



**This electronic thesis or dissertation has been
downloaded from Explore Bristol Research,
<http://research-information.bristol.ac.uk>**

Author:

Kang, Sang-Won

Title:

**Rethinking the relationship between voluntary associations, democratic citizenship,
and cultural values**

General rights

Access to the thesis is subject to the Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial-No Derivatives 4.0 International Public License. A copy of this may be found at <https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/legalcode> This license sets out your rights and the restrictions that apply to your access to the thesis so it is important you read this before proceeding.

Take down policy

Some pages of this thesis may have been removed for copyright restrictions prior to having it been deposited in Explore Bristol Research. However, if you have discovered material within the thesis that you consider to be unlawful e.g. breaches of copyright (either yours or that of a third party) or any other law, including but not limited to those relating to patent, trademark, confidentiality, data protection, obscenity, defamation, libel, then please contact collections-metadata@bristol.ac.uk and include the following information in your message:

- Your contact details
- Bibliographic details for the item, including a URL
- An outline nature of the complaint

Your claim will be investigated and, where appropriate, the item in question will be removed from public view as soon as possible.

Rethinking the relationship between voluntary associations, democratic citizenship, and cultural values

Sang-won, Kang

A dissertation submitted to the University of Bristol in accordance with the requirements for award of the degree of PhD in Social Policy in the Faculty of Social Sciences and Law

School for Policy Studies

Oct 2022

71,133 words

Abstract

This research aims to investigate the correlation between voluntary associations and cultural values in promoting democratic citizenship. Democratic citizenship consists of two key aspects, namely civic virtue (e.g., García, 2007; Zhu & Fu, 2017) and political engagement (e.g., Vassallo, 2004). Civic virtue can be measured by levels of generalised trust (Fukuyama, 1995b) and tolerance (Iglič, 2010). Political engagement can be measured as interest in politics, voting and political activities which include and consist of assertive civic culture (Welzel & Dalton, 2017). Some scholars suggest that emerging democracies in East Asia have fallen short on the formation of democratic citizenship (Chang, Zhu, & Park, 2007). This is despite a flourishing civic society in post democratisation. This research is timely in seeking to understand the true nature of democracy in this region.

This research utilises theories of social capital, political culture and Asian values debates to examine levels of democratic citizenship in the East and West. A multi-level approach encompassing both individual and country-level variables is adopted to estimate levels of democratic citizenship. More specifically, this research presents a series of large scale, comprehensive tests of democratic citizenship across twenty-nine countries employing the most recently released seventh waves of World Values Survey (WVS) data. It particularly pays attention to the theories and measurements of individual level membership of voluntary associations and societal level cultural values in fostering (or undermining) trust and other forms of democratic citizenship.

Findings highlighted that voluntary associations are beneficial for the generation of tolerance, generalised trust, and political engagement. However, the impacts depend largely on the cultural differences. While the current literature on social capital emphasises a positive effect between membership of voluntary associations and democratic citizenship, this position is only partially supported in the findings. Indeed, collectivistic, and hierarchical cultural values (e.g., Asian values) play a negative moderating role.

This research contributes to social capital theory by reigniting a long-standing debate over Confucianism and its compatibility with Western democratic values. It provides a theoretical and empirical basis for future research by integrating the existing theories of social capital,

political culture and Asian values thesis. Very few studies have integrated these frameworks to investigate these phenomena empirically. This study offers a new analytical tool to empirically explore the relationship between voluntary association and democracy across different cultural contexts.

I declare that the work in this dissertation was carried out in accordance with the requirements of the University's *Regulations and Code of Practice for Research Degree Programmes* and that it has not been submitted for any other academic award. Except where indicated by specific reference in the text, the work is the candidate's own work. Work done in collaboration with, or with the assistance of, others, is indicated as such. Any views expressed in the dissertation are those of the author.


SIGNED:  DATE: 20th of Oct, 2022

Table of contents

Chapter 1. Introduction	1
1.1 Research background	3
1.2 The scope of the research	7
1.2.1 Relationships between voluntary associations, democratic citizenship, and cultural values	7
1.2.2 Democratic transformation in East Asia, an important arena for comparative study	9
1.3 Aims and questions of the research	10
1.4 Importance of the research	11
1.5 Plan of the thesis	12
Chapter 2. Associations as schools of democracy	14
2.1 Introduction	14
2.2 Two elements of democratic citizenship	15
2.3 Associational life and civic virtue	16
2.3.1 Tocqueville and his followers	16
2.3.2 Theory of social capital	18
2.3.3 Associations and civic virtue	20
2.4 Theory of political culture and political engagement	24
2.4.1 Verba and Almond and their followers	24
2.4.2 Participatory culture and voluntary associations	25
2.4.3 Civic voluntarism and political engagement	27
2.4.4 Empirical corroboration	29
2.5 Counterarguments	32
2.6 Concluding remarks	38
Chapter 3. Asian values and democratic citizenship	42
3.1 Background	42
3.2 Brief history of Asian values debates	44
3.2.1 The rise and fall of Asian values debates	44
3.2.2 Two pillars of the Asian values debates	46
3.3 Two dimensions of Asian values	56
3.3.1 Collectivism	58
3.3.2 Hierarchism	59

3.4 Asian values and democratic citizenship	61
3.4.1 Background	61
3.4.2 Asian values, associations, and democratic citizenship	62
3.4.3 Empirical corroboration.....	66
3.5 Concluding remarks	69
Chapter 4. Research framework and data.....	71
4.1 Introduction.....	71
4.1.1 Research design.....	72
4.1.2 World Values Survey and other available data sources	73
4.1.3 Country selection.....	78
4.2 Empirical strategy and research framework	80
4.2.1 From an exploratory approach to multi-level modelling	80
4.2.2 Multi-level model.....	81
4.2.3 Research framework.....	83
4.3 Data.....	84
4.3.1 Variables and measurements.....	84
4.3.2 Reliability and validity	95
4.3.3 Missing values.....	103
4.4 Ethical considerations.....	103
4.5 Concluding remarks	104
Chapter 5. Preliminary analysis	106
5.1 Introduction.....	106
5.2 Missing values.....	107
5.3 Preliminary analyses on independent and dependent variables	110
5.3.1 Do Asian values really exist?.....	110
5.3.2 Does participation in voluntary associations vary between regions?	117
5.3.3 Does democratic citizenship vary between regions?	121
5.4 Concluding remarks	128
Chapter 6. Baseline analysis.....	131
6.1 Introduction.....	131
6.2 Correlations between voluntary associations, cultural values, and democratic citizenship.....	132
6.2.1 Correlations between voluntary associations and democratic citizenship.....	132

6.2.2 Correlations between cultural values and democratic citizenship.....	134
6.3 Baseline analysis at individual level.....	137
6.3.1 Logistic regressions at individual level.....	137
6.3.2 Multiple logistic regression at the individual level	143
6.3.3 Comparison between contemporary Western and Eastern societies.....	148
6.4 Concluding remarks	158
Chapter 7. Multi-level modelling	161
7.1 Introduction.....	161
7.2 Preliminary steps: Does each dependent variable vary across societies?.....	164
7.2.1 Likelihood ratio (LR) tests.....	165
7.2.2 Variance component model with intra-class correlation coefficient (ICC) tests.....	166
7.3 Random intercept model: Does the impact of societal-level cultural values on democratic citizenship vary significantly across societies?.....	170
7.4 Random slope model: Does the impact of individual-level associational membership on democratic citizenship vary significantly across societies?.....	176
7.4.1 Random slope model.....	176
7.4.2 Cross-level interactions	180
7.5 Concluding remarks	184
Chapter 8. Discussion and conclusion.....	188
8.1 Introduction.....	188
8.2 Key findings.....	192
8.3 Contribution to knowledge.....	201
8.3.1 Theoretical contribution: integrating the Asian values discourse into social capital and political culture discussions.....	202
8.3.2 Empirical contribution: comparing Western and East Asian societies	204
8.4 Policy implications	207
8.5 Limitations and recommendations for future research.....	209
8.6 Concluding remarks	212
Appendices	214
References	234

Lists of Tables and Figures

Table 1.1 The 29 selected countries of the research	6
Table 4.1 The number of observations for 29 countries	79
Table 4.2 Democratic citizenship: civic virtue	86
Table 4.3 Democratic citizenship: political engagement	86
Table 4.4 Conceptualisation: voluntary associations	87
Table 4.5 Conceptualisation: cultural values	90
Table 4.6 Conceptualisation: control variables	92
Table 4.7 Operationalisation of variables of the research	94
Table 4.8 Reliability test for tolerance: Cronbach's alpha reliability coefficient	96
Table 4.9 Validity of items on tolerance: factor analysis	96
Table 4.10 Reliability test for trust: Cronbach's alpha reliability coefficient	97
Table 4.11 Validity of items on trust: factor analysis	97
Table 4.12 Reliability test for interest in politics: Cronbach's alpha reliability coefficient	99
Table 4.13 Validity of items on interest in politics: factor analysis	99
Table 4.14 Reliability test for political activities: Cronbach's alpha reliability coefficient	100
Table 4.15 Validity of items on political activities: factor analysis	100
Table 4.16 Reliability test for associational membership: Cronbach's alpha reliability coefficient	102
Table 4.17 Validity of items on associational membership: factor analysis	102
Table 5.1 Items with around 5 per cent of missing values	108
Table 5.2 Separate variance t-test	109
Table 5.3 Divisions of countries by culture	111
Table 5.4 ANOVA test: individualism	114
Table 5.5 ANOVA test: hierarchism	115
Table 5.6 T-test: individualism and hierarchism	116
Table 5.7 ANOVA: numbers of membership in voluntary association	118
Table 5.8 T-test: associational membership	119

Table 5.9 Chi-squared test: tolerance	121
Table 5.10 Chi-squared test: tolerance (West and East comparison)	122
Table 5.11 Chi-squared test: particularised trust.....	123
Table 5.12 Chi-squared test: particularised trust (West and East comparison)	123
Table 5.13 Chi-squared test: generalised trust.....	123
Table 5.14 Chi-squared test: generalised trust (West and East comparison).....	124
Table 5.15 Chi-squared test: interest in politics.....	125
Table 5.16 Chi-squared test: interest in politics (West and East comparison)	125
Table 5.17 Chi-squared test: voting.....	125
Table 5.18 Chi-squared test: voting (West and East comparison).....	126
Table 5.19 Chi-squared test: political activity	127
Table 5.20 Chi-squared test: political activity (West and East comparison)	127
Table 6.1 Correlations: between individual-level variables and democratic citizenship	133
Table 6.2 Correlations between cultural values and democratic citizenship.....	135
Table 6.3 Simple logistic regressions: civic virtue	139
Table 6.4 Simple logistic regressions: political engagement	141
Table 6.5 Multicollinearity analysis between independent variables.....	144
Table 6.6 Multiple logistic regressions: civic virtue.....	145
Table 6.7 Multiple logistic regression analyses: political engagement.....	147
Table 6.8 Multiple logistic regression (West and East comparison): tolerance.....	149
Table 6.9 Multiple logistic regression (West and East comparison): particularised trust.....	150
Table 6.10 Multiple logistic regression (West and East comparison): generalised trust	151
Table 6.11 Multiple logistic regression (West and East comparison): interest in politics	153
Table 6.12 Multiple logistic regression (West and East comparison): voting	154
Table 6.13 Multiple logistic regression (West and East comparison): political activity	155
Table 7.1 Likelihood ratio test of null model.....	166
Table 7.2 Results of intra-class correlation coefficient (ICC) tests	167
Table 7.3 Results of ICC tests (Western and Eastern societies).....	169

Table 7.4 Random intercept ordered logistic regression models (model 1 to model 3).....	172
Table 7.5 Random slope logistic regression model	179
Table 7.6 Summary of cross-level interactions: West and East comparison (civic virtue)	181
Table 7.7 Summary of cross-level interactions: West and East comparison (political engagement).....	182
Figure 4.1 Conceptual framework of the relationship between voluntary associations, cultural values and democratic citizenship	84
Figure 5.1 Means of individualism, hierarchism, and score of 29 countries	112

Acknowledgement

Looking back on the verge of the end of this long journey, I am filled with many emotions. I now realise that I am not as smart or ambitious as I thought when I first started this long journey. I lacked confidence and was more sluggish than I had expected. This humble dissertation, therefore, is something beyond my own ability. It is a result of the superlative mentorship and friendship that I have received.

It was impossible for me to complete this journey without the sincere support of the nicest people around me. First and foremost, I am deeply indebted to my supervisors for their guidance and support throughout my years at Bristol. I would like to express my heartfelt gratitude to Professor Sarah Ayres, who has been my guiding beacon throughout the course with her patience and generosity even when I changed the subject of the thesis and the methodology. I also owe a great deal of appreciation to Dr Eldin Fahmy, who patiently waited and supported me until the end. In addition to being incredibly supportive and engaging advisors, their dedication to theoretically important questions and analytical rigor has been eminent, and has profoundly influenced the way I approach my own work. Without their support, it would have been impossible for me to come this far. I would also like to thank Dr Patsios and Professor Choi, who carefully reviewed this humble dissertation and provided me with many valuable suggestions.

Another major source of inspiration for me has come from my friends at Bristol. Muddling through difficulties together for a long time, I developed a sense of comradeship with friends such as Lee Seungjun, Kim Juri, Lee Yoo-chul, Yi Bong-jo, Jung Jayu, and Lee Kyung-hyun. The conversations I had with them while sitting down on the bench at the Brandon hill motivated and inspired me more than any academic endeavour. It is an honour for me to say that these smartest and kindest people are my friends. I also owe a special thanks to the Turley brothers. Joe and Daniel were good friends I could rely on heavily whenever I had difficulties adjusting to life in England. The experience of visiting the pub with them and watching the World Cup together is an unforgettable memory that will stay with me for the rest of my life.

Above all, I would like to express my gratitude to my parents, my sister Hyunjung, and Hanna for their generous support, patience, and care for their old son and brother. The supports of my family and my lover are always the driving force for me, and everything that motivates me in the days to come.

Chapter 1. Introduction

The aim of this research is to investigate the implications of voluntary associations and cultural values for the promotion of democratic citizenship consisting of civic virtue (García, 2007; Zhu & Fu, 2017) and political engagement (Vassallo, 2004). Civic virtue can be defined as a generalised trust (Fukuyama, 1995b) and tolerance to social diversity (Iglič, 2010). On the other hand, political engagement can be described as a means of interest in politics, voting, and political activities, all of which constitute assertive civic culture (Welzel & Dalton, 2017). These forms of democratic citizenship are crucial to a stable and consolidated democracy.

In the more than two decades since Putnam (1993; 2000) popularised the term “social capital”, the origin of democratic citizenship has been intensely scrutinised in many academic fields, highlighting the importance of the function of voluntary associations in cultivating democratic citizenship. The relationships between the variables that are key to democratic citizenship, however, are still poorly understood. To uncover them, this research brings together a series of large-scale, comprehensive tests of democratic citizenship undertaken across twenty-nine countries using the most recent seventh wave of the World Values Survey (WVS) data. It will pay particular attention to the theories and measurements of individual-level membership of voluntary associations and societal-level cultural values in fostering (or undermining) trust and other forms of democratic citizenship. This research starts from the hypothesis that voluntary associations are beneficial for the formation of democratic citizenship, while collectivistic and hierarchical cultural values (e.g., Asian values) can play a negative role. The hypothesis will be tested using a multi-level modelling, encompassing both individual-level and societal-level variables to compare different regions of the world. Specifically, it examines individual-level elements pertaining to associational membership and democratic citizenship. This research uses an interest in politics, voting, and participation in political activities as measures of civic virtue, including both particularised and generalised trust and tolerance of social diversity (Iglič, 2010; Park, 2012) and political engagement (Verba & Almond, 1963). Societal-level elements can be measured by cultural values, which are often referred to as “individualism/collectivism” and “social horizontal/hierarchical orientation” (“hierarchism” in this thesis, Hofstede, 2011).

For more than twenty years, democracy researchers have attempted to define the relationship between voluntary associations and democratic citizenship (Cohen, 1999; García, 2007; Paxton,

2007; Knowles, 2015; Ibsen et al., 2019). This stream of scholarly research has been driven by seminal works on social capital popularised by Putnam (1993; 2000). The main theory of social capital suggests that associational memberships are likely to increase trust and other forms of democratic norms by creating a sense of “we”; furthermore, it can extend the boundaries of associational membership (Paxton, 2007). That is, it may extend beyond a particular group when members are connected to other groups. According to a Tocquevillian (2003)[1835] perspective, associational membership can widen a person’s sphere of concern and influence. More specifically, Tocqueville argued that joining voluntary associations can help individuals develop a sense of civic virtue and responsibility, which can then extend to the wider community. By participating in voluntary associations, people can learn the way to work together for common good, practice compromise and negotiation, and develop a sense of social togetherness. This sense of togetherness, in turn, can improve trust among individuals and foster a sense of collective responsibility for the welfare of the community (ibid). However, this mechanism so far seems to have fallen short of expectations, especially in new democracies. Empirical evidence, especially from East Asian societies, raises questions about the positive influences of voluntary associations on democratic citizenship, such as increasing trust, tolerance, and political engagement. This is because in many studies, the relationship between the above-mentioned variables is not significant or shows only a weak correlation (e.g., Park & Shin, 2005; Park, 2012; Dwivedi, 2017). This empirical evidence is important since it is associated with growing concerns that many “*third-wave democracies*” have seemingly failed to fully embrace the principles of liberal democracy (Huntington, 1991) and that, if civic failures become long term, they could conclusively endanger democratic legitimacy (Park, 2017). Indeed, the debate over Asian values and their compatibility with Western liberal democracy has recurrently erupted since Lee kuan-yew popularised the term “*Asian values*” (Zakaria, 1994). In accordance with some Asian values theorists, individuals’ involvement in voluntary associations is not likely to be related with the cultivation of trust and other forms of democratic citizenship. Rather, it is often considered to be inefficient and conflict-ridden (Servaes & Verschooten, 2007), and it is likened to qualities that are seen as ultimately threatening orderly society (Dalton & Ong, 2005). This study therefore begins with a long- standing question in political science: whether the function of a voluntary association as “*a school of democracy*” (Park & Lee, 2007; Van Ingen & Van der Meer, 2016) is universal. It attempts to answer this question by comparing engagement in voluntary associations within Western European and East Asian countries.

Accordingly, this study reviews prior research on social capital and political culture and investigates the relationship between Asian values and democratic citizenship since the 1990s. It conducts a set of multi-level analyses to explore the impact of voluntary associations and cultural values on democratic citizenship in twenty-nine Western and Eastern societies. By adopting cultural values in its considerations, this research will broaden the scope of social capital and political culture based on empirical corroboration, mainly from East Asia.

1.1 Research background

What makes a democracy consolidated is one of the most vigorously investigated issues in the field of social science (Yoon, 2017). Those theories and commitments on civil society since after de Tocqueville in the early 19th century onwards have emphasised the importance of voluntary associational life and the democratic citizenship that it generates (Newton, 2001; Paxton & Ressler, 2018). According to de Tocqueville and his followers, voluntary associations are regarded as schools of democracy that foster “*habits of the heart*” that are deeply related to democratic citizenship (Park, 2012:35). Many scholars suggest that voluntary associations create trust as a consequence of network diversity (Cohen, 1999; Anheier & Kendall, 2002; Quintelier, 2013; Meleady et al., 2020). For instance, those who once perceived their in-group members as more reliable, trustworthy, and helpful expand their radius of trust by participating in multiple groups (Glanville, 2016; Brewer, 2017). Inter-group contact theory also provides proof that diverse networks lead to a reassessment of out-group members (Glanville, 2016). Put another way, cooperation with diverse others can increase trust through the inclusion of dissimilar others formerly regarded as members of a heterogeneous group (Marschall & Stolle, 2004). Pettigrew (1997: 174) asserts that inter-group contact can lead to understandings about in-groups and out-groups at the same time. More specifically, “*in-group norms, customs and lifestyles turn out not to be the only ways to manage the social world. This new perspective not only individualises and ‘humanises’ out-group members but serves to distance you from your in-group*”. In line with the idea that inter-group contact may help the extension of trust beyond an in-group, Pettigrew also demonstrates that inter-racial contact builds tolerance for dissimilar others. In a similar vein, Zucker (1986: 57) maintains that sharing the same expectations with others about “*the common understandings that are ‘taken for granted’ as a part of the ‘world*

in common” underpins the generation of social trust. Accordingly, involvement in voluntary associations that often expose an individual to a diverse set of others “*should facilitate the sense that people*” in general “*are trustworthy*” (Glanville, 2016: 33).

The above studies, all of which mentioned the importance of the function of voluntary associations in cultivating social trust and cooperative norms, are in line with Tocqueville’s early discovery that voluntary associations are the foundation of democracy in America (2003)[1835]. Tocqueville, specifically, asserts that cooperation generated within organisations extends to larger society through individuals’ participation in voluntary association. That is, by engaging in voluntary associations, a person can discover how to cope with non-acquaintances and eventually realise that they share common interests (Glanville, 2016). In a similar way, “*civic voluntarism*” has also been emphasised in the theory of political culture since Verba and Almond (1963). Drawing on comparative studies of five countries, they conclude that civic culture, a blend of conventional parochial cultures with more contemporary participatory ones, is not only “*particularly appropriate for*” but also the most “*congruent with*” a “*democratic political system*” (Rosamond, 1997: 62). In this vein, participatory culture is seen as one of the essential parts of civic culture underlying a stable democracy. To borrow Putnam’s (1993) argument, people can think and behave in accordance with a social manner by participating in voluntary associations. Such participation is a foundation for a flourishing democracy. In this vein, widespread civic engagement via voluntary associations can be regarded as a solution for collective action dilemmas. Given the importance of democratic citizenship for a stable democracy, previous studies have explored the source of democratic citizenship by examining the role of voluntary associations. According to the literature, democratic citizenship characteristics consist of both cognitive dimensions (e.g., trust and tolerance) and structural dimensions (e.g., associational engagement) (Anderson & Paskeviciute, 2006; Park, 2012). Despite having different traditions, theories of social capital and political culture have a common understanding of the importance for a stable democracy of citizens’ involvement in associations. The role of voluntary associations as a foundation of democratic citizenship is justified by both intellectual traditions.

During the controversies over Asian values and democracy in the early 1990s, however, these conventional beliefs were challenged by some scholars and practitioners. The former Singaporean Prime Minister Lee Kuan-yew and his followers (so-called Singapore school; referred to as Ortmann & Thompson, 2016), for instance, maintains that “*Confucian values*”

(interchangeable with “*Asian values*”) and Western-style democracy cannot generally be reconciled, and civic engagement is not a universal panacea for social problems. Lee argues that democracy based on Western individualism could even undermine the traditional values, virtues, social order, and harmony of the East Asian region (Zakaria, 1994). Following this, many scholars have debated the fundamental contradictions between long-established Asian values and liberal democracy (Fukuyama, 1995a; Fukuyama, 1995b; Fukuyama, 2001a; Pye, 2000; Park & Shin, 2006; Shin & Sin, 2012; Knowles, 2015). For example, Huntington (2000) argued that East Asian values hinder democratisation since they prioritise hierarchy, strong-man leadership and social order over individual liberty. In other words, Asian values, which stress group primacy over the individual, emphasising unity and harmony (Park & Shin, 2006; Dalton & Shin, 2014), might be cited as incompatible with Western types of democratic citizenship, which stress social diversity, political competition, and interpersonal trust. The attachment to traditional hierarchical structures, paternalistic norms and collectivistic orientations are also seen as shaping Asian citizens to be intrinsically allegiant rather than assertive (Knowles, 2015; Welzel & Dalton, 2017).

The function of a voluntary association as a school for democracy that cultivates democratic citizenship has also been empirically questioned. Many studies, especially from East Asian countries, have shown that the correlations between the variables associated with voluntary association and democracy are insignificant or weak (Park & Shin, 2005; Van Deth & Zmerli, 2010; Park, 2012). The discrepancy between ideas and reality is due to a lack of integrated theory dealing with seemingly similar subjects and a lack of appropriate data. Research on the issue in the realm of social capital or political culture, for instance, has primarily focused on individual-level factors such as voluntary associational membership when explaining democratic citizenship. Societal factors, however, such as cultural values, have often been overlooked. This research will thus highlight how both individual-level and societal-level cultural variables simultaneously contribute to the formation of democratic citizenship and to its explanation.

To scrutinise the essence of the relationship between voluntary associations, democratic citizenship and cultural values, this research compares twenty-nine modern Western and East Asian societies. To understand the correlation of the above-mentioned variables, it employs a quantitative method, specifically, the use of the multi-level regression model (MLM). By adopting MLM, this research tries to disentangle both the individual and societal-level factors

involved in creating generalised trust and other important forms of democratic citizenship. Specifically, this study investigates the role of voluntary associations at the individual level in explaining the formation of democratic citizenship, while considering societal-level factors such as cultural values of individualism and hierarchical orientation. It thus attempts to shed new light on the theory of social capital and political culture based on empirical studies of modern Western and East Asian societies. For MLM, data will be gathered from the most recent seventh wave of the World Values Survey.

The countries used for this research include several in the West, including the US, the UK and Western European countries, Australia and New Zealand, and Northern and Southern East Asian countries such as China, Japan, South Korea (Korea hereafter), Singapore, Vietnam, Thailand, and Indonesia. The criteria used to select countries are as follows. First, in the case of Western countries, the eighteen countries chosen are all developed OECD members. Among eighteen countries with accessible WVS 7 data, countries classified as “Ex-soviet East” (e.g., Estonia and Slovenia) (Welzel & Dalton, 2017), with different cultural traditions, are excluded. Portugal, where data on income – a major control variable in this study – is not available from WVS 7, has also been excluded. In terms of East Asian countries, eleven countries in total with accessible data have been selected for analysis. Despite the geographical proximity to the countries chosen, Macau, Mongolia and Myanmar have been excluded from this study because of limitations in the available cultural data. As a result, the Asian countries selected include six Confucian East Asian societies (China, Hong Kong, Japan, Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan) and five non- Confucian East Asian states (the others) (see Yoon, 2017). Table 1.1 shows a list of the twenty- nine countries studied in this research.

Table 1.1 The 29 selected countries of the research

	West/Europe	East Asia	Note
Countries	Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Italy, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, U.K., U.S.A.	China, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Vietnam, Thailand	18 Western 11 East Asian countries
Total	18	11	29

Note: countries from World Values Survey 7 (2017–20)

The question about whether the relationship between voluntary associations and democratic citizenship varies in different cultural contexts offers a significant opportunity for this study to lead to new knowledge. This work has not been done before and will make an original and significant contribution to the global literature on social capital, political culture, civil society, and democracy, which has tended to be Western dominated in its focus. This study will have implications for the understanding of different properties of organisations in various contexts. It may help to show how findings about associations can be a cornerstone for social policy-making to overcome social divisiveness and foster social cohesion.

1.2 The scope of the research

1.2.1 Relationships between voluntary associations, democratic citizenship, and cultural values.

The exact means by which voluntary associations foster democratic citizenship remain ambiguous, even though a large volume of studies have attempted to reveal the relationships among the factors involved. According to early work by Ellickson (1991) and Ostrom (1998), for instance, cooperative norms and trust can be derived from repeated associational interactions. Empirical analysis of the impact of voluntary associations on social capital, on the other hand, usually focuses on the presumed positive consequences for socialisation arising from associations (Maloney & Rossteutscher, 2007; Glanville, Andersson, & Paxton, 2013). Some studies have corroborated this expectation empirically, yet others have yielded less favourable results (Putzel, 1997; Van Deth & Zmerli, 2010). This seems to be because of the multifaceted nature of instances of voluntary associations, and the multidimensional relationships between the variables that are still under-investigated. In an effort to uncover the real nature of voluntary associations, many researchers have focused, in particular, on the importance of contexts such as the degree of democratisation, and the post-communist heritage, various types of welfare regimes, political customs, and “*types of voluntary associations*” (Van Deth & Zmerli, 2010: 631).

Special attentions have also been paid to the function of cultural values, such as generalised trust in the establishment of democratic citizenship (Subramaniam, 2000). Trust, norms of

tolerance and participatory culture largely depend on societal cultural conditions. This argument has been reinforced by a series of empirical corroborations. Evidence derived mostly from East Asia shows that voluntary associations have no, or limited, impact on democratic citizenship (e.g., Park, 2012; Park & Subramanian, 2012; Yoon, 2017). Democratic citizenship can be characterised by civic virtue, which refers to the values, attitudes, and behaviours that are necessary for the maintenance and flourishing of democratic societies as Tocqueville argue (2003)[1835]. It also involves political engagement, which encompasses a range of activities that citizens can undertake to participate in the democratic process, such as voting, attending public meetings, and joining political or social organisations (See Verba & Almond, 1963). The effect of East Asian cultural values on the function of voluntary associations in fostering democratic citizenship can be inferred from the vigorous debate over the compatibility between Asian values and Western democracy, which has been raging since the mid-1990s. Despite numerous theoretical discussions of the relationships between associations, democratic citizenship, and cultural values, however, empirical research exploring the issues is limited (Yoon, 2017). This may, in part, be due to cultural values seeming too broad to conceptualise meaningfully and too general to measure precisely. Thanks to the efforts of previous scholars to define these issues, however, it is now possible to understand a variety of aspects of Asian values. Various views on the traits of Asian values seem to reach an agreement theoretically (Kim, 2010), and their collectivistic and hierarchical features have been empirically supported by qualitative and statistical methods (e.g., Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Hofstede, 2011).

This research will build on such findings and attempt to investigate the relationship between “voluntary associations”, “democratic citizenship” and “cultural value”. The types of voluntary association considered here include not only participation in formal groups and organisations but also involvement in informal networks. Formal associations are characterized by explicit rules and structure, such as labour unions and political parties. Informal associations, in contrast, are formed spontaneously and lack formal rules, such as bowling clubs like the ones Putnam (2000) describes in his book. Overall, the wording is clear and precise, but some minor adjustments could improve the clarity and coherence of the passage. Democratic citizenship, second, can be understood as issues related to democratic norms such as tolerance, a readiness to embrace objectionable groups, particularised and generalised trust, and political engagement, including i) an interest in politics, ii) voting and iii) political activities. Cultural values in this research are largely associated with “Asian values” as the following section describes.

1.2.2 Democratic transformation in East Asia, an important arena for comparative study

East Asia can be regarded as an important testbed to assess whether voluntary associations, coupled with cultural values, affect the formation of democratic citizenship, for several reasons. First of all, East Asia can be considered the only non-Western part of the world which contains industrialised, economically prosperous countries that are also liberal democracies such as Japan, Korea, and Taiwan (Fukuyama, 2014). Economically, East Asia is a region that includes advanced economies namely Japan, Korea, and Taiwan, and politically it is undoubtable that voluntary associations are thriving in this region after the movement towards democratisation in the late 1980s (Chiavacci, Grano, & Obinger, 2020).

Politically, however, East Asia, clearly has different democratic traditions than Western liberal nations. The vast majority of Western countries have long histories of democratic government, whereas East Asia has experienced a relatively short history of democracy; furthermore, the region has experienced considerable political fluctuations in recent decades. As Huntington (2012) has noted, many countries in East Asia transitioned to democracy after the so-called “third democratic wave” in the 1980s. During this process, Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, and the Philippines, which were once authoritarian regimes, became more democratic. In the course of the Asian economic crisis of the late 1990s, Indonesia also embraced greater democracy after three decades of military authoritarian regimes (see also, Chu, 2016). On the other hand, East Asia is also home to China, Singapore, Vietnam, and Malaysia, which have fast-growing economies but which, at the same time, lack democratic political institutions (Fukuyama, 2014). China’s remarkable economic march, which has largely been duplicated in Vietnam, served to strengthen the justification of its authoritarian one-party system. Even in more democratic countries such as Indonesia, there are growing concerns about threats to political freedom and the revival of elite rule (Chu, 2016). According to Freedom House (2014), Singapore and Malaysia are still classified as “partially free” nations. Even in Japan, the oldest democracy in this region, only two-thirds of respondents to the third wave of the Asia Barometer Survey agreed that “democracy is always preferable to authoritarianism” (Chang, Zhu, & Park, 2007).

With respect to cultural values, East Asian countries also have distinctive features, which distinguish them from the West. Of course, questions remain about the nature, and even existence of, “Asian values”, and there is even a debate about whether East Asia and Southeast Asia can be included in the same category (Kim, 2010), as these regions include a vast number

of different religions, ethnicities, and cultural traditions. However, despite Confucian, Buddhist, Christian and Islamic religious traditions having different characteristics in this region, they coexist in East Asia and share cultural values and norms that are distinguishable from Western European culture (Inoguchi, Mikami, & Fujii, 2007). Lee Kuan-yew (Zakaria, 1994) mentioned that East Asian countries such as China, Hong Kong, Japan, Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan share these values, however, according to some scholars, Southeast Asian countries may also share similar values (Kim, 2010). Therefore, eleven countries from East and Southeast Asia will be chosen for comparative analysis with Western countries.

While several traits distinguish Asian values from Western culture (Dalton & Shin, 2006; Kim, 2010), many scholars agree on at least two features: collectivism and hierarchism (e.g., Kim, 2010; Dalton & Shin, 2006; Kim, 2010). In this vein, this research considered such values as major features of Asian culture. Bringing the above-mentioned variables together, this thesis will conduct multi-level regression analysis to disentangle the relationships and interactions among them.

1.3 Aims and questions of the research

Based on the background and scope of this research, it aims to investigate the implications of voluntary associations and cultural values for the promotion of democratic citizenship. As a result, factors associated with democratic citizenship within different regions will be identified. Independent variables at individual and country level will be adopted to examine the origin of democratic citizenship employing pertinent statistical analytic tools. The prime concern of this research is country-level variables that significantly explain democratic citizenship, over and above the impacts of individual-level variables. Inter-level interactions between the factors will also be examined.

This research will be guided by the following research questions:

- 1) What is the relationship between voluntary associations and democratic citizenship – civic virtue and political engagement – in contemporary Western and Eastern societies?
- 2) How do cultural values – collectivism and hierarchism – impact variations in democratic citizenship across the West and the East?

The first question involves confirming whether conventional ideas from theories of social

capital and political culture have universal applicability in the different regions with different contexts. The second question pays more attention to disparate cultural traits in different countries.

In order to answer the above questions, this research adopts the following hypotheses:

Hypothesis 1. Membership of voluntary associations fosters democratic citizenship (both civic virtue and political engagement).

Hypothesis 2. The impacts of voluntary associations on democratic citizenship vary across East and West.

Hypothesis 3. Cultural values such as collectivism and hierarchism can play a negative role in moderating the relationship between voluntary associations and democratic citizenship.

These hypotheses will be tested using data from the World Values Survey 7. This secondary data analysis could shed light on the compatibility of existing theories with democratic citizenship, especially in East Asian societies, with different cultural contexts, by applying an established methodological approach in a new research setting.

1.4 Importance of the research

This research will contribute to the existing body of literature by addressing issues and theories of democracy and civil society. First, it will provide new insights into understanding the role of voluntary associations in fostering democracy in different cultural contexts, especially in East Asia, by considering country-level cultural factors. Scholars have tried to investigate the implications of voluntary associations for a stable democracy. Most of the mainstream theories and ideas have, however, come from Western scholars who examine Western societies (Ito-Morales, 2017). The application of the theories to contexts primarily influenced by Western historical and cultural backgrounds is not necessarily consistent with other societies' experiences. The first notable important contribution of this research is therefore that it challenges these assumptions by seeking to analyse the democracy of non-Western contexts.

Even though East Asia has come under the increasing influence of Western cultures and values (Welzel, 2012), traditional cultural values based mainly on Confucianism are still deeply rooted in this area (Shin, 2013; Knowles, 2015). Another crucial contribution of this research is to uncover and analyse this challenging but intriguing issue.

This study should also contribute to the existing body of literature by offering an empirical corroboration of previous arguments about the role of cultural values in democratic citizenship, which are often marginalised in theoretical debates. Even though there are myriad debates on the compatibility of Asian values with Western democracy, few quantitative analyses have been undertaken investigating these questions empirically. This is partly due to the lack of appropriate data. The combination of a new application of methodology and newly released data allows this research to be original and to contribute to previous literature.

All in all, this study will fill a gap in the existing literature, which has tried to explain democratic citizenship in different regions by taking cultural values into consideration. Adopting the most recent data and using a method that has not yet been employed to analyse these problems, this research broadens the understanding of the role of associational life and cultural values as foundations of democratic citizenship.

1.5 Plan of the thesis

This thesis is comprised of eight chapters. After this chapter, Chapter 2 lays out the conventional wisdom about the relationship between voluntary associations and democratic citizenship. Chapter 2 focuses on the mainstream theories of social capital and political culture, which have been vigorously considered to uncover the role of voluntary associations and participatory culture in promoting democratic citizenship. This existing body of knowledge will explain why, and how, associational life can be seen as functioning as a “school of democracy” for ordinary citizens learning to cultivate democratic citizenship. The last section of Chapter 2 also expands the arguments about the limitations of Western-centred ideas in non-Western contexts.

Chapter 3 will then continue by introducing the Asian values thesis and the question of the compatibility of Asian values with democracy, and it will make a path for further analyses. The

third chapter systematically documents the nature of Asian values in East Asia. It does this by theorising on the compatibility and incompatibility of Asian values with democracy. Furthermore, it explains the discrepancies between conventional ideas of democracy and the realities of democracy in East Asia. This chapter will also demonstrate the dominance of cultural values in East Asia and describe how they moderate the role of voluntary associations in fostering democratic citizenship.

In the fourth chapter the methodology of this research will be introduced. Chapter 4 presents detailed information on the quantitative method of the research, including data collection and variables. By using multi-level regression analyses of the most recent World Values Survey data for 29 contemporary societies in both the West and the East, this research seeks to document the prevalence of different cultural characteristics in voluntary associations and their influence on democratic socialisation, which highlights the importance of developing democratic norms, values, and attitudes that can foster civic virtue and political engagement.

The fifth chapter presents baseline analyses of dependent and independent variables by reporting the distributions of different cultural values across the countries investigated. Before undertaking a full-scale analysis, the researcher conducts an exploratory analysis in this chapter to confirm the correlations between the variables. Outliers or extreme values are also checked.

In the sixth chapter a series of baseline analyses are conducted using simple and multiple logistic regression. Before multi-level modelling is employed, this chapter undertakes baseline analysis consisting of individual-level independent variables and socio-demographic control variables aimed at explaining instances of democratic citizenship. The results presented in this chapter will justify the introduction of MLM by showing that the effects of voluntary associations on democratic citizenship vary across the regions.

Chapter 7 will introduce cultural factors and integrate them with multi-level model analyses. Such a new approach promises to offer a unique contribution by this research. This chapter will pay attention to the impact of cultural values moderating the role of voluntary associations on democratic citizenship, especially in East Asian societies. The final chapter discusses the research's main findings and considers broader theoretical implications, especially in the realm of policy studies. It then makes recommendations for future research.

Chapter 2. Associations as schools of democracy

2.1 Introduction

This chapter will introduce the conventional ideas that explain the relationship between voluntary associations, trust, and other forms of democratic citizenship. Even though there is a lack of understanding about the exact processes that explain the socialisation impact of voluntary associations, a vast amount of research has been conducted examining the relationship between voluntary associations and democratic citizenship in various fields of study, ranging from social capital theories to theories of political culture.

Democracy is the most prevalent and practised mode of political system in the modern era (Lee, 2013). To consolidate its sustainability and stability, the necessary conditions of a well-functioning democracy have long been investigated. Popular involvement is one of the indispensable elements of a stable democracy (Mair, 2013). In other words, stirring passions and interest in the politics of ordinary citizenry can be said to be at the heart of democracy. However, many scholars have discovered that contemporary democracies are suffering from unprecedented problems such as extreme individualism and political apathy (Mestrovic, 2004; Kobayashi & Ikeda, 2009). In the academic arena of sociology and politics, especially in the theories of social capital and political culture, the functions of voluntary associations have been noted to respond to resolving the above-mentioned problems. Paying attention to the function of voluntary associations as “schools of democracy” (Park & Lee, 2007; Van der Meer & Van Ingen, 2009), previous studies in the fields of social capital and political culture investigate the relationship between voluntary associations and democratic citizenship.

This and the following chapters provide the major findings from the preceding studies, especially in the theories about social capital and political culture. This exploration facilitates our understanding of the main topic and the relationship between the main variables of the research. It will further help us to begin questioning the generality of mainstream ideas with counterevidence mainly derived from East Asian societies.

This chapter consists of five main sections. Section 2.2 explains why civic virtue and political engagement were selected as the two primary elements of democratic citizenship in this study,

among several other possible factors. Section 2.3 presents the theoretical backgrounds of the relationship between associational life and civic virtue, particularly in the field of social capital theory. Section 2.4 presents key arguments regarding political culture that emphasise the importance of civic voluntarism for stable democracy, which are supported by empirical evidence in Section 2.5. Finally, Section 2.6 summarises the chapter and provides an opportunity for further speculation about the potential influence of Asian values on democracy. As the Asian value debate suggests, the unique cultural characteristics of each society may influence the impact of voluntary associations on democratic citizenship.

2.2 Two elements of democratic citizenship

Democratic citizenship refers to the political rights and responsibilities of individuals within a democratic system, emphasising both citizens' duties and expectations (Crick, 2002). According to Dahl (2008)[1989], it encompasses a wide range of activities, from participating in elections and shaping public policies to advocating for individual rights and protecting the common good. Citizenship is not just a legal status, but a vital aspect of individual identity and a means of participating in the governance of society. Therefore, the level of democratic citizenship is important for the development and consolidation of sustainable democracies. This is particularly crucial in relatively new democracies, such as East Asia, which have experienced significant socio-political and economic transformations.

As mentioned above, democratic citizenship encompasses various aspects of civic engagement and social responsibility (Borgida, Federico, and Sullivan, 2009), which comprise of a multifaceted concept. One of its most important components is civic virtue, which includes behaviours such as trustworthiness and concern for the common good (Putnam, 1993; 2000). Trust, in particular, is an essential aspect of civic virtue as it promotes cooperation and collective action in society. Research shows a positive relationship between social capital and democratic engagement, with communities that have high levels of trust and dense networks experiencing higher voter turnout and stronger democratic institutions (Putnam, 2000). Therefore, trust, which contributes to the development of social capital and a concern for the public good, is a crucial aspect of civic virtue.

In addition to trust, tolerance is another key dimension of civic virtue that this research considers. Tolerance involves accepting and respecting diversity in a society, including

differences in beliefs, values, and identities (Stoeckel and Ceka, 2022). It contributes to the development of social capital by fostering a sense of shared identity and mutual respect among citizens, even when they disagree on important issues. Research, such as that of Marquart-Pyatt and Paxton (2007), suggests that tolerance promotes democratic participation by creating a climate of trust and mutual respect, where citizens feel empowered to express their opinions and engage in constructive dialogue. Therefore, tolerance is a crucial aspect of civic virtue, as it fosters inclusive democratic participation and engagement.

Another important dimension of democratic citizenship is the development of political engagement for stable democracy. Many studies stress the significance of political participation for ordinary citizens, as it is inseparable from democracy. As Parry, Moyser, and Day (1992:3) stated, “*Any book about political participation is also a book about democracy.*” Similarly, Verba and Nie (1987:1) mentioned in their pivotal work that “*the more participation there is in decisions, the more democracy there is*”.

Overall, democratic citizenship is a complex concept which involves the development of civic culture, and political engagement. These dimensions are interrelated and contribute to the development of a healthy and effective democracy. This research, therefore, focuses on two specific dimensions of democratic citizenship, namely civic virtue (trust and tolerance) and political engagement.

2.3 Associational life and civic virtue

2.3.1 Tocqueville and his followers

One of the practically and scholarly important questions about the role of voluntary associations for a stable democracy is whether they contribute to the creation and prosperity of democratic citizenship. A long-lasting idea in the academic field regards voluntary associations as “schools of democracy” that can foster democratic citizenship such as trust (Geys, 2012; Park & Subramanian, 2012), tolerance (Iglič, 2010) and political engagement (van Ingen & van der Meer, 2016). Involvement in voluntary associations, for instance, can lead people into politics on a small scale (Van Deth, 2007), where individuals find a way to cope with heterogeneous others (Putnam, 2000; Glanville, 2016), learn civic and organisational norms and skills (Ayala,

2000; Baggetta, 2009) and enhance broader social and political interests (Halpern, 2005). Individual participants in voluntary associations can learn civic skills that can broaden their political concerns, as well as urge further political involvement (Quintelier, 2013). The pedigree of these ideas dates back to the mid-19th century when Tocqueville (2003)[1835] noted that “voluntary associations” were one of the foundations of American democracy. Specifically, he observed that voluntary associations in America elicited civic consciousness, as they take their members out of primary associations such as family. Instead, they put members in the wider public sphere, where they can acquire “*the sense of reciprocity, trust and value to work together*” (Warren, 2001: 30).

After Tocqueville, voluntary associations and their socialising effects became one of the most intensively investigated topics in the field of democratic theory. Researchers often still quote Tocqueville’s idea, whereby “*the virtues and viability of democracy*” rely on “*the strength of associations in the society*” (ibid.: 3). The reason why Tocqueville’s discovery is intriguing is that he asserts that voluntary associations encourage ordinary citizens to embrace democratic virtue by introducing civic and political norms so that the democratic governance can remain stable. In short, Tocqueville’s legacy often regards voluntary associations as fostering “*habits of the heart*”, which is heavily related to democratic citizenship (Park, 2012: 35; see also Newton, 2001; Bellah et al., 2007). In this vein, the importance of associational life, and subsequently generated democratic citizenship, have long been stressed by several scholars and practitioners, from Tocqueville to Putnam, to contemporary civil society theorists (Newton, 2001). Briefly mentioned, they assert that a dense network and membership of voluntary associations not only “*helps to sustain civil society and community relations in a way that creates trust and cooperation between citizens*” but also enhances “*a high level of civic participation*” (ibid.: 201). As a result, voluntary associations could be regarded as the conditions of social cohesion and public awareness that ultimately result in democratic stability.

To put Tocqueville’s observations in the context of modern societies, voluntary associations are “*parts of society which is neither family, market, nor state*” (Newton, 1999). In addition, they are not divided by the authorities; rather, they are linked by the horizontal connections to ensure democratic participation. According to Verba, Scholzman, & Brady. (1995: 1), these horizontal networks assure “*the equal opportunity to raise voices*”. In this vein, voluntary associations are often regarded as schools to realise the enhancement of democratic citizenship.

2.3.2 Theory of social capital

Drawing on Tocqueville's insights, many researchers have also emphasised the importance of voluntary associations for a stable democracy. In his seminal work, for example, Putnam (1993) especially linked voluntary associations to democratic citizenship via the notion of social capital by analysing regional governance in Italy. He argues, first, that social participation enhances civic norms and skills, which can be prerequisites of social capital. Participation in voluntary associations conduces one to practise associational lives, which involves facing up to the inevitable disagreements and conflict with heterogeneous others. These civic norms and skills eventually lead to resolving collective problems. As a result, the experiences, in turn, foster social skills. According to Ikeda and Kobayahi (2007: 3), these positive effects of "*having in-depth discussions*" and "*coordinating voluntary associations*" can not only promote individuals' social skills but also spill over to different social circumstances. Putnam (1993; 2000) argues that trust is a representative feature of social capital arising from engagement in voluntary associations and social connections within and outside dense networks.

As discussed above, Putnam's social capital theory is derived from Tocqueville's intellectual heritage. However, he focuses the habits of individuals at the societal level, differently from Tocqueville. By analysing the disparities of associational cultures between the northern and southern parts of Italy, he investigates which place has favourable prerequisites for the construction of competent, effective, and democratic institutions (Putnam, 1993). Then, Putnam argues that Northern Italy, where associational activities are thriving, has better-functioning institutions. He adds that horizontally intertwined networks can reinforce the construction of civic virtues such as social trust and political participation. In contrast, Southern Italy is flourishing less in terms of voluntary associations, and the local governance does not function well compared to the north. In the south the social networks among individuals are more likely to be structured hierarchically, which eventually makes ordinary citizens feel controlled and separated. Interpersonal networks in Southern Italy are not necessarily weaker than in the north. Indeed, the communal networks in Southern Italy are as bountiful and vigorous as in the north, but these connections remain largely within the confines of primary groups such as families, kinship, neighbours, and acquaintances. It hardly extends to heterogeneous groups containing dissimilar others. In the end, these forms of association do not contribute to the well-functioning democratic governance in this region. The generalised reciprocal trust, which is an indispensable element of social capital, is difficult to cultivate in

these forms of closed relationship (Putnam, 1993; 2000; Fukuyama, 1995b). For Tocqueville, Putnam, and their followers, in summary, one of the most important functions of voluntary associational life is its democratic socialisation effect, which is “*building citizenship skills and attitudes crucial for motivating citizens to use these skills*” (Foley, Edwards, & Diani, 2001: 5).

In instances where associations promote contact with diverse dissimilar others, voluntary associations serve as “*bridges*” that extend across “*diverse social cleavages*” (Putnam, 2000: 22). Putnam apposes bridging associations with bonding ones that “*reinforce exclusive identities*” (ibid.: 22). Unlike bridging associations, bonding associations are based on members who share similar characteristics. Bonding associations reinforce members’ identities and are crucial for social support. However, they often turn their members inward, leading to in-group loyalty and favouritism so strong that it prevents the generalisation of trust towards out-groups. Thus, bridging groups are considered more likely to externalise trust, according to Putnam. After Putnam, studies on social capital thrived for more than two decades in political science. The principal of the socialising impacts of voluntary associations is that the dense network of connections among individuals could make the cooperative norms more prosperous; therefore, individual participants can broaden their thoughts and behaviours based on the understanding of others. In the end social capital helps to resolve the collective action dilemma, and thus democracy in society can work better.

In a similar vein, Glanville (2016) and Van der Meer (2016) use inter-group contact theory to investigate how diverse associations lead to civic virtue such as trust and tolerance towards others. They find that when cooperation occurs across the different associations, it can widen the shared identity beyond group borders. These contacts expand the realm of identity by allowing members to reckon other group members once viewed as heterogeneous others as in-group members (see also Uslaner, 2012). Diverse connections also can lead to a “*de-provincialisation*” of the in-group, according to Pettigrew (1997: 174). With deprovincialisation, a friendship with someone different along some dimension “*can provide insight about in-groups as well as out-groups*”. From Rothstein and Stolle’s (2008) perspective, diverse connections can lead to generalised rather than particularised trust – typical to bonding social capital (see also Fukuyama, 1995b). The mechanism of the socialising effects of voluntary associations is well explained by Glanville (2016: 33), as follows:

“... cooperative experiences with diverse others should positively influence the perception that

the people in general are trustworthy because it increases the expectation that other actors share the same basic set of ideas about the rules for interaction and exchange, which is fundamental in the placement of trust. Accordingly, positive exposure to a diverse set of others, which often occurs in voluntary associations, should facilitate the sense that more types of people are trustworthy and expand even more generally beyond the specific categories of inter-group cooperation.”

2.3.3 Associations and civic virtue

According to the theories reviewed so far, membership of voluntary associations appears to generate trust to those beyond the associational border. Then, it requires an understanding of how membership of a voluntary association could increase democratic citizenship such as trust and tolerance of those outside the group, not only to members within a group. Welzel (2013: 99) mentioned how civic virtue originates from intimate relationship, and then expands to “*unspecified others to eventually include even remote others*”. As mentioned above, voluntary associations are expected to function as a school of democracy that cultivates the civic virtue of trust and tolerance of dissimilar others. There are two main pillars for explaining the relationship between voluntary associations and civic virtue amongst ingroup members.

First, members of voluntary associations experience shared norms and values for cooperation. Norms, attitudes, and behaviours are spread among individuals in all kinds of groups through networks (Marsden & Friedkin, 1993). For instance, when individuals engage in conversations with other members of their association, they begin to adopt patterns of thought and speech similar to those of other members (Perrin, 2009). Important for the spread of trust is that associations require cooperation and trust for their continuance. Since joining an association is voluntary, exit is relatively free. Thus, individual members are likely to leave the association when the cost of trustworthiness in others is too burdensome, which may culminate in the collapse of the association. According to Kramer (1999: 579), the organisation’s sustainability largely rests on its capacity to “*successfully instil mutual trustworthiness among its members*”. Norms of cooperation and trust are, therefore, particularly noteworthy in voluntary associations (Putnam, 2000).

Second, voluntary associations have mechanisms for sanctioning untrustworthy members. Routine meetings in associations ensure that a potential person in whom trust will be placed

will be involved in recurrent interactions with others in the association, allowing future sanctions to be taken against anyone who destroys that trust (Nowak, 2006). Even if these people do not themselves recurrently interact with all of the members of the group, associations provide a stable network of members who can also sanction them. That is to say, third persons can monitor exchanges and disseminate negative messages and damage reputations via gossip (Burt & Knez, 1995; see also Nowak, 2006). The power of sanctions in associations to create trust among members comes from their ability to increase the predictability of interactions (Paxton, 2007). Social trust is generally thought to be learned through repeated interactions (Gibbs, 1990; Paxton & Glanville, 2015). Individual members can update their expectations of trusting interactions based on whether prior expectations have been met (Glanville & Paxton, 2007). Thus, through norms and sanctioning processes, associations internally build a “virtuous circle” (Putnam, 1993) – as trust situations are recurrently and successfully operated, members can better anticipate the thoughts and behaviour of other people in their associations, which ultimately results in the cultivation of trust between members.

While some studies are focused on fostering the trust of other members of the association, previous works have extended the argument about how an association can create trust among its members by focusing on the depth of membership. The argument is that the simple fact of membership itself may not be sufficient. Instead, the amount of time and energy spent in the association is more critical, as cited by Putnam (2000: 58): “*An individual who ‘belongs to’ half a dozen community groups may actually be active in none. What really matters ... is not merely nominal membership, but active and involved membership*” (see also Skocpol, 2013). However, some theorists argue that the exact mechanism of the socialising impact of voluntary associations is often inclined to avoid touching the core (Paxton & Ressler, 2018). Stolle (1998: 503) explains this well: “*Social capital theory does not specify how in-group trust relates to generalised trust, only that it does.*” The situation is aggravated by the issue that many of the cases that cultivate social trust in the narrow circle of associations seem to lose their adequacy in moving forward to wider ones. For instance, the shared norms or values that lead to in-group trust could be generated at the expense of trust in out-group others (Granovetter, 1973). Putnam (2000) also points out that trust can build up within the boundaries of an association rather than extending beyond them. Indeed, many theorists recognise that not all associations are beneficial in constructing social trust (e.g., Stolle, 1998; Paxton, 2002; Beyerlein & Hipp, 2005).

To understand how associations can produce trust and generalise it beyond the borders, the

relations between in-groups and out-groups need to be scrutinised. Many studies on the social psychologies have demonstrated that one classifies others into groups of “we” and “they” (Hogg, 1992; see also Rotter, 1971). The groups that we see ourselves as being a part of receive positive feelings, trust, and commitment. In other words, individuals usually regard in-group members as more trustworthy and more reliable than out-group members (Uslaner, 2002; Foddy, Platow, & Yamanashi, 2009). The impact of classification is so compelling that individuals tend to feel positively about group members created in minutes between non-acquaintances in experiments (Paxton & Ressler, 2018; Haidt, 2012). These social categories involving an individual’s identification with “we” can range from primary groups such as a family to wider and ideological ones such as racial groups, a company, political parties or a nation (Realo, Allik, & Greenfield, 2008; Haidt, 2012; Van Hoorn, 2015). In summary, association memberships construct “*opportunities for positive experiences with others under the ‘controlled’ circumstances of shared interest*” (Anheier & Kendall, 2002: 350). It often tends to establish a sense of belonging (we), and thus cultivate trust amongst members (Haidt, 2012).

Even though social psychology shows how individuals categorise others into groups of “we” and “they” by participating in social groups and associations (Hogg 1992; Haidt, 2012), the theories also shed light on the possibility of expanding trust beyond and across associations. That is, as Wright et al. (1997) maintain, a dense network connection to outside groups can expand the borders of the category of membership and eventually create social trust across the associations. Those who once were “they” can become “we” after membership connects and trust is built up. Paxton (2007: 53) also describes it as follows: “*Norms, attitudes, and behaviours are transferred through social networks when voluntary associations are linked, even weakly.*” Networks of interaction established by connections can facilitate the sharing and strengthening of common norms and values across groups, deepening the consistency of interactions across groups and eventually creating trust between them. Involvement in a voluntary association which is connected to different associations can contribute to understanding others and as a result could foster trust, in contrast to those with confined and closed associational connections (Wollebaek & Selle, 2002; Wollebæk & Strømsnes, 2008).

Inter-group contact theory also offers grounds for an explanation of how trust is generalised to out-group members in a similar vein. It suggests that contact across in-group boundaries could reduce negative views of out-groups and foster generalised trust (Uslaner, 2012). According to

the theory, the type of associations, whether they are connected or isolated, is crucial. Connected associations are groups that are highly intertwined with other voluntary associations via the diverse memberships of its joiners (Paxton, 2007). On the contrary, isolated associations are less likely to be linked to other groups (Park & Subramanian, 2012). At the individual level, multiple memberships create more trust than single membership (Glanville, 2016). At the same time, individuals who join multiple associations also connect them (Paxton, 2007). In other words, an individual member who is involved in multiple associations builds a network connection between the groups (Moody & White, 2003). Associations differ in terms of how many of their members have multiple memberships and therefore how connected they are through networks to other associations. All in all, proponents of the connected/isolated classification argue that voluntary associations that are linked via those networks to broader society can be more favourable in terms of constructing generalised trust compared to associations that remain disconnected.

Theoretically, the argument builds on in-groups and out-groups and the extension of networks across associations (Paxton, 2007). Dense network connection across each association makes one to transmit the trust obtained within the association to other group members. Multiple and overlapped associational memberships facilitate the construction of familiarities or knowledge of others across associations. Via “vouching” for mutually trustful members, an unknown person can turn into a trustworthy one (ibid., 51). It is also re-asserted by Paxton and Ressler (2018: 155) as “*if a friend tells you to trust a friend of hers that you have never met, you are likely to do so*”. As briefly mentioned above, Putnam (2000) also classifies the types of association into bridging and bonding ones. According to Putnam (2000: 22), bonding associations can be defined as “*inward looking and tend to reinforce exclusive identities and homogenous groups*”, whereas bridging associations can be viewed as “*outward looking and encompass people across diverse social cleavages*”. In a Tocquevillian sense, membership of connected and bridging associations allows individuals to broaden their sphere of concern.

This section, so far, has examined the function of voluntary associations in cultivating democratic norms and virtue. Advocates who support the socialising function of voluntary associations as schools of democracy maintain that members can gain civic virtues such as trust and tolerance for others via social interactions within and outside associational networks. Analysing the role of voluntary associations for social and political learning processes, Fung (2003) finds that voluntary associations instil civic virtue in its members. According to Fung,

civic virtues entail “*attention to the public good, habits of cooperation, respect for others, respect for the rule of law, willingness to participation in public life, self-confidence, and efficiency*” (ibid.: 519–20). In addition, voluntary associations are assumed to help its members understand other members by teaching “*how to organise themselves, run meetings, write letters, argue issues, and make speeches - that are necessary for all manner of political action*” (ibid.: 520). In short, the denser the network in which an individual is involved, the more they will encounter dissimilarity to others, which can be assumed to be linked to the argument about the greater opportunities to access a broader range of social resources. A set of these processes can improve individuals’ capacity during economic dealings or social negotiations by offering greater chances to understand how to discriminate trustworthy others. To borrow Putnam’s (1993) insight, involvement in voluntary associations can culminate in affluent and productive communities.

2.4 Theory of political culture and political engagement

2.4.1 Verba and Almond and their followers

Theories of political culture (e.g., Verba & Almond, 1963; Pye & Verba, 2015) are also noteworthy in their ability to understand the relationships within voluntary associations and democratic citizenships, as this provides some normative backgrounds of the cultural basis of a stable democracy. Many studies in this field argue that civic engagement, affiliation, and networks allow one to have “*civic-ness*”, which results in a stable and consolidated democracy (e.g., Richey, 2013). In their seminal work Verba and Almond (1963) noted the importance of citizens’ political behaviour for a stable democracy, asserting that “*a democratic form of participatory political system requires a political culture consistent with it*” (ibid.: 5). In terms of theories of democracy, political culture posits that most ordinary people share the common democratic norms and values – the “*habits of hearts*” – that are the essential elements of democratic citizenship (Bellah et al., 2007: 183). In this vein, democratic political culture results in the development of a stable and consolidated democracy, which should be formed and determined by the civic skills of political engagement. According to Verba and Almond (1963), democratic citizens should not only be allegiant in terms of respecting laws and being

loyal to their social rules and norms; they should also be assertive and readily engage in the political process.

