



<Articles>On the Establishment of the Possessive Have Got and its Cognitive Motivation

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On the Establishment of the Possessive *Have Got* and its Cognitive Motivation*

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1. Introduction

This article deals with the *have got* form in British English that denotes possession, exemplified by the following:¹

- (1) a. John's got a key to the safe in his pocket.
b. The kids in my class haven't got any imagination.

Both of the examples describe the possessive relation between the subject and the object.² We will call this kind of expression the possessive *have got*.

The purpose of the present article is to show the establishment of the possessive *have got* from a cognitive perspective. Section 2 examines the relation between the possessive *have got* and the form in which the perfect of *get* takes a nominal as its object (for the convenience of discussion, hereafter, the perfect of *get*). Section 3 examines the semantic and syntactic behavior of the possessive *have got*. Section 4 considers the establishment of the possessive *have got* with using the notion of "scope", roughly defined as portions of a scene that are conceptually cut off on the basis of our cognitive ability. Section 5 is a conclusion.

2. Relation between the Possessive *Have Got* and the Perfect of *Get*

2.1. *Implicature or Independent Meaning?*

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¹ As is well known, the form of the perfect of *get* is different between British English and American English. In British English, the sequence *have got* is used as both the possessive *have got* and the perfect of *get*. In American English, on the other hand, the regular past participle of *get* is not *got* but *gotten* and hence the possessive *have got* is clearly distinguished from the perfect of *get*. Since we are here concerned with the relation between them, we limit the discussion to the possessive *have got* in British English.

² 'Possessive' should be taken in a broad sense, because it might be difficult to count the following sentences as describing possessive relations:

- (i) a. *This room has got large windows.*
b. *The tree has got a ball on it.*

As the purpose of this paper is concerned, it is not necessary to discuss the relation in detail.

Let us consider the following sentence as the first step in our analysis:

(2) You've got plenty of money.

The meaning of the sentence is ambiguous between possession and acquisition when the sequence *have got* is followed by a nominal. This ambiguity comes from the formal identity between the possessive *have got* and the perfect of *get* (namely, both takes the sequence *have got*). Here, one might ask why the one form carries the two distinct meanings. Intuitively, it seems possible to count a sense of possession in (2) just as an implicature that stems from that of acquisition in the perfect of *get*. The sentence above, in other words, is the perfect of *get* and the sense of possession results from its sense of acquisition. Such a view suggests that there is no need to assume the possessive *have got* as existing independently of the perfect of *get*.

Let us consider in more detail the possibility that a sense of possession in sentences such as (2) is an implicature. In order to reveal it, it is necessary to examine the perfect itself. According to Wada (2001), the perfect implicates two types of resultant states: direct resultant states and indirect resultant states. Let us take a brief look at some of the examples:

- (3) a. Dodos have already died out. (They do not exist on the earth)
 b. I have now given up. (so don't expect any further action on my part)

(Wada (2001:134))

The resultant state in the parenthesis in (3a) and the one in (3b) are direct resultant state and indirect resultant state, respectively. The former is directly derived from the sense of the perfect itself, whereas the latter is not: although the fact that *something has died out* necessarily entails that it does not exist anymore, *giving up something* does not entail the content of the parenthesized sentence.³

Turning now to the perfect of *get*, it implicates a possessing state as a direct resultant state:⁴

³ This distinction seems parallel to the notion of "conventional implicature" and "conversational implicature" by Grice (1975).

⁴ Note that this is restricted to the case where the perfect of *get* describes an act of acquisition.

(4) Jack has got a new car. (He possesses it)

The parenthesized possessing state is entailed as a result of acquisition, because to acquire something always means to possess it, irrelevant of whether the possession lasts for a long time or not. Even if we give something to someone as soon as getting it, possessing it temporarily is no doubt to be implicated. On the basis of the fact, it seems plausible to say that the sense of possession is an implicature and hence the possessive *have got* is not needed.

We must reject the idea that there is no need to count the possessive *have got* as an independent expression, however. There is, in fact, a piece of strong evidence to show that the sense of possession is not an implicature:

(5) You've got plenty of money *in your house*.

