Between Entrapment and Proliferation
- Alliance Management of the US and China over Two Koreas' Nuclear Weapons Programs -

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Abstract

By examining the alliance management of the US and China over two Koreas' nuclear weapons programs, this dissertation finds the cause of nuclear restraint from security commitment. It asserts that a patron takes entrapment risk and increases security commitment when it fears nuclear proliferation greater than entrapment. This dissertation employs the combination of a case comparison method and a within-case method because nuclear restraint is a complex process that follows multiple steps, including rollback, suspension, or resumption of the nuclear weapons program.

From 1974 to 1982, the US provided South Korea with an increasing commitment level because Washington worried more about nuclear proliferation than entrapment. The US perceived high risk of nuclear proliferation, which might cause a major destabilizing effect in Asia, where Washington built a security network of bilateral alliances. To avoid nuclear proliferation, the US took entrapment risk and terminated South Korea's nuclear weapons development.

In contrast, from 1993 to 2009, China provided North Korea with a decreasing commitment level because Beijing was more concerned with entrapment than nuclear proliferation. China perceived high risk of entrapment from a possible North Korean regime collapse and a massive refugee influx across the border. To avoid entrapment, China remained at a low commitment level to North Korea, which eventually conducted nuclear tests and withdrew from nuclear negotiations.

This finding expands our knowledge about the commitment by differentiating the risks of entrapment and nuclear proliferation. It also emphasizes the role of positive security commitment for nuclear restraint.

Keywords: entrapment, nuclear proliferation, security commitment, alliance management, the US-South Korea alliance, the China-North Korea alliance
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Abbreviations

ADD	Agency for Defense Development
ANZUS	Security Treaty between Australia, New Zealand, and the United States of America
ARF	ASEAN Regional Forum
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
CANDU	Canada Deuterium Uranium
CCP	Chinese Communist Party
CPV	Chinese People's Volunteers
CVID	Complete, Verifiable, Irreversible Dismantlement
DMZ	Korean Demilitarized Zone
HEU	Highly Enriched Uranium
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
IRT	a Russian acronym for a Soviet-type Thermal Research Reactor
KAERI	Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute
KNFDI	Korea Nuclear Fuel Development Institute
KWP	Korean Workers Party
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NPT	Treaty of the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
NRX	National Research Experimental
NSC	National Security Council
NSDD	National Security Decision Directives
NSDM	National Security Decision Memorandum
NSSD	National Security Study Directive
NSSM	National Security Study Memorandum
NWS	Nuclear Weapons State
OSPSEA	Office of the Second Presidential Secretary for Economic Affairs
PD	Presidential Decision
PLA	People's Liberation Army
PRM	Presidential Review Memoranda
SCO	Shanghai Cooperation Organization
SEATO	Southeast Asia Treaty Organization
WEC	Weapons Exploitation Committee

I. INTRODUCTION

This dissertation investigates how the United States and China managed their alliances when their allies attempted to develop nuclear weapons. As a patron, the US successfully terminated a nuclear weapons program operated by its client in South Korea, while China, as a patron, failed to prevent its client in North Korea from acquiring nuclear weapons. By comparing two Korean cases, this dissertation aims to explain why a patron, which fears entrapment, provides the client with security commitment and how the patron's alliance management affects the client's nuclear weapons development.

There appear a few studies that examined how the US and China opposed nuclear weapons development in the context of alliance management. A couple of studies discussed the role of security commitment in preventing nuclear weapons development but did not explain why and how a patron establishes that security commitment.[1] With a lesser emphasis on security commitment, a recent study discussed how the US pressured South Korea to cancel its nuclear weapons program by withholding economic and technological assistance for weapons-related infrastructure

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[1] Dan Reiter, "Security Commitments and Nuclear Proliferation," *Foreign Policy Analysis* 10, no. 1 (2014); Philipp C. Bleek and Eric B. Lorber, "Security Guarantees and Allied Nuclear Proliferation," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 58, no. 3 (2014).

such as nuclear reprocessing facilities.[2] Another study argued that China

provided a shelter for North Korea with diplomatic and economic assistance

to develop nuclear weapons.[3]

Security commitment is a primary measure of alliance management,

but it is difficult for a patron to provide the client with a security

commitment because the security provider fears an increasing risk of

entrapment. The difficulty of providing commitment does not mean that a

patron abrogates an alliance. Historically, patrons opposed nuclear weapons

development by their clients but have not abandoned alliances. For instance,

the US and China managed to retain alliances while opposing nuclear

weapons development by South Korea and North Korea. There is much to

discuss how a patron prevents nuclear weapons development in the context

of alliance management.

1. Puzzle

The United States and China have been opposing nuclear weapons

development by their allies and neighboring states. Theoretically, the US

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[2] Alexander Lanoszka, *Atomic Assurance: The Alliance Politics of Nuclear Proliferation* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 2018), 110-31.

[3] Henrik Stålhane Hiim, *China and International Nuclear Weapons Proliferation: Strategic Assistance* (New York, NY: Routledge, 2018), 136-80.

and China lose more than gain from nuclear proliferation.[4] Nuclear

weapons development by the weak state can trigger a nuclear arms race,

destabilizing the security environment where the strong state has strategic

interests to preserve. Besides, nuclear weapons change the status of power

asymmetry between a strong state and a weak state by diminishing the

former's influence over the latter. In the worst scenario, the nuclear-armed

state might push a crisis to the brink and entrap the strong state into

conflicts, which the latter wish to avoid.

The history of alliance management also supports the opposition to

nuclear weapons development. During the Cold War, for example, the

United States assured its allies in Europe and Asia by establishing the

reliability of security commitment.[5] The US convinced its allies of security

assurance by deploying its troops and pledging to retaliate against the Soviet

opponent with nuclear weapons, although making reliable assurance was

more difficult than credible retaliation.[6] In return, the US benefited from its

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[4] Matthew Kroenig, "Force or Friendship? Explaining Great Power Nonproliferation Policy," *Security Studies* 23, no. 1 (2014); Nicholas L. Miller, *Stopping the bomb: The sources and effectiveness of US nonproliferation policy* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 2018).

[5] Mira Rapp-Hooper, *Shields of the Republic: The Triumph and Peril of America's Alliances* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2020), 57.

[6] The greater difficulty for assuring an ally is known as the "Healey Theorem." Former British Defense Minister Denis Healey is famously cited for his words, "it takes only five percent credibility of American retaliation to deter the Russians but ninety-five percent credibility to reassure the Europeans." Denis Healey, *The time of my life* (Michael Joseph, 1989), 243. recited from Steven E. Miller, Robert Legvold, and Lawrence Freedman, *Meeting the Challenges of the New Nuclear Age: Nuclear Weapons in a Changing Global Order* (Cambridge, Mass.: American Academy of Arts & Sciences, 2019), 65.

troops abroad by controlling the ally's security impulse, including pursuing nuclear weapons.[7] In the communist bloc, the Soviet Union and China also opposed nuclear weapons development by their communist clients. In doing so, the Soviet Union assured its allies with large military investments in East-Central Europe to prevent Warsaw Pact members' nuclear proliferation. China continued to provide North Korea with military and economic aid, but China opposed the transfer of nuclear weapons technology to the communist ally.

Nevertheless, there exists a mixed record on nuclear restraint by alliance management. Patrons successfully prevented nuclear weapons development in South Korea, West Germany, and Romania, in naming a few.[8] However, tight alliance treaties could not prevent nuclear weapons development by the United Kingdom in 1951, France in 1960, China in 1964, India in 1974, and North Korea in 2006.[9] To the lesser extent of alignment, Israel around the late 1960s and Pakistan in 1998 became nuclear-armed states.[10]

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[7] Rapp-Hooper, *Shields of the Republic: The Triumph and Peril of America's Alliances*, 57-60.

[8] In 1963, Romania expressed its interest in developing nuclear weapons. Romania hosted about 3,500 Soviet troops until 1958. By the early 1970s, Romania received enough highly enriched uranium from the US to produce a nuclear weapon. See Alexander Lanoszka, "Nuclear proliferation and nonproliferation among soviet allies," *Journal of Global Security Studies* 3, no. 2 (2018): 223-25.

[9] For world nuclear forces and the year of a first nuclear test, see SIPRI, *SIPRI Yearbook* (Oxford University Press Oxford, 2019).

[10] Israel's ambiguous nuclear posture makes it hard to know when it began to exercise nuclear deterrent capacity. It has been known through declassified

Patrons deployed military forces in its allies' territory, but they also deployed less than 1,000 troops or withdrew their troop deployment from other clients. Without a physical demonstration of allied forces, an informal security assurance was given to some allied states. For example, the United States prepared for military assistance informally, recognizing the strategic importance of Sweden, which was officially neutral between Western Europe and the Soviet Union.[11] Table 1 summarizes the mixed record.

Table 1. Ally's Nuclear Weapons Development

	Termination	Acquisition
High Level of Troops Deployed	Italy South Korea Taiwan West Germany	France* United Kingdom*
Low Level of Troops Deployed (less than 1,000)	Australia Egypt** Romania** South Africa Sweden	India** Israel North Korea*** Pakistan

Adapted from Debs and Monteiro (2017), *Nuclear Politics*, 70-84. The termination case of Iran in 1978 is disregarded in this table.
* Country as Nuclear Weapons State (NWS) under the NPT.
** Country aligned with the Soviet Union during its nuclear activities
*** Country aligned with China during its nuclear activities

documents that Israel pledged not to introduce nuclear weapons into the region, planting the seeds of Israeli nuclear opacity. See Avner Cohen, "Stumbling Into Opacity: The United States, Israel, and the Atom, 1960–63," *Security Studies* 4, no. 2 (1994).

[11] Alexandre Debs and Nuno P. Monteiro, *Nuclear Politics* (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 189-90.

Overall, alliance management of nuclear weapons development is puzzling. The United States and China were patrons on the Korean Peninsula under the bilateral alliance treaties. They opposed the development of nuclear weapons by their clients, South Korea, and North Korea. The patrons provided their clients with military, economic, and diplomatic assistance to prevent the client's nuclear weapons development. However, nuclear restraint by alliance management led to different results significantly. The United States managed the alliance with South Korea, strengthening the military relationship and preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. In contrast, China barely retained an asymmetric relationship with North Korea and failed to prevent North Korea from developing nuclear weapons.

The following questions emerge from this puzzle: Why did the United States succeed, and China fail to prevent nuclear weapons development by their allies despite the power superiority? What differences do exist between the alliance management of the United States and China? How did the patrons establish the reliability of security commitment to prevent the clients from developing nuclear weapons? What was the primary cause of security commitment? To answer these questions, this project discusses alliance management in relation to nuclear restraint.

2. Alliance and Nuclear Weapons

In this project, I make an argument on alliance management of nuclear weapons development. First, I raise attention to alliance management that has been less explored in both works of literature on alliance and nuclear nonproliferation. Furthermore, I illustrate that a client develops nuclear weapons when it fears abandonment by its patron. Last, I explain that a patron opposes a client's nuclear weapons development because it mainly worries about regional instability triggered by nuclear proliferation.

Alliance Management in Nuclear Restraint

At a glance, alliance management runs counter to a nuclear nonproliferation hypothesis, which argues that a patron should establish a reliable security commitment to restrain the client from developing nuclear weapons. Alliance management aims to address the alliance security dilemma by exerting a balancing act between abandonment and entrapment.[12] If a patron increases security commitment to assure the safety of its client, then the risk of entrapment, in turn, might increase in a way that its commitment might drag the patron into a conflict over the client's interests in developing nuclear weapons. In other words, a patron becomes reluctant to provide a

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[12] Glenn H. Snyder, "The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics," *World politics* 36, no. 4 (1984).

security commitment because it worries about the client, which would continue to develop nuclear weapons under a patron's security umbrella.

However, recent studies argued that the United States has managed to employ security commitments to assure and control its allies. In Mira Rapp-Hooper's words, "these signs of commitment aim to persuade the ally that its security is entwined with that of its guarantor, assuaging worries. But if the cost of assurance is taxing to deterrence-extending states, they also gain an important benefit. The fears of weaker allies reflect their dependency, and that gives defenders control."[13] Similarly, Victor Cha argued that the United States had no other option but to take the intense risk of entrapment as an unconventional approach for successful control of an ally's unwanted behavior.[14]

This unconventional approach was first introduced by Glenn Snyder, who suggested that a firm commitment sometimes is one method to avoid entrapment risks.[15] In particular, he stated that a state might avoid entrapment because "supporting the ally might improve its sense of security enough that it could feel safer in conciliating its opponent."[16] Despite the

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[13] Rapp-Hooper, *Shields of the Republic: The Triumph and Peril of America's Alliances*, 57-58.

[14] Victor Cha, *Powerplay: The Origins of the American Alliance System in Asia* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2016).

[15] Snyder's suggested method took into consideration of multiple objectives of deterrence, assurance, and control. See Glenn H. Snyder, *Alliance Politics* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1997), 185.

[16] Ibid.

explicit notion of benefits of security commitment over entrapment, few studies discuss how and when a patron may employ a security commitment to avoid a risk of entrapment.

Client's Motivation: Fear of Abandonment

A large volume of literature explores the motivation of states to pursue nuclear weapons.[17] We know from the literature that the motivation of nuclear weapons development arises from the nature of the security environment.[18] In particular, the fear of abandonment drives a client's nuclear weapons development. We also know that non-security factors such as domestic regime characteristics, cultural values, nationalist ideology, and leader's psychology, among others, affect the national search for nuclear weapons.[19]

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[17] The literature on examining the causes of nuclear proliferation falls into two categories. Literature in the first category explores the motivations of states who pursue nuclear weapons. Literature in the second category taps into the motivations of states who supply nuclear assistance. In this project, I focus on the first category. For the literature on nuclear supplier's motivation, see Stephen M. Meyer, *The Dynamics of Nuclear Proliferation* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986); Matthew Fuhrmann, "Spreading Temptation: Proliferation and Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation Agreements," *International Security* 34, no. 1 (2009); Nicholas L. Miller, "Why Nuclear Energy Programs Rarely Lead to Proliferation," ibid.42, no. 2 (2017); Sonali Singh and Christopher R. Way, "The Correlates of Nuclear Proliferation: A Quantitative Test," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 48, no. 6 (2004).

[18] Scott D. Sagan, "Why do States Build Nuclear Weapons? Three Models in Search of a Bomb," *International Security* 21, no. 3 (1997).

[19] For domestic regime characteristics, see Etel Solingen, *Nuclear Logics: Contrasting Paths in East Asia and the Middle East* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009). For Japan's pacifist culture and nonproliferation, see Mike M Mochizuki, "Japan tests the nuclear taboo," *Nonproliferation Review* 14, no. 2

Among them, the security motivation is the most salient explanation for nuclear weapons development. Based on neorealist theory in international relations, Scott Sagan introduced a security model to explain that a state pursues nuclear weapons capabilities to protect its independence and security unless the state cannot align with the nuclear-armed state.[20] Malign security environment can incur security threats to a country, and if not met by conventional military build-up or alliance with external deterrence, the threatened country may develop nuclear weapons.

Drawing on the security model, scholars discussed what causes states to reverse their nuclear decision. Debs and Monteiro applied strategic interactions between a patron and a client. They focused on relative power dynamics to claim that the success of nuclear weapons development depends on the patron's behavior.[21] A reliable security commitment reduces the ally's fear of abandonment, and the ally reverses its nuclear decision. T. V. Paul suggested a similar view that defensive states refrain from developing nuclear weapons when the level of conflict is low or moderate to

(2007). For nationalist ideology, see Mike Mochizuki and Deepa M Ollapally, *Nuclear Debates in Asia: The Role of Geopolitics and Domestic Processes* (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 2016). For psychology, see Jacques E. C. Hymans, *The psychology of nuclear proliferation: Identity, emotions and foreign policy* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006).

[20] Sagan, "Three Models."

[21] Debs and Monteiro, *Nuclear Politics*.

allow states to gain more economic interdependence.[22] In addition, Etel Solingen discussed non-security incentives for deciding not to develop nuclear weapons. By considering the dynamics between the domestic regime's orientation toward an open economy and the liberal international order, Solingen's study supported that a state exchanges a security choice with the national welfare.[23]

Overall, security is the major cause of nuclear weapons development. Non-security factors help us understand why states under various security threats choose different paths for nuclear weapons development. Nevertheless, relative power, a defensive attribute of a state actor, and incentives for national welfare explain that states forbear nuclear weapons for other national interests if a patron provides security commitment, which would reduce the client's fear of abandonment.

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[22] T. V. Paul exhibits hard realism, which delineates the propensity of an arms race, and modifies the version of realism to 'prudence realism,' by applying an institutionalist analysis. The interdependence of norms and economic interests become incentives for states to forebear nuclear weapons. T. V. Paul, *Power Versus Prudence: Why Nations Forgo Nuclear Weapons* (Quebec City, Canada: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2000).

[23] Solingen, *Nuclear Logics*. She disaggregated the national decision to pursue nuclear weapons and suggested that economic liberalization and regime survival influence a nuclear decision. Aiming to liberalize its economy, to invite foreign investment, and to participate in global trade, a political regime would forgo a nuclear weapons program considering countermeasures such as sanctions, which will damage the ruling coalition's popular support.

Patron's Motivation: Nuclear Nonproliferation

There appear three reasons why patrons in asymmetric alliances oppose nuclear weapons development by their clients.[24] First, nuclear weapons development increases proliferation risks, which destabilize the regional security environment. For example, John Mearsheimer argued that more nuclear weapons create arms competition.[25] A regional rival state could start pursuing nuclear weapons in response to an ally's nuclear weapons development. In turn, the regional security environment may deteriorate as more states acquire nuclear weapons. This is what nuclear domino warns: a state's nuclear armament might lead to another in a neighboring country.[26]

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[24] Two patterns of dependence exist in allied relationships. Asymmetric alliances are forged between states with a larger difference in capabilities to receive different benefits. A patron exchanges its security resources with the client's autonomy of a particular issue to achieve foreign policy objectives. According to James Morrow, security is the "ability to maintain the current resolution of the issues that it wishes to preserve" and is determined by relative military capabilities. Autonomy is "the degree to which it pursues desired changes in the status quo" and is negotiable and affected by how a state values its autonomy. The precise amount of security is determined by the client's location, treaty obligations, and threat perceived by the adversary. On the contrary, symmetric alliances are formed by states with similar capabilities. Two great powers may share similar interests to form an alliance to gain security or autonomy. To Morrow, an alliance under a model of capability aggregation either for status-quo purpose or revisionist purpose is a symmetric alliance. In a lengthy footnote, Morrow discusses the misclassification of a symmetric alliance between a major state and a minor state as an asymmetric alliance. This causes statistical error and bias. See James D. Morrow, "Alliances and Asymmetry: An Alternative to the Capability Aggregation Model of Alliances," *American Journal of Political Science* 35, no. 4 (1991): 908-14; 21-22.

[25] The concern over uncertainty about other's aggressive intentions persists so that states are pursuing of power maximization, which can lead to security competition until a state becomes a hegemon. See John J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (New York, NY: WW Norton & Company, 2001), 373-77.

[26] A nuclear domino is a strategic chain reaction similar to what Robert Jervis termed a spiral model of the security dilemma. See Robert Jervis, "Deterrence, the

Even though nuclear weapons are yet to be deployed in theater, their mere existence alone creates a high level of uncertainty for neighboring countries that do not possess nuclear weapons.[27]

Similarly, Scott Sagan argued that more nuclear weapons would worsen because a military organization is susceptible to preventive war.[28] Organizations may miscalculate and fail to satisfy the rational qualification of nuclear weapons operations. Organizations receive limited information making their members have biases based on experience and current responsibilities.[29] Considering possible organizational impediments to rationality, neighboring states should worry about deterrence failures and accidental wars.

In the worst scenario, a patron fears that it might be dragged into a nuclear war. For example, Francis Gavin examined a declassified report produced in 1962. He noted that US policymakers feared a nuclear-armed state might threaten to use or employ a nuclear weapon to pull the United States into a conflict against its will.[30]

Spiral Model, and Intentions of the Adversary," in *Perception and Misperception in International Politics*, New Edition (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1976).

[27] Paul, *Power Versus Prudence*, 17.

[28] Standardized procedures to operate in crisis simplifies mechanisms to respond to increasing uncertainty. See Scott D. Sagan, "More Will Be Worse," in *The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed*, ed. Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz (New York, NY: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 2003).

[29] Ibid., 51.

[30] Francis J. Gavin, *Nuclear Weapons and American Grand Strategy* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2020), 85.

Second, nuclear weapons, which cause a significant influence over its power asymmetry, can constrain a patron's military freedom of action. For example, Matthew Kroenig introduced a power-projection theory to explain a great power nonproliferation policy.[31] He argued that states oppose the spread of nuclear weapons over other states, including a friendly state when the former has the ability to project military power over the latter.[32]

To the extent of alliance duration, a qualitative change in capabilities between allies may jeopardize the existence of the alliance.[33] James Morrow stated, "changes in the capabilities of the state and its ally alter its security in and out of the alliance. Any such change makes an alliance more likely to break; increases in a state's capabilities improve its security outside the alliance, decrease in its ally's capabilities reduce its security in the

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[31] Kroenig, "Force or Friendship."

[32] Ibid.

[33] This does not mean asymmetric alliances are fragile. Asymmetric alliances last longer than symmetric alliances because of the possible exchange of different benefits. Symmetric alliances require a great deal of harmony, instead. Symmetric alliances are susceptible to break with changes in their relative capabilities because either a strengthened state finds the alliance no longer necessary. When the allies no longer share a mutual interest, they are unlikely to coordinate their future actions. Morrow, "Alliances and Asymmetry," 930. Stephen Walt also supports the longer endurance of asymmetric alliances by emphasizing the role of "hegemonic leadership." A superpower, which has global interests in conflict with a rival superpower, encourages minor states to keep their allied relationships. An alliance under the hegemonic leadership of a superpower is durable if the alliance leader firmly commits itself to preserve the alliance and bear costs by offering material resources to attract allies or punish non-compliance by its allies. See Stephen M. Walt, "Why Alliances Endure or Collapse," *Survival* 39, no. 1 (1997).

alliance, and either ally can break the alliance."[34]

Third, a nuclear-armed client is likely to compete over security interests with the patron. Allies have different scopes of security interests. T. V. Paul said, "great powers tend to have global interests, while the security concerns and interests of most idle and small powers focus on their regions."[35] With enhanced, independent security capabilities, the nuclear-armed ally might seek changes in foreign policy status quo. In other words, a patron opposes nuclear weapons development because nuclear weapons devalue the security commitment to defend a client. A nuclear-armed client may have more incentive to pursue individual foreign policy objectives, which the patron does not agree with. Nuclear weapons also reduce the incentive to concede its sovereignty to the alliance. For example, in the 1960s, France sought an independent nuclear deterrent, but the United States resisted because it worried about the weakening of influence over the alliance.[36]

In contrast, others presented an optimistic view that nuclear-armed patrons may cooperate with their client's nuclear weapons program. They argue that nuclear weapons development brings strategic, political, and

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[34] James D. Morrow, "Alliances: Why Write Them Down?," *Annual Review of Political Science* 3, no. 1 (2000): 78.

[35] Paul, *Power Versus Prudence*, 17.

[36] Avery Goldstein, *Deterrence and Security in the 21st Century: China, Britain, France and the Enduring Legacy of the Nuclear Revolution* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2000), 181-216.

military advantages to an alliance. At the structural level, one might argue that the international system could be more stable with more nuclear weapons as nuclear weapons introduced a revolutionary change in the balance of power.[37] In Kenneth Waltz's expression, "more may be better" because nuclear weapons as second-strike forces make a preventive attack difficult and dangerous.[38]

Similarly, some supply-side literature argued that a nuclear supplier might assist its military ally because it can strengthen their strategic partnership and impose costs on rival states.[39] Matthew Fuhrmann and Benjamin Tkach argued that a nuclear-armed ally might also provide sensitive nuclear assistance to increase the potential capacity to proliferate because this "nuclear latency" can be translated into a similar deterrence effect.[40]

Others also introduced a view that the United States and China have been selectively enforced proliferation policies. For example, Nicholas

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[37] Bernard Brodie et al., *The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and World Order* (New York: Harcourt, 1946). The massive scale of nuclear destruction changes military strategy from winning wars to avert them.

[38] Kenneth N. Waltz, "More May be Better," in *The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed*, ed. Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz (New York, NY: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 2003).

[39] Matthew Fuhrmann, "Taking a Walk on the Supply Side: The Determinants of Civilian Nuclear Cooperation," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 53, no. 2 (2009); Matthew Kroenig, "Exporting the Bomb: Why States Provide Sensitive Nuclear Assistance," *American Political Science Review* 103, no. 1 (2009).

[40] Matthew Fuhrmann and Benjamin Tkach, "Almost Nuclear: Introducing the Nuclear Latency Dataset," *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 32, no. 4 (2015).

Miller suggested how the US acted against rogue states while allowing

Western, democratic states access to nuclear weapons.[41] Henrik Hiim

argued that Chinese nuclear assistance increased when Beijing saw less risk

of provoking adversaries.[42]

   However, a patron's direct support for a client's nuclear weapons

program is rare. There exist only two circumstantial cases: American

support for Israeli nuclear weapons and Chinese support for Pakistani

nuclear weapons. They are based on highly circumstantial evidence.

Besides, states barely started to discuss the pros and cons of nuclear

proliferation in the 1960s.[43] Miller also pointed out that American support

in democratic allies for nuclear weapons occurred during the initial stage of

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[41] By listing negative and positive views of nuclear proliferation, Nicholas Miller suggested that the US government selectively benefited its liberal, Western, or democratic allies while constraining its enemies. Besides, he introduced a view that Democratic administrations supported strong nonproliferation policies while Republican administrations did not. Still, he concluded that "the US government pursues nonproliferation in order to (1) preserve its conventional power-projection advantages; (2) reduce the risk of nuclear war; (3) maintain influence over allies." For the causes of the US nonproliferation policy, see Miller, *Stopping the bomb*, 11-14.

[42] Henrik Hiim called this risk "cascade effects," which refers to unfavorable changes in military doctrines of adversaries. In addition, he argued that the strategic values of a recipient state affected the level of the Chinese assistance to nuclear weapons development in Pakistan, Iran, and North Korea. He suggested four categories of nuclear support: (1) direct weapons support, (2) limited support, (3) sheltering with diplomatic assistance, or (4) mixed strategies. For the cause of the Chinese proliferation policy, see Hiim, *China and International Nuclear Weapons Proliferation*, 32-39.

[43] For the American debate between the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) and the State Department whether to oppose or allow allied nuclear proliferation, See Francis J. Gavin, *Nuclear Statecraft: History and Strategy in America's Atomic Age* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 2012), 80-87.

the Cold War.[44] In addition, nuclear assistance does not directly transfer nuclear weapons. To be sure, most nuclear assistance is conducted as an energy program, which usually involves nonproliferation regulations.[45] A nuclear supplier may assist their ally with sensitive nuclear technologies controlled under bilateral and multilateral nuclear cooperation agreements. As Matthew Fuhrmann admitted, nuclear assistance is not a sufficient condition for nuclear proliferation.[46]

Furthermore, the positive view on assistance to a nuclear weapons program does not necessarily assume allied relationships. Nuclear-armed states might assist non-allied states for nuclear weapons programs when the recipients share strategic interests against the supplier's adversary. It premises that influence over a non-allied recipient is less valuable to the supplier than the allied recipient. In other words, a positive view of nuclear proliferation does not consider alliance management.

In short, a patron worries about the client's nuclear weapons development because the risk of nuclear proliferation destabilizes the regional security environment, and nuclear weapons provide an opportunity for the client to pursue an independent military strategy. Nuclear weapons development becomes a management challenge to the alliance. The patron

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[44] Miller, *Stopping the bomb*, 13.

[45] Miller, "Rarely Lead to Proliferation."

[46] Christoph Bluth et al., "Civilian nuclear cooperation and the proliferation of nuclear weapons," ibid.35, no. 1 (2010): 194.

may provide nuclear assistance to the client to enhance deterrence against adversaries. Nevertheless, they do not support the spread of nuclear weapons, which might be used against their will. Therefore, nuclear weapons development is one of the most critical challenges for alliance management.

To summarize, alliance management matters in relation to nuclear restraint. Nuclear weapons development challenges the management of an alliance because nuclear weapons development may lead to regional nuclear proliferation. How does a patron prevent the client from developing nuclear weapons and retain the alliance at the same time? Alliance management has been one of the most underdeveloped areas in alliance theory as more emphasis has been put on alliance formation. We might broaden our knowledge about alliance management by investigating a logical linkage of alliance and nuclear weapons development.

3. Argument

I argue that a patron provides the client with a security commitment when it worries more about nuclear proliferation than entrapment. In the general context of an alliance, alliance management explains that a patron would reduce its security commitment to avoid entrapment, which drags the patron to unwanted interests of the client based on alliance obligations. Contrary to the general explanation, nuclear weapons development shifts the relations

between commitment and entrapment unconventionally. A patron takes the risk of entrapment and increases its security commitment to avoid the danger of nuclear proliferation.

In the context of a client's nuclear weapons development, a patron employs such an unconventional, risk-taking approach because the danger of nuclear proliferation, which destabilizes the regional security environment, is more fearsome than the risk of entrapment. If a patron has significant value in the stability of the security environment, its risk-taking approach will be emboldened. However, not every patron fears nuclear proliferation more than entrapment. A patron may find entrapment more dangerous than nuclear proliferation or both fearsome. In such a double bind case, a patron may employ a risk-averse approach. If not completely avoiding entrapment by withdrawal from the alliance, the patron may decrease security commitment to the alliance.

In both the risk-taking approach and the risk-averse approach, a patron does not abandon the client if the patron has a strategic value in the client.[47] Other scholars suggested that a patron may employ a threat of withdrawal or impose sanctions to compel the client to renounce the nuclear weapons program. They argued that withdrawal and sanctions increase the client's security uncertainty, thereby forcing the client to exchange its

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[47] Morrow argued that changes in a weak ally's capabilities would not influence either party's decision to leave the alliance. Morrow, "Why Write Them Down," 79.

autonomy of nuclear weapons development with external security arrangements. However, they do not make a convincing case when a patron has strategic value in regional stability. In other words, the patron would be unable to convince the client of withdrawal and sanctions. Moreover, the client may resist the pressure if it knows its safety is essential to the patron's strategic interests.

I also argue that the patron's reliable security commitment restrains the client from developing nuclear weapons. To do so, the patron may employ hard commitment and soft commitment. First, hard commitment is a physical demonstration of military power and includes forward-based troop deployments, joint exercises, and other military infrastructure investments. Troop deployment is part of the forward defense for the patron's advanced positioning and preparation to deter adversarial threats.[48] For the client, troop deployment is assuring because the attached deterrence effect extends to an ally's security. Second, soft commitment is interest sharing and includes diplomatic dialogues and other non-military exchange. Economic assistance is part of political commitment because it delivers a message that the patron has strategic interests in the client's security. The patron's confirmation of its interest in an ally's national survival would significantly assure the client.

Both hard commitment and soft commitment may increase the level

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[48] Rapp-Hooper, *Shields of the Republic: The Triumph and Peril of America's Alliances*, 49.

of security commitment. I do not argue that they are sufficient conditions to establish the reliability of security commitment. Patron's demonstration of military power may be reliable enough to deliver the patron's willingness to protect the client. However, without sharing the patron's strategic interests with the client, it will be difficult for the patron to fully convince the client of its resolve to come to the client's defense even at risk to itself. Depending on the strategic context, the client may become suspicious of a patron's resolve to come to its aid. With such an unreliable security commitment, the client may take advantage of its patron's physical protection as a window of opportunity to develop nuclear weapons.

My argument assumes that weak states are defensive in nature and likely to make a prudent choice of nuclear restraint when the patron reduces fundamental military threats. My argument stems from Glenn Snyder's work on alliance politics.[49] He listed methods to avoid entrapment risks based on negative incentives (i.e., withdrawal and sanctions) or positive incentives (i.e., firm commitment). I do not question the general knowledge explaining that a patron withdraws or impose sanctions to avoid entrapment. Instead, I argue that a patron employs a security commitment at its risk when faced with another, greater risk: destabilizing security environment due to nuclear proliferation.

The South Korean case reveals that the American troop deployments

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[49] Snyder, *Alliance Politics*.

and joint exercises were generally effective to assure South Korea. The reliability of the American commitment was greater when its vital interests in the protection of South Korea were discussed through diplomatic dialogues. The threat of withdrawal was ineffective to terminate South Korea's nuclear weapons program. Besides, the official documentary reveals weak evidence that proves the US threat to withhold or abrogate its military support.

The North Korean case shows that China's core interests in preserving a stable Korean Peninsula were partly effective in preventing nuclear weapons development in North Korea. However, China was unable to assure North Korea. The Chinese armed forces were already withdrawn from North Korea in the early 1950s. In the post-Cold War, military exchanges with North Korea significantly diminished as China established a diplomatic relationship with the United States and South Korea. China's security commitment was unreliable to prevent North Korea from developing nuclear weapons. Sanctions as signs of nonsupport only deteriorated the bilateral relationship, leading China to lose North Korea's confidence in the alliance. With unreliable security commitment, China eventually failed to prevent North Korea from developing nuclear weapons.

4. Plan of Dissertation

Following the introduction, chapter 2 reviews theories of alliance management. I focus on alliance management literature to describe that patron's alliance management aims to avoid entrapment. After illustrating that a general method to avoid entrapment is withdrawal rather than commitment, I examine the limits of withdrawal in the context of a client's nuclear weapons development. To build the theoretical framework of my dissertation, I contend that Snyder made a self-contradictory argument on alliance management by treating commitment as both a cause and a solution to avoid entrapment. I reinterpret Snyder's methods to avoid entrapment by suggesting that a state may give a firm commitment to take the risk of entrapment and avoid greater danger: nuclear proliferation. I build my theory upon existing knowledge on the role of a reliable security commitment in nuclear restraint to explain causes that may increase the level of reliability to prevent nuclear weapons development. Then I explain the method and the selection of cases to test my theory and describe sources that I used for the project.

Upon establishing a theoretical framework, chapter 3 and chapter 4 analyze the alliance management of the United States and China to restrain South Korea and North Korea from developing nuclear weapons. To find out whether the cases confirm or reject the theory, chapter 3 examines the US management of nuclear weapons programs in South Korea from 1974 to

1982, and chapter 4 examines the Chinese management of nuclear weapons programs in North Korea from 1994 to 2009. In particular, the case studies compare the US and China's risk assessment to explain that patrons employ security commitments when they face greater nuclear proliferation risks or lesser entrapment risks.

Chapter 3 and chapter 4 will be divided into three parts. To better understand cases, the first part will discuss the origins of each alliance: how the United States and China began to manage asymmetric alliances with South Korea and North Korea. It will also discuss the alliance policies of the US and China from a historical context. The second part will discuss the background of nuclear weapons development in two Koreas by illustrating the deteriorating security environment and following the detection of nuclear weapons programs. The discussion will explain how the US and China slowed down nuclear weapons development. The third part will discuss why South Korea and North Korea maintained or resumed their nuclear weapons programs by illustrating continued disengagement by the US and China despite the existence of adversarial threats. To compare the final outcomes of cases, the focus will be given how the US terminated nuclear weapons development in South Korea, and how China failed to restrain North Korea from developing nuclear weapons.

In conclusion, chapter 6 summarizes the argument of the study and confirms that a patron provides security commitment to avoid nuclear proliferation, and a reliable security commitment restrains the client from

developing nuclear weapons. The project draws a lesson for a patron to demonstrate its ability and willingness to prevent nuclear weapons development by comparing the US and Chinese alliance management. The conclusion draws implications for policy and further theoretical development.

II. THEORIES OF ALLIANCE MANAGEMENT

1. Theoretical Overview

Patron's Management Tool: Commitment

A state employs security commitment to reassure its ally, defend it from the adversary, and reveal its intention to preserve the alliance. Security commitment also allows a security provider to win a concession of a particular foreign policy objective from the recipient. In other words, stronger commitment increases the level of foreign policy autonomy for a security provider. Especially in an asymmetric alliance, a patron takes advantage of dependence relationships to achieve broader security objectives by increasing security commitment. For example, a patron may promise to provide positive security assurances in exchange for a client's compliance with nuclear nonproliferation. By promising to come to another's aid, states not only forge an alliance but also manage the military relationships.

Structural changes in a new security landscape reshape the alignment of states to reconsider the level of security commitment. In wartime, the primary goal of alliances is to aggregate military capabilities to deter or defeat common threats. By increasing commitments, allied states receive more security than being alone. In peacetime, states reduce the level of

commitment to the alliance.[50]   Alliances become no longer necessary because threats are diminished, or allies accomplished shared goals. Upon the end of the Second World War, for example, the United States and the former Soviet Union ended the wartime coalition and stood against each other.

The post-Cold War alliance has revealed a different aspect, however. For instance, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) survived the post-Cold War. The American alliance network in Asia also continues to thrive. Even China maintains an alliance with North Korea. That is, capability aggregation is inadequate to explain why alliances endure in the 21st century.

To better describe the endurance of alliances, international relations scholarship shifted the focus of alliance theory from formation to management. James Morrow introduced the autonomy-security trade-off model to describe how alliances operate to balance an ally's security and autonomy interests by exchanging them with others.[51]   He took a broad approach to describe the trade-off *between* states. Differences in allied states' capabilities and interests enable a state to exchange its security interests with its ally's autonomy interests. To Morrow, an ally has

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[50] Kenneth Waltz attempted to explain alliance formation with structural realism. The balance of power became the best-known theory of alliance formation. From Waltz's perspective, wartime alliances are thought to be forged to combine military forces and coordinate the allies' joint war efforts. See Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979).

[51] Morrow, "Alliances and Asymmetry."

autonomy when it wishes a change in a particular issue. If an ally has no interest in any change, the ally has no autonomy to exchange. In this case, the trade-off may not be attractive for the ally. If a particular interest is vital to the ally, then it may not make a concession. For example, a patron would be unable to manage the alliance if the client views indigenous nuclear deterrent as its vital interests.

Besides, a patron may find its client's autonomy concession unattractive as well. For example, a client may be unable to provide a strategic location to attract troop deployment from a patron. In other words, a client's policy preference must be negotiable and attractive for an exchange with security provided by a patron. Therefore, Morrow's interpretation of the autonomy-security trade-off model implies that stronger security commitment increases the level of foreign policy autonomy for a patron.

