

Role-Playing and Simulation Based Learning in Higher Education: Case Study in Model United Nations

The Honors Program
Senior Capstone Project
Student's Name: Jason C. Fortin
Faculty Sponsor: Dr. Richard Holtzman
May 2012

Table of Contents

Abstract.....	2
Hypothesis.....	2
Simulation in Context.....	3
Methodology and Approach.....	7
Learning Objectives.....	8
Topic Selection.....	9
Simulation Protocol.....	10
Preparation.....	11
Role Assignments.....	11
Position Paper.....	12
Simulation Execution.....	14
Debriefing Session.....	15
Assessment Mechanisms.....	16
Control Group.....	17
Analysis.....	19
Overview.....	19
Paper Assessment.....	19
In-class Measurements and Observations.....	21
Debriefing Session.....	25
Pre and Post Quiz Results.....	27
Conclusion.....	29
Use of a Model United Nations Simulation in a Classroom.....	29
Suggestions for Future Simulations.....	30
Value of a Model United Nations Simulation.....	32
Appendix A.....	33
Appendix B.....	34
Appendix C.....	43
Appendix D.....	77
Appendix E.....	83
References.....	86

ABSTRACT

It is currently estimated that more than 200,000 high school and university students participate in model United Nations each year. With over 400 annual conferences in thirty-five countries, this fifty-year-old tradition has redefined how students engage international relations in an academic setting (Educational Outreach 1). Active learning has been heralded for decades as a superior technique to teach various disciplines, including international relations. It allows students to experience deep learning and develop skills unattainable through conventional pedagogical methods. This paper explores the specific impact of a model United Nations simulation on the academic experience and student performance through a controlled and experiential testing in a collegiate classroom. I devised and coordinated a simulated Security Council meeting (which discussed Terrorism in Pakistan) and measured student performance before, during and after the simulation, and then compared it to a control group. Four assessment mechanisms were used: pre and post simulation evaluation of student position papers; achievement of Kolb's Learning phases and other in-class observations; student reflections from a debriefing session; and pre and post simulation basic knowledge quizzes. The results conclude that role-playing and simulation based learning can have an incredibly strong impact on a student's education. The skills learned in the simulation allowed students to outperform their peers and positioned them for more long-term academic growth.

HYPOTHESIS

Although standard lecture and other class projects have traditionally dominated the education system, I contend that simulation based learning allows for a more rigorous, engaging, fun and educational academic experience. This style of active learning is compatible for teaching across the assortment of perspectives intrinsic to international relations teaching and scholarship.

SIMULATION IN CONTEXT

As the world globalizes it becomes increasingly important for education to prepare students properly for the complexities of the international community. Part of this preparation should be a solid foundation in international relations (IR) theory, practice, and understanding. Students must be able to think critically, creatively approach problems, work across cultures, interact with philosophically opposing viewpoints, and collaborate to achieve a common goal. Yet there is a challenge to teaching international relations as “complex realities of contemporary global politics transcend many of the constructs useful for understanding the Cold War era.” (Lantis, Kuzma, and Boehrer 2000:2) Globalization changes the way we live our lives every day. As a result, our education should adopt methods to comprehend and adapt to these changes. Newman and Twigg state that an educational process should cover the “full richness, complexity, drama, and importance of international affairs.” (Newman and Twigg 2000:835) Instruction of international relations needs to convey that the discipline is not black and white, and not a technical skill—it is not something that can be simply tested. Students have to learn how to apply, examine, analyze, and then reapply, as well overcome obstacles in pursuit of their goals.

The traditional approach (lecture and readings) to international studies education falls short of preparing students with an adequate skill-set needed to operate effectively in a globalized world. Even more so, it does not prepare future IR participants for the complexities of their work. Kirsten Haack argues that conventional teaching “obstruct[s] the achievement of *true* deep learning.” Traditional curricula has a tendency to “interrogate the subject through questions aimed at a lower cognitive level.” (Haack 2008:395) Course content is primarily descriptive and does not unearth why an organization operates the way it does, or how the international system facilitates cooperation. Crossley-Frolick contends “that teaching international relations in today’s world requires more pedagogical agility than ever” and “traditional lecture is limited in its capacity to capture the imagination of students” (Crossley-Frolick 2010:2). Robert Barr and John Tagg argue for a transformation from a lecture-oriented “instructional paradigm” to a new “learning paradigm.” (Barr and Tagg 1995:13) These authors claim that the traditional educational pedagogical model is not a holistic, student-centered approach. The current standard falls short at developing “critical thinking skills, and elicit[ing] discovery and construction of knowledge.”(Lantis 1998:41)

Scholars have consistently praised active learning methods as the solution to the gap between the desired education experience and the model which traditional approaches provide. Active learning is defined as “learning based on discovery, inquiry and participation [and] is preferable to passive, lecture-based learning.” (Cusimano 2000:79) This accepted form of achieving qualitative “deep learning” in higher education helps students learn by creating meaning rather than memorizing. Bigg’s and Collis’s Structure of the Observed Learning Outcome (SOLO) taxonomy states that deep learning means an “increased ability to connect, synthesize, and abstract knowledge while surface learning is evident where students merely pick up one or two aspects of a task but do not establish any meaningful relationships between them.” (Haack 2008:396, Biggs 2003, and Mosely et al. 2005) Kolb’s Experiential Learning Model¹ has served as the backbone of active learning conception since its introduction in the mid 1980s. Fox and Ronkowski have articulated that the best learning experience is achieved when a student is guided through all four of Kolb’s phases: concrete experience, reflective observation, abstract conceptualization, and active experimentation (Fox and Ronkowski 1997:733). Kolb defines this deep learning as a “process whereby knowledge is created through the transformation of experience.” (Kolb 1984:41) This process is highlighted by three key levels of progression: first, students take an active role in their own learning; second, they connect theory to practice in the outside world; and third, they integrate this knowledge into their own conceptual framework. (Boud and Pascoe 1978:2) This process prepares students for generating knowledge in future circumstances, trains them for “real-world” happenings, and incubates a sense of tolerance for diverse perspectives.

An important and relevant type of active or experiential learning for the IR disciple is simulation. Studies have shown that simulations “develop different skills from [conventional] classroom teaching—especially those of being imaginative and innovative.” (Winham 1991:417) Lantis believes that simulations can “truly enliven the international relations classroom and enhance the learning experience.” (Lantis 1998:39) Other research has concluded that simulations are better mechanisms for long-term retention of imperative IR concepts. (Newmann and Twigg 2000:835) Further, simulations enhance the education experience by teaching students about international negotiation (Kaufman 1998:59), generating empathy (Morgan 2003), promoting critical thinking,

¹ David Kolb, and American educational theorist, developed the experiential learning theory (ELT) (see Appendix A). Brock and Cameron have justified this project by applying Kolb’s ELT to the field of political science.

and providing greater insight into the dynamics of international political exchange (Smith and Boyer 1996:691). Simulations can even serve as a tool for teaching students how to recover and move forward from failure. These themes are interwoven into a learning technique that stimulates student participation and walks them through international and organizational conflict and resolution by forcing students to interact with a problem rather than simply observing it.

A type of simulation which achieves these ends and fits well into IR curricula is model United Nations (MUN). MUN is a role-playing exercise in which students assume positions of various countries at a mock United Nations committee hearing (the committees and topics vary by organizer choice). Hazleton and Mahurin have referred to the model UN experience as a “learning laboratory” that can help increase “cognitive knowledge of diplomatic strategies and outcomes; enhance understanding of key concepts and the complexities of the situations being simulated; and reinforce, change and/or develop participant attitudes toward the objects of the simulation.” (Hazleton and Mahurin 1986:151) Furthermore, Schlenker and Bonoma found that the MUN environment fosters certain pressures and constraints on students (Bonoma and Schlenker 1978:9-13). Within this setting, students have to tackle problems with limited resources and options, widen their comprehension of the concepts, principles, and strategies involved and devise solutions that they otherwise may not have considered. On a larger level, MUN grants each student involved a unique and important experience. Students are thrust into difficult and often controversial discussions about international peace, security, and development. Through this type of simulation students gain an understanding about the UN and the various underpinnings of the international community. This agile method of education exposes them to conflict and alliance, failure and success, creative and critical thinking, and a realistic atmosphere to test and evaluate theories and knowledge learned in class.

This paper supports the importance and integration of model United Nations into the IR learning experience. Previous research on its applicability has assessed its flexibility through largely external observational methods. Research has proven that MUN stimulates interest in IR and is more enjoyable than traditional lecture style education—two traits which have been proven to have positive effects on a student’s academic performance. This paper will measure how simulation based learning, specifically model United Nations, can have an impact on academic achievement in comparison to conventional course structure. There are three main components:

methodology, analysis, and conclusion. The methodology section will outline how I organized the simulation and measured its impact for student learning and why these metrics were chosen. The second section will present the results of my research and comment on their applicability and meaning. The final section will comment on its utility in a classroom, provide suggestions for future simulations, and evaluate the model United Nations simulation. By no means does this paper aim to refute the existence of, or replace completely, traditional education methods, but rather it contends that different pedagogical models—such as a model United Nations simulation—can play a positive role while fulfilling external objectives not necessarily achieved through conventional methods.

METHODOLOGY AND APPROACH

To value the effectiveness of model United Nations as part of an academic curriculum, I conducted a simulation in an Introduction to International Global Politics (GLOB-241) course at Bryant University. The students participated in a mock meeting of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). Each student was paired up with a classmate and represented a member-state of the Security Council or an additional participatory role. The Security Council convened for four classes to discuss the issue of “Terrorism in Pakistan.” The simulation produced six resolutions which reflected the class’ opinion on how the international community should approach the issue. The results of this simulated classroom experience were measured against a control group. This control group was a second Introduction to Global Politics class which was taught by the same professor. This class had to undergo the same evaluation methods, but did not participate in a simulation. Instead, the class was given traditional lectures by their regular professor about the United Nations and the situation in Pakistan.

While there is no definitive formula on how to conduct simulations (whether model UN or not), there is a list of suggested criteria among academics. Simulations should have clearly stated objectives (Kille 2002), a vigilant design and assessment process (Shaw 2004), operate under clear rules of procedure and protocol (Lantis 2000; Zeff 2003; Asal 2005; Chasek 2005), include good student preparation for role-playing (Asal 2005), and conclude with a structured debriefing and reflection session (Petranek 2000). Fortuitously, simulating the United Nations provides a natural framework for the experience. This simulation’s design mimics an actual Security Council meeting as much as possible (details on the assessment process will be addressed later in “Assessment Mechanisms”). To represent accurately a UNSC meeting, delegates follow slightly modified United Nations rules of procedure. In this case, the specific rules were drawn from the National High School Model United Nations Conference. These rules allow for the optimum amount of flexibility while maintaining a realistic atmosphere (See “Preparation”). Good student preparation is ensured through the provision of a Background Guide on the topic (more details below). Each student (known during the simulation as a delegate) is also required to submit a position paper outlining his/her representative stance on the topic before the Security Council. Further, a sound understanding of the simulation’s goals and objectives is imperative because the instructor will have to guide debate on an ad-hoc basis. Lastly, a debriefing and reflection

session will clarify student thinking, reinforce specific teaching points, and link the simulation to “real life.” As this paper will outline below, this simulation incorporated all of these important aspects through its inception and execution.

The following sections will explain the learning objectives, how the topic was selected, the simulation protocol, student preparation, and how roles were assigned. I will then cover the logistics of the simulation itself, explain the importance and structure of the debriefing session, outline my assessment mechanisms, and elucidate the details of the control group in this exercise.

Learning Objectives

Bearing in mind that the “complex realities of contemporary global politics transcend many of the constructs useful for understanding the Cold War era,” (Lantis, Kuzma and Boehrer 2000:2) this simulation employed learning objectives to fill gaps present in the standard lecture method. Straight forward lectures do not always capture the imagination of the new generation of students. Consider the frequent objects in their lives—YouTube, Facebook, Google, and other active tools that can instantly connect them to people and information worldwide. Instant messaging on cell phones is much more interactive than a PowerPoint presentation by a professor. As a result, there is much to gain pedagogically for instructors to adopt alternative methods of instruction.

This simulation allows delegates to address multiple prominent topics in international relations. Furthermore, it provides a platform through which delegates can examine the theories of national sovereignty, power-politics, ability of the international community to respond to a certain situation, reasoning behind global disagreement, and political deadlock over what sometimes seems a simple issue. As this paper will explain during the test results and overview of the debriefing exercise, the students who participated in the simulation underwent deep learning and gained a better grasp on these important issues than their controlled counterparts.

The practice and profession of international affairs includes several aspects and requires certain skill-sets that standard lectures and chapter readings cannot address. The way international politics, business, and cultural exchanges are conducted effectively change the substance of the interaction. Successful participation in the international field mandates the ability to negotiate,

bargain, be diplomatic, develop contingency plans, understand incentive structures, analyze, and respond to various state and organizational strategies. Krain and Lantis argue that students must be able to “examine the motivations, behavioral constraints, resources and interactions among institutional actors.” (Krain and Lantis 2006) This goal is challenged and often restricted under the traditional lecture structure. However, a model United Nations meeting, which allows students to live and work through a realistically simulated international community, creates an opportunity for them to acquire, or at least practice, these abilities. Reading about international organizations makes it difficult to understand their limitations, but interacting with them heightens students’ abilities to participate effectively in international relations.

Topic Selection

As previously noted, the simulation is designed to place students in the shoes of Ambassadors from various countries and organizations around the world, thus allowing them to simulate the decision making process of global leaders. This simulation addressed the issue of Terrorism in Pakistan. The topic was chosen for a few reasons: the relevance of terrorism in the realm of international relations, increasing importance of Pakistan in South Asian politics, the impact on global efforts in Afghanistan, the number of important states and organizations involved, and the risk of nuclear fallout. Since 2001, terrorism has been a focal point of international security discussions and decisions. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) engaged the Afghanistan territory in a 10+ year war which is still on-going. Countries around the world have spent trillions on state security measures to protect them from terrorist attacks. Terrorism is a seemingly looming and poorly understood threat to everyone everywhere. The relationship between Pakistan and the rest of South Asia—namely India and Afghanistan – is largely impacted by how well militia groups and terrorist networks are controlled in its Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and Northwestern Frontier Province (NWFP). Decreased state control over these areas, as well as a fragmented relationship between the Pakistani military and civilian government, sends warning signs to its neighboring countries. For example, weak control over Pakistan’s western border allows frequent crossing of terrorists and supplies from groups in Pakistan and Afghanistan, which undermines NATO’s efforts in the region. Moreover, terrorist groups have used weak state control in the NWFP to plan and carry out attacks against India, Pakistan’s arch enemy. There are numerous parties interested in Pakistan’s security and the future of terrorist groups harbored in their country. China, India, Afghanistan, and the United

States have obvious interests due to their regional ties or direct involvement in the issue. However, states who have vested trade interests in South Asian markets are also threatened by an unstable Pakistan. Aid organizations are concerned over the surging numbers of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) the conflict has caused. Weak legal and police controls allow opium and arms trade to flourish which undermines advancement efforts of Central and South Asia. Last, but frequently at the top of many lists, is the concern over the security of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal, both its military and energy resources. If a facility were to suffer an attack or material was obtained by a rogue militia group, the fallout and international implications would be devastating.

Simulation Protocol

This simulation operated under rules of procedure which mirrored those of the United Nations. I used the National High School Model United Nations' Rules of Procedure (see Appendix A). These rules are thorough and formal. During the simulation, the delegates followed United Nations protocol for speaking, caucusing, and proposing solutions. Rule 12 – Functions of the Chairman -- grants the chair (the instructor) discretionary powers over certain motions. This allows the instructor to guide debate in an effective, but not controlling manner. Because the students participating in the simulation had little to no MUN exposure, I adjusted the rules to allow for teaching moments. This allows the instructor to interject during the course of debate and provide relevant information, guide delegates through a subtopic, comment on current proposals, or explain a certain aspect of international relations. During my simulation, I stopped the committee to explain the intricacies of international aid. There was a consensus among the majority of delegates to provide Pakistan with some form of aid as a means of alleviating the challenges. Yet, the delegates were struggling with the next steps. I paused the committee session to explain the various forms of aid the Security Council could provide or request from various agencies. I also walked the class through important aspects that one must consider when requesting aid (i.e. Who will provide the aid? What kind of aid will be provided? How much aid will be provided? Who will distribute the aid? Will Pakistan accept the aid? How will the aid be monitored? When will the aid be distributed? etc.) Although this analysis and explanation took about five minutes of debate time, it saved time in the long run because delegates came to understand how best to approach some of the recommendations. Their solutions became more targeted, practical, and thorough. There are multiple sets of rules available online from different

conferences. I encourage anyone who wishes to run a simulation to adapt a set of rules and adjust accordingly for his/her teaching preferences.

Preparation

Students were provided extensive resources to prepare for the simulation. Two weeks before the start of the simulation, the students were provided an overview on what a simulation was, how it will be conducted, and why it was important. After introducing the nature of the model UN meeting, a Background Guide (BG), which I developed and wrote, was distributed (Appendix C). This Background Guide is a 20 page document that introduced the delegates to the history of the Security Council, included simulation guidelines, and outlined many facets of the topic under consideration. The BG included an overview of “terrorism,” history of Pakistan, influence of Islam on Pakistani politics and history, and the relevance of the Soviet-Afghan War. The BG then explained the challenges of terrorism in Pakistan. Through an examination of the geographic area of the FATA and NWFP, it outlined the rise of the Taliban and sectarian violence. After setting the stage, it dove into the current status and concerns from the security, political and humanitarian viewpoints. The BG concluded with an introduction to the important terrorist groups in Pakistan.

The security section addressed the topics of Pakistan’s military defense capabilities, its nuclear facilities, current efforts to control the arms trade, and channels to supply and equip terrorists. The political section elaborated on the limitations imposed by self-rule (sovereignty), fiscal and political accountability issues, economic ramifications of insurgency, counter-terrorism legislation, and international assistance and collaboration. Under the humanitarian concerns section, past peace treaties with terrorists and aid for internally displaced persons were addressed. The final section of the topic overview within the BG outlined the history and ambitions of four important terrorist organizations in Pakistan: *Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)*, *Lashkar-e-Omar* (“The Army of Omar”), *Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP)*, and the *Al-Qaeda* network. This section also examined why people join insurgent groups and various types of terrorist attacks and the goals, effects and overall gains associated with different types of attacks.

Role Assignments

Following the topic introduction portion of the BG, there is a section detailing the role assignments. As mentioned, each student was assigned a particular role to act out during the

simulation. There were 36 students in the class, but only 15 members on the Security Council (SC). Hence, students were randomly paired with partners and assigned to a country as a team. Because there were three extra pairs needing assignment, I added positions to the SC meeting on observational status. These students were allowed to debate, discuss, and propose solutions to the topic, but were not allowed to vote. The positions of “Attaché from the NATO mission in Afghanistan,” “Attaché from the UNHCR,” and an “International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Representative” were added to the Council. The NATO representative was added to bring detailed knowledge about current multilateral efforts to combat terrorism in the region. The United Nations High Commissioner’s for Refugees (UNHCR) representative was included to ensure protection of Afghani and Pakistani refugees—this also presented a unique teaching moment that the UNHCR could not help IDPs in Pakistan because they technically are not refugees. Lastly, the IAEA representative was present to ensure substantial attention was paid to Pakistan’s absence from the international nuclear regime and what implications it holds for international assistance for their nuclear program.

Although the background was extensive, it was only provided as a springboard for students to start their research. Ten research and preparation questions were posed to all delegates. These questions directed the students down certain research and analysis paths on which to write their position papers and prepare their simulation remarks. Following the research and preparation questions is an “Important Documents” section which outlines key resources that all students may engage in, in preparation for the debate.

These materials are integral to the success of the simulation. They provide students a starting point for their research. The role explanation portion helps ease the burden of stepping into someone else’s shoes without guidance. If the delegates do not have proper direction before the start of the simulation, the benefits of the simulation will be severely limited.

Position Paper

The primary reasoning behind such in-depth preparatory support is to position the students to write the best position paper possible. A position paper is a 3-5 page document outlining a country’s perspective on the topic. Each delegate (whether paired or not) has to write his/her own paper. The paper forces delegates to research their role’s history with the issue or the states involved and extrapolate how their current and past foreign policies and connections will impact

their country's current stance on the designated topic. Ideally, the students should use this paper to write a letter on behalf of their country (as if they were an ambassador) to the world articulating the country's stance and proposing solutions or suggestions on how the international community can best approach the issue. These papers do not need to be exactly 3-5 pages, but I have found this length thorough enough without being overwhelming. These papers can be shared with the other committee members prior to the commencement of the simulation so delegates can comprehend the various perspectives and goals present in the committee.

Various model United Nations conferences provide feedback to delegates on the quality of their position paper upon arriving at the conference. I have found that the feedback is more effective when disseminated at least a week before the session starts. This allows the delegates to make appropriate adjustments to his/her policy and conduct further research if needed. For classroom purposes, I used this position paper as a "draft." Each delegate handed in his/her position paper two weeks before the simulation and I returned comments and suggestions one week before the simulation began. The delegates had to hand in their final copy of their position paper at the conclusion of the simulation. They were instructed to observe the proceedings of the simulation and use that experience as a tool to enhance the academic quality of their papers. I selected seventeen different factors and separated them into six different categories to measure student performance through their papers. I compared the results pre and post simulation to determine the impact the simulation had on student progress towards achieving learning objectives.

The rubrics were drawn directly from the Association of American Colleges and Universities (AAC&U). This national association strives to improve and advance undergraduate education and is a well-respected resource for university officials and faculty. The six categories I chose to measure were: creative thinking, critical thinking, problem solving, foundations for skills for lifelong learning, inquiry and analysis, and information literacy. These are about half of the areas the AAC&U views as imperative for a successful learning environment. The other rubrics available were left out due to their inapplicability to this experiment. Each category has anywhere from one to five sub-points. For each sub-point, a student can earn between zero and four points. The total numerical value for each category is the sum of their scores on each sub-point. The total score of the papers is a sum of the totals from each category. Descriptions of

what level of work is required to attain a certain value are listed in full detail in Appendix D. All the rubrics used are also available in this section.