The theory of political culture is influential on various field of democratic studies (e.g., the theory of civil society) by emphasising participatory culture (Ito-Morales, 2017). Specifically, voluntarily associated citizens are a crucial element of a stable democracy. From comparative surveys of five nations, Verba and Almond (1963) maintain that political culture, a blend of conventional ones, namely the more traditional and allegiant tendencies, with more contemporary and assertive cultures, is not only “*particularly appropriate for*” but also “*most congruent with*” a stable and effective democracy (Yoon, 2017: 61). Eckstein (1969) elaborates on the congruence theory based on this argument. He argues that the performance of a democratic government can be improved when authority patterns of associations exhibit consistency with the societal level patterns of authority. In addition, Eckstein demonstrates how a mixture of democratic and non-democratic attributes of political culture generates “*balanced disparities*” for the better performance of democratic governance (ibid.: 13). Inglehart, who revived the debates after the 1980s, similarly defines political culture as “*a coherent syndrome of personal life satisfaction, political satisfaction, interpersonal trust and support for the existing social order*” (Inglehart, 1988: 1203). Alongside the given arguments, a growing number of studies stress the importance of an assertive, and allegiant, culture for a stable democracy. One of the most common discourses is that they consistently point to the significance of citizens’ participation in political processes. According to those who support participatory democracy, ordinary citizens “*could be entitled to be able to participate in*” the political processes when there is a well-designed institutional system that can encourage citizens’ active participation (Nylen & Dodd, 2003: 28). These empowered citizens can contribute to the better performance of democracy as a result of preventing political corruption and monitoring the malfunctioning elite politics.

2.4.2 Participatory culture and voluntary associations

The theory of political culture can be summarised by the claim that the more political participation of ordinary citizens there is, the better the performance of democratic governance can be secured. According to Barber’s (2003) term, democracy can be stronger if political participation is guaranteed. In this vein, the importance of involvement in voluntary associations

has also emerged in the field of political culture. As Dalton and Shin (2006) noted, voluntary associations and civil society are among the best places for public mass to engage in political processes, apart from voting. Accordingly, the theory of civic society has tackled the impact of participatory culture on stable democracy in relation to political culture.¹ In their pivotal work, Verba and Almond (1963) noted the positive impact on democracy of involvement in associations. Such associations encompass organisations, groups, or communities. According to the authors, by participation in voluntary associations, ordinary citizens can increase their “*political competence*” (ibid., 313). These enhanced political capacities can be transferred to the levels of “*farther communities*”, that is, national or international, political, and state levels (ibid., 310). In other words, voluntary associations contribute to a better democracy by filling in the gaps between the political systems and the social demands of public. To borrow the expression of Van Deth (2007: vii), voluntary associations can “*incorporate normal citizens into the legal systems of democratic governance*”.

These sets of ideas are in line with the so-called neo-Tocquevillian theories of social capital by ascribing to civil society associational life. Specifically, Almond and Verba (1963) maintain that associational membership improves civil and political virtues, which are related to democratic citizenship. Therefore, the existence of voluntary associations can strengthen the democratic capacities of a society. In the following expressions of Diamond (1999: 242), we can see the significance of the function of voluntary associations for the consolidation of democratic governance: “(Voluntary associations can instil) *not only the participatory habits, interests, and skills of democratic citizenship but also the deeper values of a democratic political culture such as tolerance, moderation, a willingness to compromise, and a respect for opposing viewpoints.*”

The importance of participatory culture for the better performance of democracy can also be witnessed in the notion of social capital. Putnam, (1993: 6) who triggered the debates of social capital, also noted the significance of culture as a necessary condition for a stable democracy, which is “*strong, responsive, effective representative*”. As a result of exploring the relationship

¹ Throughout this chapter, the terms “participation” and “participatory culture” are used interchangeably to refer to citizen involvement in voluntary association or political process. However, it is important to note that some scholars distinguish between these concepts. Participation typically refers to individual acts of engagement, such as voting or attending public meetings, while participatory culture encompasses a broader set of practices which emphasise collaboration, creativity, and social connectedness (Jenkins, 2006).

between civic culture and democracy within one country, such as Italy (ibid.) and the United States (Putnam, 2000), his conviction is that culture, especially participatory civic culture, is crucial for a stable democracy. Based on a comparative study of regional governments in Italy, he further illustrates that the social capital, characterised by the “*features of social organisations and civic virtue such as trust, norms, and networks*”, can enhance the competence of society by promoting cooperative norms (Putnam, 1993: 67). It is also beneficial to the performance of regional and local government. Since his claim, social capital generated through associational participation has been widely understood to function a positive role in collective actions, economic transactions, and the effective operation of democracy, as discussed in the previous section (see also Woolcock, 2010).

Briefly, the aforementioned participatory political culture is inextricably linked to civic engagement in the political process. Many scholars of social capital and political culture commonly argue that voluntary civic associations, dense networks, and participatory culture not only have a positive effect on the stable practice of democratic governance but also contribute to the improvement of democratic citizenship. While Tocqueville and his followers emphasise associations as training arenas of political engagement, political culture theorists also claim that associations offer their members political skills, civic virtues, and opportunities of enlarged political engagement.

All in all, in the arena of both social capital and political culture, researchers have focused on the implications of voluntary associations as places for their members to be involved in the political process. Ensuring thriving opportunities for participating in voluntary associations, democratic governance could be more stable and consolidated.

2.4.3 Civic voluntarism and political engagement

Similar to the abovementioned theory of political culture, Verba, Scholzman and Brady (1995) suggest a model of civic voluntarism that emphasises civic political engagement in the political process. It demonstrates that political institutions play an important role in vitalising individuals to participate in the political process. In the model of civic voluntarism, voluntary associations or other types of civil organisation are regarded as venues where political deliberation, mobilisation and recruitment take place (Iglič & Fabregas, 2007). Civic voluntarism, specifically, is a socio-economic model that pertains to the relationship between voluntary associations and political participation (Ito-Morales, 2017). Myriad forms of

organisation, association and institution – from the primary associations of family to schools, labour unions or religious groups – can be included in the discourse about civic volunteerism.

In terms of political participation, this refers to various forms of citizens' activities in the policy-making process, apart from participation in elections. These activities encompass comprehensive forms of participation. For instance, Verba and Nie (1987) argue that political participation pertains to the activities of ordinary citizens who try to, directly or indirectly, influence the elected public officials or their actions. Verba, Nie, & Kim (1978) also define it as the lawful actions of ordinary citizens to influence public officials or government policies. From a broader perspective, illegal political activity also includes political participation (Barnes & Kaase, 1979). More recently, Huntington and Nelson (2013) assert it as the acts of ordinary citizens intended to influence government policymaking, regardless of whether or not it has an actual effect.

There are also various taxonomies that classify the types of political participation. In the case of dividing into conventional and unconventional participation (Barnes & Kaase, 1979), conventional participation refers to voting and involvement in demonstrations, and unconventional participation pertains to relatively non-institutional participation, such as the refusal to pay taxes, occupation, and sabotage. Similarly, Muller (1982) classifies legal and illegal participation. Legal participation is related to the conventional/unconventional participation mentioned above, while illegal participation refers to disobedience or violent activities. The classification of types of political participation varies relying largely on the researchers' interests. Verba and Nie (1987) classify citizens' political participation into four types, according to their characteristics, which are voting, election campaign, contact and associational activity. According to Huntington and Nelson (2013), it can be divided into: election campaigns, lobbying activities, associational activities, contact and violence.

Among these types of political participation, civic voluntarism is highly related to non-institutional participation, which is adopted by most of the previous studies. That is, non-institutional participation is formed based on voluntary civic associations, while institutional participation takes place under the legal or institutional system of government. This research also focuses on the non-institutional forms of participation, such as assemblies and petitions, demonstrations, and official strikes rather than institutional political participation. As Verba, Scholzman and Brady (1995) point out, these non-institutional associations provide citizens

with opportunities to enhance so-called “habits of hearts”, and decisions made in those environments also lead them to create ways of being involved in various political activities. In summary, through participating in voluntary associations, citizens can obtain civic skills and these capacities can be transmitted to the political arena. Voluntary associations help citizens spend their resources in a more efficient way for political purposes, ultimately encouraging them to engage more actively in politics (Verba, Scholzman, & Brady, 1995). These arguments have been supported through empirical studies. For instance, Han (2016) recently discovered that voluntary associations serve an important function in promoting political activities in the US. According to Han, participatory individuals get involved in political processes in myriad ways, including actively attending meetings, engaging others, letting their political voice be heard and positively influencing the creation of political interest among individuals (see also Lee, 2020; No, Han, and Wang, 2021).

2.4.4 Empirical corroboration

For more than a couple of decades, a volume of empirical studies has thrown a good deal of light on the nature and origins of democratic citizenship. In terms of the relationship and democratic citizenship, the existing endeavours on this issue are well illustrated by Newton, Stolle and Zmerli (2018: 42). They assert that most of the existing empirical research pay particular attention to “*the role of voluntary associations in developing and sustaining it; and the ways in which the asymmetric nature of these correlations is dependent on different types of various form of democratic citizenship*”. The majority of research on voluntary associations and democratic citizenship so far has often focused on the number of associational memberships, rather than distinguishing between types of association (Paxton & Ressler, 2018). Research has also tended to be cross-sectional and not to take the contextual and structural features into account when modelling the relationship between the given variables.

This section will review the evidence for and against an effect of associations on democratic citizenship, which comprises civic virtue – trust and tolerance – and political engagement – voting, an interest in politics and political activities. A considerable amount of study has investigated the relationship between associational membership and trust across the world. Among them, the author primarily focuses on studies from the United States, Western European countries, and East Asian societies in line with the purpose of this research.

When using various types of cross-sectional data set and investigating all types of association, studies tend to find an effect between the amount of associational membership and trust (Newton, Stolle, & Zmerli, 2018). For instance, Stolle (1998) found that the members who are most involved are also the most trusting of other group members. Howard and Gilbert (2008), in a similar vein, discovered that multiple memberships in voluntary associations enhance more trust in the US and many other European countries. Some scholars have explicitly constructed plausible models for examining the reciprocal association between voluntary associational membership and trust in ensuring that the direction of impact flows in both directions. Using Doyle, Dane and Bernbach survey, Shah (1998), for instance, models a beneficial relationship between voluntary associations and social trust in the US. He discovers that associational membership is linked to the generation of trust, but no evidence can be found for the opposite. It is noteworthy that this annual survey has more than 3,600 pre-recruited recipients across the US regarding demographic characteristics, and the data has proven to be an effective barometer of mainstream America (Putnam & Yonish, 1998). Brehm and Rahn (1997) used another data set, the General Social Survey. Based on this result, they also assert that the influence of voluntary associations on the construction of trust is much stronger than the other way around. Paxton et al. (2011) also used the same data set as Brehm and Rahn (1997) to construct a model to explore the reciprocal relationship between voluntary associations and trust. Their discovery reinforces the idea that there is a relationship between trust and participation in voluntary associations, but it suggests that this relationship is unidirectional: participations in associations can positively influence trust, but trust does not necessarily lead to more association involvement. More recently, Glanville (2016) employed cross-sectional data of the Social Capital Benchmark Survey from Harvard University for a similar purpose. She discovered a reciprocal impact between trust and associations, and yet its influences are relatively weak. The socialisation impact of multiple membership of voluntary associations on trust is predominantly arbitrated by the density of the associations' networks.

Besides modelling the reciprocal relationship from cross-sectional data, time-ordered longitudinal analyses also strengthen the causal direction of the above-mentioned relationship. Claibourn and Martin (2000) adopted longitudinal data from the Michigan Socialization Study. The range of data used in the analysis is noticeably long, from 1965 to 1982. They found not strong but positive and significant impacts of associational membership on trust, while the opposite direction is not significant. With a cross-lagged model, Quintelier and Hooghe (2012)

also suggest that associational membership socialises individuals into increased trust. According to their findings, the relationships between the given variables are reciprocal. However, the impact of involvement in voluntary associations on trust is far more powerful than the effect of trust on the willingness to partake in associational membership.

In contrast to the analyses adopting cross-sectional data and random-effects models, most studies that employ a fixed-effect modelling strategy fail to demonstrate a significant relationship between associational membership and trust.² For instance, Sturgis et al. (2012) use measurements of formal social networks that include associational memberships and demonstrate that the coefficients for these social network variables are reduced significantly in the fixed-effects model. This finding leads them to conclude that changes in formal and informal social networks have no causal relationship to changes in levels of trust. This conclusion is also supported with fixed effects modelling on data from Switzerland (Van Ingen & Bekkers, 2015). Many studies using time-series data with fixed-effect modelling yield the similar mixed results. Van Ingen and Bekkers (2015) investigated the effect of association participation on the creation of trust by adding data from Britain, the Netherlands and Australia to the above-mentioned Swiss sample. Their modelling with fixed effects also fails to find a significant effect of associational participation on trust. Interestingly, 10% of the sample shows higher trust in the first year of the study (when using a separated regression), but the effect does not continue in the second year. Another research conducted by Wollebaek and Selle (2002) (see also Wollebæk and Strømsnes, 2008) yields similar results. By adopting the data set of Norwegian and European societies, their findings demonstrate no significant differences in social capital (measured by trust, networks, and involvement in civic associations) between participatory and non-participatory individual members (see also Van der Meer & Van Ingen, 2009). More recently, van der Meer (2016) focused on the potential mechanism of voluntary associations increasing out-group trust (towards different ethnicity). Their discovery also finds that trust does not vary significantly among individuals who are more regularly or enthusiastically involved in voluntary associations.

The above empirical studies show the complicatedness of the relationship between voluntary associations and democratic citizenship. Many studies show that associational participation has

² In the fixed-effects model, the intercepts of each observation are random, but the coefficient is fixed to measure the influence of the independent variable regardless of, for instance, the time-invariant variable. For detailed information, please see Allison and Christakis (2006).

positive effects on the increase in democratic citizenship such as trust, but it is difficult to find such significance in studies, especially using time-series data and the fixed-effects model. As the longitudinal study using the fixed-effects model is a method that considers the time-invariant variable as an error term in the equation, which can complement the biased estimation of the OLS regression (Sengewald & Pohl, 2019). The different results between cross-sectional and longitudinal studies above may stand for the influence of unobserved variables, which can cause a overestimation of the role of associations in OLS regression (see Maxwell, Cole, & Mitchell, 2011).

Furthermore, as seen in the following chapter, there is a volume of counterevidence in explaining the socialisation effect of associational membership on democratic citizenship. Much of this conflicting evidence is found especially in studies from East Asia (e.g., Park, 2012). This situation may require a different perspective in the relationship between voluntary associations and democratic citizenship.

2.5 Counterarguments

Among advocates who affirm the positive role of voluntary associations, scepticism also exists. For instance, Ellis (2005) recognised that associational life is not flawless in creating and strengthening a democratic environment. Some scholars point out the limitations of the impact of voluntary associations' socialisation in the following ways.

First, the composition of their members is based on “voluntariness”, which can create a problem. Specifically, a volunteer association can be either more inclusive or exclusive in selecting its members. Because the formation of an association is literally “voluntary”, there are no forced rules or obligations to form an association. Put another way, each voluntary association has its own rule in constructing and choosing its members. A mafia group is akin to the classical example in this case (Varese, 2020). Mafia-like associations, composed of reliable and intimate members, promote trust and cooperative activities among members, and yet they have nothing to do with the increase in democratic values. In contrast to the voluntary civic associations, governmental institutions or associations can be seemingly more comprehensive, inclusive, and democratic. This is because, as Ellis (2005) points out, governmental associations impose democratic and anti-discriminatory norms. The given example shows a conceptual tension of

democracy between the theories and reality. Normatively, democracy should guarantee inclusion and equal opportunities as much as possible. However, at the same time, it should also entail free choice, and thus the tension between inclusion and exclusion in membership is hardly avoidable. Furthermore, these homogeneous associations tend to foster in-group trust, while harming generalised trust. As Dekker and Uslaner (2003) pointed out, voluntary associations may not always have a beneficial effect on the generation of democratic citizenship. Although membership of voluntary associations is usually accompanied by positive impacts on democratic citizenship in terms of increased trust and political engagement (Van Deth & Zmerli, 2010), such a characteristic of mafia-like bonding trust can be associated with negative consequences. These so-called “dark sides” of associational membership entail intolerance and polarised, divided societies. In addition, Van Deth and Zmerli (2010) also suggest that a welfare system in a society affects the cooperative tendency between citizens. That is to say, societal-level contexts also need to be considered as an important condition for the formation of democratic citizenship. In this vein, Van Deth and Zmerli (2010) maintain that we need to scrutinise the internal attributes of the association, as well as the context of macro-level variables for the positive impacts of associational membership.

Second, these arguments are also connected to the discussion of the structural relationship of an association with external groups. Some scholars point out the importance of the associational structure in the relation within and outside the groups for the creation of democratic citizenship. That is to say, the fact that associations can be competing and replicated also raises another dilemma. In the case of members facing opposition within a voluntary association, members can freely leave one group and join the other “*similar but without- opposite-group association*” (ibid., 355). As a result, a voluntary association can gather members with more similar opinions, which reflects the contradictory aspects of freedom in a democratic society. The “voluntariness” of the association can be associated with exclusive and inclusive membership simultaneously. When voluntary associations continue to choose similar members to join, civic skills through discussions, negotiations and compromises will never be achieved.

Another negative facet of voluntary associations can be derived from the hierarchical structure within and outside the associations (Maloney & Rossteutscher, 2007). These hierarchical structures can originate from rivalry and competition between several associations serving a similar purpose in an equivalent sector. The situation of associations competing for similar goals can lead to competition in mobilising better, or the best, members. Such competition

often results in divisions between members. While some members can receive a kind of compensation based on their expertise, competence and personal networks, others remain ordinary volunteers. According to Maloney and Rossteutscher (2007), this differentiation among members is often found in large and famous associations, for instance, Amnesty International and so forth. In these large associations some employees are usually full-time staff. According to Maloney and Rossteutscher's (2007) research, some low-skilled members seem to stop meeting other members or begin to lose their original motivation. Many of these ordinary members just donate intermittently to maintain their membership. Dekker and Uslaner (2003) find that such intensive, as well as empty, participation in voluntary associations is often witnessed, especially in the case of German, Dutch and Scandinavian societies. The original will of solidarity of the participants is overridden by a bureaucratic hierarchical structure of association. More seriously, this situation can be linked to the so-called "free-rider" problem, when there is an asymmetry of information between the staff and the ordinary participants. Undeniably, "free-riding" is one of the most common problems of democracy (Ostrom, 2000). Democratic citizenship is a powerful driver for preventing such free-riding problems; however, as mentioned above, sometimes the voluntary association itself does not cultivate the democratic virtue. Based on the empirical studies on the relation between voluntary associations and democratic citizenship within European countries, Halman (2003) found that there is no significant and sufficient evidence between the two given variables. More specifically, voluntary association does not automatically guarantee such civic and democratic virtues for their members than non-voluntary associations. According to Halman, the level of education is more crucial for the increase of democratic citizenship among its members. Newton (1999), in a similar vein, emphasises the significance of education for enhancing democratic norms and citizenships. He particularly stresses the role of a university education by offering evidence that university students develop social skills working with strangers together from the "*same community during the university period*" (ibid., 18). Specifically, his research emphasises the importance of group activities because such activities allow one to develop a sense of citizenship, universalism, and cooperative norms. In summary, what is crucial is the structure of an association rather than the association itself for cultivating democratic citizenship, as noted by Clark (2017).

Third, in addition to the context and its structure, it is necessary to refer to the arguments of a series of communitarian thinkers to explain the relationship between the voluntary association

and democratic citizenship. This is because these sets of communitarian philosophers emphasise the harmony of the individual's obligations and rights, which has often been overlooked by civil society theorists. According to their arguments, voluntary associations contribute to the stability of democracy by simultaneously helping people with their obligations to society and their rights. For instance, Dagger (1997) points to the role of voluntary associations, especially political ones, for a stable democracy by extending an individual's political concern. At the same time, however, he also highlights that if this associational life does not presuppose the existence of a community, it can break the political community per se by accelerating the individualism of members beyond the association itself. In other words, the emphasis on participation in voluntary associations without the premise of the community can lead to abuse of individual freedom. He asserts that the rights and freedom of individuals cannot be established apart from the community, as everyone relies heavily on the presence of community (See also Sandel, 2005). Accordingly, the importance of individual rights and freedom is undeniable; however, the other side of rights, that is, responsibilities towards society, should not be abandoned. As every individual member can be involved in voluntary associations (Dagger emphasises "*political associations*"), all of them have the responsibility to behave virtuously for the common good. Otherwise, the community per se cannot exist. According to this communitarian thinking, democratic citizenship is a consequence, but also a prerequisite, of associational life, as they instil in their members the need to concern about "*common good for the society*" (Dagger, 1997: 14). Surely, democratic citizenship is hardly achievable as the individual members of a community are likely to be tempted to "free-ride" on the other members' goodwill. According to Dagger, the solution to the problem is civic education. For Dagger, the best training arena for civic education for obtaining democratic citizenship is associations. From the immediate community (such as family or neighbours) to broader associations (e.g., political associations), one can learn their duties and rights for the community simultaneously. This is aligned with the arguments from political culture, which emphasises the role of communal life for enhancing the stability of democracy, as Verba and Almond (1963) outlined: An indispensable element of decent democracy should be based on the experience of significant proportion of people participating "*in the work of small*", and voluntary associations in relation either to "*local government, trade unions, or other types of civic activities*" (ibid., 164). This strand of an idea from communitarian thoughts is intriguing, as it is also aligned with some arguments from political culture emphasising that a mixture of an assertive and more traditional and allegiant culture is the most appropriate for stable

democratic governance. All in all, people can think and behave in accordance with democratic virtues when they learn their duties and rights from the associational life.

One of the most prevalent and crucial viewpoints criticising the role of voluntary associations in fostering democratic citizenship, fourth, is that these theories fundamentally originated from the individualistic nature of Western society (Ito-Morales, 2017). Paradoxically, this problem becomes more conspicuous as democracy spreads into global societies (ibid.). This critical view can be revealed in the discourse of debates about Asian values, and it is also associated with the communitarian thoughts mentioned above. As seen above, a vast number of studies highlight that the consequences of voluntary associations can largely depend on the circumstances and structures of the associations. In brief, consisting of more diverse members, and the more horizontally structured associations, the more positive effects can be derived for the formation of trust, tolerance, and political engagement. Unfortunately, however, most of the given theories and counterarguments have been developed around Western societies, where individualistic, pluralist, and horizontal cultures are already prevalent (Qi, 2013). In the other contexts where more collectivistic, paternalistic, and hierarchical cultures prevail, participation in voluntary associations can be understood and function in a completely different way.

It is also noteworthy that, except for some communitarian approaches, it is difficult to find any argument that mentions the harmony between individual-level democratic citizenship and social order for stable democracy. As we will see in the more detailed discussions in the subsequent chapter, this is the point that some advocates of certain Asian values argue. Specifically, some political leaders from East Asia, such as Lee Kuan-yew and Mahathir Mohamad, regard voluntary associations as a channel that can harm an orderly society and cause various social problems by promoting enthusiasm for “more rights” of individuals (e.g., Zakaria, 1994). According to them, this can eventually harm democratic citizenship. Also, as mentioned by Markus and Kitayama (1991) in their pivotal work, the individuality of East Asians is not solely independent (as so-called Westerners) but deeply interdependent. For them, individuals cannot be fundamentally separated from the community, as the Western communitarian thinkers emphasised. This difference can alter the formation, as well as viewpoints, of democratic citizenship. In the more collectivistic and hierarchical countries, the relationships between voluntary associations and society or government can also vary. Indeed, there have been intensive debates on the nature and relationships of voluntary associations with society, especially from East Asian academia. They are noteworthy because these researches

have attempted to unravel the dissimilarities in explaining the nature of civic associations and their role in democracy from different points of view based on the Western and East Asian intellectual tradition. The differences are crucial and intriguing as it is linked to the substantial debates on the understanding of democracy within West and East societies. For instance, as Fine (2014) points out, the nature of civic society can be deeply influenced by collective manners of cultural characteristic, religious traditions, or ideologies. By scrutinising the Chinese case, Wakeman Jr (1993) further elaborates that these different characteristics can shape the notion of citizens and democratic governance, which eventually affect the relationship between individuals and the state. Therefore, one of the major variances between two intellectual discourses can be revealed from the different viewpoints on the relationship between individuals and society.

The Western intellectual traditions regard voluntary associations as indispensable intermediaries linking citizens and the state (Dunn & Hann, 1996; Newton, 2001; Van Rooy & Robinson, 2020). At the heart of this notion of voluntary associations, there are three major scholarly tenets in the terrain of social sciences: i) liberalism, ii) communitarianism and iii) republican thoughts (van Deth, Montero, and Westholm, 2007). Liberalism assumes that independent individuals from the state pay particular attention to individual freedom, especially “negative freedom”. The autonomy of individuals is the most prioritised value, and the importance of the community is less emphasised. In this regard, disagreeable interference from states is regarded as unjust and unwelcome. Under these traditions, voluntary associations can be perceived as a place that creates spontaneous order. The communitarian thought is antithetical to the liberalistic idea. As seen in the earlier section with the discussion from Dagger, they stress the communal responsibility and individuals’ right to self-recognition at the same time. As a place where individual social responsibility is educated, the nearest associations such as family are emphasised. Lastly, republican thoughts pay attention to the importance of political associations. While this intellectual tradition shares some similarities with communitarianism, as both prioritise the role of political associations in shaping individual rights and obligations as mentioned by Van Deth, Montero and Westholm (2007), there is a key difference. Unlike communitarianism, republican thought does not place emphasis on artificial political associations.

These notions of voluntary associations, however, can hardly be acceptable in more paternalistic Confucian East Asian societies. In terms of Confucian ideas, the state is not

necessarily the counterpart of citizens. Rather, the relation is supposed to be harmonious, like the parent–child one (Jacques, 2012). In this regard, the purpose of voluntary associations is to promote stability, harmony, and order to increase the common good of society (Park & Kim, 2001). Aligned with the given discussions, Dunn and Hann’s (1996) following argument is worth noting. They argue that in contemporary literature, in the discourse about voluntary associations, the notion of the West-oriented form of civil society is widely adopted, but little consideration is given to the varieties of different notions and the possibility of other forms of civicism. Accordingly, the theories of civil society can be in danger of “*overgeneralisation of the concept*” (ibid., 2). Specifically, as the notion of civil society, and the related concept of voluntary associations, are fundamentally based on Western thoughts of liberal individualism, different thoughts from different regional and cultural backgrounds tend to be disregarded. In summary, the influence of voluntary associations on democracy in different countries in other regions is not necessarily parallel to the Western path.

The rest of the research chapters will pay much attention to the different notions of voluntary associations in the East Asian context in a more sophisticated way, in line with Dunn and Hann (1996). As witnessed in the course of Asian values debates, the distinctive cultural characteristics and historical paths of East Asia can alter the perspective of the relationship between citizens and states, and it may shed new light on the relationship between voluntary associations and democratic citizenship.

2.6 Concluding remarks

This chapter reviews the existing mainstream theories on the relationship between voluntary associations and democratic citizenship, exploring empirical evidence and also briefly summarising the counterarguments, mainly from East Asia. Once again, scholars in the field of social capital and political culture have often mentioned the role of voluntary associations in fostering democratic citizenship, and it is eventually associated with the better functioning of democratic governance. First and foremost, Putnam (2000) noted a decline in participation in voluntary associations in the US, and he was concerned that it could be a negative harbinger of democracy in America. However, there are some scholars who stand against Putnam’s assertion. For instance, Dekker and Uslaner (2003) criticise Putnam for attaching too much importance

to “face-to-face” engagement. Kobayashi and Ikeda (2009) point out that the mechanisms by which associational participation leads to political activities are not clear. In addition, as the theory expands into various fields, numerous perspectives are emerging in the academic fields. For instance, Soroka, Helliwell, and Johnston (2003) argue that in the field of politics, literature tends to examine the connection between formal association membership and political engagement, whereas sociologists tend to emphasise the nature of networks within associations. Despite these different perspectives, however, what the series of discussions shares is that participation in voluntary associations serves a positive role in the generation of democratic citizenship such as trust and political engagement.

Based on Tocqueville’s observation from early 19th century America, contemporary debates of social capital stress the role of voluntary associations in the generation of democratic citizenship. Along with social capital, theories of political culture are also noteworthy. In their pivotal work of the civic culture, Verba and Almond (1963) emphasise the importance of participatory culture for a well-functioning democracy. They argue that the propensity of an ordinary citizen’s cooperative action is heavily relied on social attitudes, such as paying trust and reciprocity to the others, which can be strengthened via involvement in voluntary associations. That is to say, such voluntary associations instil in their members cooperative habits and reciprocal norms. Accordingly, involvement in voluntary associations can be regarded as a fundamental source of democratic citizenship such as tolerance, trust and political engagement, which ultimately leads to a stable democracy and support for democratic institutions (Park, 2012).

As previously mentioned, the most critical components of democratic citizenship, that is, the most commonly highlighted in the field of social capital and political culture, are trust and political engagement. In other words, individuals can develop tolerance or trust for social diversity as they form networks with various kinds of people beyond associations. Also, participation in associations is linked to an increase in political engagement by extending an individual’s level of interest to society in general. For this reason, it has been one of the main interests for researchers to identify the exact mechanism by which voluntary associations foster democratic citizenship. Based on the previous works, this chapter has paid attention to the mechanism of associations and democratic citizenship. The distinction between bridging and bonding associations, and between isolated and connected associations, can shed light on our understanding of the relationship. All in all, this chapter has attempted to scrutinise the effects

of forms and content of different associations.

Even though it is widely believed that voluntary associations can create democratic citizenship, there are some important counterarguments. Specifically, while existing theories certainly touch on important factors that offer a possible explanation for associational life and its democratic socialisation effects, some theories and empirical corroboration, mainly from East Asia, reveal a contesting argument. The discrepancy highlights the need for a new theoretical approach to understanding the importance of cultural contexts in new democracies. As will be discussed in detail in Chapter 3, some of the major concerns about the relationship between voluntary associations and democratic citizenship can be summarised as follows.

First, individuals who join voluntary associations may already be more trusting people in general than those who do not. There is no question that membership of voluntary associations involves a degree of trust a priori. Thus, scholars have raised the concern that individuals that involve in voluntary associations are already inclined to be more trusting than their counterparts (Nannestad, 2008; Sturgis et al., 2012). The observed differences in trust between joiners and non-joiners are therefore originated from the level of trust inherent in the act of joining an association. It may also be that trusting people are the ones that are most likely to maintain their membership over time (Bekkers, 2012). If more trusting people join associations, then a reciprocal relationship might exist (Sønderskov, 2010). In other words, trust would predict membership, as well as vice versa. Many scholars have also used longitudinal data to disentangle the causal relationship between associational membership and trust, as explored above (see also Claibourn & Martin, 2000; Quintelier & Hooghe, 2012). However, the examinations of many longitudinal researches provide some insights that the inclusion of fixed effects is necessary to ensure that unobserved characteristics are not truly responsible for the observed relationship between membership and democratic citizenship. This study will take some individual socio-demographical characteristics into the model to reflect the fixed effects. The details will be explained in the following chapter.

Second, there may be another factor that remains unmeasured and unexplored in theory. That is, some unmeasured characteristic of individuals or the social context might generate either group membership or democratic citizenship, therefore explaining away the observed relationship between the given two variables. While there are relatively few suggestions for what these unmeasured characteristics might be, Nannestad (2008) points to the presence of

good institutions and cultural contexts in the formation of generalised trust. Among them, this study adopts the hypothesis that cultural values of society influence the formation of democratic citizenship. In the following chapters the author will take a closer look at the debates about the relationship between cultural values and democratic citizenship in line with debates over Asian values after the mid-1990s.

Chapter 3. Asian values and democratic citizenship

3.1 Background

This chapter sets out the discourse around debates about Asian values in order to figure out the relation between cultural values and democratic citizenship. As briefly mentioned in the previous chapter, the unique cultural characteristics and historical heritage from different regions provide different viewpoints on the relationship between individuals and the state. In this regard, exploring intensive debates about the compatibility between Asian values and Western democratic values since the 1990s can shed new light on the fields of social capital, political culture and theories of civil society. This chapter is structured as follows. The following Section 3.2 outlines a brief history of the debate about Asian values since the 1990s. Then, Section 3.3 offers two major components of Asian values: collectivism and hierarchism. Section 3.4 explains the previous works, which scrutinise the association between Asian values and democratic citizenship by introducing the compatible and incompatible thesis. Finally, Section 3.5 offers some concluding remarks.

Since former Singaporean Prime Minister Lee Kuan-yew triggered the debates around Asian values in the 1990s, there has been much interest in the academic fields in how Asian values influence the economy and democracy in East Asia. According to Lee Kuan-yew, East Asia's staggering socio-economic development was predominantly owing to its distinctive cultural attributes, based on Confucian and family-based collectivistic values (Zakaria, 1994). Furthermore, he ascribed the “breakdown” of American civil societies to the prevalence of extreme individualism. According to his expression, “*the expansion*” of the rights of individuals “*to behave or misbehave ... has come at the expense of orderly society*” (ibid.: 111). This discussion resonates with the concerns of some Western communitarian philosophers, who worry that the emphasis on individualistic liberal values can lead to a lack of social responsibility towards the community.

On the other hand, there is a propagation of scepticism about Asian values and their negative impact on Asian societies, especially after the financial crisis of the late 1990s. For instance, Fukuyama (Fukuyama, 2001; 2014) saw that the traditional Asian family-based cultural

tradition is easily linked to amoral familyism and nepotism, which in turn leads to corruption by fostering in-group favouritism. This is aligned with the “dark side” of social capital labelled by Van Deth and Zmerli (2010) (or sometimes labelled as ‘unsocial capital’ according to Levi, 1996). Attachment to traditional familyism and collectivism in East Asian society can have a positive impact on particularised trust on family and neighbours, but it can also deter the expansion of generalised trust towards society in general beyond such primary groups.

These conflicting views on Asian values then extend to the discussion about the compatibility between Asian values and liberal democracy. It is intriguing that this discussion can offer a different perspective to conventional ideas on the relationship between voluntary associations and democratic citizenship. Unlike the Tocquevillian (2003)[1835] tradition, which regards voluntary associations as the foundations of democracy, advocates of Asian values view voluntary associations as a channel for claiming individual “rights”, which eventually harm the harmonious social order. Therefore, unlike Putnam (2000), who argues that the decline of participation in voluntary associations is a harbinger of a decrease in social capital in America, some Asian values theorists maintain that unlimited expansion of individual rights through voluntary associations might come at the expense of a disciplined and well-ordered society and even a stable democracy itself (Jiang, 2000).

Given these contesting ideas, exploring the actual role of voluntary associations in East Asia is fascinating. However, there is hardly any agreement on how voluntary associations affect democratic citizenship in East Asia. This is partially because there have been relatively few empirical studies examining the impact of Asian values on democracy in practice. Furthermore, much of the previous literature has focused on single case studies on one society, such as Japan (Ikeda, 2002; Ito-Morales, 2017), South Korea (Cha, 2003; Knowles, 2015; Dwivedi, 2017) and China (Bell, 2010a; Jiang, 2013). There is a volume of cross-border comparative studies (Dalton and Ong, 2005; He, 2007; Park, 2011; Shin and Sin, 2012; Yoon, 2017). However, almost all of them focus only on Asian regions, which have cultural similarities. Thus, previous research does not allow us to achieve universal understandings of the relationships between cultural values and democracy. In this vein, this research will compare Western and East Asian countries to examine how cultural values affect democratic citizenship based on the comparison of theoretical legacies of the neo-Tocquevillian (Ellickson, 2016; Klein and Lee, 2019) thesis and Asian values debates (Ortmann and Thompson, 2016; Shin, 2017). The findings will shed some light on whether there are indeed any distinctive cultural values in East

Asia. They will also broaden the understanding of the function of Asian values in influencing democracy.

3.2 Brief history of Asian values debates

3.2.1 The rise and fall of Asian values debates

If culture is regarded as a constantly mutating social circumstances in the field of social science, the values which comprise it should be recognised “*in the context of historical processes*”, as Sen argues (2014: 51). In this regard, exploring the fluctuations of debates about Asian values can be prioritised before disentangling the relationship between democracy and East Asia’s distinctive culture features.

While the origin of dichotomisation of the “East” (or Orient) against the counter-entity of the “West” (or Occident) dates back much further (e.g., Emerson, 1995), the modern debate about “Asian values”, which is related to the purpose of this research, was provoked by a series of politico-economic incidents after the 1990s. One of the most important incidents was the whipping of an 18-year-old American high-school student by the Singaporean government for vandalism (Kim, 2010). This case received wide coverage from international politics and the media. Bill Clinton, President of the US at the time, called the Singaporean government for a plea, and more than twenty US congresspeople signed a letter to the Singaporean government requesting leniency. While many American citizens and the media criticised the Singaporean government and their stringent legal systems for unmitigated infringement of individual rights, Singaporean officials maintained their stance with the logic of cultural values such as strong morality (Fawcett, 1994).

A similar event occurred later, in 2005. A Vietnamese Australian, Van-Tuong Nguyen, was arrested and executed by Singapore on suspicion of possession of 400 grams of heroin. Australian Prime Minister Edward Whitlam condemned the Singaporean government as “a rogue Chinese port” for the immoderate punishment of the foreigner, who had no previous criminal record (Grattan, 2005). The Singaporean government maintained its position in order to preserve social order.

The above-mentioned events were not simply diplomatic problems but far more profound ones for the Singaporean government (Fukuyama, 1995a). For them, it was considered a just right for a sovereign state to implement its legal procedures on international citizens. Moreover, some Singaporean practitioners used the case as a means to justify their authoritarian regime by accusing Western liberal democracy of social disorder and rampant social problems. They argued that undisciplined behaviours that harm the social order would not be welcome in East Asia and would need to be castigated. For instance, Lee Kuan-yew maintained that Western liberal democracy based on individualism had come at the expense of social order by leading to problems of “*guns, drugs, violent crimes, vagrancy, and unbecoming behaviours in public*” (Zakaria, 1994: 111). This claim echoed the greater logic that Singaporeans have been making, namely, that Western-style democracy does not seem to be compatible with Asian culture. Rather, they argued that cultural traits based on Confucianism in Northeast Asia, so-called “Asian values” (interchangeably Confucian values; Cha, 2003) create a far more consistent ideological foundation for orderly East Asian society compared to the liberal democracy from the West (Fukuyama, 1995a: 1).

A more recent development in the literature arises from economics, which traces Asian economic miracles to Confucian cultural values. Many scholars have attributed the miraculous successes of the East Asian region to their Confucian values, most notably “*familism, communalism, authority orientations, and work ethic*” (Kim, 2010; Lew, 2013). Scientific terms such as the “Asian economic development model” (Pye, 2000) or “Confucian capitalism” (Cha, 2003) emerged in academia, as demonstrated in the statement of culturalists like the one below:

In the early 1990s, I happened to come across economic data on Ghana and South Korea from the early 1960s, and was astonished to see how similar their economies were then. These two countries had roughly comparable levels of per capita GNP; similar divisions of their economy among primary products, manufacturing, and services; and overwhelmingly primary product exports, with South Korea” ... producing ... “a few manufactured goods. Also, they were receiving comparable levels of economic aid. Thirty years later, South Korea had become an industrial giant with the fourteenth largest economy in the world. No such changes had occurred in Ghana, whose per capita GNP was now about one-fifteenth that of South Korea’s. Undoubtedly, many factors played a role, but it seemed to me that culture had to be a large part of the explanation. South Koreans valued thrift, investment, hard work, education, organization, and

discipline. Ghanaians had different values. In short, cultures count. (Harrison and Huntington, 2002; xiii)

Of course, the discourse about Asian values may have lost its theoretical validity since after the Asian economic crisis in the 1990s, with the accusation of “crony capitalism” (Fukuyama, 2001). However, it is frequently wrongly supposed that the Asian values debates disappeared afterwards. As Thompson (2015) argues, supporters of this seemingly illiberal rhetoric reconstruct the logic in a shape of “good governance”. Technocrats in some countries link the globalised good governance discourse by emphasising the necessity for an authoritarian government to strengthen states’ competitiveness after the economic crisis. Specifically, the Singaporean and Malaysian governments used “Asian values” and government-led developmental strategies to combat the “ill” effects of Westernisation (Thompson, 2000). In addition, China has actively sought to support its own model of economic development, with socio-political stability as an alternative for the Western democratic consensus, following the Singaporean example (Ortmann and Thompson, 2016; Thompson, 2019). Tu (2014) also claimed that the Confucian tradition in the modernisation processes is still evident in East Asia. He argued that the model of developmental states that started with Japan, Korea and Taiwan is based largely on Confucian heritage, which stresses strong leadership of government, followed by contemporary China and Vietnam. According to Thompson and Tu, therefore, the Asian values discourse remains, albeit in a different form.

As discussed above, the Asian values debates have fluctuated according to East Asia’s politico-economic changes. Before examining the associations between Asian values and democratic citizenship, which is the main target of this research, a deeper investigation is needed on how these debates have taken place.

3.2.2 Two pillars of the Asian values debates

Since Lee Kuan-yew popularised the term “Asian values” in the mid-1990s, the debates about the association between Asian values and democracy have primarily been divided into three parts. The first is about whether Asian values really exist and the second concerns the compatibility of Asian culture with Western liberal democracy. On the other hand, there are substantial discussions about how Asian values have affected the economic development of the

region. In this chapter the main focus is on the first two dimensions.

Asian values, do they really exist?

The first type of debate pertains to the fundamental question of whether Asian values really exist. Furthermore, it will also scrutinise whether these cultural traits of Asian values exist only in East Asia. Many scholars have long speculated about the existence of distinct and coherent cultural characteristics in East Asia compared to non-Asian regions. Supporters of Asian values would argue that East Asians uphold their unique cultural characteristics, traditions and rituals, which succeeded mostly from the region's historical path – comprising the “Asian exceptionalism thesis” maintaining the different value systems between the West and East (Bomhoff and Gu, 2012). On the contrary, critics maintain that Asian values are actually fictitious, recalled by a few Asian politicians to legitimate their authoritarian governments (Kim, 2010; see also Welzel, 2012).

Aligned with these political issues, there has been intense controversy over whether Asian values are really present. As discussed in the previous section, Lee Kuan-yew, the most well-known progenitor of the notion, followed the roots of Asian values back to Confucian thought from ancient China. He maintained that economic development and socio-political stability in East Asia were derived from the foundations of family values, which are largely based on Confucianism (Zakaria, 1994). This idea, then, flowed into many practitioners and scholars in the East, as well as Southeast Asia. Although the philosophies that influenced the ground of East Asia's culture are myriad, many scholars have agreed that imprints of Confucianism in these regions are deep and still in existence (Nathan, 2012). Lee Kuan-yew dichotomised the East Asian region as Confucian and non-Confucian regions. Confucian societies encompass countries such as China, Japan, Korea, Singapore, and Vietnam, where Confucian values still linger, while Southeast Asia has a mixture of Sinic and Indian cultures (Zakaria, 1994). Many scholars have pointed out that Indian culture itself emphasises similar values to Confucianism (e.g., Sen, 2014). At the heart of Asian values are Confucian values, as articulated by the ancient philosopher (Sen, 2014).

Even though a more detailed discussion of the components of Asian values will take place in the following section, in accordance with the supporters of Asian values, the economic

accomplishments and political transformation of this region do not solely depend on the reproduction of Western-imported socio-political values. Rather, the conservation and encouragement of the core Confucian philosophy – such as familyism, collectivism, authority orientations, education and work ethic (Nathan, 2012) – are the main drivers of its development. With respect to the relationship between cultural values and democratic citizenship, these Confucian values are particularly significant because there have been vigorous debates over whether these cultural values are compatible with liberal democracy. They therefore provide a sound basis for exploring Asian values in this study. Previous empirical research on each of these cultural aspects is set out below.

Kim (2010) contends that East Asians uphold different cultural attitudes to non-Asians. By conducting multi-level regressions within 72 countries across the regions, Kim finds that East Asians have a significantly high level of familial values and authority orientations. Empirical studies on political culture also provide a clue that East Asian societies have a distinctive culture compared to the West. For instance, Bomhoff and Gu (2012: 1) found that many individuals from East Asia preserve significantly distinctive perspectives to “*work, family, and social issues that would appear traditional and conservative by today’s Western standard*”. They further assert that these values are “*held typically by people who are less trusting and more suspicious of democracy*” (ibid.: 1). Welzel and Dalton (2017) also suggest that East Asian societies are more likely to hold a blend of solid allegiant cultures with slightly fainter assertive self-expression values. They suppose that these peculiar examples may indicate the legacy of Confucian values, which emphasises prevailing respect for authority in East Asian societies (see also Inglehart & Welzel, 2010).

On the other hand, criticism of the existence of Asian values can largely be summarised in three dimensions. First, there is scepticism about the existence of Asian values per se. The opponents have often mentioned that Asian values do not designate an inclusive term that takes in myriad forms of values across the whole of Asia. Since Asia is the birthplace of various cultures and religions, the form of customs and practical manners can vary across regions (Sen, 1997). Furthermore, many of these critics allege that the Asian values debates have been used as a tool to defend and endorse authoritarian forms of governance in this region (Inoguchi and Newman, 1997).

Second, some scholars emphasise that Asian values have been fading in the course of

globalisation and economic modernisation. By conducting longitudinal analysis of 14 Asian countries using WVS data 1 to 5, Welzel (2012), for instance, argued that there are positive relationships between education level, motivational empowerment and emancipatory values in East Asia. He adds that up-surgings of emancipatory values can lead to an eagerness for a Western type of liberal democracy of the public masses, which eventually accelerates the spread of democratic values and disciplines. There is also a statistically significant difference between the cohorts, which means that the younger generations are less likely to have an allegiance to Asian values (see also Welzel & Dalton, 2017). More recently, Knowles (2015) discovered that the link between obedience and authority is getting weaker among Korean junior-high students. He found that only a small proportion of students (21%) answered that they had to follow their tutors when there was a disagreeable idea. Similarly, Park and Shin (2006) also found that an affinity for traditional values was weaker among the younger cohorts. Other research has shown that socio-economic modernisation (Inglehart and Welzel, 2005), meeting Western individualistic cultures (Hyun, 2001) and democratic values (Shin and Sin, 2012), can decrease such an affinity towards inherited Confucian values. Possibly, the constant changes in social and economic settings may diminish distinctive cultural values in East Asia.

Third, there is also a question of whether familyism and collectivism, which are considered to be among the most distinctive cultural traits in East Asia, do not merely exist in this region. Fukuyama (1995a), for instance, compared social capital between Italy and China, noting that familyism is not a distinctive feature of East Asia. Similar values were discovered in Italian society. He uses a term “*Italian Confucianism*” (ibid.: 97), asserting that small firms in central Italy and their networked structures demonstrate familyism and strong family bonds in the region. This puts a distinctive stamp on business life, without undermining the sense of the broader civic community in the political realm. In addition, the vigorous debates on liberalism–communitarianism in Anglo-American academia show that the tradition of communitarianism also exists in Western societies (Rorty, 1991). Based on the ideas of Aristotle, Rousseau and Hegel, communitarianism appeals to the concept of a healthy community for a virtuous life. According to the communitarian theorists, the community is perceived as an institutional foundation for generating fraternal feelings, fellowships, a shared manner of self-recognition and, partially, a “*constitutive sense of belonging*” (Sandel, 2005: 140). These communitarian philosophers perceive democratic citizenship to be “*a knowledge of public affairs, a sense of belonging, a moral bond with the community whose fate is at stake*” (Sandel, 1998: 5). The

intellectual tradition of communitarianism in the West, in many respects, is parallel in terms of thoughts about Asian values in respect to Western liberal democracy (Jiang, 2000). In other words, both trends have commonalities, emphasising the interdependence between the individual and one's context and stressing a sense of belonging and a concern for the whole. Given the above facts, criticism of liberal democracy is not a privilege of East Asians alone.

These debates, in terms of content, are related to cultural relativism. To borrow Kim's (2010: 317) expression, the Asian values debate has drifted between cultural relativism and universalism. While advocates of cultural relativism assume that cultures comprise of beliefs, customs, and social norms can create the foundation of "*political, economic, and cultural institutions and processes*", universalists argue that Asia's Confucian standards – not respecting individual human freedom – are nothing but a self-justification for suppressing fundamental human rights which is more crucial than cultural distinctiveness. The criticism from the universalists warns of the possibility that the Asian values debates could either reinforce cultural stereotypes or turn into ideological devices to reinforce certain specific social relationships. For these reasons, before analysing the association of Asian values with democratic citizenship, it is also crucial to examine whether Asian values really exist regardless of the regions and the generations.

Asian values and liberal democracy: are they compatible?

The second pillar of the debates about Asian values pertains to the compatibility of Western liberal democracy with Asian culture. To date, policymakers, scholars and practitioners have intensively debated the compatibility and suitability of Western-type liberal democracy in East Asian societies for many decades (Weller, 2018). They generally espouse a couple of perspectives, both of which will be examined in this section. The first argument is that the socio-political tenets of Asian values are basically antagonistic to the principles of Western democratic values. On the contrary, others interpret some major tenets of Confucian thought that correspond, or are consistent with, liberal democracy.

Incompatible thesis

Of these two conflicting views, the incompatible theory, arguing that Asian values are

irreconcilable with Western democracy, is more often cited and “*known as orthodoxy*” (Nuyen, 2000: 133). A number of scholars argue that Confucian principles of social and political ethics are fundamentally undemocratic or even anti-democratic (Huntington, 1991; Pye, 2000), particularly the incompatible thesis regarding Confucian thoughts as a socio-political values system which stresses the “*collective good, hierarchical social relations, and meritocratic rule*” by the moral elites (Shin & Sin, 2012: 2). Unlike Western liberal democratic principles that concern individual rights, pluralistic participation and checks and balances in political procedures, Confucian principles construct an essentially different socio-political system. In this regard, Confucian and liberal democratic values are regarded as two different and irreconcilable principles (Li, 1999; Chan, 1999). Thus, these incompatibility theories, which are based on extensive scrutiny of Confucian socio-political principles, provide an analytical tool criticising the ties between traditional values in East Asia and Western-style liberal democracy. This relationship is illustrated well in the following statement by He (2010: 20): that the Confucian values system demonstrates “*a political order in which the rule of*” virtuous elites is paramount. It further espouses that the ethical obligation is “*central, political inequality is taken for granted, moral concern overrides the political bargaining process, and harmony prevails over conflict*”. According to He, Confucian thoughts are discordant with Western-style democratic norms in which “*the rule of law prevails, rights are central, political equality is taken for granted, the political bargaining process overrides moral consensus, and conflict is seen as a necessarily normal condition of political life*”. In other words, the essential principles that make up democratic values such as individual freedom, equal opportunities and pluralistic values are incompatible with the major principles of Confucianism, namely, moral obligations and fidelity (Nuyen, 2000).

This strand of ideas is echoed by several scholars and practitioners. For instance, Huntington claims that traditional Confucian values are innately undemocratic, and so-called “Confucian democracy” is a contradictory term (Huntington, 1991). Subsequently, countries under Confucianism’s influence are less likely to be hospitable to embracing democracy. Huntington further mentions that Confucianism can endorse “*the group over the individual; authority over liberty; and responsibilities over rights; and it offers no institutional protection of individual rights against the state*” (ibid.: 24). Some politicians in this region also support these opinions. For instance, previous prime ministers of Singapore and Malaysia, Lee Kuan-yew and Mahathir Mohamed, officially advocated that the pre-eminence of Confucian cultures in each

society deters the influx of liberal democracy from the West.

Other opponents contend that these politicians exploit Confucian dogma to legitimate their illiberal regimes (Brennan and Fan, 2007). In terms of its content, critics often point out that the division of the eligibility of the governor and the duty of the governed in politics is one of the most dissonant principles in democratic values (Shin and Sin, 2012). Under democratic politics, as a self-governing system by the public masses, citizens govern themselves in both a direct and indirect way via such means as elections. Under Confucian society, however, only people who qualify in surmounting the moral obligations as a ruler (i.e., *moral elites*) are authorised to govern society (Analects 4:14). Although Confucianism emphasises the public masses as “*the root of the state*”, which means individuals’ welfare is supremacy (Mencius 9:5),³ Confucian thoughts neither mention self-governing nor readily allow the public to engage in politics in a straightforward way. Ordinary citizens, thus, should not only be eligible to rule themselves but also not be assigned to government. Alternatively, they need to be good followers, “*bending like grass in the wind*” (Analects 12: 19). That is to say, the public masses should manifest a virtuous manner and loyalty to the government (Hahm, 2004). As Li (2006) points out, it may entail citizens’ submissiveness towards authority, and it can eventually restrain them from being involved in any antisocial behaviour, which erodes socio-political cohesion. All in all, Confucian principles of propriety and loyalty can be regarded as drivers for individuals not to exhibit enthusiasm in politics.

On the contrary, this hierarchical governance system fosters political authority gathered mostly in the governor, unlike Western democratic governance, which emphasises checks and balances through the division of power (Subramaniam, 2000). In this regard, Confucian thoughts do not accommodate any essential democratic pluralistic norms (Chan, 2007). Rather, Confucianism emphasises good followership as much as the moral obligations of the ruler (Dhakhwa & Enriquez, 2008). In summary, a value system from Confucianism can be regarded as a hierarchical structure where the common people remain passive.

³ Mencius (4th–3rd century BC) is an influential philosopher in Confucianism. Based on the insights of Confucius (6th–5th century BC), he elaborated on the thoughts of Confucianism, especially on the relationship between governors and the governed (Perry, 2008). He justifies that the ruled can start a revolution if their ruler does not meet the public masses’ expectations. This idea is linked to the compatible thesis of Asian values with liberal democracy in the midst of the 1990s debates (see the following compatible thesis section; and also Kim, 1994).

Aligned with its hierarchical structure, Confucian thoughts furthermore liken the government to a patriarchal family system, where the relationship between the governor and the governed is analogous with that of father and son (Murphy, 2000). The duty of good government is, accordingly, akin to the role of the good father, who works and supports his offspring. Like a patriarchal family, the social structure and political system also have a hierarchical order. The family-like government in Confucian society is likely to be organised in a patriarchal system regarding the interests of its members. Bai (2008) insists that there is no such restriction on the function of government for economic prosperity, social harmony and political order in Confucian countries based on this principle. It is legitimate for government to intervene in not only politico-economic but also moral issues of society when such an intervention is supposed to ensure social welfare (see also O'Dwyer, 2003). This interventionist form of government is contrary to the Western liberal democratic mode of governance, which supposes that government is morally neutral and interference with the private realm should not be allowed (Chan, 2007). These ideas are apparently contradictory to liberal democracy from the West, which priorities the presence of rival political entities (Shin, 2013). From this perspective, traditional Confucianism does seem to be antithetical to liberal democracy.

Compatible thesis

While many opponents of Asian values maintain that Confucian thought deters democratisation because it prioritises *“hierarchy, strong man leadership, and the importance it places on harmony and cooperation over competition”* (Knowles, 2011: 1; see also Huntington, 1991), supporters of Asian values contend that the Asian style of democracy is different from liberal democracy, enhancing *“respect for authority, collective socio-economic prosperity, stability and order, and permits the state’s delineation of the ethical parameters of a society”* (Sen, 2014: 56). Indeed, in some societies in East Asia – such as Japan, Korea and Taiwan – democratic institutions are strongly entrenched despite adversity in their histories (Shin, 2013). Furthermore, throughout the whole of East Asia, democracy can be acknowledged the most widely agreed fashion of government, and the number of people who support it continue to grow (Chang, Zhu and Park, 2007).

Kim Dae-Jung (1994), a former president of Korea, insisted that Asian values underpin the foundations of the rapid pervasion of democracy in East Asia. Moreover, they allow the regions

to evolve democracy beyond the Western political standard. Lee Teng-Hui (1999), a former Taiwanese president, similarly argued that excessive individualism and modification of other limitations arising from liberal democracy can be balanced by Confucianism. According to Lee, Confucian thoughts can foster the welfare of individuals and society in general simultaneously. Like Kim and Lee, many scholars maintain that Confucian principles accommodate “*democratic seeds, and these seeds can serve as the very foundation of sustainable democracy in Confucian East Asia*” (Shin, 2013: 6; see also Xu, 2006; Yung, 2010). By scrutinising the Confucian doctrine on the socio-political system, Chan (2007) emphasised its consistency with liberal democracy. The notable elements of Confucian thought, which is most commonly compatible with democratic principles, entail “*political accountability, equality, tolerance, and political participation*” (Shin, 2013: 6).

First, the connection between Confucianism and the rise of political accountability is worth noting. Although Confucian thought apparently pays attention to an ordered and harmonious society, and prioritises citizens’ loyalty to their government, it also emphasises the will of the public masses. The core tenet of Confucianism never allows the arbitrary rules of the governor; indeed, they can obtain legitimacy only when accountability to the public is secured. In the source of this accountability, there can be a couple of major doctrines of government, which are “*people as the root (min-ben; 民本 in Chinese)*” (Xu, 2006: 137) and the “*Heavenly mandate (Tian-ming; 天命 in Chinese)*” (ibid.: 139; see also Shin, 2013). The “*minben*” principle pertains to the idea that the public mass has the paramount importance, and the governors should concern people’s welfare as the main priority. The “*tian-ming*” principle refers to governors’ legitimacy being derived from people’s approval and compliance. Even though neither of the principles is perfectly identical to democratic standards, there is still some common ground at the core of both political ideas (in summary, for the people, not by the people). According to Nuyen (2000) open and general exams in hiring public officials are perceived as an alternate mode of a rival electoral system in democratic politics. Restrictions on political power are also important elements of both Confucian and democratic principles. Although the “*tian-ming*” principle endorses the governor’s substantial legitimacy, the political influence depends entirely on the constant virtuous and qualified governing. In relation to the issue, Tu (1996) argues that great power and authority given to politicians in Confucian societies are constantly monitored and checked by the public masses in East Asia.

An analogous concept of democratic accountability can also be witnessed in the Confucian principle of duty and the right to remonstrance (Xu, 2006). Confucius saw governance as a recurrent reciprocal commitment between the governors and the governed. The concept stands for true loyalty from the governed to the governor “*to correct the sinful nature in the governor*”, and “*when the governor committed weighty problems, the governed should remonstrate with the governor*”. However, if recurrent problems occur, people can impeach the governor (Mencius 5:20). The Confucian tradition of remonstrance, according to Shin (2013), is analogous to the principle of democracy of rivalry in elections and to impeachment in the political process. Indeed, in the politics of East Asia, it is often pointed out that this culture of remonstrance, which rectifies the failure of government, leads to democratisation beyond authoritarianism (Kim & Kim, 2007).

In addition to the discourse about political accountability, second, equality can also be deemed a democratic element found in the Confucian tradition. Confucius asserts the equality of all human beings in nature (Analects 7:2). Confucian thoughts pay particular emphasis to equal opportunities in education and politics for individuals, regardless of their individual characteristics. Collins (2008) asserts that the Confucian mode of universal education can be deemed consistent with democratic tenets stressing the importance of an educated citizenship. Accordingly, Collins maintains that individual members respect others’ rights and private life since all equally constitute society as a whole both in Western and East Asian societies. This idea is viewed as a parallel component of Western democracy’s emphasis on equality. Surely, it does not necessarily stand for that modern Confucian countries impose such values; however, Confucian values can be used to foster such democratic values (Shin, 2013).

Furthermore, closer scrutiny of Asian values reveals that tolerance of diversity is also encouraged by Confucian philosophy. Specifically, the Confucian notion of harmony embodies tolerance towards diverse entities. According to Confucius, exemplary individual esteems “*harmony but not conformity*” while petty individual esteems “*conformity but not harmony*” (Analects 8: 23). According to the idea, harmony pertains to the integration of various beliefs, not disposing of opposing perspectives (Shin, 2013). Surely, as Confucius pointed out, there is a limit to the pursuit of such harmony, which depends largely on individuality. Thus, Confucians ideally seek “*harmony in diversity*”, as Bell (2010b) points out. In its principle, therefore, a robust society is only achievable in the case of individuals and societies being harmonised. According to Shin (2013), Confucian ideas of tolerance and harmony underpin the

social nature of tolerating diverse religious traditions in East Asia. He further argues that tolerance and harmony eventually help the region to promote the democratic notion of pluralism in combining diverse interests.

A last point about the compatible thesis of Confucian thoughts with democracy pertains to the realm of political engagement. Despite widespread political engagement possibly not seeming to be a typical feature of Confucianism, it is still certainly utilised to improve robust civic associations (Shin, 2013). As Mencius mentions, one of the government's main responsibilities is the promotion of political participation of the public masses via equal education. Some scholars maintain that the Confucian tradition can promote societal mobilisation, as it emphasises universal education (Bai, 2008). In Confucian societies, education is regarded as the most important way for citizens to complete not only society but also themselves; educated persons tend to be more demanding on the governors, as Yung (2010) noted.

The debates about the compatibility between Asian values and democracy are still raging. Recently, Kim and Jeong (2017) elaborated on East Asia's public and private relationship being fundamentally different to that of the West. They continued the debates about Asian values by asserting that civil society in liberal democracy, as part of the private realm, is clearly in contrast with the public, whereas its border in Confucian East Asia is relatively blurred. As seen so far, the idea that Asian values can affect the mode of democracy and the behaviour of citizens has long been elaborated. In order to examine the true nature of Asian values and democracy, and furthermore the association with democratic citizenship, it is necessary to investigate more closely what Asian values really are. Therefore, before moving on to present the research framework, the next section will examine the traits of Asian values.