Glenn Snyder applied the autonomy-security trade-off model to alliance management with different implications: stronger commitment might decrease the level of foreign policy autonomy. He took a different focus to examine the trade-off *within* a state.[52] He provided an example of when states respond to adversarial threats to rebalance security and autonomy.[53] A state may increase its security by strengthening an alliance

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[52] Snyder, *Alliance Politics*, 181.

[53] Ibid., 180-81.

at some cost to its autonomy in response to growing adversarial threats. In the case of diminishing threats, a state may trade its excess security for more autonomy. The state is less committed to the alliance. In this sense, Snyder argued that allied states are required to decide "how firmly to commit themselves to the proto-partner and how much support to give that partner in specific conflict interactions with the adversary."[54] In other words, an allied state increases or decreases its security commitment to cope with the changing security environment.

Furthermore, Snyder translated the trade-off between autonomy and security into the tension between entrapment risks and abandonment risks.[55] He labeled the tension "alliance security dilemma."[56] It is a dilemma because of an increase or decrease of commitment, which shifts expectations on entrapment and abandonment inversely.[57] A state can decrease the risk of entrapment by weakening commitment or not fulfilling one's support to an ally in conflicting issues, but this will increase the risk

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[54] Snyder, "The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics," 466.

[55] "Entrapment means being dragged into a conflict over an ally's interests that one does not share or shares only partially." Because an alliance provides defense and deterrence, an ally may take a firmer position to escalate tensions into conflict. A state may go to war against its will because of treaty obligations to assist its ally. Ibid., 467. Abandonment is defection ranging from realignment with the opponent to a de-alignment, including the abrogation of an alliance treaty. A state also cancels a security commitment to remain alone by building arms or making concessions with the adversary and realign with it. Other forms of abandonment include a failure to meet alliance commitments or support the ally diplomatically in conflict. Ibid., 466-67.

[56] Snyder, *Alliance Politics*, 181.

[57] Ibid.

of abandonment by reducing the expectation of loyalty from the ally. A state may make a concession with the adversary and expect that the alliance is no longer needed. Conversely, a state can decrease the risk of abandonment by strengthening commitment to the ally, but this will increase the risk of entrapment by emboldening the ally with confidence in allied support.

Snyder's interpretation of the autonomy-security trade-off model implies that stronger commitment may reduce the level of foreign policy autonomy for a security provider. Thus, he described alliance management as the bargaining process to seek "an optimum mix between the risks of abandonment and entrapment."[58] That is, commitment serves as a management tool for the balancing act.

In short, both Morrow and Snyder apply a similar concept of autonomy-security trade-off to develop theories of alliance management. By providing a security commitment, a patron takes advantage of power asymmetry to manage the allied relationship. A patron should expect more freedom of foreign policy by strengthening its commitment to the alliance if the patron overcomes the entrapment challenge.

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[58] Ibid., 189.

Patron's Management Challenge: Entrapment

A patron is more susceptible to the risk of entrapment than the risk of abandonment. A patron may not be able to provide more security, not because its client is unwilling to make autonomy concession but because the patron must worry about the consequence of being dragged into the client's interests.

To be sure, the focus of optimizing the alliance dilemma is on managing the risk of entrapment rather than the fear of abandonment when it comes to an asymmetric alliance. As James Morrow has put it, "states forge an asymmetric alliance only when they solve the entrapment problem."[59] A patron expects less freedom of foreign policy (or more entrapment risks) by strengthening the allied relationship as the alliance dilemma dictates. To a patron, abandonment is less significant than entrapment because the patron would not expect much security benefits from the client. Conversely, weak states align with more strong states to get aid against their local enemy. The weak allies are much more concerned about threats from local rivals than threats from an adversarial great power.

Building on the autonomy-exchange trade-off model, the alliance dilemma suggests that the asymmetry of capabilities and following exchange translate into the imbalance of entrapment and abandonment for

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[59] Morrow, "Why Write Them Down," 79.

the allied states.[60] In an extreme case, a patron has entrapment risks solely, whereas the client holds abandonment risks. For example, Victor Cha argued that the US accommodation practices with an adversary increased entrapment risks vis-à-vis the ally as the great power perceived stronger alliances as unnecessarily provocative.[61] As weak allies, South Korea and Japan faced more significant abandonment risks when they perceived high external threats, had few alternative alliance partners and limited indigenous military capabilities, and allied with the US that had a reputation of appeasement policies.[62]

In other cases, the patron's security commitment may serve as insurance for an adventurous client, making the client behave more recklessly.[63] Snyder argued that entrapment risks arise when "the ally is emboldened to stand firmer and take more risks vis-à-vis opponent, and one becomes more firmly committed to the ally."[64] The greater certainty of security commitment encourages the weak ally to become overconfident and

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[60] Symmetry means the allied states share either risk of entrapment or abandonment.

[61] Victor Cha, "Abandonment, entrapment, and neoclassical realism in Asia: the United States, Japan, and Korea," *International Studies Quarterly* 44, no. 2 (2000): 265-66.

[62] Ibid.

[63] Brett Benson discusses a weak state's behavior of threatening the alliance based on the concept of moral hazard. See Brett V. Benson, *Constructing International Security: Alliances, Deterrence, and Moral Hazard* (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2012).

[64] See Glenn H. Snyder, "Alliance Theory: A Neorealist First Cut," *Journal of International Affairs* 44, no. 1 (1990): 113.

pursue its interests, thus raise the risk of entrapment.[65] In other cases, an

ally is unable to pursue its interests to change foreign policy status quo

alone and may attempt to push a crisis to the brink so that the ally can force

a great power to come to its aid.[66]

Entrapment risks might be more significant than abandonment risks

in a bipolar system. For example, Snyder suggested that weak allies of a

superpower have no incentive to realign with the other superpower.[67]

Superpowers are less worried about being abandoned by their allies.

Furthermore, a patron has a dilemma in facing dual challenges to

retain asymmetry relationships with allies and to avoid entrapment risks. For

example, Keren Yarhi-Milo, Alexander Lanoszka, and Zack Cooper coined

the term "patron's dilemma," emphasizing America's risk of entrapment,

which arises from ally's anxiety in response to increasing adversarial

threats.[68]

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[65] Other adverse effects of strong commitment include the preclusion of the options of alternative realignment or the solidification of adversary alliance. See "The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics," 467-68.

[66] Morrow, "Why Write Them Down," 182; Snyder, *Alliance Politics*.

[67] Snyder, "Alliance Theory," 118-19.

[68] Keren Yarhi-Milo, Alexander Lanoszka, and Zack Cooper, "To Arm or to Ally? The Patron's Dilemma and the Strategic Logic of Arms Transfers and Alliances," *International Security* 41, no. 2 (2016).

Avoiding Entrapment: Withdrawal

How does a state address the entrapment challenge of alliance management? In general, international relations scholarship explains that a state moves away from the ally or withdraws security commitment. To be sure, the threat of withdrawal is one of the five methods that Snyder suggested how a state avoids entrapment risks. Snyder presented five ways that a state may employ to avoid entrapment and restrain its ally based on positive or negative incentives.[69] Simply put, these methods are carrots or sticks of alliance management.

Figure 1 expresses these methods.

Figure 1. Snyder's Methods to Avoid Entrapment

Negative Incentives				Positive Incentives
Threat of Withdrawal	withhold diplomatic support to a particular issue	insist on consultation during a crisis	persuade to change ally's preference	**Firm commitment**

On the one hand, the threat of withdrawal is a coercive method to avoid entrapment. The patron moves away from the client or threatens to withhold diplomatic support to a particular issue. The client becomes more willing to comply with the patron's demands, facing greater uncertainty of allied protection. To the lesser extent of coercion, Snyder suggested that a

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[69] Snyder, *Alliance Politics*, 185-86; 320-28.

state may rely on its ability to persuade the ally. The state may insist on

consultation during a crisis or persuade the ally to change its preference or

dissuade unwanted behavior.[70]

On the other hand, a firm commitment is a method of assurance.

Snyder argued, "sometimes, however, giving the ally a firm commitment

may be a better safeguard against entrapment than distancing oneself."[71] He

explained that a firm commitment either deter adversary or improve a

client's sense of security, which will lead to conciliation with the adversary.

In other words, firm commitment reduces a client's fear of abandonment

and prevents the client from developing nuclear weapons.

Nevertheless, it does not explain how a patron employs a firm

commitment when it fears entrapment risk. How can commitment increase

and decrease entrapment at the same time? To recall the patron's

management challenge, the risk of entrapment is significantly greater than a

risk of abandonment for a more powerful state. To balance entrapment and

abandonment, a patron hardly employs additional security commitment to

avoid a risk of entrapment. Domestically, it will also be difficult for the

patron to mobilize additional resources.

Therefore, a general method of avoiding entrapment is withdrawal

rather than commitment. Based on the general explanation, scholars

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[70] Ibid., 185-86; 322-25.

[71] Ibid., 185.

discussed alliance politics in explaining a patron's threat of withdrawal prevents the client from developing nuclear weapons. In other words, they placed "alliance coercion" as the main driver of restraining nuclear weapons development.[72] They claimed that a patron could compel its client to restrain nuclear weapons development by imposing punishment in case of noncompliance.

Alliance coercion is built on two major propositions. First, it argues that the threat of withdrawal effectively compels an ally's nuclear behavior into nonproliferation compliance. In other words, it interprets the autonomy-security trade-off as a forceful exchange. By employing coercive measures such as the threat of withdrawal, a patron aims to prevent the client from developing nuclear weapons by decreasing the certainty of the patron's protection, which otherwise emboldens the client's confidence in the alliance. Feared by the patron's uncertain support, the client perceives the threat as credible enough.

Second, alliance coercion assumes that states are power maximizing actors. As Mearsheimer has put it, "the international system creates powerful incentives for states to look for opportunities to gain power at the expense of rivals and to take advantage of those situations when the benefits

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[72] Gene Gerzhoy, "Alliance Coercion and Nuclear Restraint: How the United States Thwarted West Germany's Nuclear Ambitions," *International Security* 39, no. 4 (2015); Lanoszka, *Atomic Assurance*.

outweigh the costs."[73] In this vein, alliance coercion premises states'

competitive characteristics under the principle of self-help, which contends

that states pursue both allies and arms.[74]

Alliance coercion claims that a patron may conditionalize the threat

of withdrawal to compel a client to comply with the patron's demands. In

other words, the success of restraining threat hinges on the conditionality of

withdrawal. A patron promises not to withdraw once the client cancels

nuclear weapons development. In doing so, the patron may employ threats

of military, economic, technological withdrawal.

A client militarily dependent on a patron will restrain its nuclear

weapons development when it is certain that the patron will withdraw its

threat if the client complies. For example, Gene Gerzhoy argued that the US

threat of military abandonment linked to nonproliferation demands

compelled West Germany to trade-off the ally's nuclear ambition with

security commitment.[75] He emphasized the effectiveness of alliance

coercion, which is "a strategy consisting of a patron's use of conditional

threats of military abandonment."[76]

Withdrawal of non-military assistance is another way to compel a

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[73] Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, 21.

[74] States behave under the international anarchy system, and they are ruled by the
principle of self-help balancing against power by an internal military build-up and
external alignment to achieve national survival. Waltz, *Theory of International
Politics*.

[75] Gerzhoy, "Alliance Coercion."

[76] Ibid., 92.

client to cancel nuclear weapons development. Alexander Lanoszka argued that the United States restrained ally's nuclear programs by threatening economic and technological nonsupport.[77] He disagreed with Gerzhoy's argument of employing a threat to abrogate the alliance. Military withdrawal would risk the client's deepening abandonment fear even if these threats are conditional to noncompliance.[78] In Lanoszka's words, "how can abandonment fears trigger nuclear weapons interest, but abandonment threats end it?"[79] Instead of military sanctions, Lanoszka argued that non-military threats such as economic sanctions are more promising. Faced with alliance coercion, a client economically and technologically dependent on the patron would choose its welfare over the nuclear arsenal.

To the lesser extent of withdrawal, a patron may increase the ambiguity of its security commitment to make the client anxious and comply with the patron's demand. For example, a patron may pressure its client by revealing that it could not accept something that the client has pursued. If a restraining patron has strategic interests over the client's security, the patron may partly oppose the client's interests. In another case, a patron may bring restraining pressure on the client by revealing that it could accept something the client has refused to concede.[80] The client casts

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[77] Lanoszka, *Atomic Assurance*.

[78] Ibid., 20.

[79] Ibid.

[80] Snyder, *Alliance Politics*, 326.

some doubts on the patron's support. Increased uncertainty of allied support creates anxiety about being abandoned. As a result, the client concedes to the patron.

Similarly, a patron may increase the credibility of threats by making a vague commitment to its ally. Snyder argued that "restraint is likely to be more successful when the alliance's terms are vague or ambiguous than when they are explicit and precise."[81] The vague commitment may foster uncertainty and maximize the credibility of a restraining threat. When the restraining patron makes a vague commitment to the alliance, the client becomes unable to know if this entails any obligation upon the restrainer. The client becomes anxious to make a concession to the alliance.

Scholars who support alliance coercion admit that military security guarantees serve as a basis for a patron to retain an alliance. Despite the importance of the conditionality of threats, alliance coercion suggests that a patron might deploy its troops to create a tripwire that ensures its military engagement, restore, or retain troops levels.[82] Nevertheless, alliance coercion emphasizes that a security commitment alone does not reduce entrapment risks for a patron nor successfully prevent a client from developing nuclear weapons.

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[81] Ibid., 327.

[82] Gerzhoy, "Alliance Coercion," 104; Lanoszka, *Atomic Assurance*, 19.

Limits of Withdrawal

First, alliance coercion, which places the threat of withdrawal at the center of its argument, neglects alliance management based on positive incentives. It under-evaluates how firm commitment may assure the client and reduce the client's fear of abandonment, which initially triggered nuclear weapons development. A patron provides a security commitment to assure the client that their security is under protection. Snyder, who delved into coercive strategies, implied that non-coercive measures might help achieve restraint success. He noted: "The success of restraint will depend not only on the credibility of restraining threats but also on (1) how much the ally must give up in succumbing to restraint, and (2) how much it would be harmed if it does not succumb and the threat is carried out. … Even if the threat (say, of nonsupport in a crisis) is credible, it may still not be effective if the ally would have to sacrifice important values in being restrained or if it has little need of help."[83]

However, his discussion ends here. He did not specify how the restrainer could influence these allies' interests and dependence. Still, there appear two possible responses to his statement. First, a restrainer may provide negative incentives. The restrainer increases an ally's expected damage for noncompliance by imposing conditional coercive measures. If the ally complies, the restrainer revokes the threat. In turn, the ally's

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[83] Snyder, *Alliance Politics*, 327-28.

expected damage decreases to the level before the threat. Second, a restrainer may provide positive incentives. The restrainer (or a security provider) decreases an ally's expected damage by offering additional security assurance. The ally's expected damage decreases under the initial level.

Alliance coercion only focuses on negative incentives. A restrainer imposes a conditional threat so that its ally complies to minimize damage to its security interests. The greater the ally's expected damage, the higher the possibility of successful coercion. On the contrary, alliance coercion disregards positive incentives. It does not discuss how a patron may employ firm commitment.[84] A theoretical framework that would capture assurance implications of alliance management has to be developed.

Second, alliance coercion does not make a convincing case when a restraining patron has strategic value over the client's security.[85] Considering the "big influence of small allies," a state with less dependence

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[84] There exists a tendency to emphasize coercive measures when it comes to alliance management. Many studies find ways to develop alliance management arguments from adversarial games. These studies are relying on Thomas Schelling's work on adversarial strategies, particularly deterrence. For example, see "The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics."

[85] A great power may have strategic interests when it needs to block an increase in the adversary's power by defending its ally. A great power might need to use an ally's specific territory as a strategic base to pursue its broader security interests. To protect its interests, a great power extends security commitment not only to defend the ally but also to prevent the ally's defection to the adversary. Ibid., 467-73. Snyder, *Alliance Politics*, 169-70.

on its ally may be unable to employ credible threats.[86] Knowing that the

patron will come to its aid, the client may take advantage of its vulnerability

and continue to pursue its nuclear interest regardless of the threat of

withdrawal.[87] Because of strategic interests to preserve the alliance, the

patron may fail to make a credible threat to the client. As a result, the client

may continue to develop nuclear weapons.

       In some cases, a patron may hesitate to impose threats. The hesitance

of the patron arises from its fear of the client's defection. As Snyder has put

it, "it is likely to be easier to restrain a strong ally than a weak one."[88] He

also noted that "there are so few instances of it in the case studies. The only

explicit threats of defection came from states that were being restrained or

not supported, not from those seeking to restrain them."[89] Even in other

cases, when mutual dependence is on the rise, states might prefer to be

entrapped rather than abandoned. In Snyder's words, "the restrainer's

reluctance [to attempt restraint] will rise faster than the restrainee's

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[86] Robert O. Keohane, "The big influence of small allies," *Foreign Policy*, no. 2 (1971).

[87] Security commitment by strategic interests allows what Robert Jervis indicated as a paradox of vulnerability. Paradoxically, the weakness of an ally becomes a strength to force the great power to provide more security benefits to the alliance. Snyder, *Alliance Politics*, 170. Robert Jervis articulated this threatening behavior as "the ability to leave a relationship generates power within it." Regarding weakness as strength, see Robert Jervis, *System Effects: Complexity in Political and Social life* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1998), 195-97.

[88] Snyder, *Alliance Politics*, 326.

[89] Ibid., 322.

vulnerability" when the tension in the security environment increases.[90] This was the case during the Cold War. Superpowers had their national security reasons to protect their allies.[91]

The view of allied states as offensive actors in nature is also questionable. Offensive realism dictates alliance coercion.[92] In other words, alliance coercion overestimates the state's behavior to pursue security interests. The most explicit example appears in Gerzhoy's work. His argument assumes that states are power maximizers. This is a hasty generalization. One might argue that some great powers are power maximizing actors, but weak states are generally defensive actors. Moreover, he assumes that alliance is offensive in nature. He insisted that states choose competitive strategies when they enter the alliance to balance against adversarial threats.[93] However, the choice of competitive strategies does not interpret states as offensive in nature. It also does not translate into the offensive nature of the alliance.

The defensive alliance is common, instead. States forge a balancing alliance to defend and deter adversarial threats.[94] Besides, states choose to

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[90] Ibid., 328.

[91] Snyder, "The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics."

[92] Offensive realism claims that states are always under fear of uncertainty. States are never satisfied with their security and maximize power. Beyond survival, states pursue hegemony. See Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*.

[93] In a footnote, Gerzhoy dismissed the cooperative strategy discussed by defensive realism by arguing that allied states are competing actors. See Gerzhoy, "Alliance Coercion," 96.

[94] Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*.

cooperate on arms control and arms reduction with their adversaries while maintaining strong alliances. In Charles Glaser's words, "countries should sometimes exercise self-restraint and pursue cooperative military policies because these policies can convince a rational opponent to revise favorably its view of the country's motives."[95]

Similarly, alliance coercion misinterprets the state's nuclear interests. Some explain that any state with advanced nuclear technology or nuclear latency may be deemed a potential proliferator. In this view, Japan, South Korea, or Taiwan, which are good practitioners of the peaceful use of nuclear energy, are deemed potential proliferators with latent nuclear capabilities.[96] This assessment is incorrect. States manage to continue their cooperative relationships with other states operating nuclear programs. For example, the United States maintains cooperative relationships with Japan, South Korea, or Taiwan, which operates advanced nuclear programs.

Despite the limitation of alliance coercion, some insisted that a patron is still able to employ credible threats. For example, Gerzhoy argued that the same uncertainty of security commitment not only motivates the client to develop nuclear weapons but also provides the patron with leverage to make the client anxious.[97] He made a somewhat convincing point. The

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[95] Charles L. Glaser, "Realists as optimists: Cooperation as self-help," *International Security* 19, no. 3 (1994): 53.

[96] Mark Fitzpatrick, *Asia's latent nuclear powers: Japan, South Korea and Taiwan* (New York, NY: Routledge, 2017).

[97] Gerzhoy, "Alliance Coercion," 102.

client cannot know for sure if the patron would continue to protect the client.[98]

Nevertheless, that might be the exact reason why states forge an alliance. They write down a formal commitment to increase the level of confidence in the alliance. Allies communicate their intention of support or establish the reliability of commitment to tie their hands for future intervention.[99] To continuously keep up with each other, allies may not coerce each other but confirm their willingness to protect shared interests.

2. Theoretical Framework

Commitment or assurance has received much less attention than compellence in the alliance management literature and the nuclear nonproliferation literature. In Jeffrey Knopf's words, "there has been little effort to develop a general theory of security assurances or to conduct systematic empirical research on the effectiveness of assurances."[100] We know that reliable security commitment can reduce ally's abandonment fear, motivating the ally to develop nuclear weapons. However, we know little

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[98] External threats continuously change. Great power's alliance policy will be influenced by this structural change as well. Besides, domestic pressure to retreat or reduce military budget also influence alliance policy.

[99] Morrow, "Why Write Them Down."

[100] Jeffrey W. Knopf, *Security Assurances and Nuclear Nonproliferation* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2012), 3.

about why a patron employs security commitment to an assertive client and how it establishes the reliability of security commitment.

Why does a patron provide security commitment to a client attempting to develop nuclear weapons? What challenges does a patron face providing the commitment? How does a patron establish the reliability of security commitment? Collectively, what are the causes of the patron's commitment to restrain nuclear weapons development? To answer these questions, I focus on designing a theoretical framework to illustrate different options of a nuclear weapons program that a patron can induce from a client, the scope and definition of security commitment, and causes of reliable security commitment.

Options of a Nuclear Weapons Program

Before I discuss different options of a nuclear weapons program, I stress that "nuclear weapons development" and "nuclear weapons proliferation" are not the same. They are connected but different in terms of scope and influence. Nuclear weapons development refers to a national program for increasing nuclear technology capabilities for military purposes, whereas nuclear proliferation refers to the spread of nuclear weapons beyond the scope of a nation-state. Nuclear proliferation shifts the balance of power at the regional or the international level. Some nonproliferation literature does not distinguish them, but it is essential to discern one from the other for this project.

Nuclear weapons development is not merely a collection of separate events. As Alexander Montgomery and Scott Sagan noted, "proliferation is a process by which countries move closer to or away from different thresholds toward developing the bomb."[101] Besides, these events do not progress in a stylized order. In Ariel Levite's words, "nuclear weapons programs typically fizzle out in a gradual and nonlinear way rather than shut down abruptly and completely."[102]

Nevertheless, defining distinct options of a nuclear weapons program is necessary for scientific analysis. I conceptualize five options for a nuclear weapons program. They are 1) explore and pursuit of the nuclear weapons program, 2) suspension of the nuclear weapons program, 3) nuclear hedging, 4) termination of the nuclear weapons program, and 5) acquisition of nuclear weapons.

First, a client "explore and pursuit" when it perceives security is threatened or faces abandonment by the patron.[103] It has been criticized that differentiating exploring and pursuing is a difficult task because of the ambivalence of the nuclear proliferation process and decision-making inside

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[101] Alexander H. Montgomery and Scott D. Sagan, "The Perils of Predicting Proliferation," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 53, no. 2 (2009): 308.

[102] Ariel E. Levite, "Never Say Never Again: Nuclear Reversal Revisited," *International Security* 27, no. 3 (2003): 74.

[103] Assuming that there is no intervention to a proliferation process, a conventional study divided degrees of nuclearization into four processes: no interest; explore the possibility of weapons; pursuit under substantial efforts to develop weapons; and acquire of nuclear weapons. Singh and Way, "Correlates of Proliferation," 866-67.

the government.[104] For example, Dong-Joon Jo and Erik Gartzke coded these activities of exploration and pursuit by combining them as a single event, the existence of an active nuclear weapons program.[105]

For the dissertation, I merge exploration and pursuit because that is for the case study's timing to begin after. Because I am more interested in examining why states reverse their nuclear decisions than why states start nuclear weapons programs, I begin analyzing cases when a patron detects an ally's nuclear weapons development.

Second, a client can "suspend" its nuclear weapons program when the patron intervenes. The suspension is a manifestation of a concession made to other states on a bilateral or multilateral framework. The suspension is a narrow interpretation of restraint, consisting of three measures: freezing production of fissile materials and delivery systems, capping development programs to prevent further augmentation, and shutting down all related facilities such as reactors.[106] The suspension is short of rollback. It is distinguishable from a broader scope of nuclear restraint because suspension means that the client is merely settled to comply with outside demands to maintain what it has already achieved.

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[104] Montgomery and Sagan, "Perils of Predicting Proliferation," 304.

[105] Dong-Joon Jo and Erik Gartzke, "Determinants of Nuclear Weapons Proliferation," ibid.51, no. 1 (2007): 172.

[106] Toby Dalton, Ariel E. Levite, and George Perkovich, 2018, https://carnegieendowment.org/2018/06/04/key-issues-for-u.s.-north-korea-negotiations-pub-76485.

Third, a client may employ a strategy of "nuclear hedging," which includes its nuclear weapons program's rollback process. In terms of nuclear reversal, nuclear hedging is one step further from suspension, but it is far from complete reversal. In Levite's words, "nuclear hedging is a strategy that may be adopted either during the process of developing a bomb or as part of the rollback process, as a way of retaining the option of restarting a weapons program that has been halted or reversed."[107]

Nuclear hedging states also show strong willingness and transparent records of nonproliferation compliance. To maintain indigenous technical capacity, the client must comply with nonproliferation rules and norms or reveal a positive intention to accept them by signing agreements such as the Treaty of the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).

Thus, nuclear hedging states have two faces: latent nuclear capacity and compliance records. For example, states, including South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan, with advanced nuclear technologies are deemed hedging states.[108] However, they are also good citizens of the global nonproliferation regime. Despite the mixed characteristics, nuclear hedging plays a crucial role in facilitating nuclear reversal because it creates a

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[107] Levite, "Never Say Never Again," 69.

[108] Lami Kim, "South Korea's Nuclear Hedging?" *The Washington Quarterly* 41, no. 1 (2018); Kei Koga, "The Concept of "Hedging" Revisited: the Case of Japan's Foreign Policy Strategy in East Asia's Power Shift," *International Studies Review* 20, no. 4 (2018); Joseph F. Pilat, "Nuclear Latency and Hedging: Concepts, History, and Issues," (2019).

window of opportunity for external intervention.[109]

Fourth, a client may terminate the nuclear weapons program. Nuclear "termination" is a governmental decision to do so and includes disablement and dismantlement of the official nuclear weapons program. Still, private research and unauthorized programs are excluded from this definition.[110]

Fifth, a client may continue its nuclear weapons program and acquire nuclear weapons. The "acquisition" of nuclear weapons includes nuclear explosion, proclamation, nuclear weapons doctrine, and deployment. The acquisition is not an event of a nuclear reversal, but the definition is necessary for comparison.

To identify the variation of the dependent variable, I posit "explore and pursuit" for the initiation point of a nuclear weapons development case and "termination" or "acquisition" as the final events of the case.

Figure 2 summarizes the options of a nuclear weapons program.

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[109] Levite, "Never Say Never Again," 87. This does not mean that nuclear acquisition can be achieved through a short period without any external intervention. Nuclear weapons development takes time. States spend years, often decades exploring and pursuing the nuclear option before acquiring the bomb. Nuclear hedging delays and reverses the process with a rollback mechanism.

[110] See ibid., 67.

Figure 2. Options of a Nuclear Weapons Program

Termination of the Nuclear Program	Nuclear Hedging	Nuclear Suspension	Acquisition of Nuclear Weapons
• Disablement • Dismantlement	• Compliance Records • Latent Nuclear Capacity	• Freezing • Capping • Shut-down	• Explosion • Proclamation • Doctrine • Deployment

Definition and Scope of Commitment

Alliances are written pledges to recognize their common interests and increase expectations of each other.[111] States can join together by building a self-enforcing agreement without external enforcement, such as institutions, when they have mutual self-interest.[112] In this study, I focus on a defense pact between a patron and a client, where the former plays as a security provider of the alliance.[113] To examine an alliance's assurance mechanism, I disregard other types of alliances, such as offensive alliances or non-

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[111] Morrow, "Why Write Them Down."

[112] Brett Ashley Leeds, "Credible commitments and international cooperation: Guaranteeing contracts without external enforcement," *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 18, no. 1 (2000).

[113] Alliances are based on treaties, but they are not institutions with an independent mechanism to constrain members. Alliances are not institutions for both neoliberal institutionalists and neorealists. To neoliberal institutionalists, alliances are formal agreements between states, but they generally do not qualify as institutions, which independently exert constraints on members. To neorealists, power and dominance are the intrinsic nature of institutions. For a different interpretation of institutions, see David A Lake, "Beyond Anarchy: The Importance of Security Institutions," *International Security* 26, no. 1 (2001).; NATO may be the exception. See Alexandra Gheciu, "Security institutions as agents of socialization? NATO and the 'New Europe'," *International Organization* 59, no. 4 (2005).

aggression agreements.

The scope of security commitments depends on the language promised in defensive alliance treaties. Post-1945 alliances usually do not designate adversaries, although the context of alliance formation indicates who adversaries are.[114] Alliances can limit their responsibility as a collective defense against an unprovoked attack to reassure the adversary that the alliance is not aggressive.[115] In doing so, an alliance can also maintain the foreign policy status-quo of each party. For example, the US alliances drafted the language of security commitments to be defensive based on Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, which guaranteed individual and collective self-defense.[116] The type of security commitments also varies from specifying the number of troops deployed in wartime to merely instructing parties to conduct consultation.[117]

Security commitments derive from written promises in alliance treaties or strategic interests in aiding the ally that already existed prior to the promise.[118] States can forge an alliance by formally arranging a treaty and create their obligation to engage moral, legal, and political values such

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[114] Snyder, *Alliance Politics*, 14.

[115] Ibid.

[116] Rapp-Hooper, *Shields of the Republic: The Triumph and Peril of America's Alliances*, 38-43.

[117] Snyder, *Alliance Politics*, 15.

[118] Ibid., 169.

as prestige and reputation to honor the treaty.[119] Regardless of written promises, a patron may protect its weak ally because protecting the ally's resources against the adversary is in its strategic interests. The patron may already have the intention to defend the client without a formal relationship. The difference between treaty obligations and strategic interests may be insignificant. As Stephen Walt notes, "[changes in commitment] have been revealed primarily by changes in behavior or verbal statements, not by the rewriting of a document."[120]

This does not mean a treaty alliance and informal alignment are alike. The formal aspect of alliance adds specificity, legal and moral obligation, and reciprocity.[121] A treaty alliance creates the expectation that parties respond with specified action against identified opponents. Shared interests among allies can be selected by concluding a treaty, limiting mutual obligations, and clarifying expectations about the reliability of the alliance. In terms of nuclear deterrence, the formalization of an alliance matters because it establishes its credibility against adversaries. Limiting the analysis to formal alliances would not omit important cases of nuclear proliferation. Most cases of nuclear reversal, except for Sweden, are

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[119] Ibid.

[120] Stephen M. Walt, *The Origins of Alliance* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1990), 12.

[121] Snyder, *Alliance Politics*, 8-11.

observed within formal defense pacts.[122]

       I define security commitment as a positive security assurance directed at allies.[123] Security commitment is part of what Jeffery Knopf calls "alliance-related assurance."[124] It is similar to a "security guarantee," which is often used as a substitute for assurance provided by a more powerful state under a formal defense pact. This is especially true in reference to extended nuclear deterrence to convince its ally that it does not need an indigenous nuclear deterrent.[125]

       Security commitment or alliance-related assurance is distinguishable from "assurances" in a plural form used in the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) context. Positive assurances are promises demanded by non-nuclear weapons states to nuclear weapons states to come to their aid when attacked, whereas negative assurances are promises made by nuclear weapons states to non-nuclear weapons states not to attack with nuclear weapons.[126]

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[122] For informal assurance of the US protection toward Sweden, see Debs and Monteiro, *Nuclear Politics*, 179-96.

[123] Alliance commitments are both promises and threats. As a promise, a security provider commits its assurance to defend an ally. As a threat, a security provider commits its warning to deter an adversary. A security provider may keep an alliance commitment to preserve its reputation for resolve in conflict against the adversary. See Snyder, *Alliance Politics*, 36.

[124] Jeffrey W. Knopf, "Security Assurances: Initial Hypotheses," in *Security Assurances and Nuclear Nonproliferation*, ed. Jeffrey W. Knopf (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2012), 14.

[125] Ibid., 17.

[126] John Simpson, "The Role of Security Assurances in the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime," ibid.

The United States, for instance, has been used the term assurance to indicate its conventional and nuclear means as its defense strategy directed at allies.[127] The US has never adopted a "no-first-use policy" of nuclear weapons to preserve the assurance of allies and partners. Its Nuclear Posture Review, which is the primary statement of American nuclear weapons policy, intentionally left options to launch a preemptive or a preventive-first strike against adversarial nuclear forces.[128]

Security commitment, however, does not necessarily entail extended nuclear deterrence. An ally may refer to assurance to indicate the potential use of conventional forces, instead. A patron may not consider the use of nuclear weapons for its assurance strategy toward a client. For instance, China binds itself to a no-first-use policy of nuclear weapons, meaning that it would not use its nuclear weapons first under any circumstance.[129] In its defense white paper in 2006, the Chinese government stated that "China upholds the principles of counterattack in self-defense and limited development of nuclear weapons, and aims at building a lean and effective

[127] "Quadrennial Defense Review," September 30, 2001, Department of Defense; "The National Security Strategy of the United States of America," September 2002, The White House.

[128] "Nuclear Posture Review," 2018, Department of Defense; Michael S Gerson, "No first use: the next step for US nuclear policy," *International Security* 35, no. 2 (2010): 8.

[129] China is the only legitimate nuclear weapons state that holds an unconditional no-first use policy of nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union had declared such a policy in 1982, but its successor Russia rescinded it in 1995. India and North Korea also announced the no-first-use policy, but they are not recognized as legitimate nuclear weapons states. Peng Guangqian and Rong Yu, "Nuclear no-first-use revisited," *China Security* 5, no. 1 (2009): 78.

nuclear force capable of meeting national security needs."[130]

Assurance has other meanings too. As Knopf has put it, two types of assurance are used in adversarial games. They are "deterrence-related assurance" or "reassurance."[131] First, an effective deterrence strategy must entail corresponding assurance components to an adversarial target so that a state can deliver a clear, conditional intention to prevent unwanted action by the adversary.[132] In the context of adversarial games, James Morrow refined the assurance component in deterrence as "signaling."[133] A state or allied states signal the shared interests to the adversary, which evaluates the possibility of an ally's interference in a potential conflict. The similarity of an ally's foreign policies and military coordination impose costs on the adversary. Second, reassurance is a form of assurance that a state seeks to convince its intention of non-aggression to another state.[134]

Taken together, a patron's security commitment does not aim to make a single objective. For the purpose of discussion, however, I use security commitment in reference to positive security assurance toward an

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[130] "China's National Defense in 2006," 2006, Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China.

[131] Knopf, "Security Assurances," 14.

[132] Thomas Shelling, *Arms and Influence* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1966), 74.

[133] James Morrow noted that specification of alliance commitments helps parties to identify three sufficient conditions for an alliance: to recognize their common interests, to increase expectation to each other, and to signal their resolve by threatening their adversaries for a deterrence purpose. See Morrow, "Why Write Them Down."

[134] Knopf, "Security Assurances," 16.

ally. For a stylistic reason, I use security commitment and security assurance interchangeably. From the varieties of assurances that are shown in Table 2, it is this commitment that the dissertation takes to alliance management of nuclear weapons development.

Table 2. The Terminology of Security Commitment

Target States	Allied States or Partners	Adversaries
Generic	Assurance	Reassurance
Alliance-related	Security Guarantee, mainly referring to extended nuclear deterrence	Signaling
NPT-related	Positive Assurances	Negative Assurances

Avoiding Nuclear Proliferation: Commitment

In the dissertation, the objective of the theoretical framework is to examine the causes of security commitment in the context of nuclear weapons development. In doing so, I mainly discuss two questions. First, why does a patron provide security commitment to a client, which attempts to develop nuclear weapons? Second, how does the patron establish the reliability of security commitment? That being said, I postulate security commitment as the main driver of a patron's alliance policy to prevent the client from developing nuclear weapons.

My theory is built on two major findings from previous studies. First, a reliable security commitment effectively reduces an ally's abandonment fear, which initially triggered nuclear weapons. The argument is based on the security model of nuclear weapons development introduced by Scott Sagan, who argued that "nuclear restraint is caused by the absence of the fundamental military threats that produce positive proliferation decisions."[135] Developing a theory of the relationships between a client's decisions to accept a patron's security commitment or to develop nuclear weapons, Dan Reiter also concluded that a state with high abandonment fears decides not to acquire nuclear weapons when it receives a reliable security commitment.[136]

Second, a client is pacified with a patron's security commitment and behave defensively against the adversary. States are rational actors. Being relieved by worries over abandonment by the patron, the client no longer finds benefits from developing nuclear weapons. As Nuno Monteiro and Alexandre Debs noted, the cost becomes greater than the benefits of developing nuclear weapons.[137] States are defensive actors as well. Nuclear nonproliferation is a choice of forbearance made by the client whose abandonment risks are reduced. T. V. Paul argued that states "prudently

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[135] Sagan, "Three Models," 61.

[136] Reiter, "Security Commitments and Nuclear Proliferation."

[137] Nuno P Monteiro and Alexandre Debs, "The Strategic Logic of Nuclear Proliferation," *International Security* 39, no. 2 (2014): 17."

choose to avert a negative outcome" because of the importance of security

dilemma that impinges each other's security.[138] In other words, states aim

to avoid regional instability once their confidence in patron's security

protection is restored.

Figure 3 expresses the objective of the theoretical framework.

Figure 3. The Objective of the Theoretical Framework

Theoretical framework of the dissertation

1. Why does a patron provide security
commitment to a client, which attempts to
develop nuclear weapons?
2. How does the patron establish the
reliability of security commitment?

Scott Sagan's security model and others
- the absence of fundamental military threats
- reduction of client's abandonment fears
- reduction of willingness and opportunity of
client to go nuclear

Now I discuss the first question: why does a patron provide security

commitment to a client, which attempts to develop nuclear weapons? To

answer, I briefly examine a theoretical challenge that security commitment

brings to a risk of entrapment. To recall, Snyder provided five methods for a

state to avoid entrapment. The threat of withdrawal as a coercive method is

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[138] Paul, *Power Versus Prudence*, 15.

a general solution to avoid entrapment. Nevertheless, Snyder stated, "sometimes, however, giving the ally a firm commitment may be a better safeguard against entrapment than distancing oneself."[139] Stronger support for the alliance may improve the ally's sense of security. Assured by a firm commitment, the ally might find itself in a much safer condition in conciliating its adversary.

