History @ Erasmus

Histories of Encounters

Edited by
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Preface

Alex van Stipriaan

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In 1978, the "experimental" History of Society programme was launched in Rotterdam, an initiative of the Faculty of Social Sciences at Erasmus University. Unlike in other Dutch universities, this programme was not embedded in a humanities faculty because Erasmus University did not have one, and still does not. This was what made the programme experimental as, contrary to the rest of the Netherlands, history in Rotterdam was viewed as a social science, or at least a study that needed to be approached from the social and economic sciences.

Elsewhere in the Netherlands, some watched the Rotterdam experiment expectantly while others dismissed it from the start. Traditional historical scholarship in the Dutch context was based on, among other things, a Eurocentric periodisation and an emphasis on synchrony, elements that were not present in the History of Society programme. In its stead were new conventions such as a typology of societies and a more diachronic approach. Our aim then was to differentiate between various models of societies in world history which were not necessarily consecutive in time, and could –or still can – exist alongside each other and be studied by comparing them to one another. These types of societies were given names which were completely different from traditional categories, such as the History of Pre-Agricultural Societies (focusing on hunters and gatherers), the History of Agricultural-Urban Societies, and the History of Industrial Societies. The most interesting perhaps of all the new categories, and the most difficult to explain, was Agricultural-Metropolitan Societies, or AgMet. This described mainly non-Western societies in which agricultural, pre-industrial and urban structures existed simultaneously while usually being linked to a Western colonial metropolis.

Because most lecturers and researchers had been educated in a tradition of chronological periods, this approach proved to be

challenging to put into practice. Internationally as well the traditional European division of history into Ancient, Medieval and Modern time periods introduced at the end of the seventeenth century dominated to such an extent that its influence was difficult to avoid. For many people, types of society still corresponded with the more familiar periodization of history. The Eurocentric element was mainly overcome by the full recognition of AgMet, later renamed as the History of Non-Western Societies (GNWS). However, this term brought with it its own problems because it mainly described what it was not and simplistically lumped together everything outside Europe.

The Rotterdam experiment brought another new aspect to historical scholarship in the Netherlands: a concerted theoretical reflection and a focus on mentalities and cultural history. By using anthropology and social psychology alongside the term group cultures, this approach came close to that used in the social sciences. Furthermore, the study of history in Rotterdam focused on the media such as film, radio and television as a subject and as an alternative to writing a thesis. Students were allowed to graduate with radio and film documentaries as their final project, a feature which gave a boost to the programme's popularity. It could even be argued that the current Media and Communications programme in today's faculty, the Erasmus School of History, Culture and Communication (ESHCC), had its roots in the media emphasis of the History of Society programme. The vocational graduation variants in the field of communications and information, policy, management, education and research also increased the focus on society and thus its popularity among students. In all senses of the word, the History of Society programme was truly experimental.

Now, forty years later, not much seems to remain of the former programme. Within this period, many major and minor reorganisations, changes and expansions have taken place. In the 1980s, universities were confronted with the so-called SKG operation (Selective Growth and Decrease). Rotterdam now had to leave various parts of the history programme to Leiden while other emphases would come to Rotterdam. While this change did not come to pass, the budget cuts certainly did, resulting in changes such as the History of Pre-Agricultural and Agricultural Societies disappearing from the curriculum. In the 1990s, the History of Society spawned the new Arts and Cultural Studies (KCW) programme. This was an almost immediate success, sometimes even threatening to expand at the expense of the History programme. At the same time, the semester system was also replaced by a four-module system. The types of society approach was gradually pushed to the background. For example, the History of Non-Western Societies (formerly AgMet) was

replaced by the more common term World History and the History of Pre-Industrial Societies chair became the Early Modern History chair.

A massive change took place in 2001 when Europe decided to introduce the bachelor-master degree structure. History of Society was replaced by a bachelor programme in History and a master programme still called History of Society but which had very little in common with the original concept originating in 1978. Fast forward to 2009 and the Arts and Culture Studies department was transformed into Culture Studies with a third faculty department being founded: Media and Communication. In 2013, History, now itself a department of the new ESHCC faculty, encountered financial difficulties and had to embark on yet another reorganisation. This resulted in the removal of the Early Modern History chair. As a consequence, pre-seventeenth century history is now hardly studied or taught in our department. Crucially, this latest reorganisation raised a fundamental question: who are we now as a history programme? Is there actually still a typical Rotterdam profile? Our overwhelming response to the latter question is yes, and this is shown by our new History programme curriculum and the joint formulation of our research profile, History @ Erasmus, which is included in this publication and which we hope also answers the first question.

The current curriculum still includes several pillars from the early years of the programme, such as the prominent place of the theory of history and the focus on much more than just the Western world, including post-colonial perspectives. The long-term perspective is also characteristic of the Rotterdam approach. However, the emphasis now tends to be on history after 1750 and more attention is devoted to the place of the Netherlands in a global context. This also reflects the interests of our students, past and present, whose research mainly focuses on more recent periods (see also chapter by Adriaansen). In both education and research, questions from the present tend to be key and often broad historical lines are followed. We mainly choose subjects which go beyond the national angle and focus on the interaction between local and global levels and any changes or continuities which are associated with that. Many courses are therefore given from an inter- or a transnational or even global perspective. There are now three permanent chairs. The Economic History and International Relations chair demonstrates the strong connections with the international dynamics of the port city and the origins of Erasmus University. The Global History and Cultural Encounters chair is logically a more cultural chair, focusing on historic interactions at all levels between the micro-local, global and macro-global. The third chair is Theory and Methods of History, one of the very first pillars of Rotterdam's history programme. Here, historical-philosophical reflection takes place and attention is given to historical culture in

a broad sense, the past as dealt with in an academic and popular manner. The programme also has several special and/or more personal chairs in the fields of urban history, heritage, business history, migration history and large historical databases.

Our recent History @ Erasmus research profile (see below) shows that the types of society approach has completely disappeared. Now there are words like 'global encounters', 'micro' and 'macro' research, 'bottom-up' and 'top-down' approaches. The nation state is just one of the many levels on which history is studied in Rotterdam and certainly not the leading unit of analysis. This is also evident from the diverse contributions which are included in this compilation. Based on the History @ Erasmus joint profile, we asked researchers in History to write a short contribution about the type of research they are doing. Most of the contributions present a clear historical case or piece of empirical theory which is illustrated through the accompanying visualisation in the form of a map, table, photo or print. The cases vary from an Iriquois Wampum belt to Dutch shipbuilding, from the World Cup Football to sixteenth-century Gelderland, from Syrian holy places to war games, urban history, fashion industry and body decoration. All together these contributions comprise a wonderful mosaic. The aim of this volume is to demonstrate the connections in the Rotterdam history mosaic through all its different shades. In order to make these connections clearer, we have grouped the contributions into three themes. The first theme, comprising parts 1, 2 and 3, shows the different levels of interaction on which we work and are named "Global Networks", "Regional Dynamics" and "Local Narratives" respectively. The second theme addresses and reflects on the question of how history is currently used, and is described in part 4 as "History in the Present." Through each and every contribution in this book a glimmer or more explicit reference can be discerned of the key tenets of the History @ Erasmus profile which is our third theme: encounters and interaction, top-down and bottom-up movements and a theoretically-informed study of history.

This compilation is bilingual; some contributions are in English and some in Dutch. This reflects both the two most commonly used publication languages among our researchers and the two languages used to teach the programme. English is the language used by most researchers in international fora and in which lectures are given in the international lecture hall. Dutch remains the primary language for some subjects and for students aiming at a career in the Netherlands. This also applies to many of the popular scientific activities targeting a much larger national audience.

There has never been a dull moment in the last forty years. The History department has gradually created a new identity, emerging from its former self, through which we constantly address current and future challenges while always bringing our own unique colour pallet to the mosaic of historical science in the Netherlands and beyond. We are therefore already looking forward to the ideas which will be presented at our fifty-year anniversary in ten years' time.

Finally, we would like to commemorate our colleagues whom we have lost while working with us or shortly after retiring, in particular professor Huib Vleesenbeek, drs. Christi Boerdam, drs. Tineke Gossens and most recently dr. Ferry de Goey and dr. Bert Altena.

For the realisation of this compilation, we would like to thank the ESHCC faculty, the Erasmus Trust Fund for funding this publication, designer Tymen Cieraad for his creativity and efficient collaboration, everyone who helped us with finding relevant illustrations, and of course all the authors.

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History @ Erasmus
Histories of Encounters

History @ Erasmus is the research group of the ESHCC History Department at Erasmus University. We study historical encounters from the micro-local level of the individual or family, to the macro level of global networks, particularly during the past five centuries. Our research expresses a particular interest in (global) flows – top down, bottom up as well as trans-level. One of the keys then is the prefix 'trans' as in trans-national, trans-Atlantic, trans-cultural, trans-regional, even trans-port, all of which connect and presuppose encounters. A theory driven approach helps us to understand these historical interactions and complexities.

The nation state is just one of the levels in the encountering chains we study, with very different and often changing conceptions of space in the micro-local and the macro-global.

We stand on the shoulders of what we called half a century ago "History of Society" at the time our history department started at Erasmus University. A decolonising, emancipating and internationalising world in the midst of the Cold War asked for new approaches to history. Instead of a focus on eurocentric historical periods, we planned to study history along the lines of archetypal sorts of societies in world history with the help of social science theories.

Over time we have moved towards more interactive and global dimensions of history without losing sight of the local, nor the use of concepts, theories and historiographies. A more dynamic histories of encounters approach is what binds us in Rotterdam. The rapidly changing and diversifying national and global contexts confronting us today is the inspiration for our historical research.

Our concept of encounters entails three dimensions: historical praxis, methodological approach, and theory. The latter contains the search for, and use of, theories for our research, in neighbouring (social science) disciplines, as well as theoretical reflection on history as such. Methodological encounters means connecting different approaches to each other such as a comparative and a quantitative method, or the combination of oral history and documentary sources. In the historical praxis we look for encounters in a variety of ways, such as between people, cultures, economies, nations, regions, ideas, and objects. Encountering can lead to connections as well as to clashes; it can be a process of entanglement as well as disentanglement, and in any case it entails interaction and often the dynamics of change.

Histories of encounters, therefore, focuses on historical processes – as well as the reflexivity about it – of asymmetrical power positions and their fights and competitions, resistance, innovation, transformation and everything that happens as a consequence of crossing lines, borders, or whatever that divides. This is shaped by a variety of scholarship in our research platform, varying from, among other topics, studies on historical consciousness and multiperspectivity in historical narratives, to international economic and political relations in Europe, and economic policies in particular world regions. This includes global fashion industries, historical games, and sports, migration and global citizenship to meaning and contents of cultural heritage in multicultural Europe, in the Black Atlantic, or in the Middle East, to name just another few. Encounters is what binds us all, and what seems to be a promising way to jointly develop further: it is obviously embedded in decisive scholarly debates of today and tomorrow.

Global Networks

Mondiale Netwerken

Graph 1. Trade transactions of Hubert Schepmoes based on the Rotterdam notarial records (1632-1655)

Map 1. International trade network of Hubert Schepmoes based on the Rotterdam notarial records (1632-1655)

Maarten F. Van Dijck

Rotterdam and the Beginnings of Global Trade in the Early Modern Period

Assistant Professor Theory and Methodology of History

Historians have extensively discussed the rise of Rotterdam during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the heydays of the harbour, but the earliest growth after 1600 received less attention, although a lot can be found about this in the notarial records of those days. They show that Rotterdam was a pivotal node in global networks during the first phase of globalisation. Waterfronts of early modern port cities were responsible for global exchange of people, goods and ideas between different parts of the globe. In the case of this essay, this will be shown by several exchanges between Rotterdam and New Amsterdam.

Hubrecht Schepmoes (1610- 1657), son of a textile merchant from Delft, but himself working from Rotterdam, started in the silk trade. His development as a merchant is a fine example of how Rotterdam merchants built up careers in international trade. Switching from silk to coal trade to horses, and from neighbouring European countries to long-distance trade with the Baltic states, the Mediterranean and eventually North America, the scope and impact of his trade expanded during Schepmoes' career. At the end of his career, no other merchant had sent more ships from Rotterdam to New Amsterdam as Schepmoes did. The sources do not mention what kind of goods Schepmoes shipped to New Amsterdam, but the cargo he sent in 1650 had a value of 11,000 guilders which corresponds today to more than 100,000 euros.

Merchants were not only responsible for the exchange of material goods. One of them, the English quaker Benjamin Furly, participated enthusiastically in debates on monarchy or popular representation he organised in his house with such eminent thinkers as John Locke, Pierre Bayle, William Penn and the Earl of Shaftesbury.

Because of his commercial networks, these debates travelled the world and influenced among others the so-called Leisler rebellion in New York, former New Amsterdam, against new taxations in 1689. This uprising was named after Jacob Leisler, a German migrant whose involvement in the fur and tobacco trade made him one of the richest men in New York. He himself never visited Rotterdam but many of his New York friends and supporters resided for some time in Rotterdam.

Of course these travelling ideas were just the side cargo to the people and products crossing the seas. For example Jacob Jansz Huys, who came from Oudkarspel – some 100 kilometres north of Rotterdam – joined the ship of Adriaen Blommaert to New Amsterdam in 1649. Huys was a carpenter and left the Dutch Republic for the New Netherlands to establish a new life as a carpenter overseas. He had to pay Blommaert 42 guilders for every month he spent aboard the ship. This sum equaled the monthly wage of a beginning carpenter in Amsterdam. However, Blommaert had to bring Huys back to Rotterdam free of any charge if he decided to return to the Dutch Republic. Apparently, Jacob did not become homesick and stayed at least eleven years in the New Netherlands. He pops up in a document dated 8 May 1660 as the skipper of the *Nieuwer Amstel* who brought lumber and other provisions from New Amsterdam to Curaçao, an interesting career move.

Wood and carpenters were very essential for the establishments and the extension of the colonies. Obviously, therefore, Jacob Jansz Huys was not the only carpenter who left the Dutch Republic for the New Netherlands. Another interesting example is found in a notarial agreement between three young carpenters from the southern part of the Dutch Republic dating from 1656. They decided to sail from Rotterdam to New Amsterdam with the ship De *Geldersche Blom* and formally promised each other to work together at their destination as carpenters. The document stated that they would split their revenues in three and support each other in case of sickness or any other accident.

Port cities were gateways to move goods, people and ideas between different parts of the globe. Historians have already shown how important Amsterdam was for the development of global trade in the early modern period, but other cities in the Dutch Republic hardly received any attention. This is partially due to the fact that many archives of the Dutch West India Company were destroyed in the nineteenth century. The notarial archives, however, provide an interesting alternative to find out how trade, migration and communication were organized in the early days of one of the most important ports in world history. It is certainly the task of the Rotterdam history department to look closer at the past of its own city to understand this essential early phase of globalisation.

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Trade card of W. Grimshaw, grocer & tea dealer, c. 1810 (Source: British Museum, Banks 68.54)

Chris Nierstrasz

Running Tea: A Story of Smuggling in the eighteenth century

Assistant Professor Global History

"The masters (of the ships) have regular attendants on shore to receive the cargoes, who make signals in the Night to inform the Crew when the Coast is clear –The cargoes being landed, and paid for in Specie or bartered for wool (which they carry to our natural Enemies to the great Detriment of our manufactories) [sic]."

As late as 1779, fair tea traders in England, in other words those who paid taxes to the British state, asked their Parliament to take firm action against the smuggling of tea. As the quote above, from "a memorial and petition of the tea dealers of Britain to Parliament" makes clear, this was a thorny question as the smugglers were not foreigners, but Englishmen working from the inside. Historians still depict international trade in these times of mercantilism as a zero-sum game for silver between countries. However, states were apparently not the only actors in channeling global trade. In fact, one of the problems the early modern state faced was its inability to control what entered its borders. The quoted source narrates how the smugglers formed bands on horses, each carrying 100 to 200 pounds of tea each, and openly rode through towns and challenges the dragoons of the royal army, "some of whom have been so unfortunate as to lose their lives in fruitless attempts to stop their progress."

Smugglers were not only willing to apply violence to get their way, but were often more capable in applying violence than the state itself. This source suggests that smuggling and illegal dealings were organised and substantial. This presents historians with a complex problem: a large part of it happened hidden from our sight and has left no paper trace. In contrast, the trade conducted under the aegis of the state was registered and is available for analysis by historians today. This may explain why trade in the early-modern period is still mainly

presented as a struggle between nations, where one nation prevails over another in direct competition. As the above example has already shown, there are strong reasons to doubt if this was actually true, but how can we prove that if all we have is anecdotal proof of smuggling?

This is where my comparative and quantitative research with a global perspective of long-distance trade becomes interesting. The main item of smuggling in this case was tea. At this moment in time, this commodity was only available to Europeans from China. Relatively few players (Dutch, English, French, Danish, Swedish and Ostend East India companies) imported tea for the West-European market. The largest market by far -to which all East India companies catered – was England and its thirteen colonies in the Americas. High taxation on tea in these areas led to profitable smuggling. My research has made it possible to reconstruct how much tea came to Europe by analysing the total amount of tea that was shipped to Europe based on records from East India companies. In turn, the total trade gives us a clear indication of the amount of smuggling as almost all of the tea was sold in the British Isles and its thirteen colonies in the Americas. If we follow the trail of records, it shows us that as much as 60 to 80 per cent of tea was imported into England by East India companies other than the English East India Company, until the moment when England radically lowered taxation and put a stop to smuggling in 1786. This is of course a radically different picture from the one depicted in academic literature whereby the English East India Company is portrayed as the winner in the tea trade from the moment it started buying its tea directly from China in 1715. What is more, the smugglers brought more varieties of tea to England than the English East India Company did. These varieties not only indicate the popularization of the consumption of tea by the smugglers, but also cannot disguise the fact that the continental companies had a better feeling for the market than the English East India Company.

This research radically alters our understanding of how the global and the local interacted in the early-modern period. Flows of goods from far-away places simply did not respect the sound borders of European states. By studying these global connections as products passed from Asia to Europe and beyond we can give new meaning to how we should understand globalisation in the early-modern world. And of course, it is not strange either to conduct this research at Rotterdam as this story of smuggling to England is deeply rooted in the history of this region: many of those involved in smuggling departed from Rotterdam itself or from cities close-by such as Flushing and Middelburg.

