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A Study Of The Effect Of Organizational Communication Cultures On Interorganizational Collaboration Of Crisis Response

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A STUDY OF THE EFFECT OF ORGANIZATIONAL COMMUNICATION CULTURES ON INTERORGANIZATIONAL COLLABORATION OF CRISIS RESPONSE

by

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DEDICATION

To God for his unfailing love and support that sustained me throughout this journey.

To my wonderful family: my parents, Ross and J-Jay, my siblings Elizabeth, Emily and Jonathan, my in-laws John and Jeff, and my nieces and nephews, Christopher, Rachel, Jenna, Julia, Ryan, Sarah, and Jacob. Your love, guidance, support, and most of all patience, helped me more than I can express in words.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION, LITERATURE REVIEW, AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS

Introduction

For the past century, crises and disasters have increasingly captured the attention of the public, the media, business organizations, the government, and academics from a variety of fields. In the study of crisis most researchers, practitioners, and governmental officials acknowledge the importance of communication in effective crisis management (Auf der Heide, 1989; Coombs, 1999; Seeger, Sellnow, & Ulmer, 2003; U. S. Governmental Accountability Office [GAO], 2007). In fact, communication is arguably a core function that, if practiced effectively, can significantly enhance preparedness, improve coordination and cooperation, empower the public, facilitate logistics, reduce public anxiety and generally limit and mitigate harm. Therefore, crisis response organizations and researchers have been focusing their attention on the technological barriers between organizations (GAO, 2007) or identifying how to best create a network of individuals who will communicate information between organizations (Greve, 2005; Kapucu, 2006).

While beneficial, this will not solve the inherent communication differences between organizations with divergent organizational cultures that must coordinate during crisis response. Just as different countries encounter communication difficulties when attempting intercultural communication (Hofstede, 2001); different organizational cultures of crisis response organizations may create miscommunication and conflict between these organizations. This problem is magnified during a crisis given the critical need to coordinate and the fact that organizations are often forced to interact with entirely new social actors. Tensions can be further magnified if crisis response organizations have vastly different conceptualizations of what

coordinated response means or even expect collaboration instead of coordination. Thus, the aim of this instrumental case study was to use qualitative methods to explore and describe the cultures of two crisis response organizations and identify how their different communication practices may influence crisis collaboration.

This study examined in depth two crisis response organizations that are active in most Emergency Operation Centers (EOCs); a regional chapter of a disaster response organization (DRO) and a metropolitan police department (MPD) in a large U.S. metropolitan city. EOCs are one type of emergency management group that coordinates interorganizational crisis response. These two organizations were selected because they have a great potential of having divergent organizational communication cultures. The study therefore identified how their different communication practices positively or negatively influence crisis collaboration.

A metropolitan police department not only handles emergencies on a daily basis, but is often the "first line of response for public safety and security" during a crisis, including "preserving life and protecting property" (Federal Emergency Management Agency [FEMA], 2013). The emergency management unit (EMU) of the MPD specifically handled crisis and emergency response including bomb threats, hostage situations, and terrorist threats, among others. Therefore, this specialized unit of the MPD was a primary focus of this study.

The regional chapter of a disaster response organization is an international non-profit agency. Its disaster relief services program "helps vulnerable people and communities around the world prepare for, respond to, and recover from natural disasters, humanitarian crises, and health emergencies by mobilizing the power of the world's largest humanitarian network (DRO chapter website, 2009). It is also recognized by federal, state and local governments across the country as well as serving as the Federal Emergency Management Agency's (FEMA) "principle

supplier of mass care in federally declared disasters" (DRO chapter website, 2009). Both the MPD and DRO are members of the city's Metropolitan Emergency Operations Center (MEOC) led by the city's office of Homeland Security and Emergency Management (HSEM) that coordinates and manages interorganizational crisis response.

It is important to identify how the different communication practices of these crisis response organizations influence interorganizational communication and crisis collaboration efforts for several reasons. If members of these two organizations allowed their own organizational culture to supersede EOC collaboration efforts, it may result in poor decision-making, time delays in action, or inadvertently increasing the harm. Some level of coordination is necessary for the effective and efficient use of resources and or coordination can distract from the immediate needs of the situation. But crises also are unusual, unpredictable, and overwhelming events that require the actions of hundreds and sometimes thousands of people from a wide variety of sectors (e.g., first responders, public works, nonprofit disaster relief agencies, businesses, healthcare, etc.) to rapidly manage the response and mitigate harm. The nature of crises and the inherent time pressures of response also increase the difficulty and complexity of managing the response beyond day-to-day emergency response and thus requires a more collaborative rather than coordinated effort. Therefore, this study investigated the following research questions: 1) What are the primary crisis related organizational cultural features of the regional chapter of a Disaster Response Organization (DRO) and the Metropolitan Police Department (MPD)?; 2) How are the crisis related organizational cultures of the Metropolitan Police Department and the regional chapter of a Disaster Relief Organization enacted through communication practices between members?; and 3) How do the differences in

these two organizational communication cultures influence their ability to practice crisis collaboration?

This instrumental case study collected data using the qualitative approaches of participant observation, interviews, and document analysis. The researcher spent a total of four and one-half months in the field of both the Metropolitan Police Department (MPD) and the regional chapter of the national non-profit disaster relief organization (DRO). Data was collected by taking field notes regarding the day-to-day operations as well as attending any crisis response planning meetings. Several informal and semi-structured interviews were also conducted during the course of this study. Appropriate organizational documentation, such as organization pamphlets, websites, meeting documents, and crisis plans was collected and analyzed from both organizations as they were germane to the study.

While some studies have focused on the communicative aspects of interorganizational coordination in crisis management (Garner, 2006; Gray, 1985; Greve, 2005; Isbell & Goldstein, 2006; Kapucu, 2006), little effort has specifically been directed toward examining the effect that different communication cultures of crisis response organizations may have on interorganizational collaboration during a large scale event. These conditions could create miscommunication and conflict between organizations that are not familiar with each other's different cultures or could increase situational awareness of the crisis thereby improving crisis response. In addition, there has been a lack of clarity in the crisis response literature about what crisis coordination means and how crisis collaboration is a distinct construct from crisis coordination. Thus the aim of this instrumental case study was to use qualitative approaches to explore and describe two crisis response organizational cultures and identify how their different communication practices may influence crisis collaboration.

Interorganizational Coordination, Collaboration, and Crisis Management

In a large scale crisis (defined here as "an unusual event of overwhelmingly negative significance that carries a high level of risk, harm, and opportunity for further loss" [Seeger, Sellnow, & Ulmer, 2003, p. 4]), an individual organization cannot manage the event alone because it simply does not have the necessary resources (e.g., information, money, labor, equipment, etc.) or skills. Moreover, uncoordinated actions can create unanticipated problems for other stakeholders and actually make the crisis worse (Gray, 1985, p. 912 & 914). Therefore, coordination among several organizations is almost always necessary, but not necessarily sufficient for an effective crisis response.

One problem with the current crisis management literature is that it rarely distinguishes between crisis coordination and crisis collaboration, often using the terms interchangeably or assuming that people intuitively know what these terms mean without defining them. This could lead to confusion and conflict between scholars and practitioners as to the understanding and goals of interorganizational crisis management and response. For example, the crisis communication literature and the media have discussed instances of effective interorganizational coordination, such as the Oklahoma City bombing, as well as ineffective interorganizational coordination, as in the case of Hurricane Katrina. But these focus on how to have a higher level of coordinated response and assume that everyone involved had the same understanding and goal of crisis response.

Both crisis coordination and crisis collaboration are similar in that they utilize "temporarily formed groups with representatives of many other primary organizations" (Keyton & Stallworth, 2003, p. 236). I argue, however, that the traditional discussion of more or less interorganizational crisis coordination does not accurately portray when crisis response reaches a

level of crisis collaboration beyond coordination or when crisis collaboration is needed for effective response management. This next section explores and defines the distinct constructs of crisis coordination and crisis collaboration and why crisis collaboration should be the superordinate goal of interorganizational crisis management.

Defining Crisis Coordination and Crisis Collaboration

A common definition of crisis coordination is "mutually agreed upon cooperation about how to carry out particular tasks" (Quarantelli, 1997a, p. 48) or "any joint activity that is intended to produce more public value than could be produced when organizations act alone" (U. S. Government Accountability Office [GAO], 2005, p.4). Crisis coordination can include simply informing others about what an organization will be doing in crisis response, centralized decision making by one organization to other organizations, or mutually agreed upon cooperation negotiated beforehand (Quarantelli, 1997a). One example of a method for crisis coordination is a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) that crisis response organizations create to pre-define their roles and responsibilities during a crisis.

But crisis coordination implies a less integrated level of involvement between organizations and more focus on individual organizational goals in crisis response and mitigation. Coordination can be an acceptable level of response for everyday emergencies (e.g., fires, highway accidents, etc.) and responding to smaller crises (e.g., a bad snowstorm, seasonal flooding, city-wide foodborne outbreak, etc.) However, in crisis coordination two independent agencies can work in conjunction with one another but have minimal interaction and association during a crisis response. A problem with crisis coordination is that it can cause what Auf der Heide (1989) termed "Robinson Crusoe Syndrome" - when organizations continue focusing on their own tasks and working independently in response to a crisis instead of "focusing on how

their role fits into the overall response effort" (p. 57). This problem becomes magnified in more dynamic circumstances and larger events that stretch the resources. These responses are going to required partnerships where individual mission and response domain of the organization have to become part of a larger domain and mission to be effective. In other words, crisis collaboration connotes a deeper partnership between organizations where the crisis response mission, decisions, and activities are jointly established and carried out. For example local, state and federal (CDC) public health departments along with health care systems have their individual missions for dealing with local disease outbreaks. But these organizations also have an integrated public health mission and ongoing partnerships developed over time when crisis collaboration is necessary during public health crises such as the 2009 H1N1 outbreak. Therefore, EOCs and other crisis management groups should have collaboration as the superordinate goal of interorganizational crisis response when responding to more dynamic or large-scale crisis or disaster. While it is easy to initially dismiss the need for collaboration because the probability of these types of crises occurring, 't Hart, Heyse, and Boin (2001) suggest that certain long-term trends in Western society will make these crises more of a normal rather than exceptional state. In addition, factors such as increased population density in high-risk areas, increased technological risks, emerging infectious diseases, and increased terrorism, and increased globalization and international travel also tend to increase this probability (Reynolds & Seeger, 2012, p. 2-5). For these reasons, while crisis collaboration may not be necessary in all crisis response, it is necessary to define and develop if EOCs want to build ongoing relationships and capitalize and enrich the capacity of various response groups.in managing and mitigating these types of responses where crisis coordination is not sufficient.

Although crisis collaboration is not currently defined in the crisis communication or crisis management literature, one can look to the fields of organizational communication and group communication as a guide. As Chrislip and Larson (1994) state, "Collaboration is more than simply sharing knowledge and information [communication] and more than a relationship that helps each party achieve its own goals [cooperation and coordination]" (p. 5). Collaboration is the "process in which two or more organizations engage in shared decision-making and coordinated joined action to address a common goal" (Keyton & Stallworth, 2003, p. 237). Stohl and Walker (2002) speak about collaborating groups in general when they describe the benefits of collaboration, but their observations can also apply to the problem of interorganizational collaboration during a crisis.

> The expectation is that by involving multiple partners, collaboration will alleviate some of these concerns by allowing organizations to (a) complete difficult, complex projects in a timely fashion; (b) pool financial and material resources; and (c) increase innovation (especially in the area of new technologies) by leveraging the strengths, knowledge and skills of each organizational partner involved. (Stohl & Walker, 2002, p. 240)

Crisis collaboration should therefore be the target outcome of crisis response management because crisis management groups, such as an EOC, must contend with the uncertainty and complexities of mitigating a crisis under time constraints as well as managing the actions of a wide variety of organizations and resources. In crisis collaboration, this means that all members of the EOC create an alliance in which they value member interdependence, equal input of participants, and shared decision-making (Keyton & Stallworth, 2003) in order to reach their shared goal of effective crisis response and mitigation, even under severe time and decision-making pressures. The research on collaborating groups by Keyton and Stallworth (2003) and Stohl and Walker (2002), allows for further distinguishing the differences between crisis coordination and crisis collaboration. These are presented in Table 1. [Please note that for

the purposes of this project the author will use the term "coordination" when it is used in the traditional sense in the crisis response literature and when organizational members generally discuss working with other organizations. This is to acknowledge their general lack of clarity between crisis coordination and crisis collaboration. When the author uses the term "collaboration", that indicates a distinction made in the research literature or a distinction made by the author of the type of interorganizational crisis response organizational members are discussing based on the features described in Table 1.]

Although crisis collaboration should be the superordinate goal of EOCs, interorganizational crisis coordination in itself is often challenging enough for EOCs trying to manage any crisis. Many interorganizational coordination case studies of disasters suggest process or procedural ways in which a disaster could have been better managed. From these observations, suggestions are made about how similar disasters in the future could learn from mistakes in coordination efforts (Tierney, 2007). For example, Nigg (1997) reported on jurisdictional coordination issues between the city, county, and state level organizations as they responded to the 1994 Northridge earthquake. She found that the disaster plan added additional levels that resources and assistance requests had to flow through that were not normally there in the flow of information for day-to-day operations. This in turn caused confusion, mistrust, and "going around" the disaster plan that resulted in coordination problems during the disaster. Nigg, therefore, recommended that the procedures and levels for information sharing in response to a disaster be as similar as possible to the non-emergency procedures.

Table 1		
Differences Between Crisis Coordination and Crisis Collaboration		
Feature	**Crisis Coordination**	**Crisis Collaboration**
Goal of crisis response	Concern for meeting individual organizational goal	Common definition of problem by group and agreed goal to reach
Tasks and resources	Organizations focus on "expert area" of crisis response; can lead to competing for resources or redundancies.	Realization of interdependence of organizations; results in sharing of resources and tasks to avoid redundancies.
Communication	Lack of sharing of information between organizations or one way from EOC to crisis response organizations.	Continuous flow of communication and willingness to share information between organizations and the collaborating group.
Decision-Making	Top-down orders (command-and-control) from crisis manager or incident commander to organizations.	Power and status among collaborating group members equal so participation and consensus decision-making is encouraged.
Member Trust/Loyalty	To their individual organization; sees other organizations as competitors.	To the collaborating group; sees other organizations as partners.
Organizational Boundaries	Rigid – Members identify strongly with their organizational culture; organizational boundary spanning of members is rare.	Flexible – Members more willing to adapt to fit collaborating group culture; organizational boundary spanning of members is common.

Quarantelli (1988) in a summary of disaster crisis management research, found that in the typical community disaster there were management problems in "the communication process and information flow; the exercise of authority and decision-making; and, the development of co-ordination and loosening the command structure" (p. 375). Auf der Heide (1989) also found crisis management problems in what he termed, the "Robinson Crusoe Syndrome" - when organizations continue focus on their own tasks and working independently in response to a crisis instead of "focusing on how their role fits into the overall response effort" (p. 57). An example would be multiple ambulance services taking all victims of a disaster to one hospital

and thereby overwhelming that hospital's emergency response capability. A more effective alternative is to coordinate with the fire departments, other EMS services, and area hospitals to determine which hospitals should get which victims based upon the type and severity of injury and the capacity of hospitals to receive those victims.

Three Perspectives on Coordination of Disaster Response

To deal with these interorganizational coordination problems, crisis managers and researchers have described three perspectives regarding disaster response coordination - the bureaucratic perspective, the structural perspective, and the network perspective (Tierney, 2005). These are described in detail below (see Table 2).

The bureaucratic approach to crisis coordination was derived from U.S. military doctrine responding to wartime conflict situations. Many emergency managers themselves "began their careers in the armed services so it is logical that the early professionals would lean towards a 'paramilitary' approach" (Drabek & McEntire, 2003, p. 106). This "command and control" model favored top-down, hierarchical decision-making and centralization of power in an attempt to control the chaos inherent in disasters (Auf der Heide, 1989; Drabek, 2003; Quarantelli, 1997a; Tierney, 2007). This bureaucratic perspective was also favored because it fit government's traditional norms of "clearly defined objectives, a division of labor, a formal structure, and a set of policies and procedures" (Schneider, 1992, p. 137-138) that crisis managers felt standardized the crises response processes and lessened decision-making confusion.

Table 2
Summary of Three Perspectives of Disaster Response Coordination

Coordination Perspective	Philosophy	Structure	Strengths	Weaknesses
Bureaucratic	Command-and-Control response to chaos in disasters	Rigid, hierarchical	Clearly defined objectives, division of labor, formal structure, standardized set of policies and procedures	Perpetuates "panic and chaos" myths of public's response to disasters; doesn't account for emergent groups; doesn't allow for flexibility as disaster situation changes
Structural	Disaster response is a blend of elements of structure (domains and tasks) and agency (resources and activities)	A range of different organizational forms created on continuum from formal organizing (D-T-R-A) to collective behavior (A-R-D-T)	Describes forms of organizing rather than specific organizations; more flexible in allowing for different structural forms to be organized as disaster changes	Does not capture network features such as communication structures, density, or nodes of centrality
Network	Networks of organizations are formed to respond to a particular disaster based on needs and situation. Two types: 1) Emergent Multi-Organizational Networks (EMONs) 2) Joint Information Centers (JICs)	Network structures are flexible and fluid to determine most successful strategies and organizations necessary to respond to each unique disaster	Incorporates emergent groups more easily into disaster response strategies; gives emergency managers and Public Information Officers (PIOs) specific strategies for effective coordination response	Network is limited in scope to that particular disaster which leads to little consistency in coordinated action from disaster to disaster. Emergency managers may also not correctly identify those groups necessary for disaster response

So to return to the example used earlier, if several ambulance services were called to respond to a disaster site, they would communicate the information about the victims up the incident command system to the incident commander or "the individual responsible for all incident activities, including the development of strategies and tactics and the ordering and the release of resources" (FEMA, 2013). The incident commander would then communicate with the hospitals and then communicate back to the ambulance service which hospital to transport the victim. This would assist in preventing any one hospital from being overwhelmed with victims.

This bureaucratic model is primarily used by the military, first responder organizations (i.e., police, fire, EMS), and anyone utilizing the federal government's National Response Framework or Incident Command System. But, some researchers have criticized this model. Drabek and McEntire (2003) explained that this model perpetuates the panic and chaos myths of the public's response to disaster. They also said the bureaucratic approach does not take into account the emergence of new or different groups and the necessary role they play in effective large-scale disaster response (p. 107). Another criticism is that the model is ineffective for large-scale disaster response because its centralized structure cannot mesh with "the political and structural realities [of localism, lack of standardization, unit diversity and fragmentation] inherent in American society" (Drabek, 1985, p. 91). In addition, the model does not allow for the flexibility of collective improvisation and resourcefulness needed as a disaster increases in its size and complexity (Tierney, 2003). Neal and Phillips (1995) also argue that this model creates jurisdictional disputes and interagency competition that may prevent effective response to a crisis (p. 331). One dramatic example of this was the bickering and blame-shifting between the New Orleans mayor, governor of Louisiana, and FEMA over who was in charge of the Hurricane Katrina response. This resulted in trucks of food and water waiting until they received orders that

they could start their relief efforts. Although this perspective still dominates most interorganizational crisis coordination, researchers have called for the use of more-realistic, and flexible perspectives that can better react to the inherent ambiguity and creative problem-solving needed in crisis management.

A second perspective is the structural approach. Kreps and his colleagues developed a social theory of disaster response to describe various organizing processes and role enactments that take place when organizations transition from "more routine circumstances to those of crises" (Kreps & Bosworth, 1993, p. 428). When all four structural elements of domains (D), tasks (T), human and material resources (R), and activities (A) are present, "a disaster-relevant organization has been socially constructed" (Kreps & Bosworth, 1993, p. 433). This model better describes dynamic stability and change elements that happen in disaster response and now reflect a continuum of structural forms with "D-T-R-A or formal organizing at one end" where "structural ends (domains and tasks) precede and constrain structural means (resources and activities)", "A-R-D-T or collective behavior at the other end" which "structural means precede and constrain structural ends" and 22 other structural forms in between (Kreps & Bosworth, 1993, p. 433-434). As Tierney (2005) explains, this format allows for flexibility for when organizations have to improvise to new disaster situations other than what they were trained for (e.g., firefighters who fight building fires now have to respond to a burning aircraft). This format also allows for response-related tasks not in the crisis response plan to be handled by creating different organizational forms (e.g., search and rescue, sheltering of victims, etc.) (Tierney, 2005).

This model is more flexible in allowing for different structural forms to be organized for successful coordination of disaster response depending on the type, severity, and duration of a

crisis. However, Gillespie (1991) argued that this taxonomy did not capture network features such as communication structures, density, centrality, or the increasing complexity of the management of coordinated response. Therefore, Drabek (2003) proposed a third perspective of crisis coordination, the network perspective.

A third coordination perspective, created as an alternative to the bureaucratic perspective, is the network approach. This approach privileges the instrumental communication dimensions of coordination. With a network perspective organizations are pulled together to respond to a particular disaster based on the needs and scope of the disaster. For example a public health crisis such as pandemic influenza most likely would involve the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), community health offices, hospitals, primary care physicians and schools. A terrorist attack (not involving biological weapons) would need more law enforcement and paramilitary groups such as the FBI, National Guard, and the Department of Homeland Security.

Two types of coordination networks have been documented in disaster response. The first is the Joint Information Center (JIC). JICs have been around at least since the 9/11 attacks but were formalized as part of the National Response Plan (now the National Response Framework) to help coordinate and disseminate information to the public (typically via the media). This is accomplished on a local, regional or national level, depending on the severity and magnitude of the crisis (FEMA, 2013). A JIC is usually located next to or near the Incident Command Center or Emergency Operations Center which is managing the disaster coordination efforts. Its members are typically the Public Information Officers (PIOs) of the organizations involved in the disaster response. Actions include providing information about where disaster victims can get assistance, major updates or briefings concerning recovery efforts, and even rumor control (FEMA, 2013; May, 2006). "By developing media lists, contact information for

relevant stakeholders, and coordinated news releases, the JIC staff facilitates dissemination of accurate, consistent, accessible, and timely public information to numerous audiences" (FEMA, 2013, p. 37). The primary purpose of the JIC is to leverage communication resources and insure a coordinated communication strategy and a unified message.

The importance of establishing a JIC was realized when response agencies failed to establish this coordinating structure during Hurricane Katrina. As Under Secretary for Preparedness George Forsman recalled,

> It was a real bad situation because we lost any element of relationship between the media at large and the DHS organization, the state of Louisiana, and their organization in New Orleans—and the result was critical. We spent so much time being critical that we didn't get critical information out to the populous at large. (May, 2006, p. 11)

Because the government wasn't getting the information out to the public via a JIC about how the public should respond to the escalating disaster, the government was portrayed as doing nothing and the media took on the role of the JIC. Instead of objectively reporting what was going on, they created a unified message to communicate to the federal government the urgency of the situation and created greater situational awareness of the dire needs of citizens stranded on rooftops and in convention centers and arenas.

A second network perspective found in coordinated response to disasters is emergent multi-organizational networks (EMONs). EMONs are networks of organizations that are formed to respond to a particular disaster based on the unique needs and situation. Drabek studied EMONs that emergency managers used to coordinate in response to a disaster. He found that emergency managers "must implement sets of strategies that collectively will help to lace the resources of diverse agencies into an integrated whole within rapidly changing and highly uncertain decision environments" (Drabek, 2003, p. 68). Through interviews and response questionnaires of 62 emergency managers and 89 contact agency executives covering 10

different U.S. disasters in 1999, Drabek identified 26 strategies which are organized into five broader categories - core strategies, consequence strategies, customer strategies, control strategies, and cultural strategies (Drabek, 2003). Core strategies such as domain clarification, jurisdictional negotiation, and resource familiarization help to define the purpose of the EMON. Consequence strategies deal with the management of network decisions and activities such as use of information technologies and maintaining a hospitable EOC climate. Customer strategies involve the EMON dealing with the public in terms of receiving citizen requests, dealing with the media, documenting damage assessments as well as disaster repairs and restoration. Control strategies showed how a clear EOC mission and values could allow others in the group to make decisions on tactic implementation that produce results. This is opposite of what control usually means in the bureaucratic perspective mentioned earlier.   Finally, cultural strategies were strategies that emergency managers utilized to help foster interorganizational understanding and communication, as well as helping the EMON understand the needs of a diverse community with vulnerable populations. While social factors such as characteristics of the emergency manager, characteristics of the disaster, and characteristics of the community, did have an effect on response effectiveness, those emergency managers" who used the largest number of [strategies] were found to have guided the most effective disaster responses" (Drabek, 2003, p. 201).

A benefit of the network approach to coordination is that it allows for emergent groups (e.g., search and rescue, assessment groups, volunteers, etc.) and organizations not originally part of the crisis response plan, but affected by the crisis, (e.g., businesses, faith-based organizations, community groups, etc.) to be integrated effectively into the crisis response (Drabek, 1985; Drabek & McEntire, 2003; Neal & Phillips, 1995).   This approach also "minimizes ritual

behavior, tolerates decentralization and learning, and fosters effectiveness as it is flexible and innovative" (Britton, 1989, p. 15).

One drawback to utilizing the network form of coordination is that it is limited in scope to that particular disaster. This leads to little consistency in coordinated action from disaster to disaster because the members may be too overwhelmed with the disaster response efforts to accurately document actions. Networks can also make coordination and information sharing more difficult because the trust between network members may not be established in comparison to long-established teams or bureaucratic structures. Another limitation is that the network is determined by the emergency manager and she/he may not identify groups that are important to include in the network for a particular disaster response. For example, in Hurricane Katrina, the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) quickly learned that the one of the most effective ways to disseminate public health information was through local faith-based organizations (FBOs), which were not part of their original communication plans nor were they involved in any pre-crisis planning exercises. "The relationship established between local FBOs and those seeking assistance already made these organizations trusted sources of health information" (Vanderford, Nastoff, Telfer, & Bonzo, 2007, p. 13).

While these three crisis coordination perspectives are generally described as unique and viable alternatives to the other two, Harrald (2006) argues that one can have the discipline of similar structures and processes of the bureaucratic perspective while allowing for the flexibility and innovation found in the network perspective to solve problems that a large scale disaster creates. He believes that although bureaucratic structures have the potential to be more flexible, most crisis managers come from a military or paramilitary background steeped in bureaucratic processes and will fall back on those when placed in high-stress, decision-making situations.

Harrald (2006) even concedes that it is difficult to find and train emergency managers who are both innovative and technically competent (p. 268). The structural and network perspectives seem to be a better fit even though one deals with organizations (network) while the other deals with ways of organizing (structural). Moreover, he concludes that the best perspective may be for crisis managers to utilize the network perspective while also introducing some common policies and interoperability of systems of the bureaucratic perspective.

In summary, at minimum, some level of interorganizational coordination is needed to manage large-scale crisis response and mitigation because one organization alone does not have the necessary resources to deal with the crisis. To help with the issues of interorganizational coordination crisis managers and researchers have developed three perspectives of disaster coordination response – bureaucratic, structural, and network. Although the network perspective does come closest to meeting the superordinate goal of crisis collaboration in terms of its flexibility and willingness to partner with emergent organizations, it doesn't address all crisis collaboration issues. All three perspectives do agree though that effective communication is an integral part of interorganizational coordination efforts. However, while the bureaucratic perspective tends to be more focused on interoperability issues, the network perspective is more focused on information sharing. The importance of these two communication issues in interorganizational coordination are discussed further in the next section.

Communication and Interorganizational Coordination

Coordination and communication has been a persistent theme in both crisis management literature and practice. Auf der Heide, for example, describes a close conceptual relationship between interorganizational coordination and communication in his 1989 book, *Disaster Response: Principles of Preparation and Coordination*.

In disasters, communication difficulties are often hard to separate from coordination difficulties, and the greatest coordination difficulties are inter-organizational. Therefore, many of the communication problems are those related to inter-agency information sharing. Frequently, the means for communication exists, but for a number of reasons, persons are hesitant to communicate with others outside their own organization. (p. 79)

Many researchers agree with Auf der Heide's contention that problems with disaster coordination are often related to the communication of information between organizations. These information sharing issues typically fall into two camps – 1) the interoperability of the technology used to communicate information and 2) information sharing or the content of what is communicated.

Technology such as cellular phones, radios, computer databasing systems, and geographic information systems (GIS) are all used to facilitate the exchange of information between organizations during a crisis but are only effective if everyone is utilizing the same system. The process of connecting and integrating these diverse communication and information systems is called interoperability (Auf der Heide, 1989; Libenau, 2003) and has often been described as the solution to the coordination and communication problem. For example, Libenau (2003) in studying interorganizational communication during the September 11, 2001 disaster found that firefighters' radios were not networked with police, other groups of firefighters, or other emergency services so they could not talk to one another and coordinate action (p. 48).

After the September 11, 2001 disaster, the issue of interoperability has been the focus of governmental coordination efforts and research (GAO, 2007; Harrison, Gil-Garcia, Pardo, & Thompson, 2006; Lund, 2002; National Task Force on Interoperability, 2003). In fact, the federal government has funded over $2.15 billion from 2003 to 2005 for communication interoperability projects (GAO, 2007, p. 2-3). However, the 2007 General Accountability Office report found that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) did not ensure that states that received funding

were aligning their interoperability plans with statewide emergency communication plans and the DHS had not yet addressed interoperability issues with federal agencies (GAO, 2007, p. 3). Finally, national standards of interoperable communication devices have been slow, and have resulted in the premature purchase of some equipment (GAO, 2007, p. 4). Additional questions remain about the reach of the technology, what organizations have access to the technology, and resilience of the technology in a disaster.

Some researchers, such as Quarantelli (1997b) suggest that the more important communication issue with disaster response and management is with information sharing - "[T]he real problem was the flow of information content that was inaccurate, incomplete or misdirected, the kind of difficulties not solvable by more communication equipment" (p. 95). During a crisis, the amount of information greatly increases and will flow "within every responding organization; between organizations; from citizens to organizations; and from organizations to citizens" (Quarantelli, 1997a, p. 45). This amount of information typically overwhelms the member of an organization receiving the communication, therefore he or she has to "filter all but the most essential information to pass along to decision-makers" (Auf der Heide, 1989, p. 55). Interorganizational coordination issues arise when information not deemed important by one organizational member is not shared but may be important information to the overall disaster effort. This is because another organization may have needed that information to complete an important response task (Auf der Heide, 1989, p. 56).

Other studies have examined the importance of communication as information sharing in interorganizational coordination to help manage crises more effectively. In examining the 2003 Columbia disaster, Garner (2006) said that the interorganizational relationships NASA had with its external contractors and the government contributed to a NASA culture of poor decision-

making. Gray (1985) described a process model examining conditions during three developmental phases of planning (problem-solving, direction-setting, and structuring) that lead to successful coordination. In interviewing directors of non-profit disaster relief agencies, Isbell and Goldstein (2006) determined that successful coordination during a crisis consisted of pre-planning to agree upon what non-profit agencies will have what responsibilities in the crisis response, the need for a structured response by all collaborators involved, and a collaborative state that fluctuated between active and passive states. Greve (2005) speculated that interorganizational learning through interbranch job rotation, a combined searchable database for all members, and network ties to informational holders by governmental agencies such as the FBI and CIA might have led to better coordination and may have prevented the September 11 terrorist attacks. In another study of the September 11 terrorist attacks, Kapucu (2006) found that to foster interorganizational network coordination, organizations should establish communications and social networks with other organizations *before* disasters occur. Moreover, integrated IT communication systems would have helped interagency communication and decision-making on September 11.

In summary, practitioners and researchers agree that interorganizational communication is the key to facilitating crisis coordination. The US federal government has pushed interoperability of communication systems as the solution to interorganizational communication issues during a crisis. Other researchers argue that information sharing between organizations is the larger communication issue and advocate for pre-crisis development of professional and social interorganizational networks to develop trust and common avenues for information sharing and learning. Past research on *crisis coordination* helps to explain how communication can be improved in the pre-planning stages of crisis management as well as improving the

interoperability of communication systems. However, research on crisis management and crisis communication has not yet addressed how the interorganizational members of an Emergency Operations Center (EOC) influence *crisis collaboration* efforts. This next section presents the bona fide group perspective as a way of framing how an EOC can be understood as a complex system that deals with internal processes and external exigencies, which in turn can affect crisis collaboration efforts.

Crisis Collaboration and the Bona Fide Group Perspective

The bona fide group perspective first conceptualized by Putnam and Stohl (1990) can help further understanding of crisis collaboration within EOCs "because of its focus on the communication influences that emanate from group membership and group environmental characteristics" (Keyton & Stallworth, 2003, p. 239). EOCs are constituted as bona fide groups exhibiting many of the traditional characteristics and functions thereof. Bona fide groups "exhibit the characteristics of stable but permeable boundaries and interdependence with context" (Stohl & Putnam, 1994, p. 286).

Stable yet permeable boundaries means that although group membership is defined (in group versus outgroup) these group boundaries tend to be fluid and permeable because group membership can fluctuate and change depending on how others identify with the group (or not) (Stohl & Putnam, 2003; Stohl & Putnam, 1994). These stable yet permeable boundaries are also determined by intergroup communication and group-member relationships outside the group (Stohl & Putnam, 1994, p. 286). EOCs have stable yet permeable boundaries because group membership is often in flux in two ways. First, EOC members representing a particular organization can change over time as people are promoted or leave their representative roles or organizations. Also members from other organizations can be added or excluded from an EOC

either gradually over time, based on the goals of the EOC, or suddenly as the EOC needs a particular organization to manage a particular crisis.

Interdependence with context means that bona fide groups are embedded in multiple environments such as historical, economic, physical, and cultural that all have an effect on intragroup communication, intergroup relationships, and coordination efforts (Frey, 2003, p. 5-6). As Keyton and Stallworth (2003) further explain, members of a bona fide group "are not starting from scratch; rather, they bring with them the history and politics of their own organizations, as well as any positive and negative influences from their previous organizational history" (p. 257). This interdependence with context can also apply to EOCs. For example, if two organizations have a negative history of working with each other outside of the EOC then the members representing those organizations can bring that history into the EOC and hinder collaboration efforts of the EOC.

Therefore, the importance of viewing an EOC's crisis collaboration efforts from a bona fide group perspective is that one does not focus exclusively on the internal processes (e.g., information sharing between members) of the group or the external environments (e.g., groups have a history of competing for funding). Both are intricately linked and one cannot be privileged over the other. As Stohl and Walker (2002) state, "to understand what is going on 'inside' any group we must also understand what is going on 'outside' it and the relation between these two spaces" (p. 242). The communicative context is the essential element in which collaboration is managed by its members. "Though communication, the various participants manage their boundaries, borders, contexts, roles and tasks" (Stohl & Walker, 2002, p. 242).

As stated previously, most crisis collaboration studies in the past have typically focused on internal processes and have assumed that collaborative groups such as the EOC are groups

with stable and impermeable boundaries. This is why their focus has been on information sharing and on interoperability of communication systems. But in order to understand an EOC's crisis collaboration efforts and challenges the focus needs to be on internal processes and the external environments, which have an equally important effect on crisis collaboration. For that reason, to better understand interorganizational collaboration of EOCs one external environment to examine further is the individual organizational culture of EOC members. EOC members are embedded in the organizational culture to which they are primary members (e.g., police, public works, government, hospital, etc.). Thus one can argue that the influences, politics, history, and communicative practices of that organization (which make up its organizational culture) can have an effect on how that member works within the EOC group. This next section reviews the concept of organizational culture in greater depth and how communication is an integral part of organizational culture. Additionally, organizational culture concepts are identified that are the most salient in studying crisis response organizations.

Organizational Culture

The study of organizational culture began in the 1960's but became popular beginning in the 1980's when trade magazines like *Business Week* and *Fortune,* and a best-selling management book *In Search of Excellence* explored the topic (Eisenberg & Riley, 2001, p. 293). Culture has become a broad paradigm for organizational inquiry in a variety of fields, including business, sociology, anthropology, and communication. At its most basic level, organizational culture has been described as "the way we do things around here" (Schein, 1999, p. 27). Researchers in the social sciences and business have also defined culture in a variety of ways which in turn has affected how they studied the concept in organizations. Pettigrew (1979) defines culture as "the system of such publicly and collectively accepted meanings operating for

a given group at a given time" (p. 574). Van Maanen and Barley (1984) explain culture as codes and assumptions that create meaning systems "which give rise to behavioral and cognitive diversity" (p. 308). After reviewing the various definitions of organizational culture, , for the purpose of the current study I choose to define it as *how organizational members subjectively create shared patterns of symbols and meanings through communication that defines, guides, and sometimes constrains their everyday thoughts and behaviors in organizational life*. This is a continuous and dynamic process that most closely relates to the symbolic-interpretative concept of organizational culture. This concept also centrally locates communication as the process that helps organizational members create and maintain organizational culture. Finally, this definition is influenced by concepts of organizational culture as symbolism and meaning described by anthropologist Clifford Geertz (1973) and management professor Andrew Pettigrew (1979). This is further described in the next section.

Culture as Symbolism and Meaning

The concept of culture in organizations was heavily influenced by anthropologist Clifford Geertz's notion of culture. Geertz noted, "man is an animal suspended in webs of significance he himself has spun, I take culture to be those webs, and the analysis of it to be therefore not an experimental science in search of law but an interpretive one in search of meaning" (1973, p.5). Like the spider, man's "webs of significance" contain many things about his life and existence – interactions with others and interactions with himself, choices he has made, sensational events and mundane events – all woven together, crisscrossing, and supporting each other to create meaning and culture. A person's reality and how they live is defined and interpreted through their beliefs, symbols and values that constitute their culture or whom they are. People then

interpret and make sense of the world through social discourse and other communication practices.

Pettigrew expanded Geertz's work by linking it to the study of organizations. Pettigrew (1979) felt that one did not understand the dynamics of an organization through a functionalist or "snapshot" view of an organization, but advocated for a more interpretive view of organizational culture.

> In describing and defining the various forms and functions of symbols, language, ideologies, beliefs, rituals, and myths…These concepts direct attention toward the mobilization of consciousness and purpose, the codification of meaning, the emergence of normative patterns, the rise and fall of systems of leadership and strategies of legitimization. It is through such mechanisms and processes that culture evolves,…Man creates culture and culture creates man. (Pettigrew, 1979, p. 576)

Pettigrew's work created interest among organizational communication scholars interested in examining organizations from this cultural perspective. Specifically, he pointed out the importance of studying the use of language in an organization to relate values, power distributions and other concepts (1979). By observing people in an organization, through their everyday talk, their documents, their nonverbal signs, we can determine how they develop and reify their meanings, norms, values into their organizational culture and in turn how that organizational culture affects how people talk, dress, and interact. Thus, "communication develops shared meaning, which leads to organized action" (Donnellon, Gray, & Bougon, 1986, p. 45).

While early researchers studied culture by examining rare organizational events, talk or artifacts that had deeper cultural meaning through its symbols and metaphors (i.e., Schein, 1992), more recently communication and management scholars have turned to everyday talk, rituals, and nonverbal communication between organizational members (Eisenberg & Riley, 2001, p.

296). This work shows that culture is created and maintained just as much from the mundane as by the sublime. Trujillo and Dionisopoulos noted that rhetorical scholars such as Kenneth Burke and Erving Goffman argued that every day "communication is the very action which creates social identities and social realities" (Trujillo & Dionisopoulos, 1987, p. 199). For example, although Manning (1982) and Trujillo and Dionisopoulos (1987) studied police cultures of three different departments (2 in the US and 1 in the UK), they found that members of these organizations use communication to reify the notion that society is dangerous and the police are the only ones able to handle the danger and control society.

This leads to the question of what every day organizational talk a researcher should study. Pacanowsky and O'Donnell-Trujillo (1982) identified the following broad functional dimensions that can guide communication researchers exploring organizational culture: relevant constructs (how members define general organizational concepts), facts ("social knowledge" of proper organizational behavior), practice (how members perform tasks or activities), vocabulary (vernacular or jargon), metaphors (how members structure their experiences), stories, and rites and rituals (p. 124-126). Other researchers (Conquergood, 1991; Pacanowsky & O'Donnell-Trujillo, 1983) have added that seeing communication as a performance or drama allows them to see organizational members as "actors who creatively play, improvise, interpret, and re-present roles and scripts" (Conquergood, 1991, p. 187). Conquergood (1991) also advocates observing how organizational culture can be communicated in nonverbal ways such as "dance, music, gesture, food, ritual artifact, symbolic action, as well as words" (p. 189).

However, communication researchers also must be cautious about taking too wide or too narrow a view of organizational culture. Carbaugh (1988) and Hatch (1993) suggest that not everything should be considered a symbolic action or meaning of an organization's culture.

Carbaugh explains that patterns of symbolic action and meaning should only be considered "culture" if they are "a) deeply felt, b) commonly intelligible [it resonates with the collective], and c) widely accessible" (Carbaugh, 1988, p. 38). Hatch (1993) notes that artifacts themselves are not symbols, but artifacts can become symbols of an organizational culture if they are produced and used by organizational members "to produce a socially constructed reality to express their self-images and to contextualize their activity and identity" (p. 673). On the other hand, Trice and Beyer (1984) when creating a typology of organizational rites, cautioned scholars on researching "single, discrete elements of culture - such as symbols, myths or stories - that seemed important in the settings they analyzed" (p. 653) for fear of researchers getting a limited or distorted view of the organizational culture. Therefore organizational culture constructs selected for this study were those that best encapsulated organization events, talk, and artifacts of crisis response organizations.

Organizational Culture Constructs Relating to Crisis Response Organizations

Taking the guidance from past researchers that one should not take too wide or narrow a view when studying an organizational culture, one must also acknowledge a balance between the scope of a particular study and accurately portraying an organizational culture. No one study can or should claim to completely capture all the complexity, dynamics, and nuances of an organizational culture. The study of organizational culture has inspired communication researchers (Bantz, 1993; Hofstede, 2001; Pacanowsky & O'Donnell Trujillo, 1982; Schein, 1992) to identify many constructs in order to determine how organizational members subjectively create shared patterns of symbols and meaning through communication to define, guide, and sometimes constrain their everyday thoughts and behaviors in organizational life.

It is acknowledged that other frameworks could be used. Given the fact the primary emphasis of project is on crisis coordination and collaboration it is necessary to choose a set of constructs to examine the issue of culture. Other markers or indices of culture also can be represented within these four large categories. Therefore, I choose the following four organizational culture constructs of vocabulary, rites and rituals, stories and symbols as the most relevant to my study of crisis response organizations and how they communicate their organizational culture. These four constructs also are often the standard elements the researchers above have used in the conceptualizations of organizational culture. These were selected as they specifically reference a communicative action such as the choice of words used by organizational members (vocabulary) or using words to convey a particular understanding of a crisis or one's role in crisis response (stories). Organizational symbols such as dress, logos, and office décor are often powerful vehicles for nonverbal communication for those inside and outside the organization. And rites and rituals are evident in the collective crisis preparation and crisis response activities of planning meetings, trainings, and protocols and procedures. A more in depth discussion follows of the four constructs most relevant to the focus of the current study.

Vocabulary. Words are the essential way by which we communicate and are an important way that members distinguish their organization from other organizations as well as signal membership. Jargon, and how common words have a particular meaning within an organization, becomes a short-handed way for members to work effectively with one another as well as protect themselves from outsiders. This specialized organizational vocabulary often provides clues as to what are the relevant constructs, facts, and practices of organizational life (Pacanowsky & O'Donnell-Trujillo, 1982) as well as a way to "draw inferences about a group's metaphors and values" (Driskill & Brenton, 2005, p. 45). Vocabulary thus becomes an easy way

to determine how crisis response organizations create and maintain symbolic boundaries as well as how they might infuse common words such as "crisis" and "coordination" with different meanings from organization to organization.

Quarantelli (1997a), for example, has noted that different organizations have assigned different meanings to the word "coordination".

> Some groups view coordination…as informing other groups about what they will be doing. Others see coordination as the centralization of decision-making within a particular agency or among a few key officials, usually including themselves. Others again see coordination…as mutually agreed cooperation about how to carry out particular tasks. (Quarantelli, 1997a, p. 48)

As discussed earlier, the lack of clarity and distinction between crisis coordination and crisis collaboration is another vocabulary choice that causes confusion in the expectations of working with other organizations. Therefore, when organizations come together to respond to a disaster, they may become easily frustrated with one another because other groups are not "coordinating" or "collaborating" with them as they believe they should because they ascribe different meanings to the same word.

Another example of vocabulary differences can be seen with the language used in an Emergency Operations Center (EOC). When attending a regional disaster response exercise in 2008, the researcher discovered that an EOC uses many acronyms and terminology that may be familiar with some organizational members and unfamiliar with others because it is not a part of their everyday organizational culture. An EOC member must know that "800 MHz" and "ETEAM" are all interoperability technologies used within the EOC. They must also know what the terms, "hot wash" and "duty logs" mean, who the "incident commander" is, and decipher phrases such as "Due to credible threats on September 10 of explosions at soft targets, the threat level was increased from Yellow to Orange level". This level of vocabulary and terminology

may be easier for members of paramilitaristic organizations to understand than other organizations because most of the earliest emergency managers started their careers in the military (Drabek & McEntire, 2003, p. 106). Therefore emergency management procedures, which are used by EOCs, tend to be steeped in militaristic and paramilitaristic language, largely due to the background of participants. Language is clearly an important part of the emergency management culture.

