THE NATURE OF PEACE AND THE DYNAMICS

OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

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Contents

> States historically identify them-
> selves by their relationship with one
> another, asserting their existence
> and defining their boundaries by the
> use of force or immanent threat of
> force; and so long as the
> international community consists of
> sovereign states, war between them
> remains a _possibility_, of which all
> governments have to take reasonable
> account.
>
> Michael Howard, The Causes of War

1. Turning the question around

For many centuries now, plans and proposals have been made for 'eternal

peace' (Kant), for collective security or international disarmament or for

substituting the rule of international law for the state of war. Though

these efforts have not been completely in vain, they have hardly been

successful. Why not?

Their failure shows at least that they were based on an inadequate

understanding of the dynamics of international politics and the nature of

'peace'. These proposals as most current thinking about 'peace' are based on

the assumption that peaceful conduct is (or should be) normal or natural,

whereas war and violence are a deviation and violate a norm. People who live

in highly pacified nation-states tend to forget that peaceful conduct in

earlier societies was in no way self-evident and could only be taken for

granted at the peril of one's life: "...there was an undercurrent of

violence at all levels of society", as an historian writes about Europe

during the Renaissance.[1] But despite increasing concern about 'safety in the

streets' and violent crime daily life in nation-state societies is still
extraordinarily peaceful, certainly if seen in historical perspective. Life
is no longer 'brutish, nasty and short'. Selfevident peacefulness conditions
the prevailing attitudes towards violence and war. People who behave
violently within states are labelled as either 'mad' or 'bad', criminal or
insane. There appears to be no other possibility. A moral and legal norm
that has slowly developed over the ages has thus been transformed into the
image of normal social conduct, into a property of human nature.

This perspective contrasts sharply with the violent character of
international relations and the threat of nuclear war. The question "Why
then cannot states behave peacefully too?" follows logically. If a norm has
been violated someone or something must be to blame. A specific cause to
blame must be found, the removal of which will restore the normal condition,
in this case transform swords into ploughshares and install peace among
nations. Such causes to blame can either be the nature and agressiveness of
specific states, such as the Soviet Union or the United States, Iran or
Iraq, China or Vietnam, or personified abstractions like absolutism,
nationalism, imperialism, capitalism or communism and more recently weapons
technology - nuclear weapons especially - but as a pattern of thinking
blaming remains the same.[2] Blaming seriously hampers the development of more
realistic thinking about international politics.

For example, if one tries to find and isolate the cause for war or the
threat of war one becomes blind to the possibility that the question may
have to be turned on its head. What if violence and war are the normal
condition, so that it is 'peace' rather than continuous fighting that has to
be explained? And if that is so, how could the contrast between domestic
peacefulness and international violence have become so great?

It would follow that any new proposal to bring 'peace' or 'disarmament' to the world must be grounded in an analysis of the structure of the processes which it aims to influence or steer in a different direction. What kind of processes are these? Formulated in a nutshell: the development of and competition between the attack and defense units within which human beings have always lived.[3] Contemporary nation-states are the most recent form of these survival units and in that capacity may even begin to be superseded. It is their rivalry which has led to the rise of the present "great powers" which propel the nuclear arms race. This paper will discuss the basic characteristics of these processes, without going too much into historical detail. Its purpose is to provide a longer term perspective to the problems of the nuclear age. That perspective at the same time will hopefully show that the perspective on the future to be developed later and based on the premise that the nuclear balance between the great powers may become a functional equivalent of the monopoly of violence of the state at the international level is one of a number of possible lines of global development, a practicable utopia, not just a mirage.

2. Dynamics of the development of states

Why do all states - with but very few exceptions - maintain standing armies and continuously produce or acquire new weapons?[4] That question must be answered if we want to assess the possibilities for disarmament or arms control and hope to increase the chances of peaceful resolution of conflicts between states.

Formulated in this manner the question is a bit misleading. It could lead to the supposition that states at a particular time in the past may <u>not</u> have had armies or weapons and then, suddenly, for a specific reason, decided to arm themselves - in the same way as people may nowadays begin to buy guns in order to protect themselves and their house from assault or robbery. To take the continuity of the role of violence in interstate relations into account a preliminary question about the nature of states should therefore be asked. How did states emerge from pre-state societies and develop into the relatively durable nation-states that we tend to take for granted today as the 'natural' units into which mankind is - and should be - divided? What precisely is the difference between states and other forms of social organisation, such as business corporations, trade unions, political parties, local communities, universities and so on? That dissimilarity manifests itself as soon as we ask the further question why banks or trade unions usually do not maintain private armies to fight other banks or to wage the class struggle. If they would do so, the police - and when needed the army - would intervene and the responsible leaders at least would be sent to prison. But banks or trade unions have no need to resort to violence, because in most states there are institutional means available - courts and bargaining procedures - to settle their conflicts.

States are thus distinguished from other kinds of social organisation in the sense that their institutions effectively claim the monopoly of the legally recognised right to use violence and physical coercion to maintain the peace ('law and order') and to enforce their rules and decrees within their boundaries, whereas nobody else within their territory is allowed to use violence or threaten to use it. Peace within the state is the peace of the state.

This formulation of the distinctive characteristics of states vis a vis other social organisations is a slightly amended version of Max Weber's famous definition of the state.[5] But in his formulation the state is depicted as if it existed in a void, as if it was alone in the world. It should therefore be complemented with Norbert Elias' description of the nature of attack and defense units, thereby adding the plural to the singular. States as all other forms of attack and defense units are:

> "units (which) have exercised comparatively strict
> control over the use of physical violence in the
> relations between its members, (whereas) at the same
> time they have allowed, and often encouraged, their
> members to use physical violence against non-members."[6]

That is the reason why states as all other attack and defense units are the units to which people refer as the society or the social whole. They are the primary units of we-identification. When they have become sufficiently stable and durable they can command and receive the ultimate loyalty of their members. Though loyalty and identification are specifically associated with the 'nation', the concept of the nation-state shows the intimate connection between the two types of units. But even when the idea of the nation did not yet exist states could already become the focus of loyalty and identification:

> "...after 771 BC, ordinary people (in China) began to
> recognise and emphasize the difference in dialects,
> customs, religion, cults among the states...Pride in
> local distinctions and loyalty to the prince of the
> state became much more pronounced....The significance of
> this development was that during the period of the

> Warring States, princes could more easily organise
> peasant militias and armies to fight their wars for
> them. In turn, peasants and townsmen believed they were
> fighting not just as a duty to a feudal lord but for the
> independence and honor of their own state."[7]

The strength of identification with attack and defense units of their members may also explain the more recent riddle why despite Stalinist terror the Soviet people fought so valiantly for their state during the Second World War. Because such identification is also an inherent component of modern nationalism, nationalism is often anachronistically projected into the past. But it is misleading to speak of 'rudimentary nationalism' before the eighteenth century when the idea of the nation as the unit which rightfully claims its own state as the expression of popular sovereignty and the right to self-determination made its appearance.

Is the nation-state at present considered the legitimate and self-evident form of the attack and defense unit, it is by no means 'natural'. It is rather the latest phase in a long line of attack and defense units of many different forms, such as bands of hunters and gatherers; nomadic bands or clans; sedentary or nomadic tribes; fortified villages or towns (city-states); military-bureaucratic empires; feudal warrior units, large and small; dynastic states and perhaps more.

The primary function of such units is to protect their members against atacks of other such units which threaten them with conquest, domination or plunder for their own expansion or gain or to prepare themselves for similar activities. Defense and attack functions can therefore not be separated from each other, except in the case of the smallest and weakest units. Human beings have in any case always lived in a plurality of separate survival

units. Their size and structure changes, but their basic function remains the same. In earlier phases attack and defense unit networks in different parts of the world, say in China, the America's and Europe, existed seperately from each other, now there is only one such network that covers the world as a whole. Both the size of attack and defense units and the geographic scope of their interests have grown continually.

In the development of attack and defense units the pacification of larger and larger territories goes together with an increasingly specialized organisation of the (potential) use of violence against other such units. This process has not always been continuous, however. Empires could be formed in the past by military conquest even though their size was in advance of the means of transport, taxation, administration and military technique necessary to control them from their center. They could therefore not be kept together for very long. Only the Chinese empire survived for more than twenty centuries, though it too had its periods of desintegration. But once the Pax Romana of the Roman empire crumbled, it disappeared once and for all. Charlemagne did not succeed in durably reviving it: his empire desintegrated after his death. The feudal period itself was the outcome of desintegration: centrifugal forces became stronger than centripetal forces.[8] Elias describes the typical process as follows:

> "Whoever was once entrusted by the central lord with the
> function of ruling in a particular area and was thus in
> effect the lord of this area, no longer depended on the
> central lord to sustain and protect himself and his
> dependents, at least as long as he was threatened by no
> stronger external foe. At the first opportunity,
> therefore, as soon as the central power showed the
> slightest sign of weakness, the local ruler or his

descendants sought to demonstrate their right and
ability to rule the district entrusted to them, and
their independence of the central authority. (They) did
their best to take over the area entrusted to them, as
if it were the hereditary property of their family."[8]

We can say that attack and defense units in the early Middle Ages were
primarily feudal castles and fortified towns, though there was considerable
confusion about boundaries of protection and control. Daily life during that
instable period was therefore much more violent than in contemporary nation-
states: the distinction between violence control within attack and defense
units and the preparation for violence against other such units was much
less pronounced than in later phases of development. People were more often
than not forced to defend and help themselves. Even within towns armed
rivalry between leading families was a common feature of urban life, as can
be observed in the Tuscany town of San Gimignano: fortified towerhouses,
built partly for protection, partly for status reasons, still determine its
silhouette.

The balance between centrifugal and centripetal forces gradually shifted
ttowards the former, because of the expansion of trade and transport, the
rise of towns, the growth of the money economy and the development of
military technique (especially artillery). In the later Middle Ages durable
control over larger territories became possible. That can be seen in
retrospect, but it was not as such the driving force behind the formation of
dynastic states. The development of states was not planned or willed by
anyone, it was the outcome of coercive rivalry, of Fichte's simple rule that
those who do not become stronger while others do, in fact become weaker.

Territorial states ruled by dynastic monarchs thus emerged from centuries long armed struggles between feudal houses. At first these simply tried to expand their possessions, their 'Hausmacht' as it was appropriately called in Germany. Later, when only a few houses were left, they disputed each other the hegemonial position in a much larger territory, more or less of the size of the present states.[9] In such competitive processes there is a strong tendency towards the monopolisation of power:

> "if in a larger social unit many smaller units which through their interdependence form the larger one, have relatively equal strength and are thus able to compete freely - unhampered by previously existing monopolies - for the chances to acquire social power, which means primarily for the means of the subsistence and production, then there is a very high probability that some will win and submit others. As a consequence gradually fewer and fewer units will control more and more powerchances, so that more and more units will be eliminated from the competition and will become directly or indirectly dependent upon an ever decreasing number."[10]

State formation as the process of the monopolisation of the means of violence in the hands of a single ruler or dynasty has been a violent elimination struggle. In 1500 Western Europe still counted five hundred independent political entities, whereas in 1900 no more than twenty remained.[11] The rest have been vanquished and incorporated into the units that became the nation-states as these began to develop in the nineteenth century. Nationalism then became a new centrifugal force: of the still existing multinational empires in Europe in 1914 - the Austro-Hungarian,

Ottoman and Russian empires - only the last survived in the form of the Soviet Union. After 1945 the European colonial empires, weakened by war, could not withstand the onslaught of nationalism either.

The changing nature of weaponry has been one of the necessary conditions of the development of states as we now know them. During the Middle Ages sword-carrying harnessed warriors on horses were much superior to (mercenary)soldiers on foot.[12] The power balance between what later became 'cavalry' and 'infantry' only began to change after the development of fire arms. (It is interesting to note that the modern form of harness, the tank was incorporated in the 'cavalry' thereby temporarily restoring its superiority). Mercenary soldiers armed with muskets could easily defeat harnessed warriors on horses. Those feudal lords which had sufficient financial resources to raise and pay mercenary armies could gradually eliminate their rivals. In most cases these were lords vested with princely or monarchical titles. Such dynastic rulers could then gradually subdue and dominate the feudal warrior aristocracies within their domain and in a later phase force many of them to come to live at their courts.