Simulation Execution

The simulation I conducted ran through four one-hour class periods which met on Monday, Wednesday, and Friday. About 15 minutes of the first class period were used to go over the rules of debate, and explain how the simulation worked. Traditionally, once taking roll call, the first task in committee is to set the agenda. However, since there was only one topic on our agenda, the discussion order was already set. The next order of business was to open a new Speaker's List intended for substantive debate on the first issue on the agenda. The Speaker's List is a list of members who wish to speak on the topic currently being discussed on the agenda. The delegates had to motion to set the time limits for the Speaker's List and raise their placards to be added to the list. At this time, delegates are encouraged to read from their position papers to inform the committee of their intentions and get comfortable with public speaking. After delegates had addressed many of the aspects of the topic, they were encouraged to motion for and enter into a moderated caucus. Moderated caucuses are periods of debate which typically have a shorter speaking time, but no structured speaking list. Delegates who wish to speak during moderated caucuses must raise their placard and be recognized from the chair. After the time for the moderated caucus has expired, debate will return to the Speaker's List.

A third type of debate that can occur during a simulation is an unmoderated caucus.

Unmoderated caucuses are time periods which allow delegates to get up and meet with members sharing similar or divergent opinions on the topic. During this time period, delegates can begin drafting sets of ideas on how to solve the issue and form blocs. Votes on procedural matters, such as unmoderated or moderated caucuses, are procedural matters and require a simple majority vote with any abstentions being prohibited.

The goal of this simulation was to produce well-written, comprehensive resolutions to the issues at hand. Resolutions are the Security Council's way of passing laws or suggestions to the international community. If an informal setting is desired, or different committee structures want to be employed, these resolutions can be turned into Action Plans which will allow delegates to vote on how to respond to the topic without undergoing the formal and rigid structure of the United Nations. Through formal and informal debate, delegates begin this resolution writing

process by creating a working paper, which is essentially a collection of ideas on possible solutions. Once the dais accepts the working paper, it becomes a draft resolution and may be edited, withdrawn, or merged with another draft resolution at any time prior to formal voting procedure. When the dais accepts a motion to close debate, or the Speaker's List is exhausted, the committee moves into voting procedure on the draft resolutions. During this time, veto power for the five permanent members (P-5) of the Security Council (U.S., France, U.K., China, and Russia) is active and abstentions are permitted. The final resolution is passed by a simple majority, however, if one or more of the P-5 votes negatively on the resolution it automatically does not pass.

Debriefing Session

After voting on the resolutions in the beginning of the fifth session, the simulation class underwent a debriefing session. An instructor led session following the conclusion of debate allows the various events of the simulation to be placed into context. Debriefings are key to guiding student understanding of what occurred at the surface; they also probe for subtle or less visible impacts. This session is a great opportunity for students to connect the dots of their learning experience—essentially rounding out a story which can be more easily retained.

For this component of the simulation, I drew from established processes on how to best conduct a debriefing session. This structure lists the following rationale for debriefing the simulation experience: 1) to answer student questions; 2) to sort out and clarify student thinking; 3) to reinforce specific teaching points; 4) to link the simulation to “real life;” and, 5) to release emotional tension that has been built during the exercise. (Fritzsche, Leonard, Boscia, Anderson; 2004:337). The research presented in “Developments in Business Simulation and Experiential Learning” presents five to seven questions in each objective category and I selected seven questions, in total, due to time constraints during the debriefing session. Some questions were slightly altered to be asked in the positive. The following questions were asked to the class; those marked with an * were drawn directly from the previously mentioned paper.

1. How did you feel about participating in the simulation?*
2. Why was this a worthwhile activity in terms of learning? Enjoyable?*
3. What personal long-term effects do you think you may have gained from this experience?*

4. What problems did you encounter in making decisions as a result of your previous decisions?*
5. What did you learn that was new to you during this simulation? (Consider what you learned about working together in a group, course objectives, the real world.)*
6. Describe this simulation's connections to (is it part of) a much larger situation (company, industry, country, world).*
7. What are some of the decisions you made that have not been tried in the real world? Why do you think that is so?*
8. Tell me one skill you learned/developed during this simulation.
9. Did your perspectives on the issue of Terrorism in Pakistan change?

Assessment Mechanisms

There are four key assessment mechanisms within my project. Two measures have already been discussed, the debriefing session and the position papers. Their results will be elaborated upon during the analysis section. The two remaining assessment mechanisms are the pre and post simulation quizzes and the in-class observatory measures.

In addition to measuring the analytical capabilities through the position papers, I wanted to measure simple knowledge retention. I developed two quizzes, one on various aspects of Pakistan and one on the United Nations. These quizzes (in Appendix E) pose simple questions such as “What is the Capital of Pakistan?” and “Pakistan is an Islamic state: True or False” or “How many members of the Security Council have veto power and what are they?” and “The United States is the largest contributor of Peacekeepers to the UN: True or False.” These quizzes were designed to cover basic facts, and were not specifically tailored to the simulation. Nor did the lecture in the control group purposely cover all aspects of the quizzes.

The quizzes were distributed to each member in class one week before the simulation started. All quizzes were collected and scored for both classes. One week following the end of the simulation, the exact same quiz was redistributed to both classes to measure improvement. The scores were averaged for each topic and then added together. The difference reflected between the beginning and ending scores marks the average change between the pre and post quiz of the class.

During the simulation, I observed and recorded students' progress in public speaking and the simulation's achievement of Kolb's four learning phases. Student capacity to participate in the simulation was recorded in full. After taking pages of notes from the class discussion, I went back through my comments and conducted a grounded theory analysis to qualify the development made by the class. As a measurement of completing Kolb's learning stages, I drew upon explanations of the goals of each phase and the signs that occurred. While in class, I recorded when a student or groups of students achieved the benchmarks.

Control Group

As mentioned, to compare the progress made as a result of the model United Nations simulation, a controlled class was utilized. Before the start of the simulation the control class (Class B) had the same lectures, readings, and assignments as the class with the simulation class (Class A). Class B also took the pre and post quizzes on the same days as Class A. Students in Class B were assigned a country using the same procedure and were provided with all of the same preparatory information and lectures. The students in Class B also wrote a position paper as if they were going to participate in a simulation. When the simulation started, Class B was lectured by their professor on the United Nations for two days, the situation in Pakistan for one day, and one day on current international topics. This class was assigned the following readings to provide introductions on the purpose of the United Nations and to examine some of the issues facing Pakistan.

Annan, Kofi. " 'In Larger Freedom': Decision Time at the UN." Foreign Affairs. May/June 2005, Vol. 84, Issue 3, P63-74.

"Does the United Nations Deserve Support?"

Fortin, Jason. "Terrorism in Pakistan." 2010.

Helms, Jesse "Saving the U.N." Foreign Affairs. 2004, Vol. 75, Issue 5.

Karen Mingst, Essentials of International Relations, 5th edition ISBN 978-0-393-93529-5, pp. 181-201; 362-70

Snow, Donald. Cases in International Relations. "Failed and Failing States." 5th edition ISBN 978-0-205-00582-6.

"Wrestling for Influence" The Economist, Jul 3rd, 2008

<http://www.economist.com/node/11664289>.

Because Class B did not have a simulation to draw upon for the final version of their paper, they were encouraged to draw from class lectures and their assigned readings. Both Class A and Class B had to turn in their papers on the same days.

ANALYSIS

Overview

My results exhibit that simulation based learning performs better against conventional teaching methods. The assessment of position papers show that students participating in a simulation exercise outperform similar students in traditional lecture classes in the following areas: creative thinking, critical thinking, problem solving, developing foundations for lifelong learning, analyzing situations, and showcasing improved information literacy. Analysis based on in-class measurements and observations indicates that students made advancements in all four areas of Kolb's model as well as acquired new skills sets. The debriefing session suggests that students felt they learned more and enjoyed the simulation much more than a traditional class. Plus, the pre and post quizzes indicate that the simulation students experienced a net-gain in basic knowledge relative to the control group.

Paper Assessment

As the table on the next illustrates, the students in the simulation class experienced a 58.46% increase in their overall score on their position papers. Students in the control group had an increase of 23.90%, which results in a net increase of 34.55% of the simulation class over the control group. Grades were assigned to each position paper submitted before and after the simulation or class lectures based on the grading rubric in Appendix D. The grades for each class of papers were averaged, and from that average the percent increase was calculated. Each class had 36 students, which meant 72 position papers were examined twice. Some papers were left out of the examination process if the second one was unchanged. If they were included they would not have impacted the final results, so they were passed over in the scoring process.

	Pre-Sim Avg	Post-Sim Avg	Total vs Control	
Simulation Papers	30.30	48.01		
Percentage Increase		58.46%	34.55%	
Grade Areas	Pre-Sim Avg	Post-Sim Avg	Percent Increase	Vs. Control
<i>Creative Thinking</i>	4.63	8.42	81.74%	28.71%
<i>Critical Thinking</i>	3.71	6.06	63.21%	40.21%
<i>Problem Solving</i>	8.66	13.72	58.38%	32.98%
<i>Foundations</i>	5.50	8.19	48.95%	34.86%
<i>Inquiry/Analysis</i>	5.46	8.81	61.27%	39.08%
<i>Information Literacy</i>	2.33	2.81	20.66%	17.70%

Impressive gains were noted particularly in the categories of critical thinking and inquiry/analysis. The critical thinking section measured student performance on their ability to craft an imaginative and specific position which was logical and reflected the students informed evaluation. The Inquiry/Analysis rubric measured whether the student evidence was organized and synthesized to generate a logically extrapolated conclusion from the inquiry findings as well as insightfully discussed limitations and implications. These gains in the simulation class can be explained by the nature of the simulation itself. Simulation based learning calls upon students to digest existing information and produce a valuable conclusion from their background knowledge. They then must act upon their conclusion, within the realm of reason, and discuss its applicability with other delegates.

The consistency and magnitude of these gains exhibits the benefits of incorporating simulation based learning into a classroom experience. Simulations, such as the model UN, encourage students to not only learn the material, but apply it in a real world context, and generate new paths from which one can approach the problem. As a result, students have to take risks, and often experience challenges from the situation and their peers. This process persuades them to approach creatively various issues and in turn develop problem solving skills. Further, success in a simulation requires an insightful and critical thinker. Students not only become masters of the original material, but discover its meaning, its shortcomings, and its potential importance in the discussion at hand. Consequently, students dive deeper in the substance, engage different perspectives, and grow much more than they would have under the conventional model.

In-class Measurements and Observations

There are two core components in this section of assessment: in-class observations and progress towards completing Kolb's Learning Style Model. My in-class observations will provide constructive commentary on the debate process, development, and notable achievements by various students. The second portion will break down and evaluate how the simulation achieved the four different learning phases of Kolb's model and how these achievements differed, both positively and negatively, from the traditional lecture format.

Two related skills which developed during the simulation were speaking confidence and speaking ability. Speaking capability during a model United Nations simulation encompasses a portfolio of more specific, yet integral abilities. When a delegate speaks during the simulation, he/she is offering his/her country's perspective on the current debate. Delegates prepare speeches, offer commentary on the spot, respond to questions posed by other representatives, and publically respond to criticism. Conveying their position integrates diplomacy, varying levels of argumentation, clear and concise articulation, and on the spot decision making. At the outset, students struggled with on the spot speaking and were extremely uncomfortable with diplomatic speech. They hesitated with making decisions without having confirmed research expressing a specific viewpoint. Lastly, they shied away from responding to critical questions of their policy or negative comments towards their policy positions or proposed solutions.

Throughout the debate, their speaking capabilities improved, slowly at first, and rapidly towards the end. In order for them to gain confidence in their abilities or take risks, they had to observe others wandering into uncertain territory. Articulating the complexities of international relations is not a one step process; it is more a development cycle. For example, one delegate struggled to read her prepared speech during the second session, but by closing she was eloquently defending her country's stance on the CTBT. Grounded and accurate comments on international policy proposals enhance the learning environment for the entire classroom. Once the simulation develops, delegates are persuaded by their peers to view the situation from multiple perspectives. This creates an incredibly valuable climate for students to process the complex realities of an international situation through a variety of lenses. Each student is forced to contemplate more than one perspective and more than one idea. These issues must then be internally weighted before voicing his or her opinion. In essence, the challenge of global policy is vibrantly

displayed while diving into the topic, encouraging students to put facts into perspective, and calling upon them to analyze the various facets of the global community.

This comprehensive discussion-oriented environment is certainly ideal, especially when viewed in comparison to no participation. In this simulation every student spoke multiple times. At the beginning of the simulation, students were forced onto the Speaker's List, but well into the second and third session, there was not enough room on the board to contain a list of eager speakers. Speeches became more articulate, analytical, and creative. As the simulation progressed, more students gained the confidence to accept questions or comments on their statements. Students also used the unmoderated caucuses to develop teams and construct their comments and proposals in a way that reflected a cohesive unit with a developed strategy and strong objectives. This progress allowed them to sift out the important topics of the debate and address the details of related components. The conversation shifted from "we can give aid" to "we would like to propose this type of aid from this organization for this purpose with these conditions to achieve these goals." As a result, their resolutions became more measurable, actionable, and integrative.

Kolb's Experiential Learning Model has been widely praised for its validity and reliability. Its origins have served as the framework for extensive follow-up research in educational settings. Its concepts are particularly applicable to simulation based learning. His model divides the learning process into four stages: concrete experience, reflective observation, abstract conceptualization, and active experimentation (Smith and Kolb 1985). Concrete experiences are noted as providing the framework for the learning process and require students to be flexible and open minded because they "engage the individual personally." The model United Nations simulation fulfills these objectives almost immediately. Each student is assigned a different role to play and by having a unique perspective is intimately engaged with the situation. The interactive nature makes their involvement more fun, and allows them to relate their academic learning to the real world, allowing their appreciation to grow. This simulation provided students with a background guide which covered numerous topics—all of which could not be addressed during debate. Students were able to identify with which topics they deemed were most important. Yet, as happens in the real world, each student cannot directly control the direction of the committee, it moves as a cohesive unit. This movement requires flexibility from the students in regards to

which aspects will be discussed. Moreover, because each student's perspective is different from the start, progressive movement towards a solution obliges tolerance for opposing views and a non-judgmental attitude toward different proposals.

The second stage of Kolb's cycle is reflective observation, which is imperative for making sense of the experience. This aspect was captured during the debriefing session following the end of the simulation. It is important to note that many other scholars have argued debriefings are critical components of any simulation experience (Steinwachs 1992; Smith and Boyer 1996; Cusimano 2000; Petranek 2000; Hertel and Millis 2002; Markulis and Strang 2003; Zeff 2003; Fritzsche, Leonard, Boscia and Anderson 2004; Switkey 2004; Asal 2005). During the debriefing, as outlined later, students describe what happened in the simulation, explain their perceptions, and contemplate how the course of events impacted their learning. This session also gives students the opportunity to share with their classmates what they found most valuable. Such an experience is effective because, instead of the instructor telling students what they should have learned, classmates have the opportunity to reflect through lenses of their peers. This is particularly important because it allows students to digress from the sometimes hectic nature of the debate and contextualize the events.

Kolb's third stage, abstract conceptualization, is achieved before, during, and following the simulation. The Background Guide presents the theories and challenges of the international discussion, aspects which the students must process and weigh while writing their pre-position paper. During the simulation, students experience how abstract international theories play out in the global community. For example, the concept of sovereignty can be discussed and challenged in their position paper, but interacting with this principle in a real-life simulation grants the student a new perspective on the uses and limits of such a principle. The role of the instructor is paramount to ensure students progress through this stage. The instructor must moderate debate to guide students to use logic and ideas as opposed to feelings to understand the debate and problems posed. Lastly, the debriefing session allows the instructor to pose questions on how the simulation helped students interact with some of the abstract components of the international system and how the world could best improve this process.

The final stage, active experimentation, reaches to the heart of the simulation and the pre and post-simulation position paper. While writing their papers and preparing for the simulation, students interact with the concepts of international relations. Participating in the simulation allows them to act out their thoughts, test the concepts they previously researched, and develop ways to respond to international issues. The background readings educate the students on the issues at play, while their personal research outlines historical efforts as well as their country's perspective. The simulation gives each student a platform to test actions, and view how his/her predictions on global response or cooperation over said action would unfold. Finally, students can use their preparation and in-class negotiation to devise creatively new strategies to address global problems. During this simulation, students modified and created international committees to fill gaps they perceived in the UN's ability to support counter-terrorism efforts.

Lastly, the simulation teaches students how to fail. Although this may seem contradictory to the common goal of empowering students, it is just as important a lesson to learn. Understanding failure and why it occurs gives students deeper insight into how to resolve global problems, and the conditions under which success can be achieved (Sasley 2010). The resolution which was voted on (six were proposed, but only one could be voted on due to time constraints) failed by veto of the United States and France. This was a sorrowful defeat to the sponsors of the paper because the vast majority of the committee supported the resolution. Students were frustrated that the U.S. vetoed over a seemingly minute portion of the resolution. However, this served as a perfect example of the complexity in world affairs, especially the political impact. Simulations are a good way to teach students about failures, and how to learn from them, because they allow students to go through the learning process on their own. From this, students can learn to develop paths on how to avoid failure, and also understand that not all problems are solvable. Sasley argues that understanding failure is important because

“To reach some agreed-upon outcome students might have to—in the context of their specific groups and roles—compromise on their entrenched ideas and values. This clashes with some of the most deeply held cultural values in American society, one that outside observers from de Tocqueville to Einstein have referred to: ‘that with enough determination individuals can achieve whatever they set out to.’ ” (Sasley 2010:64)

Yet, foreign policy is not simple, and America's hegemony is decreasing—especially with the rise of China. Disagreements over foreign policy are likely to occur because countries utilize different decision making processes. As the world becomes a more globalized and connected playing field, a heightened comprehension of how individuals from different backgrounds will make foreign policy decisions is crucial to individual, organizational, and governmental success.

Debriefing Session

During the debriefing session, I asked nine different questions over a 40 minute period to the simulation class. These questions focused on aspects of the simulation and how it had impacted their learning experience. Out of the 31 students present for the debriefing session, 26 stated their opinions about terrorism, Pakistan, and the UN had changed. Multiple students stated that the simulation had changed the way they thought about international affairs. They enjoyed being placed in a different country's shoes and hearing a variety of perspectives about an issue. From these different perspectives, conflict and disagreement naturally arose. Learning how to manage conflict, diplomatically disagree with another country's perspective, and negotiate for a common agenda were also challenges they faced. Understanding the different perspectives forced the students to make arguments that knowingly would turn people against them.

One student acknowledged that the simulation was a “more interesting, different way to learn. The simulation was more interactive, and better than a lecture. I felt more into it, as opposed to getting talked at.” Students believed, “It was a memorable activity and experience” and the simulation was “a lot of fun.” This level of enjoyment is crucial when discussing international affairs topics because the issues are not cut and dry. Students noted that the enjoyable environment motivated them to work harder and made it easier to process information beyond face value. Another student noted that the simulation taught him how to take simple facts and standard information and process what it means and discover how to respond to any given situation. These critical thinking skills cannot simply be developed in a classroom lecture setting. Participants commented that their experience pushed them to “analyze an issue more than I would have” in order to take the next best step. For example, multiple students discussed the realities of international cooperation in regards to aid. The simulation forced them to witness personally that there is no simple solution to issues surrounding terrorism, and that providing aid

to suppress terrorism is a process much more complicated than portrayed in the readings or media.

Students frequently commented about the U.N. system and some of its impracticalities for handling international issues. One student noted the institutional mechanics are not efficient, and granting veto power to SC members seriously hinders global cooperation. However, the order of the SC rules of procedure and equal speaking time given to smaller countries allowed them to gain a more global perspective. A few students noted their frustration with U.S. foreign policy and the roadblocks it presents to some international issues, such as nuclear proliferation. During the simulation, students worked tirelessly to have Pakistan and India sign the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Pakistan agreed to sign the NPT if India signed, and India agreed if the US would sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). This proposal was flatly rejected by the United States delegates, which seriously set back the discussion on Pakistan's nuclear program. Through these experiences, delegates became acutely aware of the power politics in the international arena. They noted that they found themselves leading and following other's leads at different points in the simulation. Some expressed frustration at having no influence over the discussion, while others noted how easy it was to manipulate debate to reach their goals.

Participants discussed how difficult it was to step into someone else's shoes at the beginning of the simulation. They struggled to articulate an opinion which they did not agree with, and had difficulty representing a country without a slew of background research. As the simulation progressed, they became more comfortable with thinking critically from a different perspective. Some countries did not have publicized or easily accessible positions on terrorism in Pakistan—such as Guatemala or Togo. These students had to learn how to take various strands of information and piece them together into a policy that made sense. Many students commented that this process of creative thinking and knowledge generation, as opposed to reiteration, became easier as the simulation progressed.

Students also addressed the social skills they developed throughout the debate. Public speaking, fielding pointed questions, and negotiation topped the list. They noted that they learned how to become more cooperative and patient, especially when working with individuals who held points of view completely divergent from their own. The fast paced nature of the simulation forced

them to think on their feet and independently assess where other members stood on an issue. One delegate noted that she had a problem choosing which relationships to develop and which sides to take. Another student concluded that this experience forced him to set his personal opinions aside and look at the topics from a more analytical and critical perspective. As a result, he found himself consistently asking why, what, or how, as opposed to just settling into an opinion.

Pre and Post Quiz Results

As previously iterated, the quizzes assessed simple information retention. Two quizzes were administered to each class, one before the simulation (and lecture) period and one after. Their scores between the two classes were compared. The chart below illustrates the results.

