



New Horizons in Studying the Cellular Mechanisms of Alzheimer's Disease

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Abstract

Following an analysis of the state of investigations and clinical outcomes in the Alzheimer's research field, I argue that the widely accepted 'amyloid cascade' mechanistic explanation of Alzheimer's disease appears to be fundamentally incomplete. In this context, I propose that a framework termed 'principled mechanism' (PM) can help remedy this problem. First, using a series of five 'tests', PM systematically compares different components of a given mechanistic explanation against a paradigmatic set of criteria and hints at various ways of making the mechanistic explanation more 'complete'. I will demonstrate these steps using the amyloid explanation, highlighting its missing or problematic mechanistic elements. Second, PM makes an appeal for the discovery and application of 'biological principles' that approximate *ceteris paribus* generalisations or laws and are operative at the level of a biological cell. Although thermodynamic, evolutionary, ecological and other laws or principles from chemistry and the broader life sciences could inform them, biological principles should be considered ontologically unique. These principles could augment different facets of the mechanistic explanation but also allow further *independent* nomological explanation of the phenomenon. Whilst this overall strategy can be complementary to certain 'new mechanist' approaches, an important distinction of the PM framework is its equal attention to the explanatory utility of biological principles. Lastly, I detail two hypothetical biological principles and show how they could each inform and improve the potentially incomplete mechanistic

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aspects of the amyloid explanation and how they could provide independent explanations for the cellular features associated with Alzheimer's disease.

1 Introduction

This chapter aims to show the practical utility of the 'principled mechanism' (PM) account on a current case in biomedicine, namely, on the field of Alzheimer's disease (AD) research. As will be detailed throughout the chapter, PM is a model of biological explanation that supplements mechanistic elements with 'principles', or non-accidental generalisations that may nevertheless fall short of full-blown lawhood. AD studies represent an active area of investigation that has clear clinical and biological implications. In the philosophy of biology literature, there are (to the extent of what the research for this chapter has revealed) no examples of a thorough analysis of AD research, and the few AD-focused accounts that do exist concern, for instance, the idea of a 'genetic cause' using the example of AD (Dekkers & Rikkert, 2006; Nordenfelt, 2006), the subject of selfhood in AD patients (Kontos, 2004), or the concepts of person essentialism and psychological continuity (Olson & Witt, 2020).¹

The chapter is structured to provide a philosophical case study of the disease, centred on three questions: (i) What is the current problem with AD research and why do we face this problem? (Sect. 3); (ii) why might contemporary philosophical accounts of mechanism in biology not offer tractable solutions to adequately confront this challenge? (Sect. 4); and (iii) what can the PM framework offer instead to move us in a more productive direction (Sects. 5–7)?

The AD field is broad and varied, and I have tried, to the extent possible, to sufficiently represent the current breadth of research whilst also staying on point. I aim to explicate the following answers to the above questions. First, a large segment of the AD field has been, for the most part, of one voice when it comes to the central elements of a mechanistic explanation that has motivated research in the field for the past three decades. The AD mechanistic model and the resultant explanation are greatly detailed (and increasingly so by the day). However, the explanation – despite immense effort – has not translated into the clinic for patients, and many clinical trials have been unsuccessful. I argue that this is not due to challenges in clinical 'translations' of the explanation's predictions, but rather to a fundamental problem with how mechanistic explanations are approached in the field.

Second, I argue that the solution to this problem is not to simply do away with mechanistic explanations, for there is no serious replacement for this explanatory type in biomedicine. The solution should build on the existing mechanistic explanations. Moreover, whilst I am sympathetic to the 'new mechanist' (NM) project

¹ Of note, a relevant recent philosophical work presents a framework called 'MecCog' that builds mechanism schemas for diseases including AD (Kundu et al., 2021).

in the philosophy of scientific explanation, I provide several strands of argument to the effect that existing NM accounts, to the extent that they go beyond reflecting current biological practice, may not be sufficiently critical of that practice to be used to help resolve the problem set out in this chapter. Third, I will propose that a series of 'paradigmatic' tests can, as an initial strategy, point to elements within a given mechanistic explanation that could make it more comprehensive and generate new empirical questions. As a next step, I will argue that the addition of biological principles that could *explain* (and help augment our understanding of) the elements highlighted in the tests can make the overall explanation richer and our potential understanding of AD pathobiology more fundamental.

Before proceeding further, I will address two important concerns in Sect. 2, namely, what range of mechanistic concepts the chapter makes use of and why AD is well suited for the purpose of this case study.

2 Usage of Mechanistic Concepts and Context of AD Research in Biology

Perusing current biomedical journals would leave little doubt that the search for 'mechanisms' forms the basis of a great proportion of the research effort. However, there is much ambiguity in the intended meaning of mechanistic concepts and terms in the biological literature (Marder, 2020). This might partly be attributable to the impression that 'mechanism' could be said to be taken as a *primitive* concept in biology (much like 'point' or 'line' in geometry; Pearl & Mackenzie, 2018, p. 373) – a notion on which much else relies but one that is refractory to a simple and universal definition. It goes without saying that philosophers of mechanism have studied these topics extensively, but this literature has not yet found its way into mainstream biomedical research. For our purposes here, however, the intended terminological meanings should be crystallised.

2.1 Actual Mechanisms, Mechanistic Models and Mechanistic Explanations

Consider the statement 'the bacterium *Helicobacter pylori* can lead to (or cause) peptic ulcers'. Here, 'peptic ulcer' is the *phenomenon to be explained* (henceforth the 'phenomenon'). Moreover, *H. pylori* is a putative cause, or a causative agent. One could then ask why *H. pylori* causes peptic ulcers. Perhaps because this is its function in the gastrointestinal environment. The question could be rephrased as: how or by what means does *H. pylori* cause peptic ulcers? The 'how' or the 'means' with which a putative causative agent leads to a phenomenon can be called the *actual*

mechanism by which the phenomenon arises (henceforth the ‘mechanism’).² To avoid confusion, I use the word ‘mechanism’ to indicate an assumption about the work that causes or produces a phenomenon.³

We can model a mechanism. One can understand a model to be some representation of reality (or a phenomenon), and it can be used as a heuristic or thinking tool, or as part of a broader explanation, or perhaps as a way to simplify the complexity of the phenomenon. There are different accounts of how a model does the ‘representing’, but I will not expand on them here.⁴ In molecular biology, cellular processes are often represented using a network of parts (e.g. proteins, genes, RNAs), indications of change and movement (e.g. of a protein from one location to another), interactions (e.g. protein–protein, protein–DNA, protein–lipid) and so on. Therefore, we can define a *mechanistic model* as a representation of a mechanism. It follows that a given mechanism could have multiple different representations.

Mechanistic models can subsequently be used as part of a statement or a description to detail and give reasons for a phenomenon (see, e.g. Brini et al., 2020). Let us call this the *mechanistic account* or *mechanistic explanation*. A mechanistic model could give rise to several explanations that investigators can use to make predictions, molecular interventions and so forth (Lombrozo, 2011).

Three caveats are necessary: First, some studies in cellular biology may stop at the stage of detailing certain elements of a model and not progress to a full-fledged mechanistic explanation. For our purposes here, however, the explanatory stage is key. Second, biologists investigating a cellular phenomenon may at times feel it is sufficient to provide an analysis of the putative function of a ‘part’, such as a protein, and provide only a version of a ‘functional’ explanation. As will also be seen later in the context of AD, this should indeed be viewed as complementary to mechanistic explanations (see also Theurer, 2018). And third, I am not claiming that all explanations require a model; I am arguing that mechanistic explanations typically use at least some elements of mechanistic models.

2.2 AD Research as a Quintessential Mechanistic Research Programme

AD imposes a huge burden on patients and their families. Worldwide, the projected number of dementia cases (a majority of which is thought to be AD) is estimated to

² There are distinctions to be made between mechanistic and ‘difference-making’ accounts of causation, but I will not delve into the topic here.

³ The reason why this assumption may not apply across the board is that in some cases using ‘mechanism’ as a stand-in for ‘means’ may strike as odd. For example, when referring to the means with which a magnetic pole attracts a pole of opposite polarity, talking about ‘mechanism’ is unusual. Rather, we could talk of magnetic ‘fields’ and ‘forces’.

⁴ As an example, a candidate for how models represent has been called the ‘DEKI’ account (denotation, exemplification, keying up of properties, and imputation) (Frigg & Nguyen, 2016).

reach over 131.5 million individuals by 2050 (PLOS Medicine Editors, 2016). Why is AD a suitable research field for studying the theoretical basis behind mechanistic explanations? First, there has now been more than 50 years of systematic research on AD, and a vast portion of the published works refer to 'disease mechanism', 'mechanistic understanding', 'mechanistic pathways' and many other related concepts. The current cellular understanding of AD is complex to the point that a lot can be said about its various facets, strengths and shortcomings. Furthermore, a well-accepted and overarching mechanistic explanation has been the mainstay of the field for several decades, and, importantly, it has been tested in different lights, for example, in countless laboratory-based assays all the way to many clinical trials. So what exactly is the problem?

