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*Cross-Border Philanthropy in the Islamic World:
From Europe to North Africa and the Middle East (MENA)*

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- Lucas C. P. M. Meijs and Malika Ouacha
Special Issue Guest Editors

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INTRODUCTION

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A well-known form of cross-border philanthropy, remittances, was traditionally done to help modernize migrants' home-countries in economic and social ways. These acts of giving were, one: faith-based, two: international, and three: done from a secular social context towards an (Islamic) faith-based society. However, over the last two decades, we have seen such acts lead to a still under-examined understanding of cross-border philanthropy. Expanding this understanding through this special issue led to the distinction of three key elements: the fundament of cross-border philanthropy (religious or secular), its influence on the local, regional and global civil society (social geography) and finally the importance of religious norms and values (societal opposites). Each part of this ternary influences the other parts which makes it impossible to examine one without including the other. The introduction of the special issue 'Cross-Border Philanthropy in the Islamic World: from Europe to Middle East and North Africa (MENA)' draws a brief preface of the constant ternary connection of which each part is further examined in the articles within this special issue.

Keywords: philanthropy in Europe vs Islamic societies: secular, faith-based and cross-border

As the act of cross-border philanthropy has been broadening out over the last few decades, it is important to first dive into one of the important units that led the examination of cross-border philanthropy in the first place: migration. Nyberg Sorensen's argument (2014) on the extensive amount of capital, such as remittances, performed towards the home-countries of these migrants' communities, challenges us to examine several actors involved in this form of philanthropy. This includes the

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parties on both sides of the act of philanthropy and their fundaments for philanthropy. While the giving party may act from a religious point of view, the receiving end may not share the same perspective. As the other way around is also possible, we argue that an examination of possible differences or similarities of the philanthropic fundament is crucial. Bommes et. al, state that, “throughout the 19th and 20th century, Western Europe dealt with several migration flows from North Africa and the Middle East (MENA). While these patterns of migration differ greatly across countries and times, they are closely linked to migration flows to other geographical regions, in particular the Gulf States” (Bommes et al., 2015, p. 20). De Haas illustrates this in his comparative overview of the Euro-Mediterranean migration history and future, exemplified by the cases of Morocco, Egypt and Turkey (De Haas, 2015).

As De Haas demonstrates, “migration from the MENA region to Europe started with post-colonial migration from Morocco to France in the 1950’s, which was followed by guest-worker migration from Morocco and Turkey to several Western European destinations. This was the case up until the oil crisis in 1973 that led to a recruitment stop in European countries. This recruitment stop also marked the beginning of growing labor migration, in particular from Egypt to the Arab Gulf countries up until the 1991 Gulf War that led to massive repatriations from this region” (De Haas, 2003). “Migration from Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia and, especially, from Turkey, to Europe continued both as family and as asylum migration. Destinations diversified – in particular for Moroccans, who have increasingly also moved to Southern Europe. In addition, Turkish migration has also been directed to the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) since the 1990s” (Bommes et al. 2015, p. 21). De Haas explores three factors as “decisive for migration patterns: political and economic developments, such as the 1973 oil crisis or the 1991 Gulf War, differentials in economic and social opportunities between sending and receiving countries, and path dependence in the sense that immigrants tend to follow the routes laid out by pioneers” (De Haas, 2015). The latter two will be further addressed in this introduction chapter and later on in Ouacha’s article “Diasporic volunteering in cross-national perspective: is faith-based more effective than secular philanthropy? A case of the Netherlands and Morocco”.

As stated earlier by De Haas (2003), it is fair to consider migration as one of the starting points of cross-border philanthropy. However, the “fundamental assumption of migration-systems theory is that migration alters the social, cultural, economic and institutional conditions at both the sending and receiving ends – that is, the entire developmental space within which migration processes operate” (De

Haas 2003). Mabogunje (1970), the founder of migration-systems theory, defined a “migration system as a set of places, linked by flows and counterflows of people, goods, services and information, which tend to facilitate further exchange, including migration, between the places.” Or in our field of interests, between both the giving and receiving parties in a cross-border context. But, where Mabogunje focused on rural-urban migration within the African continent, Portes and Böröcz (1987) and Kritz, Lim and Zlotnik (1992) extended this to international migration.

“International migration systems consist of countries, or rather places within different countries that exchange relatively large numbers of migrants, and are also characterized by feedback mechanisms that connect the movement of people between particular countries, areas and even cities to the concomitant flows of goods, remittances, ideas and information” (Fawcett, 1989; Gurak & Caces, 1992; Massey et al., 1998). Mabogunje (1970) stressed “the role of feedback mechanisms through which information about the migrants’ reception and situation at the destination is transmitted back to the place of origin. Thus facilitating subsequent movements and leading to almost-organized migratory flows between particular places, regions and countries. While pioneer migrants were often among the relatively well-off, this information flow made international migration more accessible to other groups”. Money sent back to families from migrant-sending communities “increased the feeling of relative deprivation among non-migrants. This subsequently increased aspirations to migrate as a way to achieve upward socio-economic mobility” (De Haas, 2003; Quinn, 2006). “Besides this motivational effect, remittances may also be directly used to finance the migration of other family and community members” (Van Dalen et al., 2005) or to help improve their livelihoods in the country of origin.

Over the last two decades, this motivational effect has expanded, which resulted in the act of remittances to help improve the livelihoods of others besides family and community-members in the countries of origin. The difference here is that such philanthropic acts are committed not by pioneer migrants, but by the diaspora that found its existence in the meantime. Such philanthropic acts are not only driven by personal cultural heritage, but also by personal Islamic motives in a non-Islamic societal context (e.g. the Western European countries). The latter will be further explored in the next paragraph, along with the Islamic inspired social engagement within the context of both Europe’ and the MENA’ civil societies. We will do this by further extending the position the cross-border philanthropy of the MENA diaspora in Western Europe on a global civil scale.

Before we explore the diversity of actors in Europe's and the MENA's civil societies and the fundament of their volunteering and philanthropy, it is important to clarify the meaning of our use of terminology and that of actors engaged in the act of cross-border philanthropy we aim to examine.

As Miller states: "clear thinking about philanthropy requires us to define it—to specify the boundaries between motives, means, and objectives that are truly philanthropic and those that are not. Any proper definition must pay attention to how the term "philanthropy" has been applied in practice, and yet, description alone cannot suffice" (Miller, 2006, p. 52). According to Sulek, "the precise meaning of *philanthrôpia* in ancient Greek has received relatively little attention in the scholarly literature of philanthropic studies" (2010, p. 385). As we aim to examine different types of philanthropy, which will all be clarified throughout the issue, the main definition must be stated. Here we follow the statement of Sulek. "*Philanthrôpia* is a compound word, composed of the root words *phileô* and *anthrôpos*. The particular aspect of love usually signified by *phileô* is affectionate regard or friendship. *Phileô* represents one of four major word groups usually employed in ancient Greek to express the concepts of love, attraction, or desire; the other three being *eros*, *stergô*, and *agape*" (Sandys, 1868). *Eros* is "the most all-encompassing form of love, whereas *stergô* tends to signify the form of love encompassed by the concepts of loyalty or liking, and *agape*, finally, tends to signify brotherly love. *Anthrôpos*, on the other hand, "is the generic word for "humankind," signifying human beings in the widest sense of the word, including both men and women, civilized and barbarian, master and slave" (Sandys, 1868).

"The classical Greeks believed the word *anthrôpos* derived from the phrase *anathrôn-ha-opôpe*, which translates as "one who observes closely what he has seen"" (Plato, 1997, *Cratylus*, 399d). Through a brief etymological historical overview, "it is clear that the use and meaning of *philanthrôpia* evolved considerably between the mid-5th and late 4th centuries BCE", according to Sulek (2010, p. 395). Through a brief survey of contemporary academic definitions of philanthropy, Sulek adds that "a number of disagreements are discerned as to the precise meaning of philanthropy in the modern era, even among the leading scholars in the field of philanthropic studies. In particular, there is fundamental disagreement over whether philanthropy is voluntary, or whether it is compelled by factors such as moral restraints, social obligations, and the like. Whether philanthropy serves a public purpose, a public good, a charitable need, or simply a communicated want or desire, whether philanthropy is an intent to achieve a particular aim, the

actual attainment of that aim, or just simply a private act of giving”. Sulek’s survey also reveals “a significant degree of divergence between the academic meaning of philanthropy intended by most scholars and how it is generally understood by society at large. Although donating money to charity is an aspect of philanthropy recognized in both common and academic usage, the predominance of this particular aspect in common parlance is considered to be a more recent development” (2010, p. 203).

To summarize, our examination of differences and similarities of cross-border philanthropy fundamentals leads to the discussion on secular vs faith based. Besides the definition of Sulek, which we apply further in this introduction chapter, we discuss secular philanthropy by using the more widely accepted definition employed by Salamon (1992). He defines philanthropy “as the private giving of time or valuables (money, security, property) for public purposes. He states that philanthropy is characterized as one form of income of private non-profit organizations” (1992, p. 10). The use of the term within faith-based philanthropy comes from the religious, Islamic approach which will be further examined in the second paragraph of this introduction chapter. Examining philanthropic fundamentals also leads to examining social geographical contexts. The form of cross-border philanthropy under examination in this special issue is performed by those in one social context (Western Europe) and received by those in another (the Mena). According to Macdonald and De Borms (2008), Europe’s philanthropic landscape can be scattered in four models. These models are described in the next paragraph. Such models bring along an important set of questions related to the importance of the further examination of social geography.

Social geography: local, regional and international cross-border philanthropy

As mentioned earlier, our special issue examines both the context of the giving as that of the receiving ends of cross-border philanthropy. The first contains the European context, which according to Macdonald and de Borms “can be divided in four models, beginning with the Anglo-Saxon model. In Anglo-Saxon societies, civil society organizations (CSOs) are viewed as being a counterweight to government and the state” (2008, p. 19). In an ideal world, “they foster pluralism in their societies and cast themselves in the role of critics of the state and advocates of reform. There is usually a strong culture of volunteerism, and foundations support civil society and fund issues that governments

do not. There is also an enabling legal and fiscal infrastructure that encourages donations and gifts. The most obvious examples are the United States and the United Kingdom” (Macdonald & de Broms 2008, p. 18).

Second, “the Rhine model. This includes Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands and is characterized by strong CSOs that are institution like and often receive contracts from the state in a form of ‘societal corporatism’, rather than operating as a counterweight to the state. They function much like subcontractors in sectors such as healthcare and education. Paradoxically, they are independent from the state, but predominantly publicly funded. Because of this interdependent relationship and dependence on government funding, the fiscal and legal climate does not strongly favor donations and gifts. In this space, foundations within the context of overall Europe, are only recently being recognized as important players, particularly corporate foundations” (Macdonald & de Broms 2008, p. 19).

Third, “the Latin/Mediterranean model. Here the role of the state is strong with a clear division between church and state. Traditionally, the church does charity work and the state is responsible for delivering goods and social services. The state is a strong economic actor and the relationship between the state and market is different from that in other models. CSOs face a challenge in being accepted as independent and autonomous. There is an effort to control organizations and associations politically, either through representation on boards or by legal measures, such as what happened in Italy with the attempt to bring the banking foundations under political control. Gifts and donations are not encouraged by the fiscal system and volunteerism is viewed as a threat to the job market. Foundations have difficulty moving into their role of complementarity. Supporting and funding what government does not, thereby fostering pluralism in civil society because when they move into what is perceived as political territory, they are challenged by politicians who question their mandate” (Macdonald & de Broms 2008, p. 19).

Finally, “the Scandinavian model where the state traditionally plays a strong role, but because of the Protestant roots in these countries, personal initiative is viewed as a positive. There is a strong welfare state, but at the same time volunteerism is a powerful force. CSOs typically thrive and fulfil a complementarity role to bridge the gaps in the system. Civil society often identifies a need, which is later filled by government. Gifts and donations are not strongly promoted in the fiscal system. In this environment, foundations have a very strong relationship with

government and government agencies” (Macdonald & de Broms 2008, p. 19).

Linked to these different models, Macdonald and De Broms also argue “the need of diversifying the applicability of concepts such as social justice, social economy, social entrepreneurship, leadership, community and volunteer work” (2008, p. 19). They state that “these are not necessarily understood in the same way in different parts of Europe, whether it be in the north, south, east or west. At the same time, the lingua franca is often being simplified into a type of shorthand, which risks leaving out nuances and meanings behind it (2008, p. 19).” Broms and Macdonald advocate for “the need to be consciously aware of this intercultural learning challenge as we branch out into doing cross-border or international work” (idem). This specific argument points directly to the second gap in scientific literature that we aim to address in this special issue, which is the further examination of cross-border philanthropy from Europe to the MENA on the influence on the local, regional and global civil society. As both continents share a philanthropic flow coming from a (post) colonial resource, e.g. France to their previous colonies, such as Morocco and Algeria, Werbner argues that the latter were an ideal territory for western European countries in which several philanthropic projects could take place (2010).

Throughout the twentieth century, literature has shown that such forms of philanthropy were either established by the colonial force themselves, or by the diaspora that found its existence within the migration from the colonies to the country of the colonizer. Examples are philanthropic projects taking place in Pakistan, which are a predictable process, according to Werbner (2010). By taking Pakistani migrant-settlers in Britain as an example, Werbner argues that “the social formation of a diaspora replicates itself transnationally. Yet, it is not the product of any central organizing force able to control the multiple goals pursued by local diaspora communities through a philanthropic project. Diasporic philanthropic organizations retain their autonomy along with a capacity to switch agendas and shift orientations in response to local predicaments or world historical events” (2010, p. 121).

In our special issue, the term cross-border philanthropy is used in two ways. First, to refer to diasporic philanthropic projects from one (European) country to the other (one of the countries in the MENA), which is often a country of origin. Second, to also refer to philanthropic projects done by actors in the national civil field, towards a culturally different context within the same region. This will be elaborated and further examined in Ouacha’ article.

We find it remarkable when a colonial past is absent between a Western country and the MENA, cross-border philanthropic projects still take place in a cross-national philanthropic field. This is the case with both secular and faith-based philanthropic projects. The only difference with cross-border philanthropy in the MENA is that the first often include a post-colonial or neo-colonial sentiment (e.g. see Werbner, 2002). By analyzing several projects of both secular and faith-based philanthropists in the MENA, we noticed a gap in the available literature on cross-border philanthropy. To the best of our knowledge, much of the focus in current available literature is cross-border Muslim philanthropy within the context of the MENA region. Here we specifically refer to several forms of philanthropy coming from a Muslim country to another. Aid from the Gulf to North Africa might be more accurate, due to the societal faith-based norms and values in the Gulf and the region. The same argument cannot simply be used for the types of philanthropy work of Muslims living in Europe even if their goals of philanthropy are in the MENA. It is, however, important to take into account the extensive colonial past France has with Morocco, Algeria and Lebanon (Ennaji, 2011). Yet, our explorative empirical research, which will be further examined in Ouacha's article, also indicates a flow of philanthropy work from the Netherlands to North Africa, geographical regions without a colonial past, done by young Muslim philanthropists. Due to the migration history of these philanthropists and their act of zakat, their projects will be referred to as diasporic philanthropic Islamic organizations. By differentiating philanthropy through the examination of its fundamental base, using the earlier mentioned definition of Salamon (1992), the third part of our examined ternary is addressed in the next section. Namely, the importance of religious norms and values (societal opposites). We will do this by first exploring to which degree religion can influence the form of faith-based philanthropy.

In increasingly plural societies with rising immigration and crossings of ethnicities, cultures and religions in a Western context, the question of "what brings societies together and communities closer has entered the political discourse once again" (Hann 1996). As Hann suggests "debates about civil society are closely linked to other debates: about modernity itself, about individualism, culturalism, pluralism and the boundaries between public and private" (Hann, 1996, p. 6). However, as each paper in this special issue takes part in the discussion on the influence of religion on faith-based philanthropy (e.g. see May, 2019) from a different but important angle, it is also fair to briefly discuss the presence of Islam in Europe and its civil society. This is mainly because of the faith-based Islamic motif we see amongst cross-border

philanthropists discussed in the included articles of this special issue. Before we explore the presence of Islam in post-modern Europe and the religion of Islam as a crucial motive of the diasporic philanthropy projects this special issue examines, it is important to first discuss the presence of Islam in Europe before the growth of the MENA diaspora since the 1960s.

The illusion of an Islam-absent European civil society

As stated by Nordbruch and Ryad (2014), “Muslims in Europe during the interwar period (1918-1939) were no passive strangers to local politics and public debate. Like their non-Muslim European peers of that period, many intellectuals and activists among them had a variety of ways to articulate, such as letters, memoirs, and newspapers. Besides, they actively engaged with European and international institutions, social actors, and political movements—all while their politics and networking were subject to local influences and restrictions” (Nordbruch & Ryad, 2014, p. 6). In a similar way, during these years, “the local interwar European controversies and prevailing social and political concerns impacted the intellectual outlook and political visions formulated by Muslim thinkers. The ideas and visions formulated by Muslims in interwar Europe were closely related to prevailing discourses in Muslim societies. Most Muslim political mediators chose Switzerland, Germany, Britain, and France as points of departure for their political mobility. Germany in particular offered many of them an exceptional opportunity for fraternal ties after World War I. North African political actors in Europe were also able to build long-standing ties with many French and Spanish socialists and anti-imperialist activists. In the meantime, through the establishment of journals and newspapers in Europe and enormous contributions to the Arab and Muslim press, Muslims participated in the popularization of the European political, socioreligious and intellectual thought in the wider Muslim world” (idem). The intercultural and interreligious correspondence between Europe and the MENA are therefore not unexamined territory. However, when examining similar correspondence within the field of philanthropy and Europe’s civil society, we have noticed an important gap in academic literature to which we aim to contribute through this special issue.

In her examination of zakat and Sadaqah, as two forms of Islamic philanthropy, May (2019) stated that “when exploring both forms, it is important to address the differences between the two”. In her work on Islamic charity in the case of the UK, she explains that “zakat,

as an individual obligation, does not require a third party for its completion. In recent tradition, it is far more common, particularly for followers of Sunnism, to privately and discreetly distribute zakat to those they are acutely aware are of need. There are therefore no accurate official national, let alone global, figures to provide the financial flows derived from zakat. Nonetheless, it is possible to gather generalized estimates of financial flows” (May, 2019, p. 9). Combined, “zakat and sadaqah are thought to run into the millions of British pounds across the UK” (May 2019, p. 9).

“Fadi Itani (currently Deputy Director General, Qatar Charity¹) estimated that worldwide zakat and sadaqah collections were approximately £130 billion (Itani, 2012). Another respondent from the Muslim World League based in London estimated that annual zakat collections within the UK alone stand at around £140 million, while another charity spokesman believed zakat funds distributed worldwide to be higher than global international aid (Itani 2012). The bases for these estimates were not however expanded upon, and as Fadi Itani later commented (while Chief Executive Officer of Zakat House in 2013), his own estimate was a ‘calculated guess’” (May, 2019, p. 8). “While exact figures are impossible to state due to the often private nature of alms giving, financial data is widely available via donation centers such as mosques, national charities and overseas relief agencies, all of which are legally bound to publicize annual financial reports. New Muslim immigrants and first generations born within the UK are thought to widely distribute zakat to extended family members, ‘neighbors’ and people in need in the towns and villages of the ‘homeland’” (May 2019, p. 9). This is similar to the earlier mentioned act of remittances. Much of zakat finances, also discussed in this special issue, are therefore subsumed under general ‘remittances’.

Nonetheless, “as ties to homelands weaken over generations, extended families are lifted from absolute poverty and ties to Britain and local communities harden, the practices of zakat are beginning to alter as more and more British born Muslims prefer to distribute zakat in their local lived communities and/or overseas for emergency relief and other such projects irrespective of links to ‘homelands’” (May 2019, p. 9). “Public expressions of religion in secular society has traditionally been viewed with suspicion if not downright hostility. In classical secularization theory, religion is relegated to the private sphere thus a public expression of religiosity is viewed as religion seeping out of its marginalized role and a potential danger to the pluralism and tolerance

¹ Fadi Itani OBE (@elitanifadi) / Twitter

of ‘civilized’ society. Simultaneously, the role of religion in welfare provision and charitable purposes are thread through British history and recognized as fulfilling an important role in the emergence of civil society” (May 2019, p. 9).

Not all Muslim charities cater for the giving of zakat as the obligations and constraints are fairly restrictive and many require religious scholars’ validation to be considered legitimate. Even then, the charities that do collect zakat do not always publish the amounts/percentages that are collected as specifically zakat nor are they required to under the Charity Commission and OSCR current legislations. More often zakat donations are recorded under the ‘secular’ categories of ‘restricted’ funds in contrast to ‘unrestricted’ funds (differentiating between donors who allow their monies to be spent on general charity and those who have donated for specific projects such as ‘water’, ‘orphanages’, ‘flood relief’ or specified geographies etc.). However, many charities retain their own private records regarding the amount of donations for different funds.

Our special issue contains articles in which further research has been done on the effect of these two forms of Islamic philanthropy through a comparison with secular philanthropy, all within the context of Western Europe and the MENA. As it is a well-known fact that most countries, belonging to the MENA, are faith based Islamic nation-states (see Nordbruch, et al., 2014), the civil society as a whole also holds secular flows of philanthropy besides the faith based ones. This will be further examined in our special issue by addressing the importance of religious norms and values of both the giving and the receiving end of cross-border philanthropy in different national contexts within Western Europe, e.g. in the article of Merve Reyhan Kayikci, or the MENA, e.g. in the articles of Marwan Abu-Ghazaleh Mahajneh, Itay Greenspan, and Muhammad M. Haj-Yahia, and Haneen Magadlah and Ram Cnaan. Or in the combination of both demonstrated in the article of Malika Ouacha. This is done through the overall raised questions such as: does cross-border philanthropy influence local, regional and international philanthropic landscapes? If so, what are the important variables and how can one recognize this influence? And if not, why is the act of cross-border philanthropy still done in great numbers (see Nyberg- Sorensen, 2020)?

Conclusion

To summarize, over the last few decades, much research has been done on cross-border philanthropy between several countries. Yet, it is to the

best of our knowledge, that both an empirical and theoretical gap exist in the examination of flows of philanthropy between countries that do not share historical events, such as colonialism, and societal sources of norms and values, such as religion. The Netherlands and Morocco are examples of such countries that do not share a colonial past, and so are Belgium and Tunisia. The diasporic philanthropy, as a result of migration, is one of the flows that has created these international bridges. It is interesting to further examine whether the receiving end in the diasporic flow of philanthropy is less receptive to this type cross-border aid than they are to aid coming from the nations own civil society or post-colonial sources (E.g. British resources in the context of Egypt and French resources in the case of Algeria and Morocco). We will do this through a theoretical ternary: the fundament of cross-border philanthropy (faith-based or secular), its influence on the local, regional and global civil society (social geography) and finally the importance of religious norms and values (societal opposites). However, challenging times such as the COVID-19 pandemic could be a disruptive influence on such international, diasporic aid. However, from several empirical data sets presented in the studies included in this special issue, the conclusion for the opposite can be made, as cross-border philanthropic projects from Europe to the MENA never stopped.

Before we present the research articles related to our overall topic of cross-border philanthropy in the MENA, we think invite our readers to critically think along with two important extensive works. By starting off our special issue with two book-review chapters that provide both a present and historical overview of insights on how to further broaden (and examine) cross-border philanthropy in the Islamic world, that are written by the authors themselves, we hope our readers are set off on the right foot to further read the special issue. The first is done by Sabith Khan and Debra Merrit through their book 'Remittances and International Development: The Invisible Forces Shaping Community' (2020). And the second by Amy Singer, through her work 'Charity in Islamic Societies - Themes in Islamic History' (2008). These two review-chapters will be followed up by the works of the following contributing scholars: Merve Reyhan Kayikci, with her research on 'The experiences of the female Muslim volunteers in Belgium in terms of how volunteering is an endeavor of ethical self-making', Marwan Abu-Ghazaleh Mahajneh, Itay Greenspan, and Muhammad M. Haj-Yahia on 'Zakat Giving to Non-Muslims: Muftis' Attitudes in Arab and Non-Arab Countries', Ram Cnaan and Haneen Magadlah on 'the Israeli-Palestinian Muslims in the Service of People in the Occupied Territories', and finally Malika Ouacha with her article 'Diasporic volunteering in cross-

national perspective: is faith-based more effective than secular philanthropy? A case of the Netherlands and Morocco’.

As mentioned earlier, each author contributes to the overall topic, in their own way, within their own context of research. In table 1, we have separated the topics of the articles in this special issue according to the earlier mentioned ternary of our examination of cross-border philanthropy: the fundament of cross-border philanthropy (religious or secular), its influence on the local, regional and global civil society (social geography) and finally the importance of religious norms and values (societal opposites).

