

EUROSKEPTICISM AND THE POLITICS OF MEMORY: THE CASE OF CZECH REPUBLIC, POLAND AND GERMANY

ЄВРОСКЕПТИЦИЗМ І ПОЛІТИКА ПАМ'ЯТІ: ПРИКЛАД ЧЕХІЇ, ПОЛЬЩІ ТА НІМЕЧЧИНИ

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By the beginning of the 21st century, the EU has made significant progress in implementing the United Europe project by introducing a single currency – the euro. It successfully solved the tasks related to the movement toward a "global cosmopolitan memory", the formation of common European identity. At the beginning of the 21st century, more than 67% of EU citizens perceived themselves primarily as Europeans. The pan-European culture of memory, becoming, in fact, cosmopolitan, took a dominant position in the historical narrative of the European space. In 2004, there was a large-scale expansion of the EU at the expense of the countries of the former socialist camp. The expansion carried out for purely political purposes and without economic justification, caused the development of a whole range of negative phenomena for the EU, one of which was the emergence of a conflict of memory. The principles of the policy of memory were adjusted, the transition from a cosmopolitan approach to the principle of agonist, i.e. dialogue based not only on the conflict of interests but also on the mutual respect of the disputants. Within the framework of this approach, key assessments of the historical narrative were corrected. Thus, in 2009, the European Parliament made additions to the previously adopted in 2005. It was a document giving an assessment of the Holocaust and the fascist regime with the inclusion of Soviet totalitarianism in this assessment framework. In subsequent years, assessments of the narrative of the Second World War began to more and more correspond to the concept of the culture of historical memory adopted by the countries of 'Young Europe'. The culture of memory in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe was based on fundamentally different concepts of understanding the experience of the historical past and its most important layer associated with the Second World War – it was a different historical memory.

Key words: Europe, euroscepticism, memory, politics, history.

До початку XXI століття ЄС значно просунувся в реалізації проекту Об'єднаної Європи, ввівши єдину валюту – євро. Вона успішно вирішувала завдання, пов'язані з рухом до «глобальної космополітичної пам'яті», формуванням загальноєвропейської ідентичності. На початку XXI століття більше 67% громадян ЄС сприймали себе насамперед європейцями. Загальноєвропейська культура пам'яті, ставши, по суті, космополітичною, зайняла домінуючу позицію в історичному наративі європейського простору. У 2004 році відбулося масштабне розширення ЄС за рахунок країн колишнього соціалістичного табору. Розширення, здійснене в суто політичних цілях і без економічного обґрунтування, спричинило розвиток цілого ряду негативних для ЄС явищ, одним із яких стало виникнення конфлікту пам'яті. Відкориговано принципи політики пам'яті, перехід від космополітичного підходу до принципу агонізму, тобто діалогу, заснованого не лише на конфлікті інтересів, а й на взаємоповазі учасників суперечки. У рамках цього підходу були скориговані ключові оцінки історичного наративу. Так, у 2009 році Європарламент вніс доповнення до раніше прийнятого у 2005 році. Це був документ, який дає оцінку Голокосту та фашистському режиму з включенням у цю рамку оцінки радянського тоталітаризму. У наступні роки оцінки наративу Другої світової війни почали дедалі більше відповідати прийнятій країнами «Молодої Європи» концепції культури історичної пам'яті. Культура пам'яті в країнах Центрально-Східної Європи базувалася на принципово різних концепціях розуміння досвіду історичного минулого та його найважливішого пласта, пов'язаного з Другою світовою війною – це була інша історична пам'ять. Щоб подолати «кризу пам'яті», ЄС та його інституції управління активізують діяльність, спрямовану на її вирішення. Вона набуває системно планового характеру, розрахованого на довгострокову перспективу. Це засвідчує реалізація в зазначений період двох спеціальних програм, метою яких було подолання кризи та зміцнення спільної європейської ідентичності.

Ключові слова: Європа, євроскептицизм, політика пам'яті, історія.

