On the outside, looking in

Understanding transparency at the frontline

Noortje de Boer

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On the Outside, Looking in

Understanding Transparency at the Frontline

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Doctoral Committee

Promotor:	Prof.dr. E.H. Klijn
Copromotor:	Dr.ir. J. Eshuis
Other members:	Prof.dr. A.J. Steijn
	Prof.dr. S.M. Groeneveld
	Prof.dr. J.G. van Erp

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Chapter 1

Introduction

On July 11th, 2019, the court ruled that a report of the Dutch Education inspection on the Islamic Cornelius Haga School in Amsterdam could be published (NOS, 2019a; 2019b). The report of the year before had concluded with a positive evaluation of the education of the school. However, in March 2019, the school was brought to the attention of the Education Inspection after the National Coordinator of Terrorism Control and Safety[1] issued a warning that students influenced by teachers after close contact with 'radical' individuals (NOS, 2019a; 2019b; Zwart, 2019). The report of the Education Inspection did not find evidence to support this warning but did find other 'severe' shortcomings (Kuiper & Gualtherie van Weezel, 2019f). The school tried to prevent the report from being disclosed via legal proceedings. Their lawyer argued that, while the inspection report concluded that several aspects of the school were not up to par, the Inspectorate mixed its own interpretations with the law. Their lawyer stated, "if the Education Inspection, who, by definition, has authority because it regulates education, publishes that report, people think it is correct. We cannot compensate that effect with our own vision on that report" (NOS, 2019b, para 5).

This example is not unique and illustrates that transparency of a report about public performance can allow journalists, citizens and many more on the outside to look inside of a public organization. Moreover, it depicts the complex nature of making information collected by public organizations transparent, the consequences it can have and the potential pressure that its puts on street-level bureaucrats, such as inspectors, collecting the information on which the reports are based. This dissertation has delved into the phenomenon of transparency both, like the example above, when the information is provided by public organizations, but also when citizens make performance of societal stakeholders public. More specifically, it investigated what transparency does to the frontline and, thus, street-level bureaucrats (e.g. inspectors) and those they meet face-to-face (e.g. entrepreneurs or citizens).

1.1 Transparency and the public sector

Transparency is seen as promising for governments and its public organizations because, it is held, it is a way to show others (i.e. citizens) that you (i.e. the government) have nothing to hide. In this way, transparency is seen as one way to improve relations with citizens. This government-citizen relationship on the citizens-side has been characterized by an under-estimation of public performance and trust (Alon-Barkat, 2019; Levi & Stoker, 2000; Van Ryzin, 2011). A good relationship between public organizations and its citizens is important, because it can stimulate citizens' cooperation during service provision and, in turn, facilitate successful implementation and performance (Alon-Barkat, 2019). This positive connotation of transparency to achieve effects external to public organizations (e.g. increase trust and performance perceptions) has become dominant in the academic and societal debates. In turn, transparency has become hard to argue against and achieved a 'cult-like' status (Bernstein, 2017).

Governments and public organizations 'going transparent' is nothing new. In the 80s and 90s, the instrument of transparency was believed to be a practice of good governance. Transparency was thought to be a remedy to multiple societal problems, such as low public trust, corruption and poor government performance, because it enhanced accountability and stimulated public participation (Birkinshaw, 2006; Hood, 2007; Michener, 2019; Nye et al., 1997). As a result, a wave of New Public Management reforms was implemented to enhance transparency of public organizations. These reforms also painted a picture of transparency that was full of promises (see also Fung et al., 2007). At the same time, public organizations and their managers were generally geared towards avoiding political risks or 'blame' (Hood, 2007). Avoiding blame becomes harder in a transparent society where

[1] Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid van het Ministerie van Justitie en Veiligheid

information is readily available to non-governmental actors. In turn, public organizations have become more aware of how their intentions, capabilities and overall track record are perceived by external audiences and try to adjust their management accordingly. Thus, organizational reputation and how to manage it has become an important part of how public organizations function (Carpenter & Krause, 2012). Public organizations even use transparency proactively to brand themselves with promotional symbols, such as logos (Alon-Barkat, 2019; Karens et al., 2016; Teodoro & An, 2018).

Transparency scholarship has skyrocketed since the NPM reforms (see Cucciniello et al., 2017 for an overview). Transparency scholars initially investigated the functioning of transparency (i.e. 'promises'), such as effects on citizens' trust and participation. However, results have been mixed and given rise to debates between optimists, pessimists and sceptics – all of whom have empirical backing for their arguments (see Grimmelikhuijsen, 2012 for an overview). Despite the fact that there is no clear-cut answer, governments have continued to embed transparency in their everyday functioning. In 2009, Barack Obama initiated the Open Government Partnership (OPG). This has inspired open government initiatives across the globe built on access to information laws (Piotrowski, 2017). This open government movement is not solely devoted to transparency – but also to collaboration and participation – and this movement shows that transparency is continuing to root itself into the functioning and management of public organizations.

1.2 Defining transparency

Specifying what transparency entails is not straightforward. Therefore, it is often labelled an 'umbrella concept' (see Hirsch & Levin, 1999). To illustrate this, freedom of information (FOI) laws, user-generated data, self-disclosure of performance information or whistleblowing have all – at least to some extent – been discussed under the heading of transparency. Despite the fact that these transparency practices seem distinct, what they have in common is that they address information provision (see Alon-Barkat, 2019). Information provision allows for 'inward observability'. This means that individuals external to the organization can see what happens on the inside (Grimmelikhuijsen, 2012). Societal stakeholders, such as citizens, are enabled to hold decision-makers accountable using the information provided by putting pressure on them to improve their services and regulations (see Baekgaard & Serritzlew, 2016; James, 2011; Van de Walle & Roberts, 2008).

This line of reasoning defines transparency as "the availability of information about an organization or actor allowing external stakeholders to monitor the internal workings or performance of that organizations (Grimmelikhuijsen, 2012, p. 5; see also Grimmelikhuijsen & Meijer, 2012; Grimmelikhuijsen et al., 2013). This definition, first and foremost, reveals an instrumental and informative focus, since transparency is understood to enable monitoring and accountability mechanisms by external stakeholders. Thus, transparency is seen as a tool to achieve citizens-oriented goals (i.e. increase legitimacy, trust, participation, satisfaction) or public organization-oriented goals (e.g. increase accountability, performance or decrease corruption) (Alon-Barkat, 2019; Cucciniello et al., 2017). Second, this definition is distinct from conceptualizing transparency as a human right. A human's 'right to know' is distinct from available information that allows monitorization by others (e.g. Birkinshaw, 2006; Florini, 2007). Finally, this definition focuses more on the pro-active provision of information, such as disclosing the inspection report of Cornelius Haga School in Amsterdam. It does not focus on reactive provision of information, such as a municipality obeying a citizen organizations information request under the Freedom of Information law (Hood & Heald, 2006). The definition does not include the act of demanding information, as would be the case under the Freedom of Information law, but rather information made available pro-actively by actors without a request (see also Grimmelikhuijsen, 2012).

1.3 Why frontline encounters matter

In addition to transparency's external effects, such as on legitimacy, trust, participation, satisfaction, accountability, performance or corruption (Cucciniello et al., 2017), there could also be internal effects, particularly on how street-level bureaucrats and citizens interact when they meet at the frontline. Understanding how bureaucrats implement policies during face-to-face encounters with citizens is crucial for an understanding of the functioning of public organizations and the state at large. Zacka (2017) highlighted that "public policy remains an abstraction until it is carried out. In an important respect, public policy is the sum total of the actions taken by street-level bureaucrats" (p. 16, italics in original). Public policies come to life when street-level bureaucrats transform them into realities during face-to-face encounters with entrepreneurs, clients or citizens (Bartels, 2013; Goodsell, 1981; Lipsky, 2010; Zacka, 2017). Traditionally, this public encounter was deemed problematic to accountability of the democratic processes because of the inevitability of discretion involved. Bureaucrat-citizen encounters were understood as being set in highly regulated environments. Street-level bureaucrats had to be impersonal and impartial by acting solely on rules and expertise and, in this way, were steered towards acting in the public, rather than their private, interests (Bartels, 2013).

Lipsky's (2010) work changed this perspective by acknowledging the value of discretion. Lipsky stressed that street-level bureaucrats have discretion because they must implement policies in complex realities that do not match written policies fully, while, at the same time, dealing with numerous stress factors: limited time, resources and information. Ultimately, bureaucrats must cope and develop mental shortcuts to process citizens and this often results in unequal treatment (Bartels, 2013). Hence, "the reality of the work of street-level bureaucrats could hardly be farther from the bureaucratic ideal of impersonal detachment in decision making" (Lipsky, 2010, p. 9).

Much of the classic work on street-level bureaucracy has focused on what different types of street-level bureaucrats, such as nurses, teachers or police officers, have in common, such as their discretion (e.g. Lipsky, 2010; Maynard-Moody & Musheno, 2000; 2003; Hill & Hupe, 2002; Goodsell, 1981). However, there are also important differences between street-level bureaucrats, for instance, whether bureaucrats' (1) decisions concern policy implementation, (2) interact with vulnerable or non-vulnerable clients or (3) meet the same citizen once or repeatedly. Zacka (2017) illustrates "unlike teachers, police officers carry guns and sometimes make life-or-death decisions; unlike welfare workers, these officers interact not just with individuals seeking services but with the population at large; and unlike social workers, who have repeated encounters with clients through which a personal relationship can develop, our encounters with police officers are often episodic and happen on a one-time basis" (p. 23). By this line of reasoning, Maynard-Moody & Musheno (2000; 2003) revealed that street-level bureaucrats use two narratives when using their discretion to make decisions; namely, that of the 'state-agent' or 'citizen-agent.' While the former puts the state at the centre of their decisions by sticking to rules and striving for consistency, the latter puts the citizen at the heart and focuses on the morality and ethics of their decisions (Maynard-Moody & Musheno, 2000; 2003). This dissertation focuses on enforcing bureaucrats who, in particular, may tell predominantly state-agent narratives (see section 1.7. for a discussion on the implications of this focus).

1.4 Why transparency matters for frontline encounters

To date, street-level bureaucrats have been neglected by transparency scholars (see also

Grimmelikhuijsen et al., 2017). However, there are substantive indications that transparency may matter for (1) how street-level bureaucrats implement policies at the frontline and (2) how bureaucrat-citizen interactions evolve.

Firstly, transparency can make implementation actions by street-level bureaucrats visible to the public. As a result, they too can increasingly be monitored and held personally accountable, for instance, for individual perceived wrongdoings (see Hood, 2007; 2011). To illustrate this, we can see that public organizations and their street-level agents have become increasingly prone to online reviews written by citizens. Several countries host popular websites, such as zoekdokter.nl, which allow patients to rank and review profiles associated with specific doctors. These doctors are identifiable by name (Adams, 2013; Trigg, 2014). Thus, transparency does not just have external effects on organizations or citizens, but also internal ones for street-level bureaucrats' day-to-day work and their encounters with citizens.

Secondly, when street-level bureaucrats interact with citizens, there are two ways transparency has always been present by design. The first one is part of the design of bureaucrat-citizen encounters. This is because some encounters are, by nature, more transparent than others. More specifically, some bureaucrat-citizen encounters happen 'on the street' with bystanders. Thus, the work of these street-level bureaucrats is set in physically open spaces. However, other bureaucrat-citizen encounters are not transparent since they happen behind physical doors, such as in offices. Notably, the work of these street-level bureaucrats takes place in closed spaces (Gofen, 2015). Police officers, for instance, work in a more open space when they patrol the streets, whereas social workers are more isolated within offices or when visiting a family at their home. Moreover, transparency also plays a role in the information exchanged when bureaucrats and citizens meet. While street-level bureaucrats provide services or enforce laws, they rely on their own observations of citizens' behaviour. Thus, citizens are critical in providing additional contextual information about their individual situation. Street-level bureaucrats need citizens to disclose information about their circumstances to make full sense of their cases and to decide how to implement or enforce public policies accordingly (de Bruijn et al., 2007; Raaphorst, 2018). Transparency is, then, related to what contextual and clarifying information the citizen discloses or not to the bureaucrat. This information is also provided without a request and enables street-level bureaucrats 'on the outside' to 'look inside' the citizens' situation (see Grimmelikhuijsen, 2012).

1.5 Changing transparency dynamics at the frontline

However, the context within which bureaucrat-citizen encounters occur has changed over recent decades due to developments in Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) and so, in turn, has the role of transparency. From the citizens' side of the story, ICTs have created a 'global village' (McLuhan, 1962) where anyone can access information anytime from their technological devices and has lowered boundaries for societal actors, such as citizens, to get it to the public. This is especially important to understand when studying bureaucrat-citizen encounters. Public encounters include, by definition, a street-level bureaucrat and a citizen and citizens are not just passive actors during service delivery (Gofen, 2013; 2015). Citizens executing transparency about what happens when citizens encounter street-level bureaucrats is an increasingly common activity. A smartphone empowers citizens to film street-level bureaucrats they encounter or have encountered, upload the video material or write about them online. Some scholars have even labelled this type of transparency 'computer-mediated transparency' (Meijer, 2009).

A recent example illustrates the empowerment of active citizens during bureaucrat-citizen encounters. In 2016, a Dutch woman released a satirical fake advertisement on YouTube for a new mobile application called Poke-a-Cop Go (a reference to the popular game Pokémon Go) as a response to police violence during Blackface (i.e. Zwarte Piet) protests. She included faces of actual police officers from her hometown in the video, which were photoshopped onto the bodies of famous Pokémon characters. The video depicted that you could 'catch' the police officers by throwing stones at them (Sonnemans, 2018a; 2018b). This example is even an indication that it forms part of a bigger movement aligned with the cop watching movement in the United States. Cop watching is a movement where citizens team up to film police officers in order to expose and prevent police misconduct and, ultimately, participate in help deliver the democratic process. The organization Copwatch started this movement by releasing a documentary in 2017. This started a website with information on citizens' rights to film police officers and even led to them offering courses. What originally started as a collective process, where groups of organized citizens would stimulate individuals to film police officers, has now also become associated with incidental filming of photo-taking of citizens (Brucato, 2015a; 2015b).

In this way, society is moving from surveillance to sousveillance: 'the watching of publics of those with institutional authority' (Brucato, 2015a, p. 45). Thus, sousveillance is the watching of those at the top by those at the bottom. While citizens increasingly use transparency practices during public encounters to make the ways of behaving of street-level bureaucrats more visible, public organizations have responded by implementing transparency policies enabling street-level bureaucrats to make the behaviour of citizens during interactions also directly transparent. For instance, many street-level bureaucrats have started wearing body cameras (Bromberg et al., 2018). Some public organizations have even started to make the databases storing the body camera footage public (Ramirez, 2018).

From the bureaucrats' side of the story, ICTs have amplified both the amount and scope of the information about governments and its street-level agents being made available to citizens (Grimmelikhuijsen & Meijer, 2012). Due to the lower boundaries, public organizations have increased their transparency practices as well. Recent technological advancements have allowed public organizations to easily display their performances on a range of online platforms, such as Twitter, Facebook and YouTube. Some bureaucrats even have their own Twitter account. Hence, "although freedom of information laws forms the backbone of government transparency, computer-mediated transparency is an essential part of modern-day government transparency" (Grimmelikhuijsen et al., 2013, p. 575).

Moreover, the role of transparency for bureaucrats during their service provision has expanded the wide implementation of transparency policies because it makes bureaucrats' performance indirectly visible. When societal stakeholders are empowered to look inside, the day-to-day outputs of street-level bureaucrats' work also becomes more visible and, in turn, 'monitor-able'. Public organizations may publish reports that include performance criteria, such as the number of cases processed, which indirectly include street-level bureaucrats' performance. The performance of individuals that street-level bureaucrats encounter also becomes more transparent. To illustrate this, the Dutch Education Inspection publishes annual reports on an interactive map on their website indicating which schools perform as either 'excellent', 'good' or 'poor' and this includes a full report by a jury. Although no teachers are named in the report, there is ample reference to how teachers are doing and how colleagues work together. Thus, indirectly, the performance of teachers is visible to anyone visiting the website or with access to the jury report.

In summary we have seen that a variety of transparency activities have changed one-on-one bureaucrat-citizen encounters into one-on-many encounters by making both policy implementation and enforcement actions of street-level bureaucrats part of the public sphere and empowering citizens

to contribute to that visibility. This dissertation studied the implications of transparency by both public organizations and citizens for the day-to-day frontline work of enforcing street-level bureaucrats and their encounters with entrepreneurs and citizens. This introductory chapter will highlight the aim and questions underpinning this dissertation and indicate its relevance for academia and practice.

1.6 Research question

This dissertation set out to understand the effects of transparency on the two central actors in frontline encounters: the street-level bureaucrat and the citizen. It did so specifically in enforcement contexts where street-level bureaucrats are powerful because they implement obligations rather than services (see section 1.7. for a more elaborate discussion). The overarching research question of this dissertation was:

What are the effects of transparency on street-level bureaucrats and citizens?

This question is answered in chapter 7. To answer the general research question systematically, it was broken down into five sub-questions.

1. How can street-level bureaucrats' enforcement during frontline encounters be conceptualized and measured?

2. What is the effect of transparency on street-level bureaucrats' enforcement and experienced resistance by citizens during frontline encounters?

3. What is the effect of transparency on regulatory performance and does street-level bureaucrats' relational distance from citizens matter?

4. In frontline encounters with little transparency, how are different street-level bureaucrats assessed by citizens in terms of warmth and competence traits?

5. What is the effect of street-level bureaucrats' enforcement during frontline encounters on citizens' transparency and obedience?

Chapters 2 through to 6 each provide empirical backing and an answer to one of the sub-questions above. These chapters can be clustered into two general parts of this dissertation. Part one consists of chapter 2, 3 and 4, which aimed to understand the perspective of the street-level bureaucrat. These three chapters all draw on large-scale surveys among street-level bureaucrats of the Netherlands Food and Product Safety Authority. Part one, as a result, primarily addresses the effects of transparency by a public organization. Part two consist of chapter 5 and 6. These aimed to understand the perspective of the citizen, including if and how they make enforcement of street-level bureaucrats transparent. Both chapters used multiple survey experiments among citizens to test the hypothesized relationships.

1.7 Focus on enforcement

This dissertation has studied the effects of transparency on street-level bureaucrats and citizens

within a specific type of context, namely enforcement. This section will discuss the particularities of this focus for answering the research question(s). Enforcement is a suitable context for two main reasons.

First, transparency is tool in the toolbox of enforcement agencies (e.g. Austin et al.,2015; Rothberg et al., 2008; Van Erp, 2010). In this dissertation, part one focuses on inspectors from the Netherlands Food and Product Safety Authority (i.e. NVWA), which operates under the Ministry of Agriculture, Nature and Food quality. The NVWA is tasked with regulating the safety of food, consumer products, animal welfare and nature. The authority of the NVWA ranges across numerous sectors and many companies. To illustrate this, the NVWA regulates, amongst others, food safety of the catering industry (roughly 80,000 companies), industrial eatables (roughly 10,000 companies) and slaughter houses (roughly 200). Therefore, it works predominantly based on risk-based regulation (Nederlandse Voedsel en Warenautoriteit, 2019a). The NVWA is also one of the largest regulators of the Netherlands with, in 2016, 1,201 inspectors conducting inspections, making it particularly suitable to study street-level bureaucrats using large n methods.

More importantly, the objective of the NVWA is to actively make all relevant information about regulation and its execution transparent by 2022. Moreover, it sees transparency as a regulatory instrument because it defines it as the publication of information about how individual entrepreneurs comply with laws and regulations with names and address of individual companies, product names or brand names. In this way, the NVWA wants to disclose which entrepreneurs do well and which do not do well in terms of their compliance and, in turn, stimulate them to continue to make compliance their priority (Nederlandse Voedsel en Warenautoriteit, 2019b). Around the time this dissertation collected survey data among inspectors, the NVWA was in the middle of rolling out a large-scale transparency initiative for the catering industry in a few major cities in the Netherlands. Hence, inspectors of the NVWA would already, or by 2022, deal with transparency of their inspection results, making this a relevant context for this dissertation.

Second, much like any other street-level bureaucrats, inspectors have a great deal of discretion to implement policies during face-to-face encounters with citizens but also face stressors, such as limited time. In this way, inspectors are classic street-level bureaucrats (Lipsky, 2010). As mentioned in section 1.3., however, inspectors may tell predominantly ‘state-agent’ narratives and put the state rather than the citizen at the centre of their decisions (Maynard-Moody & Musheno, 2000; 2003). In turn, inspectors have unique characteristics. For instance, they deliver obligations rather than services (Sparrow, 2000). Inspectors are tasked with detecting wrongdoing and sanctioning accordingly. Thus, when using sanctions, inspectors constrain the person that they inspect from possibly behaving in the way they want to (Baldwin et al., 1998; Sparrow, 2000). Moreover, street-level bureaucrats often interact with vulnerable groups, such as the elderly or the unemployed (Lipsky, 2010). However, inspectors also often interact with a heterogeneous group, such as powerful corporations (Braithwaite, 2003; Nielsen, 2015). Finally, when street-level bureaucrats meet citizens, this is often voluntarily. However, when inspectors encounter citizens, this interaction is often unwanted by citizens because often they are thought to have possibly violated laws and do not have a clear exit option (Nielsen 2015; Winter & May, 2015). Like other enforcing bureaucrats, inspectors are especially powerful (Raaphorst, 2018).

By focussing on enforcement, this study has been able to dissect clear effects of transparency in highly regulated settings where most power is in the hand of the bureaucrat. Notably, part two (i.e. citizen-perspective) focused not only on inspectors but on a variety of enforcing bureaucrats, such as municipal enforcers, healthcare inspectors and customers officers. This approach was suitable because citizens encounter multiple enforcing bureaucrats in their lifetime and not just one.

1.8 The contribution

Why does this dissertation matter? This section first highlights the relevance of this study for the academic community (section 1.8.1.) followed by its societal relevance (section 1.8.2.).

1.8.1 For academia

This dissertation marries two streams of literature that previously have been disconnected: transparency and street-level bureaucracy. As a result, this study has contributed an entirely new perspective to the transparency scholarship, namely that of street-level bureaucrats. Notably, street-level bureaucrats play a crucial role in implementing transparency policies (Hyun et al., 2017), but have been neglected by transparency scholars (Grimmelikhuijsen et al., 2017). Understanding if and how transparency affects street-level bureaucrats' day-to-day behaviour is important because street-level bureaucrats' work is already inherently complex, characterized by uncertainty and dominated by stressors with which they cope (Lipsky, 2010; Tummers et al., 2015; Raaphorst, 2018). The street-level bureaucracy literature helps transparency scholars understand how transparency further complicates frontline work and also investigates its implications for effective service provision, treatment of citizens, and, in turn, better governance (see Hood, 2007).

This dissertation also contributes to the street-level bureaucracy literature that focuses predominantly on the street-level bureaucrat side of service provision (e.g. DeBois, 2016; Gofen et al., 2019; Harrits, 2019; Lipsky, 2010; Maynard-Moody & Musheno, 2000; Hill & Hupe, 2002; Tummers et al., 2015; Zacka, 2017). However, delving into the citizen-side of service provision rarely happens. This is surprising because citizens are not passive actors (DuBois, 2016; Gofen, 2013; 2015). This dissertation contributes to the street-level bureaucracy literature by revealing what happens at the citizen-side of frontline encounters (chapter 5 and 6). It specifically contributes to the understanding of citizens' complaint filing via informal channels, such as social media by delving into their public shaming of bureaucrats.

Finally, this dissertation methodologically advances our understanding of street-level bureaucrats and bureaucrat-citizen encounters by not taking the predominantly qualitative approach (Van Engen, 2019). Qualitative methods are invaluable because they allow researchers to unravel how street-level bureaucrats make decisions and deal with service provision within complex realities. Much of the classic work is based on qualitative inquiries (e.g. DuBois, 2016; Lipsky, 2010; Maynard-Moody & Musheno, 2003). However, qualitative methods complicate comparisons across street-level bureaucrats. This is because they do not allow for generalization about all bureaucrats in a population (see Hupe et al., 2016; Van Engen, 2019). Qualitative methods also do not allow researchers to dissect the clear-cut effects of explanatory variables on bureaucrats' work because, for instance, they cannot control for extraneous variables. This dissertation is not the first to notice the under-representation of quantitative work in street-level bureaucracy scholarship. Consequently, there has been a recent rise in quantitative scholars addressing frontline topics (e.g. Andersen & Jakobsen, 2017; Jilke & Tummers, 2018; Jensen & Pedersen, 2017; Guul, 2018). This study contributes to this 'quantification' in the street-level bureaucracy literature which includes substantive insights from both qualitative and quantitative studies.

1.8.2 For society

This dissertation also provides valuable insights for society. The ever-increasing amount of information available to citizens and street-level bureaucrats is unprecedented. Increasing numbers of (public) organizations disclose what and how they are doing publicly on their website or via their developed mobile applications. On top of that, freedom of information laws/acts have been adopted increasingly across the globe and have allowed citizens, when the information is not yet voluntarily disclosed by public organizations, to request it anyway. It is not just changes in public organizations themselves, but also technological advancements that have anyone with a digital device literally to upload whatever and whenever s/he likes to global audiences or store it for personal use (e.g. Bromberg et al., 2018; Brucato, 2015a; 2015b; Grimmelikhuijsen & Meijer, 2012; Ramirez, 2018). At the same time, misinformation on the Internet is on the rise (Iyengar & Massey, 2019; Lewandowsky et al., 2017; van der Linden, 2017). This misinformation is not limited to just political campaigns, but covers societal issues, such as vaccinations (Poland & Spier, 2010; Lazer et al., 2018; Van der Linden, 2017). There are even indications that misinformation can lead to physical danger for enforcing street-level bureaucrats, such as police officers (Phartiyal et al., 2018; Roozenbeek & Van der Linden, 2019).

These societal changes impact street-level bureaucrats who, daily, face a clientele who are more transparency demanding, sometimes misinformation-based and armed with smartphones to 'watch the watchmen' (Brucato, 2015a; 2015b). More importantly, when every step a street-level bureaucrat takes is already disclosed, can be disclosed, or 'watched' by citizens, this may have important implications for how bureaucrats deal with face-to-face encounters and, in turn, decide how they enforce policies and sanctions.

This dissertation offers valuable insights into the impact of transparency on frontline encounters, both from the perspective of the street-level bureaucrat, as well as from the citizen. These insights are useful for three reasons. First, for public managers and street-level bureaucrats, it has shown how a rise in (perceived) transparency affected bureaucrats' enforcement attitudes during encounters with citizens and how they related to citizens. Second, it is helpful for policy makers tasked with drafting transparency policies or implementation protocols because it can help them make the consequences of street-level bureaucrats' daily work explicit. Finally, this dissertation is insightful for citizens themselves, since it reveals how transparency practices alter street-level bureaucrats during the encounters they are part of. In turn, citizens may better understand why street-level bureaucrats enforce the way they do and act accordingly.

1.9 The outline

The outline of this dissertation is as follows: This first introductory chapter has discussed the reasons why this dissertation studied the role of transparency for both street-level bureaucrats and citizens in frontline encounters and, more specifically, within the context of enforcement. Chapters 2 through to 6 are the empirical chapters that show what this dissertation found with each chapter answering one sub-research question.

This dissertation includes five empirical chapters of which three (chapter 2, 5 and 6) are single-authored. Chapters 2 through to 4 have all been published separately and previously in international peer reviewed journals, specifically International Journal of Public Administration, Public Administration Review and Public Administration. All these three chapters draw on survey data collected from inspectors of the NVWA as respondents. Chapter 2 answers the first sub-question. More specifically, chapter 2 aimed to dissect what constitutes as a bureaucrats' enforcement during frontline encounters and how can it be measured. Chapter 3 (co-authored by Erik Hans Klijn and Jasper Eshuis) investigated how transparency affects bureaucrats' enforcement and their experienced resistance

by citizens during frontline encounters. Chapter 4 (co-authored by Jasper Eshuis) investigated the impact of transparency on bureaucrat-citizen relations and bureaucrats' perceptions of performance.

Chapter 5 and 6 aimed to understand the effects of frontline encounters on citizens, including their transparency practices. Chapter 5 is under review at an international peer reviewed journal while chapter 6 is revised and resubmitted to an international peer reviewed journal. Both chapters used multiple survey experiments among Dutch citizens. More specifically, before testing the effect of transparency by citizens, chapter 5 first aimed to understand citizens' biases when assessing bureaucrats in situations where there is not a lot of transparency. Chapter 6 aimed to unravel the effects of transparency by citizens, but also to test whether the enforcement of street-level bureaucrats during frontline encounters (see chapter 1) contributed to this transparency or not.

Chapter 7 discusses 'so what' by presenting the four key conclusions and a discussion of their implications for academia and practice. Chapter 7 also answers 'what is next' by presenting an agenda for future research.

Part 1

The street-level bureaucrat

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Chapter 2

Street-level enforcement style: A multidimensional measurement instrument

Abstract

This study investigates street-level bureaucrats' enforcement style and its underlying dimensions by developing and validating a multi-dimensional measurement scale. Developing a measurement scale for enforcement style is relevant because the number of underlying dimensions is contested and studies developing measurement scales are scarce. This complicates cross-sector and cross-national comparisons. Using a survey among inspectors of the Netherlands Food and Consumer Product Safety Authority (NVWA), street-level enforcement style is found to consist of three dimensions, (1) legal, (2) facilitation and (3) accommodation. This study contributes to more validated measurement instruments by presenting a 13-item measure that can be used to study street-level bureaucrats' enforcement style.

2.1 Introduction

What happens at the frontlines of policy implementation has long been at the centre of public management and public administration research (Hupe, Hill and Buffat, 2016; Lipsky, 2010). Scholars increasingly address specific attitudes, capabilities, decision-making processes and motivational dynamics of street-level bureaucrats to better understand street-level dynamics (Etienne, 2014; May and Wood, 2003; Maynard-Moody and Musheno, 2000). A diverse range of street-level behaviors are studied, such as policy alienation (Tummers, 2012; Van Engen, 2017a; Van Engen et al., 2016), coping (Tummers et al., 2015) and uncertainty experiences (Raaphorst, 2018). An explicit focus on enforcement at the street is, however, missing from this debate (May and Wood 2003). This is surprising since street-level enforcement is increasingly addressed by regulation scholars (Lo et al., 2009; Mascini and van Wijk, 2009; May and Winter, 1999; 2000; May and Wood, 2003; Nielsen, 2007).

Street-level enforcement is better understood as enforcement style of individual street-level bureaucrats. Enforcement style concerns how street-level bureaucrats, such as inspectors or police officers, enforce at the street during interactions with inspectees (May and Winter, 1999; 2000). Street-level enforcement style is, thus, a type of attitude of street-level bureaucrats during inspectee-encounters which can differ depending on the situation at hand. When enforcement style is studied, it is generally understood to be two-dimensional (May and Winter, 1999; 2000; May and Wood, 2003). May and Winter (2011), contrastingly, highlight that there could be even more dimensions. This multi-dimensionality, however, has barely been further explored (Lo et al., 2009). On top of that, scholars generally agree that street-level bureaucrats have different enforcement styles during exactly the same inspectee-encounter, but what makes up these different styles remains unclear (Etienne, 2014; Nielsen, 2015; Mascini and Van Wijk, 2009; Winter and May, 2002). It, thus, remains unclear how many dimensions underlie street-level enforcement style and how they are composed (May and Winter, 2011).

This study sets out to address this multi-dimensional nature of street-level enforcement style and the dimensions underlying it through measurement scale development and validation. Existing studies using measurement scales to study street-level enforcement style are scarce (e.g. Lo et al., 2009; May and Winter, 2000), based on qualitative or mixed-method research (e.g. Mascini and Van Wijk, 2009; Nielsen, 2015) or are tested among inspectees rather than street-level bureaucrats themselves (e.g. May and Winter, 2000). More importantly, these studies use scales created ad hoc and, thus, for the specific purposes of the respective studies. These scales are valuable, but rarely follow all measurement development steps, such as generating – and reviewing an item pool, or running extensive statistical tests for reliability and validity (DeVellis, 2016; Van Engen, 2017b). Measurement development steps ensure valid and reliable scales that allows for cross-sector and cross-national comparisons. This, ultimately, contributes to a better understanding of street-level enforcement style which is crucial because the style of enforcing has implications for the implementation of public policies, street-level bureaucrats' interactions with - and treatment of inspectees and, ultimately, the legitimacy of government (Lipsky, 2010).

Therefore, this paper investigates: What dimensions underlie street-level enforcement style and how can they be measured? by developing as well as validating a multi-dimensional measurement scale for street-level enforcement style. This study investigates a specific type of street-level bureaucrats, namely inspectors. Inspectors are suitable to study because they have considerable autonomy and discretion when enforcing rules and regulations and while interacting with inspectees. They are, thus, classic street-level bureaucrats (Lipsky, 2010; May and Wood, 2003). However, inspectors work for rule-enforcing organizations focused on delivering obligations by catching and punishing wrong-doers during interactions with inspectees (Sparrow, 2000) making them very powerful street-level

bureaucrats (Raaphorst, 2018).

This paper is structured as follows. First, the conceptual foundations of enforcement style will be discussed. Second, the empirical part is based on a survey (n = 507) among Dutch inspectors. It reports steps taken in scale development and assesses the psychometric properties using exploratory and confirmatory factor analysis and validity tests. Third, results are presented and discussed with regard to their theoretical contributions as well as how scholars and practitioners may benefit from them in terms of understanding and executing policy implementation.

2.2 Theoretical framework

The inspector

Street-level bureaucrats' autonomy and discretion for delivering obligations and interacting with inspectees sets the stage for their ways of inspecting at the street-level (Nielsen, 2015; Sparrow, 2000). Street-level bureaucrats are defined as 'public service workers who interact directly with citizens in the course of their job, and who have substantial discretion in the execution of their work' (Lipsky, 2010, p. 3). Inspectors implement public policies with considerable autonomy and discretion during inspectee interactions and are, therefore, classic street-level bureaucrats (Lipsky, 2010). The implementation strategies of the public organizations that employ inspectors determine what to enforce, how to enforce and when to enforce (see May and Burby, 1998; May and Winter, 2000; Sparrow, 2000). These organizational boundaries partly determine the parameters within which inspectors can make judgments about the application of enforcement policies during on-site visits with inspectees (Nielsen, 2015; Maynard-Moody and Musheno, 2000). Hence, within these parameters inspectors have their own discretionary room to behave as they see fit during regulatory encounters (May andWinter, 2000; May and Wood, 2003).

Inspectors, however, also have distinct characteristics. First, most street-level bureaucrats, like teachers, social workers and physicians, deliver services to clients. Inspectors, however, deliver obligations to inspectees (Sparrow, 2000). Regulators and their inspectors set out to minimize social risks by detecting wrongdoers and punishing them accordingly. By using sanctions, inspectors, thus, limit their inspectees freedom of acting the way they want (Baldwin et al., 1998; Sparrow, 2000). Second, whereas some street-level bureaucrats often interact with vulnerable inspectees, like social clients or the unemployed (Lipsky, 2010), inspectors mainly interact with a heterogeneous clientele, such as powerful corporations (Braithwaite, 2003; Nielsen, 2015). Third, the inspectees do not have a choice when interacting with inspectors, because there is no exit option (Nielsen, 2015). When an inspector fines a bar owner for violating smoking regulations, for example, this inspectee does not want this interaction and cannot choose to exit it. Inspectees, therefore, often view the intervening interactions with inspectors as unwanted since their intention is to detect criminal behavior and punish accordingly (Nielsen, 2015; Winter and May, 2016). In sum, inspectors are powerful (see Raaphorst, 2018) because they limit inspectees freedom and interactions are obligatory and unavoidable.

Defining enforcement style

Street-level enforcement consist of enforcement actions and enforcement style. Notably, enforcement style is also frequently used to study the ways of enforcing of regulatory agencies (e.g. Braithwaite et al., 1987; Carter, 2017; McCallister, 2010). In this article, however, street-level bureaucrats and not the regulatory agency are the unit of analysis. Both enforcement actions and enforcement style are

related since they address the behavior of street-level bureaucrats during the enforcement process, but they are conceptually different (May and Winter, 2000). Enforcement actions address behavioral activities conducted by street-level bureaucrats before and after a public encounter. They include, for instance, finalizing sanctions, specifying specific indicators that are inspected, or the planning of day-to-day inspectee-encounters and executing accompanied administrative tasks (May and Winter, 2000). Enforcement actions are enforcement tasks that a street-level bureaucrat executes before s/he visits inspectees and which are, thus, not directly related to the behavior of a specific inspectee.