3 Problems for the Mainstream Biomedical Research Approach to AD

In 1907, Alois Alzheimer (1864–1915) provided two pathological hallmarks for the disease in the brain, which are now widely known as *amyloid plaques* and *neurofibrillary tangles* (Alzheimer et al., 1995) (these two terms will be referred to repeatedly). The hallmarks are now known to be due to the aggregation of two main types of 'sticky' proteins: the plaques are formed of *amyloid beta (A β) peptide* (mostly outside affected neurons) and the neurofibrillary tangles (NFTs) of *tau protein* (inside affected neurons). Focused investigations of A β three decades ago are what started the extensive and what one could call the 'mainstream' molecular research effort on AD. What has resulted is a working explanation called the *amyloid cascade hypothesis/mechanistic explanation* (Beyreuther & Masters, 1991; Hardy & Allsop, 1991; Selkoe, 1991), henceforth the 'amyloid explanation'. Although many additional genes and cellular pathways have since been associated to varying degrees with some manifestations of the disease (see Liu et al., 2019), almost all findings in AD are usually interpreted via and/or placed within the amyloid explanation.

3.1 The Amyloid Cascade Mechanistic Explanation

To analyse the amyloid explanation, it would help to choose an illustrative schematic that depicts both processes of amyloid plaque formation by A β and NFT formation by tau. However, note that technically the amyloid cascade hypothesis usually only refers to the amyloid plaque formation process in AD and does not include the NFT formation arm. To simplify subsequent references to these two defining lesions of AD, I will use the umbrella term of 'amyloid explanation' to refer to both processes.

Of the available choices, a summarising figure from a review article by Panza and colleagues (Panza et al., 2019) is shown in Fig. 1 and will be used as a reference visual for the amyloid mechanistic model. Also, to simplify the depicted illustration




Fig. 1 Putative pathobiological mechanistic model of Alzheimer's disease (Panza et al., 2019). Here the authors show the process of amyloid plaque formation outside the neuronal cell, and the generation of neurofibrillary tangles inside the cell, along with “mechanisms of action of the main anti-amyloid- β ($A\beta$) drugs that are currently [early 2019] in phase III clinical development for the treatment of Alzheimer disease” (Panza et al., 2019, p. 75). The intracellular endpoint depicted is mitochondrial damage, whereas the extracellular endpoints shown are neuronal damage, microglial dysfunction and reactive astrocytes. Abbreviations, as per the original caption, are: AICD, amyloid precursor protein intracellular domain; BACE, β -secretase; sAPP β , soluble amyloid precursor protein- β . Reproduced with permission from Panza et al., 2019; copyright Springer Nature

using text, three salient processes in the figure are summarised in Table 1. These are as follows:

1. The *amyloidogenic* amyloid precursor protein (APP) processing pathway. This process *increases* the production of $A\beta$ and the formation of amyloid plaque.
2. The *non-amyloidogenic* APP processing pathway. This process *decreases* the production of $A\beta$ and the formation of amyloid plaque.
3. The NFT formation pathway. This process leads to the aggregation of tau.

Table 1 Three pathways in the AD pathogenesis mechanism (details adapted from Panza et al., 2019). The steps in Table 1 are greatly simplified, given that for each step multiple details and subtleties have been reported. One such important detail, for example, is the varying clearance of Aβ by ‘apolipoprotein E’ (APOE) proteins (Yamazaki et al., 2019). In fact, variants of APOE are genetic risk factors for late-onset sporadic AD (Ishii & Iadecola, 2020), and there is ongoing extensive research on APOE in the context of AD in general (Li & Zhao, 2021; Lu et al., 2021). However, the point of this chapter is not to analyse AD mechanisms exhaustively but rather to scrutinise the theoretical basis of a typical cellular mechanistic explanation

Amyloidogenic APP processing	Non-amyloidogenic APP processing	Neurofibrillary tangle formation
<i>Increased in AD</i>	<i>Reduced in AD</i>	<i>Increased in AD</i>
<p>Start</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Amyloid precursor protein (APP) <p>Process</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Cleavage by protease β-secretase 1 (BACE1) <p>Products</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Soluble extracellular fragment, sAPPβ • Cell-membrane-bound fragment, C99 <p>Process</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 2. Cleavage of C99 by protease γ-secretase <p>Products</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Release of Aβ peptide (40- or 42-amino-acid length) • Aggregation of Aβ to form oligomers, protofibrils, fibrils and plaques 	<p>Start</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Amyloid precursor protein (APP) <p>Process</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Cleavage by extracellular protease α-secretase <p>Product</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Soluble extracellular fragment, sAPPα 	<p>Start</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Microtubule-associated tau protein <p>Process</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Hyperphosphorylation of tau <p>Products</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Aggregation of hyperphosphorylated tau • NFT formation
<p>Endpoint</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Synapse loss and neuronal death mediated by Aβ oligomers 		<p>Endpoints</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Cytoskeletal changes and disruption of axonal transport • Spread of misfolded/aggregated tau to other cells

In the figure, the lipid membrane of a neuronal cell is shown as a bilayer (two lines of circles with lines in between, like a horizontal ladder). The cytoplasm or intracellular space is the area below the membrane, shown in beige. All the area above the membrane is the extracellular space, and one more neuron and two other cell types in the brain (astrocytes and microglial immune cells, which act to support

neurons)⁵ are illustrated at a much smaller size. Pathways 1 and 2, which have to do with amyloid plaque formation, both start with the APP protein, which in the figure is shown as a twisting ‘tube’ that has been cut by two pairs of scissors. The reason for the three colours of the tube (red, orange and blue) is to show the three fragments (or ‘peptides’) of APP that form when it is cleaved by a number of other proteins (enzymes).

In the *amyloidogenic pathway*, APP is cleaved by an enzyme (‘ β -secretase’ or BACE, depicted as a pair of purple scissors above the membrane) to produce two fragments, namely, ‘sAPP β ’ (in blue) and ‘C99’ (the part of APP that remains). The C99 fragment is then cleaved by another enzyme, ‘ γ -secretase’ (depicted as a pair of yellow scissors within the membrane), yielding the A β peptide (orange fragment). A β ‘monomers’ start to aggregate to form oligomers, fibrils and plaques (shown sequentially in the extracellular space). Over the past decade, attention has shifted from the insoluble fibrils and plaques to the soluble oligomers as the toxic A β form in neurons (Dear et al., 2020). These steps are summarised in the first column of Table 1.

Concomitant with Pathway 1, the *non-amyloidogenic pathway* is also proposed to be taking place on the cell membrane with respect to APP. Specifically, in this pathway, rather than initially being cleaved by β -secretase, APP is cleaved by ‘ α -secretase’ at a different site, leading to the production of a soluble fragment called ‘sAPP α ’ and *preventing* A β peptide production. Because this pathway is supposed to be a ‘physiological’ process that happens normally in the brain, it is not shown in the figure. However, the steps are summarised in the second column of Table 1. In AD, the *balance* between these two pathways is thought to be skewed toward the amyloidogenic route. In other words, more of process 1 and less of process 2 takes place.

Pathway 3 concerns the intracellular formation of NFT, where the central player is the tau protein. Tau is mainly found in the axons (long projections) of neurons and is physiologically associated with promoting the assembly of microtubules. Microtubules are polymers of ‘tubulin’ proteins and form part of the cytoskeleton; they provide structure to the cell and aid in other functions. In Fig. 1, a microtubule is depicted as a purple cylinder (formed of many tubulin ‘spheres’) below the membrane, and tau proteins can be seen as blue objects wrapping around the microtubule. In the AD amyloid explanation (and indeed in explanations of other neurodegenerative conditions involving tau),⁶ the tau protein, which is modified in the cell by the attachment of a ‘phosphoryl’ chemical group (i.e. is said to be ‘phosphorylated’) to a number of its amino acids, becomes *hyperphosphorylated*; that is, multiple sites on the protein become saturated with phosphorylation. It is thought that tau hyperphosphorylation leads to its dissociation from microtubules, which in turn leads to microtubule disintegration and the formation of tau aggregates

⁵ Indeed, these glial cell types are thought to have crucial involvements in the pathogenesis of AD. See, for example, Da Mesquita et al. (2021), Guttenplan et al. (2021), and Ulrich and Holtzman (2021).

⁶ ‘Tauopathies’ include a broad range of conditions (Shi et al., 2021; Stahlberg & Riek, 2021).

(both depicted in the figure). These aggregates can turn into NFTs and may even spread to other neurons (not shown in the figure), causing further NFTs to form in a given brain region. The steps in this pathway are summarised in the last column of Table 1.

The amyloid explanation centres on these protein aggregation events, the end result of which is neuronal loss and cognitive impairment. What happens in the brain at a cortical level (i.e. populations of neurons and brain regions) is beyond the current discussion, as we are concerned with the more immediate task of accounting for processes at the cellular level. Nonetheless, attention in the field has been directed for more than a decade now toward a region of the brain called the entorhinal cortex as perhaps the first part of the brain that suffers from the loss of its neurons (NTNU, 2020; Shugart, 2020).⁷

The elucidation of each of these three pathways has been a major advance in the field. For instance, research on the mechanistic details of tau aggregation was featured on the cover of *Nature* as recently as November 2019 and October 2021. This shows how important not just the AD research field but also the broader scientific community judges deciphering AD's pathobiology to be.

What might now be apparent is that conceptual gaps exist that the amyloid explanation needs to address: it does not explain, for example, how pathways 1 and 2 interact and influence pathway 3. The non-amyloidogenic pathway is supposedly a normal physiological process, whereas the amyloidogenic pathway is pronounced in disease. Yet to a certain extent, both are taking place in health *and* in disease. Moreover, pathway 3 (involving tau aggregates) has been identified to also have non-neurodegenerative manifestations (Park et al., 2020) and to also participate in normal physiological processes in, for example, hibernating animals (Arendt et al., 2003). The picture is therefore complicated in various ways. Having said that, this is not a complication that would, at least conceptually, pose a problem that current frameworks in the philosophy of biology could not address. For us, the nub of the problem is more fundamental than how the various pathways may interact.

