Borders, Mobilities, and Governance in Transnational Perspective 🔓

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Summary

Despite the dominant notion that people are now allegedly living in the "era of globalization," accompanied by rosy stories about a "global village," borders have never lost their significance. On the contrary, the importance of borders has grown significantly under recent global and European crises. Not only have the number of borders increased, but borders also have become fluid as they moved outside national territories in order to protect countries, as well as political and economic unions, against the perceived threats of transnational organized crime, pandemics, unwanted migration, and terrorism. This externalization of borders through (financial) support and bilateral agreements with other countries led to a relocation of borders far beyond the geographical borders of nation states. In addition, borders have been renewed, reinforced, (temporarily) reactivated, and transformed. Specific attention is paid to some developments surrounding borders, including a responsibilization process on border control, in which governments increasingly stimulate or enforce private parties to take up responsibility in controlling their companies, and ultimately their borders, with respect to irregular migration and crime. Borders are also embodied in different kinds of measures and policies of nation-states that guard access of welfare state provisions, and through the merging of criminal law and immigration law (i.e., crimmigration). Finally, the "border industry" means business for construction, infrastructure, biometrics, and identity technology companies, as well as for security forces, research institutes, aid organizations, and human smugglers. The commodification of borders is an ongoing process as envisioned not only in popular culture as music, literature, reality TV and movies, but also in borders that have become important touristic attractions. The framing of borders through this commodification process as inevitable and as a necessity in turn expresses and legitimates current state agendas.

Keywords: borders, border control, migration control, responsibilization, undocumented migrants, externalization of borders, asylum, transnational organized crime, crimmigration

Subjects: International Crime

Introduction

After a period in which the viability and relevance of borders was questioned from a trade perspective, and borders seemed of less importance, divergent threats as well as new insecurities brought borders back to the center of global attention. Among the most important sources of this resurgence of borders are terrorism, drugs trafficking, illegal wildlife trade, and transnational organized crime as well as recent (irregular) migration flows. But it was the COVID-19 pandemic in particular that gave borders a new viability. Before this new coronavirus started to dominate world politics in 2019, the narrative seemed clear: the world is borderless for regular goods as well as for people—at lease for tourists and other so-called "good mobility"—in which everything and everyone can move depending on their moods, needs, wishes, and paychecks. For "bad mobility"—the refugees, the unwanted migrants—the world does not even resemble a "global village," but rather a place with all too many "closed doors" (Daniels, 2004; Franko Aas, 2007, p. 31). With the pandemic, this narrative has changed. It is not so much the border that has lost its significance, but rather the distinction between "good" and "bad" mobility, as viruses do not discriminate between tourists, businesspeople, terrorists, vagabonds, or crimmigrants.

In this article, the following questions are addressed: How can borders be defined, and what are the purposes of borders? How are borders controlled? What different kinds of borders can be discerned in terms of capital, goods, and people? To answer these questions, the article delves into the criminological literature and beyond as a multidisciplinary analysis of borders can provide a better understanding of the meanings of borders. The focus here is on European border practices and migration-related issues.

The core message of this article is that, notwithstanding important notions of globalization that emphasize the idea of a borderless world and the image of a global village, there are still important "lines" between countries. Borders have not only been revitalized and restrengthened but have also been externalized and transformed into other bodies, collaborations, and arrangements that surpass the responsibility of the nation-state that traditionally dealt with borders and border control.

Borders Defined

In English dictionaries, the concept "border" has different meanings. The first and foremost important meaning refers to a border as "the official line that separates two countries, states, or areas, or the area close to this line" (Longman Dictionary, n.d.), or as stated in the Oxford dictionary, "the line that divides two countries or areas and/or the land near this line"[1] According to these dictionaries, the nouns "boundary" and "frontier" are synonyms for border, where frontier is especially used in the context of "wildness, danger and uncertainty" (Oxford Learner's Dictionaries, n.d.) Within the academic world, this definition of borders is adopted by some, whereas others do not even come close to these literal definitions of borders. Within geography, for instance, borders have been defined as "the physical and highly visible lines of separation between political, social and economic spaces" (Newman, 2006, p. 144). The state's national borders embody and enforce its sovereignty, defined as the monopoly of authority in a particular territory (Sassen, 2006, p. 415).

Within cultural studies and anthropology, border are defined much more in terms of differences and "otherness," as tools of inclusion and exclusion with the word's roots in colonial practices of displacement (Khosravi, 2019; Newman, 2006). Anthropologists study the everyday lives of border communities in interaction with the "efforts of lawmakers and law enforcers to regulate the political economy of the borderland regions" (Chávez, 2016, p. 4; Wilson & Donnan, 2016). It is often—although not exclusively—within the anthropological discipline that border actors, such as guards, border patrol officers, and custom agents, become human beings with discretionary power searching for illicit goods, such as drugs, or dealing with human smugglers or migrants who seek for opportunities to cross borders (Brouwer, 2020; De Genova, 2017; Woude & Leun, 2017).