Quiz Results (Knowledge Retention)				
	UN Pre	Pakistan Pre	UN Post	Pakistan Post
Simulation Mean	5.952	3.290	8.681	3.783
<i>Simulation Change</i>			45.85%	14.98%
Control Group Mean	5.323	3.806	8.261	3.788
<i>Control Group Change</i>			55.20%	-0.49%
Change over Control Group			-9.35%	15.47%
Total Change over Control Group				6.13%

The class which underwent the simulation experienced a 3.61% increase in total knowledge retention, while the control group actually decreased -0.17%. Although this is a small increase, there are a few important conclusions that can be drawn. Firstly, the simulation appears to have been effective, in fact more effective, in communicating simple facts and figures. This is integral because information was not directly ‘taught’ to the class in the common use of the word; it was shared through the class. Secondly, the simulation did not cover all topics or details on the quiz, while the control group did. Traditionally, scholars note that simulations are limited because the topic engagement is somewhat uncontrolled. While accurate, because the simulation should run

itself without instructor interference, these results suggest that knowledge retention actually improved over lectures where specific facts and theories could be directly addressed. As a result, either the students learned the topic outside of the classroom through their own independent or group research, or the information covered during the simulation was retained at a higher percentage than the information covered in the lecture. This higher retention rate would impact the results because retaining 80% of 50% of the material—50% being what is covered—is larger than retaining 30% if all material is covered.

These conclusions are particularly insightful because active learning literature already proves that simulations play a much larger role than learning retention. As a result, this portion of the analysis concludes that the simulation exceeded the simple goals of lecture style teaching before the more important impacts of simulation based learning were even measured. Their results indicate that students also advanced in basic knowledge in addition to previously outlined impact.

CONCLUSION

Use of a Model United Nations Simulation in a Classroom

Bearing in mind the success of this experiment, the question arises “how can MUN (or another type of simulation) be integrated into a classroom?” First, a simulation should complement and not completely replace a curriculum. Second, there are a few logistical points such as duration and topic selection an instructor should bear in mind. Lastly, simulations need to be well thought out exercises in order for their true potential to be achieved. Successful adoption and integration of the following points will render a positive learning environment and maximize the benefits of experiential learning.

Simulations can play an integral part in the learning experience, but their placement within a developed curriculum is extremely important. Foundational knowledge of international systems, theories, and certain situations can critically ameliorate the simulation experience. Students with in-depth background knowledge about the functional practices of the international community can easily adapt to the mechanics of the simulation, thus allowing them to focus their time on the substance at hand. For example, the quality of the debate and discussion visibly improved once the students managed to overcome the knowledge gap on how the UN works. Furthermore, increased understanding of the abilities and different organizations of the international community will enhance the capacity of students to utilize knowingly the global structure to solve various problems. Therefore, it is important to position the simulation after some knowledge has been developed. I would also suggest that the simulation not be placed towards the end of the course, but in the middle. This way the skills students develop during the simulation can serve as a framework for their performance throughout the remainder of the course.

Second, instructors should pay careful attention to the logistics of the simulation. Simulations should try to last two to three (six or more classes) weeks in duration. Although my simulation ran about one and-a-half weeks, it would have been more beneficial if it could have run longer. The first session is normally used to familiarize students with the debate procedure and introduce a few perspectives on the topic. During the second session all positions will be presented and students will start to dig into some of the sub topics. Sessions three and four will be primarily used for intense substantive debate, bloc formulation, and resolution writing. Session five should

be reserved for voting, while session six should be used as a debriefing session. If instructors have the flexibility to expand the middle portion (session three and four to sessions three through six) the quality of the ideas, resolutions, and diplomatic negotiation will greatly improve. Some scholars have noted that fewer longer sessions can be more beneficial than multiple short sessions. I agree with this perspective because in a longer session, delegates have time to step into their roles and fully engage a topic—a short session runs the risk of cutting debate off during the height of idea formulation. Additionally, this simulation is more conducive for a smaller class size. Unless an abundance of time is present, a simulation should not be run with more than 40 students. In a class of up to 40, students can be paired up to make 20 delegations. Any more delegations would result in too much time being spent on hearing all perspectives and opinions. As a result, the more delegations, the less each delegate gets to speak, and the less interactive and beneficial the simulation.

Moreover, some scholars have debated what course level is most conducive for hosting a simulation. I contend that simulations can be conducted in every level of IR courses, as long as the appropriate preparation materials are required. The lower-level courses should be provided with more preparation materials and overview of the UN and other international systems. The topic should also vary by level. Introductory courses should not partake in a narrowly focused debate (such as the Western Sahara or the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict) but can engage wider encompassing issues, i.e., Colombian FARC or the Israeli-Palestine issue. More advanced courses can venture outside the traditional UN structure and simulate State Cabinets, councils, and other specialized agencies. Ideally, the instructor should choose a topic which touches on various aspects of international affairs he/she wishes to highlight. For example, a topic such as the situation in Pakistan examines the issues of foreign aid, international and humanitarian intervention, nuclear weapons safety, and terrorism. In the end it is important to remember that MUN simulations advance student skill sets, a process which is beneficial and crucial at any level. Regardless of the topic, its selection should serve as a tool to achieve specified learning objectives, and should not be random.

Suggestions for Future Simulations

For instructors wishing to incorporate a simulation into their classroom, I have provided a few suggestions below. These ideas are by no means mandatory, but they have the ability to enhance

greatly the learning experience. First, I suggest that professors provide a background guide to all delegates. This Background Guide should provide an overview of the committee history, mechanics of the simulation, outline the history of the topic, and include current status updates, role descriptions, and ask questions to guide the focus of student research. Although these BGs are not easy to produce, lecturers should look into using BGs from established MUN conferences. Professors should also provide a detailed explanation of the position paper assignment. If this aspect is not thoroughly covered, students may enter the debate under false presumptions or with less than adequate background knowledge.

Instructors should also explicitly explain the learning objectives of the simulation. Students who better understand the goal and purpose of the simulation can draw more from the role-playing atmosphere. At the outset of the simulation, students were unsure about which steps to take or how the process would work. A more extensive explanation process on the reason and structure of the simulation would allow delegates to dive into debate. I suggest that the individual coordinating the simulation set up office hours to help students prepare or more actively participate during the simulation. A 10 minute meeting with each delegation prior to the simulation would ensure each country was following the appropriate perspective and that students were prepared and energized for debate. If key countries, such as any of the P-5 or a country directly affected by the topic is inadequately prepared, the quality of the debate will be tampered. At the start of the debate, each delegate should be provided a list of perambulatory and operative clauses so they spend less time on the technicalities of the UN language. Providing a sample resolution to the committee can help delegates better understand how the UN responds to international quagmires and simultaneously gives them a template for their own work.


Incorporating different information technology infrastructure can also enhance the quality of the debate. For example, having an assistant with digital chat capabilities allows students to ask fact-based questions (such as, “How many drone attacks in Pakistan were there last year?”) and receive almost instant feedback. This information exchange can expand the limits of standard debate. Students can also request access to different documents, such as treaties or press releases they may want to reference in the committee. This chat option can also be expanded to allow students to discuss options with their bloc members—discussions which would have to be monitored. I suggest utilizing a tool such as Respondus Lockdown Browser to prevent students

from misusing the technology to access Facebook, Twitter, YouTube etc. The instructor would have to ensure students were not substituting the in-class discussion with the chat-based tool, but using it as an additional source to achieve their desired results.

Value of a Model United Nations Simulation

These results tell us that a model United Nations simulation has a substantial impact on the way students think and learn in the field of international relations studies. Simulation based learning is a mechanism to encourage education to focus on self-generated learning. The benefits of such an exercise are worth the time and effort. Simulation based learning is a more effective method to increase student's creative and critical thinking, analytical and problem solving capabilities, and comprehension of complex and diverse topics. This type of learning is more fun and interactive which helps students not only engage the substance, but it contributes to their own education. This high level of in-class participation also develops strong social and speaking skills. Moreover, simulations, if crafted and executed correctly, can lead a student through all four phases of Kolb's learning model. Students who undergo simulations comment that the process helps them view problems through an ameliorated, more advanced, and more thorough lens. With this perspective, students are better equipped to assume their role as global citizens and leaders. Finally, these learning objectives can be accomplished without expensing retention of basic information—in fact, their retention rates improve because students interact with information as opposed to viewing it. Simulation based learning should be seriously considered by members of the higher education community and incorporated into various curricula to maximize a students learning process.

APPENDIX A



© concept david kolb, adaptation and design alan chapman, 2005-06, based on [Kolb's learning styles](#), 1984
 Not to be sold or published. More free online training resources are at www.businessballs.com. Sole risk with user.

APPENDIX B

NHSMUN Rules of Procedure

Rule 1 — Date of Meeting

The General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council shall meet every year in regular session.

Rule 2 — Emergency Session

Emergency sessions invoked under General Assembly Resolution 377 A (V) shall be immediately convened upon the request of the Secretary-General.

Comment — General Assembly Resolution 377 A (V), known as the "Uniting for Peace Resolution," allows the Security Council, in the event of a veto, to refer an issue to the General Assembly Plenary. Such a motion requires the affirmative vote of seven (7) Members and is not subject to a veto. Security Council powers such as mandatory sanctions or military action may not be exercised by the General Assembly. Any General Assembly resolutions voted upon under this procedure require a two-thirds majority for passage.

Rule 3 — Emergency Special Session; Agenda

Notwithstanding the provisions of any other rule and unless the General Assembly decides otherwise, the Assembly, in the case of an emergency special session, shall convene to discuss only the item under consideration.

Rule 4 — Delegations

The delegation of a Member State shall consist of no more than two representatives in any committee.

Comment — Regardless of the number of representatives, a Member State has only one vote in each committee in which it is a member.

Rule 5 — Credentials

The credentials and the names of representatives of Member States shall be submitted to the Secretary-General if possible not later than one week before the opening of the session.

Rule 6 — Credentials Committee

The Credentials Committee shall be composed of a representative of each of those Member States elected to serve on the Credentials Committee of the current session of the General Assembly. It shall examine the credentials of representatives and report without delay.

Comment — The Credentials Committee is charged with the responsibility of ensuring that all representatives seated at the United Nations are in fact representative of the people of that nation. The credentials of any representative may be referred to the Credentials Committee, which meets at the end of the last regular committee session. The Credentials Committee will submit its recommendation, in resolution form, to the General Assembly Plenary for its decision. The Credentials Committee of the conference shall be composed of the same nations as the Credentials Committee of the current session of the United Nations.

Rule 7 — Provisional Admission to a Session

Any representative to whose admission a Member has made objection shall be seated provisionally with the same rights as other representatives until the Credentials Committee has reported and the General Assembly has rendered a decision on the matter.

Rule 8 — General Committee; Composition

The General Committee shall be composed of a representative of each of those Member States which have been elected to serve as the President of the General Assembly or the Vice-President or the

Chairman of a Main Committee at the current session of the General Assembly. No two Members of the General Committee shall be representatives of the same Member State and the General Committee shall be so constituted as to ensure its representative character.

Comment — The General Committee of the conference shall be composed of the same Member States as the General Committee of the current session of the United Nations.

Rule 9 — General Committee; Functions

The General Committee shall convene prior to the final plenary session of the General Assembly. The General Committee shall determine the agenda of the final plenary session. The General Committee shall not consider the substance of any issue, and shall meet at the request of the Secretary-General.

Comment — The General Committee will order the resolutions passed by each Main Committee for the consideration of the plenary session.

Rule 10 — Duties of the Secretary-General

The Secretary-General shall act in that capacity in all meetings of the General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council, their committees and subcommittees. The Secretary-General may designate a member of the Secretariat to act in the place of the Secretary-General at these meetings. The Secretary-General shall provide and direct the staff required by the General Assembly, the Economic and Social Council, and any committees or subsidiary organs which they may establish.

Comment — The term "Secretariat" refers collectively to those designated to act on behalf of the Secretary-General.

Rule 11 — Statements by the Secretariat

The Secretary-General, or a member of the Secretariat designated by the Secretary-General as his or her representative, may make, at any time, either oral or written statements to any plenary meeting or any committee or subcommittee concerning any question under consideration by it.

Rule 12 — Functions of the Chairman

The Chairman shall declare the opening and closing of each meeting of the committee, direct its discussions, ensure observance of the rules of procedure, accord the right to speak, put questions and announce decisions. The Chairman shall rule on points of order and, subject to these rules, shall have complete control of the proceedings at any meeting and over the maintenance of order thereat. The Chairman may, in the course of the discussion of an item, propose to the committee the limitation of the time to be allowed to speakers, the closure of the list of speakers, or the closure of the debate. The Chairman may also propose the suspension or adjournment of the meeting or the adjournment of debate on the item under discussion.

Comment — The Chairman shall have discretionary powers to entertain a motion, or suggest to the body that a motion would be in order, or choose not to entertain a motion and suggest that it be withdrawn. The Chairman may rule a motion out of order, thus disallowing that motion.

Rule 13 — Invitation to Silent Prayer or Meditation

Immediately after the opening of the first plenary meeting and immediately preceding the closing of the final plenary meeting of each session of the General Assembly and Economic and Social Council, the Chairman shall invite representatives to observe a moment of silence dedicated to prayer or meditation.

Rule 14 — Establishment of Committees and Subcommittees

The General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council may establish such committees as they deem necessary for the performance of their functions. Each committee may set up subcommittees.

Rule 15 — Notification Under Article 12 of the Charter

The Secretary-General, with the consent of the Security Council, shall notify the General Assembly, at each session, of any matters relative to the maintenance of international peace and security which are under consideration by the Security Council, and shall similarly notify the General Assembly, or the Members of the United Nations if the General Assembly is not in session, immediately when the Security Council ceases to consider such matters.

Comment — Technically the General Assembly is not permitted to discuss or vote on an issue that is under consideration by the Security Council. However, in practice, the General Assembly both discusses and votes on different aspects of issues before the Security Council.

Rule 16 — Provisional Agenda

The Provisional Agenda for a regular session of all committees and organs of the United Nations shall be drawn up by the Secretary-General and communicated to the Members of the United Nations at least sixty (60) days before the opening of the session.

Comment — The Provisional Agenda is the topic list provided by the Directors of the committees. The order of the topics does not imply the order of the agenda.

Rule 17 — Adoption of the Agenda

Each committee shall order the provisional agenda provided by the Secretary-General. A proposed agenda shall include all topics provided in the provisional agenda. It requires a simple majority to approve an agenda order and proposed agendas shall be voted upon in the order in which they were proposed.

Comment — The first item of business for each committee will be to order its agenda. A speakers list will be established for purposes of discussing the order of the agenda. After a sufficient number of speakers have spoken on the order of the agenda, a Member may move, from the floor, that a particular agenda order be adopted. If properly moved, an immediate procedural vote will be conducted. If the proposed agenda passes, debate on the order of the agenda will be deemed to have been closed, the speakers list will be discarded, and the committee will begin consideration of the first agenda topic. If the proposed agenda fails, the committee will continue debate, using the same speakers list, until another order is proposed. If a proposed agenda fails, it may be reintroduced at a later time.

Rule 18 — Change of Agenda

A committee may change the order in which it considers agenda topics. The Chairman may entertain one speaker for, and one against, a motion to change the order. A simple majority vote is required to change the order in which agenda topics will be discussed.

Comment — A motion to change the order of the agenda may only be moved after a substantive topic has been closed and all related resolutions and amendments have been put to a vote. A motion to change the agenda may not be moved during the substantive debate of any topic.

Rule 19 — Quorum

The Chairman may declare a meeting open and permit the debate to proceed or a procedural vote to be taken when at least one-quarter of the members of the committee are present. The presence of a majority of the members of the committee shall be required for any substantive decision to be taken.

Comment — Procedural votes refer to motions regarding the process of the discussion (e.g. a motion for recess, or closure of the speakers list). Substantive votes address the substance of the topic under discussion (e.g. a vote on the contents of a resolution or amendment).

Rule 20 — Speeches

No Member may address a committee without having previously obtained the permission of the Chairman. The Chairman shall take a speakers list in the order in which the Members signify their desire to speak. The Chairman shall call a speaker to order if the speaker's remarks are not relevant to the subject under discussion.

Comment — Members may speak as often as they wish, however, Members must wait until they have already spoken before being placed on the speakers list again.

Rule 21 — Language and Interpretation

English shall be the official and the working language of the General Assembly, the Economic and Social Council, and their committees and subcommittees. Any Member may make a speech in any language other than the official language. In this case, the Member shall provide for simultaneous interpretation into the official language.

Comment — The time required for translation and the original speech shall both be counted against the speaker's time.

Rule 22 — Time Limit on Speeches

The Chairman may, upon consultation with the committee or as a result of a motion by a member of the committee, limit the time allowed to each speaker on any question. When debate is limited and a speaker exceeds the allotted time, the Chairman shall call that speaker to order without delay.

Rule 23 — Questions to the Speaker

When the committee is engaged in substantive debate, a time limit has been placed on speeches, and the speaker has not exhausted the allotted time, the speaker may inform the Chairman that he or she will accept questions from the floor. At such time, the Chairman will recognize Members to pose substantive questions to the speaker on the issue under discussion. The speaker may at any time determine that he or she will cease accepting questions and thus conclude his or her remarks.

Comment — A Member may only rise to pose questions to the speaker when:

- a) the committee is debating a substantive issue;
- b) a time limit has been placed on speeches;
- c) the speaker has not exhausted his or her allotted time; and
- d) the speaker has agreed to accept questions from the floor.

Questions addressed to the speaker shall relate directly to the substantive issue under discussion, requesting elucidation or clarification of a point made or a position taken by the speaker. The Member asking a question of the speaker may not engage the speaker in debate, but rather must phrase his or her point in the form of a question. The speaker may at any time decide to conclude his or her remarks and answers, notwithstanding that a question may remain unanswered. Members may want to keep their questions brief because a speaker's time shall be measured from the point at which the speaker takes the floor, and shall include the time used to ask a question. When a speaker's allotted time has elapsed, the Chairman shall promptly call the speaker to order.

Rule 24 — Yields

When the time for speeches has been limited, a Member recognized to speak on a substantive issue may yield his or her remaining time to another Member. This Member may not yield any additional time.

Comment — A representative may share her or his allotted time with another representative of the same Member State and this shall not count as a yield. A yield may be announced at any time before the speaker has left the floor. Yields may not be granted during procedural debate.

Rule 25 — Closing the Speakers List

The speakers list may be closed at any time upon the majority vote of the Members present and voting.

Comment — When a closed speakers list is exhausted, debate automatically ends and an immediate vote is taken on all resolutions and amendments before the committee.

Rule 26 — Reopening the Speakers List

The speakers list may be reopened by a vote of the Members provided that at least one speaker remains on the list at the time of the motion. One Member may speak in favor of and one opposed to this motion. *Comment* — If the motion is carried, additional Members may be added to the already existing speakers list.

Rule 27 — Right of Reply

If a speaker has impugned the national integrity of another Member State or observer, or the personal integrity of another representative, the Chairman may accord that Member or representative appropriate speaking time to exercise the right of reply.

Comment — The right of reply is to be used to respond to the statements of the speaker. It may not be used to make corresponding, insulting remarks. It is granted at the discretion of the Chairman and should only be requested at the conclusion of the speaker's remarks.

Rule 28 — Resolutions and Amendments

Resolutions and amendments shall normally be submitted in writing to the Chairman who shall circulate copies to the Members. No resolutions or amendments shall be voted upon unless copies of them have been made available to all Members.

Comment — Any Member may submit an amendment or a resolution. Any Member may be added to the list of sponsors of a resolution or amendment at any time before the resolution or amendment is put to a vote. Sponsorship indicates support of and agreement with a resolution or amendment. Because of the limited resources of the conference, it is necessary to insure a minimum level of discussion of a resolution or amendment before it is produced for general distribution. Therefore, a resolution must have the signatures of one-fifth of the membership of the body (but not less than five Members) and amendments must have the signatures of one-tenth of the membership of the body (but not less than three Members). A "signature" does not indicate sponsorship of, nor even agreement with, a resolution or amendment. Rather, a signature is intended to mean that the Member desires the opportunity to discuss the resolution or amendment. A less formal draft of a resolution, often referred to as a working paper, may also be submitted to the Chairman for the purpose of making additional copies for wider distribution. Whether a working paper is copied and how many copies are made will be determined by the Chairman.

Rule 29 — Competence

Any motion calling for a decision on the competence of the committee to adopt a resolution or amendment submitted to it shall be put to the vote before a vote is taken on the resolution or amendment in question.

Comment — The Secretary-General has approved the competence of each committee to discuss the topic areas included in the provisional agenda. This rule serves to prevent the exercise of powers reserved exclusively for the Security Council by the General Assembly or the Economic and Social Council. In this vote, an affirmative vote indicates that the body is NOT competent to pass the proposal and vice versa.

Rule 30 — Withdrawal

A motion, resolution, or amendment may be withdrawn by its mover or sponsor(s) at any time before voting on the motion, resolution, or amendment has commenced. A motion, resolution, or amendment thus withdrawn may be reintroduced by any Member. A resolution may not be withdrawn after it has been amended.

Comment — In order to withdraw a resolution or an amendment, all sponsors must agree to the withdrawal.

Rule 31 — Point of Order

During the discussion of any matter, a Member may rise to a point of order. A point of order is used only in the case of an error in the order of procedure and is used to bring the issue to the attention of the

Chairman. A Member rising to a point of order may not speak on the substance of the matter under discussion.

Comment — If necessary, a point of order may interrupt a speaker.

Rule 32 — Point of Parliamentary Inquiry

A Member may rise to a point of parliamentary inquiry when uncertain of the procedural setting of the committee. A Member may not interrupt a speaker on a point of parliamentary inquiry.

Comment — Representatives may use this point to have the Chairman explain any procedural matter. A point of parliamentary inquiry may be raised during voting procedure.

Rule 33 — Point of Personal Privilege

A Member may rise to a point of personal privilege in order to bring to the attention of the Chairman some physical discomfort which is disrupting the proper functioning of the committee. A point of personal privilege may interrupt a speaker.

Comment — A representative may rise to a point of personal privilege when he or she is unable to hear the Chairman or speaker or for other physical reasons which may impair the representative's ability to participate in or listen to the debate.

