Master's Thesis of International Studies

Attitudes of South Korean Youth toward Refugees

Conducting a Survey to Seoul National University
Students about the Arrival of Yemeni
Asylum Seekers at Jeju Island in 2018

난민을 향한 한국 20대의 인식 분석:
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Graduate School of International Studies
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Abstract

Attitudes of South Korean Youth toward Refugees: Conducting a Survey to Seoul National University Students about the Arrival of Yemeni Asylum Seekers at Jeju Island in 2018

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After around 500 Yemeni asylum seekers arrived at Jeju Island seeking refuge in 2018, there was much opposition toward them in South Korea. Youth were most antagonistic compared to other age groups which is a characteristic that contrasts with many Western countries. This paper intends to find answers to why they were most against receiving them and compare Seoul National University (SNU) students' opinions with those of other twenty-year-olds. Primary data was collected by conducting surveys to SNU students and a panel from polling agency Macromill Embrain which were later examined via statistical and content analyses. Such first-hand information fills a gap within the literature since Korean youth attitudes specifically toward this issue have been left unaddressed. Moreover, results differ from the consensus during that time that youth were unwelcoming because of job competition worries. The main findings were that participants showed unenthusiasm toward refugees, SNU students had relatively more positive attitudes but with no major distinction, and that the majority have not changed their positions since 2018. Meanwhile intersectionality and deliberative democracy theories were utilized to question whether there was a lack of deliberative opinion-formation and policy-making processes and to highlight the importance of substantive democracy.

Keywords: refugee, South Korea, survey, public opinion, intersectionality, deliberative democracy
Student number: 2018-25349

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I. Introduction

1.1 Background of South Korea's Response

In 2018, approximately 500 Yemeni asylum seekers arrived at Jeju Island seeking refuge. The appearance of a large group of foreigners within a short amount of time was considered unprecedented for a country with high ethnic homogeneity. Refugee issues have long been considered a faraway issue and even a Western one due to its low saliency as a topic for discussion in East Asian countries including South Korea. "Refugee law [itself] is [also] sometimes seen as a Western import, imposed on Asian nations that did not traditionally embrace the concept" (Wolman 2018, 34). According to Sara E. Davies, this has been the case because many Asian countries were not main participants in drafting the 1951 United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees which were Eurocentric and created to mainly address displacement of Europeans post-Second World War (2006).

The arrival of Yemeni asylum seekers at Jeju Island, however, did not happen in a vacuum. As highlighted in media worldwide, recent discussions about refugees noticeably began around 2015 when a large influx of asylum seekers made their way and continue to do so toward Europe which was then followed by numerous anti-migrant actions in major asylum destinations in the West. Host countries met their entries in diverse ways, some humanitarian and others more negative such as border detentions of children that were headed by former U.S. President Trump. It was only a matter of time for refugee debates to emerge in other regions amid

increasing numbers of asylum seekers. At the end of 2019, the U.N. Refugee Agency (interchangeably UNHCR) estimates that there were 79.5 million forcibly displaced people worldwide (UNHCR 2020).

Against this backdrop, this paper turns to East Asia and studies public attitudes toward refugees in South Korea (hereinafter Korea), specifically focusing on how Koreans reacted to Yemeni asylum seekers' arrival at Jeju Island in 2018. Before I describe my research questions and goals, I first provide background information. To begin with, prior to arriving at Korea, the Yemeni asylum seekers went to Malaysia, a Muslim-majority nation like Yemen, in order to flee from civil war and dire circumstances. However, they could not continue to stay there for Malaysia is a non-signatory of the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. Contrary to expectations, in Asia, most refugees are accommodated in non-signatory states as seen in *Figure 1* (Choi, "Asian Civil Society," 2019).

Figure 1. Refugee Population in Asia

Source: Choi, "Asian Civil Society," 2019, 164.

"East Asian countries only make marginal contributions, while they strongly benefit efforts of other countries...that have to deal with a large influx of refugees" (Biedermann 2017). When the Yemeni asylum seekers learned that neighboring Korea is a signatory and that Jeju Island allowed visa-free entry, they flew to the island. Visa-free entry was originally implemented at Jeju Island to attract tourism but after their arrival the government prohibited it for Yemeni nationals.

According to researcher Hyun Mee Kim, the April 2018 inter-Korean summit and calls for peace also acted as a pull factor for them (2018, 213). Their presence, however, soon caught the Korean public's attention even though the number of asylum seekers coming to Korea has been continuously increasing as shown in *Table 1* below.

Table 1. Number of Refugee Applicants and Admitted Refugees

Year	2011	2014	2016	2018
Number of Refugee Applicants	1,011	2,896	7,542	16,173
Number of Admitted Refugees	42	94	98	144

Source: Choi and Park 2020, 21.

Soon after their arrival, a petition bill titled 'Abolition or amendment of refugee law, visa-free entry and of permission to apply for asylum' was posted on the government's website which gained signatures from more than 714,000 citizens (Kim, "The younger," 2018). There were also various anti-refugee rallies held throughout Seoul (S. Choe 2018). As the petition gained more media coverage, several news agencies and polling organizations conducted public opinion surveys. Realmeter's June 20th, 2018

survey and Gallup Korea's July 10-12th, 2018 poll were most cited by the press, and thus, most influential in shaping public discourse. Realmeter's survey indicated that 49% were against accepting the asylum seekers compared to 39% who were in favor (Realmeter 2018). Similarly, Gallup Korea's poll showed that 62% said refugees should be accepted to a minimum amount via rigorous screening (Gallup Korea 2018). Both surveys were effective in taking a snapshot of public opinion in a fast and large-scale manner. Nonetheless, the survey results solidified the initial backlash which then discouraged subsequent debates and in-depth analyses. The people's, media's and government's attention toward the issue soon dwindled and discussions surrounding this seemingly once-and-for-all event have been close to nonexistent in the public sphere since then.

Around August 2018, due to increasing pressure, the government responded. Under the current Moon Jae-in administration, officials are required to respond to petitions that accumulate more than 200,000 signatures within 30 days (Office of the President 2020). Accordingly, the Ministry of Justice issued its official response in August 2018 as shown in *Figure 2,* and stated that the government will make improvements such as increase personnel and establish a refugee review tribunal (Seong 2018). This decision was a reply to critiques of how until the end of June 2018 there were only two application reviewers in Jeju Island and findings that interpreting services available for asylum seekers are inadequate and routinely falsified (Lee 2013; Maeil Business 2018; Kwon, "Justice Ministry," 2019). The government's stance was, in essence, that *true* refugees will be protected while *fake* applicants will be weeded out (Seong

2018; emphasis added). In December 2018, only two out of 549 applicants were granted refugee status and 412 were given humanitarian status ⁻ a status that excludes recipients from accessing social safety nets such as healthcare (Choi 2018).

Figure 2. Timeline from June to August 2018

Around 500 Yemenis seek asylum in Jeju Island

(Government limits their movement to the island in April)

06/01/2018

08/01/2018

Online petition bill asking for abolition or amendment of refugee law is posted on the government's official webpage

01~06/2018

06/13/2018

Yemen is listed as a country prohibited from visa-free entry

Ministry of Justice issues official response via the government's social media program "11:50 at the Blue House"

Source: organized by author.

Since the arrival of Yemeni asylum seekers several lawmakers have proposed hard-line bills and the Ministry of Justice has expressed the need to make amendments to the refugee law, one of which is creating exceptions to the non-refoulement principle (J. Oh 2019). Jeeyun Kwon explains the main discussions surrounding the amendments:

> The amendments included strengthening identity verification and background checks, tougher procedures for visa over-stayers, termination of applications for any applicant returning to their home country, and penalties for any migration broker. Some are concerned that the revised refugee law will create long delays in the refugee

application process, which in turn would backfire by producing refugee brokers and illegal immigrants. In addition, refugee applicants are also placed in a situation where they cannot receive social security or play a productive role as members of society until the screening process is completed (2019)

In September 2019, the Ministry of Justice announced that a new department in charge of reviewing formal objections will be established in 2020 in efforts to address the pileup of paperwork and to speed up evaluation processes but this was not exactly a refugee review tribunal that was proposed when the government first issued its official response (Choi, "Ministry of Justice," 2019). As for the number of application reviewers, it has increased as promised (Choi, "Ministry of Justice," 2019). However, more are needed. "Approximately 15,000 or more apply for asylum each year but there were only 65 government officials in charge of the initial screening in 2019" (J. Kim 2020). Meanwhile, in November 2019, the National Human Rights Commission opened a branch office at Jeju Island to address human rights issues including Yemeni refugees (Jang 2019). Most recently, on December 28th, 2020, the Ministry of Justice announced amendments to the national refugee law which are planned to be submitted to the National Assembly in 2021 (Ministry of Justice 2020). Main components of the reform include having designated centers where officials and interpreters/translators have been selected by the government, expanding the committee responsible for reviewing objections, limiting re-applications by those who were rejected if there are no significant changes to prevent abuse of extended stays, disapproving reasons that appear to be groundless according to refugee law, terminating screening processes if applicant visits

home country, strengthening punishment toward brokers, enhancing applicants' procedural rights by improving interpretation/translation services as well as allowing access to recordings of screening interviews, and permitting employment for refugees and those granted humanitarian status within six months after application (Ministry of Justice 2020).

One can clearly see the prevalent opposition toward refugees within Korea's public opinion. Yet, upon close examination, it may not be as clear-cut as depicted in the polls and media. First, although the petition bill showed overwhelming dissent Korea was the second-largest country in terms of private – neither governmental nor business – donations to the U.N. Refugee Agency in the world that same year (Lee 2019). Second, there was a more complicated picture behind the numbers; Korean youth, especially females, were most anti-refugee (Kim, "The younger," 2018). "By age group, more support for an accepting approach was found among respondents in their fifties (37 percent) than younger ones in their twenties (11.9 percent) and thirties (17.6 percent)" (Lim 2018). Another survey similarly found that 70% of those in their 20s opposed receiving the Yemeni asylum seekers compared to other age groups (Jeong 2018). This characteristic was still visible in 2020; according to a survey conducted by UNHCR Korea and Hankook Research, young females showed most opposition even though overall the percentage of those who approve increased compared to 2018 (Cho 2020). Third, although Korea ranks 35th out of 37 OECD countries in refugee recognition rates it was the first Asian country to enact its own national refugee law which came into force in 2013 (Sim and Choi 2018). Fourth, some have questioned the reliability of

the petitions by indicating that the system allows individuals to sign in via various social media accounts thereby possibly increasing the number of signatures (Lee and Lee 2019). Lastly, the government's hesitant/belated response was confounding given that Korea holds a public image of a strong supporter of refugees in the international arena such as by chairing the U.N. Refugee Agency Executive Committee from 2013 to 2014 and later signing onto the Global Compact on Refugees.

1.2 Research Questions and Objectives

What caught my attention the most in regards to Korea's public opinion toward the Yemeni asylum seekers was that the 'what' was answered but the 'why' remained unanswered. To elaborate, there was information about 'what' the opinions of the majority were but there was a lack of information and discussion of 'why' people opposed or approved. I was especially startled by the fact that young people were most against the issue because this seemed to contradict the common belief that they tend to be more liberal than older generations and because it was in stark contrast with young people in other countries. According to the Global Shapers Survey, young people in Europe, North America, Latin America, the Middle East, North Africa, South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa are more approving of including refugees in the national workforce than millennials in East Asia and the Pacific (WEF 2017, 23).

In addition, being a student at Seoul National University (hereinafter SNU), I was curious about how SNU students perceive this particular issue. As SNU is one of many symbols of Korea's young intellect, I wanted to

conduct a litmus test of aspiring leaders. By investigating their opinions, I hoped to get a glimpse of Korea's future stance on refugee issues.

I hence constructed two research questions: a) why were Korean youth most against receiving the Yemeni asylum seekers who arrived at Jeju Island in 2018? and b) how similar or different are the opinions of SNU students from other twenty-year-olds in Korea? My sub-questions included: a) among the young, why were women more against the issue than men? and b) what is the relevance of this issue for other important topics such as multiculturalism, North Korean refugees, marriage migrants, overseas Koreans, and low-skilled laborers from abroad? My goals were to a) go beyond numbers of how many oppose/approve and find reasons behind each stance, b) investigate opinions of SNU students and compare with other Korean youth, c) continue discussions through a follow-up survey and show informed deliberation is needed for opinion-formation and policy-making.

II. Literature Review

In this section, I conducted a critical overview of previous research in order to find possible answers to my two research questions which are 'why were Korean youth most against receiving the Yemeni asylum seekers who arrived at Jeju Island in 2018?' and 'how similar or different are the opinions of SNU students from other twenty-year-olds in Korea?' I discovered five major themes: securitization, neoliberalism, femonationalism, socio-cultural psychology, and democracy.

Before going into each theme, however, I first introduce researcher Kyung-Koo Han's study titled "The Archaeology of the Ethnically Homogeneous Nation-State and Multiculturalism in Korea" to explain Korea's history and how Korea's ethnic nationalism, especially the pure blood theory rooted in the Dangun story, became visible only in modern times. Han explains that "in traditional Korea, Dangun [who is seen as a founder of Old Joseon that came from the heavens] was not perceived as the symbol of the blood ties of the Korean people, but as the founder of the first state...[and thus] his importance [was] only in his having been a political leader, not a biological progenitor" (2007, 14). Modern understanding of Dangun is thus different from the past.

Moving onto later times, the Japanese occupation affected Korea's nationalism. Han indicates that during and after the Japanese occupation, Korea adopted German nationalism which ironically the Japanese had used to rule Korea (23). This was when Dangun transformed into a mythic procreator in efforts to consolidate the people against foreign influences (24).

Afterward, Korea's nationalism became more ethnic-centered as Korea went through conflicts with the North, authoritarian regimes, commercialized nationalism like the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games, and defensive nationalism like the Gold Collection Movement after the 1998-99 economic crisis (26).

In regards to immigration, "Korea [became] a labor-exporting country from the early 1960s to the late 1980s" (Kim 2009, 3):

> ...thousands of Korean workers emigrated annually in the 1960s and 1970s, notably to Germany, when miners and nurses made up the bulk of the outgoing migrant workers. During the 'construction boom' of the 1970s and early 1980s, tens of thousands of Koreans were sent to the Middle East to work as construction workers for Korean companies. In the 1980s, more than 30,000 Koreans migrated annually as laborers to other countries (3)

Today, Korea has stepped into being a labor-importing and more multicultural society. "The number of foreigners staying in South Korea increased nearly 7 percent [in 2019], topping 2.5 million for the first time" (Yonhap News 2020b). Moreover, it could reach "4.1 million by 2050 or 9.2 percent of the total population, which would be similar to the proportion of foreign-born residents in England...in 2005" (Kim 2009, 1). Yet promotion and education of multiculturalism remain low, especially in Korea's schooling systems (Olneck 2011; Kim and Lee 2019). It is here after I have explained changes in nationalism and population movement that I now move onto the specific themes found in literature.

2.1 Securitization

One of the main themes in literature was securitization and the high possibility that Koreans, especially the youth, opposed receiving the Yemeni asylum seekers due to perceiving their presence as a threat. In "Threatened or Threatening? Securitization of the Yemeni Asylum Seekers in South Korea," Eunyoung Christina Choi and Seo Yeon Park well illustrate how securitization played a major role. They discuss how European media post-9/11, Yemenis' race, the fact that the majority were men, Islamophobia, and Korea's internal situation all intersected with one another resulting in securitization (2020, 5). Similar to my own observations, they noticed that "the participation [in anti-refugee protests] were mostly from the younger generations" (2020, 8).

Researchers Sook Choi and Si Yeon Jang also found that securitization of refugees was prevalent. In "An Online Opinion Analysis on Refugee Acceptance Using Topic Modeling," they conducted text mining analysis of YouTube content. Keywords found in their analysis "conveyed an extremist and closed national protectionist tendency that dichotomously [divided] the Korean people and refugees" (2020, 186). Their results, however, cannot be generalized since each social media platform may have different demographic characteristics.

Similar to Choi and Jang, scholars Ye Won Shin and Dong Hoon Ma analyzed media content by looking at articles published by two newspaper agencies: the more politically conservative *Chosun Ilbo* and the more politically liberal *Hankyoreh* (2019). They found that the two were opposites; the former was more myopic and nationalistic while the latter was

more farsighted and humanitarian (65). In addition, they noticed that the term 'multiculturalism' possessed negative connotations in Korea and was being understood as distinct cultures instead of cultural diversity (37).

In "Immigration, threat perception, and national identity: Evidence from South Korea," researchers Shang E. Ha and Seung-Jin Jang utilized data from the 2010 Korean General Social Survey to examine three types of threat: economic or realistic, cultural or symbolic, and social or threat to security/public safety (2015, 54). They found that Koreans were more concerned with cultural threat than economic threat, and that older generations were more likely to reinforce national identity (60). This, in particular, is why opposition toward the Yemeni asylum seekers countered the common belief that young people are more liberal than older generations. Even though the survey they used did not ask participants about refugees I was still able to observe young people's more approving attitudes toward North Korean refugees, the Korean-Chinese, and foreign workers compared to young people's more closed attitudes toward refugees.

What these scholars commonly agree upon is that post-9/11 Western media was especially influential in shaping Koreans' public opinion since most Koreans learn about Muslims and Islam not through direct encounters but through media. This is why securitization was strongly detected in the aforementioned analyses of online media, newspapers, and surveys. The government's actions such as delisting Yemen from the no-visa system and promising to identify *fake* refugees therefore only legitimized the othering of refugees (H. Oh 2019; emphasis added).

2.2 Neoliberalism

Neoliberalism was another theme that frequently appeared in the literature, especially in research that mentioned youth. In "Voices of ordinary citizens: *ban damunhwa* and its neoliberal affect of anti-immigration in South Korea," Euy Ryung Jun stresses that there is a strong connection between anti-multiculturalism and neoliberalism. Jun points out that anti-multiculturalism is connected to "a neoliberal ethic of productivity, self-reliance, and fairness [that portrays] migrants as parasites [which hypocritically] reproduces the neoliberal politics of exclusion and deprivation [that nationals themselves detest]" (2019, 390). Researcher Hyun Choe also sees neoliberalism as the main obstacle to promoting multicultural citizenship in Korea. He emphasizes that people think that "'affirmative action' [means] giving unwarranted benefits to the disadvantaged" (2007, 140).

Choi and Park also make a similar note in their paper saying that "[because the young] generation has experienced a highly neoliberal and stratified society where individuals are asked to be responsible for any circumstances or results, even [those] not always under individuals' control, they are intrinsically sensitive to the notion of 'gains without pains'" (2020, 388). Jun as well as Choi and Park thus demonstrate that reverse discrimination is being legitimized by neoliberalism. Choi and Park further indicate that Korean youth tend to be more conservative toward minority issues mainly due to economic difficulties (2020). Researcher Yong Hwan Kim states likewise that the strong neoliberal thinking shared among young people, especially the idea that all faults are not on the society but on the individual, has resulted in a lack of empathy (2018).