This sentence is interpreted only as describing a purely stative situation, i.e. a possessing state, because of the prepositional phrase *in your house* that expresses the place the money is located. If the sentence is the perfect of *get* and its sense of possession is an implicature, we are confronted with a question that is hard to answer: why can the perfect of *get* describe a possessing state with no sense of acquisition?

In contrast, if counting the possessive *have got* as an independent expression of the perfect of *get*, we can account for the fact that the sentence in (5) describes only a possessing state. That is, the sequence *have got* in (5) is not the perfect of *get* but the possessive *have got*. We can account for the following sentence where inalienable objects follow the sequence *have got* by assuming the independent existence of the possessive *have got*:

(6) She has got long arms, three small fingers and short legs.

Although the perfect of *get* cannot be followed by inalienable objects such as *arms*, *fingers*, and *legs* because it describes an act of acquisition, the sentence in (6) is not anomalous. To the extent that we are clinging to the idea that the sense of possession is an implicature, we cannot solve this problem. Rather, what accounts for the plausibility of the sentence in (6) is the idea that the sense of possession is not an implicature and the possessive *have got* exists independently of the perfect of *get*: the sentence in (6) is by no means the perfect of *get*.

Further empirical justification for the independency of the possessive *have got* comes from the observation of (7) and (8):

- (7) a. * John has got a dog, hasn't he?
 b. John has got a dog, doesn't he?
- (8) a. * Mary has got a dog, and John has too.
 b. Mary has got a dog, and John does too.

(Battistella (1987:214-216))

When the *have got* form denotes a possessive meaning, its tagged sentence and the clause involving VP deletion require *do* as in (7) and (8).⁵ (In contrast, the auxiliary *have* appears in both the tagged sentence and the clause involving VP deletion in the case of the perfect of *get*). We cannot explain the behavior without drawing a line between the perfect of *get* and the possessive *have got*. We will discuss the reason why the tagged sentence of the possessive *have got* shows such a behavior in section 4.

From what has been discussed above, we can conclude that the possessive *have got* exists independently of the perfect of *get*. This, however, is not to say that they are homonyms: they, in fact, carry different meanings on the one hand, and are tightly related on the other hand.

2.2. Syntactic and Semantic Relation

We have thus far emphasized the difference between the perfect of *get* and the possessive *have got*. All the same, it is necessary to keep in mind that both of them contain the sequence *have got* which consists of the auxiliary *have* and the main verb *get*. The following examples prove clearly that the sequence *have got* in the possessive *have got* has the same formal structure as the perfect of *get*:

- (9) a. Have you got the key in your bag?
 b. * Do you have got the key in your bag?
- (10)a. I haven't got the money right now.
 b. * I don't have got the money right now.

In the interrogative and negation, the *have* is inverted with the subject in

⁵ LeSourd (1976) and Fodor and Smith (1978) account for this anomalous behavior transformationally. LeSourd postulates that *have got* consists of a main verb *have* and a meaningless morpheme *got* which is transformationally inserted into the main verb position. After the insertion has been applied, the main verb *have* must become an auxiliary on the basis of the syntactic constraint. He also assumes that the generation of tagged sentences and the clause involving VP deletion precedes the insertion of *got* and hence *do* is required in accordance with the main verb *have*. I cannot accept the view because some fundamental questions remain unanswered. See Tamura (2004,2005) for details.

the former and is followed by the negative affix *n't* in the latter. These behaviors clearly prove that the possessive *have got* also consists of the auxiliary and the main verb: its form is identified with that of the perfect of *get*.

In addition to the formal identity, as we have seen, there is also a semantic similarity between the possessive *have got* and the perfect of *get*. A brief look at a pair of examples:

- (11)a. Mary's got Hamlet and Macbeth *in her bag*.
 b. Mary's got Hamlet and Macbeth *from her mother*.

Examples (11a,b) are the possessive *have got* and the perfect of *get*, respectively: the former denotes possession, while the latter acquisition. As noted in the previous subsection, these two notions are not irrelevant each other: they are, as it were, neighboring notions in that one always implicates the other (that is, an act of acquiring something always implicates possessing it). In this respect, we can say that there is a semantic similarity between the possessive *have got* and the perfect of *get*. I will discuss their relation in more detail in section 4.