Within criminology there is a flourishing body of research and a number of scholars dealing with borders, border control, border penality, geopolitics and economic power, (social) justice, and international migration (among others, Barker, 2017; Bosworth, 2008, 2017; Franko, 2020; Franko Aas & Bosworth, 2013; Weber & Pickering, 2014; Woude et al., 2017). One important subfield is coined as "border criminology," defined by Mary Bosworth (2017, p. 373) as a convergence between criminal justice and immigration control, that is, as a penological counterpart of "crimmigration." The underlying idea is that current border regimes are an exponent of a new phase of the "penal state," in which penality is increasingly used as a means of regulating and demarcating the line between people who "belong" somewhere and people who do not, between "good" and "evil," and between the settled and the newcomers. Katja Franko (2020) focuses on the "technicality" of such a crimmigration penality, that is, on the bureaucratic production of the crimmigrant other, rather than, for example, framing it in the currently highly popular national populist discourse. This latter "governance by fear" frame notably includes the fear of importing new contagious diseases, the fear of "foreign fighters" or terrorists entering with "proper" refugees, and indeed the nativist idea that "those Muslims will take over our country."

Citizenship (and the lack of it) is another key theme in border criminology. A recent study in this respect, and probably a typical (North) European take on it, is what Vanessa Barker (2019) calls the "walling of the Welfare State." Herein she points at the exclusive tendencies of "humanitarian" welfare states, in which "citizenship" is seen as a sort of "membership" of the state as a provider of welfare, and thus how the effective integration or "incorporation" of newcomers becomes the standard for a successful citizenship. Newcomers are primarily judged on their "belonging" and their "worthiness" of, in this case, Swedish citizenship. Because this form of adaptation did not take place (enough), the political tide, after Sweden had in 2015 accepted more Syrian refugees (per head of the population) than any other country, turned very quickly and resulted in a new "penal nationalism" by 2016. Also because much of the crimmigration literature is rooted in a U.S. legal context, Barker's study on Sweden is quite refreshing: if the focus is on Europe, a framework is needed that allows for other forms in which crimmigration takes place, and indeed for different rationales of border control.

Mobility as such also forms an important part of border criminology, most notably the increased criminalization and penalization of the mobility of the global poor. Concentrating on the role of criminal law and policing in this respect, Ana Aliverti (2015) focuses in her study

on "crimes of mobility" on the nexus between law enforcement and penality on the one hand, and social precarity and inequality on the other. As Dario Melossi (2015) has demonstrated, this is a nexus already more than a century old.

In this article, a definition of borders defined as those lines and areas that separate countries or areas is used only as a starting point for analysis. These physical lines of separation sometimes have their origin in nature, such as mountain ranges, rivers, and seas, but are always human-made and additionally enforced by brick walls, fences, razor wire walls, and buildings, as well as equipped with drones and other modern high-tech equipment in order to discover "trespassers" before they enter the border (cf. Broeders, 2009). In the nearby future, border control will be subcontracted to artificial intelligence programs such as AVATAR— Automated Virtual Agent for Truth Assessments in Real-Time—giving sovereign power to algorithms and identification technologies in the domain of border control (Muller, 2013; see also, e.g., VOA News, 2018). These borders are created, abandoned, recreated, and re-enforced, and have political and economic as well as social meaning. As Newman (2003, p. 13) argues in his influential paper on borders and power, border studies came a long way from "the study of the hard territorial line separating states within the international system" to studying "the process of bordering, through which territories and peoples are respectively included or excluded within a hierarchical network of groups, affiliations and identities."

Why Borders Are Still Relevant—or Are They?

Although these physical borders are still being used as separating different nation-states from each other, these same national borders are increasingly becoming deterritorialized as states are increasingly controlling entry within and beyond their territories (Weber & Pickering, 2014, p. 11). Sassen (2006, p. 418), in this respect, refers to a new type of reterritorialization as a "transboundary space that in principle should be nongeographic and escape all territory." Sassen (2006, p. 418) defines territoriality as the "exclusive institutionalized authority over its territory," something that, as such, "was foundational for the nation-states." Although borders are being removed in order to facilitate international market expansion, new borders are being constructed, reconstructed, and re-enforced in order to control clandestine or illegal movements of people, especially to the West. "Debordering is being accompanied in many places by a partial re-bordering in the form of enhanced policing," as Andreas (2000b, p. 2) noted.