Introduction. The core of historical memory was nationalism, and its key component, the basis of the historical narrative, was the concept of sacrifice [16]. The historical memory of these countries was focused

on recognizing themselves as double victims – the Nazi regime and Soviet totalitarianism. Hence their resolute agreement to take the blame and responsibility for the Holocaust and bear the burden of repent-

ance. It happened so that they considered themselves the same victims as the Jewish people, so they were not going to join the concept of a culture of memory that had been formed by that time within the EU. Moreover, as part of their assessment of the Holocaust, they tried to construct their national narratives of the search for the lost genocide [8]. A striking example in this context is Poland, one of the first to create the Institute of Memory, the purpose of which was to focus historical memory and historical consciousness on what has deep roots in the people, and should take on external forms [10]. Refusing to integrate into the current concept of a pan-European culture of memory, the countries behaved quite aggressively towards it, trying, if not to replace it, then to radically correct it following their concept. In the conditions of a new emerging reality, the situation which was aggravated as a result of the failure of the adoption of the EU Constitution in 2005, Brussels was forced to make adjustments to the policy of memory, to give it dynamism, consistency, make it more effective and understandable for the citizens of the European Union. Under the new conditions, the memory of Europe could not represent a homogeneous master narrative, but the connectedness of concepts in the dialogue and interpenetration of national images in history. A consensus must be reached, the premise of which is shared European knowledge about “executioners and victims” [4, c. 54].

The principles of the policy of memory were adjusted, the transition from a cosmopolitan approach to the principle of agonist, i.e. dialogue based not only on the conflict of interests but also on the mutual respect of the disputants. Within the framework of this approach, key assessments of the historical narrative were corrected. Thus, in 2009, the European Parliament made additions to the previously adopted in 2005. It was a document giving an assessment of the Holocaust and the fascist regime with the inclusion of Soviet totalitarianism in this assessment framework. In subsequent years, assessments of the narrative of the Second World War began to more and more correspond to the concept of the culture of historical memory adopted by the countries of ‘Young Europe’, which is evidenced by the content of the documents adopted during this period.

In 2019, the European Parliament adopted a resolution ‘On the Impact of Historical Memory on the Future Of Europe [20], which spoke about the authoritarianism and totalitarianism of the Nazi and communist regimes. To overcome the ‘crisis of memory’, the EU and its institutions of governance are stepping up their activities aimed at its resolution. It is acquiring a systematically planned character, designed for the long term, as evidenced by the implementation during this period of two special programs, the purpose of which was to overcome the crisis and strengthen the common European identity. An example of such a

program is Europe for Citizens initiative (2006–2013 and 2014–2020) [17].

The development of the second program was preceded by an in-depth analysis commissioned by the Committee of the European Parliament on the topic of European historical memory: politics, problems, prospects [13]. This made it possible to more clearly formulate in it the program for the formation of historical memory in the EU. The correction of the policy of memory assumed the convergence of the two concepts in favor of the approaches of the Eastern European countries, but its implementation did not lead to the achievement of the set goals. Here we have to say that the European historical narrative remains split and develops within the framework of two concepts.

The impact of historical lessons on modern Czech euroskepticism

The way out of the crisis requires a new type of construction of the past, a new type of common European politics of memory. In separate plots, the memory of individual groups, and countries of the regions, can live their own lives in it, being inscribed in the general narrative frame of the EU [13]. The future will show whether Brussels will be able to solve this problem, but the future of the European Union depends on its solution. Most experts and researchers agree on this. The indecisiveness of this problem at the present stage objectively creates the ground for the perception by EU citizens of the program guidelines, rhetoric, demands, and slogans of Eurosceptics who actively oppose the pan-European culture of memory.

Within the framework of the national state, the influence of the historical past, the narrative of national memory on public consciousness, worldview attitudes, and the motivation for choosing political sympathies become the most significant. In several countries, the officially pursued policy of memory is aimed at creating a negative image of the EU by drawing parallels between historical events and processes of the past with the present day. Thus, V. Havel, the leader of the Czech Republic, compared the EU with the USSR, evaluating it as another empire, where the Czech Republic is destined for the role of a province. The Czech Republic is a clear confirmation of the conclusion of a number of researchers that Euroskepticism in most cases is not the result of socio-economic trouble, but its motivation lies in the field of culture, national identity, and the desire to preserve one's identity. Being an economically quite prosperous country, it ranks third in terms of the level of development of Euroskepticism, where $\frac{3}{4}$ of citizens have a negative attitude towards the EU. The dominant factor, in this case, is the national memory of the Czech people [14].

