

India and Pakistan: Outlining a Path towards Peace

*Michael Hirsh, Ahmad Hassan Awan and Jayanta Krishna Sarmah**

Abstract

[This paper is a multidisciplinary analysis of the relationship between India and Pakistan. The authors contend that much would be gained by Pakistan and India if normalization between the two could be achieved. By examining the failures of past negotiations and examining current conditions, the paper puts forth areas where there exist common interests and what they believe could be a path to peace between these nation-states. The work suggests there are numerous factors that have contributed to the current state of affairs between India and Pakistan. Some of the factors are more obvious than others like the Partition trauma and Kashmir. The paper then highlights some of the more obscure issues which include anti-other education in Pakistani and Indian schools. All need to be considered as we try to unravel the knot of distrust between these two countries and look to establish common ground in areas which require urgent attention and push for reconciliation. – *Authors.*]

Introduction

The India-Pakistan relationship is crucial to world peace and yet this complex bilateral relationship has been largely ignored by policy makers. For a better understanding of Indo-Pak relations, history, religion and symbols are crucial in making sense of the complexity which revolves around the two rival states. Even though the use of religious sentiments and invoking history by the politico-religious-military elites on both sides is a common strategy to pursue political gains and legitimize actions, the bilateral relationship between India and Pakistan makes the most sense when understood in the political terms. Despite the symbols of divergence there exists a history of coexistence and mutual harmony bigger than the differences. The countries share an overlapping ancestry, history, culture, sports, language and faiths. Post-independence Pakistan and India have both had successes in the diplomatic sphere. There exists an on-again off-again peace process between the two that is reflective of the various bilateral engagements.

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Numerous factors, one finds, have been playing certain roles in the trajectory of relations between India and Pakistan, since independence in 1947. Some of the factors are more obvious than others. All need to be considered as we try to unravel the knot of distrust between these two countries. The paper will begin by looking at some of the more obvious concerns and then move on to some of the more obscure issues that need to be addressed.

The Obvious

Partition

Partition of British India on 14 August, 1947 which gave rise to Pakistan and India¹ is oft cited as one of the most important factors hampering reconciliation between the two countries. Though colonial India had a history of communal or ethnic riots, the violence born of the anticipation

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of² and actualization of Partition was of a much greater scale than subcontinent had ever known. Upwards to 14 million people were displaced, hundreds of thousands killed and many more wounded.³ The resettlement process was painful and many who had previously been prosperous found themselves destitute as a result of the transition.⁴ Rape of and capture of women occurred on both sides. Though many post-factum exchanges of these women were made, the women were often shamed shadows within the families they rejoined in their respective countries.⁵

The scars of partition are important as they have contributed significantly to the perpetual hostility between the two nation-states. The trauma carried over into the mindsets of those who took over the new governments and have yet not fully disappeared.⁶ They exist within living

¹ Ramachandra Guha, *India After Gandhi: The History of the World's Largest Democracy*, (New York: Harper Collins, 2007).

² Stephen P. Cohen, *Shooting for a Century: The India-Pakistan Conundrum*, (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2013).

³ Khurshid M, Kasuri, *Neither a Hawk Nor a Dove*, (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2015).

⁴ Guha, *India After Gandhi: The History of the World's Largest Democracy*.

⁵ Kamran A. Ali, *Communism in Pakistan: Politics and Class Activism 1947-1972* (London: Oxford University Press, 2015).

⁶ Richard Sisson and Rose Leo, *War and Secession: Pakistan, India and the Creation of Bangladesh* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1992).

memories of those in both countries who have passed their stories on to their children and grandchildren. For all Partition is a "painful legacy."⁷ A distraught eye witness to the trauma of 1946-7 recalled that on the eve of departure (due to partition) from Rajshahi "Tears began to flow. I realized for the first time that the part of Bengal which had been my home was no longer my home. It was a foreign land...The underlying feeling was that we were being driven from our own country...We were angry with both Nehru and Jinnah for not handling the situation properly".⁸

Kashmir: The Hereditary Conflict

The Kashmir dispute continues to be a major thorn in the relations between India and Pakistan since Partition. The conflict has a historical political legacy of dominance and conquest attached to it that dates back to the Hindu-Muslim rivalry in the sub-continent over the centuries. The conflict has led to three wars over Kashmir, in 1947, 1965 and 1999. The issue of Kashmir remains the world's largest and most militarized dispute.⁹

