

Study of Political and Sectional
Voting Alignments in the
United States Senate, 1921-1929

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A STUDY OF POLITICAL AND SECTIONAL VOTING
ALIGNMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES
SENATE, 1921-1929

by

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INTRODUCTION

The politics of the 1920's, often caricaturized in a few simple generalizations, prove upon thoughtful investigation to be exceedingly complex.¹ Several common and casual assertions about "twenties" politics should come under critical reanalysis, including traditional descriptions of the extent and character of party division. The usual historical generalization is that, although conservatism was the predominant political attitude, both parties were fragmented by sectional and ideological struggles. As a consequence there was a breakdown in the party system. This dissertation tests this conclusion through an examination of voting patterns in the United States Senate from the 67th through the 70th Congress (1921-29). Virtually every political history of the era touches upon Senate voting alignments, but there is no extant study with the scope, structure, and methodology of this dissertation.

The need for this investigation stems from severe deficiencies in political studies of the 1920's. Many descriptions are little more than tedious exposes of debauchery

¹For a perceptive critique of "twenties" historiography see Henry F. May, "Shifting Perspectives on the 1920's," Mississippi Valley Historical Review, XLIII (December, 1956), 405-27.

and incompetence.² Moreover, nearly every political study is written from the liberal "frame of reference." Some political critiques of the 1920's can be dismissed as fundamentally liberal vendettas, but even responsible scholars reflect the same bias which is all but universal among practitioners of the historical craft.³ This study is neither a defense nor advocacy of a political group or philosophy. The conclusions herein are based upon a detached analysis of Senate voting patterns and presented with a determination for accuracy.

The historian should be eclectic in his methodology. Any technique should be adopted which will contribute to clarity, precision, and insight into the historical topic. Traditional research techniques have usually been used as a basis for descriptions of politics and parties in the 1920's. The results have often been impressive, but the methodology has sometimes contributed to excessive selectivity in materials, reliance upon fragmentary data, casualness in definitions, and little regard for criteria. The dimensions

²A classic of this type is Samuel Hopkins Adams, Incredible Era: The Life and Times of Warren Gamabiel Harding (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1939).

³A representative study of the polemic school is Karl Schriftgiesser, This Was Normalcy: An Account of Party Politics During Twelve Republican Years: 1920-1932 (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1948), whereas Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Crisis of the Old Order 1919-1933 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1957) reflects the scholarly bias.

of methodology have recently been expanded by historians who have developed new techniques and adopted others, primarily, from the social sciences.⁴ Ideas and methods advanced by these historians are incorporated into this dissertation. This study should be perceived as paralleling standard political histories of the 1920's, but employing different methodology with the purpose of revising the traditional interpretations. Given this procedure, it is not surprising that this study will both suggest new perspectives on politics of the 1920's and reenforce certain traditional themes.

Most of this study is an analysis of Senate roll-call votes to gauge the influence of party and section upon voting behavior. Among the advantages of statistical analysis to test historical generalizations are that it: (1) imposes detachment upon the user thereby contributing to objectivity; (2) enables judgments based upon quantitative rather than selected evidence; (3) ensures an accuracy and precision in measurement impossible to obtain by other methods; and (4) is a valuable way to gain insight into political behavior because legislators must record their decisions on every conceivable issue, and votes cannot be rationalized away or

⁴A standard study using the new methodology is Lee Benson, The Concept of Jacksonian Democracy: New York as a Test Case (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961). For the efficacy of this approach see Ernest Nagel, The Structure of Science (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1961), and William O. Aydelotte, "Quantification in History," American Historical Review, LXXI (April, 1966), 803-25.

obscured by rhetoric. Quantitative analysis was the most efficacious methodology which could be adopted for the design and purpose of this investigation.⁵

This dissertation tests, analyzes, refines and/or modifies the standard historical interpretations of patterns within the major political parties during the 1920's. Its major theme is that both the Republicans and Democrats were afflicted with pronounced disunity stemming from ideological and sectional antagonism. The principal disruptive group within the Republican party consisted of agrarian senators who, in the progressive cause, took their party affiliation casually and practiced insurgency. Urban and rural Democrats were likewise engaged in an ideological power struggle for party hegemony. A political party is often a confederation of warring factions unified only by the same label and acquisitiveness for power; historians usually agree that this is a more accurate characterization of politics in the 1920's than for most eras.

⁵The literature upon statistical methodology for measuring and analyzing legislative votes is voluminous. Among the more valuable references in designing this study were Stuart A. Rice, Farmers and Workers in American Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1924), and Quantitative Methods in Politics (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1928); David B. Truman, The Congressional Party: A Case Study (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1959); Duncan MacRae, Jr., Dimensions of Congressional Voting: A Statistical Study of the House of Representatives in the 81st Congress (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1958); and Julius Turner, "Party and Constituency: Pressures on Congress," Johns Hopkins University Studies in Historical and Political Science, LXIX, No. 1 (1951).

The first chapter of this dissertation is a brief historical survey of the United States Senate during the 1920's. It is written from a political perspective and designed to "set" the Senate milieu. The chapter emphasizes party politics and the Senate's legislative preoccupations, and includes relevant "reference" data. This chapter provides the historical background and serves as a departure for the statistical chapters.

Each subsequent chapter investigates an aspect of Senate voting patterns. The degree of division and likeness between Republicans and Democrats is measured in chapter two to ascertain whether the historical generalizations indicating "inordinate" interparty mutuality are valid. Chapter three is a redefinition of the standard historical theme relating to internal party disunity. This chapter illustrates that, even with more internal party conflict than usual, party government continued throughout the 1920's. The party loyalty of each senator is determined in chapter four. This measurement of party influence upon individual senators reaffirms that political affiliation was the paramount determinant of voting behavior. It also provides an opportunity to judge whether the historical characterizations of senators as party regulars or irregulars are valid or need revision.

Chapter five is an examination of Republican insurgents in the 1920's. The common interpretation is that a group of Midwestern and Western Republican senators sustained the progressive spirit in an era of normalcy through their independence of the party organization. Both voting information and criteria of insurgency and progressivism are used to assess the validity of the almost universal interpretation that these senators exemplified liberalism and independence. The conclusions from this chapter may point the need for an intensive reexamination of progressivism and insurgency, and a thorough reevaluation of the reform impulse in the 1920's.

The sixth chapter is an investigation of sectional influences in the Senate voting patterns. Nearly every historian of the 1920's emphasizes the sectional and/or urban-rural discord as a major force in party politics. This chapter measures the degree of sectionalism in the Senate votes, and determines whether geography or party affiliation was the predominant guide to voting behavior during the 1920's.

Because there are a series of internal summaries and chapter conclusions, the dissertation conclusion simply reiterates the major conclusions from the investigation, and indicates possible revisions needed in current historical literature on "twenties" politics.

DATA AND PROCEDURE

The 1364 roll-call votes in the United States Senate from 1921 through 1929 were the raw data for the statistical analysis in this dissertation. Mere volume of votes alone made computer processing the only practical method of analysis. It was also the only way to achieve the accuracy needed for this study. In preparing the voting data for computer programming, information on each vote in the Congressional Record was manually duplicated on a work sheet. The relevant information on the work sheet was manually coded and placed on IBM score forms. These forms were processed by computer which transmitted the coded information from score forms onto IBM cards. The cards were the raw material for computer analysis. A series of computer programs were written which translated the stored data on the cards into indices of voting behavior.

CHAPTER I

A POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES

SENATE, 1921-29

This chapter is a brief historical survey of the United States Senate from the 67th through the 70th Congress (1921-29). It includes information on Senate election results and party representation in the Upper House. The emphasis, however, is upon Senate legislative activities and political tumult. Because of the primary reliance upon statistical analysis in this dissertation, it was decided to include this chapter for reference material and to provide a historical context for subsequent chapters.

The Republican party controlled the Senate throughout the 1920's. Conforming to the general election pattern for the party in power, the Republicans gained large majorities in presidential elections which were reduced in off-year elections. From a narrow two seat majority in the 66th Congress (1919-21), the Republicans increased their numbers to 59 against only 37 Democrats in the 67th Congress (1921-23).¹ There were 60 Republicans briefly when

¹The political composition of the Senate is in Historical Statistics of the United States: Colonial Times to 1957 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1960), pp. 691-2. A valuable reference on individual senators is Biographical Directory of the American Congress, 1774-1961, comp. Clifford P. Reynolds (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1961).

a Democrat resigned and a Republican was appointed in his place, but the original alignment was restored when a Democrat was elected to the seat. There were nine new senators who filled vacant seats caused by deaths and resignations, but the party representation was unchanged.

Public resentment, stemming primarily from a depressed economy, was responsible, in most historians' judgment, for the appreciable reduction of Republicans in the 68th Congress (1923-25).² The Republicans held 17 and the Democrats 15 of the 32 regularly contested seats in the 1922 elections. Republicans retained 9 seats, gained 2 from the Democrats, and lost 8. Democrats gained 7 Republican seats while they held 13 of their 15 seats. The final Republican loss was to a Farmer-Labor candidate. Aside from the regularly contested seats, there were six vacancies from deaths and resignations to be filled during the Senate adjournment period. The Republicans possessed 5 of these seats, and they lost a seat each to the Democrats and Farmer-Laborites, while the Democrats kept their seat which had been vacated. This made the Senate composition, in the first session, 51 Republicans, 43 Democrats, and 2

²In the Midwest, this public resentment was manifested in the election of progressive over conservative Republicans for their party nomination. For insights into a series of elections see Jerry Alvin Neprash, The Brookhart Campaigns in Iowa, 1920-1926: A Study in the Motivation of Political Attitudes (New York: Columbia University Press, 1932). A comprehensive study of the 1922 elections is needed. Many of the assumptions about the issues and implications of these major elections have not been effectively demonstrated.

Farmer-Laborites. During the recess period, the Republicans added a single senator to their membership from an election to fill a seat held by a Democrat serving on an appointment. Although there were other changes in the Senate membership, Republican and Democratic representation remained stable which made the party alignment, in the second session, 52 Republicans, 42 Democrats, and 2 Farmer-Laborites.

In the 1924 election, the Republicans made an impressive recovery from the 1922 debacle to increase substantially their majority in the 69th Congress (1925-27). They raised their numerical advantage from 8 to 14 seats. In the first session, there were 55 Republicans aligned against 40 Democrats, and 1 Farmer-Laborite. The Republican margin was slightly decreased in the second session when the Democrats gained 2 seats at Republican expense, and a Republican senator-elect was denied his seat. This made the Senate party composition 52 Republicans, 42 Democrats, and 1 Farmer-Laborite.

The Republican majority was markedly reduced in the 1926 elections. They could organize the Senate in the 70th Congress (1927-29) only because they had the Farmer-Labor vote, and the Democrats were not obstructionists. The party alignment was 47 Republicans, 46 Democrats, and 1 Farmer-Laborite. Besides the still vacant seat from the 69th Congress, another vacancy occurred when the Republican senator-elect from Pennsylvania was prevented from taking his seat.

The Republican position improved in the second session when a Republican defeated a Democrat in a special election, and a Republican filled the vacant Illinois seat. As a result, the Senate membership included 49 Republicans, 45 Democrats, and 1 Farmer-Laborite.

The Republican Senate majorities in the 1920's were based upon predominant political power in all geographical regions, excluding only the Democratic South. Although the Democratic party occasionally cut into Republican majorities outside the South, the former seldom threatened Republican hegemony. The voting evolution of this decade which would make the Democrats the majority party in the 1930's was not then yet perceived. From the data in the following tables, the extent to which the Republican party dominated the nation through control of three (out of four) major geographical regions is apparent.³

³The East includes Rhode Island, Connecticut, Massachusetts, Vermont, Maine, New Hampshire, Delaware, New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania.

The Central States are Iowa, Kansas, Michigan, Illinois, Ohio, North Dakota, South Dakota, Nebraska, Wisconsin, Indiana, and Minnesota.

The West includes Arizona, Idaho, New Mexico, Washington, California, Wyoming, Utah, Oregon, Colorado, Nevada, and Montana.

Included in the South are North Carolina, South Carolina, Louisiana, Maryland, Arkansas, Kentucky, Florida, Georgia, Virginia, West Virginia, Mississippi, Oklahoma, Alabama, Texas, Tennessee, and Missouri.

All subsequent references to a geographical region will be based upon these classifications.

TABLE 1

POLITICAL COMPOSITION OF GEOGRAPHICAL REGIONS--
UNITES STATES SENATE, 1921-1929

67th Congress (1921-1923)					
	East	Central	South	West	Total
Republicans	17 (18)	20	7	15	59 (60) *
Democrats	<u>3 (2)</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>25</u>	<u>7</u>	<u>37 (36)</u>
Total	20	22	32	22	96
68th Congress (1923-1925)					
Republicans	15	18	5	13 (14)	51 (52)**
Democrats	5	2	27	9 (8)	43 (42)
Farmer- Laborites	<u>0</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>2 (2)</u>
Total	20	22	32	22	96
69th Congress (1925-1927)					
Republicans	16 (15)	19 (18)	7 (6)	13	55 (52)**
Democrats	4 (5)	2 (2)	25 (26)	9	40 (42)
Farmer- Laborites	<u>0</u>	<u>1 (1)</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>1 (1)</u>
Total	20	22 (21)	32	22	96 (95)
70th Congress (1927-1929)					
Republicans	13	18 (20)	3	13	47 (49)**
Democrats	6	2 (1)	29	9	46 (45)
Farmer- Laborites	<u>0</u>	<u>1 (1)</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>1 (1)</u>
Total	19	21 (22)	32	22	94 (95)

(*Sectional-party alignment in the first and second sessions.
**Sectional-party alignment in the second session.)

The Senate was the focus of political activity in the 1920's, but its legislative achievements were unimpressive. In retrospect, the senators raised few issues that seemed vitally germane to the needs of a complex and interrelated twentieth century society. The Senate debates were intense and the conflicts often authentic, but a kind of unreality envelopes the politics of the era. Senate emphasis was usually not upon substantive and meaningful issues, but upon traditional and often irrelevant issues which the protagonists viewed from antiquated frames of reference. A need for original reanalysis of issues was crushed by stereotypes and dialogue from a past generation.

There was a minor struggle over organization of the Senate in the 67th Congress. The Republican leadership proposed a rules change to increase the membership of the standing committees thereby enabling every Republican to have an "exclusive" committee assignment which would increase the disparity in majority and minority party committee representation.⁴ Democrats conducted a mild filibuster against the change, but the Republican majority easily modified the rules. Some regular Republicans supported the plan as a way to keep the committees under their control by preventing

⁴Among the most useful works on Senate organization, procedures, and practices is George H. Haynes, The Senate of the United States: Its History and Practice, 2 vols. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1938).

Democrats and unreliable Republicans from constituting committee majorities.⁵

The Republican leadership moved for the enactment of tariff and tax measures in the first session. In their determination to revoke what they called the Democratic confiscatory tax schedules, Republican leaders made tax revision the paramount legislative concern. After seven weeks of continuous debate, the Senate passed a tax bill which included provisions which the Republican oligarchy described as an anathema. This was because Democrats and undependable Republicans allied to determine much of the bill's final form.⁶

Senate attention then concentrated upon tariff legislation. A permanent tariff law was deferred to a later session, but the Republicans acted almost unanimously to pass a temporary tariff bill over nearly solid Democratic opposition. The controversial issue of compensation for veterans was raised and debated in the Senate, but the only measure that was passed was an innocuous bill to consolidate many government units into the Veterans' Bureau. Other important pieces of legislation passed by the Senate in this

⁵Lindsay Rogers, "American Government and Politics: The First (Special) Session of the 67th Congress, April 11, 1921--November 23, 1921," American Political Science Review, XVI (February, 1922), 42.

⁶Roy G. Blakey, "The Revenue Act of 1921," American Economic Review, XII (March, 1922), 75-101.

session, include amendments to the Volstead Act, grants-in-aid to the states for road construction, and emergency legislation curtailing immigration.⁷

Formulation and passage of a tariff bill was the major Senate preoccupation during the second session. The Fordney-McCumber tariff bill was shaped in the Senate Finance Committee for nine months. It was then debated on the Senate floor from April through late August 1922 when it was passed by the Republicans on a strict party vote. The high tariff measure was in a House-Senate conference committee for a month before the members returned a compromise bill to the Senate, which the Republicans passed on September 19, 1922.⁸

The Senate again attended to the veterans' bonus issue. Although the Senate finally passed a compensation bill, President Warren G. Harding vetoed it, and was able to mobilize enough congressional support to sustain his veto. This failed to end the agitation for some form of veterans' compensation.

⁷A summary of the major legislation is available in Rogers, American Political Science Review, XVI, No. 1, 43-6. There are many sources for the background and substance of the major laws enacted during the 1920's, but perhaps the single most valuable work is Louis M. Hacker, American Problems of Today: A History of the United States Since the World War (New York: F. S. Crofts and Company, 1941).

⁸The politics and procedure involved in passage of the bill is in Abraham Berglund, "The Tariff Act of 1922," American Economic Review, XIII (March, 1923), 14-33.

Bonus proponents raised the issue later in the 1920's with more success.⁹

The third and fourth sessions of the 67th Congress were unproductive. Passage of the ship subsidy bill was the only purpose for the third session. When a Southern filibuster against the Dyer Anti-Lynching bill precluded any legislative business, the leaders in both parties agreed to dispense with the Dyer bill and adjourn. In the fourth session, the Senate passed a voluminous amount of minor legislation.¹⁰

The Farm Bloc was responsible for much of the legislation passed in the 67th Congress. There were 22 senators from both parties in the Bloc, and they were committed to the enactment of measures which would provide economic relief for agriculture.¹¹ The group's strategy was to act in unison to

⁹A description of the bonus controversy is in Lindsay Rogers, "American Government and Politics: Later Sessions of the 67th Congress," American Political Science Review, XVIII (February, 1924), 81-4.

¹⁰The legislation in the later sessions is summarized in Ibid., pp. 80-1.

¹¹There is a multitude of literature on the membership, objectives, and Farm Bloc achievements. Some insights from the leader of the Bloc may be found in Arthur Capper, The Agricultural Bloc (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1922). Among the standard sources on this group are Wesley McCune, The Farm Bloc, 2 vols. (Garden City: Doubleday, Doran and Company, 1943); John D. Hicks and Theodore Saloutos, Agricultural Discontent in the Middle West 1900-1939 (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1951); and James H. Shideler, Farm Crisis, 1919-1923 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1957).

force concessions from the Republican leadership, and some Republicans were not above the threat to make support of their party contingent upon enactment of agrarian bills. It was effective pressure politics, and a series of measures to assist agriculture was passed into law, including increased tariff duties on farm products, extension of credit, regulation of packing houses and grain exchanges, and exemption of farm cooperatives from anti-trust legislation. This legislation did not prevent a continuous decline in farm incomes during the 1920's, and the rural senators subsequently proposed other solutions to end the agricultural depression.

The Senate had an unimpressive legislative record in the 68th Congress, which was characterized by conflicts with the executive branch and Republican factionalism. Depending upon the issue, the Republican majority was more illusory than real because it depended upon the fidelity of a few senators who were known for their unreliability. When these senators were disposed, they could usually form a Senate majority with receptive Democrats. Defections by this group, however, should not be overemphasized because many Administration defeats resulted from revolts by reliable Republicans. The Senate refusal to consider American entry into the World Court, passage of the bonus bill over President Calvin Coolidge's veto, and the mutilation of Secretary of the Treasury Andrew Mellon's tax proposal were the work of both

Republican reliables and unreliables. A political analyst concluded that the Republican senators seldom missed an opportunity to ignore the President's recommendations or repudiate him when the lines were drawn.¹²

Although the Republican senators united against their party leader, they were intensely divided among themselves. This division became a fierce struggle when the Senate was being organized. A few Republicans opposed Albert B. Cummins (Iowa) for chairman of the Interstate Commerce Committee even though seniority and custom entitled him to the position. After a month of conflict, Republicans Robert M. La Follette (Wis.), Edwin F. Ladd (N.D.), Lynn J. Frazier (N.D.), and Smith W. Brookhart (Iowa) broke with the party to vote for Democrat Ellison D. Smith (S.C.) and thereby elect him committee chairman.¹³

In late November 1924, the second controversy was ignited when the regular Republicans announced their intention to discipline their colleagues who failed to endorse Coolidge in the presidential campaign, or openly supported La Follette,

¹²Lindsay Rogers, "American Government and Politics: First and Second Sessions of the Sixty-Eighth Congress, December 3, 1923 to June 7, 1924: December 1, 1924 to March 4, 1925," American Political Science Review, XIX (November, 1925), 762.

¹³Clarence A. Berdahl, "American Government and Politics: Some Notes on Party Membership in Congress, I," American Political Science Review, XLIII (April, 1949), 320.

the Progressive party presidential candidate. In addition to La Follette, the Republican conference identified Brookhart, Frazier, and Ladd as those to be excluded from future Republican conferences and ineligible to fill Republican vacancies on Senate committees.¹⁴ Punishment was postponed to the 69th Congress.

The Senate passed only a few important measures in the 68th Congress. In the first session, the senators were preoccupied with the tax revision bill based upon Mellon's suggestions. The final Senate bill differed substantially from the Mellon plan, including lesser reductions for upper income classes and larger reductions for lower income groups.¹⁵ An almost unanimous Senate also approved the immigration bill which imposed an immigration quota at two per cent of the foreign born in the United States based upon the 1890 census.¹⁶ The Rogers Act, which reorganized the Foreign Service, and the child labor amendment, which authorized the Congress to regulate the labor of persons under 18 years, were the other

¹⁴New York Times, November 29, 1924, pp. 1-2.

¹⁵The bill is analyzed in Roy G. Blakey, "The Revenue Act of 1924," American Economic Review, XIV (September, 1924), 475-504.

¹⁶John Higham, Strangers in the Land: Patterns of American Nativism 1860-1925 (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1955), pp. 264-330, is a critical source for immigration policy in the 1920's.

important measures passed by the Senate. In the second session, the Senate approved a plethora of minor bills.¹⁷

The alliance between the Democrats and unreliable Republicans was nearly defunct in the first session of the 69th Congress. This may have been because the increased number of reliable Republicans impaired the alliance's effectiveness, but the surface impression was that the Democrats and unreliable Republicans simply lacked the will to use their power.¹⁸ There seemed to be three causes behind this lack of will, including a "new" Democratic attitude, a paucity of divisive issues, and an improvement in relations between the reliable and unreliable Republicans. The Democrats reflected an inexplicable disinterest in a working alliance with the dissident Republicans. As an example, only a few Democrats responded when George W. Norris (R-Neb.) implored the loyal opposition to support his amendment to the revenue bill.¹⁹ Cooperation between the two groups, however, appeared to increase during the second session. Second,

¹⁷For a survey of the legislation enacted in the 68th Congress see Rogers, American Political Science Review, XIX, No. 4, 766; and Lindsay Rogers and Parker Thomas Moon (ed.), "Record of Political Events," Political Science Quarterly, XLI (March, 1926), 40-74.

¹⁸Arthur W. Macmahon, "American Government and Politics: First Session of the Sixty-Ninth Congress: December 7, 1925, to July 3, 1926," American Political Science Review, XX (August, 1926), 612.

¹⁹U.S., Congressional Record, 69th Cong., 1st Sess., 1926, LXVII, Part 4, 3605. Hereafter cited as Cong. Record.

many crucial issues had been resolved by the 69th Congress which reduced the need for Democratic and unreliable Republican unity. The primary basis of their alliance was obstruction or modification of the regular Republican program. With most of this program already enacted, there was less impetus for the two groups to continue their working relationship. Neither group advanced an original legislative program which could have revitalized their pact.