In the Czech Republic, the formation of a national culture of memory is given priority. There are a number of structures operating in the country – for example, the ‘Memory of the People’ project, and the

‘Post Bellum’ Institute for the Study of Totalitarianism, coordinating the development of the concept of a national culture of memory [11]. They are based on the study of the historical experience of the twentieth century, in the center of which lies the problem of Czech statehood. If the Holocaust played a key role in the pan-European culture of memory, then for the Czechs, the landmark events through which they look into the present and future are the theme of Munich, here we can speak about the events of 1948 and 1968. The lesson that has been learned from history by both the Czech elite and the people is the consciousness of a persistent complex of mistrust toward Western European democracy. This is the so-called ‘Munich Syndrome’ – a narrative of betrayal by the allies and partly by their government, which did not give the people the opportunity to defend their freedom.

The ‘Munich Syndrome’ had a strong influence on the historical consciousness and psychology of the Czechs for many years to come, largely determining today the attitude of both the Czech political elite and ordinary Czech citizens toward the EU [8, p. 21]. The tragic history of the Czechs, connected with the problem of the formation of their statehood, determines the core of the national memory of the Czechs, hence the extremely reverent feeling, and deep patriotism concerning their state.

The Czech Republic is a country whose inhabitants practically do not migrate from the country. The preservation of one's identity and national unity within the framework of the nation-state determined the essence of the policy of memory, especially during the presidency of V. Klaus, one of the first leaders of the EU countries, who criticized the EU and the integration model it was implementing. Historical memory and the lessons of the past are firmly on the agenda – especially the tragic events and processes associated with the formation of Czech statehood in the XIX and especially in the XX century: this is its revival on the ruins of the Habsburg Empire, the loss of independence in the 39th, the tragic process of post-war reconstruction, where the events of 1949, 1968, and the collapse of Soviet totalitarianism served as markers.

The lessons of the historical past, their comprehension in refraction to the realities of today, have formed for the majority of citizens of the country and part of its political elite a stable discourse of historical consciousness associated with the reluctance of people to sacrifice hard-won independence for the sake of the vector of development determined by Brussels. This approach was implemented by President V. Klaus, who determined the policy of the Czech Republic from 2003–2013. He considered its main vector to be the strengthening of sovereignty, and not the transformation of the country into an element of a federation, “where we would turn into an insignificant province” [25, p. 11].

Within the framework of the existence of the European Union, the sore point generated by historical memory is the problem of the Sudeten Germans, which has been transformed today within the framework of relations with Germany. V. Klaus, based on the lessons of the past, was the first within the EU to express his fears about the strengthening of Germany, its leadership in the European Union, and its transformation into a new empire.

The ideas of healthy nationalism and pragmatism, and the strengthening of their statehood for today's citizens of the Czech Republic are much closer and dearer than the unity of Europe and common European values, as evidenced by the unwillingness of the Czechs to enter the Eurozone, to accept refugees. Euroskepticism in the Czech Republic is realized both at the level of civil society, ordinary citizens, and the level of political elites, and has a steady upward trend. At the time of joining the EU, 77% of the country's inhabitants trusted Brussels [24].

According to a survey conducted by ‘Europeum’ (2018), 54% of Czechs were against leaving the EU, while 34% were of the opposite opinion; and 75% think the EU exaggerates its positive aspects. In 2019, 31% of Czech citizens had a positive attitude towards the EU. There is a coincidence of political and public Euroskepticism in the country. Thus, out of 38 political parties, 1/3 is in the positions of Euroskepticism, from ‘hard’, demanding an exit from the EU, to ‘soft’, using critical rhetoric against the EU.

At the same time, the Czech Republic demonstrates an extremely passive policy in matters of deepening the integration process in Europe. This was the reason for her sharp criticism from the leadership of Brussels. In May 2018, the European Commissioner for Justice V. Yurov at the conference ‘Challenge of Europe’ explicitly stated that if the Czech Republic is not active in solving pan-European problems, but confines itself only to criticizing the EU, in the future, it may have problems in the future because of this connection with getting rid of individualist countries as ballast [9]. The nature of Czech Euroskepticism lies precisely in its national specificity, its mentality, its past, politicization, and actualization of the national culture of memory and historical consciousness.