3.2 Capturing the Full Complexity of the Disease

Up to this day, the amyloid explanation has actually been quite *successful* in a certain sense. Details of various aspects of the underlying working model continue to be worked out by different groups, clinical trials are designed based on the explanation and the 'tenet' of the explanation (i.e. the theme of protein aggregation inside and outside neurons) remains quite intact. As mentioned earlier, even when alternative explanations are proposed for AD, they are often pinned to the amyloid explanation. As a case in point, there has been ongoing interest in the possibility of a microbial link to AD (Cairns et al., 2020) and whether A β has antimicrobial properties (Pastore et al., 2020). But when an 'antimicrobial protection hypothesis'

⁷ The locus coeruleus has also been investigated as the site of tau aggregation (Jacobs et al., 2021).

was proposed to account for these possibilities, the authors commented that “the new model extends but remains broadly consistent with the Amyloid Cascade Hypothesis and overwhelming data showing the primacy of A β in AD pathology” (Moir et al., 2018, p. 1602). It might be safe to say that the amyloid explanation has, in a way, stood the test of time. Furthermore, it is hard to imagine a *radically different* mechanistic explanation that could circumvent the current one, and the AD hallmarks, altogether.

Nonetheless, there is in fact a fundamental and consequential problem with the amyloid explanation: the explanation has not led to genuine clinical improvement in patients. This reality is highlighted when we consider the many clinical trials that have tested what were meant to be ‘disease-modifying’ therapeutics validated in the laboratory based on the amyloid account. In an opinion piece titled “we need to radically rethink our approach to Alzheimer’s research”, Mark Hammond and Tim Newton wrote that “over the past decade we’ve seen failure after failure in clinical trials for neurodegenerative disease [and] despite over 200 clinical trials, we still don’t have any meaningful therapeutics for Alzheimer’s” (Hammond & Newton, 2020).⁸ This does not stem from the way that the mechanistic explanation is being *translated* from ‘bench to bedside’. Practicable strategies already exist in biology to deal with the problem of translation (see, e.g. Henderson et al., 2020).

In fact, many of the AD therapies tested have been produced to *match* the understanding and prediction afforded by the amyloid explanation in remarkably precise ways. In other words, if the explanation suggests that protein ‘X’ should be lowered in patients (and this has been borne out in laboratory and animal experiments), the therapeutics being tested *are* indeed lowering that protein in patients being tested (see, e.g. Mintun et al., 2021). Hence, the explanation’s predictions/demands are being *translated* all the way to patients in a strictly biological sense but are still not successful in halting AD. Therefore, something might be amiss with the explanation itself, in that it is not capturing the full complexity of AD and is somehow seriously incomplete.

It is important to note here that such problems could in fact generalise to – and are typical of – any other mechanistic explanation in biomedicine. In cases such as certain rare monogenic diseases, the explanation might have fewer identified components relative to the amyloid explanation of AD and a more delineated causal chain, whereas in other complex cases, such as various types of cancer, the mechanistic explanation might be much more multifaceted than that of AD. There might also not be a general consensus in the respective research field on a unified mechanistic explanation. That being said, this chapter’s analysis could just as easily be applied to the mechanistic explanation of any pathobiological condition.

How should the challenge with the amyloid explanation be approached? I will outline two possibilities, calling them the ‘incremental’ and the ‘non-mechanistic’

⁸ Of relevance also to this discussion is the multitude of commentaries in the latter half of 2021 and early 2022 on the anti-A β monoclonal antibody Aducanumab (Aduhelm) (Dunn et al., 2021; Mullard, 2021; Rogers, 2022; Selkoe, 2021).

options, and then point out that I advocate for a middle ground. To begin with, solutions proposed by some AD investigators appear to argue for staying within the confines of the current mechanistic framework, whilst attempting to increase our understanding of certain details and gaps in our knowledge of the workings of the model, or the timeline of clinical trials and interventions (Aisen, 2019; Petsko, 2018). I call this the incremental approach. Important details that require resolution, for instance, concern clarifying how levels of A β in patients are correlated with the stage of the disease (Masters, 2019) or whether it is causative of AD or a by-product of other processes (Panza et al., 2019).

The focus on details might also lead to the addition of new molecules to the explanation that may eventually become therapeutic 'targets'. However, given the long history of AD research, it is quite unlikely that one or more hitherto undiscovered targets waiting to be added to the mechanistic model would suddenly change everything. I cannot 'prove' this, for such an outcome is theoretically possible, although, as I have emphasised, all new details that have thus far been discovered have in one way or another revolved around the amyloid explanation.

The incremental approach might also reveal new knowledge about the existing molecular parts of the amyloid explanation. This is important because the evolutionary history behind the function of each protein stretches back hundreds of millions of years, and any key protein identified in the AD explanation (e.g. APP) very likely also functions in various other cellular processes that might have little to do with AD per se, therefore making molecular interventions on it risky. Additionally, when investigators focus on one mechanism, a general problem of 'masking' may be encountered, whereby "the operation of one mechanism might *mask* or hide the operation" of other mechanisms (Illari, 2011, p. 146; original emphasis). For example, the secretase enzymes might function in as-yet-unidentified processes in neurons that are critical for normal cognition. If that is so, the amyloid explanation must also be able to capture these important aspects of its key protein players. However, there is no obvious path as to how the amyloid explanation can connect with other cellular mechanisms. The incremental approach can in principle reveal insights toward this issue, but it is not clear how exactly this would be achieved.

An opposing option is to look for completely non-mechanistic explanations for AD, but such a suggestion would be received as outlandish in cellular biology. It is inconceivable for anyone in biomedicine to advocate giving up the entire 'mechanistic enterprise' (i.e. the creation of mechanistic models and provision of mechanistic explanations), for there is no viable alternative to such an approach. If someone proposed a completely non-mechanistic approach to studying AD's cellular phenomena – it is hard to imagine what this would look like, for even a purely mathematical approach would have to rely upon some 'platform' in the form of a mechanistic model – it could not realistically inform current research because it would simply not 'connect with' anything that investigators are pursuing. Consider also that even network-based or topological explanations in molecular biology are often used to search for mechanistic elements within them (see Yadav et al., 2020). What is more, the mechanistic enterprise appears to connect with at least some of our intuitive insights about how nature works (Spelke & Kinzler, 2007).

I argue for a middle way, such that the meticulous mechanistic understanding centred on protein aggregation is preserved but also augmented with a ‘novel’ non-mechanistic approach so that new experiments would not merely bring about ‘more of the same’, but would rather constitute genuine steps forward in our understanding of the complexity of the disease. This is the ultimate aim of the PM framework, to help show how exactly the amyloid explanation might be ‘incomplete’ and how one might go about improving it. One can then reasonably hope that the explanation would have a better chance of actually halting the disease.

But first, before outlining the PM approach, I will look for insights toward improving the amyloid explanation in work by contemporary philosophers concerned with mechanistic theory.

4 ‘New Mechanism’ and Clues for Moving Past the Explanatory Problem

Beginning in the 1990s, a renewed interest in mechanisms began to take shape primarily within the philosophy of biology. This strand of investigation is termed ‘new mechanism’ (NM) to distinguish it from research on the history of mechanical philosophy. NM was a welcome development, for it aimed to systematise – and provide the underlying theory for – mechanistic concepts and usages that were (and for the most part still are) treated superficially in biomedical practice.

A reminder of the context within which NM arose is important here. Many philosophers of science in the mid-twentieth century were pursuing a nomological tradition (i.e. based on natural laws) that is best exemplified by Carl Hempel’s (1905–1997) deductive-nomological (DN) model of scientific explanation (Hempel, 1965). The zeitgeist of this approach can perhaps be said to have been “experiment as the source of knowledge, mathematical formulation as the descriptive medium [and] mathematical deduction as the guiding principle in the search for new phenomena to be verified by experimentation” (Dijksterhuis, 1961, p. 3). This also instilled a sense of valuing “rigor, precision, and generality” in scientific theorising (Bogen, 2020, §11).

But the DN approach was problematic, even in the seemingly compatible subfields of physics. As early as the same period as the peak of logical empiricism, Thomas Kuhn (1922–1996) was questioning the highly formal and axiomatic approaches to scientific theories (Kuhn, 1962), and, in the words of Simon Blackburn, advocated a “less formal and more contextualized approach [. . . which] stressed the open-endedness of scientific activity [and] the heuristic value of analogies and models” (Blackburn, 2016, p. 475). Philosophers of biology also took note of such problems. William Wimsatt, who with a group of students and collaborators set the stage for the NM approach, writes that in 1974, he argued that “discovering a mechanism as a relatively stable and manipulable articulation of causal factors better fit the activity of biologists than a search for laws” (Wimsatt, 2017, p. xv).

Over the past 30 years, NM philosophers have provided influential accounts with which to systematically conceive of mechanisms and mechanistic explanations. For example, in 1993, William Bechtel and Robert Richardson wrote that mechanistic research results in “a detailed account of the parts and operations of a mechanism and how they are organized and orchestrated in a specific model system” (Bechtel & Richardson, 2010, p. xli).⁹ Peter Machamer, Lindley Darden and Carl Craver defined mechanisms as “entities and activities organized such that they are productive of regular changes from start or set-up to finish or termination conditions” (Machamer et al., 2000, p. 3). Along the same lines, Bechtel and Adele Abrahamsen defined a mechanism as “a structure performing a function in virtue of its component parts, component operations, and their organization [where] the orchestrated functioning of the mechanism is responsible for one or more phenomena” (Bechtel & Abrahamsen, 2005, p. 423). Stuart Glennan and Phyllis Illari have written about the concept of a ‘minimal mechanism’, whereby “a mechanism for a phenomenon consists of entities (or parts) whose activities and interactions are organized so as to be responsible for the phenomenon” (Glennan, 2017, p. 17; Glennan & Illari, 2017, p. 92).