The behavior of street-level bureaucrats, however, also has a relational dimension because they implement policies during inspectee interactions (De Boer et al., 2018; de Boer and Eshuis, 2018; Maynard-Moody and Musheno, 2000; Pautz, 2010). Bruijn et al. (2007) highlight that enforcing regulations is inherently a game between the inspector and the inspectee. The relational attitude of inspectors during these interactions is captured in their enforcement style. Enforcement style is defined as 'the character of the day-to-day interactions of [street-level bureaucrats] when dealing with regulated entities' (May and Winter, 2000, 145). During these face-to-face interactions street-level bureaucrats behave a certain way towards inspectees, predominantly focusing on implementing enforcement policies but also giving advice or tips on how to improve compliance. In sum, the most important difference between enforcement action and style is that the latter is relational coming to to light during face-to-face encounters with inspectees but the departure point for decision-making remains the rules that street-level bureaucrats need to enforce (May and Winter, 2000). The focus here is solely on street-level enforcement style.

Understanding enforcement style

There is a general agreement that street-level enforcement style is not fixed, and street-level bureaucrats combine different elements in varying constellations depending on the situation at hand (Mascini, 2013; Pautz, 2010). On top of that, street-level bureaucrats have a different style of enforcement during the same inspectee-encounter (Etienne, 2014; Nielsen, 2015; Mascini and Van Wijk, 2009; May and Winter, 2000). The way these enforcement style variations are studied, however, differ. Scholars differ in whether enforcement style is understood to vary along on one or along multiple dimensions (Kagan, 1994; Lo et al., 2009; May and Wood, 2003; Reiss, 1984; May and Winter, 1999; 2000). Traditionally, enforcement style was conceptualized as being one-dimensional. The single dimension concerned the rigidness of applying rules (May and Wood, 2003). To illustrate, Kagan (1994) emphasizes that street-level bureaucrats vary in style from being cooperative to more punitive. Reiss (1984) highlights that styles vary from accommodative to more deterrent and sanctioning. Scholars, however, have pointed out that one dimension with two polar opposites – ranging from more cooperative to punitive – is not enough to grasp the complex nature of street-level enforcement style (Braithwaite et al., 1987; Gormley, 1998; May and Burby, 1998).

Indeed, May and Winter (1999) empirically revealed that enforcement style varied along not one but two dimensions, specifically formalism[1] and coercion. May and Winter (2000) define formalism as 'the degree of rigidity in interactions that varies from informal conversations and rule-bound instances on the part of the [street-level bureaucrats]' (p. 147) and coercion as 'the willingness to issue threats that vary from a trusting inspector not issuing warnings, to a skeptical [street-level bureaucrat] threatening to report or to impose penalties for violations' (147). While Kagan (1994) conceptualized both dimensions on one dimension – the punitive dimension – May and Winter (1999; 2000) argue that they should be separated because street-level bureaucrats can vary in the extent to which they internalize each. Put differently, May and Winter (1999; 2000) show that both dimensions can be present – in different degrees – simultaneously which results in different patterns of enforcement styles

(May and Winter, 1999; 2000). Three ideal types of street-level bureaucrat enforcement style were identified, namely (1) legalistic (high formalism, moderate coercion); (2) flexible (moderate formalism and coercion) and; (3) accommodative (low formalism and coercion). May and Winter (2000) thus show that enforcement style is composed of two dimensions and the combination in which they are applied at the street-level result in different enforcement styles of street-level bureaucrats.

May and Wood (2003) also see street-level enforcement style as two-dimensional, but they use slightly different labels than May and Winter (1999; 2000). They empirically show that street-level enforcement style consists of (1) formalism and (2) facilitation which replaces the coercion dimension of May and Winter (1999; 2000). In line with May and Winter (1999; 2000), formalism is understood as rigidly applying rules and regulations. Facilitation is defined as 'the willingness of [street-level bureaucrats] to help regulatees and be forgiving' (May and Wood, 2003, p. 1999). This two-dimensional nature of enforcement style has now become widely accepted and used to study the frontline enforcement behavior of street-level bureaucrats (e.g. Mascini and Van Wijk, 2009; May and Wood, 2003; Nielsen, 2015).

In a later reflection on their own work, May and Winter (2011) point out that there could be more than two dimensions. Surprisingly, this notion has not been further explored. When enforcement style at the street-level is discussed, the traditional two-dimensional understanding of enforcement style remains the main conceptualization (e.g. Carter, 2017; Yee, Tang and Lo, 2014; Zhan, Lo and Tang, 2013). One notable exception is the work of Lo et al. (2009) who do build on the idea of a multi-dimensional enforcement style and, thus, make an important contribution to the understanding of street-level enforcement style. Lo et al. (2009) conceptualize that enforcement style is constructed of five underlying dimensions.

The first two dimensions of Lo et al.'s (2009) multi-dimensional concept include May and Winter's (1999) identified formalism and coercion. First, formalism stresses the attention paid to the rigidness of the law during interactions by being reserved and legal-oriented (Lo et al., 2009; May and Winter, 1999; 2000; May and Wood, 2003). Examples of the formal dimension would be putting an emphasis on a firm implementation of rules and regulations and not considering mitigating circumstances of inspectees (Lo et al., 2009). Second, coercion focuses on the force of the law and, thus, the willingness of street-level bureaucrats to issue and signal threats (Lo et al., 2009; May and Winter, 1999; 2000). Street-level bureaucrats focusing on coming across as an authority, keeping inspectees on their toes and making threats adhere to the coercive dimension of enforcement style.

Third, educational highlights the communicative aspect of the law (Lo et al., 2009). Street-level bureaucrats encounter numerous inspectees who did not intend to break laws, but merely do not understand them because they are too complex and exhaustive (e.g. Nielsen, 2015). Focusing on informing and educating inspectees during interactions are examples fitting the educational enforcement style dimension. Fourth, prioritization entails pragmatic enforcement. Street-level bureaucrats applying this dimension are focused on prioritizing contextual circumstances on the one hand, like the inspectees' cooperation, while on the other hand also focusing on being effective at the same time (Lo et al., 2009). Prioritizing during inspectee encounters is, thus, concerned with placing more emphasis on contextual circumstances and being effective than on other elements – like informing inspectees (see Tummers et al., 2015). Finally, accommodation emphasizes 'the reconciliation of the demands of key stakeholders in regulatory enforcement' (Lo et al., 2009, p. 2710). Street-level bureaucrats, thus, consider the opinions of other stakeholders like colleagues or supervisors (Lo et al., 2009; Maynard-Moody and Musheno, 2000). Notably, this dimension slightly differs from the other four. Street-level bureaucrats cannot emphasize the opinions of others during inspectee encounters but, merely, keep them in the back of their mind.

The five dimensions of enforcement style are summarized in table 2.1. This table provides a definition for each dimension to clarify the conceptual differences between each dimension. Also, an example of an attitude fitting each dimension is given. It is important to note that at the street-level, street-level bureaucrats can employ one or combinations of the enforcement style dimensions depending on the inspectee they are interacting with. None of the enforcement dimensions are likely to be present solely in their pure form. Instead, street-level bureaucrats will combine different degrees of multiple dimensions of enforcement styles during interactions with inspectees which, ultimately, results in their street-level enforcement style (Lo et al., 2009; Mascini and Van Wijk, 2009; May and Winter, 2000; May and Wood, 2003).

Table 2.1. Five dimensions of street-level bureaucrats' enforcement style

Concept	**Dimension**	**Dimension definition†**	**Example†**
Enforcement style	Formalism	The emphasis a street-level bureaucrat puts on rigid legal requirements during interactions with inspectees	An inspector emphasizing strict requirements that must be met by the inspectee
	Coercion	The emphasis a street-level bureaucrat puts on issuing threats during inspectee interactions	An inspector threatening the inspectee with issuing a sanction
	Educational	The emphasis a street-level bureaucrat puts on educating a client during inspectee interactions	An inspector explaining rules and regulations to the inspectee
	Prioritization	The emphasis a street-level bureaucrat puts on being effective considering contextual constrains during inspectee interactions	An inspector not considering the mitigating circumstances of the inspectee
	Accommodation	The extent to which a street-level bureaucrat takes opinions of other stakeholders into account during inspectee interactions	An inspector taking opinions of colleagues in his/her team into account when interacting with the inspectee

† Note: Definitions and examples are inspired by and adapted from Lo et al. (2009) and May & Winter (1999; 2000)

Measuring enforcement style

Lo et al. (2009) took the first important steps to further advance the dimensions that underlie street-level enforcement style. There are, however, limitations. First and foremost, Lo et al. (2009) test their enforcement style dimensions in an Asian context, specifically China. Understanding non-Western contexts is, indeed, lacking from the regulatory enforcement literature and, thus, very important (Van Rooij et al., 2013). However, encounters between inspectors and those they regulate is context-depended (Mascini, 2013). In this line of reasoning, there are differences between the Chinese regulatory context and other contexts, such as the West (Van Rooij et al., 2013; Zhan, Lo and Tang, 2013; Zhang, 2016). Due to these cultural differences, it could very well be that the street-level enforcement style dimensions also differ in a Western context. The Western context, specifically the Dutch context, is central in this article. Second, Lo et al. (2009) create their scales ad hoc and do not follow measurement development steps (DeVellis, 2016; Van Engen, 2017a). For example, no cognitive interviews are conducted to ensure that the dimensions and their operationalization resonate with inspectors. Likewise, no exploratory and confirmatory steps are taken to gain a deeper understanding of the way the five dimensions are made up.

2.3 Method

Case

The Netherlands Food and Consumer Product Safety Authority (NVWA) was selected as a case for this research. The NVWA is one of the largest Dutch inspectorates with the core responsibility of overseeing food- and product safety to ensure that public health and animal welfare are up to standard. This case was selected because the NVWA has been under a lot of pressure over the past decade due to several media outrages. Reforming the way the NVWA and its inspectors enforce has often been suggested as a way to combat such large-scale debacles as well as the risks for the public (Weel ,2017; Posthumus, 2015).

Data

An online survey was distributed among inspectors in October and November 2016 at the NVWA. Respondents were guaranteed full anonymity and confidentiality. Only inspectors from the divisions Veterinary and Import, Agriculture and Nature and Consumer and Safety (n = 1201) were included, because face-to-face inspection visits are not central to other divisions. A total response rate of 56.5 percent was achieved (n = 679). A total of 172 respondents were excluded from analysis because they filled in less than 50 percent of the questionnaire. The total sample, thus, consists of 507 respondents.

This sample includes 71.9 percent males, 27.4 percent females and 0.4 percent others. Ages ranges between 23 and 73 (M = 47.99, SD = 12.85). All three divisions are represented (33.3 percent Consumer & Safety, 34.7 percent Veterinary & Import, 32 percent Agriculture & Nature). Work experience varies between 1 and 43 years (M = 16.27, SD = 11.22). The sample was representative (see table 2.2). The respondents in the sample only had slightly lower years of work experience than the total population (M = 21.3), which should be considered when interpreting the findings.

Table 2.2. Sample and population characteristics

	Sample (n=507)	Population (n=1201)
Age (M)	48.99	49.0
Years' work experience (M)	16.27	21.30
Female (%)	27.40	28.73
Male (%)	71.90	71.27
Other gender (%)	0.40	-

Note: No data is available on other genders for the total populations

Measurement scale: Preparation and analysis

A two-phase approach was used to develop and validate the measurement scale for street-level enforcement style (DeVellis, 2016). The two phases consist of preparation and analysis (Van Engen, 2017a).

For the preparation, DeVellis (2016) measurement development guidelines were followed. First, a preliminary item pool was generated by adapting items created by Lo et al. (2009) but also adding to it by building on other scholars who have quantitatively measured street-level enforcement style (Mascini and Van Wijk, 2009; May and Winter, 1999; 2000). This resulted in 5 items for each dimension (25 in total). This item pool is larger than the expected final scale, which is common practice, since it allows the researcher to identify the most optimal combination of items (DeVellis, 2016; Van Engen, 2017b). All items were measured on a 10-point scale ranging from completely disagree (1) till completely agree (10). Second, the item pool was reviewed by experts (n = 11) to evaluate face validity. Interviewed experts included 5 senior staffers composed of middle and upper management and 6 inspectors. After revising the items several times, the experts recognized that the 25-item scale measured the different dimensions of enforcement style and were formulated appropriately for the enforcement context.

For analysis, the statistical program R and packages 'lavaan' (Rosseel, 2012), 'psych' (Revelle, 2014), 'semTools' (Pornprasertmanit et al., 2013) were used to conduct factor analysis and establish internal consistency reliability as well as construct validity (DeVellis, 2016; Van Engen, 2017a). The data slightly diverges from multivariate normality. This does not pose a problem for parameter estimates if it is accounted for (Field, 2013). Consequently, the Satorra-Bentler correction for the maximum likelihood estimation was used to calculate the parameters (Satorra and Bentler, 1994). Following Osborne and Fitzpatrick (2012), internal replication was used to ensure the findings are robust and, therefore, the sample was randomly split in half (1n = 253; 2n = 254). The first half was used for exploratory factor analysis (EFA) and the second half for confirmatory factor analysis (CFA). Reliability was tested by examining model fit statistics and McDonald's omega. Finally, construct validity was assessed by testing the internal, convergent – and discriminant validity by relating enforcement style to theoretically related and unrelated measured constructs.

2.4 Results

Exploratory factor analysis (EFA)

The first half of the data (n = 253) was used to conduct the exploratory factor analysis. Oblique rotation was used since factors were expected to correlate (Field, 2013). A total of twelve items were excluded. This is in line with the general rule of thumb that the tested preliminary item pool is at least twice the size of the final scale (Van Engen, 2017b). First, three items were omitted. These items were reverse coded, but the factors they loaded on could not be explained theoretically. It is, therefore, likely that respondents failed to attend to the positive-negative wording due to the limited number of reverse coded items. To limit method bias, the three items were omitted (DeVellis, 2016; Podsakoff et al., 2003). Second, eight additional items were omitted because they had factor loadings below .4 or cross-loadings above .3 (Field, 2013).

Based on the scree plot and theoretical interpretations of factors, the EFA results in a three-factor model instead of the expected five-factor model. Table 2.3 shows the full wording of each item using a template. Underlined words are generic words that can be adjusted and replaced as necessary to fit the context of other studies (see Van Engen et al., 2016). The three factors are (1) legal; (2) facilitation and (3) accommodation. Each factor is a separate dimension that street-level behavior can vary on. An inspector's enforcement style is, then, made up of the way s/he varies along the three dimensions. Notably, rather than being individual dimensions, both formalism and coercion (factor 1) as well as prioritization and educational (factor 2) collapse and make up one latent construct each.

First, while May and Winter (1999; 2000) separate formalism and coercion this study shows they are interconnected. The first factor is composed of three formalism items and two coercion items and labelled the legal dimension. The legal dimension is revealed to be defined by the extent to which attention is paid to an inspector to the rigidness and force of the law. Second, the prioritization and education enforcement dimension also make up one factor as opposed to the expected two (Lo et al., 2009). The second factor is composed of three educational items and one prioritization item. This factor is labelled the facilitation dimension because it is composed of both the helping aspect highlighted in the educational dimension and forgiving which is part of prioritization. Finally, the accommodation dimension formed – as expected – one of the factors.

Table 2.3. EFA with oblique rotated factor loadings

Item		F1	F2	F3
Legal dimension (ω = .80) *During client encounters, I focus on:*				
1	Implementing policy X by following the letter of the law	0.67		
2	That I enforce in an unambiguous way	0.78		
3	That I make strict agreements with clients	0.69		
4	That I execute the client encounter as completely as possible	0.73		
5	That I uphold high standards regarding clients' compliance with rules and regulations	0.80		
Facilitation dimension (ω = .85) *During client-encounters, I focus on:*				
1	Transferring my professional knowledge to clients		0.76	
2	Giving indications how to improve compliance to clients		0.79	
3	Being as helpful as possible to clients		0.90	
4	The circumstances of clients that I encounter		0.63	
Accommodation dimension (ω = .83) *During client encounters, I consider:*				
1	The opinions about government task A of colleagues from my team			0.80
2	The opinions about government task A of other teams			0.91
3	The opinions about government task A of other clients			0.65
4	The opinions about government task A of my team leader			0.62

Note: In this study, the general underlined term clients is replaced by inspectee, government task A is replaced by inspecting, policy X by intervention policy and client encounter by inspection(s).

Confirmatory factor analysis (CFA)

The second half of the data-set (n = 254) was used to perform the CFA. The fit of the model was assessed using the comparative fit index (CFI), the Tucker-Lewis index (TLI), the root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA) and the standardized root mean square residual (SRMR). Cut-off criteria are between ≥ .95 (good fit) and ≥ .90 (moderate fit) for CFI and TLI, between ≤ .06 (good fit) and ≤ .08 (moderate fit) for RMSEA and, finally, ≤ .08 (good fit) for SRMR (Hu & Bentler, 1999). The model ($\chi 2$ = 99.191, df = 62). The model fit was good with CFI = .929, TLI = .911, RSMEA = .052, PCLOSE = .385 and SRMR = .066.

Descriptive statistics

Table 2.4 shows the descriptive statistics. It is noteworthy that inspectors' street-level enforcement style is, in general, mostly legal in nature (M = 8.01) followed by facilitation (M = 7. 36). Inspectors also have a considerable accommodation enforcement style (M = 6.08) although the mean is considerably lower than for the other two dimensions.

Table 2.4. Descriptive statistics of dimensions of enforcement style

Enforcement style dimension	Min	Max	M	SD
Legal	1	10	8.01	1.03
Facilitation	1	10	7.36	1.32
Accommodation	1	10	6.08	1.94

Internal consistency reliability tests

The internal consistency reliability of a measurement scale concerns the homogeneity of items (DeVellis, 2016). The internal consistency reliability was tested using the model fit indices mentioned above and McDonald's omega. First and foremost, as mentioned earlier all fit indices pass the recommended thresholds indicating good internal consistency reliability. Second, the EFA resulted in a three-factor model. The proposed measure was assessed for reliability using McDonald's omega which is more sensible and less prone to over- and underestimation than the highly-critiqued Cronbach's alpha (Dunn et al., 2014; Sijtsma, 2009). Reliability for all three factors were above the .7 threshold ($\omega = .80$ (factor 1), $\omega = .85$ (factor 2) and $\omega = .83$ (factor 3) indicating good reliability (see table 2.3).

Construct validity tests

Construct validity addresses the extent to which the underlying latent construct – here street-level enforcement style – "behaves the way the construct it purports to measure should behave" (DeVellis, 2016, p. 95). The internal construct validity is assessed first, followed by convergent and discriminant validity (DeVellis, 2016).

Internal construct validity

The three factors all measure a different dimension of the latent construct of enforcement style. It is therefore expected that they correlate. Table 2.5 shows that the legal, facilitation and accommodation dimension all positively correlate and are, thus, related but distinguishable. Correlations are strongest between facilitation and accommodation ($r = 0.30$) and weakest between legal and accommodation ($r = 0.16$). That all dimensions positively correlate is in line with theories on street-level enforcement style which indicate that none of these styles are going to be solely present. Inspectors will combine the different dimensions during inspectee encounters and vary concerning the extent to which each dimension is internalized. These different combinations of variations make up an individuals' street-

Table 2.5. Internal construct validity

		1	2	3
1	Legal	1		
2	Facilitation	0.24***	1	
3	Accommodation	0.16**	0.30***	1

*** $p < .001$; ** $p < .05$

level enforcement style (Lo et al., 2009; Mascini and Van Wijk, 2009; May and Winter, 2000; May and Wood, 2003).

Convergent construct validity

Convergent validity assesses the extent to which predicted related constructs are indeed related (DeVellis, 2016). The three dimensions of street-level enforcement style were theorized to be related to three constructs (perceived trust in inspectees' compliance, years of work experience and rule obedience). Trust is perception-based, because perceptions of inspectors inform their regulatory practices and, thus, their enforcement styles (Pautz and Rinfret, 2011). Different relations are expected for each of the three dimensions and the related constructs, because inspectors will employ different combinations of the underlying dimensions of street-level enforcement styles during interactions with inspectees. Each dimension, thus, has a distinct nature (Lo et al., 2009; Mascini and Van Wijk, 2009; May and Winter, 2000; May and Wood, 2003). See appendix I for an overview of all measures and response categories.

Perceived trust in inspectees' performance

The character of the relationship between inspectees and inspectors influences street-level enforcement style (Nielsen, 2007; Pautz and Wamsley, 2012). Contrary to the New Public Management (NPM) model, which is built around a lack of trust between principals and agents (Bouckaert, 2012), there is a trusting relation between inspectees and inspectors (Pautz and Wamsley, 2012). Despite the lack of substantive empirical evidence, there seems to be consensus in the literature that more trusting inspectors favour a flexible and facilitating approach during encounters with inspectees (May and Winter, 1999;2000; Pautz and Wamsley, 2012). May and Winter (2000) emphasize that inspectors with a helpful approach 'trust regulatees and sympathize with the difficulties they face in attempting to comply with regulations' (149). A positive relationship is, therefore, expected between an inspectors' trust in a inspectees' compliance and the facilitation dimension of enforcement style (Pautz, 2010; Pautz and Rinfret, 2011; Pautz and Wamsley, 2012). The results in table 5 confirm the predicted relation (st.B = 0.155). This, indeed, suggests that the consensus of the relation between trust and a facilitative approach during face-to-face inspection visits (Pautz, 2010; Pautz and Rinfret, 2011; Pautz and Wamsley, 2012) is, indeed, supported by empirical evidence.

Years of work experience

In addition to the character of inspector-inspectee relations, it has long been acknowledged that individual characteristics of inspectors matter for the way they enforce (e.g. Hawkins, 1984; Gormley, 1998). Hawkins (1984), for instance, showed that the older the inspectors, the more flexible they were. Likewise, Kaufmann (2017) emphasize that inspectors with little work experience exhibit "a more policing, nit-picking attitude" than colleagues with more years of work experience. The newer inspectors do not have the confidence yet to determine which violations and risks can be overlooked and where they can be facilitating (Kaufmann, 2017; Hawkins, 1984). In this line of reasoning, a positive relationship is expected between years of work experience and the facilitation enforcement style dimension. Table 5 confirms that older inspectors are more comfortable with providing advice and sympathizing with the circumstances of inspectees (facilitation dimension) than their younger colleagues (st.B = 0.202).

Rule obedience

Next to demographic characteristics like years or work experience, personality characteristics matter for street-level enforcement style. It is expected that inspectors who are very rule obedient will apply the legal and accommodation dimension more extensively. First, rule obedience is a personality characteristic and inspectors possessing this will be more comfortable with being strict and formal (see van Kleef et al., 2015). It is, therefore, hypothesized that there is a positive relationship between the legal dimension and an inspectors' rule obedience. Second, reliable judgments are central to the legitimacy of regulators (Tuijn et al., 2012). Rule obedient inspectors are hypothesized to be more accommodative because they turn to other stakeholders, like their team leaders and colleagues, for support on how to make judgments and, in turn, enforce (see Maynard-Moody and Musheno, 2000). Table 5 shows that both expectations are confirmed (st.B = 0.308 and st.B = 0.134, respectively).

Discriminant validity

Discriminant validity assesses whether expected unrelated constructs are, indeed, unrelated (DeVellis, 2016). Two unrelated constructs are traditional media usage (measured in hours) and social desirability (measured by 1 item and a 10-point scale ranging from completely disagree till completely agree). Table 2.6 shows that both constructs are, indeed, not correlated with all three dimensions of street-level enforcement style.

Table 2.6. Convergent and discriminant validity

		Street-level enforcement style dimensions		
		1	**2**	**3**
		Legal	Facilitation	Accommodation
Convergent validity				
Trust in inspectees' compliance	0.035	0.155*	-0.039	1
Rule obedience	0.308***	0.031	0.134*	
Years' work experience	-0.053	0.202**	-0.077	
Discriminant validity				
Traditional media usage	0.027	-0.083	0.044	
Social desirability	-0.013	-0.073	0.084	

The standardized coefficients from the Structural Equation Model (SEM) are reported
*** p < .00; ** p < .05; * p < .01

2.5 Conclusion and discussion

Understanding street-level enforcement is important for understanding policy implementation (May and Wood, 2003). This study has both a theoretical and methodological point of departure. Theoretically, there is an unsolved conceptual puzzle concerning the nature and number of dimensions underlying street-level enforcement style. Methodologically, there is a lack of a validated and psychometrically sound measurement scale which complicates cross-sector and cross-national comparisons. This study investigates and operationalizes street-level enforcement style by building on the classic work of May and Winter (1999; 2000) and the more recent work of Lo et al. (2009). By revealing three dimensions underlying street-level enforcement style (legal, facilitation, accommodation), this study contributes to a deeper understanding of street-level enforcement behavior generally and takes the first step towards understanding individual variations specifically.

Theoretically, this study contributes knowledge on how we can understand street-level behavior, and specifically enforcement style by addressing its underlying dimensions (May & Winter, 2011). This study, thus, conceptually contributes to the concept of enforcement style. While May and Winter (1999;2000) and May and Wood (2003) argue for a two-dimensional conceptualization, Lo et al. (2009) advocates a five-dimensional underpinning of enforcement style. The findings of the measurement development and validation analysis in this study adds to this dimensionality discussion and shows that – in a Western context – street-level enforcement style is composed of three dimensions. First, the legal dimension is constructed of both the rigidness (formalism) and force of the law (coercion) (Kagan, 1994; Lo et al., 2009; May and Winter, 1999; 2000; May and Wood, 2003). This finding is in line with the original notion of a punitive and legal style and, sub-sequentially, applying rules rigidly (Kagan, 1994). Kagan (1994), ultimately, argues that formalism and coercion make up the same construct. Notably, this study shows that the legal dimension is revealed to not solely consist of variations in flexibility of applying rules (Kagan, 1994) but also of the extent of the emphasis inspectors put on being rigid and strict (Kagan, 1994; May and Wood, 2003) as well as their degree of threatening with sanctions and consequences for non-compliant behavior (Lo et al., 2009; May and Winter, 1999; 2000).

The second dimension is facilitation which encompasses the communicative function (educational) of the law while considering circumstances at hand (prioritization) (May and Wood, 2003; Lo et al., 2009). This finding is in line with previous research. According to May and Wood (2003) one of the dimensions of street-level enforcement style is facilitation which encompasses helping and forgiving inspectees. The educational enforcement dimension entails the extent of the communicative function of the law and providing information to inspectees (Lo et al., 2009). Sharing information signals a positive relationship fostering cooperation and, thus, a way of helping (e.g. Bruijn et al., 2007; Etienne, 2013; Nielsen, 2007). In addition, prioritization is a dimension composed of the extent of accounting for contextual circumstances of inspectees (Lo et al., 2009). Paying attention during inspections to the situations of inspectees can be seen as forgiving (May and Wood, 2003). In sum, though May and Wood (2003) do not explicitly study it, they state that helping and forgiving are at the heart of facilitation. The second factor revealed in this study empirically confirms this idea.

Finally, accommodation addresses the extent to which inspectors consider opinions of other stakeholders, like their team leaders when conducting inspection visits (Lo et al., 2009). First and foremost, by empirically identifying this third dimension the present study confirms that May and Winter (2011) were correct to point out that street-level enforcement style is more complex than originality thought. And consequently, indeed, best captured in more than two dimensions (Lo et al., 2009). Furthermore, the accommodation dimension is in line with Maynard-Moody and Musheno's (2000) notion that street-level workers are inherently connected to peers. Though the interactions street-level bureaucrats have with inspectees determines how they implement policies, it is the

relationship with their fellow street-level workers which shapes their attitude and support their ways of dealing with inspectees. Notably, as opposed to the legal and facilitation dimension, accommodation is more cognitive in nature. Future research could explore roles of other external stakeholders for the enforcement styles of street-level bureaucrats (e.g. de Boer et al., 2018; de Boer and Eshuis, 2018) or study variations within the enforcement style of inspectors and other cognitive behaviors (e.g. Tummers et al., 2015).

The legal, facilitation and accommodation enforcement style dimensions were also theoretically related to individual-level characteristics of the street-level bureaucrat, namely (1)) perceived trust in inspectees' performance; (2) years of work experience, and; (3) rule obedience. The convergent validity tests showed that individual antecedents of inspectors positively correlate with different dimensions of enforcement style. This could have important consequences for scholars investigating street-level enforcement style variation. This study adds to the growing body of research showing that individual level antecedents such as demographics (Hawkins, 1984; Kaufmann, 2017), trust and other relational aspects of inspector-inspectee interactions (Etienne, 2013; Pautz, 2010; Pautz and Rinfret, 2011; Pautz and Wamsley, 2012) as well as personality traits like rule obedience (see Van Kleef et al., 2015) may potentially help explain enforcement style variations. Future research investigating individual antecedents in relation to inspectee encounters can, thus, be especially fruitful for understanding street-level enforcement styles.

Methodologically, this study answers to the increasing number of articles calling for creating high quality measurement scales (e.g. Grimmelikhuijsen and Knies, 2017; Van Engen et al. 2016; 2017a; Van Loon et al., 2016). The street-level enforcement scale at hand, ultimately, enables scholars to study this concept systematically across sectors and countries and investigate the extent of its effects. In other words, future studies are urged to further explore the three enforcement style dimensions across different types of street-level bureaucrats, its antecedents and its effects at the street-level. Scholars can, for instance, investigate the effects of street-level enforcement style of other street-level bureaucrats on ways of implementing public policies (see Mascini and Van Wijk, 2009) and their interactions with inspectees (see de Boer et al., 2018; de Boer and Eshuis, 2018; Etienne, 2013; Pautz and Wamsley, 2012).

Despite the theoretical and methodological contributions, this study has limitations. First and foremost, the data collected here is cross-sectional making the establishment of causal inferences impossible. Making causal inferences is not the goal of this study and more research is needed to fully grasp the causal implications of the correlations found in the convergent and discriminant tests of this study. Second, street-level enforcement style is situational and, thus, differs across individual inspectee encounters, sectors and countries. Notably, a Western population was used in this sample. Lo et al. (2009) street-level enforcement style study was tested in an Asian context since they surveyed Chinese inspectors. The Chinese regulatory context is seen as more authoritarian than the Western context (Van Rooij et al., 2013; Zhan et al., 2013; Zhang, 2016). The role of Chinese inspectors and their behavior during interactions with inspectees may, thus, differ from inspectors operating in a Western context but there could also be similarities. Future research should study cross-national similarities and differences concerning the three dimensions underpinning street-level enforcement style or compare across sectors within one country or individual encounters as well as its implications for implementation of enforcement policies.

Finally, this measurement scale is validated using a specific kind of street-level bureaucrat, namely the inspector. Regardless, many other street-level bureaucrats implement enforcement policies, like police officers (e.g. Engel and Worden, 2003). In addition, a large portion of street-level bureaucrats may arguably deal with less rules (Maynard-Moody and Musheno, 2000) but may still have to enforce public policies such as parole officers. More research is needed to understand the way other type of

street-level bureaucrats enforce at the street-level and how they combine the three dimensions during different encounters with inspectees. In this way, a more thorough understanding can be established of similarities and differences in street-level enforcement styles.

All in all, street-level enforcement style is more complex than is commonly proposed (May and Winter, 1999; 2000; May and Winter, 2011). Studies aiming to investigate street-level enforcement style can benefit from taking its three-dimensional nature into account and advancing it. Using the developed and validated 13-item measure will allow for cross-sector and cross-national comparisons which, ultimately, ensures a better understanding of how street-level enforcement style is made up and how it can be measured systematically.

Notes

[1] Formalism is conceptualized in the social sciences in different ways. In the political sciences, it is frequently referred to as the gap between what is said formally and what is actually executed in practice (e.g. Farazmand, 2012; Riggs, 1994). In this article, the conceptualization of formalism used by scholars specifically investigating street-level enforcement style is used.

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Chapter 3

Does transparency by public organizations influence street-level bureaucrats' enforcement style?

Abstract

Governments use different regulatory instruments to ensure businesses owners or 'inspectees' comply with rules and regulations. One increasingly applied tool is disclosing information about the compliance performance of inspectees to other stakeholders. Disclosing performance information has consequences for inspectors since it increases the visibility of their day-to-day work. Using a large survey (n = 679) among Dutch inspectors of the Netherlands Food and Consumer Product Safety Authority, this study shows that the disclosure of performance information impacts enforcement style at the street-level. The study finds that perceived disclosed performance information positively enhances all three dimensions of inspectors' enforcement style (legal, facilitation and accommodation). This effect is strongest for facilitation and accommodation and least strong for the legal style. Perceived resistance partly explains this effect. Opposed to our expectations, we find that more perceived disclosure does not result in more but in less perceived resistance of inspectees by inspectors.

3.1 Introduction

Inspectors are classic street-level bureaucrats with considerable autonomy and discretion to make judgements about the applicability of sanctions during interactions with clients (Lipsky, 2010) such as business owners. They are, however, not the only ones responsible for ensuring businesses or 'inspectees 'adhere to rules and regulations. Inspectors function in a network of stakeholders (Klijn & Koppenjan, 2016; Meijer, 2013) including, for instance, consumers, public service organizations, business organizations and the media. This context has triggered regulators to use that network to stimulate compliance of private- and public inspectees, such as schools and hospitals. Making compliance performances of inspectees available to the public is an instrument that helps activate stakeholders operating in that network. This disclosure of performance information allows stakeholders to hold inspectees accountable (Bovens, 2007). For example, parents can question schools when they underperform, or consumers can hold firms responsible for poor quality of products (Van de Walle & Bouckaert, 2003). The media may, sub-sequentially, catch up with this information, report negatively, which, in turn, damages the image of inspectees (cf. Bennett, 2012; Eshuis & Klijn, 2012).

Regulators are disclosing performance information in different ways, such as passively presenting policy information (De Fine Licht, 2014; Grimmelikhuijsen & Meijer, 2012; Grimmelikhuijsen et al., 2013; Van Erp, 2010), actively publishing sanctions (Ayres & Braithwaite, 1995; van Erp, 2011) or constructing 'rating and rankings' (Hood et al., 2008; Van de Walle & Roberts, 2008). Different ways of disclosing performance information by governments vary in, for instance, their degree of completeness, color and usability (Douglas and Meijer, 2016). They, however, all share the intention of stimulating compliance of inspectees (Meijer, 2013; Meijer & Homburg, 2009; Van de Walle & Roberts, 2008) by activating other stakeholders in the network to act on that information (e.g. Meijer, 2103). For instance, consumers may stop eating at a local lunchroom if it is disclosed that it does not comply with hygiene rules and regulations. Therefore, this paper focuses on disclosed information about compliance performance of inspectees provided by government agencies for other stakeholders.

Research on disclosing performance information at the street-level is scarce and its impact remains unclear (e.g. Etienne, 2014). Scholars usually address other actors, such as public managers (e.g. Moynihan & Pandey, 2010), businesses (e.g. Meijer & Homburg, 2009) or citizens (e.g. James, 2011; Van de Walle & Roberts, 2008). The implications for inspectors are, thus, largely missing in this debate. The aim of this study is, therefore, to understand the impact of disclosure of performance information on street-level behavior, specifically from the viewpoint of inspectors. This study proposes that investigating disclosed performance information may facilitate clarifications because this instrument might have important implications for inspectors' day-to-day encounters with inspectees and, in turn their enforcement style (Mascini & Van Wijk, 2009; May & Wood, 2003).

First and foremost, the work of inspectors is becoming more visible to the public which makes it more accountable. The way inspectors enforce can be scrutinized by the public which, in turn, may impact the way inspectors enforce (Schillemans, 2008; Winter, 2003). Second, inspectees' (non-) compliance will be part of the public sphere which may influence the way they behave towards inspectors during regulatory encounters (Levi-Flaur, 2011; Murphy, 2004). Especially for inspectees not complying, risks and uncertainties are increased which may trigger more resistance at the street. Inspectors may, sub-sequentially, enforce in a more legal manner (cf. Etienne, 2014). In sum, disclosing performance information potentially increases the visibility of inspectors and triggers inspectees during regulatory interactions. Therefore, the central research question being addressed is to what extent does the perceived disclosure of performance information impact inspectors' enforcement style during regulatory encounters? This research contributes theoretically as it investigates why inspectors enforce the way they do by showing the direct impact of perceived disclosure of performance

information (cf. Ayres & Braithwaite, 1995; Meijer & Homburg, 2009; van Erp, 2011; Van de Walle & Roberts, 2008) and indirect impact of perceived resistance by inspectees at the frontlines (cf. Etienne, 2013; 2014; Van Erp, 2009).