Perhaps second only to the trauma of partition in hampering reconciliation between the countries is the disposition of Kashmir. At the time of Partition Kashmir was a majority Muslim princely state with a Hindu leader. Like other princely states at the time of Partition, Kashmir was given the opportunity to decide its own fate, i.e., whether to join Pakistan or India. That Kashmir was not assigned to Pakistan at Partition was a great disappointment to Pakistanis despite the fact that it was a Muslim majority state. This disappointment was shared by Mohammad Ali Jinnah, who was resigned to living with the lines as drawn "As honorable people we must abide by it."¹⁰

In response to increased Indian involvement, on October 22, 1947 "a force of several thousand armed men" entered Kashmir from the then North-West Frontier Province of Pakistan.¹¹ In response to this, as India claims, Kashmiri leader Maharaja Hari Singh requested military assistance from India. On 24, October, 1947 he signed an Instrument of

⁷ Wendy Doniger and Martha C. Nussbaum, *Pluralism and Democracy in India: Debating the Hindu Right*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 89.

⁸ (Ghoshal 2007, 42)

⁹ "CIA World Factbook, 2016," accessed 5th February 2017, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/resources/the-world-factbook/geos/print_pk.html.

¹⁰ Burke, Samuel Martin, and Salim al-Din Quraishi, *Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah: his personality and his politics*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997). 354

¹¹ Guha, *India After Gandhi: The History of the World's Largest Democracy*, 79.

Ascension¹² resulting in Kashmir's control by India.¹³ Clashes between Indian and Pakistani armies ensued.¹⁴ Though a formal ceasefire was agreed upon on January 1, 1949, the UN's 5 January, 1949 call for a plebiscite to decide Kashmir's final status was never executed.

Since then both Pakistan and India have controlled Kashmiri territory and each claim to be on the right side of history. The current disposition of Kashmir continues to fuel an "enduring rivalry" between the two countries.¹⁵

The pattern of conflict leading up to the Kashmir dispute is still with us. India continues to control a part of Kashmir with an iron fist and [India alleges that] Pakistan continues to use proxies to instigate insurgency. Such actions have led to unintended consequences for both. Use of proxies has given space to non-state actors who act independently adding to the extremism that threatens the entire region.¹⁶ It also fuels support within Pakistan for groups such as Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) whose activities undercut peace efforts between Pakistan and India.¹⁷ However the group has been banned since 2002 among various others by the Pakistan government.¹⁸ While such groups continue with their struggle in one way or the other, Indian state's repression and violent response has continued, rather seen intensifying of late.

Pakistan is accused of political repression and creating proxies for its own interests on its side of the Kashmir. Indian security forces have been accused of carrying out human rights violations such as unlawful killings, rapes, disappearances and torture with near impunity. The Indian government has at least half a million troops stationed in Kashmir which means that there is one soldier for every 25 residents in the Indian Administered Kashmir.¹⁹ An example of inhumane treatment was recently visible when Indian security forces used bullets and steel pellets to suppress a protest blinding protestors and killing more than 45 people in July 2016.²⁰ In all of this, the voices of the Kashmiris who want self-

¹² A document whose authenticity is disputed. *Eds.*]

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Burke and Quraishi, *Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah*.

¹⁵ Ian Talbot, *Pakistan: A New History*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012) 16.

¹⁶ Kasuri, *Neither a Hawk Nor a Dove*.

¹⁷ Talbot, *Pakistan: A New History*.

¹⁸ "List of Proscribed/Banned Organizations," NACTA, accessed April 8, 2017. [http://www.nacta.gov.pk/Downloads/BannedOrganization\(Eng\).pdf](http://www.nacta.gov.pk/Downloads/BannedOrganization(Eng).pdf)

¹⁹ Amnesty International Report, 2013.

²⁰ Mirza Waheed, "India is blinding young Kashmiri protesters – and no one will face justice," *The Guardian*, July 18, 2016, accessed August 2, 2016,

determination remain unheard. Kashmir remains the primary stumbling block in the bilateral relations and regional progress.

The Cold War and Regional Security

It is unfortunate for India and Pakistan that they became independent nation-states at the height of the Cold War. It is even more unfortunate that they found themselves on opposing sides with Pakistan allying with the US and India with the USSR. This international bifurcation contributed to the distance between the two nations.