Rule 34 — Appeal

A Member may appeal a discretionary ruling of the Chairman. The Member may explain the appeal and the Chairman may explain the basis of the ruling. The Chairman's ruling will stand unless overruled by a majority of the Members present and voting.

Comment — Voting "yes" on this motion means a Member wishes to overrule the decision of the Chairman. Voting "no" means the Member wishes to uphold the ruling.

Rule 35 — Recess of the Meeting

During the discussion of any matter, a Member may move to recess the meeting. Such a motion shall include the proposed length of such recess and shall not be debated but immediately shall be put to the vote.

Comment — Recess of the meeting is used for caucusing, meal breaks and the evening break. Normally, a recess for the purpose of caucusing should not exceed twenty minutes. When the motion to recess is made, the Chairman may suggest a different time period for the suspension. A simple majority is required to pass a motion to recess.

Rule 36 — Closure of Debate

A Member may at any time move the closure of the debate on the item under consideration, whether or not any other Member has signified his or her wish to speak. Permission to speak on the closure of the debate shall be accorded only to two Members opposing the closure, after which the motion immediately shall be put to the vote. If two-thirds of the committee is in favor of the closure, the Chairman shall declare the closure of the debate.

Comment — Closure of debate is used to end discussion of a topic area. When debate is closed, the committee must move to an immediate vote on the resolution(s) and amendment(s) under that topic area. Motions for closure of debate are generally out of order until there has been a full discussion of the issue by the committee. The speakers list will be discarded following passage of a motion to close debate. The speakers list will not be carried over for other substantive or procedural debate.

Rule 37 — Adjournment of Debate

During the discussion of any matter, a Member may move the adjournment of the debate on the item under discussion. Two Members may speak in favor of, and two against, the motion after which the motion immediately shall be put to the vote.

Comment — Adjournment of debate is used to end discussion of a topic area. Adjournment of debate is sometimes referred to as "tabling" debate on the topic area. When debate is adjourned, the resolution(s) and amendment(s) under that topic area are not voted on. A topic area which has been adjourned may only be reconsidered in accordance with Rule 49.

Rule 38 — Adjournment of Session

The General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council may each decide at any session to adjourn temporarily and resume the meeting at a later date.

Comment — Unlike recess, adjournment is only appropriate at the final closing of committee sessions and at the close of the conference. This is a procedural motion and requires the approval of the Chairman.

Rule 39 — Order of Procedural Motions

The motions indicated below shall have precedence in the following order over all other proposals or motions before the committee:

- a) to recess the meeting (Rule 35);
- b) to adjourn the session (Rule 38);
- c) to adjourn the debate on the item under discussion (Rule 37);
- d) to close debate on the item under discussion (Rule 36).

Rule 40 — Voting Rights

Each Member of the United Nations shall have one vote.

Comment — Observer delegations may not vote on substantive issues, but may vote on procedural motions.

Rule 41 — Meaning of the Phrase "Members Present and Voting"

For the purposes of these rules, the phrase "Members present and voting" means Members casting an affirmative or negative vote. Members who abstain from voting are considered as not voting.

Comment — Abstentions will not be called for in procedural votes.

Rule 42 — Simple Majority

Decisions of committees on questions other than those provided for in Rules 36, 48, and 49, including the determination of additional categories of questions to be decided by a two-thirds majority, shall be made by a majority of the Members present and voting. If a vote is equally divided, the motion, resolution, or amendment fails.

Rule 43 — Method of Voting

The General Assembly shall normally vote by show of placards, but any Member may request a roll-call vote on a resolution or amendment. The roll-call shall be taken in the English alphabetical order of the names of the Members, beginning with the Member whose name is drawn by lot by the Chairman. The name of each Member shall be called in any roll-call, and one of the Member State's representatives shall reply "yes," "no," or "abstention." Members may pass in the order of a vote once per vote. The Chairman may allow Members to explain their vote after a roll-call vote. The Chairman shall not permit the sponsors of a resolution or amendment to explain their vote on their own resolution or amendment. The result of the voting shall be inserted in the record in the English alphabetical order of the names of the Members.

Comment — The Chairman may require that a motion for a roll-call vote be supported by as much as one-fifth of the committee. While abstentions do not count as votes for purposes of determining a majority (Rule 41), Members abstaining from a vote may request the right to explain their abstention, provided that they were not the sponsor of the resolution or amendment. Roll-call votes may not be taken on procedural motions.

Rule 44 — Conduct During the Voting

After the Chairman has announced the beginning of voting, no Member shall interrupt the voting except on a point of order in connection with the actual conduct of the voting or on a point of parliamentary inquiry.

Comment — During a vote, representatives should maintain proper decorum; no caucusing should take place, no notes should be passed, and no representatives should enter or leave the room.

Rule 45 — Division of Resolutions and Amendments

- a) A Member may move that the operative clauses of a resolution or amendment be voted on separately. If objection is made to the motion for division, the motion to divide shall be voted on. This is a procedural vote. Permission to speak on the motion for division may be granted to two speakers for and two speakers against the motion.
- b) If the motion for division is carried, a substantive vote shall be taken on each of the divided parts.
- c) Those parts which are approved shall then be voted on as a whole. This shall be a substantive vote. If all operative parts of the resolution or amendment have been rejected, the resolution or amendment shall be considered to have been rejected as a whole.
- d) In the event of several motions for division, the Chairman shall order the motions, selecting that motion which divides the resolution or amendment into the most parts first. A successful motion for division will supersede later conflicting motions.

Comment — This action consists of three stages, one procedural and two substantive:

- 1) The vote on whether the resolution or amendment will be divided at all; this is a procedural vote;
- 2) The vote on each of the divided operative parts; these are substantive votes;
- 3) The final vote on all of the accepted parts as a whole; this is a substantive vote.

Pre-ambulatory clauses may not be divided. A motion for division must delineate the placement of each operative clause. Only clauses that are distinctly specified within the resolution or amendment may be divided.

Rule 46 — Voting on Amendments

A motion is considered an amendment to a resolution if it adds to, deletes from or revises part of the resolution. When an amendment to a resolution is moved, the amendment shall be voted on first. When two or more amendments to a resolution are moved, the committee shall first vote on the amendment furthest removed in substance from the original resolution and then on the amendment next furthest removed there from, and so on until all of the amendments have been put to a vote. Where, however, the adoption of one amendment necessarily implies the rejection of another amendment, the latter amendment shall not be put to a vote. If any amendments are adopted, the amended resolution shall then be voted upon.

Comment -- Amendments will be voted upon after debate on the topic area has been closed and immediately before the vote on the relevant resolution. Pre-ambulatory clauses may not be amended. Technically, there are no "friendly amendments." However, if all of the sponsors of a resolution agree that a certain change to a proposed resolution is desirable, with the concurrence of the Chairman, the sponsors may withdraw the original resolution and submit a "new" resolution, as changed. All other amendments must be put to a vote. The Chairman shall determine the order of voting on the amendments and when one amendment implies the rejection of another.

Rule 47 — Voting on Resolutions

If two or more resolutions relate to the same question, the committee shall, unless it decides otherwise, vote on the resolutions in the order in which they have been submitted. The Committee may, after each vote on a resolution, decide whether to vote on the next resolution.

Comment — It requires a majority vote to change the order in which a committee considers resolutions.

Rule 48 — Important Questions

Decisions of the General Assembly on important questions shall be made by a two-thirds majority of the Members present and voting. These questions shall include: recommendations with respect to the maintenance of international peace and security, the suspension of the rights and privileges of membership, the expulsion of Members, questions relating to the operation of the trusteeship system, and budgetary questions. Any Member may move to consider a resolution an important question. Two Members may speak in favor of and two against the motion. It shall require a simple majority vote to consider a resolution as an important question.

Comment — The Chairman will not determine the existence of an important question; it requires the initiative of the committee. Only when a resolution is in its final form may a motion be made to consider it an important question (i.e., after voting on amendments and division is completed).

Rule 49 — Reconsideration

When a resolution has been adopted or rejected or when debate on a topic area has been adjourned, it may not be reconsidered at the same session unless the committee, by a two-thirds majority of the Members present and voting, so decides. Permission to speak on a motion to reconsider may be accorded only to one speaker in favor of the motion, and one opposing the motion, after which the motion immediately shall be put to the vote.

Comment — This rule may be used to reconsider specific resolutions upon which an actual vote has been taken or entire topic areas upon which debate was adjourned. It may not be used to reconsider entire topic areas upon which debate was closed and a vote was taken on the resolution(s) and amendment(s). As a practical matter, a motion to reconsider a resolution should be made only by a Member who voted with the originally prevailing side.

APPENDIX C

SECURITY COUNCIL

~ 2012 ~

Combating Terrorism in Pakistan

By: Jason Fortin

Contact: jfortin1@bryant.edu

SIMULATION

As delegates serving on the Security Council, all members will have the opportunity to put forth resolutions aimed at addressing some of the world's most complex international issues. These resolutions are meant to embody the work of the UN Security Council, and should reflect the central objective of the body: to maintain global security and stability.

The five permanent members of the Security Council, known as the P-5, possess veto power on substantive issues. The ten remaining delegations, which bring total committee membership to fifteen, do not have veto power. Also, the Council may, from time to time, invite non-Security Council nations or organizations to members to participate in the proceedings. Such members may only vote on procedural matters; once the committee has entered formal voting procedure on any resolution, the invitee is not permitted to cast their vote.

In this simulation of the UN Security Council, the Director (Jason Fortin) will chair debate. The Director can also be referred to as the dais. The dais is charged with the task of maintaining decorum throughout the committee session. The dais will also assist delegates in their use of parliamentary procedure and work to ensure that all points of order are handled appropriately. Furthermore, the Director will provide directional advice and delegates may ask the dais any questions they have about the topics themselves and/or procedural matters.

A delegate's first job before coming to committee is to research both topics before the committee and to feel comfortable advocating their assigned country's policies. It is important that even if a delegate does not agree personally with a nation's policies, he or she remains true to country policy, and continues to voice these ideas to the committee, remaining cognizant of how these policies are reflected in resolutions written during the simulation. As members on a very specialized committee, delegates are encouraged to work together towards a viable solution, and all members should seek to collaborate with states whose policies and opinions on the issues similar to their own.

Traditionally, the first task in committee will be to set the agenda. However, since there is only one topic on our Agenda, the discussion order is already set. The next order of business is to open a new Speaker's List intended for substantive debate on the first issue on the agenda. Debate will move in the order of this Speaker's List until a vote by the Council moves the discussion into either a moderated or unmoderated caucus. Votes on procedural matters such as unmoderated or moderated caucuses are procedural matters and will require a simple majority vote with any abstentions being prohibited.

The goal of this simulation is to produce well-written, comprehensive resolutions to the issues at hand. Through formal and informal debate, delegates will begin this resolution writing process by creating a working paper, which is essentially a collection of ideas on possible solutions. Once the dais accepts the working paper it becomes a draft resolution and may be edited, withdrawn, or merged with another draft resolution at any time prior to formal voting procedure. When the dais accepts a motion to close debate, or the Speaker's List is exhausted, the committee moves into voting procedure on the draft resolutions. During this time, veto power for the P-5 is active and abstentions are permitted. The final resolution is passed by a simple majority, however if one or more of the P-5 votes negatively on the resolution it automatically does not pass.

Working on the Security Council is a unique, unparalleled opportunity for students to take control of their own education. Delegates' ability to work together, to compromise, and to accurately advocate the policies of the nations they represent will ultimately determine the success of the committee.

COMMITTEE HISTORY

In 1945, the international community founded the United Nations. The UN Security Council, among the first main bodies created, was declared responsible for establishing and maintaining peace and security on a global scale. Under the original UN Charter, the Security Council was entrusted with important powers ranging from the ability to authorize military action to the creation of peacekeeping missions. Today, the Security Council investigates disputes, formulates systems to monitor sources of international friction, applies sanctions, and determines the existence of potential or current hazards to international stability. In addition, the UN Security Council's Charter includes a "responsibility to protect" clause, ensuring that the committee exercises its diverse powers for the good of humanity, especially in times of war, genocide, or other crimes against humanity.

The original founding members of the UN Security Council were the Allied Powers of World War II: the United States, the Russian Federation, the People's Democratic of China, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and France. These members are called the Permanent 5, or the P-5, because their position on the Security Council is permanent and because they uniquely possess the ability to veto proposed resolutions. The remaining ten members of the Security Council rotate membership based on geographic distribution requirements and upon approval by the General Assembly. After election to the Council, these members remain on the body for a two-year period. Additionally, the Presidency of the Council rotates every month based on English alphabetical order.

The mandate of the UN Security Council is unique in the breadth of global issues it seeks to address and discuss. The Security Council focuses on issues all around the world, and under Chapter 5, Article 26 of the UN Charter, the Security Council works "to promote the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security with the least diversion for armament of the world's human and economic resources."

To ensure that its mission is accomplished and its mandate maintained, the Security Council utilizes an array of methods to inhibit international conflict. The first of these tools includes the declaration of a cease-fire, stating that all involved in the issue abstain from further acts of violence or potentially harmful behavior. Furthermore, the Security Council has the ability to position peacekeepers in a given region to either supervise the withdrawal of troops, oversee a ceasefire, or prevent aggressive powers from committing further acts of brutality. These peacekeeping forces are always volunteered by member-states of the UN, as the United Nations itself does not possess any formal standing military. Today, there are two different mandates for peacekeeping missions. The first, outlined in Chapter VI of the UN Charter, limits peacekeeping forces to monitoring ceasefires, implementing confidence-building measures, and reporting overall progress. Secondly, the Chapter VII mandate allows for the enforcement of a ceasefire agreement. Additionally, the Security Council maintains the right to enforce economic sanctions on countries failing to obey international law.

Finally, if all diplomatic, political, and economic steps still prove ineffective, the Security Council may decide to deploy a collective military force of troops supplied by various member-states. Any member-state that has continuously violated the UN Charter is also subject to expulsion from the UN as a whole by choice of the General Assembly after recommendation by the Security Council.

In order to critically examine and dissect global issues, it is crucial to understand the function and overall structure of the Security Council. Because of the body's unique and complex agenda, work at the National High School Model United Nations conference will need to encompass varying degrees of strategies utilized by the Security Council for the purpose of upholding the committee's mandate and ensuring peace and stability worldwide.

Topic A: Combating Terrorism in Pakistan

Introduction

In the past decade, global terrorism has become an ever more pressing issue. In order to better accommodate the changing forms and applications of terrorism, the United Nations Security Council has aggressively discussed paths to control the spread of violence. Global organizations and individual countries alike have pursued a number of manners to stop terrorist attacks and cells from forming. Since 2001, two wars were launched in Afghanistan and Iraq, ostensibly to fight terrorism and its allies. Until the summer of 2009, the battle against insurgents in Afghanistan seemed productive and successful. However, the situation is worsening and insurgencies are on the rise once again, based in neighboring Pakistan. Unmanned drones have been successful in physically destroying insurgent camps and killing their members, but the solution to a safer future for Pakistan's people requires a much more complex approach. These terrorists and developing insurgency networks threaten the strength of Pakistan's civilian government. Moreover, the weakly patrolled Pakistan-Afghan border is a crossing point for neighboring terrorist organizations. The six largest militaries in the world cannot control insurgents in the North Western Frontier Province (NWFP), nor the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). Pakistan's newly elected officials need to show the strength to overcome the insurgents in order to address immediate security concerns and establish a solid framework for a civilian government. It is up to the Security Council to facilitate this transition and to help develop new solutions.

HISTORY


Definition of Terrorism

The word "terrorism" and its definition have constantly changed since the word's birth in France during the late 1790s (Hoffman 16). When it first appeared, the word meant revolutionary or anti-government activity undertaken by non-state or sub-national entities. "*La régime de la terreur*" incorporated terrorism and terrorists to describe the newly formed government and intimidate its opposition. Coined by Robespierre, the word held connotations of virtue and democracy, much the opposite of its definition today. Today, the Oxford English Dictionary defines terrorism as, "A policy intended to strike with terror those against whom it is adopted; the employment of methods of intimidation". Following the supported Islamic and religious insurgency against the Soviet Union throughout 1970s-1990s, terrorism in Pakistan became closely associated with religious extremism (Abdaie, Gardeazabal 1). Terrorism has throughout history inhibited the development of countries.

Ireland, Spain, Sri Lanka and Pakistan are all countries that have spent countless resources on combating terrorism that may otherwise have been available for industry and development. Governmental operations are seriously affected by an effective terrorist attack. Following 9/11 global airport security skyrocketed, more money was poured into national defense and NATO engaged the Taliban in Afghanistan – costing the United States US \$171.1 billion and 675 military lives (AFSC 3).

Background of Pakistan

Until 1849, the territory now known as the Islamic Republic of Pakistan was under the control of various empires such as the Persian Empire, Greek Empire, Mauryan Empire and Mughal Empire. As the Mughal Empire splintered, a group of small states, in the current region of the Punjab province, formed a Sikh confederacy, which eventually expanded into the Sikh Empire. In 1849 the British, under advisement of the British East India Trading company, annexed the Sikh Empire. Eight years later, the Indian rebellion of 1857 encouraged a number of rebel groups to form in the NWFP, among other areas, and started taking control away from the British. These groups were labeled “freedom-fighters” by the Indian Nationalists. As the Indian nationalist movement gained strength, Muslims feared that the Hindu majority would seek to suppress Muslim culture and religion in an independent India. The Muslim League, operating under the influences of Maulana Mohammad Ali’s Green Book, disagreed with many of the policies laid out by the Indian Congress. However, with the guidance of Mahatma Ghandi, the two groups laid aside their issues in order to



seize control of their own territory from the British. On 14 and 15 August 1947, British India gave way to two new independent states, the Dominion of Pakistan and the Union of India, which both joined the British Commonwealth (Indo 1). The process of splitting the country was poorly executed, the job of drawing the official borders was assigned to an official who was unfamiliar with India at large as well as the vying interests of Muslims and Hindus. The commission was also expected to create the partition line as quickly as possible, meaning that there was little time spent on researching the resources and community atmospheres in the partitioned states. When attempting to implement the planned divisions, Hindu’s and Muslim’s rapidly migrated carrying fear and

resentment against the need to uplift their lives, and as the two migrating groups met, violence erupted. It’s estimated that anywhere between 700,000 and 1 million died during the transfer to a multiple state system (Chatterji 193). Furthermore, disagreement between Pakistan and India over the divisions of Punjab, Bengal and Kashmir led to the Indo-Pakistani War of 1947 (Indo 1). The war involved many small scale battles which eventually ended with a ceasefire on 31 December 1948 and the establishment of the “Line of Control,” which refers to the military control line for Indian and Pakistani forces in the Jammu-Kashmir district (2). Following the ceasefire, Pakistan went through a series of military and civilian governments. Between 1947 and 1971, Pakistan consisted of two geographically separate regions, West Pakistan and East Pakistan, as seen in the map (“Pehchaaan”).

During the 1960s, there was a rise in Bengali nationalism/independence movement in East Pakistan as Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, of the Pakistani People's Party (PPP) gathered support in West Pakistan (The War 1). East Pakistan eventually declared its Independence as Bangladesh, and following numerous guerilla conflicts with West Pakistan's Army, the Pakistani army surrendered on 16 December 1971 (2). General Yahya Khan, who was leading Pakistan during the war, resigned his power to Zulfikar Ali Bhutto following his embarrassing defeat.

Transition to an Islamic State

Zulfikar Ali Bhutto ruled until a bloodless coup in 1977. He is most remembered for starting Pakistan's nuclear program and masterminding an assassination of an opposing political leader. This attack provoked outcry in the NWFP and Balochistan, which led him to deploy 100,000 soldiers, a political move that divided the country. Following the 1977 military coup, which ousted Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and the PPP, General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq abolished the constitution and implemented martial law (Chossudovsky 2). He made various efforts to eliminate traces of the previous government and worked to undermine the secular structures of the Pakistani state that existed under Bhutto. Zia-ul-Haq implemented Nizam-e-Mustafa (Islamic System) a complete transformation from Pakistan's predominantly Common Law. His first step was the implementation of *shari'a* (Islamic law as defined in the Qur'an and the Sunnah — the sayings of the Prophet). This changed many of Pakistan's common laws in the name of Islam: i.e. prohibition, adultery, blasphemy, even the abolishment of profitable banks (Esposito 289). This inconsistency of Pakistan's legal structure characterizes its governmental history. Law was frequently changing or is under threat of change because of differences of opinion among the ruling factions as Pakistan has had only one peaceful transition of power (President Musharaff resigned in 2008 and Asif Ali Zardari of the PPP was elected). Zia-ul-Haq's Islamization along with Pakistan's involvement in the Soviet-Afghan War contributed to increased fundamentalism around the country.

Soviet-Afghan War

When the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) seized power in Afghanistan in 1978, it developed strong relations with the United States. In order to thwart Soviet expansion, the United States supported Islamic brigades in an effort to destroy the newly formed secular civilian government (Roy 3). Pakistan employed similar Islamic ideals and worked closely with the CIA to help develop the ISI and fight with the PDPA. From 1982 to 1992, the ISI and CIA recruited and trained 35,000 Muslims for the Afghan jihad against the Soviets (Chossudovsky 6). One of the main contributing states was Saudi Arabia, which financed madrassas (Islamic schools) in Pakistan. The hallmarks of CIA-ISI guerilla training remain prevalent in current terrorist attacks (i.e. targeted assassinations and car bomb attacks). And, much of the transportation of personnel and arms for the war went through the NWFP.

In 1979, the CIA recruited Osama bin Laden to establish charities and foundations to raise money for the Islamic brigades. Many of these organizations that he helped create still exist today as a means of channeling money, training and supplying insurgents throughout the NWFP and even in ISI headquarters at Rawalpindi, Pakistan. In order to save face for the American mission against the Soviet Union and ally closely with Afghanistan, the ISI acted as the liaison between the CIA and the mujahedeen (plural of mujahid — someone who is involved in *jihad*). After Pakistan established *shari'a* in December 1984, its support for the mujahedeen sky-rocketed (Chossudovsky 5). The NWFP and the Khyber Pass proved essential to help move weapons and troops into Afghanistan. With assistance of the United States National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 166 — a

presidential decree issued by Ronald Regan to provide military aid to the Mujahedeen — the amount of weapons increased from 10,000 tons in 1983 to 65,000 in 1987 (McCoy 477).