This paper is structured as follows: The theoretical foundations will be discussed first, including conceptualizations of disclosing performance information, enforcement style and potentially influential factors like perceived resistance. Then, the methodological considerations will be presented followed by the findings based on a survey (n = 507) among Dutch inspectors of the Netherlands Food and Consumer Product Safety Authority. Finally, a conclusion and discussion on the implications for understanding enforcement at the frontlines and policy implementation are provided.

3.2 Conceptual framework and expectations

Enforcement style

According to May & Wood (2003), “enforcement style is a concept that is easily understood in the abstract but hard to pin down in the specifics” (p. 119). It has been described as ‘regulatory style’ (Gormley, 1998; Kagan, 1994), styles of enforcement which vary (Hutter, 1989) or it is intertwined with the concept of enforcement strategies (May & Wood, 2003). The general notion of these different labels of enforcement style addresses inspectors’ ways of enforcing at the frontline as well as their ways of interacting with their inspectees (May & Winter, 1999; 2000; May & Wood, 2003). Enforcement style is defined as “the character of the day-to-day interactions of inspectors when dealing with representatives of regulated entities” (May & Wood, 2003, p. 119).

Enforcement style can be understood as a single or a multi-dimensional concept (Kagan, 1994; May & Winter, 1999; 2000). Traditionally, it was studied along a single dimension. Kagan (1994), for instance, used the rigidness of applying rules to study enforcement style. More recently, however, scholars have empirically shown that enforcement style is multi-dimensional (e.g. de Boer, 2019; Lo et al., 2009; May & Winter, 1999; 2000). May and Winter (1999; 2000) illustrate that an inspectors’ typical enforcement style is better understood as being two-dimensional, consisting of formalism and coercion. The formal dimension refers to inspectors’ degrees of formality and flexibility while coercion addresses levels of trust and willingness of inspectors to use threats. These two dimensions can be applied in different degrees at the same time but can also be applied separately. This suggests that enforcement style is multifaceted and more nuanced than originally thought. Therefore, exploring more enforcement style dimensions can facilitate a deeper level of understanding (Winter & May, 2011).

Lo et al. (2009) make an important contribution and bring forward that enforcement style is composed of five dimensions. First, formalism which is “adherence to rather rigid legal requirements” (Lo et al., 2009, p. 2709). A formalistic style entails enforcing clear penalties, setting strict deadlines and not considering mitigating circumstances of inspectees. Second, coercion highlights “the force of law” (Lo et al., 2009, p. 2709). In practice, more coercive inspectors are very willing to implement – or threaten with sanctions. Third, educational stresses “the communicative function of the law” (Lo et al., 2009, p. 2709). Here, educating inspectees and the public who can, in turn, put pressure on more responsible behavior is central. Fourth, prioritization is defined as “pragmatic enforcement that tries to get the most effective result within the given contextual constraints and while considering the circumstances

at hand" (Lo et al., 2009, p. 2709). A prioritizing enforcement style entails, for instance, prioritizing violations in determining the consequences. Finally, accommodation refers to "the reconciliation of the demands of key stake holders in regulatory enforcement" (Lo et al., 2009, p. 2710). In other words, inspectors' keep opinions of others – like their supervisors – in the back of their mind during regulatory encounters with inspectees.

Lo et al. (2009) are the first to show that enforcement style is, indeed, composed of more than two dimensions. There are, however, some limitations to their study. First, their instrument is tested among Chinese inspectors and it is unsure whether their scales are valid beyond that research context (de Boer, 2019). Second, their scales are created ad hoc and not validated using, for instance, steps like exploratory- and confirmatory factor analyses or by interviewing experts (deVellis, 2016). Building on Lo et al. (2009), de Boer (2019) has furthered the conceptualization and measurement of enforcement style by re-developing and validating a measurement scale. This work brings together the classic conceptualization of the two-dimensional enforcement style (May & Winter, 1999; 2000) and the five-dimensional enforcement style (Lo et al., 2009).

De Boer (2019) finds that enforcement style is composed of three dimensions, namely (1) legal which combines both rigid and coercive applications of the law, (2) facilitation incorporating both the communicative application of the law as well as accounting for situational characteristics of inspectees and, finally, (3) accommodation which entails taking opinions of others into account. In this study, we use de Boer's (2019) scales because they have been validated using measurement development and validation steps (DeVellis, 2016).

Disclosure of performance information

There is a trend towards making more information available to the public about the ways the governments and its clients are performing (Van Dooren & Van de Walle, 2008; Van Erp, 2009; 2010). Though the extent of the disclosure of this information varies across governments, it makes both the work of agencies and individual inspectors more visible to the public (e.g. Etienne, 2014; Gilad et al., 2013; Meijer, 2013; Moar & Sulitzeanu-Kenan, 2013; Winter, 2003). Performance information is defined as "systematic information describing the outputs and outcomes of public programmes and other organizations – whether intended or otherwise – generated by systems and processes intended to produce such information" (Pollitt, 2006, p. 39). In this study, disclosing performance information specifically disclosed information about compliance performance of inspectees provided by government agencies for other stakeholders.

The degree of disclosure of performance information can vary along three dimensions, namely (1) completeness, (2) coloring and (3) usability (Douglas & Meijer, 2016; Grimmelikhuijsen, 2012). First, completeness of the information can range from "basic, brief information without any details or consist of elaborate information in the form of both quantitative and qualitative data" (Douglas & Meijer, 2016, p. 3). Second, coloring of the information refers to how "information about the organization can never be presented in a fully neutral manner" (Douglas & Meijer, 2016, p. 3) and consist of a certain frame. Finally, usability of the information entails that "information can be made available in an accessible format, which is easily understandable for a layperson, or be presented in such a way that only committed experts can understand it" (Douglas & Meijer, 2016, p. 3). Governments vary in the extent to which the performance information they disclose meets these criteria and, thus, how visible their work as well as that of their inspectors are.

Notably, the implications of disclosing performance information are two-folded. One the one hand, regulators disclose information about the compliance performance of their inspectees. On the

other hand, the task of regulators is to ensure compliance of inspectees with rules and regulations (Baldwin et al., 1998; Sparrow, 2000). When regulators disclose the compliance performance of their inspectees, their own performance becomes available for monitoring. The less inspectees violate rules and regulations, the more the regulator is seen as performing well.

Hypothesized impact of disclosing performance information on enforcement style

Scholars have started to investigate whether this increasing visibility of inspectors' work may help grasp variations in enforcement (e.g. Etienne, 2014; Winter, 2013). Inspectors are classic street-level bureaucrats with substantive discretion and autonomy to make judgments during interactions with inspectees (Lipsky, 2010; Raaphorst, 2018). The increased visibility of regulators caused by disclosing performance information and the associated reaction of inspectees during regulatory encounters contributes to the uncertainties inspectors face and, in turn, influences their enforcement style. The disclosure of performance information may directly and indirectly have an impact on inspectors' enforcement style.

A direct relation is hypothesized because disclosing performance information may increase uncertainties inspectors' experience. During regulatory encounters inspectors face uncertainties because they must apply their professional knowledge to complex inspection situations using limited information. Inspectors must interpret the situation at hand, find out what is happening and determine the appropriate outcome of the face-to-face interaction (Mascini & Van Wijk, 2009; Maynard-Moody & Musheno, 2003; Raaphorst, 2018). Publishing performance information makes performances of inspectees part of the public sphere (van Erp, 2009; 2010). Stakeholders can scrutinize not just these inspectees, but also the regulators responsible for ensuring compliance (Carpenter, 2014; Gilad, 2012). The stakeholders are, thus, empowered to make judgments about the performance of regulators and their inspectors based on the disclosed information (cf. Carpenter, 2014; Meijer, 20143; Klijn & Koppenjan, 2016) which increases the uncertainties inspectors face.

It is, therefore, expected that inspectors perceiving the disclosure of performance information to be substantive, will become more legal, less facilitative and more accommodative. First, inspectors are expected to become more legal and, thus, rigidly apply rules and regulations because sticking to procedures they know can be used to reduce the uncertainty. Procedures prescribe fixed elements for their ways of working, thus reducing uncertainty (Maynard-Moody & Musheno, 2012; Raaphorst, 2018). In addition, it provides legitimacy and approval within their organization. Second, inspectors are hypothesized to have a low facilitation style and, thus, not substantively provide information on how compliance can be improved and consider circumstances of inspectees. By sticking to standards and facts, inspectors minimize the uncertainty that unambiguous enforcement behavior is made visible or inspectees are empowered to make judgments about their performance (cf. Carpenter, 2014; Gilad, 2012). Finally, inspectors are expected to become more accommodative because if they perceive that other stakeholders, like their team leaders and colleagues, think similarly about the way they enforce, uncertainty is reduced. In this way, they have 'a backing' (Hupe & Hill, 2007). The hypotheses thus read as follows:

H1a: Inspectors with a high score on perceived disclosure of performance information will have a high score on a legal enforcement style.

H1b: Inspectors with a high score on perceived disclosure of performance information will have a low score on a facilitation enforcement style.

H1b: Inspectors with a high score on perceived disclosure of performance information will have a high score on an accommodation enforcement style.

To gain a deeper understanding of the relationship between disclosure of performance information and enforcement style, it is important to look at indirect effects. Street-level work is inherently relational in nature and characterized by face-to-face encounters (Lipsky, 2010). Therefore, the relation between inspector and inspectee is considered and, more specifically, the resistance inspectors perceive during regulatory encounters.

First, as mentioned earlier, disclosing performance information is intended to stimulate compliance of inspectees (Meijer & Homburg, 2009; Van de Walle & Roberts, 2008). Disclosing non-compliant behavior embarrasses inspectees by harming their reputation which, in turn, incentivizes compliance (Etienne, 2014; Van Erp, 2009; 2010; Schillemans, 2008). This risk of reputation damage may increase resistance against inspectors during face-to-face encounters (e.g. Etienne, 2014). On top of that, laws about the disclosure and its consequences for the inspectee can simply be too complex and exhaustive (cf. Nielsen, 2015). This may also lead inspectees to resist more during regulatory encounters in the way of asking for clarifications or negotiating (cf. Etienne, 2014). Perceived resistance is understood as “doubt about the intentions of the [inspector] to behave cooperatively and benignly towards those [she or he] dominates” (Murphy, 2004, p. 194). It is thus expected, that inspectors with a high score on perceived disclosure of performance information will have a high score on perceived resistance.

H2: Inspectors with a high score on perceived disclosed performance information will have a high score on perceived resistance.

Second, resistance at the street-level may harm the social interaction between the inspector and inspectee. Inspectors operate in a context of sanctioning and limiting citizens’ or organizations’ freedom, to ensure compliance (Baldwin et al., 1998). Inspectors thus “deliver obligations rather than services” (Sparrow, 2000, p. 2). Delivering obligations goes hand in hand with negotiations during regulatory encounters which, in turn, increases uncertainties for inspectors because they may have to improvise on the spot (Etienne, 2014; Raaphorst, 2018). Much like the hypothesized direct relations between perceived disclosure of performance information above (see hypothesis H1a, H1b and H1c), inspectors are expected to reduce these uncertainties and enforce accordingly. The hypotheses, thus, read as follows:

H3a: Inspectors with a high score on perceived resistance will have a high score on a legal enforcement style.

H3b: Inspectors with a high score on perceived resistance will have a low score on a facilitation enforcement style.

H3c: Inspectors with a high score on perceived resistance will have a high score on an accommodation enforcement style.

Figure 3.1. Conceptual model



3.3 Method

The conceptual model was tested at The Netherlands Food and Consumer Product Safety Authority (NVWA). The NVWA was selected because it is one of the largest regulators in the Netherlands, with the important task of overseeing companies involved in food production and product safety, to ensure public health and animal welfare. The NVWA is currently developing and implementing ways of disclosing information about inspectees' performance. The NVWA is not developing one universal way for disclosing performance information concerning all its inspection tasks (i.e. public safety, public health and animal welfare). Each division of the NVWA deals with multiple inspection topics. The NVWA is customizing the way performance information is disclosed for each inspection topic in order to ensure maximum impact on the compliance of inspectees. To illustrate, for some inspection topics the compliance performance of inspectees is made available by disclosing full inspection reports, while for other topics traffic light symbols accompanied by the most important indicators are made available via a smartphone application.

Data

The data was collected in October and November 2016 using an online survey with active cooperation of NVWA. The NVWA is made up of the board of directors, an advisory body and 5 divisions, namely Staff, Management, Veterinary & Import, Agriculture & Nature and Consumer & Safety. This study focuses solely on inspectors who conduct face-to-face inspection visits and therefore only inspectors working at Veterinary & Import, Agriculture & Nature and Consumer & Safety were included. Only in these three divisions are inspectors employed who conduct inspection visits. The sample frame consists of all NVWA inspectors (n = 1201) working at Veterinary & Import, Agriculture & Nature and Consumer & Safety.

Respondents were assured that answers would be fully anonymous and confidential. The questionnaire includes new scales which were validated through expert interviews (n = 11). The consulted experts consisted of individual inspectors (n = 6) and a senior staff committee (n = 5). Respondents were informed by e-mail about the study, reminded at two week intervals and had 6 weeks to complete the questionnaire. In total 679 inspectors completed the questionnaire resulting in a response rate of 56.5 percent. Non-response was present in multiple variables. 172 respondents filled in only 50 percent or less. These respondents were excluded from the analysis resulting in a total sample of

507 respondents.

In terms of demographics, 71.9 percent are male, 27.7 percent female and 0.4 percent other. Respondents are between 23 and 73 years old (M = 47.99, SD = 12.85) and experience as an inspector ranged from 1 till 43 years (M = 16.27, SD = 11.22). Of the respondents 33.3 percent worked in the division Consumer & Safety, 34.7 percent in Veterinary & Import, 31.7 percent in Agriculture & Nature and 0.4 percent in other. The sample is representative of the total population. Only work experience in the sample was slightly lower than that of the total population (M = 21.3) which should be considered when interpreting the results.

Measures

The key variables to be explained are enforcement style, perceived degree of disclosure of performance information and perceived resistance. A complete overview of the items of all variables can be found in appendix I.

Enforcement style. Drawing on de Boer (2019), enforcement style is measured on three dimensions, namely (1) legal; (2) facilitation and; (3) accommodation. Legal was measured using five items and facilitation and accommodation using four items on a 10-point scale ranging from never (1) till always (10). Items included were, for instance: during inspections I focus on 'making strict agreements with clients' (legal); 'clarifying rules and regulations to clients' (facilitation); 'the opinions of inspectors from my team about enforcing' (accommodation). Reliability for all three factors were above the .7 threshold (ω = .80 (legal), ω = .85 (facilitation) and ω = .83 (accommodation) indicating acceptable reliability[1].

Perceived degree of disclosure of performance information. Building on transparency scholarship, the perception of disclosure of performance information of inspectors is operationalized to consist of three criteria, namely (1) completeness, (2) coloring and (3) usability (Douglas & Meijer, 2016; Grimmelikhuijsen, 2012). For each criterion 2 items were formulated resulting in a 6-item measure. Items included were, for instance: I would typify the inspection results that the NVWA discloses as 'complete' (completeness); 'without judgment' (coloring); and, understandable for non-experts (usability). EFA showed that the third criteria (usability) entails a separate factor. Since usability is measured on only 2 items, both items are omitted. The resulting 4-item measure is reliable (ω = .89)[2].

Perceived resistance. Perceived resistance is based on Braithwaite's (2003) and Murphy's (2004) studies targeting tax payers and measuring their doubt about the intentions of the Tax Authority. Inspired by Murphy's (2004) scale, 5 items were formulated to fit the viewpoint of the inspectors and their context. All items were reverse coded and items included: 'it is possible to satisfy clients completely' and 'clients actively help during inspections'. Two items were dropped after an EFA was conducted because of low factor loadings $< .4$ or cross-loadings $> .3$ resulting in a reliable 3-item measure (ω = .71)[3].

Controls. There are also several controls included based on the correlation table, namely: rule obedience and several demographics (gender and work experience).

Common source bias

The variables in this study are inherently perceptual, making a survey the appropriate method (George & Pandey, 2017; Podsakoff et al., 2012). Potential common source bias was minimized

using design remedies (Podsakoff et al., 2012). First, the questionnaire was tested among informants which increases face validity. Second, the dependent- and independent variables were presented on separate pages of the questionnaire. Third, variables which consisted of multiple items were given a different color to increase respondent focus. Fourth, the respondents were incentivized to participate by informing them that a short report would be shared with them and the management of the NVWA. Finally, organizational support ensured that inspectors were informed through different channels and by different people (the researchers, their team leaders, management) about the importance of participating in this research (George & Pandey, 2017; Lee et al., 2012; Podsakoff & Organ, 1986; Podsakoff et al., 2012).

Post-hoc statistical remedies indicate that common source bias does not substantially impact the findings of this study. First, a confirmatory factor analysis was carried out (Podsakoff et al., 2003). All variables in the conceptual model were loaded on one factor. The fit of the model is assessed using the comparative fit index (CFI), the Tucker-Lewis index (TLI), the root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA) and the standardized root mean square residual (SRMR). Cut-off criteria are between $\geq .95$ (good fit) and $\geq .90$ (moderate fit) for CFI and TLI, between $\leq .06$ (good fit) and $\leq .08$ (moderate fit) for RMSEA with PCLOSE >.05 and, finally, $\leq .08$ (good fit) for SRMR (Hu & Bentler, 1999). The model fit ($\chi^2 = 1537.436$, $df = 171$, $p = .000$)[4] is very poor with CFI = .397, TLI = .330, RSMEA = .169, PCLOSE = .000 and SRMR = .160. Second, a common latent factor model was estimated (Podsakoff et al., 2003). All items were loaded on their theoretical constructs as well as on a first-order factor. An ANOVA testing the χ^2 differences between the common latent factor model and the conceptual model is not statistically significant (χ^2 difference = 2.1991, $df = 2$, $p = .3333$). Thus, including the common latent factor did not improve the model.

3.4 Findings

Several analyses were conducted to determine whether perceived disclosed performance information impacts inspectors' style during regulatory encounters as well as whether this is mediated by perceived resistance using the statistical program R. More specifically, the packages 'lavaan' (Rosseel, 2012), 'psych' (Revelle, 2015), 'semTools' (Pronprasertmanit et al., 2013) and 'semPlot' (Epskamp, 2013) were used. The parameters were estimated using the Satorra-Bentler correction because our data slightly violates assumptions of multivariate normality (Satorra & Bentler, 1994).

Table 3.1 shows the descriptive statistics and the correlations between the perceived disclosure of performance information, the three dimensions of enforcement style and perceived resistance. The correlations between perceived disclosure of performance information and legal (.12), facilitation (.25) and accommodation (.32) enforcement style are all statistically significant. The three enforcement styles also correlate significantly at the .001-level. Perceived resistance, the mediator in the conceptual model, correlates negatively with a facilitation style (-0.22). Perceived resistance also negatively correlates significantly with perceived disclosed performance information (-0.11) and does not correlate with a formal or accommodation style which contradicts our theoretical expectations.

None of the control variables correlate with the independent variable (perceived disclosure of performance information) and the mediator (perceived resistance)[4]. A legal style correlates significantly with rule obedience (.31), a facilitation style with work experience (.15) and an accommodation style with the gender dummy (1 = female) (-.10) as well as rule obedience (.10). All other control variables correlating significantly were included in the model.

To further investigate the relation between the variables, Structural Equation Modeling (SEM) is used, specifically a fully latent structural regression modeling (Kline, 2015). SEM is used due to the latent nature of the dependent, independent and mediator variables and the multiple regressions hypothesized. The model ($\chi^2 = 409.230$, $df = 216$, $p = .000$)[5] fit is good with CFI = .923, TLI = .911, RSMEA = .048, PCLOSE = .679 and SRMR = .057.

Table 3.1. Means, Standard Deviations and Correlations (n = 507)

		M	SD	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
1	Perceived degree of disclosed performance information	5.5	1.98	1								
2	Legal style	8.04	1.06	0.12**	1							
3	Facilitation style	7.40	1.43	0.25***	0.34***	1						
4	Accommodation style	5.80	1.83	0.32***	0.21***	0.32***	1					
5	Perceived resistance	5.68	1.63	-0.11**	-0.04	-0.22***	-0.09	1				
6	Work experience	16.37	11.18	-0.06	0.00	0.15**	0.04	0.00	1			
7	Gender (1 = Female)	0.28	0.45	-0.07	-0.04	-0.05	-0.10**	-0.01	-0.34***	1		
8	Gender (1 = Other)	0.00	0.06	-0.01	-0.01	0.01	-0.06	0.05	-0.04	-0.04	1	
9	Rule obedience	7.57	1.44	0.08	0.31***	0.07	0.10**	-0.05	-0.01	0.01	-0.03	1

Note: *** $p < .001$; ** $p < .05$

Table 3.2. Result of SEM

	Dependent variables											
	Legal style			Facilitation style			Accommodation style			Perceived resistance style		
Independent variables	z	St.SE	St.B	z	St.SE	St.B	z	St.SE	St.B	z	St.SE	St.B
Direct effects												
Perceived degree of disclosed performance information	2.331	0.037	0.156**	5.086	0.038	0.306***	5.447	0.050	0.335***	-2.343	0.028	-0.143**
Perceived resistance	-0.169	0.082	-0.012	-3.084	0.109	-0.241**	-0.097	0.117	-0.054	-	-	-
Indirect effects via perceived resistance												
Perceived degree of disclosed performance information	0.171	0.005	0.002	2.130	0.010	0.035**	0.804	0.008	0.008	-	-	-
Total effects												
Perceived degree of disclosed performance information	2.310	0.038	0.157**	5.557	0.039	0.341***	5.605	0.050	0.343***	-	-	-

Notes: *** $p < .001$; ** $p < .05$

Figure 3.2. Graphical representation result of SEM



Table 3.2 shows the results of the hypothesized direct and indirect effects. First, the direct effects are discussed. Hypothesis 1a expects that the inspectors who score high on perceived disclosure of performance information will also score high on a legal style. The standardized coefficients for the legal enforcement style are, indeed, statistically significant indicating that the greater inspectors perceive the disclosure of performance information to be, the greater their legal enforcement style (z = 2.331, st.B = .156, SE = .037, p = .020). Hypothesis 1b expected that when inspectors' perceptions of disclosed performance information increased, their facilitation enforcement style would decrease. This relationship is also statistically significant but in the opposite direction as hypothesized. This study finds that as the perception of disclosure of performance information of inspectors rises, so does their facilitation enforcement style (z = 5.086, st.B = .306, SE = .038, p = .000). This is, thus, the exact opposite of the expected relationship. Hypothesis 1c concerns the accommodation enforcement style of inspectors. It was expected, that inspectors who score high on the perceived disclosure of performance information would have a high accommodation enforcement style. The standardized coefficients are, as expected, statistically significant (z = 5.447 st.B = .335, SE = .050, p = .000). In other words, the greater inspectors perceive the disclosure of performance information to be, the greater their accommodation enforcement style. The effect of disclosure of performance information is about half as small for legal style (st.B = .156) as opposed to the effect on accommodation (St.B = .335) and facilitation (St.B = .306) style.

Our second and third set of hypotheses concerns the indirect effect of perceived disclosed performance information on enforcement style through the mediator perceived resistance. Hypothesis 2 states that a high score on perceived disclosure of performance information leads to high scores on perceived resistance of inspectees. This relationship is found to be statistically significant, but negatively instead of positively (z = -2.342, st.B = -.143, SE = .028, p = .019). When inspectors perceive the disclosure of performance information to be greater, they perceive less resistance by inspectees. The third set of hypotheses expects that high scores on perceived resistance by inspectees will lead to a more legal (H3a), less facilitation (H3b) and more accommodation (H3c) enforcement style. Only the relation between perceived resistance and a facilitation style is statistically significant (z = -3.084, st.B = -.241,

SE = .109, p = .002). In other words, when inspectors perceive the resistance by inspectees to be greater, they become less facilitating in their style.

In this line of reasoning, when investigating the total indirect effects of an inspector's perceived disclosure of performance information on all three dimensions of enforcement style through perceived resistance, one statistically significant relation is found. The relationship between the inspectors' perception of disclosed performance information and a facilitation style is mediated by their perceived resistance (z = 2.130, st.B = .035, SE = .010, p = .033). Notably, the total indirect effect is small but, nonetheless, statistically significant. When an inspector scores high on perceived disclosure of performance information, s/he perceives less resistance by inspectees, which, sub-sequentially, leads to a more facilitating enforcement style. See table 3.3 for a complete overview of confirmed and disconfirmed hypotheses.

Table 3.3. Results hypotheses

#	Hypothesized relationship	Confirmed
1a	Inspectors with a high score on perceived disclosure of performance information will have a high score on a legal enforcement style	Yes
1b	Inspectors with a high score on perceived disclosure of performance information will have a low score on a facilitation enforcement style	No (opposite effect found)
1c	Inspectors with a high score on perceived disclosure of performance information will have a high score on an accommodation enforcement style	Yes
2	Inspectors with a high score on perceived disclosed performance information will have a high score on perceived resistance	No (opposite effect found)
3a	Inspectors with a high score on perceived resistance will have a high score on a legal enforcement style	No
3b	Inspectors with a high score on perceived resistance will have a low score on a facilitation enforcement style	Yes
3c	Inspectors with a high score on perceived resistance will have a high score on an accommodation enforcement style	No

3.5 Conclusion and discussion

This study aims to contribute to the knowledge about the reasons why inspectors vary in their enforcement styles during regulatory encounters with inspectees. In terms of theory, this study proposed that researching the impact of disclosed performance information as well as the perceived resistance of inspectees help to explain enforcement style variations. On basis of the literature on street-level enforcement (e.g. Lo et al., 2009; May & Winter, 1999; 2000) and disclosing performance information (e.g. Gilad et al., 2013; Moar & Sulitzeanu-Kenan, 2013; Van Dooren & Van de Walle, 2008; Van Erp, 2009; 2010), this study theorized that making compliance performance information of inspectees part of the public sphere will add visibility and, in turn, uncertainty for inspectors and thus stimulate them to adapt their enforcement style. A significant direct effect of inspectors' perception of disclosure of performance information on all three dimensions of enforcement style (legal, facilitation and accommodation) was found. Also, a significant indirect effect was revealed between perceived disclosure of performance information, perceived resistance and a facilitation style.

First and foremost, this study enhances the understanding of enforcement and regulation by showing that disclosing performance information, which makes both compliance performance of inspectees and the activities of the regulators themselves publicly accessible, impacts inspectors' frontline enforcement behavior (cf. Etienne, 2014). More specifically, inspectors intensify all three dimensions (legal, facilitation and accommodation) of their enforcement style when they perceive the disclosure of performance information to be substantive. Future research is needed to also understand the unintended consequences of disclosing performance information for street-level behavior. To illustrate, disclosing performance information is meant to empower other stakeholders to hold regulators accountable (cf. Bovens, 2007; Van der Walle & Robberts, 2008). However, such disclosure may result in perverse incentives (Freeman, 2002) like gaming behavior by the regulators (Courty & Marschke, 2004) to avoid increasing visibility or mitigate possible consequences of this. For instance, inspectors may take extra time to complete inspection visits or resist conducting complex inspections such as the complete closure of businesses. Taking more time and prioritizing easy inspection visits may, in turn, boost the inspectors score on the performance criteria of the organization. In addition, inspectors may also intentionally leave details out of the inspector report or do the opposite and, thus, include way too many details. These unintended consequences may potentially, in the end, not foster but harm the quality of regulation (cf. Freeman, 2002; Werner & Asch, 2005). Future research connecting street-level enforcement style to these potential unintended could shed more light on this.

Second, opposed to our expectations, inspectors tend to facilitate more rather than less during regulatory encounters when they perceive the disclosure of performance information to be substantive. This could possibly be explained by the relational nature of enforcement (Lipsky, 2010). First, disclosing performance information is relatively new and may potentially damage the reputation of inspectees (e.g. Van Erp, 2009; 2010) which, in turn, may harm their relationship with regulators. Inspectors may use a facilitation enforcement style because providing information and considering circumstances at hand fosters trust and, in turn, enhances a cooperative relation between inspector and inspectee (e.g. Pautz, 2009; Pautz & Wamsley, 2009) and mitigates the 'hard' signal that disclosing performance information can be. In other words, inspectors may move towards clients (Tummers et al., 2015) by being facilitative in their style. Another explanation could be that because disclosing performance information makes the work of inspectors more visible (e.g. Winter, 2003), they become more vulnerable in terms of blame. Inspectors will set out to minimize this risk (Hood, 2011) and may, therefore, provide information and clarifications to ensure the inspectees' knowledge on the implications of disclosure performance information is complete (cf. Nielsen, 2015). This may enhance the image that they did everything they could to communicate with inspectees. Further research (including for instance experimental methods) where the type of performance information that is collected or utilized is varied, is needed to fully understand why inspectors become more

facilitative in their enforcement style when they perceive the disclosure of performance information to be greater.

Third, this study also found that the strength of the effect of the perceived disclosure of performance information on the three enforcement style dimensions varies. The effect on the legal enforcement style is only half of the effect on the accommodation and facilitation styles. These differences could be explained by the extent to which inspectors can use their discretionary space in each enforcement style. On the one hand, a legal style is closely associated with executing organizational protocols and sticking rigidly to rules and regulations (de Boer, 2019; Lo et al., 2009 Baldwin et al., 2012; Mascini & Van Wijk, 2009). This style, thus, gives inspectors little room to maneuver using their discretionary space. Facilitation and accommodation, on the other hand, are both styles that are less directly determined by organizational procedures. In other words, these two styles are associated with the discretionary space of inspectors (e.g. Lipsky, 2010). Thus, that the effect of disclosing performance information on facilitation and accommodation is larger than on a legal style, can potentially be explained by the notion that inspectors simply have more room to vary these styles than their legal style.

Finally, a surprising result of this study is that inspectors who perceive disclosure of performance information to be substantive, perceive low resistance by inspectees. A potential explanation could be that inspectors view disclosing performance information as an effective instrument to enhance compliance (Meijer & Homburg, 2009). In that sense there will be less resistance among inspectees, since disclosure stimulates them to obey the rules and regulations. Future research, however, is needed to really clarify this result. Investigating the types of uncertainties inspectors experience (e.g. Raaphorst, 2018) or their coping mechanisms (Tummers et al., 2015) can be especially fruitful.

There are, of course, methodological limitations. Most importantly, using a single survey has been critiqued because it is at risk of common source bias and relationship overestimation (Podsakoff & Organ, 1986; Meier & O'Toole, 2012). Here, this critique has merit, but potential common source bias was an unavoidable limitation. First and foremost, all variables in our conceptual model are perceptual in nature (George & Pandey, 2017). Nonetheless, Podsakoff et al. (2012) highlight that when "both the predictor and criterion variables are capturing individual's perceptions, beliefs, judgments, or feelings" (p. 549) surveys are the right choice of method. Second, other objective data sources were unavailable due to access limitations and privacy concerns within the organization used in this study (George & Pandey, 2017). As was already mentioned, perceptions are at the heart of this study and are best collected directly from the population of interest (here inspectors). There are limited possibilities to collect this information in large quantities. Finally, the correlation matrix shows that not all variables are significantly positively related (George & Pandey, 2017) – something that would be expected if common source bias were present (Spector, 2006). By using design and ex-ante statistical remedies, this limitation was, thus, minimized.

There are also other limitations of this study. First and foremost, this study explains only part of the variation in enforcement style. Future research should further address inspectors' behavior by studying the impact of other potential explanatory variables, such as political pressure (e.g. Moynihan & Hawes, 2012). Second, a single organization was studied in this article. For generalization to other (regulation) organization and contexts, more cross-sector and cross-national research is needed. Future research can benefit from comparative approaches, including comparisons of different regulation systems such as command-and-control and bottom-up (voluntary-based).

All in all, this study contributes to the public management- and administration literature by showing that disclosing performance information is relevant for inspectors' enforcement style, and that the three dimensions of enforcement style are not mutually exclusive (see also May and Winter, 1999;

2000). The study also highlights that inspectors are becoming more active in the sense of intensifying multiple enforcement styles, as a result of disclosing performance information. They choose a more facilitative style, a more accommodative style and -to lesser extent a more legal style. The study also indicates that for a better understanding of inspectors' enforcement styles we should look at the interaction between inspectors with their environment, including the strategy of their organization regarding disclosing public information, and inspectees' behavior.

Notes

[1] McDonald's omega rather than Cronbach's alpha is reported. Cronbach's alpha has been heavily critiqued over the years because it is prone to over- and underestimation which McDonald's omega is not (e.g. Sijstma, 2009). Notably, the reliability for the three factors does not differ when calculating Cronbach's alpha ($\alpha = .85$ (legal), $\alpha = .88$ (facilitation), and $\alpha = .83$ (accommodation).

[2] $\alpha = .88$

[3] The reliability for the three factors does not differ substantially when calculating Cronbach's alpha ($\alpha = .69$).

4 We ran the analysis including dummies for division as controls. However, model fit statistics worsened and indicated model misspecification. Notably, none of our statistically (in)significant results changed substantially.

5 That chi-square is significant is due to the large n (e.g. West, Taylor & Wu, 2012).

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Chapter 4

A street-level perspective on transparency by public organizations and regulatory performance: Does relational distance matter?

Abstract

This study investigates the extent to which inspectors perceive government transparency as impacting regulatory performance. It theorizes that, when inspectors perceive an increase in transparency, they find that the perceived relational distance between themselves and their inspectees rises and this, subsequently, increases regulatory performance. The findings from a survey among Netherlands Food and Consumer Product Safety Authority inspectors (n = 466) confirm that inspectors view an increase in transparency as enhancing regulatory performance. This study further investigates this mechanism by comparing two divisions with different levels of factual relational distance (i.e. frequency of inspector-inspectee interactions). The findings reveal that only in the division with small factual relational distance does perceived relational distance mediate the effect of transparency on regulatory performance. More specifically, in divisions with frequent interactions between inspector and inspectee, more perceived transparency increases perceived relational distance; this in turn, increases perceived regulatory performance.

4.1 Introduction

Government transparency is commonly understood to contribute to better governance in general (Hood, 2007) and to improving regulation in particular (Meijer and Homburg, 2009; Van Dooren and Van de Walle, 2008; Van Erp, 2011). The external pressure that develops when governments make information public about the compliance of inspectees such as business owners is assumed to help governments in executing their task of ensuring and improving the compliance of inspectees (Van de Walle and Van Dooren, 2008). Stimulating inspectees' compliance also implies that the public sector itself performs better, in the sense of its effectiveness in ensuring compliance with public rules and regulations. However, empirical evidence to support this assumption is scarce and mixed (see Meijer and Homburg, 2009; Porumbescu, 2017; Im et al., 2013). The actual effect of government transparency on regulatory performance, therefore, remains unclear.

Regulatory performance depends, to a large extent, on the ways inspectors interact with inspectees during face-to-face encounters (Baldwin et al., 2012; Boyne et al., 2002; Hood et al., 1999). During these encounters, inspectors interact and form relationships with inspectees through often repeated interactions. The relational distance between inspector and inspectee can have important implications for regulatory performance. An intimate and cooperate relationship may foster inspectees' compliance (see Ayres and Braithwaite, 1995; Baldwin et al., 2012; Etienne, 2013; Pautz, 2009; Pautz and Wamsley, 2012), but it can also result in the 'capture' of inspectors. An inspector's position will be weakened because s/he gets too close to the businesses s/he regulates and, in turn, gets captured (Ashworth et al., 2002; James, 2000; Makkai and Braithwaite, 1992). Government transparency interferes with this street-level relationship because the behavior of both inspectees and inspectors becomes visible (see de Boer et al., 2018; Etienne, 2014; Winter, 2003) to all stakeholders in the public sphere, making it, in turn, less intimate (see Black, 2010).

Transparency research has barely addressed this effect on the relational distance between inspector and inspectee at street-level, nor the implications for inspectors' perceptions of regulatory performance (see Grimmelikhuijsen et al., 2017; Meijer and Homburg, 2009; Porumbescu, 2017). There is, thus, a lack of research on government transparency and regulatory performance in which inspectors' perceptions are put at the center – even though they are crucial actors in regulatory governance (see de Boer et al., 2018). This study sets out to contribute empirical evidence to the debate on government transparency and regulatory performance by answering the question: To what extent do inspectors perceive government transparency as impacting regulatory performance? It is hypothesized that this effect can be explained by the perceived relational distance between inspector and inspectee.

