8. Holding the Ugandan Police to Account: Case Study of the Police Accountability and Reform Project[1]

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1. Introduction

The police play an important role in the thinking about public accountability. The importance of the police is evidently based on the organization's key role in providing crucial public services related to guaranteeing safety, security and the rule of law – or, to put it more succinctly, 'law and order'. Yet, another feature of policing may even be more vital when reflecting on police accountability. That characteristic reflects the so-called 'paradox of violence' of the democratic state: its police force is one of the 'strong arms' of a state, and it holds a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence, but at the same time it needs to respect legal restraints on the actual use of its powers. The paradox of violence implies that 'a democratic society needs protection both *by police* and *from police*' (Marx 2001).

This chapter focuses on a project aimed at enhancing accountability in Uganda. The country may be considered a very difficult environment for strengthening accountability, as the National Service Delivery Study 2015 has reported that an overwhelming majority of respondents see the Uganda Police Force as the most corrupt institution in the country (Kato 2016). The bad reputation of the police force prompted a Ugandan non-governmental organization (NGO), HURINET-U (Human Rights Network-Uganda), with financial support from the Royal Netherlands Embassy in Kampala, to initiate the Police Accountability and Reform Project (PARP).

The chapter presents the findings of research on the police accountability project, which are relevant as an example of how civil-society engagement with government agencies may lead to enhanced awareness among public servants of their accountability relationship vis-à-vis citizens and their need to adhere to basic principles of public integrity. We argue, in particular, that the activities of HURINET-U have contributed to a better understanding of the relationships between the police and Ugandan citizens, political parties and the media. Significantly, HURINET-U's project resulted in improved knowledge of the rights of

citizens, either individually or as part of a collective, and potentially more respect for civil and political liberties.

We discuss various aspects of policing in Uganda. The following section introduces the notion of police accountability as a special case of public accountability. The third section focuses on Uganda, and describes some relevant characteristics of the country's political system and its police force. Section 4 outlines the key features of the PARP. Section 5 sketches out the way in which our evaluation of the effectiveness of PARP was designed, how we executed the research project and what its major findings were. The final section of the chapter contains our conclusions.

2. Police Accountability

In democratic societies, the police are normally held to account in various different ways, just as (almost) all public agencies are (Bovens 2005: 187–8). Police officers face organizational/hierarchical accountability to their superiors and a police force is subject to political oversight by parliaments, which represent the population at large. Individual police officers may be the target of legal accountability in criminal or civil courts if they are suspected of excessive use of force or gross omissions. Increasingly, the police also face administrative accountability relations with inspectors and auditors for their use of public resources and with ombudsmen for their interactions with the general public. Finally, professional accountability measures are implemented by peers, either in professional associations or in disciplinary committees.

In the case of the police, however, various other aspects of their work impact on accountability relations. First, as Lister and Rowe (2016: 1) have argued, discussions about police accountability almost inevitably also acquire a political dimension because the agency's role is connected to the maintenance of a particular social and political order. Second, the police are facing the aforementioned paradox of violence: since they hold a monopoly of violence, they must apply force with great restraint. Police action requires very careful assessment because of the power asymmetries in the relationship between the police and 'ordinary civilians', who do not command the same means of coercion. Third, as argued by Lister and Jones (2016), police action is not a technical activity. Instead, 'policing is a normative enterprise that holds significant implications not only for principles of human

rights, due process, and fair treatment, but also for utilitarian objectives of ensuring that citizens live in just and safe societies' (Lister and Jones 2016: 192–3). This requires respect for important democratic values, such as equity, responsiveness, the distribution of power and information, redress and participation (Lister and Jones 2016: 199–206).