Without going into the specifics, how biologists think about the AD mechanism arguably matches the accounts above. Moreover, the amyloid explanation itself is attuned to the way that Bechtel and Richardson, for example, defined mechanistic accounts. However, it is not immediately clear based on these accounts how the amyloid explanation might be incomplete and how it could be improved. Depending on the context, the NM accounts require much more expansion to function as a critiquing framework. One could, for example, ‘read into’ the accounts or find elements that could be useful for our problem, but they do not provide explicit details for us to use. Part of the reason for this might be that many NM philosophers and philosophers of biology in general might not have concentrated on the *failures* present in modern cell biology. Laura Franklin-Hall similarly suggests that “a too-successful enculturation of philosophers into the scientific mindset [makes] it difficult to achieve the critical distance needed to philosophize *about* science” (Franklin-Hall, 2016, p. 71; original emphasis).

Notwithstanding these concerns, what *hints* could one distil from the NM approach about what the amyloid explanation might be lacking? I believe such hints might become apparent when one considers how the NM and related approaches have dealt with ideas concerning the introduction of laws into mechanistic explanations. Craver and James Tabery maintain that mechanisms “seem to play the role of laws in the biological sciences: we seek mechanisms to explain, predict, and control phenomena in nature even if mechanisms lack many of the characteristics definitive of laws in the logical empiricist framework (such as universality, inviolable necessity, or unrestricted scope)” (Craver & Tabery, 2019, §4.1). In another take, Craver and Marie Kaiser write that “mechanists *decenter* laws in their thinking about

⁹ This is a reprint of the 1993 edition. The quoted text is from the introduction to the original edition.

science because the old paradigm, centering laws, has become mired in debates that are inconsequential and, as a result, have *stopped generating new questions* and producing new results” (Craver & Kaiser, 2013, p. 144; my italics). Whilst a goal of this chapter is to put laws back in the centre of discussion,¹⁰ I share the view of Craver and Kaiser in emphasising the importance of generating new empirical questions as a key criterion of a framework’s success. Let us call this hint #1.

The view of Bechtel and Richardson is more compatible with the view on laws I argue for here. They also considered the place of laws or “general and abstract explanatory principles” (Bechtel & Richardson, 2010, p. 232) in mechanistic accounts. Their main motivation was to “question the hegemony of laws in explanation [but] not their existence” (Bechtel & Richardson, 2010, p. 256). In more recent work, Bechtel comments that “laws may be invoked to characterize the overall functioning of the mechanism or some of its operations, but it is the discovery that particular operations are being performed that is required to specify the mechanism” (Bechtel, 2011, p. 537). Congruent with this description, Nancy Cartwright, John Pemberton and Sarah Wieten (whose work is not usually considered part of the NM tradition) have proposed that “when a mechanism M gives rise to a regular behavior RB that is described in a cp [ceteris paribus] law, RB is what it takes for some set of principles that govern the features of M’s parts in their arrangement in M all to be instanced together” (Cartwright et al., 2020, p. 18). I will say more on ceteris paribus laws in Sect. 7.

In recent work analysing examples from chronobiology (the biology of time in terms of an organism’s 24-hour circadian rhythm), Bechtel mentions “principles of organization (design principles)” which “assert that any system implementing the organization will exhibit the specified behavior” (Bechtel, 2017, p. 19). Relatedly, Sara Green has investigated the idea of design principles in the context of ‘systems biology’ and introduced the idea of “constraint-based generality” (Green, 2015; Green & Jones, 2016). Whilst the thesis of this chapter is sympathetic to these accounts, they do not explicitly show how the amyloid explanation should be overhauled, and the role and discovery of principles (non-accidental generalisations that may nevertheless fall short of full-blown lawhood) come across as peripheral to the specification and operations of a mechanism. I state this because, for instance, an AD investigator might just assume that the current amyloid explanation is *already* serving the purpose of ‘organising’ the components of the underlying model by accounting for the temporal cascade of events both inside and outside the cell. Thus, the investigator needs a convincing reason to invoke an extra concept, such as a ‘principle’. Nonetheless, the NM works cited in this and the preceding paragraph hint at an explanatory role that principles of organisation could play, at least in a qualitative sense. Let us consider this hint #2.

As might be expected from the often-cyclical nature of the history of ideas, as the NM approach began to become dominant in the philosophy of biology, a small

¹⁰ Others, for example Bert Leuridan (2010), have also argued that laws cannot be supplanted by mechanisms in scientific explanations.

but steady wave of proposals reintroduced or amalgamated certain elements of the pre-NM nomological approaches. For example, José Díez has proposed a ‘neo-Hempel’ account of scientific explanation, whereby “to explain a phenomenon is to make it expectable by introducing new conceptual/ontological machinery and using special, and non-ad hoc, non-accidental regularities” (Díez, 2014, p. 1413). ‘Expectability’ is a key notion in Díez’s account.¹¹ Roger Deulofeu and Javier Suárez pick up on this notion in their paper on “when mechanisms are not enough” and write that in their analysis, “the use of scientific laws is supposed to be a minimal *requirement* of all scientific explanations, since the purpose of a scientific explanation is to make phenomena expectable” (Deulofeu & Suárez, 2018, p. 95; my italics).

In this body of literature, one of the closest approaches to the one in this chapter is an account by Alleva et al. (2017) on a problem in biochemistry. The authors are concerned with the mechanistic description of the conformational changes in a protein upon the binding of another molecule (‘allosteric’ regulation). What they propose “essentially contains nonaccidental, nomological regularities that can properly be considered as laws in a relevant, though minimal, sense of lawhood” (Alleva et al., 2017, p. 12). Importantly, they say that “we do not believe that the mechanistic and our model-theoretic accounts are in opposition” (Alleva et al., 2017, p. 12), but rather “we advocate a plural, syncretic perspective in which every relevant aspect is explicated according to its specific nature” (Alleva et al., 2017, p. 13). This “plural, syncretic perspective” and the notion of ‘expectability’, even though they originated in works that one might say are ‘reacting’ to the NM tradition, could still be our hint #3.

The confluence of these three hints – that is, a framework’s ability to generate new empirical questions, an explanatory role for principles and generalisations, and an explanation’s drive toward expectability – is a niche where the ‘principled mechanistic’ (PM) explanation can fit. As I shall argue, PM’s strength lies first and foremost in generating questions that current mechanistic explanations are not poised to produce. Furthermore, I will argue for an independent and critical explanatory role for ‘biological principles’. And, lastly, PM pushes for *quantitative* expectability of the phenomenon being studied.

Beyond these three hints, there are also other intersections between PM and NM. For instance, part of the PM framework involves creating a series of ‘tests’ to detail what a ‘paradigmatic’ PM explanation would look like (Sect. 5). For this, concepts developed in the NM literature about mechanistic elements such as decomposable parts, organisation and levels will be of great utility. This is why I consider the PM project to be complementary to NM, yet more prescriptive of what investigators ‘ought’ to be doing compared to NM when it comes to existing problems in biology.

In closing this section, I should emphasise that my intention is not to imply that all open problems related to current AD research require PM, or some other

¹¹ The notion of ‘expectability’ recalls what Hempel termed the “nomic expectability of a phenomenon” (Hempel, 1968, p. 119).

augmented mechanistic framework. The purpose of PM is to improve the overall explanation of AD. Nonetheless, recalling the final paragraph of Sect. 3.1, I noted that there are open challenges pertaining to the amyloid explanation that are separate from what I argue to be its ‘foundational’ shortcomings. One such challenge had to do with how one could reconcile the involvement of pathways 1, 2 and 3 in both physiological and disease processes. Would, for instance, disease in such cases be a matter of imbalance? Accounts in NM, such as those explicating how operations within a mechanism might be organised or what different levels and lines of feedback might exist in a particular mechanistic explanation of a phenomenon, would be well placed to tackle such questions.

5 Toward an Ideal ‘Principled Mechanistic’ Explanation in the Context of AD

The chapter thus far has indicated that the PM approach aims to strike a middle way between purely mechanistic and non-mechanistic options. Taking a cue from NM philosophers, on the mechanistic side, PM aims for some systematisation of the elements of mechanistic explanations. On the non-mechanistic side, the goal is to adapt hypothesised ‘biological principles’ to mechanistic explanations, where the resultant PM explanation would be an augmented but still coherent whole.

To begin to demonstrate that satisfactory explanations in biology are liable to require an appeal to principles as well as mechanisms, it might be useful to mention an analogy with ‘reaction mechanisms’ and thermodynamic laws in chemistry. When a chemist sets out to explain the reaction between some molecules, they detail the reaction mechanism; that is, the sequence of molecular/atomic steps leading to an overall chemical change. But they do not stop there, for they also appeal to thermodynamic laws that further explain the steps.

In fact, thermodynamics (e.g. the second law) has been highly formalised in chemistry in the form of the notion of change in ‘Gibbs free energy’ (ΔG), “whose sign predicts the direction of reaction, and whose magnitude indicates the maximum amount of work realizable from the reaction” (Feinman & Fine, 2004, p. 2). As such, thermodynamics can help (i) *predict* something about the reaction (recall the notion of ‘expectability’ from hint #3) and (ii) provide some sort of *quantification* for the yield of the reaction. These could arguably be achieved without necessarily appealing to the mechanistic details of the reaction. However, the notion of ΔG can also (iii) be applied to the details of the reaction mechanism itself to reveal new insights. As an example, chemists have used thermodynamic notions of molecules’ lowest free-energy states to study the immensely complex mechanism of hydrogen bond formation amongst clusters of water molecules (Richardson et al., 2016), allowing them to reveal how the bond formation mechanism *itself* might be operating (see also Llored, 2011).