Furthermore, in order to lessen the financial burden of the operation against the Soviet Union, heroin labs were opened in Afghanistan to finance the Islamic brigades (Chossudovsky 10). The establishment of the Golden Crescent Drug Trade further expanded the network of mujahedeen and broadcasted their message to a larger audience. Their military success, vast network and opportunity for martyrdom (a martyr in Islam is guaranteed a unique reward -- automatic admittance to heaven) created numerous Islamic paramilitary groups (Dawud 516). However, because many of the groups were so closely tied to the CIA or the ISI, few arrests were made and rebellious military groups were allowed to thrive. Pakistan's involvement in the Soviet-Afghan war ended in the early 1990s when the United States imposed sanctions on Pakistan for its nuclear developments. However, the militia and insurgent groups remained. As the United States abandoned Pakistan and eventually Afghanistan, the groups turned their hatred towards the West, most noticeably America (i.e. the commencement of jihad's the anti-western agenda).


Islam in Pakistan

Islam is the official religion of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, with 97% of its total population being Muslims (US Department 1). 70% of the Pakistani Muslims are Sunni while the remaining 30% identify as Shi'a. Islam was first brought to Pakistan by the Umayyad dynasty in 711 CE (Berzin 1). After many years of rule by multiple empires, the area currently known as Pakistan developed into a central hub for Islam. Sufis, practitioners of the inner mystical dimensions of Islam, used missionaries and teachings to convert most of the people in the region to Islam. Sir Allama Muhammad Iqbal, a poet-philosopher first presented the idea of creating a Muslim state to the Muslim League in 1930. He proposed to unify the four provinces of Punjab, Sindh, Balochistan, and the North Western Frontier (practically modern-day Pakistan), but wanted to maintain a secular government. When Prophet Mohammad established a government in Madina, he set up the possibility for governance and religion to be unified.

It should also be noted that Islamism is a set of ideologies unifying Islam as a religion and political system. Abul Ala Maududi, one of the founding fathers of modern Islamic thought, believed that “the Muslim community's decline resulted from practicing a corrupted form of Islam contaminated by non-Islamic ideas and culture” (Gerges 1). He asserted that the integration of non-Islamic notions was an insult to Allah. Maudaudi preached that the only way to purify their society was by establishing Islamic states through militant jihad (striving in the way of Allah) (Meri 419). Hassan al Banna, founder of the al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun (Muslim Brotherhood), agreed with Maudaudi and deemed “pure Islam” was the “antidote to Western domination and a cure for the malady infecting the Muslim world” (Stanley 1). Sayyid Qutb, regarded by many as the theoretician of the contemporary extremist movement, (Gerges 1) focused on removing non-Islamic leaders and governments. Qutb and Banna started gathering support through schools, mosques, and factories (just as modern extremist organizations). Qutb's theory of unrestricted jihad “against every obstacle that comes into the way of worshiping God and the implementation of the divine authority on earth” is the roots of Azzam and Ayman al-Zawahiri (al-Qaeda leaders) and eventually the founding of Osama bin Laden's al Qaeda (Gerges 1). These theoreticians laid the framework for Islam, Islamism and Islamic Extremist. Lastly, one of the beliefs of Islamism is “that the purpose of the state is to provide an environment where Muslims can properly practice their religion” (Pike 2). Hence, if a leader fails such a task, he/she may be rightfully removed.

Recent History

In August of 1988, acting President, General Muhammad Zia-ul-Huq was killed in an airplane crash. To replace him, Pakistan held various elections, resulting in many power transitions and allegations of corruption (Chossudovsky 8). Years of weak politics and division among the elite came to a halt when General Pervez Musharraf led a coup in 1999. The previous years of corruption, aggressive politics and militia factions weakened hopes of a unified and progressive Pakistan. Pakistan's economic development under General Musharraf signaled hope for a unified country. However, when Benazir Bhutto, a trusted and prominent political leader, was assassinated, it drove the divisions deeper and deeper. Recently, shifts towards democracy have weakened the local military presence and allowed the criminal and insurgent groups established by the state 20-30 years ago to thrive throughout the country — especially in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and in the NWFP, see in the map below (“Taliban Influence: FATA”).



Throughout the early 2000s, Pakistan focused more on the reconstruction of their political and governmental bureaucracy in Islamabad. This direction gathered support from the international community, but diverted focus away from the lawless regions of the North. Resources were also diverted away from the lawless regions because Pakistan had previously viewed an invasion from India as the number one security risk towards Pakistani statehood. Lastly, Pakistan’s weak bureaucratic control over the outlying areas allowed insurgent groups to form and networks to be established in the NWFP and FATA -- where law could not be enforced. It wasn’t until 25 June 2009 that Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari, said that terrorism is now Pakistan’s biggest threat, not India (Kroft 1). The former security misguidance kept Islamabad distracted from the growing insurgent groups in their western territories.

From the end of 2008 and through the middle of 2009, insurgent attacks in the NWFP and FATA soared. Militants took control of about 70% of the Malakand region by holding off 12,000 government troops with only 3,000 Taliban militants (Mass 1). Since moving troops to those areas in 2002, Pakistan has lost 1,300 troops in the conflict (Nawaz 13). Progressive officials from the secular Awami National Party were elected to office in the region, but were swiftly assassinated by Taliban suicide bombers (Roggio). The government has considered giving concessions to the insurgents, such as peace treaties and instating *shari'a* law, but all of these have failed to bring peace to the region. Attacks have not only been centered in the Swat valley; they have been distributed throughout the Punjab Province, Peshawar, FATA, Karachi and many other areas. This recent surge in violence comes as a harsh awakening to Pakistan and the international community. Terrorist organizations from around the world, specifically Afghanistan, have been hiding in the NWFP and FATA. This violence has displaced millions, killed thousands and questions the stability of the new civilian government in Pakistan.

Federally Administered Tribal Areas

The Federally Administered Tribal Areas consist of seven Tribal Areas (called agencies) that border Afghanistan to the west, Punjab and NWFP to the North and East, and Balochistan to the south. The agencies are from north to south: Bajuar, Mohmand, Khyber, Orakzai, Kurram, North Waziristan and South Waziristan (Nawaz 2). The FATA encompasses 27,500 square kilometers and are home to over 3.5 million Pakistanis and 1.5 million Afghani refugees. The FATA come under the control of the President of Pakistan through the governor of the NWFP. The FATA operates under the same regulations left by the British back in 1901. The Frontier Crimes Regulations has a political agent who represents the President of Pakistan in each tribal agency. The local tribal leaders have rejected the idea of a Federalist Pakistan. The FATA have representatives in the Pakistani Congress, but are not allowed to organize political parties. Hence, all the Islamic candidates campaigned through mosques and *madrassabs* (Islamic schools) and *mullabs* (muslim men, educated in Islamic theology and sacred law) were elected. As a result, Islam has developed into a core foundation for politics throughout FATA.


Rise of the Taliban

As NATO moved into Afghanistan in October of 2001, the Taliban and al-Qaeda entered into FATA for protection. The Taliban used the FATA as a base from which to launch attacks into Afghanistan and seriously undermines the NATO mission in Afghanistan. In 2004 Pakistan sent 80,000 troops into the FATA to search for al-Qaeda operatives. Both operations were ineffective, as the troops met harsh resistance from the Taliban. The Pakistani Army tried to seize control eight more times between 2004 and 2006 and met increasing resistance. The Taliban negotiated peace accords, not the tribal leaders, indicating the long arm of the Taliban's control. Working alongside the mullahs, are the tribal *maliks* (influentials), these men deal with most of the day to day governance of the region. Of the roughly 1,600 *maliks* in the region, the Taliban has assassinated 600 in the past few years (Nawaz 7).

Sectarian Violence

As extremism increases in the FATA, Sunni attacks on the Shi'a minority have surged. The Shi'a minority retaliated by launching attacks against Sunnis in the Kurram agency, killing 1,500 and wounding 500 (Nawaz 13). This sectarian violence had been nonexistent when the Shi'a, in need of protection from the Sunnis, helped the government track down Taliban and al-Qaeda members from Afghanistan who sought refuge in Tora Bora (Nawaz 14). But, since the surge of Sunni attacks on the Shi'a in the past few years, the government's non-intervention prompted the Shi'a to stop helping as

well. Sectarian violence is only further complicated by the presence of the Taliban and al-Qaeda. These organizations have allied with individual tribes to build a defense system against the Pakistani government and NATO troops. This relationship between the insurgents and the tribes is one of the biggest roadblocks to eliminating the terrorist organizations. In order to expose the network of insurgents, the bond between the local tribesman and terrorists must be broken. See below for a map of the FATA.



Current Status

Introduction

For many years, the Taliban had large amounts of unregulated control in FATA and NWFP. Its size grew, it launched attacks into Afghanistan, its leaders even held news conferences. However, the Pakistan government does not support its continued existence. Many feel that it may be too late; the situation is much more dangerous and difficult than it was ten years ago (Kroft 1). The international community questions Pakistan's devotion to the fight against global terrorism, and out of necessity, has made some serious pushes on its own. This aggression has led Pakistan's people to think that the war they are fighting is America's war (2). Many citizens see the US as an imperial power and relate it to the Soviet Union, which they fought 20-30 years ago. Unmanned Predator drones have attacked al Qaeda and Taliban targets inside Pakistan, and dozens of Pakistani bystanders have been killed. Khalid Khawaja, a former Pakistani intelligence officer, said, "I don't think that Zardari has any power. Zardari is only a puppet of United States here. He's here only because the United States wanted him to be planted here" (3). Pakistan needs to convince its people that it is also their war, not just America's war. A RAND Corporation study titled *How Terrorist Groups End* cites that effective police and intelligence work, not military force, bring superior counterterrorism results. Pakistan, as it is slowly admitting, needs the help of the international community (4). If Pakistan is not able to control the Taliban, its credibility will diminish and the country could experience an even more volatile future.

Security Concerns

Military Defense

Combating terrorism in Pakistan is extremely difficult because of Pakistan's location and geography. Its position in southwest Asia bordering Afghanistan makes it nearly impossible to effectively monitor and deal with the security situation. Without a secure border or strong relations with its neighbors, Islamabad's ability to govern Pakistan greatly diminishes (Gerges 12). For example, the permeable border with Afghanistan has allowed the Taliban and al-Qaeda to move in and out of the FATA and take over leadership from the tribal Sikhs. Creating and protecting a secure environment and homeland was further complicated by the earthquakes in the north. This natural disaster crippled Pakistan's economy and challenged its security forces. Moreover, Pakistan's unstable and frequent regime changes have lowered the chances for long-term security and diplomacy in the future. Much of this quandary, in the eyes of military defense, is not the government's fault: it is al-Qaeda's. Pakistan needs to prove to the world — and, more importantly, to its people — that its borders are secure, and that people can carry on their lives without fear of terrorism.

To further complicate matters, the ongoing conflict with domestic militia groups require different combat tactics than those taught during basic military training. For example, terrorist organizations do not use organized battle techniques, but rather, mimic the guerilla warfare that was effective during the Soviet-Afghan war. This type of combat makes it very difficult for basic infantry to perform well against insurgents (Gerges 20). Because of this new "foreign" front, Pakistan's military requires completely new battle tactics and new technical support to track down and eliminate the terrorists. Additionally, Pakistan has found itself battling both tribes and insurgents simultaneously. The CTC does not direct military operations; however it may recommend and work alongside the military in the physical and aggressive counter-terrorism action plans.

Nuclear Facilities

Pakistan continues fissile material production, and its current nuclear arsenal consists of approximately sixty nuclear warheads (Kronstand 62). According to Pakistani authorities, most warheads are stored unassembled and separate from the nuclear fissile cores and are delivered to launch sites separately to ensure security. The international community is becoming gravely concerned with the destabilization of the NWFP due to eleven weapon assembly facilities, plutonium extraction points and uranium enrichment centrifuge plants located there (Cirincione 238). While an overthrow of Islamabad by al-Qaeda is unlikely, there have been a number of attacks on nuclear facilities in the past few years ("Pakistan Nuclear"). Additionally, by increasing the concentration of forces in the NWFP, less security is available for central and southern nuclear facilities.

Another growing concern is rogue security officials who may sympathize with insurgents. The smallest leak in security could lead to the acquisition of nuclear material or means to attack a facility. A successful attack on a nuclear facility could lead to widespread fatalities and radiation contamination that would be extremely difficult to control. Pakistan, with the SC's assistance, needs to prove to the international community that it can effectively secure its nuclear facilities and operate them for peaceful measures.

Fears of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal falling into the hands of the Taliban grew stronger as insurgents successfully attacked a bus filled with workers from Kahuta Research Laboratories (a producer of weapons-grade uranium). Just before the attacks strengthened in late June, the Taliban and al-Qaeda announced that their goal "is to topple the government and gain control of its nuclear arsenal." (Masood 1) The attack on the workers has undermined confidence in the Pakistani Armed Forces — which the United States spent over US\$100 million to train through 2009.

Controlling the Arms Trade

In addition to the growing concerns over the security of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal, the arms trade has grown significantly in the FATA and NWFP regions following weakened government presence. Terrorist groups, such as the Taliban, Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan, Sunni Sipah-e-Sahaba, and the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), and al-Qaeda have all previously traded for arms in northern Pakistan (Bajoria 1). According to analysts, about one hundred illegal weapons factories openly furnish arms and explosives to Taliban fighters, local elders, and government officials in Darra Adamkhel (a border town near Afghanistan) (Rahmanullah 1). Shahzad Arbab, a senior government official in the tribal area, states "The government knows it must create jobs in textiles and other industries to wean workers away from the illegal weapons industry. But for now, the Pakistan government is helpless to stop them. These Taliban have full support of their respective tribes" (2). This is often the case in the FATA especially in towns like Darra Adamkhel which has been under Taliban rule since 2002 (2). Furthermore, al-Qaeda's international networks have given it access to wide-ranging arms trades. Al-Qaeda has come in the possession of high grade weapons and used them against NATO troops in Afghanistan. Reports have been released stating that al-Qaeda is pursuing chemical and biological weapons; however their possession of a Weapon of Mass Destruction is far-fetched, and if it did occur, would not for a long time.

Supplying and Equipping Terrorists

One of the biggest issues at hand is the longevity of these terrorist organizations. Clearly, there are not enough preventative measures in place to exclude terrorists from gaining access to funding, weapons, or manpower. There has been much debate on whether the problem stems solely from Pakistani regulations and personnel or if the issue is much more an international problem. Fiscal

accountability remains a serious issue in Pakistan, as much of the funding of terrorists flows through the Pakistani government (Advani 1). Ties from the Afghan-Soviet war still exist between insurgent groups and government personnel. Recently declassified intelligence reports from the US CIA/DOD by means of the Freedom of Information Act, prove that the Pakistani Frontier Corps have been supplying and training Taliban for decades. (Department of State). Pakistani authorities continue to deny all claims by US intelligence agencies. Therefore, as mandated by Security Council Resolution 1373, the CTC must investigate procedures by which they may freeze the funds of the terrorists and work with the Pakistani authorities to carry out article 2c of Resolution 1373, which reads, “Deny safe haven to those who finance, plan, support, or commit terrorist acts, or provide safe havens” (SC/1373). As Pakistan continues to deny any involvement with the Taliban, the problem remains. Insurgents still gain access to funds, weapons and information that allow them to further their operations.

Political Concerns

Limitations imposed by self-rule

All actions considered by the CTC must be approved by the Pakistani government. Moreover, the Pakistani government’s ability to reject any plan, task force, personnel presence, etc., has troubled foreign efforts to intervene. As cross-border Afghan-Pak violence intensifies, the US has implored Islamabad to allow US military involvement along the border in order to prevent further escalation in Afghanistan. In the past, the United States has offered to supply Pakistan with military support in the troubled regions of the NWFP and FATA. However, Pakistan has continually denied such requests for support, stating that the recent surge of violence is an internal issue. More likely, Pakistan is wary of the United States committing forces in a way similar to Iraq and Afghanistan. According to Pakistan's Ambassador to the United States, Husain Haqqani, “fighting terrorism is Pakistan’s own war” (Bajoria 1). In the interest of developing its own economy, curbing the approximately 3.5% of GDP spent yearly on fighting terrorism, and rebuilding cities destroyed by bombs and combat (Roman 2), Pakistan has called for large amounts of monetary aid (Rivers 1). “Extremism and terrorism are our own problems. This is our own fight. This is our own cause... My priority number one is to maintain law and order in the country ... and that's why it is in our own interest that extremism and terrorism is contained.” (Gilani 1). The international community may not take any direct action in Pakistan without its approval. However, as the problem grows beyond Pakistan’s borders, the CTC holds the ability to bring together cooperating parties to find a comprehensive and integrated approach to the situation.

Fiscal and Political Accountability

Many countries, including the United Kingdom, Saudi Arabia, and the United States, have questioned Pakistan’s use of funds provided to it for counter-terrorism efforts. For example, a recent report issued by the United States Government Accountability Office (GAO) stated, “We found that the Defense [department] did not consistently apply its existing CSF oversight guidance and that certain deficiencies existed in Defense’s oversight procedures” (USGAO 3). These discrepancies call into question the effectiveness of the Pakistani defense system and military procedures. Recently, the GAO has released multiple reports calling for “Increased Oversight and Accountability Needed over Pakistan Reimbursement Claims for Coalition Support Funds.” (2) Moreover, since 2001, the US has reported giving the Pakistani government US\$10 billion to cover the cost of moving troops into the NWFP and FATA (Gerges 10). However, the Pakistani Armed Forces (*Musalab Afvaj-e-Paksitan*) claim they only received US\$300 million in 2008 and that most of

the money was absorbed by the Ministry of Finance. Pakistan has also received political pressure from the international community to step up its COIN efforts (“A real offensive” 1).

Building off these fiscal and military problems — described by *The Economist* as a “phoney war” claiming that Pakistan’s counter-terrorism efforts are fake, politically driven actions with no real ambition to kill off the insurgents. Poor bureaucratic control and security risks (due to insurgent control) have limited Pakistan’s ability to govern to the extent that only 1.5 million (out of 175 million) Pakistanis pay taxes. Consistent attacks on officials also limit governmental expansion and accountability (Roman). The poor fiscal revenue generated from so few Pakistanis paying taxes, combined with the lawlessness in the FATA, limits government prevention of terrorist activities and causes a circular reel of events. Poor administration allows the Taliban to build enough strength until the international community puts severe pressure on Islamabad, then a huge military operation occurs and a peace treaty is signed, prompting six to twelve months of peace before the process repeats itself. When Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani called for aid without strings, he only further diminished Pakistan’s accountability, which has slowed international contributions to Pakistani-led efforts and increasing political turmoil and regional insecurity have slowed international and private investment (USGAO).

Economic Ramifications of Insurgency

The growing Islamist insurgent presence puts Pakistan’s economic viability into jeopardy and therefore is of great concern to the Pakistani government. Private investors continue to shy away from Pakistan, and the economic recession has decreased Pakistan’s annual GDP growth. Decreasing tax revenues and the 2008-9 global recession could send Pakistan back to the International Monetary Fund for another bailout in addition to US\$7.6 billion given to them in November. The United States and Japan have pledged US\$5 billion USD in April 2009 to help alleviate counter-terrorism expenditures. The NWFP accounts for 10% of the country’s GDP with its huge mineral reserves, tourist attractions, and logging operations. Controlling major parts of the NWFP places the Taliban in an ideal location for attacks on the Sindh and Punjab Provinces — Pakistan’s economic hub and major source of tax revenue. According to Pakistan’s Finance Ministry, the internal strife has cost the country 35 billion USD in the past six years, roughly 3.5% of the country’s GDP. Moreover, with foreign investment expected to fall another 20% by the end of 2009 and GDP growth slumping from 7% to 2.5%, Pakistan is in need of an economically conscious response to the insurgents. Pakistan needs to find ways to secure contributions to help rebuild the northern region (Roman). Once funding is secured, the SC may help monitor the distribution of funds and resources. By improving the security and credibility of an effective Pakistani government, the SC will pave the road for future investment and prosperity.

Counter-Terrorism Legislation

Twelve years ago, Pakistan passed and implemented the Anti-Terrorism Act of 1997 intended to “provide for the prevention of terrorism, sectarian violence and for speedy trial of heinous offences and for matters connected therewith and incidental thereto.” It also contains the bulk of Pakistan’s legislation and formal responses to terrorists (E/CN.4/1997/60 13). This Act further provides Islamabad’s broad definition of terrorism and gives the Anti-Terrorism Court dominion in all areas of the country. Furthermore, the act helped solidify prosecution procedures and legal outcomes of those convicted of participating in terrorist activities. It set the minimum sentence to seven years for any man/women involved in terrorist activities. Any man who committed a terrorist act that resulted in the death of another individual is punishable by death. Prior to the passage of this law, there was no legal outline regarding terrorism. The SC has been working closely with Pakistan to review its current procedures and augment them.

The SC will assess the following: offences, penalties, competence of the courts, criminal procedure, special investigation measures, legislation on weapons, explosives and dangerous substances and legislation on asylum and immigration. They will also investigate new guidelines to prevent the use of assets for criminal purposes, anti-money-laundering legislation and legislation against the financing of terrorism. The last area of legislation that needs to be revamped is law enforcement services, specifically, provision of counter-terrorism machinery, coordination of services, early warning system and methods for combating and preventing criminal activities linked to terrorism (“Press Kit”).