Rites and rituals. Hofstede (2001) suggests rites and rituals are "collective activities that are technically unnecessary to the achievement of desired ends, but that within a culture are considered socially essential, keeping the individual bound within the norms of the collectivity" (p. 10). Rites and rituals can either be formal (i.e., initiation) or informal (i.e., how meetings are run), performed regularly or occasionally, but are enacted collectively to provide the rules, norms, and values of organizational life for members (Pacanowsky & O'Donnell-Trujillo, 1982; Hofstede, 2001). Trice and Beyer (1984) identified six types of rites – rites of passage, rites of degradation, rites of enhancement, rites of renewal, rites of conflict reduction, and rites of integration (p. 657). Rites and rituals are also drawn on by members and talked about to make sense of an organizational reality and of those members' actions within it (Pacanowsky & O'Donnell-Trujillo, 1982, p. 136).

As Trice and Beyer (1984) argue, rites and rituals "may not be a 'master key' that unlocks *all* of the meanings of a culture, but they are events in which *much* of a culture surfaces" (p. 656). For example, regular meetings in themselves may not alone represent an organizational culture, but meetings can be communication events in which people try to make sense of what is happening to them and see their place in the organization and the process of meetings can produce and reproduce structures of an organizational culture (Schwartzman, 1993, p. 39-41).

Rites and rituals of an organization can help define and reify how crisis response organizations frame crisis and crisis response. For example, if an organization's rites and rituals are mostly private and formal occasions, they could reinforce to members the organization's closed boundary and reinforce power structures. This in turn could hinder organizational members coordinating during crisis response because they only trust their organization to get the job done.

Some rites and rituals are common throughout the crisis cycle. Organizations have regular crisis trainings, drills, and exercises to prepare for crisis. These can either enhance coordination efforts to be enacted when a crisis occurs or they can reinforce lack of coordination between organizations. Another kind of crisis ritual occurs when an organization forces out one or more of the dominant leaders because the public has determined that the organization could have prevented the crisis (Seeger, Sellnow & Ulmer, 2003, p. 81). Examples of this include the Enron crisis, the American Red Cross's handling of 9/11 funds, and Hurricane Katrina resulting in the resignation of the FEMA director. These firings can be described as a rite of degradation by an organization because the organization wants to show that it is breaking away from long held beliefs and procedures and "making room for fresh perspectives and new voices" (Seeger, Sellnow & Ulmer, 2003, p. 81).

Another common post-crisis rite and ritual is the memorial event. When crises cause great tragedy and loss, people, organizations, and communities feel the need to remember and memorialize these events. These ceremonies, whether private or public, help with the grieving process, but are also meant as a form of learning because they serve "as a reminder that the community must remain vigilant in preparing for and, if possible, preventing similar crisis in the

future" (Seeger, Sellnow & Ulmer, 2003, p. 77). Therefore rites and rituals are an important identifying feature of organizational culture and appear to play a specific role in crisis response.

Stories. Stories are narratives that are generally based on actual events and experiences (Trice & Beyer, 1984, p. 655) members tell to other members and to those outside the organization to share organizational experiences. Reasons for telling stories are important to organizational culture because they "typify certain experiences as being, in principle, worthy of emulation (when the story glorifies success) or deserving of caution (when the story accentuates failure)" (Pacanowsky & O'Donnell-Trujillo, 1982, p. 139). Stories help to socialize newcomers as well as constituting values or morals that members should adhere to or avoid (Driskill & Brenton, 2005, p.44). Stories can appear in conversations, interviews, informal discussions and other events in organizational life and can be an account of something that happened in the past or presented as examples of particular points (Schwartzman, 1993).

Stories about a crisis or a "critical incident" in the life of an organization or community "allow current members to richly experience the past" (Seeger, Sellnow, & Ulmer, 2003, p. 80) as well as encode beliefs, lessons, and values that "allow for meaning and lessons to be transposed to current circumstances" (Seeger, Sellnow, & Ulmer, 2003, p. 80). Stories of a crisis event by the media can even become a morality play, in which "good and evil are clearly presented along with the consequences of unethical acts" (Seeger, Sellnow, & Ulmer, 2003, p. 225). These morality plays can result in organizational learning by other organizations that "may modify their actions and structures to avoid similar scandals" (Seeger, Sellnow, & Ulmer, 2003, p. 225). In fact, in the 1980's many public relations professionals and academics became interested in crisis management strategies after hearing stories of successful crisis management

by Johnson & Johnson in the 1982 Tylenol tampering case and in the unsuccessful management of the 1989 Exxon Valdez oil spill (Heath & O'Hair, 2009, p. 5).

For crisis response organizations, stories might also emphasize heroes within the organization or outside the organization that should be models for behavior in crisis response (Hofstede, 2001, p. 10). But heroes in one organizational culture can be outlaws in another. For example while some people praised New Orleans Mayor Ray Nagin for his swearing to convey the urgency of his constituents' situation, others saw it as going beyond the bounds of what being a "proper leader" in a crisis should be. Therefore stories can be a powerful way for organizations to reinforce their culture. The dramatic features of crisis stories may make them particularly compelling influences.

Symbols. Symbols are physical objects or non-verbal acts that "serve as a vehicle for conveying meaning, usually by representing another thing" (Trice & Beyer, 1984, p. 655). Symbols can be dress, gestures, music, logos, buildings, pictures, titles and so on, but not all physical objects or non-verbal acts are symbols. For example, Hatch (1993) suggests that artifacts themselves are not symbols, but artifacts can become symbols of an organizational culture if they are produced and used by organizational members "to produce a socially constructed reality to express their self-images and to contextualize their activity and identity (p. 673).

Symbols help reinforce norms, values, and meanings by organizational members and may get carried into interactions with outsiders (i.e., crisis response coordination) where members may assume that others understand their meaning. Batteau, Brandenburg, Seeger, and Eaton (2007) explain that in law enforcement organizations (but sometimes in EMS organizations and firefighters), being "badged" or "sworn" "establishes both formal and informal lines of authority

and cooperation, and creates patterns of expected deference" (p. 2). Because of this they might also expect this same deference to their authority when coordinating with other organizations on crisis response. If this doesn't occur, then it creates conflict between the organizations.

Another example of symbols can be seen within the Emergency Operations Center (EOC). Although crises are typically seen as chaotic and highly uncertain events, the EOC is set up to symbolize the command and control its members want to have over the crisis situation. One must have credentials to access the EOC, nameplates indicate where each organization member is supposed to work, and there are TV screens to monitor the media's coverage of the crisis response.

Finally when organizations want to create new symbols to change the culture, they sometimes forget to examine the rest of the artifacts in their culture to make sure their meanings are not contradicting one another. For example, when the researcher observed a disaster training exercise at an EOC, the leader emphasized that members should use new collaborative technologies such as 800 MHz radios, smart phones, and collaborative database systems during the training. But the room was still set up where similar agencies (e.g., police, hospitals, public works, etc.) were grouped together and facing inward toward each other conveying parallel instead of collaborative communication. Therefore it was no surprise when agencies communicated mostly with their similar counterparts and also utilized their own organizational communication systems. Symbols can be powerful representations of organizational culture and can illustrate the contradictory nature of organizational life.

So far I have argued for a distinction between crisis coordination and crisis collaboration in the review of crisis management, crisis communication, and organizational communication literature. I then described how organizational culture can significantly shape how organizational

members view crisis response and how they communicate with other organizations. The next section demonstrates how the organizational culture to which a member belongs (outside of the EOC) can influence interorganizational collaboration efforts within the EOC.

Organizational Culture and Interorganizational Collaboration

People create their individual identity through their social experiences. An important component of this identity comes from their membership in groups (Abrams, O'Connor, & Giles, 2002, p. 229). Since individuals spend an average of 38.5 hours a week (Department of Labor, 2013) working in an organization, one could conclude that their organizational membership is an important part of their identity. "Organizations tend to develop internal myths, traditions, heroes, unique symbols and language, ceremonies and customs, all of which set them off from other community bodies" (Granot, 1997, p. 306). Organizational members then use culture to identify with their organization and to also differentiate themselves, and therefore the organization as a whole, from those they perceive as competitors. If a member identifies strongly with their organizational culture, these organizational identities tend to remain a part of a person's identity outside of work as well. For example police officers "carry courtesy cards, off-duty revolvers, and wallet badges" (Van Maanen & Bradley, 1984) so they can always be ready to protect the public. Even when off the job, their identity is closely associated with their jobs.

Creating identity through organizational culture also creates and maintains organizational boundaries. Boundaries can be either rigid or more flexible through the use of both physical (e.g., badges, uniforms, etc.) and informational means (e.g., stories, jargon, etc.). Reflecting on Oakes, Haslam, and Turner's (1994) work on in-group versus out-group behavior, Abrams, O'Connor and Giles (2002) stated that organizational members maintain rigid boundaries

between in-group and out-group identities by developing different ways of communicating within the organization and externally to others (p. 230). It is through these communicative actions that "members display their belongingness to the organization as well as their opposition to those outside the organization" (Trujillo & Dionisopoulos, 1987, p. 199), as well as "constitute a system of common social meanings and shared interpretive schema within an organization" (Trujillo & Dionisopoulos, 1987, p. 199).

Membership in an organizational culture imparts several benefits. It helps members categorize and structure the work world, gives members a sense of commonality (within group) and uniqueness (with others outside the group) (Van Maanen & Barley, 1984), and makes work meaningful instead of "just another paycheck". If members develop tight social networks within the organization, organizational members also tend to socialize and participate in leisure activities outside of work as well (Van Maanen & Bradley, 1984). But these benefits may become liabilities when the need arises for organizations to collaborate in crisis response and mitigation efforts.

Organizational Culture and Barriers to Collaboration

As described earlier, a crisis or disaster needs the coordinated action between organizations because one organization alone does not have sufficient resources to manage the crisis. Communities and governments have chosen different coordination strategies and many have developed plans and policies such as the National Response Framework or mutual aid agreements that detail how coordination should occur between organizations in disaster response. But as Eaton and Brandenburg suggest, "forced partnerships cannot penetrate to a deeper level [of coordination] without cultural acceptance from all partners" (2008, p. 105). Drabek (2005)

illustrates some these cultural differences between agencies responding to a disaster by this interview response from an emergency manager.

> You see each department has a personality. Our public works people work well with personnel from our utilities. So we keep them together although they rotate the chair every few hours. They can resolve their differences despite the competition among them because they talk the same language, but it is more than just technical terminology. In contrast, you have your PIO [Public Information Officer] cluster. You really have to let them know who is in charge. They really differ from the fire culture. They're used to being heroes and are eager to be helpful. That contrasts to the police who seem to react as if it is them against the world. Consequently, police personnel don't want to look indecisive or admit that they don't know. So they don't seek our help. In contrast, the fire guys are quick to tell us what they need and we can get on it. But the police, they simply will not admit they need resources. They had officers trapped under debris but they were reluctant to let anyone in the EOC [Emergency Operations Center] know about this. They just don't seem to have the capacity to see the big picture and be able to open up for discussion of problems. They seem locked into an "either/or" type of thinking. When you work with people from all of these different cultures in a high stress environment where there is a lot of uncertainty in the information coming in and things are changing rapidly, you really see this. (p. 59)

Therefore, these members from different organizations have to overcome three cultural barriers to enhance interorganizational collaboration in disaster response.

Organizational expertise. The first cultural barrier to crisis collaboration is the "belief that only the membership possesses the proper knowledge, skills, and orientations necessary to make decisions as to how the work is to be performed and evaluated" (Van Maanen & Bradley, 1984). Most organizations tend to work successfully on their own in their day-to-day operations because many communities' services are fragmented and highly specialized. Since crises are rare events, this belief will be prevalent and difficult for members to break out of when they are thrust into a disaster response situation. For example, during the 1994 Northridge earthquake, Nigg (1997) found that "Ocean City" agencies did not have much interaction or pre-planning for interorganizational coordination prior to the earthquake. Nigg describes the city's response as

"uncoordinated and 'individualistic'" and "although the city's EPC [Emergency Preparedness Coordinator] had the EOC operational within the day of the earthquake, many departments did not bother to send representatives to the EOC nor did they use it to channel requests for personnel or material resources" (1997, p. 5).

Competition between organizations. A second cultural barrier among organizations during disaster response is a result of long-standing rivalries or competition between organizations. Increased demand for services results in organizations having to vie against each other for public attention in order to secure the same pool of limited resources or funding available (Granot, 1997; Isbell & Goldstein, 2006). Rivalries also are a way for organizations that provide similar services to differentiate themselves and create a unique identity. For example, Tierney (1985) documented how hospitals tried to affect their participation in EMS disaster response because of long-standing rivalries among themselves (e.g., high-status versus low-status hospitals, public vs. private hospitals) in order to maintain control over "whom they treat and what services they offer" (p.80). Eaton and Brandenburg (2008) also described how two organizations who had "a long history of criticizing each other" wouldn't attend crisis planning exercises hosted by the other organization (p. 99). These rivalries can be temporarily suspended if organizations are overwhelmed by a crisis, like the 1997 Red River Valley floods (Sellnow, Seeger, & Ulmer 2002). But if the organizational cultures of these groups are strong enough, these rivalries can lead to great mistrust and lack of action, such as the war of words between officials of the city of New Orleans, the state of Louisiana, and FEMA during Hurricane Katrina.

Unit diversity. A third cultural barrier unique to interorganizational crisis collaboration is the wide-range of unit diversity (Drabek, 1985) that is found among all of the organizations

that respond to disasters. These organizations range from typical emergency or first responders (e.g., fire, police, EMS, search and rescue teams, hospitals, etc.), to public works agencies (e.g., utilities, water, sanitation, etc.) to disaster relief agencies (e.g., American Red Cross, Salvation Army, Volunteers of America, etc.), to governmental agencies (e.g., city, region, state, federal). Although typically not part of disaster planning operations, other organizations will also respond depending on the type of disaster – for example, military organizations (i.e., the National Guard), faith-based organizations (FBOs), commercial companies (e.g., home improvement stores, grocery stores, etc.), and public health organizations (e.g., Centers for Disease Control, community health agencies, poison control centers, etc.). These varied organizations leads to different organizational cultures clashing with one another as they try to coordinate a disaster response effort.

> Some organizations are highly disciplined, others disorderly; some with sharp hierarchical structure, others informal and egalitarian; in some authoritarian decision-making prevails, while others tend towards democratic sharing…Organizations may range from frank openness about their activities to-closed-mouth secrecy. (Granot, 1997, p. 306)

Following the September 11, 2001 attacks a congressional investigation determined that lack of coordination and information sharing between governmental agencies would be improved if these agencies were centralized under one department, thus the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) was created (Kettl, 2003). But the service culture of FEMA, who primarily responded to natural disasters, clashed with the more paramilitary culture of the DHS whose mission was preventing terrorism. This resulted in a mass exodus of skilled FEMA employees, which resulted in managers with little disaster response experience taking their place. Consequently, the remaining FEMA managers were poorly prepared to manage the Hurricane Katrina disaster (Bier, 2006). Therefore, the wide-variety of disaster response organizations can

have a negative effect on interorganizational collaboration efforts if their organizational cultures clash with each other.

Strategies for Increasing Crisis Collaboration

To overcome the three cultural barriers of interorganizational collaboration in disaster response, two solutions have been proposed by scholars from a review of the research literature.

Increase boundary spanning of group members. One proposed solution to the problem of coordination among organizational cultures is encouraging boundary spanning among organizations through frequent communication among coordinating activities in the form of practice drills, planning, and informal networking (GAO, 2005). Boundary spanning occurs when organizational members reach across the boundaries of their group or organizational membership in order to seek or share information (Leifer & Delbecq, 1978). When a need arises for organizations to seek information or resources to reduce uncertainty or make decisions, some members of an organization will engage in boundary spanning activities to communicate with members in other organizations. But organizational members are so used to their own coding schemes and conceptual frames in communicating intraorganizationally, that they first assume that their references and meanings are the same (Bennington, Shelter, & Shaw, 2003, p. 121). Just as a single organizational culture can have a primary culture and sub-culture or several sub-cultures, organizational cultures within the same type of organization (e.g., emergency services, hospitals, service organizations, etc.). For example, first responder organizations (fire, police, EMS) have a paramilitary macroculture that they all ascribe to, but police cultures can be different from fire departments, and even can be different among different departments (i.e. state vs. local) if their assumptions, values, experiences, and symbols give them different references to the same terms or experiences (Bennington, Shetler, & Shaw, 2003; Malone, 2003). This

interorganizational collaboration is now made more difficult because members now have to learn "local coding schemes and languages as well as the specialized conceptual frames" (Tushman & Scalan, 1981, p. 291) in order to ensure that interorganizational members are agreeing on symbolic meanings.

Batteau, Brandenburg, Seeger, and Eaton (2007) propose that three boundary spanning concepts may facilitate disaster coordination and more effective communication between disaster response organizations. 1) Boundary permeability is the ability of the crisis collaborating group to be flexible and fluid in its membership of crisis response organizations. 2) Institutional familiarity is how well collaborating group members know and understand the other organizations they are working with. This is often facilitated through participation in past crisis response efforts or in pre-planning training and exercises. 3) Cultural similarity is how much organizational cultural values, norms, and structures overlap with their own organizational culture. For example similar units such as paramilitaristic units of police and fire departments may coordinate more easily with each other because they have similar identification of members, missions, and hierarchical structures. Boundary spanning by EOC members therefore will lessen the boundary defining tendencies of organizational membership.

Have a strong collaborating group culture. Another solution to the negative effects of members' adherence to their individual organizational culture is to create a unique and strong organizational culture within the Emergency Operations Center (EOC) group. This would be an organizational culture of disaster response that encourages the flow of information and rewards risk sharing, empowerment of members, and innovation (Westrum 2004) and emphasizes interorganizational crisis collaboration. While time and the development of informal network relationships can help the process of negotiating meaning through communication (Auf der

Heide, 1989; Bennington, Shetler, & Shaw, 2003; Kapucu, 2006; Tushman & Scalan, 1981),

during a crisis the time needed to decide which information to share and which organization(s)

should handle what tasks decreases dramatically. Nathan and Mitroff (1991) contend that

"organizations must subscribe to a single negotiated order [agreeing on the rules and structure of

network communication] if they are to proceed in a rapid and integrated fashion to respond to a

crisis" (p. 172). This also assumes that all of the potential organizational responders can be

identified ahead of time and have the time and resources necessary to engage in pre-crisis

planning to develop this unified organizational culture. However, which members from various

organizations come together to respond to a disaster vary depending on what type of crisis they

are responding to, and even members within an EOC can change often enough to make it

difficult to develop a unified culture (Drabek, 2003).

Stress and ambiguity also create conditions in which EOC members may forget to utilize

the emergency operations procedures (EOPs) which details how interorganizational collaboration

should occur. Instead members may revert to their own organization's way of communicating

and handling a crisis which may be vastly different from the EOC's procedures. According to

Seeger, Sellnow, and Ulmer (2003), "The most immediate and salient conditions of this [crisis]

stage are high levels of uncertainty, confusion, disorientation, surprise, shock, and stress. High

levels of emotional arousal, including fear, anger, sadness, and loss, accompany the event" (p.

125). The members of different organizational cultures responding to the crisis become

important since, "under pressure, those responses acquired more recently and practiced less

often, should unravel sooner than those acquired less recently and practiced more often, which

have become more habitual. Thus, requisite variety [the relative variety of enactment capacity

available within an organization] may disappear right when it is most needed" (Weick, 1990, p.

577). In other words, even with crisis communication plans pre-determined and enacted by the incident command structure of an EOC, organizational members coming together with other organizations during a crisis could revert to their own organization's way of communicating. This could be expected to create communication problems between organizations that are not familiar with each other's different communication cultures.

For example, when I previously observed a regional Midwest joint crisis training exercise in September 2008, the interorganizational members of the EOC could not use the coordinated communication system because they forgot their access codes, members seemed reluctant to talk across units to share information, and lot of organizational unit jargon was used in the update meetings. Also at the debriefing, the director of the training exercise chided the organizational participants because no one brought or used their emergency operations procedures during the exercise. Since joint crisis training exercises are supposed to mimic interorganizational response during an actual crisis, this failure highlights the potential communication problems between organizations that are not familiar with each other's different communication cultures and how easily members forget the policies and procedures of the newer EOC organizational culture.

To summarize the review of literature, there has been a lack of clarity in the crisis response literature about what crisis coordination means and how crisis collaboration is a distinct construct from crisis coordination. Several interorganizational coordination perspectives and strategies have been proposed by researchers and practitioners. But I argue that the traditional discussion of more or less interorganizational crisis coordination does not accurately portray when crisis response reaches a level of crisis collaboration beyond coordination or when crisis collaboration is needed for effective response management. Previous studies have disregarded the important distinction between crisis coordination and crisis collaboration and the challenges

and benefits of each to interorganizational crisis response efforts. In addition, scholars and practitioners have neglected to examine how the different organizational communication cultures of crisis response organizations may affect crisis collaboration efforts. Therefore the goal of this study is to offer important new evidence not previously explored in interorganizational crisis collaboration. The next section will discuss the research questions that will frame this study.

Research Questions

The aim of this study was to use qualitative methods to describe and understand two cultures of crisis response organizations and identify how their communication practices may have influenced crisis collaboration within the context of an Emergency Operations Center (EOC). Therefore, this study explored the following research questions:

RQ 1: What are the primary crisis related organizational cultural features of the regional chapter of a Disaster Response Organization (DRO) and the Metropolitan Police Department (MPD)?

RQ 2: How are the crisis related organizational cultures of the Metropolitan Police Department and the regional chapter of a Disaster Relief Organization enacted through communication practices between members?

RQ 3: How do the differences in these two organizational communication cultures influence their ability to practice crisis collaboration?

The first question sought to identify and describe the organizational cultures of a regional chapter of a disaster relief organization (DRO) and metropolitan police department (MPD). As stated in the earlier discussion, people create part of their identity through their group membership (Abrams, O'Connor, & Giles, 2002, p. 229). "Organizations tend to develop internal myths, traditions, heroes, unique symbols and language, ceremonies and customs, all of which set them off from other community bodies" (Granot, 1997, p. 306). Organizational

members then use culture to identify with their organization and to also differentiate themselves, and therefore the organization as a whole, from others. By choosing an emergency response agency that tends to be bureaucratic and authoritative in nature (the emergency management unit of a local police department) and a disaster response agency that is a non-profit agency with a strong humanitarian mission and also heavily utilizes volunteers in its crisis response efforts, this made it easier to identify the differences between the two organizational cultures. Moreover, understanding the emergency management culture of these organizations is important. While others have investigated what might be termed routine organizational cultures, little is known about the disaster response culture.

The second research question explored specifically how organization members in the DRO and MPD subjectively created shared patterns of symbols and meanings through communication that defines, guides, and sometimes constrains their everyday thoughts and behaviors in organizational life. Using the four communication constructs of vocabulary, rituals, stories, and symbols, explained earlier, each communication culture was examined through this interpretive lens. During data collection the researcher observed each organization trying to answer these general questions, "(1) What are the key communication activities [grounded in culture], the unfolding of which are occasions when sense-making is accomplished? and (2) What is the sense members of any particular organization have made of their experiences?" (Pacanowsky & O'Donnell-Trujillo, 1982, p. 124).

Since this is a study of organizations that respond to crises, it also needed to be determined how each organizational culture viewed crisis, their role in responding to a crisis, and their views on collaborating with other organizations during large scale crises. Although crises are defined as "unusual events", these events typically have a lasting impact on organizations

that experience one and therefore are likely to create strong organizational narratives that help to shape that particular culture's view of crisis. These two organizations have dealt with crises in the past, even though the current membership may not have. Even if an organization or its members have not personally experienced a crisis, large scale crises, such as the September 11 terrorist attacks and the Hurricane Katrina flooding of New Orleans, have created such strong reactions in people that they are likely to create organizational narratives of "what they would have done in that situation", which would also have helped to shape a cultural view of crisis.

Once the communication cultures of the two crisis response organizations have been determined, the researcher turned to the third research question to examine how the organizational communication cultures of the DRO and MPD may influence crisis collaboration. One would expect that these organizational cultures would be similar during everyday operations and in crisis response because the units within these organizations deal with emergencies response and crisis planning on a daily basis. So for them, crisis is a relatively routine experience. The goal was to determine how the individual organizational cultures of members may help or hinder the interorganizational crisis collaboration process.

Summary

When a large scale crisis affects a community (i.e., the Virginia Tech shooting), region (i.e., Hurricane Katrina), or sometimes an entire country (i.e., the 2010 earthquake in Haiti), the response efforts must also be large scale involving many different agencies "requir[ing] coordination of a variety of resources, technical skill and response capacity" (Seeger, Sellnow, & Ulmer, 2003, p. 189). Dozens and sometimes even hundreds of organizations, often with very different missions, methods, technologies and cultures, are called upon to work together in order to mitigate the crisis and assist in the recovery efforts. This management group is typically

called the Emergency Operations Center (EOC). Although several interorganizational coordination perspectives and strategies have been proposed by researchers and practitioners, they are neglecting to define and explore the benefits of crisis collaboration. Crisis collaboration takes place when members of several crisis response organizations create an alliance in which they value member interdependence, equal input of participants, and shared decision-making (Keyton & Stallworth, 2003). This allows them to reach their common goal of crisis response and mitigation, even under severe time and decision-making pressures. The bona fide group perspective shows us how communication constitutes the collaboration process and how internal processes of the EOC are intricately linked to the external environments in which the group is embedded.

To better understand interorganizational crisis collaboration, one environmental exigency that needs to be examined further is the individual organizational cultures of crisis response organizations that come together to manage and mitigate a crisis. Individual organizational cultures can provide barriers to crisis collaboration efforts unless there are strategies that are put into place to mitigate these issues. If the individual organizational cultures are too strong then conflicts and miscommunication could inhibit collaboration efforts, the consequences of which could prolong or intensify a crisis instead of mitigation. Thus the aim of this study was to use a qualitative approach to explore and describe two crisis response organizational cultures and identify how their different communication practices may influence crisis collaboration.

CHAPTER 2

METHODS

This chapter describes the methodology employed to answer the research questions and provides a justification for using qualitative approaches and an instrumental case study. These approaches were used to describe and explore two crisis response organizational cultures and identified how their different communication practices may influence crisis collaboration. First this chapter describes the instrumental case study and how it diverged from a typical crisis communication case study. Next the chapter discusses the organizations selected for the study, a regional chapter of a national non-profit disaster relief organization (DRO) and the emergency management unit of a metropolitan police department (EMU MPD). Then, an explanation of the qualitative data collection methods of participant observation, interviews and documents are given as well as how they were applied to this study. Finally the procedures for analysis are described.

Instrumental Case Study

This instrumental case study used qualitative methods to explore and describe two crisis response organizational cultures and identified how their different communication practices may influence crisis collaboration. Robert K. Yin defines a case study in the social science context as "an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident" (2003, p. 13). The case study method is probably the most popular approach to studying crisis communication (Sellnow & Seeger, 2013; Fearn-Banks, 2007). This is because "Crises occur with little perceived warning, hence manipulation of the contexts in which they occur is at best unreasonable and at worst unethical" (Seeger, Sellnow, & Ulmer, 1998, p. 261). The case study

was the best choice for this project as it sought to explore and describe the phenomenon of organizational cultures and crisis collaboration in the context of crisis response organizations that can aid in theoretical development (Seeger, Sellnow, & Ulmer, 198, p. 262). Therefore the goal of this study is to offer important new evidence not previously explored in interorganizational crisis collaboration.

Stake (2005) defines three types of case study as intrinsic, instrumental, and collective. The instrumental case study places the context of a particular crisis response secondary and the case is examined "mainly to provide insight into an issue or to redraw a generalization" (Stake, 2005, p. 445

An instrumental case study was the method chosen for the current study because its primary interest is in better understanding the phenomenon of how organizational cultures of crisis response organizations can affect crisis collaboration efforts.

Even though the current study employed an instrumental case design, it diverged from a typical crisis communication case study. Most case study research in this area has communication researchers studying either a recent crisis or a crisis that has happened years ago in order to gain better understanding of the communication processes or patterns of that event. Because the crisis event has already occurred, the researchers rely on documentation, archival records, and/or interviews to piece together what happened to aid in theoretical development (Seeger, Sellnow, & Ulmer, 2003, p. 262) and/or results in learning that can be passed along to others as "what to do" or "what not to do" in a crisis (Fearn-Banks, 2007). This case study was also different from typical crisis case studies because it incorporated qualitative methods of "doing fieldwork", specifically participant observation and interview fieldwork. This type of fieldwork was necessary for this study because it allowed for the immersion needed to

understand the organizational cultural experience as members do (Emerson, Fretz, & Shaw, 1995) and how members constituted organizational culture through their communication. Pacanowsky and O'Donnell-Trujillo also agree that typical case study methods do not insure "the gathering of the kind of data we think is required for telling a 'good organizational story'" (1982, p. 127). As Stake (2005) argues, "case study is defined by interest in an individual case, not by the methods of inquiry used" (p. 443). Now that the type of study has been described the next section will discuss the selection of organizations for this study.

Case Study Organizations

This study sought to understand how organizational cultures of crisis response organizations can affect crisis collaboration efforts in a metropolitan area. To explore the research questions, this project examined two organizations that typically participate through an interorganizational crisis management group, such as an Emergency Operations Center (EOC) that is managed by a governmental emergency management agency whenever it is activated for crisis response. The study focused on organizations under a particular metropolitan EOC (MEOC) under the city's Homeland Security and Emergency Management agency (HSEM) because it is the crisis management entity for any large-scale crises that occurs in the city. The mission of the MEOC is

> to provide leadership in coordinating the development of a sustainable and all-hazard, regional approach to large-scale emergencies or disasters. To emphasize an integrated process for establishing preventative measures, emergency operations, planning and training to minimize the impact of catastrophic events on the people, property, environment and economy of the City of _____. (MEOC website, 2009)

The goals of this study were to understand how crisis collaboration can be influenced by the interorganizational communication of MEOC members. Therefore, this study examined in depth two crisis response organizations that are active in most MEOC crisis response operations; the

emergency management unit of a metropolitan police department (EMU MPD) and a regional chapter of a national non-profit disaster relief organization (DRO). These organizations were selected because they have the greatest potential of having divergent organizational communication cultures. The study could therefore identify how their different communication practices may positively or negatively influence crisis collaboration.

The MPD not only handles emergencies on a daily basis, but is often the "first line of response for public safety and security" during a crisis, including "preserving life and protecting property" (FEMA, 2013). The emergency management unit of the MPD specifically handles crisis and emergency response including bomb threats, hostage situations, and terrorist threats. Therefore, this unit of the MPD was the primary focus of this study.

The regional chapter of the national non-profit disaster relief organization (DRO) "helps vulnerable people and communities around the world prepare for, respond to, and recover from natural disasters, humanitarian crises, and health emergencies by mobilizing the power of the world's largest humanitarian network (DRO website, 2009). The DRO is recognized by federal, state and local governments across the country as a "principle supplier of mass care in federally declared disasters" but also does daily emergency response for citizens affected by fires (DRO website, 2009). In addition, the regional chapter of the DRO is also a standing member of the Metropolitan Emergency Operations Center (MEOC).

The researcher initially gained access to the two organizational gatekeepers using her prior connections with persons at her university that previously worked with these organizations. In this case, a co-worker had volunteered and been a member on a regional board with the DRO and the Chief of Police at the University had participated in crisis response planning meetings with the EMU MPD. These two persons allowed her to use their names in initial reach outs to the

two organizations. After receiving written organizational support for the study from the gatekeeper of the two organizations and Human Investigation Committee approval from the University, the researcher spent four and one-half months in the field of both the Metropolitan Police Department (MPD) and the regional chapter of the national non-profit disaster relief organization (DRO) to collect data on their individual organizational cultures.

The goal was to identify how the different communication practices of these two organizations may influence interorganizational communication and crisis collaboration efforts. If the MEOC members of these two organizations allow their own organizational culture to supersede the collaboration efforts, it could also hinder crisis collaboration efforts during an actual crisis response. Next the data collection methods for the study are described.

Data Collection

Researchers can use multiple methods of data collection to gather their evidence over a defined period of time to "create as complete an understanding as possible of the complex interactions" of a crisis (Sellnow, Seeger, & Ulmer, 2003, p. 275). During the course of this study, three methods of data collection were employed – participant observation, interviews, and documents. An electronic log book of what data was collected when (i.e. field observations, interviews, archival documents) as well as code names and titles of participants in various organizations was kept by the researcher (see Appendix A).

Participant Observation

"Participant observation is a method in which a researcher takes part in the daily activities, rituals, interactions, and events of a group of people has the means of learning the explicit and tacit aspects of their life routines and their culture" (DeWalt & DeWalt, 2002). Participant observations, also called fieldwork, requires some level of immersion into the

organizational life over time so that researchers can study communication in context by social actors to create meaning (Emerson, Fretz, & Shaw, 1995). This is so the researcher can gain a rich understanding of the processes, complexities and patterns to be able to produce "thick description" (Geertz, 1973) of that culture. The level of immersion can vary from complete observer, observer-participant, participant-observer, to complete participant (Bantz, 1993; Lindlof, 1995), but the goal is to become a part of the culture as much as the organization or community will allow.

Participant observation includes, but is not limited to, "observing, asking questions [informally and formally], participating in group activities, and testing the validity of one's perceptions against the intuitions of natives" (Saville-Troike, 2003, p. 3). This process is recorded through the writing of field notes. Writing field notes is the regular and systematic method of documenting what the researcher observes and learns while participating in organizational life (Emerson, Fretz, & Shaw, 1995, p. 1). What this means is that the researcher's observations (data) are not to be separated from how the researcher experiences the observations (findings). "It thus becomes critical for the [researcher] to document her own activities, circumstances, and emotional responses as these factors shape the process of observing and recording others' lives" (Emerson, Fretz, & Shaw, 1995, p. 11). The researcher also sees the writing of field notes as a continuous process of learning and reflection to help the researcher to build insights and understandings of future observations of the organizational culture (Emerson, Fretz, & Shaw, 1995, p. 13). In addition, the researcher must remain open "to categories and modes of thought and behavior which may not have been anticipated by the investigator" (Saville-Troike, 2003, p. 3). Next the specific procedures of participant observation and the writing of field notes for the study are explained.

When entering each organization, the researcher took the stance of the "novice", just like new members do upon entering an organization. The goal was to observe as many people, settings, interactions, and events as possible in a non-judgmental manner to gain a basic understanding of the organizational culture. "Novices watch what other people are doing, ask others to explain what is happening, try things out for themselves – occasionally making mistakes – and so on" (Hamersley & Atkinson, 2002, p. 99). In other words, the researcher looked for things that were confusing for her but seem to be clear to members so she could start to understand their perspective (Lindlof & Taylor, 2002, p. 153-157). In this phase of research, field notes were more like "scratch notes" (Lindlof & Taylor, 2002) or "jottings" (Emerson, Fretz & Shaw, 2002) writing down as much detail and impressions as quickly as possible to preserve observations. The goal here was to be as descriptive and concrete as possible without making assumptions or analysis of what is happening. These jottings occurred either in the field or after the researcher left the field that day depending on the appropriateness of the setting and sensitivities of the organizations and its members. Drawing maps of various rooms and settings will also aided recollection while typing up field notes to help in understanding the organizational culture through the interaction of physical context and members.

Next, field notes were typed up and expanded using the jottings from the field and the reflections of the participant observation to create a chronological "thick description" of what was experienced that day. The expanded field notes consisted of "description of the physical context, the people involved, as much of their behavior and nonverbal communication as possible, and in words that are as close as possible to the words used by the participants" (DeWalt & DeWalt, 2002, p. 149). This helped to generate a clearer analysis later and helped trigger other important details and memories to add what was not recorded in the original

jottings. While avoiding making any analysis or assumptions of the observations, field notes included any questions or confusions the researcher had about what was being observed. These were labeled clearly through parenthetical notations so not to confuse them with the other observations or attribute them to organizational members. It was important to include these so the researcher was aware of future observations or questions that need to be asked through informal interviews the next time the researcher was in the field to better provide further clarification of the observations.

After becoming more familiar with the "what" and "how" of each organizational culture in the initial period of participant observation, subsequent field notes included a chronological description of interactions and events. In addition, the researcher started to do an initial analysis by documenting "recurring patterns of social action, and how participants understand them" (Lindlof & Taylor, 2002, p. 166). However, in looking for patterns, the researcher remained open to variations and contradictions to patterns to avoid forcing the observations to match developing constructs or themes (Emerson, Fretz, & Shaw, 2002, p. 29).

In this study, the researcher's role could be classified as a participant-observer for the non-profit disaster relief organization (DRO) and as an observer for the emergency management unit of the metropolitan police department (EMU MPD). This distinction was made because of the level of access granted by each organization. The researcher was able to observe the daily lives and interactions of organizational members in several facets of the DRO, including attending a quarterly volunteer meeting, a day-long seminar with another crisis response organization, a high school club meeting associated with the organization, an annual social event for volunteers, and three different ride alongs with members to observe how they responded to emergency calls and interacted with clients. This resulted in approximately 23 total hours of

time in the field with the organization (see Appendix A). Throughout the study, the members of the DRO identified her as a fellow member of the organization by introducing her to clients as a member of the organization and by on-the-job training in the process of interviewing clients so she could participate in the activities of members such as walk-throughs of buildings and providing organizational information and resources to clients.

In contrast to the DRO, access to the EMU MPD organization was more difficult to obtain and maintain throughout the study. For example, the researcher knew she needed a trusted member to the EMU MPD to introduce her to the organizational gatekeeper, the Chief of Police at the university who had coordinated with the unit on several crisis response meetings and trainings. But it took several emails and phone calls from both the researcher and the Chief of Police over two months to set up the initial research study meeting.

Then after negotiating and gaining initial access for the study by the EMU MPD the researcher was limited by the organizational gatekeeper to attending law enforcement and security planning meetings of the Auto Show in which crisis planning occurred. The MPD was the lead law enforcement agency in this effort. She also was able to do a walk-around with her informant for a couple of hours at the Auto Show event and visit two interorganizational management centers set up for the event. Finally the researcher attended a "non-first responder Fusion Liaison Officer (FLO)" training led by the state police department mentioned at one of the meetings, but not attended by MPD members. The researcher was denied the request to observe the daily organizational life of the EMU MPD for "security reasons." Although the researcher was only able to spend 13 hours in the field with the MPD (with an additional 6 hours in FLO training; see Appendix A), those hours were rich in content. For example, the Auto Show meetings provided a great opportunity to see how members interacted with other organizations

and observe active crisis planning meetings. In addition, interviews and documentation provided other rich sources of data on crisis response and working with other organizations.

Scholars of organizational culture have often discussed where the researcher positions him/herself in the observations and writing of organizational culture (Conquergood, 1991; Eisenberg & Riley, 2001). So it is up to the organizational culture researcher to decide how his/her experiences both in the field and own life experiences get reflected in their writing so that both the "reality" of the organizational culture can be represented and others (outsiders, academics, practitioners, group members) can also learn from the researchers insights into the culture.

In this case, the failure to gain particular kinds of access to information and daily operations by the EMU MPD that emerged during the study was indicative of organizational culture because of what it inherently reflected about cultural norms and in-group versus out-group culture. As Kleinman and Copp (1993) state,

> [Fieldworkers] can learn from any vantage point as long as we know what roles we occupy in different situations. Our feelings while in a particular role might mirror those who hold a similar role in the setting…Thus our feelings suggest hypotheses about how others, members of a subgroup in the setting or perhaps outsiders, feel about themselves and each other. (p. 31)

The positioning of the researcher as "outsider" or "other" by EMU MPD members and her access experiences became a theme germane to this study. Control of access and information is a primary process whereby organizational membership is signaled and maintained. Therefore anytime the researcher was denied access by the EMU MPD, it served as an important indicator of the organization's culture and communication practices and was analyzed as such.

In addition, from the onset of the study the researcher knew she could not take a purely functionalist or objective approach to her observations due to the active and participatory nature

of her fieldwork. But as the differences in gaining access to the two organizational cultures became apparent and affected her experiences, the researcher started to utilize rhetorical reflexivity in her observations and later analysis in order to "seek out these sites of tension, displacement, and contradiction between the Being There of performed experience and the Being Here of written texts" (Conquergood 1991, p. 193). Rhetorical reflexivity was documented by the researcher throughout the data collection process in fieldnotes, separate analytical memo, and in email conversations with her dissertation advisor. The researcher was also able to spend 10 hours in the field with the Homeland Security and Emergency Management (HSEM) office that manages the metropolitan emergency operations center (MEOC). This occurred through one visit during the Auto Show and at HSEM headquarters as they participated in a three-day crisis response exercise to test a new secure database software package to potentially be used in crisis response. But neither the DRO nor the MPD participated in the exercise so that data from the exercise was excluded for this study.

Participant observation was employed as an interpretative, reflexive process to more fully understand the intricacies and complexities of organizational life and to guide interactions and informal interview questions later in the data collection process. Next, interviews are discussed as another form of data collection that aided in the understanding of organizational culture.

Interviews

Another important data source for this case study was interviews. Interviewing in this context involved "Asking questions and listening to others tell what they know, feel, and believe" (Lindlof & Taylor, 2002, p. 170). Interviewing also enables the researcher "to understand the sensemaking that animates communicative performances" (Lindlof & Taylor, 2002, p. 172). Therefore, interviews served the following purposes for this study:

> Understanding the social actor's experience and perspective through stories, accounts, and explanations; understanding native conceptualizations of communication, eliciting the language forms used by social actors in natural settings, gathering information about things or processes that cannot be observed effectively by other means, inquiring about occurrences in the past, verifying, validating, or commenting on information obtained from other sources, and testing hypotheses developed in the field. (Lindlof & Taylor, 2002, p. 173)

In other words, participant observation was useful to understand how organizational culture was constituted between members within a particular context. Interviews also aided in corroborating any insights culled from the observations and documentation during the study as well as, more importantly, contradict any information or assumptions (Lindlof, 1995; Yin, 2003). This was especially important as a control since the researcher is not a member of any of these organizations.

Throughout the study, interviews were either informal or semi-structured. The first, called informal interviewing or ethnographic interviewing arose during participant observation. One type of informal interview occurred in the field when the researcher had an introductory meeting with individual organizational members and they described their roles and responsibilities with the organization. These were not done with an interview guide to build rapport between the researcher and organizational members and to mimic how a new member would interact with members and learn about an organization and its culture. But the researcher did have general topics jotted down to cover such as, "History with the organization", "Title, roles, and responsibilities", "What they do day-to-day and in emergency or crisis", "What do they like or not like about working in the organization", "Tell me a story about an event", and so on.

Informal interviews also occurred in the field when there was a lull in the action of daily organizational life and the researcher could probe for clarification and understanding of the

meaning of certain terms, conversations, behaviors, or actions. These lulls during participant observation included travel time with members in the same vehicle to and from headquarters to other locations, informal time before and after meetings or events, and during breaks or meals. While some of this could be understood through further field observations, it was also necessary for the researcher to ask specific questions to gain understanding of what meanings the members attributed to these terms, behaviors, or actions. Some of this was done through the natural conversations with other members where clarifying questions were asked to explain something such as an acronym or term that was just used. At other times while typing up her fieldnotes, the researcher would come across terms or processes she didn't understand or other topics she wanted to follow-up with members during her next interaction with them. She would note these in her field journal, and when an opportunity arose during a lull in participant observation, she used the opportunity to ask questions about a particular area of interest or to follow-up on a previous conversation to clarify something she did not understand (Lindlof & Taylor, 2002, p. 176). By doing this informally, this again mimicked the process a new member would use to understand organizational life and organizational culture.

Semi-structured interviews were more structured that informal interviews, lasted much longer than informal interviews, and were often set-apart from the daily organizational life of members. The researcher used an interview guide (see Appendix B) which consisted of a "list of open-ended questions that direct conversation without forcing the interviewee to select preestablished responses…to elicit from the interviewee rich, detailed materials that can be used in qualitative analysis" (Lofland, Snow, Anderson, & Lofland, 2006, p. 17). These questions were developed to learn what members felt their organization's role was in a crisis, the communication process during a response, what organizations it interacts with on a daily basis

and during larger responses, and crisis planning and trainings they are involved with, both internally and with other organizations. The overall interview guide questions did not change throughout the data collection process to give the researcher some level of reliability or consistency of observations during data collection (Lindloff & Taylor, 2002, p. 239, Yin 2003). This consistency in semi-structured interviews aided in data analysis of the study by verifying cultural constructs among members within each organization and for comparative analysis between organizations.

Although semi-structured, these types of questions were open-ended so the researcher is open to new information and insights within established parameters (Lindlof, 1995; Yin, 2003). This allowed the researcher the freedom to inquire about new or interesting information presented in the interview that was germane to the study but not anticipated by the researcher. Finally, some questions were included that were specific to the member the research interviewed or the time in which the interview was conducted to allow for the interpretative and reflexive process of qualitative data collection. These questions mostly arose during the process of typing up earlier fieldnotes and consisted of either follow-up questions from earlier member/researcher interactions, probe about a particular organizational process, or to gather information on specific constructs underrepresented in the data. Lack of access to particular members during participant observation mainly drove the addition of these questions to the semi-structured interviews.

To elicit the most comprehensive and honest responses in interviews (from the interviewee viewpoint), it was important for the interviewees to feel both comfortable and safe. This is achieved by attaining rapport with interviewees. In interview situations, "Rapport is a quality of a communication event, not of a relationship" (Lindlof & Taylor, 2002, p. 189).

Rapport was developed first by getting to know the participants in a field setting before requesting an interview.

To develop rapport for the semi-structured interviews, the researcher encourage the interviewee to choose the time and place for the interviews that was convenient for them and allowed for the level of privacy with which they felt comfortable (Lindlof & Taylor, 2002, p. 185). This allowed them to be relaxed and not worry about who may overhear the conversation. As part of the informed consent process, the researcher also allowed the interviewee to choose his or her own pseudonym. Most did not. However one person did request that a gender neutral name and masculine pronouns be used whenever that person was quoted or described in the study. Therefore all participants in the study are referred to as "he" or "him" regardless of actual gender except in the cases where the researcher was describing her own experiences or interactions.