After independence Pakistan faced many challenges. From refugees to defense production, Pakistan required strong allies. It was inclined towards the Western bloc because both shared a belief in democracy and was disinclined toward the Eastern bloc due to "the repression...(of) Muslims in Central Asia...under Stalinist rule"²¹ and Krushchev's support for Afghanistan's claim of a "Pashtunistan."²²

The United States had concerns regarding Pakistan's religious ideological foundation as opposed to India's secular vision. It was also wary of the Indian reaction of Pakistan joining the South East Treaty Organization (SEATO) making it eligible to receive military equipment. Nevertheless, given its geostrategic location the US was convinced that Pakistan could play a key role in the Cold War. Pakistan's proximity to the Persian Gulf, the rise of nationalist elements in Iran, the Korean War and the liberation of Communist China all played significant roles in strengthening US interest in Pakistan.²³ India on the other hand sought to remain neutral in Cold War politics but after Kashmir was taken up in the UN, India recognized the benefits of having the Soviet Union as a permanent ally in the Security Council.²⁴

The events of 1965 and 1971 convinced decision makers in Islamabad that Pakistan could not rely upon defense agreements with the West.

<https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/jul/18/india-blinding-kashmiri-protesters-justice-steel-pellets>.

²¹ Kasuri, *Neither a Hawk Nor a Dove*, 93.

²² Ibid. 98.

²³ Abdul Sattar, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy 1947-2012*, (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2013), 46-49.

²⁴ Kasuri, *Neither a Hawk Nor a Dove*.

The events of 1965 and 1971 convinced decision makers in Islamabad that Pakistan could not rely upon defense agreements with the West. An arms embargo was enforced against Pakistan following the 1965 war. The India-backed separation of East Pakistan in 1971 was next. The loss was significantly demoralizing for Pakistan not only in terms of resources or economics but also ideologically.

While internal politics were certainly at play in the development of a secessionist movement within East Pakistan²⁵, New Delhi's support using proxies, which Prime Minister Modi recently acknowledged,²⁶ led to military battles between India and Pakistan. The resulting loss of its eastern wing and the establishment of an independent Bangladesh left Pakistan reduced by a sixth geographically as well as more homogeneous ethnically and religiously. Pakistan also lost half of its navy, a third of its army, and a quarter of its air force.²⁷ During the battles India captured 93,000 Pakistani military and civil personnel which were later released under the Simla Agreement.²⁸

The 1980's Soviet invasion of Afghanistan had far-reaching consequences for Pakistan that are still visible. During the war Pakistan absorbed the bulk of the Afghans refugees fleeing the war zone, many of whom never returned home. Pakistan again became relevant to Washington as the US cashed in on the opportunity to defeat the Soviets. The US and Pakistani governments worked together to develop a guerilla force called the Mujahideen (freedom fighters). The Mujahideen were trained in and migrated from Pakistan to Afghanistan and back again. Pakistan's involvement in the war helped to defeat the Soviet Union and end the Cold War.

The US abandoned the Mujahideen (many of whom went on to call themselves the Taliban) and a civil war ensued. Post 9/11 US intervention in Afghanistan and dismantling of Taliban regime also gave India a renewed foothold in the war-torn nation, adding to the concerns of Pakistan, in a addition to other fall-outs of a situation that endures till today. Some foreign experts view that the anti-Soviet proxy strategy also provided a model for Pakistan vis-à-vis its relationship with India as regards to Kashmir.²⁹

²⁵ Talbot, *Pakistan: A New History*.

²⁶ "FO Slams Modi's Statement on Indian Involvement in 1971 war," The News, accessed April 8, 2017, <https://www.thenews.com.pk/latest/5143-fo-slams-modis-statements-on-indian-involvement-in-1971-war>

²⁷ Talbot, *Pakistan: A New History*.

²⁸ Ayesha Jalal, *Democracy and Authoritarianism in South Asia: A Comparative and Historical Perspective*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995).

²⁹ Talbot, *Pakistan: A New History*.