I would contend that Snyder's suggestion of firm commitment is flawed on the objective of avoiding entrapment. Snyder made a self-contradictory argument on the commitment by treating commitment as both a cause and a solution to increasing entrapment risks. His argument creates a vicious circle of entrapment for a patron, as shown in Figure 4.[140]

Figure 4. Patron's Vicious Circle of Entrapment

In defense of Snyder's suggestion, a patron is trapped in a vicious circle of entrapment mainly because security commitment emboldens the client to stand firmer vis-à-vis the opponent. Snyder explained that a security commitment increases entrapment risk because the patron's firm

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[139] Snyder, *Alliance Politics*, 185.

[140] "Alliance Theory," 113; *Alliance Politics*, 320.

commitment encourages the client to become overconfident.[141] When the client perceives a greater certainty of security protection but continues to face an adversarial threat, the ally may pursue its interests, dragging the patron into an unwanted conflict.

In terms of nuclear weapons development, a patron increases security commitment to reduce the client's abandonment fear, but the increase in commitment unintentionally encourages the client to continue with nuclear weapons development. Debs and Monteiro also supported the unintentional consequence of commitment. They argued that a patron's security commitment might increase the opportunity for a client's nuclear weapons development by increasing the cost of a possible preemptive attack by the adversary.[142]

However, there exists a theoretical dissatisfaction, no matter how convincing the argument of unintentional commitment effects. When the client attempts to develop nuclear weapons, why would the patron provide security commitment in the first place? To be sure, the patron's intention of employing a firm commitment is to assure and control the ally. In the context of nuclear weapons development, security assurance reduces the client's fear of abandonment. Nevertheless, it is difficult to understand why

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[141] "The ally behaves recklessly or takes a firmer position toward its opponent than one would like because it is confident of one's support." See *Alliance Politics*, 181. In Victor Cha's expression, this is overdependence pathology. See Cha, *The Origins of the American Alliance System in Asia*, 20-21.

[142] Debs and Monteiro, *Nuclear Politics*.

the patron assures the client when the entrapment risk arises.

I suggest that Snyder's methods to avoid entrapment may require a reinterpretation. A state withdraws to avoid entrapment but gives a firm commitment to take entrapment.

Figure 5 expresses the reinterpretation of Snyder's methods.

Figure 5. Reinterpretation of Snyder's Methods

Avoid Entrapment/ Risk-averse — Take Entrapment/ Risk-taking

Threat of Withdrawal — withhold diplomatic support to a particular issue — insist on consultation during a crisis — persuade to change ally's preference — Firm commitment

Victor Cha's "powerplay strategy" shares a similar approach, although his focus of alliance management is heavily inclined to control aspects rather than assurance aspects.[143] Examining the origins of the US alliance system in Asia, he argued that the United States moved closer to South Korea, Taiwan, and Japan to exercise control over them.[144] The US

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[143] Cha does not discuss "commitment" as assurance. Instead, he offers a view that the US had "moved closer" to Asian allies to control their behavior. Cha, *The Origins of the American Alliance System in Asia*.

[144] Powerplay is based on a coercive mechanism, which forces the allied decisions. For example, his explanation of South Korea's restraint was a forceful result. However, South Korea's unilateral demand on a defense pact at the expense of its aggressive North Korea policy implies that South Korea was pacified with the US assurance. I do not disregard coercion or control functions, but commitment is less coercive than one might argue. A balanced view on assurance and control aspects of security commitment is required. For South Korea's restraint, see "'Rhee-

had strategic and intrinsic interests over ally's security. When the US faced an intense entrapment risk, the superpower's only choice was to take the risk of entrapment and minimize the ally's overconfidence.[145] If so, what constitutes the intense fear of entrapment? Cha does not specify when the intensity of entrapment occurs to a state. To specify the intensity of entrapment, a particular context of analysis is required.

To refine the arguments of Snyder and Cha, I apply the context of nuclear proliferation. I suggest that a state gives the ally a firm commitment not to avoid entrapment risk but to avoid nuclear proliferation risk that jeopardizes the regional stability.

Figure 6 shows the shift in commitment dynamics between avoiding entrapment and nuclear proliferation.

Straint': The Origins of the US-ROK Alliance," *International Journal of Korean Studies* 15, no. 1 (2011).

[145] *The Origins of the American Alliance System in Asia*, 34. Cha also claimed that states might prefer control strategies, which are more costly than distancing strategies in dealing with entrapment fears, "when entrapment fears (1) are intensely held, (2) are accompanied by power asymmetries (i.e., the larger power seeks control over the smaller one), or (3) when the smaller power has a revisionist agenda." See "Powerplay: Origins of the US Alliance System in Asia," *International Security* 34, no. 3 (2010): 194-95.