Finally, there was a beginning of reconciliation between the Republican factions. There was intense agitation between Republicans at the first of the 69th Congress, which abated only upon its conclusion. A vicious party division occurred when the reliables punished the defectors in the 1924 presidential election. Ladd and La Follette had died, which left Frazier and Brookhart to be disciplined. Following extensive debate, Robert N. Stanfield (Ore.) supplanted Frazier as chairman of the Committee on Public Lands and Surveys by a 36-13 margin in an almost exclusively Republican election.²⁰ A disputed Iowa election gave the most adamant Republican regulars their opportunity for revenge upon Brookhart. In the Senate vote to determine possession of the contested seat, one-third of the reliable Republicans voted with the

²⁰Ibid., 69th Cong., Special Sess., 1925, LXVII, Part 1, 63.

Democrats to seat Democrat Daniel F. Steck in place of Brookhart. The vote was 45-41.²¹

There was also a dissident-reliable Republican struggle over the appointment of Gerald P. Nye (N.D.) to fill the vacant seat resulting from Ladd's death. The constitutional issue was whether the appointment fulfilled the requirements of the 17th Amendment: the political issue was that Nye was appointed by a governor elected with the Non-Partisan League's endorsement. The Senate Committee on Privileges and Elections made an adverse report concerning Nye's eligibility, but a Democratic majority and one-third of the Republicans voted to seat the North Dakotan.²²

Nevertheless, there was a germ of improved relations between the two Republican wings. Robert M. La Follette, Jr. (Wis.), upon election to his father's former seat, expressed an allegiance to the father's progressive ideals and policies. Although the La Follette manifesto portended rebellion, the Republican caucus chose to regard him as a regular Republican party member.²³ La Follette gladly accepted the designation.

²¹Ibid., 69th Cong., 1st Sess., 1926, LXVII, Part 7, 7301. Also see Clarence A. Berdahl, "American Government and Politics: Some Notes on Party Membership in Congress, II," American Political Science Review, XLIII (June, 1949), 492-96.

²²Cong. Record, 69th Cong., 1st Sess., 1926, LXVII, Part 2, 1893.

²³Macmahon, American Political Science Review, XX, No. 3, 613.

Then in the second session, perhaps influenced by the election results which would narrow the Republican margin in the new Senate, the regulars made a basic retreat with respect to the remaining 1924 bolter. Frazier was readmitted to the Republican conference and his committee seniority was restored.²⁴ Relations between the two factions would improve drastically in the 70th Congress.

There were few legislative achievements in the 69th Congress. More Senate attention than usual was given to foreign affairs, including an intense struggle between isolationist and internationalist groups over the World Court Resolution and consideration of many minor treaties. The 1926 Revenue Act was perhaps the most important domestic bill passed by the Senate. Secretary Mellon's tenacity was rewarded when the senators finally accepted the bulk of his plan, including a reduction in corporate taxes.²⁵

A much publicized bill in the first session was the McNary-Haugen measure based upon the scheme formulated by George N. Peek, President of the Moline Plow Company.²⁶ There was

²⁴Arthur W. Macmahon, "American Government and Politics: Second Session of the Sixty-Ninth Congress: December 6, 1926, to March 4, 1927," American Political Science Review, XXI (May, 1927), 298.

²⁵The law is analyzed in Roy G. Blakey, "Revenue Act of 1926," American Economic Review, XVI (September, 1926), 401-25.

²⁶Two valuable sources on McNary-Haugen are Gilbert C. Fite, George N. Peek and the Fight for Farm Parity (Norman:

profuse debate over the bill which failed to receive Senate approval because of Democratic and Eastern Republican opposition. The farm forces, however, did not accept this defeat as final.

The McNary-Haugen plan and the banking bill, which related to branch banking and federal reserve bank charters, nearly constituted the total business of the second session. Both bills could be passed if they could be brought to the Senate floor. The McNary-Haugen bill was certain of passage because it had been rewritten to attract Southern votes. A dispute over priority developed between the supporters of each measure. The impasse was resolved when the Senate approved the motion to make the farm bill unfinished business, and the banking bill advocates agreed to limit debate on McNary-Haugen in order to gain support for their bill from farm bill supporters. This manipulation enabled the passage of the two most important bills in the second session.²⁷

With the narrow Republican margin in the 70th Congress, a crisis in the organization of the Senate was to be expected. The Senate, however, was organized with little friction. The realistic regular Republicans increased Democratic

University of Oklahoma Press, 1954) and; John D. Black, "McNary-Haugen Movement," American Economic Review, XVIII (September, 1928), 405-27.

²⁷Macmahon, American Political Science Review, XXI, No. 2, 306-08.

representation on the standing committees. Then the regulars acquiesced in the elevation of dissident Republicans to committee chairmanships. With Gerald P. Nye (N.D.), Lynn J. Frazier (N.D.), Peter Norbeck (S.D.), and Robert B. Howell (Neb.) made chairmen, this left only the Committee on Privileges and Elections under regular Republican control, and it was forced to share power with the special committee on elections.²⁸

Dissident and regular Republicans denied that they had made a formal bargain in order to expedite Senate organization. When the correspondence between Charles Curtis (Kan.), Republican Senate majority leader, and the La Follette group was made public, however, it contained certain requirements of a bargain. Prior to the convening of the 70th Congress, La Follette and his followers informed Curtis that committee preferment was not their basic concern, but they want assurances from the Republican majority that there would be votes in the first session on the McNary-Haugen bill, an investigation of United States Latin American policy, and the bill to regulate issuance of injunctions.²⁹ Curtis responded that votes were due on the

²⁸Arthur W. Macmahon, "American Government and Politics: First Session of the Seventieth Congress: December 5, 1927, to May 29, 1928," American Political Science Review, XXII (August, 1928), 653.

²⁹Cong. Record, 70th Cong., 1st Sess., 1927, LXIX, Part 1, 537.

measures, and that the promotion of unreliable Republicans to chairmanships of committees would ensure that the bills would not be pigeonholed.³⁰ The reply was unsatisfactory to the La Follette group who now insisted that their position be made known to the Republican conference. The conference authorized Curtis to negotiate with the unreliaables; the result was a press statement which defined their understanding. A pledge was made by the Republican conference that there would be no delay on the votes wanted by the La Follette group. In return, the La Follette group promised to assist in the Republican organization of the Senate, but reserved their right to an independent course thereafter.³¹

Once the Senate was organized, it considered charges of excessive campaign expenditures and fraud against Republican Senators-elect Frank L. Smith (Ill.) and William Vare (Penn.). Vare was prevented from taking his seat during the 70th Congress while an investigation was made of the charges against him. By a 61-23 vote, Smith was declared ineligible for the Illinois seat.³² The Senate leadership then concentrated upon their legislative program. Among the major bills

³⁰Kansas Historical Society, Charles Curtis MSS, Curtis to Senators La Follette, Frazier, Nye, John J. Blaine (R-Wis.), and Henrik Shipstead (FL-Minne.), Dec. 3, 1927.

³¹Cong. Record, 70th Cong., 1st Sess., 1927, LXIX, Part 1, 537

³²Ibid., p. 178.

passed by the Senate were the tax reduction bill, the McNary-Haugen measure, a bill to enable the manufacture of fertilizer in the Muscle Shoals plant, and a flood control measure.³³

The Senate leadership's legislative program was enacted in the first session, except for the Boulder Dam and Navy Cruiser bills. These measures, along with the Kellogg-Briand Treaty, were given priority in the second session. Senate passage of the Boulder Dam bill terminated years of bitter stalemate between the Southwestern states over water resources. A conflict then developed as to whether the Navy Cruiser bill or the Kellogg-Briand Treaty should receive priority. The supporters of each proposal agreed to make both items unfinished business, and the two measures were tied together and passed.³⁴

This chapter basically supports the traditional theme that Senate activity resulted in few positive legislative accomplishments and was characterized by intense intraparty discord. Dissension is usually present in a deliberative body, but the chronic and pervasive tension in the 1920's

³³The principal bills are summarized in Macmahon, American Political Science Review, XXII, No. 3, 669-75.

³⁴The major legislative achievements of the second session are found in Arthur W. Macmahon, "American Government and Politics: Second Session of the Seventieth Congress: December 3, 1928, to March 4, 1929," American Political Science Review, XXIII (May, 1929), 364-82.

seems to exceed what is normal. This is a correct impression but it is often overstated. The usual emphasis upon internal party controversy and political irregularity can be attributed both to the historian's frame of reference and methodology, and to the topic. The historian often focuses upon divergence from the standard pattern; this sometimes causes him to neglect the general scheme and exaggerate deviation. Then too, the use of traditional research methods encourages the historian to concentrate upon aspects which receive the most publicity regardless of whether those aspects are representative. The American political system itself compounds the difficulty in adopting the proper perspective toward irregularity. It is an unusually stable system responsible for an atmosphere in which any political rebellion may give the impression of proportions that it does not have. This was true in the 1920's. The following chapters emphasize what the general trend was in Senate voting. Irregularity was prominent in the decade, but this should not cause neglect of the basic political pattern. The subsequent chapters attempt to restore a more balanced perspective to party politics in the 1920's.

CHAPTER II

A MEASUREMENT OF DIVISION AND LIKENESS BETWEEN THE REPUBLICAN AND DEMOCRATIC PARTIES

The two major interpretations of politics in the 1920's indicate that party affiliation was less forceful than normal in determining Senate voting alignments. Whereas party membership is traditionally the paramount guide to the way legislators vote, it is commonly asserted that other loyalties and interests distracted from and sometimes supplanted party allegiance in this era. One standard thesis emphasizes the salient ideological and sectional fissures within both political parties. Western and Midwestern Republican senators, who held progressive views and represented agriculture, opposed their Eastern colleagues, who advanced business policies and were political conservatives. The Democratic party was divided into urban and rural wings and each regarded the other as an anathema.¹ These divisions discouraged voting along strict party lines. If this description is accurate, vote analysis should reveal few instances of unified parties confronting each other.

¹For a general statement of this theme see John D. Hicks, Republican Ascendancy, 1921-1933 (New York: Harper and Row, 1960), 88-105.

The other interpretation emphasizes the homogeneity of the two political parties. With the eclipse of progressivism, the contention is that the national government was dominated by preponderant conservative majorities in both parties.² The conclusion is that ideological affinity between Republicans and Democrats resulted in the two groups voting more alike than usual. Therefore, voting patterns should reflect slight division between the parties. From another perspective, this thesis reenforces the premise that party membership declined as an influence on voting behavior because party exclusiveness was made secondary to ideology. This impeded voting alignments along party lines. Accordingly, an examination of the votes should indicate exceptionally unified parties voting in unusually high agreement with each other.

Both of the preceding generalizations about party politics have some validity, but they are not wholly acceptable. They seem to have impressionistic bases. This stems from the failure both to define terms or apply the proper methodology. The result is that there is only a vague idea of what is being measured and the measurement itself is inexact. Precise political descriptions require the use of methods designed for the nature of the inquiry. It is virtually

²Eric F. Goldman, Rendezvous With Destiny: A History of Modern American Reform (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1952), 284-319, contains a firm position on conservative control of the parties.

impossible to measure accurately division and affinity between the parties without the use of simple statistical methodology. This technique is used in this chapter. The results are analyzed for patterns that will supplement and modify the standard historical interpretations.

A common assertion is that national politics in the 1920's were abnormal. In reality, however, there is no normal political era with which the 1920's can be contrasted. There are, nevertheless, general contours in American politics, and most historians believe that the "twenties" diverged enough from the pattern to be an aberration. This judgment can only be tested through a comparison of the results from this investigation with other voting studies. The comparison is made in this chapter, but the conclusions must be somewhat qualified because there are differences in techniques between the studies.

One premise to be tested in this chapter is that party affiliation was less influential in determining senators' voting positions than normally. There should, therefore, be few votes reflecting high party unity with the parties voting solidly against each other. The "party vote" is a simple method to measure high party unity and extreme division between the Republicans and Democrats. By the standard applied here, at least 90 per cent of the members of each party must vote against each other to be a party vote. So determined,

there were 79 party votes in the 1920's, which is only 5.8 per cent of the total 1364 roll-call votes. This percentage is statistically unimpressive and substantially below the number in other eras for which there is information. A. Lawrence Lowell, an early researcher in the study of party influence on legislative voting, compiled and summarized data on 1644 Senate votes in five Congresses during the nineteenth century.³ Using the same standards as above, an examination of these votes revealed that 401, or 24.4 per cent, were party votes.⁴

Again using a vote of 90 per cent as the gauge, but now with this percentage or more of the two parties voting in agreement, there is little difference in the results from this and the Lowell investigation. At least 90 per cent of both parties voted together only 20 times or on 1.2 per cent of the votes in the nineteenth century Congresses.⁵ This is slightly less than the 1920's when 90 per cent of each party voted the same way 29 times or on 2.1 per cent of the roll-call

3A. Lawrence Lowell, "The Influence of Party upon Legislation in England and America," Annual Report of the American Historical Association for the Year 1901 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1902), I, 319-542. The data is for the 29th, 38th, 50th, 55th, and 56th Congresses which were elected in 1844, 1862, 1886, 1896, and 1898.

⁴Ibid., pp. 532-6.

⁵Ibid.

votes. This data appears to support the conclusion that party was less decisive in determining voting behavior during the 1920's. A thorough comparison between this and the Lowell study, however, suggests that this conclusion is only partially true. Although there were fewer party votes in the Senate during the 1920's, party division was reflected in a larger percentage of votes than in the nineteenth century Congresses.

Both sets of data were examined to ascertain also the number of times that 90 per cent or more of one party voted in opposition to at least 50 per cent but less than 90 per cent of the other party. In the 1920's, this was the pattern on 456 or 33.4 per cent of the votes. Parenthetically, the same party percentages voted in agreement on only 7.5 per cent or 102 of the votes. By this formula, there was more disagreement between the parties in the twentieth than the nineteenth century Congresses. In the latter period, the above pattern of disagreement occurred 535 times or upon 32.5 per cent of the votes. On 11.9 per cent or 195 votes, the same party percentages voted alike.⁶

Majorities, but less than 90 per cent, of each party voted in opposition on the remaining votes. There were 493 votes in the nineteenth century Congresses on which the

⁶Ibid.

majorities voted against each other which translates into 30 per cent of the total votes.⁷ In marked contrast, the Republican and Democratic majorities, between 1921 and 1929, voted in opposition on 51.2 per cent of the votes or 698 times.

These statistics seem to confirm that party affiliation was the principal guide to the way senators voted both in the nineteenth and twentieth century Congresses. Division between the parties is indicated on 86.9 per cent of the votes in the former and on 90.4 per cent in the latter Congresses. An unexpected conclusion is that party affiliation was a significant factor on a greater percentage of votes in the 1920's. The paucity of party votes in the 67th through the 70th Congress, however, suggests that few issues generated enough partisanship to produce many votes with extraordinary party majorities voting against each other. Another basic deduction is that, although the bulk of senators must have voted their party position, either the Republicans or Democrats or both were more fragmented than normal.

The "index of likeness" is another technique for measuring the difference between Republicans and Democrats. It measures the difference between the two groups in the degree of support given to a motion. The index is obtained

⁷Ibid.

by subtracting the percentage of "yea" votes cast by one party from the percentage of "yea" votes cast by the other, and subtracting the difference from 100. Therefore, if the Republicans support a measure 70 "yea" and 30 "nay", and the Democrats oppose it 70 "nay" and 30 "yea," the Republican percentage of "yea" votes is 70, and the Democratic 30. The difference between these percentages is 40, which, when subtracted from 100 yields an index of likeness of 60. The index of likeness ranges from 0 to 100, with 0 representing complete dissimilarity of voting behavior, and 100 perfect similarity.⁸

There was 61.3 average likeness between the Republicans and Democrats for the 67th through the 70th Congress. This likeness percentage only slightly exceeded the normal interparty likeness over a protracted period. From the 47th through the 76th Congress (1880-1940), the average likeness between the parties was 59.7.⁹ The average likeness for the 1920's acquires more significance when it is examined by Congress and issue.

⁸Rice, Quantitative Methods in Politics, pp. 209-11.

⁹This likeness percentage was computed from materials in John B. Johnson, Jr., The Extent and Consistency of Party Voting in the United States Senate (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago, 1943), 22-251. Although data from the Johnson study enables valuable comparisons, conclusions from comparisons between this and the Johnson investigation must be qualified. This is because there are basic differences in chronology and organization between the two

Increasing likeness between the Republicans and Democrats was the trend throughout the decade. They had the least mutuality in the 67th Congress (1921-23) with only 49.0 likeness. Thereafter, their likeness drastically increased. Republican and Democratic likeness rose to 62.0, then 66.0, and finally 68.0 for the 68th (1923-25), 69th (1925-27), and the 70th (1927-29) Congresses.

There was a salient divergence of interparty likeness according to issues. In the following table, Republican and Democratic likeness is presented for all 20 categories of issues. The table includes their likeness for each category by Congress with the average likeness for the decade. There is a 60.5 variance between the issue with the least and most interparty likeness. It is apparent that any discerning judgment with respect to interparty likeness must make reference to specific issues. Historical generalizations which imply uniform interparty likeness are deceptive and inaccurate.

The assertion that Republicans and Democrats had more affinity upon specific issues than normal can now be tested. A table was constructed in which the interparty likeness on

studies. The Johnson dissertation analyzes 243 representative votes over several epochs whereas this study includes all roll-call for one historical era.

TABLE 2
 INTERPARTY LIKENESS BY ISSUE AND
 CONGRESS, 1921-1929

Issue	Congress				Average Likeness
	67	68	69	70	
Tariff	29.0		24.0	32.0	28.3
Race	8.0	28.0		54.0	30.0
Senate Organization	29.0	20.0	51.0	35.0	33.8
Appropriations	37.0	49.0	42.0	69.0	49.3
Tax Revenue	34.0	52.0	67.0	46.0	49.8
Investigations	38.0	67.0	54.0	42.0	50.3
Pensions-Claims- Compensation		58.0			58.0
Business-Industry-Banks	40.0	53.0	69.0	74.0	59.0
Senate Procedure	36.0	56.0	66.0	85.0	60.8
Veterans' Compensation	77.0	51.0	65.0		64.3
Public Works	36.0	77.0	69.0	80.0	65.5
Agriculture	58.0	59.0	70.0	80.0	66.8
Government Organization	46.0	79.0	75.0	74.0	68.5
Appointments	50.0	74.0	57.0	99.0	70.0
Military Affairs	57.0	75.0	65.0	83.0	70.3
Public Power		76.0	81.0	67.0	71.3
Foreign Policy	45.0	86.0	86.0	83.0	75.0
Welfare		88.0	67.0	74.0	76.3
Immigration	72.0	83.0	91.0		82.0
Prohibition	94.0		87.0	85.0	88.7

certain issues during the 1920's was compared with the same issues from 1880 through 1940.¹⁰ There are two admitted flaws in this comparison: (1) some major issues were excluded from comparison because they were not analyzed in the Johnson study; and (2) specific legislation incorporated within a general category of issues may not always be identical in both studies. Despite these deficiencies, the preceding

¹⁰The information for 1880-1940 was extrapolated and computed from Johnson, pp. 22-251.

TABLE 3

COMPARISON OF INTERPARTY LIKENESS IN THE 1920'S WITH THE AVERAGE
INTERPARTY LIKENESS (1880-1940) ON CERTAIN ISSUES

Issue	Interparty Likeness 1921-1929	Average Interparty Likeness 1880-1940		
			More 1921-29	Less 1921-29
Tariff	28.3	23.6	4.7	
Tax-Revenue	49.8	57.9		8.1
Business-Industry-Banks	59.0	66.2		7.2
Veterans' Compensation	64.3	79.2		14.9
Agriculture	66.8	59.7	7.1	
Foreign Policy	75.0	52.0	23.0	
Welfare	76.3	74.3	2.0	
Immigration	82.0	81.0	1.0	
Prohibition (liquor)	88.7	81.4	7.3	

comparison provides a basis for correctives, or perhaps refinements, in political interpretations of the 1920's. Although there was more Republican and Democratic likeness on issues by overall averages, this generalization will not hold up when applied to specific issues. Party differences on tax-revenue, business-industry-banks, and veterans' compensation, three of the nine issues, were markedly more pronounced in the 1920's than normal. On two issues, welfare and immigration, there was slightly more interparty likeness than usual, but the difference between the 1920's and the 1880-1940 average is inappreciable. The remaining four issues, tariff, agriculture, foreign policy, and prohibition (liquor), reflect a significant increase in affinity between the two parties. For accuracy and efficacy, historical generalizations on interparty likeness must be qualified according to issues.

The traditional historical descriptions of the extent of interparty likeness and division during the 1920's are substantially valid, but require some modification. Divisions between the Republicans and Democrats in the 1920's were not as intense but were more frequent than normal. Although partisanship failed to produce average divisions of intensity between the parties, indicating that party membership was less influential on the voting behavior of some senators, the significant conclusion is that the fundamental Senate divisions continued to be along party lines. There

was more voting homogeneity between Republicans and Democrats than was usual, but only slightly more than the normal likeness pattern. The traditional interpretation required other modifications. The two groups did not vote more alike than was usual throughout the era: they voted less alike at the beginning of the decade than was normal but by its conclusion their mutuality exceeded the "norm." Their degree of likeness was also contingent upon issue. Statements with respect to interparty mutuality must make allowance for these relevancies. Partisanship declined slightly in the 1920's, but party remained the basic influence upon voting behavior.

CHAPTER III

AN ANALYSIS OF DEMOCRATIC AND REPUBLICAN PARTY COHESION

This chapter is an analysis of Republican and Democratic party solidarity during the 1920's. According to the usual interpretation, both political parties were afflicted with deep ideological and sectional divisions. The schism in the Republican party aligned the progressive-agrarian Western and Midwestern senators against the conservative-urban Easterners. There was a power struggle of equal intensity and scope within the Democratic party. The rural, dry, nativist, protestant forces clashed with the urban, Catholic, wet, immigrant wing. Intraparty relations were characterized by recrimination and sharp divisions.¹ The natural result was a substantial reduction in party unity.

¹This description may be slightly oversimplified, but it is the basic theme advanced, among others, by Wilfred E. Binkley, American Political Parties: Their Natural History, 4th ed. enl. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1962); Russel B. Nye, Midwestern Progressive Politics: A Study of Its Origins and Development, 1870-1958 (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1959); Malcolm Moos, The Republicans: A History of Their Party (New York: Random House, 1956); William E. Leuchtenburg, The Perils of Prosperity, 1914-1932 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958); George H. Mayer, The Republican Party, 1854-1954 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964); Arthur S. Link, William B. Catton, and William M. Leary, Jr., American Epoch: A History of the United States Since the 1890's, 3rd ed. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1967); and Hicks, Republican Ascendancy, 1921-1933.

This nearly categorical assertion of party fragmentation has not previously been examined by vote analysis. Even if the standard interpretation is basically correct, this does not obviate the need for more precise measurement of party fragmentation. There is likewise a need for investigation of heretofore neglected aspects and ramifications of party solidarity in the 1920's. This chapter attempts to rectify these deficiencies in the traditional interpretations.

A simple and effective method by which to assess party unity is by a graph which indicates the number of times that various percentages of party members vote together. Democratic solidarity is first examined in the following table. It includes all the roll-call votes in the 67th through the 70th Congress. The number of times that the indicated percentages of Democrats vote together are presented by Congress with totals for the 1920's. Within the parentheses, the number of votes are presented as a percentage of the total votes in each Congress. The obvious impression is that of pronounced Democratic solidarity. At least 90 per cent of the Democrats voted together on nearly one-half of the total votes during the 1920's. In the descending scale of Democratic unity there are progressively fewer votes. The table also indicates that there was significant variance in Democratic solidarity from Congress to Congress, and that there was a pattern of declining cohesion throughout the decade.