Other Military and Surrogate Confrontations

Military confrontations between nations foster suspicion and harden hatreds. When countries have a running history of confrontations, each new event refreshes the suspicion and hatred felt on both sides, passing it on to younger and younger generations.³⁰ Indo-Pak relations are marked by a history of confrontation including at the Rann of Kutch – April, 1965, at Siachen in 1984 and the 1999 Kargil Operation. Even military exercises such as Operation Brass Tacks in the winter 1986-7 could harden relations between countries.³¹

Perhaps as significant as actual military confrontations in maintaining distance between countries is the use of surrogate forces to achieve strategic goals. Cohen argues that both countries support dissidents in the other's country.³² Talbot reports that Pakistan used *jihadist* forces against India in Kashmir. Attacks on the Parliament building in New Delhi in December of 2002³³ and the Mumbai bombings³⁴ in 2008 are also tied to militants emanating from Pakistan. Talbot contends that Musharraf afforded radical elements in Pakistan protection due to "Indo-centric security strategies."³⁵ Pakistan eventually abandoned its support of the Taliban. It has also accepted that "...non-state actors in Afghanistan and Kashmir caused... difficulties for Pakistan."³⁶ Talbot also reports the suspicion among Pakistani officials that India has likewise been involved in the Baloch insurgency against Pakistan. Since 9/11 growing Indian influence in post-Taliban Afghanistan is perceived as a security threat by Pakistan.

Religion and Intolerance

Understanding the use of religion and religious symbols is crucial in making sense of the complex relations within and between these two states. For example, soon after Partition a senior Congress leader K.M. Munshi called for the restoration of the Somanath temple attacked by Mahmud of Ghazni in the Tenth Century. Though the Indian government insisted and continues to insist on the secular nature of its state, the

³⁰ Cohen, *Shooting for a Century*.

³¹ Kasuri, *Neither a Hawk Nor a Dove*.

³² Cohen, *Shooting for a Century*.

³³ Talbot, *Pakistan: A New History*.

³⁴ Antara Dev Sen, "Clarity Begins at Home: To Nurture Pluralism and Democracy in India, TheMedia Needs to First Inculcate These Traits within Itself" in *Pluralism and Democracy in India: Debating the Hindu Right*, ed. by Wendy Doniger and Martha C. Nussbaum, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 105-24.

³⁵ Talbot, *Pakistan: A New History*, 174.

³⁶ Kasuri, *Neither a Hawk Nor a Dove*, 329.

temple was nevertheless reconstructed.³⁷ Pakistan's nuclear missiles are named for prominent conquerors and rulers from the past (e.g., Ghazni, Ghauri, Babar and Abdali) who represent Muslim victories over the Hindus. Since Partition both countries have had to address their respective multi-ethnic and religious communities. Within both the Hindu and Muslim traditions there exist multiple variations. Each country is also home to citizens outside of its dominant faith (though this is more so in case of India than Pakistan).

While an indigenous variant of the Deobandi tradition played an important role in agitating for the establishment of Pakistan³⁸ it was not

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until the late 1970's and 1980's the move to embrace the Middle East as source of financial support and trade, that Pakistan experiences the ascendancy of the Deobandi religious tradition. Deobandis and other sects may in some cases be less accepting of each other and leading to increased sectarianism in the country. It can further be understood in the context of

changing regional landscape and sect-based rivalry of the Middle East. The Iranian revolution and the Afghan Jihad are essential factors. As the Deobandi tradition spread in Pakistan, folk or Sufi traditions of Islam were attacked. For a segment of Pakistani society, this tradition comes to be the basis for interpreting the world as a struggle between "true faith and unbelievers."³⁹ For some, this is how the struggle over Kashmir is to be interpreted. India must too then be the home to "unbelievers."

The policies of Zia regime from 1977-1988 are seen as having played a role in polarizing Pakistani society. Some argue that Zia's policies can be termed as unintended consequences as part of Afghan policy and attribute increase in intolerance which the previous governments sought to restrict, to his policies of Islamization.⁴⁰

³⁷ M.J. Akbar, *Tinderbox: The Past and Future of Pakistan*, (Sydney: Harper Collins, 2011), 17.

³⁸ Venkat Dhulipalia *Creating A new Medina: State Power, Islam and the Quest for Pakistan in Late Colonial India*, (Delhi: Cambridge University Press, 2015).

³⁹ Talbot, *Pakistan: A New History*, 166.