However, monarchs and princes were only able to expand and intensify their control over the territories which they ruled - often only in name - because of the continuation of rivalry on the higher level of integration of the larger territorial units that became the dynastic states. Partly because of continuous wars, partly as a function of internal class conflict in which kings could play a balancing role, the dynastic states formed in Western Europe during the fourteenth to the sixteenth century could gradually develop into the so-called absolute monarchies and court societies of the seventeenth and eighteenth century.[13]

To maintain a standing army requires a sufficient money supply. A large
enough and continuous supply of financial resources requires an increasingly
elaborate and permanent organisation of tax collection. Thus the two
fundamental central monopolies of states, the monopolies of control over the
means of violence and taxation, had to develop in interplay. They each
formed a necessary condition for the development of the other. It should be
noted, however, that the durable taxation monopolies which developed out of
the irregular 'feudal aids' due to a king as military leader, could only be
consolidated during long periods of war. Especially the Hundred Years' War
(1339-1453) between the territorial units controlled by the rivalling houses
of the Capetians and the Plantagenets (and their successors), which after
that century of struggle became roughly present day France and Britain, was
crucial for the development of permanent royal monopolies of taxation,
maintained by a rudimentary central state bureaucracy.[14] After the Hundred
Years' War France emerged as the most centralized and powerful dynastic
state of Western Europe. The French Court and bureaucracy became a model for
the other dynastic states in Europe. If other European monarchs wanted to
keep up with French military power and remain real participants in the
international power struggle, they were forced to imitate the pattern of
organisation of the French state.[15]

Only after the large territories that became the states as we know them
today were pacified by the royal 'forces of order' could the marked
distinction between domestic peace and interstate war and between domestic
politics and foreign policy develop which is at present so clearly reflected
in the division between domestic and foreign news in the mass media as well
as in the structure of government. The most frequently used demarcation
point for the emergence of an 'interstate system' in Europe the Peace of

Westphalia of 1648, when states mutually recognized each other in a treaty. [16]

 But it was of course a gradual process: within the territory of each state rivalry and competition between families, organised groups and social classes became more and more peaceful and were more and more regulated by constitutionally and legally established procedures. Feuds and blood revenge were repressed and criminal law replaced private retaliation. This is nowadays taken so much for granted that it is easy to underestimate its importance. Milovan Djilas' description of his youth in Montenegro before 1914 may help not to forget:

> "Though the life of my family is not completely typical
> of my homeland, it is typical in one respect: the men of
> several generations have died at the hands of
> Montenegrins, men of the same faith and name. My
> father's grandfather, my two own grandfathers, my father
> and my uncle were killed, as though a dread curse lay
> upon them. My father and his brother and my brothers
> were killed, even though all of them yearned to die
> peacefully in their beds beside their wives. Generation
> after generation, and the bloody chain was not broken.
> The inherited fear and hatred of feuding clans was
> stronger than fear and hatred of the enemy, the Turks.
> It seems to me that I was born with blood on my eyes. My
> first sight was of blood. My first words were blood and
> bathed in blood." [17]

Quite to the contrary, in modern industrial nation-states domestic politics has become non-violent as a matter of course. In the nineteenth century it was already taken for granted. That is clear, for example, in Karl Marx' treatment of politics and the state as surface phenomena or part

of a 'superstructure', rather than seeing the development of attack and

defense units as basic in the dynamics of human social development.[18] But

the main question in Marx' period was whether a 'revolution', i.e. a violent

take-over of control over the central state institutions was justified

and/or necesssary. The monopoly of violence of the state as such was not put

into question.[19]

Political violence in domestic politics has since become exceptional in

modern industrial nation-states. When violence is at present being advocated

or used for political purposes in Western Europe or the United States, the

majority of citizens becomes very upset. Political violence within states is

now usually labeled and dealt with as 'terrorism'. And precisely because the

inhabitants of industrial nation-states see violence as a deviation, as a

form of abnormal or criminal conduct, they find it difficult to understand

why non-violence in the relations between states cannot easily be brought

about by the elimination of whatever they see as the cause to blame, thus

clearing the way for the establishment of the rule of law.

But legal rules and institutional procedures can only work well if they

are backed up and enforced by a central monopoly of violence. As we will

see, it is precisely its absence that explains the continuing threat of war

in international politics. A central monopoly of violence or its functional

equivalent(s) is needed to make the relations between states more peaceful

and reduce the threat of war.

As this brief analysis of the dynamics of development of states has shown

it can only be a question of more or less violence, not of completely

eliminating it. Violence in the relations between human beings is both a

lasting aspect and lasting problem of human civilisations. Violence can be

controlled and mitigated to a greater or a lesser extent, but every form of

violence control implies a threat and some use of violence. This inconvenient fact is but all too often forgotten by supporters of particular devices for establishing 'peace', usually based as they are on the removal of a specific obstacle and the assumption that this will restore the inherent peacefulness of human beings, states included. But again, peacefulness is not natural, but the precarious outcome of specific social arrangements and civilising processes.

Any attempt to find ways to reduce the threat of war and to resolve conflicts between states peacefully must therefore be based on an understanding both of the dynamics of development of states and of the implications and conditions of the monopoly of violence of the state.

3. The nature of 'peace'

The development of the state's peace, of a relatively stable monopoly of violence of the state has the following implications for the nature of the interdependencies and conflicts between individuals and organised groups or social classes within the territorial boundaries of a state-society:

1. No individual, group, organisation or class can resist being subjected to the authority and the power, first of a private ruler (or in Africa and Asia of colonial rulers) and later of the central public institutions of the state. This does not mean that private citizens or organised groups within a state are powerless: it is always a question of power balances with a smaller or greater degree of unevenness.

2. The central institutions of the state can effectively claim the sole right to threaten or use violence to maintain the peace and so enforce its

rules and decrees, whereas individual citizens or organised groups within the state territory are prohibited by law from the use of violent means for the settlement of their conflicts. They are no longer allowed to threaten or use violence in the relationships with each other - nor, of course, in dealing with the agencies or the representatives of the state.

In criminal law there are a number of provisions which sanction the use of violence in special circumstances, such as self-defence against unprovoked attack. But the rule that violent self-help and private retaliation are forbidden remains the foundation of any code of criminal law. Criminal law, as it has now become a self-evident feature of contemporary states, did indeed develop originally as a means for monarchs or city-state rulers to eliminate private retaliation and violent self-help within their borders or walls.[20]

In most modern industrial nation-states the government, as entrusted with the right to use violence, has gradually become subjected to 'democratic' control procedures and to specific norms, starting with the habeas corpus and gradually developing into declarations of human rights, from the Declaration des Droits de l'Homme du Citoyen proclaimed during the French Revolution to the Declaration on Human Rights of the United Nations and similar declarations made by regional organisations such as the Council of Europe. When such control procedures have not been developed or are not adequate, so that a government is at liberty to use violence against its own citizens, we speak of a dictatorship - or of a regime of terror, if repression is used in an arbitrary manner to intimidate and terrify the population as a whole.[21]

3. A number of organisations or agencies have developed, such as the army, the police, the secret services and the judicial branch of government, which

specialize in the threat and use of violence and in violence control within

the state. These organisations command crucial power resources, which can in

many cases too easily be used for their own gain. Though countervailing

institutions and powers have been developed in some states, the problem of

"who controls the controllers themselves" has nowhere been fully solved. The

control over the monopolised means of violence is in many societies still

the most decisive power resource, as the large number of military coups and

governments in contemporary states demonstrates.[22]

4. By means of conscription, whether in peacetime or only enforced in time

of war, states can oblige a large part of the male population and in some

cases also of the female population, to actually use violence or prepare for

the use of violence against the members of other states in the name of their

own state. For that reason there remains a marked tension between the

strictly enforced prohibition of violent conduct within the state territory

and the obligation to use violence - often depicted as heroic - against

people who belong to other state societies. However, in some states it has

nowadays become possible to be a "conscientious objector" against military

service. This shows that the double moral standard about violent conduct

becomes increasingly difficult to justify in contemporary states. In

different forms of development aid and international cooperation feelings of

solidarity and identification with mankind as a whole begin to be

institutionalised. Self-evident exclusive nationalism becomes more difficult

to sustain.

As individuals or as organisations within a state people have increasingly

been forced to restrain their aggressive impulses and other kinds of violent

conduct, whether spontaneous or premeditated. They have to settle their

conflicts in a peaceful manner through negotiations or through court

procedures. Family feuds, private revenge, duelling, private armies, all
these normal features of former warrior civilisations, are no longer
allowed. Whether individuals are generally allowed to possess arms as in the
United States, or only when licensed to do so as in the Netherlands, makes
little difference in that respect. Anyone who uses fire arms or other means
of violence will in principle in any state be brought to court and
sentenced.

5. The nature and level of individual self-restraint changes, as Norbert
Elias has demonstrated for Western Europe.[23] But the changing form of self-
restraint, the increasing 'social constraint towards self-restraint' leading
to highly developed individual conscience formation has, in turn, led to the
development of a high degree of ambivalence with respect to the practice of
violence. Before dynastic states developed in Western Europe, blood revenge,
murder, plunder and robbery were rather ordinary and generally accepted
features of daily life. The forceful appropriation of what others,
especially peasants had produced, was common practice rather than an
exception. As descriptions of the daily life of the European Middle Ages
show quite clearly, the contrasts between the rich and the poor and between
the strong and the weak were much greater than today. Because life was more
insecure people experienced life more intensely and fiercely than the
citizens of contemporary welfare-states.[24] This could find expression, for
example, in a quick alternation between the emotional states of human
beings: exuberant gaiety could from one moment to another give way to deep
sorrow. Of course, especially the upper classes could at that time so easily
give in to all their immediate urges and wishes.

Serfs, peasants and the lower urban classes had to restrain themselves in
their relations with their superiors, and probably children raised in

families of domestic servants learned from an early age onwards to control themselves sometimes even better than their superiors.[25] The English butler is, of course, a case in point.

But during the Middle Ages the upper classes, the town burghers as well as the feudal nobles, liked to fight.[26] Knights were educated for tournaments and for war. They would have looked askance at the pacifist norms which we now take for granted. To participate in tournaments or in actual battles gave meaning to their life. But city life was also strongly influenced by family feuds. And it was often necessary to threaten or use violence in order to acquire a better social position. Not only members of the nobility had their own private armies, but town burghers also often fought in armed groups, consisting mainly of family members and friends. The physical insecurity in which people lived in these days did not imply, however, that they were more fearful or more depressed than people in our days. It may have been precisely because of the insecurity and riskiness of their living conditions that they were able to enjoy their lives much more intensely than people at present can do.[27]

It is very difficult for people living in industrial nation-states to imagine what it would mean to live in a society without a relatively stable monopoly of violence, in which women, children and elderly people have to be protected outside of their own neighbourhood and men must always be prepared to fight. In such societies one cannot yet expect to die peacefully in one's own bed as in our kind of societies.[28] Nevertheless, in the contemporary world there are still many countries and urban neighbourhoods in which private violence remains a regular feature of daily life.

6. A relatively stable monopoly of violence of the state, however, does
not require an even distribution of power chances between the people within
the territory of the state. Nor does it imply social harmony: rivalry and
power struggles continue, but they do so in a different form. However, the
less uneven the power balances between ruling establishments and the ruled
and between social classes within a state become, the greater the chances
that political procedures can develop, through which power struggles and
competition within the state can be regulated and conflicts can be settled
in a manner which meets with a high degree of popular acceptance. That
development has been the kernel of what we now call liberal or parliamentary
democracy. A relatively stable monopoly of violence is an indispensible
precondition for the peaceful settlement of conflicts in courts of law, for
the development of multiparty systems and the rights to freedom of speech
and association. The political rights and freedoms of individual citizens as
well as the development of a relatively autonomous and self-regulating
"economy" depend on the prior establishment of a central monopoly of
violence of a state.[29]

The development of a violence monopoly of the state is thus the foundation
for peaceful conduct within states, as required by increasing social
differentiation and the growing length and complexity of the chains of human
interdependencies. On the other side, that development has gone together
with the formation of standing armies and other specialized central state
institutions, which in turn have stimulated political, military-strategic
and economic rivalries between states. Competition between states and the
increasing power and control of central state institutions over the
population are thus inextricably bound together.