In today’s cell biology, we have the equivalent of intricate ‘reaction mechanisms’ for phenomena such as AD (although perhaps not as systematised as in chemistry), but what is largely missing is the cell biology equivalent of thermodynamic laws.

This, in essence, is the framework that a PM explanation aims to achieve. The tasks at hand are to describe a way to systematise mechanistic explanations and to show how an appeal to principles can augment the power of cell biological explanations. I embark on the first task in this section and look at the second task in Sects. 6 and 7.

Here, based on different NM-related accounts (Bechtel & Abrahamsen, 2005; Bechtel & Richardson, 2010; Cartwright et al., 2020; Glennan & Illari, 2017), earlier approaches to naturalistic explanations and research on AD and non-AD mechanistic explanations in the cell biology literature, I propose to develop a concise series of criteria for a *paradigmatically* 'good' mechanistic explanation. These criteria could be thought of as candidate determinants of the 'good-making features' (borrowing from Newton-Smith, 1981) of a mechanistic explanation. The idea is not to say that fulfilling all the criteria would arrive at an ideal or complete explanation *in an absolute sense*. I only claim that moving toward fulfilling these criteria, if we can, would produce better mechanistic explanations than what we already have. Furthermore, the criteria can be presented in the format of a series of 'tests' to help us determine whether an explanation meets the criteria.

- *TEST #1*: The phenomenon to be explained is set out as unambiguously as possible.

This first test concerns the explanandum. It is only referring to the phenomenon and is not yet concerned with the explanation per se and is simply appealing to a goal of clearly stipulating what a biologist is to investigate. There is often much work to be done prior to setting out to explain a phenomenon in clarifying the biological problem at hand. Such an aim not only helps avoid explanatory irrelevance but could also facilitate consistency amongst investigators and the ease of communicating different explanatory angles of the phenomenon. For example, setting out to explain 'cell death' (e.g. apoptosis) is clearer than setting out to explain 'cellular dysfunction', without stipulating what the 'dysfunction' implies. In a sense, an investigator wants to pre-empt the question 'But what exactly *are* we explaining?'

- *TEST #2*: The explanation sets out an environment to situate the mechanism leading to the phenomenon and refers to decomposable and detectable parts that constitute the mechanism.

This test narrows in on two basic epistemic criteria of a mechanistic explanation, namely, the context and the parts. It starts by locating the environment within which the phenomenon and the putative mechanism underlying it occur. Stipulating the environment should be an easy task because it directly corresponds to the cellular location that researchers choose to study. Furthermore, there are not many choices when it comes to the cell: it consists of the intracellular space (i.e. the cytoplasm), the membrane, the extracellular space and 'sub-environments' relevant to the explanation, for example an organelle such as the mitochondrion inside the cytoplasm.

The explanation should then stipulate the parts (or entities) of interest. The parts can be detected and measured in the stipulated environment(s). Much of cell biology revolves around molecular parts such as DNAs, RNAs and proteins,

which are themselves composed of smaller subparts in the form of nucleic acids, amino acids and so forth. There is a reductionist undercurrent in cell biology's reliance on molecular parts for its explanations. The biologist E. O. Wilson explained this as a "search strategy employed to find points of entry into otherwise impenetrably complex systems" (Wilson, 1998, p. 59). Indeed, as already detailed, much of the AD amyloid explanation relies upon a cast of molecular parts in the form of proteins.

- *TEST #3*: The parts represented in the mechanistic model on which the explanation relies are organised and have some form of interaction.

This test concerns quantitative associations amongst the parts. Once the key parts of a mechanism have been detected, determining how they are spatiotemporally organised relative to each other and interact amongst each other is a rational next step. In the cell, one could have protein–protein, protein–lipid, protein–DNA and many other types of interactions. Investigating such interactions could be done at a small scale or using what are called 'interactome' approaches, which are aimed at providing a quantifiable snapshot of the interaction of a greater number of molecules. Determining interactions between key parts in a mechanistic model and the resulting explanation may also hint at potential interactions with parts in other (ostensibly unrelated) cellular processes, hence aiding in dealing with the possible masking effect of parallel mechanisms mentioned in Sect. 3.2.

As a lead-up to the next section, consider that if a category of biological principles could be hypothesised that might possibly explain spatiotemporal interactions in the cell, this could have an augmenting role in a PM explanation. More on this later.

- *TEST #4*: The relevant interacting parts described in the explanation exert some form of change on each other via some intermediate means.

This test stays on the theme of interaction amongst parts but is concerned with the nature of the interactions and the changes they bring about. Put differently, it is essentially about the *consequences* of the associations amongst parts, particularly proteins. Why is this important? A cell's behaviour is ultimately mediated through its plethora of proteins, hence the physicochemical changes that proteins exert on each other are crucial. It might often turn out that the mere fact that two proteins interact could be discovered relatively easily, but the biological significance and change(s) brought about by the interaction would take many years to unravel.¹² What also complicates the understanding of the biological significance of protein–protein interactions is that evolution has created a reality whereby most proteins associate with only a specific subset of other proteins and are relatively inert in terms of interactions with others.¹³

¹² This is not restricted to proteins only but could also figure in genomics, where, for example, "activity-by-contact" models have been applied to map the significance of interactions between different genomic elements (Fulco et al., 2019; Gaffney, 2019; Nasser et al., 2021).

¹³ I am grateful to Gerold Schmitt-Ulms (University of Toronto) for bringing this point to my attention. See also Schmitt-Ulms et al. (2021).

What could help us establish the nature of the changes exerted by molecular parts on each other is to analyse the intermediate means of their interactions, which could themselves be other mechanisms (composed of parts, etc.) or things that are not standardly classed as mechanisms, such as physicochemical forces. Proteins are thought to interact with each other via various modes of electrostatic attraction resulting in changes in protein conformation and/or the addition of chemical groups (recall the 'hyperphosphorylation' of tau). In this context, a hypothesised category of biological principles that explain macromolecular interactions could inform the test's criteria in a PM explanation.

- **TEST #5:** The explanation can accurately account for the sequence of cellular changes leading to detectable variation in the phenomenon.

Whilst Tests #2 to #4 focus on changes effected on/by individual parts, this test attempts to bridge the parts to the phenomenon by highlighting how a *series* of changes (effected on/by individual parts) may be temporally and causally connected to lead to quantifiable variations in the phenomenon. Indeed, a cornerstone of biological investigations is studying natural or artificial variation/change in a phenomenon as a crucial way of gleaning details about its underlying mechanism.

To help fulfil this explanatory criterion, one or some cellular part(s) should in principle be manipulated (by the investigator or by nature itself in the case of 'natural experiments'), altering the phenomenon and/or effecting changes on other parts and paving the way to determining causal relations amongst the parts in the mechanism underlying the phenomenon. Philosophers of science are well familiar with James Woodward's work on 'interventions' (Woodward, 2016). Whilst interventions in cell biology certainly have to adhere to various methodological standards, the use of 'manipulability' and 'intervention' here is not necessarily committing to the formal constraints of what would count as interventions by Woodward's account.

As a case in point, suppose that in a cell culture dish of dying neurons, the neurons begin to recover under certain natural conditions, thus hinting that halting neuronal death in cell culture is possible. Hence, we have a variation in the cell death phenomenon. Let us then assume that an investigator's quantifiable overexpression of a certain protein in dying neurons recapitulates the said variation in the phenomenon; that is, it halts neuronal death to a certain degree. This now sets the course for researching how and in what causal sequence of resultant changes the intervention on (i.e. overexpression of) the protein ultimately leads to the variation in the phenomenon.

These five tests should not be thought of as individually necessary conditions for a productive research programme leading to a successful mechanistic explanation. Collectively, they are not exhaustive stipulations for a paradigmatic mechanistic explanation. There could surely be further criteria or more exact stipulations for the framework, but the current ones are meant as starting points. Additionally, the tests should not be construed as true-or-false propositions. Even when an explanation fulfils the criteria of a test to a certain degree, the granularity or depth with which

those criteria are fulfilled could always be improved upon with refined theoretical work and new empirical findings, and newer questions to investigate could be proposed.

The tests are also not necessarily meant to be hierarchical, but it makes sense for some of them to build on each other. Moreover, a given phenomenon might be explained at least in a rudimentary way even when most of these tests are answered in the negative, that is, if the mechanistic model being investigated is at an early stage of development. But in the case of AD, the mechanistic model and explanation have enough detail to be able to engage with the criteria of each test at an appreciable richness.

Below, each of the tests is applied to the amyloid explanation, marking out specific strengths and shortcomings. The point is to systematically ascertain what the explanation might be missing and how to make it more complete. Furthermore, as introduced above, some of the tests might benefit heuristically from a biological principle that is relevant to their criteria. These opportunities will be highlighted.

- *TEST #1: Is the AD phenomenon set out as unambiguously as possible?*

The amyloid explanation has, as one of its endpoints, neuronal damage and cell death (beginning in certain parts of the brain, such as the entorhinal cortex). A number of cellular processes leading to A β aggregation and NFT formation have been postulated as the cause of such changes. As far as one could tell, the AD field takes *cellular damage* as the reference phenomenon to investigate the disease. This cellular manifestation of AD is, at the very least, defined in relatively unambiguous terms and communicated as such by investigators in the field. One can therefore tentatively say that, for the most part, the answer to this test is *affirmative*.

