

CROSSING BORDERS

*Liber Amicorum for
Professor A. Geske Dijkstra*

EDITED BY MARKUS HAVERLAND, WIL HOUT
AND MICHAL ONDERCO

Colophon

This collection was prepared for the occasion of the valedictory lecture of prof.dr. A. Geske Dijkstra on 29 March 2023 as a Professor of Governance and Global Development at the Erasmus University Rotterdam

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Table of contents

	Preface	1
1	Hoe sterk is de eenzame fietser? Kees van Paridon	3
Gender		
2	Vrouwen en economie: Een ongemakkelijke relatie Janneke Plantenga	15
3	Notes on Geske Dijkstra's Contributions to Feminist Economics: The Discipline and the Journal Elissa Braunstein	23
4	When It Comes to Nuclear Weapons, Women "Don't Know" a Lot: Why It is a Problem? Michal Onderco	27
Development economics		
5	The Unruly Nature of Development Aid: Reflections on the Work of Geske Dijkstra Menno Fenger	43
6	De analyse van economische systemen: Geschiedenis en actualiteit Hans-Jürgen Wagener	49
7	Giving Money Can Be Surprisingly Effective: Lessons From Budget Support and Cash Transfers Ruerd Ruben	59
8	The Case for Debt Relief Twenty Years Later Niels Hermes	71
9	Financing Sustainable Development: Shall We Throw More Money at the Problem or Start with Doing Better With Existing Resources? Rob Vos	83
10	Revisiting the Poverty Reduction Strategy of Honduras Niek de Jong	97
Governance		
11	Does Foreign Aid Influence Policy? Howard White & Amirah El-Haddad	111
12	Political Conditionality of European Union Policies: Relaxing Abroad, Tightening at Home? Markus Haverland	117
13	Strengthening Police Accountability in Uganda Wil Hout	123
Colleague, friend, lecturer		
14	Friendship in Revolutionary Nicaragua: A Personal Reflection Millie Thayer	137

15	Gerespecteerd als wetenschapper, geliefd om haar vriendelijkheid	143
	Nadia Molenaers	
16	Developing Students: A Legacy of Teaching Global Development	145
	Pieter Tuytens	
17	Geduld, kennis en enthousiasme	149
	André Loozekoot	
18	Are All Full Professors as Professional, Helpful and Dedicated as Geske Dijkstra?	153
	Mario Villalba Ferrera	
	Contributors	157
	Geske in pictures	159
	Bibliography of A. Geske Dijkstra	163

PREFACE

**MARKUS HAVERLAND, WIL HOUT AND MICHAL
ONDERCO**

Geske Dijkstra has had a profound impact in many areas. She has shaped how scholars and policy makers think about aid effectiveness, gender equality and democratic governance. In all these fields, Dijkstra's work has been marked by empirical rigour, theoretical sophistication, and close connection between scholarship and practice.

To honor of Geske Dijkstra's many scholarly contributions, we asked her past and current colleagues, co-authors, and students to reflect on her contributions to scholarship, the intersection of Geske's scholarship with their own work, and her role as a colleague, mentor and a role model. The enthusiastic response, reflected in the large number of contributions to this volume, demonstrates Geske Dijkstra's standing in academia, as a respected scholar and a well-liked colleague. The contributions that we received focus on Geske's scholarly contributions and her role model position in and outside academia.

The contributors who chose to focus on Geske's scholarly work highlight her contributions in the fields of gender, development economics and governance – three areas where Geske had the largest scholarly impact. Geske's scholarly engagement demonstrates that her work remains very relevant. Her work informs discussions about the most topical discussions today – from the role of women in academia to financing sustainable development and the allocation of aid in the European Union. Geske Dijkstra's publications provide useful lenses for scholars who seek to engage with new topics.

At the same time, contributions also make clear that Geske Dijkstra served as a role model for many in academia and left a profound mark on people's lives both as a colleague and teacher. Her long teaching career has been marked by the

commitment to student success as well as to academic excellence. Throughout her career, Geske has helped young scholars find secure footing in the academic world. Contributions to this book are a testimony to her commitment.

Papers submitted for this *liber amicorum* have all been prepared by authors exclusively for this volume. We owe a great deal of gratitude to them. We thank the Department of Public Administration and Sociology at Erasmus University Rotterdam for the financial contribution towards the printing of this book. We also thank Rogier Bakker for technical assistance, and Ashmi Krishnan and Katie Senneville for careful language editing.

Markus Haverland, Wil Hout, and Michal Onderco
Rotterdam, March 2023

1

HOE STERK IS DE EENZAME FIETSER?

KEES VAN PARIDON

‘Tegen de wind in fietsen’ is in Nederland geen onbekend verschijnsel. Het waait altijd, zo lijkt het, en er zijn heel veel fietsen. Buitenlanders valt daarnaast het bestaan van aparte fietspaden en fietsstroken op. Waarschijnlijk zullen de Nederlanders vooral de wind benadrukken. Het waait hier bijna altijd, en, zo denken heel veel Nederlanders, je hebt bijna altijd de wind tegen. Die uitdrukking, ‘Tegen de wind in fietsen’, staat ook voor een mentaliteit. Het leven gaat niet altijd over rozen, en om iets te bereiken moet je offers brengen, inspanningen plegen, zeker als je vanuit een lastige startsituatie moet beginnen. Natuurlijk moet je ook geluk hebben, maar zonder inzet, zonder doorzettingsvermogen red je het meestal niet. Geske Dijkstra behoort duidelijk tot de groep die het succes niet kwam toewaaïen, maar wel in staat was om met succes de eindstreep te halen.

Omdat Geske en ik geregeld hetzelfde traject fietsten, van Centraal Station Rotterdam naar het complex Woudestein van de Erasmus Universiteit of vice versa, en ik redelijk doorfietste, viel het me op dat Geske mij wel heel vaak inhaalde en dan haar tempo moest inhouden om verder met mij op te rijden. Ik zag daarin de drive terug die ze op vele andere fronten toonde, in de wetenschap maar zeker ook daar buiten. Juist haar mentaliteit zorgde ervoor dat Geske meermalen Nederlands tenniskampioen bij de senioren werd. Daarvoor was training en inzet nodig, en Geske was in staat die op te brengen. Ik sluit niet uit dat ze ook bij andere sporten bovengemiddeld presteerde.

Voor mij typeert dat beeld Geske Dijkstra, in meerdere opzichten. Geske kwam uit een niet-academisch milieu, ze beschikte niet over alle zeven vinkjes, een snel gangbaar geworden uitdrukking hier. Door hard en doelgericht te werken heeft Geske op vele fronten opmerkelijke prestaties geleverd. Tegelijk heeft ze, samen met Tom, hun dochters Susanne en Wieteke een betrokken opvoeding kunnen geven. Diezelfde mentaliteit heeft haar op zware momenten, toen ze door een

ernstige ziekte getroffen werd, geholpen om de gevolgen van die ziekte en van de daarop volgende behandeling zo goed mogelijk te verwerken en weer aan de slag te gaan.

Doortastend en betrokken, maar ook eigenzinnig, dat zijn ook kenmerken van de wetenschappelijke loopbaan van Geske Dijkstra. Dat spreekt al uit de keuze om twee studies tegelijk te doen, namelijk economie en sociologie, in Groningen. Dat waren en zijn niet alleen twee onderscheiden disciplines. Ook de onderzoeksthema's lopen duidelijk uiteen, en ook het soort studenten dat voor één van deze disciplines kiest verschilt nogal. Ik doe de waarheid geen geweld aan als ik stel dat de maatschappelijke oriëntatie van sociologiestudenten veelal groter is dan die van economiestudenten. Dat gold zeker voor de jaren waarin Geske Dijkstra aanving met haar studie. Zeker, ook bij economen was er aandacht voor thema's als inkomensverdeling en ontwikkelingssamenwerking, maar de invulling van die thema's was relatief sterk beleidsgericht. Bij sociologie was er juist meer aandacht voor de maatschappelijke inbedding en gevolgen. Door beide studies te volgen, was voor Geske Dijkstra de verbinding tussen beide disciplines gemakkelijker te leggen. En dat weerspiegelde zich in de thema's waar ze zich vervolgens mee heeft beziggehouden.

Die doortastendheid, betrokkenheid en eigenzinnigheid laat zich ook aflezen aan haar grote aantal publicaties. Geske Dijkstra heeft een haast onafzienbaar aantal (ook geredigeerde) boeken, artikelen, papers en presentaties geproduceerd. Daarbij moet worden opgemerkt dat Geske Dijkstra vele jaren twee posities vervulde. Ze was verbonden aan de Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam, eerst als UHD, later als bijzonder hoogleraar en vervolgens gewoon hoogleraar bij de opleiding bestuurskunde (later bestuurskunde en sociologie). Tegelijkertijd heeft ze lange tijd twee dagen per week voor eigen risico onderzoek gedaan, vooral op het terrein van ontwikkelingssamenwerking. Dat bracht vaak ook (lange) reizen met zich, voor veldonderzoek, netwerkopbouw en ook voor presentaties. De orderportefeuille van Geske Dijkstra was eerder te vol dan te leeg: haar onderzoek was veelgevraagd, hetgeen een indicatie is dat de opdrachtgevers de kwaliteit waardeerden. Geske Dijkstra heeft zich in de loop der tijd ontwikkeld tot een nationaal en internationaal gerespecteerd en gewaardeerd expert op het terrein van ontwikkelings-samenwerking. Daarbij heeft zij altijd veel samengewerkt, binnen en buiten de universiteit, met collega's in binnen- en buitenland.

Geske Dijkstra heeft vanaf het begin veel aandacht gegeven aan de thema's genderproblematiek en aan ontwikkelingssamenwerking, inclusief de *governance* van dit beleid op nationaal en internationaal niveau. Opvallend is dat deze thema's,

zeker de genderproblematiek, veertig jaar geleden, bij het begin van haar wetenschappelijke loopbaan, niet echt *en vogue* waren, zeker niet onder economen. De afgelopen jaren is de aandacht hiervoor duidelijk toegenomen. Geske Dijkstra was daarmee niet alleen haar tijd vooruit, ze heeft ook belangrijke bijdragen geleverd.

Genderproblematiek

Allereerst besteed ik aandacht aan de genderproblematiek. Veertig jaar geleden was *female economics*, of breder genderproblematiek, zeker in de economische wetenschappen een non-issue. In de economische theorie werd geen onderscheid gemaakt tussen mannen en vrouwen. Natuurlijk was bekend dat de arbeidsdeelname van vrouwen tussen Westerse landen sterk verschilde, en dat in de minder ontwikkelde landen vrouwen juist vaak een vooraanstaander plaats innamen. Het was al opmerkelijk dat sommigen in de jaren zeventig betoogden dat de economische waarde van huishoudelijke arbeid ook in het BNP meegenomen zou moeten worden. Nog duidelijker waren de verschillen in de economische wetenschap zelf. Of het nu ging om het aandeel vrouwen onder de studenten, binnen de wetenschappelijke staf of onder hoogleraren, of onder vrouwelijke auteurs van wetenschappelijke artikelen, was er altijd een duidelijke ondervertegenwoordiging.

Uit mijn studietijd kan ik eigenlijk alleen de naam van Joan Robinson als vooraanstaand econoom herinneren. Opgeleid in Cambridge, behoorde ze al snel tot de inner *circle* van de 'Cambridge School'. In die jaren werkte Keynes aan *Treatise on Money* en later de *General Theory*. De economen van de 'Cambridge School' vormden voor Keynes een klankbord. Joan Robinson droeg vooral bij aan de discussie over de werkgelegenheidsaspecten. Ze is daarnaast bekend geworden door haar bijdragen aan de mededingingstheorie. Later heeft ze de langetermijnaspecten van de Keynesiaanse theorie verder uitgewerkt. Zij had zeker aanzien in de economische wetenschap, maar zij manifesteerde zich vooral als Keynesiaanse econoom, niet als pleitbezorger van de positie van vrouwen in de economische wetenschap.

Nu, veertig jaar later, is de genderproblematiek dramatisch veranderd. Er zijn veel meer vrouwelijke studenten, en ook binnen de wetenschappelijke staf en onder professoren is het aantal vrouwen sterk toegenomen. Zeker, er is nog steeds geen evenredig aandeel, maar de ontwikkelingen in de afgelopen jaren wettigen de indruk dat het aandeel verder in de goede richting zal veranderen. Die ontwikkeling is langzamer gegaan dan verwacht, en is vaak ook met meer strijd gepaard gegaan. Waar velen, ook ondergetekende, verwachtten dat de groeiende instroom van

vrouwen op termijn vanzelfsprekend ook tot meer UHD's en hoogleraarposities zou leiden, bleek op enig moment toch dat extra maatregelen, zoals quotaregelingen en extra fondsen, nodig waren om de instroom op die hogere niveaus daadwerkelijk te vergroten. Werd in eerste instantie niet zelden de veronderstelde schroom van vrouwen als oorzaak van de ondervertegenwoordiging genoemd, zeker in relatie tot de harde cultuur onder economen, later is het perspectief verbreed naar de rol van 'mannen-kartels' in de wetenschap, met de bijbehorende dominantie van een sterk competitieve werkomgeving. Deze factoren zijn veel moeilijker aan te pakken, maar toch lijkt ook hier een duidelijke verandering op te treden. De uitreiking van de Nobelprijs voor de economie aan Elinor Ostrom in 2009, en 10 jaar later aan Esther Duflo, laat zien dat ook op dat niveau vrouwen de top hebben weten te bereiken. In de beleids sfeer kunnen Kristina Georgieva en Gita Gopinath genoemd worden, met belangrijke posities in het IMF, Jane Yellen als voormalig president van de Federal Reserve Bank en de huidige minister van Financiën van de VS, en Christine Lagarde als president van de ECB. Ook in Nederland worden op dat niveau langzaam de bakens verzet, zie bijvoorbeeld Laura van Geest als directeur van het CPB of Angeliën Kemna, lange tijd verantwoordelijk voor de beleggingsportefeuille van ABP.

Die toegenomen instroom in de wetenschap heeft ook geleid tot een zekere accentverschuiving in de onderzoeksthema's, met meer aandacht voor thema's als arbeid, gezondheidszorg, onderwijs, geluk, discriminatie, gender en ontwikkelingseconomie, en daarbinnen speciale aandacht voor de positie van vrouwen. Natuurlijk heeft de sterk gestegen deelname van vrouwen aan het economisch verkeer daar ook aan bijgedragen.

Ontwikkelingseconomie

Toen Geske Dijkstra aan het begin van de jaren tachtig afstudeerde, verkeerde de wereldeconomie in een heftige economische crisis. Stagnerende groei, oplopende werkloosheid, aanzienlijke begrotingstekorten en een bovenmatige inflatie maakten duidelijk dat de langdurige naoorlogse herstelfase ten einde was gekomen. Dat gold met name de meer ontwikkelde Westerse landen. Die landen hadden een aanzienlijke inkomensgroei doorgemaakt. Die welvaartsgroei bereikte met vertraging ook tal van opkomende Oost-Aziatische economieën. Landen als Japan, Zuid-Korea en Taiwan, gestart vanaf een zeer laag inkomensniveau, slaagden er vanaf de jaren zestig in hun producten in toenemende mate af te zetten op de wereldmarkt. Dankzij hun lage arbeidskosten konden zij zich concurrerend manifesteren. In de daarop volgende jaren slaagden ze erin om op steeds nieuwe markten een plek te veroveren.

Voor andere minder ontwikkelde landen ontbrak op dat moment dat ontwikkelingsperspectief nog. Sommige bleken te beschikken over waardevolle grondstoffen, met name aardolie, die zij tegen goed geld op de wereldmarkt konden verkopen. Maar in veel landen was de industrie, de andere exportoptie, vaak niet of nauwelijks ontwikkeld. Daarnaast worstelden veel landen met de naweeën van hun koloniale status. Belangrijke vragen waren hoe men de nationale economie tot ontwikkeling kon brengen en hoe men inkomensgroei kon verwezenlijken voor de burgers. Moest men de markten openen, zoals landen in Oost-Azië gedaan hadden, of moest men zich juist afsluiten van invloeden van buiten? Die laatste optie was politiek gezien voor tal van landen aantrekkelijk. Als kolonie waren vele landen jarenlang uitgebuit, vooral ook door Westerse bedrijven. Daar moest een eind aan komen, en in dat perspectief lag een beleid van zelfvoorziening voor de hand. Een inspirerend voorbeeld was de Sovjet-Unie in de jaren twintig, met haar Nieuw Economisch Programma. Ook Nicaragua moest haar economisch beleid opnieuw bepalen, toen de Sandinistas in 1979 het corrupte regime van de Somoza-familie omver wierpen.

Geske Dijkstra koos het vraagstuk van de ontwikkelingsstrategie die Nicaragua moest volgen, voor haar PhD-onderzoek, waarbij ze gebruik maakte van de comparative systems approach.¹ Geske's onderzoek was mede gebaseerd op uitgebreid veldonderzoek in Nicaragua zelf, met interviews met politici en ondernemers. Haar conclusie was dat een gemengde economie in Nicaragua alleen kans van slagen had – dat wil zeggen dat deze tot stabiele economische ontwikkeling zou leiden – als aan vijf voorwaarden was voldaan: 1) een duidelijke ideologie betreffende de gemengde economie, 2) een passend accumulatiebeleid, met voldoende investeringen in de staatsbedrijven én in de particuliere sector, 3) een doeltreffend prijsbeleid, 4) de bereidheid van ondernemers om in een gemengde economie te blijven produceren, en 5) externe factoren (in dit geval vooral de houding van de VS). Geske Dijkstra concludeerde dat aan de eerste en vijfde voorwaarde voldaan werd, maar dat over de andere drie voorwaarden twijfel gerechtvaardigd was. Dat lag deels aan de aanwezigheid van veel kleine bedrijven in sectoren als de landbouw, maar ook aan de neiging om over te gaan tot te grootschalige investeringen en de soms te restrictieve houding ten opzichte van exporten. Geske Dijkstra benadrukte de betekenis van vrije prijsvorming, maar stelde dat die zich moeilijk verhoudt tot het streven naar inkomensgroei voor de

1 G. Dijkstra (1992), *Industrialization in Sandinista Nicaragua. Policy and Practice in a Mixed Economy*, Westview Press, Boulder. Het proefschrift zelf werd in 1988 verdedigd.

inwoners en tot de ruimte die centrale planning toestaat. Haar conclusie luidde dan ook dat handhaving van een gemengde economische orde grenzen stelde aan de industrialisatiestrategie.

De hier beschreven onderzoeksbenadering, die niet alleen data en onderzoek van buiten in de beschouwing betreft, maar ook veldwerk omvat, inclusief gesprekken met betrokkenen, is kenmerkend voor veel latere onderzoeksprojecten van Geske Dijkstra geweest. In haar onderzoek combineerde zij theoretische inzichten en ervaringen van elders met de feitelijke praktijk in het land op basis van onderzoek ter plekke.

In een latere fase van haar wetenschappelijke loopbaan heeft Geske Dijkstra het vizier meer op de evaluatie van het ontwikkelingsbeleid van Westerse landen gericht. Haar review artikel over begrotingssteun, armoede en corruptie² kan nog als een soort tussenstation beschouwd worden, relevant voor zowel donorlanden als ontvangende landen. Andere projecten en artikelen richtten zich op de vraag of de steun die vanuit bijvoorbeeld een land als Nederland gegeven werd, adequaat en doeltreffend is geweest. In een recent ESB artikel,³ dat Geske Dijkstra schreef met veel auteurs werkzaam op het terrein van ontwikkelingssamenwerking, wordt geconcludeerd dat een effectief ontwikkelingsbeleid een cultuur van leren en betere evaluaties impliceert, een cultuur die volgens de auteurs van dat artikel momenteel nog niet in voldoende mate aanwezig is bij het Nederlandse ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken.

Kijken we naar de feitelijke ontwikkeling van de ontwikkelingslanden, dan zien we dat in vele landen in Azië en deels ook in Afrika de economische groei en daarmee de inkomensverbetering vanaf de jaren tachtig succesvol is geweest. Ruwweg 60 procent van de wereldbevolking, vooral in de rond 1990 minder ontwikkelde landen, heeft in twintig jaar tijd tenminste een 50 procent reële inkomensverbetering meegemaakt. Tegelijk lijkt de inkomensachterstand op de inwoners van de meer ontwikkelde landen iets afgenomen te zijn. Die inkomensgroei betreft vooral de inwoners van landen die gekozen hebben voor 'export-led growth'. Door producten tegen concurrerende condities op de wereldmarkt aan te bieden, werd inkomen gegenereerd om nieuwe investeringen te realiseren, in infrastructuur, onderwijs, gezondheidszorg, terwijl tevens particuliere

² Zie G. Dijkstra (2018), Budget support, poverty and corruption: A review of the evidence, EBA rapport 2018-04.

³ Zie M. Treurniet e.a. (2021), Effectief ontwikkelingsbeleid vergt cultuur van leren en betere evaluaties, *ESB*, vol. 106, nummer 4801, blz. 436-439.

investeringen werden gedaan in bestaande en nieuwe sectoren. De groei werd ook mogelijk gemaakt door een groot arbeidsaanbod, vooral van mensen die hun baan verloren in de laagproductieve agrarische sector. Dat heeft tot een duidelijke reële inkomensgroei in veel landen met een lager ontwikkelingsniveau geleid.

Tegelijk zijn er ook landen die een dergelijke positieve ontwikkeling niet hebben doorgemaakt. Daarbij gaat het vaak om landen met een relatief laag inkomensniveau, die zich vooralsnog, vooral om ideologische redenen, afzijdig hebben gehouden van de wereldmarkt. In de ontwikkelde landen werd de groei gecontinueerd, maar vlakke deze wel af. De sterke ontwikkeling in de minder ontwikkelde landen, met hun groeiend aandeel op allerlei productmarkten, zorgde ervoor dat mensen in de meer ontwikkelde landen in vooral gestandaardiseerde banen, in de industrie en meer recent ook in de dienstensector, hun arbeidspositie ondergraven zagen worden. Bedrijven van hier investeerden in toenemende mate daar, om zo te profiteren van de relatief lage loonkosten. Tegelijk zorgde de instroom van vooral lager geschoolde immigranten ook voor meer concurrentie binnen hun arbeidsmarktsegment hier, vooral in sectoren met veel gestandaardiseerde arbeid. Bedrijven die bleven, verhoogden de eisen aan nieuwe werknemers. Het aantal banen stond onder druk, de loonontwikkeling werd evenzeer afgeremd, en ook de arbeidsvoorwaarden kalfden af.

Toenemende wederzijde afhankelijkheid en politisering van de wereldeconomie

De bovenstaande beschrijving stoelt in belangrijke mate op de idee dat ieder land in zekere mate zijn eigen economische koers kan uitzetten. Natuurlijk, invloeden van buiten waren er ook vroeger al, van het instellen van mondiale spelregels door het IMF en de WTO tot directe investeringen en de rol van multinationale ondernemingen. Ook de invloed van de wereldconjunctuur moet niet onderschat worden. Maar duidelijk is dat de groeiende populariteit van het begrip globalisering niet zonder reden was.

Productie hier en elders, afzet daar en hier, creëert internationale handel, transport, geldstromen, inkomensgroei en werkgelegenheid, maar leidt ook tot afhankelijkheden. Dat kwam duidelijk naar voren bij de coronacrisis, maar bleek ook bij de ongelukkige blokkade van het Suezkanaal door de Ever Given. Stagnerende productie, fors oplopende kosten voor containertransporten, steeds langere levertijden en hogere prijzen waren evenzovele indicatoren van de toegenomen onderlinge afhankelijkheid. De oorlog in Oekraïne versterkte dit beeld nog verder. De onderbreking van de graanexporten uit Rusland en de Oekraïne over

de Zwarte Zee impliceerde dreigende hongersnood in tal van Afrikaanse landen, terwijl de instelling van een boycot van Russische olie, gas en andere producten leidde tot veel hogere prijzen en schaarstes op verschillende markten. De extra importheffingen geïntroduceerd door president Trump en gehandhaafd onder president Biden vormden een nieuwe belemmering voor vrijhandel, en ook de onwil van de VS om goedkeuring te verlenen aan de benoeming van nieuwe rechters in WTO-geschillencommissies was een uiting van pogingen om zand in de wereldhandelsmotor te strooien. Cijfers van het CPB⁴ indiceren een stagnerende groei van de wereldhandel vanaf 2010.

Maar er is nog een andere factor die in toenemende mate van invloed is op de mondiale handelontwikkeling. Dat is de politieke en economische uitdaging die China in toenemende mate stelt aan Verenigde Staten. Vanaf de Tweede Wereldoorlog is de VS leidend geweest: politiek, economisch, technologisch en militair. Politieke tegenstrevers als de Sovjet-Unie en economische uitdagers als Japan konden uiteindelijk de race met de VS niet volhouden. Maar met China is een nieuwe serieuze kandidaat aan de horizon verschenen. Met een ongekende economische ontwikkeling vanaf 1979 is het BNP van China in de buurt van dat van de VS gekomen. Natuurlijk, uitgedrukt als BNP per capita ligt China nog ver achter. Maar de economische opkomst van China wordt door de VS toch als steeds bedreigender ervaren. Ook in politiek, technologisch en militair opzicht timmert China hard aan de weg. Daarbij wordt een buitenlands investeringsbeleid gerealiseerd waarin China op gecoördineerde wijze, bijvoorbeeld via het Nieuwe-Zijderouteplan, investeert in ontwikkelde en minder ontwikkelde landen om zo politieke invloed te verwerven, toegang tot belangrijke grondstoffen te realiseren en een grotere afhankelijkheid van die landen van China te bewerkstelligen.

De VS heeft ondertussen stappen gezet om de export van technologische kennis, al dan niet besloten in high-tech producten, te verhinderen, en om bondgenootschappen op te bouwen dan wel bestaande te versterken om zo de invloed van China in te perken. Die strategie behelst ook de belemmering van dan wel een verbod op high-tech producten uit andere landen. Het door de VS aangekondigde verbod voor ASML om bepaalde zeer gespecialiseerde apparatuur, die kan worden gebruikt om hoogwaardige chips te vervaardigen, aan China te leveren, is daar een goed voorbeeld van. Meer algemeen proberen zowel de VS als China landen in hun kamp te krijgen, waarbij in toenemende mate druk wordt

4 Zie <https://www.cpb.nl/wereldhandelsmonitor-november-2022> en de daar opgenomen tijdreeksen.

uitgeoefend om voor de één en daarmee tegen de ander te kiezen. Dat geldt voor ontwikkelde landen maar zeker ook voor landen in opkomst. Zeker in Afrika zorgt het koloniale verleden van veel Westerse landen voor een positievere houding jegens China. Ook al zijn de opkomende landen op dit moment in economisch opzicht nog niet belangrijk, dat kan in de toekomst veranderen. Hun politieke en strategische betekenis is nu echter al duidelijk. Blokvorming kan uitmonden in handelsbelemmeringen over en weer, waar alle handelspartners onder kunnen komen te lijden.

Waar Geske Dijkstra aandacht vroeg voor de (vrouwelijke) bewoners van een land, voor de wijze waarop met hun belangen en politieke invloed rekening zou moeten worden gehouden, lijkt dat aspect de afgelopen jaren aan betekenis te hebben verloren. De in de voorgaande alinea's besproken recente ontwikkelingen duiden veel meer op nationaal-strategische, machtspolitieke overwegingen, waarbij de rol van individuele burgers op de achtergrond raakt. Of het nu gaat om beelden van burgers in landen met een extreem strikte lockdown, om burgers die in gebombardeerde steden en verwoeste gebieden leven, of om hongersnood in landen die vaak part noch deel hebben aan deze confrontaties, de perspectieven voor heel veel mensen zijn onzeker geworden. Nieuwe Geske Dijkstra's zijn nodig om een ander, vreedzamer, inclusiever en gelijkter toekomstbeeld te schetsen, en te realiseren.

GENDER

2

VROUWEN EN ECONOMIE EEN ONGEMAKKELIJKE RELATIE JANNEKE PLANTENGA

Steeds meer meisjes kiezen voor een universitaire opleiding. In 2021 bedroeg het aandeel vrouwen onder alle eerstejaars-bachelor studenten in Nederland zelfs 55%. Ook het aantal meisjes dat economie als universitaire opleiding kiest is sterk gegroeid, van enkele tientallen in het midden van de jaren zeventig tot ruim 4000 in 2021. Het aandeel vrouwen onder economiestudenten ligt met ruim 35% echter nog steeds bijna 20 procentpunten lager dan het algemene aandeel (verg. database UvN).