3.3 Two dimensions of Asian values

Asian values consist of multidimensional norms, and some critics have argued that they do not necessarily denote an all-inclusive set of shared values in Asia (Sen, 2014). However, at the core of the arguments, remarkably consistent components are witnessed, and Confucianism is usually pointed out (Barr, 2000; Bell, 2010a). In other words, despite such dissimilarities and cultural distinctiveness of Asian societies, scholars often mention that it is not challenging to discover common ground in terms of value patterns between East Asians. Furthermore, these

values are in sharp contrast to those of Western individuals or communities (Sen, 2014). Noticeably, Asian values consist of multifaceted aspects, and therefore previous works count multiple values when measuring Asian values in general. Accordingly, scholars' choice is significant when assessing the values impact on, and implications for, democracy. However, there is no doubt that Asian values owe to Confucianism enough that the two terms are usually interchangeable, as briefly discussed earlier. For instance, Shin (2013) uses the term "Confucian East Asia", which encompasses countries that inherited profound Confucian impacts such as developed Japan, Taiwan, Korea, and Singapore, as well as developing China and Vietnam. In accordance with Chang, Chu and Weatherallet (2018: 196), these countries have distinctive and predominant cultural orientations, such as "*hierarchical collectivism (loyalty to group leaders), paternalistic meritocracy (benevolent rule by a moral elite), interpersonal reciprocity, and accommodation (avoiding conflict with others), communal interest and harmony (sacrificing personal interest for the community) and Confucian familism (placing family above self)*".

Such commonalities in culture arouse an inclination to prioritise groups over individuals and loyalty over freedom in the region (Nathan, 2012). Barr (2000) also notes the importance of hierarchical Confucian values, explaining that they dictate to everyone how to act properly in hierarchical East Asian societies. Among these multifaceted values, this research pays particular attention to two aspects that are most commonly mentioned in previous work and which are subject to empirical corroboration, that is, (1) collectivism and (2) hierarchism. To borrow Dalton and Shin's (2006: 174) expression, these cultural traits refer to "*respect for hierarchy and concern for collective well-being*".

There are some reasons why this research focuses on collectivistic and hierarchical values among the various dimensions of Asian values. As pointed out by Kim (2010) and Lew(2013), East Asian societies emphasise other cultural values such as the importance of education, respect for the elderly, and strong work ethic. East Asia is identified as having the highest levels of familism and secularism by Welzel and Inglehart's (2009) cultural classification.⁴ Despite

⁴ However, we need to pay caution to classify East Asian culture as secularistic. While some scholars, such as Welzel and Inglehart (2009), have classified the region as secular, it may overlook the characteristics of Confucianism. It emphasises traditional values such as familism and obedience to authority, but is also prone to atheism. As a result, East Asian responses to World Values Survey questions related to God and religion may be lower compared to other regions, potentially leading to a misclassification of the region as secular. For a detailed discussion, see Yang (2018).

having different names, these values can be broadly categorised as collectivistic, prioritising the interests of families, organisations, and communities over individuals. Respect for the elderly, underscored by Kim (2010), is also related to respect for authority, and can be considered a manifestation of hierarchism in this study. As mentioned earlier, these two values are often cited as being most controversial values in relation to Western liberal democracy. In this vein, it is intriguing to examine whether collectivism leads to cronyism and corruption by promoting in-group favouritism or fosters the consideration of the common good. Additionally, it is compelling to scrutinise if hierarchism results in ‘*unquestioned loyalty*’ (Fukuyama, 1995a) or reciprocal relationships between the governors and the governed.

3.3.1 Collectivism

The first dimension of Asian values, collectivism (or sometimes called communitarianism), is very noticeable in the existing literature. It means the supremacy of team purpose over individual freedom and welfare, which is described well in Singaporean politician Tong’s definition (1994, 417): “*a sense of community and nationhood ... strong moral values based on family ties*”. It assumes that individuals are inherently interdependent rather than independent. In Confucianism the ideal self is, therefore, established in accordance with one’s relationship with others (Park and Shin, 2005). In other words, Confucian thoughts view a society as not only intrinsically hierarchical but also innately interdependent between individuals, which is contrary to many scholars in the field of civil society who support liberal democracy’s emphasis on horizontal networks and independent individuals as part of democratic citizenship (e.g., Putnam, 2000). Collectivism is fundamentally based on familism (Jacques, 2012), emphasising social harmony and disciplines (Zakaria, 1994) and organic solidarity (Tu, 2014). That is to say, Confucian collectivism is also closely related to familism, which pertains to “*explicit or tacit acknowledgment of the importance of family in both public and private arenas of life*” (Kim, 2010; 320). Accordingly, the role of family, as an ultimate basic unit of society in terms of educating and socialising its members, is particularly significant in East Asia. Specifically, home is perceived as the place that provides emotional support (Ringmar, 2005) or a sanctuary from the “*impersonal public realm*” (Duncan, 2002: 13) in Western society.

On the other hand, in the Confucian context home is regarded as an incubator where moral discipline is instilled for public life. Home is the space where people learn their rights,

obligations, responsibilities and power. In Confucian traditions, therefore, home is not only private but also “*public in nature*” (Duncan, 2002: 19). Confucian tradition views the relationship between home (private) and society (public) as being in harmony rather than conflict (Lew, 2013). Accordingly, family-based values heavily determine one’s perception of their position in Confucian East Asia, providing ‘a sense of trusting community as an extended model of the family’ (Tu, 1991). Individuals, as in family relations, tend to sacrifice themselves to some extent and pursue harmony with their community (Shin, 2013). Similarly, Jacques (2012: 70) also noted that families are the basic unit of East Asian societies, “*with the firm, like the nation, conceived in its image*’. Familyism extends its territory beyond the fence of the family to the state level, and it is deeply rooted in their languages – for example, the word “nation” in East Asian countries is translated into “family-state” (e.g., *Guójiā* in China, *Kokka* in Japanese and *Guk-ga* in Korean). The idea of the supremacy of collectivistic values in the ruling state is sort of necessary for some of East Asia’s politicians. For example, for Lee Kuan-yew maintains that ‘a model of society in which the collective interests take antecedence over individual rights’ fits Asian society well compared to individualistic liberal values (Bauer & Bell, 1999). Mahathir Mohamad, a former Malaysian prime minister, also claimed that collectivism in East Asia is superior to Western individualism (Teik, 2003). Given the above, a few proponents of the traditional values of Asia politicise the term collectivism, dichotomise the collectivistic East and individualistic West, and finally raise a question about the suitability of Western liberalism for East Asian society. Fukuyama (1995b), who primarily notes the negative aspects of Asian values on democracy, also comments that the potential of “Confucian democracy” is based on collectivism, which can balance the unfavourable tendency of individualistic and atomised Western society. Furthermore, Pye (1999) regard collectivistic values in Confucianism as not being in opposition to democratic norms. Rather, according to them, it is reciprocal since collectivism can promote cooperative behaviour among citizens. Fox (1997) is also noteworthy, who focuses on the ancient Confucian lectures. Fox held that classical Confucian lectures emphasise collective harmony based on an integration of diverse individuals in horizontal networks, as everybody has their positions, every individual, regardless of times or locations, “*has the potential to show forth, through their participation in community activities, the sort of authority which binds the community together*” (ibid.: 582).

3.3.2 Hierarchism

The second dimension is hierarchism, which is probably one of the most extensively

investigated features of Asian values (Shin, 2013). This character involves a variety of behavioural and structural distinctions between official and unofficial authorities such as obedience to higher rank and class, preference for the seniority system, affection for a powerful leader and stress on a harmonious government over a competitive one (Kim, 2010). A reminiscence of ancient emperors of China (legendary wise emperors, Yao and Shun) was epitomised in the political ideal and legitimacy of hierarchism, being strictly linked to the nostalgia of elite rule (Chang, Zhu, & Park, 2007; Yuezhi, 2012). The hierarchical feature, for some advocates of Asian values, is used to allege unequivocally that Asian cultural traits are fundamentally disparate from Anglo-American liberalism (Kim, 1997). Loyalty to social hierarchy is particularly emphasised in many hierarchical East Asian regimes (Dalton & Shin, 2006).

In terms of the political cultural theory, the allegiant culture is dominant over the assertive one in some parts of East Asia. In this vein, the impacts of Confucianism can be regarded as altering the perspective of the public masses on government and leaders in modern practice in East Asia. For instance, government intervention in the market can be viewed as not only indispensable but also preferable (Tu, 2014). While the maxim of the invisible hand supposes that “*government is a necessary evil and that the market in itself can provide*” a spontaneous order (ibid.: 108), government intervention has been taken for granted in many East Asian countries in terms of being responsible for public needs, welfare, accountability and maintenance of order (Inoguchi and Newman, 1997). The sense of hierarchism is instilled in the family early on. Fathers unquestionably take a lead role in the family and each family member occupies their predetermined place. Communities, associations, societies, firms, governments and nations are understood as an extended image of this hierarchical organism of families (Jacques, 2012).

This propensity has made the relationship between government and civil society somewhat hierarchical (Jacques, 2012; Kim and Jeong, 2017). This relationship has also been used to justify the logic of paternalistic states in this region. It places great emphasis on different forms of civic virtues and norms, such as obedience to authority, family values and allegiance. Barr’s (2004) following remark is noteworthy. Quoting Confucius’ words, Barr likens the governors–the governed relationship to the father–son relationship: “*The (Public)mass/son is expected to give his ruler/father obedience and respect ... and to govern the state/family by example and by exhortation and education rather than by the arbitrary imposition of his will*” (Barr, 2000; 311). Similarly, one of the most important norms in Confucianism is *filial piety* – unquestioned

loyalty to parents and reverence for their desires (Kim, 2010). The norms of filial piety between father and son could easily be transformed into the relationship between ruler and ruled or leader and followers, eventually yielding unquestioned loyalty to the government.

Although the given taxonomy divides Asian values in two, they are not necessarily mutually exclusive. Rather, they could be highly interwoven (ibid.). Values underpinning the family can be transmitted to larger organisations. On the other hand, depending on their applications, scholars draw upon multiple traits of Asian values, including work ethics (e.g., Ferguson, 2012; Lew, 2013), stress on education (e.g., Kim, 2010; Tu, 2014), and so on. However, for convenience, this research attempts to examine how the two most frequently mentioned attributes affect democratic citizenship. Before investigating the influence of Asian values on democratic citizenship in East Asia, one must question the implied link between values and behaviour. As Fukuyama notes, “*values almost never have a direct impact on behaviour; they must be mediated through a variety of institutions to make themselves manifest*” (Fukuyama, 2001: XVIII). The explanations for the nature of democracy in East Asia, therefore, are more likely to be found in the institutions that have grown up in recent decades than in a supposed singular and ancient value system. In the context of this research, the institutions could be voluntary associations and civil society.

3.4 Asian values and democratic citizenship

3.4.1 Background

It is widely acknowledged that economic improvements of East Asia corroborate the idea that a healthy economy could be a favourable condition for democratisation (Sen, 2014). From this perspective, seemingly accelerating economic success is promising for further democratisation and democratic consolidation in this region. First Japan, and followed by Korea and Taiwan, transitioned from authoritarian regimes to decent democracies. There is no doubt that the democratisation of the region has led to the prosperity of voluntary associations in various fields, including the political, social and economic realms (He, 2010). Remarkable accomplishments provided optimistic views that developing countries in this region, such as China and other Southeast Asian societies, would pursue a similar course. In other words, many

democratic theories hold the tacit belief that economic development can be viewed as a prerequisite for democratic governance and its developments (e.g., Huntington, 2012; Bomhoff & Gu, 2012).

Unfortunately, however, in the course of the 21st century, democratic principles have not been firmly established in many Asian societies, where authoritarian rules are influential in political procedures and institutions (Sen, 2014). As Sen noted, it is largely because of Asian values that “*sanctions authority and control as strong as necessary to create an orderly society*” (ibid.: 53). In many Southeast Asian societies (such as Thailand and the Philippines), which are moving forwards democratically, elite-ruled governance models are still ubiquitous (Acharya, 2003). Moreover, countries that have already achieved democratisation are also experiencing a decline in social trust or efficacy of democracy. Specifically, Hellmann (2020) argues that those who have undergone government-led socio-economic development in patriarchal societies may experience a conflict between their expectations of government and aspirations for democratic principles. In light of these concerns, and in keeping with the aim of this chapter, we need to pay more attention to the philosophical grounds and its practices in relation to the association between Asian values and democratic features.

3.4.2 Asian values, associations, and democratic citizenship

Even after their democratisation, many societies, for instance, Taiwan and South Korea, are still following the inertia of Confucian culture (Shin, 2013; Tu, 1996). That is to say, hierarchical and collectivistic cultural inclinations, which pertain to groups over individuals, unquestioned loyalty to authority, and attachment for the seniority system, as mentioned above, still prevail in East Asia (Jung, 2010). Confucianism is still lingering in East Asia and influencing individuals’ socio-political attitudes (Knowles, 2015). For instance, Pye (2000) noted the lack of civic engagement as an important characteristic of Confucian society. The Confucianism that emphasises loyalty and propriety induce the public masses to be more likely to be obedient to government authority and less likely to stand up to governmental policies (see also Li, 2006). Similarly, Hahm (2004) also argued that this influence of Confucianism hinders the prosperity of voluntary associations by leaving little room for the public to develop an assertive civic culture. An empirical study conducted by Kennedy, Kuang and Chow (2013) discovered that students from Confucian societies (e.g., South Korea, Taiwan and Hong Kong)

are less likely to engage in politics than non-Confucian societies. They suggest that the cultural traditions inherited in East Asia may deter the development of civic association, which is an essential part of the democratic accountability of governance.

As investigated in the earlier section, Confucian thoughts can be contradictory with basic principles of liberal democracy values by separating the governors from the governed (Shin & Sin, 2012). Fukuyama (1995) also hypothesised that citizens in East Asia tend to be in favour of “*authoritarian rule*” that leads states to adopt “*soft authoritarianism*” (Fukuyama, 1995a: 2; see also Shin & Sin, 2012: 211). Shin and Sin (2012) also mentioned that the Confucian government model is not a democratic but a patriarchal meritocracy model. Fukuyama (1995a) also posited that the public masses in East Asia are prone to embracing authoritarianism so that governments practise “soft” authoritarian rules (ibid: 2; see also Shin & Sin, 2012: 211). In addition, Shin and Sin (2012) refer to the East Asian political model as a paternalistic meritocracy instead of a democracy.

There is also the opposing view that the role of Asian values is favourable for fostering democratic citizenship. Cultural traditions of familism and collectivism enhance social trust and tolerance, which are important elements of democratic citizenship (Shin, 2013), and the political heritage of paternalistic meritocracy leads to aspirations for democratic government (albeit not liberal democracy). These underlying cultural traits let the public prioritise the collectivistic well-being in economic areas over the well-being of the community over individual freedom, and subsequently East Asian societies have a chance to construct a unique notion of democracy combining Asian values and democratic principles. According to Shin (2013) it can be labelled a novel brand of democracy in East Asia. Likewise, Fukuyama also mentions the positive virtue that may be linked to democratic citizenship in Confucianism. In other words, compared to Christianity and Islam, Confucianism is much more tolerant of other religions (Shin, 2013), and this can be linked to the essential virtue of a democratic society (Fukuyama, 1995b).

Based primarily on the notion of mutual responsibilities between the governor and the governed, Knowles (2015: 193) asserts five basic elements of Confucian traditions that can be beneficial for democracy. These elements entail defying excessive tyranny, enhancing human rights, supporting intense political engagement “*of virtuous people*”, strengthening “*civic virtue such as tolerance and (willingness to) compromise*”, and emphasising “*socio-economic equality*”

(for more details, see Section 3.2.2). The reason why the East Asian public consent to the power and authority of the governor is based on the expectation that, in return for this consent and obedience, the governor will rule for the public's well-being. Of course, this view is, to some extent, contradictory to the notion of Western liberal democracy. For Confucianism, Western liberal democracy, which emphasises the autonomous individual (Gutmann, 1993), can result in problems and a disordered society. In Yao's (1999: 34) terms, the liberal democratic notion de-emphasises the "*roles and responsibilities of the individual to the community, which is at the heart of Confucianism*" (see also Shin & Sin, 2012). Besides the theoretical advocacy, the history of democratisation in East Asia also raises questions about how the assumption about deterring the effects of Confucianism on democracy can be exaggerated. According to Kim (2000), for example, the process of democratisation in East Asia largely depends on the result of mass protests and mobilisation via voluntary associations against authoritarian regimes. All of the gaps between the theories and practices in East Asia raise underlying complexities in the relationship between cultural values and democracy. In terms of discordance, it makes sense to reassess our appraisals of some arguments related to Asian values, voluntary associations and democratic citizenship. Do Asian values really hinder civic engagement? Do voluntary associations offer foundations for consolidated and pluralistic democracy? The answer should transcend the conventional framework about the role of voluntary associations, mostly derived from Putnam and his followers.

Putnam's perspective sheds light on the fact that every society has its own civic norms and virtues, which ensure an orderly society, creating "*an integrated functioning society and preventing confusion, disorder, and anarchy*" (Pye, 2000: 764). According to social capital theory by Putnam, the levels of trust and networks between individual members are crucial for collective action (Putnam, 1993). Voluntary associations comprise diverse interests and pluralistic individuals, which is at the core of the creation of democratic citizenship and eventually for the effective function of democratic governance (Putnam, 2000). Voluntary associations provide the very foundations for the connection of various individuals for a pluralistic democracy. In this regard, Pye (2000) asserts that engagement in voluntary associations is an indispensable block in a stable democracy. However, as seen earlier, in order to expand the scope of theories to different contexts, in seeking to predict the forthcoming of East Asian democracy, more specifically, the role of different cultural values should be addressed. In terms of democratic citizenship and voluntary associations in East Asia, there are

competing theories about the role of Asian values. Although democracy and Confucianism collide in significant ways, a number of scholars have recently analysed the components of each concept as beneficial for the other. For example, one of the most noticeable links between the two concepts comes from the Confucian notion of democratic citizenship (e.g., Freeman, 1996; Tu, 2002).

Confucian tenets emphasise reciprocal responsibility, or interdependency with others in society. Political leaders may find it favourable to confine some individual freedoms for the purpose of social order, and yet they are able to reconstruct those tenets to enhance democratic governance “*for the people*” (might not the best condition for “*by the people*”; Shin, 2013: 6). On the contrary, some scholars also maintain that Confucian thought can be linked to encouraging existing democracy in this region. Kim (1997), for instance, maintains that the Confucianism that stresses social order and respect towards authority may literally help the continuity of growing democracy. Bell (2009) also points out the institutional advantage of Confucian meritocracy for a stable democracy. According to him, governments elected merely by the people might not be appropriate for democratic governance. This is partially due to the elected politicians in pluralistic democracy cannot fully realise the long-run results of ones’ choices. Instead, by blending both the Confucian model with contemporary liberal institutions, intellectual technocrats with liberal ideologies could ensure the best accountability of government to the public. Specifically, he suggests the model of Confucian democracy, which comprises two different layers of public official – one from elections and the other from strict examinations. He adds that, insulated from voters’ short-term interests, the latter are able to pursue the long-term interests for society.

In addition, Knowles (2015: 193) notes the favourable characteristics of Confucian thought for democratic citizenship. He pays much attention to the collectivistic values of Confucianism as a seed of democratic citizens. Specifically, putting supremacy on the group goal over individual right can broaden the sense of individual responsibility, and eventually link to “*support for democracy*”. Confucian values, in this regard, can be regarded as a complicated and multifaceted notion that can support and deter the consolidation of democracy at the same time (Knowles, 2015). In a similar vein, Tu’s (1996: 33–34) arguments in his seminal work are worth noting, which is that Asian values which emphasise the improvement of individual competency via their notion of “*commitment to family as the basic unit of society and to family ethics as the foundations of social stability*”; “*trust in the intrinsic value of moral education*”;

“belief in self-reliance, the work ethic, and mutual aid”; and *“a sense of an organic unity with an ever-extending network of relationships”*, can offer favourable foundation to East Asian societies to establish their own unique fashion of democracy.

In terms of Asian values and voluntary associations, there are also multiple contesting theories. While the majority of scholars have ascribed the weak tradition of civil societies in East Asia to familism, which has rendered the boundaries between the private sphere and the government unclear (Pye, 2000; Kim, 2010), Shin (2013) argues that, taking Korea as an example, the robust traditions of voluntary associations have long served significant roles in Korean history and culture, especially in the process of democratisation (see also Kim, 2000). He dated the origin of Korean civil society back to the 19th century. The emphasis of Confucian thought on the right to protest about morally wrong politics provides the public with more chances to communicate with political officials. Modern Korean theorists also claim that the rise of civic movements witnessed during recent decades manifested the power of civic mobilisation in East Asia, and popular demand via voluntary associations can be seen anywhere in this region (Cho, 1997). The contradictions and complexity in prior studies make it necessary to look at what actual empirical evidence there is before moving onto a research framework.

3.4.3 Empirical corroboration

To date, most of the discussions about the relationship between Asian values and democracy have remained in the speculative arena, and they lack empirical corroboration. These theoretical discussions have undoubtedly provided important implications for the relationship underlying each variable, but the need for empirical interpretations is also raised in practice. It was only relatively recently that East Asian public survey data was used to evaluate the influence of Asian values in the course of democratisation within Asian societies.

For instance, Dalton and Ong (2005) examined how attachment to authority in six East Asian societies influences the preference for democracy. By adopting fourth wave of World Values Surveys data, their analysis demonstrates that there is no significant relationship between the given variables. Against the orthodoxy of an incompatible hypothesis, an orientation towards respect, obedience to parents and attachment to authority do not significantly deter the preference for a democracy among Asian individuals. In the case of Korea, Park and Shin (2006)

suggest that reverence for Confucianism, which pursues harmonious political views, hinders public support for democracy. Likewise, Chang, Chu, & Tasi (2005) discovered that Confucianism related to strong family bonds deters public support for individual freedom and equal opportunities among Chinese, Hong Kongese and Taiwanese individuals. These unfavourable relationships between Asian values and democratic norms can reinforce the incompatible thesis of Confucian values for liberal democracy. On the contrary, Fetzer and Soper (2007) suggest that strong family bonds in Taiwanese society are positively related to the preference for democracy and female political rights. The findings show that Confucian thoughts enhance human rights and eventually support the compatibility thesis. More recently, Shin and Sin (2012) yielded a result from a South Korean case reinforcing that Confucian values deter individuals' democratic support. Exposure to democracy, however, can decrease the negative relationship. In other words, the latent negative role of Confucian values in support for democracy can be weakened when the history of democracy goes deeper. On the one hand, a number of empirical tests have been conducted on how Asian values have changed in the process of globalisation, economic development and democratisation, and how such changes affect Asian notions of democracy. For instance, despite substantial reverence to cultural traditions in East Asia (Bomhoff & Gu, 2012; Kennedy, Kuang, & Chow, 2013), the empirical corroborations show that some of the values are fading in the process of globalisation (Welzel, 2012) and economic modernisation (Inglehart & Welzel., 2010; Welzel, 2012). Park and Shin (2006) point out that reverence to Asian values in political terrain, which once had negative impacts on support for democracy, is weaker within the younger generations in Japan, Korea and Taiwan. Furthermore, Welzel (2012) suggests that Asian cultures such as loyalty towards authority are being eroded in East Asia, especially in the younger generations in Korea and Taiwan, where they have experienced democratisation and economic development. He argues that "Asian exceptionalism", once accepted as orthodoxy in the field of democracy, has faded. In a similar vein, Kennedy, Kuang, & Chow (2013) also showed that eighth graders in democratised Korea are less likely to accept authoritarian rule than students in countries such as Indonesia and Thailand. Besides, Hyun (2001) discovered that experiences of Western individualism negatively affect attachment to Korean traditional values. The series of research commonly demonstrates that traditional cultural values can be eroded by political, socio-economical transformations. To interpret the empirical analyses in relation to the theory of political culture, it can be seen that the Asian region, which was classified as having "allegiance culture", emphasising obedience to authority over self-expression, is changing into an "assertive

culture” while experiencing democracy and economic development (Welzel & Inglehart, 2009; Dalton & Welzel, 2014). Therefore, in analysing the precise association of Asian values with democracy, it could be worthwhile to consider the socio-demographic features (e.g., income and age).

It is undoubtable that voluntary associations and civil societies are thriving across East Asia after modernisation and democratisation (Alagappa, 2004), with a proliferation of social groups in evidence. Yet, this does not inevitably mean that individuals are active involving in voluntary associations in East Asia (Park, 2012). Furthermore, many studies produce conflicting evidence against conventional theories of civil societies. For instance, in a series of single case studies on South Korea, Bae (2008) and Park and Kim (2006) found that there is no significant role played by voluntary associations in variables related to democratic citizenship such as generalised tolerance. Only political activism had statistical significance, but the correlation was weak.

In a comparative study of Asian countries, this trend was reconfirmed. In East Asian societies, voluntary associations had little or no effect on trust, reciprocity, tolerance or political participation. This trend was the same as in Japan, where democracy and association participation rates were flourishing, and Singapore, where participation in associations was legally limited (Park and Lee, 2007; Park, 2011; 2012; Park & Subramanian, 2012). These analyses apparently demonstrate that there may not be an intrinsic link between the quantity of associational membership and consolidation of democracy in many of Asian countries, although the voluntary associations (especially political associations) played an integral role in democratisation. Many associations are not necessarily consolidating democracy, as not all associations are presumed to enhance democratic citizenship (Warren, 2001). The socialising effects of voluntary associations vary significantly, relying on the nature and practice of each association.

Apart from the empirical research from Asian cases, a number of comparative studies on Western societies reveal the importance of voluntary associations. That is, associational membership in building generalised trust and political engagement is confirmed, just like Tocqueville’s assumption. For instance, Stolle and Rochon (2001) demonstrate that associational membership increases not only political concerns and participation, but also generalised trust based on a comparative study between Germany, the United States and Sweden. By employing WVS, Maraffi et al. (2008) show that voluntary associational membership is a crucial element in enhancing generalised trust and other socio-political factors

(see also Glanville, 2016).

The above results from empirical studies show that the relationship between cultural values, voluntary associations and democratic citizenship is complex. Overall, however, voluntary associations provide a better explanation for democratic citizenship in Western societies. Evidence from East Asia is somewhat mixed and vague. This is partially because, as pointed out in some Asian values debates, Asian cultural values can influence the formation of democratic citizenship. Therefore, a more sophisticated framework will be needed to better understand the given relationships.

3.5 Concluding remarks

This chapter has investigated the extant literature on the debates about Asian values and their relationship with democracy. From a brief history of Asian values, this chapter has drawn upon collectivism and hierarchism, which are the two most prominent features of Asian values. In addition, it has also scrutinised the Asian values discourse in relation to the theories of civil society and associational life. As seen so far, there have been intensive debates over the relationship between them. These debates provide an invaluable basis for the analyses, as they suggested potential variables that may moderate the role of voluntary associations in democratic citizenship. The insights that this chapter could bring can be summarised in two parts. First of all, there have been vigorous discussions about Asian values, and many scholars classify their different levels and attributes. This research concerns Asian values in two dimensions based on the existing literature, namely: 1) collectivism – group primacy over individuals; and 2) hierarchism – a tendency towards respect for authority.

The second part of this chapter addressed the compatibility between Asian values and democratic norms. In terms of the associations between Asian values and democracy reviewed so far, there is the dichotomised taxonomy: the compatible and incompatible thesis. In terms of collectivism, which prioritises the collective purpose over individual interests, this can limit individual political participation in a similar context to the allegiance culture of Verba and Almond's (1963) civic culture. It may also reinforce in-group favouritism, as it is based on familism, which ultimately deters the formation of generalised trust (Van Ingen & Bekkers, 2015). On the other hand, there is an opinion that collectivism can promote tolerance and

generalised trust by emphasising individual responsibility to the community and benevolence to others (Yao, 1999; Shin & Sin, 2012). The hierarchical orientation in Confucian thoughts basically contradicts the social capital theory, which assumes the importance of horizontal networks; however, it may encourage the reciprocity of benevolence between the governor and the governed and the morality of the political elite towards the public masses at the same time (Shin & Sin, 2012).

Such dichotomisation may overlook the presence of underlying complexities between the seemingly contradictory phenomenon and fail to observe its overlapping characteristics. In addition, the relationship evolves into vagueness with the process of modernisation and democratisation. What is clear, however, is that existing studies present new potential for exploring the relationship between voluntary associations, democratic citizenship and cultural values. Therefore, this study will consider cultural values as a moderating variable in the relationship between voluntary associations and democratic citizenship. To uncover the nature of the relationships, this study adopts a set of hypotheses. More detailed information on the research hypotheses and frameworks will be introduced in the next chapter.

Chapter 4. Research framework and data

4.1 Introduction

This chapter introduces the key variables and methodology of the research. As mentioned in the previous chapters, the aim of the research is to investigate the correlation between voluntary associations and democratic citizenship in contemporary East Asian and Western societies. Since each concept is related to an individual's attitude and behaviour, attention should be paid to the operationalisation of each variable. Here, democratic citizenship consists of two key aspects, namely, civic virtue (e.g., García, 2007; Zhu & Fu, 2017) and political engagement (e.g., Vassallo, 2004). Civic virtue is measured by levels of generalised trust (e.g., Putnam, 2000; Fukuyama, 1995b) and tolerance (Iglič, 2010). Political engagement is defined as interests in politics, voting and forms of political action that reflect an assertive civic culture (Welzel & Dalton, 2017). Furthermore, it will pay attention to the moderating role of cultural values – collectivism and hierarchism (e.g., Kim, 2010) – in moderating the relationship between voluntary associations and democratic citizenship.

In terms of methodology, a multi-level, cross-national method, which contains both individual and societal-level variables, is adopted to envision levels of democratic citizenship. Specifically, this research presents a series of large-scale, comprehensive tests of democratic citizenship across twenty-nine West/European and East Asian societies using survey from the most recent seventh wave of WVS. In particular, it notes to the theories and measurements of individual-level membership of voluntary associations and societal-level cultural values in fostering (or undermining) trust and other forms of democratic citizenship. Again, given the existing theories reviewed in Chapters 2 and 3, the key priorities for investigation here include addressing the following research questions:

- 1) What is the relationship between voluntary associations and democratic citizenship – civic virtue and political engagement – in twenty-nine Western and Eastern societies?
- 2) How do cultural values – collectivism and hierarchism – impact variations in democratic citizenship across the West and East?

The first question seeks to confirm if the conventional wisdom that voluntary associations

foster democratic citizenship has universal applicability across global regions and in different cultural contexts. The second question pays more attention to the impact of disparate cultural traits in different countries. That is to say, the first question scrutinises the role of voluntary associations, which is emphasised in mainstream theories of social capital and political culture, while the second question is more likely to be associated with the compatibility between cultural values and democracy. Although the role of voluntary associations in generating democratic citizenship has long been studied, there is hardly any agreement on what sociocultural contexts might moderate the relationship. This is a very interesting omission in the evidence base, given the vigorous debates over the relationship between democracy and Asian culture since the 1990s.

4.1.1 Research design

This research employs a quantitative approach using secondary data from the World Values Survey (WVS). Qualitative methods are more favourable in demonstrating and analysing a sort of textual data (Krishna & Shrader, 2000). In the field of social capital studies, therefore, qualitative methods have been widely used to uncover not only causal mechanisms but also the different perspectives of marginalised groups within a community. As social capital exists between people, qualitative methods may yield the researcher more nuanced information than survey-based research (Dudwick et al., 2006). However, qualitative methods also have some limitations, since sample sizes tend to be small and not selected randomly. Also, the data is not standardised and therefore cannot be generalised (i.e., the data is unique to the cases it is attached to). In this vein, in qualitative analysis it is “*more difficult to extrapolate its findings for generalisation*” (ibid.: 4). The results of qualitative research are not easy to replicate.

On the other hand, quantitative research is widely understood to have key advantages in the comparability, replicability and generalisation of the analytic results using multiple representative samples (ibid.). Of course, quantitative techniques may have some weaknesses in terms of ignoring many important characteristics of people and societies. However, given that the main purpose of this research is a comparison between East Asian and Western countries, it can be seen that a quantitative study that can generalise the results is more suitable for this research.

Secondary data analysis also has some specific merits and demerits (Boslaugh, 2007). It is more efficient, as secondary data allows researchers to save time and money. Also, it allows us to use high-quality, nationally representative, large amounts of sample data, which is fruitful in policy studies. However, it may not contain question items that exactly suit the research purposes. Furthermore, especially when measuring people's attitudes and behaviour in cross-cultural research, the operationalisation of variables may cause problems. The linkage of abstract values to empirical indicators can vary across societies, and there may be differences in the tendency of survey responses (Wang et al., 2008). Fortunately, recent innovations in global surveys of public opinion, including the WVS, have provided a great chance to construct precise measurements of key values of the research. The WVS, which gathered its data from worldwide cross-sectional and multiple survey waves, offers plentiful data with respect to the number of observations, with extensive geographical coverage and various questions relevant to understanding individuals' attitudes and behaviours from different societies. Therefore, while paying some caution in its interpretation, this study adopts WVS as the main data for analyses.

4.1.2 World Values Survey and other available data sources

There are several large-scale secondary survey data sets that contain questions associated with voluntary associations, democratic citizenship and cultural values. Social capital and democratic citizenship have been rigorously measured by various international organisations. For instance, the OECD has accumulated data on social issues related to the topic of the research such as trust between individuals, political participation (e.g., voter turnout rate) and tolerance for minorities (e.g., OECD, 2019). To examine the associations between regional development and social capital, the World Bank has also scrutinised the measurement of social capital (Grootaert & Van Bastelar, 2002) and provides data on trust in institutions. International opinion surveys such as the Gallup World Poll have also offered appropriate data on generalised trust and tolerance for diversity for decades within 160 countries. However, this data has disadvantages in terms of coverage. For instance, the OECD study was mainly conducted in around forty major developed countries, which excluded some specific East Asian regions (e.g., Taiwan and Southeast Asia). The World Bank data lacks questions on tolerance, while the Gallup World Poll has limited questions on trust.

Within academia in Western Europe and East Asia, data such as the European Social Survey

(ESS) and the Asian Barometer Survey (ABS) have been used frequently to examine the relationship between voluntary associations, democratic citizenship and cultural values. The ESS, which covers 36 European countries, has diverse questions on social trust, political engagement, tolerance for heterogeneous groups and associational life. The ABS contains many questions on individual-level trust, tolerance, political engagement and cultural orientation within 14 East Asian countries. There is plenty of research employing ESS data to examine social and political trust in European countries. Using data from the ESS, Marozzi (2015), for example, compared confidence in government institutions within 29 European countries. The study shows that confidence in governments in ex-Communist and Southern European countries is significantly lower than Scandinavian countries, which have high levels of trust. Sturgis et al. (2012) also used ESS data to examine the relationship between voluntary associations, generalised trust and confidence in government in 19 European countries. The findings highlight that there is no significant evidence that generalised trust has spilled over to confidence in government, but it confirms that participation in associations plays a significant role in promoting generalised trust.

On the other hand, the Asian Barometer Survey (ABS) has also been used extensively to investigate the relationship between voluntary associations and democratic citizenship in the East Asian region. For instance, Yoon (2017) observed that participations in voluntary associations are not enough in the creation of democratic citizenship in East Asia. This is partially because in collectivistic cultures, individuals are more likely to involve in homogeneous groups. As a result, Yoon argues that involvement in voluntary associations does not necessarily foster some of the essential parts of democratic citizenship such as political engagement. Moreover, he asserts that voluntary associations which comprise of homogeneous individuals even educate its members that democracy is inevitably conflict-ridden. Zhai (2017), also employing the ABS, discovered that Confucian values (collectivistic hierarchism) do not decrease support for democracy, while also, to some extent, having negative effects on political participation.

As presented above, the ESS and ABS data sets also offer adequate sources of evidence for the research. However, the two data sets differ in their topic coverage and operationalisation of key concepts. In terms of associational membership, a key variable of this study, for example, the ESS offers a total of 11 questions while the ABS provides 10. The ABS asks about participation in women's groups, whereas the ESS does not contain a similar question. Second, this data has

limitations in terms of geographical coverage. The ESS and ABS only offer data about European and East Asian countries, which inevitably results in the exclusion of American and Oceanic countries.

World Values Survey: strengths and limitations

The WVS asks a series of questions concerning the key concepts of this research, such as trust, tolerance and political engagement, as well as the numbers of respondents' membership in voluntary associations. The advantages of this survey have grown, as they have come to offer more comprehensive inclusion of different regions since its regional coverage has enlarged by time series data are accumulated. The questionnaires from the most recent seventh wave contained more than 260 questions. In each society, the obtained sample size of respondents is around 1,000 to 4,000 people, with an average of 1,300 respondents per country. By containing more than 100,000 respondents in the seventh wave globally, the WVS can provide coverage of more than eighty contemporary societies, amounting to “*almost 85 per cent of the world's population*” (Dima, 2009: 11).

The WVS offers four main advantages for this research. First, as Ariely and Davidov (2011: 10) point out, it covers a wide range of regions encompassing diverging historical, cultural, and political paths, “*from established democracies to non-democratic countries*”, while many other data sets have geographical limitations – for example, the Asian Barometer Survey and the European Social Survey. As mentioned above, it is often referred to as the only academic database with more than 80 per cent of global population coverage (Norris, 2009; Ariely & Davidov, 2011). Second, it offers operational measures of various dimensions of individuals' attitudes and behaviours related to the main topic of this research. As Fleche, Smith and Sorsa (2012: 13) point out, it measures changing values and behaviours regarding “*democracy, social trust, and political engagement using standardised instruments which allow global comparison*”. Third, it is also noteworthy that the most recent available data set, WVS wave 7, was released from late July 2020 to 2021, which enables us to broaden our understanding of the issue with the latest information. Fourth, in practical ways, it provides the largest sample size, which is a critical issue in conducting multi-level modelling where sufficient samples within each group are crucial (Hox, Moerbeek & Van de Schoot, 2017).

The WVS also has some limitations. In particular, the data collection mode varies between

countries. Four major techniques were adopted in data collection, including computer-assisted personal interview, paper-and-pencil interview, web interview, telephone interview, and mail or post (for more details on the mode of data collection, see Appendix 4.1). Despite the WVS mainly using face-to-face interviews as a standardised sampling technique, standardisation is still limited (Curtice, 2007). For instance, in the case of Australia, Japan and New Zealand, all the survey interviews were conducted by mail. The interview method is determined by research teams within each country in practice. In addition, problems with sampling techniques can be raised. Basically, all the samples of this research are collected via probability sampling method to obtain an equal selection of probability samples. It consists of the following two steps. First, selections of primary sampling units were executed with stratification assuring that every administrative regional unit location represented a proportion of the population. After that, a random selection of individuals based on simple probability sampling was undertaken at the second stage.⁵ Throughout the process, WVS 7 covered all residents in a country aged 18 years and older. Nevertheless, the quality of WVS samples generally tends to be stronger in advanced countries. In other words, in countries with a large population (e.g., China) and high illiteracy rate, too many resources are necessary in the survey per se, and the urban population and more educated people tend to be oversampled compared to rural and undereducated respondents (Baker, 2013). Thus, it is reasonable to conclude that WVS data has an inclination to underrate cross-national differences between developed and developing countries; yet still, it demonstrates considerable disparities between the given societies.

Despite these limitations, the WVS is still one of the most extensively used survey data sets. Because of the huge data set based on multiple questions, the WVS has “*a strong standing in the social scientific community as well as for publication purposes*” (Hurtienne & Kaufmann, 2012: 10). Although the nature of the samples can vary across countries, the overall quality of the data is still considerably higher than the academically acceptable threshold (Baker, 2013). Accordingly, there is an impressive number of publications studying social capital, democratic citizenship and cultural values using WVS data. For instance, Elgar et al. (2011) investigate the correlations between social capital and self-evaluated life satisfaction for nearly 70,000 respondents of fifty rich and developing countries. By adopting multi-level modelling, they

⁵ In the cases of the US and Canada specifically, stratified random sampling with three call-backs were conducted. In Denmark, Sweden and Norway, stratified randomly selected individuals were interviewed. In Japan the process was based on names provided by local government institutions.

showed the positive correlation between country-level social capital and respondents' health and life satisfaction.

Furthermore, the positive impacts of cross-level interactions between social capital and gender were also evident;⁶ that is, the benefits of social capital were found to be greater in females than males. Drawing on WVS data, Dalton and Ong (2005b) investigated the role of associational membership in generalised trust and political engagement in Vietnam. Despite vibrant involvement in social group membership among the Vietnamese people, they found that it does not necessarily create social capital. Moreover, some forms of association, such as unions and women/youth groups, have unfavourable impacts on social trust and political engagement. Gengler, Tessler, Al-Emadi and Diop (2013) also used WVS data to analyse the role of voluntary associations in appreciation for democracy in Qatar. They found that voluntary associational membership in Qatar is merely "*an extension of traditional society and the prevailing regime*" (ibid.: 258) and not significantly linked to an appreciation of democracy. International organisations have also used WVS data extensively. For instance, the United Nations Development Programme used the WVS gender social norms index to measure attitudes towards gender equality at the global level (UNDP, 2020), and the OECD has frequently used the index of social capital (OECD, 2017).

On the other hand, there is ongoing debate about the content of WVS in measuring Asian values or democratic citizenship; and the modes of measurement, the influence of cross-national differences, such as the different scales used, different nuances in translation and disparate understandings of the questions have not been widely discussed (Ariely & Davidov, 2011). The fact that these issues have been overlooked is evident in the previous studies, which measure various variables related to social capital, democratic citizenship or cultural values. As such issues are linked to significant results which can cause "*a biased estimate of means and regression coefficients*" problems (ibid.: 273), it is necessary to take a closer look at each question. For instance, many studies have criticised one of the most commonly used questions, namely, "*satisfaction with democracy*", as a single question of measuring its concept. As the notion of democracy can be vague and misinterpreted, some scholars have maintained that it is

⁶ Cross-level interaction in a multilevel model occurs when the relationship between an independent variable and a dependent variable varies across different levels of analysis, such as the individual level and the group level. It means that the effect of a predictor at one level of analysis may depend on the level of another predictor at a different level of analysis. See more details in section 4.2.2.

not apparent whether the question is actually measuring the reverence of democracy or simply support for the current political situations (Canache, Mondak, & Seligson, 2001; Linde & Ekman, 2003). In particular, with a multifaceted concept such as Asian values and democratic citizenship, it is doubtful whether these concepts can be measured well with only one question item (see Brown, 2015). Random measurement errors can only be controlled when multiple questions are adopted to measure a concept (Saris & Gallhofer, 2007). It further allows the validity test of the scale and cross-national invariance of meaning (Brown, 2015).⁷ To obtain cross-national comparability, this study tries to adopt multiple indicator scales to measure a specific concept from the WVS, if available.

Response rates can raise another concern about non-response bias. Fortunately, the missing values for the items used in this study are less than three per cent in almost all cases. In the case of there being more than five per cent of missing values, the expectation-maximisation algorithm (EM) will be used. More detailed discussions on this issue will be addressed in Section 4.3.3.

4.1.3 Country selection

It is very important to select a unit of analysis in a comparative study. This process may involve a trade-off between “*close-up*” and “*long-distance*” perspectives (Hantrais, 2008: 56). According to Hantrais, “*close-up*” perspectives are more likely to reveal differences that are not captured in wider studies. In contrast, “*long-distance*” perspectives contain large samples of countries and are germane for the generalisation of analysis. The existing seminal studies on social capital, mainly in Western societies, provide profound insights, but it is questionable how useful a Western-centric analysis is for a genuinely comparative approach. Also, studies on East Asian countries that have primarily focused on detailed descriptions and emphasising East Asian cultural traits are least likely to provide common ground for theorisation. Intentionally or not, they tend to neglect the general role of voluntary associations in democratic citizenship being absorbed in “*Asian exceptionalism*” (Welzel, 2012: 1).

The units of this research, therefore, will encompass contemporary Western countries, including

⁷ It refers to the ability of a measurement instrument to have consistent meaning and validity across different countries or cultures. It is important to ensure that the results obtained from the study can be compared across different countries or cultures.

English-speaking societies (including the US, the UK, Canada, Australia and New Zealand), Catholic European countries (such as France, Italy and Spain) and Protestant European countries (such as Denmark, Germany, Sweden and Switzerland) (for a cultural classification, please see Inglehart & Welzel, 2010). Also, contemporary East Asian societies, including North and South East Asian countries (such as China, Taiwan, Japan, Korea, Vietnam, Thailand, Indonesia, etc.), are also added. South and Northeast Asian countries are sometimes divided into the Confucian and non-Confucian East (e.g., Yoon, 2017), but as Sen (2014) pointed out, there are similar aspects in terms of cultural characteristics. So, this study encompasses South–North East Asia, with East Asia for the counter entity of the West. Table 4.1 shows the list of twenty-nine countries and the sample sizes.

Table 4.1 The number of observations for 29 countries

		West/Europe		East Asia		Note
Countries	Australia	1,813	China	3,036		
	Austria	1,644	Hong Kong	2,075		
	Canada	4,018	Indonesia	3,179		
	Denmark	3,362	Japan	1,349		
	Finland	1,199	Malaysia	1,309		
	France	1,870	Philippines	1,200		
	Germany	3,698	Singapore	2,012		
	Greece	1,200	Korea	1,245		
	Iceland	1,620	Taiwan	1,210	18 Western 11 Asian countries	
	Italy	2,272	Thailand	1,500		
	Netherlands	4,530	Vietnam	1,200		
	New Zealand	1,057				
	Norway	1,122				
	Spain	1,209				
	Sweden	1,194				
	Switzerland	3,154				
	UK	1,788				
	USA	2,596				
			39,346			19,315

Source: 7th wave of World values survey (www.worldvaluessurvey.org)

The criteria for the selection of targeted countries are as follows. First, in the case of Western countries, eighteen chosen countries are developed OECD countries (Portugal was excluded from the analysis because of a lack of some important demographic figures, such as income). Countries that are classified as “*Ex-soviet East*” (Welzel and Dalton, 2017: 8) are excluded (e.g., Czech Republic, Estonia, Russia, Slovakia and Slovenia), as they are often referred to as having different characteristics from the West and East Asian societies in their cultural and historical context and democracy. In fact, many scholars have been studying the features of social capital in the region separately from Western Europe (see Paldam & Svendsen, 2000; Svendsen, 2003; Fidrmuc & Gërkhani, 2004; Twigg, 2016). In the case of East Asia, eleven countries with accessible WVS data are selected for analysis (i.e., excluding data for Macau, Mongolia and Myanmar, which lack important data on trust and cultural values). As a result, this study focuses on a comparison between contemporary West and East countries.

4.2 Empirical strategy and research framework

4.2.1 From an exploratory approach to multi-level modelling

This study broadens the scope of the existing body of knowledge in two ways. First, it examines the universality of voluntary associations in cultivating democratic citizenship. Second, it specifically considers two types of cultural value associated with the Asian values debates: (i) collectivism – the degree of group primacy over individual freedom (Park & Shin, 2006; see also Sen, 2014); and (ii) hierarchism – “*respect for hierarchy and concern for collective well-being*” (Dalton & Shin, 2006: 174; see also Shin, 2013; Knowles, 2015). It thus investigates the moderating role of cultural values, which has received little scrutiny in previous research. It will confirm whether the impact of cultural values overrides the socialising effect of voluntary associations by encouraging group primacy or unquestioned loyalty to authorities.

As discussed earlier, there have been intensive debates about the compatibility between Asian values and democracy. Although a large volume of research has scrutinised how Asian values affect social capital and democracy, most of the studies have geographical limitations, being confined to East Asia. As pioneering research on this issue, the methods used in this study are commenced in an exploratory way comparing Western and Eastern societies. Before

conducting full-scale analysis, therefore, the work seeks to confirm whether Asian values were manifest in different societies, whether there are any disparities in the relationship between voluntary associations and democratic citizenship in different societies, and what role (if any) cultural values play in this relationship. Once these preliminary analyses have been done, a multi-level modelling approach is applied.

In this vein, the analyses are divided into two steps: first, in a preliminary analysis, some basic statistical techniques such as descriptive statistics, ANOVA, T-test and chi-squared tests are applied. These basic steps can help with determining whether or not there are any significant differences in cultural values, involvement in voluntary associations, and democratic citizenship between each country and region. Analysis on outliers for each value is also conducted during the preliminary analyses. In the set of these processes, the difference between cultural values and democratic citizenship in each region will be witnessed.

4.2.2 Multi-level model

It is advantageous to use quantitative methods to find out which theory best fits our observations based on existing theories and rich data (Yilmaz, 2013). In the field of Asian values theory, scholars have been using public survey database from East Asia to evaluate the influence of Asian values on democracy for less than a couple of decades (Shin, 2013). Given that debates on Asian values have been primarily theoretical, predominantly speculative and without practical corroborations, academic debates should be empirically investigated. A qualitative methodology can be a suitable empirical alternative to see how the culture of East Asian society affects democratic citizenship. Furthermore, since this study aims to compare 29 East Asian and Western societies based on extensive survey data, the author adopts a quantitative methodology. It employs multi-level modelling (MLM) to unravel individual and societal-level determinants in promoting generalised trust and other important indicators related to democratic citizenship.

There are three reasons why multi-level analysis is the most appropriate method to compare democratic citizenship in different regional contexts: first, the problem of dependent variables within a single country makes MLM necessary. There is little doubt to infer that the cultural or political orientations, attitudes, behaviours and beliefs of one in the same society are likely to be similar than others having dissimilar cultural backgrounds. Since individuals in the same society share analogous experiences based on shared historical incidents. Besides, individuals from the same country are educated under the analogous system. That is to say, citizens from

the same society are not genuinely separate with its contexts and thus can cause correlated errors when treated as independent observations (Yoon, 2017). The fact that observations are not solely independent can violate a basic assumption of inferential statistics, which is that error terms are independent. Thus, pooling all observations, regardless of the dependence among the models, will underestimate standard errors, which can result in a type I error.⁸ MLM addresses the fact that individual-level observations are not truly independent (i.e., they share variance), thus allowing the researcher to merge “*multiple levels of analysis*” in one inclusive equation “*by specifying predictors from different levels*” (Steenbergen & Jones, 2002: 219).

Second, MLM helps researchers to better understand causal heterogeneity (Western, 1998). By examining cross-level interactions, MLM allow the researcher to identify if the causal impacts of individual-level indicators are moderated by societal-level ones.⁹ In a multilevel model, more specifically, interaction effects refer to the situation where the relationship between two variables (e.g., predictor and outcome) changes depending on the level of another variable (societal level cultural values in this research). It is possible to estimate and test for interaction effects at different levels of analysis. These effects can be important to consider because they can provide insights into how the relationships between variables differ across different contexts or groups. As environmental factors are often thought to interact with individual-level factors in shaping behaviours, MLM is vibrantly used in the field of political science (e.g., Huckfeldt & Sprague, 1987; Lau, 1989). Since this study also assumes that the societal-level cultural context can shape individuals’ behaviours and attitudes towards democracy, individual-level variability can be restricted to societal-level values. In this case, the interaction effect would refer to how the relationship between participating in voluntary associations and democratic citizenship (measured by civic virtue and political engagement) changes depending on the level of cultural values in the society. For example, a positive relationship between participating in voluntary associations and democratic citizenship may be stronger in societies that are more individualistic and egalitarian compared to societies that are more collectivistic and hierarchical. In other words, cultural values of collectivism and hierarchy may moderate the relationship between participating in voluntary associations and democratic citizenship.

⁸ A type I error means rejecting a null hypothesis incorrectly (Durand, 2013). That is, it pertains to the one conclusion that a significant relationship exists between variables even in the case of non-significance.

⁹ Interaction effects between different-level variables. In this research, that is, the interaction between the individual-level voluntary associations variable and societal-level cultural values.

MLM is suitable for finding a causal inference within different levels of variable. By providing an insight on causal inference, finally, MLM offers the potential for wider generalisation of the knowledge. Since this work compares the different geographical regions across the West and East, the findings from MLM can be augmented in future research by analysing different countries.

4.2.3 Research framework


Based on the theoretical background and methodology, this research proposes a multi-level framework, as described in Figure 4.1. This framework assumes that democratic citizenship can be generated by multi-level factors, which encompasses both individual and societal processes simultaneously. That is, these two different-level factors, together, are the fundamental lenses for understanding the creation of democratic citizenship as multi-level phenomena. Moreover, this framework contains cross-level interactions between individual-level voluntary associations and societal-level cultural values in fostering democratic citizenship.

One essential interest here focuses on neo-Tocquevillian scholars' understanding of the developmental effects of association (Park & Lee, 2007), which strongly emphasises the positive effects of voluntary associations on democracy. Accordingly, involvement in associations is regarded to enhance "*norms of reciprocity, citizenship, and social trust*", and further offers basis for social interactions for mobilisation to seek a shared goal "*for common good*" (Foley, Edwards, & Diani, 2001: 17). Numerous studies that examine the relationship between voluntary associations and democratic citizenships have paid attention to the function of voluntary associations in widening citizens' political concerns and in fostering civic virtue (Dekker, 2009; Van Deth & Zmerli, 2010; Zhu & Fu, 2017). This research also posits that involvement in voluntary associations plays a significant role in creating democratic citizenship.

On the other hand, it also pays attention to the moderating role of societal-level cultural values. As seen in the debates over Asian values, societal-level cultural traits can alter not only the perspective of democratic citizenship but also the role of voluntary associations. Two potential channels are considered here: first, collectivism, based on familyism, undermines tolerance of social diversity and generalised trust by reinforcing in-group-favouritism and ordered-society preferences. Second, in East Asia, the emphasis on hierarchical structures and processes in organisations, and on proper conduct and loyalty to one's leaders (e.g., Hahm, 2004), is in stark

contrast to the Western cultural characteristics, which may also affect citizens' political engagement. This framework serves two purposes: first, it provides an opportunity for fruitful comparisons of the direct effects of associational membership and cultural values on democratic citizenship across different levels (i.e., individual, societal); and second, it acknowledges the cross-level interactions between individual and societal-level variables.

Figure 4.1 Conceptual framework of the relationship between voluntary associations, cultural values and democratic citizenship



Source: author's own. More detailed equations of MLM are presented in Appendix 4.2.

4.3 Data

This section describes the dependent, independent and control variables chosen for this study. Operational definitions for the variables analysed here are based on questions contained in the World Values Survey and are introduced here. Classical reliability theory (Cronbach's alpha) and factor analysis methods are used to evaluate the reliability and validity of each variable's scale (see Section 4.2.2). The expectation-maximisation (EM) algorithm is used to correct for the effects of missing values (see Section 4.3.3).

4.3.1 Variables and measurements

Dependent variable: democratic citizenship

As mentioned in the previous chapter, advocates of voluntary associations as "schools of

democracy” maintain that associational membership provides the basis of democratic citizenship via associational interactions in various settings. For example, by scrutinising the roles of voluntary associations for socialisation processes, Fung (2003) argues that voluntary associations can cultivate “*civic virtues*”. According to Fung, civic virtues pertain to “*attention to the public good, habits of cooperation, toleration, respect for others, respect for the rule of law, willingness to participation in public life, self-confidence, and efficiency*” (ibid.: 515). Moreover, voluntary association is regarded to educate its members civic skills – the way to organise themselves, hold conventions, communicate one another, discuss political affairs – which “*are necessary for all manner of political action*” (ibid.: 516). These are pivotal functions of voluntary associations for neo-Tocquevillian social scientists. Among these kinds of civic virtue, this research considers toleration for diverse groups to be an important variable, which is an essential ingredient for a pluralist society (Park & Jang, 2012; Zhu & Fu, 2017). Trust is particularly emphasised by social capital theorists as another crucial element of civic virtue for a stable democracy (Fukuyama, 1995b; Park, 2012).

In this research both particularised and generalised trust will be addressed to better understand the role of voluntary associations for democratic citizenship. In terms of tolerance towards social diversity, the WVS provides various questions. The approach to measuring tolerance adopted in this study closely mirrors existing operational measures focusing on attitudes towards members of different social groups. The scores for each question item are added (equally weighted) to construct a scale. Florida (2006) also used the same approach to investigate tolerance across social classes in the US. All in all, to measure the levels of “civic virtues – tolerance and generalised/particularised trust” and “political engagement – interests in politics/political activities”, the WVS asks the following questions:

On the other hand, in line with Fung’s (2003) definitions, and following Verba and Almond’s (1963) theory of political culture, political engagement is another important pillar of democratic citizenship. Scholars who follow the Tocqueville’s intellectual path also describe associations as an educational arena for political participations. It is often argued that associations offer political capacities, and chances to its members which foster active participations in the decision-making process. For example, Dalton and Welzel (2014; 2017) stress that assertive citizenship can be generated from associations, and it is eventually beneficial for accountable governance. According to the authors, voluntary associations can be regarded as an arena for political discussion, mobilisation and recruitment.

Table 4.2 Democratic citizenship: civic virtue

Generalised trust

[ASK ALL] *“Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people?”*

(Q57) Generalised trust

(1 = most people can be trusted, 2 = need to be very careful)

Particularised trust

[ASK ALL] *“I’d like to ask you how much you trust people from various groups. Could you tell me for each whether you trust people from this group completely, somewhat, not very much or not at all?”*

(Q58 to 60) Trust: your family, neighbourhood, people you know personally

(1 = not at all, 2 = not very much, 3 = somewhat, 4 = completely)

Tolerance

[ASK ALL] *“On this list are various groups of people. Could you please mention any that you would not like to have as neighbours?”*

(Q18 to Q22) Neighbours: people of a different race, immigrants/foreign workers/homosexuals/people of a different religion/heavy drinkers

(1 = acceptable, 0 = not acceptable)

Source: 7th wave of World values survey (www.worldvaluessurvey.org)

Table 4.3 Democratic citizenship: political engagement

Interest in politics

[ASK ALL] *“How interested would you say you are in politics?”*

(Q199) Interest in politics

(1 = very interested, 2 = somewhat interested, 3 = not very interested, 4 = not at all interested)

Voting

[ASK ALL] *“When elections take place, do you vote always, usually or never?”*

(Q221 and 222) Vote in elections: both local and national level

(3 = always, 2 = usually, 1 = never)

Political activities

[ASK ALL] *“Now I’d like you to look at this card. I’m going to read out some forms of political action that people can take, and I’d like you to tell me, for each one, whether you have done any of these things, whether you might do it or would never under any circumstances do it.”*

(Q209 to Q212) Political action: signing a petition; joining in boycotts; attending lawful demonstrations; joining unofficial strikes

(3 = have done, 2 = might do, 1 = would never do)

Source: 7th wave of World values survey (www.worldvaluessurvey.org)

In his analysis of East Asian countries, Park (2012) utilises indices from the Asian Barometer Survey to explore citizens' interests in politics, levels of political efficacy, and participation in various political activities such as voting. In a similar vein, in their seminal work on political culture and political change, Dalton and Welzel (2014) suggest that an interest in politics could be captured by voting and other conventional forms of legal activity such as petitions, boycotts and demonstrations. Likewise, this research adopts questions related to an interest in politics, voting and political activities from the WVS 7 in order to investigate the function of voluntary associations in fostering political engagement. Table 4.3 above demonstrates the key variables of the research related to political engagement from the WVS.

Independent variable: voluntary associations

One of the most widely used ways of measuring voluntary associations is the “structural-operational definition” proposed by Anheier and Salamon (1999). The structural-operational definition focuses on the fundamental structure and operation of voluntary associations instead of their purpose. According to this approach, voluntary associations have five fundamental characteristics; they must: (i) have an institutional structure and presence, (ii) be institutionally separated from the government, (iii) be non-profit and distributing, (iv) be autonomous and (v) be voluntary (ibid.; 7–8; see also Salamon & Sokolowski, 2004). The quality of associations is crucial in creating democratic citizenship; however, most quantitative studies focus on the extent/prevalence of voluntary associational membership because of data limitations.

Table 4.4 Conceptualisation: voluntary associations

<p>Associational membership</p> <p>[ASK ALL] <i>“Now I am going to read off a list of voluntary organisations. For each organisation, could you tell me whether you are an active member, an inactive member or not a member of that type of organisation? Church, sport, educational, labour union, political party, environmental, professional, humanitarian or charitable, consumer organisation, self-help group, other organisation.”</i></p> <p>(Q94 to 105) Associational membership: church, sport, educational, labour union, political party, environmental, professional, humanitarian or charitable, consumer organisation, self-help group, other organisation</p> <p>(0 = not a member, 1 = member)</p>

Source: 7th wave of World values survey (www.worldvaluessurvey.org)

According to Anheier and Salamon (1999), the extent of collective citizenry action is also an important structural characteristic of civil society. They argue that the extent of collective

action in voluntary associations, such as associational membership, is a significant feature in comparative research. It reflects the “*existence of legal provisions relating to civil liberties*” (Heinrich, 2005: 218). This notion has been extensively “*tested and found applicability*” in different national circumstances, especially in quantitative studies (Salamon & Sokolowski, 2004: 10). In light of this definition, many scholars have investigated the relationship between involvement in voluntary associations, democratic citizenship and social capital (e.g., Wollebæk & Strømsnes, 2008; Ibsen et al., 2019). The WVS provides various measures of voluntary associational membership and different types of association, as shown in Table 4.4, which may plausibly have differing effects for citizens’ democratic citizenship.

Moderating variable: cultural values

Two cultural traits associated with the Asian values hypothesis are investigated here: collectivism and hierarchism. Various indicators can be used to measure “hierarchical collectivism” (Park & Shin, 2006). For instance, Schwartz (2009) introduced an “autonomy-embeddedness” classification to measure the individualistic/collectivistic culture. Inglehart and Welzel (2010) used several of the WVS questions to classify “traditional” and “self-expressive” countries. “Traditional values” pertain to “*the importance of religion, parent–child ties, deference to authority and traditional family values*”, whereas “*self-expression values*” are more likely to be related to the “*high priority to environment protection, gender equality, tolerance to otherness*” (Rungtule & Senkane, 2018: 92). This index has been widely used to confirm the existence of Asian values (Vinken, 2006; Kim, 2010; Minkov & Hofstede, 2012). Dalton and Welzel (2014) also used this approach to see how cultural values are changing in the course of globalisation in the East Asian region (see also Welzel & Dalton, 2017). Dalton and Ong (2005) used the index to suggest how Asian values represented by hierarchism and collectivism influence East Asians’ perception of democracy.