The remainder of this article is structured as follows. First, the theoretical framework of government transparency, regulatory performance, and relational distance between inspector and inspectee is highlighted. Second, the method is discussed, followed by the results of a survey (n = 466) among Dutch inspectors from The Netherlands Food and Consumer Product Safety Authority (NVWA). Third, a concluding section summarizes the main points and provides a discussion on the implications for public administration and management scholarship, as well as policy implementation.

4.2 Conceptual framework and expectations

This section theoretically explores the main concepts and their interrelations. It discusses the

independent variable of government transparency, the dependent variable regulatory performance, and the mediating variable relational distance between inspector and inspectee.

Governments are increasingly making information transparent about their own and inspectees' regulatory performance (see de Boer et al., 2018; Van Dooren and Van de Walle, 2008). Government transparency has been defined in many ways. Cucciniello et al. (2017) emphasize that these definitions often address the availability of information about decision-making processes such as budgetary matters, about operational aspects, or about the performance of governmental bodies. Government transparency enables inward observability. Inward observability allows stakeholders to monitor governmental bodies' internal workings, for example regulators' activities and decision making (Grimmelikhuijsen et al., 2013; Grimmelikhuijsen and Meijer, 2012). Stakeholders will be able to monitor and make judgements about whether or not regulators are performing well because regulators make the level of compliance by inspectees transparent. Therefore, government transparency is defined as 'the availability of information about an organization or actor allowing external stakeholders to monitor the internal workings or performance of that organization' (Grimmelikhuijsen, 2012, p. 55). For instance, when regulators disclose how restaurants are performing concerning hygiene rules and regulations, this allows citizens to observe not only the performance of specific restaurants but also the performance of regulators; if restaurants fail to comply with hygiene regulations, the regulator has failed to enforce those rules.

Government transparency can vary concerning the amount and type of information disclosed. Regulators must make choices about the amount of performance information they disclose, and this varies across regulators. It is important to understand these variations, because the greater the amount of information made public, the more visible the performance of regulators, and, in turn, the greater the inward observability. The amount of regulatory performance information can be understood to vary along three dimensions (Douglas and Meijer, 2016; Grimmelikhuijsen, 2012): completeness, color, and usability.

Firstly, governments vary in the completeness of performance information made available to stakeholders (Grimmelikhuijsen, 2012). Some may disclose only basic information lacking details, whereas others disclose elaborate quantitative and qualitative data (Douglas and Meijer, 2016). To illustrate, governments may translate the performance of inspectees into a smiley system. They may indicate good or bad performance by displaying a happy or a sad smiley (Meijer and Homburg, 2009), or make full datasets transparent that include all sanctions any inspectee has received over a certain period of time

Second, governments must decide about the color of performance information disclosed. The extent to which presented information is colored varies however (Douglas and Meijer, 2016; Grimmelikhuijsen, 2012). Notably, facts in the political realm are always interpreted and presented in a certain way (Stone, 2002); neutral information does not exist (Douglas and Meijer, 2016). For example, governments can present all steps and communication with inspectees online for each restaurant in a specific city, or disclose solely the names of violators of a hygiene law. Color does not necessarily concern a purposeful intention to cover or hide information; rather, it addresses the consciously or unconsciously invoked overtone and connotation of performance information.

Third, the usability of performance information differs. The advent of information and communication technologies means that anyone can read government information anytime, but the information is not necessarily understandable and usable by all actors. Disclosed information may be usable by experts but not by laypeople, or vice versa. Meijer and Homburg (2009) describe how the Danish National Veterinary and Food Inspectorate places happy or sad smiley faces on the door of restaurants and on their own website because they are simple and easy to interpret. This system is specifically targeted

at laypeople, but it may not be very useful to experts who want details about food quality.

Finally, besides the amount of transparent information, the type of information that governments disclose can also vary. This study specifically addresses transparency about regulatory performance information. One of the core tasks of regulators is to enforce rules and regulations and, ultimately, limit social risks (Ayres and Braithwaite, 1995; Baldwin et al., 2012). Therefore, regulatory performance information concerns data about the ways inspectees comply with rules and regulations, and about assessing social risks. Notably, Performance remains a contested concept and needs conceptual clarification (Andersen et al., 2016; Boyne, 2006). This study focuses specifically on regulatory performance, which is defined as governments' effectiveness in achieving inspectees' compliance with public rules and regulations and in assessing social risks.

Hypothesized effects of government transparency on regulatory performance

We hypothesize both a direct and an indirect effect of transparency on regulatory performance. Figure 4.1 shows the conceptual model underpinning this study. All core variables are based on the perceptions of street-level inspectors. The model shows that inspectors' perceived government transparency is expected to impact perceived regulatory performance directly. Because theories on capture and responsive regulation emphasize that relational distance between inspectors and inspectees plays an important role (Ayres and Braithwaite, 1995; Black, 2010; Hood et al., 1999; Mascini and Van Wijk, 2009), it is hypothesized that the relation between government transparency and regulatory performance is also mediated by perceived relational distance. The remainder of this section addresses the variables and relationships in the conceptual model.

Direct effect

Scholars frequently question whether transparency is the 'golden tool in policy making' (de Fine Licht, 2014, p. 262). Although transparency is often positively associated with performance for a range of different reasons, such as reducing corruption and enhancing financial efficiency and accountability (Cucciniello et al., 2017; Hood, 2007), the pros and cons of transparency are contested and results are mixed (see Cucciniello et al., 2017; de Fine Licht, 2014; Fung et al., 2007; Grimmelikhuijsen et al., 2013; Hood and Heald, 2006; Porumbescu et al., 2017). These mixed results are, however, almost solely based on studies addressing effects of transparency on citizens (see Grimmelikhuijsen et al., 2013; Grimmelikhuijsen et al., 2017). For example, effects of transparency on citizens' trust in government, their perceived government legitimacy and their voice behavior (Grimmelikhuijsen et al., 2017). None of these transparency studies, however, are – to the authors' knowledge – based on the perspective and insights of street-level bureaucrats.

A notable exception is the recent work by de Boer et al. (2018). De Boer et al. (2018) study the effect of perceived government transparency on the perceived resistance of inspectees by inspectors and their enforcement style during face-to-face encounters with inspectees. De Boer et al. (2018) find that when regulators disclose more performance information, inspectors experience less resistance from inspectees during face-to-face interactions. They explain this result by suggesting that inspectors actually see government transparency as an effective instrument to enhance compliance and assess social risks. In this line of reasoning, Meijer and Homburg (2009) studied government transparency explicitly within the regulation sector. They argue that, under certain conditions, transparency practices can, indeed, contribute to the minimization of social risks. In sum, inspectors view that government transparency reduces resistance of inspectees (de Boer et al., 2018) and thus contributes positively

Figure 4.1. Conceptual model



to ensuring compliance and assessing social risks (de Boer et al., 2018, Meijer and Homburg, 2009). It is, therefore, expected that transparency will be perceived by inspectors as enhancing regulatory performance. The first hypothesis reads as follows:

H1: Perceived government transparency has a positive effect on perceived regulatory performance

Indirect effect via perceived relational distance

We do not expect the direct effect to fully explain the hypothesized relationship between perceived transparency and perceived regulatory performance. Therefore, to gain a deeper understanding of the relationship between perceived government transparency and regulatory performance, we investigate an indirect effect. We focus on an often-discussed but under-researched element in effective regulation at the street-level, namely relational distance between inspector and inspectee (Ashworth et al., 2002; Baldwin et al., 2012; Black, 2010; Hawkins, 1984; Hood et al., 1999).

Relational distance concerns the degree to which the inspector and the inspectee participate in each other's (professional) lives (see Baldwin et al., 2012; Boyne et al., 2002). Relational distance may have profound implications for regulatory performance. Indeed, Black (2010) argues that intimacy breeds partnership. To illustrate, the intimacy of small relational distance may help inspectors to better understand the inspectee and be responsive (Ayres and Braithwaite, 1995), as well as facilitate trust between inspectors and inspectees. According to Pautz (2009) and Pautz and Wamsley (2012), a trusting relation between inspector and inspectee can stimulate inspectees' cooperation. To put it differently, small relational distance may benefit regulatory performance because it allows inspectors to be responsive and encourage inspectees towards more compliant behavior (Ayres and Braithwaite, 1995). Nevertheless, the unintended consequences of being responsive while also punishing wrongdoers and (re)building trust present difficulties for inspectors in practice (Mascini and Van Wijk, 2009).

Hood et al. (1999) argue that, in intimate relationships, there is a chance of inspectors sympathizing with their inspectees and becoming allies. In other words, small relational distance could also hinder regulatory performance because it may result in capture. Capture occurs when inspectors 'go native' and identify too much with the business organizations with which they interact (James, 2000; Makkai and Braithwaite, 1992). The perceived relational distance between inspectors and inspectees,

ultimately, becomes too low (see Ashworth et al., 2002; Baldwin et al., 2012). Capture undermines regulatory performance because it clouds inspectors' independent judgement and, thus, the information collected about inspectees' regulatory performance (Ashworth et al., 2002). In essence, inspectors must juggle between cooperation and persuasion while ensuring that they are not getting too close to inspectees and, ultimately, getting captured.

Relational distance consists of two dimensions, namely a perceived and a factual one. First, the factual dimension concerns the frequency of face-to-face interactions between an inspector and inspectee (see Baldwin et al., 2012; Boyne et al., 2002). Factual relational distance is largely beyond the control of inspectors themselves. Even though inspectors as street-level bureaucrats have certain discretion (Lipsky, 2010), organizational boundaries and regulatory structures largely determine how often certain groups of inspectees are to be inspected (see Ayres and Braithwaite, 1995; Baldwin et al., 2012; May and Burby, 1998; Sparrow, 2000). For instance, in risk-based regulation regimes certain 'at-risk' groups are identified that are more likely to non-comply. These groups are then set to more frequent inspection visits than non-risk groups (Rothstein et al., 2006). Second, the perceived dimension concerns the experienced intimacy between an inspector and inspectee. This intimacy builds and evolves during the face-to-face inspection visits of inspectors with inspectees. Perceived relational distance is, thus, shaped through the way inspectors behave and interact with inspectees (see Etienne, 2013; Pautz and Wamsley, 2012). Both dimensions of relational distance together make up the total relational distance between an inspector and inspectee.

Factual and perceived relational distance are interrelated. To illustrate, when the frequency of face-to-face interactions between an inspector and inspectee is high (i.e. small factual relational distance), inspectors physically meet inspectees and have the opportunity to build an intimate relationship (i.e. small perceived relational distance) and almost become 'insiders'. When the frequency of interactions is low (i.e. high factual relational distance), inspectors cannot build such a close relationship simply because they do not interact with the inspectee often. Intimacy between and inspector and inspectee cannot evolve and inspectors stay 'outsiders' (Baldwin et al. 2012; Boyne et al, 2002, Etienne, 2013; Pautz and Wamsley, 2012).

In this line of reasoning, this study primarily investigates the role of perceived relational distance because a governmental organization's decision to make information about compliance transparent and public may have consequences for the perceived relational distance between inspectors and inspectees, but not for the factual relational distance. When an inspector perceives the government transparency to be substantial this may have implications for their level of intimacy between inspector and inspectee (i.e. perceived relational distance) because their relationship becomes more visible (see de Boer et al., 2018), but not for the frequency of interactions (i.e. factual relational distance) since this is mostly beyond the control of inspectors and pre-determined by organizational structures (see Ayres and Braithwaite, 1995; Baldwin et al., 2012; May and Burby, 1998; Sparrow, 2000).

If information is disclosed, external stakeholders become monitors in the background of the intimate relationship between inspectors and inspectees (de Boer et al., 2018). Ultimately, this brings the relationship into the public sphere and, therefore, the relationship becomes less intimate (see Black, 2010) and, in turn, the perceived relational distance becomes larger. Because of the difficulties that inspectors face while being responsive and controlling for the unintended consequences during face-to-face interactions (Mascini and Van Wijk, 2009), the potential hindrance of capture (Hood et al., 1999) to regulatory performance is expected to outweigh the potential benefits of being able to persuade inspectees towards more compliance (see Ayres & Braithwaite, 1995). In other words, it is expected that, inspectors will perceive the growing perceived relational distance to be beneficial for regulatory performance because it limits their struggle with getting captured.

In addition, as we mentioned before, factual relational distance and perceived relational distance are interrelated. We, therefore, expect perceived relational distance to work differently for inspectors in environments with large and small factual relational distance to inspectees. For inspectors in environments with small factual relational distance, perceived relational distance will play an important role in enforcement at the street-level (see Etienne, 2013; Pautz and Wamsley, 2012). These inspectors must, as we mentioned above, juggle being responsive while not getting too close and captured (see Ayres & Braithwaite, 1995; Hood et al., 1999). On the other hand, for inspectors who enforce policies in street-level environments where the factual relational distance is large, the relationship with the inspectee will matter much less in their day-to-day work (see Baldwin et al., 2012; Boyne et al., 2002) simply because they do not meet inspectees often or more than once. In sum, when the factual relational distance is small, inspectors must deal with the implications of their intimate relationship with inspectees for the regulatory performance. However, when the factual relational distance is large inspectors do not face the consequences of an intimate relationship with inspectees, because it is not present in the first place. Our final hypotheses, therefore, read as follows:

H2a: In a division where factual relational distance is large, perceived relational distance does not mediate a positive effect of perceived government transparency on perceived regulatory performance.

H2b: In a division where factual relational distance is small, perceived relational distance does mediate a positive effect of perceived government transparency on perceived regulatory performance.

4.3 Method

This research was carried out at the NVWA. The NVWA is among the largest inspectorates in the Netherlands. Its core task is to ensure compliance with rules and regulations concerning public safety, public health, and animal welfare. Moreover, the NVWA is in the process of developing and implementing ways of disclosing performance information about compliance performance of the businesses that it regulates. Furthermore, responsiveness and relational distance are prominent topics in the NVWA's enforcement strategy (Mascini and Van Wijk, 2009; Van Rooij et al., 2015). NVWA inspectors conduct face-to-face inspection visits based on performance criteria. For some sectors, business organizations' performance on several of these criteria is made available to the public on the NVWA website or via a mobile application.

NVWA inspectors are classic street-level bureaucrats because they implement public policies with autonomy and room to maneuver using their discretion (Lipsky, 2010). Inspectors deliver not only public services – like social workers or physicians – but also obligations, because they set out to punish wrongdoers (Sparrow, 2000); this makes them especially powerful (Raaphorst, 2018). They are particularly suitable for studying the influence of relational distance, as they often interact with a heterogeneous clientele – such as powerful corporations – and often have repeated interactions with their inspectees (Braithwaite, 2003; Nielsen, 2015).

Data

Between October and November 2016, an online survey was distributed among NVWA inspectors. All respondents were informed by e-mail about the research and assured full anonymity and confidentiality of their answers. The NVWA consists of five divisions, an advisory board, and a board of directors. The sample frame consists of all inspectors working for two divisions (n = 804), namely, Veterinary & Import (n = 406) and Consumer & Safety (n = 398). These two divisions were chosen because in

Veterinary & Import there is a high frequency of interactions between inspectors and business owners and in Consumer & Safety there is a low frequency. Thus, we could compare inspectors with low levels and high levels of relational distance vis-à-vis inspectees. Experts from the NVWA confirmed that these divisions differed in terms of relational distance between inspectors and inspectees. A complete overview of the departments within each division can be found in Table 4.1.

Table 4.1. Departments within the divisions Veterinary & Import and Consumer & Safety

Division	**Department**
Veterinary & Import	Veterinary 1
	Veterinary 2
	Import
Consumer & Safety	Catering industry
	Food safety & industrial production
	Sustainability, food safety, and EU subsidy
	Product safety (excluding laboratory)

New scales are used in this study. These were developed and validated using expert interviews (n = 11). The experts were inspectors from the divisions Consumer & Safety (n = 4) and Veterinary & Import (n = 2) and a senior staff committee including middle and upper management (n = 5). The items were revised in light of the feedback from the expert interviews, and the survey was distributed after the final set was approved to suit the context of street-level bureaucrats and their day-to-day enforcement.

A total of 466 inspectors filled in the questionnaire, resulting in a response rate of 58.0 percent. The number of respondents from Consumer & Safety was 221, and 245 from Veterinary & Import. Because they filled in less than 50 percent of the questions, 123 respondents were omitted from the analyses, resulting in a total sample of 343 respondents. Of these, 168 were from Consumer & Safety and 175 from Veterinary & Import. The total sample consists of 69.1 percent male, 30.3 percent female, and 0.6 percent other. Respondents were between 23 and 73 years old (M = 49.7, SD = 10.78). Their work experience ranged between 1 and 40 years (M = 15.9, SD = 10.77). Table 4.2 gives an overview of the characteristics of the two samples and the actual population. The total sample is representative of the total population. Only work experience is slightly lower in the sample than in the total population (M = 19.9 years). This slight difference in years' work experience is present in both samples (M = 23.8 and 16.0, respectively). Also, women are slightly under- and men overrepresented in both samples. This should be considered when the findings are being interpreted.

Measures

The three key variables in this study are: perceived government transparency, perceived regulatory performance, and perceived relational distance.

Perceived government transparency: Building on Grimmelikhuijsen (2012) and Douglas and Meijer (2016), the focus is on the perceived amount of performance information made available by

Table 4.2. Sample and population characteristics

	Consumer & Safety (n = 168)		**Veterinary & Import (n = 175)**		**Total (n = 343)**	
	Sample	Population	Sample	Population	Sample	Population
Age (M)	49.2	48.5	50.2	49.0	49.7	48.8
Years' work experience (M)	18.6	23.8	13.4	16.0	15.9	19.9
Female (%)	24.6	28.1	35.4	40.2	30.3	29.0
Male (%)	74.3	71.9	64.2	59.9	69.7	71.0
Other sex (%)	1.2	-	0	-	0.6	-

Note: No data are available on other sexes for the total population

governments to other stakeholders. The amount of performance information disclosed is based on the three criteria mentioned earlier, namely (1) completeness; (2) coloring, and (3) usability (Douglas and Meijer, 2016; Grimmelikhuijsen, 2012). Two items were formulated for each criterion. Examples of items included are: 'I would typify the inspection results that the NVWA discloses as detailed' (completeness); 'shedding light on all aspects of an inspection' (coloring); and 'understandable for non-experts' (usability). Using exploratory factor analysis, it was found that the three criteria did not form one factor, but two. The third criteria – usability – formed a separate factor. Usability was, however, measured by only two items and therefore omitted from further analysis. The four items that remained formed a reliable measure for perceived government transparency ($\omega = .88$). McDonald's omega is reported and not Cronbach's alpha; Cronbach's alpha has been criticized because it is prone to over- and underestimation (Sijtsma, 2009).

Perceived regulatory performance: The core tasks of the government body that employs the inspectors in this study, the NVWA, were used to develop a measure of regulatory performance. The NVWA has two core tasks in which the inspectors are involved. First, enforcement entails all proceedings that are geared towards influencing compliance behavior. Second, risk assessment concerns judgements of societal dangers (Nederlandse Voedsel en Warenautoriteit, 2015). For each core task, two items were formulated. To illustrate, an item included is: 'My division is successful in…tracing violations of rules and regulations' (enforcement). The first two core tasks formed a reliable measure of perceived regulatory performance ($\omega = .85$).

Perceived relational distance: Part of the relational distance index (Hess, 2003) was used to measure the way inspectors perceive the relational distance between themselves and business organizations. Hess (2003) describes three tactics that people can use to distance themselves, namely, (1) avoidance, (2) disengagement, and (3) cognitive dissociation. The first tactic was not used to operationalize relational distance, as business organizations cannot avoid street-level bureaucrats during face-to-face inspections. This tactic is, therefore, not realistic or suitable for the context in this study. Disengagement entails individuals' efforts to disengage from those with whom they are interacting. Cognitive dissociation 'refers to changing perceptions about the relationship and the meaning of people's actions in effort to perceive less association in the relationship' (Hess, 2003, p. 203). For both disengagement and cognitive dissociation, two items were created. These included, amongst others, 'when I talk to the inspectee, I do not mention personal subjects' (disengagement) and 'In my mind, I position myself as superior to inspectees in order to make a clear distinction between myself and them.'

The exploratory factor analysis and reliability statistics showed that the four items did not form a reliable scale. Dropping items did not result in a reliable scale either (Field et al., 2012). Therefore, it was decided to use one item only. Out of the four items, the items 'In my mind, I position myself as superior to inspectees in order to make a clear distinction between myself and them' was chosen because it is the least ambiguous and the least open to multiple interpretations. In addition, this item measures cognitive dissociation, and this fits well with the focus on perceptions in this research (Hess, 2003).

Controls: Sex, age, and work experience were included as demographic control variables. Trust in government transparency was also included and measured using one item, namely, 'I think that disclosing inspection results will increase the compliance of inspectees.' Controlling for the extent of street-level bureaucrats' trust in the effect of the instrument is important, because it may relate to the way they perceive the overall effectiveness of government transparency and regulatory performance. Appendix I provides an overview of all items.

Common source bias: Design – and ex-post remedies

Common source bias is a potential limitation for survey research using perceptional data (George and Pandey, 2017; Podsakoff et al., 2012). Design remedies are best suited to limiting common source bias, and therefore several measures were taken (Podsakoff et al., 2012). First, the importance of this research was communicated by the researchers but also by the NVWA management and team leaders to ensure support and careful answering of the questions by the respondents. There was, thus, substantive organizational support. Second, respondents were informed that the NVWA management and they themselves would get a report; this served as an incentive to participate. Third, all items of the multi-item questions were colored in a different shade of grey to facilitate respondents' focus while answering the questionnaire. Finally, as already mentioned, the questionnaire was tested among experts. This enhances face validity (George and Pandey, 2017; Lee et al., 2012; Podsakoff and Organ, 1986; Podsakoff et al., 2003; Podsakoff et al., 2012).

Although post-hoc statistical remedies have been criticized substantially (George and Pandey, 2017; Podsakoff et al., 2003; Podsakoff et al., 2012), they are a useful indication of whether common source bias influences model estimation. Two tests were conducted. Firstly, the independent, dependent, and mediating variables were all loaded on one latent factor for a confirmatory factor analysis (Podsakoff et al., 2003). The comparative fit index (CFI), the Tucker-Lewis index (TLI), the root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA), and the standardized root square residual (SRMR) were used to assess the fit of the models. Cut-off criteria are between ≥ .95 (good fit) and ≥ .90 (moderate fit) for CFI and TLI, between ≤ .06 (good fit) and ≤ .08 (moderate fit) for RMSEA with PCLOSE >.05, and ≤ .08 (good fit) for SRMR (Hu and Bentler, 1999). The fit of the model for the total sample is very poor ($\chi 2$ = 339.021, df = 27) with CFI = .665, TLI = .553, RSMEA = .232, PCLOSE = .000, and SRMR = .152. When the sample is split, the model fits remain poor ($\chi 2$ = 187.580, df = 27, CFI = .615, TLI = .486, RSMEA = .226, PCLOSE = .000, and SRMR = .161; and $\chi 2$ = 174.552, df = 27, CFI = .714, TLI = .618, RSMEA = .238, PCLOSE = .000, and SRMR = .138, respectively).

Secondly, all individual items of the variables were loaded on a first-order factor as well as on their own latent constructs. This is known as a common latent factor model estimation (Podsakoff et al., 2003). The differences in $\chi 2$ between the conceptual and the common latent factor model were tested in the total sample using ANOVA. The ANOVA is not statistically significant ($\chi 2$ difference = 1.182, df = 1, p = 0.277). For both samples separately, the ANOVA tests are not statistically significant either ($\chi 2$ difference = 1.925, p = 0.1653; and $\chi 2$ difference = 0.222, p = 0.6377, respectively). Adding a common latent factor to the conceptualized model did not result in a better fit. It can, therefore, be

concluded that there is no indication that common source bias impacts the findings in this study.

4.4 Findings

The statistical program R was used to determine the impact of perceived government transparency on perceived regulatory performance, as well as the extent to which relational distance mediates this relationship. The packages ‘lavaan’ (Rosseel, 2011), ‘psych’ (Revelle, 2014), and ‘semTools’ (Pornprasertmanit et al., 2013) were used. Our data vary slightly from normality, and therefore the parameters in our models were estimated using the Satorra-Bentler correction (Satorra and Bentler, 1994).

Table 4.3 displays the descriptive statistics and the correlations between the independent, dependent, mediating, and control variables. Perceived government transparency correlates positively with perceived regulatory performance (.37) as well as perceived relational distance (.16). Likewise, perceived relational distance correlates positively with perceived regulatory performance (. 22). Both government transparency and regulatory performance correlate positively with the control variable trust in government transparency (.18 and .18, respectively). Perceived regulatory performance also correlates positively with the sex dummy (1 = Female) (.13). Perceived relational distance correlates with none of the control variables. All significant correlations were included in the estimation of the parameters.

Table 4.3. Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations total sample (n = 343)

		M	SD	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
1	Perceived government transparency	5.45	1.76	1							
2	Perceived regulatory performance	6.77	1.50	0.37***	1						
3	Perceived relational distance	5.07	2.45	0.16**	0.22***	1					
4	Age	49.67	10.78	0.08	-0.01	0.08	1				
5	Years' work experience	15.92	10.77	-0.05	0.03	0.04	0.60***	1			
6	Sex (1 = Female)	0.30	0.46	-0.03	0.13**	-0.04	-0.43***	-0.31***	1		
7	Sex (1 = Other)	0.01	0.08	-0.01	-0.04	-0.02	-0.02	-0.05	-0.05	1	
8	Trust in government transparency	7.33	1.99	0.18**	0.18**	-0.01	0.00	0.03	-0.05	-0.01	1

Note: *** $p < .001$; ** $p < .01$

Structural Equation Modeling (SEM) was used to further study the relationship between the core variables in this study because of the latent nature of both the independent and the dependent variables and the multiple regression paths (Kline, 2015). The sample was split, as we were interested in a comparison between the division with a low frequency of interactions (Consumer & Safety) and the division with a high frequency of interactions (Veterinary & Import) between street-level bureaucrats and businesses. For both samples, the same model was used for parameter estimation. Table 4.4 shows the model fit statistics for both models; the fit is good in each case.

Table 4.4. Model fit statistics

	Model 1 (Consumer & Safety)	**Model 2 (Veterinary & Import)**
χ^2	63.618	43.579
df	41	41
CFI	0.949	0.995
TLI	0.932	0.994
RESMA	0.066	0.021
PCLOSE	0.225	0.880
SRMR	0.060	0.066

The results of the hypothesized relations are displayed in Figures 4.2 and 4.3 and Table 4.5. The first hypothesis concerns the direct relation between perceived government transparency and perceived regulatory performance. More specifically, it predicts that inspectors' perceptions of government transparency and regulatory performance are positively related. The standardized regression coefficients for both models confirm this expectation. For both the inspectors who have few interactions with the same inspectees (Model 1 Consumer & Safety) and the inspectors who have frequent and recurrent interactions (Model 2 Veterinary & Import), it is found that, when their perception of government transparency rises, so does their perceived regulatory performance ($z = 2.305$, st.B = .245, SE = .054, $p = .021$; and $z = 3.516$, st.B = .419, SE = .077, $p = .000$, respectively). The effect is strongest for the inspectors with a high frequency of contact (Model 2).

Table 4.5. Results SEM

	Model 1 (Consumer & Safety)						Model 2 (Veterinary & Import)					
	Perceived regulatory performance			Perceived relational distance			Perceived regulatory performance			Perceived relational distance		
	z	St.SE	St.B	z	St.SE	St.B	z	St.SE	St.B	z	St.SE	St.B
Direct effect												
Perceived government transparency	2.305	0.054	0.245**	-0.417	0.116	-0.038	3.516	0.077	0.419***	3.621	0.132	0.368***
Perceived relational distance	1.147	0.040	0.114	-	-	-	2.625	0.043	0.227**	-	-	-
Indirect effect via perceived resistance												
Perceived government transparency	-0.409	0.005	-0.004	-	-	-	2.265	0.024	0.083**	-	-	-
Total effect												
Perceived government transparency	2.306	0.053	0.240**	-	-	-	3.870	0.084	0.502***	-	-	-

Note: *** $p < .001$; ** $p < .01$

Figure 4.2. Graphical representation SEM result Model 1 (Consumer & Safety division)



Figure 4.3. Graphical representation SEM result Model 2 (Veterinary & Import division)



The second set of hypotheses concerns the mediating effect of perceived relational distance. On the one hand, hypothesis 2a predicts that the effect will not be mediated by perceived relational distance for inspectors working for divisions where the recurrence and occurrence of contact with inspectees is low (Model 1). Hypothesis 2b, on the other hand, expects that inspectors working at divisions where the frequency of face-to-face interactions with inspectees is high, the relational distance between them will mediate the effect between perceived government transparency and perceived regulatory performance (Model 2). Both hypothesis 2a and hypothesis 2b are confirmed. Model 1 shows, indeed, that the relationship between perceived government transparency and perceived regulatory performance is not explained by perceived relational distance (z = -.409, st.B = -.004, SE = .005, p = .681).

In addition, this study finds a statistically significant total indirect effect for Model 2 (z = -2.265, st.B = .024, SE = .083, p = .023). When the inspectors' perceptions of government transparency rise, so does their perceived relational distance and, consequently, also their perception of regulatory performance. When we examine this relationship more closely, a statistically significant relationship is found between perceived government transparency and relational distance (z = 3.621, st.B = .368, SE = .132, p = .000) as well as between relational distance and regulatory performance (z = 2.625, st.B = .227, SE = .043, p = .009). In sum, the relationship between perceived government transparency and perceived regulatory performance of inspectors working in a division where the frequency of contact between themselves and inspectees is low can be explained by their perceived relational distance.

4.5 Conclusion and discussion

This study investigates the extent to which inspectors, who are classic street-level bureaucrats, perceive an impact of government transparency on regulatory performance and how this is mediated through perceived relational distance between the inspector and the inspectee. Our findings contribute to the existing literature in three ways.

Firstly, transparency scholars often stress that the pros and cons of government transparency are contested (Cucciniello et al., 2017; de Fine Licht, 2014; Fung et al., 2007; Grimmelikhuijsen et al., 2013; Hood and Heald, 2006; Van Dooren and Van de Walle, 2008). The transparency debate, however, lacks a street-level perspective (see de Boer et al., 2018). Our findings indicate that, according to street-level bureaucrats, government transparency does contribute to good performance of their division. More specifically, the more street-level bureaucrats perceive that regulatory performance regarding business organizations' compliance is made transparent, the more they perceive that their division is performing well in fulfilling its public tasks such as tracing rule violations and monitoring risks.

Second, one reason why street-level bureaucrats perceive regulatory performance as improving when more performance information is made transparent is because of an indirect effect through increased perceived relational distance. The results show that, for street-level bureaucrats working in divisions where the factual relational distance is small (i.e. frequency of interactions with business owners is high), there is not only a direct positive effect of increased perceived government transparency on perceived regulatory performance, but also an indirect effect: increases in perceived government transparency lead to larger perceived relational distance, which, consequently, increases perceived regulatory performance. This indirect effect does not occur in divisions where the factual relational distance is large (i.e. the interaction between street-level bureaucrats and business owners is low). In other words, in divisions with a lot of face-to-face encounters, the perceived mechanism through which regulatory performance is realized changes when the level of transparency increases.

In such divisions, perceived regulatory performance becomes less dependent on the close relationship between the street-level bureaucrat and the inspectee, and more dependent on public scrutiny by other stakeholders. This points to a shift from a more relational regulatory procedure to a more public regulatory process. Interestingly, although scholars investigating the relationship and interactions between street-level bureaucrats and their clients have shown that fostering trust and a cooperative relation may be beneficial for delivering and implementing public policies (Pautz, 2009; Pautz and Wamsley, 2012), our findings indicate that, according to street-level bureaucrats' perceptions, the shift towards more transparent public procedures and less intimate relationships enhances regulators' ability to perform. Future research is needed to assess whether these findings also hold among other stakeholders such as public managers or business owners. A cross-sector approach using, for instance, experiments may be especially fruitful (see de Fine Licht, 2014; Porumbescu et al., 2017).

Finally, the results contribute to the literature on regulatory capture (Baldwin et al., 2012; Carpenter and Moss, 2013; Mitnick, 2011; James, 2000) by providing empirical confirmation for theory stating that, when there is little contact between street-level bureaucrats and business owners, street-level bureaucrats do not go native, because the factual relational distance is high and, consequently, the regulated industry does not control or capture government agencies (James, 2000; Makkai and Braithwaite, 1992; Mitnick, 2011). When there is a lot of contact, street-level bureaucrats run the risk of going native because the factual relational distance is small and, in turn, get captured. The findings may indicate that street-level bureaucrats feel pressure from their clients and are not able to create a desirable perceived relational distance themselves but need institutional arrangements – such as government transparency – to remain at a distance. In sum, this research indicates that increasing government transparency helps to limit regulatory capture because it increases perceived relational distance (see Carpenter and Moss, 2013). Future research is needed to understand implications of increasing relational distance at the street-level, for instance, in terms of bureaucrats' engagement in policy design (see Lavee et al., 2018), policy alienation (see Van Engen et al., 2016) and enforcement style (see de Boer, 2019; de Boer et al., 2018).

As with any research, there are methodological limitations to this study. First, surveys collecting data from respondents at a single point in time have been criticized because of the risk of common source bias (Podsakoff and Organ, 1986; Meier and O'Toole, 2012). Risking common source bias was unavoidable, as we are interested in perceptions, but common source bias was limited through design remedies. The ex-post remedies conducted did not indicate common source bias in our findings (George and Pandey, 2017). Second, it is not possible to make causal inferences, because our data are cross-sectional. Future studies, for instance using experimental methods, could be used to further distill the mechanisms identified in this research. Third, relational distance is only measured by one item since the intended four-item scale did not pass reliability thresholds (Field et al., 2012). Relational distance may be more complex and nuanced than the single item using in this study. Future research should pay attention to continuing the development and validation of a reliable measurement scale for relational distance.

Finally, this research has theoretical limitations. First, it addresses a specific type of street-level bureaucrat, namely, inspectors, in a specific context, The Netherlands. Inspectors are similar to other street-level bureaucrats. For instance, they enforce policies, just as for example police officers. Inspectors may, however, also differ from other street-level bureaucrats. Second, the Dutch context may differ from other countries, for example because of specific features of Dutch culture or of the Dutch regulatory system. More research is needed to determine which contextual features may be of influence and whether our results can be generalized to other countries and sectors. Future research with cross-sector and cross-national comparisons will help to assess how other street-level bureaucrats view the impact of government transparency on regulatory performance in other sectors and countries across the globe.

Third, this study addresses the impact of government transparency on regulatory performance and assesses whether relational distance matters. The transparency of the bureaucrat-inspectee encounter may, however, also influence their relational distance and have implications for how street-level bureaucrats perceive the impact of government transparency. Future research could compare the impact of government transparency for bureaucrat-inspectee encounters which are public (e.g. police arrests) and not public (e.g. slaughterhouse inspection visits). Finally, and most importantly, this study is unable to explain how street-level bureaucrats interpret the effects of government transparency on their relational distance with inspectees and regulatory performance. Future research using qualitative methods, such as interviews, will be crucial to distill the interpretations of street-level bureaucrats on how government transparency, relational distance and regulatory performance interact with one another.

Part 2

The citizen

This chapter has been submitted to an international peer-reviewed journal.

Chapter 5

How do citizens assess different types of street-level bureaucrats' warmth and competence? A typology and test

Abstract

Citizens encounter numerous street-level bureaucrats in their lifetime, but how do they assess the traits of the bureaucrats they meet? Understanding citizen assessments of bureaucrats is important because variations can have consequences for the process of service provision. This article explores citizens' classification of types street-level bureaucrats based on their core tasks. Using a factorial survey (n = 580), three clusters of bureaucrats were found, namely (1) regulation-oriented; (2) service-oriented; and (3) oriented to both. This article then tests how these bureaucrats' warmth and competence were assessed and investigates whether the bureaucrats' gender matters. A between-subject experiment (n = 1,602) revealed that regulation-oriented bureaucrats were assessed the least competent and warm. Regardless of core task, female bureaucrats were assessed as being warmer than male bureaucrats. Female and male bureaucrats were assessed as being equally competent. This article shows how citizens stereotype bureaucrats and discusses the implications for public management literature.