In the context of this chapter, we argue that several democratic values actually come together in the notion of police integrity. A well-known definition describes integrity as 'the quality of acting in accordance with relevant moral values, norms, and rules', and it can be a quality both of individuals and organizations (Lasthuizen et al. 2011: 387). Democratic values, built on notions of police integrity, and accountability are important determinants of public confidence in the police, and can be seen as two sides of the same coin. As it has been put in a recent synthesis of work on police accountability,

> [a]s citizens are more likely to cooperate with requests for information and assistance if they perceive those delivering policing to have integrity and legitimacy, then accountability has an important role in delivering core policing functions of law enforcement, security and order maintenance. (Lister and Rowe 2016: 5)

Linked to the understanding of policing as a normative activity, it seems important to look at accountability not just in a formal way but to also take into account the moral dimension of police work. In this sense, Davids and Boyce (2016: 91) have made a plea for the adoption of a 'social accountability perspective' to address 'multiple dimensions of answerability (to formal systems of accountability) and responsibility (in the sense of virtue)'. The latter dimension, in particular, relates to the ethical significance of policing, which is ultimately built on integrity and the trustworthiness of police officers' behaviour, and thus is the basis for the public's trust in the police.

3. The Ugandan Context

Politics in Uganda

Since its 1986 victory in the Ugandan Bush War, the protracted civil war against the Obote regime, the National Resistance Army has dominated Ugandan politics. The NRA was subsequently institutionalized as a political force, and renamed to National Resistance

Movement (NRM). The Ugandan 'Movement System', which was in place between 1986 and 2005, was a 'no-party' political system in which individual representatives were elected on the basis of their personal merit instead of a party platform.

Yoweri Museveni has been the undisputed strongman of the NRA/M regime since 1986, and was elected president in 1996. Museveni won four subsequent national elections (in 2001, 2006, 2011 and 2016); he competed in the latter three elections because the presidential term limit had been abolished in 2005. Regime maintenance became increasingly important in the face of rising opposition, and this led to the search for instruments with which to broaden the regime's support base among the Ugandan population (Khisa 2014).

One of the ways for the regime to secure political support for the NRM at the local and national level was to use patronage arrangements and condone corruption (Khisa 2014: 32–6; Tangri and Mwenda 2013). Decentralization was a vital instrument of patronage: the rapid increase in the number of districts in the country, from around 40 in the mid-1990s to 111 since 2012 (Ministry of Trade, Industry and Cooperatives 2017), made it possible for the regime to reward its supporters with positions in local government (Golooba-Mutebi and Hickey 2013: 16–17). Next to this, the increased activity of opposition politicians and internal NRM challengers spurred government activities – targeting independent media, the judiciary and opposition parties (Anderson and Fisher 2016). The latest National Development Plan chose to place less emphasis on poverty reduction and service delivery as policy priorities, and instead opted for investment in 'growth opportunities' – especially agriculture, tourism, natural resources, infrastructure and human-capital development (Government of Uganda 2015: xxv; Hickey 2013). Government support for justice and law-and-order activities received less priority: according to the National Development Plan II, the allocation to those activities was foreseen to fall from 1.26 per cent of GDP in 2015 to 1.05 per cent in 2019 (Government of Uganda 2015: 280). The Uganda Police Force, however, has been, and will remain, a priority – which is reflected in the planned growth of its budget by 29 per cent between 2016 and 2022 (Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development 2017: 165).

The Uganda Police Force
The Uganda Police Force was established in 1906 (Uganda Police Force 2007). It is organized on the basis of 20 directorates, related to functional tasks (such as traffic and road

safety, human rights and legal services, and criminal investigation and crime intelligence), and geographically divided into regional and district offices, police stations and posts (Uganda Police Force 2019). In 2003, Uganda had around 15,000 police officers, while its police force had grown to almost 45,000 officers in 2015 (Uganda Police Force 2015: 3).

In 2016, the Corruption Perceptions Index, which measures the perceived levels of public-sector corruption worldwide, placed Uganda among the top 15 per cent of most-corrupt countries in 2016 (Transparency International 2017). The country's police force is regarded as particularly corrupt (Basheka 2013: 72–4; Transparency International-Kenya 2013). The results of various surveys – including Uganda's National Service Delivery Study 2015 (Kato 2016) and older surveys by the Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative (2006b) – indicate that a majority of Ugandan citizens have consistently rated the police as the most corrupt institution in the country. It is generally felt that integrity problems such as corruption affect service delivery by the police and complicate accountability. In particular, the lack of accountability of the Ugandan police is felt to be responsible for delayed justice, illegal acts, excessive use of force and the failure to conclude investigations (Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative 2006a: 7–11).