Taking into consideration the formal identity and semantic similarity (or closeness), it is quite likely that the possessive *have got* has a deep connection with the perfect of *get* though they are not the same. It is said, in fact, that the possessive *have got* has been developed from the perfect of *get* (cf. Jespersen (1931), Visser (1973) and Araki and Ugaji (1984) among others). In contrast, what if we count their identity and similarity as being accidental? We must have overlooked a chance to account not only for the various properties of the possessive *have got*, but also for the reason why one form can convey two types of meaning. We, here, do not take such a view; what gives us an account of them is to assume the connection between the two forms.

3. Semantic Aspect of the Possessive *Have Got*

This section reveals the semantic aspect of the possessive *have got*. Consider the following sentences for example:

- (12)a. Mary has got a beautiful house.
 b. Mary has got blown eyes.

These, as I said at the beginning, denote that the subject referent possesses the object referent with no implication of acquisition. Therefore, it is possible to express inalienable possession as in (12b). As far as

considering the examples above, one may say that the possessive *have got* has no notable features that need to be dealt with; it seems to show the same behavior as the possessive *have* exemplified by *Mary has a master's degree in education*.

There is, however, room for reconsidering this matter. I give pairs of examples to show that the behavior of the possessive *have got* is different from that of the possessive *have*:

(13)a. ? John had got the key in his bag.

b. ? Had you got any pets at home?

(14)a. * He doesn't want to have got the flu.

b. * I ordered him to have got the I.D card with him at all times.

(Toda (1993:62))

What these examples make clear is that the possessive *have got*, unlike the possessive *have* such as *John had the key*, cannot describe possession both in the past as in (13) and in the future as in (14). To put it the other way round, the possessive *have got* describes only a possessing state in the present and hence is used in the simple present tense.⁶

This requires some further explanation. Let us consider the following examples, which are unacceptable in spite of being used in the simple present tense:

(15)a. ? I always/usually have got cash in my wallet.

b. * Every year he's got a week's holiday. (Toda (1993:60))

The possessive *have got* is not compatible with the adverbial phrases (such as *always*, *usually* and *every year*) that describe events as happening regularly or all the time. This fact clearly suggests that the use of the possessive *have got* in the simple present tense cannot always be accepted. Then, when is it acceptable? Toda (1993) makes an important statement on this matter, giving the following:

(16) I haven't got any whisky.

According to Toda, this example implies that whiskey is out of stock not habitually but right now. That is to say, the use of the possessive *have got* is restricted to describe a possessing state just at the time of utterance. Hence, the incompatibility with the adverbial phrases as in (15).

The following example supports the claim that the possessive *have*

⁶ As is well known, the progressive aspect focuses on the situation as being in progress at a particular time. Therefore, the possessive *have got* cannot be used in the present progressive tense.

got describes possession at the time of utterance:

- (17) I haven't got a driving license because I don't have a driving license.

Although both of the main clause and the *because*-clause negate the possession of the same entity (i.e. *a driving license*) and therefore the meaning of the whole sentence seems to be redundant, it is perfectly acceptable. The reason is that the possessive *have got* in the main clause does not necessarily describe the same situation as the possessive *have* in the *because*-clause: the possessive *have got* describes a lack of a driving license at the time of utterance, whereas the possessive *have* a habitual lack of it (that is, the subject may not even take a driving license). We can, therefore, paraphrase (17) as *A driving license is not here with me because I've never passed the test*. In brief, it is the narrowed meaning of the possessive *have got* that makes the interpretation of (17) not redundant.

What needs to be emphasized is that the speaker expresses with using the possessive *have got* whether the possessive relation is established at the time of utterance or not. To put it more concretely, since the speaker does not care whether the possessive relation is continuous or not, the possessive *have got* is compatible with an inalienable object as in (12b). That is to say, it just describes (or cuts off) a possessive relation at the time of utterance. The following pair of examples shows that the speaker directs his/her attention only to the possessive relation at the time of utterance:

- (18)a. Look at that face! He hasn't got any teeth.
 b. I can see she's got a beautiful face.