Table 1

Article	The theoretical and practical fundament of cross-border philanthropy (religious or secular)	The influence of cross-border philanthropy on the local, regional and global civil society (social geography)	The importance of religious norms and values (societal opposites)
Book review Amy Singer (2008) <i>Charity in Islamic Societies - Themes in Islamic History</i>	X		X
Book review Sabith Khan & Daisha M. Merritt (2020) <i>Remittances and International Development: The Invisible Forces Shaping Community</i>	X	X	
Merve Reyhan Kayikci - <i>The experiences of the female Muslim volunteers in Belgium</i>	X		X

<i>in terms of how volunteering is an endeavor of ethical self-making</i>			
Marwan Abu-Ghazaleh Mahajneh, Itay Greenspan, and Muhammad M. Haj-Yahia - <i>Attitudes towards “Zakat” giving to non-Muslims: Comparison of Muftis in Arab and non-Arab countries</i>	X	X	
Ram Cnaan & Haneen Magadlah - <i>Muslim devotion in cross-border philanthropy between Israel and Palestinian authority during the COVID-19 pandemic</i>		X	X
Malika Ouacha - <i>Faith based vs Secular philanthropy and volunteering in cross-national perspective (the bridge between the Netherlands and Morocco)</i>	X	X	

None of the articles covers the ternary as a whole. The visible gaps in figure 1 demonstrate the several layers of the gap we aim to fill together and in the future. Therefore, it is important to mention that this special issue is part of a growing and developing knowledge agenda on cross-border philanthropy. Some articles in this special issue touch upon one or two variables of the ternary. At the same time, awareness is created on the importance of the further examination of the other elements of the

ternary for cross-border philanthropy. This overall comes together in the collective aim of this special issue, which is to provide us with a deeper knowledge and understanding of several layers of cross-border philanthropy and therefore of the global civil field.

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REFLECTIONS ON RE-READING “CHARITY IN ISLAMIC SOCIETIES”

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This book review responds to an invitation to reflect on a book I wrote over a decade ago. Such a valuable opportunity allows me to reflect on how a book has stood the test of time: to think about what still seems useful or valid; to consider what was left out or new aspects that could be added; or suggest other books that can be written. In preparation for writing this book review, I re-read the book entirely, probably for the first time since completing the proofs, and also read through many of the reviews that appeared.

At the time the book was published, I wrote in the preface:

“I began this book convinced that the study of charity and philanthropy offers profound insights into the nature of human societies and historical change. At its conclusion, I remain equally persuaded that this is the case.” (CIS, ix)

Nothing I have learned in the interim has changed my appreciation for the historical insights to be gained by considering what and how people give voluntarily of their material wealth, their time, and their expertise for the benefit of other living beings. The topic touches on virtually every aspect of the human experience and it offers a universal framework for the comparative study of human societies and historical change. However, my starting point for the book was the idea that the central role of charity in the ideals of Islam and the enormous repertoire of practices associated with it from around the globe and across time requires that anyone seeking to understand Islam and Muslims pay attention to these

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and not dismiss them as being of secondary importance, or, worse, none at all.

One question implicit in this reconsideration of a middle-aged work is whether the book is still worth reading for a basic understanding of charity as part of Muslim beliefs and practices, and in order to appreciate how examples of these are important to include in discussions of charity in other belief systems and faith practices, as well in the context of secular practices of giving. To this, I would answer “yes,” but the book is also just as incomplete as it was when it first appeared in 2008. It was never intended to be a comprehensive and conclusive discussion but rather a starting point for people approaching the topic from two directions: 1) people interested in charity and philanthropy who are unfamiliar with Islam or about how charity is articulated or practiced in Muslim contexts; 2) people interested in Islam who would like to know something about how the study of charity and philanthropy has developed, what issues have framed its study in other cultures and histories, and what these can offer to the comparative study or theoretical modeling of charity.

Charity in Islamic Societies does seem dated in one particular dimension: the volume of research that has appeared in the interim could be the basis for other synthetic books, perhaps to address specific aspects, places or periods in the history of Islamic societies. The book can still serve as a useful introductory framework to the topic, and I plan to use it in an upcoming course, partly instead of lectures in order to free up class time to focus on some of the rich bibliography of work that has appeared since the book was published. These newer works further illustrate and amplify the basic frameworks discussed in the book. They also take the discussion to new geographies and social contexts; explore more closely the way charitable practices have developed in the late twentieth and early twenty-first century, as well as in earlier eras; and integrate individual or NGO giving to a broader critique of the social and economic impact of more recent neo-liberal economic and political policies. The study of humanitarianism and the early initiatives of global humanitarian organizations in the early twentieth century have claimed significant space in this growing bibliography. Notably, more recent research is also grounded in a growing array of disciplines, even as it takes advantage of the more porous boundaries among disciplines to develop new interdisciplinary approaches.

Together, these expand the analytic approaches and theoretical frameworks for making sense of the emerging volume of empirical work.

When Patricia Crone and Marigold Acland first approached me about writing this book in the late 1990s, I had already spent almost a

decade exploring the practice of endowed charitable foundations (*waqf/awqāf*). My first encounter was, literally, at ground level, with the villages whose revenues were defined as “belonging to the waqf of . . .”. The villages in question were Palestinian and the revenues they contributed to the endowments came mostly from the fields and flocks of local peasants to support institutions in the *Haramayn* – Mecca and Medina, Jerusalem and Hebron. These included mosques, schools, dervish lodges, fountains, and baths, as well as many other endowments in local towns. Gradually, it became clear that the specific Ottoman-Palestinian shapes of the *awqāf* were merely the local versions of institutions and beneficiaries supported by endowments across the geographical space and chronological span of Islamic history, linked to an even larger world of non-Muslim endowment practices stretching around the globe from ancient to contemporary times.

Endowments in Islamic societies are only one expression of how Muslims make the voluntary donations recommended to them. Alongside the obligatory alms they are commanded to pay as core aspects of belief and practice, based on the teachings of the Quran. The religious obligation of Muslims to pay *zakat*, a combined form of annual revenue and wealth tax, is one means of transferring wealth within the Muslim community. *Sadaqah*, voluntary giving, is a practice permeating the texts and practices of Islamic theology, law, history and culture. Even now, I remember something of the overwhelming realization that the topic I had started with – endowments – was difficult to circumscribe or define as a discrete field of research because it touched virtually every other aspect of society and culture. Ironically, it was almost reassuring when I finally read Marcel Mauss’ *The Gift* (1967) for the first time and contemplated his proposition that reciprocal obligations and entitlements are embedded in any act of giving, and as a result constitute one of the essential social bonds in human societies. Whether one agrees or not with Mauss’ appreciation of the explanatory scope of relationships created through giving must give one pause.

Charity in Islamic Societies was thus partly conceived to convey the diversity of ideas and practices related to benevolent giving that were tied together through the language of Muslim belief and practice, while also pointing to the ways in which these beliefs and practices were the Muslim articulation of universal human social practices. More than any of my previous research, this project also impelled me to find colleagues working on any or all of its myriad aspects. In hindsight, Michael Bonner (1952-2019), Mine Ener (1965-2003) and I created a kind of laboratory without walls to bring together people whose research intersected around questions emerging from the study of obligatory and voluntary giving in

Islamic societies. Had we begun in the 2010s instead of the 1990s, we would surely have connected with a larger and more far-flung group, leveraging digital communications to exchange materials, meet and even publish. Instead, we relied on large annual conferences until finally organizing a symposium of our own. Without those occasions to learn about work in progress and explore ideas that were just coming together, I would never have had a sense of the scope of the topic nor kept up with the new directions and approaches of the increasing number of researchers who have become part of this conversation.

The book was also conceived in the late 1990s, when “Islamic charity” was increasingly mentioned in the popular press in connection with the funding of Islamist extremism. It was frustrating to be discovering a topic that suggested shared attitudes and practices among societies just as the public discourse positioned it as an instrument of hostility, division and violence. The impact of the September 11, 2001 attacks reinforced this framing and led to further demonization of Muslim charitable practices, as well as to emergency statutes that threatened donors who unknowingly gave to organizations or initiatives that might contribute to extremist actions at several removes from the original donors. It was this atmosphere that convinced me that the book could interest to both popular and academic audiences and offer a comparative context for thinking about charitable giving in Islamic societies.

Like parents for their children, we sometimes have outsized expectations of the impact our writing will have, as we can only control what we write and not who will read it nor how. In this regard, I was not quite Don Quixote but as the book reviews began to accumulate, it became clear that the book was not reaching the audiences I had hoped it might. Part of the problem, as I later discovered, was that the marketing department of Cambridge University Press (UK) had failed to send the book out for review even to any popular press outlet, nor even to some of the major journals in the fields of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies, and this despite my own dutiful listing for them of the publications to which it should be sent for review. It is common practice in the UK that major university and trade presses also send books of potential interest to a wider audience to the very widely read *Economist* and *Times Literary Supplement* for review. Had that been the case, the book might have attracted additional readers. This aside is not meant to castigate the Press, but rather to caution authors that no one is as interested in publicizing our work as we are, so the responsibility is on us to follow up at every stage of the pre- and post-publication process.

There was another factor shaping the conversation around charity and Islam just as *Charity in Islamic Societies* was being published. This one was also specific to Cambridge University Press and perhaps not unconnected to the lack of diligence shown by the press in publicizing my book. In the spring of 2007, the Saudi billionaire, Sheikh Khalid bin Mahfouz, sued (or threatened to sue) Cambridge University Press for libel, for what he asserted were false claims that his family had financed terrorism in Sudan and other places during the 1990s. The claims were made by J. Millard Burr and Robert O. Collins in their book *Alms for Jihad: Charity and Terrorism in the Islamic World* (2006), published by Cambridge. As a result of the lawsuit, the Press agreed to pulp 2300 copies remaining in its hands and to recall copies from booksellers and libraries to which the book had been sold, also producing an errata sheet for insertion in copies that were not returned, issuing a written apology to the Sheikh, and paying the legal fees of the case and an undisclosed sum in damages.¹ According to U.K. libel laws, the burden of proof in such cases falls on the defendant. In a case highlighting the difference between libel laws in the U.K. and the U.S., a similar lawsuit in California against Yale University Press for apparently false statements in the 2006 book *Hamas: Politics, Charity, and Terrorism in the Service of Jihad* by Matthew Levitt was dropped.² These cases illustrate the extent to which the topic was perceived to be one that could sustain several publications with sensational titles as well as reinforcing the widespread belief that Islamic charity was chiefly valuable as a natural and constant companion to Islamist political violence.

Clearly, the topic of charity in Islam was a hot one in the 2000s, but perhaps interest in the subject was judged to have been exhausted by the time a volume with the more innocuous title of *Charity in Islamic Societies* was published. It was a rather tame study in comparison with those that preceded it, and the people it discussed were mostly long dead.

When it did appear, the expected academic reviews of the book were largely positive, and it won a prize as the “Outstanding Book in

¹ In June 2021, this book is advertised on amazon.com as available for \$245 (used hardcover) or paperback (used from \$510.08 and new from \$596.02. At the time, I suggested to my own university library that they put the book on closed reserve in hopes of preventing it from being pilfered. In the catalog of Brandeis University, where I currently work, the book is listed as “lost” as of May 2008.

² An earlier book – Rachel Ehrenfeld, *Funding Evil: How Terrorism Is Financed – and How to Stop It*, Chicago: Bonus Books, 2003 – had also been attacked by bin Mahfouz. Rachel Donadio, “Libel Without Borders,” *New York Times Book Review* (Oct. 7, 2007): 43; Notice published by the ALA Intellectual Freedom Committee, Kenton L. Oliver, Chair, in *newsletter on international freedom*, Vol. LVI/no. 6 (November 2007), www.ala.org/nif (accessed June 15, 2021).

Nonprofit and Voluntary Action Research” (2010) from ARNOVA, the Association for Research on Nonprofit Organizations and Voluntary Action. Critics mostly acknowledged that the book does not pretend to be comprehensive but rather issues an invitation to contribute to an ongoing discussion and to address the lacunae as correctives so as to expand the boundaries of this field of inquiry. Many people liked the book, reading it as reasonably successful in its stated goals, which were:

“First, to raise the question of whether there is something identifiably Islamic in the ideologies and practices of charity in Islamic societies. Second, to demystify the nature and practice of Islamic charity for scholars, students, and interested readers at the beginning of the twenty-first century. Third, to confirm that the prism of charity is a fruitful one through which to examine the historical record of human activity and the engines of historical change. . . . Fourth, the book aimed to illustrate that the comparative study of charity contributes to exploring the differences and similarities between societies and their historical experiences. Fifth, this study . . . sought to attract students and scholars to the historical study of charity as a fruitful field of inquiry in the history of Islamic societies.”³

For those unfamiliar with the book, it may be useful to see a snapshot of its contents:

Introduction

- a. Introduction
 - b. What is charity?
 - c. Ideas about giving
 - d. Writing charity into history
 - e. Writing about charity in Islamic societies
 - f. The chapters
- 1. Pray and pay alms
 - a. Introduction
 - b. A story
 - c. What is zakat?
 - d. Calculating zakat

³ Amy Singer, *Charity in Islamic Societies* (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 217. For some of these reviews, see: Robert D. McChesney in *International Journal of Turkish Studies* 15/1-2 (2009): 150-152; Lisa Pollard, *English Historical Review* cxxvi, 519 (2011): 117-118; Elyse Semerdjian, *Journal of World History* 21, 3 (2010): 505-509.

- e. Payment and distribution
 - f. Intentions and rewards
 - g. Zakat al-fitr
 - 2. Even half a date
 - a. Introduction
 - b. Supplying the basics
 - c. A calendar of charity
 - d. A lifetime of giving
 - e. Waqf
 - i. Basic parameters
 - ii. Why found a waqf?
 - 3. The upper hand
 - a. Weighing In
 - b. Muzaffar al-Din
 - c. Ibn Battuta and Abu `Inan
 - d. Haseki Hurrem Sultan
 - e. Mehmed Ağa
 - f. Sufis and saints
 - 4. The poor and the needy
 - a. Introduction
 - b. Thinking about poverty
 - c. The poor and the indigent (*al-fuqara wa'l-masakin*)
 - d. To work or to beg?
 - 5. A mixed economy of charity
 - a. Introduction
 - b. The Ottoman Empire: a “welfare state”?
 - c. Waqf reforms
 - d. Reinventing imperial charity
 - e. Managing poor relief
 - f. Reinventing zakat
 - g. Associations and NGOs
- Conclusion: re-orienting charity

One reviewer’s comments suggested that the book had also fulfilled another of its embedded goals as a counterbalance to the fear of Islamic charity as portrayed in the press: “We all know that *zakat* is one of the pillars of faith (while jihad is not), but historians of Islam have failed to make its significance apparent. This book does an admirable job at rectifying this omission” (Rapoport, 2009).

One reviewer from the general field of philanthropy studies grouped the book among a number of new publications from the early

twenty-first century that worked “to move philanthropy and generosity from the margins to the center of new narratives. Taken together,” she said, “they provide important clues as to how we can use the history of philanthropy and the nonprofit sector to understand national and imperial histories in new ways” (McCarthy, 2010). This was true not only in the general study of philanthropy on which this particular reviewer focused, but especially for the study of charitable giving (as a general term) in Islamic societies. One early volume in this shift was the result of the conference that Michael Bonner, Mine Ener and I convened at the University of Michigan in May 2000, which was published in 2001 as the collection *Poverty and Charity in Middle Eastern Contexts* (SUNY Press). As an indication of the size of the scholarly community then working in this new field, it turned out that from among the fifteen articles that appeared in that volume, at least ten were versions of work that appeared in monograph form in the years immediately before or after the conference.⁴

The book also drew some more critical responses from reviewers. As always, some of these pointed to where the book did too little, asking for: more consideration of non-Ottoman topics or the post-imperial Islamic world; additional examples to illustrate specific topics; translations of waqf deeds and other primary sources in an appendix; a bibliography of primary sources; and a glossary. Another, rarer critique pointed out where the book went too far. Of my claim “that members of the merchant class and scholars were not involved in charitable activities in the form of *awqāf* since their names are missing from biographical dictionaries,” one reviewer noted: “This conclusion is too premature

⁴ These include: Mehdi Bozorgmehr and Beth Baron, eds., *Philanthropy Among Middle Eastern Americans and Their Historical Traditions of Giving* (New York: Center for the Study of Philanthropy (CUNY), 2001); Mark R. Cohen, *Poverty and Charity in the Jewish Community of Medieval Egypt* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005); Mark R. Cohen, *The Voice of the Poor in the Middle Ages: An Anthology of Documents from the Cairo Geniza* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005); Mine Ener, *Managing Egypt's Poor and the Politics of Benevolence, 1800–1952* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003); Miriam Hoexter, *Endowments, Rulers and Community: Waqf al-Ḥaramayn in Ottoman Algiers* (Leiden: Brill, 1998); Timur Kuran, *The Long Divergence: How Islamic Law Held Back the Middle East* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011); Nadir Özbek, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Sosyal Devlet: Siyaset, İktidar ve Meşruiyet 1876–1914* (İstanbul: İletişim, 2002); Adam Sabra, *Poverty and charity in medieval Islam: Mamluk Egypt 1250–1517* (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2000); Miri Shefer-Mossensohn, *Ottoman Medicine: Healing and Medical Institutions, 1500–1700* (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 2009); Amy Singer, *Constructing Ottoman Beneficence: An Imperial Soup Kitchen in Jerusalem* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2002); and Amy Singer, *Charity in Islamic Societies* (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2008).

based on a study of biographical dictionaries alone” (Zarinebaf, 2011). Not only was the conclusion premature but it also broke one of the historian’s guiding dictums, one which I emphasize to my students: *Absence of evidence is not absence of evidence*. I am happy to correct this statement and can only invite the reviewer or other scholars who have encountered examples of merchant and scholar endowments to share them eventually with the rest of us.

More substantively, reviewers pointed to the disjuncture that resulted from a study organized thematically and not chronologically. This is truly a problem in a book like this and constitutes perhaps the chief structural compromise I made in organizing the material. However, I was concerned that a chronological discussion would argue implicitly for a linear development of charitable practice in Islamic societies up to the nineteenth century; I did not want to make that claim. In contrast, Chapter 5, “A mixed economy of charity,” did argue for clear changes in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, although it also proposed that older forms of charitable practice were not abandoned as a layer of state sponsored welfare structures and global organizations came into being. From the perspective of 2021, I remain convinced that the economy of charity is not only mixed, but that non-state institutions have grown more important in many places where a neo-liberal approach to economy and society would like governments to be less involved in welfare-type support, making this realm the responsibility of third sector organizations of all types.⁵

One reviewer also made the valid point that: “Charity – as a practice and a belief – is a historically contingent, situational occurrence. Singer could have illustrated this point by rigorously investigating a cohesive set of sources related to a particular component of charity in the Ottoman period (her area of expertise)” (Salaymeh, 2010). My choice not to do this in *Charity in Islamic Studies* was largely due to the fact that my previous monograph had been just such an in-depth study of a single endowment at the time of its founding, the Haseki Sultan *imaret* (public kitchen) established in mid-sixteenth-century Jerusalem. Articles and books framed by in-depth studies of single institutions or organizations have added well-grounded insights to our understanding

⁵ For a discussion of this trend in Turkey, see: Ayşe Buğra, “Poverty and Citizenship: An Overview of the Social-Policy Environment in Republican Turkey.” *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 39 (2007): 33–52.

of waqf endowments and the complex ways in which they contributed to Islamic society and culture over the long arc of Islamic history.⁶

After completing *Charity in Islamic Societies*, I was on my way back to the *imarets*, but with the aim of studying the cluster of such institutions established in the Ottoman city of Edirne through the late fifteenth century in order to learn more about how (and if) they worked as a collective in the urban space of this key Ottoman city. While studies on individual institutions have proliferated, and, at a somewhat slower pace, people have considered the overall meaning and impact of Islamic waqf making, one glaring gap in our understanding is the extent to which endowment making may have been directed or coordinated intentionally, reflecting conscious policies to develop certain places or certain kinds of institutions. In the Ottoman Empire, the spatial distribution and chronology provide circumstantial evidence that this was the case, and the work of Gülru Necipoğlu (2005) on the architect Sinan as well as that of Çiğdem Kafescioğlu (2009) on Istanbul offer the beginnings of an empirical basis on which to discuss the matter. In the meantime, I have been distracted by the early Ottoman history of Edirne itself, since too many basic parameters of this city have not been explored. Once I have a clearer sense of this, I hope to return to the kitchens!

Perhaps the most significant critiques of *Charity in Islamic Societies* addressed two additional lacunae. The first was a perceived failure to engage with the exegetical tradition that grounds the study of Islamic theology, law and the other fields, known sometimes as the Islamic sciences. The literature of this tradition and its scholarship is vast and I lack the familiarity or training needed to study these materials with the depth and rigor they deserve. Thus, to the extent that I do so in the book, my engagement was necessarily superficial and relied on a selection of scholarship. At the same time, the material is far too important to have been left out entirely. However, it would have been appropriate to signal readers more clearly that this was the case. Once again, I invite those who do have these skills and are intrigued by the prospect of considering these texts through the prism of larger questions about charity and philanthropy, to undertake such studies.

⁶ This bibliography is too extensive to review here. Some examples from relatively recent research include: Nina Macaraig, *Çemberlitaş Hamamı in Istanbul: The Biographical Memoir of a Turkish Bath* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2019); Kayhan Orbay, "The Magnificent Süleymaniye Owed a Debt to the Butcher and the Grocer," *Bellefen* LXXV, no. 272 (2011): 87-133 and many articles by the same author on the accounts of imperial Ottoman endowments; the special issue of *The Muslim World* on "Muslim Endowments in Asia: Waqf, Charity and Circulations," Vol. 108, #4 (2018); and the journal *Endowment Studies* (Brill), which began publishing in 2017.

The second omission that displeased some critics was the absence of a theoretical or interpretive framework (Hassanali, 2021; Salaymeh, 2010). Here, I would note that I did not feel that this work was of a type that would bear the weight of a single interpretive framework. It is not a sustained empirical study robust enough for the task nor was it a complete review of scholarship in an existing field. However, the framing of the book does not mislead readers on this point. At various junctures, different interpretations of charity are discussed, from Muslim sources and others, in order to share them with readers who are not well-versed in the study of charity. My own instinct at the time was that a single interpretive framework was more likely to corral a too-slim body of evidence under an ill-fitting umbrella. With time, I have become increasingly convinced that Mauss' fundamental idea about the nature of voluntary giving is worth bearing always in mind as one studies charity. That is: it is never entirely voluntary, either in its form or scope, and that it both results from the social systems that organize societies and strengthens them. At the same time, the ideas of Amotz and Avishag Zahavi (1997) about giving as a form of risk that has its own rewards of power and status can be very helpful in understanding the dynamics around decisions of what, when, how much and to whom to give. Meanwhile, it is key not to underestimate the force of sincere piety and a teleological belief in a day of reckoning whose outcome can be affected by the individual's actions in this life.

Where are we today in the study of Muslim philanthropy?

Increasingly, the study of charity and philanthropy in Muslim societies has become part of the mainstream of academic research on the MENA region specifically and on Muslim communities worldwide. Compared with the situation at the end of the twentieth century, that of the third decade of the twenty-first offers a different intellectual landscape where this topic is concerned. For a look at the way in which the field is changing, one could survey the programs of the annual meeting of the Middle East Studies Association of North America. This is an enormous conference where several hundred papers are delivered each year. Increasingly, there are not only panels on topics related to charity (including philanthropy, welfare, aid, humanitarianism, and others), but research on particular charitable initiatives forms the empirical basis of papers presented in the context of studying education, gender relations,

minority rights, political activism and more.⁷ The 2014 special issue on the “Politics of Benevolence” of the *International Journal of Middle East Studies* (46/2) was one landmark in the development of this area of study. In the context of the present volume, one should note the article there by Stacy Fahrenthold (2014) on transnational philanthropy in Syrian communities in Brazil.

A complete review of the study of Muslim philanthropy today would require another and a much longer article than this one. It seems useful here, to conclude by focusing on the project at hand: a collective consideration of one aspect of the topic. In contemplating the organizing title of this special issue – Cross Border Philanthropy in the Islamic World – it is worth noting that Muslim philanthropy has always been “cross border,” if by borders we mean political boundaries. What has changed is the shape of those borders, their political and economic meanings, and the fact that they may constitute far more significant barriers today than they perhaps did in the past. To take only one example, but an enormous one, donations for Mecca and Medina, the *Haramayn al-Sharifayn*, have always flowed across political borders. This did not happen only as one-time donations, but also took the shape of endowment revenues that were conveyed annually in heavily guarded caravans before the days of wire transfers.⁸ While the *Haramayn* were perhaps the largest beneficiary of such cross border donations in the Islamic world, they were far from being the only ones. The histories of major shrines – in North Africa, Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, Bosnia and Turkey, to name only a few – include ample testimonies to this, sometimes as complaints for the interrupted flows of their revenues.

What does seem to be a newer aspect of the cross border philanthropy under discussion here is the extent to which it also flows from Muslim communities living as minorities in different parts of the world. Muslim diaspora communities gradually became globally significant in the twentieth century. As they became more economically secure, these communities have organized donations for individual Muslims in need or to support communities, either locally or at some distance from where their donors reside. The initiatives may be local responses to crisis; a more stable, project-based relationship with a

⁷ The programs of the MESA conferences from 2018 on may be accessed easily online at the MESA website, at <https://mesana.org/annual-meeting/previous-meetings> (accessed June 21, 2021). Programs before 2018 are archived among the Hathi Trust holdings, which unfortunately limits their access to subscription holders or those working on university research library platforms.

⁸ See Hoexter, *Endowments*, and Suraiya Faroqhi, *Pilgrims and Sultans: The Hajj Under the Ottomans 1517–1683*, (London: I.B. Tauris, 1990).

specific place or initiative; or contributions to the enormous Muslim transnational aid and development organizations created in the past few decades. They represent an intersection of two larger ecologies of philanthropy in which Muslims participate: 1) giving in Muslim communities worldwide and 2) the activities of global relief and development organizations which choose their targets according to criteria other than faith affiliations, even if the organizations began as faith-based. The present special issue of the *Journal of Muslim Philanthropy and Civil Society* takes up aspects of cross border philanthropy, consciously expanding the conversation of global Muslim philanthropy.