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Ralf Futselaar

Onbemind en onbekend: geheime transporten van gevangenen uit Noordwest Europa

Universitair Docent Sociale Geschiedenis

Het Spinn- en Zuchthaus in Hamburg, omstreeks 1840. Uit deze instellingen waren de meeste getransporteerde gevangenen afkomstig. Lithografie van de gebroeders Stuhr. Bron: Wikimedia commons.

Burgemeester Bowne van New York was woedend, en dat zouden de heren Burgemeesters van Hamburg weten ook. In september 1832 plofte er zijn boze brief op de mat:

> "…when a souvereign state like the free city of Hamburgh thus presumes to violate the implied faith of nations and, under the sanction of her public authorities to send her robbers and incendiaries among us, when our city is made another Botany Bay and seems likely to become a thoroughfare upon which a population too corrupt even the bodies politic of the old world to endure is to be disgorged, it is time for the government to turn its attention seriously to the subject and take order immediately for arresting the tide of abominations which is setting in upon us."

Hamburg had zich schuldig gemaakt, en niet voor het eerst, aan het deporteren van gevangenen naar de Verenigde Staten. Nu was het in de achttiende en negentiende eeuw niet ongebruikelijk om veroordeelde criminelen vanuit Europa te verschepen naar overzeese gebiedsdelen. Landen als Frankrijk en het Verenigd Koninkrijk deden dat op grote schaal. Ook tussen de tropische koloniën ontstond een druk verkeer van mensen die om allerlei redenen veroordeeld waren tot dwangarbeid. Deze gedeporteerden waren zeer in trek, vooral nadat de slavernij op veel plekken min of meer was afgeschaft.

Dat Hamburg, en een aantal andere Noord-Duitse en Scandinavische staten, van delinquente burgers af kwamen door ze naar verre oorden te verschepen was dus niet opvallend, maar wel dat die oorden niet onder hun eigen gezag stonden. Koloniale machten waren deze staatjes immers niet. De wens om door deportatie van mensen af te komen kon alleen vervuld worden door ze naar de koloniën van andere landen, of naar recent onafhankelijke staten in de Nieuwe Wereld te sturen.

Dat kon openlijk gebeuren, of in ieder geval met wederzijds goedvinden van de betrokken staten. In de 1920er jaren werden zeker twee scheepsladingen met gedetineerden uit Bremen en Hamburg naar Brazilië gebracht, waar ze tot hun ontzetting prompt werden ingelijfd in het leger van keizer Dom Pedro I. Een paar tuchthuisboeven die de Hamburgers in de achttiende eeuw deporteerden naar Groenland waren daar welkom en functioneerden volgens de autoriteiten ter plaatse heel behoorlijk.

In de meeste gevallen waren Europese schepen met gedetineerden echter verre van welkom. Er zat dan weinig anders op dan de gedetineerden ofwel stiekem aan land te zetten, ofwel de indruk te geven dat het om normale immigranten ging. Vooral in de Verenigde Staten lukte dit enige tijd heel aardig. Toen de Amerikanen echter steeds moeilijker begonnen te doen, werden gedetineerden

op de slecht bewaakte kust van Newfoundland aan land gezet. Daarvandaan wisten ze de weg naar de VS doorgaans makkelijk te vinden. Op eigen houtje, welteverstaan, want eenmaal aan land waren ze in principe vrij.

Koloniale grootmachten zetten gedetineerden steevast in als dwangarbeiders als ze eenmaal in de kolonie waren aangekomen. Deportatie was in die gevallen ook nadrukkelijk een straf op zich. Voor steden als Hamburg was dit geen optie. Doel van de hele operatie was om de kosten van het penitentiair systeem beheersbaar te houden door criminelen domweg te lozen. Dwang was daar niet voor nodig; de meeste gedetineerden waren graag bereid een enkele reis naar de Amerika, maar in voorkomende gevallen ook wel naar Bombay, of desnoods Groenland te aanvaarden, als ze daarmee hun lange gevangenisstraffen, vrijwel altijd aangevuld met zware dwangarbeid, voortijdig konden beëindigen.

Staten en staatjes als Hannover, Bremen en Hamburg, en in de negentiende eeuw ook de stad Kopenhagen, hadden financieel veel te winnen bij de transporten. Hoewel het rechtsgevoel gesust moest worden met wat leugentjes om bestwil, dat het alleen lichte gevallen waren die een overtocht aangeboden kregen, of mensen die hun straf er bijna op hadden zitten, was de ambitie vooral om van dure gevangenen af te komen. Burgemeester Bowne had ook niet helemaal ongelijk toen hij de afgeleverde migranten omschreef als "rovers en brandstichters". Het schip dat in 1832 aanmeerde op Ellis Island was gevuld met langgestraften, draaideurcriminelen en anderen die door de Hamburgse magistraten als hopeloze gevallen werden gezien.

We weten nog weinig van de trans-Atlantische transporten van gedetineerden door landen die zelf niet over kolonies beschikten. De staten die gevangenen verscheepten schreeuwden dat ook bepaald niet van de daken. In het Deense geval staat vast dat de autoriteiten in de laatste decennia van de negentiende eeuw actief probeerden Amerikaanse diplomaten om de tuin te leiden, maar ook zonder list en bedrog was duidelijk dat de transporten toch beter in stilte konden worden uitgevoerd. Noch de autoriteiten in het ontvangende gebied, noch de eigen bevolking werd actief op de hoogte gebracht.

Nog veel vragen zijn onbeantwoord over dit fenomeen. Vast staat dat vanaf het midden van de achttiende eeuw transporten plaatsvonden en dat ze zeker tot het einde van de negentiende eeuw zijn doorgegaan. Verder onderzoek kan ons leren over de attitudes ten aanzien van criminaliteit en criminelen in de zendende en de ontvangende landen. Deze onbeminde boeven hoeven niet onbekend te blijven.

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Dario Fazzi

Human Rights vs. Human Life: The US-Soviet Bottom-Line

Lecturer International Relations

In 1977 an incident occurred in a tiny fisherman village located in the south-eastern corner of Italy, which resonated in both Washington and Moscow. That kind of linkages in history, combining the micro and macro levels of analysis simultaneously, is what inspires me the most as a historian and what makes me feel so much at home at EUR's history department. An overarching, comprehensive view of history, one that intertwines the local and global together, helps me in the exploration of the global repercussions that a plethora of apparently marginal events recurrently had throughout the cold war.

When the incident happened, the crisis of the cold war détente – the attempt to establish a pacific coexistence between the two superpowers – was already in full swing. The newly elected American president Jimmy Carter was trying to implement an international policy based on the universal safeguard of human rights. In his inaugural address, Carter had stressed the importance of such a new approach for the conduct of American foreign policy, which had to be based on nothing less than a worldwide defense of human freedom. "Because we are free," the US president said, reiterating a long-standing view of American exceptionalism, "we can never be indifferent to the fate of freedom elsewhere. Our moral sense dictates a clear-cut preference for those societies which share with us an abiding respect for individual human rights." The main object of Carter's criticism, was, of course, the Soviet Union. Moscow had a gloomy record in human rights violations. Individual freedoms of speech, associations, religion, and expressions were constantly denied at home and threatened abroad. In Russia, the KGB dutifully applied a policy of "medicalization" to human rights activists, or, as the official propaganda portrayed them, dissenters. People like Andrei Sakharov or the intellectuals reunited in the so-called Helsinki Watch

Groups were usually confined in psychiatric institutions, when not sent to prison, labor camps or internal exile. Abroad, the rise of local protests culminating in the launch of the anti-socialist Czech manifesto *Charter 77*, was met with constant hostility and violent repression.

This tension notwithstanding, when a minor incident occurred to three American soldiers off the coast of Italy, Washington and Moscow suddenly found a common denominator that led them to agree on some of the most basic humanitarian principles, including the absolute value of human life. On a sunny afternoon in November, indeed, three members of the US Air Force working at the radar station of San Vito Dei Normanni decided to go for a small boat trip. The weather was good and the routine activity at the base was running smoothly as usual. Once the three stepped in their tiny boat, however, the stream changed rapidly. Wave after wave, the tiny rowboat was soon carried out in open sea and disappeared from the sights of those living near the coasts of Santa Sabina. It was then, when the three men had almost lost faith in their rescue, that a Soviet ship patrolling the southern Adriatic noticed them, and saved them without a hint of hesitation. The Soviet Captain, Vladimir Bogdanov, and the whole crew of the *Kazatin*, offered shelter to and took immediate care of the three Americans, bringing them safely back to their port. For their actions, which had followed the best tradition of maritime solidarity, the Soviet sailors were praised and secretly acknowledged by the American officials, including those working at the American embassy in Italy.

The small adventure of the three American soldiers had proven that their arch-enemy had a human face, perhaps instilling in some US policymakers a bit of optimism for future bilateral rapprochements with Moscow. This did not happen and the story of the three men in the end did not substantially alter the grand strategies of the cold war. Nevertheless, their accident is still worthy of further historical inquiry. What had, for instance, induced the American soldiers to embark on such a late boat trip? Was that a customary practice for the US soldiers at the San Vito Dei Normanni base, as it was for many Italians living in the coastal areas of the Peninsula, or not? And, more generally, how did American soldiers spend their free time while stationed in Italy? Were there other relevant, and perhaps less dangerous, forms of cross-cultural exchanges? And how did local people react to such colorful manifestations of American folklore as Halloween or Thanksgiving? In order to answer these questions, the papers of the US Department of State, where this story comes from, may be useful but surely not exhaustive. They can enlighten, for instance, the geopolitical reasons that had brought, in the first place, the American soldiers to Italy. But other local sources, oral interviews and unofficial accounts are needed to reckon with the multifaceted elements that such a continuous transatlantic exchange entailed. And this is precisely the challenge my current research project is engaged in. My main aim, indeed, is to assess the overall economic, environmental and socio-cultural impact that the enduring presence of hundreds of American military outposts in Europe has had throughout the cold war. The hope is that by adopting a bottom-up approach, it will be possible to render justice to the complexity of the cold war relations, something that traditional, top-down, diplomatic histories have too often left outside their purview.

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Interstoff 1961. Buyers and sellers at the Interstoff event. Courtesy Messe Frankfurt GmbH.

Ben Wubs

Two competing fashion fairs on a global market: Interstoff in Frankfurt and Première Vision in Paris

Professor International Business History

For a long time, the study of fashion belonged to the realm of costume and design history. It is only recently that scholars have started to study fashion as a major economic and business activity. My research aims to study fashion from the multidisciplinary perspective of geography, business and economic history, and management, without ignoring the cultural aspects of this most glamorous industry. My project draws on the new culturally-informed field of business history to step inside the fashion system and examine its ever-altering supply chains and changing production and consumption relations and locations in the fashion industry in the last 150 years. Fashion can only be studied as a system which functions far beyond the national level. For centuries the production of raw materials, manufacturing and markets have had international and transnational dimensions. In my research, the main actors in the fashion industry are explored, including manufacturers, designers, intermediaries, trade associations, fashion fairs, fashion forecasters and retailers. Overarching research questions are: What were the main drivers of changes in the fashion system? Was it technology or relative factor costs? Why has the West, until this day, played such an important role in the industry? What was the role of symbolic capital and intangible factors like creativity and human capital?

A fine example of the historical and global evolution of the fashion industry is the changing role of fashion fabric fairs and the competition between the two most important fabric fairs after World

War II, Interstoff in Frankfurt, Germany and Première Vision in Paris, France. These fabric fairs competed with one another to become the foremost event until the end of the 1990s. In 1999, Interstoff was discontinued in Frankfurt and, at first glance, it appeared that Première Vision had won the competition because it became the number one fabric fair in Europe and still is. However, after taking a more historical and global approach, I came to the opposite conclusion.

Interstoff was set up in 1959, 13 years before Première Vision, as a spin-off from a general consumer fair organized by Messe Frankfurt. It had, like all trade fairs, many functions. However, right from the start, Interstoff was not just a temporary marketplace for the international textile industry but was it also a trend-maker. For at least 30 years, Interstoff's biannual events were the place to be in the global textile business with all major players going to Frankfurt twice a year, not just to buy and sell, but also to see the latest trends in fabrics and colours. Nonetheless, in Europe, it was difficult for Interstoff to compete with the selective and protectionist fair policies of Première Vision which could position itself as the gatekeeper of European, and particularly Italian, weavers. As Interstoff could not pursue this selective policy, many European exhibitors increasingly preferred to move to Paris and visitors followed suit to see the latest trends during the 1990s. Interstoff could not follow the same strategy because, according to German law, the exclusion of Asian exhibitors, such as was done in Paris, was illegal. It would also contradict Messe Frankfurt's internationalization strategy which aimed to organize new fairs outside Germany, particularly in Asia. The exclusion of Chinese exhibitors, for example, would have immediately led to countermeasures by the Chinese government and textile industry.

Although Messe Frankfurt had internalized fashion forecasting by means of expensive international trend events, it was no longer able to attract the top segment of industry during the 1990s. Its non-selective and open attitude towards all textile manufacturers in the world was in direct contradiction to being an exclusive, trendsetting, leading fair. In addition, Première Vision could also play the Parisian card of being part of the leading fashion capital where fashion predictions were made for the rest of the world. For Interstoff, it was nigh on impossible to win this competition about exclusivity. However, at the end of the 1980s, Messe Frankfurt had already decided to export the Interstoff brand, including trend forecasting, to Asia. Indeed, it was the first mover on the Asian textile fair market and became the most important fabric fair organizer in China. Messe Frankfurt's move to China may have been a clever decision as the growth rate in the last thirty years in China was incomparably higher than in Europe and the textile market was much more lucrative

there. Its strategy was also based on the philosophy that markets have to follow production, which was now mainly taking place in China, instead of Europe. Furthermore, this move also contributed to the geographical expansion of the European fashion and textile industries to China and supported Chinese firms to become major actors on the world market which was a direct consequence of the liberal trade policies that growing numbers of nationalist politicians in the West began to regret. This example clearly demonstrates the importance of a historical and global approach to the study of the fashion industry.

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Figure 1: (African) migrants hand over the World Cup to France. Source: Mahmoud Al- Rifai (2018)

Table 1: Percentage of migrant football players at the FIFA World Cup, 1930 – 2018. Source: Gijs van Campenhout.

[In absolute numbers: 631 out of the 10.143 football players are migrant footballers]

Gijsbert Oonk & Gijs van Campenhout

The Emergence of Hyperdiversity at the World Cup Football, 1930-2022

**Professor Jean Monnet Chair: Migration, Citizenship and Identity
PhD Candidate Global History**

The FIFA World Cup and the Olympic Games are championships between countries. Through their national sports teams, countries own unique national identities are represented and expressed. The athletes are a country's pride and joy as they are the (temporary) embodiment of a state and its citizens. Competing in the name of the nation, wearing the national team jersey, and singing the national anthem (often accompanied with symbolic hand gestures), is widely considered to be an honour. National football teams and Olympic delegations, however, become more and more characterised by hyperdiversity as, paradoxically, these teams increasingly include athletes who simultaneously have genuine links with other nations.

At the 2018 FIFA World Cup, 200 of the 736 footballers (i.e. over 25%) were, on paper, eligible to represent more than one national team. The national team of Morocco is an extreme example of this trend as only six (!) of the 23 players in their squad were born and raised in the country they represented. The Moroccan team was essentially a European team with players born in countries such as France, the Netherlands, Spain and Belgium. The cultural diversity within the Moroccan national team led to a diversity of spoken languages during training sessions and matches with Arabic, Berber, French and Dutch being the most frequently spoken languages among players. Because three-quarters of the Moroccan footballers were not born in the country they represented, Morocco's French coach, Hervé Renard, shouted his

commands in two languages: French and English.

The emergence of migrant football players in national teams is nothing new, and indeed has a long history (see Table 1). Already at the first World Cup in 1930, the national team of the United States included five players who were born in Scotland and one born in England. Moreover, the 1934 Italian national team became world champion with the help of four Argentina-born footballers and one native of Brazil. All of these South Americans were eligible to represent Italy because of their Italian descent. Interestingly, it was Benito Mussolini himself who supported the selection of these migrant players by publicly emphasising their blood connection with the Italian nation.

The FIFA World Cups between 1950 and 1990 can be characterized as a period of relative regularity as the volume of migrant footballers fluctuated between 1% and 5% throughout these editions. A notable exception is 1966 where there was an all-time low of migrant players. This is due to the fact that traditional migrant countries like the USA and Australia did not qualify. Moreover, although Portugal played with four players from Mozambique, they were considered Portuguese at the time due to former colonial ruling. Two French players happened to be born in Argentina, representing 0.57% of the total number of selected players.

These fluctuations in numbers mainly depend on the national football teams that qualify for the World Cup as some national football federations have been more reliant on migrant footballers than others. For example, because the national teams of the United States, Australia and Switzerland – countries who traditionally select a high number of migrant footballers – failed to qualify for the 1954 and 1978 World Cups, the number of migrant footballers at these editions remained low. Since the mid-1990s, however, the percentage of migrant footballers has increased for each FIFA World Cup. Processes of globalisation such as post-colonial and labour migration, and the professionalisation and commercialisation of international football, reflect the increase of migrant players at the FIFA World Cup.

In 2022, for the first time in its history, the tournament will be played in November and December, instead of June/July, when Qatar hosts the FIFA World Cup. As this country lacks a football culture and history, it does not have a talented pool of footballers. Therefore, the Qatari Football Federation has been running a large-scale football program, with the Aspire Academy as the best known example, aimed at naturalising young talented African football players. Like Portugal did with Brazilian-born players Deco and Pepe in the mid-2000s, these African youngsters live and train in Qatar for over five years, after which they become eligible to play in the national team of Qatar if

they have acquired Qatari citizenship. Because of this program, it is possible that the national team of Qatar will mainly comprise players of African descent. However, the roots of these players will remain invisible on paper as the naturalised Qatari players will likely play under their adopted Muslim names. Although not all national teams were nationally homogenous from the beginning of this international competition, homogeneity has been the norm throughout the twentieth century. Due to globalisation and commercialisation, this has changed since the 1990s. The only country that has never selected a migrant football player throughout its World Cup history is Brazil. As hyperdiversity in national teams becomes the norm, the coming World Cups will be won by migrants.