Figure 6. Shifting Dynamics of Security Commitment

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┌──────────────┐      ┌──────────────────┐      ┌──────────────┐
│  Entrapment  │ ───▶ │ Avoid Entrapment │ ───▶ │  Withdrawal  │
└──────────────┘      └──────────────────┘      └──────────────┘
       ▲
       │   Patron's risk assessment of the client's nuclear weapons program
       ▼
┌──────────────┐      ┌──────────────────────┐   ┌──────────────┐
│   Nuclear    │ ───▶ │ Take a risk of        │   │    Firm      │
│ Proliferation│      │ Entrapment to         │──▶│  Commitment  │
│              │      │ Avoid Proliferation   │   │              │
└──────────────┘      └──────────────────────┘   └──────────────┘
```

A patron's commitment dynamics dramatically changes from avoiding entrapment to taking entrapment when the patron perceives nuclear proliferation is more dangerous than entrapment. Once the client's nuclear weapons development is exposed to neighboring states, they would conduct preemptive strikes or initiate nuclear weapons development. The patron may be less worried about entrapment risk because there emerges a greater danger of nuclear proliferation that destabilizes the security environment. To avoid nuclear proliferation, a patron provides a reliable commitment to assure the client and restrain nuclear weapons development. Table 3 compares arguments on commitment and entrapment.

Table 3. Comparison of Arguments on Commitment and Entrapment

Reference	Glenn Snyder's Alliance Politics	Victor Cha's Powerplay	This Dissertation
Argument	"Sometimes, however, giving the ally a firm commitment may be a better safeguard against entrapment than distancing oneself."[146]	"Sometimes a state will deal with entrapment anxieties not by distancing or hedging, but by drawing even closer to the ally."[147]	When a patron fears nuclear proliferation greater than entrapment, the patron provides the client with a reliable security commitment.
Patron's Objective	Avoiding entrapment	Exercising control over the ally	Avoiding nuclear proliferation
Patron's Response	Firm commitment	Draw closer to the ally	Reliable commitment

One might argue that the risk of nuclear proliferation may constitute the intense fear of entrapment. However, nuclear proliferation does not necessarily mean that a patron would be dragged by commitment over a

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[146] Snyder, *Alliance Politics*, 185.

[147] Cha, *The Origins of the American Alliance System in Asia*, 26.

client's interests. Instead, the patron would be dragged into regional conflicts.

Having said that, I would suggest that entrapment and nuclear proliferation are independent of each other. Scholars also discussed that patron's risks stem from different sources. For example, Lanoszka offered four sources.[148] An institutional source refers to a general explanation between commitment and entrapment in the alliance, and a systemic source refers to the changing balance of power.[149] Nuclear proliferation qualifies as a risk created by the systemic source because it shifts the regional balance of power. Therefore, it would be clear to say that a risk of entrapment, which arises at the alliance level, and a risk of nuclear proliferation, which arises at the system level, are qualitatively different. Figure 7 expresses a causal mechanism of commitment.

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[148] Lanoszka's discussion refers to four sources of entrapment. However, his usage of the term entrapment is extensive. Some distinguish entrapment from entanglement. For instance, Tongfi Kim suggested that a situation when a state is compelled to aid an ally because of the alliance is "entanglement." Kim argued that undesirable entrapment occurs when allied states adopt a risky policy beyond the scope of an alliance agreement. This distinction of terminology is useful, but I do not use the terminology in this dissertation to avoid any confusion. See Tongfi Kim, "Why Alliances Entangle but Seldom Entrap States," *Security Studies* 20, no. 3 (2011): 355.

[149] The other sources are reputational sources and transnational ideological sources. See table 1 of the typology of entrapment risks in Alexander Lanoszka, "Tangled up in rose? Theories of alliance entrapment and the 2008 Russo-Georgian War," *Contemporary Security Policy* 39, no. 2 (2018): 242.

Figure 7. A Causal Mechanism of Commitment

| Patron's Risk of Entrapment | × | Patron's Risk of Nuclear Proliferation | → | Patron's Commitment | → | Client's Nuclear Option |

In addition, a state with greater interests in preserving the stability of the security environment is more likely to show a risk-taking behavior, which has been discussed by international relations scholarship. For example, Jeffery Taliaferro argued that when leaders of powerful states are expected to incur losses in consideration of their relative power or prestige, they tend to be risk-taking to avoid such losses and thus intervene in the problems of the periphery.[150] Besides, the risk-taking behavior is in line with the state's status quo tendency suggested by defensive realism.[151] Therefore, when a patron is a status-quo power, the patron would take the risk of entrapment and increase its commitment to the client.

Taken together, when a patron fears nuclear proliferation greater than entrapment, the objective of a patron's security commitment shifts from avoiding entrapment to avoiding nuclear proliferation. The patron

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[150] Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, *Balancing risks: Great power intervention in the periphery* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2004). Recited from Ji Hwan Hwang, "Risk-taking and Losses in International Politics," [Wi-heom-su-yong-gwa Son-sil-ui Gug-je-jeong-chi-jeog Ui-mi.] *Strategic Studies* 15, no. 3 (2008): 250.

[151] "A Realist Interpretation of Prospect Theory: Theorizing Status-Quo Bias and Relative Losses in International Relations," [Jeon-mang-i-lon-ui Hyeon-sil-ju-ui-jeog I-hae: hyeon-sang-yu-ji-gyeong-hyang-gwa sang-dae-jeog son-sil-ui gug-je-jeong-chi-i-lon.] *Korean Journal of International Relations* 47, no. 3 (2007).

provides the client with security commitment by taking the consequential risk of entrapment instead of avoiding entrapment. This discussion leads me to propose the first hypothesis:

Hypothesis 1. When a patron fears nuclear proliferation greater than entrapment, the patron is more likely to increase the level of security commitment.

Hard and Soft Commitments

Now I discuss the second question: how does the patron establish the reliability of security commitment? I build on existing knowledge that a reliable security commitment prevents nuclear weapons development because commitment serves as a positive assurance to reduce the client's fear of abandonment. To develop further how a state successfully establishes the reliability of security commitment, one should investigate enabling conditions for the security provider's power projection ability.

A state establishes the reliability of security commitment when it convinces its ally that it will have both the ability and willingness to act as promised.[152] Similarly, T. V. Paul suggested simple but useful conceptual categories to explain how a state expresses its power in two types of

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[152] Ashley Leeds, "Credible commitments and international cooperation: Guaranteeing contracts without external enforcement," 51.

influences.[153] First, structural influence is derived from asymmetric power and resources among states and the international system. Second, decisional influence derives from the interests of a security provider. Structural influence may pressure a weak state to act as a strong state wishes to accomplish. However, one could argue that if a strong state has lesser interest than a weak state, the strong state may not always prevail.

That being said, I attempt to illustrate that a patron expresses its commitment as a hard commitment and soft commitment. These commitments would increase the level patron's commitment and establish the reliability of commitment.

First, hard commitment is a patron's physical demonstration of military capability. Components of hard commitment include the level of troop deployment, the frequency and scale of joint exercises, and other investment in military infrastructure such as military assistance for the client's military modernization. The physical presence of a patron increases the reliability of security commitment to the client. Troop deployment is a significant sign of hard commitment because it assures the ally and deters the adversary. For example, the United States deployed forward-based troops with military superiority to punish, compel, and defeat an undeterred adversary. In Hunzeker and Lanoszka's words, "[Allies] have faith because

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[153] T. V. Paul, "Influence through arms transfers: Lessons from the US-Pakistani relationship," *Asian Survey* 32, no. 12 (1992): 1078-79.

American troops can kill and win."[154] In addition, troops deployment is risky for a patron because the troops may become the adversary's target. However, ground troops increase the deterrence effect by demonstrating their ability and willingness to fight abroad by taking those risks.[155]

For instance, the United States has deployed troops in Germany and South Korea. These troops were intended to function as tripwires, which placed great pressure on the US response to adversarial attacks.[156] In his discussion of the art of commitment, Thomas Schelling also argued that the US demonstrated its security commitment by stationing troops in West Berlin. This made the American resolve credible because the presence of the US troops "left the Soviet Union in no doubt that the United States would by automatically involved in the event of any attack on Europe."[157] In other words, the US forced itself into an inescapable future.

In fact, troop deployment is part of a patron's forward defense posture. Forward defense refers to a situation when a state acquires military bases on the ally's territory to improve its defensive position and deny an adversary from attacking closer to the mainland.[158] The major objective of

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[154] Michael Allen Hunzeker and Alexander Lanoszka, "Landpower and American credibility," *Parameters* 45, no. 4 (2015).

[155] Ibid.

[156] Knopf, *Security Assurances and Nuclear Nonproliferation*, 26.

[157] Shelling, *Arms and Influence*, 47.

[158] Rapp-Hooper, *Shields of the Republic: The Triumph and Peril of America's Alliances*, 49.

forward defense is to protect the patron's national interest. Nevertheless, the

forward defense provides strategic benefits for both the patron and the

client. Mira Rapp-hooper explained that forward defense transforms

national defense from a tactical issue to a strategic issue.[159] Forward

defense allows a patron to maintain and project its power abroad for

advanced preparation and positioning. The patron can protect its national

security interest by denying adversarial attacks away from its homeland.

The patron's forward defense provides geographic benefits to the client,

especially when a proximate opponent threatens the client.[160] In other

words, the allies cooperate because the patron deploys its troops in the

client's territory while the client commits to hosting base facilities.[161]

In addition, extended nuclear deterrence is inseparable from the

forward defense because forward basing takes deterrence beyond the

borders of the patron. Extended deterrence operates to secure the patron's

forward bases and to protect the client. In Rapp-hooper's words, "those

[long-range airpower, missiles, and nuclear] weapons were also vital to the

operation of a forward-defense effort. The United States could use its own

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[159] The United States, for example, allied with many weak states in the early Cold War to use foreign bases in ally's territory, which formed a perimeter around the Soviet bloc. Long-range airpower and missiles serve a vital role in transforming defense from tactical and operational to a strategic problem. See ibid., 49-53.

[160] Walt discussed "geographic proximity" as one of the sources of threat. See Walt, *Origins of Alliance*, 23-24.

[161] Allies may change their incentives by willingly taking steps to constrain their future actions to guarantee their future behavior. See Ashley Leeds, "Credible commitments and international cooperation: Guaranteeing contracts without external enforcement," 54.

nuclear and long range-strike capabilities to guard faraway allies."[162] In the

context of nuclear weapons development, extended nuclear deterrence can

substitute for an independent nuclear arsenal, which would associate a

substantial amount of financial burden.[163] Nuclear extended deterrence as a

reliable security commitment has also been discussed elsewhere.[164]

Collectively, the physical presence of the patron serves as a great stabilizer

in an unstable security environment.

Nevertheless, hard commitment does not necessarily require the

forward deployment of the patron's nuclear forces to prevent nuclear

proliferation. Nuclear forces deployment may provoke adversaries,

offsetting the effectiveness of security commitment. For example,

Fuhrmann and Sechser examined how states can signal their alliance

commitment to the adversary.[165] They argued that "hand-tying

proclamations of alliance commitments by nuclear states significantly

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[162] Rapp-Hooper, *Shields of the Republic: The Triumph and Peril of America's Alliances*, 50.

[163] Others also highlighted that security commitment would make states less likely to initiate nuclear weapons programs Bleek and Lorber, "Security Guarantees and Allied Nuclear Proliferation," 432.

[164] Nonproliferation scholars also suggested that security commitment from nuclear-armed ally most effectively prevents nuclear proliferation. For example, Sagan argued that some form of first-use policy is a crucial element of US nuclear commitments. Sagan, "Three Models," 62. Others emphasized the US nuclear umbrella as an effective measure for nonproliferation in the Asia-Pacific region. For the US nuclear umbrella in Asia, see Bruno Tertrais, "Security Assurances and the Future of Proliferation," in *Over the Horizon Proliferation Threats*, ed. James Wirtz and Peter Lavoy (Standford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2012).

[165] Matthew Fuhrmann and Todd S. Sechser, "Signaling Alliance Commitments: Hand-Tying and Sunk Costs in Extended Nuclear Deterrence," *American Journal of Political Science* 58, no. 4 (2014).

strengthen general deterrence and prevent challenges against proteges –

even without other costly signals such as conventional military

deployments."[166] Foreign nuclear deployments did not diminish militarized

disputes. Their findings suggested that an alliance might prevent nuclear

proliferation without the physical presence of nuclear weapons in the

client's territory. This discussion leads me to propose the second hypothesis:

Hypothesis 2. Patron's demonstration of military power to the client

will increase the reliability of security commitment.

Second, soft commitment refers to a patron's act of interest sharing

with a client. Components of soft commitment include the frequency of

diplomatic dialogues such as high-level official meetings and non-military

exchange. Interest sharing is the patron's strategic interests, shared with the

client's regional interests or national survival. If a patron pursues a

competitive policy against a regional rivalry or a client's adversary, the

patron may convince the client of its resolve to deter the adversary and

prevent the client's resources from coming into the hands of the

adversary.[167] Otherwise, a patron may pursue a cooperative policy with

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[166] Ibid., 932.

[167] In a similar vein, vital interest at stake means that allies have symmetric interests or mutual self-interest, which are necessary to build international cooperation. Gourevitch explained that "the strength of the commitment between the two countries rested completely on mutual self-interest." See Peter A.

regional rivalry or reconciliation with the client's adversary. The patron may find itself challenging to convince the client of its resolve to deter the adversary and protect the ally. In such a case, the reliability of security commitment will be declined.

Similarly, a patron's intrinsic interest in protecting its values in the client's security may influence the reliability of security commitment. Economic assistance is part of soft commitment because it is a sign of commitment that the patron has a strategic value in the client's security. The client may have more confidence in the alliance when the patron has tangible values such as economic interest in the client. For example, Paul Huth and Bruce Russett argued that "successful deterrence is very much more than just a matter of having a favorable military balance, and very much a matter of the nature and extent of ties between the defender state and the state it wishes to protect."[168]

I discuss soft commitment because hard commitment may not demonstrate the patron's willingness enough. A simple power-based explanation cannot tell why a more powerful state succeeds or fails to change a weak state's behavior. For example, in his study explaining the willingness of a powerful ally, Jeremy Pressman supported the limit of

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Gourevitch, "The Governance Problem in International Relations," in *Strategic Choice and International Relations*, ed. David A Lake and Robert Powell (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1999), 152.

[168] Paul Huth and Bruce Russett, "What makes deterrence work? Cases from 1900 to 1980," *World Politics: A Quarterly Journal of International Relations* 36, no. 4 (1984): 497.

power supremacy. He finds that "merely being the more capable ally is not sufficient to prevail in an alliance restraint dispute."[169] In fact, despite the presence of US military forces in allies' territories, the clients have been questioning American resolve to defend the alliance with all available means.[170] It is not hard to see why allies continuously worry about great power's resolve. In Goldstein's words, "in an anarchic world states have the opportunity to renege on treaty commitments and given the dangers of war in the nuclear age, a self-regarding, rational state would have strong incentives to do so."[171]

In addition, a more powerful state may have to make concessions. For example, the United States had to make substantial concessions in establishing export control regimes in Asia and Western Europe to win

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[169] Pressman claimed that the effectiveness of power mobilization depends on the domestic attributes of a more powerful ally. However, he does not consider elements of the restrainee's motivation nor strategic relations of allied states. Domestic attributes are deception, leadership unity, national security priorities, and policy alternatives. First, deception relates to a situation when an ally conceals its military policy to its security provider. Alliance restraint will not be attempted. In other words, the success of alliance restraint depends on the ability of information assessment of a security provider. Second, divided leadership and disagreement about a particular issue will make power mobilization difficult. Third, if the security provider's highest national security priorities are incompatible with the ally's security policy, it will be easier for the security provider to mobilize its power resources. Fourth, alternative pathways may make power mobilization possible. Jeremy Pressman, *Warring Friends: Alliance Restraint in International Politics* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 2011), 15-17.

[170] James M. Acton, "Extended Deterrence and Communicating Resolve," (Monterey, CA: the Center on Contemporary Conflict, Naval Postgraduate School 2009).

[171] Goldstein, *Deterrence and Security in the 21st Century*, 185.

support for containing the Soviet Union.[172] As Andrew Moravcsik has put it, power asymmetry does not necessarily favor a more powerful state even in a military crisis. In his words, "strong preference for the issue at stake can compensate for a deficiency in capabilities as demonstrated by examples like the Boer War, Hitler's remilitarization of the Rhineland, Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Chechnya. In each case, the relative intensity of state preferences reshaped the outcome to the advantage of the weak."[173]

This means that a patron may fail to prevent the client from developing nuclear weapons despite an attempt to employ security commitment to the alliance. For instance, the nuclear weapons developments in England and France reveal that the United States, as a superpower presenting in Western Europe against the Soviet bloc, failed to project its power to restrain the allies from developing nuclear weapons.[174] Debs and Monteiro also stated, "the presence of a powerful ally raises the costs of a preventive war launched against its protégé, thereby increasing the protégé's opportunity to nuclearize. Therefore, whenever an alliance fails to take away the protégé's willingness to go nuclear, it will boost its

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[172] Michael Mastanduno, *Economic containment: CoCom and the politics of East-West trade* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1992); Seongho Sheen, "Trade, Technology and Security: U.S. Bilateral Export-control Negotiations with South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and Australia" (Ph. D. Dissertation, the Fletcher School at Tufts University, 2001).

[173] Andrew Moravcsik, "Taking preferences seriously: A liberal theory of international politics," *International Organization* 51, no. 4 (1997): 524.

[174] Goldstein, *Deterrence and Security in the 21st Century*.

opportunity to get the bomb."[175]

In other words, overconfidence arises from the inadequate resolution of the client's fear of abandonment. A patron defines strategic interests to ensure the balance of power globally, whereas the client's security interest usually is limited to its regional concern or solely to its national survival. For example, Goldstein argued that diverging interests in Indochina led France to doubt automatic American support for French interests.[176] France recognized that the American self-interest in national survival as a strong incentive to abandon the ally. Consequently, France accelerated its drive to develop an independent nuclear arsenal. In this circumstance, the weak ally's interests may influence the effectiveness of security commitment.[177] This discussion leads me to propose the third hypothesis:

Hypothesis 3. Patron's shared interests with the client will increase the reliability of security commitment.

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[175] Debs and Monteiro, *Nuclear Politics*, 49.

[176] In the late 1950s, France was worried about the fall of colonial dominoes communist-led nationalists in Indochina. France defined its stakes in the Indochina war as vital as security concerns against the Soviet challenge in Europe. The United States did not support France's interest to protect its colonial legacy. Instead, the US was interested in Indochina as part of the regional effort against communist expansion. Goldstein, *Deterrence and Security in the 21st Century*, 184-91.

[177] This is analogous to signaling a deterrent to the adversary. For example, James Fearon argued that a state's beliefs and issue choices rather than the opponent's superior military power might determine the effectiveness of the deterrent signal. James D Fearon, "Signaling versus the balance of power and interests: An empirical test of a crisis bargaining model," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 38, no. 2 (1994): 238.

To summarize, the patron's commitment to demonstrate military power (or hard commitment) and commitment to share strategic interests (or soft commitment) will increase the reliability of security commitment, leading to the termination of the client's nuclear weapons program. I do not argue that these commitments are sufficient conditions to establish the reliability of security commitment. I only attempt to illustrate paths to increase the reliability of security commitment and better understand how a patron may establish the reliability of security commitment by disaggregating security commitment into ability and willingness aspects. I only speculate that the patron's physical demonstration of power may be inadequate to terminate the client's nuclear weapons program, and shared interests may complement the reliability of commitment. Figure 8 Summarizes the discussion.

Figure 8. Summary of the Theoretical Framework

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┌──────────────┐        ┌──────────────┐        ┌──────────────┐
│  Causes of   │        │              │        │              │
│  Security    │───────▶│  Security    │───────▶│   Nuclear    │
│  Commitment  │        │  Commitment  │        │   Restraint  │
└──────────────┘        └──────────────┘        └──────────────┘
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1. When a patron fears nuclear proliferation greater than entrapment, the patron is more likely to increase the level of security commitment.

2. Patron's demonstration of military power to the client will increase the reliability of security commitment.

3. Patron's shared interests with the client will increase the reliability of security commitment.

- Demonstration of military power: the level of troops deployment, the frequency and scale of joint exercise, and other investment in military infrastructure such as military assistance for client's military modernization
- Shared interests: the frequency of diplomatic dialogues such as high-level official meetings and non-military exchange such as economic assistance

3. Research Design

This dissertation aims to examine the causes of security commitment that restrain a client from developing nuclear weapons. My research applies a theoretical focus on a patron's security commitment: why and how a patron assures a client and prevents nuclear weapons development. To find general knowledge useful to the foreign policy problem, I will use the method of

structured, focused comparison.[178] To expand the understanding of nuclear

restraint as a process, I also conduct a within-case analysis. Combining a

case comparison method with a within-case method would benefit from

elaborating how different management policies cause nuclear restraint.[179]

Each case traces the process of nuclear weapons development in relation to

a patron's risk assessment and changing security commitment, which should

be reliable enough to restrain a client's nuclear behavior.

To compare and trace the case of termination and acquisition, the

general questions of each case will be as follows: What was the determining

factor for security commitment? What did the pattern of patron's security

assurance look like? How did a client respond to a patron's commitment in

relation to their motivation to develop nuclear weapons? With the set of

questions in mind, I will examine how an asymmetric alliance was forged,

how a patron tried to assure a client, and how the client reacted to the

patron's security commitment.[180]

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[178] Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2005), 67.

[179] For benefits of the mixed method of case comparison and process tracing, see Derek Beach and Ingo Rohlfing, "Integrating cross-case analyses and process tracing in set-theoretic research: Strategies and parameters of debate," *Sociological Methods & Research* 47, no. 1 (2018).

[180] As Alexander George and Andrew Bennett have put it, the method requires a researcher to ask "a set of standardized, general questions of each case" and undertake the study of cases with "a specific research objective in mind and a theoretical focus appropriate for that objective." George and Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*, 69-70.

Case Selection

To investigate the validity of my argument on the causes of security commitment, I select a case of the termination of nuclear weapons development and another case of the acquisition of nuclear weapons for a comparative case study. Using the method of difference, I choose the two most similar nuclear weapons development cases: South Korea from 1974 to 1982 and North Korea from 1993 to 2009.

They are historically important cases and share similarities in geographic proximity to perceive an adversarial threat, the asymmetric pattern of an alliance, and the patron's opposition to nuclear weapons development. Power asymmetry between the patron and the client appears to promise simple power-based security commitment as a determinant of nuclear restraint.

Despite a series of unilateral decisions by the United States to withdraw its troops from the Korean Peninsula and South Korea's attempt to develop nuclear weapons, the US managed to retain the alliance and prevented South Korea from developing nuclear weapons.[181] During the process, South Korea restrained its nuclear pursuit in 1976 but left future

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[181] It has been widely known that South Korea's security motives for nuclear interest were triggered by the US announcement to withdraw from South Korea. Seung-Young Kim, "Security, Nationalism and the Pursuit of Nuclear Weapons and Missiles: The South Korean Case, 1970–82," *Diplomacy and Statecraft* 12, no. 4 (2001); Sung Gul Hong, "The Search for Deterrence: Park's Nuclear Option," in *The Park Chung Hee Era: The Transformation of South Korea*, ed. Kim. Byung-Kook and Ezra F. Vogel (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2011).

decisions open until it reconsidered nuclear weapons development. In other words, South Korea, after 1976, was employing a nuclear hedging strategy. The Reagan administration promised not to withdraw US troops and recognized South Korea as vital to the security of the United States.[182] Eventually, South Korea terminated its nuclear weapons development in late 1980. For the case analysis, I posit that the South Korean case ended in 1982 when the South Korean government de-compartmentalized weapons-related projects.

On the contrary, China barely retained the alliance and failed to prevent North Korea from developing nuclear weapons.[183] North Korea announced its withdrawal from the NPT twice in 1993 and 2003. Each time China advocated a stable Korean Peninsula as well as nuclear nonproliferation through peaceful dialogues between stakeholders.[184] In

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[182] Scott Snyder and Joyce Lee, "Infusing Commitment with Credibility: The Role of Security Assurances in Cementing the U.S.-ROK Alliance," in *Security Assurances and Nuclear Nonproliferation*, ed. Jeffrey W. Knopf (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2012), 168.

[183] China and North Korea hold a weak alliance, which is under uncertain relations without power asymmetry dynamics. Jae Ho Chung and Myung-hae Choi, "Uncertain Allies or Uncomfortable Neighbors? Making Sense of China-North Korea Relations, 1949–2010," *The Pacific Review* 26, no. 3 (2013).

[184] To explain the Chinese failure in the North Korean case, most studies focused on China's role in the denuclearization process and its concern over North Korea. China is seen as rather a conflict mediator than a stakeholder in its alliance relationship with North Korea. China has been mostly reluctant to employ full sanctions for fear of a regime collapse in North Korea, which will create refugee issues at its border. Samuel S Kim, "China's Conflict-Management Approach to the Nuclear Standoff on the Korean Peninsula," *Asian Perspective* 30, no. 1 (2006). Dingli Shen, "Cooperative Denuclearization toward North Korea," *The Washington Quarterly* 32, no. 4 (2009).

1994, North Korea once suspended the nuclear weapons program as agreed with the United States. When North Korea resumed the program in 2003, China became a host of five rounds of Six-Party Talks. Despite Chinese efforts to mediate tensions on the Korean Peninsula, North Korea conducted its first nuclear test in October 2006.[185] For the case analysis, I posit that the North Korean case ended in 2009 when North Korea declared withdrawal from the Six-Party Talks in April 2009 and conducted the second nuclear test in May 2009. A recent analysis degraded the relationship by arguing that "China is no longer wedded to North Korea's survival."[186] The reluctance and minimized effort to curb North Korea's nuclear weapons program may result from a new finding that the China-North Korea alliance shares very few common interests.[187]

Table 4 summarizes the selection of most similar cases.

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[185] China's comprehensive policy to avoid the collapse of the North Korean regime and help to reform itself greatly affected the suspension of North Korea's nuclear weapons program. David Shambaugh, "China and the Korean Peninsula: Playing for the Long Term," ibid.26, no. 2 (2003).

[186] Oriana Skylar Mastro, "Why China won't Rescue North Korea: What to Expect if Things Fall Apart," *Foreign Affairs* 97 (2018).

[187] You Ji, "China and North Korea: a Fragile Relationship of Strategic Convenience," *Journal of Contemporary China* 10, no. 28 (2001).

Table 4. Selection of Most Similar Cases

	The US Management of South Korea from 1974 to 1982	The Chinese Management of North Korea from 1993 to 2009
Geographic proximity of adversary	Near	Near
Pattern of alliance	Asymmetry	Asymmetry
Patron's position on the client's nuclear weapons development	Opposition	Opposition
Patron's alliance management policy	Take Entrapment to avoid nuclear proliferation	Avoid Entrapment
Outcome of nuclear weapons development (interim options)	Termination of the Nuclear Program (hedging in 1976)	Acquisition of the Nuclear Weapons (suspension in 1994)

Nevertheless, nuclear restraint is a complex process, which requires a close examination. States do not abruptly decide to reverse their nuclear activities. For example, the acquisition of nuclear weapons requires states to follow multiple steps: assuming the patron will intervene in the client's nuclear weapons program, the client often decides to suspend, rollback, and resume their nuclear weapons development. Thus, a dichotomy of nuclear

termination and acquisition may not adequately define outcomes to explain. As Barbara Geddes has put it, "we need to seek to understand underlying processes rather than explaining large-scale, complex outcomes."[188]

Against the backdrop, the interim options of nuclear weapons development by South Korea in 1976 and North Korea in 1994 may offer a depth explanation for understanding the different role of the patron's security commitment in preventing the client from nuclear weapons development.

To be sure, I do not intend to compare the US-ROK alliance with the China-DPRK alliance. Their origin and intra-alliance dynamics are different. Instead, I focus on the US and China commitments as patrons' management policies to the clients. As more powerful states, the US and China concluded defense treaties with weak allies on the Korean Peninsula. First, the United States and South Korea signed a mutual defense treaty on October 1, 1953. Article 3 of the treaty confirms their mutual commitment to come to another's aid.[189] Second, China and North Korea signed a mutual defense treaty on July 11, 1961. Article 2 of the treaty confirms their

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[188] Barbara Geddes, "Paradigms and Sand Castles in Comparative Politics of Developing Areas," in *Political Science Looking to the Future: Comparative Politics, Policy, and International Relations*, ed. William Crotty and William J. Crotty (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1991), 68.

[189] "Mutual Defense Treaty Between the United States and the Republic of Korea," October 1, 1953.

mutual commitment as well.[190] Table 5 shows commitments in US-ROK and China-DPRK defense treaties.

Table 5. Commitments in US-ROK and China-DPRK Defense Treaties

Mutual Defense Treaty Between the United States and the Republic of Korea
Article 3. Each Party recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific area on either of the Parties in territories now under their respective administrative control, or hereafter recognized by one of the Parties as lawfully brought under the administrative control of the other, would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes.
Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance Between the People's Republic of China and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.
Article 2. The Contracting Parties undertake jointly to adopt all measures to prevent aggression against either of the Contracting Parties by any state. In the event of one of the Contracting Parties being subjected to the armed attack by any state or several states jointly and thus being involved in a state of war, the other Contracting Party shall immediately render military and other assistance by all means at its disposal.

One might argue that China only became a major patron of North Korea when it substituted the Soviet Union in the 1990s, or China's military

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[190] "Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance Between the People's Republic of China and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea," July 11, 1961.

capabilities were limited to act as a reliable patron. However, a patron's security commitment is not only expressed by military power exercise but also by sharing interests. China's soft commitment, such as diplomatic and economic assistance, would qualify its role as a patron.

I structure each case analysis in the following manner. To identify each alliance's characteristics and essential concepts, I first illustrate the origins of the US-ROK alliance and China-DPRK alliance. To emphasize the client's security motivation of nuclear weapons development, I review the strategic contexts of each case to illustrate the outset of nuclear weapons development.

After I describe why clients initiated such actions, I examine how patrons assessed the risk of nuclear proliferation and entrapment to decide the level of security commitment. To determine why clients restrained nuclear weapons development, I trace variations of patron's security commitment, expressed in multiple ways.

To determine whether the clients restrained their nuclear weapons development due to the patron's assurances, the evidence must do more than to show the patron's changing security commitment. In particular, reliability is mostly a matter of perception. Commitment is reliable if the client expects that the patron will fulfill promises to come to its aid. For example, the client's leadership decisions and diplomatic rhetoric should reveal a sensitivity to the patron's threat reduction efforts, thereby convinced of such assurance by terminating nuclear weapons development or adopting

stringent nuclear safeguard measures bilaterally or multilaterally.

Sources

In this project, I rely on scholarly articles, books, media articles, official statements, and declassified documents from multiple archives, gathered through digital access and a short field trip to Washington, D.C. in early 2020. I draw upon secondary historical literature to identify the characteristic of the American and the Chinese alliance policies, and other sources such as memoirs and essential research materials on the two Koreas' nuclear weapons developments to identify critical events.

To verify official statements from historical resources, I review declassified documents extensively. First, for significant security memorandum of the United States, I draw upon the Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) documentary records; National Security Council Reports from the US National Archives; National Security Study Directives from the CIA CREST database; and National Security Decision Directives from the website provided by Federation of American Scientists. I examine other official statements, including presidential speeches obtained from Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States; the American Presidency Project by the University of California Santa Barbara; Presidential Speeches of the Miller Center, University of Virginia; Presidential Libraries of Richard Nixon, Gerald Ford, Jimmy Carter, and Ronald Reagan; and ROK Presidential Archives.

Second, I examine a range of primary sources regarding the South Korean and the North Korean nuclear weapons development obtained from the collection of "Stopping Korea from Going Nuclear Part I and Part II" published by Digital National Security Archive of George Washington University; "South Korean Nuclear History," "North Korea International Documentation Project," and "China-North Korea Relations" from Digital Archive of Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars; South Korean declassified documents on NPT ratification from Diplomatic Archives of ROK Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Due to the secrecy of nuclear weapons policy, the evidence is sometimes circumstantial. However, they still provide insights into how the United States and China sought to assure their allies and prevent nuclear proliferation.

Third, Chinese diplomatic positions are reviewed with primary but English resources, only due to my inability to comprehend Chinese literature. Chinese defense papers and descriptions on foreign policy principles are obtained from People's Daily and the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs website. Verbatim records of meetings at the Security Council before voting for resolutions provide invaluable narratives that Chinese officials expressed for diplomatic support toward North Korea.

Last, I used the US Troops Deployment Dataset obtained from the Heritage Foundation and information on the important visits between China and North Korea obtained from the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs website.

III. THE US AND NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION IN SOUTH KOREA

1. US Risk-taking Alliance Policy

Containment and the Hub-and-Spoke System

Upon the end of World War II, the United States presence in the world became more apparent with a transformation of American foreign policy from isolationism to internationalism, which refers to US engagement in all aspects of international relations.[191] In particular, the United States designed the new grand strategy to contain the Soviet Union.[192] Based on the National Security Council Paper 68 (NSC 68) entitled "United States

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[191] For the transformation of American foreign policy, see Jeffrey W. Legro, "Whence American Internationalism," *International Organization* 54, no. 2 (2000); Andrew Johnstone, "Isolationism and Internationalism in American Foreign Relations," *Journal of Transatlantic Studies* 9, no. 1 (2011). American foreign policy has been mainly driven by two orientations: isolationism and internationalism. Regarding American isolationism, the US had been reluctant to engage with foreign affairs from the outset. George Washington's Farewell address warned the nation to "steer clear of permanent alliances with any portion of the foreign world." The US Senate avoided creating of the League of Nations, and the America First Committee protested US involvement in World War II. In this tradition, the US sought to avoid any permanent alliances. For George Washington's farewell address, see George Washington, *Washington's Farewell Address [1796]* (First National Bank of Miami, 1796).

[192] The US view on the Soviet Union as the product of ideology and a revolutionary power with the unlimited expansion is found from George Kennan's "X" article published by Foreign Affairs in July 1947. Along with "long telegram," a diplomatic cable submitted to the US State of Department by Kennan, they are essential documents that established the American containment strategy, or the Truman Doctrine.

Objectives and Programs for National Security," the Truman administration

rejected American isolationism. It introduced the new American grand

strategy to seek "the rapid building up of the political, economic, and

military strength of the free world" to deter Soviet aggression.[193] In doing

so, the US engaged with international affairs through multilateralism by

creating the United Nations for global affairs, the North Atlantic Treaty

Organization (NATO) for European security, and the Southeast Asia Treaty

Organization (SEATO) for anti-communism in Southeast Asia.

In East Asia, American foreign policymakers also preferred a

collective security arrangement. As a Special Advisor to Secretary of State,

John Foster Dulles broadly supported Pacific Pact with Japan embedded in

the multilateral security framework, as Germany was in NATO.[194] The US

sought to transform Japan's aggressive power into a stabilizing force in a

regional security framework, where Japan is playing a supportive role

against the expansion of communism in Indochina and elsewhere.

However, the US settled with its second-best option, the network of

bilateral alliances in the Asia-Pacific region. The American preference for a

multilateral structure in the region was not fulfilled because of growing

uncertainties from the early Korean War in 1950. Initially, the US worried

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[193] "National Security Council Report, NSC 68, 'United States Objectives and Programs for National Security'," April 14, 1950, *Cold War Origins*, Wilson Center Digital Archive: International History Declassified.

[194] Kent Calder, "Securing Security Through Prosperity: the San Francisco System in Comparative Perspective," *The Pacific Review* 17, no. 1 (2004): 141.

about Asian countries conspiring to induce US military aid by provoking Communist China and North Korea.[195] For example, Chinese Nationalist leader Chiang Kai-shek, the Philippine President Elpidio Quirino, and South Korean President Syngman Rhee sought the "Pacific Union Pact" as a Marshall Plan for Asia.[196] Instead, the US favored a limited membership of "Pacific Security Pact," including Japan, the Philippines, and Australia as the off-shore defense line to "deny Formosa to the Chinese Communist regime, to forestall communist aggression in South and Southeast Asia, and to retain under active consideration the problem of Pacific security in its entirety."[197]

Nevertheless, when the US faced the Chinese intervention in the Korean War, American anxieties led to an early settlement with Japan to conclude a bilateral defense pact. For instance, Dulles feared that Japan's stability might be jeopardized because of its fragile domestic politics and nationalist sentiment. A bilateral defense pact was accompanied by a peace treaty to control Japan and to ensure other allies in the region against

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[195] Victor Cha suggested that the US approach to major states in East Asia was bilateral and aimed to control the allies from overdependence pathology and reduce the risk for the US to be entrapped by reckless Asian leaders. Besides, with a belief in the domino theory that a collapse of one anti-communist ally leads to another, the failure of allied adventurism to roll back communism in the region could backfire on the American interests with the collapse of the anti-communists in the region. See Cha, "Powerplay: Origins of the US Alliance System in Asia," 189.

[196] Leszek Buszynski, "The San Francisco System: Contemporary Meaning and Challenges," *Asian Perspective* 35, no. 3 (2011): 320.

[197] "Position Paper Prepared in the Department of State: A Pacific Security Pact," January 2, 1952, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Asia and the Pacific*, Government Printing Office.

Japan's revival as a revisionist power.[198]

Eventually, the United States established a network of security alliances with American military bases and armed forces in Australia, South Korea, and Japan, among others. The overarching US presence in the Asia-Pacific region emerged as "a dense network of formal security alliances" and "a hub-and-spokes network of bilateral ties radiating from Washington."[199]

The objective of the hub and spoke network was clear: to build a stable security architecture in the Asia-Pacific region. Nevertheless, the US concluded bilateral alliances with major states in Asia-Pacific with different security concerns as well.[200] The alliance between the US and Japan grew out of Japan's disarmament at the end of World War II. The Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan was initially signed on September 8, 1951, during the San Francisco Conference and later amended in 1960. For other allies in Asia, the US assured to prevent a revival of Japanese militarism. For example, the Security Treaty between Australia, New Zealand, and the United States of America (ANZUS) was signed in July 1951. The treaty resulted from a failed attempt

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[198] Calder, "Securing security through prosperity," 142.

[199] Ibid., 138-39. According to Calder, from a comprehensive view of the integrated system of political-economic relations, the hub-and-spoke system is often referred to as the San Francisco System, which features not only a security network of bilateral alliances but also strong asymmetry in security and economics, special precedence to Japan, and liberal trade access to American markets.

[200] Buszynski, "The San Francisco System."

to create a multilateral, regional security institution, the Pacific Pact, to respond to the expansion of communism in Indochina.[201] Australia and New Zealand opposed to include Japan in the regional pact, and the US concluded the tripartite treaty to reassure the allies. Parties of the ANZUS treaty agreed on "pending the development of a more comprehensive system of regional security in the Pacific Area."[202] For similar reasons, the Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States and the Philippines was signed on August 30, 1951.

The US also provided security assurance against local threats. For example, the Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States and the Republic of Korea was signed on October 1, 1953, due to the Korean War. The treaty aimed to provide US security commitment to protect South Korea from North Korea's bellicose action and pacify South Korean President Syngman Rhee's worries upon the armistice agreement at Panmunjom on July 27, 1953. In addition, The Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States and the Republic of China was signed on December 2, 1954, to deter communist China from attacking Taiwan and prevent a military escalation between Chiang Kai-shek backed by the US military and communist China.

With formalized defense alignments, the US armed forces were stationed in each ally's territory to maintain regional stability. Figure 9

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[201] Ibid., 320.

[202] ANZUS Article VIII

expresses the presence of US forces in Asia after the Korean War.

Figure 9. US Troops in Major Asian Allies from 1953 to 1962

	1953	1954	1955	1956	1957	1958	1959	1960	1961	1962
Philippines	15,466	26,890	10,819	10,191	11,297	21,092	10,683	11,334	11,681	13,936
Taiwan	811	4,174	7,093	5,379	6,261	19,044	4,402	4,147	4,349	4,121
South Korea	326,863	225,590	75,328	68,810	71,043	46,024	49,827	55,864	57,694	60,947
Japan	209,168	210,250	189,866	168,592	150,874	107,634	85,387	83,462	85,864	91,741

Source: Kane (2004), "Global U.S. Troop Deployment."

Upon the end of the Korean War in 1953, the United States had 326,863 troops in South Korea and 209,168 troops in Japan. Despite a dramatic decrease in forces, the US maintained troops with a significant weight. For example, in the 1960s, the US had around 58,000 troops in South Korea and around 85,500 troops in Japan.[203]

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[203] Tim Kane, "Global U.S. Troop Deployment, 1950-2003," (The Heritage Foundation, October 27, 2004).

After all, the US sought to stabilize the regional order in Asia-Pacific. The US grand strategy in the Asia-Pacific postulated an alliance network of bilateral defense treaties with major Asian states to limit the communist influence on its allies, provide security commitment for preventing a revival of Japanese aggression, and assure the security of allies from local threats. The interaction between Asian countries increased fears of entrapment for the United States. The US took these risks by creating a bilateral network centered by it with the separation of its allies from each other.

Détente and Peace Through Partnership

Throughout the 1970s, the US commitment to act as a pacific power remained, despite the adjustment of its engagement policy in Asia initiated by the Nixon administration. Under the narrative of "peace through partnership," the United States sought to establish a new international order, détente, in which the US and the Soviet Union, along with other great powers, would maintain the status quo by balancing each other.

The Nixon administration (1969-1974) sought new international relations with communist countries. Defining peace as a durable structure of international relationships, President Richard Nixon and his National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger embarked on a new foreign policy of détente, which was aimed to reform previous containment strategy from

ideological competition to a new global balance of power.[204] There were

four major components in Nixon's strategy to build constructive

relationships with the Soviet Union: the acknowledgment and entitlement of

the same status as a superpower; a formal legitimation of the present

division of Europe including the status of West Germany; a concession to

the Soviet Union in economic and technical assistance; and mutual restraint

including strategic arms control with a set of new norms and rules between

the US and the Soviet Union.[205]

   For Nixon, détente meant no decline in American power. America's

goal was to maintain its strategic advantage and global leadership. In the

first annual report to the US Congress on the US foreign policy in 1970,

Nixon pointed out that the new foreign policy aimed to accommodate once a

monolithic but then divided communist world of the Soviet Union and

China.[206] In doing so, the US attempted to improve its relationship with

China. Beginning with the normalization process in February 1972,

President Nixon visited Beijing to open relations with the Chinese

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[204] Robert S. Litwak, *Détente and the Nixon doctrine: American foreign policy and the pursuit of stability, 1969-1976* (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1986).