TABLE 4

NUMBER OF TIMES THAT VARIOUS PERCENTAGES OF THE
DEMOCRATS VOTE TOGETHER, 1921-29

Congress	Percentages of Democrats Voting Together					Total
	50-60	60-70	70-80	80-90	90-100	
67	49 (6.7)	62 (8.5)	98(13.5)	136(18.7)	382(52.5)	727
68	28(13.1)	23(10.8)	25(11.7)	38(17.8)	99(46.5)	213
69	32(13.7)	33(14.1)	49(20.9)	45(19.2)	75(32.1)	234
70	33(17.4)	27(14.2)	34(17.9)	30(15.8)	66(34.7)	190
Totals	142(10.4)	145(10.6)	206(15.1)	249(18.3)	622(45.6)	1364

The frequency that certain percentages of Democrats voted together was also determined according to issue. This computation revealed that Democratic cohesion fluctuated graphically contingent upon the issues.

Table 4 and Table 5 demonstrate that Democratic unity was dependent upon the issue and relative according to the Congress. These tables provide a valuable general impression of Democratic solidarity, but they fail to measure party affinity with satisfactory precision. This can be rectified through the use of the cohesion index. The index of cohesion is a measure of party unity on a vote, regardless of the position of the other party. It is obtained by dividing the number of votes cast by the party members who were in a majority by the total number of party members who voted. The percentage will range from 50 to 100, and is converted to the scale of 0 to 100. Therefore, if the party votes either 25 "yea" and 75 "nay" or 75 "yea" and 25 "nay," the majority cast 75 votes which are divided by 100, the total number of votes cast. The percentage is 75, which converted to a 0 to 100 scale equals 50, the party's index of cohesion. The lowest cohesion is 0, and the highest is 100.²

Democratic cohesion was 61.8 in the 1920's. This is less than normal Democratic cohesion. Their average cohesion,

²Rice, Quantitative Methods in Politics, pp. 208-9.

TABLE 5

NUMBER OF TIMES THAT VARIOUS PERCENTAGES OF THE DEMOCRATS VOTE
TOGETHER ACCORDING TO ISSUES, 1921-29

Issue	Percentage of Democrats Voting Together					Total
	50-60	60-70	70-80	80-90	90-100	
Senate						
Organization	1	0	2	3	53	59
Foreign Affairs	17	20	23	27	51	138
Military Affairs	8	13	13	14	19	67
Tariff	12	10	29	55	212	318
Senate Procedure	14	14	13	8	36	85
Appointments	2	3	2	10	19	36
Government						
Organization	7	3	16	18	15	59
Immigration	3	5	4	4	3	19
Agriculture	12	18	22	28	16	96
Welfare	7	3	10	4	0	24
Business-Industry-						
Banks	8	10	11	10	22	61
Tax-Revenue	13	12	14	21	79	139
Veterans'						
Compensation	1	2	7	7	13	30
Prohibition	3	4	5	3	1	16
Appropriations	8	7	13	19	40	87
Pensions-Claims-						
Compensation	1	2	1	0	0	4
Public Works	4	10	5	5	10	34
Public Power	20	8	14	10	4	56
Investigations	0	0	2	1	28	31
Race	1	1	0	2	1	5
Totals	142	145	206	249	622	1364

based upon 243 votes encompassing ten issues, from 1880 through 1940 was 69.8 which is 8.0 more than it was for the 1920's.³ This comparison verifies the usual historical interpretations with respect to increased Democratic disunity. When the average cohesion for the 1920's is analyzed by Congress and issue, there are ramifications which are not reflected in the standard theses.

Democratic solidarity varied significantly dependent upon the Congress. In the 67th Congress, Democrats had an impressive 69.0 cohesion which was the most they had in any "twenties" Congress. There was a consistent waning of their solidarity in each succeeding Congress. Democratic cohesion declined to 65.0, then to 57.0, and finally to 56.0 in the 68th, 69th, and 70th Congresses. Corresponding, and apparently related, to decreasing Democratic unity were changes in Senate issues and party membership, and party quarrels outside the Congress. The enactment of many Republican programs in the 67th Congress seems to have eroded Democratic solidarity. Also, from a nearly exclusive Southern group, the Senate Democratic party became increasingly heterogeneous which contributed to disunity. The extent to which this variegated party composition caused less voting solidarity is difficult to assess. A few Southerners especially, however, demonstrated

³This figure is based upon data from Johnson, pp. 22-251.

some voting irregularity. Relations, outside the Senate, between the urban and rural Democratic wings did degenerate throughout the era culminating in Southern indifference and even defection in the 1928 presidential election.

Democratic cohesion also varied appreciably upon the nature of the issue. In the following table, the Democrats' cohesion is given by issue for each Congress with the average cohesion for all Congresses in the 1920's. Although Democratic cohesion exceeded their historical "norm" for some issues in an isolated Congress, primarily the 67th, this was not the general pattern for the decade. Democratic cohesion, with the exception of the tariff, was less in the 1920's than their overall average on every issue, for which there is data to enable comparisons. When the results from this analysis are contrasted with the average Democratic cohesion between 1880 and 1940, the high degree of Democratic disunity in the 1920's becomes obvious.⁴

In table 7, Democratic solidarity for the 1920's is compared with their normal cohesion between 1880-1940 on certain issues. The issues are arranged in the sequence from least to most cohesion during the 1920's. Whether Democratic cohesion was more or less in the 1920's is indicated in the appropriate column.

⁴The raw data for the 1880-1940 average cohesion is found in Johnson, pp. 22-251.

TABLE 6

DEMOCRATIC COHESION ACCORDING TO ISSUE FOR
EACH CONGRESS WITH THE AVERAGE
COHESION FOR THE 67TH THROUGH
THE 70TH CONGRESS,
1921-29

Issue	Congress				Average Cohesion
	67	68	69	70	
Pensions-Claims- Compensation	--	27.0	--	--	27.0
Public Power	--	35.0	31.0	46.0	37.3
Prohibition	30.0	--	55.0	32.0	39.0
Welfare	59.0	15.0	44.0	--	39.3
Immigration	58.0	52.0	8.0	--	39.3
Agriculture	56.0	33.0	52.0	48.0	47.3
Senate Procedure	65.0	55.0	52.0	26.0	49.5
Race	88.0	55.0	--	8.0	50.3
Foreign Policy	57.0	48.0	67.0	53.0	56.3
Military Affairs	53.0	43.0	70.0	60.0	56.5
Public Works	81.0	58.0	45.0	48.0	58.0
Government Organization	60.0	58.0	72.0	48.0	59.5
Business-Industry- Banks	63.0	89.0	53.0	46.0	62.8
Appropriations	69.0	72.0	55.0	58.0	63.5
Appointments	70.0	80.0	66.0	58.0	68.5
Veterans' Compensation	55.0	71.0	84.0	--	70.0
Tax-Revenue	80.0	82.0	55.0	65.0	70.5
Tariff	76.0	--	74.0	86.0	78.7
Senate Organization	93.0	95.0	66.0	85.0	84.8
Investigations	88.0	100.0	91.0	96.0	93.8

These statistical indices demonstrate that party affiliation was less instrumental in determining senators' voting behavior in the 1920's than normally. It should not be concluded, however, that party affiliation was a negligible influence upon voting patterns. Subsequent analysis

TABLE 7

COMPARISON OF DEMOCRATIC COHESION IN THE
1920'S WITH THEIR AVERAGE COHESION
BETWEEN 1880-1940 ON
SELECTED ISSUES

Issue	Cohesion 1921-29	Average Cohesion 1880-1940	More	Less
Prohibition (liquor)	39.0	47.8		8.8
Welfare	39.3	76.0		36.7
Immigration	39.3	68.3		29.0
Agriculture	47.3	64.8		17.5
Foreign Policy	56.3	63.4		7.1
Business-Industry-Banks	62.8	68.5		5.7
Veterans' Compensation	70.0	79.9		9.9
Tax-Revenue	70.5	73.3		2.8
Tariff	78.7	76.7	2.0	

will reenforce the conclusion that party membership was the most discernible influence upon Senate voting in all Congresses and for every issue.

If party affiliation was irrelevant to the way Democrats voted, their voting profile would reflect a "chance" pattern. In the absence of party pressure, one-half of the Democrats would be expected to vote one way and one-half the other way, and the influence of party would be 0. Chi-squares indicate the effect of a variable in the vote distribution, which is party in this case. The larger the chi-square statistic, the stronger is the relatedness in the sample.⁵ The chi-square test indicates there was a party

⁵For a description and formula of chi-square see George H. Weinberg and John A. Schumaker, Statistics: An

influence upon Democratic voting. Democratic chi-squares were 7.49, 8.21, 6.97 and 7.78 for the 67th, 68th, 69th and 70th Congresses. Chi-square analysis also revealed a party influence upon voting over all issues.⁶ The usual historical pronouncements on the existence of extreme Democratic disunity in the 1920's are supported by statistical evidence. These pronouncements are, however, exceedingly imprecise. Democratic cohesion was closely related to time sequence and issues; historical generalizations which fail to allow for these factors are inaccurate.

Republican and Democratic patterns of disunity are in sharp contrast. Although the statistical information reinforces the interpretation that there was "inordinate" disruption within the Republican party, the analysis produced unexpected results. The Republicans were less united than the Democrats in most of the Congresses. They were also more fragmented relative to their overall "norm" of party cohesion than the Democrats. Republican cohesion was 57.8 for the decade. This was 9.8 below the average Republican cohesion of 67.6 between 1880-1940.⁷ These

Intuitive Approach (Belmont, California: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1962), 216-24.

⁶Democratic chi-squares for Congresses and issues are in Appendix A.

⁷This statistic was computed from data found in Johnson, pp. 22-251.

measurements seem to emphatically confirm the presence of usually high divisions between the Republicans during the 1920's.

Upon examination, however, there were diverse motifs within the major theme of Republican discord. This is easily perceived in the graph with vote distribution by the percentage of Republicans voting together. Although Republican solidarity in the 1920's was below their average, the table suggests that they had more unity than allowed for in the usual interpretation. At least 90 per cent of the Republicans voted together on over two-fifths of the total votes, and 80 per cent or more of the Republicans were in agreement on over three-fifths of the votes in the 1920's. The table also indicates that Republican solidarity had divergent patterns over the decade.

The decline in Republican unity in the 1920's is reflected in the cohesion indices. In the 67th Congress (1921-23), Republican cohesion was 71.0 which was the most for either party in any Congress in the 1920's. This was unexpected because more substantive and, theoretically, divisive issues were raised in the 67th Congress. The natural assumption would be, based upon the interpretation of internal ideological and geographical party conflict, that Republican cohesion would be less in this Congress. After the 67th Congress, there was a precipitous decline in party

TABLE 8

NUMBER OF TIMES THAT VARIOUS PERCENTAGES OF THE REPUBLICANS
VOTE TOGETHER, 1921-29

Congress	Percentages of Republicans Voting Together					Total
	50-60	60-70	70-80	80-90	90-100	
67	52 (7.2)	56 (7.7)	83(11.4)	136(18.7)	400(55.0)	727
68	21 (9.9)	32(15.0)	50(23.5)	46(21.6)	64(30.0)	213
69	29(12.4)	42(17.9)	54(23.1)	61(26.1)	48(20.5)	234
70	27(14.2)	54(28.4)	33(17.4)	32(16.8)	44(23.2)	190
Totals	129 (9.5)	184(13.5)	220(16.1)	275(20.2)	556(40.8)	1364

unity. The entry of "farm state radicals" into the Senate following the 1922 elections certainly contributed to the breach within the party. It was widened with the Republican rupture in the 1924 presidential election. Republican cohesion fell to 57.0 in the 68th Congress (1923-25). Intraparty relations improved after the 68th Congress and by 1927 most of the outstanding differences between the groups were resolved. Incongruously, the restoration of party relations was paralleled with a constant decrease in party voting solidarity. Republican cohesion declined to 53.0 in the 69th Congress (1925-27), and finally to 50.0 in the 70th Congress (1927-29). Surface impressions of party unity may not always correspond to voting cohesion.

Perhaps an insight into the nature and cause of Republican discord can be obtained from examining their voting patterns according to issues. The following table presents the percentages of Republicans voting together according to issues. The cohesion index reenforces the impression from the vote distribution scale that there was extreme divergence among Republicans contingent upon the issue. There was 55.3 difference between the issue upon which there was the least and most Republican cohesion. This range was less than that of the Democrats, but it exceeded by far the normal Republican range.

TABLE 9
 NUMBER OF TIMES THAT VARIOUS PERCENTAGES OF
 THE REPUBLICANS VOTE TOGETHER
 ACCORDING TO ISSUES,
 1921-29

Issue	50-60	60-70	70-80	80-90	90-100	Total
Senate						
Organization	2	8	19	11	19	59
Foreign Policy	4	5	19	21	89	138
Military Affairs	9	11	18	16	13	67
Tariff	21	18	30	46	203	318
Senate Procedure	8	7	10	13	47	85
Appointments	1	3	8	10	14	36
Government						
Organization	6	7	8	16	22	59
Immigration	3	3	1	3	9	19
Agriculture	20	13	25	24	14	96
Welfare	1	3	4	13	3	24
Business-Industry-						
Banks	6	22	11	14	8	61
Tax-Revenue	11	29	22	34	43	139
Veterans'						
Compensation	5	9	2	6	8	30
Prohibition	6	4	2	3	1	16
Appropriations	5	14	13	20	35	87
Claims-Pensions-						
Compensation	0	0	0	1	3	4
Public Works	5	12	3	10	4	34
Public Power	11	10	21	4	10	56
Investigations	5	6	4	9	7	31
Race	0	0	0	1	4	5
Totals	129	184	220	275	556	1364

Republican cohesion in the 1920's was markedly below their "norm" for 1880-1940. They had less cohesion on every issue, for which there is information, than usual. The issues in the table below are arranged in order from the least to most cohesion in the 1920's.⁸

⁸The data for 1880-1940 is taken from Johnson, pp. 22-251.

TABLE 10

REPUBLICAN COHESION ACCORDING TO ISSUE FOR
EACH CONGRESS WITH THE AVERAGE
COHESION FOR THE 67TH THROUGH
THE 70TH CONGRESS,
1921-29

Issue	Congress				Average Cohesion
	67	68	69	70	
Prohibition	23.0	--	44.0	53.0	40.0
Public Works	44.0	32.0	52.0	45.0	43.3
Public Power	--	40.0	43.0	51.0	44.7
Agriculture	55.0	53.0	41.0	31.0	45.0
Veterans'					
Compensation	45.0	59.0	47.0	--	50.3
Business-Industry-					
Banks	64.0	55.0	48.0	36.0	50.8
Military Affairs	53.0	54.0	43.0	55.0	51.3
Investigations	79.0	59.0	30.0	44.0	53.0
Immigration	82.0	63.0	21.0	--	55.3
Tax-Revenue	62.0	56.0	54.0	59.0	57.8
Senate Procedure	76.0	49.0	69.0	42.0	59.0
Welfare	64.0	56.0	59.0	--	59.7
Senate					
Organization	76.0	64.0	57.0	44.0	60.3
Government					
Organization	61.0	56.0	74.0	69.0	65.0
Appointments	79.0	62.0	59.0	62.0	65.5
Foreign Policy	80.0	45.0	68.0	72.0	66.3
Tariff	75.0	--	78.0	48.0	67.0
Claims-Pensions-					
Compensation	--	78.0	--	--	78.0
Race	96.0	90.0	--	100.0	95.3

TABLE 11
 COMPARISON OF REPUBLICAN COHESION IN THE
 1920'S WITH THEIR AVERAGE COHESION
 BETWEEN 1880-1940 ON
 SELECTED ISSUES

Issue	Cohesion 1921-29	Average Cohesion 1880-1940	Difference
Prohibition (liquor)	40.0	58.7	18.7
Agriculture	45.0	66.1	21.1
Veterans' Compensation	50.3	76.7	26.4
Business-Industry-Banks	50.8	57.7	6.9
Immigration	55.3	64.1	8.8
Welfare	59.7	60.8	1.1
Tax-Revenue	57.8	64.0	6.2
Foreign Policy	66.3	67.6	1.3
Tariff	67.0	80.9	13.9

All the preceding indices indicate a diminution of party influence on Republican voting in the 1920's. Party pressure, however, for voting conformity was far from negligible.

Chi-square analysis affirms that party membership was a determinant of the way Republican senators voted. This measurement indicates that Republicans voted together, in excess of random arrangement, by averages of 12.02, 7.96, 7.65, and 7.15 respectively in the 67th, 68th, 69th, and 70th Congresses. There were wide differences of party influence from issue to issue, but it was easily perceived in every category.⁹

⁹The Republican chi-squares for Congresses and issues are in Appendix A. Their chi-square averages may exceed

Even with the decrease in party unity, party membership is the key to Senate voting practices in the 1920's. Both parties, as reflected in the vote distribution graphs, cohesion indices, and chi-squares, had measurable divisions, but not of the magnitude often expressed in political literature. Overall, "twenties" politics has more similarity than dissimilarity with the general model of American political processes and behavior.

In the investigation of party cohesion, an impression formed that the Republicans and Democrats had their own distinctive patterns of disunity. A table was constructed to enable convenient comparison of Democratic vis-a-vis Republican cohesion according to issue. The purpose was to discern whether the Republicans and Democrats had the same cohesion patterns. In Table 12, the difference in their cohesion is indicated in parenthesis beside the party with the most cohesion.

Each party had more cohesion than the other on ten issues. This information contributes to a clarification of historical interpretations with respect to party unity during the 1920's. Party cohesion does not have a monolithic

those for the Democrats although the Democrats have more cohesion. This is because chi-squares reflect the number in the group being measured; the more members of a group the higher the chi-square. Because there were more Republicans than Democrats in the Senate, the former may have higher chi-square averages.

TABLE 12
 COMPARISON OF DEMOCRATIC AND REPUBLICAN
 COHESION ACCORDING TO ISSUE,
 1921-29

Issue	Democrats	Republicans
Claims-Pensions- Compensation	27.0	78.0 (51.0)
Public Power	37.3	44.7 (7.4)
Prohibition	39.0	40.0 (1.0)
Welfare	39.3	59.7 (20.4)
Immigration	39.3	55.3 (16.0)
Agriculture	47.3 (2.3)	45.0
Senate Procedure	49.5	59.0 (9.5)
Race	50.3	95.3 (45.0)
Foreign Policy	56.3	66.3 (10.0)
Military Affairs	56.5 (5.2)	51.3
Public Works	58.0 (14.7)	43.3
Government Organization	59.5	65.0 (5.5)
Business-Industry-Banks	62.8 (12.0)	50.8
Appropriations	63.5	65.3 (1.8)
Appointments	68.5 (3.0)	65.5
Veterans' Compensation	70.0 (19.7)	50.3
Tax-Revenue	70.5 (12.7)	57.8
Tariff	78.7 (11.7)	67.0
Senate Organization	84.8 (24.5)	60.3
Investigations	93.8 (40.8)	53.0

pattern, it fluctuates according to issue. Although the Democrats had more cohesion overall during the 1920's than the Republicans, this was not true on all issues. This comparison also enabled a delineation of respective patterns of Democratic and Republican cohesion.

The issues in this study can generally be defined as two types--substantive and non-substantive. Substantive issues are those of policy determination whereas the non-substantive relate to procedure, partisanship, and party

loyalty. There is not, naturally, always a clear distinction between the two. It seemed, nevertheless, that there was a defensible rationale for classifying 16 issues as substantive and the remaining 4 issues as non-substantive. In the table below, the issues are identified as substantive and non-substantive with a D or R in the adjoining column to indicate the party with the most cohesion on that issue.

TABLE 13
COMPARISON OF DEMOCRATIC AND REPUBLICAN
COHESION ON SUBSTANTIVE AND
NON-SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES,
1921-29

Substantive Issues	Party	Non-substantive Issues	Party
Claims-Pensions-			
Compensation	R	Senate Procedure	R
Public Power	R	Appointments	D
Prohibition	R	Senate Organization	D
Welfare	R	Investigations	D
Immigration	R		
Agriculture	D		
Foreign Policy	R		
Military Affairs	D		
Public Works	D		
Race	R		
Government Organization	R		
Business-Industry-Banks	D		
Appropriations	R		
Veterans' Compensation	D		
Tax-Revenue	D		
Tariff	D		

The Republicans had more unity, sometimes by narrow margins, than the Democrats on 9 of the 16 substantive issues. On the non-substantive issues, the Democrats had

more cohesion on 3 of the 4 issues. This suggests a fundamental difference in the nature of cohesion within each party. Democrats agreed less upon policy among themselves than Republicans, but they had more affinity upon partisan matters. Partisan issues are those upon which party affiliation should be the basic guide to voting behavior. Irrespective of policy differences, all partisans should vote together on issues that reflect their party exclusiveness. Senate organization is an illustration where, whatever other differences between party members, every Republican and Democrat should vote for their respective candidates for Senate offices. Whereas Republicans had mutuality that exceeded the Democrats on policy issues, they were less united upon issues when party loyalty should be the determinant of voting conduct. Republican division seemed to be more politically based than Democratic fragmentation which appeared to stem from policy differences.

Both political parties were more divided during the 1920's than normally. Their cohesion did vary significantly, however, according to the Congress and issue. Moreover, there seemed to be a difference in the nature of discord within each party: Democrats had more unity upon party loyalty matters whereas the Republicans had more solidarity upon policy issues.

Some plausible causes for the party cohesion patterns have already been alluded to in this chapter. A brief complementary section examining political conditions and attitudes may further clarify these patterns. The pronounced division between the parties in the 67th Congress partially resulted from Republican determination to supplant Democratic policies with their own. Once their several major programs were adopted, the Republican leadership was basically satisfied to defend the status quo. The Republican hierarchy combined a simple pro-business policy with a determination to curtail governmental welfare responsibility. This and the fact that Republican programs could largely be implemented through the executive reduced confrontations in the Senate after the 67th Congress and, therefore, the opportunities for division between the parties.¹⁰

The Democrats and unreliable Republicans were often committed to mere obstruction of regular Republican programs. Their lack of originality in proposing measures reflected their restricted ken of governmental welfare and public interest obligations.¹¹ Even if they had the necessary vision, it is unrealistic to assume that they could have enacted a comprehensive reform program into law. Although a Democratic-irregular Republican coalition could

¹⁰Mayer, pp. 383-4.

¹¹Link, Catton, and Leary, p. 325.

sometimes pass bills in the Senate, the Republican executives could usually rely upon enough regular support to sustain their vetoes. There was little indication that the Supreme Court would find reform legislation constitutional if it was enacted into law. A majority of the justices were reactionaries and conservatives who zealously nullified laws which they believed were incompatible with laissez-faire economics.¹² With these conditions, it is not surprising that party unity eroded and that political issues were often largely unrelated to the public interest.

There is another view of politics in the 1920's which requires restatement because it has either been assumed or overlooked. Historical emphasis has focused upon party dissension, insurgency, defection and irregularity with the resultant impression that there was virtual party anarchy in the 1920's. The evidence in the first three chapters supports the assertion that the parties were less unified, but it should also dispel the idea that there was massive party revolution.