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Regional Dynamics

Regionale Dynamiek

Hein Klemann

Rotterdam, het Ruhrgebied en het probleem van transnationale geschiedenis

Professor Economische Geschiedenis en Internationale Relaties

Rijnsleepvaart. Sleepboot 'Asgard', een van de paradepaardjes van de Nederlandse Rijnvaartvereniging opvarend vanuit Rotterdam naar de Ruhr met twee geladen sleepschepen, begin jaren 1950. (Foto: Hans Schuitemaker; met dank aan Vereniging De Binnenvaart)

In 1932 gaf het Amerikaanse Congres Herbert Hoovers minister van handel opdracht inzicht te verschaffen in de economische ontwikkeling. Hij schakelde het *National Bureau of Economic Research* in, waarop Simon Kuznets de *national income* accounts ontwikkelde. Dat systeem leverde allerlei inzichten op. In de huidige nationale rekeningen wordt de som van de toegevoegde waarde in elke bedrijfstak en de som van de inkomsten berekend. In principe moeten internationale economische contacten het verschil tussen de uitkomsten verklaren. De nationale context staat centraal. Macro-economische begrippen als nationaal inkomen, bruto binnenlands product, nationale spaarquote stammen allemaal uit die rekeningen die het instrumentarium vormen om de economische politiek te onderbouwen. De vraag is of zij ook geschikt zijn om de economie wetenschappelijk, bijvoorbeeld in een historische context te analyseren.

In de jaren 1990 werden aan de Universiteit Utrecht de nationale rekeningen voor de jaren 1800-1913 gereconstrueerd. Jan-Luiten van Zanden en Arthur van Riel konden daardoor in 2000 nieuwe inzichten presenteren over de Nederlandse economie in de lange negentiende eeuw en langslepende debatten beslechten, bijvoorbeeld over de trage industrialisatie. Hun studie laat evenwel ook de zwakke kant van de nationale rekeningen zien. Zo constateren zij dat door de Spoorwegwet van 1860 en door allerlei liberale maatregelen uit de jaren 1850, Nederland eindelijk een geïntegreerde nationale economie ontwikkelde. Feitelijk was daar geen sprake van. Zowel Nederland als de Duitse *Zollverein* gingen in 1862 op vrijhandel over, waarna beide landen economisch zodanig verweven raakten dat het zinloos werd van nationale economieën te spreken.

Uit Duits economisch-historisch onderzoek blijkt dat er, tot de oorlog die in 1914 creëerde, geen afgebakende Duitse economie bestond. De contacten tussen de Duitse regio's onderling waren niet intensiever dan die met aanpalende niet-Duitse gebieden. Vrijhandel en monetaire stabiliteit maakten nationale grenzen economisch irrelevant. Tenzij de politiek de economie binnen nationale grenzen dwingt, is het concept nationale economie slechts zinvol in het kader van de economische politiek. De nationale rekeningen zijn dan ook ontstaan in een periode gekenmerkt door isolationisme. Ze waren bovendien bedoeld voor politiek-economische, niet voor wetenschappelijke analyse.

Al in de jaren 1980 wees Sidney Pollard erop dat de industriële revolutie niet in Engeland of Duitsland, maar in Lancashire of het Ruhrgebied plaatsvond. Alles wijst erop dat dit Ruhrgebied en de Rotterdamse haven al in de negentiende eeuw tot één economische regio integreerden. Om dat te onderzoeken, moet de economische ontwikkeling op een niet-nationaal niveau worden geanalyseerd. Theoretisch kunnen de ideeën van economen als Michael Porter en Paul Krugman, die regio's centraal stellen, daarbij behulpzaam

zijn. Beiden wijzen op externe effecten om regionale clustering te verklaren. Economisch-historici die regionale of zelfs transnationale ontwikkelingen willen analyseren, stuiten er echter op dat de bronnen nationaal zijn. Natiestaten creëren niet alleen de context voor overheid en bestuur, maar ook voor analyse. Archieven over sociale of economische ontwikkelingen en beleid zijn nationaal georganiseerd, statistische bureaus creëren nationale cijfers en politici laten stukken na over de nationale politiek. Transnationale ontwikkelingen worden daardoor over het hoofd gezien. Het is typerend dat er tot voor enige jaren geen recente wetenschappelijke publicaties bestonden over de relatie tussen Rotterdam en het Ruhrgebied. Niettemin is Rotterdam de belangrijkste Duitse zeehaven en het Rijn-Ruhrgebied het belangrijkste deel van het Rotterdamse achterland. Transnationale economische relaties worden niet zozeer genegeerd, maar door het ontbreken van gegevens eenvoudigweg niet waargenomen. Dat geldt voor de politici en journalisten. Dat geldt vaak ook voor wetenschappers. Met het Rijnproject dat de laatste jaren aan de ESHCC is ontwikkeld, is geprobeerd daar in deze regio iets aan te doen.

Tussen Nederland en Duitsland ontstonden al in de jaren 1860 zulke nauwe economische contacten dat de som van de Nederlandse in- en uitvoer de nationale productie overtrof. Die nauwe verwevenheid, die het onzinnig maakt van een nationale economie te spreken, wordt nog intensiever als in de jaren 1880 de Rijnkanalisatie is voltooid. De Rotterdamse overslag is vanaf die tijd voor 75 procent Duits en het binnenlands transport dat in 1860 al voor 20 procent Rijnvaart van en naar Duitsland betrof, bestaat vlak vóór de Eerste Wereldoorlog al voor de helft uit Rijnvaart van de Rotterdamse haven naar de Duitse grens. Ook investeren Duitse bedrijven volop in Nederland en beschouwt de Duitse mijnbouw Nederland als een deel van zijn thuismarkt. Voor het staalconcern Thyssen wordt Nederland zelfs zo belangrijk dat het uiteen valt in een Nederlands en een Duits bedrijf, terwijl de handelsfirma Müller en Co. zijn hoofdzetel al in de negentiende eeuw van Düsseldorf naar Rotterdam verplaatst. Na de Eerste Wereldoorlog investeren Nederlandse bedrijven als Philips, Van den Bergh, Jurgens en Aku in de Duitse Rijnstreek en ontwikkelen zich zo tot multinationals. Het meest kenmerkende is echter dat de Nederlandse economie zich vanaf 1860 tot het inzakken van het Ruhrgebied in de jaren 1980, parallel aan de Duitse ontwikkelt en haar internationale verwevenheid zo intensief wordt dat de Nederlandse economie feitelijk grotendeels bestond en bestaat uit geografisch samenkomende, individuele schakels in internationale georganiseerde bedrijfskolommen. Afgezien van de periode van de wereldoorlogen en de Grote Depressie, toen de politiek de economie in een nationaal keurslijf dwong, bestond en bestaat er geen nationale Nederlandse economie.

Rijnsleepvaart.Radersleepboot 'Ragnar'met vier geladen sleepschepen opvarend in Duitsland, begin jaren 1950. (Foto: Hans Schuitemaker; met dank aan Vereniging De Binnenvaart)

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Jeroen Euwe

Art price economics: From boom & bust to process of canonization on the art market

Assistant professor, Economic History and International Relations

Development of prices on the art market 1940-1945 (index 1940=100), superimposed on part of a newspaper article on art as investment in De Telegraaf, 22 May 1941.

"Almost everyone deals in 'art'; this week the baker offered me a Gabriël which, however, turned out to be a clumsy forgery", reported the Hague art dealer A.J. Boer in his 1943 book *Kluchten en drama's in den kunsthandel (Farces and Drama in the Art Trade)*. Boer wanted to educate lay people on the effects of this boom on the art market. Due to fast rising prices and a lack of imports, the market was flooded with lesser quality paintings and outright *kitsch*. Issues surrounding price, quality and authenticity of artworks, as well as large-scale exports to Germany of Dutch cultural heritage and kitsch, instigated several attempts to regulate the market. The accommodating as well as the collaborating departments in the Dutch civil service, the German *Aufsichtsverwaltung* (the civil administration which supervised the Dutch civil service), the Dutch government in exile, and even Göring himself tried control various aspects of the art market.

This boom started right after the Dutch capitulation in May 1940 when the two most important art collectors in Nazi-Germany – Hitler and Göring – were buying art on a large scale. In their wake, a large number of Nazi officials and other Germans followed. Given this sudden buying frenzy, it is hardly surprising that the scarce older literature on art markets identifies the two men as the driving force behind this boom. My aim here is to show how the use of statistics and basic economic price theory leads to a better understanding of what happened on the art market during World War II, and why.

When trying to understand the development of price and volume, it is necessary to build databases of art sales and prices. In such an enterprise it is essential to make sure that the recorded prices were actually attained and that these works of art and prices were representative of the market. The methodology should be approached with no less caution. Indices based on average or median prices do not account for shifts in quality, therefore their results are easily skewed. This can be mitigated somewhat through choice of data, and by comparing mean and average prices. The repeat-sales method – which looks at price increases at different times of sales of the same artworks – is also easily skewed, especially in such a short timeframe as the duration of World War II. Hedonic regression, however, deals with all these issues because price is determined by the characteristics (artist, quality, authenticity) of an artwork and the price development of its market. Using this approach, I can construct an index of price development on the markets for artwork which comprises modern paintings, paintings from the romantic period, and old masters. The analysis yields results which are shown below, superimposed on a newspaper article about the boom. These indicate a slight increase in prices by 1941 (in volume, an aspect not covered

here, the boom had already started), with the boom taking off the next year and lasting until the very end of the German occupation.

Insights into the development of prices and volume – while helping to prove the boom and providing insight into taste and so on – do not explain why such a boom occurred nor who was actually buying all of these objects. Here, again, insights from economics help explain what happened. To fuel their war effort, the Germans decided to exploit the Dutch economy to the fullest extent possible. Although this resulted in full employment, the money earned could hardly be spent because goods such as food and clothing were rationed and prices were kept stable. As the volume of money in savings accounts mounted, so did inflationary pressure. This was because the Germans paid in Marks, which *De Nederlandsche Bank* exchanged for guilders, forcing the Dutch money presses to work overtime. The increase in the money supply was so great that already in the spring of 1941 the press was talking about a widespread fear of inflation that was causing the Dutch population to invest in goods of lasting value, namely, art. Meanwhile, where there is rationing, there is also a black market. As prices on the black market increased, black marketeers possessed ever larger amounts of cash money. Because they were aware that a currency reform would be implemented after the liberation, they too were investing in art. During the height of the Hunger Winter, it was the black marketeers who pushed the art boom to new heights, as by then Germans and regular Dutch buyers had other concerns and were no longer active.

My initial research has broadened to the international art market in the period 1870 to 1970, specifically its reaction to political and economic crises, and processes of professionalization and canonization of modern art. However, my work remains firmly rooted in economic history. Typical of my Rotterdam approach is the variety of research methods and sources that I include. And, of course, studying the art market is a study in encounters between people, cultures, economies, nations, regions, ideas, and objects.

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Maroon woman from Langatabiki, Suriname, 1947 (Photo W.van de Poll; Nat. Arch., 252-6776)

Alex van Stipriaan

Embodied identifications of slavery

Professor of Caribbean History

Since the sixteenth century, African bodies, along with European guns and capital, shaped a transatlantic system of globalisation dominated by Western Europe. The Netherlands and its American colonies formed an integral part of this system. Between c. 1600 and c. 1830 some 600,000 African men and women were forcibly transported by Dutch ships from the coasts of present day Guinée (Bissau) down to Angola, and then to the Americas. Almost half of them went to Suriname. The violent coming together of Native Americans, Europeans and Africans within this system of slavery soon produced socio-cultural processes which are now often defined as creolisation. In this process, new cultures emerged out of the continuous, and often violent, interactions within a context of extreme unequal power relations between culturally and ethnically different groups. In this process of cultural mixing, selections are made between what is relevant and what is not in the new creole situation. Linguists have shown how, over time, the constituent components of such a creole might almost disappear (a process dubbed decreolisation) or re-emerge (recreolisation). Four centuries of Caribbean history are the ultimate proof of these processes.

Probably the two most degrading parts of enslavement were when, beginning at African shores, buyers branded their mark into enslaved bodies with a hot iron, and next when this was repeated in Suriname by plantation owners who imposed a new name upon the enslaved. It had to be made perfectly clear whose property they were now. And if brandmarks did not stress the enslaved's loss of personal autonomy, the whip did, until the last day of slavery, leaving their bodily traces as well.

However, like any rigid suppressive system, slavery was full of paradoxes as shown by the enslaved's body. Next to the brandmarks that same body was often proudly decorated as a result of African

practices of decorating by scarification, and/or cicatrisation. The latter entails a special form of incising the skin with a sharp instrument after which ash, herbs and palm oil are rubbed into the wound, resulting in raised, more pronounced scars. This form of scarification was particularly known in the Congo Basin and the region of present-day Ghana which happened to be the main slaving areas for Suriname. In many parts of Africa, scarification was applied to distinguish oneself from others as part of an elite, a family or an ethnic group. It was a form of identification which also held a dimension of aesthetic and personal decoration. Many African masks in museums all over the world are evidence of this tradition.

Slave traders and slave owners were very much aware of these ethnic markers. They used them when differentiating Africans by their ethnic reputations of being "good" or "bad" slaves. Three observers in eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century Suriname differentiated between at least twenty-five African ethnicities, of which only five were not scarified. The others had all kind of marks all over the body, from a few facial incisions or dots to deep incisions in the breast or back. The application of these often very complicated scarifications had obviously been accompanied by a lot of pain. And to keep them fresh, they had to be renewed often several times a year. Thus, the physical pain might have been much stronger than that of the two brandmarks that accompanied enslavement. Nonetheless, the latter was a sign of degradation and suppression, whereas the former was a sign of pride, announcing that "I still own myself." Part of survival strategies during slavery, however, was to be as invisible as possible. Therefore, these embodied signs of identification were no longer applied by the enslaved born in Suriname, the so-called creoles. Due to continuing imports of enslaved Africans, however, scarification remained in the colony until well into the nineteenth century.

Remarkably, scarification was re-introduced by the descendants of those who had escaped from slavery since the end of the seventeenth century. This community, known as Maroons, had built up independent and free communities far away in the Amazonian rain forests to the south and southeast of the plantation colony and incorporated scarification as part of their culture. New forms were introduced and new cultural practices came to surround it. Two of the most notable forms were the highly erotic scarring of the erogenous zones, which was kept hidden from everyone except the sexual partner, and scarring as a healing practice by rubbing herbs into the scar wounds to cure particular diseases. A century later Maroon men again discarded the practice as a result of their increased interaction with urban regions where scarification is considered primitive and heathenish. By the same influence, Maroon women have reduced scarification to the area "under the skirt". Embodied identification

in the history of slavery and its afterlife has been a process of creolisation, as well as de-, and recreolisation. It would not surprise me if, among Maroon youngsters, today's global tattoo culture would (re)emerge based on old scarification patterns. The body remains an understudied, though intriguing, historical source.

Maroon man from the Cottica region, Suriname, c 1910.
(Photo Eugen Klein; Coll. Tropenmuseum, 60038520)

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Druze shrine dedicated to Nabi Habil, Abel, son of Adam, to the west of Damascus. The shrines has become part of pilgrimage tours organized for Iraqi and Iranian Shiite Muslims (Photo Dick Douwes, 2009)

Dick Douwes

Sectarianism and shrine culture in the Middle East

Professor of Global History

The popular assumption that historical antagonisms between various religious communities in the Middle East sufficiently explains the tensions of today is incorrect. Today's sectarianism is one of the consequences of the major destabilizing interventions of the West in the region, including recent ones such as in Iraq. Having said that, it is obvious that local dynamics, though not necessarily religious in origin, have to be taken into account in order to understand the intricate interplay between religion, community and politics.

Religious diversity in the Middle East is often depicted as being sectarian and associated with violence. Yet communities large and small have survived many centuries of Islamic rule, like the Samaritans close to Nablus on the West Bank and that other Jewish curiosity, the Mandeans - followers of John the Baptist - in the delta of the Euphrates and Tigris rivers. The latter even have seats in parliament in Iran.

The roots of religious diversity in the Middle East are premodern. Middle Eastern premodernity allowed for a high degree of diversity though not equality, that being a modern concept. The premodern rulers in the region, including the Ottomans, endorsed religious diversity both outside of and – albeit tacitly – within Islam. They built upon the Islamic principle of granting protection to non-Muslims, principally Christians and Jews. In return the latter paid a special tax, a major source of state revenue. Formally, their public visibility was restricted by regulations that prohibited certain forms of dress and the building of new or the restoration of old religious buildings ruined by earthquakes. This unequal treatment may have caused the gradual decline of some communities but a variety of traditions persisted. Some actually flourished such as the Jewish community of Bagdad and the Maronite Christians in Lebanon. Most churches in Lebanon were in fact built in Ottoman times. Unlike diversity outside of Islam, no formal arrangements existed that dealt

with the variety within Islam other than disciplinary measures. Nonetheless, the original diversity of the founding period of Islam, as well as later variations, has been preserved in what is considered to be Islam's heartland, the Middle East. Nowhere else is variation in Islam as pronounced.

The traditional system of communities of faith living next to and with each other, sustained by the autocratic but typically pragmatic nature of premodern Islamic rule, came under severe pressure from the mid-nineteenth century onwards. As a result of interventions by European powers claiming authority over Christian and Jewish communities, Ottoman sovereignty over its non-Muslim population weakened. Religious affiliation became political, offering access to power within but also beyond the state.

A clear case in point is the saint and shrine culture. This practice is at the heart of traditional devotion in the Middle East and, perhaps, a historically essential dynamic sustaining religious diversity by sharing the sacred. Shrine buildings, next to mosques, churches and synagogues, represent in stone and spirit the various religious traditions in public space. But also certain trees, wells and grottos are held sacred by many. Within Islam, shrine culture is closely connected to the Sufi tradition, a major supplier of holy men and a few holy women. But a whole range of biblical and koranic personalities, as well as numerous other characters, constitute a densely populated sacred geography harbouring thousands of sacred places. Major saints that transcend communal boundaries include Nabi Khidr, Mar Elyas (Eliah) and Mar Jurjus (St. George). The Muslim Khidr – or Hızır in Turkish - is closely associated with Eliah to the extent that they merge in the popular saintly entity of Hızırelyas in Anatolia and elsewhere. Maria – Miryam for Muslims – is the most venerated of shared female saints.

Many shades exist in seeking blessings from a saint as well as in expressing religiosity or religious identity. Reformist Islamic thinkers and activists criticise and often categorically reject Sufism and its ritual choreographies. In particular these reformists reject popular expressions of devotion which share with the Sufi tradition the notion of sacredness rooted in the 'knowledge' or 'secret' of a saint, the source of his or her *baraka* (blessing) which is the main commodity that is on offer at shrines. Nonetheless, shrines have become more popular over the last few decades and continue to be shared in the sense of being held sacred and visited by members of various communities. But the tradition of shared sacredness is also under pressure and, at times, under violent attack, for instance in Syria and Iraq where the Islamic State destroyed hundreds of shrines, mainly Muslim ones. Efforts to claim shrines for a particular community or to build new and exclusive shrines also reflect the

increased impact of what may be called sectarianization of shrine culture and the fostering of privileged access to devotional and, with it, social networks.