Diezelfde onder-representatie zien we terug wanneer het gaat om academische posities. Ultimo 2021 bedroeg het aandeel vrouwelijke hoogleraren in alle wetenschapsgebieden in Nederland 26,7%. Dat overall cijfer suggereert al grote ongelijkheid en een hard glazen plafond, maar het is een hele score in vergelijking met de economische wetenschap, waar het aandeel vrouwelijke hoogleraren op datzelfde moment slechts 16,0% bedraagt. Sterker nog: het aandeel vrouwelijke hoogleraren in de economie is lager dan het aandeel vrouwelijke hoogleraren in de techniek, terwijl deze laatste sector traditioneel als 'ontwikkelingsgebied' wordt gezien. Daarbij past de kanttekening dat het aandeel vrouwelijke aio's met circa 45% niet heel afwijkend is van de landelijke score (en zelfs relatief gunstig is in vergelijking met het aandeel vrouwen onder eerstejaars economiestudenten). Het verschil loopt echter op per functiecategorie naar circa 6 procentpunten bij de UD's, 9 procentpunt bij de UHD's en dus 10,7 procentpunt bij de hoogleraren (LNVH 2022: 10; 48).

Nu kunnen we dit natuurlijk positief duiden: wellicht is er sprake van een cohorteffect en komt het 'later' vanzelf goed, bijvoorbeeld wanneer de aio's van nu carrière hebben gemaakt en de toekomstige hoogleraarsposities kunnen vervullen. Maar deze cijfers kunnen ook aanleiding zijn tot zorgen over dat carrièrepad. Is het wellicht extra moeilijk voor vrouwen om carrière te maken in de economische

wetenschap? En zo ja: waarom is dat zo en wat is er aan te doen?

Aandeel vrouwen in wetenschapsgebied Economie, naar functiecategorie per instelling, in fte, ultimo 2021.




Figure 2.1 Aandel vrouwen in wetenschapsgebied Economie

Deze vragen staan in deze bijdrage centraal. Daartoe worden om te beginnen enkele cijfers over de huidige situatie in Nederland gepresenteerd. Vervolgens wordt de vraag gesteld wat de (internationale) literatuur meldt over de positie van vrouwen binnen de economische discipline, waarna tenslotte nog enkele oplossingsrichtingen worden gesuggereerd.

Vrouwen in economie: feiten en cijfers

Het valt niet mee om gedetailleerde gegevens te vinden over het aandeel vrouwen in verschillende universitaire functiecategorieën, uitgesplitst naar discipline. De meest toegankelijk bron is het jaarlijkse rapport van de LNVH: Monitor Vrouwelijke Hoogleraren. Sinds 2021 bevat deze monitor ook gegevens over het aandeel vrouwen per wetenschapsgebied voor de verschillende Nederlandse universitaire instellingen. Daarbij wordt speciale aandacht besteed aan het wetenschapsgebied economie omdat “in dit wetenschapsgebied in zijn geheel en in het bijzonder voor een aantal universiteiten werk aan de winkel is om een evenredige man-vrouwverdeling te bereiken (LNVH 2021: 17)”.

Tabel 1 geeft de cijfers voor ultimo 2021. Iedere faculteit laat het bekende beeld zien van een redelijk evenredige vertegenwoordiging van vrouwen onder promovendi (de UU en OU scoren hier zelfs boven de 50%) en een (meestal) aanzienlijke lagere vertegenwoordiging onder de UD's (positieve uitzonderingen

zijn hier de VU en de OU). Echt dramatisch worden de scores onder de senior posities: de UU bijvoorbeeld heeft geen vrouwelijke UHD's en het aandeel vrouwelijke hoogleraren ligt bij de UvA royaal onder de 10%.

Deze situatie niet uniek is voor Nederland; in tegendeel. Ook in de VS en de UK vindt een scherpe daling van het aandeel vrouwen plaats bij UHD-posities. Ginther & Kahn (2021) komen voor de VS bijvoorbeeld tot de conclusie dat vrouwelijke UD's 15% minder kans hebben op een promotie naar een (vaste) UHD-positie. Het resultaat is dat in de VS het aandeel vrouwen onder 'full professors' in 2017 slechts iets meer dan 13% bedraagt en onder UHD's 23%. Lundberg en Stern (2019) kwamen eerder tot een vergelijkbare conclusie: er is sprake van een 'leaky pipeline' wanneer een vaste UHD positie in beeld komt (Lundberg & Stern, 2019: 14). In UK is de situatie niet veel beter met (in 2016) een aandeel vrouwen van circa 13% onder hoogleraren en 21% onder UHD (Gamage et al 2020). De scores in Europa liggen daar wellicht iets boven (verg Auriol et al. (2019), maar het beeld is duidelijk: "The under-representation of women in economics is a discipline-wide problem" (Gamage et al. 2020: 9). De vraag is nu: wat verklaart de onder-representatie van vrouwen binnen de economie en meer in het bijzonder: wat verklaart het verschil in promotiekansen?

Achtergronden

Een verschil in keuzegedrag hoeft op zich natuurlijk geen probleem te zijn. Wellicht spelen hier verschillende preferenties een rol en hebben mannen en vrouwen verschillende voorkeuren. Als we ook nog veronderstellen dat mannen en vrouwen goed geïnformeerd zijn, hebben we helemaal weinig reden tot zorg – behalve dan dat de ondervetegenwoordiging van vrouwen bij senior staf wel vraagtekens oproept; een dergelijk verschil lijkt moeilijk te herleiden op een verschil in preferenties.

Een verschil in promotiekansen zou het resultaat kunnen zijn van verschil in productiviteit. Dit zou een gevolg kunnen zijn van het feit dat de promotie van UD tot UHD vaak samenvalt met de periode waarin vrouwen ook te maken krijgen met zorgverantwoordelijkheden. Ginther en Kahn (2021) analyseerden daarom het verschil in promotiekans, gecontroleerd voor het aantal publicaties, citaties, toegekende subsidies en omvang van die subsidies in dollar. Op basis van data van Academic Analytics konden zij vaststellen dat binnen het vakgebied van de economie, vrouwelijke UD's 15% minder kans hadden op een promotie naar een (vaste) UHD-positie. Een dergelijk verschil in promotiekans kon niet worden vastgesteld in biomedische wetenschappen, natuurkunde, politieke wetenschappen, wiskunde & statistiek en techniek. Opvallend genoeg werden deze verschillen niet

gevonden bij (onderzoeksintensieve) top universiteiten. Als mogelijke reden dat vrouwen elders minder eenvoudig in aanmerking komen voor een aanstelling als UHD verwijzen de auteurs de naar de rol van onderwijs en de aanwijzingen dat een vrouwelijke docent over het algemeen lager wordt geoordeeld dan haar mannelijke collega. “Also, women may be more likely to engage in low-promotable tasks” (Ginther & Kahn, 2021: 7)

Lundberg & Stern (2019) analyseerden ook mogelijke verschillen in onderwerpen/onderzoeksinteressen. Als vrouwen ‘allemaal’ kiezen voor arbeidseconomie of openbare financiën zou dat ook kunnen verklaren dat vrouwen minder carrière kunnen maken. Volgens de auteurs is hiervan echter geen sprake. De verschillen zijn klein en bovendien tamelijk constant. Het is dus niet zo dat “differential trends in field choice over time explain the observed change in the gender gap in the share of PHD recipients who become assistant professors and who are later tenured” (Lundberg & Stern, 2019: 13).

Als er niet sprake is van verschillen in productiviteit, is er misschien toch iets anders aan de hand. Wellicht hebben vrouwen minder toegang tot mentoring; weinig vrouwelijk senior staf betekent immers bijna per definitie weinig rolmodellen en een gebrek aan mentoren. Juist in situaties waarin relevante informatie over publicatie mogelijkheden informeel worden gedeeld, is een netwerk en een mentor voor junior staf belangrijk. Verschillend onderzoek toont aan dat mentoring programma’s inderdaad een significant positief effect hebben op het aantal publicaties en onderzoeks subsidies van de deelnemers met als uiteindelijke resultaat meer vaste aanstellingen op senior posities (verg. Blau et al. 2010; Ginther et al. 2020).

Maar het gaat niet alleen om publicaties; het gaat ook om de beoordeling van de publicaties. Uit onderzoek van Sarsons (2017) bijvoorbeeld bleek dat de bijdrage van vrouwen aan papers met meerdere auteurs systematische werd onderschat; bij een man vergrootte een co-auteurschap zijn kansen op promotie naar een vaste aanstelling met 8%; bij vrouwen was dit slechts 2%. Het verschil is veel minder groot wanneer een vrouwen co-auteur was bij een andere vrouw, wat een indicatie is voor het feit dat het niet gaat om een co-auteurschap *an sich*, maar om de specifieke man-vrouw combinatie. Sarsons (2017: 144): “The probability that a woman receives tenure is significantly lower when she coauthors unless she works with other women. Men, on the other hand, have an equal probability of receiving tenure when they coauthor and solo author, conditional on the quality of the paper”. Een vergelijkbare analyse onder sociologen laat een dergelijk verschil niet zien.

Een laatste aspect dat genoemd moet worden is de vaak de competitieve sfeer

binnen de economische discipline, en dan met name binnen de seminar cultuur. Sprekers worden vaak in de rede gevallen en er is niet zelden sprake van een spervuur aan vragen, met een sterk intimiderende impact. Uit experimenteel onderzoek van Niederle en Vesterlund (2007) blijkt dat vrouwen vaak niet kiezen voor een competitieve omgeving. Deels lijkt dit te worden verklaard door een verschil in overmoed (mannen zijn relatief overmoediger dan vrouwen) deels door een verschil in voorkeuren (mannen werken liever in een competitieve omgeving dan vrouwen). Dat de competitieve sfeer niet een geïsoleerd issue betreft, bleek ook uit tamelijke recente enquête van de American Economic Association naar het professionele klimaat. Drie voorzitters van de AEA (allen topeconomen van naam en faam) erkenden daar dat “many members of the profession have suffered harassment and discrimination during their careers, including both overt acts of abuse and more subtle forms of marginalization” (Blanchard, Bernanke, & Yellen 2019). Het is niet uit te sluiten dat de sterk competitieve seminar cultuur verband houdt met de sterke nadruk op toppublicaties; door Smith (2021) samengevat als de “T5 tyranny”. Deze nadruk op top 5 publicaties, met een grote macht voor (editorial) gatekeepers en onaantastbare superstars, creëert ruimte voor sterk competitieve werkomgeving waarin alleen topprestaties in tel zijn.

Oplossingen

Als dit de achtergronden zijn, wat is dan de oplossing? De meeste auteurs zijn het er over eens dat de ondervertegenwoordiging van vrouwen het meest gebaat zou zijn met systemische benadering. Een geïsoleerde maatregel, zoals het formuleren van streefcijfers over het aandeel vrouwen in senior posities, kan niet succesvol zijn, wanneer het traject er naar toe er veel hobbels bevat. Wat nodig is, is een bredere kijk op de discipline, de tradities binnen de discipline en het personeelsbeleid. Een goede manier om een dergelijke systemische aanpak vorm te geven is om beleid langs drie lijnen te ontwikkelen: de toegang; de opleiding en de organisatie.

De toegang betreft vooral beleid dat zich richt op voorlichtingsdagen; een diversere presentatie kan belangrijk zijn voor een eerste indruk bij middelbare scholieren. Studieverenigingen zouden hier ook een rol kunnen spelen, met een laagdrempelige introductie. Een mooi voorbeeld van een brede voorlichtingscampagne is bijvoorbeeld het project ‘Discover economics’ van de Britse Royal Economics Society. Dit project beoogt om de aantrekkingskracht van de economische discipline onder potentiële studenten te vergroten en zo diversiteit te stimuleren. Er is een blog, er komen vrouwelijke studentes aan het woord, en er worden concrete problemen geformuleerd en vragen gesteld (‘what is happening to food prices?’). Dit alles met het doel om een wat breder perspectief op

de economie te genereren.

Maar als een meer diverse studentenpopulatie binnen is, moet hen natuurlijk ook over de volle breedte iets geboden worden. Er is de laatste jaren hard gewerkt aan het opzetten van een meer divers en inclusief curriculum. De economische faculteiten zijn hier over het algemeen niet de ‘first movers’, maar er valt natuurlijk wel iets te leren van ontwikkelingen elders. Zo verwijst de term ‘inclusief curriculum’ zowel naar de leeromgeving en de manier waarop het onderwijs wordt gegeven, als naar de inhoud van het onderwijs. Inmiddels zijn verschillende *reflection tools* beschikbaar (ook online) die divers en inclusief onderwijs een stap verder brengen. Bij het lesmateriaal gaat het bijvoorbeeld om het introduceren van artikelen geschreven door vrouwen, of om artikelen die een meer divers palet aan perspectieven bevatten en het gebruik van stereotypen beperken. Dat lijkt voor de hand liggend, maar de praktijk blijkt weerbarstig. De wijze waarop het onderwijs wordt gegeven speelt natuurlijk ook een rol. Het gaat dan om de manier waarop met bepaalde ‘spannende’ onderwerpen wordt omgegaan (migratie, armoede, koloniaal verleden), om het hanteren van inclusief taalgebruik, en, meer in het algemeen, om het creëren van een inclusieve en veilige leeromgeving. Ook netwerken (‘Women in Economics’) kunnen een veilige structuur bieden, waar binnen ervaringen kunnen worden gedeeld, en waarin initiatieven tot verandering kunnen ontstaan.

Daar hoort uiteraard ook een veilige seminar-cultuur bij. Om hiermee een begin te maken, hebben verschillende scholen een gedragscode ingevoerd, waarin de nadruk worden gelegd op een meer respectvolle bejegening. De AEA heeft in 2019 een gedragscode ingevoerd en de Nederlandse KVS sinds 2020. In een toelichting in de ESB stelt de voorzitter Robert Dur: “De afgelopen jaren is er breed onderkend dat niet iedereen zich altijd even welkom voelt binnen de economengemeenschap. Daar willen we wat aan doen en een gedragscode is een stap in die richting” (Ernst, 2020). In de gedragscode staat onder meer: “De KVSH organiseert evenementen waarbij mensen economische ideeën uitwisselen (...). Het is daarom noodzakelijk dat alle aanwezigen elkaar met respect behandelen”. Behalve het introduceren van een *code of conduct* kunnen ook afspraken worden gemaakt over een meer diverse seminar-cultuur, door bijvoorbeeld meer vrouwen uit te nodigen om hun werk te presenteren, om het aantal onderwerpen te verbreden en om regels voor uitnodiging (die vaak gerelateerd zijn aan publicaties in de top5) te verbreden.

Tenslotte is het ook belangrijk om de organisatie aan te spreken. De zittende staf moet het probleem onderkennen en zich hier ook verantwoordelijk voor voelen. Uit verschillend onderzoek blijkt dat rolmodellen buitengewoon belangrijk

zijn voor junior staf. Verschillende stimuleringsprogramma's proberen hierop in te spelen. Zo heeft de UU het Westerdijk programma voor talentvolle vrouwelijke UD's, genoemd naar Johanna Westerdijk, de eerste vrouwelijke hoogleraar in Nederland. De RUG heeft het Rosalind Franklin Fellowship programma voor talentvolle vrouwelijke PhD; de kandidaten worden geselecteerd voor een tenure track positie met als uiteindelijk doel een vaste aanstelling als hoogleraar.

Een belangrijke organisatorische verandering op nationaal niveau is de recente 'hervorming' van de beroemde ESB economentop in de Economenparade. De Economentop bestaat sinds 1980 en is traditioneel een van de meeste gelezen stukken van de ESB. Maar, zoals de ESB droogje opmerkt: 'tijden veranderen'. De eenzijdige focus op toppublicaties resulteerde in een zeer sterke oververtegenwoordiging van (witte) mannen, die niet meer goed aansloot bij de ontwikkelingen binnen de huidige wetenschap. Daar gaat het immers niet alleen meer om (internationale) publicaties, maar ook minder gemakkelijke kwantificeerbare universitaire doelen zoals onderwijskwaliteit en maatschappelijk belang. Derhalve wordt in de eerste economenparade van 2022 jong talent belicht. Het resultaat is een veel diversere parade naar kleur en gender (Kleinknecht & Lukkezen 2022).

In dat opzicht lijkt het tij relatief gunstig. De hele discussie rond Open Science heeft de keerzijde laten zien van een strikte nadruk op publiceren. Onder de paraplu van 'Erkennen en Waarderen' is er meer ruimte voor multidisciplinair onderzoek, voor onderwijs, en voor impact activiteiten. Meer in het algemeen is er minder nadruk op numerieke (onderzoeks)output en meer aandacht voor een kwalitatieve beoordeling waarbinnen ook team spirit, leiderschap en impact een plaats kan vinden.

Tot slot

Eindigen we dan toch nog positief? Het blijft een uitdaging. Om te beginnen om meer meisjes richting de economische wetenschap te trekken en vervolgens om meer vrouwen te benoemen in senior posities. Op alle fronten zal beleid nodig zijn om de onder-representatie van vrouwen in de economische wetenschap tegen te gaan. Omdat economie te belangrijk is om aan alleen mannen over te laten. Omdat economie gaat over de meest doelmatige inrichting van de samenleving en omdat die samenleving een grote mate van diversiteit kent. Gelukkig zijn er altijd inspirerende rolmodellen, zoals Minouche Shafik, directeur van de London School of Economics. Zij krijgt het laatste woord: "I have always understood equality as not about demanding 'more', but rather being entitled to the same". En zo is het maar net!

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3

NOTES ON GESKE DIJKSTRA'S CONTRIBUTIONS TO FEMINIST ECONOMICS THE DISCIPLINE AND THE JOURNAL ELISSA BRAUNSTEIN

I clearly remember the first time I came across Geske Dijkstra's work. It was sometime in the spring of 2000, and I had just defended my dissertation in economics. I had gotten into the habit of gobbling up the latest issue of the journal *Feminist Economics*, then in only its sixth year of publication and a treasured source of intellectual community and inspiration. I came across what would become one of the classics in the feminist economics literature, Geske Dijkstra's and Lucia Hanmer's critical analysis of an alternative to the United Nations Development Programme's (UNDP) Gender-Related Development Index (GDI) (Dijkstra & Hanmer, 2000). At the time the UNDP was working on engendering its human development framework and data, and Dijkstra and Hanmer (2000) argued that, among other conceptual and methodological issues, the GDI conflated relative gender equality with absolute achievements in human development and made it difficult to conduct comparisons between countries. The alternative they proposed, the Relative Status of Women index (RSW), was based on the same indicators as UNDP's Human Development Index and the GDI but used female-to-male ratios rather than a weighted average of levels to reflect women's achievements relative to men. Other related work added measures of gendered empowerment to develop the Standardised Index of Gender Equality (SIGE), as well as continued to engage with UNDP and the wider development community on the importance of improving measurements of gender equality for development policy and practice (Dijkstra, 2002, 2006).

These conceptual critiques and methodological alternatives represent some of the best that feminist economics has to offer, both to academic disciplines and enhancing people's lives. A central focus of the feminist economics projects is to improve economic theory and policy by applying feminist insights to prevailing

economic models, methods, and policy analysis. Geske's contributions to sharpening measures of gender equality illustrate why and how a deeper understanding of gender dynamics – for instance that, focusing on women's relative rather than absolute achievements enable a more robust understanding of gender inequality and the policies, institutions, and norms that affect them and, can help make economic policies more effective and socially just. Geske's varied contributions to the economics literature illustrate similar critical feminist interventions, as for example with her incisive evaluations of aid, debt relief, poverty reduction strategies and adjustment in Latin America from a gender perspective (e.g., Dijkstra, 2001, 2011); analyses of gender and economics in European contexts (Dijkstra, 1997; Dijkstra & Plantenga, 1997); and gender segregation and income differences in Nicaragua (Herrera, Dijkstra & Ruben, 2019).

From the vantage point of those early career days in 2000, when I would later have the great good fortune of working directly with Geske on the journal *Feminist Economics*, is an experience I am extremely grateful for. Geske became an associate editor in 2011 and is now nearing the end of her fourth three-year term, one of the longest-serving associate editors the journal has ever had. Over that time, she has handled about 100 submissions, ranking among our top three associate editors in terms of number of manuscripts handled. I hate to emphasize quantity, but it helps to understand the weight of Geske's editorial contribution to the feminist economics discipline. Serving as an associate editor at *Feminist Economics* is demanding and substantive service. Once an associate editor volunteers to handle a manuscript, they are tasked with the substantial work of shepherding the manuscript through review (including finding at least three reviewers, adjudicating among them, giving guidance to authors on how to navigate and prioritize reviewer feedback in a written report, and recommending a decision to the editor). As an editorial team, the journal has long aimed to incorporate a feminist approach to peer review, which includes a commitment to constructive, mentoring feedback, and a willingness to support authors through potentially multiple rounds of revisions (the journal is known for its demanding and constructive reviewing process). Geske has served as one of the editorial team's key contributors in this regard, one who has been unfailingly kind in her feedback, generous with her time, and quietly stalwart in her service.

The regional and topical breadth of Geske's own research also characterize the broad scope of her editorial contributions to the journal. Topical themes among submissions that Geske handled touch on intra-household resource allocation decisions, including the distribution and application of time; gender equality in education; gender income gaps; gender-aware analyses of trade liberalization and

development; gender-targeted microfinance and financial inclusion; and development strategy and policy evaluation from a gender perspective, including the impact of debt and foreign aid. Geographic contexts spanned the globe, with most manuscripts focused on locations in the developing regions of Africa, Asia, and Latin America. *Feminist Economics* has had a diversity of authors that have greatly benefited from Geske's editorial stewardship.

Now from the vantage point of 2023, it is clearer to me how Geske's service to the feminist economics community is a model to appreciate and emulate, in intellectual, strategic, and practical ways. We are so fortunate to have learned and benefited from it. Thank you!

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4

WHEN IT COMES TO NUCLEAR WEAPONS, WOMEN “DON’T KNOW” A LOT WHY IS IT A PROBLEM? MICHAL ONDERCO

Introduction

In the study of nuclear weapons and nuclear strategy, there is no shortage of reminders that the field is heavily gendered. From the paradigmatic study of Carol Cohn on the gendered language of defence intellectuals (Cohn, 1987) to the natural science studies which showed that female bodies process radiation differently, impacting women more from fallout from nuclear tests (Dimmen, 2014; Olson, 2016). Additionally, women are also less represented in delegations negotiating on disarmament issues, including on nuclear weapons (Dalaqua, 2019, 2021; Dalaqua, Egeland, & Graff Hugo, 2019). For the proponents of banning nuclear weapons, the gender element is the essential part of the message (Acheson, 2019, 2021). Even if generalized into “gender-sensitive approach”, nuclear policymaking is often focused on including women (Brown & Considine, 2022).¹ Gendered approaches are often seen to fit within the broader scope of the study of “nuclear injustice”, the human cost of nuclear deterrence (Stärk & Kühn, 2022). Hence, the idea that gender influences heavily how nuclear weapons are discussed, negotiated, but also how they impact individual humans is not particularly new.

In this paper, written for a volume in honour of an eminent feminist development scholar Geske Dijkstra, I however, look at something different. In a recent survey, which I designed with my colleague Michal Smetana and was fielded by YouGov in the second half of 2020, we asked questions related to nuclear

¹ One might also notice that the vast majority of scholars cited in this opening paragraph identify as not-males. This suggests that even the study of gender and nuclear weapons is gendered.

deterrence, use of nuclear weapons, and prospects for nuclear disarmament. The results showed an interesting pattern – female participants were much more likely to answer “don’t know” to our questions. The difference was rather stark. This pattern therefore begs for a question – does this matter, if the women feel that they “don’t know” about nuclear weapons?²

Geske Dijkstra spent her life studying different aspects of gender inequality, including on how to measure and conceptualize it (Dijkstra, 2006; Dijkstra & Hanmer, 2000; Dijkstra & Plantenga, 1997). To ask about consequences of gender differences in views of nuclear weapons fits in grander scheme of Dijkstra’s scholarship.

The remainder of this paper continues as follows. In the subsequent section, I introduce the empirical data on gender gaps in answering “don’t know” in surveys of nuclear attitudes. Then, I discuss some consequences of such gap, and why scholars should pay attention to it in the future studies.

Gender gap in “don’t know” answers

Gendered variation in attitudes towards different forms of the use of force are not new, but continues to be debated in existing scholarship. Richard Eichenberg, a leading scholar of public opinion on the use of force, wrote in his 2003 review article of “disappearance of [...] yawning gender differences over US defence issues” (p. 111), and concluded that the differences existed on the margins. However, over a decade later, he revised this view, arguing that the differences are marked, but are mostly driven by different perspectives on conflict, with women being more attuned to the humanitarian arguments (Eichenberg, 2016). This view was also confirmed by Bae and Lee (2021), who argue that women’s opinions of adversary are driven by the cost of conflict. However, the patterns are not uniform – in their pioneering studies which started the so-called “third wave” of studying nuclear taboo³, Press, Sagan, and Valentino (2013) find no effect of gender on the willingness to use nuclear weapons against adversaries, and this finding was confirmed also in subsequent studies (Dill, Sagan, & Valentino, 2022; Sagan & Valentino, 2017). However, studies conducted in Europe do find some effect of gender, and generally find women less likely to approve the use of nuclear weapons (Onderco, Etienne, & Smetana, 2022) and more likely to support nuclear disarmament (Onderco, Smetana, van der Meer, & Etienne, 2021).

2 The existing data does not allow us to answer the question “why” this pattern emerges yet.

3 The “third wave” label was developed by Smetana and Wunderlich, 2021

Our work with Michal Smetana was motivated by the “third wave” of nuclear taboo studies which has until then predominantly focused on public opinion studied in the United States. We commissioned a study of public opinion on nuclear issues to be fielded by YouGov, which was administered to an elite sample of 101 members of the 19th Bundestag in June and July 2020. We then subsequently fielded the same survey using YouGov to 2,020 respondents from the general population in October 2020 using a representative sample (for more information, see Onderco & Smetana, 2021; Smetana & Onderco, 2022).

However, what was surprising in our findings that there was a major gender gap in how “don’t know” responses from participants to our questions. While this gap was less pronounced among the elite respondents, it was very obvious among the general public population. This gap is the focus of the present paper.

In this survey, we asked questions related to four main aspects: the political and military purpose of nuclear weapons, the legitimacy of their potential use, as well as the views on withdrawal and nuclear disarmament. In every single category, we find a significant difference in the proportion of men and female respondents who answered “don’t know” to our queries. The proportion of female respondents who answered “don’t know” was never below 30% and sometimes reached up to 40%. This finding is quite alarming for both scholarship and policy practice.

Political and military purpose of nuclear weapons

We first asked the respondents about the political and military purpose of stationing of nuclear weapons. We particularly focused on the deterrent value of such weapons, as well as their importance in the bilateral relationship with the United States. We asked our respondents whether they agree or disagree with the statements that the stationing of US nuclear weapons in Germany “deters nuclear attacks against NATO countries” and that it “deters non-nuclear attacks against NATO countries”. We then asked two questions related to the political purpose of stationing, asking the respondents whether “the stationing of the US nuclear weapons in Germany gives Germany political weight within NATO” and whether it “gives Germany special influence on U.S. nuclear policy”.

Results in Table 4.1 clearly show a major gender gap in the answers “don’t know”. This gap is more pronounced among the general population than among the elite audience (Bundestag members), but even there, a major difference can be found when it comes to the deterrent effect of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear attacks. The difference between men and females in the general population sample is on average 20 percentage points – which suggests that women are a bit more than twice as likely to answer that they do not know answers to these questions.

Table 4.1 Proportion of respondents answering “don’t know” on questions related to political and military purpose of nuclear weapons

	Male elite	Female elite	Male population	Female population
<i>The stationing of the US nuclear weapons in Germany deters non-nuclear attacks against NATO countries</i>	16%	26%	15%	36%
<i>The stationing of the US nuclear weapons in Germany deters nuclear attacks against NATO countries</i>	1%		14%	35%
<i>The stationing of the US nuclear weapons in Germany gives Germany political weight within the NATO</i>			13%	33%
<i>The stationing of the US nuclear weapons in Germany gives Germany special influence on the US nuclear policy</i>	1%		13%	32%

Nuclear weapons use

We also asked respondents about the potential use of nuclear weapons. In the survey, we asked the respondents to imagine a military conflict in the Baltics between Russia and NATO. Such conflict represents the most likely scenario for a military use of nuclear weapons stationed in Germany by NATO.