Throughout history, borders are disputed and contested everywhere (O'Dowd, 2016, pp. 162– 163). Borders are transferred and displaced as a trade for war damage, as was, for instance, the case in specific areas at the Dutch–German border after the Second World War. A more recent example in the context of re-bordering is presented in the Brexit withdrawal agreement (Council of the European Union, 2019) on the Republic of Ireland–United Kingdom land border on the island of Ireland. It was agreed in the Brexit negotiations that this new external land border of the European Union between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland would be an open border without control, in order to facilitate economic prosperity on both sides of the border. In addition, a continuation of the open border would also contribute to the prolongation of peace between both countries that had ended their war only in 1998. In September 2020, however, British Prime Minister Boris Johnson threatened to overrule the Northern Ireland Protocol of the Brexit divorce treaty in order to enforce a so-called "hard

border" between the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland. At the same time, border communities are protesting (No Borders, No Barrier) against the risk of a hard border, in favor of peace and prosperity (Ferguson & Booth, 2020).

Borders are very much alive. The idea that economic development, military changes, and a growing virtual world through modern communications technology would obviate national borders is contradicted by other developments such as the criminalization of borders in order to deter those who are perceived as trespassers (Andreas, 2000a). Although Andreas focuses especially on so-called clandestine migration, one could easily add to the criminalization of borders the trafficking in forbidden goods such as drugs, weapons, wildlife, ivory, and wood; and, not to be forgotten, the threat of terrorism.

The revitalization of borders, however, has many faces, from classic "old school" borders; externalized borders; internalized borders, with their processes of crimmigration; and responsibilized borders. Borders are frequently used as political instruments, such as the so-called "Trump Wall" at the U.S.–Mexican border, which symbolizes much more than the border itself. Another example in 2020 is presented by the statements of the Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who threatened to open the borders to Greece, and thus to the EU, if Turkey did not receive support from the European Union for the Syrian refugees in the country.

The question as to whether borders have become less important in the era of globalization, as some academics and others have claimed, should be answered with a clear "no." Current crises, such as the COVID-19 pandemic of 2020, and what was labeled as the "humanitarian" and "refugee crisis in Europe" of 2015, contradict general notions of a borderless global village. In both crises, borders were created, re-established, and remade in order to restrict or prevent the free movement of people and goods. Additionally, by explaining the increased importance of borders as a defense toward current (humanitarian) crises, one could easily ignore the fact that much of the current mobility toward Europe has been shaped by Western (post)colonial histories (De Genova, 2017).

In what follows, a distinction is made between two different types of borders: internal and external borders. Additionally, a more traditional or classic expression of internal and external borders, as well as more recent developments of crimmigration, externalization, and responsibilization that can be situated within these borders, is described.

Reactivating Existing Borders and Internal Border Control

The founding of the European Union as a multinational political project in 1992 came along with the removal of internal borders between its member states, implying that citizens of these members states have the right to move and reside freely within the European Union. This also implies that outsiders—that is, non-EU citizens—need a valid passport and in many cases a visa that allows them to enter and stay for a specific period of time in the country. During the COVID-19 pandemic, EU member states not only closed their external borders to travelers from countries that were not members of the EU, but also their internal borders for citizens of other EU member states, through specific entry bans and the reintroduction of internal border controls by its member states. It was only in September 2020 that the European Union advocated its member states to safely reopen their countries to foreigners.

Migration scholars, such as the German sociologist Hans-Jörg Albrecht (2002), distinguish between internal and external migration controls. After the abolishment of the internal borders between EU member states with the Schengen agreement in 1985, internal migration control relates to different kinds of control mechanisms intended to identify undocumented migrants who have already crossed the Schengen borders (cf. Woude & Leun, 2017). In doing so, governments try to identify undocumented migrants within the different EU countries, with the goal of deterrence or discouragement and exclusion from participating in mainstream society. Internal control mechanisms also consist of immigration checks in border areas of Schengen countries, as well as deportation and repatriation policies, exclusion from services, and the creation of criminal offenses that have an impact on migration control. One important means of excluding the undocumented migrants from mainstream society and pushing them into the margins of society is the introduction of the Social Security number that provides access to all different kinds of services and amenities, including access to the labor market.

Next to policies and laws that enlarge the division between citizens, non-citizens, and undocumented migrants, were developed all over European and other Western countries during the 1990s and onward, two new developments around internal borders or bordering can be distinguished. The first refers to the ongoing process of what could be denoted as "border responsibilization," and the second refers to the process, first coined by Stumpf (2006), known as "crimmigration."