It is clear here that the possessive *have got* describes not a permanent possessive relation but a possessive relation between a possessor and a possessee at the time of utterance. Thus, the possessive *have got* is compatible even with an inalienable object if it simply describes a possessing state at the time of utterance.

To recapitulate the discussion so far, the possessive *have got* has the narrow meaning in comparison with the possessive *have* in that it is specialized to denote possession at the time of utterance. The following section seeks to consider the establishment of the possessive *have got* and clarify where such a meaning comes from.

4. Establishment of the Possessive *Have Got*

4.1. Narrowing of Scope and Its Motivation

Linguistic expressions are based on our conceptualization and hence vary depending on which portions of a scene we deal with; generally, the same scene can be encoded in any of several different ways. Such a cognitive ability has been introduced into linguistic analyses as the scope of a predication that is put forth by Langacker (1987).⁷ The scope of a predication (hereafter, the scope), defined as portions of a scene, can be used throughout linguistic analyses. Consider the transitive/intransitive alternation, exemplified by the following, which can be accounted for in terms of the scope:

- (19)a. John dropped the ball.
 b. The ball dropped.

The scope of the transitive sentence in (19a) is larger than that of the intransitive sentence in (19b). While the scope is placed over the total scene in the former, it is placed over the final portion of the scene in the latter. In the latter case, the agent and his action of dropping the ball are out of the scope: the speaker focuses his/her attention not on *John* but only on *the ball*. Thus, different patterns of scope can be placed over the scene.

Having introduced the notion of the scope, we now return to the analysis of the possessive *have got* and the perfect of *get*. We claim here that the difference between the possessive *have got* and the perfect of *get* reflects the flexibility in how we place the scope over a scene and that the former resulted from the latter by narrowing the scope. We will begin our discussion by considering the size of the scopes in the possessive *have got* and the perfect of *get*.

In order to examine the scope of the perfect of *get*, I have to clarify the perfect itself first. According to Wada (2001), the perfect consists of two distinct events.⁸ One is designated by the *have* and another is designated by the participle.⁹ For example, the following sentence

⁷ As the similar cognitive device, Talmy (2000) proposes the windowing of attention. See Talmy (2000) for more detail.

⁸ In our analysis, we do not dare to use the term *event* as the antonym of *state*. Note that the term carries no specialized meaning and is used as referring to both dynamic and stative situations.

⁹ The idea that the perfect auxiliary *have* itself expresses a certain event is based on the Aux-as-Main-Verb Hypothesis (cf. Ross (1969) and Huddleston (1974)), whose plausibility is shown in the following example:

(i) Now you may go skiing tonight.
 Here, the two distinct events expressed by the auxiliary *may* and the verb *go* occur in

consists of two events:

(20) Mana has played the *koto*. (Wada (2001:77))

In addition that the main verb expresses the event in which *Mana played the koto*, the perfect auxiliary *have* also expresses a distinct event. The latter event is a resulting state of the former such as, for example, *she is now tired* because of playing the *koto*.

There is another example to support the claim that the perfect consists of two distinct events. Let us consider the following:


(21) Tom had seen the movie at ten o'clock. (Wada (2001:99))

This example, according to Wada, contains two events and hence can be interpreted in two ways, either as Tom's seeing movie occurs at ten o'clock or as it occurs before ten o'clock. This proves clearly that the example consists of two events: the former interpretation is available when *at ten o'clock* refers to the time when the event expressed by the main verb occurs whereas the latter is available when it refers to the time when the event expressed by the perfect auxiliary occurs. We can conclude from what has been discussed above that the perfect consists of two distinct events. In other words, the scope is placed over the two events in the perfect.

The same thing may be said of the perfect of *get*. As discussed in section 2, the perfect of *get* denotes not only acquisition but also possession as in (4), repeated here as (22):

(22) Jack has got a new car. (He possesses it.)