International Assistance and Collaboration

One of the main charges of the SC is to unite Islamabad and the international community to facilitate the implementation of new counter-terrorism initiatives (CTC). To date, the CTC (a subset of the SC) has conducted one site visit to Pakistan, the specifics of which are currently classified. However, Pakistan had to answer critical questions regarding their counter-terrorism policies, mostly in regards to its counter-terrorism legislation and fiscal defenses. Pakistan has received large amounts of financial aid from the United States, European Union, and the IMF. However, it has been reluctant to accept physical resources and training from western nations. The Pakistani government fears that any American presence on the ground in Pakistan will deter confidence in Islamabad’s ability to run the country effectively and will serve as just another extension of American imperialism. Pakistan does not have a history of working effectively with its own people in the rural areas. The FC has failed in cutting off the ties between tribal leaders and the insurgents. Experts in the field of Pakistani relations cite the need to draw on the Pakistani people to get ideas and complimentary motivation (Gerges 21). But, they do not have the resources to do so. The SC must act as a liaison between the international community and on-the-ground efforts to fight terrorism. Once the resources are attained, the SC must then monitor their use and distribution to ensure that all possible efforts are made to combat terrorist organizations. Pakistan has also denied requests to ratify certain key resolutions and key anti-terrorism legislation already passed by the United Nations, such as 1979 International Convention against the Taking of Hostages, the 1980 Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, the 1999 International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, and the 2005 International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (“Counter-Terrorism Activities”). These legislative adjustments could ameliorate the global perception of Pakistan and theoretically increase aid and support. The SC cannot end its efforts once the short term problems are resolved, it must establish lasting ties between Pakistan and working organizations to ensure that Islamic extremism does not continue to grow. It is important for Pakistan to work with all types of organizations, stretching from the West to Islamic charities.

Humanitarian Concerns

Peace Treaties with terrorists

As mentioned, recent efforts by the various governments in Pakistan include signing peace treaties with the Taliban and militia groups. On 16 February 2009, the Pakistani authorities signed a treaty with the Taliban Movement of Swat, led by Maulana Fazlullah (Stack, 1). Fazlullah stated, "Once Islamic law is imposed there will be no problems in Swat. The Taliban will lay down their arms" (1). *Shari’a* law was implemented in the Swat valley, and the area remained stable for a few months until the Taliban began attacking civilians and military troops once again – leading to the current crisis. While these peace treaties are received well by locals, as they establish temporary peace and security, they are frequently violated by the insurgents and only allow terrorist organizations time to regroup

and regain their strength before launching more attacks. Despite this recurring cycle, groups like the Swat Peace Committee push for peace agreements under the auspices that “For God’s sake, let’s implement [a] deal. It will bring peace.” Such views cause dire problems for the government, because if it wins the battle militarily and does not sign the treaty it could lose the political support of the local population, which plays such an important role in the war on terror (“A Real” 3). Inam-ur-Rahman, an advocate for the peace treaties, states, “Even if you take a Pushtun person to paradise by force, he will not go. He will go with you only by friendly means.” However, local militia and tribesmen are being conceptually grouped with terrorists. Many of these tribesmen have taken up arms in a manner of self-defense against the insurgents. Working with these locals to establish strong political and economic ties would help to bring peace to the region as well as to build alliances against the insurgents. In order to gain full control of the area, the government must respond to the insurgencies with an appropriate amount of force to maintain the flow of donations from the international community and simultaneously keep local support (“A Real” 6).

Aid for Internally Displaced Persons

Pakistan’s recent aggressive military response to the strengthening Taliban and other militia groups has resulted in the displacement of massive numbers of Pakistani citizens — upwards of 1.9 million (Montas 1). Only about 160,000 of these IDPs are living in the IDP camps while the remainders are staying with relatives, in temporary housing, or in newly founded settlements which are at risk of degenerating into slums. As the FC attempt to push the Taliban back out of the Swat valley, the government encourages its citizens to return home. However, most of the villages have been leveled and the citizens are returning to nothing. In 2005, the Pakistani military was able to successfully provide for and rebuild the homes of those affected by the horrid earthquakes in the Pamir Mountains; if they can repeat such triumph their global credibility will increase. Additionally, if the government increases the provisions for IDPs and partners with the tribal leaders, it will maintain the support of the people in the NWFP and aid efforts to defeat the Taliban.

Currently, Pakistan lacks many of the supplies needed to effectively support their IDPs due to their bank fallout almost two years ago (See Economic Ramifications). Without a more stable economy or increased assistance from NGOs and other governments, maintaining security and the well-being of their own people will become a serious problem; those displaced by the conflict need supplies and monetary assistance from the international community. Moreover, if the insecurity continues to spread, access to Afghanistan through the Khyber Pass and other legally accessible routes will effectively terminate, creating a poorly supplied, terrorized, and borderless region that will undermine government and development efforts in both Afghanistan and Pakistan. The Pakistani military has only minimal control of their borders and FATA/NWFP. If terrorism spreads to more regions the military’s access to more areas will be restricted. If such a disaster occurs, the area that is currently the breeding ground for terrorist groups, the drug and arms trades, and militia dissent against the new Pakistani parliament will grow at disturbing and potentially uncontrollable rate.

Pakistani dissent towards the West has severely limited the amount of supplies that can be donated to the relief effort. Because the government views the situation in the FATA and NWFP as an internal issue, Pakistani authorities have refused to allow American officials or planes to deliver aid. Many Pakistanis have poor memories of the West because of American drones bombing villages (Bardsley 1). Because of the slow response of governmental relief efforts, Islamist charities have placed themselves in an influential position, as they provide rapid and comprehensive aid in disaster areas, allowing them to push their anti-Western agenda. Pakistan is attempting to rally public support for the fight against insurgents and the Taliban by not allowing the presence of many

western agencies. Although the lack of support sounds like a fault of the Pakistani authorities, without the support of their own people, their battle against terrorism will fail no matter how much aid is sent. Furthermore, one of the most prominent jihadist charity groups, Jamaat-ud-Dawa (declared a terrorist group by the UNSC), has rallied immense support through contributions to IDPs and refugees, but has been barred from camps by Lt. Gen. Nadeem Ahmad (head of the Pakistani Army's disaster management group). This group along with others that were banned had been entering camps in search of recruits for their organizations. The Jamaat-ed-Dawa is using its donations to the people to buy their support and create an image that they're fighting to help, not causing chaos and violence. If violent jihadist groups continue to gain support from the local tribes, Pakistan will need to muster more troops to combat a larger and more organized contingency.

With no government hospitals, very few doctors, low supplies, and essentially non-existent security, loyalty to Islamabad is unreliable. Aid can get through to the people, but without recognition of the donors as aid is not branded with the contributor's flag or name. This political sacrifice, although for the good of the cause, does little to improve international relations -- donations are rarely made anonymously. According to United States Senator John Kerry, chairman of the Senate Council on Foreign Relations, "There is an opportunity actually to provide services, much as we did with the earthquake relief, which had a profound impact on the perception of America" (Perlez). Understandably, the US and other states are not eager to provide a government with supplies that refuses to cooperate with their political agenda.

Important Terrorist Groups in Pakistan

Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)

The TTP refers to the Taliban movement in Pakistan and was officially formed in December of 2007 (Abbas 2). A *shura* (consultative committee) of forty Taliban established the TTP in northern Pakistan with goals to: enforce *shari'a*, rid the FATA of any Pakistani military presence, and refuse future peace deals with the government of Pakistan. Despite the organization's infancy, it has grown to command around 5,000 fighters, has representation from all of FATA's seven tribal agencies, and has moved into many districts of the NWFP. Baitullah Mehsud, a 34-year old from South Waziristan led this organization until he was killed on 5 August 2009 by a US airstrike (Walsh 1). In 2007, he captured 250 military personnel and held them hostage until 25 militants were released (Abbas 3).

Prior to the establishment of this organization, the Pakistani Taliban operated separately from the Afghani Taliban. In 2002, they started gathering sympathizers in the FATA for the war in Afghanistan. The Afghani Taliban's efforts led to the establishment of many extremist groups within the FATA and started networking small cells together. This distinct makeup of merged terrorist cells allowed them to integrate into Pakistani society by engaging in military attacks while cutting political deals with the Pakistani government to establish their autonomy in the area (1). Some Pakistani agencies have been sympathetic to the Taliban in order to control religious and sectarian violence along the Afghani-Pakistan border. For example, the Taliban would promise to control sectarian violence in exchange for certain freedoms. This approach worked almost perfectly. The Pakistani Taliban effectively established themselves as an alternative leadership to the traditional tribal elders. The Pakistani government didn't recognize this transformation until it was too late and the Taliban had overthrown the traditional tribal leaders. The Taliban had killed approximately two hundred of the tribal elders under charges of being Pakistani and American spies (Abbas 2). This administration change, with little action from the government, created an entirely new and unpredictable environment in the FATA.

Lashkar-e-Omar (“The Army of Omar”).

In January 2002 three Islamic groups merged together to form Lashkar-e-Omar (LeO) (Lashkar-e-Omar 1). While its ideology and goals are still mildly unclear, its foundation revolves around Islamist extremisms and totalitarian politics. Experts speculate that the group was named after Mullah Mohammad Omar, leader of the Taliban in Afghanistan, and adopted some of the same ideals (2). The LeO, reportedly headed by Qari Asadullah, has a weak organizational structure which has hampered its effectiveness. Despite its conglomerate origins, it has branched out to include many “freelance” terrorists or “terrorists for hire” with similar ideas. Although the LeO’s widespread and broad structure appears as a weakness, its many arms have developed close links with al-Qaeda and several terrorist groups active in the Indian states of Jammu and Kashmir (3). This non-organized structure limits the Pakistani Army’s ability to track and predict their actions. Additionally, many members of LeO still maintain contacts from their former organizations. Radical, disoriented groups like this may not be able to construct massive, detailed and thoroughly destructive attacks like the Taliban, but their local resources and lack of authority places no limits on their objectives. The LeO is suspected to be responsible for an attack on a Christian church in Punjab on 28 October 2002, which killed a policeman and seventeen worshippers, including five children (2). It is also suspected of kidnapping US journalist Daniel Pearl and bombing a church in Islamabad in which five people were killed, including a US diplomat's wife and daughter. The LeO was reportedly involved in the suicide bombing of the Sheraton Hotel in Karachi and the attack on the US consulate in Karachi in 2002.

Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP)

The SSP is a Sunni sectarian group that primarily targets Shi’a communities. As 75% of Pakistanis practice Sunni Islam, there has not been much response to their aggressive nature against the Shi’a communities. The SSP was formed in the Punjab province during the Zia-ul-Haq regime to overthrow the Shi’a landlords (“Sipah-e-Sahaba”, 1). The SSP receives much of their funding and support from the working and peasants classes, especially shopkeepers who look to compete with the Shi’a landlords in Punjab. The SSP actively opposes any US-Pakistani alliance and in addition, joined the Afghan Jihad Council, which claims that the US action is not a war against Taliban but a war against Islam. The SSP, run by Allama Ali Sher Ghazni, primarily targets prominent opposition activists and fires on Shi’a worshippers in mosques (“Sipah-e-Sahaba” 1). Recently, the SSP has begun to receive most of its funding from private Saudi Arabian investors (2). Moreover, the SSP is one of the best-equipped terrorist groups. It possesses high grade weapons, such as rocket launchers and surface to air missiles, and exerts much political influence. Considered to be one of the most powerful Pakistani extremist groups, its influence extends throughout all four provinces and reportedly has five hundred cells and offices in all 34 districts of Punjab. In addition to its domestic presence it has expanded its influence into seventeen other countries including Saudi Arabia, Canada and England (“Sipah-e-Sahaba”).

Al-Qaeda

Al-Qaeda formed out of the Maktab al-Khidamat (a recruitment organization supported by the CIA and ISI during the Soviet-Afghan war) (“Maktab al-Khidamat” 1). Al-Qaeda is an organization separate from the Taliban, though they once shared a close relationship. The Taliban is a Sunni, Islamist political movement that governed Afghanistan from 1996-2001. The Taliban remains solely situated in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The other publicized group in the region is Al-Qaeda, a terrorist network established during the Afghan-Soviet War under the command of Osama bin Laden. After the Soviet Union was defeated, the US and Pakistan discontinued their support for the

mujahedeen. Throughout the Taliban's rule over Afghanistan, it sheltered al-Qaeda and its former members. While being sheltered, al-Qaeda was allowed to expand into a global network of terrorists. Its insurgent threat is small, but its networking capabilities, training facilities, and fiscal and military backing make it one of the most dangerous organizations in the world. Its main objectives include the end of foreign influence in Muslim countries and the creation of a new Islamic caliphate (a state that, in theory, has political and spiritual control over Islamdom). Lastly, but most importantly, the group believes and teaches that the killing of bystanders during war and civilians is religiously justified in jihad. This belief gives the group ideological backing for suicide bombings and destroying public property.

Why do people join the insurgents?

There are many reasons people choose to take up arms with the insurgents. For some school dropouts, social misfits, economically disadvantaged, and army or police retirees, it is their only option (Karim 50). Others wish to become local heroes or avenge wrong doings done to Sikh community. In other situations, it is for their own security. As the number of attacks increase in the rural villages, people need to find ways to protect themselves. In March 2009, under the "Village Defence Rifle" program the Pakistani government handed out 30,000 rifles to "peaceful individuals and organized groups" in the NWFP. chief minister Ameer Haider Hoti stated, "The move is aimed at increasing cooperation between people and police to check the activities of terrorists and saboteurs," The government is now hesitant about providing weapons for self defense to its people. The Taliban runs the open arms market in Darha and collects many of its recruits from this region.

Perhaps the most important ideological reason for why people join insurgent groups is a sense of duty or loyalty to their homeland or people. The West has launched a series of aggressive wars that have killed tens of thousands of innocent civilians on shoddy pretenses; this fact alone would logically spur many young men into joining insurgent groups to defend their homelands for fear that something similar could happen where they come from. The idea of "blowback," and the theory that the West's interference into the affairs of the Islamic world, beginning with colonialism (Algeria, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan) and ending with US interventions throughout the 20th and 21st centuries (Afghanistan, Iraq) is a very important thing to consider. If this is one of the causes of the problem, the SC should not support policies that continue the cycle of imperialism, colonialism, and disrespect that has characterized interaction with the Islamic world since the 1800s.

Types of Terrorist Attacks

<i>Events/Terrorist Acts</i>	<i>Related To</i>	<i>Effect</i>	<i>Overall Gains</i>
Assassination	Liquidation of political opponents	Shock effect	Short term and limited
Communal riots	Alienation, migration of minorities	Anger, resentment of destruction of property	Marginal effects on ethnic ratios in some areas
Bomb attacks	Indiscriminate destruction of life and property spreads scare with little effort	Shock, anger and fear	Very marginal
Bank robberies extortion	Collection of funds	Loss of confidence in authorities	Substantial monetary gains
Demands	Khalistan: justice for	Big appeal for Sikhs	Moral isolation of

	Sikhs	creates resentment in others	Sikhs largely achieved
Arms and financial assistance abroad	Attacks on security forces: substance of movement attack new recruits	Larger numbers of civil and paramilitary casualties	Increase state repression: demoralize security forces
Attack on civil engineers and workers	Stoppage of work; dharma yudh	Work has suffered delays	Major gain, though temporary

(Pakistan Factor, 45-46)

Conclusion

Improvement seems to be arriving; Pakistan increased its counter-terrorism efforts immensely between May and July 2009. Nevertheless, such short-term successes have been a common feature in Pakistan over the past ten years with limited long-term impact. Pakistan's military force, composed of roughly 600,000 troops, is able to respond to most conventional military attacks successfully ("Pakistan Military Guide"). However, as towns grow into cities and insurgents mobilize, changes must be made. Despite this changing threat, The Frontier Corps (Pakistan's branch of the Army) was trained for peacetime operations, not counter-insurgency (20). There is little room or plans for sustainability. Their current and weak long-term proposal, along with immediate security struggles has rendered most counter-terrorism efforts unorganized and ineffective. There needs to be more focus on this volatile region not only resource wise but administratively as well — only 30-38% of the development, security and humanitarian funds actually reach FATA because there is no staff to monitor them (21). The random suicide bomber or shooting is almost impossible to predict or stop when manufactured on such a small level (i.e. by one cell, not a network). Islamic extremism is an issue, as some *madrassahs* have developed into centers of Islamic radicalism and recruitment for the Taliban (Rashid 185). Additionally, on 28 May 2009, Taliban commander, Baitullah Mehsud, told the international press, "We want the people of Lahore, Rawalpindi, Islamabad and Multan to leave those cities, as we plan major attacks against governmental facilities in coming days and weeks" (Kaya 1). Despite Pakistani forces clearing 70% of Mingora, the largest city in the Taliban-controlled Swat valley and killing 1,100 militants, the conflict is far from over. This also shows that a pure military option is not the answer – humanitarian and economic development will likely be the keys to solving the issue. The United States' operation in Afghanistan depends on transit shipments via Pakistan for 80% of its cargo and 40% of its fuel (10). Without these shipments, the situation in Afghanistan will continue to deteriorate only furthering the burden on the FATA and in the NWFP. Asif Ali Zardari, a journalist from the Washington Post, correctly stated in referring to the region, "Failure is not an option; not for us, not for the world."

Committee Representatives

Togo

Togo's foreign policy is nonaligned, but has strong ties with Western nations. Togo is in favor of regional integration methods as it has been a strong participant in the African Union.

Morocco

Morocco has had its own troubles with state sponsored terrorism, but has bilateral relations with Pakistan. Pakistan does not recognize Western Sahara and supports Morocco's view that this is an internal matter. Morocco is likely to view Pakistan's suppression of terrorist organizations as internal as well. Morocco will not be an aggressive advocate of intervention, but will work to find solutions that appease Pakistan.

South Africa

South Africa does not support continued growth of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal, having given up its own two decades back. South Africa supports positive engagement mechanisms to slow violence and is not in favor of aggressive military interventions. It will support the rule of law, but also the ability of Pakistan to try its own citizens how it pleases.

India

India and Pakistan share a long and complex history marked by a joint independence struggle, the eventual establishment of two separate nations, and subsequent wars and violence associated with the division of the subcontinent which still haunt these two uneasy neighbors. Relations today are still impacted by tensions produced in the 1947 British Partition, India's assistance to Bangladesh during its independence movement, and the ongoing Kashmir dispute. Immediately after the partition, India and Pakistan shared fairly diplomatic relations, however, the resulting mass migration of people to their "respective" nations, created large amounts of unrest and violence (Independence War of Bangladesh). Also, disagreement over disputed territories, including Kashmir, turned the neighbors against one another. Since then, Pakistan and India have fought three wars over Kashmir while simultaneously cultivating their respective nuclear weapons' programs. Attacks by Pakistani-based terrorist groups have stalled once productive bilateral talks between the neighbors, straining and eliminating diplomatic channels of communication. Tensions with India must be relaxed and enduring problems addressed in order for the promotion of stability on the subcontinent (Wynbrandt).

European Union (France, UK, Germany, Portugal)

Since opening diplomatic relations with Pakistan in 1947, European countries have since then donated over \$10 billion in aid to the country. In 2009 the European Union donated \$100 million to Pakistan in order to help relieve the devastation brought about by instability in the region. During the Cold War, specific members of the EU, including the United Kingdom and France, pushed for the formation of a jihad against the Soviet Union, further deepening, but also complicating, this relationship. Ties between the UK and Pakistan have changed over time from deep resentment prior to the Partition to more diplomatic ones seen today (Wynbrandt). Germany and Pakistan have consistently enjoyed a close relationship both economically and politically. Other countries of the European Union generally share strong ties with Pakistan and have been willing to support its efforts towards democracy and stabilization, while supporting US claims that Pakistan must make a larger effort to combat terrorism on its soil (New York Times).

Azerbaijan

Azerbaijan and Pakistan have become increasingly close in the past decade, with Pakistan supporting Azerbaijan's position on the Upper Garabagh conflict. Similarly, Azerbaijan has noted Pakistan plays a strong role in fighting international terrorism, and believes both countries share similar struggles. Azerbaijan hopes to improve trade relations with Pakistan and will not risk losing an important ally in its own regional struggles.

Colombia

Colombia shares Pakistan's problem of insurgent groups, and thus can empathize with the challenges faced by the government. Colombia will support increased international aid for Pakistan, but will take a strong stance when assistance packages threaten national sovereignty. This representative will favor institutional improvements which bolster the government's authority. Colombia understands the need to balance military control with a stable civilian government, something Pakistan has struggled to accomplish since the state's formal inception.

Guatemala

Pakistan and Guatemala have only officially established diplomatic relations this past October. Guatemala is seriously concerned with the trafficking of illicit drugs, as it is a transit country for cocaine and opium. The US also provides large amounts of aid to Guatemala. Guatemala originated the idea for a Central American Parliament, and thus would be in favor of regional solutions to various issues. However, Guatemala would like to see increased trade and stronger institutional frameworks emerge in a variety of global issues.

Russia

Russia has cooperated with India and China on security issues in the region. More importantly, Russia is very much on board with the idea of a concerted campaign against terrorism in the region. Pakistan was the original feeder of the mujahedeen during the Soviet-Afghan war. Consequently, Russia does not have a soft spot for this struggling state. Like the US, Russia views its primary threats as emanating from an array of transnational actors. However, Russia is not directly threatened by terrorist attacks, it is more concerned with the development of religious extremism and internal threats it will pose if the cause spreads.

Pakistan

Pakistan holding a seat will present challenges to the council. Pakistan resists continued influence and intervention by western nations and their regimes. The number one security threat, in the minds of the government, is not the al-Qaeda and Taliban in the west, but the threat India poses. The U.S. has a long history of financial support to Pakistan, a facet Islamabad does not want to see fade. However, gaining the trust and support of their people will take precedence over American demands.

China

The People's Republic of China has a dynamic relationship with its regional neighbor and border. China has built an alliance out of necessity; it does not want to see India become too powerful. China has sold nuclear reactors and other devices to Pakistan and jointly resisted India's territorial claims. However, China lays claim to a parcel of land in the Jammu and Kashmir region. China does not want American troops in a border country; neither will it allow terrorist groups to operate along its penetrable border. The PRC views this relationship from a business perspective, it's not out to make friends, but it's not out to risk it all either.