Next, since researchers are expecting interviewees to be truthful in their interviews, the researchers showed reciprocity by being clear and truthful in the purpose of her interview. "Participants should be given clear, honest reasons for why they have been contacted, what the project goals are, and how the interview will be conducted" (Lindlof & Taylor, 2002, p. 189). The researcher also worked to set a comfortable tone for the interview as well as help each other become familiar with each other's communicative styles (Lindlof & Taylor, 2002, p. 190) by starting the interview meeting with reciprocal self-disclosure about their jobs, family, or life. For this study, the researcher worked to establish good rapport with all interviewees and used open-ended questions to create a positive atmosphere and tone for the interviews so the interviewees felt comfortable answering questions openly and honestly.

Finally, while informal interview data was captured through the fieldnote writing process, semi-structured interviews were, when allowed, recorded using a digital tape recorder. Care was taken at the beginning of each interview to explain to interviewees that the purpose of tape recording is so the researcher can focus on the conversation and listen instead of note-taking (Lofland et al., 2006, p. 106). The other purpose was to ensure that their words are captured as they said them and not forgotten or remembered differently by the researcher at a later time (Lindlof & Taylor, 2002, p. 187) which could result in misunderstanding or substituting the researcher's meaning for that of the interviewee. However if the interviewee chose to not be tape-recorded, as occurred in all EMU MPD semi-structured interviews, then the researcher respected the interviewee's wishes.

Regardless of tape recording, the researcher took extensive notes in case of technological failure and to keep track of what information had been talked about and new topics or information that came up so the interviewer could ask follow-up questions. This ensured that the interview goals were accomplished. Immediately following the interview, a post-interview comment sheet was completed whereas the researcher jotted down field notes after she left the scene. Included on this comment sheet were descriptions on the setting, the interviewee, the tone of the interview, the researcher's feelings on the experience including any difficulties encountered, and initial insights and reflections (Lofland et al., 2006, p. 103). This was a useful for reference as the transcript of each interview was typed up and also became analytic memos to reference before subsequent interviews or later data analysis.

In this study, the researcher conducted semi-structured interviews with two members of the DRO. She also conducted several "informational interviews" in meeting with four members of the DRO, three full-time staff members and one volunteer. These interviews fell in between

informal and semi-structured interviews because they took place outside of field observations in a meeting set up with a member to initially gain information about field observation opportunities. However these members were often eager to share information about the background and structure of the organization, their role in the organization, and recent or past events without being prompted by the researcher. Therefore, seeing an opportunity to gather valuable information, the researcher took fieldnotes, which were then expanded upon when typed up later. Informal interviews were also conducted in discussions with DRO members in the field to clarify information or meanings of actions and conversations as they occurred or during a lull in the action or conversation.

In the case of the EMU MPD, the researcher had one initial informational interview with her informant and one semi-structured interview with the same informant. That semi-structured interviewed was also modified slightly to discuss communication procedures in responding to emergency calls or more regular operations and preparing for the major international event in order to elicit answers that would yield information about the EMU MPD's organizational culture. After multiple requests via email and phone calls were made over several months to interview the head of the unit, the head of the unit finally acquiesced to participate in a semi-structured interview. This interview occurred over two meetings due to him arriving late for the first interview and his limited availability due to his schedule.

Interviews are valuable sources of data because they can help the researcher better understand members' meanings as well as the organizational cultures being studied. Since the researcher was not a member of the organizations being studied, interviews gave valuable insights into the organizational cultures from the point of view of the members. While

participant observation and interviews were the primary types of data collection, documents were also a valuable resource for this study.

Documents

Documents are important because they are the paper trail left behind after a crisis. They also explain the preset processes and procedures organizational members should be enacting in crisis response. Documents can add to the robustness of a study because institutional texts "are inextricably linked to the social contexts in which they are produced" (Miller, 1997, p. 77). "Documents can also help researchers reconstruct past events or ongoing processes that are not available for direct observation…and…reflect certain kinds of organizational reality at work" (Lindlof & Taylor, 2002, p. 117).

In this study, the following documents were collected as they were germane to the study as they related to crisis planning, meetings, exercises or response, or the organizational culture, such as organizational structure, emails, and publicly available communication materials (e.g., website, social media, pamphlets, etc.). From the DRO the following documents were obtained: a volunteer recruiting pamphlet, a reference guide to services the organization provides to the public, a recovery information booklet given to clients, agenda and information sheets from their quarterly volunteer meeting, the chapter disaster response plan, and a controller/evaluator handbook from a 2004 crisis training exercise. From the EMU MPD, the researcher obtained the meeting agenda and information materials when she attended the law enforcement and security planning meetings of the Auto Show in which crisis planning occurred. She also received a threat assessment for the Auto Show through an email sent by the state police department who ran the non-first responder training session. Requests were made to negotiate access to view and take notes on procedure documents the MPD unit used for crisis response and/or major events,

but the researcher was only able to view and access the procedure document related to Auto Show. Information from organizational websites was also collected and analyzed as it was germane to the study.

<div align="center">**Data Analysis**</div>

As previously stated, although data collection and analysis are discussed as separate steps in this dissertation, often they occurred simultaneously during this study. This is because "It is all too easy to let one's field notes and other types of data pile up day by day and week by week…But it is a grave error to let this work accumulate without regular reflection and review. Under such circumstance the sense of progress may prove illusory, and a good deal of the data collection could be unnecessarily aimless" (Hammersley & Atkinson, 1995, p. 191). The specific process of data analysis is discussed next.

Data Management

Data management consists of using tools for "categorizing, sorting, and retrieving data" (Lindlof & Taylor, 2002, p. 211). All handwritten field notes and documents were filed in chronological order by organization. All typed up field notes, digital interviews, interview transcripts, analytic memos, reports, etc. were stored electronically in folders by organization chronologically as well. In addition a general chronological log (see Appendix A) of the study kept electronically listed the actions of the researcher (e.g., data collection at Site A, Interview with Site A, Participant C, etc.), and a brief description of what data was collected or analyzed on that date. A running log of codes and their definitions (i.e., a codebook) as well as important thematic constructs and their definitions were kept electronically to ensure consistency in coding schemes. This also ensured that specific data was located quickly for analysis and referenced accurately throughout the course of this study.

In addition to the storage and retrieval of data, qualitative data analysis software was also utilized. In this study the researcher used Atlas.ti version 6.2 qualitative data analysis software. She utilized this software to help her more easily import data documents (i.e., fieldnotes, memos, interview transcripts, scanned documents) into a central location, group and filter data into "families" by organization, define and assign codes to texts, and quickly and thoroughly retrieve those codes while still maintaining the ability to analyze the information within the larger context. While data management was important in the organization of the data, data reduction strategies were also employed to assist with data analysis.

Data Reduction

Data reduction is "the process of selecting, focusing, simplifying, abstracting, and transforming the data that appear in written-up field notes or transcriptions" (Miles & Huberman, 1994, p. 10). This is primarily done through analytic memos, coding, and data displays. Every few weeks in the data collection process the researcher paused to develop analytic memos by carefully reading over all of the data collected at that time (e.g., field notes, interview transcripts, documents). As Hammersley and Atkinson (1995) state, in analytic memos

> One looks to see whether any interesting patterns can be identified; whether anything stands out as surprising or puzzling; how the data relate to what one might have expected on the basis of commonsense knowledge, official accounts, or previous theory; and whether there are any apparent inconsistencies or contradictions among the views of different groups or individuals, or between people's expressed beliefs or attitudes and what they do. (p. 210)

Analytic memos helped the researcher to assess progress, identify emergent ideas/themes/constructs found in the data, and strategize next steps in the study (Hammersley & Atkinson, 1995, p. 191).

In addition to analytic memos, conducting analytic coding every few weeks when there was a lull in data collection also helped to condense and order the data collected in the study. "Codes are tags or labels for assigning units of meaning to the descriptive or inferential information compiled during a study...attached to words, phrases, sentences or whole paragraphs, connected or unconnected to a specific setting" (Miles & Huberman, 1994, p. 56). Using Atlas.ti qualitative analysis software for analytic coding allowed the researcher to mark the data at that time without separating it from its context but still allowed for quick retrieval and clustering of the data later when it was needed to be related to constructs, themes, or research questions (Miles & Huberman, 1994, p. 57).

Initial open coding occurred by reviewing the data line by line and placing sections of texts, whether specific terms, phrases, or paragraphs, into loose categories, such as "information sharing", "organization self-identification", and "jargon". "This stage of coding is 'unrestricted' because the analyst has not yet decided the range of categories or how the categories are defined, and has also not unitized the coding procedure (i.e., decided what constitutes a textual unit)" (Lindlof & Taylor, 2002, p. 219). These initial codes became more refined as the study continued using the constant comparison method of Glaser and Strauss (1967). The constant comparison method helped by noting "similarities with and difference to other data that have been similarly categorized" (Hammersley & Atkinson, 1995, p. 213). Therefore, some codes were dropped (e.g., "engaging volunteers") while new codes were discovered (e.g., "previous crisis response job experience") and some codes were combined or split apart to be re-coded into more defined categories.

The researcher then analyzed the data again using the study's initial four cultural constructs of vocabulary, rituals, stories, and symbols as well as the categorizations of crisis

coordination and crisis collaboration identified in chapter one to determine whether these constructs were already found during initial coding and what constructs needed more data collected so it could be analyzed. However it was important at this stage of coding to also be open to meanings that may not have been initially chosen by the researcher but were still germane to addressing the research questions of this study. As Stake (2005) explains, "A plan is essential, but the [researcher] needs to anticipate the need to recognize and develop late-emerging issues" (p. 453). For example, "access issues" was a code that emerged later in the study as these experiences became an indicator of organizational culture during the study.

Once again utilizing Glaser and Strauss's constant comparison method coded data was reviewed again as the researcher looked for connections between constructs and communication practices to start to integrate the data together (Lindlof & Taylor, 2002, p. 220-221). This helped to collapse a large amount of codes into smaller, broader categories or codes and was a higher level of data analysis. For example, in this study the researcher was looking for specific cultural constructs and communication practices, but she needed to connect these to determine the primary crisis related cultural features of each organization being studied and then later compare and contrast the two organizations.

Analytic memos and coding helped in reducing the large amount of data collected in this study to a few categories. This led to determining the cultural features of each crisis response organization and how their organizational cultures shaped their worldview of crisis response as either crisis coordination or crisis collaboration. These common categories were then used for the final data analysis stage of interpretation.

Interpretation

"Interpretation involves the translation of an object of analysis from one frame of meaning into another" (Lindlof & Taylor, 2002, p. 232). Interpretation transforms the study from one of simple description of the data to a deeper explanation and "more coherent understanding of what, how and why" (Miles & Huberman, 1994, p. 91).

One strategy that aided interpretation in this study was using data displays. Data displays are visual formats of information that are "focused enough to permit a viewing of a full data set in the same location, and are arranged systematically to answer the research questions at hand" (Miles & Huberman, 1994, p. 91-92). Data displays can take many forms from tables and matrices to charts to decision-models, to time-ordered or role-ordered models (DeWalt & DeWalt, 2002; Miles & Huberman, 1994). In this step of data analysis, common categories or coding from the earlier analysis were be turned into data displays to "permit careful comparisons, detection of differences, noting of patterns and themes, seeing trends, and so on" (Miles & Huberman, 1994, p. 92) between two or more elements. This was useful when doing the within-case analysis to determine how each crisis response organization was structured and how it related to other crisis response organizations and crisis management or coordination groups. Data displays were also useful to distinguish the different crisis response worldviews of the two organizations and how these worldviews could influence an EOC. Therefore, data displays of tables and figures are located throughout this paper to help the reader better understand the researcher's interpretations of the research literature, research design, results and conclusions.

Quality Measures for Case Study Methodology

Finally in this instrumental case study, three tactics were taken in research design and analysis to determine good quality measures of case study validity and reliability (Yin, 2003). First, triangulation was important to verify the construct validity of the findings. Triangulation is "the comparison of two or more forms of evidence with respect to an object of research interest" (Lindlof & Taylor, 2002, p. 240). By gathering multiple types of data – participant observation, interviews and documents – the findings of this study were corroborated and seen as more accurate and convincing (Yin, 2003, p. 92). This also allows the weaknesses of one single method to be diminished or "the biases of the individual methods are thought to 'cancel out' and validation of the claim is enhanced" (Lindlof & Taylor, 2002, p. 240). Another way that the researcher attempted to triangulate the data was to use multiple sources of data by sampling a variety of sites, settings, people, activities, events, and times (Lindlof & Taylor, 2002, p. 121). This triangulation of data was more successful in the non-profit disaster relief organization (DRO) than the metropolitan police department (MPD) because the researcher was given greater access by the DRO. By sampling from a variety of sources and using three different types of data collection over a period of time, one can be reasonably confident that these data collection methods "create[d] as complete an understanding as possible of the complex interactions" of the two crisis response organizations in this study (Sellnow, Seeger, & Ulmer, 2002, p. 275).

Second, internal validity standards were met by following a careful data analysis strategy determined before collecting data (Yin, 2003). The theoretical propositions outlined in chapter one guided the case study data collection and analysis. After initial open coding, the researcher analyzed the data again using the study's initial four cultural constructs of vocabulary, rituals, stories, and symbols as well as the categorizations of crisis coordination and crisis collaboration

to determine whether these constructs were already found during initial coding and what constructs needed more data collected so it could be analyzed. Utilizing Glaser and Strauss's constant comparison method data was reviewed multiple times throughout the study as the researcher looked for connections between constructs and communication practices to start to integrate the data together. A running log of codes and their definitions (i.e., a codebook) as well as important thematic constructs and their definitions were kept electronically to ensure consistency in coding schemes. This also ensured that specific data was located quickly for analysis and referenced accurately throughout the course of this study. Data collection was determined to be complete when the researcher determined that continuing data collection was resulting in redundancy and clear regularities emerged that felt integrated (Patton, 2002, p. 466).

Finally, the researcher met reliability standards by detailed the steps of study design, data collection and analysis in this chapter and in Appendix A. According to Yin, reliability in a case study design is "demonstrating that the operations of a study – such as the data collection procedures can be repeated, with the same results" (2003, p. 33). An electronic case study database was created at the start of the study to organize and document data collected (Yin, 2003, p. 94). This database contained all typed up field notes, interview transcripts, analytic memos, archival documents, etc. stored electronically in folders by organization. In addition a general chronological log (see Appendix A) of the study kept electronically listed the actions of the researcher (e.g., data collection at Site A, Interview with Site A, Participant C, etc.), and a brief description of what data was collected or analyzed on that date. Although qualitative case studies do not lend to replication on the same level as experimental studies, investigators should be confident that they can follow the procedures outlined in this chapter to conduct a similar case study.

In summary, this chapter provided an overview of the study design, background on the organizations recruited for the case study, data collection methods, and data analysis and interpretation procedures (see Figure 1). In the next two chapters, the results of data collection and analysis of the DRO and EMU MPD organizations are discussed. Specifically the results will describe the organizational communication culture of each organization and how the four theoretical organizational culture constructs affected how they viewed interorganizational crisis communication and collaboration.

Figure 1: **Research Design**

CHAPTER 3

RESULTS: DISASTER RELIEF ORGANIZATION

As noted earlier, different crisis response organizations have distinct organizational cultures and communication practices. Moreover, these differences may affect coordination or collaboration when organizations are required to work together during a crisis response. To discover how this may occur, one needs to first describe the crisis related organizational cultural features of the disaster relief organization (DRO) and the metropolitan police department (MPD) This chapter describes the DRO and the following chapter describes the MPD. It is also important to examine how the organizational cultures are enacted through communication practices between members. This chapter starts with describing the DRO's cultural constructs of vocabulary, rites and rituals, stories, and symbols and how together they are communicated through members, documents, and policies to create their open and service-oriented organizational culture. The chapter then explores how DRO's organizational communication culture influences its view of interorganizational crisis response as being a more collaborative effort. Finally, the bona fide group concept of interdependence of context will be explored to discuss how historical, economic, and political contexts have affected the DRO at the national and local level, resulting in tension between the two groups and its effect on the regional DRO's organizational culture.

Disaster Relief Organization (DRO)

As described in chapter two, the regional chapter of the national non-profit disaster relief organization (DRO) "helps vulnerable people and communities around the world prepare for, respond to, and recover from natural disasters, humanitarian crises, and health emergencies by mobilizing the power of the world's largest humanitarian network" (DRO chapter website, 2009).

The DRO is recognized by federal, state and local governments across the country as a "principle supplier of mass care in federally declared disasters" but also does daily emergency response for citizens affected by fires" (DRO chapter website, 2009).

The DRO is a national organization with over 800 chapters in the U.S. and its territories. It describes its structure in its New Employee Guide (2006) as an inverted pyramid with community needs and resources at the top and the national headquarters at the bottom. This indicates the reliance of the DRO on the community for donations and volunteers and its focus on serving the community (see Figure 2).

Figure 2: **DRO's organizational structure (modified from New Employee Guide, 2006).**

This particular chapter of the DRO is considered a regional chapter because it covers three counties as well as a large city in its metropolitan jurisdiction. Part of the mission of the emergency and disaster services unit of the DRO is to "provide relief to disaster victims" (DRO Annual Report, 2009) and the chapter fulfills this in its daily operations by providing relief to

people who have had their home damaged or lost in a fire. This unit within the DRO is one of the busiest in the country responding to "an average five home fires and other disasters a day" and "provides emergency food, clothing, temporary shelter, and personal care items" (DRO chapter website, 2010) to those affected by home fires. If a fire or other disaster (e.g., tornado, flooding, etc.) affects more than fifteen people or ten families, then the DRO will open a facility to provide food, shelter, and other basic needs and staff with shelter teams from the unit.

These services are provided by the emergency and disaster services unit seven days a week and 365 days a year through seven full-time staff (one director, one disaster manager, five emergency services specialists) and five crisis duty workers that cover the 24-hour phone lines. The majority of the workforce in the unit are volunteers, anywhere from 60-75 of them, divided into twelve volunteer response teams who respond to calls between 6 p.m. – 6 a.m. on weekdays and on weekends and holidays. Volunteers' years of service range from under a year to over 15 years. Most volunteers are women between 45-65 or retired persons and work(ed) in a variety of fields such as health care, education, mental health, first responder, and business. Some volunteers, like Jim, are treated as informal leaders in the unit because of his further commitment to the organization in leading fundraising activities and being the instructor of all emergency and disaster response courses completed by new unit volunteers (Sue, volunteer party, Dec. 2010; Des interview, Feb. 2011), In addition, volunteers and staff of the emergency and disaster services unit that have been with the DRO for at least one year and have completed the three month training may be sent to other areas of the country to provide additional disaster relief services to areas in need (Des interview, Oct. 2010).

Organizational Culture

As described in chapter one, organizational culture concerns how organizational members subjectively create shared patterns of symbols and meanings through communication that defines, guides, and sometimes constrains their everyday thoughts and behaviors in organizational life. This is a continuous and dynamic process that centrally locates communication as the process that helps organizational members create and maintain organizational culture. To better understand the organizational culture of the DRO, the four cultural constructs of vocabulary, rites and rituals, stories, and symbols identified in chapter one are used to create a "thick" description of how the organization views crisis response and its role in it.

Vocabulary

As discussed in chapter one, words are the essential way in which organizational members communicate and are an important way members distinguish their organization from other organizations and signal membership. Words and language encode culture and through their use enact that culture. Vocabulary thus becomes an easy way to determine how the regional DRO's emergency and disaster services unit created and maintain symbolic boundaries as well as how they defined crisis response and working with other organizations. First, the vocabulary of the DRO is a hybrid of its organization's humanitarian mission and the realities of working within emergency management systems created by first responder organizations (e.g., police, fire, EMS) and governmental agencies. This is followed by a discussion of the way DRO used vocabulary to convey how it struggled with constraints imposed by the national headquarters and the ever-present need for funding to carry out its operations.

Social service language. First, the DRO's humanitarian focus is reinforced by its use of social service language. Although the public literature on its website, social marketing sites, and pamphlets called people affected by fires and other disasters, "disaster victims", members in the DRO prefer to use the term "client". As Jim, one of the informal volunteer leaders, explains, "the term [victim] is demeaning; this way maintains dignity" (Jim interview, Oct. 2010). The word "client" was used by staff members in meetings and by volunteer team members during fire response calls. It was also used to describe DRO resources. For example, the paperwork on each fire was called the "client casework" and the debit cards given so people can purchase food and clothing were called "client assistance cards". Then the client information was entered into the national DRO database system called the "Client Case System". For this organization, the word client, not only erased the stigma of being called a victim, it was a specific term used throughout the social services, human services, and social work fields to describe people that they served. Therefore, "client" reinforced the service aspect of the DRO.

Other social services terms were used by members to reify the service culture of the DRO. Although staff members' official job title was "Emergency Services Specialist", the disaster recovery handbook and volunteer team members referred to DRO staff as "caseworkers". These caseworkers gave "referrals" to other agencies to help clients recover personal identification documents, get furniture, or apply for emergency assistance. When volunteer response teams responded to fire calls, they distributed "comfort care kits" containing personal care items to each client. They also had teddy bears in the van to give to children they interacted with. Team members always introduced themselves as volunteers to clients to show that they were "not there because we have to but we want to" (Jim interview, Dec. 2010). Team members were trained to always ask the clients before they leave the scene, "Have your

immediate needs been met by us today?" The team member completing paperwork at the scene was then required to write down whether "client needs were met".

Finally, the service culture was reinforced in how the volunteers and staff talked to and about clients. The researcher observed a volunteer team on fire response calls taking time to listen to stories from clients about what they lost and making sympathetic comments such as "I'm sorry for your loss," "We are here to help," and "Losing a pet is awful. It's like losing a family member." Members of the DRO, whether volunteers or paid staff, often told the researcher that they see value in what they do because they were providing valuable services to people who are thankful that they came. As director Des says, "When I help kids, those are the best days…If I give food or comfort to them for night, I feel good. I know that night that they have something" (Des interview, Feb. 2011). Volunteer leader Jim adds, "We go home with a good feeling because we give them hope, counseling, and resources. This is equally important as material things. We take as much time as necessary" (Jim interview, Dec. 2010).

Adopting emergency management language. The DRO staff expressed that providing disaster relief is the unit's main mission in helping clients, but members also needed to work with fire departments and other emergency management agencies in order to provide those services and coordinate response efforts. Fire fighters often alerted the crisis duty workers at the DRO that they've just responded to a fire and some people need their services because the home was damaged or destroyed. The DRO volunteers and coordinators also interacted with fire fighters at the scene of a fire response to get information on damage assessments and if it was safe for the DRO members, to do their own assessment of the property.

The DRO staff also worked with city emergency management agencies to coordinate response efforts and have them open city owned properties that the DRO could turn into

emergency shelters. Many of these relationships were developed through regular disaster trainings and exercises the DRO was invited to take part in. To accomplish this, some members of the DRO staff have adopted emergency management vocabulary to more effectively communicate with these organizations. This language tended to be similar to military and paramilitary language (i.e., first responder organizations) – disasters were "incidents", personnel were "deployed" to help, the emergency manager was called the "incident commander". Since 2001, this language has been standardized and privileged by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) through the Incident Command System (ICS). Training was also required by DHS and FEMA if organizations wanted to be part of larger disaster response efforts and have a seat in an Emergency Operations Center (EOC). Thus, the DRO was even more fully integrated to the larger structure and culture or emergency response.

This emergency management language was clearly and regularly used by the two managers of the emergency and disaster services unit of the DRO. The emergency services director was already familiar with this language because he worked as a paramedic for the city's fire department and was also the emergency manager for the city before working at the DRO. They also reported that they had taken the Professional Emergency Manager training run by the state police agency. Although not from an emergency management background, Ken, a DRO manager, saw this training as valuable because he "knew it was a good link to emergency management so we could use this as a non-profit; we could use the same sort of language they're using" (Ken interview, Feb. 2011). Later in the interview Ken, elaborated on the importance of learning the language of other emergency management and first responder organizations when discussing the value of disaster trainings with other organizations.

We as non-profit responders, we don't necessarily have to attend the same training that the emergency managers have to attend. I'll give you a language [example]. There's a form of a leadership model, incident command, and that is typically what fire [department] uses, and what also EMS the emergency medical service [uses]. Well it's good for us, the [DRO], to know incident command because then we have a feel for how they think. The incident command system has terms that maybe we don't use every day, and their org. charts, if we know the org. charts for incident command, we can kind of adopt it for us to….So in knowing *their* incident command system, I can link it to the *team* members and say, "Well the fire department has an incident command person, there's somebody there's a person in their org. chart responsible for planning. Let's see how similar to us, even if we're responding to an apartment fire, which person is responsible for planning and we can use the same lingo. In the middle of the night, my person at the apartment, the [DRO] person at the apartment fire can remember, "Oh, there must be an incident commander out here from the fire department. I need to go talk to the incident commander because that incident commander can maybe tell me when it is safe for the clients to go back into the apartment", so we *learn* that *language*. (Ken interview, Feb. 2011)

Des, as a former emergency manager himself, also saw the value of talking the language of emergency response agencies. "They [FEMA] want us to learn [the Incident Command System (ICS)] but [DRO] is resisting. The line of demarcation between emergency management and [DRO] is dying - now many of the trainings are the same. Some [DRO] people don't understand ICS and its importance" (Des interview, Feb. 2011). Ken and Des understood that by learning the emergency management language, they could more easily understand other agencies and effectively communicate with them during a crisis.

Although the DRO chapter was not mandating ICS training or instituting special training for its volunteers, Ken and Des were trying to get most of their staff and some volunteer leaders trained so they could learn the language and associated protocol and procedures. This was especially important when the DRO needed a representative to be a part the Metropolitan Emergency Operations Center (MEOC). The MEOC is the interorganizational crisis management group run by the city's Homeland Security and Emergency Management (HSEM) department. The MEOC is typically activated for coordination of a larger disaster response and

special events such as the Super Bowl and All-Star game. Ken further described why being a

part of the MEOC and knowing the language was important for the DRO.

> If an event had occurred [at the Super Bowl]… Noah's role would have been sort of a communications person since he's in the room with the fire department. And they do a round robin and Noah will say, "Well this is what we're doing here and there."…But there's certain training too. To sit in the Emergency Operations Center… [he] must have certain Incident Command training, certain levels, I think 100-400 because they're using that language; it's all about that language. And so in the Emergency Operations Center there's a lot of Incident Command lingo and so that affects who can sit in an Emergency Operations Center too. (Ken interview, March 2011)

The DRO's past experience of working with emergency management organizations on

special events, smaller emergencies, and larger crisis response efforts has also allowed this

emergency management language to be included in the language of their disaster plans. For

example, the Chapter Disaster Response Plan first outlined its "hazard risk assessment and

impact analysis" (2009, p. 12-13). It then described the DRO's "disaster health services

protocols" (p.14), when a "disaster incident report" should be completed (p. 19), when the

volunteer response team should be "deployed in order to assess the situation" (p. 15), what

"response triggers" or situations that would "activate this plan" (p. 15), and how DRO personnel

should not be deployed into "hot" or "warm" zones during a WMD/T event involving CBRNE

(p. 30). The purpose of the chapter's Disaster Response Plan was to help guide staff members

and even some volunteers in disaster response. Therefore, Des and Ken were correct in

suggesting they need to know what these terms mean and how to use them correctly in order to

effectively communicate with other emergency management organizations.

This adoption of more first responder or emergency management language by members

also reflected how the historical and cultural context of crisis response has affected the DRO at

the local level. Bona fide group perspective, first discussed in chapter one, theorized that groups

are embedded in multiple environments such as historical, economic, physical, and cultural that

all have an effect on intragroup communication, intergroup relationships, and coordination efforts (Frey, 2003, p. 5-6). The DRO has increasingly interacted with various emergency management and first responder agencies that used the ICS response structure and language in crisis response. Through these interactions, DRO leadership learned that understanding the ICS structure and adopting the language resulted in them working and communicating more effectively with them. But using that language wasn't just restricted to interactions with outside agencies. It also seeped into the organizational culture as it became used more between members, in communication materials such as the chapter Disaster Response Plan, and as the leadership required more members to take ICS training. This affect was not surprising to the researcher given how the organization saw itself as a collaborating partner in crisis response. This will be discussed further in this chapter under the "Crisis Response as Collaboration" section.

"National" headquarters. Another way in which external environments have impacted the vocabulary and organizational culture of the DRO is in how DRO members' expressed tense relationship with the national DRO headquarters. As stated earlier, the DRO is a regional chapter of a national non-profit disaster relief organization. DRO members used vocabulary to convey how it struggled with the increased constraints given by the national headquarters in raising and using funds and the ever-present need for local community fundraising to carry out its operations.

As bona fide group perspective suggests, members "bring with them the history and politics of their own organization, as well as any positive or negative influences from their previous organizational history" (Keyton & Stallworth, 2003). But over the past ten years, historical, political, and economic factors at the national level of the DRO have tarnished its image as a humanitarian disaster relief organization. After the September 11, 2001 attacks,

fundraising for large-scale disasters became more prevalent over the traditional community-type fundraising. In the ten years since, non-profit organizations like the national DRO headquarters have dealt with the additional pressure and scrutiny from the public and politicians to "wisely" use funds raised for large-scale disaster relief operations. In fact, the national DRO was criticized after a couple of major disasters for not distributing all of the money people donated to that particular disaster relief operation, not distributing it quickly enough, and even allegations of embezzlement of funds by DRO members and local chapters (CNN.com, Nov. 2001; Associated Press, Sept. 2005; Holguin, Feb. 2009).

Therefore, in response to this criticism, the national headquarters has been changing its policies and processes as to how individual chapters raise and use public funds in disaster relief. This standardization and centralization of decision-making has frustrated many members of the regional chapter of the DRO. Members have taken to calling national headquarters "National". This term was often said in a tone that conveyed frustration and a "Big Brother" attitude because of headquarters' bureaucratic policies and processes it embodied.

During the study the DRO chapter was struggling financially to locally fund its disaster relief operations and that concern was felt throughout the organization. At a quarterly meeting of the DRO fire response and disaster volunteers, the director of the unit bluntly explained the situation the chapter was in financially and what budget changes national headquarters was making.

> The [national headquarters of DRO] is changing again and I'm going to talk about how it is going to affect local response of multiple family fires. Historically we have responded to disasters and emergencies. For house fires, we are still the second busiest chapter in the nation in house fires…Historically we use to get funds from families and organizations such as United Way. But today American disasters are so large that we cannot rely on the public to make donations work. Therefore we need the government's help for large disasters…Certain money that [DRO] can keep is less than 10% for operations…Funding is not there for small disasters. For example, tornadoes - look at

what little to no emotion people react to them now…Chapters such as San Diego and Milwaukee are wealthy but not as busy as us. National has now said that we are all one [DRO] - Everybody's money is everybody's. They are asking chapters to cut the fat and improve the budget. I was in DC at National one week ago - they know who we are. (Des, quarterly volunteer mtg., Feb. 2011)

This concern for chapter funding and budget cuts by the DRO manager has trickled down to other staff members and volunteers. The members of the DRO often talked about how critical it was for the public to recognize the importance of what they do. They felt that this was accomplished at the local level to the media and the public by better marketing what the DRO did in response to fires and other disasters. The increased recognition would then result in an increasing of funding from the community. As Jim, a volunteer leader, described, "If we want to improve our donations, we have to let people know what we do…Every time we get media to cover and get exposure we get a spike in donations 1-3 days after" (Jim interview, Dec. 2010). However, DRO members felt the budget cuts and new policies the national headquarters put into place hampered their fundraising ability.

Members communicated this collective frustration by using the term "National" to describe national headquarters' restrictive policies and actions. A couple of days before the February 2011 quarterly volunteer meeting, a large apartment fire occurred in which the DRO and the Salvation Army both responded. During the meeting, volunteer team member Jerry expressed his displeasure at the lack of credit DRO received as part of the response. He explained that a local radio station reported how the Salvation Army was the only organization helping people affected. Jerry explained that his wife had to call in so the DRO would also get recognition. Jerry wondered why they have no media department to ensure they also get mentioned. This complaint was reaffirmed by several other volunteers nodding their heads or verbally agreeing with Jerry. The next 30 minutes of the meeting then shifted to a discussion

with Mark from the local PR firm hired by the DRO, the managers, and the volunteers as to what the DRO was doing to market itself to the public and the media.

To shift blame from himself and the PR firm, Mark stated that "National" had put new policies in place that restricted their local fundraising efforts. Again when, a volunteer team member commented that "We don't have any TV campaigns like the old days had," Mark responded that "All advertising campaigns are now run out of National and local chapters are not allowed to do any on their own" (quarterly volunteer mtg., Feb. 2011). By using the term "National", Mark redirected their frustration toward the national headquarters, which many DRO members already feared was constricting this DRO chapter through several recent changes in process and policies. Again, when another volunteer asked about commercials and billboards he saw in another city, Mark emphasized that "the new policy from National in the last few months…is also tying our hands development-wise" (quarterly volunteer mtg., Feb. 2011)

Fundraising restrictions were also reinforced in the chapter's Disaster Response Plan (DRP), which was a localized version of national headquarters' DRP. Examples of the rules of fundraising include, "Ensure that public information, Fund Raising, and other program activities are done in accordance with guidance from national headquarters" (2009, p. 5); and, "When a disaster occurs, the chapter will immediately inform the community that [DRO] disaster services are being provided to people impacted by the disaster. The community will also be informed that the [DRO] is dependent upon voluntary contributions to provide such disaster services and that all [DRO] disaster assistance is free" (2009, p. 16). Through these examples, one could see how the local PR firm and the chapter members were correct when they complained that "National" put constraints on their fundraising efforts that they felt contributed to their lack of local recognition for their disaster relief operations.

In addition to fundraising constraints, national DRO's standardization and centralization of decision-making in regard to spending funds conflicted with the DRO chapter's service and local community focused culture. This resulted in organizational members struggling with how maintain their organization's humanitarian focus of providing disaster relief while also following new spending restrictions imposed by the national organization.

In addition, DRO chapter members felt increasing pressure from National to be good "stewards" of how they spent money for disaster relief operations. In one of the researcher's first visits with the DRO, Jim told her, "There is a well-known [DRO] verbiage – 'We are stewards of the donor's money'" (SART mtg., Nov. 2010). One way this was reinforced was through the changes in spending policies and processes "National" had recently implemented. As stated previously, chapter DRO members assisted people who had been involved in fires or other disasters by providing food, clothing, and shelter through "client assistant cards" (debit cards) and hotel stay vouchers. National set a formula as to how much money each adult or child could receive for food and clothing based upon the extent of fire damage to the home. A hotel voucher could also be given for 1-3 nights stay depending on damage to the home. But national headquarters new policy was to emphasize opening up a shelter instead of giving hotel vouchers because it was more cost effective (Des interview, Feb. 2011). Other policy changes from National had prescribed what types of shelters to use and where disaster volunteers stayed when traveling to help another chapter with disaster response.

> Now we cannot use the big box stores [as a shelter] because we don't have the money to pay. We're told by National to find something small. National is coming in next week and we need to show staff in the field, not here on the computer drinking coffee. [DRO] volunteers when they travel now have to triple bunk in hotel or have staff in shelter and tents because we don't have money and it looks bad to the public. (Des interview, Feb. 2011)

The DRO national headquarters also required local chapters to input all services they provided to clients into a national database. The Disaster Response Plan states, "The chapter will use the Client Assistance System (CAS) as the standard method of documenting, issuing CACs and reporting [DRO] assistance to clients. The Client Assistance System will be used to provide and record assistance provided to clients in all disaster types and events" (2009, p. 19). These changes in policies and rules and increased accountability by national headquarters made some DRO members hyper-aware of how they spent money for disaster response as they felt that National was watching every funding decision they made. Manager Ken gave an example of how he had to notify others if he was going to spend a higher than typical amount for a fire response.

> If I think it is gonna be a lot of *money*, I then need to give a heads up to our finance department. We issue cards, like [DRO] debit cards, and if I think there's gonna be 30 cards issued in one night, that's a lot. And we all get emails from a place when these cards are issued and Shelia [the accountant] gets that same email…Anytime we think we're gonna spend that much money, my boss needs to know cause he needs to tell his boss, and sometimes National. Oh I didn't mention National. Sometimes National will call. Someone in DC is monitoring/watching CNN local stations and if they see a big fire in [city], they'll call too. They'll call the crisis duty worker; they'll call the 800 number. And so, we can get notified a lot of ways. (Ken interview, Feb. 2011)

The researcher also noticed how this increased scrutiny by National with how the DRO spends money has created a tension with members seeing themselves as helping others without judgment but also more wary about those who might abuse their generosity. "If they were to take this [DRO] out of the community - what a void. People get debit cards and carry around as status. Police have sometimes found cards because they were used to cut up cocaine. We monitor the cards - can use for 7 days then cut off. Each time you use a card it costs me $2. [DRO] Cards are a status symbol." (Des interview, Feb. 2011). This quote showed that Des knew of the value DRO has in the community. But at the same time, his use of phrases such as "we monitor the

cards," "cut off," and "it costs me $2" shows a more cynical view of how they have to monitor how people use their funds.

The following examples illustrate how the DRO members used the term, "National" to convey their frustration with the constraints and limitations they felt national headquarters gave them with its recent policy and rule changes concerning fundraising and spending funds for disaster relief operations. This tension between the organization's mission and the policy and process constraints imposed by National is also illustrated further in the stories section of this chapter. The next section describes how the second organization culture construct, rites and rituals in the DRO chapter helped organizational members commit to the values and norms of the organization.

Rites and Rituals

As described in chapter one, rites and rituals are "collective activities that are technically unnecessary to the achievement of desired ends, but that within a culture are considered socially essential, keeping the individual bound within the norms of the collectivity (Hofstede, 2001, p. 10). Rites and rituals can either be formal or informal, performed regularly or occasionally, but are enacted collectively to provide the rules, norms, and values of organizational life for members (Pacanowsky & O'Donnell-Trujillo, 1982; Hofstede, 2001). In the Disaster Relief Organization (DRO) chapter, the researcher observed the rites and rituals of the quarterly volunteer meeting and social events. Through interviews with members and examining artifacts, the researcher determined rites and rituals of crisis response trainings and exercises, and fundraising activities such as disaster relief telethons. These rites and rituals helped volunteers engage with and show commitment to the values of the organization and value working with other organizations in crisis preparation. Some rituals, such as employee and volunteer training

and disaster fundraising, were becoming more carefully controlled by national headquarters (National DRO) to generate loyalty and commitment to the National DRO from members and the public, rather than the DRO regional chapter. This also gave national headquarters a way to control the regional DRO.

Quarterly volunteer meetings. The DRO had quarterly meetings with its disaster relief volunteers. According to Jim, a volunteer leader, the purpose of the meetings was to "keep people engaged" (Jim interview, Dec. 2010). Previously, they held meetings once a month, but attendance was poor because "volunteers didn't get anything out of them" (Jim interview, Dec. 2010). Now that they've changed to quarterly meetings, they get almost all of the volunteers attending. The meetings took place on a Saturday morning at the chapter's headquarters and typically lasted 2-3 hours. Volunteers were notified about the meeting through email. Food was provided as well as an agenda for the meeting and any necessary handouts. For the February meeting the researcher attended, approximately 40 people attended and the agenda consisted of self-introductions around the room, updates by chapter leadership, updates from volunteer leadership, "communication", and closing remarks. As was the purpose of most meetings, information was conveyed from the DRO staff and informal volunteer leader Jim to the volunteers, such as upcoming volunteer events, how to operate the new 800 MHz radios in the vans, new policies from national headquarters, and how to complete paperwork correctly.

As discussed in chapter one, regular meetings in themselves may not alone represent an organizational culture, but meetings can be communication events in which people try to make sense of what is happening to them and see their place in the organization and the process of meetings can produce and reproduce structures of an organizational culture (Schwartzman, 1993, p. 39-41). These regular and formal quarterly meetings also served a higher purpose as an

organizational ritual because they symbolized and reinforced the regional DRO's collective values, beliefs, and rules (Pacanowsky & O'Donnell-Trujillo, 1982; Trice & Beyer, 1984). These included the organizational culture values of service and treating volunteers on an equal level as full organizational members while in return reinforcing volunteer commitment to the organization's mission and following the rules and procedures of the organization.

For example, unlike other organizations that may treat volunteers as temporary workers, and without the same status or responsibilities as full members of the organization, the DRO engaged its volunteers as valuable members of the organization. By treating volunteers as full members of the organization, they were encouraging them to represent the organization as equal status members as well as get involved in problem solving organizational issues.

This is also an illustration of the bona fide group concept of stable but permeable boundaries discussed in chapter one. The DRO had permeable boundaries because it accepted community volunteers as full members and freely shared information, including challenges and problems the organization was having. In turn this created volunteers with a strong in-group identification of being committed members of the DRO who leveraged their out-group relationships to help the organization. This is demonstrated further in the examples below and contributed the DROs open and collaborative culture discussed at the end of this chapter.

For the February volunteer meeting, the chapter leadership encouraged and empowered volunteers to take initiative in helping the chapter promote itself and its fundraising efforts. They did this by engaging volunteers in a discussion about the issues and inviting Mark from the PR firm to be at the quarterly meeting. As the chapter leadership was discussing the lack of funding for marketing, volunteers spoke up to complain about how another volunteer organization was getting recognition for fire response by the media while the DRO was also on the scene assisting

clients. The volunteers first blamed the DRO and the PR firm for not doing more to market the organization and generate media coverage. Mark from the PR firm deflected some of the marketing criticism by blaming the new policies of national headquarters that severely restricted how individual chapters could market themselves.

But he and Michelle, the DRO marketing person, also engaged the volunteers in problem solving and supporting the organization. For example, Michelle said to the volunteers "we are going to have to be more creative" by promoting the DRO through local media and social media to get recognition for their efforts and increase fundraising. This lead to a comment from a volunteer about how they are the "unknown silent angels in this room" and how "we need to talk to the media about silent angels working in the night" (quarterly volunteer mtg., Feb. 2011). One of the DRO staff members then said they liked that term, "silent angels" and the discussion turned to how volunteers could be the "silent angels" and help promote the organization more broadly and effectively. Mark suggested that volunteers who use Facebook and Twitter should follow their chapter's pages and pass them along to friends so they "can go viral". Des, the director of the unit, passionately described how he felt that the volunteers were the face of the organization.

> If you are literate and compassionate go to microphone and talk [to the media]. You are it. I met a friend whose house was firebombed. Who pulls up, but George [DRO volunteer member]. I'm scared but George is on it. I saw firsthand what you do. That's the commercial. That's what people need to see to give money. (Feb. 2011)

Jim, a volunteer leader, also suggested that if a volunteer on a fire scene thinks the response is "different, new or interesting from the standard" then they should call a DRO coordinator to see if the media can cover it.

This engagement of volunteers in the meeting to problem solve and support the organization also occurred later in the meeting in a discussion about fundraising. One volunteer

offered to go to a retailer to get some GPS systems for their vans donated if the DRO needed more. And Jim described several upcoming fundraising events at sporting events, motorcycle rides and other summer events the DRO was hosting that needed volunteers to sign up to work the DRO tent or tables. This purposeful inclusion of the volunteers helped raise awareness of the DRO's funding and marketing problems but also allowed volunteers to be fully engaged members of the organization by offering to be part of the solution. Again, this inclusion and engagement was unique compared to how volunteers are typically treated by organizations and reinforced that the DRO values volunteers as active members and contributors to the organization.

Social gatherings. Annual rites of integration (Beyer & Trice, 1987) were another way the DRO showed that it valued and supported its volunteers as active members of the organization. It also enabled volunteers to recommit to the values of the organization. Rites of integration are those work-related social gatherings that "encourage and revive common feelings that bind members together and commit them to [an organization]" (Beyer & Trice, 1987, p. 11). The DRO understood that almost its entire disaster response staff was made up of volunteers (96%, DRO chapter blog, April 2011). These volunteers mostly worked nights, weekends, and holidays so clients could receive the DRO's services they need. The bad economic climate had resulted in a decrease of public funding of NGOs, which in turn caused the national headquarters to increasingly cut funding for full time staff and impose new rules on fundraising at the chapter level. Chapters then have to rely on their volunteers more to take on responsibilities of staff members as well as promote the organization. Therefore, work-related social gatherings, such as the annual Volunteer Recognition Dinner and Christmas party, helped volunteers feel valued and recommit to the organization. Such socialization also helped build a sense of community among

members and stronger member identification that binded them to each other and to the organization. These aspects are further illustrated below.

As part of National Volunteer week, the DRO chapter used social media and a Volunteer Recognition Dinner to publicly thank its volunteers. The DROs Twitter site posted, "It is National Volunteer Week! Thank you to all of our volunteers! Your hours and dedication are what the [DRO] are made up of!" (DRO chapter Twitter site, April 2011). At the Volunteer Recognition Dinner, volunteers received awards and pins for years of service. This information was also placed on their social media sites with a picture of two smiling volunteers. In addition they had an annual Christmas Party at chapter headquarters where volunteers and their family members were invited to share in a meal, play games, and receive raffle prizes, which were donated by staff and volunteers. The DRO staff served the meal to the volunteers and their family and took time throughout the evening to thank the volunteers and shared stories of how volunteers were an important part of the organization. The CEO of the chapter even appeared at the beginning of the evening to mingle with the volunteers and say a few words of thanks before gracefully exiting.

Although these may seem like simple, low-cost gestures, these rites of integration actually served important organizational cultural purposes that benefitted the organization. These benefits included saving additional staff time or resources in additional volunteer recruitment and training and low-cost positive marketing of the organization in the community from committed and satisfied volunteers.