In fact, according to a 2014 Pew Research Center survey, Korea was "the only country where young people were less likely than those ages 50 or older to say children...today will be better off...than their parents" which shows their gloomy outlook (Parker 2015). Moreover, some common buzzwords associated with Korean youth are 'hell-Joseon' and 'sampo' - the former negatively referring to the last dynasty of the Korean monarchy that was "unable to cope with global trends" and the latter meaning that the young have given up on relationships, marriage, and children (J. Kim 2016). Furthermore, according to the Bank of Korea, "the 25-29 age bracket accounted for 21.6 percent of unemployed people in...2018, marking the highest ratio among OECD members...[and] the seventh consecutive year that the proportion of unemployed people aged 25-29...ranked highest among OECD members" (Yonhap News 2020d).

Researchers Dong-Hoon Seol and John D. Skrentny also point to neoliberalism and its negative effects in "Why Is There So Little Migrant Settlement in East Asia?" Even though they did not directly utilize the term 'neoliberalism' in their paper they expressed their concern that the developmental state culture may explain the low number of migrant settlements in East Asia (2009). As shown in *Figure 3*, Korea and Japan have lower percentages of immigrants compared to European countries of similar economic standing. They demonstrate that placing the economy/ productivity over anything else could be a reason why East Asian countries have low percentages of immigrants even among countries of similar capacity. They suggest that "the repertoires...of a 'developmental state' ...prioritize economic growth over individual rights" (580).

Figure 3. Economic Development and Percentage of Migrants in 2005

Source: Seol and Skrentny 2009, 581.

Nonetheless, they carefully distinguish the elites from the public when talking about the developmental state culture. They indicate that the Korean public is not as anti-migrant by citing "a 2007 Pew Research Center poll of 46 countries [in which] South Korea was the only country (excluding the Palestinian Territories) that expressed opposition to more restrictive immigration policies" (603).

Literature that emphasize the role of neoliberalism thus demonstrate that there is a blurry line between 'equality' and 'equity' in Korea ‑ the former meaning that everyone is given the same starting line while the latter differentiates starting lines according to individuals' diverse societal positions.

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2.3 Femonationalism

As indicated in the introduction, Korean women, especially young women, expressed the strongest disapproval toward receiving the Yemeni asylum seekers. According to a survey conducted by Hankook Research, 74% of female participants agreed with the statement that the possibility of terrorism will increase by receiving [them] compared to 58% of male participants meanwhile 79% of female participants also responded that crime rates will rise compared to 64% of male participants (Jeong 2018). Various scholars have observed this phenomenon as well and indicated that the opposition from young women was due to femonationalism, also known as gendered nationalism.

In the literature, femonationalism was often discussed in conjunction with Islamophobia. In "Dangerous alliance in the name of women's rights: petition against receiving Yemeni refugees and Islamophobia," researcher Nami Kim states that there was cooperation among nationalists, conservative protestants, and feminists in the opposition side of the debate (2018). In her paper, she cites Sara R. Farris and her book *In the Name of Women's Rights: The Rise of Femonationalism* to explain that Islamophobia and gendered nationalism united in anti-refugee positions. Hyun Mee Kim also indicates in her research that when the Yemeni asylum seekers arrived at Jeju Island "there was an emotional coalition among conservative politicians, fundamentalist Christians, youth and women" (2018, 219).

Even before the arrival of Yemeni asylum seekers, researchers have identified Islamophobia in the Korean society. In "South Korean Attitudes Toward Muslims: Revealing the Impact of Religious Tolerance," researcher

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Hoi Ok Jeong found that "age showed no significant effect" in anti-Muslim sentiment (2017, 391). Jeong analyzed data from the 2008 International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) Topical Module: Religion and compared Korea's anti-Muslim sentiment with that of Western countries. She saw that even though Korea had not been targeted by Islamic extremists to the same extent as European or North American countries the results showed that "South Koreans' level of hostility toward Muslims was similar to that in Belgium and Denmark...[and more surprisingly] was on the high [end], ranking 8th [out] of 20 countries" as shown in *Figure 4* below (389).

Figure 4. Percentages of Anti-Muslim Sentiment

Source: Jeong 2017, 389.

Researcher Hye Min Oh also points out the close connection between Korean women's anxiety regarding sex crimes and their projected fear toward the Yemeni asylum seekers. She analyzed 257 articles from eleven major newspaper agencies published in between January and December of 2018. Oh found that at the beginning of 2018 refugees were

not seen as a threat, especially during the Pyeong Chang Winter Olympics during which the second runners of Seoul's torch relay included the head of the International Organization for Migration in Korea, a marriage migrant, an international student, a foreign worker, and a 16-year-old refugee (2019, 164). However, the peaceful image associated with refugees soon transformed into fear with the arrival of Yemeni asylum seekers. The geographical distance between Jeju Island and the peninsula heightened imagined fears meanwhile frustrations felt by women during the Me Too Movement were projected onto an identifiable entity (159).

It is thus highly possible that the Me Too Movement strengthened femonationalism. In "Same Despair but Different Hope: Youth Activism in East Asia and Contentious Politics," researcher Yunjeong Joo indicates that "the most visible achievements in the...Korean youth movement [were] the...'new feminist movements' [during which voices were raised] against gender-related crimes and Korea's abortion law" (2018, 412). Feminism was thus clearly a key issue for Korean youth, especially young females, in 2018 but women's frustrations took a negative turn when women's rights activists joined hands with Islamophobia.

Before moving onto the next theme, it is important to point out that femonationalism is not unique to Korea and is visible in other countries. In fact, "in the wake of the 2015 'refugee crisis,' the degree of gender nationalism reached unprecedented levels" with "populist radical right [movements] in...Europe, such as the French Front National...[using femonationalism as] part of their anti-Islam agenda" (Abdou 2017, 85-6). Similarly, voting results from the 2016 U.S. presidential election demonstrate

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that race and gender played a strong role as could be seen by the support former president Trump received from white women, especially non-college white women (Holyck 2016; Pew Research Center 2018). As such, "it would be naive to...regard Islamophobia manifested in Korea as an isolated or an unusual phenomenon disconnected from what is going on in the USA and/or Europe, especially in the post-9/11 context" (N. Kim 2016, 122).

2.4 Socio-cultural Psychology

Other scholars studied Korea's public opinion from a more psychological point of view. Researcher Yong Hwan Kim cites Martha Nussbaum's distinction between 'primitive disgust' and 'projective disgust' to explain how Koreans' opposition toward Yemeni asylum seekers was a demonstration of the latter (2018). He also alludes to Carolin Emcke's five characteristics of 'hatred' and how they could be observed in Korea. The characteristics are the following: 1) hatred is neither a personal emotion nor accidental but created collectively based on a shared ideology, 2) it necessitates a form of expression such as hate speech, 3) it also necessitates distorted associations and imageries, 4) it necessitates a narcissistic frame of cognition for justification, and 5) it can be trained and educated (2018, 8).

Meanwhile in "Cultural Differences in Targets of Stigmatization Between Individual- and Group-Oriented Cultures," Hyeyoung Shin, John F. Dovidio and Jaime L. Napier examined possible "differences in [stigmatization] between individual-oriented, Northern European/North American culture and more group-oriented, East Asian culture" (2013, 99).

By using data on 13 countries from the World Values Survey collected between 2005 and 2007, they found that "East Asian countries demonstrated greater [levels of] stigmatization than Northern European/North American cultures" (106). Their research shows that cultural psychology may be an important factor that should be taken into account when examining public opinion toward out-groups in different countries.

Similar to Shin, Dovidio and Napier, researchers Shanto Iyengar, Simon Jackman, Solomon Messing, Nicholas Valentino, Toril Aalberg, Raymond Duch, Kyu S. Hahn, Stuart Soroka, Allison Harell and Tetsuro Kobayashi also conducted a cross-national analysis of seven industrialized nations in "Do Attitudes about Immigration Predict Willingness to Admit Individual Immigrants?: A Cross-National Test of the Person-Positivity Bias" (2013). As the title suggests, they found that there is a gap between the public's attitude toward general immigration and their willingness to admit specific immigrants (642). Surprisingly, South Korea, Japan, and the U.S. displayed "the highest level of relative positivity for individual immigrants" and were "least responsive to the occupation skills" of the immigrant they were asked to opine about (654-55). Researcher Han Il Chang, however, criticizes their study, especially their designation of "Sri Lankans as the more familiar group for [participants] from South Korea [while] Kuwait was used [to represent the] Muslim stereotype" since "Kuwait is...far more familiar to South Koreans [because] numerous temporary workers [went] to Kuwait in the 1970s and 1980s" (2019, 191).

One can thus draw a connection between their research and Shin, Dovidio and Napier's study and raise meaningful questions such as whether

it is the group-oriented culture in East Asian countries that push individuals to follow what is perceived to be the majority's opinion even if on the individual level they are more open toward foreigners, a phenomenon that Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann calls 'spiral of silence.'

2.5 Democracy

Throughout literature, anti-multiculturalism and opinions toward immigrants were mentioned in tandem with its implications for democracy. Researcher Han Il Chang indicates that the inflow of immigrants into Korea started with the advent of democracy; "when South Korea democratized in 1987, immigrants accounted for only 0.01% of the population [but] during the first decade after democratization, the number of immigrants increased more than 40 times" (2019, 195). Researcher Iain Watson similarly states that "multicultural policies are often thought to represent the maturing of liberal democracy in South Korea" (2010, 337). However, as Watson points out, both liberal and conservative parties have only shown tokenism regarding multiculturalism.

Dong-Hoon Seol and Jungmin Seo also explain that "existing literature on Korean democratization is heavily focused on the legal and institutional changes since the 1980s democratization movement" but not "in the rights of minorities [that were] suppressed" (2014, 17). Efforts to pass anti-discrimination bills to the National Assembly since 2007 have failed (22). In fact, the minor liberal Justice Party recently proposed the bill to the National Assembly which is "the seventh attempt by the government or a

political party" to do so (D. Jung 2020a). The National Human Rights Commission has expressed its support for such a move by stressing that "among OECD member countries, Korea and Japan are the only two countries that do not have an Equality Law" (D. Jung 2020a). Nonetheless, "conservative churches have been opposing the passage of the anti-discrimination for almost two decades" (Park 2020).

Seol and Seo conducted a survey on ten university campuses to measure opinions on minorities. They asked participants about two different groups: 1) those who emerged from globalization such as the Korean-Chinese, North Korean refugees, foreign spouses, foreign migrant workers, and 2) those who emerged from democratization such as the Chinese, gays/lesbians, and mixed-race individuals. They also had control groups: international students, naturalized Korean citizens, foreign investors, Korean Americans, persons with disabilities, refugees/asylum seekers, and persons affected with HIV/AIDS (2014, 24). The results in *Figure 5* demonstrate that refugees are not seen favorably by the young generation.

Figure 5. Korean Students' Social Distance Scores

Note: A min. score of 3.0 for favorable, a score of 3.0 to a min. of 3.5 for intermediate, a score of over 3.5 for unfavorable.

Scholars also discussed the unique situation Korea was in when the Yemeni asylum seekers arrived at Jeju Island in 2018. Their arrival "happened early in [Moon's] presidency and people still had vivid memories of impeaching previous president Park Geun-hye [and as he] came into power [through] 'the candlelight revolution' [he] could not just ignore the voices of the people, even [those] from the conservative side" (Choi and Park 2020, 20). Researcher Hyun Mee Kim similarly explains that the Moon administration had to follow the voice of the people even if it was a hard-line stance because Yemeni asylum seekers' arrival occurred during the transition from a conservative right administration to an administration that

represented the sovereignty of the people (2018). The result was what she describes as 'political impetuosity,' with the government flaunting their role as protectors by further 'refugee-izing refugees.' For Kim, such action was akin to what James C. Scott calls 'seeing like a state' (221). Young Hoon Song expands criticism toward the government by additionally talking about provincial governments (2019). He indicates that the arrival of Yemeni asylum seekers coincided with the provincial elections during which politicians addressed the refugee issue as little as possible. Song describes Korea's opposition toward the refugees by citing John Stuart Mill's idea of 'tyranny of the majority.' During this time, anti-multiculturalism thus changed "from...hate speech to a form of populist politics" (Jun 2019, 392).

Yet researchers differentiated state-led versus citizen-led actions and indicated that citizens were more open toward immigrants. Researcher Erin Aeran Chung states that it was actually citizen-led movements that pushed the government to change its policies. In "Workers or Residents? Diverging Patterns of Immigrant Incorporation in Korea and Japan," Chung talks about grassroots movements. Focusing on migrant labor, she explains that "human rights activists, labor unions and citizen groups that had played central roles in the earlier democratization movement applied tools used to incorporate [laborers], women and the poor...to make claims for migrant worker rights" (2010, 680). This led to many changes, and "in 2006, Korea became the first Asian country to grant local voting rights to foreign residents" (675). Her research shows that the civil society advocates for immigrant incorporation and contradicts "the official stance that Korea...cannot accommodate ethnically diverse...populations" (696).

Hyun Choe makes a similar observation in "South Korean Society and Multicultural Citizenship." He found that the public is more open to multicultural citizenship than the government by citing "a survey conducted by the South Korean Women's Development Institute (KWDI) in July 2007 [in which]...over 50%...agreed or strongly agreed with permitting the entry of migrant workers' families, seeking immigrants' opinions in forming policies that affect them, and protecting their human rights [as well as] granting...citizenship to children of immigrants" (2007, 138). The survey also showed that "people in their twenties and thirties responded that respect for the political system and the laws of South Korea are more important than blood [ties]" (139). This is why opposition toward the Yemeni asylum seekers countered the belief that youth are more liberal than older groups.

Focusing more on refugees, researcher Won Geun Choi also asserts that the civil society plays a strong role in promoting refugee protection. In "Asian Civil Society and Reconfiguration of Refugee Protection in Asia," Choi specifically talks about how the Asia Pacific Refugee Rights Network (APRRN) helped to strengthen refugee protection in a transnational manner. He indicates that APRRN grew its influence because state-centric approaches were not effectively implemented, and demonstrates the change in their strategic focus from top-down institutionalization to bottom-up implementation (2019, 171). However, in his paper, Choi did not address possible biases he might have had as an insider to APRRN. Moreover, the attitudes toward refugees shared by a group of individuals dedicated to the cause could be different from the opinions of the general citizenry.

2.6 Summary

In this section, I tried to find possible answers to my research questions which are 'why were Korean youth most against receiving the Yemeni asylum seekers who arrived at Jeju Island in 2018?' and 'how similar or different are the opinions of SNU students from other twenty-year-olds in Korea?' Upon reviewing previous research, I found five major themes: securitization, neoliberalism, femonationalism, socio-cultural psychology, and democracy. These themes served as the foundation and reference point for my survey questionnaire, especially when creating specific response options (see Appendix 1).

During literature review, however, it was challenging to find journal articles that centrally addressed Korean youth attitudes specifically toward the Yemeni asylum seekers who arrived at Jeju Island in 2018. Moreover, I could not obtain information on how SNU students thought about the issue. Detecting this gap within the literature and the lack of first-hand data, I saw the need to conduct survey research which will be further explained later in the methodology section.

III. Theoretical Framework

In this section, I explain the theories I used as my main analytical tools. As indicated in the previous section, prior research underscored the importance of taking into account people's perceptions and emotions, multiple factors when analyzing immigration attitudes, and the implications of multiculturalism for democracy. As such, I focus on group threat theory, intersectionality, and deliberative democracy with special emphasis on the latter two. In addition to explicating each theory, I make connections among the three and show that they are in dialogue with one another.

3.1 Group Threat

Two groups emerge to the foreground in my topic of interest: Korean nationals on one side and Yemeni asylum seekers on the other. As indicated in the previous section by scholars who pointed out the securitization of refugees, one of the main reasons why there was large opposition toward the Yemeni asylum seekers was that Koreans saw them as a threat. Such a dynamic is not unique to Korea and has already been identifiable in countries accommodating greater numbers of asylum seekers, especially in North America and Europe.

In "Warmth of the Welcome: Attitudes Toward Immigrants and Immigration Policy in the United States," Elizabeth Fussell presents both "classic theories of prejudice (group threat and contact) and newer theories (symbolic politics and social identity theory)" (2014, 480). Under the group

threat theory umbrella, Blumer's theory of group position, Hubert M. Blalock Jr.'s theory of minority-group relations, and Allport's theory of prejudice serve as keystones. These theories have mostly been utilized to explain Whites' attitudes toward Blacks but they have also been transferred to research on immigration. In simple terms, "the threat hypothesis proposes that prejudice occurs in an in-group when members perceive a threat from an out-group [because] the threat consolidates their sense of themselves as an in-group and reinforces their feelings of superiority" (482). The sense of threat then gets stronger as the size of the out-group enlarges.

In "Race Prejudice as a Sense of Group Position," Herbert Blumer sets forth how relative group positions lead to negative intergroup relations. His idea helps expand our understanding of race prejudice by widening the scope of analysis, shifting from a "preoccupation with feelings [within] individuals to a concern with the relationship of...groups" and collective consciousness (1958, 3). The essence of his thinking is captured below:

> Even though given individual members may have personal views and feelings different from the sense of group position, they will have to conjure with the sense of group position held by their racial group. If the sense of position is strong, to act contrary to it is to risk a feeling of self-alienation and to face the possibility of ostracism.... The locus of race prejudice is not in the area of individual feeling but in the definition of the respective positions of the racial groups (5)

Blumer's explanations of racial prejudice and group position closely apply to the case of Koreans' opposition toward the Yemeni asylum seekers. Their arrival led to various types of fractures and group divisions including

Koreans versus Yemenis, citizens versus foreigners, males versus females, Christians versus Muslims, taxpayers versus beneficiaries, Asian versus Arab, and more. His theory also relates back to the literature not only to studies on securitization but also to studies on person-positivity bias, cultural differences between the East and the West as well as to papers that draw a distinction between the more open citizenry and the more closed elites/government. Most importantly, his ideas well explain why young Korean women were most against receiving the Yemeni asylum seekers, especially how awareness of their group position in the society heightened during the Me Too Movement then leading to increased threat perception.

However, despite its strengths, Blumer's theory of group position stops short of addressing more nuanced questions such as 'if an individual belongs to more than one group then how does his/her position within the society change?' 'can an individual be a member of an in-group and out-group at the same time?' and 'do feelings of threat toward an out-group increase for individuals who belong to in-groups that are more ostracized within the society?' The next theory – intersectionality – can provide answers.

3.2 Intersectionality

Intersectionality can be best understood with an example. Group A consists of Black women with low-income jobs and Group B consists of White men with high-income jobs. Race, gender and income variables intersect with one another and place these groups in different starting lines

which results in different degrees of access to rights and resources within the society. As one can infer, the theory of intersectionality takes one step further from the in-group/out-group dichotomy and unidirectional perception of threat. Instead, it takes a more multivariate approach and embraces complexities in society where individuals' relative group position frequently change and move depending on the groups to which they belong.

Researchers Hajer Al-Faham, Angelique M. Davis and Rose Ernst explain the development of intersectionality in "Intersectionality: From Theory to Practice." Having origins in activism by women of color, intersectionality was introduced to the academy by Kimberlé Crenshaw. The theory allows "legal scholars, social scientists, and other researchers [to go] 'beyond simply analyzing differences between groups' and instead provides the crucial opportunity to study differences within [and across] groups" (2006, 250). Therefore, it opposes "zero-sum politics, or the 'Oppression Olympics,' [which] refers to a perceived competition between marginalized groups over who among them has endured the greatest suffering," a phenomenon that was observed in Korea when young women and feminists opposed receiving the asylum seekers more than other groups (259-60).