[205] Alexander George and Gordon A. Craig, "From Detente to the End of the Cold War," in *Force and statecraft: Diplomatic problems of our time* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1983), 119-21. The arms control process started as part of détente with the Soviet Union. In May 1972, the US and the Soviet Union signed a Strategic Arms Limitations Agreement (SALT I) to freeze the number of strategic missiles.

[206] "US Foreign Policy for the 1970's: a New Strategy for Peace: A Report to the Congress," February 18, 1970, Government Printing Office.

communist. Stronger relations with Beijing would allow him to play China against the Soviet Union.

The United States sought to build a new regional structure in Asia-Pacific to achieve dual objectives of keeping a strong American presence and reducing American armed forces from the region. On the one hand, the US was committed to protecting its anti-communism interests in Asia and remained as a protector against threats from China. Highlighting the US presence as a "pacific power" in the region, Nixon suggested that anti-communist forces in Asia are strong but still require US protection against the threat posed by China.[207]

The Nixon administration did not intend for the US to disengage from world affairs completely. The 1970 foreign policy report mentioned that "[the US] has no intention of withdrawing from the world," and "peace in the world will continue to require us to maintain our commitment-and we will."[208] In terms of the Asia-Pacific region, the second and the third report to the US Congress in 1971 and 1972 reiterated the continuation of the US treaty commitments and the maintenance of sufficient US forces in the

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[207] At the same time, Nixon sought to reconcile with China and dissuade its imperial ambitions to expand its influence in Asia. As a result, Nixon visited Beijing to open a diplomatic relationship in 1972.

[208] "US Foreign Policy for the 1970's: a New Strategy for Peace: A Report to the Congress," 7.

region.[209]

On the other hand, the new US foreign policy aimed to share responsibilities in order to avoid the entrapment of unnecessary local crises. The Nixon administration suggested that the primary responsibility of the allied defense was in Asian countries and gradually sought to minimize US engagement in the region. In 1967, Nixon envisaged his new Asia policy to suggest that "the central pattern of the future in the US-Asian relations must be American support for Asian initiatives."[210] Despite the need for American strength to protect Asian states from communism, Nixon firmly noted that "other nations must recognize that the role of the United States as a world policeman is likely to be limited in the future."[211]

With an informal remark with reporters met in Guam 1969, later known as "Nixon Doctrine," President Nixon suggested a continuing American role as a protector in the region but warned that "we must avoid the kind of policy that will make countries in Asia so dependent upon us that we are dragged into conflicts such as the one we have in Vietnam."[212]

Similarly, in the 1970 foreign policy report, the Nixon

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[209] "Third Annual Report to the Congress on United States Foreign Policy," February 9, 1972, *American Presidency Document Categories*, The American Presidency Project.

[210] Richard M. Nixon, "Asia after Viet Nam," *Foreign Affairs* 46, no. 1 (1967): 124.

[211] Ibid., 114.

[212] "29. Editorial Note," *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976*, Government Printing Office.

administration introduced "peace through partnership" as a basic principle to guide its foreign policy.[213] A major theme of the partnership was sharing responsibilities by establishing a new regional structure and reducing American forces in the Asia-Pacific region. In terms of a new regional structure, the US security commitments in Asia-Pacific were conditional in that the new regional structure is created based on the role of the US, Japan, China, and the Soviet Union as major powers in the region and "collective interests of Asian nations acting in regional groupings."[214] In terms of reducing American forces, the US armed forces began to withdraw from Vietnam in 1969. The US Congress banned military activity in Indochina in 1973.[215] American withdrawal from Vietnam was a signal of sharing responsibilities for other Asian allies, including South Korea. In South Korea, the US forces were decreased from 66,531 in 1969 to around 40,000 in the late 1970s. In Japan, almost half of the US troops were retreated (see Figure 10).

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[213] "US Foreign Policy for the 1970's: a New Strategy for Peace: A Report to the Congress," 4.

[214] "US Foreign Policy for the 1970's: Building for Peace: A Report to the Congress by Richard Nixon, President of the United States," February 25, 1971, Government Printing Office.

[215] By ending the war in Viet Nam, the US chose a path of an honorable exit or "Vietnamization" to balance three objectives: to sustain America's morale, to afford South Viet Nam an opportunity to stand on its own, and to provide incentives to North Viet Nam to settle. See Henry Kissinger, *Diplomacy* (New York, NY: Simon and Schuster, 1994), 681.

Figure 10. US Troops in Major Asian Allies from 1969 to 1980

	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980
■ Philippines	27,352	23,440	17,821	15,808	14,399	18,026	13,934	15,483	14,050	14,433	14,101	13,387
■ Taiwan	9,243	8,813	8,565	8,289	8,267	4,619	2,584	2,090	995	753	-	-
■ South Korea	66,531	52,197	40,740	41,600	41,864	40,387	40,204	39,133	40,705	41,565	39,018	38,780
■ Japan	84,802	82,264	71,485	61,747	56,240	51,608	48,337	46,794	46,237	45,939	46,207	46,004

Source: Kane (2004), "Global U.S. Troop Deployment."

To compensate for the retrenchment of the US forces in Asia, including from Vietnam to South Korea, the Nixon administration requested a vast increase of its Military Assistance Program budget from the US Congress. In Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird's words, the military assistance was "the essential ingredient of our policy if we are to honor our obligations, support our allies, and yet reduce the likelihood of having to commit American ground combat units."[216]

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[216] Earl C Ravenal, "The Nixon Doctrine and Our Asian Commitments," *Foreign Affairs* 49, no. 2 (1971): 204.

The Ford administration (1974-1977) continued to pursue foreign policy goals of the previous Nixon administration, although the US government slowed down the pace of troop's withdrawal after the fall of Saigon, the capital of South Vietnam, in May 1975.[217] In an address at the University of Hawaii in December 1975, President Ford proclaimed a Pacific Doctrine, a restatement of the Nixon Doctrine. He noted that "the United States, the Soviet Union, China, and Japan are all Pacific powers," and "equilibrium in the Pacific is essential to the United States and the other countries in the Pacific."[218] Partnership with Japan and the normalization of relations with China continued to serve as premises of the Ford administration's foreign policy. SEATO was phased out, but American support for multilateral efforts to regional security cooperation continued with the newly established Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

Despite the communist take-over in Indochina upon the fall of Saigon, there has been no drastic change in US political and security goals. In 1976, under President Ford's direct order, National Security Study Memorandum 235 (NSSM 235) reviewed US interests and objectives in the Asia-Pacific region. According to NSSM 235, the loss of Indochina was

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[217] Andrew J Gawthorpe, "The Ford Administration and Security Policy in the Asia-Pacific after the Fall of Saigon," *The Historical Journal* 52, no. 3 (2009).

[218] "Address by President Gerald R. Ford at the University of Hawaii," December 7, 1975, *Selected Gerald R. Ford Presidential Speeches and Writings*, Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.

limited in Southeast Asia, and the major power balance among the US, the Soviet Union, China, and Japan had not been radically changed.[219] The United States saw the domination of communism in East Asia was unlikely "because of the Sino-Soviet dispute, the gradual development of less militant policies by both the USSR and the PRC, the continuing strength of the U.S.-Japan alliance, and the current relative stability of most non-communist East Asian societies."[220]

Still, a distinction from the Nixon Doctrine was a re-emphasis on the strategic importance of the Asia-Pacific region. For example, the Kintner report influenced the Ford administration's foreign policy in East Asia.[221] In this report, then the US Ambassador to Thailand, Willian Kintner, advised that the US should maintain a strong forward basing posture utilizing existing facilities as long as possible.[222] However, he also foresaw that the US would not fully maintain operational bases on foreign soil over the long run. Against the backdrop, obligations to allies were confirmed when President Ford called for "resolution of outstanding political conflicts" and a supportive role of the US with "a modest responsibility" by

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[219] "U.S. Interests and Objectives in the Asia- Pacific Region -- Part I, NSSM 235," November 5, 1976, *the National Security Council Institutional Files*, Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.

[220] Ibid., 4.

[221] Gawthorpe, "The Ford Administration and Security Policy."

[222] "US Policy Interests in the Asian-Pacific Area: the US Purpose in Asia," October 31, 1975, *the Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific*, Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.

strengthening the self-reliance of Asian countries.[223] American strength was recognized as a basic not only to the balance of power in the region but also to support political and social legitimacy, which each Asian country was responsible for.

The Carter administration (1977-1981) again aimed to minimize unwanted involvement in Asia with a fundamental basis of foreign policy shifted from power politics to values and idealism under democratic moralism and human rights in diplomacy. President Carter proclaimed a new toughness rooted in his human rights concerns and condemnation of previous détente policy against the Soviet Union.[224] As Nixon foresaw earlier the establishment of an international structure of peace among great powers, the Soviet Union became a matured power in the eyes of American foreign policymakers.

During the Carter administration, ideological influence on the US strategy affected Asia policy. For example, in 1977, President Carter delivered a speech at Notre Dame University to declare his foreign policy "free of that inordinate fear of communism."[225] The Carter administration expressed its stance not to support any form of government against democracy and human rights. This angered many Asian leaders in

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[223] "Address by President Gerald R. Ford at the University of Hawaii."

[224] John Dumbrell, *American Foreign Policy: Carter to Clinton* (London, UK: Macmillan International Higher Education, 1996), 40.

[225] "University of Notre Dame Commencement," May 22, 1977, *Presidential Speeches*, UVA Miller Center.

authoritarian regimes, including South Korea. The administration attempted to cut economic aid and pressured international economic institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund to curtail economic assistance.[226]

However, the assessment of the Soviet intention was divided within the Carter administration. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance saw the Soviet Union as "becoming benign," but National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski thought it was malevolent.[227] The arms control process started with the Nixon administration continued to conclude the second Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT II) to curtail the manufacture of strategic nuclear weapons with the Soviet Union in June 1979. Nevertheless, the Carter administration withdrew from SALT II after the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in December 1979.

Peace Through Strength and Alliances

Throughout the 1980s, the Reagan administration (1981~1989) anchored a policy initiative to roll back the tide of Soviet expansionism and to reassert American power to the world. The initiative became known as the Reagan Doctrine. At the personal level, dissatisfaction with containment and détente were the roots of the doctrine. There existed domestic and international

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[226] Robert D. Schulzinger, *US Diplomacy since 1900* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1998), 317.

[227] Dumbrell, *American Foreign Policy: Carter to Clinton*, 41.

influence for Reagan's initiation as well.[228] Domestic influence included the effects of the Vietnam War, the rise of the conservative right, and the election victory of Ronald Reagan in 1980. International influence included the Soviet expansion into the Third World, weakening containment effect, reduced risk of direct confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union, great attention on Third World periphery, and increased instability due to the rise of the nationalist movement in the Third World.

The Reagan doctrine was heavily influenced by President Reagan's ideological viewpoint and his foreign policymakers, who observed events in the developing world and blamed the Soviet Union for instigating the unrest. At a press conference in 1981, President Regan stated that "I know of no leader of the Soviet Union since the revolution and including the present leadership that has not more than once repeated in the various communist congresses they hold their determination that their goal must be promotion of world revolution and a one-world socialist or communist state, whichever word you want to use."[229] National Security Adviser Richard Allen and Secretary of State Alexander Haig also shared the conservative view.[230]

The Reagan administration sought to rebuild the American military

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[228] James M. Scott, *Deciding to Intervene: The Reagan Doctrine and American Foreign Policy* (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 1996), 15.

[229] Lescaze Lee, "Reagan Denounces Soviets But Speaks Gently of Iran," *The Washington Post*, January 30, 1981.

[230] Scott, *Deciding to intervene*, 18.

strength and restrain the threat posed by the aggressive and ideological

Soviet Union. As a presidential candidate, Reagan pledged to pursue a

"peace through strength" policy to restore America's defense capabilities.[231]

His willingness to be ready for war was not campaign rhetoric. As an

outline of the Reagan administration's foreign policy, in November 1981,

State Secretary Alexander Haig stated four pillars of the foreign policy

before the House Foreign Affairs Committee: the restoration of American

economic health and military strength; the renewal of America's traditional

alliances and development of new friendships; the promotion of peaceful

progress in developing nations, and the achievement of a relationship with

the Soviet Union based on restraint and reciprocity.[232]

In 1982, President Reagan directed a review study of the US national

security strategy to produce a National Security Decision Directives 1-82

(NSDD 1-82), which were issued by President Reagan and his Assistants to

the President for National Security Affairs to set forth official national

security policy for the guidance of the defense, intelligence, and foreign

policy establishments of the US government. The scope of the review study

included US national security objectives, regional security objectives, and

international behavior on US national strategy, the impact of Soviet military

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[231] Lou Cannon, "Reagan: 'Peace Through Strength'," *The Washington Post*, August 19, 1980.

[232] "Excerpts from Haig's Review of Foreign Policy Presented to a House Panel," *The New York Times*, November 13, 1981.

power, the role of allies in US national strategy, and objectives and policies of strategic forces.[233]

Through NSDD 32, after carefully reviewing the NSSD 1-82 study of the US national security strategy, Reagan directed that the study serves as a guide for US national security strategy.[234] Unlike the Nixon administration, which sought a status-quo with the Soviet Union, the Reagan administration aimed "to contain and reverse the expansion of Soviet control and military presence throughout the world."[235] The Reagan administration saw growing Soviet influence as the key military threat to American security. The risk of direct confrontation with the Soviet Union was conceivable, although the study assessed a war with a Soviet client arising from regional tensions was more likely than a confrontation.

In terms of the global posture of US forces and the role of alliances, national security strategies aimed "to deter military attack by the USSR and its allies against the US, its allies, and other important countries across the spectrum of conflict" and "to strengthen the influence of the US throughout

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[233] "National Security Study Directive (NSSD) 1-82, U.S. Natioanl Security Strategy," February 5, 1982, *General CIA Records*, Freedom of Information Act Electronic Reading Room.

[234] Although the full text of the NSSD 1-82 study remains classified, NSDD 32 introduces the contents of NSSD 1-82, including global objectives, threats to US national security, regional military objectives, and the role of allies. See "NSDD 32: US National Security Strategy," May 20, 1982, *NSDD - National Security Decision Directives Reagan Administration*, Intelligence Resource Program, Federation of American Scientists.

[235] Ibid.

the world by strengthening existing alliances."[236] Along with security assistance to allies, Reagan also directed that "the US should be prepared to intervene militarily in regional or local conflicts" and "the maintenance and improvement of forward-deployed forces and rapidly deployable U.S.-based forces."[237] As expressed in Figure 11, the US had a moderate increase in troops stationed in major Asian allies in the 1980s.

Figure 11. US Troops in Major Asian Allies from 1981 to 1989

	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989
Philippines	14,500	14,223	14,850	15,319	15,374	16,068	16,404	16,655	14,745
South Korea	38,254	39,194	38,705	40,785	41,718	43,133	44,674	45,501	44,461
Japan	46,196	51,015	48,711	45,761	46,923	48,104	49,783	49,680	49,861

Source: Kane (2004), "Global U.S. Troop Deployment"

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[236] Ibid.

[237] Ibid.

In sum, the United States largely maintained its physical presence in the Asia-Pacific region and continued to act as a patron of Asian allies, although the American perception of entrapment swung high and low. The United States perceived the risk of entrapment higher in the 1970s and lowered in the 1980s. In the 1970s, the US administrations partly reduced armed forces in the Asia-Pacific region. The Nixon administration paved a new way for American foreign policy and reduced its over-commitment in Asia-Pacific, starting from Vietnam. The Ford administration slowed down the pace of withdrawal as it saw a possibility of the Soviet expansion in Asia, but soon the Carter administration revived US disengagement from authoritarian Asian allies. US perception of entrapment went low when the Reagan administration decided to roll back the Soviet aggression in the 1980s.

US risk-taking alliance policy and forward defense posture to assure allies in the Asia-Pacific region were hardly changed. Nixon insisted on the US role as a pacific power. Ford also confirmed US obligations to the Asian allies. Carter's moral diplomacy short-lived facing Soviet aggression. Finally, the US vowed to rebuild American military strength and renew allied relationships.

2. South Korea from 1974 to 1976

Withdrawal and Warnings of Proliferation

South Korea's interest in nuclear weapons can be explained by increasing North Korean provocations and a sudden withdrawal of US troops. In the late 1960s, North Korea's behavior vis-à-vis South Korea became increasingly aggressive. In 1968, thirty-one North Korean commandos attempted to assassinate President Park Chung-hee in a raid on his official residence, Cheong Wa Dae (or the Blue House), in Seoul. The commando team approached a checkpoint less than 100 meters from the residence. In the same year, North Korea captured the US intelligence ship, the USS Pueblo. In 1969, North Korea shot down the US reconnaissance plane EC-121, killed four US soldiers near the southern boundary of the DMZ, hijacked a South Korea airliner, to name a few. North Korea's provocation continued in the 1970s.[238] Because North Korea enjoyed military superiority over South Korea, the presence of US troops had substantially reduced the North Korean threat.

Against the backdrop, a unilateral decision of US disengagement from South Korea undermined South Korea's confidence in American security commitment. On August 21 and 22, 1969, US President Richard

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[238] For a list of North Korean provocation actions, see Hannah Fischer, "North Korean Provocative Actions, 1950-2007," (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, April 20, 2007).

Nixon had a meeting with South Korean President Park Chung-hee in San

Francisco to elaborate the Nixon Doctrine, a new Asia policy to scale down

US presence in the region. During the summit, Nixon denied American

retreat from the region but maintained a vague position about troop

withdrawal from South Korea.[239] Nixon and Park signed a joint statement

to agree with defense and deterrence played by South Korean and American

forces stationed in South Korea, but they failed to mention earlier US

commitment, including no reduction in the number of US forces in Korea.[240]

   A year later, the United States decided to withdraw its troops from

South Korea. In early March 1970, Nixon signed National Security Decision

Memorandum 48 (NSDM 48) on US programs in Korea to decide the

reduction of US military presence in Korea by 20,000 personnel by the end

of the fiscal year of 1971 and further disposition of remaining forces as to

reduce US presence in the demilitarized zone (DMZ), which is a border

barrier that divides the Korean Peninsula.[241] Nixon wanted to proceed with

consultations for creating a situation in which US withdrawals resulted from

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[239] Lanoszka, *Atomic Assurance*, 115.

[240] "Joint Statement Following Discussions With President Park of South Korea,"
August 22, 1969, *American Presidency Document Categories*, The American
Presidency Project. Despite the failure, it has been known that President Park had
favorable impressions of the summit. Park believed that the US would not
withdraw from South Korea as long as South Korean troops were remained in
Vietnam and expected full consultation in advance before removing US troops
from Korea. See Chae-Jin Lee, *A Troubled Peace: US Policy and the Two Koreas*
(Baltimore, Maryland: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006), 67-68.

[241] "National Security Decision Memorandum 48: U.S. Programs in Korea," March
20, 1970, *National Security Decision Memoranda (NSDM)*, Richard Nixon
Presidential Library.

President Park's initiative in view of present South Korea's strength and the agreed need for future improvements in South Korean forces.[242]

Washington's unilateral action frustrated Seoul. In late March 1970, US ambassador William Porter notified President Park of the decision to withdraw US troops from South Korea. Park felt betrayed and abandoned by the US. He argued that Washington had no right to withdraw unilaterally because Article Four of the Mutual Defense Treaty required their mutual agreement.[243] In August 1970, the US Vice President Spirow Agnew met President Park in Seoul. During the meeting, Park demanded a written guarantee from the US government to protect South Korea from the North Korean attack, a pledge not to withdraw any more troops, and 3 billion US dollars of military aid.[244] Agnew was not authorized to make any commitment. However, on a flight to Taipei after the meeting, he told reporters that the US forces in Korea would be removed entirely within five

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[242] Ibid. Nixon decided three conditions for consultations: five years military assistance at a level of 200 million US dollars per year, increase of economic assistance above a level of 50 million US dollars per year, and further withdrawals beyond the 20,000 personnel when South Korean forces return from Vietnam or compensating improvements in South Korean forces are well underway.

[243] Lee, *A Troubled Peace: US Policy and the Two Koreas*, 69. Article 4 of the mutual defense treaty reads that "the Republic of Korea grants, and the United States of America accepts, the right to dispose United States land, air and sea forces in and about the territory of the Republic of Korea as determined by mutual agreement." See "Mutual Defense Treaty Between the United States and the Republic of Korea," October 1, 1953,

[244] William J. Taylor, Jennifer A. Smith, and Michael J. Mazarr, "US Troop Reductions from Korea, 1970–1990," *The Journal of East Asian Affairs* 4, no. 2 (1990): 262.

years.[245]

On February 6, 1971, the United States and South Korea agreed to withdraw the Seventh Infantry Division by June 1971 and relocate the Second Infantry Division and other US troops away from the DMZ. To compensate weakening tripwire effect of American forces in Korea and modernize South Korean armed forces, the US agreed to provide 1.5 billion US dollars in military aid over five years.[246] Seventh Infantry withdrew promptly, but it took seven years for South Korea to receive American military aid fully. The undermined mutual confidence, in turn, made President Park reduce South Korea's dependency on its unreliable US security commitment. Accordingly, it has been known that Park revealed his nuclear aspiration in an interview with the Washington Post on June 12, 1975, and later expressed his concern to a US official that "if the US nuclear umbrella is to be removed, Korea will have to develop nuclear weapons."[247]

Initially, the Nixon administration perceived a low level of nuclear proliferation risk, although it inherited the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation

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[245] James M. Naughton, "Agnew Says U.S. Aims At Full Pullout in Korea," *The New York Times*, August 27, 1970.

[246] To prepare for American disengagement, South Korea needed compensating resources and sufficient time to modernize its armed forces. In his letter to Nixon, Park expressed that "the Nixon Doctrine should be applied discreetly and gradually in Asia, where the situation is still fluid and fraught with dangers, lest a power vacuum or disequilibrium should be created, and peace and security endangered." See "US President Richard Nixon's Diplomatic Letter, 1971," April 15, 1971, ROK Ministry of Foreign Affairs Diplomatic Archives.

[247] Hyung-A Kim, *Korea's Development under Park Chung Hee* (London and New York: Routledge, 2004), 193.

of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) from the previous Johnson administration. The NPT became effective on March 5, 1970, but Nixon was not very enthusiastic about the treaty and even skeptical about nuclear proliferation by third world states until India's nuclear test in May 1974.[248] The Indian nuclear test moved nonproliferation from the periphery to the center of US foreign policy.[249] By June 1974, the US government sought tight nonproliferation export controls.[250]

In such an alarming atmosphere, South Korea's nuclear weapons development became a significant concern for the United States. In July 1974, the early suspicion arose from outgoing US ambassador to South Korea Phillip Habib, who reported Washington his "visceral feeling" that some South Korean senior officials desired to obtain the capability to produce nuclear weapons "based only on growing independence of Korean attitude toward defense matters and increasing doubts about the durability of US commitments."[251] By late 1974, there were a few doubts in Washington about Seoul's interest in nuclear weapons development.

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[248] Gavin, *Nuclear Statecraft: History and Strategy in America's Atomic Age*, 117-18; *Nuclear Weapons and American Grand Strategy*, 96-100.

[249] William C. Potter, "India and the New Look of US Nonproliferation Policy," *Nonproliferation Review* 12, no. 2 (2005): 344.

[250] "NSDM 255: Security and Other Aspects of the Growth and Dissemination of Nuclear Power Industries," June 3, 1974, *National Security Decision Memoranda (NSDM)*, Richard Nixon Presidential Library.

[251] "U.S. Embassy in Republic of Korea telegram 4957 to Department of State, "Korean Accession to NPT"," July 30, 1974, *Stopping Korea from Going Nuclear, Part I*, National Security Archive.

Washington's doubt was not entirely circumstantial. Faced by the US military disengagement, President Park began to emphasize self-reliance in defense with the modernization of armed forces. Combined with the erosion of confidence in US security commitment, South Korea's self-reliance extended to the search for an independent nuclear deterrent. In doing so, South Korea compartmentalized its nuclear weapons program and placed it under the auspices of the Office of the Second Presidential Secretary for Economic Affairs (OSPSEA) for the direct management of Cheong Wa Dae.[252] Decisions related to nuclear weapons development were made through the Weapons Exploitation Committee (WEC) in the early 1970s, suggesting that South Korea's existing nuclear power program took a detour into an effort to develop nuclear weapons.[253] The Agency for Defense Development (ADD) conducted research and development on weapons design, a delivery system, and explosion technology.[254]

The Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute (KAERI), an affiliate of the Ministry of Science and Technology, was tasked to acquire

[252] Scott Snyder, "South Korean Nuclear Decision Making," in *Forecasting Nuclear Proliferation in the 21st Century: A Comparative Perspective*, ed. William C. Potter and Gaukhar Mukhatzhanova (Stanford, Calif.: Standford University Press, 2010), 161.

[253] Kim, "Security, Nationalism and the Pursuit of Nuclear Weapons and Missiles: The South Korean Case, 1970–82," 58.

[254] Hong, "The Search for Deterrence: Park's Nuclear Option," 490. To acquire strategic missile capability, Park signed the "Basic Plan for Developing Ballistic Missiles" and ordered to implement it as part of the Yulgok project. For South Korea's missile development, see ibid., 494-96.

reprocessing facilities.[255] South Korea reached France, Belgium, and Canada to purchase a spent fuel reprocessing facility, a mixed-oxide reprocessing laboratory, and a heavy-water Canada Deuterium Uranium (CANDU) reactor.[256] Later, a report by the Central Intelligence Agency of the United States concluded that South Korea's nuclear weapons program took shape around 1974 and 1975 with President Park's authorization, combining missile and nuclear warhead research in a project designated "890."[257]

In November 1974, Washington raised concern over Seoul's plan to purchase a Canadian reactor in relation to the possible diversion of plutonium for nuclear weapons.[258] Although the US estimated that South Korea would need at least a decade to carry out a nuclear weapons development program, the US also saw its earlier detonation of a demonstrative device possible by obtaining extensive foreign assistance.[259]

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[255] For South Korea's attempt to acquire reprocessing technologies, See ibid., 490-94.

[256] Snyder, "South Korean Nuclear Decision Making," 161.

[257] "South Korea: Nuclear Development and Strategic Decisionmaking," June, 1978, CIA National Foreign Assessment Center.

[258] "US National Security Council Memorandum, Sale of Canadian Nuclear Reactor to South Korea," November 14, 1974, *South Korean Nuclear History*, Wilson Center Digital Archive: International History Declassified.

[259] The United States prepared Special National Intelligence Estimate (SNIE 4-1-74), an overall estimate of the global nuclear proliferation, a few months after India's peaceful nuclear explosion (PNE) in May 1974. For the SNIE report, see, "Special National Intelligence Estimate SNIE 4-1-74, Prospects for Further Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons," August 23, 1974, *Indian Nuclear History*, Wilson Center Digital Archive: International History Declassified.

A month later, the US Department of State learned about South Korea's plan to develop nuclear weapons and missiles from a telegram sent by the US embassy in Seoul. In that telegram, the US embassy in Seoul assembled the sensitive information of Seoul's nuclear interest to summarize that "[South Korea] has decided to proceed with the initial phase of a nuclear weapons development program."[260] In early March 1975, Washington concurred fully in embassy assessment that South Korea has embarked on exploring nuclear weapons development.

The United States perceived South Korea's nuclear weapons program as a dangerous behavior that might trigger nuclear proliferation in the region. In a diplomatic cable from the US Secretary of State Kissinger to the US embassy in Seoul, Washington's worry about nuclear proliferation in the region is explicitly expressed: "in the case of Korea, our general concerns are intensified by its strategic location and by the impact which any Korean effort to establish nuclear capability would have on its neighbors, particularly North Korea and Japan. ROK possession of nuclear weapons would have major destabilizing effect in an area in which not only Japan but USSR, PRC, and ourselves are directly involved. It could lead to Soviet or Chinese assurances of nuclear weapons support to North Korea in

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[260] "ROK Plans to Develop Nuclear Weapons and Missiles," December 2, 1974, *Stopping Korea from Going Nuclear, Part I*, National Security Archive.

the event of conflict."[261]

Withholding of Nuclear Energy Cooperation

The US sought to discourage South Korea's interest in nuclear weapons by denying access to reprocessing technologies and increasing transparency of South Korea's nuclear activities with strengthened safeguard measures. To discourage Seoul's interest in nuclear weapons, Washington considered three policy courses. First, the US would inhibit South Korea's access to sensitive technology and equipment, both through unilateral action and the multilateral approach based on supplier states' guidelines. Second, the US would press South Korea to ratify the NPT. Third, the US would improve American surveillance of South Korean nuclear facilities.[262]

A major effort of inhibition appeared in the US attempt to thwart South Korea's acquisition plan of reprocessing facilities, which provided direct access to plutonium that could be used for developing nuclear weapons. By April 1975, KAERI and two French companies, CERCA and Saint-Gobain Technique Nouvelle, signed separate, interim contracts for fuel fabrication and spent-fuel reprocessing.[263] KAERI was also negotiating with Canada to construct a heavy-water CANDU reactor and an National

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[261] "US Department of State Cable, ROK Plans to Develop Nuclear Weapons and Missiles," March 4, 1975, *South Korean Nuclear History*, Wilson Center Digital Archive: International History Declassified.

[262] Ibid.

[263] Hong, "The Search for Deterrence: Park's Nuclear Option," 491.

Research Experimental (NRX) reactor, which India used to obtain plutonium for its nuclear test.[264] Because the Canadian NRX reactor used natural uranium for fuel, South Korea would have found it more attractive with relative ease to secure independent use of spent nuclear fuel.[265]

The Ford administration threatened to suspend bilateral nuclear energy cooperation, which South Korea benefited from nuclear power plants. In July 1975, then-Acting Secretary of State Robert Ingersoll proposed Kissinger a course of action to "state [US] concern about Korean national reprocessing plans and point out that such a development could jeopardize US nuclear assistance, particularly the pending Exim loan for the KORI II reactor."[266] Given the greater economic importance of the power reactors, Ingersoll sought to arrange the loan and the sale of the US reactor to help US nonproliferation objectives.

However, an attempt to withhold the bilateral nuclear cooperation was insufficient to defeat South Korea's nuclear interest. By October 1975, the US embassy demanded South Korean President Park Chung-hee to stop its plans to introduce national reprocessing facilities, but Park rejected the demand and instead offered a concession to allow US inspection of the

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[264] "US National Security Council Memorandum, Sale of Canadian Nuclear Reactor to South Korea."

[265] Hong, "The Search for Deterrence: Park's Nuclear Option," 492.

[266] "US Department of State Memorandum, Approach to South Korea on Reprocessing," July 2, 1975, *South Korean Nuclear History*, Wilson Center Digital Archive: International History Declassified.

planned reprocessing facilities.[267]

In November 1975, the US changed its course of action to strengthen its opposition to South Korea's reprocessing capability along with export controls with Canada and France.[268] On the one hand, Ingersoll consulted with the French ambassador and Canadian ambassador in Washington to share the US view on South Korea's attempt to acquire nuclear weapons capability.[269] The Canada ploy was working. The Canadian ambassador told Ingersoll that the Canadian government decided to hold off on signing a nuclear assistance agreement with South Korea, scheduled for December 8 or 9.[270]

On the other hand, US Ambassador to South Korea Richard Sneider was less successful in dissuading South Korean officials. In December 1975, Sneider asked Washington to emphasize an adverse impact on the broader relationship with South Korea and clarify that far more than

[267] Hong, "The Search for Deterrence: Park's Nuclear Option," 498.

[268] "Document 26: Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Philip Habib and Policy Planning Staff director Winston Lord through the Deputy Secretary of State (Ingersoll) to the Secretary of State, "Korean Reprocessing – the Next Step," with attached study, "Korean Reprocessing: Issues and Options"," November 18, 1975, *Stopping Korea from Going Nuclear, Part I*, National Security Archive.

[269] "Your Meetings with the French and Canadian Ambassadors on Korean Reprocessing," December 4, 1975, *Stopping Korea from Going Nuclear, Part I*, National Security Archive; "ROK Nuclear Reprocessing Plant Negotiation," December 6, 1975, *Stopping Korea from Going Nuclear, Part I*, National Security Archive.

[270] "ROK Nuclear Reprocessing Plant," December 10, 1975, *Stopping Korea from Going Nuclear, Part I*, National Security Archive.

American nuclear support is at stake.[271] Furthermore, Sneider suggested

warning that "if South Korea proceed as it has indicated to date, whole

range of security and political relationships between [the] US and ROK will

be affected, including potential for adverse congressional action on security

assistance for Korea."[272]

However, as South Korea decided to reconsider reprocessing plans,

Sneider requested Washington in a January 1976 telegram to modify its

instruction of disruptive policy and avoid "forcing confrontation and

humiliating loss of face and prestige for President Park."[273]

Assurance Despite Disengagement

The United States attempted to assure South Korea by promising continuous

US support, although its policy options were limited by ongoing US

disengagement throughout the 1970s. US President Gerald Ford and his

security aid Henry Kissinger was aware of the sensitivity that the US troop's

withdrawal brings toward South Korea's interest in nuclear weapons. For

example, in a telegram in March 1975, Kissinger noted that "ROK nuclear

weapon effort has been in the part reflection of lessened ROKG confidence

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[271] "US Department of State Cable, ROK Nuclear Reprocessing," December 10, 1975, *South Korean Nuclear History*, Wilson Center Digital Archive: International History Declassified.

[272] Ibid.

[273] "US Department of State Cable, ROK Nuclear Reprocessing " January 5, 1976, *South Korean Nuclear History*, Wilson Center Digital Archive: International History Declassified.

in US security commitment."[274] Summarizing memoranda from Kissinger to Ford, Lanoszka illustrated that Kissinger advised Ford not to make any changes in troop deployment to avoid sending the wrong signal to Seoul.[275]

Against the background, the US aimed to assure South Korea by promising not to implement additional troop withdrawal during the current administration and pledging to complete planned complementary measures to aid South Korea's military modernization. The US also informally confirmed and reminded the existence of tactical nuclear weapons deployed in South Korea and discussed the expansion of joint exercise and planning.

First, US President Ford and US Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger met South Korean President Park Chung-hee to assure American presence on the Korean Peninsula. For example, on November 22, 1974, during a summit meeting in Seoul, Ford elaborated continuing US support for South Korea and told Park that "[the US] reaffirm the modernization program. Next, we have no intention of withdrawing US personnel from Korea. The joint efforts of the US and Korean military are in the best interests of peace and stability in the Korean Peninsula."[276] In addition, on August 26 and 27, 1975, Schlesinger visited Seoul to meet

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[274] "US Department of State Cable, ROK Plans to Develop Nuclear Weapons and Missiles."

[275] Lanoszka, *Atomic Assurance*, 123.

[276] "November 22, 1974 - Ford, Kissinger, South Korean President Park Chung-Hee," *National Security Adviser. Memoranda of Conversations, 1973-1977*, Gerald R. Ford Library.

President Park and South Korean Minister of Defense Suh Jyong-chul.[277] Schlesinger told Park the US foresaw no basic changes concerning the level of US forces over the next five years. Schlesinger admitted lingering skepticism in the US Congress about US troop deployment, but he emphasized President Ford's unequivocal position in support of South Korea. On August 26, in Minister Suh's office, Schlesinger told Suh that the US does not plan any fundamental changes in US support. Suh emphasized that "US forces must continue to be stationed in Korea at the current level."[278]

Second, the US expedited assistance to South Korea's military modernization plan for force complementarity and improved air defense. For example, through NSDM 282, Ford decided to complete an obligation to South Korea's modernization plan at an early date, aiming to demonstrate US commitment to the security of South Korea. He also decided on the sale of an F-4D squadron and two F-5A squadrons.[279] Besides, during the meeting with defense minister Suh, Schlesinger suggested that "the state of our forces needs improvement. The perception by the North that those forces cannot only defend the South but can also inflict damage on North

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[277] "Memoranda of Conversations between James R. Schlesinger and Park Chung Hee and Suh Jyong-chul," 1975/08/26, *South Korean Nuclear History*, Wilson Center Digital Archive: International History Declassified.

[278] Ibid.

[279] "NSDM 282: Korean Force Modernization Plan," January 9, 1975, *Ford Administration National Security Decision Memoranda*, Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.

Korea will preserve our deterrence. We must have sufficient munitions on hand and be ready to move in more by air."[280]

Furthermore, the US and South Korea discussed the issue of force complementarity concerning nuclear deterrent. In other words, the US confirmed its nuclear umbrella in South Korea. Already in June 1975, Schlesinger broke a two-decade-long silence of US posture regarding nuclear weapons in Korea and said, "we have deployed in Korea tactical nuclear weapons, as is, I believe, well known."[281] In relation to the US nuclear umbrella, the US also planned to transfer the Nike-Hercules battalion to South Korea.[282] As Schlesinger himself admitted that the nuclear deployment is known to the South Korean government, his confirmation of the tactical weapons was a reminder to South Korea, which sought to improve the balance of power against North Korea by confirming US extended nuclear deterrence. During the meeting between Schlesinger and Suh on August 26, two defense ministers discussed complementarity for nuclear weapons development. In Schlesinger's words, "strategically, nuclear development is an area in which complementarity is necessary and

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[280] "Memoranda of Conversations between James R. Schlesinger and Park Chung Hee and Suh Jyong-chul."

[281] Terence Roehrig, *Japan, South Korea, and the United States Nuclear Umbrella: Deterrence after the Cold War* (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2017), 59.

[282] "Memoranda of Conversations between James R. Schlesinger and Park Chung Hee and Suh Jyong-chul."

desirable."[283] In other words, US nuclear deterrence on behalf of its allies was expected to serve as the complementarity between the US and South Korean forces.[284]

Third, the US and South Korea discussed to expand joint exercise and planning. During his visit to Seoul in August 1975, Schlesinger also added statements on joint exercise and planning. In his words, "I think we should move in the direction of greater exercise activity. For example, US air units could come to Korea for exercises. These could be useful because they would be visible and would be factored into the calculations of North Korea, China, and the Soviet Union. … We must continue to develop all options in this area. We must develop joint contingency plans. We will reinforce General Stilwell's own inclinations to plan jointly for the defense of the islands."[285]

Although the United States attempted to assure South Korea with promises of force complementarity, the US continued its accommodative policy toward the communist countries in Asia. The US saw a stable power distribution as a counterbalance, especially against the Soviet Union. Despite the fall of Saigon and further communist expansion in Cambodia,

[283] Ibid.

[284] "272. Memorandum of Conversation, Seoul," August 27, 1975, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976*, Government Printing Office.

[285] "Memoranda of Conversations between James R. Schlesinger and Park Chung Hee and Suh Jyong-chul."

the US saw the major power balance structure in East Asia unchanged.[286]

For example, the Director of Policy Planning Staff Winston Lord wrote to the Secretary of State Kissinger that "the Soviets are looking for political openings, but they've probably lost as much ground (versus China) in Northeast Asia (Korea, Japan) as they have gained in Southeast Asia (Hanoi)."[287] He added, "in Korea we continue to face serious policy dilemmas. But these are inherent in the situation itself; they are not a derivative consequence of the setback in Indochina."[288]

The policy dilemma referred to the incompatible objectives of preserving peace on the Korean Peninsula and pressuring Seoul to relax its human rights situations. Concerning these incompatible objectives, the US government was split toward South Korea's policy. As the Park government's authoritarianism became more repressive under the Yushin regime, some US Congress members raised their voices to criticize US

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[286] Based on other declassified memoranda, Won Gon Park suggested that US policies concerning troop deployment in South Korea began to reflect its strategic importance around 1975 when communism expanded over Indochina. He provides a nuanced view interpreting the South Korea policy of the Ford administration. See Won Gon Park, "The ROK-US Relations during the Ford Administration: Restoration of the ROK-US Alliance [Po-deu haeng-jeong-bu si-gi han-mi gwan-gye: han-mi-dong-maeng-ui bog-won]," in *South Korea's Foreign Relations and Diplomatic History [Han-gug-ui dae-oe-gwan-gye-wa oe-gyo-sa]*, ed. Northeast Asian History Foundation Korean Diplomatic History Compilation Committee (Seoul, ROK: Northeast Asian History Foundation, 2019).

[287] "21. Memorandum from the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Lord) to Secretary of State Kissinger, Washington," October 16, 1975, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976*, Government Printing Office.

[288] Ibid.

policy toward South Korea.[289] For example, Congressman Donald Fraser, the chairman of the subcommittee on international organizations, prepared a letter to President Ford asking him to disassociate US security policies in South Korea from Park's domestic policies. Others called for a re-examination or even termination of security assistance if the executive branch fails to justify the human rights situation in South Korea.[290]

Congressional concern over human rights abuse became long-term trouble over US security assistance and troop deployment in South Korea. One way to persuade the US Congress was to lean heavily on Park's authoritarian regime. However, Kissinger strongly opposed pressuring Seoul because he was concerned about the misinterpretation of US intentions by North Korea.[291]

It was not only an opposing view from the US Congress endangering US security assistance to South Korea. Different opinions regarding troops adjustment lingered even in the US executive branch. For example, Lanoszka summarized declassified documents to illustrate that President

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[289] On October 17, 1972, Park replaced the existing constitution with a new text under the need for revitalizing reform (Yushin). He argued that the necessity of a more efficient Korean democracy to cope with rising military tensions on the Korean Peninsula. For the origins of the Yushin regime, see Hyug Baeg Im, "The Origins of the Yushin Regime: Machiavelli Unveiled," in *The Park Chung Hee Era: The Transformation of South Korea*, ed. Byung-Kook Kim and Ezra F. Vogel (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2011).

[290] "275. Information Memorandum From the Acting Assistant Secretary for International Security Affairs in the Department of Defense (Bergold) to Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, Washington," March 16, 1976, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976*, Government Printing Office.

[291] Ibid.

Ford and Secretary of State Kissinger refused to accept the recommendation from the Department of Defense to consider additional restructuring of troops deployment in South Korea.[292]

In addition, the Ford administration hesitated to renew its policy toward South Korea. For example, in late May 1975, Ford directed a US policy study toward the Korean Peninsula through NSSM 226.[293] The study was directed to assume a continuation of the US-ROK alliance and include US force presence in South Korea. However, the study was soon delayed, pending the broad review of US interests and security objectives in the Asia-Pacific region. It was then again resumed in April 1976, focusing on the level of US military presence in South Korea, among many other issues. In May 1976, the study was again suspended.[294]

South Korea's Reluctant Ratification of the NPT

US concern about South Korea's nuclear weapons development was partly resolved by South Korea's ratification of the NPT, and South Korea expressed its removal of anxiety by US reaffirmation of security

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[292] Lanoszka, *Atomic Assurance*, 123.

[293] "National Security Study Memorandum 226: Review of U. S. Policy Toward the Korean Peninsula," May 27, 1975, *National Security Adviser National Security Decision Memoranda National Security Study Memoranda: Copy Set, 1974-1977*, Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.

[294] "279. Memorandum From Thomas J. Barnes of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft), Washington," May 19, 1976, Government Printing Office.

commitment. Nevertheless, South Korea's perception of the reliability of US security commitment was severely damaged, and its interests in nuclear weapons lingered on.

South Korea ratified the NPT to receive nuclear technologies from Canada. South Korea signed the NPT in 1966 but was not ratifying it until April 23, 1975. Initially, South Korea and Canada discussed the ratification of the NPT as part of conditions to sign a bilateral nuclear energy cooperation agreement with Canada. The Canadian government expressed that the NPT ratification would facilitate the approval of nuclear cooperation from the Canadian parliament, which was alarmed by India's nuclear test in 1974 using Canadian technologies. The US also led international export control efforts to dissuade Canada and France from transferring reprocessing facilities to South Korea.

South Korea was withholding the NPT ratification. During his visit to Canada in November 1974, South Korean Minister of Foreign Affairs Kim Dong-jo had assured the Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs Allan MacEachen that CANDU and NRX facilities would only be used peacefully. Kim also explained that South Korea is withholding the NPT ratification because of strategic reasons with Japan, China, and North Korea, which had not ratified the NPT yet.[295]

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[295] "NPT Ratification Review and Action," January 9, 1975, *Canada Reactor(CANDU) Transfer, 1975-77 V. 1-3*, ROK Ministry of Foreign Affairs Diplomatic Archives.

In early January 1975, Canada dramatically changed its position to fully revise forthcoming nuclear cooperation with South Korea. Canada demanded South Korea accept stronger safeguard measures, including the NPT ratification and a provision of Canadian control over the reprocessing of spent nuclear fuels. Canada was working with the United States regarding the spread of reprocessing technologies. Canada explained that the issue of reprocessing facilities began to be likely "sine qua non" or indispensable action for bilateral nuclear cooperation.[296]