Volunteers, who by definition don't get paid, needed to feel valued in other ways so they would recommit to the organization. One DRO volunteer at the Christmas party, who had been with the organization for over 15 years, said that he volunteered with the DRO because, "we're

treated like family here" (Christmas party, Dec. 2011). The extended family metaphor was reinforced at these rites of integration where family and friends were welcomed and sociality and laughter were evident. This recognition of volunteers was also reinforced publicly through social media. Volunteers, encouraged to join the social media sites of the organization, felt valued because of this public recognition and could easily share this information with family and friends through social media. This recommitted volunteers to the organization as they felt bound together as family members and shared in the celebrations of volunteer recognition and holiday celebrations.

This volunteer recognition also helped the organization promote itself and recruit new volunteers. Whenever the organization posted a message about what their volunteers were doing, such as being sent to respond to a disaster, they included information on how people could volunteer (DRO chapter blog, April 2011). This helped increase their pool of volunteers. In addition, these rites of integration reinforced the image to the public of the service culture of the local chapter DRO; how it wanted to help people and was not mandated by profit or regulation to do so. Finally, the DRO staff modeled the service culture of the organization by serving the meal, providing raffle prizes, and having several staff members thank volunteers throughout the events. Because the DRO relied on the work and commitment of these volunteers to the organization, these rites of integration were vital to maintain those ties. As DRO manager Ken explained, "they work hard and the volunteers, I want them acknowledged 'cause they're *there*. They're there at an apartment fire for 10 hours" (Ken interview, Feb., 2011).

Crisis response trainings and exercises. Finally, the DRO engaged in rituals, such as crisis response training and exercises and disaster response fundraising through telethons. As described in chapter one, crisis response trainings and exercises are common rituals for many

crisis response organizations that reinforces a shared understand of members' responsibilities during crisis response and how they should coordinate or collaborate with other organizations. Participating in these disaster trainings and exercises are also crisis response rituals because they occurred regularly (mostly because of government regulation) and are an important part of the overall culture of crisis response organizations. By expecting volunteers to engage the same training and fundraising responsibilities as organizational members, these two rituals created a shared understanding by the organization that volunteers need to be committed members of the organization.

Crisis response trainings and exercises at the DRO occurred on two levels; basic disaster response training, and interorganizational crisis response exercises. DRO volunteers must have completed six training courses within an approximate 3 month time frame before they could be active volunteers. These courses included: Online Orientation, Disaster Services Overview, Disaster Assessment, Client Casework – Providing Emergency Assistance, Shelter Operations and Simulation, and a final class, in which a volunteer leader talked about the reality of volunteering for disaster services of the DRO (Des interview, Oct. 2010; Jim interview, Dec. 2010; Training Schedule, 2011). These online and classroom-style courses combined learning about the organization and its services with practical training on learning the rules, policies, and procedures of responding to fires calls and working in a shelter. These courses also served as a rite of passage because they taught the volunteers what it meant to be a member of the DRO and to commit to representing the organization. For example, the Online Orientation was called "[DRO] Culture" and included modules describing the organization's history, foundations (mission, structure, strategic direction), key services, and commitments (DRO national website, Feb., 2011).

Being a disaster services volunteer within the DRO was more intense and time consuming than other volunteer positions, so the last class was necessary to explain the "reality of the work" and gain a commitment from the volunteer before assigning them to a team (Jim interview, Dec. 2010). A typical fire call was 3 hours, often at night or on weekends (Jim interview, Dec. 2010). When a volunteer was sent in the field to do disaster response, such as sheltering or distributing food and water at a disaster site, they were on assignment for 12-14 hours a day for up to 2 weeks (SART mtg., Nov. 2010). The DRO does not accept "spontaneous volunteers", people who showed up at a disaster shelter wanting to help, without at least completing a volunteer application, going through a background check, and receiving an abbreviated training (SART mtg., Nov. 2010) by the organization. Even in these cases, they would be paired up with a regular DRO volunteer or member. After they completed training, the "spontaneous volunteer" would be assigned to a disaster response team and given a DRO vest, hat and ID to identify them as a member of the organization until the disaster response was finished (Jim interview, Dec. 2010).

Once DRO volunteers completed basic training, they were still encouraged to take optional training classes to learn new skills. Typically, organizations only emphasize professional development for members. Therefore, this communication reinforced DRO's culture of valuing volunteers as members. For example, at the quarterly volunteer meeting in February, Mario, a staff member who specialized in sheltering and training, talked about upcoming training opportunities for volunteers such as CPR/First Aid, driving and using the Emergency Response Vehicle (ERV) (a mobile feeding vehicle), and disaster response and people with mobility issues (2011). Mario also suggested volunteers should take online FEMA courses on Incident Command System (ICS) or National Incident Management System (NIMS) because they work a

lot with FEMA with shelters and other disaster response. Demonstrating commitment to professional development, other volunteers suggested training courses for volunteers to take and suggested the DRO develop additional courses, such as Wilderness CPR/First Aid and Managing Spontaneous Volunteers. Volunteers also inquired about courses through the State Training Institute (STI), a week-long event held annually that was run by the state chapter of the DRO. Mario informed them that "because of budget constraints, there is no STI this year" (Feb. 2011). When the volunteers voiced their disappointment at this, Mario agreed but offered other online training opportunities, such as the FEMA training, and offered to hear any suggestions of what classes they should add locally.

Some training was also incorporated into the quarterly volunteer meetings to make sure they have the same knowledge as members. At the February meeting, volunteers received training on how to use the new 800 MHz radio systems installed in DRO response vehicles and do's and don'ts on how to communicate using the system. Volunteers also received training on how to correct mistakes in completing client casework forms. The emphasis on these training sessions and encouraging other training opportunities reflected a culture where volunteers were encouraged and committed to being as well-trained disaster responders as members were.

On the surface, volunteer training helped give volunteers the skills they need to be able to respond to the disasters and emergencies required of them by the organization chapter. But the trainings were also purposefully designed to learn what it meant to be a committed member of the National DRO and to follow the rules. For example, the online orientation had one module titled, "Our Commitments" that "describes how [DRO] employees and volunteers apply our values, practice total diversity and act within ethical standards to uphold the public trust" (DRO national website, Feb. 2011). The required initial courses for volunteers were also carefully

designed and controlled by the National DRO. All training sessions were either completed online though the national website or the curriculum was sent to the DRO by national headquarters to use for classroom-style courses (Ken interview, Feb. 2011). This control of training by National DRO seemed to expand to other training opportunities as evidenced by the cutting of funding for the State Training Institute (quarterly volunteer mtg., Feb. 2011), the incorporation of some ICS into DRO training courses (Ken interview, Feb. 2011), and the mention by another staff member to volunteers that "there are a lot of big changes taking place and it will be big news when the chapter COO (Chief Operating Officer) comes back from National," (quarterly volunteer mtg., Feb. 2011). Even the time spent in the quarterly meeting to correctly complete the casework form was explained because they need more standardization to make the DRO staffs' job easier when the input the information into the national database system (quarterly volunteer mtg., Feb. 2011). By controlling and designing training for all DRO employees and volunteers, the National DRO ensured consistency across all chapters as well as emphasized commitment by members to values, rules, and policies of the national organization over the regional chapter.

Besides individual trainings, interorganizational crisis response trainings and exercises helped the regional DRO plan and prepare for disasters and their role in localized response. These preparedness meetings and exercises were a large part a DRO staff member's job. As DRO staff member Ken said that "if we're not responding to a disaster now, we're planning…planning is probably70 percent of my job" (interview, Feb. 2011). For the DRO, these consisted specifically of 1) table-top simulations, where representatives from various organizations talk through a crisis response scenario, 3) functional exercises where representatives role play communications they would do for a real event, and 4) full-scale exercises where a controlled disaster event is simulated in the field and various organizations

practice how they would respond and work together (Ken interview, Feb. 2011). The DRO was involved in approximately 13-15 of these a year (Des interview, Oct. 2010). DRO staff members attended various meetings and exercises, although Des and Ken as the DRO managers attended the majority of the exercise orientations and planning meetings. Some long term volunteers did attend smaller scale meetings and exercises, such as those with other non-profit disaster relief organizations like the animal sheltering meeting and simulation the researcher attended (Nov., 2010). However, all DRO volunteers were encouraged to participate as "victims" in full-scale exercises because, "sometimes it's good to see things from the other side" (Jim, quarterly mtg., Feb. 2011). Participating in these disaster trainings and exercises were rituals because they occurred regularly (mostly because of government regulation) and are an important part of the culture of crisis response organizations.

Engaging in these exercises and planning meetings also reinforced the service culture of the organization as one willing to be a part of a team and work with partners in crisis response. For example, the researcher attended a co-sheltering workshop hosted by the state animal response team (SART), which rescues and cares for animals during a crisis event (SART mtg., Nov. 2010). The DRO was represented by a staff member and two volunteers. SART was excited that DRO was willing to discuss pet owner co-sheltering and potential partnerships. Privately, DRO members told me they didn't know how feasibly co-sheltering would work, however they were willing to hear what ideas SART had. During the meeting DRO members acknowledged that pet issues effected people's evacuation decisions and freely shared their ideas and experiences about sheltering with those groups in attendance. This conveyed to those attending the workshop that DRO valued the issues of the public that they served and showed their willingness to engage in new partners in crisis response.

Disaster relief fundraising. A final ritual that the DRO participated in is fundraising after a disaster has occurred. Fundraising communication and events are unique to non-profit disaster relief organizations such as the DRO. In an age of 24-hour news reporting and where citizens share stories, information, and images through social media, disasters create a sense of helplessness or cognitive dissonance in people. People often turn to making a donation to non-profit organizations to help disaster victims because it relieves that cognitive dissonance (Waters, 2009). Because the DRO is a prominent disaster relief organization, it engaged in these fundraising activities through the mass media and electronically through its website and social media.

In the past this helped the DRO fund its local disaster relief efforts and promote the activities and positive image of the organization to the local community. Over the years, the National DRO developed a sophisticated communication and fundraising plan, which restricted any funds raised locally from going to the DRO chapter during a national disaster response.

> If it's a national or international disaster, we [regional chapter of DRO] are in more of a fundraising mode and communication mode. For example, Channel 7 [TV station] loves to do a telethon if there is disaster. Because the chapter is part of the national organization, there are lots of rules on what communication to the public needs to be so it is coordinated with national. We can communicate how the [DRO] is responding and what type of help is needed from the public. Rules are we cannot reach out for individual help unless the disaster reaches certain level - like the [county] tornadoes. There are levels of disasters and lots of rules, lots of things have changed. (Michelle interview, DRO marketing coordinator, Dec. 2010)

First, the fundraising communication rules and policies for local chapter DROs to use for large-scale or "non-recurrent disasters" were clearly defined through the National DRO's disaster fund raising action plan. "In the case of non-recurrent disasters that affect areas beyond the jurisdiction of the chapter, the chapter will engage in cooperative fundraising efforts with

other impacted chapters, in coordination with the service area, as prescribed in the disaster fund raising action plan" (DRO Chapter Response Plan, 2009, p. 16).

Second, the local chapter used its website, blog, Facebook, and Twitter accounts to communicate what the National DRO was doing and how people could donate to National DRO's disaster relief efforts. These messages seemed to follow the recommendations of public relations scholars to have DRO's response efforts publicized in (social) media outlets, use testimonials and images from the disaster and response, and use factual information and statistics to state the needs of the organization (Bennett and Daniel, 2002; Bennett and Kottasz, 2000).

During this study, the Japan tsunami and nuclear disaster occurred, soon followed by a tornado outbreak in the United States across several states. Although the local DRO was not directly affected by these disasters, they engaged in the ritual of disaster fundraising for the national organization. Most of these messages were created by the National DRO in a press release format. The messages varied from testimonies and images from the disaster (often including an image of a person wearing a DRO vest or other identification) to updating the public on its fundraising efforts for a particular disaster and how it had used those funds. This information was then posted on the local chapter's DROs website and social media (with links to the larger article).

If there was a local response to the disaster, such as sending disaster volunteers to help in relief efforts, then a short paragraph by the local DRO was posted at the beginning followed by a press release from the National DRO concerning the same disaster (DRO chapter website, April 2011). In all communications, the mission of the national organization and its reliance on the public for assistance was made clear.

> The [DRO] shelters, feeds and provides emotional support to victims of disasters…provides international humanitarian aid; and supports military members and

their families. The [DRO] is a charitable organization - not a government agency - and depends on volunteers and the generosity of the American public to perform its mission. For more information, please visit [national DRO website link] or join our blog at [national DRO blog link]. (DRO chapter blog, April 2011)

This, however, made it more difficult for the regional DRO chapter to reach out to the community during a time of heightened interest to present their ongoing need for regional community emergency and disaster funding.

The clear communication and fundraising plan and communication materials the National DRO provided helped the local chapter DRO provide timely information about current disaster relief and fundraising efforts. But it also restricted the local DRO from creating connections and long-term fundraising relationships with the community at a time in which they were most likely to donate to their organization. DRO chapters were expected to use their staff and volunteers to answer phones during local telethons and post timely updates to its websites and social media communications as part of cooperative fundraising efforts. But the donation links and telephone and text numbers listed in communication messages were to the National DRO. For example, when one clicked on a link on the local DRO website to donate to the Japan Disaster Relief, the link actually took one to the National DRO donation page (DRO chapter website, April 2011). On that page, the choice to donate to the regional DRO chapter was listed as the fourth of five options: "Where the need is greatest, Disaster relief for countless crises, Help for Military members and their families, Your local [DRO] Chapter, and Japan Earthquake and Pacific Tsunami". Also, if one clicked on the general "Donate Now" button located on the local DRO website, donating funds to that chapter was still one of four options for donors (DRO chapter website, April 2011). This resulted in many DRO members communicating their frustration with National DRO in meetings over lack of funding and in turn recognition for their role in local disaster response discussed earlier.

Given these restrictions from the National DRO, the regional DRO has been more creative in engaging in other community fundraising rituals to raise money for its daily emergency services operations or for local level disasters. They hosted 5K run/walks and motorcycle rides and had a DRO tent at sporting events and summer festivals to increase visibility and communicate their needs (quarterly volunteer mtg., Feb. 2011). DRO volunteers were strongly encouraged to assist with these events and wear their organizational gear to identify themselves with the organization, and in exchange the organization got them free entrance to the event. These local fundraising events were also communicated through the local DRO's website and social media. In addition, they used their social media to publically thank their local corporate and foundation donors for their generosity.

> In honor of [DRO] month, we would like to recognize our supporters. Today, we would like to recognize, Lamar Advertising. The Lamar Advertising Corporation has made it possible for the [DRO, regional chapter] to broadcast our message to the public via billboards around the [location removed] area. It is because of the generosity of Lamar Advertising that we are able to get the word out and let the public know what we do. (DRO chapter Facebook page, April 2011)

The local DRO also used more subtle means of communicating their reliance on the public's generosity of donating funds in other written materials handed out to various audiences. For example, on the cover of the Recovery Information booklet handed out to all clients serviced by the DRO during a fire, it says, "[DRO] assistance is an outright gift made possible by the generous contributions of the American people" (Recovery Information booklet, n.d., p.1). The "Little Red Book" reference guide that describes the services the regional DRO provides lists the services provided for disaster relief, "with the help of people who donate time and money," (Little Red Book, n.d., p.11). One Twitter message simply stated, "Your support of the [local DRO] allows us to send volunteers and staff to NC & TX to help after storms and fires" (DRO chapter Twitter site, April 2011). Instead of direct solicitations of donations, these messages

were more subtle in communicating the need for donations to do local disaster relief work as well as communicating appreciation to the public for supporting them. These more subtle forms of communication also helped the regional DRO get around the fundraising barriers the National DRO placed on them. Although it hasn't lessened their frustration with National DRO's restrictions, it has helped them maintain their presence as a valued disaster relief organization in their local community.

Rites and rituals in the DRO chapter helped volunteers commit to the values and norms of the organization and in turn valued them as full members of the organization. Whether it was quarterly meetings, rites of integration such as social and recognition events, crisis trainings and exercises, or crisis fundraising, the service mission was made clear to members and volunteers. They were expected to do their part as valued members to help the organization beyond typical volunteer duties. Volunteers were expected to know their role through training and commit to being ambassadors of the organization, but were also encouraged to engage in helping to solve the challenges of the organization. Rituals, such as attending crisis trainings and exercises on an organizational level, also reinforced the service culture of the organization. Disaster relief fundraising rituals reinforced the service mission of the organization and its reliance on donations for the public to provide those services. Although some rites and rituals were carefully controlled by the National DRO to generate national level loyalty and commitment from members and the public, the regional DRO used meetings and events with volunteers and local fundraising efforts as well as messages through its website and social media to the public to create a local connection and commitment to the regional organization chapter.

The next cultural construct discussed are the stories told by members. These stories encode, transmit and reinforce the organizational culture of the regional DRO.

Stories

As described in chapter one stories are an important way members share organizational experiences with other members and those outside the organization (Trice & Beyer, 1984, p. 655). Telling stories is also an important way members' share and reinforce organizational culture because stories "typify certain experiences as being, in principle, worthy of emulation (when the story glorifies success) or deserving of caution (when the story accentuates failure)" (Pacanowsky & O'Donnell-Trujillo, 1982, p. 139). Stories appeared in conversations, interviews, and informal discussions and ranged from an account of something that happened in the past or as examples of particular points (Schwartzman, 1993). The stories that were told by DRO members reinforced the organizational culture by emphasizing the service mission of the DRO, helping them cope with tragedy, warnings about safety in responding to emergencies, and not to let clients "take advantage of the system".

As a perceived newcomer to the organization, the researcher was told stories by members as a way to socialize her to the cultural values and rules of the organization that members adhere to (Driskill & Brenton, 2005, p.44). Because the DRO culture had established stable yet permeable boundaries (Stohl & Putnam, 1994), members freely shared stories with the researcher and other non-members. The researcher was even told by volunteer leader Jim that one of their goals in the beginning of the project was to recruit her to become a DRO volunteer as a result of her research on the organization (quarterly volunteer mtg., Feb. 2011).

Service stories. The first kind of story told by members reinforced the non-profit humanitarian mission of the organization and explained how the members were there to compassionately serve the community in their time of need. One type of story was the "sincere helping story" that reflected how members felt they were making a difference in the work they

did. These stories were general or specific in nature. For example, Des, the DRO director, when discussing the low salary of DRO staff members, talked about how DRO members were often serving the most vulnerable members of the community in their time of need.

> When I help kids, those are the best days. When disasters trickle down it is really bad for kids. Stress sometimes causes parents to take out things on the kids. But if I give food or comfort to them for night, I feel good. I know that night that they have something…People are proud, they used to work but now they are unemployed and also lost their house [in a fire]. So I worry about kids and senior citizens. (Des interview, Feb. 2011)

So Des reinforced in the story that the regional DRO provided a valuable service to the community.

In another instance, during the quarterly meeting, Jim, a volunteer leader, talked to the volunteers about how taking time to be with clients in their time of need was an important part of their job. A volunteer then supported and reinforced this organizational value by sharing a short example of taking time with clients was important.

> Jim: We want to spend extra 5-10 minutes to comfort them [clients] and give them ideas on things they can do to help themselves. That part of job is just as important as things we give them. Try to dry their tears, maybe try to get them to laugh. We don't want to be on a race course. Five minutes is not going to change our life but may change theirs. These small things give credence to the [DRO] and shows that we have heart.

> DAT Volunteer: Once I helped two brothers. One brother felt overwhelmed and was glad to get information from me and the [DRO] to help empower him to take care of his family. (quarterly volunteer mtg., Feb. 2011)

> The researcher looked around during this exchange and saw many volunteers nodding their heads in agreement, which indicated supporting this organizational practice.

Sincere stories of service also conveyed how the volunteers went above and beyond the job to be there for the people affected by a fire. During one interview about what DRO volunteers do, Jim, offered the following story. "There was a fire where a 13 year old autistic boy was the fatality. We talked to family and neighbors and learned that the autistic boy started

the fire. I remember talking to the family. Later, I went to the funeral and was only white guy there, but the family was so thankful and touched that I came" (Jim interview, Dec. 2010). These types of stories were effective ways to promote an expectation and commitment from volunteers to do their job on nights, weekends, and holidays because they were providing valuable services to people in their time of need and also emotional support and compassion to people who may have lost everything.

These stories also reflected the service culture of the organization and were told to outsiders by members or disseminated through electronic communications to encourage others in the community to volunteer or donate money to the organization. For example, after the Joplin tornado destroyed much of the town in May 2011, Des and a DRO volunteer spent two weeks providing services on behalf of the National DRO. The chapter DRO blog told their story as well as posted the pictures that Des took. The pictures showed the devastation from the tornado but also included several pictures of Des and the DRO volunteer wearing their gear and handing out supplies or giving a young girl a teddy bear (DRO chapter blog, June, 2011). These verbal and visual stories told a story to the public how the DRO was serving people in time of need and how the organization relied on volunteers and donations from the public to fulfill their service mission.

Coping and safety stories. A second kind of story told by members helped members cope with the tragic situations and sometimes gruesome images of death and destruction that they came in contact with. These stories were often told at social occasions or during down time when volunteer teams members were traveling from call to call. These stories often highlighted extreme cases and were told in a humorous light, similar to "war stories" often told between

soldiers. For example, when the researcher was at the volunteer Christmas party, she sat with the

team she would be going on calls with the following week.

> During dinner I sit and listen as the DRO team starts to trade stories of their experiences on fire calls. I hear stories of people showing prison ID as their only form of identification, a blind woman suddenly not blind when she needs to walk out of the house, and people who set fires deliberately. They then talk about animals in fires - cats burned or dying from smoke inhalation, pit bulls in yards, mice in a house sitting on a burned out stove staring at them. These stories are often told in a jolly tone and people around laugh. Jim says that fire trucks now carry masks to revive cats, dogs, and now snakes. The others at the table laugh and say that he must be joking.

> Tom tells a story that there was a guy whose house burned and the house was in the family for 3 generations. The front brick façade was there but as soon as they walked through the front door, everything was charcoal and they could see nothing but sky. The guy was really mad - they told him that if he didn't calm down, they were going to leave. They guy replied, "I've been drinking and smoking pot since this happened trying to calm down." Much laughter followed the story.

> At one point, Jim looks at me [the researcher] and says that he must think we are insensitive because we talk about clients like that. Bob says it is a way to debrief and stay sane, but they only do it in the van away from the client. Tom then adds, "Then we must be the sanest van around," to much laughter. (Christmas party, Dec. 2010)

As in this case, these stories were often very tragic - homes are destroyed and pets die. But the

stories were told in a humorous way and helped bond the team together because they had gone

through similar experiences. They also gave members a way to cope by providing context.

The researcher also observed, when accompanying a volunteer team on fire calls, how

these fire stories as well as sharing personal information with each other created a bond between

volunteer team members. In the down times in the van between calls, the volunteer team often

shared personal stories with other members such as asking about how family is doing, how their

jobs or classes are going, and what the food is like at a restaurant they drive by. The stories were

a combination of sincerity and joking with each other and the team included the researcher in

many of the conversations. The team also took time to share fire stories with the researcher like

the following.

> The three of them then start telling stories about some houses that have been firebombed in the past or deliberately set by others. Sue says that sometimes people will claim that they don't know how the fire started when clearly it was arson. Tom then tells a story about a time when they were asking a client how a fire started and the person said they didn't know but on the wall behind them was spray painted, "That is what happens when you sleep with someone's husband." They all laugh at this story. (DRO volunteer team fire call, Dec. 2010)

This story was meant to reassure the researcher that although they sometimes went into dangerous situations, DRO volunteers had not been hurt because the public knew the role of the organization was to help them. Sharing this story bonded the team together and helped them cope with dangerous situations by reminding themselves that people don't harm DRO volunteers. It also helped allay the concerns of the newcomer about personal safety since they were traveling to a recently firebombed home.

In addition, stories helped newcomers learn how to stay safe on a fire call. During the Christmas party, the researcher was told by DRO volunteer Sue what she needed to wear when going out on calls. They included wearing warm clothes that I don't mind getting smoky, a hat and gloves (because it's December and very cold out), and hard toed and soled shoes because there is a lot of broken glass and nails on the ground (Sue, Dec. 2010). Proper clothing was subtly reinforced through a story later shared by Tom over dinner.

> I thought people used to not keep their house well because there are piles of stuff everywhere as we examine a house. But then I learned that firefighters cause most of the damage because they are throwing stuff out of closets, turning over furniture, breaking windows and putting holes in the roof just to get to the fire and put it out. (Tom, Dec. 2010)

This story and a previous story about stressed and potentially dangerous animals that were left at houses after a fire were recalled by the researcher as she went out on her first fire call.

> We then decide to get out of the van and do a walk around the house to see what we can determine. Tom and Dwayne go to the front of the house, while Susan and I walk around to the side. Susan points up with her flashlight to show that the window at the top of the house is broken out, but the first floor windows and door look normal. We then go

around to the back and walk up onto a back deck. I see a cage that looks big enough for a dog and start to get a little nervous after hearing the stories from them about frightened and therefore sometimes violent animals. But there is no dog in sight so I relax and go back to the task at hand….Tom and Dwayne then join us on the back porch and I caution them about being careful on the deck because there are several floorboards missing. (DRO volunteer team fire call, Dec. 2010)

The previous stories socialized the researcher to what dangers to expect at a fire call and made her more aware of keeping herself and the other team members safe.

Client scam stories. Finally, stories showed how the DRO had policies in place to ensure the safety of its volunteers and protect members and donors' money from being swindled. Ken shared with the researcher in one interview that if they get a call about a fire, they will call the fire station within that jurisdiction to verify that a fire recently did take place.

There's a safety issue here to, because occasionally…once in a while we will get a call that can be bogus, and we [call to] verify the fire and we find, "Oh there was no fire, fire department doesn't have anything. "And the fire department will go back two, three weeks and say, "We don't have anything at this address," we're not gonna send anyone out in harm's way. 'Cause some people, some, it's not often, will try to be creative and if there's a vacant house or if a house fire, how do I put this, it's a vacant house that was recently on fire and some have tried to say they live there at the vacant house. So that's why we verify. (Ken interview, March 2011)

This need for verification that a fire took place and that the clients do live at that address was a recurring type of "client scam" story that was told to the researcher. These stories often juxtaposed the desire to help people who are in need, but also be aware of those who may try to deceive you to get services. In discussing what DRO volunteer teams do on a fire call, Jim, a volunteer leader, made the following observation.

DRO teams go to the client and do a damage assessment of house to determine needs of family. The team gets information from the chapter dispatcher - family name, address, contact number, crossroads of where house located, how many people living in house. Our job is to disseminate information and see if what they (DRO teams) are seeing matches what was told to the chapter. We require ID that confirms that head of house lives at residence. We want to give [services] to people who deserve it – they really live in the house and really have 5 children. For example, if it's reported there are 3-4 children in house then we count mattresses and determine who sleeps where. Remember

when the person calls in they are traumatized so we do keep that in mind. A number of times we have to go to the hospital to interview people. The job is distressing/disturbing – We see dead animals and hurt children. Our job is to make sure the money we're spending, donated by individuals and companies, we need to make sure we are spending it properly. Generally you can watch reactions and body language to tell good info and fabricated info. 75% of fires [we respond to] are in [city]. Lots of people that we work with have grown up without a lot. They are dependent on non-profits and the city and know how things work and how to use it to their advantage. Our job is to make sure to provide emergency services - put up people for maximum of 3 days, but normally 1-2 days. (Jim interview, Dec. 2010)

Another story told by Des, the DRO director, further highlighted this juxtaposition that

DRO members have to deal with.

If they were to take this [the DRO] out of the community - what a void. They get debit cards and carry them around as a status symbol. Police have sometimes found cards because they were used to cut up cocaine. We monitor the cards – You can use for 7 days then they're cut off. Each time you use a card it costs me $2. Cards are a status symbol. (Des interview, Feb. 2011)

These stories seemed to serve two purposes. First, they reinforced the strict funding limits

that the National DRO had put in place for serving clients by the DRO members. There were

levels of services that could be given to clients depending on how damaged was the

house/apartment, how many people were living there (adults and children) and what time of

day/year the fire occurred. This information was on a laminated sheet and frequently referred to

by DRO members as they talked to the client during a fire call. Second, these stories highlighted

the funding issues the regional DRO chapter was having and reminded members how they

needed to be cautious about giving money to people who may want to take advantage of the

services the organization provides. As a result, DRO team members were seen giving rules and

advice to clients on how they can and cannot spend the money. This was observed during a fire

call when the DRO team explained to a client how the debit cards worked.

Sue tells the owner that she is giving them $____ for food. She then tells him the same thing she told the family the previous night about getting the most out of their money by going to McDonalds rather than buying steaks. When she tells him that he cannot use the

money for cigarettes, alcohol or firearms, the owner replies that he hasn't had a drink for over a year. Dwayne congratulates him. Dwayne then says that he shouldn't let tonight tempt him to drink either. The guy says that he won't drink tonight…Sue then puts the card into an envelope and writes the amount of money on the back top of the envelope…Tom then says he is also putting the voucher for the hotel in the envelope and tells him that he needs to give it to the front desk when they arrive and the [DRO] will get charged for the hotel room instead of them. He also says that the voucher is only for the cost of the room and nothing else. Susan hands the envelope to the owner who thanks her and then takes out the credit card to put into his wallet. (DRO volunteer team fire call, Dec. 2010)

This advice by DRO volunteers reinforced the funding policies of the National DRO, by warning their clients to make wise choices in spending the money.

This tension between fulfilling DRO's mission by serving the clients and being good stewards of the organization's money may have caused confusion and frustration for some members. The regional DRO staff addressed this issue by telling stories that upheld that the need to serve the clients should always be the deciding factor between the two. For example, Des related how during a series of fires during a windstorm, the DRO "helped the homeless as well because we are a neutral agency" (Des interview, Oct. 2010). At the quarterly volunteer meeting, Jim instructed the group on how to complete the paperwork correctly so the staff doesn't have to reconcile missing paperwork with what they need to enter into the national CAS database (Feb. 2011). Jim also told members that they should err on the side of helping people. "If they need it, we owe them seasonal garments and we should provide it" (quarterly volunteer mtg., Feb. 2011). This indicated that the local chapter DRO chose to reinforce their chapter's service culture. However this choice may be more difficult in the future if tension continues between National DRO's policies and local chapter's DRO culture. This will be discussed further in chapter five.

Organizational stories told by DRO members socialized newcomers as well as constituted values or morals that members should adhere to or avoid. The stories told by DRO members reinforced the organizational culture by emphasizing the service mission of the DRO, as well as

helped them cope with tragedy, warned them how to safely respond to emergencies, and not to let clients "take advantage of the system". While most of these stories helped members learn how to become a committed member of the organization and deal with the unique challenges of the job, they also reflected policies and expectations of National DRO to spend money wisely and not let the public take advantage of their kindness. While the later stories took some of the idealism out of the service and humanitarian culture of the organization, the leadership of the DRO emphasized that members should choose helping others over saving money.

The final construct that helped reveal the organizational culture of the DRO was symbols, which is discussed next.

Symbols

Symbols are physical objects or non-verbal acts that "serve as a vehicle for conveying meaning, usually by representing another thing" (Trice & Beyer, 1984, p. 655). Symbols help reinforce norms, values, and meanings by organizational members and may get carried into interactions with outsiders where members may assume that others understand their meaning. For the regional DRO, the organization's logo, member dress, and office bulletin boards served as symbols that communicated the DRO's service culture and values of the organization.

DRO logo. The DRO's logo was ubiquitous throughout the local DRO chapter; and on a national level has also become synonymous with humanitarian disaster relief by the public. Historically, the DRO logo's shape and colors were chosen to resemble the neutrality and impartiality of a country during wartime (New Employee Guide, 2006). Therefore, their logo reflected an organization that helped the wounded on the battlefield, regardless of nationality, race, religion or political beliefs. Today, the logo is still seen as a powerful symbol of help and humanitarianism to victims of fires and other disasters. When local elementary school children

were asked to draw pictures of what the DRO's services meant to them, every picture but one included the logo and in one picture the DRO people were personified by the logo itself (Little Red Book, n.d.).

The DRO knew the symbolic power of their logo and put it on everything it could to promote this positive identity. Some examples included member clothing and gear, communications such as the website, social media, and marketing and preparedness materials, vehicles, tents and tablecloths where they work at festivals or fundraising events, and kits such as disaster preparedness, comfort care, and first aid. They even had temporary logo tattoos that were handed out by Des at a high school DRO club meeting as they were popular with younger people (DRO club mtg., Jan. 2011). In addition, organizational pictures and videos almost always included someone (volunteers or members) or something (vehicles, shelters, bags) with the logo providing aid or compassion to disaster victims. For example, on a postcard the DRO handed out, it explained what they do and how one can contact the regional DRO in three languages (English, Spanish, and Arabic). The one picture included showed the logo 4 times – once on a vehicle, on three hats, and on a comfort care kit being handed to a person wrapped in a blanket (DRO postcard, n.d.).

The ubiquity of the logo helped promote the mission of the organization, but the logo also served as a way to keep organizational members safe. DRO members were often asked to go into disaster areas or dangerous neighborhoods where a fire occurred to serve clients. Members felt that by wearing clothing or driving a vehicle with the logo, they didn't have to worry about people hurting them. As Jim, a volunteer leader, explained, "Volunteers wear DRO vest because we want people to know we're helping. It's also a safety issue, but we've never had an incident where a DRO volunteer was harmed. We go into bad areas, but people have respect for DRO and

know we're there to help" (Jim interview, Dec. 2010). During the quarterly volunteer meeting, Jim also made a "PR and safety announcement" for volunteers to "always wear your vest and use the 4-way flashers on the van. This brings attention to you and DRO and also identifies you" (Feb. 2011). This feeling of helping and safety while being identified by the DRO logo has become a part of the local chapter's DRO culture. For example, while the researcher was accompanying a DRO volunteer team to a fire call, Tom said to the researcher, "We go into some bad areas in [city], but nothing has ever happened to a [DRO] volunteer while we are in these neighborhoods because they know we are there to help" (DRO volunteer team fire call, Dec. 2010). Thus, the DRO logo reinforced the humanitarian mission and service culture of the organization, which was widely recognized and respected by members and people in the local community. This in turn, kept DRO members safe when responding to fire calls in dangerous neighborhoods.

Member dress. As previously stated, the DRO logo was often found on clothing and gear that members and volunteers wore. This "uniform" worn by DRO members and volunteers served two purposes. First, like many other crisis response organizations, the clothing and gear served as a uniform to identify DRO members and gave them access to sites so they could engage in emergency and disaster relief efforts. Once a volunteer completed the 3 month training, they were assigned to a disaster response team and given a DRO vest, hat and organizational ID card (Jim interview, Dec. 2010). This presentation of DRO clothing and ID symbolized the volunteers becoming full members of the organization. Volunteers could also use their ID card, which they wore attached to a DRO lanyard around their neck, to bypass the security station at the entrance of the chapter headquarters and electronically open certain locked doors in the building.

In addition, their clothing and ID cards gave them access to fire scenes and DRO shelters. For example, at the shelter meeting and simulation, Mario, a DRO staff member told the State Animal Response Team (SART) members, "Each [DRO] volunteer at a shelter has a [DRO] hat, vest, and ID on so you know who are the clients and who are staff" (SART mtg., Nov. 2010). In another instance, the researcher asked DRO staff member Ken if there were certain credentials that DRO members needed to gain access to emergency or disaster areas. He said they did for large Level 3 disasters because that brought in the National DRO and federal agencies. But for most emergencies or disaster that were Level 1 (home and small level apartment fires) or Level 2 (larger apartment fires and local disasters needing shelters), "Not really…no because they see the DRO van and the vest. And they, the city, they want us there. I mean they called us, so they want to get us in there as quickly as possible" (Ken interview, March 2011). The researcher was also introduced to clients by the DRO volunteer team as a member of the DRO because she was wearing a DRO vest given to her by the DRO manager (DRO volunteer team fire call, Dec. 2010). So the DRO clothing and ID cards served as a uniform signifying membership into the organization as well as access privileges for members and volunteers to the chapter headquarters and most fire and disaster sites.

Second, members often wore their DRO clothing and gear when not engaging in DRO business. This symbolized their pride in being a member of the organization and commitment to the organization and its role in the community. The researcher often observed DRO volunteers and staff members wearing other DRO labeled clothing, pins, bags, and hats that weren't part of the uniform given to them when they joined. Jim explained that members bought shirts and other goods themselves or were given as gifts by staff (interview, Dec. 2010). The DRO pins also

served to identify years of service, disasters they worked, or people they had met from other

DRO chapters.

> The DRO Chief Operating Officer gives Tom, a volunteer team leader, three DRO pins that look fairly old. Tom seems touched by the gesture and thanks the guy. He then gives me a pin to keep. He says that the pins that everyone is wearing get traded by volunteers across the country at DRO workshops or seminars like Olympic pins. Some pins identify certain chapters, while others identify certain disasters that they have worked. He says that sometimes the volunteers get a little crazy trying to trade and collect pins at these events. My pin says "Hurricane Season 2005" on the top and bottom in gold letters, shows the southeast section of the US (gulf coast) and a hurricane symbol like you see on the weather channel in the Gulf Coast. Next to the states in the Gulf of Mexico is the DRO logo. This pin was obviously handed out to those volunteers who helped with Katrina relief efforts in the Gulf Coast in 2005. (DRO Christmas Party, Dec. 2010)

At DRO social events or more casual events, such as the Christmas party, Recognition Dinner,

and Saturday morning quarterly volunteer meeting, almost all members were wearing a DRO

shirt, jacket, hat, bag, or lanyard with various DRO pins tacked on. If they weren't wearing DRO

clothing, they typically chose to wear red clothing, one of the organization's colors, or a DRO

pin on their lapel or tie. At the Saturday morning SART meeting and simulation, the researcher

hadn't yet met any DRO staff, but she could easily identify DRO volunteers and staff by the

DRO gear they were wearing (Nov. 2011). Interestingly, none of the SART members

representing other organizations wore clothing that identified them with their organization.

In addition, during the quarterly volunteer meeting Des suggested that volunteers wear

their clothing in the community to help bring more recognition to the organization.

> We are all we've got. If you can be seen, be seen. We don't have an identity in the community anymore even though we are a widely known brand. We do it so well and in the middle of the night all the time so it is not news. You guys are it. Each one of you is media and marketing person. As long as you are doing the right thing and wearing the right clothes, we want you to be labeled. (Des, quarterly volunteer mtg., Feb. 2011)

In response to this, many volunteers verbally agreed with Des or nodded their heads in approval.

This willingness to purchase other DRO clothing and gear and wear it in the community and

during more social and casual times, symbolized their commitment to and pride as a member of the DRO.

Office bulletin boards. In another example of organizational symbols, most of the emergency services office areas at the DRO chapter building were fairly non-descript (rows of cubicles, meeting rooms, dispatch area) except for the bulletin boards. Upon closer inspection, the bulletin boards were a reflection of the culture of the organization. Much of the space was filled with pictures of staff members and volunteers serving at disaster sites, fundraising events, or special recognition events. Other pictures showed DRO's connection with organizational partners. In one, the city mayor was shaking a DRO member's hand, and in another the manager of DRO emergency services had his arm around the director of emergency disaster services for the local Salvation Army chapter. Also on the board were letters to the DRO, one personal and one from a city official, thanking them for providing services to families affected by a particular fire. Other things included newsletters or newspaper articles that highlighted a DRO volunteer from the chapter, with a handwritten sticky note giving kudos to the volunteer. Finally there was a paper that detailed the major disaster events the DRO responded to in the metropolitan area from 1997 to 2009 and what actions were taken by the organization. These items on the bulletin board supported the values of the organizational culture – serving the community by responding to fires and other disasters, partner relationships with city officials, non-profit organizations, and the community, and recognizing and valuing the contributions of staff and volunteers. Since this bulletin board was not located in a public space, it was meant to reinforce these values to DRO members and volunteers.

Although not all artifacts are symbols of organizational culture, the organization's logo, member dress, and office bulletin boards became symbols of the DRO's culture because they

were used by organizational members to emphasize the DRO's service culture and values of the organization. Now that the four cultural constructs of vocabulary, rites and rituals, stories, and symbols have been described, the following section explores how these constructs contributed to a more open and collaborative culture of crisis response among the DRO and its members.

<center>**Crisis Response as Collaboration**</center>

As described in chapter one, an individual organization cannot manage a crisis event alone because it simply does not have the necessary resources (e.g., information, money, personnel, equipment, etc.). Moreover, uncoordinated actions can create unanticipated problems for other stakeholders and actually make the crisis worse (Gray, 1985, p. 912 & 914). Although the terms crisis coordination and crisis collaboration are often used interchangeably, they are two distinct worldviews of crisis response. As discussed in chapter one, crisis coordination implies a minimal level of involvement between organizations to achieve crisis response and mitigation, or "mutually agreed upon cooperation about how to carry out particular tasks" (Quarantelli, 1997a, p. 48). In this sense, two independent organizations can coordinate crisis response activities but have minimal interaction and association with each other during a crisis. Crisis collaboration means that crisis response organizations create an alliance in which they value interorganizational interdependence, equal input of participants, and shared decision-making (Keyton & Stallworth, 2003) in order to reach their shared goal of effective crisis response and mitigation, even under severe time and decision-making pressures. Crisis collaboration in this sense connotes a deeper partnership between organizations where the crisis response mission, decisions, and activities are jointly established and carried out.

Figure 3 illustrates the regional DRO's crisis response relationships with organizations at both the local community level and national level. This figure was created by the researcher

based on members' descriptions in formal and informal interviews, researcher observations of organizational activities, and the chapter disaster response plan. The boundary surrounding DRO is not a solid line to demonstrate the fact that it is stable yet permeable. VOAD and MEOC are represented in bold and italics to indicate that it is a collaborative group with representatives of the connected organizations. The arrows illustrate the primary flow of communication, whether in one direction or flowing freely between the two. If the arrow is a solid line then it represents more of a crisis coordination relationship; if it is dotted then it represents a crisis collaborative relationship. The circles serve as a reminder that these organizations have interdependence with context. Therefore, past crisis experiences, history, economy, and politics affect the DRO and other organizations at a local community and national level.

Figure 3: **DRO's crisis response relationship with other organizations.**

As explained in chapter one, an organization's culture can affect whether its members see crisis response as crisis coordination or crisis collaboration. The regional DRO viewed crisis response as crisis collaboration because of its awareness of how lack of resources resulted in its interdependence on the community and other organizations, willingness to partner with other organizations, and lack of organization culture barriers to collaboration.

It was true that some aspects of DROs crisis response can be initially viewed as crisis coordination activities (e.g., MOUs, "gentlemen's agreement", delegating of tasks, etc.). However their open and service oriented organizational culture and stable yet permeable organizational boundaries elevated its crisis response worldview to one of crisis collaboration. DRO members viewed their paramount goal as helping the victims of crisis, and chose to do so through an egalitarian and decentralized culture. Their organizational culture also valued interorganizational interdependence, equal participation, and shared decision-making. Although there was some tension felt by DRO members when resources were tighter (e.g. restrictions from National DRO, lack of funding, or lack of identity in the community), DRO leadership worked hard to maintain good relationships with the organization most viewed as direct competition and diffuse any "us versus them" feeling by DRO members. This worldview of crisis collaboration was born out of the organizational culture and is delineated below.

Lack of Resources and Recognition of Interdependence

The DRO did not have the necessary resources to manage crisis response alone and needed the community, crisis response organizations, and non-profit and social service organizations to fulfill its mission. As stated earlier, the DRO engaged in many fundraising rites and rituals because it had to rely on the local community for volunteer employees and money to

fund their response. Therefore it was interdependent with the community in order to successfully engage in crisis response. For example, the Chapter Disaster Response Plan stated,

> When a disaster occurs, the chapter will immediately inform the community that [DRO] disaster services are being provided to people impacted by the disaster. The community will also be informed that the [DRO] is dependent upon voluntary contributions to provide such disaster services and that all [DRO] disaster assistance is free. (2009, p.19)

This dependence on the community was communicated in its many fundraising and marketing activities, such as tables at community events, website and social media updates during a local, regional or national disaster response, and any marketing or disaster response communication materials it distributed. The DRO was also dependent on the media to cover their response activities, such as fire calls because that gave them recognition with the community. "Jim's probably the most outspoken person about the media, about us not having a lot of media 'cause it brings in money. You know, if a person sees it/ unfortunately people are/ sometimes people are generally motivated to give money" (Ken interview, Feb. 2011).

The DRO also saw interdependence with other organizations as critical because they simply did not have the personnel, shelter space, or money for all the services necessary for crisis response. They needed the fire department to give them access to fire scenes so they could talk to victims. Their close relationship with city fire departments often resulted in the fire department giving victims at a fire scene the DRO's 1-800 number, or the DRO would call the fire department to verify a fire took place and there were people needing assistance before they dispatched a volunteer team to the site (Jim, Dec. 2010). The DRO also had memorandums of operation (MOUs) with cities in their jurisdiction to provide schools and recreation centers as shelters. In addition, they relied on local churches and the Salvation Army to help supply food at shelters. Finally, they worked with and wrote referrals to other volunteer agencies, such as food pantries and other non-profit organizations to provide food, furniture, household items or other

longer term care needs to their clients, who were often poor, underserved, and uninsured members of the community. As Des stated, "Relationships with other agencies is key because my budget is only 1 million - 2 million dollars per year for house fires, community disaster relief or disaster relief response" (Des interview, Oct. 2010).

Some of this resource sharing among organizations did reflect more crisis coordination activities, especially when organizations were providing services in their "expert" area of crisis response. But there were many examples of the DRO recognizing and accepting its interdependence with the community, the media, and other organizations so they could provide the resources necessary for successful crisis response. The outcome of sharing of resources and tasks was necessary in order to provide the most comprehensive services and assistance to fire and disaster victims. This interdependence also helped the DRO view its relationships with those organizations as partnerships rather than independent crisis response organizations working in conjunction with one another.