Crime statistics show that 252,065 crimes were reported in Uganda in 2017. This resulted in a crime rate of 667 per 100,000 inhabitants (Uganda Police 2017: 1–2). Of all crimes, on average less than 30 per cent result in a conviction (Uganda Police Force 2015: 6). Corruption cases reported to the police were surprisingly scarce: Uganda Police (2017: 1) mentions 37 cases over the course of 2017. The Ugandan police report 137 cases of police officers being arrested because they took bribes from motorists (Uganda Police 2017: 58).

4. The Police Accountability and Reform Project (PARP)

The PARP was implemented by HURINET-U between October 2010 and January 2013, in the second phase of a broader project that had started in 2007. It was executed with financial support from the Royal Netherlands Embassy, which provided €260,355 for the duration of the project following on from an allocation of €230,000 for the earlier phase. While the project was carried out by HURINET-U, the National Working Group on the PARP included

seven other local and international NGOs working on human rights, policing and the rule of law.

The project was implemented because the police in Uganda are perceived as a partisan force that operates in a near-colonial mode. The main concerns were police brutality, lack of respect for human rights, abuse of power and corruption. HURINET-U has had a long-standing relationship with the police. According to the Dutch embassy in Uganda, 'HURINET-U is the only Civil Society Organization with good rapport with the police and has established good channels of dialogue on Public Order Management, human rights violations etc.' (Royal Netherlands Embassy, Kampala 2013: 1).

The overall objective of the PARP was 'to contribute to the establishment of an accountable and democratic police service that works in close cooperation with the public in order to ensure a safe and secure society' (HURINET-U 2013: 6). The project brought together the police and civil society in order to foster exchange and establish a stronger civilian oversight over the police. The objectives of the intervention were to:

1) create stronger civilian oversight of the police;
2) establish public-safety and security networks on the basis of a shared responsibility between the police and the public;
3) stimulate the contribution of civil society and the public to a police-review process; and
4) promote public-order management that promotes and protects the rights and freedoms of assembly (HURINET-U 2013: 6).

The PARP's theory of change was based on a range of premises. First, it was argued that increased contact between citizens and the police, and better information about the role of the latter, would create a police force that was responsive to societal needs. Second, contacts and information exchange were expected to start to change the role of the police from being an instrument of the regime into a service for the people. Third, improved knowledge would restore the community's trust in the police and would benefit the image of the police force among Ugandans. Fourth, enhanced civilian oversight would make the police more accountable. Fifth, dialogues between the police, civil society and specific groups of civilians (such as journalists and students) would promote knowledge and understanding of the police. Sixth, coalition building was seen as the optimal model for the dialogue: coalitions of civil-

society groups, journalists and students would be central to building knowledge and trust. Finally, the establishment of complaint procedures, research and publications would bring police malfunctioning into the open.

The PARP consisted of a multitude of activities. Target groups varied across these activities, and ranged from police officers to representatives of the media, students, members of parliament and leaders of civil-society organizations. Most activities were workshops (referred to as 'dialogues') aiming to create rapport between the police and a variety of societal actors. Next to this, activities undertaken as part of the PARP were aimed at creating awareness about impending changes in the Ugandan public-order-management regime.

The main activities of the project that related to the objective of strengthening police accountability can be grouped into three categories (HURINET-U 2011a; 2011b):

1) As part of the 'dialogues', HURINET-U organized six one-day meetings involving police officers and civil-society organizations, covering nine districts, each attended by approximately 60 people; two meetings of the reform coalition with police commanders; advocacy discussions of the project team with the police; three media–police dialogues, with approximately 150 participants in total; and a national workshop for media, civil society and the police, with 45 participants.