The Responsibilization of Borders and Processes of Crimmigration

Responsibilization can be perceived as another transformation with consequences for internal as well as external control. David Garland (2002) noticed that, with the rise of crime and feelings of insecurity, central governments accepted the fact that they could not deal with crime control alone and began incorporating citizens and other private actors in their efforts to control crime. To quote Garland (2002, p. 205): "In the complex, differentiated world of late modernity, effective, legitimate government must devolve power and share the work of social control with local organizations and communities." So, in order to fight crime, ordinary citizens, companies, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and other private as well as non-private actors were encouraged to support the government in controlling crime, especially in the sphere of crime prevention. A similar process, as described by Garland in the domain of crime control, is going on in the field of border control. In both areas of crime and migration control situated in the field of borders, governments are cooperating with private actors, such as companies, NGOs, and citizens in an effort to prevent and control, for instance, drug trafficking and irregular migration across (national) borders. An example of borders and crime control and two examples of migration control are presented here.

The first example of responsibilization in internal migration control comes from the United Kingdom and is presented by sociologist Nira Yuval-Davis (2016), who describes how landlords in the United Kingdom have to check the authenticity of passports and visas of their tenants. Although landlords are not trained (nor paid) as border agents and do not have the professional abilities to judge the quality of the documents, they can nevertheless be demanded to pay a fine if it turns out that their tenants have lied about their legal status and visas. Landlords may even face prison sentences. As a consequence, Yuval-Davis (2016, p. 46)

argues, they are increasingly reluctant to rent their property to "people who look as if they were not born in the United Kingdom" (cf. Bowling & Westenra, 2020; cf. Kox & Staring, 2020).

A second example in the context of internal migration control is derived from the Netherlands, where, as in many other European countries, private transport companies are being held responsible for knowingly or unknowingly transporting undocumented migrants in their trucks. If the police do find stowaways without valid travel or residence documents in the trucks or cars, the private company can be fined for each immigrant, €4,000 to €5,000 per person in Belgium and a similar fine in the Netherlands. Therefore, transport companies protect their territories by putting up high wire fences around their workplace and by using scans, cameras, gates, and other necessary electronic measures to keep the unwanted immigrants out of their trucks and off their terrains. Sophie Scholten (2014), who studied private transport companies in the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, describes the mechanisms of responsibilized migration control. Carriers in both countries are obliged to check the documents of passengers and prevent the so-called "inadmissible passengers" from continuing their journey. U.K. and Dutch carriers are obliged to re-transport these passengers at their own cost and are responsible for taking accurate measures to prevent people from traveling clandestinely. In addition, the U.K. government requests additional passenger data from carriers, like the Dutch government does on a smaller scale from air carriers related to so-called "risk airports." Scholten convincingly argues that carrier sanction policies have relocated the border and become remote control instruments in a complex, layered system of border control. Private transport companies function first as remote hired employees for immigration control policies, and second, by delivering all kinds of personal data on their passengers, they also function increasingly as information providers. More control measures by the carriers in turn led to a decrease of (undocumented) fare-paying travelers and an increase of immigrants relying on more dangerous means of clandestine traveling in order to reach the United Kingdom. Immigration control through carriers also results in a situation where transport companies decide who will be included or excluded from entering the country. Although governments have tried to incorporate measures favoring immigrants who apply for asylum within the carriers' regimes, empirical research illustrates that these private companies do not make that exception for (clandestine) passengers who claim asylum. According to Scholten, governments are aware of this serious omission but seem to take it for granted as some kind of collateral damage. Simultaneously, this situation whereby non-state actors function as immigration control poses serious questions with respect to international rights to seek asylum and principles of non-refoulement.

The third example comes from the context of crime control *in casu* drug trafficking through seaports and airports that function as borders as well. These economic transport hubs are arranged to facilitate the efficient and massive movement of goods and people. It is a well-known fact that control measures can interfere with the efficiency of the ports, their competitiveness, and the economic objectives of private companies. Total control of goods and people—if possible—would seriously disrupt these economic and human flows, and instead a balance is sought between free movement and safety, based on selective control patterns and risk profiles (cf. Dekkers, 2019). The notion that a competitive port is also a secure port is steadily growing in importance, not only among authorities but also among the private port actors. The private sector increasingly stresses the importance of secure ports, and companies increasingly invest in (expensive) tracking systems, cameras, fences, and training

courses on integrity in order to improve security and fight drug trafficking (Roks et al., 2020). Some companies even apply so-called security by design, implying that security must form an integral part of business processes instead of consisting of cosmetic measures (Lam & Dai, 2015). Sometimes these investments are enforced by governments threatening the companies with fines or the withdrawal of licenses, and sometimes governments try to stimulate the private companies to take their own responsibility in contributing to a safe port. As Roks et al. (2020) argue, systems of self-regulation and meta-regulation are being used. This presents us with an image of border control in which authorities cooperate with private parties who—voluntarily or by force—shoulder the responsibility in controlling drug trafficking.