The parenthesized possessing state is entailed as a result of acquisition. On the basis of the observation above, acquisition is the event expressed by the main verb *get* and possession is by the perfect auxiliary *have*. Therefore, the scope of the perfect of *get* encompasses both an act of acquisition and a possessing state, which is schematized as follows:




The dotted square is the scope and the line between the two events represents that they are related: an act of acquisition causes a possessing state. The arrow under the scope represents the flow of time and suggests

the two periods of time referred by *now* and *tonight*, respectively. This is the reason why the two different time adverbials is compatible in one sentence. We can account for such a sentence on the basis of the hypothesis.


that an act of acquisition precedes a possessing state. TU is short for the time of utterance and the vertical bold line represents that the possessing state is connected to the time of utterance.

We may now proceed to the scope of the possessive *have got*. On the basis of the observation in the previous section that the possessive *have got* describes a possessing state at the time of utterance with no implication of acquisition, we can schematize its scope as follows:



Note that the arrow that represents the flow of time is not needed here, because the possessive *have got* does not encompass two events; only a possessing state is encompassed in the scope and placed at the time of utterance.

Now that we have examined the scopes of the perfect of *get* and the possessive *have got*, we will consider their relation in terms of the scope. We claim here, as I said earlier, that the possessive *have got* resulted from narrowing the scope of the perfect of *get*. If our claim is on the right track, we can explain not only why the possessive *have got* shares the same syntactic form with the perfect of *get* but also why it describes only a possessing state at the time of utterance. When the scope of the perfect of *get* is narrowed, the schematic representation in (23) is revised as follows:



The scope represented by the dotted square of (23) is narrowed toward a possessing state and encompasses only a possessing state, which is shown by the following examples:

- (26)a. A: According to the accomplice we caught yesterday, Jack
has got a machine gun from the mafia.
 B: That's dangerous!
- b. A: Do you have any interesting books?
 B: I've *got* *The Great Gatsby* at the bookstore.

In (26a), the speaker B thinks that Jack's possession of a gun, rather than Jack's act of acquisition of it, is dangerous. What is important is that, in

the perfect of *get*, a possessing state as the resultant state is more focused than an act of acquisition. In (26b), the perfect of *get* in B's utterance describes or strongly implicates a possessing state. These examples clearly show that in the perfect of *get* a possessing state tends to be focused rather than an act of acquisition. This is the motivation why the scope is narrowed toward a possessing state in the perfect of *get*.

Narrowing (or widening) a scope such as above is not a special but a general operation and is reflected in many linguistic phenomena. Lakoff's (1987:428) explanation for the difference between mass nouns and plurals is interesting:

The relationship between multiplex entities and masses is a natural visual relationship. Imagine a large herd of cows up close – close enough to pick out the individual cows. Now imagine yourself moving back until you can no longer pick out the individual cows. What you perceive is a mass. There is a point at which you cease making out the individuals and start perceiving a mass. It is this perceptual experience upon which the relationship between multiplex entities and masses rests.

Furthermore, a semantic property of the progressive form can also be explained in terms of the narrowing of scope. The progressive, as is well known, describes only a portion of an event. Take the following for example:

- (27)a. He saw Mary cross the street.
 b. He saw Mary crossing the street.

If one uses the sentence in (27a), he/she has to observe the total event: he/she knows that Mary finished crossing the street safely. On the other hand, if one uses the sentence in (27b), he/she observes only a portion of the event: he/she does not know whether Mary finished crossing the street or not. Such a difference results from narrowing (or widening) the scope. Namely, the progressive is used when we place a narrow scope over an event.


Thus, as schematized in (25), the scope of the perfect of *get* is narrowed and comes to encompass only a possessing state. We should notice here that the perfect of *get* becomes close to the possessive *have got* schematized in (24) by the operation. That is to say, the narrowing of the scope in the perfect of *get* leads to the establishment of the possessive *have got*. In the next subsection, we will furthermore discuss the plausibility of

the establishment.