2) Activities aimed at influencing Ugandan public opinion, which included the creation of a police-reform website; the distribution of 700 copies of the police accountability newsletter 'Police Watch'; police-station visits in four places in Acholi, northern Uganda, with 850 people attending; a publication on the impact of the Public Order Management Bill/Act on human rights and freedoms (leading to the distribution of 300 copies and encounters with parliament); the airing of 15 radio talk shows with police commanders to discuss the rights, freedoms and responsibilities of the general public during gatherings and demonstrations; and field missions to document the role of the army and police during elections, leading to a pre-election statement, the distribution of the final report and the issuing of press releases.

3) Finally, the project focused directly on police activities by organizing a module on the media at the Police Training Department, distributing 10,000 copies of a review of a police-complaints form and circulating 5,500 copies of the police-complaints-handling manual.

HURINET-U's work was implemented in part of Uganda. The organization worked mainly in 11 of the more than 120 districts: Arua, Bushenyi, Gulu, Kabale, Kabarole, Kampala, Lira, Masaka, Mbarara, Moroto and Soroti.

5. Evaluating the PARP's effectiveness

Design and Methods

Our research on PARP involved three different methods of data collection, mainly focused on the normative dimensions of accountability: integrity, justice and respect for (human) rights. All three methods used a logic of differences, and involved the comparison of districts where PARP was implemented with 'non-PARP districts' in order to evaluate the project's effectiveness. The methods aimed to chart the attitudes of police officers, as well as police characteristics and crime-incidence rates. In consultation with HURINET-U, we randomly picked five districts in which HURINET-U had carried out its activities (Bushenyi, Kabale, Kabarole, Mbarara and Soroti) and purposively matched them with five other randomly chosen districts in which HURINET-U had not been active (Iganga, Jinja, Luwero, Mityana and Tororo).[2] We chose no more than one district per region in order to ensure regional coverage.

Our first method aimed to collect (administrative) data on the police and the prevalence of crime in the ten districts selected for the purpose of this evaluation. The second method consisted of a survey among 600 police officers from ten selected districts. The third method involved in-depth interviews with 23 police officers from the higher ranks, drawn from eight different districts. The next three sub-sections analyse the findings based on the three sets of data.

Analysis of Administrative Data

Data collected on the police organization and district characteristics show that our ten districts exhibit quite substantial variation in terms of the average numbers of police stations, the average strength of the police force and the average number of riots in the 2005–12 period. The differences across districts appears to be unrelated to the size of their populations. The highest annual average of riots was observed in the two mid-sized districts of Jinja (3.0)

and Mbarara (2.3). The two largest districts, Bushenyi and Iganga, had relatively few riots, with annual averages of 0.8 and 0.4 respectively. Overall, the number of police stations appears unrelated to district size, but the strength of the police force seems to compensate for this, since the number of police officers per district is broadly in line with population size.

Crime data shows considerable variation over the 2005–13 period. Yet, Figure 8.1, below, illustrates that the absolute annual crime rate has followed a similar trend across PARP ('treated') and control ('untreated') districts. Over the reporting period, the number of annual crimes varied from 167 in Mityana to slightly over 3,000 in Jinja. In terms of reported homicides between 2005 and 2013 (not shown), there are also substantial differences across districts, ranging from a minimum of 0 (Luwero in 2006) to a maximum of 74 (Mbarara in 2013). The fluctuation in the number of reported crimes and homicides, and the similarity of fluctuations over districts, suggests that there may have been differences in reporting standards rather than in actual crime rates. On the basis of available data on police statistics on crimes and homicides, it seems impossible to relate the quality of policing in Uganda to the impact of PARP activities.

Figure 8.1 – Average Number of Crimes in Districts (2005–13)

Source: Administrative data, Ugandan Police Force

Analysis of the Police Survey[3]

An important part of our data collection concerned the attitudes of individual police officers towards proper policing. As part of a survey, respondents were provided with 12 identical,

hypothetical vignette cases depicting police misbehaviour at varying degrees of seriousness.[4] Our survey questions elicited an assessment of the depicted cases based on police officers' judgement of good policing and the perceived best-practice standards among colleagues. The approach was inspired by earlier research on police integrity and accountability (cf. Klockars et al. 2006; Kutnjak Ivković 2005).