Against the backdrop, South Korea was placed in a difficult position. Canceling CANDU transfer and withholding the NPT ratification meant a severe impact on South Korea's international stance on nuclear nonproliferation. Most importantly, South Korea worried about the possibility that the cancellation of the CANDU transfer could lead to a misunderstanding that it was intended to acquire nuclear weapons. Furthermore, this would jeopardize South Korea's future nuclear cooperation with other nuclear suppliers.[297] As a consequence, South Korea ratified the NPT on April 23, 1975.

In January 1976, South Korea concluded the bilateral nuclear cooperation with Canada and canceled a contract for French reprocessing facilities. These events were clearly seen as the rollback process of nuclear

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[296] Ibid.

[297] Ibid.

weapons development. Canada decided to authorize nuclear cooperation with South Korea on the condition that South Korea assures that "it is not pursuing an acquisition of the reprocessing facility, and the projected reprocessing facility has been shelved indefinitely, which is understood to mean for a lengthy period. At least until after the Republic of Korea's negotiations with the United States on further nuclear cooperation is resolved."[298]

For the US-ROK alliance, the ratification of the NPT meant an exchange between the reaffirmation of US security assurance and South Korea's pledge to nonproliferation compliance. South Korea's NPT ratification helped the United States relieve its concern about South Korea's interest in nuclear weapons and its possible regional impact. During the meeting in Cheong Wa Dae in August 1975, President Park and Secretary of Defense Schlesinger shared a view that South Korea's nuclear weapons would provide the communist countries with justification for threatening South Korea with nuclear weapons.[299]

President Park expressed his sense of relief on Korea's situation based on the reaffirmation of US security commitment in Korea.[300] He

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[298] "Document 34: U.S. Embassy Seoul telegram 0552 to Department of State, "ROK Nuclear Reprocessing; Canadian Reactor Sale.","" January 25, 1976, *Stopping Korea from Going Nuclear, Part II*, National Security Archive.

[299] "272. Memorandum of Conversation, Seoul."

[300] "Memoranda of Conversations between James R. Schlesinger and Park Chung Hee and Suh Jyong-chul."

explained to Schlesinger that South Korea had every intention of living up to the NPT. Park also explained that the previous interview with columnist Robert Novak regarding Korea's nuclear intention was misinterpreted.[301] However, the damage to South Korea's perception of the reliability of US commitment was not completely recovered. Park stressed the war on the Korean peninsula is still possible because of miscalculation by North Korea. To prevent miscalculation, Park sought to build South Korean military capabilities continuously.

3. South Korea from 1977 to 1982

A Proposal for Complete Withdrawal

President Carter did not appreciate the complex, strategic role that US troops play in South Korea. His foreign policy was oriented toward moral, democratic values, especially human rights issues. On May 22, 1977, in his address at the Commencement Exercise at the University of Notre Dame, President Carter stated, "being confident of our own future, we are now free

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[301] Don Oberdorfer summarized the interview with Robert Novac. In early June 1975, President Park told Novak that "we have the capability." In Oberdorfer's words, Park added, in a plea for continuing US support, "if the US nuclear umbrella were to be removed, we have to start developing our nuclear capability to save ourselves." However, in the memorandum of conversation, Park told Schlesinger that this interview was forced by Novak, a journalist who insisted on a hypothetical question. Don Oberdorfer and Robert Carlin, *The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History*, Third ed. (New York, NY: Basic Books, 2014), 57. "272. Memorandum of Conversation, Seoul."

of that inordinate fear of communism which once led us to embrace any dictator who joined us in that fear. I'm glad that that's being changed."[302]

Carter's political idealism expanded to a new toughness against authoritarianism in Asian allies. In March 1976, as a presidential candidate, Carter had interviewed with the Washington Post to say that he would consider retreating the 700 US tactical nuclear weapons deployed in South Korea.[303] His campaign to remove nuclear weapons from South Korea was along with the policy position of the Democratic Party. In July 1976 Democratic Party Platform, candidates confirmed that "on a prudent and carefully planned basis, we can redeploy, and gradually phase out, the US ground forces, and can withdraw the nuclear weapons now stationed in Korea without endangering that support."[304]

On January 26, 1977, President Carter directed the Policy Review Committee undertake a broad review of US policies toward the Korean Peninsula in order to examine the possible course of action for dealing with a reduction in US conventional force levels, South Korea's nuclear intentions, and efforts to acquire access to advanced missile technology among others through Presidential Review Memorandum 13 (PRM 13).[305]

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[302] "University of Notre Dame Commencement."

[303] "Jimmy Carter: The Candidate on the Issues: An Interview," Washington Post, March 21, 1976, p. 2 recited from Taliaferro, *Defending Frenemies,* p. 196.

[304] "1976 Democratic Party Platform," July 12, 1976, *American Presidency Document Categories*, The American Presidency Project.

[305] "PRM 13: Korea," *Presidential Review Memoranda (PRM)*, Jimmy Carter Library.

William Gleysteen, Deputy of the Assistant Secretary of State for East

Asian and Pacific Affairs, recalled that the White House told Secretary of

State Cyrus Vance to consider only the timetable for implementation and

disregard the political and strategic consequences of a complete

withdrawal.[306]

In the Carter administration, foreign policymakers opposed Carter's

proposal to withdraw the remaining 40,000 US troops from Korea

completely. For example, the commander of US Forces in Korea, General

John Vessey Jr., told Carter that removing US troops from Korea would

make only a marginal increase in South Korea's capability in contrast to the

significant reduction in US capabilities.[307] An interagency group for East

Asia chaired by the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific

Affairs Richard Holbrooke, along with the Secretary of State Vance, the

Secretary of Defense Harold Brown, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of

Defense Morton Abramowitz, and NSC director for East Asia Michael

Armacost agreed to persuade President Carter to modify his proposal to

"involve withdrawal of a largely symbolic number of combat forces along

with a large number of non-combat forces, followed by a careful review of

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[306] William H. Gleysteen, *Massive entanglement, marginal influence: Carter and Korea in crisis* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2012), 17.

[307] "Document 01. Memorandum of Conversation with President Carter by General John W. Vessey," February 18, 1977, *How Do You Solve a Problem like (South) Korea? The Carter Years*, National Security Archive.

the situation in Korea, before any further withdrawal."[308]

Carter's proposed withdrawal ran into international opposition as well. Along with other East Asian countries, "the Chinese tacitly have taken an especially positive view of US military presence, not only in Korea but throughout East Asia, seeing it as a help in blocking the expansion of Soviet influence in the region."[309] Japan and the ASEAN states also shared a general concern about the stability of the Korean Peninsula.

However, President Carter insisted on the withdrawal proposal. On February 15, 1977, Carter sent a letter to South Korean President Park Chung-hee to convey his intention to withdraw the US ground combat forces from South Korea gradually and stressed the involvement of the fullest consultation with Park.[310] He also added his concern about human rights issues in South Korea. In April 1977, during a National Security Council meeting, Carter reaffirmed his intention to withdraw US troops from South Korea entirely.[311] On May 5, 1977, following the National Security Council's review of US policy options toward Korea, Carter

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[308] Gleysteen, *Massive entanglement, marginal influence: Carter and Korea in crisis*, 24.

[309] Lanoszka, *Atomic Assurance*, 126; "US Ground Force Withdrawal: Korean Stability and Foreign Relations," June 7, 1977, *The Carter Chill: US-ROK-DPRK Trilateral Relations, 1976-1979*, Wilson Center North Korea International Documentation Project.

[310] "Letter from Jimmy Carter to Park Chung Hee," February 15, 1977, *The Carter Chill: US-ROK-DPRK Trilateral Relations, 1976-1979*, Wilson Center North Korea International Documentation Project.

[311] Gleysteen, *Massive entanglement, marginal influence: Carter and Korea in crisis*, 24.

directed through Presidential Decision 12 (PD 12) to implement a timetable, which included a gradual withdrawal of the 2nd Division no less than 6,000 ground force personnel by 1978, a second brigade no less than 9,000 by the end of June 1980, and the completion of ground force withdrawals by 1982.[312]

Unlike the previous Nixon and Ford administrations, the Carter administration attempted to curtail nuclear proliferation aggressively.[313] For example, during his speech at the United Nations on May 13, 1976, Carter stated, "there is a fearsome prospect that the spread of nuclear reactors will mean the spread of nuclear weapons to many nations."[314] Carter's approach was more aggressive than his predecessors' approaches as he halted domestic construction of reprocessing facility and increased the US leverage to cancel contracts to transfer reprocessing technology to France and Japan.[315]

Despite increasing US attention on nuclear proliferation, the US perception of nuclear proliferation risk in South Korea remained short of high alert. In early May 1977, a CIA report suggested "withdrawals could

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[312] "PD 12: US Policy in Korea," May 5, 1977, *Presidential Directives (PD)*, Jimmy Carter Library.

[313] J. Michael Martinez, "The Carter Administration and the Evolution of American Nuclear Nonproliferation Policy, 1977-1981," *Journal of Policy History* 14, no. 3 (2002): 278.

[314] "Excerpts From Carter Speech on Nuclear Policy," *The New York Times*, May 14, 1976.

[315] Martinez, "The Carter Administration and the Evolution of American Nuclear Nonproliferation Policy, 1977-1981," 272-74.

stimulate President Park to attempt to reactivate South Korea's nuclear and

long-range missile programs," among other disadvantages and risks of US

ground force withdrawal.[316] Another CIA report, in June 1978, described

that "officials in the Korean nuclear research community believe that, even

while bowing to US preferences on the line of work they pursue, certain

activities can and should be undertaken to keep Seoul's nuclear option

open."[317] The report concluded that "the most important factors in Korea's

calculations regarding nuclear weapons will not be questions of technical

feasibility. Rather they will be successive reassessments of the US security

commitment."[318]

That being said, South Korea's interest in nuclear weapons was

under the surface. South Korea's ratification of the NPT and the cancellation

of the reprocessing plan was far from a complete nuclear reversal. Some

scholars suggested that the Park government avoided adopting explicit

pursuit of nuclear weapons development. Kim Seung-young illustrated that

President Park specifically ordered his senior aides to build nuclear

capacity. In November 1976, when Jimmy Carter was elected the US

president in 1976, President Park directed his senior economic advisor Oh

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[316] "CIA and National Intelligence Reports on Ground Troop Withdrawals, April-May 1977," February 15, 1977, *The Carter Chill: US-ROK-DPRK Trilateral Relations, 1976-1979*, Wilson Center North Korea International Documentation Project.

[317] "South Korea: Nuclear Development and Strategic Decisionmaking," i.

[318] Ibid., 18.

Won-chul "to pursue a full-scale development of nuclear industry, but without making much noise."[319] Oh recalled Park's nuclear intention to reach a level of capability and technology to assemble nuclear weapons just like Japan, without inviting foreign pressure.[320] With a similar illustration, Min Byung-won defined South Korea's nuclear policy in the late 1970s as a dual-purpose policy to secure energy resources and acquisition of capability to develop nuclear weapons in a short period.[321] In short, South Korea employed a nuclear hedging strategy.

To be sure, Carter's ambitious proposal to completely withdraw American forces from Korea renewed fear of alliance abandonment in Seoul.[322] Faced with a negative view on the US presence in South Korea, President Park might have considered renewing his nuclear development project, although the US saw the possibility very low. In the late 1970s, South Korea made almost no public statement regarding nuclear weapons development. South Korea had canceled reprocessing technology transfer from advanced nuclear suppliers.

South Korea largely maintained its official position on nuclear

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[319] Kim, "Security, Nationalism and the Pursuit of Nuclear Weapons and Missiles: The South Korean Case, 1970–82," 67.

[320] Ibid.

[321] Byung-won Min, "Counterfactual Analysis of South Korea's Security Crisis and its Dual Nuclear Policy in the Late 1970s," [1970 nyeon-dae hu-ban han-gug-ui an-bo-wi-gi-wa haeg-gae-bal-jeong-chaeg: i-jung-jeog haeg-jeong-chaeg-e gwan-han ban sa-sil-jeog bun-seog.] *Korean Journal of Political And Diplomatic History* 26, no. 1 (2004): 134.

[322] Lanoszka, *Atomic Assurance*, 127.

nonproliferation. On January 29, 1977, President Park stated that South Korea "will not go nuclear" during his annual inspection of the Ministry of Defense.[323] During the plenary meeting in National Assembly, on June 24, 1977, Prime Minister Choi Kyu-ha told lawmakers, who advocated nuclear weapons development, that "the Park government has no plan to develop nuclear weapons," under the circumstances, in which "the US is providing nuclear umbrella to its allies, and South Korea joined the NPT."[324]

However, in a National Assembly meeting to discuss Carter's troop's withdrawal, the Foreign Minister told lawmakers regarding nuclear weapons that "if it is necessary for national security interests and people's safety, it is possible for South Korea as a sovereign state to make its own judgment on the matter."[325]

Besides, South Korea continued its effort to develop indigenous nuclear technology. South Korea established the Korea Nuclear Fuel Development Institute (KNFDI) to indirectly build the capacity of reprocessing technologies and fuel fabrication technologies for civilian purposes.[326] KNFDI headed a renamed reprocessing program, once

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[323] Young-sun Ha, "Nuclearization of Small States and World Order: the Case of Korea," *Asian Survey* 18, no. 11 (1978): 1142.

[324] "Call for Independent Development of Nuclear Weapons," *Chosun Ilbo*, June 25, 1977.

[325] Ha, "Nuclearization of Small States and World Order: the Case of Korea," 1142.

[326] Kim, "Security, Nationalism and the Pursuit of Nuclear Weapons and Missiles: The South Korean Case, 1970–82," 67.

operated by KAERI, the Chemical Fuel Replacement Project.[327] KNFDI's

research paralleled civilian nuclear energy development. To substitute the

thwarted introduction of a Canadian NRX reactor, South Korea pursued to

build it on their own, finishing a detailed design in 1979.[328] In addition,

ADD continued to develop missile capability. In September 1978, ADD

successfully tested the surface-to-surface missile, Baekgom (or Nike-

Hercules Korea-1), with a limited range of 180 kilometers.[329] Park

allegedly encouraged the institute to further pursue a long-term development

of ballistic missiles with a range of 2,000 kilometers and rocket capability

for a satellite launch.[330] In short, South Korea's option of nuclear weapons

program remained under its hedging strategy.

The Park government's nuclear hedging strategy did not last long as

South Korea and the United States had domestic power transition toward the

1980s. On October 26, 1979, President Park was assassinated by his senior

intelligence aid, director of Korea Central Intelligence Agency Kim Jae-kyu.

A few months later, the commander of the Defense Security Command,

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[327] Hong Sung-gul illustrated a detailed description of South Korea's effort to transfer KAERI's work to KNFDI. See Hong, "The Search for Deterrence: Park's Nuclear Option," 508-10.

[328] Kim, "Security, Nationalism and the Pursuit of Nuclear Weapons and Missiles: The South Korean Case, 1970–82," 67.

[329] South Korea's missile range was limited by the US demand in 1976 to 180 kilometers as a condition to missile technology transfer. See Hong, "The Search for Deterrence: Park's Nuclear Option," 509-10.

[330] Kim, "Security, Nationalism and the Pursuit of Nuclear Weapons and Missiles: The South Korean Case, 1970–82," 68.

Major General Chun Doo-hwan, seized power in a coup. The Carter administration issued a statement to reaffirm US security commitment for South Korea. In August 1980, Chun assumed the presidency with an indirect election by the National Conference for Unification.[331] In January 1981, the Reagan administration was inaugurated with a relentless anti-communist policy. Reagan's invitation to host Chun in Washington opened a new chapter in the US-ROK alliance.

The 1981 Summit to Restore the Alliance

The Reagan administration strengthened US presence in South Korea to implement its new security strategy, recovering its global posture and increasing its influence worldwide through "the maintenance and improvement of forward-deployed forces and rapidly deployable US-based forces, together with periodic exercises, security assistance, and special operations."[332]

To the Reagan administration, efforts to reverse the Soviet expansion led to the necessity of an accommodative strategy toward South Korea. For example, Reagan's national security adviser Richard Allen reported to Reagan that an upcoming meeting with South Korean President Chun would send a powerful signal to all of Asia. He continued with a

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[331] For a political crisis and power transition after the death of President Park, see Lee, *A Troubled Peace: US Policy and the Two Koreas*, 102-07.

[332] "NSDD 32: US National Security Strategy."

contrast that unlike President Carter's first message to Asia was aimed to reduce US troops in Korea, Reagan's first signal should be that the US is "cognizant of the vital interests of the Free World in Asia," and "consistent American strength and support are necessary."[333] Similarly, Secretary of State Alexander Haig also emphasized the primacy of bilateral security relationships while downplayed the issue of human rights and democracy in South Korea.[334]

The 1981 summit in Washington confirmed the new alliance policy that the Reagan administration sought toward Seoul. On February 2, 1981, Reagan met Chun in the White House and said that Chun's visit was an opportunity "to restore the alliance" and stated that "he wanted to make plain that it would not be a policy of his administration to suggest that any American troops be pulled out of the Republic of Korea." He added, "we are committed to the security of the Republic."[335] Chun stated that "the presence of US troops on the Peninsula help to correct the balance and stated confidently that the ROK, with US support, could stop any North Korean adventurism."[336] The Reagan administration also promised to

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[333] "Memorandum for the President: President Chun of Korea," January 29, 1981, *Seeing Human rights in the "Proper Manner": The Reagan-Chun Summit of February 1981*, National Security Archive.

[334] Lee, *A Troubled Peace: US Policy and the Two Koreas*, 114.

[335] "Memorandum of Conversation, Subject: Summary of the President's Meeting with President Chun Doo Hwan of the Republic of Korea," February 2, 1981, *Seeing Human rights in the "Proper Manner": The Reagan-Chun Summit of February 1981*, National Security Archive.

[336] Ibid.

expedite the transfer of technology and weapons systems along with an increase in US Foreign Military Sales credit levels. He further appealed an accommodative gesture by offering a sale of F-16 fighters if South Korea finds it necessary.[337]

During the meeting between State Secretary Haig and South Korean Foreign Minister Lho Shin-Yong, on February 5, 1981, Haig and Lho discussed how to phrase US commitment for South Korea. The initial draft prepared by the US Department of State said, "President Reagan stated that the United States has no plans to withdraw US ground combat forces from the Korean Peninsula and pledged that any future adjustments in US force levels on the peninsula would be implemented after consultations."[338] Washington aimed to assure Seoul a prior consultation for troop adjustment to avoid the ramifications of the Nixon and the Carter administration's sudden notification. However, Seoul hoped to remove any connotation of changes in the status of US troops in South Korea. As a compromise, the communique stated that "President Reagan assured President Chun that the United States has no plans to withdraw US ground combat forces from the Korean Peninsula."[339]

An increasing significance of joint exercises followed the decision to

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[337] Ibid.

[338] Chae-Jin Lee, *Reagan Faces Korea: Alliance Politics and Quiet Diplomacy* (Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Mcmillan, 2020), 30.

[339] Ibid.

maintain US ground troops. For example, Team Spirit Exercise, initiated in 1976, conducted larger, more frequent, and more visible exercise during US ground troop's withdrawal.[340] In 1977, the exercise introduced B-52 nuclear bombers, which confirmed the visibility of the US nuclear umbrella on the Korean Peninsula. The total participant of the exercise dropped to 145,000 in 1980. However, the exercise continued to grow in numbers and significance in the Reagan administration. In the 1980s, Team Spirit Exercise saw an increasing number of participants, over 200,000 personnel, to become America's largest military exercise until the 1990s.[341]

Concerning the alliance, the Reagan administration's perception of entrapment was low. Unlike the Ford administration, which sought to assure South Korea by promising the maintenance of US forces in Korea without sharing the strategic interest to engage with the regional security agenda, the Reagan administration not only committed to restoring the alliance but also established a new policy to engage with its allies in Asia. For example, the US national security strategy drafted in National Security Decision Directive 32 (NSDD 32), on May 20, 1982, expressed the significance of US allies, including South Korea, to protect US interests.[342] Regarding the role of allies, NSDD 32 stated that "the United States must increasingly

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[340] John F Farrell, "Team Spirit: A Case Study on the Value of Military Exercises as a Show of Force in the Aftermath of Combat Operations," in *Air & Space Power Journal* (Air Force Research Institute, 2009).

[341] Ibid.

[342] "NSDD 32: US National Security Strategy."

draw upon the resources and cooperation of allies and others to protect our interests and those of our friends," and "to meet the challenges to our interests successfully, the US will require stronger and more effective collective defense arrangements."[343]

There appears other documentary evidence that the US reconfigured its interests in securing its allies for its global strategic interests. For example, during the Reagan presidency, the US recognized South Korea as "vital" to the security of the United States for the first time.[344] For example, a 1982 joint statement from a meeting between South Korean Defense Minister Choo Young-bock and US Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger stated that "the two sides reaffirmed that the security of the Republic of Korea is pivotal to the peace and stability of Northeast Asia and, in turn, vital to the security of the United States."[345] Weinberger also confirmed that "the United States nuclear umbrella will continue to provide additional security to the Republic of Korea."[346] Besides, during the 1982 summit in Seoul, Reagan and Chun issued a joint statement to reset the US-ROK alliance. In the statement, the two Presidents pledged to uphold the obligations embodied in the Mutual Defense Treaty, and Reagan reaffirmed the continuing strong commitment of the US to the security of South Korea,

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[343] Ibid.

[344] Snyder and Lee, "Security Assurances," 168.

[345] "Joint Communique of the Fourteenth Annual Security Consultative Meeting," March 31, 1982, CIA Library.

[346] Ibid.

"noting that the security of the Republic of Korea is pivotal to the peace and stability of Northeast Asia and in turn, vital to the security of the United States."[347]

Other NSDDs also expressed America's broader interests to protect its national security and expand its regional influence.[348] One might argue that the US saw less significance in Northeast Asia as these documents show that the Reagan administration placed more significance in Western Europe, the Middle East, and Southwest Asia. Nevertheless, its strengthened security commitment was sufficient to assure South Korea.

Nuclear nonproliferation remained a major foreign policy agenda, but the Reagan administration was actively promoting nuclear energy cooperation. In his statement on US nuclear nonproliferation policy on July 16, 1984, President Reagan confirmed that "our nation faces major challenges in international affairs. One of the most critical is the need to prevent the spread of nuclear explosives to additional countries. Further proliferation would pose a severe threat to international peace, regional and global stability, and the security interests of the United States and other

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[347] "Joint Statement Following Meetings With President Chun Doo Hwan of the Republic of Korea," November 14, 1983, Ronald Reagan Presidential Library.

[348] "NSDD 75: US Relations with the USSR," May 20, 1982, *NSDD - National Security Decision Directives Reagan Administration*, Intelligence Resource Program, Federation of American Scientists; "NSDD 99: US Security Strategy for near East and South Asia," May 20, 1982, *NSDD - National Security Decision Directives Reagan Administration*, Intelligence Resource Program, Federation of American Scientists.

countries."[349] To reduce the risks of nuclear proliferation, he called for "a strong and dependable United States, vibrant alliances and improved relations with others, and a dedication to those tasks that are vital for a stable world order."[350]

The Reagan administration also sought to expand its nuclear cooperation with allies under safeguard measures. For example, in the statement on nuclear nonproliferation policy, Reagan recognized that "many friends and allies of the United States have a strong interest in nuclear power and have, during recent years, lost confidence in the ability of our nation to recognize their needs" and sought to reestablish the US as "a predictable and reliable partner for peaceful nuclear cooperation under adequate safeguards."[351]

Against the backdrop, Washington and Seoul discussed nuclear matters during President Chun's visit to the United States in February 1981. During the following meeting after the summit, State Secretary Haig "assured President Chun that Korea could rely upon the United States as a source of nuclear fuel supplies and technology for Korea's nuclear power program."[352] He also added his appreciation for South Korea's compliance

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[349] "Statement on United States Nuclear Nonproliferation Policy," July 16, 1981, Ronald Reagan Presidential Library.

[350] Ibid.

[351] Ibid.

[352] "Cable, ROK President Chun's Meeting with the Secretary at the State Department," February 6, 1981, *Seeing Human Rights in the "Proper Manner": The Reagan-Chun Summit of February 1981*, National Security Archive.

with nuclear nonproliferation. On February 5, 1981, Secretary Haig and Foreign Minister Lho met to finalize the draft joint communique of the summit. Haig emphasized strategic factors that served as the basis of the close bilateral relationship and stated that "for our part we would maintain and improve our military forces in Korea. We would retain our nuclear weapons in Korea, although – as [President Reagan] had explained to President Chun – it was important for the ROK to continue cooperating with our nonproliferation policy."[353]

Termination of the Nuclear Weapons Program

After a summit meeting with President Reagan in February 1981, South Korea's recovered confidence in US security commitment led to President Chun's action to eliminate lingering nuclear weapons-related projects. In particular, Chun restructured governmental agencies and research institutes, which had been compartmentalized by the previous Park government. For example, the mission of KNFDI to build indigenous reprocessing capacity returned to KAERI to conduct academic research on nuclear fuel technologies.[354] For commercial fuel fabrication, the newly established Korea Nuclear Fuel Co. Ltd began to operate in 1982. Chun abolished the

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[353] "Cable: Korea President Chun's Visit – The Secretary's Meeting at Blair House," February 5, 1981, *Seeing Human rights in the "Proper Manner": The Reagan-Chun Summit of February 1981*, National Security Archive.

[354] Snyder, "South Korean Nuclear Decision Making," 162.

OSPSEA, which was allegedly in charge of financing nuclear research under the auspices of Cheong Wa Dae.

In addition, Chun reorganized ADD to dismiss over 800 scientists and engineers by 1982.[355] Oh Won-chul, who served as a senior presidential secretary during the Park government, argued this reorganization profoundly damaged South Korea's long-range missile development capability.[356] South Korea also reduced its budget for research projects, leading to a return of supervision of research expenditure on the Economic Planning Board (the current Ministry of Finance) and the National Assembly.[357] An interview with a missile scientist, who worked at ADD during the period, revealed that "the Blue House stopped providing special budgets for the ADD," terminating all projects initiated by President Park.[358]

Along with continued participation in the global nuclear nonproliferation regime, South Korea's transparency in nuclear activities became greater. South Korea conducted a study on the outlook of the nuclear fuel cycle, and it explicitly recognized international safeguard measures that forbid the transfer of enrichment and reprocessing

[355] Hong, "The Search for Deterrence: Park's Nuclear Option."

[356] Ibid., 510.

[357] For an extensive illustration of South Korea's continued position on increasingly transparent nuclear activities, see Sangsun Shim, "The causes of South Korea's nuclear choices: A case study in nonproliferation" (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Maryland, College Park, 2003), 60-64.

[358] Ibid., 76.

technologies in its fifth five-year plan for nuclear technology development (1981-1985).[359] In a 1986 IAEA working group meeting in Seoul, a Korean delegate stated that South Korea aimed to win public acceptance for nuclear power, thereby keeping "its nose away from the stink of gunpowder and highly enriched uranium above 90 [percent]."[360] In 1987, the United States and South Korea signed the Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the Republic of Korea and the Government of the United States of America on the Protection of Strategic Commodities and Technical Data. In November 1991, South Korea unilaterally stated that "in compliance with the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and following safeguard measures concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency, we ensure that nuclear facilities and nuclear materials in Korea undergo a thorough international inspection, do not possess nuclear fuel reprocessing and nuclear enrichment facilities."[361]

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[359] *Science and Technology Annual*, [Gwa-hag-gi-sul-yeon-gam] (Seoul, Republic of Korea: Ministry of Science and Technology, 1981), 51-52.

[360] Peter John Hayes, "Pacific Powderkeg, American Nuclear Dilemmas in Korea" (Ph. D. Dissertation, University of California, Berkeley, 1989), 409.

[361] "Declaration for Denuclearization and Peace Building on the Korean Peninsula," November 8, 1991, Presidential Archives of the Republic of Korea.

4. Conclusion

The United States has been demonstrating its power in Asia-Pacific since the end of World War II. Although the US sought to build a multilateral security architecture in the region, the diverging interests of Asian allies and the outbreak of the Korean War forced the US to establish a bilateral network of alliances: the hub and spoke system. Ever since the establishment of the security network, the US has projected its power supremacy to act as a pacific power and maintained US armed forces in South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, and the Philippines. US commitment declined as it sought to avoid the risk of entrapment during the period of Détente. However, the US has been largely employing a risk-taking alliance policy in the region to maintain the stability of the regional security environment.

In the 1970s, the Nixon administration expressed its concern about the high level of entrapment with the Nixon Doctrine. For example, in 1970, Washington informed Seoul about a sudden withdrawal of US forces in Korea, and it was shocking for the South Korean President Park Chung-hee. In response to the US withdrawal, he initiated South Korea's nuclear weapons program. In 1974, the US embassy in Seoul sent a telegram to report South Korea's nuclear weapons program, and Washington confirmed it.

The US perceived South Korea's nuclear pursuit as a high risk of nuclear proliferation and raised a warning of major destabilizing effect in

the region. The Nixon administration perceived low risk of nuclear proliferation in the late 1960s. However, as the US was alarmed by India's nuclear test in 1974, its concern over nuclear proliferation in Asia was high enough to force the patron to increase the client's confidence in the alliance. To do so, the Ford administration promised not to withdraw additional US troops during its term, decided to expedite military assistance for force complementarity, confirmed the existence of US tactical nuclear weapons in South Korea, and discussed to expand US-ROK joint exercises.

The Ford administration perceived lesser entrapment risk than the previous Nixon administration as it saw a necessity to maintain a strong forward basing posture in East Asia. However, the Ford administration did not reconsider its alliance policy toward South Korea. Ford's Pacific Doctrine was a reiteration of the Nixon Doctrine, and the Ford administration saw the balance of power in East Asia unchanged despite the setback in Indochina. Besides, the US Congress preferred to disengage from South Korea because of its human rights abuse and limited US security commitment.

As a result, South Korea expressed its relief on the security situation based on the reaffirmation of US commitment, but it also continued nuclear pursuit without making much noise. South Korea ratified the NPT in 1975 and canceled a contract for French reprocessing facilities in 1976. Nevertheless, South Korea's nuclear rollback was far from a complete nuclear reversal. In 1977, the Carter administration supported the retreat of

tactical nuclear weapons from South Korea and opposed assisting authoritarianism in Asia. South Korea's nuclear option remained open. According to the US assessment, South Korea's nuclear weapons-related programs remained active as the client improved its nuclear and missile technologies. Besides, South Korean policymakers revealed a possibility of making an independent judgment on nuclear matters, although South Korea publicly positioned itself under the NPT.

In the 1980s, the Reagan administration altered US foreign policy from détente to a policy of reversing the Soviet expansion. In 1981, Reagan invited South Korean President Chun Doo-hwan to Washington so that the US can send a powerful message to allies in Asia. To Reagan, the summit was an opportunity to restore the alliance. He restored US commitment to the security of South Korea by promising not to withdraw US forces in Korea. In the 1980s, the Team Spirit Exercise participant exceeded 200,000 personnel to become America's largest military exercise. Furthermore, the US shared strategic interest with South Korea by confirming that the client's security is vital to the patron's security.

To the Reagan administration, nuclear nonproliferation remained as a major foreign policy agenda. To reduce the risks of nuclear proliferation, Reagan sought a greater role in the US as a nuclear supplier because nuclear cooperation entailed safeguard measures. The US promised South Korea to provide reliable nuclear fuel supplies and technology transfer. The US also assured South Korea to provide extended nuclear deterrence, emphasizing

the importance of compliance with the US nonproliferation policy.

As a final result, South Korea terminated the nuclear weapons program. Once-compartmentalized organizations recovered their position. The South Korean government reduced the budget for relevant research projects and returned supervising functions to the financing ministry and the National Assembly by 1982.

In sum, the US perception of nuclear proliferation and entrapment changed over time. When Nixon paved the way for the new American foreign policy, the US saw a high risk of entrapment. Upon the US detection of South Korea's nuclear weapons program, nuclear proliferation became high risk in the region. That is, the US saw both entrapment and nuclear proliferation as high risks. Under the circumstance, the US was only able to provide a limited commitment to South Korea, which in turn ratified the NPT and sought indigenous nuclear capacity at the same time. However, when Reagan aimed to roll back the Soviet aggression and restore US alliances, the US saw a low risk of entrapment. Therefore, the US increased the level of security commitment to South Korea, which terminated the nuclear weapons program.

Table 6 expresses the assessment of US management of South Korea's nuclear weapons program.

Table 6. US Management of South Korea's Nuclear Weapons Program

Year of the Nuclear Option	Risk Assessment by the US		US Commitment	South Korea's Nuclear Option
	Entrapment	Nuclear Proliferation		
1974	high	low	low	pursuit
1976	high	high	medium	hedging
1977	high	medium	low	hedging
1982	low	medium	high	termination

In general, the US management of South Korea's nuclear weapons program fits my theory: when nuclear proliferation is more fearsome than entrapment, the patron increases its commitment to the client. However, two events require further explanations.

First, the case of South Korea's nuclear option in 1976 may have been influenced by the Ford administration's preference for international solutions. That is, entrapment risks remained a major concern. The US successfully inhibited the transfer of nuclear technologies by establishing export controls among advanced nuclear suppliers such as Canada and France. Nuclear supplier's united front effectively narrowed South Korea's choice to ratify the NPT to acquire CANDU reactors. Nevertheless, South Korea continued to develop indigenous nuclear capacity.

However, US inhibition does not support the effectiveness of withdrawal as an alliance management policy. US threat of withdrawal was mostly ineffective in restraining South Korea's nuclear weapons development. The Ford administration threatened to suspend bilateral nuclear energy cooperation by pending an Exim loan for the KORI II reactor. President Park rejected the US demand to cancel a national plan for reprocessing facilities. Instead, he suggested allowing US inspection of the facilities.

In addition, there is no documentary evidence to show that the US threatened South Korea by military withdrawal. To be sure, the US Ambassador to South Korea, Richard Sneider, asked Washington to emphasize an adverse impact on the alliance. However, soon after South Korea's attempt to introduce sensitive nuclear technologies was failed by strengthened safeguard measures, Sneider reconsidered his suggestion and requested Washington not to force a confrontation with the ally in South Korea. Furthermore, it is difficult to confirm that US officials made such a threat to South Korea as Oberdorfer and others describe in their books.

I would suspect that the strategic value of South Korea in the security of the US remained throughout the 1970s and the 1980s. As Glenn Snyder argued about the difficulty of making a threat to a strategically important ally, it would have been difficult for the US to attempt to do so and to threaten South Korea credibly.

Second, the theory shows the best explanatory power in South

Korea's nuclear option in 1982. However, one might argue that President Chun Doo-hwan was already prepared to eliminate the nuclear weapons program because he needed US recognition for his domestic legitimacy.

For example, Scott Sagan's domestic politics model and Etel Solingen's domestic models of political survival and their orientations to the global political economy support the alternative explanation. To Sagan, Chun was a domestic actor who discouraged South Korea from pursuing the bomb. In Sagan's words, "whether or not the acquisition of nuclear weapons serves the national interests of a state, it is likely to serve the parochial bureaucratic or political interests of at least some individual actors within the state."[362] To Solingen, South Korea's "Northern Policy" to expand South Korea's export market in Eastern Europe and other communist countries may have served as a motivation to discourage the nuclear weapons program. In Solingen's words, "leaders or ruling coalitions advocating economic growth through integration in the global economy have incentives to avoid the costs of nuclearization, which impair domestic reforms favoring internationalization."[363]

They are legitimate arguments. However, they do not weaken my argument that the US employed a security commitment because it perceived nuclear proliferation more fearsome than entrapment. Reagan was ready to

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[362] Sagan, "Three Models," 63.

[363] Solingen, *Nuclear Logics*, 17.

provide a stronger commitment to South Korea because of the US foreign

policy to roll back the Soviet expansion. South Korea initiated the nuclear

weapons program because of security motivations: North Korea's

aggression and the US withdrawal. It would be difficult to understand why a

state restrain its nuclear weapons development unless its security situation is

resolved. Therefore, it would be security factors that mainly causes nuclear

restraint, although domestic factors contribute to illustrate the South Korean

reality completely.

IV. CHINA AND NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION IN NORTH KOREA

1. China's Risk-averse Alliance Policy

A Reluctant Intervention in the Korean War

Contrary to China's rich historical examples of alliance politics, its experience of modern alliance politics is not deep. China forged formal alignments with the Soviet Union in 1950 and North Korea in 1961. For China, the bilateral relations with North Korea are the only alliance with a weaker state. The China-North Korea alliance is also the only alliance that endures until today. Thus, I describe the origins of China's alliance policy by postulating China-North Korea at the center of the chapter.

Based on more than half-century history of battlefield cooperation in China's civil war and the Korean War, China and North Korea often stress the bilateral relationship as "the alliance cemented in blood." However, many scholars argue that the relationship is fragile, and the two socialist countries hardly agree on any matters.[364] According to Andrew Scobell, the alliance as the comrades-in-arms relationship is built on shared socialist and divided nation ideology, the geopolitical balance of power in the region, and

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[364] Ji, "China and North Korea: a Fragile Relationship of Strategic Convenience."

ambivalent views on the United States.[365] In particular, for both socialist

party-states, the existence of a neighboring socialist country is strongly

linked to each other's political legitimacy. China views the Korean

Peninsula as a critical bulwark and North Korea as a buffer state, as it

recognized the sense of vulnerability when the United States intervened in

the Korean War by crossing the 38th parallel and approached the borderline.

Nevertheless, the Chinese alliance policy toward North Korean

affairs has been risk-averse because Beijing has expected hardly anything to

gain by pressuring North Korea.[366] Beijing feared that North Korea would

either pull away from China or collapse itself, generating a malign security

environment on the Korean Peninsula.[367]

China's risk-averse behavior dates back to the 1950s when it

reluctantly sent troops on the Korean Peninsula. Preoccupied with the

imperative need for state-building, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)

hesitated to intervene in the Korean War until its armed forces under the

name of the Chinese People's Volunteers (CPV) crossed the borderline

between China and North Korea on October 19, 1950. China's intervention

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[365] Andrew Scobell, *China and North Korea: from comrades-in-arms to allies at arm's length* (Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, 2004).

[366] According to Chambers, China has avoided entrapment risks from provocative actions by its formal and informal allies, including Cambodia, North Korea, North Vietnam, Pakistan, and Thailand. See Michael R. Chambers, "Dealing by a Truculent Ally: A Comparative Perspective on China's Handling of North Korea," *Journal of East Asian Studies* 5, no. 1 (2005).

[367] Scobell, *China and North Korea: from comrades-in-arms to allies at arm's length*, 20-21.

in the Korean War was a difficult decision for the newly established state with minor military power to fight against one of the world's most powerful states, the United States.

China opposed a war on the Korean Peninsula. There appear two pieces of evidence that show China's opposition to the war. First, China was unprepared for the war. Just five days before the war broke out, on June 20, 1950, the CCP began to reduce the number of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) with a demobilization process due to tight financial conditions.[368] Along the border area of the Yalu river, China maintained its forces at the minimum level with the 42nd Army of Fourth Field Corps, while others were stationed along the eastern coastal area facing Taiwan and a few advancing into Tibet. Second, China was uninformed of a war plan. North Korean leader Kim Il-sung only informed Chairman Mao Zedong of his intention to reunify the Korean Peninsula by force but did not share a detailed plan as he discussed with Premier Joseph Stalin of the Soviet Union. Collectively, China was against a war on the Korean Peninsula, being more cautious about the possible American intervention, which Kim and Stalin did not expect.[369]

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[368] Hao Yufan and Zhai Zhihai, "China's Decision to Enter the Korean War: History Revisited," *The China Quarterly*, no. 121 (1990): 99.

[369] China's consideration of the possibility of American intervention and a direct military confrontation stemmed from military and economic aid from the United States to Kuomintang (KMT) during the Chinese civil war between the CCP and the KMT. The US provided more than USD 2 billion to the KMT during the war and another USD 129 million in 1949. Denouncing the United States as an

When the US intervened, however, the war on the Korean Peninsula became a matter of national security for China. In particular, a US decision to dispatch the 7[th] Fleet between the Chinese mainland and Taiwan raised Beijing's alarm. Chinese leaders took this development seriously. For the CCP leaders, the American action was armed aggression against Chinese territory.[370] Mao's belief in "American duplicity and expansionism" intensified with the US 7[th] Fleet near Taiwan, which was perceived as a reverse of a US policy of noninterference in the Chinese civil war.[371] Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai stated that "no matter what obstructive action US imperialists may take, the fact that Taiwan is part of China will remain unchanged forever."[372] China augmented its armed forces near the Yalu River, but it was only after the US decided to cross the 38[th] parallel to carry a battlefield into North Korea.

Despite China's inferior economic strength and military power, not to mention the fear of American nuclear capabilities, Mao finally decided to participate in the Korean War. For Mao, the confrontation with the US was inevitable, and the peninsula was a more favorable battlefield than Taiwan

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imperialistic power, China decided to "lean to the side" of the Soviet Union. See ibid., 94-96.

[370] Chen Jian, *China's Road to the Korean War: The Making of the Sino-American Confrontation* (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1995), 127-28.

[371] Thomas J. Christensen, "Threats, Assurances, and the Last Chance for Peace: The Lessons of Mao's Korean War Telegrams," *International Security* 17, no. 1 (1992).

[372] Xinhua Monthly, May 1951, 12. recited from Yufan and Zhihai, "China's Decision," 101.

or Indochina.[373] In short, China recognized the Korean War as a matter of the Taiwan problem and participated in the war to protect its national security.

The Alliance of Lips and Teeth

Upon the end of the Korean War in 1953, China's military presence on the Korean Peninsula phased out.[374] The withdrawal of the CPV from North Korea was a choice considering strategic relations with the United States and North Korea. China has prioritized the Taiwan issue over the Korean Peninsula and withdrew its troops from North Korea to maintain its influence by minimizing internal interference with North Korea's domestic politics.[375]

First, concerning the United States, China sought to lower the tension on the Korean Peninsula and focus on the Taiwan issue. In 1954, China unilaterally withdrew the CPV stationed in North Korea, even after the failure of the Geneva Conference to discuss the withdrawal of foreign troops on the Korean Peninsula. According to Shunji Hiraiwa, China took a symbolic gesture to improve its international status through a pacifist

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[373] Ibid.

[374] The withdrawal took two phases: one from September 1954 to October 1955 and the other from March 1958 to October 1958. See Jong-Guk Lee, *North Korea and China Relations for 60 Years* [Bug-Han Jung-Gug Gwan-Gye 60 Nyeon: Sun-Chi Gwan-Gye Ui Gu-Jo Was Byeon-Yong] (Seoul, Republic of Korea: Sunin, 2013), 31.

[375] Ibid.

offensive, and above all, relocated its armed forces in response to the heightened crisis in the Taiwan Strait.[376] In the same period, the Cold War tensions were rising as the United States led the establishment of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) to prevent the expansion of communism in the region. Furthermore, the US signed a defense treaty with Taiwan. China evaluated the relevance between the Korean Peninsula and Taiwan in relation to the United States. To prepare for the Taiwan crisis, China decided to withdraw the CPV from North Korea to restore military power along the coastal area.

Second, paradoxically, the CPV withdrawal was Beijing's effort to maintain its waning influence over Pyongyang. Through the "August Incident" in 1956, Kim Il-sung succeeded in excluding the pro-Soviet faction and pro-Chinese Yan'an faction from its domestic politics and paved a way to establish the idea of self-reliance, the Juche ideology.[377] Kim monopolized the initiative to interpret North Koreans' socialist ideology and secured political structure out of domestic power struggle. With the CPV still stationed in North Korea, China failed to prevent Kim Il-sung from

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[376] Ibid., 44-51.

[377] The August Incident was a failed attempt by the Soviet-Korean faction and the Yan'an faction to remove Kim Il-sung from power at the second plenary session of the third Central Committee of the KWP. Kim Il-sung waged massive purges against the participants of the attempt and established a monolithic political structure with himself as an undisputable paramount leader. See. Chen Jian, "Limits of the 'Lips and Teeth' Alliance: an Historical Review of Chinese-North Korean Relations," in *Asia Program Special Report* (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center for International Scholars, 2003), 6-7.

purging the Yan'an faction within the Korean Workers Party (KWP).[378] To

limit the Chinese influence within the KWP, North Korea eventually

demanded the CPV withdrawal. In doing so, North Korea also sought to

compel the United States to withdraw from South Korea.[379] For China,

which had lost its leverage over the North Korean leadership, excessive

intervention in the North Korean affairs would have further weakened

China's influence over North Korea.[380] Instead, through the CPV

withdrawal, China reduced the US threat to North Korea, allowing North

Korea to recognize China's strategic role in the region.

     Despite the CPV's withdrawal, China continued to engage with

North Korea. Beijing needed a stable relationship with Pyongyang amid

increasing Cold War tensions and the growing rivalry between China and

the Soviet Union after they split in 1960.[381] For example, China and the

Soviet Union clashed at the 1960 Bucharest Conference, where two parties

disputed over ideological issues before other socialist parties, including

North Korea's KWP.[382] The relationship between China and the Soviet

Union deteriorated as Premier of the Soviet Union Nikita Khrushchev

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[378] Ibid., 10.

[379] Cheng Xiaohe, "The Evolution of the Lips and Teeth Relationship: China-North Korea Relations in the 1960s," in *China and North Korea: Strategic and policy perspectives from a changing China*, ed. Carla Freeman (New York, NY: Springer, 2015), 121.