⁴⁰ Ayesha Jalal, "The Past As Present," in *Pakistan Beyond the Crisis State*, ed. Maleeha Lodhi, (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2011), 14.

In India, Hinduism has also been transformed and politicized. The Hindu Right, embodied by the "Sangh Parivar"⁴¹ has been diligent in its efforts to transform India's secular democracy into a Hindu religious state. Governments taken over by its political wing the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) have often "sought to institutionalize anti-minority policies."⁴² While support for the Hindu Right may be fed by the upper castes' desire "to protect their upper caste status"⁴³ the effect is a growing alienation among India's non-Hindus. In this game Pakistan is used as a boogeyman to build support for Hindutva.⁴⁴

Amartya Sen argues in his book *Identity and Violence* that despite the secular nature of India's constitution, "...the threat of a renewed promotion of the Hindu sectarian conception of India is ever present."⁴⁵ This is visible with recent increases in the number of violent incidents against minorities particularly Muslims in India signaling a rise in communal tensions and affecting Indo-Pak relations so much so that even India-Pakistan cricket match had to be shifted from Dharamsala, Himachal Pradesh to Kolkata due to security concerns in the city and a controversial statement by the Himachal Pradesh Chief Minister.⁴⁶ The recent election of Chief Minister of Uttar Pradesh Yogi Adityanath in March 2017 is another example of controversial choice reflecting the deep divisions along communal lines. The priest-politician is known for his staunch Hindutva approach, provocative and fire-brand speeches and enjoys mass following across the state. He never shies away from making controversial remarks, be it about Islam or Pakistan.⁴⁷

⁴¹ Doniger and Nussbaum, *Pluralism and Democracy in India*, 2.

⁴² Amrita Basu, "The Long March from Ayodhya: Democracy and Violence in India." *In Pluralism and Democracy in India: Debating the Hindu Right*, ed. by Wendy Doniger and Martha C. Nussbaum, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 153-73.

⁴³ Zoya Hasan, "Tokenism or Empowerment? Policies and Institutions for Disadvantaged Communities." *In Pluralism and Democracy in India: Debating the Hindu Right*, ed. by Wendy Doniger and Martha C. Nussbaum, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 185.

⁴⁴ Doniger and Nussbaum, *Pluralism and Democracy in India*.

⁴⁵ Amartya Sen, *Identity of Violence: The Illusion of Destiny*, (London: Penguin Books Ltd, 2006).

⁴⁶ "T20 match vs Pak shouldn't be held in Dharamsala: Himachal CM," Hindustan Times, 2nd March 2016, Accessed 8th April 2017, <http://www.hindustantimes.com/cricket/t20-match-vs-pak-shouldn-t-be-held-in-dharamshala-himachal-cm/story-oM3UhesbZ5iMp0ybJMzUOP.html>.

⁴⁷ "Who is Yogi Adityanath? Everything you need to know," The Indian Express, updated 19th March, Accessed 8th April 2017, <http://indianexpress.com/elections/uttar-pradesh-assembly-elections-2017/who-is-yogi-adityanath-4575013/>.

The Obscure

Pakistani Identity

A range of issues are less visible but still important in terms of normalization of relations between the two nations; one of these may be that of identity.

Pakistan since the beginning has attempted to create a unified identity. The inherent tension of Muslim nationalism and that of a territorial state remains a challenge. The government has attempted to portray Pakistan as an Islamic state but this has led to politically divisive consequences. India's reluctance to share power with Muslims and its oft stated aim of undoing Partition has also played a role in Pakistan's obsession in pushing for a linear identity.⁴⁸ The Muslim identity also plays a key role in the Kashmir dispute. As a Muslim majority region, according to the spirit of Partition, it should have been a part of Pakistan.⁴⁹ Pakistan remains a diverse country in which Islam is a key pillar but its use to establish a homogenous identity seems a daunting task.

The Experience of Partition

The uneven experience of Partition among citizens also hampers reconciliation. Upward to three-fourths of in-migrants to Pakistan were from East-Punjab.⁵⁰ Thus Punjabis may have the broadest grievances against India among Pakistan's citizens. They have dominant control of the Pakistani military where they make upwards a major chunk of the army.⁵¹ Their presence in government administration is also large. Punjabis who have disproportionately suffered the painful dislocations of Partition among Pakistani citizens are major players in the most important Pakistani institutions that must be engaged in all reconciliation efforts.