5.1 Introduction

Citizens can encounter many different kinds of street-level bureaucrats in their lifetime, such as nurses, customs officers and youth councillors. But, how do citizens assess the bureaucrats they meet? Understanding how citizens assess street-level bureaucrats is important because citizens are not passive actors during service provision (Cuter et al., 2008; DuBois, 2016; Gofen, 2013; 2015). Variations in assessments of bureaucrats by citizens may have implications for service provision generally and the behaviour of citizens during bureaucrat-citizen encounters specifically. Matching individual-level characteristics, such as gender, can increase the effort of both the bureaucrat and the citizen (Guul, 2018; Meier, 2018; Riccucci et al., 2015). Hence, citizens' judgements can have implications for how citizens behave during public encounters. These, in turn, can either foster or harm successful service provision (see Pautz & Wamsley, 2012; Raaphorst & Loyens, 2018).

There is little scholarship on the citizen-side of service provision. Scholars have primarily focused on how bureaucrats deal with, behave and decide during citizen encounters (e.g. de Boer & Eshuis, 2018; DuBois, 2016; Jensen & Pedersen, 2017; Loyens & Maeschalck, 2010; Maynard-Moody & Musheno, 2000; Lipsky, 2010; Tummers et al., 2015). As a result, little is known about how citizens assess bureaucrats or the implications of this for policy implementation. This is surprising because, from the bureaucrats' perspective, there is evidence that how citizens are judged, for instance, in terms of trust, stereotypes and deservingness, matters during service provision. How bureaucrats assess citizens is, at least to some extent, a normal part of how bureaucrats behave and decide about services (Harrits, 2019; Jilke & Tummers, 2018; Pedersen et al., 2018; Thomann & Rapp, 2018; Yang, 2005). Citizens may, much like bureaucrats, rely on mental shortcuts to evaluate the people they encounter (see Jilke et al., 2018; Raaphorst et al, 2018; Willis & Todorov, 2006).

This article argues that citizens also assess individual bureaucrats' characteristics and it is high time we should have delved into its specificities. However, before the implications of citizens' assessments of bureaucrats can be investigated, we need to understand citizens' assessments of different types of bureaucrats an sich. Both the social psychology and political sciences have long traditions in understanding how humans assess each other in terms the traits of warmth and competence (e.g. Fiske et al., 2007; Laustsen & Bor, 2017; Wojciszke et al., 1998). This article draws on this trait assessment literature and investigates how citizens assess street-level bureaucrats' warmth and competence.

The purpose of this article is two-folded. First, it explores how citizens classify different bureaucrats based on their core tasks. A typology is created using a factorial survey design (n = 580). Using this typology, this article then tests how bureaucrats' warmth and competence were assessed with a within-subject experiment (n = 1,602).

Two theories are tested. First, Haye's (2005; 2010) issue ownership theory states that political parties 'own' some social issues more than others, which, in turn, reflect how party members' traits are assessed. The Democratic Party, for instance, owns the issue of welfare because it often discusses vulnerable groups and, as a result, its members are assessed as being warmer than their Republican counterparts (Hayes, 2005; 2010). It is theorized that, like political parties, public organizations each 'own' some issues more than others and this can explain how bureaucrats' traits are assessed. Second, Eagly & Kagan's (2002) role congruency theory states that gender stereotypes exist and these may align (i.e. congruence) or clash (i.e. incongruence) with someone's leadership role. It is theorized that some core tasks of bureaucrats are (in)congruent with gender stereotypes and this affects their competence and warmth assessments by citizens.

The article is structured as follows: First, the conceptual underpinnings and hypothesized relations

are highlighted. Then, the methodological considerations are presented, followed by the results based on a two-survey experiment. This article concludes with a discussion of the findings for understanding micro-level mechanisms from the citizen-side of service provision.

5.2 Conceptual framework

Both political scientists and social psychologists seem to agree that warmth and competence are two main dimensions that humans assess each other human's traits (e.g. Fiske et al., 2007; Laustsen & Bor, 2017; Wojciszke et al., 1998). Fiske et al. (2007) highlighted that "the warmth dimension captures traits that are related to perceived intent, including friendliness, helpfulness, sincerity, trustworthiness and morality, whereas the competence dimension reflects traits that are related to perceived ability, including intelligence, skill, creativity and efficacy" (p. 77). However, which trait dimension is dominant for trait evaluations is not clear. Social psychologists argue – based on evolutionary pressures – that social perceptions are based, first, on whether someone has good intentions or not (i.e. warmth dimension) and, second, on whether someone can behave according to intentions (i.e. competence dimension) (Fiske et al., 2007). Political scientists argue – using the relevancy of tasks – for the exact same opposite – dominance, since citizens evaluate candidates based on whether they are competent enough to fulfil their political tasks before evaluating their warmth (Funk, 1999; Laustsen & Bor, 2017).

Issue ownership

But how do citizens assess warmth or competence traits of street-level bureaucrats? Different information cues have been related to variations in trait assessments, ranging from party affiliation of political candidates to facial features (Hall et al., 2009; Olivola & Todorov, 2010). Political scientists have found that trait assessments can be rooted in the issues 'owned' by the political party that an individual represents. Institutions 'issue ownership' is defined as a "reputation for policy and program interest, produced by a history of attention, initiative, and innovation towards problems, which leads [citizens] to believe that one of the [institutions] is more sincere and committed to do something" (Petrocik, 1996, p. 826). Issue ownership develops due to the reputation political parties built up regarding issues they can and cannot handle skilfully which, in turn, are transferred to how politicians working for those parties are assessed regarding their traits (Goren, 2007; Hayes, 2005; Petrocik, 1996). Essentially, this indicates that the social issues political parties embody, such as healthcare or law enforcement, trickles down to how citizens judge the traits of politicians.

Hayes (2005; 2010) builds on the notion of issue ownership and has developed it regarding: (1) how voters evaluate traits of political candidates and (2) how such trait evaluations impact vote choice. Hayes (2005) issue ownership theory states that the public's trait evaluation of presidential candidates (i.e. the individual) is determined by the political parties (i.e. the institution) they represent. Trait ownership theory stresses that public perceptions of a presidential candidate's traits relate to the issues their political party campaign on and, thus, talk about frequently. Presidential candidates' traits are determined then by issue ownership because the public now associates specific character traits with candidates because they frequently publicly campaign on them. To put this differently, citizens judge the traits of presidential candidates predominantly based on the stereotypical notions they have of the political parties they represent and not on information cues related specifically to the candidate him/herself (Hayes, 2005; 2010).

Public organizations do not campaign for voters, nor do they have candidates competing with one

another. Nevertheless, the reputation of a (public) institution– a core component of Hayes (2005) trait ownership theory – is widely acknowledged to be important for organizational behaviour and public perceptions. To illustrate, organizational reputation influences bureaucratic behaviour and institutional patterns, such as the amount of autonomy and discretion (Busuioc & Lodge, 2016; Carpenter & Krause, 2012). Public organizations also manage and use their reputation and may even brand themselves in order to achieve more favourable public perceptions (Karens et al., 2016; Maor et al., 2012; Teodoro & An, 2018; Waeraas & Byrkjeflot, 2012). Hence, in line with Haye's (2005) theory of issue ownership, certain public organizations may be prone to stereotypical thinking, due to their reputations on handling societal issues. This, in turn, reflects on how citizens assess traits of the street-level bureaucrats they encounter (see Hvidman, 2018).

Citizens encounter a range of street-level bureaucrats in their lifetime employed by public organizations with different core tasks. Public organizations can be roughly classified as being either regulation-focused (e.g. police or inspectorates), service-focused (e.g. schools or hospitals), or both (e.g. rehabilitation centres) (Jensen, 2018). Expand on this we can say that regulation-driven organizations "deliver obligations rather than services" (Sparrow, 2000, p.2) such as fines and sanctions. Service-oriented organizations offer services, such as care and unemployment benefits. Notably, public organizations will almost never be fully regulation, nor service-oriented. For example, a school inspector may issue a fine to a school for not meeting requirements regarding their budget plans, but may also provide advice on how to improve their student wellbeing. Regardless of this, public organizations do 'own' certain societal issues more than others (see Hayes, 2005; Petrocik, 1996) because there are differences in what precise job tasks public organizations have and, thus, what street-level bureaucrats deliver to citizens. In other words, it is hypothesized that the stereotypical notions depicted by Hayes (2005) are also present for public organizations when citizens assess street-level bureaucrats' traits because the sheer nature of public organizations' core task make them owner of some issues.

More specifically, Hayes (2005) found that, on the one hand, Democrats often campaign at locations involving vulnerable groups of citizens, such as nursing homes. Therefore, they 'own' the issue of welfare of the vulnerable. As a result, voters perceive their presidential candidates to be warmer (labelled by Hayes (2005) as empathetic and compassionate) than their Republican counterparts. Republicans, at the other hand, focus on law and order as more competent (labelled by Hayes (2005) as leadership) than Democrats (see Hayes, 2005). It is expected that this mechanism is also present for public organizations and their street-level bureaucrats. More specifically, service-oriented public organizations will also be associated with vulnerable groups of citizens, such as the elderly, sick and unemployed (i.e. the warmth dimension). Conversely, enforcement-oriented public organizations will be associated more with law and order because they punish wrongdoers and sanction them accordingly (i.e. the competence dimension). Therefore, it is expected that:

H1a: Bureaucrats employed by regulation-oriented organizations will be assessed as *more* competent than bureaucrats employed by service-oriented organizations

H1b: Bureaucrats employed by regulation-oriented organizations will be assessed as *less* warm than bureaucrats employed by more service-providing organizations

Role congruence

According to Hayes (2005; 2010) voters drew on campaign information to assess whether political candidates behaved in line with the traits 'owned' by their political parties because they rarely met them in person. Street-level bureaucrats are like politicians because they are also the face of 'the

system' during service provision. However, unlike political candidates, citizens do meet street-level bureaucrats face-to-face during service provision (Maynard-Moody & Musheno, 2000; Lipsky, 2010). These bureaucrats are an important source of episodic information, which steer citizens' assessments (Olsen, 2017a). To illustrate this, if you call your local police station to report a theft, you may already have predispositions about the police as an institution, but you are also directly interacting with another human being - the police officer. Whether the police officer has a female or a male voice and says s/he is a deputy or a detective may provide you with episodic cues to draw on and, ultimately, assess the traits of the person you are dealing with.

Due to technological advancements, such as digitalization, there seems to be a notable shift towards more bureaucrat-citizen encounters that are by design low-information settings and, therefore, impersonal in nature. For instance, contact between bureaucrats and citizens are increasingly moderated by technology. As a result, face-to-face contact is being replaced by screen-to-screen contact, via for instance telephone, e-mail or social media (Bovens & Zouridis, 2002). In addition, for a large portion of citizens, especially the non-vulnerable ones, the only times they encounter bureaucrats is in one-shot (i.e. singular) settings, rather than repeated (i.e. plural) (see Boyne et al., 2002; Black, 2010). For example, you may encounter a parking officer who has issue a fine to you for wrongfully parking your car. The next time that you get fined, it will probably not be the same parking officer. In these cases, citizens may rely on only name or voice when assessing the bureaucrat. In such low-information encounters, any identifiable information available to citizens to identify street-level bureaucrats matters, because citizens' reliance on stereotypical thinking changes when more cues can be drawn on (Bauer, 2013; 2015).

Gender is a particularly powerful cue because it can be identified based on multiple sources of information, such as physical appearance, name and voice. Moreover, gender cues are hard to hide. In this line of reasoning, Eagly & Karan's (2002) role congruence theory proposed that stereotypical characteristics associated with women and leaders were incongruent and, therefore, women were less likely to emerge as leaders than men and, in turn, would be penalized harsher. Gender roles are "those shared expectations (about appropriate qualities and behaviour) that apply to individuals on the basis of their socially defined gender" (Eagly, 1997, p. 12) or "sets of norms that communicate what is generally appropriate for each sex" (Burn, 1995, p. 3). Gender roles for females, for instance, include traits, such as sensitive, warm and compassionate (Bauer, 2013; 2015). Following Eagly & Karan (2002), these gender roles and associated traits did not match expected roles of, for instance, leaders (Eagly & Karau, 2002; Konrad & Canning, 1997; Ritter & Yoder, 2004). Moreover, women have been generally characterized as being warmer (see also Bauer, 2015) and less competent than men (see Herrnson et al., 2003; Huddy et al., 1993; Lawless, 2004). Drawing on role congruence theory (Eagly & Karan, 2002), we expected that these stereotypes were also present for street-level bureaucrats. Therefore, the second hypothesis is as follows:

H2: Female bureaucrats will be assessed as being more warm and less competent than male bureaucrats

Stereotypical notions of the public organizations and gender of the bureaucrats can also interact. To illustrate this, when you call the police station to report a break-in and get a female police officer on the phone, these two cues may be incongruent and, in turn, decrease warmth assessments. However, when you call your local hospital with an emergency – a public organization 'owning' the 'warm' social issue of healthcare – and get a female nurse on the phone, these cues congruent and, ultimately the cues may amplify warmth assessment. In other words, the warmth of women may not correspond to the stereotypical notions associated with regulation-oriented organizations focused on law and order. Masculinity is associated with law and order related topics, such as economic and military issues (e.g. Huddy et al., 1993; Lawless, 2004). Therefore, male bureaucrats may be congruent

with stereotypical associations of regulation-oriented organizations. However, the warmth of female bureaucrats may be congruent with service-oriented organizations because they are associated with vulnerable groups, but not with male bureaucrats. Therefore, we expected that when core task and gender were congruent (service-oriented*female and regulation-oriented*male) their traits would be assessed higher. When core task and gender were incongruent (regulation-oriented*female and service-oriented*male) their traits would be assessed lower.

H3: When issue ownership and gender are congruent, trait assessments will be assessed higher than when issue ownership and gender are incongruent

5.3 Study 1

Before testing the hypothesized relations, an explorative study was used to understand how citizens classify different types of street-level bureaucrats based on their core task (i.e. regulation-focused or service-focuses).

Method

Design. A factorial survey was used which is a method well-suited to explore the underlying principles of attitudes and perceptions. Factorial surveys are a within-subject experimental method where respondents are exposed to X vignettes that vary across X dimensions based on their levels (Auspurg & Hinz, 2014). One dimension with one level was varied, namely the type of street-level bureaucrat. 30 different types of street-level bureaucrats were formulated based on six main public enforcement domains in The Netherlands: (1) public space; (2) environment, wellbeing and infrastructure; (3) education; (4) public transport; (5) work, income and healthcare and; (6) general investigation. In order to provide a balance between potential regulation- and service-oriented bureaucrats, half of the formulated street-level bureaucrats have official investigative authority (i.e. buitengewoon opsporingsambtenaar) and the other half do not.

Procedure. To prevent boredom, fatigue or respondents identifying the manipulation, the vignette sample was divided in six decks of five vignettes (see appendix II). Respondents were randomly allocated to a deck. Within decks the order of the vignettes was also randomized. Since each of the 116 respondents rated five vignettes, the total analytical sample is 580 observations (Auspurg & Hinz, 2014). After answering demographic questions, respondents rated each vignette on a 10-point scale for the dependent variable of this study, two core tasks. The items were formulated as follows: (1) The core tasks of the [insert type of street-level bureaucrat] are enforcing laws and regulations (i.e. regulation-oriented core task); (2) The core tasks of the [insert type of street-level bureaucrat] are enforcing laws and regulations (i.e. service-providing core task).

Respondents. The factorial survey was distributed via Qualtrics panels in February 2019 and their software among a sample of the Dutch population (see table 5.1 for sample characteristics).

Results

For each of the 30 vignettes, the ratings of respondents on the two dependent variables (i.e. a regulation-focused and service-focused core task) were used to calculate mean scores for each type of street-level bureaucrat. The mean scores of each type of bureaucrat were plotted to visualize their

Table 5.1. Sample characteristics

		Study 1
Age (M)		39.29 (SD = 16.58)
Gender (%)	Female	25.9
	Male	74.1
Education level (%)	None	0
	Elementary	2.6
	High school	23.3
	MBO	24.1
	Bachelor	19.0
	Master	29.3
	MBA	0.9
	PhD	0.9
Ethnic minority (%)	Yes	25.0
	No	75.0

differentiation on both core tasks (see figure 5.1). Bureaucrats with official investigative authority are depicted in blue and without investigative authority in red. Figure 5.1 clearly indicates that some types of street-level bureaucrats can be differentiated from others based on a service-oriented or regulation-oriented core task.

The structure of the data was explored further using cluster analysis allowing the identification of optimal grouping of observations in clusters and dissimilarities across clusters. Hierarchical clustering was used since the optimal n of clusters is unknown (Rencher, 2003). In interpreting the agglomeration statistics[2] of hierarchical cluster analysis it was not two, but three clusters that were optimal[3] with a maximum silhouette width of 0.46. k-means clustering was used to identify which types of street-level bureaucrats belong to which cluster[4] (Rencher, 2003). Table 5.2 displays the mean scores of the three clusters on both core tasks. 65 percent is the total variance that is explained by the clustering.

The first cluster can be classified as primarily service-oriented that scores higher on the service-oriented (M = 4.95) than regulation-oriented (M = 3.94) core task. Street-level bureaucrats in this cluster include, for instance, nurses, maternity assistant and elementary school teachers. The second cluster is primarily regulation-oriented scoring high on the regulation-oriented (M = 5.30) core task and low on service-oriented (M = 3.90). Bureaucrats in this cluster are, amongst others, parking officers, customs officers and healthcare inspectors. Finally, the third cluster scores high on both core tasks (M = 5.06 on regulation-oriented, M = 5.35 on service-oriented). This cluster includes, for instance, youth care workers, debt councillors and police officers. Figure 5.2 shows the composition of all three clusters where cluster 1 is indicated by green, cluster 2 by red and cluster 3 by blue.

[2] Including euclidean distance, dendrogram, cluster membership, silhouette plot (Hair et al., 1995; Rencher, 2003)

[3] This process resembles the interpretation of a scree plot and its eigen values in factor analysis.

[4] Following Rencher's (2002) both complete and average linkage were compared. The results were similar to a substantial extent indicating that natural clusters were identified in the data (2002

Table 5.2. Cluster means

Cluster	Mean score regulation-oriented	Mean score for service-oriented
1	3.94	4.95
2	5.30	3.90
3	5.06	5.35

Figure 5.1. Mean scores core task of street-level bureaucrat



Figure 5.2. Three-cluster solution



5.4 Study 2

The second study tests whether trait assessments of street-level bureaucrats were affected by core tasks (i.e. issue ownership theory) and gender (i.e. role congruency theory).

Design. A 3*2 within-subject design was used to test the hypothesized relations in a survey experiment. The respondents were asked to imagine that they contacted a local street-level bureaucrat and asked to rate them based on their first impression. Based on the results of the first experiment, the experimental manipulation for core task included three (instead of two) different sets of bureaucrats (i.e. regulation-oriented, service-oriented and both). From each cluster, three bureaucrats were chosen at random to increase generalizability across bureaucrats (see table 5.3). Respondents were randomly allocated to one of three bureaucrats within each treatment group. The second experimental manipulation, for gender, included varying the name of the street-level bureaucrat. Jan indicated male and Anna for female which are typical Dutch names (see also Baekgaard & George, 2018; Riccucci et al., 2016 for similar manipulations). One sentence on the outcome of the contact with the street-level bureaucrat was included to ensure that respondent did not make inferences about possible outcomes that could have affected our treatments and boost realism. The resulting vignette is as follows:

Imagine that you have a question for a [type of bureaucrat based on core task] to which you cannot find the answer yourself. You, therefore, contact a [type of bureaucrat based on core task] by phone. Your request is respondent by [gender].

Your question is answered within the average completion time of 15 minutes.

Procedure. Respondents were asked to fill in demographics first followed by the introduction to the experiment. Then respondents were allocated randomly to one of the six treatment groups. Within each treatment group, respondents were randomly shown one out of three possible street-level bureaucrats (see table 5.3). After the treatment, all respondents filled in an identical post-experiment questionnaire about the dependent variables. Following the well-established trait assessment literature, the dependent variable in this study (trait assessment) was measured using validated items of its two dimensions (perceived competence and warmth) (see Cuddy et al., 2002; Funk, 1999; Gonzales et al., 1995; Goren, 2007; Schneider & Bos, 2014). Respondents were asked 'How well or bad do the following words describe [X]?' The street-level bureaucrat in their treatment replaced X.

Table 5.3. Treatment groups' core task

Core task	Street-level bureaucrats included
Regulation-oriented	1. Municipal enforcer
	2. Customs officer
	3. Healthcare inspector
Service-oriented	1. Nurse
	2. Maternity assistant
	3. Wedding officiant
Both	4. Emergency medical technician
	5. Youth councillor
	6. Debt councillor

The words competent, confident, capable, efficient, intelligent and qualified were used to measure competence. Likeable, good-natured, friendly, warm, sincere and caring measured warmth. All six items were measured on a seven point scale ranging from very bad (1) till very well (7). The items form reliable scales with ω = .89 (competence) and ω = .83 (warmth).

Respondents. The survey experiment was distributed via Qualtrics panels in June 2019 and their software among a sample of the Dutch population (n = 1602) (see table 5.4 for sample characteristics).

Balance checks. A series of (logistic) regressions were used to test whether the six experimental groups were balanced in terms of demographics (age, gender, education level, and ethnicity), prior experience and political preferences (see appendix III). The results indicated that randomization was successful and our sample was balanced across groups, as only one difference was statistically significant. This is comparable to results due to chance (for similar testing and results see Baekgaard & George, 2018).

Table 5.4. Sample characteristics

		Study 2
Age (M)		1969 (SD = 18.67)
Gender (%)	Female	45.4
	Male	54.5
	Other	0.1
Education level (%)	None	1.0
	Elementary	2.1
	High school	27.0
	MBO	32.0
	Bachelor	19.1
	Master	16.4
	MBA	0.8
	PhD	1.6
Ethnic minority (%)	Yes	11.2
	No	88.8

Results

Hypothesis 1. Hypothesis 1 predicted a main effect, more specifically, that bureaucrats with a regulation-oriented core task would be assessed as being (a) more competent and (b) less warm than bureaucrats with a service-oriented core task. Based on study 1, an additional main effect was tested for which no hypothesis was formulated, namely the effect of bureaucrats with both a regulation- and service-oriented core task on both competence and warmth ratings by citizens. ANOVA analysis indicated that the main effect of core task (i.e. regulation-oriented, service-oriented or both) on both competence ($F(1,1599) = 6.24$, $p = .002$) and warmth ratings of bureaucrats by citizens ($F(1,1599) =$ 10.61, $p = .000$) were statistically significant[5].

[5] A MANOVA generated similar significant effects.

Table 5.5. Descriptive statistics competence and warmth ratings

		N	Mean	SD	Min	Max
Competence	Regulation-oriented	534	4.87	1.03	1	7
	Service-oriented	534	5.03	0.95	1	7
	Both	534	5.08	1.05	1	7
	Total	1602	5.00	1.02	1	7
Warmth	Regulation-oriented	534	4.88	1.00	1	7
	Service-oriented	534	5.10	0.96	1	7
	Both	534	5.15	1.06	1	7
	Total	1602	5.04	1.01	1	7

However, for competence, post-hoc analysis showed that hypothesis 1a was rejected. Contrary to expectations, table 5 shows that competence ratings were not the highest, but the lowest, among regulation-oriented bureaucrats (M = 4.87, SD = 1.03). Competence ratings were highest among bureaucrats with a core task of both regulation- and service-oriented (M = 5.08, SD = 1.05), followed by service-oriented bureaucrats (M= 5.03, SD = 0.95). The mean difference in competence ratings between participants exposed to the bureaucrat with a service-oriented core task was 0.16 higher than those exposed to the regulation-oriented bureaucrats. Likewise, participants exposed to the bureaucrats with both a regulation- and service-oriented core task rated the competence of that bureaucrat 0.21 higher than those exposed to the regulation-oriented bureaucrats. Both differences are statistically significant (with p = 0.023 and p = 0.002 respectively) and small effects (with d = 0.16 and d = 0.20 respectively). Notably, the difference between service-oriented bureaucrats and bureaucrats with both core task was not statistically significant (p = 0.751).

For warmth, post-hoc analysis revealed that hypothesis 1b was confirmed. Table 5.5 confirms that warmth ratings of bureaucrats by citizens were the lowest among regulation-oriented bureaucrats (M = 4.88, SD = 1.00). Moreover, the mean difference between participants' ratings of bureaucrats' warmth exposed to the service-oriented bureaucrats was 0.22 higher than those treated to the regulation-oriented bureaucrat. Regulation-oriented bureaucrats were also rated 0.27 lower on warmth than bureaucrats with both core tasks. The effects were statistically significant (p = 001, p = 000) and small (d = 0.22, d = 0.26) (see table 5.6). In line with the mean differences for competence, no statistically significant difference was found between warmth ratings for bureaucrats with both core task and solely the service-oriented core task.

Table 5.6. Main effect on competence and warmth ratings

Dependent variable	Group A	Group B	Mean diff. (A-B)	Std. E	Cohen's *d*
Competence	Service	Regulation	0.16** (0.023)	0.06	0.16
	Both	Regulation	0.21** (0.002)	0.06	0.20
	Both	Service	0.04 (0.751)	0.06	-
Warmth	Service	Regulation	0.22** (0.001)	0.06	0.22
	Both	Regulation	0.27*** (0.000)	0.06	0.26
	Both	Service	0.05 (0.72)	0.06	-

Note: Post hoc using Tukey comparisons, *p-value* between brackets, ***p <.001, **p <.05

In sum, the post-hoc analysis for competence ratings indicated that, although there is a statistically significant effect of bureaucrats' core task on citizens trait ratings of bureaucrats, hypothesis 1a can be rejected because the effect occurs in the opposite direction. To put this differently, bureaucrats with a regulation-oriented core task were assessed as less competent than bureaucrats with a service-oriented core task. In addition, they were also rated as less competent than bureaucrats with both a regulation- and service-oriented core task. Thus, bureaucrats with a regulation-oriented core task were significantly rated less competent than bureaucrats with other core tasks. Hypothesis 1b can be confirmed. In line with expectations, regulation-oriented bureaucrats rated as being less warm than service-oriented bureaucrats. Notably, all effects had a Cohen d around 0.20 meaning that the difference in trait assessments was small.

Hypothesis 2. Hypothesis 2 expected that female bureaucrats would be assessed as being more warm and less competent than male bureaucrats. Independent two-group t-test analysis showed that the effect of gender on competence was not statistically significant ($t(1593) = -0.275$, $p = 0.784$). The mean scores on competence of both male ($M = 4.99$, $SD = 0.98$) and female bureaucrats ($M = 5.00$, $SD = 1.05$) are almost identical. There is a statistically significant difference in mean scores on warmth ($t(1591) = -2.10$, $p = 0.036$). Female bureaucrats were assessed warmer ($M = 5.10$, $SD = 1.05$) than male bureaucrats ($M = 4.99$, $SD = 0.98$). The effect is small with Cohen's d of 0.11. Hypothesis 2 is, thus, only partly confirmed. Female bureaucrats were assessed warmer as predicted, but there was no difference in competence assessment between male and female bureaucrats.

Hypothesis 3. Hypothesis 3 predicted that when issue ownership and gender were congruent (service-oriented*female and regulation-oriented*male), trait assessments would be higher than when issue ownership and gender were incongruent (regulation-oriented*male and service-oriented*female). ANOVA analyses revealed no statistically significant interaction effects for either competence ($F(2,1596) = 2.83$, $p = 0.06$) or warmth ($F(2,1596) = 1.43$, $p = 0.240$). Table 5.7 shows that the means differences across treatment groups are, indeed, highly similar. Hypothesis 3 is rejected.

5.5 Conclusion and discussion

This article has investigated (1) how citizens assess street-level bureaucrats and (2) whether core tasks and gender alter citizens' assessments of bureaucrats' competence and warmth. The results of this paper contribute in three ways to the existing literature.

First and foremost, this article shows that, in the eyes of citizens, one uniform street-level bureaucrat did not exist. A typology of three different groups of bureaucrats was found based on their perceived core task, namely bureaucrats that were (1) regulation-oriented; (2) service-oriented and (3) both. These findings contribute to the street-level bureaucracy literature because they clearly speak to Maynard-Moody & Musheno's (2000; 2003) classical distinction between citizen- and state-agents. Maynard-Moody & Musheno (2000; 2003) revealed two dominant narratives among bureaucrats about how they made decisions. The state-agents stick to rules, regulations and procedures in order to make consistent frontline decisions. The state was central, not the citizen. The citizen-agents put the citizen at the centre with decisions made that were moral and ethical for the client. Our findings show that citizens largely mirror this analytical distinction of role perceptions of bureaucrats based on bureaucrats' core tasks.

Street-level bureaucracy work has focused predominantly on the communalities between different

Table 5.7. Descriptive statistics interaction effect gender*core task

			N	Mean	SD	Min	Max
Competence	Regulation-oriented	Male	267	4.92	1.00	1	7
		Female	267	4.82	1.06	1	7
	Service-oriented	Male	267	4.95	0.98	1	7
		Female	267	5.12	0.93	1	7
	Both	Male	267	5.10	0.96	1	7
		Female	267	5.06	1.13	1	7
	Total	Male	801	4.99	0.98	1	7
		Female	801	5.00	1.05	1	7
Warmth	Regulation-oriented	Male	267	4.89	0.98	1	7
		Female	267	4.88	1.03	1	7
	Service-oriented	Male	267	5.02	0.94	1	7
		Female	267	5.18	0.98	1	7
	Both	Male	267	5.06	1.01	1	7
		Female	267	5.23	1.11	1	7
	Total	Male	801	5.10	1.05	1	7
		Female	801	5.04	1.02	1	7

types of bureaucrats, such as their discretion (e.g. Harrits, 2019; Jilke & Tummers, 2018; Lipsky, 2010; Maynard-Moody & Musheno, 2000; 2003; Pedersen et al., 2018). However, there were also notable differences between bureaucrats. Zacka (2017) illustrated "unlike teachers, police officers carry guns and sometimes make life-or-death decisions; unlike welfare workers, these officers interact not just with individuals seeking services but with the population at large; and unlike social workers, who have repeated encounters with clients through which a personal relationship can develop, our encounters with police officers are often episodic and happen on a one-time basis" (p. 23). This study has shown that focusing on differences between types of bureaucrats, such as their core tasks, can be a fruitful venue for future research. Future research could also investigate whether issue ownership also trickles down to how citizens assess traits of street-level managers (see Gassner & Gofen, 2018) or public managers (see Pedersen et al., 2017).

Second, this article found that street-level bureaucrats' competence and warmth were assessed differently based on their core tasks (i.e. issue ownership theory). Bureaucrats with a primarily regulation-oriented task were assessed as being least warm when compared to bureaucrats executing a service-oriented core task, as well as bureaucrats executing both core tasks. Contrary to expectations, regulation-oriented bureaucrats were also assessed as being least competent. This could indicate that the reputation of regulation-oriented public organizations among citizens was least favourable when compared to than public organizations and this, in turn, trickled down to perceptions of street-level agents. This finding could help explain variations in organizational reputation and help draft reputation management strategies of public organizations (Busuioc & lodge, 2016; Carpenter & Krause, 2012; Maor et al., 2012).

In addition, the less competent and warm traits associated with regulation-oriented bureaucrats also advance insights on citizens' evaluations of the public sector and the potential presence of negativity

bias. Scholarship has been mixed on whether public organizations can steer citizens towards more favourable interpretations (e.g. Baekgaard & Serritzlew, 2016; James, 2010; Olsen, 2015; 2017b; Piotrowski et al., 2017). This study has revealed that a potential explanation could be as to whether public organizations can steer citizens' evaluations was due to their possession of (un)favourable traits (i.e. (not) warm; (not) competent). Moreover, the findings may also have indicated that negative perceptions of public organizations cannot just be clustered by subgroups of citizens (Hvidman, 2018), but also in subgroups of public organizations or their street-level agents. Future research could investigate whether stereotypical notions of street-level bureaucrats can also trickle back up to how citizens assess public organizations at large. Experimental methods would be particularly suitable for this.

Third, bureaucrats' competence and warmth were also assessed differently based on the bureaucrats' gender. No differences were found in competence assessments between male and female bureaucrats. However, female bureaucrats were assessed as being slightly warmer than males. This finding contributes to the literature on representative bureaucracy. There are some mixed findings on whether a street-level bureaucrats' gender affects citizens' perceptions (e.g. Doornkamp et al., 2019; Guul, 2018; Piatak & Mohr, 2019). Only Doornkamp et al. (2019) measure stereotypical beliefs, but do so directly which, as the authors themselves already have indicated, is a limitation. This article has dissected stereotypical beliefs in terms of traits. The findings have indicated that differences in warmth could help explain the mixed findings of the effect of a bureaucrats' gender on citizens' biases and performance during service provision.

Fourth, gender and core task did not strengthen or weaken each other's effects. This result contributes to the literature on stereotyping and discrimination (e.g. Harrits, 2019; Jilke & Tummers, 2018; Pedersen et al., 2018; Raaphorst et al., 2018; Thomann & Rapp, 2018; Yang, 2005). It could be that other cues, which were not included in the experimental design, are (in)congruent and, in turn, affect a bureaucrat's trait assessment. Future research could explore the numerous cues citizens can draw on during bureaucrat-citizen encounters or investigate how core tasks and a bureaucrat's gender affect other aspects, such as bureaucrats' trustworthiness.

A note of caution is necessary when interpreting our findings, since all the effects are small. This is not surprising, since the isolated effects of only two cues were tested. In real life, citizens will draw on multiple cues to assess bureaucrats during an encounter. These small effects are also in line with stereotyping research that have shown that cues work in subtle ways (Raaphorst et al., 2018). However, even small effects could have profound implications for the day-to-day interactions of citizens with bureaucrats and, potentially, how trustworthy and cooperative people behave during those encounters. This article has shown that bureaucrats were, much like citizens, stereotyped in terms of traits based on core tasks and gender. Future research is needed to assess the implications of the variations in trait assessment identified in this article.

As with any research, there are limitations to this study. First, a prime limitation of survey experiments is their low external validity because simplistic treatments are induced which are less complex than real world settings. This limitation should be taken into account and, on the one hand, citizens can be expected to use cues to assess traits of bureaucrats based on more than one heuristic in real life encounters. On the other hand, reliance on heuristics may be even more prone in real life settings, since multiple stereotypical cues will be available to the citizen regarding the same characteristic of the street-level bureaucrat. Core tasks, for instance, could be induced by function, clothing and type of office. Second, more research is necessary to assess whether the classification of bureaucrats based on issue ownership (study 1) and the effects on trait assessments of bureaucrats (study 2) also holds valid in contexts other than in the Netherlands. Third, though it was not the aim of this article, no conclusions can be drawn about the implications for citizens' attitudes or behaviours towards

governments, or whether this matters for successful service provision. The well-established literature on trait assessments shows that such differences impact the severity of punishment (e.g. Blair et al., 2004; Eberhardt et al., 2006; Zebrowitz & McDonald, 1991) or electoral success (e.g. Funk, 1999; Goren, 2007; Hayes, 2005). This article has established an important first step in understanding how citizens assess street-level bureaucrats' traits. Future research could go on to dissect the effects of trait assessment for the ways in which bureaucrat-citizens encounters unfold and how citizens behave.

This chapter has been revised and resubmitted to an international peer-reviewed journal.

Chapter 6

The (un)intended effects of street-level bureaucrats' enforcement style: Do citizens shame or obey?

Abstract

This study studies the intended and unintended effects of street-level bureaucrats' enforcement style. More specifically, it answers to what extent street-level bureaucrats' enforcement style affects citizens' obedience (i.e. intended effect) during face-to-face encounters and willingness to publicly shame bureaucrats (i.e. unintended effect). Building on insights from street-level enforcement and the theory of social interactionist theory of coercive actions, a trade-off is theorized between the effect of enforcement style on citizens' on-the-spot obedience and on public shaming. Results of an experiment (n = 318) and replication (n = 311) in The Netherlands reveal that (1) neither the legal nor facilitation dimension has an effect on on-the-spot obedience; (2) the legal dimension does not affect public shaming but; (3) the facilitation decreases it. These findings are robust across the experiment and replication.