Overall, 600 police officers were selected for participation in the survey, using randomized, stratified sampling. As a result, 60 police officers were included from each of the districts that had been chosen in consultation with HURINET-U. The survey focused on perceptions and attitudes; we did not ask officers about their actual behaviour, because such questions would probably yield biased responses. Instead, after each case, police officers answered five normative questions. These related to:

1) officers' own assessment of the seriousness of the depicted behaviour;
2) the likeliness that they would themselves report a fellow police officer engaging in such behaviour;
3) officers' assessment of the position of most officers in their office vis-à-vis the misbehaviour;
4) their own view as to what disciplinary measure should follow on the discovery of the misbehaviour; and
5) their assessment as to whether the misbehaviour would be seen as a violation of official policy in their agency.

Data obtained from the survey was analysed with matching techniques and simultaneous regressions. By applying these techniques, we were able to assess whether differences in responses between police officers from PARP and non-PARP districts could plausibly (and statistically significantly) be ascribed to participation in the project. A summary of the results is presented in Table 8.1, below. The findings show that there are consistent differences between the two groups of police officers on all questions, and that the differences are highly statistically significant. This implies that PARP had a positive impact on normative judgments of police accountability and integrity – importantly, including human rights as one of its main target areas.

Table 8.1: Main Results of Analyses of Survey Data per Normative Question

	1. Severity of behaviour	2. Likelihood of reporting	3. Assessment of severity by most in office	4. Position on disciplinary action	5. Assessment of violation of official policy	Average across all questions
Simple comparison of means						
Treatment effect	0.487	0.364	0.326	0.222	0.263	0.327
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	
Control group average	3.771	4.004	3.742	3.760	4.300	
Propensity score matching						
Treatment effect	0.503	0.407	0.286	0.213	0.270	0.336
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)	
Average effect from simultaneous regression						
Treatment effect	0.437	0.377	0.350	0.191	0.181	0.210
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.023)	(0.041)	(0.000)

Notes: Robust p-values in parentheses. Sample size is 7,200 (12 vignette cases with 600 respondents)
Source: Authors' own calculations

Analysis of Police Interviews

In-depth interviews were held with 23 district police officers,[5] selected from the higher ranks. Interviewees included Regional Police Commanders (RPCs), District Police Commanders (DPCs) and Officers in Charge of the Criminal Investigation Department (OC-CIDs) from four PARP districts (Bushenyi, Kabale, Kabarole and Mbarara) and four non-PARP districts (Iganga, Jinja, Luwero and Tororo). The interviews focused on the functioning of the police, the main challenges encountered in day-to-day work, the handling of complaints about the police and the observed impacts of the roll-out of the PARP. Questions on the PARP addressed the project's positive and negative impacts, the overall relevance of projects such as the PARP and the officers' assessment of the sustainability of the results achieved by the PARP.

Overall, the assessments of the situation of the Ugandan Police Force and the problems encountered by the police in their daily work did not show important differences across the two sets of districts. The problems mentioned by senior police officers related mainly to the availability of equipment, the state of police stations and personnel issues. Some senior police officers reported political issues, such as interference by the central, regional or local

government with the work of the police. Answers to questions about citizens' complaints also did not differentiate PARP from non-PARP districts. Issues raised related to police corruption, delays in investigations, the mismanagement of case files, and compromising relations between police officers and criminals.

The assessment of PARP activities and their impacts showed a marked difference between officers working in PARP and non-PARP districts. All 12 police officers stationed in non-PARP districts were unable to comment on the project activities and were equally silent about possible positive or negative impacts. Several of those police officers indicated explicitly they had not heard about the project before.

The comments provided by the officers from the PARP districts were generally at a rather abstract level, but they showed a certain level of knowledge about, and possibly a shift in attitude towards, 'good' police behaviour – particularly when compared with officers from non-PARP districts. It seems that at least some of the difference in knowledge and attitude between the two groups of police officers of equivalent rank could possibly be attributed to involvement in the project.