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REMITTANCES AND INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT: THE FORCES SHAPING COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT

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In an era of increasing government austerity (pre-covid) and also reticent spending on social welfare, during the pandemic, this book asks some fundamental questions about the role of remittances in community sustenance and development. Prior similar research has shown that global remittances, are three times the amount of international development aid. Remittance research has recently begun to gain momentum in the academic realm. However, the processes of meaning making, the theorizing of various aspects involving remittances, and policy on remittances are not often treated with much depth. Which is why this book aims to treat remittances as an act of social norm involving individuals, nation states and diaspora groups. The book treats remittances both as an act of individual piety and obligation as well as a sociological fact, which needs to be understood from the perspective of the actors, i.e., the givers and recipients. Using theories of charitable giving, motives of giving, policy analysis and international relations, the authors offer a compelling narrative of how and why remittances occur and its impact on both the giver and recipient. Along with the aim to shed light on this important social reality.

Khan and Merritt's book, *Remittances and International Development*, is the outcome of research carried out by both the researchers, in the areas of charity, philanthropy and remittances. As scholars, they have written about—both individually and together—

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issues of remittances, philanthropy and voluntary action. Though continued to remain curious and fascinated by how individual actions can be key in ensuring collective good.

Remittances are a key part of the debate around international aid and often are ignored by practitioners and scholars, alike. As the World Bank and other agencies studying this phenomenon point out, remittances far outweigh international aid in magnitude. However, their impact is qualitatively different, impacting our world in ways both subtle and not so subtle. As Dr. Dilip Ratha at the World Bank argues:

At more than three times the size of development aid, international migrants' remittances provide a lifeline for millions of households in developing countries. In addition, migrants hold more than \$500 billion in annual savings. Together, remittances and migrant savings offer a substantial source of financing for development projects that can improve lives and livelihoods in developing countries.¹

The book asserts that this dynamic of sending remittances is rooted in various forces that shape the acts themselves: motivations of senders, needs of recipients, government policies and international relations. The research attempts to offer a nuanced theoretical perspective that brings all these forces together, to examine how remittance giving has evolved. This perspective of looking at remittances is what is unique about this book and specifically suggests that scholars should take a grounded approach to examining this lived phenomenon. Rather than using existing concepts and categories to understand it.

Religious motives dominate charitable giving around the world, as several scholars have pointed out (Siddiqui, 2014; Wuthnow, 2008; Bekkers and Wiepking, 2011). The researchers examine the role of ethical and religious notions of charity, through interviews and other data collection measures.

While the focus of the book is on offering a theoretical perspective that is interdisciplinary in nature, utilization of both qualitative and quantitative approaches have been demonstrated. In the pursuit of understanding remittances, cultural and subcultural differences seen through the case study analysis as well as the implemented governmental policies. Available data surrounding remittance giving is illustrated as further evidence of the complexity and intricacies of this phenomenon. Furthermore, the researchers broadly

¹ Leveraging Migration and Remittances for Development | United Nations (oclc.org) (Accessed on November 28th, 2021).

demonstrate the relationship[s] between remittances and public good. This is presented through not only a policy lens, but a sociological lens that includes religion as a construct.

Khan and Merritt delve into the following questions:

1. *What is the reason that remittances have increased in the last two to three decades?*
2. *What are the policy frameworks that nation-states use, to frame the discourse of remittances?*
3. *How have the discourses of remittances changed in the last few years, globally?*
4. *Can we understand the phenomenon of remittances using the framework of charitable giving and philanthropy?*
5. *How do remittances shape the relations between nation-states?*

Each question is answered substantively, employing a mixed-methods approach. Some of the key substantive points made in the book cover, are the following:

Motivations to send and receive - Background

In this chapter, the literature on motivations to send and receive is covered. Given the growing awareness around issues of development, aid and migration, there has been a lot of research on motivations to send. The chapter synthesizes this work and also offers an analysis. Scholars have previously pointed out that the motivations to send and receive money revolve around awareness, ties to the groups involved or some form of affiliation. With the rise of mass media, digital technologies and means of communication, the research suggest that there are norms of solidarity, community building and network formation that goes beyond traditional notions of community. It is argued that remittances can help understand how global activism, solidarity and community building are taking place, around the world. Which is why a closer examination of these phenomenon is crucial if we are to understand how the modern individual relates to others around him/her.

Growth of money transfer: theorizing technology, distance and money

Technology has emerged as one of the bigger forces shaping remittances and giving. A theoretical lens is used to look at how technology is

impacting giving and sending, what implications it has on relationships of donor and recipient. With the rise of firms such as MoneyGram, Western Union and others that are based in the West and act as conduits of transfer of money, this chapter seeks to examine how these firms act as bridges of connection. What role do they play, besides being pure agents of money transfer? Do they lobby the government for fairer and better regulations? Or do they seek to just profit from this basic need of millions, around the world, to send money to their loved ones? Khan and Merritt offer a theoretical perspective of this important component of the remittances landscape. Based on an in-depth analysis and interviews with individuals from the remittances sector, the book offers a critical perspective that delves deep into the relationship between technology, policy and governance. The goal is not to map the historical development of technology, but to offer a sophisticated analysis of how technology, policy and people come together to shape this field.

Remittances by numbers: How much is sent and where

In this chapter, the focus is purely on the quantitative aspects of giving, looking carefully at the numbers. Focus is placed on the three countries of interest: India, USA and Mexico. While we know that remittances are roughly three times in size as the international development aid (World Bank 2020), the authors seek to contextualize these numbers in the changes ongoing around us. The quantity of remittances varies across time and location, there are certain trends that have emerged in the past few years. This chapter contextualizes these debates and makes sense of how they have evolved. What are the causes of these changes and how might they change in the future? These are a few of the questions the authors seek to answer in this chapter.

Policy and remittances: Security dilemmas and human needs

This chapter looks at the policy around remittances and giving. Humanitarian aid policy and remittances giving have been adversely impacted by the regulations around remittances. This chapter offers a critical case analysis of countries where sending and receiving money can mean the difference between life and death, and how these are examined. The authors seek to understand how policy shapes practices. Especially in the context of humanitarian aid, in disaster and crisis situations, the authors seek to understand how remittances play a crucial

role and what policy changes are needed for an effective response from the diaspora communities.

Discourse of remittances: How it shapes praxis in India, USA and Mexico

In this chapter, Khan and Merritt purely discuss the discourses of remittances and how it shapes practices of migration. Do migrants influence remittances behavior of others? How does the discourse of remittance shape the lives of those who are dependent on the money sent? Examination of this as well as the sustainability of continued remittances, both the giving and receiving, is included in this chapter. It delves into the social paradigm that is created through the remittance relationship. While also paying respect to the differences in cultures including, though not limited to faith differences.

Case studies: India as a receiver and USA as a sender

Using India and the US respectively as paradigmatic examples of the largest recipient and sender respectively, the authors take a close look at the dynamics of how remittances came to be. This includes historically and sociologically. The chapter looks at the forces that shaped remittance behavior in each country and future implications. Through review of documents, interviews, and first-person anecdotal evidence, this chapter relies heavily on the individual and the experiences gained or lost from remittances.

Remittances and the Persian Gulf nations

With the rise of the oil and natural gas income, rich Middle Eastern states appeared as magnets for migrant workers, which resulted in the phenomenon of the guest worker booming since the late 1970s. With this, we have also seen the rise of remittances to South and South-East Asia, where a majority of the migrant workers are from. The authors offer an up to-date analysis of how the changing economy in states such as Qatar and Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, with the ongoing political and economic upheavals, might impact the remittances landscape and its mean for the recipient states. While it is also worthwhile to examine how their own economies might change. As the resource, rich Gulf States shift their positioning in the global landscape from being a magnet for fortune seekers to become hubs of innovation. The chapter provides an

understanding of how this shift may impact the millions of people working there, who are the primary remittance senders.

With the COVID pandemic and subsequent stoppage of migration inflows into the Gulf countries, there has been a change in the patterns of remittances. Which is why the manner in which the governments of the region have supported migrant workers or not, needs updating.

Remittances as subaltern philanthropy

We frame remittances as ‘subaltern philanthropy’ or philanthropy by the poor and marginalized towards others. Even though remittances giving to the ‘in group’ is what happens mostly, there are instances when it exhibits philanthropic characteristics of addressing the ‘common good.’ This chapter critically examines how remittances can be seen as a new form of solidarity among people who are marginalized. This new perspective has not been explored and examined in much depth. Khan and Merritt argue that this perspective of examining remittances dispels many stereotypes. Finally it brings greater clarity to why people send money to their relatives or friends in the country of their origins.

Remittances and International Development: The forces shaping community development (2021) offers an applied dive into the phenomenon of remittances. Remittances that are occurring across the globe and are impacting activities in everyone’s backyard. The contribution of this book review to the Special Issue ‘*Cross-border philanthropy in the Islamic world*’ include a furthering perspective on the interactions between local and global philanthropy. This with a particular insight into the private money transfers between India and Saudi Arabia as well as India and the United States of America. These country-to-country interactions are an example of diaspora philanthropy that is part of community and international development as well as sustainability. Furthermore, this book illuminates the typologies of diaspora communities while placing the understanding as a person’s identification with their country of origin and their livelihood in their host country.

Finally, as the month of Ramadhan begins in April, and its observance is visibly seen in Muslim majority countries, we can also see an uptick in both philanthropy and remittances. Typically, there is a rise in remittances sent by migrants around festivals, and Ramadhan is no exception. This sending and receiving of money sums up all that one can say about obligations towards one another and one’s identity. With money as a mediating factor, one can understand how human relations

are being shaped and re-shaped by a closer examination of remittances. This book makes a compelling case as to how.

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ON VOLUNTEERING AND THE ETHICAL TRAJECTORY: THE IMPACT OF SOCIAL EXPECTATIONS AND RELIGIOUS COMMITMENTS ON THE VOLUNTEERING PRACTICES OF MUSLIM BELGIAN WOMEN

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Organizations established by Turkish-Belgians have traditionally been male-dominated. The reasons for this goes back to labor migration when most workers arriving in Europe were men and the organizations were established to meet their needs. In this context the experiences of female volunteers have gone largely unnoticed. This paper critically investigates how Muslim women in Belgium take up volunteering as a way to enhance their pious ethical self and become active citizens. It interrogates modern liberal conceptions of volunteering as short-lived projects aimed to be coherent, effective, and well-managed. The findings of this research were obtained through the participant observation of activities organized by female volunteers in five associations in Belgium. Participant observation was complemented with in-depth interviews with association members. The main assertion of the

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paper is that the religious inspiration that motivates volunteering and the social expectation of Muslim women to demonstrate their value to society turns volunteering into a life-long, continuous, but less coherent commitment.

Introduction

"Yes, but what sort of volunteering are you talking about?" This is the question I am confronted with any time I talk about my interlocutors during conferences, presentations, and book talks. "We understand that they are volunteers, but not quite what exactly they do," is something I hear very often. Although I understand the question, I believe that the need to strictly frame the scope, content and methodology of my interlocutors' volunteering speaks to a very specific way volunteering is expected to be in Western societies.

It is not easy to describe the scope and content of my interlocutors' volunteering activities or the methodologies they follow in realizing their projects. The most important reason for this is that they do not have a clearly defined program or cause. The overarching themes of their events focus very generally on values such as dialogue, social cohesion, and community development. These values are articulated in a wide array of events and activities and most of them are short-term. The volunteers themselves do not have a clearly defined job description and channel their energies and skills to whatever is required from them during each specific event and program. Although the projects they organize are not consistent in scope and content, my interlocutor's commitment to volunteering is very consistent.

In modern societies where volunteering has come to be defined as an "industry" (Rochester, Paine & Howlett, 2010, p. 3), continuity to achieve a goal is very important. However, the division of labor is determined by the volunteer's skill and interests. This is described as the "dominant paradigm", wherein volunteering involves an organizational context, "professionally staffed and formally structured organizations" (Rochester et. al., 2010, p. 11). There is "an organized structure of action, which is unpaid, non-obligatory and takes places in an organized context" (Dekker and Halman, 2003; Wilson, 2000).

In addition to following a well-developed method with a certain degree of professionalism to achieve a goal, volunteer organizations and managers do not usually expect continued commitment from their members. Although active and ongoing members do exist, short-term or episodic volunteering is gaining increasing popularity (Cnaan et al.,

2021). Episodic volunteering entails assistance to a project that has a very clearly defined aim and scope (Dunn et al., 2016). In this type of volunteering, individuals can prepare meals at a charity, provide supplies for the homeless, or offer help at a disaster zone. This type of volunteering is especially handy for people who have busy lives and less free time. It benefits agencies that can mobilize a larger number of people for short time periods.

This article problematizes existing descriptions of volunteering in modern societies, by analyzing and comparing different forms of the practice that have emerged among Belgian Muslims in the recent years. By using qualitative ethnographic methods, it examines how Belgian Muslim female volunteers' volunteering practices are shaped by the Islamic tradition. Moreover, it shows how interactions with the Belgian society inform the content of volunteering. It examines how liberal notions core to modern volunteering such as agency, individualism, and professionalism have been rethought and practiced in relation to illiberal (orthodox) Islamic motivations. Ultimately, this article brings insight to how Islamic ethics factors into volunteering as a "form of civic engagement and manifestations of active citizenship in post-secular, (neo)liberal-democratic societies" (Peucker and Kayikci, 2020, p. 3).

This article not only fills a gap in the existing literature but also questions our conceptual understanding of volunteering, which is largely a civic-secular practice today (Peucker and Kayikci, 2020). Having said this, I do acknowledge that in many cases religion plays a significant role in motivating people to volunteer and Islam is not an exception. However, the focus in this article is not to understand how different religious traditions have inspired volunteering and benevolence. My aim is to understand how Muslim women negotiate their social interactions and daily conflicts through the platform of volunteering. For the Belgian Muslim volunteers, religion is at the very heart of the volunteering. Their events and programs are secular in form and content, however the motivation to volunteer comes largely from how they understand a good practicing Muslim should conduct herself in social propriety. I will discuss this in detail in the coming sections, however, to get a better comprehension of how these two entities—the societal and the religious—intersect through volunteering we need a better idea of the context in which the Muslim volunteers live and work.

Strikingly, relevant literature has neglected the experiences of European Muslim volunteers, especially how it informs their ethical subjectivation with regards to religion and society. Volunteering has been the bedrock of Western societies, and it is paradoxical that Muslims have been given relatively little empirical and theoretical attention in this

area, especially in studies emerging from Europe. One of the most common stereotypes projected on Muslims is “that they socially isolate themselves and avoid contact with non-Muslims” (Pew, 2017; Peucker, 2017, p. 7). Policymakers have regarded mosques and Islamic community centers as secluded spaces of worship that are disconnected from the larger society (Vertovec, 2010; Peucker, 2017). Therefore, the connection between Muslim community spaces (both religious and non-religious) and pro-social activities have been largely neglected.

The first section discusses the contours of volunteering as it has been conceptualized in existing academic studies. It sketches the personal and social dynamics that shape the form and content of volunteering in the West and the expected outcomes of volunteering. The following section elaborates on the context of my research and the brief history of Turkish organizations in Belgium. It illustrates their key features to clarify the means and motivations through which these organizations have been established. It then analyzes the ethical underpinnings of volunteering, the relationality of my participants' agency and how this inspires not only a long-term but life-long commitment to volunteering. The article then turns to the ethics of volunteering and the Islamic motivation behind a lifetime of devotion to social purposes. It problematizes the argument that Muslim ethical self-formation is an individualistic trajectory and asserts that it is relational. The relationality of ethics suggests that ethics are not only located in personal worship but transcend the boundaries of the body. The ethical, for my Muslim participants, is closely related to social norms and propriety. Finally, the article analyses how my research participants create a culture of volunteering that relies more on constant devotion and motivation than professionalism and organization. It links this culture of volunteering to a very specific demand they are expected to respond to, which is to prove themselves as good citizens. It then moves on to critically examine how social and political developments and discourses factor into my research participants' volunteering activities. Namely, the section seeks to answer how volunteering turns them into acceptable citizens and how this is interlinked to their religious subjectivation.

Discerning the contours of volunteering in modern society

The notion that volunteering is an organized set of actions carried out in a designated space and time, has prompted questions I mentioned earlier about the agenda of my research participants. Most people look for some sort of structure, a project, and a goal in volunteering. The success of any

project is measured through how well the volunteers are able to achieve that goal (Haski-Leventhal & Meijs, 2010).

Despite these expectations, the definition of what constitutes volunteering has remained ambiguous. McCurley and Vesuvio have fairly pointed out that, "The only thing that can be said with any degree of certainty about the volunteer community is that it can never be described as monolithic" (1985, p. 14). The uncertainty and complexity around the definition of volunteering increases its scope but also makes it difficult to discern who can truly be considered a volunteer. Volunteering is closely associated with a strong civil society and has been a central topic of interest for policymakers (Dekker and Halman, 2003). Policymakers in and beyond Europe have encouraged volunteering as a way of active citizenship and developed policies to maintain the practice (Strickland, 2010).

While it is regarded as one of the most effective ways of active citizenship, volunteering as a practical outcome of activism and civic engagement is often closely related to the individuals' personal choice of how they want to allocate their free time and resources (Omoto, Snyder and Hackett, 2010). It is important to underline this matter of freeness *because* volunteering is quite separated from professionalism and professional life. Any time, money, or energy that is spent for the sake of volunteering must be extra and up to the individual to identify where and how they will use it (Wilson, 2000). Along similar lines, according to Silber, "volunteerism is a way for the individual to express themselves and become personally involved in a cause" (Silber, 2000, p. 393). Moreover, it is a matter of choice, not obligation (Dekker and Halman, 2003).

In addition to free will, contemporary volunteering is described as individualized and temporal. Lesley Hustinx (2001) draws our attention to a "post-modernized" and "individualized" flow of "new volunteers." This type of volunteer is less interested in continuous commitment and more interested in specific goals and projects (Hustinx, 2001). These goals and projects are usually determined by causes that seem to be in trend during that specific time. This is a point that comes to our attention repeatedly in the literature: volunteering seems to be highly individualized and short-lived. Dekker and Halman suggest that individualization and "decreasing organizational loyalty does not necessarily connote negativity in terms of commitments to the cause" (2003, p. 8). It does mean, however, that there is a certain flexibility whenever there is a new flow of volunteers replacing those who have completed their task. This makes "individualism a resource", and thus, "voluntary work does not have to react merely by assimilating; it has the

autonomy to attract different groups and to attract the same group with different images, ideals and incentives” (Dekker and Halman, 2003 p. 8).

Previous studies have discussed that the cause often precludes the volunteer, *as long as the job gets done*, so to speak (Dekker and Halman, 2003). In their cartography Rochester et. al. (2020) describe more informal methodologies of volunteering where the volunteer is emotionally invested in the cause, commits to long-term projects and takes on a variety of duties regardless of their training. While my participants' experiences overlap with this description, their understanding of volunteering is also fundamentally different in how they evaluate personal success and efficiency.

First, the volunteer is not another individual who is there to get the job done; her aim is not only to complete the task set by the volunteering managers but to also work on her ethical self-formation in the process. The trajectory of working on the cause, and the kind of performative, affective, and moral change such work inflicts on the volunteer, are as important, if not more, than the cause itself. Second, the trajectory of working on the course is ambiguous, and often loosely organized. This is not because the volunteers do not take their duties seriously, but because their agendas often depend on the changing social and political agenda.

Regardless of how social, political, and global developments inform Muslim civil society, the volunteering aspect of their daily lives has been significantly understudied. The bulk of work focusing on Muslim activism look at the negotiation between belonging in the west and religiosity (Van Es, 2016; Elshayyal, 2018; Peucker and Kayikci, 2020). Relationally, another line of studies has studied existing debates in the "culturalization of citizenship" and the importance of "demonstrating" belonging and loyalty through a commitment to social norms, values, and symbols (Tonkens and Duyvendak, 2016; Van Es 2019, 142). How Muslims mobilize their collective agency to challenge stereotypes and negative perceptions projected on their communities (Van Es, 2018; Van Es, 2019; Maira, 2020) has also become an important line of inquiry. Interestingly, volunteering does not appear as a case in these studies and empirical research exploring civil participation and volunteering beyond mosque networks and religious benevolence (e.g. charity) is even more scarce.

In doing so, it shifts the focus from mosque congregations and networks towards the ways Muslims establish their own (non-religious) organizations to create a space of self-representation within civil society.

Setting the Scene: Muslim Female Volunteers and their Associations

The research undertaken for this paper is a result of qualitative ethnographic research into five associations in Brussels and Flanders. From 2014 to 2018, I conducted participant observation in the associations, during which I observed the activities carried out and participated in the events organized by the volunteers. I conducted interviews with fifty women and casually spoke with many more female volunteers whose exact number is difficult to really determine. My research participants are all Belgian who are of Turkish descent.

Although I did not apply an age limit, my research participants were mainly under the age of forty. This was not a deliberated choice on my part but stemmed from the fact that the majority of women volunteering for the associations were young.

My research participants have established many different foundations in Brussels, and each has a different aim and scope. One focuses on youth issues, another on education, and one of them is a women's associations. While they all have a different focus, the members and administrators of each association help the others in every way possible when organizing an event. All the associations are interlinked because of their members' mobility, and all the associations are members of one larger umbrella association. I started out this research with the aim of studying 'women's associations', but early in my fieldwork I understood that it would not be possible. Although there are 'women's associations', there is literally no event limited to women, and women partner with other associations that are mixed gendered. This is why I decided to conduct my research with female volunteers without restricting my focus to one (women's) association.

For the sake of protecting my interlocutors' privacy, I have anonymized their names and used pseudonyms and I have anonymized the names of the associations. When I first started working on the project in January 2014, I started going to the events that were organized by the female associations in Brussels. I started attending any event I possibly could that was organized by my research participants, from cooking classes to roundtable debates to panels at the EU.

Throughout the research, I narrowed my focus to the female members because their entanglements with the larger society are in many ways different from men. They stand out as Muslims more apparently than most Turkish men, due to their headscarves and modest fashion. Even with some research participants who choose not to use the headscarf the pressure they feel as Muslims is more tangible than men,

and their urgency for community betterment has more specific reasons. Moreover, organizations established by Turkish-Belgians have been largely male dominated since the first migrants to Belgium were mainly male workers (Manço, 2000). Most studies that refer to Muslim organizations in Europe do not specify the proportion of female participants, their roles and duties (Sunier, 2003). In this context, the experiences of Turkish-Belgian female volunteers and the ways in which they address social problems through volunteering have escaped scholarly attention. This article will provide much needed insight into this phenomenon.

Before I go into my own ethnographic data, I believe it is necessary to discuss how these generations came to live in Brussels and Flanders. This is necessary to know, firstly in order to understand how Muslims became a populational reality in Europe. Second, it will navigate us into the discussion of how this population became an ‘issue’ on a societal and political level. I will also more specifically discuss the Turkish populations, and a phenomenon that is almost unique to them, which is their tendency to form associations. When we consider that Turkish ethnic and religious belongings manifest more through associations than through mosques, it becomes imperative to consider how this came to be part of their community reality.

“After the labor migration agreement (1964) between the Moroccan, Turkish, and Belgian governments, the new incoming population were distributed in the country’s coal mining areas until the end of the 1960s” (Manco and Kanmaz, 2005, p. 1107). These two populations were concentrated in Flanders and Brussels, rather than Wallonia, and they worked in blue-collar jobs, as they had very little by way of educational background (Lesthaeghe, 2000). “As soon as the need for labor reached its optimum point, the government stopped entries from countries that were not part of the European community” (Castles, 1986, p. 763). This cessation did not stop further migration; however, the migration changed form, and the influx continued. Workers, who could now stay permanently in the country, reunified with their families and settled (Wets 2006).

“As the first generation of immigrants settled and built families in Europe, they started realizing that their children were going to face realities that they as parents had not encountered in their home countries. The following generations were not only Muslim, but they were Belgian, Dutch, French, German, etc., and this called for special attention when developing a way for them to stay in touch with their religious and cultural background” (Yukleyen, 2009, p. 35). “Whereas the religious organizations of the first generation were very communal and segregated

from larger society, the second and following generations established their associations with the consciousness that they were part of the country, and these associations were not only for communal needs but also served as spaces to find recognition from the larger social and political body” (Yukleyen, 2009, p. 35).

Turks in Europe, and especially in Belgium, tend to have a strong tendency towards establishing associations, one of the most important reasons for this is that the networks and community ties they develop through these associations help them preserve their cultural and religious identities and provide a support system for the challenges they face as minorities (Manco, 1997). There are numerous associations established in Belgium by the Turkish community, and it is safe to say that most of these associations tend to be local centers of more transnational movements. These movements are mostly organized around religious or national values, and although most of them do uphold Turkish nationalist values, some of them are secular. Regardless of whether Islam is recognized in European countries as an official religion, communities can organize around associations based on religious principles and identifications (Soysal, 1997).

According to previous studies civic communities and ethnic networks provide a catalyst for immigrant’s feelings of trust and their political participation in the host country (Fennema and Tillie, 1999). This is a significant point of discussion, as the Turkish community, including my research participants, are highly organized in Belgium, at least when it comes to associations. Despite high organizational levels among the Turkish level, they seem to be relatively underrepresented in comparison to other minority communities such as the Moroccans. One of the primary reasons for this is that since most Turkish movements and associations that are present in Belgium – and Europe – are off-shoots from Turkey, they seem to be more directly involved in Turkish politics and social movements (Ostergaard-Nielsen, 2003). Departing from these examples, my research participants' associations are not connected to any organization in Turkey. Their local associations specifically target local issues and detach from country-of-origin issues. Even the use of language is strictly limited to Dutch and French in the associations and during the events. There are several reasons for this.

