of gratitude to my thesis advisor Park Tae Gyun for offering me insightful guidance on the historical dynamic between North Korea and African countries. Once again, I am indebted to professor Sheen Seong Ho and Han Jeong Hun for their close readings and helpful suggestions.

I am grateful for professor Victor Cha in the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). His analytic and comprehensive advice and suggestions on the external variables in this paper were crucial and inspirational. Additionally, I'd like to thank Korea Foundation for offering me a valuable opportunity to build up my paper at the excellent Think Tank in Washington D.C.

Also, I'm grateful to my warmhearted and brilliant classmates, including Gregory McGarr, Jaidi Khawla, Ambrine Dumas, Eunju Oh, and Miri Moon, for taking their valuable time to read a draft and helpful suggestions. I am also grateful to have read a thoughtful and wide-ranging thesis and articles. The one about the effects of sanctions against North Korea recommended by the renowned and warm-hearted scholar Alex Mourmouras of the IMF.

I appreciate all the comments and encouragements from all researchers and coworkers such as Marie DuMond, Patrick G. Buchan, Ben Rimland, Andreyka Natalegawa, Alyssa Perez, Diana Ciocan, Summer Tan, Nico Han, Choi Min Jeong and Song Ellis in CSIS, Colin Thompson in the U.S. Department of Homeland Security and Charles Kraus in Wilson Center regarding the main idea of this paper. Their feedback was so valuable and accurate to point out weak points in my previous ideas.

My thesis would not exist without the keen comments from these devoted and generous professors and scholars. Last but not least, I sincerely thank my wonderful family, who has given me unstinting support.

03 February 2021

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