Political memory of Poland and its impact on the modern politics

At the time, the ruling political elite is Euroskeptical, and their policies provoke speculation that after Brexit there will be Poxexit, i.e. Poland will leave the EU. The reason for this paradox lies in the ‘right turn’, which began in 2005 when the left forces in power in Poland after 1989 suffered a crushing defeat. The victory was won by the right-wing conservative party ‘Law and Justice’ (‘PiS’), standing on the positions of nationalism and traditional values. Finally, the ‘right turn’ ended with the victory of the PiS party in the parliamentary elections of 2015 and the presidential elections in 2016,

the party repeated its success in 2019, receiving more than 46% in the parliamentary elections. Its candidate A. Duda was again elected president of the country. The current situation in Poland is a clear confirmation of P. Nora's conclusion that "the past has ceased to be a guarantee of the future, therefore memory has become a driving force in the promise of continuity": the past is always aimed at solving the problems of the present and its concept is determined by ideological attitudes, political guidelines of power structures.

The formation of the concept and narrative of historical memory and the policy for the implementation of this task, which in Poland was called 'historical policy', began immediately after 1989. Poland became the first country where the National Institute of Memory was established in 1998. Until 2005, the process of forming a new narrative of memory and historical consciousness was closely connected with the process of de-communization. The dominance of liberals in this period in governmental structures had a decisive influence on the development of basic approaches to solving this problem. The emphasis was placed on the study of the socialist period of Polish history in the context of the de-communization process.

The liberals who were in power during this period saw the future of Poland in United Europe and sought to reform the historical consciousness and study the historical past, which would testify to the common destinies of Poland and Western Europe, the importance and priority of universal human values. The modernization of the past carried out during this period was based on the principle of critical patriotism, the essence of which was to consider the historical past through the prism of universal values, and morality, as well as learn lessons and admit mistakes.

With the coming to power of the PiS party, especially after 2015, a new qualitative stage begins in the formation of new concepts of the historical past, the 'new history of the country'. The model of the historical past, based on the principle of critical patriotism, contradicted the ideological principles of the party and its leaders, for whom the main value was not universal human values and common destinies of European peoples, but traditional national values, Catholicism, family. The party and its leaders could not be satisfied with the understanding of the past, realized in the historical consciousness, which is evaluated as a policy of "national amnesia" [21, p. 2228]. The party leaders saw future Poland as more than just an EU member following the path outlined by Brussels; their goal was to create the Third Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth as a leader country, playing the same role as the First Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth once played in the past. Historical memory and historical consciousness are considered by them the most important resource for the realization of this goal.

The PiS party became one of the few parties that, when adopting its program in 2004, included a special

section on historical politics and its goals, considering it to be the most important part of state policy. The essence of historical politics was understood by them as the activation of public discourse about the past through various kinds of institutionalization of this discourse, both at the state and the local level. By 2015, historical politics acquired, according to Burda, the features of 'symbolic violence' – the consistent brutal imposition of a new narrative landscape of memory [8, c. 101].

The very process of the formation of a 'new history', based on which a radical modernization of historical memory and the reformatting of the historical consciousness of Polish society began, was put in a strict framework, the exit from which even meant criminal punishment. Taboo was imposed on the Holocaust issues in Poland, the problem of 'settlers' – the eviction of Germans from Poland. The basic concept was the formation of historical memory, where the past appears as a transparent ball, without the slightest spots and dots on it; the image of the past should only cause pride in one's people and delight.

Such an approach required the rejection of the principle of critical patriotism, replacing it with 'patriotism of tomorrow', based on values in the spirit of ethnic patriotism of the late XIX century, and an integral community – 'Polishness'. Healthy patriotism must resist "distortions of Polish history at home and abroad" [24, c. 78].

The transformation of Poland historical memory into an instrument of struggle

The outline of the narrative of historical memory consisted of such significant events as the Commonwealth, which appeared to be the forerunner of Modern Europe; mythologized images of Polish uprisings, where special significance is attached to the Warsaw uprising of 1944; glorification of the fighters for the national liberation movement, personifying the high morality, morality, conscience and honor of the Polish people, a role model and pride of the present and future generations. A special place in the concept of "new history" is occupied by the history of the twentieth century, where Poland is represented by its main sufferer – a victim of the intrigues of totalitarian states, betrayed by the allies, doomed by them to great torment. This gives it today the right to demand compensation for the horror she endured during the Second World War.

The historical policy of the Polish authorities, consistently based on historical experience, strengthens in the minds of the Polish society the idea of an exceptional Polish nation that has made a significant contribution to the development of European civilization, which gives it the right to a more significant role in modern Europe.

The formation of an extremely negative image of Russia as an enemy of the Polish people is also considered the most important component of historical

politics. Russophobia is one of the significant features that characterize modern Polish society.