Crisis Response as Partnerships

The DRO saw its relationship with other crisis response organizations as valuable partners in what they do. The DRO used words and phrases like "partner", "team", and "we're there together" to convey a reciprocal crisis collaboration relationship of interdependence and support among other organizations it interacted with for daily fire response and larger disasters response. This relationship was reinforced when communicated in meetings to volunteer members, on their website and social media, and in regular meetings with those organizations.

First, the DRO had a close relationship with other Volunteer Organizations Active in Disasters (VOAD) in the region because they had a similar service mission in disaster relief. This umbrella organization was started in the region in the late 1990s after a deadly tornado outbreak

and the two organizations met quarterly. The DRO also met with other non-profit organizations to explore partnership opportunities in disaster relief. In November 2010, for example, several DRO members and the researcher attended a one-day meeting with a state animal response team (SART) to discuss the possibility of co-sheltering of pets and their owners during a disaster. Throughout the day DRO and SART members discussed their roles in sheltering humans and pets and potential issues of health, safety, and managing volunteers if they were to set-up a co-shelter.

There was one organization DRO managers described as their "largest partner" because they often responded to the same fire calls and larger disasters. This organization was the Salvation Army. These two organizations are the largest of the VOAD organizations and trade off leadership of the VOAD every year. Though VOAD and their regular interactions, they have developed a close working relationship. For example, if one organization arrived at a fire scene and the other organization isn't there yet, then they would give the other a call and pass along the information (Ken, March 2011). If the DRO opened a shelter, the Salvation Army often provided the food (Ken, March 2011). The researcher was able to observe this partnership when they decided to open a joint service center at a local Salvation Army church to assist 25 families that were involved in an apartment fire (Feb. 2011). This partnership and high degree of coordination was maintained through regularly meetings with the leadership of the DRO and Salvation Army who have developed a "gentlemen's agreement" as to who does what in disaster relief.

> The Salvation Army knows/we have a good relationship, Des, with the [Salvation Army] director. So our agreement, our gentlemen's agreement, Salvation Army will do the feeding during the apartment fire, while we will do the case work assistance. So working with partners, there's different levels that we work with partners. So in the field at 2am, it's the Salvation Army; we're there together. (Ken interview, March 2011)

What elevated this partnership beyond one of crisis coordination to crisis collaboration was its similar disaster relief mission and commitment by leadership from both organizations to maintain a strong collaborative relationship rather than competitive one. Tacked on the bulletin board in the DRO disaster services area is a picture of the DRO and Salvation Army leaders smiling with their arms around each other's shoulders. In another example, one of the researcher's interviews was terminated early because Ken and Des had to go to a meeting with the Salvation Army. Des mentioned that they had to leave because there was some feuding going on between some people in the two organizations. Des said before leaving, "We're on the same team so were gonna get that worked out" (Ken interview, Feb. 2011). Therefore, the crisis response partnership between the organizations was a collaborative one.

When it came to larger disasters that required more sustained comprehensive coordination, the DRO saw local emergency management agencies and the Federal Emergency Response Agency (FEMA) as partners in disaster relief. The national headquarters of DRO had a history of working closely with FEMA in major disasters and in 2010 signed a five-year Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) detailing their partnership. As Des explained, the MOA "clearly states the [DRO] as lead response for Emergency Services 6 with FEMA. It lays out what the [DRO] does, what FEMA does and what we do together. [For example] we will partner with FEMA to do money and resources assessment" (Feb. 2011). FEMA also provided trainings that the DRO recommended its staff and volunteers take (quarterly volunteer mtg., Feb. 2011) and managed the National Shelter database that the DRO used. The DRO's social media websites also "followed" FEMA and frequently re-posted information on their social media sites they think is valuable to their followers. At the local level, the DRO partnered with city emergency management agencies when coordination of disaster services was needed. The city

owned many of the properties that the DRO used and must unlock them so the DRO could set up shelters. "And the reality is when we're responding to a big disaster we can't do anything without the government partners, the emergency management. If we need a shelter open, we go through them. So it always has to be a partnership 'cause they're the ones typically who call us, emergency management" (Ken interview, Feb. 2011).

While the DRO is defined by the public during a crisis as the "shelter people" or experts in providing food and shelter services, the regional DRO members recognize that all of their crisis activities and capabilities cannot be done without the support and partnership of other organizations (food, shelter locations, shelter database, training) and the community (volunteers, funding). This is different from a coordination relationship that assumes that the organization can provide most expected services on its own and coordinates activities to reduce redundancies with similar service organizations. This distinction will be made clearer in chapter five when the regional DRO organization is compared to the EMU MPD organization.

In addition, the DRO engaged in local disaster planning and exercises with these organizations to enhance these partnerships. The role of the DRO in disaster response was defined by DRO director Des as, "We are known as the shelter people" (interview, Dec. 2010). Therefore, DRO's role in local disaster planning and exercises was to make sure that their organization members and volunteers had the proper training and knew their roles, that they were organized, and that they had the supplies they need to set up a shelter (Ken interview, Feb. 2011). Ken also saw disaster exercises as a way to help other organizations understand what the DRO does and doesn't do in a response.

> …we discover the challenges while we're exercising. 'Cause that's when we say, "Oh, no. We don't do that." We'll be at the practice Emergency Operations Center role playing…and someone from this particular city/we're role playing with the city of Bravo, the director of recreation, they'll raise their hand and say, "Oh well the [DRO], you have

3000 cots, you're already gonna be at the community center." And we'll say, "No, we won't." I'll look at the director and say, "No, you'll have to call us in advance and you tell us where to park the trailer." So the misconceptions but those aren't so much challenges. We're learning about each other before the event. (Ken interview, Feb. 2011)

Participating in these disaster trainings and exercises were crisis response rituals because they occurred regularly (mostly because of government regulation) and were an important part of the overall culture of crisis response organizations. The DRO managers preferred these rituals to just planning because, "a plan goes on a shelf until something gets going. What it takes is exercises and remembering things from them, not pulling a plan off a shelf" (Des interview, Feb. 2011). The DRO felt these training activities and exercises create a shared understanding of what each organizations role is in a local response and reinforced the idea that working together to prepare for disasters lead to better overall crisis response effort.

I can't promote exercises enough. That's/if we're going to one exercise a week, that's great 'cause we're learning about each other. And we have good relationships/there's not a whole lotta organizations that are responding to the big disasters…it's all about pre-disaster to working together….Just networking and knowing…the cell phone numbers and how to reach people at 2am. (Ken interview, Feb. 2011)

Again, this partnership with FEMA and emergency management agencies might at first seem more like crisis coordination than crisis collaboration. However, as described previously in this chapter, the DRO was willing to adopt the more paramilitaristic language and ICS training used by emergency management agencies, first responder organizations (e.g. fire, police, EMS), FEMA and DHS. The DRO leaders understood that by learning and using the emergency management vocabulary and crisis response structures, they could more easily understand other agencies and effectively communicate and share information with them during a crisis. The DRO was willing to change parts of its organizational culture in order to better serve their superordinate mission of providing relief to disaster victims. Therefore, this more closely aligns the DRO with viewing crisis response as collaboration rather than coordination.

The collaborative relationship between the DRO and these organizations can also be explained because the DRO had three boundary spanning concepts that facilitated this relationship (Batteau, Brandenburg, Seeger, and Eaton 2007). First, as discussed previously, the DRO had boundary permeability because it was fluid it its membership and relied mostly on volunteers. Second, it had institutional familiarity with these organizations because it regularly participated with them in daily emergency response or crisis planning or exercises. Third, the DRO had cultural similarity with VOAD and other non-profit organizations because of their similar cultural values and structures. These boundary spanning concepts along with the lack of barriers to crisis collaboration, assisted the DRO in having a culture of crisis collaboration. Next, the DROs lack of barriers to crisis collaboration will be discussed.

Lack of Crisis Collaboration Barriers

Chapter one described how members from different organizations must overcome three cultural barriers to enhance interorganizational collaboration in disaster response. The first barrier, organizational expertise, is the "belief that only the membership possesses the proper knowledge, skills, and orientations necessary to make decisions as to how the work is to be performed and evaluated" (Van Maanen & Bradley, 1984). The DRO does claim expertise in disaster relief; as Des stated, they are known as the "shelter people" (Des interview, Dec. 2010). However, as stated previously, it readily accepted others' assistance in the role of sheltering people, particularly since they, the DRO, didn't have the resources to do so. Salvation Army and religious organizations provided food. City emergency management agencies and city officials provided schools and recreation centers as the physical location for shelters. Social service agencies sometimes located personnel at shelters to provide mental health, counseling, and other social services. Police departments added shelters to their patrol unit routes to give people and

workers a sense of safety and security. SART may work with the DRO to help owners co-shelter their pets. Finally, the DRO developed a process for managing spontaneous volunteers from the community who wanted to help disaster victims at shelters. The DRO took leadership and primary management responsibility of running the shelters, but did not assume they needed to be the sole provider of all services in the shelter

The DRO also was willing to participate in any local crisis planning and response exercises, even if it was just providing volunteers to be victims in an active shooter exercise, because, "It is sometimes good to see things from the other side" (Jim, quarterly volunteer mtg., Feb. 2011). This helped DRO members better understand what victims experienced while also helping those organizations more effectively practice their crisis response plans.

A second barrier to crisis collaboration, competition between organizations, results when organizations having to vie against each other for public attention in order to secure the same pool of limited resources or funding available (Isbell & Goldstein, 2006; Granot, 1997). The members of the DRO did feel competition, most regularly with the Salvation Army, because they had similar missions of providing disaster relief to victims. This tension got amplified as a result of two circumstances. First, the DRO's national headquarters changed its policy to funnel local funds raised during a national disaster to the national headquarters. Then, the current economic recession resulted in fewer donations by the community to local non-profit organizations. Combined, the local DRO acutely felt pressure to get more recognition from local media and the community for its disaster relief operations so it could raise the funds necessary to complete its mission. Therefore, when the Salvation Army and the DRO responded to the same apartment fire and only the Salvation Army was initially mentioned by media covering the event, DRO members were upset (volunteer quarterly mtg., Feb. 2011). Members also spoke to the researcher

at times about how the Salvation Army didn't have as much bureaucracy as did the DRO. They felt this made it easier for that organization to respond quickly to fires and disasters. "The Salvation Army just responds and the [DRO] is all about paperwork. Even today the [DRO] is so into documentation, the numbers and mechanics of it" (Des interview, Feb. 2011).

This scarcity of resources could have resulted in a sense of competition and mistrust between the organizations. However, the DRO and Salvation Army leadership observed how in 1997 after a terrible tornado outbreak in the region, competition between the two organizations resulted in a "horrible response" where the organizations were "fighting over victims" (Des informal interview, Feb. 2011). The organizations' leadership then decided to form a local VOAD group and have a more collaborative relationship. Therefore, when tensions arose between the two groups, they met to "work it out" (Ken interview, Feb. 2011). In the quarterly volunteer meeting, when members were upset at the Salvation Army getting recognition and not the DRO, leadership focused on how the organization could better market itself to the community. It also reinforced the collaborative relationship during that meeting by asking for DRO volunteers to work a joint service center run by the two organizations out of a Salvation Army office the following day. DRO maintained a crisis collaboration view of crisis response by focusing on the superordinate goal of helping disaster victims rather than competing for individual resources.

A third barrier to crisis collaboration is the unit diversity of organizations involved in crisis response. Granot (1997) described this as the following.

> Some organizations are highly disciplined, others disorderly; some with sharp hierarchical structure, others informal and egalitarian; in some authoritarian decision-making prevails, while others tend towards democratic sharing…Organizations may range from frank openness about their activities to-closed-mouth secrecy. (p. 306)

In other words, DRO's more open, volunteer based, and service-oriented culture may have conflicted with a more authoritative, hierarchical, and closed organizational culture (such as the MPD described in chapter four). What determines though whether the DRO was more collaborative was how it dealt with these culture clashes. Again, the DRO chose to have more of a crisis collaboration worldview of crisis response. It understood its interdependence with others' for successful crisis response and therefore saw them as partners in the superordinate goal of providing disaster relief to victims. It was willing to adopt some of the language, training, and ICS command and control structure in order to be able to participate in larger crisis response efforts. DRO volunteers also came from a wide variety of other crisis response organizations, either as current employees or recently retired. DRO members were emergency managers, school principals, nurses, fire fighters, business leaders, and social workers. This allowed members to act as boundary spanners with other organizations as they had previous trusted relationships with members and understood their unique organizational culture. This also facilitated boundary permeability of the organization. This distinction will be discussed further in chapter five as it is compared to the EMU MPD's culture.

<p style="text-align:center">Summary</p>

The local chapter of the Disaster Relief Organization (DRO) had an organizational culture that was open and service-oriented, viewed volunteers as committed and valued members of the organization, and recognized themselves and other crisis response organizations as collaborative partners in providing successful crisis response to their local community. But over the past ten years, historical, political, and economic factors at the national level of the DRO have resulted in the implementation by National DRO of more structures, policies, and processes

on local DRO chapters. These have been conflicting with the local DRO's organizational culture and resulted in frustration by organizational members towards the national level organization.

Organizational members believed in and were committed the service mission and values of the DRO and this was reflected in their language, rites and rituals, stories, and symbols. The humanitarian focus of the organization was reflected in its use of service language. Volunteers were recognized for serving the DRO and the community publicly through their website and social media and through rites of integration such as the annual Christmas party and Volunteer Recognition dinner. Volunteer training rituals included an online orientation class that describes the organization's history of disaster relief services and organizational principles of humanity, neutrality, and impartiality. Stories shared by organizational members reflected their compassion and willingness to serve the community in their time of need, including vulnerable populations of such as the homeless, children, elderly, and those of low socio-economic status. Artifacts such as the DRO logo, member dress, and the DRO bulletin boards reinforced this service culture recognized by both members and those outside of the organization.

The DRO's organizational culture was more open than closed because they recognized other crisis response organizations and persons as necessary collaborators to provide successful disaster response services to their community. DRO members and volunteers often referred to other organizations they worked with as partners. This relationship was reinforced when communicated in meetings to volunteer members, on their website and social media, and in regular meetings with those organizations. Disaster trainings and exercises were rituals that created institutional familiarity and reinforced the idea that working together to prepare for disasters lead to better overall crisis response effort.

Over the past ten years, historical, political, and economic factors at the national level of the DRO have tarnished its public image as a humanitarian disaster relief organization. These factors have naturally resulted in the implementation of more structures, policies, and processes on local DRO chapters justified under the motto "We are all one [DRO]". The ritual of fundraising and communicating need to the public after major disasters was now outlined by the Disaster Fundraising Action Plan and telethon money was funneled to the national DRO. Client casework detailing services provided after fires was entered into the national DRO's "Client Assistance System" database by regional DRO caseworkers. Volunteers were trained either through the national DRO website or through curriculum provided by them to ensure that they are learning and committing to the rules and values communicated by the national DRO.

The standardization and centralization of decision-making put in place by National DRO have been conflicting with the regional DRO's organizational service and local community focused culture and resulted in frustration by organizational members towards the national organization. Members had taken to calling national headquarters "National". This term was often said in a tone that conveyed frustration and a "Big Brother" feeling the headquarters' bureaucratic policies and processes embodied. Some members also felt that these processes prevent them from responding quickly to meet the needs of clients. These policies and constant concerns for fundraising made it more difficult for the regional DRO to create long-term fundraising relationships with the local community and made members more suspicious of clients who might "take advantage of the system" to get money or services.

This was also a local versus national tension in terms of who has the right to make decisions at the community level. There is a tension with the DRO because they felt National was taking that control away. The regional DRO doesn't have a choice but to accept the

additional restrictions and bureaucratic processes of the national organization, especially since most of the funding stream now trickles from national to regional/local chapters. This tension mainly exists because it was now an organizational culture clash between the National and regional DRO organization and a feeling that the regional DRO is losing its identity and place in the local community.

To deal with this tension between the national DRO and the regional DRO chapter, leaders tried to come up with creative community-based fundraising ideas and encouraged members to always err on the side of serving the clients. This helped the regional DRO feel like they were preserving their organizational culture of service and openness.

Finally, the DRO viewed crisis response as crisis collaboration because of its lack of resources, willingness to partner with other organizations, and lack of organization culture barriers to collaboration. It was true that some aspects of DROs crisis response were crisis coordination activities (e.g. MOUs, "gentlemen's agreement", delegating of tasks, etc.). However their open and service oriented organizational culture elevated its worldview to crisis collaboration. DRO members viewed their ultimate goal as helping the victims of crisis, not to gain credit as sole responders. Their organizational culture also valued interorganizational interdependence, equal participation, and shared decision-making. Although there was some tension felt by DRO members when resources were tighter (e.g. restrictions from National DRO, lack of funding, or lack of identity in the local community), DRO leadership worked hard to maintain good relationships with organizations and diffuse any "us versus them" feeling by DRO members. However, lack of full-time staffing combined with this crisis collaboration worldview may prevent the DRO from reaping the benefits of equal participation and shared decision-

making, especially when other organizations do not share the same worldview or organizational culture.

The next chapter describes the crisis related organizational cultural features of the metropolitan police department (MPD) and its view of crisis response. The MPD is a different kind of organization with a unique structure, culture, and view of interorganizational crisis response.

CHAPTER 4

RESULTS: METROPOLITAN POLICE DEPARTMENT

Different crisis response organizations have distinct organizational cultures and communication practices. Moreover, these differences may affect coordination or collaboration when organizations are working together during a crisis response. The previous chapter described the organizational culture and communication practices of a regional chapter of a disaster relief organization (DRO). This chapter describes the crisis related organizational cultural features of the Emergency Management Unit of the Metropolitan Police Department (EMU MPD). It also examines how the organizational culture is enacted through communication practices between members. The EMU MPD is a different kind of organization with a unique culture, vocabulary and structure. Therefore, this chapter initially describes the EMU MPD's cultural constructs of vocabulary, rites and rituals, stories, and symbols and how together they are communicated through members, documents, and policies. These combined to create an organizational culture that was generally authoritarian, bureaucratic and closed to out-group members or organizations. The chapter then explores how EMU MPD's organizational communication culture influenced its view of interorganizational crisis response with other organizations. Finally, this chapter will demonstrate how the EMU MPD was collaborative with a larger macroculture of law enforcement and first responder organizations with similar crisis response cultures, but bureaucratic in coordination with organizations with dissimilar crisis response cultures that were not part of the macroculture.

Metropolitan Police Department (MPD)

As described in chapter two, The Metropolitan Police Department (MPD) not only handled emergencies on a daily basis, but was often the "first line of response for public safety

and security" during a crisis, including "preserving life and protecting property" (FEMA, 2013).
The emergency management unit (EMU) of the MPD specifically handled crisis and emergency
response including bomb threats, hostage situations, and terrorist threats, among others.
Therefore, this unit of the MPD was the primary focus of this study.

The EMU MPD is part of a larger city government structure (see Figure 4). Along with
the MPD are other first responder units such as the fire department and EMS, city services such
as department of transportation (DOT) and public works (water, sewage), and Homeland
Security and Emergency Management (HSEM) (City government website, 2012). HSEM
oversees the larger crisis response collaborating group, the Metropolitan Emergency Operations
Center (MEOC).

Figure 4: **EMU MPD's organizational structure within the larger city government structure.**

The emergency management unit of the MPD was created in 2002, after the events of 9/11 and because the city was situated along an active international border (Michael interview, March 2011). Its mission was primarily "to protect the citizens of the city from acts of terrorism or criminal activity" (Michael interview, March 2011). Officially, there are five people in the unit, but they oversee other "special skills" response units, such as the bomb squad, special response team (SRT aka SWAT), harbor patrol/dive team, Metropolitan Intelligence Operations Center (MIOC), and K-9 (Sam interview, Nov. 2010). Unlike other MPD units, they are "on call" 24 hours a day (5 days on, 2 days off) unless on vacation. Frequency of calls varies by unit and time of year, however holidays are typically higher demand times for SRT and dive teams. The bomb squad unit "gets the most calls"; approximately "1-4 times per week" (Sam interview, Nov. 2010). The bomb squad and dive teams are regional teams as well that can respond if requested by neighboring jurisdictions (Sam interview, Dec. 2010). The unit also provides crisis security planning and specialized response support for major events in the city such as large trade shows, protests/parades/holiday celebrations, and major professional events such as the NFL Super Bowl and the MLB All-Star Game. During the time of the study, the EMU MPD was involved in security planning for the annual Auto Show, which draws some 750,000 people to a downtown convention center.

Organizational Culture

As described in chapter one, organizational culture frames how organizational members subjectively create shared patterns of symbols and meanings through communication that defines, guides, and sometimes constrains their everyday thoughts and behaviors in organizational life. This is a continuous and dynamic process that centrally locates communication as the process that helps organizational members create and maintain

organizational culture and boundaries. To better understand the organizational culture of the MPD, the four cultural constructs of vocabulary, rites and rituals, stories, and symbols are described to create a "thick" description of how the organization views crisis response and its role in it.

Vocabulary

Words are the essential way in which we communicate and, in the case of organizational culture, are an important way members distinguish their organization from other organizations. Words and word choice in essence signal membership. Words and language also encode culture and through their use enact that culture. In this case, the vocabulary of the MPD is a product of its paramilitaristic background and security-focused mission. This reinforced the authoritative and bureaucratic structure of the organization to members and those outside the organization. In addition, since this vocabulary was also shared by a larger macroculture that included other law enforcement, and emergency management agencies, it allowed the MPD to more easily communicate and coordinate with those related groups. Finally, this shared vocabulary allowed the MPD to assert its authority and demonstrate expertise. This specialized vocabulary excluded outsiders or forced out-group organizations to adapt to their vocabulary in order to participate in crisis response efforts.

Paramilitaristic and hierarchical language. The MPD as a law-enforcement organization can be considered a paramilitary organization. Although it is not a military arm of the government, it is considered a paramilitary organization as it "resembles them [military] in organization, equipment, training or mission" ("Military Terms", 2011). Therefore, the MPD often used a vocabulary that paralleled military organizations.

The first set of terms defined the hierarchical levels of people in the MPD and other law enforcement agencies. This was similar to the ranks or levels found in the military. The lowest ranks of police officers were called "Uniforms" or "Patrol". Specialized units that operated during large events were often referred to as "plainclothes" or "P.I. Teams". These units were made up of local and state police detectives, members of EMU MPD, or officers from federal agencies. Patrol or Uniforms were given more menial roles such as traffic control or general perimeter security while "plainclothes" were given more decision-making authority or the responsibility of spotting potential threats. This group was especially employed when they wanted to maintain security at large events that they thought could be terrorist targets but not make the public uncomfortable. "Don't want them to think it is a police state…Okay for uniforms to patrol corridors, but only plainclothes inside" (Bruce, MPD, Auto Show mtg., Nov. 2010).

Members of the MPD were also separated into "units" or "commands" with "commanding officers", "supervisors", or the OIC (Officer in charge) giving orders "on scene" of an emergency response. "I have a meeting with all commanding officers and they communicate to their troops. I don't micromanage - I give direction and they carry out the mission to the troops. I identify weaknesses and gaps and provide strategy to overcome shortcomings" (Michael interview, March 2011). This gave the MPD a clear hierarchy or "chain of command" during daily operations so they could better control the operations of any emergency or crisis situation. This is similar to the military structure when engaging in operations.

Besides word and language, command, unit, and troops, other military terms were used regularly in the MPD. Sam, an EMU member of the MPD called their office, "base" (personal

communication, Jan. 2011). An explosion that caused injuries was described as using "military level munitions" and a person got "shrapnel wounds" (Sam interview, Dec. 2010). And Michael said as the EMU supervisor, he had access to information that was "classified", "unclassified", and "top secret" (March 2011).

In another example, Sam, outlined the following procedures for how they respond to a bomb threat.

> Patrols respond first and then activate Bomb Squad. Supervisors [Bomb Squad supervisors and Sam] go on scene. Patrol does perimeter security. We handle the device if found. Evacuation is handled by Patrol. Me or whoever is on scene will relay the decision and steps to Patrol or Chief. If there is a device, once we take possession we then take to a location to be detonated…Patrol is then relieved from scene. (Sam interview, Dec. 2010)

This example also highlights the "protocols" or "procedures" that the MPD used in responding to a bomb threat or any other emergency "incident". These were very well defined plans that clearly defined the roles of MPD members and the actions they should take in during an incident or emergency response. The terms protocols and procedures also references military structure and culture. When asked how decisions are made and communicated by MPD during a crisis response, Michael did not hesitate in listing the proper protocol.

> Usually a patrol officer responds. First, the dispatcher from 9-1-1 call center gets communication and then communicates to an [MPD] officer depending on situation. Officer will notify the supervisor. Supervisor will assess - they'll call resources they need - SRT, K-9, bomb squad, etc. then I'll get a call from the supervisor. I'll start putting an overall assessment together on what is needed, what is not needed in terms of resources, blockade. I'll ask the supervisor questions on what has transpired so far. I will then come over the radio telling them I've taken over as incident commander and call for resources - fire, EMS, public works, [gas company] for gas. I'll call resources or person with me will call. I always have a person with me because I'm busy managing the scene. They do a chronological log to make sure resources are met and do phone calls through communication over radio to communicate to 911 dispatch and they will make calls. (Michael interview, March 2011)

This vocabulary and pattern of language use gave the members of the EMU and larger MPD a clear sense of duties and responsibilities as it reflected the hierarchical structure of the organization. It also signaled common membership and referenced a standard repertoire of operation.

Threats, danger, and maintaining security. This clarity was also reflected in the EMU MPD's security-focused mission, "to protect the citizens of the city of [city name] from acts of terrorism and criminal activity" (Michael interview, March 2011). When Sam was also asked the mission of the unit, the answer was, "To provide further protection of the city of [city name] against acts of terrorism, prepare and plan for national disasters, and mitigate vulnerabilities" (March 2011). In both of these descriptions, protection against terrorism was at the forefront of priorities. This assumed that terrorism was a very real and regular threat, the world was a dangerous place, and the EMU MPD's job was to protect the city's citizens from this danger. This worldview got reinforced through vocabulary communicated by members of the MPD.

First, all potential dangers were labeled "threats" that could lead to larger "incidents" if not identified through "intelligence" and member vigilance to look for "suspicious activity". The best example of this was seen in the preparations for the Auto Show. The Auto Show is an annual event that brought major car companies from around the world as well as 750,000 visitors to the downtown convention center over a 10-day period (Auto Show mtg., Oct. 2010). In addition to the general public, attendees included media, car company executives, celebrities, government officials, and protestors from around the world. This event was seen as very high profile, therefore, the Auto Show Limited Liability Corporation (LLC) that managed the show hired a security team to coordinate security for the event. These Auto Show security meetings included local, state, and federal law enforcement, as well first responders and private security.

At these security meetings, participants often included talk about "intelligence/ongoing threats and trends" (Auto Show mtg. agenda, Nov. 2010). Michael, the supervisor of the EMU of MPD noted that his unit was considered lead for the event and led the following threat discussion at one meeting.

> Michael asks state police to give intelligence update. State police say that nothing is on the radar right now in terms of threats, "but we're monitoring for credible threats". State police person then asks other agencies, "please tell us information so we can look into it. Any little thing could turn out to be very big." Michael then explains big days are both Saturdays, 15th, 17th, and 22nd so they "need lots of manpower" on those days. He says there will also be listserv that will blast out messages. "You will be notified if you are on the list. This is a good situational awareness management tool." (Auto Show mtg., Nov. 2010)

The following month, a "threat assessment" document for the Auto Show was emailed to all those who attended the planning meetings. "This assessment has been prepared to assist security planners and law enforcement personnel in monitoring threat information and maintaining a safe and secure event environment" (Auto Show threat assessment, Dec. 2010). This information was shared with MPD members so they could maintain "situational awareness" and look out for these threats as they worked the Auto Show. For example, the researcher walked around the Auto Show one day with Sam and asked for the purpose of walking around the main floor.

> I walk around looking for suspicious behavior or activity. I ask him what he considers suspicious activity. He says that they just know it when they see it…He then said that if they have a specific person that may be a threat then they do keep an eye out for them. For example, [a car company] said they had a disgruntled employee that they recently fired and they were worried that the guy might try to do something at the Auto Show. So his picture has been circulated and they are keeping an eye out for the guy. (Sam, Auto Show walk through, Jan. 2011)

People who were the source of these threats were also labeled by law enforcement members using dangerous sounding terms. During the study, the researcher heard these people called,

"barricaded gunman", "environmental extremist", "lone offender", "Rambo", "self-radicalized individuals", "active shooter", "bomber", and most commonly "terrorist".

This language of threats and dangerous people used by members then reinforced the clarity of the unit's mission. The EMU MPD needed to control those threats to protect the citizens or restore control if an incident should occur. For example, the Auto Show head of security stated that "if anything happens, we will manage the chaos" (Harry, Auto Show mtg., Dec. 2010). When asked how it was determined that a crisis is over, Sam responded, "This is when all damages and hazards have been removed - into recovery and restoring order, for example letting people back in building… Advise the principle [supervisor] that we're all set and cleared the scene and we're turning it over to you" (Sam interview, Dec. 2010). Note the phrases, "hazards have been removed", "restoring order", and "cleared the scene" all evoke the sense that the EMU MPD's role was to take control and restore order. This was also reinforced when supervisor Michael described his role in responding to an incident. "I will then come over the radio telling them I've taken over as incident commander and call for resources…I'm busy managing the scene…When we have fully mitigated the situation. I get over the air and let them know that the situation is over" (Michael interview, March 2011).

But it was not just operational control of an incident that fell under the responsibility of the EMU MPD. It and other law enforcement agencies also felt that control of information was critical to managing threats. Documents when shared were labeled by a combination of four terms: classified, unclassified, official use, and unofficial use. Access to information clearly followed membership patters. Only "members" could access certain information.

For example, since the researcher was not a first responder or a member of law enforcement, part of that larger macroculture, she only received access to "unclassified"

information but with the caveat "for official use only". This was further clarified at the top of the

first page of the Auto Show threat assessment document.

> This document is the property of the [state] Intelligence Operations Center for Homeland Security and is prepared for the limited purpose of information sharing. This information is designated UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (U//FOUO) and is shared in confidence. Release to the media of any information in this document is prohibited. (Auto Show threat assessment, Dec. 2010)

The top of each page was labeled "UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY" as well as

each paragraph of information had either a (U), or (U//FOUO) listed at the beginning so people

who received it were clear at what level the information was cleared or could be shared.

However, deciding to deny access of information to members of some crisis response

organizations, led to frustrations by those organizations who wanted more of a collaborative

information sharing environment. "Information sharing doesn't happen. Law enforcement failed

to reach out to private sector. They reach out to [auto companies] but ignore hospitals and never

get info from them…Information sharing doesn't happen on any level with hospital and law

enforcement" (John, Hospital A Security Chief, FLO training, Dec. 2010). This labeling of

information created closed membership boundaries that could result in lack of certain

information sharing between organizations. This may also result in the unintentional filtering of

information that is integral to the overall crisis response effort. Lack of access to locations

(credentialing) and information and its potential consequences are discussed in later sections in

this chapter and in chapter five.

In another example, emails which came from the state intelligence operations center

(IOC) were labeled with these terms as well as used the terms "sensitive" and "privileged" when

describing how the information in the email and subsequent attachment could and could not be

used.

> This e-mail transmission and any attachments may contain [state IOC] privileged and sensitive information intended only for the use of the addressee. It contains information that may be exempt from public release under the Freedom of Information Act (5 U.S.C. 552). Any dissemination, distribution, copying or action taken in reliance on the contents of this e-mail by anyone other than the intended recipient is strictly prohibited. No portion of this transmission should be furnished to the public or the media, either in written or verbal form. ([state] IOC, personal communication, Jan. 3, 2011)

While the researcher was still confused to what exactly these terms meant (and didn't ask for fear of losing access to that information), the more general meaning was clear. The information was intended for the larger macroculture of law enforcement and first responders, and authorized non-first responders who had taken a course from the state IOC to identify and manage threats and protect the public. However information was not to be shared with the public or the media because it was considered, at minimum, sensitive information. Military tems.net defines "sensitive" as "Requiring special protection from disclosure that could cause embarrassment, compromise, or threat to the security of the sponsoring power. May be applied to an agency, installation, person, position, document, material, or activity" (2011). However by labeling information by these terms, MPD and the larger macroculture were reinforcing the "panic myth" (Tierney, 2003); that knowing this information would cause fear among the public. In addition, these groups were afraid that if the information was released publicly, then they could not control the situation because the dangerous people would know their security procedures and circumvent them. Therefore, the informational boundaries were rigorously maintained and defended by the EMU MPD and the larger macroculture.

However, some in law enforcement did see the need to loosen information sharing restrictions and declassify or deprivilege information, at least to private companies and institutions that they felt needed the information to provide security to their people and property. At the non-first responder fusion liaison officer (FLO) training session, state police officer Dan

stated, "The [law enforcement] discipline needs to get off its high horse on sharing information. We need to get away from 'need to know' to 'duty to share'. "If we need to scrub something down then need to do it and get info out to private sector" (FLO training, Dec. 2010). Later when the director of the city's Homeland Security and Emergency Management department was introduced, he echoed Dan's sentiments. "Ross [HSEM director] introduces himself to group and says that things are still screwed up - not sharing information, still "stovepipe information" and stamp things "law enforcement sensitive". He says "there are big cultural changes that have to take place" (FLO training, Dec. 2010). While this barrier to information sharing was acknowledged by both Dan and Ross, their organizations still followed the proper protocol for labeling information classified, unclassified, for official use, and sensitive in emails and other information documents (Auto Show threat assessment, Dec. 2010; personal communication, Jan. 3, 2011). This reinforces how strong the law enforcement and paramilitary organizational macroculture of maintaining security and following proper protocol and information control was enacted. This enactment was the manifestation of a larger set of good intentions of maintaining secrecy in order to protect the public, but resulted in unintentional effects of not sharing potentially valuable information among crisis response organizations.

Shared emergency management and response language. Finally, the MPD vocabulary shared many of the same terms and meanings of emergency management and response systems. One reason was because, as stated by the ARC in chapter three, this language also used many militaristic and paramilitaristic terms and is part of this larger macroculture. Members of the MPD regularly used terms such as "events" (non-crises but have the potential to turn into "incidents"), "incidents" (a critical situation that they had to respond to immediately), the need to "mitigate" situations, and having "staging areas" to put resources when responding to a crisis.

They also regularly referred to federal emergency management response systems, such as Incident Command System (ICS) and National Incident Management System (NIMS) for both crisis response and day to day emergency response.

> We [EMU MPD] collect information on terrorist threats, do security surveys, barricaded gunman, bomb squad, hazmat, basically any critical incident in the city. My office is responsible for running Incident Command, establish a list of what has taken place, run Incident Command System. The concept is to run smoother and faster. Know what we don't have is important and to get those resources. We set up a command post on scene and staging area so personnel know where to come and role and responsibilities. (Who responds?) Police, fire, EMS personnel depending on situation. Role of incident commander could change. If fire, then police goes from primary to secondary command and we are there in support for the other. (How similar or different to day to day?) Same for day to day. It is designed to deal with any critical incident. We all use the ICS system. Everyone is trained with ICS for unit. ICS is mandated by federal government for all first responders. Fire, police, EMS all know ICS. (Michael interview, March 2011)

Using the same ICS system that the HSEM MEOC used for larger crisis and disaster response gave EMU MPD members a level of comfort with the vocabulary used that other organizations may not have.

The paramilitaristic vocabulary used and labeling of people and situations as "threats" and "dangerous" gave the members of the MPD and other law enforcement agencies a sense of clear mission, hierarchy and procedures. The EMU MPD saw their role as "To provide further protection for the city of [city name] against acts of terrorism, prepare and plan for national disasters and mitigate vulnerabilities" (Sam interview, March 2011). This translated into an organizational culture that felt the need to protect others and control these potentially dangerous people and situations that shouldn't be questioned by others. However, this vocabulary also served to separate the macroculture of law enforcement, first responders, and emergency management members who use similar military and paramilitary language and structures from private businesses, NGOs and the public who were not familiar with this language but that still played a role in crisis response. This assigned people and organizations insider and outsider

status. Outsiders could gain access to information, but only if they were given permission by the insiders and took the initiative to learn and adapt their own language to using this vocabulary. This separation and distinction will be discussed later under the crisis collaboration and coordination section in this chapter and in chapter five.

The next section of this chapter describes how the second organization culture construct, rites and rituals, in the MPD helped reinforce the bureaucratic and authoritative values and norms of the organization. Rites and rituals were central to the construction of member identity and in determining who was a member of the culture.

Rites and Rituals

As described in chapter one, rites and rituals are "collective activities that are technically unnecessary to the achievement of desired ends, but that within a culture are considered socially essential, keeping the individual bound within the norms of the collectivity" (Hofstede, 2001, p. 10). Rites and rituals can either be formal or informal, performed regularly or occasionally, but are enacted collectively to provide the rules, norms, and values of organizational life for members (Hofstede, 2001; Pacanowsky & O'Donnell-Trujillo, 1982). For crisis response organizations like the Emergency Management Unit of the Metropolitan Police Department (EMU MPD), some rites and rituals are common throughout the crisis cycle. The EMU MPD has regular crisis trainings, drills, and exercises to prepare for crisis. These rites and rituals helped define and reify how members framed crisis and crisis response.

The researcher observed the rites and rituals of the security planning meetings (aka crisis planning meetings) for a large annual Auto Show. Through interviews with members and examining artifacts, the researcher determined rites and rituals of other crisis training, exercises, and responses. This also included how the ritual of following protocols reinforced the values and

rules of the organization. These rites and rituals reinforced the MPD's authoritative and bureaucratic culture by showing need to protect others from dangerous people and situations, showcase their expertise in this area, and control who has access to specific EMU MPD rites and rituals.

Crisis Planning. As described earlier, the annual Auto Show is a large international event and has been staged in this city for decades. As noted, the event creates significant risks by drawing large numbers of domestic and international visitors, dignitaries, and media to the city. (Auto Show threat assessment, Dec. 2010). Because of this, planners considered this a high profile event needing ongoing security to protect people and property. Therefore, private security (Auto Show LLC security, event site security, and auto companies security), law enforcement (federal, state, and local), and other first responder organizations (fire departments, EMS) met for several months prior to the show. Although the event planners were the Auto Show organization, the EMU MPD was considered the lead agency planning security for the Auto Show so the two often shared leading the meetings (Auto Show mtg., Oct. 2010). The three meetings attended by the researcher primarily discussed three topics, 1) protocol and procedures for dealing with emergencies or threats, both unintentional (fire or weather) and intentional (terrorism and protests), 2) sharing intelligence or threat information among organizations, and 3) event logistics and personnel support.

Harry, the Chief of Auto Show security through the LLC (and a former police officer) often discussed proper protocol and procedures for the event in case of an emergency, such as a fire or weather incident. He particularly emphasized at every meeting the new policy that everyone working security for the event had to be on the same radio system and frequencies. This is also known as interoperability of communication systems.

> Everyone will get a radio [from Auto Show security] because of the fire last year that occurred on the third level cat walk. It took 12 extinguishers to put out. Last year we couldn't communicate with security inside and it made it more difficult to evacuate the 20-28,000 people. But we did it in 10 minutes and also had the fire out, hall cleaned and people back in the show 4-5 hours after because of the cooperation of everyone in here. People will be on radios the first day of the show but they need to notify me and my team ahead of time how many they will need. (Harry, Auto Show mtg., Oct. 2010)

Other emergency procedures were discussed such as not parking in the fire lanes around the convention center, medical response, and evacuations.

> We're working on emergency evacuation plan for [convention center]. [Plaza] will be the initial evacuation place with buses waiting there. If there is a longer evacuation, such as a toxic chemical spill, then we will evacuate to [nearby sporting venues]. We will work with [city transportation department] to provide buses for evacuation. Last year we also had [nearby college] as an indoor evacuation facility. If anything happens, we will manage the chaos, but last year was a team effort. (Harry, Auto Show mtg., Dec. 2010)

In addition to unintentional emergencies, the security meetings discussed protocols and procedures to prevent an intentional terrorist attack and how to handle protestors who either wanted to disrupt the event or get media attention. Michael, the EMU MPD supervisor, said that many law enforcement intelligence centers would be monitoring for threats before and during the event (Auto Show mtg., Oct. 2010). Radiation detection teams from the Army, K-9 units, and PI [private investigation] teams made up of "state police, ATF, FBI and Air Marshalls for the [public transportation system]" (Auto Show mtg., Nov. 2010) would also be walking the floor (patrolling) of the Auto Show. In addition, the EMU MPD bomb squad unit trained the event private security on how to identify a bomb (Auto Show mtg., Dec. 2010).

Michael also stated the proper procedures in place in case a person or group decided to hold protests outside the event.

> For law enforcement - my thing is not trying to stop them. If they are minding the law then we are not going to do anything. For example, 800-900 people last year did a funeral march for the U.S. We worked with them instead of against them. It allowed us to keep our manpower where they needed to be. Not expecting that to happen this year. The tea party and environmentalists have calmed down. There may be some challenges

> to passing out literature. The rule is they [protestors] can stand by doors and 2 people can come inside. I tell you on our behalf we don't care - let them do it. Why create an issue when there's not an issue as long as they're not messing with folks? If it's a criminal nature then law enforcement will step in and handle accordingly. We are more concerned with a terrorist or active shooter than person passing out leaflets. Security can escort out if there is an issue unless it's a criminal matter. (Auto Show mtg., Nov. 2010)

These security protocols and procedures for emergencies, terrorist threats, and protests were first reinforced by the meeting handouts that contained information on evacuation routes, parking locations, and security rules and reminders. A crisis response plan, primarily written by the EMU MPD, was also distributed to the people who attended the security meetings.

> We call them procedures, not emergency response plans. We have procedures for specific scenarios that we use as guidelines. But these procedures are always up for debate and are reviewed every time after an event. After every situation we sit down and talk about what worked and what didn't. It is always in a round table. (Sam interview, Nov. 2010)

The second topic discussed at all security meetings consisted of a round table discussion where each organization at the meeting would share intelligence information on any security threats or other security concerns for the Auto Show. Federal agencies and state police would share intelligence on any potential terrorist threats or concerns, both international terrorists such as Al Qaeda, and domestic terrorist groups. Information sharing, as seen in these meetings, can be a critical component of interorganizational coordination. Several of the large auto companies also had intelligence centers and would pass along any information related to disgruntled employees (called "lone offenders"), union activists, or other groups who may want to disrupt the event through protests or attacks inside the event. Sam from EMU MPD reinforced the importance of this information sharing period of these security meetings. "We need help with intelligence operations communication. Being 'in' and knowing everyone so we know the issues or problems. For example, if I see a protest organization, I remember that I can get info that I

can use in the situation knowing little bits of info from private sector and law enforcement" (Sam

interview, Dec. 2010).

Although there were not any direct threats made about the Auto Show, Michael and other

law enforcement officials emphasized the importance of sharing intelligence information before

and during the event for situational awareness.

> Nothing on the radar right now in terms of threats - we're monitoring for credible threats. Other agencies, please tell us information so we can look into it. Any little thing could turn out to be very big. Intelligence piece will be in the [state] IOC. Any intelligence you have will be filtered through that center. Both Saturdays are critical because of [sporting events]…There will be a listserv that will blast out messages. You will be notified if you are on the list. This is a good situational awareness management tool….Each year gets better and better – just fine tuning. We're also reaching out to the [Auto Company's] global intelligence center so we are together and on the same page. (Dan, state IOC, Auto Show mtg., Nov. 2010)

Two weeks before the Auto Show, an official threat assessment document was sent to all

attendees of the security meetings. The document again stated that there were no credible threats,

but re-emphasized the importance of situational awareness and informing the intelligence center

of any suspicious activity during the event, such as "individuals or groups making threatening

statements or declarations" or "suspicious persons or vehicles attempting to enter or linger near

egress points, loading docks, restricted areas or sites" (Auto Show threat assessment, Dec. 2010).

A final security measure of credentialing was heavily reinforced at every security

meeting as a way to address security threats. While the public gained access to the exhibit hall

floor by buying a ticket, those people working the event (law enforcement, private security, auto

company exhibit employees, first responders, and building/exhibit maintenance), VIP guests

(government officials, company executives and special guests, celebrities), and the media needed

special Auto Show credentials to access certain areas or gain after-hours access. The

credentialing process consisted of the proper group hosting that person completing an application

with an accompanying picture ID. If the person provided all information required for that particular credential (media, VIP, Auto Show workers, etc.), the security office would clear them and proper credentials would be issued. At the October Auto Show meeting the following explanation was given about credentials.

> There will be a board posted at the security office of what credentials will be allowed in. The credentials that we have this year are being passed around so everyone can become familiar with them. If someone doesn't have one, then they don't gain access. Wristbands are required for workers and press individuals. This shows you have been identified at some time by your picture ID. Auto companies need to come to us directly to get wristbands and credentials. After show hours we have special VIP guests. There will be special passes for show floor but they still need to be cleared through the security office. (Harry, Auto Show mtg., Oct. 2010)

The importance of credentialing was also re-emphasized at the other meetings, in meeting handouts, and the crisis response plan or Auto Show procedures. Credentialing can be understood as both a ritual and as an overt way of signaling membership. Credentials signal membership and legitimacy by physically formalizing approval by the gatekeeping organization. Therefore, the process of being sponsored and reviewed for credentials can be understood as important ritual of membership in crisis planning and response. This is further discussed in the Symbols section of this chapter.

Finally, all security meetings for the Auto Show discussed event logistics and personnel support requirements. Information included dates and descriptions of special events (press days, charity preview, education day), traffic or parking issues due to concurrent sporting or music events in the area, floor plans and parking locations, and access and traffic flow to and from the loading dock area. At the November security meeting, manpower and commitments by area law enforcement agencies were discussed. Because of financial issues, the LLC had to reduce the number of Auto Show private security they could hire (Auto Show mtg., Nov. 2010). Therefore Michael from the MPD asked that surrounding local and state law enforcement agencies provide

more personnel and even reserve officers to cover the Auto Show, especially on the higher volume days such as special events and weekends (Auto Show mtg., Nov. 2010). Logistics and personnel were important topics because attendees at these meetings needed to know this information to do their job and provide the proper level of security deemed necessary for the Auto Show.