In his book *The Power Elite* C. W. Mills (1956) describes the US ruling class of federal government leaders, top military brass and industrialists, as a distinct social-psychological entity that, because of similar experiences from childhood forward, act in ways that preserve

⁴⁸ Jalal, "The Past as Present," 11.

⁴⁹ Munir Akram, Reversing Strategic Shrinkage," in *Pakistan Beyond the Crisis State*, ed. Maleeha Lodhi, (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2011), 294.

⁵⁰ Talbot, *Pakistan: A New History*. [Pakistan army, on its part, has taken and is taking several initiatives for increasing recruitments at all levels from other ethnic groups of the country. Eds.]

⁵¹ Ibid.

the interests of their group.⁵² For Mills this is not a result of conspiratorial joint action, but rather like actions based on similar worldviews. Does the ruling elite in Pakistan, with its common Partition history and favored social position, similarly act in ways that preserve the status quo which includes a militarized relationship with India? Kasuri's observation that "...generals in both Pakistan and India tend to become peacemakers...after their retirement"⁵³ suggests that removal from the insular world of the military provides former top brass in each country with the distance needed to see their country's respective interests with fresh eyes.

Anti-Other Education

Additional challenges exist in the field of education. While school systems in both countries are unable to provide quality education for all of their children, children in both countries are taught to hate the other's country.⁵⁴ In Pakistan, Zia's moves for education and curriculum were seen by some as attempting "to write Jinnah's pluralistic vision of Pakistan out of the history books."⁵⁵ Some *Madrassahs* (religious schools) established during the time of Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, in Pakistan, are also portrayed as breeding intolerance, militancy and a justification for violence.⁵⁶

Similar attempts to demonize the other have also been occurring in India. Immediately upon taking power in 1999 the BJP started rewriting Indian textbooks and modifying curriculum.⁵⁷ Scholars who oppose the politicization of school curriculum are assigned the pejorative "intellectual terrorists."⁵⁸ Pressure has also been successfully brought to bear on publishers to remove from the Indian market books that stray from the Hindutva line.⁵⁹ Cohen argues it is time to do away with the manufactured myth of eternal Hindu-Muslim conflict propagated by some on both sides.⁶⁰ (H)istorical revisionism ... in both Pakistan and India ... makes understanding of each other that much more difficult."⁶¹

⁵² C. Wright Mills, *The Power Elite*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1956)

⁵³ Kasuri, *Neither a Hawk Nor a Dove*, 424.

⁵⁴ Cohen, *Shooting for a Century*.

⁵⁵ Talbot, *Pakistan: A New History*, 115.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*

⁵⁷ Doniger and Nussbaum, *Pluralism and Democracy in India*.

⁵⁸ Mushirul Hasan, "The BJP's Intellectual Agenda: Textbooks and Imagined History." In *Pluralism and Democracy in India: Debating the Hindu Right*, ed. Wendy Doniger and Martha C. Nussbaum, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 250.

⁵⁹ Hasan, "The BJP's Intellectual Agenda."

⁶⁰ Cohen, *Shooting for a Century*.

⁶¹ Kasuri, *Neither a Hawk Nor a Dove*, 124.

China's Ascendancy

The ascendancy of China as a world power and as the major trading partner with Pakistan also influences India-Pakistan relations. It may have reduced the latter's need for reconciliation and the benefits it would provide. Kasuri notes that "China has been Pakistan's most trusted friend..."⁶² China's past conflict with India may contribute to its

willingness to support the Indo-Pak status quo.

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The recently agreed upon China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) "which envisages a road, railway, fiber optic communications, and a pipeline"⁶³ is another landmark milestone in Pak-China relations.

This is an enormous development project for Pakistan making improved ties with India economically less pressing.

China has repeatedly supported Pakistan's stance on various disputes including Kashmir, which now holds strategic importance for both Pakistan and China as the only land route between the two states.⁶⁴ If this relationship is understood in the context of global politics and balance of power, the US intends to restrict China's emergence and toward this end, India holds the key. As was the case during the Cold War, the outcomes for India and Pakistan of being played off against each other will not be desirable for either country.