The parties continued to organize and direct the contest for political power in American society, and to use

¹²For a constitutional history of the 1920's see Alfred H. Kelly and Winfred A. Harbison, The American Constitution: Its Origins and Development, 3rd ed. (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1963), 685-721.

government for their ends. To obtain and keep power in order to form public policy requires party regularity. The politician must give his primary allegiance to the party at the expense of his personal independence--party loyalty alone ensures party government. This was the pervasive practice even in the 1920's. The politics of this decade correspond more closely to the traditional political pattern than is usually conceded by historians. The remaining three chapters especially should contribute to establishing this theme of "twenties" politics.

CHAPTER IV

A MEASUREMENT OF THE PARTY LOYALTY OF REPUBLICAN AND DEMOCRATIC SENATORS

This study concentrates upon group voting patterns. However, group indices are only composites of voting decisions made by individual senators. A voting profile of each senator is vital for an insight into the group statistics. It has a second important purpose in this chapter which is to test the generally accepted conclusion that party was eclipsed as the principal guide to voting behavior. The usual assertion is that both political parties had major internal cleaveages. Conservative Eastern Republicans were militant party regulars. This was in sharp contrast to many Midwestern and Western Republicans who expounded progressivism and were party irregulars; some senators in this group were known as insurgents. The Democratic party is often described as being divided along rural-urban lines which reflected ideological differences between the two groups. If party loyalty was markedly reduced in the 1920's, it should be reflected in an increase in voting irregularity. This chapter is a measurement of the voting reliability of Republican and Democratic senators.

The usual description of party politics fails to include either a definition of political regularity or provide

a criteria by which to distinguish between regulars and irregulars. Admittedly, there is no sound intuitive way or cryptic mathematical formula to delineate these behavior patterns. Party regularity of senators can, however, be measured. Through this measurement, however, the perception of senators as only regulars or irregulars is modified to degrees of regularity. This means that a senator will not usually be seen as absolutely regular or irregular, he will be perceived as more or less regular in relation to his colleagues. Categorical norms of regularity and irregularity could be designed, but they would have no practical value in this study.

The second deficiency in the usual interpretation is that it seems based upon narrow research and sometimes invalid materials. This is rectified by the loyalty index in this chapter which encompasses the voting record for all senators over every issue for the 1920's. As a result, any senator can be placed precisely in the spectrum of party dependability relative to every other senator. References are often made about senators as members of groups which implies a uniform group behavior. The loyalty index readily enables even subtle distinctions to be made between group members which impressionistically have identical political reliability, i.e., Eastern Republicans may be more diverse in their dependability than is usually believed. When historians identify a senator as

a member of a group, i.e., William E. Borah was a Western Republican insurgent, they are seldom in agreement if that senator was an authentic group member. The data from the loyalty index should enable more accurate judgments in the definition of groups and their members. It is conceivable that some senators, based upon their voting records, have been erroneously included or excluded from groups defined by their party regularity. The loyalty index is a way to test the accuracy of judgments made by historians about the political reliability or undependability of some senators. Precise data on the party reliability of each senator in the 1920's is not available except in this study.

The following loyalty index is a modification of the standard loyalty index which only indicates the times and percentage that a senator votes with his party when at least 90 per cent of each party are voting in opposition. Because the 90 per cent party vote is rare in the 1920's and, theoretically, a senator could vote with his party only under these conditions, it seemed more valid to determine senators' party regularity at different stages of party disagreement. The index indicates the number of times and percentage that a senator votes with his party under three different conditions: (1) when he votes with a majority of his party irrespective of what the other party does; (2) when he votes with a majority of his party against a majority of the other

party; and (3) when he votes with at least 90 per cent of his party against 90 per cent of the other party.

In the index, the number in parenthesis along the left hand margin indicates the Congress. There are eight columns in the table which, from the left to right hand margin, are: (1) the number of times that the senator voted with the majority of his party; (2) the percentage of times that the senator voted with his party; (3) the number of times that the senator voted against his party majority; (4) the percentage of times that the senator voted against his party majority; (5) the number of times that the senator voted with a majority of his party against the majority of the other party; (6) the percentage of times that the senator voted with his party majority against a majority of the other party; (7) the number of times that the senator voted with his party when 90 per cent of each party were voting in opposition to the other; and (8) the percentage of times that the senator voted with 90 per cent of his party against 90 per cent of the other party.

TABLE 14

REPUBLICAN LOYALTY INDEX

Lewis H. Ball (Del.)

(67)	555	93.00	45	7.00	450	96.00	179	99.00
(68)	156	<u>83.00</u>	32	17.00	104	<u>87.00</u>	19	<u>100.00</u>
		88.00				91.50		99.50

Frank B. Brandegree (Conn.)

(67)	572	90.00	65	10.00	457	94.00	173	98.00
(68)	116	<u>93.00</u>	9	7.00	75	<u>96.00</u>	13	<u>100.00</u>
		91.50				95.00		99.00

James W. Wadsworth, Jr. (N.Y.)

(67)	555	86.00	88	14.00	452	91.00	192	98.00
(68)	158	79.00	42	21.00	104	84.00	18	95.00
(69)	162	<u>80.00</u>	40	20.00	85	<u>87.00</u>	10	<u>100.00</u>
		81.67				87.33		97.67

Philander C. Knox (Pa.)

(67)	90	69.00	13	31.00	40	82.00	7	100.00
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Bert M. Fernald (Me.)

(67)	470	89.00	60	11.00	382	93.00	149	100.00
(68)	157	87.00	24	13.00	110	92.00	19	100.00
(69)	86	<u>75.00</u>	28	25.00	45	<u>88.00</u>	3	<u>100.00</u>
		83.67				91.00		100.00

Joseph S. Frelinghuysen (N.J.)

(67)	528	88.00	73	12.00	425	94.00	174	100.00
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William M. Calder (N.Y.)

(67)	554	90.00	61	10.00	453	96.00	175	99.00
------	-----	-------	----	-------	-----	-------	-----	-------

Walter E. Edge (N.J.)

(67)	364	88.00	52	12.00	291	92.00	103	99.00
(68)	157	84.00	29	16.00	101	86.00	15	100.00
(69)	161	83.00	33	17.00	78	81.00	9	100.00
(70)	125	<u>80.00</u>	31	20.00	63	<u>91.00</u>	15	<u>100.00</u>
		83.75				87.50		99.75

Le Baron B. Colt (R.I.)

(67)	477	90.00	52	10.00	379	95.00	127	99.00
(68)	101	<u>88.00</u>	14	12.00	72	<u>99.00</u>	13	<u>100.00</u>
		89.00				97.00		99.50

William P. Dillingham (Vt.)

(67)	443	89.00	53	11.00	359	97.00	141	99.00
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Frederic Hale (Me.)

(67)	616	93.00	47	7.00	485	96.00	193	99.00
(68)	193	94.00	12	6.00	122	95.00	18	100.00
(69)	200	88.00	28	12.00	99	92.00	11	100.00
(70)	146	<u>81.00</u>	35	19.00	69	<u>86.00</u>	17	<u>100.00</u>
		89.00				92.25		99.75

Henry W. Keyes (N.H.)

(67)	618	92.00	55	8.00	486	94.00	206	99.00
(68)	181	94.00	12	6.00	114	97.00	17	100.00
(69)	186	89.00	23	11.00	92	91.00	11	100.00
(70)	134	<u>88.00</u>	18	12.00	69	<u>97.00</u>	16	<u>100.00</u>
		90.75				94.75		99.75

Henry C. Lodge (Mass.)

(67)	622	94.00	41	6.00	476	95.00	203	99.00
(68)	104	<u>90.00</u>	11	10.00	78	<u>94.00</u>	14	<u>100.00</u>
		92.00				94.50		99.50

George P. McLean (Conn.)

(67)	540	92.00	50	8.00	447	96.00	171	97.00
(68)	140	84.00	26	16.00	107	90.00	17	100.00
(69)	145	84.00	27	16.00	68	88.00	7	88.00
(70)	93	<u>76.00</u>	30	24.00	54	<u>95.00</u>	16	<u>100.00</u>
		84.00				92.25		96.25

George H. Moses (N.H.)

(67)	482	86.00	81	14.00	394	91.00	163	91.00
(68)	161	81.00	37	19.00	107	86.00	19	100.00
(69)	142	75.00	47	25.00	72	89.00	8	100.00
(70)	108	<u>77.00</u> <u>79.75</u>	33	23.00	64	<u>85.00</u> <u>87.75</u>	17	<u>100.00</u> <u>97.75</u>

Carroll S. Page (Vt.)

(67)	536	94.00	37	6.00	407	95.00	169	97.00
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Boies Penrose (Pa.)

(67)	138	88.00	19	12.00	71	97.00	17	100.00
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Thomas C. Du Pont (Del.)

(67)	272	94.00	18	6.00	251	91.00	109	95.00
(69)	74	88.00	10	12.00	24	77.00	2	100.00
(70)	32	<u>73.00</u> <u>85.00</u>	12	27.00	23	<u>92.00</u> <u>86.67</u>	3	<u>100.00</u> <u>98.33</u>

William E. Crow (Pa.)

(67)	240	94.00	16	6.00	195	93.00	96	100.00
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George W. Pepper (Pa.)

(67)	386	92.00	35	8.00	344	94.00	156	99.00
(68)	174	90.00	19	10.00	118	94.00	19	100.00
(69)	165	<u>88.00</u> <u>90.00</u>	23	12.00	80	<u>89.00</u> <u>92.33</u>	9	<u>90.00</u> <u>96.33</u>

David A. Reed (Pa.)

(67)	116	88.00	16	12.00	89	91.00	22	96.00
(68)	153	78.00	42	22.00	103	85.00	19	100.00
(69)	176	79.00	46	21.00	89	85.00	10	91.00
(70)	135	<u>76.00</u> <u>80.25</u>	43	24.00	72	<u>89.00</u> <u>87.50</u>	17	<u>100.00</u> <u>96.75</u>

Porter H. Dale (Vt.)

(68)	160	87.00	23	13.00	96	81.00	19	100.00
(69)	140	84.00	27	16.00	62	84.00	8	89.00
(70)	86	<u>69.00</u> <u>80.00</u>	39	31.00	38	<u>69.00</u> <u>78.00</u>	14	<u>100.00</u> <u>96.33</u>

Frank L. Greene (Vt.)

(68)	96	84.00	18	16.00	81	92.00	19	100.00
(69)	114	86.00	19	14.00	52	91.00	4	100.00
(70)	119	<u>82.00</u> <u>84.00</u>	26	18.00	64	<u>97.00</u> <u>93.33</u>	17	<u>100.00</u> <u>100.00</u>

William M. Butler (Mass.)

(68)	59	84.00	11	16.00	37	88.00	1	100.00
(69)	140	<u>93.00</u> <u>88.50</u>	11	7.00	67	<u>94.00</u> <u>91.00</u>	6	<u>86.00</u> <u>93.00</u>

Jesse H. Metcalf (R.I.)

(68)	57	80.00	14	20.00	38	86.00	4	100.00
(69)	179	86.00	29	14.00	93	91.00	9	90.00
(70)	116	<u>78.00</u> <u>81.33</u>	33	22.00	63	<u>91.00</u> <u>89.33</u>	15	<u>100.00</u> <u>96.67</u>

Hiram Bingham (Conn.)

(68)	50	77.00	15	23.00	33	87.00	4	100.00
(69)	149	75.00	50	25.00	76	84.00	9	82.00
(70)	130	<u>75.00</u> <u>75.67</u>	44	25.00	70	<u>91.00</u> <u>87.33</u>	16	<u>94.00</u> <u>94.00</u>

Frederick H. Gillette (Mass.)

(69)	136	84.00	25	16.00	61	86.00	4	80.00
(70)	97	<u>78.00</u> <u>81.00</u>	28	22.00	52	<u>88.00</u> <u>87.00</u>	12	<u>100.00</u> <u>90.00</u>

Arthur R. Gould (Me.)

(69)	37	84.00	7	16.00	20	83.00	3	100.00
(70)	74	<u>85.00</u>	13	15.00	44	<u>100.00</u>	13	<u>100.00</u>
		84.50				91.50		100.00

Daniel O. Hastings (Del.)

(70)	44	94.00	3	6.00	13	93.00	1	100.00
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Harry S. New (Ind.)

(67)	541	91.00	54	9.00	442	95.00	164	99.00
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Arthur Capper (Kansas)

(67)	522	73.00	192	27.00	386	71.00	181	89.00
(68)	140	71.00	58	29.00	72	59.00	17	89.00
(69)	161	79.00	42	21.00	72	73.00	9	100.00
(70)	123	<u>69.00</u>	56	31.00	46	<u>57.00</u>	17	<u>100.00</u>
		73.00				65.00		94.50

Albert B. Cummins (Iowa)

(67)	407	78.00	118	22.00	305	76.00	106	83.00
(68)	125	77.00	38	23.00	73	71.00	10	100.00
(69)	93	<u>79.00</u>	25	21.00	41	<u>76.00</u>	4	<u>100.00</u>
		78.00				74.33		94.33

Charles Curtis (Kansas)

(67)	568	94.00	42	6.00	514	95.00	201	100.00
(68)	189	93.00	15	7.00	116	93.00	18	95.00
(69)	176	89.00	22	11.00	83	89.00	10	100.00
(70)	153	<u>87.00</u>	23	13.00	68	<u>89.00</u>	17	<u>100.00</u>
		90.75				91.50		98.75

Frank B. Kellogg (Minne.)

(67)	530	82.00	115	18.00	417	83.00	162	90.00
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Edwin F. Ladd (N.D.)

(67)	447	80.00	111	20.00	335	78.00	138	91.00
(68)	96	55.00	79	45.00	35	33.00	4	29.00
(69)	4	<u>36.00</u>	7	64.00	1	<u>17.00</u>	1	<u>100.00</u>
		57.00				42.67		73.33

Robert M. La Follette (Wis.)

(67)	184	34.00	354	66.00	90	23.00	37	26.00
(68)	25	<u>42.00</u>	35	58.00	11	<u>28.00</u>	1	<u>33.00</u>
		38.00				25.50		29.50

Irving L. Lenroot (Wis.)

(67)	512	81.00	122	19.00	383	79.00	159	93.00
(68)	94	83.00	19	17.00	71	89.00	15	94.00
(69)	134	<u>75.00</u>	44	25.00	61	<u>77.00</u>	4	<u>100.00</u>
		79.67				81.67		95.67

J. Medill Mc Cormick (Ill.)

(67)	436	85.00	77	15.00	319	86.00	129	90.00
(68)	104	<u>92.00</u>	9	8.00	77	<u>99.00</u>	13	<u>100.00</u>
		88.50				92.50		95.00

Porter J. McCumber (N.D.)

(67)	578	90.00	66	10.00	462	92.00	198	96.00
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William B. McKinley (Ill.)

(67)	529	92.00	46	8.00	417	95.00	183	99.00
(68)	172	90.00	19	10.00	107	91.00	19	100.00
(69)	63	<u>85.00</u>	11	15.00	25	<u>89.00</u>	4	<u>100.00</u>
		89.00				91.67		99.33

Knut Nelson (Minne.)

(67)	471	84.00	88	16.00	351	87.00	153	92.00
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Peter Norbeck (S.D.)

(67)	350	74.00	124	26.00	261	77.00	106	91.00
(68)	78	53.00	68	47.00	43	44.00	15	88.00
(69)	113	65.00	61	35.00	49	64.00	5	86.00
(70)	95	<u>68.00</u> 65.00	45	32.00	39	<u>61.00</u> 61.50	13	<u>93.00</u> 89.50

George W. Norris (Neb.)

(67)	149	42.00	202	58.00	121	41.00	20	16.00
(68)	80	42.00	110	58.00	32	27.00	4	25.00
(69)	92	45.00	111	55.00	31	33.00	5	56.00
(70)	98	<u>58.00</u> 46.75	72	42.00	39	<u>50.00</u> 37.75	14	<u>88.00</u> 46.25

Thomas Sterling (S.D.)

(67)	564	86.00	83	14.00	406	86.00	174	99.00
(68)	161	<u>82.00</u> 84.00	83	18.00	114	<u>92.00</u> 89.00	19	<u>100.00</u> 99.50

Charles E. Townsend (Mich.)

(67)	546	88.00	75	12.00	418	89.00	184	94.00
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James E. Watson (Ind.)

(67)	565	94.00	37	6.00	437	98.00	176	93.00
(68)	165	93.00	12	7.00	110	96.00	18	100.00
(69)	181	90.00	21	10.00	88	89.00	10	100.00
(70)	137	<u>86.00</u> 90.75	23	14.00	61	<u>61.00</u> 92.50	13	<u>100.00</u> 98.25

Frank B. Willis (Ohio)

(67)	514	86.00	86	14.00	385	85.00	174	98.00
(68)	151	77.00	44	23.00	109	84.00	19	100.00
(69)	199	88.00	28	12.00	94	90.00	11	100.00
(70)	36	<u>69.00</u> 80.00	16	31.00	16	<u>55.00</u> 78.50	4	<u>100.00</u> 99.50

William S. Kenyon (Iowa)

(67)	144	61.00	92	39.00	37	32.00	8	22.00
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Truman H. Newberry (Mich.)

(67)	446	91.00	44	9.00	328	84.00	156	100.00
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Charles A. Rawson (Iowa)

(67)	308	90.00	33	10.00	220	81.00	100	91.00
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Smith W. Brookhart (Iowa)

(67)	23	38.00	37	62.00	14	33.00	3	50.00
(68)	88	43.00	118	57.00	31	25.00	5	28.00
(69)	22	30.00	52	70.00	4	13.00	1	25.00
(70)	91	<u>49.00</u> 40.00	94	51.00	38	<u>47.00</u> 29.50	15	<u>88.00</u> 47.75

James Couzens (Mich.)

(67)	25	60.00	17	40.00	17	57.00	3	100.00
(68)	108	74.00	37	26.00	65	70.00	18	95.00
(69)	125	64.00	71	36.00	47	50.00	6	75.00
(70)	118	<u>68.00</u> 66.50	55	32.00	41	<u>53.00</u> 57.50	17	<u>100.00</u> 92.50

Simeon D. Fess (Ohio)

(68)	159	82.00	34	18.00	100	82.00	18	95.00
(69)	193	88.00	26	12.00	95	90.00	11	100.00
(70)	141	<u>83.00</u>	28	17.00	65	<u>88.00</u>	15	<u>100.00</u>
		84.33				86.67		98.33

Lynn J. Frazier (N.D.)

(68)	91	46.00	108	54.00	34	27.00	6	32.00
(69)	89	42.00	124	58.00	33	33.00	4	50.00
(70)	77	<u>52.00</u>	72	48.00	30	<u>44.00</u>	11	<u>92.00</u>
		46.67				34.67		58.00

Robert B. Howell (Neb.)

(68)	89	47.00	100	53.00	39	33.00	6	38.00
(69)	92	48.00	100	52.00	29	33.00	4	50.00
(70)	64	<u>57.00</u>	48	43.00	27	<u>50.00</u>	11	<u>92.00</u>
		50.67				38.67		60.00

Charles S. Deneen (Ill.)

(68)	2	100.00	0	0.00	1	100.00		
(69)	182	89.00	22	11.00	84	89.00	11	100.00
(70)	150	<u>89.00</u>	19	11.00	63	<u>86.00</u>	17	<u>100.00</u>
		92.67				91.67		100.00

Thomas D. Schall (Minne.)

(69)	159	82.00	35	18.00	77	83.00	9	100.00
(70)	142	<u>84.00</u>	28	16.00	59	<u>77.00</u>	16	<u>100.00</u>
		83.00				80.00		100.00

William H. McMaster (S.D.)

(69)	132	61.00	84	39.00	54	53.00	8	73.00
(70)	99	<u>57.00</u>	75	43.00	38	<u>48.00</u>	12	<u>75.00</u>
		59.00				50.50		74.00

Arthur R. Robinson (Ind.)

(69)	159	84.00	31	16.00	71	80.00	6	100.00
(70)	128	<u>82.00</u>	28	18.00	44	<u>69.00</u>	11	<u>100.00</u>
		83.00				74.50		100.00

Robert M. La Follette, Jr. (Wis.)

(69)	89	44.00	113	56.00	34	37.00	3	33.00
(70)	80	<u>54.00</u>	69	46.00	33	<u>48.00</u>	16	<u>94.00</u>
		49.00				42.50		63.50

Gerald P. Nye (N.D.)

(69)	74	42.00	102	58.00	24	31.00	2	33.00
(70)	98	<u>54.00</u>	85	46.00	40	<u>50.00</u>	16	<u>94.00</u>
		48.00				40.50		63.50

David W. Stewart (Iowa)

(69)	58	82.00	13	18.00	26	74.00	4	100.00
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John J. Blaine (Wis.)

(70)	90	47.00	100	53.00	41	49.00	16	94.00
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Otis F. Glenn (Ill.)

(70)	47	81.00	11	19.00	16	80.00	1	100.00
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Theodore E. Burton (Ohio)

(70)	29	78.00	8	22.00	11	100.00	1	100.00
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William E. Borah (Idaho)

(67)	197	40.00	281	60.00	132	36.00	48	44.00
(68)	95	52.00	86	48.00	46	41.00	12	71.00
(69)	83	48.00	91	52.00	41	49.00	5	56.00
(70)	83	<u>54.00</u>	72	46.00	43	<u>57.00</u>	16	<u>94.00</u>
		48.50				45.75		66.25

Holm O. Bursum (N.M.)

(67)	588	89.00	75	11.00	470	92.00	192	99.00
(68)	184	<u>93.00</u>	14	7.00	120	<u>97.00</u>	18	<u>100.00</u>
		91.00				94.50		99.50

Ralph H. Cameron (Arz.)

(67)	549	89.00	67	11.00	442	94.00	157	98.00
(68)	185	92.00	16	8.00	113	92.00	18	100.00
(69)	174	<u>81.00</u>	41	19.00	75	<u>74.00</u>	10	<u>100.00</u>
		87.33				86.67		99.33

Frank R. Gooding (Id.)

(67)	564	87.00	84	13.00	453	89.00	187	98.00
(68)	125	63.00	75	38.00	63	50.00	17	100.00
(69)	163	79.00	44	21.00	73	73.00	9	90.00
(70)	52	<u>76.00</u>	16	24.00	22	<u>69.00</u>	6	<u>100.00</u>
		76.25				70.25		97.00

Hiram W. Johnson (Calif.)

(67)	288	64.00	162	36.00	228	66.00	99	86.00
(68)	82	56.00	65	44.00	42	43.00	13	87.00
(69)	97	50.00	97	50.00	37	40.00	5	63.00
(70)	116	<u>69.00</u>	52	31.00	46	<u>61.00</u>	15	<u>100.00</u>
		59.75				52.50		84.00

Wesley L. Jones (Wash.)

(67)	533	80.00	134	20.00	423	82.00	184	94.00
(68)	143	68.00	67	32.00	77	59.00	17	89.00
(69)	181	78.00	52	22.00	79	72.00	10	91.00
(70)	131	<u>75.00</u>	44	25.00	51	<u>65.00</u>	15	<u>94.00</u>
		75.25				69.50		92.00

Charles L. McNary (Ore.)

(67)	542	82.00	122	18.00	408	83.00	172	84.00
(68)	161	77.00	47	23.00	88	69.00	16	89.00
(69)	153	70.00	66	30.00	61	60.00	8	73.00
(70)	132	<u>75.00</u> <u>76.00</u>	44	25.00	53	<u>66.00</u> <u>69.50</u>	15	<u>94.00</u> <u>85.00</u>

Samuel D. Nicholson (Colo.)

(67)	503	90.00	59	10.00	403	92.00	168	99.00
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Tasker L. Oddie (Nev.)