Detail of Druze shrine dedicated to Nabi Habil near Damascus. The Druzes constitute a small, heterodox community, often seen as not 'truly' Islamic within mainstream Islam (photo Dick Douwes, 2009)

Shiite shrine dedicated to Maria, located in an ancient olive tree, Sa'ida, Lebanon (Photo Dick Douwes, 2010)

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Magazine cover *Inter-Ocean, Special British Malaya Number*. Photo title reads: "Friday Prayers at the Mosque in Kuala Lumpur". Photo Nakajima.

Sandra Khor Manickam

Another Malay World: Dislocation and Dissonance between the past and the present

Assistant Professor Theory and Methodology of History

Half-heartedly browsing the online catalogues of used bookstores in the Netherlands for books on the history of Malaya, my homeland and main topic of research, I stumbled upon a magazine whose listed title announced itself as "Inter-Ocean. A Dutch East Indian Magazine covering Malaysia and Australia. Vol. 6 - August 1925 - Number 8. 'Special British Malay Number'". Since moving to the Netherlands, I noticed that as there was mostly an interest in the Dutch East Indies, books on colonial Malaya, a former British colony instead, were often sold for cheap. What was this magazine and why had I not heard of it? I wondered. Curious, I clicked on the "Bestel Nu!"(Order Now) button.

I was not disappointed as it turned out to be a tourist magazine published in Java by the United Netherlands-American Chambers of Commerce. The special issue was on British Malaya, and the articles that filled the pages were about the many sultanates under protection of the British and crown colonies that made up the term British Malaya. The purpose of the issue was seen as a way to educate people about British Malaya as distinct from Netherlands East Indies, and it is here that I began to understand why it was not familiar to me: I had not, until recently, been very much concerned with how Malaya was looked at from the perspective of those familiar with the other colonised territory from across the Straits of Melaka.

Research projects often begin serendipitously. As a researcher, I have material that I collected consciously from the time I was an undergraduate student which I kept on the off chance that it might come in handy someday. Other material, often the most interesting, and posing intriguing questions, are found by accident, like a piece that does not quite fit the puzzle. The case of this magazine is one

such puzzle to me, and prompted me to think about how colonialisms were compared between colonisers.

The study of colonialism is a study of unequal encounters and as such has continuing relevance to any history programme today. It is essential to understand different colonial pasts, and how they intersect with the present, in order to have an understanding of the world today. It is indeed my colonial past and present, as a Malaysian working in the Netherlands on the history of colonialism, that informs the dissonance in understandings of the part of the world I study. Many people I meet in the Netherlands do not grasp the differences between the Netherlands East Indies which became Indonesia (their understanding of the Malay world), and British Malaya which became Malaysia (the other Malay World). My (dis) location as a stray Malaysian in Dutch academia, becomes a basis for questioning and for my having to explain what colonialism has to do with it. In fact, in the magazine, I found a reflection of my experience, that even in the 1920s people were engaged with explaining this difference to audiences more familiar with Netherlands East Indies. The introduction by the Managing Editor G.G. van der Kop states that publishing special issues like this one was part of their policy to stimulate an interest for Malayan countries abroad as well as to further mutual understanding between Malayan countries. Furthermore,

> "the Western Power in Southern Asia are confronted with the same problems and yet there are so many local differences that the mutual knowledge of the same can only tend to broaden our views and give us that priceless possession in this world of man of many races: a better understanding!"

Indeed, the cover typifies what one ought to understand about British Malaya, as explained by the caption "Friday Prayers at the Mosque in Kuala Lumpur". The picturesque piety of Muslim inhabitants was picked over the industries and railways, over Chinese and Indian migrants ubiquitous in the tin-mining and rubber industries, and the indigenous people displaced by land alienation in the name of development. The articles within highlighted what tourists should know such as how good the railways were and what to expect of the "natives". As a scholar more familiar with the history of Malaya, I wondered what the readers expected before reading these articles, and how such tourist pamphlets changed their perception of the Malayan world, if at all.

Within History @ Erasmus, we are engaged in research on history and its relation to the present. Often, present circumstances prompt us as researchers to look to history for explanations for how things came to be, and then we discover other aspects of the past that do not

find its place in the general scholarship of the area. Within studies of today's independent Southeast Asian countries, the links between the territories are often not highlighted for reasons of space or expertise. It is this research that I hope to contribute more towards.

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Prime Minister Attlee visiting the severely damaged shipyard *De Schelde* in Vlissingen in 1945. In the background, yard number 214 as an image of the perseverance of the shipyard during the war. Photo W. v.d. Poll (Source: National Archive, The Hague, 2.24.03.01, 900-2351)

Judith Siegel
Surviving in abnormal times.
Dutch Shipbuilding 1914-1945

PhD Candidate Economic History

The year was 1913. The Dutch shipyard *De Schelde* in Vlissingen had finally managed to get back in step with international competitors after so many decades of decline. However, in 1914, the Great War abruptly put an end to all the new plans for the shipyard and new strategies for survival had to be developed. Despite the difficult circumstances in this period of political and financial upheaval, the enterprise managed to do fairly well. In fact, it even became possible to expand the shipyard and build bigger ships with profits made during the war. This helped the company get through the depression of the early 1920s. After a few stable years, the world was struck by a severe financial crisis in 1929 and the newly built ships were no longer wanted as the international trade market collapsed. Again the managers had to work hard to keep the company afloat. However, they were creative and started building smaller vessels. They also took up other construction work and even started to build planes. Unfortunately, the shipyard was forced to let go over 1500 of its employees and other shipyards were even forced to close their gates. Then, in the mid 1930s, prospects become more optimistic. Even though the reason for this was the preparation for another possible war, it meant that *De Schelde* had better perspectives for growth. However, general faith in the neutral position of the Netherlands was crushed by the German invasion of 1940. A week after the invasion, on 18 May, German officers of the *Kriegsmarine* inspected the shipyard and the management of *De Schelde* found itself in a completely different situation of managing the company. Dilemmas crossed its path and the choice to build for the enemy was both judged as economic collaboration and honoured as serving the interest of the company and its employees after the war. Through the five years of World War II, *De Schelde* and Vlissingen suffered heavy destruction. However, the hull of yard number 214, ordered shortly before the outbreak of the war, survived and was seen as the symbol of the perseverance of the shipyard and its employees. In 1946

the ship was launched as the *Willem Ruys*, named after the manager of the Rotterdamse Lloyd who was killed by the Germans in 1942.

How did the Dutch shipbuilding industry survive this period of war and crisis? To what extent can innovation be seen as a feature of its competitiveness? This research aims to unravel the decision-making processes concerning innovation within the Dutch shipbuilding industry and its interaction with the surrounding network between 1914 and 1945 at the local, regional and national level. The focal point will lie on the importance of accessibility to knowledge, as well as its production and sharing. This will be linked to the industry's innovativeness, meaning both the capacity and willingness of the shipbuilding industry to innovate. Inspired by the field of business history and social-economic history, this perspective adds a new dimension to the research into the developments of Dutch industry, in particular the Dutch shipbuilding industry. This was an industry that was strongly affected by the slow industrialisation in the Netherlands in the nineteenth century, an industry that endeavoured to remain competitive in a period struck by war and crisis in which normal economic conditions, away from protectionism and cartelisation, did not exist. Despite investing heavily between 1914 and 1945, Dutch shipbuilding still appeared to be mainly conservative and therefor possibly lagged behind in innovation. Furthermore, this research will be supported by case studies that consist of archival research into three large shipyards in the region of Rotterdam and Zeeland: the *NV Koninklijke Maatschappij De Schelde* in Vlissingen, the *Rotterdamsche Droogdok Maatschappij NV*, and *Wilton-Feijenoord* in Schiedam. These three shipyards, mainly builders of large sea vessels, grew into important regional economic centres for the Dutch shipbuilding industry in the first half of the twentieth century. Questions posed include: how open were the shipyards to new ideas? What innovations can be seen on the shipyard? What was the motivation behind these innovations (e.g. company culture, investments) and did they succeed? What did the shipyards' network consist of? What was the impact of the political and financial circumstances on the decision-making process, particularly concerning innovation? These last two questions bring this research from the local to the regional and the national level. The focus here lies on the encounters of the shipyards with different actors.

Regionally, this research mainly looks at the interactions between shipyards and their suppliers and customers, most importantly shipping companies and the Royal Navy. On the national level regulatory organisations, specifically classification societies and the Dutch government, play an important role. For instance in terms of influence on the design process of the ships and subsidies for shipping companies.

By unravelling the encounters surrounding the shipbuilding industry that took place on various levels, this research will give an insight into how an industry and its network evolved and how they tried to remain competitive in a period in which 'normal' economic conditions, away from protectionism and cartelisation, hardly existed.

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The launch of the SS Rotterdam at the Rotterdamse *Droogdok Maatschappij* shipyard in 1958.

(Source: Stadsarchief Rotterdam; photo taken by D. van de Ven)

Mark Straver

Dutch shipbuilding in the postwar period: increasing competition in a globalising World

PhD Candidate Economic History

On April 6 1983, the large shipbuilding conglomerate R*ijn-Schelde-Verolme Machinefabrieken en Scheepswerven NV* (RSV) was declared bankrupt. A serious consequence of this verdict was the massive unemployment of people previously working in shipbuilding or in related and supporting industries. Moreover, the Dutch government had been providing financial support to this shipbuilding conglomerate and thereby lost 2.7 billion guilders with the bankruptcy. What followed was the first Parliamentary Inquiry in the postwar era into how it could have been that a company with this enormous amount of government support was not able to survive. Though inquiry revolved around the years following the establishment of the *Rijn-Schelde* merger in 1965 until the bankruptcy, the origins of the decline lay in the years before.

Already in the early 1960s, shipbuilders were aware that developments were not looking very promising. An increasing number of ships were built by foreign shipyards and captains of industry expressed their concerns about the competitiveness of Dutch shipyards. However, Dutch shipbuilding had actually been doing very well in the years after World War II and the Netherlands was among the foremost ship-producing countries in the world. Although the subsequent interaction between the large shipyards and the government has been thoroughly studied, there is little understanding of the reasons for these economic dynamics in the years after 1945.

My research, which forms part of a collaboration between the ESHCC and the Maritime Museum of Rotterdam, focuses on the sea-going shipbuilding industry in the Netherlands between 1945 and 1983.

The bankruptcy of the RSV in 1983 denoted the decimation of the traditional large shipbuilding industry in the Netherlands and thereby forms, and symbolises, the end of this period. The case strongly adheres to the causes and consequences of global encounters as this industry faced turbulent times after World War II due to fierce international competition. In light of the surge in world trade, demand for ships grew and Dutch shipyards took the opportunity to increase their absolute and relative position in the shipbuilding market. Examples of Dutch shipbuilding companies, all located in the western part of the Netherlands, included *Rotterdamse Droogdok Maatschappij NV, Koninklijke Maatschappij De Schelde NV, Verolme Verenigde Scheepswerven NV, and Nederlandsche Dok en Scheepsbouw Maatschappij VoF*. However, increasing international competition put pressure on Dutch shipbuilding to maintain its competitiveness. Ultimately, the shipbuilding industry could not hold onto its competitive position, causing stagnating growth in production and a fall in market share from the 1960s onwards. The initial rise of Dutch shipbuilding in the global market made this industry an even more fundamental aspect of Dutch industry: after its postwar surge it provided direct and indirect employment to about eighty thousand people and was an important purchaser of industrialised products such as engines and metalware. Moreover, the conception of shipbuilding as part of the maritime tradition of the Netherlands was of strong cultural importance.

Central to the study of this historical case is the question of why the shipbuilding industry was able to be competitive after the war and why subsequently it was unable to sustain this position. Japanese competition was an important driver for the later dynamics in the global shipbuilding market, but it does not explain why from the 1960s onwards the Dutch shipbuilding industry also consistently performed worse than other main West European shipbuilding industries in terms of ship output. To find out the reasons for the economic fluctuations during this period, my research explores the developing structures and relationships between the Dutch shipbuilding industry's main economic agents: the shipyards, shipping companies, and maritime suppliers. The methodological choice of focusing on the range of regional suppliers and shipyards and internationally operating shipping companies also exemplifies the connection between the region and the world. Lloyd's Register of Shipping books, company archives, and maritime journals constitute a large part of the primary source material used to obtain the required information for this research. These sources shed light on aspects such as ship production, company performance, technological and organisational innovation, and supplier and customer relations.

The dynamics within the Dutch shipbuilding industry in the postwar period is an example of the societal relevance and impact of studying global encounters. The case illustrates how an increasingly globalising world can have a strong effect on the lives of people in the region. International competition in shipbuilding not only became more frequent during this period, but it had immense consequences for socio-economic, political, and cultural aspects of the region.

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Illustration on the title page of Geldenhouwer's *Historia Batavica,* possibly depicting ancient Batavians.

Aart Noordzij

Shifting Borders. Spatial and Ethnographic Imaginary in sixteenth-century Guelders

Lecturer Cultural History

For a long time, scholarship on political geography has been overwhelmingly ahistorical. Political scientists assumed that the modern mosaic of territorialized states, with clear-cut borders and distinctions between inside and outside, was self-evident, and did not need any historical explanation. However, confronted with processes of globalisation and regionalisation, a growing number of scholars advocated a more historicized understanding of political space. Political geographer Andrew Agnew made us aware of "the territorial trap", the mindset whereby scholars tended to take the territorialization of space for granted when it actually needed historical explanation. History @ Erasmus confirms this more dynamic approach to territorialization as the research programme stresses the "very different and often changing conceptions of space in the micro-local and the macro-global" levels.

The sixteenth-century duchy of Guelders is a case in point. Guelders was a complex patchwork of local lordships, towns, regions and feudal networks, all with their own nebulous borders, and all interacting with the boundless universalism (in theory) of the Holy Roman Empire. Significantly, around 1550 geographer Christiaan Sgrooten was baffled when he was ordered to make a map of Guelders. He consulted the ducal administration but the confusion about the borders of the duchy was too great. How did people in Guelders conceptualize the political space they were living in? We will take a look at two ethnographic descriptions of Guelders from the sixteenth century.

Gerard Geldenhouwer was a humanist born in 1482 in Nijmegen. During the years 1530, he was Professor of History and Theology at the Protestant University of Marburg. His life's work

was to reconstruct the ancient history of his country of origin, the Duchy of Guelders. A true humanist, Geldenhouwer consulted ancient sources like Tacitus and Plinius in pursuit of his reconstruction. On the basis of these sources, he claimed that his compatriots descended from the German people of the Batavians. However, as his sources were far from univocal, Geldenhouwer had a hard time supporting this claim. He discovered that Batavians had lived only in certain parts of Guelders and that some sources, confusingly, indicated that his compatriots descended from the German tribe of the Sicambers. Moreover, Geldenhouwer had to admit that the Batavians also lived in the southern part of Holland. This was confusing because, according to him, the weaklings of Holland had nothing in common with the warlike nature of the original Batavians.

The story about the Sicambrian past of Guelders was taken up in 1568 by Hendrik Arents, a humanist and historian from Arnhem. In his work, Hendrik Arents claimed that the German tribe of the Sicambers had lived precisely within the borders of contemporary Guelders. What was more, Hendrik Arents pushed the genealogical origins of the Guelders/Sicambers to a primordial past, namely to the person of Tuisco, the would-be fourth son of Noah. According to the Bible, Noah had only three sons but Hendrik Arents made use of another source to claim the existence of a fourth: a recently discovered manuscript attributed to the Babylonian priest Berossus about the genealogical roots of the European nations. This manuscript introduced the figure of Tuisco. Actually, the manuscript was a manifest forgery, but Arents and other humanist historians preferred to be fooled: the information in the manuscript was exactly what they needed in order to structure the ethnographic and territorial make-up of Europe according to their wishes. Arents was convinced that the territory of Guelders was the home ground of the Sicambers, and with the help of the Berossus manuscript, Arents could demonstrate the primordial history of the current-day Guelders people and territory.

Nevertheless, Hendrik Arents realized that things were less straightforward. In a second edition of his work – perhaps after some critical remarks – he admitted that Guelders was not a mono-ethnic political community, but something more ambiguous. The Guelders territory was a composite of many different towns, he wrote. Accordingly the people of Guelders were a composite of a mixture of peoples, like the Sicambers, the Batavians, the Cananafates, and the Menapians. Unfortunately, Arents did not elaborate on how this insight fitted in with the rest of his narrative.

The writings of Geldenhouwer and Arents offer a regional snapshot of the long history of the construction of political and ethnic borders and identities in Europe. They show us that in the sixteenth century, these borders and identities were still in the making, though they were already less elusive than in previous centuries. Neither the mapmaker Sgrooten, nor the historians Geldenhouwer or Arents were able to turn Guelders into a clear-cut territorial unit or one that was ethnically homogenous. Their failures notwithstanding, they demonstrated the wish and the will to create such units, and to give them primordial credentials.

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Local Narratives

Lokale Verhalen

Theo Pronk

Waarom oude steden er toe doen. Over Italiaanse maagden en Hollandse burgers

Docent-promovendus Cultuurgeschiedenis

De stedemaagd boven de Groothoofdspoort in Dordrecht, hier nieuw aangebracht in 1618 als opvolger van een eerdere maagd.

Vervaardigd door Gilles Huppe (Afbeelding: VanBram Studio)

Al vierhonderd jaar kijkt de stedemaagd zachtmoedig neer op bezoekers die via de Groothoofdspoort Dordrecht betreden. Dat ze er nog altijd zit, is niet vanzelfsprekend. De meeste stadspoorten vielen ten prooi aan stadssanering terwijl de Groothoofdspoort zelf twee grote restauraties moest ondergaan. Dat ze nog zit is ook een geluk. De stedemaagd vertelt een verhaal dat ver terug reikt en ver boven het lokale uitstijgt. Vooral vertelt ze een belangwekkend verhaal, over de grondslagen van onze huidige samenleving.