In this research, the focus is on measuring societal levels of collectivism and hierarchism using Hofstede’s (2011) “cultural dimensions” framework, rather than the WVS 7 data. Although Inglehart and Welzel (2010) demonstrate cultural differences across countries, Hofstede’s theory is a widely used paradigm for understanding cross-cultural studies in various academic fields, such as anthropology, sociology, psychology, and management. The theory proposes six cultural dimensions: power distance, individualism-collectivism, masculinity-femininity, uncertainty avoidance, long-term orientation, and indulgence-restraint, each of which

represents a different aspect of cultural values (Hofstede, 2011). This research adopts the dimensions of individualism-collectivism and power distance to measure collectivism and hierarchism at a societal level.

Although Inglehart and Welzel (2010) illustrate disparate cultural characteristics well in different countries, this research employs Hofstede's (2011) "*cultural dimensions*" to measure societal levels of collectivism and hierarchism, for two reasons. First, Hofstede's (2011) idea is one of the most extensively used paradigms to measure national cultures. Based on factor analysis of a worldwide survey of IBM employees, he developed an original model to capture national cultures across several dimensions. One of the most significant contributions of Hofstede's theory is its ability to facilitate the examination of the relationship between individuals and organisations in navigating cultural differences, and to provide a better understanding of the cultural context in which they operate. The theory has been used to explain the differences in communication styles, leadership approaches, and decision-making processes across cultures. Furthermore, Hofstede's dimension has been used to develop cross-cultural research and to compare different cultures based on the dimensions. This has led to a better understanding of cultural similarities and differences and has helped to break down cultural stereotypes and prejudices. More specifically, Hofstede used terms such as "individualism/collectivism" and "power distance" to measure collectivism and hierarchism at a societal level. In light of his work, numerous studies have examined the impact of national culture in various academic fields. In terms of social capital, for instance, Realo, Allik and Greenfield (2008) used this framework to investigate the role of collectivism in extending of radius of citizens' social trust. They found that collectivistic culture is negatively linked to the formation of generalised trust, as it reinforces in-group favouritism. Another research which used Hofstede's dimensions to understand democracy is the work of Treisman (2007) to explain why some countries have higher levels of corruption than others. He argues that societies with high power distance and high uncertainty avoidance are more likely to have higher levels of corruption because individuals in these societies are more likely to defer to authority figures and avoid taking risks. More recently, Grzegorzczuk (2019) also used this index to examine the role of national cultures on the creation and utilisation of social capital in university–industry links in the US, Singapore, Taiwan and Hong Kong. He discovered that societal-level culture plays a pivotal role in the management of university–industry relations, especially in technology transfer. That is, it influences the management style of Asian universities by fostering authoritative and directive management styles, which are widespread

in East Asia enterprises. In contrast, in the US an individualistic and horizontal workplace culture cultivates more participatory and informal management styles.

Second, and more importantly, using WVS 7 questions to measure national cultures may create endogeneity issues because some of the questions are common between independent and dependent variables. For instance, levels of tolerance, which is one of the major dependent variables of this research, is constructed based on questions about the acceptance of foreign immigrants and homosexuals. Inglehart and Welzel’s (2010) measurement of “self-expression values” also uses the same question. Empirically, Inglehart and Oyserman (2004) find that WVS’ cultural classification is closely linked to Hofstede’s (2001) cultural dimensions. According to their analysis, the mean national scores of WVS cultural values show significant correlations with the “individualism–collectivism” scores provided by Hofstede (2001), which is 0.87. For this reason, this study adopts Hofstede’s (2001) cultural dimensions to measure the societal-level collectivism and hierarchism instead of WVS questions on culture (See Table 4.5 below).

Table 4.5 Conceptualisation: cultural values

<p>Collectivism (namely, collectivism and hierarchism dimension)</p> <p><i>This dimension pertains to the degree to which countries are integrated into groups. It is also related to individuals’ perceived obligations and dependence on groups.</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Individualism: “I” – consciousness and right of privacy • Collectivism: “we” – consciousness and emphasis on belongingness <p>Hierarchism (namely, power distance dimension)</p> <p><i>This dimension pertains to the extent to which the less powerful members of organisations (e.g., the family) accept unequally distributed power.</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Low hierarchism: hierarchy stands for inequality of roles • High hierarchism: hierarchy stands for existential inequality
--

Source: Hofstede (2011: 11); for raw data on the cultural values of each country, see Appendix 4.3

Of course, it may have some limitations. First, it might ignore individual differences. Hofstede’s cultural dimensions focuses primarily on cultural values at a societal level, ignoring individual differences within cultures. It is important to recognise that people within the same culture may hold different values and beliefs as Triandis (2004) mentioned. Second, it assumes that cultural values are static and slowly changing (Hofstede, 2011), which may not reflect the dynamic nature of culture and the potential for cultural values to evolve over time. Although

the WVS 7 data used in this study was released after 2020, Hofstede's cultural dimensions were released in 2011. However, as Durkheim (2014)[1893] argued in his seminal work "The Division of Labour in Society", social norms and values are deeply ingrained in society, and cultural change occurs slowly over time. Therefore, this study uses Hofstede's (2011) data as an index to measure the culture of each country.

Control variables

Since certain factors can influence the level of democratic citizenship in a society, these variables should be treated as controls in order to accurately assess the relationships of interest. Many scholars have found that attachment to Asian values has changed in the course of globalisation, economic development and political transition to democracy (e.g., Welzel, 2012). Among the younger generations, for instance, Welzel (2012) suggests that attachment to "obedience to authority" has faded because of globalisation and economic development. Hyun (2001) noted unfavourable relations between experience to Western notions of liberalism and attachment to cultural values such as collectivism within Korean citizens. In the field of political culture, Welzel and Inglehart (2009) and Dalton and Welzel (2014) also found that collectivistic hierarchism in East Asia has transitioned into more self-expressive "assertive" cultures in the process of political democratisation, especially among the youth. In line with the given evidence, numerous empirical studies show that individual-level demographic characteristics also affect democratic citizenship. Younger cohorts are less likely to uphold traditional values and are more likely to embrace democratic norms in East Asia (e.g., Park & Shin, 2006; Welzel, 2012). Kennedy, Kuang, & Chow (2013) also showed the lower reverence to authoritarianism amongst Korean junior high school students compared to the old. Besides the age, other demographic characteristics can influence levels of democratic citizenship. The levels of education are generally associated with greater political knowledge, participation, and efficacy (Verba, Schlozman, & Brady, 1995). This may be because education increases critical thinking skills and exposure to political issues and institutions. Higher income also may be more likely to participate in politics due to greater resources and social networks (ibid). Some studies have found that women are more likely to vote than men, and that gender differences in political participation may be decreasing (Carpini & Keeter, 1996).

Therefore, in analysing the relationship between cultural values and democracy, it is useful to control for individual-level demographic figures such as age, education and income. Thus, this

research includes a number of individual control variables encompassing demographic indicators such as gender, age, education level and income, as detailed in Table 4.6 (below).

Table 4.6 Conceptualisation: control variables

Demographic factors	Gender Age Education level (years of formal education) Income	WVS 7
----------------------------	--	-------

Source: author's own

Surely, some variables at the country level can also be considered as control variables, especially at country-level. For instance, GDP per capita and democracy, which were identified as major control variables in previous research that explored the relationship between voluntary associations and generalised trust in East Asian countries (Yoon, 2017). However, this study excluded these variables from the analysis for the following reasons.

Firstly, the democracy index was not included as a control variable in this study because it could potentially lead to endogeneity problems. Given that the dependent variables in this study include political engagement and civic virtue, treating the democracy index as a control variable would not be appropriate. This is because the democracy index is itself correlated with political engagement and civic virtue, the key components of democratic citizenship that is also influenced by voluntary association. Including the democracy index as a control variable could therefore lead to endogeneity problems, whereby the estimated effects of voluntary association on political engagement are biased due to the inclusion of a variable that is itself a determinant of political engagement.

Secondly, including GDP per capita as a control variable could lead to issues with multicollinearity because it is highly correlated with other variables in this model, such as individual income level. This could make it difficult to estimate the unique effect of each variable on democratic citizenship, as the effect of GDP per capita may be conflated with the effect of other correlated variables. Furthermore, the results of correlation analyses conducted between the GDP per capita and dependent variables in this study supported this argument. Specifically, the analysis found a weak correlation between them, which is consistent with the findings of Yoon's (2017) previous research.¹⁰

¹⁰ The correlation index between the main dependent variables in this study and the GDP per capita of 29 countries ranged from 0.02 to 0.3, indicating a low correlation. For more detailed information on the threshold

Therefore, this study concluded that it is more advantageous to exclude country-level variables than to include them in the analysis. The decision to exclude these control variables was based on careful consideration of the potential sources of bias and confounding in the analysis.

Operationalisation for analyses

The given variables dealt with in the set of analyses need to be operationalised, as most of them are categorical variables. For example, generalised trust and tolerance, one of the key variables of this research, consists of binary questions. In addition, particularised trust is measured by a set of questions on a four-point scale; and the situation of independent variables is similar. As mentioned, associational membership consists of a total of 10 binary questions asking whether to join any of the following organisations, including labour unions, sports clubs, charities or religious groups. Here, the total number of groups that each individual belongs to is taken as a score of associational membership. In terms of control variables, “gender” consists of a dichotomy question – male or female; “income” is divided into decile categories; “education level” is composed of six groups – primary to PhD; and “age” comprises six intervals.

In this situation, this study needs to operationalise these categorical variables to perform a series of preliminary analyses, including a chi-square test, logistic regression, and MLM. This research divides the above variables into dichotomous values for the convenience of analysis and interpretation. More specifically, cut-off values were selected that distinguishes between the two categories based on the distribution of the data. To dichotomise a discrete association variable into two categories, for example, total number of memberships in voluntary association for person [ranges from 0 to 10] can be dichotomised into “high participatory” and “low participatory” categories. One possible method is to select a cut-off value, which represents about top 50% of participants, and categorise individuals with a score of 2 or higher as “high membership” (about 43% of total cases), while those with a score of 1 or lower are categorised as “low membership” group (57% of all cases). This can be achieved by creating a new binary variable called “membership category”, with a value of 1 for “high membership” and a value of 0 for “low membership”. The cut-off value can be chosen based on the research question and the context of each data.

This dichotomy will use basic statistics on the distribution of each variable (for more details of

of correlation, please refer to Field (2014).

the distribution of each variable, see Appendix 4.4). Regarding the operationalisation of each variable, it is shown in Table 4.7 (below).

Table 4.7 Operationalisation of variables of the research

<p>Associational membership The total number of groups to which each individual belongs: <i>Religious, educational groups, labour union, political parties, conservational, professional, sports clubs, consumer groups, humanitarian organisations and self-help groups</i> (1 = multiple membership; 0 = singular or no membership)</p> <p>Tolerance The total score of the following three binary questions <i>Neighbourhood: different races, immigrants/foreign workers, and homosexuals</i> (1 = high tolerance group; 0 = low tolerance group)</p> <p>Particularised trust Average trust scores for the following groups <i>Family, neighbours, people you know personally</i> (1 = high trust group; 0 = low trust group)</p> <p>Generalised trust Average trust scores for the following groups <i>People you meet first time, another religion, another nationality</i> (1 = high trust group; 0 = low trust group)</p> <p>Interest in politics Very interested, somewhat interested, not very interested, not at all interested (1 = interested; 0 = not interested)</p> <p>Voting Average score of local and national elections (1 = participatory; 0 = non-participatory)</p> <p>Political actions Average scores for signing a petition; joining in boycotts; attending lawful demonstrations; unofficial strikes (1 = participatory; 0 = non-participatory)</p> <p>Control variables Gender = male (0), female (1); age = under 40 (0), over 40 (1); income = 1st to 5th (0), 6th to 10th deciles (1) education = primary to upper-secondary (0) over post-secondary (1)</p>

Source: Author's own

4.3.2 Reliability and validity

In this section a series of reliability and validity tests of the given variables are conducted. The reliability test pertains to consistency; that is, it refers to the degree to which a test is consistent in measuring what it set out to measure. The criterion pertains to evaluating whether there is a consistent and reproducible measurement. High reliability provides consistent results regardless of time, questions and evaluators. Meanwhile, validity indicates accuracy; in other words, it pertains to the levels to which a test actually captures what it wanted to measure (Fitzner, 2007). High validity is directly related to the concept of targeted measurement and totally unrelated to those that it is targeted to measure. The reliability of each scale can be tested using Cronbach's alpha coefficient, which is the most widely used coefficient of reliability (Bonett & Wright, 2015). Furthermore, all items of each variable need to be a valid indicator that properly measures the underlying theoretical construction. This study attempted to construct valid and reliable measures based on questions frequently used in previous literature. However, additional exploratory factor analysis (EFA) is adopted to further assess their construct validity.

Dependent variables

Democratic citizenship

First, among five items on tolerance for social diversity in the seventh wave of WVS, this research excludes questions on heavy drinking and drug addiction in light of Das, DiRienzo and Tiemann's (2008) approach. To create the Global Tolerance Index, they employed the WVS questions on respondents' acceptance of homosexuals, foreign workers and different races as their neighbours. The Cronbach's alpha coefficient of these three questions is slightly below the level of 0.6 ($\alpha = .596$). However, when excluding homosexuals, the item-deleted α is over the moderate level.¹¹ Thus, this research adopts the above two questions to measure tolerance. In general, if Cronbach's alpha value is between 0.6 and 0.8, it is considered that the items/questions are acceptable (Daud et al., 2018). Next, exploratory factor analysis is conducted for the given three items, and the result is demonstrated in Table 4.9 (below).

¹¹ Cronbach's alpha value of each item shows the value that consists of all but one item.

Table 4.8 Reliability test for tolerance: Cronbach's alpha reliability coefficient

Item	Item-rest correlation	Cronbach's α (Item deleted)
Neighbours: people of a different race	.462	.452
Neighbours: immigrants/foreign workers	.438	.444
Neighbours: homosexuals	.353	.609
Cronbach' α		.596

Note: N = 57127; N of items = 3; Source: WVS Wave 7

Table 4.9 Validity of items on tolerance: factor analysis

<i>Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin</i> test	.624	
Bartlett's test	Approx. χ^2	20539.086
	df	3
	<i>p</i>	.000 ***

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < 0.001$

	Factors
	1
Neighbours: people of a different race	.794
Neighbours: immigrants/foreign workers	.787
Neighbours: homosexuals	.675
% of variance	56.891
Cumulative %	56.891

Extraction method: principal component analysis

Before extracting the factors, a few more tests are needed to be addressed to evaluate the suitability of the data for factor analysis (Taber, 2018). The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) stands for the sampling adequacy while Bartlett's test is the most widely used methods to evaluate the appropriateness of the data for factor analysis. The KMO, more specifically, asserts that values exceeding 0.50 can be regarded as appropriate for factor analysis (Budaev, 2010). $KMO < 0.5$ is viewed as completely inappropriate, and levels of "*KMO between .5 and .7 must be treated with caution*" (Lasanthika & Wickramasinghe, 2020: 85). Bartlett's test of sphericity is often regarded significantly suitable for factor analysis when $p < .5$ (Williams, Onsman, & Brown, 2010). According to Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin's value (.624) and Bartlett's test ($< .001$), the questions on tolerance in WVS 7 can be considered suitable. The results of the factor analysis

demonstrate that all of the given items load on a single latent factor.

Table 4.10 Reliability test for trust: Cronbach's alpha reliability coefficient¹²

Item	Item-rest correlation	Cronbach's α (item deleted)
Most people can be trusted	.473	.804
Trust: your family	.237	.831
Trust: your neighbourhood	.535	.793
Trust: people you know personally	.579	.785
Trust: people you meet for the first time	.666	.768
Trust: people of another religion	.668	.767
Trust: people of another nationality	.687	.763
Cronbach's α		.814

Note: N = 53857; number of items = 7; data source: WVS Wave 7

Table 4.11 Validity of items on trust: factor analysis

<i>Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin test</i>	.786	
Bartlett's test	Approx. χ^2	116727.412
	df	15
	<i>p</i>	.000 ***

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < 0.001$

	Factors	
	1	2
Trust: people of another nationality	.887	.164
Trust: people of another religion	.875	.161
Trust: people you meet for the first time	.799	.297
Trust: your neighbourhood	.547	.561
Trust: people you know personally	.636	.858
Trust: your family	.101	.673
% of variance	50.796	17.871
Cumulative %	50.796	68.667

Extraction method: principal component analysis

Rotation method: direct Oblimin

¹² For item selection, items with a factor loading of .50 or more were selected, and the eigen value of the factor was extracted with 1.0 or more.

Second, a total of seven items are associated with trust ‘very highly’ according to Cronbach’s alpha coefficients ($\alpha = .814$) (Taber, 2018) (see Table 4.10 above). More specifically, all the items add up to the reliability of the index, although the indicator of trust on one’s family ($\alpha = .831$) only contributes a little. It is also presented that the item-rest correlation of “trust: your family” is relatively low, at .237 (c.f. the item-rest correlation means the correlation within an item and the scale which is generated by all of the items). However, even though Cronbach’s alpha value of “trust: your family” contributes only a little to the reliability of the index, the items still have acceptable internal consistency as a whole ($\alpha = .814$). Thus, the Cronbach’s alpha result indicates that the remaining set of seven items measures a single unidimensional latent construct, which in this case is trust. As this research adopts the most extensively used question “most people can be trusted” as a means of measuring generalised trust, assessing the validity of particularised trust items will be conducted based on the remaining six WVS 7 questions on social trust.

In terms of validity of items on trust, the result of the factor analysis is shown in Table 4.11 (above). The results of the factor analysis for trust met both of KMO and Bartlett’s test criteria. The extracted factors are classified into two categories, the first being “*trust: another nationality, another religion, and people who meet for the first time*” and the second being “*trust toward neighbourhood, personally known people, and family*”. This classification is not surprising in light of existing studies that divide trust into “particularised” and “generalised” trust (e.g., Fukuyama, 1995). Given that the results are consistent with prior research, the credibility of WVS 7 data and questions is reinforced. Among these factors, this study adopts the latter one as the “particularised trust” variable. Items on trust towards “another nationality, another religion, and people who meet for the first time” seem to be linked to generalised trust, but these questions are excluded. Since it is reasonable to infer that they are easily linked to tolerance of social diversity (e.g., tolerance for immigrant workers), this can create an endogeneity problem. In other words, the question on trust of other nationalities is undoubtedly highly correlated with the question on tolerance: “neighbours: people of a different race or immigrants”.

Political engagement

Variables on political engagement are mainly divided into “interest in politics”, “voting” and “political activities” in this research. As seen in Section 4.3.1, this research employs questions on conventional forms of legal activity, such as voting, and assertive/participatory activities,

such as petitions, boycotts and demonstrations. More general questions on an interest in politics are also employed to measure levels of wider political engagement. First, the three items related to an interest in politics result in an acceptable alpha coefficient ($\alpha = .671$) based on Daud et al.'s (2018) criteria (see Table 4.12 below). Moreover, when excluding the item “interest in politics”, the Cronbach alpha value is .882, which shows a very high level.

Table 4.12 Reliability test for interest in politics: Cronbach’s alpha reliability coefficient

Item	Item-rest correlation	Cronbach’s α (item deleted)
Vote in elections: local level	.629	.389
Vote in elections: national level	.628	.384
Interest in politics	.256	.882
Cronbach’s α		.671

Note: N = 52828; N of items = 3; source: WVS Wave 7

Table 4.13 Validity of items on interest in politics: factor analysis

<i>Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin</i> test	.545	
Bartlett’s test	Approx. χ^2	55054.316
	df	3
	<i>p</i>	.000 ***

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < 0.001$

	Factors	
	1	
Vote in elections: local level	.894	
Vote in elections: national level	.883	
Interest in politics	.273	
% of variance	63.898	
Cumulative %	63.898	

Extraction method: principal component analysis

This distinction between political interest and voting is also evident in the following validity analysis. As shown in the above Table 4.13 the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin value (.545) and Bartlett’s test (<.001) are significant. Furthermore, it presents that the question on interest in politics has a significantly lower correlation (.273) compared to the two questions about voting behaviour.

However, interest in politics is an indicator that is used in several similar studies and a key indicator for measuring political engagement (Park, 2012; Yoon, 2017); thus, it remains a key dependent variable in this study. Accordingly, the above questions will be divided into two categories: interest in politics and voting.

Table 4.14 Reliability test for political activities: Cronbach’s alpha reliability coefficient

Item	Item-rest correlation	Cronbach’s α (item deleted)
Political action: signing a petition	.569	.750
Political action: joining in boycotts	.651	.704
Political action: attending lawful/peaceful demonstrations	.644	.706
Political action: joining unofficial strikes	.522	.768
Cronbach’s α		.786

Note: N = 55459; N of items = 4; source: WVS Wave 7

Table 4.15 Validity of items on political activities: factor analysis

<i>Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin</i> test	.773	
Bartlett’s test	Approx. χ^2	63089.534
	df	6
	<i>p</i>	.000***

p* < .05, *p* < .01, ****p* < 0.001

	Factors
	1
Political action: attending lawful/peaceful demonstrations	.759
Political action: joining unofficial strikes	.748
Political action: joining in boycotts	.667
Political action: signing a petition	.609
% of variance	61.240
Cumulative %	61.240

Extraction method: principal component analysis

Second, the results of the reliability test on the questions about political activities are presented in Table 4.14 (above). Including all four items results in a very high alpha scale coefficient ($\alpha = .786$). Given that many suggest a threshold value of ≥ 0.7 (e.g., Taber, 2018), it can be seen that all items satisfy the reliability criteria, both in item-rest correlation and item-deleted

Cronbach's α . In terms of validity, the four questions are grouped into one item, and when looking through the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin value (.786) and Bartlett's test (<.001), it can be seen that the questions on political activities in WVS 7 can be considered valid measures of the underlying theoretical construct (See Table 4.15 above).

Independent variables

The WVS offers a series of questions measuring an individual's associational membership. Ten questions on memberships are employed to measure levels of voluntary associations in this study.¹³ Different types of voluntary association are also noteworthy in the analysis because numerous studies maintain that the impacts of associational activities can vary across the different types of associations. That is to say, the types of voluntary associations to which citizens belong can be more crucial than the number of memberships. Specifically, in some cases of interest groups or family/regional-based associations, membership leads to unsocial capital by reinforcing in-group favouritism rather than cultivating civic virtues, such as generalised trust (Hooghe & Stolle, 2003; Maloney & Rossteutscher, 2007; Park & Lee, 2007). For this reason, when measuring reliability and especially validity, it is also important to find out what types of association they are grouped into.

In terms of reliability, the Cronbach's alpha value of the 10 items is sufficiently high ($\alpha = .774$) (see Table 4.16 below). It tells us that the internal consistency of the 10 questions is very high. However, membership of churches or other religious communities shows relatively low item-rest correlations (.352) and contributes only marginally to scale reliability. Nonetheless, it is over the minimum threshold of the item-rest value of 0.3 (Ekolu & Quainoo, 2019). Thus, the Cronbach's alpha result indicates that the set of 10 items measures a single unidimensional latent construct of associational membership.

As mentioned above, the types and numbers of association in which individuals are involved can be considered important elements in the formation of democratic citizenship. However, the associational membership data from WVS 7 can be classified into a singular group, and, accordingly, this study intends to conduct analysis by focusing on the number, rather than type, of associational membership.

¹³ As there is a vast number of missing values in an item of "membership: other groups", a single item is excluded for the analysis. Specifically, the ratios of missing values for the question are China (77%), Malaysia (29%) and the Netherlands (7%). Given that the ratio of missing values for other questions is less than 2%, it is quite high.

Table 4.16 Reliability test for associational membership: Cronbach's alpha reliability coefficient

Item	Item-rest correlation	Cronbach's α (item deleted)
Membership: church or religious organisation	.352	.771
Membership: education, art, cultural activities	.491	.747
Membership: labour union	.375	.763
Membership: political party	.430	.756
Membership: conversation, environment, ecology, animal rights	.512	.746
Membership: professional organisation	.467	.751
Membership: sports or recreational	.375	.766
Membership: consumer group	.512	.749
Membership: humanitarian or charitable	.526	.743
Membership: self-help group, mutual aid group	.472	.753
Cronbach's α		.774

Note: N = 57640; N of items = 10; source: WVS Wave 7

Table 4.17 Validity of items on associational membership: factor analysis

<i>Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin</i> test	.887	
Bartlett's test	Approx. χ^2	102509.931
	df	45
	<i>p</i>	.000***

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < 0.001$

	Factors
	1
Membership: humanitarian or charitable	.672
Membership: consumer group	.662
Membership: conversation, environment, ecology, animal rights	.662
Membership: self-help group, mutual aid group	.623
Membership: education, art, cultural activities	.617
Membership: professional organisation	.602
Membership: political party	.567
Membership: labour union	.493
Membership: sports or recreational	.484
Membership: church or religious organisation	.459
% of variance	34.683
Cumulative %	34.683

Extraction method: principal component analysis

4.3.3 Missing values

Missing data can lead to an incomplete data problem. Luengo, García & Herrera (2012) point to three major problems related to missing values, including (i) loss of efficiency, (ii) inappropriate treating and analysis of the data and (iii) bias and misleading conclusions arising from differences in an incomplete data set. Little & Rubin (2019) also mentioned that researchers cannot estimate accurate causal inference from data with a large portion of missing values. The lack of data raises the degree of uncertainty, which can lead to an inaccurate conclusion (Seldadyo & de Haan, 2006).

Before moving on to the next stage, therefore, examinations of the overall figures of missing data are essential to understand their patterns in order to address the problems that may occur. In the practice of quantitative studies, many of the analyses adopt “*listwise deletion*”, also known as “*complete-case analysis*”, to treat the missing values. It is also a basic way in most statistical programmes (Little & Rubin, 2019). On the other hand, there are different guidelines about what proportion of missing data makes the study vulnerable: 5 per cent has often been advised as the lowest threshold below which imputation methods can be beneficial (Schafer, 1999). Dong & Peng (2013) also suggest that more than 10 per cent of missing values are more likely to lead to a biased conclusion, and a study with more than 40 per cent of missing data should be considered a hypothesis-generating study only. Fortunately, the WVS data is notably robust and therefore this research needs only a small imputation strategy to estimate the missing values on a few items. This study will use the expectation-maximisation (EM) algorithm to correct variables with more than 5 per cent of missing data (see Appendix 4.5 for more details about EM). The subsequent preliminary analyses chapter will describe in more detail the process of treating these items with missing values.

4.4 Ethical considerations

This research does not entail a data collection process as it uses secondary data. This is a time- and resource-saving process but certain ethical considerations should be noted before analysing the secondary data. As there is an agreement about the result from large-scale survey data analysis, the basic ethical issues related to the secondary data use are almost the same; that is, it is mostly associated with the issues arising from confidentiality (Tripathy, 2013).

Data that is freely downloadable implies permissions for further analysis, and yet the property

of the original source needs to be recognised. The British Sociological Association's Statement of Ethical Practice (2002) proposes a set of ethical issues on secondary data use, such as: (1) the data needs to be acquired properly, not excessively; (2) the data should not be stored for more than the period of research; (3) it needs to be stored safely to avoid unauthorised access; (4) caution should be paid to accidental loss of data; and (4) soft copies need to be encrypted. The author observes the above criteria and further follows the WVS regulations on ethical considerations for data, which are (5) the use of data for non-profit purposes, (6) prohibition on the redistribution of data, and (7) quoting the source of the data.¹⁴ This study pays much attention to the above ethical issues in the entire analytical processes.

On the other hand, this research was received research ethics approval from the University of Bristol. The REC approval reference number is SPSREC/19-20/062.

4.5 Concluding remarks

This chapter has outlined the data and methodology of the research and it can be summarised in the following three ways. First, this study adopts the seventh wave of the World Values Survey (WVS) as the main source of data for the analyses. The WVS provides rich information on participation in voluntary associations, tolerance, trust and political engagement at an individual level. Because of its robustness and geographical broadness, the WVS is one of the best options for the study, enabling the comparison of West European and East Asian societies. Considering that other alternative, the Gallup World Poll, the World Bank and OECD data, are missing questions about some of the major variables of this research, the WVS can be considered the most appropriate data for the following analyses.

Second, this chapter has discussed the methodology of the research. As mentioned earlier, this study employs a multi-level model (MLM) as the main analytical tool for the analysis. This is because cultural variables at the societal level affect the behaviours and attitudes of individuals, so it is difficult to assume that individuals in one country are completely independent. Before conducting MLM in Chapter 7, the following chapters present a set of preliminary and basic

¹⁴ Ethical regulations that must be agreed to download data from the World Values Survey. It can be found on the WVS webpage (<https://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSContents.jsp>)

analyses, including descriptive statistics, chi-square analyses and logistic regressions, to justify the adoption of MLM. Specifically, Chapter 5 presents the missing values and peculiarities of each variable rather than focusing on the relationship between variables. Chapter 6 provides a sketch of the relationship between variables using the logistic regression analyses before employing MLM.

Lastly, this chapter has conducted operationalisation for each variable through a series of reliability and validity tests. In this process, some questions that do not meet certain criteria are excluded from further analyses (e.g., a question about tolerance of homosexuality; for more detail, see Section 4.3.2). Through the set of processes, this chapter has been able to draw some key variables of research, such as associational membership as an independent variable, and tolerance, particularised/generalised trust, an interest in politics, voting and political activities as dependent variables.

Chapter 5. Preliminary analysis

5.1 Introduction

Prior to conducting a full-scale analysis, this chapter sets out preliminary analyses on each variable. Specifically, this chapter will first check missing values, outliers and extreme values; then it will conduct a series of ANOVA, T-test and chi-squared tests to investigate whether there are any significant differences between each variable across regions. These exploratory preliminary analyses will provide a basis for more elaborate analyses in the subsequent chapters. The topics covered in this chapter are as follows:

- a) Are there any outliers and missing values in each variable?
- b) Does the cultural value of collectivism and hierarchism differ from country to country?
- c) Does participation in voluntary associations vary between the West and East?
- d) Does democratic citizenship vary between the West and East?

The structure of this chapter is as follows. The following section outlines the missing values of each variable. If necessary, the replacement of missing values is carried out via a method such as the EM algorithm. The next section investigates whether regional differences in cultural values are significant; for this work, Inglehart and Welzel's (2010) cultural classification criteria are applied. Next, this chapter will confirm whether there are significant disparities in the main independent and dependent variables across regions, namely, association membership and democratic citizenship. ANOVA, T-test and chi-squared tests are employed to test the significance. Finally, Section 5.4 provides the concluding remarks of this chapter.

Before examining the moderating role of cultural values, it is very important to conduct exploratory research on the above questions, for four reasons. First, the existence of Asian values is still a hotly debated issue in academia. The continuing debates range from studies confirming distinctive cultural values in East Asia (Thompson, 2000; Barr, 2004; Kim, 2010) to arguments that Asian collectivistic hierarchism is disappearing amid politico-economic transformation (Sen, 2014; Welzel & Dalton, 2017). Furthermore, some scholars maintain that some cultural features regarded as distinctive values in Asian culture can be witnessed in other

regions. Fukuyama (1995b), for instance, argues that familyism, which is generally viewed as a key characteristic of Asian values, is also found in Southern Europe, for example, Italy. The Asian values debate after the mid and late 1990s triggered intensive subsequent debates about how these cultural characteristics influence the economic and political development of the region. However, it is first important to review whether Asian values really exist and whether they are limited to East Asian regions.

Second, there is contested evidence regarding the impact of voluntary associations on democratic citizenship, mainly from East Asia. Mainstream theorists from social capital and political culture maintain that participation in voluntary associations can be regarded as a foundation of democracy by functioning as a school that cultivates democratic norms and civic virtue (Inglehart, 1988; Putnam, 2000; Shin & Dalton, 2006; Welzel & Dalton, 2017). However, some scholars argue that the influence of voluntary associations on democratic citizenship is negligible or at least weak. These arguments assume that the type of association is important (Van der Meer & Van Ingen, 2009; Park, 2012) or that cultural values override the socialising impacts of voluntary associations (Park & Lee, 2007; Park, 2011). Therefore, before conducting a full-scale analysis, it is important to examine whether there are actually differences in the patterns of associational membership across regions.

Finally, numerous studies scrutinise the relationships between democratic citizenship and voluntary associations (e.g., Cohen, 1999; Iglič, 2010; Anheier & Kendall, 2002; Van der Meer, 2016), and Asian values, respectively (e.g., Subramaniam, 2000; Dalton & Ong, 2003; Subramaniam, 2000; Kennedy, Kuang, & Chow, 2013). Nevertheless, only a handful of studies have synthesised these two theories (Yoon, 2017). Furthermore, most studies that investigate the role of Asian values on democracy have been mainly speculative because of data limitations. In this vein, this study first attempts to explore the relationship between the given variables using some basic statistical techniques, including descriptive statistics, T-tests, ANOVA and chi-squared analysis.

5.2 Missing values

This section examines the overall features of missing values to deal with problems that may

arise. This research adopts a total of 24 questions for key dependent, independent and control variables. Each item is considered to have missing values, which are checked as “missing”, “not asked in survey”, “not applicable”, “no answer” or “don’t know”. The proportion of missing values in each item of the research varies from 0.1% (gender) to 6.9% (income). (See Appendix 5.1 for more details about the proportion of missing values of each item.) Even though the World Values Survey (WVS) has a relatively small portion of missing values, it does contain a certain amount of missing data. Thus, an imputation technique for missing values is necessary prior to the main analytical steps, namely, the expectation-maximisation (EM) algorithm, as proposed by Dempster and Laird (1977) (See also, Little and Rubin, 2019).¹⁵

Table 5.1 Items with around 5 per cent of missing values

Items	#	Rest N	%
Income	4,029	54,722	6.9%
Vote: national level	3,663	55,088	6.2%
Vote: local level	2,646	56,105	4.5%
Political action: joining unofficial strikes	2,100	56,651	3.6%
Political action: joining in boycotts	2,004	56,747	3.4%

Note: Appendix 5.1 presents the proportion of missing values of the rest of the items

As noted in the previous chapter, the existing studies suggest various thresholds for missing values (e.g., Schafer, 1999; dong & Peng, 2013), but this study adopts the 5 per cent threshold suggested by Schafer (1999) to obtain analytical rigor. Table 5.1 presents some items with around 5 per cent of missing values. This research contains a total of three items with around 5 per cent of missing values, which are income and voting at national and local levels.

Before conducting EM, a test called the “separate variance t-test” needs to be conducted.¹⁶ As the EM presumes that the data is missing completely at random (MCAR), this step can help us to determine if variables are missing in a random way or systematically.

¹⁵ The EM algorithm is an inferential technique based on iterating the procedures of regression imputation and maximum likelihood (Little & Rubin, 2019). This method has recently been carried out in the field of social capital study (e.g., Waverijn, Heijmans, & Groenewegen, 2017; Muhammad, Mahadi, & Hussin., 2017) and shows a promising result with categorical data of socio-demographics and social trust (for more detailed information for EM, see Appendix 4.5).

¹⁶ The separate variance t-test allows for different variances between the groups and adjusts the degrees of freedom accordingly. In the context of EM algorithm, the separate variance t-test can be used to assess whether the data can be modeled using a single Gaussian distribution or if separate Gaussian distributions are needed for different groups (For more details, see Bishop and Nasrabadi, 2006).

Table 5.2 Separate variance t-test

	Country	
Income	df	4782.4
	P (2-tailed)	.460 *
	# Present	54,722
	# Missing	4,029
Voting: national	df	5048.9
	P (2-tailed)	.000
	# Present	55,088
	# Missing	3,663
Voting: local	df	4189.66
	P (2-tailed)	.000
	# Present	56,105
	# Missing	2,646

Note: * < .05

Table 5.2 (above) shows the results of the separate variance t-test, which can give us an indication of whether or not there is any relationship between the data that is missing in certain outcomes and other variables (in this case, country). As p-values of income are over the significant level of < .05, this indicates that there are no systematic differences in missing outcomes. On the other hand, missing values on voting – local and national – indicate that there are systematic differences based on country.

Even though WVS 7 has only a handful of missing values among the various items in the questionnaire, careful attention must be paid to the two questions about voting. The reason why they have a relatively high proportion of missing values on voting (both local and national) is because of the cases of China and Singapore. In Singapore, a city-state, the response to “voting: local level” is not sought since they only have general elections at the national level. On the contrary, the Chinese, under a single-party authoritarian state, only vote for local-level peoples’ congress and they only have local-level elections. As they have a hierarchical electoral system, it is intrinsically impossible to obtain the answer to “voting: national level”. These two countries are, however, particularly important terrains of this research, given that the Asian values debate was sparked by former Singaporean Prime Minister Lee kuan-yew, and it is largely based on the Chinese ancient philosophy of Confucianism. For this reason, instead of excluding these two countries from the analysis, this research will use either local or national-level voting as dependent variables in the case of these two countries. Indeed, when excluding these two countries, the proportions of missing values in both national and local-level voting decrease from 6.2 per cent and 4.5 per cent to 0.1 per cent and 1.1 per cent, respectively. As a

result, the EM algorithm to address missing values is conducted for the “item: income”, which has over 5 per cent of missing data. Further analyses proceed after imputation on the income variable has been carried out.

5.3 Preliminary analyses on independent and dependent variables

5.3.1 Do Asian values really exist?

Many scholars who argue that culture influences individual behavioural patterns have developed different taxonomies of countries. For instance, in his pivotal work, Huntington (1996) classified the world into nine civilisations, mainly based on their religion. Using WVS data, Inglehart and Welzel (2010) also classified nine cultures based on individualism (“self-expression”) and traditionalism. In addition, scholars who advocate Asian values generally distinguish between Confucian and non-Confucian East Asian countries. Confucian countries mainly include Northeast Asian countries, such as China, Hong Kong, Japan, Korea, Japan, Taiwan, Singapore, and, in some cases, Vietnam, as being influenced by Sinic culture; and non-Confucian countries primarily consist of Southeast Asian countries, such as Thailand and Indonesia (see Chang, Zhu, & Park, 2007; Yoon, 2017). Specifically, the 29 countries analysed in this research are classified into 5 regions, according to Inglehart and Welzel’s (2010) taxonomy, namely, English-speaking, Protestant, Catholic European, Confucian and South Asian (i.e., non-Confucian) countries. Huntington (1996), more simply, grouped the countries of Europe, North America and Oceania into the West and divided the East Asian region into Chinese, Japanese and Buddhist culture. Sen (2014), on the other hand, mentions the cultural commonalities between Confucian Northeast and non-Confucian Southeast Asia in terms of collectivistic hierarchism. In the case of Vietnam, although it belongs to Southeast Asia geographically, it is often classified as a Confucian country (Chang et al., 2007; Yoon, 2017). Indeed, as examined through descriptive statistics, it shows similar patterns to Confucian countries regarding membership of voluntary associations. Thus, Vietnam is grouped with Confucian countries in this research. Accordingly, the cultural divisions of the selected 29 countries are presented in Table 5.3 (below).

The author employs not only Inglehart and Welzel’s (2010) five cultural divisions but also the

West and East comparison of both Huntington (2010) and Sen (2014). Based on these two taxonomies, this chapter will explore whether there are any differences in cultural characteristics, associational participation and democratic citizenship between each region.

Table 5.3 Divisions of countries by culture

	Regions	No.	Countries
West (18)	English-speaking	5	Australia, Canada, New Zealand, UK, USA
	Protestant Europe	9	Austria, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Iceland, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland
	Catholic Europe	4	France, Greece, Italy, Spain
East (11)	Confucian	7	China, Hong Kong, Japan, Korea, Singapore, Taiwan, Vietnam
	Non-Confucian	4	Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand
Total		29	

Note: Based on Huntington (2010) and Sen (2014) for the West/East division and Inglehart and Welzel (2010) for the five divisions


Figure 5.1 shows a scatter plot of Hofstede's (2011) cultural score for individualism and hierarchism in the 29 targeted countries. (The raw data of each value for each country is presented in Appendix 4.3). As noted in Chapter 4.1, Hofstede (2011) provides the mean values of individualism/collectivism and horizontal/hierarchical orientation based on a large-scale survey of each country.

As can be seen in Figure 5.1, English-speaking countries such as the United States (91), Australia (90), the United Kingdom (89) and New Zealand (79) rank top for individualism, followed by Protestant Europe, such as the Netherlands (80), Sweden (71) and Germany (67). In the Catholic European region, individualism is high in Italy (76) and France (71), while the rankings in Spain (51) and Greece (35) are relatively low. East Asian countries, such as Indonesia (14), Taiwan (17), Korea (18) and Thailand (20) rank bottom, indicating a high degree of collectivism. An interesting fact is that the degrees of individualism are low in most parts of East Asia, regardless of the regime system. In other words, Korea, Taiwan and Hong Kong, which have an established democracy and developed economy, do not show a significant difference in individualism compared to South Asian countries and China, which are labelled

as authoritarian regimes (Freedom House, 2019) and under-developed economies.

The hierarchism scores for each country are also presented in Figure 5.1. In contrast with individualism, the hierarchism of English-speaking and Protestant European countries ranks low – New Zealand (22), Sweden (31), Norway (31), the UK (35), the US (40) – while the hierarchical orientation of East Asian countries is very high – Malaysia (100), China (80), Korea (60). The hierarchism in Catholic Europe is moderate – France (68), Spain (57) and Italy (50). These figures appear to reveal differences in cultural values across global regions. While English-speaking and Protestant European countries show more individualistic and egalitarian cultural orientations, East Asian countries are more inclined to collectivist and hierarchical values. Catholic European countries are located in the middle.

Figure 5.1 Means of individualism, hierarchism and score of 29 countries



Note: author's own based on data from Hofstede (2011)

When dividing the above five regions into two – the West and the East – the cultural differences between Confucian and non-Confucian countries appear to be smaller than in the West. In other words, while collectivistic hierarchism in Catholic European countries differs from Protestant and English-speaking countries, in East Asia the cultural values of Confucian and non-

Confucian countries seem to be relatively similar. It is noteworthy that the cultures among East Asian countries are relatively homogeneous despite differences in political regime and levels of economic development. That is to say, the degree of individualism and hierarchism within democratically consolidated and economically developed East Asian countries – Hong Kong, Korea and Taiwan – is not so different from the values for authoritarian/developing countries – China, Malaysia, Thailand and Vietnam. Japan scores relatively low on both collectivism and hierarchism among East Asian countries, perhaps partially because of Japan’s long history of Westernisation or because Japanese respondents tend to respond more conservatively to survey questions (see Fischer, 2004). This fact runs counter to the argument that socio-political and economic transformation in East Asia, under the influence of globalisation, democratisation and economic development, brings cultural changes in Asian values (Dalton & Welzel, 2014; Welzel & Dalton, 2017). However, further analyses are necessary to examine if these cultural differences are statistically significant beyond the above descriptive statistics. Analysis of variance (ANOVA) and T-test are performed to determine if these differences in group means are statistically significant.

Table 5.4 below demonstrates the results of the ANOVA test for individualism across the five cultural regions. In terms of individualism, the means for each cultural region vary from 85.5 (English-speaking) to 20.4 (non-Confucian East Asia). More specifically, the mean value of individualism scores is the highest in English-speaking countries, followed by Protestant and Catholic Europe. The large differences can be witnessed with East Asian societies in terms of individualism score. According to the F-scores in the multiple comparison table, the differences in mean values across regions are all statistically significant at the 0.05 level.

On the other hand, the results of the ANOVA test for hierarchism are shown in Table 5.5 (below). The region with the highest mean for hierarchism is non-Confucian East Asia (81.8), and the most egalitarian culture is Protestant Europe (30.1). The Catholic European countries again show a moderate degree of hierarchism, with a regional mean of 58.3.

Table 5.4 ANOVA test: individualism

Descriptive

Individualism	N	Mean	Std. deviation	Std. error	95% C.I.		Minimum	Maximum
					Lower	Upper		
English-speaking	11272	85.48	5.188	.049	85.38	85.57	79	91
Protestant EU	21566	69.64	7.288	.050	69.54	69.74	55	80
Catholic EU	6556	62.46	15.708	.194	62.08	62.84	35	76
Confucian EA	12144	23.24	8.390	.076	23.09	23.39	17	46
Non-Confucian	7213	20.43	6.805	.080	20.27	20.58	14	32
Total	58751	56.25	26.252	.108	56.03	56.46	14	91

Levene's test of equality of error variance

	Levene	df1	df2	Sig.
Individualism	5182.014	4	58746	.000

Multiple comparison

Regions (I)	Regions (J)	(I-J)	Std. error	Sig.	95% C.I.	
					Lower	Upper
English-speaking	Protestant Europe	15.834 *	.070	.010	15.63	16.03
	Catholic Europe	23.017 *	.200	.001	22.46	23.58
	Confucian East Asia	62.232 *	.090	.000	61.98	62.48
	Non-Confucian East Asia	65.049 *	.094	.000	64.79	65.31
Protestant EU	English-speaking	-15.834 *	.070	.010	-16.03	-15.63
	Catholic Europe	7.183 *	.200	.001	6.62	7.74
	Confucian East Asia	46.398 *	.091	.000	46.15	46.65
	Non-Confucian East Asia	49.215 *	.094	.000	48.95	49.48
Catholic EU	English-speaking	-23.017 *	.200	.001	-23.58	-22.46
	Protestant Europe	-7.183 *	.200	.001	-7.74	-6.62
	Confucian East Asia	39.215 *	.208	.001	38.63	39.80
	Non-Confucian East Asia	42.032 *	.210	.001	41.44	42.62
Confucian EA	English-speaking	-62.232 *	.090	.000	-62.48	-61.98
	Protestant Europe	-46.398 *	.091	.000	-46.65	-46.15
	Catholic Europe	-39.215 *	.208	.001	-39.80	-38.63
	Non-Confucian East Asia	2.817 *	.111	.000	2.51	3.12
Non-Confucian EA	English-speaking	-65.049 *	.094	.000	-65.31	-64.79
	Protestant Europe	-49.215 *	.094	.000	-49.48	-48.95
	Catholic Europe	-42.032 *	.210	.001	-42.62	-41.44
	Confucian East Asia	-2.817 *	.111	.000	-3.12	-2.51

Note: * < .05; Dunnett T3

Table 5.5 ANOVA test: hierarchism

Descriptive

Hierarchism	N	Mean	Std. deviation	Std. error	95% C.I.		Minimum	Maximum
					Lower	Upper		
English-speaking	11272	36.04	5.185	.049	35.94	36.13	22	40
Protestant EU	21566	30.09	8.409	.057	29.98	30.20	11	38
Catholic EU	6556	58.26	7.184	.089	58.08	58.43	50	68
Confucian EA	12144	68.80	8.955	.081	68.65	68.96	54	80
Non-Confucian	7213	81.76	12.545	.148	81.47	82.04	64	100
Total	58751	48.72	21.414	.088	48.55	48.89	11	100

Levene's test of equality of error variance

	Levene	df1	df2	Sig.
Hierarchism	2293.626	4	58746	.000

Multiple comparison

Regions (I)	Regions (J)	(I-J)	Std. error	Sig.	95% C.I.	
					Lower	Upper
English-speaking	Protestant Europe	5.948 *	.075	.014	5.73	6.17
	Catholic Europe	-22.219 *	.101	.000	-22.50	-21.94
	Confucian East Asia	-32.768 *	.095	.000	-33.03	-32.51
	Non-Confucian East Asia	-45.719 *	.156	.001	-46.15	-45.28
Protestant EU	English-speaking	-5.948 *	.075	.014	-6.17	-5.73
	Catholic Europe	-28.167 *	.106	.000	-28.46	-27.87
	Confucian East Asia	-38.716 *	.099	.000	-38.99	-38.44
	Non-Confucian East Asia	-51.667 *	.158	.001	-52.11	-51.22
Catholic EU	English-speaking	22.219 *	.101	.000	21.94	22.50
	Protestant Europe	28.167 *	.106	.000	27.87	28.46
	Confucian East Asia	-10.549 *	.120	.000	-10.88	-10.22
	Non-Confucian East Asia	-23.500 *	.172	.000	-23.98	-23.02
Confucian EA	English-speaking	32.768 *	.095	.000	32.51	33.03
	Protestant Europe	38.716 *	.099	.000	38.44	38.99
	Catholic Europe	10.549 *	.120	.000	10.22	10.88
	Non-Confucian East Asia	-12.950 *	.169	.000	-13.42	-12.48
Non-Confucian EA	English-speaking	45.719 *	.156	.001	45.28	46.15
	Protestant Europe	51.667 *	.158	.001	51.22	52.11
	Catholic Europe	23.500 *	.172	.000	23.02	23.98
	Confucian East Asia	12.950 *	.169	.000	12.48	13.42

Note: * < .05; Dunnett T3

Table 5.5 demonstrates that there are statistically significant differences between the mean values of hierarchism in the five cultural regions. In addition, after classifying the 29 countries

into 2 global regions – West and East – T-tests are also conducted to confirm whether there is a statistically significant difference in the means for hierarchism and collectivism. According to the T-test, as shown in Table 5.6, the differences in the means of individualism and hierarchism are statistically significant at the .01 level.

Table 5.6 T-test: individualism and hierarchism

	Groups		N	Means	Std. deviation	Std. error mean			
Individualism	West		39394	72.98	12.126	.061			
	East		19357	22.19	7.954	.057			
	Levene's test		T-test for equality of means						
	F	Sig.	t	df	Sig. (2-tailed)	Mean difference	Std. error difference	95% C.I.	
								Lower	Upper
Equal variances assumed	3373.305	.000	529.393	58749	.000	50.783	.096	50.595	50.971
Equal variances not assumed			606.939	54124.546	.000 *	50.783	.084	50.619	50.947

	Groups		N	Means	Std. deviation	Std. error mean			
Hierarchism	West		39394	36.48	12.503	.063			
	East		19357	73.63	12.172	.087			
	Levene's test		T-test for equality of means						
	F	Sig.	t	df	Sig. (2-tailed)	Mean difference	Std. error difference	95% C.I.	
								Lower	Upper
Equal variances assumed	191.728	.000	-341.485	58749	.000	-37.152	.109	-37.366	-36.939
Equal variances not assumed			-344.625	39422.953	.000 *	-37.152	.108	-37.364	-36.941

Note: * < .05; individualism and hierarchism from Hofstede (2011)

These analyses confirm that East Asian countries, which encompass Confucian and non-Confucian societies, are more collectivistic and hierarchical than Western/European countries, including English-speaking, Protestant and Catholic European countries. Specifically, the Hofstede individualism score of 18 Western countries is 73.0 points, whereas the average value of 11 East Asian countries is 22.2 points, showing much more collectivistic characteristics. On the other hand, in the case of hierarchism, the average of East Asian societies is 73.6 points, which is much more hierarchical than that of the West, which was only 36.5 points. However, through the above analyses, it is also evident that there are significant differences in cultural

values represented by collectivistic hierarchism within each region. Of course, these analyses require more detailed follow-up studies. For instance, there can be significant cultural differences, even within each country. Just like Putnam's (1993) assumption derived from close scrutiny of Southern and Northern Italy, regional cultures can also vary significantly. However, since this study pays more attention to the differences in cultures at a national level, the results of the above ANOVA and T-tests provide sufficient grounds to consider cultural values an important variable in democratic citizenship in the subsequent chapters.

5.3.2 Does participation in voluntary associations vary between regions?

This section attempts to confirm whether the basic features of associational life really vary across regions. This is an important preliminary step, as there are conflicting arguments concerning the prospects for a flourishing civil society in East Asian countries. Some authors mention that civic society and voluntary associations are among the most important driving factors in democratisation in this region (Diamond, 1999; Kim & Jeong, 2017). Others maintain that cultural predispositions in Asian societies may hinder associational activity (Rodan, 1997). Hahm (2004: 98) also argues that the notion of Confucian tradition may “*leave little room for the masses outside of government to develop an active civic life*” (Hahm, 2004: 98). In order to confirm whether there are any differences in the degree of associational participation according to cultural regions, this section conducts a series of ANOVA and T-tests. Specifically, ANOVA and T-tests aim to determine how much membership of a total of 10 associations differs by region. The results are presented in Tables 5.7 and 5.8 (below).

Table 5.7 (below) shows the results of the ANOVA tests based on the mean number of associational memberships in each region (refer to Appendix 5.2 for detailed information on the percentage of participation in each type of voluntary association in each country). According to the ANOVA test, the mean number of memberships in voluntary associations is highest in non-Confucian countries (2.98), followed by English-speaking countries (2.27), whereas Confucian countries (1.25) and Catholic European countries (0.52) rank lowest. In addition, the ANOVA tests show that these regional differences are statistically significant at the $p < .05$ level. The reason why active participation in voluntary associations in non-Confucian countries is highest is largely because of the high levels of religious associations. In the case of Indonesia, an Islamic country, more than 70.9 per cent of all respondents (2,269 people) participate in religious groups, and the proportion in Thailand, a Buddhist country, is

about 49.5 per cent. However, these rates in Catholic Europe and Confucian East Asia are relatively low (see Appendix 5.2).

Table 5.7 ANOVA: numbers of membership in voluntary association

Membership	N	Mean	Std. deviation	Std. Error	95% C.I.		Minimum	Maximum
					Lower	Upper		
English-speaking	10933	2.27	2.318	.022	2.23	2.32	0	10
Protestant EU	20988	1.91	1.615	.011	1.89	1.93	0	10
Catholic EU	6499	.52	1.042	.013	.49	.54	0	10
Confucian EA	12063	1.25	2.080	.019	1.21	1.29	0	10
Non-Confucian	7157	2.98	3.148	.037	2.90	3.05	0	10
Total	57640	1.82	2.167	.009	1.80	1.83	0	10

Levene's test of equality of error variance

	Levene	df1	df2	Sig.
Membership	2070.423	4	57635	.000

Multiple comparison

Regions (I)	Regions (J)	(I-J)	Std. error	Sig.	95% C.I.	
					Lower	Upper
English-speaking	Protestant Europe	.363 *	.025	.000	.29	.43
	Catholic Europe	1.755 *	.026	.000	1.68	1.83
	Confucian East Asia	1.023 *	.029	.000	.94	1.10
	Non-Confucian East Asia	-.702 *	.043	.000	-.82	-.58
Protestant EU	English-speaking	-.363 *	.025	.000	-.43	-.29
	Catholic Europe	1.391 *	.017	.000	1.34	1.44
	Confucian East Asia	.659 *	.022	.000	.60	.72
	Non-Confucian East Asia	-1.065 *	.039	.001	-1.17	-.96
Catholic EU	English-speaking	-1.755 *	.026	.000	-1.83	-1.68
	Protestant Europe	-1.391 *	.017	.000	-1.44	-1.34
	Confucian East Asia	-.732 *	.023	.000	-.80	-.67
	Non-Confucian East Asia	-2.457 *	.039	.001	-2.57	-2.35
Confucian EA	English-speaking	-1.023 *	.029	.000	-1.10	-.94
	Protestant Europe	-.659 *	.022	.000	-.72	-.60
	Catholic Europe	.732 *	.023	.000	.67	.80
	Non-Confucian East Asia	-1.725 *	.042	.000	-1.84	-1.61
Non-Confucian EA	English-speaking	.702 *	.043	.000	.58	.82
	Protestant Europe	1.065 *	.039	.001	.96	1.17
	Catholic Europe	2.457 *	.039	.001	2.35	2.57
	Confucian East Asia	1.725 *	.042	.000	1.61	1.84

Note: * < .05; Dunnett T3; associational membership = number of memberships

As seen in Table 5.7, voluntary associations are flourishing in English-speaking, Protestant European and non-Confucian East Asian societies. On the other hand, citizens in Catholic Europe and Confucian Asian countries seem not to actively participate in voluntary associations.

Next, the results of the T-tests of the mean values for associational membership between Western and Eastern societies can be seen in Table 5.8 (below). According to the results of the T-tests between the two regions, the average number of associational memberships is 1.8 in Western and 1.9 in Eastern societies, respectively. This modest difference in the mean values of associational membership is statistically significant at the $p < .05$ level.

Table 5.8 T-test: associational membership

	Groups	N	Means	Std. deviation	Std. error mean				
Associational membership	West	38420	1.78	1.867	.010				
	East	19220	1.89	2.665	.019				
	Levene's test		T-test for equality of means						
	F	Sig.	t	df	Sig. (2-tailed)	Mean difference	Std. error difference	95% C.I.	
								Lower	Upper
Equal variances assumed	1904.030	.000	-6.004	57638	.000	-.115	.019	-.152	1904.03
Equal variances not assumed			-5.356	28945.951	.000 *	-.115	.021	-.157	

Note: * < .05; associational membership = number of memberships

In addition to examination of the characteristics of membership by country and region, outliers need to be checked and excluded from the analysis. Outliers located outside 1.5 times the inter quartile range (Tukey, 1977) can be identified through the boxplot (see Appendix 5.3). The total number of outliers is 73 out of 58,751 cases.¹⁷ The following steps for checking outliers for dependent variables yield a total number of 130 outliers: specifically, 62 cases from particularised trust, 39 cases from tolerance, 25 from voting and 4 from political activity. These outliers will also be excluded from the analyses in the subsequent chapters.

¹⁷ Specifically, for English-speaking countries, the US has 13 outlier cases, while there are 5 cases from Norway, 1 from Sweden and 8 cases from Switzerland in Protestant European countries. In terms of Catholic Europe, Greece has 4 and Spain has 19 outlier cases, while all 20 cases of Confucian countries' outliers are reported from Vietnam. These cases will be excluded in subsequent analyses.

Regarding the types of association, individuals from English-speaking countries participate widely in various types of association activity, including religious groups (37.7%) and professional (29.5%), recreational (29.1%) and cultural (26.1%) associations. In Protestant European countries, recreational associations (40.1%), religious groups (38.8%), and labour unions (27.2%) are particularly widespread. On the other hand, associational participation in Catholic European countries is generally low. In Catholic European countries, recreational associations are the most popular, with 12.5 per cent of all respondents answering that they have membership in these types of association (See Appendix 5.2).

In East Asia the overall rate of associational participation in Confucian countries is low, except for religious groups (22.5%) and recreational associations (18.1%). Non-Confucian countries show relatively active participation in associations, especially in religious groups (59.0%) and in charitable (38.8%), recreational (34.5%), and ecological associations (29.8%). Vietnam, despite its geographical proximity to Southeast Asia, is more similar to Confucian countries in Northeast Asia. There could be two reasons for the lack of associational membership in Vietnam. First, the type of voluntary association discussed in Western democratic theory may be lacking in Vietnam because of the still-dominant role of the Communist state (Dalton and Ong, 2005). Second, as many scholars mentioned, Vietnam can be classified as a country influenced by Confucian culture (Chang, Zhu, & Park, 2007; Shin & Sin, 2012; Shin, 2013). Given that associational membership in other Confucian countries is low, the inactivity of Vietnam's voluntary associations makes some sense (for more details on the above statistics, see Appendix 5.2).

As shown in the set of tests above, participation in voluntary associations has different characteristics based on cultural regions. While people from Catholic Europe and Confucian East Asia are less likely to be participated in voluntary associations, English-speaking, Protestant Europe and non-Confucian East Asian countries demonstrate relatively active membership in associations. This is contrary to some theories that hierarchical and collectivistic culture can deter involvement in voluntary associations (e.g., Hahm, 2004). Judging from the fact that associational membership is highest in the most hierarchical and collectivistic Southeast Asian countries, it may be more appropriate to interpret association participation as originating from the historical and religious context of one society.

5.3.3 Does democratic citizenship vary between regions?

This section conducts further preliminary analyses to analyse whether there are any significant differences in democratic citizenship across regions. By employing a set of chi-squared tests, the analyses in this section provide a better understanding of the regional differences in democratic citizenship and justify the adoption of more sophisticated methodologies in the subsequent chapters. Unlike the ANOVA tests performed above, the reason why the chi-squared test is carried out in this section is because the dependent variables in this research are categorical variables. As described in the methodology chapter, one key aspect of democratic citizenship is civic virtue, which is operationalised here in terms of tolerance, generalised trust and particularised trust.¹⁸ According to the cross-tabulation in Table 5.9 (below), the probabilities of Western individuals being included in the high tolerance category are 85.2 per cent in English-speaking countries, 87.2 per cent in Protestant Europe and 77.2 per cent in Catholic Europe, respectively. On the contrary, those probabilities of East Asian countries, regardless of whether they are Confucian or non-Confucian, are noticeably lower. Specifically, Confucian countries have 45.4 per cent and non-Confucian countries have 35.6 per cent. The results of the chi-squared test confirm that regional differences in tolerance are statistically significant at the $p < .001$ level.

Table 5.9 Chi-squared test: tolerance

	Regions					Total
	English-speaking	Protestant Europe	Catholic Europe	Confucian	Non-Confucian	
Low tolerance	1,645	2,699	1,301	6,552	4,639	16,836
(%)	14.8%	12.8%	22.8%	54.6%	64.4%	29.5%
High tolerance	9,460	18,400	4,395	5,450	2,567	40,272
(%)	85.2%	87.2%	77.2%	45.4%	35.6%	70.5%
Total	11,105	21,099	5,696	12,002	7,206	57,108

$\chi^2(p)$ (df=4) 11957.425 ***

Note: Pearson χ^2 , * < .05, ** < .01, *** < .001; high tolerance = 1, low tolerance = 0

¹⁸ Specifically, tolerance is defined by the mean scores of acceptance for different races and immigrants, and categorised into two (1 = high tolerance, 0 = low tolerance); generalised trust is constructed by a binomial question for “most people can be trusted”, and particularised trust consists of a mean value of trust scores for family, neighbourhood and acquaintances (1 = high trust, 0 = low trust).