A specific part of this process of border responsibilization is represented by the development of individual certificates of good conduct or, on a more transnational or supra-national level, through the "assessment capacities of auditing and certification bodies" (Bartley, 2018, p. 2) such as, for instance, the authorized economic operator (AEO). AEO certification is based on the partnership between customs and businesses, and is awarded by EU customs organizations as a recognition of a company's security standards. AEO certificates are based on risk management. In order to receive an AEO certificate, companies are obliged to a self-assessment focusing on, among other criteria, its administrative organization and its safety and security measures. In order to be granted this AEO status, operators have to meet certain standards set out by customs authorities. Companies that comply with the AEO standards after being audited by customs authorities are granted easier access to ports, reduced controls of their ships and goods while moving from one European port to another, and priority if the company's ship has been selected for an inspection (European Commission, 2006; Staring et al., 2019). The AEO system, however, is not airtight. Studies in the domain of transnational environmental crime showed how companies granted AEO status would not comply with the AEO standards in other countries (Bisschop, 2016). Transnational drug-trafficking research shows cases of organized crime networks hitching a "drug ride" on ships belonging to companies enjoying an AEO status (Pluimgraaff, 2016; Staring et al., 2019).

A similar process of creating border privileges, not so much for the flow of goods but for facilitating the flow of specific groups of people at airports, is described by Katja Franko Aas (2012). She argues that specific frequent traveler programs like IRIS (2004–2013) and FLUX (2009–2017) are reserved for so-called low-risk passengers, without a criminal record or immigration convictions, who are willing (and able) to pay enrollment fees (Franko Aas, 2012). Although both programs have been halted, alternative registered travelers programs are developed through the close cooperation of public control agencies and private companies in which biometrics as well as risk analysis play an important role (Flying Dutch Guy, 2016). According to Franko Aas (2012, pp. 336–338), frequent traveler programs that facilitate expedited border clearance differentiate between citizens through presorting "bona fide travelers" from the "crimmigrants"—bogus travelers, irregular migrants, and so-called asylum shoppers.

The process of crimmigration can be perceived as a form of internal migration control that specifically targets undocumented migrants and functions as an internal border that they can hardly overcome. Crimmigration (Stumpf, 2006) has been defined as a process in which criminal law and immigration law are increasingly merging and overlapping. This means on the one hand that immigration practices are increasingly criminalized and dealt with by criminal law, and on the other hand that criminal practices are increasingly dealt with through

immigration law, such that criminal offenses can have migratory consequences. Some scholars such as Chacón (2009) write about retooling the criminal justice system in order to manage migration, whereas Maartje van der Woude et al. (2017, p. 4) define crimmigration as the "growing merger of crime control and immigration control" while examining this theoretical concept for its applicability for understanding the European context.

All these different examples referring to "border responsibilization" and crimmigration illustrate how border control has been transformed by including risk management and risk profiles, but also by a process of responsibilization that includes private partners directly or indirectly in border control, next to the more classic authorities that already have a long history of controlling the borders. Understanding processes of crimmigration in an EU context as a way of controlling unwanted migrants through the criminalization of behavior or products —as the ban on khat in the Netherlands—that target specific groups of migrants and vice versa will ultimately lead to deportations and/or "entrance bans" for the undocumented migrants involved (Nabben & Korf, 2017; Staring, 2014). This means that Schengen borders will be closed for these migrants for a period of 5 years. On a more general level, border control practices do not focus solely on safeguarding the "physical and highly visible lines of separation between political, social and economic spaces" (Newman, 2006, p. 144), but increasingly consist of assemblages of technologies, laws, institutions, representations, discourses, and/or practices that are used in and beyond border areas (Genç et al., 2018). It seems fair to conclude that these developments may facilitate logistical and economical processes but also increase inequality and discriminatory practices in society as much as they shape and disrupt the lives of people living far outside of Europe.

External Border Control

Next to internal border control instruments and developments, several external border control measures can be distinguished, such as for instance "old-school" walls, fences, and controls, next to utilizing modern technological equipment, such as aerial drones, cameras, unmanned planes, satellite systems, and radar systems (Andersson, 2014, pp. 88–90). When the European Union in 1993 abolished internal borders between its member states, the external borders of the EU became increasingly fortified. Many international organizations are currently responsible for border control as well: WTO, Frontex, UN, to name a few. Particularly after the "refugee crisis" of 2015, individual states reclaimed their sovereignty through these border controls. New fences were established in Hungary (Korte, 2020), as well as no-entry policies for immigrants who try to cross the Mediterranean in small boats in Italy. In addition, EU countries refused to distribute the "burden" of migration, equally showing thereby a lack of solidarity. Brexit fits in this process of fortification and bordering as campaigners wanting to leave the European Union presented immigration as out of control, with slogans such as "Take Back Control of Our Borders" (cf. Goodman & Narang, 2019).