6.1 Introduction

Why street-level bureaucrats behave the way they do is a central topic in public management and public administration research (e.g. Petersen et al., 2018; Tummers et al., 2015; Van Engen et al., 2016). There is also growing attention for how bureaucrats assess citizens (Harrits, 2018; Jilke & Tummers, 2018; Keulemans & van der Walle, 2018; Pedersen et al., 2017; Raaphorst et al., 2017) What is lacking from this debate, however, is how citizens assess street-level bureaucrats. Citizens' assessment of street-level bureaucrats is relevant to explore since bureaucrats' behaviour if often perceived more negative than intended (Mascini & Van Wijk, 2009). Such assessments by citizens matter because they can affect service provision by, for instance, increasing efforts by citizens during bureaucrat-citizen encounters (Guul, 2018; Riccucci et al., 2015). This is especially prevalent for bureaucrats working in enforcing professions such as police officers, traffic wardens, conductors or inspectors who deal with disobedience which has been labelled a 'negative' citizen behaviour (Gofen et al., 2018). These enforcing bureaucrats limit citizens' freedom by sanctioning non-compliant behaviour (Sparrow, 2000) making them especially prone for negative assessments of citizens.

The frontline enforcement of bureaucrats is often referred to as enforcement style which is defined as their attitude during public encounters towards citizens while enforcing public policies and issuing sanctions (de Boer, 2018; May & Winter, 1999; 2000). Most scholarship investigates the effect of the compliers' motivations or regulatory structures on citizens' (dis)obedience (Ayres & Braithwaite, 1992; Kagan, 1994; May, 2005; Winter & May, 2001) but rarely focuses on what bureaucrats do during public encounters to ensure immediate or 'on-the-spot' obedience (i.e. compliance) (Gofen et al., 2018). In turn, surprisingly few studies test the direct effect of enforcement style on obedience during face-to-face encounters and, in turn, no uniform conclusions can be drawn.

More importantly, scholars largely ignore that street-level bureaucrats' enforcement style can result in other citizens' behaviour such as negative assessments (see Mascini & Van Wijk, 2009; May & Winter, 2011) which happen largely in the online public sphere. Governments are increasingly showing the public via online channels how they are performing which empowers citizens to hold them accountable (see Grimmelikhuijsen & Meijer, 2012; Hupe & Hill, 2016; Van Dooren & Van de Walle, 2008). There is, indeed, growing indication that citizens do. To illustrate, police departments across the globe are active social media to enhance their perceptions among citizens (Grimmelikhuijsen & Meijer, 2015). On top of that, citizens actively provide feedback via social media platforms about the quality of services (Griffiths & Leaver, 2018; Trigg, 2013; Van der Wale, 2016; Van Erp & Loyens, 2018). Moreover, citizens also film and photograph police and share it on social media in order to expose police misconduct (see Potere, 2012). There is also a rise of citizens organizing 'cop-watching' groups who record the behaviour of police officers with smartphones and publish their collected material online (Bock, 2016; Simonsen, 2016). In other words, citizens are increasingly 'watching the watchmen' by shaming them publicly online (see Potere, 2012).

In essence, during public encounters street-level bureaucrats must use their enforcement style to ensure citizens obey when given a sanction while at the same time avoid the potential consequences of negative citizen assessments by getting publicly shamed. In this study, insights from relational distance (see Black, 2010; de Boer & Eshuis, 2018; Grimmelikhuijsen et al., 2019; Trope et al., 2007) and theory of social interactionist theory of coercive actions (Tedeschi & Feldson, 1994) are used to theorize a trade-off between the intended effect of a bureaucrats' enforcement style (i.e. obedience) and the unintended effect (i.e. public shaming). Using this theorized tension, this study answers To what extent does street-level bureaucrats' enforcement style influence citizens' obedience and public shaming of bureaucrats online? Theoretically, this study contributes to our understanding of implications of street-level bureaucrats' enforcement during public encounters for the ways citizen assess bureaucrats (e.g. Pedersen et al., 2017). Methodologically, an experimental

test and replication are conducted. Replications of experiments remain rare while the necessity of replication is increasingly recognized for (dis)confirming theories under (dis)similar conditions (Walker et al., 2017). This study, therefore, adheres to the call for more replication.

The remainder of this study is structured as follows: The conceptual underpinnings and hypothesized relations will be discussed first. Then, the methodological considerations and the experimental design will be explained followed by a discussion of the findings. This study concludes with a discussion and conclusion section addressing the implications of the findings for understanding street-level enforcement and policy implementation across different public management contexts.

6.2 Conceptualizing enforcement style

A street-level bureaucrats' enforcement style is composed of multiple dimensions. During encounters with citizens, street-level bureaucrats will use their discretion to decide how to best combine the different enforcement style dimensions in a specific context which, in the end, makes up their enforcement style. Which constellation of dimensions is combined depends on the context at hand and the street-level bureaucrat him/herself (Nielsen, 2016; Mascini & Van Wijk, 2009; May & Winter, 2000). A bureaucrats' enforcements style depends, thus, to a large degree on the social dynamics between bureaucrat and citizens (see Pedersen et al., 2017; Raaphorst & Loyens, 2018), such as, for instance, the social distance in their relationship due to socio-economic status (Black, 2010). There is no clear consensus in the literature yet concerning the number of dimensions of enforcement style (see May & Winter, 2011). To illustrate, while on the one hand May & Winter (1999; 2000) empirically reveal two dimensions, Lo et al. (2009) on the other hand find five dimensions. Recent research provides empirical evidence that, in a Western context, street-level bureaucrats' enforcement style is composed of three dimensions, namely a (1) legal, (2) facilitation and, (3) accommodation dimension (de Boer, 2018; de Boer et al., 2018).

First, the legal dimension concerns both formal and coercive elements of enforcement. Street-level bureaucrats applying this dimension in their style are generally rigid in their enforcement of policies and threatening by stressing negative consequences of disobedience such as sanctions (see also Kagan, 1994; May & Winter, 1999; 2000; May & Wood, 2003). Second, the facilitation dimension addresses predominately a communicative attitude towards enforcement (see also Lo et al., 2009). To illustrate, street-level bureaucrats adhering to this dimension focus on transferring professional knowledge to help citizens obey regulations. Finally, the accommodation dimension concerns the extent to which opinions about enforcing of others, such as co-workers or team leaders, are considered during encounters with citizens by street-level bureaucrats (see also Lo et al., 2009). Notably, this dimension slightly differs from the first two since it is cognitive and not behavioural in nature. In other words, the accommodation enforcement style dimension will not be directly visible to citizens and, therefore, not directly affect citizens' behaviour whereas the legal and facilitation dimension will (de Boer, 2018; de Boer et al., 2018).

Intended effect: On-the-spot obedience

Often enforcing bureaucrats have to secure obedience with rules, regulations or sanctions directly while interacting with citizens face-to-face. These citizens are not powerless and may hold the power to decide to obey or not. Unlike organizational interventions, street-level bureaucrats often encounter citizens before or while they are non-compliant and are, thus, sanctioned. To illustrate, police officers fining citizens often need to secure obedience on the spot by having the offenders pay directly or fail

by having them wait and object which, in turn, raises bureaucratic paperwork. Ultimately, street-level bureaucrats can use their enforcement style during policy delivery to secure on-the-spot obedience with sanctions (see May & Winter, 1999; 2000). Though little studies test the effect of variations in enforcement style on citizens' on-the-spot obedience with sanctions and the results are not uniform (see May & Winter, 2011), there is a long tradition of evidence indicating that both the legal as well as the facilitation dimension positively affect citizens' obedience. A positive effect is expected from both the legal and facilitation dimension of enforcement style on citizens' obedience.

On the one hand, the legal dimension can stimulate citizens' obedience with sanctions (May & Winter, 1999; 2000; Van Parys & Struyven, 2018) because it, amongst others, signals predictability (Liu et al., 2018). There is, indeed, some empirical support in the classic compliance literature. Nielsen & Parker (2009) find that a legal or 'tit for that' approach rarely occurs in practice, but when it does it improves compliance. Moreover, May & Winter (1999) investigate the direct effect of enforcement style on farmers' compliance with agro-environmental regulations and find a modest positive effect of a legal style (labelled by them as coercion). In addition, Winter & May (2001) investigate compliance of homebuilders. They also find a modest effect of a legal style (labelled by them as formalism) on compliance, especially when the knowledge of regulations and sanctions by homebuilders is low. May & Wood (2003), however, study homebuilders' compliance capacity but do not find any direct effect of enforcement style. Nevertheless, their results do indicate that a legal enforcement style can indirectly affect obedience by increasing future cooperation.

On the other hand, Van Parys & Struyen (2018) state "whereas it was formerly assumed that citizens or firms can only be motivated to [obey with sanctions] by use of coercion, motivation is now considered a much more complex phenomenon downsizing the relative performance of coercive approaches and favouring more cooperative approaches" (p. 4). A growing body of scholarship addresses these cooperative aspects, which are central components of the facilitation dimension and, more specifically, the relationship that forms because of it during enforcing encounters between the street-level bureaucrat and those they regulate (e.g. Ayres & Braithwaite, 1994; Pautz et al., 2017; Pautz & Wamsley, 2012). There is, indeed, growing evidence that a facilitative attitude fosters trust and cooperation (Pautz, 2009; Pautz & Wamsley, 2012) and, in that way, obedience (see Pautz et al., 2017).

Regardless, scholars have started to acknowledge that the effectiveness of how policies are enforced and wrongdoings sanctioned also depends on the social dynamics between street-level bureaucrat and citizens (e.g. Raaphorst & Loyens, 2018; Van der Walle & Raaphorst, 2019). Therefore, it is expected that the strength of the positive effect of a legal and facilitation enforcement style to differ, because the social dynamics differ in repeated and occasional (i.e. one-shot) enforcement interactions. Scholars have stressed the importance of using relational distance to differentiate between repeated and one-shot interactions between bureaucrat and citizens because it may affect how they (intend to) behave (see de Boer & Eshuis, 2018; Liu et al., 2018). We theorize our expected difference by drawing on the notion of relational distance (Black, 2010).

Drawing on the notion of relational distance by Black (2010), de Boer & Eshuis (2018) define relational distance as 'the degree to which the [bureaucrat] and the [citizen] participate in each other's (professional) lives)" (p. 5). Relational distance has been linked to a greater feeling of intimacy, sympathy and trust between actors (see Black, 2010; Pautz & Wamsley, 2012; Hood et al., 1999). Relational distance is affected by multiple dimensions, such as similarities in personal characteristics (e.g. job), frequency of interactions and likelihood of meeting (see Black, 2010; Trope et al, 2007). This study primarily focuses on the distance between two individuals and, thus, the "distance between the perceiver and a social target, that is, another individual or group" (Grimmelikhuijsen et al., 2019, p. 5).

In repeated interactions, the relational distance is low because the frequency of citizen-bureaucrat interactions is high. The bureaucrat and citizen can get to know each other through these repeated interactions and form a relationship which can be used by bureaucrats to persuade citizens towards obedient behaviour (see Baldwin et al., 2012; Boyne et al., 2002, Black, 2010). To illustrate, veterinary inspectors, some of which are permanently based in slaughter houses, have frequent interactions with the slaughter house owners. In one-shot enforcement interactions, however, the relational distance is high because the frequency of interactions is low. The bureaucrat and citizen interact only on occasions and interactions between the same citizen and the same bureaucrat are rare (Baldwin et al., 2012; Boyne et al., 2002, Black, 2010). There will, thus, be little opportunity for the bureaucrats to adequately communicate cooperative intentions nor form a long-lasting relationship (see Mascini & Van Wijk, 2009; Pautz et al., 2017). An example of this type of encounter is between conductors of public transport and citizens. When citizens board a train, their ticket will be checked by a train conductor but the chance of encountering the same conductor regularly is exceptional.

All in all, it is expected that, as mentioned above, both the legal and facilitation dimension positively affect citizens' obedience with sanctions. However, the effectiveness of the facilitation dimension is expected to depend on its ability to foster and nurture trust and a cooperative relationship (see Pautz, 2009; Pautz & Wamsley, 2012) while the effectiveness of the legal dimension does not. It is, therefore, expected that in one-shot enforcement encounters, there is almost no real bureaucrat-citizen relationship to begin with and, in turn, a facilitation style will have a weaker effect on on-the-spot obedience because it cannot succeed in fostering a cooperative and trusting relationship

H1: In one-shot bureaucrat-citizen encounters, the legal enforcement style dimension will have a stronger positive effect on citizens' on-the-spot obedience with sanctions than the facilitation enforcement style dimension

Unintended effects: Public shaming

Scholars often neglect, that there is also indication that a legal enforcement style may have consequences in terms of perverse behaviours by citizens. One way citizens can make their perverse behaviours know is by public shaming. Shaming has a long tradition in the regulation literature as a regulatory instrument where regulators can disclose names of non-compliant businesses in order to steer them towards more favourable behaviours (e.g. Ayres & Braithwaite, 1995; Hood, 2007, Van Erp, 2013). However, citizens increasingly also provide feedback through formal complaints or informal shaming on social media (Griffiths & Leaver, 2018; Trigg, 2013; Van der Wale, 2016; Van Erp & Loyens, 2018). Public shaming is a form of criticizing public organizations or their bureaucrats "which either seeks to induce shame in that person, or at least express a judgement that the person ought to feel ashamed of themselves" (Rowbottom, 2013, p. 1). Even when this feeling of shame is not evoked, public shaming can result in reputational damage and 'blame' for both organizations and individual bureaucrats (de Boer et al., 2018; Hood, 2010; Van Erp, 2011). On top of that, citizens' (negative) feedback plays an increasingly important role in the way regulators enforce (Griffith & Leaver, 2018; Van Erp & Loyens, 2018). An important goal of public shaming is critiquing and negative assessments. This goal is important when investigating citizens since this aspect of public shaming includes a subjective view of the person doing the shaming of actions of the one being shamed. In other words, it included a perceptual judgement of citizens. Public shaming is often done via (online) media outlets (Rowbottom, 2013). But how does a bureaucrats' enforcement style influence public shaming by citizens online?

Two streams of literature help form expectations about public shaming of bureaucrats by citizens. First, there is also indication that a legal enforcement style has a boomerang-effect. Notably, it is hard

for street-level bureaucrats to determine when being legal in their style boomerangs. Mascini & Van Wijk (2009) study the applicability of assumptions in responsive regulation theories among Dutch inspectors and the citizen-clients they regulate. They find that citizens perceive the attitude of the inspectors they interact with as more punitive and negative than the inspectors intended. Citizens tend to focus on the strict and coercive elements of their encounter, such as being threatened with a fine, rather than on positive signals. Mascini & Van Wijk (2009), thus, show that enforcing street-level bureaucrats are unable to fully control the negative consequences of their enforcement style.

Moreover, May & Winter (1999) find that street-level bureaucrats should "get tough up to a point" (May & Winter, 1999, p. 625) but not go beyond that point. In other words, overly applying the legal dimension can stimulate citizens' conformity but only when it is below certain threshold. May & Winter (1999) find that when these thresholds are surpassed, threatening with sanctions (i.e. a core component of the legal dimension) negatively affects obedience and, thus, backfires because it may be perceived as bullying by citizens (see also May & Winter, 2011). Citizens could, in turn, react by resisting with disobedient behaviour such as verbal aggression both offline and online (see Belevedere et al., 2005; Engel, 2003). To put it differently, it is expected that a solely legal enforcement style will have a boomerang-effect and, in turn, perverse effects will occur in the form of publicly shaming bureaucrats.

H2a: In one-shot bureaucrat-citizen encounters, the legal enforcement style dimension increases willingness to publicly shame bureaucrats

This boomerang-effect is not expected to occur for bureaucrats' applying a facilitating style when they sanction citizens. Tedeschi & Feldson's (1994) social interactionist theory of coercive actions is helps ground this expectation. Their theory states that individuals will conduct coercive actions in order to protect their social identity. Coercive actions are considered actions which are intended to be harmful to others, such as public verbal of physical aggression. A central component in Tedeschi & Feldson's (1994) theory is the notion of impression management and saving face as a predictor for coercive actions. When third parties are present during encounters between bureaucrat and citizens, citizens will aim to 'save face' when their authority is challenged. Citizens' authority can be challenges when citizens feel their freedom is restricted or when they believe the street-level bureaucrat is impolite, disrespectful or unfair (Engel, 2003; Engel et al., 2012; Tedeschi & Feldson, 1994).

To illustrate, when citizens are threatened with consequences of violating laws (i.e. a central component of the legal enforcement style) during traffic stops, citizens may disrespect the police officer verbally in public (see Engel, 2003). Building on Tedeschi & Feldson's (1994) social interactionist theory of coercive actions, it is expected that in one-shot public enforcement encounters, where bystanders are present, the facilitation dimension is expected not to backfire because it will not be perceived as overly punitive but rather as more positive and, in turn, does not challenge citizens' authority (Mascini & Van Wijk, 2009; May & Winter, 2011; Tedeschi & Feldson, 1994). This, in turn, is expected to lead citizens to decrease their public shaming of bureaucrats.

H2b: In one-shot bureaucrat-citizen encounters, the facilitation enforcement dimension decreases willingness to publicly shame bureaucrats

6.3 Method

Data collection

To test the hypothesized relations, two survey experiments were sent to a representative sample of citizens of the Dutch population. Experiment 1 was used to test hypothesized mechanism and experiment 2 served as replication to see whether the hypothesized effects hold in a different context (see Walker et al., 2017). Both survey set-ups followed recommendations and requirements by public management and administration research (Lee et al., 2012; Podsakoff et al., 2012). More specifically, both experiments were pre-tested with a pilot study; dependent and independent variables were separated; items of multiple-item questions were highlighted to enhance respondent focus; anonymity of answers was guaranteed, and response bias was minimized by including an introductory statement.

Both experiments and pilot studies were conducted via the online panel organization Qualtrics. Minor adjustments were made based on the results of the pilots (n1 = 150; n2 = 150). Experiment 1 (n3 = 318) was conducted in May 2018 and experiment 2 (n4 = 311) in July 2018. On top of Qualtrics own quality checks, an attention check was included as well as one screener to ensure that participants had at least one social media account (see appendix IIII). Respondents who failed to answer the attention check correctly or had zero social media accounts were excluded from the sample.

Settings

In experiment 1 all respondents were subjected to a hypothetical scenario about getting fined by a train conductor for not having a valid train ticket. In experiment 2 (i.e. replication) only the context was altered to getting fined by a city watch officer for not having a valid parking ticket. Both contexts were chosen for four main reasons. First and foremost, both train conductors and city watch officers are classic street-level bureaucrats enforcing public laws (i.e. buitengewoon opsporingsambtenaar) and sanction wrongdoers accordingly. Second, when you get fined by train conductors and city watch officers this will happen in a public space and, therefore, there will be third parties present. Third, all citizens are likely to have travelled by train or car at least once in their lifetime making it a realistic scenario. Finally, it is rare that a citizen interacts with the same train conductor or city watch officer on multiple occasions ensuring the one-shot nature of the public encounter.

Procedure

First, respondents were asked to fill in questionnaire items about demographics and several confounding factors (i.e. perceived procedural fairness and compliance motivations). Second, respondents were exposed to the treatment which started with a clear introduction to make clear that: (1) they needed to read the hypothetical scenario carefully; (2) their answers would be kept confidential and, more importantly, (3) that though it is a hypothetical situation that they should really try to answer as though a similar situation occurred in their life (see Jilke & Tummers, 2018). Third, respondents were randomly assigned to a control or one of two treatment groups. In each of the three groups the information about the enforcement style of the bureaucrat (i.e. the independent variable in this study) differed. The control group was included to isolate the effect of enforcement style and rule out any other potential explanations. Figure 6.1 displays the survey experiment design. Finally, after the treatment all respondents filled in identical questions about the dependent variables as well

as the manipulation checks.

Figure 6.1. Experimental design



Measures

Enforcement style: The independent variable is enforcement style. This study builds on recent empirical evidence that it consists of three dimensions, namely (1) legal; (2) facilitation and, (3) accommodation (de Boer, 2019). This experiment focuses on the legal and facilitation dimension, since these have behavioural implications for citizens while the accommodation dimension is more cognitive in nature and, therefore, not directly visible to citizens (see de Boer, 2019). For each treatment scenarios were developed (see table 6.1).

Treatment checks: To ensure the treatments were perceived by respondents as intended, three items were formulated to measure the legal and facilitation style as perceived by respondents. Respondents were asked to rate on a ten-point scale to what extent the street-level bureaucrat was 'threatening' (i.e. legal style) or 'advising' (i.e. facilitation style). Principal Component Analysis (PCA) indicated that both three-item scales measure one underlying construct and the scales indicated good reliability (in n3, α = .882 for legal and α = .907 for facilitation; in n4, α = .852 for legal and α = .797 for facilitation).

Citizens' obedience: Obedient behaviors are hard to measure and has been measured in many different ways (see May & Winter, 2011; Parker & Nielsen, 2009). This study builds on Gofen et al. (2019) who take a bottom-up perspective to citizen obedience which entails a focus on interventions taken by bureaucrats during public encounters and, in turn, on situations where citizens can be sanctioned. In this study respondents are exposed to a vignette in which they did do not have a valid ticket. On-the-spot obedience is, then, operationalized as one dichotomous item giving respondents two options, namely (1) pay the bureaucrat the fine immediately (i.e. obedience) or (2) object to the fine and not pay the bureaucrat the fine immediately (i.e. disobedience). This latter is understood as disobediencesince the citizen is choosing a behaviour which is not in line with full cooperation (i.e. paying the fine immediately) and poses more administrative burdens on both bureaucrat and citizen.

Public shaming of bureaucrats by citizens: Building on the idea of 'naming and shaming' (see Rowbottom, 2013; Van Erp, 2011) public shaming of street-level bureaucrats by citizens is understood as a citizens' criticizing bureaucrats and their individual characteristics via online platforms. Respondents were asked to answer three items about what they would write in an online review about their interaction with the conductor. The first item ('what is the tone of your review') addressed

Table 6.1. Experiment scenarios (varies independent variable: enforcement style)

	Experiment treatment	**Scenario**
Experiment		You travel by train today. At the train station, you held your OV- chipcard against the in check gates and you boarded the train. While on the train, the conductor comes by. You hand over your OV-chipcard to the conductor. Your ticket is not valid, because of a tear in your OV- chipcard. Due to the tear the portable scanner of the conductor cannot validate your ticket. You get fined with the statutory mandatory raise of € 50 euros
	Group 1 (control)	-
	Group 2 (legal)	The conductor says that the law is very clear and you have to have a valid ticket at all times and you do not have that. The conductor threatens that severe consequences always follow immediately when you do not follow the law.
	Group 3 (facilitation)	The conductor says that it can happen that your OV-chipcard does not function properly. The conductor gives you very useful tips on how you can easily apply for a new OV-chipcard and where you can find all the information you need.
Replication		You parked your car at a parking facility at a public street today. At the pay point, you paid for parking and you put the receipt behind your windshield. When you want to leave, a city watch officer is standing next to your car. Your parking receipt is not valid, because of a tear in the receipt. Due to the tear the portable scanner of the city watch officer cannot validate your receipt. You get the statutory fine for parking without paying of € 50 euros.
	Group 1 (control)	-
	Group 2 (legal)	The city watch officer says that the law is very clear and you have to have a valid receipt at all times and you clearly do not have that. The city watch officer threatens that severe consequences always follow immediately when you do not follow the law.
	Group 3 (facilitation)	The city watch officer says that it can happen of course that there is a tear in a parking receipt. The city watch officer gives you very useful tips on how you can easily pay using all kinds of other ways than the physical pay point and where you can find all the information you need.

the tone of the review and taps into the criticizing aspect of public shaming of bureaucrats. The second item ('how do you describe the interaction with the conductor') addressed the interaction with the conductor and focuses on the behaviour of the bureaucrat. The third item ('how do you describe the conductor') focuses on individual characteristics of the bureaucrat. All items had polar opposites. The scale was reversed for analysis for interpretation purposes. The lower the score, the lower the public shaming. PCA indicated that all three items measured one underlying construct which is highly reliable (in n3, $\alpha = .835$; in n4, $\alpha = .890$)

Potential covariates: On top of demographic controls (i.e. age, gender, education level and ethnicity) two main potential covariates were identified based on previous literature, namely (1) perceived procedural fairness and (2) compliance motivations (i.e. calculative, normative and social) (see Grimmelikhuijsen & Meijer, 2015; Nielsen & Parker, 2009; Winter & May, 2011).

A complete overview of all items can be found in the appendix IIII and of the factor analyses in appendix V.

6.4 Results

Descriptive statistics

Table 6.2 depicts the descriptive statistics for both samples concerning year of birth, gender, education level, ethnicity and number of social media accounts. Both samples are largely similar with the exception of the distribution of gender[6].

Balance and manipulation checks

First, a series of ANOVA's and chi-squared tests were used to test whether the experimental groups were balanced concerning demographics (age, gender, education level, ethnicity) and possible covariates (total number of social media accounts, daily social media use, extent of usage of train/car, previous experience with train/car fines, compliance motivations and procedural fairness[7]). In experiment 1, the mean response in the control- and legal treatment group differed concerning normative compliance motivation ($F(2, 315) = 3.7$, $p = .026$). Normative compliance motivation was, therefore, included as a covariate in the hypotheses testing of experiment 1 as a robustness check.

[6] The next section 'randomization and manipulation checks' shows that randomization in both experiments was successful regarding gender which ensures that possible differences in outcomes are not caused by the difference in gender distribution.

[7] Procedural fairness also concerns the treatment of citizens (see Grimmelikhuijsen & Meijer, 2012). First, the 3-item measure implemented prior to the treatment yielded no significant differences across groups which shows that perceived procedural fairness does not confound our findings. Second, it could also be argued that our treatment concerns procedural fairness (rather than enforcement style). Therefore, a 1-item measure about sanction fairness was included after the treatment. If our treatment induces procedural fairness rather than enforcement style significant differences across treatment groups are expected. ANOVA with Tukey corrections for multiple comparisons (see Field, 2013) is not statistically significant for experiment 1 nor experiment 2. This indicates that the treatment does not induce procedural fairness.

Table 6.2. Sample characteristics

		Experiment 1 (n = 318)	**Experiment 2 (n = 311)**
Year of birth (M)		1980.08 (SD = 14.46)	1968.40 (SD = 15.73)
Gender (%)	Female	65.1	42.4
	Male	34.9	57.2
	Other	0	0.3
Education level (%)	None	0.3	0.6
	Elementary	3.5	2.9
	High school	27.0	30.9
	MBO	29.6	31.2
	Bachelor	17.0	18.3
	Master	18.6	14.1
	MBA	0.6	1.0
	PhD	3.5	1.0
Ethnic minority (%)	Yes	18.2	12.9
	No	81.8	87.1
Total SM accounts (M)		3.55 (SD = 1.85)	2.84 (SD =1.78)

Second, respondents were asked to respond to two sets of questions right after the experimental scenarios to measure the effectiveness of the treatment. A MANOVA as well as post-hoc analyses confirm that the treatments influenced the respondents as intended in both experiments. In both experiment 1 ($V = .32$, $F(4, 630) = 29.6$, $p = .000$) and 2 ($V = .16$, $F(4, 616) = 13.69$, $p = .000$) there is a significant effect of the treatment on the manipulation perception. For experiment 1, the mean score of legal treatment group is highest for the legal items ($M = 6.75$, $SD = 2.54$) and this mean differs significantly from the control group ($p = .005$)[8]. Likewise, the mean score of the facilitation treatment group is highest for the facilitation items ($M = 7.30$, $SD = 2.59$) and this mean score differs significantly from the control group ($p = .000$). Table 6.3 shows that this pattern is identical in experiment 2. It has to be noted that respondents in experiment 2 perceive the enforcement style is, on average, perceived as more legal ($M = 6.40$, $SD = 2.44$ compared to $M = 5.55$, $SD = 2.64$ in experiment 1) and less facilitating ($M = 4.97$, $SD = 2.17$ compared to $M = 5.44$, $SD = 2.59$ in experiment 1) than respondents in experiment 1. This difference should be taken into account when interpreting the results.

[8] There are no changes in significant findings when normative compliance motivation is included as a covariate.

Table 6.3. Descriptive statistics treatments

		N	Mean	SD	Std. E	Min	Max
Experiment 1: Train conductor							
Legal style	Control group	106	5.70	2.37	.23	1	10
	Legal group	106	6.75	2.54	.25	1	10
	Facilitation group	106	4.20	2.38	.23	1	10
	Total	318	5.55	2.64	.15	1	10
Facilitation style	Control group	106	4.82	2.46	.24	1	10
	Legal group	106	4.20	2.42	.24	1	10
	Facilitation group	106	7.30	2.59	.17	1	10
	Total	318	5.44	2.59	.15	1	10
Experiment 2: City watch officer							
Legal style	Control group	103	6.39	2.38	.23	1	10
	Legal group	105	7.33	2.26	.22	1	10
	Facilitation group	103	5.48	2.33	.23	1	10
	Total	311	6.40	2.44	.14	1	10
Facilitation style	Control group	103	4.62	2.06	.20	1	10
	Legal group	105	4.37	2.20	.22	1	10
	Facilitation group	103	5.93	1.91	.19	1	10
	Total	311	4.97	2.17	.12	1	10

Table 6.4. Manipulation check

	Group A	Group B	Mean diff. (A-B)	Std. E
Experiment 1: Train conductor				
Legal dimension	Control	Legal	-1.05**	.33
	Control	Facilitation	1.50***	.33
	Legal	Facilitation	2.56***	.33
Facilitation dimension	Control	Legal	.62	.31
	Control	Facilitation	-2.48***	.31
	Legal	Facilitation	-3.09***	.31
Experiment 2: City watch officer				
Legal dimension	Control	Legal	-.95**	.32
	Control	Facilitation	.91**	.32
	Legal	Facilitation	1.85***	.32
Facilitation dimension	Control	Legal	.26	.29
	Control	Facilitation	-1.31***	.29
	Legal	Facilitation	-1.56***	.29

Note: MANOVA with Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons; ***$p < .001$, **$p < .05$

Hypotheses testing

Hypothesis 1 predicted that a legal style would have a stronger positive effect on citizens' obedience than the facilitation style dimension. Table 6.5 reports the contingency table for experiment 1 showing that, regardless of the assigned group, the majority of respondents disobey. The percentage of respondents who report non-compliance ranges between 72 and 75. In other words, contrary to our expectation formulated in H1, experiment 1 finds no significant differences between groups exposed to the legal dimension. Likewise, the facilitation dimension does not affect obedience. Results from experiment 2 confirms this result and also indicate that the majority of respondents report disobedience (with a range from 80 till 87 percent) and there are no significant difference between groups (see table 5). Hypothesis 1 is, therefore, rejected.

Table 6.5. Contingency table citizens' obedience

		Control group	**Legal group**	**Facilitation group**
Experiment 1: Train conductor ($\chi2$ = .264, df = 2, p = .876)				
Obedience	Count	31 (29.2 %)	34 (32.1 %)	34 (31.1 %)
Disobedience	Count	75 (70.8 %)	72 (67.9 %)	72 (67.9 %)
Total	Count	106 (100 %)	106 (100%)	106 (100 %)
Experiment 2: City watch officer ($\chi2$ = 2.136, df = 2, p = .344)				
Obedience	Count	16 (15.5 %)	24 (22.9 %)	23 (22.3 %)
Disobedience	Count	87 (84.5 %)	81 (77.1 %)	80 (77.7 %)
Total	Count	103 (100 %)	105 (100 %)	103 (100 %)

Note: Column percentages between brackets

Hypothesis 2a predicted that the legal style dimension would increase public shaming of bureaucrats by citizens online while hypothesis 2b predicted that the facilitation style dimension would have no effect on public shaming of bureaucrats. For both experiment 1 (F(2, 315) = 20.01, p = .000[9]) and experiment 2 (F(2, 310) = 10.22, p = .000) the ANOVA indicates an overall significant effect of street-level bureaucrats' enforcement style on citizens' public shaming of bureaucrats online. Since the overall effect is statistically significant in both experiments, follow-up analysis are conducted.

Regarding hypothesis 2a, table 6.6 shows that in experiment 1 citizens' public shaming is highest in the legal treatment group (M = 6.30, SD = 2.05). Nevertheless, table 6.7 reveals that the mean difference between the control and legal treatment group is not statistically significant (p = .066 for ANOVA and p = .292 for ANCOVA with normative motivation as a covariate. These findings are identical in experiment 2. In experiment 2, public shaming is also highest in the legal treatment group (M = 6.77, SD = 2.29). Similar to experiment 1, the mean differences between groups are not statistically significant (p = .199). To put it differently, citizens' do not publicly shame street-level bureaucrats more via only platforms when they uphold the legal dimension. Hypothesis 2a is, thus, not confirmed.

[9] There are no changes in significant findings when normative compliance motivation is included as a covariate.

Table 6.6. Descriptive statistics public shaming of bureaucrats by citizens

		N	Mean	SD	Std. E	Min	Max
	Experiment 1: Train conductor						
Public shaming by citizens	Control group	106	5.65	2.29	.22	1	10
	Legal group	106	6.30	2.05	.20	1	10
	Facilitation group	106	4.55	1.70	.17	1	10
	Total	318	5.50	2.15	.12	1	10
	Experiment 2: City watch officer						
Public shaming by citizens	Control group	103	6.20	2.31	.23	1	10
	Legal group	105	6.77	2.29	.22	1	10
	Facilitation group	103	5.38	2.06	.20	1	10
	Total	311	6.12	2.29	.13	1	10

Table 6.7. Main effect

Dependent variable	**Group A**	**Group B**	**Mean diff. (A-B)**	**Std. E**
Experiment 1: Train conductor				
Public shaming by citizens	Control	Legal	-.64	.28
	Control	Facilitation	1.10***	.28
	Legal	Facilitation	1.74***	.28
Experiment 2: City watch officer				
Public shaming by citizens	Control	Legal	-.57	.31
	Control	Facilitation	.82**	.31
	Legal	Facilitation	1.39***	.31

Note: ANOVA with Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons; ***p <.001, **p <.05

In addition, with regard to experiment 1 table 6 indicates that citizens' public shaming is lowest in the facilitation treatment group (M = 4.55, SD = 1.70). The ANOVA results indicate that the mean difference between the control and facilitation treatment group is statistically significant (p = .000 for both ANOVA and ANCOVA with normative motivation as covariate). The mean of public shaming by citizens online is 1.10 lower in the facilitation group than in the control group. The second experiment also confirms these findings. Table 7 shows that, similar to experiment 1, public shaming is lowest in the facilitation treatment group (M = 5.38, SD = 2.06). On top of that, the mean difference between the facilitation and control group is statistically significant (p = .026). The mean public shaming is .82 lower than the control group. The results from both experiments confirm hypothesis 2b and show that the facilitation enforcement style dimension has a negative effect (i.e. decreases) public shaming.

In sum, results indicate that, in one-shot encounters, the enforcement style of street-level bureaucrats does not significantly impact citizens' obedience (H1). In addition, when street-level bureaucrats uphold the legal dimension, citizens will not publicly shame them online (H2a). However, when bureaucrats have use the facilitation dimension, citizens will be more positive in their online review

and, thus, publicly shame them less (H2b). The findings, thus, indicate that a legal style does not backfire and does not result in public shaming of bureaucrats by citizens but a facilitation style does diminish public shaming. All findings were consistent across the experiment and its replication (i.e. experiment 2).

6.5 Conclusion and discussion

This study experimentally investigated the effect of street-level bureaucrats' enforcement style on two intentions of citizens, their obedience with sanctions and assessments of street-level bureaucrats in the form of publicly shaming bureaucrats online. Building on street-level enforcement literature and active role of citizens in bureaucrat-citizens encounters it is theorized that there is a tension for bureaucrats between ensuring on-the-spot obedience (i.e. the intended effect) and getting publicly shamed online (i.e. the unintended effect). Based on a survey experiment and replication, three main conclusions can be drawn.

First and foremost, this study indicates that in one-shot public encounters where the relational distance between citizen and bureaucrat is high neither a legal nor a facilitation style stimulates citizen intentions to obey. A possible explanation for this finding can be formulated by building on the notion of interactional justice which addresses quality of the treatment individuals receive by authorities and, specifically, the extent to which individuals affected by decisions from authorities are treated respectfully and with dignity (see Bies, 2005; Grimmelikhuijsen & Meijer, 2012; Tyler, 2003). In this line of reasoning, it could be theorized that, for instance, the threatening aspect of a legal enforcement style may be perceived as illegitimate and disrespectful by citizens who, in the end, will resist and not comply. Future research needs to move beyond solely controlling for the covariate effect of procedural justice, which we did in this study, and test the feasibility of interactional justice as an explanation by using it as a treatment or dependent variable in an experimental design. For practitioners this implies when getting fined, street-level bureaucrats cannot use their enforcement style to ensure citizens' obey with paying immediately.