The introduction and rooting of all the above concepts in historical memory and historical consciousness is the support that allows the leadership of Poland, its ruling PiS party, not to perceive the existing model of the integration process in the form of the EU and to pursue a policy, both domestically and internationally, that runs counter to with the principles and laws of the European Union.

The historical past and the historical memory formed on its basis today are an important resource for Poland's struggle for a special place within the EU as a regional leader in CEE. The historical policy pursued inside the country is showing its effectiveness: today 49.8% of Poles believe that the Auschwitz concentration camp, the place of extermination of hundreds of thousands of Jews, is a symbol of the martyrdom of the Polish people. The number of those who believe that the Jews suffered the most has drastically decreased, and today there are less than 30%. At the same time, 42% of Polish citizens are convinced that Russia is pursuing an aggressive policy and is an enemy of the Polish people [25, c. 13].

The example of Poland is proof of the politicization of historical memory and demonstrates its close connection with the political agenda. On the example of Poland, historical memory has been transformed into an instrument of the struggle for power within the country: in the past, arguments are being sought to justify a critical attitude towards the EU.

The case of Germany

For a long time, Germany also belonged to the Euroskeptics. The country that initiated the United Europe project has become a locomotive and the main donor. The phenomenon of Euroskepticism on German soil developed only in the second decade of the XXI century, manifesting itself in the activities of political parties and protest movements. A powerful impetus for the development of Euroskepticism in the country was the creation in 2013 of the Alternative for Germany (AfD) party, which proclaimed the need to return to the national currency, and took a tough anti-migrant and anti-European stance. The program of the AfD, adopted at the congress in Dresden, also included a clause on the withdrawal of the FRG from the European Union. Following the results of the elections to the Bundestag in 2017, the AfD became the third political force in the country and has good prospects for the parliamentary elections in autumn 2021 [3, c. 394]. The party is represented in the parliaments of all 16 federal states.

The growing popularity of the party is evidence that Euroskepticism has penetrated the public consciousness and determines the political sympathies of a significant part of the country's population. This is demonstrated by the results of sociological research. Thus, according to a survey conducted in 2017, 62%

of Germans believe that the EU is on the wrong course, while 42% support the idea of a referendum on EU membership (in 2016 there were only 29% of such people), 64% oppose EU enlargement and 82% is against the admission of Turkey into the EU. In 2019, the number of Germans who confirmed their distrust of the EU was 38% [7, c. 388].

The growth of Euroskepticism is the result of a complex set of factors, among which a significant role belongs to the historical memory of the Germans, its concept, which dominates today in society. The memory of Germany, as the researchers note, is the memory of the post-heroic community, which is based on a moral and ethical model [1]. When historical responsibility is considered not at the level of biographical memory, but at the level of belonging to a national identity, as indicated by all researchers of the problems of historical memory, whose work was mentioned in this article.

The concept of the formation of historical memory and historical consciousness of modern German society was slow and difficult in the FRG in the course of tough discussions. From proposals to forget one's past, primarily related to the history of the twentieth century (the Nazi regime and the Second World War) and start one's history from scratch to the recognition of only criticism of Nazism and its leaders, leaving out of its scope an assessment of the role of the German people in the tragedy of Second World War.

By the 90' of the XX century, basic approaches to the problem of the historical past associated with the theme of the Second World War were determined. This is a 'reworking' of experience, its comprehension in the context of the recognition of collective guilt, collective responsibility, collective repentance, and moral condemnation of the past. The emotional component should be the fear of the threat of oblivion of the past, "which must be tempered with sincere repentance" [5]. The principles of collective guilt and collective repentance were defined as 'features of national identity'. The key moment of the historical narrative is the Holocaust.

One of the directions of the policy of memory was the task of perpetuating the memories of what happened and giving them a normative character; a number of laws are adopted that define the framework for assessing the past, primarily the Holocaust as the greatest tragedy in the history of mankind. The accession of the GDR and the unification of Germany required the search for a new consensus in the assessment of their past. The inhabitants of the Eastern lands had a different mentality and perception of the past, where the responsibility for the tragedy of Germany was borne by 'capitalists and fascists', and they were their victims [23]. East Germans refused to take on a complex of guilt and repentance, to consider not national, but pan-European values as a priority, and to put up with the fact that national interests and national

identity remain outside the legal field. The all-German consensus was destroyed. The change of generations also contributed to its destruction: the new generation, which did not know the war and did not understand why it should bear a sense of guilt, does not consider it right to talk about national interests and reduce the entire history of Germany only to the Third Reich, the First and Second World War.