Within the context of Europe, external migration control, among other things, focuses on controlling the country's external borders. Since the Schengen agreement (1985), where internal border controls between member states were by and large abolished, Europe is talking about the external borders of the Schengen zone that aim to prevent unwanted migrants or undocumented migrants from gaining access. New member states of the European Union had to adapt to specific border control regimes, and in order to realize this, they were supported with EU money, and if necessary also with Frontex—the EU's Border and

Coast Guard Agency. So far, nothing new; but this external migration control is continuously developing in relatively new directions. The most important developments on external bordering are explained in "Some "Old School" Developments: Intensified Border Control and New Borders" and "Borders as Business: The Commodification of Borders."

Some "Old School" Developments: Intensified Border Control and New Borders

During the first two decades of this millennium, Europe was faced with internal as well as external threats that gave a push to temporary strengthening or intensification of internal border control by specific member countries of the European Union. Although there are many economic arguments to counter the temporary reintroduction of border control within the Schengen area, it still seems to be a logical national answer of many countries trying to deal with the fear of COVID-19, the influx of refugees, and the fear of European terrorists or terrorists that could come along with these refugee movements, as well as the threats from organized crime. To give only a few examples across Europe: Denmark temporarily reintroduced border control from May 12, 2020, until November 12, 2020, at all internal land and sea borders because of COVID-19, while also referring to terrorist threats and organized criminality. Other European countries also temporarily reintroduced intensified border control, such as Finland, Hungary, France, Germany, and Norway, sometimes also referring to so-called secondary movements (European Commission, n.d.). The fear for the influx of (undocumented) migrants or terrorists led many European countries to temporarily enforce or even close their borders for the entrance of immigrants trying to seek refuge. The Belgian government, for instance, decided to increase border control at their borders with France after the French, in March 2016, evacuated the migrant camp shelter in Calais. Germany explained their increased border control in September 2015 by denouncing that "it is not to stop the entrance of refugees but rather the interception of those people that come along with the flow, but who are no refugee at all" (AD, 2015). This fragmented and temporary reintroduction of border controls within the European Union and its internal national borders finds its reasoning in diverse contexts and always comes along with symbolic meanings within broader political discussions (cf. Newman, 2003).

A second "old school" development surrounding borders that never really disappeared from the political agendas are the walls and fences that have been built and are being constructed at the external borders of countries such as the United States of America and Mexico, and European countries such as Greece, Spain, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Romania. To summarize some of the main projects in this last decade: Greece built a fence along its border with Turkey in late 2012. Bulgaria built a fence at their border with Turkey in mid-2014. Hungary built a fence in 2015 at the border with Serbia. Hungary built another fence in 2015, blocking the entrance with Croatia. Slovenia finished a fence with its neighboring country Croatia in November 2015, and at the same time Macedonia finished its fence at the border with Greece. The Spanish enclaves Ceuta and Melilla on Moroccan mainland are already well-known for the fences surrounding their enclaves, and these borders are constantly being reinforced since 2005. In September 2016, Norway started building a steel fence at a remote arctic border with Russia, to deter illegal border crossings and prevent human smuggling. Around November 2016, France and the United Kingdom finished a new and criticized wall in the French port city of Calais in order to prevent migrants from crossing the English Channel to

the United Kingdom. Among the latest recent new "walls" that have been created are the fences around the Mória Reception and Identification Centre in order to prevent refugees from Turkey entering the Greek mainland and subsequently the EU. During early 2020, Greece planned the construction of a floating fence, including flashlights in the sea, that should rise 50 centimeters above the water and stop the entrance of refugees from the nearby Turkish coast (Mills, 2020). Since the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, European countries have built 1,000 to 1,200 kilometers of anti-immigrant fences costing at least 500 million euro (Akkerman, 2019; Mohdin & Collins, 2016; Mohdin & Petzinger, 2016). As a consequence, where borders and fences are effective, new camps arise with refugees awaiting their chances of applying for asylum and proceeding their journeys under subhuman conditions. In addition, criminal smuggling networks profit from these circumstances, thereby increasing the vulnerability of the refugees and migrants on the move (Snel et al., 2020).