Iets lijkt echter niet te kloppen aan deze zeventiende-eeuwse stedemaagd. Vooral de hemelsblauwe mantel en ontblote borst lijken ongepast voor het protestantse Holland. De gelijkenis met de maagd Maria valt niet te ontkennen, specifieker nog met de *Virgo lactans* of melkgevende maagd. Zij was de meest centrale figuur van de katholieke aanbidding: de koningin van de hemel en moeder van Christus. Zij bracht zo de genade in de wereld. Maria troostte, voedde en huilde mee. Daarmee is zij de barmhartige bemiddelaar tussen hemel en aarde. 'Onbevlekt' door zonde belichaamt zij de deugd zelf, en wijst zo de weg naar verlossing.

De aanwezigheid van deze stedemaagd is nog opvallender wanneer wordt gekeken naar het jaar dat ze – in haar huidige vorm – verscheen. In 1618 was Dordrecht tevens trotse gastheer van de calvinistische Synode. Voor de theologische scherpslijpers, die via de Groothoofdspoort de stad betraden, was Mariaverering uit den boze. Genade lag voor hen enkel en alleen in de Bijbel besloten. Hoewel de aanwezigheid van de Virgo Lactans ze niet zal zijn ontgaan, is geen enkele klacht overgeleverd. Blijkbaar gaf de maagd geen aanstoot.

Een vreemde zaak, of toch niet? Eeuwen eerder, in Italië, is het begin van een uitleg te vinden. In 1325 schilderde Ambrogio Lorenzetti een madonna; zachtmoedig neerkijkend op het Christuskind, met hemelsblauwe mantel en ontblote borst. Hij, en andere leden van de Sienese school, schilderden haar vaak. Deze populariteit wordt niet verklaard door enige overdreven vroomheid van de Sienese burgers. Wel gold ze als patrones van hun stadsrepubliek, als moeder van alle burgers, en was zo onderdeel van lokale identiteit.

In de Middeleeuwen werd een politieke gemeenschap gezien als morele entiteit, die naast vrede en welvaart ook spiritueel welzijn diende, ofwel goddelijke genade moest bevorderen. Dit lukte alleen wanneer een gemeenschap was ingericht aan de hand van deugden als geloof, naastenliefde, rechtschapenheid en standvastigheid. In het wereldberoemde fresco in het Sienese stadhuis, geschilderd door dezelfde Lorenzetti, werd goed bestuur dan ook verbeeld door personificaties van deugden. Wie beter dan Maria, de vleesgeworden deugd zelf, belichaamde dit politieke ideaal?

Siena was dan ook bepaald niet de enige stad die haar koos

als representante. In de geschiedschrijving is wel geopperd dat ze de vorst verving. Voor de Italiaanse steden, die zich sinds hun opkomst in de twaalfde eeuw hadden losgewrikt van keizer of kerk, was er geen heerser om hen te vertegenwoordigen. Legitimatie werd elders gezocht; in het idee dat burgerlijk samenleven in zichzelf deugdzaam is. Burgers werken immers samen, en zetten zich als actieve deelnemers in voor hun gemeenschap en elkaar. De burger was een ware Christen, en de stad een heilsgemeenschap. Maria stond zo aan de basis van een politieke orde die wordt gedefinieerd aan de hand van in-personele, onderliggende principes; een concept waarop ook het moderne staatsbegrip werd gestoeld.

Het deugden-vocabulaire vond weerklank in heel Europa; in eerste instantie in steden die, net als in Italië, zochten naar legitimatie van hun zelfbestuur. Op stadhuizen, stadspoorten, fonteinen of bruggen verschenen representaties en personificaties van deugden die bestuurders én bestuurden aan hun plichten moesten herinneren. Maria bleef populair. Venetië, beroemdste onder alle stadsrepublieken, baseerde zijn Maria-cultus op een overlevering waarin de engel Gabriël de geboorte van de stad had aangekondigd zoals bij Maria het Christuskind. Maria werd standaard onderdeel van het burgerlijk repertoire, genoeg om directe katholieke associaties te doen vervagen. De maagd was simpelweg belichaming van deugd, ook voor de calvinistische scherpslijpers uit 1618.

De Dordtse stedemaagd herinnert eraan hoezeer lokale geschiedenis baat heeft bij een bredere context. Dit geldt bij uitstek voor stadsgeschiedenis. De voormoderne stad was een knooppunt, waar stromen van mensen, goederen, kapitaal, berichten en ideeën bijeen kwamen; om te botsen, te worden ingepast in lokale behoeftes, en tot iets nieuws te komen. Deze dynamiek is voor Dordrecht goed waarneembaar. Dankzij een gunstige ligging profiteerde de stad onevenredig van de rivierhandel, kreeg in Holland als eerste stadsrechten (1220) en groeide, dankzij de verbondenheid met elders, boven de lokale verhoudingen uit. Receptie van het oorspronkelijk Italiaanse burger-vocabulaire leek onvermijdelijk. Aangepast aan de lokale context, presenteerde Dordrecht zich daarbij als 'eerste stad' en vertegenwoordiger van stedelijk zelfbestuur in héél Holland. Niet voor niets zit de Dordtse stedemaagd pontificaal in de Hollandse tuin.

Het verhaal van de Dordtse stedemaagd, tot slot, is een warm pleidooi voor stedelijk erfgoed. Juist in de oude stad, als knooppunt, lieten grotere historische ontwikkelingen concrete sporen na. Eén stadspoort, met één maagd, biedt zo toegang tot een hele achterliggende wereld. Zomaar een gedachte, wanneer u volgende keer onder haar doorloopt.

Lorenzetti's *Madonna del latte,* 1325, toont een Maria met menselijke trekken. Dit was typerend voor de Sienese school, die brak met strenge Byzantijnse vormen (Afbeelding: Wikimedia Commons)

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Het Rotterdamse Zomercarnaval 2018. Foto Rob Hilz

Paul van de Laar

Rotterdam migratiestad: op zoek naar een nieuw narratief

Bijzonder Hoogleraar Geschiedenis van Rotterdam (leerstoel Roterodamum)

Sinds 1984 viert Rotterdam zijn Zomercarnaval. De optocht eindigt traditiegetrouw op de Coolsingel, de boulevard die tijdens het carnaval verandert in een langgerekt lint van exotische eetstalletjes met Vietnamese loempia's tot en met Mexicaanse taco's en, Surinaamse roti's. Eten, dansen en opgezweept worden door drumbands met snerpende fluitjes die ervoor zorgen dat de deelnemers in het juist ritme bewegen. Rotterdam is trots op zijn Zomercarnaval, oorspronkelijk naar de stad gehaald om het multiculturele karakter van de stad te accentueren en te vieren. In het kader van de sociale vernieuwing kwam rapporteur van de commissie Albeda, Pim Fortuyn, in 1987 zelfs met een voorstel voor een islamitische kasba. Een multiculturele markthal zogezegd, ook goed voor het toerisme. Halverwege de jaren negentig bood multicultureel Rotterdam nog altijd een wenkend perspectief door de uitverkiezing van Rotterdam Culturele Hoofdstad van Europa in 2001. Het kosmopolitische Rotterdam, verbeeld aan de hand van zijn veelkleurigheid. Het Zomercarnaval met zijn straatparade accentueerde dat gevoel. Allerlei symbolen, maar ook kenmerkende locaties die de diversiteit van Rotterdam uitdrukten, werden belicht. De West-Kruiskade, geïllustreerd met tekeningen van een Chinese draak en de exotische groenten- en fruitmarkt. Dansend, zingend, bewegend gaf de stad uitdrukking aan Rotterdam is vele steden, zoals het programma ging heten, geïnspireerd op het in 1981 verschenen boek van Italo Calvino, *Onzichtbare steden*.

Cultuur als bindmiddel, een voorwaarde voor een succesvolle toekomst. Wie de beelden, de introductiefilms en het promotiemateriaal overziet, kan niet anders dan concluderen dat multicultureel Rotterdam niet als drama, maar als zegen werd gezien. De Rotterdamse omarming van een veelkleurige stad en de nadruk op kosmopolitische

havenculturen inspireerde latere culturele hoofdsteden Liverpool (2008) en Marseille (2013). Net als Rotterdam steden die als 'tweede stad' van het land in de jaren zeventig en tachtig gebukt gingen onder grote economische en sociale problemen. Rotterdam deed het dankzij zijn wereldhaven in vergelijking beter en het programma van Culturele Hoofdstad 2001 met zijn kleinschalige programmering en betrokkenheid van bewoners werd als voorbeeld gezien. De optimisten die de successen na afloop wilden verduurzamen met nieuwe multiculturele manifestaties kregen het deksel op de neus. Cultuur was er inmiddels genoeg, het werd tijd voor schoon, heel en veilig. Dat werd de nieuwe boodschap van Rotterdam na 2002, toen Fortuyns Leefbaar Rotterdam zijn tanden liet zien. Het multiculturalisme werd nu als een drama gezien. Dat was niet alleen de boodschap van de populisten. In 2000 had Paul Scheffer met zijn artikel in NRC-Handelsblad, *Het Multiculturele drama*, het mislukken van het multiculturalisme ook onder de Nederlandse intelligentsia salonfähig gemaakt. Voortaan hoefde je geen Fortuynist te zijn om integratiepessimist te zijn.

In Rotterdam zorgde dat voor een drastische ommekeer. In het nieuwe officiële verhaal van de stad was opeens geen plaats meer voor nieuwe migranten, tenzij zij zich volledig aanpasten aan de normen en waarden van de stad. Alsof politici zich niet langer meer thuisvoelden in Rotterdam is "vele steden" en het migratieverleden selectief interpreteerden. Rotterdam was groot geworden door migranten. Hun kinderen en kleinkinderen hadden de basis gelegd voor de grootste Europese haven en het naoorlogse welvaartssucces. De voorwaarden voor dit narratief hadden P.J. Bouman en W.H. Bouman in hun klassieker *De Groei van de grote werkstad* (1952) geschetst. Zij waren de eersten die de relatie tussen het karakter van de stad en zijn migratiegeschiedenis blootlegden. Het werd het standaardverhaal over het snelgroeiende Rotterdam met zijn uitbreidingswijken die in toenemende mate werden bevolkt door de plattelanders van de Zuid-Hollandse eilanden, Zeeland en Brabant. Steeds minder vaak slaagden politici erin om het negentiende-eeuwse verhaal van de werkstad, gepopulariseerd door Bouman en Bouman, te verbinden met de recente migratie die vanaf de jaren zestig op gang was gekomen. Ook optimisten over de multiculturele samenleving erkenden dat het niet eenvoudig was om nieuwkomers een toekomst te bieden in de stad en dat de integratie met problemen gepaard gaat.

Het opvallende is echter dat er zo abrupt afscheid genomen is van een beleid, dat in 2001 nog als succesvol werd gevierd. Het duidelijkst is dat zichtbaar in de veelbesproken Rotterdamwet van 2003 waarmee de stad probeerde om de instroom van "marginale groepen" in bepaalde achtergestelde gebieden tegen te gaan. Rotterdam moest een stad in balans worden en het kon niet zo zijn dat de nieuwe migratiegolf het broze evenwicht zou verstoren. Het Zomercarnaval

is populair bij het publiek en een uitgelezen moment om diversiteit, hoe eenzijdig ook, te vieren. De rest van het jaar is de toegenomen diversiteit van de stad vooral een probleem dat gemanaged moet worden. Terwijl Rotterdam steeds diverser wordt, is het beleid gericht op een homogene stad, een identiteit die teruggrijpt of een fictief verleden.Rotterdam als superdiverse stad is zo in beweging dat het veel meer weg heeft van de negentiende-eeuwse werkstad met zijn vlottende bevolking dan politici en beleidsmakers ons wensen te realiseren. Het zou veel zinvoller zijn – en dat zie ik als een taak voor mij als historicus – om te proberen het migratienarratief waarmee Bouman en Bouman zijn begonnen te vertalen naar een eigentijdse variant.

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
Het boek *De jongens van de Hobby Club* kreeg op in het land ook concreet vervolg. Op de foto leden van Hobby Club Dordrecht, 1954

Hilde Harmsen

Op het kruispunt van angsten en verwachtingen. Techniek in kinderboeken in de lange jaren vijftig

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"Wij willen ook niet de techniek verheffen tot een hoger plan dan zij verdient. We zijn er ons wel van bewust dat er vanuit een geestelijk en moreel oogpunt veel belangrijker dingen zijn dan technische hobbies, maar t.a.v. de geestelijke en morele herbewapening van de jeugd geloven wij, dat men, om de massa van de jeugd te verheffen, niet te hoog moet grijpen."

Een bevlogen betoog verbindt de toekomst van Nederland met de toekomst van "Hollandse jongens" die "behalve hun hoofd ook hun handen kunnen gebruiken". Het is afkomstig van de laatste pagina's van Leonard de Vries' eerste deel van een reeks kinderboeken over *De jongens van de Hobby Club* (1947) en moedigt jongens met "pit, ambitie en technische aanleg" aan de handen ineen te slaan, zichzelf te ontplooien en te bouwen aan een betere toekomst voor Nederland. In de eerste decennia na de Tweede Wereldoorlog verschenen veel (jongens) boeken waarin techniek een belangrijke rol speelde. Ze sloten aan bij de fascinatie voor nieuwe technologische mogelijkheden zoals die ook in populaire cultuur voor volwassenen te vinden was.

Hoewel het Nederland van deze periode wel getypeerd is als 'technocratie', riep nieuwe technologie niet louter bewondering, maar ook angsten op. Zo ging het idee dat industrialisatie de laatste strohalm was om het land van handel en veeteelt nog te kunnen laten aanhaken in de vaart der volkeren, gepaard met de diepgaande angst dat dit moderniseringsproces allerlei sociale verbanden zou

losweken en vernietigen. Terwijl de overheid tussen 1949 en 1963 via de zogenaamde industrialisatienota's het industrialiseringsproces aanjoeg en inzette op het industrierijp maken van de bevolking, werd het intellectueel debat gekenmerkt door pessimisme. De diagnose kwam erop neer dat de kloof tussen technologische ontwikkeling en menselijke beschaving gevuld werd met een onwaardige massacultuur. Dergelijke vertogen bouwden voort op het vooroorlogse cultuurpessimisme en vermengden een afkeer van totalitaire systemen met de angst voor moreel verval door het moderne industriële arbeidsproces. Begin jaren vijftig kwamen dergelijke ideeën vooral ook tot uiting in zorg om de jeugd. Deze leek 'verwilderd', aldus het veelvuldig aangehaalde rapport *De maatschappelijke verwildering der jeugd* uit 1952, opgesteld onder leiding van de bekende Nederlandse pedagoog Martinus J. Langeveld. De keuze voor industrialisering leek onvermijdelijk, maar de spagaat tussen het enthousiasmeren van jongeren voor techniek en hen weerbaar te maken tegen de gevaren ervan, hield de gemoederen bezig. Ook het betoog gericht aan "de jongens van de hobby club" vormde daarvan een vertaling.

Industrialisatie vormde slechts één van de vele aan techniek en mechanisatie gerelateerde ontwikkelingen waarin zowel kansen als gevaren werden gezien. Ook andere nieuwe en spectaculaire technologieën (ruimtevaart, atoomtechniek, robots) brachten zowel utopische verwachtingen als dystopische angsten naar boven. Dit alles roept de vraag op hoe volwassenen kinderen initieerden in een door technische ontwikkelingen sterk veranderende wereld, een vraag die nog steeds actueel is. Techniek kan, in navolging van David Nye, worden opgevat als onderdeel van een voortdurende conversatie tussen generaties over wat wenselijk, mogelijk of waar is. Verhalen zijn een manier om de symbolische betekenisgeving rond techniek tot uiting te laten komen. Zij komen voort uit verwachtingen en wensen ten aanzien van de toekomst, aspecten die eveneens ideeën over het doel van opvoeding bepalen. Daar ligt dan ook het kruispunt waar ideeën over opvoeding en technologie elkaar ontmoeten. Door inzichten en methoden uit de literatuurwetenschappen, de historische pedagogiek en de cultuurgeschiedenis van de techniek te combineren, probeer ik op basis van fictie voor kinderen een antwoord op de bovenstaande vraag te vinden. Aan kinderboeken werd in deze periode een belangrijke pedagogische functie toegedicht. Steeds opnieuw moesten auteurs zich dus afvragen welke waarden en emoties zij geschikt vonden om over te dragen op hun jonge publiek en in welke vorm dat moest gebeuren.

Technologie wordt in de kinderboeken meestal geassocieerd met avontuur, ontwikkeling en ongekende mogelijkheden om aardse beperkingen te overstijgen. Echter, ook in de avontuurlijke en optimistische narratieven in kinderboeken schemeren soms zorgen

ten aanzien van de toekomst door. Dat is opmerkelijk voor een periode waarin de opvatting was dat in kinderland de hemel blauw moest zijn. Overigens gebeurt dat zelden zo expliciet als in het bovengenoemde citaat uit het boek van Leonard de Vries, waar het enthousiasmeren van de jeugd voor technische hobby's en industriële bedrijvigheid gepaard gaat met een flinke portie morele karaktervorming. Vaker wordt technologie gepresenteerd als een moeilijk beheersbare kracht. Maar hoewel jonge lezers in de meeste boeken een glimp konden opvangen van de gevaren waarmee technologie omgeven leek te zijn, monden de spannende 'technische' avonturen van de hoofdpersonen, niet zelden uit in een glansrijke carrière in de Nederlandse industrie.

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The Evoluon in 1968. Photographer Jac de Nijs. Source: Wikimedia Commons

Dick van Lente

Selling progress: The Philips Electronics Company's Evoluon exhibition and the debate about technology, 1945-1970

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At the outskirts of Eindhoven, a town in southern Netherlands, stands an elegant but curious building, a kind of concrete flying saucer: the Evoluon. It was built in the 1960s as the exhibition building of the Philips Electronics Company, the most prestigious Dutch multinational firm at the time, with the purpose of explaining to the public Philips' contribution to human progress. In this essay, I suggest that the 'Philips story,' as expressed in the Evoluon, can be read as a response to other stories circulating at the time: it was part of a conversation about the future of Western society.

After World War II, the long standing debate about technology and progress became particularly intense, in the Netherlands as much as elsewhere. The dominant political view was that reconstruction and economic growth required international competitiveness which in turn demanded technological capability. Full employment was believed to prevent a repetition of the economic and political crisis of the 1930s. The Philips company embraced all these goals and made them part of its corporate strategy. The company's research lab was to create new and better products. And providing jobs, housing, and social and medical care to employees were considered as important as making a profit. At the forefront of post-war socio-economic modernization, Philips was almost considered a national institution.