Ange-Marie Hancock describes intersectionality as a useful and comprehensive tool for research in "When Multiplication Doesn't Equal Quick Addition: Examining Intersectionality as a Research Paradigm." She explains that intersectionality takes a more holistic approach by drawing "attention to the simultaneous and interacting effects of gender, race, class, sexual orientation, and national origin" (2007, 63). She acknowledges that due to its full embrace of complexities the theory has been rejected by

researchers who prefer having clear variables, especially quantitative scholars (66). However, as demonstrated in *Table 2* below, she indicates that political science research has in fact transitioned from privileging "a single category of sociopolitical difference (e.g. race *or* gender) to work that examines multiple categories of sociopolitical differences as isolated phenomena (e.g. race *and* gender) to, most recently, work that examines intersecting categories of sociopolitical difference (e.g. race *interacts* with gender)" (67).

Table 2. Differences among Approaches in Political Science

	Unitary Approach	Multiple Approach	Intersectional Approach
Q1: How many categories are addressed?	One	More than one	More than one
Q2: What is the relationship posited between categories?	Category examined is primary	Categories matter equally in a predetermined relationship to each other	Categories matter equally; the relationship between categories is an open empirical question
Q3: How are categories conceptualized?	Static at the individual or institutional level	Static at the individual or institutional level	Dynamic interaction between individual and institutional factors
Q4: What is the presumed makeup of each category?	Uniform	Uniform	Diverse; members often differ in politically significant ways
Q5: What levels of analysis are considered feasible in a single analysis?	Individual *or* institutional	Individual *and* institutional	Individual *integrated* with institutional
Q6: What is the methodological conventional wisdom?	Empirical or Theoretical; Single method preferred; multiple method possible	Empirical or Theoretical; Single method sufficient; multiple method desirable	Empirical and Theoretical; Multiple method necessary and sufficient

Source: Hancock 2007, 64.

In fact, intersectional approaches could be seen in the aforementioned literature such as studies on the role of femonationalism – gender interacting with race – in shaping young Korean women's opinions toward the Yemeni asylum seekers as well as the role of neoliberalism – age interacting with economic status – in shaping young Koreans of both genders to go against receiving the asylum seekers.

Justin A. Berg well demonstrates how intersectionality can be incorporated into research in his work titled "Race, Class, Gender, and Social Space: Using an Intersectional Approach to Study Immigration Studies." As indicated by Hancock, Berg was able to find that intersectional approaches capture what unitary approaches cannot. He utilized data from the 2004 General Social Survey and the 2000 Census and conducted hierarchical linear modeling. One of his findings, for instance, was how more educated women than men disagreed that immigrants take jobs from native-born citizens as shown in *Figure 6* below (2010, 293).

Figure 6. Intersection of Gender and Class

Source: Berg 2010, 293.

"The additive model showed race and gender to be nonsignificant [but] differences...emerged in the [intersectional] model" (292). Berg's research thus shows that intersectional approaches allow scholars to read between the lines within immigration attitudes. Although he was able to apply intersectionality to the field of migration as a method it was another scholar that transferred intersectionality to the field as a theoretical lens.

Nira Yuval-Davis integrates intersectionality into the field of migration and presents what she calls 'politics of belonging.' She states that "it is important to relate the notion of *belonging* to the differential positionings from which belonging are imagined and narrated, in terms of gender, class, stage in the life cycle, etc., even in relation to...the same boundaries and borders" (2005, 521; emphasis added). In other words, people experience and are subject to different degrees of not only marginalization and threat but also a sense of belonging depending on their identities/groups to which they belong in the society. Moreover, because such identities and group memberships can change, politics of belonging is as flexible as intersectionality. Hence "the contested and shifting nature of...boundaries and borders may reflect not only dynamic power relations between individuals, collectivities and institutions but also subjective and situational processes" (2005, 521). Those power relations can be seen in how "people who are constructed to be members of the other ethnic, racial and national collectivities, are not considered 'to belong' to the nation state community, even if formally they are entitled to" (2007, 563).

Furthermore, Yuval-Davis expands the scope of intersectionality by not only studying the effects of ascriptive identities but also the emotional dimensions in politics of belonging. In "Intersectionality, Citizenship and Contemporary Politics of Belonging," she explains that "the emotional element...is so crucial to the politics of belonging [because] people *love* their people and their country, they *hate* the enemy and they *fear* invasion and pollution to their 'culture and tradition'" (2007, 564). Relatedly, in "Secure borders and safe haven and the gendered politics of belonging: Beyond

social cohesion" Yuval-Davis, Floya Anthias and Eleonore Kofman point out the more expansive characteristic of politics of belonging compared to intersectionality by indicating that belonging "is not just about membership, rights and duties, but also about the emotions that such memberships evoke [and furthermore that] belonging [cannot] be reduced to identities and identifications" (2005, 526). This characteristic is why I see her thinking as an extension of the theory of intersectionality.

3.3 Deliberative Democracy

Upon reviewing group threat theory, intersectionality and politics of belonging, additional questions arise such as 'why is it important to have a keen eye for relative group positions, different degrees of societal marginalization and levels of affiliation?' and 'what is the end goal of incorporating these theories when studying intergroup relations and immigration attitudes?' As indicated in the literature review section, anti-multiculturalism was often discussed in relation to its democratic implications. Deliberative democracy theorists can provide answers.

"Broadly defined, deliberative democracy refers to the idea that legitimate lawmaking [comes] from the public deliberation of citizens" (Bohman and Rehg 1997, ix). It is often associated with participatory politics and civic governance. One of the most well-known theorists is Jürgen Habermas who sought to address problems of popular sovereignty:

> ...even the most earnest endeavors at political self-organization are
> defeated by resistant elements originating in the stubborn systemic

logics of the market and administrative power. At one time,
democracy was something to be asserted against the despotism
palpably embodied in the king, members of the aristocracy, and
higher-ranking clerics. Since then, political authority has
been depersonalized (1997, 41)

He thus criticizes procedural democracy and calls for more substantive
systems; he opposes the public remaining simply as a plural but asks for an
active, engaged group of citizens that are willing to form opinions and
reach consensus. Habermas especially emphasizes sensitivity and diffusion for
democracy to be substantive. He stresses that "democratic procedures should
produce rational outcomes insofar as opinion-formation inside parliamentary
bodies remains sensitive to the results of a surrounding informal
opinion-formation in autonomous public spheres" (60). That is, he saw
reciprocity between the government/representatives and the public/citizens as
a crucial element. Additionally, he stated that "consensus and majority rule
are compatible only if the latter has an internal relation to the search for
truth" (1997, 47; emphasis added). He hence not only underscored the
public's will but also reason.

Deliberative democracy is still highly relevant today. In
"Experimenting with a Democratic Ideal: Deliberative Polling and Public
Opinion," scholars James S. Fishkin and Robert C. Luskin point to the lack
of deliberation in modern democracy and criticize public opinion surveys.
They indicate that "in the beginning, public opinion polling combined
aspirations for both political equality...and deliberation [and] the pioneering
figure George Gallup touted polling as a serious instrument of democratic
reform" (2005, 286). However, similar to Habermas's worry, such procedures

did not improve the substance of opinion-formation. Fishkin and Luskin claim that "giving the mass public, which is not generally very deliberative, more say has meant decreasing the level of deliberation behind political decision-making [hence] as political equality has gone up, deliberation has gone down" (285). In efforts to address this problem – what Anthony Downs would call 'rational ignorance' – and provide an alternative, they created an experimental design that could encourage deliberation: deliberative polling. As illustrated in *Figure 7*, their process starts with a random sample then exposing participants to balanced information, arranging small group discussions and plenary sessions, obtaining opinions via a questionnaire, and diffusing results via various forms of offline and online media.

Figure 7. Deliberative Polling Process

Source: Website of Center for Deliberative Democracy.

The results of their research "show that ordinary people can deliberate, that they benefit from doing so, and that [deliberation] neither biases nor polarizes their opinions" (2005, 284). They also provide criteria that ensure deliberation as shown in *Table 3* below (285).

Table 3. Criteria for Deliberation in Public Opinion

Informed	Arguments should be supported by appropriate and reasonably accurate factual claims.
Balanced	Arguments should be met by contrary arguments.
Conscientious	The participants should be willing to talk and listen, with civility and respect.
Substantive	Arguments should be considered sincerely on their merits, not how they are made or who is making them.
Comprehensive	All points of view held by significant portions of the population should receive attention.

Source: organized by author.

Based on these criteria, it is difficult to say with confidence that Korea's large opposition toward the Yemeni asylum seekers came from deliberation. Initial survey results and soundbites only ignited hostility while the government's passive response worsened feelings of uncertainty. Before the public could get fully informed, exposed to balanced information, and engage in conscientious, substantive and comprehensive discussions, the government had taken measures such as prohibiting Yemenis from visa-free entry to Jeju Island and hastily agreeing to amend the national refugee law. There was a lack of what Habermas describes as a search for truth.

Deliberative polling proposed by Fishkin and Luskin, however, has some limitations. Because it is an experiment, questions remain as to how such processes can be translated into nationwide surveys. They themselves acknowledge this weakness by stating that "experiments [are] high on

internal validity" but low on external validity (295). Moreover, deliberative polling could be taken advantage of depending on when, by whom, and for what issue it is utilized. In other words, there could be an unfairness problem if deliberative processes are selectively chosen for certain issues yet not utilized for other topics, especially if participants are asked to deliberate about a public policy and the surveyors are government officials who are in their benefit to use such processes as a way to persuade the public in the name of promoting deliberation. Nonetheless, deliberative polling itself is a meaningful step toward more deliberative public opinion-formation and policy-making processes.

Before introducing Habermas, I indicated that deliberative democracy theorists can provide answers to questions such as 'why is it important to have a keen eye for relative group positions, different degrees of societal marginalization and levels of affiliation?' and 'what is the end goal of incorporating these theories when studying intergroup relations and immigration attitudes?' The answer is the improvement of democracy, and scholar Iris M. Young well explains this point in "Difference as a Resource for Democratic Communication." Her main argument is that awareness of relative group positions is vital for substantive democracy. By proposing what she calls 'group-differentiated politics,' Young says that hearing the needs of social groups is equal to hearing different perspectives which is why differences are critical for democracy (1997). Similar to intersectionality and politics of belonging theorists, Young noticed that "the perspectives of privileged and powerful groups tend to dominate public discourse and policy...and continue to exclude and marginalize others even when law and

public rhetoric state a commitment to equality" (383). She acknowledges that many deliberative democracy theorists oppose "politics of difference [and] identity politics [because it could remove] both the motivation and the capacity for citizens to talk to one another and solve problems together" (384). In other words, they view politics of difference as an obstacle to opinion-formation of the masses. However, in Young's view, being aware of differences is "a necessary resource for a discussion-based politics in which participants aim to cooperate, reach understanding, and do justice" (385).

Furthermore, similar to Blumer and his emphasis that discussions of racial prejudice should be based on a focus on groups rather than individuals, Young also explains that "what constitutes a social group is not *internal* to the attributes and self-understanding of its members [rather] what makes the group a group is the relation in which it stands to others" (389; emphasis added). That is, "social groups are collections of persons similarly situated in social fields structured by power and resources" (391). As such, she replaces the term 'group' with 'perspective' to support her argument. Young is hence against "turning the many into one" (401). She believes that "without the recognition of group-based identities..., deliberative democracy will be blind to sources of inequality and asymmetries of power" (Bohman and Rehg 1997, xxv). This aspect could be why scholars who focused on anti-multiculturalism discussed its implications for democratic advancement. As Darcie Draudt points out, "the way [Korea] treats immigrants will mark its evolution as a modern democracy" (2016, 12).

Likewise, scholar Nancy Fraser stresses the need to update the theory in "Transnationalizing the Public Sphere: On the Legitimacy and

Efficacy of Public Opinion in a Post-Westphalian World" (2007). She re-examines public sphere theory presented in Habermas's 1962 book titled *Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere* and indicates that his description of the public sphere is narrow and bounded to the Westphalian territorial state which is why many nations find it difficult to apply it to the transnational world of today. She explains that Habermas saw "the public sphere [as] a key institutional component of...Westphalian democracy" and envisioned a model in which "public communication [are] conducted in the *national* language and relayed through the *national* media...[and reflects] the...political will of the *national* citizenry" (11; emphasis added).

However, "every state now has non-citizens on its territory; most are multicultural and/or multinational..., public spheres today are not coextensive with political membership [and the opinions represent] neither the common interest nor the general will of any demos" (16). This is perhaps why voices of non-citizens are not seen as legitimate, and such illegitimacy is in turn used as justification for enduring discrimination. As such, she states that a new public sphere composed of people who share not a common citizenship but "a common set of structures...that affect their lives" as well as new transnational powers accountable to them are needed (23). In providing an update of the theory for a world where many topics transcend borders and where new forms of power such as transnational elites/corporations/governance have appeared, Fraser stresses the need for a transnational understanding of deliberative democracy.

In short, these three theories served as crucial pairs of glasses in deciphering Korea's public opinion toward the Yemeni asylum seekers.

IV. Methodology

4.1 Selection of Approach

As explained in the literature review section, prior research neither specifically addressed Korean youth attitudes toward the Yemeni asylum seekers who arrived at Jeju Island in 2018 nor did they have primary data on the opinions of Koreans in their 20s and of SNU students. Accordingly, in order to answer 'why were Korean youth most against receiving Yemeni asylum seekers who arrived at Jeju Island in 2018?' and 'how similar or different are the opinions of SNU students from other twenty-year-olds in Korea?' I conducted surveys and obtained first-hand information. As one can infer from my research questions, I do not approach this research with pre-structured hypotheses. Instead, my study is a step that is necessary before such verification of hypotheses even takes place. It thus demands a different reading from top-down deductive studies. To emphasize, I conduct a bottom-up, exploratory and qualitative inquiry aimed at gaining primary data and making observations.

4.2 Explanation of Procedure

After receiving Institutional Review Board approval on May 6th, 2020, I administered online surveys over the course of three weeks. To be specific, from May 14th to 18th, 2020, I gathered 383 questionnaires from Korean twenty-year-olds who are part of a polling agency called Macromill

Embrain (hereinafter Embrain). I chose this agency because it boasts a large panel for online research in Asia, is a well-known organization with a global network of offices and major clients, and conducts surveys that cover a wide range of topics from marketing to public policy issues (Embrain 2020a). Additionally, from May 11th to June 1st, 2020, I gathered 209 questionnaires from Korean twenty-year-olds who are members of SNU. In sum, I collected a total of 592 questionnaires. The survey research itself was conducted in Korean. I disposed of questionnaires whose surveyees were of a different age or did not follow given instructions.

In regards to participant recruitment, I randomly sent invitations to SNU students via the email addresses provided in SNU's emailing system and by utilizing the random numbers table method. Any individual who has an SNU email including myself can access this information. I sent equal amounts of email invitations to each of the 29 colleges. Meanwhile, for the Embrain sample, I delivered the invitation and questionnaire documents to the agency and requested for it to be randomly distributed to their panel.

Both samples were given the same questionnaire. Some personal questions were different for the SNU sample, however, since contrary to the Embrain sample it mainly consists of students (see Appendix 1). For the SNU sample, I created the online questionnaire via Google Forms. I made sure that individuals could only participate once to avoid duplications and explained that temporary ID/PWs were available for those who do not have a Gmail account to ensure equal opportunity for participation. Meanwhile the online version of my questionnaire that was sent to Embrain was confirmed by me before distribution. Both surveys had a total of 23 questions.

In the questionnaires, I first asked participants through which medium they first heard about the Yemeni asylum seekers who arrived at Jeju Island in 2018. Then, I asked whether they thought the asylum seekers came to do economic activities and/or escape from war, came all at once or over various months, and whether they came via illegal or legal routes. Third, I asked whether they opposed or approved receiving the asylum seekers when they first heard about their arrival. Participants hearing about the occurrence for the first time through my survey were instead asked about their current stance. As such, I am interested in the initial stance of participants. Next, I asked for specific reasons why participants opposed/approved. My fifth question was an open-ended question; all participants were asked whether their stance changed over time, and if so, why and how meanwhile participants who heard about the occurrence for the first time through my survey were instead asked to freely write any additional reasons behind their stance. Sixth, I asked about their level of interest and information-seeking behavior. Next, I asked whether they were willing to discuss with another person who has a different opinion.

Then I asked why participants think there was large opposition in Korean society. Ninth, I asked why they think people in their 20s, especially women, were most against receiving the asylum seekers. Afterward, I asked for their thoughts that come to mind after hearing that South Korea ranked 35th out of 37 OECD members in refugee recognition rates in 2018 while ranking 2nd in the world in terms of private − neither governmental nor business − contributions to the U.N. Refugee Agency. Then I asked how they currently feel about refugees who live in Korea.

The twelfth question asked their opinions on what the Korean government's position should be from now on. The rest of the questions were demographic questions which slightly differ for each sample (see Appendix 1). "Demographic questions such as income, education or age [were not asked] near the beginning of a survey unless they [were] needed to determine eligibility for the survey" (Pew Research Center 2020).

Regarding sample size, according to Priscilla Salant and Don A. Dillman (1994), the ideal sample size for a population equal to or larger than 100,000 but less than 1,000,000 members in which one expects a 50/50 split is 383 to make estimates with a sample error of no more than 5 percent at the 95 percent confidence level (55). As of July 2020, the number of twenty-year-olds in Embrain's panel was 425,652 (Embrain 2020b). Therefore, the 383 questionnaires collected in the Embrain sample were adequate for analysis. Meanwhile the total number of Korean students enrolled in SNU was 27,784 as of April 2019 (SNU 2020). I was able to collect 209 questionnaires which all else equal (i.e. 50/50 split and 95 percent confidence interval) means a sample error of around 6.8 percent. Since it was lower than 10 percent the SNU questionnaires were also appropriate for analysis.

Answers to my survey questionnaire were numerically coded on Excel and IBM SPSS Statistics. Then they were analyzed for descriptive statistics and chi-square statistics. Meanwhile written answers were translated into English because the surveys were conducted in Korean. They were then categorized manually by theme. I thus interpreted the results based on statistical as well as content analyses.

V. Results

5.1 Descriptive Statistics

In both samples, there were more female participants; 59.3% were females and 40.7% were males in the Embrain sample while 60.8% were females and 39.2% were males in the SNU sample. In regards to age, there were more 26-year-old participants in the Embrain sample (15.9%) meanwhile there were more 28-year-old respondents in the SNU sample (17.2%). In both samples, most fell in between 25 and 28 years of age.

Participants in both samples lived in Seoul and Gyeonggi-do the longest; 28.7% lived in Gyeonggi-do and 22.5% lived in Seoul in the Embrain sample while 39.2% lived in Seoul and 15.8% lived in Gyeonggi-do in the SNU sample. I asked participants where they lived the longest and not their current place of residence because many in their 20s tend to change locations frequently for education or employment purposes. I thus considered it would be better to ask participants the region that would have shaped their personal background the most.