European borders have not only been strengthened and moved outward but have also moved beyond the direct borders of the European Union. According to some critical academics and representatives of human rights organizations and NGOs (Kopacz-Thomaidis, 2019), the EU has with this externalization of borders created an extraterritorial zone of EU migration control through its efforts of influencing the migration policies of these transit countries (cf. Andersson, 2014; De Genova, 2017). One of these new territories of migration control is Mauritania in West Africa, which became a popular transit country for West African migrants embarking to the (Spanish) Canary Islands after Morocco increased control of undocumented migrants and put a hold on transit flows to the EU through the Strait of Gibraltar and the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla. By 2006, the Spanish government had already signed several agreements with the Mauritanian government to jointly combat undocumented migration in return for money, development aid, European funding, and equipment. The Mauritanian government allowed Spanish police to patrol harbors and the coast in close cooperation with the Mauritanian police forces, and Spain delivered vehicles for beach patrols, and boats and night vision equipment in order to supervise the beach and water by night. After 2009, when the number of boat journeys from Mauritania to the Canary Islands significantly dropped, the European Union financed measures whose aims include strengthening the control and surveillance of the population and the borders. Modern electronics and checkpoints are employed to register and prevent the entry of migrants—not only at sea borders, but also, and especially, at the distant porous borders with Senegal and Mali (cf. Schultz, 2020). All these countries have created migration policies that are largely based on surveillance and which, from an EU perspective, became part of newly established border zones far away from Europe's external borders (Dünnwald, 2011, 2015). Another example of this externalization of border control is discussed in the ethnographic work of Susanne Schultz (2020) on North African and European deportation regimes, studied through the lives of deported Malian migrants. She convincingly argues that the number of forced returns in Mali "increased with the strengthening and outsourcing of a European external border on the African continent in the 2000s [while] gaining momentum in the aftermath of the European 'refugee crisis.'" The Malian deportees expressed their deportation experiences in terms of suffering filled with such emotions as restlessness, fear, stress, and anger (Schultz, 2020, pp. 224–225).

The externalization of borders is, of course, not only realized through deportation regimes, (financial) support, and training, but also through bilateral agreements between receiving countries and transit countries. Well-documented examples of these agreements are

presented in the Italy–Libya agreement (2006 onward) and the EU–Turkey agreement (2016) as an effort to hinder the influx of migrants entering the EU using Turkey as a stepping stone. Although these agreements may be successful in the immobilization of migrants and refugees, they often come along with serious human rights violations (Van Liempt et al., 2017).

Borders as Business: The Commodification of Borders

Within the broader academic world, borders and borderlands have become increasingly important topics worth studying. Not only geographers focus on these topics, but also sociologists, anthropologists, migration scholars, and criminologists, among others. It was, for instance, only in 1986 that a specific journal—*Journal of Borderlands Studies*—published their first issue focusing on "border studies as an emergent field of scientific inquiry," with special attention for the U.S.–Mexican border areas (Stoddard, 1986). Many other academics and journals since then have joined, broadening their scope from the U.S.–Mexican border to other geographical areas, among which are Europe and its neighboring countries (cf. Wilson & Donnan, 2016).

Contemporary borders are to some extent also commodified borders, as their original value or goal has been transformed. Borders as an object can be traded and have economic value (Appadurai, 1986). This commodification of borders took place, for example, in popular culture. Songs like Bruce Springsteen's (1995) "Across the Border" show that borders are much more than straightforward lines that separate countries. Borders as a sociological concept appeal to one's imagination and ambitions. Borders as such play an important role in popular culture and are a central theme in music, books, and movies.[2] In many border areas, cultural projects, museums, hikes, and biking routes were developed to satisfy the hunger for border experiences. Borders and border control are also serious commercial businesses in reality television series like *Border Patrol* (New Zealand), *Border Security: Australia's Front Line* (BSAFL), *Customs UK*, and *Border Security: America's Front Line*. The formula of all these series is more or less the same: reality television series, where border officers from the immigration services, customs or the national police are being followed in their daily routines and interactions with international travelers crossing borders. They all deal with the interaction between government representatives and irregular migrants and people trying to smuggle goods, food, and/or drugs. According to Walsh (2015), who made a study on the Australian version, programs like these express and legitimate neoliberal state agendas through presenting the inevitable, necessary, and desirable daily reality of border control. This reality is, of course, highly structured by the program's producers, who, according to Walsh,

> select a handful of events and transform them into vignettes or stories that convey meaning, advocate solutions, link certain groups with particular risks and behaviors, and offer broader visions of the world that structure viewers' frame of reference. By magnifying and amplifying the dangers of unregulated borders as well as constructing heroic and capable authorities and threatening, devious offenders, BSAFL prioritizes official conceptualizations of security at the expense of human-centered versions. In the final instance, such positioning renders border securitization inevitable, necessary and desirable, foreclosing discussions of policy alternatives.
>
> (Walsh, 2015, p. 17)