At the same time, however, well-known intellectuals such as Norbert Wiener in the US and Fred Polak in the Netherlands expressed grave concerns about current technological developments. They spoke

of a 'second industrial revolution,' the core of which were electronic technologies such as computers and industrial automation. One of their worries was that continued automation would lead to a return of mass unemployment and social turmoil. As a major electronics firm, Philips obviously felt compelled to respond to such fears.

One form this response took was exhibitions for a large public of which the Evoluon was the most spectacular. It was not the first one, however. In 1951, celebrating its 60th anniversary, Philips sent an exhibition of its consumer products around the country and named it 'Triumph of Technology'. Upon its opening in Amsterdam, the mayor gave a speech in which he praised Philips' innovative power. Philips demonstrates, he said, Dutch technological competitiveness. 'Triumph of Technology' confirmed the Dutch government's basic economic goals.

Philips' second big show was the spectacular 'Poème électronique' presented at the Brussels World Fair in 1958. In a striking pavilion, a film created by the famous architect LeCorbusier was shown accompanied by spatial sound effects from 350 loudspeakers by composer Edgar Varèse. Its topic was 'mankind's struggle to attain harmony.' It consisted of an avalanche of sounds and images including gruesome ones of mass graves, missiles, and atomic explosions. Although there was some more uplifting material as well, the show rather neatly reflected the fears of technology in the mid-fifties, or, as Philips' president chose to call it, 'the spiritual confusion of our times.' Although it had invited these artists to create the exhibit, Philips was very unhappy with the result, and when the company's 75th anniversary approached, it was decided to tell 'the Philips story' in an unambiguous way. The vehicle for this story was the Evoluon. Its opening in 1966 was attended, characteristically, by the Queen's husband, the prime minister, the chairman of the Parliament, and several high ranking officers of the armed forces.

The exhibition was spread over three levels inside the flying saucer. After entering the building, visitors were carried by an elevator to the highest level which was devoted to everyday uses of (mainly electronic) technology: lighting, entertainment, medical technology, and so on. At the next level basic technological processes were explained, such as the recording and transmission of sound. Finally, at the bottom level, the Philips company was presented. The designers kept their message implicit but we find it clearly stated in their working papers, now in the company's archives. The name of the building summed it all up: Philips was a creative community, developing technical solutions for the benefit of all, and therefore contributing to the peaceful *evolution* of society, not to the revolutionary disruption critics spoke about.

The Evoluon quickly became one of the most popular attractions in the Netherlands. However, in the seventies, a steady decline set in

and the exhibition was closed in 1989. The basic reason was that the 'Philips story' became increasingly out of sync with society. Philips entered difficult times, had to fire hundreds of employees and close several factories, which undermined its heroic national role. Capitalism and Western technology were heavily criticized in the late sixties, and the Club of Rome's Limits to growth report (1972) undermined one of the basic premises of post-war industrial politics.

Very recently, the Evoluon was designated a national monument, and rightly so: it is not only a stylish example of 1960s architecture, but also an eloquent expression of one phase in the ongoing debate about technological progress.

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Alice Janssens

Interwoven Spaces: Exploring Berlin as a Fashion City

PhD Candidate Business History

Three mannequins of the clothing company "Wolf & Schlachter", Berlin ca. 1935; Jewish Museum Berlin, donated by Peter Sinclair, formerly Peter Jacob

Berlin is seldom ranked among the names of traditional fashion cities such as London, Paris, New York and Milan. In an article from January 2018, the industry periodical Business of Fashion shared the thoughts of a Berlin-based designer: "Berlin has never had an active garment-making industry." The designer's comment is far from correct. Rather, it confirms the somber prognosis of Werner Dopp from 1962 who wrote in celebration of the 125th anniversary of the Berliner ready-to-wear industry. Dopp described the industry, which forty years before had employed 180,000 people and had a turnover of more than a billion marks, as "going to the dogs". He expressed concern that the industry (and the world) had forgotten its past. His statement seems strangely applicable today. Clearly, Berliner fashion, and the international fashion community, has forgotten its roots. Roots which stretch back past the twentieth century, and reached a crowning point during the Interwar period.

Prior to the late 1930s the German clothing industry, predominantly based in Berlin, was the second largest export industry and employer. Yet this substantial industrial impact is little recognised in contemporary discussion, either social or academic. Only a small number of scholarly works on early twentieth century Berlin fashion exist, specifically within the economic history and business history disciplines. Of the academic work on the Berlin fashion industry during the Interwar period, most originates from the fields of sociology, gender, material or fashion studies. The available literature, much of which is directed towards the German audience, focuses predominantly on the ready-to-wear (*Konfektion*) industry and department stores (*Warenhäuser*) of the city. These subjects bring into stark relief the role of the Jewish community in the construction of early-twentieth century German garments and the development of the surrounding sector. There remains little analysis of the broader structures of the Interwar fashion sector which may provide an understanding of fashion within the city, its spatial and economic aspects, actors and networks. My research aims to resolve this issue, exploring the Berlin fashion industry of the 1920s and 1930s. Addressing the regional dynamics and structure of the city of Berlin within a broader global network, it aims to shed light onto not only commodity chains, actors and intermediary structures but also intangible representations in media and Berliner fashions' place within global flows. This will provide insight into the relationships between Parisian designers and consumers, Berliner makers and international department stores.

Methodologically tying the fields of business history, economic geography and fashion studies together, this research employs the theoretical concept "fashion capital" or "fashion city" as a base to analyse the development of Berliner fashion during the Interwar

period. This concept allows for the examination of structures, systems, agents and interwoven spatial dynamics. It has recently been suggested that there are a range of types of fashion city which hold different positions in a broader global network. Scholarship predominantly addresses the development of contemporary fashion locations across the globe through the outsourcing of manufacturing and advertising, franchising of firms, and online consumption options. However, what is stressed is the potential heterogeneity of fashion locations. These new perspectives provide excellent suggestions for the study of diverse fashion cities within both contemporary and historical periods, indicating the key role of internal creation, specialisation, and positions within regional, national and global fashion and consumption networks.

A case representative of Berliner fashion is the women's clothing firm Wolf & Schlachter whose coats are pictured above. Founded in 1919, the firm operated out of the fashion cluster situated around Hausvogteiplatz, in the centre of Berlin. Although the firm moved three times they remained located in this ready-to-wear district. The firm specialised in women's clothing and coats, key products of the Berliner industry as a whole. Wolf & Schlachter's nature as a ready-to-wear producer is playfully indicated in the above image through reference to off the rack purchases, as the models appear to hang in the coats which are displayed on a framing rail. The Jewish firm, like many others in the Berlin fashion industry, was export oriented. This, according to Christoph Kreutzmüller, Eva-Lotte Reimer and Michael Wildt, is the reason for its continuation following the National Socialist seizure of power. Wolf & Schlachter is representative of the export focus, clustering and specialisation common to the Berlin industry, however its case is only one of many within the broadly connected Berlin-based, regional and international networks that my research aims to analyse.

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Willem Frijhoff

Tawagonshi: geschiedschrijving en etnische twijfel

Emeritus Professor Cultuurgeschiedenis

Exemplaar van de *Two Row Wampum Belt,* de kralenstreng met twee rijen schelpenkralen die voor de leden van de Haudenosaunee-confederatie het blijvend verbond tussen de Iroquois-volkeren en de Westerlingen symboliseert (Bron: mohawknationnews.com).

Geschiedschrijving is steeds een vorm van onderhandelen tussen belanghebbende partijen. Het daarbij gehanteerde geschiedbeeld hangt mede van de uitgangspunten, vooroordelen en methoden af. Zo werd in 2013 in de staat New York met veel vertoon het vierhonderdjarig bestaan gevierd van een verbond tussen de oorspronkelijke bewoners, de Iroquois, waaronder de Mohawks, en de Europeanen (thans de witte Amerikanen). Voor de natives is dat verbond een realiteit en volgens hun perceptie is het in de loop van de geschiedenis steeds weer vernieuwd, wat getuigt van de duurzame gelijkwaardigheid van beide bevolkingsgroepen en culturen. Onder witte Amerikanen leeft daarentegen grote twijfel aan de realiteit en de aard van het verbond. Twee historische artefacten worden als bewijs aangevoerd. Ten eerste een geschreven verdragstekst, ondertekend door vier *native* stamhoofden en twee Nederlanders, schipper Hendrick Christiaensz van *De Fortuyn*, en bonthandelaar Jacob Eelkens. Die tekst staat bekend als Tawagonshi Treaty (ook wel Kaswentha Treaty), naar de plaats nabij de huidige stad Albany waar dat verbond op 21 april 1613 zou zijn gesloten. Ten tweede een wampum-streng zoals hierbij afgebeeld, de *Covenant Chain*, waarvan de dubbele rij zwarte, in één streng met elkaar verbonden schelpenkralen het blijvend verbond tussen de twee bevolkingsgroepen symboliseert (en in de geest van de Mohawks ook daadwerkelijk belichaamd). Onder verwijzing naar die 400-jarige traditie voeren de verdedigers van het verdrag thans een *Two Row Renewal Campaign*, met veel weerklank op internet en in de *social media*.

Aan beide materiële artefacten kleven echter problemen die de historische interpretaties krachtig beïnvloeden. Al meer dan dertig jaar ligt de verdragstekst onder vuur. De witte Amerikanen hebben ook nooit echt raad geweten met de betekenis van de wampum-streng: bewijs van een handelsovereenkomst, van een politiek verbond, of (althans in de ogen van de *natives*) van een diepere levensgemeenschap? Het *Journal of Early American History* heeft in 2013 het woord gegeven aan voor-, maar toch vooral tegenstanders van die verdragstraditie. De Tawagonshi Treaty werd er definitief afgeserveerd als een westers fake-product van de hand van de arts Lawrence G. van Loon, die de tot dan volkomen onbekende tekst in 1968 publiceerde. Van Loon had de tekst uit zijn duim gezogen (het origineel is nooit getoond, alleen een slechte fotokopie is bekend), maar de inhoud hoeft dat niet te zijn. Behalve uit westerse notariële en andere bronnen over de handelsreizen en de interculturele contacten kon hij voor de duurzaamheid van de relatie uit de mondelinge traditie van de *natives* putten. Christiaensz en Eelkens waren in 1613 met hun schip de Hudson opgevaren, tot aan het huidige Albany, in het land van de Mohawks. Deze vingen landinwaarts de duizenden bevers en

otters die ze met de Europeanen verhandelden om er in het koude, slecht verwarmde West-Europa de hoeden en mantels van te maken die zo prominent de schilderijen uit de Gouden Eeuw sieren. Ter plekke werd een eenvoudig fort opgericht, fort Nassau, van waaruit bonthandelaarszoon Eelkens enkele jaren intensief handel dreef met de Mohawks, maar vermoedelijk ook met hun vijanden, de Mahicans. Dat impliceerde een soort driehoeksovereenkomst en lijkt de beide *native* volkeren nader tot elkaar te hebben gebracht. Na 1623 nam de West-Indische Compagnie de particuliere handel over. Eelkens trad, mede uit frustratie, in dienst van Engelse kooplieden en bestond het in 1633 zelfs om vanuit een Engels schip de profijtelijke handel bij het fort weer op te pakken en de WIC te tarten, maar hij verdwijnt vervolgens uit beeld. Eelkens' grote kwaliteiten als koopman en interculturele go-between zorgden er echter voor dat hij in de herinnering van de Iroquois bleef voortleven en bij onderhandelingen in 1678 en 1689 door hen nog als de ideale partner ten voorbeeld werd gesteld. Ook de *Two Row* wampum-streng behoort tot de *native* orale traditie, want de exemplaren die nu bestaan zijn alle van recente makelij. Al vroeg in de zeventiende eeuw is sprake van de rol van wampum (of sewant) als ruil- en betaalmiddel, maar pas in 1864 wordt de eerste *Two Row*-streng vermeld.

Deze casus stelt twee benaderingen van de geschiedenis radicaal tegenover elkaar: een Westers/Amerikaanse, scripturaal, steunend op tastbaar materieel bewijs, met af een toe een vleug intellectueel bronnen-fetisjisme; en een native, oraal, steunend op de herinneringscultuur en deze vervlechtend met een eigen opvatting van de beschavingsgeschiedenis. De verdragsakten die voor de ene partij slechts een zakelijke handelsovereenkomst zijn, impliceren voor de andere cultureel contact of een politiek verbond. En de grootste tegenstelling ligt in de bereidheid om bij geschiedschrijving antithetische standpunten serieus te nemen, die vanuit een andere logica worden ingenomen. Hoor en wederhoor. Evenwichtige geschiedschrijving zit vol paradoxen, maar de paradoxen zitten niet altijd waar men ze zou verwachten. In dit geval: wiens geschiedschrijving tegenover wiens vooroordelen?

Mijn eigen onderzoek focust op de persoon die centraal staat bij beide partijen maar bij elk daarvan een eigen beeld heeft, Jacob Eelkens, en op de historische interpretaties van zijn persoon en optreden. Want zijn persoonsgeschiedenis wordt door alle auteurs verwaarloosd: hij is niet meer dan een pion in hun verhaal. Door hemzelf tot op het bot te ontleden, hem tegelijk in de familiecultuur van de bonthandelaren te plaatsen – belijdend katholiek uit Den Bosch, ietwat eigenzinnige migranten in Amsterdam waar Jacob werd geboren, en actief in de Atlantische handelscultuur van Rouaan waar hij opgroeide –, en de receptie van die historische fasen te

analyseren probeer ik grip te krijgen op de mechanismen die onze beelden van zowel local als global history steeds weer anders vormgeven.

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Karin Willemse

Local narratives: contextualising the founding of Kebkabiya, a town in Darfur

Assistant Professor Global History

Hajja surrounded by her daughters and her grandchildren. Her white tobe marks her position as a Sudanese government employee (fieldwork photo Karin Willemse, 1991-1992)

Before the British colonised Sudan in 1899, Kebkabiya had been a garrison place for the army of the Darfur Sultan Muhammad Tayrab (ruled 1752/3-1785/6), who extended the Fur Sultanate to the Nile by conquering the Funj province of Kordofan in 1787. He had brought his court from the mountainous range of Jebel Marra to the plains near Kebkabiya at the end of the eighteenth century. The ruins of Shoba some four kilometers south of the town still testify to the palace of this renowned Fur sultan. Remarkably, however, it was not him but Faqih Sinin, a religious and political leader who, a century later, became locally deified as the founder of Kebkabiya.

During my anthropological-historical research in Darfur in the 1980s and 1990s local narratives constituted an important source to understand how the history of the town was locally constructed. As Tosh indicates in his *The Pursuit of Knowledge*, local, mostly oral, historical accounts require the use of additional historical sources about the same period that these accounts refer to in order to assess their value for historical research. In addition, I maintain that the contemporary context in which the researcher collected the narratives is also of significance since narratives about the past are often instrumental to power dynamics in the present, as I learned during my fieldwork in Kebkabiya, a town in North Darfur, in the period of October 1990 – May 1992.

In this period I stayed on the compound of Hajja, an elderly widow and her two daughters and grandchildren. I taped her biographic narrative over a period of months. Hajja was the stepdaughter of Faqih Sinin who, like Hajja, was from the Tama ethnic group that had come to Darfur from Chad in the mid-nineteenth century. Faqih Sinin was a religious and political leader who ruled Kebkabiya during the Mahdiyya period (1885-1889), a time when it was a precolonial state based on Islamic principles, before British colonisation. After his death, he became revered as a saint since, as Hajja phrased it, he "even attracted lions and snakes to live in peace at his side". He was locally also considered the founder of Kebkabiya. This last claim was striking since he was quite obviously not. So why then was Faqih Sinin locally constructed as the founder of Kebkabiya? By consulting British colonial reports, sultanic records and the medical history of Darfur, I managed to contextualize this local, seemingly misinformed, narrative.

In the period that Sinin was posted in Kebkabiya, fights between local warring factions as well as colonial powers threatened the local population with being taken hostage, enslavement, or with enforced conscription to one of the armies, a fate that many escaped by fleeing the area. Those who stayed were also in danger of contracting contagious diseases like cholera or smallpox. A whole army force led by Osman Jano, the Mahdist army leader who had

installed Faqih Sinin in Kebkabiya, had fallen victim to an epidemic. In addition, this was the period of the great famine also referred to as *Sana Jano*, the year of Jano.

In other words, the area around Kebkabiya was virtually depopulated in the period that Faqih Sinin settled in the same place. Sinin thus offered a kind of safe haven in an era of turmoil, violence and insecurity, not the least because he was accompanied by a strong Mahdist army contingent. I came to understand Sinin's importance to the re-establishment of the town but it still did not make sense that the earlier involvement of the Fur Sultans was so completely negated.

The relevance of this silence became clear to me when I considered the political context of the time I recorded these local narratives. I realized that local political and economic dynamics had changed due to the newly established Islamist state, which had come to power by a military coup in 1989, just a year before I conducted my fieldwork. It replaced the four-year-young democratic regime that had been led by UMMA party, which in Kebkabiya had mostly followers from the Fur ethnic group who had thus also gained local power. The Tama, however, supported the rival DUP party. They had constituted a majority ever since their forefather Sinin had settled in town and they had held most of the important government positions in the period before the democratic regime came to power. Though none of the Tama I met were openly supportive of the Islamist regime, the demise of the UMMA party meant that Tama could reclaim local power positions. Like the Mahdiyya, this postcolonial Islamist state brought a restoration of the proper course of history, with the Tama as the 'righteous rulers' of the town.

Thus, in order to understand why a local community constructs a past by emphasizing some historical events and silencing others, it is not sufficient for an historian to give a historical context of the period that is referred to in these local narratives. It is just as important to consider these local perspectives as discursive means to justify contemporary power relations, especially when political dynamics cannot be openly articulated or criticized.

And Hajja? She abstained from taking a position in this political strife. She was proud to wear the white *tobe*, or veil, that marked her position as a female government (*any* government) employee. She was allowed to wear this white uniform by virtue of her elevated position as a *trained* medical midwife, which she had held for several decades. She therefore stood above the ethnic parties and local political machinations though her position came with different challenges and possibilities. But that is an entirely different local narrative.