First, the founders of the associations are second generation Turks. Although this does not necessarily mean that they should detach from their country of origin, the sense of being born and raised in Belgium repositions their ideas of home and belonging. The people who founded these associations were people who had the material means to do so, hence they were somewhat wealthy. These people had investments

and businesses in Belgium, and, thus, their social and political concerns were oriented towards Belgium more than Turkey. This being said, their events and agenda nearly always address issues pertaining to diversity and especially the Turkish (and frequently Moroccan) minorities (Ostergaard-Nielsen, 2003).

Second, these associations do not have a political party or ideology that represent them in Turkey. The diversity among the members makes it very difficult for the associations to turn into a hub of ideology, ethnicity, or kinship. The members come from different ideological backgrounds, different hometowns, and even different ethnic groups. This diversity makes it increasingly difficult to define the associations in the framework of one representative body (Ostergaard-Nielsen, 2003).

Third, Belgium is a political complex. The federal structure of the country – the EU and the linguistic divides – ensures there is often a ministry for each region and linguistic group. This results in the inevitable reality that Belgium is a haven for politicians. The high numbers of politicians make them more accessible to the public in comparison to other countries. My research participants, who directly aim for political contributions to their program, utilize this easy accessibility. These contributions may not exactly be financial, or even open support, but involves the participation of politicians in their events, including giving speeches. This is, of course, a dual benefit, in that the volunteers find recognition for their cause and get attention for their events, whilst the politicians expand their voter base. This recognition and attention at the political level is a motivating force for my research participants, stimulating their belief that their struggles are not in vain. It also incorporates them further into their local setting (Ostergaard-Nielsen, 2003).

God and society, the ethics of giving

When we do ibada, it is our personal worship to Allah. It is a farz, and there is no chance of not doing it. It is what we do for ourselves, to show gratitude for what Allah has given us, ward off the evil, and ultimately [prepare] for judgment day. Ibada is what we do for ourselves. But Allah will ask us, “what did you do for me?” For Allah we need to devote all that he has given to us, for him, and we must guide people along the moral codes he set. Whatever we do for society, we have done for Allah.

This quote is from Elif, a woman in her late thirties who lived in Brussels and worked as a teacher. Sitting in the dining hall of the association we talked about what it meant to strive more than *ibada*. The Belgian Muslim women started volunteering with the idea that a faithful Muslim should go beyond regular religious obligations. They wanted to do more than praying, fasting, and the occasional alms giving. They wanted to do something for God. "You cannot pray five times a day and expect repentance," was a saying that would be repeated frequently among the volunteers. It means that personal worship constitutes only one aspect of the pious trajectory.

According to Elif, volunteering constitutes the pious trajectory of the volunteer, just like individual worship does. One is not more important than another, but my research participants reflect on each trajectory differently. *ibada* has its own sphere: the mosque, home, or a room where one can pray. The body is its boundaries; a person performs the prayer five times a day, they fast with their body, they read and study the Quran for knowledge to be a better Muslim; they go for pilgrimage to experience the holy lands and fulfil an obligation of Islam; they give zakat, similarly to fulfil an obligation, for it is *their* money that they are giving – and *their* good deed. However, a faithful Muslim needs to surpass the limits of their body if they truly want to achieve an ethical self. This is where society comes in the picture, because a commitment for the well-being of other people is where the pious subject surpasses her body. My research participants call their volunteering *infaq*, which literally means "spending" or "giving" in Arabic. In essence they describe volunteering as a constant form of giving to society, where the transaction is not only material (e.g. money) but also spiritual. The time, effort, labour, skill, and finances channelled to volunteering informs the pious subjects' ethical self, making them depend on society as much as those in need depend on them.

This relational aspect of ethical self-formation has been studied only marginally (Mittermaier, 2013). The ethical turn in the anthropology of Islam has been concerned with how bodily practices inform inner spiritual strength and sincerity (Mahmood, 2005; Gade, 2004; Fadil, 2009; Schielke, 2010; Jouili, 2015). Subjects concern modern pious reflect on religious tenets, actively seek knowledge and deliberate (Mahmood, 2005). These new modes of reflection are transferred onto the micro practices constituting the pious (disciplinary) self-formation. In light of the discussion above, these disciplinary practices are willingly taken up by the pious women and reiterated for the sake of "perfectly" enhancing those norms (Mahmood, 2005). Pierre Hadot refers to the embodiment of these practices as "spiritual", as they

bring under control bodily and emotional spontaneities (Mahmood, 2005; Mahmood, 2001). What is interesting about the concept of spiritual exercises is that they are meant to be *lifelong*. The trajectory of the ethical self requires constant conscious work, and as Schielke describes "a perfectionist project of self-discipline" (Schielke, 2009, p. 24 ; see also Mahmood, 2005; Lambek, 2010). This notion is central to my research participants' experience, as "the whole notion surrounding volunteering is that it is a lifelong commitment, not bound to temporal restrictions" (Schielke, 2009, p. 24). The ethical relationship with God is meant to be maintained as long as the subject lives, consequentially does their desire to volunteer, which becomes an added factor to why their volunteering life is never meant to be short term or concise.

The ethical turn in the anthropology of Islam laid the grounds for another line of studies that would come later and argue that modern Muslims—especially in Western contexts—are individualized and we were witnessing an individualization of ethics (Cesari, 2004). The overarching argument that is apparent in this line of research is that modern, informed Muslims practice religion for their self and not due to social expectations or norms (Mahmood, 2005). This assertion has neglected to understand how society has a direct impact on the ways in which religious practices and devotions take shape. Even when discussing how ethical deliberations are immersed in social, political and historical developments, relevant literature neglects how these trajectories take shape for Muslims living in non-Muslim societies. The ethical is always a challenge, an effort, and sometimes even a conflict. What is more, this strife is focused on the individual, and his/her endeavor to correspond to *become* ethical (Asad, 1993; Mahmood, 2005; Hirschkind, 2006). In the following section I turn to this compelling issue and discuss how volunteering—as an Islamically inspired ethical practice—is embedded in personal interactions, social propriety and contextual dynamics. I unpack how this informs a specific culture of volunteering that overlaps but at many key points diverges from conventional volunteering.

On the Culture of Doing Everything

"Oh, you need to be willing and ready to do everything if you're in this association," said Tuba, a young woman in her early thirties. A mother of two and a molecular biology scientist, Tuba would not come as a woman to be busy decorating cakes on a Wednesday evening. But there we were, sitting in the association's large, hyper-equipped kitchen smothering chocolate icing over a four-layer cake. Well, Tuba was the

one handling the icing, as she was adamant that I touch nothing and, in her words, "destroy" anything. "What do you mean anything?" I asked her simply. "Well, I never knew how to bake or decorate or even had the interest. But then, now I have to do these things because the labor is needed and I have to step up," she said.

Josephat parked right in front of a busy road. The association would attract a lot of people during the sunny weekend and my research participants were hoping to raise a decent amount of money. The money would then be channeled to sponsor other more large-scale events. According to Tuba, if you were volunteering at the association, there was no such thing as "I cannot do," as you needed to be prepared to learn anything if the association needed the service. This is essentially what volunteering is about for my research participants; being ready to take up duties and labors that they probably would not in any other entity of life. As I was sitting next to Tuba, now watching her pipe tiny flowers in darker chocolate on the cake, my memory took me to another moment where a different volunteer told me in the very same kitchen how she had learned to make Albanian dishes just for one event. The volunteers' skills, however, are not limited to food-making, as these are merely two examples of a continuous devotion to learn more skills and successfully carry out a wide variety of tasks.

The fundamental understanding that motivates women like Tuba to push their comfort zones is to be able to step up when needed. A limited number of women volunteer for the association, but their agenda is stretched to include events from panels and symposiums, to bake sales and kite making with children. These events serve a core purpose; namely, to reach out to as many people as possible and invite them to their events. The idea is that the more people come to their events and get to know them, the more they will realize that Muslim women are properly functioning actors of the Belgian society, and not a mere "problem". It is for this reason that they feel compelled to reach out to people from as many different backgrounds as possible, and hence keep their activities very diverse so they appeal to different types of people.

There are two different lines of experience that inspires this need to reach out. The first is rooted in social expectations and suspicions that Muslim women are a liability to society entrapped in their own cultural constraints. Muslim immigrants and minorities are often regarded as difficult to integrate (Field, 2007), and Muslim women the victim of oppression (Kunst, Tajamal, Sam & Ulleberg, 2012). Muslims are also presented as problem citizens, uninterested in education or progress (Kunst et. al., 2012). The second is in embedded in more religious understanding keep the well-being of others as a priority. My

research participants' daily volunteering activities are entangled in both motivations, which are often in conversation with one another.

Flemish Education minister Hilde Crevits made a very controversial claim in March 2017, saying parents of ethnic minority children were not involved enough in their children's education. According to Crevits this was the primary reason why children did not do well in schools (De Morgen 2017). By adding that schools were ready to tackle these problems, and that it was the passiveness of parents that hinders this process, the minister attracted a lot of critical attention. Although there is no scientific data to back Crevits' remarks, the low educational levels of minority children has been a problem in the Belgian education system. Turkish and Moroccan students have been failing their exams and dropping out of school at a higher percentage than their peers (Phalet and Swyngedouw, 2003). The OECD PISA studies suggest that Turkish and Moroccan children show the highest gap in their mathematical and reading abilities among other OECD countries.

Stereotypes and problems associated with minority communities and especially Muslims have prompted my research participants to take matters into their own hands and find solutions. In their events, the volunteers usually target social problems and reflect on issues like unemployment, educational problems, radicalization, and in general the problem of 'integration', or indeed the lack of it. Elif reflected on this point over a coffee in her home. "We need to show that Islam is not like they (the non-Muslim) think it is: backward and closed to development. Or Muslims are not like they see on the media," she said grimly. The volunteers' daily endeavors mainly consist of thinking of ways to prove they are not "those kind of Muslims," she told me. This becomes actualized through volunteering in a very general framework.

The general expectation from volunteering in most societies is that it contributes to social cohesion and addresses social needs (Rochester et. al., 2010). It is not only the volunteers who expect a tangible result from their work but also policymakers and government actors. As expectations from volunteering rise, so do standards that determine its effectivity and impact. Volunteering has had a prominent place, especially in Western societies, for the last few decades giving way to what some have referred to a "volunteering industry". As the practice becomes an industry, "specialist profession has been underlined by the development of quality standards, training for those who manage the work of volunteers, and the establishment of a professional body for volunteer managers," (Rochester et.al., 2010, p. 3). The structure and organization that are aimed in volunteering do not fit the needs and aims of my research participants. Working with limited budget, limited

numbers of people and an agenda that changes depending on the political climate, my research participants constantly reflect on their priorities in weekly meetings and allocate their resources accordingly. While this may seem to be common sense, it also indicates very clearly that the benefits many voluntary organizations reap from professional and well-structured management simply does not apply for organizations run by minorities such as the Muslim women. The foremost aim of professionally trained managers, quality standards and performance measures are to improve the quality of volunteering experience (Manetti, Bellucci, Como and Bagnoli 2015), but what determines this experience when the volunteers are minorities who are challenged by social and political stigma is still an ambiguous and unanswered question.

In late 2016, my research participants started applying for grants made available by local administrations and the European Commission. Most of the grants they applied for concerned countering violent extremism (CVE). Although such grants were available before 2016 (Jaminé and Fadil, 2019) this newly found interest of my research participants towards CVE was based on a very important development, the March 22 terror attacks that took place in Brussels city and the airport. Over time, we discussed with the volunteer women about what CVE meant to them, young, urban, Turkish women who had never come across extremist actors in their own community. I was interested to know how they would reach out to those individuals who were described as extremist or actors with the potential to resort to violence. I was also very interested to know what kind of methodology they developed to counter extremism.

The scope of this paper does not include a detail about CVE projects the Muslim volunteers developed, but what I am trying to point out here is how deep a countries' agenda impacts the volunteers' sense of responsibility and social commitment. Indeed, my research participants were awarded with several grants from the city and also the European Commission. The overarching themes of these projects were to counter extremism through dialogue. As broad as this may seem, their methodologies consisted of organizing book clubs for community youth, spring festivals where adolescents could meet and make friends in safe spaces, and roundtables with policy-makers and academics. A year later when I asked my research participants if they were happy with the outcome of their project, they admitted it had been a learning curve. They explained their problems reaching out to non-Turkish (and especially Moroccan youth), and really being able to measure the impact of their events and programs. Nevertheless, nearly five years after the attacks the

volunteers continue with 'countering violent extremism with dialogue' programs at an increasing pace.

Margaretha van Es (2019) writes about how Muslims are expected to denounce extremism, an expectation that is exacerbated after every terrorist attack. By openly and loudly condemning extremism Muslims will be once again demonstrating their loyalty to the social contract and common social values, like freedom, gender-equality, respect to homosexuals (De Waal, 2017). Speaking from the Dutch context, Van Es points out that "Muslims' belonging to the Netherlands is conditional and depends on their constant pledge of loyalty" (2019, p. 146). Quite similarly, their volunteering activities are my research participants' pledge of loyalty and not just to clarify they do not support violence but explicitly show they are modern accomplished women. Elif's statement that they want to show *they are not like Muslims they see on the media* echoes in my head as I think about how the women push themselves to work more efficiently, reach out to as many people as possible and take on more duties at the association often after very long working hours. The need and expectation to prove themselves over and over again creates a culture of doing everything among the volunteers. This culture is not only a bar they set for themselves but also what their audience expect. Political actors, local administration, media, and the people who attend their events want to see a pro-active, efficient Muslim woman.

Littleton stated, "feminist scholars have discussed for decades the burdens many women in modern society face because of the demand that they have successful careers and functioning family lives" (Littleton, 1986, p. 1043). For Muslim women these burdens are also entangled with their religious identity and the compelling need to overcome negative stereotypes pushed on them and tackle all kinds of exclusion and discrimination they face (Göle, 2003). "*Our visibility is always questioned,*" said Esra a twenty-five-year-old young woman working as the secretary of the association. "People want to see us at the forefront of the events, like if we are organizing a panel or symposium, they want to see us sitting by male volunteers. Even if you are not interested in the topic or really learned in it, you take part because then the next question is "*are the female volunteers only interested in bake sales and cooking?*" Esra continued to explain the social pressure of always being seen and being efficient. She told me that many volunteers would not mind cooking or doing dishes, as they were also an important part of volunteering, but there was always the agenda to be seen and heard. When I asked them if their endeavors to be publicly active had made any visible changes in the perceptions of the larger society and policy-makers

towards them, the answer was always the same: "they tell us that we are not like other Muslim women, we are exemplary". The volunteers often convey this to me as an accomplishment on their part, often choosing not to discuss what this meant for those *other* Muslims who had not manifested tangible contributions to social welfare. On the one hand, the volunteers' contributions to society are appreciated and recognized. On the other hand, the idea that Muslims are active contributors to society is conditional, in that they visibly and continuously perform their contributions. This is an expectation directed to Muslim women maybe more than other active citizens, because as we have discussed before, their acceptance is based on their ability to demonstrate belonging.

Conclusion

This article started with the assertion that volunteering in modern societies is presumed to have a well-defined goal and methodology, and that volunteering organizations are managed similarly to companies. They give trainings, take on people specifically for the job, and have a system for human resources. This in some way sets a precedent for what volunteering should look like and when I discuss my research participants' volunteering activities there seems to be the lingering questions of *so what exactly do they do?* Throughout this article, I seek to critically interrogate the concept of volunteering and what it means for those whose agenda is not as clearly defined as conventional volunteers, and those who are also inspired by orthodox traditions. What does it mean to volunteer, when one of the essential guiding ethical parameters is religion? How are religious and social commitments entangled in a context where Islam and Muslims are confronted with compelling issues on a daily basis?

I start with unpacking the relationality of ethics. While most of the existing literature in the anthropology of Islam is concerned with the individualization of ethics, I suggest that society has a much more direct significance on the pious subject's ethical formation than is given credit for. Volunteering itself is the Islamic tradition of *infaq* rethought in relation to modern giving. It is a form of giving that can be appreciated and understood by the Western audience. In turn, it allows my research participants to address problems pertaining to their community. The more they are devoted to solving those problems the better Muslims they become and also take a step closer to becoming acceptable citizens. Yet, this has a profound effect on the way they construct volunteering. Having limited number of volunteers and such a wide agenda, my research participants establish a culture of doing everything where the volunteer

needs to prepared to be versatile. The agenda changes very quickly and accordingly, the volunteers need to adapt in terms of time management, labor investment and even learning new skills. This is far from professional management and can be described better in terms of "learning in the field". In many ways, this can negatively affect the process and outcome but what matters on an ethical level to the volunteers is that they addressed the problem on the table. In many ways this is also what society expects of them. Most of the time the outcome of a program or event weighs less for local administrators, and politicians than the fact that Muslims owned the responsibility of a specific issue pertaining to their communities. In this case, the impact of a program may be greater than its actual effectiveness on the ground. The impact it has for the volunteers is immeasurable, as they say *Allahu a'lem*.¹ it is ultimately God who will determine the true value of doing something for society.

¹ God Knows.

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ZAKAT GIVING TO NON-MUSLIMS: MUFTIS' ATTITUDES IN ARAB AND NON-ARAB COUNTRIES

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A heated cultural and religious debate endures in the Muslim world around the question of whether Islamic theology allows for giving religious philanthropy to non-Muslims, as individuals or nonprofit organizations. The debate pertains especially to the practice of zakat, which considered to be a religious practice of giving to Muslim compatriots. Yet in the context of contemporary times, with a global pandemic and growing interactions between Muslims and non-Muslim, the exclusivity of giving zakat to Muslim beneficiaries is being questioned in theological debates and in practice. Muftis are central in shaping the contours of this debate, since a growing number of fatwas (juristic decrees) are addressing the issue at stake. This calls for a focus on Muftis' attitudes towards giving zakat to non-Muslims through content analysis of fatwas. Our analysis reveals that Muftis in Arab countries tend to allow giving zakat only to non-Muslims residing in the same country. Muftis in non-Arab countries, as well as those who engage in preaching Islam to an English-speaking audience, tend to allow giving zakat to non-Muslims who live in non-Muslim countries. However, some Muftis in both Arab and non-Arab countries have conditioned that non-Muslim recipients of zakat must belong to the category of zakat recipients of Al-Muallafatu Qulūbuhum "those whose hearts are

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inclined towards Islam". Discussion on the implications of these findings is offered.

Keywords: Zakat to non-Muslims, fatwa, Muftis, Al-Muallafatu Qulūbuhum.

Introduction

Considered the main driver for philanthropy among Muslims, charity/almsgiving is not only material in nature, but it also has religious, social, emotional and cultural importance for Muslims, because it embodies both social solidarity and social welfare ideas and practice (Dean & Khan, 1997; Jawad, 2009). Muslim philanthropy is comprised of both, mandatory (zakat) and voluntary components (e.g., *sadaqah*, waqf). Zakat – the mandatory component of charity – is not only a moral virtue, but a religious obligation; one of the five pillars of Islam, and the bulk of Muslim charitable giving is done through zakat (Mahmood, 2019; Singer, 2008).

However, a cultural and religious debate exists in the Muslim world around the question whether Islamic theology allows for zakat giving to non-Muslims (e.g., Hamat & Hanapi, 2017). There is no definite theological agreement on the question of giving zakat to non-Muslims (Hamat & Hanapi, 2017). This debate is especially crucial in contemporary times given the growing interactions between Muslims and non-Muslim in a globalized world, and the growing need for financial contributions by individual donors across countries and religions. Muftis – the leading Islamic religious scholars – are central in shaping the contours of this debate. Since Muslim believers approach Muftis seeking their opinion theological and practical matters, they are also seeking advice on the issue of zakat giving to non-Muslim. Due to Muftis' central position in this debate, understanding the variation of their attitudes towards giving zakat to non-Muslims is necessary and important. Understanding Muftis' attitudes on this theological debate has implications for both individual donors as well as non-profit beneficiaries. It can shape the philanthropic landscape of both, Muslim-dominated countries as well as states where Muslims are a considerable minority group.

Accordingly, our research aims to answer the following questions: (1) what are the attitudes of Muftis regarding zakat giving to non-Muslims? (2) iff differences are found, are these differences aligned with the geographical location of Muftis in Arab and non-Arab

countries? To explore these questions, we content analyze fatwas (juristic decrees) of Muftis from around the world on the subject matter. The rationale of the study is to contribute to our in-depth understanding of the role of Islamic philanthropy in contemporary society.

In what follows, we first review Muslim philanthropy generally and the practice of zakat specifically, including discussion on recipients of zakat and an examination of the term *Al-Muallafatu Qulūbuhum*. Following description of our methodology, the second part of the paper will present the research results on Muftis attitudes toward zakat giving to non-Muslims based on analyzed fatwas, and offer some insights on these findings in the concluding section.

Review of the Literature

Definition of Philanthropy and Muslim Philanthropy

Philanthropy is a voluntary, private action done without seeking profit or other considerations. It seeks to create social change, improve the quality of life of others, and provide a long-term substantive solution to social problems (Anheier & List, 2005).

Concepts of philanthropy and social justice have a strong basis in Islamic teachings and practice (Paarlberg, 2021; Singer, 2008). Charity is the third of the five central tenants (pillars) in Islam (next after prayer in importance). It is considered as a form of worship and as a safety net for the benefit of the community (Singer, 2008), contributing to the redistribution of wealth in Muslim society and to the abatement of poverty (Dean & Khan, 1997). Indeed, the Qur'an mentions 63 terms related to doing good to others (Hasan, 2006), including: providing food to people who suffer from hunger, turning sadness into great joy, giving to relatives, caring for the disabled and those with special needs, relieving the suffering from natural disasters, caring for the sick, helping debtors, giving alms to slaves/prisoners of war and more (Rubin, 1998). For example, the Qur'an says:

Righteousness is the one who gives out wealth, despite the love of it, to the near of kin, the orphans, the needy, the wayfarer, those who ask, and for the sake of setting slaves free. (2:177)¹

¹ All references to the Qur'an are translations from Al-Hilali & Khan (1996).

In Islam, charity can be of two kinds: obligatory and voluntary. Obligatory charity consists of *zakat* and *zakat al-fitr*;² while voluntary charity includes *sadaqah* and *waqf* (charitable endowment) (Singer, 2008). This paper focuses on *zakat* only, and therefore the other giving mechanisms are not covered in detail.

The Importance of Zakat in Muslim Faith

The word *zakat* in Arabic translates to “that which purifies,” or “that which causes growth” (Basri & Khali, 2014; Habib, 2007). The practice of *zakat* is the first known system of community-wide welfare that is structured as a social support network for those in need (Rini, 2020). The Historian Michael Bonner, who studied poverty and charity in early Islamic society, asserts that pre-Islamic values of generosity and redistribution of wealth became institutionalized in the practice of *zakat* and *sadaqah* (Singer, 2018).

Because of its obligatory nature, part of a prescribed religious observance, *zakat* is a meaningful institution with a clearly defined religious socio-economic mandate. The hadith states that among the benefits of *zakat* is that it brings a servant closer to God, increases his or her faith and results in great reward from God.³ For example: *Giving charity wipes away sins just as water extinguishes the fire* (Bukhārī, 1956). Indeed, for Muslim believers, *zakat* is understood not as a philanthropic act, but as an expression of faith in God through obedience (Singer, 2018) while being a major economic driver and a tool for poverty alleviation, especially in Muslim countries (Powell, 2010; Rini, 2020). The payable amount of *zakat* for each individual is determined upon the amount of cash and the type of assets an individual possesses. The Qur'an does not specify a prescribed percentage of *zakat*. However, the customary practice (mentioned in the hadith) is to pay 2.5% on capital assets and 20% on assets such as agricultural goods, precious metals, minerals, and livestock (Al Qaradawi, 2000). Individuals' possessions can be classified as either *Zakatable* (i.e., a possession

² *Zakat Al-Fitr* is given by every Muslim at the end of the month of Ramadan. This mandatory charity is directed to the poor and the needy. The majority of scholars share the opinion that *Zakat Al-Fitr* is not to be given to non-Muslims.

³ E.g., “Whoever gives charity the size of a date, from that which is earned lawfully – since Almighty Allah only accepts that which is noble and lawful – Almighty Allah will indeed take it with His Right Hand and cause it to grow for its owner, just as one of you raises up his colt, to the point that the charity will become like the size of a mountain” (Sahih Al-Bukhari. <https://sunnah.com/bukhari:1410>).

subject to zakat) or non-*Zakatable* (i.e., a possession not subject to zakat) wealth. It is generally stated that any Muslim who possesses the minimum amount of value (*Nisab*) is liable to pay zakat, and those in poverty (without the minimum *Nisab*) are exempted (ibid).⁴ In many Muslim countries, the government is responsible for the collection and administration of zakat, and has established collection mechanisms – similar to tax systems – to do so (Powell, 2010).

Zakat Recipients

While the amount of zakat giving is somewhat uncertain in the scripts, the Qur'an gives a clearer depiction of who should enjoy from zakat distribution. The verse below is the most frequently cited to define those who are entitled to receive zakat (Singer, 2008):

Charity (Zakat) is solely for the poor, for the needy, for those employed to administer it, for those whose hearts have been inclined (to Islam), in (freeing) the captives, for those in debt, in the way of Allah, and for the wayfarer; a duty imposed by Allah; and Allah is the All-Knower, the All-Wise. (Surah 9:60)

This citation comprised of eight categories of zakat recipients: (1) the poor (*Al-Fuqarā'*) are those without sufficient means of livelihood (2) the needy (*Al-Masākīn*) are dependents who cannot meet their basic needs (3) those employed to administer it (*Al-Āmilīyn*) are zakat collectors, (4) *those whose hearts have been inclined to Islam (Al-Mu'allafatu Qulūbuhum)* (see below), (5) *the captives (Fir-Riqāb)* are slaves who have or intend to free from their master, (6) *those in debt (Al-Ghārimīn)* are those who have unintentionally accumulated overwhelming debt, (7) *in the way of Allah (Fī Sabīlillāh)* are those fighting for a religious cause (Jihad) or against the unbelievers but are not salaried, and (8) *wayfarers (Ibnu Al-Sabīl)* are travelers (for a worthy goal), or immigrants, who got cut off from their own means of living and need financial assistance. Zakat should not be given to family members but only for strangers.