(67)	609	91.00	57	9.00	489	95.00	202	94.00
(68)	200	95.00	11	5.00	125	95.00	19	100.00
(69)	197	88.00	27	12.00	90	87.00	11	100.00
(70)	159	<u>85.00</u> <u>89.75</u>	28	15.00	67	<u>83.00</u> <u>90.00</u>	17	<u>100.00</u> <u>98.50</u>

Lawrence C. Phipps (Colo.)

(67)	618	92.00	92	8.00	435	87.00	208	99.00
(68)	177	90.00	20	10.00	115	93.00	19	100.00
(69)	161	78.00	45	22.00	80	81.00	10	100.00
(70)	146	<u>85.00</u> <u>86.25</u>	25	15.00	75	<u>96.00</u> <u>89.25</u>	16	<u>100.00</u> <u>99.75</u>

Miles Poindexter (Wash.)

(67)	526	90.00	57	10.00	438	94.00	164	94.00
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Samuel M. Shortridge (Calif.)

(67)	550	90.00	64	10.00	437	94.00	180	94.00
(68)	155	91.00	15	9.00	97	92.00	19	100.00
(69)	193	89.00	23	11.00	92	90.00	10	100.00
(70)	133	<u>86.00</u> <u>89.00</u>	21	14.00	66	<u>92.00</u> <u>92.00</u>	16	<u>100.00</u> <u>98.50</u>

Reed Smoot (Utah)

(67)	583	93.00	46	7.00	481	95.00	193	99.00
(68)	160	86.00	25	14.00	109	88.00	19	100.00
(69)	143	90.00	16	10.00	67	92.00	7	100.00
(70)	114	<u>83.00</u> 88.00	24	17.00	58	<u>88.00</u> 90.75	16	<u>100.00</u> 99.75

Robert N. Stanfield (Ore.)

(67)	510	88.00	72	12.00	400	90.00	156	93.00
(68)	146	83.00	29	17.00	92	81.00	16	94.00
(69)	149	<u>81.00</u> 84.00	36	19.00	58	<u>70.00</u> 80.33	6	<u>100.00</u> 95.67

Francis E. Warren (Wyo.)

(67)	575	91.00	57	9.00	460	96.00	190	94.00
(68)	150	88.00	21	12.00	105	95.00	18	100.00
(69)	173	87.00	27	14.00	84	88.00	9	100.00
(70)	114	<u>79.00</u> 86.25	31	21.00	61	<u>92.00</u> 92.75	14	<u>100.00</u> 98.50

Rice W. Means (Colo.)

(68)	62	93.00	5	7.00	38	90.00	4	100.00
(69)	121	<u>83.00</u> 88.00	24	17.00	50	<u>81.00</u> 85.50	8	<u>100.00</u> 100.00

Charles W. Waterman (Colo.)

(70)	128	73.00	47	27.00	59	77.00	15	88.00
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Frederick Steiwer (Ore.)

(70)	139	84.00	26	16.00	58	83.00	13	93.00
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Bronson M. Cutting (N.M.)

(70)	89	85.00	16	15.00	40	85.00	12	100.00
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Octaviano A. Lazzazolo (N.M.)

(70) 16 73.00 6 27.00 2 33.00

John Thomas (Idaho)

(70) 53 85.00 9 15.00 17 81.00 1 100.00

Davis Elkins (W.Va.)

(67) 475 89.00 57 11.00 410 97.00 160 99.00

(68) 73 76.00 23 24.00 58 89.00 13 100.00
82.50 93.00 99.50

Joseph I. France (Md.)

(67) 463 80.00 115 20.00 373 83.00 157 96.00

Richard P. Ernst (Ky.)

(67) 560 92.00 48 8.00 451 96.00 163 99.00

(68) 148 87.00 22 13.00 101 94.00 18 100.00

(69) 166 89.00 20 11.00 81 91.00 7 100.00
89.33 93.67 99.67

John W. Harreld (Okla.)

(67) 498 89.00 64 11.00 390 90.00 162 98.00

(68) 158 77.00 46 23.00 101 80.00 19 100.00

(69) 132 73.00 49 27.00 61 76.00 9 100.00
79.67 82.00 99.33

Seldon P. Spencer (Mo.)

(67) 539 92.00 48 8.00 407 92.00 159 89.00

(68) 172 89.00 21 11.00 112 93.00 18 100.00

(69) 11 100.00 0 7 100.00 3 100.00
93.67 95.00 96.33

Howard Sutherland (W.Va.)

(67) 601 91.00 59 9.00 462 92.00 197 97.00

Ovington E. Weller (Md.)

(67)	497	93.00	37	7.00	381	95.00	157	99.00
(68)	115	85.00	21	15.00	82	87.00	15	100.00
(69)	138	<u>79.00</u>	37	21.00	63	<u>81.00</u>	7	<u>100.00</u>
		85.67				87.67		99.67

Guy D. Goff (W.Va.)

(69)	179	83.00	37	17.00	83	81.00	11	100.00
(70)	106	<u>78.00</u>	30	22.00	51	<u>89.00</u>	13	<u>100.00</u>
		80.50				85.00		100.00

William P. Pine (Okla.)

(69)	168	79.00	45	21.00	84	82.00	9	100.00
(70)	106	<u>79.00</u>	28	21.00	44	<u>72.00</u>	13	<u>100.00</u>
		79.00				77.00		100.00

Frederic M. Sackett (Ky.)

(69)	196	89.00	25	11.00	89	86.00	9	100.00
(70)	150	<u>86.00</u>	25	14.00	70	<u>89.00</u>	16	<u>100.00</u>
		87.50				87.50		100.00

George H. Williams (Mo.)

(69)	94	79.00	25	21.00	31	94.00	3	100.00
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The tables, for practical purposes, nearly interpret themselves. There are two tendencies, nevertheless, reflected in the Republican loyalty index which require brief exposition. Virtually every Republican senator, regardless of reliability, responded, however slightly, to party pressure. When disagreement between the parties became more pronounced, the tendency was for Republicans to increase their regularity.

Only three Republicans voted more with their party, irrespective of the degree of Democratic opposition, than they did when 90 per cent of both parties were in opposition. A more valid gauge of party influence is to determine Republican response only on those votes with the parties in conflict. William S. Kenyon (Iowa), who voted relatively few times, was the only Republican not to vote more with his party when both parties were at least 90 per cent in opposition than when they were only 50 per cent or more in opposition. With this exception, party affiliation was a discernible influence on all Republicans as disagreement between the parties intensified.

This does not mean that there was not a hard core of Republican recalcitrants. Consistent with the usual thesis, a number of Westerners and Midwesterners took their party affiliation casually, and party membership often seemed to be a secondary guide to the way they voted. There were 11 Republicans (William E. Borah (Id.), John J. Blaine (Wis.), Robert M. La Follette, Jr. (Wis.), Gerald P. Nye (N.D.), Edwin F. Ladd (N.D.), George W. Norris (Neb.), Robert M. La Follette (Wis.), William S. Kenyon (Iowa), Robert B. Howell (Neb.), Smith W. Brookhart (Iowa) and Lynn J. Frazier (N.D.) who voted more with the Democrats than their own party when 50 per cent or more of each party were in opposition. When 90 per cent or over in each party voted against each other,

the number of senators voting more with the opposition than their own party was reduced to four, Robert M. La Follette (Wis.), George W. Norris (Neb.), William S. Kenyon (Iowa), and Smith W. Brookhart (Iowa). The above senators are those usually identified as the political unreliaables in historical literature. The Republican Party was afflicted with an unprecedented group of low loyalty senators.

TABLE 15
DEMOCRATIC LOYALTY INDEX

David I. Walsh (Mass.)								
(67)	497	86.00	82	14.00	368	87.00	166	95.00
(68)	159	80.00	41	20.00	99	78.00	18	95.00
(69)	52	73.00	19	27.00	27	77.00	3	100.00
(70)	135	<u>77.00</u> 79.00	41	23.00	59	<u>78.00</u> 80.00	16	<u>100.00</u> 97.50
Josiah O. Wolcott (Del.)								
(67)	77	91.00	7	9.00	30	92.00	7	100.00
Thomas F. Bayard, Jr. (Del.)								
(67)	58	79.00	15	21.00	41	79.00	12	100.00
(68)	149	72.00	58	28.00	92	71.00	17	89.00
(69)	148	72.00	57	28.00	63	66.00	7	88.00
(70)	112	<u>66.00</u> 72.25	58	34.00	52	<u>68.00</u> 71.00	15	<u>100.00</u> 94.25

William C. Bruce (Md.)

(68)	120	59.00	82	41.00	64	52.00	13	68.00
(69)	127	62.00	79	38.00	37	39.00	4	44.00
(70)	110	<u>67.00</u>	54	33.00	46	<u>65.00</u>	9	<u>64.00</u>
		62.67				52.00		58.67

Royal S. Copeland (N.Y.)

(68)	154	79.00	41	21.00	102	82.00	18	95.00
(69)	164	77.00	48	23.00	78	75.00	10	100.00
(70)	128	<u>79.00</u>	35	29.00	48	<u>74.00</u>	13	<u>93.00</u>
		78.33				77.00		96.00

Edward I. Edwards (N.J.)

(68)	119	73.00	45	27.00	78	73.00	16	89.00
(69)	153	75.00	51	25.00	70	69.00	6	75.00
(70)	105	<u>77.00</u>	32	23.00	44	<u>73.00</u>	13	<u>100.00</u>
		75.00				71.67		88.00

Robert F. Wagner (N.Y.)

(70)	137	84.00	27	16.00	59	83.00	16	100.00
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Gilbert M. Hitchcock (Neb.)

(67)	511	90.00	56	10.00	402	91.00	157	98.00
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Atlee Pomerene (Ohio)

(67)	483	82.00	105	18.00	372	82.00	168	94.00
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Woodbridge N. Ferris (Mich.)

(68)	160	84.00	30	16.00	100	84.00	17	89.00
(69)	155	77.00	47	23.00	68	74.00	9	100.00
(70)	42	<u>91.00</u>	4	9.00	25	<u>93.00</u>	4	<u>100.00</u>
		84.00				83.67		96.33

Samuel M. Ralston (Ind.)

(68)	162	88.00	23	12.00	97	87.00	19	100.00
(69)	9	<u>82.00</u>	2	18.00	6	<u>100.00</u>	2	<u>100.00</u>
		85.00				93.50		100.00

Daniel F. Steck (Iowa)

(69)	105	81.00	25	19.00	41	65.00	7	100.00
(70)	123	<u>76.00</u>	39	24.00	52	<u>71.00</u>	16	<u>100.00</u>
		78.50				68.00		100.00

Cyrus Locher (Ohio)

(70)	50	82.00	11	18.00	21	81.00	8	100.00
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Edwin S. Broussard (La.)

(67)	277	48.00	303	52.00	178	41.00	61	40.00
(68)	167	81.00	38	19.00	102	80.00	18	95.00
(69)	168	82.00	36	18.00	77	80.00	8	100.00
(70)	132	<u>77.00</u>	40	23.00	57	<u>76.00</u>	16	<u>94.00</u>
		72.00				69.25		82.25

Charles A. Culberson (Texas)

(67)	518	94.00	36	6.00	414	95.00	161	99.00
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Thaddeus H. Caraway (Ark.)

(67)	537	93.00	40	7.00	432	97.00	174	100.00
(68)	163	86.00	26	14.00	106	88.00	18	95.00
(69)	150	84.00	28	16.00	73	83.00	5	100.00
(70)	140	<u>87.00</u>	21	13.00	60	<u>86.00</u>	15	<u>100.00</u>
		87.50				88.50		98.75

Nathaniel B. Dial (S.C.)

(67)	546	86.00	89	14.00	449	90.00	179	98.00
(68)	152	<u>78.00</u>	42	22.00	98	<u>80.00</u>	17	<u>94.00</u>
		82.00				85.00		96.00

Duncan U. Fletcher (Fla.)

(67)	542	88.00	75	12.00	420	88.00	182	99.00
(68)	182	88.00	24	12.00	113	90.00	19	100.00
(69)	132	84.00	25	16.00	53	77.00	7	100.00
(70)	125	<u>82.00</u> 85.50	28	18.00	65	<u>92.00</u> 86.75	16	<u>100.00</u> 99.75

Carter Glass (Va.)

(67)	434	88.00	58	12.00	329	91.00	138	100.00
(68)	148	80.00	37	20.00	94	80.00	16	94.00
(69)	137	76.00	44	24.00	55	63.00	7	86.00
(70)	133	<u>83.00</u> 81.75	28	17.00	66	<u>89.00</u> 80.75	15	<u>100.00</u> 95.00

William J. Harris (Ga.)

(67)	549	91.00	53	9.00	435	95.00	176	100.00
(68)	174	92.00	16	8.00	114	97.00	18	100.00
(69)	187	86.00	30	14.00	95	92.00	11	100.00
(70)	139	<u>78.00</u> 86.75	39	22.00	68	<u>86.00</u> 92.50	17	<u>100.00</u> 100.00

Byron P. Harrison (Miss.)

(67)	545	95.00	30	5.00	439	98.00	169	99.00
(68)	163	84.00	30	16.00	101	86.00	16	100.00
(69)	177	91.00	18	9.00	83	90.00	10	100.00
(70)	144	<u>86.00</u> 89.00	23	14.00	71	<u>93.00</u> 91.75	17	<u>100.00</u> 99.75

Kenneth D. McKellar (Tenn.)

(67)	518	90.00	58	10.00	363	93.00	140	88.00
(68)	189	91.00	19	9.00	117	91.00	19	100.00
(69)	186	82.00	41	18.00	95	87.00	10	100.00
(70)	135	<u>83.00</u> 86.50	28	17.00	62	<u>89.00</u> 90.00	15	<u>100.00</u> 97.00

Lee S. Overman (N.C.)

(67)	570	92.00	50	8.00	465	95.00	196	98.00
(68)	164	88.00	22	12.00	107	91.00	17	94.00
(69)	171	89.00	22	11.00	83	88.00	10	91.00
(70)	116	<u>81.00</u> 87.50	27	19.00	50	<u>78.00</u> 88.00	14	<u>100.00</u> 95.75

Robert L. Owen (Okla.)

(67)	275	80.00	68	20.00	222	87.00	85	93.00
(68)	79	<u>87.00</u> 83.50	12	13.00	52	<u>85.00</u> 86.00	13	<u>100.00</u> 96.50

Joseph E. Ransdell (La.)

(67)	291	65.00	154	35.00	220	61.00	89	75.00
(68)	154	87.00	23	13.00	96	86.00	18	95.00
(69)	168	82.00	36	18.00	73	74.00	6	75.00
(70)	104	<u>81.00</u> 78.75	24	19.00	47	<u>80.00</u> 75.25	12	<u>100.00</u> 86.25

Joseph T. Robinson (Ark.)

(67)	559	88.00	76	12.00	465	95.00	197	99.00
(68)	158	86.00	25	14.00	92	83.00	17	94.00
(69)	154	86.00	25	14.00	69	83.00	9	100.00
(70)	139	<u>89.00</u> 87.25	17	11.00	68	<u>91.00</u> 88.00	17	<u>100.00</u> 98.25

Morris Sheppard (Texas)

(67)	630	88.00	85	12.00	475	90.00	202	92.00
(68)	177	83.00	35	17.00	115	88.00	19	100.00
(69)	197	85.00	35	15.00	97	88.00	10	100.00
(70)	149	<u>78.00</u> 83.50	41	22.00	69	<u>83.00</u> 87.25	17	<u>100.00</u> 98.00

John K. Shields (Tenn.)

(67)	492	86.00	81	14.00	404	93.00	177	97.00
(68)	140	<u>84.00</u> 85.00	27	16.00	91	<u>87.00</u> 90.00	17	<u>100.00</u> 98.50

Furnifold M. Simmons (N.C.)

(67)	556	94.00	37	6.00	451	96.00	172	97.00
(68)	180	90.00	20	10.00	115	92.00	18	95.00
(69)	170	89.00	20	11.00	67	83.00	10	100.00
(70)	140	<u>90.00</u> 90.75	15	10.00	63	<u>89.00</u> 90.00	16	<u>100.00</u> 98.00

Ellison D. Smith (S.C.)

(67)	515	86.00	82	14.00	399	90.00	174	92.00
(68)	143	86.00	24	14.00	81	90.00	10	91.00
(69)	152	83.00	31	17.00	67	87.00	7	100.00
(70)	135	<u>83.00</u> 84.50	27	17.00	57	<u>83.00</u> 87.50	13	<u>100.00</u> 95.75

Augustus O. Stanley (Ky.)

(67)	522	90.00	61	10.00	427	93.00		99.00
(68)	129	<u>88.00</u> 89.00	18	12.00	91	<u>89.00</u> 91.00	15	<u>100.00</u> 99.50

Claude A. Swanson (Va.)

(67)	560	94.00	36	6.00	446	93.00	206	99.00
(68)	176	88.00	24	12.00	109	90.00	18	95.00
(69)	155	86.00	26	14.00	62	78.00	9	90.00
(70)	141	<u>88.00</u> <u>89.00</u>	20	12.00	64	<u>89.00</u> <u>87.50</u>	14	<u>100.00</u> <u>98.50</u>

Park Trammell (Fla.)

(67)	503	91.00	51	9.00	371	91.00	146	97.00
(68)	170	89.00	20	11.00	109	93.00	17	100.00
(69)	171	85.00	31	15.00	91	89.00	10	100.00
(70)	887	<u>79.00</u> <u>86.00</u>	23	21.00	41	<u>87.00</u> <u>90.00</u>	5	<u>100.00</u> <u>99.25</u>

Oscar W. Underwood (Ala.)

(67)	546	83.00	111	17.00	418	85.00	192	95.00
(68)	144	80.00	35	20.00	100	86.00	15	100.00
(69)	72	<u>67.00</u> <u>76.67</u>	35	33.00	23	<u>53.00</u> <u>74.67</u>	3	<u>100.00</u> <u>98.33</u>

James A. Reed (Mo.)

(67)	466	85.00	81	15.00	364	91.00	161	97.00
(68)	147	86.00	24	14.00	98	88.00	17	94.00
(69)	97	59.00	68	41.00	64	78.00	6	100.00
(70)	91	<u>74.00</u> <u>76.00</u>	32	26.00	51	<u>84.00</u> <u>85.25</u>	13	<u>93.00</u> <u>96.00</u>

John S. Williams (Miss.)

(67)	456	84.00	89	16.00	346	85.00	133	92.00
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James T. Heflin (Ala.)

(67)	604	93.00	46	7.00	448	94.00	199	100.00
(68)	181	90.00	21	10.00	115	93.00	18	100.00
(69)	182	84.00	34	16.00	88	89.00	9	90.00
(70)	144	<u>78.00</u> 86.25	40	22.00	74	<u>95.00</u> 92.75	14	<u>100.00</u> 97.50

Thomas E. Watson (Ga.)

(67)	341	82.00	62	18.00	259	85.00	86	91.00
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Walter F. George (Ga.)

(67)	64	88.00	9	12.00	45	83.00	14	100.00
(68)	174	86.00	29	14.00	111	89.00	18	95.00
(69)	169	85.00	29	15.00	84	88.00	9	100.00
(70)	133	<u>82.00</u> 85.25	30	18.00	63	<u>89.00</u> 87.25	16	<u>100.00</u> 98.75

Earle B. Mayfield (Texas)

(68)	164	87.00	24	13.00	110	92.00	19	100.00
(69)	183	86.00	29	14.00	88	89.00	10	91.00
(70)	129	<u>81.00</u> 84.67	31	19.00	65	<u>89.00</u> 90.00	15	<u>94.00</u> 95.00

Matthew M. Neely (W.Va.)

(68)	171	85.00	30	15.00	110	88.00	19	100.00
(69)	164	78.00	47	22.00	79	81.00	7	88.00
(70)	130	<u>78.00</u> 80.33	36	22.00	67	<u>91.00</u> 86.67	16	<u>100.00</u> 96.00

Hubert D. Stephens (Miss.)

(68)	145	84.00	27	16.00	94	87.00	15	94.00
(69)	167	87.00	24	13.00	83	90.00	9	100.00
(70)	132	$\frac{86.00}{85.67}$	21	14.00	57	$\frac{88.00}{88.33}$	14	$\frac{100.00}{98.00}$

Coleman L. Blease (S.C.)

(69)	120	55.00	99	45.00	78	75.00	9	90.00
(70)	84	$\frac{58.00}{56.50}$	60	42.00	35	$\frac{57.00}{66.00}$	7	$\frac{88.00}{89.00}$

Lawrence D. Tyson (Tenn.)

(69)	184	88.00	26	12.00	81	85.00	9	100.00
(70)	125	$\frac{86.00}{87.00}$	20	14.00	59	$\frac{87.00}{86.00}$	16	$\frac{100.00}{100.00}$

Harry B. Hawes (Mo.)

(69)	58	84.00	11	16.00	22	67.00	3	100.00
(70)	128	$\frac{82.00}{83.00}$	29	18.00	61	$\frac{84.00}{75.50}$	16	$\frac{94.00}{97.00}$

Alben W. Barkley (Ky.)

(70)	152	85.00	26	15.00	69	88.00	17	100.00
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Hugo L. Black (Ala.)

(70)	127	71.00	52	29.00	70	88.00	16	100.00
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John W. E. Thomas (Okla.)

(70)	125	76.00	40	24.00	63	86.00	17	100.00
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Millard E. Tydings (Md.)

(70)	108	72.00	42	28.00	50	75.00	12	100.00
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Henry F. Ashurst (Ariz.)

(67)	542	85.00	92	15.00	433	89.00	181	99.00
(68)	146	85.00	26	15.00	99	88.00	17	100.00
(69)	167	81.00	40	19.00	81	81.00	10	100.00
(70)	127	<u>81.00</u> <u>83.00</u>	30	19.00	58	<u>85.00</u> <u>85.75</u>	14	<u>100.00</u> <u>99.75</u>

Andrieus A. Jones (N.M.)

(67)	482	84.00	92	16.00	396	88.00	175	98.00
(68)	167	86.00	28	14.00	101	83.00	19	100.00
(69)	133	81.00	31	19.00	54	72.00	6	86.00
(70)	9	<u>100.00</u> <u>87.75</u>	0	0.00	9	<u>100.00</u> <u>85.75</u>	2	<u>100.00</u> <u>96.00</u>

John B. Kendrick (Wyo.)

(67)	342	57.00	259	43.00	225	48.00	77	48.00
(68)	175	85.00	32	15.00	98	77.00	18	100.00
(69)	167	77.00	51	23.00	62	60.00	9	82.00
(70)	123	<u>78.00</u> <u>74.25</u>	35	22.00	44	<u>61.00</u> <u>61.50</u>	11	<u>85.00</u> <u>78.75</u>

William H. King (Utah)

(67)	445	78.00	125	22.00	378	87.00	154	96.00
(68)	119	64.00	67	36.00	79	65.00	17	89.00
(69)	113	58.00	81	42.00	61	68.00	7	100.00
(70)	69	<u>46.00</u> <u>61.50</u>	80	54.00	38	<u>56.00</u> <u>69.00</u>	12	<u>100.00</u> <u>96.25</u>

Henry L. Meyers (Mont.)

(67)	350	77.00	104	23.00	286	77.00	140	95.00
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Key Pittman (Nev.)

(67)	475	92.00	42	8.00	355	92.00	166	99.00
(68)	148	84.00	28	16.00	93	88.00	18	95.00
(69)	132	87.00	19	13.00	62	85.00	8	100.00
(70)	105	<u>83.00</u> <u>86.50</u>	21	17.00	45	<u>87.00</u> <u>88.00</u>	14	<u>100.00</u> <u>98.50</u>

Thomas J. Walsh (Mont.)