The physical embodiment of borders in brick walls, fences, and watchtowers sometimes also plays an important role in tourism after they have lost their original function of protecting the country against those unwanted people trying to get in and those who would like to escape the country. The Great Wall of China that already dates back more than two centuries BCE, is one of the most popular touristic attractions in China, and for some parts the daily number of visitors has been restricted to 65,000 in order to ease congestion. In 2018 alone, more than 9.9 million tourists visited the Badaling section of the Great Wall (Askhar, 2019). Another famous example is presented by the remains of the Berlin Wall that divided (capitalist) Western Germany from (socialist) East Germany from 1951 until 1989. This Berlin Wall mirrors the Great Wall of China in terms of its touristic value and the number of tourists that are drawn to it. The Berlin municipality introduced several measures to reduce the impact of mass tourism around the remains of the wall and the well-known "Checkpoint Charlie" as one of the central border crossing points from that period (cf. Von Stocki, 1995).[3]

Next to the "touristification" of borders and the obvious amusement industry surrounding borders, other forms of commodification also deal with borders. Patrick van Berlo (2020), for instance, employs the concept of commodification in the context of the increased privatization, offshoring, and outsourcing of immigration detention. He argues that this commodification challenges international human rights law accountability. In the context of the commodification of borders, other academics refer to the "illegality industry" (Andersson, 2014) and "the business of building walls" (Akkerman, 2019). Where Andersson (2014, p. 14) refers to the expansive and lucrative field of the management of irregular migration in Europe and beyond, Akkerman discusses the military and security industries that not only shape but also profit from the militarization and externalization of borders (Akkerman, 2019, p. 29). Bordering is business, not only for construction, infrastructure, biometrics, and identity-technology companies but also for security companies, research institutes, aid organizations, and human smugglers (Andersson, 2014, p. 14; Snel et al., 2020).

Conclusions

The short answer on the opening question regarding the viability of borders would be in line with the quote from Wilson and Donnan (2016, p. 1), stating that "there are more international borders in the world today than ever there were before." The notion of what a "border" is, and who are the actors that are supposed to protect these borders, has changed fundamentally. Not only can a bordered penality be seen here, but rather a wide spectrum of very different, mobile, sometimes also privatized and bureaucratic "frontiers" have been put up within countries as well as far beyond these countries. This multiplication of borders is embodied in the increasing numbers of borders worldwide and also in the multiple types of borders described in this article, from classic, reactivated, digitalized, and enforced borders, to the externalization of borders outside the scope of national countries, or even the agglomerate of unified countries of the European Union through economic support, trainings, and bilateral agreements between countries. In addition, a process of crimmigration and responsibilization of border control was described here, by which a relocation of borders takes place, in which the rights of those who cross borders are not always protected. This specific development of border control is directly aimed at the country's external borders or, as in the case of the EU, at the external borders of a union of countries. However, the responsibilization of borders also takes place within the country's internal control

mechanisms focusing on the deterrence and return of undocumented migrants. Depending on the issues that are dealt with, these public–private technological arrangements result in and/or certificate specific flows of goods as well as of people in order to find a balance between economic profits, logistics, safety, and control. These arrangements differentiate between the goods and people that are wanted and unwanted. Finally, borders also mean business for a whole range of different public and private actors in the border industry. There is a commodification and "touristification" of borders going on. Borders have become part and parcel of popular culture. It is a harsh reality that, for some, borders embody amusement, entertainment, and income, whereas for others borders represent fear and death.

Digital Materials

Border Criminologies blog *<https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/research-subject-groups/centre-criminology/centreborder-criminologies/blog>* (Oxford University)

Australian Border Deaths Database *<https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/research-subject-groups/centre-criminology/centreborder-criminologies/blog>* (Monash University)

Human Costs of Border Control: Database of Deaths at the Borders of Southern Europe *<http://www.borderdeaths.org/>* (Free University Amsterdam)

Asylum and Migration *<https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/asylum-and-migration.html>* United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

FRONTEX—European Border and Coast Guard Agency *<https://frontex.europa.eu/>*

Migration Data Portal: The Bigger Picture *<https://migrationdataportal.org/?i=stock_abs_&t=2020>*

IOM's Global Migration Data Analysis Centre *<https://gmdac.iom.int/>*

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Notes

1. Outside the scope of this article are those border definitions that refer to areas of soil (horticulture) or "a band along or around the edge of something"; and, finally, borders are also defined as "something that separates one situation, state etc. from another" (Longman Dictionary, n.d.).

2. See for instance *The Border*, a Polish drama series (2016) situated at Poland's external European Union border with Ukraine "about a squad that targets Ukrainian gangs trafficking Eastern European migrants into Poland" (Lawson, 2016).

3. de Volkskrant *<https://www.volkskrant.nl/nieuws-achtergrond/berlijn-wil-toerisme-industrie-rondom-checkpoint-charlie-aan-banden-leggen-en-komt-met-maatregelen~bcc5387d/>*

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