In both samples, the majority of participants did not have a religion: 74.9% in the Embrain sample and 62.7% in the SNU sample. The majority of respondents in both samples were politically moderate as well: 43.1% in the Embrain sample and 37.8% in the SNU sample. When asked about one's average monthly income most participants selected 'equal to or more than 1 million won and less than 3 million won' (34.5%) in the Embrain sample. Since the SNU sample were mostly full-time students participants were instead asked on their perceived standard of living and

most chose 'medium' (66.5%). Respondents in the Embrain sample were similarly asked about their satisfaction with their standard of living and most picked 'satisfied' (63.2%). Surveyees in both samples were then asked about their highest level of education and most chose 'bachelor's degree (prospective graduates included)' with 77.0% in the Embrain sample and 54.5% in the SNU sample. Yet more people selected 'master's degree (prospective graduates included)' in the SNU sample (29.7%) than in the Embrain sample (5.5%).

When asked about the job sector most participants in the Embrain sample chose 'student' (38.4%) which was then followed by 'office occupations' (26.6%). In the SNU sample, the majority had no job outside of school (88.5%). The second most chosen option in the Embrain sample was 'regular employee' (35.0%). When participants in the Embrain sample were asked whether they had more than one job the question was not applicable for the majority (52.5%) while the option 'yes' was 32.6%. Detailed demographic data can be found in Appendix 3.

In the first survey question, a vast majority of the participants in the Embrain sample (64.0%) first heard about the occurrence through 'newscast/news articles.' Similarly, the majority of participants in the SNU sample (78.5%) also chose 'newscast/news articles.' Meanwhile more people in the Embrain sample (19.8%) selected 'social media (ex: YouTube, Facebook, Twitter etc.)' compared to the SNU sample (8.6%). Additionally, more people in the Embrain sample (13.1%) heard about the 2018 arrival of Yemeni asylum seekers at Jeju Island for the first time through my questionnaire than the SNU sample (8.6%).

Next, in the second survey question, 56.4% of participants in the Embrain sample selected 'I think the Yemeni asylum seekers who arrived at Jeju Island came to Korea in order to escape from war' followed by 29.5% who chose 'I think the Yemeni asylum seekers came to Jeju Island via illegal routes' and 17.9% who picked 'I think around 500 Yemeni asylum seekers came to Jeju Island over various months.' In the SNU sample, the majority of respondents (36.4%) also selected 'escape from war.' However, contrary to the Embrain sample, 'over various months' came next (22.0%) followed by 'illegal routes' (17.3%). Regardless, the three most chosen options were identical in both samples.

For the third question, I compared the percentages of both samples as seen in *Figure 8* and *Figure 9* below.

Figure 8. Embrain Responses to Question 3

Figure 9. SNU Responses to Question 3

As can be seen, the majority of participants in the Embrain sample chose 'oppose but there should be an opportunity for an asylum seeker's application to be reviewed' meanwhile the majority in the SNU sample selected 'approve but there should be strict screening processes.' When responses are divided into oppose versus approve 72% of participants opposed and 28% approved in the Embrain sample. Meanwhile 42.1% opposed and 57.9% approved in the SNU sample. Hence, the gap between those who oppose and approve is larger in the Embrain sample.

In the fourth question, participants were asked to choose their top three reasons behind their stances. In both samples, the top three choices for opposing and the percentages for each were almost identical; 21.7% in the Embrain sample and 21.2% in the SNU sample chose 'worry over public safety' as their first choice, followed by 15.6% in the Embrain sample and 16.7% in the SNU sample selecting 'concern over national security problems and possibility of terrorism' as second. Then 14.4% in the Embrain sample

and 14.8% in the SNU sample picked 'government and laws in Korea unready to receive refugees' as the third option.

Similarly, the top three choices for approving were identical in the two samples. However, the order and the percentages for each option were different. In both samples, the top choice was 'the need to help refugees from a humanitarian perspective' with 20.3% in the Embrain sample and 28.2% in the SNU sample. Nonetheless, the second choice in the Embrain sample was 'Korea's difficult past such as the Korean War and establishment of a provisional government during which we received help from other countries' (14.7%) and the third choice was 'Korea's legal and economic responsibility as signatory of the Convention to the Status of Refugees and as OECD member with the capacity to receive refugees' (13.1%). Meanwhile the second choice in the SNU sample was 'responsibility/capacity' (22.9%) and the third was 'difficult past' (13.0%).

The fifth question was an open-ended question so written answers were studied via content analysis as will be further explained in the 5.3 subsection. In questions six, seven, eight, nine and ten, percentages in both samples were almost the same. In the sixth question, the majority in both samples selected 'I was interested in the Yemeni refugees at Jeju island but I did not search for related information' with 43.1% in the Embrain sample and 39.7% in the SNU sample. In the seventh question, more people in both samples chose 'I am not as willing to actively discuss about Yemeni refugees at Jeju Island with another person who has a different opinion than me' with 75.5% in the Embrain sample and 64.1% in the SNU sample. In the eighth question, the majority in both samples picked 'people

expecting there to be more personal/societal costs than benefits from receiving refugees' with 52.4% in the Embrain sample and 47.5% in the SNU sample.

In the ninth question, the top choice was the same for both samples with 44.7% in the Embrain sample and 46.6% in the SNU sample choosing 'anxieties felt in our society projected onto refugees (ex. the Me Too Movement in Korea started toward the beginning of 2018 while the majority of Yemeni refugees who arrived at Jeju Island were young men).' For the tenth question, in both samples the top answer was 'I did not expect donation levels to be that high and it would rather be better for donations to be made for domestic needs' with 42.5% in the Embrain sample and 29.6% in the SNU sample. There was a lower percentage in the SNU sample because more people in the SNU sample (12.0%) selected the 'other' option compared to 4.4% in the Embrain sample. As will be explained in the 5.3 subsection, the most common answer among SNU students who chose 'other' was that donating from afar is preferable than receiving refugees into Korea. More people in the SNU sample (28.0%) also picked 'many people support and help refugees even though they do not actively express their opinions' compared to the Embrain sample (19.8%).

In the eleventh question, the majority of participants in both samples selected 'anxiety' with 42.3% in the Embrain sample and 37.3% in the SNU sample. The second most chosen option in the Embrain sample was 'disinterest' (33.9%) while in the SNU sample it was 'sympathy' (26.8%). Last but not least, similar to responses in the third question, the majority of respondents in the Embrain sample (60.8%) chose 'amend the

national refugee law and make border control as well as asylum application review processes stricter' meanwhile the majority of participants in the SNU sample (55.0%) selected 'share the minimum responsibility needed in receiving refugees as a member of the international society.' The bar graphs for each sample are displayed in *Figure 10* and *Figure 11*. When summing up answers and dividing them into two realms 68.4% fell under 'not receive' and 31.6% fell under 'receive' in the Embrain sample. On the contrary, in the SNU sample, 39.2% fell under 'not receive' and 60.7% fell under 'receive.' SNU participants thus agree more with statements that refugees should be received than Embrain participants.

Figure 10. Embrain Responses to Question 12

Figure 11. SNU Responses to Question 12

5.2 Chi-square Statistics

Through descriptive statistics, I was able to find answers to my two research questions 'why were Korean youth most against receiving the Yemeni asylum seekers who arrived at Jeju Island in 2018?' by looking at participants' reasons behind their stances as well as 'how similar or different are the opinions of SNU students from other twenty-year-olds in Korea?' by comparing the top responses and percentages of options that were chosen.

Regarding my sub-question 'among the young, why were women more against the issue than men?' which is asked in question 9, however, curiosities remained. The most selected response option was 'Anxieties felt in our society projected onto refugees (ex. the Me Too Movement in Korea started toward the beginning of 2018 while the majority of Yemeni refugees

who arrived at Jeju Island were young men)' in both samples. Nonetheless, referring back to literature on femonationalism, I wanted to further check whether both males and females agreed with that response option. Accordingly, I ran a chi-square test of independence and found a significant association in the Embrain sample as seen in *Table 4*.

Table 4. SPSS Output for Questions 9 and 13 (Embrain)

Crosstab

			sex		Total
			1 male	2 female	
projected	0 not selected	Count	64	62	126
		Expected Count	51.3	74.7	126.0
		% within projected	50.8%	49.2%	100.0%
		% within sex	41.0%	27.3%	32.9%
		Adjusted Residual	2.8	-2.8	
	1 selected	Count	92	165	257
		Expected Count	104.7	152.3	257.0
		% within projected	35.8%	64.2%	100.0%
		% within sex	59.0%	72.7%	67.1%
		Adjusted Residual	-2.8	2.8	
Total		Count	156	227	383
		Expected Count	156.0	227.0	383.0
		% within projected	40.7%	59.3%	100.0%
		% within sex	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymptotic Significance (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	7.876[a]	1	.005		
Continuity Correction[b]	7.267	1	.007		
Likelihood Ratio	7.817	1	.005		
Fisher's Exact Test				.006	.004
Linear-by-Linear Association	7.855	1	.005		
N of Valid Cases	383				

a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5.
The minimum expected count is 51.32.
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Symmetric Measures

		Value	Approximate Significance
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.143	.005
	Cramer's V	.143	.005
N of Valid Cases		383	

As can be seen above, more females chose the 'Anxieties felt in our society projected onto refugees' option than men but there were also more males that selected the option than males who did not albeit to a lesser extent than females (x^2(df=1) = 7.267, $p < 0.01$, *phi* = 0.143). No significant association was found in the SNU sample. To note, the Embrain sample is used as a proxy representation of Korean youth unlike the SNU sample which is a specific case.

5.3 Content Analysis

For the written answers provided by participants, I analyzed and categorized the contents by theme (see Appendix 4). Starting with the Embrain sample, two participants wrote their own reasons why they oppose receiving the Yemeni asylum seekers which were 'questionable qualification' and 'preference of assimilation' than multiculturalism. The corresponding quote for 'questionable qualification' reads "they were capable enough to leave their country and people behind to escape and come to Korea." No written answers were provided for the approving side. Next, in the open-ended question, a total of thirty four participants wrote their opinions. The category that had the highest number of corresponding responses was 'the need for strict screening processes.' Respondents, however, showed incoherent comprehension of what a strict screening process meant. For example, one respondent showed a more negative interpretation by stating that "the reviews must be done thoroughly and if there is any reason for disqualification they should not be able to enter" while a different participant seemed more open toward refugees saying "they came here seeking refuge so they should be able to receive strict screening anywhere." The next categories with high numbers of corresponding answers were 'fake refugees' and 'Korea's unpreparedness/lack of capacity' which was then followed by 'religious and cultural differences' and 'the need to give an opportunity for application review.'

Other codes that emerged include 'celebrity vs. terrorist,' 'worries of misogyny,' 'crime prevention,' 'negative information in the news,' 'negativity toward tax and social security benefits given to foreigners,' 'need to abide

by international law,' 'for a better Korean society,' 'sympathy,' 'Korea as an uncommon destination/geographical distance,' 'negative precedents from abroad,' 'refugees' unwillingness to adapt,' 'refugees' backwardness and inability to adapt,' 'Korea's superiority as an advanced country,' 'security over reputation and human rights,' 'Korean citizens come first,' 'worry over future increase,' 'worry over illegal residence,' 'humanitarian need,' and 'same stance due to no personal influences.' I coded 'celebrity vs. terrorist' for two respondents whose reasons were based on incorrect portrayals of foreigners that are unfortunately common in media; one respondent wrote "I think we should accept refugees who truly want to live well in Korea just like [the celebrity] Sam Okyere who got permanent residency" and another said "I watched a video about two European women who were travelling but got beheaded by a Middle Eastern terrorist group so I highly oppose." Meanwhile those who heard about the occurrence for the first time were asked to freely write additional reasons. Two participants provided answers which were 'general anti-foreigner sentiment' and 'Korea's unpreparedness.'

When asked why there was strong opposition in the Korean society eight participants provided written answers which were coded as 'only men,' 'manipulation of public opinion,' 'negative precedents from abroad,' 'public safety concerns,' 'danger,' 'dissatisfaction toward the media,' 'negative press' and 'political gap between the public and the government.' When asked why people in their 20s, especially women, were most against receiving the Yemeni asylum seekers eighteen participants gave written answers. The category with the highest number of corresponding responses was 'prevalence of sex crimes in Islamic countries and associated fear of crimes

targeting women in Korea.' An example of a response is the quote "In Islamic countries, they mistreat women, sexual assault crimes are severe, and they are not willing to change their culture." This category was then followed by 'poor views on women's rights in Islamic countries and associated fear of negative effects to Korea,' 'public safety concerns' and 'threat.' Other themes included 'Islam as a discriminatory religion,' 'negative precedents from abroad,' 'Korean citizens come first,' 'eristic women in Korea' and 'just a coincidence.'

Next, when asked for their opinions after reading about Korea's different rankings nineteen participants provided their opinions. Numerous respondents fell under the category 'preference of helping from afar.' For instance, a respondent wrote "I think people want to help through donations but do not consider the possibility of living together." Other themes that arose included 'public safety concerns,' 'Korea's unpreparedness,' 'North Korea as a priority,' 'wish for more opinions of support to be expressed,' 'refugee recognition rates not based on government's stance' and 'being coerced into sacrificing personal space.'

Moving onto the SNU sample, two respondents provided written answers to why they approve receiving the Yemeni asylum seekers which were coded as 'right to free movement' and 'rule of law above all.' No written responses were given for the opposing side. In the open-ended question, eighteen participants gave written answers. The category with the highest number of corresponding responses was 'acknowledgment of humanitarian perspectives' which was then followed by 'economic benefits for Korean citizens first,' 'critique of government's actions,' 'potential

criminals,' 'sympathy based on Korea's difficult past,' 'need for assurance of refugees' willingness to adapt,' 'give an opportunity,' 'worry of future increase,' 'need for solutions,' 'dissimilarity between students and economically active youth,' 'positive cases,' 'negative portrayals in the news,' 'concern for security regarding jobs and public safety' and 'less intensity of opinion after time.' Among those who heard about the occurrence for the first time, two participants provided written answers which were categorized as 'lawfulness comes first,' 'association of issue salience with illegality,' 'responsibility to protect based on Korea's capacity,' 'religious and cultural differences' and 'negative precedents from abroad.'

In regards to written responses for the open-ended question, it is worth comparing the two samples further as shown in *Table 5*. Among those who indicated that both their stance and reasons changed, more people moved from negative to positive stances in the Embrain sample while more people moved from positive to negative stances in the SNU sample. In any case, the majority of survey participants in both samples did not change their initial stance and corresponding reasons. In the Embrain sample, 90.6% of participants did not change their initial stance and reasons. Meanwhile 4.4% of respondents changed both their stance and reasons, another 4.4% only altered/added reasons, and 0.5% wrote 'I don't know.' Similarly, in the SNU sample, 90.4% of respondents did not change their initial stance and reasons while 5.7% changed both and 3.8% only altered/added reasons. In other words, the vast majority neither changed their initial stance nor reasons in both samples since 2018.

Table 5. Response Statistics for Open-ended Question 5

Embrain Survey

Respondents aware beforehand	Respondents first time hearing
Changed both stance and reason	Changed both stance and reason
17 - Provided explanations: 13 Positive to negative: 4 Negative to positive: 9 - Did not provide explanations: 4 Positive to negative: 3 Negative to positive: 1	0
Stance same, reason different/added	Stance same, reason different/added
15	2
Did not change both	Did not change both
299	48
Other ('I don't know' answers)	
2	
Sum: 333	Sum: 50
Total: 383 participants	

SNU Survey

Respondents aware beforehand	Respondents first time hearing
Changed both stance and reason	Changed both stance and reason
12 - Provided explanations: 9 Positive to negative: 7 Negative to positive: 2 - Did not provide explanations: 3 Positive to negative: 2 Negative to positive: 1	0
Stance same, reason different/added	Stance same, reason different/added
6	2
Did not change both	Did not change both
173	16
Sum: 191	Sum: 18
Total: 209 participants	

Continuing with the SNU sample, when asked about why there was strong opposition in the Korean society, seven participants wrote their opinions. The category with the most number of corresponding responses was 'confusion and lack of information due to provocative media.' Other themes included 'worsening of Korea's patriarchal culture,' 'public safety concerns,' 'negative precedents from abroad,' 'Korea as a non-colonial country with no historical responsibility' and 'neo-feminist young women as instigators of anti-refugee opinions online.' To note, the last category appeared even before the corresponding participant was specifically asked the next question which was why young people in their 20s, especially women, were most against receiving them. Thirteen respondents provided written answers to that very question. The theme that had the most corresponding responses was 'negative attitudes toward Islam and Muslim men regarding attitudes toward women' then followed by 'concern for security.' Other themes included 'negative bias formed by actual cases in SNS,' 'coinciding period with the Me Too Movement,' 'Korean males in their 40s rather perceived as being most anti-refugee,' 'lack of knowledge and interest,' 'change perceived as consuming,' 'negative precedents from abroad,' 'refugees as shunned figures' and 'the need for a common yet weak target.'

When asked about opinions after reading about Korea's different rankings, thirty participants provided written answers. Similar to the Embrain sample, the category with the highest number of corresponding responses was 'preference of helping from afar.' For example, one participant wrote "...Feeling sympathy for refugees' difficulties and donating in hopes of improving their situation is greatly different from inviting them to my living

space and embracing them as a community member." This category was then followed by 'superficial generosity,' 'difference between individual and national attitudes' and 'Korea's unpreparedness.' Other themes included 'paying off responsibility,' 'many donations made to humanitarian agencies,' 'public service announcement effect,' 'convenience of making donations,' 'high awareness in Korea,' 'education of Korea as a homogeneous country,' 'questionable reasons for applying for asylum,' 'short history of multiculturalism and lack of national discussions,' 'critique of Korea's refugee recognition rate,' 'rank vs. amount,' 'public opinion online vs. offline,' 'government's passive stance due to North Korean refugees' and 'exclusion of North Korean defectors in refugee statistics.' Throughout the content analysis process, I made sure to categorize written answers multiple times and without bias by using low-inference descriptors.

VI. Discussion

6.1 Comparison and Interpretation

In both samples, the majority of participants were females in between 25 and 28 years of age who lived in Seoul or Gyeonggi-do the longest, have no religion, are politically moderate, have either middle income or moderate satisfaction with their standard of living, have a bachelor's degree including prospective graduates, and are students.

The option 'I think the Yemeni asylum seekers came to Jeju Island via illegal routes' was among the top three for both samples even though more people (29.5%) in the Embrain sample chose the option than in the SNU sample (17.3%). SNU students were more positive about receiving the Yemeni asylum seekers than participants in the Embrain sample. In the third question, for example, more leaned on the opposing side in the Embrain sample (72.0%) than in the SNU sample (42.1%). Yet, in both samples, the top three reasons for opposing/approving were identical. This may mean that those who oppose commonly see refugees from a security and governmental capacity point of view while those who approve consider humanitarian, historical and responsibility aspects. Moreover, in both samples, participants' interest did not extend to information-seeking behavior and were not as willing to discuss the issue with another person with a different opinion from theirs which indicates a lack of deliberation behind opinion formations.