United States

Under Prime Minister Liaqut Ali Khan, Pakistan attempted to remain neutral, a decision that cost Pakistan in a time where it needed allies and assistance (Insight on Conflict). However, in the 1960's the US and Pakistan maintained strong military ties as the US established three air bases within

Pakistan, helping in the US fight against the Soviets. Pakistan remains one of the most crucial non-NATO allies of the US, although relations have been strained in the recent events surrounding the death of Osama bin Laden. Furthermore, since 2004, the US has initiated drone attacks on the tribal regions of Pakistan, most notably the FATA where al-Qaeda and other militant groups are known to operate. While the Pakistani government has condemned these attacks in the past, a Wikileaks article released by Pakistan's Army Chief Ashfaq Parvez Kayani showed that the government actually requested that the US increase the number of drone attacks in the FATA and northern regions. Also, since the death of Osama bin Laden, the US has cut funding to Pakistan by hundreds of thousands of dollars fearing its efforts to confront terrorism are limited and its actions do not match its rhetoric.

Attaché from the NATO mission in Afghanistan

The conflict in Afghanistan is very closely tied to the recent insurgency in Pakistan, through history, culture and tribal lineage. These similarities make appropriate communication with the NATO mission in Afghanistan. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization has occupied Afghanistan since a coalition, led by the United States, invaded in early 2002. These troops have the resources and training to properly carry out COIN. Moreover, many of the refugees in Pakistan hail from Afghanistan and members of the Taliban and different militia groups currently and extensively seek refuge in FATA and NWFP. NATO helped dramatically after the earthquake of 2005 destroyed many parts of Pakistan, rebuilding infrastructure and houses across the country. Since then, the two groups have discussed the potential of regional security often, especially in regard to the situation in Afghanistan. Very recently however, this strong relationship has been put to the test with NATO bombings of Taliban forces operating within Pakistan. Relations following the death of Osama bin Laden have been shaky and NATO continues to demand amplified efforts in fighting terrorism. The Obama administration has also struggled with Pakistan, fearing that due to recent conflict, Pakistan will shut down transit into Afghanistan that helps supply US troops in the region (Masood 1). In September 2010, Pakistan restricted NATO supplies from entering Afghanistan by shutting down the land route necessary for doing so. More recently, when two NATO helicopters entered 400 yards into Pakistani airspace, firing took place between Pakistani soldiers on the ground and the NATO troops. Since the incident, both sides are still trying to mend ties, although the amount of mistrust amongst political leaders and citizens alike is incredibly high, making any hope of peaceful negotiation very difficult (Crilly 1). The attaché from the NATO mission in Afghanistan must work to establish an effective border, ameliorate relations between the two nations and halt cross border religious conflict (Shia vs. Sunni). This delegate has the ability to reorder NATO's mission in Afghanistan (with full permission of its headquarters) to better improve border relations with Pakistan.

Attaché from UNHCR

This delegate's main role in this committee is protection of refugees. As the issue of terrorism demands international scope, especially in this region, this delegate must safeguard refugees in order to avoid a diplomatic crisis. Basically, make sure refugees aren't being targeted by certain groups and are equally protected regardless of history or religious affiliation. This representative will be responsible for maintaining the flow of aid to the refugees of terrorist attacks or counter-attacks by government troops. This delegate should research how current refugees are living and where. In regards to camps, he/she must be knowledgeable of their sizes and capacities. The delegate should also familiarize his/herself with previous issues concerning refugees in Pakistan, such as the flow of persons through the Khyber Pass.

IAEA representative

The representative from the International Atomic Energy Agency will serve to protect nuclear safety in Pakistan. As mentioned earlier in this Background Guide, extremist groups aim to take control of some of the nuclear plants in Pakistan and have already started targeting their employees. The security threat of these nuclear power plants is a grave concern to the international community. The idea of a nuclear weapon or weapons-grade plutonium falling into the hands of a terrorist organization should be feared by all. Additionally, the IAEA representative will need to ensure that the probability of an attack on a nuclear facility remains low. He/she should also make sure that Pakistan does not underestimate any threats on their nuclear arsenal. Furthermore, the IAEA will have a strong background in the proper use and distribution of nuclear energy. Pakistan is not a signatory of the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and is not bound to tell the IAEA about all its nuclear activities. This representative must research efforts to circumvent this in order to ensure nuclear safety in Pakistan.

Research and Preparation Questions:

1. How should terrorism in Pakistan be addressed? Is international intervention warranted or have current events with organizations such as NATO proved that this only creates more conflict? Does your country have a history of dealing with terrorism, how has it responded?
2. What are three main reasons why terrorists groups are still growing in the FATA and NWFP?
3. How important of a role should the United States' War on Terror play in Pakistan's own counter-insurgency efforts?
4. What are some immediate short term efforts the SC could make to help improve the situation in Pakistan?
5. How can anti-terrorism efforts utilize the contributions of the Pakistani people?
6. Examine the importance of Islam in the culture of the Pakistani people and how it affects the country's political and cultural structure.
7. As there are multiple terrorist organizations operating in Pakistan, which group threatens the region the most and why? How are these groups threatening the security of Pakistan? Is there a possibility of one of these groups gaining nuclear capabilities?
8. What steps should the SC and other international organizations take to assist Pakistan as much as possible while regarding its national sovereignty?
9. How should Pakistan's humanitarian crisis be addressed? Does it simply need more international aid? Less aid? Is this a domestic, regional, or international problem? Whose responsibility is it to fix?
10. What needs to be done to secure the economic situation in Pakistan? Will increasing international trade help the Pakistani economy or should the state focus its energy on developing its agriculture and deepening internal goods? How can Pakistan grow more independent of the national bank?

Important Documents

Bajoria, Jayshree. "Pakistan's New Generation of Terrorists." Council on Foreign Relations. Morgan Stanley. 06 February 2008

<http://www.cfr.org/publication/15422/pakistans_new_generation_of_terrorists.html>.

A great resource to start researching. It clearly outlines the different types of terrorist groups in Pakistan and briefly addresses potential counter-terrorism challenges.

Pakistan Nuclear Weapons." Federation of American Scientists. 11 Dec. 2002. 06 June 2009

<<http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/pakistan/nuke/>>.

Detailed assessment of Pakistan's nuclear weapons program. Accounts for the history, development of and risks associated with their nuclear program.

SC/1373. "Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts." 28 September 2001.

Resolution that created the CTC and set the standard for an international movement against terrorism.

Khan, Munir A. "Pakistan Nuclear Weapons." Federation of American Scientists. Regional Studies, Oct. 1998. Web. 31 July 2011. <<http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/pakistan/nuke/>>.

Details on the development of the Pakistani nuclear weapons program and its future.

"Pakistan." World: Pakistan. New York Times, 11 July 2011. Web. 31 July 2011.

<<http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/international/countriesandterritories/pakistan/index.html>>.

History and detailed description of the situation in Pakistan by the New York Times.

"UNDP Responds to Humanitarian Crisis in Pakistan." United Nations Development Programme Newsroom. United Nations, 17 June 2009. Web. 31 July 2011.

<<http://content.undp.org/go/newsroom/2009/june/undp-responds-to-humanitariancrisis-in-pakistan.en>>.

A report on UNDP involvement in the crisis in Pakistan in 2009.

Bibliography

UN Sources

E/CN.4/1997/60. Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions. Page 13.

An older document addressing the legal matters concerning human rights in regards to counter-terrorism activities.

S/AC.44/2004/(02)/22 "Pakistan's Report on Measures of Implementation." 5 Nov. 2004
Pakistan's progression according to Islamabad.

SC/1535. "Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts." 26 March 2004.
Resolution that created the CTED under the CTC.

SC/1804. "Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts." 20 March 2008.
Extended the mandate of the CTC and CTED until 2010.

Abbas, Hassan. "A Profile of Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan" CTC Sentinel. 1-4.

A concise and well-written overview of one of the main terrorist groups in Pakistan. The document also provides brief analysis on other prominent terrorist groups around the world.

"Counter-Terrorism Committee." Welcome to the United Nations: It's Your World. Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate. 06 July 2009 <<http://www.un.org/sc/ctc/>>.
The official CTC website. A wealth of information on the history and current projects of the CTC.

"Pakistan: Country Profile." United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. 200.
<http://www.unodc.org/pakistan/en/country_profile.html>.

Illuminates how closely related Pakistan and Afghanistan are due to the drug trade in the Golden Crescent.

"Press Kit – United Nations Counter-Terrorism Committee." 28 May 2009.
<http://www.un.org/sc/ctc/pdf/presskit/FINAL_2008_PressKit_EN.pdf>
Provides much of the basic essential information to begin researching the CTED and its mission.

"United Nations Counter Terrorism Committee." May 22 2009.
<<http://www.un.org/sc/ctc/aboutus.html>>
The official site for the CTC and the CTED. It has a lot of useful links under the "Resources" tab.

Non-UN Sources

"The 1971 war." BBC News. Web. 19 Sept. 2009.
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/english/static/in_depth/south_asia/2002/india_pakistan/timeline/1971.stm>.

A short article summarizing the important facts of the 1971 war in which Bangladesh received independence from Pakistan.

Amy, Belasco. "The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Global War on Terror since 9/11". Rep. no. RL33110. Congressional Research Service, 15 May 2009. Web. 19 Sept. 2009.
<<http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL33110.pdf>>.

A report prepared for the Foreign Service committee of the United States Congress which analyzes the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. This report provides great and bountiful data on the war on terror since 2001.

"A real offensive, or a phoney war?" The Economist 30 Apr. 2009: 34.

A critical article of Islamabad's response to the recent insurgency surge in the Swat valley.

Abadie, Alberto, and Javier Gardeazabal. *Terrorism and the World Economy*. Publication. 1-10.

A complex and detailed assessment terrorism and the global economy. Much of the document is difficult to understand with a micro/macro economics background, but the introduction and assessment simplify the issue in to comprehensible terms.

Advani, L.K. "Pak mission conduit for terrorist funding in India" *Express India - Latest News, India News, Indian Cricket, World, Entertainment, Business & Finance News*. Press Trust of India, 26 June 2002. Web. 03 Sept. 2009.

<<http://www.expressindia.com/news/fullstory.php?newsid=12013>>.

Home Minister L.K. Advani charges the Pakistan High Commission in New Delhi with being among the channels used to fund terrorists in India.

Bajoria, Jayshree. "The Capital Interview: 'Fighting Terrorism is Pakistan's Own War.'" Council on Foreign Relations. Morgan Stanley. 21 October 2008 <http://www.cfr.org/publication/17567/capital_interview.html>.

A look into the Pakistani stance on the issue in this interview with Husain Haqqani, Pakistan's ambassador to the United States.

Bardsley, Daniel. "US drone attack kills 12 in Pakistan - The National Newspaper." *Home Page - The National Newspaper*. Abu Dhabi Media Company, 21 Aug. 2009. Web. 02 Sept. 2009.

<<http://www.thenational.ae/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20090822/FOREIGN/708219794/1103>>.

An article discussing the effectiveness of unmanned drones in Pakistan as well as reporting the most recent village bombing.

"Bangladesh - The War for Bangladeshi Independence, 1971." *Country Studies*. Library of Congress. Web. 03 Sept. 2009. <<http://countrystudies.us/bangladesh/17.htm>>.

Describes why and how a Bangladeshi nationalist movement began and its secession from West Pakistan.

Berzin, Alexander . "Part I: The Umayyad Caliphate (661 - 750 CE), The First Muslim Incursion into the Indian Subcontinent." December 2006. 5 August 2009.

<http://www.berzinarchives.com/web/en/archives/e-books/unpublished_manuscripts/historical_interaction/pt1/history_cultures_04.html>.

The Historical Interaction between the Buddhist and Islamic Cultures before the Mongol Empire.

Birsel, Robert. "Pakistan will defeat Taliban, must win hearts - PM | International | Reuters." *Reuters.com - World News, Financial News, Breaking US & International News*. 14 May 2009. <http://www.reuters.com/article/homepageCrisis/idUSISL425112._CH_.2400>.

A critical look into the importance of Islamabad's image during their counter-terrorism activities.

Chatterji, Joya "The Fashioning of a Frontier: The Radcliffe Line and Bengal's Border Landscape, 1947-52" Modern Asian Studies. Vol 33.1 1 Feb 1999: 185-242

Outlines the history of the partitioning of India with East and West Pakistan.

Chossudovsky, Michel. "Pakistan and the "Global War on Terrorism"" Center for Research on Globalization (2009).

An examination of the development of terrorist groups within Pakistan through the early 2000s.

Cirincione, Joseph, Jon B. Wolfsthal, and Miriam Rajkumar. "Deadly Arsenals Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Threats, Revised Edition." New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005. Page 238.

Extremely detailed account of WMD arsenals around the world. Resourceful, and accurate, yet accounts for the WMDs on an global scale, and not just Pakistan.

"Counter-Terrorism Activities - Pakistan Security Research Unit". Pakistan Security Research Unit. University of Bradford. 19 June 2009

<<http://spaces.brad.ac.uk:8080/display/ssispsru/Counter-Terrorism+Activities>>.

An archive of important documents relating to terrorism in Pakistan. Documents include articles and analysis of the issue as well as UN documents and treaties pertaining to Pakistan counter-terrorism efforts.

Dawud, Sunan Abu. Shorter Encyclopedia of Islam. P. 518. 22 August 2009. < <http://bahai-library.org/theses/dying/dying4.islam.html> >.

This paper examines jibad and martyrdom in Islam. It provides many citations to the Qu'ran in order to clear up any misunderstands about the Islamic faith and jibad.

"District Map of Pakistan's FATA and NWFP." Map. Pakistan Think Tank. Web. 3 Sept. 2009.

<http://www.pakistanthinktank.org/v2/images/stories/map_showing_nwfp_and_fata.png>.

This political map outlines the borders of the districts in the FATA and NWFP. It also notes the locations of other major cities to allow its readers to better grasp the geographical location of the FATA and NWFP.

Department of State. "ARA/NEA REARCS". 28 August 2009.

<<http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB227/index.htm#17>>.

Declassified document from the Department of State that describes Pakistan's support of the Taliban through fake shipping companies and by other means.

Esposito, John L. Voices of Resurgent Islam. 1983, p.289

A collection of biographical essays detailing contemporary leaders in Islamic revival and resurgence.

Fu'ad Husayn `Al-Zarqawi. "The Second Generation of al-Qa'ida, Part Fourteen," *Al-Quds al-Arabi*, July 13, 2005

An Arabic book based on interviews with Senior Islamic officials.

Gerges, Fawaz A. *The Far Enemy: Why Jihad Went Global*. Bronxville, N.Y. Sarah Lawrence College.

<http://www.cambridge.org/us/catalogue/catalogue.asp?isbn=9780521791403>.

An excellent and easy to read assessment of the development of contemporary extremism, jihad, Islamism and their connections.

Gilani, Yousuf. "Gilani calls for aid without strings." Dawn Media Group, 30 July 2009. Web. 02

Sept. 2009. <<http://www.dawn.com/wps/wcm/connect/dawn-content-library/dawn/news/pakistan/09-gilani-calls-for-aid-without-strings--szh-09>>.

Dawn, a Pakistani news source, reports on a recent news conference with Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani concerning international assistance.

Hoffman, Bruce. Inside Terrorism. New York: Columbia UP, 1998.

This source provides a scholarly approach to defining terrorism.

"Indo-Pakistani Conflict of 1947-48." GlobalSecurity.org - Reliable Security Information. 6 Jan. 2009. Web. 03 Sept. 2009. <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/indo-pak_1947.htm>.

Detailed description of the conflict that led to the formation of two separate nations – Pakistan and India.

Kaya, Travis. "As Pakistan Reclaims Swat Valley, Taliban Strikes Back | TakePart Social Action Network™." TakePart Social Action Network: Controversial Issues, Activism, Environmental, Human Rights, Political News |. 28 May 2009.

<<http://www.takepart.com/blog/2009/05/28/as-pakistan-reclaims-swat-valley-taliban-strikes-back/>>.

An independent writer describes Pakistan's military response to the insurgent violence in the Swat Valley with citations from the Wall Street Journal and Washington Post.

Kroft, Steve, and Asif Zardari. "Zardari: We Underestimated Taliban Threat." *60 Minutes*. CBS News. 15 Feb. 2009. 31 May 2009. Web. 1 Sept. 2009.

<<http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2009/02/13/60minutes/main4800926.shtml?tag=contentMain;contentBody>>.

An interview with President of Pakistan, Asif Ali Zardari, on the Taliban threat in the swat valley. The interview is valuable to gain Islamabad's perspective to the insurgents and how they plan on dealing with them.

Kronstand, Alan K. Pakistan – US Relations. Congressional Research Service Report RL33498. Feb 6, 2009.

A thorough analysis of US relations with Pakistan and current motives and restrictions to further engagement. Provides a sound view of America's approach to Pakistani issues.

"Lashkar-e-Omar, Terrorist Group of Pakistan." South Asia Terrorism Portal. 12 July 2009

<<http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/terroristoutfits/LeO.htm>>.

A strong summary of this terrorist group in Pakistan. Includes links to information on many other aspects of terrorism in Pakistan.

Lumpkin, John. "Maktab al-Khidamat." GlobalSecurity.org - Reliable Security Information. Web. 19 Sept. 2009. <http://www.globalsecurity.org/security/profiles/maktab_al-khidamat.htm>.

Very short description of the Maktab al-Khidamat terrorist group (i.e. its goals, center of operations, key members etc).

Mass, Warren. "Pakistan Agrees to Taliban Haven in Swat Valley." *The New American*. 17 Feb.

2009. <<http://www.thenewamerican.com/index.php/world-mainmenu-26/asia-mainmenu-33/792-pakistan-agrees-to-taliban-haven-in-swat-valley>>.

A very American, critical article of Pakistan's response to recent insurgent conflict.

Masood, Salman. "Attack in Pakistani Garrison City Raises Anxiety About Safety of Nuclear Labs and Staff." *The New York Times* [New York City] 4 July 2009: A6.

Brief report of a Taliban suicide bombing targeting nuclear lab workers.

Meri, Josef W. *Medieval Islamic Civilization: An Encyclopedia*. Routledge. 2005. *Jihad*, p.419

Encyclopedia describing what a jihad is and its background.

McCoy, Alfred W. *The Politics of Heroin CIA Complicity in the Global Drug Trade*. New York: Lawrence Hill Books, 2003.

Useful for a more thorough background of the weapons trade and drug trade in NWFP.

McPhail, Adrienne. "Terrorism's Adverse Effects on Development." *Arab News Newspaper*. 28 Oct. 2003. Web. 02 Aug. 2009.

<<http://www.arabnews.com/?page=7§ion=0&article=34266&d=28&m=10&y=2003>>

This article sites how the 9/11 terrorist attacks specifically affected travel and tourism in South East Asia. It also sheds some light on how imperative tourism is for the South Asian countries.

Montas, Michele. "UN appoints first Special Envoy for humanitarian affairs for Pakistan." *Indians in Thailand*. 25 Aug. 2009. Web. 02 Sept. 2009.

<http://www.thaindian.com/newsportal/south-asia/un-appoints-first-special-envoy-for-humanitarian-affairs-for-pakistan_100237552.html>.

A short press release regarding a management change regarding the humanitarian affairs division in Pakistan. It lists a few quotes from the new director describing the current situation in Pakistan.

Mujaddidi, Talha. "Playing with Fire in Pakistan." *Axis of Logic*. 24 Dec. 2008. Web. 2 Sept. 2009.

<<http://www.axisoflogic.com/artman/uploads/fata-cia.jpg>>.

Clear, color coded Map of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas and their bordering Afghanistan

"Pakistan." Chromatism. Web. 3 Sept. 2009.

<<http://chromatism.net/current/images/pakistan.gif>>.

Map of Pakistan's provinces.

"Pakistan: International Religious Freedom Report 2006." U.S. Department of State. Web. 19 Sept. 2009. <<http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2006/71443.htm>>.

Detailed report issued by the US State Department concerning religion in Pakistani culture and politics. It addresses the influence of Islam as well as the integration of religions and their practices into day to day life.

"Pakistan Military Guide." GlobalSecurity.org - Reliable Security Information. 06 Apr. 2009.

<<http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/pakistan/index.html>>.

A detailed and reliable source regarding Pakistan's military strength.

Pehchaaan, Meri. "East and West Pakistan." Map. Web. 3 Sept. 2009.

<<http://princefino.files.wordpress.com/2008/12/east-and-west-pakistan.jpg>>.

A map depicting Pakistan prior to the 1971 war which granted East Pakistan independence as Bangladesh.

Perlez, Jane, and Pir Zubair Shah. "In Refugee Aid, Pakistan's War Has New Fron." *The New York Times* [New York City] 2 July 2009: A1.

A constructive article outlining the barriers for international intervention in Pakistan, especially in relation to the West.

Pike, John. "Pakistan Legal System." *GlobalSecurity.org - Reliable Security Information*. Web. 03 Sept.

2009. <<http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/pakistan/legal-system.htm>>.

A mildly long description of Pakistan's legal system that includes details of Islamism in the current state.

Rahmanullah. "Pakistan's illicit arms trade thrives." *San Francisco Chronicle* 16 Nov. 2007: A29.

Provides some insight into the arms trade in Pakistan and how it funds terrorism and threatens the states security.

Rashid, Ahmed. *Taliban Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia*. New York: Yale UP, 2000.

Examines the influence of the Taliban in Central Asia.

Rivers, Tom. "British and Pakistani Leaders Discuss Anti-Taliban Campaign." VOA News - Voice of America - English News Homepage. 13 May 2009.

<<http://www.voanews.com/english/archive/2009-05/2009-05-13-voa40.cfm?CFID=251063892&CFTOKEN=57146913&jsessionid=88305fad445b34c7d570342266c1a65435f7>>.

A biased and brief look into Pakistan's call for international assistance to fight the Taliban.