The Elimination of the Pakistan's Political Left

The elimination of Pakistan's political left was in part an expression of the centralizing of power began under Jinnah but accelerated by "Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan who openly advocated the supremacy of one ruling party."⁶⁵ In this he was assisted by both British and US intelligence agencies looking to prevent any infiltration of Communist sympathizers into the Pakistani government during the Cold War. The early elimination of left and the decimation of Pakistani labor organizations under Zia ul Haq⁶⁶ means that for most of Pakistan's history only a narrow band of political thought has held sway within the ministries of power. Syed Sajjad Zaheer who led the organizing efforts of the Communist Party of

⁶² Kasuri, *Neither a Hawk Nor a Dove*, p. 685.

⁶³ Ibid. p. 687.

⁶⁴ Akram, "Reversing Strategic Shrinkage," 294.

⁶⁵ Ali, *Communism in Pakistan*, 122.

⁶⁶ Ibid.

Pakistan (CPP) for many years, was sent to Pakistan by the Communist Party of India (CPI) to lead the organization of the left.⁶⁷ Had such transnational organizing efforts been successful India and Pakistan were likely to be pushed more vigorously toward reconciliation than they have to date.

Micro-Insults

Small indignities like the poor treatment of one another's diplomats (and other such "micro-insults") harm already damaged relationships.⁶⁸ The inability of scholars, performers and others to obtain the visas necessary to travel to one another's country also retards reconciliation. People to people contacts have often led the way to wider openings between nations.

Many more issues could be added to these lists of the obvious and obscure issues that hamper reconciliation. From the large – such as water disputes, Siachin, Sir Creek etc. the issues that were to be taken up in now stalled 'Composite Dialogue' – to several smaller sources of tension between Pakistan and India exist. But common ground between the two countries exists as well.

Common Ground

Many have argued that both India and Pakistan would benefit by reconciliation between the two countries. While individual initiatives may be of greater benefit to one country over the other, the overall benefits of reconciliation will be significant to both.

Nuclear Weapons

While the mutual possession of nuclear weapons can clearly be seen as a threat to the well-being of both nations, membership in the nuclear club also demands rational and critical thinking among Pakistani and Indian leaders. The nuclear debate in South Asia began with the 1974 detonation of an Indian nuclear device.⁶⁹ The explosion changed the regional security balance. Although India tried to assure Pakistan that its nuclear explosion was entirely peaceful, Pakistan, like many others in the world, was understandably apprehensive. Pakistan refused to acknowledge India's civilian nuclear purpose and embarked on its own

⁶⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁸ Cohen, *Shooting for a Century*.

⁶⁹ Guha, *India After Gandhi*.

nuclear weapons program for its survival and to negate India's conventional weapons superiority.

Both India and Pakistan conducted nuclear tests in May 1998 and since then have further increased their respective nuclear arsenals.⁷⁰ An important reason for the concern about nuclear weapons in South Asia is that, despite all other arguments, the possibility of a nuclear weapon use cannot be ruled out.⁷¹ It is because of the very threat of their potential use that the possession of nuclear weapons opens the door for constructive dialogue between these two nations.

The need for dialogue becomes ever more pertinent with recent advancements in ballistic missile systems and defense, the presence of tactical nuclear weapons, and with both states pushing for a nuclear triad. Though the rationale for the need of nuclear weapons remains based on minimum credible deterrence, the more intricate the weapons, the more usable they seem. Therefore, a nuclear dialogue aimed at eliminating the risk of a nuclear war becomes more important and an area where cooperation is beneficial to both states. This is especially true given that the state of human security for the people in both states remains miserable.

Environmental Issues

South Asian countries are already being affected by climate change. The effects are region wide. There solutions also demand collaborative action. On 26, May 2010 Pakistan's Moen-jo-Daro region, experienced a record high 128 degrees Fahrenheit/53.5 degrees Centigrade.⁷² Regional deforestation has contributed to the increasing heat. It has also made Pakistan more vulnerable to flooding. In 2010 one-fifth of Pakistan was covered with flood waters requiring 2.5 million living in the Punjab to flee. The Maplecroft Environmental Risk Report places Pakistan in the Extreme Risk Category for Global Warning.⁷³

Coastal areas throughout the region are also at risk as sea levels rise. Falling water tables in both countries present a growing problem. In India hundreds of millions are affected by arsenic in the ground water in the Ganga Plain.