The responses provided by nine police officers[6] in PARP districts typically addressed issues connected to desirable police behaviour in terms of respect for human rights, the treatment of arrested people and interactions with the community in general. Although we cannot generalize on the basis of a limited number of interviews, the convergence in the answers of the police officers is striking. It is likely that this convergence in answers is due partly to the norm-setting effect resulting from the involvement of police officers in the PARP. Although we cannot draw conclusions about the concrete impact of norm acceptance on behaviour, it is probably safe to conclude that people who support particular norms will show different day-to-day behaviour. Box 6.1, below, contains examples of comments about the project's perceived positive impacts.

Box 6.1: Quotes on the Perceived Impact of the PARP

'Well, there are a number of positive changes . . . For instance as a result of the PARP project with HURINET-U impunity is no longer there and service delivery has improved especially in the areas of detention of suspects for long hours, torture of suspects, and corruption.' (Regional Police Commander, Bushenyi district)

'Cases of torture of suspects have reduced. Police officers now respect the law, have customer care and handle suspects better.' (Acting District Police Commander, Kabale district)

'More citizens know their rights and entitlements and can engage police officers on this. For example, it is common knowledge that police bond is free. More still, the intervention has bridged the gap between police and the citizens, and today, more private citizens can demand accountability from the police. More still, civil society can better engage with police as stakeholders to enforce the implementation of the desired human rights standards.' (Officer in Charge of the Criminal Investigation Department, Kabarole district)

'Police are more inclined to their mandate of protecting people and their property than ever before. This has been enhanced with public sensitization through the print and electronic media on citizen awareness campaigns.' (Regional Police Commander, Kabarole district)

'The project taught me to be accountable, to improve on service delivery, to improve on democratic governance; that whatever you do, you should do it democratically. Even while talking, we need to talk to people like we do to our masters, we should not shout at them. If public officers know that people are our masters, then we would never abuse them.' (Officer in Charge of the Criminal Investigation Department, Mbarara district)

Possibly, comments on 'ideal practices' in daily police operations and suggestions on improvements to the quality of policing may, to some extent, reflect officers' normative conviction about proper police behaviour. In a way, these can be seen as validation of what the PARP claimed to have brought about. In this respect, the comment of one of the interviewees, who was stationed in the PARP district Mbarara, is relevant: 'I did not go for those trainings but on the side of respecting human rights, I have seen a change in people who went for those courses. They now know what human rights means; there is now less violation of human rights' (District Police Commander, Mbarara district). Some typical examples of best practices and suggestions for improving the quality of policing are presented in Box 6.2, below.

Box 6.2: Quotes on Best Practices and Quality Improvement

'The procedure of handling crimes begins with a report about a crime from members of the public, or media, or police officer. The complaint is then registered and investigations begin within a few hours and a response is made within a short time. The maximum time it should take is two days.' (Comment about best practice, Officer in Charge of the Criminal Investigation Department, Kabale district)

'There are a number of areas of improvement within the police force. And such areas basically include the following: human rights; training the different officers in the area of forensic investigation; crime management and investigation; public relations.' (Comment

about quality improvement, Acting District Police Commander/Officer in Charge of the Criminal Investigations Department, Bushenyi district)

'When I go for radio talk shows as well as meeting villagers where crimes are committed, I observe we need crime preventers within the villages. We also need to bridge the gap between community and police by having enough community liaison officers.' (Comment about quality improvement, District Police Commander, Mbarara district)

In contrast to police officers stationed in PARP districts, officers from other stations tended to answer the questions about best practices and improving the quality of policing more in terms of technical solutions to the concrete problems experienced by the police, as well as the need to train police officers through refresher courses and similar activities.

The interviews also addressed the role of civil-society organizations, such as HURINET-U, and the perception of such organizations by police officers. Some officers commented that the PARP had taught the police about civil-society organizations, and particularly about the fact that the latter should not be seen as adversaries but as partners, whose activities can benefit the work of the police. Comments related to civil-society organizations mainly addressed their potential contributions to police work. Interviewees indicated that the work of civil-society organizations may enhance the transparency of police activities, contribute to the learning capacity and improved functioning of police officers, make citizens aware of their entitlements and the mandate of the police, strengthen oversight over the behaviour of police officers, and create a better relationship between citizens and the police.