It is important to note that all these zakat categories refer, in principle, to Muslim believers only. However, a heated cultural and religious debate has ensued in the Muslim world for centuries around the question whether Islamic theology allows for giving zakat to individuals or nonprofit non-Muslim beneficiaries (Basri & Khali, 2014; Hamat &

⁴ In *fiqh*, it is estimated that *Nisab* equals to 85 grams of pure gold; currently (May 2021) it amounts to approximately \$3,913 (<https://irusa.org/zakat-calculator/>)

Hanapi, 2017; Munir, 2014). This debate is reinforced in contemporary time, with growing interactions between Muslims and non-Muslims (Aziz, 2021). The verse itself does not indicate whether zakat should be decentralized, centralized, institutionalized or personalized to Muslim and Non-Muslim. However, in modern practice, this vagueness is utilized to allow the flexibility of zakat distribution in various circumstances, and to the nurturing of the question whether in a modern, technological and commercialized society, zakat could be used to cover the expenses of both Muslim and Non-Muslim civil society nonprofit organizations. Therefore, the exclusivity of giving zakat to Muslim beneficiaries is being probed (Basri & Khali, 2014).

Before delving into this debate, it is important to clarify the attitudes in Islam towards the 'stranger' and non-Muslims. In *fiqh*, non-Muslims residing in an Islamic state are called *Ḍimmī* (collectively *Ahl Al-Ḍimmah*). The term *Ḍimmī* literally means 'protected person', referring to the state's obligation under shari'a to protect non-Muslim's life, property and freedom of religion. The general policy in Islam is to guarantee full rights to non-Muslim populations; thus, people subscribing to other religions were granted full civic rights. The status of *Ahl Al-Ḍimmah* comes in exchange for loyalty to the state and payment of *jizyah* (tax levied on non-Muslims in Muslim countries, which complements the zakat paid by Muslims). In contrast to *Ḍimmī*, *Kāfir*s do not enjoy similar protections. *Kāfir* refers to a person who rejects or questions the tenets of Islam, and is thus often translated as 'infidel.' The term is used in different ways in the Qur'an, with the most fundamental sense being 'ungrateful' (toward Allah). *Kufr* means 'to be thankless', 'to be faithless', or 'ingratitude.' Its opposite is *Īmān* (faith).

The Debate Over Giving Zakat to Non-Muslim Recipients

One of the more noticeable and debated categories among the list of eight zakat recipients is *Al-Muallafatu Qulūbuhum*, which translates as 'those whose hearts are inclined to Islam.' In its original meaning, this category entails zakat recipients that include sympathizers to Islam, those expected to convert to Islam or who have converted, and potential allies whose relationship with the Muslim community needed to be strengthened. The meaning of the term has raised two questions regarding zakat giving: (1) who are the people included under the definition of 'whose hearts are inclined to Islam,' as this verse suggests, and (2) under what circumstances bringing these hearts close can be regarded a valid expenditure of zakat (Aziz, 2021).

Early Muslim scholars, like Al-Māwardī (11th century), restricted the permissibility of dispensing zakat to Muslim only, stating that non-Muslim can be granted support from sources other than zakat, such as *sadaqah* (Khalil & Zakaria, 2017). While giving zakat to non-Muslims is a debated issue, there is greater agreement regarding giving *sadaqah* to non-Muslims. Other scholars contended that non-Muslim qualify for zakat if they fall within the category of *Al-Muallafatu Qulūbuhum* (Aziz, 2021). Ibn Al-‘Arabī (2003, 2, p. 529), for example, wrote in the 12th century: “Such people should be given charity to win their hearts and minds, and furthermore, justice is compulsory in every situation, whether in war or in peace.” Similarly, Ibn Kathīr (1997, 4, p. 167) wrote in the 14th century:

Al-Muallafatu Qulūbuhum refers to those people who may be interested in becoming Muslims, and it is not necessary to inform them that they are being paid Zakat – while there are others who should be given Zakat for the sake of strengthening their Islam; and in order to build a positive and strong relationship with the non-Muslim community to avoid conflicts and tensions.

In other words, many early Muslim scholars alleged that recipients of zakat under the *Al-Muallafatu Qulūbuhum* category can be Muslims or Non-Muslims who are expected to either embrace Islam; or that their belief would be strengthened; or that they would defend the Muslims. These people were eligible, according to Islamic theology, to receive zakat to compensate them for the hardships they might endure in losing their family or community support due to converting their religion.

This approach regarding *Al-Muallafatu Qulūbuhum* has modern implications as well (Aziz, 2021; Mossiere, 2016). In present-day, opinions of Muftis in non-Muslim countries (such as Musharraf Hussain Al Azhari from the UK) and Arab countries (such as Al Qaradawi from Egypt) are heard arguing that there is no reason to confine dispensation of zakat to Muslims only, and that Muslims should be allowed to give zakat to non-Muslims, not for the sake of converting to Islam, but as an act of kindness and good citizenship (Munir, 2014; Caeiro, 2011). Finally, the third category of zakat recipients is *Al-Āmīlīn* or ‘those who administer it’, which refers to those who are responsible for the collection, distribution and management of zakat. We may infer that the salaries of workers in nonprofit organizations (including religious institutions such as Mosques) can be paid from zakat funds. Furthermore, religious organizations providing accommodation, board and lodging,

education and other facilities for students may receive the zakat, as they fall under the category of ‘those who administer it’. Therefore, since we must support the structures that are required for those who administer zakat, the organization is a legitimate recipient of zakat payments.

Study Goals and Significance

The debate over the issue of zakat giving to non-Muslims is even more relevant these days following the Covid-19 pandemic, because the global pandemic has challenged the nation-state divisions, rendering the study and its practical implications especially timely. Against the backdrop of this debate, this study aims to examine the attitudes of Muftis, in both Arab and non-Arab countries, on the topic of zakat giving to non-Muslim beneficiaries.

Muftis are central in shaping the contours of this debate because – as Muslim legal religious leaders – their influence on believers’ behavior and decisions is high (Caeiro, 2011). Beyond their legal-religious role, Muftis enjoy high social, cultural and spiritual legitimacy and privilege, hence their importance (ibid).

This calls for a focus on Muftis’ views regarding giving zakat to non-Muslims, as it is expressed in written fatwas. Fatwa is a formal juristic opinion or interpretation given by Muftis and is usually issued “in response to questions from individuals or Islamic courts” (Britannica, 2016) and is based in interpretation of the Qur’an and the hadith. Though considered authoritative, fatwas are generally not treated as binding judgments; a requester who finds a fatwa unconvincing is permitted to seek another opinion (ibid).⁵ Therefore, we find variation of opinions and numerous fatwas available throughout the Muslim regarding the contested issue of giving zakat to non-Muslims. This is a fertile ground for analytic review of Muftis’ attitudes toward zakat giving, as the results below suggest. While all Muftis draw their religious guidance from the Qur’an and the hadith, differences are inevitable because of varying interpretations of the sacred texts, both literally and politically.

The rationale of the study is to contribute to in-depth understanding of the role of Islamic cross-border philanthropy in routine and emergency times. Thus, this research seeks to answer two main questions: first, what are the attitudes of Muftis regarding zakat giving to non-Muslims? Second, if differences are found in Muftis’ attitudes,

⁵ The structure of a typical Fatwa includes: Name of the Fatwa requester and date of the request; name of the Mufti issuing the Fatwa and date of response; the question and the answer that includes: Introduction, Praise to God, body of the answer based on the Qur’an and the hadith, and conclusion.

are these differences aligned with the geographical location of Muftis in Arab and non-Arab countries, and why?

Methodology

This study utilizes a qualitative and quantitative method of analyzing of fatwas regarding the giving of zakat to non-Muslims.

Data collection

We collected a purposive sample of fatwas on the topic of zakat giving to non-Muslims. First, we searched for fatwas that were accessible via social media and websites, organizational publications or online archives. It is important to note that in some cases the fatwas were published by an organization, not necessarily attributing it to a specific Mufti, but rather uploading it on their website. Since the online available fatwas were limited, in a second step, the first author approached directly various Muftis from Arab and non-Arab countries with a direct question on this topic. Placing direct questions to the Muftis by Muslim believers is a common practice in Muslim culture. Muftis will then respond to the questions sent to them either in writing or orally. Analyzed responses were either in Arabic or in English.

The phrasing of the question read as follows:

Greetings. This fatwa will help me learn about your position on giving or not giving Zakat to non-Muslims and the various considerations that guided you in formulating this position. I would like to discuss your views about religious philanthropy and giving Zakat. My first question is, what are your views on the Islamic approach to religious philanthropy – specifically, about giving Zakat to non-Muslim beneficiaries (individuals, non-profit organizations, and communities)?

Data analysis

The collected fatwas were examined and coded according to several characteristics, such as source of fatwa (social media & Internet or direct approach to the mufti); length of fatwa. The fatwas were then divided into two main groups – those that were written by Muftis residing in Arab countries and those that were published in non-Arab countries. Finally, using content analysis tools, attitudes toward zakat-giving to non-Muslims were coded, divided by Muftis' country of residence. Our final

sample included 76 fatwas collected through the web and email. Table 1 summarizes the analyzed fatwas. We can see that more fatwas were collected from Muftis in Arab countries (68%) compared to fatwas collected from Muftis in non-Arab countries (32%). Non-Arab countries were as diverse as countries from Asia (India, Pakistan, and Malaysia), Europe (UK, France), North America, Africa, and Israel.

Table 1 - Analyzed fatwas by fatwa and Mufti characteristics (N=76)

Fatwa Characteristics	
Source of Fatwa	Direct data collection (email, WhatsApp) – 54% (41) Publicly available on web or social media – 46% (35)
Language of Fatwa	Arabic – 78.9% (60) English – 21.1% (16)
Mufti Characteristics	
Location of Mufti	Arab country – 68.4% (52) Non-Arab country – 31.6% (24)

Study Results

Analyzing the fatwas reveal agreement and variation in Muftis’ attitudes towards zakat giving to non-Muslim. Some of the Muftis appeared to be flexible dealing with giving zakat to non-Muslims, while preserving the rules of shari’a. In their rulings, some Muftis searched through classical texts to identify situations, opinions of early Islamic scholars, and Qur’an quotes that supports their conclusions. Others were strict in declaring zakat-giving as impermissible, typically making direct inferences from the Qur’an and the hadith, and rarely taking into consideration the opinion of other contemporary scholars or the contemporary context. Two observations were unanimously agreed among most Muftis. First is that giving zakat should first meets the demands of Muslims and be given to non-Muslim as a second priority, and in the case where there are no voluntary charity and alms such as *sadaqah* available to non-Muslims. Second, Muftis support zakat-giving to non-Muslims on an individual

basis under specific circumstances such as those who suffer from severe diseases, or constant hunger or a close non-Arab neighbor, or when almsgiving to needy non-Muslims are insufficient. These however are individual cases and not binding rulings.

With regards to variation of Muftis’ attitudes, we found three overarching approaches of Muftis to the question of broad giving zakat to non-Muslims:

- (1) *Those who support giving zakat to non-Muslims unconditionally,*
- (2) *Those who support giving zakat to non-Muslims under some conditions, and*
- (3) *Those who object giving zakat to non-Muslims.*

The following Table 2 sums the Muftis’ attitudes towards zakat giving to non-Muslim as reflected in their fatwas.

Table 2 – Attitudes toward Zakat-giving to non-Muslim, by country of Mufti

	(1) Oppose Zakat- giving	(2) Support Zakat- giving	(3) Support Zakat- giving under some conditions	Total
Muftis in Arab countries	40.4% (21)	30.8% (16)	28.8% (15)	100% (52)
Muftis in non-Arab countries	50.0% (12)	33.3% (8)	16.7% (4)	100% (24)
Total	43.4% (33)	31.6% (24)	25.0% (19)	(76)

The Table shows that almost two-thirds (56.6%) of the analyzed fatwas, written by Muftis in both Arab and non-Arab countries, support zakat-giving, whether fully or under some conditions (Columns 2 and 3). Those who support giving zakat to non-Muslims unconditionally are almost similar in percentage in Arab and non-Arab countries. On the other hand, only 43% of Muftis oppose the idea of zakat giving to non-Muslim (Column 1). Interestingly, higher percentage of Muftis in non-Arab

countries (50%; half of the sample of those Muftis) opposed zakat-giving to non-Muslim, compared to 40% only of Muftis in Arab countries. Indeed, Muftis in Arab countries seemed to rule more frequently that non-Muslim can benefit from zakat funds (60% of Muftis in Arab countries vs. 50% of Muftis in non-Arab countries). A detailed discussion is now suggested, connecting these findings to the category of *Al-Muallafa Qulūbuhum*, using a few examples.

First, Muftis who supported in their fatwas the giving zakat to non-Muslims seemed to be motivated by a universalistic approach of seeking social solidarity, sympathy and cooperation with neighboring residents. In England, for example, a leading Mufti opined that there is a strong argument to allow British Muslim to discharge their zakat to non-Muslims in order to show the kind nature of Muslim community, not as a bribe to become Muslims, but rather as an act of kindness and good citizenship:

I would like to clarify that juristic opinion on a fatwa depends on four things: the time, the place, the people and the circumstances. In the light of the above opinions of Muslim scholars, we can discern that British Muslims living in the limelight of media and in an Islamophobic environment must behave impeccably and morally in the best way. Paying Zakat is therefore a way of showing generosity and making friends. (Mufti in the UK who migrated from Pakistan).⁶

Second, those who support giving zakat to non-Muslims under some conditions were found to differ with regards to the conditions they pose for allowing such giving. One group suggested a geographic criterion: they supported giving zakat to non-Muslims only in the same country, and the reasons they include in the fatwas are for the sake of sympathy, care, and social justice. Those who hold this view are mostly Muftis in Arab countries among whose citizens one can find diverse non-Muslim populations (such as Copts in Egypt), or diversity of residents who belong to different Islamic Schools of Thought.

We can give non-Muslim the Zakah since the poor and the needy in Quran are not limited to Muslim, so when we fathom the verse of eight categories, we know the target population includes both Muslim and non-Muslim. So it is permitted to give non-Muslim, but especially the non-Muslim who lives in a Muslim country.

⁶ <https://www.musharrafhussain.com/payment-of-zakah/>

(Mufti in Arab country, personal communication)

Priority of Zakāt distribution should be given to the Muslim community according to the group of people identified in the Quran as eligible recipients of Zakāt; however, the government is allowed to distribute the Zakāt income to non-Muslims based on Islamic political needs and for the purpose of Islamic Da'wah (propagation). (a fatwa issued by a Dar Al-Ifta in a Muslim-majority Asian country)

The second group of Muftis posed a religious criterion: they permitted to pay zakat to non-Muslims on the condition that the recipients fall under the category of *Al-Muallafa Qulūbuhum*, from 'those whose hearts are inclined towards Islam'. For example, the viewpoint of scholars from the *Hanafi* School of Thought regarding *zakat al-fitr* is that it may be given to the People of the Book (i.e., the other monotheistic religions – Jews and Christians). These scholars have extended this ruling to general zakat, thus allowing for zakat to be given to non-Muslims of the People of the Book, subject to two conditions: (1) that giving to needy Muslim recipients is not curtailed by this; and (2) that there is no harm suffered from these non-Muslim recipients.

As for Zakat al Fitr, it can be given to Muslims or non-Muslims alike according to Abu Haneefah and his student Muhammad. But the majority of scholars disagree and state that it has to be given to Muslims (a fatwa issued by a Dar Al-Ifta in Egypt).⁷

Verse 60 of Surat 9 (At-Tawbah) does not confine the category of poor and needy to Muslims. Hence, it is evident that Zakah May Be Given To Muslim As Well As Non-Muslim Poor And Needy. As for the payment of Zakah to non-Muslim poor and needy, I have to add that I had in mind Christians and Jews and whoever we treat similarly such as Hindus and Zoroastrians (as the Prophet, peace and blessings be upon him, said to treat them like the People of the Book) who live with Muslims peacefully. The permissibility is limited to this category. (Mufti in an Arab country that others have also relied on his opinion).⁸

⁷ <https://zakat.unhcr.org/blog/en/fatwa/dar-al-ifta-al-missriyyah>

⁸ <https://aboutislam.net/counseling/ask-the-scholar/acts-of-worship/can-give-zakah-non-muslims/>

As for Zakat, it should only be given to the Muslims. It can be given to such non-Muslims who are interested in Islam and their hearts may be won by this kind gesture. As for Sadaqah, it can be given to needy non-Muslims as well or to such non-Muslim foundations that are working for the welfare of poor and the needy. Similarly, donations can be accepted from the non-Muslims for all general purposes except for building the mosques or printing the copies of the Quran. (Mufti in an Arab country)

A third group focuses its condition for zakat giving to the organizational criterion: Organizations, even non-Muslim working in support of Muslim poor and needy or for the greater good, are allowed to receive zakat even if the organization is not considered Muslim.

Donating to non-Islamic charities etc. will be permissible on condition that the funds are not used to promote other religions. In many instances organisations that do charity projects for the poor, use the opportunity to promote their religion and ideology. (Mufti in a non-Arab country)

It is allowed for Muslims to give their alms to the non-Muslims like a Copts who are in need of money, treatment, or protection from the COVID-19 disease, the fatwa in Egypt said. (Mufti in an Arab country)

This condition is connected to the third category of zakat recipients -- *Al-Āmilīyn* or ‘those who administer it’ – suggesting that permission to give zakat to non-Muslim organizations is not necessarily connected to the category of *Al-Muallafa Qulūbuhum*. Finally, those who oppose zakat giving to non-Muslims seemed to mainly include Muftis who live in homogenous Islamic societies, such as (Jordan and Saudi Arabia). These Muftis have excluded the fourth category of zakat recipients (*Al-Muallafatu Qulūbuhum*) from those eligible to enjoy zakat. They state that since zakat is the RIGHT of poor Muslims, it cannot be paid to non-Muslims. However, these Muftis tended to emphasize that it is still permissible to give the voluntary *sadaqah* donations to non-Muslims.

Zakat cannot be paid to non-Muslims given that Zakat is the right of the poor Muslim. However, it is permissible to give optional Sadaqahh to non-Muslims. (Mufti in a non-Arab country)

There is difference of opinion on this [question]. In some schools,

there are specific ways in which non-Muslims could be given Zakat through the category "those whose hearts are to be reconciled" (al-mu'allafati qulubuhum) mentioned in the Quran [Quran, 9.61] This category is, however, considered abrogated in the Hanafi school. (Mufti of the Hanafi School in a non-Arab country)

The fuqaha' have mentioned explicitly that giving charity--besides Zakat--is recommended for good causes, worldly or religious--including non-Muslim worldly causes. (Mufti in an Arab country)

Discussion and Conclusions: Explaining Muftis' Attitudes

The Covid-19 pandemic and its effects on the global economic situation raised many jurisprudential issues of solidarity among peoples, nations and religions. Some of these issues were recently addressed by Muftis in their fatwas, in an effort to come up with legal provisions for the question of the place of Muslims in multicultural societies. One of the most important questions that stands at the heart of this paper focuses on the permissibility of paying zakat to non-Muslims. Philanthropic acts of generosity are important and worthy of appreciation, not only in their humanistic aspect but also in the social, political and cultural meanings lying behind them (Aziz, 2021). In recent years, the issue of generosity and giving of a Muslim person to non-Muslim has received growing attention in academic discussions (e.g., Hamat & Hanapi, 2017; Mossiere, 2016).

A close examination of 76 fatwas in this paper revealed that the Mufti's opinions and attitudes are divided into two competing camps. The first minority camp advocated a minimalist approach arguing that philanthropic acts of zakat should only be performed within the Muslim community, and accordingly giving should be proceeded to Muslim associations only. These Muftis have left out the fourth category of worthy recipients of zakat ('those whose hearts are inclined towards Islam'). The second majority camp of Muftis support zakat-giving – whether fully or under some conditions --- basing their opinion on religious-historic justifications, political justifications and organizational justifications. While Muftis from this camp still emphasize the priority of paying zakat to Muslims as the first stage, because zakat helps needy Muslims and because it fulfils Muslim religious obligations as prescribed in the Qur'an and the hadith, they are still open to accept and advocate

zakat-giving to non-Muslims. Overall, Muftis in this camp present a more universalistic approach of humanistic acts of generosity that must be done without discrimination of religion or race, and to some degree is meant to appease the negative attitudes towards Islam in the global world and to allow the non-Muslim population to adopt a more positive stance towards Islam. Muftis explain that giving alms, zakat and obligatory payments to non-Muslims is a way to attract their heart towards Islam in general, and a way of applying social solidarity, which is at the heart of a universalistic attitude of Islam. Giving zakat to non-Muslims is important to attract people to Islam or to give a positive view about Islam in non-Muslim countries, especially in contemporary times where a great number of misconceptions are spread about Islam.

The fatwa analysis suggested five main motivation for zakat giving to non-Muslims

First, the call for integration, not closure. Islam wants to encourage the integration of Muslims in a non-Islamic environment, and zakat for non-Muslims helps improve their view of Islam, which helps to integrate Muslims into non-Islamic countries and the integration of non-Muslims into Islamic countries is also an important factor (Aziz, 2021). The Muftis from the Arab Islamic world tend to give zakat to non-Muslims in the view of humanity and as an integration of non-Muslims in Islamic countries. Muftis in Arab countries recommend giving zakat not only from a religious but also a national point of view. On the other hand, Muftis in non-Arab countries recommend paying zakat to non-Muslims to integrate Muslims as minorities by giving a good image of Muslims in Islamic countries, and by giving a good image of coexistence with Muslims. It also encourages non-Muslims to give alms to non-Muslims, just as the Muftis in non-Arab countries wanted to resort to coexistence with non-Muslims for the public's need and interest.

Second: Social solidarity, which is benevolence to non-Muslims as well, and this is stipulated in the Qur'an and Sunnah, and the public interest and solidarity requires giving money to non-Muslims, which increased the flexibility of Muftis to give zakat to non-Muslims (Basri & Khali, 2014). The Muftis in non-Arab countries rely more on the current circumstances. They give fatwas according to the urgent need and the special conditions they live in. In the Arab Islamic world, they generally speak without mentioning the experience of a country.

Third, the exchange of charity, because today we see that non-Muslims donate to the poor and needy without discrimination in most matters to the religion of the helper, just as Islamic countries take aid

from non-Muslims either to individuals or groups, and as a matter of priority, the exchange of alms and zakat is important in the continuity of the thing (Singer, 2018).

Fourth: National Identity. A Muslim in non-Islamic countries wants to be an effective island in non-Islamic countries and he must not differentiate between people because of religion, and this leads to non-Muslims will not differentiate between people because of religion, that is, as they are treated (Hamat & Hanapi, 2017).

Fifth, the intimate relationship with non-Muslims increases the love of religions and the love of people, especially because of the spread of politics that leads to hatred between religions, and with this, zakat is a means to bridge the rift and reduce tension between religions, which helps to spread love between religions, and zakat is a lever and an essential factor in achieving the studded goal (Singer, 2008). There is a tendency among the Muftis in the Arab world to give zakat to non-Muslims due to social and economic factors. Improving the situation of non-Muslims in Arab countries can lead to an improvement in the economic situation of non-Muslims, which foretells an improvement in the general economic issue, meaning that the benefit for Muslims as well. In non-Arab countries, they look at the matter, or in terms of more tangible, realistic conditions. In the Arab Islamic world, there is more flexibility, although zakat is subject to many and strict conditions, but the flexibility is due to the general call for global Islam and the work to achieve social solidarity. As for the non-Arab Islamic world, either they always agree or they completely disagree, that is, there is no opinion between the two matters, because the conditions in the non-Arab Islamic world are more variable, which leads to a trend of opinion, either general prohibition or general permissibility.

In conclusion, the issue of zakat-giving to non-Muslims has intensified in recent times making this study and its implications especially timely (Hamat & Hanapi, 2017). This debate has received academic credence in this article, which hopefully will contribute to the mapping of the role of Islamic cross-border philanthropy in routine and emergency times. Future research could include semi-structured interviews with Muftis to deepen understanding of the social, cultural, economic and political motivations underlying the process of Muftis' decision-making regarding zakat giving to non-Muslims. The precedent event that humanity copes with these days, namely a global pandemic that affects Muslims and non-Muslims alike, may have great implications on this matter.

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ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN MUSLIMS IN THE SERVICE OF PEOPLE IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES

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Palestinian people living in Israel confront a dual existence. On one hand, they struggle for equal rights and inclusion; on the other, they oppose occupation and violation of human rights in the Occupied Territories. Indeed, this dual existence is particularly complex for Muslim citizens in Israel. In this article, we study Israeli Muslims who volunteer within Occupied Territories and compare them to those who volunteer within the borders of Israel. Based on a survey of 392 Israeli Muslim volunteers, one-third volunteered in Occupied Territories. Contrary to our expectations, Muslim volunteers in Israel encountered more friction with Israeli security forces. Also contrary to our expectations, volunteers in Israel were more engaged in issues of human rights, whereas Occupied Territory volunteers were focused on child welfare and poverty-alleviation services. Thus, we find that military governance of Occupied Territories prevents political volunteering, limiting politically motivated volunteering to citizens of Israel in Israel itself.