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History in the Present

Geschiedenis Nu

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Susan Hogervorst & Kees Ribbens

Een aandeel in de verzetsidentiteit: De tentoonstelling 'Weerbare democratie' en de toe-eigening van het oorlogsverleden

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'Rotterdam bouwt een puinhoop' kopte Het Vrije Volk eind april 1946, nog geen jaar na het einde van de Tweede Wereldoorlog. Alsof de oorlogsschade onvoldoende zichtbaar was, verrees op de hoek van Coolsingel en Kruiskade in het stadshart een acht meter hoog puinrestant 'waaruit half verkoolde balken steken om de ravage zo realistisch mogelijk te doen zijn'. Het bouwwerk, voorzien van een affiche van kunstenaar Dick Elffers, diende als reclamezuil voor de prestigieuze tentoonstelling 'Weerbare democratie' in het Centraal Belastinggebouw aan de Westzeedijk. De tentoonstelling was een initiatief van de Grote Advies Commissie der Illegaliteit, een landelijke bundeling van verzetsgroepen. Verzet was dan ook het centrale thema van waaruit het kersverse oorlogsverleden werd bezien.

Eerder was de expositie in de Nieuwe Kerk in Amsterdam te zien geweest, en na Rotterdam zou de tentoonstelling naar Almelo gaan. Bijzonder is dat de tentoonstelling aan de plaatselijke situatie werd aangepast. In Rotterdam waren, dankzij medewerking van het voormalig Rotterdams verzet, maquettes te bewonderen waarin lokale verzetsdaden waren gereconstrueerd, zoals een overval op het hoofdbureau van politie aan het Haagsche Veer. Het accent lag doelbewust niet op authentieke objecten. Waar in tegenwoordige historische musea juist

veel wordt gewerkt met historische objecten, plaatsen en verhalen, streefden de makers van 'Weerbare democratie' ernaar geen 'resten en overblijfselen van het praktische verzetswerk' tentoon te stellen. Dit waren enkel 'dode voorwerpen' die 'pas belangwekkend [worden] door wat men erbij denkt'. Uit te beelden 'wat men erbij denken moet', was het centrale uitgangspunt van de tentoonstelling, en dat kon beter aan de hand van kunstwerken, speciaal voor de tentoonstelling gemaakt door gerenommeerde kunstenaars.

Toch was er wel degelijk een authentiek historisch object, zowel in Amsterdam als in Rotterdam: een drukpers waarmee tijdens de oorlog valse persoonsbewijzen waren gemaakt. Bezoekers konden deze gereconstrueerde illegale drukkerij ook echt in werking zien, en zelfs een Ausweis laten maken (zie afbeelding). Op deze van allerhande stempels met adelaars en hakenkruisen voorziene facsimile kon de bezoeker zijn of haar naam invullen en de datum waarop de tentoonstelling was bezocht. Daarmee werd verklaard dat het 'gedurende de bezettingstijd niet mogelijk gebleken [was] hem/haar een Nationaalsocialistische of Fascistische gezindheid bij te brengen', zo stond er op het document. De authentieke drukpers diende daarmee een doel van het (toenmalige) heden: het uitdragen van de verzetsidealen. Met de Ausweis nam de bezoeker als het ware een aandeel in een antinazistische identiteit.

De verzets-Ausweis roept allerlei vragen op die tot het instrumentarium van historici behoren, zoals de vraag naar continuïteit en verandering. Vanuit de historische cultuur-benadering gaat het daarbij specifiek om het nauwgezet bestuderen en verklaren van de (beeld)taal en de praktijken waarmee uitdrukking en betekenis werd gegeven aan het toenmalige heden en verleden. In dat licht is de Ausweis niet slechts een mooie vondst, maar ook wetenschappelijk interessant. Uit diverse empirische studies, deels verricht aan deze faculteit, is gebleken dat het verleden sinds de jaren tachtig steeds individueler wordt beleefd. In die zin was de tentoonstellings-Ausweis zijn tijd ver vooruit. De Ausweis doet bovendien denken aan de (eveneens nagemaakte) identiteitskaart van Holocaustslachtoffers die bezoekers van het United States Holocaust Memorial Museum in Washington DC krijgen uitgereikt, waarna ze er in het museum achter komen of 'hun' slachtoffer de vervolging heeft overleefd of niet. Zoiets was in de jaren 1990 state of the art in museumland, maar tegenwoordig zetten veel historische musea zulke strategieën in om de bezoeker te stimuleren zich in te leven in het verleden. De afstand tussen verleden en heden wordt ermee voor even overbrugd, zo is althans het streven.

Een belangrijk verschil met 'Weerbare democratie' is echter dat het oorlogsverleden in 1946 nog vers in het geheugen lag. Het was dan ook niet de afstand in de tijd die hier diende te worden overbrugd

- al was de oorlog inmiddels geschiedenis geworden - maar de afstand tussen de uiteenlopende posities in bezettingstijd. Slechts een kleine minderheid van de bevolking had immers actief een rol in het verzet vervuld. De tentoonstelling voorzag Nederland dus van een opgepoetste collectieve identiteit die eenheid en houvast bood in de naoorlogse samenleving die opnieuw moest worden opgebouwd; letterlijk maar ook ideologisch. Dit belangrijke doel heiligde het middel: het vertekenen van het beeld van het verleden. Het verzet had het Nederlandse volk samengebonden, zo heette het, en werd nu als collectieve heldendaad omarmd en toegeëigend als ideologisch fundament van de naoorlogse vrijheid en een 'weerbare democratie'. In hoeverre er eensgezindheid bestond over de verdere invulling van die gezamenlijke toekomst bleef in de tentoonstelling onbesproken.

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Laurie Slegtenhorst

In de voetsporen van de Geallieerden

Promovenda Historische Cultuur

Wandelaars van de Vierdaagse lopen door de historische zone bij de brug 'De Oversteek' in Nijmegen op 19-07-2016.
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"I think we are walking in their footsteps […]. This is hard, but what they did was harder and kind of little bit of respect for that".

In dit citaat verbindt een negentienjarige militair uit Wales het heden met het verleden door tijdens het wandelen van de Nijmeegse Vierdaagse in 2016 zich in te beelden hoe de geallieerden in september 1944 *Operation Market Garden* uitvoerden om een groot deel van Zuid-Nederland te bevrijden. Deze verbinding werd nog eens versterkt doordat het interview plaatsvond bij de rivier de Waal en de brug ´De Oversteek´ die een belangrijke rol speelden tijdens de bevrijding van Nijmegen op 20 september 1944.

Speciaal voor het honderdjarige jubileum van de Vierdaagse had de Stichting *Liberation Route Europe* (2013) in samenwerking met het vfonds (Nationaal Fonds voor Vrede, Vrijheid en Veteranenzorg) het initiatief genomen om de wandelaars een historische beleving van de Tweede Wereldoorlog te geven. Beide organisaties hebben als doelstelling om de geschiedenis van de Tweede Wereldoorlog zichtbaar te maken in het hedendaagse landschap en te verbinden aan verschillende recreatieve evenementen. Op deze manier zouden mensen gestimuleerd worden om na denken over het verleden en de vrede en vrijheid waarin we nu leven.

Langs de route van de Vierdaagse werden elke dag zogenaamde historische zones ingericht, verbonden aan een historisch locatie, waarin een thema uit de oorlogsperiode 1944-1945 werd uitgelicht. In deze zones werd gebruik gemaakt van historische beelden/foto's en audiofragmenten om de geschiedenis dichterbij de wandelaars te brengen. Om zicht te krijgen op het perspectief van de bezoekers heb ik op de tweede dag van de Vierdaagse de historische zone bij de brug 'De Oversteek' bezocht en 51 wandelaars (waaronder militairen) geïnterviewd.

In mijn promotieonderzoek *Heldhaftige Geschiedenissen. De popularisering van de Tweede Wereldoorlog in Nederland sinds ca. 2000* bestudeer ik door middel van interviews en enquêtes hoe mensen tegenwoordig omgaan met geschiedenis uit populaire media. De manier waarop populaire representaties het heden verbinden met het verleden is een belangrijk onderzoeksgebied van de geschiedenis afdeling op de Erasmus Universiteit. In dit onderzoek gebruik ik het concept 'historische afstand' om de afgenomen interviews te analyseren en te bestuderen. Ik bekijk op welke manier de deelnemers van de Vierdaagse een temporele verbinding maken tussen het heden en verleden, hoe zij op een emotionele manier verbonden zijn met de geschiedenis en welke betekenis de plek en/of historische zone heeft voor hun historische beleving.

Het citaat aan het begin van dit artikel toont aan dat de geschiedenis van de Tweede Wereldoorlog voor deze militair dichterbij kwam door

dezelfde route te volgen als de geallieerden in 1944 en de zware fysieke omstandigheden die hij voelde tijdens het wandelen. Voor een andere, 32-jarige Amerikaanse militair kwam de geschiedenis juist dichterbij door het zien van de brug waar zijn divisie in 1944 had gevochten:

> "For me it is very important that bridges, especially important, because I am in the 82nd Airborne division and that is where the 504 parachute infantry regiment and the 505th crossed during operation Market Garden to engage the Germans."

Andere wandelaars konden de verbinding met het verleden vooral maken door het zien van de vele militairen en de historische beelden in de zones.

> "Ik loop wel de hele dag tussen de militairen en dat brengt je wel een beetje terug naar die tijd." (groepsinterview twee mannen en vrouwen, tussen de 52-58 jaar, Nederland).

> "Maar het ziet er nu heel anders uit dan toen, dus het is ook mooi als je een keer de foto's erbij ziet of…. en nog mooier als je de verhalen erbij hoorde." (man, 67 jaar, Nederland).

Andere reacties toonden aan dat de geschiedenis op een afstand bleef, de historische zones weinig indruk maakten en de Vierdaagse vooral gezien werd als recreatie.

> "Het is een leuke manier om aandacht te krijgen, maar ik ben aan het lopen, ik kijk verder heel weinig en ik let heel slecht op. Het is niet echt aan mij besteed." (vrouw, 66 jaar, Nederland).

De afstand of nabijheid tot het verleden werd door het publiek op verschillende manieren waargenomen, en was afhankelijk van hun persoonlijke en emotionele betrokkenheid bij het verleden. Uit de citaten werd duidelijk dat militaire deelnemers veel binding met het verleden voelden, door het zien van de locaties en het gevoel in de voetsporen van hun militaire voorgangers te lopen. Voor de civiele deelnemers bleef de geschiedenis vooral op een afstand en werd het in de meeste gevallen ook niet aangewakkerd door de historische zones. De Vierdaagse bleef voor hen voornamelijk een recreatief evenement.

Toch moet deze conclusie niet te negatief worden gezien. De historische zones hadden de geschiedenis wel weer een plek gegeven in het hedendaagse landschap en de deelnemers het besef gegeven onder welke zware omstandigheden de geallieerden in 1944 hier moesten opereren en aan wie zij het te danken hebben dat zij tijdens de Vierdaagse in vrijheid kunnen wandelen.

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Foto van een screenshot uit het spel Call of Duty: WWII. In de screenshot is een gefictionaliseerde versie van het concentratiekamp Berga te zien, waarin de speler virtueel kan rondlopen om uiteindelijk op zoek te gaan naar Robert Zussman, een gevangen genomen Joodse medesoldaat.

Bron: 'CALL OF DUTY WW2 – Ending / Epiloque', in: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8QGVxEVZwnQ, geraadpleegd op 08.09.2018.

Pieter Van den Heede

'De Beste Oorlog Ooit' herbeleven? De verbeelding van de Tweede Wereldoorlog in digitale entertainment games

Promovendus Theorie en Methoden van de Geschiedenis

Op welke manier wordt de Tweede Wereldoorlog verbeeld in digitale entertainment games? Dit is de centrale vraag van mijn promotie-onderzoek naar contemporaine historische cultuur. Digitale games zijn vandaag immers alomtegenwoordig. De game-industrie genereert wereldwijd al enkele jaren meer inkomsten dan de film- en de muziekindustrie samen. Tegelijk vormen games ook de belichaming van twee centrale kenmerken van onze samenleving. Het eerste is haar inherente 'speelse' karakter, in die zin dat de menselijke cultuur al eeuwenlang doordrongen is van talloze spelelementen, zoals beschreven door de Nederlandse cultuurhistoricus Johan Huizinga. Het tweede is de toenemende digitalisering, aangezien games vaak een voortrekkersrol spelen inzake digitale innovatie, en gamers zich in een fundamenteel gedigitaliseerde omgeving bewegen wanneer ze online spelen, 'streamen' via Twitch, en actief zijn op chat-apps als Discord. Entertainment games bieden met andere woorden een centrale inkijk in hoe mensen vandaag omgaan met het gecontesteerde verleden van de Tweede Wereldoorlog, en welk beeld ze over de oorlog hebben. En dat in een samenleving waarin ook de 'beleving' van het verleden steeds meer centraal is komen te staan en waarin het onderscheid tussen 'officiële' en 'populaire' historische verbeeldingen, en de producenten en consumenten ervan, fundamenteel vaag is geworden. Dat is een van de centrale gecontextualiseerde vragen die we aan de afdeling geschiedenis van de Erasmus Universiteit proberen te beantwoorden.

Hoe bieden games een verbeelding van dit verwoestende conflict?

Tot enkele jaren geleden volstond het om te zeggen dat entertainment games over de Tweede Wereldoorlog, die vooral door Amerikaanse, Britse en Russische spelontwikkelaars worden gemaakt, zich op een beperkt aantal thema's richten. Een daarvan is de weergave van heroïsche 'witte' mannelijke soldaten en generaals en het vermogen van spelers om in die hoedanigheid het verloop van de oorlog te bepalen. Een andere is de gedetailleerde weergave van wapentuig en andere 'militaria'. En niet de minste is ook de voorstelling van het Naziregime als het ultieme kwaad dat de speler in een episch eindgevecht moet vernietigen. Opvallend hierbij is dat deze games vaak een aantal 'filters' bevat. Zo zijn in de virtuele werelden van spellen over de Tweede Wereldoorlog meestal geen burgers te zien en worden fysieke verminking en andere gevolgen van oorlog niet getoond. Ontwikkelaars willen de speler een aangename ervaring bezorgen, en daarom morele ambiguïteit vermijden. Hetzelfde gold tot voor kort voor de weergave van de Holocaust in games. Spelontwikkelaars gingen dit thema meestal uit de weg, omdat games als een trivialiserend medium gezien worden, dat niet in staat is om de Holocaust op een respectvolle manier weer te geven.

Wat dit laatste betreft is er de voorbije jaren echter een kentering merkbaar. In 2017 bracht Activision, één van de grootste Amerikaanse uitgevers van games, het spel *Call of Duty: WWII* uit, waarin wel degelijk, zij het deels impliciet, een poging wordt gedaan om de Holocaust in beeld te brengen (zie afbeelding). Wat meteen de vraag oproept: hoe wordt de Holocaust voorgesteld in dit spel?

Algemeen kan gesteld worden dat de verbeelding van de Holocaust in *Call of Duty: WWII* vooral een ideologische functie vervult. In het spel kruip je als speler in de huid van de fictieve Amerikaanse soldaat Ronald Daniels, die deelneemt aan de landing in Normandië op D-Day, en van daaruit optrekt om West-Europa te bevrijden van de Nazi-bezetter. Tijdens de opmars bouwt Daniels een vriendschap op met Robert Zussman, een Joodse medesoldaat die later, tijdens de 'Slag om de Ardennen' in de winter van 1944, gevangen genomen wordt door het Duitse leger. Daniels zweert dat hij alles zal doen om Zussman terug te vinden, omdat hij doorheen de strijd geleerd heeft dat "alleen het vechten voor je strijdmakkers je overeind houdt." De zoektocht levert aanvankelijk niets op, maar op het einde van het spel ontdekt Daniels' legereenheid toch het concentratiekamp Berga, waar Zussman gevangen gehouden wordt (het kamp dat getoond wordt op de afbeelding). Samen met zijn medesoldaten, waarvan sommigen zelf eerst nog antisemitische opvattingen hadden geuit, slaagt Daniels erin om Zussman net van de dood te redden.

Wat hierbij opvalt zijn twee zaken: in de eerste plaats vormt *Call of Duty: WWII* in belangrijke mate een herinterpretatie van een verheerlijkende mythologische verbeelding van de Tweede Wereldoorlog, zoals die al sinds de jaren 1990 een centrale rol speel in het Amerikaanse herinneringsdiscours. Het is de verbeelding van een conflict waarin nobele alledaagse Amerikaanse burgers, als lid van 'the greatest generation', belangeloos ten strijde trokken om Europa te bevrijden van het kwaad. Daarnaast wordt de Holocaust in Call of Duty: WWII vooral getoond als de verschrikking die alle Amerikaanse soldaten tijdens de oorlog samenbrengt als 'Amerikanen', ondanks het feit dat raciale conflicten destijds, en vandaag de dag nog steeds, een centrale rol spe(e)l(d)en in de Amerikaanse samenleving. Dit toont aan hoe games actief bijdragen aan een bestendiging van populaire nationale mythes, die vervolgens hun weg vinden naar een veel groter mondiaal publiek, ook in Nederland.

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Lise Zurné

Wie wil de kolonist zijn? Historische *re-enactments* van de dekolonisatie

Promovenda Theorie en Methoden van de Geschiedenis

?

Op 5 maart 2016 stond ik in een uniform van de *Tentara Sukarela Pembela Tanah Air*, de Verdedigers van het Vaderland, voor een koloniaal fort, midden in de Indonesische stad Yogyakarta. De parkeerplaats van het fort was getransformeerd tot een podium: er lagen juten zakken, houten barricades met prikkeldraad, en groene tonnen met daarop het logo van de Bataafse Petroleum Maatschappij geschilderd. Deze zelfgemaakte attributen dienden ooit als schuilplaats voor de onafhankelijkheidsstrijders tegen de kogels van het koloniale leger.