In the survey, the respondents expressed their degree of agreement with four statements on the conditions under which it could be legitimate to employ nuclear weapons in that conflict. The first scenario entailed “a demonstrative explosion over an unpopulated area to de-escalate in an attempt to stop an ongoing Russian invasion of the Baltic countries”. The second scenario involved the use of nuclear weapons “to target Russian military units and thereby gain a military advantage over Russia in the conflict”. The third scenario would see “a demonstrative explosion over an unpopulated area to respond to a similar demonstrative nuclear explosion conducted by Russia”. In the fourth scenario, US nuclear weapons in Germany would be used “to target Kaliningrad as a response to a Russian nuclear strike against NATO troops, in an attempt to stop an ongoing Russian invasion of the Baltic countries”.

Table 4.2 Proportion of respondents answering “don’t know” on questions related to potential nuclear weapons use

	Male elite	Female elite	Male population	Female population
<i>As a demonstrative explosion over an unpopulated area to de-escalate in an attempt to stop an ongoing Russian invasion of the Baltic countries</i>	14%	13%	18%	36%
<i>To target Russian military units and thereby gain a military advantage over Russia in the conflict</i>	14%	13%	17%	36%
<i>As a demonstrative explosion over an unpopulated area to respond to a similar demonstrative nuclear explosion conducted by Russia</i>	14%	17%	17%	37%
<i>To target Kaliningrad as a response to a Russian nuclear strike against NATO troops, in an attempt to stop an ongoing Russian invasion of the Baltic countries</i>	17%	13%	20%	40%

Our results again indicated that the proportion of women who responded “don’t know” to our survey question was at least twice as high as the proportion of men, and sometimes even higher. The difference between men and women was again around 20 percentage points. Interestingly enough, this effect applies almost exclusively to the population sample only – in the elite sample, such difference is not replicated.

Withdrawal and disarmament

In our survey, we also asked the respondents about the potential withdrawal of weapons and nuclear disarmament. We asked these questions because at the time of fielding the survey, the withdrawal of nuclear weapons from Germany was a major domestic political debate in Germany, gearing for the elections in 2021 (we summarize this debate somewhat in Smetana, Onderco, & Etienne, 2021). Nuclear weapons were therefore, a salient issue in the domestic debate in Germany.

We asked the respondents a set of questions related to the withdrawal of nuclear weapons. Respondents were asked to express their agreement (or disagreement with five statements. These statements were: “the U.S. nuclear weapons in Germany should not be withdrawn under any circumstances”, “U.S. nuclear weapons in Germany can be withdrawn if there are additional reinforcements by U.S. troops”,

“if NATO European countries including Germany strengthen their conventional capabilities”, “U.S. nuclear weapons in Germany can be withdrawn if the U.S. and Russia agree on further arms control steps” and finally, “U.S. nuclear weapons should be withdrawn without any preconditions”.

Again, twice as many female respondents responded “don’t know” to these questions. Table 4.3 reports the results. It is noticeable that the gender gap emerges only in some questions in the elite sample, but is rather consistent in the general population sample. The gap between men and women in the general population sample is around 20 percentage points, again.

Table 4.3 Proportion of respondents answering “don’t know” on questions related to withdrawal of nuclear weapons

	Male elite	Female elite	Male population	Female population
<i>The US nuclear weapons in Germany should not be withdrawn under any circumstance</i>	1%	4%	15%	35%
<i>The US nuclear weapons in Germany can be withdrawn if there are additional reinforcements by the US troops</i>	10%	17%	18%	39%
<i>The US nuclear weapons in Germany can be withdrawn if NATO European countries including Germany strengthen their conventional capabilities</i>	9%	9%	17%	38%
<i>The US nuclear weapons in Germany can be withdrawn if the US and Russia agree on further arms control steps</i>	3%	13%	16%	38%
<i>The US nuclear weapons should be withdrawn without any preconditions</i>	9%	9%	18%	39%

Similar patterns are replicated when we asked the respondents about their views on nuclear disarmament. In our survey, we asked respondents about their agreement or disagreement with a set of propositions about nuclear disarmament. Table 4.4 reports the findings. The main finding is that the gender gap of

approximately 20 percentage points in responding to different questions is replicated here too. This gap exists predominantly in the general population sample, but again can be found also in the elite sample too.

Table 4.4 Proportion of respondents answering “don’t know” on questions related to nuclear disarmament

	Male elite	Female elite	Male population	Female population
<i>Complete nuclear disarmament will happen through the pressure from the civil society on the governments</i>	1%		14%	31%
<i>Complete nuclear disarmament will happen when countries possessing nuclear weapons resolve their (geo)political disputes</i>	7%	13%	17%	35%
<i>Complete nuclear disarmament will happen when world leaders are confident that the technology allows for its verification</i>	15%	26%	19%	40%
<i>Complete nuclear disarmament will happen when leaders believe emerging technologies make nuclear weapons unnecessary</i>	18%	13%	17%	35%
<i>Complete nuclear disarmament is not likely to happen in the next 50 years</i>			15%	36%
<i>Complete nuclear disarmament will not make us more secure.</i>	3%	4%	17%	34%

Evidence from other surveys

This pattern of data goes beyond our single survey. While exact data is somewhat hard to come by (availability of data is limited, and not all surveys allow respondents to select “don’t know” as an answer), there is at least one survey where the data confirms this pattern. Pelopidas and Egeland (2020)’s paper on what Europeans believe about the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki was based on the 2019 survey conducted for their project in a sample of seven European countries. Pelopidas and Egeland (2020) set out in their paper to test three theses key to the so-called Stimson narrative. Stimson narrative is the argument, perpetuated in the US foreign policy that, the atomic bombings of Japan (1) shortened the war significantly, (2) were necessary to bring Japan to surrender and (3) saved American soldiers’ lives. All three of these statements were put to question by recent historical work.

Pelopidas and Egeland (2020) asked their respondents to agree or disagree with statements: whether “Atomic bombings of Japan in World War II” shortened the war, were necessary for the surrender and saved American soldiers’ lives respectively.⁴

Table 4.5 Gender gap in answers “don’t know” on questions related to the Stimson narrative

	“Shortened the war significantly”	“Were necessary to bring Japan to surrender”	“Saved American soldiers’ lives”
<i>Belgium</i>	25%	12%	30%
<i>France</i>	25%	17%	20%
<i>Germany</i>	21%	12%	13%
<i>Italy</i>	9%	6%	3%
<i>Netherlands</i>	27%	19%	24%
<i>Poland</i>	17%	13%	16%
<i>Sweden</i>	28%	18%	29%
<i>Turkey</i>	9%	10%	16%
<i>UK</i>	24%	18%	19%

Note: The numbers represent the difference between the proportion of female and male respondents answering “don’t know” to questions related to the Stimson narrative.

The data in Table 4.5 demonstrates significant gender gaps in answers to questions related to nuclear weapons. While this gender gap varies by questions and by country. We can notice that some countries with relatively high gender inequality (measured using Dijkstra’s Standardized Index of Gender Equality, Dijkstra, 2002) have relatively low differences (Turkey or Italy), whereas countries with high levels of gender equality such as Sweden see rather large gender gaps (Sweden, Germany or the Netherlands). Without diving too much into the data, the findings suggest that, a significant gender gap persists in answering questions “don’t know” when it comes to nuclear weapons.

How to interpret the gap?

Now that the gender gap has been established, one might think about how to interpret its existence. To be sure, there is distinguished social science methodology scholarship which engages the question about what “don’t know” answers mean.

⁴ I am immensely thankful to Benoit Pelopidas for sharing his data with me.

Some scholars argue that “don’t know” answers sometimes include false negatives i.e., individuals who refrain from expressing their true preferences (Gilljam & Granberg, 1993). Others argue that “don’t know” reflects the situation of genuine indecision (Dolnicar & Grün, 2014). Luskin and Bullock (2011) in their experimental study found that any increase in the political knowledge after removing don’t know answers is either illusory or small. However, a recent textbook on survey design recommends avoiding “don’t know” answers to improve reliability and validity of responses (Krosnick, 2018).

Rather than resolving this conundrum, I wish to offer a few suggestions for how to interpret the gender gap.

The first and most straightforward answer is to interpret the gap as *prima facie* evidence of a gendered gap in knowledge about nuclear weapons. This interpretation would suggest that there is a genuine gap in how much men and women know about nuclear weapons. Such finding would be in line with some of the patterns of action which we observe in the field. For instance, there is an increase in special funding and fellowship programs for female participants, with the goal of increasing the participation of women in the field. Specific funding opportunities exist for women to join the field. The somewhat lower gender gap in the elite sample in our survey in Germany suggests that education might have something to do with the difference. As the existing scholarship on elite-public gaps in public opinion suggested, the differences introduced through the elite selection might erase some pre-existing variation due to interest and knowledge (Kertzer, 2020). If this is indeed a part of the explanation, then future scholarship should ask not only how to remedy this gap, but also why the knowledge gap exists in the first place.

The second possible explanation is that women are not less knowledgeable, but that they are less forthcoming in expressing their views. This view would correspond both to the existing work on survey design which argues that “don’t know” answers represent false negatives, and basically capture situations where male respondents are artificially confident (Lizotte & Sidman, 2009; Mondak & Anderson, 2004). Finding that men are more self-confident than women about their knowledge would rhyme with the work on masculinities and nuclear weapons (Cohn, 1987). If men are more self-confident about their answers, then they would obviously be more willing to offer them, even if they express less certainty in those views. Again, the lower gender gap among the elite answers would fit with this explanation, as the women who climb the power ladder to the elite positions are unlikely to hold back their views.

The third possible explanation might be that female respondents simply do not

attach as much salience to nuclear weapons. In other words, their “don’t know” answers do not tell us as much about the knowledge but about the salience they attach to the topic. At the time when both Smetana & I and, Pelopidas & Egeland conducted surveys, nuclear conflict was seen as a remote possibility in Europe. It is therefore fully possible that our respondents considered that these questions relate to topics of very remote issues, and hence did not feel need to enunciate an answer.

The fourth possibility might be that females in our survey, more than males, develop conflicting views about options. They may for instance feel very conflicted about the deterrent effect of nuclear weapons. Or about the need to deter in the first place. In other words, female respondents might actually think about the question from different perspectives, in a more complex manner than male respondents, hence developing a more complex possible answer to the question.

Especially the first, second and fourth option create major challenges for the democratic governance when it comes to nuclear weapons. Scholars have for a long time, recognized that, governance of nuclear weapons has drifted away from the models of democracy (Dahl, 1985). There is also an ongoing debate among the scholars about the degree to which the public opinion *should* matter when it comes to complex issues of foreign policy (Eriksen, 2011; Lord, 2011). However, for public acceptability of any foreign policy, especially the ones where the potential costs are so high, we need to see the fact that 40% of respondents answer questions about it with “don’t know” as a problem.

The results from the second option create challenges for democratic governance too. The pattern in which females are less likely to express views (and by contrast, males are much more likely to express their views even if their level of certainty might be comparable) means that the public debate might not only be biased, but also does not reflect the most qualified voices. Future works on, for instance, media appearances of experts could explore these issues further.

Future academic scholarship should scrutinize and analyse these questions with more depth. Future work should similarly, dive more in depth in the more granular patterns among the female participants. Dividing participants by age is, of course, very rough, and we need to understand better any patterns caused by age, partisan ideology or lived experiences.

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DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS

5

THE UNRULY NATURE OF DEVELOPMENT AID REFLECTIONS ON THE WORK OF GESKE DIJKSTRA MENNO FENGER

“The economy is a complex adaptive system. This was grasped intuitively by, among others, Alfred Marshall, John Maynard Keynes and, of course, Joseph Schumpeter. However, over the past half century, developments in economics have not been based upon these intuitions to any significant extent. Instead, constrained optimization became the cornerstone of a 'modern' economics in which theories were constructed upon this particular kind of behavioral rule ” (Foster, 2005, p.32).

After re-reading (parts of) Geske Dijkstra's work, I dare to say that the above quote also applies to her work on development aid. In her work, she opposes the dominance of rational planning and emphasizes the importance of politics and ownership of recipient countries of foreign aid. Without explicitly addressing the theory of complex systems, many of her analyses of development aid failures contain elements of this theory. In my contribution to this liber amicorum, I try to make this link more explicit. My contribution consists of three parts. First, I discuss the characteristics of complex adaptive systems and their relevance to Geske's research. Then, I reflect on strategies that might work for (adjusting) complex systems and – again – place a number of recommendations from Geske's work in these strategies. Finally, based on these steps, I provide some concluding remarks about Geske's work in a public administration context.

Developing countries as complex adaptive systems

The term 'complex' has long been used - appropriately and inappropriately - for everything that is not 'simple'. But only since the mid-1990s, a scientific movement has emerged that attempts to examine complexity from a more systematic angle. Over the past decade, the Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR),

Department of Public Administration and Sociology has played an important role in the analysis of complexity, with people such as Geert Teisman and Lasse Gerrits.

A complex adaptive system (CAS) can be defined as “a group of semi-autonomous agents that interact in interdependent and unpredictable ways such that they create system-wide patterns. These patterns, over time, reinforce future behavior of the agents in the system” (Holladay, 2011: 1, see also Dooley, 1997). Cilliers (1998, pp. 3-5) describes ten characteristics of complex adaptive systems. I'll highlight five characteristics here:

1. Complex systems consist of many elements. When there is a limited number of elements, it is still possible to capture the behavior of these elements in an equation or a model. When the number of elements increases, not only is there no logical language to capture this, but a model no longer contributes to understanding how the system functions.
2. Many elements are a necessary but not a sufficient condition. These elements must interact with each other in a dynamic way, causing the system to change over time.
3. Interactions are non-linear: big events can have small consequences; small events can have big consequences.
4. Complex systems are open systems, it is not always clear where the system begins and/or ends.
5. Complex systems have a dynamic equilibrium. This means that continuous actions within the system are required to safeguard the survival of the system. When the elements of the system stop adding energy, it ceases to exist.

While Cilliers (1998) mainly emphasizes the element of 'complexity', our EUR colleague Lasse Gerrits (2012) gives more substance to the concept of 'adaptivity'. He especially emphasizes the unpredictable character of the reactions of complex adaptive systems to external interventions. The heterogeneity of actors in the system makes it virtually impossible to predict the effect of policy measures: the system can go completely out of balance ('hysteresis' as Gerrits calls it), or, on the contrary, may absorb the external shocks as much as possible without changing direction (resilience). In both cases the external intervention – such as development aid – will not have the desired effect.

As an economist with a sociological background, Geske quickly realized in her publications on development aid that a model-based approach of the effect of development aid was inadequate. Many of her publications consist of detailed

descriptions of countries, in which the interactions between the actors within the countries occupy an important place. We see many of the above characteristics of complex adaptive systems reflected in her work. One of the most striking and early examples of this can be seen in her publication, 'The effectiveness of policy conditionality' (Dijkstra, 2002). In this article, she argues that the implementation of development aid reform measures depends on "the extent to which powerful actors in government and the opposition gain or lose from the reforms and aid, and the possible outcome of a power struggle between these groups" (Dijkstra, 2002, p.318). In this publication she tries to preserve the economic paradigm somewhat by speaking of an 'augmented principal -agent' relationship (Dijkstra, 2002, p. 312), but in the case descriptions I mainly see heterogeneous actors, divergent reactions and political conflicts. The comparative case table included in this publication (Dijkstra, 2002, p.315) shows remarkable similarity to the method of qualitative comparative case analysis (QCA), a method favored by complexity scientists in public administration.

From this brief overview we can deduce that the development economist Geske Dijkstra was far ahead of her time. Like the economists from my opening quote, Geske quickly sensed that development economics cannot be captured in economic comparisons, but that the complex, adaptive, underlying dynamics can only be analyzed through the comparison of qualitative descriptions. She does not believe in simple solutions but emphasizes the unruly nature of development aid. It is no coincidence that her work is peppered with the jargon of unruliness: there are 'paradoxes', 'unintended consequences' and 'illusions' everywhere.

Dealing with complex adaptive systems

The perspective of complex adaptive systems has been embraced in various scientific disciplines. Nevertheless, this perspective creates a difficult dilemma for scientists and practitioners: if the system is complex and adaptive, and the effect of external interventions therefore unpredictable, it is also difficult to influence its direction. This is particularly problematic for scientific fields in which interventions are *core business*, such as organizational science, public administration and development economics.

Fortunately, various scientific perspectives have sought – and found – ways to redirect the course of complex adaptive systems, while acknowledging the complexity and adaptability. In the context of this contribution, I would like to specifically highlight two strategies, because they can also be clearly seen in Geske's work: emergence and ownership.

Emergence is a central concept in the analysis of complex adaptive systems:

organized behavior 'arises' more or less spontaneously, without a clear plan, but the behavior is coordinated. The classic example of the flock of birds illustrates this: there is no conductor orchestrating the flock of birds, yet it is a coherent pattern, without the birds bumping into each other.

When it comes to redirecting complex systems, many authors claim that it is important to link up with the emerging strategies that are already embedded in the system. Tony Bovaird (2008) argues that these emergent strategies reveal themselves through seemingly small events that resonate in the interactions in the system and may have large effects in the end. Geske is clearly aware of the importance of emergence in foreign aid. In various publications, she calls for intervention that align with the events within the system rather than disturbing the system from the outside. One clear example can be found in Dijkstra (2011, p.131), when she states that "donors should take domestic political processes seriously and should not ignore them". A second example can be found in her position with regard to supporting authoritarian regimes. Even though supporting authoritarian regimes is contested, many examples show that stable non-authoritarian opposition benefits from political stability and economic development. In times of chaos, democratic reforms are highly unlikely (see Francois & Sud, 2006). Geske clearly is aware of this when stating that "there appears to be (...) a trade-off between the democracy and the political stability objective (...), to the extent that aid to authoritarian regimes may help to maintain stability" (Dijkstra, 2018, p.231).

'Ownership' is a second strategy that may be used in dealing with complex adaptive systems. "Country ownership in development aid assumes that with recipient countries' interest and participation, "owning" aid-funded initiatives will lead to more successful outcomes" (Watson et al., 2016: 5). In a broader sense, and building upon the work of Elinor Ostrom (Ostrom, 1999; Ostrom, Burger, Field, Norgaard & Policansky, 1999, we may argue that ownership is about the ability to design and moderate the institutions that decide about the allocation and use of foreign aid by the participants. Ostrom claims that when participants 'own' the institutions, these institutions produce better outcomes through four mechanisms:

1. Use of local knowledge. Users usually have a good idea of how the system works, they know the other users and what standards apply.
2. The inclusion of reliable participants. Because of their knowledge of the system, users can set rules that reduce the chance that new entrants are purely rational egoists. As a result, the costs of sanctions and monitoring can be limited.
3. Short feedback loops. In local systems, it quickly becomes clear

whether rules are working properly or not and what unintended effects may occur. The parties involved also have the powers to adjust these rules and they have an interest in seeing this happen.

4. Parallel autonomous systems. Different local systems emerge, each with its own set of rules. This reduces the chance of major crises as a result of a failing system with consequences for a large area or a large target group.

Throughout Geske's work, she seems to express support for country ownership, for instance when arguing in favor of general budget support (see for instance Dijkstra, 2018, p.231). But her clearest acknowledgement of the ownership principle may be found in the following citation: "Donors should not attempt to use aid to buy policies (...). This practice denies the country the right to design its own policies and find its own ways" (Dijkstra, 2002, p.332).

Concluding remarks

Throughout her long career as a development economist, Geske has come to learn, accept, and even embrace the complex adaptive character of developing countries. In that journey, she has broadened her theoretical and methodological scope. Her work is a cocktail of economic assumptions challenged by empirical reality and topped with political pragmatism. In this contribution I have shown that - without explicitly converting to the complex systems paradigm or language - many of her insights, conclusions and recommendations build upon the principles in the complexity paradigm – or the other way round.

On the one hand, Geske sometimes may have felt lonely in what is now the Department of Public Administration and Sociology – being one of the few economists and being the only researcher specialized in developing countries. Though, the list of contributors to this *liber amicorum* shows that she has found collaborators throughout the academic world that share her passion and fascination for issues of development and foreign aid to fill that gap. On the other hand, through this contribution I have also shown that the theoretical embedding within our department may have been 'spot on'. I think she has, consciously or unconsciously, benefited from the plural, fragmented and pragmatic approach of the public administration discipline. In her turn, she has contributed to the evolution of that same discipline by highlighting the importance of conceptual clarity and causal precision – and by forcing us to think beyond the borders of Rotterdam, the Hague and our own country. I would like to thank her for these inspiring insights during the time we have been colleagues at Erasmus University.

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6

DE ANALYSE VAN ECONOMISCHE SYSTEMEN GESCHIEDENIS EN ACTUALITEIT HANS-JÜRGEN WAGENER¹

De vergelijking van politieke systemen kent een geschiedenis die teruggaat tot de *Politeia* van Aristoteles. De vergelijking van economische systemen is een product van de 20e eeuw. De eerste expliciete definitie van het economische systeem vinden we in Sombart (1925, 14): “die als geistige Einheit gedachte Wirtschaftsweise, die (1) von einer bestimmten Wirtschaftsgesinnung beherrscht, (2) eine bestimmte Ordnung und Organisation hat und (3) eine bestimmte Technik anwendet”. Klaarblijkelijk speelt Sombart in op het historisch materialisme van Marx, die de productiewijze (het systeem) opvat als een samenspel van productiekrachten (techniek), productieverhoudingen (orde en organisatie) en de bovenbouw (onder andere politieke en wettelijke regels, cultuur en gezindheid).

De neoklassieke hoofdstroom van de economie stelde een ander probleem centraal: optimalisering onder bepaalde nevenvoorwaarden, ofwel allocatieve efficiëntie. Het economische systeem werd als een onveranderlijk gegeven verondersteld en dus lange tijd verwaarloosd. Pas in de jaren negentig van de twintigste eeuw veranderde dit aanzienlijk. Het waren zeker niet toevallig economische historici zoals Douglass North die inzichten van Marx en Weber herontdekten: zij stelden dat “history matters”, “ideas matter” (Denzau en North 1994, p. 3) en “institutions matter” (North 1994). Daar sluit onmiddellijk de vraag bij aan: “But Which Ones?” (Bardhan 2005), die door theoretisch en vergelijkend empirisch onderzoek beantwoord dient te worden.

De marxistische aanpak bevat twee algemene inzichten. Economische systemen kunnen als modellen en als case studies worden geanalyseerd (Bornstein,

¹ Deze tekst is gebaseerd op Wagener (2023).

1971, pp. 350-351). Een model is een ideaaltipe bestaande uit elementen (zoals technologie, instituties en mentale modellen) die de onderzoeker, meestal op basis van een algemene theorie en empirische evidentie, kenmerkend acht voor een concreet systeem. Case studies vergelijken bestaande economische systemen. Deze zijn historische fenomenen en zijn altijd gemengde systemen die nooit een puur model op perfecte manier weerspiegelen. Dit is het tweede marxistische inzicht. Historische fenomenen hebben een verleden dat de tegenwoordige toestand mede bepaalt (padafhankelijkheid). De verschillende nationale eigenaardigheden van de systeemopbouw resulteren in talrijke mogelijke case studies.

Een aanpalend onderzoeksterrein is dat van de institutionele economie. Haar onderwerp, instituties en constitutionele regels, zijn ongetwijfeld elementen van economische systemen, maar toch worden deze niet onderzocht op een historische en beschrijvende manier. In plaats daarvan past de institutionele economie het standaardmodel van rationele keuze onder nevenvoorwaarden toe (Voigt 2019 & Voigt, 2020) en is dus een aanvulling op de mainstream. Een tweede aanpalend terrein zijn de *area studies*. Zij leggen zich toe op een apart geografisch gebied (de voormalige Sovjet-Unie, Oost-Europa, Latijns-Amerika, enz.) en zijn niet beperkt tot de economie. Zij werden in het begin van twintigste eeuw geïntroduceerd om de imperiale belangen van de Europese koloniale machten te ondersteunen en analyseren politiek, economie, cultuur en talen van een bepaalde geografische regio – een voorbeeld van een instituut voor *area studies* is de School of Oriental and African Studies (nu om redenen van politieke correctheid slechts onder de afkorting SOAS bekend) aan de Universiteit van London, die in 1916 als School of Oriental Studies opgericht werd.

De abstracte economische theorie werd valide geacht voor ieder economisch systeem. Vilfredo Pareto ([1909] 1966, 364) maakte dit expliciet: “De zuivere economie biedt ons geen werkelijk beslissende maatstaaf om te kiezen tussen een sociale organisatie die gebaseerd is op particulier eigendom en een socialistische organisatie”. Zo’n 50 jaar later bleef deze stelling onveranderd en werd deze herhaald door Tjalling Koopmans (1957, p. 147): “In particular, the economics profession is not ready to speak with anything approaching scientific authority on the economic aspects of the issue of individual versus collective enterprise which divides mankind in our time”. Ook al zijn de economen indifferent wat betreft de theoretische eigenschappen van de fundamentele allocatiemechanismen (markt en plan), zijn zij het niet betreffende de respectievelijke economische systemen. Dit heeft wederom Pareto (1964 [1896-97] I, 321) duidelijk gemaakt: “Je kunt wezens bedenken die in alle opzichten superieur zijn vergeleken met menselijke wezens

zoals die tot nu toe op aarde aan te treffen zijn; dan zijn deze oneindig deskundige, eerlijke en verstandige wezens mogelijkwerwijze in staat, met werkelijk bovenmenselijke inspanningen, de economische fenomenen zo te beheersen en soortgelijke resultaten (nutsmaximalisering) te bereiken zoals die door het spel van de vrije concurrentie bereikt kunnen worden”.

Het eerste en meest omvangrijke leerboek over de vergelijking van economische systemen was een stalinistisch werk uit 1954 (Political Economy [1954] 1957), dat de politieke economie van het kapitalisme en het socialisme tegenover elkaar stelde. De oplage liep in de miljoenen en was verplichte stof voor alle academische studies in de socialistische wereld. Het aantal Westerse leerboeken breidde zich vooral in de jaren zestig en zeventig van de vorige eeuw uit. Vooraanstaande auteurs zijn Landauer, Bornstein, Grossman, Neuberger en Duffy, Wiles en Gregory en Stuart. De vergelijking van economische systemen was kennelijk bij voorkeur een onderwerp van Amerikaans onderzoek en onderwijs. De lancering van Sputnik 1 (1957) en de ruimtereis van Gagarin (1961) choqueerden de VS en leidden tot een intensieve politieke en academische belangstelling voor de Sovjet-Unie. Khrushchevs uitdaging voor de wedstrijd der systemen werd serieus aanvaard. In Nederland daarentegen speelde vergelijkend onderzoek een bescheiden rol. Naast Floor Hartog (1968) in Groningen en Dick Schouten (1980) in Tilburg heeft ook deze auteur twee boeken aan de literatuur toegevoegd (Wagener 1980, 1988).

In het naoorlogse Europa komen wij twee scholen van vergelijkende analyse van economische systemen tegen, de Duitse en de Franse. De Duitse school volgde Walter Eucken's theorie van economische orde (*Ordnungsökonomie*) (Eucken, 2004, 2021). Eucken probeerde tussen de historische school en de theoretische school (klassiek, Oostenrijks en neoklassiek) te bemiddelen. Beide moesten volgens hem worden gecombineerd om concrete economische processen te kunnen begrijpen.

Hiernaast heeft de Franse *théorie de la régulation* zich toegelegd op de analyse van historische vormen van orde. Zij werd in de jaren 1970 geïnitieerd als reactie op de crisis aan het einde van de *trente glorieuses* en kan als kritiek op de neoklassieke school worden gezien (Boyer & Saillard, 1995). Haar wortels liggen in het historisch materialisme van Marx, maar in tegenstelling tot Marx en Eucken zijn de regulationisten terughoudend met het doen van normatieve uitspraken. De enige toets voor een actueel systeem is zijn stabiele uitvoerbaarheid. Het verschil tussen de Duitse en Franse benaderingen werd duidelijk tijdens de postsocialistische transformatie. De Duitse ordoliberalen stelden een programma op voor wat er gedaan moest worden, zoals Eucken ([2004] dat al voor de transformatie van de

Duitse oorlogs- en planeconomie had gedaan. Dit kwam op vele punten overeen met de zogenaamde Washington Consensus van 1990. Daartegen observeerden de Franse regulationisten vanuit de zijlijn slechts wat daadwerkelijk werd gedaan.