Key words: Volunteering, Cross-border, Palestinians, Muslims

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Background

Since the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948 and for almost twenty years (until 1967), Israeli Palestinians¹ were subject to martial law that restricted their movement, means of employment, and residences, which severely restricted opportunity and isolated them from the Jewish majority and regional Arabic countries (Barzilai, 2000; Kimmerling & Migdal, 2009). A year after martial law was lifted, the Six Day War of 1967 took place. By consequence, Israeli Palestinians saw their neighbors and relatives placed under Israeli military Governorate—a military governance system—in the Occupied Territories (Louis & Shlaim, 2012).

Existing research has attended to the various complexities of Israeli Palestinian identity (Mi'ari, 2009). Even something as simple as naming one's identity group is vexed in this context. For example, Palestinians who did not leave Israel were initially identified as *Israeli Arabs*. However, they are currently identified as *Palestinians in Israel* or *Palestinians with Israeli citizenship*. Zoabi (2020) suggested referring to this group as *the left behind*, indicating that they stayed after the war of 1948, and remained loyal to their group-identity despite state efforts to erase their significance. Indeed, for many years, the State of Israel aimed to exclude Israeli Palestinians from public life in Israel, preventing formation of a clear ethnic identity. Thus, naming was limited to terms that suggest an outsider status: Arabs in Israel or Israeli Arabs (Rohna & Khoury, 2015; El-Sakka et al., 2017). State pressure effectively impeded self-definition for this minority community.

Israeli Palestinians comprise 21.1% of Israel's population (Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, 2020). While Israeli Palestinians are religiously heterogeneous, most of them are Sunni Muslims (83.2%) (Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics, 2018), and Muslims represent 17.9% of the population overall. Even with these differences, many scholars presume homogeneity among Israeli Palestinians, as they are most commonly presented in comparison to the Jewish majority. In this paper, we focus on Israeli Palestinians who are Muslim. Notably, antagonistic relationships with neighboring Arab countries impact the ways Israeli Muslims are treated and understood in Israel. Whereas many

¹ The terms "Palestinians in Israel" and "Israeli Palestinians" will be used here to refer to Palestinian or Arab citizens of Israel, excluding the Palestinians of East Jerusalem who have permanent residency status. The term "Palestinians" with no added qualification will be used here to refer to people who live in the Occupied Territories of Judea and Samaria or the Gaza Strip.

Muslims in the West live under Christian majorities, Israeli Muslims are the only ones to live under a Jewish majority.

Jewish Israeli society often perceives Israeli Palestinians both as an unwanted minority and as a potential fifth column. In a region where Israel stands as a small Jewish island among many millions of Arab Muslims, Israeli Palestinians are often treated with distrust and suspicion (Cohen, 2011; Pappé, 2011; Rohana & Huri, 2015). Furthermore, for many Jewish Israelis, Israeli Palestinians pose a demographic threat—the fear that Palestinians will become the dominant demographic group in Israel (Abulof, 2014; Yonah, 2004)—when counted alongside Palestinians in the Occupied Territories. In response, Israeli Palestinians are a minority that is systematically marginalized, isolated, and controlled. For the State of Israel, Palestinian citizens represent a minority in need of surveillance and control (Ali, 2012; Jamal, 2005).

Jewish Israelis and Israeli Palestinians are segregated geographically and socially so that each group lives in its own sphere. For example, while Israeli Jews may intermarry regardless of ethnicity, Jewish-Palestinian marriages are almost nonexistent. Kaplan and Herbst-Debby (2018) studied mixed-ethnicity marriages in Israel and reported “very few couples who crossed the most polarized boundary in the Israeli context – Israeli Jews married to Israeli Palestinians” so much so that they “could not test for their marital dissolution patterns” (p. 305). Furthermore, Hakak (2016) recorded many state-supported policies and organizations that worked against such mixed marriages. Almost as a rule, Jews and Palestinians do not reside in the same local authorities, except for a few historically mixed towns (Monterescu & Rabinowitz, 2007). Jews and Palestinians in Israel rarely interact socially, and a majority of members on both sides agree that their interrelationships are worse than they were following the 1948 war (Hermann, 2017).

Israeli Palestinians live under a Jewish state in a condition Rabinowitz (2001) called a “trapped minority”:

A trapped minority is a segment of a larger group spread across at least two states. Citizens of a state hegemonized by others, its members are alienated from political power. Unable to influence the definition of public goods or enjoy them, its members are at the same time marginal within their mother nation abroad. (p.64)

Israeli Palestinians are segregated from the Jewish majority based on history, religion, ethnicity, language, and culture. At the same time, they are not easily accepted or part of the wider Arab world, even by those

living in the Occupied Territories (Cavanaugh, 2019). Palestinians in Israel are also conflicted regarding their position vis-à-vis their compatriots in the Occupied Territories. On the one hand they hope and aim for the occupation to end, but on the other hand they want to maintain their own status and struggle for equality in Israel. As such, while supporting the human rights and quality of life of those in the Occupied Territories, Israeli Palestinians are also engaging in advancing their social and economic status in Israel. This unique existence is further complicated, according to Jabareen (2014), as Palestinians in Israel are “the first and only Arab group in modern history that has become a homeland minority” (p. 189).

From the perspective of national welfare policies, heterogeneous societies—especially those with distinct ethnic minority groups—often provide minority groups with inferior responses to their needs (Banting et al., 2006), forcing them to develop and manage their own services (Weisbrod, 1988, 1998). Since the State of Israel became independent, Israeli Palestinians, most of whom are Muslims, have been a designated ethnic minority that is continuously discriminated against and underserved by the state (Cnaan, 1985; Israeli, 2020; Coursen-Neff, 2003; Haidar, 1994; Herzog, 1999; Yiftachel, 1997). While Israeli Palestinians are covered by all Israeli laws (with the exception of the service in the Israeli Defense Forces) and are equal citizens in theory, but in practice they are second-rate citizens. Indeed, this longstanding implicit discrimination became explicit in 2018, when the Knesset passed the 2018 Israeli Basic Law: Israel as the Nation-State of the Jewish People, which stated unequivocally that Israel is only for Jews (Zoabi, 2020).

Most Israeli Palestinians live in Arab-majority towns and cities, and eight of Israel's ten poorest cities are majority Arab in population (Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics, 2020). Most Palestinian children in Israel attend different schools than Jewish Israelis, and usually with lower educational attainments (Arar, 2012). Only upper-class families send their children to Catholic or elite Jewish schools. Consequently, Palestinian Israelis do not fare well in admission to higher education institutions (Arar, 2012; Al-Haj, 1995; Feniger et al., 2015; Lissitsa, 2015). Palestinian Israeli families compose 15% of total families, yet they represent 38% of poor families in the country (Mayers-JDC-Brookdale, 2018). Even in regard to injury and mortality from road accidents, Israeli Palestinians fare worse than their Jewish compatriots (Magid et al., 2013). Arab political parties are legal and have participated in all Israeli elections. However, there was longstanding national consensus that no leading Jewish party would include an Arab party to

join a government coalition (Zeedan, 2019, Galnoor, 2020). This was broken for the first time in 2021 in an eight-party coalition to topple the Likkud party of Benjamin Netanyahu.

Israeli Palestinians Today

Jamal (2011) noted that Israeli Palestinians have undergone major social and economic change in the past two decades. One notable change is the modernization of this population, evident in adoption of a more Western lifestyle characterized by increasing numbers of women in higher education and employment, increased consumerism and professionalization, and decreased fertility. While slow, the trend is evident (Bank of Israel, 2019). In addition, these changes contributed to the rise of a middle class within the Palestinian community, with the Bank of Israel (2019) reporting that 28% of Palestinian families are now middle class. While still lagging far behind their Jewish counterparts in many respects, Israeli Palestinians made major inroads into mainstream society since 2000. While they persist, education and income gaps are narrowing. In many professional fields like nursing, law, pharmacy, and medicine, Israeli Palestinians are equal to or exceeding numbers of Jewish professionals (Fuchs, 2017).

Changes to gender roles are equally striking. As more Israeli Palestinian women pursue education, more women are joining the labor force. From being almost non-existent in the early 1950s, many married Israeli Palestinian women now contribute to their dual-income families at rates nearing the Jewish population. Furthermore, Israeli Palestinian young women are attending higher education institutions with the intention of being employed upon graduation (Stier, 2013). Simultaneously, the percentage of low-skilled workers among Israeli Palestinians dropped and those holding advanced degrees in professional fields grew (Khattab & Miaari, 2013). However, these occupational advancements should be taken in context. While women's employment doubled since 1970, it is still significantly lower than the rise in employment among Jewish women in Israel (Yashiv & Kaiser, 2013). Indeed, CBS (2019) reports that 40% of adult Israeli Palestinian women are active in the labor force, as compared with 74.2% of Jewish women.

The rise in higher education is also a bittersweet development. The Israel Council of Higher Education (2019) reported an increase in percentage of Israeli Palestinians in higher-education institutions from 10% in 2008 to 18% in 2018. Indeed, this rise is impressive, especially in that it includes participation in STEM disciplines, especially health-related professions. However, alongside this progress, Palestinian

students are increasingly withdrawing from their education, and a growing number are leaving the country to study abroad because they cannot study their disciplines of choice in Israel, especially health-related professions (Krill & Amariye, 2019).

Irrespective of socio-economic improvements, a wide gap in municipal services and state support leaves the Israeli Palestinian community woefully underserved (Lavie, 2018). In response to this neglect, Israeli Palestinians developed their own parallel services through civic engagement (Zidane, 2000; Eseed, 2017). The rise in Palestinian civic engagement is divided into secular and religious nonprofits working in a complementary manner (Zoabi, 2020). Even so, most of these nonprofit organizations are underfunded, under-supported by state authorities, and struggle to be sustainable (Shihadeh & Saabneh, 2015). Jamal (2017) argued that these Palestinian Israeli civic organizations allow the community to coexist with the state while also counteracting Jewish conservative trends and demanding equality in public services. Furthermore, these critical civic organizations allow for social and political discourse that effectively advances the needs and interests of Israeli Palestinians. However, such civic organizations become successful, the state views them as threat (Eseed, 2017).

In this article, we study Israeli Muslim Palestinians who are engaged in cross-border volunteering; they assist Palestinians residing in the Occupied Territories. They help the counterparts who have no Israeli citizenship and with overwhelming unmet needs. We use variations of the phrase *helping Palestinians from or in Occupied Territories*. This use of *from* and/or *in* implies people who help Palestinians currently residing within the Occupied Territories, but also volunteers who intentionally and directly help people *from* Occupied Territories when they come into Israel. These can include people who need legal and courtroom translation, individuals requiring medical assistance in Israeli hospitals, and people from the Occupied Territories who are allowed to work in Israel.

In the next section, we discuss different statuses of Israeli and Occupied Territories Palestinians, and their varied mobility and services access. We also discuss Israeli Palestinians' interest—especially Muslims—in helping Palestinians in Occupied Territories through cross-border volunteering. This section concludes with a set of related hypotheses. After a research methods section, the findings are presented. Finally, we discuss and offer a conclusion regarding religious-political volunteering among Israeli Muslim Palestinians.

Palestinians in the Occupied Territories

The establishment of Israel in 1948 shocked Palestinian society, effectively creating a split between those who stayed behind and became Israeli citizens and those who fled or were forced to leave. Those who fled lived in refugee camps alongside other Palestinians in Jordan (the West Bank) and Egypt (Gaza Strip), or in nearby Arab countries (Abu Saada & Abu Al Nahl, 2016). Largely, this division still exists. According to the Palestinian Bureau of Statistics (2020), there are 5.2 million Palestinians in the Occupied Territories, 3.1 million in the West Bank, and 2.1 million in the Gaza Strip. Consequent to the Oslo Accords, many West Bank Palestinians reside under Israeli military governance, and the rest are restricted and indirectly controlled by the Israeli settlers and the temporary military governance (Mi'ari, 2009; Stern, 2020).

As noted above, between 1948 and 1967, Israeli Palestinians were isolated from their relatives and compatriots. After the 1967 war, Israel captured these Territories and new relationships were formed between the two Palestinian groups with little restrictions. However, in response to the Palestinian uprising (Intifada) in 1987, Israel built a wall separating the Occupied Territories from Israel, preventing Palestinian travel from the Occupied Territories without special permission. Thus, these two Palestinian populations lived separately and developed different organizations, identities, and life expectations (Ghanim, 2015; Mana et al., 2015).

Some families were even separated in 1948. Thus, some families may have different legal statuses, and their communications and interactions may be illegal. Yet, these two groups of Palestinians are actively interacting. Cross-border marriages occur regularly, and wives from the Occupied Territories may come live with their Israeli Palestinian husbands in the State of Israel. Visits between Israeli and Occupied Territories Palestinians are common. However, Israeli Palestinians can travel more freely than Palestinians in Occupied Territories. Palestinians on both sides of the separation wall feel trapped (Menahem, 2010). Pasquetti (2015) noted, "Studies of transnationalism typically frame it in opposition to the entrapping effects of borders. Yet, for many people, transnationalism is negotiated in contexts marked by forced separation and differential mobility" (p. 2738). Similarly, residents of the Occupied Territories are limited in their ability to travel, reunite with relatives from other countries, build new neighborhoods, access quality services, and enjoy health and happiness (Ryan, 2015). Palestinians from the Occupied Territories who want to enter Israel must obtain special permits for work, health services, family gatherings, or similar reasons. Permits are often denied, and even when approved, entry

is subject to long delays at the discretion of soldiers controlling the gates that separate Israel from the Occupied Territories. Israeli citizens, however, can go in and out with few restrictions (Human Rights Watch, 2020).

The relationship between Israeli Palestinians and Occupied Territories Palestinians is rarely studied. One exception is the trend of young Israeli Palestinians who study in the Occupied Territories after these institutions of higher education were recognized by the State of Israel as part of the Oslo Accords (Arar & Haj-Yehia, 2016, 2020).

Cross-Border Volunteering

Life for Palestinians in the Occupied Territories portends high rates of poverty and limited social, educational, and health services. Furthermore, safety and security are highly compromised. In response to these poor conditions, some Israeli Palestinians volunteer to help their counterparts in or from Occupied Territories.

Research on volunteering among Israeli Palestinians is both limited and contradictory. For example, Zidan (2005) reported a meteoric rise in volunteering among Israeli Palestinians from 28% in 1997 to 70% in 2002. By contrast, the CBS (2019) reported only 6% of Israeli Palestinians aged 20 and over volunteered in 2018, even as other signs of civic engagement such as growth in new nonprofit organizations suggest otherwise. Similarly, philanthropic donations are also on the rise among Israeli Palestinians (CBS 2019). As described above, the majority of Israeli Palestinians are Muslim. According to Zidane (2005) there is a direct and strong relationship between religion and generosity. For example, among formal volunteers to nonprofit organizations, religiously affiliated Israeli Palestinians were second in numbers only to those volunteering to nonprofits aiming for civic improvement. Jamal (2017) noted two volunteering and civic-engagement trends among Israeli Muslims: one more progressive cohort, striving for democratization and social inclusion; and another more conservative cohort, focused on education, religion, and basic welfare services. Both trends are applicable to cross-border volunteering.

Volunteering for people in and/or from the Occupied Territories can be seen as a political statement. Israeli Palestinians engaged in such activity likely oppose occupation and wish to demonstrate their resistance to Israeli military governance. However, no previous study has examined the political side of this type of cross-border volunteering.

In summary, in the past few years, a type of volunteering is emerging: Israeli Palestinian volunteers meet Palestinians from the

Occupied Territories and help them, whether by crossing into the Occupied Territories or by supporting Palestinians from Occupied Territories in Israel. This unique cross-border volunteering was never studied before and is the focus of this research. Given that most Palestinians are Muslims, we focus this paper on Israeli Muslims engaged in cross-border volunteering and compare them to Israeli Palestinians who volunteer within the 1967 borders of Israel. We aim to answer the following questions:

1. *Do the socio-demographic characteristics of Israeli Muslims who help Palestinians from Occupied Territories differ from those who volunteer inside Israel only?*
2. *Do Israeli Muslims who help Palestinians from Occupied Territories feel more threatened or harassed by the Israeli State than those who volunteer in Israel only?*
3. *Do Israeli Muslims who help Palestinians from Occupied Territories report higher rates of religiosity than those who volunteer in Israel only?*
4. *Do Israeli Muslims who help Palestinians from Occupied Territories report higher rates of political interest than those who volunteer in Israel only?*

Methodology

Procedures

Data were collected in Israel between February and April 2021. Eligible participants were Muslims who were citizens or residents of Israel who volunteered within the State of Israel and/or the Occupied Territories. We excluded respondents who did not volunteer and non-Israeli citizens/residents. Some volunteers who resided in Jerusalem were not full citizens of Israel but are nonetheless under Israeli State authority as residents of Jerusalem. Thus, we included them in the sample. About 715 individuals started the questionnaire, but many of them did not volunteer, were not Muslims, or did not complete the questionnaire. Based on our criteria, we ended with a sample size of 392 respondents.

We advertised the study in Arabic social media and shared it with many volunteer organizations. We also asked respondents to share it with other volunteers. As such, this is not a representative sample, but one that includes a large number of respondents (N = 392) who reside in communities across Israel.

We did not include any identifying variables in the survey instrument. However, some potential respondents feared government control and elected not to participate for this reason. The survey instrument was loaded on the online survey platform, Qualtrics, and a web link was shared with potential respondents. The survey included 78 items and took 15–25 minutes to complete. Respondents did not receive any form of payment for participation, and the study was approved by the first author's university IRB.

Questionnaire

The questionnaire was composed after a lengthy discussion between the authors and a group of experts, with most parts initially written in English. The text was then translated into Arabic. The three sub-scales of Islamic orientation and a few other elements were originally composed in Arabic and translated to English. Later the questionnaire was re-translated from Arabic to English with very few inconsistencies. Following procedures described by Brislin (1980), both versions were compared and adjusted by the authors to ensure that the English version matched the Arabic version.

The questionnaire began with a small set of socio-demographic variables followed by the respondent's volunteer experience and a question about volunteering location. Then, we introduced 24 questions regarding motivation to volunteer. This section was based on previous scales, as well as additional items focusing on Islamic commitment and political orientation. The questionnaire concluded with three sub-scales of Islamic orientation.

Variables

Our dependent variable was location of the volunteer work. We distinguished between two sub-groups: those who volunteered only within the borders of Israel (as established prior to 1967) and those who volunteered only or also in Occupied Territories (the Gaza strip and/or West Bank).

We included a set of control variables that related to respondent socio-demographic background (gender, age, education, and marital status), as well as volunteer experience (how long they volunteered, number of monthly volunteer hours, and field of volunteering). Gender was a binary variable of male or female. Originally, we had five age categories. However, only five respondents were older than 60 years; as such, we combined this group with the nearest category (45–60) to make the group

age 45 and older. Education was a three-category variable, comprised of high school or below, undergraduate degree, and master's degree or higher. Regarding marital status, we found a very small number of widowed or separated respondents. We included them with singles and compared them to those who were married. Months of volunteering and average hours of volunteering per month were recorded numerically by respondents. Regarding fields of volunteering, respondents reported six areas such as child welfare, medical care, and human rights.

To test religion and political interest as factors of cross-border volunteering, we used a 24-item motivation-to-volunteer scale based on previous studies (Cnaan & Goldberg-Glen, Clary, 1991). Some motives were added for this sample that were either Islamic oriented or politically oriented. Political statements centered on meeting people in the Occupied Territories, supporting the Palestinian cause, and empowering Israeli Palestinians. We aimed to find factor structures within these 24 items, but almost all variables were loaded best on the first factor. As such, we treated them individually.

Regarding Islamic orientation, we used three sub-scales from the Psychological Measure of Islamic Religiousness (Amer, 2021; Abu-Raiya et al., 2008). We selected these three sub-scales after consultation with the developer of the scale, and it was provided for us in Arabic. The three subscales were Islamic Ethical Principles & Universality subscale (with items such as being humble, honoring the parents, treating people equitably, helping relatives and neighbors); Islamic Principles and Universality subscale (with items such as viewing every Muslim in the world as a brother or sister, identifying with every Muslim's suffering); and Islamic religious Duty, Obligation & Exclusivism subscale (with items such as "Islam is Allah's complete, unfailing guide to happiness and salvation, which must be totally followed"). The Cronbach Alpha reliabilities of these scales ranged from .830 to .964.

Analyses

To answer questions of difference between those who volunteer only in Israel and those who volunteer to help people in the Occupied Territories, we first conducted a set of bivariate analyses. We tested the socio-demographic variables and the volunteering experience, the various motivations to volunteer, and the three sub-scales of Islamic orientation. We applied T-test for differences in means and Pearson Chi Square tests for nominal variables to determine differences in the dependent variable.

To study the full effect of all the studied variables, we ran a binary logistic regression. We used dummy variables for education and marital status, keeping those with education levels of high school or below and human rights as volunteer field as references.

Findings

Sample

Our sample consisted of 392 Muslim citizens of Israel who volunteered in the past year. As visible in Table 1, a majority of respondents were younger women with an above-average level of education. Only about a third of them (34.7%) volunteered in Occupied Territories.

See Table 1

Table 1 shows that the two studied groups were not statistically different in three of four socio-demographic variables. The only exception was age. Younger participants (i.e., the two groups under 30 years of age) were significantly less likely to volunteer in the Occupied Territories ($X^2 = 10.74$, $df = 3$, $p < .05$).

Regarding level of religiosity, all three studied subscales showed no significant differences between the two groups. As we will discuss later, this finding suggests that helping people in the Occupied Territories is not religiously motivated.

We did find some significant differences regarding volunteer experience. Hours of volunteering per month did not yield any significant difference. However, lengths of involvement in volunteering (measured in months), showed a significant difference between the groups. Those volunteering in Israel only reported an average of 25.7 months (a little over two years) as compared with 43.3 months (about three and a half years) for those volunteering in the Occupied Territories ($t = 3.63$, $p < .001$). Thus, it seems that experienced volunteers are more likely to assume the difficult task of cross-border volunteering.

In addition, the field of volunteering was also statistically significant ($X^2 = 49.71$, $df = 5$, $p < .001$). As visible on the bottom of Table 1, it is clear that those who volunteer only within Israel focus more on education, elderly services, and human rights. The latter finding was a bit surprising, as Palestinians in the Occupied Territories experienced more violations of their human rights. The two groups almost evenly participated in providing medical services (22.4% of those volunteering in Israel and 21.2% of those volunteering in the Occupied territories).

Finally, those volunteering in the Occupied Territories were more active in fields of child welfare and poverty.

Regarding the items that measure motivation to volunteer, only five indicated a significant difference between the groups, and three others were almost significant (at a level of below .10). Considering the eight motives that demonstrated a significant difference between the two groups, the emerging picture is that political recognition and identity were more distinct than other motivations to volunteer. Six out of these motives were political such as “supporting the Palestinian plight” and “acting against the government of Israel.” In all but one motive, the mean score was higher for those volunteering in the Occupied Territories. The exception was “getting recognition,” which was higher for volunteers in Israel only.

See Table 2

We grouped the four items measuring political motivation for volunteering into one subscale. This subscale Cronbach alpha was .75. The two studied groups were significantly different with means of 3.71 and 4.09 respectively ($t = 5.13, p < .001$).

Our final analysis included all the studied variables into one regression model. Given that the dependent variable was binary, we applied binary logistic regression. We conducted the analysis in four stages. First, we included the socio-demographic variables. Then, we added the three religious scales. This was followed by the inclusion of the volunteering variables. Finally, we added the political motivation scale and the recognition variables found to be significant motives differentiating the two groups.

As can be seen in Table 3, age was significant in the first two models but turned insignificant when volunteering variables were included. The volunteering and motivation variables were the most significant variables in explaining differences between groups. Those volunteering longer were more likely to volunteer in the Occupied Territories. Field of volunteering was also significant, where volunteers in the Occupied Territories tended to focus on child welfare and poverty. Volunteering to gain recognition was significant and higher among those volunteering in Israel only. In the regression model, the political motivation scale was insignificant.

See Table 3

Conclusions

In this article, we noted the conflicted reality of Palestinians in Israel. On the one hand, they are progressing economically even as they are marginalized within Israeli society. On the other hand, their counterparts in the Occupied Territories are struggling for human rights and live in poverty. This conflict calls Palestinians in Israel to struggle for their own civil rights and integration, while simultaneously *struggling to end* occupation or at least assist their compatriots in Occupied Territories. This conflict is especially compelling among Muslims in Israel—the only country in the world wherein Muslims are the minority and Jews are the majority. For these reasons, motives to volunteer can include establishing a strong Palestinian/Muslim community in Israel, challenging the authority of the Israeli government, helping those in the Occupied Territories, expressing Muslim values, and more. In this article, we focused on Muslim volunteers engaged in cross-border volunteering. That is, we wanted to know more about Muslim Volunteers in Israel who help people from and/or in Occupied Territories.

We conducted a survey among several Muslim volunteers (N = 392) throughout Israel. They were mostly young (under 45 years of age) women who were well educated. Surprisingly, there were no statistical differences regarding most of the socio-demographic variables between Muslim volunteers in Israel versus those volunteering in the Occupied Territories. The only exception was age that shows that older volunteers are more common among those volunteering in the Occupied Territories. However, this difference turned insignificant in the final logistic regression models. The three subscales of Islamic religiosity (Islamic Ethical Principles, Islamic Universality, and Islamic Duty) were also insignificant in differentiating the two studied groups. This finding surprised us, as we expected higher levels of adherence to the faith to motivate people to help those in the Occupied Territories. Religiosity may be a strong motivator to volunteer in general as both studied groups reported high levels of religiosity, but it was not a significant motive to help those in the Occupied Territories.