More people in both samples chose 'people expecting there to be more personal/societal costs than benefits from receiving refugees' than 'Yemen being a Muslim country and skepticism toward Islam' as their main

reason for why they think there was large opposition in the Korean society which is in line with scholars who indicate that neoliberalism and a cost-benefit frame of mind play a strong role in anti-refugee sentiment, especially among the young. Regarding why women in their 20s were most against receiving the Yemeni asylum seekers, participants in both samples agreed that anxieties felt in the Korean society were projected onto the refugees amid the Me Too Movement. Chi-square tests further demonstrate that although more females chose that option than males there were more males who also selected than males who did not in the Embrain sample.

In both samples, the majority indicated that they did not expect private donation levels to the U.N. to be that high and preferred donations be made for domestic needs. The majority also felt 'anxiety' toward refugees currently living in Korea. Meanwhile regarding what the government's position should be from now on, the results were similar to those seen in the third question; the majority of respondents in the Embrain sample chose amending the national refugee law and making border control as well as asylum application review processes stricter while the majority of participants in the SNU sample selected sharing the minimum responsibility in receiving refugees as a member of the international society.

A key finding in the content analysis was that around 90% of participants did not change their initial stances and reasons despite the passage of time and likely contact with new viewpoints. This may mean that initial stances and reasons are sticky and hard to change. Nonetheless, among the minority who did alter their opinions, more participants in the Embrain sample moved from a negative to a more positive one meanwhile

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more people moved from positive to negative stances in the SNU sample. Another crucial observation was that participants seemed to have inaccurate understandings of who refugees are, why they leave their home country, how the Yemeni asylum seekers arrived at Jeju Island, and Korea's current system and standing in refugee recognition. Statements expressing doubt of their legality based on the observation that the majority were young males (which itself alone cannot be a signifier of 'fakeness') and that they were beneficiaries of unqualified monetary assistance were not far from those expressed by the general public in 2018 (Kim, "Rumors," 2018). Moreover, in the Embrain sample, respondents seemed to use 'strict screening processes' in their arguments incoherently, some interpreting it negatively and others positively. Lack of awareness ties back to how the majority in both samples did not search for information despite being interested.

It is also worth noticing that many respondents from both samples wrote answers that fall under the category 'preference of helping from afar.' This not only demonstrates that many young people in Korea place distance between themselves and refugees from abroad but this also closely mirrors the government's current position. Nonetheless, whether helping from afar can be justifiable through donations – an amount that is insufficient for protecting increasing numbers of forcibly displaced worldwide (and thereby counter to the goal of refugee protection promised to the international community) – is debatable. At the time of drafting my questionnaire, I left out this category as a response option because I thought it could merely be a paraphrase of the given question. However, I deem it would be beneficial to include it as a separate response option for future research.

Lastly, the results in my content analysis are in dialogue with previous research, especially with a study conducted by Jeong-Woo Koo, Byeong-Eun Cheong and Francisco O. Ramirez titled "Who Thinks and Behaves According to Human Rights?: Evidence from the Korean National Human Rights Survey." In their research, they conducted face-to-face interviews with a nationally representative and randomly chosen sample of 1,500 participants and fielded a comprehensive survey (2015, 64). By differentiating awareness, endorsement, and engagement, they found that "younger people are much more likely to endorse human rights, *without* being more aware or more engaged with human rights" (80; emphasis added). This is similar to how 'preference of helping from afar' was the top option among those who wrote their own answers in both of my samples.

6.2 Evaluation and Limitations

Before moving onto the conclusion, I reflect on possible criticisms and limitations to my research. First, some may say that asking participants about an occurrence that happened in the past could be faulty since it relies on participants' memory. However, I believe that asking about the Yemeni asylum seekers was better than asking about a more recent yet less salient refugee-related topic, especially given the unprecedented nature of the occurrence in the Korean context where such issues are rarely discussed.

Another point of commentary could be that the results may be interpreted differently. In the results section, I described how overall SNU participants showed relatively more positive attitudes than Embrain

participants. However, some may claim that respondents in both samples fall under a common umbrella of 'passive/shy opposition.' Critics could indicate that the majority of participants opposed/approved as long as a certain condition was met. They could also point to how similar themes emerged in both samples such as the criminalization of refugees, security or public safety concerns, negativity toward Islam and Muslim men, and preference of helping from afar which may mean that SNU participants hold onto similar prejudices yet seem more positive because they express their opinions in more nuanced terms. Nonetheless, I tried to reduce such social desirability bias by assuring that participants' anonymity and responses will be kept confidential. I thus consider placing participants under one category as being more subjective than relying on the statistical results even though I agree that there was no major distinction in SNU participants' relative positivity.

Quantitative researchers may also wonder how I ensured validity and reliability. Since my research is exploratory and qualitative in its nature of inquiry I followed Yvonna S. Lincoln and Egon G. Guba's criteria for trustworthiness (1985). I demonstrated credibility (i.e. alternative to internal validity) via sources triangulation of my survey results, previous polls and previous literature/reports. Additionally, because I used surveys as my main method, I was able to ensure both transferability by describing in detail the context, procedure and findings as well as external validity by showing the statistical confidence limits. I was not able to conduct the recommended inquiry audit for dependability (i.e. alternative to reliability) and confirmability (i.e. alternative to objectivity). However, I ensured auditability by transparently explaining research processes such as in Appendix 4.

A major limitation was the low response rates. In the Embrain sample, 424 completed the survey when 3,938 questionnaire emails were sent. In the SNU sample, 368 completed the survey when 5,474 were sent. The response rate was 10.77% in the Embrain sample and 6.72% in the SNU sample. Results may thus be less representative than desired. The biggest limitation is that the Embrain sample does not represent Korean youth. The ideal sample would have been young people in their 20s randomly chosen from the national population. However, given the limited access to resources, I instead selected from a panel in a polling agency.

Lastly, it is crucial to note that the survey was conducted during the Coronavirus pandemic. This is not a limitation per se since the goal of a survey is to capture participants' opinions at a particular point in time yet I remind the reader of the particular context in which my research took place. Respondents may have shown more guarded attitudes due to a heightened sense of uncertainty. Nonetheless, I believe that since the survey asked participants about an event that has already happened in the past pandemic-related anxiety/fear might not have been as influential as much.

6.3 Significance and Reflections

Why my research is significant can be explained by five reasons. First, I was able to fill a gap within the literature; from 2018 to December 1st, 2020, there are no English and Korean academic journal articles that centrally address Korean youth attitudes specifically toward this issue to the best of my knowledge. Second, my results differ from what was considered

an indisputable fact at the time. Namely, during that time, there was a general consensus that young people in Korea were most against receiving them either because they worried over possible job competition with the Yemeni asylum seekers, the majority of whom were young males or because of Islamophobia. However, my results contradict the former point since participants in my survey did not choose job competition as a major reason for opposing. Third, I was able to present both quantitative and qualitative data. Fourth, I made sure participants had the opportunity to freely express their opinions by having 'other' options and an open-ended question. In doing so, I was able to go beyond numeric data. Fifth, I was able to demonstrate the importance of continuing discussions on this issue by conducting a follow-up survey, and correspondingly, show that informed deliberation is crucial for opinion-formation and policy-making.

In hindsight, soon after the arrival of Yemeni asylum seekers at Jeju Island, the Korean public expressed fear not only due to its unprecedented nature but also because of lack of information. Even today, Koreans show low levels of multicultural acceptance even though crime rates committed by foreigners have declined for two years in a row (Han 2019). Surveys conducted at the time showed that the vast majority opposed receiving them. However, without balanced and constructive debates, negative polling results only cemented people's initial response. Due to public pressure as seen by the petition bill, the government hastily agreed to make amendments to the national refugee law, one of which is creating exceptions to the non-refoulement principle. However, it simultaneously maintained an image of a strong supporter of refugees in the international

arena by, for instance, partaking in the Global Refugee Forum.

Examining Koreans' refugee attitudes is important because it is closely tied to the public's perceptions toward immigrants whose numbers will most likely rise in the near future. Korea is currently facing severe low birth rates, an aging population and labor shortage. Korean Immigration Service Commissioner Gyu-geun Cha recently stated that "years of government efforts to reverse [this] trend have been futile leaving the country with the difficult choice of [either] enduring the shock of a rapid decrease in the population or turning to immigration" (M. Jung 2020b). Even without new immigration into the country, demographics are increasingly changing. Korea "is expected to report its first annual population decline" in 2020 (M. Jung 2020a). Meanwhile "the proportion of babies born to multicultural families out of all childbirths in South Korea reached an all-time high in 2019 due to the country's low birthrate" (Yonhap News 2020c). Moreover, "some project that in 2035 Korea will need almost 5 million additional immigrants to counter the fall in the working population" (S. Kim 2020).

There are also other closely related topics that could rise above the surface more and more such as multiculturalism, North Korean refugees, overseas Koreans, and low-income laborers from abroad. At the same time, there are increasing calls for Korea to share more responsibility and implement societal changes as it becomes more multicultural and because it is an OECD member with increasing economic/political power. Unfortunately, as of April 2020, Korea's refugee recognition rate (3.6%) is still far below the OECD average (24.8%) and the refugee protection rate is

only 11.4% (Kang and Park 2020).

Since immigration into Korea began with democratization in 1987, the government has continuously expanded immigration policies such as bringing in marriage migrants, mostly from Southeast Asia. More recently, the government decided to allow seasonal agricultural workers to stay longer, introduce a new visa for highly educated foreign workers and offer incentives to foreign residents in less populous regions (Kim 2019; Kang 2019). However, more profound and long-term transformations are needed to ensure processes are less emotionally driven and to transition into a more substantive democracy. Phil Robertson, the deputy Asia director at Human Rights Watch, underscores that "South Korea's democracy will remain incomplete until the government acts to end discrimination and revoke laws that violate basic rights" (Human Rights Watch 2018). By showing the tip of an iceberg, this study thus sought to expose worrisome opinion-formation and policy-making processes underneath people's/government's knee-jerk reactions that could act as a roadblock for addressing germane topics and Korea's democratic advancement.

Most importantly, by making a stark contrast between young adults in South Korea and in other countries, especially the U.S. and Europe, it asks for the Korean youth to hold up a mirror. In the U.S., millennials are "less likely to see large numbers of immigrants and refugees coming into the U.S. as a critical threat [than Gen Xers and Boomers]" (Berbic and Kafura 2018). Similarly, 75% of American millennials say that "immigrants strengthen rather than burden the U.S." compared to "62% of Gen Xers, 52% of Baby Boomers and 44% in the Silent Generation" (Jones 2019).

Some may say that a comparison of these two very different regions is meaningless. However, young people in East Asia and the Pacific are least approving of including refugees in the national workforce compared to millennials not only in Europe and North America but also in Latin America, the Middle East, North Africa, South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa (WEF 2017, 23). Moreover, according to a more recent survey conducted by Hankook Research in December 2019, 56.6% of Gen Z – a generation following millennials – respondents agreed with the statement 'refugees should not be accepted because they pose a threat to Koreans' (Ahn 2020).

The results of my survey similarly indicate that South Korean youth demonstrate unenthusiastic attitudes toward refugees. Even though SNU students demonstrated relatively more positive attitudes it was difficult to conclude that there was a major distinction between them and other young adults based on content analysis and results such as how the majority in both samples preferred donations to be made for domestic causes when they were asked why Korea's refugee recognition rates were low while private donation levels to the U.N. Refugee Agency were high.

Based on these reflections, this paper poses several questions for further reflection. "South Korea became an officially 'multicultural' nation when its government declared national Together Day on May 20, 2007" (N. Kim 2016, 115). But does our level of awareness match the fact that Korea is becoming more multicultural/ethnic? This is an important question, especially having in mind that around 50% of the Korean public is still unfamiliar with the terms 'refugee' and 'persons granted humanitarian status' (Jang 2020). In addition, according to a survey, only 26% of participants

were aware of the situation in Yemen compared to 68% who responded that they were not much aware of what was happening in Yemen (2018). Meanwhile according to a survey of 310 foreign residents conducted by the National Human Rights Commission of Korea, "68.4 percent of the respondents said they had experienced racial discrimination in South Korean society" (Ock 2020).

Furthermore, echoing discussions surrounding the Asian values debate, universalism versus relativism, and Amitav Acharya's explanation of differences between the East and West regarding human security, another important question to ask would be whether anti-foreigner sentiment should be left untouched and implicitly acknowledged as Korea's own characteristic. If so, will the international community be as generous as we are to ourselves amid calls for more burden-sharing? With worsening global warming, a climate crisis could displace 1.2 billion people by 2050 which could "have huge social and political impacts, not just in the developing world, but also in the developed" (Henley 2020). In fact, "almost 40 percent of Asia's 4 billion people live within 45 miles of coastline [and] in China alone, 23 million people are directly at risk of displacement due to sea level rise" (Le, Tunger, and Gold 2020).

By raising these questions and refusing to belittle problematic opinion-formation/policy-making processes and youth attitudes in Korea, this paper raised them above the surface as areas of deep concern.

VII. Conclusion

In this paper, I sought to find answers to my two research questions: a) why were Korean youth most against receiving the Yemeni asylum seekers who arrived at Jeju Island in 2018? and b) how similar or different are the opinions of SNU students from other twenty-year-olds in Korea? By conducting a critical review of previous literature, I was able to identify five major themes: securitization, neoliberalism, femonationalism, socio-cultural psychology, and democracy. These themes acted as possible answers for the questions and served as a reference point for my survey questionnaire. Nonetheless, it was difficult to find journal articles that specifically addressed Korean youth attitudes toward the Yemeni asylum seekers. I also could not obtain information on how SNU students thought about the issue. By conducting survey research, I was able to fill this void.

Major findings of my survey research were the following: 1) overall SNU students showed relatively more positive attitudes but with no major difference, 2) the most commonly selected reasons behind each opposing/approving stance were identical in both samples; those who oppose commonly saw refugees from a security and lack of governmental capacity point of view while those who approve commonly considered humanitarian reasons, Korea's own difficult history as well as Korea's ability/responsibility to protect, 3) the majority of participants neither extended their interests to information-seeking behavior nor showed willingness to discuss with another person with a different opinion, 4) most respondents said that there was large opposition in the Korean society because people expected there to be more personal/societal costs than benefits, 5) most also agreed that young

people, especially women in their 20s, opposed more because their anxieties were projected onto the asylum seekers, 6) the majority in both samples also indicated that they did not expect private donation levels to the U.N. Refugee Agency to be that high and preferred donations be made for domestic causes, 7) most participants felt anxiety toward refugees living in Korea, and 8) the majority of respondents' initial stance and their respective reasons have not changed since 2018.

By interpreting the results of my research via statistical as well as content analyses and by connecting them with key literature and theories, I was able to accomplish my research objectives which were the following: a) go beyond numbers of how many oppose/approve and find reasons behind each stance, b) investigate the opinions of SNU students and compare with other Korean youth, and c) continue discussions on this issue through a follow-up survey, and in doing so, demonstrate that informed deliberation is crucial for public opinion formation and policy-making. One must keep in mind, however, that the Embrain sample only represents the attitudes of young people who are part of the agency, not Korean youth. I also remind that response rates were low for both samples.

Discussions about refugees will continue to rise in South Korea. It is no longer a faraway issue. In fact, the cumulative number of asylum applications filed in Korea beginning from 1994 to August 2020 topped 70,000 for the first time (Yonhap News 2020a). Therefore, I hope future research continues to address refugee issues in Korea. Some ideas for future research include fielding a more large-scale study of multiple universities in Korea. It would also be interesting to compare millennials with younger

generations because, according to a survey conducted by the Korean Women's Development Institute, "the level of acceptance toward immigrants among Korean adults has decreased slightly compared with 2015 [but] the reverse is true for middle and high school students" (Park 2019).

There have also been reports that a revision to the Multicultural Families Support Act has been proposed to the National Assembly in efforts to include refugees and North Korean refugees as well as to ban hate speech toward individuals of a different race, country or culture (D. Jung 2020b; Lee 2020). Hence, it would be informative to ask the public about this proposal, similar calls for change such as the anti-discrimination law, and the amendments to the national refugee law announced by the Ministry of Justice. Another possibility would be to conduct a survey to a more nationally representative population after solving areas of improvement described in this pilot study. Lastly, it would be eye-opening to conduct Fishkin's deliberative polling to compare informed and uninformed audiences.

To conclude, during the Korean War "Koreans...were the beneficiaries of the UN's *first* aid to refugees" (Hwang 2018; emphasis added). The topic of refugees is not and will likely continue not to be a faraway issue for South Korea. Hence opposition toward the arrival of Yemeni asylum seekers at Jeju Island in 2018 urges a reassessment of not only the government's position but also the public's level of awareness, especially that of the youth who supposedly have more exposure to factual information and values of multiculturalism. The overall lack of enthusiasm and low levels of deliberation behind opinion-formation found among the majority of participants of this survey research underline that very necessity.

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Appendices

Appendix 1. Survey Questionnaire (English)

1) In 2018, around 500 Yemenis came to Jeju Island to apply for asylum. From which medium did you first hear about this occurrence?
❍ Social media (ex. YouTube, Facebook, Twitter)
❍ People nearby
❍ Newscast / news articles
❍ This survey
❍ Other: _____
[options 1~3 presented in random order]

2) Select all the choices that are closest to your opinion.
❍ I think the Yemeni asylum seekers who arrived at Jeju Island came to Korea in order to do economic activities.
❍ I think the Yemeni asylum seekers who arrived at Jeju Island came to Korea in order to escape from war.
❍ I think around 500 Yemeni asylum seekers came to Jeju Island all at once.
❍ I think around 500 Yemeni asylum seekers came to Jeju Island over various months.
❍ I think the Yemeni asylum seekers came to Jeju Island via illegal routes.
❍ I think the Yemeni asylum seekers came to Jeju Island via legal routes.

3) What was your stance on receiving them when you first heard about the occurrence? (Participants who first heard about the occurrence through this survey were instead asked 'What is your stance on receiving the Yemeni asylum seekers who arrived at Jeju Island?')
❍ Oppose greatly
❍ Oppose
❍ Oppose but there should be an opportunity for an asylum seeker's application to be reviewed
❍ Approve but there should be strict screening processes
❍ Approve
❍ Approve greatly
[options presented in opposite order as well]

4a) Choose 3 reasons why you oppose.
- ⭕ Concern over national security problems and possibility of terrorism
- ⭕ Worry over public safety
- ⭕ Job competition with nationals
- ⭕ Social welfare competition with nationals
- ⭕ Government and laws unready to receive refugees
- ⭕ Lack of understanding about foreigners in Korea because it is not a multiethnic country
- ⭕ Cultural and religious differences
- ⭕ Obstacle to social integration
- ⭕ Asylum applications could rise in the future
- ⭕ Untruthful application reasons and status
- ⭕ Other: _____

[options except 'other' presented in random order]

4b) Choose 3 reasons why you approve.
- ⭕ Korea's difficult past such as the Korean War and establishment of a provisional government during which we received help from other countries
- ⭕ The need to help refugees from a humanitarian perspective
- ⭕ Economic help gained by adding foreign labor force in sectors nationals avoid
- ⭕ Improvement to Korea's low birth rates and aging population
- ⭕ Korea's legal and economic responsibility as signatory of the Convention to the Status of Refugees and as OECD member with the capacity to receive refugees
- ⭕ Korea as a multicultural society that brings in diverse people and cultures
- ⭕ Feasibility of receiving refugees in a similar way to accepting overseas Koreans, marriage migrants and North Korean refugees
- ⭕ Increase diversity and tolerance in our society
- ⭕ Usefulness to prepare and experience beforehand since the number of refugees will continue increasing because of globalization
- ⭕ Feasibility of helping refugees who arrived in our country in a similar way to sending foreign aid to other countries
- ⭕ Other: _____

[options except 'other' presented in random order]

5) If your stance on accepting Yemeni asylum seekers who arrived at Jeju Island in 2018 has changed when comparing the first time you heard the news and today (ex. from 'highly approve' to 'highly oppose' or from 'highly oppose' to 'oppose but there should be an opportunity for an asylum seeker's application to be reviewed') then freely explain how and why. If your stance is the same yet your reason(s) why changed then also explain below. If both your stance and reason(s) did not change then write 'no changes.' (Participants who first heard about the occurrence by taking this survey were instead asked 'Please freely write below if you have any additional opinions.')