Om economische systemen te beschrijven en te vergelijken zijn objectieve criteria nodig. Tjalling Koopmans en John Michael Montias (1971) alsook János Kornai (1971) hebben een descriptief-theoretisch kader geleverd. Koopmans en Montias doelen rechtstreeks op de vergelijking van economische systemen. Zoals de titel van zijn boek *Anti-Equilibrium* suggereert, beoogt Kornai een systeemtheoretisch alternatief voor de algemene evenwichtstheorie te geven. In beide gevallen wordt het economisch proces beschreven als een transformatie van inputs, gebaseerd op individuele en collectieve beslissingen, in samenwerking met een externe omgeving tot een output die op basis van de wederom individuele en collectieve voorkeuren wordt geëvalueerd. Het systeem bepaalt onder andere de beslissingsbevoegdheden van individuen en centrale autoriteiten.

Output $\{o\}$ van het economisch proces is een vector van goederen en diensten en resulteert uit de voorspelde waarden van de niet-controleerbare omgevingsfactoren $\{e\}$, het effectieve systeem $\{s\}$ en de genomen individuele en collectieve beslissingen $\{p\}$ (subscripts i en A duiden respectievelijk de individuele en centrale autoriteit aan, P de verzameling van mogelijke beslissingen). Het effectieve systeem $\{s\}$ is een door traditie en constitutie bepaalde deelverzameling van $\{S\}$ en “includes all political, social and economic institutions, organizational structure, laws and rules (and the extent of their enforcement and voluntary observance), and all traditions, religious and secular beliefs, attitudes, values, taboos, and the resulting systematic or stochastic behavior patterns.” (Koopmans & Montias, 1971, pp. 31-32). Deze factoren vallen nauwelijks exact te identificeren.

De relatie tussen deze elementen noemen Koopmans en Montias de *grand relationship*:

$$o = f(e, s, p_A, p_i)$$

met p_A in $P_A(e, s)$ en p_i in $P_i(e, s)$

Kornai voegt er een belangrijk element aan toe. Het economische proces produceert namelijk niet alleen goederen en diensten maar ook de informatie (zoals prijzen) die voor een optimale werking van de economie nodig is. Hij onderscheidt in de economie een reële sfeer, die de materiele processen bevat, en een controlesfeer, die uit communicatie en informatie bestaat. Beslissingen worden in de controlesfeer genomen en zijn gebaseerd op de verwachte uitkomsten van $\{o\}$. De actuele productie vindt plaats in de reële sfeer en leidt tot reële output $\{o\}$. Beide moeten niet gelijk zijn. Koopmans en Montias (1971, pp. 36-37) veronderstellen nu:

“the policies applied are the best available within the institutional and normative constraints of the system”. Dat komt erop neer dat de actoren de *grand relationship*, het functioneren van de economie, kennen en dus rationele verwachtingen hebben.

Het zou voorbarig zijn om het concept van het economische systeem over boord te werpen omdat zijn elementen en zijn werking welhaast niet te meten zijn. Zowel de constitutieve factoren als hun effecten voor de productie van welvaart, kunnen op holistische manier worden “begrepen”. De operatie die Max Weber *Verstehen* heeft genoemd of de methode van “verhalen” zijn bruikbaar voor de vergelijkende analyse: “Storytelling is an attempt to give an account of an interrelated set of phenomena in which fact, theory, and values are all mixed together in the telling. Historians of course are the archetypal storytellers” (Ward, 1972, 180). Het is uiteindelijk het “verhaal” dat politici overtuigt om actief te worden.

De plan–marktdichotomie van economische systemen heeft geleid tot verscheidene hypothesen betreffende hun mogelijke ontwikkeling. Friedrich Hayek (Hayek & Caldwell, 2009) stelt bijvoorbeeld dat iedere afwijking van het neoliberale pad der deugd leidt tot de glibberige *road to serfdom*. Jan Tinbergen (1959, 1961) meent daartegen dat uit de economische theorie de constructie van een optimaal regime volgt dat markt en plan combineert en waarheen de rationale politiek van mensen die dezelfde *desiderata* nastreven, zal convergeren. Uit socialistische hoek werd deze hypothese uiteraard bestreden (Van den Doel, 1971).

Het einde van het reëel bestaande socialisme in 1990 kwam als een verrassing en heeft de vergelijking van economische systemen beroofd van haar centrale vraagstuk, namelijk de tegenstelling tussen individualisme en collectivisme. Daarmee kwam de vraag op of deze tak van economie een nieuw paradigma nodig heeft, te weten een paradigma dat zich concentreert op kapitalistische economische systemen. Twee aanpakken zijn hier van belang. Een groep van vijf *law and economics* specialisten heeft *The New Comparative Economics* (Djankov et al., 2003) gepresenteerd, maar in feite vastgehouden aan de traditionele tegenstelling van particuliere en publieke regulering van het economische proces. Hun aanpak is gebaseerd op de *trade-off* tussen wanorde en dictatuur: hoe meer particuliere regulering, des te meer wanorde en hoe meer publieke regulering, des te meer dictatuur – de Marxistische visie van het individualisme aan de ene en Hayeks visie van het collectivisme aan de andere kant. Gemeten worden de variabelen met sociale kosten in een ruimte van wanorde en dictatuur.

Elk systeem wordt gekarakteriseerd door een lijn van alternatieve combinaties, de *institutional possibility frontier*, die een maatschappij, gegeven haar *civic capital*, niet overschrijden kan. Het *civic capital* is een aggregaat van alle institutionele factoren

die de efficiëntie van het systeem bepalen. Welke mate van efficiëntie voor een gegeven maatschappij mogelijk is, hangt af van talloze factoren: geschiedenis, traditie, geografie, cultuur, mentale modellen, governance, cognitie enz. Het lijkt een gewaagde opgave deze variabelen in een aggregaat samen te vatten. De lijn “is assumed to be convex to the origin. This matches the standard neoclassical assumption that marginal increases in dictatorship produce progressively smaller reductions in disorder” (Ibid., 599). De analogie met een indifferentielijn springt in het oog, ook al bestaat een dergelijke neoklassieke veronderstelling niet. Waar de systeemspecifieke *possibility frontier* de laagste quasi-budgetlijn van totale sociale kosten raakt, heb je dan de optimale combinatie van instituties. Dat lijkt heel sterk op Tinbergen, maar blijft een fictie.

De tweede postsocialistische aanpak, de *Varieties of Capitalism*-benadering van Peter Hall en David Soskice (2001), heeft aanzienlijk meer empirische studies voortgebracht. Hun centrale hypothese stelt dat noch institutionele optimalisering, noch internationale economische integratie “will force the institutions and regulatory regimes of diverse nations into convergence on a common model” (Ibid, vi). De taak van het systeem is overal gelijk: ondernemingen moeten relaties ontwikkelen die geschikt zijn om coördinatieproblemen op te lossen. Geschiedenis, traditie en cultuur resulteren in verschillende oplossingen van dit probleem, die tot verschillende institutionele ordes van het economische proces leiden. Uit verschillende institutionele structuren volgen verschillende strategieën van ondernemingen en daarmee gepaard gaan dan ook verschillende vormen van comparatieve voordelen en productspecialisaties.

Voor een deelverzameling von OECD-landen hebben Hall en Soskice twee clusters van ideale systeemtypes geïdentificeerd: liberale markteconomieën en gecoördineerde markteconomieën. De eerste groep vertrouwt vooral op markten en hiërarchieën om hun activiteiten te coördineren, de tweede zet ook niet-markt instituties in, zoals netwerken tussen bedrijven, corporatieve organisaties en overleginstituties. Het functioneren van het systeem vereist een hoog niveau van sociaal kapitaal. Beide systeemtypen zijn even succesvol gebleken. Ook de globalisatie heeft het laatste type niet laten verdwijnen. De overeenkomst van deze aanpak met de Franse *théorie de la régulation* is duidelijk.

Economische systemen zijn aan permanente veranderingen onderworpen. Zij passen zich continu aan een dynamische en turbulente omgeving aan. Normaal gebeurt dit stapsgewijs op een evolutionaire manier (Wagener, 2011). Toch het kan ook in sprongen gebeuren zoals in de postsocialistische transformatie. Net zoals het economische systeem kiest de analyse van systeemveranderingen haar

uitgangspositie bij Marx en zijn theorie van het historisch materialisme. Schumpeter (2016, [1912] 1934) heeft deze theorie uitgebreid met het methodologisch individualisme en de figuur van de ondernemer die de actor is in het proces. Vertegenwoordigers van het nieuwe institutionalisme zoals Douglass North (2010, p. 63) hebben met Marx en Schumpeter beklemtoond dat “changes in [the] stock of knowledge is the key to the evolution of economies”. Aan de andere kant is het de macht van de heersende klasse die de richting van veranderingen, of juist hun verhindering, bepaalt: “the structure of an economic market reflects the beliefs of those in a position to make the rules of the game” (Ibid., 50). Daarover zou nog meer te zeggen vallen.

Masahiko Aoki (2001) en Avner Greif (1998, 2006) analyseren met hun “Historical and Comparative Institutional Analysis” instituties als evolutionair ontstane systeeminstrumenten. In het middelpunt van de belangstelling staan niet individuele instituties maar de complexe relaties tussen hen, waarbij informele impliciete elementen samen met formele expliciete elementen een samenhangend geheel vormen. “Agents’ strategic choices made on the basis of shared beliefs jointly reproduce the equilibrium state, which in turn reconfirms its summary representation” (Aoki, 2001, p. 12). De keuze van relevante instituties wordt niet bepaald door een rationele beslissing onder nevenvoorwaarden zoals in de neoklassieke institutionele economie. Zij ontwikkelt zich onder invloed van historische aspecten, culturele factoren, mentale houdingen en kennis, sociale en politieke structuren, enzovoorts.

De hier toegepaste speltheorie bevat twee belangrijke inzichten. In de eerste plaats is er het inzicht dat instituties als evenwichten zelfbehoudend zijn. In een Nash-evenwicht zijn de actoren niet in veranderingen geïnteresseerd. Dat verklaart de hardnekkigheid van systemen. Er bestaan in de wereld talloze weinig efficiënte ordes die stabiel zijn en niet in staat “best practice” oplossingen over te nemen. In de tweede plaats zijn er meerdere evenwichten mogelijk, wat bijvoorbeeld het naast elkaar bestaan van de liberale en de gecoördineerde markteconomieën verklaart.

Institutionele veranderingen zetten in als overtuigingen niet meer overeenstemmen met de feiten, als er een cognitieve mismatch is ontstaan tussen wat men denkt te weten en wat men feitelijk ervaart. De oorzaken zijn meestal exogeen: nieuwe kennis, nieuwe markten of externe schokken. “Endogenous institutional change appears, then, to be a contradiction in terms” (Greif 2006, 241). Deze aanpak blijft binnen het Marx-Schumpeter paradigma. Ontstaan en verandering van het institutionele systeem is volgens de Stanford-economen Aoki en Greif een complex evolutionair fenomeen. Daarmee staan zij niet zo ver af van

Hayek (2011, p. 164) die beweerde: “We have never designed our economic system. We were not intelligent enough for that”.

Referenties

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7

GIVING MONEY CAN BE SURPRISINGLY EFFECTIVE LESSONS FROM BUDGET SUPPORT AND CASH TRANSFERS RUERD RUBEN

Introduction

Since the very beginning of development aid there has been an ambivalent relationship between donors and recipients. While donors stress the importance of effective delivery of aid, recipients are foremost interested in reinforcing ownership and changing asymmetric relationships. These two sides of the 'chain' of aid are usually difficult to reconcile (Sobhan, 1990).

In this complex political landscape, policy priorities frequently change. It is increasingly recognized that silver bullets are not available. The initial focus on reducing capital shortages first shifted to addressing market failures and then to institutional reforms and governance. This was accompanied by changes in the mechanism that are considered vital for guaranteeing aid effectiveness. Procedures that reinforce accountability and complementarities and that reduce transaction costs receive growing attention.

Development cooperation is sometimes considered to be a rather cumbersome procedure for distributing money (to those that are in need). This involves a large number of competing institutions that are guided by complex rules for the use, monitoring and evaluation of resource allocation agreements. Despite tremendous efforts and good intentions, aid often produces disappointing results. Perverse incentives and opportunistic behaviour put aid effectiveness at risk (Gibson, Andersson & Shivakumar, 2005).

Much of the development debate is therefore related to the institutions that structure the delivery of aid. Overcoming fragmentation at the supply of aid and reducing the volatility in its delivery are considered major challenges for an

effective and transparent aid architecture. In addition, the governance of aid relationships and the mechanisms for reaching the poorest people are increasingly seen as the Achilles heel for strengthening aid effectiveness.

In this context, it is interesting to focus attention on two rather ‘simple’ aid delivery modalities that are based on large-scale transfers of resources for investments in priority areas. Giving money without too many strings attached may enforce ownership of local recipients and permits them to define their own longer-term investment priorities. This is usually accompanied by strong stakeholder responsiveness and high participation rates in terms of outreach and uptake of activities.

Budget support and cash transfers rely on rather different institutional design principles, but also share several similarities with respect to their underlying behavioural mechanisms. Both interventions rely on direct transfers of resources and try to increase the time-horizon of recipient public and private partners (i.e., governments and citizens). Most importantly, they meet similar objections from politicians in donor countries that show little interest in proven impact and tend to focus on their loss of control over aid flows.

In the remainder of this article we discuss the available evidence regarding the poverty implications of country-level budget support programs and more targeted cash transfer programs that aim at direct social protection. Both types of programs use explicit (ex-ante or ex-post) conditionalities to enforce public or private behaviour. We argue that the decentralisation of aid arrangements can be helpful to recover trust and establish confidence in the poverty effectiveness of development cooperation.

Budget support

Budget support – also labelled as ‘program aid’ - provides countries on a contractual base with resources to support public investments in priority programs. It aims to align with country policies and to reduce the burden of multiple, fragmented aid projects (in line with the 2005 Paris Declaration). Budget support is provided against the definition of a nationally-convened Poverty Reduction Strategy Plan (PRSP). It attempts to strengthen country financial and management systems and, ultimately, to achieve better development results through more efficient, effective public spending (Dijkstra, 2021).

In the low-income countries, the increased flow of funds resulting from budget support led to a considerable improvement in the coverage and utilisation of services for the benefit of their citizens – particularly in education, healthcare and water and sanitation (see Figure 7.1). Other important investment areas were

microfinance services, climate-smart agriculture environmental management, and social protection programs. Budget support also focussed on improvements in macroeconomic performance, a significant strengthening of public finance management systems and some gains in transparency and oversight, as well as in the legal and institutional framework for fighting corruption (FISCUS/ADE, 2014).

Budget support led to substantial alignment of aid to local systems. In most countries disbursement conditions of donors were harmonised to a great extent. The predictability of budget support became substantially better than for highly fragmented project aid. Budget support also decreased transaction costs for aid delivery. Contrary to the many expectations on the high fiduciary risks of budget support, there is no evidence that it increased corruption (Dijkstra, 2018).




Figure 7.1 Thematic priorities of budget support programs

Source: World Bank (Koeberle, Stavreski & Walliser, 2006)

The experience of most countries demonstrates that budget support can achieve significant results within diverse contexts. Tangible outcomes have been achieved on the reduction of (non-)income poverty – especially in rural areas - even while these cannot always be fully attributed to budget support. The delivery mechanisms for budget support were closely aligned to government policies and processes. Annual disbursements were in line with the amounts projected in the

budgets and proved to be significantly more predictable than other aid modalities, even while the timing of disbursements within year sometimes proved to be more problematic (Orth, Schmitt, Krisch & Oltsch, 2017).

On the other hand, there were no signs of disincentive effects resulting from budget support and additional resources were used predominantly to raise spendings within the priority sectors, especially in education, health and infrastructure. Transparency and accountability systems improved, but policy dialogues were often not fully inclusive and less satisfactory. The expectation of donors that budget support could leverage better democratic governance laid the foundations for growing disappointment (Molenaers, 2012).

In fact, the translation of nationally-convened budget support programs into activities that are managed by regional and local authorities met severe constraints. Information on commitments did not lead to greater transparency in spendings. Some loose efforts were made to inform parents on school budgets to enable them to exercise democratic control. In some cities, citizen organizations were involved in bottom-up budgeting that guaranteed full disclosure of relevant fiscal information. But these complementary initiatives remain exceptions on the bumpy road towards performance-based aid management.

In recent years, there has been a sharp decline in the acceptance of budget support in donor circles and a growing scepticism about the implementation modalities that were used as reasons to fully suspend it (except by several multilateral agencies that remain using it). Despite a large number of country evaluations and synthesis studies that attest to the positive effects of budget support (Orth et al., 2017; FISCUS/ADE, 2014; IOB, 2012), empirical findings on the effectiveness of the aid modality were bypassed by political debates demanding the closure of budget support programs.

Taking stock of the experiences with budget support since the late 1990s, donors often had unrealistic expectations about the possibilities of increasing the incomes of the poorest communities in the short term. Moreover, the policy theory behind general budget support changed over time: initially, countries had to comply with strict entry conditions in the area of socio-economic policy, but soon after, donors added improved governance as a condition for receiving budget support (IOB, 2012). Recent aid policies are increasingly determined by foreign policy and commercial objectives. Despite the positive effects of budget support found in studies and evaluations, most donors no longer provide budget support (Dijkstra, 2021).

Cash transfers

Cash transfer are interventions that directly provide cash resources (or vouchers) to target specific populations with the aim of reducing poverty and support a variety of development outcomes. Cash transfer programs may be either conditional or unconditional (Biscaye, Orth, Schmitt, Krisch & Oltsch, 2017). Conditional cash transfer programs offer social safety nets for transferring money directly to low-income households contingent on meeting certain behavioural requirements (e.g., visiting a health clinic, attending school). Unconditional cash transfers share similar social safety net goals but do not condition transfers on recipient behaviour.

Cash transfers are targeted towards poor households' investments in education or health (e.g., keep children in school, attend prenatal check-ups, etc.). They combine a protection goal to reduce current poverty and a promotion objective to prevent future poverty by facilitating household investments in human capital accumulation. They are influential in redistributing income to the poor and have well-documented impacts on reducing current poverty, increasing school participation, eliminating child labour, and improving the use of health and nutrition services among mothers and children (Pega et al., 2022).

Small, frequent, and reliable cash payments to poor households have shown to cause contemporaneous improvements in multiple domains, such as per capita consumption, savings, nutrition, mental health, teen pregnancies, child marriages, immunizations and intimate partner violence (see Figure 7.2). The large majority of the evidence on long-term outcomes is "positive", indicating that cash transfer programs decrease stunting frequency or early marriage, increase women's savings and investments opportunities, and enhance women's empowerment (Biscaye et al., 2017). These effects may be sustained in the longer run, and perhaps even grow. Delivering these programs through government-led cash transfer systems has led to large impacts at low cost and they are hence considered highly cost-effective. Synthesis studies show, however, "mixed" evidence and some outcomes are still uncertain and need further confirmation (Pega et al., 2021).

Low- and middle-income countries have increasingly adopted cash transfer programs as central elements of their poverty reduction and social protection strategies. Bastagli et al. (2016) report that around 130 low- and middle-income countries have at least one unconditional cash transfer program in place (up from 27 countries in 2008). Conditional cash transfers started in Latin America, but growth in the adoption of unconditional transfer programs is especially high in sub-Saharan Africa, where they are used by 40 of 48 countries (up from 20 countries in

2010). With the Covid-19 pandemic, cash transfers reached unparalleled levels of coverage (over 1.3 billion people, about half with digital delivery) but spread unevenly across countries and were largely of short duration.

The last decades mark the emergence of another approach: direct targeting of the ultra-poor and supporting them simultaneously with a broader package of interventions that includes a lumpsum cash grant or asset transfers (e.g., a dairy cow) along with complementary small regular cash transfers (so that the beneficiaries do not have to liquidate their productive assets to deal with negative shocks), training to acquire skills needed to succeed in the chosen income-generating activity, and psychosocial support in the form of life skills training or visits from social workers – often for a period of several years. While these programs can be more expensive, they are also expected to result in more structural changes (Sikkema, 2020).




Figure 7.2 Outcomes of cash transfer programs

Source: Biscaye et al. (2017)

Non-governmental organizations, such as 100Weeks, provide people with weekly cash donations for 100 weeks with no strings attached, allowing them to lift their families out of extreme poverty. Selected beneficiaries receive training and money on provided mobile phones. In a similar vein, GiveDirectly became a leading global NGO specialized in delivering digital cash transfers. Since 2009, they delivered \$580M+ in cash directly into the hands of over 1.37 million people living

in poverty. Resources are used for a broad range of activities, such as purchasing cows and goats and chickens, paying school fees, water, solar lights, tin roofs, irrigation, motorcycles to jumpstart taxi services and other businesses.

(Un)conditional cash transfer programs have stimulated a large number of randomized field experiments (RCTs) that incorporate progressive learning during their implementation. The Abdul Latif Jameel Poverty Action Lab (J-PAL) is created as the global research hub to inform policy and practice by scientific evidence. This initiative proved to be vital for creating a policy consensus around the role of cash transfers for effective poverty reduction programs. The availability of independently-collected field evidence and the engagement in critical learning on the possibilities for improving effectiveness and scaling have added to the confidence in cash transfer programs.

Lessons learned

The before-outlined procedures and mechanisms for the design of budget support programs and cash transfers show important differences in terms of the choice of instruments and the modalities for delivery and implementation. However, there are also important similarities in the result areas that are targeted: better access to education, health care (especially for pregnant women and children) and (self)employment. These services are considered vital for reaching poor people living in less favourable areas (remote rural regions, urban slums).

The underlying ‘theory of change’ of budget support programs is essentially different from the ‘intervention theory’ underpinning cash transfers (see Table 7.1). Budget support focusses on leveraging public finance towards social development programmes that offer key services to the target population. The supply of donor funding through national governments and their subsequent channelling to sector ministries and regional authorities supported public finance management but made poverty targeting more complicated.

On the other hand, social protection aims to provide direct support to households and communities, usually taking women as an entry point. Cash transfers become available on a regular basis, sometimes requiring the participation in immunization, pregnancy and infant care, and educational attainment. Since they are demand-oriented, most cash transfer programs rely on self-selection but show reasonable effective targeting. Moreover, opportunities for collective action at village or community level enable participants to strengthen resilience and support investments for improved livelihoods.

Table 7.1 Comparison of budget support and cash transfer programs

	Budget Support	Cash Transfers
<i>Focus</i>	Macroeconomic	Microeconomic
<i>Orientation</i>	Supply-driven	Demand-oriented
<i>Level</i>	Country/region/sector	Individual/household/community
<i>Outcome</i>	Governance	Resilience

Measuring the effectiveness and impact of budget support and cash transfer programs meets great challenges. The impact of budget support is difficult to establish unambiguously – in the absence of an adequate counterfactual – and is usually based on a large number of cross-country comparisons. The impact of cash transfers can be assessed using rigorous experimental approaches (RCTs), but these are difficult to generalize. Whereas the risks of selection bias of the recipients of cash transfers can be adequately detected, budget support is still likely to suffer from excessive reach. Different methods have been developed to target beneficiaries, vary the payment modalities, as well as the payment frequency in order to better tailor the programs to local needs and possibilities.

In essence, however, budget support and cash transfer programs are based on a number of similar behavioural mechanisms that are considered vital for improving aid effectiveness. These critical assumptions on the underlying drivers for influencing and changing the behaviour of poor people focus on five leverage points:

- Poverty reduction starts with reducing uncertainty regarding access to resources, markets and networks, as well as knowledge and information. Most people fall back in poverty due to unexpected shocks and idiosyncratic events (such as sickness, fire, marriage, theft) that need insurance in order to prevent chronic disasters. The stretched time-horizon of budget support and cash transfer programs enables recipients to engage in recovery activities and to invest in activities that strengthen their resilience against future shocks.
- Transaction costs strongly depend on trust between partners in budget support and cash transfer programs. Improving institutional trust is a key condition for generating positive responses from final recipients. Regular and predictable transfers are helpful to reinforce trust. This can be further supported by people's participation in the design and implementation of these programs, and by guaranteeing transparency

about decision-making procedures and resource allocation rules.

- People care first about well-being: Investments in child care, education and health payoff in terms of subsequent opportunities for engaging in economically productive activities that improve livelihoods. Poor household also benefit from community-level social protection and local infrastructure that permit reciprocal exchange and mutual assistance. Many cash transfer programs enable the diversification of income sources and reinforce social networks, but environmental implications remain more limited.
- Civic support for budget support and cash transfer programs improves with transparent targeting that includes clear criteria for eligibility. Political drivers may easily lead to leakages or coverage failures. Effective beneficiary targeting involves many trade-offs in terms of cost effectiveness, and therefore demographic or spatial targeting are usually preferred (Slater & Farrington, 2009).
- Cash transfer and budget support programs need balance between scaling and adaptation. There may be a temptation to ‘roll out’ effective experiences to different locations, but is equally important to rely on adaptive mechanisms for tailoring the program better to local conditions. Even while these programs are temporary in nature, sustainability concerns deserve attention. It is therefore of foremost importance to support the anchoring of improved livelihood practices in ordinary behaviour.

In contrast to these common behavioural assumptions and mechanisms underlying effective budget support and cash transfer programs, we need to acknowledge that the political economy conditions around their implementation are essentially different. Budget support rapidly lost popularity when it became associated to authoritarian regimes that paid limited attention to democratic governance. The framing of budget support as ‘governmental’ paved the way for introducing unrealistic political conditionalities (Dijkstra, 2018; 2021; Molenaers, 2012).

This was carefully avoided with the cash transfer programs. Even while there was initially quite some scepticism about their effectiveness, the political constituency in favour of cash transfer was supported by credible evidence on poverty and equity implications. Targeting individuals and communities was popular in policy circles, especially if mechanisms for controlling clientelism were in place (Swamy, 2016). Cash transfers were also broadly used as a direct response

to the Covid-19 crisis and to support recovery from natural disasters (tsunami, floods, droughts) contributing further to its reputation.

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8

THE CASE FOR DEBT RELIEF TWENTY YEARS LATER NIELS HERMES

Introduction

In 1988, Geske defended her PhD thesis in Groningen entitled “Industrialization in a mixed economic order: A system-comparative study of the industrialization policy of Nicaragua”. The topic of her thesis shows her interest in social and economic issues. Also after she defended her thesis, Geske remained interested in economic and social development. She wrote about several topics, such as gender equality, the effectiveness of development aid, and the impact of structural adjustment policies of the IMF and World Bank for developing economies such as Uganda and Nicaragua. In most of her studies, she provides clear policy recommendations contributing to policy debates on how to solve real-life social and economic development challenges.

During 2001-2003, I had the pleasure to work with Geske on one such real-life challenge: the effectiveness of debt relief. We wrote a report for the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, evaluating the potential of providing support for debt relief to heavily indebted poor countries (HIPC) as a way of effectively supporting the social and economic development of these countries (Dijkstra & Hermes, 2003).

In the remainder of this paper, I will first briefly discuss the work she has published over the past forty years (section 2), after which I will summarize our joint work on the sustainability of debt and the effectiveness of debt relief as an instrument to support social and economic development (section 3). I will then discuss debt sustainability and the case of debt relief twenty years after we published our report in 2003 (section 4). What has research shown with respect to the effectiveness of debt relief over the last twenty years? I will close this paper with some short concluding remarks (section 5).

Geske Dijkstra: A socially concerned economist

Over the past four decades¹, Geske has worked on a large number of topics, all related to social, political and economic development. Evaluating her output, using her Google Scholar account as a source², it shows that she has published on a long list of topics, such as gender equality, governance and economic policy, IMF and World Bank policies (including evaluations of the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP), aid conditionality and program aid), aid effectiveness, trade policy, sustainable development goals (including analyses of CSR certification, water management and sanitation regulation, waste management projects, etc.), poverty reduction, and debt and debt relief programs. Next to writing on these topics, several of her publications also deal with specific countries, in particular Nicaragua, and country regions, most notably Latin America. A major part of her papers and articles (21 out of 114) deal with IMF and World Bank policies. Other topics she published on rather extensively are the social, economic and political development of Nicaragua (18), government debt and the effectiveness of debt relief programs (18), gender equality (14), and (political) governance (10).

Her three most cited articles deal with the measurement of gender equality (Dijkstra & Hanmer, 2000; 323 citations), governance and democracy (Bekkers et al., 2007, p.269) and the effectiveness of the PRSP in Bolivia, Honduras and Nicaragua (Dijkstra, 2005, p.256). Many of her other well-cited papers also deal with one of these three topics.

In addition, the evaluation of her publications reveals that Geske has worked with many co-authors. In the past forty years she has successfully cooperated with over 70 authors, both from within and outside the Netherlands. The one author she cooperated with most is Kristin Komives (9 out of 114 outlets), currently (early 2023) director of programs at ISEAL Alliance, and between 2001 and 2010 senior lecturer at the Institute of Social Studies. Geske and Kristin published several papers and articles on poverty reduction and the effectiveness of the PRSP process in Latin America.