Having said that, what the amyloid explanation is currently missing is an exact account of how neuronal death at a single-cell level connects with brain-region-specific damage and how that precisely leads to AD's behavioural symptoms. Thus, there is much work to be done, even though this test is being marked as affirmative.

- *TEST #2: Does the amyloid explanation set out an environment to situate the underlying AD mechanism and refer to decomposable and detectable parts that constitute the mechanism?*

The amyloid explanation deals within the confines of the environments inside and immediately surrounding single neurons and glial cells. Furthermore, the explanation rests on a number of key protein players such as APP and tau, which are detectable in experimental settings and whose amino acid sequences are known. Therefore, the answer here is also *affirmative*.

Recall, however, that these tests should not be thought of as true-or-false propositions. For example, what is still missing in the explanation is some account of how, within the densely crowded and highly viscous intracellular environment of the cell, large aggregates of, for instance, tau proteins can even *begin* to form and take up significant intracellular volume. This is not a mere data gap in the explanation; it is a *conceptual gap* that the explanation should cover.

Thus, here again there is much work to be done, even though I have marked the test as affirmative.¹⁴

- *TEST #3: Are the parts represented in the model the amyloid explanation relies on organised and are they in some form of interaction?*

Neurons (which are the 'environment' of the amyloid explanation) are quintessential examples of vastly complex network arrangements of proteins, nucleic acids, lipids and other molecular 'parts'. Moreover, the protein players in the explanation are organised into pathways, as outlined in Table 1. Additionally, the chain of direct interactions amongst the parts in either of the (extracellular) A β and (intracellular) tau arms of the explanation is clear and is known in some depth. However, the interaction of the parts *between* the two arms of the underlying model is much less clear in the explanation (Bloom, 2014; Love, 2001; Rudenko et al., 2019; Tapia-Rojas et al., 2019). Given that both the extracellular and intracellular pathways are implicated in the pathobiology of the disease, there is strong reason based on the existing model to believe there to be important cross-interactions (Busche & Hyman, 2020; Pascoal et al., 2021),¹⁵ but there is no firm indication yet as to their nature. Hence, the tentative answer here for the amyloid explanation is *negative*. The obvious barrier, and perhaps connection, between the two arms is the *cell membrane*, which spatially separates the internal and external cellular milieus. This possibility will be explored in Sect. 6.

- *TEST #4: Do the relevant interacting parts described in the amyloid explanation exert some form of change on each other via some intermediate means?*

The question of this test, it may seem, can easily be answered in the affirmative for the cascade of steps that generate the A β peptide. For, as detailed in Sect. 3, the very production of the peptide involves changes exerted by one part (one of the 'secretase' enzymes) on another part (the APP protein), for example. But what are the intermediate means? The protein structures and 'active sites' (e.g. of the secretase enzymes that cleave APP) are known and have been the subject of many studies (Dehury et al., 2019; Seegar et al., 2017), and yet, in terms of exactly how the interaction takes place, we have not progressed much beyond relatively basic appeals to electrostatic interactions and hydrogen bonds. Whilst

¹⁴ With respect to the properties of the intracellular environment, in the past several years there has been much activity concerning the application of a chemical process called 'phase transition' (i.e. a transition between different states of matter) to neurodegenerative disease research, including AD. The idea behind this application is that protein aggregates found in AD neurons can "form via liquid-to-solid phase transitions" (Mathieu et al., 2020, p. 56). Meanwhile, however, there is no consensus or obvious concern in the AD field as to whether liquid-to-solid phase transitions are governed by a specific biological principle operative in the cell, or if such phase transitions can merely be explained mechanistically without specifying one or more biological principles. This is opportune ground to ask if phase transitions in the cell could actually be explained by a specific hypothesised cellular principle of organisation, and if so, how this would compare with other principles of organisation and provide an independent explanatory window.

¹⁵ Thanks to Lindley Darden (University of Maryland) for bringing this paper to my attention.

we can detect a change exerted upon a protein by another, the means with which the change is exerted is nowhere as intelligible as, for example, detecting the parts themselves, their arrangement and so forth, and much ground needs to be covered to determine exactly how *chemical* principles, such as electrostatic attraction, actually operate at the *protein* and *cellular* scales (see, e.g. Matta, 2006; Zhai et al., 2019). I will therefore mark the answer here as *negative*. As hinted at earlier, it would be immensely useful if chemical principles of interaction could be transformed into a category of principles that would specifically account for *biological* macromolecular interactions. More on this in Sect. 6.

- *TEST #5: Can the amyloid explanation accurately account for the sequence of cellular changes that lead to detectable variation in the AD cellular phenomenon?*

Accounting for detectable variation in the sense of increased protein cleavage, fibrillation and aggregation certainly occupies a central place within the amyloid explanation. Such variations have been painstakingly studied by using, for example, interventions that increase A β or tau levels in cultured neurons or in mice and detecting resultant changes in other elements of the presumed underlying mechanism (i.e. parts, interactions, etc.). In addition, certain familial genetic mutations provide *natural* cases of variability of the implicated protein levels. What is still unclear, however, is the certainty and order with which each episode of change can be pinned onto the disease's timeline. As already noted, one of the key open questions in AD research is whether (and to what extent) A β aggregation is causative of the disease phenomenon or is protective (Huang et al., 2021; Panza et al., 2019; Sturchio et al., 2021); that is, whether neuronal cell death starts to happen before or after A β aggregation begins in any appreciable manner. The same goes for NFT formation by tau: does it happen before, concomitant with, or after plaque formation? Therefore, the sequence of changes (i.e. what happens first, what comes next, etc.) cannot be definitively assigned as of yet. Hence the answer here is *negative*.

These tests applied in the context of the amyloid explanation do two things: first, independent of the issue of biological principles, they can systematically help prioritise which underexplored or missing mechanistic element(s) within the explanation should be investigated and how their discovery could fit into the broader picture of understanding the phenomenon of interest. Second, regardless of the negative or positive assessment of the mechanistic criteria, at least some of the tests could inspire or hint at biological principles or generalisations that could be discovered, adapted or hypothesised to enrich the overall explanation (i.e. the PM explanation) and lead to new research questions. Moreover, a given biological principle might feed back into a particular test that inspired its discovery and help resolve the mechanistic gaps that were identified. How principles might achieve these is the topic of the remaining two sections.

6 Two Biological Principles Relevant to AD

I will begin by describing two hypothetical biological principles that could be candidates for inclusion in a PM investigation of AD. These example principles will help with the discussion in Sect. 7, where more abstract and general aspects of biological principles will be the focus. I should note that proposing and investigating even one novel biological principle and determining its empirical impact requires a dedicated research programme.

I will use two of the paradigmatic tests as a springboard here: Test #3, which had to do with the arrangement and interaction of parts, and Test #4, which was centred on interacting parts exerting some form of change on each other via intermediate means. I argued that a category of biological principles that explain spatiotemporal interactions in the cell and another category that accounts for biological macromolecular interactions could augment our understanding of the criteria picked out in the two tests. To that end, I will propose two principles that I have provisionally termed the 'principle of cellular synchrony' and the 'principle of generative protein domains'. Each falls under one of the two categories.

6.1 Principle of Cellular Synchrony

A few years ago I suggested that the collective vibrations of 'phospholipids' (a class of lipid molecules) that form the cell membrane may act as a *pacemaker* or timekeeping source for cellular processes at a frequency in the picosecond range (i.e. one-trillionth [10^{-12}] of a second) (Ehsani, 2012). Incidentally, this timekeeping proposal bears similarities to observations that physicists studying biological systems made (Adair, 2002; Fröhlich, 1968), an indication that the focus on vibrational behaviour has a clear lineage in biophysics. I should emphasise that this proposal is *not* related to the circadian rhythm (discussed earlier relating to Bechtel, 2017), which pertains to the 24-h timekeeping that happens at an *organism* level and regulates the sleep-wake cycle. Cell membrane vibrations concern an individual cell and at a time regime that is orders of magnitude faster than 1 s. Additionally, there is no connection between this proposal and the pacemaker cells of the heart, which are a group of cells that form an electrical conduction system to control the rate of heart muscle contractions in the order of a few seconds.

There are various methods of attempting to validate the link between cell membrane vibrations and timekeeping in the cell. As the evidence stands to date, the possibility of such a function of the membrane is relatively strong (not discussed further). Building on this possibility, one could posit a *principle of cellular synchrony* that entails that all processes within a cell (e.g. the activity of proteins, intracellular transport, DNA transcription, etc.) happen in a synchronised manner and are cyclically coordinated based on a subsecond vibrational frequency. This further entails that unsynchronised processes may lead to cell death. Such a principle and the notion of a common timing regime answer to the fact that

cellular processes have a mind-boggling level of coordination and interdependence (recall, for example, the earlier discussion of mechanisms ‘masking’ each other; Illari, 2011). Moreover, because membranes are a universal feature of cells from all domains of life (Jekely, 2006), this principle would be expected to be operative in any cell. This is my first example of a ‘biological principle’.