6) Select what best applies to you. (Duration: from the first time you heard about the occurrence to now). (Participants who heard about the occurrence for the first time were instead asked 'Select what best applies to you.')
❍ I was not as interested in the Yemeni refugees at Jeju Island so I did not search for related information.
❍ I was interested in the Yemeni refugees at Jeju Island but I did not search for related information.
❍ I was interested in the Yemeni refugees at Jeju Island so I searched for related information.
❍ I was highly interested in Yemeni refugees at Jeju Island so I actively searched for related information.
[options presented in opposite order as well]

7) Select what applies to you.
❍ I am not as willing to actively discuss about Yemeni refugees at Jeju Island with another person who has a different opinion than me.
❍ I am much willing to actively discuss about Yemeni refugees at Jeju Island with another person who has a different opinion than me.
[options presented in random order]

8) When Yemeni asylum seekers arrived at Jeju Island in 2018 there was opposition from the public with more than 714,000 people signing a petition

bill posted on the government's official website that opposes receiving refugees and requests the refugee law to be amended. Select all the reasons you think explains why there was such large opposition in our society.

◯ Yemen being a Muslim country and skepticism toward Islam.

◯ People expecting there to be more personal/societal costs than benefits from receiving refugees.

◯ Difference from usual portrayals of refugees (ex. usage of cell phones, completion of higher education, etc.)

◯ Silenced voices of those who are more neutral or express approval toward receiving refugees

◯ Other: _____

[options except 'other' presented in random order]

9) When Yemeni asylum seekers arrived at Jeju Island in 2018 various public opinion survey results showed that people in their 20s, especially women, were most against receiving refugees compared to other age groups. Select all that are close to your thoughts on why that was the case.

◯ Concern that job competition could become worse

◯ International news obtained mostly from Western media which tend to show negative images of Muslims (ex. 9/11)

◯ Active usage of social media and exposure to fake/biased news from which prejudice can be created

◯ Anxieties felt in our society projected onto refugees (ex. the Me Too Movement in Korea started toward the beginning of 2018 while the majority of Yemeni refugees who arrived at Jeju Island were young men)

◯ Other: _____

[options except 'other' presented in random order]

10) In 2018, South Korea ranked 35th out of 37 OECD countries in refugee recognition rates. Meanwhile, that same year, Korea ranked 2nd in the world in regards to private ‒ neither governmental nor business ‒ contributions to the U.N. Refugee Agency. Select all that are closest to your opinion.

◯ Many people in our country approve receiving refugees but the government opposes

◯ Korea's refugee recognition rate may seem low in comparison to other OECD countries but when compared to other countries in the world it could be higher

○ Many people support and help refugees even though they do not actively express their opinions
○ I did not expect donation levels to be that high and it would rather be better for donations to be made for domestic needs
○ Other: _____
[options except 'other' presented in random order]

11) How do you feel about refugees who are currently living with us in Korea?
○ Irritation
○ Anxiety
○ Sympathy
○ Hospitality
○ Disinterest
[options presented in opposite order as well]

12) What should be the government's position in regards to refugees from now on?
○ Actively receive refugees in consideration of increasing numbers of refugees worldwide
○ Share the minimum responsibility needed in receiving refugees as a member of the international society
○ Amend the national refugee law and make border control as well as asylum application review processes stricter
○ Withdraw from the international refugee treaty and fully oppose receiving refugees
[options presented in random order]

13) What is your biological sex?
○ Male
○ Female

14) What is your age? _____

15) Where did you live the longest?

○ Seoul   ○ Incheon   ○ Chungbuk
○ Abroad   ○ Daejeon   ○ Sejong
○ Gyeonggi   ○ Chungnam   ○ Gangwon

❍ Busan	❍ Gyeongnam	❍ Jeonnam
❍ Ulsan	❍ Gyeongbuk	❍ Jeonbuk
❍ Daegu	❍ Gwangju	❍ Jeju

16) What is your religion?
❍ Protestanism
❍ Catholicism
❍ Buddhism
❍ None
❍ Other: _____
[options 1~3 presented in random order]

17) What is your political ideology?
❍ Conservative
❍ Moderate
❍ Liberal
❍ Do not know or none
[options except 'do not know or none' presented in opposite order]

- For Embrain:
18) What is your average monthly household income? If you are a single household then calculate the average monthly personal income.
❍ Less than 1 million won
❍ Equal to or more than 1 million won and less than 3 million won
❍ Equal to or more than 3 million won and less than 5 million won
❍ Equal to or more than 5 million won and less than 7 million won
❍ More than 7 million won

19) How satisfied are you with your standard of living?
❍ Very satisfied
❍ Satisfied
❍ Dissatisfied
❍ Very dissatisfied
[options presented in opposite order as well]

20) What is the highest level of education you have completed?
❍ High school diploma or less

○ Bachelor's degree (prospective graduates included)
○ Master's degree (prospective graduates included)

21) In which sector do you work?

○ Office occupations
○ Service occupations
○ Specialty or professional occupations
○ Student (end survey)
○ Homemaker (end survey)

○ Production occupations
○ Farming, forestry, livestock, fishing occupations
○ Self-employed
○ Unemployed (end survey)
○ Other: _____

22) What is your employment status?

○ Regular employee
○ Temporary employee
○ Dayworker

○ Owner or self-employed
○ Other: _____

23) Do you currently have more than one job?
○ Yes
○ No

- **For SNU:**
18) How would you rank your current standard of living?
○ High
○ Medium
○ Low
[options presented in opposite order as well]

19) What is the highest level of education you have completed?
○ High school diploma or less
○ Bachelor's degree (prospective graduates included)
○ Master's degree (prospective graduates included)

20) Do you currently have a job outside of school?
○ Yes
○ No (end survey)

21) In which sector do you work?

❍ Office occupations
❍ Service occupations
❍ Specialty or professional occupations
❍ Homemaker (end survey)

❍ Production occupations
❍ Farming, forestry, livestock, fishing occupations
❍ Self-employed
❍ Other: _____

22) What is your employment status?

❍ Regular employee
❍ Temporary employee
❍ Dayworker

❍ Owner or self-employed
❍ Other: _____

23) Starbucks gift cards (5,000 won each) will be sent to 50 participants on a first-come-first-served basis. If you would like to receive one write your e-mail below. If you do not want one you do not have to write your email.

_____

(Note: Embrain survey respondents were not separately given gift cards because they are already remunerated for participating in polls by the agency itself.)

Appendix 2. Original Survey Questionnaire (Korean)

1. 2018년에 500여명의 예멘인이 제주도에 도착하여 난민 지위를 신청했
   다. 이 소식을 처음으로 알게 된 매체를 다음 중 고르시오.
   ○ 소셜 미디어 (예: 유튜브, 페이스북, 트위터 등)
   ○ 주변 사람들
   ○ 뉴스 방송/기사
   ○ 본 설문지
   ○ 기타: _____
   ('본 설문지'와 '기타' 이외의 선택사항들 랜덤하게 배열)

2. 다음 중 본인의 생각과 가장 가까운 문장을 모두 고르시오.
   ○ 제주도에 왔던 예멘 난민은 한국에서 경제활동을 하기 위해 왔다고
     생각한다.
   ○ 제주도에 왔던 예멘 난민은 전쟁을 피하기 위해 한국에 왔다고 생각
     한다.
   ○ 500여명의 예멘 난민이 제주도에 한꺼번에 왔다고 생각한다.
   ○ 500여명의 예멘 난민이 제주도에 몇 달에 걸쳐 왔다고 생각한다.
   ○ 제주도에 왔던 예멘 난민은 불법적인 경로로 왔다고 생각한다.
   ○ 제주도에 왔던 예멘 난민은 합법적인 경로로 왔다고 생각한다.

3.

1번 질문에 '본 설문지' *이외의* 옵션을 고른 참여자의 경우	1번 질문에 '본 설문지' 옵션을 고른 참여자의 경우
처음 소식을 들었을 때, 그들의 수용에 대한 본인의 입장이 무엇이었는지 다음 중 고르시오.	제주도에 도착했던 예멘 난민 수용에 대한 본인의 입장이 무엇인지 다음 중 고르시오.
○ 매우 반대한다	○ 매우 반대한다
○ 반대한다	○ 반대한다
○ 반대하지만 난민 신청자의 심사 기회는 주어져야 한다고 생각한다	○ 반대하지만 난민 신청자의 심사 기회는 주어져야 한다고 생각한다
○ 찬성하지만 엄격한 난민 심사 절	○ 찬성하지만 엄격한 난민 심사 절

차가 있어야 한다고 생각한다 ○ 찬성한다 ○ 매우 찬성한다	차가 있어야 한다고 생각한다 ○ 찬성한다 ○ 매우 찬성한다

<div align="center">(선택사항들 반대 순서로도 배열)</div>

4.

3번 질문에 응답자가 반대하는 쪽을 선택했을 경우	3번 질문에 응답자가 찬성하는 쪽을 선택했을 경우
반대하는 이유 3가지를 다음 중 고르시오.	찬성하는 이유 3가지를 다음 중 고르시오.
○ 국가 안보 문제 및 테러 가능성이 우려되기 때문에 ○ 치안이 우려되기 때문에 ○ 우리나라 사람과 일자리 경쟁을 할 것 같기 때문에 ○ 우리나라 사람과 사회복지 경쟁을 할 것 같기 때문에 ○ 우리나라 정부나 법이 아직 난민을 받기에 충분히 준비되어 있지 않기 때문에 ○ 우리사회가 다민족 국가가 아닌 만큼 이민족에 대한 이해가 충분하지 않기 때문에 ○ 문화적 및 종교적 차이점 때문에 ○ 사회통합을 저해할 수 있기 때문에 ○ 받아들이면 미래에 난민 신청 수가 증가할 것 같기 때문에 ○ 난민 신청 사유 및 지위가 거짓된 것 같기 때문에 ○ 기타: _____	○ 우리나라도 한국 전쟁 때, 임시 정부 수립 때 등 다른 국가의 도움을 받았던 어려운 시절이 있었기 때문에 ○ 인도주의적인 차원에서 난민을 도와줘야 하기 때문에 ○ 우리나라 사람들이 꺼리는 분야에서 노동력을 보완하여 경제에 도움이 될 것 같기 때문에 ○ 우리나라 저출산/고령화 문제를 완화시킬 수 있을 것 같기 때문에 ○ 한국이 국제 난민 협약 가입국으로서 그리고 OECD 회원국으로서 난민을 수용할 능력을 갖추었고 그러한 법적, 경제적 책무가 있기 때문에 ○ 우리나라가 여러 나라의 사람/문화를 받아들이는 국제적인 사회이기 때문에 ○ 재외동포, 결혼 이민자, 북한 이탈 주민 등과 비슷한 차원에서 난민을 수용할 수 있다고 생각하기 때문에 ○ 우리 사회의 다양성/포용성을 증가시킬 수 있기 때문에

	○ 세계화로 인해 난민 신청 수는 계속 증가할 것이며 미리 경험/대비하는 것이 좋기 때문에
	○ 해외 원조로 다른 나라 사람을 돕듯이 우리나라 영토에 도착한 난민도 같은 차원에서 지원할 수 있다고 생각하기 때문에
	○ 기타: _____

('기타'를 뺀 나머지 선택사항들 랜덤하게 배열)

5.

1번 질문에 '본 설문지' *이외의* 옵션을 고른 참여자의 경우	1번 질문에 '본 설문지' 옵션을 고른 참여자의 경우
처음 소식을 들었을 때와 지금을 비교했을 때, 2018년 제주도 예멘 난민의 수용에 대한 본인의 입장이 바뀌었다면 (예: '매우 찬성'에서 '매우 반대' 또는 '매우 반대'에서 '반대하지만 난민 신청자의 심사 기회는 주어져야 한다고 생각한다'로), 어떻게 바뀌었고 그 이유가 무엇인지 자유로이 서술하시오. 만약 입장 변화는 없지만 해당 이유가 바뀌었을 경우, 그 또한 서술하시오. (입장과 이유 모두 변화가 없을 시 '변화 없음' 기입). _____	위 질문 문항 이외의 추가 의견이 있다면 아래 자유로이 서술하시오. _____

6.

1번 질문에 '본 설문지' *이외의* 옵션을 고른 참여자의 경우	1번 질문에 '본 설문지' 옵션을 고른 참여자의 경우
본인에게 해당되는 사항을 고르시오. (기간: 처음 소식을 들었을 때부터 지금까지).	본인에게 해당되는 사항을 고르시오.
○ 제주도 예멘 난민에 대해 관심이 낮아서 관련 정보를 찾지 않았다. ○ 제주도 예멘 난민에 대해 관심은 있지만 관련 정보를 찾지 않았다. ○ 제주도 예멘 난민에 대해 관심이 있어서 관련 정보를 찾아보았다. ○ 제주도 예멘 난민에 대해 관심이 많아서 관련 정보를 적극적으로 찾아보았다.	○ 제주도 예멘 난민에 대해 관심이 낮아서 관련 정보를 찾지 않을 것 같다. ○ 제주도 예멘 난민에 대해 관심은 있지만 관련 정보를 찾지 않을 것 같다. ○ 제주도 예멘 난민에 대해 관심이 있어서 관련 정보를 찾을 것 같다. ○ 제주도 예멘 난민에 대해 관심이 많아서 관련 정보를 적극적으로 찾을 것 같다.

(선택사항들 반대 순서로도 배열)

7. 다음 중 본인에게 해당되는 사항을 고르시오.
○ 2018년 제주도 예멘 난민에 대해 나와 다른 의견을 갖은 사람과 적극적으로 토론할 의향이 적다.
○ 2018년 제주도 예멘 난민에 대해 나와 다른 의견을 갖은 사람과 적극적으로 토론할 의향이 많다.

(선택사항들 랜덤하게 배열)

8. 2018년, 예멘 난민이 제주도에 도착했을 당시 난민 수용을 반대하고 국내 난민법이 개정되길 요청하는 청와대 국민청원에 714,000명 이상이 서명했고 반대 여론이 컸다. 우리 사회에서 반대 여론이 컸던 주된 이유가 무엇이라고 생각하는지 모두 고르시오.
○ 예멘이 주 이슬람 국가라는 점과 이슬람 종교를 향한 회의적인 시선 때문에

○ 난민을 수용함으로서 이익을 얻기보다는 개인적/사회적 피해가 더 클
   것 같아서
○ 흔히 생각하는 난민의 모습과 달라서 (예: 핸드폰 사용, 고등교육 수
   료 등)
○ 난민 수용에 대해서 중도적인 입장이거나 찬성하는 사람들의 목소리
   가 묻혀서
○ 기타: _____
('기타'를 뺀 나머지 선택사항들 랜덤하게 배열)

9. 2018년, 예멘 난민이 제주도에 도착했을 당시 여러 여론조사 결과에
의하면 전 연령층 중 20대 특히 20대 여성이 난민 수용을 가장 반대한
것으로 나타났다. 그 이유가 무엇이라고 생각하는지 본인의 생각과 가장
가까운 문장을 모두 고르시오.
○ 취업 경쟁이 더 심화될 우려를 하기 때문에
○ 국제뉴스를 주로 서구 언론을 통해 얻으며 서구 언론이 보도하는 이
   슬람교도의 모습이 부정적이기 (예: 9/11 테러 등) 때문에
○ 소셜 미디어를 많이 활용하는 연령층으로서 가짜/편향된 뉴스에 많이
   노출되어 난민에 대한 부정적인 편견이 생겼을 것 같기 때문에
○ 우리사회에서 느끼는 불안함이 난민에게 투영되었기 때문에 (예: 한
   국에서 미투운동/성폭행 및 성희롱을 고발하는 운동이 2018년 초에
   시작되었는데 그 해 제주도에 도착했던 예멘 난민 대다수가 젊은 남
   성이었음)
○ 기타:

   _____
('기타'를 뺀 나머지 선택사항들 랜덤하게 배열)

10. 2018년에 우리나라는 OECD 37개국 중 난민 인정률이 35위였다. 다
른 한편으로는, 같은 해, 유엔난민기구의 (정부나 기업 부문이 아닌) 민
간 부문 후원율이 세계 2위였다. 다음 중 본인의 생각과 가장 가까운 선
택사항을 모두 고르시오.
○ 우리나라에 난민 수용을 찬성하는 사람들이 많지만 정부는 난민 수용

을 반대하는 입장이다.

○ OECD 국가들과 비교했을 때 한국의 난민 인정률 순위가 낮아 보이지만, 전 세계 국가들과 비교했을 때는 한국의 순위가 높은 편일 것 같다.

○ 표현을 적극적으로 하지 않지만 난민을 지지하고 돕는 사람들이 상당히 많다.

○ 후원율이 저 정도로 높을 것이라고 예상하지 못했고 차라리 국내 후원을 더 많이 하는 것이 낫다고 생각한다.

○ 기타:

_____

('기타'를 뺀 나머지 선택사항들 랜덤하게 배열)

11. 현재 한국에서 우리와 같이 지내고 있는 난민들에 대해서 어떤 감정이 드는지 다음 중 고르시오.

○ 불쾌
○ 우려
○ 동정
○ 환영
○ 무관심

(선택사항들 반대 순서로도 배열)

12. 앞으로 우리 정부가 난민에 대해 어떤 입장을 취해야 하는지 다음 중 고르시오. (선택사항들 랜덤하게 배열)

○ 증가하는 전세계 난민 수를 고려하여 앞으로는 난민을 적극적으로 수용해야 한다.

○ 국제사회의 일원으로서 난민 수용에 있어서 최소한의 역할분담을 해야 한다.

○ 국내 난민법을 개정하여 국경 통제와 난민 심사 절차를 더 엄격하게 해야 한다.

○ 국제 난민 협약에서 탈퇴하고 난민 수용을 최대한 반대해야 한다.

-------------다음은 귀하의 일반적인 사항을 묻는 질문입니다------------

13. 귀하의 성별은 무엇입니까?

○ 남성　　　　　　　　　　　　　　○ 여성

14. 귀하의 연령은 어떻게 되십니까?　　　만 _____ 세

15. 귀하가 가장 오랫동안 거주한 지역은 어디입니까?