(67)	514	91.00	52	9.00	395	92.00	164	95.00
(68)	158	85.00	28	15.00	98	84.00	19	100.00
(69)	146	71.00	61	29.00	69	70.00	7	100.00
(70)	125	<u>77.00</u> <u>81.00</u>	37	23.00	60	<u>83.00</u> <u>82.25</u>	16	<u>100.00</u> <u>98.75</u>

Alva B. Adams (Colo.)

(68)	107	82.00	24	18.00	63	79.00	13	93.00
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Clarence C. Dill (Wash.)

(68)	158	80.00	39	20.00	96	79.00	18	95.00
(69)	131	65.00	70	35.00	76	78.00	10	91.00
(70)	128	<u>72.00</u> <u>72.33</u>	50	28.00	59	<u>76.00</u> <u>77.67</u>	13	<u>93.00</u> <u>93.00</u>

Burton K. Wheeler (Mont.)

(68)	144	86.00	24	14.00	101	91.00	18	100.00
(69)	122	65.00	65	35.00	66	79.00	9	90.00
(70)	101	<u>67.00</u> <u>72.67</u>	50	33.00	51	<u>81.00</u> <u>83.67</u>	11	<u>100.00</u> <u>96.67</u>

Sam G. Bratton (N.M.)

(69)	182	85.00	31	15.00	89	86.00	9	90.00
(70)	126	<u>79.00</u> <u>82.00</u>	34	21.00	52	<u>75.00</u> <u>80.50</u>	13	<u>100.00</u> <u>95.00</u>

Carl Hayden (Ariz.)

(70)	140	81.00	32	19.00	68	87.00	17	100.00
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Peter G. Gerry (R.I.)

(67)	515	89.00	63	11.00	411	92.00	168	99.00
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(68)	130	80.00	33	20.00	77	78.00	15	94.00
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(69)	143	80.00	35	20.00	71	85.00	8	100.00
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(70)	118	<u>81.00</u>	28	19.00	53	<u>84.00</u>	16	<u>100.00</u>
		82.50				84.75		98.25

As a group, the Democrats have more reliability than the Republicans. There are low loyalty Democrats, but none are as irregular as the most intransigent Republicans. The least regular Democrat was William C. Bruce (Md.) who voted with his party 52 per cent when the majorities were in opposition and 58.67 when they were 90 per cent or more in disagreement. This is significantly more regular than Robert M. La Follette, (Wis.) and William S. Kenyon (Iowa), the lowest loyalty Republicans. No Democrat voted overall more with the Republicans than his own party under any condition. Also, all Democrats increased in party regularity as the division between the two parties became more pronounced. Most of the less regular Democrats achieved their low loyalty percentages on one issue--the tariff. This, for example, explains the low loyalty percentages for Edwin S. Broussard (La.) and John B. Kendrick (Wyo.). Excluding William C. Bruce, no Democratic senator has a pattern of obstruction comparable to several Republicans. Democrats,

unlike the Republicans, always voted together on key party issues such as the election of Senate officers and committee chairmen. It is also significant that there is not a sectional pattern of regularity and irregularity in the Democratic party as in the Republican party. There were crucial differences between groups of Democrats, but it was not reflected in the voting profiles as with the Republicans.

This loyalty index supports the conclusions from chapters two and three--party was the decisive influence upon the way that most senators voted in the 1920's. The Democrats especially, with only minor exceptions, demonstrated an extraordinary degree of party commitment. This may be attributed to their position as a minority party which only required that they oppose the Republican administrations. Whatever the ideological and cultural antagonisms between Democrats, they were not appreciably reflected in their voting profiles. Political irregularity was basically a Republican practice. This should not obscure the fact that the preponderant Republican majority was exceptionally regular, and that even the defiant Republicans usually responded to party pressure. Republican irregularity is probably a very reliable gauge of independence because the intransigents are voting in opposition to their administration and party program. These Republican intransigents are examined in the next chapter.

CHAPTER V

THE REPUBLICAN INSURGENTS: THEIR PARTY PRACTICES AND THE LIBERAL TRADITION

The common historical thesis of the 1920's is that reform zeal persisted and survived despite conservative political domination. A genuine dissident group, as it is usually told, consisted of Midwestern and Western Republican senators who reflected the progressive political philosophy, practiced insurgency against the regular-conservative Republican leadership, and received adulation from followers for their determination and integrity. This interpretation is disputed by several historians who believe that many self-anointed insurgents invoked the rhetoric of progressivism and independence, but behaved timidly and hypocritically at crucial "moments of truth." The purpose of this chapter is to contribute to resolving this historiographical quarrel, and to clarify and propose revisions in the general conceptions about Republican insurgency.¹

¹The standard thesis is defended by Nye, Midwestern Progressive Politics; Hicks, Republican Ascendancy; Mayer, The Republican Party; Binkley, American Political Parties; Moos, The Republicans; and Arthur S. Link, "What Happened to the Progressive Movement in the 1920's?," American Historical Review, LXIV (July, 1959), 833-51. Exception to their position is taken by Richard Hofstadter, The Age of Reform: From Bryan to F.D.R. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1955.)

Some of the controversy between historical "schools" can be attributed to their major reliance upon traditional research methods. This dependence often results in unsystematic analysis with confusion over the practices which constitute insurgency, vague descriptions of its scope and intensity, and disagreement in the identification of insurgents. By the application of methodology more adapted to the topic, some of these deficiencies could be eliminated.

The failure to adequately define insurgency is responsible for most of the bewilderment over its meaning. Historians seem to have four ideas as to what constituted insurgency. It is quite probable that historians have identified a Republican senator as an insurgent if, in their judgment, he: (1) identified himself publicly as an independent or was critical of the Republican executives and colleagues within the party; (2) voted consistently against his party majority; (3) refused to fulfill the traditional obligations of party membership; and (4) was a progressive. The first determinant of insurgency is excluded from this analysis. There is already sufficient documentation from the insurgents themselves as to their avowed independence and opposition to party conformity. Public expressions by politicians, however, may or may not correspond to their behavior. This analysis disregards the rhetoric and concentrates upon ascertaining actual behavior. The latter three criteria are

systematically applied to the Senate membership from the 67th through the 70th Congress both to identify the insurgents and discern their degree of independence.

Voting irregularity is often perceived as insurgency. A selective loyalty index, based upon the 1364 Senate roll-call votes between 1921 and 1929, was constructed to determine whether the senators voting most against their party were the same as those usually known as insurgents. The index was restricted to the 15 senators with the lowest loyalty percentages.

The loyalty table affirms that voting irregularity was predominantly a Western characteristic. There are exceptions, but most of the lowest loyalty percentage senators are the traditional insurgents in historical writing. For perspective, however, it should be indicated that the number of senators with low loyalty percentages is not as imposing when related to the total number of Republican senators during the era. The index also includes some senators with loyalty percentages that can not be defined as habitual opposition to their party.

Voting irregularity is not the only or perhaps the most valid gauge of insurgency. The nature of the political system enables politicians to have a high degree of independence upon substantive issues irrespective of party policy. The party code obligates the politician to: (1) support the

TABLE 16

SELECTIVE LOYALTY INDEX FOR REPUBLICAN SENATORS, 1921-1929

Senator	Times and Percentage voting with a Repub- lican majority against a Democratic majority		Times and Percentage voting with 90 per cent of their party against 90 per cent of the Democrats	
William S. Kenyon (Iowa)	37	32.00	8	22.00
Robert M. La Follette (Wis.)	101	25.50	38	29.50
George W. Norris (Neb.)	223	37.75	43	46.25
Smith W. Brookhart (Iowa)	87	29.50	24	47.75
Lynn J. Frazier (N.D.)	97	34.67	21	58.00
Robert B. Howell (Neb.)	95	38.67	21	60.00
Robert M. La Follette, Jr. (Wis.)	67	42.50	19	63.50
Gerald P. Nye (N.D.)	64	40.50	18	63.50
William E. Borah (Idaho)	262	45.75	81	66.25
Edwin Ladd (N.D.)	371	42.67	143	73.33
William H. McMaster (S.D.)	92	50.50	20	74.00
Hiram W. Johnson (Calif.)	353	52.50	132	84.00
Charles L. McNary (Ore.)	610	69.50	211	85.00
Charles W. Waterman (Colo.)	47	27.00	15	88.00
Peter Norbeck (S.D.)	392	61.50	139	89.50

party slate for legislative offices and standing committees; (2) endorse the party presidential candidate; (3) vote for major partisan appointments and; (4) vote with the party when partisanship itself is an issue.² The way in which the Republican senators respond to these obligations is an effective rationale for distinguishing between party regulars and insurgents.

Some Midwesterners refused, in varying degrees, to comply with these party responsibilities. A few senators were intransigent and chronic in their insurgency whereas others were less aggressive and intermittent in its practice. There were only eight Republican senators in the 1920's who violated even a single party obligation. Generally, the senators who voted most against their party were also those who showed a propensity to violate the rules of party membership. For the 1920's, voting irregularity is quite a reliable indicator of other and more intractable insurgency.

An implacable protest was generated from a few Midwesterners when Albert B. Cummins (Iowa) was proposed, at the beginning of the 69th Congress in 1923, for chairman of the Interstate Commerce Committee.³ This was a genuine

²Common denominators of congressional partisans are found in Roland Young, The American Congress (New York: Harper and Row, 1958), p. 67.

³The insurgents opposed Cummins on the grounds that he would have excessive power as both president pro tempore of

revolt against party authority because Cummins fulfilled the seniority requirement, was chosen by the Republican Committee on Committees, and confirmed by the Republican conference. Because the Midwest senators held the balance of power in the Senate, they were able to prevent the election of a chairman and paralyze legislative proceedings for a month. The impasse was terminated on January 9, 1924, when Edwin F. Ladd (N.D.), Lynn J. Frazier (N.D.), Smith W. Brookhart (Iowa), and Robert M. La Follette (Wis.) voted with the Democrats to elect Ellison D. Smith (S.C.) committee chairman. This was the only time in the 1920's that insurgency was invoked to obstruct party selection of committee chairman.⁴

La Follette completed his rupture with the party in 1924 when he accepted the Progressive party presidential nomination. North Dakotans Ladd and Frazier actively

the Senate and chairman of the Interstate Commerce Committee. They also argued that the 1922 elections repudiated the Esch-Cummins Act, and the author of the Act should not preside over the committee responsible for railroad legislation. To these arguments, the regulars rejoined that the insurgents were La Follette supporters and only interested in an issue for the 1924 presidential election. The debate may be found in the New York Times for December 11, 16, 17, 1923.

⁴The votes taken for chairman are in the Cong. Record, 68th Cong., 1st Sess., 1923-24, LXV, Part 1, 159-747. For a terse summary of the controversy see Berdahl, American Political Science Review, XLIII, No. 2, 320.

supported him, but at the same time disavowed the charge that they were leaving the Republican party. Brookhart of Iowa did not work publicly for La Follette, but he refused to endorse Calvin Coolidge for which he was read out of his state Republican organization. After the election, the party conference resolved to punish La Follette and the others by assigning them to committees as members of a third party which would cost them their committee seniority, and excluding them from the party conference.⁵

In emulation of the 1924 defectors, three Republican senators refused to support Herbert Hoover in the 1928 presidential election. John J. Blaine and Robert M. La Follette, Jr., both of Wisconsin, and Nebraskan George W. Norris were not, however, officially disciplined for their insurgency. They continued their committee assignments without loss of seniority, but their power was diminished by the simple expedient of increasing the number of reliable members on their committees. This exceedingly mild and inconsequential rebuke failed to ignite the fierce debate

⁵James Henry Shideler, The Neo-Progressives: Reform Politics in the United States, 1920-1925 (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Department of History, University of California (Berkeley), 1945), pp. 274-76, examines the insurgents' positions in the 1924 election. In the sequel over punishment of the bolters see Berdahl, American Political Science Review, XLIII, No. 3, 492-6. Cong. Record, 68th Cong., 2n Sess., 1924, LXVI, Part 1, 10-71, has germane dialogue on the punishment of the bolters and the obligations of party membership.

that took place when punitive measures were taken against the 1924 bolters.⁶

A small Midwestern group extended their insurgency to opposition of major partisan appointments. Perhaps the most reliable gauge of their intransigency was their objection to appointments in which members of the same party as the president usually acquiesce in his judgment.⁷ Norris alone had the distinction of voting against confirmation of every major appointment proposed by Presidents Harding and Coolidge. Frazier opposed all four prospective appointments upon which he voted. Brookhart was nearly as implacable by voting against the confirmation of three out of four prospective appointees. Peter Norbeck (S.D.) was less obstructionist, but he opposed administration candidates three times on six votes. La Follette voted twice on four occasions against administration appointees. No other Republican senator voted to reject more than one nominee. Republican opposition to major partisan appointments was not massive,

⁶Berdahl, supra, pp. 504-05.

⁷The appointments are George Harvey as Ambassador to Great Britain, Cong. Record, 67th Cong., 1st Sess., 1921, XLI, Part 1, 369; Pierce Butler to Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, Ibid., 67th Cong., 4th Sess., 1922, LXIV, Part 1, 813; Frank B. Kellogg as Ambassador to Great Britain, Ibid., 68th Cong., 1st Sess., 1923, LXV, Part 1, 235; Harlan Fiske Stone to Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, Ibid., 68th Cong., 2n Sess., 1925, LXVI, Part 3, 3057 and; Charles Warren as Attorney-General, Ibid., 69th Cong., Special Sess., 1925, LXVII, Part 1, 101, 275.

but these few Middle West incorrigibles demonstrated a persistent hostility to administration choices for vital government positions.

The final requirement of party regularity is that a legislator vote with his party when partisanship itself is an issue. It seemed probable that partisanship would be most intense upon Senate investigations that could prove embarrassing to one of the parties and upon votes to override presidential vetoes. Neither of these produced either the party positions or the voting alignments that were expected. The highly publicized Senate investigation of oil leases, which exposed corruption in the Harding cabinet, was authorized without Republican dissent.⁸ Only one Republican opposed the resolution to investigate the nefarious activities of Attorney-General Harry A. Daugherty.⁹ When Republican Senator Arthur R. Gould (Me.) was accused of bribery on behalf of a business client, only six members of his party opposed an investigation into the charges.¹⁰ Republicans were in markedly less agreement over Senate investigatory powers and other proposed investigations, but

⁸Ibid., 67th Cong., 2n Sess., 1922, LXII, Part 6, 6097.

⁹Ibid., 68th Cong., 1st Sess., 1924, LXV, Part 4, 3410.

¹⁰Ibid., 69th Cong., 2n Sess., 1926, LXVIII, Part 1, 44.

investigations which could result in adverse publicity did not in themselves generate strict partisan votes or divide Republicans along insurgent vis-a-vis regular lines.

Presidential vetoes neither awed the Republican senators into submission nor galvanized them into support of the administration. From the votes to override vetoes, which were selected for analysis, a majority of Republicans, except once, voted to nullify the executive veto.¹¹ Republican senators were obviously more in accord among themselves than with the executive. The votes, however, reflect a sectional division with an Eastern majority voting in every instance to sustain the vetoes whereas the Westerners, excluding the bill to increase postal workers' salaries, voted to override the veto. Senators, with the exception of most Easterners, were quite willing to defy their own executive on vetoes.

That there was some militant Republican insurgency in the 1920's is indisputable, but the evidence from this investigation modifies and refines the usual generalizations

¹¹The Republican votes to override the veto of veterans' compensation bills were 27-21 and 30-17, Ibid., 67th Cong., 2n Sess., 1922, LXII, Part 12, 12999-13000; and Ibid., 68th Cong., 1st Sess., 1924, LXV, Part 9, 8871. The veto of the rural post roads bill was opposed 19-17, Ibid., 70th Cong., 1st Sess., 1928, LXIX, Part 9, 9673. Passage of the McNary-Haugen bill over the veto was approved 20-19, Ibid., 9879. A Republican majority sustained the veto of a bill increasing postal workers' salaries by a 28-21 vote, Ibid., 68th Cong., 2n Sess., 1925, LXVI, Part 2, 1285.

made about insurgency. It was neither practiced on the scale nor with the intensity that is often assumed. There were only a few "authentic" insurgents, and they did not uniformly or consistently demonstrate obstruction or independence from their party. Insurgency was practiced in degrees. Insurgency is a continuum from mild and sporadic to intractable and chronic. The small force of genuine Western insurgents expressed the variegation within the continuum. The failure to describe insurgency as a matter of degree has been a basic cause of the conflicting historical impressions of the Midwesterners and Westerners.

There is a general attitude that insurgency is analogous with progressivism. The concepts, however, are mutually exclusive: insurgency describes the relationship of the politician to his party whereas progressivism denotes his political ideology. There is both a philosophical and historical origin behind the equation of the two concepts. A reverent American tradition is distrust of professional politicians. The belief became universal that elected officials should mirror the will of the people while the attitude crystallized into a dogma that party loyalty impeded popular expression. Whatever the reality, independent politicians became meshed with the idea of sovereignty of the electorate and, therefore, with progressivism. Historically, insurgency was first used to describe the Liberal Republicans

and Mugwumps who broke from the party in the late 19th century. The term was used in subsequent generations to identify recalcitrant Republicans from the West. Because of their political and economic programs they were also called progressives.¹² It is natural to see continuity between these Westerners and their heirs, but it is not perforce valid.

The preponderance of historians assert that progressivism persisted throughout the 1920's, and that the Midwestern and Western insurgents were its most articulate exponents. If this conclusion is valid, it should be reflected in the votes on progressive issues. Assuming that insurgency and progressivism are analogous, then the insurgents should be in unanimous support of these issues and the regulars who are portrayed as conservatives should be opposed. It has been asserted that progressive legislation in the 1920's included Farm Bloc programs, immigration restriction, prohibition, and public power.¹³ An investigation of the voting patterns

¹²Moos, The Republicans, p. 253.

¹³Link, American Historical Review, LXIV, No. 4, 845-8. Admittedly, other issues could be selected which might reflect the voting pattern presumed to exist according to the usual arguments. It is simply proposed that it was not present, to a pronounced degree, on these issues. Even if the dichotomy should appear upon other issues, it does not invalidate the contention herein that there cannot be a categorical assumption that insurgents vote differently from regulars on progressive issues. The conclusion from this vote analysis is not pronounced as final, but is only suggested as a basis for further investigation.

on these issues reveals that the division between the insurgents and regulars, except upon public power, was minor.

To an extent, this examination of voting patterns is negative because it fails to contribute to forming criteria of progressivism. The purpose is to ascertain whether insurgency is relevant to progressivism. It is true that the senators known as insurgents vote upon these issues in the predicted way, but the regulars vote almost the same and analyses of the 1920's do not contain references to regular-progressives. Insurgency and regularity and progressivism and conservatism may appear together in any combination.

The sole Farm Bloc objective was economic relief for the devoutly capitalistic middle-class farmer. Perception of the agrarian group as an authentic and doctrinaire insurgent-progressive instrumentality overlooks its narrow interests and diverse membership. The Bloc was disinterested in issues unrelated to agriculture and, outside of agreement upon the need for agricultural relief, the membership held widely divergent political and economic dogmas. Senators styled as insurgents and progressives were active in the Bloc, but so were regulars and "Tories," including Frank B. Kellogg (Minne.), John Harreld (Okla.), and Robert Stanfield (Ore.). There was broad support for agricultural legislation which gives the votes a different composition than is sometimes assumed. An overwhelming majority of Republican

senators, irrespective of ideology or regularity, voted for the farm measures.¹⁴

Curtailment of European immigration had nearly unanimous approval from Republican senators. No Republican voted against the temporary immigration bill and only two opposed the permanent legislation.¹⁵ Although it has been argued that making the United States impregnable to European immigrants was simply the culmination of a progressive proposal, the debates and votes reflect more than progressive attitudes. Public opinion, infused with nativism and hyper-patriotism, was reflected in the Senate where both insurgents and regulars concurred in the need to "protect" the United States through immigration restriction. The attitudes reflected in drastic curtailment of immigration did not represent progressivism alone, but were also expressions of militant Americanism, racism, and isolationism.

The visualization of prohibition as a progressive triumph is dubious. Although some insurgents and progressives

¹⁴Republicans voted 56-1 for the Emergency Tariff, Cong. Record, 67th Cong. 1st Sess., 1921, LXI, Part 2, 1308. They voted 31-6 for the Packers and Stockyards bill, Ibid., Part 5, 4644. Provision for an agricultural member of the Federal Reserve Board was approved 41-7, Ibid., 2n Sess., 1922, LXII, Part 2, 1270. The Capper-Volstead bill had unanimous support 36-0, Ibid., Part 3, 2282. Republicans approved the Fordney-McCumber Tariff 45-1, Ibid., Part 11, 11627.

¹⁵Ibid., 67th Cong., 1st Sess., 1921, LXI, Part 1, 968; Ibid., 68th Cong., 1st Sess., 1924, LXV, Part 7, 6649.

believed that prohibition was a vital reform measure, others found prohibition intolerable on expedient and personal grounds. Regulars who are classified as conservatives were also deeply divided among themselves over prohibition. National prohibition was a legal reality by the 1920's, and Republican senators, notwithstanding previous divisions, almost uniformly supported "dry" legislation. Only one vote on beer belies less than Republican unanimity on prohibition, and the basic division on this vote was not ideological but sectional with Eastern senators generally voting "wet" and senators from the other sections voting "dry."¹⁶

The public power controversy during the 1920's focused upon the disposition of the government dams and nitrogen plants at Muscle Shoals, Alabama. In the Senate, the Muscle Shoals debate had two stages. Norris was able, in the initial stage, to prevent the leasing of the Muscle Shoals complex to Henry Ford, even though many senators and farm groups believed in the industrialist's plan to transform the Tennessee Valley through private enterprise. By indefatigable effort, Norris secured majorities in the second phase for government operation.

¹⁶Representative votes on prohibition include Ibid., 68th Cong., 1st Sess., 1925, LXV, Part 4, 4804-5; Ibid., 69th Cong., 2n Sess., 1927, LXVIII, Part 5, 5346; and Ibid., 70th Cong., 2n Sess., 1929, LXX, Part 4, 3742. Republicans voted their approval 33-1, 38-1, and 36-5 respectively. The vote on beer was 27-14, Ibid., 67th Cong., 1st Sess., 1921, LXI, Part 5, 4742.

There were three major votes on Muscle Shoals. The first vote was on private operation; it was passed with Republicans nearly equally divided except for the Easterners who gave their unanimous approval to the measure. Midwestern and Western senators usually identified as insurgents opposed private operation and the regulars voted for it. The remaining votes were on government operation. On one vote, the traditional insurgents and about one-half of the regulars voted for passage. The second vote reflected a pronounced shift by the Midwest regulars to vote against furthering the scope of government operations. This is the only issue upon which the votes nearly conform to the predicted pattern, and even upon this issue the regulars sometimes fail to vote in the anticipated way.¹⁷

The vote analysis of Farm Bloc programs, immigration restriction, prohibition, and Muscle Shoals does not substantiate the presence of a graphic insurgent-progressive and regular-conservative cleavage. There is nearly universal approval from the Republican senators for three of the four issues. If support of these measures is a true reflection of progressivism, then the regulars are only slightly less

¹⁷The Republican vote was 34-13 for private operation, Ibid., 68th Cong., 2n Sess., 1925, LXVI, Part 2, 1808. On government operation the votes were 20-15 and 16-22, Ibid., 70th Cong., 1st Sess., 1928, LXIX, Part 4, 4635; Ibid., Part 9, 9842.

progressive than the insurgents. Progressivism, in the same way as party regularity, is a matter of degree and simply because the regulars failed to support every aspect of one of the four progressive proposals it would not make them categorically conservative. The relationship between insurgency and progressivism seems quite tenuous.