The forms and nature of state control have also changed considerably, especially in parliamentary welfare states. But as long as interstate competition continues in its present form parliamentary democracy and the political liberties of private citizens are precarious and may be threatened by the demands of 'national security'.[30] The state's 'peace', like any other social arrangement, has a price. The nature of that price is still best expressed in the persisting question: "quis custodiet ipsos custodies?" or "who controls the controllers themselves?".

4. Constants and dynamics of international politics

International politics, it is now clear, is the continuation in a larger format and on a higher level of integration of the competition between feudal lords - and between earlier forms of attack and defense units in general. For the understanding of international politics it remains crucial that the competition between states - and especially the relations between great powers - are not regulated by institutionalized procedures and rules, backed up by a central monopoly of violence, capable of forcing states to preacefully settle their disputes and conflicts. Their increasing interdependencies have made contemporary states conclude a wide range of multilateral and bilateral treaties.[31] A number of international organisations functions reasonably well and states in general respect at least the procedural rules of international law. The vast majority of international transactions is peaceful. But in the last resort the threat of war remains and the relative power and violence potential of states is as decisive as ever. The only real difference with the past in that sense is to

be found in the changed nature of weaponry, in the development of nuclear weapons, as will be argued later in this study.

Because competition between states is not being regulated by a violence monopoly at the international level their situation has often been compared to the primeval 'state of nature' or anarchy. A recent study still describes the figuration of states as the anarchical society.[32] The precarious situation of states as a function of the coercive competition between them is a consequence of their security dilemma: the lack of a central monopoly of violence at the world level implies that states can never be certain that they will not be attacked by other states or that the superior military power of an opponent will not compel them to make political concessions.[33] In order not to become forced to submit themselves, states will be inclined to arm themselves as well as they can or to ally themselves with other (stronger) states. However, such armament programmes or alliances are perceived by other states as a threat to their own security. They will, in turn, feel forced to strengthen their arms capacity or to form their own alliances. So even if no single state would actually intend to attack another state, the coercive dynamic set in motion by the security dilemma would keep the drift towards war in existence and arms production and acquisition in full swing.

The security dilamma is a modern formulation of what social contract philosophy in the eighteenth century called the state of nature: the natural condition of man, before 'society' was established (in the sense of relatively durable attack and defense units, we can now say) was one of 'war of every man against every man'. But, Hobbes adds, though there was never a time when 'particular men' were in such a condition:

"Yet in all times kings and Persons of Sovereign
authority, because of their Independency, are in
continual jealousies, and in the state and posture of
Gladiators; having their weapons pointing, and their
eyes fixed on one another; that is their Forts,
Garrisons and Guns, upon the Frontiers of their
kingdomes; and continually Spyes upon their neighbours;
which is a posture of War."[34]

States thus find themselves in a situation which is a state of war or rather

a state in which the memory and the threat of war is always present.[35]

Memories and expectations of war - "having their weapons pointing, and

their eyes fixed on one another" - produce feelings of insecurity and often

what more dispassionate analysis would consider exagerated enemy-images,

defense panics and popular fears. But it is not so easy to demonstrate

beyond doubt that suspicion of an enemy or fear of war is exaggerated or

unjustified. This relationship between high threat levels and strong

emotional reactions is characteristic for what Norbert Elias has called

doublebind figurations and processes:[36]

"(doublebind figurations are formed by) human groups
which are interdependent because each of them is without
redress, without the chance to appeal for protection to
any superior force or to a binding code of self
restraint and civilized conduct, exposed to the possible
use of violence by the other group. Wherever human
groups are arranged in the form of such a figuration
they are with great regularity drawn into a power
struggle and, if they form the top of an inter-state
hierarchy, into a hegemonial struggle with a strong
self-perpetuating tendency."

In such a figuration the rivaling units and their members may get caught in a critical process which none of them can any longer control, in an inexorable drift towards war:

> "High exposure to the dangers of the process tends to
> highten the emotivity of human responses. High emotivity
> of human responses lessens the chance of a realistic
> assessment of the critical process, hence of a realistic
> practice in relation to it. Relatively unrealistic
> practice under the pressure of strong affects lessens
> the chance of bringing the critical process under
> control."

As this formulation makes clear, doublebind processes are characterized by circularity. Participants in a doublebind process are tied in two ways: to their rivals and the threat of their uncontrolled rivalry as well as to their own fears and emotions, which prevent them from analysing the threat in more detached manner. It is therefore very difficult to break through the doublebind:

> "A more reality adequate and more "rational" way of
> acting would perhaps be possible if both sides bound to
> each other could perceive themselves and each other in
> terms of the doublebind figuration which they form
> together. At present that is perhaps too much to expect.
> By and large the peoples of this world and their leaders
> are still too strongly caught in the circularity of
> their doublebind processes to be able to control the
> dangers they constitute for each other and for
> themselves more permanently."

It is important to add that this makes it futile to concentrate one's analysis of international rivalries and conflicts on the plans or intentions

of one or the other side only. One should look instead at the "immanent
dynamics of the figuration which two or more hegemonic states form with each
other and which determines to a large extent the plans and willfull acts of
each side."

In a state of nature or doublebind figuration - the latter is the more
sociological formulation - the relations between the units are not
unstructured, not a free for all. Anarchy is a misleading metaphor.
Interstate relations are structured and to some extent regulated by the
power balances between them. But there is no power strong enough to
effectively claim the right to use violence and physical coercion to
maintain the peace between competing states and make them comply with the
rules and regulations of international law. The structure and "order" of the
relations between states is therefore primarily a function of the relative
power ratio's between them, of what is usually called the Balance of Power.
As we will come to see, however, certain great powers can and did function
as a partial substitute for a central monopoly of violence, fulfilling
pacifying and regulating functions on an internatoinal scale. The same may
be said for particular powerbalances during a certain period of time.

But it should first be stressed that concepts like the balance of power or
the security dilemma may lead to thinking in static terms, or at least to
giving more attention to what remains constant in the relations between
states than to what changes, both in the nature of the units and in the
relations between them. There are certainly durable features in interstate
competition. The power balancing in which states remain engaged finds
expression in a friend-enemy logic, which has hardly changed through the
course of human history. The prescriptions for prudent statemanship of

Kautilya in ancient India are still relevant for understanding the conduct

of states in the present world:

> "In foreign relations the basic principle is that
> neighbouring states are enemies and alternate one's
> allies. In dealing with his enemies and allies
> (Kautilya's) Arthasastra clearly instructs the king in
> the principles of a balance power system. In order to
> prevent his state's defeat and to ensure its eventual
> victory, the king must follow a judicious policy of
> continual combination and recombination with other
> states against his enemies."[37]

That neighbours are still predisposed to become enemies was clearly

demonstrated by the rivalry and active hostility between such ideologically

fraternal states as the Soviet Union and China, or Vietnam and Cambodja. The

war between Iran and Iraq forms another example. And that alternately "the

enemy of my enemy is my friend" has been practised by China in befriending

the United States and Western Europe, even encouraging the latter to

strengthen its armaments. Only when neighbours unite in an alliance against

a strong power with hegemonic aspirations, such as the member-states of

NATO, does it become possible for neighbours to remain friends and even

perceive this as the normal state of their relationship. Such durable

alliances may become the precursors of attack and defense units on a higher

level of integration. But the nature of the competing units and the power-

balances between them do not remain constant. The states that we now know in

Western Europe, for example, which were the first modern states, originated

from the struggle for territory and power between the strongest feudal

lords:

"One sees the movement: first castle stands against
castle, then territory against territory, then state
against state, and appearing on the historical horizon
today are the first signs of struggles for an
integration of regions and masses of people on a still
larger scale."[38]

At each level these power contests acquire the form of an elimination

struggle in the sense that more and more participants were either conquered

or forced to withdraw from the competition. In interstate relations, as in

earlier phases of competition between attack and defense units, there are

countertendencies to these hegemonic or elimination processes. An example is

again nationalism, the strength of which first made multinational empires

within Europe collapse and afterwards the European colonial empires. These

large entities desintegrated quickly and were replaced by a much greater

number of smaller states, which attempted to preserve their interdependence

through policies of non-alignment. And a strongly nationalist state like

Poland, for example, still exists even though it was twice in its history

divided by great powers. The Baltic states, on the other hand, though

strongly nationalist too, were after 1945 easily annexed by the Soviet

empire.

These are just a few illustratoins, as this is not the place for a

detailed analysis of the specific features of the formation of states in the

contemporary world. What they make clear is simply this: even though the

security dilemma and doublebind processes are a durable background condition

of relations between states and in that sense describe the constants of

international politics, interstate relations as such are far from static,

nor do they tend towards balance in the sense of equilibrium. We rather

observe a strong tendency towards the formation of ever larger units with an

increasingly extended reach and towards monopolisation of power between

them. That tendency manifests itself in the development of great powers - at

present the United States, the Soviet Union and perhaps China - and the

decline of previous great powers, such as Portugal, Spain, Sweden or Holland

and in a later phase England, France, Germany and Japan.

5. Balance of power policy versus reason of state

War is crucial in the formation of great powers: "Great power status is

lost, as it is won, by violence. A great power does not die in its bed."[39]

But not all wars are equally important. A distinction should be made between

wars that either do not disturb or restore a given power balance and wars

that change both the nature - and/or number - of the great powers and the

power balance between them. The latter kind of wars can be called "great"

and in this century 'global' (world) wars.[40] The Hundred Years' war can be

seen as the first great war of the dynastic era in Europe, even though only

the Thirty Years' war (1618/1648) inaugurated the practice of using peace

conferences for establishing a new power balance between the great powers -

one more in agreement with the changed power ratio's between them -

primarily by solving territorial problems that were or could develop into

sources of conflict between them. The Congresses of Vienna, Versailles and

the series of conferences at the end of the second World War - with Jalta as

the most symbolic and contested - are cases in point and show at the same

time how the 'great''wars in Europe increasingly became 'global' wars. Peace

settlements increasingly became conscious attempts to lay the foundations of

a new international order, by way of power balancing, new institutional

devices and the application of political principles such as monarchy

(Vienna) or national self-determination (Versailles). Though the Congress of

Vienna indeed tried to restore the old dynastic balance of power in Europe

after Napoleon's bid for hegemony had been defeated, it also attempted to

create a new power balance - for example by merging Belgium into the Kingdom

of the Netherlands - and later a regular negotiating procedure between the

great powers, the Conference system which after 1822 became the looser

framework of the Concert of Europe.[41] The result of the Congress of Vienna

was thus not simply 'a world restored' as Henry Kissinger has stressed, but

just as much the foundation for a new world.[42]

The notion of balance of power can have different meanings and may

therefore be confusing.[43] It may refer to a particular power figuration in a

certain period: "the balance of power between the great powers in 19th

century Europe remained fairly stable until the unification of Germany".

That analytical meaning is more clearly expressed by the dynamic term power

balance. It can also more easily avoid the fallacy of equating balance with

equilibrium - or with a supposed tendency towards equilibrium. As used in

political propaganda the term balance of power indeed stands for

equilibrium: "the balance of power between the East and the West should be

restored". In fact, however, 'balance' then but all too often means

superiority. For these reasons the concept of balance of power is best

reserved for a particular kind of foreign policy made possible by a

reasonable degree of evenness of power between great powers and on a shared

concept of interstate order, making for moderation and restraint. It has

received this meaning through what Edward V. Gulick has called Europe's

"classical balance of power", but it also inspired Henry Kissinger's attempt

to make the Soviet Union accept the rules of balance of power policy, based on 'equality of power' and the shared expectation of prudence and restraint.[44] His famous concept of 'linkage' was intended to teach the Soviet Union how to respect the rules of the game - but in fact raised the question whether paedagogy in the relations between the great powers is not out of place.[45]

The classical conception of the balance of power is expressed very well in a passage from the pamphlet Europe's Catechism, published in 1741:

"Catechist: Hold, my pretty Child - one Word more. - You have been ask'd concerning the Ballance of power. - Tell me what it is?

Europa: It is such an equal Distribution of Power among the Princes of Europe, as makes it impracticable for the one to disturb the Repose of the other.