Roggio, Bill. "Pakistani provincial minister escapes assassination attempt -." *The Long War Journal*. 11 Mar. 2009.

<http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2009/03/pakistani_provincial.php>.

A short article demonstrating the Taliban's political and religious agenda.

Roman, David. "Pakistan's Taliban Fight Threatens Key Economic Zone." *The Wall Street Journal* [New York City] 15 May 2009.

A concise and simple assessment of the effects terrorism is having on Pakistan's economy and how this relates to international intervention and national development.

Roy, Olivier. *The lessons of the Soviet/Afghan war*. London: Brassey's for the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1991.

Provides some great information on how the ISI and CIA supported the establishment of insurgencies along the Pakistani/Afghani border.

"Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan" [South Asia Terrorism Portal](http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/terroristoutfits/ssp.htm). 12 July 2009

<<http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/terroristoutfits/ssp.htm>>

A strong summary of this terrorist group in Pakistan. Includes links to information on many other aspects of terrorism in Pakistan

Stack, Liam. "Pakistan-Taliban deal: Islamic law for peace in Swat Valley." *The Christian Science Monitor*. 16 Feb. 2009. Web. 19 Aug. 2009.

<<http://www.csmonitor.com/2009/0216/p99s01-duts.html>>.

An informative article describing the peace treaty signed by the Pakistani Authorities and the Pakistani Taliban concerning the presence in the Swat Valley. The article includes excerpts from the deal and intentions/perceptions from both parties involved.

Stanley, Trevor. "Hassan al-Banna: Founder of the Muslim Brotherhood, Ikhwan al-Muslimum," *Perspectives on World History and Current Events*, 2005, <http://www.pwhce.org/banna.html>.

A great article explaining the differences between Islam and Islamism as well as articulating the foundation of the Muslim Brotherhood and modern extremism.

Steinburg, Jeffrey. "The Golden Crescent Heroin Connection." *Executive Intelligence Review* 22.41 (1995). Web. 26 Aug. 2009.

<http://www.larouchepub.com/other/1995/2241_golden_crescent.html>.

This article examines how the drug trade and heroine trade are interlinked. It describes how arms are smuggled into the country.

"Taliban Influence: FATA and NWFP." Map. Long War Journal. Web. 3 Sept. 2009.
<http://johnbatchelorshow.com/debrief/images/NWFP_redmap_04142008.jpg>.
A map showing which regions the Taliban controls or has significant influence in.

United States Government Accountability Office GAO-08-806
America's critique of Pakistan's apparent misuse of counter-terrorism funds.

Walsh, Declan. "Taliban leader Baitullah Mehsud killed in air strike | World news | guardian.co.uk." *The Guardian UK*. 7 Aug. 2009. Web. 02 Sept. 2009.
<<http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/aug/07/baitullah-mehsud-dead-taliban-pakistan>>.
A short news brief describing the death of Baitullah Mehsud.

"War on terror is Pakistan's own war." *Christian News on Christian Today*. Reuters, 26 July 2009. Web. 30 Aug. 2009.
<<http://www.christiantoday.com/article/war.on.terror.is.pakistans.own.war/20918.htm>>.
Pakistani Prime Minister visited America to tell former President George W. Bush that "extremism and terrorism are our [their] own problems". When contrasted to the current Pakistani approach, it's evident that Islamabad is changing their perception of international assistance.

Werner, Wouter. "Disciplining Softly: The Counter-Terrorism Committee and the Logic of Precaution" *Paper presented at the annual meeting of the ISA's 50th ANNUAL CONVENTION "EXPLORING THE PAST, ANTICIPATING THE FUTURE", New York Marriott Marquis, NEW YORK CITY, NY, USA, Feb 15, 2009. 2009-05-22.*
<http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p310672_index.html>.
This author applauds the creation of the CTC and upholds that its diplomatic efforts will triumph over more aggressive military counter-terrorism efforts.

Zardari, Asif Ali. "The Frontier Against Terrorism." *The Washington Post*. 22 June 2009. Web. 19 Sept. 2009. <<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/06/21/AR2009062101793.html>>.

APPENDIX D

Creative Thinking Rubric

Definition

Creative thinking is both the capacity to combine or synthesize existing ideas, images, or expertise in original ways and the experience of thinking, reacting, and working in an imaginative way characterized by a high degree of innovation, divergent thinking, and risk taking.

A zero is assigned to any work sample or collection of work that does not meet benchmark (cell one) level performance.

	Capstone (4)	Milestones (3)	Milestones (2)	Benchmark (1)
Solving Problems	Not only develops a logical, consistent plan to solve problem, but recognizes consequences of solution and can articulate reason for choosing solution.	Having selected from among alternatives, develops a logical, consistent plan to solve the problem.	Considers and rejects less acceptable approaches to solving problem.	Only a single approach is considered and is used to solve the problem.
Innovative Thinking <i>Novelty or uniqueness (of idea, claim, question, form, etc.)</i>	Extends a novel or unique idea, question, format, or product to create new knowledge or knowledge that crosses boundaries.	Creates a novel or unique idea, question, format, or product.	Experiments with creating a novel or unique idea, question, format, or product.	Reformulates a collection of available ideas.
Connecting, Synthesizing, Transforming	Transforms ideas or solutions into entirely new forms.	Synthesizes ideas or solutions into a coherent whole.	Connects ideas or solutions in novel ways.	Recognizes existing connections among ideas or solutions.

Critical Thinking Rubric

Definition

Critical thinking is a habit of mind characterized by the comprehensive exploration of issues, ideas, artifacts, and events before accepting or formulating an opinion or conclusion.

A zero is assigned to any work sample or collection of work that does not meet benchmark (cell one) level performance.

	Capstone (4)	Milestones (3)	Milestones (2)	Benchmark (1)
Student's position (perspective, thesis/hypothesis)	Specific position (perspective, thesis/hypothesis) is imaginative, taking into account the complexities of an issue. Limits of position (perspective, thesis/hypothesis) are acknowledged. Others' points of view are synthesized within position (perspective, thesis/hypothesis).	Specific position (perspective, thesis/hypothesis) takes into account the complexities of an issue. Others' points of view are acknowledged within position (perspective, thesis/hypothesis).	Specific position (perspective, thesis/hypothesis) acknowledges different sides of an issue.	Specific position (perspective, thesis/hypothesis) is stated, but is simplistic and obvious.
Conclusions and related outcomes (implications and consequences)	Conclusions and related outcomes (consequences and implications) are logical and reflect student's informed evaluation and ability to place evidence and perspectives discussed in priority order.	Conclusion is logically tied to a range of information, including opposing viewpoints; related outcomes (consequences and implications) are identified clearly.	Conclusion is logically tied to information (because information is chosen to fit the desired conclusion); some related outcomes (consequences and implications) are identified clearly.	Conclusion is inconsistently tied to some of the information discussed; related outcomes (consequences and implications) are oversimplified.

Foundations and Skills for Lifelong Learning Rubric

Definition

Lifelong learning is “all purposeful learning activity, undertaken on an ongoing basis with the aim of improving knowledge, skills and competence”. An endeavor of higher education is to prepare students to be this type of learner by developing specific dispositions and skills (described in this rubric) while in school. (From The European Commission. 2000. Commission staff working paper: A memorandum on lifelong learning. Retrieved September 3, 2003, from www.see-educoop.net/education_in/pdf/lifelong-oth-enl-t02.pdf.)

A zero is assigned to any work sample or collection of work that does not meet benchmark (cell one) level performance.

	Capstone (4)	Milestones (3)	Milestones (2)	Benchmark (1)
Curiosity	Explores a topic in depth, yielding a rich awareness and/or little-known information indicating intense interest in the subject.	Explores a topic in depth, yielding insight and/or information indicating interest in the subject.	Explores a topic with some evidence of depth, providing occasional insight and/or information indicating mild interest in the subject.	Explores a topic at a surface level, providing little insight and/or information beyond the very basic facts indicating low interest in the subject.
Initiative	Completes required work, generates and pursues opportunities to expand knowledge, skills, and abilities.	Completes required work, identifies and pursues opportunities to expand knowledge, skills, and abilities.	Completes required work and identifies opportunities to expand knowledge, skills, and abilities.	Completes required work.
Transfer	Makes explicit references to previous learning and applies in an innovative (new and creative) way that knowledge and those skills to demonstrate comprehension and performance in novel situations.	Makes references to previous learning and shows evidence of applying that knowledge and those skills to demonstrate comprehension and performance in novel situations.	Makes references to previous learning and attempts to apply that knowledge and those skills to demonstrate comprehension and performance in novel situations.	Makes vague references to previous learning but does not apply knowledge and skills to demonstrate comprehension and performance in novel situations.

Information Literacy Rubric

Definition

The ability to know when there is a need for information, to be able to identify, locate, evaluate, and effectively and responsibly use and share that information for the problem at hand. - The National Forum on Information Literacy.

A zero is assigned to any work sample or collection of work that does not meet benchmark (cell one) level performance.

	Capstone (4)	Milestones (3)	Milestones (2)	Benchmark (1)
Use Information Effectively to Accomplish a Specific Purpose	Communicates, organizes and synthesizes information from sources to fully achieve a specific purpose, with clarity and depth	Communicates, organizes and synthesizes information from sources. Intended purpose is achieved.	Communicates and organizes information from sources. The information is not yet synthesized, so the intended purpose is not fully achieved.	Communicates information from sources. The information is fragmented and/or used inappropriately (misquoted, taken out of context, or incorrectly paraphrased, etc.), so the intended purpose is not achieved.

Inquiry and Analysis Rubric

Definition

Inquiry is a systematic process of exploring issues/objects/works through the collection and analysis of evidence that result in informed conclusions/judgments. Analysis is the process of breaking complex topics or issues into parts to gain a better understanding of them.

A zero is assigned to any work sample or collection of work that does not meet benchmark (cell one) level performance.

	Capstone (4)	Milestones (3)	Milestones (2)	Benchmark (1)
Analysis	Organizes and synthesizes evidence to reveal insightful patterns, differences, or similarities related to focus.	Organizes evidence to reveal important patterns, differences, or similarities related to focus.	Organizes evidence, but the organization is not effective in revealing important patterns, differences, or similarities.	Lists evidence, but it is not organized and/or is unrelated to focus.
Conclusions	States a conclusion that is a logical extrapolation from the inquiry findings.	States a conclusion focused solely on the inquiry findings. The conclusion arises specifically from and responds specifically to the inquiry findings.	States a general conclusion that, because it is so general, also applies beyond the scope of the inquiry findings.	States an ambiguous, illogical, or unsupported conclusion from inquiry findings.
Limitations and Implications	Insightfully discusses in detail relevant and supported limitations and implications.	Discusses relevant and supported limitations and implications.	Presents relevant and supported limitations and implications.	Presents limitations and implications, but they are possibly irrelevant and unsupported.

Problem Solving Rubric

Definition

Problem solving is the process of designing, evaluating, and implementing a strategy to answer an open-ended question or achieve a desired goal.

A zero is assigned to any work sample or collection of work that does not meet benchmark (cell one) level performance.

	Capstone (4)	Milestones (3)	Milestones (2)	Benchmark (1)
Define Problem	Demonstrates the ability to construct a clear and insightful problem statement with evidence of all relevant contextual factors.	Demonstrates the ability to construct a problem statement with evidence of most relevant contextual factors, and problem statement is adequately detailed.	Begins to demonstrate the ability to construct a problem statement with evidence of most relevant contextual factors, but problem statement is superficial.	Demonstrates a limited ability in identifying a problem statement or related contextual factors.
Identify Strategies	Identifies multiple approaches for solving the problem that apply within a specific context.	Identifies multiple approaches for solving the problem, only some of which apply within a specific context.	Identifies only a single approach for solving the problem that does apply within a specific context.	Identifies one or more approaches for solving the problem that do not apply within a specific context.
Propose Solutions/Hypotheses	Proposes one or more solutions/hypotheses that indicates a deep comprehension of the problem. Solution/hypotheses are sensitive to contextual factors as well as all of the following: ethical, logical, and cultural dimensions of the problem.	Proposes one or more solutions/hypotheses that indicates comprehension of the problem. Solutions/hypotheses are sensitive to contextual factors as well as the one of the following: ethical, logical, or cultural dimensions of the problem.	Proposes one solution/hypothesis that is “off the shelf” rather than individually designed to address the specific contextual factors of the problem.	Proposes a solution/hypothesis that is difficult to evaluate because it is vague or only indirectly addresses the problem statement.
Implement Solution	Implements the solution in a manner that addresses thoroughly and deeply multiple contextual factors of the problem.	Implements the solution in a manner that addresses multiple contextual factors of the problem in a surface manner.	Implements the solution in a manner that addresses the problem statement but ignores relevant contextual factors.	Implements the solution in a manner that does not directly address the problem statement.
Evaluate Outcomes	Reviews results relative to the problem defined with thorough, specific considerations of need for further work.	Reviews results relative to the problem defined with some consideration of need for further work.	Reviews results in terms of the problem defined with little, if any, consideration of need for further work.	Reviews results superficially in terms of the problem defined with no consideration of need for further work

APPENDIX E

United Nations Quiz

Number: _____

Date: _____

1. The United Nations has an army. True or False.
2. The United States is the largest supplier of peacekeepers to the United Nations. True or False
3. When was the UN founded?
 - a. 1945
 - b. 1954
 - c. 1930
 - d. 1927
4. Where are the Headquarters of the UN?
 - a. Paris
 - b. London
 - c. New York
 - d. Washington
5. Who is the current Secretary-General of the United Nations?
 - a. Kofi Annan
 - b. Ban Ki Moon
 - c. Hu Jintao
 - d. Nicholas Sarkozy
6. What is the name of the document which outlines the aims of the UN and the rights and obligation of each member state?
 - a. The United Nations Treaty
 - b. The United Nations Charter
 - c. The United Nations Agreement
7. The UN's budget comes from country's based on their
 - a. Size of population

- b. Size of economy
 - c. Desired contribution amount
 - d. Location
8. How many Security Council members have veto power, and what are they?
 9. How many states are members of the UN?
 10. How many members are on the UN Security Council?
 11. Which member has cast the most Veto votes?
 12. What do the following acronyms stand for?
 - a. WHO
 - b. ECOSOC
 - c. IMF
 - d. WTO
 - e. WB
 - f. UNICEF
 - g. UNESCO
 - h. ICJ
 - i. ICC
-

Pakistan Quiz

1. Pakistan is an Islamic state. True or False
2. Pakistan receives aid from the United States. True or False
3. Pakistan has nuclear weapons. True or False
4. Al-Qaeda is the largest terrorist group in Pakistan. True or False.
5. The current president of Pakistan is_____.
6. The capital of Pakistan is_____.
7. The word jihad means _____.
8. Pakistan has a population of
 - a. 50 million
 - b. 100 million
 - c. 180 million

- d. 127 million
9. Drone attacks have killed
- a. 500 persons
 - b. 1000 persons
 - c. 2300 persons
 - d. 300 persons
10. Out of the total persons killed by drone attacks what percent were civilians?
- a. 5%
 - b. 50%
 - c. 10%
 - d. 25%
11. Pakistan was declared a state in what year?

REFERENCES

- Amoore, Louise and Paul Langley. "Experiencing Globalization: Active Teaching and Learning in International Political Economy." *International Studies Perspectives*. 2001, 15-32.
- Asal., V. "Playing Games with International Relations." *International Studies Perspectives*. 2005, 359-373.
- Barr, Robert B. and John Tagg. "From Teaching to Learning – A New Paradigm for Undergraduate Education." 1995, 13-25. <http://www.athens.edu/visitors/QEP/Barr_and_Tagg_article.pdf>.
- Biggs, John. *Teaching for Quality Learning at University*. 2nd edition. Maidenhead: Open University Press. 2003.
- Brennan, Mary Beth. "The Importance of the Model United Nations Experience." 1996 <<http://students.jccc.net/un/valueMUN.htm>>.
- Bonoma, Thomas V. and Barry R. Schlenker. "The SEU Calculus: Effects of Response Mode, Sex, and Sex role on Uncertain Decisions." *Decision Sciences*. 1978, 206-27.
- Boud, D., and J. Pascoe. *Experiential Learning: Developments in Australian Post-Secondary Education*. Sydney: Australian Consortium on Experiential Education. 1978.
- Brock, K., and B. Cameron. "Enlivening Political Science Courses with Kolb's Learning Preference Model." *PS: Political Science and Politics*. 1999, 251–256.
- Burch, Kurt. "A Primer on Problem-Based Learning for International Relations Courses." *International Studies Perspectives*. 2000, 31-44.
- Chasek, P. "Power Politics, Diplomacy and Role Playing: Simulationg UN Security Council's Response to Terrorism." *International Studies Perspectives*. 2005, 1-19.
- Crossley-Frolick, K. A. "Beyond Model UN: Simulating Multi-Level, Multi-Actor Diplomacy Using the Millennium Development Goals." *International Studies Perspectives*. 2010, 184–201.
- "Educational Outreach." United Nations Information Center. <<http://unic.un.org/imucms/kathmandu/35/923/educational-outreach.aspx>>.
- Fritzsche, David J., Nancy H. Leonard, Marian W. Boscia, and Phil H. Anderson. "Simulation Debriefing Procedures." *Developments in Business Simulation and Experiential Learning*. 2004, 327-328.

(Role-Playing and Simulation Based Learning in Higher Education: Case Study in Model United Nations)

Senior Capstone Project for (Jason C. Fortin)

- Fox, Richard L. and Shirley A Ronkowski. "Learning Styles of Political Science Students." *PS: Political Science and Politics*. 1997, 732-737.
- Haack, Kirsten. "UN Studies and the Curriculum as Active Learning Tool." *International Studies Perspective*. 2008, 395-410.
- Hazleton, William A. "International Organizations and Conflict Resolution: Peace Education Through Simulation."
- Hazleton, William A. and James E. Jacob. "Simulating International Diplomacy: The National Model United Nations Experience." *Teaching Political Science*. 1983: 10, 96-97.
- Hazleton William A. and Ronald P. Mahurin. "External Simulations as Teaching Devices: The Model United Nations." *Simulation & Games*. Sage Publications, Inc. 1986 194-171.
- Kaufman, Joyce P. "Using Simulation as a Tool to Teach About International Negotiation." *International Negotiation*. 1998 59-75.
- Kille, K. J. "Simulation the Creation of a New International Human Rights Treaty: Active Learning in the International Studies Classroom." *International Studies Perspectives*. 2002, 271-290.
- Kolb, D. *Experiential Learning: Experience as the source of learning and development*. Englewood Cliffs. NJ: Prentice-Hill. 1984.
- Krain, Matthew and Jeffrey S. Lantis. "Building Knowledge? Evaluation the Effectiveness of the Global Problems Summit Simulation." *International Studies Perspective*. 2006, 395-407.
- Lantis, Jeffrey S. "Simulations and Experiential Learning in the International Relations Classroom." *International Negotiation*. 1998, 39-57.
- Lantis, Jeffrey. "United Nations Security Council Restructuring Summit." *The New International Studies Classroom: Active Teaching*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner. 2000.
- Lantis, J., L.M. Kuzma and J. Boehrer. "Active Teaching and Learning at a Critical Crossroads." *The New International Studies Classroom: Active Teaching, Active Learning*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers. 2000, 2.
- McIntosh, Daniel. "The Uses and Limits of the Model United Nations in an International Relations Classroom." *International Studies Perspectives*. 2001, 269-280.
- Morgan, A. L. "Toward a Global Theory of Mind: The Potential Benefits of Presenting a Range of IR Theories through Active Learning." *International Studies Perspectives*. 2001, 351-370.

(Role-Playing and Simulation Based Learning in Higher Education: Case Study in Model United Nations)

Senior Capstone Project for (Jason C. Fortin)

Montgomery, Michael J. and Paul F. Diehl. "Game Review: Model United Nations." *Simulation & Games*. 1983, 363-366.

Moseley, David et al. *Frameworks for Thinking. A Handbook for Teaching and Learning*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2005.

Muldoon, James P. Jr. "The Model United Nations Revisited." *Simulation and Games*. Sage Publications, Inc. 1995, 27-35.

Newmann, William W. and Judyth L. Twigg. "Active Engagement of the Into IR Student: A Simulation Approach." *PS: Political Science and Politics*. Dec. 2000; Vol. 33, No. 5 835-842.

Petranek, C. F. "Written Debriefing: The Next Vital Step in Learning with Simulations." *Simulation & Gaming*. 2000, 108-119.

Pivec, Maja, Olga Dziabenko and Irmgard Schinnerl. "Aspects of Game-Based Learning."

Sasley, Brent. "Teaching Students How to Fail: Simulations as Tools of Explanation." *International Studies Perspectives*. 2010, 61-74.

Shinko, Rosemary E. "Thinking, Doing, and Writing International Relations Theory." *International Studies Perspective*. 2006, 43-50.

Smith, Donna M., and David A. Kolb. *User's Guide for the Learning-Style Inventory: A Manual for Teachers and Trainers*. Boston: McBer. 1985.

Smith, E., and M. Boyer. "Designing In-Class Simulations." *PS: Political Science and Politics*. 1996, 690-694.

Smith, Mark K. "Howard Gardner and multiple intelligences." *The encyclopedia of informal education*. 2008. <<http://www.infed.org/thinkers/gardner.htm>>.

Starkey, Brigid A. and Elizabeth L. Blake. "Simulation in International Relations Education." *Simulation Gaming*. 2001, Vol 32: 537-551.

Travis, Susan. "Experiencing and Model United Nations." *Social Education*. 1994, 434.

Winham, G. "Simulation for Teaching and Analysis." *International Negotiation*. Sanfrancisco: Jossey-Bass. 1991, 409-423.

Yilmaz, Levent, Tuncer I. Oren and Nasser Ghasem-Aghaee. "Simulation-based problem-solving environments for conflict studies." *Simulation Gaming*. 2006, Vol 37: 534.

Zeff, E. "Negotiating in the European Council: A Model European Union Format for Individual Classes." *International Studies Perspectives*. 2003, 265-275.