Table 5.10 Chi-squared test: tolerance (West and East comparison)

	Regions		Total
	West	East	
Low tolerance	5,645	11,191	16,836
(%)	14.9%	58.3%	29.5%
High tolerance	32,255	8,017	40,272
(%)	85.1%	41.7%	70.5%
Total	37,900	19,208	57,108
$\chi^2(p)$ (df = 1)	11532.926 ***		

Note: Pearson χ^2 , * < .05, ** < .01, *** < .001; high tolerance = 1, low tolerance = 0

Table 5.10 (above) shows the chi-squared test results of the two regions, West and East, instead of the five cultural divisions. The result shows that 85.1 per cent of Western individuals are included in high tolerance groups, whereas only 41.7 per cent of East Asians, including both Confucian and non-Confucian societies, embrace immigrants and different races in their neighbours. The difference between the two regions is statistically significant at the $p < .001$ level. Second, the chi-squared test results on particularised trust are presented in Tables 5.11 and 5.12 (below).

The cross-tabulation of particularised trust in the five cultural regions shows relatively high trust in family, acquaintances and neighbours in Protestant Europe (52.4%) and English-speaking countries (37.8%). In contrast, particularised trust in Confucian (17.2%) and non-Confucian (17.5%) East Asia is comparably low. In Catholic Europe this is at a medium level (28.9%). As a result of the dichotomised comparison of West and East, particularised trust in the West (44.2%) is higher than in East Asia (17.3%). All of these results are significant at the $p < .001$ level.

Lastly, the table of the chi-squared test on generalised trust shows a slightly different pattern from the results for the above analyses on tolerance and particularised trust (see Table 5.13). The probabilities of being included in the high generalised trust group of individuals from Protestant Europe and English-speaking countries are 62.2 per cent and 47.6 per cent, respectively, while that of the Catholic European people is relatively low, at 27.0 per cent. Confucian East Asia is located in the middle at 42.0 per cent. Non-Confucian East Asian countries have the lowest proportion of individuals in the high generalised trust category, with 13.1 per cent.

Table 5.11 Chi-squared test: particularised trust

	Regions					Total
	English-speaking	Protestant Europe	Catholic Europe	Confucian	Non-Confucian	
Low trust	6,918	9,958	4,559	9,907	5,933	37,275
(%)	62.2%	47.6%	71.1%	82.8%	82.5%	64.7%
High trust	4,205	10,949	1,854	2,056	1,255	20,319
(%)	37.8%	52.4%	28.9%	17.2%	17.5%	35.3%
Total	11,123	20,907	6,413	11,963	7,188	57,594
$\chi^2(p)(df=4)$	5534.284 ***					

Note: Pearson χ^2 , * < .05, ** < .01, *** < .001; df = 1; high trust = 1, low trust = 0

Table 5.12 Chi-squared test: particularised trust (West and East comparison)

	Regions		Total
	West	East	
Low tolerance	21,435	15,840	37,275
(%)	55.8%	82.7%	64.7%
High tolerance	17,008	3,311	20,319
(%)	44.2%	17.3%	35.3%
Total	38,443	19,151	57,594
$\chi^2(p)$ (df = 1)	4067.120 ***		

Note: Pearson χ^2 , * < .05, ** < .01, *** < .001; high trust = 1, low trust = 0

Table 5.13 Chi-squared test: generalised trust

	Regions					Total
	English-speaking	Protestant Europe	Catholic Europe	Confucian	Non-Confucian	
Low trust	5,861	7,912	4,709	6,967	6,194	31,643
(%)	52.4%	37.8%	73.0%	58.0%	86.9%	54.8%
High trust	5,319	13,033	1,742	5,038	933	26,065
(%)	47.6%	62.2%	27.0%	42.0%	13.1%	45.2%
Total	11,180	20,945	6,451	12,005	7,127	57,708
$\chi^2(p)$ (df = 4)	6356.698 ***					

Note: Pearson χ^2 , * < .05, ** < .01, *** < .001; most people can be trusted = 1, need to be cautious = 0

The results of the chi-squared tests dichotomising West and East societies are presented in Table 5.14 (below). According to this taxonomy, 52.1 per cent of individuals from the West are included in the high generalised trust category, while 31.2 per cent from East Asia are included in this category. All of the above results are significant at the confidence level of $p < .001$.

Table 5.14 Chi-squared test: generalised trust (West and East comparison)

	Regions		Total
	West	East	
Low tolerance	18,482	13,161	31,643
(%)	47.9%	68.8%	54.8%
High tolerance	20,094	5,971	26,065
(%)	52.1%	31.2%	45.2%
Total	38,576	19,132	57,708
$\chi^2(p) (df = 1)$	2251.306 ***		

Note: Pearson χ^2 , * $< .05$, ** $< .01$, *** $< .001$; most people can be trusted = 1, need to be cautious = 0

On the other hand, this section also carries out a set of chi-squared tests on political engagement, another important dependent variable in this research – namely, an interest in politics, voting and political activity.¹⁹ First, according to the chi-squared test on interest in politics shown in Table 5.15 (below), Protestant European countries show the highest level of interest in politics (64.5%), followed by English-speaking countries (63.2%). The proportion of groups with high political interest in Catholic European countries is 39.4 per cent, which is lower than in Confucian and non-Confucian East Asia (44.2% and 46.6%, respectively).

In the comparison of the West and East regions, the proportion of groups with high political interest in the West reaches about 59.9 per cent, while in East Asia the ratio is relatively low, at 45.1 per cent (see Table 5.16 below). The above chi-squared test results for both the five regions and the West–East comparison are significant at the confidence level of $p < .001$.

¹⁹ Similar to the indicators on civic virtue, variables related to political engagement also consist of categorical variables. Accordingly, a series of chi-squared tests is adopted instead of ANOVA or T-tests. Specifically, interest in politics (1 = interested, 0 = no interest); voting (1 = likely to, 0 = unlikely to); political activity (1 = participatory, 0 = non-participatory) (see Chapter 4.3.1 for more details).

Table 5.15 Chi-squared test: interest in politics

	Regions					Total
	English-speaking	Protestant Europe	Catholic Europe	Confucian	Non-Confucian	
Low interest	4,142	7,567	3,957	6,743	3,836	26,245
(%)	36.9%	35.5%	60.6%	55.8%	53.4%	45.0%
High interest	7,072	13,762	2,573	5,336	3,347	32,090
(%)	63.1%	64.5%	39.4%	44.2%	46.6%	55.0%
Total	11,214	21,329	6,530	12,079	7,183	58,335
$\chi^2(p)$ ($d = 4$)	2494.795 ***					

Note: Pearson χ^2 , * < .05, ** < .01, *** < .001; high interest = 1, low interest = 0

Table 5.16 Chi-squared test: interest in politics (West and East comparison)

	Regions		Total
	West	East	
Low interest	15,666	10,579	26,245
(%)	40.1%	54.9%	45.0%
High interest	23,407	8,683	32,090
(%)	59.9%	45.1%	55.0%
Total	39,073	19,262	58,335
$\chi^2(p)$ ($df = 1$)	1146.100 ***		

Note: Pearson χ^2 , * < .05, ** < .01, *** < .001; high interest = 1, low interest = 0

Table 5.17 Chi-squared test: voting

	Regions					Total
	English-speaking	Protestant Europe	Catholic Europe	Confucian	Non-Confucian	
Unlikely to	4,922	7,310	2,004	7,084	2,353	23,673
(%)	44.1%	34.7%	31.0%	58.8%	32.9%	40.9%
Likely to	6,230	13,767	4,467	4,964	4,801	34,229
(%)	55.9%	65.3%	69.0%	41.2%	67.1%	59.1%
Total	11,152	21,077	6,471	12,048	7,154	57902
$\chi^2(p)$ ($df = 4$)	2436.245 ***					

Note: Pearson χ^2 , * < .05, ** < .01, *** < .001; likely to = 1, unlikely to = 0

Second, the results of the chi-squared tests related to voting behaviour are presented in Tables 5.17 (above) and 5.18 (below). According to the results of the analysis, the region that most actively participates in voting is Catholic Europe (69%), followed by non-Confucian East Asia (67.1%), Protestant Europe (65.3%) and English-speaking (55.9%) countries. In Confucian countries the proportion of people who are likely to vote is 41.2 per cent, which is lower than other regions. Dichotomised analysis demonstrates a similar propensity to the above analytic results for the West and East comparisons. That is to say, the proportion of those that actively participate in voting in the West is 63.2 per cent, which is significantly higher than the East, at 50.9 per cent. A set of chi-squared analyses is significant at the confidence level of $p < .001$.

Table 5.18 Chi-squared test: voting (West and East comparison)

	Regions		Total
	West	East	
Unlikely to	14,236	9,437	23,673
(%)	36.8%	49.1%	40.9%
Likely to	24,464	9,765	34,229
(%)	63.2%	50.9%	59.1%
Total	38,700	19,202	57,902
$\chi^2(p)$ ($df = 1$)	811.275***		

Note: Pearson χ^2 , * $< .05$, ** $< .01$, *** $< .001$; likely to = 1, unlikely to = 0

Finally, the results of the chi-squared tests on the regional differences in the proportion of people participating in various political activities, such as demonstrations, petitions and legal strikes, are shown in Tables 5.19 and 5.20 (below). In the comparison between the five cultural regions (see Table 5.19), English-speaking countries have the most active participants in terms of political activity (66.7%), followed by Protestant Europe (56.9%) and Catholic Europe (51.3%). In both Confucian and non-Confucian East Asia, participation in political activity is very low, with Confucian countries at 26.8 per cent and non-Confucian countries at 19.3 per cent. Accordingly, it is not surprising that the difference between West and East is statistically significant ($p < .001$; see Table 5.20). In the West the proportion of people actively participating in political activity is 58.9 per cent, whereas in East Asia it is only 23.9 per cent.

The different tests so far show that democratic citizenship in different regions varies significantly in most cases. Overall, almost all variables for democratic citizenship in English-

speaking and Protestant European countries are significantly high, while tolerance, trust, interest in politics, voting and political activity in Confucian countries are consistently lower. The democratic citizenship of Catholic European countries is higher in terms of tolerance, voting and political activity than in East Asia, but both particularised and generalised trust and an interest in politics are relatively low. Non-Confucian countries generally demonstrate the lowest levels of democratic citizenship in most cases, but they do present a moderate level of interest in politics, and participation in voting is higher than in Protestant Europe or English-speaking countries. The results of the chi-squared tests are divided into two regions – West and East – allowing us to see a clearer picture. In other words, the democratic citizenship of eighteen countries, including English-speaking, Protestant and Catholic European countries, is consistently and statistically significantly higher than in the eleven Confucian and non-Confucian East Asian countries.

Table 5.19 Chi-squared test: political activity

	Regions					Total
	English-speaking	Protestant Europe	Catholic Europe	Confucian	Non-Confucian	
Non-participatory	3,650	8,490	2,924	8,463	5,774	29,301
(%)	33.3%	43.1%	48.7%	73.2%	80.7%	52.9%
Participatory	7,298	11,227	3,086	3,102	1,379	26,092
(%)	66.7%	56.9%	51.3%	26.8%	19.3%	47.1%
Total	19,717	6,010	11,565	7,153	55,393	19,717
$\chi^2(p)(df=4)$	6621.699 ***					

Note: Pearson χ^2 , * < .05, ** < .01, *** < .001; participatory = 1, non-participatory = 0

Table 5.20 Chi-squared test: political activity (West and East comparison)

	Regions		Total
	West	East	
Non-participatory	15,064	14,237	29,301
(%)	41.1%	76.1%	52.9%
Participatory	21,611	4,481	26,092
(%)	58.9%	23.9%	47.1%
Total	36,675	18,718	55,393
$\chi^2(p)(df=1)$	6088.181***		

Note: Pearson χ^2 , * < .05, ** < .01, *** < .001; participatory = 1, non-participatory = 0

5.4 Concluding remarks

This chapter has adopted a set of preliminary statistical techniques to describe the basic features of the key values of the research. First, this chapter has found three variables that have more or less 5 per cent of missing values: income, voting at local level and voting at national level. Among them, the variables of “voting” are a result of the national characteristics of Singapore and China, and if they are not taken into accounts the missing value falls below the threshold of 5 per cent. As a result, imputation of the missing values on the variable “income” has been attempted through the expectation–maximisation algorithm.

Second, a series of preliminary steps have been carried out to understand the different characteristics of each variable. Descriptive statistics, ANOVA tests, T-tests and chi-squared tests are employed to see whether the differences in cultural values, associational membership and democratic citizenship are significant across regions. According to the results of the preliminary analyses, the five cultural regions – English-speaking, Protestant, Catholic Europe, Confucian and non-Confucian East Asia – have distinct cultures regarding collectivism and hierarchism. In addition, a set of preliminary tests also confirms that there are significant differences in participation in voluntary associations and democratic citizenship across cultural regions. The findings can be summarised in three ways. In terms of cultural values, first, there are significant differences in individualism and hierarchism in each region. Specifically, English-speaking and Protestant European countries have shown more individualistic and horizontal cultural values, while East Asia has demonstrated a more collectivistic and hierarchical orientation. Catholic Europe has been located somewhere in the middle (see section 5.3.1). Second, the average number of voluntary associational memberships is high in English-speaking, Protestant European and non-Confucian countries, while it is low in Catholic European and Confucian countries. When dividing the five regions into two – West and East – the gap becomes smaller, but the difference is still statistically significant (see Section 5.3.2).

Third, differences in democratic citizenship across the different cultural regions are also significant in most cases. Within European countries, almost all values of democratic citizenship in English-speaking and Protestant European countries are very high compared to Catholic Europe, except for voting. Moreover, East Asian Confucian countries have a higher level of tolerance, trust and political activity than non-Confucian East Asia. A comparison of

Western and Eastern regions shows that the indicators of democratic citizenship of the West are consistently and statistically significantly higher than in East Asian countries.

Given that this research primarily focuses on the role of voluntary associations in cultivating democratic citizenship, a series of regional comparisons offers interesting arguments for further research. In other words, the relationship between voluntary associations and democratic citizenship fits comparatively well in Western countries. English-speaking and Protestant European countries with higher associational membership show consistently higher levels of tolerance, trust, interest in politics and political activity than Catholic Europe. Catholic European countries only show a higher level of voting than these two regions. However, these results seem to lose their explanatory power when the geographical scope is limited to East Asian countries. Non-Confucian countries show a higher level of membership in associations than Confucian countries but lower or similar levels of democratic citizenship in almost all areas, except voting. Even in the comparison of the East and West, the conventional idea about the role of voluntary associations seems not to fit very well. In other words, the East Asian region, including Confucian and non-Confucian societies, shows a slightly higher average number of voluntary associational membership than the West, but it also demonstrates significantly lower values in all indicators of democratic citizenship.

In summary, the findings partially support the mainstream orthodoxy asserting that associations function as schools for democracy in fostering democratic citizenship, especially within Western societies. On the other hand, the above preliminary analyses raise another question. That is to say, the results seem to support the assumptions of Asian values advocates that lingering East Asian values in the region are influencing the socialisation effects of voluntary associations (Chang et al., 2007; Yoon, 2017; Shin, 2013). The results recall long-standing debates about Asian values and their compatibility with Western-style liberal democracy.

Even though the above analysis highlights that the major variables of this research exhibit significant differences across regions, it is still difficult to fully understand the above-mentioned complex relationships using preliminary statistical techniques. The multifaceted nature of the relationship is hardly comprehended by ANOVA, T-tests or chi-squared analysis. These preliminary analyses do not leave room to infer causality between variables. In this vein, another implication from the preliminary analyses is that it can offer grounds for the adaptation of more elaborate analysis tools in subsequent chapters to investigate the

relationship between associations, democratic citizenship and cultural values. The set of correlation and regression analyses in the following chapter may offer a better understanding of the grounds of the disparity between theory and reality.

Chapter 6. Baseline analysis

6.1 Introduction

This chapter sets out the results of the baseline analysis based on correlational and logistic regression analyses. It first examines the correlations between individual-level variables, including involvement in voluntary associations (i.e., membership), socio-demographic variables (i.e., gender, age, income and levels of education), cultural values (i.e., individualism and hierarchism) and democratic citizenship. The purpose of these analyses is to confirm whether the existing conventional wisdom about social capital and political culture is universal across Western and Eastern societies. Because mainstream theories argue that participation in voluntary associations serves as a channel for promoting trust and political engagement (Park & Lee, 2007; Van Ingen & Van der Meer, 2016), examining whether the relationship varies across global regions can help with identifying potential latent variables that moderate the relationship between voluntary associations and democratic citizenship. The results will demonstrate not only whether the relationship between democratic citizenship and voluntary associations is consistent with previous studies but also how these relationships vary across regions. After presenting the correlations, this chapter will also conduct a set of simple and multiple logistic regression analyses. The process of discovering the impact of independent variables on the generation of democratic citizenship at an individual level justifies the necessity to adopt multi-level modelling, the main methodology of this study. That is to say, apart from individual-level factors, higher-level factors, such as cultural values or social norms may have varying effects on democratic citizenship across different countries and regions (See Steenbergen & Jones).

The rest of this chapter is divided into three parts. First, a set of correlation analyses is conducted between the given variables. In this process, the chapter will examine the impacts of independent variables on democratic citizenship across East Asian and Western societies. After that, investigations are conducted into how individual-level variables affect the generation of democratic citizenship via logistic regressions. If the impact of individual variables on the formation of democratic citizenship varies significantly across regions, these differences may suggest the hidden influence of cultural values on democratic citizenship, as some Asian values theorists argue. Based on the results presented in this chapter, a more elaborate multi-level modelling will be used in the subsequent chapter.

6.2 Correlations between voluntary associations, cultural values, and democratic citizenship

As shown in the previous chapter, cultural values, associational membership and democratic citizenship vary between countries and global regions. In order to examine whether the relationships between these variables are statistically significant, it is necessary to scrutinise the inter-correlations between these variables. A set of correlation analysis is also used to examine the relationship between a societal-level variable of cultural values and democratic citizenship, which is a dependent variable of this research. First, this section conducts stratified correlation analyses based on individual-level data to examine the different correlation patterns in Western and Eastern countries. In other words, stratified correlation analyses are performed separately on 18 Western countries and 11 East Asian regions, dividing them into two groups, in order to examine differences in the relationship between independent and dependent variables across regions.

6.2.1 Correlations between voluntary associations and democratic citizenship

The correlation between associational membership and values for democratic citizenship indicators is examined based on Kendall's tau-b correlation test (see Appendix 6.1 for the results of the correlation analyses by country).²⁰ Table 6.1 (below) shows the correlation between membership of voluntary associations, socio-demographic features and indicators of democratic citizenship across cultural regions. According to these results, there are significant relationships between membership of the associations and most aspects of democratic citizenship.

Two key things are worth mentioning in this section. First, looking at the correlations between socio-demographic variables and democratic citizenship, it is clear that most of the measures show a similar pattern of relationships in both West and East (except for the effects of gender on generalised trust, and education and income on particularised trust in the case of East Asia). As individual-level control variables, these socio-demographic features are seen to have similar propensities, regardless of the regions in relation to democratic citizenship.

²⁰ The reason why this section adopts Kendall's tau-b correlation test is that it is preferable to measure a monotonic relationship using ranked data (Abdi, 2007). Pearson's correlation coefficient, which uses the mean and variance of the variables, can lead to erroneous results if the variable values do not follow a normal distribution. In this research most of the key variables are categorical and even binomial, and Kendall's correlation is the preferred method to measure the correlations.

Table 6.1 Correlations: between individual-level variables and democratic citizenship

18 Western countries							11 East Asian countries					
Civic virtue			Political engagement				Civic virtue			Political engagement		
Tolerance	Particularised trust	Generalised trust	Interest in politics	Voting	Political activity		Tolerance	Particularised trust	Generalised trust	Interest in politics	Voting	Political activity
<i>Voluntary associations</i>												
Membership	.090 ***	.121 ***	.230 ***	.203 ***	.120 ***	.203 ***	-.009	.015 **	-.035 ***	.074 ***	.076 ***	.121 ***
<i>Socio-demographic variables</i>												
Gender	.076 **	.029 ***	-.011 **	-.141 ***	-.016 ***	-.044 ***	.023 ***	-.028 ***	-.007	-.098 ***	-.023 ***	-.082 ***
Age	-.037 ***	.101 ***	.028 ***	.127 ***	.215 ***	-.057 ***	-.039 ***	.033 ***	.043 ***	.037 ***	.138 ***	-.065 ***
Education	.104 ***	.039 ***	.189 ***	.178 ***	.040 ***	.220 ***	.170 ***	-.005	.110 ***	.036 ***	.018 **	.203 ***
Income	.072 ***	.121 ***	.183 ***	.122 ***	.094 ***	.107 ***	.056 ***	-.004	.039 ***	.035 ***	.018 **	.066 ***

Note: Entries are Kendall's tau b. (***. $P < .01$, **. $P < .05$); number of observations = 58,679 (West = 39,346; East = 19,333). Data: WVS7

Dependent variables: tolerance = additive score of tolerance for different races/immigrant workers, high tolerance (1), low tolerance (0); particularised trust = additive score of trust for family, neighbours and acquaintance, high trust (1), low trust (0); generalised trust = most people can be trusted (1), need to be careful (0)

Independent variables: membership = one membership or less (0), multiple membership (1); gender = male (0), female (1); age = under 40 (0), over 40 (1); education = primary to upper-secondary (0), over post-secondary (1); income = 1st to 5th deciles (0), 6th to 10th deciles (1)

Overall, gender has a negative correlation with political engagement and age shows a negative correlation with political tolerance and political activity in both regions. On the other hand, education and income levels present positive correlations with civic virtue and political engagement. However, the relationship between associational membership and democratic citizenship is strikingly different across the two regions. In eighteen Western countries, multiple membership of voluntary associations demonstrates statistically significant and positive correlations with every variable of civic virtue and political engagement. In East Asia, on the contrary, the correlation between associational membership and tolerance is not statistically significant. Furthermore, the correlation between associational membership and generalised trust is negative. The relationship between associational membership and political engagement is positive, regardless of the region; and yet, Western countries show consistently stronger correlations than East Asian countries.

This may imply that the conventional model of voluntary associations fostering democratic citizenship may not fit East Asian societies so well. The Tocquevillian idea, which supposes that voluntary associations improve the ability to cope with dissimilar others (Putnam, 2000), and also make one more interested in broader social and political issues (Halpern, 2005), is not well supported here for East Asian countries.

6.2.2 Correlations between cultural values and democratic citizenship

Culturalists may suggest one possibility to explain why the socialisation effect of voluntary associations shows regional disparities. In terms of Asian values debates, for instance, Lee Kuan-yew's expression, "culture is destiny", summarises this issue well (Zakaria, 1994). For this reason, this section attempts to examine how cultural values represented by collectivistic hierarchism affect democratic citizenships in practice. The results of the correlation analyses between cultural values and democratic citizenship are presented in Table 6.2 (below).

Table 6.2 Correlations between cultural values and democratic citizenship

	18 Western countries						11 East Asian countries					
	Civic virtue			Political engagement			Civic virtue			Political engagement		
	Tolerance	Particularised trust	Generalised trust	Interest in politics	Voting	Political activity	Tolerance	Particularised trust	Generalised trust	Interest in politics	Voting	Political activity
Individualism	.011 ***	.020 ***	.002	.026 ***	-.064 ***	.068 ***	.212 ***	.009	.083 ***	.135 ***	-.124 ***	.088 ***
Hierarchism	-.079 ***	-.167 ***	-.211 ***	-.100 ***	-.074 ***	-.018 ***	-.107 ***	-.003	-.021 ***	.026 ***	-.062 ***	-.108 ***

Note: Entries are Kendall's tau b. (***. $P < .01$, **. $P < .05$); number of observations = 58,679 (West = 39,346; East = 19,333). Data = WVS7

Dependent variables: tolerance = additive score of tolerance for different races/immigrant workers, high tolerance (1), low tolerance (0); particularised trust = additive score of trust for family, neighbours and acquaintance, high trust (1), low trust (0); generalised trust = most people can be trusted (1), need to be careful (0)

Independent variables: Hofstede (2011)

Table 6.2 analyses the relationships between cultural values and democratic citizenship. In terms of individualism, first, the correlation offers intriguing results for further analysis. Individualism shows significant correlations in most cases. Specifically, the correlations between individualism and democratic citizenship are positive in most cases, regardless of region. However, these correlations are greater in East Asia than in Western societies. For example, the correlation between individualism and tolerance is .212 in East Asia but only .011 in the West. Also, the correlation with an interest in politics is .135 in East Asia, which is higher than in the West, at 0.26. This suggests that individualistic culture has a greater influence on creating democratic citizenship in East Asia than in Western societies.

Second, hierarchism and democratic citizenship also demonstrate significant correlations in most cases, except the association between hierarchism and particularised trust in East Asian societies. Unlike the correlation with individualism, hierarchism is negatively linked to democratic citizenship. Regional differences are somewhat mixed. The negative correlation between both hierarchism and tolerance, and political activity, is larger in East Asia than in the West. In terms of the correlation with generalised trust, on the contrary, the negative relationship is stronger in the West. One unique thing here is that hierarchism has a positive correlation with an interest in politics in East Asian societies. It can be inferred that hierarchism may partially strengthen the political demands of the public in East Asia, such as the moral uprightness of rulers, the responsible delivery of public welfare and the maintenance of an orderly society (Inoguchi & Newman, 1997). In addition, these results are antithetical to the position of some opponents of the Asian values thesis, who maintain that hierarchism promotes unquestioning loyalty and is eventually linked with obedience to authority (Huntington, 2012).

As can be seen above, the two cultural values of individualism and hierarchism seem to have significant impacts on democratic citizenship, as many scholars have argued extensively in the Asian values debate. However, these correlations are insufficient to fully scrutinise the complex relationship between these variables. This is because the correlation analysis only provides insights into the relationship between the two variables. More importantly, the correlation analysis only describes an association between variables, while regression analysis offers more information on the impact of explanatory variables on the

dependent measure. Therefore, it is necessary to explore the relationship between the above variables in a more sophisticated way. In the following section a set of logistic regressions is used to take a closer look at the relationship between each variable.

6.3 Baseline analysis at individual level

6.3.1 Logistic regressions at individual level

In this section simple (bivariate) and multiple logistic regression analyses are conducted between associational membership, socio-demographic control variables and democratic citizenship – comprising civic virtue and political engagement.²¹ In addition, it will also run stratified logistic analyses for Eastern and Western countries. Asian values debates can provide grounds for this stratification. The purpose of stratified analyses is to examine whether the cultural values of societies affect democratic citizenship. As mentioned in the literature review, there has been a longstanding academic debate over the compatibility between Asian values and democratic citizenship. Moreover, since the previous section shows the disparities across regions, it is timely and crucial to examine the impact of each independent variable on democratic citizenship.

First, the results of the simple logistic regressions between associational membership and socio-demographic variables on civic virtue (tolerance, particularised and generalised trust) are presented in Table 6.3. below.²² It is noticeable that all of the independent variables are

²¹ The reason for adopting a logistic regression is that most of the independent/dependent variables of the research are categorical data – either nominal or ordinal. Ordinary least squares (OLS) regression is found to be less favourable in analysing dichotomous outcomes due to its strict statistical premises, such as linearity, continuity, and normal distribution (Tabachnick, Fidell, & Ullman, 2007), logistic regressions are adopted as a main statistical technique in this section.

²² For a better understanding, a brief summary of how to interpret the logistic regression results table is as follows. β presents the estimated logistic coefficients for the model. However, it is often difficult to interpret intuitively, as the logistic coefficients are in log-odds units. Thus, coefficient in logistic regression is often translated into odds ratios (OR). OR is straightly came from coefficients in logistic regressions. β_j pertains to the regression coefficient of independent variable X_j , and exponentiated β_j shows the OR. When other variables are being equal, “the odds ratio means the change in the odds of Y given a unit change in X_j ” (Peng et al., 2002: 24).

significantly associated with tolerance, and particularised and generalised trust. The results also allow us to determine which of the independent variables significantly predict the risk of one belonging to each category (i.e., the comparison group) versus the reference category – low tolerance and low trust groups. Specifically, in terms of the relationship between associational membership and tolerance, the predictor is positive and significant ($\beta = .399$, S.E. = .019). The slope could be interpreted as follows: the log-odds of being in the “high tolerance” category for a person who has multiple memberships of voluntary associations is predicted to be .399 points greater than for participants with fewer memberships. Put another way, the result indicates that people participating in multiple associations have higher possibilities of belonging to the “high” tolerance group, compared with people who participate less. According to the odds ratio, multiple associational participation increases the likelihood of belonging to the “high” tolerance categories about 1.5 times (OR = 1.491).

Associational membership is highly related to other dependent variables. People with multiple associational memberships are between 61.3 per cent and 94.5 per cent more likely to belong to high particularised and generalised trust groups compared with people who have one or no memberships (OR = 1.613 and 1.945, respectively).

Table 6.3 Simple logistic regressions: civic virtue

	Tolerance			Particularised trust			Generalised trust		
	B	SE	OR	B	SE	OR	B	SE	OR
Associational membership	.399	.019	1.491***	.478	.018	1.613***	.665	.665	1.945***
Gender	.186	.018	1.204***	.038	.017	1.039 *	-.047	.017	.954 **
Age	.069	.019	1.071***	.474	.019	1.606***	.224	.018	1.251***
Education	.850	.019	2.340***	.285	.018	1.330***	.775	.017	2.170***
Income	.649	.020	1.914***	.561	.018	1.753***	.702	.018	2.018***
Regions	-2.076	.021	.125***	-1.334	.022	.263***	-.874	.019	.417***

Note: *** < .001, ** < .01, * < .05; β = coefficient; SE = robust standard error; OR = odds ratio; data = WVS7

Dependent variables: tolerance = additive score of tolerance for different races/immigrant workers, high tolerance (1), low tolerance (0); particularised trust = additive score of trust for family, neighbours and acquaintance, high trust (1), low trust (0); generalised trust = most people can be trusted (1), need to be careful (0)

Independent variables: associational membership = one membership or less (0), multiple membership (1); gender = male (0), female (1); age = under 40 (0), over 40 (1); education = primary to upper-secondary (0), over post-secondary (1); income = 1st to 5th deciles (0), 6th to 10th deciles (1); regions = West (0), East (1)

Socio-demographic control variables are also found to have significant relationships with dependent variables in general. In terms of the influence on tolerance, it is education and income that seem to have the greatest impacts. The odds ratios show that being in the high education and high-income groups increases the odds of “high tolerance” almost twice (OR = 2.340 and 1.914, respectively). Age and gender are also seen to have significant relationships with tolerance. When looking at the odds ratio, Table 6.3 presents that females and older people (over 40) are more likely to belong to the high tolerance group compared to men and younger people (OR = 1.071 and 1.204, respectively). The relationship between associational membership, socio-demographic indicators and trust is also mostly significant. In particular, the relationship with particularised trust is observed to be consistent and statistically significant with all of the independent variables. Among them, especially noteworthy variables are also the level of education and income. Given the figures of the odds ratio, people in the high level of education category are 1.3 and 2.2 times more likely to be included in the high particularised and generalised trust categories, respectively (OR = 1.330 and 2.170). A higher income also increases the likelihood of being categorised in each of the high trust groups, 1.7 and 2.0 times. That is, the higher the level of education and income, the higher the level of social trust. The relationships between gender and civic virtue are somewhat mixed. In general, females are more likely to belong to the higher tolerance and particularised trust categories than males (OR >1), but generalised trust is slightly lower (OR <1).

Next, a series of simple logistic regressions is conducted between independent/control variables and categorical measures of political engagement: an interest in politics; voting; political activity. The results are shown in Table 6.4 (below). Similar to the relationship with civic virtue, associational membership and socio-demographical variables are significantly associated with political engagement. From the results, it can be inferred that associational membership is highly associated with an interest in politics, voting and political activity. This means that associational life could be regarded as one of the key indicators affecting the creation of political engagement.

Table 6.4 Simple logistic regressions: political engagement

	Interest in politics			Voting			Political activity		
	B	SE	OR	B	SE	OR	B	SE	OR
Associational membership	.708	.017	2.030***	.478	.017	1.613***	.811	.018	2.251***
Gender	-.515	.017	.598***	-.080	.017	.924***	-.229	.017	.796***
Age	.459	.017	1.582***	.840	.018	2.316***	-.078	.018	.925***
Education	.614	.017	1.849***	.208	.017	1.231***	1.049	.018	2.855***
Income	.488	.018	1.629***	.370	.018	1.448***	.628	.018	1.874***
Regions	-.599	.018	.549***	-.507	.018	.602***	-1.517	.020	.219***

Note: *** < .001, ** < .01, * < .05; β = coefficient; SE = robust standard error; OR = odds ratio; data = WVS7

Dependent variables: interest in politics = interested (1), not very interested (0); voting = unlikely to (0), likely to (1); political activities = non-participatory (0), participatory (1)

Independent variables: associational membership = one membership or less (0), multiple membership (1); gender = male (0), female (1); age = under 40 (0), over 40 (1); education = primary to upper-secondary (0), over post-secondary (1); income = 1st to 5th deciles (0), 6th to 10th deciles (1); regions = West (0), East (1)

Specifically, individuals with multiple voluntary association memberships are 2.0, 1.6 and 2.3 times more likely to belong to the “high political interest”, “more likely to vote” and “high political activity” groups than those with one or no memberships (see odds ratios in Table 6.4). Socio-demographic factors also demonstrate strong associations with categorical measures of political engagement. The results are consistent and statistically significant in almost all dimensions. Generally speaking, females are seen to have a lower level of political engagement than males (OR <1), and the higher the age, education level and income, the higher the level of political interest, voting and political participation. For instance, as viewed through the odds ratio, as the level of education increases, the likelihood of belonging to the “interested in politics” and “actively participated in political activities”, versus lower education and income groups, is 1.8 and 2.8 times greater, respectively.

Since one of the main concerns of this research is whether the influence of associational membership on political engagement varies between regions, it is also necessary to pay attention to the impact of the variable “region”. What can be seen from the results of simple logistic regression analyses is that membership of associations has greater effects on tolerance and trust in Western societies than East Asian ones. For example, regional variables based on the East and West division demonstrate that East Asia has lower values of all dependent variables compared to the West. Specifically, East Asian individuals are far less likely to belong to the high tolerance group than Westerners (OR = .125). In terms of particularised and generalised trust, the odds ratios are .263 and .417, respectively. The results mean that the likelihood of East Asian individuals being included in the higher tolerance, particularised and generalised categories is only 12.5 per cent, 26.3 per cent and 41.7 per cent compared to Westerners (OR = .125, .263 and .417, respectively) (See Table 6.3 above).

Regional variables also exert a significant influence on political engagement. This is shown by the odds ratios of the variable “regions” on interest in politics, voting and political activity. According to these results, the likelihood of East Asian respondents being included in the high political interest group, high voting group and high political activity group is 45.1 per cent, 39.8 per cent and 78.1 per cent lower than for Westerners (OR = 0.549, 0.602, and 0.219, respectively) (See Table 6.4 above).

These findings call into question the conventional conclusion that associational engagement fosters social and political socialisation, while reinforcing some arguments, mainly from East Asia, that the relationship between associational membership and democratic citizenship is mixed or at least weak (e.g., Park & Kim, 2006; Park, 2014; Yoon, 2017). The socialisation effect of voluntary associations emphasised by Tocqueville or Putnam does not fit very well, at least in East Asia. The results can be interpreted in connection with the Asian values debates or allegiance to political culture (Dalton & Welzel, 2014) in the East Asian region, which may suggest that other unobserved influences on political engagement need to be addressed.

The above analyses suggest a new interpretive potential for the relationship between voluntary associations and democratic citizenship. However, the above bivariate logistic regressions can overlook the interaction between each variable. Therefore, the next section performs a set of multiple logistic regressions, with multiple sets of independent variables.

6.3.2 Multiple logistic regression at the individual level

As shown in the simple regression analyses, associational life and socio-demographic factors demonstrate significant relationships with the dependent variables of civic virtue and political activism. Although the analysis provides rich information on the relationship between each explanatory/control variable and dependent variable, more sophisticated analyses are needed in order to predict the real nature of the role of voluntary associations in creating democratic citizenship. Furthermore, simple logistic analyses have limitations in that it is difficult to examine the multi-collinearity of each independent variable. In this section, therefore, multiple logistic regression is carried out to test the relationship between categorical dependent variables and independent/control variables.

It should be cautiously noted that when multiple regression is performed, interactions between multiple independent variables can occur. For example, even if income and education level have significant impacts on civic virtue and political engagement, since income also intuitively has a positive relationship with education, it is necessary to scrutinise the interaction between them. In this vein, before all possible variables are included in the

equation, a multi-collinearity test between independent/control variables is performed by checking correlation coefficients and variance inflation factor (VIF) values. If independent variables in a logistic regression are highly correlated, this makes it necessary to add interaction variables to the model. The results of the multicollinearity analysis between independent variables are as follows.

Table 6.5 Multicollinearity analysis between independent variables

	Tolerance	Particularised trust	Generalised trust	Interests in politics	Voting	Political activity
	VIF					
Associational life						
<i>Associational membership</i>	1.054	1.055	1.055	1.054	1.055	1.055
Socio-demographic						
<i>Gender</i>	1.005	1.005	1.005	1.005	1.005	1.005
<i>Age</i>	1.029	1.030	1.029	1.029	1.030	1.030
<i>Education</i>	1.140	1.139	1.139	1.139	1.140	1.142
<i>Income</i>	1.113	1.111	1.112	1.112	1.112	1.113
Regions	1.081	1.078	1.077	1.076	1.077	1.082

Again, the importance of testing the variance inflation factor (VIF) lies in the fact that it is possible that multicollinearity “*undermines the statistical significance of an independent variable*” (Allen, 1997: 176). The VIF demonstrates how much the variance of the coefficient estimate is increased by multicollinearity. In logistic regression, the VIF threshold is often set at 10, but values above 2.5 may still raise concerns (Midi et al., 2010). The results of multicollinearity between the independent/control variable in this study are low compared to the general statistical threshold, so a specific diagnostic tool is not considered in the subsequent multiple logistic analyses (See Table 6.5 above). Table 6.6 (below) shows the results of multiple logistic regression analysis on the relationship between independent, control variables and civic virtue – tolerance, particularised and generalised trust.

Table 6.6 Multiple logistic regressions: civic virtue

	Tolerance			Particularised trust			Generalised trust		
	B	SE	OR	B	SE	OR	B	SE	OR
Associational membership	.132	.022	1.142***	.354	.020	1.425***	.455	.019	1.576***
Gender	.298	.022	1.348***	.083	.019	1.087***	.009	.018	1.009
Age	-.069	.023	.933**	.390	.021	1.476***	.238	.019	1.268***
Education	.603	.023	1.828***	.004	.021	1.004	.549	.019	1.732***
Income	.190	.023	1.209***	.348	.020	1.417***	.405	.019	1.500***
Regions	-2.028	.022	.132***	-1.221	.023	.295***	-.706	.020	.494***
Nagelkerke R ²	.293			.132			.124		
Cox & Snell R ²	.207			.096			.093		
-2 Log likelihood	51980.482			62828.466			67644.101		
Chi-square	12125.191 ***			5327.059 ***			5139.717 ***		

Note: *** < .001, ** < .01, * < .05; β = coefficient; SE = robust standard error; OR = odds ratio; data = WVS7

Dependent variables: tolerance = additive score of tolerance for different races/immigrant workers, high tolerance (1), low tolerance (0); particularised trust = additive score of trust for family, neighbours and acquaintance, high trust (1), low trust (0); generalised trust = most people can be trusted (1), need to be careful (0)

Independent variables: associational membership = one membership or less (0), multiple membership (1); gender = male (0), female (1); age = under 40 (0), over 40 (1); education = primary to upper-secondary (0), over post-secondary (1); income = 1st to 5th deciles (0), 6th to 10th deciles (1); regions = West (0), East (1)

Overall, the results of multiple logistic regression analyses do not reveal a significant difference from the results of simple logistic regression analyses. Socio-demographic indicators demonstrate consistent and statistically significant impacts on tolerance, particularised and generalised trust. Among them, the effects of education level and income are found to be the strongest. For instance, the odds ratios of education for the tolerance and generalised trust categories are approximately 1.8 and 1.7, respectively. This means that individuals with a higher level of education are 82.8 per cent and 73.2 per cent more likely to belong to the higher tolerance and generalised trust categories, respectively. However, a few things should be pointed out. For instance, educational level that has a significant effect on particularised trust in simple logistic regressions is found to be statistically insignificant in the multiple logistic analysis. Also, the impact of gender on generalised trust becomes insignificant, and the relationship between age and tolerance goes in the opposite direction in multiple logistic regressions. Since there are several independent variables in multi logistic regression, there may be a correlation between each variable, which eventually affect the impact of some relationship. Despite some slight changes in the relationship between the control and dependent variables, voluntary associations and regional factors – the main focus of this research – still demonstrate significant relationships with each categorical variable of civic virtue. Next, the results of multiple logistic regression analyses between the independent/control variables and political engagement are presented in Table 6.7. The results show that the impacts of independent variables on voting are significant in almost all cases – except gender. It is also noteworthy that no critical differences are found compared with the simple logistic regression results. Briefly, the more active the participation in an association, the higher the income and education level, resulting in a higher interest in politics, voting and political activity. It is also inferred that males are more likely to be more interested in politics than females.

Throughout the multiple logistic regression analyses, this section examined how voluntary associations and various socio-demographic factors influence some major indicators of civic virtue and political activism. The results partially support the conventional wisdom of neo- Tocquevillian and Putnam’s theory, which emphasised the function of voluntary associations in cultivating civic virtue. The results are meaningful, as one of the main interests of this research – namely, a discourse about “association as a school of democracy” – is reconfirmed to some extent.

Table 6.7 Multiple logistic regression analyses: political engagement

	Interest in politics			Voting			Political activity		
	B	SE	OR	B	SE	OR	B	SE	OR
Associational membership	.556	.019	1.744***	.422	.019	1.525***	.603	.020	1.828***
Gender	-.490	.018	.612***	-.032	.018	.968	-.194	.020	.824***
Age	.485	.019	1.624***	.832	.019	2.297***	-.165	.021	.848***
Education	.438	.019	1.550***	.109	.020	1.115***	.774	.020	2.168***
Income	.229	.019	1.258***	.245	.020	1.278***	.143	.021	1.153***
Regions	-.445	.019	.641***	-.340	.019	.712***	-1.454	.022	.234***
Nagelkerke R ²	.112			.086			.237		
Cox & Snell R ²	.084			.064			.178		
-2 Log likelihood	68615.202			68281.519			60812.894		
Chi-square	4667.731 ***			3515.450 ***			10026.944 ***		

Note: *** < .001, ** < .01, * < .05; β coefficient; SE = robust standard error; OR = odds ratio; data = WVS7

Dependent variables: interest in politics = interested (1), not very interested (0); voting = unlikely to (0), likely to (1); political activity = non-participatory (0), participatory (1)

Independent variables: associational membership = one membership or less (0), multiple membership (1); gender = male (0), female (1); age = under 40 (0), over 40 (1); education = primary to upper-secondary (0), over post-secondary (1); income = 1st to 5th deciles (0), 6th to 10th deciles (1); regions = West (0), East (1)

On the one hand, however, the above discussion still does not resolve the question raised by some Asian values advocates, who doubt whether such orthodoxy is applicable in different cultural contexts. In order to explore these questions more precisely, the next chapter conducts stratified logistic regression analyses, which distinguishes between the West and East Asia. It will yield comparability on the relationship between voluntary associations and democratic citizenship by region.

6.3.3 Comparison between contemporary Western and Eastern societies

In this section logistic regression analyses are conducted by separating East Asian and Western countries to compare how associational membership and socio-demographic variables influence the formation of democratic citizenship in each region. By comparing regions, it aims to examine consistency with the existing empirical studies on East Asian countries. In some of the previous literature on democratic citizenship in East Asian countries, voluntary associations have no, or weak, associations with democratic citizenship (e.g., Park, 2012; Dwivedi, 2017; Yoon, 2017). In order to confirm the results of previous studies, and to identify regional variations in the effects of each independent variable on democratic citizenship, it will adopt a series of stratified multiple logistic regression models comparing the East and West separately. First, the results of the logistic regression analyses on the relationship between voluntary associations and socio-demographic control variables and civic virtue – tolerance, particularised and generalised trust – are presented in Tables 6.8 to 6.10 (below). The foremost thing worth noting is that the influence of associational membership on each civic virtue variable varies across regions. That is to say, the influence of associational membership on tolerance, particularised and generalised trust appears to be consistently stronger in Western societies than East Asia. In the case of the relationship between associational membership and particularised trust, for example, the average OR of Western countries is 1.532, whereas in East Asia it is 1.087. In Western societies, individuals with multiple memberships are 53.2 per cent more likely to be categorised in the high particularised trust group than those with one or no associational memberships. In East Asia it only increases by 8.7 per cent (see Table 6.9). The relationships between voluntary associations, tolerance and generalised trust show more dramatic disparities.

Table 6.8 Multiple logistic regression (West and East comparison): tolerance

	Tolerance					
	18 Western countries			11 East Asian countries		
	B	SE	OR	B	SE	OR
Associational membership	.355	.033	1.427***	-.073	.031	.930 *
Gender	.491	.032	1.634***	.120	.030	1.127***
Age	-.135	.035	.874***	-.024	.031	.976
Education	.460	.034	1.584***	.698	.033	2.010***
Income	.289	.033	1.335***	.093	.033	1.098**
Nagelkerke R ²	.044			.039		
Cox & Snell R ²	.024			.029		
-2 Log likelihood	26839.593			24946.823		
Chi-square	831.495***			554.891***		

Note: *** < .001, ** < .01, * < .05; β = coefficient; SE = robust standard error; OR = odds ratio; data = WVS7

Dependent variables: tolerance = additive score of tolerance for different races/immigrant workers, high tolerance (1), low tolerance (0)

Independent variables: associational membership = one membership or less (0), multiple membership (1); gender = male (0), female (1); age = under 40 (0), over 40 (1); education = primary to upper-secondary (0), over post-secondary (1); income = 1st to 5th deciles (0), 6th to 10th deciles (1)

Table 6.9 Multiple logistic regression (West and East comparison): particularised trust

	Particularised trust					
	18 Western countries			11 East Asian countries		
	B	SE	OR	B	SE	OR
Associational membership	.426	.023	1.532***	.083	.040	1.087 *
Gender	.163	.022	1.177***	-.147	.039	.863***
Age	.456	.024	1.578***	.178	.040	1.194***
Education	-.015	.024	.985	-.012	.043	.988
Income	.453	.023	1.573***	-.014	.044	.986
Nagelkerke R ²	.050			.004		
Cox & Snell R ²	.037			.002		
-2 Log likelihood	45452.005			17149.260		
Chi-square	1287.273***			40.467***		

Note: *** < .001, ** < .01, * < .05; β = coefficient; SE = robust standard error; OR = odds ratio; data = WVS7

Dependent variables: particularised trust = additive score of trust for family, neighbours and acquaintances, high trust (1), low trust (0)

Independent variables: associational membership = one membership or less (0), multiple membership (1); gender = male (0), female (1); age = under 40 (0), over 40 (1); education = primary to upper-secondary (0), over post-secondary (1); income = 1st to 5th deciles (0), 6th to 10th deciles (1)

Table 6.10 Multiple logistic regression (West and East comparison): generalised trust

	Generalised trust					
	18 Western countries			11 East Asian countries		
	B	SE	OR	B	SE	OR
Associational membership	.753	.023	2.123***	-.183	.034	.832***
Gender	.007	.023	1.007	-.011	.032	.989
Age	.185	.024	1.204***	.280	.033	1.323***
Education	.511	.024	1.668***	.539	.034	1.715***
Income	.528	.023	1.696***	.090	.035	1.095*
Nagelkerke R ²	.115			.025		
Cox & Snell R ²	.086			.018		
-2 Log likelihood	44101.276			22846.899		
Chi-square	3072.871***			335.135***		

Note: *** < .001, ** < .01, * < .05; β = coefficient; SE = robust standard error; OR = odds ratio; data = WVS7

Dependent variables: interest in politics = interested (1), not very interested (0); voting = unlikely to (0), likely to (1); political activity = non-participatory (0), participatory (1) generalised trust = most people can be trusted (1), need to be careful (0)

Independent variables: associational membership = one membership or less (0), multiple membership (1); gender = male (0), female (1); age = under 40 (0), over 40 (1); education = primary to upper-secondary (0), over post-secondary (1); income = 1st to 5th deciles (0), 6th to 10th deciles (1)

The influence of voluntary association membership on tolerance and generalised trust reveals positive relationships in the West yet negative ones in East Asia (See Table 6.8 and 6.10 respectively). Specifically, in the case of 18 Western countries, multiple membership is found to increase the likelihood of belonging to a high tolerance and high generalised trust group by 42.7 per cent (OR = 1.427) and more than double (OR = 2.123), respectively. On the contrary, East Asia shows that the odds are somewhat reduced, by 7.0 per cent (OR = .930) and 16.8 per cent (OR = .832). In East Asia participation in multiple voluntary associations leads to a decrease in generalised trust and tolerance.

The effects of socio-demographic variables on civic virtue are found to be mixed. Overall, education and income level are seen to have favourable and statistically significant impacts on promoting tolerance and generalised trust. However, the relationships with particularised trust are not significant in most cases. In the case of age, the level of tolerance and trust for respondents over the age of 40 is higher than in the under 40 group (except for the relationship with tolerance in East Asia). Gender exerts significant influence on the relationship between tolerance and particularised trust. In the West female has higher levels of tolerance and particularised trust than male (OR > 1), whereas in East Asia, male is more likely to be in the high tolerance and particularised groups (OR < 1).

On the other hand, Pseudo R^2 , both Nagelkerke R^2 and Cox & Snell R^2 , in the East Asian model are consistently lower than in the Western societies in general. R^2 values offer an indication of the amount of variation in the dependent variable explained by the model. In other words, a set of independent (i.e., associational membership) and socio-demographic control variables included in the above analyses explains the dependent variable better in Western societies than the East. This implies that there may be other variables influencing democratic citizenships, especially in East Asia.

Table 6.11 Multiple logistic regression (West and East comparison): interest in politics

Interest in politics						
	18 Western countries			11 East Asian countries		
	B	SE	OR	B	SE	OR
Associational membership	.689	.024	1.992***	.279	.031	1.322***
Gender	-.579	.023	.560***	-.373	.030	.688***
Age	.647	.025	1.911***	.189	.030	1.208***
Education	.586	.025	1.797***	.122	.032	1.130***
Income	.253	.024	1.288***	.134	.033	1.143***
Nagelkerke R ²	.130			.023		
Cox & Snell R ²	.096			.018		
-2 Log likelihood	42609.796			25588.382		
Chi-square	3481.232***			333.506***		

Note: *** < .001, ** < .01, * < .05; β = coefficient; SE = robust standard error; OR = odds ratio; data = WVS7

Dependent variables: interest in politics = interested (1), not very interested (0)

Independent variables: associational membership = one membership or less (0), multiple membership (1); gender = male (0), female (1); age = under 40 (0), over 40 (1); education = primary to upper-secondary (0), over post-secondary (1); income = 1st to 5th deciles (0), 6th to 10th deciles (1)

Table 6.12 Multiple logistic regression (West and East comparison): voting

Voting						
	18 Western countries			11 East Asian countries		
	B	SE	OR	B	SE	OR
Associational membership	.462	.024	1.587***	.343	.031	1.409***
Gender	-.010	.023	.990	-.054	.030	.947
Age	.969	.024	2.636***	.608	.031	1.836***
Education	.064	.025	1.066*	.157	.032	1.171***
Income	.330	.024	1.391***	.074	.033	1.077*
Nagelkerke R ²	.090			.037		
Cox & Snell R ²	.066			.028		
-2 Log likelihood	42651.451			25494.988		
Chi-square	2326.574***			523.541***		

Note: *** < .001, ** < .01, * < .05; β = coefficient; SE = robust standard error; OR = odds ratio; data = WVS7

Dependent variables: voting = unlikely to (0), likely to (1)

Independent variables: associational membership = one membership or less (0), multiple membership (1); gender = male (0), female (1); age = under 40 (0), over 40 (1); education = primary to upper-secondary (0), over post-secondary (1); income = 1st to 5th deciles (0), 6th to 10th deciles (1)

Table 6.13 Multiple logistic regression (West and East comparison): political activity

Political activity						
	18 Western countries			11 East Asian countries		
	B	SE	OR	B	SE	OR
Associational membership	.650	.024	1.915***	.509	.036	1.664***
Gender	-.138	.024	.871***	-.322	.036	.725***
Age	-.182	.025	.833***	-.124	.036	.883**
Education	.716	.025	2.047***	.886	.037	2.426***
Income	.163	.024	1.177***	.099	.039	1.105*
Nagelkerke R ²	.098			.083		
Cox & Snell R ²	.073			.056		
-2 Log likelihood	41569.998			19198.597		
Chi-square	2477.352***			1052.931***		

Note: *** < .001, ** < .01, * < .05; β = coefficient; SE = robust standard error; OR = odds ratio; data = WVS7

Dependent variables: political activities = non-participatory (0), participatory (1)

Independent variables: associational membership = one membership or less (0), multiple membership (1); gender = male (0), female (1); age = under 40 (0), over 40 (1); education = primary to upper-secondary (0), over post-secondary (1); income = 1st to 5th deciles (0), 6th to 10th deciles (1)

Second, the relationships between political engagement and associational membership/other socio-demographic control variables are illustrated in Tables 6.11, 6.12 and 6.13 (above) to scrutinise the role of voluntary associations in fostering political interest, voting and related activities.

At first glimpse, there seems to be no major difference in terms of the effects of associational membership on categorical measures of political engagement between the two regions. In both regions associational membership has significant impacts on fostering an interest in politics, voting behaviour and participation in political activity. However, taking a closer look can reveal the following crucial differences: similar to the relationship between voluntary associations and civic virtue, these results show that the role of voluntary associations as schools for cultivating political engagement is greater in Western society than East Asia. In general, the influence of associational life on an interest in politics, voting and political activity is stronger in Western countries than East Asian countries. Specifically, the influence of associational membership on each measure of political engagement – interest in politics, voting and political activity – appears to be consistently stronger in Western societies than East Asia. In the case of the high interest in politics category, for example, the average OR of Western countries is 1.992, whereas in East Asia it is 1.322. This means that when people join multiple voluntary associations, the likelihood of belonging to the “high interest in politics” category may increase by double in the West, while in East Asia it increases by 32.2 per cent (See Table 6.11). Similarly, when individuals from the West have multiple memberships, the likelihood of belonging to the “high political activities” category is around 1.9 times greater (OR = 1.915) than among those who are involved in one or no memberships, whereas in East Asia it is 1.7 times greater (OR = 1.664). Although this gap in voting is smaller between regions, propensity is also consistent. In Western countries the OR for high voting categories reaches 1.587, while in East Asia it is around 1.409 (See Tables 6.12 and 6.13 respectively). The differences in the results observed between the Western and East Asian regions may indicate the impact of regional cultural values on political engagement.

Most of the other results between demographics and political engagement from the baseline analyses coincide with previous studies. For instance, in explaining who becomes politically

active, Verba and Nie (1987) suggested in their seminal work that structural factors play important roles, noticeably the educational levels and income, along with the associated elements of gender and age. Along with the existing literature, the results of the given analyses also show that demographic variables have significant effects on political engagement. Overall, higher levels of education and income lead to higher political interest, voting and political participation (OR > 1). Male is more likely to be included in high political interest and high voting categories than female, regardless of region. Age is another significant variable in explaining an interest in politics and voting behaviour, but political activity in the over 40s is significantly lower than in the younger group (OR < 1). The findings that younger people are less likely to vote while being more likely to participate in various forms of political activities (such as strikes and petitions) are consistent with some previous works (e.g., Melo & Stockemer, 2014; Lilleker & Koc-Michalska, 2017), which may suggest that the pattern of political participation is changing rather than declining.

Another thing that is noteworthy in the relationship between socio-demographic variables and democratic citizenship is the role of education in explaining political activity. Unlike other variables, the impact of education on voting and political activity is stronger in East Asia than in the West (see Table 6.12 and 6.13). This tendency may reflect the role of Asian values, which are especially emphasised in education, and which regard political participation as an obligation of the intellectual elite (Bell, 2009).

The above analytic results show that many of the impacts of voluntary associations in cultivating democratic citizenship vary significantly across the West and East. These results are contrary to the conventional wisdom that voluntary associations are channels for cultivating democratic citizenship. Rather, involvement in multiple associations seems to reduce tolerance for social diversity and generalised trust in East Asian societies. As discussed in more detail in the subsequent chapter, Realo, Allik and Greenfield (2008) suggest a possible explanation for this propensity. That is, in a collectivistic society, involvement in voluntary associations strengthens trust among intimate primary groups such as family, neighbours and acquaintances (i.e., particularised trust in this case), but the extension of this particularised trust beyond narrow circles to heterogeneous others can be

hampered by in-group favouritism.

On the other hand, some cases show the possibility of a positive role of Asian values in promoting democratic citizenship. This possibility is primarily witnessed in the relationship with political engagement. For example, in the case of correlation analysis, hierarchism is positively associated with an interest in politics (see Chapter 6.2.2). In terms of individual-level logistic regression analysis, education has a great impact on political activities in East Asia. These results imply that cultural values and democratic citizenship are intertwined in complicated ways. In order to explore this complex relationship more precisely, a more sophisticated model is required.

6.4 Concluding remarks

The main goal of this chapter has been to address the baseline analyses by adopting key individual-level predictor variables. In this chapter, therefore, a set of correlation, simple and multiple logistic regression analyses between categorical variables of democratic citizenship and explanatory variables have been performed. The findings can be summarised as follows.

The results of both tests show similar patterns in the relationship between voluntary associations and democratic citizenship, in most cases. As previous literature on theories of social capital and political culture suggests, the role of associational membership is positively linked to various values of democratic citizenship, especially in Western societies. For instance, looking at the correlations between voluntary associations and democratic citizenship, associational membership is seen to have significant and positive relationships with tolerance, particularised and generalised trust, an interest in politics, voting and political activity, in most cases (see Chapter 6.2.1). Similarly, simple and multiple logistic regressions also suggest that involvement in voluntary associations can create a set of democratic citizenship (see Chapters 6.3.1 and 6.3.2). With respect to the research questions of this study, for example, associational membership is highly related to each dependent

variable. People with multiple associational memberships are more likely to belong to high tolerance, high particularised and generalised trust groups approximately 1.4, 1.5 and 2.1 times, respectively, more than people who have one or no memberships in the West (see Tables 6.8, 6.9 and 6.10). These results partially reinforce the conventional beliefs in the fields of social capital and political culture (Putnam, 2000; Hooghe & Stolle, 2003; Dekker & Uslaner, 2003; Iglič, 2010). This is to say, the results support existing studies outlining that voluntary associations function as a school of democracy that cultivates civic mindedness (Park, 2011).

However, these conclusions are undermined by the East Asian cases. Specifically, the correlation analyses for East Asian societies provide results that run counter to those of the West. The correlation between associational membership and dependent variables is not statistically significant (e.g., tolerance), and it is even negative in some cases (e.g., generalised trust). Even in the case of positive correlations, regardless of region, its influence is more powerful in Western society (i.e., correlation with political engagement). A set of logistic regression analyses also provide some conflicting results regarding the conventional models developed in the West. In other words, the influence of associational membership in enhancing democratic citizenship in 11 Asian countries is consistently lower than in the West. Even in relation to tolerance and generalised trust, participation in multiple associations is found to decrease the given dependent variables (see Table 6.8 and 6.10). These results provide an indication that the existing body of theory linking voluntary associations and democratic citizenship may not fit well in the East Asian context. However, the above analysis leads to a couple of limitations, as follows. First, even though various variables about associational membership and socio-demographic features have significant relationships with democratic citizenship, the explanatory power of these models is quite low. That is to say, in a multiple logistic regression analysis in relation to tolerance, for example, the R^2 values of the model (e.g., Nagelkerke R^2), including both independent and control variables, range from .086 to .293. R-squared values in logistic regression analysis are generally lower than linear regression analysis and are difficult to estimate (Hu et al., 2006), but this situation requires the introduction of a new model that can better explain the dependent variable. Perhaps it suggests that the “Western” model of civic engagement in

terms of creating democratic citizenship might not be so useful or might be relevant to the case for examining level 2 effects.

In addition, the above logistic regressions provide an outline of the relationship between voluntary association participation and democratic citizenship at the individual level; yet they do not provide any clues as to how the effect fluctuates in various contexts. Starting from these limitations, this study attempts to present a new model in which cultural variables are added to the equation. As explained in the previous chapter, since these cultural variables are measured at societal rather than individual level, it is necessary to introduce a multi-level model. A comparison of East/West in this chapter would be a first step in addressing this agenda. In the next chapter a multi-level analysis will be conducted in which individualism/hierarchism at the social level is added, in addition to the independent variable/control variables at the individual level.