Also somewhat surprising, we found no statistically significant differences between the two groups regarding altercations or harassment from the Israeli army or other security forces. In fact, although not statistically significant, more Muslim volunteers in Israel felt at risk due to their volunteering than those volunteering in the Occupied Territories. Similarly, and almost statistically significant ($p = .056$), those volunteering in Israel felt they were viewed more suspiciously by various security forces. Informally, some respondents told us that although they had such experiences, they preferred not to answer this question—

fearing misuse of the data. We have no way of assessing how many felt that way, and if there were more among the volunteers in the Occupied Territories or not.

Our focus was not on volunteering per-se. We wanted to distinguish between those volunteering only in Israel vs. those volunteering to help people from the Occupied Territories. Between these two groups of volunteers, level of religiosity was insignificant. The most significant differences between groups involved years of volunteering and fields of volunteering. We found more-seasoned volunteers significantly more likely to volunteer in the Occupied Territories than newer volunteers. We suggest that willingness to engage in this type of cross-border volunteer requires a mature commitment. People who start volunteering are happy to help others but are not ready to tackle the barriers that come with crossing over to the Occupied Territories or accompanying people from these areas while in Israel. Such volunteering carries risk of being viewed as hostile to the state of Israel and may mean placement on an invisible blacklist. For instance, one well-known Muslim activist who led different volunteering projects assisting hospitalized children from the Occupied Territories was arrested amid claims she was involved in suspicious terror activity (Itial, 2020).

After a few years of volunteering, some people feel more secure in their role and their position in society and are willing to expand their volunteering to help those in Occupied Territories (Itial 2020). This may also explain why age was significant in the bivariate analysis but not in the regression analysis. If only after a few years of volunteering one feels ready to volunteer for people from the Occupied Territories it means that on average age will be higher. However, it is the experience rather than the age that makes the difference.

The most notable difference between the two studied groups was the field of volunteering. Those who volunteered in Occupied Territories were more commonly engaged in areas of child welfare and poverty. Those volunteering within the borders of Israel were more commonly engaged in areas like medical care and human rights. We expected those volunteering in the Occupied Territories to be more engaged in human rights, as the rights of Palestinians in the Occupied Territories are often violated. For example, late-night raids of West Bank homes had been common for decades. The practice was stopped in 2021, after the army found it ineffective and the Israeli Supreme Court ruled it illegal. Such human rights violations are numerous, yet many Muslim citizens in Israel do not feel safe enough to engage in combatting them and limit their involvement to providing basic social services. Being

marginal in the State of Israel, they dare only to provide basic services for their compatriots in the Occupied Territories, but do not engage in a struggle for human rights or ending the occupation.

It can be argued that fields of volunteering is not an independent variable, but rather an outcome of where people volunteer. It may not be the choice of the volunteers, but a reflection of the local people needs and activities. This indicates a significant difference between volunteering in Israel and in Occupied Territories. While in Israel, legally as citizens, Muslims are free to be politically active and in a limited manner even defy the state authorities, with their involvement in the Occupied Territories, their involvement is restricted and requires caution. Any deviation from mere social care in the Occupied Territories can lead to an interrogation, detention, and even an arrest. This may also explain why the political motivation scale was insignificant in the final regression model. Those who are politically motivated, do their work within the borders of Israel where the law protects their freedom of speech and political assembling.

Given the reality of Palestinian life as a suspected and marginalized minority in Israel, all volunteering may be viewed as political. Helping in-country Palestinian networks of alternative education, health, and welfare services to strengthen the community can be viewed as political acts—even more profoundly so when volunteering is under the auspices of the Islamic Movement or other organizations that oppose the Zionist state. This may explain why the political motivation scale was insignificant in the final regression model. Muslim citizens of Israel can express their political opposition to the policies of the State both by helping those in the Occupied Territories and by creating an independent Muslim society within Israel (Eseed, 2017). Although not significant, those volunteering within Israel reported higher levels of suspicious treatment or feeling at risk by the Israeli security forces. This may be attributed to increased fear in the Occupied Territories. It may also explain why seeking recognition as a motivation to volunteer is higher among those volunteering in Israel. These volunteers are engaged in visibly pro-Palestinian activities and received public appreciation within their communities.

Cross-border volunteering in Israel is quite complicated. While physically crisscrossing may be an easy process, different sets of laws and rules apply in the Occupied Territories, and the Israeli army has rights and privileges that are not applied to Israel as a nation. As such, Muslim citizens of Israel are putting themselves at risk when volunteering in Occupied Territories. The risk may not be immediate. Yet, it is an implicitly understood reality. This may explain why Muslim

citizens of Israel tend to volunteer by providing human services, while reserving more political volunteering to Israel. Put differently, even fields of volunteering are impacted by an occupation that overpowers decisions about the types of human support that are and are not allowed.

Table 1. Sample Characteristics and Comparisons Between Groups

Variable	Categories	Overall	Volunteer in Israel	Volunteer in Occupied Territories
Gender	Male	33.2%	33.2%	30.1%
	Female	67.3%	66.8%	69.9%
Age	-18	6.9%	8.8%	3.8%
	19-30	40.8%	42.8%	36.8%
	31-45	38.8%	35.2%	44.4%
	45+	13.5%	13.2%	15.0%
Marital status	Married	45.7%	45.2%	45.9%
	Single	54.3%	59.9%	54.1%
Education	High school and below	16.8%	17.6%	16.5%
	Undergraduate degree	48%	46.8%	50.4%
	Graduate master's degree and above	35.2%	35.6%	33.1%
Islamic religiousness	Islamic Ethical Principles	4.27%	4.35%	4.12%
	Islamic Universality	4.12%	4.13%	4.06%
	Islamic Duty	3.62%	3.60%	3.58%
Average Total months of volunteering		31.5	25.7	43.3 ***
Average Total hours a month		19.9	19.5	20.21
Area of volunteering	Education	28%	36.5%	12.9% ***
	Elder Services	4.2%	5.4%	2.3%
	Human Rights	13.5%	14.1%	10.6%
	Medical Services	22.2%	22.4%	21.2%
	Child Welfare	13.2%	6.6%	25.8%
	Poverty	19%	14.9%	27.3%
Encounters	Encountered Israeli security forces	21.6%	20.0%	25.6%
	Suspected by security forces	7.6%	11.3%	5.6% #
	Felt at risk	9.7%	11.6%	6.0%

Note. # p < 0.10 * p < 0.05 ** p < 0.01 *** p < 0.001

Table 2. Motivation to Volunteer and Comparisons Between Groups

Variable	Overall	Volunteer in Israel	Volunteer in Occupied Territories
Family tradition	3.51	3.43	3.63
Minimize boredom	3.42	3.48	3.17 #
True Muslim	3.78	3.83	3.73
Supporting the Palestinian plight	4.36	4.24	4.59 *** (t = 3.22, p < .001)
Act against the government of Israel	3.29	3.17	3.51 *** (t = 2.18, p < .05)
Family and friends volunteer	2.13	2.14	2.12
Set an example	4.36	4.40	4.30
Gain respect	3.53	3.56	3.46
Meeting people from the Occupied Territories	3.74	3.56	4.07 *** (t = 6.13, p < .001)
Makes me a better human being	4.66	4.66	4.67
Getting respect from employer	3.79	3.89	3.64
Will get me to the Garden of Eden	3.70	3.64	3.84
I have relatives in the Occupied Territories	1.83	1.84	1.82
Volunteering is a Quran edict	3.47	3.38	3.65
Giving power to Israeli Palestinians	3.89	3.99	3.73 #
Too few people volunteer	3.27	3.34	3.15
Volunteering reflects positively on Islam	3.61	3.61	3.61
My volunteering help diminish the occupation	3.19	3.08	3.40 #
I just love to volunteer	4.16	4.16	4.16
Respect other volunteers	4.30	4.27	4.37
Volunteering relates to my Palestinian identity	3.97	3.87	4.17 * (t = 2,17, p < .05)
Reality of my life	4.46	4.42	4.49
Add value to my life	4.59	4.65	4.52
Gain recognition	3.45	3.59	3.22 * (t = 2.34, p < .05)

(Means on a 5-category Likert Scale)

*Note. # p < 0.10 * p < 0.05 ** p < 0.01 *** p < 0.001*

Table 3. Binary Logistic Regressions of Volunteering Location

Variables (reference group)	I	II	III	IV
Gender (Male)	0.192 (0.24)	0.149 (0.27)	0.184 (0.37)	0.016 (0.36)
Marital status (Married)	0.197 (0.25)	0.255 (0.29)	0.382 (0.36)	0.369 (0.39)
Age	0.408 * (0.16)	0.475 **	0.186 (0.22)	0.175 (0.24)
Education ^	1.679 (0.16)	0.159 (0.19)	0.006 (0.23)	0.036 (0.25)
Islamic ethical principles		0.410 (0.23)	0.539 (0.29)	0.378 (0.30)
Islamic universality		0.149 (0.22)	0.146 (0.25)	0.157 (0.27)
Islamic duty		0.318 (0.25)	0.287 (0.33)	0.118 (0.31)
Length of volunteering (months)			0.011 ** (0.01)	(0.014) ** (0.35)
Area of volunteering education (poverty)			1.727 ** (0.01)	0.179 *** (0.47)
Area of volunteering elder care (poverty)			1.711 (0.45)	2.070 * (0.1.03)
Area of volunteering human rights (poverty)			0.739 (0.49)	1.073 * (0.51)
Area of volunteering health care (poverty)			1.087 * (0.44)	1.304 * (0.46)
Area of volunteering childcare (poverty)			-1.304 * (0.52)	1.203 * (0.56)
Gain recognition				0.234 * (0.12)
Political motivation scale				0.324 (0.18)
Pseudo R ²	0.026	0.038	0.214	0.243

Note. * p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001

^An ordered logistic regression was used for education.

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DIASPORIC VOLUNTEERING IN CROSS-NATIONAL PERSPECTIVE: IS FAITH-BASED MORE EFFECTIVE THAN SECULAR PHILANTHROPY? A CASE OF THE NETHERLANDS AND MOROCCO

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Cross-border diasporic philanthropy has been studied over the last couple of decades. Several studies have demonstrated the impact of diaspora groups in Europe supporting their family and community members in their home country through the act of remittances. As diaspora groups often exist in countries with a post-colonial history, countries who do not share such history are rather absent in these studies. The Netherlands and Morocco are examples of such. This study contributes to the literature on cross-border diasporic philanthropy in cross-national context of countries with no colonial past, but with a diaspora present in both societies. Through empirical research, done between 2016 and 2021, the perspectives are summarized and presented of three distinctive groups: the Amazigh diaspora living in the Netherlands, the Amazigh diaspora living in Morocco and the social groups finding themselves on the receiving ends of the philanthropy done by the first two groups. This study presents how both diasporic voluntary

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groups, both paid and unpaid, are criticizing the other (diaspora voluntary group) together with how post-colonial behavior is experienced by the receiving end. This study reveals both religious and secular motifs within the national and international Moroccan diaspora, stating that religious motifs as more effective than the first. This leads to the main argument answering the question in the title of this article, along with a possible explanation of the existence of this phenomenon and elevation for its solution.

Key words: diaspora, cross-border philanthropy, faith based vs secular, urban vs rural, sense of belonging.

Introduction

Morocco's unique geographical position and its large scale of diversity, makes the country an interesting case when examining human aid and philanthropy. This is especially the case, since both Africa and the MENA (Middle East North Africa) have been a constant objective of aid performed by Western civil actors (Fowler, 2021). However, it is important to keep in mind that Morocco is part of both geographical regions: Africa and the MENA. Following the earlier statement of Fowler (2021), it would be interesting to examine whether philanthropy and volunteering within the borders of Africa and the MENA is different, or not. As the MENA is often referred to as the Islamic 'Arab' world (see Gerges, 2019), important concepts, such as ethnicity, cultural and religious identity, the form of state and the belonging governance, the civil society and so on, are immediately included when researching one particular country. This complexity grows as the latter appears to have strong international bounds with volunteering and philanthropy as important fundamentals. In the case of Morocco, research has shown that volunteering and philanthropy are mostly done by its own diaspora living abroad (see Mahieu, 2020).

However, before further discussing the importance Moroccan diaspora embody for their country of origin, it is necessary to further elaborate the position Morocco holds within the Islamic world. As stated by Contreras et.al (2015, p. 113), "it is not an easy venture to track down religion in the context of Morocco today and to understand the mechanisms by which religion makes itself manifest in the country and abroad. An attempt to understand the characteristics of Islam in Morocco has motivated studies in the social sciences since before the country's independence". As Geertz (1968, p. 20) noted "that the key is to

recognize “the material reasons why Moroccan Islam became activist, rigorous, dogmatic and more than a little anthropolatrous”. Geertz tried to understand and explain Islam in Morocco as a cultural whole homogenized over time by the contact between rural tribes and city dwellers”. However, Westermarck wrote “that in their religious practice, Moroccans endeavor to benefit by the *baraka* (gained religious favor) and to escape the problem” (Contreras, 2015, p. 113).

The extent to which these statements characterize the relationship between Moroccans and religion in their practices today was analyzed with a survey of 1,156 people (El Ayadi, Rachik and Tozy, 2007). In terms of religious practice, “15% of Moroccans say they never pray and only 16% go to the mosque to do so (only 2% of women). The level increases with age (using morning prayer as an example, 9.8% of 18-24 year-olds practice it, compared to 57.6% of people over 60)” (El Ayadi, Rachik and Tozy 2007, p. 51-55). “Despite the proliferation of practices like pilgrimages and religious festivals, pilgrimage seems to attract increasingly fewer Moroccans” (El Ayadi, Rachik and Tozy, 2007, p. 61-62). “Young people are more active practitioners than before, although this is seen in conjunction with religious and political fervor at a time of tension with the West—referring to Northern America and Western Europe. The common use of specific religious vocabulary among young people reveals a generational and ideological break and a greater understanding of their religion, indicated by 56.7% of the survey respondents” (El Ayadi, Rachik and Tozy, 2007, p. 75). “Religious knowledge is trending upwards, not only among the well-educated, with their scripturalist explanations of religion, but in general. Simple practice no longer appears to be sufficient; rather, there is a growing interest in knowing religious history and doctrine better, caused by the political involvement of Islam in e.g. the war on terror” (El Ayadi, Rachik and Tozy, 2007, p. 97). Interestingly, the study also offers empirical data about the secularization of Moroccan society.

“Moroccans increasingly support separating religion and politics: 41.5% believe that politicians should not be involved in religion and that ‘ulama’ should not be involved in politics (35.4%), although 25.2% believe the opposite” (El Ayadi, Rachik and Tozy, 2007, p. 82). Additionally, “an important number of the survey respondents say they have no opinion about the matter. After the 2003 Casablanca attacks and subsequent events, part of the population became disinterested in questions related to Islam and politics because it could lead to ‘useless tension’” (Contreras et al., 2015, p. 113). This is striking as Contreras et al. (2015) present “the religious component in the upbringing of Moroccan diaspora in the West as one of the most important aspects” (p.

113). This will be further elaborated in the discussion section below, in which I present my data.

However, as this study mainly focuses on the diaspora present in the Netherlands, the context of Europe is important to mention in the introduction as well. The Dutch Moroccan diaspora is currently “one of the largest and most dispersed migrant population. Over the last century, large diaspora communities have settled in France (1,146,000), Belgium (298,000), the Netherlands (363,000), Italy (487,000) and Spain (766,000) and smaller ones in many other European countries, including Germany (127,000)” (De Haas, 2014). These migrant populations, “currently estimated by the Moroccan government at five million worldwide (about 15% of the total Moroccan population), contribute in various ways to Morocco’s economy and society” (Mahieu, 2020, p. 231). Most notably, “there is an annual remittance flow of around \$7 billion (through official channels only). Remittances are the second source of hard currency after tourism receipts, which are also, to a large extent, provided by expatriate Moroccans during summer holidays (MPC, 2013), as more than two million Moroccans return every year during holidays. Because of this significant financial input, the Moroccan population abroad is often depicted as the “cash cow” of Morocco. Many also own houses in Morocco, and at the community level, numerous small-scale non-governmental initiatives improve general welfare and contribute to local development in Morocco” (Mahieu, 2020, p. 231).

While the Moroccan population abroad grew throughout the 20th century, along with the flow of remittances and forms of cross-border philanthropy such as orphanages being built by collected money by the diasporic community, the country itself went through many internal changes. Social movements which started right before the country’s independence in 1956, resulted in a national civil society in which national NGOs became the most important actors. These were often managed and guided by elite Arab-speaking women, living in the big city of Casablanca and Rabat (see Sadiqi, 2012). No denial can be made about the importance of the outreach role these actors played in the civil field of Morocco. However, as it is clear how much the Moroccan diaspora population contributes to the country’s development in valuta, it is fair to make a comparison between the diaspora and the country’s own civil society organizations (CSOs, see Fowler, 2021). The available scientific literature within the field of philanthropy and transnationalism has emphasized several flows of voluntarism and philanthropy between different continents, countries and ((non)-religious) communities. However, it is to the best of my knowledge that little of the existing

literature compares local and cross-border philanthropy. In addition to that, little research has focused on cross-border philanthropy between countries with no or little (post-colonial) history, such as the Netherlands and Morocco. This compared to countries who do share a colonial past along with a diaspora performing cross-border philanthropy (e.g. Pakistani-English diaspora in the UK (see Werber, 2019)).

Thus, if Morocco's diaspora is described as the country's 'cash cow', the question one can raise, and therefore the challenge for this study is: how does diasporic cross-border philanthropy, coming from a country with no colonial past with Morocco, affect Morocco's civil society, compared to the philanthropy that is done locally? The importance, or influence, of religion (e.g. faith based giving, *zakat*, *sadaqah*, *waqf*) is left out in this observation, but will be included in the discussion section below. It is in the same section where the question mentioned in the title will be further discussed.

Heterogeneous Moroccan diaspora in the Netherlands

Europe's need of cheap labor after the Second World War has been an important driver for Morocco's post-war emigration (Charef, 2014). Morocco's signing of a series of labor treaties with European states during the 1950s and 1960s can be put forward as the decisive factor of twentieth century Moroccan emigration. Mahieu (2020) argues that, "while the initial labor migration wave was primarily low-skilled and male-dominated, this unidimensional picture should be nuanced in at least four ways" (p. 231).

First, "the presence of Moroccans in Europe is older than post-war migration, including Moroccan soldiers' participation in the World Wars. Second, Moroccan emigration has always been motivated by other than strictly economic factors, such as political repression under Morocco's authoritarian regime following independence. Third, after the abandonment of the labor recruitment treaties in 1973, Moroccan emigration continued, albeit in different shapes. Other types of Moroccan migration emerged such as (female) family reunification, student migration, high-skilled migration, marriage migration, etc., thus adding to the diversity in the Moroccan expatriate population. Fourth, the Moroccan population abroad has expanded geographically to an increasing number of destinations. Initially, the Moroccan labor migration went to France, Belgium, the Netherlands and Germany (the four countries that had signed a labor treaty with Morocco). Among these, France was the primary destination, with population movements

being anchored in the status of Morocco as a French protectorate until the Moroccan independence in 1956” (Mahieu, 2020, p. 231).

However, De Haas argues that the Moroccan migration to a specific region in Europe is dependent on the region of the Moroccan migrant in their homeland (2001). Adding that “these patterns seem to be partly reproduced and reinforced by migrant networks. The northern Rif Mountains, the southwestern Sous area, and the southern river oases located in the pre-African fault between the Saghro and High Atlas (mainly Dadès, Todgha, Ferkla), have been the earliest and most renowned “expulsion zones” of international migrants” (De Haas, 2003, p. 112). “The provinces with the highest international migration rates are Agadir (Sous), Ouarzazate (which comprises most oases), and the northern provinces of Al Hoceima, Nador, and, to a lesser degree, Oujda”, Refass added (1990, p. 228). “The Rif, the Sous, and the southern oases form the principal ‘migration belts’, where ancient traditions of internal, largely circular and seasonal labor migration have been continued, extended, and transformed in the twentieth century following colonization, state formation, and modernization” (De Haas, 2003, p. 112).

According to Bencherifa, “several factors explain why international migration has predominantly occurred from these regions. First, it has been argued that Morocco’s most intensive out-migration has typically occurred in rural regions characterized by low rainfall” (Bencherifa, 1996, p. 404) and “high population densities in relation to limited agricultural resources” (Fadloulah et al., 2000, p. 53). Nevertheless, De Haas adds “that it should be mentioned that these areas—with the possible exception of parts of the Rif—are not among the most rural in Morocco” (2003, p. 112). For instance, “oases that have heavily participated in international migration are relatively prosperous oases located in fertile river valleys. More peripherally and agriculturally marginal oases (e.g., the Bani and mountain oases) tend to be far less involved in international migration” (De Haas, 1998). Second, “the fact that these regions had already established ancient traditions of circular migration within Morocco and to Algeria appears to have greatly facilitated their participation in new forms of rural-to-urban and international migration to Europe. Third, recruiters and employers in Europe generally preferred illiterate people, as they were seen as hard working, non-plaintive, and not prone to “subversive” activities such as trade union membership” (Obdeijn, 1993; Reniers, 1999, p. 684). Finally, “the Moroccan government actively stimulated labor recruitment from these regions. It saw migration as an instrument to decrease tensions in these poor, generally Amazigh speaking, rural areas,

which had a rebellious reputation vis-à-vis the power of the predominantly urban, Arab-speaking governance. This was particularly the case for the Rif, where violent rebellions had occurred on several occasions before and after independence” (Obdeijn, 1993; Reniers, 1999, p. 684).

According to (Fadloulah et al., 2000, p. 51), “nowhere else in Morocco is migration as rooted in social life to the same extent as in the northern Rif Mountains and the surrounding areas.” “The Rif was among the first regions to participate in labor migration to France in colonial times, mostly via Algeria” (Heinemeijer et al., 1976, p. 90). “Direct migration to France and internal migration to central Morocco was limited, however, as the north was part of the Spanish protectorate, and therefore had developed little links with central Morocco and France. As of the late 1950s, the Rif entered a period of deep economic crisis, caused by little to no economical and societal investments from the government. This resulted in a rebellion against the Moroccan state in 1958-1959. After the definite closure of the Moroccan-Algerian border in 1962 following political-military tensions between the two countries, new migration destinations were increasingly explored in northwestern Europe” (Heinemeijer et al., 1976, p. 90), where high economic growth led to an increasing shortage of unskilled labor.

Demonstrated by Haleber, “since the 1960s, the Rif Mountains and surrounding areas in the north have concentrated on migration to the Netherlands, Belgium, and Germany. The large majority of Moroccans in those three countries are from the north. For instance, more than three quarters of Moroccan migrants in the Netherlands originate from the Rif mountains (provinces Nador, Al Hoceima, Taza, Chaouen and Tétouan) and the region around Oujda and Berkane (Maroc oriental)” (De Mas 1990b; Haleber, 1990 p. 139). Adding that “France is also an important destination, but less than in other regions, which can partly be explained by the absence of historical colonial links” (Haleber 1990, p. 139). In France, there is a larger community with roots in the area of Ouarzazate and the Atlas region. The separation in regions to which Moroccans immigrated, has had an immense impact on the way diaspora correspondents referred to their philanthropic behavior towards the country of origin. The relationship between the home country and the countries in which diaspora are resident, is therefore important to mention, as there is no colonial past between the Netherlands and Morocco like there is between France and Morocco. Therefore, the human aid in forms of volunteering and philanthropy between the first two is based on a different kind of diasporic behavior. How this is less post-colonial, or more, is discussed in the section ‘discussion’.

Again referring to the amount of remittances that Moroccan migrants commit towards their home country, the important question that should also be raised here is the diaspora's sense of belonging (see Bouras, 2012). According to Contreras et al. (2015), "the Moroccan state has created a transnational field of action over the last twenty years that fosters a sense of belonging among those living abroad. Transnational spaces have been developed not only where migration flows and where entries and exits are managed, but also where the identities, sense of belonging, and unique forms of citizen development, that are part of progressively more intricate international relations, are negotiated" (p. 113). These 'diaspora policies' consist of an array of measures, including: ministerial and consular reforms, investment policies to attract remittances, the extension of political rights (dual citizenship, the right to vote from abroad), the extension of state protection or services and symbolic policies. They are all meant to reinforce a sense of belonging (Levitt and De la Dehesa, 2003). Besides, many first generations migrants kept their initial plan alive, which was to return to their homeland. Even after the second generations found its way into Europe's daily life. Meaning, becoming part of its education system (Bouras, 2012). This resulted in a complete generation growing up in one continent, while being told by their home base that the plan for the future remains in Morocco. As stated earlier, besides the geographical importance of Morocco, religious aspects were very much present in this upbringing. However, "with ancillary material elements of worship, the inclusion of religious content in classes on the language and culture of origin for diaspora of Moroccans and the creation of a symbolic language of belonging to a community is defined by religion" (Contreras et al. 2015, p. 113). This explains the importance of Islam and the Islamic identity within Moroccan diaspora communities outside of Morocco (see Werbner, 2012), and the visible contradiction with the country of origin. Though the official state and law is partly based on *Sharia* (Islamic law), the rest is still based on the French legal system which was implemented in 1912 (De Haas, 2003).