Catechist: Tell me wherein consists the Safety of Europe?

Europa: In this same Ballance of Power.

Catechist: What is it that generally causes War in her Bowels?

Europa: It is occasion'd by the Ballance of Power being destroy'd.

Catechist: And how is that Ballance be destroy'd?

Europa: The Ballance may be destroy'd by Force or Fraud; by the Pusillanimity of some, and the Corruption of all.

Catechist: When any Potentate hath arriv'd to an exorbitant Share of Power, ought not the Rest to league together in order to reduce him to his due Proportion of it?

Europa: Yes, certainly. - Otherwise there is but
one Potentate, and the others are only a
kind of Vassals to him."

The classical balance of power shows already how precarious it was as a

device for the preservation of international order and the control of

international violence. As Gulick has analysed the conditions for restrained

balance of power policy, they are quite stringent.[47] The most important is

indeed "such an equal Distribution of power among the Princes of Europe, as

makes it impracticable for the one to disturb the Repose of the other". That

is not a durable given, however. An even power balance has to be maintained

by continual 'combination and recombination', that is to say by flexibility

in forming alliances - and when a balance threatens to break down by quickly

forming war coalitions (even among previous enemies) against aspiring

hegemonists: "Otherwise there is but one Potentate".

Maintenance of the balance of power thus required a different kind of

morality then the moral rules which govern conduct between individual human

beings within a state:

"All particular interests, prejudices, or partialities
must be sacrificed to the higher interest....of uniting
against oppression or against the measures which appear
to place the security of all in jeopardy. No previous
quarrel with any given state, no existing condition even
of actual hostility, must be suffered to interfere with

the imperative claims of the general security"[48]

This quotation from Lord Brougham not only shows why international morality

must be different but also that balance of power policy is quite different

from a policy based on 'reason of state' recognizing no 'higher interest'

than that of one's own state. The bad name that balance of power policy

acquired - for moral reasons - among democrats and liberals in the nineteenth and twentieth century is thus hardly justified. Balance of power was in fact an attempt to develop procedures and institutions for limitation and control of international violence. Prince Metternich, for example, who still has the reputation of a ruthless power calculator and inveterate schemer, wrote this about the balance of power:

> "...we must always view the society of states as the essential condition of the modern world...The great axioms of political science proceed from the knowledge of the true political interests of all states; it is upon these general interests that rests the guarantee of their existence. What characterizes the modern world and distinguishes it from the ancient is the tendency of states to draw near each other and to form a kind of social body based on the same principle as human society...In the ancient world isolation and the practice of the most absolute selfishness without any other restraint than that of prudence was the sum of politics...Modern society on the other hand exhibits the application of the principle of solidarity and of the balance of power between states."[49]

The maintenance of the balance of power does not exclude war. On the contrary, war is explicitly recognized as an indispensible instrument to preserve or restore the balance. But no war should aim at destroying an opponent, because that would harm or destroy the balance between the others:

> "The preservation and the integrity of Prussia are important not only to the empire, to Sweden, Denmark, Turkey, England and above all to France...; but it is further important to the powers which seem to menace it: because each should prefer its actual state to the

excessive expansion of the other, and consequently is
interested in its preservation"[50]

Balance of power as practiced by dynastic states can thus be said to have
been an attempt to see the relations between states as a figuration with
regularities and a dynamic of its own and to act upon that shared conception
rather than on a narrow view of the immediate interest of one's own state.
Unlike most peace plans it was realistic in recognizing interstate rivalry
and the need for power balancing, in short 'the state ofwar', and to attempt
on that basis to promote a measure of restraint in the relations between
states in Europe.

But balance of power policy cannot easily contain large or sudden shifts
in the power ratio's between the member states. The French revolution, and
particularly the 'levee en masse', which gave France superior military power
and led to the attempt of Napoleon to give France hegemonic status in
Europe, demonstrated the fragility of the classical balance of power. If an
increasingly powerful state neither recognizes the balance as such nor
respects its rules any longer, it will break down.

Napoleon overextended French power by the invasion of Russia and was
defeated by the grand coalition of Russia, Great Britain, Astria and
Prussia. In its formative treaties the coalition had expressed its aim as:
"to put an end to Europe's sorrows and secure its future peace through the
restoration of a just balance of power" and "a redivision of their
respective forces suitable to assure this equilibrium"[51] The latter was the
purpose of the Congress of Vienna. Apart from balancing devices like the
reconstitution of France as a great power, the creation of the Kingdom of
the Netherlands, and settlements of the Polish question and a large number

of boundary conflicts, a novelty was introduced. The British Foreign

Secretary Castlereagh drafted article VI of the Treaty of the Quadruple

Alliance (1815), which provided for periodic meetings "by the High

contracting parties....for the consideration of the measures which shall be

considered the most salutory for the repose and prosperity of nations...and

the peace of Europe".[52] Though this stipulation has been interpreted as no

more than a brief for intervention by the great powers in case of domestic

upheavals so as to prevent another French revolution, that is too limited a

view of its significance. Castlereagh's draft led to the so-called

'Conference system' which held sway over Europe for seven years. The

periodic meetings between the great five to discuss matters 'of common

interest' stopped in 1822, after Castlereagh had taken his own life and his

successor Canning refused point-blank to support France's proposal for joint

armed intervention in Spain. Canning then began to substitute: "for

Castlereagh's continental policy, a policy which would be more in accord

with the isolatonist feelings of the British people", as Harold Nicholson

puts it.[53] Canning himself used the language of reason of state: "Every

nation for itself, and God for us all!"[54]

But the idea of a Concert of Europe itself is more important than the

precise sequence of historical events or its hidden meaning. In its reliance

upon unity of the great powers as the foundation for "the repose and

prosperity of nations....and the peace of Europe" it has much in common with

the Security Council of the United Nations. It gave the conception both its

strength and its weakness: the consent and cooperation of the great powers

are indispensible for crisis management and peace-keeping, but the rivalry

between the great powers precludes joint action when and wherever the vital

interests of one of the great powers are at stake. Still, to move from peace

conferences as postwar settlements to conferences aiming at removing

potential sources of war and 'crisis management' - in the language of

contemporary international politics - is clearly a step forward. The Concert

of Europe is often seen as 'the germ of future international government'.[55]

But that is a misleading formulation. Unlike the League of Nations the

European Concert was firmly anchored on the familiar ground of balance of

power policies. It was a step forward not towards international government

or organisation but towards managing actual or potential shifts in the

balance of power which might threaten 'the repose of Europe'. The basic

distinction to be made is that between the strongly involved perspective of

the 'reason of state' and the more detached perspective of balance of power

policy, which recognizes the existence of a figuration of states with a

structure of its own, the preservation of which is perceived as a common

interest of all the (great) powers.[56] That consensus conception is more

realistic than the idea of a substitute international government relying on

collective security measures which states were supposed to be willing to

take on the basis of a normative common interest in avoiding war and

punishing agressors. The collective security concept of the League of

Nations failed because it was in a sense a premature application of criminal

law notions to interstate relations.[57] Balance of power policies, however,

fail when aspiring or 'revolutionary' powers become sufficiently strong to

challenge the consensus.[58]

Though the peacekeeping procedures of the Security Council of the United

nations still pay lip-service to 'collective security' they are in fact a

continuation in a more durable and more elaborate institutionalized form of

the Conference system of the Concert of Europe: the right of veto is an explicit recognition that they can be no more than a partial substitute for a monopoly of violence at the international level.

It is but all too easy to expose such rudimentary forms as a sham. Common interests - as perceived - were indeed in the end weaker than the demands of national security and/or aggrandizement. The security dilemma and the doublebind remained in force. The Conference system as such worked only for seven years though its practices continued up to 1914; the League of Nations was doomed to failure from the beginning on because it was 'idealist' (in E.H. Carr's sense) in its set-up and because the United States did not join it; while the United nations system was immobilised from the beginning of the Cold War on.[59] But much easy criticism is implicitly based on applying the model of domestic peace and political relations within (parliamentary) states to the development of interstate relations. One should not look for the replacement of national sovereignty by international government but for the development of workable substitutes or functional equivalents for a monopoly of violence at the international level. In that manner one can also see more clearly what functions these rudimentary substitutes have in fact fulfilled despite all their shortcomings and failures.

Even though the Conference system as such came to an end during 1822-1825 the idea of anticipatory conferences or 'crisis management' did not disappear. The Concert of Europe remained slumbering. When in 1853 war threatened to erupt between Russia and Turkey, a conference was called together by Austria in order to prevent it. A compromise declaration was issued aimed at protecting the Christian population of the Balkans without admitting the right of Russia to intervene. Turkey refused to accept it and declared war on Russia. France and Britain - for the first time in centuries

as allies - came together to the support of Turkey and to teach Russia a lesson. The Crimean war, though France and England had to pay dearly for it, did check Russian expansion and thereby restored rather than disrupted the existing power balance. The war also led to a renewed, if diffident attempt to create a procedure for crisis management. At the peace conference held in Paris in 1856 the great powers accepted Lord Clarendon's proposal to express a 'wish' that states "should have resources to the good offices of a friendly power" before taking up arms.[60] The conference also agreed on a Declaration on Maritime law and limitations on naval warfare. The idea of a "higher" interest of the figuration of states as such had not disappeared. Another anticipatory Congress was held in 1878 in Berlin with Bismarck as "honest broker" between Russia, Great-Britain, Austria-Hungary and Turkey to settle potential conflicts over the future of the Balkans, of Cyprus and of parts of Asia Minor coveted by Russia. The Congress was successful in that it pacified the great powers, though the arrangements agreed upon later proved inadequate. It also estranged Germany and Russia from each other, thus laying the foundation for the later division of the great powers into two rigidly hostile camps.[61] Bismarck hosted another conference in Berlin in 1844-85 in which the great powers agreed on handing over the Congo basin to King Leopold of Belgium's Free State of the Congo. For maintaining the European power balance it was better to give the Congo to a small power than to have one of the great powers acquire it.

Nineteenth century Europe was relatively peaceful. When the great powers went to war with each other their number remained limited, as in the Crimean war, the Prussian-Austrian was of 1866 and the Franco-Prussian war of 1870. Despite the unsettling consequences of the industrial revolution and the rise of nationalism no general war occured between 1815 and 1914. Was this

century of peace due to the restraining influence of the persisting idea of the European Concert?[62] Or could tensions within Europe be contained when there was still enough room for colonial expansion?[63] What can in any case be said is that the open rivalry for colonial possessions - 'No peace beyond the line' as Drake formulated it - became more and more closed towards the end of the century, whereas the existing power balance was disrupted at the same time. That happened primarily because of the unification of Germany, a great power of a new format which after 1890 acquired - at least among part of its ruling circle - hegemonic ambitions, and also, though of less importance, because of the unification of Italy. These two late-comers - as states, as industrialising countries and as colonial powers - changed the great power figuration in such a manner that the pressure in the European kettle strongly increased, especially after Bismarck disappeared from the scene in 1890. The changed power figuration then, crystallized in the formation of two competing alliances, the Triple Entente and the Triple Alliance. A multipolar power balance was thus transformed into an inflexible bipolar structure. In that situation balancing policies and diplomatic mediation could no longer be as effective as before. Germany's aspirations, its increasing strength and especially its attempt to build up a strong navy forced England (which was becoming weaker at the time) to give up its role as an aloof balancer of the power relations on the continent and enter into a durable alliance with its former rivals France and Russia. Rigid alliances, the closure of colonial competition and continuing conflicts on the Balkans made for a drift towards general (and global) war that in July 1914 could no longer be contained.