Why is this a ‘biological’ rather than a ‘chemical’ principle? To be sure, the inherent vibrations of every single phospholipid derive from the molecule’s *chemistry*. However, when countless phospholipids come together in a membrane, encapsulate the contents of the cell and produce physical vibrations in unison and that vibrational frequency is transferred across the volume of the cell to affect all the biochemical processes within it, these collectively make the proposed principle a uniquely *biological* one that is operative at a cellular level. Moreover, the principle could be expanded to entail that in a tissue such as the brain, all adjacent cells might potentially have their cellular processes synchronised as well because of direct or indirect membrane contact. This could be an important consequence of the principle because just as processes in individual cells are intricately coordinated, a collection of neurons and other brain cells also need to be ‘in sync’ in terms of their synaptic communication, production of action potential and many other functions. In AD, for example, the loss of synaptic communication (and consequently coordination) between neurons is thought to be a key pathological step as the disease progresses (Edwards, 2019).

Also, in virtue of the above, no *cellular mechanism*¹⁶ could be said to underlie the principle of cellular synchrony. That is, cell membrane vibrations are not the result of a network of interacting proteins and other molecules in the cell. They essentially happen ‘automatically’ and ‘on their own’ because an empty shell of just cell membrane would still have the vibrations. However, the vibrations of *each* phospholipid in the membrane could perhaps be explained with a *chemical* or *molecular* mechanistic explanation along with thermodynamic laws, for example. Thus, even if this principle does admit of further explanation, the explanation is unlikely to be a purely mechanistic one – appealing as it presumably will to thermodynamic laws – and any mechanistic component of the explanation is likely to be at the chemical rather than the biological level.

On the basis of the temporal synchrony that this principle could entail across cellular processes, we might consider it as a member of potential principles of *spatiotemporal interactions*. Going back to Test #3 on how the membrane could bridge the extracellular and intracellular facets of the AD amyloid explanation, a hypothesis that the principle of synchrony brings forth is that both the A β peptide and hyperphosphorylated tau might interfere in tandem with the vibrations of the membrane. We know, for example, that extracellular A β oligomers “destabilize the [...] membrane’s structure, induce a generalized increase in membrane permeability, and insert themselves into the membrane to form cation-conducting pores” (Wang et al., 2016, p. 1914; see also Wang et al., 2021). It has also been reported

¹⁶ Here I intend for ‘cellular’ mechanisms to be distinct from physical or chemical mechanisms.

that the tau protein forms complexes with phospholipids (Ait-Bouziad et al., 2017). And A β might in fact directly interact with and facilitate the fibrilization of tau (Vasconcelos et al., 2016).

The interplay of unsynchronised cellular processes and AD pathology, mediated by the membrane and both A β and tau, would be a possible new path of investigation. This could lead to novel insights about (i) how the main parts and pathways of the AD mechanistic model could be explained to be connected and (ii) how the pathways interact with and influence each other. This is one scenario in which a new biological principle could *heuristically apply to the elements of a mechanistic explanation*, in this case showing one way of allowing the AD explanation to satisfy the conditions of Test #3. Furthermore, the principle can *independently* (and without necessarily invoking the mechanistic elements) raise the explanatory possibility that AD could, for instance, signal an overall unsynchronised timing amongst cellular processes in a given region of the brain. If such a line of investigation were to be pursued, *quantifications* of the unsynchronised timing of cellular processes might also be studied. For instance, in light of the loss of synaptic communication and coordination, an AD researcher could investigate how long certain cellular processes might be 'off' relative to each other and if this timing difference would increase as the disease progresses.

6.2 Principle of Generative Protein Domains

A second hypothetical biological principle could relate to the geometry and three-dimensional conformation of proteins such as A β and tau. In this subsection, I would like to specifically focus on tau, which is taken to be an 'intrinsically disordered' protein (Sabbagh & Dickey, 2016).

Since the 1950s, protein structure has been defined in terms of *domains* or segments that may be of (roughly) three flavours: 'alpha-helical', 'beta-sheet' and 'disordered'. Approximately a third of human proteins are thought to contain disordered segments, and these segments contribute significantly to protein-protein interactions and therefore to protein function (Kim & Chung, 2020).¹⁷ A visual representation of how ordered versus disordered protein domains can be thought of is presented in Fig. 2. A persistent challenge, however, has been that there is no overarching explanatory theory of what a disordered domain is and how it could systematically be conceptualised.

But what if disordered proteins are not really 'disordered' after all? Commentators on the physics of 'order' and 'chaos', or 'patterned' and 'patternless'

¹⁷ A helpful overview of this topic is provided in Schmid and Hugel (2020, p. 2) as follows: "proteins are often flexible and will change shape, much like a tree in the wind. Nevertheless, for some of the activities that it performs, a protein must adopt one specific shape. Therefore, the likelihood that the protein will take on this specific shape directly determines how efficiently that protein can perform a specific job". See also Aprile et al. (2021) and Yeates (2019).




Fig. 2 Representations of ordered and disordered proteins. This figure from Uversky (2017) depicts a multidomain ordered protein (an alpha-helical protein) (top left) and a disordered protein (top right). The structural and conformational rigidities of the *domains* within these two types of protein structure are compared to bricks versus noodles. However, is a protein that contains a disordered domain – such as the tau protein (which is actually entirely disordered) – really without any particularly constant shape (like a strand of noodle) or is it perhaps ‘structured’ in some other way? Related to this discussion, as shown in the figure, are also the notions of stability and resilience: “taking a few or even just one brick can lead to the collapse of the wall, whereas a bowl of noodles remains a bowl of noodles even after many noodles are eaten” (Uversky, 2017, p. 26). Reproduced with permission from Uversky, 2017; copyright Elsevier

phenomena, do not usually entertain a *third* possibility, one that would in principle be neither ordered nor disordered (Crutchfield, 2012).¹⁸ Truly envisioning what a third possibility could be may perhaps be beyond human cognitive capacity, but there have been attempts toward such a goal (see, e.g. Clouser et al., 2019; Sormanni et al., 2017).

¹⁸ Guttinger (2021) discusses a process ontology of intrinsically disordered proteins.

Within this context, one could propose a *principle of generative protein domains* that states that so-called disordered protein domains might be 'generative' domains in that they can assume *multiple* precise structures that are appropriate to their immediate cellular environment and interacting partners. The possible structures that a disordered domain could assume might be dependent on the complex balance of a number of factors, including (i) the *chemical* interactions (electrostatic and non-electrostatic) within the protein domain itself (amongst its different amino acids) and between different domains of the same or another protein; (ii) the *geometrical* constraints of the protein (e.g. some structural configurations might simply be geometrically impossible for the protein macromolecule); and (iii) the *physicochemical* properties of the cellular fluid or medium surrounding the protein (its composition, viscosity, etc.) and those properties' effects on the domain's structure.

The factors stipulated for this principle could potentially be operative on any protein domain, regardless of its 'orderedness'. However, it is reasonable to assume that for ordered domains (alpha-helical and beta-sheet), the influence of the first factor (i.e. chemical interactions amongst a domain's amino acids) might be so overwhelming that it outweighs the contributions of the other two factors. This is due to the prevailing notion that the single (albeit dynamic) structure of ordered domains can be entirely explained by chemical properties at the protein sequence level (Söding, 2017) and that these domains assume the same 'constant' structure in most cellular contexts. The principle of generative protein domains can be assigned to the *biological macromolecular interactions* category, and since it is wholly concerned with proteins in cells, it is unambiguously a *biological* principle that is operative at a cellular level.

Could this principle, similar to the principle of cellular synchrony, also be counted as ontologically distinct from cellular mechanistic explanations? I argue that it can, given that it fundamentally concerns the internal and external *chemistry* of proteins. Because of this, it might only be possible to posit *chemical* mechanisms underwriting it, if at all. Consider that we are not dealing with a small molecule interacting with its surrounding medium in the cytoplasm or the geometrical constraints of a few atoms. A protein is a *macromolecule* with potentially many properties that cannot entirely be explained by chemical mechanisms and thermodynamic laws (Jiang et al., 2018).

Taking the principle of generative protein domains as *explaining* the structure of disordered protein domains, one could posit that in *certain cellular milieus*, the tau protein may indeed have a precise and constant structure (i.e. a constrained structure without any significant variance), albeit not alpha-helical or beta-sheet ordered. One implication is that the tau protein sequence might be able to 'generate' different three-dimensional structures depending on its hyperphosphorylation status (a geometric and chemical change), and/or on whether it is in the intracellular fluid or interacting with the membrane (a change of medium). This could actually also go some way toward accounting for the *multiple roles* that a disordered protein could have in the cell (see, e.g. Olivieri et al., 2020). The generative protein domains

principle could thus help *explain facets of the behaviour of tau in AD neurons independent of the amyloid explanation.*

At the same time, however, the potential implications of this principle could inform the problem highlighted in Test #4. There, a problem was that the current conception of how two proteins interact is tenuous: “in terms of exactly how the interaction takes place, we have not progressed much beyond relatively basic appeals to electrostatic interactions and hydrogen bonds” (Sect. 5). Obtaining new insights on the dynamics of tau’s structure could lead to clues about its interaction with other ‘ordered’ and ‘disordered’ proteins. The principle might also eventually lead to *quantifications* of the extent to which the interaction between such proteins is dictated by electrostatic forces and hydrogen bonds, and how much – as suggested by the principle’s stipulations – is shaped by the medium surrounding the proteins and the mutual geometrical constraints of their interacting domains. We might thus be able to quantify the *strength* of tau’s interaction with its key interacting protein partners in the AD amyloid explanation.