Chapter 7. Multi-level modelling

7.1 Introduction

This chapter simultaneously examines the influence of voluntary association membership at the individual level and cultural values at the societal level on the formation of democratic citizenship. By addressing the moderating role played by collectivism and hierarchism, which are derived from the Asian values debates, this chapter aims to reveal the following two research questions (RQ):

RQ 1. What is the relationship between voluntary associations and democratic citizenship – civic virtue and political engagement – in contemporary Western and Eastern societies?

RQ 2. How do cultural values – collectivism and hierarchism – impact variations in democratic citizenship across the West and the East?

As seen in the previous chapters, which present the initial results on the relationship between voluntary associations and democratic citizenship, the impacts of associational membership in fostering civic virtue and political engagement are different in contemporary Western and East Asian countries. The impacts of associational membership on tolerance, particularised/generalised trust, an interest in politics, voting and political activity in East Asia are consistently lower than in the West. In order to investigate the origin of these discrepancies, a series of correlation analyses regarding cultural variables were conducted in Chapter 6. The results of the tests showed that collectivism and hierarchism have significant negative correlations with democratic citizenship. Accordingly, this chapter addresses cultural variables in the analysis in order to better understand the true nature among the given variables. The following three sub-questions are adopted to examine the relationship between voluntary associations, cultural values and democratic citizenship:

- (a) Does each dependent variable vary across societies?
- (b) Does the impact of individual-level associational membership on democratic citizenship

vary significantly across societies?

(c) Does the impact of societal-level cultural values on democratic citizenship vary significantly across societies?

This chapter is based on the proposition that the function of voluntary associations as “schools of democracy” can vary from one society to another, as discussed in the previous chapter. In other words, the role of voluntary associations as a channel for enhancing civic virtue and political engagement, which has been discussed since de Tocqueville, explains Western society well but may be less applicable to East Asian society, where collectivistic and hierarchical cultures linger. Western democratic theory typically posits the state and civic society as parallel and confrontational, whereas Confucian countries assume the relations between the state and civil society to be patriarchal, similar to a traditional bread-winning family model (Tu, 1985; Jacques, 2012). Therefore, the relationship between the state and civil society can be postulated as more patriarchally and hierarchically linked. That is to say, the governor is understood to be like the “parents” of the people and thus considering mainly with assuring moral uprightness and conducting appropriately as a parent figure. Altering policies or institutions can be regarded as secondary priority (Tu, 1985). Till nowadays, the East Asian terms for the state demonstrate the fundamentally distinctive notion of government. That is, the terms “nation-family; Guo-jia (in Chinese), Kokka (in Japanese), and Guk-ga (in Korean)” suggest the survival of the idea of a paternal and consensual relationship between rulers and their subjects.

Indeed, the idea of the function of the state as guardian of the citizen’s interests established in very early days in line with the advent of stable bureaucracy in ancient/medieval East Asian societies (Shin & Sin, 2012). This idea also posits that good government manage to create social order, harmony between different classes, and peace. These differences in the relationship between government and civil society can also affect the formation of democratic citizenship through voluntary associations. Even though neo-Tocquevillian scholars regard involvement in horizontal and voluntary associations as a means of fostering trust (or tolerance) towards heterogeneous others in a pluralistic Western society (Glanville, 2016), East Asian culture is more likely to be homogenous, collectivistic and hierarchical.

Summarising the above discussion, the following hypotheses are addressed to investigate the relationship between voluntary associations, cultural values and democratic citizenship:

Hypothesis 1. Membership of voluntary associations fosters democratic citizenship (both civic virtue and political engagement).

Hypothesis 2. The impacts of voluntary associations on democratic citizenship vary across East and West.

Hypothesis 3. Cultural values such as collectivism and hierarchism can play a negative role in moderating the relationship between voluntary associations and democratic citizenship.

Regarding the method, a series of multi-level regression modelling (MLM) is used to test the sub-questions of this study. It supposes that country-level cultural values not only affect individuals' democratic citizenship in Western and Eastern societies but also moderate the effects of associational involvement on dependent variables.

Bickel (2007) notes the advantages of MLM compared to the ordinary least squares (OLS) model. In particular, when individuals are clustered into the same units, the advantages of MLM as an analytical method can be maximised. Specifically, clustered data poses methodological problems by violating basic OLS assumptions, in which each case and observation is independent, and eventually the error terms should be independent and identically distributed. When individual cases are clustered within the same groups or units by nature, the observations are, by definition, non-independent. Especially in the realm of social and behavioural studies, many phenomena are hierarchically structured in nature (McCoach, 2018). Therefore, MLM is used widely, for example, in educational studies, as individual students belong to the same schools or classes, or in the field of pathology, where patients are also nested in the same hospital. In this vein, MLM has become one of the most conspicuously adopted approaches when researchers need to scrutinise individual and group-level effects in the same analysis. Consequently, MLM is one of the most widely used tools to analyse quantitative data, including variability and uncertainty across the different levels (Sagan et al., 2013). In terms of this research, OLS regression is inadequate because cultural values can have a common impact on individuals in the same society. Specifically,

this study assumes that societal values (i.e., individualism and hierarchism) and individual-level associational membership affect democratic citizenship at the same time. In addition, the interactions between these two levels are also among the main interests of the analytical process. In order to test the above hypothesised effects, a statistical method that can capture multi-level and hierarchical relationships in individual and contextual data should be used. If the characteristics of the individual (lower) level are drawn or analysed from the environmental (upper) level data, there is a risk of ecological fallacy (or vice versa) (Diez, 2002). To test this multi-level and clustered structure data, this chapter employs multi-level modelling.

The chapter consists of five sections, as follows, addressing a series of research questions and hypotheses. First, in Section 7.2 it tests likelihood ratios (LR) and intra-class correlation coefficients (ICC), which can offer grounds for adopting multi-level modelling approaches instead of the traditional ordinary linear regressions. In Section 7.3 random intercept models will be used to scrutinise which individual-level characteristics (i.e., socio-demographic characteristics and associational membership) are linked to levels of democratic citizenship. Section 7.4 includes country-level variables in the models to investigate whether these factors have a significant impact on variance in citizens' socio-political attitudes and behaviour. Based on these results, the final section draws implications for the impact of cultural values on civic virtue and political engagement. By means of the above steps, this study aims to shed new light on the understanding of how culture affects the hypothesised relationship between voluntary associations and democratic citizenship.

7.2 Preliminary steps: Does each dependent variable vary across societies?

Before conducting MLM, it is important to note that societal effects can be investigated by including dummy variables for countries with an ordinary regression model (OLS; fixed-effects model). In this model, however, the effects of societal-level factors are confused with the impacts of the country dummies. In OLS models, the upper-level effect is not a part of the residual anymore. Rather, such OLS models can be regarded as including dummies for

each upper-level unit, which may result in excluding useful variation. Put another way, it is impossible to disentangle effects out because of witnessed and unwitnessed societal-level characteristics (Rasbash, 2018). With single-level analysis, it may not be possible to capture the different slopes and intercepts across the countries in this research. Thus, a multi-level model, which allows us to estimate the effects of both types, is therefore preferred in this chapter.

MLM in this chapter is developed in three key steps, as recommended by Heck, Thomas, & Tabata (2014), which are (i) specification and testing of the null model (with no predictors), (ii) testing of the individual-level model (random intercept model) and (iii) testing of the societal-level model (random slope model). Before directly addressing MLM, likelihood ratios (LR) are first tested. These processes are needed to establish whether MLM is a suitable option for addressing the research questions instead of the traditional regression model. During testing of the null model, intra-class correlation coefficients (ICC) are also presented to assess the necessity to adopt MLM.

7.2.1 Likelihood ratio (LR) tests

A typical first step in multi-level modelling is to determine whether there is evidence of clustering in the data with respect to the dependent variable. Clustering in the data may produce biases in parameter estimates and standard errors, which can result in incorrect inferences. In other words, the presence of a hierarchical structure does not directly mean that it is sufficient to adopt multi-level modelling.

One possible approach to significance testing involves the likelihood ratio (LR), which tests the null hypothesis of no group differences. The LR test can be adopted as overall tests of if the random coefficients regression analysis with factors are significantly better fit than the null model (i.e., intercept-only) without independent variables (Garson, 2013). This approach starts with the estimation of the null model to determine the total variance of the dependent variable in the current model. It further shows the difference between total and within-cluster variance. For example, if the variance is enough to reject the null hypothesis

at the $p < .01$ confidence level, it is good to enough to explain the difference between the groups of the dependent variable, which can be tested through MLM (for more detailed information on the LR test, see Appendix 7.1).

Table 7.1 presents the results of LR tests between null models (i.e., no predictors) and simple ordered logistic models without upper-level random intercepts. It is worth noting that only significance levels of less than $p < .001$ are considered in this study to avoid trivially small effects that may become significant. As a result, the difference in the amount of deviation between the two models varies from 2,453 to 13,372, based on the dependent variables, which are statistically significant when compared with the chi-squared value, with 1 degree of freedom ($df = 1$). If the chi-squared test is significant, this indicates that there is significant variability in the intercept variance. As chi-squared values are noticeably less than $p < .001$, the null hypothesis can be rejected, and it can be inferred that there are statistically significant differences between the models. In this case it can be concluded that the random coefficients model is preferred. For all six dependent variables, LR tests suggest that a multi-level approach is preferred to a single-level linear regression.

Table 7.1 Likelihood ratio test of null model

	Tolerance	Particularised Trust	Generalised Trust	Interest in Politics	Voting	Political activities
LR χ^2 ($df=1$)	13372.22***	5779.55***	6693.73***	2513.92***	2453.07***	7010.52***

Note: *** $<.001$, ** $<.01$, * $<.05$; N of individuals (countries): 57,108 (29)

Data Source: World Values Survey 7

7.2.2 Variance component model with intra-class correlation coefficient (ICC) tests

Another method that is typically considered when answering the question of whether there is clustering involves the estimation of the intra-class correlation coefficient (ICC) (Peugh, 2010). ICC stands for the ratio of the between-cluster variance to the total variance (MacKinnon, 2012). According to Heck, Thomas and Tabata (2014: 8), the term ICC refers to correlations between “*any two randomly chosen individuals in the same group*”. It denotes not only the proportion of the total variance of dependent variables, which is

explained by the clustering, but also the correlation among the observations within the same cluster. ICCs offer the following advantages. By representing the level of common variance that observations share in the same group, Intra-class correlation coefficient provides the basis for multi-level modelling. When observations are highly correlated, the variance of observations at the lower measurement level turns into smaller, which means that the ICC becomes larger (Hox, Moerbeek, & Van de schoot, 2017). As the relative variance of the groups become larger, the researcher tends not to accept that the clusters are analogous (Park & Lake, 2005). Specifically, if ICC is zero, for instance, observations within the same clusters can be interpreted in the same way as observations from the other clusters. In this case, simple linear regression can be adopted instead of MLM. (For more information on variance component models, see Appendix 7.2). In this vein, before analysing the research questions directly, it is first necessary to calculate intra-class correlation coefficients (ICCs) using variance component models. Again, this variance component model, which includes no predictors, is used to test whether there is significant variation in the individual-level residuals and societal-level means in this research. This basic model allows us to address the first sub-question: (a) “Does each dependent variable vary across societies?”

Table 7.2 Results of intra-class correlation coefficient (ICC) tests

	Civic virtue			Political engagement		
	Tolerance	Particularised Trust	Generalised Trust	Interest in Politics	Voting	Political activities
ICC within 29 countries	0.305	0.156	0.175	0.075	0.145	0.151

Note: Total number of observations (countries): 57,108 (29)

Data Source: World Values Survey 7

Table 7.2 demonstrates the intra-class correlation for each dependent variable. ICCs calculated for the model with categorical measures of democratic citizenship range from .075 (interest in politics) to .305 (tolerance), respectively. This means that at least 7.5 per cent of the variance in values for interest in politics and 30.5 per cent of the variance in tolerance can be attributed to differences between countries. More specific interpretations of the differences between ICCs of each dependent variable are as follows. The ICC of 0.305

in the case of tolerance suggests that the proportion of variance explained by level 2 cluster (i.e., countries in this case) is 30.5 per cent. It can also be regarded as an indication that the researcher may expect a within-country correlation of 0.305 on the dependent variable “tolerance” between any two chosen observations. As Liljequist et al. (2019) pointed out, whether the ICC value is good enough can depend primarily on the intention and decision of the researcher. In the field of social science, ICCs with values over .05 or higher are often taken as an indicator of substantial clustering of observations within level 2 (upper level) units (Heck et al., 2014). For the current model, the ICC varies from .07 to .30 and suggests that applying MLM is appropriate.

One noteworthy thing arising from the results is that the ICC value of civic virtue – tolerance, particularised and generalised trust – is consistently higher than that of political engagement – interest in politics, voting and political activities. This means that the impact of societal-level measures of cultural values on civic virtue is greater than for political engagement. More details about individual items can be translated as follows: first, in terms of civic virtue, the ICCs of both generalised and particularised trust are smaller than for tolerance. This shows that societal-level clusters account for 30.5 per cent of the total variance of tolerance, while the variance of generalised/particularised trust is 15.6 per cent and 17.5 per cent, respectively. In other words, tolerance differs greatly across the different countries, while trust is relatively small. In respect to political engagement, on the other hand, the ICCs for interest in politics are smaller than for voting and political activity. This means that even though there are relatively few differences in the interest in politics between societies, voting and participation in political activity (e.g., petition or strikes) are relatively large. Given that one of the main purposes of the research is to compare Western and Eastern societies, it is necessary to examine regional differences in terms of ICCs, which are presented in Table (below). ICC values from Table 7.3 provide information on how much these level 2 variables explain the variance of each dependent variable in both the West and East. The results of the ICCs show that tolerance (in terms of civic virtue), voting and political activity (in terms of political engagement) vary across the level 2 clusters. In relation to the hypothesis of this research, this may suggest that collectivism and hierarchism can lead to a decrease in tolerance, voting and political activity, in particular. This result

suggests that, in East Asia, where political inequality is taken for granted, and non-confrontational orientation prevails over conflict (He, 2010), East Asian individuals are less likely to engage in politics through formal and informal methods such as voting and other forms of political activity (e.g., petitions, strikes and political protests). As mentioned in the previous chapter, this suggests that “*Confucianism contradicts the Western notion of citizenship, which emphasises autonomous individuals pursuing their understanding of the good life*” (Knowles, 2014: 193).

Table 7.3 Results of ICC tests (Western and Eastern societies)

	Civic virtue			Political engagement		
	Tolerance	Particularised Trust	Generalised Trust	Interest in Politics	Voting	Political activities
West	0.070032	0.146587	0.172542	0.077814	0.094274	0.045349
East	0.27752	0.019348	0.164016	0.085598	0.323114	0.116759

Note: Number of clusters = West (18), East (11)

Data Source: World Values Survey 7

At the same time, however, the above ICC results show that differences in an “interest in politics” by country are relatively small. As we can see from the results of the previous correlation analysis, cultural variables, especially hierarchism, show positive correlations with an interest in politics (see Table 6.2). The results may show that cultural values in East Asia not only strengthen compliance with authority but also encourage an interest in politics for the public by fostering the expectation of benevolence and reciprocity of the ruler, as some advocates of the Asian values debates argue (Shin, 2013).

In summary, a set of LR and ICC test results demonstrate that levels of democratic citizenship vary significantly across countries and regions. These tests ensure the construction of more elaborate multi-level models to analyse what kind of societal-level factors account for the variance in the random intercepts between countries. Accordingly, this study considers that the research questions can be best carried out employing the multi-level model instead of adopting OLS.

7.3 Random intercept model: Does the impact of societal-level cultural values on democratic citizenship vary significantly across societies?

To examine whether individuals' values of democratic citizenship vary between countries and whether they have any relationships with societal-level factors (i.e., cultural values), this section uses random intercept models (Heck et al., 2014). This allows us to discover the extent to which differences between individuals regarding their values on democratic citizenship are due to their nationality after controlling for lower-level factors (i.e., membership and demography). The reason why it is referred to as a random intercept model is because the intercepts of the topics are allowed to vary randomly across the different groups, where the overall slope coefficient is shared by all societies. That is to say, only the intercept coefficient β_{0j} is regarded as random, as specified in equation [7.3].²³ Whereas regression coefficients β_{1j} , are restricted to having common “fixed” effects for all counties (Hox, Moerbeek, & Van de Schoot, 2017). Thus, multi-level random intercept models allow the researcher to understand the extent to which differences between individuals in terms of their values on democratic citizenship are due to societal-level cultural values after controlling for level 1 covariates.

This random intercept model is related to the second sub-question of the chapter: (b) “Does the impact of individual-level associational membership on democratic citizenship vary significantly across societies?” This sub-question could be tested by analysing the likelihood ratio test. Specifically, the LR test is used to investigate whether the inclusion of societal-level cultural values increases the general model fit of the equation. This section therefore adopts a series of ordered logistic regression models with (or without) random variance of democratic citizenship across countries. Table 7.4 (below) summarises the results of ordered logistic regressions to answer sub-question (b).

In Table 7.4, model 1 shows multi-level ordered logistic regression analysis results when only individual-level factors are included. Models 2 and 3 present the results of the inclusion of societal-level variables only, and all variables, respectively. According to the comparison

²³ Equation [7.5] in Appendix 7.3: $Y_{ij} = \beta_{0j} + \beta_{1j}X_{ij} + e_{ij}$

of the likelihood ratio between model 1 and model 3 at the bottom of the table, using country-level values as explanatory variables leads to a statistically significant improvement in model fit, in some cases.²⁴ Specifically, the inclusion of the societal-level variables in the model improves the overall model fit, as seen in model 3 ($\chi^2(2) = 7.3, p < .01$). The introduction of upper-level variation to the model alters the relationship between most of the independent and dependent variables in some ways. For instance, the impacts of associational membership on social trust (both particularised and generalised) are slightly decreased when the country-level variation is included in model 3. This potentially means that the variation in social trust is influenced by both individual and societal-level factors simultaneously. In order to understand the relationship between variables more clearly, therefore, both levels of measurement should be considered.

In model 2, when only societal-level variables are included as explanatory variables, some country-level variables predict democratic citizenship at a statistically significant level. In general, it can predict civic virtue (i.e., tolerance and social trust) better than political engagement (i.e., interest in politics, voting and political activity). For instance, this suggests that the levels of tolerance and generalised trust are highly correlated to individualism and hierarchism. Specifically, a unit increase in individualism increases tolerance and generalised trust by 82.5 per cent and 36.6 per cent, at the $p < .001$ and $< .01$ levels, respectively (OR = 1.825 and 1.366). More strikingly, the relationship between hierarchism and civic virtue is consistently negatively related; that is, hierarchism is predicted to decrease both particularised and generalised trust. Specifically, countries with strong hierarchism are found to be about 42.2 per cent lower in particularised trust and about 40.5 per cent lower in generalised trust (OR = .578 and .595, respectively).

²⁴ To be specific, in the cases of tolerance, particularised trust and political activities. See LR test (b).

Table 7.4 Random intercept ordered logistic regression models (model 1 to model 3)

<i>Model 1</i>	Tolerance		Particularised trust		Generalised trust		Interest in politics		Voting		Political activity							
	B	OR	B	OR	B	OR	B	OR	B	OR	B	OR						
Demographic values																		
<i>Gender</i>	.409	***	1.506	.064		1.066	.209	***	1.232	-.543	***	.580	-.020		.979	-.099	**	.905
<i>Age</i>	-.157	**	.854	.428	***	1.534	.278	***	1.321	.635	***	1.888	.837	***	2.310	-.191	***	.825
<i>Income</i>	.310	***	1.363	.778	***	2.177	.317	***	1.373	.283	***	1.327	.378	***	1.460	.258	***	1.294
<i>Education</i>	.652	***	1.919	.422	***	1.525	.622	***	1.862	.672	***	1.959	.454	***	1.576	.688	***	1.990
Associational life																		
<i>Associational membership</i>	.284	***	1.329	.368	***	1.826	.512	***	1.669	.569	***	1.767	.713	***	2.041	.587	***	1.798
Log likelihood	-9322.6865		-4847.112		-14668.169		-24019.848		-12081.092		-16101.312							
a. LR test (df)	436.89 (5) ***		387.81 (5) ***		968.45 (5) ***		2136.00 (5) ***		1154.82 (5) ***		1209.57 (5) ***							
Model 2																		
<i>Model 2</i>	Tolerance		Particularised trust		Generalised trust		Interest in politics		Voting		Political activity							
	B	OR	B	OR	B	OR	B	OR	B	OR	B	OR						
Country-level factors																		
<i>Individualism</i>	.601	***	1.825	-.010		.989	.312	**	1.366	.097		1.102	.133		1.142	.609	***	1.839
<i>Hierarchism</i>	-.307		.734	-.547	***	.578	-.518	**	.595	-.202		.817	-.167		.845	-.135		.873
Log likelihood	-37405.479		-18390.723		-40848.203		-62115.074		-31864.929		-42665.236							
a. LR test (df)	63.43 (2) ***		29.78 (2) ***		60.07 (2) ***		11.47 (2) **		6.22 (2) **		111.98 (2) ***							

<i>Model 3</i>	Tolerance		Particularised trust		Generalised trust		Interest in politics		Voting		Political activity						
	B	OR	B	OR	B	OR	B	OR	B	OR	B	OR					
Demographic values																	
<i>Gender</i>	.410	***	1.507	.064	1.066	.209	***	1.232	-.543	***	.580	-.020	.979	***	.905		
<i>Age</i>	-.157	***	.854	.429	***	1.536	.278	***	1.	.635	***	1.888	.837	***	2.310	***	.825
<i>Income</i>	.309	***	1.362	.777	***	2.176	.317	***	1.373	.283	***	1.327	.378	***	1.460	***	1.294
<i>Education</i>	.652	***	1.919	.421	***	1.524	.621	***	1.862	.672	***	1.958	.455	***	1.576	***	1.992
Associational life																	
<i>Associational membership</i>	.281	***	1.325	.596	***	1.815	.510	***	1.666	.567	***	1.764	.714	***	2.042	***	1.802
Country-level factors																	
<i>Individualism</i>	.723	***	2.062	.060	1.062	.382	1.465	.261	1.298	.029	1.030	***	1.479				
<i>Hierarchism</i>	-.110	.895	-.433	***	.648	-.323	***	.723	-.210	.810	.033	1.304	1.089				
Log likelihood	-9318.9167		-4843.2135		-14665.735		-24018.201		-12081.062		-16097.62						
a. LR test (df)	450.21 (7) ***		404.81 (7) ***		977.40 (7) ***		2140.94 (7) ***		1154.92 (7) ***		1223.78 (7)						
b. LR test (df)	7.53 (2) **		7.97 (2) **		4.86 (2)		3.29 (2)		0.06 (2)		7.384 (2) **						

Note: *** p < .001, ** < .01, * < .05; number of observations = 58,679 (West = 39,346; East = 19,333). Data: WVS 7 & Hofstede (2011)

Dependent variables: tolerance = additive score of tolerance for different races/immigrant workers, high tolerance (1), low tolerance (0); particularised trust = additive score of trust for family, neighbours and acquaintance, high trust (1), low trust (0); generalised trust = most people can be trusted (1), need to be careful (0)

Independent variables: membership = one membership or less (0), multiple membership (1); gender = male (0), female (1); age = under 40 (0), over 40 (1); education = primary to upper-secondary (0), over post-secondary (1); income = 1st to 5th deciles (0), 6th to 10th deciles (1)

a. a simple logistic regression model as a reference, b. model 1 as a reference B = coefficient OR = odds ratio

The association between cultural factors and political engagement is partially supported in model 2. Specifically, individualism has a statistically significant impact on promoting participation in political activity. For one unit of individualism at the societal level, the likelihood of individuals being categorised in the active political activity group increases by about 82.5 per cent (OR = 1.825; < .001). In many cases, no statistically significant relationship is seen between societal-level cultural factors and political engagement variables. However, this is not surprising if we look at previous ICC results (see Section 7.2.2). In other words, Asian values represented by collectivism and hierarchism seem to be more closely related to variables of civic virtue, namely, tolerance and trust, rather than variables of political engagement. The results seemingly support the opponents of Asian values theorists, who argue that collectivism and hierarchism in East Asia, based on familism, strengthen compliance with authority and harmony over conflict, deterring the expansion of trust and political participation (Fukuyama, 1995a; 2001; Theiss-Morse & Hibbing, 2005; Shin, 2013).

If we look at model 2 and model 3 together, however, the influence of cultural variables changes in some cases. For example, the relationship between individualism and generalised trust, which was a significantly negative relationship in model 2, becomes non-significant in model 3 when individual-level variables are accounted for. In addition, the effect of individualism on political activities and the negative effect of hierarchism on trust also decrease in model 3. Therefore, model 2 needs to be interpreted with caution, since individual-level covariates are not included. The inclusion of individual-level covariates in the model may cause a noticeable change in the relationship between country-level variables and democratic citizenship, which is further explained in model 3.

Model 3 shows the results of the multi-level logistic regression with all of the independent variables (both individual and country-level variables). As cultural values at societal level are included in model 3, coefficients and odds ratios for individual-level factors change in some cases, as mentioned above. However, the significant relationship between individual-level factors and dependent variables does not change, depending on the inclusion of country-level variables, especially in the relationship with civic virtue (i.e., tolerance). In other words, all of the individual-level factors that are seen to have significant relationships

with democratic citizenship in model 1 are also seen to have significant relationships with the dependent variables in model 3, regardless of the inclusion of cultural variables in the model.

The odds ratio of individualism on tolerance in model 3 of Table 7.4 (OR = 2.062) suggests that individualism results in a twofold increase in the likelihood of belonging to the high tolerance group. In other words, when individuals live in societies with higher levels of individualism, social tolerance increases dramatically. On the other hand, the odds ratio of hierarchism towards particularised and generalised trust (OR = .895, and .648) suggests that a unit increase in hierarchism at country level decreases particularised and generalised trust by 10.5 per cent and 35.2 per cent, respectively. This is in line with previous research showing that cultural traits that emphasise collectivism reinforce in-group trust and lead to distrust of out-group dissimilar others and society in general. Thus, the radius of trust can hardly expand to society in general (Realo, Allik, & Greenfield, 2008; Yoon, 2017).

All in all, the above random intercept models show that the average value of democratic citizenship varies depending on the country. Considering cultural variables provides a significant explanatory power for the relationship between the given variables. To summarise the above results, collectivism and hierarchism are significantly related to some key variables of democratic citizenship. In particular, individualism is significantly and positively linked to tolerance and political activities (OR = 2.062 and 1.465, respectively), and hierarchism has a significant impact on reducing both particularised and generalised trust (OR = 0.648 and 0.723, respectively). This may tell us that East Asian culture, which can be characterised as collectivistic hierarchism, can prevent the expansion of trust beyond primary groups by strengthening in-group favouritism, as Realo, Allik and Greenfield (2008) discovered. At the same time, political activity can be regarded as a manner of creating a dissenting voice, which hinders an orderly society. On the other hand, individualism can serve as a cultural basis for cultivating various forms of political activity and fostering tolerance for heterogeneous others by strengthening pluralism.

7.4 Random slope model: Does the impact of individual-level associational membership on democratic citizenship vary significantly across societies?

Model 3 in Table 7.4 shows that democratic citizenship varies across countries based on a random intercept logistic model. It also helps us to understand that the level of democratic citizenship depends largely on country-level cultural values, while the effects of individual-level characteristics are assumed to be fixed in each society. That is to say, in the discussion about the first sub-research questions, it was assumed that the relations between democratic citizenship and individual-level factors are the same for every country. As this study also needs to examine how the effects of level 1 independent variables are changed by country-level attributes, the model for estimating the effects of individual-level predictors needs to be further developed. Thus, this section now constructs random slope model, which allow the slope to differ randomly across country units.

Unlike a random intercept model, a random slope model allows each country regression to have varying slopes, which means that the independent variables do not have the same effects for each country. It can enable us to discover how the associations between the independent variable and its outcome differs for each country (Rasbash, 2018). In the random slope (or coefficient) model, the coefficients of one or more explanatory variables can vary from one country to another. The first step to building the random coefficient multi-level model is to test whether the impacts of the level 1 independent variables differ across countries at a statistically significant level. This first stage is related to sub-question (c) “Does the impact of individual-level associational membership on democratic citizenship vary significantly across societies?” After that, by adopting cross-level interaction models (Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002), this section further scrutinises which country-level factors have a moderating impact on the relationship between individual-level predictors and citizens’ democratic citizenship.

7.4.1 Random slope model

The random slope model would mean that the effect of associational membership on

democratic citizenship may vary across the different cultural values.²⁵ In other words, instead of assuming a fixed effect of associational membership on democratic citizenship, a random slope model allows for the possibility that this effect varies randomly across the different levels of cultural values. Accordingly, sub-questions (b) can be addressed by testing the variance of the slopes. This model allows for the possibility that the effect of associational membership on democratic citizenship varies randomly across different levels of cultural values. Specifically, by adding in a random slope of individual-level values, we can test whether the relationship between individual-level variables and democratic citizenship varies across societies. To assess the existence of random coefficients, a likelihood ratio test can be used to determine whether the effect of each individual-level factor varies significantly across countries. This test can be used to reject the null hypothesis that the new variance parameters associated with individual-level independent variables are equal to zero, thus providing evidence that the effect of individual-level factors differs significantly across countries.²⁶

The results of the random slope models and likelihood ratio tests are presented in Table 7.5 (below). One thing noteworthy first is that every of the random slope elements are included in the model one-by-one, as the computation procedures of the random coefficient model is extremely intensive (Hox, Moerbeek, & Van de Schoot, 2017). In summary, the results of the analyses demonstrate that the effects of individual-level variables, including associational membership and socio-demographical values, vary significantly across country units in random coefficient ordered logistic regression models. That is to say, a total of five individual-level dependent and control variables – associational membership, gender, age, income and education level – vary significantly across countries in random coefficient models. This means that the relationship between democratic citizenship and all of the

²⁵ More details on the equations of random slope models are presented in Appendix 7.4 – equation [7.9] to [7.11].

²⁶ In other words, the existence of random coefficients can be convinced by achieving statistically significant variance for level 1 parameters – that is to say, $\text{Var}(\beta_{1j}) = \text{Var}(u_{1j}) = \gamma_{11} \neq 0$ (Kim, 2004). The null hypothesis of the likelihood ratio test is that the new variance parameters associated with the individual-level independent variable – membership of voluntary associations or demographic features – are equal to zero. For instance, the LR test statistic for gender for tolerance in the random intercept model is $\chi^2(2) = 4,249$ ($p < .001$). This means that there is evidence that the impact of gender on tolerance varies significantly across countries. Therefore, a significant likelihood ratio test statistic means that the null hypothesis can be rejected because the effect of individual-level factors differs significantly across countries.

individual-level predictors in random coefficient logistic regression models varies based on different societies. Specifically, with respect to the relationship between income and tolerance in random intercept models, for instance, multiple membership could foster high levels of tolerance (see model 3 in Table 7.4).

However, this relationship might not be the same across the different societies, according to the random slope model. In some countries, income is more of an influential factor on the creation of tolerance; and, ultimately, in these countries the difference in terms of tolerance for dissimilar others between rich and poor can be larger. Variance in the slopes between other variables can be interpreted in the same way. In respect to the coefficients between education and generalised trust, for example, the results show that the variance of the slopes between countries differs significantly (referred to the fourth column of Table 7.5). We can infer that some countries have a high value for the coefficient of education in the cultivation of generalised trust. In these countries the role of education in creating generalised trust can be larger than in other societies (or vice versa).

Thus, the results also suggest that the effect of associational membership on democratic citizenship is not universal but context-dependent, underscoring the importance of considering cultural values and contextual factors when exploring the role of associational membership in promoting democratic citizenship.

Table 7.5 Random slope logistic regression model

Model 4	Tolerance			Particularised trust			Generalised trust			Interest in politics			Voting			Political activity		
	VAR	SE	LR	VAR	SE	LR	VAR	SE	LR	VAR	SE	LR	VAR	SE	LR	VAR	SE	LR
Demographic values																		
<i>Gender</i>	.520	.059	4249 ***	.443	.018	3592 ***	.352	.019	2619 ***	.213	.023	3037 ***	.306	.044	3006 ***	.251	.049	2190 ***
<i>Age</i>	.687	.158	4362 ***	.300	.060	3656 ***	.294	.042	2929 ***	.252	.054	3184 ***	.159	.033	4087 ***	.011	.004	4478 ***
<i>Income</i>	.551	.063	4224 ***	.313	.046	3644 ***	.314	.032	3048 ***	.292	.030	2972 ***	.273	.051	2021 ***	.313	.062	2217 ***
<i>Education</i>	.534	.164	4325 ***	.292	.070	3612 ***	.331	.044	2734 ***	.308	.062	3070 ***	.344	.042	3036 ***	.328	.101	2234 ***
Associational life																		
Associational membership	.084	.030	4253 ***	.010	.005	2605 ***	.296	.029	3611 ***	.227	.048	2531 ***	.025	.007	6913 ***	.317	.022	2154 ***

Note: a likelihood ratio test (random intercept model 3 as a reference), each random slope component of the democratic citizenships was included in the model variable-by-variable, all the individual-level explanatory variables are included in the model.

*** $p < .001$, ** $< .01$, * $< .05$

VAR = γ_{11} , SE = γ_{11}

No. of observations (groups): 58,679 (29)

Dependent variables: tolerance = additive score of tolerance for different races/immigrant workers, high tolerance (1), low tolerance (0); particularised trust = additive score of trust for family, neighbours and acquaintance, high trust (1), low trust (0); generalised trust = most people can be trusted (1), need to be careful (0)

Independent variables: membership = one membership or less (0), multiple membership (1); gender = male (0), female(1); age = under 40 (0), over 40 (1); education = primary to upper-secondary (0), over post-secondary (1); income = 1st to 5th deciles (0), 6th to 10th deciles (1)

Data source: World Values Survey 7; Hofstede (2011)

7.4.2 Cross-level interactions

In the previous sections the societal-level cultural values (i.e., collectivism and hierarchism) significantly influence the generation of democratic citizenship. On the other hand, it has also been witnessed that the impact of individual-level variables on democratic citizenship could vary in each country. However, it is still unexplored which country-level factors are influential on the relationship between individual-level factors and democratic citizenship. This requires the introduction of statistical tests for cross-level interactions between individual and country-level independent variables. As these are interactions between variables on two different levels, they can be considered as cross-level interactions (Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002).²⁷ As noted in the methodology chapter, the country-level variable Z_j performs as a moderator. That is to say, the relationship between the individual-level variables and the dependent variables may be moderated by country-level variables (Hox et al., 2017) – that is, individualism and hierarchism. In order to interpret cross-level interactions properly, the interaction $\gamma_{11}Z_jX_{ij}$ in equation [7.12] needs to be interpreted together with $\gamma_{01}Z_j$, which is the overall regression coefficient between the dependent variable and the country-level predictor.

As every single variable showed random coefficient variance in the previous section, all of the individual and country-level indicators are used here to develop an elaborated model. During the process, as recommended by Hox et al. (2017), both the direct effects and the interaction term are integrated into the equation and controlled for. Furthermore, to examine the different features between the East and the West, this interaction analysis is carried out with stratified models based on a West/East classification. The impact of cross-level interactions and its significance can be witnessed in the following Tables 7.6 and 7.7. Empty cells in Tables 7.6 and 7.7 indicate that there was no statistically significant interaction effect between the variables in question. As there can be tons of cross-level interaction effects, the I have only included the statistically significant results in the table.²⁸

²⁷ The equation of cross-level interaction model is presented as equation [7.9] to [7.12] in Appendix 7.4.

²⁸ That is, the empty cells in Tables 7.6 and 7.7 indicate that there was no statistically significant interaction effect between the variables in question.

Table 7.6 Summary of cross-level interactions: West and East comparison (civic virtue)

	<i>West</i>			<i>East</i>		
	<i>OR</i>		<i>SE(B)</i>	<i>OR</i>		<i>SE(B)</i>
<i>Tolerance</i>						
<i>High level of individualism</i>						
Associational membership	.976	***	.003	1.028	***	.005
Gender	1.007	**	.002	1.009	*	.004
Age	1.007	**	.003	.964	***	.005
Education	.982	***	.003	.958	***	.004
<i>High level of hierarchism</i>						
Associational membership	.987	***	.003	.984	***	.003
Education	.991	**	.003			
Age				.964	***	.005
<i>Particularised trust</i>						
<i>High level of individualism</i>						
Associational membership				1.018	**	.006
Gender	1.006	**	.002	1.011	*	.005
Age	1.012	***	.002	.987	*	.006
Education	.991	***	.002	.974	***	.006
Income	1.009	***	.002			
<i>High level of hierarchism</i>						
Associational membership	.997	***	.002	.988	***	.003
Age	.995	*	.002			
Education	.996	*	.002	.992	**	.003
Income	1.002	***	.000			
<i>Generalised trust</i>						
<i>High level of individualism</i>						
Associational membership	.986	***	.002	1.040	***	.005
Gender	.994	**	.002	1.011	*	.004
Age	1.009	***	.002			
Education	.987	***	.002	.982	***	.004
Income	1.005	*	.002	1.012	**	.005
<i>High level of hierarchism</i>						
Associational membership				.967	***	.003
Gender						
Age	1.004	*	.002			
Education	.989	***	.002			
Income	1.002	**	.000	1.001	***	.000

Note: All of the individual and country-level variables are included in the model. * < .05, ** < .01, *** < .001; SE = robust standard error; OR = odds ratio; data = WVS7; number of observations (groups) = West = 39,346(18); East = 19,333 (11); dependent variables: tolerance = additive score of tolerance for different races/immigrant workers, high tolerance (1), low tolerance (0); particularised trust = additive score of trust for family, neighbours and acquaintances, high trust (1), low trust (0); generalised trust = most people can be trusted (1), need to be careful (0); independent variables: membership = one membership or less (0), multiple membership

(1); gender = male (0), female (1); age = under 40 (0), over 40 (1); education = primary to upper-secondary (0), over post-secondary (1); income = 1st to 5th deciles (0), 6th to 10th deciles (1).

Table 7.7 Summary of cross-level interactions: West and East comparison (political engagement)

	<i>West</i>			<i>East</i>		
	<i>OR</i>		<i>SE(B)</i>	<i>OR</i>		<i>SE(B)</i>
<i>Interest in politics</i>						
<i>High level of individualism</i>						
Associational membership				1.024	***	.005
Gender	.994	**	.002			
Age				1.010	*	.004
Education	.995	*	.002	.991	*	.004
Income				.991	*	.004
<i>High level of hierarchism</i>						
Associational membership	1.013	***	.002	.992	**	.003
Education	1.001	***	.000	1.000	**	.000
Gender				1.012	***	.002
Income						
Age	.992	***	.002	.994	*	.003
<i>Voting</i>						
<i>High level of individualism</i>						
Associational membership				.977	***	.005
Age	1.005	*	.002	1.030	***	.004
Education	.992	***	.002	1.014	**	.004
Income				.989	*	.005
<i>High level of hierarchism</i>						
Associational membership	.974	***	.002	1.030	***	.003
Age	1.006	**	.002	.989	***	.003
Education	.994	**	.002	.989	***	.003
Income	1.001	***	.000			
<i>Political activities</i>						
<i>High level of individualism</i>						
Associational membership				1.001	***	.000
Age	1.013	***	.002			
Education	.996	*	.002	.978	***	.005
Income	.995	**	.002			
<i>High level of hierarchism</i>						
Associational membership	.992	***	.002			
Gender	.994	**	.002	.990	**	.003
Income	1.000	**	.000	1.001	***	.000

Note: All of the individual and country-level variables are included in the model. * < .05, ** < .01 *** < .001; SE = robust standard error; OR = odds ratio; data = WVS7; number of observations (groups) = West = 39,346 (18); East = 19,333 (11); dependent variables: tolerance = additive score of tolerance for different races/immigrant workers, high tolerance (1), low tolerance (0); particularised trust = additive score of trust for family, neighbours and acquaintance, high trust (1), low trust (0); generalised trust = most people can be trusted (1), need to be careful (0); independent variables: membership = one membership or less (0), multiple membership (1); gender = male (0), female (1); age = under 40 (0), over 40 (1); education = primary to upper-secondary (0), over post-secondary (1); income = 1st to 5th deciles (0), 6th to 10th deciles (1).

The test results of cross-level interactions in Tables 7.6 and 7.7 (above) demonstrate that societal-level cultural values of individualism and hierarchism interact with various individual variables to influence the formation of democratic citizenship. Interaction patterns with social– demographic variables are somewhat vague and mixed.

Overall, it can appear complicated at the first glance. However, the interaction between associational membership and cultural values, which is the main interest of this research, shows a consistent propensity in the results. In terms of the relationship between individualism and associational membership, first, especially in East Asian society, interaction effects are mostly positive in the association with democratic citizenship. For instance, interactions of individualism with associational membership can increase tolerance, both particularised and generalised trust, an interest in politics and political activity in East Asia. The exception is having a negative relationship with voting (OR < 1, see Table 7.6). These results seem to support the opinions of the incompatible thesis in the Asian values debate. In other words, collectivism in East Asia has a negative impact on the generation of democratic civic virtues, such as trust and tolerance (e.g., Fukuyama, 1995b).

In the West, on the contrary, interactions between individualism and associational membership are negatively linked to tolerance, generalised trust and political activity. These results are intriguing because they seem to be contradictory to the findings from East Asia. As mentioned in the previous chapter, there have been conflicting arguments about the impact of individualism on democratic citizenship. Some have postulated that individualism is a precondition for pervasive generalised trust extending beyond the immediate organisation of family (e.g., Van Hoorn, 2015). At the same time, however, some advocates of Asian values

point out that prevailing individualism in the West is the cause of social problems. Aside from Durkheim's philosophical claim that Western competitive individualism is linked to a permanent social anomie (Dicristina, 2016), politicians like Lee Kuan-yew ascribe many social problems in the US, such as "*guns, drugs, and violent crimes*", to the spread of extreme individualism, that is, the misuse of individual freedom (Zakaria, 1994). The analysis results are linked to these two conflicting views at the same time. In other words, in Asia, where a strong collectivistic orientation prevails, individualism can lead to improving many dimensions of democratic citizenship. Yet, different results can be seen in the context of Western societies, where individualism is widespread.

On the other hand, hierarchism also affects democratic citizenship through interactions with voluntary associational membership. While individualism has positive interaction effects on democratic citizenship in many cases, hierarchism has shown negative impacts on democratic citizenship, regardless of the region. Through interactions with associational membership, tolerance, trust and the propensity to vote and engage in political activity are decreased. In East Asia this negative relationship is witnessed in the relationship with tolerance, both particularised and generalised trust, and an interest in politics. The two exceptions are that the interactions increase the interest in politics in Western society and enhance voting in East Asia. In summary, the two cultural values, individualism and hierarchism, seem to have significant impacts on democratic citizenship intertwined with voluntary associations. The above results show controversial and seemingly contradictory aspects at the same time, just like the long-standing debates on the compatibility between Asian values and democracy.

7.5 Concluding remarks

The purpose of this chapter has been to confirm whether Tocquevillian insights can be applied in the context of East Asia. Conventional wisdom following Tocqueville's intellectual heritage holds that the generation of democratic citizenship (such as tolerance, trust, interest in politics, voting and political engagement) is based on involvement in horizontal and voluntary associations (represented by "town-hall meetings"). In other words, in Western democracy that presupposes pluralism, voluntary associations are a means of

contact with dissimilar others. By getting involved in voluntary associations, people can expand their radius of trust beyond primary groups and enhance their realm of concern. To borrow the expression of Putnam (1993), voluntary associations can be regarded as a channel “from many to one”.

On the contrary, as many Asian values theorists have noticed, East Asia has fundamentally different cultural contexts, which are more hierarchical and collectivistic. Therefore, in the context of East Asia, where collectivistic culture and hierarchical social structures are taken for granted (Kim, 2010), participation in voluntary associations can be understood as a medium that divides the originally homogeneous community into many. Based on Theiss-Morse and Hibbing’s (2005) insights, homogeneous forms of society can regard heterogeneous associations as “*messy or inefficient*” and inevitably “*conflict-ridden*”.

This chapter, in this vein, has investigated the impacts of not only individual-level associational membership but also country-level cultural values on democratic citizenship among 29 Western and Eastern societies. The preliminary test results of ICC and LR suggest that democratic citizenship varies significantly between countries. The empirical tests based on multi-level modelling showed a set of mixed results at individual, as well as societal level. Given the societal-level variance of each variable of democratic citizenship, two country-level variables associated with the East Asian values hypothesis (individualism and hierarchism) are incorporated into the model. Of the country-level structural variables, high levels of individualism are mostly significantly associated with individual-level measures of associational membership and demographic features in random coefficient models, while high levels of hierarchism combined with individual-level predictors have negative impacts on the most of variables of democratic citizenship.

The results of these analyses are consistent with previous Asian values literature claiming that cultural differences affect democratic citizenship (Park & Shin, 2006; Park & Subramanian, 2012). Aligned with these studies, this research also suggests that high values of collectivism and hierarchism in East Asia may alter an individual’s attitudes toward democracy. All in all, as for the societal-level indicators, individualism and hierarchism seem

to serve consistent and predicted effects on democratic citizenship, which is in mostly accordance with the existing studies on civic culture and social capital. To be specific, individualism seems to have a positive impact on the improvement in tolerance towards social diversity, while hierarchism seems to have an unfavourable influence on the expansion of social trust (both generalised and particularised). Despite less statistical significance being observed in the relationship between political engagement and cultural variables, individualism has been shown to have a consistently positive relationship with political activities.

On the other hand, the results of the interaction analyses reveal dramatic differences in terms of their impact on Western and Eastern societies. Generally, interaction effects tend to show contradictory impacts on the West and East. Specifically, individualism shows a positive relationship with dependent variables, especially in East Asia, while it decreases many democratic citizenship values in the West. Hierarchism shows a negative interaction effect when combined with associational membership in both regions.

These results could provide empirical evidence for the existing body of social capital and Asian values debates in terms of whether it is incompatible with Western liberal democracy, in the following two ways. First, the influence of voluntary associations as a school of democracy fostering democratic citizenship can vary depending on the cultural context. The theory of civil society derived from Tocqueville, Putnam and his followers, which is mostly based on observations from the US civil society, is generally right in the Western context. However, the impacts could vary in East Asia, which lacks the tradition of civil society, and the relationship between individuals, the public masses and governance is different by nature.

Second, East Asian values, especially hierarchism, could hinder improvements in tolerance, social trust and political activism. Amid scholars and practitioners who have previously found the value of democracy in cultural traditions in East Asia (e.g., Kim, 1994), and who claim that Asian authoritarianism cannot work in parallel with Western liberal democracy (e.g., He, 2010; Shin & Sin, 2012), the results of the research are more likely to support the latter, especially in the case of hierarchism.

In conclusion, this chapter has examined the applicability of Tocquevillian insights in the context of East Asia, and the impact of cultural values on democratic citizenship. The findings suggest that voluntary associations may have different effects on democratic citizenship in Western and East Asian contexts, with collectivistic and hierarchical cultural values in East Asia potentially hindering improvements in tolerance, social trust, and political engagement. These results highlight the need to take into account cultural differences when considering the role of voluntary associations in fostering democratic citizenship. Moreover, the results of this study suggest that cultural differences in East Asia, particularly the presence of hierarchism, may pose challenges to the promotion of democratic values and practices, highlighting the ongoing debates regarding the compatibility of Asian values with Western liberal democracy. Overall, this chapter contributes to the ongoing discussions regarding the relationship between voluntary associations, democratic citizenship, and cultural values.

Chapter 8. Discussion and conclusion

8.1 Introduction

The aim of this research was to investigate the role of voluntary associations and cultural values in the promotion of democratic citizenship. To examine the relationship between the given variables, this research presented a series of large-scale, comprehensive tests of democratic citizenship across 29 countries using the most recent seventh wave (2017–20; released from 2021 to 2022) of the World Values Survey (WVS). It has paid particular attention to the conventional theories of social capital and political culture to draw appropriate variables. As a result, democratic citizenship has been measured using the following indicators: civic virtue – trust, tolerance; and political engagement – an interest in politics, voting and political activity. These can be regarded as appropriate indicators because they allowed us to measure both the attitudinal and behavioural aspects of democratic citizenship. On the other hand, this research has also considered the societal level of cultural values – collectivism and hierarchism – which are derived from the Asian values debate, like other major variables. As a result, this research has examined the relationship between individual-level associational membership and societal-level cultural values, which can affect the construction of democratic citizenship simultaneously. A set of hypotheses were developed to test the given relationships, including:

- Hypothesis 1. Membership of voluntary associations fosters democratic citizenship (both civic virtue and political engagement).
- Hypothesis 2. The impacts of voluntary associations on democratic citizenship vary across East and West.
- Hypothesis 3. Cultural values such as collectivism and hierarchism can play a negative role in moderating the relationship between voluntary associations and democratic citizenship.

These hypotheses have been analysed via a set of multi-level, cross-cultural model,

encompassing both individual and societal-level variables. The analyses have been undertaken by employing data from the most recent seventh wave of the World Values Survey combined with societal-level cultural values from Hofstede (2011).²⁹

In order to investigate the above hypotheses, this research commenced with a literature review on the theories of social capital and political culture, which emphasised the importance of participation in voluntary associations in cultivating democratic citizenship. After that, as a counter argument, debates about the compatibility of Western democracy with Asian values were also scrutinised. Since Putnam (1993) popularised the term “social capital”, mainstream theorists on civil society have made significant advances in understanding the role of voluntary associations in enhancing trust (e.g., Glanville, Andersson, & Paxton, 2013), tolerance (e.g., Cigler & Joslyn, 2002; Iglič, 2010) and political engagement (e.g., Vassallo, 2004). These works show that membership of voluntary associations is one of the critical determinants for creating social capital and democratic citizenship (Ibsen et al., 2019). Empirical evidence also corroborates the proposition that membership of voluntary associations positively impacts building trust and promoting political engagement (e.g., McFarland & Thomas, 2006; Park & Subramanian, 2012). In this regard, multiple memberships of voluntary associations can be viewed as one of the key antecedents determining the promotion of tolerance, trust and the emergence of participatory civic culture. These existing studies illustrate the relationship between voluntary associations and democratic citizenship.

However, some scholars have pointed out that most of the theories are primarily derived from Western societies (Diop et al., 2017). Consequently, little is known about the mechanism and attributes of trust or other forms of democratic citizenship in different geographical and cultural contexts. Moreover, membership of voluntary associations is often cited as a romanticised “panacea” to treat all of the challenges inherent in improving democratic citizenship (Kohn, 2002: 1). Some empirical evidence has also shown that voluntary associations fail to play their expected role in improving democratic citizenship in East Asian countries (Park, 2012; Knowles, 2015). Membership of voluntary associations is

²⁹ More details about each data, please visit www.worldvaluessurvey.org AND www.hofstde-insights.com.

found to be significant for fostering social capital or political engagement, but its effect is minimal, or even statistically insignificant, in some East Asian societies (see also Paxton, 2007). This discrepancy between the theory and evidence suggests some underlying complexities. For instance, the effects of voluntary associations can largely depend on the types of association (i.e., whether they are bonding or bridging, e.g., Park & Lee, 2007). Specifically, it has long been pointed out that bonding associations are more likely to facilitate “inward-looking trust”, which tends to increase exclusive and homogeneous identities, while bridging associations are more likely to generate “outward-looking, generalised trust” (Realo, Allik, & Greenfield, 2008: 450). Alternatively, the role of voluntary associations in democratic citizenship is often argued to be nuanced on members’ extent and length of engagement (Van der Meer, 2016). Others have also pointed out that the socialisation effects of voluntary associations are moderated by wider cultural norms such as Asian values (Dalton & Ong, 2005; Nannestad, 2008; Welzel, 2011). For example, Bae (2008) noted that in the context of intrinsically hierarchical structures, which connect their members by age and rank, voluntary associations in Korea may not be useful in building generalised trust and tolerance.

Aligned with the ideas that cultural values can moderate the role of voluntary associations in democratic citizenship, it is worth noting the intense debates over the compatibility between Western liberal democracy and Asian values since the 1990s. Supporters of the Asian values thesis maintain that Confucian values are positively linked to democratic citizenship, as Confucianism stresses commitment to family and promoting family ethics, such as trust (e.g., Tu, 1996). Because of the nature of Confucianism, which sees society as an extended form of family, some values such as trust, discipline and commitment to family can be also extended to societal level. Incompatibility theorists such as Huntington (1991), however, doubt the positive role of Asian values on democratic citizenship. As Confucian legacy emphasises the “*group over the individual; authority over liberty; and responsibilities over rights*” (ibid.: 24; see also Subramaniam, 2000), individuals can become accustomed to being obedient to authority in this cultural context. To borrow Verba and Almond’s (1963) term, Asian values emphasise allegiance rather than an assertive political culture.

Empirical evidence often claims that East Asia's collectivistic and hierarchical values are negatively linked to Western-style assertive political participation in liberal democracies. For example, obedience towards authority could hinder political engagement (Knowles, 2015) by fostering unquestioning loyalty (Hunsaker, 2016). Also, in-group favouritism (Fukuyama, 2017) may prevent the spill-over effects of voluntary associations on generalised trust by preventing members from connecting with external groups. The results of this study broaden the discussion by demonstrating that the relationship between membership of voluntary associations, cultural values and democratic citizenship is complexly related in the following two ways.

First, the function of a voluntary association in fostering civic virtue and political engagement is widely confirmed in the analyses at the individual level, regardless of cultural values. After controlling for country-level factors in a random intercept model (see Chapter 7.3. and see Chapter 6.3 also), associational membership is positively and significantly linked to various aspects of democratic citizenship such as trust, tolerance, an interest in politics, voting and political activities. This result is consistent with the conventional wisdom of civil society theory that voluntary associations can promote the transcendence of trust beyond specific groups, as many scholars have already discovered (Pettigrew, 1997; Schmid, Ramiah, & Hewstone, 2014; Glanville, 2016; Meleady et. al., 2020). It also reinforces Tocqueville's (2003) early argument that the cooperative norms generated within organisations extend beyond the confines of associations to broader society via involvement in voluntary associations. By participation in these associations, one can learn "*how to take on the views of dissimilar others*" (Glanville, 2016: 33; see also Theiss-Morse and Hibbing, 2005). Given the assumption about the role of voluntary associations in fostering trust of dissimilar others, and in broadening social concerns to larger society, the results of this study are supportive of those ideas, at least at an individual level.

The second dimension, however, demonstrates that cultural values, which are related to collectivism and hierarchism, may deter the impact of voluntary associations on democratic citizenship. The logistic regression analysis shows that when comparing the West and Asia, the influence of voluntary associations was comparatively weak in Asian societies (see

Chapter 6.3.3). Specifically, individualism has statistically significant positive impacts on tolerance and generalised trust, while hierarchism has negative impacts on tolerance, both particularised and generalised trust (see Chapter 7.3.2). In addition to the direct impacts of cultural values on democratic citizenship, the cultural traits of collectivism and hierarchism also contribute significantly to civic virtue and political engagement when incorporated with individual-level variables. That is, collectivism and hierarchism, when combined with individual-level variables, have interaction effects on democratic citizenship. For instance, more income, older age and better education leads to more generalised trust, particularised trust and tolerance, respectively, in a more individualistic society. On the other hand, hierarchism, combined with gender and age, has negative effects on tolerance and an interest in politics (see Chapter 7.4.2).

The results of the analyses may seem complex at first glance. However, we can find a significant tendency within them. In some relationships, collectivism and hierarchism override the positive effects of voluntary associations on democratic citizenship. These results shed new light on the relationship between membership of a voluntary association and democratic citizenship. As documented in the following section, the results of the research highlight that the cultural context should be taken into accounts when analysing the socialisation effects of voluntary associations.

The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. The following section first demonstrates the key findings of this study; it summarises the relationship between voluntary associations and democratic citizenship, and the moderating roles of Asian values. Second, based on the research findings, contributions to the existing body of knowledge are presented in relation to (i) theoretical and (ii) empirical aspects. After examining the implications of the findings for policy, the research concludes by reflecting on some of the limitations of the work and makes suggestions for future research.

8.2 Key findings

This research consists of two main research questions connected to three hypotheses. To

summarise, the key findings related to each question will be presented as follows:

R.Q.1. What is the relationship between voluntary associations and democratic citizenship – civic virtue and political engagement – in contemporary Western and Eastern societies?

Hypothesis 1. Membership of voluntary associations fosters democratic citizenship (both civic virtue and political engagement).

In line with research question 1, the research findings reveal that associational membership plays a significant role in determining democratic citizenship in both regions. At the individual level, involvement in voluntary associations seems to have positive effects on dependent variables such as tolerance, trust, an interest in politics, voting and political activity. According to the analyses (see Table 6.3 and 6.4), associational membership is highly correlated with each value of democratic citizenship.

In terms of the relationship between associational membership and civic virtue, as measured by trust and tolerance, individuals who are more actively involved in voluntary associations are 49.1 per cent more likely to be categorised in the high tolerance group (OR = 1.491) (see Table 6.3). A set of multiple logistic regression analyses also find similar results, namely, that associational membership fosters both particularised and generalised trust (OR = 1.425 and 1.576 respectively, see Table 6.6). One of the central concerns of civil society theory is “*how particularised trust (trust in known others) extends to generalized trust (default expectations about the trustworthiness of people in general)*” (Glanville & Shi, 2020: 1). These findings show that involvement in voluntary associations fosters both of them. In addition, according to the multiple logistic regression analysis, those who involve in voluntary associations are 1.7 times more likely to be classified in the high political interest group, 1.5 times more likely to vote and 1.8 times more likely to participate in political activity than those who do not (OR = 1.744, 1.525 and 1.828, respectively, see Table 6.7). The positive impacts of associational life creating democratic citizenship are well described by previous research (e.g., Paxton, 2007; Park & Subramanian, 2012; Glanville, 2016). By joining multiple associations, one can “*create the networks of interaction by connections that help to pass and solidify moral assumptions and therefore increase trust*” or other forms of democratic citizenship, in contrast to people with limited or closed social experiences

(Paxton, 2007: 53). However, the effects of voluntary associations vary across regions, as discussed below. Briefly, the relationship between voluntary associations and democratic citizenship in East Asia is consistently weaker than in the West, which requires further discussion of the impact of cultural values:

Hypothesis 2. The impacts of voluntary associations on democratic citizenship vary across East and West.

However, it is worth noting that such relationships vary from region to region. The results of these analyses show that regional differences seem to play a critical role in determining the relationship between associational membership and democratic citizenship. First, considering the previous research, which emphasises the role of voluntary associations in shaping civic virtue (e.g., Putnam, 1993), the preliminary analyses results are intriguing. According to the results of Section 5.3.2, individuals in Catholic Europe and Confucian Asia have an average 0.52 and 1.25 memberships, which is lower than in other regions. Within Western countries, associational membership seems to correlate highly with tolerance, both particularised and generalised trust. In other words, English-speaking and Protestant European countries with high levels of associational membership show high values for civic virtues, while Catholic Europe, with the lowest average number of memberships, presents consistently lower in terms of tolerance, particularised and generalised trust. On the contrary, in the case of East Asia, the hypothesis about the conventional idea of social capital and civil societies shows a strikingly different pattern. Although individuals from non-Confucian countries show relatively high levels of participation in voluntary associations compared to Confucian societies, their values of civic virtue are comparably lower than in Confucian countries. In particular, in respect to generalised trust, Confucian East Asia is higher than Catholic Europe, and there is no remarkable difference when compared to English-speaking countries. This may suggest that the role of voluntary associations as a pathway for cultivating civic virtues, at least in East Asia, does not meet the expectations of existing theories. It may also suggest that other variables may be present, especially in creating generalised trust.

According to the multiple logistic regressions comparing West and East, furthermore, the role of associational membership in promoting trust and political engagement is weak in East Asian countries, while it is much more highly correlated and significant in the West (see Chapter 6.3.3). In the case of a series of multiple logistic regression analyses of the relationship between voluntary associations and civic virtue, the impacts of participation in associations are much stronger in Western countries compared to the East. Specifically, the odds ratio for the impact of associational membership on particularised trust was 1.532 in Western countries but only 1.087 in East Asia. On generalised trust, it was 2.123 in Western countries and .832 in East Asian societies. The relationship between voluntary association participation and trust is intriguing in particular. Existing studies often point out that strong familism in East Asia promotes in-group favouritism, and it is difficult to secure generalised trust beyond the primary groups and associations in this region (Realo & Allik, 2008). Fukuyama (1995a), in a similar vein, refers to Confucian countries such as China and Korea being high in particularised trust but low in generalised trust. However, the above results indicate that not only generalised trust, but also particularised trust are significantly lower in East Asia than the West (See Table 5.12 and 5.13). Furthermore, the results of the multiple logistic analyses also only partially supported the assumptions. Specifically, voluntary associations had a greater impact on the formation of trust in the West than in East Asia, regardless of particularised or generalised trust (see Tables 6.9 and 6.10). Additionally, in East Asia, although associational participation does only have weak impact on particularised trust (OR = 1.087), it is found to have a relatively strong negative effect on generalised trust (OR = 0.832). This result is very intriguing given the fact that some influential researchers (e.g., Fukuyama, 1995; Realo and Allik, 2008) have suggested that strong in-group favouritism in East Asia may hinder the generalisation of social trust. According to this perspective, particularised trust in collectivist societies may be strong, whilst generalised trust may be weaker. However, my empirical analysis results indicate that associational membership can foster both particularised and generalised trust in Western societies, while the impact is weak in East Asian societies

Similarly, in East Asian societies, voluntary associations have a negative impact on tolerance (OR = 0.930, see Table 6.8) as well. The series of results suggest that the socialisation effect of voluntary associations in East Asia is far weaker than in the West. In East Asia, and

especially in the case of tolerance, the more active the participation in voluntary associations, the more negative the impact. The results of the analyses thus strengthen the existing empirical evidence. That is, this research is in line with previous studies which found that membership of voluntary associations is not associated with tolerance or trust in East Asian countries (Bae, 2008; Park & Kim, 2006).