[380] Lee, *North Korea and China Relations for 60 Years*, 67.

[381] Chung and Choi, "Uncertain Allies or Uncomfortable Neighbors?."

[382] Xiaohe, "The Evolution of the Lips and Teeth Relationship," 120.

degraded Stalin's legacy, who confronted the United States. Khrushchev altered the diplomatic route of the Soviet Union to peaceful coexistence with its rival superpower, the United States.

China understood the Soviet's peaceful approach to the US as a potential abandonment risk and the accomplishment of the Soviet's deterrence strategy with inter-continental ballistic missile capabilities.[383] Unlike the Soviet Union, China was far from balancing against the military power of the United States. Moreover, China continued armed protests against Taiwan and confronted the United States, but the Soviet Union wanted to avoid possible entrapment risks into the US-China conflict.[384] As the split deepened, China was gradually losing security support from the Soviet Union for the Taiwan issue. Eventually, the Soviet Union abandoned economic and military assistance to China, including assistance for nuclear weapons development.[385]

Against the backdrop, Beijing sought to improve its relationship with Pyongyang. China already had made a special effort to keep connected with North Korea by sending Premier Zhou Enlai in 1958 to agree on

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[383] Lee, *North Korea and China Relations for 60 Years*, 77-78.

[384] Myung-hae Choi, *China-DPRK Alliance: a History of Uncomfortable Cohabitation* [Jung-Gug Bug-han Dong-maeng Gwan-gye: Bul-Pyeon-Han Dong-Geo-ui Yeog-sa] (Seoul, Republic of Korea: Oreum, 2009), 120-30.

[385] In the middle of the Soviet-China split, the Soviet Union rescinded its promise to transfer a technical model of a nuclear bomb. See Zhihua Shen and Yafeng Xia, "Between Aid and Restriction: The Soviet Union's Changing Policies on China's Nuclear Weapons Program, 1954-1960," *Asian Perspective* 36, no. 1 (2012).

consultation and coordination through a summit between Mao Zedong or

Zhou Enlai and Kim Il-sung enshrined in the Agreement Concerning Mutual

Visits of Leaders between China and North Korea.[386] With the agreement

of summit diplomacy, China established a new communication channel with

Kim Il-sung, while North Korea gained access to top leaders in Beijing.[387]

Besides, China signed a long-term trade agreement (1959-1962) and two

loan agreements to maintain relations with North Korea.[388]

      As the ideological split between China and the Soviet Union

deteriorated, the relationship between China and North Korea developed

into a military alliance, allowing China's influence over the Korean

Peninsula.[389] In July 1961, China and North Korea signed the Treaty of

Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance. The agreement was a

military pact that provided North Korea with China's security assurance

amid increasing threat from the US-led alliance network in East Asia, and it

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[386] Chung and Choi, "Uncertain Allies or Uncomfortable Neighbors?," 248.

[387] Ibid.

[388] Zhihua Shen and Yafeng Xia, "China and the Post-War Reconstruction of North Korea, 1953-1961," in *North Korea International Documentation Project Working Paper* (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center for International Scholars, 2012), 22.

[389] For North Korea, the China and Soviet split was an opportunity to conclude bilateral defense pacts both with China and the Soviet Union almost simultaneously. Furthermore, North Korea needed to enhance security guarantees from the nuclear-armed Soviet Union and neighboring China as the United States was building a security architecture of anti-communism in Northeast Asia. Kim Il-sung also wanted to show the unity of socialist camps in the Northeast through the signing of military treaties with China and the Soviet Union. In addition, China's third-world approach of nonintervention principle assured Kim Il-sung to consolidate his domestic power. Choi, *China-DPRK Alliance: a History of Uncomfortable Cohabitation*, 156.

also was a strategic opportunity for China to win North Korea out of the influence of the Soviet Union and restrain North Korea's adventurous behavior. China and North Korea also shared security threats from modernizing American armed forces and nuclear capabilities in the region.

However, for decades after the conclusion of a formal defense treaty, the bilateral relationship made no significant progress. Beijing did not take a greater role in the Korean Peninsula but only sought to maintain its relations with Pyongyang when the tension between China and the Soviet Union was intensified. North Korea also preferred closer ties with China when it could not win support from the Soviet Union. For example, in the late 1960s, the two Asian socialist countries confirmed the necessity of a close relationship when the Soviet Union expanded to influence other socialist countries. In 1968, for instance, the Soviet Union invaded Czechoslovakia to crackdown on reformists. In 1969, China and the Soviet Union clashed on an island in the Ussuri River. North Korea was increasing tensions on the Korean Peninsula with a commando raid in Seoul to assassinate the South Korean President Park Chung-hee in 1968, the capture of the USS Pueblo in 1968, and the EC-121 shootdown incident in 1969. However, the Soviet Union did not want to get involved in a confrontation with the United States.

Against the backdrop, China and North Korea re-confirmed their close relationship. In April 1970, Zhou Enlai visited Pyongyang to sign a joint communique emphasizing their "lips and teeth" relationship. After Zhou visited Pyongyang, China and North Korea also agreed on a package

for Chinese economic aids, including technical assistance and long-term commercial transactions for the Six-Year Plan of North Korea (1971-1976).[390]

Despite such opportunities to enhance the allied relationship with North Korea, China began to improve relations with the United States in the 1970s. Furthermore, the relationship between China and North Korea did not improve due to the difference in economic development lines as China advanced into an era of Reform and Opening in the 1980s. As the Soviet Union's military threat was resolved with the end of the Cold War, China pursued economic reform, prioritizing economic development and political stability. Moreover, China began to normalize relations with South Korea, allowed individual contacts by 1989, and established a diplomatic relationship in 1992. The China-North Korea relations deteriorated as Pyongyang unilaterally suspended high-level visits.

Non-alignment and the New Security Concept

Since the beginning of Reform and Opening in 1978, China's foreign policy has been evolved to cope with its increasing international engagement. Based on its continued guidance of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, first introduced in the 1950s for Chinese peripheral diplomacy

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[390] Sukhoon Hong, "What Does North Korea Want from China? Understanding Pyongyang's Policy Priorities toward Beijing," *The Korean Journal of International Studies* 12, no. 1 (2014): 287.

with countries in Southeast Asia, China has developed its foreign policy to become a more proactive player on the international stage. This development included the "Non-alignment Principle" in 1982 and "the New Security Concept" in 1996. Despite conceptual updates in its approach to global affairs, China's bilateral and multilateral practices remained mostly in the economic domain.

There appear three major considerations formulating China's Non-alignment Principle: the establishment of a new national goal to pursue economic development, a new perception of the formation of a US-Soviet balance of power, and the failure of existing alliance policies.

First, the Non-alignment Principle came out as part of the open-door policy of China. In December 1978, during the Central Committee meeting of the CCP, Chairman Deng Xiaoping rejected Mao's isolationism and self-reliance to pursue China's opening to the world.[391] China recognized that a benign international security environment is beneficial to its economic and social development. To do so, the maintenance of world peace, the reduction of the threat of war, and the protection of China's sovereign independence were crucial. Therefore, the independence of China's foreign policy since the 1970s has been instrumental for China to its openness.

Second, Deng's China took advantage of the rivalry between the

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[391] Avery Goldstein, "A Rising China's Growing Presence: The Challenges of Global Engagement," in *China's Global Engagement: Cooperation, Competition, and Influence in the 21st Century*, ed. Jacques DeLisle and Avery Goldstein (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2017), 5.

United States and the Soviet Union by shifting China's grand strategy from "War and Revolution" to "Peace and Development." With the new grand strategy, "peace" mainly meant neutrality between two superpowers of the Cold War. For example, in the wake of the 1980 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the Chinese leadership evaluated the international balance of power as a new parity between the United States and the Soviet Union and decided not to stand on the side of any major power.[392] "Development" meant engagement in nontraditional areas such as international trade and transnational security agenda.[393] Diplomatic isolation and military conflict with neighboring countries were not desirable due to the lack of domestic resources for economic development. China also needed to engage with advanced countries such as the United States and Japan for foreign investment and technology. In 1986, as part of opening efforts, China began to expand foreign trade and attract investments by embracing international rules and norms and negotiating to enter the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT). China also participated in regional efforts to tackle broader issues such as the environment, immigration, drug-trafficking, organized cross-border crime.[394]

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[392] Young Nam Cho, "China's Alliance Policy in the 21st Century: Change and Continuity," in *EAI National Security Panel (NSP) Report* (Seoul, Republic of Korea: East Asia Institute, 2009), 8-9.

[393] Wu Baiyi, "The Chinese Security Concept and its Historical Evolution," *Journal of Contemporary China* 10, no. 27 (2001): 277-78.

[394] Ibid.

Third, the non-alignment principle was based on lessons learned from the failure of traditional alliances, particularly with the Soviet Union.[395] After the signing of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance in 1950, the ideological controversy between the two states was intensified, and the alliance failed in 1969 as they clashed at the border near Zhenbao (or Damansky) Island on the Ussuri River. Furthermore, China's security arrangements with other socialist countries did not end well.[396] China provided military aid to North Vietnam (1954-1975) to maintain a paramilitary alliance but failed in 1979 when China retaliated against Vietnam's war in Cambodia backed by the Soviet Union. Other cooperation and semi-alliance relations between Albania and Pakistan were also unsuccessful. The only formal alliance with North Korea increasingly became a potential liability, although China's mainstream thinking maintained to see the alliance as a strategic asset.[397]

In the post-Cold War world, Deng's strategic reorientation toward "Peace and Development" continued to develop China's security policy into

[395] Charles Liu to Hidden Harmonies China Blog, 2012, https://blog.hiddenharmonies.org/2012/03/08/li-daguang-non-aligned-policy-does-not-mean-china-cannot-make-friends/; Maria Barbal Campayo, "Chinas Non-alliance Strategy: Facing the XXI Century," *African Journal of Political Science and International Relations* 10, no. 8 (2016): 107.

[396] Bates Gill, *Rising Star: China's New Security Diplomacy* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2010), 22-25.

[397] Cho, "China's Alliance Policy in the 21st Century," 19-21.

the "New Security Concept."[398] The concept draws from the Five Principles

of Peaceful Coexistence, which China has been advocated since the

Bandung Conference in 1955 to employ periphery diplomacy with third

world countries and settle border conflicts.[399] The Five Principles of

Peaceful Co-Existence (mutual respect for territorial integrity and

sovereignty, mutual nonaggression, noninterference in each other's internal

affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence) have become

the basic norms in developing state to state relations transcending social

systems and ideologies.[400]

Building on the five principles, the New Security Concept consists

of mutual trust to reject hostility driven by Cold War ideology, mutual

benefit to meet the social development objectives and create conditions for

common security, equality to refrain from interfering in other countries

internal affairs, and coordination to negotiate on a peaceful manner and

prevent wars and conflicts.[401] China perceived a decline of the US presence

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[398] "I. The Security Situation, China's National Defense in 2002," PRC Information Office of the State Council, http://en.people.cn/features/ndpaper2002/nd1.html.

[399] Gill, *Rising Star: China's New Security Diplomacy*, 4-5; Choi, *China-DPRK Alliance: a History of Uncomfortable Cohabitation*, 131-32.

[400] "China's Initiation of the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-Existence," PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/ziliao_665539/3602_665543/3604_665547/t18053.shtml.

[401] Elizabeth Freund Larus, "China's New Security Concept and Peaceful Rise: Trustful Cooperation or Deceptive Diplomacy?," *American Journal of Chinese Studies* 12, no. 2 (2005).

in Asian security-related multilateral institutions such as the ASEAN

Regional Forum (ARF) and the Council on Security Cooperation in the

Asia-Pacific (CSCAP). In response, China utilized its new security

assessment for its proactive engagement with Asian countries.[402]

The New Security Concept is part of an illustration of Chinese

aspiration to be recognized as a world power in regional institutions.[403]

Around the 1990s, China began to appeal for the new international order

based on liberal concepts of security that emphasize dialogue and

consultation for arms control, disarmament, confidence-building measures,

and other non-security issues.[404] According to a position paper of China's

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the new security concept is "to rise above one-

sided security and seek common security through mutually beneficial

cooperation" based on the Five Principles.[405] The paper also emphasized

that "strengthening dialogue and cooperation is regarded as the fundamental

approach to common security."

By the mid-2000s, China became an active player in multilateral

security mechanisms from ASEAN, to ARF, to the Six-Party Talks for

resolving the North Korean nuclear crisis. The goal of proactive

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[402] David Shambaugh, "China Engages Asia: Reshaping the Regional Order," *International security* 29, no. 3 (2005).

[403] Ibid., 68-70.

[404] Larus, "China's New Security Concept and Peaceful Rise."

[405] "China's Position Paper on the New Security Concept," PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/ce/ceun/eng/xw/t27742.htm.

participation is that China can dampen tensions in the international security environment and focus on domestic development, extend its influence, and reassure its "Peaceful Rise," and avoid confrontation with the United States.[406]

In addition, China utilized the New Security Concept to persuade Asian states to abrogate alliances with the United States. According to a study, Chinese diplomats visited Asian states in 1997 and offered China's new concept as an alternative to the Cold War-era alliance network.[407] They argued the existing Cold War alliance system was formulated against the Soviet Union during the Cold War. From the Chinese perspective, as the Soviet Union was collapsed and the Cold War was ended, alliance mechanisms were no longer necessary.

The Chinese perspective on the alliance was unwelcome by the US allies in Asia.[408] For the US allies in Asia, the focus of the alliance system already had been extended to other communist countries, China, and North Korea. China's failed approach showed what the emerging Asian great power expected from military alliances. Unlike a positive-sum view by the United States and its peacetime allies to maintain security and stability in the region, China saw the alliances as remnants of the Cold War and countermeasures to protect one against another.

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[406] Gill, *Rising Star: China's New Security Diplomacy*, 29.

[407] Shambaugh, "China Engages Asia: Reshaping the Regional Order," 70.

[408] Ibid.

China failed to disassociate Asian states from the existing alliance network led by the United States but continued to engage with them both in the economic and nontraditional security domain. Along with Chinese expansion in other institutions such as ASEAN, China improved its relations with neighboring Asian countries. For example, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) was established among the Shanghai Five group (China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan), which sought to build military confidence by reducing forces in their border regions. Adding Uzbekistan, the SCO has been evolved to coordinate counterterrorism efforts and even economic cooperation to lower regional trade barriers.

However, China's greater engagement in Asia was only appreciated in soft power diplomacy to popularize its cultural elements.[409] China concluded bilateral strategic partnerships with Russia (1996), the US (1997), the EU (2003), India (2005), Japan (2007), and South Korea (2008), among others, reflecting its new diplomatic posture to differentiate its view on peacetime relations from traditional wartime alliances. Strategic partnerships as a manifestation of the New Security Concept that emerged from the end of Cold War mentality and wartime alliances are devoid of practical meaning.[410]

In sum, China has been employing a risk-averse alliance policy.

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[409] Ibid.

[410] Cho, "China's Alliance Policy in the 21st Century," 13.

China saw the Korean War as a matter of national security when the United States dispatched the 7th Fleet to the Taiwan Strait and crossed the 38th parallel on the Korean Peninsula. Upon the end of the Korean War, China withdrew its troops from the peninsula to focus on the Taiwan problem. China concluded a defense pact with North Korea and continued to improve its relations, mainly in response to the fear of being abandoned by the Soviet Union. However, the bilateral relationship did not progress because China engaged with the United States and advanced into the international stage.

China's Non-alignment Principle also reflects its risk-averse behavior. To pursue economic reform and development, China sought a benign security environment and independent foreign policy. For example, in the early 1980s, the Chinese leadership decided not to stand on the side of neither the United States nor the Soviet Union. Chinese experience on failed alliances also contributed to the formulation of the Non-alignment Principle. With the New Security Concept, China continued to avoid confrontation with the United States. It also offered an alternative to alliance mechanisms. However, China's negative view of alliances was unpopular among the US allies in Asia. Despite its efforts toward greater engagement, China mostly remains active in the economic and nontraditional security domain.

2. North Korea from 1993 to 1994

Disengagement and the Yongbyon Reactor

North Korea's interest in nuclear weapons can be explained by the increasing American influence in the region, the diminishing influence of the Soviet Union, and China's disengagement. In late 1960, North Korea faced an increasing number of American nuclear weapons deployed in the region. Throughout the 1960s and the 1970s, the United States deployed more than 800 nuclear weapons in South Korea.[411] As a response, North Korean leader Kim Il-sung repeatedly expressed his intention to acquire nuclear weapons to guarantee North Korea's strategic autonomy.[412] For instance, in early 1960, North Korea sought the Soviet's deployment of nuclear missiles or, preferably, missile technology transfer.[413]

North Korea also asked the Soviet Union for assistance to build nuclear weapons. For example, in August 1962, North Korea Foreign Minister Pak Seong-cheol told Soviet Ambassador in North Korea Visily Moskovsky that "the Americans hold on to Taiwan, to South Korea and

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[411] Robert S Norris, William M Arkin, and William Burr, "Where They Were," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 55, no. 6 (1999): 30.

[412] Daniel Wertz, Matthew McGrath, and Scott LaFoy, "North Korea's Nuclear Weapons Program," in *Issue Brief* (Washington, DC: The National Committee on North Korea, April 2018), 2.

[413] "Conversation between Soviet Ambassador in North Korea Vasily Moskovsky and Czechoslovak Ambassador Moravec," April 15, 1963, *North Korean Nuclear History*, Wilson Center Digital Archive: International History Declassified.

South Vietnam, blackmail the people with their nuclear weapons, and, with their help, rule on these continents and do not intend to leave." He added, "[Americans] have a large stockpile, and we are to be forbidden even to think about the manufacture of nuclear weapons? I think that in such case the advantage will be on the Americans' side."[414] However, the Soviets refused military aid, including the transfer of MiG-21 jet fighters and surface-to-air missiles.[415]

Instead of the Soviet military aid, North Korea managed to receive nuclear energy assistance.[416] In 1964, North Korea began to construct the IRT-2000 research reactor at Yongbyon with technical assistance from the Soviet Union. In the following years, Soviet and North Korean experts set up a nuclear research facility at Yongbyon and increased reactor capacities. The Soviet Union provided nuclear assistance for peaceful purposes and demanded compliance with nuclear nonproliferation.

Second, in October 1962, North Korea witnessed a retreat from the Soviet Union during the Cuban Missile Crisis. Pyongyang sought allied protection from the US nuclear threat but had great distrust in the Soviet

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[414] "Conversation between Soviet Ambassador in North Korea Vasily Moskovsky and North Korean Foreign Minister Pak Seong-cheol," August 24, 1962, *North Korean Nuclear History*, Wilson Center Digital Archive: International History Declassified.

[415] Sergey Radchenko, *Two suns in the heavens: the Sino-Soviet struggle for supremacy, 1962-1967*, vol. 33 (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2009), 77.

[416] North Korea's interest in nuclear technology stretches back to 1959 when it signed a bilateral agreement on nuclear cooperation with the Soviet Union.

Union's security assurance. For example, in January 1965, North Korean Vice Premier Kim Il told Soviet Premier Aleksei Kosygin that Pyongyang "could not count that the Soviet government would keep the obligations related to the defense of Korea it assumed in the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance." He added, "the Soviet Union had betrayed Cuba at the time of the Caribbean crisis, and later it also betrayed the Vietnamese."[417]

Third, North Korea's confidence in China's security commitment also decreased. Chinese troops withdrew from North Korea in 1958, and in that same year, North Korea began to build capacities for nuclear technology.[418] China's nuclear assistance is known as minimal. For example, North Korean officials congratulated when China successfully conducted its first nuclear weapons test. Ryu Cheol-su, a trainer at the Ministry of Social Security Foreign Relations Department, said: "like what Chairman Mao had said, whatever the imperialists have, we must have, and now we really have it. Our people are powerful, and we will be even more formidable when we have powerful weapons in our hands."[419] Pyongyang

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[417] James F. Person, "The Cuban Missile Crisis and the Origins of North Korea's Policy of Self-Reliance in National Defense," in *North Korea International Documentation Project* (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center for International Scholars, October 2012), 8-9.

[418] "Journal of Soviet Ambassador in the DPRK A. M. Puzanov," May 20, 1958, *North Korean Nuclear History*, Wilson Center Digital Archive: International History Declassified.

[419] "Cable from the Chinese Embassy in North Korea, 'Reactions to China's Nuclear Test'," October 17, 1964, *Chinese Nuclear History*, Wilson Center Digital Archive: International History Declassified.

asked Beijing to share its nuclear weapons technology after China's nuclear test in 1964, but Mao Zedong refused.[420]

In the 1970s, China confirmed its interests in restraining North Korea's adventurism in the US-China rapprochement course. For instance, Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai met US National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger in June 1972 and shared his view on preserving stability on the Korean Peninsula. Zhou had no objection when Kissinger stated, "we oppose military aggression by South Korea against North Korea. … We believe that it would help maintain Asian peace if you could use your influence with North Korea to not use force against the US and against South Korea."[421] To Pyongyang, improved relations between the US and China might bring an opportunity to remove the US presence in Korea. North Korea attempted to use China as leverage to achieve Korean unification by force, but ultimately Pyongyang saw Beijing's lack of interest in Korean unification as a betrayal.[422]

In the 1980s, North Korea began to lag behind South Korea. North Korea's armed forces continuously declined with its 1960s design, whereas

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[420] Joel S Wit, Daniel B Poneman, and Robert L Gallucci, *Going Critical: The First North Korean Nuclear Crisis* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2004), 2-3; "North Korea, Nuclear History," Nuclear Threat Initiative, https://www.nti.org/learn/countries/north-korea/nuclear/.

[421] Yafeng Xia and Zhihua Shen, "China's Last Ally: Beijing's Policy toward North Korea during the U.S.–China Rapprochement, 1970–1975," *Diplomatic History* 38, no. 5 (2014): 1092.

[422] Ibid., 1098-102.

South Korea's armed forces were increasingly equipped with modern weaponry.[423] Pyongyang's diplomatic relationship with communist countries dramatically altered as South Korea implemented "Northern Policy," a campaign to improve diplomatic relationships with communist countries.[424] South Korea hosted the 1988 Olympic games with the attendance of the Soviet Union, China, and other communist countries. Eventually, South Korea established a diplomatic relationship with the Soviet Union in 1990 and China in 1992. To North Korea, China's lean toward South Korea was a heavy blow, although Beijing told Pyongyang that its diplomatic relations with Seoul would not affect the 1961 alliance treaty, ensuring the continued existence of North Korea.[425] Furthermore, Pyongyang's sense of betrayal by Moscow and Beijing was aggravated by decreasing trade, loans, and aid.[426]

Against the backdrop, North Korea's interest in nuclear weapons first manifested with the construction of a 5-MWe reactor in late 1970.

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[423] Michael O'Hanlon, "Stopping a North Korean Invasion: Why Defending South Korea is Easier than the Pentagon Thinks," *International Security* 22, no. 4 (1998): 143-44.

[424] For South Korea's Northern Policy, see Hakjoon Kim, "The Republic of Korea's Northern Policy: Origin, Development, and Prospects," *Japan Review of International Affairs* 5, no. Special Issue (1991).

[425] Ding Yi and Shen Dingli, "Assessing the Effectiveness of Security Assurances on the DPRK's Nuclear Issue," *The Korean journal of defense analysis* 31, no. 4 (2019): 584-85.

[426] John S. Park, "Assessing the Role of Security Assurances in Dealing with North Korea," in *Security Assurances and Nuclear Nonproliferation*, ed. Jeffrey W. Knopf (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2012), 193.

North Korea used a graphite moderator and natural uranium at Yongbyon,

which became operational in January 1986.[427] The 5Mwe graphite reactor

was especially well suited for a high proportion of plutonium-239, critical

for nuclear weapons. Under pressure from the Soviet Union, North Korea

signed the NPT in 1985. Pyongyang concluded a trilateral safeguard

measure, partially applicable to certain facilities assisted by the Soviet

Union. In 1988, the US intelligence detected North Korea's construction of

a reprocessing plant at Yongbyon. In April 1992, North Korea completed its

NPT obligatory comprehensive safeguards agreement with the International

Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to verify its nuclear program. On May 4,

Pyongyang reported its initial declaration of nuclear materials to the agency,

and the report stated that North Korea had seven sites and about ninety

grams of plutonium subject to IAEA inspection.[428] The IAEA inspection

questioned North Korea's initial declaration, unfolding the first nuclear

crisis in North Korea.[429]

On March 12, 1993, North Korea announced its intention to

withdraw from the NPT, shortly after denying IAEA inspectors access to

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[427] Leon V. Sigal, *Disarming strangers: nuclear diplomacy with North Korea*, vol. 81 (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1999), 21-22.

[428] Mohamed ElBaradei, *The Age of Deception: Nuclear Diplomacy in Treacherous Times* (New York, NY: Metropolitan Books, 2011), 38.

[429] The IAEA inspectors found a significant discrepancy between a reported amount of plutonium and the actual presentation by North Koreans, who were surprised by the IAEA's sophisticated analysis. For details of North Korea's acknowledgment and concealment, see ibid., 38-41.

suspected nuclear waste sites. The first North Korean nuclear crisis hit its peak on May 14, 1994, when North Korea began to extract spent fuels from the reactor without the IAEA inspection.[430]

Strategic Dilemma and Entrapment Fear

Upon the first North Korean nuclear crisis, China faced a strategic dilemma. Beijing feared that not only intervention might lead to international sanctions and pressure causing the collapse of the North Korean regime, but also nonintervention in North Korea's nuclear weapons program may trigger a nuclear domino that could destabilize Northeast Asia.[431] Concerning the regional instability, some argued that China could adapt to Japan's nuclear weapons but could not cope with Taiwan's nuclear weapons and a possible military confrontation with the United States.[432] Besides, China's nuclear weapons policy in the context of East-West confrontation diminished as it became an active participant in the nuclear nonproliferation regime.[433]

To China, a possible North Korean collapse meant a risk of entrapment, which was equally dangerous as a risk of nuclear proliferation.

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[430] David E. Sanger, "North Koreans Say Nuclear Fuel Rods Are Being Removed," *The New York Times*, May 15, 1994.

[431] Wit, Poneman, and Gallucci, *Going critical*, 31.

[432] Bonnie S Glaser and Wang Liang, "North Korea: the beginning of a China-US partnership?," *Washington Quarterly* 31, no. 3 (2008): 174.

[433] Guo Xiaobing, "China's Understanding of the Threat of Nuclear Proliferation," in *Understanding: Chinese Nuclear Thinking*, ed. Li Bin and Tong Zhao (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, January 1, 2016), 171-72.

The collapse of North Korea would have brought a direct threat to China's national interests. China could have tolerated the loss of the only alliance. Although there exists a legal obligation to protect North Korea, some argued that China would not fear losing North Korea.[434] Instead, China worried about a possible large-scale influx of North Korean refugees and conflict on the Korean Peninsula spillover across the border. A US intelligence report also concurred that "China's primary objective would be to prevent a political crisis that might result from the collapse of the North," and "Beijing is not required by treaty to provide military aid to aggressive Pyongyang."[435]

Moreover, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) 's regime security objective reinforced China's national security interest to prevent the collapse of the North Korean regime. In 1978, Deng Xiaoping took power, and China gradually transformed itself into a developing country. As Horowitz and Yet have put it, "Deng sought to prevent China from being distracted from the central task of economic development by international adventures and their consequences."[436] With its nonintervention principle in other countries' domestic affairs, China avoided taking an active role in the

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[434] Banning Garrett and Bonnie Glaser, "Looking Across the Yalu: Chinese Assessments of North Korea," *Asian Survey* 35, no. 6 (1995): 538.

[435] "China: Potential Response to Korean Contingencies," January 31, 1994, *Reading the North Korean Tea Leaves: The Perpetual Struggle to Fathom Pyongyang's Motives and Goals*, National Security Archive.

[436] Shale Horowitz and Min Ye, "China's Grand Strategy, the Korean Nuclear Crisis, and the Six-Party Talks," *Pacific Focus* 21, no. 2 (2006): 51.

North Korean nuclear crisis.[437] China aimed to preserve a stable Korean

Peninsula (i.e., preserve the North Korean regime and normalize its

relationship with South Korea) as a prerequisite for China's continued

economic development.[438] After the Tiananmen Square incident in 1989,

China's international isolation also limited Beijing's capacity to intervene in

the North Korean nuclear crisis.

Instead of taking an active role in the nuclear crisis, Beijing threw a

lifeline to Pyongyang to avoid entrapment derived from a possible collapse

of the North Korea regime.[439] To the extent of preventing the collapse of

North Korea, as Shambaugh has put it, "Beijing believes that it must deal

with the DPRK government and extends it aid in the form of foodstuffs and

energy supplies to alleviate public suffering in North Korea."[440] For

example, China's share of foreign trade with North Korea rose from 24

percent in 1991 to 37 percent in 1994, accounting for 37 percent of its oil

imports and 80 percent of its food grain imports.[441] Another source

indicated that North Korea had imported 500,000 tons of heavy-oil since

1994, accounting for 70 to 90 percent of North Korea's fuel imports.[442]

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[437] Scott Snyder, *China's Rise and the Two Koreas: Politics, Economics, Security* (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2009), 142-43.

[438] Ibid., 137.

[439] Horowitz and Ye, "China's Grand Strategy," 67.

[440] Shambaugh, "China and the Korean Peninsula: Playing for the Long Term."

[441] Selig S Harrison, *Korean Endgame: A Strategy for Reunification and US Disengagement* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2003), 312.

[442] Shambaugh, "China and the Korean Peninsula: Playing for the Long Term," 46.

Despite increasing China's economic aid, Chinese influence over North Korea was uncertain. For example, Japan remained the single biggest market for North Korea throughout the 1990s, and China's share in North Korea's total trade fluctuated around 20 percent until 2002.[443]

In addition, Beijing sought to maintain a stable relationship with the North Korean leadership. From July 27th to 29, 1993, the First Secretary of Secretariat of the Chinese Communist Party Hu Jintao visited North Korea to attend the 40th-anniversary event of the Korean War and reaffirmed Beijing's friendship with Pyongyang by expressing support for Pyongyang's leadership succession plan from Kim Il-sung to Kim Jong-il.[444] In July 1994, President Jiang Zemin met North Korea's Army Chief of Staff Choi Kwang in Beijing. It was the highest-level visit by a North Korean since the nuclear crisis began. Jiang told Choi that "China deems it an unshakable policy to strengthen and develop the blood-bound friendship between the two countries."[445]

By doing so, China could have managed its long-standing nonintervention principle, which is also enshrined in the China-North Korea

[443] Dong Sun Lee, Iordanka Alexandrova, and Yihei Zhao, "The Chinese Failure to Disarm North Korea: Geographical Proximity, US Unipolarity, and Alliance Restraint," *Contemporary Security Policy* 41, no. 4 (2020): 597.

[444] Hongseo Park, "China's Management of Alliance Dilemma over the Nuclear Crisis in the Korean Peninsula: its Theory and Practice," [Bug-haeg-wi-gi-si jung-gug-ui dae-bug dong-maeng-an-bo-dil-le-ma gwan-li yeon-gu.] *The Korean Journal of International Studies* 46, no. 1 (2006): 111.

[445] Patrick E Tyler, "China Tells Why It Opposes Korea Sanctions," *The New York Times*, June 13, 1994.

defense pact. Article V of the China-North Korea defense pact states, "the Contracting Parties, on the principles of mutual respect for sovereignty, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit and in the spirit of friendly co-operation, will continue to render each other every possible economic and technical aid in the cause of socialist construction of the two countries and will continue to consolidate and develop economic, cultural, and scientific and technical co-operation between the two countries."[446]

Opposition to International Pressure

From the outset of North Korea's announcement to withdraw from the NPT and forbid international inspections, China opposed bringing the nuclear issue in North Korea to the United Nations Security Council to avoid entrapment by the collapse of North Korea. For example, on March 24th, 1993, Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen said that his government "not only opposed sanctions but also was against bringing up the matter before the United Nations Security Council." He added, "we support patient consultations to reach an appropriate solution."[447] In April 1993, the IAEA Board of Governors proposed a resolution regarding North Korea's non-

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[446] "Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance Between the People's Republic of China and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea," July 11, 1961.

[447] Nicholas D. Kristof, "China opposes U.N. over North Korea," *The New York Times*, March 24, 1993.

compliance to the UN Security Council, where China refused to impose sanctions or adopt a resolution to demand Pyongyang not to develop nuclear weapons and not to withdraw from the NPT.[448] China also opposed a resolution by the IAEA board of governors to ask the UN Security Council for access to North Korean sites.[449] With China's abstention, the UN Security Council adopted resolution 825 with a subtle tone of language to call on Pyongyang to reconsider the announcement of its withdrawal from the NPT, to honor its nonproliferation obligations under the NPT and comply with its safeguards agreement with the IAEA.[450]

Furthermore, China consistently supported diplomatic solutions and insisted on a peaceful dialogue between the United States and North Korea to address the nuclear crisis. For instance, on May 11, 1993, before the voting of UNSC resolution 825, Chinese representative Li Zhaoxing stressed its position on denuclearization of the Korean peninsula and said, "China does not wish to see nuclear weapons on the peninsula, whether in the north or in the south or to have them introduced there by a third party."[451] Li's statement made clear that China viewed the nuclear issues

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[448] ElBaradei, *The Age of Deception: Nuclear Diplomacy in Treacherous Times*, 43.

[449] David E. Sanger, "Atomic Energy Agency Asks U.N. To Move Against North Koreans," *The New York Times*, April 2, 1993.

[450] "Resolution 825," May 11, 1993, The United Nations.

[451] "S/PV.3212 Provisional Verbatim Record of the Three Thousand Two Hundred and Twelfth Meeting," May 11, 1993, *Meetings conducted by the Security Council in 1993*, Dag Hammarskjöld Library.

concerning North Korea is mainly a matter between North Korea and the IAEA, North Korea and the United States, and North Korea and South Korea. Li added, "It should be therefore be settled properly through direct dialogue and consultation between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the three other parties concerned, respectively. In this connection, China opposes the practice of imposing pressures."[452]

Similarly, China declined to play a substantive role in influencing North Korea's nuclear behavior. For instance, on March 26, 1993, during the summit meeting in Beijing, South Korean President Kim Young-sam requested Chinese President Jiang Zemin for China's active role in resolving the North Korean nuclear issue. However, Jiang only expressed Beijing's principled position, the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, and its peaceful resolution.[453] China did not support North Korea's position on nuclear weaponization but did neither want to pressure North Korea to impose the promises of denuclearization.[454]

China's approach to the first nuclear crisis was consistent with its policy on the Korean Peninsula since the Korean War: a stable Korean

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[452] Ibid., 42-43.

[453] Dong Ryul Lee, "China's Strategy and Role on the Korean Peninsula's Denuclearizaton and Peace Process," [Han-ban-do bi-haeg, pyeong-hwa peu-lo-se-seu-e dae-han jung-gug-ui jeon-lyag-gwa yeog-hal.] *Korean and World Politics* 35, no. 1 (2019).

[454] Chong Wook Chung, *Chung Chong Wook Diplomatic Memoir: the First North Korean Nuclear Crisis and the Exile of Hwang Jang-yop* [Jeong-jong-ug oe-gyo bi-log] (Seoul, Republic of Korea: Guiparang, 2019), 176.

Peninsula as a buffer zone between the US-South Korea alliance and China.[455] For instance, on April 15, 1994, when the US Ambassador Stapleton Roy proposed a dialogue with North Korea to the Chinese vice foreign minister Tang Jiaxuan, China officially rejected the role between the US and North Korea and passed the proposal to the North Koreans. Beijing wanted to play a positive role in ending the nuclear impasse but attempted to avoid being caught in the middle.[456]

Against the backdrop, China viewed the United States as better positioned to restrain North Korea. Besides, China believed that North Korea intended to use the nuclear weapons program to obtain concessions from the United States. For example, the Chinese insisted that North Korea would restrain the nuclear weapons program once the US would provide reassurance and economic aid and establish diplomatic ties.[457] Besides, Chinese diplomats told the South Korean officials that supporting dialogue between North Korea and the United States presented the best way since "the final leverage is with the United States."[458] China's diplomatic support and economic aid served as leverage to induce North Korea to sit with the

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[455] Nicholas Khoo, "Retooling Great Power Nonproliferation Theory: Explaining China's North Korea Nuclear Weapons Policy," *The Pacific Review* (2019): 7.

[456] Wit, Poneman, and Gallucci, *Going critical*, 41.

[457] Garrett and Glaser, "Looking Across the Yalu," 535.

[458] Wit, Poneman, and Gallucci, *Going critical*, 31.

United States at the bargaining table.[459] Eventually, Beijing attained its goals to keep the Korean Peninsula nuclear-free and stable by passing the buck to Washington.[460]

Praise for the Agreed Framework

On October 21, 1994, the first North Korean nuclear crisis ended with the conclusion of the Agreed Framework. China firmly supported the bilateral negotiation between the United States and North Korea and uniformly praised the agreement as improving stability in the region.[461] Although the signatories of the political agreement were the United States and North Korea, China achieved a peaceful resolution instead of international sanctions and a possible confrontation with the US.

The Agreed Framework consists of four sections, 1) a freeze of North Korea's graphite reactors, heavy oil provision to offset the freeze, and the US-led arrangement for the provision of a light water reactor, 2) full normalization of political and economic relations, 3) peace and security on a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula, and 4) strengthening of the international

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[459] Chinese diplomats in Pyongyang told North Koreans that China might not be able to veto international sanctions because of growing international opinion against the North Korean nuclear issue. However, North Korea is known to be already decided to talk with the US. Lee, *A Troubled Peace: US Policy and the Two Koreas*, 172; Oberdorfer and Carlin, *The Two Koreas*, 251-52.

[460] Lee, Alexandrova, and Zhao, "The Chinese Failure to Disarm North Korea: Geographical Proximity, US Unipolarity, and Alliance Restraint," 596.

[461] Garrett and Glaser, "Looking Across the Yalu," 535.

nuclear nonproliferation regime.[462]

North Korea agreed to freeze its reactors and related facilities within one month, allowing the IAEA to monitor the process. The framework stated a final denuclearization stage as the dismantlement of North Korea's graphite reactors, but the timing of dismantling the graphite reactor was not confirmed as it was decided to take place when the light water reactor project was completed. North Korea agreed to discuss the storage and disposal of the spent nuclear fuel from the 5Mwe experimental reactor.

The Agreed Framework suspended North Korea's nuclear weapons program. Pyongyang decided to freeze its nuclear activities, halting its plutonium production, and placing its facilities under the IAEA monitoring. The 5Mwe reactor, of which North Korea removed the spent fuel to extract weapons-grade plutonium, would be permanently shut down.[463] However, the suspension of the nuclear weapons program also meant that Pyongyang was able to keep its level of nuclear achievement without a rollback process.

By signing the Agreed Framework, North Korea also agreed to work together for peace and security on a nuclear-free Korean peninsula. The framework included three provisions regarding the stability of the Korean Peninsula:

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[462] "Agreed Framework of 21 October 1984 between the United States of America and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea,"

[463] Wit, Poneman, and Gallucci, *Going critical*, 331.

1) The US will provide formal assurances to the DPRK against the threat or use of nuclear weapons by the US.

2) The DPRK will consistently take steps to implement the North-South Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula

3) The DPRK will engage in North-South dialogue, as this Agreed Framework will help create an atmosphere that promotes such dialogue.[464]

From the Chinese perspective, North Korea officially accepted China's consistent position on denuclearization and a peaceful solution to the Korean Peninsula. Beijing was greatly relieved by the Agreed Framework because it addressed the warring conflict between the US and North Korea over the nuclear issue.[465] Chinese experts also evaluated the agreement as an opportunity for North Korea to improve its economic conditions, which will legitimize the rule of Kim Jong-il and improve the political stability of the North Korean regime.[466]

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[464] "Agreed Framework of 21 October 1984 between the United States of America and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea."

[465] Ji, "China and North Korea: a Fragile Relationship of Strategic Convenience," 394.

[466] Garrett and Glaser, "Looking Across the Yalu," 533.

3. North Korea from 2003 to 2009

Devotion to Reform and Opening

After the first North Korean nuclear crisis, China did not further improve its relationship with North Korea. Instead, China's strategic interests shared with North Korea as an ideological partner gradually faded away as China devoted its resources to economic development. Besides, China sought broader interests on the Korean Peninsula apart from North Korea's interests.

On the one hand, as a patron of the alliance, China was concealing its strength and kept avoiding responsibility by observing from the outside until Deng's death in 1997.[467] When North Korea went through the March of Suffering, a period of mass starvation and an economic crisis from 1994 to 1998, China did not increase economic assistance toward North Korea and kept it at the minimum level to prevent the collapse of the North Korean regime. Rather than increasing aid, Beijing declined to provide economic aid to North Korea. As China focused its resources on economic reform and opening, it began to demand North Korea to pay for coal, oil, and food with hard currency at "preferential prices," which are lower than world prices but not low as "friendship prices."[468]

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[467] Horowitz and Ye, "China's Grand Strategy," 68.

[468] Garrett and Glaser, "Looking Across the Yalu," 540-41.

In addition, important visits of leaders between China and North Korea dramatically declined in the 1990s. In particular, North Korea unilaterally halted the exchange when China established diplomatic ties with South Korea in August 1992. Hu Jintao paid a visit to North Korea with the Chinese Party and Government Delegation in July 1993. There was no summit until 2000.[469] Similarly, there was no North Korean leader's visit to China when China established diplomatic ties with the US in January 1979.

Figure 12 expresses the visit between China and North Korea provided by the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs during the Deng Xiaoping (1978-1992) and Jiang Zemin (1993-2002) era.[470] They include state visits, official visits, official goodwill visits, and other informal or friendly visits by Chairman, Prime Minister, Foreign Minister, General Secretary, and the like. The lists of the visits are provided in Appendix 1 and 2.

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[469] Tat Yan Kong, "China's Engagement-oriented Strategy towards North Korea: Achievements and Limitations," *Pacific Review* 31, no. 1 (2018): 78.

[470] Deng Xiaoping was the official leader from 1978 to 1989. However, some argued that his paramount leadership was extended until 1992, when he strived to get China back on the track to reform and opening. For Deng's leadership, see Ezra F. Vogel, *Deng Xiaoping and the transformation of China*, vol. 10 (Cambridge, Massachusettes: Harvard University Press, 2011).

Figure 12. Visits between China and North Korea (1978-2002)[471]

Source: Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "V. List of important exchange visits between leaders of China and North Korea," https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/gjhdq_676201/gj_676203/yz_676205/1206_6764 04/sbgx_676408/

On the other hand, China sought greater influence over the Korean Peninsula by drawing closer to South Korea. For example, China established diplomatic ties with South Korea in 1992. Upon the conclusion of the 1994 Agreed Framework between the US and North Korea, China participated in the US-South Korea initiative to move beyond the armistice terms ending the Korean War.[472] In contrast, after the conclusion of the Agreed Framework, North Korea proposed a "new peace arrangement" to

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[471] "V. List of important exchange visits between leaders of China and North Korea," PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/gjhdq_676201/gj_676203/yz_676205/1206_67640 4/sbgx_676408/.

[472] Horowitz and Ye, "China's Grand Strategy," 68.

pursue the elimination of the armistice treaty and sought a direct

conversation with the United States for a peace treaty.[473]

In early September 1994, China announced that it was withdrawing

from the Military Armistice Commission of the United Nations Command,

which oversaw the armistice of the Korean War. China's withdrawal was

diplomatic support for North Korea, whereas a stunning move for South

Korea. Chinese Deputy Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan said that "North

Korea's withdrawal in effect rendered the commission inoperative. …

[China] have agreed with North Korea that a new agreement should be

negotiated to protect the peace on the peninsula."[474]

Nevertheless, China insisted on adherence to the armistice treaty

before concluding a peace treaty on the Korean peninsula. For instance, in

late October 1994, Chinese Prime Minister Li Peng made a statement

regarding the peace system during his visit to Jeju Island, South Korea. Li

said that "the construction of a peace mechanism should be resolved through

negotiations among all relevant parties" and that "until a new peace

mechanism is established, the Armistice Agreement is still in effect and

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[473] In 1991, North Korea was seeking to eliminate the commission after a South Korean general replaced the American general on the head of the commission. For details of North Korea's move, see Hideya Kurata, "The International Context of North Korea's Proposal for a 'New Peace Arrangement': Issues after the US-DPRK Nuclear Accord," *The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis* 7, no. 1 (1995).

[474] James Sterngold, "China, Backing North Korea, Quits Armistice Commission," *The New York Times*, September 3, 1994.

should be observed."[475] His use of the term "peace mechanism" did not

necessarily refer to North Korea's new peace arrangement, of which

Pyongyang intended to isolate Seoul. Besides, China's use of the term "all

relevant parties" referred to Beijing's support for bilateral dialogues

between Seoul and Pyongyang.[476]

Meanwhile, the implementation of the Agreed Framework proved

slow and incomplete because of the reluctance of the US Congress to fund

the deal and North Korea's missile development activities. In January 1996,

the Clinton administration provided an optimistic report about the

implementation of the Agreed Framework. However, it was concerned

about North Korea's half full cooperation with the IAEA, which complained

that "the DPRK was still not in full compliance with its safeguards

agreement."[477] By early 1998, the US intelligence reported suspicious

nuclear activity in North Korea's underground site in Kumchang-RI.