In this study, the covariate effect of compliance motivations was controlled for and there is no indication that this explains citizens' (non-)compliance. However, compliance motivation researchers could still be correct in that citizens' obedience is primarily determined by their compliance motivations (e.g. May, 2005; Nielsen & Parker, 2012; Parker & Nielsen, 2008; 2012; Peterson & Diss-Torrance, 2012; Winter & May, 2001) and not the enforcement style of the street-level bureaucrat that fines them. In this study, compliance motivations scales are self-assessed motivations. Future research could set out to manipulate the compliance motivations of citizens and distil if these do explain their (dis-)obedient behaviours. For instance by offering respondents more or less money if they comply. Scholars could also study compliance motivations as dependent variables to test whether street-level bureaucrats' enforcement style or other enforcement instrument are able to alter them and, in this way, nudge citizens towards more obedience. Experimental methods will be especially helpful.

Secondly, it can be concluded that street-level enforcement style does not boomerang in one-shot encounters in the form of shaming of street-level bureaucrats by citizens online. A potential explanation is that, in this study, citizens did not experience the tipping point beyond which enforcement style would backfire. The shape of the boomerang-effect differs in the studies indicating that it may occur as a consequence of getting too 'tough' (see Liu et al., 2018; Winter & May, 1999). Future research is needed to fully distil this boomerang mechanism. More research is also needed to explore other potential negative consequences for street-level bureaucrats than public shaming when they get too 'tough' or 'soft' while interacting with citizens, for instance in terms of physical aggression.

Observational studies will especially be fruitful because they allow the researcher to make sense of negative consequences first hand. For practitioners this implies that, at least in one-shot encounters, the likelihood of getting shamed online when fining a citizen is low.

Third and finally, the experimental findings do show that their enforcement style results less public shaming and, perhaps even 'public faming.' When street-level bureaucrats execute a facilitation style, the shaming in the online review decreases and, ultimately, citizens express themselves more positive online about the bureaucrat they interact with. Tying this finding back to the lack of support for a legal style to result in public shaming, this study could indicate that citizens may not have a strong negativity bias (see Hood, 2007) when it comes to one-shot public encounters with street-level bureaucrats. More research is needed to test this idea and dissect how negativity bias works at the street-level. Scholars could, for instance, conduct comparative research aimed at dissecting how negative and positive experiences with enforcing bureaucrats are viewed by citizens and, ultimately, their behaviours towards governments.

This study has, like any research, both theoretical and methodological limitations. A first theoretical limitation is that this research is conducted in a Western context, namely The Netherlands and it is unclear how these results translate to non-Western context. There is already substantive body of research addressing enforcement of street-level bureaucrats in non-Western contexts (e.g. Liu et al., 2018; Lo et al., 2009) but not regarding unintended consequences such as public shaming. More comparative research is needed to determine how the Dutch context influences the results and how its implications can be generalized to other countries. Second, this study specifically explored the effect of enforcement style in one-shot bureaucrat-citizen encounters. It may be, however, that a bureaucrats' enforcement style only matters in bureaucrat-citizen encounters where there are repeated interactions (see Baldwin et al., 2012; Boyne et al., 2002, Black, 2010) with trust and familiarity between bureaucrat and citizen (Pautz, 2009; Pautz & Wamsley, 2012). Future research may investigate this mechanism in repeated interactions, for instance through experimental research with multiple rounds or set up observational research comparing both one-shot and repeated bureaucrat-citizen encounters.

Methodologically, the first limitation is that, though there seems to be consensus that street-level bureaucrats combine different dimensions of enforcement style during public encounters (Nielsen, 2016; Mascini & Van Wijk, 2009; May & Winter, 2000), the interaction between both enforcement styles was not incorporated in the experimental design. It is, therefore, not possible to draw conclusions about the effects of combined enforcement styles. Nevertheless, there is only limited research addressing the impact of enforcement style on citizen obedience. (e.g. May & Winter, 1999; 2000; May & Wood, 2003; Nielsen & Parker, 2009). Testing the direct effects is necessary before indirect effects can be included. Second, both dependent variables in this study are a behavioural intention and not actual behaviour. It remains unclear how citizens actually behave. Future research could use machine learning techniques to study actual online reviews written by citizens about public services. Third, citizens did not have the option to not shame the bureaucrat via the online review. This could affect our results because only a small portion of the respondents may actually shame bureaucrats if we would have offered an exit option. We tried to minimize this limitation by including a selection criteria to ensure respondents had at least one social media account ensuring they could envision writing an online review. Replications of our findings including a design improvement allowing citizens to not fill in an online review at all are needed to verify our findings.

Fourth, this experiment focuses on public shaming as the negative assessment and it could be that only a small group of citizens actually interact with street-level bureaucrats online (Grimmelikhuijsen & Meijer, 2015) raising questions about the external validity which is a common weakness of experimental studies (James et al., 2017). There is, however, a digital street (de Graaf & Meijer, 2018)

and substantive indication that citizens do write online reviews to evaluate services they receive (Chan, 2016; Mishna et al., 2012; Trigg, 2014). More importantly, both the experiment and replication were piloted and respondents indicated that the depicted situation could occur in real life indicating that in a Dutch context, citizens deemed it realistic. Fifth, this study did not control for personality characteristics nor usage of social media. In this way, this study cannot provide an explanation for why some respondent do (not) shame bureaucrats online. Finally, the experiment includes a scenario in which the disobedience of the respondent is not as clear-cut which makes it ideal for testing variations chosen by the bureaucrat regarding enforcement style. However, it could influence the dependent variables in this study. Future research would benefit from comparative work including both clear-cut and less clear-cut violating behaviour of citizens. This could, for instance, be done by assigning clear roles to subjects about their (dis)obedience.

Despite its limitations, this study provides experimental evidence which is robust across two different one-shot public encounters with enforcing street-level bureaucrats (i.e. train conductor and a city watch officer). Moreover, it is, to our knowledge, the first of its kind to investigating how citizens assess behaviour of street-level bureaucrats through public shaming and provides evidence that that how bureaucrats sanction (i.e. enforcement style) does not matter for citizen obedience with sanctions but does matter for how citizens assess bureaucrats.

Chapter 7

Conclusion

7.1 Recapping the research question

The research aim of this dissertation was to understand what happens to both street-level bureaucrats and citizens during frontline encounters in the context of enforcement when transparency comes into play. This topic is important to understand because transparency continues to root itself into public organizations. Meanwhile, academics have primarily focused on effects external to those public organizations, such as increasing citizens' trust, and tackling such issues as low public performance perceptions and raising participation rates (see Cucciniello et al., 2017 for an overview). Other actors also, such as citizens, increasingly have contributed to transparency of public organizations and street-level agents (e.g. Brucato, 2015a; 2015b; Trigg, 2014). Understanding how bureaucrats enforce public policies at the frontline is crucial for understanding the functioning of public organizations (see Bartels, 2013; Lipsky, 2010; Zacka, 2017). Therefore, this dissertation investigated:

What are the effects of transparency on street-level bureaucrats and citizens?

This chapter, first, answers the research questions by combining insights from all the empirical chapters (2 through 6) (section 7.1). Second, it discusses what the answers contribute to academia and practice by presenting four key conclusions (section 7.2). Finally, an agenda for future research is given that incorporates the most prominent theoretical and methodological limitations as concluded by this dissertation (section 7.3.).

The overarching question was broken down into five sub-questions as depicted in Table 7.1. While the first three research questions addressed the perspective of the street-level bureaucrat, the fourth and fifth research question addressed the perspective of the citizen.

Table 7.1 Sub-questions

#	Sub-question	Chapter
1	How can street-level bureaucrats' enforcement during frontline encounters be conceptualized and measured?	2
2	What is the effect of transparency on street-level bureaucrats' enforcement and experienced resistance by citizens during frontline encounters?	3
3	What is the effect of transparency on regulatory performance and does street-level bureaucrats' relational distance from citizens matter?	4
4	In frontline encounters with little transparency, how are different street-level bureaucrats assessed by citizens in terms of warmth and competence traits?	5
5	What is the effect of street-level bureaucrats' enforcement during frontline encounters on citizens' transparency and obedience?	6

7.2 Answering the research question

This section aims to reveal what the answers are to the research questions by summarizing the findings, as well as conclusions, for each empirical chapter separately.

7.2.1 Sub-question 1: Street-level bureaucrats' enforcement is best conceptualized in three dimensions

Chapter 2 dissected the multi-dimensionality of bureaucrats' attitudes during face-to-face enforcement encounters using the concept of enforcement style (May & Winter, 1999, 2000). Chapter 2 also developed and validated a measurement scale for street-level enforcement style. Based on the enforcement and regulation literature, five underlying dimensions were identified: formalism, coercion, education, prioritization and accommodation. These dimensions can be combined in varying extents and result in a bureaucrats' total enforcement style. Based on the five dimensions, questionnaire items were developed and validated using a survey (n = 507) among inspectors of the NVWA. Results showed that, in a Dutch context, enforcement style consisted of not five, but three dimensions. First, the legal dimension was made up of both formalism (i.e. rigidness) and coercion (i.e. force of the law). Facilitation, the second dimension of enforcement style, was composed of both education (i.e. the communicative function of the law) and prioritization (i.e. considering circumstances at hand). Lastly, accommodation (i.e. considering opinions of others) was a cognitive dimension revealing that colleagues also shape bureaucrats' enforcement activities.

7.2.2 Sub-question 2: Transparency by public organizations intensifies all dimensions of bureaucrats' enforcement attitude and lowers resistance from citizens

Using the same survey data, chapter 3 tested whether transparency by public organizations[10] affected the three dimensions of enforcement attitude and studied the effect of resistance by citizens. Combining insights from the literature on transparency with those of street-level bureaucracy, it was theorized that transparency adds to the uncertainties street-level bureaucrats face while enforcing public policies. In order to reduce these uncertainties, it was expected that bureaucrats' would be stricter (i.e. legal), provide less information (i.e. facilitation) and keep in mind what others think about policy enforcement (i.e. accommodation). The results indicated that the amount of perceived transparency was positively related to all dimensions of enforcement attitude. Contrary to expectations, rather than facilitating less, bureaucrats facilitated more when they perceived more transparency. This may be due to bureaucrats' explaining (i.e. a core aspect of facilitation) the implications of transparency more to citizens, since its implementation was relatively new. Chapter 3 also theorized that transparency would result in more reputational damage for citizens and, in turn, create more resistance towards bureaucrats. The result was surprising: the effect between transparency and resistance by citizens was found to be negative. Thus, this chapter indicated that street-level bureaucrats intensified their enforcement attitude and, potentially, believed it to be an effective instrument to ensure compliance since it reduced resistance at the frontline.

7.2.3 Sub-question 3: Transparency by public organizations enhances performance and, for bureaucrats with frequent encounters with citizens, this is due to the cognitive distance from citizens that transparency creates

Chapter 4 also used survey data from NVWA inspectors. Chapter 4 builds on the surprising result of Chapter 3, namely that the more transparency is perceived, the less perceived resistance there is from citizens. Chapter 4 builds on this result by testing whether street-level bureaucrats found transparency to be positively associated with overall regulatory performance. Chapter 4 argued that, if this is indeed the case, it could explain chapter 3 findings that more transparency leads to less resistance: because transparency is an instrument that stimulates 'good' compliance behaviour and,

[10] In chapter 3 transparency is labelled 'disclosure of performance information'.

thus, lowers resistance. Drawing on capture theory (e.g. Black, 2010; Hood et al., 1999), chapter 4 also studied whether the relational distance between bureaucrats and citizens explained the relationship between transparency and regulatory performance.

It was found that more transparency, indeed, led to better regulatory performance. By comparing two different groups of bureaucrats – one with a high, and one with a low, frequency of face-to-face encounters (i.e. factual relational distance) – this chapter showed that more transparency increases perceived relational distance. More perceived relational distance, in turn, increased perceived regulatory performance. Both results were found only for the bureaucrats who did frequently interact with citizens. This finding indicated that, although it was often stressed that bureaucrats who met citizens often benefited from a close relationship (e.g. Pautz & Wamsley, 2009), transparency can increase bureaucrat-citizen relational distance which benefits performance.

7.2.4 Sub-question 4: In frontline encounters with little transparency, citizens warmth and competence assessment of street-level bureaucrats depend on the bureaucrats' core task and gender

In order to understand what the effects are of street-level bureaucrats' enforcement attitudes on transparency by citizens (sub-question five and chapter 6), it is important to first understand citizens' biases of enforcement bureaucrats whom they have never met and have very limited information about. Chapter 5 builds on the previous chapters because it assessed bureaucrat-citizen encounters where there was not a lot of information available about the street-level bureaucrat. Chapter 5 investigated how citizens assessed bureaucrats who they had encountered for first-time via telephone regarding two traits: warmth and competence. In addition, it was tested as to whether the core task and gender of the bureaucrat altered those trait assessments. Chapter 5 used a factorial survey (n = 580) and survey experiment (n = 1,602) among Dutch citizens. The theorizing was based on issue ownership theory (Hayes, 2005) where it was to be expected that bureaucrats with different core tasks would become 'owners' of different social issues. This ownership, in turn, would affect how citizens were assessed in terms of warmth and competence. Drawing from role congruency theory (e.g. Eagly & Karan, 2002), it also was to be expected that (a) when bureaucrats were assessed differently based on their gender and (b) when the bureaucrats' gender was congruent with their core task, trait assessments would be amplified.

The factorial survey showed that three groups of bureaucrats can be constructed, based on whether their core task was perceived as regulation- or service-oriented by citizens; namely (1) primarily regulation-oriented bureaucrats; (2) primarily service-oriented bureaucrats and; (3) bureaucrats who were both regulation- and service-oriented. The experimental findings showed that regulation-oriented bureaucrats were assessed as less warm than both service-oriented bureaucrats and bureaucrats with both core tasks. Contrary to the hypothesized relations, regulation-oriented bureaucrats were also assessed as less competent than the two other groups of bureaucrats. This could be due to the more punitive reputation that regulatory organizations have (see Carpenter & Krause, 2012). Moreover, female bureaucrats were assessed as warmer than males. Both female and male bureaucrats were assessed as equally competent. These findings indicated that citizens relied on stereotypical notions of bureaucrats when assessing their traits and, ultimately, these assessments varied.

7.2.5 Sub-question 5: Neither a legal nor facilitation enforcement attitude results in citizens' obedience, but facilitation lowers their negative transparency intentions

Chapter 6 builds on chapter 5 by conducting an experiment and replication with two regulation-oriented bureaucrats: parking officers and conductors. Chapter 6 aimed to enhance understanding of the citizen-side of service provision by testing the effects of street-level bureaucrats' enforcement attitudes on citizens' intentions to obey paying a fine and to be negative in their public transparency[11]. Drawing from literature on enforcement style, relational distance and the social interactionist theory of coercive actions (Tedeschi & Feldson, 1994), it was theorized that a legal attitude would have led to more obedience than facilitation, but a legal attitude also would have led to public shaming (i.e. negative transparency). Using a survey experiment (n = 318) and a replication (n = 311) among Dutch citizens, the findings showed no effect of a legal, nor facilitation attitude on obedience in situations where citizens had met a bureaucrat for the first time. Moreover, being legal did not result in more intended shaming by citizens. However, being facilitative did result in less intended shaming. Chapter 6 showed that when bureaucrats were facilitating, citizens intended to be positive in their transparency about their encounters with bureaucrats.

7.3 The four key conclusions

The previous section has shown 'what' this dissertation found by answering the central research question via its sub-questions. However, it did lead one to wonder 'so what' does this answer mean for understanding transparency at the frontline? Answering the research question does not end this debate – it is only the beginning. Therefore, this section moves beyond solely answering the research question and reflects on their implications for academia and practice. This reflection is structured by presenting the four key conclusions of this dissertation to move the discussion on transparency's frontline implications forward.

7.3.1 Conclusion 1 – Transparency helps street-level bureaucrats to do their job

This conclusion discusses how transparency facilitated street-level bureaucrats in executing their core tasks. First, transparency enhanced overall regulatory performance. The effect of transparency on regulatory performance was almost twice the size for bureaucrats with frequent interactions compared with those with infrequent interactions (with st.B = .419 and .245 respectively). Thus, transparency seemed to be especially helpful for those bureaucrats with frequent interactions with citizens. A positive effect was found of perceived relational distance on performance for bureaucrats with regular contact with citizens, but this effect did not occur for bureaucrats without regular contact. More transparency was found to enlarge perceived relational distance only for bureaucrats with close contact with citizens. This could indicate that street-level bureaucrats, especially who frequently meet citizens, struggled to not get too close (i.e. capture) to citizens as this complicated doing their job. Therefore, transparency can create the distance from citizens that the bureaucrats with frequent contact needed during frontline encounters. Last, but not least, this dissertation found that enforcing policies during frontline encounters was helped by transparency since it reduced resistance that bureaucrats experienced (st.B = 0.306).

This conclusion contributes to the scholarly debate between transparency 'optimists' and 'skeptics' (see Grimmelikhuijsen, 2012) by adding support to the transparency 'optimists.' Notably, transparency often has been implemented as an instrument by public organizations because it allows stakeholders to

[11] In chapter six negative public transparency is labelled 'public shaming' and measured by citizens' intentions to write a negative online review.

monitor and judge governments' decision-making generally, but also the performance of entrepreneurs specifically and, ultimately, to act accordingly (Grimmelikhuijsen & Meijer, 2012; Grimmelikhuijsen et al., 2013). Citizens will be empowered to question under-performance. Entrepreneurs will fear reputational damage and, ultimately, loss of revenue and resist the implementation of transparency policies (see Meijer & Homburg, 2009; van de Walle & Bouckaert, 2003). This dissertation has provided more nuances to this notion by showing that street-level bureaucrats did not perceive more resistance when there was more transparency, but rather less resistance. Thus, street-level bureaucrats may be transparency 'optimists', at least in terms of the enforcement process at the front line. This insight is relevant for public managers and supervisors of bureaucrats with complex dossiers because highlighting the presence of transparency practices may help bureaucrats deal with resistance.

The transparency literature has long been dominated by the study of external implications, specifically regarding effects on policy- and citizen-oriented goals (see Cucciniello et al., 2017 for an overview). At the same time, leading authors, such as Lipsky (2010), Maynard-Moody & Musheno (2000) and Hill & Hupe (2002) have long stressed that the face-to-face enforcement of public policies by street-level bureaucrats is a core part of the functioning of governments and its legitimacy. This dissertation adds that, besides external (i.e. policy- and citizen-oriented) effects, transparency also has internal effects on public organizations and, specifically, on street-level bureaucrats during their enforcement of public policies and how they (cognitively) relate to the citizens they encounter. This contribution is useful for policymakers tasked with drafting internal informative documents about transparency practices that are – or will be – implemented, because it may be beneficial to state explicitly the benefit for street-level bureaucrats: smoother frontline encounters.

Furthermore, regulation scholars often research 'capture' because it undermines effective regulatory performance (Baldwin et al., 2012; Carpenter & Moss, 2013; Hood et al., 1999; James, 2000; Mitnick, 2011). Capture occurs when street-level bureaucrats get too close to those they inspect in circumstances of low relational distance. It is then that bureaucrats can sympathize too much with entrepreneurs, become allies and cannot objectively collect and assess information (Ashworth et al., 2002; Hood et al., 1999; James, 2000; Makkai & Braithwaite, 1992). This study indicates that transparency limits bureaucrats' capture and can ensure that bureaucrats assess information in a manner that can benefit service provision. More specifically, transparency could be a way to keep a workable balance for a relational distance that is close, but not too close. Finally, transparency scholars are often concerned with the instrumental value of transparency to achieve citizen- and policy-related goals (Cucciniello et al., 2017). This dissertation has revealed that transparency's instrumental value may expand well-beyond those and include, at least, the bureaucrat-oriented goal of limiting capture.

Notably, all street-level bureaucrats implement policies when facing stress factors, such as limited time, resources and information (Lipsky, 2010). For practitioners generally, it is relevant to note that bureaucrats who interact with citizens regularly face a specific stressor: keeping a cognitive distance. Public managers should be aware that bureaucrats need this cognitive distance from those they inspect in order to get the feeling that they can do their job properly. There is good news for policymakers tasked with implementing transparency practices: more transparency could be one intervention that can mitigate bureaucrat-citizen closeness and facilitate bureaucrats in the execution of their tasks. It is important to note that practitioners should not overestimate the 'promise' of transparency to create and, potentially, keep distance between bureaucrats and citizens. This only applies to bureaucrats with frequent contact with citizens and not bureaucrats with sporadic contact.

7.3.2 Conclusion 2 – More transparency by public organizations can indirectly stimulate positive transparency by citizens

The second conclusion reflects on how transparency by public organizations and by citizens is connected and could, ultimately, reinforce each other. Due to, amongst others, ICT developments, public organizations are by no means the only actor contributing to the increasing transparency of public organizations and its frontline agents (e.g. Adams, 2013; Brucato, 2015a; 2015b; Grimmelikhuijsen & Meijer, 2012; Trigg, 2014). This dissertation studied transparency by public organizations and by citizens separately, but its results have indicated that they could reinforce each other. The findings have shown that, when there was more transparency by public organizations, street-level bureaucrats' enforcement attitudes became more legal, facilitating and accommodating. At the same time, this study has found that, when bureaucrats' enforcement attitude was legal-based, citizens did not intend to be negative, nor positive, in their transparency. However, the results also showed that when bureaucrats' enforcement attitudes were facilitation-based, citizens intended to be less negative in their transparency. By combining both findings, it can be concluded that transparency by public organizations and by citizens could, in some instances, form a reinforcing mechanism, namely: more transparency by public organizations results in a more facilitation-oriented enforcement attitude by street-level bureaucrats which, in turn, results in less negative transparency by citizens. Notably, when street-level bureaucrats combine different dimensions due to more transparency, this reinforcing mechanism surrounding the facilitation attitudes of bureaucrats may become more complex.

Scholars often have focused on transparency by one type of societal actors. For instance, governments presenting policy information (e.g. de Fine Licht, 2014; Grimmelikhuisen & Meijer, 2014; Piotrowski et al., 2017), disclosing sanctions (e.g. Van Erp, 2011), showing ratings and rankings (Hood et al., 2008; Van de Walle & Roberts, 2008) or individuals filming other individuals (e.g. Brucato, 2015a; 2015b). This dissertation has been no different and has explored two transparency types separately. However, the results have indicated that transparency by public organizations and citizens could be interconnected. This is important for scholars now studying types of transparency in isolation. Including transparency by other societal actors could help scholars reach a better understanding of the transparency practices of the actor(s) they already study.

7.3.3 Conclusion 3 -- While transparency by public organizations is often a form of punishment, transparency by citizens is not

The third conclusion reflects on the nature of transparency by public organizations and by citizens. Within the enforcement context, transparency by public organizations as an instrument was predominantly built on the notion that disclosing poor performance would result in reputational damage for entrepreneurs and in, turn, loss of consumers and revenue. As such, transparency was used to shame poor performance and to stimulate compliance of both citizens and entrepreneurs (Meijer, 2013; Meijer & Homburg, 2009; Van de Walle & Roberts, 2008). Conspicuously, this dissertation did not investigate this assumption, since its aim was to dissect the effect of transparency on street-level encounters and not on compliance. This study did investigate transparency practices by citizens. An experiment and replication found that bureaucrats' enforcement style did not result in negative transparency by citizens or shaming. However, the results did show that a facilitative enforcement attitude resulted in less negative transparency by citizens. In other words, citizens were less negative in what they disclosed publicly when bureaucrats had a facilitating enforcement attitude and may, arguably, even 'fame'. These results indicate that the instrumental nature of transparency between both actors may differ: public organizations use transparency to disclose negative performance, while

citizens can also use and discuss positive experiences.

This conclusion is in line with recent research that has shown that citizens are less negative (i.e. ready to blame) about those providing the service directly when they were given more information about certain aspects, such as context and responsibility (Piatak et al., 2017). This conclusion contributes to the scholarly debate on negativity bias. Negativity bias means that citizens respond stronger to negative information than they do to positive information. Thus, citizens are asymmetrical in their ways of reacting (Olsen, 2015). Scholars have examined negativity bias predominantly for how citizens interpret performance information by public organizations and found mixed results (e.g. James, 2010; James & Mosley, 2014; Olsen, 2015). This study indicated that citizens might not have a strong negativity bias when it comes to information based on how street-level bureaucrats issue them with fines. Citizens could even have a positivity bias when bureaucrats do so with a facilitation approach. In other words, how citizens respond to negative information may work differently when this information is drawn from encounters with street-level bureaucrats on the frontline.

For street-level bureaucrats tasked with sanctioning and fining citizens, it is relevant to keep in mind that, when citizens shame them after an encounter, this will be the exception and not the rule when it comes to negative online reviews. However, this study's investigations were restricted solely to shaming via online review writing. There are, for instance, recent examples of other forms of shaming by citizens that occur after a frontline encounter that seem to have become more the rule, rather than the exception. For instance, citizens film street-level bureaucrats and, while filming, obstruct bureaucrats from properly helping citizens in need. Americans have even named this phenomenon 'rubbernecking' (Mudde, 2018; Van Leeuwen, 2019). To put this differently, this dissertation by no means has argued that the consequences of public shaming should be under-estimated for street-level bureaucrats. Rather, citizens writing negative public reviews after a 'negative' experience, such as getting fined will be rare.

7.3.4 Conclusion 4 – Citizens have biases about different bureaucrats' traits they meet screen-to-screen, but these do not clearly explain how citizens behave face-to-face

The last conclusion addresses frontline encounters where there was no explicit transparency and, thus, there was limited information available to citizens about bureaucrats. This dissertation investigated how different types of bureaucrats were classified by citizens and, as a result, revealed their biases. This dissertation has revealed that citizens classify bureaucrats into three categories based on their core task, namely (1) regulation-oriented; (2) citizen-oriented, and; (3) oriented at both (chapter 5). More importantly, citizens, in terms of their warmth and competence traits in screen-to-screen encounters, assessed the three identified types of bureaucrats differently.

The results have indicated that regulation-oriented street-level bureaucrats were assessed lowest in terms of their competence and warmth. Female bureaucrats were assessed as being warmer than males when citizens encountered them via telephone (i.e. screen-to-screen). However, the size effects were small (d ranging between 0.16-0.26). This study did not explain how citizens act on these predispositions when they met bureaucrats face-to-face. Experimental evidence has shown that, in face-to-face settings, neither a legal nor facilitation enforcement attitude increased citizens' obedience with paying fines. At the same time, only a facilitation attitude decreased negative transparency by citizens. A legal enforcement attitude did not impact transparency by citizens whatsoever. In other words, this dissertation has indicated that, while citizens stereotype enforcing bureaucrats in terms of competence and warmth screen-to-screen, these stereotypes did not result in clear face-to-face behavioural intentions regarding, for instance, intended obedience or transparency.

This literature on stereotyping and discrimination has focused solely on how street-level bureaucrats' stereotyped or discriminated citizens. There is some evidence compiled, at least to some extent, on how bureaucrats assessed citizens and how this affected their decision-making (Harrits, 2019; Jilke et al., 2018; Pedersen et al., 2018; Raaphorst et al., 2018; Thomann & Rapp, 2018). This study has shown that citizens also had stereotypical notions of bureaucrats in terms of their traits. Scholars have shown that stereotypical notions of bureaucrats by citizens can have important implications for policy implementation. For instance, there is an increasing amount of evidence that gender-matching increases the efforts of both bureaucrats and citizens (Guul, 2018; Meier, 2018; Riccucci et al., 2015) this benefits service provision. The results of this study have provided a nuanced account of the implications of stereotypical notions held by citizens for street-level bureaucrats. This has indicated that, much like bureaucrats' stereotypical notions of citizens, biases about bureaucrats may work in subtle ways (see Raaphorst et al., 2018).

The literature on representative bureaucracy has investigated the effects of a street-level bureaucrats' gender on service provision. This scholarship predominantly investigated the effects of symbolic, active or passive gender representation or gender-matching between bureaucrat and client (see Doornekamp et al., 2019; Guul, 2018; Meier & Nicholsen-Crotty, 2006; Piatak & Mohr, 2019; Riccucci et al., 2015; 2016). This study contributes to that body of literature because it helps understand the constellation of stereotypical beliefs of bureaucrats based on gender by revealing differences in trait perceptions (see also Doornekamp et al., 2019). This dissertation has indicated that variations in warmth between male and female street-level bureaucrats in particular may be worthwhile to investigate in terms of effects on citizens' behaviour during service provision.

An important take-away for practitioners is that, according to citizens, one uniform street-level bureaucrat does not exist and citizens hold different stereotypical notions about bureaucrats based on their traits. Trends in digitalization and ICT innovations have meant that bureaucrats increasingly meet citizens screen-to-screen, rather than face-to-face (Bovens & Zouridis, 2002). Dutch respondents in screen-to-screen situations have assessed various regulation-oriented bureaucrats (e.g. inspectors in healthcare, catering industry, tax and labour) as being the least competent and warm by citizens. Such bureaucrats should be aware of these biases to help them relate, understand and deal with citizens via telephone or other screen-to-screen settings, such as e-mail. The biases in competence and warmth assessments are also useful for public managers when assessing individual performances based on input from citizens, especially when this is based on electronic forms of communication. Awareness ensures fair and just evaluations of individual street-level bureaucrats.

7.4 Limitations

All research has its limitations and this dissertation is no exception. Although specific limitations are discussed separately in the empirical chapters 2 through 6, the most prominent overarching theoretical and methodological limitations are highlighted here.

Theoretically, this dissertation has focused, primarily, on the role of transparency of performance information (i.e. inspection results) during frontline encounters. This type of transparency is central in the first part (chapter 2, 3 and 4) of this dissertation. This focus, unfortunately, limited the conclusions to one type of information that can be disclosed by public organizations or citizens. Numerous forms of transparency on the frontline could play a role, such as: (1) whether bureaucrats enforced 'on the street' with bystanders or behind closed doors in offices (see Gofen, 2015); or, (2) what type of information citizens disclosed or not when bureaucrats probed for answers about their (non)compliant behaviours. While this dissertation has shown transparency of performance information matters for

frontline encounters, other forms of transparency could work in (dis)similar ways and, arguably, play an even bigger role during frontline encounters than disclosure of inspection results.

Moreover, this dissertation has focused on the context of enforcement. The inspectors at the centre of the first part of this dissertation are employed by the Netherlands Food and Product Safety Authority. The NVWA uses transparency as a enforcement tool and was, at the time of data collection, in the middle of making all relevant information about regulation public (see section 1.7.). It is, therefore, likely that the findings translate to both inspectors and other bureaucrats working in similar enforcement contexts where transparency is a prominent tool. In addition, the findings also likely translate to other street-level bureaucrats working in enforcement contexts such as, for instance, tax officials because their 'power' and highly regulated interactions with citizens or entrepreneurs will be similar (see Van de Walle & Raaphorst for an overview of current research on inspectors). Last but not least, all the data was collected in the Netherlands. When the frontline encounters are of similar nature, it is likely that the conclusions will transfer. Nevertheless, it has to be noted that there is little cross-national research about effects of transparency. Grimmelikhuijsen et al. (2013) investigated the effect of transparency on trust of citizens by hypothesizing different effects in the Netherlands and South Korea. Surprisingly, they found similar patterns. Therefore, it is unclear if and how the results of this dissertation might translate to other countries.

Methodologically, this dissertation was based partly on cross-sectional data. Therefore, no conclusions could be drawn about causality in chapter 2 through 4 and this should be considered when interpreting the results. Reversed causality also cannot be ruled out. Theoretically, it seems unlikely that, while it was hypothesized that transparency influences bureaucrats' enforcement style (chapter 3), this relationship could be reversed. However, it was also theorized that transparency perceptions influenced performance perceptions (chapter 4). It is possible that this relationship could be reversed. Nevertheless, in chapter 4, it was argued why the proposed hypothesized relation was most reasonable. In the second part of this dissertation, experimental methods were used. Thus, the results of chapters 5 and 6 show conclusions could be drawn about causality. However, experiments are often critiqued for their limited external validity because they induce simplistic treatments that are less complex than real world scenarios (James et al., 2017). This limitation was combatted, as much as possible, by, for instance, making the treatments as realistic as possible, by carefully piloting experiments and by replicating experiments. Nevertheless, external validity concerns remain a limitation of the experimental results.

7.5 Future research directions

Transparency practices by public organizations, citizens and other actors are likely to expand over the upcoming decades due to, amongst other things, ICT developments. The insights of this dissertation, hopefully, can be useful to scholars wishing to better grasp transparency and/or frontline encounters. Drawing on the previous sections of this chapter, this last section will outline venues for future research.

Those interested in understanding transparency could investigate the internal effects of transparency by public organizations, rather than just the external effects, such as the implications for frontline encounters. To illustrate this, scholars could investigate unintended consequences of transparency because it could result in perverse incentives, such as gaming behaviour and cutting corners (see Freeman, 2002; Hood, 2007; 2011) which harms public performance. Scholars could also link transparency to bureaucrats' ethical behaviour and honesty (Belle & Cantarelli, 2017; Olsen et al., 2018). It could be hypothesized that by raising transparency functions as an internal monitoring system

for bureaucracies will, in turn, raise bureaucrats' self-awareness, moral standards and, ultimately, could decrease their unethical behaviour (Belle & Cantarelli, 2017). In other words, researchers could test if internal transparency makes street-level bureaucrats more ethical and honest. If transparency does, citizens could receive more equal and equitable service. Furthermore, whether more internal transparency is created because humans disclose bureaucrats' performance, or if computers do, also may be interesting to explore (see Cohn et al., 2018), especially since bureaucratic processes and bureaucrats' decision-making are being increasingly automated (e.g. Bovens & Zouridis, 2002). Whether or not a 'computer says no' may affect fairness perceptions of citizens.

Explicitly studying transparency mechanisms at the street-level may also be of interest to those scholars interested in bureaucrat-citizen encounters. Transparency mechanisms have been examined, predominantly, as being top-down in terms of their effects on citizens and policies (see Cucinniello et al., 2017). However, the different consequences of transparency on 'the street' are unexplored. To illustrate this, contact between street-level bureaucrats and citizens has become evolved increasingly from screen-to-screen, instead of face-to-face (Bovens & Zouridis, 2002). This makes the actual encounter less transparent. Citizens have fewer cues about the type of street-level bureaucrats that they are meeting. Scholars could study how this affects street-level bureaucrats' service provision and enforcement. Research could also investigate if it matters for either policy implementation or enforcement as to whether bureaucrat-citizen encounters happen on the street with bystanders or behind closed doors in an office. Understanding differences in service allocations and sanctions, when bureaucrats' encounters with citizens are more transparent than others is important, because it potentially harms public organizations' overall legitimacy and citizens' trust.

Future research could explore the role of relationships between street-level bureaucrats and citizens and their implications for service provision. There is growing academic attention for helping the behaviour of bureaucrats (Jilke & Tummers, 2018; Thomann & Rapp, 2018), when bureaucrats decide to bend or break rules for citizens (Borry & Hendersen, 2019; DeHart-Davis, 2007) and the role of empathy in bureaucrats' use of discretion (Jensen & Pedersen, 2017). How street-level bureaucrats make sense of the citizens they are processing is central in these studies. This study has shown that some street-level bureaucrats interact by design more with some citizens than others and this can generate intimacy. For street-level bureaucrats dealing with such close relations, limiting this was found to be beneficial for public performance. It could be hypothesized that bureaucrats who fail to keep a certain amount of distance cannot make just and fair decisions about service allocation and this explains why bureaucrats bend rules. Future research could further test theories around when close bureaucrat-citizen relations benefit and when they harm public performance.