Whether regional differences are statistically significant is also confirmed through multi-level modelling. The results of likelihood ratio tests also suggest that the level of democratic citizenship varies significantly between countries (see Chapter 7.2.1). In the case of the relationship between voluntary associations and political engagement, regional differences were relatively small compared to civic virtue variables, and yet the positive role of voluntary associations also decreased in East Asia compared to the West. Interestingly and exceptionally, the relationship between voluntary associations and voting has a stronger positive correlation in East Asia than in the West, which requires further explanation (see Chapter 6.3.3). One possible explanation for this finding is that East Asia's collectivism and hierarchism not only strengthen obedience to authority (Knowles, 2015) but also raise interest in national politics (Henderson, 1970) by emphasising the ruler's duties or moral uprightness. Just as Mencius mentioned, the government's legitimacy arises only if rulers fulfil their duties by assuring economic welfare, security and moral rectitude (Chun, 2012). In this sense, voting can be considered a form of active protest for ordinary citizens against government in the cultural context of East Asia (see also Kim & Kim, 2007).³⁰ Alternatively, obedience inclines people to vote in East Asia; indeed, they may view it as a public duty and responsibility. Voting may not be a form of active protest but rather an obligation to participate in political processes.

The evidence presented here suggests that engagement in voluntary associations does not necessarily guarantee democratic citizenship, especially in East Asian regions. One possible explanation for the variation between regions is that cultural values lead to differences in the extent to which voluntary associations impact democratic citizenship, as argued by Asian values theorists (e.g., Nannestad, Svendsen, Dinesen, & Sønderskov, 2014; Zhai, 2017). The result of multi-level modelling may offer an answer regarding how Asian values based on collectivistic familism moderate the role of voluntary associations on democratic

³⁰ Mencius is often regarded as the "second Sage" of Confucian thoughts after Confucius (Doğan, 2021).

citizenship. As mentioned earlier, this research applied two cultural variables from a long debate on the compatibility of Asian values with Western liberal democracy – collectivism and hierarchism – to analyse as moderating variables. The key findings are connected to the contents of the following research question 2 and hypothesis 3:

R.Q.2 How do cultural values – collectivism and hierarchism – impact variations in democratic citizenship across the West and the East?

Hypothesis 3. Cultural values such as collectivism and hierarchism can play a negative role in moderating the relationship between voluntary associations and democratic citizenship.

The answer to research question 2 is that cultural values play a significant role in determining democratic citizenship across the region. First, multiple logistic regression results, which add “regions” as dummy variables, show significant differences in democratic citizenship, depending on the global region (see Chapter 6.3.1 and 6.3.2). In all of the dependent variables related to democratic citizenship, the region was found to cause significant differences, and, in the case of East Asia, the region consistently had a negative impact on citizens’ democratic citizenship. The impact of associational membership on democratic citizenship was not constant when regional variables were taken into consideration.

Similar results were obtained in subsequent log likelihood ratio tests (Chapter 7.2.1) and intraclass correlation coefficients (ICCs) (Chapter 7.2.2). Specifically, the ICC test showed that country-level variables account for 30.5 per cent, 15.6 per cent, and 17.5 percent of the variation in tolerance, generalised trust, and political action, respectively. In other words, 30.5 to 17.5 percent of the variation in each outcome can be attributed to differences between the societies being compared, indicating significant levels of within-group variation. Consistent evidence is found across a series of multi-level models that cultural variables are associated with significant variation in democratic citizenship. According to the random intercept model in Chapter 7.3, levels of democratic citizenship vary significantly across countries. Therefore, cultural variables have a significant impact on democratic citizenship at the individual level. These results suggest that high levels of individualism are

significantly associated with high levels of tolerance and political activities (OR = 2.062 and 1.479, respectively in model 3 of Table 7.4), while hierarchism is negatively associated with both particularised and generalised trust.

Again, these results are not only in line with existing empirical evidence (Yoon, 2017) but they also strengthen existing discussions that Asian values represented by collectivism and hierarchism could negatively affect civic virtue and political engagement (Pye, 2000). That is to say, in East Asia, where Confucian traditions linger (Knowles, 2015), the public are less likely to actively participate in civic life (Hahm, 2004). Furthermore, Confucian norms that emphasise in-group favouritism and unquestioning loyalty to authority may turn Asian people away from involvement in political activity by teaching them that associational participation is a channel of confrontation and conflict and ultimately harmful for social order and harmony (Theiss-Morse & Hibbing, 2005). As Li (2006) pointed out, homogeneity of society is more important for East Asians as it can ensure social harmony and order. Associational life can easily be regarded as a channel for dissenting voices, making homogeneous society heterogeneous.

The pivotal study of Markus and Kitayama (1991) in America and Japan may shed light on the different societal backgrounds for understanding dissenting voices.³¹ As mentioned earlier, distinct conceptions of individuality in East Asian culture which emphasise on the indispensable connectedness and interdependency of individuals (collectivism in this research) stress harmonious interdependence between individuals. On the contrary, Western culture (represented by America) “*neither assumes nor values such overt relatedness between individuals*” (ibid.: 1). They note the powerful impact of cultural differences of individuality at individual levels of cognition, emotion and motivation; yet perhaps these concepts could also affect socio-political attitudes and behaviours.

More specifically, as mentioned in the literature review, there have been some arguments about the impact of individualism on democratic citizenship. Some have postulated that individualism is a precondition for the extension of generalised trust beyond immediate

³¹ To Americans say that “the squeaky wheel gets the grease”, and the British say “if you don’t ask, you don’t get”. On the other hand, the Japanese (and Koreans also) say “the nail that stands out gets hammered down”.

organisations such as family (Delhey, Newton, & Welzel, 2011; Van Hoorn, 2015). Specifically, in a society where collectivism prevails, it is difficult to build generalised trust beyond primary groups such as family, friends and relatives (Realo, Allik, & Greenfield, 2008). This discussion is also linked to the pivotal dichotomisation of *Gemeinschaft* (often translated into “community”) and *Gesellschaft* (“society”), proposed by Tönnies (2002)[1887]. In other words, traditional “communities” are deeply rooted in subjective feelings of affection towards collectivistic primary groups, while modern “society” is based on rational cooperation between mutually independent individuals.

All in all, the country-level values of collectivism and hierarchism are significantly related to democratic citizenship. These values seemingly play a negative role in determining the extent of democratic citizenship. As seen in Chapter 6.3.3, the impact of associational membership on trust, tolerance and political engagement was consistently lower in East Asian countries than in the West. Furthermore, as for the country-level analyses with Asian cultural values in Chapter 7, individualism and hierarchism seem to exercise expected and consistent influences on the same dependent variables. Specifically, collectivism and hierarchism appear to reduce the positive impact of voluntary associations on democratic citizenship. According to the findings from the random slope models in Chapter 7.4, the effects of associational membership on all dependent measures of democratic citizenship vary significantly across countries (see Table 7.5). This means that even though associational membership is positively associated with democratic citizenship, its impacts vary across countries. Put another way, the effects of voluntary associations on democratic citizenship are altered by the characteristics of country-level cultural factors. Furthermore, some of the effects of the individual-level variables on democratic citizenship were not constant across countries. From the random coefficient multi-level models (see Chapter 7.4), it was found that the effects of voluntary associations on democratic citizenship are altered by the cultural variables measured at country level. Specifically, cross-level interaction analysis (see Chapter 7.4.2) showed that some effects of individual-level variables on democratic citizenship (e.g., gender on tolerance, or age on interest in politics) are reduced when societal levels of hierarchism are higher. By contrast, individualism has positive interaction effects in some cases when combined with income or age. These findings link the Asian values theory with the making of civic-minded citizens and strengthening the

“incompatibility thesis” (Dalton & Shin, 2014: 2), which highlights that Asian values have undemocratic, or even anti-democratic, properties (Pye, 2000).

In contrast to advocates of Asian values, Confucian cultures do not seem to contain the seeds of democratic politics, based on the results of these analyses. The mechanism by which Asian values counteract the positive role of voluntary associations could be interpreted in the following ways. First, collectivism is often cited as an obstacle to the expansion of the radius of trust and tolerance (Realo, Allik, & Greenfield, 2008; Glanville & Shi, 2020). As Fukuyama (1995) points out, collectivistic familial values in East Asia can play a negative role, preventing the expansion of generalised trust by strengthening in-group favouritism. Even though some exponents of the concepts argue that the concept of “harmony in diversity” in Asian values embodies social trust and tolerance towards diversity (Bell, 2010b; Shin, 2013), the findings support the claim that collectivism and hierarchism are negatively associated with tolerance, generalised trust, an interest in politics, voting and political activity. Second, collectivism in East Asia may affect the active forms of voluntary associations. As Lew (2013) pointed out, the forms of voluntary associations flourishing in East Asia are traditional communities based on kinship, blood, school ties and regional proximity. The prevalence of collectivism, therefore, may affect the flourishing forms of groups – that is, homogenous associations.

Hierarchism, another pillar of Asian culture, also seems to have a negative moderating impact on democratic citizenship. As Dalton and Shin (2014) noted, East Asia’s ethics systems, which tend to place priority on social order over individual freedom and rights, may hinder the positive role of voluntary associations on democratic citizenship. From the beginning, hierarchism has run counter to the ideas of Tocqueville (2003) and Putnam (1993), which emphasise the existence of horizontal networks. In East Asia’s hierarchical culture, residents can learn one of the most important norms in Confucian philosophy, namely, filial piety – unconditional respect and obedience to parents (or rulers/leaders as well) – rather than reciprocal trust. This may yield unquestioning loyalty, which is easily linked to different norms for democracy.

While Huntington’s (1991) idea that Confucian-influenced societies can be inhospitable to

democratisation is somewhat controversial, his comment can still help us to understand the relationship between hierarchism and democratic citizenship.³² As Huntington pointed out, “*Confucian-influenced societies promote the group over the individual, authority over liberty, and responsibilities over rights, and they offer no institutional protection of individual rights against the state* (ibid, 24).”

One notable exception to the findings is that the relationship between hierarchism and political engagement is less negative (or even relatively positive) than for civic virtue. For instance, regional differences in political engagement with hierarchism, especially in voting, were notably small compared to tolerance and trust (see Chapter 7.4.1). In addition, the effect of the interaction of hierarchism with income on political action is positive (see Chapter 7.4.2). This phenomenon raises the following two possibilities. First, the thesis about the compatibility of Asian values with democracy could be partially supported in terms of the relationship between hierarchism and political engagement. As Bai (2008) interpreted the words of Mencius, intellectually advanced groups are inclined to be more demanding of their political leaders (see also Yung, 2010). Voting and political activity can be actively used as a means of fulfilling their demands for well-educated and high-income populations in East Asia. In fact, Kim and Kim (2007) asserted that active political participation and political protests by the newly emerged middle class and intellectuals were the driving force behind democratisation in 1980s Korea. Second, socio-economic modernisation and Westernisation can generate conflicting consequences for the liberalisation of traditional values and the democratisation of political engagement. From Tu’s (2014) perspective, indigenisation and liberalisation of traditional values are both currently taking place in East Asia, which suggests that exposure to the force of modernisation and Westernisation entails divergence from traditional values in this region.

In summary, these findings suggest that individual-level associational membership has statistically significant effects on democratic citizenship. However, multi-level analyses also

³² Mignolo (2002), for instance, argues that Huntington’s idea of democracy is based on a bourgeois-liberal paradigm which prioritises Western-style one with capitalism. He suggests that this paradigm overlooks the cultural and historical context of non-Western societies, and thus, may not be an accurate way to understand their relationship with democracy.

show that country-level cultural differences play a crucial role in explaining democratic citizenship. Thus, this study concludes that understanding democratic citizenship by simply considering individual-level factors (i.e., membership of voluntary associations) can cause misunderstandings regarding the real relationship between these variables. Individual, as well as country-level, factors are interconnected in influencing democratic citizenship. They therefore need to be considered together for a more accurate explanation.

8.3 Contribution to knowledge

By addressing the individual and societal-level effects on democratic citizenship among 29 countries using multi-level modelling approaches, this research has made original contributions to the existing body of knowledge in several empirical and theoretical ways, as follows. First, the results of the analyses are partially consistent with previous mainstream theories of social capital and political culture. The evidence presented here has found positive effects of voluntary associations on democratic citizenship. At the same time, however, this study also discovered that the relationship between associational life and democratic citizenship varies across regions. Specifically, in the more hierarchical and collectivistic East Asia, the role of voluntary associations in fostering democratic citizenship is found to be significantly weaker than in the West. The results of the analyses contribute to empirically specifying the various dimensions of building democratic citizenship, which is an area that is lacking in the current literature.

Second, another original contribution of this research is that it provides a theoretical basis for future research by integrating existing theories of social capital, political culture and Asian values. Many scholars in the field of social capital have sought to explain the role of voluntary associations in fostering democratic citizenship. Asian values theorists, on the other hand, have made efforts to investigate the relationship between cultural values and democratic citizenship. However, given that few studies have integrated these perspectives to investigate citizens' political behaviour and attitudes, this study can be regarded as providing a new analytical tool for follow-up research. By incorporating cultural variables,

the results of the thesis provide useful additional information for future studies on social capital and democratic citizenship, especially in non-Western contexts such as East Asia.

8.3.1 Theoretical contribution: integrating the Asian values discourse into social capital and political culture discussions

This study has demonstrated theoretical originality by integrating different fields of study, including theories of social capital, political culture and Asian values, which fundamentally address a similar topic. Previous studies have focused predominantly on the factors that might develop the democratic citizenship required for a stable democracy (e.g., Verba & Almond, 1963; Putnam, 1993; Linz & Stepan, 1996; Park, 2017). For instance, studies on civil society often claim that voluntary associations are a critical element determining democratic citizenship. This is especially the case since social capital theory has gained popularity since Putnam (1993). Specifically, in the theory of social capital, it is often presumed that membership of “*voluntary associations is highly beneficial*” for the construction of democratic citizenship “*among the association’s affiliates*” (Iglič, 2010: 1). The theory of political culture is also noteworthy in clarifying the relationship between voluntary associations and democracy because it provides some empirical foundations for the cultural traits needed for a stable democracy (e.g., Verba & Almond, 1963; Pye & Verba, 2015). Many studies in this field maintain that active participation in voluntary associations allows one to have “*civic-ness* (interchangeably “*democratic citizenships*” in this research)” and ultimately results in a stable and consolidated democracy (Cohen, 1999: 267; see also Wessels, 2018).

Seminal works, mostly qualitative case studies, have successfully provided the normative background for associational theories of democratic practice (Putnam, 1993; De Tocqueville, 2003). However, despite these theoretical expectations, empirical studies on the relationship between voluntary associations and democratic citizenship have, so far, resulted in mixed findings on the importance of voluntary associations influencing the success of trust-building or promoting political engagement. Sometimes, it is found to be significant for improving democratic citizenship (Newton, 2001), but its significance is weak or even absent. This

trend is particularly observed in non-Western contexts such as East Asian countries (Park, 2012) and even Eastern European countries (Iglič, 2010), as mentioned earlier.

One possible explanation to bridge this gap between theory and reality might begin with the consideration of cultural variables. Indeed, some scholars have argued that measures of democratic citizenship such as social trust are ultimately derived from cultural values (Nannestad, 2008) or moral norms (Uslaner 2002). These perspectives, which have rich heritage in social psychologies, maintain that civic virtues such as generalised trust are “*most strongly related to a general outlook on the world, the most important ingredients of which are certain religious values most strongly embodied in Protestantism, or egalitarianism*” (Nannestad, 2008: 425). According to this idea, these democratic values and norms are transmitted and inherited through socialisation processes. Similar discussions highlighting the relationship between cultural values and democratic citizenship can also be seen in the Asian values debates. As mentioned in the previous chapter, Asian values advocates have had a massive debate over whether hierarchical and collectivistic values in Asia are compatible with Western liberal democratic values (Fukuyama, 1995a; Tu, 1996; Shin & Sin, 2012; Huntington, 2012). According to “Asian values” proponents, East Asian countries are rather paternalistic, accepting of hierarchical authority and have collectivistic characters which improve an orderly society.

By contrast, Western culture is more likely to be “*rights-based and individualistic, which is congruent with the competitive elements of a democratic system*” (Dalton & Ong, 2005: 212). In this vein, some scholars have discovered that involvement in voluntary associations can be regarded as a channel for creating dissonance, conflict and tension rather than consensus or harmony, especially in East Asian contexts (e.g., Yoon, 2017). Theories of political culture have involved similar discussions. According to Dalton and Shin (2006), for example, a democratic political culture requires both an aware and participatory public. The importance of these political cultures somewhat relies on their “*congruence with the social and political structure of one’s society*” (Dalton & Shin, 2014: 109).

As discussed so far, research on where democratic citizenship originated has been conducted in various academic fields. Each theory deals with similar topics but mentions causal, conditional and structural factors, respectively. Thus, a new framework of analysis was

needed that integrates the existing theories. At this point, this study analysed how voluntary associations and cultural values play a different role in cultivating democratic citizenship by adopting a set of statistical methods. In order to obtain a clear understanding of the reality of democratic citizenship, this study has attempted to infer the causal and conditional factors at individual and country level, respectively. Consequently, voluntary associations at the individual level and cultural variables at the societal level simultaneously affect democratic citizenship.

8.3.2 Empirical contribution: comparing Western and East Asian societies

This research also makes an original empirical contribution through examining Western and East Asian countries together. As mentioned earlier, theories of social capital, political culture and Asian values have a long pedigree and are rich in related discussions. As a result, there have been numerous studies on the relationship between voluntary associations and trust (e.g., Paxton, 2007), individualism and a stable democracy (e.g., Bellah et al., 2007) and the compatibility of Confucian norms with Western liberal democracy (e.g., Pye, 2000; Sen, 2014; Knowles, 2015). Consequently, comparative analyses have been actively conducted in this field (Jiang, 2000; Park, 2012). However, most of the previous studies have only focused on comparisons between culturally similar East Asian and Western countries, respectively. For instance, there are many studies comparing the relationship between voluntary associations and variables such as trust or tolerance among Western countries (e.g., Newton, 2001; Anheier & Kendall, 2002; Bekkers, 2005; Glanville, 2016). These studies reinforce the conventional wisdom showing the relationship between the variables to be significant (even though its impact is sometimes weak).

In other regions, where experiences of democracy are relatively short, and they have different historical paths and cultural contexts, conflicting empirical corroborations are also discovered. For example, Iglič (2010), who compares the role of voluntary associations in constructing tolerance for diverse social groups in Western and Eastern European countries, maintains that the socialising effects can only be found in Western countries, where traditions of democracy and civil society are consolidated. These relationships are not found

in ex-Communist European countries. There are also many studies exploring the relationship between voluntary associations and democratic citizenship among East Asian countries. Many of these studies find only a weak (or insignificant) correlation between the two variables, unlike the conventional wisdom (Inoguchi, Mikami, & Fujii, 2007; He, 2007; Park, 2012).

The reason why comparative studies between regions are so rare is partially as follows: (i) there have been few integrative discussions combining cultural values and civil society theories, and (ii) there has been a lack of appropriate data. This research is the first of its kind to conduct a comparative analysis between East Asian and Western societies based on integrating Asian values discourses and social capital theories and extracting comparable data recently released by the WVS (2020 - 2022). In terms of the former, comparative studies linking voluntary associations and democratic citizenship in both Western and East Asian societies have been scarce. This study empirically argues that the existing discussion of the impact of voluntary associations on democratic citizenship can be viewed as Western-centric since other variables such as cultural values may affect the dynamics of democratic citizenship, depending on the regional context. As a result, this research can offer a new perspective on the relationship between voluntary associations and democratic citizenship. By applying Asian values discourses in the analyses, this research uncovers not only the importance of voluntary associations as predictive factors but also cultural value as a context fostering positive democratic citizenship.

Employing multi-level modelling with WVS data has allowed the author to conduct comparative analyses. By adopting adequate data from the WVS, this research has measured and compared seemingly complex concepts. In terms of cultural values, for instance, this study has been able to draw upon variables that can be applied to quantitative research. This consisted of two attributes – collectivism and hierarchism – through reviewing previous studies. Of course, many studies have found a relationship between societal cultural conditions and individual-level attitudes and behaviours (e.g., Dalton & Ong, 2005; Bomhoff & Gu, 2012). However, most studies have only examined individual or societal-level impacts on democratic citizenship, respectively, because of data limitations. Hence, many studies have necessarily neglected taking hierarchical structure into account in the analysis, which is likely to be important in explaining an individual's political attitudes and behaviours. On

the other hand, a handful of studies have investigated the relationship between the country-level cultural values and social trust at the individual level (e.g., Paxton, 2007; Yoon, 2017). Yet, an examination of societal-level effects on various values associated with democratic citizenship, using a variety of country-level cultural characteristics from WVS data combined with Hofstede's cultural dimension (Hofstede, 2011), has not been carried out. This study is the first of its kind to do so. It has filled a gap in the field by measuring societal-level effects on democratic citizenship using multi-level modelling approaches applied to East Asian and Western European societies. In the process, the research has the major strength of measuring key variables at both individual and societal levels, which could also be helpful for future research. As mentioned earlier, this research used the terms "collectivism" and "hierarchism" in the course of analyses, rather than "Asian values" or "Confucianism", for the purposes of empirical application. Therefore, it is expected that the concept used in this study can be applied to other regions in future studies.

8.4 Policy implications

During the research it has been demonstrated that cultural values can cause fundamental differences in individuals' political attitudes and behaviours. Given that the purpose of public policy is also to shape behaviour, the results of the research can offer a basis by which governments can design policies by understanding how people operate, how they think and what motivates them. In other words, if it is true that individuals' political behaviours and attitudes are largely shaped by wider cultural norms and values, then policies will need to be designed at a nation-state level to accommodate that difference. In this vein, the findings of this study can provide some useful policy implications in the following ways.

First, by understanding the role of cultural values in the policy process, policymakers could find concepts that are useful in policy initiatives, because citizens' attitudes and behaviours impact the way public policy is developed and implemented. Likewise, cultural differences can affect citizens' perspectives towards the normative role of government. In a Western context, where the relationship between government and civil society is "horizontal" (i.e., as counterparts), the government is sometimes perceived as an intruder (Jacques, 2012). By

contrast, in the context of East Asia, where the tradition of familism is prevalent, the government is perceived as the “head of the family”, or a guardian defending the interests of the community. In this paternalistic cultural context, ordinary citizens tend to seek harmony rather than conflict with government, and they can be more supportive of a wider range of government responsibility and intervention (Chang, Zhu, & Park, 2007).

Furthermore, some scholars maintain that individuals are more likely to show obedience to governmental authorities in East Asian society (Knowles, 2015). As a result, cultural values can inform the evolution of public participation schemes. Hierarchical and collectivistic culture is not conducive to public participation, as it supports centralised and top-down systems of governance. For instance, Bazzi, Fiszbein and Gebresilasse (2021) recently discovered that cultural values can serve a pivotal role in individuals’ compliance with government policies. Specifically, they found that individualism was able to erode policy responses to social challenges in the context of the COVID 19 pandemic in the US. The lack of a collectivistic sense of citizenship hampered pro-social behaviours such as voluntary social distancing and mask-wearing policy, which is eventually based on the norms of “*reciprocity, trust, cooperation, and propensity to contribute to the public good*” (ibid.: 2; see also Barrios et al., 2021).

These ideas echo broader debates about global policy transfer of the kind promoted by global governance organisations, like the WHO. In many cases, policy initiatives designed and implemented in one society are usually transferred to or mutated into other societies (McCann & Ward, 2012). Yet, such transformations are not always implementable because of “*a range of socio-political, economic, geographical and cultural differences*” (Daniell, 2014: 1). As Ayres and Marsh (2014) noted, evidence-based policy and its transfer is often undermined by the context-specificity of policy. What works in one location or geography may not work well in another, given the multitude of contextual factors. Sen (2004) aptly described the way that cultural values affect not only economic behaviours and modes of political participation but also value formation and evolution, which are closely associated with why and how social policies have mutated differently in various social contexts. In terms of the recent COVID-19 pandemic responses, Bok et al. (2021) found that those who score high on collectivism are more likely to consistently support community and individual

mask-wearing policies. Among US citizens, those who score higher on collectivism, preferring societal “we” as opposed to individual “me” (statements), are more compliant with public safety adverts about wearing masks (ibid.: 1). These insights offer important information for governments who may need to design policy quickly and effectively to control the public without spending too much money.

Second, the findings suggest new challenges and opportunities for government in creating social capital. More specifically, government can play a more significant role as a catalyst in creating trust and other forms of democratic citizenship in more hierarchical and collectivistic societies such as East Asia.

At first glance, it may seem contradictory to emphasise the role of government in cultivating democratic citizenship. This is because citizens’ checks and balances on the government are understood as an essential virtue of democracy. However, as Lim (2007) found, the direct and indirect role of government in creating networks among diverse actors is crucial in collectivistic East Asian societies. This is because trust and other cooperative norms are primarily derived from immediate social ties based on blood, school, and region. Government institutions can exploit various means for composing networks of interactions between them.

As such, cultural values and public policy affect each other. This is well described by Coyle and Ellis (2019: 46): “*Culture affects policy, and policy affects culture.*” Based on an understanding of cultural values in one society, policymakers can design better public policies. These policies could not only be “*more generally acceptable*” to the public but also “*produce culturally desirable outcomes*” (Daniell, 2014: 1). It is for this reason that a number of scholars have stressed the significance of understanding cultural values when designing public policy and governance interventions (e.g., Foucault, 1991; Tremain, 2005; Lemke, 2015).

8.5 Limitations and recommendations for future research

This research also raises some questions that remain unanswered and where future research

is needed in the following ways. First, the results of analyses imply that associational membership matters in enhancing democratic citizenship while Asian values are negatively related to it. However, it does not directly tell us the exact mechanism. Citizens in some countries, especially those with high levels of collectivism and hierarchism (e.g., East Asia), do not seemingly socialise in voluntary associations to improve tolerance or trust for dissimilar others. When compared to more individualistic societies in the West, this tendency become apparent. Voluminous studies so far have offered insights for understanding the mechanisms of the relationship. For instance, Theiss-Morse and Hibbing (2005) give us a clue for interpreting this phenomenon. Contrary to those who maintain that formal and bridging associational memberships could cultivate democratic norms, Theiss-Morse and Hibbing (2005) argue that engagement in voluntary associations does not necessarily offer a sufficient basis for democratic citizenship. The more important variable is the character or types of association – homogeneous or heterogeneous groups. According to them, involvement in heterogeneous associations rather than homogeneous ones leads to political participation, while homogeneous groups “*may even turn people away from political participation*”. In addition, they maintain that homogeneous forms of associations often teach their members that democracy can be “*messy, inefficient, and conflict-ridden, the realities of which good citizens need to learn*” (ibid.: 227). As this research focused on the number of associational memberships, a closer investigation into the nature and characteristics of groups is needed. That is, it is necessary to examine whether people in East Asia, where collectivism is prevalent, more actively participate in homogeneous groups compared to those in Western societies. These studies could test whether the homogeneous types of association are less likely to improve generalised trust while strengthening the cultivation of particularised trust by bolstering in-group favouritism, as mentioned by Fukuyama (2001).

Second, the results of this study have regional limitations. To generalise its lessons, the scope of the research needs to be expanded beyond Western and East Asian societies. The analyses of this research intentionally used the terms “collectivism” and “hierarchism” for the main variables, rather than “Asian values” or “Confucianism”, to provide applicability to other regions. This is because those cultural traits are not only prevalent in East Asia but can also

be found in other places where pre-modern tradition is lingering (the Middle East, for instance, according to Diop et al., 2017), or even in some European countries, as Fukuyama (1995) mentioned. If it shows that the result is specific to the societies of this research (i.e., Confucian countries), it is necessary to ponder further the assumed causal relationships, as pointed out by Yoon (2017).

Furthermore, the precise mechanism underpinning the positive relationship between hierarchism and political activities (see Table 7.6) requires further elaboration, as it directly contradicts previous works which argue the incompatible thesis of Asian values for liberal democracy. This result lends weight to the idea that a hierarchical Confucian society does not simply emphasise unquestioning loyalty and consent towards authority, as some scholars argue (Hunsaker, 2016; Liu & Shen, 2021). Rather, it stresses the reciprocal responsibility between the governor and the governed, the ideal role of ruler as a guardian of moral uprightness and the public masses actively participating in the political realm by understanding democracy as a “politics of protest” to monitor the corruption of public officials or their rulers (Kim & Kim, 2007). Of course, the conclusion that hierarchism has a positive effect on political action might reflect measurement problems. However, these problems can be solved with rich data in the future. As more data accumulates, longitudinal analysis can also try to observe changes in these relationships over time, which can offer a clue regarding the nature of the interactions between these variables. Ultimately, it may give an answer that Confucian East Asians are dissociating themselves from traditional Confucian ethics and norms by experiencing a process of democratisation. Indeed, Welzel (2012) criticises “*Asian exceptionalism*” and maintains that the cultural values of East Asian individuals have become more Westernised as the economy has advanced and they have experienced democratisation for a longer period of time (See also, McCann et al., 2010). Despite these limitations, however, the analysis results of this chapter show the importance of cultural variables as a factor determining democratic citizenship. The true nature of the relationship between associations, Asian values and democratic citizenship may be as complex as its long history. This research, however, offers an exploratory lens for future research to delve into the topic.

8.6 Concluding remarks

One of the most crucial concerns in the theory of liberal democracy in Western society is how to socialise and integrate private individuals into a public society (Realo et al., 2008). With regard to this issue, Tocqueville (2003)[1835] noted the socialising role of voluntary associations as the foundation of democracy in the United States based on his observations in the early 19th century. Social capital theorists who followed Tocqueville's intellectual heritage have emphasised that involvement in voluntary associations can contribute to the consolidation of democracy through promoting civic virtue and political engagement, which is democratic citizenship in this thesis. In a strikingly similar vein to Tocqueville's perspective, Durkheim (1976) also developed analogous discussions around the time. He described a man as homoduplex – a biological organism driven by animal instincts, on the one hand, while being led by morality and other elements created by society, on the other. This argument refers to the possibility of collective consciences being generated via socialising effects of group ties such as family, church, community and other such groups, which could conclusively transform highly anomic societies into integrated ones. The above discussions are well illustrated in a classical Latin sentence, "*E pluribus unum; Out of many, one*", which is written on the Great Seal of the United States. In individualistic Western societies, associations can be understood as key socialising channels from "many" to "one", which can be viewed as a means allowing individuals to go beyond their animal nature by imposing a specific normative system and regulating their behaviour. In terms of social capital theory, one can obtain social skills to deal with dissimilar others via participating in various forms of association.

In contrast to the West, individuality in East Asia is deeply rooted in the fundamental interdependencies with others, as Weber (1953)[1905] pointed out in his seminal work. In other words, an individual is perceived as a member of a primary group (e.g., family) rather than an independent entity, and society is viewed as an extended form of this primitive group. Under this collectivistic culture, which emphasises "*attending to others, fitting in, and harmonious interdependence*" with others (Markus & Kitayama, 1991: 224), participation in voluntary associations can be perceived as a means that divides the intrinsically

harmonious “one” into “many” (i.e., out of one, many).

The results of this research are intertwined with existing debates on democracy theory. On the one hand, the results offer some clues about whether the “socialisation effects of voluntary associations [are] universal” in the theory of civil society (Tocqueville, 2003) and “to what extent is the mix of allegiant and assertive cultures best for stable democracy?” emphasised in political culture theory (Verba & Almond, 1963). On the other hand, the results of this research are associated with the long-standing debates over the compatibility of Western democracy with Asian values. Based on multi-level modelling of 29 different societies, several points became clear, including the following: 1) the role of voluntary associations as a channel to promote trust, tolerance and political engagement is not universal. This mechanism fits better, especially in Western societies, where individualistic and horizontal culture are prevalent: 2) democratic citizenship can be influenced by cultural factors, such as collectivism and hierarchism. In addition, 3) collectivism and hierarchism seem to have negative impacts on democratic citizenship in most cases; and 4) even though it is necessary to delve into the nature and functions of associations in the subsequent research, individualistic and horizontal culture seem to be a prerequisite for the role of voluntary associations to perform their socialisation effects.

This thesis accentuates the persistence of cultural values as a crucial factor in the foundation of democratic citizenship, especially in the East Asian region. Such analysis seems more relevant than ever, with growing concerns about the failure of new democracies (Chang, Chu, & Park, 2007; Choi, 2018), especially in a non-Western context. Therefore, continuous attention is required to establish whether “*Asian exceptionalism*” is just a myth and whether East Asia will also move towards embracing Western values (Welzel, 2012: 1). Observing East Asia embracing Western individualistic culture or discovering different forms of democratic value will also shed light on the debate about “*multiple modernities*” (Tu, 2014: 104), namely, whether modernisation is an equal concept to Westernisation.

Appendices

Appendix 4.1 Modes of data collection

	Computer- Assisted Personal Interviewing	Paper-and- Pencil Interviewing	Computer- Assisted Web Interviewing	Mail/Post	Computer- Assisted Phone Interviewing	Total
Australia	0	0	0	1,813	0	1,813
Austria	1,644	0	0	0	0	1,644
Canada	0	0	4,018	0	0	4,018
China	0	3,036	0	0	0	3,036
Taiwan	1,210	0	0	0	0	1,210
Denmark	1,696	0	1,255	411	0	3,362
Finland	388	0	668	143	0	1,199
France	1,870	0	0	0	0	1,870
Germany	3,022	0	109	567	0	3,698
Greece	0	1,200	0	0	0	1,200
Hong Kong	0	1,031	1,044	0	0	2,075
Iceland	879	34	657	50	0	1,620
Indonesia	3,179	0	0	0	0	3,179
Italy	2,272	0	0	0	0	2,272
Japan	0	0	0	1,349	0	1,349
Korea	1,245	0	0	0	0	1,245
Malaysia	400	0	909	0	0	1,309
Netherlands	686	0	3,844	0	0	4,530
New Zealand	0	0	0	1,057	0	1,057
Norway	977	0	0	0	145	1,122
Philippines	0	1,200	0	0	0	1,200
Singapore	0	2,012	0	0	0	2,012
Vietnam	1,200	0	0	0	0	1,200
Spain	1,209	0	0	0	0	1,209
Sweden	1,194	0	0	0	0	1,194
Switzerland	673	0	1,800	681	0	3,154
Thailand	0	1,500	0	0	0	1,500
United Kingdom	1,788	0	0	0	0	1,788
United States	0	0	2,522	0	74	2,596
Total	25,532	10,013	16,826	6,071	219	58,661

Appendix 4.2 Equations of Multilevel modelling

MLM of this research comprise of two levels, which are individual and societal levels. More specifically, individual level analysis contains indicators related to associational membership and socio-demographical variables such as gender, age, educational level and income. The following equation is drawn from the hypothesis.

Level 1: Individual

$$Y [\text{Generalised Trust/ Particularised /Tolerance/ Voting/ Interest in politics/ Political activism}] \\ = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{Gender} + \beta_2 \text{Age} + \beta_3 \text{Education} + \beta_4 \text{Income} + \beta_5 \text{MEMB} + r_{ij} \quad [1]$$

MEMB represents the number of formal and informal associational membership which one belongs to, r_{ij} is the error term meaning random effects that are not included in the equation. The next step is to prepare a country level model as presuming that cultural values and belief of the persons from the same society are more similar than others from different countries (Yoon,2017).

Level 2: Country

$$\beta_0 = G_{00} + G_{01} \text{IND} + G_{02} \text{HIER} + u_{0j} \quad [2]$$

IND represents the measure of Individualism/collectivism, HIER stands for hierarchism across countries. Finally, by synthesising two suggestive models together, a mixed model is written as follow:

Multilevel Model

$$Y [\text{Generalised Trust/ Particularised /Tolerance/ Voting/ Interest in politics/ Political activism}] \\ = G_{00} + \beta_1 \text{Gender} + \beta_2 \text{Age} + \beta_3 \text{Education} + \beta_4 \text{Income} + \beta_5 \text{MEMB} + G_{01} \text{IND} + G_{02} \text{HIER} + \\ r_{ij} + u_{0j} \quad [3]$$

An analysis on a suggestive multilevel model is carried out to examine whether the role of association on democratic citizenship is altered significantly by moderating effects of Asian values of collectivism and hierarchism.

Appendix 4.3 Hofstede's Cultural values of each country

	Hierarchism	Individualism
Australia	38	90
Austria	11	55
Canada	39	80
China	80	20
Denmark	18	74
Finland	33	63
France	68	71
Germany	35	67
Greece	60	35
Hong Kong	68	25
Iceland	30	60
Indonesia	78	14
Italy	50	76
Japan	54	46
Korea	60	18
Malaysia	104	26
Netherlands	38	80
New Zealand	22	79
Norway	31	69
Philippines	94	32
Portugal	63	27
Spain	57	51
Sweden	31	71
Switzerland	34	68
Taiwan	58	17
Thailand	64	20
UK	35	89
USA	40	91
Vietnam	70	20

Data source: Hofstede (2011)

Hofstede (2011) offers a decent database to measure the national level cultures: which comprise of six dimensions such as 'Power Distance', 'Uncertainty Avoidance', 'Individualism/Collectivism' and so forth. This is one of the most vigorously used data for comparing national level cultures between different countries (e.g., Jones, 2007; Favaretto et al., 2016). Among these multiple components, this research employs 'power distance' for hierarchism and individualism/collectivism to measure the Asian values for each country.

Appendix 4.4 Distributions of key variables

To conduct and interpret logistic regressions, this research operationalises the following key variables into dichotomised values. Distributions of each item need to be checked to conduct such dichotomisation.

Numbers of Associational membership

	#	%	cumulative %	
Membership	none	19,692	33.6	34.2
	1	13,142	22.4	57.0
	2	9,117	15.5	72.9
	3	6,102	10.4	83.5
	4	3,669	6.3	89.8
	5	2,045	3.5	93.4
	6	1,134	1.9	95.4
	7	719	1.2	96.6
	8	489	.8	97.5
	9	410	.7	98.2
	10	1,050	1.8	100.0
	Total	57,569	98.1	
	Missing	1,110	1.9	
	Total	58,679	100.0	

Note: As the cumulative percentage of none to single membership is 57%, this research operationalises none to 1 membership as (0), and multiple memberships (1) for logistic analyses.

Tolerance

	#	%	cumulative %	
Tolerance	.00	40,272	68.6	70.5
	.50	12,441	21.2	92.3
	1.00	4,395	7.5	100.0
	Total	57,108	97.3	
	Missing	1571	2.7	
	Total	58679	100.0	

Note: The variable 'tolerance' is calculated by the mean values of questions on "tolerance for immigrants and different races". As the cumulative percentage of do not care is 70%, this research operationalises 0 as (1: high tolerance) and the rests (0: low tolerance).

Particularised Trust

	#	%	cumulative %
Trust completely	8,665	14.8	15.0
1.33	11,654	19.9	35.3
1.67	19,811	33.8	69.7
2.00	10,378	17.7	87.7
2.33	4,283	7.3	95.1
2.67	1,817	3.1	98.3
3.00	672	1.1	99.5
3.33	196	.3	99.8
3.67	60	.1	99.9
Never trust	58	.1	100.0
Total	57,594	98.2	
Missing	1,571	1,085	
Total	58,679	58,679	

Note: The variable 'particularised trust' is calculated by the mean values of questions on "Trust: family, friends, neighbours, and personally known" (1 = trust completely; 4 = never trust). As the cumulative percentage trust level 1.67 almost 70%, this research operationalises 1 to 1.33 as (1: high trust) and the rests (0: low trust).

Interest in politics

	#	%	cumulative %
Very interested	8,900	15.2	15.3
Somewhat interested	23,190	39.5	55.0
Not very interested	17,882	30.5	85.7
Not at all interested	8,363	14.3	100.0
Total	58,335	99.4	
Missing	344	.6	
Total	58,679	100.0	

Note: The variable 'interest in politics' consists of four categories. As the cumulative percentage of very and somewhat interested is 55%, this research operationalises 0 as (1: very + somewhat = high interest) and the rests (0: not very + not at all = low interest).

Voting

	#	%	cumulative %
Always do	34,229	58.3	59.1
1.50	4,706	8.0	67.2
2.00	9,319	15.9	83.3
2.50	1,919	3.3	86.7
3.00	5,947	10.1	96.9
3.50	143	.2	97.2
Never	1,639	2.8	100.0
Total	57,902	98.7	
Missing	777	1.3	
Total	58,679	100.0	

Note: The variable ‘voting’ is calculated by the mean values of questions on “Voting: national and local levels”. As the cumulative percentage always voting is almost 60%, this research operationalises ‘Always do’ as (1: participatory) and the rests (0: not participatory).

Political activities

	#	%	cumulative %
Likely do	1,407	2.4	2.5
1.25	3,090	5.3	8.1
1.50	5,019	8.6	17.2
1.75	6,850	11.7	29.5
2.00	9,726	16.6	47.1
2.25	6,706	11.4	59.2
2.50	7,269	12.4	72.3
2.75	4,516	7.7	80.5
Never	10,810	18.4	100.0
Total	55,393	94.4	
Missing	3,286	5.6	
Total	58,679	100.0	

Note: The variable ‘political activities’ is calculated by the mean values of questions on “political activities: petition, demonstration, boycotts, and strikes” (1 = likely do; 4 = never). As the cumulative percentage of political activities level 2.00 almost 50%, this research operationalises 1 to 2 as (1: participatory) and the rests (0: none-participatory).

Appendix 4.5 EM Algorithm

As mentioned above, the EM algorithm is an inferential method derived from iterative computation of regression as well as maximum likelihood (Little & Rubin, 2019). EM comprises of two stages: the first (E) step that calculates an expected value of log likelihood as an estimated value about a parameter, and M step maximise parameter estimates of this expected value. That is to say, M first creates $\hat{\alpha}, \hat{\beta}$ to capture X based on observed Y .

$$X_{imp} = \hat{\alpha} + \hat{\beta}Y_{obs}$$

X_{imp} stands for the imputed data while Y_{obs} refers to the observation. As a result, missing value is estimated by the average value of X_{imp} , given the Y_{obs} .

The second stage of estimation, or ‘M’ re-calculates the means, and covariances by adopting equation which “*compensates for the lack of residual variation in the imputed values of X*” (Von Hippel, 2004: 163). These processes recur till convergence (in the case of the significance level = 0.01, for instance, the convergence is achieved after 10,000 iteration processes). It is an algorithm that finds the optimal value by alternating these two steps.

Appendix 5.1 Missing values of each item

Items		#	Rest N	%
Trust	Trust: Your family	284	58,467	0.49%
	Trust: Your neighbourhood (B)	841	57,910	1.43%
	Trust: People you know personally (B)	440	58,311	0.75%
	Most people can be trusted	973	57,778	1.66%
Tolerance	Neighbours: People of a different race	852	57,899	1.45%
	Neighbours: Immigrants/foreign workers	1,503	57,248	2.56%
	Neighbours: Homosexuals	844	57,907	1.44%
Interests in Politics	Interest in politics	345	58,406	0.59%
	Vote in elections: local level	2,646	56,105	4.50%
	Vote in elections: National level	3,663	55,088	6.23%
Political activities	Political action: signing a petition	1,059	57,692	1.80%
	Political action: joining in boycotts	2,004	56,747	3.41%
	Political action: attending lawful/peaceful demonstrations	1,551	57,200	2.64%
	Political action: joining unofficial strikes	2,100	56,651	3.57%
Associational membership	Member: Belong to religious organisation	446	58,305	0.76%
	Member: Belong to education, arts, music or cultural activities	523	58,228	0.89%
	Member: Belong to labour unions	535	58,216	0.91%
	Member: Belong to political parties	540	58,211	0.92%
	Member: Belong to conservation, the environment, ecology, animal rights	546	58,205	0.93%
	Member: Belong to professional associations	593	58,158	1.01%
	Member: Belong to sports or recreation	489	58,262	0.83%
	Member: Belong to consumer groups	614	58,137	1.05%
	Member: Belong to humanitarian or charitable organization	530	58,221	0.90%
Member: Belong to self-help group, mutual aid group	632	58,119	1.08%	
Demography	Income	4,029	54,722	6.86%
	Education	704	58,047	1.20%
	Age	157	58,594	0.27%
	Gender	66	58,685	0.11%
Mean				1.79%

Source: WVS 7; Note: Shaded items indicate around 5% of missing values

Appendix 5.2 Associational membership

English-Speaking countries

			USA	CAN	GBR	AUS	NZL	Total
English Speaking	Religious	N	1081	2651	1513	1045	674	6964
		Y	1500	1367	274	744	330	4215
			58.1%	34.0%	15.3%	41.6%	32.9%	37.7%
	Cultural	N	1742	3166	1523	1133	676	8240
		Y	834	852	264	651	309	2910
			32.4%	21.2%	14.8%	36.5%	31.4%	26.1%
	Ecological	N	2068	3415	1634	1501	804	9422
		Y	505	603	153	280	178	1719
			19.6%	15.0%	8.6%	15.7%	18.1%	15.4%
	Professional	N	1665	2748	1536	1195	697	7841
		Y	898	1270	251	581	286	3286
			35.0%	31.6%	14.1%	32.7%	29.1%	29.5%
	Recreational	N	1914	3071	1374	1065	489	7913
		Y	661	947	413	724	502	3247
			25.7%	23.6%	23.1%	40.5%	50.7%	29.1%
	Consumer	N	2162	3491	1770	1622	894	9939
		Y	387	527	17	154	77	1162
			15.2%	13.1%	1.0%	8.7%	8.0%	10.5%
	Charitable	N	1681	3059	1549	1199	664	8152
		Y	876	959	238	583	330	2986
			34.3%	23.9%	13.3%	32.7%	33.2%	26.8%
	Self-help	N	2172	3385	1697	1494	835	9583
		Y	368	633	90	287	143	1521
			14.5%	15.8%	5.0%	16.1%	14.6%	13.7%
	Labour	N	2099	2954	1608	1441	833	8935
		Y	473	1064	179	342	153	2211
			18.4%	26.5%	10.0%	19.2%	15.5%	19.8%
	Political	N	1306	3241	1703	1603	852	8705
		Y	1263	777	84	177	136	2437
			49.2%	19.3%	4.7%	10.0%	13.8%	21.9%
			27.5%	22.0%	10.2%	22.8%	23.5%	21.6%

Data: WVS 7; N=not a member, Y=member

Protestant European countries

			NED	CHE	GER	AUT	FIN	SWE	NOR	DMK	ISL	Total
Protestant Europe	Religious	N	3286	1902	2281	1106	809	813	850	1313	662	13022
		Y	1099	1246	1388	531	368	364	272	2036	956	8260
			25.1%	39.6%	37.8%	32.4%	31.3%	30.9%	24.2%	60.8%	59.1%	38.8%
	Cultural	N	3438	2291	2910	1412	928	950	947	2740	1265	16881
		Y	940	857	730	225	246	226	175	609	351	4359
			21.5%	27.2%	20.1%	13.7%	21.0%	19.2%	15.6%	18.2%	21.7%	20.5%
	Ecological	N	3629	2495	3272	1572	1085	1010	1048	2867	1419	18397
		Y	756	647	363	65	93	167	74	482	197	2844
			17.2%	20.6%	10.0%	4.0%	7.9%	14.2%	6.6%	14.4%	12.2%	13.4%

Professional	N	3872	2393	3202	1536	1020	1027	950	2938	1263	18201
	Y	492	747	422	101	158	149	172	411	350	3002
		11.3%	23.8%	11.6%	6.2%	13.4%	12.7%	15.3%	12.3%	21.7%	14.2%
Recreational	N	2524	1835	2002	1214	802	715	729	1863	1044	12728
	Y	1867	1309	1646	423	379	461	393	1486	574	8538
		42.5%	41.6%	45.1%	25.8%	32.1%	39.2%	35.0%	44.4%	35.5%	40.1%
Consumer	N	3872	2944	3565	1602	1145	1028	1055	3075	1477	19763
	Y	507	195	59	35	30	148	67	274	140	1455
		11.6%	6.2%	1.6%	2.1%	2.6%	12.6%	6.0%	8.2%	8.7%	6.9%
Charitable	N	3686	2557	3148	1513	984	871	892	2564	1155	17370
	Y	695	591	490	124	197	306	230	785	463	3881
		15.9%	18.8%	13.5%	7.6%	16.7%	26.0%	20.5%	23.4%	28.6%	18.3%
Self-help	N	4228	2982	3363	1563	1110	1118	1087	3171	1468	20090
	Y	148	151	262	74	58	58	35	178	149	1113
		3.4%	4.8%	7.2%	4.5%	5.0%	4.9%	3.1%	5.3%	9.2%	5.2%
Labour	N	3627	2852	3150	1437	701	695	695	1689	616	15462
	Y	758	293	486	200	478	481	427	1660	1001	5784
		17.3%	9.3%	13.4%	12.2%	40.5%	40.9%	38.1%	49.6%	61.9%	27.2%
Political	N	4122	2895	3454	1525	1088	1077	1021	3152	1316	19650
	Y	263	251	182	112	91	100	101	197	301	1598
		6.0%	8.0%	5.0%	6.8%	7.7%	8.5%	9.0%	5.9%	18.6%	7.5%
		17.2%	20.0%	16.5%	11.5%	17.8%	20.9%	17.3%	24.2%	27.7%	19.2%

Data: WVS 7; N=not a member, Y=member

Catholic European countries

			FRA	ESP	ITA	GRC	Total
Catholic Europe	Religious	N	1774	1120	2124	1124	6142
		Y	94	82	125	74	375
			5.0%	6.8%	5.6%	6.2%	5.8%
	Cultural	N	1674	1103	2127	1084	5988
		Y	194	100	122	115	531
			10.4%	8.3%	5.4%	9.6%	8.1%
	Ecological	N	1781	1142	2190	1157	6270
		Y	87	59	59	42	247
			4.7%	4.9%	2.6%	3.5%	3.8%
	Professional	N	1795	1148	2179	1117	6239
		Y	73	52	70	80	275
			3.91%	3.9%	4.3%	3.1%	6.7%
	Recreational	N	1494	1077	2074	1057	5702
		Y	374	126	175	142	817
			20.0%	10.5%	7.8%	11.8%	12.5%
	Consumer	N	1834	1177	2240	1171	6422
		Y	34	24	9	27	94
			1.8%	2.0%	0.4%	2.3%	1.4%
	Charitable	N	1715	1103	2112	1148	6078
		Y	153	99	137	51	440
			8.2%	8.2%	6.1%	4.3%	6.8%
	Self-help	N	1831	1174	2231	1155	6391
		Y	37	25	18	43	123
			2.0%	2.1%	0.8%	3.6%	1.9%

Labour	N	1758	1132	2188	1122	6200
	Y	110	69	61	75	315
		5.9%	5.7%	2.7%	6.3%	4.8%
Political	N	1825	1153	2214	1134	6326
	Y	43	45	35	62	185
		2.3%	3.8%	1.6%	5.2%	2.8%
		6.4%	5.7%	3.6%	5.9%	5.2%

Data: WVS 7; N=not a member, Y=member


Confucian East Asia

			CHN	TWN	HKG	KOR	JPN	VNM	SGP	Total
Confucian East Asia	Religious	N	1774	1120	2124	1124	6142	1055	1166	9384
		Y	94	82	125	74	375	145	842	2732
			5.0%	6.8%	5.6%	6.2%	5.8%	12.1%	41.9%	22.5%
	Cultural	N	2744	884	1599	1097	1195	1138	1647	10304
		Y	279	339	476	148	141	62	361	1806
			9.2%	27.7%	22.9%	11.9%	10.6%	5.2%	18.0%	14.9%
	Ecological	N	2904	1023	1730	1182	1317	1156	1906	11218
		Y	119	200	345	63	19	44	98	888
			3.9%	16.4%	16.6%	5.1%	1.4%	3.7%	4.9%	7.3%
	Professional	N	2893	898	1601	1191	1241	1159	1733	10716
		Y	127	325	474	54	95	41	275	1391
			35.04%	4.2%	26.6%	22.8%	4.3%	7.1%	3.4%	13.7%
	Recreational	N	2786	741	1565	993	1124	1117	1587	9913
		Y	237	482	510	252	211	83	420	2195
			7.8%	39.4%	24.6%	20.2%	15.8%	6.9%	20.9%	18.1%
	Consumer	N	2784	1065	1748	1174	1314	1134	1903	11122
		Y	237	158	327	71	22	66	105	986
			7.8%	12.9%	15.8%	5.7%	1.6%	5.5%	5.2%	8.1%
	Charitable	N	2932	953	1706	1185	1292	1087	1788	10943
		Y	87	270	369	60	44	113	221	1164
			2.9%	22.1%	17.8%	4.8%	3.3%	9.4%	11.0%	9.6%
	Self-help	N	2789	1051	1705	958	1281	1121	1821	10726
		Y	231	172	370	287	53	79	187	1379
			7.6%	14.1%	17.8%	23.1%	4.0%	6.6%	9.3%	11.4%
	Labour	N	2691	872	1637	1169	1203	1139	1785	10496
		Y	331	351	438	76	133	61	222	1612
			11.0%	28.7%	21.1%	6.1%	10.0%	5.1%	11.1%	13.3%
	Political	N	2644	1048	1806	1189	1277	1149	1944	11057
		Y	378	175	269	56	59	51	59	1047
			12.5%	14.3%	13.0%	4.5%	4.4%	4.3%	2.9%	8.7%
			7.2%	20.9%	17.8%	9.2%	6.4%	6.2%	13.9%	12.6%


Non-Confucian East Asia



			THA	MAY	PHP	IDN	Total
Non-Confucian East Asia	Religious	N	757	704	563	930	2954
		Y	743	608	637	2269	4257
			49.5%	46.3%	53.1%	70.9%	59.0%
	Cultural	N	880	921	978	2310	5089
		Y	620	391	222	887	2120
			41.3%	29.8%	18.5%	27.7%	29.4%
	Ecological	N	1020	968	990	2074	5052
		Y	480	345	209	1114	2148
			32.0%	26.3%	17.4%	34.9%	29.8%
	Professional	N	1016	908	1061	2280	5265
		Y	484	405	138	915	1942
			32.3%	30.8%	11.5%	28.6%	26.9%
	Recreational	N	903	833	901	2087	4724
		Y	597	479	299	1110	2485
			39.8%	36.5%	24.9%	34.7%	34.5%
	Consumer	N	1033	951	1033	2661	5678
		Y	467	362	167	520	1516
			31.1%	27.6%	13.9%	16.3%	21.1%
	Charitable	N	1020	904	940	1954	4818
		Y	480	409	260	1240	2389
			32.0%	31.2%	21.7%	38.8%	33.1%
	Self-help	N	971	950	1087	2577	5585
		Y	529	363	112	604	1608
			35.3%	27.6%	9.3%	19.0%	22.4%
	Labour	N	1035	892	981	2651	5559
		Y	465	420	219	538	1642
			31.0%	32.0%	18.3%	16.9%	22.8%
	Political	N	1005	955	1046	2863	5869
		Y	495	357	153	332	1337
			33.0%	27.2%	12.8%	10.4%	18.6%
			35.8%	32.0%	21.3%	31.0%	30.6%

Tolerance



Voting





Appendix 6.1 Correlation between Associational membership and democratic citizenships

			Interest in politics	Voting	Political activism	Particularised Trust	Generalised Trust	Tolerance
Austria			-.169**	-.180**	-.188**	-.070**	-.125**	-.088**
Australia			-.154**	-.021	-.177**	-.017	-.104**	-.011
China			-.153**		-.078*	.001	-.109**	-.049
Germany			-.180**	-.238**	-.244**	-.083**	-.152**	-.082**
Denmark			-.167**	-.153**	-.194**	-.159**	-.180**	-.098**
Spain			-.085**	-.051	-.185**	.005	-.038	.017
Finland			-.140**	-.194**	-.170**	-.095**	-.157**	-.097**
France			-.193**	-.160**	-.213**	-.109**	-.165**	-.089**
Greece			-.200**	-.060*	-.243**	-.016	-.121**	-.046
Hong Kong			-.142**	-.018	-.180**	.025	-.103**	.021
Indonesia			-.132**	.030*	-.130**	-.028*	-.037**	.024
Italy			-.209**	-.068**	-.191**	-.067**	-.162**	-.127**
Japan			-.163**	-.187**	-.188**	-.078**	-.088**	-.005
Korea	Associational Membership	Kendall's tau b.	-.085**	.060*	-.208**	-.088**	-.026	.026
Malaysia			-.116**	-.088**	-.157**	-.111**	-.122**	-.032
Netherlands			-.218**	-.210**	-.193**	-.157**	-.202**	-.101**
Norway			-.191**	-.177**	-.176**	-.082**	-.146**	-.059*
New Zealand			-.153**	-.191**	-.217**	-.078**	-.098**	.012
Philippines			-.065**	-.019	-.158**	-.025	-.065**	.000
Portugal			-.133**	-.023	-.205**	-.030	-.050	-.063*
Sweden			-.115**	-.187**	-.174**	-.116**	-.142**	-.102**
Thailand			-.262**	.370**	-.298**	.036	-.310**	.199**
Taiwan			-.088**	-.054*	-.147**	-.038	-.096**	-.030
UK			-.258**	-.183**	-.285**	-.104**	-.157**	-.084**
USA			-.209**	-.192**	-.230**	-.092**	-.147**	-.003
Vietnam			-.153**	-.043	-.149**	.063*	.029	-.102**

** , P<0.01; * , P<0.05

Appendix 7.1 Likelihood Ratio Test (LR)

The LR test analyse the difference of two equations by comparing models fits with maximum likelihood. It compares the log likelihood of two models and analyses whether there are any significant differences (Steele, 2008). More specifically, LR can be calculated by $-2 \log \text{Likelihood}_1 - (-2 \log \text{Likelihood}_2)$ (Leroy et al., 2022). ‘log’ stands for the natural logarithm (Steele, 2008). The comparison is usually conducted between the null model (refers to as D_0) and a model with independent variables (refers to as D_1). If $D_1 - D_0$'s p is larger than chi-square threshold, then the research could the null and conclude that the differences between two models are statistically significant.

Appendix 7.2 Intraclass Correlation Coefficient (ICC)

ICC can be derived from a model without covariates (Park and Lake, 2005). It is usually employed to determine whether there is any significant variation between lower-level residuals and upper-level means. In other words, it can indicate that after controlling individual level variables (Level 1), there remains non-trivial variation in dependent variables occurring between level 2 units. In this research, the two-level variance components are used as follows:

$$\text{Level 1: } Y_{00} = \beta_{0j} + e_{ij} \quad [\text{Modelling within-groups variation}] \quad [7.1]$$

The i means each individual ($i = 1 \dots n$), while j stands for upper-level units, in this research, country ($j = 1 \dots J$). The β_{0j} stands for the intercept of the j th country unit. e_{ij} means the residual for the individual level predictor, which is assumed to have normal distribution with mean 0 and variance σ_e^2 . That is, $e_{ij} \sim N(0, \sigma_e^2)$.

In multilevel modelling, the intercept β_{0j} represents in country level model as follows:

$$\text{Level 2: } \beta_{0j} = \gamma_{00} + \mu_{0j} \quad [\text{Modelling between group variation}] \quad [7.2]$$

In mixed model, α stands for the grand mean while μ_{0j} means the random intercept variance which is the random effect of the j th country. to the intercept that is assumed to be normally distributed with mean 0 and variance σ_u^2 . By combining above equations [7.1] and [7.2] yields the mixed model as follow:

$$Y_{00} = \alpha + \mu_{0j} + e_{ij} \quad [\text{Mixed model}] \quad [7.3]$$

The mixed model divides the variances of different level dependent variables into two components: “*the variance of clusters, σ_u^2 , and the variance of observations at Level 1, σ^2* ” (Park & Lake, 2005: 5). The ICC can be calculated based on the above two variance components as follows.

$$\text{ICC} = \frac{\sigma_u^2}{\sigma_u^2 + \sigma^2} \quad [7.4]$$

ICC can range from 0 to 1. If ρ equals to 0, it means that all the individuals are independent one another. Whereas ICC 1 stands for that one in all clusters are exactly the same. All in all, ICC stands for the ratio of between cluster variance to the total variance.

Appendix 7.3 Random intercept model

Random intercept models allow us to discover to what extent differences between individuals in their values of democratic citizenships arise from to their membership of voluntary association after controlling for other demographic features. The two-level random intercept model with one level 1 independent variable can be described as follow:

$$\text{Level 1: } Y_{ij} = \beta_{0j} + \beta_{1j}X_{ij} + e_{ij} \quad [7.5]$$

Y_{ij} = democratic citizenship for individual ‘i’ in country ‘j’.

β_{0j} = intercept for country ‘j’. Since β_{1j} is included as a predictor at level 1, it is interpreted as the mean score of democratic citizenship for county ‘j’, controlling for individual level variable.

e_{ij} = level 1 residuals; difference between individual ‘i’ in country ‘j’s’ predicted

democratic citizenship score and the individual's actual score.