The principles of cellular synchrony and generative protein domains are just two examples of potential biological principles that could be hypothesised based on the problems at hand. For each of these principles, one could ask what *parameters* (i.e. context-dependent and changeable factors similar to a temperature variable in a thermodynamic law) could fine-tune the principle. In the case of the cellular synchrony principle, the ‘rigidity’ of the cell membrane could be a possible parameter, whereby the more rigid the membrane, the lower its vibrational frequency might be expected to be. The rigidity could be dictated by, for instance, how tightly packed the membrane is of phospholipids. In the case of the generative domains principle, potential parameters are indeed stipulated in the principle itself, such as the composition or the viscosity of the medium surrounding the protein. All such parameters need to be validated experimentally.

In all, the examples in this section were meant to demonstrate how the discovery of biological principles could go hand in hand with the elucidation of the mechanistic elements of a mechanistic explanation brought about by the paradigmatic tests. Moreover, the two hypothesised principles showed how biological principles might have both non-mechanistic and mechanistic effects on the overall explanation: They might do independent explanatory work, and they might also act as heuristics for making mechanistic explanations more ‘complete’. The next section moves away from the specifics of the examples in this section to draw more general claims about the place of biological principles in a PM explanation.

7 Biological Principles and Mechanistic Explanations

The examples of the principles of cellular synchrony and generative protein domains can help crystallise some general properties about biological principles. Starting with their non-mechanistic effects on the overall explanation, one might initially ask how biological principles would fit into the broader notion of scientific laws. Indeed, in the special sciences (basically any natural science other than fundamental

physics), it is hard to come by generalisations that can act as almost universal laws that, as noted previously, are characterised by “universality, inviolable necessity, or unrestricted scope” (Craver & Tabery, 2019, §4.1).¹⁹

Philosophers of science usually discuss patterns and generalisations in fields like biology under the framework of *ceteris paribus* laws – that is, laws that hold when *other things are (held) equal*. These laws are essentially generalisations that admit of various context-dependent exceptions and therefore can be thought of as a category of non-exceptionless generalisations – that is, generalisations that include exceptions (Fenton-Glynn, 2016). The discussion of *ceteris paribus* laws traces its history to the economic sciences but has been applied and critiqued in all branches of the special sciences. For reasons that will be discussed in future work (Ehsani, 2022), in this chapter, the generalisations concerning cell biology that I call ‘principles’ approximate what some philosophers of science mean by *ceteris paribus* laws or ‘invariant generalisations’.

Some further points also need to be made about the word ‘biological’ in ‘biological principles’. First, principles or laws from the broader *life sciences* could be applied to cell biology. Foremost amongst these are evolutionary principles (Linguist et al., 2016), which generally apply at a *cell population* level. Indeed, many forms of generalisations that cell biologists may know as ‘principles’ or ‘laws’ fall within the purview of observational patterns or conjectures in (i) evolution (e.g. concerning genetic plasticity; Hannan, 2018), (ii) zoology (e.g. concerning tissue patterning; Barkai & Shilo, 2020), (iii) ecology or (iv) biogeography and can often have a mathematical form. Second, a motivation for the PM framework is to argue that biological principles for cellular phenomena should be recognised as being distinct from – but connected to – the laws and principles of thermodynamics, evolution, ecology and other related fields.²⁰

With these distinctions in mind, how could biological principles deliver independent explanatory work? To begin with, consider, for example, that the principle of cellular synchrony could potentially account for the collective unsynchronised behaviour of a group of adjacent neurons in AD patients without referencing any particular mechanistic explanation, such as the amyloid explanation. The

¹⁹ An example is Newton’s law of universal gravitation. Even then, however, one needs to be cognisant of the effect of electrical force between charged bodies (see Elgin, 2017, p. 25).

²⁰ Arguments regarding the distinctiveness of biological principles could be varied and draw from many sources. As a case in point, Marc Lange, in a chapter on “what would natural laws in the life sciences be”, writes that “a biological generalization can possess a distinctive variety of necessity – can be a biological law. Associated with this distinctive necessity is a range of invariance under counterfactual antecedents that is broader in some respects than the range of invariance exhibited by the fundamental physical laws” (Lange, 2013, p. 83). Beyond broadness, the distinctiveness of biological principles can also stem from the uniqueness of *cellular* phenomena compared to physical and chemical phenomena. Of note, the discussion of biological principles could just as well cover *organism*-level phenomena, but an in-depth explanation of such phenomena (bearing in mind that an organism is made up of a vast number of different cells) would necessarily be much more complex. Here I have restricted the scope of biological principles only to the phenomena of the cell, which is biology’s basic unit of study.

principle could stipulate a common reaction timing regime for some number of cells and, if an investigator so chooses, ‘explain’ AD cellular phenomena completely non-mechanistically. This line of study could also facilitate the prediction and ‘expectability’ (Deulofeu & Suárez, 2018) of what might happen in the brain as the disease progresses.²¹

This brings to mind how thermodynamic laws allow a chemist to feel confident, to a certain extent, about what to expect before a reaction is initiated. This does not mean that thermodynamic laws would necessarily lead to the exact prediction of a reaction’s outcome (although that is certainly an ultimate goal); instead, it means whether to simply expect the reaction to be endothermic or not, for example. Importantly, the predictive power biological principles facilitate might additionally make the explanation more quantitative, as was described for the two examples: the principle on cellular timekeeping could lead to measurements of the differences in cellular process times, and the principle on disordered protein domains could lead to better quantifications of the strength of protein–protein interactions.

Moving next to the mechanistic explanatory effects of biological principles, recall from Sect. 5 that at least some of the mechanistic criteria the paradigmatic tests picked out could in theory be explained by one or more hypothesised biological principles. The principles could help bring general information to bear on the mechanistic explanation and thus be utilised to (i) understand its various facets, such as the nature of the parts or their interactions (as the generative protein domains principle did for protein structure), and (ii) move toward the resolution of the potentially missing elements of the mechanistic explanation (as the cellular synchrony principle did to bridge the extracellular and intracellular facets of the amyloid explanation).

The mechanistic explanatory effects of principles, I would argue, might complement and fit into at least a segment of current NM investigations, such as the principles of organisation (or design principles) that were alluded to earlier (Bechtel, 2017). However, to what extent this generalises across NM-related investigations is a matter of debate. As quoted in Sect. 4, Cartwright and colleagues are of the opinion that a mechanism’s ‘regular behaviour’ “is what it takes for some set of principles that govern the features of M’s parts in their arrangement in M all to be instanced together” (Cartwright et al., 2020, p. 18). On the other hand, Beate Krickel argues that “the new mechanists could in principle accept that [. . .] the interactions between mechanistic components are governed by laws (which they usually do not) but that it does not follow that laws or expectability adds any explanatory power to a mechanistic explanation” (Krickel, 2020, p. 8). This chapter’s arguments, however, suggest that biological principles have the potential to increase the explanatory power of mechanistic explanations of cellular phenomena in a heuristic manner. Furthermore, the principles themselves might independently explain certain facets

²¹ There is pertinent discussion to be had about the independent explanatory work of biological principles and the literature on ‘grounding’ (e.g. Trogon, 2018) that I shall postpone to future work.

of the target phenomenon, thereby increasing the explanatory power of the *overall* explanation (which I have called the PM explanation).

To recap, the goal of the PM framework is to discover and apply biological principles or generalisations that are operative in a biological cell. The principles could have independent explanatory power that would aid in prediction and expectability. Biological principles could also make various components of the mechanistic explanation more complete, thereby also increasing the depth of the mechanistic share of the overall explanation.

8 Conclusions

In this chapter, I argued that various strands of clinical evidence point to the conclusion that the existing and widely accepted amyloid cascade mechanistic explanation of Alzheimer's disease (AD) appears to be fundamentally incomplete. I proposed that a 'principled mechanism' (PM) theoretical framework has the potential to inspire new sets of empirical questions and novel avenues of investigation that can take a given mechanistic explanation at any stage of development as its starting point. PM is a two-pronged framework. First, using a short series of 'tests', it systematically compares different components of the mechanistic explanation against a paradigmatic set of criteria and hints at various ways to make the mechanistic explanation more complete. Second, it makes an appeal for the discovery and application of 'biological principles' relevant to the phenomenon being explained. Next, I detailed two hypothetical biological principles, one having to do with 'time' at the cellular level and the other concerning the structure of 'disordered' protein domains, and how they could each inform and improve different aspects of the amyloid explanation of AD. Using these examples, I argued that biological principles are 'principles' because they approximate what some philosophers mean by *ceteris paribus* laws or 'invariant generalisations', and they are 'biological' because they operate at and are specific to the level of a biological cell. Such principles could aid in several ways, such as augmenting different facets of the mechanistic explanation but also allowing further independent nomological explanation of the phenomenon. Whilst this strategy can be complementary to certain New Mechanist approaches, an important distinction of the PM framework is its equal attention to the explanatory utility of biological principles.

Overall, PM can help move cell biological investigations from what might be called a generally 'mechanistic-descriptive' state (the status quo) to a 'mechanistic-nomological' paradigm, entailing theoretical biological generalisations alongside mechanistic accounts. If the purpose of an AD research programme is to arrive at a deeper form of biological explanation that would enable researchers to move toward finding effective treatments, and in doing so introduce the field to hitherto uninvestigated paths of enquiry, then the PM approach can be useful by making the current AD amyloid model and resultant explanation much more adequate for purpose (see Parker, 2020). Moreover, the PM framework could just as easily be applied to other biomedical domains, such as mechanistic explanations in

research about cancer, diabetes or cardiovascular disease, and to explanations for physiological cellular phenomena.

Ultimately, a broader goal of the case study in this chapter is to show that what is perceived by some to be a fragmentation between analytic philosophy and biomedicine is artificial and unhelpful, and that progress can be made when philosophical approaches are directed at open and neglected problems concerning the biological cell (see Ehsani, 2020).

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