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# Indications & Warning for Amphibious Ops against Taiwan: Philosophy, Methodology, Applications, Results

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## The Return of I&W to the Western Pacific

Indications and warning intelligence is an effort to identify and monitor changes in an opponent's operational posture. It is an effort to assess whether or not opponent's military units or other types of operational capabilities are in a "day alert" or "generated alert" status. Day alert represents a normal, or peacetime, status in which assets are maintained in a routine posture and are not highly capable of conducting offensive operations or even any significant operation at all. By definition, most units most of the time are in a day alert status –their activities are centered on undertaking routine maintenance, training, or other activities required to preserve the potential for real operations. Each organization also possess a unique day alert posture because bureaucratic procedures, equipment maintenance demands, funding cycles and personnel practices combine to create routines and patterns of activity that are not easily broken.



*No I&W*

## Research Findings: I&W Intelligence is Poorly Understood

Meeting likely challenges in the Western Pacific will require the United States to generate forces, especially U.S. Navy units, in the region. Although Indications and Warning (I&W) intelligence is now central to current and future U.S. Navy strategy and operations across the Indo-Pacific, today's officers and intelligence analysts have limited experience with managing the I&W system in general or with I&W intelligence in particular. It is also unlikely that they commanders understand the difference between I&W intelligence and intelligence reporting offering specific event predictions; confusion in this regard might lead them to disregard warnings in the expectation that more specific estimates are in the offing.



*I&W is a System Comprised of Intelligence Analysts and Operators*

## Research Findings: Effective I&W = Warning & Response

- To be effective, I&W intelligence needs exist as a system that links together analysts and operations, warning and response, intelligence realities to strategic and operational requirements.
- I&W requirements and deliverables must be understood by intelligence analysts and operators.



*I&W Intelligence*

## Recommendations

- Intelligence analysts and operators need to discuss I&W issues/requirements/realities on an ongoing basis.
- Intelligence analysts and managers need to take responsibility for the I&W "system".
- Analysts and operators need to take steps to strengthen the I&W system to bolster deterrence in the Western Pacific.



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