Ik had mij destijds drie maanden ondergedompeld in de wereld van de *historical re-enactments*. Veel landen kennen hedendaagse historische nabootsingen van grote veldslagen zoals die van Waterloo (BE), de Slag bij Gettysburg (VS) en in Nederland bijvoorbeeld de Slag om Grolle. Vaak worden deze *re-enactors* afgedaan als mannen die simpelweg soldaatje willen spelen. Zeker in de academische wereld is er tot nu toe weinig aandacht geweest voor deze populaire vorm van het beleven en representeren van het verleden. Dat, terwijl toch duizenden mensen zich regelmatig in deze 'gevechten' mengen. Mijn huidige onderzoek richt zich op deze *re-enactors* en hoopt inzichten te bieden in de hedendaagse interpretatie van het verleden. Waar meestal de 'verre' vijand wordt nagespeeld richt ik me op de *re-enactments* van een 'dichtbij' verleden: de Tweede Wereldoorlog en de dekolonisatie van Indonesië. Daarbij ga ik er vanuit dat, door hun nabijheid, deze historische episodes nog steeds gevoelig liggen en daarmee noodzakelijk ethische dilemma's oproepen. Wat voor keuzes maken *re-enactors* daarin? Wat laten ze wel en niet zien? Hoe 'speel' en representeer je bijvoorbeeld lijden, executies of ander buitengewoon geweld? En is het moeilijk, om de 'vijand' te spelen? Of juist niet, in Indonesië leek de rol van de KNIL soldaat het meest geliefd want, "zij zagen er gewoon zo cool uit, toch?", aldus een van de deelnemers.

Wat *re-enactments* onderscheidt van andere populariserende genres is de zintuigelijke ervaring die het biedt aan de deelnemers. Het gaat om het zo goed mogelijk nabootsen van de omstandigheden van het verleden om je zo te kunnen inleven in de historische personages en de keuzes die zij gemaakt hebben, oftewel: de geschiedenis leren van 'binnenuit'. Het belang van de zintuigelijke ervaring geldt niet alleen voor de *performance* – ook vooraf aan deze momenten zijn *re-enactors* fysiek bezig met het zich eigen maken van het verleden. Bijvoorbeeld door zelf wapens en militaire objecten te maken, trainingsweekenden te organiseren waarin militaire strategieën worden geoefend, tot het samen drinken van een borrel in stijl: oranje bitter. Volgens sommige academici is de toenemende interesse in de 'tastbaarheid' van het verleden onderdeel van een affective turn waarin de focus zou liggen op de individuele

ervaring en het dagelijks leven in plaats van politieke processen. De vraag luidt dan ook: kunnen zintuigelijke ervaringen helpen in het genereren van kennis?

Alhoewel re-enactment zeker onderzoek vereist naar de historische episode in kwestie heeft mijn eerdere onderzoek uitgewezen dat ze niet altijd uitnodigen tot kritische discussies over de representatie van het verleden. Controverses werden liever uit de weggegaan, waarbij er voornamelijk een geromantiseerd beeld van het verleden werd geschetst met de nadruk op kameraadschap en eenheid. Re-enactment onderzoekers stellen dan ook dat *re-enactments* door de fysieke en psychologische ervaring voornamelijk leiden tot een ander soort kennis, namelijk een *bodily knowledge*. Dit perspectief vraagt om een onderzoeksmethode die zich dan ook richt op de 'ervaring' van het naspelen van het verleden: *sensory ethnography*. Daarmee wordt niet alleen de zintuigelijke beleving van de onderzochte deelnemers onderdeel van de analyse, maar ook die van de onderzoeker zelf .

Terug naar 5 maart 2016, waar het geluid van sirenes over de speakers schalde, het signaal voor het begin van het gevecht. Waar in een film of musical de narratieve structuur gecontroleerd wordt en talloze malen geoefend, biedt een re-enactment tot op zekere hoogte ruimte voor eigen invulling. Door deze 'speelruimte' zouden deelnemers zoals ik de 'echte' oorlog ervaren. Maar door de talloze explosieven die afgevuurd worden, het geluid van geweerschoten over de speaker en schuilend achter mijn camera, word ik voornamelijk overrompeld door alles dat op mij af komt. Voor mij leek het één grote chaos. Ik zag hoe, terwijl sommigen zich braaf in het gevecht mengden, anderen voornamelijk leken te schrikken van de harde knallen en de rook. Een paar leken niet precies te weten wat ze moesten doen of waar ze hun geweer op moesten richten, en keken vooral toe vanaf de rand van de gevechtslinie. Het leek voor sommigen dan ook een opluchting toen het volkslied Indonesia Raya over de speakers galmde: de republikeinse soldaten hadden toch de Nederlanders weten te verslaan. Dus zo voelde oorlog! Waar velen de intenties van *re-enactors* bevragen en kritische vragen stellen over hoe zij met het verleden omspringen heeft de *re-enactment* op 5 maart mij in ieder geval een ding geleerd: dat 'oorlog', zelfs met de volle wetenschap dat het gespeeld is, toch best eng, onvoorspelbaar en chaotisch is, en dat misschien niemand in de gevechtslinie echt weet waar hij of zij mee bezig is. Alsnog een sensorische ervaring, die van nut kan zijn voor de geschiedschrijving.

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Maria Grever

Het "bonnetje": de kracht van het verhaal

Hoogleraar Theorie en Methoden van de Geschiedenis

Bijschrift

Komt een staatssecretaris bij Veiligheid en Justitie. Hij is afkomstig uit de rechterlijke macht, de staande magistratuur. Als officier van justitie heeft hij in 2000 een deal gesloten met drugshandelaar Cees H. waartoe hij niet bevoegd was. *Du moment* dat hij lid wordt van de regering in 2010 vormt hij een integriteitrisico, al verzwijgt hij dat. Zou die deal bekend worden dan loopt zijn positie en die van de minister gevaar. De kwestie regardeert ook de premier omdat hij eindverantwoordelijk is voor de samenstelling van zijn kabinet: Rutte-I.

In 2014 bericht *Nieuwsuur* over de deal. Er ontstaat discussie over het exacte bedrag van de schikking, variërend van 1,25 miljoen tot 2 miljoen euro. Het bewijs, het bankafschrift van de transactie met H., is echter zoek. De regering dwingt Kamerleden van de coalitie om de cover-up in stand te houden. Dat gaat zover dat zelfs de Kamervoorzitter informatie ter controle van de regering vernietigt. Vier dagen nadat *Nieuwsuur* het exacte bedrag in 2015 onthult, vinden ambtenaren van Veiligheid en Justitie alsnog "het bonnetje" in een verouderd financieel computersysteem. Het bonnetje bevestigt dat het OM destijds 4,7 miljoen euro heeft overgemaakt aan Cees H. Alle betrokkenen bij de affaire zijn van de VVD. Drie stappen noodgedwongen op: staatssecretaris Fred Teeven, minister Ivo Opstelten en Kamervoorzitter Marga Miltenburg. Premier Mark Rutte blijft buiten schot.

We kennen deze feiten over de "Teevendeal" vooral dankzij standvastig speurwerk van Bas Haan, *Nieuwsuur* journalist en alumnus Maatschappijgeschiedenis van de Erasmus Universiteit. Zijn waarheidsvinding heeft grote politieke consequenties gehad. Maar we zijn er nog niet. Haan heeft er een boek over geschreven, *De rekening voor Rutte* (2017)

> "omdat de optelsom van alle deelverhalen en onderdelen van de affaire pas laat zien hoe fundamenteel fout de gevoerde politiek is geweest. Het geheel is meer dan de som der delen en dat kan alleen in een boek vastgelegd worden."

Het opmerkelijke is dat na de verschijning van het boek ook de opvolger van Opstelten, VVD minister Ard van der Steur, in 2017 moet aftreden. Hoe is dit mogelijk?

Haan heeft niet alleen feiten op een rij gezet, maar ze geïntegreerd in een verhaal met een plot. Een goed plot beeldt volgens Aristoteles één complete handeling uit, zo stelde hij in zijn Poëtica. Hij baseerde zich op de Odyssee waarin Homerus niet alle gebeurtenissen in het leven van Odysseus vertelt maar zich concentreert op zijn thuiskomst, waaraan alle andere verhalen ondergeschikt zijn gemaakt. Volgens Aristoteles hebben dichters een plot nodig voor de eenheid van het verhaal omdat zij schrijven

over zaken die kunnen gebeuren. Historici vertellen slechts wat is gebeurd. Ruim tweeduizend jaar later benadrukte Paul Ricoeur in zijn magnus opus *Time and Narrative* dat een plot ook in geschiedschrijving van groot belang is, omdat het een integrerende werking heeft. Geen enkele historicus schrijft "en toen, en toen … ". Dat doen kroniekschrijvers. Pas in een verhaal wordt door middel van het plot betekenis gegeven aan de gebeurtenissen. Dat geldt ook voor het boek van Bas Haan. De volgende plots zouden mogelijk zijn geweest:

1. "*Liberals First*", het partijbelang gaat voor: de staatsrechterlijke scheiding der machten is voor de VVD ondergeschikt aan de continuering van de bestuurlijke macht.

2. De loyaliteit van de premier: Mark Rutte beschermt mensen in zijn directe omgeving totdat het echt niet meer kan. Maar in feite beschermt hij zichzelf, want hij is verantwoordelijk voor de samenstelling van de regering. Hij holt zodoende de functie van de Tweede Kamer en daarmee ook van de rechtsstaat uit.

Het plot in Haans boek is de reconstructie van de doofpot. Tijdens het schrijven ontvouwt zich een patroon over de rol van Rutte dat leidt tot een volgende "smoking gun": de email van Van der Steur aan Opstelten. De cover-up is bewezen en de val van minister Van der Steur onvermijdelijk. Eén element is uitgegroeid tot de kristallisatie van het hele proces: "het bonnetje". Dat ene bonnetje heeft de doofpot blootgelegd. Het is een metafoor geworden voor alle moeite die is gedaan om de Teevendeal onder de pet te houden.

Bij de leerstoel geschiedtheorie in Rotterdam analyseren we de relatie tussen tekst (beeld) en lezer (kijker), de rol van het plot in de (historische) narratio, en hoe mensen deel uitmaken van tradities en daar vorm aan geven. Betekenis is nooit definitief maar ontstaat en verandert in dialoog met tradities, wanneer we in gesprek zijn over de zaak waar het om gaat. Dit type onderzoek, in de geschiedfilosofie aangeduid als hermeneutiek, vormt een integraal onderdeel van het onderzoeksprogramma History@Erasmus en van ons onderwijs. Want net als aan elke opleiding Geschiedenis leren Rotterdamse studenten vaardigheden om kritisch en integer bronnenonderzoek te doen. Maar ze leren ook dat de manier waarop het verhaal wordt geconstrueerd, welk plot je kiest, een groot effect heeft op beeldvorming en geloofwaardigheid. Dat laat het fascinerende boek van Haan overtuigend zien.

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Defeat of the Spanish Armada, 8 August 1588; by Philip James de Loutherbourg (1796 – oil on canvas).

Tina van der Vlies

Encountering Histories in English and Dutch Textbooks, 1920-2000

PhD Candidate and lecturer Historical Culture

In 1949, an English history textbook described the retreating German troops after the Battle of Britain – the German Air Force air campaign against the United Kingdom in 1940 – as follows:

> "They were the retreating remnants of a shattered and disordered armada whose rout meant even more to Britain than had the defeat of the Spanish Armada nearly four hundred years earlier."

The authors made a historical analogy between 1940 and the English defeat of the Spanish Armada in the sixteenth century in order to compare the impact of these routs on Britain. In turn their narration of sixteenth century events employs a flash-forward effect to emphasize the danger of invasion in 1588:

> "Our country has been threatened with invasion several times since 1588, but until the German threat in 1940 the danger has never been as great as that from the Spanish Armada."

This history textbook exposes narrative encounters between past events and contemporary war experiences. The year 1588 functions as an important anchor in the narration of the past; it offers a background perspective for observing and understanding the present. The event of 1588 is one of the most famous stories in English history and has gained universal meaning in its narrative form: it has become a heroic apologue of the defence of freedom against tyranny, an eternal myth of the victory of the weak over the strong. Hence, throughout their textbook series, the authors employed more flashbacks to this naval battle in 1588, for example, in their narration about Napoleon.

History textbooks contain canonised texts about the past. National narratives in this genre have provided many people with

meaning, memory and identity. Members of a particular culture often remember and narrate the past as well as the present according to the same mental schemata and plot structures as these cultural codes are relevant to its members. Since these cultural codes are shared by a mnemonic community, several studies have examined what these communities collectively remember and highlight the complexities of collective remembrance within a certain community that is often not as homogenous as it seems. In addition to the content, I am particularly interested in the mnemonic form in which national communities remember, narrate and transmit the past as detectable in the schemata and plot structures of national narratives in history textbooks.

This mnemonic form is not necessarily bound to national contexts: it can be transnational as well. The quoted English textbook series is entitled *The Four Freedoms or the People We Are*, referring to the 'freedom speech' by United States President Franklin Roosevelt in 1941. Roosevelt proposed four fundamental freedoms for everyone: freedom of speech, freedom of religion, freedom from want and freedom from fear. The English textbook authors used Roosevelt's speech as a trans-historical frame to narrate their nation's past, present and future. They started their textbook with an image in which the journey towards the four freedoms is represented as four rivers flowing towards the future. The future is located in the year 2000, a glorious horizon where the four freedoms appear to arrive at their ultimate destination. On these rivers, there are several ships travelling towards the horizon, some of which threaten the four freedoms and are sinking while others remain afloat. The ships *Armada* and *Hitler*, representing the danger of invasion, are both sinking in the river 'Freedom from fear'. The authors showed the significance of history, including the horrible period of World War II, by narrating history as an attempt to obtain the four freedoms.

The question of how and why textbook authors combine different histories, places and times is a key focus of my research. The study of these combinations can contribute to a deeper understanding of how history is transmitted, interpreted and perpetuated in textbooks. Resonance patterns in history textbooks can reveal widespread frames of references and possible schemata in the narration of national history. I study national narratives in English and Dutch history textbooks for 11-14 year-old students published in the period 1920-2000. This comparative study embraces a multidisciplinary approach which fits well into History@Erasmus and uses insights from different fields - such as history, memory studies, literature and sociology - to scrutinize how and why different periods intermingle in narrated and remembered history. This process can transform the meaning of an event by associating it with the interpretative framework of another event. Moreover, instead of comparisons between two moments in time (historical analogies), the chain of signification is derived from a *combination* of cross-references between histories. Distinct moments in time and space are recomposed into a different configuration. Hence, by examining how textbook authors combine histories, places and periods in their narrative, this study can bring to light how history is made sense of, and to what extent this has changed after large-scale events, such as war.

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
Figure 1. Choropleth map of geographical orientations in master's thesis titles in the History of Society, 1983-2018

Figure 2. Hexbin map of geographical orientations in master's thesis titles in the History of Society, 1983-2018

Robbert-Jan Adriaansen

Mapping 40 years of thesis topics in the History of Society

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Historical culture is an important research field in our history department. Historical culture broadly entails the various relationships people individually or collectively maintain with the past. All too often, scholars make a distinction between historiography - the study of the historical discipline - which is serious business, and popular forms of memory, which can be manipulated, distorted, and abused for all kinds of purposes. Historical culture aims to do away with this normative binary opposition and studies historiography as one of many ways in which cultures make the past meaningful. My research focuses on metahistorical questions regarding conceptions of history, historical consciousness and historicity, but I always aim to operationalise abstract theory. Today's digital culture offers many opportunities to gather, analyse, and visualise data on how people give meaning to the past. By means of example, and in honour of 40 years of History at Erasmus University Rotterdam, I will illustrate this by literally mapping the geospatial foci of 40 years of master's theses in the History of Society programme. What were the places our students have been interested in? About which topoi did they write their master's theses and *doctoraalscripties*?

In order to gain insight into these issues I compiled a dataset consisting of author names, thesis titles and years of publication by scraping the WorldCat library catalogue. Theses published since 2006 have been made digitally available in the EUR Thesis Repository (https://thesis.eur.nl). The titles indexed under our master's programme were added to the dataset and duplicate entries were removed. This resulted in a dataset comprising of 895 titles of theses completed from 1983 to 2018. Next, the thesis titles were analysed with the natural language processing API Textrazor which provides named entity recognition for both Dutch and English texts including location entities.

50 percent of the titles contained an identifiable toponym and, of that group, 28 percent contained more than one place name. Textrazor returned a longitude and latitude per toponym. By itself this is not very meaningful as entire countries are represented by geometric points, i.e. Kenya is represented by a geolocation near Anghiti Restaurant in Nairobi (delicious Indian cuisine, but awfully small portions!). Yet this data does offer the possibility of identifying the frequency in which the geometric points occur within an already available dataset of national boundaries. The result is a choropleth map (Figure 1), which displays the count of geometric points within national borders in a gradient colour scale.

The map provides a lot of information about the geospatial orientation of the master's theses. The relative prominence of the Netherlands as a point of focus may come as no surprise but apart from that the map displays a truly global orientation. The former Dutch colonies are well represented but do not stand out in comparison to places that show less traces of Dutch colonial involvement such as India or Russia. It appears that the global is not necessarily approached through Dutch eyes – an observation that is confirmed by reviewing the thesis titles. The choice of geographical focus could have been that of the student but there were, and still are, structural incentives in the curriculum that influence the choice of focus. The expertise of the supervisors is one, but also courses, and particular thesis classes (or, as we call them, research workshops) influence the geographical focus. The existence of the research workshop "The Rise and Fall of the American Empire" can – for example – explain the steady flow of theses on US history that is visible in the 2010s.

There is also much information a choropleth map does not show or even distort. Firstly, the map takes nation states as the main geographical entities and prevents the visibility of transnational, regional and local research interests as cities, for example, are represented by the nation. Secondly, the represented nations are presented as static entities whereas the dataset contains theses about political entities long gone such as the Soviet Union. In order to solve the first issue (the latter is more complex to solve), I created a hexbin map that displays the density of features in a hexagonal grid, again with a gradient colour. In this map, polygonal – instead of geometric point – representations of political entities were retrieved from Openstreetmaps. The overlapping polygons per hexagonal bin were counted and finally the hexbin map was plotted. This provides a more nuanced insight into thesis topics. For example, Mexico seems to have attracted no interest as a topic but the hexbin map shows that Mexico City has. The same local focus counts for Nairobi and Buenos Aires.

All in all, this case study shows not only what the geospatial orientations of 40 years of master's theses in the History of Society

programme were, but also that the multidisciplinary approach in terms of theory and methodology for which the History of Society stands is far from dead and may revive in the near future inspired by the digital humanities.

Further reading

The source code of this chapter can be found at: [https://github.com/rjadr/mapping-40-years-of-history-at-EUR].

Grever, Maria and Robbert-Jan Adriaansen. "Historical culture: A concept revisited." Mario Carretero, Stefan Berger and Maria Grever, eds. *Palgrave handbook of research in historical culture and education.* Basingstoke, 2017: 73-89.

Yim, Aldrin, Claire Chung and Allen Yu. *Matplotlib for Python developers: effective techniques for data visualization with Python.* Birmingham, 2018.

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