The emerging needs of society and the conflict of concepts were sensitively caught by the Euroskeptics. Representatives of the AfD began to actively develop the theme of the need to revise the concept of historical memory. Holocaust becomes a kind of civil religion: the Holocaust monument in the center of Berlin was seen by AfD representatives as a monument to shame in the heart of their capital [20, p.132]. The party consistently justifies the need for a 180° turn in the politics of memory, and the implementation of a reform in the teaching of history [2, c. 53].

Representatives of the AfD believe that Germany's guilt has long been redeemed, and the concept of guilt only ties Germany's hands in the process of strengthening its influence as a sovereign state. In this regard, the party raises the question of the need to reach a new agreement on the status of allied troops in Germany and raises the problem of 'displaced Germans', which was hushed up for a long time. Thus, Eurosceptics return to the agenda the problem of changing the content of memory, where, along with the articulation of human rights and tolerance, national interests should be present and national identity should be manifested.

Today in German society there is a feeling of fatigue from the constant reference to the topic of the Holocaust, the younger generation has no desire to repent for the sins of their ancestors and bear the burden of guilt on their shoulders. Coming out with a demand to correct the concept of historical memory, the AfD is expanding the number of its supporters, especially among young people, consolidating around itself a part of society that does not want to live with the burden of eternal guilt and repentance. In Germany, historical memory has become a source of both political and public Euroscepticism.

The influence of historical memory on attitudes towards the EU is also clearly visible in the moods of the citizens of candidate countries for EU accession. An illustrative example is Serbia, where distrust of the West, unwillingness to join the EU, and doubts about its success are characteristic of the majority of Serbian society and are rooted in the country's past. There is nostalgia for Yugoslavia in Serbian society, especially during the period of Marshall Tito. For Serbs, the period of the Second World War is a special national pride, when it was the Serbian people who were one of the first to create the resistance movement against fascism. The Serbs link the collapse of Yugoslavia directly with the West. The events asso-

ciated with the bombing of Yugoslavia in 1999 are considered especially painful for Serbian society. The negative perception of the EU is also connected with the verdict of the Hague court Ratko Mladic – some Serbs consider him a national hero. The main reason is the rejection from the Serbs of Kosovo, a territory that has a sacred meaning for these people in their self-identification as a nation [22]. Also, the historical past and historical memory associated with the role of Russia in the history of the Serbian people today largely form the pro-Russian orientation of development as an alternative to relations with the European Union.

Conclusion. Historical memory has a decisive influence on the development of Euroscepticism in almost all EU countries. In addition to the countries discussed above, their influence is especially significant in Britain, where Eurosceptics were able to achieve their goal of leaving the EU and continue to be a significant example for Eurosceptics in France. In the historical memory of the French and their historical consciousness, the past is associated with Greater France – this is how they want to see France in the XXI century. The problem of the influence of historical memory on the growth of the number of Eurosceptics is so multifaceted and multi-vector that it is impossible to fully consider it within the framework of this article. But the influence of France's historical past does not raise doubts that France today is the second country in terms of the development of Euroscepticism.

The strengthening of the importance of historical memory in the life of modern society is associated with the result of a serious temporal shift, the impact of the loss of a clear image of the future, and the loss of the present, which led to an increase in public interest in the past. In parallel, this contributed to the activation of the policy of managing the past, its manipulation through the policy of memory, the formation of historical consciousness following certain political goals and objectives of the state, supranational structures, or even a specific group of people.

Historical memory is politicized, turning into an instrument of political struggle, into the politics of memory – into an element of state and party policy. In the EU space, all actors participating in the political process are actively using it for their purposes, both in confrontation with the EU and in the struggle for power within nation-states. Historical memory has become an important resource for Eurosceptics to expand their influence. States are pursuing a policy of memory aimed at forming priorities related to national values, the perception of the uniqueness and originality of their past, and the significance of these characteristics for the present.

National memory, even in the context of globalization and purposeful activities on the way to its transformation within the EU into a pan-European culture

of memory, turned out to be a priority for EU citizens. The crisis of common European identity associated with the collapse of the desire to create a common European culture of memory has confirmed Sean Carey's conclusions that national attachment with a sense

of national pride has a significant negative impact on support for European integration. This, in turn, proves the close interaction and mutual influence of the socio-cultural phenomenon of historical memory and the political phenomenon, which is Euroskepticism.

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