The attempts of Czar Nicholas to revive the Conference system in a new form through the two peace conferences in the Hague, held in 1899 and 1907,

may have been inspired by the military weakness of Russia. But if that was
so, it was less important than the fact that the other great powers reacted
so lukewarmly to his idea and did not use the opportunity to settle any of
the conflicts between them. Instead the conference discussed proposals for
the limitation of armaments -unsuccessfully - and for the establishment of a
Tribunal of Arbitration - successfully. The German Emperor, however,
remarked that "he should not depend on arbitration, but on his own sharp
sword, for safety".[64]

It can be concluded that both balance of power policy and its extension to
a concert of great powers have in certain periods functioned as a
rudimentary substitute for a central monopoly of violence at the
international level. But they could do so only under certain conditions, of
which a more or less even power balance between the great powers and a
sufficiently detached perspective on the figuration they form together were
the most important. As soon as the power balance shifts so markedly that one
of the great powers can begin to have hegemonic aspirations -or can be
suspected of such aspirations by its rivals - balance of power policies can
no longer keep the peace. The more involved perspective of 'reason of state'
takes over. The doublebind is strengthened again. Defense panics propel arms
races and these in turn feed hostile emotions and lead to exaggerated enemy-
images.[65] All of this occurred in the years between 1890 and 1914. It
coincided with an increasingly important role in foreign policy of public
opinion, which did not accept any longer the more detached and seemingly
cynical morality of balance of power policy. The drift towards war thus
became ever stronger, though in the beginning of the twentieth century three
crises (Algeciras, Bosnia and Agadir), that might as well have led to war as
the July 1914 crisis, were overcome - the first even by the conference

method.[66] But in 1914 it was as if Europe had become ripe for war: the

enthusiasm for war of soldiers and their families alike was great and the

peaceful intentions of socialist parties were swept away by the strength of

national we-feelings. The doublebind had become strong for enlightened

balance of power policies and the conference methods.

6. Monopoly functions of great powers

Balance of power policies and their extension in the Concert of Europe

explain why the state of war does not have to be the same as permanent war.

International violence can be mitigated when the doublebind is not too

strong. Balance of power policies thus fulfill certain functions, be it

precariously, which are analogous to the monopoly of violence of the state.

But state institutions have gradually acquired many more functions than the

peaceful settlement of conflicts within their territory. Their violence

monopoly in combination with the monopoly of taxation has served to preserve

order, to make roads and other transport routes safe for long distance

trade, to standardize currencies and to facilitate all kinds of economic

transactions through legal rules and procedures. In a later phase they also

acquired educational, cultural and many kinds of 'welfare' functions. Can we

observe a similar relationship between monopoly power and monopoly functions

at the international level? From the end of the nineteenth century onwards a

number of the more specialised functions of regulating or coordinating

international transactions and communications have been entrusted to

function-specific international organisations ('specialised agencies' in

United Nations terminology). The more technical these functions are -

postal, telegraph, health - the more smoothly these organisations can work.

The more they touch on vital interests of states the more difficult, if not

impossible, their regulation through international organisation beccomes.[67]

Yet, some order, some international coordination and regulation has

developed in certain periods and was either preserved or declined.

This observation has made some scholars postulate the emergence and

decline of monopoly powers, of great powers acquiring for a time a position

of global dominance of hegemony. That position, they say, has enabled these

powers to maintain order and to regulate international monetary and economic

transactions primarily for their own profit, as a kind of substitute

taxation.

So does Immanuel Wallerstein perceive three cases of hegemony in the

development of the capitalist world-economy, by which he means:

> "that situation in which the ongoing rivalry between the
> so-called 'great powers' is so unbalanced that one power
> can largely impose its rules and its wishes (at the
> least by effective veto power) in the economic,
> political, military, diplomatic, and even cultural
> arenas. The material base for such power lies in the
> ability of enterprises domiciled in that power to
> operate more efficiently in all three major economic
> arenas - agro-industrial production, commerce and
> finance."[18]

Even though Wallerstein hedges his definition ('largely', 'at the least')

he can identify no more than three instances of great powers having been

hegemonic or monopoly powers: The United Provinces of the Netherlands (1625-

72), the United Kingdom (1815-73) and the United States (1945-67). He posits

some analogies between these three cases: hegemonic powers were advocates of

global "liberalism" in the sense of free flow of the factors of production,
they were primarily sea-powers and they achieved their position through a
(thirty years) war involving all the major powers.

If for Wallerstein the interstate system is just the "expression at the
level of the political arena (of) the capitalist drive for the endless
accumulation of capital"[69] for George Modelski it is the other way round:
"a succession of world powers shaped the global system".[70] Nevertheless,
their accounts of the rise and decline of hegemonic or world powers show
more similarities than differences. Modelski adds Portugal as the first
world power and distinguishes between two phases of British hegemony, one
before and one after 1789. Because Modelski's is concerned with political
position and power instead of economic competitiveness ('material base') his
periodisation, especially before the nineteenth century is different. He
considers Portugal the first world power because of its successful
elimination of Venice as a rival sea power, ("it seized the heart of the
pre-existing world system"[71]), its monopolization of trade with Asia, Africa
and Brazil and its claims of exclusion towards other powers by Papal Bull's
and treaties with Spain. But Portugal's seaborne empire hardly counted in
the European power balance. In fact, it did not even offer Portugal
protection against annexation by Spain in 1580. To see in Portugal a world
power is therefore anachronistic, based on reasoning by analogy with the
Atlantic seaboard states that later became great powers, which combined
holding the balance in Europe with important monopoly functions in the world
outside Europe. The United Provinces too, which acquire their position of
world power a little earlier for Modelski (with the Twelve Years' truce in
1609) than for Wallerstein (1625, though he later uses the peace of

Westphalia as demarcation point), was primarily a seapower. It could acquire

its position of great power in Europe at least as much because of temporary

internal weakening of its rivals as through its own resources. In other

words: its power was derived from its particular position in a network of

trade (and later finance) and power relations. Dutch power grew and declined

with the changing composition of that network. Wallerstein's explanation of

an edge in agro-industrial production as the origin of Dutch hegomony is

therefore also anachronistic. What may have been so in the case with England

and the United States does not automatically apply to the Netherlands. In

fact the term 'agro-industrial' itself is already an anachronism.

The weakness in both Wallerstein's and Modelski's models of phases or long

cycles in the world system is precisely that they speak of a world system

instead of a great power figuration and therefore concentrate their

attention on power in the world at large rather than on power relative to

that of other great powers in Europe. From a continental perspective the

phases in the development of the European power balance can look very

different. For the German historian Ludwig Dehio, for example, the

demarcation points are 'bids for supremacy' of the continental powers Spain

(under Philip II), France (under Louis XIV and Napoleon) and Germany (under

Hitler) respectively.[72] Modelski recognizes the difference only in a

footnote:

> "Monopoly in the global system was not incompatible with
> a European balance of power which in its later form was
> a form of oligopoly: competition among the few. Such a
> balance could be a way of sharing in the gains of global
> monopoly."[73]

But formulated in that manner the European balance of power is an intregal part of the world-system: but in fact it was at first the other way round. Modelski and Wallerstein both reason backwards, try to discern parallels and analogies to present developments (the decline of American power) in past phases or cycles.[74] They do not see that in earlier phases colonial and naval power were on the one hand power resources in the rivalry between the great powers in Europe, whereas on the other hand especially England's position as balancer of the power relations on the continent helped it to continuously expand its colonial possessions.[75] There was thus a two way relationship between the European power balance and 'global' power. This gave England its strong position in the nineteenth century and it also gradually transformed the European great power balance into a global balance. Both the two 'world' wars still have its origin in the rivalry between European great powers. Their result, however, was the end of Europe as the center of international politics and the beginning of global great power rivalry. In that sense one can only speak of a 'world system' after 1945, when the United States and the Soviet Union remained as the only two great powers, which then became identical with being 'world' powers or in popular language, 'superpowers'.

Though Wallerstein and Modelski's approaches are both deficient because of their desire to discover the present in the past, their models and evidence do show the importance for the international figuration as a whole of the monopoly functions of certain great powers. Modelski speaks of "sharing in the gains of global monopoly" but that is perhaps to direct a formulation. If the Dutch claimed the 'mare liberum' as a legal back-up of their fight against Portugese and Spanish trade monopolies and succeeded, that is the beginning of unhampered long distance sea trade for the members of all

states, even though some are able to use the new opportunities better than others.[76] If England maintains the freedom of the seas principle and uses its navy not only for establishing its own overseas power but also for eliminating piracy and for the 'Pax Brittanica', this further assures peaceful long distance trade among nations. These monopoly functions then are quite similar to those of dynastic monarchs pacifying their territories and creating the conditions for the emergence of national economies. In the same way, the global economy developed in the wake of the British navy. The existence of such monopoly functions remains usually hidden behind the profits for the monopolist. Modelski calls such functions monopoly rents:

> "to its holders accrue benefits larger than they
> otherwise would be, e.g. in a more dispersed system. In
> the past these benefits have revolved around greater
> than average security...., preferential access to,
> better knowledge of, and superior bargaining power in
> global transactions and communications (bringing
> additional wealth through trade and services) and a
> capacity to "set the rules" in world affairs. In each
> cycle, such benefits helped to create a "golden age" for
> the world power, making it an object of respect, acclaim
> and imitation, a "model of development."[77]

But where in his model then is France, the object of 'respect, acclaim and imitation' in Europe during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries? Modelski makes too much of analogies with the position of the United States after 1945: he projects the characteristics of the American power position (without, however, mentioning the Soviet Union) back into the past - and so does Wallerstein. They are wrong: there have never been any hegemonic or world powers, there have only been a number of great sea powers exercising certain monopoly functions in the world at large. Some of these functions

have since been taken over by international organisations or incorporated
and further developed in international law. The law of the sea is a case in
point.

The concept of monopoly functions of great powers can now be discussed
more systematically. Instead of concentrating on monopoly rents it is more
adequate to make a distinction between functions of dominance or rule and
coordinating and regulating functions, as these can be fulfilled either by
state institutions (or monarchs) or by great powers.

A simple example may be useful: the development of the functions of
housenumbers. Ludwig Meyer von Kronau, a Swiss traveller, in 1789 goes from
Zurich to Austria. He writes in his diary:

> "As we got to the other side of Bozberg near Hornussen
> and entered Austrian territory we were struck by the
> sight of the housenumbers which seemed like a kind of
> shower, and appeared to us as a symbol of the hand of
> sovereign, inexorably extending over the property of the
> private person."[78]

Indeed, Emperor Joseph II had forced his subjects to fasten little white
plaquets with streetname and housenumber on their houses. For the Emperor
that was a means to keep an eye on his subjects and, more importantly, to
require a more reliable estimate of the tax capacity of his population. In
the meantime street-names and housenumbers have become indispensable means
of orientation and communication. They have become so self-evident that we
no longer associate them with the rule of the King or the institutions of
the state. The introduction of housenumbers was intended as a personal
instrument of rule of the King, but unintendedly facilitated the reciprocal
communication of the members of state-societies as they became more and more

closely knit together. Because most societies have become more and more
dependent on impersonal transactions carried out over ever longer distances,
the invention of housenumbers gradually spread over the world as a whole and
in most countries became a self-evident feature of daily life. Housenumbers
and streetnames are at present still important for the detection and
suveillance activities of the police, but that will not bring anybody to
demand their abolition. During the German occupation of the Netherlands,
however, in many cities street-names and housenumbers were removed by the
population in order to make it more difficult for the German police to find
Jews or other people who wanted to escape from being sent to Germany as
labourers or inmates of concentration camps.

The following further remarks about the development housenumbers can be
made:

1. The functions and meaning of housenumbers have not always been what
they are now. Even now the relationship between the dominance and the
communication and orientation functions of housenumbers can still vary. In
Japan, for example, the streets have names and the houses have numbers but
they are not visibly marked. A map with streetnames and housenumbers can
only be found in the local police office, the koban. To orient oneself in an
unfamiliar neighbourhood one is forced to go for information to the koban.
One may suppose that local police officers in Japan have as their most
important function the surveillance of individual citizens. That was indeed
the case during the period of military rule when kobans were introduced, but
after 1945 these have developed into a kind of social service centre, in
which all kinds of information and even first aid are being given. Small
libraries have been established in kobans and people can even borrow some
money there to pay for going home after a drinking bout.[79]

These functions of the kobans have had as an unintended consequence, that according to a comparative survey Japanese poliemen are much better disciplined and less inclined to violent conduct than police officers in the United States.[80] In Japan the most important character trait which police officers are required to have is the ability to listen and have a receptive attitude towards the people. Fire arms are seldomly used and even the riot police has a reputation of restraint.

The fact that in Japan houses do not carry visible numbers thus has had the unintended consequence that the communication and service functions of kobans and of local police officers have developed much further than in most countries where houses do have visible numbers. What at first sight appears self-evident: "housenumbers are housenumbers" is therefore not at all the case.