○ 서울	○ 충북	○ 경남
○ 해외	○ 세종	○ 경북
○ 경기	○ 강원	○ 광주
○ 인천	○ 부산	○ 전남
○ 대전	○ 울산	○ 전북
○ 충남	○ 대구	○ 제주

16. 귀하의 종교는 무엇입니까?
○ 개신교
○ 천주교
○ 불교
○ 없음
○ 기타: _____
('없음'과 '기타' 이외의 선택사항들 램덤하게 배열)

17. 귀하는 어떤 이념 성향을 가졌습니까?

○ 보수
○ 중도
○ 진보
○ 모름/없음
('모름/없음' 이외의 선택사항들 반대 순서로도 배열)

- **엠브레인용:**

18. 귀하의 월평균 가계 소득은 대략 얼마입니까? 1인 가족인 경우, 월평균 개인 소득을 계산하여 주십시오.

○ 100만원 미만
○ 100만원 이상~300만원 미만
○ 300만원 이상~500만원 미만
○ 500만원 이상~700만원 미만
○ 700만원 이상

19. 귀하의 생활수준 만족도가 어떻게 되십니까?

○ 매우 만족
○ 만족하는 편
○ 불만족하는 편
○ 매우 불만족
(선택사항들 반대 순서로도 배열)

20. 귀하의 최종 학력은 무엇입니까?

○ 고등학교 졸업 이하
○ 대학교 졸업 (졸업 예정자 포함)
○ 대학원 졸업 (졸업 예정자 포함)

21. 귀하의 직업은 무엇입니까?
○ 사무직
○ 서비스직
○ 전문직
○ 학생 (설문조사 마감)
○ 전업주부(남성 포함) (설문조사 마감)
○ 노동/생산직
○ 농업/임업/축산업/수산업
○ 자영업

○ 무직 (설문조사 마감)
○ 기타: _____

22. 귀하의 근로 유형은 무엇입니까?

○ 상용직 근로자
○ 임시직 근로자
○ 일용직 근로자
○ 고용주/자영업자
○ 기타: _____

23. 하나 이상의 직업을 갖고 계십니까?

○ 예
○ 아니오

- 서울대용:
18. 본인의 경제적 생활수준은 어떻다고 생각하시나요?
○ 상
○ 중
○ 하
(선택사항들 반대 순서로도 배열)

19. 귀하의 최종 학력은 무엇입니까?
○ 고등학교 졸업 이하
○ 대학교 졸업 (졸업 예정자 포함)
○ 대학원 졸업 (졸업 예정자 포함)

20. 현재 학업 외에 직업을 갖고 계십니까?
○ 예
○ 아니오 (설문조사 마감)

21. 귀하의 직업 유형이 무엇입니까?
 ◯ 사무직
 ◯ 서비스직
 ◯ 전문직
 ◯ 노동/생산직
 ◯ 농업/임업/축산업/수산업
 ◯ 자영업
 ◯ 가정주부 (남성 포함) (설문조사 마감)
 ◯ 기타
    '기타'를 고른 경우 본인의 답을 기재하시오.

    _____

22. 귀하의 근로 유형은 무엇입니까?
 ◯ 상용직 근로자
 ◯ 임시직 근로자
 ◯ 일용직 근로자
 ◯ 고용주/자영업자
 ◯ 기타
    '기타'를 고른 경우 본인의 답을 기재하시오.

    _____

23. 설문에 참여하신 분들 중 선착순 50명에게는 스타벅스 기프트
카드를 보내드릴 예정입니다. 기프트 카드를 원할 시 본인의 이메일을
적어주십시오. 기프트 카드를 원치 않을 시에는 이메일을 적지 않아도
됩니다.

_____

(비고: 엠브레인 참여자들은 이미 엠브레인에서 혜택을 받기 때문에 따로
스타벅스 기프트카드를 보내지 않았습니다.)

Appendix 3. Descriptive Statistics of Demographic Data

Embrain Sample (total N: 383)			SNU Sample (total N: 209)		
Variable	N	%	Variable	N	%
Sex			Sex		
Male	156	40.7%	Male	82	39.2%
Female	227	59.3%	Female	127	60.8%
Age			Age		
20	19	5.0%	20	18	8.6%
21	27	7.0%	21	18	8.6%
22	22	5.7%	22	12	5.7%
23	30	7.8%	23	15	7.2%
24	36	9.4%	24	23	11.0%
25	52	13.6%	25	28	13.4%
26	61	15.9%	26	21	10.0%
27	49	12.8%	27	27	12.9%
28	49	12.8%	28	36	17.2%
29	38	9.9%	29	11	5.3%
Place lived the longest			Place lived the longest		
Seoul	86	22.5%	Seoul	82	39.2%
Abroad	3	0.8%	Abroad	9	4.3%
Gyeonggi	110	28.7%	Gyeonggi	33	15.8%
Incheon	22	5.7%	Incheon	10	4.8%
Daejeon	11	2.9%	Daejeon	5	2.4%
Chungnam	9	2.3%	Chungnam	4	1.9%
Chungbuk	12	3.1%	Chungbuk	2	1.0%
Sejong	0	0.0%	Sejong	1	0.5%
Gangwon	15	3.9%	Gangwon	2	1.0%
Busan	23	6.0%	Busan	12	5.7%
Ulsan	5	1.3%	Ulsan	3	1.4%
Daegu	23	6.0%	Daegu	7	3.3%
Gyeongnam	20	5.2%	Gyeongnam	8	3.8%
Gyeongbuk	12	3.1%	Gyeongbuk	3	1.4%
Gwangju	12	3.1%	Gwangju	10	4.8%
Jeonnam	7	1.8%	Jeonnam	4	1.9%
Jeonbuk	10	2.6%	Jeonbuk	6	2.9%
Jeju	3	0.8%	Jeju	8	3.8%
Religion			Religion		
Protestantism	44	11.5%	Protestantism	36	17.2%
Catholicism	22	5.7%	Catholicism	29	13.9%
Buddhism	21	5.5%	Buddhism	11	5.3%
None	287	74.9%	None	131	62.7%
Other	9	2.3%	Other	2	1.0%

Political ideology		
Conservative	41	10.7%
Moderate	165	43.1%
Liberal	79	20.6%
Do not know or none	98	25.6%
Ave. mo. income (x) (won)		
$x < 1$ mln.	35	9.1%
1 mln. $\leq x <$ 3 mln.	132	34.5%
3 mln. $\leq x <$ 5 mln.	96	25.1%
5 mln. $\leq x <$ 7 mln.	63	16.4%
$x > 7$ mln.	57	14.9%
Standard of living satisf.		
Very satisfied	27	7.0%
Satisfied	242	63.2%
Dissatisfied	104	27.2%
Very dissatisfied	10	2.6%
Highest level of educ.		
HS diploma or less	67	17.5%
BA degree (prosp. incl.)	295	77.0%
MA degree (prosp. incl.)	21	5.5%
Job sector		
Office	102	26.6%
Service	21	5.5%
Specialty/professional	39	10.2%
Student	147	38.4%
Homemaker	2	0.5%
Production	5	1.3%
Farming, forestry, livestock, fishing	1	0.3%
Self-employed	5	1.3%
Unemployed	52	13.6%
Other	9	2.3%
Employment status		
No job so n/a (this category was only	201	52.5%

Political ideology		
Conservative	42	20.1%
Moderate	79	37.8%
Liberal	57	27.3%
Do not know or none	31	14.8%
Standard of living satisf.		
High	50	23.9%
Medium	139	66.5%
Low	20	9.6%
Highest level of educ.		
HS diploma or less	33	15.8%
BA degree (prosp. incl.)	114	54.5%
MA degree (prosp. incl.)	62	29.7%
Job outside of school		
Yes	24	11.5%
No	185	88.5%
Job sector		
No job so n/a (this category was only used for statistics and was not an option on the actual questionnaire)	185	88.5%
Office	9	4.3%
Service	2	1.0%
Specialty/professional	9	4.3%
Homemaker	0	0.0%
Production	0	0.0%
Farming, forestry, livestock, fishing	0	0.0%
Self-employed	0	0.0%
Unemployed (this category was only used for statistics and was not an option on the actual questionnaire)	0	0.0%
Other	4	1.9%
Employment status		
No job so n/a (this category was only used for statistics and was not an option on the actual questionnaire)	185	88.5%
Regular employee	9	4.3%
Temporary employee	10	4.8%

used for statistics and was not an option on the actual questionnaire)			Dayworker	1	0.5%
Regular employee	134	35.0%	Owner/self-employed	3	1.4%
Temporary employee	32	8.4%	Other	1	0.5%
Dayworker	5	1.3%			
Owner/self-employed	8	2.1%			
Other	3	0.8%			
More than one job					
No job so n/a (this category was only used for statistics and was not an option on the actual questionnaire)	201	52.5%			
Yes	125	32.6%			
No	57	14.9%			

Appendix 4. Categorization of Quotes for Content Analysis

- **For Embrain:**

Table 1. Respondents who chose 'other' to the survey question "Choose 3 reasons why you oppose."

Theme	Quote
Questionable qualification	They were capable enough to leave their country and people behind to escape and come to Korea.
Preference of assimilation	I support cultural assimilation, not multiculturalism which is a nonsensical ideal.

N: 2

Table 2. Respondents who provided explanations to the open-ended survey question "If your stance on accepting Yemeni asylum seekers who arrived at Jeju Island in 2018 has changed when comparing the first time you heard the news and today (ex. from 'highly approve' to 'highly oppose' or from 'highly oppose' to 'oppose but there should be an opportunity for an asylum seeker's application to be reviewed') then freely explain how and why. If your stance is the same yet your reason(s) why changed then also explain below. If both your stance and reason(s) did not change then write 'no changes.'

Quote	Theme
When I first got the news I thought 'they must have had a hard time in their home country to decide to come *all* the way to Korea.'	Korea as an uncommon destination (geographical distance)
My stance changed after hearing about situations in other countries that received refugees.	Negative precedents from abroad
They only desire our understanding and tolerance but do not make compromises on their religion or culture which are problematic.	Refugees' unwillingness to adapt
It is uncertain whether individuals who lived in that type of situation can follow the higher values of our country's culture and safety standards.	Refugees' backwardness and inability to adapt
I think we should accept refugees who truly want to live well in Korea just like (the celebrity) Sam Okyere who got permanent residency.	Celebrity vs. terrorist

I watched a video about two European women who were travelling but got beheaded by a Middle Eastern terrorist group so I highly oppose.	
Having in mind that religion and culture are why there is war and conflict, if they move from refugee status to citizenship status then this can become a bigger problem. In the case of a country where religious issues are especially problematic, I think we need to thoroughly determine whether there could be negative impacts from a person's religion. I think it is too early to accept other religions and cultures and become a multicultural country.	Religious and cultural differences
In addition, among the refugees, there are no women, children and elderly people. I do not think that adult men assumed the responsibility and risked their lives to come here. Rather I believe it is because they are treated better than women or the elderly in that country, and so crimes against women and the elderly could occur in our country. I worry because women's rights in their country is even worse than that of Korea which is rubbish.	Worries of misogyny
There could be a big leap of logic here but what would happen to victims if even one crime takes place? If we can prevent it then we need to. I oppose potential safety issues that may arise from bringing in refugees just so that a small minority of true refugees can apply.	Crime prevention
There was an incident in which male immigrants committed sexual assault in the news.	Negative information in the news

Since I am not from Jeju Island I mostly hear about refugees from the news and there were more negative (refugees coming to our country and committing crimes) than positive news.	
I think that why they came and what they plan to do here must be meticulously asked prior to deciding whether to approve or not. I think that the law must be revised and that refugees must be selectively received after strict screening processes. There should be very, very strict screening processes.... I do approve of receiving them under strict screening processes in which differentiation is possible but since I think that would be difficult I oppose. The reviews must be done thoroughly and if there is any reason for disqualification they should not be able to enter. I think that slowly receiving refugees who are in desperate need and are morally good through strict screening processes will stabilize the situation, contrary to just opposing. They came here seeking refuge so they should be able to receive strict screening anywhere.	The need for strict screening processes
Since issues that arose from receiving refugees are not that problematic I think giving them a chance for their applications to be reviewed is alright. I am open to giving at least one opportunity from a humanitarian point of view. I do think they should have the opportunity for	The need to give an opportunity for application review

their applications to be reviewed since they are human beings just like us from a global perspective.	
I thought refugees came involuntarily due to war. But I believe there were many people who applied to earn money and that brokers were involved instead of truly being in difficult situations. It is also unclear whether their intentions of coming here are sincere given that our country is still in armistice. As a citizen of a country that experienced civil war, I think there is a big danger in accepting young asylum seekers who ran away from protecting their country's sovereignty and families despite having the capacity as well as those who instead of going to neighboring countries chose to come to Korea where individualism is stronger than refugee related laws, norms or principles. I initially opposed because in addition to the numerous articles about it I thought they applied for refugee status after coming here via illegal routes or to simply benefit economically…. Despite the fact that Korea has the legal responsibility to protect those who have applied for refugee status under current law many people are taking advantage of the system.	Fake refugees (doubt of asylum seekers' intentions)
Our country already treats foreigners with insurance, for example, but costs for that are covered by citizens' tax money. So I think there could be an increase of poor people. Foreign residents are already receiving a lot of benefits such as health insurance and visit Korea for medical tourism. Citizens are paying the taxes and many are suffering from COVID19.	Negativity toward tax and social security benefits to foreigners

There should be an opportunity for asylum applications to be reviewed because deportation is illegal according to international law. We need to accept in a humanitarian manner and solve problems that arise from it legally.	Need to abide by international law
Since Korea is neither a third country nor a developing country but an advanced country Korea needs to follow basic regulations.	Korea's superiority as an advanced country
Keeping the reputation of a law-abiding country could in turn be appealing to emotions. Wrong precedents could happen to us and passed onto our future generations. This cannot be dismissed as just a matter of human rights or compassion.	Security over reputation and human rights
If you're going to talk about the cost of life of those who fled from threats of death then you first need to take good care of our ancestors who died in countless battlefields to defend this nation and future generations.	Korean citizens come first
I approved (receiving refugees) but oppose them coming in high numbers.	Worry over future increase
We need to obtain their personal information in preparation of their illegal residence.	Worry over illegal residence
Our country is closed toward other ethnicities than expected and so this must be improved with time. But right now, I don't think we have the capacity. It would be great to give them opportunities once we have the proper measures and laws, and to receive them based on their behavior, but I think right now it would be a strain. Even though it is impossible today I think they should be received in the future. I hope Korea could be a country that is capable enough to ensure protection at least for the	Korea's unpreparedness / lack of capacity

period they are here, but we are not strong enough to counter even large powers like China. So I do not think we are ready.	
I think that simply being in the opposition side worsens discrimination against refugees that is already prevalent in society. I worry greatly but I felt that I should not oppose just because they are different. We need to attain a multicultural perspective by showing interest in international, diplomatic issues.	For a better Korean society
They came to a different country because they felt a threat to their lives. Our country also went through difficult times.	Sympathy
They are human beings just like us and so finding a way for them to live is important from a humanitarian perspective.	Humanitarian need
(My stance didn't change) because receiving refugees hasn't directly affected me yet.	Same stance due to no personal influences

Note: Participants had multiple ideas within their responses which is why the sum of categories (24) is different from the number of respondents (34).

Table 3. Respondents who provided opinions to the open-ended survey question "Please freely write below if you have any additional opinions." (This survey question was asked in lieu of the question above to respondents who heard about the 2018 arrival of Yemeni asylum seekers at Jeju Island for the first time by taking this survey.)

Quote	Theme
I would like it if refugees are not brought in and foreign workers are kept to a minimum.	General anti-foreigner sentiment
I do not think we are ready yet.	Korea's unpreparedness

N: 2

Table 4. Respondents who chose 'other' to the survey question 'When Yemeni asylum seekers arrived at Jeju Island in 2018 there was opposition

from the public with more than 714,000 people signing a petition bill posted on the government's official website that opposes receiving refugees and requests the refugee law to be amended. Select all the reasons you think explains why there was such large opposition in our society.'

Quote	Theme
They claim to be refugees but there are only men.	Only men
Public opinion was manipulated.	Manipulation of public opinion
Due to negative examples from other countries that have received refugees.	Negative precedents from abroad
Due to public safety reasons.	Public safety concerns
Because they are dangerous.	Danger
There was a lack of effort from the media in conveying information while not completely knowing the refugees' situation.	Dissatisfaction toward the media
Due to press that were negative toward refugees.	Negative press
Because [the public] did not politically agree with the refugee-receiving government.	Political gap between the public and the government

N: 8

Table 5. Respondents who chose 'other' to the survey question 'When Yemeni asylum seekers arrived at Jeju Island in 2018 various public opinion survey results showed that people in their 20s, especially women, were most against receiving refugees compared to other age groups. Select all that are close to your thoughts on why that was the case.'

Quote	Theme
Women's rights in Islamic countries are not as respected as they are in Korea.	Poor views on women's rights in Islamic countries and associated fear of negative effects in Korea
Repulsion resulting from the fact that Islamic culture is very conservative toward women.	
Ideas of hatred toward women shared among Muslim men can affect Korea's culture.	
I know that people in Islamic [countries] do rape games and upload recorded videos [to the Internet].	Prevalence of sex crimes in Islamic countries and

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Quote	Theme
Worries over crimes targeting women.	associated fear of crimes targeting women in Korea
The idea that men are superior to women exists in Islamic scriptures and mind. So women could be exposed to danger.	
Because they actually do commit sexual crimes.	
In Islamic countries, they mistreat women, sexual assault crimes are severe, and they are not willing to change their culture.	
Because Islam excludes other cultures and suppresses women's rights.	Islam as a discriminatory religion
Many severe crimes targeting women occur in countries that received refugees and so [opposing] was a choice made for self-protection.	Negative precedents from abroad
Threat to public safety.	Public safety concerns
For public safety reasons.	
Public safety problems.	
They are dangerous.	Threat
Concern for possible crimes.	
Why receive refugees when we are not even able to care for the citizens right now?	Korean citizens come first
Although it is due to job anxiety I also think there may have been empty-headed women who opposed just for the sake of opposing.	Eristic women in Korea
I do not think there was a particular reason and was just [a sum of] individual thoughts.	Just a coincidence

Note: Participants had multiple ideas within their responses which is why the sum of categories (9) is different from the number of respondents (18).

Table 6. Respondents who chose 'other' to the survey question 'In 2018, South Korea ranked 35th out of 37 OECD countries in refugee recognition rates. Meanwhile, that same year, Korea ranked 2nd in the world in regards to private − neither governmental nor business − contributions to the U.N. Refugee Agency. Select all that are closest to your opinion.'