4.2. Unidirectional Entailment

Although we have discussed the motivation of narrowing the scope in the perfect of *get* and the establishment of the possessive *have got*, there remains an unanswered question. Even if the scope is narrowed and comes to encompass only a possessing state, an act of acquisition is implied (that is, it still remains out of the scope) as in (25). This is just the same as the case where one can predict the existence of the arm out of the scope when the scope is placed only over the hand. The possessive *have got*, however, does not imply an act of acquisition as in (24) and hence one can say *Mary has got long arms and short legs*. If the possessive *have got* results from the perfect of *get* by narrowing the scope, why does the former not imply an act of acquisition? Why does an act of acquisition not exist out of the scope in (24)?

The key to answering the question is in the relation between the two notions of acquisition and possession. While they are tightly connected or very close each other, they are also in a special relation, i.e. a unidirectional entailment relation. If someone gets something, then that he/she possesses it is entailed (it does not matter whether the duration of possession is long or not), but not vice versa: possessing something does not necessarily mean acquiring it. This makes intuitive sense. For instance, you have your body parts, but they are not the ones that were acquired in the past. It is, thus, the unidirectional entailment relation that removes an act of acquisition from the representation in (25): an act of acquisition becomes an implication of a possessing state by being framed out of the scope and then is removed because of the unidirectional entailment relation. This operation is schematized as follows:




The representation in the left of the thick arrow changes into the one in the right of it by removing the act of acquisition. Therefore, the possession in the right is no longer a resultant state of an action of acquisition. I would like to emphasize here that the representation of the right corresponds to that of the possessive *have got* shown in (24). Namely, the possessive *have got* established via the two distinct operations, i.e. the narrowing of

the scope and removal of acquisition by the unidirectional entailment relation.

This is not the whole story, however. In the following subsection, we will further discuss the establishment of the possessive *have got* and the plausibility of the possessive *have got* being an independent form of the perfect of *get*.

4.3. *Reanalysis and the Establishment of the Possessive Have Got*

To recapitulate the discussion so far, the two types of operations are applied to the perfect of *get*: (i) the narrowing of the scope and (ii) removal of acquisition based on the unidirectional entailment relation, as shown in (25) and (28). What has to be noted here is that these operations cause a mismatch between the form and meaning in the sequence *have got*, which is schematized as follows:



Note that the auxiliary *have* and the main verb *get* express distinct events, respectively, before the operations are applied. This is because, as I noted in section 4.1, the auxiliary *have* itself also refers to an event as well as the main verb *get*. In contrast, after the two operations are applied, the sequence *have got* as a unit comes to refer to only one event, i.e. possession. In this respect, we can say that the sequence *have got* after the operations are applied has a mismatch between the form and meaning. The point here is that the mismatch causes the sequence *have got* to be reanalyzed. In what follows, we will discuss the reanalysis of the sequence *have got*.

A brief look, before we proceed, at the notion of reanalysis. Reanalysis is defined as a change in constituency, hierarchical structure, category labels, grammatical relations, and cohesion that does not involve any surface manifestation (cf. Hopper and Traugott (1993)). Let us consider the word *hamburger*, which is cited in Hopper and Traugott (1993:50), for instance. *Hamburger* originally consisted of [*hamburg*] and [*-er*], and means the thing from the German city of Hamburg. It was reanalyzed as [*ham*] and [*burger*], and then [*ham*] came to be replaced by *cheese*, *fish*, and so forth. Reanalysis is not restricted to the lexical item. For example, one of the most common is the *be going to* form as tense marker, which originally referred to movement in space. It was also

reanalyzed as tense marker and as a grammatical unit.¹⁰

The sequence *have got* can also be explained in terms of reanalysis. In the perfect of *get*, the sequence is decomposed into [*have*] and [*got*], which refer to a possessing state and an act of acquisition, respectively. When the operations of narrowing the scope and the removal of acquisition are applied, the sequence *have got* is reanalyzed as a unit in correspondence with its meaning in order to resolve the mismatch as follows:

(30) [*have*][*got*] > [*have got*]

As a result, the sequence *have got* came to be the grammatical unit which denotes possession (i.e. the possessive *have got*) and stored as if it is a single word. This is mirrored in the behavior in the tagged sentence and the clause involving VP deletion in (7) and (8), repeated here as (31) and (32):

(31)a * John has got a dog, hasn't he?

b. John has got a dog, doesn't he?