2. The development of the functions and meaning of housenumbers has not as such been planned or intended by anyone. They have developed more or less blindly, in connection with other aspects of development.

3. The introduction by the central institutions of the state of standardized streetnames and housenumbers shows that in the development of states the functions of rule and dominance and the coordinating and regulating functions are interconnected with each other, but at the same time have to be distinguished from each other. That the different functions of state institutions - functions for those who control the state monopolies and functions for the individual citizens or the people as a whole - are not sufficiently distinguished is a very important source of confusion and contradiction.

The more assymmetrical the power relations between rulers and ruled or between great and small powers - and even more so between colonial powers

and the inhabitants of colonies - the more difficult it will be to perceive

this distinction. Can one expect subjugated peoples to appreciate the

'public interest' functions of oppressive governments or of great powers?

But that does not make these functions less real. In fact, only an

analysis of such functions can explain the way in which an established

structure of rule - whether at the national or international level - so

often contains the seeds of its own destruction. Colonial powers, for

example, pacified large areas in the America's, Asia and Africa and made

them into territories of colonial rule; they thus facilitated the emergence

of new 'national' entities as both the foundation and the legitimation of

emancipation movements which could later succesfully contest the

continuation of their rule.

'Law and order' is anyway not just an ideological tool of rulers to

suppress opposition and protest movements, it also has a function for the

ruled. It enables people to engage in peaceful economic activities, it

protects them against fear of the continuous threat of violence, it makes it

possible for them to save, to invest, to insure against future risks, in

short to look at their life from a long-term perspective, to plan a career

by going through long years of education (without having to go into a

monastery) and so on. Postponement of gratification requires security.

The expansion of Western Europe unintendedly provided the rudiments of

global 'law and order'. The pacification of large territories for the sake

of colonial rule and control and led to the formation of the 'new' states

first of the Americas and later of Asia and Africa. The great seapowers

pacified the transport and trade routes linking the continents. On that

basis a world economy - admittedly centred on Europe and unevenly developing

- could gradually emerge.[81] Did the industrial revolution make the Pax

<u>Brittanica</u> possible or was it rather England's position as a global power that explains why the industrial revolution could occur in that island state? The answer is, of course, not an either-or. The second interconnection, however, is seldom mentioned, because of the prevailing tendency to see economic processes or 'capitalism' (as Wallerstein has it) as the primary or basic cause.

But in the same way as the development of national economies depended on the prior formation of dynastic states, so a global economy could not have emerged but for the monopoly functions of great powers. The pacification of the seas and the development of maritime law were the important preconditions but later especially the monetary function of great powers has been crucial. The innovations in financial exchange and credit procedures (especially bills of exchange) introduced first in Italy and further developed in Antwerp and by the Amsterdam Exchange Bank founded in 1609 when Holland was becoming the dominant seapower in Europe, can be seen as an early form of international monetary coordination.[82] But just as emerging 'national' economies could not do without a centrally standardized currency to replace the many different local currencies which became a hindrance to trade and exchange, so did the emerging global economy. The gold standard was the first substitute or functional equivalent for an international standard currency. As adopted between 1863 and 1874 by all the European powers (not yet by the United States) it "simplified the operations of a single free and multilateral system of world trading, increasingly pivoting on London".[83]

As a national standard - a fixed relation between unit of currency and a 'standard' quantity of gold - the gold standard dates back to the beginning of the eighteenth century. But a silver standard (the pound <u>sterling</u>)

existed also. Either of the two (or even a bimetallic standard, since

bimetallism was the common practice in Europe) would therefore have been

possible. But Britain adopted a full gold standard in 1820 and because of

its crucial role in trade and capital movements the other European countries

gradually had to follow suit. The bimetallic and silver standards were

pushed out, with the United States as one of the last resisters.

The international gold standard is usually described as a autonomously

functioning way of adjusting the exchange rates of national currencies. In

fact, however, its success was dependent on the economic and political power

of England:

> "...not only was the gold standard neither impersonal nor
> fully automatic; it was also not politically
> symmetrical. In fact, the pre-1914 monetary order was
> arranged in a distinctly hierarchical fashion, with the
> countries of the periphery at the bottom, the core
> countries above, and at the peak - Britain. Great
> Britain dominated international monetary relations in
> the nineteenth century as no state has since, with the
> exception of the United States immediately After World
> War II. Britain was the supreme industrial power of the
> day, the biggest exporter of manufactured goods, the
> largest overseas investor. London was by far the most
> widely used of the world's currencies for both current -
> and capital-account transactions. It is sometimes
> claimed that the gold standard was in reality a
> sterling-exchange standard. In one sense this
> appellation is misleading, insofar as most monetary
> reserves before 1914 (as mentioned above) were still
> held in gold, not sterling, and insofar as governments
> continued to be concerned with maintaining the gold
> value of their currencies, not the sterling value. Yet
> in another sense the fact cannot be denied: the
> classical gold standard was a sterling standard - a

hegemonic regime - in the sense that Britain not only
dominated the international monetary order, establishing
and maintaining the prevailing rules of the game, but
also gave monetary relations whatever degree of inherent
stability they possessed.
This stability was ensured through a trio of roles which
at that time only Britain had the economic and financial
resources to play: (1) maintaining a relatively open
market for the exports of countries in balance-of-
payments difficulties; (2) providing contracyclical
foreign long-term lending; and (3) acting as lender of
last resort in times of exchange crisis. These were not
roles that the British deliberately sought or even
particularly welcomed. As far as the Bank of England was
concerned, its monetary policies were dictated solely by
the need to protect its narrow reserves and the gold
convertibility of the pound. It did not regard itself as
responsible for global monetary stabilization or as
money manager of the world. Yet this is precisely the
responsibility that was thrust upon it in practice -
acquired, like the British Empire itself, more or less
absentmindedly. The widespread international use of
sterling and the close liks between the larger financial
markets in London and the smaller national financial
markets elsewhere inevitable endowed Britain with the
power to guide the world's monetary policy. Changes of
policy by the Bank of England inevitably imposed a
certain discipline and coordination on monetary
conditions in other countries."[84]

This quotation from Benjamin Cohen makes perfectly clear how the monetary

monopoly function of Britain - and after 1945 of the United States -

originated and how dependent it was on the edge of superiority that the

British Empire acquired with respect to the other great powers in Europe.

Britain's role as a substitute central bank for the global economy was
intertwined with its domination of weaker countries, whether its own
colonies or the new states in Latin America.[85] Britain regulated
international monetary relations partly at their expense.[86] But such
'monopoly rents' do not negate the 'public interest' function of the British
monopoly.

How important that had been became clear after 1914. The dominant position
of the British economy had already begun to decline from the 1890's onward.
Britain had to face increasing competition in industrial export markets and
from new financial centers such as Paris, Berlin and New York.[87] It became
more and more difficult for the City of London to manage international
monetary relations. In 1914 the gold standard was suspended because of the
war. Shortage of gold was the only reason that it was not immediately
restored after the war. The monopoly functions of England were appreciated
so much that the period of its functioning operation of the gold standard
was widely seen as a 'Golden Age'.[88] How dependent the functioning of the
gold standard had been on British power was not yet seen at the time. The
solution for regulating international monetary relations was therefore found
in a modification of the gold standard, the gold-exchange standard. In 1925
Britain reestablished the gold convertibility of the pound and no longer
restricted exports of gold: "Within a year nearly fourty other nations had
joined in the experiment and most other independent governments joined not
much later".[89] But six years later Britain was no longer strong enough to
withstand a run on its reserves after a large number of banks on the
continent had failed. It suspended convertibility again. As the United
States had not yet become strong enough to replace Britain, being itself at

the time also in the throes of the Depression, that meant a temporary ending of global monetary coordination and regulation. A sterling bloc grouped around England, a dollar bloc around the United States and a gold bloc around France emerged, hostile towards each other. As large group of countries, especially Germany and Eastern European countries, started on an autarkic policy and abandoned convertibility altogether. That lack of international monetary coordination - leading to competitive depreciations and deflationary policies - considerable worsened the depression of the thirties.

In 1944 the Allies - or rather the United States and Britain - negotiated a new international monetary order at Bretton Woods. There is no need to describe the results in detail here. Important is only that it gradually became in fact a dollar-exchange standard[90] despite attempts by the British delegation led by Lord Keynes to introduce a more power-neutral reserve unit, the 'bancor' which would make large overdraft facilities in the context of an International Clearing Union possible.[91] In that way the potential conflict - which later turned out to be real enough and a major reason for present criticism of IMF 'conditionality', i.e. required adjustments of national economic policies as a condition for assistance[92] - between external monetary policy and domestic economic policy could have been solved. Keynes' plan for a Clearing Union which would guarantee sufficient international liquidity was intended precisely "to safeguard the unfettered right of Britain and other nations to pursue policies of domestic expansion".[93] Keynes' plan would probably have resulted in an international coordinating mechanism that favoured the weak at the expense of the strong, even though it at the same time may have benefited strong and weak alike,

particularly in the long term. But as Keynes himself has said: in the long run we are all dead. Certain losses in the short term are usually regarded as more important than uncertain gains in the future.

Therefore the views of the United States carried the day at Bretton Woods in 1944. The United Stats acquired similar monopoly functions for the international monetary system, be it in the different institutional setting of the international Monetary Fund, as Britain had fulfilled in the 'Golden Age' before 1914. How important such a leading great power is for smooth international monetary coordination became clear in the early seventies. The United States then came in the position that Britain might have run into if war would not have broken out in 1914. Britain's economic and political position would otherwise most likely have continued to weaken until the moment when it would no longer have been able to fulfill its international 'central bank' functions, as described above by Benjamin Cohen.[94] That is what happened to the United States in the early seventies: it had overextended its power in Vietnam and at the same time was fearing increasing economic competition from Western Europe and Japan. President Nixon was forced to suspend the free convertibility into gold and other reserve assets of the dollar in 1971. An intensive search for an alternative 'international monetary order' started.[95] This time, however, the system did not break down completely as in 1931. In the meantime - and in that sense the Bretton Woods agreements proved to be farsighted - the monopoly functions were to some extent shared between an intergovernmental organisation and the dominant great power. Negotiations about reform of the international monetary system had in fact already begun before 1971. Government leaders were aware of the consequences of not reaching a compromise. The IMF structure could thus cushion the shocks of the American

decision, later supported by a new informal European monetary coordinating agreement (the 'snake'). Fixed exchange rates were no longer tenable after the devaluation of the dollar at the end of 1971. But the world even learned "to live with floating exchange rates in a world of inflation and recession".[96] This successful adaptation of the system by muddling through even made a recent revival of the dominant monetary position of the United States possible. There is still no other currency as strong as the dollar, because there is still no other great (capitalist) power than the United States. As long as that remains the case international monetary coordination will be faced with reconciling the 'public interest' functions with monopoly rents resulting from assymetries in power between the members of the system. Patching up and muddling through seems still more likely than the creation of a new international monetary order for the benefit of all.[97]

Monopoly functions are thus a more or less precarious substitute for a truly international monopoly of violence and taxation as the basis for the other coordinating and regulating functions now exercised by states. It is necessary to recognize the ambivalent character of monopoly functions, the balance between functions or 'rents' for the monopolist and 'public interest' functions. The question is under what conditions that balance can shift further towards the latter.

7. The Globalization of Great Power Rivalry

In the seventeenth century Britain had two foreign secretaries, one for the Nordic balance of power and one for the central European balance. These two balances were at that time still relatively autonomous from each

other.[98] Relatively, because the fact that Britain was interested in both already shows that the two balances were interconnected. But an overarching European power balance developed only gradually with the expanding size and composition of trade and financial exchange networks, with the improvement of means of transport, in sum with the increasing interdependencies between all parts of Europe - and the world at large at the same time. But the latent changes in the degree of interconnectedness of power relations in Europe did not become manifest before Napoleon's attempt to make France the hegenomic power on the European continent. After 1815 the idea - and the practice - of the Concert of Europe marked the development towards the higher level of integration of one single European power balance. That did not exclude local balances (for example within Germany until 1866 or in the Balkans) but these then became lower levels of integration, part of a hierarchy rather than separate balances in their own right as before.[99] As all European countries became more tightly knit together, they became parts of a single hierarchically ordered whole.