To summarize, three topics were discussed at Auto Show security meetings: protocol and procedures for emergencies or incidents, sharing intelligence about threats and credentialing to deter threats, and event and personnel logistics. This reinforced the beliefs of the larger macroculture that the EMU MPD and other security and law enforcement agencies needed to control people or situations so that either a terrorist incident didn't occur, or they could quickly mitigate an emergency if it did occur. This also reinforced the EMU MPD organization's cultural belief that people and dangerous situations could be controlled and they were the experts that were able control the information or situation.

EMU MPD crisis response training. Beyond the ritual of crisis planning, the ritual of crisis response training helped the EMU MPD demonstrate and maintain what they saw as their organizational expertise. There were two types of crisis response trainings that the EMU MPD engaged in, regular trainings to develop and enhance skills in specialized emergency response and joint interorganizational trainings with other crisis response organizations to respond to larger crises or disasters.

The EMU MPD is a specialized response unit within the MPD and houses teams such as bomb squad, special response team (SRT aka SWAT), harbor patrol/dive team, and K-9 (Sam interview, Nov. 2010).The EMU MPD placed value in being the experts within the MPD to deal with emergencies needing their unit to mitigate the emergency. Therefore, they engaged in

regular training to maintain and enhance their specialized skills and to maintain their reputation as experts in those areas. This included weekly training within each specialized team as well as cross-training between teams to develop new skills.

> I sit down weekly with staff from various commands and cross train. For example, I have 6 members on the bomb squad and a dive team. The dive team members are not experts with bombs so I took two members of the bomb squad and trained and put them on the dive team to deal with maritime operations that deal with water born IEDs…I identify weaknesses and gaps and provide strategy to overcome shortcomings. (Michael interview, March 2011)

The researcher also observed the bomb squad training in a fenced-in parking lot (Researcher observations, Dec. 2010) and training schedules posted in the main office for SRT and bomb squad teams (Researcher observations, Jan. 2011). In addition, EMU MPD members attended regular training on terrorism or related Homeland Security issues and threats since that was one of their critical functions. For example, the researcher was told by Sam that he attended two Department of Homeland Security training sessions, one in November and one in March. (The researcher was not told the subject of these sessions.) Sam also mentioned sending weekly reports to Michael about what training the teams did (Researcher observations, March 2011).

As evident in the quote from Michael above, the organizational value of the unit being well trained was set by the EMU MPD supervisor. "Training is paramount to me. I'm responsible to make sure people trained but I have to train to lead" (Michael interview, March 2011). Michael reinforced this value by the two pictures he had on his office door, which the researcher asked him about during an interview.

> The top picture is me putting the guys to work on training. Underneath picture is written "Poor performance promotes pain." They were not doing what promotes professionalism and being on point every time - no errors, no mistakes. I exercised their minds, getting their minds right. Guys comment on the intensity on my face [in the picture]. I don't play any games with SRT. The lower picture is from my commanding officer. I am demonstrating how to shoot one handed. I did that when I was really in shape [joking tone]. (Michael interview, March 2011)

The emphasis on regular training within the EMU MPD, reinforced by its supervisor, reflected an organizational culture that prided itself on its expertise in specialized emergency response and worked hard to maintain that standard of excellence.

In addition to specialized training, the EMU MPD attended interorganizational training on how to coordinate with other organizations in a larger crisis or disaster response. The first type of training they attended was Incident Command System (ICS) and National Incident Management System (NIMS) trainings. These were part of the National Response Framework (2013), which is the mandated federal operations response plan for coordinated response for large crises or disasters. "Everyone in MPD, all levels, are required to be trained in ICS and NIMS. We're not required to train in all levels. We all have to take 300 and 400 level, but not have to take 700 or 800. Executives [in MPD] and homeland security units including us are trained on all levels (Sam, March 2011)."

Another type of training members attended involved using interoperable communications equipment such as 800 MHz radios and ETEAM, which is a secured database system for information sharing and coordinated response. Sam noted that this city was the first city in the country to train personnel on 800 MHz radios (Sam interview, Dec. 2010). He also stated that their unit and all other agencies/departments got updates and refresher training on 800 MHz radios and ETEAM before any major events, such as the Auto Show (Sam interview, Dec. 2010).

The final type of interorganizational crisis response training the EMU MPD participated in were regular tabletop exercises (talking through scenarios) or full-scale exercises (simulated disaster event and response). Michael further describes the purpose and regularity of these types of exercises.

For tabletop exercises, various disciplines come that have a role and discuss what agencies will do and what resources are available….Those are consistently exercised 3-4 times a year. The city puts on tabletops. Federal counterparts also have various exercises. The county puts them on. We go and participate in them to know each other's capabilities and resources. We put on [full-scale] exercises if they are involving an active shooter, barricaded gunman, or maritime operations. (Michael interview, March 2011)

Michael saw value in these types of coordinated exercises because they got to know other organizations' capabilities and resources. However, he had less tolerance for people who didn't seem to know what they were doing during exercises or those exercises that were seen as wasting the EMU MPD's time because they weren't involved throughout the exercise.

[Most helpful in crisis training is] Knowing the people I deal with are fluent, skilled and experienced in their respective areas. Have folks that know what the hell they're doing. Don't give me someone who doesn't know what they're doing, who won't panic in crisis type situation…[Least helpful are] training scenarios that have no involvement or situation for first responders. That is asinine training. In a tabletop, you need to think outside the box but also need to make it realistic so that first responders will be able to be successful. Not a 10 minute exercise that uses up all resources and then call in the [National] Guard. This pisses off officers. You've used up resources in 5 minutes and there's nothing left to do for 6 hours. (Michael interview, March 2011)

Michael, it appears, felt that interorganizational crisis response training sessions were important only if they led to increasing his confidence in the expertise of other agencies role in crisis response or if the exercise specifically involved the demonstration or enhancement of EMU MPD's skills and expertise in crisis response. If these two elements were not present in the exercise, then he felt that interorganizational crisis response trainings were a waste of time. This view reinforces a more coordinated view of crisis response by the EMU MPD and is further explored in the collaboration versus coordination section later in this chapter.

Following protocols as an EMU MPD ritual. EMU MPD's involvement in the rituals of crisis planning meetings and training also played an important role in another ritual of crisis or emergency response, protocols. These protocols were essentially rules and procedures introduced in crisis response meetings and plans and reinforced through training. This resulted in a process

of deep enculturation for following rules and procedures in order to effectively control and mitigate a crisis or emergency. Protocols are part of the law enforcement culture, but protocols are also a part of the law enforcement and first responder macroculture, military culture, and the Incident Command System (ICS). Unlike processes and steps, protocols imply a strict adherence to the rules and procedures described and not general guidelines that leave room for discussion or exception.

When talking to Sam or Michael, the researcher often heard the protocols mentioned in meetings or saw in plans echoed back to her when they described crisis response situations. For example, Sam described how the EMU MPD recently handled a group of protesters at the Auto Show in January.

> He said that for Friday's protest at the Charity Preview, the uniforms outside radioed in that there were some people starting to congregate outside [convention center's] main entrance with signs…Sam says that whenever they get to a protest, they always ask who is in charge so they can go talk to that person…. He says that they first ask the person in charge if they have a permit to protest. About 80% of people say no and we don't ask them to leave but we now can tell them what to do. ..[At this protest] Michael then told them that they cannot protest right outside [convention center] because if there were a fire and they had to evacuate everyone, then they couldn't because the protest is blocking the main exit. Michael then asked them if they could move to the sidewalk in front of the hotel across the street and said they would still be very visible but not blocking the entrance or exits. They agreed because as Sam says, "They just want to be heard and get their point across to the media and we aren't preventing that." (Sam, Auto Show walk through, Jan. 2011)

This story of how the EMU MPD handled the protest situation echoed the procedures and reasoning behind them that Michael laid down at the November Auto Show security meeting.

> The 10th and 11th is when we are expecting protests because they want to see the press….Last year saw the UAW, tea party; lots of different protestors. We gave them a lot of ground and negotiated. For law enforcement - my thing is not trying to stop them. If they are minding the law then we are not going to do anything…We worked with them instead of against them. (Michael, Auto Show mtg., Nov. 2010)

In this example, the protocols served to identify the boundaries of what to do when the public minded the law versus needing to intervene to maintain control of a situation.

This communication and enculturation of protocols into the actions of EMU MPD members also reinforced the organizational values of being able to run smooth operations in order quickly control and mitigate potentially dangerous situations. Michael reinforced this value when he stated to the researcher the value of using the ICS system.

> My office is responsible for running Incident Command, establish a list of what has taken place, and run the Incident Command System. The concept is to run smoother and faster. [Figure out] what we don't have is important and get resources. Set up a command post on scene and staging area so personnel know where to come and their role and responsibilities. (Michael interview, March 2011)

This cultural value of using proper protocols and procedures is further reinforced through stories described next in this chapter.

Researcher's lack of access to daily EMU MPD rituals. Finally, the difficulty of gaining access to some rites and rituals and lack of access to other daily rites reflected the security and secrecy culture of the EMU MPD. Access also defined clear in-group and out-group boundaries of the organization. As described in chapter two, the during the initial meeting with Michael and Sam, they agreed to give the researcher initial access to "collect data using observations of [EMU MPD] organization and its members as it plans for emergencies and crisis, does crisis training, and responds to crises" (EMU MPD Research Information Sheet, Aug. 2010). The researcher was given access to Auto Show security planning meetings, but during the study she was denied opportunities to observe daily life at the EMU MPD location or daily crisis response activities. For example, on the day of the first Auto Show security meeting, there were threats of dangerous windstorms and thunderstorms in the area (Auto Show mtg., Oct. 2010). The researcher stayed after the meeting to ask Michael, the EMU MPD supervisor, if he would

call her so she could to observe what they did in their unit if they were asked to respond to this situation. Michael listened to the researcher's request but responded that I should get home to avoid the bad weather and avoided responding to the request. The researcher was frustrated but thought that the "no" could have been the result of lack of rapport with Michael since this was his first time interacting with her without Sam there.

Another example of denial of access was the following. At her first meeting with Sam, with whom the researcher had been primarily communicating, the researcher asked if it would be possible for her to observe the daily operations of the unit.

> I explained it would help me to better understand how their unit works. Sam replied that he would have to run that by Michael [EMU MPD supervisor] to see if it would be possible. He said that he wasn't sure because undercover people sometimes come into the office to discuss what they are doing and that is confidential. I said I understood and that if I was in the office at that time and an undercover person came in, I could easily leave the room if that was an issue. (Sam informal interview, Nov. 2010)

At the next Auto Show security meeting in November, Sam greeted the researcher and then pulled her to the side of the room away from the chairs and other people talking.

> He tells me that he talked to Michael and Michael determined that I cannot do any observations or job shadowing in their unit office because it is a security issue. He said that they have special agents that come in and out all the time to brief them and some of them are undercover. They [the special agents] know it is a secure environment and can talk freely. So Michael wouldn't feel comfortable sitting me in the office to observe. "I hope you're not bummed," Sam says to me. "But all Auto Show meetings will be open to you to observe." (Auto Show mtg., Nov. 2010)

As the quotes above explain, this lack of access to observe daily operations and potentially important rites and rituals of the organization was denied because of perceived security and confidentiality issues.

Throughout the study, the researcher had to continuously negotiate access with the EMU MPD to information or observations because she was an outsider to the EMU MPD and the larger trusted macroculture of the law enforcement and first responder community. Beyond

access to Auto Show security planning meetings, the researcher had to initiate requests to attend Fusion Liaison Officer (FLO) training, do an Auto Show walk through with Sam, see part of the intelligence center (IOC), and review the Auto Show crisis response plan and procedures. Even when access was negotiated and confidentiality of information was assured by the researcher, further permissions by gatekeepers needed to be obtained. First, to attend the FLO training, the researcher had to fill out paperwork and get her advisor to sign it, along with approval from the state police trainer. However, she only was approved to attend the training for "non- law enforcement and private sector counterparts" (personal communication, Dec. 1, 2010). She was not allowed to attend the first responder FLO training even though her purpose was to observe the same trainings that first responder organizations like the EMU MPD did.

The researcher also had to receive an Auto Show credential from Sam in order to gain access to the Auto Show security command center and to walk the floor of the Auto Show with him. However the researcher was denied access to the same security show command post later that weekend when an incident occurred because she wasn't wearing a uniform nor was she properly credentialed that signaled membership and access. This was in spite of the fact she had been in the command center on two previous occasions that week, had conversations with several members in the command center, and had been asked to help perform crowd control with other police officers at their request in response to the same incident (Auto Show visit 3, Jan. 2011). Finally, the researcher was only given access to review and take notes on the Auto Show crisis response plan and procedures for a specific amount of time and only when Sam was present in the room (Researcher observations, March 2011).

At each instance that access to crisis response rites and rituals was obstructed, it was explained to the researcher that it was for security reasons, thus positioning the researcher as an

outsider or out-group member. As described in chapters one and two, control of information is a primary process whereby membership is signaled and maintained. By denying the researcher access to some forms of information based on "security issues", it served as an important indicator of the EMU MPD's culture the outsiders could not be trusted in the same way as members. The researcher also wasn't part of the larger macroculture as she was not a member of a law enforcement agency or first responder nor did she have particular security clearances to be allowed access to certain information. This indicated to the researcher that EMU MPD's fear of sensitive or secure information potentially reaching dangerous people was so greatly ingrained in their culture that they found it easier to deny or restrict access to those who were not part of the larger macroculture. This closed membership phenomenon and its impact is explored further in the collaboration versus coordination section later in this chapter.

In summary, the EMU MPD had several rites and rituals that reinforced a closed membership culture that was very authoritative and bureaucratic. Members saw crisis planning meetings and crisis trainings as a way for other organizations to utilize their emergency management and crisis response experience. Protocols were also a ritual that was emphasized in planning and training and became infused into the organization as an orderly way to manage and mitigate dangerous people and situations. However, if one was not deemed a member of the organization, access was denied to daily rites and rituals of the organization for security reasons. Even when access was granted by the organizational gatekeeper, the non-member had to be escorted by a member and properly credentialed. Wider access was granted only if one was a member of the EMU MPD or had a similar culture to the organization. In the next section on organizational stories, this membership boundary drawn by EMU MPD members affected what stories were told and how the organization was presented.

Stories

Stories are an important way members share organizational experiences with other members and with those outside the organization and socialize newcomers to the culture of the organization (Trice & Beyer, 1984, p. 655). Stories were told by EMU MPD members during interviews and others in the larger macroculture during Auto Show security planning meetings. These stories reinforced an authoritative and bureaucratic organizational culture and elevated the belief that their expertise was needed to protect the public. Stories accomplished this by emphasizing how they dealt with dangerous people by controlling the situation and the importance of following protocol in both typical emergency response and in larger disaster response. In addition, they passed on cultural lessons, world views, and norms of operation.

Danger stories. Most stories offered by EMU MPD described dangerous people and situations that needed the expertise of the EMU MPD to handle the emergency.

> I came from SRT unit and I run all barricaded gunman situations. Multiple situations happened this weekend. We were already at one so decided to handle that one and continued with caution so we don't lose troops. So we tell other situation to stand by and hold because we had two barricaded gunman situations. Officers on [MPD] are trained to set up perimeter and hold position, not to run in. In a hostage situation, the officer on scene makes judgment call whether to go in. But we train them to hold position especially if shots fired because they're not trained and don't have equipment or knowledge….I've experienced so many [crises]-- Hazmat situation, air event situation, bomb squad situation, barricaded gunman. A hostage rescue occurred few years back. A guy was holding 3 people in a house. We had to go in and he released two shots as we were making entry. We came in on top and he was holding a hostage with a gun to their head. He shot himself in the head when we approached him. Good outcome for us 'cause none of hostages were hurt. (Michael interview, March 2011)

 Michael reinforced in the story that police officers who are not EMU members are not supposed to handle these situations because they do not have the expertise – training, equipment, knowledge—needed to deal with barricaded gunmen. He also emphasized his expertise as a

being a previous member of the SRT, so he knows how to lead the EMU in dealing with these dangerous people. This is a normative lesson conveyed through story telling.

Similarly, Sam reinforced the expertise of his unit when he described what he did when walking the floor of the Auto Show.

> He then said that if they have a specific person that may be a threat then they do keep an eye out for them. For example, [car company] said they had a disgruntled employee that they recently fired and they were worried that the guy might try to do something at the Auto Show. So his picture has been circulated and they are keeping an eye out for the guy. He adds that just because the guy shows up at the Auto Show and even at [car company's display] still doesn't mean that he is going to do something, so they will just watch him but not approach him or prevent him from going anywhere. I ask Sam what is considered suspicious behavior and he again says that it is just something they pick up on and it is hard to say specifically. But he then does give an example that if they see a person with a duffle bag walking around and then the person drops the duffle by a car and walks away, then that is suspicious activity. (Auto Show walk through, Jan. 2011)

This story illustrated that Sam and other members of this organization felt confident to handle this threat because they had "picked up" the expertise necessary to identify suspicious activity.

In another story, Michael conveyed how they always have to be on guard and look for threats of terrorism by relating it to the September 11, 2001 World Trade Center attacks. "Now right wing homegrown terrorists here in U.S. It keeps me up at night. Acts of terrorism in this country has ties to [state] militia. 9/11 attacks were tied to [this state] through providing safe houses or financial means; there was affiliation through the state." (Michael interview, March 2011). These two stories together conveyed a world view and operating norm of risk awareness for EMI MPD members because the world was a dangerous place and threats could manifest at any time.

In another example, the danger of "these people" was reinforced in the terms EMU MPD members used in stories. Members frequently used terms such as terrorist, suspicious person, and

gunman. In another example, when the researcher asked for a crisis response example, Sam

shared the following story of "a female version of Rambo."

> For example, I'm trying to think of one [Michael] won't mind me talking about. There
> was this female version of Rambo - what happened was not reflective of the damage. For
> example she says she bought fireworks but the reconstruction showed military level
> munitions. We called her Rambo because she got shrapnel wounds when she blew up her
> boyfriend's car in front of his girlfriend's house. Rambo went to CVS and steals
> bandages and medical supplies, sews herself up and was living in abandoned parks for a
> week. (Sam interview, Dec. 2010)

By using the name of a common pop culture security icon that used explosives to fight law

enforcement, EMU MPD members created a shortcut term that quickly labeled this woman as

dangerous to the community.

Even in a non-terrorism response or disaster response, EMU MPD this risk awareness

norm prevailed. For example, when the researcher asked him about his experience during the

2003 national power blackout that affected the city, Michael provided the following response.

> SRT was responsible for maintaining downtown area headquarters and to respond to any
> looting on the streets. We went to 13 hour shifts. There were no lines of communication
> so we were living at base. Had to be ready to respond. Fortunately nothing
> occurred….Gonna lose 37% [police] manpower 'cause they want to be with families.
> [Protecting the] city is no longer a primary concern for them. We had to learn to
> compensate…We have something here for families. They can come to base and are in a
> safe and clandestine place. We have food, water, radios, games. Not the most
> comfortable, but we have cots and running water. (Michael interview, March 2011)

Even though this event was not caused by terrorists or "dangerous people," the members of the

EMU MPD through this story are taught that dangerous things such as looting may take place

and the organization had a plan to protect their families from any danger that might happen

during a disaster. These stories of dangerous people and situations that needed the expertise of

the EMU MPD to resolve solidified for members their mission to "protect citizens of the

city…from acts of criminal activity and terrorism." These stories also caused members to be

hyper-aware of potential risks or threats around them and resulted in member defining clear boundaries of "us" and "them".

Proper protocol stories. The second type of story demonstrated the importance of using proper protocol in emergency response and the negative consequences for not following protocol. These critical incident stories encode beliefs, lessons, and values that "allow for meaning and lessons to be transposed to current circumstances" (Seeger, Sellnow, & Ulmer, 2003, p. 80) For example, fire response and evacuation procedures were heavily emphasized in all three Auto Show security planning meetings given there was a fire the previous year. During the Auto Show walk through with Sam, the researcher asked him if he worked the Auto Show during last year's fire, he said he did and told the following story.

> As soon as we knew it was a fire we knew what to do and didn't have to be told. We went to the back of the Auto Show floor and split it down the middle so we were directing half of the people to one hall exit and half of the people to the other hall exit. …Because the fire wasn't that big it was put out quickly and people were back in the show in about 4-5 hours." I ask where everyone was evacuated to and Sam said that since the fire wasn't big, they just were in the concourse. He also said there were two big rooms opened up in case some people wanted to go and sit down. He said that they had buses standing by so if it was bigger then they could evacuate to the local community college nearby. He said the secondary location was [sporting venue]. He said that he has a map of the evacuation route back at his office that he could show me as well. (Sam, Auto Show walk through, Jan. 2011)

The framing of the critical incident in this story mirrored the procedures explained in the security meetings. In knowing what to do in this situation, this story demonstrated the strict adherence of members to protocols learned earlier and how it resulted in quick action. Another critical incident story told by the security chief for the Auto Show reinforced humorously what happened when a police officer didn't follow proper protocol and wait for fire fighters to respond to the fire and tried to put it out himself.

> "Forgetting he's a policeman" the guy used the extinguishers but also got shocked quite badly because the catwalk was electrified because of the fire. [Everyone laughs good-

naturedly at the story.] It was a third tier fire - 400-500 square feet on the catwalk. The Auto Show was reopened in 4 hours after the fire. We need to just refine the system by improving communication and working better with the [MPD] and [MFD – Metropolitan Fire Department]. (Auto Show mtg., Oct. 2010)

Although told in a humorous way, it underscored valuable lesson learned that members of organizations needed to stay within their frame of expertise. In this case, if there was a fire this year it is only the fire department should attempt to extinguish the fire. If a person were to stray outside of their organizational expertise, negative consequences, such as getting a nasty shock will occur.

Therefore, these two stories illustrated the importance of following protocol then reflected a larger organizational culture of properly controlling dangerous people and situations. They also highlighted a culture of bureaucratic interorganizational coordination by showing that organizations best worked together in a crisis by staying within their area of expertise. This bureaucratic coordination view of crisis response is discussed later in this chapter.

Selective storytelling. A theme that emerged in storytelling is that EMU MPD members didn't readily share stories with the researcher, and, even then, relatively few stories were told. This seemed to counter previous research literature in which storytelling was an important communicative action that conveyed organizational culture and membership (Trujillo & Dionisopoulos, 1987; Van Maanen, 1973). Stories were also shared among members of the larger macroculture during Auto Show planning meetings. Therefore, the researcher often had to ask for specific examples of how their unit responded to emergencies or crises or about a specific disaster response, such as the 2003 blackout event. In another instance, Sam seemed to self-censor stories by telling the researcher, "I'm trying to think of one [Michael] won't mind me talking about…I'm trying to keep general so Michael doesn't get pissed" (Sam interview, Dec. 2010). This explanation by Sam suggested that he couldn't share too much or specific

information with the researcher or else his supervisor might react negatively. In another situation, both the chief of security for the Auto Show and Sam joked with other law enforcement people that the researcher "was trouble".

> Harry the Chief of Security then walks in and Sam and he greet each other. Harry asks me how things are going. I tell him well and thank him again for taking time to talk to me on Saturday. He then turns to Sam and jokes with him that he knows that I am nothing but trouble with my writing and publishing things. He jokes back that he knows… Sam then jokes to the MEOC people that I am trouble and that I am like a postal worker that could go off at any minute. (I laugh along with them, but part of me wonders if there is truth behind their joking in terms of how they see me and my study as a threat to them. I wasn't getting any sinister undertones necessarily, but I also feel like they were sharing a little bit of truth with each other behind their joking.) (Researcher observations, Auto Show walk through, Jan. 2011)

One explanation for why storytelling did not naturally occur between the researcher and members is because she wasn't identified as a member of the organization or larger macroculture law enforcement and first responders. As described earlier, the EMU MPD's organizational culture reinforced an "us" versus "them" or in-group versus out-group boundary of membership. This boundary defining then limited how much information about their organization and protocols they would share with non-members.

Therefore, some self-censorship may have occurred because telling too much information would have violated cultural norms that kept information from non-members to protect the security of the organization and operations. This is evidenced when Sam described the reason of using secure cell phones and radios. "We have 800 megahertz radios. Patrol radios are not secure because anyone can get radio receiver and programs book and they can listen in. What we do is not communicate to patrol. We don't want shithead barricaded in house to know that SWAT [SRT] is going to break in the door" (Sam interview, Dec. 2010).

Some stories also may not have been shared because the researcher was not a member, and therefore did not need to be socialized to the culture or taught important lessons of the

organization. Stories often convey the informal lessons of the organization and its culture and thus may not be as acceptable for the general public. For example, none of the stories shared by EMU MPD members were organizational failure or organizational learning stories. Sharing organizational failure stories to non-members would have violated the organization's mission to protect the people from terrorist threats and criminal activity. Since the EMU MPD wanted to portray a culture of expertise against dangerous people and threats against the public, it could have been seen as inappropriate for members to share these types of stories with non-members.

To summarize, stories, when shared with the researcher, reinforced the EMU MPD's culture that the world is full of dangerous people and situations that need to be controlled by their organization. They always needed to be aware of the risks or threats around them and follow proper protocol, training, and their specific expertise to control these dangerous situations. This world view also clearly delineated membership boundaries or an "us" versus "them" culture. Therefore members need to be careful with whom they shared stories and information to protect themselves, others, and their operations. The final construct that helped reveal the organizational culture of the EMU MPD was symbols, which is discussed next.

Symbols

Symbols are physical objects or non-verbal acts that "serve as a vehicle for conveying meaning, usually by representing another thing" (Trice & Beyer, 1984, p. 655). Symbols help reinforce norms, values, and meanings by organizational members and may get carried into interactions with outsiders where members may assume that others understand their meaning. For the EMU MPD, symbols of member dress and building and office structure and décor reinforced clear in-group boundaries, lines of authority and expertise of these members to collaborate to control dangerous people and situations. These symbols were made very visible

when members wanted to reinforce control and authority but also hidden when they wanted to be able to observe and gather information on dangerous people or protect themselves from dangerous people.

Organizational member dress. The first type of symbol concerned organizational member dress. Throughout the study, the researcher observed four general dress types or costumes– formal uniform, specialized response uniform, professional dress, and plainclothes. The choice of what costume to wear appeared to be very intentional and related to the situation they were in or what level of authority they sought to convey. For example, during security meetings for the Auto Show, Michael the MPD supervisor was in a suit most likely to convey professionalism and that he and the EMU MPD were the lead for Auto Show security and coordination (Auto Show mtgs., Oct.-Dec. 2010). Sam was either in professional dress or formal uniform for these same meetings. This matched the dress of the other law enforcement members, federal agencies, or security personnel that attended the meeting. If one wore professional dress for the meeting, they were still easily identified by their agency ID hanging around their neck or off their belt loop. Some also wore lapel pins that were logos for their agency. Between the uniforms, IDs, and pins, the researcher and other people attending the meeting could identify what organization a person belonged to in just a few seconds. Michael explained the intentionality of his dress as such. "When I need to be very forceful I wear my uniform. When I need to show power I wear a suit with a red tie. When dressed down I'm in a relaxed mode. When wearing tactical uniforms it's during a training that day or to let people know what my skills are" (Michael interview, March 2011).

However, EMU MPD members wore "plainclothes" when they did police work out among the public and wished to conceal their identity. This is so they could blend in and look

like the rest of the public in order to monitor locations for "suspicious behavior or activity" (Sam, Auto Show walk through, Jan. 2011) or observe suspicious behavior or dangerous persons. This was most apparent during the Auto Show walk through the researcher did with Sam (Jan. 2011). He was dressed for the walk through of the floor of the Auto Show in a non-descript t-shirt, jeans, and a light jacket. We also took an unmarked police car from their office to the convention center. Once we arrived on the floor of the convention center where the Auto Show was taking place, Sam described how they looked for suspicious activity and what he would do if they saw such behavior and needed to take action.

> At times when it is quieter like now [a day during the work week] where there aren't as many people, we have 20 people on the floor. We will increase it up to 60 people on weekends, during the evening, and during special events like Charity Preview or Education Day where there are a lot of kids on the floor." He clarifies that each person is assigned to a company display like Ford or Mazda, etc. I ask if they are all in plainclothes like he is right now and he says that each person stationed at a company display is in uniform, but the PI teams are in plainclothes and walk the entire floor. He then says that if some suspicious activity happens and a person needs to be taken into custody, then the plainclothes will never make the arrest, it will always be the uniform who is radioed the information from the plainclothes person. The uniform then takes the person to the nearest facility to be processed. (Sam, Auto Show walk through, Jan. 2011)

From this observation, the researcher concluded that dress was a function of the role particular security personnel played during the Auto Show. Only law enforcement members with specialized skills or from specialized agencies/departments (e.g., PI teams made up of EMU MPD, state police, ATF, FBI and Air Marshalls) were allowed to wear plainclothes while on duty. They were tasked with looking for dangerous people who might do harm on a larger scale at the event, such as the disgruntled employee mentioned in the previous section. For EMU MPD members, to do this job meant concealing their identity from the public. But patrol or basic police officers always had to wear their formal uniform while on duty and private security wore their professional jacket and ID. This group of security personnel were to provide a deterrent for

more general criminal activity that occurred at large events such as theft, sexual misconduct, missing persons (i.e., lost children), and fights. In the security reminders handed out at the Auto Show security meeting, the following information was shared. "…please request your staff deliver lost persons to…In the event items are lost or stolen, a report should be made to [Auto Show] Security… Both a wristband and a credential are required for all individuals working the show to gain admittance" (Auto Show mtg. handouts, Oct. 2010). Although this group was not prohibited from monitoring and reporting suspicious activity, they were not given explicit instructions or training during the security meetings or written documentation to perform that role. Therefore, dress during the Auto Show event delineated clear lines of authority and responsibilities of law enforcement and security personnel. By having EMU MPD members in plainclothes, they felt they could also control any dangerous activity or a larger intentional crisis or act of terrorism from occurring. This conclusion could also be applied to other large events where the EMU MPD saw a threat of dangerous activity or terrorism.

Another important part of dress already mentioned was the credential or ID. The importance of credentials for certain persons to gain access to the Auto Show floor without a ticket or areas not accessible to the public was described earlier in the discussion of Rites and Rituals. When the researcher participated in the Auto Show walk through with Sam, both wore Auto Show credentials in order to gain access to the Auto Show security office and floor. The researcher's credentials were labeled "Family Pass" (Auto Show walk through, Jan. 2011).

Credentials were also important for the EMU MPD and law enforcement community to quickly identify who was a member of that group and who got access to "unauthorized areas". In addition to the Auto Show floor, credentials were used to gain access to Auto Show security meetings, Intelligence Operations Center (IOC), and the EMU MPD's office or "base". When the

researcher did not have credentials, she had to show her driver's license as a form of picture ID, sign into certain locations and be escorted by an EMU MPD member.

The issue of stolen and use of fraudulent law enforcement or military IDs or Auto Show credentials was also reinforced as a threat to security.

> (U) [Unclassified] Terrorists or criminals may attempt to gain access to restricted areas by impersonating government or military officials, or emergency personnel, but detecting such individuals will pose an important security challenge prior to and during the 2011 [Auto Show]. However, a number of contractors, employees, vendors, and volunteers will work in [convention center] in preparation, during and after the 2011 [Auto Show]. Employees can be used as cover by terrorists or criminals to gain access to facilities. (Auto Show threat assessment, Dec. 2010)

> Please contact the CIP [Critical Infrastructure Protection Desk with any information pertaining to the following:…Any theft of, or missing official company identification documents, uniforms, credentials or vehicles necessary for accessing CIKR [Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources] facilities or sector-specific events. ([state]IOC CIP-Desk brochure, Dec. 2011)

Both the Auto Show Threat Assessment document and non-first responder FLO training (which the researcher received the CIP-Desk brochure) emphasized the danger of terrorists, criminals, or environmental extremists. They were worried that they people would use fraudulent credentials or IDs to try to impersonate law enforcement, military, or employees to access special events or critical infrastructures such as energy plants, hospitals, or government buildings. Since credentialing was an easy way to gain access or membership, tight controls and security were put in place to prevent false identification and security threats.

Therefore, credentialing for the EMU MPD created important controls that signaled organizational membership, belonging to a larger law enforcement community, and prevented dangerous people from having unauthorized access by trying to be one of them. If one was properly credentialed, then one could move freely within an event and be accepted as a part of

the coordination team. However, if one did not have credentials, access was denied or one could only gain access with a properly credentialed member to confirm that he could be there.

Credentials facilitate some forms of interaction and thus promote some forms of coordination. They also serve to impede other forms of interaction and this limit some forms of coordination. For example, tight controlling of who is credentialed to gain access to a crisis site or EOC could prevent valuable information sharing and impede decision-making during crisis response. In addition, levels of credentials may have the same negative effect if a person's lower credential automatically assigns them less authority to whatever useful information or ideas she might have to aid in crisis response. This is further discussed in the next section and in chapter five.

Building/Office structure and décor. The second type of symbol important to understanding EMU MPD involved the building and office structure and décor. For example, the "base" or building in which the EMU MPD office was located lacked any outside identification, but did have noticeable security measures.

> The building that their office is located in is not at an identified police station. The building is not identified by any sign as being a police building. It is a one story small building downtown that could easily be passed by without further notice. (The building is also not identified on the police department's website.) I would never have found it unless I had the exact address from Sam. I park in the parking lot next to the building and notice that there is a fenced in and gated area covered in black plastic further back in the parking lot with an access card system at the gate. Since I see no police vehicles in the open parking lot, I assume the gated area is where they park their vehicles. I get out of my car and walk up a short wheelchair accessible ramp to the front door. Again, there is no sign on the door, no instructions, just a speaker box with a white button. I press the button and release it. After a few seconds, someone comes over the intercom and asks me what my business is. I explain that I am there for a meeting with Sam of the EMU MPD. I hear a buzzing sound and pull on the door to enter. Once in the door there is a small entryway area with a couple of chairs totally closed off from the rest of the interior. There is a large white sign with red all caps block lettering next to the door that says, "PERSONS ENTERING ARE SUBJECT TO SEARCH. NO WEAPONS. NO FIREARMS. (INCLUDES FINGERNAIL FILES, PEN KNIVES, POCKET KNIVES)."

Soon a uniformed officer opens a door on the opposite side of the entrance and gestures me in. (Researcher observations, Nov. 2010)

Whenever the researcher was inside the building to meet with Sam or Michael, she was always escorted to the EMU MPD offices. She was also escorted to the locked conference room where some of the meetings took place and to the restroom.

The Intelligence Operations Center (IOC) and High-Intensity Drug Trafficking Area (HIDTA) center were in another location that the EMU MPD personnel used during daily operations and the Auto Show. They were also located in a non-descript office building in the city, again except for the high security measures needed to gain access.

> We walk to a building entrance and Sam asks me if I have ID, I tell him I do. He says that everyone who goes into the HIDTA has to have federal clearance and I don't have it. But since the IOC is in a conference room next to the HIDTA we can go in there. We go to the front desk and sign in. Sam greets the security person and asks if we need to show ID, but the person replies that we do not. As we get into the elevator, Sam comments that the person should have checked our IDs. We get off of the floor where the IOC is and I notice a keypad next to the door. Sam opens his phone and calls someone to let us in. As we are waiting, he gestures to a door at the end of the hall and says that it is where the HIDTA is. A guy meets us at the door and greets Sam. Sam introduces us and he holds open the door for us. Sam reaches for the next door handle to pull it open and the guy quickly pulls his hand away and tells Sam that he should know better than to touch the door. (Weird, some sort of security measure?) I do notice that above the door handle is a large grey knob that kind of looks like a combination lock thing but we go too quickly through the door for me to examine it closer. (Researcher observations, Jan. 2011)

In addition, these two locations were not named on the MPD website, nor was any contact information given for their offices (MPD website, March 2011). Sam revealed that the non-identification of EMU MPD operational locations was intentional.

> I asked if this [base] was considered a police station - Sam said it is not a station. 'There is no access to the public for security reasons. The same goes for Tac. Ops, [Tactical Operations] which is located [near downtown landmark]." Tac. Ops. is next to them on the org. chart and report to same person as [EM] Unit but not under [EMU MPD]. (Researcher observations, March 2011)

Although specific "security reasons" was never fully explained, it was a term often used by EMU

MPD and other law enforcement personnel throughout the study to justify certain actions by the

EMU MPD or law enforcement and also the restriction or denial of access to information. In this

case, they used "security reasons" to justify obscuring their identity to the public, or more

importantly, to prevent dangerous people from targeting their location. This was justified

because of the sensitive and sometimes "classified" nature of their job and the fact that they did

not interact with the public on a daily basis. However, MPD police stations were clearly

identified so the public could call upon them when they needed assistance or to report a crime. In

fact, if a citizen wanted to report suspected terrorism, the city government and MPD websites

directed people to the city's Homeland Security and Emergency Management website and

contact information. Therefore, this intentional concealment of location reinforced the secretive

culture of the EMU MPD.

Once inside these locations, the office décor and equipment reflected the security and

closed culture of the EMU MPD and similar law enforcement agencies. For example, the IOC

conference room set up for monitoring suspicious activity during the Auto Show reflected this

culture.

> We walk down a hallway and turn in to a medium sized conference room. There is a
> long conference room table in the middle and rows of computers on either side of the
> table. Probably 14-16 desktops and a lap top as well. On top of each computer monitor
> (or fallen down next to a computer) is a paper triangle placard stating the name of the
> agency at that computer...On the whiteboard to the right as we walk in is a large taped up
> schedule of when the IOC is open and all of the special Auto Show days listed (press
> days, charity event, education day, etc.)…At the other end is another white board. On it
> are two pictures and descriptions of two people. In front of that is a TV on a cart that is
> tuned to some local TV station. Sam motions me down to one of the computers at the end
> and gestures me to sit down next to him. He said that this was the EMU MPD station but
> there are people here from DEA, [public transportation security], Air Marshals, FBI, etc.
> He said that this is pretty much the operation here. The EMU MPD person also works in
> the HIDTA when he's not in here working the Auto Show). All of the computers have
> the ETEAM software main login page on the screen. He tries to log into ETEAM but it

won't let him because he is still logged in back at the station…I point to the pictures on the wall and ask him if one of those was the suspicious [auto company] person we were talking about during the Auto Show walk through. He says yes and points him out. I told him that I also saw that same flyer in their office earlier today. (Researcher observations, Jan. 2011)

As this description illustrates, password protected computers with secure database programs that coordinate and share information were accessible only by those law enforcement personnel or agencies supporting security monitoring of suspicious persons, criminals or terrorists. Information on suspicious persons was posted on the wall. The TV was there to monitor and gather information on what the media said about an emergency were it to occur during the Auto Show. Other than what was described above, the room is very plain with no windows or other decorations or information that doesn't pertain to the purpose of the IOC. The room was devoid of any personalization or sense of identity or community one would see in other organizations. This again reinforced the serious mission of the EMU MPD to protect the citizens of the community from dangerous people and the measures they had in place to prevent this from occurring. This room structure and equipment used also symbolized the collaborative nature that the EMU MPD had with other law enforcement and security agencies. This will be discussed further in the next section on EMU MPD collaboration and coordination.

The décor at the EMU MPD main office also reinforced that this space was primarily meant for members of the EMU MPD and other law enforcement agencies that supported or worked with them. The spaces also conveyed that it was not intended to facilitate interaction with the public. In this space there were 3-4 chairs against the wall and a small coffee table with magazines on it that resembled a makeshift waiting room in the large open room. However, upon closer inspection, the magazines were all homeland security or law enforcement trade

magazines (Researcher observations, Nov. 2010). These magazines symbolized that the only guests the EMU MPD expected in the office were other law enforcement members.

Above the chairs was a row of pictures that included the city mayor and others in police uniforms, including the EMU MPD supervisor. At the end of the row was a hand drawn picture of a police officer with a name under it. These pictures were described by Sam; " a line of reporting chain from their office up to the Mayor…that every police station is supposed to have posted for the public to see but not all of them do" (Researcher observations, Jan. 2011). When asked about the hand drawn picture after the EMU MPD supervisor, Sam laughed and responded that it was "an inside joke of the office" and provided no further explanation. These pictures then reinforced the authoritative culture of the EMD by displaying the strict line of reporting authority EMU MPD personnel were expected to follow. Even though Sam described the pictures as required to be posted for the public, the fact that an inside joke hand-drawn picture was posted next to them indicated that they did not intend the public to frequent the office.

In addition, the bulletin board in the EMU MPD office reflected the roles and responsibilities of the unit.

> I notice that there is a flat screen TV on the opposite side of the wall, turned on but no one is in the room to watch it. I watch CNN for a minute, then turn my attention to the bulletin board next to the TV. There are lots of pieces of paper tacked to the wall. Some are police union and MPD meeting notices. Some are Excel Spreadsheet training schedules for the various units under EMU MPD (bomb squad, SRT, etc.). I also see some flyers or notices showing a few people's faces and explanations of criminal activity they are wanted for or suspicious persons for EMU MPD members to watch for. One of them has "arrested" listed next to it and I see that on the paper the notification was sent out by Michael, the EMU MPD Supervisor. (Researcher observations, Jan. 2011)

Besides general meeting notices one expects to find at offices, training notices, suspicious person notices, and notices of criminal arrests by the EMU MPD posted on this bulletin board reinforced the expertise of the EMU to control dangerous people and situations. Again, this information was

only meant for law enforcement and EMU MPD members given it was located in a secure office space in a building not identified as a police station.

In summary, the dress of members and design and décor of EMU MPD offices and buildings symbolized a clear in-group and out-group membership distinction. Those considered as part of the in-group for EMU MPD were those members of their unit or other law enforcement personnel who collaborated with them in fulfilling their mission to protect citizens against terrorists or other dangerous criminals. Costumes and credentials of the EMU MPD members and other law enforcement organizations symbolized this in-group as well as revealed a level of trust one could feel towards another in just in a few seconds of looking at another person. The office décor also reflected this in-group status by the specialized type of information or equipment made available to these members and not to out-group member or the public. Lack of identification of locations of EMU MPD offices ("base" and IOC) and high security measures of those locations symbolized and reinforced for members the "secure" nature of their work and need to protect themselves and information from those dangerous people or non-law enforcement people not authorized to have access. This in-group and out-group distinction also affected whether the EMU MPD had a more collaborative or coordinating relationship with other crisis response organizations. This will be explained further in the next section.

MPD's Crisis Response as Collaboration for In-Groups and Coordination for Out-Groups

As described in chapter one, although the terms crisis coordination and crisis coordination are often used interchangeably, they are two distinct worldviews of crisis response. Crisis coordination implies a minimal level of involvement between organizations to achieve crisis response and mitigation, or "mutually agreed upon cooperation about how to carry out particular tasks" (Quarantelli, 1997a, p. 48). In crisis coordination two independent agencies can

work in conjunction with one another but have minimal interaction and association during a crisis response. In crisis collaboration, crisis response organizations create an alliance in which they value inter-organizational interdependence, equal input of participants, and shared decision-making (Keyton & Stallworth, 2003) in order to reach their shared goal of effective crisis response and mitigation, even under severe time and decision-making pressures. In other words, crisis collaboration connotes a deeper partnership between organizations where the crisis response mission, decisions, and activities are jointly established and carried out.

An organization's culture can affect whether its members see crisis response as crisis coordination or crisis collaboration. Members of the Emergency Management Unit of the Metropolitan Police Department (EMU MPD) described themselves as having what the researcher would define as a collaborative relationship with other groups in crisis response. "Because [EMU MPD] done such a good job at developing relationships with other agencies, there's no problem communicating or getting response [during a crisis]" (Sam interview, Dec. 2010). Upon closer inspection, one finds that EMU MPD does indeed have a collaborative relationship with in-group organizations that are part of a larger macroculture because these law enforcement and first responder organizations share institutional familiarity and cultural similarity. However, they have a more bureaucratic coordination relationship with those organizations and members they deem outside their marcoculture's organizational boundaries.

Figure 5: **EMU MPD's crisis response relationship with other organizations**.

Figure 5 illustrates the relationships with organizations EMU MPD described. This figure was created by the researcher based on members' descriptions in formal and informal interviews, researcher observations of Auto Show security planning meetings and Auto Show walk through, and the non-first responder fusion liaison officer (FLO) training. The boundary surrounding EMU MPD is a solid line to demonstrate it has rigid organizational boundaries due to its culture of expertise and secrecy. Auto Show and MEOC are represented in bold and italics to indicate that it is a collaborative group with representatives of the connected organizations. The arrows illustrate the primary flow of communication, whether in one direction or flowing freely between the two. If the arrow is a solid line then it represents more of a crisis coordination relationship; if it is dotted then it represents a crisis collaborative relationship. The circle serves as a reminder

that these organizations have interdependence with context (Stohl & Putnam, 1994). Therefore, past crisis experiences, history, economy, and politics affect the EMU MPD and other organizations at a local community and national level.

This lower level of coordinated response with out-groups could result in coordination and communication issues when the EMU MPD engage in larger interorganizational response efforts or work within the Metropolitan Emergency Response Center (MEOC). This is because the MEOC's membership extends beyond the macroculture's in-group of the law enforcement and first responder community. This worldview of crisis collaboration with in-groups and crisis coordination with out-groups was a result of EMU MPD's organizational culture and is detailed next.