In multilevel model, the intercept β_{0j} and the slope β_{1j} are represented in the following country level regression models:

$$\text{Level 2: } \beta_{0j} = \gamma_{00} + \mu_{0j} \quad [7.6]$$

$$\beta_{1j} = \gamma_{10} \quad [7.7]$$

γ_{00} stands for the grand mean while μ_{0j} refers to level 2 residual. Here, γ_{10} in equation [7.7] means overall regression coefficient between democratic citizenship at level 1. Single equation model by substituting [7.6], [7.7] yields following equation [7.8]

$$\text{Mixed model: } Y_{ij} = \gamma_{00} + \gamma_{10}X_{ij} + \mu_{0j} + e_{ij} \quad [7.8]$$

This model, [7.8] is usually referred to as a random intercept model since the intercept of the regression can be varying randomly across countries where the overall slope coefficient is shared by all societies. In other words, only the intercept, β_{0j} , is viewed as random in Equation [7.5], while regression coefficient, β_{1j} , is understood as having a fixed effect to all county level units. The segment $[\gamma_{00} + \gamma_{10}X_{ij}]$ in equation [7.8] includes the fixed coefficients (Hox et al., 2017).

Appendix 7.4 Random slope model

A random intercept model of this research presumes that the relationship between democratic citizenships and individual level independent variables are the same for each country. Therefore, the coefficient β_{1j} in equation [7.5] is fixed across the countries. However, some previous research argue that the effects of country-level cultural values variable can determine the democratic citizenship (Yoon, 2017) and thus it is reasonable to regard slopes can be varying randomly across the country level clusters. As a result, the equation [7.9] and [7.11] can be drawn as:

$$\text{Level 1: } Y_{ij} = \beta_{0j} + \beta_{1j}X_{ij} + e_{ij} \quad [7.9]$$

$$\text{Level 2: } \beta_{0j} = \gamma_{00} + \gamma_{01}X_{ij} + \mu_{0j} \quad [7.10]$$

$$\beta_{1j} = \gamma_{10} + \gamma_{11}Z_j + \mu_{1j} \quad [7.11]$$

The Equation [7.10] and [7.11] present a random effect given that $\text{Var}(u_{1j}) \neq 0$ while Equation [7.12] presents a random effect multilevel model without a cross-level interaction which incorporates the country level variable with randomly varying covariance.

$$\text{Mixed model: } Y_{ij} = \gamma_{00} + \gamma_{01}X_{ij} + \mu_{0j} + \gamma_{10}X_{ij} + \gamma_{11}Z_jX_{ij} + \mu_{1j}X_{ij} + \mu_{0j} + e_{ij} \quad [7.12]$$

Level 1 equation is exactly the same as before [7.9]. However, level 2 equation with respect to the slopes [7.11], we have γ_{10} [fixed effect] while μ_{1j} reflect the variation and slopes across the countries. On the other hand, γ_{11} is essentially the regression slope where we are predicting variation in the country level slopes based on a country characteristic variable Z_j .

As a result, the term $\gamma_{11}Z_jX_{ij}$ in [7.12] can be understood as a cross-level interaction effect (or moderation effect). That is to say, country level variable Z_j in the equation [7.12] acts as a moderator variable and the relationship between individual level explanatory variables and dependent variable varies according to the values of moderator variable (Hox et al., 2017).

References

- Abdi, H. (2007). The Kendall rank correlation coefficient. *Encyclopedia of Measurement and Statistics*, 2, 508–510.
- Acharya, A. (2003). Democratisation and the prospects for participatory regionalism in Southeast Asia. *Third World Quarterly*, 24(2), 375–390.
- Alagappa, M. (2004). *Civil society and political change in Asia: expanding and contracting democratic space*. Stanford University Press.
- Allen, M. P. (1997). The problem of multicollinearity. *Understanding regression analysis*, 176-180.
- Allison, P.D. and Christakis, N.A. (2006). Fixed-effects methods for the analysis of nonrepeated events. *Sociological methodology*, 36(1), pp.155-172.
- Anderson, C.J. and Paskeviciute, A. (2006). How ethnic and linguistic heterogeneity influence the prospects for civil society: A comparative study of citizenship behavior. *The Journal of Politics*, 68(4), pp.783-802.
- Anheier, H. K., & Salamon, L. M. (1999). *Global civil society: Dimensions of the nonprofit sector*. Institute for Policy Studies, John Hopkins University.
- Anheier, H., & Kendall, J. (2002). Interpersonal trust and voluntary associations: examining three approaches. *The British Journal of Sociology*, 53(3), 343–362.
- Ariely, G., & Davidov, E. (2011). Can we rate public support for democracy in a comparable way? Cross-national equivalence of democratic attitudes in the World Value Survey. *Social Indicators Research*, 104(2), 271–286.
- Association, B. S. (2002). *British Sociological Association Statement of Ethical Practice*. Technical report, British Sociological Association, Durham. URL: [http://www](http://www....)
- Ayres, S., & Marsh, A. (2014). Reflections on contemporary debates in policy studies. In *Rethinking Policy and Politics* (pp. 231–256). Policy Press.
- Bae, J.H. (2008). Are Associations Schools of Democracy in Korea?: The Internal Effects of Associational Membership. *Korean Political Science Review*, 975–995.
- Bai, T. (2008). A Mencian version of limited democracy. *Res Publica*, 14(1), 19–34.
- Baker, W. E. (2013). America’s crisis of values. In *America’s Crisis of Values*. Princeton University Press.
- Barber, B. (2003). *Strong democracy: Participatory politics for a new age*. Univ of California Press.
- Barnes, S. H., & Kaase, M. (1979). *Political action: Mass participation in five western democracies*. Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications.
- Barr, M. D. (2000). Lee Kuan Yew and the “Asian values” debate. *Asian Studies Review*, 24(3),

309–334.

- Barr, M. D. (2004). *Cultural politics and Asian values: The tepid war* (Vol. 6). Routledge.
- Barrios, J. M., Benmelech, E., Hochberg, Y. V, Sapienza, P., & Zingales, L. (2021). Civic capital and social distancing during the Covid-19 pandemic☆. *Journal of Public Economics*, 193, 104310.
- Bauer, J. R., & Bell, D. A. (1999). *The East Asian challenge for human rights*. Cambridge University Press.
- Bazzi, S., Fiszbein, M., & Gebresilashe, M. (2021). “Rugged individualism” and collective (in) action during the COVID-19 pandemic. *Journal of Public Economics*, 195, 104357.
- Bekkers, R. (2012). Trust and volunteering: Selection or causation? Evidence from a 4 year panel study. *Political Behavior*, 34, 225-247.
- Bickel, R. (2007). *Multilevel analysis for applied research: It's just regression!*. Guilford Press.
- Bell, D. A. (2009). *Beyond liberal democracy: Political thinking for an East Asian context*. Princeton University Press.
- Bell, D. A. (2010a). *China's new Confucianism: Politics and everyday life in a changing society*. Princeton University Press.
- Bell, D. A. (2010b). *Confucian political ethics*. Princeton University Press.
- Bellah, R. N., Madsen, R., Sullivan, W. M., Swidler, A., & Tipton, S. M. (2007). *Habits of the heart: Individualism and commitment in American life*. Univ of California Press.
- Beyerlein, K., & Hipp, J. R. (2005). Social capital, too much of a good thing? American religious traditions and community crime. *Social Forces*, 84(2), 995-1013.
- Bishop, C.M. and Nasrabadi, N.M. (2006). *Pattern recognition and machine learning* (Vol. 4, No. 4, p. 738). New York: springer.
- Bok, S., Shum, J., Harvie, J., & Lee, M. (2021). We versus me: Indirect conditional effects of collectivism on COVID-19 public policy hypocrisy. *Journal of Entrepreneurship and Public Policy*.
- Boslaugh, S. (2007). *Secondary data sources for public health: A practical guide*. Cambridge University Press.
- Bomhoff, E. J., & Gu, M. M.-L. (2012). East Asia remains different: A comment on the index of “self-expression values,” by Inglehart and Welzel. *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology*, 43(3), 373–383.
- Bonett, D. G., & Wright, T. A. (2015). Cronbach's alpha reliability: Interval estimation, hypothesis testing, and sample size planning. *Journal of Organizational Behavior*, 36(1), 3–15.
- Borgida, E., Federico, C.M. and Sullivan, J.L. eds. (2009). *The political psychology of democratic citizenship*. Oxford University Press.

- Brehm, J., & Rahn, W. (1997). Individual-level evidence for the causes and consequences of social capital. *American journal of political science*, 999-1023.
- Brennan, A., & Fan, R. (2007). Autonomy and interdependence: A dialogue between liberalism and confucianism. *Journal of Social Philosophy*, 38(4), 511–535.
- Brewer, M.B. (2017). Intergroup discrimination: Ingroup love or outgroup hate?.
- Brown, T. A. (2015). *Confirmatory factor analysis for applied research*. Guilford publications.
- Budaev, S. V. (2010). Using principal components and factor analysis in animal behaviour research: caveats and guidelines. *Ethology*, 116(5), 472–480.
- Burt, R. S., & Knez, M. (1995). Kinds of third-party effects on trust. *Rationality and society*, 7(3), 255-292.
- Canache, D., Mondak, J. J., & Seligson, M. A. (2001). Meaning and measurement in cross-national research on satisfaction with democracy. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 65(4), 506–528.
- Carpini, M.X.D. and Keeter, S. (1996). *What Americans know about politics and why it matters*. Yale University Press.
- Cha, S. H. (2003). Myth and reality in the discourse of Confucian capitalism in Korea. *Asian Survey*, 43(3), 485–506.
- Chan, J. (1999). A Confucian perspective on human rights for contemporary China. *The East Asian Challenge for Human Rights*, 212.
- Chan, J. (2007). Democracy and meritocracy: Toward a Confucian perspective. *Journal of Chinese Philosophy*, 34(2), 179–193.
- Chang, Y., Chu, Y., & Tsai, F. (2005). Confucianism and democratic values in three Chinese societies. *Issues & Studies*, 41(4), 1–33.
- Chang, Y., Chu, Y., & Weatherall, M. (2018). Is there still an Asian way?: The changing nature of political culture in East Asia. In *Routledge handbook of politics in Asia* (pp. 195–210). Routledge.
- Chang, Y., Zhu, Y., & Park, C. (2007). Authoritarian nostalgia in Asia. *Journal of Democracy*, 18(3), 66–80.
- Chiavacci, D., Grano, S., & Obinger, J. (2020). *Civil Society and the state in democratic East Asia: Between entanglement and contention in post high growth* (p. 321). Amsterdam University Press.
- Cho, H. (1997). The historical origin of civil society in Korea. *Korea Journal*, 37(2), 24-41.
- Choi, D.-H. (2018). *Severed connections: political parties and democratic responsiveness in Sub-Saharan Africa*. UC Berkeley.
- Chu, Y.H. (2016). Sources of regime legitimacy in Confucian societies. *Journal of Chinese Governance*, 1(2), pp.195-213.
- Chun, S. (2012). Moral Rights and Justification of Revolution: Heart-Nature Theme of

- Mencius. In *Major Aspects of Chinese Religion and Philosophy* (pp. 251–276). Springer.
- Cigler, A., & Joslyn, M. R. (2002). The extensiveness of group membership and social capital: The impact on political tolerance attitudes. *Political Research Quarterly*, 55(1), 7-25.
- Clark, W. (2017). *Activism in the public sphere: Exploring the discourse of political participation*. Routledge.
- Claibourn, M. P., & Martin, P. S. (2000). Trusting and joining? An empirical test of the reciprocal nature of social capital. *Political Behavior*, 22, 267-291.
- Cohen, J. L. (1999). Does voluntary association make democracy work. *Diversity and Its Discontents: Cultural Conflict and Common Ground in Contemporary American Society*, 263–292.
- Collins, M. (2008). China’s Confucius and Western democracy. *Contemporary Review*, 1689, 161.
- Coyle, D. J., & Ellis, R. J. (2019). *Politics, policy, and culture*. Routledge.
- Crick, B. (2002). *Democracy: A very short introduction*. OUP Oxford.
- Curtice, J. (2007). Comparative opinion surveys. In *The Oxford handbook of political behavior*.
- Dagger, R. (1997). *Civic virtues: Rights, citizenship, and republican liberalism*. Oxford University Press on Demand.
- Dahl, R.A. (2008)[1989]. *Democracy and its Critics*. Yale university press.
- Dalton, R. J., & Ong, N.-N. T. (2005a). Authority orientations and democratic attitudes: A test of the ‘Asian values’ hypothesis. *Japanese Journal of Political Science*, 6(2), 211–231.
- Dalton, R. J., & Ong, N.-N. T. (2005b). Civil society and social capital in Vietnam. *Modernization and Social Change in Vietnam. Hamburg, Institut Für Asienkunde*.
- Dalton, R. J., & Ong, N. T. (2003). Authority Orientations and Democratic Attitudes in East Asia: A Test of the «Asian Values. Hypothesis», *Centre for the Study of Democracy, University of California, Irvine (Www. Democ. Uci. Edu)*. Presented at the Conference «How People View Democracy: Public Opinion in New Democracies», at the Center for Democracy, Development and the Rule of T.
- Dalton, R. J., & Shin, D. C. (2006). Citizens, Democracy, and Markets. *Citizens, Democracy, and Markets around the Pacific Rim: Congruence Theory and Political Culture*, 1–17.
- Dalton, R. J., & Shin, D. C. (2014). Reassessing the civic culture model. *The Civic Culture Transformed: From Allegiant to Assertive Citizens*, 91–115.
- Dalton, R. J., & Welzel, C. (2014). *The civic culture transformed: From allegiant to assertive citizens*. Cambridge University Press.
- Dalton, R., & Shin, D. C. (2006). Weber’s Theory of Capitalism in Confucian East Asia. *Citizens, Democracy, and Markets Around the Pacific Rim: Congruence Theory and Political Culture*, Ed. Russell Dalton and Doh Chull Shin.
- Daniell, K. A. (2014). The role of national culture in shaping public policy: A review of the literature. *Australia: The Australian National University*.

- Das, J., DiRienzo, C., & Tiemann, T. (2008). A global tolerance index. *Competitiveness Review: An International Business Journal*.
- Daud, K. A. M., Khidzir, N. Z., Ismail, A. R., & Abdullah, F. A. (2018). Validity and reliability of instrument to measure social media skills among small and medium entrepreneurs at Pengkalan Datu River. *International Journal of Development and Sustainability*, 7(3), 1026–1037.
- De Bary, W. T., & De Bary, W. T. (1998). *Asian values and human rights: A Confucian communitarian perspective*. Harvard University Press.
- Delhey, J., Newton, K., & Welzel, C. (2011). How general is trust in “most people”? Solving the radius of trust problem. *American sociological review*, 76(5), 786-807.
- De Tocqueville, A. (2003). *Democracy in america* (Vol. 10). Regnery Publishing.
- Dekker, P. (2009). Civicness: From civil society to civic services? *VOLUNTAS: International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations*, 20(3), 220–238.
- Dekker, P., & Uslaner, E. M. (2003). *Social capital and participation in everyday life* (Vol.23). Routledge.
- Dempster, A., & Laird, N. M. (1977). Rubin. D.(1997)“Maximum likelihood from incomplete data via the EM algorithm.” *Journal of the Royal Statistical Society*, 39(1).
- Dhakhwa, S., & Enriquez, S. (2008). *The relevance of Confucian philosophy to modern concepts of leadership and followership*.
- Diamond, L. (1999). *Developing democracy: Toward consolidation*. JHU Press.
- DiCristina, B. (2016). Durkheim’s theory of anomie and crime: A clarification and elaboration. *Australian & New Zealand Journal of Criminology*, 49(3), 311-331.
- Diez, R. (2002). A glossary for multilevel analysis. *Journal of epidemiology and community health*, 56(8), 588.
- Dima, B. (2009). *A discussion on new cultural and accounting variables and IFRSs’ implementation [:] Empirical study on a sample of Central and Eastern European countries*.
- Diop, A., Jardina, A. E., Tessler, M., & Wittrock, J. (2017). Antecedents of Trust among Citizens and Non-citizens in Qatar. *Journal of International Migration and Integration*, 18(1), 183–202.
- Doğan, A. (2021). *Hegemony with Chinese Characteristics: From the Tributary System to the Belt and Road Initiative*. Routledge.
- Dong, Y., & Peng, C.-Y. J. (2013). Principled missing data methods for researchers. *SpringerPlus*, 2(1), 222.

- Dudwick, N., Kuehnast, K., Jones, V. N., & Woolcock, M. (2006). Analyzing social capital in context. *A Guide to Using Qualitative Methods and Data*, 1–46.
- Duncan, J. (2002). The problematic modernity of Confucianism: The question of “civil society” in Choson dynasty Korea. In *Korean society* (pp. 45–65). Routledge.
- Dunn, E., & Hann, C. (1996). *Civil society: Challenging western models*. Psychology Press.
- Durand, C. P. (2013). Does raising type 1 error rate improve power to detect interactions in linear regression models? A simulation study. *PLoS One*, 8(8), e71079.
- Durkheim, E. (1976). *The elementary forms of the religious life*. Allen & Unwin.
- Durkheim, E. (2014) [1893]. *The division of labor in society*. Simon and Schuster.
- Dwivedi, S. S. (2017). Civil society and democracy in East Asia with special reference to South Korea. *Journal of Social and Economic Development*, 19(1), 211–226.
- Eckstein, H. (1969). Authority relations and governmental performance: a theoretical framework. *Comparative Political Studies*, 2(3), 269-325.
- Ekolu, S., & Quainoo, H. (2019). Reliability of assessments in engineering education using Cronbach’s alpha, KR and split-half methods. *Global Journal of Engineering Education*, 21(1), 21–29.
- Elgar, F. J., Davis, C. G., Wohl, M. J., Trites, S. J., Zelenski, J. M., & Martin, M. S. (2011). Social capital, health and life satisfaction in 50 countries. *Health & Place*, 17(5), 1044–1053.
- Ellickson, R. C. (2016). When civil society uses an iron fist: the roles of private associations in rulemaking and adjudication. *American Law and Economics Review*, 18(2), 235–271.
- Ellis, S. J. (2005). *By The People: A History of Americans as Volunteers*, New Century Edition [online]. Philadelphia, PA: Energize.
- Emmerson, D. K. (1995). Singapore and the "Asian values" debate. *Journal of Democracy*, 6(4), 95–105.
- Fawcett, Karen. (March 9, 1994)"Americans in Singapore Condemn Caning for Teen." *USA Today: Washington DC*. <http://www.corpun.com/sgju9403.htm#1199> [Accessed May 4, 2019].
- Favaretto, R. M., Dihl, L., Barreto, R., & Musse, S. R. (2016). Using group behaviors to detect hofstede cultural dimensions. *2016 IEEE International Conference on Image Processing (ICIP)*, 2936–2940.
- Ferguson, N. (2012). *Civilization: The West and the rest*. Penguin.
- Fetzer, J. S., & Soper, J. C. (2007). The effect of Confucian values on support for democracy and human rights in Taiwan. *Taiwan Journal of Democracy*, 3(1), 143–154.
- Fidrmuc, J., & Gërkhani, K. (2004). *Formation of social capital in Eastern Europe: Explaining the gap vis-à-vis developed countries*.
- Field, A. (2013). *Discovering statistics using IBM SPSS statistics*. sage.

- Fine, G. A. (2014). The hinge: Civil society, group culture, and the interaction order. *Social Psychology Quarterly*, 77(1), 5–26.
- Fischer, R. (2004). Standardization to account for cross-cultural response bias: A classification of score adjustment procedures and review of research in JCCP. *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology*, 35(3), 263–282.
- Fitzner, K. (2007). Reliability and validity a quick review. *The Diabetes Educator*, 33(5), 775–780.
- Fleche, S., Smith, C., & Sorsa, P. (2012). *Exploring determinants of subjective wellbeing in OECD countries: evidence from the World Value Survey*.
- Florida, R. (2006). The flight of the creative class: The new global competition for talent. *Liberal Education*, 92(3), 22–29.
- Foley, M. W., Edwards, B., & Diani, M. (2001). Social capital reconsidered. *Beyond Tocqueville: Civil Society and the Social Capital Debate in Comparative Perspective*, 266–280.
- Foddy, M., Platow, M. J., & Yamagishi, T. (2009). Group-based trust in strangers: The role of stereotypes and expectations. *Psychological Science*, 20(4), 419–422.
- Foucault, M. (1991). *The Foucault effect: Studies in governmentality*. University of Chicago Press.
- Fox, R. A. (1997). Confucian and communitarian responses to liberal democracy. *The Review of Politics*, 59(3), 561–592.
- Freedom House. (2014). *Freedom in the world 2014: The annual survey of political rights and civil liberties*. Rowman & Littlefield.
- Freedom House. (2020, APR 16). Freedom in the World 2019: Democracy in Retreat. <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2019/democracy-retreat>
- Freeman, M. (1996). Human rights, democracy and ‘Asian values.’ *The Pacific Review*, 9(3), 352–366.
- Fukuyama, F. (1995a). Confucianism and democracy. *Journal of Democracy*, 6(2), 20–33.
- Fukuyama, F. (1995b). *Trust: The social virtues and the creation of prosperity* (Issue D10 301 c. 1/c. 2). Free Press Paperbacks.
- Fukuyama, F. (2001). Asian values in the wake of the Asian crisis. *Democracy, Market Economics and Development*. Washington, DC: World Bank, 149–168.
- Fukuyama, F. (2014). Political Order and Political Decay: From the Industrial Revolution to the Globalization of Democracy. *New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux*, 455–466.
- Fukuyama, F. (2017). *Asian values and the Asian crisis*. *Commentary*, 105 (2), 23–27.
- Fung, A. (2003). Associations and democracy: Between theories, hopes, and realities. *Annual Review of Sociology*, 29(1), 515–539.

- García, R. V. (2007). Creating Social Capital and Civic Virtue: Historical Legacy and Individualistic Values-What Civil Society in Spain?. *Civil Societies and Social Movements. Potentials and Problems*. London: Routledge, 166–183.
- Garson, G. D. (2013). Introductory guide to HLM with HLM 7 software. *Hierarchical linear modeling: Guide and applications*, 55-96.
- Gengler, J., Tessler, M., Al-Emadi, D., & Diop, A. (2013). Civic life and democratic citizenship in Qatar findings from the First Qatar World Values Survey. *Middle East Law and Governance*, 5(3), 258–279.
- Geys, B. (2012). Association membership and generalized trust: Are connections between associations losing their value?. *Journal of Civil Society*, 8(1), 1-15.
- Gibbs, J. P. (1990). *Foundations of Social Theory*.
- Glanville, J. L. (2016). Why does involvement in voluntary associations promote trust? Examining the role of network diversity. *Sociological Inquiry*, 86(1), 29–50.
- Glanville, J. L., Andersson, M. A., & Paxton, P. (2013). Do social connections create trust? An examination using new longitudinal data. *Social Forces*, 92(2), 545–562.
- Glanville, J. L., & Paxton, P. (2007). How do we learn to trust? A confirmatory tetrad analysis of the sources of generalized trust. *Social Psychology Quarterly*, 70(3), 230-242.
- Glanville, J. L., & Shi, Q. (2020). The Extension of particularized trust to generalized and out-group trust: The constraining role of collectivism. *Social Forces*, 98(4), 1801–1828.
- Golafshani, N. (2003). Understanding reliability and validity in qualitative research. *The Qualitative Report*, 8(4), 597–607.
- Granovetter, M. S. (1973). The strength of weak ties. *American journal of sociology*, 78(6), 1360-1380.
- Grattan, M. (2005). *Whitlam hits out at “Chinese rogue port city.”* The Age. <https://www.theage.com.au/national/whitlam-hits-out-at-chinese-rogue-port-city-20051125-ge1b6q.html>
- Grootaert, C., & Van Bastelar, T. (2002). *Understanding and measuring social capital: A multi-disciplinary tool for practitioners*. The World Bank.
- Grzegorzcyk, M. (2019). The role of culture-moderated social capital in technology transfer—insights from Asia and America. *Technological Forecasting and Social Change*, 143, 132–141.
- Gutmann, A. (1993). Democracy & democratic education. *Studies in Philosophy and Education*, 12(1), 1–9.
- Hahm, C. (2004). The ironies of Confucianism. *Journal of Democracy*, 15(3), 93–107.
- Haidt, J. (2012). *The righteous mind: Why good people are divided by politics and religion*. Vintage.
- Halman, L. (2003). Volunteering, democracy, and democratic attitudes. *The values of*

- volunteering: Cross-cultural perspectives*, 179-198.
- Han, H. (2016). The organizational roots of political activism: Field experiments on creating a relational context. *American Political Science Review*, 110(2), 296-307.
- Hantrais, L. (2008). *International comparative research: Theory, methods and practice*. Macmillan International Higher Education.
- Harrison, L. E., & Huntington, S. P. (2002). *Culture matters: How values shape human progress*. Basic books.
- He, B. (2010). Four models of the relationship between Confucianism and democracy. *Journal of Chinese Philosophy*, 37(1), 18–33.
- He, L. (2007). *In search for an East Asian model: the receding of the developmental state and the growth of civil society in China, Japan and South Korea*. <http://oatd.org/oatd/record?record=%22oai:ugakr.libs.uga.edu:10724/24159%22>
- Heck, R., Thomas, S., & Tabata, L. (2014). *Multilevel and longitudinal modelling with SPSS*, edn.
- Hein, C. (1997). The historical origin of civil society in Korea. *Korea Journal*, 37(2), 24–41.
- Heinrich, V. F. (2005). Studying civil society across the world: Exploring the thorny issues of conceptualization and measurement. *Journal of Civil Society*, 1(3), 211–228.
- Hellmann, O. (2020). South Korea's democracy and the legacies of the developmental state. *Stateness and Democracy in East Asia*, 47–70.
- Henderson, G. (1970). Korea. The Politics of the Vortex. *VRÜ Verfassung Und Recht in Ü bersee*, 3(3), 414–415.
- Hogg, M. A. (1992). The social psychology of group cohesiveness: From attraction to social identity.
- Hofstede, G. (2011). Dimensionalizing cultures: The Hofstede model in context. *Online Readings in Psychology and Culture*, 2(1), 8.
- Hooghe, M., & Stolle, D. (2003). *Generating social capital: Civil society and institutions in comparative perspective*. Springer.
- House, F. (2019). Freedom in the world 2019: Democracy in Retreat. *Freedom House: Washington DC and New York*.
- Howard, M. M., & Gilbert, L. (2008). A cross-national comparison of the internal effects of participation in voluntary organizations. *Political Studies*, 56(1), 12-32.
- Hox, J. J., Moerbeek, M., & Van de Schoot, R. (2017). *Multilevel analysis: Techniques and applications*. Routledge.
- Hu, B., Shao, J., & Palta, M. (2006). Pseudo-R² in logistic regression model. *Statistica Sinica*, 847-860.

- Huckfeldt, R., & Sprague, J. (1987). Networks in context: The social flow of political information. *American Political Science Review*, 81(4), 1197–1216.
- Hunsaker, W. D. (2016). Spiritual leadership and organizational citizenship behavior: relationship with Confucian values. *Journal of Management, Spirituality & Religion*, 13(3), 206–225.
- Huntington, S. (1996). P.(1996). *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*. New York.
- Huntington, S. P. (1991). Democracy's third wave. *Journal of Democracy*, 2(2), 12–34.
- Huntington, S. P. (2012). *The third wave: Democratization in the late 20th century* (Vol. 4). University of Oklahoma Press.
- Huntington, S. P., & Nelson, J. M. (2013). No easy choice. In *No Easy Choice*. Harvard University Press.
- Hurtienne, T., & Kaufmann, G. (2012). *Methodological biases: Inglehart's world value survey and Q methodology*.
- Hyun, K. J. (2001). Sociocultural change and traditional values: Confucian values among Koreans and Korean Americans. *International Journal of Intercultural Relations*, 25(2), 203–229.
- Ibsen, B., Elmoose-Østerlund, K., Feiler, S., Breuer, C., Seippel, Ø., Van der Roest, J.-W., & Scheerder, J. (2019). Democratic participation in voluntary associations: A multilevel analysis of sports clubs in Europe. *Voluntas: International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations*, 30(5), 1148–1163.
- Iglič, H. (2010). Voluntary associations and tolerance: An ambiguous relationship. *American Behavioral Scientist*, 53(5), 717–736.
- Iglič, H., & Fabregas, J. F. (2007). *Social networks*.
- Ikeda, K. (2002). *Social capital and social communication in Japan: Political participation and tolerance*.
- Inglehart, R. (1988). The renaissance of political culture. *American Political Science Review*, 82(4), 1203–1230.
- Inglehart, R., Basanez, M., Catterberg, G., Diez-Medrano, J., Moreno, A., Norris, P., Siemińska, R., & Zijasnabar, I. (2010). Changing human beliefs and values 1981–2007. *A Cross-Cultural Sourcebook Based on the World Values Surveys and European Values Studies*, Chichester.
- Inglehart, R., & Oyserman, D. (2004). *Individualism, autonomy and self-expression: The human development syndrome*.
- Inglehart, R., & Welzel, C. (2005). *Modernization, cultural change, and democracy: The human development sequence*. Cambridge University Press.
- Inglehart, R., & Welzel, C. (2010). The WVS cultural map of the world. *World Values Survey*.

- Inoguchi, T., Mikami, S., & Fujii, S. (2007). Social capital in East Asia: Comparative political culture in Confucian societies. *Japanese Journal of Political Science*, 8(3), 409-426.
- Inoguchi, T., & Newman, E. (1997). Introduction: 'Asian values' and democracy in Asia. *Asian Values' and Democracy in Asia*, 27, 862-891.
- Ito-Morales, K. (2017). *Democracy in Japan and the role of neighborhood associations*.
- Jacques, M. (2012). *When China rules the world: The rise of the middle kingdom and the end of the western world [Greatly updated and expanded]*. Penguin UK.
- Jenkins, H. (2006). *Fans, bloggers, and gamers: Exploring participatory culture*. NYU Press.
- Jiang, Q. (2013). *A Confucian constitutional order: How China's ancient past can shape its political future* (Vol. 4). Princeton University Press.
- Jiang, Y.-H. (2000). *Asian values and communitarian democracy*. Academia Sinica, Program for Southeast Asian Area Studies.
- Jones, M. L. (2007). *Hofstede-culturally questionable?*
- Jung, T. (2010). The main characteristics of Korean moral education and the direction of its development. *Proceedings of the Moral Education in Asia's Globalizing Societies: Concepts and Practices*.
- Karen Fawcett. (1994). *Americans in Singapore condemn caning for teen*. USA Today. <https://www.corpun.com/sgju9403.htm#1199>
- Kennedy, K. J., Kuang, X., & Chow, J. K. F. (2013). Exploring Asian students' citizenship values and their relationship to civic knowledge and school participation. *Educational Psychology*, 33(3), 240-261.
- Kim, Sunhyuk; Kim, B. (2007). Democratic Consolidation and Civil Society in Korea : Continuities and Changes in the Politics of Protest. *The Journal of Asian Studies*, 50(3), 128-148.
- Kim, D. J. (1994). Is culture destiny? The myth of Asia's anti-democratic values. *Foreign Affairs*, 189-194.
- Kim, J. S. (2004). *Neighborhood effects on the etiology of child maltreatment: A multilevel study*. The University of Texas at Austin.
- Kim, S. (2000). *The politics of democratization in Korea: The role of civil society*. University of Pittsburgh Pre.
- Kim, S., & Jeong, J.-H. (2017). Historical Development of Civil Society in Korea since 1987. *Journal of International and Area Studies*, 1-14.
- Kim, S. Y. (2010). Do Asian values exist? Empirical tests of the four dimensions of Asian values. *Journal of East Asian Studies*, 10(2), 315-344.
- Kim, Y.-M. (1997). "Asian-Style Democracy": A Critique from East Asia. *Asian Survey*, 37(12), 1119-1134.

- Klein, S., & Lee, C.-S. (2019). Towards a dynamic theory of civil society: The politics of forward and backward infiltration. *Sociological Theory*, 37(1), 62–88.
- Knowles, R. (2011). *Confucian values and economic performance: exploring their effects on citizens satisfaction with democracy*. University of Missouri--Columbia.
- Knowles, R. T. (2015). n. *Asia Pacific Journal of Education*, 35(2), 191–212.
- Kobayashi, T., & Ikeda, K. I. (2009). Selective exposure in political web browsing: Empirical verification of ‘cyber-balkanization’ in Japan and the USA. *Information, Communication & Society*, 12(6), 929-953.
- Kohn, M. (2002). Panacea or privilege? New approaches to democracy and association. *Political Theory*, 30(2), 289–298.
- Kramer, R. M. (1999). Trust and distrust in organizations: Emerging perspectives, enduring questions. *Annual review of psychology*, 50(1), 569-598.
- Krishna, A., & Shrader, E. (2000). Cross-cultural measures of social capital: A tool and results from India and Panama. *Social Capital Initiative Working Paper*, 21, 1–118.
- Lasanthika, W., & Wickramasinghe, C. N. (2020). Readiness to Adopt Big Data Analytics in Private Sector Companies. *Wayamba Journal of Management*, 11(2).
- Lau, R. R. (1989). Individual and contextual influences on group identification. *Social Psychology Quarterly*, 220–231.
- Lee, C. (2020). Which voluntary organizations function as schools of democracy? Civic engagement in voluntary organizations and political participation. *VOLUNTAS: International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations*, 1–14.
- Lee, D. S. (2014). Between Liberty and Democracy: Focusing on Carl Schmitt’s Argument and Its Critique. *Peace studies*, 21(3), 69-102 [in Korean].
- Lee, Teng-hui. (1999). Confucian democracy: Modernization, culture, and the state in East Asia. *Harvard International Review*, 16-18.
- Lemke, T. (2015). *Foucault, governmentality, and critique*. Routledge.
- Leroy, N., Max, S., & Pansu, P. (2022). Is Emma or Liam the Top Scorer in Math? The Effects of a Counter-Stereotypical Role Model on Math Achievement. *Sex Roles*, 86(9), 587–603.
- Lew, S. C. (2013). The Korean economic developmental path: Confucian tradition, affective network. In *The Korean Economic Developmental Path: Confucian Tradition, Affective Network*. <https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137347299>
- Li, C. (1999). *The Tao encounters the West: Explorations in comparative philosophy*. SUNY Press.
- Li, C. (2006). Confucian value and democratic value. *Moral Issues in Global Perspective: Volume I: Moral and Political Theory*, 1, 184.
- Lilleker, D. G., & Koc-Michalska, K. (2017). What drives political participation? Motivations and mobilization in a digital age. *Political Communication*, 34(1), 21–43.

- Lim, H. (2007). Comparative Studies of the Social Capital among Korea, Taiwan and Japan: With a Focus on Trust in Cluster. *Journal of Korean Politics*, 16.
- Linde, J., & Ekman, J. (2003). Satisfaction with democracy: A note on a frequently used indicator in comparative politics. *European Journal of Political Research*, 42(3), 391–408.
- Linz, J. J., & Stepan, A. C. (1996). Toward consolidated democracies. *Journal of Democracy*, 7(2), 14–33.
- Little, R. J. A., & Rubin, D. B. (2019). *Statistical analysis with missing data* (Vol. 793). John Wiley & Sons.
- Liu, Y., & Shen, W. (2021). Perching birds or scattered streams: a study of how trust affects civic engagement among university students in contemporary China. *Higher Education*, 81(3), 421–436.
- Luengo, J., García, S., & Herrera, F. (2012). On the choice of the best imputation methods for missing values considering three groups of classification methods. *Knowledge and Information Systems*, 32(1), 77–108.
- MacKinnon, D. P. (2010). *Introduction to statistical mediation analysis*. Routledge.
- Maloney, W. A., & Rossteutscher, S. (2007). *Social capital and associations in European democracies: A comparative analysis*. Routledge.
- Maraffi, M., Newton, K., Van Deth, J., & Whiteley, P. (2008). *Social capital and European democracy*. Routledge.
- Mair, P. (2013). *Ruling the void: The hollowing of Western democracy*. Verso books.
- Markus, H. R., & Kitayama, S. (1991). Culture and the self: Implications for cognition, emotion, and motivation. *Psychological Review*, 98(2), 224.
- Marozzi, M. (2015). Measuring trust in European public institutions. *Social Indicators Research*, 123(3), 879–895.
- Marquart-Pyatt, S. and Paxton, P. (2007). In principle and in practice: Learning political tolerance in Eastern and Western Europe. *Political Behavior*, 29(1), pp.89-113.
- Marsden, P. V., & Friedkin, N. E. (1993). Network studies of social influence. *Sociological Methods & Research*, 22(1), 127-151.
- Mathur, S.K. and Dhulla, T.V., (2014). Factors influencing professionals’ decision for cloud computing adoption.
- Maxwell, S.E., Cole, D.A. and Mitchell, M.A., (2011). Bias in cross-sectional analyses of longitudinal mediation: Partial and complete mediation under an autoregressive model. *Multivariate behavioral research*, 46(5), pp.816-841.
- McCann, E., & Ward, K. (2012). Policy assemblages, mobilities and mutations: Toward a multidisciplinary conversation. *Political Studies Review*, 10(3), 325–332.
- McFarland, D. A., & Thomas, R. J. (2006). Bowling young: How youth voluntary associations influence adult political participation. *American Sociological Review*, 71(3), 401–425.

- Meleady, R., Crisp, R. J., Dhont, K., Hopthrow, T., & Turner, R. N. (2020). Intergroup contact, social dominance, and environmental concern: A test of the cognitive-liberalization hypothesis. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *118*(6), 1146.
- Melo, D. F., & Stockemer, D. (2014). Age and political participation in Germany, France and the UK: A comparative analysis. *Comparative European Politics*, *12*(1), 33–53.
- Mestrovic, S. (2004). *The Balkanization of the West: the confluence of postmodernism and postcommunism*. Routledge.
- Midi, H., Sarkar, S. K., & Rana, S. (2010). Collinearity diagnostics of binary logistic regression model. *Journal of interdisciplinary mathematics*, *13*(3), 253-267.
- Mignolo, W. (2002). The geopolitics of knowledge and the colonial difference. *The south atlantic quarterly*, *101*(1), pp.57-96.
- Minkov, M., & Hofstede, G. (2012). Hofstede's fifth dimension: New evidence from the World Values Survey. *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology*, *43*(1), 3–14.
- Moody, J., & White, D. R. (2003). Structural cohesion and embeddedness: A hierarchical concept of social groups. *American sociological review*, 103-127.
- Muhammad, L., Mahadi, B., & Hussin, N. (2017). Influence of social capital on customer's relationship satisfaction in the Pakistani banking industry. *Asia Pacific Journal of Marketing and Logistics*.
- Muller, E. N. (1982). An explanatory model for differing types of participation. *European Journal of Political Research*, *10*(1), 1–16.
- Murthy, V. (2000). The democratic potential of Confucian Minben thought. *Asian Philosophy*, *10*(1), 33–47.
- Nannestad, P. (2008). What have we learned about generalized trust, if anything? *Annu. Rev. Polit. Sci.*, *11*, 413–436.
- Nannestad, P., Svendsen, G. T., Dinesen, P. T., & Sønderskov, K. M. (2014). Do institutions or culture determine the level of social trust? The natural experiment of migration from non-western to western countries. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, *40*(4), 544–565.
- Nathan, A. F. (2012). Confucius and the Ballot Box: Why Asian Values Do not Stymie Democracy. *Foreign Affairs.*, *91*, 134.
- Newton, K. (2001). Trust, social capital, civil society, and democracy. *International Political Science Review*, *22*(2), 201–214.
- Newton, K., Stolle, D., & Zmerli, S. (2018). Social and political trust. *The Oxford handbook of social and political trust*, *37*, 961-976.
- No, W., Han, H., & Wang, L. (2021). Voluntary Association Involvement and Political Participation in South Korea. *Nonprofit Policy Forum*, *12*(4), 535–561.
- Norris, P. (2009). The globalization of comparative public opinion research. *Handbook of*

Comparative Politics, 522–540.

- Nowak, M.A. (2006). Five rules for the evolution of cooperation. *science*, 314(5805), pp.1560-1563.
- Nuyen, A. T. (2000). Confucianism, the idea of min-pen, and the democracy. *The Copenhagen Journal of Asian Studies*, 14, 130–151.
- Nylen, W., & Dodd, L. (2003). *Participatory democracy versus elitist democracy*. Palgrave Macmillan Limited.
- O'Dwyer, S. (2003). Democracy and Confucian values. *Philosophy East and West*, 39–63.
- OECD., D. S. E. (2019). *Society at a Glance 2019*. Organization for Economic.
- OECD. (2017). *OECD guidelines on measuring trust*. OECD Publishing.
- Ortmann, S., & Thompson, M. R. (2016). China and the " Singapore Model". *Journal of Democracy*, 27(1), 39–48.
- Ostrom, E. (1998). A behavioral approach to the rational choice theory of collective action: Presidential address, American Political Science Association, 1997. *American political science review*, 92(1), pp.1-22.
- Ostrom, E. (2000). Crowding out citizenship. *Scandinavian Political Studies*, 23(1), 3–16.
- Paldam, M., & Svendsen, G. T. (2000). *Missing social capital and the transition in Eastern Europe*. Department of Economics, Faculty of Business Administration.
- Park, C.-M., (2012). Good Citizens and Good Government. *Journal of Governmental Studies*.
- Park, C.-M., (2012). Associations, Social Networks, and Democratic Citizenship: Evidence from East Asia. *Taiwan Journal of Democracy*, 8(2).
- Park, C.-M., (2017). Quality of democracy 1: Public views. *Routledge Handbook of Democratization in East Asia*, 345–363.
- Park, C.-M., & Kim, W. S. (2006). Generating social trust in South Korea: the role of civil society and state institutions. *Korean Polit Assoc Rev*, 40(2), 149–169.
- Park, C.-M., & Shin, D. C. (2005). Social capital and democratic citizenship: The case of South Korea. *Japanese Journal of Political Science*, 6(1), 63–85.
- Park, C.-M., & Shin, D. C. (2006). Do Asian values deter popular support for democracy in South Korea? *Asian Survey*, 46(3), 341–361.
- Park, C.-M., (2011). Associations and social networks in Southeast Asia: Schools of democracy. *The Crisis of Democratic Governance in Southeast Asia*, 39–56.
- Park, C. M., & Lee, J. (2007). Are associations the schools of democracy across Asia. *Teipei: Asian Barometer Working Paper Series*.
- Park, C. M., & Subramanian, S. V. (2012). Voluntary association membership and social cleavages: A micro–macro link in generalized trust. *Social Forces*, 90(4), 1183–1205.

- Park, H., & Kim, M. (2001). A study on promoting social capital in Korea (in Korean). *Korean Political Science Review*, 34(4), 219–237.
- Park, S., & Lake, E. T. (2005). Multilevel modeling of a clustered continuous outcome: Nurses' work hours and burnout. *Nursing Research*, 54(6), 406.
- Parry, G., Moyser, G. and Day, N. (1992). *Political participation and democracy in Britain*. Cambridge University Press.
- Paxton, P. (2002). Social capital and democracy: An interdependent relationship. *American sociological review*, 254-277.
- Paxton, P. (2007). Association memberships and generalized trust: A multilevel model across 31 countries. *Social Forces*, 86(1), 47–76.
- Paxton, P., & Glanville, J. L. (2015). Is trust rigid or malleable? A laboratory experiment. *Social Psychology Quarterly*, 78(2), 194-204.
- Paxton, P., Hipp, J. R., Marquart-Pyatt, S., & Marquart-Pyatt, S. T. (2011). *Nonrecursive models: Endogeneity, reciprocal relationships, and feedback loops* (Vol. 168). Sage Publications.
- Paxton, P. and Ressler, R.W., (2018). Trust and participation in associations. *The Oxford handbook of social and political trust*, pp.149-172.
- Peng, C. Y. J., Lee, K. L., & Ingersoll, G. M. (2002). An introduction to logistic regression analysis and reporting. *The journal of educational research*, 96(1), 3-14.
- Peugh, J. L. (2010). A practical guide to multilevel modeling. *Journal of school psychology*, 48(1), 85-112.
- Perrin, A. J. (2009). *Citizen speak: The democratic imagination in American life*. University of Chicago Press.
- Perry, E. J. (2008). Chinese conceptions of “rights”: from Mencius to Mao—and now. *Perspectives on Politics*, 6(1), 37–50.
- Pettigrew, T. F. (1997). Generalized intergroup contact effects on prejudice. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 23(2), 173–185.
- Putnam, R. (1993). The prosperous community: Social capital and public life. *The American Prospect*, 13(Spring), Vol. 4. Available online: <http://www.prospect.org/print/vol/13> (accessed 7 April 2003).
- Putnam, R. D. (1993). *Making democracy work: Civic traditions in modern Italy*. Princeton university press.
- Putnam, R. D. (2000). Bowling alone: America's declining social capital. In *Culture and politics* (pp. 223–234). Springer.
- Putnam, R. D., & Yonish, S. (1997). New evidence on trends in American social capital and civic engagement: Are we really “bowling alone”. *Harvard University*.
- Putzel, J. (1997). Policy arena: accounting for the ‘dark side’ of social capital: reading Robert

- Putnam on democracy. *Journal of International Development: The Journal of the Development Studies Association*, 9(7), pp.939-949.
- Pye, L. W. (1999). Asian Values and Human Rights: A Confucian Communitarian Perspective.
- Pye, L. (2000). Asian values: From dynamos to dominoes. *Culture Matters: How Values Shape Human Progress*, 244–255.
- Pye, L. W., & Verba, S. (2015). *Political culture and political development*. Princeton University Press.
- Qi, X. (2013). Guanxi, social capital theory and beyond: Toward a globalized social science. *The British Journal of Sociology*, 64(2), 308–324.
- Quintelier, E. (2013). Socialization or self-selection? Membership in deliberative associations and political attitudes. *Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly*, 42(1), pp.174-192.
- Quintelier, E., & Hooghe, M. (2012). Political attitudes and political participation: A panel study on socialization and self-selection effects among late adolescents. *International Political Science Review*, 33(1), 63-81.
- Rasbash, J. (2007). What are multilevel models and why should I use them. Retrieved July, 14, 2007.
- Raudenbush, S. W., & Bryk, A. S. (2002). *Hierarchical linear models: Applications and data analysis methods* (Vol. 1). sage.
- Realo, A., Allik, J., & Greenfield, B. (2008). Radius of trust: Social capital in relation to familism and institutional collectivism. *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology*, 39(4), 447–462.
- Richey, S. (2013). *The Social Basis of the Rational Citizen: How Political Communication in Social Networks Improves Civic Competence*. Lexington Books.
- Ringmar, E. (2005). *Surviving capitalism: How we learned to live with the market and remained almost human*. Anthem Press.
- Rodan, G. (1997). Civil society and other political possibilities in Southeast Asia. *Journal of Contemporary Asia*, 27(2), 156–178.
- Rorty, R. (1991). The priority of democracy to philosophy. *Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth: Philosophical Papers, 1*, 175–196.
- Rosamond, B. (1997). Political culture. *Politics: an introduction*, pp.77-105.
- Rothstein, B., & Stolle, D. (2008). The state and social capital: An institutional theory of generalized trust. *Comparative politics*, 40(4), 441-459.
- Rotter, J. B. (1971). Generalized expectancies for interpersonal trust. *American psychologist*, 26(5), 443.
- Rungule, R., & Senkāne, S. (2018). Values of Latvians across socio-demographic groups.

- Pluralism Anxiety. Acting Socially in Latvia*, 91–104.
- Said, E. (1978). *Orientalism: Western representations of the Orient*. New York: Pantheon.
- Salamon, L. M., & Sokolowski, S. W. (2004). Measuring Civil Society: the Johns Hopkins Global Civil Society Index'. *Global Civil Society: Dimensions of the Nonprofit Sector*, 2, 61–92.
- Sandel, M. (2005). Liberalism and the Limits of Justice. In *Debates in Contemporary Political Philosophy* (pp. 150–169). Routledge.
- Sandel, M. J. (1998). *Democracy's discontent: America in search of a public philosophy*. Harvard university press.
- Saris, W. E., & Gallhofer, I. (2007). Estimation of the effects of measurement characteristics on the quality of survey questions. *Survey Research Methods*, 1(1), 29–43.
- Schafer, J. L. (1999). Multiple imputation: a primer. *Statistical Methods in Medical Research*, 8(1), 3–15.
- Schmid, K., Ramiah, A. Al, & Hewstone, M. (2014). Neighborhood ethnic diversity and trust: The role of intergroup contact and perceived threat. *Psychological Science*, 25(3), 665–674.
- Schwartz, S. H. (2009). *Causes of culture: National differences in cultural embeddedness*.
- Seldadyo, H., & de Haan, J. (2006). The determinants of corruption: A literature survey and new evidence. *EPCS Conference, Turku, Finland*, 20–23.
- Sen, A. (1997). Human rights and Asian values. *New Republic*, 217(2–3), 33–40. Sen, A. (2004). How does culture matter. *Culture and Public Action*, 38.
- Sen, P. (2014). Do Asian values still exist? Revisiting the roots in search of a plausible future. *South Asian Survey*, 21(1–2), 51–63.
- Sengewald, M.A. and Pohl, S., (2019). Compensation and amplification of attenuation bias in causal effect estimates. *psychometrika*, 84(2), pp.589-610.
- Shah, D. V. (1998). Civic engagement, interpersonal trust, and television use: An individual-level assessment of social capital. *Political Psychology*, 19(3), 469-496.
- Shin, D. C. (2013). Confucianism and Democratization in East Asia: Reassessing the Asian Values Debate. *Symposium on Confucianism, Democracy, and Constitutionalism, National Taiwan University, Taipei, June*, 14–15.
- Shin, D. C. (2017). The Asian values debate: A reassessment from the perspective of democratization. *Routledge Handbook of Democratization in East Asia*, 327–342.
- Shin, D. C., & Sin, T. (2012). *Confucianism and democratization in East Asia*. Cambridge University Press.
- Shweder, R. A. (1998). *Welcome to middle age!:(And other cultural fictions)*. University of

- Chicago Press.
- Sin, T., & Dalton, R. J. (2006). *Citizens, Democracy, and Markets Around the Pacific Rim: Congruence Theory and Political Culture*. Oxford University Press.
- Skocpol, T. (2003). *Diminished democracy: From membership to management in American civic life* (Vol. 8). University of Oklahoma press.
- Sønderskov, K. M. (2010). Does generalized social trust lead to associational membership? Unravelling a bowl of well-tossed spaghetti. *European Sociological Review*, 27(4), 419-434.
- Soroka, S., Helliwell, J.F. and Johnston, R. (2003). Measuring and modelling trust. *Diversity, social capital and the welfare state*, pp.279-303.
- Steele, F. (2008). *Introduction to multilevel modelling*.
- Steenbergen, M. R., & Jones, B. S. (2002). Modeling multilevel data structures. *American Journal of Political Science*, 218–237.
- Stoeckel, F. and Ceka, B. (2022). Political tolerance in Europe: The role of conspiratorial thinking and cosmopolitanism. *European journal of political research*.
- Stolle, D. (1998). Bowling together, bowling alone: The development of generalized trust in voluntary associations. *Political psychology*, 497-525.
- Stolle, D., & Rochon, T. R. (2001). Are all associations alike. *Beyond Tocqueville: Civil Society and the Social Capital Debate in Comparative Perspective*, 143–156.
- Sturgis, P., Patulny, R., Allum, N., & Buscha, F. (2012). *Social connectedness and generalized trust: a longitudinal perspective* (Vol. 19).
- Subramaniam, S. (2000). The Asian values debate: Implications for the spread of liberal democracy. *Asian Affairs: An American Review*, 27(1), 19–35.
- Svendsen, G. T. (2003). *Social capital, corruption and economic growth: Eastern and Western Europe*. Department of Economics, Aarhus School of Business.
- Tabachnick, B. G., Fidell, L. S., & Ullman, J. B. (2007). *Using multivariate statistics* (Vol. 5). Pearson Boston, MA.
- Taber, K. S. (2018). The use of Cronbach's alpha when developing and reporting research instruments in science education. *Research in Science Education*, 48(6), 1273–1296.
- Teik, K. B. (2003). *Beyond Mahathir: Malaysian politics and its discontents*. Zed Books.
- Teng-Hui, L. (1999). Confucian democracy: Modernization, culture, and the state in East Asia. *Harvard International Review*, 16–18.
- Theiss-Morse, E., & Hibbing, J. R. (2005). Citizenship and civic engagement. *Annu. Rev. Polit. Sci.*, 8, 227–249.

- Thompson, M. R. (2000). The survival of “Asian values” as “Zivilisationskritik.” *Theory and Society*, 29(5), 651–686.
- Thompson, M. R. (2015). Democracy with Asian characteristics. *The Journal of Asian Studies*, 74(4), 875-887.
- Thompson, M. R. (2019). Singapore and the Lineages of Authoritarian Modernity in East Asia. In *The Limits of Authoritarian Governance in Singapore’s Developmental State* (pp. 29–48). Springer.
- Tong, G. C. (1994). Social values, Singapore style. *Current History*, 93(587), 417.
- Tonnies, F. (2002). *Community and society*. Courier Corporation.
- Treisman, D. (2007). What have we learned about the causes of corruption from ten years of cross-national empirical research?. *Annu. Rev. Polit. Sci.*, 10, pp.211-244.
- Tremain, S. (2005). *Foucault, governmentality, and critical disability theory: An introduction*.
- Triandis, H.C. (2004). Dimensions of culture beyond Hofstede. In *Comparing Cultures* (pp. 28-42). Brill.
- Tripathy, J. P. (2013). Secondary data analysis: Ethical issues and challenges. *Iranian Journal of Public Health*, 42(12), 1478.
- Tu, W. (1985). *Confucian thought: Selfhood as creative transformation*. SUNY press.
- Tu, W. (1991). *The Triadic Chord: Confucian Ethics, Industrial East Asia, and Max Weber: Proceedings of the 1987 Singapore Conference on Confucian Ethics and the Modernisation of Industrial East Asia*.
- Tu, W. (2014). Multiple modernities: A preliminary inquiry into the implications of the East Asian modernity. In *Globalistics and Globalization Studies: Aspects & Dimensions of Global Views/Edited by Leonid E. Grinin, Ilya V. Ilyin, and Andrey V. Korotayev* (pp. 104–111).
- Tu, W., & Du, W. (1996). *Confucian traditions in East Asian modernity: Moral education and economic culture in Japan and the four mini-dragons*. Harvard University Press.
- Tukey, J. W. (1977). *Exploratory data analysis* (Vol. 2). Reading, MA.
- Twigg, J. L. (2016). Social capital in Russia’s regions. In *Social capital and social cohesion in post-Soviet Russia* (pp. 184–204). Routledge.
- UNDP. (2020). *No time for complacency on the road to gender equality*.
- Uslaner, E. M. (2002). *The moral foundations of trust*. Cambridge University Press.
- Uslaner, E.M. (2012). Trust, diversity, and segregation in the United States and the United Kingdom. In *Trust* (pp. 69-97). Brill.
- Van der Meer, T. (2016). Neither bridging nor bonding: A test of socialization effects by ethnically diverse voluntary associations on participants’ inter-ethnic tolerance, inter-

- ethnic trust and intra-ethnic belonging. *Social Science Research*, 55, 63–74.
- Van der Meer, T. W. G., & Van Ingen, E. J. (2009). Schools of democracy? Disentangling the relationship between civic participation and political action in 17 European countries. *European Journal of Political Research*, 48(2), 281–308.
- Van Deth, J. W., Montero, J. R., & Westholm, A. (Eds.). (2007). *Citizenship and involvement in European democracies: A comparative analysis* (Vol. 17). Routledge.
- Van Deth, J. W., & Zmerli, S. (2010). *Introduction: Civicness, equality, and democracy—A “dark side” of social capital?* Sage Publications Sage CA: Los Angeles, CA.
- Van Hoorn, A. (2015). Individualist–collectivist culture and trust radius: A multilevel approach. *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology*, 46(2), 269–276.
- Van Ingen, E., & Bekkers, R. (2015). Generalized trust through civic engagement? Evidence from five national panel studies. *Political Psychology*, 36(3), 277–294.
- Van Rooy, A., & Robinson, M. (2020). Out of the ivory tower: civil society and the aid system. In *Civil society and the aid industry* (pp. 31–70). Routledge.
- Varese, F. (2020). How mafias migrate: transplantation, functional diversification, and separation. *Crime and Justice*, 49(1), 289–337.
- Vassallo, F. (2004). Political activism and association involvement: The French choice in comparative perspective. *French Politics*, 2(3), 298–332.
- Verba, S., & Almond, G. (1963). The civic culture. *Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations*.
- Verba, S., & Nie, N. H. (1987). *Participation in America: Political democracy and social equality*. University of Chicago Press.
- Verba, S., Nie, N. H., & Kim, J. (1978). *Participation and political equality: A seven-nation comparison*. Cambridge university press.
- Verba, S., Schlozman, K. L., & Brady, H. E. (1995). *Voice and equality: Civic voluntarism in American politics*. Harvard University Press.
- Vinken, H. (2006). *East Asian Values Surveys: making a case for East Asian-origin values survey concepts*.
- Von Hippel, P. T. (2004). Biases in SPSS 12.0 missing value analysis. *The American Statistician*, 58(2), 160–164.
- Wakeman Jr, F. (1993). The civil society and public sphere debate: Western reflections on Chinese political culture. *Modern China*, 19(2), 108–138.
- Wang, R., Hempton, B., Dugan, J. P., & Komives, S. R. (2008). Cultural differences: Why do Asians avoid extreme responses? *Survey Practice*, 1(3), 2913.
- Warren, M. E. (2001). *Democracy and association*. Princeton University Press.
- Waverijn, G., Heijmans, M., & Groenewegen, P. P. (2017). Neighbourly support of people with

- chronic illness; is it related to neighbourhood social capital?. *Social Science & Medicine*, 173, 110-117.
- Weber, M., & Gerth, H. H. (1953). The Religion of China, Confucianism and Taoism. *Philosophy*, 28(105).
- Wei-Ming, T. (2002). Confucianism and liberalism. *Dao*, 2(1), 1–20.
- Weller, R. P. (2018). *Alternate civilities: Democracy and culture in China and Taiwan*. Routledge.
- Welzel, C. (2011). The Asian values thesis revisited: Evidence from the world values surveys. *Japanese Journal of Political Science*, 12(1), 1–31.
- Welzel, C. (2012). The myth of Asian exceptionalism: Response to Bomhoff and Gu. *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology*, 43(7), 1039–1054.
- Welzel, C. (2013). *Freedom rising*. Cambridge University Press.
- Welzel, C., & Dalton, R. (2017). Cultural change in Asia and beyond: From allegiant to assertive citizens. *Asian Journal of Comparative Politics*, 2(2), 112–132.
- Welzel, C., & Inglehart, R. (2009). Political culture, mass beliefs, and value change. *Democratization*, 126–144.
- Wessels, B. (2018). *Communicative civic-ness: Social media and political culture*. Routledge.
- Western, B. (1998). Causal heterogeneity in comparative research: A Bayesian hierarchical modelling approach. *American Journal of Political Science*, 42(4), 1233–1259.
- Williams, B., Onsmann, A., & Brown, T. (2010). Exploratory factor analysis: A five-step guide for novices. *Australasian Journal of Paramedicine*, 8(3).
- Wollebaek, D., & Selle, P. (2002). Does participation in voluntary associations contribute to social capital? The impact of intensity, scope, and type. *Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly*, 31(1), 32–61.
- Wollebaek, D., & Strømsnes, K. (2008). Voluntary associations, trust, and civic engagement: A multilevel approach. *Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly*, 37(2), 249–263.
- Woolcock, M. (2010). The rise and routinization of social capital, 1988–2008. *Annual review of political science*, 13, 469-487.
- Wright, S.C., Aron, A., McLaughlin-Volpe, T. and Ropp, S.A. (1997). The extended contact effect: Knowledge of cross-group friendships and prejudice. *Journal of Personality and Social psychology*, 73(1), p.73.
- Xu, K. (2006). Early Confucian principles: The potential theoretic foundation of democracy in modern China. *Asian Philosophy*, 16(2), 135–148.

- Yang, F. (2018). Religion in the global east: Challenges and opportunities for the social scientific study of religion. *Religions*, 9(10), p.305.
- Yao, X. (1999). Confucianism and its modern values: Confucian moral, educational and spiritual heritages revisited. *Journal of Beliefs and Values*, 20(1), 30–40.
- Yilmaz, K. (2013). Comparison of quantitative and qualitative research traditions: Epistemological, theoretical, and methodological differences. *European Journal of Education*, 48(2), 311–325.
- Yoon, K.-I. (2017). The Individual-level Implications of Social Capital for Democracy in East Asia. *JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AND AREA STUDIES*.
<https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cemconcomp.2011.03.014>
- Yuezhi, X. (2012). George Washington's image in China and its impact on the 1911 Revolution. *Journal of Modern Chinese History*, 6(1), 45–63.
- Yung, B. (2010). Can Confucianism add value to democracy education? *Procedia-Social and Behavioral Sciences*, 2(2), 1919–1926.
- Zakaria, F. (1994). Culture is destiny: A conversation with Lee Kuan Yew. *Foreign Affairs*, 109–126.
- Zhai, Y. (2017). Do Confucian values deter Chinese citizens' support for democracy? *Politics and Religion*, 10(2), 261–285.
- Zhu, Y., & Fu, Q. (2017). Deciphering the civic virtue of communal space: Neighborhood attachment, social capital, and neighborhood participation in urban China. *Environment and Behavior*, 49(2), 161–191.
- Zucker, L.G. (1986). Production of trust: Institutional sources of economic structure, 1840–1920. *Research in organizational behavior*.