That a process - be it with ups and downs - in the direction of the development of units of integration of increasing size and number of hierarchical levels (regional and local balances) can be observed, shows again that the concept 'world-system' is too static and therefore misleading, as has been noted already.[100] This also applies to the notion of 'long cycles' with a regular pattern of development of their own. The cycles that are posited occur within different phases of the process of integration, first towards a European and then towards a single global power balance.

Before the expansion of Western Europe there existed autonomous power balances at different levels of integration in the different parts of the world. The great wars leading to the unification of China in the period of the Warring States were completely unaffected by the rivalries between Greek states at the same time - and vice versa. But the European powers through conquest and 'pacification' gradually eliminated nearly all other power balances between attack and defense units in the rest of the world. That was a precondition for the globalization of great power rivalry and the emergence of an overarching global power balance.

The great seapowers - Portugal, The United Provinces of the Netherlands, Great Britain and the United States - were the principal intermediaries between Europeanization and globalization of great power rivalry. Especially England and later the United States held the balance in Europe and could thereby expand their global influence, whether by acquiring colonies, economic dominance or political and military bases.[101] Their monopoly functions made the emergence of a global economy possible. That great power rivalry also began to extend outside Europe was first demonstrated by the support of France for the American war of independence. An even more significant harbinger of globalization was the war between Russia and Japan in 1905, the more so because Russia lost. Its victory was not only a further spur to Japan's ambitions, but it also stimulated other nationalist movements in the Asian colonies. How strongly interconnected the world had become became manifest during the great war between 1914 and 1918, which has gone into history as the first World War. The entry of the United States into the war indeed marked the end of European self-reliance: the European great powers could no longer settle their conflicts and make peace by themselves. President Wilson became - with Clemençeau and Lloyd George - one

of the Great Three in Versailles and his insistence on the principle of
self-determination became a crucial element of the postwar order in Europe.
But though it had worldwide repercussions, the first World War was still
primarily a European conflict: it had its origins in Europe and the
principal theatre of the war was still Europe. But in the meantime Japan
became an aspiring great - and even regional hegemonic[102] - power. And
though the second World War again began in Europe, Japan's attack on Pearl
Harbour opened a second theatre of war in Asia, so that it developed into
the first truly global war.[103] Japan's rising industrial and military power
had unintendedly drawn the world together in a similar way as the rise of
Prussia had integrated Europe in the eighteenth century.

The first global war meant the end of the Eurocentric world. Great power
rivalry had become globalized. With the exception of the Soviet Union as
successor state to the Russian empire, no European state was a great power
any longer, even though France and the United Kingdom were still recognized
as such in the Security Council of the United nations. But after 1945 only
the United States and the Soviet Union remained in the race . The other
European powers were eliminated from great power competition by the war.
Great power rivalry has after 1945 become global an will remain so, if the
drift towards nuclear war can be contained. That problem will be examined in
the remainder of this study.

Notes to Chapter II

1. J.R. Hale, Renaissance Europe 1480-1520, London, 1971, p. 25. Hale continues: "It (violence) was present even in their pastimes - jousts were expected to produce casualties." For a description of the fierce character of daily life in the Midle Ages see Johan Huizinga's The Waning of the Middle Ages, 1919 (First Dutch edition) and Barbara Tuchman, A Distant Mirror, New York, 1978.

2. Blaming in social science theorizing explains the continuous attractiveness of reductionist theories. On the latter see Kenneth Waltz, A Theory of International Politics. Reading etc. 1979, Ch. 2. For cogent criticism of such theories see also his Man, the State and War, New York, 1959. The most popular example is probably the Hobson-Lenin theory of imperialism.

3. The terms 'attack and defense' or 'survival' units have been introduced by Norbert Elias as a generic concept which can take account of "the common features of this type of solidaristic grouping at different levels of social development". Cf. What is Sociology, London, 1978, pp. 138-139.

4. Apart from such continental mini-states as Liechtenstein, Monaco or San Marino and some small island-states the only real exceptiom is formed by Costa Rica. But rising tensions in the Central American region have recently led to strong pressure for reinstating the army in that country.

5. "We shall call 'state' a political set of institutions (Anstaltsbetrieb), when and in so far its executive branch successfully claims the monopoly of legitimate physical coercion for the implementation of its legal order and decrees," Max Weber, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, Tubingen, 1972, p. 29 (My translation, V.d.B.).

6. Norbert Elias, Ibidem, p. 38.

7. K.J. Holsti, International Politics: a framework for analysis, Englewood Cliffs, 1977-3, p.34. Holsti's description is based on Richard L. Walker The Multi-State System of Ancient China, Hamden, 1957.

8. Norbert Elias, State Formation and Civilisation, Vol. II of The Civilizing Process, Oxford, 1982, pp. 16-17. See further Ch. One, Dynamics of Feudalization, pp. 13-91.

9. For an extensive analysis of this process, see Norbert Elias, op. cit., esp. Ch. 2, On the Sociogenesis of the State, pp. 91-229.

10. Ibidem, p. 106. I have slightly amended the English translation.

11. Charles Tilly, Ed., The Formation of National States in Western Europe, Princeton, 1975, p. 24.

12. Alfred Vagts, A History of Militarism, New York, 1959, esp. Ch. 1 and Elias, op. cit., pp. 9-11. See also Noel Perrin, Giving up the Gun: Japan's Conversion to the Sowrd, 1543-1879. To preserve the position of the feudal Samurai warrior class and the Shogun's power monopoly guns were outlawed in Japan during the Tokugawa period.

13. Elias, op. cit., Ch. 2. VII, The Distribution of the Power Ratio's within the Unit of Rule: their Significance for the Central Authority: the Formation of the 'Royal Mechanism'.

14. Elias, ibidem, esp. Ch. 2. VIII, On the Sociogenesis of the Monopoly of Taxation, pp. 201-229.

15. Charles Tilly, Ed., op. cit., especially the contributions by Tilly, Samuel E. Finer and Gabriel Ardant. Also Vagts, op. cit., Ch. 4 and 5, and Gabriel Ardent, Histoire Financière de l'Antiquite à Nos Jours, Paris, 1976.

16. Cf. John H. Herz, International Politics in the Atomic Age, New York and London, 1959, esp. Part I, Rise and Characteristics of the Modern State System.

17. Milovan Djilas, Land without Justice, London, 1958. In early phases of a state formation process a mix of private and public violence control can develop on such a basis. The Sicilian mafia is the best known example. Its social functions have been analysed from this perspective by Anton Blok in The Mafia of a Sicilian Village, Oxford, 1974.

18. On this point see G. van Benthem van den Bergh, Is a Marxist Theory of the State possible?, Institute of Social Studies, Occasional Paper, no. 61, The Hague, 1977.

19. Anarchists like Bakunin have rightly accused the Marxists of blindness in this respect. But they tend to see the state as no more than the embodiment of violence, so that they themselves tend to be blind to the benefits of the state's peace. For the relevant texts of Bakunin see Arthur Lehning, Ed., Michael Bakoenin over anarchisme, staat en diktatuur, The Hague, 1970.

20. A.S. Diamond, The Evolution of Law and Order, London, 1951.

21. E.V. Walter, Terror and Resistance: a Study of Political Violence, New York, 1969.

22. The unexpected ease with which the Polish military took control and (temporarily?) eliminated Solidarity without bloodshed was quite instructive in this respect. The use of conscripts was not even necessary - a small number of well-trained special troops proved to be sufficient.

23. Elias, op. cit., esp. Part Two: Synopsis; Towards a Theory of Civilizing Processes, pp. 229-337.

24. Barbara Tuchman writes in A Distant Mirror (op. cit. XIV): "People of the Middle Ages existed under mental, moral and physical circumstances so different from our own as to constitute almost a foreign civilization". See also footnote 1.

25. Thus the hero of Marivaux's eighteenth century comedy Fausses Confidences is a servant, who not only controls himself better than his social superiors but also arranges with great skill the amorous relations between them.

26. "The favourite amusements of the nobility bore the imprint of a warlike temper" as Marc Bloch writes in his Feudal Society, London, Vol. I, p.303. Cf. also Elias, op. cit., esp. Vol. I, Ch. 2, XI. "Scenes from the life of a knight", pp. 204-219.

27. The Japanese writer Mishima Yukio still experienced this consequence of the state's peace as a loss. In his introduction to the Samourai's code of conduct Hagakure (London, 1977) he formulated his feeling of having been deprived of strong contrasts in the caption: "The compromise climate of today, when one may neither live beautifully nor die horribly".

28. Cf. Norbert Elias, De Eenzaamheid van Stervenden in Onze Tijd, Amsterdam, 1984, p. 60.

29. Ibidem p. 59.

30. Richard Falk, Human Rights and State Sovereignty, New York, 1981. Also Michael Mandelbaum, The Nuclear Revolution, Cambridge, 1981, Chapter 7. The Nuclear Presidency, pp. 177-207.

31. See Robert Keohane and Joseph S. Nye Jr., Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition, Boston, 1977, who argue that this development makes a revision of international relations theory necessary.

32. Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: a study of order in world politics, London and Basingstoke, 1977.

33. The term has been introduced by John H. Herz in op. cit., esp. Chapter 10. See also Robert Jervis, "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma", World Politics, Vol. XXX, October 1977, no. 1, pp. 167-214 and Bruce Russet, Prisoners of Insecurity, San Fransisco, 1983.

34. Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, Everyman Ed. p. 65.

35. Stanley Hoffman, The State of War, New York, 1965. See esp. Ch. 2 and 3, based respectively on Raymond Aron's Paix et Guerre entre les Nations and Rousseau's writings on war and peace.

36. The four following quotations are from Norbert Elias, Problems of Involvement and Detachment. Forthcoming. (Dutch edition, Amsterdam, 1982.)

37. Paul Seabury, The Balance of Power, San Francisco, 1965, p. 7. Cf. also Frank M. Russell, Theories of International Relations, New York and London, 1936, esp. Ch. III, Ancient India, pp. 37-51.

38. Elias, State Formation and Civilization, p. 88.

39. Martin Wight, Power Politics, Harmondsworth, 1979, p.48.

40. My description of the nature of 'great wars' is different both from that of Jack S. Levy: "Wars that involve nearly all the powers in intense conflict" ("World System Analysis: a Great Power Framework" in William R. Thompson (ed.) Contending Approaches to World System Analysis, Beverly Hills, 1983, pp. 183-201) and that of George Modelski's 'global wars' as 'wars that determine the constitution of the global political system' ("The long Cycle of Global Politics and the Nation-State", Comparative Studies in Society and History, Vol. 20, April 1978, pp. 214-235.) Modelski's conceptualisation, and that of Immanuel Wallerstein also, suffer from inappropriate application of systems language to international politics as Aristide B. Zolberg has argued convincingly ("'World' and 'System': a Misalliance" in Thompson, Ibidem, pp. 269-291.) See also his "Origins of the Modern World System: a Missing Link", World Politics, Vol. 33, January 1981, pp. 253-281.

41. On the Congress of Vienna see H.G. Schenk, The Aftermath of the Napoleonic Wars: The Concert of Europe - an Experiment, London, 1947; Harold Nicolson, The Congress of Vienna: A Study in Allied Unity: 1812-1822, London, 1946 and Henry A. Kissinger, A World Restored: Metternich, Castlereagh and the Problems of Peace, 1852-1822, Boston and Cambridge, 1957.

42. Kissinger, Ibidem. Despite the title of his book Kissinger does pay considerable attention to the innovative aspects of the work of the Congress of Vienna.

43. See the classic article by Ernst B. Haas "The Balance of Power: Prescription, Concept or Propaganda", World Politics, Vol. V, 1953, no. 4, reprinted in Arend Lyphart (ed.) World Politics, Boston, 1966, pp. 234-248. For different views on the balance of power the collection by Seabury, (op. cit.) is useful. See also Inis L. Claude, Power and International Relations, New York, 1962, esp. Ch. I. Claude quotes Pollard on conceptual confusion: "The balance of power may mean almost anything, and it is used not only in different senses by different people, or in different senses by the same people of different times, but in different senses by the same person at the same time".