1 See: https://scholar.google.no/citations?user=QUSc_W4AAAAJ&hl=en&oi=ao; website accessed on 30 December 2022. According to her Google Scholar account, her first publication appeared in 1983 and was about revolution and human rights in Nicaragua

2 See: https://scholar.google.no/citations?user=QUSc_W4AAAAJ&hl=en&oi=ao; website accessed on 7 January 2023. The evaluation includes all papers and articles with at least one citation. In total, 114 papers and articles are included in the evaluation in this section.

The large number of co-authors suggests that Geske is easy to work with. My own experience working with her during the early 2000s definitely confirms this. I knew Geske from meetings and seminars on social and economic development. It turned out that we both had an interest for topics such as the effectiveness of development aid, structural adjustment policies, government debt problems and debt relief, and the role of the institutional context to explain differences in development between countries.³ I assume that based on this joint interest, she asked me to join her on a project for the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This project focused on the potential of debt relief as a strategy to support social and economic development of highly indebted countries. I gladly accepted her invitation to work with her on this project. Our cooperation was very pleasant and effective, and we managed to deliver a final report for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs with clear conclusions and recommendations for debt relief policies (Dijkstra & Hermes, 2003).

The sustainability of external debt and the effectiveness of debt relief

In January 2003, Geske and I finalized the draft version of the report for the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, entitled *The Debt Crisis, International Responses, and the Relevance and Effectiveness of Debt Relief: Report of a literature survey and an econometric analysis*. This report was one of the background papers for the *Evaluation of Dutch Relief*, a large research project commissioned by the Ministry and carried out by a team of researchers led by Geske. The objective of the evaluation was to assess the efficiency, effectiveness and relevance of Dutch debt relief granted to developing countries in the 1990s. The evaluation was based on the experience of eight countries (Bolivia, Jamaica, Nicaragua, Mozambique, Peru, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia) with debt relief and the impact on their economic development. In the 1990s, these countries had received substantial debt relief from the Dutch government.

Geske's overall conclusion based on the evaluation of the debt relief experiences of these eight countries was clear (Dijkstra, 2003). Debt relief initiatives generally did not have the intended effect, that is, they did not really help these countries in regaining economic development. In most cases, debt relief was not

³ In the early 2000s, Geske and I organized two seminars, one on development research entitled *Institutions, Institutional Economics and Development*, and one on teaching development economics, both at the Institute of Social Studies in Den Haag.

sufficient for having a positive and significant impact on their growth prospects because it did not lead to a substantial reduction of debt stocks and flows (i.e. debt service payments). Related to this, debt relief initiatives would not make a difference unless they would contribute to a significant reduction of the influx of new loans, which was mostly coming from international financial institutions and donor countries. These new loans did not help reducing the already high levels of debt stock. Actually, in several cases the inflow of new debt was higher than the amount of debt reduction given (Dijkstra, 2004). The loans were handed out based on the (wrong) premise that debtor countries had a liquidity problem, while instead they actually had a solvency problem. These new loans, albeit with concessional terms, would ultimately lead to debt repayment problems, also because in contrast to commercial banks, international financial institutions and donor countries were under no pressure to write-off bad debt. Moreover, Geske was rather critical regarding the conditionality attached to the debt relief initiatives. Until the end of the 1990s, countries had to agree with the IMF on implementing a structural adjustment policy, meaning that they had to commit to restrictive fiscal and monetary policies and to market reforms such as liberalization and privatization programs. In the academic literature, however, there has been consensus that setting policy conditions in advance does not have much effect (Bird, 1998; World Bank, 1998).

The evaluation project received quite some attention. In September of 2003, Agnes van Ardenne-van der Hoeven, the then Dutch Minister of Development Cooperation wrote an extensive response to the findings of the evaluation and discussed the project findings with the Parliament (Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, 2003). Moreover, Geske published a number of articles, both in academic (Dijkstra, 2004, 2008) and popular outlets (Dijkstra, 2003), in which she summarized the research outcomes and discussed their policy implications.

The background paper Geske and I wrote for the evaluation project provides a comprehensive overview of the general discussion on the sustainability of external government debt, the causes of the debt crisis of the 1980s many developing economies were confronted with, the role played by commercial banks, bilateral (donor countries) and multilateral (IMF, World Bank) lenders in triggering and managing the crisis, and the responses of the different types of creditors to the debt crisis of these countries. Among other things, it highlights the fact that in the 1970s banks aggressively handed out loans to governments, leading to over-borrowing by the governments of many emerging economies. When economic prospects turned negative, interest rates increased and commodity prices went down, many of these

countries were confronted with severe repayment problems on their outstanding debt. By the end of the 1980s, both commercial banks and official creditors (Western countries and multilateral institutions) realized that many emerging economies had solvency problems and full repayment of debts would be impossible. Creditors acknowledged that the outstanding external debt of these countries had become unsustainable. They started forgiving part of the debt, albeit to a limited extent, and in many cases focusing only on debt service payments. Several countries remained stuck with high levels of debt, compromising their ability to generate economic development.

The central hypothesis of the report is that in order to reduce the debt problems of heavily indebted poor countries (HIPC)s, the uncertainty of their debt repayments should be reduced. According to this hypothesis, the economic development of these countries is not so much compromised by the level of the outstanding debt. Rather, it is the uncertainty regarding the levels of debt payments (interest and amortization) that made it difficult for the governments of these countries to develop policies that could support their social and economic development. The main source of this uncertainty comes from the fact that debtor countries regularly needed to negotiate with their creditors about the terms of debt service repayments. The outcomes of these negotiations turned out to be very difficult to predict. With high uncertainty regarding debt payments, it was difficult, if not impossible, to plan investments in infrastructure, innovation, health and schooling. The econometric analysis in the report supports this view: the higher the volatility of the regular debt payments of a country, which is our measure of uncertainty, the lower the social and economic development the country experienced.

The policy recommendations following from the research in the report are clear. Donor countries and private and official creditors should allow for a substantial debt stock reduction as this will contribute to reducing the volatility of annual debt service payments. Such a debt stock reduction will reduce the uncertainty about the debt payments governments have to make as it reduces the need for lengthy negotiations on the terms of debt payments and on new loans and grants. This will help governments to carry out more predictable government policies, which will stimulate private investment and restore economic growth.

The effectiveness of debt relief twenty years later

So, what has happened since the early 2000s with respect to debt relief to emerging economies? What do we know about the effectiveness of debt relief? What evidence is there showing that debt relief can make a difference for the social and

economic development of these countries? What new ideas and policies have emerged since the early 2000s regarding the use of debt relief?

In 1996, the HIPC initiative was launched by the IMF and World Bank. This was a joint initiative of international financial institutions and donor countries to ensure that the external debts of poor debtor countries would be reduced to levels that were manageable by giving them debt relief. From the beginning, the Netherlands has been very supportive to this initiative and has been also active in follow-up initiatives, such as the Enhanced HIPC initiative in 1999, and later programs, such as the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI) of 2005. The Dutch government has also been one of the main contributors to the Debt Relief Trust Fund, a fund managed by the World Bank to support debt relief initiatives (Dijkstra, 2004). Although difficult to prove, the evaluation report written by Geske may have contributed to the positive view the Dutch government has developed with respect to the importance and potential of debt relief programs for the HIPCs.

The HIPC debt relief initiative is still in operation in 2022. In order to receive debt relief under the HIPC initiative, countries must meet a number of criteria, of which one is showing commitment to poverty reduction by developing a so-called Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP), next to showing improvements in the quality of institutions, governance and policies, and must show a good track record over time in meeting these criteria. During the first stage, the case for debt relief is considered, and after it has been established that a country has met the criteria, international creditors commit to reducing debt to a level that is considered sustainable. During the second stage, countries have to show good outcomes on policy reforms agreed upon with the IMF and World Bank and implement the PRSP for at least one year. If these criteria have been fulfilled, debt relief by the international community is provided.⁴

The above short description of how debt relief is provided shows that conditionality of debt relief is still part of the HIPC initiative despite the criticism received from Geske and other researchers. The use of PRSPs has been especially criticized, also by Geske (Dijkstra, 2011). Based on her experience in several Latin American countries, such as Nicaragua, Bolivia and Honduras, she shows that, while proponents of the PRSPs argue they may enhance aid effectiveness because they

4 IMF Fact sheet on Debt Relief Under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative; see: <https://www.imf.org/en/About/Factsheets/Sheets/2016/08/01/16/11/Debt-Relief-Under-the-Heavily-Indebted-Poor-Countries-Initiative>; website accessed on 30 January 2023.

contribute to increased so-called ownership of poverty reduction programs by the government and stimulate better coordination with donors, the PRPS focus too much on rational planning and leave out the political reality in a country. PRPS may therefore hurt rather than help the effectiveness of aid.

Notwithstanding this criticism, several countries have received debt relief over the past two decades. In total, 39 countries have been (potentially) eligible for HIPC Initiative assistance of which 37 countries actually receive full debt relief from the IMF and other creditors.⁵ Until the end of 2022, these 37 countries, of which 31 are in Sub-Saharan Africa, have received \$76 billion in debt-service relief. This comes down to a reduction of debt service payments for these countries of about 1 to 1.5 percentage points of GDP between 2001 and 2017.⁶

Although many creditors, including large international financial institutions, such as the IMF, World Bank, the African Development Bank, and the Inter-American Development Bank have provided full debt relief under the HIPC Initiative, some other creditors, notably non-Paris Club official bilateral creditors and commercial creditors, have not. These creditors make up a quarter of all debt relief under the HIPC Initiative. This means that the initiative has not yet reached its full potential in bringing down the debts of some countries eligible for debt relief to sustainable levels.⁷

The next question is whether debt relief is effective. Does it help in making the debt of countries sustainable and does it assist in regaining social and economic development of these countries? Several studies have looked into these questions. Without claiming to give a full overview here of all that has been published on this topic, it seems that this research shows that debt relief may have contributed, at least

5 These countries are: Afghanistan, Benin, Bolivia, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Côte d'Ivoire, Democratic Republic of Congo, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Niger, Republic of Congo, Rwanda, São Tomé & Príncipe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania, The Gambia, Togo, Uganda, and Zambia.

6 IMF Fact sheet on Debt Relief Under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative; see: <https://www.imf.org/en/About/Factsheets/Sheets/2016/08/01/16/11/Debt-Relief-Under-the-Heavily-Indebted-Poor-Countries-Initiative>; website accessed on 30 January 2023.

7 IMF Fact sheet on Debt Relief Under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative; see: <https://www.imf.org/en/About/Factsheets/Sheets/2016/08/01/16/11/Debt-Relief-Under-the-Heavily-Indebted-Poor-Countries-Initiative>; website accessed on 30 January 2023.

to some extent, to improving the sustainability of outstanding debts by increasing the fiscal space of governments and supporting poverty reduction spending, and by helping investment and growth of debtor countries (Cassimon & Essers 2017; Ferry & Raffinot, 2019; Essers & Cassimon, 2022). For example, Essers and Cassimon (2022) show that the HIPC initiative and the MDRI have contributed to a serious reduction in debt stocks and debt service of debtor countries. Cassimon et al. (2015), Djimeu (2018) and Essers and Cassimon (2022) show that HIPC and MDRI debt relief initiatives have increased government investment spending and revenues. Some studies find a positive relationship between debt relief and economic growth (Cheng et al., 2019; IMF & World Bank, 2019; Marchesi & Masi, 2021); other studies find it more difficult to show there is a positive association between the two (Johansson, 2010). Other studies have looked at the impact of debt relief on the governance quality of a country and find a positive association (Depetris Chauvin & Kraay, 2007, Freytag & Pehnelt, 2009), without being able to claim causality. So, whereas debt relief may have helped debtor countries from falling behind, it has not been the panacea for their economic and social recovery.

Finally, a word on debt relief and the economic and political crisis that has hit the world since the beginning of the 2020s. The COVID-19 pandemic has had a major impact on developing countries. Moreover, the Ukraine war and the resulting rise in global prices for food, energy and fertilizers has also disproportionately hurt these countries. According to a recent policy paper of the IMF, the Ukraine war will most likely make it more difficult for low-income countries to recover from the negative impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, leading to an increase in the income gap between rich and poor countries.⁸ Governments of these countries are confronted with increasing fiscal deficits and a weakening of their debt position. Jones (2020) argues that the COVID-19 pandemic has contributed to a further decline of the debt service-to-revenue ratios in low-income countries. A recent World Bank report shows that the poorest countries now spend around 10 per cent of their export income on debt payments, a level that has not been reported since the year 2000.⁹ This puts pressure on creditors, especially on non-Paris club and private creditors, to consider further debt relief. In particular, China could make an important contribution. The country has been reluctant in granting debt relief in

8 See: <https://www.euronews.com/next/2022/12/09/imf-debt>; website accessed on 31 January 2023.

9 See: <https://www.euronews.com/next/2022/12/09/imf-debt>; website accessed on 31 January 2023.

the past, while at the same time it has become the largest bilateral creditor.

The IMF policy paper concludes that the low-income countries will need nearly \$500 billion in external financing for the 2022-2026 period to recover from the COVID-19 pandemic and regain economic growth.¹⁰ It remains to be seen to what extent private and public creditors and donor countries, including China, are willing to increase their contribution to making the debt position of the poorer debt countries more sustainable, given the economic and political challenges, due to the COVID-19 pandemic and the Ukraine war, they have to deal with at home.

Final remarks

Looking back at the work Geske has published over the past four decades, I would characterize Geske as an example of a socially concerned economist: someone who is interested in real-world problems and trying to find solutions for these problems, but always based on thorough academic research. Moreover, Geske is an economist who is interested in learning from other fields, such as sociology, history and political science. Her approach is multi-disciplinary, rather than mono-disciplinary.

The economics profession needs such broad and open-minded economists. Unfortunately, in the past years, I feel that economists have become less concerned with contributing to solving real-life problems. Instead, the focus has shifted towards publishing in high-impact journals and on the number of citations. This is, at least partly, due to the incentives that universities have been using for the past few decades to allocate resources, which is putting emphasis on rewarding outlets in top journals. Perhaps, the recent Declaration on Research Assessment (DORA) may bring change to this approach. The DORA initiative recognizes the need to improve the ways in which the outputs of scholarly research are evaluated. Part of this initiative is to develop new ways of assessing research output that go beyond a focus on publishing in top academic journals. These new ways may include measures of impact of research on policy discussions and outcomes. The DORA discussion may therefore have the potential to bring economics profession back to where its focus should be: making contributions to solving real-life problems.

10 See: <https://www.euronews.com/next/2022/12/09/imf-debt>; website accessed on 31 January 2023.

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9

FINANCING SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT SHALL WE THROW MORE MONEY AT THE PROBLEM OR START WITH DOING BETTER WITH EXISTING RESOURCES?

ROB VOS

Reforming development assistance and debt relief have been main threads in Geske Dijkstra's notable professional career. We worked together on those issues over two decades ago while we were both at the International Institute of Social Studies (ISS). Plus ça change? Since the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic low-income countries have been hit hard economically; first by the global recession induced by the public health related lockdowns, then by spikes in food, fuel and fertilizer prices associated with the recovery from the recession and pandemic-related supply disruptions, and subsequently by further surges in food and fertilizer prices with the outbreak of the war in Ukraine. The capacity of poor nations' governments to protect the livelihoods of their populations from the impacts of the multiple crises quickly eroded. Bilateral development assistance failed to come to a rescue, multilateral contingency financing mechanisms proved inadequate and fraught with old-fashioned, ill-conceived policy conditionality, and the lack of proper sovereign debt work-out mechanisms was painfully felt again as the number of low-income countries facing severe debt distress doubled during these years of crisis (van der Hoeven & Vos, 2022). Proper reforms on all these dimensions remain an unfinished agenda. In addition, yet another looming global crisis – climate change – is calling for transformative investments in production systems to stave off this existentialist threat and to set economies on sustainable development pathways. The calls for transformative change come with massive needs for additional (development) finance in magnitudes of hundreds of billions, if not

trillions, of US dollars per year over the next couple of decades (Diaz-Bonilla, Echeverria & Vos, 2022). However, the prospects for mobilizing new funding in such magnitude seem elusive if only considering the experience with creating new facilities for climate finance.

Over the past decade or so, my own policy research focus has shifted from the realm of international finance to issues of global food security. Yet, as I already hinted at, these domains often intersect, as has become clear with the recent global food, fuel, and fertilizer crises. It has led me to explore different ways to look at financing options and conditions. First, to look more at how can existing fiscal resources be used more effectively to support sustainable development and, second, how can market incentives be reset to encourage farmers, private businesses, and consumers to take production and consumption decisions that will better serve the health of both people and the planet. The massive support governments worldwide provide every year to their agricultural sectors is a multifold of annual aid budgets and the pools for climate finance taken together. So, can't we do better by repurposing the massive farm support? (Laborde et al. 2020, 2021; Vos, Martin & Resnick, 2022; Gautam, Laborde, Mamun, Martin, Piñeiro & Vos, 2022).¹

The 800-billion-dollar question

Agricultural support policies provide vast transfers of resources to farmers — about US\$800 billion per year worldwide in 2018–2020 (Vos, Martin & Resnick, 2022)— and enjoy strong political support in both developed and developing countries. Some agricultural support policies, such as input subsidies, have boosted global food production, particularly of staple crops, thereby reducing hunger and poverty. Yet, there are serious concerns about their impacts on achieving sustainable, healthy, and efficient agri-food systems. As pointed out by several recent studies, redirecting or “repurposing” agricultural support toward investments and incentives that encourage increased productivity, sustainable production practices and healthy dietary choices— including through allocating more public expenditures for agricultural research and development (R&D) and rural infrastructure, ecoservice payments to farmers, or appropriately targeted subsidies and/or border measures— has the potential for win-win-win gains for people, planet, and prosperity (Ding, 2021; FAO-UNDP-UNEP 2021; Gautam et al., 2022).

¹ The analysis below draws heavily on recent joint research with colleagues at the International Food Policy Research Institute (see e.g., Laborde et al. 2020, 2021; Vos, Martin & Resnick, 2022) and collaborators in that endeavour at the World Bank (Gautam et al., 2022).

Current agricultural support goes largely to agricultural producers, primarily in forms that affect market prices, and distorts incentives for producers and consumers (OECD, 2021). Fiscal support coupled to output levels or input use can help boost agricultural productivity, but also tends to lead to higher greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and land conversion for agriculture. Support provided through trade barriers, however, may reduce global emissions by reducing demand for output (Laborde et al., 2021). The strong focus of many agricultural support policies on promoting staple crops has improved access to basic calories but has done much less to improve dietary diversity. Moreover, impacts of the support are often regressive — benefiting wealthier commercial farmers, while denying poorer farmers access to markets (Ding, et al., 2021; Vos, Martin & Resnick, 2022). When provided through trade protection, farm incomes may improve but at the expense of raising the cost of food and harming poor consumers.

The need for agricultural and food policy reform

The need for reforms is now well recognized (OECD, 2021), and the urgency of reducing GHG emissions and adapting to climate change has added impetus to the calls for reform. In fact, existing food and agricultural policy support is poorly designed and ineffective to serve the multiple objectives of poverty reduction, food security, affordable access to healthy diets, and environmental sustainability (see e.g., FAO, IFAD, UNICEF, WFP & WHO, 2022). At the same time, however, recent studies have shown that simply eliminating all existing support would not greatly reduce GHG emissions, but would depress farm incomes, increase poverty, and increase the cost of healthy diets (Searchinger et al., 2020; Laborde et al., 2021; FAO-UNDP-UNEP, 2021; Gautam et al., 2022; FAO, IFAD, UNICEF, WFP & WHO, 2022).

Public discourse thus has shifted to how existing support could be repurposed to create better incentives for producers and consumers (Ding et al. 2021; Koplow & Steenblik, 2022). The 2021 United Nations Food Systems Summit (UNFSS) called for such repurposing as part of a just transition towards sustainable agri-food systems; as a result, the Coalition to Repurpose Public Support to Food and Agriculture is being established with the participation of international organizations, governments, farmer organizations, and others (Food Systems Summit Community, 2021; UNFSS, 2021; Just Rural Transition, 2021).² The “repurposing

2 See: <https://foodsystems.community/coalitions/the-coalition-to-repurpose-public-support-to-food-and-agriculture/>. See also UNFSS Finance lever (2021) and Just Rural Transition (2021).

agenda” has also been put on the agenda of the G7, as reflected among others in the G7 Development Ministers’ Meeting Communiqué of May 19, 2022 (G7 Germany, 2022a) and that of the G7 Agricultural Ministers’ Meeting of May 14, 2022 (G7 Germany, 2022b).³

Agricultural policy reform must be carefully thought through in order to ensure agri-food systems produce enough nutritious food to feed a growing world population, while drastically reducing GHG emissions to avert severe climate change impacts. In addition, the agri-food sector is the only economic sector with serious potential to become a net emissions sink — pulling more GHGs out of the atmosphere than it emits — through creation and protection of carbon sinks such as forests and soils (Ding et al., 2021). Restoration of those carbon sinks hence will be as important. Given the multiple goals that agri-food systems are now called upon to address, how can the substantial resources that support agriculture be repurposed in ways that simultaneously provide strong incentives to reduce GHG emissions, improve food system efficiency and farm productivity, and help combat poverty, hunger, and malnutrition?

Doing better with the same resources

Recent studies have pointed out that existing subsidies can be repurposed in ways that would make significant progress toward achieving both global climate and food security goals. Model-based analyses conducted by the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) and the World Bank (Gautam et al., 2022) indicate that investing an additional 1 percent of agricultural output value in R&D for technologies and practices both increase the efficiency of production and reduce emission intensities—such as modified diets for ruminants and alternate wetting and drying for rice—complemented by incentives to farmers for the adoption of those technologies could achieve greater gains with fewer trade-offs than simply eliminating subsidies.

This scenario assumes an internationally concerted strategy in which all

³ The communiqué of the G7 Development Ministers states, inter alia, that “[s]cience and evidence are key to supporting the transformation of agricultural and trade policiesand, we will explore the value of establishing a knowledge network for the transformation of agricultural policies in close alignment with existing initiatives..” (G7 Germany 2022a, para. 13). Similar language can be found in para. 12 of the communiqué of the Agricultural Ministers’ Meeting (G7 Germany 2022b). Both build inter alia on recommendations from a brief prepared for the G7 by a group of experts from the policy research community (Badiane et al. 2022).

countries shift resources from current market-distorting subsidies toward more spending on R&D that reduces emissions and, by raising productivity, creates incentives for farmers to adopt the improved technologies. The scenario results are promising, as global welfare and food output increase; food prices fall, food and healthy diets become more affordable for many people; and poverty rates fall worldwide (Figure 9.1). Global GHG emissions from agriculture and land use change would drop by about 40 percent, both because of the direct reduction in emissions from crop production and because higher productivity reduces the need for agricultural land. Farm incomes would fall with the removal of subsidies, although returns to farm labour would rise if policy reform were combined with rural development policies to facilitate a benign movement of labour out of agriculture.

The reduction in GHG emissions could be increased further through complementary policies not considered in this scenario analysis. These could include measures— such as nutritional education, food standards, and taxation — that influence food demand and dietary choices to reduce excess consumption of unhealthy or emission-intensive food products (Swinnen, Arndt & Vos, 2022).

FAO, IFAD, UNICEF, WFP and WHO (2022) in collaboration with IFPRI present a further scenario analysis showing that reorienting existing support to encourage production and consumption of nutritious foods through subsidies and border measures has great potential for both making healthy diets affordable for all and make significant progress towards environmental goals. Such reoriented domestic price support and border measures would need proper alignment with WTO rules and vice versa.

The political economy of policy reform

Reallocation of agricultural support to R&D focused on productivity-enhancing, soil health- improving and emissions-reducing technologies thus would produce better outcomes for food security and nutrition and for the natural environment, especially if carried out in an internationally coordinated manner. However, even the best reform agenda will inevitably face considerable political hurdles. This brief highlights just two of these, but central to reaching a common and internationally concerted repurposing agenda.

First, collective action problems contribute to underinvestment in agricultural R&D globally. Low- and middle-income countries often underinvest in R&D because constituents cannot see tangible benefits from these investments in the short term (Mogues, 2015). Governments and private agents in smaller economies have less incentive to invest in R&D because they receive only a small share of the benefits from research findings of broad applicability and hope to benefit from

spillovers from other countries' investments and innovations (Swinnen, 2018). Currently, only an eighth of total government support to agriculture is invested in R&D, inspection and control systems, and rural infrastructure — all of which promote beneficial innovation — while three-quarters is allocated to transfers to individual producers, many of which are commercial and large-scale operations, thus reinforcing inequality (OECD, 2021; Vos, Martin & Resnick, 2022).

Second, the magnitude and nature of government support to agricultural sectors and food system transformation differs widely across countries, including across G20 member countries. In absolute terms most support is provided by China, the European Union, and the United States (Figure 9.2). Importantly, market price support (through trade measures) remains the dominant form of distortionary support for most countries (Figure 2). Some emerging and developing countries keep domestic prices for key commodities below the world market prices, implying an implicit tax on producers of those commodities in those countries in order to protect poor consumers. In most high-income countries, positive market price support through trade measures remains the most popular form of support that governments provide to producers. This type of support has an implicit cost but cannot be directly repurposed by shifting fiscal resources to other budget items. As a group, the emerging and developing countries provide the largest share of their direct public support for agricultural public goods and services. Subsidies for green innovations and incentives for sustainable practices are emerging, but still only a very small share of total support, and moreover, except in China, these are presently mainly provided in the developed countries (Gautam et al., 2022).




Figure 9.1 Global implications of repurposing domestic support (% change relative to baseline projections for 2040)

Source: Gautam et al. (2022).
Note: Left bars indicate movement toward societal goals; right bars indicate movement away from societal goals.

These differences in support pose the following challenges to be addressed in a common framework for repurposing of agricultural support: (i) for an even-handed, internationally concerted approach, transfer of resources towards countries with weak fiscal capacity should be considered; (ii) repurposing is not only about shifting existing fiscal resources for agricultural support, but also making sure that market support through border measures are realigned to create incentives for sustainable food system transformation; and (iii) despite the previous two challenges, substantial fiscal resources are being deployed to support farmers and agricultural sectors which can be repurposed, but requiring much national consensus building to overcome likely initial resistance to changes in existing support.




Figure 9.2 Differences in agricultural support between countries and country groupings, 2016–18

Source: Gautam et al. (2022), based on data from AgIncentives Consortium (IFPRI, OECD, FAO, IDB, and theWorld Bank).

Note: EMDE = emerging market and other developing economies.

The case for global collective action

The case for such an agenda is easily made. Climate change is an existential threat to agri-food systems, and the repurposing scenarios discussed in this brief clearly point out that international cooperation for repurposing will achieve superior outcomes on all environmental, economic, and social dimensions for all countries compared with current non-cooperative agricultural support policies. While agriculture and food policies are the responsibility of national governments,

the implications of these policies have strong international spill-over effects, including, through their impact on competitiveness in international markets, on global food security and on the environment.

The scenario analyses suggest there is great potential of achieving significant win-win-win gains for people, planet, and prosperity by reallocating resources for productivity-enhancing and emission-reducing innovations and creating incentives to producers to adopt these practices for the production of more diverse and nutritious food and to consumers to make healthier dietary choices. Existing government agricultural budgets offer a major potential source of public finance for investing in such innovations and providing the necessary incentives to producers and consumers, particularly in countries with constrained fiscal stances. At the same time, this will also be a strategy to de-risk private investment in sustainable agriculture and food supply chains, which in turn would help unlock private financing (FAO, IFAD, UNICEF, WFP and WHO, 2022). Hence, any strategy to mobilize both public and private finance for agri-food systems transformation should include repurposing of the agricultural support that contributes to solving serious environmental, food security, and equity problems.

The gains are expected to be much greater (and, possibly, achievable only) through an internationally concerted approach. Nonetheless, despite such prospect, getting to a common approach will not be easy.

Current beneficiaries will undoubtedly resist policy reforms, while those who might gain from reforms are likely to be uncertain about the benefits or insufficiently organized to mobilize for change. Consequently, most policy reforms emerge from development of policy instruments that improve the balance between gains and losses –such as the EU’s provision of financial support to farmers that engage in forest conservation and organic practices—or identifying windows of opportunity for change (Resnick et al., 2018; EC, 2020a-b). Windows of opportunity for national reforms may come from international agreements, including the WTO or Paris Climate Accord. Such agreements have already been motivations for agricultural policy reform in the European Union and China, for instance, and, hence, may provide a basis for garnering support for an agreement on an internationally concerted repurposing agenda (Vos, Martin & Resnick, 2022). A commitment by G20 leaders to scale up and accelerate their efforts to repurpose their agricultural support would facilitate attempts to make their own agri-food systems more sustainable and potentially yield spillover benefits beyond their borders. It would also give them the credibility to use multilateral fora such as the Committee on World Food Security, the WTO, the World Bank, IMF, and regional

multilateral banks to encourage others to adopt repurposing strategies and promote sustainable agriculture and agri-food systems that can deliver affordable healthy diets for all.