6. Conclusions

This chapter has approached the issue of police accountability not just from a formal perspective, which would have zoomed in on the 'answerability' of the police, but has also focused on the special position of the police – deriving from 'the paradox of violence' – and argued that police accountability should include normative and moral aspects of the relationship between the police and the public.

The Ugandan NGO, HURINET-U, attempted to enhance police accountability by engaging the Netherlands Embassy in Uganda to fund a project that involved police officers across 13 districts in the country. The Police Accountability and Reform Project (PARP) targeted the Ugandan police, alongside a host of other important actors drawn from Ugandan society and

politics. Project activities involved dialogues between police and civil-society organizations, including representatives from the media, as well as a variety of broader outreach activities aimed at the Ugandan people at large.

Our case study of the PARP was aimed at assessing the impact of accountability measures at the level of individual police officers. The methodological assumption, based on a logic of differences, was that the impact of the project would be demonstrable by comparing the attitudes of police officers in participating and non-participating districts. Through a survey involving 600 officers, we tried to assess differences in attitudes with respect to integrity dilemmas in everyday police work. The interviews related to various aspects of police behaviour, including respect for human rights, treatment of suspects and police–community interaction. Both instruments demonstrate how the PARP impacted on police officers' attitudes in relation to their policing activities. The survey showed a marked difference between officers in PARP and non-PARP districts, which led to the conclusion that the project left an impact on police officers' attitudes to integrity issues. Similarly, the interviews demonstrated enhanced awareness of important accountability issues, related to the treatment of civilians and their rights, differentiating officers from participating and non-participating districts.

Our case study has illustrated how the attention among public service providers to accountability issues may impact on the attitude of people working in the public service. The difficult case of the police in Uganda shows that the attitudes of police officers appear to be malleable when there is focused attention on the roles and responsibilities of public servants. Attitudinal change is by no means a *sufficient* condition for behavioural change, as the latter is co-determined by a range of other factors – including control and command structures within the police, and the use of the police force for political objectives. Thus, accountability projects such as the PARP should not be judged only by their immediate impact on behaviour. Projects like these may have an impact on attitudes towards the accountability of service providers, and such attitudinal changes are undoubtedly a *necessary* condition for alterations in police operations. In this sense, the potential effect of accountability projects should not be underestimated as they could hold great benefit for the lives of ordinary citizens.

Notes

1 This chapter is based on research conducted for the Policy and Operations Evaluation Department (IOB) of the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs (see Hout et al. 2016). We acknowledge Jonathan Fisher's contribution on the Ugandan context, which we draw on in Section 3.

2 We did not include districts in northern Uganda because these had been affected by major conflicts until 2006, and thus were hardly involved in programmes aiming at governance reform.

3 This section contains a condensed report of the findings; more detail is given in Wagner et al. (2020).

4 The vignettes addressed the following forms of police misconduct:
a) personal services rendered to a supervisor;
b) the protection of a fellow police officer who was found drunk;
c) the acceptance of gift while on duty;
d) the acceptance of a bribe for not pursuing the investigation of a traffic incident;
e) the removal of money from a wallet found in the street;
f) the removal of goods from a burglary site for personal use;
g) the failure to accept a complaint form at a police station;
h) the arrest of a complainant to protect a befriended police officer;
i) the failure to register a report on domestic violence;
j) the failure to detain a murder suspect;
k) the violent arrest and mistreatment of a burglar; and
l) the violent repression of a peaceful demonstration.

The full versions of the vignettes are reported in Hout et al. (2016: 136–7).

5 We had initially planned 24 interviews across eight districts. One interviewee, however, dropped out, and the work schedule did not allow the replacement of this police officer.

6 Two police officers indicated they had been posted to PARP districts only recently, and were not able to comment on the possible impact of the project.

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