Collectively, the US faced difficulties in obtaining congressional approval

for financing its side of the deal.[478]

Furthermore, the new Bush administration began to speak openly

about its aggressive action toward rogue states. A few months after the

terror attack on September 11, 2001, President Bush condemned North

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[475] Kurata, "The International Context of North Korea's Proposal for a 'New Peace Arrangement': Issues after the US-DPRK Nuclear Accord," 268.

[476] Ibid.

[477] Debs and Monteiro, *Nuclear Politics*, 289.

[478] Ibid.

Korea as part of the "axis of evil" along with Iraq and Iran.[479] By demonstrating a preemptive attack in Iraq, Washington sought to use the Bush Doctrine to increase the coercive pressure on Pyongyang.[480] The Bush administration already had set stricter conditions regarding the implementation of the Agreed Framework. The US demanded North Korea to cooperate with the IAEA to resolve discrepancies over its past plutonium separation, although this was not legally obliged to North Korea before receiving components of the light-ware reactors. Besides, the US wanted North Korea to reduce the conventional threat along the border posed to South Korea.[481]

In early October 2002, US assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific Affairs James Kelly visited Pyongyang with suspicions over North Korea's secret enrichment program. Kelly was received by North Korea's First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Kang Sok-ju and Deputy Foreign Minister Kim Gye-gwan. Kang harshly criticized the hostile policies of the Bush administration and its delayed delivery of light-water reactors. Kang told Kelly that "we are a part of the axis of evil and you are a gentleman. This is our relationship. We cannot discuss matters like gentlemen. If we disarm ourselves because of US pressure, then we will

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[479] "President Delivers State of the Union Address," January 29, 2002, The White House.

[480] Park, "Security Assurances," 195.

[481] Victor D. Cha and David C. Kang, *Nuclear North Korea: A debate on engagement strategies* (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2018), 139.

become like Yugoslavia or Afghanistan's Taliban, to be beaten to death."[482]

Kang also commented on the highly enriched uranium (HEU) issues, saying

that "what is wrong with us having our own uranium enrichment program?

We are entitled to possess our own HEU, and we are bound to produce more

powerful weapons than that."[483] After Kelly visited Pyongyang, the US

suspended its heavy oil shipments under the Agreed Framework.

On January 10, 2003, North Korea announced its withdrawal from

the NPT, which took effect on April 10, 2003. North Korea became the first

state to withdraw from the treaty.[484] On April 18, 2003, the Korean Central

News Agency released a statement announcing its successful reprocessing

of more than 8,000 spent nuclear fuel rods.[485] The US satellite detected

vapor from the Yongbyon reactor's cooling tower, clear evidence that North

Korea had begun its reprocessing of the spent nuclear fuel. In January 2004,

Siegfried Hecker, former director of the Los Alamos National Laboratory,

paid a visit to Yongbyon, concluding that North Korea could produce

weapons-grade plutonium. It was evident that North Korea resumed its

nuclear activities, and the Agreed Framework was collapsed with the second

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[482] Yoichi Funabashi, *The Peninsula Question: A Chronicle of the Second Korean Nuclear Crisis* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2008), 94.

[483] Ibid.

[484] For the collapse of the Agreed Framework and North Korea's withdrawal from the NPT, see Jonathan D. Pollack, "The United States, North Korea, and the End of the Agreed Framework," *Naval War College Review* 56, no. 3 (2003).

[485] Mike Chinoy, *Meltdown: the inside story of the North Korean nuclear crisis* (New York, NY: St. Martin's Press, 2010), 170.

North Korean nuclear crisis.

Shuttle Diplomacy and the Six-Party Talks

At the outset of the second North Korean nuclear crisis, China responded more actively by arranging conversations between the United States and North Korea. For instance, on the same day when North Korea announced its withdrawal from the NPT, Chinese President Jiang Zemin told US President Bush over the phone that he disagreed with North Korea's decision and made clear that he supported the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.[486]

However, China's initial approach to the second nuclear crisis was not significantly different from its approach to the first nuclear crisis. For example, on October 25 and 26, 2002, before stepping down from office, Chinese President Jiang Zemin went to Crawford, Texas, to meet with US President George W. Bush. During the summit, Bush warned of the seriousness of the North Korean nuclear issue to his government and tried to frame US-Chinese cooperation to address the nuclear issue. Jiang told Bush that the nuclear issues were "a bilateral concern of the United States and North Korea," and it would be wrong to expect "China to play some special

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[486] Park, "China's Management of Alliance Dilemma over the Nuclear Crisis in the Korean Peninsula: its Theory and Practice," 112.

role regarding the issue."[487] The summit laid down the foundations for the "Crawford consensus," only to reaffirm China's understanding that North Korea's denuclearization should be resolved peacefully.[488]

Moreover, the US and China experienced a rough start before the second nuclear crisis. For example, in April 2001, a US reconnaissance plane and a Chinese fighter jet collided over the South China Sea. As Bonnie Glaser and Wang Liang have put it, "distrust and suspicion persisted in both countries."[489]

Nevertheless, the Chinese fear of entrapment grew greater than the first North Korean nuclear crisis. The North Korean provocation increased as it reactivated the Yongbyon reactor, withdrew from the NPT, and expelled IAEA inspectors.[490] In addition, China realized that the deadlock between the US and North Korea could escalate tensions over the Korean Peninsula. The Chinese knew that US President Bush would never accept a bilateral dialogue with Pyongyang.[491] The Chinese analysts were also worried about the nuclear issue, which could escalate and drag China into a

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[487] Funabashi, *The Peninsula Question: A Chronicle of the Second Korean Nuclear Crisis*, 268.

[488] Snyder, *China's Rise and the Two Koreas: Politics, Economics, Security*, 150.

[489] Glaser and Liang, "The beginning of a China-US partnership?," 166.

[490] Ibid., 168.

[491] Lee, Alexandrova, and Zhao, "The Chinese Failure to Disarm North Korea: Geographical Proximity, US Unipolarity, and Alliance Restraint," 597. For the US Secretary of State Colin Powell's visit to Beijing in late February 2003 to convey Bush's determination, see Glaser and Liang, "The beginning of a China-US partnership?," 169.

confrontation with the United States.[492] For example, in September 2002, the US released the National Security Strategy to articulate a new military preemption doctrine.[493] Without intervention, China would observe the retaliation of the United States, which showed aggressive behavior upon the Iraq invasion in March 2003.[494] A North Korean regime collapse and the influx of refugees across the border seemed highly probable to China more than ever.

Against the backdrop, China decided to move away from North Korea to avoid entrapment and gradually shifted its role from a bystander to a mediator between North Korea and the United States. Upon the United States' request, China accepted a role as a mediator between Washington and Pyongyang. To arrange negotiations between Washington and Pyongyang, Beijing played an unconventionally assertive role by proposing three-party talks, which were held on April 23, 2003.[495] China not only hosted meetings for nuclear negotiations with North Korea, but it also conducted intense shuttle diplomacy to sustain the negotiation process. The Chinses attempted to persuade the North Koreans and the Americans to

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[492] Snyder, *China's Rise and the Two Koreas: Politics, Economics, Security*, 151.

[493] "The National Security Strategy of the United States of America," 15.

[494] Snyder, *China's Rise and the Two Koreas: Politics, Economics, Security*, 143; Leszek Buszynski, *Negotiating with North Korea: The Six Party Talks and the Nuclear Issue* (New York, NY: Routledge, 2013), 70.

[495] Joseph Kahn, "China Offers Its Help in U.S.-North Korea Nuclear Talks," *The New York Times*, April 24, 2003.

show flexibility to come to negotiations.[496] The US insisted on multilateral meetings joined by South Korea and Japan, whereas North Korea stubbornly wanted direct bilateral talks with the US.

To become a host of nuclear negotiations, China played a pivotal role in a series of diplomatic meetings with the US, North Korea, South Korea, Japan, and Russia.[497] On July 14, 2003, the Chinese Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Dai Bingguo met Kim Jong-il in Pyongyang. Dai delivered a letter from Chinese President Hu Jintao, suggesting that Pyongyang should halt its nuclear weapons program and seek a diplomatic resolution with the US. The letter enticed North Korea with an agreed approach with Russia that the American threat to North Korea prevented the resolution of the nuclear issue.[498] Then, on July 18, Dai visited Washington to meet US Secretary of State Colin Powell proposing a reopening of the Three-Party Talks in Beijing. Powell requested an expansion of the talks to get South Korea and Japan to join. Chinese Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing and Wang Yi also traveled to finalize details for the Six-Party Talks.[499]

On August 27, 2003, Beijing hosted the Six-Party Talks. There were five rounds of the Six-Party Talks until 2007, and China employed accommodative policies, particularly economic assistance, for almost every

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[496] Snyder, *China's Rise and the Two Koreas: Politics, Economics, Security*, 151.

[497] Lee, *A Troubled Peace: US Policy and the Two Koreas*, 238-39.

[498] Buszynski, *Negotiating with North Korea*.

[499] Lee, *A Troubled Peace: US Policy and the Two Koreas*, 238-39.

round to induce North Korea's return to the talks. The exceptional case was at the early stage of its shuttle diplomacy when China suspended oil supplies to North Korea for three days to get it to join the Three-Party Talks among the United States, North Korea, and China. China cited technical reasons and denied that this was an intended pressure.[500] Some argued that the suspension of oil supply was a gesture of pressure rather than technical maintenance, which occurred shortly after the missile tests by North Korea into the waters between the Korean Peninsula and Japan.[501] Other than the instance, China continued to provide economic assistance.

China's economic assistance aimed to get North Korea to continue its participation in the Six-Party Talks. On October 30, 2003, Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress Wu Bangguo met Kim Jong-il, promising a new grant-in-aid to North Korea. Wu and Kim agreed in principle to continue the Six-Party Talks for a peaceful resolution of the nuclear issue between the US and North Korea.[502] In February 2004, China reportedly delivered about 50 million US dollars in aid to North Korea, including heavy oil, as an inducement of a North Korean attendance at the second round on February 25, 2004.[503] China persuaded North Korea, which was rapidly losing interest in the talks, to attend the third round on

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[500] Buszynski, *Negotiating with North Korea*, 70.

[501] Glaser and Liang, "The beginning of a China-US partnership?," 169.

[502] Lee, *A Troubled Peace: US Policy and the Two Koreas*, 244.

[503] Edward Cody and Anthony Faiola, "N. Korea's Kim Reportedly in China for Talks," *The Washington Post* April 20, 2004.

June 23, 2004. For the fourth round between July 6, 2005, and September 19, 2005, China also offered a long-term economic aid of two billion US dollars encouraging North Korea to continue the nuclear negotiation and prevent its backsliding on a North Korean economic reform.[504]

Throughout the three rounds, the Six-Party Talks produced little progress, and China became anxious about the stalled nuclear negotiation. Beijing demanded a more flexible position from Washington and conveyed its strong intention to continue negotiations in the six-party talks to Pyongyang.[505] Nevertheless, the US insisted on complete, verifiable, irreversible dismantlement (CVID) of all nuclear activities in North Korea, whereas North Korea demanded a frontloaded security guarantee and economic assistance. China's entrapment fear continued to grow as a failure of nuclear negotiation would not only damage China's international prestige but also destabilize the Korean Peninsula due to more coercive US measures.[506]

Against the backdrop, China became more assertive and placed a draft on the table during the fourth round between July 6, 2005, and September 19, 2005. Eventually, the Six-Party Talks produced a joint statement to reaffirm shared objectives on denuclearization.

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[504] Buszynski, *Negotiating with North Korea*, 92, 100.

[505] Glaser and Liang, "The beginning of a China-US partnership?," 170-71.

[506] Ibid.

Failed Nuclear Restraint

The Six-Party Talks gradually reached an agreement in principle of denuclearization and an implementation plan, but China's shuttle diplomacy could not stop North Korea from acquiring nuclear weapons. Through the September 19 joint statement, North Korea "committed to abandoning all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs and returning, at an early date, to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and IAEA safeguards." However, the breakthrough in September 2005 lacked a concrete implementation plan, unlike the Agreed Framework in 1994. Details of the agreement, such as a timetable, were left open for later negotiations. Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Christopher Hill admitted that "implementation of the agreement was a further step."[507] After the US imposed unilateral sanctions on Banco Delta Asia, North Korea refused to return to the Six-Party Talks and continued the nuclear weapons development. On July 5, 2006, North Korea launched seven missiles, including a Taepodong-2 intercontinental missile with an estimated range of up to 6,000 kilometers. Chinese engagement with North Korea continued as the Chinese President Hu Jintao visited Pyongyang from October 28 to October 30, 2005, as an official goodwill visit and hosted Kim Jong-il to tour China's high-tech southeast as an informal visit.

However, China's attitude toward the North Korean nuclear

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[507] Buszynski, *Negotiating with North Korea*, 97.

weapons program took another shift when North Korea conducted its first nuclear test on October 9, 2006. For example, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a statement with an unusually strong wording: "North Korea ignored universal opposition of the international community and flagrantly conducted the nuclear test on Oct. 9. The Chinese government is resolutely opposed to it."[508] Some argued that Beijing intentionally used the term "flagrantly," which was once appeared after the 1999 accidental bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade, to signal a high degree of China's anger.[509] Outraged Chinese leaders adjusted their diplomatic approach toward North Korea to "normalize" its relationship with North Korea, diminishing its long-standing special treatment.[510] China reduced political and economic cooperation in crucial channels of party-to-party and military-to-military relationships.[511]

China supported the UN Security Council in making a firm and appropriate response by voting in favor of UN Security Council Resolutions 1695 on July 15, 2006, and 1718 on October 14, 2006, and continuously advocated dialogues to address the North Korean nuclear weapons program. For example, the Chinese ambassador Wang Guangya stated at the Security

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[508] "China Resolutely Opposes N. Korea's Nuclear Test," *Xinhua News Agency* October 9, 2006.

[509] Glaser and Liang, "The beginning of a China-US partnership?," 172.

[510] Hiim, *China and International Nuclear Weapons Proliferation*, 154.

[511] Victor Cha, *The Impossible State: North Korea, Past and Future* (New York, NY: Random House, 2012), 268.

Council after voting on the resolution 1695, "the Chinese side would like to reiterate here that sanction itself is not the end. As is stipulated by the relevant provisions of the resolution, if the DPRK complies with the relevant requests of the resolution, the Security Council will suspend or lift sanctions against DPRK."[512] He continued, "we also firmly oppose the use of force. China has noted with satisfaction that in condemning DPRK nuclear test, the parties concerned have all indicated the importance of adhering to diplomatic efforts."[513] As an effort to extend the nuclear negotiation, Beijing continued its shuttle diplomacy to bring North Korea back to the negotiating table.

During the third phase of the fifth round of the Six-Party talks in 2007, China's active efforts led to a joint statement on February 13, 2007. Under the joint statement, North Korea agreed to "shut down and seal for the purpose of eventual abandonment the Yongbyon nuclear facility, including the reprocessing facility and invite back IAEA personnel to conduct all necessary monitoring and verifications as agreed between IAEA and the DPRK." However, North Korea and the US failed to meet a verification protocol for the Yongbyon facility. North Korea subsequently went on to further developing nuclear weapons capabilities.

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[512] "Explanatory Remarks by Ambassador Wang Guangya at the Security Council After Taking Vote On Draft Resolution on DPRK Nuclear Test," Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of China to the UN, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/ce/ceun/eng/zt/ch/t276121.htm.

[513] Ibid.

In April 2009, North Korea withdrew from the Six-Party Talks. On May 25, 2009, North Korea conducted the second nuclear test, followed by a series of additional tests until the sixth test in September 2017. China's relations with North Korea continued to estrange and weaken Beijing's leverage over Pyongyang. For example, on May 4, 2017, North Korea's state-run Korean Central News Agency released a rare commentary criticizing China's negative view on the North Korean nuclear weapons program. The commentary said that "the DPRK will never beg for the maintenance of friendship with China, risking its nuclear program, which is as precious as its own life, no matter how valuable the friendship is."[514]

4. Conclusion

China's behavior toward North Korea has been risk-averse as it avoided intervention in most cases. In the 1950s, China reluctantly intervened in the Korean War as it perceived national security threatened by US armed forces crossing the 38[th] parallel on the Korean Peninsula. Upon the end of the Korean War, the Chinses forces withdrew to maintain stable relations with the North Korean regime led by Kim Il-sung.

China forged the "lips and teeth" alliance with North Korea in 1961 because of an ideological struggle with the Soviet Union, which abandoned

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[514] Choe Sang-Hun, "North Korean Media, in Rare Critique of China, Says Nuclear Program Will Continue," *The New York Times*, May 4, 2017.

the communist ally in Asia. As a formal defense pact, the China-North Korea alliance shared security interests to protect themselves from American influence over the Asia region. However, China disengaged from the alliance as Beijing improved bilateral relations with the United States and South Korea.

As China entered the Reform and Opening era in 1978, its foreign policy evolved into the Non-alignment Principle in 1982 and the New Security Concept in 1996. China devoted itself to domestic economic development and favored a stable Korean Peninsula and a benign international security environment. China failed to weaken the US alliance network in Asia, and China's engagement was appreciated only in the realm of economy and non-traditional security.

Throughout the Cold War, China was unable to provide a reliable security commitment to North Korea, which faced the increasing influence of the US forces in the region and the collapse of the Soviet Union. Unlike the Soviet Union, which provided nuclear energy technology to North Korea, China refused to share its nuclear weapons technology, and its nuclear energy assistance is known as minimal. Against the backdrop, the United States raised a question about North Korea's construction of a reprocessing plant in Yongbyon. Eventually, North Korea announced withdrawal from the NPT, opening a chapter of the first North Korean nuclear crisis in 1993.

During the first nuclear crisis, China faced a strategic dilemma

between intervention and nonintervention. To China, intervention with international pressure might result in a possible collapse of the North Korean regime and a massive refugee influx crossing the border. In other words, intervention meant entrapment for China. However, nonintervention might trigger nuclear proliferation with a possible nuclearization of Taiwan and a confrontation with the United States.

China chose nonintervention because it perceived a greater risk of entrapment than that of nuclear proliferation. China's primary concern was to prevent the consequence of a regime collapse spillover across the border. Besides, the Chinese Communist Party's regime security and the success of economic development were at stake. To avoid entrapment, China advocated a stable Korean Peninsula. In doing so, China provided economic assistance, and its trading with North Korea increased substantially. Beijing also assured Pyongyang that the bilateral relations are intact through several high-level visits.

China also supported a diplomatic solution to the nuclear crisis and opposed discussing the matter before the UN Security Council. China also declined to take an active role and passed the buck to the United States as it believed that North Korea was instrumentalizing its nuclear weapons program to receive concessions from the United States.

As a result, North Korea suspended its nuclear weapons program by signing the Agreed Framework with the United States in 1994. From the Chinese perspective, the agreement achieved Beijing's goal of a stable

Korean Peninsula through a peaceful resolution.

However, China heard toast too quickly. Upon the end of the first nuclear crisis, China disengaged from North Korea as it devoted itself to the implementation of Reform and Opening. China abandoned North Korea, which went through mass starvation from 1994 to 1998. Instead of increasing economic aid, China normalized payment methods for coal, oil, and food with hard currency. High-level exchanges went dormant as North Korea unilaterally halted the exchange after China's establishment of diplomatic ties with South Korea in 1992. Between 1994 and 1998, there were no important visits between China and North Korea.

China even further moved away from North Korea as Beijing revealed diverging interests regarding the ending of the armistice treaty of the Korean War. North Korea sought to isolate South Korea, and China wanted to maintain the treaty until the conclusion of a peace treaty for all relevant parties.

In the early 2000s, the United States stigmatized North Korea as a member of an axis of evil and raised a question about a covert enrichment program. In 2003, North Korea announced its withdrawal from the NPT and resumed its nuclear weapons program by reactivating the Yongbyon reactor. The Agreed Framework collapsed with the second North Korean nuclear crisis.

During the second nuclear crisis, China's role shifted from a bystander to a mediator and a host to the Six-Party Talks. Chinese shuttle

diplomacy narrowed the gap between the United States and North Korea to sit on the negotiating table. In particular, Beijing's diplomatic engagement with Pyongyang and its economic aid to induce North Korea's participation in the denuclearization process led to another agreement to suspend the nuclear weapons program.

Throughout the second nuclear crisis, China's fear of entrapment grew greater than the first nuclear crisis. China witnessed more aggressive US behavior in Iraq, and Beijing knew that Washington would never accept a bilateral dialogue with Pyongyang. The first three rounds of the Six-Party Talks produced little progress, and China became more anxious about the consequences of a failed negotiation. To avoid the breakdown, China prepared a draft during the fourth round to conclude a joint statement among all participants.

Despite China's efforts and the conclusion of the joint statement, the negotiation broke down. After the US sanctions on the North Korean bank account in Banco Delta Asia, North Korea conducted its first nuclear test on October 9, 2006. China's attitude shifted to condemn North Korea's flagrant action, and Beijing supported a series of UN Security Council resolutions to impose international sanctions on North Korea. Eventually, North Korea withdrew from the Six-Party Talks and conducted its second nuclear test on May 25, 2009.

Table 7 summarizes the assessment of China's management of North Korea's nuclear weapons program.

Table 7. China's Management of North Korea's Nuclear Weapons Program

Year of the Nuclear Option	Risk Assessment by China		China's Commitment	North Korea's Nuclear Option
	Entrapment	Nuclear Proliferation		
1993	low	low	low	pursuit
1994	medium	medium	medium	suspension
2003	medium	low	low	resumption
2009	high	medium	low	acquisition

China's management of North Korea's nuclear weapons program mostly proves my theory: when entrapment is more fearsome than nuclear proliferation, the patron decreases its commitment to the client. However, there appear external factors that should be discussed to better explain the two events.

The case of North Korea's nuclear option in 1994 insufficiently proves my theory. Why did China's increased commitment lead North Korea to nuclear suspension instead of nuclear hedging? There appear three possible reasons.

First, a negotiation with the United States should have influenced North Korea to behave more defensively during the negotiation. China did

not strengthen its security commitment to assure North Korea.[515] Instead of playing an alliance game with North Korea, China passed the buck to the United States. The US-North Korea negotiation turned the denuclearization process into an adversarial game, which required the restraining state to provide reassurance or a promise of non-aggression. The confidence between the US and North Korea was significantly low for Pyongyang to make further concessions.

Second, the international nonproliferation regime operated to affect the result. As the US detected North Korea's nuclear weapons program, the North Korean nuclear issue became an agenda of the IAEA and the UN Security Council. International monitoring and inspection would have made Pyongyang challenging to continue a covert nuclear weapons program once it complied with international safeguard measures.

Third, North Korea's preference to secure its policy autonomy might affect Pyongyang to suspend the nuclear weapons program instead of complying with the international rules and norms. Similarly, North Korea developed nuclear weapons as tools of authoritarian control. Some argued that the logic of the nuclear weapons program is "internal to the regime, helping it to win the support of key constituents: therefore, security guarantees or other inducements that try to reduce Pyongyang's external

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[515] Yi and Dingli, "Assessing the Effectiveness of Security Assurances on the DPRK's Nuclear Issue," 584-85.

threat environment will be of only limited effectiveness."[516]

The case of North Korea's nuclear option in 2009 disproves conventional wisdom that commitment prevents nuclear weapons development. Why did North Korea backfire when China actively engaged in addressing the nuclear issue? Relevant questions have been raised elsewhere.[517] I would suspect that US-China relations should have influenced the nature of China's commitment to North Korea. Some argued that the nuclear crisis was an opportunity for the US to build cooperative relations with China.[518] As China became more anxious about the failure of the Six-Party Talks, it became more assertive to pressure North Korea. China continued to engage with North Korea to continue the Six-Party Talks, but its commitment might have altered from a tool for assurance to control the client's behavior. Even after the first North Korean nuclear test in 2006, China was able to resume the Six-Party Talks to produce a joint statement on February 13, 2007. However, China could not prevent North Korea from leaving the negotiation process, although Beijing sought to draw closer to Pyongyang.

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[516] Daniel Byman and Jennifer Lind, "Pyongyang's Survival Strategy: Tools of Authoritarian Control in North Korea," *International Security* 35, no. 1 (2010): 45.

[517] For example, Victor Cha raised a similar question. Cha stated, "knowing the conditions under which adhesion can "backfire" would be useful to policymakers." See Cha, "Powerplay: Origins of the US Alliance System in Asia," 195.

[518] For a discussion of the second North Korean nuclear crisis as a strategic opportunity for the United States to build a close relationship with China, see Glaser and Liang, "The beginning of a China-US partnership?."

V. CONCLUSION

1. Main Argument and Findings

This project began with an observation that the history of alliance management and nuclear restraint has been inconsistent. In particular, the United States and China as patrons opposed nuclear weapons development by their clients on the Korean Peninsula. Still, the US restrained South Korea from developing nuclear weapons, but China failed to prevent North Korea from acquiring nuclear weapons. This observation led to the following questions: Why do patrons provide security commitment to their clients? How do patrons restrain their clients from developing nuclear weapons?

In chapter I, the project raised attention to alliance management because the existing knowledge on commitment is contrary to a nonproliferation hypothesis. Alliance management suggests that a patron should withdraw from the alliance to avoid a risk of entrapment when the client behaves recklessly. However, a nonproliferation hypothesis argues that a patron should provide a reliable commitment to restrain the client from developing nuclear weapons.

In chapter II, the project examined the existing literature on alliance management to claim that withdrawal to avoid entrapment may be

ineffective when a patron has strategic interests in the client's security. I also contended that existing knowledge on commitment is easy to be misunderstood because it is ambiguous in explaining when the patron's commitment operates to avoid entrapment or exercise control over the ally.

I argued that a patron gives a firm commitment to take the risk of entrapment when there is a greater danger: nuclear weapons proliferation. To develop my theory, I suggested that entrapment and nuclear proliferation are independent because they stem from different sources. Entrapment arises from institutional sources, but nuclear proliferation arises from systemic sources, especially the balance of power. This discussion led me to propose my main argument: when a patron fears nuclear proliferation greater than entrapment, the patron is more likely to increase the level of security commitment. To illustrate how a patron establishes a reliable commitment, I disaggregated commitment into two categories: hard commitment soft commitment. I suggested that a patron's physical demonstration of military power and shared interests with the client increases the reliability of security commitment.

Throughout chapter III and chapter IV, the project examined the cases of South Korea from 1974 to 1982 and North Korea from 1993 to 2009 to investigate the validity of arguments. To be clear, I did not intend to compare the US-South Korea alliance and the China-North Korea alliance. The objective of the project narrowly focused on the patron's alliance policy to restrain nuclear weapons development. The project employed a case

comparison method with a within-case method because nuclear restraint is a complex process, which follows multiple steps, including rollback, suspension, or resumption of the nuclear weapons program.

The project found that a greater risk of nuclear proliferation than that of entrapment, the physical demonstration of military power, and shared interests with the client explain an increase in security commitment to restrain the client from developing nuclear weapons. Table 8 summarizes the finding.

Table 8. Findings of the Dissertation

	US Management of South Korea		China's Management of North Korea	
Year	1976	1982	1994	2009
Entrapment	high	low	medium	high
Proliferation	high	medium	medium	medium
Commitment	medium	high	medium	low
Outcome	hedging	termination	suspension	acquisition

In the case of the US management of South Korea's nuclear weapons program, the US perception of nuclear proliferation was higher than entrapment when the Reagan administration restored the US-South Korea alliance with both hard commitment and soft commitment. As the US

reconfigured its strategic interests to rebuild its global posture, its entrapment risk to the alliance declined. The US restored the alliance with the augmentation of forward-based troops and a larger scale of joint military exercises. Still, nuclear nonproliferation remained a major foreign policy agenda for the US, although the Reagan administration expanded nuclear energy cooperation with South Korea.

On the contrary, in the case of China's management of North Korea's nuclear weapons program, Beijing's perception of nuclear proliferation was lower than entrapment when it hosted the Six-Party Talks. China's fear of nuclear proliferation was not very high as it believed North Korea intended to use the nuclear weapons program as leverage to obtain concessions from the United States. However, China's fear of entrapment grew greater as the Six-Party Talks came to a standstill, and the United States behave more aggressively against North Korea. To avoid entrapment, China moved away from North Korea and consistently favored a stable Korean Peninsula. The vulnerability of North Korea has been potential damage to China's national interests. Beijing provided economic assistance and continued high-level visits with Pyongyang to sustain the negotiation process instead of providing a commitment to the vulnerable client.

The project also found that the geographic proximity between a patron and a client may constitute entrapment risk. In contrast to the US, China has been worried about the collapse of North Korea, mainly because of a possible large-scale influx of North Korean refugees across the border.

The patron may abandon the client to avoid entrapment, but this would not stop the influx. Moreover, China also worried about a conflict on the Korean Peninsula spillover across the border as it experienced a reluctant intervention in the Korean War. In such a circumstance, a possible war between the client and its adversary may increase entrapment risk, even if the patron is ready to abrogate the alliance.

However, what constitutes a risk of nuclear proliferation is still unclear. To the United States, South Korea's nuclear weapons development would have triggered nuclear proliferation among other allies in Asia. In other words, the US worried about the breakdown of the hub-and-spoke system rather than worry about South Korea's potential use of nuclear weapons against the will of Washington. Kissinger's warning of a major destabilizing effect proves the US concern. In other words, the collapse of the hub-and-spoke system in Asia is what Washington may worry about from nuclear proliferation. To China, North Korea's nuclear weapons development would have also triggered nuclear proliferation in Japan or Taiwan. However, China's fear of nuclear proliferation remained at a moderate level publicly, at least. China probably recognized the significance of the US nuclear umbrella that effectively restrained East Asian states from developing nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, such an assessment goes beyond the theoretical framework of this project. The most plausible conclusion would be that a patron evaluates the relative risk of entrapment and nuclear proliferation.

There appear legitimate counterarguments. Domestic factors may have affected the nuclear behaviors of South Korea and North Korea. First, South Korea might have been prepared to terminate the nuclear weapons program, regardless of US commitment in the 1980s. South Korea sought improved relations with North Korea, and the South Korean President Chun Doo-hwan sought political legitimacy. In particular, he wanted to win US approval by complying with US nonproliferation demand. South Korea sought energy security, so it should have complied with the demand to receive nuclear energy assistance from the US. Nevertheless, these counterarguments do not weaken my major argument as the US increased commitment to South Korea when Washington perceived nuclear proliferation as more fearsome than entrapment in the 1980s.

Second, North Korea's self-reliance ideology and preference to secure its policy autonomy may have affected Beijing's incapacity to provide a commitment to Pyongyang. Nuclear weapons served as a tool of authoritarian control, and North Korea might have no intention to negotiate denuclearization. Nevertheless, it is also true that China engaged with North Korea to sustain the negotiation process. Regardless of North Korea's regime characteristics, China's entrapment risk forced Beijing to engage with Pyongyang. It should be further discussed whether North Korea's preference changed the nature of China's engagement from assurance to control mechanism.

Would such a theoretical finding applicable to other cases? One

might argue that the cases of France and Pakistan support my theory. First, France sought independent nuclear weapons capabilities from 1945 and conducted its first nuclear test in 1960. The US rejected a French request to share nuclear weapons technologies based on the McMahon Act.[519] Nevertheless, nuclear proliferation risks were low as very few states may develop nuclear weapons throughout the 1950s.[520] It was also the time when the US was building a security architecture globally and regionally. The US perception of entrapment risk existed as the superpower was entangling with Western Europe to compete with the Soviet Union. Taken together, the US reserved from providing a stronger commitment to France. Second, China also opposed Pakistan's nuclear weapons program because it worried about nuclear proliferation in Southeast Asia, but its fear of nuclear proliferation decreased as India conducted a nuclear test in 1974. Increasing tensions between Pakistan and India may have led China to abandon Pakistan as a potential client, even though Beijing supposedly continued secret nuclear assistance to Islamabad.[521]

In sum, the major argument of this dissertation is that a patron increases its commitment to the client because it fears nuclear weapons proliferation. However, not every patron evaluates nuclear proliferation as a

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[519] Debs and Monteiro, *Nuclear Politics*, 428.

[520] Ibid., 430.

[521] For China's secret nuclear assistance to Pakistan, see Hiim, *China and International Nuclear Weapons Proliferation*, 50-84.

high priority because sometimes entrapment risk limits the patron's ability and willingness to assure the client. This finding may expand our knowledge about the commitment by differentiating the risks of entrapment and nuclear proliferation.

2. Policy Implications

This project draws important lessons to the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. First, there has been a lack of discussion on how assurance should be provided to achieve the denuclearization of North Korea. As the North Korean nuclear issue was heavily leaned toward the relations between the United States and North Korea, their long history of distrust has served as a significant stumbling block to exchange the US negative security assurance with North Korea's complete denuclearization. However, there have been very few discussions on China's security commitment to North Korea.

The findings of the project emphasize the importance of commitment as a positive security assurance provided by a patron, which assures a client's security and reduces abandonment fear to achieve nuclear restraint. However, China's commitment was limited to soft commitments, such as diplomatic and economic assistance. China's demonstration of military power directed at North Korea has also been diminishing, and China's nuclear weapons policy has been established at the minimum level

with a no-first-use policy.

Still, some argued that China should extend a formal security assurance to North Korea, even including a nuclear umbrella.[522] For example, Shen Dingli elaborated on China's changing nuclear doctrine as Beijing extended its negative security assurances to include a positive assurance component through China's National Statement on Security Assurances on April 5, 1995.[523] China has sworn to provide Ukraine with its nuclear umbrella in December 2013.[524] However, it is still questionable what China's extended nuclear deterrence could achieve with the stability of the security environment. Besides, there remains a trust issue between China and North Korea as North Korea seeks to maintain independence and self-reliance while economic dependence is rising.[525]

To be clear, China's active engagement with North Korea does not guarantee that Beijing is willing to provide North Korea with military assurance. Instead, China is becoming more assertive to pressure North

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[522] Fei Su, "China's Potential Role as Security Guarantor for North Korea," 38 North, https://www.38north.org/2018/10/fsu102418/; Zhu Zhangping, "North Korea's nuclear games endanger China," *The Global Times* April 2, 2013. The Global Times is published by the People's Daily, the Communist party's official paper.

[523] Shen Dingli, "Toward a Nuclear Weapons Free World: A Chinese Perspective," in *Perspectives* (Sydney, Australia.: Lowy Institute for International Policy, November, 2009), 9.

[524] In-Taek Han, "China's Nuclear Umbrella for Ukraine: Implications for Northeast Asia," Jeju Peace Institute, http://jpi.or.kr/?p=10474.

[525] Monet Stockes, "North Korea Doesn't Trust China to Protect It," *Foreign Policy* August 25, 2020.

Korea. For example, in response to the sixth nuclear test, China agreed to impose limited economic sanctions against North Korea by the United Nations Security Resolution 2375, restricting oil sales and Chinese banking for North Korea's financial activities.[526] I do not argue that coercive measures are ineffective because they can delay further nuclearization and provide a window of opportunity to negotiate the rollback process. However, without a positive security guarantee, China's greater engagement may witness a continuation of North Korean provocation in the future.

Second, the disaggregation of the patron's security commitment into hard commitment and soft commitment provides a lesson for South Korea's future nuclear nonproliferation policy. For a successful nuclear restraint, the patron's commitment should effectively reduce the client's abandonment fear. The Reagan administration ultimately restrained South Korea from developing nuclear weapons when it established the reliability of security commitment with both hard and soft commitment. Its demonstration of military power and the confirmation of vital interest to protect South Korea terminated the nuclear weapons program. However, when the Ford administration only employed hard commitment by delaying troop withdrawal from South Korea, the US could not completely remove South Korea's willingness to develop nuclear weapons.

Improving consultation mechanism as soft commitment is crucial to

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[526] United Nations Security Council Resolution 2375 (2017)

improve the client's perception of the patron's assurance reliability. For example, as North Korea's nuclear weapons development continued with long-range missile technologies, some raised concern about the diminishing effect of US extended nuclear deterrence and advocated South Korea's nuclear weapons development. In response, the US has improved its assurance with greater institutionalization, including the Extended Deterrence Policy Committee (EDPC) in 2011, a US-ROK Counter-Provocation Plan in 2012, and an Extended Deterrence Strategy and Consultation Group (EDSCG) in 2017.[527] For instance, during the 49th Security Consultative Meeting (SCM) in 2017, the US and South Korea decided to institutionalize a consultation mechanism of extended nuclear deterrence by establishing EDSCG to improve the alliance's deterrence posture against North Korea "through deeper coordination on diplomatic, information, military, and economic actions."[528]

Last, one might question if the Patron's commitment (or engagement to a broader extent) may increase the client's entrapment risk. For example, Lauren Sukin argued that South Korea's increasing public opinion in favor of nuclear weapons development is a response to avoid entrapment by the

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[527] Inwook Kim and Soul Park, "Deterrence Under Nuclear Asymmetry: THAAD and the Prospects for Missile Defense on the Korean Peninsula," *Contemporary Security Policy* 40, no. 2 (2019): 181-82.

[528] "Joint Communiqué of the 49th ROK-U.S. Security Consultative Meeting," October 28, 2017,

US reckless behavior.[529] She explained that a patron's security commitment might backfire when a client fears the patron's miscalculation against the adversary. In other words, a client's preference to accept a patron's security commitment is another crucial area to discuss. Dan Reiter's work already paved the way for a client's motivation to receive a patron's security commitment.[530] He warned of "the entrapment dangers of foreign nuclear weapons deployments."[531] If a patron is not a responsible actor or offensive in nature, the patron's demonstration of military power may increase the client's fear of entrapment, and the client may backfire. In such a case, the client may decline the patron's security assurance.

Alliances do not guarantee nuclear nonproliferation at the system level, but their commitment dynamics may effectively restrain nuclear weapons development at the national level. International sanctions, diplomatic and economic engagement, and physical demonstration of military forces as deterrence are significant factors in achieving nuclear restraint, but one should be noted that the restraint requires a responsible state to commit positive security assurance.

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[529] Lauren Sukin, "Credible Nuclear Security Commitments Can Backfire: Explaining Domestic Support for Nuclear Weapons Acquisition in South Korea," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 64, no. 6 (2019).

[530] Reiter, "Security Commitments and Nuclear Proliferation."

[531] Ibid., 77.

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Appendix 1. List of Important Visits by Chinese Leaders to North Korea

Name	Title	Nature of the visit	Period
Zhou Enlai	Prime Minister	Friendly visit	1958.02.14-02.21
Liu Shaoqi	Chairman	Friendly visit	1963.09.15-09.27
Zhou Enlai	Prime Minister	Official goodwill visit	1970.04.05-04.07
Ji Pengfei	Foreign Minister	Friendly visit	1972.12.22-12.25
Hua Guofeng	Party Chairman, Prime Minister	Official goodwill visit	1978.05.05-05.10
Deng Xiaoping	Vice Chairman, Vice Prime Minister	Friendly visit	1978.09.08-09.13
Zhao Ziyang	Prime Minister	Official visit	1981.12.20-12.24
Hu Yaobang	Chairman of Party, Vice Chairman of Deng Xiaoping Party	Informal visit	1982.04.26-04.30
Wu Xueqian	Foreign Minister	Official visit	1983.05.20-05.25
Hu Yaobang	General Secretary	Official goodwill visit	1984.05.04-05.11
Hu Yaobang	General Secretary	Informal visit	1985.05.04-05.06
Li Xiannian	Chairman	Friendly visit	1986.10.03-10.06
Yang Shangkun	Chairman	Friendly visit	1988.09.07-09.11
Zhao Ziyang	General Secretary	Official goodwill visit	1989.04.24-04.29
Jiang Zemin	General Secretary	Official goodwill visit	1990.03.14-03.16
Li Peng	Prime Minister	Official goodwill visit	1991.05.03-05.06
Qian Qichen	State Councilor and Minister for Foreign Affairs	Official goodwill visit	1991.06.17-06.20
Yang Shangkun	Chairman	Official goodwill visit	1992.04.12-04.17
Hu Jintao	Member of the Standing Committee of the Politburo and Secretary of the Secretariat	Chinese Party and Government Delegation	1993.07.26-07.29
Tang Jiayu	Foreign Minister	Friendly visit	1999.10.05-10.09
Jiang Zemin	General Secretary, President of the State	Official goodwill visit	2001.09.03-09-05

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Name	Title	Nature of the visit	Period
Wu Bangguo	Chairman	Official goodwill visit	2003.10.29-10.31
Hu Jintao	General Secretary, President of the State	Official goodwill visit	2005.10.28-10.30
Yang Jiechi	Foreign Minister	Official visit	2007.07.02-07.03
Xi Jinping	Vice President of the State	Official goodwill visit	2008.06.17-06.19
Wen Jiabao	Prime Minister	Official goodwill visit	2009.10.04-10.06
Li Keqiang	Vice Premier of the State Council	Official goodwill visit	2011.10.23-10.25
Li Jianguo	Vice Chairman	Official goodwill visit	2012.11.29-11.30
Li Yuanchao	Vice President of the State	Official goodwill visit	2013.07.25-07.28
Liu Yunshan	Member of the Standing Committee of the Politburo	Official goodwill visit	2015.10.09-10.12
Wang Yi	State Councilor and Minister for Foreign Affairs	Official visit	2018.05.02-05.03
Li Zhanshu	General Secretary Xi Jinping, Special Representative of the President of the People's Republic of China, Member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress	Official visit	2018.09.08-09.10
Xi Jinping	General Secretary, President of the State	State visit	2019.06.20-06.21
Wang Yi	State Councilor and Minister for Foreign Affairs	Visit	2019.09.02-09.04
Miao Hua	Member of the Central Military Commission and Director of the Political Work Department of the Military Commission	Visit	2019.10.14-10.16

Source: PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs
(https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/gjhdq_676201/gj_676203/yz_676205/1206_676404/sbgx_676408/)

Appendix 2. List of Important Visits by North Korean Leaders to China

Name	Title	Nature of the visit	Period
Kim Il-sung	Prime Minister	Official visit	1953.11.10-11.27
Kim Il-sung	Prime Minister	Friendly visit	1954.09.28-10.05
Kim Il-sung	Prime Minister	Friendly visit	1958.11.21-11.28
Kim Il-sung	Prime Minister	Friendly visit	1959.09.25-10.03
Kim Il-sung	Prime Minister	Friendly visit	1961.07.10-07.15
Cui Yongjian	Chairman	Official visit	1969.09.30-10.02
Xu	Foreign Minister	Official visit	1973.02.09-02.14
Kim Il-sung	Chairman	Friendly visit	1975.04.18-04.26
Li Zhongyu	Prime Minister	Official visit	1981.01.10-01.14
Kim Il-sung	Chairman	State visit	1982.09.16-09.25
Kim Jong-il	Secretary	Informal visit	1983.06.02-06.12
Jin Yongnan	Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs	Official visit	1984.02.07-02.14
Jiang Chengshan	Prime Minister	Official visit	1984.08.05-08.10
Kim Il-sung	Chairman	Informal visit	1984.11.26-11.28
Kim Il-sung	Chairman	Official goodwill visit	1987.05.21-05.25
Li Genmo	Prime Minister	Official goodwill visit	1987.11.09-11.14
Jin Yongnan	Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs	Official visit	1988.11.03-11.07
Kim Il-sung	General Secretary	Informal visit	1989.11.05-11.07
Jenheimer	Prime Minister	Official visit	1990.11.23-11.28
Kim Il-sung	Chairman	Official goodwill visit	1991.10.04-10.13
Jin Yongnan	Chairman	Official goodwill visit	1999.06.03-06.07
Bai Nanshun	Foreign Minister	Official goodwill visit	2000.03.18-03.22
Kim Jong-il	General Secretary	Informal visit	2000.05.29-05.31
Kim Jong-il	General Secretary	Informal visit	2001.01.15-01.20
Kim Jong-il	General Secretary	Informal visit	2004.04.19-04.21
Jin Yongnan	Chairman	Official goodwill visit	2004.10.18-10.20
Park Fengzhu	Prime Minister	Official goodwill visit	2005.03.22-03.27

Name	Title	Nature of the visit	Period
Kim Jong-il	General Secretary	Informal visit	January 10, 2006 .01.18
Bai Nanshun	Foreign Minister	Official goodwill visit	2006.05.30-06.06
Park Yichun	Foreign Minister	Official goodwill visit	2008-04.26-04.29
Jin Yongnan	Chairman	Attend the opening ceremony of the Beijing Olympic Games	2008.08.08.09
Kim Young-il	Prime Minister	Official goodwill visit	2009.03.17-03.21
Jin Yongnan	Chairman	Attend the opening ceremony of Shanghai World Expo	2010.04.29-05.01
Kim Jong-il	General Secretary	Informal visit	2010.05.03-05-07
Kim Jong-il	General Secretary	Informal visit	2010.08.26-08.30
Cui Yonglin	Prime Minister	Visit	2010.11.01-11.08
Kim Jong-il	General Secretary	Informal visit	2011.05.20-05.26
Kim Jong-il	General Secretary	Transit visit	2011.08.25-08.27
Cui Yonglin	Prime Minister	Official goodwill visit	2011.09.26-09.30
Choi Longhai	Member of the Standing Committee of the Politburo	Official goodwill visit	2013.05.24-05.28
Choi Longhai	Member of the Standing Committee of the Politburo	Attend the 70th anniversary of the victory of the Chinese People's War of Resistance Against Japan and the World Anti-Fascist War	2015.09.02-09-03
Kim Jong-un	Chairman	Informal visit	2018.03.25-03.28
Kim Jong-un	Chairman		2018.05.07-05.08
Kim Jong-un	Chairman	Official visit	2018.06.19-06.20
Li Yonghao	Foreign Minister	Official visit	2018.12.06-12.08
Kim Jong-un	Chairman	Official visit	2019.01.07-01.10

Abstract in Korean

연루와 핵확산의 딜레마: 남북한 핵개발에 대한 미국과 중국의 동맹 관리

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이재원

이 논문은 남북한 핵개발에 대한 미국과 중국의 동맹 관리를 연구함으로써 핵무기 개발 제지의 원인을 안보 공약에서 찾고, 후견국이 연루보다 핵확산을 더 두려워할 때 연루의 위험을 감수하면서 안보 공약을 증가한다고 주장한다. 핵 제지는 핵개발의 롤백(rollback), 잠정중단, 재개 등 여러 단계를 거치는 복잡한 과정인 점을 고려하여, 사례 비교와 단일 사례 연구 방법을 활용한다.

1974년부터 1982년까지 미국은 연루보다 핵확산을 더 두려워했기 때문에 한국에 대한 공약을 증가했다. 미국은 양자 동맹 형태의 안보 네트워크를 구축한 아시아에서 주요한 불안정 효과가 나타날 것으로 보고 핵확산의 위험을 높게 인식했다. 미국은 핵확산을 회피하기 위해 연루의 위험을 감수했고, 한국은 핵개발을 종료했다.

이와 대조적으로 1993년부터 2009년까지 중국은 핵확산보다 연루를 더 두려워했기 때문에 북한에 대한 공약을 감소했다. 중국은 북한 체제 붕괴 및 대규모 난민 유입 가능성을 보고 연루의 위험을 높게 인식했다. 중국은 연루를 회피하기 위해 낮은 수준의 공약을 유지했고, 결과적으로 북한은 핵실험을 감행하고 핵협상으로부터 철수했다.

이러한 연구 결과는 연루와 핵확산의 위험을 구별함으로써 안보 공약에 대한 지식을 확장하는데 기여하며, 핵 제지(nuclear restraint)를 위한 적극적 안전보장(positive security assurance)의 역할을 강조한다.

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