(32)a. * Mary has got a dog, and John has too.

b. Mary has got a dog, and John does too.

In the possessive *have got*, its tagged sentence and the clause involving VP deletion require *do*. As is well known, when the sequence *have got* is the perfect of *get*, they never require *do*; they require *have* or *has* in accordance with the perfect auxiliary *have* in the main clause. The behavior above can be explained only by the assuming that the sequence *have got* in the possessive *have got* forms a grammatical unit which refers to only one event. That is to say, since the sequence *have got* itself, as it were, is the verb which denotes possession, the tagged sentence and the clause involving VP deletion require *do* in accordance with it.

The question arises when the sequence *have got* counts as a unit: if the sequence *have got* forms a unit and is stored as if it is a single word, why is the *have* inversed with the subject or followed by *not*? Consider the following:

(33)a. Have you got the key in your bag? (= (9a))

b. I haven't got the money right now. (= (10a))

This is because the sequence *have got* did not change in constituency when reanalyzed as a unit. In other words, the sequence *have got* still consists

¹⁰ As the purpose of this paper is concerned, it is not necessary to discuss the process of establishment in detail. See Hopper and Traugott (1993) and Langacker (1999).

of the auxiliary and the verb, while it forms a unit. Since the processes of making the interrogative and negative sentences are purely syntactic, the sequence *have got* as a unit is not needed and the auxiliary *have* is inverted or followed by *not*. This also holds true for the *be going to* as tense marker:

- (34)a. Are you going to leave tomorrow?
 b. I'm not going to give you my number.

Although, as I said above, the *be going to* forms a unit, only *be* can be inverted with the subject and followed by *not*. Hence, there is no problem to count the sequence *have got* as a unit.

From what has been discussed above, we can conclude that the sequence *have got* in the perfect of *get* was reanalyzed as a grammatical unit and became the possessive *have got* after the two operations are applied. This is the establishment of the possessive *have got*.

Based on our claim, we can account for semantic and syntactic properties of the possessive *have got*. Firstly, the formal identity between the perfect of *get* and the possessive *have got* can be explained: it is natural for the possessive *have got* to take the same syntactic form superficially as the perfect of *get*, because the former resulted from the latter and they are not distinct in nature.

Secondly, we can give an account of the meaning of the possessive *have got*. As has been discussed, it describes a possessing state with no implication of acquisition, because an act of acquisition in the perfect of *get* is removed. Hence one can denote an inalienable possession with the possessive *have got* as in (12b), repeated as (35):

- (35) Mary has got blown eyes.

Naturally, inanimate entities can be taken as subjects:

- (36) This room has got large windows. (= (12c))

Finally, we can also explain on the basis of our claim the property that the use of the possessive *have got* is restricted to the time of utterance. Let us recall some of the examples in the previous section:

- (37)a. ? John had got the key in his bag. (= (13a))

- b. * He doesn't want to have got the flu. (= (14a))

As these examples show, the possessive *have got* cannot be used in both the past as in (37a) and in the future as in (37b). This also reflects that the possessive *have got* results from the perfect of *get*: since the perfect of

get describes a possessing state at the time of utterance as a result of acquisition as in (28), it is natural that the possessive *have got*, which results from the perfect of *get* by removing an act of acquisition, also describes a possessing state at the time of utterance.

5. Concluding Remarks

In this paper, we have discussed the establishment of the possessive *have got* from a synchronic perspective. The possessive *have got* stems from the perfect of *get* via the two operations that is cognitively motivated: (i) the narrowing of scope and (ii) the removal of acquisition on the basis of the unidirectional entailment relation between the notions of possession and acquisition. Furthermore, the sequence *have got* was reanalyzed and got a status as a grammatical unit, i.e. the possessive *have got*. Therefore, the possessive *have got* shows different properties from the perfect of *get* though they share the sequence *have got*. In future research, a diachronic perspective will be needed to strengthen the plausibility of our claim.

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