44. Edward Vose Gulick, Europe's Classical Balance of Power: A Case History of the Theory and Practice of one of the Great Concepts of European Statecraft, Ithaca, 1955; Henry A. Kissinger, White House Years, Boston - Toronto, 1979, esp. 'The Enduring Philosophical Problem of US - Soviet Relations', pp. 114-130.

45. Stanley Hoffman, "The World According to Henry Kissinger: I, 1965-1972" in Dead Ends: American Foreign Policy in the New Cold War, Cambridge, 1983, pp. 17-47.

46. Cited in Gulick, op. cit., p. 2.

47. Ibidem, Part I, Theory.

48. Ibidem, pp. 69-71.

49. Cited in Ibidem, p. 32.

50. The Abbe de Pradt in an analysis of Prussian neutrality, cited in Ibidem, p. 74.

51. Ibidem, p. 128.

52. Kissinger, A World Restored, p. 186.

53. Harold Nicholson, op. cit., p. 279.

54. A.J. Grant and Harold Temperley, Europe in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries (1789-1950), London, 1953, p. 143. The resurgence of 'reason of state' thinking in the form of 'Realpolitik' was especially strong in 'late-coming' Germany. For a clear example see Heinrich von Treitschke, Politics, Abridged and edited by Hans Kohn, New York and Burlingame, 1963.

55. Ibidem, p. 139. A more modest description is that of a 'security regime', along the lines of Robert Jervis 'Security Regimes', International Organisation, Vol. 36, Nr. 2, Spring 1982, esp. pp. 178-183. The concept of 'regime', however, is hardly applicable to the interstate relations, as Jervis rightly remarks. International regimes are defined as: "Those principles, rules and norms that permit nations to be restrained in their behaviour in the belief that others will reciprocate" (p. 173). But 'Principles, rules and norms' do not restrain by themselves: they require a relatively durable monopoly of violence or its functional equivalent.

56. As F.H. Hinsley formulates the "few principles underlying the conference system: that the Great Powers had a common responsibility for maintaining the territorial status-quo of the treaty of 1815 and for solving the international problems which arose in Europe; that when the status quo had to be modified or a problem had to be settled, changes should not be made without their formal and common consent: that since the consent of all was needed, decisions were not to be reached by votes". (Power and the Pursuit of peace: Theory and Practice in the History of Relations between States, Cambridge, 1967, p. 225).

57. In that sense the League of Nations scheme was 'idealist' or utopian. For what is still the best analysis of 'idealism' versus 'realism' in thinking about international politics, based originally on the debate about the League see E.H. Carr, The Twenty Years' Crisis 1919-1939, London, 1946^2. As stated before 'realism' does not have to be synonymous with 'reason of state' thinking.

58. Cf. Stanley Hoffman's analysis of Henry Kissinger's normative inference from the classical balance of power: make the Soviet Union accept the

legitimacy of the international order, so that it becomes a normal instead of a 'revolutionary' great power (Primacy or World Order; American Foreign Policy Since the Cold War, New York, 1978, Ch. Two).

59. See note 57.

60. Grant and Temperley, op. cit, p. 219.

61. Ibidem, p. 307.

62. According to R.B. Mowat (The Concert of Europe, London, 1930) it was the Concert that kept peace during the whole period of 'Armed Peace' from 1870-1914: "For although all governments blindly adhered then, as they do still, to the doctrine of absolute state sovereignty, they did nevertheless cooperate and continually communicate, with the object of preserving peace. Thus, by an increasing process of adjustment, made almost daily of the multitude of points, at which states jostle each other, friction was eased; and at big crises the Concert came together in Conference and solved or 'tided over' the difficulty." According to Mowat war broke out in 1914 only because Germany then refused to collaborate in the Concert. (p. VII)

63. An excellent analysis of this connection is provided in Adolf Rein, "Uber die Bedeutung der uberseeischen Ausdehnung fur das Europaische Staatensystem", Historisches Zeitschrift, Vol. 137, 1927, pp. 28-90. In the sixteenth century conflicts over overseas possessions were excluded from the European balance of power by the idea of a line separating the 'societal state' of Europe from the 'state of nature' outside of it: 'No peace beyond the line' (Drake). That silent agreement not only allowed piracy, but also made it possible for the Dutch and English East and West India companies to develop into quasi-states. The German chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg attempted the reverse around the turn of the century; 'no war beyond the line', leave the colonies outside European conflicts. Rain also clearly demonstrates how Great Britain profited from its position as 'balancer' of the power relations on the continent to continuously enlarge its colonial possessions. Balance of power policies were actually criticized by contemporaries on this account. (For example Von Justi, Die Chimare des Gleichgewicht von Europa, Altona, 1758). French support of the American revolution was the first extension of balance of power policies outside Europe. In the 19th century the concept world politics made its appearance in Germany, in the writings of the nationalist economist Friedrich von List 'Weltpolitik, Weltmacht, Weltinteresse' became the subject of many pamphlets and expressed the rising ambitions of Germany and its frustration over the difficulties of obtaining a colonial empire.

64. Grant and Temperley, op. cit., p. 333.

65. See Heinz Gollwitzer, Europe in the Age of Imperialism, 1880-1914, London, 1969, or Barbara Tuchman, The Proud Tower, A Portrait of the World Before the War 1890-1914, New York, 1966.

66. Grant and Temperley, Ibidem, Ch. XXVII.

67. 'Functional' international integration has been advocated by David Mitrany (A Working Peace System, London, 1943) as the starting point for a peaceful world order. If more and more coordinating and regulating functions of states would be transferred to the international level, states would learn to attach less importance to national sovereignty. What is needed, wrote Mitrany, is: "Not a peace that would keep the nations quietly apart, but a peace that would actively bring them together". Experts and specialists must take over from politicians. For a thorough discussion of functionalism in international relations see Ernst D. Haas, Beyond the Nation-State: Functionalism and International Organization, Stanford, 1964, esp. Part I, Functionalism and the Theory of Integration. The flaw in the functional argument is, of course, that it overlooks the nature of great power rivalry as a doublebind process. But even the process of integration between allies in Europe has demonstrated that there was no clear 'spill-over' (Haas) from technical and economic to political and security functions.

68. Immanuel Wallerstein, "The Three Instances of Hegemony in the History of the Capitalist World Economy", International Journal of Comparative Sociology, Vol. XXIV, 1983, Nr. 1-2, p. 101. See also The Modern World System II. Mercantilism and the Consolidation of the European World Economy, 1600-1750, New York, 1980, esp. Ch. 2, Dutch Hegonomy in the World Economy, pp. 36-74.

69. Ibidem, p. 107.

70. George Modelski, "The Long Cycle of Global Politics and the Nation-State", Comparative Studies in Society and History, Vol. 20, April 1978, p. 216.

71. Ibidem, p. 219.

72. Ludwig Dehio, The Precarious Balance: The Politics of Power in Europe 1494-1945, London, 1963.

73. op. cit., p. 228.

74. Cf. also George Modelski: "The Theory of Long Cycles and U.S. Strategic Policy" in R. Harkovy and E.A. Kolodjiez (Eds.), American Security and Policy-Making, Lexington, 1980.

75. See Adolf Rein, op. cit.

76. In the first place, of course, the monopolist himself, who can operate according to the principle "Quod licet Jovi, non licet bovi": "It is mare liberum in the British seas but mare clausum on the coast of Africa and in the East Indies" as Sir Geoffrey Downing bitterly wrote in 1663 to Lord Clarendon (cited in Wallerstein, The Modern World System II, p. 61). Gustav Schmoller added: "These Dutch, so lauded by the naif free-trader of our day on account of the low customs-duties of their early days were from the first the sternest and most warlike of monopolists after the monopolist fashion that the world has ever seen" (The Mercantile System and its Historical Significance, New York, 1897, cited in Wallerstein, Ibidem, p.61).

77. George Modelski, "The Long Cycle of Global Politics and the Nation-State", op. cit., p. 227-228.

78. Cited in E.N. Williams, The Ancien Regime in Europe, New York and Evanston, 1970, p. 1.

79. Richard Storry, "Friendly Neighbourhood Kobans", Times Literary Supplement, July 8, 1977.

80. David H. Bailey, Forces or Order: Police Behaviour in Japan and the United States, Berkeley, 1976.

81. William Woodruff, "The Emergence of an International Economy 1700-1914" in Carlo M. Cipolla, Ed., The Fontana Economic History of Europe, 4, Vol. 2. The Emergence of Industrial Societies, Glasgow, 1973, pp. 656-738.

82. Geoffrey Parker, "The Emergence of Modern Finance in Europe 1500-1730", in Carlo M. Cipolla, The Fontana Economic History of Europe, Glasgow, 1974, pp. 527-595. Also Immanuel Wallerstein, The Modern World System I: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World Economy in the Sixteenth Century, New York, etc., 1974, esp. Ch. 4, From Seville to Amsterdam: the Factor of Europe, and The Modern World System II, Ch. 2.

83. E.J. Hobsbawm, Industry and Empire, Harmondsworth, 1968, p. 140.

84. Benjamin J. Cohen, Organizing the World's Money: the Political Economy of International Monetary Relations, London and Basingstoke, 1977, p. 81-82.

85. For a detailed study of such relationship see A.G. Ford, The Gold Standard 1880-1914: Britain and Argentina, New York and London, 1983^2.

86. Fred Hirsch, Money International, London, 1967, p. 28, cited in Cohen, op. cit., p. 82

87. Cohen, ibidem, p. 83.

88. Ibidem, p. 78

89. Ibidem, p. 85.

90. Ibidem, p. 96.

91. Richard N. Gardner, Sterling-Dollar Diplomacy: the Origins and Prospects of our International Economic Order, New York, 1969^2, p. 79. Keynes' plan was designed to obtain the advantages without the disadvantages of an international gold currency "and to provide an expansionist, in place of a contractionist, pressure on world trade".

92. Cf. Cheryl Payer, The Debt Trap: The IMF and the Third World, New York, 1974. For different views Bela Balassa, "External Shocks and Policy Responses in Sub-Saharan Africa 1973-1978: Under stress, market-oriented economics fored better than others", Finance and Development, March,

1984, vol. 21, No. 1, pp. 10-13, and Jocquin Muns, <u>Adjustment,</u> <u>Conditionality, and International Financing</u>, IMF, Washington, 1984.

93. Gardner, <u>Ibidem</u>, p. 92.

94. See p...

95. Robert Solomon, <u>The International Monetary System, 1945-1976</u>, New York, 1977, pp. 185-187, and p...

96. Solomon, <u>Ibidem</u>, Ch. XV, pp. 267-288.

97. See Randall Hinshaw, Ed., <u>Global Monetary Anarchy: perspectives on</u> <u>restoring stability</u>, Beverly Hills and London, 1981. It is remarkable that a collection of essays by a group of insiders should have the word 'anarchy' in its title. It shows how used they have become to a high level of coordination, so that a relatively mild setback can be perceived as anarchy. For the present state of the discussion on reform of the international monetary system see George M. Von Furstenberg, Ed., <u>International Money and Credit: The Policy Roles</u>, Washington, 1983. See esp. Stanley Fisher ("The SPR and the IMF: Toward a World Central Bank", pp. 179-199) who writes: "It is natural and tempting to speculate whether the Fund is a fledgling world central bank, moving through crises and constitutional change toward the wider purposes that Keynes saw for the International Clearing Union" (pp. 279-280).

98. Cf. Hans Morgenthau, <u>Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and</u> <u>Peace</u>, New York, 1965[3], Ch. 13. The structure of the Balance of power, pp. 198-203. Morgenthau, however, does not make a clear distinction between (relatively) autonomous balances and local balances within one overarching unified balance.

99. For the concept of 'levels of integration' and its implications see Norbert Elias, <u>Problems of Involvement and Detachment</u>, esp. par. VII and VIII.

100. See p.

101. For an analysis of 'informal' extension of British power see S. Sideri, <u>Trade and Power</u>, Rotterdam, 1970.

102. Japan even defended its expansionism in terms of the benefits of monopoly functions by claiming to establish a 'co-prosperity sphere' in Asia.

103. Cf. C.J. Bartlett, <u>The Global Conflict 1880-1970 The International</u> <u>Rivalry of the Great Powers</u>, London and New York, 1984, Ch. 9, Global War, pp. 227-255.