Also, for high-income countries, repurposing their own agricultural support offers the possibility to better use limited fiscal resources to accelerate a green transition (involving climate change mitigation and adaptation) at home while securing the livelihoods of their producers and promoting better nutrition and health for their citizens. Such repurposing will generate positive benefits beyond national borders through reduced GHG emissions and by eliminating market distortions that presently harm producers in poorer countries. A detailed analysis of societal gains in the short and long run and of likely winners and losers could help gain the necessary support for repurposing. Reallocation of resources to productivity-enhancing and emission-reducing R&D expenditures, incentives to producers for their adoption and investments in rural infrastructure should be expected to produce major societal gains, including benefits for those farmers who benefit from current support. However, the gains from innovation in sustainable production methods may be perceived as uncertain, and adoption may come at a cost to producers in the short run. Compensatory payments to losers and to offset adoption costs for producers could help win political support. Importantly, appropriate regulations, such as mandates on the use of renewable energy or limits on the conversion of land for farming, may be essential to overcome the resistance of some agricultural producers to more environmentally sustainable reforms. Yet, also here, there are cautionary tales. For instance, even with green conditionality, resistance is still possible, as seen in the farmer protests in The Netherlands in 2022 over proposed restrictions on nitrogen emissions to meet EU directives (Ortega Froysa, 2022). When resistance by farmers or other organized groups is anticipated, the process of negotiation and engagement becomes just as important as the policy instrument under consideration. As learned from recent efforts at policy reform in India, where attempted reforms announced rapidly as part of Covid-19 measures alienated farmers, it is essential to engage stakeholders early on and iteratively in the process of designing policy reform to build trust and a common agenda (Vos, Martin & Resnick, 2022).

Lastly, there are interactive and mutually reinforcing dynamics between the domestic and global policy arenas. Creating constituencies for reform at the domestic level is essential to achieving global action. To spur domestic action and overcome resistance, an even-handed global diffusion of technologies and financial resources is needed to let all countries reap the benefits of agricultural policy reform.

Given that climate change and environmental sustainability transcend borders and national policies have strong international spillover effects, international coordination is essential. However, reaching a common understanding of the benefits of acting together and the cost of not doing so will not be easy and will require intense dialogue informed by continuous and credible assessments of the gains to be obtained and trade-offs to be reckoned with the key options for smart repurposing of agricultural support.

All of this to suggest that feasible pathways to financing sustainable development exist by doing better with existing resources. That road to reform will be rocky as it will meet uncertainty and political resistance, but we can succeed as long as we learn from the present multiple crises and the future ones we will face.

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10

REVISITING THE POVERTY REDUCTION STRATEGY OF HONDURAS

NIEK DE JONG¹

Introduction

Two decades ago, the Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA) commissioned the Institute of Social Studies – currently part of the Erasmus University Rotterdam – to conduct a series of studies on the experience of the Poverty Reduction Strategies of Bolivia, Honduras and Nicaragua. These strategies were formulated and implemented as part of the Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS) approach. This approach involved the elaboration of a Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) – that is, the strategy document – and of Annual Progress Reports on the implementation of the strategy. The strategy had to be developed by means of a participatory process. These were conditions to qualify for the Enhanced Initiative for the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC initiative) that led to condonation of a part of the countries' high external debt. The HIPC funds formed part of the sources of financing of the strategies.

This contribution takes a new look at the strategy of Honduras and the studies on the experience of the Honduran strategy. It then attempts to draw some lessons for policies to address the current situation of poverty in the country.

Poverty in Honduras

Estimates for the incidence of poverty in Honduras vary a lot, but tend to show similar trends. According to INE estimates using the 3.2 (US\$) PPP poverty line, the headcount rate of poverty increased from 36% in 2001 to 45% in 2003, after which it

¹ Geske and I formed part of the team of experts of the Erasmus University for the monitoring and evaluation of Poverty Reduction Strategies in Latin America commissioned by the Swedish International Development Agency and conducted between 2003 and 2008.

declined to 14% at the end of the decade, before rising again to 36% in 2012 (CEDLAS Statistics, 2022).² This was followed by a reduction to 29% in 2019. Other sources point at similar trends, but at much higher levels. CEPR (2022), for instance, reports that the number of households living in poverty declined from 66% to 59% in 2012-2019.

While the incidence of poverty was still high in 2019, it rose to a very high level during the Covid-19 pandemic and in part, due to the two hurricanes Eta and Iota that hit the country in 2020. Using a national poverty line, INE published a summary report indicating that an estimated 74% of Honduran households lived in poverty in 2021 (INE, 2021). The estimate was however revoked after one day and replaced by a revised one obtained by adopting a 'new methodology' (Padilla, 2021).³ Other INE estimates using a different methodology show an increase from 43% to 54% in 2019-2021 (PNUD, 2022: 107).

Whatever the exact figure of the incidence of poverty, it is clear that, poverty is widespread in Honduras and that increased efforts are needed to address the critical poverty situation, also with a view to achieving the first Sustainable Development Goal of reducing overall poverty and eliminating extreme poverty by 2030.

A complaint voiced in 2021 during the campaign for the general elections was that Honduras did not have a poverty reduction strategy at that moment (Burgos, 2021).⁴ Two decades earlier, at a time when the incidence of poverty was also high, Honduras had formulated the *Estrategia para la Reducción de la Pobreza*, or ERP for short. A question, therefore, is whether there are elements of the ERP that might be relevant for addressing today's poverty situation. This will be examined below, after a brief review of the ERP and its 2006 update and a review of selected results of the monitoring and evaluation of the ERP that a team of experts of the Erasmus University and a local expert carried out.

² The INE estimates were taken from SEDLAC (CEDLAS and the World Bank), see <https://www.cedlas.econo.unlp.edu.ar/wp/en/estadisticas/sedlac/estadisticas/#1496165262484-7f826c3f-b5c3>.

³ See <https://criterio.hn/ine-borro-publicacion-que-establecia-que-pobreza-en-honduras-es-del-74/>.

⁴ See <https://criterio.hn/honduras-no-tiene-estrategia-de-reduccion-de-la-pobreza-tiene-remesas/>.

The 2001 Poverty Reduction Strategy and update of the strategy

Honduras' ERP was developed by means of participation, or rather consultation, of civil society organisations, NGOs, and the private sector. The ERP identified a list of overall goals for Honduras that were related to the Millennium Development Goals set for 2015.⁵ Reaching those overall goals would require sufficiently high and sustainable economic growth, the political will to substantially and sustainably increase social expenditure, continued reforms to enhance competitiveness, human development and a reduction of environmental vulnerability (República de Honduras, 2001: 55). The ERP defined five strategic guidelines for the development of policies, programmes and projects (ibid.: 59-63). Following these guidelines, it identified six intervention areas: (1) enhancing equitable and sustainable economic growth; (2) reducing poverty in rural areas; (3) reducing urban poverty; (4) investment in human capital; (5) strengthening social protection for specific groups; and (6) guaranteeing the sustainability of the strategy. The ERP presented detailed policy measures, programmes and projects within these areas (ibid., 64-104). It furthermore indicated that it aimed at a tax-to-GDP ratio of at least 17.2% and at current revenues of at least 18.5% of GDP, but was not very explicit on the envisaged fiscal reforms. It did mention that it aimed at a low fiscal deficit, broadening the sales tax base, and introducing some modifications to the income tax law (ibid.: 65-66).

Shortly after the finalisation of the ERP, the new government that came into power following the elections of November 2001 presented a new national development plan for 2002-2006. However, the new government did write annual Progress Reports on the ERP's implementation and made proposals for prioritisation and redirection of the strategy (putting more emphasis on pro-poor growth). Dijkstra and Komives (2011) explain that there was a 'de facto' continued acceptance of the original PRSP as a result of donor pressure to maintain it.

In 2006, a draft updated version of the ERP was produced. It put more emphasis on pro-poor economic growth and proposed an integrated policy with an 'assets approach' to eliminate restrictions of poor people to generate income

⁵ The overarching objective of the ERP was 'to reduce poverty in a significant and sustainable way, based on accelerated and sustained economic growth, and seeking equity in the distribution of its results, through increased access of the poor to the factors of production, including human capital development, and the provision of social safety nets for the population living in extreme poverty' (original text in Spanish).

themselves and to create a virtuous circle of human development (República de Honduras, 2008).⁶ The ‘assets approach’ related to four types of policy, of which one was investment in economic and social infrastructure and improving the access of the poor to that infrastructure. Premises of the approach were the prioritisation and targeting of actions on the poorest groups and regions, giving highest priority to the 80 thousand poorest households living predominantly in the western and eastern regions of Honduras, and implementing ‘packages of interventions’ that affect simultaneously poor people’s capacities and opportunities, or sets of related projects instead of isolated ones (República de Honduras, 2006: 45-72; De Jong et al., 2007). It is a question, however, whether this was really a new approach, as the original ERP ‘envisaged concentrating the greatest efforts on social spending and investment and support for economic activity, through programmes, measures and projects, which prioritise a sustained reduction of poverty, by means of approach that emphasises the long term and pays special attention to areas of action that open up opportunities for the poor to improve their income themselves’ (República de Honduras, 2001: 55).⁷ In any case, the updated strategy was more coherent, had a clearer theoretical formulation and made the approach more explicit. Comparison of the two versions of the ERP shows that the updated strategy reclassified most of the policies envisaged in the original ERP into four strategic areas: enhancing capacities, creating opportunities, access to and modernisation of economic and social infrastructure, and management of social and environmental risks. In addition, decentralisation and transparency and accountability of the public administration were included as cross-cutting axes, with the hope of making the poverty reduction policies more effective (República de Honduras, 2006: 62-72). The restructuring would also be reflected in a modified budget for ERP implementation. A justification for the update or reformulation was indeed the lack of progress in terms of poverty reduction in spite of the improved economic performance and higher levels of social expenditure destined for the ERP, which made clear that there were inconsistencies in both the design of the original ERP and its implementation framework (ibid.: 7).

Some elements of the (updated) elaborated strategy may still be relevant for current efforts to fight poverty. For that reason, the next section first reviews findings of the monitoring and evaluation of the Honduran strategy conducted as a

⁶ The definitive version of the update appeared in 2008, see <https://docplayer.es/4917146-Estrategia-para-la-reduccion-de-la-pobreza.html>.

⁷ Translated from text in Spanish.

part of the aforementioned multi-annual study commissioned by SIDA.

Review of monitoring and evaluation of Honduras' ERP

The ERP was externally monitored and evaluated in the years 2003 to 2007 and annual country reports were produced (see Cuesta et al., 2003; Cuesta, 2004; Cabezas, 2006; De Jong et al., 2007, 2008). Doubts were expressed whether the process of ERP elaboration was genuinely participatory (Cuesta et al., 2003; Dijkstra, 2011). In the words of Dijkstra (2011): 'Although the consultation process was seen as an improvement in comparison with earlier governance practices in Honduras, the agenda had been limited and the civil society organisations did not consider that their concerns were sufficiently reflected in the strategy. Donor conditionality was the decisive factor in elaborating the strategy, and donor influence on both process and contents of the strategy had been strong.' She explained that the PRS approach in Honduras (and Bolivia and Nicaragua) 'implied that conditionality had been increased' despite 'the broad consensus among both academic and policy-making circles that setting conditions for policies was not effective'.

The contents of the ERP were also criticised. Cuesta et al. (2003) had doubts about the consistency of the strategy and referred to the critique that it 'would not go beyond traditional recommendations such as economic liberalization and the need for increased social expenditure.' Cuesta (2007) called it 'a strategy too imprecise to be effective in either reducing poverty or increasing economic growth'. He argued that in the case of the Honduran PRS, the process failed to set clear priorities and the strategy 'did not identify specific policy interventions'.

The SIDA-commissioned reports pointed at the slow process of implementation of ERP policies and projects and attempts to improve the strategy. In 2004, the Maduro government strengthened the economic growth pillar of the ERP, by putting more weight on pro-poor economic growth (Cuesta, 2005). In 2005, it conducted a new process of consultation or 'prioritisation' of the projects to be implemented in 2006 (De Jong et al. 2007). However, the elections held in that year resulted in a victory of the opposition party. The social policy of the Zelaya government that took office in 2006 included the continuation of the ERP, but at the same time trying to comply with the promises made during the election campaign by broadening the definition of poverty spending (ibid.). As mentioned earlier, the government presented a draft update of the ERP. Apart from actions related to the adoption of an 'assets approach', the updated ERP consisted of a continuation of the macro-level actions to sustain rapid economic growth in the

long run. A year later, however, the government had still not published a final version of the update agreed with civil society organisations and the international cooperation, it was feared that the budgeting of the ERP would still be according to the original ERP and that the new proposal would no longer be taken seriously as the campaign for the new Presidential elections would start the next year (De Jong et al., 2008).

The ERP was partly implemented in a decentralised way. In terms of decentralisation, the National Congress and civil society organisations wanted to go beyond what the management of the ERP implementation (and indirectly the President) had proposed. In the end, the latter gave in, and the National Congress transferred 700 million Lempiras of the nearly 900 million Lempiras of 'ERP expenditure' to the 298 municipalities of Honduras, while the remainder was destined to the monitoring of the ERP implementation at local level. A questionable condition of the use of the funds was that the municipalities should destine fixed proportions of the amount to be received to respectively productive, social and institutional/governance strengthening projects (ibid.).

Some progress was made with improving the transparency and accountability of the public administration at the central government level, but a complete system at the national level was still lacking. There was more progress at the local level, among others by a strengthening of the capacity of civil society to monitor the activities of municipal governments. Some thematic committees were formed to monitor the ERP process and public policies in general at regional level. One of the key problems of the ERP, however, was the lack of regional development and investment plans, while the capacity for monitoring at the regional level was still insufficient (De Jong et al., 2007).

The aforementioned tax revenue goals were met particularly as a result of two important tax system reforms promised in context of the ERP (though themselves not mentioned explicitly in the strategy document itself): the Financial Equilibrium and Social Protection Law of 2002 and the Tax Equity Law of 2003. In 2006, current revenues had reached 19.5% of GDP and tax revenues 17.9% of GDP. Despite the reforms, the tax system retained certain regressive features. The reforms principally featured an expanded coverage and strengthening of the Value Added Tax. Modifications to income taxes were less significant, while the contribution of foreign trade-related revenues declined. The reforms furthermore resisted relying on individual property taxes to finance social spending and to achieve greater equity and universal coverage of public services (De Jong et al., 2008).

Are selected elements of the ERP relevant for current poverty-reduction policies in Honduras?

A key element of the ERP was sustainable economic growth through sound macroeconomic policies. The ERP aimed for example at guaranteeing a stable fiscal framework and at making markets more competitive and creating conditions for private investment. It is beyond a doubt that economic growth remains a necessary condition for poverty reduction, especially in a country like Honduras, where poverty is widespread. However, economic growth should be more inclusive, as the rather traditional policies did not lead to a reduction of poverty. More emphasis on public investment in economic and social infrastructure is needed, especially in poor regions. This was recognised in the update of the ERP, at least in theory. But even then, will economic growth remain an insufficient condition for poverty reduction?

The ‘assets approach’ as (more explicitly) proposed in the revised ERP can still be relevant. In itself, it is important to try to break the vicious circle of poverty and implement policies to create a virtuous circle of poverty reduction by enhancing the capacity of poor people to generate income and generating opportunities for this. The question is how this can be done best in practice.

Conditional cash transfers (CCTs) in particular, were expected to contribute to the creation of human capital of poor people. CCTs – an example of what Ruckert (2009) called ‘micro-political policing tools for regulating and monitoring the behaviour of the poor’ – can contribute to human capital formation among their target groups. However, apart from an ethical objection to the use of micro-conditionality, there is mixed evidence on the effectiveness of CCT programmes. Some studies find that CCTs have limited or no effects on poverty or that poor people drop out of the programme (see, e.g., Saavedra, 2016; Levasseur, 2021). For these reasons, several countries have put more emphasis on universal programmes and unconditional transfers instead of CCTs, which the updated version of the ERP saw as a key element of efforts to enhance the capacities of the poor. The Government of Honduras recently created an ample system of CCTs oriented at reducing poverty, to be implemented through a revival of the *Programa de la Red Solidaria* that was established in 2006. It includes CCTs in six axes: social protection, health, education, infrastructure and environment, generation of income earning opportunities and, finally, human strengthening (República de Honduras, 2022; Red Solidaria, 2023). The programme uses geographical targeting and focusses on the territories with high concentration of poverty but has national coverage. Subsequently, individual CCTs use specific eligibility criteria. For current anti-

poverty policies in Honduras, it is recommended to make an assessment of the coverage and effectiveness of existing or past CCT programmes and conditions of their implementation, to see whether it is better to continue with this approach or, to adapt it and replace or, combine it with an approach of unconditional transfers and universal programmes.

Another key element of the ERP was pro-poor public spending, which was thought to be increased by means of the use of the HIPC funds. Although it is sometimes arbitrary where to exactly draw the line between pro-poor spending and other spending, the use of the concept is considered useful for focussing public social expenditure on expenditure that contributes most to poverty reduction. Specific examples are – expenditure to increase the coverage and, quality of public education and health services and, improving access of the poor to these services and, transfers to poor households. Hence, the concept of pro-poor public spending used in the ERP remains useful, as long as the spending genuinely contributes to poverty reduction and this category is not broadened to incorporate items to comply with promises made during election campaigns and that are probably less effective for reducing poverty.

The ERP aimed at raising social expenditure, but with avoiding strong increases in taxation, which was expected to be feasible because of the HIPC funds that would become available. Tax reforms in the context of the ERP implied higher indirect taxation and, overall, a reduction of direct taxation. Currently, in the absence of external funds such as those of HIPC, additional social expenditure targeted at poor people will have to be (mainly) financed by domestically mobilised resources. There appears to be room to generate higher direct tax revenues. The tax-to GDP ratio in Honduras stood at 19.2% in 2020, which was lower than the average for Latin America and the Caribbean, while direct taxes represented less than a quarter of total tax revenue (Revenue Statistics in Latin America and the Caribbean, 2022).⁸ A rise in indirect taxes to create fiscal space for higher social expenditure should be avoided. On the contrary, a shift from indirect taxation to direct taxation (including property taxes) could be considered, as indirect taxes tend to be regressive and much more poverty-increasing than direct taxes. ICEFI (2017) estimated that the public social expenditure targeted at poor people in Honduras was insufficient to compensate for the reduction of their income due to taxation, especially indirect taxation. Less reliance on indirect taxes and increased pro-poor social expenditure

⁸ See <https://www.oecd.org/tax/tax-policy/revenue-statistics-latin-america-and-caribbean-honduras.pdf>.

would be needed for poverty reduction.

Finally, the elements of transparency and accountability of public expenditure and its results that were emphasized in the PRS approach and, which were partly developed in Honduras remain relevant for current poverty reduction policies. They are for instance, also an element of the current *Programa de la Red Solidaria* (República de Honduras, 2022).

Conclusions

The ERP was an interesting experiment to try to arrive at a concerted approach to reduce poverty in Honduras. But it failed to reach its objective of poverty reduction for various reasons related to its design and implementation, as well as political factors. Nonetheless, some of its elements can still be relevant for current policies to reduce poverty in Honduras.

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GOVERNANCE

11

DOES FOREIGN AID INFLUENCE POLICY? **HOWARD WHITE AND AMIRAH EL-HADDAD**

Egypt recently released a number of political prisoners, including colleagues of Amirah, though not another who is a former student of both Howard and Geske. It is possible that this release was linked to the recently approved IMF loan. Whilst the release of prisoners would not be a formal condition of such a loan, it is not unlikely that behind-the-scenes negotiations took place between the Egyptian and US governments for these releases as a condition for United States support for the loan going ahead.

Reflecting on this incident, related to work Howard did with Geske back in the 1990s. We worked together, along with our colleague Jan Kees van Donge, on a study of Swedish programme aid, which is a balance of payments support provided to low- and middle-income countries linked to policy conditions (Dijkstra & White, 2002). This conditionality was most usually linked to that of the international financial institutions (IFIs), that is the World Bank and the IMF.

One part of our work was to explore the macroeconomic impact of the programme aid through the flow of funds, but the far more challenging part of the work was to explore the impact through the policy conditionality. For policy conditionality to have an effect there are two channels; one is the effect of the policies which have been supported by the conditionality, and the other is, of course, the effect on the actual policy stance of the government.

We concluded, as had many other writers working in this area around the same time (e.g., Killick, 1998), that the history of conditionality is a history of broken promises. Governments frequently agreed to conditions, which were not met at all, or partially with a lag, or the condition was met but then the policies were reversed after a few months as with Egypt's overvaluation of its exchange rate after every policy induced devaluation. Indeed, in one case the Tanzanian government sacked 5,000 public service workers to meet a condition, only to re-employ them one week

later.

There are several reasons for the failure of conditionality. One of the most important is the desire of the IFIs to ensure that the lending continues so that borrowers can repay existing debt.

For those that do not remember, or were not around at the time, the debt crisis of the 1980s was in the first instance an over-exposure to commercial debt, but those debts were restructured through the Paris Club, whereby the private banks got paid, and the loans were effectively transferred to the IFIs. Hence, the IFIs had an interest in being soft on conditionality because if the conditions were deemed to have been violated, then the loans could not flow, and the country would be unable to repay existing debt. So the debt restructuring of the 1980s and 90s was basically a Ponzi scheme to bail out the commercial banks with a growing debt burden to LMICs as they borrowed to repay existing loans.

The particular focus of our work was the role that bilateral agencies could play in the policy conditionality process. They did not share the incentive of the IFIs to ensure that the countries receive the money to repay the IFIs loans. So, ironically, bilaterals such as Sweden who had historically been to the left became stricter on the enforcement of market-oriented conditions than the IFIs themselves.

One memorable case was the privatisation programme in Zambia. The bilaterals were of the view that the World Bank was being too soft on the government and not imposing the required conditions to privatise state-owned enterprises. Both the American government and the British government brought pressure to bear, in different ways, on the World Bank to ensure that the conditions were indeed enforced.

There were a number of interesting findings from this work. One of them, which is hinted at above, is the role of informal processes. So whilst the Paris Club meetings contained the formal negotiations for the restructuring of debt, much of the real work was done in what is called “the margins”; that is side meetings, which took place between officials attending the negotiations but were not part of negotiation itself. This message could include meetings of like-minded donors, as they were called, which were the British, the Dutch and the Nordics. The like-minded donors would agree on the stance they were going to take in negotiations. They could also include indirect informal discussions between the indebted country, for example Zambia, and other debtors. Additionally, there could be some deals done on issues around politics, trade and so on.

A second important finding was the role that special relationships can play. Historically, Sweden had supported socialist governments such as Tanzania,

Vietnam and Nicaragua. These historical relationships allowed Sweden to play an influential role in policy dialogue. One example was from Geske's case study of Nicaragua. She found that due to the fact that the Swedes have been strong supporters of Nicaragua during the Sandinista period, when most other donors shied away, they were the donor who were trusted to speak to the government about devaluation. The government trusted the Swedes more because of the historical relationship. The same could be seen in Vietnam. Sweden was the only country to stay a donor in Vietnam during the Vietnamese-Chinese war in the late-70s. So when it came to forex market liberalisation, Sweden led the way through changes in the design of their programme aid modality, which had systemic effects on the government's own more general forex system.

But the relationship can go both ways. We return to Egypt as a case in point. Egypt does indeed have a special relationship with the United States, but this is by virtue of the importance of Egypt in the region to the United States and the desire of the US to pursue rapprochement between Arab countries and Israel. So essentially the Egyptian government can expect to get large amounts of both foreign aid and military assistance from the United States in return for political support for Israel- that is that the Egyptian government recognises the Israeli government. A striking example are the qualifying industrial zones (QIZs) which are industrial zones where producers enjoy duty free access to US markets but have to have a certain percentage of Israeli value-added in the products exported via the zones.

Other work Howard has done with Mick Moore and Jennifer Leavy at the Institute of Development Studies used cross-country regressions to demonstrate the governments which rely on substantial rents – that is that they have a mineral resources or foreign aid – are divorced from the need to answer to their citizens (Moore et al., 1991). Basically, the social contract is defined as a receipt of two Ps from the state – provision and protection - where citizens acquiesce to the lack of the third P (participation) in return for these services. So the heart of this social contract is that in return for not being taxed the government provides the people security, services and so on- that is the first two Ps. But, the Egyptian government does not need domestic taxpayers. It relies on foreign aid and meets the interests of those providing that aid; hence, the government's willingness to recognise Israel, although this policy is deeply unpopular in Egypt (a recent poll shows that 85% of Egyptians oppose diplomatic recognition of Israel).

Another important, finding from our work, also borne out by several other studies at the time, is that domestic policy is primarily driven by domestic political interests. Pressure from foreign donors plays a marginal role, if any. This has been

true in Egypt with Sadat's open-door policy (the *infatih*) in the 1970s, and further liberalisation under Mubarek being driven by the government's desire to accede to the WTO. The role of external agents in pushing this agenda was very limited. Hence, the prospect of the economic part of the IMF reform program does not seem promising. It is true that the government has currently liberalised the exchange rate to some degree, but it has done that previously and then reasserted control. The requirements for greater fiscal transparency and privatisation, have often been silent on the growing role of the army in the economy. It is still uncertain if army-owned enterprises will factually fall under the title of state-owned enterprises despite the stated inclusion. It is not clear if budget transparency requires the large and growing black box of military expenditure to be on budget. It is not clear that the so-called strengthening of the competition authority would actually reverse the growing trend of crony capitalism, which started under Sadat, grew under Mubarek, and has been reinforced under the regime of Sisi.

The presence of foreign aid in Egypt means there is no need for a 'social' contract, but there is an 'unsocial' social contract. Amirah has elaborated this theme in a paper in *World Development* (El-Haddad, 2020). That is the contract between the government and the businessmen who support the regime. These favoured businessmen enjoy access to government contracts, access to import licenses and so on. They are effectively protected not only by high tariff barriers and non-tariff barriers but also an unlevel playing field. It remains to be seen the extent to which the IMF conditionality will level this playing field. History – and the lessons from the work Geske and I did together – suggests otherwise.

Rather, Egypt will continue on its current unsustainable growth-led development path. The government is pursuing infrastructure investments such as the Suez Canal and an extensive network of 'bridges' (overpasses) and highways financed by domestic borrowing. Geske taught an introduction to economic development at ISS which included an emphasis on the importance of financial deepening. The government is subverting financial deepening through a classic example of crowding out. The real return to Egyptian government bonds – 15% on US\$ denominated bonds – was at one time the highest interest rate in the world.

The work Geske did with Howard on policy influence of bilateral donors followed good qualitative evaluation methods. Thirty years later these methods are being newly discovered by evaluators looking at policy influence of civil society. We were careful to discuss with the respondents general policy changes which had taken place, and who were the main actors involved in those policy changes. We also identified a wide range of actors, not just the 'official perspective'. This contrasts

with the conventional evaluation method of saying ‘I’m evaluating program X. Tell me about the effects of X.’ Such approaches are replete with biases. A recent review of evaluations Howard has worked on for the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs has found that such methods are still not as widespread as one would hope.

Howard finds he goes back to the work of Geske and Jan Kees in the 1990s quite often. And it is not for the macroeconomic modelling we did, which had been his entrée into this area evaluating programme aid. It was into the more challenging task evaluating conditionality. Howard learned a lot from Geske in our work together – as did Amirah as a student. It was a privilege to work with her and be taught by her in those years, and we wish her well in the future.

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12

POLITICAL CONDITIONALITY OF EUROPEAN UNION POLICIES RELAXING ABROAD, TIGHTENING AT HOME MARKUS HAVERLAND

Introduction

Aid typically comes with strings attached. Geske Dijkstra has contributed significantly to the literature on conditionality, including political conditionality (Dijkstra, 2002, 2013, 2018). This chapter takes the reader to the European Union (EU). In line with Geske's work, the focus is largely on financial instruments. I will proceed "from the outside in"; starting with the EU's development cooperation with non-EU members such as the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) group of states, continuing with the EUs "closer" neighbourhood, moving to those in the process of becoming EU members (enlargement, accession criteria) and finishing with policies regarding EU member states themselves. The overall message of this brief sketch is that while the EU may loosen political conditionality when it comes to non-EU countries, it has tightened political conditionality at home.