Crisis Collaboration with In-Group Organizations

Chapter one described how organizational members use culture to identify with their organization and to also differentiate themselves, and therefore the organization as a whole, from those they perceive as competitors. Creating identity through organizational culture also creates and maintains organizational boundaries. Boundaries can be either rigid or more flexible through the use of both physical (e.g., badges, uniforms, etc.) and informational means (e.g., stories, jargon, etc.). Reflecting on Oakes, Haslam, and Turner's (1994) work on in-group versus out-group behavior, Abrams, O'Connor and Giles (2002) observed that organizational members maintain rigid boundaries between in-group and out-group identities by developing different ways of communicating within the organization and externally to others (p. 230). It is through these communicative actions that "members display their belongingness to the organization as well as their opposition to those outside the organization" (Trujillo & Dionisopoulos, 1987, p.

199), as well as "constitute a system of common social meanings and shared interpretive schema within an organization" (Trujillo & Dionisopoulos, 1987, p. 199).

This in-group versus out-group boundaries is not just limited to the organization itself. These boundaries can also be drawn wider to include organizations that members of an organization see as allies or partners in the work they do or part of a larger macroculture of organizations with similar organizational cultures and missions. The EMU MPD appeared to have more effective communication and crisis collaboration with other law enforcement and first responder groups who were part of this larger macroculture because the organization illustrated the boundary spanning concepts of institutional familiarity and cultural similarity with these organizations (Batteau, Brandenburg, Seeger, and Eaton, 2007). This, in turn, facilitated crisis collaboration features of information sharing among these organizations and a high level of member trust and loyalty towards this larger in-group macroculture.

Boundary spanning. As described in chapter one, boundary spanning occurs when organizational members reach across the boundaries of their group or organizational membership in order to seek or share information (Leifer & Delbecq, 1976). Boundary spanning by members of EMU MPD was facilitated by the concepts of institutional familiarity and cultural similarity.

First, institutional familiarity defines how well collaborating group members know of and understands the other organizations they are working with. The easiest way to facilitate this is by working with other organizations on a day-to-day basis. When asked which organizations the EMU MPD works with on a daily basis, Michael, EMU MPD supervisor replied with the following.

> Federal, state and local. I work with everybody, everybody has a cell phone and I call them. Federally I work with FBI, ATF, Secret Service, Coast Guard, US Customs, Homeland Security investigators. I also work with various county agencies and law enforcement agencies - local municipal police departments, fire departments, EMS. I

have 4000 business cards and 2000 contacts on my cell phone. (Michael interview, March 2011)

Besides daily interactions, institutional familiarity was also facilitated through participation in past crisis response efforts or in pre-planning training and exercises. As described earlier, the Auto Show was an annual event and security planning meetings for the show had occurred for the past 10 years (Harry, Auto Show Security Chief, Jan. 2011). This annual planning among law enforcement, security and first responders translated into a high level of familiarity and trust among members that the researcher noticed during the security planning meetings for the Auto Show.

> As I [the researcher] was waiting, I noticed that a lot of people seemed to know one another already - they addressed other people by name and there were lots of handshakes and a few manly pats on the back… There were already some jokes being thrown around by him [Harry] as he pointed out one DPD officer who entered the room late. It was the kind of joking from people who were familiar with each other. (Auto Show mtg., Oct. 2010)

In addition, during these meetings, there were often remarks made by the Auto Show Security Chief and EMU MPD about how well the organizations assembled worked together and they frequently thanked other groups for their support. For example, Harry mentioned that a reason for the success of the fire response at last year's Auto Show was because they all worked shows in the past and were able to work well as a team (Harry, Auto Show mtg., Oct. 2010). Later in the meeting Michael, EMU MPD supervisor, added his thanks by saying, "Thank you all for your agencies' support to the continued success of this event. We want to have another successful event," (Michael, Auto Show mtg., Oct. 2010). In the December Auto Show meeting, Michael again thanked law enforcement for their help. "I have to commend everyone because you really helped us out to put out more manpower which works in our favor," (Michael, Auto Show mtg., Dec. 2010). The familiarity of working day-to-day with these organizations and

years of planning Auto Show security resulted in a EMU MPD members having a high level of trust, teamwork, and willingness to put forth extra effort to ensure that collaboration and successful crisis response occurred.

Second, while Michael claimed in the earlier quote that the EMU MPD works with "everybody", the organizations he listed were those law enforcement and first responder organizations that were culturally similar to his organization. Cultural similarity is how much organizational cultural values, norms, and structures overlap with their own organizational culture (Batteau, Brandenburg, Seeger, and Eaton, 2007). Therefore, the EMU MPD collaborated more easily with these organizations because they had similar missions, hierarchical structures, and vocabulary.

For example, the mission of the EMU MPD was similar to other law enforcement agencies - to protect and serve the public by preventing terrorism and criminal activity. It therefore collaborated most often with federal, state and local agencies that performed the same activities or provided information to the EMU MPD so they could complete their operations. Sam often mentioned that they had a good relationship with these agencies because these groups supported their efforts. "It isn't like the movies, which always shows the FBI coming in and taking over the investigation and pushing the local agency aside. The federal agencies mainly play a support role to the local agencies unless the local agency requests help or unless there it is a case that has federal jurisdiction" (Sam, Auto Show walk through, Jan. 2011).

The EMU MPD also shared a paramilitaristic culture with law enforcement and first responder organizations by sharing similar vocabulary, symbols and organizational structures. As stated in the vocabulary section of this chapter, in Auto Show meetings these organizations often used terms such intelligence, incident, patrol, threats, tactical operations, classified and for

official use only (Auto Show mtgs., Oct. 2010-Dec. 2010). When organizational members used these terms, no one ever asked for clarification or further explanation of the meaning of a term.

Law enforcement and first responder organizations also had similar organizational structures represented by member dress. At Auto Show meetings, uniformed members from different organizations represented the lower level response staff and more specialized groups within an organization and federal agencies wore suits. They also had a common understanding that being in uniform meant reinforcing authoritative or official public presence in order to deter criminal activity. In contrast, wearing plainclothes meant that obfuscating one's identity was necessary to blend into the environment and covertly monitor for potential threats.

The researcher then saw this dress reinforced at the Auto Show. The lower levels of the police department or "patrol" and private security wore uniforms and were prominently stationed at exhibits and outside the show floor. However, EMU MPD members were in plainclothes when walking the floor of the show. Other state police officers and federal agents who made up the more specialized PI teams were also seen in the security office in plainclothes (Auto Show visit 2, Jan. 2011).

A third cultural similarity was that these organizations followed the bureaucratic approach of coordination as the appropriate method and structure of crisis response. This "command and control" model favored top-down, hierarchical decision-making and centralization of power in an attempt to control the chaos inherent in disasters (Auf der Heide, 1989; Drabek, 2003; Quarantelli, 1997a; Tierney, 2007). This bureaucratic approach was reflected by member's strict adherence to the Incident Command System (ICS) and response protocols and procedures.

> My office is responsible for running Incident Command, establish a list of what has taken place, run Incident Command System. Concept is to run smoother and faster…We set up

a command post on scene and staging area so personnel know where to come and role and responsibilities. (Researcher: Who responds?) Police, fire, EMS personnel, depending on the situation. Role of incident commander could change. If fire, then police goes from primary to secondary command and we are there in support for the other. (Researcher: How similar or different is this from to day to day?) Same for day to day. It is designed to deal with any critical incident. We all use the ICS system. Everyone is trained with ICS for unit. MPD is mandated by the federal government for all first responders. Fire, police, EMS all know ICS. (Michael interview, March 2011)

ICS was used consistently by these culturally-similar groups in both day-to-day emergency responses and in larger crisis response. Although mandated by the federal government and tied to federal funding, ICS was easy for these groups to use because it was so similar to their organizational cultures and structure of hierarchical decision-making, authority, and using specific protocols for every response.

Also, in a bureaucratic approach to crisis response, every group has its own expertise and distinct role to play. This approach was easily accepted and supported by these groups. For example, during Auto Show meetings, each group reported an update on what they were doing to prepare for the event and what role they would be playing. A story was also told multiple times by the Auto Show Security Chief to reinforce not going outside one's role. "The director told story of a member of his staff who went up to catwalk to put out fire. 'Forgetting he's a policeman' the guy used the extinguishers but also got shocked quite badly because catwalk was electrified because of fire" (Harry, Auto Show mtg., Oct. 2010). This expertise and adhering to roles is also supported in the bureaucratic ICS structure for crisis response.

If there is a fire, automatically fire is the lead agency, lead incident commander is MFD, police takes direction from them. If bomb threat, then police is lead, fire assists and is on standby in case something happens. Police will block off traffic, bomb squad goes inside. But dependent upon type of crisis. EMS can be lead if mass casualty. Water dept. can be lead as well, depends on situation. In incident management everyone has to know their role. We're not EMS, not fire. (Michael interview, March 2011)

Therefore, cultural similarity was found among these law enforcement and first responder organizations through their similar paramilitaristic culture and bureaucratic approach to coordination through use of ICS during crisis response.

Crisis collaboration features as a result of boundary spanning. This boundary spanning among law enforcement and other first responder organizations meant that they saw each other as part of the larger in-group macroculture and therefore more easily collaborated with each other in preparing for and responding to crises. This crisis collaboration was evident through the features mentioned in chapter one: having a common crisis response goal, in-group member trust and loyalty, and information sharing among members.

The EMU MPD collaborated well with these in-group organizations because they had a common goal for crisis response: to prevent and control the chaos that crises created. For example, the law enforcement, security and first responder organizations collaborated well with each other in planning the annual Auto Show. This was because their common goal was to prevent disruptions by terrorists during the Auto Show and keep the public safe from incidents or emergencies.

Boundary spanning among in-group organizations also resulted in the crisis collaboration feature of a high level of member trust and loyalty and seeing others in their in-group as partners. For example, the EMU MPD often described the importance of having developed relationships with members of these groups. [In one situation], "I arrived on scene and called Michael. He then called the FBI, the person he knows. Michael has a relationship with federal and local agencies so they are only a phone call away" (Sam interview, Dec. 2010). These relationships are developed by boundary spanning of members in daily responses where they may work together,

but also in crisis planning and trainings and working events like the Auto Show over several

years.

> Personally we don't have any [challenges] we've been doing it for so long. The
> educational piece has been established and embedded in various disciplines [police, fire,
> EMS] all coming together. There's no testosterone in command post or staging area.
> When we do have a situation, we're not seeing each other for the first time, we know
> each other. We've done practice, done scenarios so we have section bosses or lower level
> officers know each other and then others in in the discipline relax [seeing this]. (Michael
> interview, March 2011)

This level of familiarity and trust among members of these organizations was also

manifested during Auto Show meetings by social rituals they enacted through communication at

Auto Show planning meetings (Pacanowsky & O'Donnell-Trujillo, 1982). These social rituals

included friendly interpersonal interactions between members of different organizations before

and after meetings, the high level of joking among organizational members, and the appreciation

shown to other organizations during meetings. These are social rituals because they are not

needed to "get the job done" and may seem at odds with the serious task of planning for a

potential crisis. But they "perform the important function of identifying membership status in a

group" by displaying "oneness" (Pacanowsky & O'Donnell-Trujillo, 1982, p. 136-137).

For example, before and after Auto Show meetings, members from different groups were

engaged in conversations with one another. Body language was very relaxed – people were

standing closely, handshakes and back slaps occurred often, and laughter filled the room. Also at

Auto Show meetings, joking or teasing others from different organizations was done by the Auto

Show Security Director, EMU MPD Supervisor, fire department, and MPD tactical operations.

They often made jokes about others before introducing them, if someone came in late, or when

sharing information. These were met with plenty of congenial laughter from the entire room.

Finally, during Auto Show meetings members of one organization often thanked other

organizations for their help and support. For example, when the fire department spokesperson speaks about last year's fire at one meeting, he thanks the MPD for their handling of the situation last year. Immediately Michael from the MPD gives kudos back to the fire department for their response (Auto Show mtg., Nov. 2010). Harry, at the first meeting also thanked every office for their help as he introduces them to share their report (Auto Show mtg., Oct. 2010).

Although none of these organizations use the word, "partner" or "partnership" this was evident by the words and actions by members of these organizations towards others in this in-group. Michael best summed up his high level of trust and loyalty with members of this in-group when he said, "Everyone is familiar with each other and we come together" (Auto Show mtg., Oct. 2010).

Another feature of crisis collaboration illustrated by this in-group was how easily and frequently these organizations shared information with each other. Auto Show meetings facilitated some of this information sharing as each group was given a chance to discuss their role and pass along important information for others to know. But access to various interoperable communication tools and systems were the main mechanisms emphasized for interorganizational information sharing. For example, possessing interoperable radios with the same frequency to talk with one another during the Auto Show was a high priority for those coordinating security.

> This year we are requiring all people that are hired as security…to have an interoperable radio on them. As you all know, last year there was a fire during the Auto Show…DPD and DFD did a good job, but they couldn't communicate with some sites to tell them about the evacuation because they didn't have the same radio system. This is a strong weakness. (Harry, Auto Show mtg., Oct. 2010)

Interoperable radio requirements were communicated at every meeting and Harry emphasized that they had up to 500 available for those who needed them because "communication is a key importance" (Auto Show mtg., Dec. 2010).

A second communication mechanism used for information sharing was ETEAM. As described earlier, ETEAM is a secured database system for information sharing and coordinated response. During the Auto Show meetings, the use of ETEAM as a resource for sharing information was mentioned several times. On one occasion Sam from EMU MPD showed her how ETEAM worked.

> Sam shows me all of the events that are in the system and that a new event is added each time. I see events going back to 2006… He then clicks on the 2011 Auto Show and shows me a screen where he explains that the files are separated by location. There are files for information from the Auto Show Security Center, [Auto company] Center, IOC at HIDTA, and the MEOC…He clicks on one of the file links and there are a lot of other blue hyperlinks with a date, person who entered in info and then a brief title. He searches and then clicks on one of them so I can see the information that was entered. Some were just status updates such as "no new information to report", a request to look up a name of a person, or a short description of what occurred at a protest. He then tells me that the best thing about ETEAM is that the messages then go directly to his phone and email so he doesn't even need to be at a computer in order to get the messages. I ask him if all the messages inputted into ETEAM get sent out to people's phones. He said no…only messages deemed important or emergency information gets sent to everyone on the list. He also points out to me that the event is in green which means that things are going normally and are pretty quiet. (Auto Show walk through, Jan. 2011)

In this example, Sam mentioned another collaborative resource for these groups, fusion centers. Fusion centers are the "Collaborative effort of two or more agencies that provide resources, expertise, and information to center with goal of maximizing ability to detect, prevent, investigate and respond to criminal and terrorist activity" (Rick, [state]IOC, FLO Training, Dec. 2010). These fusion centers operated during special events but also throughout the year to share information. The importance of these centers for information sharing was also emphasized at the Auto Show meetings.

> The intelligence piece will be in the [state] IOC. Any intelligence you have will be filtered through that center. Both Saturdays are critical because of [sporting events]…There will be a listserv that will blast out messages. You will be notified if you are on the list. This is a good situational awareness management tool….Each year gets better and better – just fine tuning. We're also reaching out to the [Auto Company's]

global intelligence center so we are together and on the same page. (Dan, [state] IOC, Auto Show mtg., Nov. 2010)

Therefore, there were several collaborative communication mechanisms, interoperable radios, ETEAM, and fusion centers, these organizations used to share information during the Auto Show. These mechanisms were also used throughout the year for other crisis responses. However, these mechanisms were only accessible to those members of law enforcement, security or first responder organizations. Sam and others at the Auto Show meeting often commented how one needed to be "on the list" in order to be notified. Dan also stated at the FLO training that, "Member agencies of [state]IOC are mostly law enforcement- National Guard, Coast Guard, ATF, TSA, FBI, DHS, State Police, Department of Corrections" (Dec. 2010).

In summary, several elements of crisis collaboration in daily emergency response and larger crisis planning and response were evident in the EMU MPD and between similar law enforcement, security, and first responder organizations. This in-group of organizations existed because they had similar organizational cultures that resulted in a larger shared macroculture. Cultural similarities included a mutual understanding that tasks and resources were best managed by experts in their related fields and decisions during a response need to be made through the Incident Command System. This allowed for boundary spanning among organizations. This boundary spanning resulted in crisis collaboration features of sharing a common crisis response goal, a willingness to share information with each other, and a high level of trust and loyalty towards each other.

However, for those organizations that may be involved in crisis response but were not considered part of this in-group, the EMU MPD had a rigid membership boundary and took a more bureaucratic coordination approach to crisis response. This is discussed in the next section.

Crisis Coordination with Out-Group Organizations

In the researcher's observations and interviews with members of the EMU MPD, organizations that were not part of the in-group were seldom mentioned in crisis response. These organizations included the city Homeland Security and Emergency Management (HSEM) agency, non-profit disaster relief organizations, city public works (water, utilities, transportation), and hospitals. These organizations, along with the in-group organizations, made up the Metropolitan Emergency Operations Center (MEOC) or the city's crisis response coordination group. When they were mentioned by the EMU MPD or inquired about by the researcher, these out-group organizations were clearly labeled as support organizations to the EMU MPD, and sometimes competition as the case of the city HSEM. This reflected a more formal and rigid membership boundary and more bureaucratic approach of coordination between EMU MPD and these organizations. This also led to frustration by some of these other organization for being relegated to this support role and the lack of information sharing from the EMU MPD.

When the EMU MPD was in-charge of an emergency response, it thought of these other groups as providing a supportive role helping the EMU MPD fulfill their core mission. This supportive role was reinforced by Michael calling these organizations "resources."

> "I'll get call from supervisor. I'll start putting overall assessment together on what is needed, what is not needed in terms of resources, blockade…I will then come over the radio telling them I've taken over as incident commander and call for resources - fire, EMS, public works, [local utility] for gas. I'll call resources or person with me will call. (Michael interview, March 2011)

Non-profit disaster relief organizations were also seen in a supporting role of the EMU MPD mission. The Salvation Army got "coffee and water for divers" and EMU MPD worked with the "Red Cross during evacuations that require folks to be outside of their homes" (Michael

interview, March 2011). The public was also seen as a resource by providing information to the

EMU MPD so they could fulfill their mission of protecting the city from terrorism. "Information

sharing is vetting and getting information to law enforcement and community by doing programs

in the community and educate them on what to look for on what terrorists may or may not be"

(Michael interview, March 2011). The public more broadly was seen as the group needing

protection and as a source of threats.

Most telling was how they viewed the city HSEM which was the head of the MEOC

during larger crisis response. In the following quotes, one can see how members of the EMU

MPD differentiated themselves from the city HSEM by the claiming different expertise and

missions. They also relegated city HSEM to a support role when they were in charge of the

response.

> While waiting for a tour, I ask Sam how EMU MPD is related to the city HSEM. He
> says that HSEM is civilian homeland security. He also said that they don't typically
> work with them unless they need to get buses or something. (Auto Show mtg., Dec.
> 2010)

> I ask Sam if they are involved in MEOC - he said they work side by side but not together.
> We take input but in the end we make decisions. For example if we needed 5 buses we
> would call them and request. Emergency response such as evacuation, we work hand in
> hand, but a tactical situation such as gunman, we notify them only. (Sam interview, Dec.
> 2010)

> (Researcher: What is the difference between your unit and the Homeland Security
> Department under Director [Ross]?) We respond to the situation. They [city HSEM]
> would respond if needed to support with additional resources. They handle grants, we do
> law enforcement response…. (Researcher: How do you work with them in crisis
> response?) We have them come in and do some coordination with other city entities or
> outside city entities for consequence management. Under the Urban Area Security
> Initiative (UASI) they'll get additional resources from neighboring counties. Director
> [Ross] helps facilitate to bring in additional emergency management, health, etc. They
> also help by doing set up of the staging areas for families and tag people. (Michael
> interview, March 2011)

One can infer from these comments that the city HSEM was not seen as part of the earlier in-group, even though they were part of the Auto Show planning group. In addition, several of its members had military backgrounds and HSEM used the same paramilitaristic Incident Command System and NIMS structure for crisis response. This distinction was made clear by EMU MPD members' use of the words "civilian" and "we do law enforcement".

HSEM was also seen as a resource coordinator, not an equal expert in emergency response. Even in a natural disaster response, when the city HSEM's MEOC leads the response, EMU MPD was clear that their role was only in providing their expertise, such as evacuating people and nothing more. (Evacuating people fit under their mission of protecting people.)

> National disaster planning we do with Director [Ross]'s people. But for snowstorms, response is more non-police. Police are involved in national disasters only if "it" hits the fan. We're involved with evacuation routes; ensuring people get out and clear a path. We are utilized to get them out. (Sam informal interview, March 2011)

By excluding HSEM from the law enforcement community and larger in-group and changing their expertise to resource coordination, EMU MPD members removed any direct competition to their expertise. This is because EMU MPD's authoritative and expert culture created strong membership identities that were threatened when another organization claimed a similar mission and expertise. This choice for EMU MPD members to see HSEM as competition rather than an interdependent collaborative partner will be discussed further in chapter five.

Seeing themselves as experts and delegating other organizations as support functions or resources to manage was most in line with a crisis coordination worldview as discussed in chapter one. EMU MPD members' primary concern in crisis response was in meeting the individual organizational goal of protecting others from terrorism and criminal activity. Members focused on their expert area of crisis response and didn't see themselves as part of a response if it didn't involve their expertise. EMU MPD members followed decision-making as top-down

orders from themselves if they were the incident commander or took orders if another organization was the incident commander. And although both EMU MPD and city HSEM both had "emergency management" in their names, the EMU MPD saw the city HSEM as competition for resources and recognition of expertise. This is why they clearly distinguished the city HSEM as an outgroup organization, even though others might see them as more similar organizations.

Finally, as noted earlier, EMU MPD was clearly reluctant to share information with the researcher and other organizations not in the in-group. This seemed to be the biggest frustration of other organizations that saw themselves as key participants and partners in crisis response. For example, at the third Auto Show meeting, a representative from the Mayor's office reminded the other law enforcement and first responder groups that they wanted to be involved in the crisis communication plan and work with other organizations if an event such as a fire occurred (Dec. 2010).

Hospital security chiefs were also frustrated with the relationship they had with law enforcement organizations such as the EMU MPD.

> Information sharing doesn't happen. Law enforcement failed to reach out to private sector. They reach out to [auto companies] but ignore hospitals and never get info from them…Information sharing doesn't happen on any level with hospital and law enforcement. City HSEM does share info but law enforcement just shows up instead of working with hospital security. It boils down to mutual respect. (John, Hospital A Security Chief, FLO training, Dec. 2010)

Later, at that same training, John asked for a "seat at the table for a two-way exchange of information." Dan from state police agreed that law enforcement needed to move from a "need to know" to a "duty to share". However when Dan described the purpose of the FLO training course, there was still a sense of separation between "first responders" and "non-first responders" with information sharing mostly traveling in one direction to law enforcement.

> The purpose of course is to help the dissemination and collection of information…I want to involve private corporations and those outside law enforcement to foster culture of cooperation…This is the private sector one-day course. We have an Emergency Response course for the next three days that includes police, fire, and EMS. For first responders, we give them direct connectivity to intelligence operations center and the ability to submit info and get notified if something goes down. (Dan, state police department, FLO training, Dec. 2010)

A "culture of cooperation" that Dan mentioned is the lowest form of coordination and isn't the two-way collaboration that other organizations wanted. This quote also illustrated how first responders received longer training sessions and had direct connectivity to the IOC whereas the FLO training emphasized how non-first responders could be aware of and report suspicious activity. As state police were part of the larger in-group described earlier, this reflected that culture of loyalty to the in-group when it came to communication and information sharing.

EMU MPD members identified themselves as being collaborative with other organizations in crisis response. However, this study showed that the organization only had a crisis collaborative relationship with those organizations it considered part of its in-group. For those organizations in the out-group that could have an important role or must be involved in certain crisis responses, EMU MPD had a more coordinating relationship. This is because it saw those organizations in a supporting role to their management of a crisis.

These member beliefs produced the cultural barriers of organizational expertise, competition, and unit diversity to interorganizational crisis collaboration with these organizations. As presented earlier, the EMU MPD viewed themselves as organizational experts in preventing terrorism and controlling dangerous people and situations. They also saw their organization in competition with the city HSEM to be seen as the emergency management experts. Finally, the EMU MPD's culture of crisis response as was different from those who were not a part of the law enforcement, security, or first responder unit.

This larger view of EMU MPD's crisis response as crisis coordination rather than crisis collaboration could have potential issues and negative ramifications when it must work within the MEOC or with other out-group organizations for certain crisis responses. This problem becomes magnified in more dynamic circumstances and larger events that stretch the resources. These responses are going to required partnerships where individual mission and response domain of the organization have to become part of a larger domain and mission to be effective. This is especially relevant if EMU MPD members are not aware of the level of this distinction between crisis coordination and crisis collaboration. This phenomenon and its implications are further discussed in chapter five.

Summary

The Emergency Management Unit of the Metropolitan Police Department (EMU MPD) has an organizational culture that was generally authoritarian, bureaucratic and closed to out-group members or organizations. The paramilitaristic vocabulary used, and labeling of people and situations as "threats" and "dangerous" gave the members of the EMU MPD a sense of clear mission, hierarchy and procedures. This vocabulary also served to separate them from private companies, NGOs and the public who were not familiar with this language. EMU MPD's rites and rituals helped reinforce the hierarchical and authoritative values and norms of the organization. Rites enacted during Auto Show planning meetings, other crisis training and exercises, and rituals of following protocols reinforced the EMU MPD's security focused culture. This manifested through communication by members demonstrating a need to protect others from dangerous people and situations, illustrating their expertise in this area, and controlling who had access to specific EMU MPD rites and rituals. Stories, when shared with the researcher, reinforced that the world was full of dangerous people and situations that were

necessary for them to control. Therefore, members needed to be careful with whom they shared information to protect themselves, other members, and their operations. Stories also reinforced following proper protocol and using their training and expertise to control these dangerous situations. Symbols of member dress, and building/office structure and décor reinforced clear in-group boundaries, lines of authority and expertise of these members. These symbols were made very visible when members wanted to emphasize control and authority but also hidden when they wanted to be able to covertly observe and gather information in public settings.

Finally, this organizational culture delineated for the EMU MPD an in-group of organizations that they could collaborate in emergency and crisis planning and response, and an out-group of organizations that they use to coordinate needed resources only when the crisis situation determined that they needed assistance beyond the in-group's expertise or resources. The next chapter presents the results of the study with a discussion of how the organizational cultural differences between the EMU MPD and DRO may influence the crisis collaboration efforts of larger coordinating groups such as an MEOC.

CHAPTER 5

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

Summary of Main Findings

When a crisis affects a community (i.e., the Virginia Tech shooting), region (i.e., Hurricane Katrina), or sometimes an entire country (i.e., the 2010 earthquake in Haiti), the response efforts must involve many different organizations "requir[ing] coordination of a variety of resources, technical skill and response capacity" (Seeger, Sellnow, & Ulmer, 2003, p. 189). Dozens and sometimes even hundreds of organizations, often with very different missions, methods, technologies and cultures are called upon to coordinate in order to mitigate the crisis and assist in the recovery efforts. Effective communication is a key component that often determines the success of this interorganizational crisis coordination and collaboration.

Practitioners and researchers have focused on improvements in interoperability of technology (i.e. 800 MHz radios) or creating a network of individuals who will communicate information between organizations (i.e. Emergency Operations Centers). However, little effort has specifically been directed toward examining the effect that different communication cultures of crisis response organizations may have on interorganizational collaboration during a large scale event. These conditions could create miscommunication and conflict between organizations that are not familiar with each other's different cultures or could increase situational awareness of the crisis thereby improving crisis response. Previous discussions of interorganizational coordination have also failed to distinguish between crisis coordination and crisis collaboration. This becomes an issue if members of one crisis response organization are frustrated with others because they are really looking for crisis collaboration, but only receiving a minimal level of crisis coordination. This also becomes an issue when an organization doesn't understand that for

some crisis responses, a higher level of crisis collaboration between organizations will be necessary to manage and mitigate the effects of more dynamic, complex and larger crises.

Thus the aim of this instrumental case study was to use qualitative methods to explore and describe two crisis response organizational cultures and identify how their different communication practices may influence crisis collaboration. This chapter will answer the research questions posed for the study, discuss the implications for crisis communication and interorganizational collaboration based on the findings, and conclude with thoughts on future studies.

Research Question One: What are the primary crisis related organizational cultural features of the regional chapter of a Disaster Response Organization (DRO) and the Metropolitan Police Department (MPD)?

This investigation was framed by three research questions presented and discussed in chapter one. At the start of this study, the first research question assumed that a regional chapter of the DRO would have a different organizational culture than the MPD. This was confirmed by examining the crisis related organizational cultural features of the two organizations.

As explored in the earlier discussion, people create part of their identity through their group membership (Abrams, O'Connor, & Giles, 2002, p. 229). "Organizations tend to develop internal myths, traditions, heroes, unique symbols and language, ceremonies and customs, all of which set them off from other community bodies" (Granot, 1997, p. 306). Organizational members then use culture to identify with their organization and to also differentiate themselves, and therefore the organization as a whole, from others. While having a strong organizational culture is beneficial for the organization itself, when organizations work together to respond to a crisis it may lead to several potentially challenging issues such as closed membership boundaries

that impedes the sharing of information. These issues can negatively affect the management and mitigation of the crisis event. Therefore, it was important to identify two unique types of organizations that are typically involved in large scale crisis response and their crisis related organizational cultural features.

The emergency and disaster services unit of a regional chapter of the Disaster Relief Organization (DRO) had an organizational culture that was open and service-oriented, viewed volunteers as committed and valued members of the organization, and recognized themselves and other crisis response organizations as collaborative partners in providing successful crisis response to their community. But over the past ten years, historical, political, and economic factors at the national level of the DRO have resulted in the implementation of more bureaucratic and authoritative structures, policies, and processes on local DRO chapters. This change in the national DRO culture has been conflicting with the regional DRO's organizational culture and resulted in frustration by organizational members towards the national organization. To deal with this tension between the different cultures of the national DRO and the regional DRO chapter, leaders tried to come up with creative community-based fundraising ideas and encouraged members to always err on the side of serving the clients. This helped the regional DRO feel like they were preserving their organizational culture while having to accept more bureaucratic processes.

The regional DRO also had to deal with differences between its culture and the more bureaucratic and authoritative culture of more paramilitaristic organizations such as the fire department and the local emergency management agency (HSEM). The DRO was willing to change parts of its organizational culture in order to better serve their superordinate mission of providing relief to disaster victims. Because the local DRO viewed itself as partners and

collaborators in crisis response, it has adopted some of the cultural features of these organizations into its culture. For example, the DRO was willing to adopt the more paramilitaristic language and ICS training used by emergency management agencies, first responder organizations (e.g. fire, police, EMS), FEMA and DHS. In addition, the DRO engaged in local disaster planning and exercises with these organizations as they felt these training activities and exercises created a shared understanding of what each organizations role is in a local response and reinforced the idea that working together to prepare for disasters lead to better overall crisis response effort. This has resulted in a greater ability for the DRO to gain access and participate in larger crisis response efforts and the Metropolitan Emergency Operations Center (MEOC).

In contrast, the organizational culture of Emergency Management Unit of the Metropolitan Police Department (EMU MPD) was generally authoritative, bureaucratic and closed to out-group members or organizations. Historical factors played a part in creating its paramilitaristic culture. Several members have a military background and the emergency management structure the EMU MPD used was initially developed based on military planning and training. The structure of the organization reinforced this paramilitaristic culture by having officers with similar ranks of the military and a strict authoritative chain of command for communication and following orders and protocols for every situation. The traditional "protect and serve" mission of the police department also gave members a strong sense that they were the experts to be called upon to protect the public from dangerous people and threatening situations. The EMU MPD's expertise was also reinforced by housing several of the special response teams for day-to-day emergencies, such as bomb squad, special response team (SRT aka SWAT), harbor patrol/dive team, intelligence center, and K-9. In this respect, this organizational culture

was similar to other police cultures described by researchers (Manning, 1982; Trujillo & Dionisopoulos, 1987).

This general organizational culture translated to how the EMU MPD saw their role in preventing and mitigating crises. Crises were primarily framed as preventing acts of terrorism. Even in natural and non-intentional manmade disasters such as the 2003 power outage, they saw their role as preventing looting and moving their families to a place where they would be safe. This view reinforced their role as experts in protecting the public and the best ones able to control the inevitable chaos that would ensue from a crisis. During crisis exercises, they saw themselves as being the lead trainers in areas such as an active shooter situation where they already had an expert team in their unit. The supervisor expressed that his unit was wasting its time when larger crisis exercises or trainings did not give opportunities for them to demonstrate their expertise or enhance their skills. Other agencies involved in the exercise also had to demonstrate that they knew what they were doing and would not panic in a crisis. This focus on individual mission and roles ignored the larger purpose of enhancing overall crisis response and the important role of information sharing.

Finally, this authoritative and bureaucratic culture created very strong membership identities which, in turn, affected how its members interacted with members of other organizations. Members of the EMU MPD were more open and collegial with members from similar organizations with similar cultures. This macroculture included first responder organizations such as other police departments, fire departments and EMS, organizations with similar security missions such as private security companies and federal agencies such as FBI and ATF, and former members of the military or military organizations. However, relationships with members from organizations with dissimilar organizational cultures were more closed and

formal. Non-profit disaster relief organizations, the city Homeland Security and Emergency Management Agency (HSEM), and the public were seen as a supporting role of the EMU MPD mission. In fact, the researcher had to prompt members of the EMU MPD to discuss how they interacted with DROs since these organizations were never mentioned in interviews or planning sessions. Moreover, the public's role was to provide information on potential dangerous people or situations to the EMU MPD (i.e., the "See Something, Say Something" campaign) without any reciprocal information sharing.

The EMU MPD members also distinguished themselves from the HSEM even though both organizations were culturally similar in their shared vocabulary, structure, and protocols for emergency and crisis response. For example, EMU MPD considered HSEM a "civilian" organization even though several of its members had military backgrounds and the emergency management response structure was paramilitaristic. This was reinforced as HSEM members were classified for the FLO training as non-first responders. In addition, both were formed after the 2001 terrorist attacks and had similar missions to prevent future attacks in order to save the lives and protect the property of its citizens. This should have resulted in a natural collaborative partnership like the EMU MPD had with other law enforcement organizations. However EMU MPD members saw their organizations as too similar and felt competition in vying for similar political resources, funding and attention as HSEM. The EMU MPD saw itself as the experts and decision-makers in terrorism-related crisis situations and did not want the HSEM usurping its expertise. So EMU MPD members redefined its relationship with HSEM as a more supporting or coordinating role in crisis response, thus maintaining their expertise and separating HSEM from the larger macroculture of law enforcement and first responders.

Therefore, the crisis related organization cultures of the DRO and EMU MPD were forged in their day-to-day structures and operations. Historical and political factors also helped shape these cultures. Because these organizations also dealt with everyday emergency situations that made crisis a relatively routine experience, their organizational cultures transferred to how they saw their role in crisis response and their interaction with other organizations. These distinct organizational cultures were strong because organizational and members' identities were developed and reinforced through communication practices between members.

Research Question Two: How are the crisis related organizational cultures of the Metropolitan Police Department and the regional chapter of a Disaster Relief Organization enacted through communication practices between members?

The second research question guiding this investigation explored the communicative features of these organizational cultures. Specifically how organizational members subjectively created shared patterns of symbols and meanings through communication that defined, guided, and sometimes constrained their everyday thoughts and behaviors in organizational life. Using the four communication constructs of vocabulary, rituals, stories, and symbols, explained in chapter one, each organizational communication culture was examined through this interpretive lens.

The communication activities of the regional chapter of the DRO reflected a tension between the local service and humanitarian DRO culture and the more bureaucratic and authoritative cultures of the national DRO and other paramilitaristic organizations (i.e. fire departments and HSEM). The communication activities also reflected how the local DRO made sense of the tension and adapted to parts of these cultures while also preserving their organizational culture of service and openness.

Written and spoken vocabulary reflected a humanitarian and service oriented culture that demonstrated a respect for clients, a desire to help clients in a time of need, the organization as providing an important service to the community, and the value of volunteers as equal members in the organization. Their rites and rituals of crisis response meetings, trainings, and social events helped volunteers commit to the values of the organization and be engaged problem-solvers and decision-makers in the organization. They also reflected the organization's elevated view of volunteers as valued and active members and the organization as part of a team that partners with other organizations in crisis response. The stories that were told by DRO members reinforced the organizational culture by emphasizing the service mission of the DRO and serving members by helping them cope with tragedy and remain safe in responding to emergencies. The DRO's logo was a powerful symbol of help and humanitarianism to members and the community and was prominently displayed on member dress and on organizational materials. Members also identified their commitment to organizational values and pride of membership by wearing DRO clothing, pins, and IDs during organizational social times and in the community. Bulletin boards in the local office also supported the values of the organizational culture – serving the community by responding to fires and other disasters, positive relationships with city officials, non-profit organizations, and the community, and recognizing and valuing the contributions of staff and volunteers.

By calling the national headquarters, "National" they symbolized the national DRO as a more hierarchical, bureaucratic and authoritative "Big Brother" culture. In meetings, members discussed how "National's" culture prevented them from responding quickly in a crisis to meet the needs of the community and create long-term fundraising relationships with the community. The ritual of training was now centralized by the national headquarters to ensure that they were

learning and committing to the rules and values communicated by the national DRO. Stories now included clients who "take advantage of the system" to get money or services, which made members more suspicious of motives and took away from the service or humanitarian purpose of the organization.

The DRO staff expressed that providing disaster relief is their main mission in helping clients, but they also needed to partner with more paramilitaristic organizations such as fire departments and other emergency management agencies in order to provide those services and work together in response efforts. DRO members realized that their service culture was very different from the authoritative and bureaucratic cultures of these organizations. Therefore, some members of the DRO have adopted emergency management vocabulary to more effectively communicate with these organizations. They also learned the processes and procedures necessary to participate in the EOC by taking Incident Command System (ICS) and Professional Emergency Management (PEM) trainings. In addition, they develop relationships with members of these organizations by regularly participating in interorganizational disaster trainings and exercises.

Even though the National DRO and the paramilitaristic organizations had similar bureaucratic and organizational structures, the local DRO made sense of these organizations in different ways. It resists the National DRO culture by reinforcing its local service culture through discussions at meetings and creative fundraising activities. But it was more willing to adopt some cultural features of fire departments and emergency management agencies because it sees it as necessary steps to more successfully complete its humanitarian and service mission. This is reflective of a realization of localization of crisis response and a need to maintain a cooperative relationship with local organizations.

The EMU MPD's authoritative, bureaucratic and closed culture was also reflected in the cultural features of vocabulary, rites and rituals, stories and symbols. These communication practices defined and reified a sharply defined membership boundary, rigid organizational structure and processes, and an organizational culture of "us" versus "them".

The paramilitary vocabulary used by members labeled people and situations as "threats" and "dangerous". This gave them a shared sense of organizational mission to protect others and control these potentially dangerous people and situations. The shared pattern of language use also referenced a standard set of hierarchy and operations that shouldn't be questioned by others. Rites and rituals such as crisis planning meetings, trainings and exercises reinforced the values and rules of the organization. For example, in crisis planning meetings for the auto show, co-led by the EMU MPD supervisor, authorities regularly stated the importance for members to follow proper protocols and procedures for emergencies, terrorist threats, and protests. These rites and rituals reinforced the MPD's security focused culture by showing need to protect others from dangerous people and situations and showcase their expertise in this area during crisis trainings and exercises. Most stories offered by members described dangerous people and situations that needed the expertise of the EMU MPD to handle the emergency. These were normative lessons that reinforced a threatening and dangerous worldview and using proper protocol was the best way to prevent and mitigate harm. Symbols such as members' different style of dress or uniforms were carefully chosen to communicate authority or conceal their identity depending on the situation. Uniforms and credentials also communicated clear lines of authority and responsibility within the MPD and a shared culture with other first responders and security organizations who wore similar dress.

In addition, EMU MPD communicated an organizational culture closed to outsiders by controlling access to information about that culture. Control of information is a primary process whereby membership is signaled and maintained. Vocabulary served to separate law enforcement, first responders, and MEOC members who use similar military and paramilitary language and structures from private businesses, NGOs and the public who were not familiar with this language. Also, terms such as "need to know", "classified", and "security reasons" were often used by EMU MPD and other law enforcement personnel throughout the study to justify certain actions by the EMU MPD or law enforcement and restricted or denied access to information. The security and secrecy culture of the EMU MPD was also reinforced in the researcher's difficulty of gaining access to some rites and rituals and lack of access to other daily rites. Stories weren't readily shared by members and were sometimes self-censored by members to protect the security of the organization and its operations. Sharing stories is often a rite of integration or socialization. Therefore, sharing them freely to non-members may violate the organization's culture processes and values. Non-identification of offices and high-security measures of locations that the EMU MPD used for its operations was intentional and reflected the organization's culture. The researcher also had to be escorted by a member to gain access to these locations and information located within. This symbolized what members felt was the secret and secure nature of their work to monitor suspicious activity and protect themselves from dangerous people or threats.

The cultural constructs of vocabulary, rites and rituals, stories, and symbols were communicated by members of these two distinct organizations to reinforce their organizational culture and define boundaries of membership. However, there were times where the organizational culture and membership also were defined or reinforced by members. The EMU

MPD's closed and bureaucratic organizational culture reinforced its clear boundaries of membership. This was accomplished by member's use of insider vocabulary and restricting access to information to non-members. This in-group membership was only extended to those members in its macroculture that shared a similar organizational culture, such as other law enforcement and first responders. In contrast, the regional chapter of the DRO's culture was more open and service-oriented. This allowed members to more freely communicate and negotiate meanings when confronted with conflicting organizational cultures of the National DRO, fire department, and HSEM. This inflexible versus flexible organizational cultures also influenced how they defined and practiced crisis collaboration, as explored in the third research question.

Research Question Three: How do the differences in these two organizational communication cultures influence their ability to practice crisis collaboration?

The third research question guiding this investigation explored the impact of organizational cultural differences on collaboration. It was expected that this study would find differences in organizational communication cultures for the two crisis-response agencies examined. This is because these two organizations have different missions, skills and experiences that define their roles and responsibilities during a crisis. Therefore, the scope and time-sensitive aspect of crisis response necessitates the interactions of multiple organizations in order to successfully manage and mitigate the effects of a crisis. This is typically accomplished through larger collaboration groups such as the Metropolitan Emergency Operations Center (MEOC), of which these two organizations are members. Whether an organization and its members view working with other organizations to manage a crisis response as crisis coordination or crisis collaboration is an important distinction. As described in chapter one, crisis

coordination is a less integrated level of involvement between organizations and more focus on individual organizational goals in crisis response and mitigation. Crisis collaboration connotes a deeper partnership between organizations where the crisis response mission, decisions, and activities are jointly established and carried out. If the individual organizational cultures define these differently, then it might hinder how they interact and share information during a crisis response.

In this study, the two organization's communication cultures defined their crisis response interactions differently. The DRO's humanitarian and service-oriented organizational communication culture defined their crisis response practices as crisis collaboration with all organizations. In contrast, the EMU MPD's bureaucratic and closed organizational communication culture defined their crisis response as crisis collaboration within a macroculture of similar organizations or in-group and bureaucratic crisis coordination with others in the out-group. This lower level of coordinated response would also manifest when the EMU MPD engage in larger interorganizational response efforts or work within the Metropolitan Emergency Response Center (MEOC). This is because the MEOC's membership extends beyond the macroculture's in-group of the law enforcement and first responder community to include organizations such as hospitals, public works, and non-profit disaster relief organizations. Therefore this identification of EMU MPD as bureaucratic crisis coordination within the context of an MEOC is important to distinguish further.

These differences in worldviews of crisis response by the DRO and EMU MPD also paralleled the crisis response differences between the crisis response features of crisis coordination and crisis collaboration outlined in chapter one and revisited below (See Table 3). Added to the table is the "Organization" row to illustrate and compare the differences in the

crisis response features of the two organizations. Further evidence of differences in crisis response features between these two organizations is described below.

Goal of crisis response. The first difference between the organizations as a result of their different cultures was in the perceived goal of crisis response. The EMU MPD's concern in crisis response was crisis coordination because it was mainly interested in meeting the individual organizational goal of protecting others from terrorism and criminal activity. For example, when the EMU MPD was in-charge of an emergency response, it thought of these other groups in the out-group as providing a supportive role helping the EMU MPD fulfill their core mission. This also included the city HSEM who lead the MEOC. They also did not see themselves as an important part of larger crisis planning or response led by others if it did not involve their individual organizational goal. For example, in natural disaster response, when the city HSEM's MEOC leads the response, EMU MPD was clear that they saw natural disasters as a "non-police" response; and their role was only in providing their expertise of evacuating people, "only if 'it' hits the fan.

DRO also saw themselves as the "shelter people" and saw itself as experts in its role in crisis response. However, DRO's ultimate goal of crisis response was more crisis collaboration in that it saw its goal of help the victims of a crisis in the larger goal of managing and mitigating the overall crisis. They did not want to necessarily to gain credit as sole responders but wanted to do its part to help manage the larger response. The DRO also was willing to change parts of its organizational culture by learning and using the emergency management vocabulary and crisis response structures so they could more easily understand other agencies and effectively communicate and share information with them and the MEOC during a crisis.

Table 3

Comparison of Crisis Response Types: EMU MPD and DRO within the context of an MEOC

Crisis Response Feature	Crisis Coordination	Crisis Collaboration
Organization	*EMU MPD*	*Regional Chapter DRO*
Goal of crisis response	Concern for meeting individual organizational goal	Common definition of problem by group and agreed goal to reach
Tasks and resources	Organizations focus on "expert area" of crisis response; can lead to competing for resources or redundancies.	Realization of interdependence of organizations; results in sharing of resources and tasks to avoid redundancies.
Communication	Lack of sharing of information between organizations or one way from EOC to crisis response organizations.	Continuous flow of communication and willingness to share information between organizations and the collaborating group.
Decision-Making	Top-down orders (command-and-control) from crisis manager or incident commander to organizations.	Power and status among collaborating group members equal so participation and consensus decision-making is encouraged.
Member Trust/Loyalty	To their individual organization; sees other organizations as competitors.	To the collaborating group; sees other organizations as partners.
Organizational Boundaries	Rigid – Members identify strongly with their organizational culture; organizational boundary spanning of members is rare.	Flexible – Members more willing to adapt to fit collaborating group culture; organizational boundary spanning of members is common.