Quote	Theme
Helping refugees and wishing them well is different from receiving them into our country.	Preference of helping from afar
We want to help them but people dislike bringing them in and so they help through	

donations instead.	
People are donating because they are abroad. If they enter our country then support toward them would decrease.	
People oppose receiving refugees into our country even though they would like to support and help them.	
Refugee support and intake are two different ideas.	
There are more people who differentiate receiving refugees nationally and helping through donations privately.	
Separate from humanitarian donations, refugee intake is opposed by many people.	
The two are different.	
I support helping refugees that are in other countries.	
I think people want to help through donations but do not consider the possibility of living together.	
I think it is okay to help refugees who are going from one country abroad to another foreign country but oppose them coming to Korea.	
I think there is a double standard here.	
I can donate but I am against receiving them.	
Those bastards only worsen public safety.	Public safety concerns
People agree on refugee protection but oppose due to the lack of needed infrastructure.	Korea's unpreparedness
Korea is yet a divided country and so I think it is better to focus on North Korea.	North Korea as a priority
It'd be great if there were more opinions of support that are expressed just as much as we help them.	Wish for more opinions of support to be expressed
I think opinions for- and against- receiving refugees are based on domestic and foreign circumstances and not a result of the government's stance.	Refugee recognition rates not based on government's stance
This is Korea. If you are not going to live with	Being coerced into

a refugee then irresponsible claims must be avoided.	sacrificing personal space

Note: Participants had multiple ideas within their responses which is why the sum of categories (7) is different from the number of respondents (19).

- **For SNU:**

Table 1. Respondents who chose 'other' to the survey question "Choose 3 reasons why you approve."

Theme	Quote
Right to free movement	I do not acknowledge arbitrary boundaries like nations so I think free movement must be ensured for refugees.
Rule of law above all	If a refugee's intent is approved under law then I do not think a person from the host country can oppose.

N: 2

Table 2. Respondents who provided explanations to the open-ended survey question "If your stance on accepting Yemeni asylum seekers who arrived at Jeju Island in 2018 has changed when comparing the first time you heard the news and today (ex. from 'highly approve' to 'highly oppose' or from 'highly oppose' to 'oppose but there should be an opportunity for an asylum seeker's application to be reviewed') then freely explain how and why. If your stance is the same yet your reason(s) why changed then also explain below. If both your stance and reason(s) did not change then write 'no changes'."

Quote	Theme
Benefits must be ensured for citizens first.	Economic benefits for Korean citizens first
There are many problems that need to be considered such as…economic benefits for refugees or overseas Koreans that are paid by tax money.	
Whether Yemenis accept the fundamentally different family system or awareness of women's rights and adopt the values once in Korea need to be thoroughly examined.	Need for assurance of refugees' willingness

	to adapt
I think we should fairly give them a chance for an application review.	Give an opportunity
I oppose now. National action was inadequate...	Critique of government's actions
I still approve but I do not think that the current ways are correct.	
Now that our poor reaction to change has been revealed more could come in the future.	Worry of future increase
I saw news about how Yemeni refugees at Jeju Island are a problem for women safety and that they disdain women and some did terrorist activities. Because they can be a threat to Koreans and women I now somewhat oppose.	Potential criminals
There are so many problems that need to be considered such as crimes...	
There hasn't been much progress so there should be a change of mind to solve this issue.	Need for solutions
Based on the differences between the comments under articles that I encountered versus the reactions of my friends, I think that there is a big difference between university/graduate students and youth that account for a large part of economic activities.	Dissimilarity between students and economically active youth
I think they made Jeju more multicultural. For example, the opening of Wardah Restaurant.	Positive cases
There is often a tendency to emotionally appeal to sympathy when talking about refugees but I also saw news about how they don't work and make unreasonable demands so I think there is much to think about.	Negative portrayals in the news
...but I sympathize with opinions that job security or public safety could get worse as a result of refugees coming.	Concern for security regarding jobs and public safety
When thinking about the humanitarian aspects my opinions changed.	Acknowledge-ment of humanitarian perspectives
I thought that we obviously need to receive them from a humanitarian perspective...	

It is correct to bring them in from a humanitarian point of view...	
I previously thought that we should actively support receiving refugees from a humanitarian perspective...	
Korea also experienced war and is a country still in armistice so we need to cultivate the ability to embrace refugees.	Sympathy based on Korea's difficult past
Because we also experienced difficulties in the past and worked abroad.	
There is almost no change in my position but I oppose a bit less than I did back then. I still think that there should be opportunities for their applications to be reviewed.	Less intensity of opinion after time
Changed from 'approve' to 'approve but there should be strict screening processes.'	Uncategorizable
I oppose now due to domestic issues.	
I changed from passive to strong approval.	

Note: Participants had multiple ideas within their responses which is why the sum of categories (14) is different from the number of respondents (18). Note: Participants were asked to provide reasons if their positions changed. Those who did not do so were neither counted nor categorized. Responses that were too vague/short were also not counted/categorized.

Table 3. Respondents who provided opinions to the open-ended survey question "Please freely write below if you have any additional opinions." (This survey question was asked in lieu of the question above to respondents who heard about the 2018 arrival of Yemeni asylum seekers at Jeju Island for the first time by taking this survey.)

Quote	Theme
I do not know very much about refugee issues but if they came through legal routes then wouldn't that mean that there is neither a reason nor a way to block them?	Lawfulness comes first
The fact that it is controversial means that they came illegally.	Association of issue salience with illegality
If there won't be conflicts with Yemen and if Korea has the capacity to receive them then we cannot and should not send them away.	Responsibility to protect based on capacity

Quote	Theme
There is a big difference religiously and culturally.	Religious and cultural differences
When looking at countries that have received refugees it does not look that positive.	Negative precedents from abroad

Note: Participants had multiple ideas within their responses which is why the sum of categories (5) is different from the number of respondents (2).

Table 4. Respondents who chose 'other' to the survey question 'When Yemeni asylum seekers arrived at Jeju Island in 2018 there was opposition from the public with more than 714,000 people signing a petition bill posted on the government's official website that opposes receiving refugees and requests the refugee law to be amended. Select all the reasons you think explains why there was such large opposition in our society.'

Quote	Theme
Bewilderment resulting from provocative press reports and fake information circulated through SNS.	Confusion and lack of information due to provocative media
As a person who studied abroad for a long time and knows three languages, I tend to search the same news in different languages. I think Korean news focus on impact news and instead of delivering accurate information of actual situations they make people surprised. Because there were many news with high view counts I think there was a hypersensitive reaction.	
Because people encountered many negative and provocative writings.	
I think that there was much opposition because people thought that the male-centric culture of Islamic countries would worsen Korea's patriarchal culture that is not solved yet.	Worsening of Korea's patriarchal culture
Vague worries over public safety.	Public safety concerns
People have seen other countries struggling with severe social problems resulting from refugee inflow.	Negative precedents from abroad
Korea did not engage in colonial rule like European	Korea as a

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Quote	Theme
countries so there is no reason to accept refugees.	non-colonial country with no historical responsibility
Women in their 20s and 30s are igniters of public opinion in the web space. The neo-feminism discussions led by them define refugees, especially refugee men from poor countries, as a threat. Any dissenting opinions were repeatedly made fun of and stigmatized as 'danger to the safety of sacred women' and 'enemy that should be eliminated.' It was impossible for there to be an environment that allows constructive debate and so there was no chance for different public opinions or reflective exchanges to emerge in the first place.	Neo-feminist young women as instigators of anti-refugee opinions online

Note: Participants had multiple ideas within their responses which is why the sum of categories (6) is different from the number of respondents (7).

Table 5. Respondents who chose 'other' to the survey question 'When Yemeni asylum seekers arrived at Jeju Island in 2018 various public opinion survey results showed that people in their 20s, especially women, were most against receiving refugees compared to other age groups. Select all that are close to your thoughts on why that was the case.'

Quote	Theme
Problems of public safety and crime.	Concern for security
Public safety and security problems. I actually heard about crimes related to refugees when I visited Jeju Island.	
As frequent users of social media, they are exposed to many news of actual cases that can form a negative bias.	Negative bias formed by actual cases in SNS
Because the majority of the refugees were young males and Muslim.	Negative attitudes toward Islam and Muslim men regarding attitudes toward
Because of how Islam regards women. Since Korean women in their 20s already feel threatened by Korean men they fear young Muslim men who disdain women as being less than a human-being and oppose their	

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increasing presence. I agree on receiving refugees but I worry over Muslim men and I do not want to take unnecessary risks. Yet I think differently toward Muslim women, children and the elderly.	women
I do not think it is related to the Me Too Movement. Rather I think it is because patriarchal and anti-women traits were found in followers of Islam among Yemeni men.	
Fear and repulsion felt toward Muslim immigrant men due to repeated stories of sexual exploitation and sexual assault in Islamic culture as well as due to poor women's rights in Islamic countries.	
Personally, people who either strongly approve or oppose a certain event strongly express their opinions. That time was a period when women were actively expressing their opinions during the Me Too Movement and feminism, and I do think women should indeed express their opinions. But this transitional period coincided with the refugees, resulting in heightened voices.	Coinciding period with the Me Too Movement
I'm not sure why women in their 20s were the ones most against that. I rather think it would be males in their 40s.	Korean males in their 40s rather perceived as being most anti-refugee
Because of not knowing much about refugees and Yemen and because there have been no experiences of being directly affected. There are low levels of interest...	Lack of knowledge and interest
...since changes are hard to predict it's easier to stay the same than to accept change.	Change perceived as consuming
Because we all know of social problems and bad public safety in other countries that resulted from refugee inflow.	Negative precedents from abroad
Not welcoming 'refugees' in and of itself could be another important factor.	Refugees as shunned figures
Due to a need for an external enemy from which no	The need for a

severe revenge is likely is needed to unify a group such as internet communities and interest groups in the country etc. The target was the refugees regardless of whether they truly pose a danger or not, and the image of foreign workers was mirrored onto the refugees. If it were another target who could quickly and directly do tit-for-tat revenge then there would not have been such explicit and irrational antagonism.	common yet weak target

Note: Participants had multiple ideas within their responses which is why the sum of categories (10) is different from the number of respondents (13).

Table 6. Respondents who chose 'other' to the survey question 'In 2018, South Korea ranked 35th out of 37 OECD countries in refugee recognition rates. Meanwhile, that same year, Korea ranked 2nd in the world in regards to private – neither governmental nor business – contributions to the U.N. Refugee Agency. Select all that are closest to your opinion.'

Quote	Theme
On the outside, it seems as though people donate and are magnanimous. But in reality, there are a lot of negative perceptions.	Superficial generosity
Donations could be an easy method to save one's face. I think there was hesitation when a real-life situation in which refugees need to be received actually happened even if having shown support for appropriate ideas in principle.	
I think it will send an image of Korea acquitting responsibility regarding refugees solely through financial support in the global community.	Paying off responsibility
There are a lot of people who accept and support refugees but when it comes to directly receiving refugees inside the country many people disagree.	Preference of helping from afar
I think it is forced to compare low refugee recognition rates and high private donation levels on the same line…. Just because donation levels are high it doesn't mean that ordinary citizens are strongly willing to receive refugees. Feeling sympathy for refugees' difficulties and donating in hopes of improving their situation is greatly different from inviting them to my	

living space and embracing them as a community member.	
Other countries supporting them is okay but receiving them into our country and living together is somewhat uncomfortable.	
Receiving refugees and donating are different.	
People are willing to help refugees but against them coming into our country.	
I support making (indirect or financial) donations for refugees but I'm not tolerant on actually integrating them socially into our national system.	
Refugee relief is desirable but it seems that people do not want to share their living space.	
I think that gap exists because of the question of whether they are near our surroundings or not. People select UNHCR as a place to donate because they understand that there are a lot of people struggling around the world and to do good. Yet there is more repulsion toward having refugees near one's surroundings.	
I think the two are different. Through donations, people can help without directly coming into contact. Although many people are uncomfortable with refugees directly coming into one's living space they still want to help from a distance.	
Donations are made from a charity perspective because people recognize refugees as those who need help with pity but do not consider them as part of 'us' with whom we need to live together.	
People make many private donations (I still think most would be made by corporations) but once refugees became an issue in our society first-hand it wasn't accepted well. People think refugees must be helped from a moral responsibility point of view but did not act up to their principles in reality.	
I think there are a lot of people who recognize the need for humanitarian assistance (including helping refugees) on a global and transnational scale. Up until	

|	
now, it was a faraway problem of other countries and possible to innocently act on the ideal that we need to protect and help the weak if it didn't directly affect us. But when suddenly it was closely linked to one's reality I think people experienced difficulty because they anticipated that there could be unexpected hardships and disharmony from receiving them.	
People support refugees on the individual level but oppose supporting them on the national, governmental level.	
Bringing them into our country and financial support are separate things.	
Although people reject accepting refugees many people help refugees outside Korea.	
There are many people who sympathize with the situations refugees are in and want to help them but that is different from receiving them.	
People want to help solve problems but do not want to drag refugees into our country.	
Private donations and national sentiment are different.	Difference between individual and national attitudes
I think there is a difference in how the two perceive refugees.	
I think there are a lot of donations made through organizations such as UNICEF and World Vision.	Many donations made to humanitarian agencies
I think it is an effect resulting from international relief fund announcements such as those of UNICEF that frequently appear on TV.	Public service announcement effect
In order to accept a refugee, related laws need to be in place but Korea did not have sufficient laws and still doesn't.	Korea's unpreparedness
Even though the government's position on the refugee issue seems progressive the refugee review process of the Ministry of Justice is very undeveloped and seems to be the opposite of the government's aims.	
Private donations are not hard since one can support	Convenience of

either financially or in terms of knowledge without having to directly move.	making donations
In this aspect, I think awareness is high in Korea.	High awareness in Korea
It wasn't too long ago that people were educated that Korea is a single-race country.	Education of Korea as a homogeneous country
I think people were not as receptive toward them because their reasons for requesting asylum were different from what people had in mind.	Questionable reasons for applying for asylum
I think, apart from international marriages, it hasn't been long that Korea accepted multiculturalism (I use this term for accuracy even though there are negative connotations). So I believe it was not an ideal environment for understanding an unfamiliar religion as Islam and Islamic culture. I imagine there was much opposition because there was neither understanding among citizens nor national discussions about multiculturalism like in the U.S. or Europe, and because this issue was sudden. However, as could be seen by individual donations, the majority of people do feel moral responsibility toward refugees so if more discussions happen at the national level then I think more people will be open to receiving.	Short history of multiculturalism and national discussions
Our refugee recognition rate is way too low.	Critique of Korea's refugee recognition rate
I don't know about private donation levels in other countries. Relatively speaking, Korea ranks high but I would like to check whether Korea's private donations are large on the absolute scale in comparison to that of other donations. What is clear though is that the Korean government is passive about accepting refugees.	Rank vs. amount
The hidden private donation levels clearly show that public opinion in the internet that is centered around women in their 20~30s does not represent the opinion	Public opinion online vs. offline

of the whole society.	
The government needs to consider Korea's geographical characteristics. Because Korea would have to receive North Korean refugees in the event of a problem in North Korea, the South Korean government needs to calculate the needed availability in case of an emergency and be passive about accepting refugees in general.	Government's passive stance due to North Korean refugees
Statistics could change if the number of North Korean refugees are included and if defectors or support for defectors are included since South Korea does not classify them as refugees.	Exclusion of NK defectors in refugee statistics

Note: Participants had multiple ideas within their responses which is why the sum of categories (17) is different from the number of respondents (30).

Appendix 5. Institutional Review Board (IRB) Approval

Seoul National University

Institutional Review Board

1 Gwanak-ro, Gwanak-gu, Seoul 08826

Tel :82-2-880-5153   FAX:82-2-882-5153

May 6, 2020

Suh Young Park
Graduate School of International Studies,
Seoul National University,
Seoul 08826, Korea

IRB No. 2005/002-005

Title of Proposal: Attitudes of South Korean Youth toward Refugees: Conducting a Survey to Seoul
National University Students about the Arrival of Yemeni Asylum Seekers at Jeju
Island in 2018

Approved period of study: 05/06/2020 − 05/05/2021

Dear Suh Young Park

This letter is to officially notify you that the Institutional Review Board has reviewed and approved the above referenced protocol to involve humans as research subjects under **an Expedited Category**. If it is necessary to continue the study beyond the approved period, a request for continuation approval should be submitted about 6 weeks prior to **05/05/2021**.

ALL SNUIRB APPROVED INVESTIGATORS MUST COMPLY WITH THE FOLLOWING:

1. Conduct the research as described in the Protocol;

2. Use only the SNUIRB approved Consent Form;

3. For non-Korean speaking subjects, a certified translation of the approved Consent Form in the subject's first language should be provided. The translated version must be approved by the SNUIRB;

4. Obtain pre-approval from the SNUIRB of any changes in the research activity except when necessary to protect human subjects; immediately report to the SNUIRB any such emergency changes for the protection of human subjects;

5. Report to SNUIRB the death, hospitalization, or serious illness of any study subject;

6. Promptly report to the SNUIRB any new information that may adversely affect the safety of the subjects or the conduct of the research;

7. Provide reports to the SNUIRB concerning the progress of the research, when requested;

8. Obtain approval of study advertisements from the SNUIRB before use;

9. Conduct the informed consent process without coercion or undue influence, and provide the potential subject with sufficient opportunity to consider whether or not to participate.

If you have any questions, please contact SNUIRB at +82-2-880-5153.

Sincerely,

Chairman

Chair, SNUIRB

초 록

난민을 향한 한국 20대의 인식 분석: 2018년 제주도 예멘 난민에 대한 서울대생의 설문조사를 토대로

박서영
국제협력
국제대학원
서울대학교

2018년, 500여명의 예멘 난민이 제주도에 도착하여 비호 신청할 당시 한국 사회에서 그들을 향한 반대 여론이 컸다. 본 연구는 다른 서양 국가의 청년과 달리 한국 내 전 연령층 중 난민 수용을 가장 반대했던 그룹이 젊은 세대라는 당시 설문조사 결과를 바탕으로 왜 20대가 가장 반대했는지 그리고 서울대생은 그들과 어떠한 차이점과 공통점을 보이는지를 알아보는 데 목적을 둔다. 서울대생 그리고 ㈜마크로밀 엠브레인의 20대 패널을 대상으로 설문지를 배포하여 원자료를 얻은 후 통계적 그리고 콘텐츠 분석을 실시했다. 주 결과로는 서울대생이 난민 수용에 대해서 큰 차이는 없었지만 조금 더 긍정적인 태도를 보였다는 차이점과 두 샘플의 참여자 대다수가 2018년 이후로 새로운 정보에 접했을 것임에도 불구하고 초기/기존의 입장으로부터 변화를 보이지 않았다는 공통점이다. 또한, 두 샘플의 대다수는 이 이슈에 대한 관심을 관련 정보를 찾는 행동으로 이어가지 않았으며 다른 의견을 갖은 사람과 대화를 할 의향을 보이지 않았다. 이와 더불어, 유엔난민기구의 민간 부문 후원율이 높을 것이라고 예상하지 못했고 차라리 국내 후원을 더 많이 하는 것이 낫다고 생각했으며 현재 한국에서 지내고 있는 난민들에 대해 우려를 표시했다. 본 조사는 당시에 그리고 그 이후로도 간과되었던 숙의적인 여론형성과 정책수립 과정을 상호교차성 이론과 숙의 민주주의 이론을 통해 재고하였고, 향후 소수집단을 포용하는 실질적 민주주의가 보장되어야 한다는 점을 강조한다.

주요어: 난민, 한국, 설문조사, 여론, 상호교차성, 숙의 민주주의
학 번: 2018-25349