Development Cooperation and Neighbourhood Policy – relaxing conditionality?

European Institutions are the fourth largest donor of official development assistance (ODA) and together with the member states responsible for more than 60 per cent of all ODA (Orbie, 2020). It was the former colonial powers, in particular France, who were at the cradle of the European development aid, as they sought to "Europeaniz[e] the aid and trade relations with their overseas countries and territories" (Fraser, 2007 as cited in Arts 2020, p. 2). Lacking a developed foreign and security policy, development aid was increasingly used to build an image of a global normative power. For instance, the EU was a driving force in the emergence of international development norms (Orbie 2020). The overall goal was economic and

social sustainability and in particular the eradication of poverty, while also “contribut[ing] to the general objective of developing and consolidating democracy and the rule of law, and to that of respecting human rights and fundamental freedoms” (Article 130u(2), EC Treaty, agreed in Maastricht in 1991). Accordingly, political conditionality was employed by the EU, and the EU was also relatively well placed to enforce it “because it is a multilateral institution, less likely to be swayed by the geostrategic interests of a single donor” (Girod, 2020, p. 10).

The importance of values such as democracy and the rule of law were also reflected in the EU’s Neighbourhood policy, which was triggered by Southern and Eastern enlargement. The European Neighbourhood Policy, established in 2004, aimed at “strengthening stability, security and well-being “of the new Southern and Eastern neighbouring countries, but also emphasized that the “privileged relationship with neighbours will build on mutual commitment to common values”, in fields such as “the rule of law” and “good governance” (European Commission, 2004, p. 4).

Over the years, the EU’s development aid policy, including its neighbourhood policy, became more aligned with the EU’s emerging foreign and security policy. The Lisbon Treaty, agreed in 2007, stipulated that development policy must be conducted “within the framework of... the Union’s external action” (Art. 208 (1) TFEU), and the already existing High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policies received more powers in this regard. The focus on developing other countries made place for “mutually beneficial partnerships” in areas such as controlling migration and the stability and security of EU borders (Orbie, 2020, p. 4). While political conditionality was still strong in the decade following the Lisbon Treaty (e.g., Zamfir, 2017), there are signs that democratic values will make place for more strategic geopolitical motives and political short-term consideration. The EU’s 2016 Global Strategy for Foreign and Security Policy is relatively modest when it comes to its democratization ambitions and speaks of “principled pragmatism” and of development cooperation “becom[ing] more flexible and aligned with our strategic priorities” (European Union, 2016, p. 48). Development cooperation in this vision is framed “less as a key component of normative power and more as an essential tool for global power” (Orbie, 2020, p. 417).

EU enlargement – strong political conditionality

EU conditionality concerning democracy and the rule of law is strongest concerning non-EU countries who want to become a member of the club. To be sure, the Treaty of Rome formally only required a country to be a “European state”

to join the then European Economic Community (Article 237, EEC Treaty). This minimalist requirement arguable reflected a division of labour with the sister organization, the Council of Europe, which saw to the European Convention of Human rights; the European Economic Community being indeed an *economic* community, busying itself with tasks like a common agricultural policy and a common market (Juncos & Pérez-Solórzano Borragán, 2019).

Hence from a purely legal perspective, the authoritarian dictatorships of Portugal and Spain could have acceded the EEC back in the sixties and early seventies, while by the way, Morocco's application in 1987 has been rejected.

Two developments lead to the establishment of formal political conditionality criteria (Juncos & Pérez-Solórzano Borragán, 2019). The first is the development from an economic *community* to a more political *union* resulting in the Maastricht Treaty. Increased cooperation in foreign and security policy and in justice and home affairs sensitized member states for political requirements that (future) members should fulfil. The second and related development was the prospect of the accession of post-communist Central and Eastern European countries after the fall of the Berlin wall, and some uncertainty whether these countries would be successful in their democratic transition. In the Maastricht Treaty, agreed in 1991, hence just two years after the fall of the Berlin wall, member states explicitly assured themselves, that their "systems of government are founded on the principles of democracy" (Article F.1., TEU, Maastricht version). Concerning the accession of new members, a set of political (and economic) criteria have been developed at the European Council in Copenhagen in 1993, which countries had to meet to become part of the EU. The first criteria being the "stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy [and] the rule of law" (European Council, 1993, p. 12). In other words, the EU now had explicit political requirement in exchange for EU membership, and hence the benefits of the single market and its internal financial instruments such as the common agricultural policy and the cohesion funds.

But once you are in? Establishing and tightening political conditionality for EU member states

At the time when Eastern Enlargement got on the EUs agenda, there were no mechanisms whatsoever in place to prevent democratic backsliding once a country has become part of the club. The Maastricht Treaty was silent on it. It was assumed that once countries have joined, democratic principle would be saved. As Eastern enlargement became more concrete, member states increasingly doubt whether this assumption was justified. The Amsterdam Treaty (1997) then included the first

version of what from the Nice Treaty on would become the “famous” Article 7, providing for sanctions, including suspending Member State’s voting rights, when there is “a serious breach of democratic principles” (Article F.1., TEU, Amsterdam version).

According to Búrca this provision “was evidently perceived as a necessary safeguard clause to provide for urgent action should one of the newer democracies, after its admission as a member, collapse or significantly fail to meet the standards asserted by the EU” (Búrca 2004, as cited in Sadurski, 2010). The treaty article was complemented with a preventive arm in the Treaty of Nice (2001) laying out rules to determine whether there is a clear risk of a serious breach by a member state of democratic principles. This addition to Article 7 was ironically not triggered by enlargement concerns but by a development in the established West European democracy, Austria. In early 2000, the Austrian people party formed a coalition government with the extreme right Austrian Freedom Party, which under the leadership of Joerg Haider had become the second largest party in parliament (Sadurski, 2010).

The most serious challenges to the rule of law were posed by Hungary (from 2011 on) and Poland (from 2015 on). However, the Article 7 procedure turned out to be not particularly effective, because of its high decision-making threshold. Unanimity of all member states, minus the one accused, is required to determine a serious breach of democratic principles. As long as Poland and Hungary hold each other’s hands, they can prevent sanctions, and the Commission anticipated this (Closa, 2019).

It was this deadlock that let EU institutions, and in particular the Commission, to have a closer look at its internal financial instruments, to explore whether one could use the power of the purse to force member states to comply with democratic principle. Traditionally, the EU’s expenditure policies were instruments to allow for the smooth functioning of the single market and later the monetary union, and a concession to those member states who expected to benefit less from those policies; initially in the 1970s, Ireland and, somewhat ironically, the United Kingdom, and later Greece, Portugal and Spain (Hix & Hoyland, 2022; Piattoni & Polverari, 2019). To be sure, this internal financial aid increasingly came with strings attached. The 1999 reform of the cohesion fund put provisions in place to strengthen compliance with rules and efficiency in the use of funds and the 2013 reform introduced *ex ante* conditionality: for instance, regarding public procurement (Piattoni & Polverari, 2019). But this can be regarded as rules concerning proper project management and does not compare to the promotion of democracy and the rule of law that the EU as

normative power committed itself in its external financial instruments.

This changed in 2018; and is by the way a testament to the Commission's creativity in legal engineering. The Commission turned to the innocent looking Article 322 (TFEU), that provides for the adaption of financial management rules. Based on this article, it boldly proposed the regulation "on the Protection of the European Union's Budget in case of Generalized Deficiency as Regards to the Rule of Law in the Member States" (European Commission, 2018). The argument was that the rule of law needs to be upheld to allow for proper usage of the EU budget. For instance, if a legal conflict concerning an EU subsidy arises in a member state, the independence of the judiciary that arbitrates in the conflict needs to be beyond doubt. The regulation was somewhat weakened by the Council, but it still provides for a serious rule of law conditionality for the EU's internal financial instrument. It also got more bite than initially anticipated, as it also applied to the new EU Recovery Fund (Baraggia & Bonelli, 2022). Importantly, in contrast to the Article 7 procedure, this regulation only requires a qualified majority in the Council to impose sanctions. At the time of writing of this chapter, the new conditionality regime is showing its teeth. In December 2022, the Council has decided to withhold from Hungary €6,3bn of cohesion funds given rule of law violations. In a separate procedure the EU has approved Hungary's recovery plan, but made the associated payment of €5,8bn in grant and €9,6bn in loans conditional on complying to what the Commission dubbed 27 "super milestones" related to rule of law reforms (Dunai & Fleming, 2022; Nguyen, 2022).

In conclusion: while the EU may relax democratic and rule of law conditionality abroad by subordinating it to its geopolitical interests, it has not only established political conditionality for its own member states but is now also prepared to act on it.

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13

STRENGTHENING POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY IN UGANDA

WIL HOUT¹

Introduction

This chapter reports on the findings of a research project on police accountability in Uganda, which started as part of an evaluation of Dutch ‘good governance’ policies undertaken by the Policy and Operations Evaluation Department (IOB) of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Geske Dijkstra was the evaluator responsible for the overall study, which also included Rwanda and Indonesia. The Uganda country study was commissioned to the International Institute of Social Studies (ISS) in 2014 and fieldwork took place in 2014 and 2015. Although the final evaluation report of the Dutch good governance approach was never published for a variety of internal and political reasons, the ISS team published several articles and book chapters with the use of the quantitative and qualitative data that were collected in the research project.

Background

The Police Accountability and Reform Project (PARP) was implemented in Uganda between 2007 and 2013 by the Human Rights Network Uganda (HURINET-U), with financial support from the Dutch Embassy in Uganda. The PARP was supported because the aim of strengthening accountability and democratic governance of the police in Uganda fit the Dutch approach that aimed to support rule of law in developing countries as part of a wider good governance agenda.

¹ This chapter draws on a number of collaborative publications (Hout et al. 2016; Wagner et al. 2017; Wagner and Hout 2019; Hout and Wagner 2019; Wagner et al. 2020; Hout et al. 2022) and I gratefully acknowledge the contributions of a number of Natascha Wagner, Rose Namara, Ria Brouwers, Jonathan Fisher and Lydeke Schakel to the research findings reported in this chapter.

The Dutch Embassy in Kampala decided to fund the PARP because HURINET-U's longstanding relationship with the Ugandan police promised successful delivery of the project. The project aims were felt to be relevant because of the central role of the Uganda Police Force in the rule of law and human rights protection in the country. At the time of the study, the Ugandan police was widely perceived to be corrupt. Moreover, it was felt to be a main instrument of the incumbent regime of President Museveni to retain power and counter pressure from the opposition with instruments that involved gross violations of human rights (The Economist, 2018; Hout & Wagner, 2019; Transparency International-Kenya, 2013).

The PARP was set up as an engagement between the police and civil society with the aim of enhancing exchange and strengthening external restraint. The PARP took the form of advocacy work, workshops involving civil society representatives, the media and the police, field visits, information campaigns and radio broadcasts (HURINET-U, 2013). Moreover, the project included dialogues involving the police, the media, and students, with the aim to address the police's abuse of power. HURINET-U's human rights engagement led to the distribution of a large number of the newly introduced complaint form along with copies of a complaints handling manual.

The PARP assessment

In our study of the Ugandan police, we decided to take police integrity as the central focus in the analysis. We understand police integrity as, 'the normative inclination among police to resist temptations to abuse the rights and privileges of their occupation' (Klockars et al., 2006, p.1). We chose for this angle, because the police, as part of the 'strong arm' of the state, face the so-called 'paradox of violence'. The police, next to the army, claim the monopoly on the legitimate use of violence in society, but is also subjected to legal restraints on the actual use of its powers. As Marx (2001) has argued, 'a democratic society needs protection both by police and from police'. Against the background of the societal role of the police, the integrity of police officers is very important.

Our study focused on police integrity rather than corruption because of the problems involved in studying corrupt behaviour. Following Klockars et al. (2000, p.3), we realised that the so-called 'organisational/occupational approach' that they propose is suited to asking 'questions of fact and opinion that can be explored directly, without arousing the resistance that direct inquiries about corrupt behaviour are likely to provoke'.

In order to evaluate the impact that the PARP had on the attitudes of police officers, we surveyed and interviewed respondents in ten out of a total of 143 police

districts. The sample (Bushenyi, Iganga, Jinja, Kabale, Kabarole, Tororo, Luwero, Mbarara, Mityana, and Soroti) included five districts where the PARP had been implemented and five where it had not been rolled out. In each of the districts, the sample consisted of 60 police officers, thus bringing the total number of survey participants to 600. Of these, a total of 23 police officers were approached for in-depth interviews about their experiences with the PARP. Data collection took place in April 2015, which was about two years after the end of the PARP intervention. The fact that our research project only identified effects that have survived is a potential strength of the study, because it avoids that the assessment focuses on immediate outputs, which happens if effects are measured right after an intervention took place.

Our study of PARP applied the approach to studying police integrity that was proposed by Klockars et al. (2000, 2006) and Kutnjak Ivković (2005a, 2005b). Their method involves the presentation of a set of ‘vignette cases’ – short hypothetical descriptions of police misconduct – to police officers in order to register the officers’ responses on the seriousness of the behaviour that is described and their attitudes to reporting fellow police officers who are involved in the misconduct. The vignettes vary from bribery on a small scale to the treatment of traffic offences, and from police behaviour in cases varying from robbery to murder.² Our survey questions ask for an assessment of the cases on the basis of officers’ judgements about good policing, while the interviews go more into depth about the considerations that police officers have in judging perceived misbehaviour.

The impacts of the PARP

The impacts of the PARP were assessed in two studies, one focusing on the analysis of quantitative survey data (Wagner et al., 2020), and the other on qualitative interview data (Hout et al. 2022).

The analysis of the differences in the responses of police officers to the 12 vignette cases shows that officers who participated in the PARP tend to be more critical of misbehaviour by fellow police officers compared to non-participants. Table 13.1 presents the results of the analysis of differences on five normative questions for each vignette case, which relate to officers’ assessments of (1) the

² The vignettes are available in the online Appendix of Wagner et al. (2020) at <https://onlinelibrary-wiley-com.eur.idm.oclc.org/action/downloadSupplement?doi=10.1111%2Frode.12643&file=rode12643-sup-0001-Appendix.docx>.

seriousness of the depicted behaviour; (2) the likeliness that they would report a fellow police officer; (3) the position of others in their office on the misbehaviour; (4) their own view as to what disciplinary measure should be taken; and (5) whether the misbehaviour would be seen as a violation of official policy in their agency.

Table 13.1 Main results of analyses of survey data per normative question

	Severity of behaviour	Likelihood of reporting	Assessment of severity by most in office	Position on disciplinary action	Assessment of violation of official policy	Average across all
<i>Simple comparison of means (no covariates)</i>						
<i>Treatment effect</i>	0.487***	0.364***	0.326***	0.222***	0.263***	0.327
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	
<i>Control group average</i>	3.771	4.004	3.742	3.760	4.300	
<i>P propensity score matching (full set of covariates)</i>						
<i>Treatment effect</i>	0.503***	0.407***	0.286***	0.213***	0.270***	0.336
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	
<i>Inverse probability weighting (full set of covariates)</i>						
<i>Treatment effect</i>	0.578***	0.374***	0.386***	0.134**	0.246***	0.344
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.023)	(0.000)	
<i>Average effect from simultaneous regression (full set of covariates)</i>						
<i>Treatment effect</i>	0.437***	0.377***	0.350***	0.191***	0.181***	0.210***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.023)	(0.041)	(0.000)

Notes: Robust *p*-values in parentheses. ***/**/* indicates significance at the 1/5/10% level, respectively. Sample size is 7,200 (12 vignette cases with 600 respondents). Robustness checks are provided in Wagner et al. (2020: 77-78).

Source: Authors' own calculations.

Data obtained from the survey were analysed with matching techniques and simultaneous regressions. By applying these techniques, we were able to assess whether differences in responses between police officers from PARP and non-PARP districts could plausibly (and statistically significantly) be ascribed to participation in the project. The findings in table 1 show that there are consistent differences between the two groups of police officers on all questions, and that the differences

are highly statistically significant. This implies that PARP had a positive impact on normative judgments of police accountability and integrity, importantly including human rights as one of its main target areas.

The findings from our quantitative analyses of the PARP indicate that the intervention seems to have contributed to greater awareness among police officers about the need for on-the-job integrity and proper behaviour vis-à-vis Ugandan citizens. Comparing police officers who took part in PARP activities with non-participants, the attitudinal difference between the two groups on a variety of vignette cases suggests that the project has had lasting positive results. We conclude from our findings that police accountability may be enhanced by targeted attention to unacceptable police behaviour, breaches of integrity and corruption. Yet, activities on good and accountable policing are not very likely to assume their full potential when used as stand-alone instruments; they need to be combined with credible internal enforcement mechanisms.

The findings from the quantitative analyses are corroborated by the results of the analysis of the interview-based data. In-depth interviews were held with 23 police officers holding commanding positions; they included Regional Police Commanders (RPCs), District Police Commanders (DPCs) and Officers in Charge of the Criminal Investigation Department (OC-CIDs) in four PARP districts (Bushenyi, Kabale, Kabarole and Mbarara) and four non-PARP ones (Iganga, Jinja, Luwero and Tororo). Apart from some general questions about policing, interviews addressed the PARP's positive and negative impacts, the overall relevance of projects such as the PARP and officers' assessment of the sustainability of the results achieved by the PARP.

The assessment of PARP activities and their impacts showed a marked difference between officers working in PARP and non-PARP districts. All twelve police officers stationed in non-PARP districts were unable to comment on the project activities and were equally silent about possible positive or negative impacts. Several of those police officers indicated explicitly they had not heard about the project before.

The comments provided by the officers from the PARP districts were generally at a rather abstract level, but they showed a certain level of knowledge about, and possibly a shift in attitude towards, 'good' police behaviour, particularly when compared to officers from non-PARP districts. It seems that at least some of the difference in knowledge and attitude between the two groups of police officers of equivalent rank could possibly be attributed to involvement in the project.

The responses provided by nine police officers in PARP districts typically

addressed issues connected to desirable police behaviour in terms of respect for human rights, the treatment of arrested people and interactions with the community in general. A typical example is the response given by a Regional Police Commander in the Bushenyi district, who commented: 'Well, there are a number of positive changes ... For instance, as a result of the PARP project with HURINET-U impunity is no longer there and service delivery has improved especially in the areas of detention of suspects for long hours, torture of suspects, and corruption.' Likewise, a telling response was given by an Officer in Charge of the Criminal Investigation Department in Mbarara district, who indicated that, '[t]he project taught me to be accountable, to improve on service delivery, to improve on democratic governance; that whatever you do, you should do it democratically. Even while talking, we need to talk to people like we do to our masters, we should not shout at them. If public officers know that people are our masters, then we would never abuse them.' Although we cannot generalize on the basis of a limited number of interviews, the convergence in the answers of the police officers is striking. It is likely that the convergence in answers can be ascribed partly to the norm-setting effect resulting from the involvement of police officers in the PARP.

Police integrity and perceived effectiveness

Wagner and Hout (2019) focused on the impact of perceptions of the institutional environment and police effectiveness among Ugandan police officers to assess the external validity of the assessments of the seriousness of misconduct presented in the vignettes. The study identified ten elements of the perceived institutional environment and police effectiveness on the basis of the following survey questions:

1. What is the perceived crime level in the local community?
2. Do the police treat young people the same as older people?
3. Do the police treat poor people the same as rich people?
4. Do the police treat men the same as women?
5. What is the level of confidence in the officer's own work?
6. What is the level of confidence in the work of the police in general?
7. Do the police always have the duty to make people obey the law?
8. Do the police perform a good job in treating people fairly and with respect?
9. Do the police perform a good job in managing crime?
10. Are the police corrupt?

We analysed the relationship of these elements with the five normative/evaluative responses to the vignette cases that were discussed above.

Our findings show that most of the ten perception indicators are highly correlated, with correlations ranging between -0.35 and 0.57 . Most indicators of the institutional environment and police effectiveness appear to be positively correlated, but the perceived level of crime in the community and the perceived level of police corruption show negative correlations with the other variables. The magnitude of the pair-wise correlations and the fact that all but one are highly statistically significant, made us conclude that the chosen indicators of the perceived institutional environment and police effectiveness are jointly relevant. On this basis, we inferred that, together, the indicators may be used as a measurement of the self-assessed quality of work of the police.

In order to provide an assessment of the impact of institutional environment variables and police effectiveness on police officers' position on issues of integrity and misbehaviour, we used two approaches. The first was the construction of an index of institutional environment and police effectiveness, averaging the scores across the ten individual items. The second approach was the use of an index obtained through the application of principal component analysis (PCA).

Table 13.2 Results employing perception indices of institutional environment and police effectiveness

	Severity of behaviour	Likelihood of reporting	Assessment of severity by most in office	Position on disciplinary action	Assessment of violation of official policy
<i>Average perception index</i>	0.203**	0.378***	0.371***	0.088	0.144*
	(0.091)	(0.065)	(0.079)	(0.062)	(0.087)
<i>PCA perception index</i>	0.023	0.098***	0.104***	0.031**	0.026
	(0.023)	(0.016)	(0.020)	(0.016)	(0.021)

Note: See table 1

The results that are summarised in Table 13.2 show that all five normative/evaluative responses appear to be correlated positively with both effectiveness indices. Our results show that of the five evaluative variables, two are positively and statistically significantly correlated with both the average police effectiveness index and the PCA index, while two are only statistically significantly correlated with the average index and one is only statistically significantly correlated with the PCA index.

Although the associations between police integrity and the perception indices differ, there is no doubt that the two indices are related but are sensitive to the type of measurement and aggregation. This seems to imply that different aspects of the perceived institutional environment and police effectiveness are related to different

normative/evaluative dimensions of police integrity. We inferred that the subjective perceptions of the institutional environment and police effectiveness undoubtedly impacts the attitudes on police integrity; this suggests that the vignette cases may serve as a tool to channel and represent the individual subjective biases in a coherent form.

Gendered police performance

A third analysis (Wagner et al., 2017) focused on the question of whether ‘feminising’ public services would contribute to improving the quality of service delivery and reducing corruption. The starting point for the analysis was anecdotal evidence that female police officers would be more trustworthy, competent, pro-social and respectful towards the people they are supposed to serve (cf. Gray, 2013).

In our study, the vignette cases served as the entry point for assessing the impact of gender on police officers’ attitudes. We randomly allocated and administered four different versions of our questionnaires to police officers and, varied the gender roles of both the police officer depicted in the case and of the victim or perpetrator. We found that the cases were judged independently of the gender of the various actors depicted in the vignettes. Even when one assumes that there is gender bias in the perception of female police officers and victims or perpetrators, the average effect explains less than 5 percent of a standard deviation irrespective of the model that is used.

As in the previous studies, our focus in the study of gendered police performance was on the normative/evaluative dimensions of police integrity. Table 13.3 presents the question-specific effects. We compared whether male police officers are judged differently on the five dimensions than their female colleagues (the first rows in the three panels), whether the gender of the victim or perpetrator makes a difference (the second row in the panels) and whether there is an interaction effect between the gender of the police officer and that of the victim/perpetrator (the third row).

The results that are summarised in Table 13.3 are, without exception, small to very small. Most of the results are also statistically insignificant. The few significant coefficients are very small and the lack of a pattern in the coefficients doesn’t allow us to draw conclusions on gendered differences in the perceptions of the cases among police officers. Overall, we found that gender framing does not have an influence on the responses; we conclude that misbehaviour by female police officers is perceived similarly to male officers’ misconduct. Similarly, we did not find a difference in the treatment of male and female victims.

Table 13.3 Results relating to gender differences

	Severity of behaviour	Likelihood of reporting	Assessment of severity by most in office	Position on disciplinary action	Assessment of violation of official policy
<i>Panel A: District and case fixed effects</i>					
<i>Male officer</i>	-0.072 (0.063)	-0.049 (0.049)	-0.056 (0.055)	-0.020 (0.050)	-0.020 (0.049)
<i>Male victim</i>	-0.100 (0.084)	-0.078 (0.052)	-0.082 (0.070)	-0.024 (0.060)	0.033 (0.057)
<i>Male officer x victim</i>	0.057 (0.105)	0.157* (0.070)	0.051 (0.091)	0.040 (0.078)	0.021 (0.075)
<i>Panel B: Respondent covariates, as well as district and case fixed effects</i>					
<i>Male officer</i>	-0.067 (0.061)	-0.038 (0.047)	-0.044 (0.054)	-0.010 (0.049)	-0.014 (0.049)
<i>Male victim</i>	-0.091 (0.081)	-0.062 (0.051)	-0.069 (0.069)	-0.010 (0.061)	0.043 (0.057)
<i>Male officer x victim</i>	0.046 (0.102)	0.141* (0.069)	0.039 (0.090)	0.025 (0.078)	0.009 (0.074)
<i>Panel C: Respondent and case fixed effects</i>					
<i>Male officer</i>	-0.016 (0.044)	-0.029 (0.039)	-0.075* (0.043)	-0.022 (0.041)	-0.078* (0.037)
<i>Male victim</i>	-0.034 (0.052)	-0.042 (0.048)	-0.099* (0.053)	-0.037 (0.058)	-0.004 (0.041)
<i>Male officer x victim</i>	-0.003 (0.075)	0.125* (0.065)	0.081 (0.072)	0.057 (0.071)	0.037 (0.061)

Note: See table 1; * denotes statistical significance at the 5% level.

An analysis of the relationship between the gender of the respondent and their responses to the five normative/evaluative questions on police integrity, however, shows a different result. Panel A in Table 13.4 provides the baseline results controlling for respondent characteristics, gender framings and their interactions, as well as, case and district fixed effects. Panel B adds the interactions of respondent gender with the experimental gender framings.

Across the five questions in panel A, the (standardised) coefficient estimates are considerably larger when compared to the coefficients associated with the randomly framed gender as reported in Table 13.3. This implies that there are significant differences in the judgements of male as compared to female police officers. The results in panel B also indicate a positive link between respondent gender and the five normative/evaluative questions on police integrity: male officers tend to be more critical of misbehaviour, are more likely to report on that behaviour, indicate

that stricter disciplinary measures should be taken, and are more convinced that misbehaviour constitutes a violation of official policy. The interaction effects are almost all not statistically significant.

Table 13.4 Correlations with respondent gender and descriptive heterogeneity analysis

	Severity of behaviour	Likelihood of reporting	Assessment of severity by most in office	Position on disciplinary action	Assessment of violation of official policy
<i>Panel A: Respondent covariates, gender framing treatments and interaction, and district and case fixed effects</i>					
<i>Male respondent</i>	0.201 ⁺ (0.117)	0.224* (0.093)	0.138 (0.101)	0.169 ⁺ (0.096)	0.171 ⁺ (0.093)
<i>Panel B: Adding interactions of respondent gender and gender framing treatments to the specification in Panel A</i>					
<i>Male respondent</i>	0.225 ⁺ (0.122)	0.236* (0.095)	0.200* (0.101)	0.276* (0.100)	0.209* (0.099)
<i>Male respondent x male officer</i>	-0.073 (0.090)	-0.117 (0.082)	-0.112 (0.079)	-0.219* (0.079)	-0.080 (0.072)
<i>Male respondent x male victim</i>	0.006 (0.097)	0.109 (0.081)	-0.085 (0.091)	-0.108 (0.084)	-0.036 (0.075)

Note: Standard errors are clustered at the respondent level. ⁺ and *denote statistical significance at the 10 and 5% level, respectively. All models are estimated using the command 'avg_effect' in STATA based on Kling et al. (2004) and Clingingsmith et al. (2009), calculating average standardised effect sizes within a seemingly-unrelated regression model to adjust for covariance across estimates.

The overall conclusion of the study is that, while it is naïve to think that women are inherently more ethical or will be more reliable police officers, the hierarchical position of women in the Ugandan police force may impact their position on misbehaviour in the ranks of the police. Given the Ugandan context, it may not come as a surprise that female police officers, who are in the minority, are less likely to report misbehaviour as it essentially means filing complaints about male colleagues to a male-dominated leadership. Needless to say, female police officers might also be less familiar with the official rules and regulations of the agency.

Concluding remarks

The four studies that were discussed in this chapter are the outcome of an evaluation project initiated by the Policy and Operations Evaluation Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and overseen by Geske Dijkstra. The findings demonstrate the value of using a survey experiment, involving vignette cases, to study attitudes (and possibly behaviour) of police officers in Uganda. The studies on the impact of the PARP (Wagner et al., 2020; Hout et al., 2022) document the potential impact of an intervention aimed at police accountability. Likewise, Wagner and Hout (2019) found that subjective perceptions of the institutional environment and police effectiveness impact police officers' attitudes on police integrity. Finally, the research reported in Wagner et al. (2017) indicates that, although female police officers may not be 'better' than their male counterparts, there still seem to be striking differences in the response to police misbehaviour by female and male police officers.