Methodology

For this paper, data has been conducted through a qualitative method with three different groups: the Amazigh diaspora living in the Netherlands (N=35), the Amazigh diaspora living in Morocco (N=30), and the social groups finding itself on the receiving ends of the philanthropy done by the first two groups (N=45). The first two have been interviewed between 2019 and 2021 and the third between 2016

and 2021. The first group of respondents contained five Dutch non-profit organizations with an overall of 30 diasporic Moroccan volunteers and whose philanthropy takes place in Morocco. The second group of respondents contained five Moroccan non-profit organizations who are located in the capital city of Rabat with 25 volunteers. And the third contained Moroccan citizens who are on the receiving end of the philanthropy and volunteering by both the first two focus groups. They are located in both the urban and rural areas. Through semi-structured interviews, the aim has been to generate in-depth ideas, motives and opinions from first hand observers. This was the case on both the giving end as it was on the receiving end of this form of philanthropy. The comparison between the groups on the giving end leads to either confirm or reject the hypothesis in which it is argued that, an Islamic civil society, such as Morocco, is served best by cross border diasporic philanthropy only when it is driven by faith.

Results and analysis¹

(Be)longing to the motherland

Surveying diasporic philanthropists and volunteers in the Netherlands between 2019 and 2021 shows that the Islamic component in diasporic cross-border philanthropy and volunteering does not serve as the only motive. Some participants even denied the presence of it in their strategy², though they used Islamic terminology in their marketing on social media. They also added that the Islamic identity as a Muslim is important to themselves privately, but not in their philanthropy. At the same time, the combination of a sense of belonging and Islamic morality resulted in a growing diasporic group of volunteers in the Netherlands. Who, according to one of the participants, mainly use their Moroccan Amazigh ethnicity to fill the needs of Morocco's lower social class. The latter has always been associated with the country's isolated, rural, Amazigh groups. One of my arguments is that the philanthropic outreach of this group of cross-border volunteers tends to be more effective than Morocco's domestic CSOs, due to the use of their cultural identity. However, it must be mentioned that the argument demonstrated in this paper is only valid if the experience of the receiving end is considered as

¹ All names used in this section are not real names of interviewees, but pseudonyms to protect their privacy.

² Due to the privacy of the interviewed philanthropists and volunteers, the websites of the organizations, in which the strategy can be analyzed, is not included.

leading. All volunteers in the five Moroccan diasporic organizations in the Netherlands (N=35) have roots in the Rif areas. This means that the upbringing was defined by religion but not only. As earlier stated by de Haas (2003), Moroccan migrants came from several regions. Due to the cultural diversity of Morocco, we can state that Moroccan migrants cannot be approached as one culturally homogenous group. There is an obvious separation between Arabs and Amazigh³ groups, which can be recognized through language, norm and values, and geography, as most Amazigh societies are located in rural, isolated areas (see Sadiqi & Ennaji 2012). Corresponding with state officials, before the Amazigh language (Tamazight) was considered an official language in 2011 (see Sadiqi, 2018), remained a challenge. One of the respondents, a doctor who performs medical care through a diasporic Dutch organization, specifically pointed at linguistic differences between medical care workers and citizens:

Every time my team and I travel to Morocco for another mission, I become aware of this huge bridge that should constantly be built between the officials and the patients. This is both the case in the Rif region as it is in other regions where the majority does not speak Arabic. Though I don't speak every Amazigh language, I do speak the Riffian language and Darija.⁴ So the translation is always covered by me.

When following up on his embodiment of a linguistic bridge by questioning its fundament, the motif was in line with 100% of my participants. Meaning: every Dutch-Moroccan volunteer who participated in this research admitted being a linguistic bridge between state officials/authorities when performing their philanthropy in Morocco.

Our parents couldn't help our home country the way we can today. We are educated, we have our connections outside of our families, so we can do more than just send money.

³ A tribal ethnic group who are considered Morocco's indigenous people. Amazigh literally means 'free people'. Decedents of this ethnic group are known as Imazighn, or Berbers, and are considered to live in communities scattered across Morocco, Algeria, Tunis, Libya, Egypt (in Siwa), Mauritania, Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger (Chaker 1998:14).

⁴ The Arabic dialect spoken in Morocco and Algeria.

Referring to Morocco as their home country immediately refers to the importance of the diasporic sense of belonging in their act of philanthropy and volunteering. Questioning why they do not perform the same type of philanthropy in their country of residence, the Netherlands, led to references to social governmental care. Added by another volunteering medical doctor:

The way our insurances work here in Europe is just not the same as it is in Morocco. Sure there are doctors and officials to rely on, but there is still a lot of money needed and the origins from a certain social class, to provide for these specific resources. People in the rural villages, not just in the Rif area, are suffering and I feel responsible. Not just as a doctor but also as a human being, as someone with roots in those same mountains.

Referring to the geographical context as a form of explanation for the feeling of belonging and longing to Morocco as their homeland was a constant in this study. Another volunteer working for a well-known Dutch initiative, referred to the village as being a physical part of her, in a spiritual way.

I feel like I meet a part of me, every time I set foot in the Rif. Though I am born in Amsterdam, it doesn't feel the same as the northern mountains of Morocco do. It's home in a special way, and that's why helping these people, and especially the children in the area get what I always had, feels like a mission of my soul. Sure, I gain blessings through the act of Zakat, but it's more than that for me. I cannot have enough of it, I constantly feel the urge of going back and keep giving.

The interviews remained filled with nostalgic emotions and participants who would open up and share the most personal stories. Interestingly enough, the same connections between personal motifs with the act of volunteering, was absent in the second study which included national Moroccan philanthropy and volunteer-organizations. The overall feeling of loyalty towards Morocco and their citizens was more formally described, in line with national political aims, and less emotional. This resulted in different motifs of the volunteers and paid staff appearing on the surface.

One of the paid volunteers (N=30) of an Amazigh organization in Rabat explained his motif:

My mother is Amazigh, she's from the South near the Todgha Valley, but she grew up in the suburbs of Marrakech. When she met my father, they moved to Rabat. I think it was because of his work, but I don't remember. My mother has always been a housewife, and I liked that as a kid. There was always someone home. But I also wanted her to be less isolated as I grew up. She had her own bubble in the neighborhood but outside of that, she didn't know anyone. So what we do at the association is that we strive to de-isolate these type of women so they become more part of society. But it's a big challenge to interact with them once you've found them in the first place because they are as isolated as my mother, and often don't speak another language besides their own tribal one which is often Tachelhiyt.⁵

The difficulty described here, was also mentioned by another paid staff member. She would refer to these isolated women as “those who do not want to be helped”:

We've tried several campaigns in the areas where these women mostly live, such as Salé and Tmara, just outside of Rabat. Most of them came from villages in the southern areas in Morocco, wanting to provide their children better chances than they could if they stayed in the village. Sure it's great that the government wants us to include these women in our social movements, but what do you do if they don't want to be included themselves?

The approaches by both staff-members were based on the Moroccan governmental aims for a higher development of rural Amazigh women. As stated by Sadiqi (2018), 90% of rural Amazigh women in Morocco are considered illiterate. This does not include the illiteracy of Amazigh women living in urban areas, which could mean the percentage is probably higher. The challenge to not enforce their own ideas on the development these women should go through, has been a shared motif by both staff members. It was remarkable to notice the absence of personal emotions in the overall of interviews. Here the analytical approach was more leading within their philanthropy and volunteering.

⁵ Socio-linguistically, the Tachelhiyt variety is part and parcel of the Tamazight dialect. However, since the native speakers in the Southern parts of Morocco refer to it as Tashelhiyt, I refer to it as such in this article.

Giving, volunteering and receiving: the comparison between diasporic volunteers, national NGOs and the perspective of the receiving end

As mentioned earlier, because Morocco is part of both the MENA and of Africa, we can discuss the flows of giving and volunteering in the both African and MENA literary perspective. Starting with the first, Murisa states that “in the 21st century, the landscape of African gifting has been expanding in diversity and the relative significance of different sources” (African Grantmakers Network, 2013; Murisa, 2018). “Three processes merit attention: innovation in foreign philanthropy, growth in corporate social investment (CSI), and variations in domestic resource mobilization (DRM), including Diaspora remittances” (Fowler, 2021, p. 7). According to the empirical data, the latter process remains the most influential when focusing on the perspective of the receiving end.

Fowler describes DRM as “a label covering an array of sources and practices that deploy the energy and assets of Africans, both on the continent or abroad. Four sources merit attention: (ultra)High-Net-Worth Individuals (U)HNWIs, middle-class private giving, diaspora remittances, and horizontal transfers below the radar of formal systems. There is an ongoing sociopolitical elevation of Africa’s HNWIs with gift-giving priorities and mechanisms (Trust Africa, 2014). Studies of “giving back” by Africa’s HNWIs show three themes standing out related to large-scale giving by African donors: 1. African donors of large gifts give mainly within their own countries. 2. The majority of gifts by African donors go towards addressing basic needs. 3. African donors of large gifts give mainly to the public sector and their own operating foundations, with limited funding reaching NGOs” (Schwier et al., 2020, p. 4). A recent study reconfirms that “HNWI’s do not favor NGOs as intermediaries for their philanthropic finance. Their philanthropic gifts jumped from US\$103 million in the period 2010 to 2019, to US\$269 million in 2020. The proportion allocated to NGOs, remained at 9%” (Hayi-Charters et al., 2021 p.8). This is similar to how Ennaji describes NGOs in Morocco. Namely, “those who achieved ground breaking initiatives, while, when also critically examining the internal organizations, the same NGOs could be charged with a lack of professionalism and a lack of accountability” (Ennaji, 2011, p. 79).

Arguable is also the post-colonial fundament due to the important note that the organizational structure in most NGOs has been completely inspired by existing association in France. According to Naciri, “this has been the case since the first feminist activists worked in philanthropic associations, after Morocco’s independency from France in 1956” (1998, p. 8). The problems in the organizations Ennaji points

to, were related to “a lack of training, information, and expertise in collective management and initiatives, as well as weak communications (both internally and externally) and a heavy reliance on international donor agencies for financing. The strategies and philanthropy they adopt enabled them to achieve sustainability through the empowerment of women with the support of the state, but lack doing so in a broader national way. Besides the internal and external lack of professionalism and organizational management, the presence of NGOs in the realization of rights for all women in Morocco reveals other issues in Moroccan society. These issues form the main reasons certain developments such as healthcare and education are very present in urban areas and less in rural areas. This led to complex and less smooth contributions between rural women and NGOs” (Ennaji 2011, p. 80). Important to address here are the perspectives of those on the receiving end who are often described as the subject NGOs serve, and to which extent they agree with or differ from the NGOs.

One of these participants was Hayat, who was interviewed in Rabat. Echoing statements made by other volunteers, she confirmed that the communication between isolated women and Morocco’s NGOs was not as she hoped it would be. She described herself as one of these isolated women:

My husband left when my son was two years old. I can't get a hold of him ever since. He just left. My mother came from Ait Hdidou to take care of my son while I would work to provide us a living. I work from 7 to 7, 7 days a week. Just across the street, in that juice bar. I see you coming in sometimes. It's nice to see people living abroad still speaking our own language (referring to Tachelhiyt).

When asked why she did not ask local women organizations to help her, she replied pointing to her own “lack” of finding these organizations: “And suppose I would find them, what would they do? I would still need to feed myself and my family.”

Meeting and interviewing Amazigh women who migrated from the rural areas of Morocco to Rabat, repeatedly confirmed certain needs could not be filled by outsiders. In the case of Hayat that need is providing a living for her family. Several participants used language as a tool to describe someone as an outsider, or not. Amazigh women in both rural and urban areas mentioned language, or oral communication, as a remaining major influential factor in the choices they make. It either motivates them to connect with volunteers, be it diasporic or locals, or

not. However, because most part of local volunteering takes place in the urban environment, automatically it belongs to the Darija-speaking part of the country. This is due to their monolingualism as Sadiqi (2003) describes. As most Amazigh women, both living in the rural and urban areas, are illiterate and presumably monolingual, they use oral genres to organize the world around them, and therefore achieve personal and social 'gains' in their daily use of language. When dealing with a volunteer organization, be it an NGO or something similar, they keep assuming that they will remain dependent on the ones who do speak Darija or other official languages. As Tachelhiyt does belong amongst Tamazight languages, its daily use is inherently different. This keeps the gap between Morocco's civil society and its Amazigh groups alive and therefore forces women like Hayat to learn the official Darija language themselves. Hayat added:

My neighbor owns the juice bar, so when he heard about my husband abandoned us, he told me that I could work for him. Though he's from Tafraout (Souss-area), we understand each other. You know how it works. I was taught Darija by my colleagues. Step by step I knew how to find my way outside in the city, because I could ask people on the street if I didn't know something. You can't be sure that the one you ask a question in Tachelhiyt would also respond back in Tachelhiyt. So I made it easier for myself and my family.

Participants in earlier interviews, which took place from 2016 to 2020 in Ait Hdidou, pointed to the same ease that was found in communities outside the rural areas and in learning Darija. It is here where similarity can be found between diaspora communities outside Morocco and those who migrated within the borders. Forms of internal rural-to-rural and rural-to-urban migration evolved following the establishment of the French protectorate in 1912. De Haas argues that "initially, the new forms of migration were an extension and intensification of older patterns of seasonal and circular migration. However, migration gradually tended to become more long-term and migrants tended to migrate further away and, increasingly, abroad" (De Haas 2001, p. 160).

According to De Haas, "in colonial times, two forms of internal migration prevailed" (De Haas 2001, p. 160). "The first was seasonal migration to agricultural areas in northern and western Morocco, such as the Moulouya, the Middle Atlas, the Gharb, the Tadla, and Doukkala. In 1954, an estimated 1,300 Todghawis, or 6.4 percent of the total population, participated in this type of seasonal migration. Like Algerian

migration, this in fact concerned a continuation of older, pre-colonial migration patterns, which were, however, intensified due to the increased demand for agricultural labor at the modern farms established by colonizers.

The second type of internal migration was the movement to cities on the Atlantic coast, notably Casablanca and Rabat” (De Haas 2003, p. 160). This region increasingly developed into the industrial and urban heartland of modernizing Morocco, which increasingly attracted migrants from the South. My participants can be considered members of these groups, e.g. Hayat and the isolated women in Salé mentioned in earlier interviews. “Modern rural-to-urban labor migration started in the early 1940s, and rapidly increased afterwards. More than seasonal migration, this rural-to-urban migration was a deviation from pre-colonial migration patterns” (De Haas 2003, p. 161). In comparison to seasonal migration, “this migration was relatively long-term, with most migrants settling on a semi-permanent basis in new quarters or slums of the swelling cities. From the Todgha, rural-to-urban migration was particularly directed at Rabat-Salé. Migrants from the Todgha tended to settle in certain quarters. Significant concentrations of Todghawis can be found in (former) slums, but also in currently upgraded popular quarters such as Takkadoum and Yacoub El Mansour in Rabat and Tabriquet in Salé” (Büchner, 1986, p. 108-109).

Contrary to the above, both national and international migration did not take place in Ait Hdidou until the late 2000s. Especially older participants described the flow of migration from the village to other parts of Morocco as “*a move of the youth*”. Hassan, the owner of a café on the Avenue Allal Ben Abdellah in Rabat, referred to the village as “*the only place where Amazigh identity can survive*”. He moved to Rabat in 2001. He added:

There was no future for me in the village. And along with me were my peers. Some did stay, but they (the ones who stayed in the village) can't blame us for wanting other things. An easier life in the city.

When asking about other actors (within Morocco’s governance system or civil society) who could be of help to create that easier life in the village too, he responded:

How can one (CSO) help you if they (CSO) don't know what you need? So besides wanting a better life for myself and

children, I sent money back to the village so that they could buy whatever and whenever they needed something.

Hassan's reference to CSOs in Morocco is similar to an experience shared with one of the diasporic volunteers:

We came to the village of Ait Hdidou, and had all this stuff that we collected through our social media. Toys for children to play with, books, pens, you name it. When we got there, I became sick to my stomach. I realized we collected everything, except for the things they really need. And that's when I asked myself: do I even know what they need? I decided to ask the women around, using a translator because I don't speak Tachelhiyt and neither do my other Moroccan volunteers. Most of them are from other, Darija speaking, parts of Morocco. That's when I learned they were much better provided with clothes, food supplies and health care. I had no idea before. I thought: We're Moroccans ourselves, even if we're living in the Netherlands, we know our country enough. The opposite is true.

Another volunteer added:

We (diaspora volunteers) think we can help our country by giving everything we didn't have when our families lived here (before they migrated to the Netherlands). But Morocco changed, and it's citizens change too. Therefore their needs. Sure there is still not enough health care, education, and equal rights, but no research is done to know exactly what people need. Morocco's own volunteers don't even know. How are we supposed to know? The money is collected before the volunteers really know what to do with it. It's the opposite of how things should go and very post-colonial if you ask me.

Referring to the post-colonial aspect and his opinion on it, he added:

Every diasporic volunteer-organization should do research first, and then decide who and how to help. They often don't know the law, I didn't either until the last years of my volunteering. I realize how I should have done things differently, but I didn't know better. That's why my criticism is as loud now, people (diaspora in the Netherlands) keep setting up these funds to collect money for the ones in need. Using

pictures of people in Morocco living in a certain (pathetic) state. It's just not ok."

This critic is similar to that of another volunteer:

I went along on the trip, and thought there was going to be a big group of volunteers, but it was only me and a few others on the airport. We went to Morocco, and specifically to the areas where the overall spoken language is Tachelhiyt. But here's the thing: I'm from these areas myself and I know from childhood memories that there are also people who are provided here, who don't need our philanthropy, etc. In fact, they need other things. Not even medical health, but more tools on how to improve their mental health. Not one single volunteer is aware of that, I realized.

Such criticism could lead to several points of discussion: the constant existence and motif of diasporic volunteer organizations, the gap between the latter and the country's own CSOs, the sense of post-colonial behavior mentioned about both voluntary groups, and finally how the receiving end acts upon both forms of volunteering and philanthropy.

Discussion


As stated earlier, though diasporic volunteering organizations do include religious terminology in their online marketing and strategy, participants in this research denied their religious identity as a motif for their volunteering and philanthropy. Personal motifs showed their cultural identity as Moroccans, rather than their religious identity as Muslims. This is in line with the importance of both culture and Islam in the upbringing of first generation migrants in the Netherlands (de Haas, 2003). El Ayadi et al. (2007), stated that Moroccan volunteers should be viewed as similar as the diasporic volunteers. Serving their country (as in Morocco) in its development by focusing on isolated, marginalized (often Amazigh) groups as form of public service. This study demonstrates that religion is mentioned in their online strategy but not in their own personal terminology during the interviews. It is therefore fair to argue that both voluntary groups perform their volunteering and philanthropy based on their sense of belonging to the receiving end. International diaspora (e.g. in the Netherlands) does so through its Moroccan-Amazigh identity, and national diaspora (e.g. in the city of

Rabat) does so through their Moroccan-national identity. We can therefore conclude that both groups perform cross-border philanthropy, but in a different order with different borders to cross. However, the striking results of diasporic volunteers reaching isolated, rural areas more than Morocco's CSOs, demand further attention. As another respondent living in the rural area of Ait Hdidou: "Sadaqah from you or your parents is the same for us. We know it comes from a person of God (al-mou'meen)."

It is here where the terminology on social media proves to make a difference. Due to the fact that religion (in this study Islam) can organize several diasporic groups who donate through money, gifts or time in a horizontal way (see Fowler, 2021), the receiving end sees their philanthropy as a religious act. Coming from those who also share an ethnic identity. This creates a multi-layered connection between the giving and the receiving end. Second, the use of religious motifs, makes diasporic organizations not only have an audience of Moroccan diaspora, but also others (such as Turkish, Surinamese, Hindu, Iraqi, etc.). All diasporic organizations in this study had their philanthropic focus on Morocco, but also had volunteers with other ethnicities joining them in their mission. It is here where it is fair to state that diaspora cross-border philanthropy not only crosses borders between countries, but also between diaspora groups. Bound by the shared identity as Muslims, diasporic volunteering and philanthropy could therefore be considered as faith-based. However, if the latter is described by citizens on the receiving end as more effective, it is only fair to further examine the possibility of a collaboration between diasporic volunteers, from this perspective on. Pointing to those living inside the borders and those living outside. As we have seen, both groups often cross the same borders.


To visualize this possibility, it is important to be clear about the flow diaspora volunteering in Morocco currently takes place which was demonstrated in the data:

Figure 1



Combining these two flows, leads to the following, perhaps more inclusive and effective perspective on diasporic volunteering and philanthropy, where both religion and secularism are combined in one mission to serve:

Figure 2



financial security and stability. If both national and international diasporic group take this desire as the main-force in their philanthropy and volunteering, the realization of Figure 2 could be easily achieved. Making such propositions creates crucial points where the true aim of CSOs becomes loud and clear.

As mentioned earlier, this study shows that both philanthropic groups perform cross-border philanthropy. However, due to their different diaspora identity, they do not cross the same borders. For example, diasporic international volunteers often speak the Amazigh language which is needed to reach the Amazigh groups that they aim to help. However, this study, amongst others like Sadiqi and Ennaji (2012) diasporic national groups in Morocco lack this important criteria. Addition to this, the national diasporic group does have the important national insights and information that the international diasporic group does not. Throughout this study, the argument is presented for a collaboration, as demonstrated in figure 2. Such collaboration could address the issue of financial dependency on international donors: direct philanthropic aid through national NGOs could provide strategic support (rural-based, Tamazight-speaking). This may allow national NGOs to go beyond donors' priorities, which may or not be aligned with the actual needs of marginalized Amazigh communities, further disposing of the post-colonial behavior.

To summarize, this paper demonstrates a collaboration between both types of diasporic cross-border philanthropists could lead to, one: disposing of post-colonial behavior, and two: a far better outreach to Morocco's still often isolated marginalized Amazigh groups. Finally, all of this could result in the socio-economic progress both the government and the country's own civil society has been aiming for over the last 75 years, but still struggle to realize.

Conclusion

In this article, the importance of diasporic cross-border philanthropists in Morocco's civil society and its development is demonstrated. By presenting several interviews from my empirical research in Morocco and the Netherlands, which have been collected between 2016 and 2021, the conclusion can be drawn that the different flows of diasporic international philanthropy hold an interesting capability to co-exist with the actors in the country's own civil society. Besides, the outreach of the international philanthropy seems to find its way more easily into Morocco's rural areas compared to the Moroccan national NGOs, reaching the most isolated Amazigh societies. As stated earlier,

according to Sadiqi and Ennaji, “the main beneficiaries of the secular aid done by the Moroccan national NGOs are still people from the upper and middle class living in urban areas, excluding the Amazigh in often rural areas” (2012, p. 15).

Literature within the field of philanthropy and transnationalism has emphasized several flows of voluntarism and philanthropy between different continents, countries and ((non)-religious) communities. However, a small sub-set of existing literature examines the comparison of both national and cross-border philanthropy from a diasporic perspective. In addition to that, little research has been done on cross-border philanthropy between countries with no or little (post-colonial) history, such as the Netherlands and Morocco. The latter two have been central in this article. Similar to the other papers included in this special issue, this paper also contributes to several fields of knowledge. First, that of both global and local cross-border philanthropy between Europe and the MENA. Second, that of cross-border philanthropy between Europe and Africa. As stated earlier, Morocco forms an unique position from both the MENA and African perspective. Third, by providing an in-depth understanding of this specific type of philanthropy from the perspective of the receiving end, Morocco’s own CSOs and the international diasporic communities could be invited to further elaborate whether collaboration is possible, as demonstrated in figure 2. When speaking of international diasporic communities, we are naturally considering communities beyond those covered in this case study too. Further elaboration could lead to the invention of tools that help to facilitate this cross-border activity for the various philanthropic purposes aimed by several civil field actors. Namely, serving those who remain isolated, marginalized and segregated in a country with similar cultural, social and religious complexities like Morocco. Finally, serving the important role Moroccan diaspora has in the highly effective form of cross-border philanthropy.

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Conclusion

Moving in between several fields of discipline along with the differentiation of cultures, religions, social norms, and values, made us combine forces, which resulted in this special issue. Such movement is similar to those who perform cross-border philanthropy in an odd yet interesting way. Namely, between countries who share a colonial past and those that do not. Through the examination of cross-border philanthropy, together with our co-authors, we have taken a closer look at the diasporic philanthropic and voluntary behavior of those who perform cross-border philanthropy.

In this special issue, we have used the term cross-border philanthropy in two ways. First, to refer to diasporic philanthropic projects from one (Western European) country to the other (a Middle Eastern or North African (MENA) country), which is often a country of origin. Second, to refer to philanthropic projects done by actors in the national civil field, towards a culturally different context within the same region. This is done in several geographical contexts but with the one overall aim: furthering our understanding of the contribution of cross-border philanthropy in the global civil field between the MENA and Western Europe. As the authors in this special issue and we ourselves have demonstrated, cross-border philanthropy is often done by diasporic voluntary and philanthropic forces. Or, as Maghadl and Cnaan have shown, those dealing with highly politically-influenced tensions. In both cases and associated contexts, our understanding and that of those involved from a different angle (e.g. policy makers) are mandatory to consider.

There have been 14 months between the submission of our co-authored proposal and the realization of our special issue. Our understanding of cross-border philanthropy has grown. However, so did our list of questionnaires. The more we learn about cross-border philanthropy and those performing it, the more we become aware of the 'island' that is embodied that we researchers, philanthropists, and receivers are on. By the performing end, by the receiving end, and by the one studying this very phenomenon. This special issue only solidified our aim of further examining cross-border philanthropy and we invite any who share this aim. In a world where much may seem connected due to globalization, we have seen that connections existing in the flow of cross-border philanthropy touch upon a layer closer to home. Namely, that of humanity. As human interaction, in every way, remains the essence of our existence and therefore of our contribution to science.