Methodologically, survey research over the past decade has become less popular among public management and administration scholars. This has been due to, for instance, criticisms of common source bias (see Podsakoff et al., 2003). This dissertation has shown that, when the aim is to understand perceptions of large populations, surveys are an appropriate method that can generate valuable insights. The limitations of methods do need to be considered when deciding upon which methods to use, but they should not be leading. The research aim and question must be the determining factor when deciding which methods to use. Moreover, experimental methods have been increasingly used (Bouwman & Grimmelikhuijsen, 2016) that frequently focus on intended behaviour. For many public management and public administration, measuring behavioural intentions may be the closest we can get to measure 'real' behaviour given that, for instance, field experiments are often hard to realize. Our field would benefit from moving beyond solely measuring intentions and supplementing the approach with insights from actual behaviour. In this way, we could assess whether there is, indeed, a 'intention-behaviour gap' or not (Webb & Sheeran, 2006). By combining insights from intentions with actual behaviours, we may get another step closer to understanding frontline behaviour.

To conclude, I will go back to how this dissertation started with the example of the disclosed report about the Islamic Cornelius Haga School. Education inspectors visited the school almost daily for months after the warning about the school was issued. Their inspections, as well as their report, were heavily scrutinized. Overall, many societal actors actively voiced their opinions while the inspectors were still conducting their inspection. This included the Minister of Education, university professors, banks, independent accountants, and parents, while the school also received threats (Hart van Nederland, 2019; Kuiper & Gualtherie van Weezel, 2019a; 2019b; 2019e; NOS, 2019a;2019b;2019d; Zwart, 2019). The media reported on one unannounced visit with a team of six inspectors because it had angered the director of the school, teachers and parents. They indicated that the visit was conducted in an 'intimidating way'. The Inspectorate stated multiple inspectors were needed to ensure the visits would be over as fast as possible (Gualtherie van Weezel & Kuiper, 2019c; Kuiper & Gualtherie van Weezel, 2019). Nevertheless, regardless - or perhaps because of all the public scrutiny - the number of new students for the Cornelius Haga School increased from 84 to 135 (Kuiper & Gualtherie van Weezel, 2019d). Notably, this example shows that transparency had real implications for policy implementation when it became scrutinized in public debates. Although this dissertation has completed an important step, it is only the beginning of really grasping what actually happens and can happen when 'the street' is made transparent.

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Appendices

Appendix I

Items used in questionnaire among NVWA inspectors for chapter 2, 3 and 4

Chapter	Construct	Item(s)	Measure
2,4	Perceived organizational effectiveness (labelled in chapter 4 as 'perceived regulatory performance') (ω = .83; α = .82)	My division is successful in: 1. Tracing violations of rules and regulations 2. Ensuring companies comply with rules and regulations 3. Monitoring risks 4. Reducing risks	10-point scale with: 1 = completely disagree 10 = completely agree
2	Perceived trust	I would typify my degree of trust in inspectees concerning their compliance as:	10-point scale with: 1 = low trust 10 = high trust
2,3	Rule obedience	In general, I am someone who follows the rules even if I disagree with them	10-point scale with: 1 = completely disagree 10 = completely agree
2,3,4	Work experience	How many years have you been employed at the NVWA (or a predecessor of the NVWA)?	Filled in in years
2	Traditional media usage	How many hours do you spend using traditional media per day?	Filled in in hours
2	Social desirability	I am always willing to admit to a mistake	10-point scale with: 1 = completely disagree 10 = completely agree
2,3	Legal (ω = .80; α = .80)	During inspections, I focus on: • Implementing the intervention policy by following the letter of the law • That I enforce in an unambiguous way • That I make strict agreements with inspectees • That I execute the inspection as complete as possible • That I uphold high standards regarding inspectees' compliance with rules and regulations	10-point scale with: 1 = never 10 = always

2,3	Facilitation (ω = .85; α = .85)	During inspections, I focus on: • Transferring my professional knowledge to inspectees • Giving indications how to improve compliance to inspectees • Being as helpful as possible to inspectees • The circumstances of inspectees that I encounter	10-point scale with: 1 = never 10 = always
2,3	Accommodation (ω = .83; α = .84)	During inspections, I consider: • The opinions about inspecting of colleagues from my team • The opinions about inspecting of other teams • The opinion about inspecting of inspectees • The opinions about inspecting of my teamleader	10-point scale with: 1 = never 10 = always
3	Perceived resistance (ω = .71; α = .69)	• It is possible to satisfy clients completely (R) • Clients actively help during inspections (R) • Clients are forward with information during inspections (R)	10-point scale with: 1 = completely disagree 10 = completely agree
	Perceived degree of disclosed performance information (labelled in chapter 4 as 'perceived government transparency') (ω = .89; α = .88)	I would typify the inspection results that the NVWA discloses as: • Complete • Detailed • Shedding light on all aspects of an inspection • Without judgement	10-point scale with: 1 = completely disagree 10 = completely agree
	Perceived relational distance	In my mind, I position myself as superior to inspectees in order to make a clear distinction between myself and them	10-point scale with: 1 = completely disagree 10 = completely agree
	Trust in government transparency	I think that disclosing inspection results will increase the compliance of inspectees	10-point scale with: 1 = completely disagree 10 = completely agree
	Gender	What is your gender?	3 answer categories (male; female; other)

Appendix II

Decks of vignettes for chapter 5

Deck #	Vignettes	Domain[2]
1	Police officer[1]	1
	Neighborhood manager	2
	School attendance officer[1]	3
	Nurse	5
	Tax inspector[1]	6
2	Municipal enforcers[1]	1
	Elementary school teacher	3
	Labor inspector[1]	5
	Maternity assistant	5
	Catering industry inspector[1]	6
3	Parking officer[1]	1
	High school teacher	3
	Tram conductor[1]	4
	Youth care worker	5
	Customs officer[1]	6
4	Municipal desk officer	1
	Forest ranger[1]	2
	Bus driver	4
	Education inspector[1]	3
	Physiotherapist	5
5	Emergency medical technician	1
	Bridge operator[1]	2
	Debt councilor	5
	Social investigator[1]	5
	Youth councilor	5
6	Fire officer	1
	Waterways inspector[1]	2
	Social worker	5
	Healthcare inspector[1]	5
	Wedding officiant	6

[1]Street-level bureaucrats with investigative authority (buitengewoon opsporingsambtenaar)
[2]Domains: (1) Public space; (2) Environment, wellbeing and infrastructure; (3) Education; (4) Public transport; (5) Work, income and healthcare; (6) General investigation

Appendix III

Balance checks for chapter 5

	Sex	Ethnicity	Education	Age	Prior experience	Political preference
z/t-value	0.90	1.16	1.06	-0.20	2.55	-0.32
B	0.03	0.01	0.02	-0.05	0.05	-0.01
s.e.	0.03	0.01	0.02	0.27	0.02	0.02
p-value	0.36	0.25	0.29	0.84	0.01**	0.75

Appendix IV

Items used in questionnaire among citizens for chapter 6

Construct	Item(s)	Measure
Year of birth	In what year were you born	Open-ended
Gender	What is your gender??	3 answer categories (male; female; other)
Education level	What is your highest completed education?	No education; Elementary education; High school education; Bachelor degree (MBO, HBO, WO); Master degree (HBO; WO); MBA or Doctoral/PhD
Ethnicity	Do you belong to an ethnic minority in The Netherlands?	Yes; No
Screener	On which of the following social media platforms do you have an account?	Twitter; Facebook; Snapchat; Vine; Musical.ly; LinkedIn; Yammer; Instagram; Flickr; Pinterest; Other, namely___; I do not have an account on any social media platform
Legal	The train conductor/city watch was: 1. Threatening 2. Coercive 3. Rigid	10-point scale with: 1 = completely disagree 10 = completely agree
Facilitation	The train conductor/city watch was: 1. Advising 2. Helpful 3. Facilitating	10-point scale with: 1 = completely disagree 10 = completely agree
Obedience	You have two options regarding the fine. Which of the two options do you choose	1. Pay the conductor/ city watch the fine immediately 2. Object to the fine and do not pay the conductor/ city watch the fine immediately
Public shaming	1. What is the tone of your review? 2. How do you describe your interaction with the conductor? 3. How do you describe the conductor?	Scale 1- 10 (completely negative – completely positive; very unpleasant – very pleasant – very incompetent – very competent)

Procedural fairness	To what extent do you (dis)agree with the following statements: (1) In the execution of their tasks, the public transport respects passengers' rights (2) You can rel y on just actions from the public transport (3) The public transport treats every passenger equally	Scale 1 – 10 (completely disagree; completely agree)
Compliance motivations	1. The chance of getting caught for violating public transport laws is high [calculative] 2. I comply with public transport laws because it is my duty [normative] 3. My friends and family expect me to comply with public transport laws [social]	Scale 1 – 10 (completely disagree; completely agree)
Time spend on social media	How many minutes do you spend per day on average on social media?	Open-ended
Public transport usage	How many times per week do u use public transport on average? Note: 1 journey equals 1 time. Please count one-way journeys. A round trip, thus, counts as 2 times.	Open-ended
Experience fines	How many times in the past month have you been fined while using public transport?	Open-ended
Attention check	Please select red for this question.	Green; Red; Blue
Treatment check	To what extent do you (dis)agree with the following statements?	Scale 1 – 10 (completely disagree; completely agree)

Appendix V

Factor analysis latent variables for chapter 6

Treatment check
Perceived enforcement style (Scale from 1 – 10)
Experiment 1: To what extent do you (dis)agree with the following statements?

The train conductor was:

	Item	Facilitation dimension	Legal dimension
1	Advising	.903	-.193
2	Helpful	.904	-.261
3	Facilitating	.890	-.104
4	Threatening	-.166	.877
5	Coercive	-.138	.925
6	Rigid	-.229	.844
	α	.907	.882
	Eigenvalue	3.46	1.52
	Variance explained	57.65	25.27

Note: PCA with varimax rotated factor loadings

Experiment 2: To what extent do you (dis)agree with the following statements?
The city watch officer was:

	Item	Facilitation dimension	Legal dimension
1	Advising	.790	.074
2	Helpful	.843	-.266
3	Facilitating	.873	-.124
4	Threatening	-.050	.856
5	Coercive	-.113	.908
6	Rigid	-.106	.852
	α	.797	.852
	Eigenvalue	1.73	2.77
	Variance explained	28.72	46.24

Note: PCA with varimax rotated factor loadings

Dependent variable

Online public shaming of bureaucrats (Scale from 1 – 10)

Experiment 1: After your train journey, you decide to write an online review about your interaction with the conductor:

	Item	F1
1	What is the tone of your review? (R) (Scale: completely negative – completely positive)	.862
2	How do you describe your interaction with the conductor? (R) (Scale: very unpleasant – very pleasant)	.893
3	How do you describe the conductor? (R) (Scale: very incompetent – very competent)	.848
	α	.835
	Eigenvalue	2.26
	Variance explained	75.28

Note: PCA with varimax rotated factor loadings

Experiment 2: After your car journey, you decide to write an online review about your interaction with the city watch officer:

	Item	F1
1	What is the tone of your review? (R) (Scale: completely negative – completely positive)	.891
2	How do you describe your interaction with the conductor? (R) (Scale: very unpleasant – very pleasant)	.926
3	How do you describe the conductor? (R) (Scale: very incompetent – very competent)	.900
	α	.890
	Eigenvalue	2.46
	Variance explained	82.02

Note: PCA with varimax rotated factor loadings

Covariates

Procedural fairness (Scale from 1 – 10)

Experiment 1: To what extent do you (dis)agree with the following statements?

	Item	F1
1	In the executing of their task, the public transport respects passengers' rights	.888
2	You can rely on just actions from the public transport	.873
3	The public transport treats every passenger equally	.871
	α	.851
	Eigenvalue	2.31
	Variance explained	77.00

Note: PCA with varimax rotated factor loadings

Experiment 2: To what extent do you (dis)agree with the following statements?

	Item	F1
1	In the executing of their task, the city watch respects passengers' rights	.912
2	You can rely on just actions from the city watch	.936
3	The city watch treats every passenger equally	.919
	α	.910
	Eigenvalue	2.55
	Variance explained	85.10

Note: PCA with varimax rotated factor loadings

Appendix VI

Description of samples

Inspectors of the Netherlands Food and Product Safety Authority (NVWA)

Chapter 2,3, and 4 all use part of a sample collected at the NVWA. Between October and November 2016, a questionnaire was distributed among all inspectors of the NVWA who conduct face-to-face inspection visits (n = 1201). Therefore, inspectors working at divisions Veterinary and Import (V&I), Agriculture and Nature (A&N) and Consumer and Safety (C&S) were included. Respondents were invited via e-mail, had six weeks to complete the questionnaire and reminded on two-week intervals. In order to conduct this study, a board of 5 members was assigned as advisors. This advisory board informed team leaders about the questionnaire and informed them to stimulate inspectors to participate. There was also a short call posted on the intranet of the NVWA to inform inspectors about the study. Chapter 2 and 3 both use the total sample (n = 507).

For the study in chapter 4, however, using the total sample was not suitable to answer the research question. In Chapter 4 only inspectors working at divisions V&I and C&S were included and not A&N because it best fitted the conceptualization of factual relational distance (n of face-to-face inspections between the same inspector and citizen). Based on data from the NVWA's annual report from 2016 an overview was created of the n of face-to-face inspections conducted annually at the division-level. This overview was checked, verified and substituted with input from the advisory committee (both based on their expertise and confidential internal data). Combining these insights, it was concluded that at the division V&I the n of these inspections was highest, while at the C&S division this was lowest. The n of face-to-face inspections at the division A&N was neither high nor low and fluctuated. Our advisory board, therefore, indicated that this division would not be suitable to investigate the effect of high or low factual relational distance. The total sample in chapter 4 is made up of 343 respondents.

Dutch citizens

Chapter 5 and 6 both use samples from the Dutch population. In chapter 5, four independent samples were used. The first two samples served to test the experiments (i.e. pilots) while the second samples served to conduct the full-fledged experiments. In chapter 6, two independent samples were used. Qualtrics was hired to recruit participants for all samples in chapter 5 and 6. Samples in chapter 5 were recruited in May and July 2018. Samples in chapter 6 were collected in February and June 2019. Qualtrics has been offering online samples for over a decade. These samples have been widely used by researchers, included those in public management – and administration (e.g. Porumbescu et al., 2017; Riccucci et al., 2018). Notably, samples in chapter 5 did not have any selection criteria for its respondents. Samples in chapter 6 did have a selection criterion: respondents had to have at least one social media account. Respondents who did not meet this criterion were not included in the samples. Overall Qualtrics avoids duplications by using IP addresses and digital fingerprinting technologies for each respondent. In this way, no respondents ended up twice in the samples.

Qualtrics does not recruit participants from a single panel but collaborates with sample partners offering traditional market research panels across the globe to enable the most diverse and, if

needed, representative datasets. The sampling partners randomly select respondents that qualify to participate. Qualtrics or its sampling partners compensate respondents based on the length of the study and their target characteristics. Compensation may include cash, gift cards or vouchers. We paid Qualtrics around 4 euros per respondent.

Qualtrics does not guarantee national representation unless specified prior to sampling. In both chapter 5 and 6, national representation was not specified because the prime interest was not to draw conclusions about the population at large but investigate the clear effect of a treatment. Randomization of respondents ensured that bias was minimized as much as possible, because all respondents had equal chance of ending up in one of the control or treatment groups. In this way, there was no relation between the individual characteristics of respondents and the treatment they were assigned to. Indeed, balance checks for the between-subject designs of both study 1 and study 2 in chapter 5 as well as study 2 in chapter 6 showed that randomization was successful, and the samples were balanced.

Qualtrics invites respondents to participate by via e-mail, SMS notifications or mobile in-app notifications. The invitations did not include specifics concerning the content of the questionnaire to avoid self-selection effects. Qualtrics replaced all respondents who finished in less than ½ the median survey completion length. On top of that, once data collection was completed for each sample, the quality of the data was hand checked by me by, for instance, checking the open-ended answers (e.g. year of birth) or identifying respondents who filled in the same category on the used measurement scales for almost the entire questionnaire (also known as 'flatlining'). These respondents were replaced by Qualtrics. In all samples, about 10 percent of the respondents was replaced.

Dutch summary

Wat is de hoofdvraag van dit proefschrift?

Openbaarmaking wordt vaak als veelbelovend gezien voor overheden en publieke organisaties omdat het een instrument is om anderen, bijvoorbeeld burgers, te laten zien dat er niks te verbergen valt. Op deze manier kan openbaarmaking de relatie met burgers verbeteren. Verschillende publieke organisaties maken dan ook actief openbaar wat ze doen en hoe het uitvoeren van hun taken gaat. Hierdoor ontstaat 'inwaartse zichtbaarheid', wat betekent dat burgers, journalisten, bedrijven en anderen die buiten de organisatie staan naar binnen kunnen kijken. Externe partijen kunnen de activiteiten en beslissingen van publieke organisaties monitoren. Openbaarmaking is 'de beschikbare informatie over een organisatie of actor die externe partijen in staat stelt de interne mechanismen en performance van die organisatie te monitoren' (Grimmelikhuijsen, 2012, p. 5).

In het debat rondom openbaarmaking staan voornamelijk de externe effecten van openbaarmaking centraal zoals op het vertrouwen, de tevredenheid en participatie van burgers. In dit proefschrift wordt onderzocht of er ook interne effecten zijn, specifiek op interacties tussen handhavende contactambtenaren en burgers wanneer ze elkaar tegenkomen op 'straat'. Begrijpen hoe contactambtenaren beleid handhaven is cruciaal voor begrijpen hoe publieke organisaties en de overheid functioneren. Beleid wordt pas 'echt' wanneer contactambtenaren het handhaven omdat zij ruimte (i.e. discretionaire bevoegdheid) hebben het geschreven beleid zo goed mogelijk te matchen met de complexe situaties die zij aantreffen (Lipsky, 2010). Openbaarmaking zorgt er echter niet alleen voor dat publieke organisaties gemonitord kunnen worden, ook contactambtenaren worden zichtbaarder voor externe partijen. Zo worden er bijvoorbeeld steeds meer online reviews geschreven over individuele contactambtenaren.

De context waarin contactambtenaren en burgers elkaar ontmoeten is de afgelopen decennia veranderd door onder andere ICT-ontwikkelingen. Voor burgers hebben deze ontwikkelingen de barrière om informatie te verkrijgen en verzenden verlaagd. Bijvoorbeeld, een smartphone geeft iedereen de macht om met één druk op de knop een parkeerwachter te filmen, het materiaal te uploaden of iets op sociale media te schrijven. Voor contactambtenaren hebben ICT-ontwikkelingen de omvang en hoeveelheid van informatie over hun organisatie en hunzelf vergroot. Veel politiebureaus en individuele politieagenten, bijvoorbeeld, hebben een account op sociale media. Door openbaarmaking zijn de één-op-één interacties tussen contactambtenaar en burger dus veranderd in één-op-veel interacties. In dit proefschrift zijn daarom de interne effecten van openbaarmaking voor de frontline onderzocht aan de hand van de centrale onderzoeksvraag:

Wat zijn de effecten van openbaarmaking op contactambtenaren en burgers?

Dit proefschrift richt zich specifiek op de effecten van openbaarmaking op handhavingsinteracties tussen contactambtenaren en burgers. De taken van handhavende contactambtenaren zijn misstanden opsporen en bestraffen. Zij voeren dus eerder verplichtingen uit dan diensten, wat ze een machtig soort contactambtenaar maakt. In deel 1 van dit proefschrift staat het perspectief van de contactambtenaar centraal en specifiek inspecteurs van de Nederlandse Voedsel en Warenautoriteit (NVWA). Hun taak bestaat uit het handhaven van, onder andere, voedsel- en productveiligheid en dierenwelzijn. De NVWA heeft als doelstelling om uiterlijk in 2022 alle informatie over toezicht en de uitvoering daarvan openbaar te maken, wat het een passende casus maakt voor dit proefschrift. In deel 2 staat het perspectief van de burger centraal. In deel 2 worden burgers bevraagd over verschillende soorten handhavende ambtenaren, omdat burgers in hun leven niet met maar met 1 handhavende contactambtenaar te maken maar met meerderen.

Waarom is dit proefschrift relevant?

Dit proefschrift heeft wetenschappelijke waarde omdat het twee stromingen literatuur, die voorheen gescheiden waren, samenbrengt: openbaarmaking en street-level bureaucracy. Hierdoor kunnen implicaties van openbaarmaking die tot op heden niet substantieel onderzocht zijn, namelijk die voor ambtenaar-burger interacties, blootgelegd worden. Bovendien staat in deel 2 van dit proefschrift de burger centraal. Burgers zijn geen passieve dienstafnemers, maar nemen een actieve rol in tijdens contactambtenaar-burger interacties. Dit proefschrift helpt de burger-kant van beleidsuitvoering beter begrijpen. Tot slot is kwantitatief onderzoek naar contactambtenaren groeiende, maar nog beperkt. Dit proefschrift draagt bij aan de 'kwantificering' van de literatuur over contactambtenaren wat bijdraagt aan vergelijkbare en generaliseerbare inzichten.

Dit proefschrift heeft ook maatschappelijke waarde. De hoeveelheid beschikbare informatie voor burgers maar ook contactambtenaren is groeiende door ICT-ontwikkelingen en de implementatie van wetten van openbaar bestuur in verschillende landen. Tegelijkertijd is misinformatie een steeds grotere maatschappelijke uitdaging. Contactambtenaren hebben dan ook te maken met burgers die openbaarmaking eisen, soms geïnformeerd zijn en met een smartphone in de hand 'bewapend' zijn. Dit proefschrift biedt inzichten voor de praktijk over de impact van openbaarmaking op zowel het dagelijks werk van contactambtenaren, burgers en hoe zij met elkaar omgaan. Voor publiek managers laat dit proefschrift zien dat openbaarmaking gevolgen heeft voor hoe contactambtenaren handhaven. Voor beleidsmakers wordt duidelijk wat de consequenties zijn van openbaarmakingsbeleid. Tot slot, voor burgers wordt inzichtelijk hoe openbaarmaking de contactambtenaar die tegenover hen staat beïnvloedt.

Wat zijn de kernbevindingen van dit proefschrift?

Om een antwoord te geven op de hoofdvraag is deze opgesplitst in vijf empirische hoofdstukken die elk een deel van de hoofdvraag helpen beantwoorden (hoofdstuk 2 tot en met 6).

1. De handhavingshouding van contactambtenaren kan worden geconceptualiseerd door middel van drie dimensies.

Het doel van hoofdstuk twee was om de multi-dimensionaliteit van de handhavingshouding van contactambtenaren te achterhalen met behulp van het concept 'handhavingsstijl'. Daarom werd een meetinstrument ontwikkeld en gevalideerd (oftewel getest op juistheid en geldigheid). Theoretisch werden vijf onderliggende dimensies van handhaving stijl geïdentificeerd, namelijk (1) formalisme; (2) dwang; (3) educatie; (4) prioritering en, tot slot; (5) accommoderen. Op basis van data van een vragenlijst (n = 507) onder inspecteurs van de NVWA werd gevonden dat, in een Westerse context, handhaving stijl niet uit vijf maar uit drie dimensies bestaat. De wettelijke dimensie bestaat uit zowel formalisme als dwang. Deze dimensie bestaat uit het benadrukken van regelgeving maar ook dreigen met sancties. De faciliterende dimensie bestaat uit educatie en prioriteringselementen. Contactambtenaren benadrukken naar ondernemers bijvoorbeeld hoe ze naleving kunnen verbeteren en houden rekening met hun omstandigheden. De laatste dimensie is de accommoderende dimensie die omvat in hoeverre contactambtenaren rekening houden met de mening van anderen, bijvoorbeeld hun collega's of teamleider, over handhaven.

2. Openbaarmaking door publieke organisaties intensifieert alle dimensies van de handhavingshouding van contactambtenaren en reduceert weerstand.

In hoofdstuk drie het effect van openbaarmaking door publieke organisaties op de wettelijke, faciliterende en accommoderende dimensies van de handhavingshouding van contactambtenaren onderzocht op basis van data uit dezelfde vragenlijst. De resultaten laten zien dat de wanneer contactambtenaren meer openbaarmaking ervaren, alle drie hun handhavingsdimensies worden versterkt. Oftewel: hoe meer openbaarmaking contactambtenaren ervaren, hoe meer wettelijk, faciliterend en accommoderend ze worden in hun handhavingshouding. Hoofdstuk drie vindt ook een verrassend resultaat: openbaarmaking zorgt niet voor meer maar minder weerstand van burgers naar contactambtenaren toe. Hoofdstuk drie laat dus zien dat openbaarmaking door publieke organisaties handhaving ‘op straat’ beïnvloedt.

3. Openbaarmaking door publieke organisaties verbetert de uitvoering van toezicht en dit komt, voor contactambtenaren met frequent contact met burgers, door de grotere ervaren afstand die openbaarmaking tussen contactambtenaar en burger creëert

Voortbouwend op de vragenlijst data onder NVWA-inspecteurs onderzocht hoofdstuk vier of openbaarmaking leidt tot betere performance en of de afstand in de relatie tussen contactambtenaar en burger deze relatie verklaart. Deze afstand tussen twee actoren (hier contactambtenaar en burger) in een relatie wordt ook wel relationele afstand genoemd. Twee dimensies van relationele afstand werden meegenomen, namelijk (1) feitelijke relationele afstand (i.e. de frequentie face-to-face contact) en (2) ervaren relationele afstand (i.e. de ervaren intimiteit). Resultaten laten zien dat openbaarmaking inderdaad bijdraagt aan betere uitvoering van toezicht. Hoofdstuk vier vergelijkt twee groepen contactambtenaren, een met weinig en veel face-to-face contact (i.e. feitelijke rationele afstand). Alleen voor contactambtenaren met veel face-to-face contact vergroot openbaarmaking de ervaren relationele afstand en deze grotere afstand draagt bij aan betere uitvoering van toezicht. Oftewel: contactambtenaren die burgers vaak face-to-face tegenkomen willen relationele afstand ervaren en dit verbetert de uitvoering van toezicht.

4. In situaties met weinig informatie, schatten burgers de warmte en competentie van ambtenaren in op basis van hun hoofdtaak en geslacht.

In hoofdstuk vijf zijn ambtenaar-burger interacties onderzocht waarin er weinig informatie beschikbaar is over de contactambtenaar. Het doel was achterhalen hoe burgers de warmte en competentie van contactambtenaren inschatten die ze voor het eerst telefonisch ontmoeten. Ook werd gekeken of de hoofdtaak en het geslacht van de contactambtenaar deze schattingen veranderden. Aan de hand van een factoriale vragenlijst (n = 580) en experiment (n = 1602) onder Nederlandse burgers werd gevonden dat contactambtenaren in drie groepen ondergebracht konden worden op basis van hun hoofdtaak, (1) hoofdzakelijk handhavende contactambtenaren; (2) hoofdzakelijk dienstverlenende contactambtenaren en; (3) contactambtenaren die zowel handhaven als diensten verlenen. Ook werd gevonden dat handhavende contactambtenaren zowel het minst warm als competent werden gezien. Vrouwelijke contactambtenaren werden als warmer dan mannen geschat. Vrouwen en mannen werden als even competent geschat.

5. Zowel een wettelijke als faciliterende handhavingshouding resulteren niet een meer gehoorzaamheid onder burgers, maar faciliteren verlaagt wel de intenties van burgers om zich negatief te zijn in hun openbaarmaking

Hoofdstuk zes voerde een experiment (n = 318) en herhaling (n = 311) uit onder Nederlandse burgers over twee hoofdzakelijk handhavende contactambtenaren: een parkeerwachter en conducteur. Het effect werd getest van een wettelijke en faciliterende handhavingshouding op de gehoorzaamheid en de intentie van burgers om op een negatief manier informatie openbaar te maken over de interactie. Resultaten laten zien dat geen van beide handhavingshoudingen de gehoorzaamheid van burgers

bevordert. Ook heeft een wettelijke handhavingshouding geen effect op negatieve openbaarmaking door burgers. Een faciliterende handhavingshouding, daarentegen, verlaagt de intenties van burgers om negatief te zijn in hun openbaarmaking.

Wat zijn de belangrijkste conclusies van dit proefschrift?

Nu de hoofdvraag is beantwoord aan de hand van de kernbevindingen van dit onderzoek, is de discussie over de effecten van openbaarmaking op ambtenaar-burger interacties niet afgerond, maar slechts begonnen. Daarom worden ook vier belangrijke conclusies getrokken die verder gaan dan het antwoord op de hoofdvraag.

Conclusie 1 -- Openbaarmaking helpt contactambtenaren met het doen van hun werk

Dit proefschrift heeft laten zien dat openbaarmaking de uitvoering van toezicht verbetert. Het effect van openbaarmaking op de uitvoering van toezicht was bijna twee keer zo groot voor contactambtenaren met frequent contact met burgers dan contactambtenaren met geen frequent contact. Openbaarmaking is dus vooral nuttig voor contactambtenaren die burgers vaak tegenkomen. Ten tweede vergroot openbaarmaking de ervaren relationele afstand tussen contactambtenaar en burger, maar alleen voor contactambtenaar en burger met frequent contact. Deze grotere afstand draagt bij aan betere performance van toezicht. Tot slot, de handhaving van beleid wordt ook bevorderd tijdens ambtenaar-burger interacties omdat openbaarmaking de weerstand die contactambtenaren ervaren van burgers reduceert. Dit proefschrift onderschrijft dus dat openbaarmaking contactambtenaren helpt bij de uitvoering van hun taken.

Conclusie 2 -- Meer openbaarmaking door publieke organisaties kan indirect positieve openbaarmaking door burgers stimuleren

De tweede conclusie reflecteert op hoe openbaarmaking door zowel publieke organisaties als burgers verbonden zijn. Door onder andere ICT-ontwikkelingen zijn publieke organisaties niet langer de enige actor die zorgen voor de toegenomen openbaarmaking over overheden en hun contactambtenaren. Dit proefschrift onderzocht openbaarmaking door zowel publieke organisaties als burgers apart van elkaar. Echter, de resultaten laten zien dat beide vormen van openbaarmaking elkaar kunnen versterken. Meer openbaarmaking door publieke organisaties versterkt onder andere de faciliterende handhavingshouding van contactambtenaren. Tegelijkertijd lieten de resultaten van dit proefschrift ook zien dat wanneer contactambtenaren alleen faciliterend zijn in hun handhavingshouding, burgers minder negatief worden in hun openbaarmaking. Wanneer we beide inzichten combineren kan het geconcludeerd worden dat openbaarmaking door publieke organisaties en burgers een versterkend mechanisme kunnen vormen: meer openbaarmaking door publieke organisaties resulteert in meer faciliteren door contactambtenaren wat weer positieve openbaarmaking door burgers tot gevolg heeft.

Conclusie 3 -- Terwijl openbaarmaking door publieke organisaties vaak een vorm van straffen is, is openbaarmaking door burgers dat niet

De derde conclusie gaat over de aard van zowel openbaarmaking door publieke organisaties als burgers. Openbaarmaking door publieke organisaties gaat, als instrument, er vooral vanuit dat anderen (bijvoorbeeld: bedrijven) gestimuleerd kunnen worden zich beter te gedragen door inzichtelijk te maken in hoeverre zij zich aan regels houden. Wanneer er onwenselijk gedrag wordt vertoond kan dit tot reputatieschade en, uiteindelijk, verlies van klanten en inkomsten leiden. Openbaarmaking door publieke organisaties toont slechte performance dus publiekelijk om zo beter gedrag te stimuleren. Dit proefschrift heeft niet onderzocht of openbaarmaking samenhangt met beter naleefgedrag, want

de frontline interactie tussen contactambtenaar en burger stond centraal. Echter, heeft dit proefschrift wel gekeken naar de openbaarmaking door burgers. Dit proefschrift vond dat de handhavingshouding van contactambtenaren niet resulteert in negatieve openbaarmaking (i.e. 'shaming') door burgers. Maar, een faciliterende handhavingshouding resulteert wel in minder negatieve openbaarmaking door burgers (i.e. faming). Oftewel: burgers worden positiever in wat zij openbaar maken wanneer contactambtenaren zich faciliterend in hun handhaving opstellen. Dit proefschrift laat dus zien dat de instrumentele aard van openbaarmaking door publieke organisaties en burgers verschillen: de ene is meer straffend en de ander meer belonend.

Conclusie 4 -- Burgers hebben vooroordelen over karaktertrekken van contactambtenaren die zij ontmoeten via de telefoon, maar deze verklaren niet hoe burgers zich face-to-face gedragen

De vierde en laatste conclusie gaat over frontline interacties waar er geen expliciete openbaarmaking is en erg beperkte informatie beschikbaar is voor burgers over contactambtenaren. Dit proefschrift laat zien dat 'de contactambtenaar' niet bestaat. Verschillende contactambtenaren kunnen in drie groepen worden geclassificeerd op basis van de hoofdtaak die burgers vinden dat zij uitvoeren (handhaven of diensten verlenen). De eerste groep zijn hoofdzakelijk handhavers, de tweede groep hoofdzakelijk dienstverleners en de derde groep heeft beide hoofdtaken. Burgers schatten deze groepen verschillend in met betrekking tot twee karaktereigenschappen, namelijk warmte en competentie, wanneer burgers ze telefonisch spreken. Dit proefschrift laat zien dat, bij telefonisch contact, handhavende contactambtenaren het laagst worden ingeschat wat betreft warmte en competentie. Vrouwelijke contactambtenaren worden warmer geschat dan mannen, maar beide zijn even competent. Dit proefschrift kan echter niet verklaren hoe burgers zich, op basis van deze vooroordelen, opstellen face-to-face naar contactambtenaren toe. Het werd bijvoorbeeld gevonden dat handhavingshouding van de contactambtenaar niet uitmaakt voor de gehoorzaamheid van burgers. In andere woorden, dit proefschrift laat zien dat burgers handhavende contactambtenaren stereotyperen wat betreft hun competentie en warmte bij telefonisch contact, maar dit lijkt zich niet duidelijk te uiten in gedragsintenties.

About the author

Noortje de Boer (1990) studied International Communication and Media at Erasmus University Rotterdam. During her bachelor degree, she was nominated twice for the 'most ambitious student' award by peers and was elected to present at the graduation ceremony (to over 600 attendees). After completing her bachelor with honours, Noortje completed the two-year research Masters in Public Administration and Sociology, which is jointly offered by Utrecht University, Erasmus University Rotterdam, Tilburg University and the Vrije Universiteit of Amsterdam. During her studies, she worked as a research trainee/assistant at Erasmus University and Utrecht University. She also practiced at the public affairs company, Weber Shandwick, and the Dutch Education Inspectorate.

After graduating, Noortje joined the Erasmus School of Social and Behavioral Sciences (ESSB) at Erasmus University, Rotterdam, as a PhD candidate. Her PhD project focused on the frontline implications of transparency by both public organisations and other stakeholders (such as citizens). She specifically focused on the implications for enforcement by frontline officials and their interactions with citizens. Her main research interests are the study of official-citizen interaction and the role of publicly available information. Noortje has specialized in experimental methods, large-scale surveys and scale development. Her research has been published in, among others, top journals in the field of public administration, such as Public Administration Review and Public Administration.

Next to her position as a PhD candidate, Noortje was a member of the NIG PhD Council from 2015 till 2018 and chaired the PhD platform at the Department of Public Administration and Sociology from 2017 till 2018. She has taught different bachelor workgroups and has been invited as guest lecturer. Noortje was a speaker at the annual symposium of Vide: the professional association of regulators and inspectors in the Netherlands. She has delivered various talks at Dutch inspectorates about her research. In November and December 2018, Noortje visited the Department of Political Science at Copenhagen University to collaborate and discuss her work with various scholars. Over the course of her PhD, Noortje has presented her work at different European and international conferences and has served as a reviewer for several peer-reviewed journals.

As of April 2019, Noortje now works as assistant professor Public Management at the Utrecht School of Governance, Utrecht University.

On the outside, looking in

Public organizations see transparency as a promising tool to boost relations with citizens and their perceptions of public performance. Due to transparency, however, the work of street-level bureaucrats is also scrutinized. Moreover, technological advancements have empowered any societal actor to make the behavior of street-level bureaucrats transparent by, for instance, filming it with a smartphone. This doctoral dissertation examines the effects of transparency on the daily work of street-level bureaucrats and their interactions with citizens. By studying food and product safety inspectors, this dissertation shows that transparency helps street-level bureaucrats do their job. By studying citizens' perceptions of multiple enforcing street-level bureaucrats (e.g. parking wardens), this dissertation reveals that citizens are biased about the street-level bureaucrats they meet, but this does not mean they will make what street-level bureaucrats do transparent to others. This dissertation concludes that transparency matters for the daily work of bureaucrats and, in turn, the citizens they meet, but it is just the beginning of grasping what happens when 'the frontline' is made transparent.