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COLLEAGUE,
FRIEND,
LECTURER

14

FINDING FRIENDSHIP IN REVOLUTIONARY NICARAGUA A PERSONAL REFLECTION MILLIE THAYER

I met Geske Dijkstra in the summer of 1984 in Managua, Nicaragua. She was in the country carrying out dissertation research for a PhD in Economics on industrialization policy in mixed economies. I was a high school teacher on leave from my job in the U.S., doing research for a project on literacy programs in Central America and the Caribbean. Below, I share my reflections on that period in mid-1980s Nicaragua, which marked both the beginning of Geske's career and the beginning of our long friendship*.

Nicaragua in the early 1980s was an intense place to be, in turns exhilarating, terrifying, frustrating, and heartbreaking. I was drawn to the place because of the revolutionary social experiment being attempted by the young leaders of the Sandinista Front for National Liberation (FSLN), who in 1979 had managed to defeat a 43-year-long, brutal family dictatorship. The early '80s were an optimistic moment. The Sandinistas, inspired by Catholic liberation theology, sought to improve the lot of the poor and marginalized on the basis of a hybrid market/state-led economy. Everywhere you looked, formerly excluded actors were entering the public stage: *campesinos*, women, workers, youth, and the urban poor, among others. I witnessed farmers with a third-grade education teaching illiterate neighbors, rural women speaking shyly for the first time in community gatherings, and neighbors canvassing low-income *barrios* with preventive health information. In November 1984, Nicaragua held its first democratic elections. A few years earlier, a campaign staffed by high school student volunteers had lowered the illiteracy rate from 50% to 13% in five enthusiastic months, and new health clinics were opening in rural areas. In many ways, the air was full of possibility, with awareness of missteps and dangers just barely on the horizon.

But 1984, when Geske and I both arrived, was a kind of a turning point. What had begun as isolated attacks by counterrevolutionary forces, with support from the Reagan Administration, had turned into full-scale war, producing casualties across the mountainous region near the Honduran border and forcing the government to divert resources away from social programs and investments to defense. A few months before our respective arrivals, Sandinista leaders accused CIA-operatives of mining the harbor of the country's principal port (damaging a Dutch dredging ship, as well as other vessels) and, in May 1985, a US trade embargo made access to imports even more difficult. Though the war itself seemed far from the capital city, the growing anxiety about the military draft and the empty shelves in the supermarkets told another story.

Geske and I met at a research center in Managua called the Instituto Nicaragüense de Investigaciones Económicas y Sociales (INIES), led by an inspiring and eternally optimistic Jesuit priest. I was assigned a desk in an office with Geske and another Dutch colleague. As a newcomer, I was grateful to find patient and friendly people who welcomed me and answered my endless questions about life in Nicaragua. I was immediately drawn to Geske's kindness, gentle humor, and understated but direct way of speaking. She and I struck up a friendship, sharing basic fixed-price lunches of rice, beans and meat at a local *comedor* in a neighborhood home, where the large red parrot had learned to imitate startlingly well the sound of a crying baby and we ate on benches under the shade of a large tree, using one hand to wave off the flies that had earned the place the nickname of *El Mosquero*. On Sundays, when the streets emptied out in the heat of the day and every Nicaraguan was home at a family meal, Geske and I would meet up at a pizza place near her house, hoping that at least one of the things listed on the menu would actually be available. Once, unless I have imagined it, I vaguely recall venturing into one of the few movie theaters to see *Raiders of the Lost Ark*, marginally more interesting than the Soviet documentaries about the Great Patriotic War that seemed to play constantly at the *Cinemateca*. We talked endlessly about Nicaraguan politics, our research, the people we missed at home, and the array of characters we had met in Nicaragua.

We also shared the vexations of daily life in a poor country, now compounded by its location in the crosshairs of a powerful enemy. A simple errand, such as, paying the electric bill or making an international phone call at Telcor, could become an odyssey, occupying an entire day—if one was lucky enough to arrive at one's destination. Aging transport equipment and shortages of parts meant endless waits for buses that then passed by with riders clinging to the open doors. Attempts

to navigate bureaucracies produced Kafkaesque experiences with shifting requirements, missing forms, and *jefes* who never arrived. Prices rocketed up and down in response to efforts to solve seemingly insoluble economic problems, on one memorable occasion producing nothing more than a \$10 beer in a country where teachers made \$40 a month. People would receive their pay in cash and run to the nearest market to buy something, anything, as the value of the currency eroded by the hour. Sometimes lightbulbs were nowhere to be found; at other times it was toilet paper, or something else. “*No hay*” (we don’t have any) was the constant refrain, sometimes followed by a sympathetic “*Si no, con mucho gusto*” (otherwise, we’d be happy to oblige), or by the slyly sarcastic “*Pero cuando venga la revolución . . .*” (But when the revolution comes . . .).

Nicaragua was not for the faint of heart, but Geske was not one to complain about hardship—bureaucracy, maybe, but not practical obstacles, to which she simply set about finding solutions. I’m not sure where she got a bicycle—perhaps from some departing Dutch colleague—but she rode it everywhere, veering around manholes lacking a cover (falling into one was common enough that Nicaraguans invented a verb for it—*manjolearse*), avoiding chunks of concrete from deteriorating sidewalks, and dodging the ubiquitous, loud and fume-filled traffic, with drivers entirely unaccustomed to bicyclists attempting to share their space, much less one ridden by a tall, blond, fearless foreigner.

The capital city had at first felt safe from the violence in the north, but the war was coming closer for urban residents. What was said to be an American spy plane, began to break the sound barrier over *Managua* every morning, creating terrifying booms. At the research institute, we joked about the “8:30 plane,” but employees were asked to volunteer to help dig trenches in the back garden in case of attack. In February 1985, at the height of the coffee harvest, our workplace sent volunteers, including Geske and myself, to the remote northern mountains to pick the crop responsible for much of Nicaragua’s foreign exchange. Our contribution to the harvest was likely small, but what we learned about the lives of rural agricultural workers was vast. We slept in a barn, aware of the rats running over us in the night, rose at 4:30, ate bug-filled beans, rice and tortillas day in and day out, braved the snakes in the coffee fields and the tiny biting insects that fell down your shirt as you shook the coffee branches, and washed our clothes with the local women on rocks in a freezing cold river. Warned that *contra* forces were active in the area, we took turns keeping watch through the night, alongside a militia brigade assigned to protect the farm. When the opposition forces attacked a neighboring plantation, we were evacuated on trucks in the middle of the night over remote dirt roads which,

we were advised, might have been mined by the *contras*. As we boarded the trucks, we were told to keep our mouths open so our eardrums wouldn't burst if there were explosions. It was a harrowing and powerful bonding experience for all of the researchers, drivers, cleaners and secretaries who had signed up to pick coffee for the *patria*. It also brought home the costs of the war to those who lived in its path.

This was the context in which Geske conducted her dissertation research on industrialization strategies in a mixed economy. I was years away from grad school still and had only a vague understanding of what it meant to write a dissertation, but I was impressed with her focus and persistence in the midst of chaos and daily distractions. As she herself later wrote in her preface, "It was fascinating, though not always pleasant, to be at the same time studying the economics of the revolution and living its problems." Nevertheless, she managed to track down and interview busy, and sometimes, resistant managers of state and private enterprises about the impact of economic policies on their businesses, and the most pressing problems they were facing. Though I am not an economist, it's clear that the topic and the site in which she chose to study it were well-chosen and astutely timed. Arriving as she did at a moment of intense challenges for government leaders, she was able to observe the fluctuations of policy-in-the-making and hear directly from its objects, as a means to gauge its chances of success. The possibility of successful industrialization in Nicaragua was not on the surface a "sexy" topic, but the potential for success of a mixed economy with an industrial base was a crucial question for small countries seeking an alternative path to development. And, indeed, the lives of the poor depended on the answers.

Geske concluded, with some caveats, that the Nicaraguan case suggested that an economy with mixed ownership of the means of production could be a viable path for developing countries aiming to transition to socialism. However, she pointed to the dangers of "growth optimism" on the part of such states, and of an excess of ambition in their short-term objectives, particularly given the need for defense against the external pressures that would accompany the inevitable counterrevolution. She illustrated how the *contra* war (along with government policy errors) forced Nicaragua into a fight for its economic survival, making the possibilities for industrialization in the near future "bleak." More broadly, she argued, only a form of "slow industrialization" would be feasible in developing countries facing the kind of militarized threats seen in Nicaragua.

Geske and I left Nicaragua and went our separate ways in mid-1985, she to complete her studies in the Netherlands, and I to do solidarity work in the US. Others will have much more to say about the substance of Geske's scholarship over

her career, but looking through her many publications, one can see the shape of her intellectual trajectory, beginning with the issues on industrialization and mixed economies she began to explore in her dissertation, then moving toward questions related to the role of ideology and technocratic states, and on to broad questions around international debt and structural adjustment, as well as foreign aid, equity and conditionalities, among other topics. Throughout, she has consistently pursued a strong interest in the links between gender relations and development. Her consultancies and evaluations have taken her to many countries that struggled, as did Nicaragua, with the inequalities of geopolitics and the scarcity of capital. She returned to Central America many times, but also used her expertise in countries in the Caribbean, South America, and Africa. It is a long and impressive record of contributions to our knowledge about how to address the kind of global inequalities she had observed firsthand in 1980s Nicaragua.

Coda

Geske and I have maintained our transnational friendship through the decades and the ups and downs of our lives. While Geske began her academic career, I returned to live and work in Nicaragua until 1991. On one trip during that period, I stopped in San Salvador to see her and Tom, who were working at the national university there, and meet their newborn baby. (Not long afterward, a guerrilla offensive in the capital city forced them to return home.) Geske encouraged me as I applied for graduate school and became a sociologist, hosted me at her home in Leyden (and loaned me a bicycle) when I made a research trip to the Netherlands, and later, generously read and commented on my work. She visited me in Oregon and Massachusetts, and I spent a few wonderful days in Italy one summer with her and Tom and their family. In between, we met up and shared rooms, meals and conversation at more Latin American Studies Association meetings than I can count. She has been a steady, supportive and loyal friend, whom I am grateful to have met so many years ago in the midst of a revolution. I wish her all the best as she begins this new phase of her life. *Adelante!*

Acknowledgements

With thanks to Richard Stahler-Sholk, whom Geske and I also met at INIES in 1984, for his memory-jogging contributions.

15

GERESPECTEERD ALS WETENSCHAPPER, GELIEFD OM HAAR VRIENDELIJKHEID NADIA MOLENAERS

Geske,

Onze eerste ontmoeting vergeet ik nooit meer. Die moet zeker 20 jaar geleden zijn.

Jij presenteerde een paper over IMF- en Wereldbank-conditionaliteiten tijdens de debt relief/PRSP-periode. Je analyse was vlijmscherp, je conclusies waren glashelder. Dat Robrecht (Renard) en ik frontaal in de ‘aanval’ gingen – want wij hadden een paper dat zo ongeveer haaks stond op jouw conclusies – heeft het samensporen van onze paden niet verhinderd. Integendeel. Het ‘wetenschappelijk debat’ tussen ons leidde tot wederzijds respect en effende het pad voor heel mooie samenwerkingsmomenten. Dat respect voor jou is in de loop der tijd alleen maar groter geworden, zowel in de breedte als in de diepte.

In de diepte hadden we regelmatig contact en ondernamen we samen leuke initiatieven. Allemaal rond ontwikkelingshulp, rond nieuwe hulpmodaliteiten en hun effectiviteit, rond conditionaliteiten en verschuivingen in paradigma’s. Die academische uitwisselingen en samenwerkingen toonden aan dat je een heel fijne en heel goede ‘sparring partner’ was. Grondig, to-the-point, maar ook praktisch en pragmatisch. Onze gezamenlijke projectjes (zoals die evaluatie van begrotingssteun, de verschillende panels die we samen organiseerden, jouw gastcolleges op onze summerschool...) lieten me zien hoe fijn, hoe makkelijk en hoe onbezorgd het was om met je samen te werken. Je stond altijd klaar, gedreven met een glimlach, bereid om initiatieven te nemen, aanzetten te geven, of grondig door te werken op aangeleverd materiaal. Altijd stipt, altijd grondig, altijd betrouwbaar. In handen van Geske kwam het gewoon goed! En toen kwam het plan om samen toch een boek te schrijven.... Maar Covid stak daar een stokje voor. Dat vind ik nog steeds een gemiste

kans. Je weet me te vinden, mocht je toch nog in de pen willen klimmen. Ik kan me geen leuker project indenken dan mijmerend te reflecteren over die goede oude ‘aid effectiveness’-periode, toen de dieren nog spraken en de experts nog invloed hadden...

Maar ook in de breedte groeide mijn respect en appreciatie. Door de jaren heen heb ik je leren kennen als een warme, lieve, vriendelijke, geduldige en moedige vrouw die ons ook – en misschien vooral – op momenten van zware tegenslagen toeliet een glimp op te vangen van haar immense innerlijke kracht. Ik leerde je sportieve kant kennen: hoeveel je hield van wandelen, de natuur en hoe fanatiek je hield van lopen en tennissen. En zelfs toen de vreselijke ziekte je een flinke knauw gaf en alles ‘on hold’ zette, pakte je de draad heel snel weer op. Binnen de kortste keren stond je terug op de tennisbaan... Die veerkracht... Ik kon daar alleen maar met open mond naar luisteren en tegelijkertijd tonnen volle bewondering voelen.

Lieve Geske, toen het bericht me bereikte dat je ‘emeritus-tijd’ snel aanbreekt sloeg de paniek me om het hart. Ik had namelijk nooit stilgestaan bij een leeftijdsverschil tussen ons. Ik dacht “Hoe? Nu al? Dat kan toch niet?” Dus ofwel schatte ik je te jong in (compliment toch?), ofwel ben ik een heel stuk ouder dan ik zelf besef (haha). Hoe dan ook deed het me beseffen dat de ‘fin de carrière’ iedereen staat te wachten... Ik hoop alleen maar dat ik een even fijne, hartelijke indruk mag achterlaten, stevig vastgeknoot aan een even indrukwekkend academische track record.

Geske, het ga je goed...

Lieve groeten,

Nadia Molenaers

16

DEVELOPING STUDENTS A LEGACY OF TEACHING GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT PIETER TUYTENS

I had the opportunity and good fortune to work together with Geske Dijkstra at the Erasmus University Rotterdam. While I greatly enjoyed our conversations, or to see her sharp mind in action during research workshops, in this contribution I want to highlight the formidable contributions Geske has made as a teacher. My first years at the EUR coincided with Geske's final years. Nonetheless, I was able to witness her incredible energy, drive and passion for teaching. This inspired not just her students, but also her colleagues – me included. Above all, Geske represents for me the true aspiration of research-based teaching. This aspiration goes beyond efforts to integrate the latest academic developments in one's lectures. Geske was able to build on her *own* extensive experience as a researcher to inform her teaching and to share this passion with her students. In what follows, it is not my purpose to do justice to the wide range of research areas to which Geske has contributed. Instead, I want to highlight a few instances where her work as a researcher has inspired her teaching on global development and international organizations.

First, there is the tremendous amount of work that Geske has done on different aspects of aid effectiveness and tackling poverty – ranging from debt relief, budget support or the effects of aid on good governance. Crucially, her contributions were not limited to academic journals; they also include an impressive list of evaluation studies and other reports for major national and international organizations. By keeping a strong foot in the practical field, Geske was able to provide students with a very rich and well-informed perspective on the complex landscape of foreign aid; or to trigger a nuanced debate on aid effectiveness.

A second theme close to Geske's research agenda, as well as her teaching activities, is that of growth and development. Institutions and good governance take

a prominent role here – exemplified by the focus of Geske's Inaugural Lecture. An important lesson here is that good governance should not simply reflect the orthodoxy of economic openness and trade liberalization; it should acknowledge the importance of strategic interventions that have been so important in facilitating growth. This insight was embedded throughout the different lectures on global development. Studying the role of good governance also results in another lesson: the importance of developing good indicators to measure it. Critically evaluating indicators is not just central to Geske her research, but also to the course work and assignments for her students.

As a third example, I want to highlight Geske's work on gender in the context of development. Throughout her career, Geske has written about topics ranging from, gender equality and economic performance, to gender relations and segregation in Central America. This sustained attention and interest has also shaped her teaching – where gender is always included in the discussions on development. This is both important *and* not evident – especially in an area where economic frameworks often make abstraction of gender and the experiences of real people. By integrating a gender-sensitive perspective in our teaching about economic development, Geske does great service to educating a generation of future policymakers.

These are three instances where her own research experiences and contributions have enriched the learning experiences of numerous cohorts of students. Every year, many students are inspired by these lectures to pursue dissertation topics related to aid effectiveness or gender in developing countries. As I 'inherit' at least one of the courses that Geske has developed over the years, I consider it my privilege to continue the good work that has been done so far. This means encouraging students to get their hands dirty with sourcing and analysing actual data. Such exercises are demanding, both for students and teachers, but extremely valuable as part of training skilled professionals. It also means insisting that students construct their arguments on sound knowledge about the governance and decision-making structures of international organizations. While going into the nitty-gritty details of voting rights and investment programmes may trigger initial resistance, it is generally rewarded with a much better understanding of the underlying tensions in these organizations. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, it means continuing the spirit of systematically integrating the perspective of developing countries in our teaching of global political economy. Doing so commits us to tell a more complex story than more orthodox accounts of post-war development would suggest; recognizing that different countries have had different experiences. This does not just allow us to bring in a more critical perspective on

policies and institutions, it *requires* us to do so.

As a final note, I want to use this contribution to express my personal gratitude to Geske. Not just for the great example that she has set; but also, for the trust and generous support she has provided during the past few years. If one has worked very hard to build up something great, it is not evident to pass it over to somebody else. I am grateful for the opportunity I received and look forward to continuing our conversations!

17

GEDULD, KENNIS EN ENTHOUSIASME

ANDRÉ LOOZEKOOT

Dit is een persoonlijke bijdrage om je te bedanken voor meer dan 10 jaar samenwerking aan een project dat ik in 2010 heb bedacht en nooit zonder jouw hulp had kunnen uitvoeren. Aan de hand van drie sterke competenties laat ik je zien waarom je zo belangrijk was voor mijn promotieonderzoek.

Geduld

Werken met een buitenpromovendus is een flinke uitdaging voor wetenschappers omdat er nogal wat onzekerheden aan kleven. Zeker als hij iemand is die bij Buitenlandse Zaken werkt en om de drie à vier jaar wordt overgeplaatst naar een andere functie waardoor hij weer een tijdje minder productief is omdat hij energie stopt in die nieuwe functie en het nieuwe land.

In 2010 leerden wij elkaar kennen toen ik gesprekken voerde met verscheidene wetenschappers over hervormingen van de openbare financiën Sub-Sahara Afrika, een werkgebied waar weinig wetenschappelijke belangstelling voor is. Jouw interesse in *governance* en ontwikkeling, je kennis van algemene begrotingssteun en openbare financiën in ontwikkelingslanden en je publicaties hierover brachten ons bij elkaar en onze ontmoeting resulteerde in 2011 in een boeiend samenwerkingsproject.

Mijn promotietraject had flinke hobbels. Voor jou en voor mij waren er life-events die tijd en aandacht vroegen, waardoor onderzoek en werk gepauzeerd werden. Met het jou kenmerkende geduld wist je ruimte te maken hiervoor. Ons contact voelde steeds weer goed en vertrouwd. Je gaf jezelf en mij de ruimte om, ieder in het eigen tempo, de draad weer op te pakken. Je flexibiliteit en geduld was voor mij heel belangrijk om meters te maken wanneer het kon, en stil te staan wanneer het moest.

Kennis

De zin die ik het meest gehoord heb bij het bespreken van een eerste of tweede versie van een paper van mijn hand was: “Dit stuk bevat eigenlijk nog te veel beleidspraat”. En dit terwijl ik dacht dat ik mijn verslag toch al behoorlijk wetenschappelijk had opgeschreven.

Je aanzienlijke wetenschappelijke kennis van *governance* in ontwikkelingslanden en grote interesse in mijn onderzoek naar parlementair toezicht op openbare financiën in Sub-Sahara Afrika resulteerden in goede gesprekken. Op basis van deze gesprekken kon ik mijn papers verbeteren, de behandeling van de literatuur versterken en de methodiek aanscherpen. Daarnaast had je oog voor het presenteren van mijn onderzoek in seminars en tevens zochten we samen naar tijdschriften om de papers in te publiceren. Vooral over publiceren wist ik niet zo veel en daarom was jij een kompas dat bepaalde of een tijdschrift al dan niet voldoende kwaliteit had voor een publicatie. Hierdoor ging ik ook de goede tijdschriften lezen en dat leverde weer nieuwe inzichten op. We pasten samen een theoretisch raamwerk aan zodat het geschikter werd voor ontwikkelingslanden en ik was enorm trots toen onze suggesties door internationale organisaties zoals de Wereldbank en het IMF (ten dele) werden overgenomen.

Ook toen wij beiden onvoldoende kennis hadden van een methode wist jij de kennis aan boord te halen door Markus Haverland – die eigenlijk te druk was voor een extra buitenpromovendus – enthousiast te maken voor mijn onderzoek. Samen met hem hebben we prachtige diepgaande casestudies kunnen uitwerken die enorm hebben bijgedragen aan mijn onderzoeksresultaten. Je hebt niet alleen zelf veel parate kennis, maar weet ook de kennis van anderen voor je promovendus te mobiliseren. En daar heb ik de vruchten van geplukt.

Enthousiasme

Je enthousiasme voor *governance* werd natuurlijk niet alleen door mij opgemerkt. In 2013 werd je benoemd tot hoogleraar *Governance and Global Development* aan de *Erasmus School of Social and Behavioural Sciences*. Je inaugurele rede liet direct zien dat er veel onopgeloste vraagstukken zijn rond goed bestuur, economische groei en de rol van donorlanden zoals Nederland. Mijn onderzoek paste naadloos in jouw onderzoekslijn en jij nam vanaf dat moment een hoofdrol in als mijn promotiebegeleider.

Naast enthousiasme voor goed bestuur en de rol van donorlanden had je nog een wetenschappelijke passie: gender en ontwikkeling. Ook hier raakten onze interesses elkaar en wist je mijn enthousiasme aan te wakkeren. In mijn casestudies

heb ik interessante observaties gedaan door aandacht te besteden aan gender en de rol van vrouwen: zij staan in Afrika vaak buiten de door mannen gedomineerde patronagesystemen die zo nadrukkelijk verbonden zijn met machtsmisbruik en corruptie met publiek geld.

Terwijl ik mijn vierde paper schreef, het derde probeerde te publiceren en het tweede moest aanpassen van reviewers wist jij mij ook bij de zoveelste afwijzing weer te enthousiasmeren om een stapje extra te zetten door complimenten te geven en suggesties te doen. Soms spraken we elkaar maanden niet, soms iedere maand. En steeds kwam ik een stapje dichterbij een publicatie en ten slotte bij mijn promotie.

Tot slot

Ik wil je enorm bedanken voor de meer dan tien jaar begeleiding die ik van je heb mogen ontvangen. Ik wens je een heel mooie toekomst toe met Tom, de kinderen en kleinkinderen. In deze toekomst zullen jouw sterke punten, waar ik zo van heb mogen profiteren - geduld, kennis en enthousiasme - zeker van pas komen bij de nieuwe klussen die je ongetwijfeld zult gaan aanpakken.

18

ARE ALL FULL PROFESSORS AS PROFESSIONAL, HELPFUL AND DEDICATED AS GESKE DIJKSTRA? MARIO VILLALBA FERRERA

Introduction

I was an international student from Paraguay who just finished a Masters in Urban Management and Development at the Institute for Housing and Urban Development Studies (IHS), part of Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR). I had a government grant from Paraguay to continue my PhD at the same institution but needed a full professor who could guide me in the process and be my PhD promoter. After a careful search, the IHS academic director approached me and said: “I think I found the right promoter for you. Her name is Geske Dijkstra. She has a lot of experience in Latin America and is an expert in cooperation and development. I think she also speaks Spanish. However, you must first meet with her and convince her about your research plans.”

We coordinated a first meeting at Geske’s office in the Department of Public Administration and Sociology at the main campus of Erasmus University Rotterdam. She was on time, ready, smiley and enthusiastic. I was so impressed. I was a Latin American studying in The Netherlands matched with a Dutch supervisor who conducted PhD research in Nicaragua during the Cold War; a political scientist matched with a feminist economist. While the difference between her experience and mine was vast, there was always a horizontal and respectful approach in her attitude.

The Super-visor

It was January, 2019. We agreed on a plan and started meeting every three weeks. Geske requested that I send her a draft of my progress at least a few days before we met. I was greatly surprised after the first meeting and the ones that

followed how meticulous she was in her comments and suggestions. Every time, she wrote comments and suggestions from beginning to end. Her commitment and dedication inspired me to follow a similar work-ethic. Having Geske as my Supervisor demanded I work to become a Super-Mario.

COVID-19 and building an online relationship

We started the year 2020 and we were in the process of publishing our first academic article. The guidance from Geske allowed me to critically analyze the data I had available and avoid jumping to too positivist conclusions. I valued her direct approach to make me realize there are many possible explanations to a given finding. During that first year I learned to be more critical and to be careful on how to communicate the scope and limits of my findings. In the middle of the review process, COVID-19 changed our in-person sessions to online sessions.

We all had to adapt during the COVID-19 pandemic. During this process, Geske guided me to restructure my research proposal. I had plans to travel to Argentina, Bolivia and Paraguay to collect data and expand the first findings we discovered in Ecuador regarding Inter-Municipal Cooperation (IMC) in Waste Management. However, we had to adapt to the circumstances. We focused on publishing a paper proposing a new typology of IMC and designing an online survey since it was unclear when borders will be open again for qualitative field work.

Having a supervisor like Geske with both qualitative and quantitative research experience facilitated the adaptation process. During ‘COVID times’, Geske also provided me with clear guidance to ensure I would take care of my physical and mental health. She knows how to encourage you to keep working on your research while also warning you whenever she notices some imbalance.

You are the main author

In the culture I come from, there are more vertical relationships between professors and students. In the process of doing research as a PhD student, I was expecting that first authorship would come from the person with the most experience in research. However, I was positively surprised when, from day one, Geske mentioned to me that since I would be the one doing most of the fieldwork for my PhD, that I should be the main author in all the co-publications. She went further to express that while she would collaborate until the completion of the PhD, she suggested that I appear as the only author in at least one of the academic papers because that might help me in my future career. This is just another example of how valuable it is to have a talented professor who puts student success as a top priority.

Together, we have co-authored two research papers that were published in

academic journals and cited globally by prestigious authors. We have expanded both scientific theory and empirical findings on Inter-Municipal Cooperation in Waste Management in Latin America. I am grateful to Geske for her encouragement and guidance that allowed me to produce high quality research.

Supporting professional development beyond PhD

Being a self-funded PhD researcher, it can be challenging when it comes to securing long-term funding to completing a PhD. In my situation, COVID-19 had an effect on the already ambitious goal of finishing my PhD in three years. Additionally, I got a part-time job as a Lecturer of Public Policy at The Hague University of Applied Sciences, which brought new financial resources to sustain my PhD journey, but limited my time necessary to dedicate to finishing it sooner than later.

While balancing decisions and priorities is not easy, Geske's support and guidance during this process helped me to manage family, teaching, research and leisure time. I appreciate the honest opinions I always received from Geske where she highlighted both the risks and benefits of my proposals. I appreciate her global view on my professional development that was not limited to a standardized PhD trajectory.

Currently, we are finishing a proposal to link my lecturer job at The Hague University of Applied Sciences more closely with my last phase of PhD research at Erasmus University Rotterdam in partnership with a research center on Urban Futures in The Hague. Her support, adaptability and professionalism is opening new cooperation frontiers for me.

Conclusions

I have had the privilege to be supervised by Geske Dijkstra, an accomplished and dedicated professor at Erasmus University Rotterdam. I am a better student, researcher, lecturer and professional thanks to her guidance and support. While she is reaching retirement from a successful academic and professional career and I am reaching my final phase of the PhD journey, I am immensely grateful our paths crossed at such important moments of our careers. From all the experiences I had with Geske, I can't answer the question "Are all full professors as professional, helpful and dedicated as Geske Dijkstra?" because my sample is so unique that it cannot be generalized. However, I hope all readers of these lines take notes for further projects on the relevance of being a role model as professor, supervisor and promoter. Thank you Geske!

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Geske in pictures



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