The major conclusions in this chapter, drawn from voting data and the application of criteria, are the bases for reanalysis of the nature of Republican insurgency. In a discipline where truth is often somewhere between the extreme interpretations, it would seem that both groups of historians in contention made judgments with respect to insurgency that have validity. There was authentic, truculent Republican insurgency in the 1920's which was a salient aspect of politics. It is proposed, however, in sympathy with the more current revisionist position, that insurgency was practiced by fewer Republicans with less consistency and intensity than is usually expounded in the standard thesis. Some Republican senators who have been classified as insurgents were at the most only marginal independents. Especially after 1925, with the demise of some militants, the majority of remaining "independents" were usually tepid insurgents.

CHAPTER VI

A STUDY OF SECTIONAL VOTING PATTERNS

Pervasive sectional discord in national politics is a standard historical theme for the 1920's. Tersely stated, the usual interpretation is that sectionalism, rooted in economic and ideological differences, generated political clashes of sharp intensity and vast proportions. Sectional conflict was present in both political parties. Within the Republican party, the Eastern manufacturing, finance, and transportation interests struggled for power with the Western agrarian groups. The Democrats were divided into an urban, Catholic, immigrant, wet wing and a rural, protestant, nativist, dry bloc. Although this sectional thesis has almost categorical acceptance by historians, there is no major study which measures the sectional influences on Senate voting. This analysis: (1) determines the sectional pattern of Senate votes and compares the influence of section with party; and (2) measures the likeness between geographical regions and sectional groups within both parties.

Party affiliation was the predominant influence reflected in Senate voting patterns. No sectional group had the comparable unity of either the Republicans or Democrats. This is verified through a comparison of sectional vis-a-vis party cohesion. The table below presents the cohesion for

geographical regions in all Congresses in the 1920's. The data on sectional unity complements that on party solidarity.

TABLE 17
COHESION INDEX FOR GEOGRAPHICAL
REGIONS, 1921-29

Congress	Region			
	East	South	Central	West
67	39.0	26.0	31.0	27.0
68	44.0	37.0	55.0	37.0
69	48.0	41.0	50.0	33.0
70	50.0	45.0	50.0	44.0
Totals	45.3	37.3	46.5	35.3

Generally, sectional cohesion increased throughout the 1920's which paralleled a decline in party unity. Although sectionalism did not supplant party affiliation as the primary impetus on senatorial voting, it was a more pronounced factor than usual during the 1920's.

Changes in issues and Senate personnel seem to be the fundamental causes for the intensified sectional voting trend. There was a type of Eastern and Western Republican alliance, primarily on foreign policy, the tariff, and farm measures, early in the era. This arrangement was ruptured in later Congresses over issues--Muscle Shoals and McNary-Haugen proposals are ideal illustrations--which generated alignments along sectional rather than party lines. The increase in the number of low loyalty Republican senators also contributed to

the decline in party cohesion, and to giving the votes a more sectional character, especially as these senators were only from the West. The cause for increased sectionalism among the Democrats is more difficult to ascertain from the votes. Much of the early Democratic unity certainly came from their opposition to the Republicans over traditional party issues, i.e., the tariff. After the 67th Congress, there is a significant reduction of Democratic cohesion. Perhaps the most valid explanation for this is that it was a reflection of growing tension between the two Democratic wings over issues that were not especially related to the votes in the Senate.

To discern the bases of sectional unity, or lack of it, a more thorough investigation is required both of sectional cohesion and the solidarity of the sectional parties. The following section presents cohesion indices, with brief analysis, for the sections and parties by issue and Congress.

The Central States senators had more voting solidarity than any other sectional group. Their cohesion was quite high on many issues, and they were the most unified group on Senate procedure, agriculture, welfare, business-industry-banks, veterans' compensation, legislative compensation, investigations, and race. The Midwesterners were the most unified on eight issues, but this was second to the Easterners

who had the highest cohesion on nine issues. It is somewhat surprising that the Central States senators demonstrate unity upon the issues that they do. With the exception of agriculture, upon which they are slightly more in accord than the Easterners, the Midwesterners lack close affinity upon issues vital to their section. Perhaps it is natural that they had most agreement upon issues relevant to other sections because these issues would not aggravate Middle West intra-sectional tensions. Moreover, they might be expected to be more unified in expressing antipathy toward interests outside their section. The general pattern for the 1920's is for a section to be more cohesive in its external policy than united in the solution of its own internal problems.

There are less ideological reasons for the high Midwestern cohesion. The sectional contingent was almost exclusively Republican and never included more than two Democrats during the 1920's. Sectional interparty conflict was, therefore, on a small scale compared to the other geographical groups, and this was reflected in high cohesion. Even though some Republicans from the section had irregular voting patterns, party affiliation was still the paramount influence on the way that most of them voted. The general rule for understanding sectional cohesion is that it is determined by the political composition of the senatorial delegation. As two party competition increased within a section during the 1920's, the voting solidarity of the section decreased.

The Midwest was the most politically homogeneous and had the highest sectional cohesion whereas the West had the most equal party representation and the lowest sectional cohesion. The cohesion index for the Central States senators follows.

TABLE 18

COHESION INDEX FOR CENTRAL STATES SENATORS
FOR EACH ISSUE AND CONGRESS, 1921-1929

Issue	Congress			Totals	
	67	68	69		70
Tariff	15.0		11.0	56.0	27.3
Senate Organization	21.0	37.0	40.0	21.0	29.8
Appropriations	20.0	36.0	43.0	41.0	35.0
Tax-Revenue	19.0	50.0	46.0	28.0	35.8
Public Works	11.0	53.0	47.0	36.0	36.8
Public Power		44.0	32.0	43.0	39.7
Appointments	37.0	60.0	63.0	6.0	41.5
Senate Procedure	20.0	42.0	61.0	49.0	43.0
Military Affairs	30.0	41.0	48.0	62.0	45.3
Government Organization	26.0	66.0	39.0	58.0	47.3
Business-Industry-Banks	20.0	65.0	50.0	55.0	47.5
Agriculture	32.0	33.0	67.0	63.0	48.8
Veterans' Compensation	34.0	54.0	66.0		51.3
Immigration	59.0	79.0	19.0		52.3
Investigations	25.0	76.0	66.0	55.0	55.5
Prohibition	39.0		71.0	60.0	56.7
Foreign Affairs	29.0	62.0	70.0	74.0	58.8

Welfare	75.0	44.0	64.0		61.0
Race	50.0	59.0		100.0	69.7
Legislative Compensation		83.0			83.0
Totals	31.2	54.7	50.2	50.4	

The high Midwestern cohesion distracts from the pronounced Republican disunity within the section. The Central States Republicans were the most divided party group within any section. Their cohesion for all Congresses was only 54.25 with indices of 64.00, 52.00, 50.00, and 51.00 in the 67th through the 70th Congress. The exceedingly low Republican statistics on party loyalty issues especially illustrates the acute party irregularity within the Midwestern bloc. It is also valuable to identify the substantive issues which most divided them. These were business measures, tax policies, public works, and public power; issues which are sometimes perceived as dividing Republicans along ideological lines. In contrast to the Republicans, the central Democrats have as much unity as any sectional party. Because they were few in number, however, their cohesion is virtually irrelevant to the general voting patterns. The cohesion of Midwestern Republicans and Democrats is presented in the following tables.

The Eastern senators were only slightly less cohesive than the Midwesterners. Although they had less cohesion overall, the Easterners had more solidarity

TABLE 19
 COHESION INDEX FOR CENTRAL STATES
 REPUBLICANS FOR EACH ISSUE
 AND CONGRESS, 1921-29

Issue	Congress			Totals	
	67	68	69		
Appointments	55.0	41.0	33.0	12.0	35.3
Public Works	31.0	58.0	33.0	56.0	44.5
Tax-Revenue	48.0	30.0	45.0	63.0	46.5
Public Power		29.0	44.0	68.0	47.0
Business-Industry-Banks	57.0	54.0	40.0	42.0	48.3
Appropriations	75.0	43.0	42.0	35.0	48.8
Tariff	68.0		67.0	12.0	49.0
Senate Organization	58.0	28.0	52.0	59.0	49.3
Military Affairs	44.0	49.0	61.0	48.0	50.5
Veterans' Compensation	63.0	48.0	43.0		51.3
Investigations	73.0	59.0	48.0	34.0	53.5
Agriculture	46.0	65.0	58.0	52.0	55.3
Government Organization	60.0	52.0	40.0	69.0	55.3
Foreign Affairs	77.0	45.0	53.0	47.0	55.5
Senate Procedure	70.0	47.0	60.0	53.0	57.5
Immigration	77.0	65.0	38.0		60.0
Prohibition	71.0		64.0	59.0	64.7
Welfare	72.0	76.0	78.0		75.3
Legislative Compensation		77.0			77.0

Race	100.0	73.0		100.0	91.0
Totals	63.6	52.2	49.9	50.6	

TABLE 20

COHESION INDEX FOR CENTRAL STATES
DEMOCRATS FOR EACH ISSUE
AND CONGRESS, 1921-29

Issue	Congress			Totals	
	67	68	69		70
Welfare	57.0	11.0	50.0		39.3
Race	0.0	75.0		100.0	58.3
Appointments	73.0	83.0	100.0	0.0	64.0
Military Affairs	72.0	38.0	75.0	77.0	65.5
Appropriations	71.0	68.0	88.0	59.0	71.5
Business-Industry-Banks	44.0	100.0	68.0	75.0	71.8
Senate Procedure	81.0	91.0	73.0	44.0	72.3
Senate Organization	100.0	97.0	57.0	36.0	72.5
Public Power		83.0	81.0	59.0	74.3
Agriculture	76.0	50.0	91.0	86.0	75.8
Government Organization	62.0	80.0	75.0	88.0	76.3
Tariff	85.0		57.0	100.0	80.7
Prohibition	50.0		100.0	100.0	83.3
Public Works	100.0	67.0	78.0	100.0	86.3
Tax-Revenue	82.0	100.0	85.0	86.0	88.3
Foreign Affairs	63.0	100.0	93.0	100.0	89.0
Veterans' Compensation	91.0	92.0	100.0		94.3

Investigations	100.0	100.0	100.0	83.0	95.8
Legislative Compensation		100.0			100.0
Totals	72.6	79.3	76.2	74.6	

on more issues than the Central States senators. The nine issues upon which they were most united were foreign affairs, military programs, appointments, government organization, immigration, tax measures, appropriations, public works, and public power. The relatively high Eastern cohesion can be fundamentally attributed to Republican domination of the section, and to habitual Republican party regularity. The minor Democratic opposition was more than offset by Republican hegemony and conformity to enable a high degree of sectional affinity. Eastern cohesion is presented in the following table.

TABLE 21

COHESION INDEX FOR THE EASTERN SENATORS
FOR EACH ISSUE AND CONGRESS,
1921-29

Issue	Congress				Totals
	67	68	69	70	
Tariff	19.0		19.0	0.0	12.7
Senate Organization	21.0	12.0	46.0	5.0	21.0
Investigations	30.0	61.0	20.0	12.0	30.8
Welfare	60.0	15.0	29.0		34.7
Tax-Revenue	21.0	44.0	55.0	34.0	38.5
Senate Procedure	31.0	37.0	52.0	40.0	40.0

Business-Industry-Banks	36.0	35.0	41.0	51.0	40.8
Legislative Compensation		41.0			41.0
Appropriations	37.0	36.0	50.0	42.0	41.3
Public Power		44.0	45.0	38.0	42.3
Agriculture	30.0	55.0	50.0	50.0	46.3
Prohibition	74.0		30.0	35.0	46.3
Veterans' Compensation	51.0	48.0	46.0		48.3
Military Affairs	46.0	33.0	50.0	71.0	50.0
Public Works	20.0	35.0	73.0	73.0	50.3
Government Organization	30.0	60.0	73.0	68.0	57.8
Immigration	69.0	58.0	51.0		59.3
Foreign Affairs	30.0	44.0	87.0	84.0	61.3
Appointments	45.0	68.0	38.0	100.0	62.8
Race	50.0	58.0		100.0	69.3
Totals	38.9	43.6	47.5	50.2	

Eastern senators of both parties were much more disposed toward unity along political rather than sectional lines. The Eastern Republicans had more affinity among themselves than Republicans from the other sections. Only the Central States Democrats had equal cohesion with the Eastern Republicans, and the paucity of the former makes this a dubious comparison. The Republicans from the East, in sequence from the 67th through the 70th Congress, had cohesion of 79.00, 72.00, 72.00, and 79.00 for a 75.50 average.

The cohesion of Eastern Democrats was exceeded only by their Midwest associates. Two Republican groups, Easterners and Southerners, although there were only a few of the latter, had more unity than Democrats from the East. The average Democratic cohesion was 70.00 for all Congresses during the 1920's. For the 67th through the 70 Congress in order, the Eastern Democratic cohesion was 78.00, 58.00, 71.00, and 73.00.

The first of the following tables presents the Eastern Republican, and the second gives the Eastern Democratic cohesion for each Congress and issue from 1921 through 1929.

TABLE 22

COHESION INDEX FOR EASTERN REPUBLICANS FOR EACH
ISSUE AND CONGRESS, 1921-1929

Issue	Congress			Totals	
	67	68	69		70
Welfare	62.0	28.0	37.0	42.3	
Prohibition	49.0		41.0	36.0	42.0
Public Works	55.0	28.0	79.0	55.0	54.3
Immigration	82.0	65.0	19.0		55.3
Military Affairs	73.0	55.0	54.0	87.0	67.3
Public Power		71.0	71.0	74.0	72.0
Veterans' Compensation	61.0	78.0	81.0		73.3
Legislative Compensation		73.0			73.0
Agriculture	78.0	70.0	68.0	85.0	75.3
Investigations	89.0	67.0	65.0	84.0	76.3

Business-Industry-Banks	74.0	94.0	62.0	82.0	78.0
Senate Procedure	84.0	86.0	85.0	60.0	78.8
Government Organization	81.0	73.0	97.0	64.0	78.8
Appropriations	80.0	77.0	98.0	71.0	81.5
Tax-Revenue	85.0	83.0	87.0	79.0	83.5
Foreign Affairs	93.0	63.0	87.0	100.0	85.8
Senate Organization	92.0	99.0	83.0	90.0	91.0
Tariff	87.0		89.0	100.0	92.0
Appointments	99.0	86.0	90.0	100.0	93.8
Race	100.0	100.0		100.0	100.0
Totals	79.0	72.0	71.8	79.2	

TABLE 23

COHESION INDEX FOR EASTERN DEMOCRATS FOR EACH
ISSUE AND CONGRESS, 1921-1929

Issue	Congress			Totals	
	67	68	69		70
Legislative Compensation		19.0			19.0
Public Power		32.0	43.0	47.0	40.7
Welfare	67.0	10.0	54.0		43.7
Senate Procedure	70.0	59.0	45.0	20.0	48.5
Race	34.0	47.0		100.0	60.3
Appropriations	71.0	63.0	58.0	71.0	65.8
Veterans' Compensation	82.0	41.0	74.0		65.7
Agriculture	77.0	79.0	63.0	47.0	66.5
Business-Industry-Banks	89.0	69.0	62.0	47.0	66.8
Prohibition	100.0		37.0	65.0	67.3

Military Affairs	68.0	45.0	84.0	73.0	67.5
Public Works	45.0	54.0	82.0	92.0	68.3
Tax-Revenue	92.0	61.0	77.0	74.0	76.0
Foreign Affairs	85.0	64.0	86.0	69.0	76.0
Immigration	78.0	73.0	83.0		78.0
Government Organization	81.0	72.0	100.0	72.0	81.3
Tariff	88.0		59.0	100.0	82.3
Appointments	79.0	81.0	83.0	100.0	85.8
Senate Organization	100.0	75.0	89.0	100.0	91.0
Investigations	100.0	100.0	91.0	95.0	96.5
Totals	78.1	58.0	70.6	73.3	

The popular idea of a monolithic Southern bloc is refuted by this study. Southerners were less unified than the Eastern and Midwestern senators, and had only slightly more affinity than the Westerners. Prohibition was the only issue upon which they had more accord than the other groups. The low Southern cohesion is the result of many diverse interests in a geographical area often believed homogeneous. The definition of South in this study, which includes both border and Confederate states, may also contribute to the low sectional cohesion. This may have increased the antithetical groups over the number usually defined as Southern. A different pattern of party representation, than what is usually thought of, may have also reduced Southern cohesion during the 1920's. Many Republicans, who were tenacious party

regulars, were elected from border states which broadened interparty sectional conflict. Southern cohesion is given in the table below.

TABLE 24

COHESION INDEX FOR THE SOUTHERN SENATORS FOR EACH
ISSUE AND CONGRESS, 1921-1929

Issue	Congress			Totals	
	67	68	69		
Senate Organization	12.0	1.0	28.0	12.0	13.3
Tariff	13.0		8.0	43.0	21.3
Tax-Revenue	15.0	32.0	48.0	28.0	30.8
Investigations	18.0	39.0	42.0	27.0	31.5
Appropriations	25.0	27.0	27.0	49.0	32.0
Legislative Compensation		32.0			32.0
Agriculture	16.0	36.0	35.0	47.0	33.5
Business-Industry-Banks	22.0	37.0	36.0	40.0	33.8
Race	64.0	7.0		35.0	35.3
Appointments	17.0	63.0	34.0	32.0	36.5
Public Power		32.0	38.0	41.0	37.0
Senate Procedure	22.0	33.0	46.0	57.0	39.5
Veterans' Compensation	32.0	37.0	51.0		40.0
Immigration	38.0	50.0	32.0		40.0
Welfare	38.0	37.0	50.0		41.7
Public Works	20.0	48.0	41.0	58.0	41.8
Government Organization	17.0	46.0	65.0	44.0	43.0

Military Affairs	28.0	45.0	37.0	62.0	43.0
Foreign Affairs	18.0	57.0	59.0	72.0	51.5
Prohibition	50.0		59.0	76.0	61.7
Totals	25.8	36.6	40.9	45.2	

Within the Democratic Party, only the Westerners, by a very slight degree, had less cohesion than the Southerners. There were only two sectional political groups in both parties with less solidarity than the Southern Democrats. The belief in Southern Democratic unanimity is a myth in the 1920's. In contrast with the Democrats, Southern Republicans had a high degree of solidarity. Their impressive unity could be somewhat attributed to the relatively few Southern Republicans being analyzed. The Republican senators, however, are an exceedingly homogeneous group and tenaciously committed to the dominant party positions. Cohesion indices for Southern Democrats and Republicans are presented in the following tables.

TABLE 25

COHESION INDEX FOR SOUTHERN DEMOCRATS
FOR EACH ISSUE AND CONGRESS,
1921-1929

Issue	Congress				Totals
	67	68	69	70	
Legislative Compensation		37.0			32.0
Public Power		37.0	34.0	51.0	40.7
Welfare	61.0	35.0	55.0	.	50.3

Prohibition	40.0		66.0	52.0	52.7
Senate Procedure	63.0	61.0	60.0	36.0	55.0
Immigration	75.0	59.0	38.0		57.3
Agriculture	60.0	48.0	66.0	61.0	58.8
Military Affairs	61.0	48.0	73.0	61.0	60.8
Government Organization	66.0	54.0	74.0	50.0	61.0
Foreign Affairs	59.0	69.0	67.0	61.0	64.0
Appropriations	69.0	78.0	61.0	62.0	67.5
Business-Banks-Industry	71.0	88.0	67.0	52.0	69.5
Race	100.0	81.0		30.0	70.3
Appointments	71.0	87.0	69.0	64.0	72.8
Veterans' Compensation	53.0	81.0	91.0		75.0
Tax-Revenue	83.0	92.0	59.0	69.0	75.8
Public Works	83.0	90.0	62.0	71.0	76.5
Tariff	80.0		85.0	86.0	83.7
Senate Organization	91.0	99.0	71.0	83.0	86.0
Investigations	82.0	100.0	89.0	95.0	91.5
Totals	70.4	69.1	65.9	61.5	

TABLE 26

COHESION INDEX FOR SOUTHERN REPUBLICANS FOR
EACH ISSUE AND CONGRESS, 1921-1929

Issue	Congress			Totals
	67	68	69	
Immigration	91.0	66.0	25.0	60.7
Veterans' Compensation	34.0	73.0	77.0	61.3
Prohibition	38.0		51.0	100.0

Public Works	74.0	39.0	75.0	72.0	65.0
Agriculture	69.0	73.0	59.0	62.0	65.8
Public Power		53.0	79.0	68.0	66.7
Investigations	78.0	78.0	47.0	78.0	70.3
Tax-Revenue	81.0	51.0	78.0	74.0	71.0
Military Affairs	71.0	55.0	80.0	86.0	73.0
Business--Industry--Banks	66.0	80.0	69.0	79.0	73.5
Foreign Affairs	80.0	51.0	64.0	100.0	73.8
Government Organization	73.0	62.0	100.0	67.0	75.5
Appropriations	82.0	82.0	100.0	65.0	82.3
Tariff	86.0		80.0		83.0
Senate Procedure	83.0	83.0	91.0	78.0	83.8
Welfare	88.0	70.0	95.0		84.3
Senate Organization	81.0	99.0	75.0	91.0	86.5
Appointments	93.0	80.0	89.0		87.3
Legislative Compensation		100.0			100.0
Race	100.0	100.0		100.0	100.0
Totals	76.0	71.9	74.1	70.0	

Westerners were the least unified sectional group. Senate organization and tariff were the only issues upon which the West had more cohesion than the other sections. Western disunity basically stems from a competitive two-party system within the region. The West was the only section in the 1920's where this condition existed. Although both Western Republicans and Democrats were quite

fragmented, there was enough party regularity to produce low sectional cohesion. The statistics are given in the table below.

TABLE 27
COHESION INDEX FOR WESTERN SENATORS
FOR EACH ISSUE AND CONGRESS,
1921-1929

Issue	Congress			Totals
	67	68	69	
Immigration	16.0	35.0	9.0	20.0
Prohibition	7.0		29.0	23.7
Foreign Affairs	31.0	15.0	36.0	26.5
Welfare	11.0	56.0	20.0	29.0
Military Affairs	27.0	41.0	10.0	30.0
Agriculture	25.0	31.0	33.0	30.8
Veterans' Compensation	16.0	54.0	25.0	31.7
Government Organization	29.0	36.0	44.0	34.3
Business-Industry-Banks	29.0	27.0	43.0	34.0
Public Works	28.0	47.0	36.0	34.8
Appointments	35.0	45.0	27.0	35.0
Senate Procedure	33.0	35.0	39.0	35.3
Appropriations	32.0	37.0	28.0	35.3
Public Power		38.0	27.0	35.3
Senate Organization	35.0	23.0	37.0	36.5
Tax-Revenue	36.0	29.0	40.0	40.0
Investigations	34.0	31.0	46.0	42.5

Legislative Compensation		48.0			48.0
Race	25.0	46.0		83.0	51.3
Totals	26.9	37.4	32.7	44.3	

Both Western parties are relatively disunified. Western Democrats have the least cohesion of any sectional Democratic group; and Central States Republicans are the only geographical group with less solidarity. Western Republicans were nearly as divisive as their Democratic counterparts. Only the Midwestern Republicans and Western Democrats were more fragmented than the Western Republicans. Western party cohesion is presented in the following tables.