Tasks and resources. The next difference in EMU MPD's crisis coordination versus DRO's crisis collaboration was how each organization viewed its crisis response tasks and resources. EMU MPD tasks and resources focused on their expert role of preventing and mitigating terrorist threats or dangerous situations and saw other organizations as resources to support their crisis response. The HSEM which heads the coordinating MEOC group is also seen by the EMU MPD as working side by side but not together in crisis response. The EMU MPD

stated that if they were in charge of a response, they would only contact HSEM if they needed resources such as buses.

As stated earlier, the DRO does claim expertise as the "shelter people" in disaster relief. However it recognizes its lack of resources and therefore interdependence with other organizations to provide shelter services. For example, the DRO managed the shelters, but it relied on and welcomed other organizations to provide resources such as shelter locations, food service, social services, and pet sheltering. Some of this resource sharing among organizations did reflect more crisis coordination activities, especially when organizations were providing services in their "expert" area of crisis response. But there were many examples of the DRO recognizing and accepting its interdependence with the community, the media, and other organizations so they could provide the resources necessary for successful crisis response. The outcome of sharing of resources and tasks was necessary in order to provide the most comprehensive services and assistance to fire and disaster victims. This interdependence also helped the DRO view its relationships with those organizations as partnerships rather than independent crisis response organizations working in conjunction with one another.

Communication. Communication is the third crisis response feature that was affected by the different organizational cultures. The EMU MPD's crisis response communication was clearly identified as crisis coordination because it consisted of tightly controlled information sharing. Sensitive information was only communicated by members to a few organizations considered in their in-group because they shared a similar organizational culture. Those organizations outside of their in-group macroculture were only allowed information to be shared on a "need to know" basis determined by the EMU MPD. Information about threats or dangerous

people was also encouraged to be communicated by other out-group organizations and to the EMU MPD without any reciprocal information sharing.

In contrast, the DRO's culture conveyed a willingness to share information and keep lines of communication open with continuous meetings with other organizations often initiated by DRO. This even occurred when they felt tension or competition with the Salvation Army for resources or community recognition. They also saw crisis trainings and exercises as a way to create a shared understanding of what each organizations role is in a local response and reinforced the idea that working together to prepare for disasters lead to better overall crisis response effort. Again, their willingness to learn and adopt the use of the ICS and paramilitaristic vocabulary of the MEOC, law enforcement and first responders reflected their goal of improving communication and increasing information sharing with these organizations. This reflected a more crisis collaboration approach to communication.

Decision-making. Next, the EMU MPD's culture reflected their bureaucratic approach of coordinated decision-making in crisis response. Their organization's day-to-day emergency response culture involved a very hierarchical structure of top-down decision-making. However, the Incident Command System (ICS) and NIMS structure mandated for larger crisis response and used by the MEOC reinforced this same crisis coordination decision-making structure. Therefore it was readily accepted and used by members of the EMU MPD. When they were considered the experts for a particular crisis response (i.e. active shooter or bomb threat), they were considered the incident command to coordinate the crisis response. They then expected to make the decisions and other organizations to follow their orders. They also accepted following orders of others if they were not the incident commander of the response. This is because it was outside their area of expertise.

The DRO's service-oriented culture allowed them to work collaboratively with other organizations and share decision-making. It initiated meetings with other organizations such as the Salvation Army and SART to discuss how to improve sheltering during disasters. It encouraged members to participate as victims in other organization's crisis exercises so they could more effectively practice crisis response plans. They saw these meetings and exercises as opportunities to learn from others and engage in problem-solving and collaborate with several organizations so they could better serve their clients.

Member trust/loyalty. Member trust and loyalty was the next crisis response feature difference between the EMU MPD and DRO. The EMU MPD's security-minded and closed culture resulted in a high level of member loyalty to their organization and trust with members from other organizations in their in-group macroculture. However, outsiders could not be trusted with the same level of information as insiders because they did not have similar cultures. For example, hospital security chiefs felt law enforcement organizations such as the EMU MPD didn't have mutual respect for them because they didn't share information with them like the city HSEM did.

The HSEM was also seen as a competitor rather than ally because they had similar crisis response mission that threatened the EMU MPD's identity. Members maintained loyalty to the EMU MPD by redefining the HSEM as a resource coordinator or supportive role and interacting with them as such to maintain this distinction. By vigorously defining their membership boundaries and member loyalty to that organizational boundary, the EMU MPD culture prevents crisis collaboration from occurring.

Juxtaposed against the EMU MPD, the DRO clearly identified other organizations as partners in crisis response and were loyal to that greater collaborative partnership. The DRO

used words and phrases like "partner", "team", and "we're there together" to convey a reciprocal

crisis collaboration relationship of trust and support among other organizations it interacted with

for daily fire response and larger disaster response. Similar to the EMU MPD, members of the

DRO were loyal to the organization and did feel competition with the Salvation Army because

they had similar missions of providing disaster relief to victims. They also competed for funding

from the community and media recognition. However the leadership of the two organizations

decided to form a strong collaborative relationship by sharing leadership of the local VOAD

group, running joint service centers for certain emergencies, and meeting regularly to work out

tensions when they arose between the two groups.

Organizational boundaries. As stated in chapter one, creating identity through

organizational culture also creates and maintains organizational boundaries. Boundaries can be

either rigid or more flexible through the use of both physical (e.g., badges, uniforms, etc.) and

informational means (e.g., stories, jargon, etc.). Abrams, O'Connor and Giles (2002) stated that

organizational members maintain rigid boundaries between in-group and out-group identities by

developing different ways of communicating within the organization and externally to others (p.

230). It is through these communicative actions that "members display their belongingness to

the organization as well as their opposition to those outside the organization" (Trujillo &

Dionisopoulos, 1987, p. 199), as well as "constitute a system of common social meanings and

shared interpretive schema within an organization" (Trujillo & Dionisopoulos, 1987, p. 199).

The EMU MPD's organizational culture reinforced crisis coordination as opposed to

collaboration because it was unwilling to engage in boundary spanning activities with other

organizations outside of their in-group macroculture. EMU MPD also had rigid organizational

boundaries due to its culture of expertise and secrecy. Members did not have institutional

familiarity and cultural similarity with organizations outside of law enforcement, security and other first responder organizations. In addition, they did not interact regularly with the DRO in day-to-day operations or during special events. Therefore, boundary spanning activities were not initiated by members of the EMU MPD toward the DRO or other out-group organizations.

In contrast, the DRO already had a crisis collaboration group culture in how it viewed crisis response and a more flexible organizational boundary. The DRO had boundary permeability because it was fluid it its membership and relied mostly on volunteers who came from a wide variety of other organizations such as emergency managers, school principals, nurses, fire fighters, business leaders, and social workers. This allowed members to act as boundary spanners with other organizations as they had previous trusted relationships with members and understood their unique organizational culture. It also worked regularly with cultural dissimilar organizations such as the fire department and city officials in its daily operations or in response to smaller emergencies. It too recognized that it had a different crisis response culture than that of first responders and the HSEM MEOC. Therefore, members were willing to adopt some of the language, training, and ICS command and control structure in order to be able to participate in larger crisis response efforts. DRO volunteers also came from a wide variety of other crisis response organizations, either as current employees or recently retired. This allowed members to act as boundary spanners with those organizations as they had previous trusted relationships with members and better understood their different organizational culture.

In summary, the EMU MPD's organizational communication culture allowed it to engage in crisis collaboration with culturally similar or in-group organizations part of a larger macroculture but prevented it from having a crisis collaboration relationship with culturally different or out-group organizations. This resulted in a crisis coordination view of crisis response

by EMU MPD, since the MEOC and many crisis responses involve working with these out-group organizations. This "us versus them" culture also inherently constrains collaboration. This was evident in the tension and frustration communicated by members of those out-group organizations who wanted a crisis collaboration relationship with the MPD.

The DRO's more open and service-oriented culture allowed it to view crisis response as crisis collaboration and to engage in a more collaborative relationship with other organizations. This organizational culture also allowed for members to redefine and modify their culture in order to maintain crisis collaboration relationships with culturally different organizations.

This study has explored and described the cultures of two crisis response organizations and identified their distinct crisis response worldviews of coordination and collaboration. The next section discusses the implications of these findings for interorganizational collaboration of crisis response and crisis communication.

Overall Implications for Crisis Communication and Collaboration

The findings of this study illustrate that the two different organizational communication cultures of the EMU MPD and regional chapter of the DRO resulted in two different worldviews of how organizations think they should work together and communicate with each other when responding to a crisis. The findings also suggest that these different worldviews give rise to processed, structures, and procedures of crisis coordination and crisis collaboration that are cultural artifacts of the organizations. For example, this study discovered that crisis response organizations like the EMU MPD whose culture is a more hierarchical, authoritative and bureaucratic organization adopted a bureaucratic coordination perspective featuring tightly focused rules and ridged roles. Whereas the DRO that is more of an open, service-oriented and interdependent culture adopted a collaboration structure characterized more by relationships and

value statements. The organizational culture determines what coordination or collaboration structure is the most natural match and therefore most easily accepted and adopted by the organization.

Therefore, once cannot assume the three perspectives of crisis coordination described by Tierney (2005) can easily be imposed on an organization or coordinating group as ways to improve coordination/collaboration and communication. As discussed in chapter one, Tierney (2005) proposed the structural and network perspectives are better alternatives to the bureaucratic perspective because they allow more flexibility for involvement of emerging groups and the changing disaster situation. Similarly, Drabek (2003) proposed that his emergent multi-organizational network perspective allows for emergency managers to respond to the unique needs of each disaster. But the network structure can also make coordination and information sharing more difficult because trust is needed between network members that may not be established in comparison to long-established teams or bureaucratic structures. As seen in this study, trust in other organizations, especially out-group organizations, is a cultural artifact of organizations not a structural artifact.

The current study suggests that if an organization's culture does not match the crisis coordination or collaboration structure, then two things may occur. First, the mismatch may lead to a rejection of that structure by organizational members. These members may then revert to the coordination or collaboration structure that best matches their culture. Second, the mismatch may be so alien and disconnected from the culture that they have great difficulty understanding and following the processes and procedures dictated by the structure. This could lead to organization members choosing not to participate in coordination activities. Either of these outcomes could result in information that would help manage and mitigate the crisis more quickly and effectively

not being shared. This culture and structure mismatch also aligns with Weick's (1990) argument that organizational members in crisis response "under pressure, those responses acquired more recently and practiced less often, should unravel sooner than those acquired less recently and practiced more often, which have become more habitual. Thus, requisite variety [the relative variety of enactment capacity available within an organization] may disappear right when it is most needed" (p. 577).

Matching the organizational culture with the crisis coordination or crisis collaboration process and structure is a new way of understanding the needs of crisis response agencies. This approach may assist organizational leaders and emergency managers quickly identify and understand the crisis coordination or collaboration worldview of their organization and take into account the coordination perspective of other organization with whom they interact. However, this does not solve the potential communication and information sharing issues that may occur when organizations with different coordinating perspectives must work together to manage and mitigate a larger crisis. Crisis coordinating groups, such as an EOC, cannot assume that training and exercising a particular coordination structure, process and procedures will automatically result in every organization understanding and adopting that worldview during a crisis response. For example, because an EOC uses the ICS structure that takes a bureaucratic coordination perspective, it cannot assume that organizations with similar cultures to the DRO will understand all of the cultural assumptions that are wrapped up in that coordinating perspective. In addition, if an EOC moves to adopt a more crisis collaboration structure, as I argue in the next section, it also cannot assume that first responder organizations will automatically start sharing information more freely with organizations or emergent groups that it doesn't work with on a regular basis.

This investigation suggests that the different crisis coordination and crisis collaboration worldviews need to first be understood by crisis management groups, such as an EOC, and the organizations involved in those groups. Then additional planning and management process need to be developed in order to ensure effective interorganizational communication and collaboration during a crisis response. This next section discusses why crisis collaboration should be the superordinate goal of EOCs, how to develop internal EOC processes to increase crisis collaboration, and how to identify the potential adverse effects of individual organizational communication cultures on an EOC.

Crisis Collaboration as the Superordinate Goal of EOCs

Crisis management groups, such as an EOC, must contend with the complexities of a crisis under time constraints and lack of resources sufficient to handle the crisis alone. Therefore, communities and governments have chosen different levels of coordination plans and policies such as the National Response Framework or mutual aid agreements that detail how coordination should occur between organizations in crisis response. As noted earlier, crisis coordination and crisis collaboration are two fundamentally different ways for EOCs to manage a crisis response.

Crisis coordination is necessary, but may not always be sufficient for an effective response. Coordination can be an acceptable level of response for everyday emergencies (e.g., fires, highway accidents, etc.) and responding to smaller crises (e.g., a bad snowstorm, seasonal flooding, city-wide foodborne outbreak, etc.). In this and other cases, crisis collaboration may not be the desired strategy or outcome due to characteristics of the emergency manager, characteristics of the disaster, and characteristics of the community. However, it should be a purposeful decision and not based on the fact that coordination is easier or because the EOC

manager isn't aware of the distinction between the two. The unpredictable and dynamic nature of crises and the inherent time pressures of response also increase the difficulty and complexity of managing the response beyond day-to-day emergency response and thus requires a more collaborative rather than coordinated effort. It is too easy for an organization or a macroculture of culturally similar organizations (i.e. first responders) to focus on their own tasks and work independently instead of understanding how their role during a crisis fits with the entire response effort (Auf der Heide, 1989).

Crisis coordination has also focused too much on interoperability of communication systems between organizations instead of information sharing as a way to improve communication between organizations. Again if organizations are too focused on their own tasks and goals during a crisis response they may filter out information they receive that is important for the overall crisis response effort and not share it. In addition, if they do not trust how out-group organizations will use "sensitive" or "classified" information, they will label information as "need to know" and won't feel a duty to share it even if it the information is considered useful or necessary for crisis response operations by the other organizations or larger response effort. In other words, these organizations may have 800 MHz radios that can talk to one another, but if they do not realize the information they have is important to share with other organizations or they don't trust how members will use the information, then they won't push the button to talk.

Crisis collaboration should therefore be the target outcome of interorganizational crisis response because it allows for more flexible response targeted to the emerging dynamics of the situation and those groups that naturally emerge to respond to and manage a crisis. Crisis collaboration also more closely aligns with the role of communication in a crisis today that is also dynamic and information is freely shared among the public, media, and crisis response

organizations. This provides opportunity for all members of the EOC to go beyond individual organizations coordinating actions to create an alliance in which they value member interdependence, equal input of participants, and shared decisions making. Then all organizations can reach their shared goal of effective crisis response and mitigation, even under severe time and decision-making pressures.

But as Eaton and Brandenburg suggest, "forced partnerships cannot penetrate to a deeper level [of collaboration] without cultural acceptance from all partners" (2008, p. 105). Putnam and Stohl's bona fide group perspective (1990) illustrates that group membership and group environmental characteristics can influence communication practices. This is especially evident for groups, such as EOCs, that have members who represent individual organizations. Therefore the organizational communication cultures of individual organizations that are a part of an EOC can have a negative impact on crisis collaboration efforts. For example, if the EOC allows member organizations that have a more crisis coordination organizational culture to supersede EOC collaboration efforts, then the lack of information sharing and increase in conflicts between organizations may increase. This could then result in overall poor decision-making, time delays in action, or inadvertently increasing the harm during a crisis response.

In order to understand this, the focus needs to be on EOC internal processes and the external environments, which have an equally important effect on crisis collaboration (see Figure 6). By identifying the potential adverse effects of individual organizational communication cultures on an EOC via the bona fide group perspective, one can then develop internal EOC processes to increase crisis collaboration. In addition, individual organizations, including the EOC, need to become more aware of how their organizational communication culture can affect larger crisis collaboration efforts.

Figure 6: **EOC as viewed through a bona fide group perspective.**

Next, we will discuss how EOC managers can develop internal EOC processes to help increase interorganizational crisis collaboration.

Develop Internal EOC Processes to Increase Crisis Collaboration

To increase crisis collaboration of EOCs, one must first understand where on the continuum of crisis coordination and collaboration it currently stands. The HSEM MEOC, and many other EOCs, are required to follow the federal National Response Framework (FEMA, 2013) so they can get access to federal funding to assist with emergency management planning and disaster relief efforts. As stated in chapter one, the NRF is a bureaucratic approach to crisis coordination because it's structure is very command and control. It has an incident command system (ICS) with a very top-down hierarchical structure, centralization of power, and

standardized and inflexible set of policies and procedures. Its boundaries are rigidly defined and information is not widely shared. Therefore, there is a fundamental tension and contradiction built into this traditional emergency management function between a vigorously defended boundary and membership (like EMU MPD) and the need to collaborate with others. The "us versus them" is evident in these organizations, a condition that inherently constrains collaboration.

One cannot expect EOCs to easily change from a crisis coordination culture to one of crisis collaboration. Most managers that run EOCs come from a military or paramilitary background steeped in bureaucratic processes and will tend to fall back on those when placed in high-stress, decision-making situations (Harrald, 2006). But these leaders can identify where their current EOC culture and communication practices result in hindrances to crisis collaboration and information sharing, such as the example above. They can then employ various cultural strategies (Drabek, 2003) to move the EOC along the continuum toward increased crisis collaboration. An EOC organizational communication culture assessment is recommended, such as the one done by the researcher with the DRO and EMU MPD for this study, to determine which cultural strategies might be most effective. However, based on the information gathered from this study, the general cultural strategies that follow may help foster interorganizational understanding and communication among EOC members.

Be aware how the organizational culture of the EOC affects members. As discussed earlier, EOCs use a bureaucratic approach to crisis coordination. Therefore, one first needs to increase awareness of how the EOCs culture of crisis coordination affects how members interact within the crisis response organization. For example, ICS training states that members should not use agency-specific jargon, acronyms or radio codes (NIMS, 2008, p. 29). However, this fails to

realize that ICS vocabulary in itself uses many acronyms and terminology that may be familiar with some organizational members, such as first responders and paramilitary groups like the EMU MPD, and unfamiliar with others, like the DRO, because it is not a part of their everyday organizational culture. Many ICS procedures were taken from military and fire service emergency response sources; and therefore tend to be steeped in militaristic and paramilitaristic language. Some organizations, such as the DRO, have recognized this and undergone the required ICS training in order to learn the vocabulary. However there will be times when emergent groups will need to be involved in a response. EOC managers then need to be hyper-aware of this possibility and take time to explain jargon or have a quick list of common terminology ready to review with these members at the beginning of a response. This could make the overall response effort more effective because these organizations could more easily understand other agencies and effectively communicate with them during a crisis.

Create shared understanding of crisis collaboration by EOC members and organizations. The second cultural strategy is to understand what level of collaboration the EOC and its members expect when working together in a response. For the purposes of this study, it has been demonstrated that the EMU MPD has a more bureaucratic approach to crisis coordination while the DRO has more of a crisis collaboration approach. Therefore, one can infer that the DRO could become frustrated if the EMU MPD or other culturally similar crisis coordination organizations don't see them as partners. Conflicts could also arise between crisis collaboration and crisis coordination organizations if they feel those organizations aren't sharing information with them during a response. Admittedly, there was no direct observation of this in the study between the DRO and EMU MPD. However, frustrations were shared in a meeting by members representing hospitals and the HSEM who wanted more of a collaborative information

sharing relationship with the MPD. An EOC must then clearly define understandings and expectations for crisis collaboration efforts during a crisis response. This must include a discussion of the EOC mission and values, a common goal to reach in crisis response, and agreement by members to share information and participate in consensus decision-making. This needs to mainly occur in EOC planning meetings or incorporated in crisis exercises, but also needs to be emphasized again at the beginning of each crisis response as new EOC members or organizations may be involved.

Understand that good communication is more than interoperability. Lack of interoperability of communications equipment between organizations has been demonstrated to be a barrier in past high profile crises. But as demonstrated in this study, training on interoperability of communications equipment needs to go beyond the how to work the device to explaining how sharing information helps consensus decision-making and increases the effectiveness of the overall response. This also could be demonstrated by developing an exercise that has information integral to the response spread across culturally dissimilar EOC organizations. Therefore in order for the response to be effective, groups must share this information with each other and the decision-making unit back in the EOC.

Foster interorganizational understanding and communication among EOC members and organizations. Many of these organizations involved in crisis response do not necessarily work together on daily operations or to manage routine emergency responses. Researchers (Auf der Heide, 1989; Bennington, Shetler, & Shaw, 2003; Kapucu, 2006; Tushman & Scalan, 1981) suggest that time spent together on joint crisis planning and exercises and the development of informal network relationships among EOC organization members can help build trust and the process of negotiating meaning of crisis response and management through communication. For

example, in chapter four, the EMU MPD was part of an Auto Show security planning group. The familiarity of working day-to-day with these organizations and years of planning Auto Show security resulted in a high level of trust, teamwork, and willingness to put forth extra effort to ensure that collaboration and successful crisis response occurred among these organizations. Although this group consisted of a macroculture of similar organizations, these results could be replicated by an EOC whose members have more unit diversity. This can be done in a couple of ways.

First, trainings and exercises need to be structured to involve more of a cross-section of diverse units that may be involved in a crisis. This will allow organizations to become more familiar with the valuable resources other organizations provide to enable a successful response. Also, crisis planning meetings should occasionally give time for organization representatives to discuss what skills and strengths they bring to an EOC and crisis response. This will also allow non-first responder organizations a chance to make their case as to why they are integral to an effective response and hopefully elevate them on a more equal level as first responder organizations. As discussed in chapter three, the DRO leadership knew they didn't work with all organizations of EOC on a regular basis. So participation in crisis planning meetings and training exercises was invaluable for them because they could correct assumptions other organizations have about what they do and do not do in crisis response. They also understood that it helped them develop relationships with people in other organizations so they would be more willing to contact the DRO if a crisis were to occur.

Second, more organizations, such as businesses, faith-based organizations, and community groups, need to be invited to participate in crisis planning and exercises. The recently updated 2013 version of the National Response Framework (NRF) states it is "intended to be used by the

whole community" and how organizations like those mentioned above should be "full partners in incident response" (2013, p.4). This change has been primarily driven by FEMA's Whole Community framework (FEMA, 2013). As FEMA and the newest NRF recognize, these organizations can bring great value as members of an EOC because they are typically the first groups to mobilize during a crisis. They have strong community networks already established and can reach the public, especially vulnerable populations, more quickly with valuable information and resources. However these groups are typically only afterthoughts by EOC managers during a response unless the particular group is specifically impacted by the crisis. Having them involved in crisis planning and exercises, strengthens the ability of EOCs to respond when official resources have difficulty gaining access to a community in the first 24 to 48 hours of a crisis. These organizations can also help EOCs better manage the spontaneous volunteers and groups that naturally emerge during a crisis response. This also gives these groups access to learning the culture of the EOC so there is not such a large gap in understanding when they naturally emerge to become part of a crisis response.

Finally, organizations like the DRO can help EOCs facilitate this whole community approach to crisis planning, training and response. In this study, the DRO had shown to be cognizant of the localization of crisis response and a need to maintain a collaborative relationship with local organizations and the community. Its willingness to also adopt some cultural features of emergency management agencies to be more involved in EOCs can be a powerful model and bridge between EOCs and these non-first responder organizations.

Understanding the crisis response organizational culture of an EOC and improving the internal processes would create a unique and strong collaborative organizational culture. This crisis collaboration culture would encourage the flow of information and rewards risk sharing,

empowerment of members, and innovation (Westrum 2004). However focusing on EOC internal processes alone will not be enough to lessen the adverse effects individual organizational communication cultures could have on an EOC and crisis response. This next section will address those issues.

Increasing Awareness of How Individual Organizational Communication Cultures Affects EOC Crisis Collaboration

Stress and ambiguity during a crisis response create conditions in which EOC members may forget to utilize the emergency operations procedures which detail how interorganizational collaboration should occur. Instead members may revert to their own organization's way of communicating and handling a crisis which may be more crisis coordination than collaboration. Therefore, individual organizations need to become more aware of how their organizational communication culture can affect an EOC and larger crisis collaboration efforts. They then can adapt strategies to lessen the barriers to interorganizational crisis collaboration.

Be aware how their organizational communication culture affects EOC crisis collaboration. Organizations first need to understand how their cultural constructs such as vocabulary, rites and rituals, stories and symbols, defines, guides and sometimes constrains how they communicate with other organizations during crisis response. As demonstrated in this study, EMU MPD's bureaucratic view of crisis coordination doesn't affect their day-to-day emergency response because they typically don't work with organizations culturally different from them. But crisis coordination organizations like the EMU MPD need to understand how their different organizational cultures of crisis response organizations may create miscommunication and conflict during larger crisis response just as different countries encounter communication difficulties when attempting intercultural communication (Hofstede, 2001).

Crisis collaboration organizations, such as the DRO, also need to be aware how they might unintentionally defer to crisis coordination organizations because they value and rely on these organizations to more successfully complete their humanitarian and service mission. Therefore they assume the same reciprocal type of relationship and information sharing from other organizations. For example, because the DRO had a smaller staff they didn't always send a member to the MEOC but assumed they would be called if they were needed or would receive the information they needed during a response. However, by not being in the room and a part of the EOC conversations the DRO may miss out of valuable information sharing that could help in its crisis response efforts that crisis coordination organizations didn't think would be important to share. This overvaluation of partnership relationships may result in crisis collaboration organizations having fewer opportunities to assert themselves as equal partner in crisis response and shared decision-making in the EOC. Studies like this one can help organizations with this awareness, which is often a first step in organizational cultural change. Another way individual organizations can increase crisis collaboration in an EOC is by encouraging boundary spanning between members of their organization and other crisis response organizations.

Increased boundary spanning of organizational members. Leadership of individual crisis response organizations should encourage boundary spanning among organizations culturally different from them. As discussed earlier, boundary spanning is when organizational members reach across the boundaries of their group or organizational membership in order to seek or share information and resources in order to reduce uncertainty or make decisions. However boundary spanning is inhibited when organizations do not have an already developed relationship or feel they cannot trust other organizations with information.

To increase boundary spanning among culturally dissimilar organizations, they need to increase boundary permeability (flexibility and fluidity in membership of crisis response organizations) and institutionally familiarity (knowledge and understanding of other organizations) (Batteau, Brandenburg, Seeger, and Eaton, 2007). This can be accomplished through frequent communication among crisis response organizations in the form of non-response related informal networking and involvement in interorganizational crisis response planning meetings, trainings, and exercises. Informal networking can be facilitated through intermediary organizations that the other two organizations have a previously developed and trusting relationship. For example, this study illustrated that both the DRO and EMU MPD have a good relationship with the fire department. This is because the fire department works with both of these organizations in regular emergency response operations. So the fire department can use their positive relationship with these two organizations to facilitate trust and relationship building between the EMU MPD and DRO. Or the DRO could ask the fire department to set up a meeting to initiate a networking relationship between it and the EMU MPD. Organizational leadership, therefore, should identify what interorganizational relationships need to be developed or improved and then identify intermediary organizations to facilitate this networking.

Organizational leadership also needs to understand the value of boundary spanning and allow its members to be involved in interorganizational collaboration groups such as the EOC and its activities. In this study, both the DRO and EMU MPD touted the benefits of being involved in interorganizational collaborative organizations such as Volunteer Organizations Active in Disasters (VOAD) and the Auto Show security planning group. Years of involvement in these groups increased institutional familiarity so they could trust other organizations with information and make efforts to reduce conflicts between the organizations, especially when they were vying

for similar funding resources. Therefore organizational leaders need to realize that they can achieve these same beneficial outcomes for their organization by encouraging and valuing organizational members' full participation in EOC planning meetings and activities. Then information sharing during a crisis can more freely flow between all crisis response organizations and increase overall effectiveness of a response because members now know and trust other interorganizational members.

Full participation also includes participation in these activities when they don't include a direct practice or demonstration of that individual organization's expertise. For example, the EMU MPD realized that they play a supporting role to the fire department during a fire incident and are fine with that designation. But it also needs to understand that playing a supporting role in EOC exercises is still an important function that helps increase trust and information sharing among organizations.

Individual organization awareness of their own organizational communication culture and leadership encouragement of boundary spanning by members will lessen the rigid boundary defining tendencies of organizational membership identity and facilitate crisis collaboration of an EOC.

This study demonstrated that individual organizational cultures can result in different worldviews of how they communicate and collaborate in crisis response. This in turn can have adverse effects on the effectiveness of the crisis response activities of an EOC. But these effects can be mitigated by EOC managers focusing on improving internal EOC processes and individual organizational leadership's awareness of how their organizational culture can affect crisis collaboration and information sharing and encouraging members' boundary spanning

efforts. The next section provides limitations of the study's findings and directions for future research.

<div align="center">**Limitations and Future Studies**</div>

Limitations

There are three limitations which should be taken into account in interpreting and applying the results of this study. First, the researcher had more access in terms of type of data and observation hours with the DRO than with the EMU MPD. As noted previously, the researcher was not able to gain full access to the EMU MPDs daily organizational life for security reasons. Therefore, it was necessary to make some inferences, albeit grounded, that the EMU MPDs organizational culture could be identified and described through member interviews and interorganizational planning meetings. However, as stated in chapter four, access to information clearly followed membership patterns, and therefore helped to inform the researcher of the closed organizational communication culture and rigid membership boundaries of the EMU MPD.

Second, the researcher was not able to view how the DRO and EMU MPD interacted with each other within the MEOC group. No large-scale crisis or exercise occurred during the study to observe the interaction of the two organizations. The researcher was able to observe a three-day crisis response exercise by the MEOC to test a new communication collaboration software package to potentially be used in crisis response. But neither the DRO nor the MPD participated in the exercise and therefore, their interaction could not be observed. The MEOC also hasn't been involved in a large organizational crisis response for over a decade.

Third, due to the qualitative nature of this study, the findings from this study are not generalizable to all EOCs. This evidence describes two crisis response organizational cultures

and identifies how their different communication practices may influence crisis collaboration of an EOC. But external environmental factors such as politics, history, and location are different for each EOC and therefore make them unique entities. For example, due to its geographic location, the MEOC has less frequency and experience responding to a large scale natural disaster than metropolitan cities located in hurricane or earthquake prone areas. Therefore future studies could compare interorganizational collaboration efforts of two different EOCs to better determine generalizability of these findings.

However given these limitations, the study's findings do add to the research literature and expands the understanding of interorganizational crisis communication and crisis collaboration to present some future research directions in these areas.

Future Research Directions

Given the findings of this study, there are several avenues of future research that can both expand the research literature and improve crisis preparedness and response activities by practitioners. First, subsequent studies should explore whether members of an EOC group are aware of and understand the difference between crisis coordination and crisis collaboration. If there are differences in the meanings of "coordination" and "collaboration" among EOC members, it could be one of the sources of conflict and stress during a response. This problem could further result in issues of information sharing, resource sharing, decision-making, and lack of trust among EOC members and their organizations if not addressed by EOC managers and individual organization leadership. Additional research to determine how well EOCs are integrating the new Whole Community Framework, emphasized in the 2013 version of the National Response Framework, could measure the trend toward collaboration as the revision appears to support a more interorganizational collaboration view of crisis response.

In addition, this distinction between crisis coordination and crisis collaboration could help crisis communication scholars better identify cases of crisis collaboration or "best practices" that EOCs can then utilize to increase crisis collaboration efforts. Studies could then test, for example, whether the cultural strategies of increasing communication cultural awareness by organizations and different EOC internal processes identified in this study actually increase crisis collaboration.

This distinction can also help EOC managers better determine if crisis coordination or crisis collaboration is the better strategy for a particular response. For example, studies could ascertain and categorize what characteristics of the emergency manager, characteristics of the disaster, and characteristics of the community and in what combination would work best for which strategy.

Future studies should also observe crisis coordination and crisis collaboration organizations within EOC planning meetings, exercises, and actual crisis response. Direct observations of how different organizational communication cultures interact during EOC crisis planning meetings and exercises could help EOC managers and organizational leadership identify barriers to interorganizational collaboration. In addition, observing the dynamics of how these organizations interact within an EOC during a real-time crisis response will ideally yield important information to facilitate organizational learning and change. These lessons learned can then be implemented in future EOC crisis preparedness activities and response.

Finally, scholars such as Tierney and Drabek have focused on the collaboration and coordination problem primarily through an emphasis on structures, processes and procedures. Organizational culture has been largely overlooked. Subsequent studies should examine culture more closely including seeking to understand the creation of a larger supra-culture that might

encompass the various response agencies as subcultures. Part of this approach might include examining the impact of crisis events as culturally unifying experiences. Agencies that have worked together to manage a significant crisis might learn about other organizations and come to see themselves as part of a larger community of responders.

Overall Conclusion

Recent history has indicated that crises are becoming more frequent rather than exceptional events. Communities, therefore, need to expect and prepare for a more unpredictable, dynamic, and large scale crises, whether they are a natural disasters, a pandemic influenza outbreaks, or a terrorist events. Dozens and sometimes even hundreds of organizations, often with very different missions, methods, technologies and cultures will be called upon to work together in order to mitigate the crisis and assist in the recovery efforts. Although several interorganizational coordination perspectives and strategies have been proposed by researchers and practitioners, they have neglected to examine how the different organizational communication cultures of crisis response organizations involved in an EOC may affect crisis collaboration efforts. Previous studies have also disregarded the important distinction between crisis coordination and crisis collaboration and the challenges and benefits of each to crisis response efforts of EOCs. The findings of this study offer important new evidence not previously explored in interorganizational crisis collaboration. Therefore this study is an important first step in understanding the importance of these concepts in successful communication during crisis response.

APPENDIX A

Logbook of Data Collection and Codenames

DRO	Date	Time Frame	Location	Description
Fieldnotes #1	10/19/2010	1.5 hrs.	Chapter HQ	Mtg. with Des to discuss study and observation opportunities
Fieldnotes #2	10/26/2010	5 min	Phone	Phone conversations with Des re: severe storms
Fieldnotes #3	11/13/2010	7 hrs.	Training Center	SART Meeting, Co-Sheltering Workshop
Fieldnotes #4	12/3/2010	2.5 hrs.	Chapter HQ	Volunteer Christmas Party
Fieldnotes #5	12/6/2010	2.25 hrs.	Chapter HQ	Mtgs. with Jim, Michelle, and Des
Fieldnotes #6	12/6/2010	3 hrs.	Fire Response	2 fire responses calls with DRO volunteer team
Fieldnotes #7	12/7/2010	2 hrs.	Fire Response	Fire response call with DRO volunteer team
Fieldnotes #8	1/13/2010	1 hr.	Fire Response	Fire response call with DRO volunteer team
Fieldnotes #8	1/25/2010	1.5 hrs.	Local High School	Des presentation to DRO High School club meeting
Fieldnotes #10	2/12/2011	3 hrs.	Chapter HQ	Quarterly Volunteer Meeting
Fieldnotes #11	2/14/2011	2 hrs.	Salvation Army Office	Case Worker interviews of 5 families recent fire response
Interview #1	2/17/2011	1.5 hrs.	Chapter HQ	Interview with Des, ES Director
Interview #2	2/17/2011	1 hr.	Chapter HQ	Interview with Ken, Mgr. Dis. Services - Part 1
Interview #3	3/1/2011	1.75 hrs.	Chapter HQ	Interview with Ken, Mgr. Dis. Services - Part 2
Fieldnotes #12	10/6/10- 2/24/11		Electronic	Emails between Researcher and DRO members

Additional DRO Documents
2009 Chapter Disaster Plan
2004 Exercise Controller/Evaluator Handbook
DRO Training Schedule - Jan-April 2011
DRO Recovery & Information Booklet
DRO Little Red Book
DRO DAT Mtg. Handouts 2/13/11
DRO Postcard

DRO SEM Website – Captured on 4/26/2011
DRO Annual Report 2008-2009
DRO Regional Blog – Captured on 4/26/2011
DRO Regional Facebook - Captured on 4/26/2011
DRO Regional Twitter - Captured on 4/26/2011
DRO 901 Form

EMU MPD	Date	Time Frame	Location	Description
Fieldnotes #1	10/26/2010	2 hrs.	Auto Show HQ	Auto Show Security Mtg. #1
Fieldnotes #2	11/10/2010	.5 hr.	EMU MPD Office	Mtg. with Sam re: Study
Fieldnotes #3	11/18/2010	1.5 hrs.	MPD Station	Auto Show Security Mtg. #2 - Law Enforcement Only
Fieldnotes #4	12/14/2010	6 hrs.	Local Hotel	Fusion Liaison Officer Training - Non First Responders
Fieldnotes #5	12/16/2010	1.75 hrs.	Convention Center	Auto Show Security Mtg. #3
Interview #1	12/16/2010	1 hr.	EMU MPD Office	Interview with Sam - General Operations
Fieldnotes #6	1/18/2011	2 hrs.	EMU MPD Office/Convention Center	Auto Show Visit; Interview #2 with Sam
Interview #2A	3/16/2011	.5 hr.	EMU MPD Office	Interview with Michael Part A
Interview #2B	3/17/2011	1 hr.	EMU MPD Office	Interview with Michael Part B
Fieldnotes #7	3/16/2011	3 hrs.	EMU MPD Office	Talking with Sam while waiting for Michael
Fieldnotes #8	10/6/10-3/8/11		Electronic	Emails between Researcher and EMU MPD members
EMU MPD Memos	Various			Researcher thoughts/frustrations with access

Additional EMU MPD Documents	
Auto Show Ops. Plan for 2011	Notes only, could not obtain actual plan
Auto Show Agendas/Packets Oct. 26 Mtg., Nov. 18 Mtg., Dec. 16 Mtg.	Handouts from attending mtgs.
Auto Show Threat Assessment	Electronic, received Jan. 2011
Non-First Responder FLO Training Invitation Paperwork	Electronic
FLO Training Agenda & Attendance Sheet	Handouts, Dec. 14 training

CIP-Desk Brochure				Handout, Dec. 14 training
Auto Show/HSEM				
Field Notes #1	1/15/2011	2.25 hrs.	Auto Show, Security Office	Auto Show Visit 2; Talk with Dir. HSEM, and Auto Show Sec. Staff
Fieldnotes #2	1/23/2011	.5 hr.	Auto Show, Security Office	Auto Show Visit 3 w/Family; Fight/Crowd Control
Fieldnotes #3	2/22/2011-2/24/2011	7 hrs.	HSEM HQ	MEOC joint exercise testing new secure database software

DRO	
Codename	*Title*
Des	Director, Disaster Services
Jim	Head Volunteer (my title), Disaster services
Sue	Co-leader DRO volunteer response team
Tom	Co-leader DRO volunteer response team
Dwayne	DRO volunteer response team member
Michelle	Development & Marketing
Noah	Emergency Services Specialist
Mario	Emergency Services Specialist
Jenny	Emergency Services Specialist
Ken	Manager, Disaster Services
Mark	Marketing guy for DRO; Outside Marketing and PR firm
Shelia	Finance Department Accountant
George	Long-time DRO volunteer for response team

MPD	
Codename	*Title*
Michael	EMU MPD Supervisor
Sam	EMU MPD Officer
Bruce	MPD Tactical Operations

Auto Show/DHSEM/SPD	
Codename	*Title*
Ross	Director, DHSEM
Harry	Chief of Auto Show Security, Auto Show
Dan	State Police officer/state IOC
Rick	State Police analyst/state IOC

APPENDIX B

Interview Guide: A Study of the Effect of Organizational Communication Cultures on Interorganizational Collaboration of Crisis Response

1. What role(s) does your organization play when it responds to a crisis (disaster)?

2. These next few questions are going to ask you about the communication procedures of your organization when a crisis occurs; from the initial call to the end of the crisis.

   a. What people/organization/entity do you receive information from that a crisis is occurring?

   b. How does the communication get passed along to the decision-maker(s) in the organization?

   c. How are decisions made in the organization as to who responds and what resources are used?

   d. How do decisions get passed along to the personnel in your organization who are tasked with responding to the crisis?

   e. How formal is the crisis communication and decision-making structure within your organization during a crisis?

   f. In what instances does your organization decide to work with other organizations in responding to a crisis? How does your organization communicate and make decisions with others when responding to a crisis? Can you please give me an example of this?

g. Are there ever any issues of miscommunication of information during a crisis? If so, please describe for me an instance in which this occurred and what your organization did once it realized there was a miscommunication.

h. How does your organization decide when a crisis is over? What communication occurs in your organization and with other organizations at this time?

i. After the crisis is over, what is the post-event communication that occurs within your organization and with other organizations?

3. Please describe for me in general terms the last crisis/disaster training exercise your organization did in regards to communication?

a. How often do these trainings occur and who is involved in the training?

b. What do you find most helpful in the crisis training and why?

c. What do you find least helpful in the crisis training and why?

d. If not mentioned, prompt: What crisis/disaster training, if any, do you participate with other organizations in regards to communication? Please describe for me this last training exercise?

4. How often does your organization participate in crisis planning meetings? *(Researcher will clarify/define planning meetings if asked.)* Who is involved in these planning meetings? Please describe for me what occurred during your last crisis planning meeting?

a. What do you find most helpful in the crisis planning meetings?

b. What do you find least helpful in the crisis planning meetings?

5. Organizations often have to work with other organizations when planning for and responding to a crisis. Because of this umbrella crisis planning/management committees/organizations are formed or are mandated by the federal government to be formed. What umbrella organizations do you work with? *(Researcher will prompt with a couple of organizations if the interviewee cannot initially think of any.)*

   a. How does your organization interact with this/these umbrella organizations during a crisis? Please give me an example of this.

   b. Who would you say is the leader of the crisis response within this umbrella organization? How does he/she communicate information/decisions to your organization during a crisis? Please give me an example of this.

   c. How does your organization communicate information/decisions to the umbrella organization during a crisis? Please give me an example of this.

   d. What is the credentialing process during a crisis so your organization can gain access to the crisis site and the umbrella organization?

   e. How does your organization interact with this/these umbrella organizations on a day-to-day basis or when a crisis is not occurring?

6. What would you describe are the primary challenges in working with other organizations in responding to a crisis? What suggestions do you have for organizations working better together in crisis response?

7. Have you ever been involved in responding to a crisis with this organization? (If yes)
    Please walk me through your experience responding to this crisis with this organization
    from the moment you received notice of the crisis until the end of the crisis.

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ABSTRACT

A STUDY OF THE EFFECT OF ORGANIZATIONAL COMMUNICATION CULTURES ON INTERORGANIZATIONAL COLLABORATION OF CRISIS RESPONSE

by

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Recent history has indicated that crises are becoming more frequent rather than exceptional events. Dozens of organizations, often with very different missions, methods, technologies and cultures, are called upon to coordinate activities in order to mitigate the crisis and assist in recovery efforts. Although several interorganizational coordination perspectives and strategies have been proposed, they have neglected to examine how different organizational communication cultures of crisis response organizations involved in an Emergency Operations Center (EOC) may affect crisis collaboration efforts. Previous studies have also disregarded the important distinction between crisis coordination and crisis collaboration and the challenges and benefits of each to crisis response efforts of EOCs.

This study examined in depth two crisis response organizations that are active in most EOCs, a regional chapter of a disaster response organization (DRO) and a metropolitan police department (MPD) in a large U.S. metropolitan city. Data for this instrumental case study was collected using the qualitative approaches of participant observation, interviews, and document analysis.

The findings illustrate that the two different organizational communication cultures of the EMU MPD and the DRO resulted in two different worldviews of how organizations think they should work together and communicate with each other when responding to a crisis. The DRO's humanitarian and service-oriented organizational communication culture defined their crisis response practices as crisis collaboration with all organizations. In contrast, the EMU MPD's bureaucratic and closed organizational communication culture defined their crisis response as crisis collaboration with similar organizational cultures and bureaucratic crisis coordination with others. This suggests that these different worldviews give rise to processes, structures, and procedures of crisis coordination and crisis collaboration that are cultural artifacts of the organizations. Therefore, once cannot assume a crisis coordination or collaboration structure can easily be imposed on an organization as a way to improve interorganizational collaboration, coordination and communication.

This investigation suggests that the different crisis coordination and crisis collaboration worldviews need to first be understood by EOCs and the organizations involved in those groups. Then additional planning and management processes need to be developed in order to ensure effective interorganizational communication and collaboration during a crisis response.

AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL STATEMENT

Laura E. Pechta is a McKing Consulting Corporation contractor and Health Communication Specialist with the Division of Emergency Operations, Emergency Risk Communication Branch (ERCB) at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). For the past two years, she has been a member of the Research and Evaluation team conducting real-time communication surveillance of traditional and social media for several emergency responses such as the global polio eradication initiative, multi-state meningitis outbreak, and Hurricane Sandy. Laura is also involved in research projects on emergency communication and coordination with internal and external CDC partners and the second edition of Crisis and Emergency Risk Communication (CERC).

In her doctoral work at Wayne State University under her advisor Dr. Matthew W. Seeger, her primary research focus was on risk and crisis communication, including issues such as interorganizational communication and collaboration between crisis response organizations, models of risk and crisis communication, and applications of crisis and emergency risk communication during crises and disasters. Laura has been involved in research projects with the CDC, National Public Health Information Coalition, and University of Kentucky. In addition, she has published in the *Journal of Homeland Security and Emergency Management,* was project manager for the book *Theorizing Crisis Communication,* and has presented at the National Conference for Health Communication, Marketing and Media (NCHCMM), National Communication Association (NCA) Annual Conference, Second International Conference on Crisis Communication, and Great Lakes Homeland Security Training Conference and Expo.