TABLE 28

COHESION INDEX FOR WESTERN DEMOCRATS FOR
EACH ISSUE AND CONGRESS, 1921-1929

Issue	Congress			Totals	
	67	68	69		70
Public Power		54.0	49.0	44.0	49.0
Agriculture	55.0	31.0	54.0	61.0	50.3
Immigration	52.0	67.0	38.0		52.3
Foreign Affairs	58.0	44.0	68.0	43.0	53.3
Military Affairs	53.0	43.0	62.0	55.0	53.3
Prohibition	54.0		53.0	54.0	53.7
Senate Procedure	71.0	65.0	47.0	35.0	54.5
Welfare	56.0	64.0	52.0		57.3
Appointments	71.0	67.0	63.0	34.0	58.8

Government Organization	60.0	66.0	47.0	69.0	60.5
Public Works	67.0	89.0	40.0	50.0	61.5
Tariff	60.0		50.0	78.0	62.7
Legislative Compensation		66.0			66.0
Appropriations	75.0	64.0	67.0	59.0	66.3
Tax-Revenue	82.0	71.0	59.0	61.0	68.3
Business-Industry-Banks	67.0	100.0	61.0	56.0	71.0
Race	100.0	50.0		66.0	72.0
Veterans' Compensation	55.0	80.0	84.0		73.0
Senate Organization	95.0	97.0	60.0	89.0	85.3
Investigations	100.0	100.0	96.0	100.0	99.0
Totals	68.4	67.7	58.3	59.6	

TABLE 29

COHESION INDEX FOR WESTERN REPUBLICANS
FOR EACH ISSUE AND CONGRESS,
1921-1929

Issue	Congress				Totals
	67	68	69	70	
Agriculture	55.0	44.0	52.0	38.0	47.3
Public Power		46.0	39.0	64.0	49.7
Prohibition	30.0		58.0	62.0	50.0
Public Works	44.0	59.0	52.0	50.0	51.3
Veterans' Compensation	50.0	65.0	52.0		55.7
Business-Industry-Banks	67.0	60.0	62.0	41.0	57.5
Immigration	86.0	68.0	19.0		57.7
Welfare	55.0	59.0	61.0		58.3

Investigations	77.0	73.0	30.0	56.0	59.0
Tax-Revenue	68.0	54.0	57.0	65.0	61.0
Military Affairs	55.0	67.0	62.0	69.0	63.3
Senate Procedure	79.0	45.0	76.0	54.0	63.5
Senate Organization	79.0	64.0	65.0	57.0	66.3
Foreign Affairs	74.0	46.0	76.0	82.0	69.5
Appropriations	77.0	63.0	93.0	60.0	73.3
Appointments	81.0	73.0	56.0	100.0	77.5
Government Organization	66.0	83.0	85.0	79.0	78.3
Tariff	79.0		81.0	84.0	81.3
Legislative Compensation		82.0			82.0
Race	86.0	80.0		100.0	88.7
Totals	67.1	62.8	59.8	66.3	

The second principal objective in this chapter is an analysis of voting mutuality between sectional groups. This study assesses the relative influence of party against section on voting patterns, and examines the affinity between rural and urban geographical regions. The conclusions from this analysis support a slight revision of most historical interpretations of sectional voting alignments in the 1920's.

This judgment is based upon the information contained within the six following tables. In sequence, the tables provide the voting likeness for: (1) Democrats and Republicans from the same section; (2) Democratic sectional groups with each other; (3) Republican sectional groups with each

other; (4) sectional Republican groups with sectional Democratic groups; (5) likeness of urban and rural sections and comparison between the two; and (6) likeness between urban and rural sections upon selected issues.

TABLE 30

LIKENESS BETWEEN DEMOCRATS AND REPUBLICANS
FROM THE SAME SECTION, 1921-1929

Sectional Groups	Likeness
East	49.5
Central	55.8
West	57.8
South	54.0

TABLE 31

LIKENESS BETWEEN DEMOCRATIC SECTIONAL
GROUPS, 1921-1929

Democratic Sectional Groups	Likeness
East-South	73.8
South-West	83.0
East-Central	81.3
Central-South	52.5
East-West	76.3
Central-West	76.0
Average Likeness Between All Sectional Groups	73.5

TABLE 32

LIKENESS BETWEEN REPUBLICAN SECTIONAL
GROUPS, 1921-1929

Republican Sectional Groups	Likeness
East-South	85.5
South-West	82.5
East-Central	67.0
Central-South	71.5
East-West	76.8
Central-West	78.3
Average Likeness Between All Sectional Groups	76.9

TABLE 33

LIKENESS BETWEEN SECTIONAL GROUPS OF ONE
PARTY WITH SECTIONAL GROUPS OF THE
OTHER PARTY, 1921-1929

Sectional Groups	Likeness
Eastern Democrats-Eastern Republicans	49.5
Central Republicans-Central Democrats	55.8
Southern Democrats-Southern Republicans	54.0
Central Democrats-Western Republicans	48.0
Southern Democrats-Western Republicans	59.0
Eastern Democrats-Southern Republicans	56.5
Central Democrats-Southern Republicans	75.0
Western Democrats-Southern Republicans	48.0
Eastern Democrats-Western Republicans	53.8
Western Democrats-Western Republicans	57.8
Western Democrats-Eastern Republicans	44.5
Western Democrats-Central Republicans	64.5
Eastern Democrats-Central Republicans	48.5
Southern Democrats-Eastern Republicans	44.5
Central Democrats-Eastern Republicans	44.5
Southern Democrats-Central Republicans	47.0

TABLE 34

LIKENESS OF THE URBAN AND RURAL GROUPS
AND THE LIKENESS BETWEEN THE URBAN
AND RURAL SECTIONS, 1921-1929

Sections	Likeness
Urban	49.5
Rural	63.9
Urban-Rural	62.7

(The Urban section includes only the Eastern groups. All other groups are classified as Rural.)

TABLE 35

LIKENESS BETWEEN THE URBAN AND RURAL
SECTIONS UPON SELECTED ISSUES,
1921-1929

Issue	Likeness
Foreign Affairs	77.4
Military Affairs	69.7
Government Organization	71.5
Agriculture	57.9
Public Works	59.6
Tax-Revenue	61.4
Business-Industry-Banks	61.5
Prohibition	55.6
Tariff	54.1
Claims-Pensions-Compensation	69.2
Veterans' Compensation	64.7
Public Power	64.3
Race	68.0
Welfare	64.9
Immigration	73.1

An obvious conclusion from the preceding tables is that party affiliation transcended sectional identification as the guide to the way most senators voted. No section had the likeness which even nearly approximated those of the

political parties. There was, moreover, only one example of two sectional groups (Central and Southern Democrats) within the same party with less likeness than a sectional group which included both Republicans and Democrats. The significance of this example is moot because of the paucity of Central Democrats who voted relatively few times.

Party membership as the major influence upon Senate votes can be perceived from another perspective. This involves an examination of the extent which Democratic and Republican sectional groups voted with sectional groups in their parties compared with the extent they voted with sectional groups in the other party. In the Republican party, only the Southerners voted more with a sectional group in the Democratic party than with all sectional groups in their own party. The Southern Republicans had more likeness with the Central Democrats than the Central Republicans. This exception to the overall pattern is not exceedingly important because of the small numbers in both groups. Within the Democratic party, only the Central States senators, and the same qualifications apply here as before, voted more with some sectional groups in Republican party than Democratic sectional groups. They voted more with the Central and Southern Republicans than the Southern Democrats. These minor aberrations do not significantly distract from the general thesis that party was the paramount influence

reflected in Senate voting patterns.

The urban-rural cleavage was both less intense and had more ramifications than is usually indicated in political histories of the 1920's. This examination revealed that neither the urban or rural geographical regions had the likeness comparable to the parties. Further comparison indicated that the rural groups had only slightly more affinity between themselves than they had collectively with the urban section. The urban section had decidedly less agreement than the rural sections and less likeness than the urban with the rural sections. This is because the urban section includes only one Democratic and Republican group which reenforces the proposition that party was the major divisive force. Although a division existed between the urban and rural sections, it was not on the scale that is usually expressed.

The idea of a rural-urban division seems oversimplified. The salient disagreements appear to be between sectional groups, often within the same party, and these are not always between rural and urban sections. Only the relatively small degree of likeness between the Central and Eastern Republicans implies a sharp urban-rural confrontation. The urban-rural likeness on substantive issues generally confirms this conclusion. There were only four issues, tariff, prohibition, public works, and agriculture, that seemed to produce urban-rural division and this was not drastic.

The conclusions in this chapter fundamentally complement those of the second chapter. Party affiliation was the basic determinant of Senate voting alignments in the 1920's. This does not totally negate the contention that sectional tension was present and distracted from party allegiance more than normal. Sectionalism was easily perceivable in the votes and it became an increasingly disruptive factor in politics with each subsequent Congress in the 1920's. For proper perspective, however, even when sectionalism was most obvious, it was unequivocally a secondary influence upon voting behavior.

CONCLUSION

This dissertation was an examination of salient political currents in the United States during the 1920's. The objective was to test, refine and revise common historical descriptions of national politics through an analysis of party and sectional voting patterns in the American Senate. The usual historical themes emphasize the inordinate fragmentation of the Republican and Democratic parties which were afflicted with acute ideological and sectional fissures. These characterizations, based upon the traditional methodology and evidence, were reanalyzed and reconstructed primarily through statistical measurement and conceptual criteria. Even where the standard interpretations were verified, this analysis contributed substantive information on voting patterns.

The major objective in this study was to determine the effect of party affiliation upon voting behavior. A valuable result of this analysis was that vague statements on party cohesion were supplanted with exact measurements. It was confirmed through statistical computation that the political parties had less unity than usual during the 1920's. This analysis, however, accomplished more than to merely reenforce the all but universal thesis. The measurement of party affinity through different statistical indices enabled the delineation of major voting schemes. It was proved that

party membership, although a less salient factor in Senate voting, was the most important determinant of the way that most senators voted. Party cohesion, it must be emphasized, did vary appreciably according to the issue and Congress. Both the Republicans and Democrats deviated nearly the same degree from the party solidarity "norm." The former were less unified than the latter which was consistent with voting trends over several generations. Party unity declined for both political parties in each succeeding Congress from 1921 through 1929. This seemed to result from the introduction of new issues, different Senate membership, and party relations outside the Congress. An exceedingly relevant conclusion from this investigation was that each party had its own peculiar kind of fragmentation. Although there were marked differences in party solidarity contingent upon issue and chronology, Democrats generally were more united upon party loyalty issues than substantive matters whereas the Republicans reflected the reverse pattern.

Because the indices used to measure party affinity fail to isolate the voting profile of individual legislators, a loyalty index was constructed to gauge the influence of party affiliation upon each senator. The purpose was to assess the party regularity for individual senators in order to test the validity of historians' judgments on identification of party unreliaables and their degree of intractability. With

few exceptions, senators traditionally classified as party irregulars are those with low loyalty percentages. Recalcitrant political activity was nearly an exclusive Republican practice. Some Midwestern and Western Republican senators demonstrated pronounced voting unreliability. Several Democrats had relatively low regularity percentages, but none opposed their party as flagrantly as the Republican incorrigibles. The loyalty index information was the basis for a more intensive examination of Republican party discord.

Although the loyalty index is a valuable method for measurement of voting dependability, it does not either clarify or define broad contours of party conduct or political ideology. A chapter, therefore, was exclusively given to the study of Republican political insurgency and its relationship to progressivism. A criteria of insurgency was applied to Republican senators to determine the scope and intensity of political rebellion. The conclusion was that some Republican Midwesterners engaged in obstruction and defiance of their party, but that insurgency had less dimension, frequency, and intensity in the 1920's than historians have generally assumed. An ancillary conclusion was that voting irregularity may be a significant indicator of more implacable forms of insurgency. No senator with an exceedingly high loyalty percentage violated the prescriptions for party loyalty. Although some senators voted consistently against their party

without disavowal of party allegiance, only those senators who were in most chronic dissent also practiced other types of insurgency.

Historical definitions of progressivism are, whatever the theoretical reflection, finally translated into advocacy of concrete legislative programs. To determine the relationship between insurgency and progressivism, the votes on progressive issues were analyzed to judge whether they produced a progressive-conservative division among Republican senators. No graphic ideological gulf was reflected on these selected issues, which suggested that the association between insurgency and progressivism, although perhaps not without some basis, seemed tenuous. This conclusion was reinforced by the evidence in an early chapter that Republican division was principally over party loyalty rather than substantive issues.

The objective of the final chapter was to determine the geographical influence upon Senate voting patterns. Those indices used to measure party cohesion were also employed to ascertain the unity both of sectional groups, without regard to party, and sectional party groups. This analysis substantiated that party affiliation and not sectional pressures and interests was the paramount guide to Senate voting. This conclusion, however, did not negate the common historical thesis that sectionalism was more pronounced

during the 1920's than was normal. Sectional conflict was present, and it became more exaggerated in the voting scheme of each subsequent Congress.

This study both reenforces and modifies the standard historical descriptions of national politics during the 1920's. Although the fundamental interpretations are confirmed, they are expanded in scope, internally refined, and redefined with more precision. Perhaps the best defense of this dissertation is that refocused attention upon and delineated the general political pattern of the 1920's. With the historical concentration upon party disruption, political insurgency, and active irregularity, it is easy to neglect the fundamental political trend. The political party continued to function in the 1920's and to be the key to voting behavior. In this respect, politics in the 1920's conform to, more than diverge from, the general scheme of American political history.

The conclusions from this study are not final or complete. Basic questions about politics of the 1920's were raised and many went unanswered. This investigation may, however, provide a basis for departure into intensive research and reanalysis of "twenties" national politics. If this dissertation indicates the need and opportunities for scholarly research in an absorbing decade it will have accomplished the writer's major objective.

APPENDIX A

APPENDIX A

DEMOCRATIC AND REPUBLICAN CHI-SQUARES

FOR EACH ISSUE AND CONGRESS, 1921-29

DEMOCRATIC CHI-SQUARES FOR EACH ISSUE AND
CONGRESS WITH THE AVERAGE FOR
1921-29

Issue	Congress				Chi-square Average
	67	68	69	70	
Senate Organization	13.02	18.70	9.21	15.87	14.20
Foreign Policy	6.21	4.02	9.58	8.06	6.97
Military Affairs	5.32	4.37	8.05	8.37	6.52
Tariff	8.21	--	9.13	17.39	11.91
Senate Procedure	6.12	8.44	4.67	2.34	5.39
Appointments	7.40	12.90	8.08	5.88	8.56
Government					
Organization	5.79	6.48	9.04	4.60	6.48
Immigration	6.22	6.14	.05	--	4.13
Agriculture	5.09	2.61	5.61	5.55	4.71
Welfare	5.09	.78	2.91	--	2.92
Business-Industry-					
Banks	7.62	15.25	5.57	5.98	8.61
Tax-Revenue	9.83	13.41	6.09	9.59	9.73
Veterans'					
Compensation	5.01	9.26	12.67	--	8.98
Prohibition	1.60	--	6.50	2.09	3.40
Appropriations	7.61	10.37	6.04	7.80	7.96
Pensions-Claims-					
Compensation	---	1.41	---	---	1.41
Public Works	8.70	6.29	4.52	6.92	6.61
Public Power	---	3.43	2.63	4.89	3.65
Investigations	12.72	19.79	15.13	19.05	16.67
Race	13.24	4.05	---	.06	5.78

REPUBLICAN CHI-SQUARES FOR EACH ISSUE AND
CONGRESS WITH THE AVERAGE FOR
1921-29

Issue	Congress				Chi-square Average
	67	68	69	70	
Senate Organization	14.85	10.43	9.87	6.88	10.51
Foreign Policy	17.60	5.05	12.76	12.16	11.89
Military Affairs	8.31	5.77	4.90	7.46	6.61

Tariff	14.45	--	13.30	5.26	11.00
Senate Procedure	12.92	6.60	10.81	4.55	8.72
Appointments	14.66	9.07	8.39	8.05	10.04
Government					
Organization	10.43	7.70	12.44	7.68	9.56
Immigration	17.79	9.58	.96	--	9.44
Agriculture	8.66	6.43	5.30	2.77	5.79
Welfare	11.38	7.72	6.05	--	8.38
Business-Industry-					
Banks	11.14	9.82	5.79	3.30	7.51
Tax-Revenue	10.35	6.60	7.35	8.92	8.31
Veterans'					
Compensation	6.10	8.58	8.25	--	7.64
Prohibition	1.56	--	5.42	7.02	4.67
Appropriations	14.73	8.26	11.08	4.98	9.76
Claims-Pensions-					
Compensation	--	11.24	--	--	11.24
Public Works	5.03	2.75	7.50	4.43	4.93
Public Power	--	3.71	4.71	6.49	4.97
Investigations	15.30	7.74	2.74	4.40	7.55
Race	21.16	16.17	--	20.00	19.11

APPENDIX B

APPENDIX B

MAJOR SENATE OFFICERS AND
PARTY LEADERS,
1921-29

<u>President Pro Tempore of the Senate</u>	<u>Dates</u>
Albert B. Cummins (R-Iowa)	1921-25
George H. Moses (R.N.H.)	1925-29

Party Leadership

Republican Majority Leaders

Henry Cabot Lodge (Mass.)	1921-24
Charles Curtis (Kansas)	1924-28
James E. Watson (Ind.)	1929

Republican Assistant Majority Leaders

Charles Curtis (Kansas)	1921-24
Wesley L. Jones (Washington)	1924-29

Democratic Minority Leaders

Oscar W. Undersood (Ala.)	1921-23
Joseph T. Robinson (Arkansas)	1923-29

Democratic Assistant Majority Leaders

Peter G. Gerry (R.I.)	1921-29
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Senate Committee Chairman
And Ranking Minority Member *(All Chairmen
all Republicans and
Ranking members Demo-
crats unless otherwise
indicated.)

<u>COMMITTEE</u>	<u>CHAIRMAN</u>	<u>RANKING MINORITY MEMBER</u>
Agriculture and Forestry	George W. Norris 1921-26	Ellison D. Smith 1921-29
	Charles L. McNary 1927-29	

Appropriations	Francis E. Warren 1921-29	Lee S. Overman 1921-29
Banking and Currency	George P. McLean 1921-27	Robert L. Owen 1921-27
	Peter Norbeck 1928-29	Duncan U. Fletcher 1928-29
Commerce	Wesley L. Jones 1921-29	Duncan U. Fletcher 1921-29
Rules	Charles Curtis 1921-29	Lee S. Overman 1921-29
Finance	Porter J. McCumber 1921-23	Furnifold M. Simmons 1921-29
	Reed Smoot 1924-29	
Immigration	LeBaron B. Colt 1921-23	William H. King 1921-29
	Thomas Sterling 1924-25	
	Hiram W. Johnson 1925-29	
Foreign Relations	Henry Cabot Lodge 1921-23	Gilbert M. Hitchcock 1921-23
	William E. Borah 1924-29	Claude A. Swanson 1924-29
Interoceanic Canals	Walter E. Edge 1921-29	Thomas J. Walsh 1921-29
Civil Service	Thomas Sterling 1921-23	
	Robert N. Stanfield 1924-25	Kenneth McKellar 1921-29
	James Couzens 1925-26	
	Porter H. Dale 1927-29	

Education and Labor	William S. Kenyon 1921-22.	Andrews A. Jones 1921-27
	William E. Borah 1922-24	Woodbridge N. Ferris 1928
	Lawrence C. Phipps 1925-26	Royal S. Copeland 1928-29
	James Couzens 1927-29	
District of Columbia	Lewis H. Ball 1921-25	William H. King 1921-29
	Arthur Capper 1925-29	
Judiciary	Knute Nelson 1921-23	Charles A. Culberson 1921-23
	William E. Borah 1924	Lee S. Overman 1924-29
	Albert B. Cummins 1925-26	
	George W. Norris 1928-29	
Interstate Commerce	Albert B. Cummins 1921-23	Ellison D. Smith 1921-24
	Ellison D. Smith 1924-25 (Democrat)	Albert B. Cummins 1924-25 (Republican)
	James A. Watson 1925-29	
Mines and Mining	Miles Poindexter 1921-23	Thomas J. Walsh 1921-29
	Tasker L. Oddie 1924-29	
Naval Affairs	Carroll S. Page 1921-23	Clande A. Swanson 1921-29
	Frederic Hale 1924-29	

Indian Affairs	Seldon P. Spencer 1921-23	Henry F. Ashurst 1921-29
	John A. Harreld 1924-27	
	Charles Curtis 1927	
	Lynn J. Frazier 1928-29	
Military Affairs	James W. Wadsworth 1921-27	Gilbert M. Hitchcock 1921-23
	Francis E. Warren 1927	Duncan U. Fletcher 1924-29
	David A. Reed 1928-29	
Privileges and Elections	William P. Dillingham 1921-23	Atlee Pomerene 1921-23
	Seldon P. Spencer 1924-25	
	Richard P. Ernst 1926-27	James A. Reed 1923-25
	James E. Watson 1927	William H. King 1925-29
	Samuel M. Shortridge 1928-29	
	Manufacturers	Robert M. LaFollette 1921-25
William B. McKinley 1925-26		
Ovington E. Weller 1927		
Charles L. McNary 1927		
George P. McLean 1928-29		

Pensions	Holm O. Bursum 1921-25	David I. Walsh 1921-25
	Peter Norbeck 1925-27	Peter G. Gerry 1925-29
	Arthur R. Robinson 1928-29	
Post Office and Post Roads	Charles E. Townshend 1921-23	Kenneth McKellar 1921-29
	Thomas A. Sterling 1924-25	
	George H. Moses 1925-29	
Public Lands and Surveys	Reed Smoot 1921-23	Henry L. Myers 1921-23
	Irvine L. Lenroot 1924-25	Key Pittman 1923-29
	Robert N. Stanfield 1925-27	
	Gerald Nye 1928-29	
Irrigation and Reclamation	Charles L. McNary 1921-26	Morris Sheppard 1921-29
	Lawrence C. Phipps 1927-29	
Territorial and Insular Possessions	Harry S. New 1921-23	Key Pittman 1921-29
	Hiram W. Johnson 1924	
	Frank B. Willis 1925-28	
	Hiram Bingham 1928-29	
Enrolled Bills	Howard Sutherland 1921-23	Nathaniel B. Dial 1921-25

	James E. Watson 1924-25	Coleman L. Blease 1925-29
	Frank L. Greene 1925-29	
Library	Frank B. Brandegee 1921-23	John S. Williams 1921-22
	George W. Pepper 1923-24	Kenneth McKellar 1923-29
	Simeon D. Fess 1925-29	
Patents	Hiram W. Johnson 1921-23	Ellison D. Smith 1921-29
	Richard P. Ernst 1924-25-26	
	William Butler 1926	
	Jesse H. Metcalf 1927-29	
Printing	George H. Moses 1921-25	Duncan U. Fletcher 1921-29
	George W. Pepper 1925-27	
	Hiram Bingham 1927-28	
	Henrick Shipstead 1929	
Public Buildings and Grounds	Bert M. Fernald 1921-26	James A. Reed 1921-29
	Henry W. Keyes 1927-29	
Audit and Control the Contingent Expenses of the Senate	William M. Calder 1921-23	Andreius A. Jones 1921-23
	Henry W. Keyes 1924-27	Kenneth McKellar 1924-27

	Charles S. Deneed 1928-29	Thaddeas H. Caraway 1928-29
Expenditures in the Executive Branch	Medill McCormick 1921-25	Oscar W. Underwood 1921-27
	David A. Reed 1925-27	Claude A. Swanson 1927-29
	Frederic M. Sackett	
*Select Committee on Revision of Laws	Richard P. Ernst 1921-25 1926-27	Nathaniel B. Dial 1921-25
		William C. Bruce 1926-27
	*Committee not in existence 1925-26-28-29	
<u>CLAIMS</u>	Arthur Capper 1921-25	Joseph T. Robinson 1921-24
	Rice Means 1926-27	Park Trammell 1924-29

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