⁷⁰ Kasuri, *Neither a Hawk Nor a Dove*.

⁷¹ Rajesh Rajagopalan, *Second Strike: Arguments about Nuclear War in South Asia*, (New Delhi: Viking, Penguin, 2005)

⁷² Lester Brown, *World on the Edge: How to Prevent Environmental and Economic Collapse*, (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 2011).

⁷³ Talbot, *Pakistan: A New History*.

Both countries stand to benefit by working on regional environmental solutions collectively. Pooling resources and sharing findings and the development of best practices will improve environmental prospects for both nations. It will also feed the growth of an important economic niche in both countries.

Economic Gains and Energy Stabilization

Both India and Pakistan will benefit economically by open trade between the two countries. Border regions will particularly benefit by the lowering of costs due to a reduction in delivery charges. Transportation companies in both countries should experience significant growth. Inter-country trade could be a significant boom to entertainment and publishing sectors.⁷⁴ The elimination of protection barriers will be a major step to reconciliation between the two. Trade could increase significantly with reconciliation.⁷⁵ India's potential as an emerging power will remain stunted unless there is increased regional integration.

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will benefit economically
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the two countries.**

Pakistan has been experiencing a worsening power supply. Energy shortages reduce its GDP by more than 2% annually.⁷⁶ Neither country supplies all of its citizens with electricity. Electrical infrastructure, both generation and distribution, is expensive to build and to maintain. Parts of both countries would benefit by a pooling of resources to build and share electrical resources.

Internal Security Concerns

Both countries have internal security challenges that must be addressed. Extremist attacks in both countries have left a significant numbers of people dead, Kasuri estimating 40,000 killed in Pakistan alone.⁷⁷ They have also contributed to the waste of resources that could have been used elsewhere for social betterment. Regardless of its form, e.g., communal violence in Gujarat,⁷⁸ Assam⁷⁹ or sectarian violence in Karachi reconciliation would free up resources that could be used to address

⁷⁴ Talbot, *Pakistan: A New History*.

⁷⁵ Cohen, *Shooting for a Century*.

⁷⁶ Talbot, *Pakistan: A New History*.

⁷⁷ Kasuri, *Neither a Hawk Nor a Dove*.

⁷⁸ Basu, "The Long March from Ayodhya: Democracy and Violence in India."

⁷⁹ Jayanta Krishna Sarmah, *The Autonomy Paradox: Interrogation of Autonomy Movement and Autonomous Councils in Assam*, (Guwahati: purbanchalPrakash, 2014).

extremist violence at home through increased internal security and the development of social program to shut off the extremist pipeline.

This is one area where all stakeholders have a common objective. South Asia is marred by religious extremism undermining security of not only India and Pakistan but also poses a global threat. Both Pakistan and India need to take actions to eliminate internal security concerns. Here a resolution of the Kashmir dispute is paramount.⁸⁰ The US and China can play a constructive role to diffuse tensions rather become parties to the rivalry. Given the US pushes for eradication of what it [the US] sees as extremism, Pakistan holds more leverage than India and therefore it is in the collective interest of all parties involved including India to push for mutual cooperation to eradicate the menace of extremism.

Peace Dividend

In addition to the benefit of the reduction of terrorist attacks at home, both countries could invest their peace dividend (i.e., money made available due to decreases in military spending) in a wide-array of social improvements. These would include improvements in education and health care. More money could be invested into addressing environmental problems and creating reliable electrical resources for their entire populations and improved water husbandry. Such reinvestments are advocated, by retired military personnel from both countries.⁸¹

Reconciliation between the two countries would invigorate a robust entertainment and performing arts trade between them. The two countries already share cricket as "an inclusive society"⁸² and are, as described by Pakistan's former Foreign Minister "organically bound."⁸³ The National Academy of the Performing Arts in Karachi regularly invites Indian performing artists to Pakistan and has been sending some of its performers to India. The economic and social opportunities are countless for music, film, television, sports etc. Shared programming at all levels reduces the ability of militants on both sides to demonize the other as a means of rationalizing their violence. It also reduces the risk of radicalization because of the "other." The arts are an important component of public dialogues.⁸⁴

⁸⁰ Akram, "Reversing Strategic Shrinkage," 303.

⁸¹ Cohen, *Shooting for a Century*.

⁸² Nussbaum, *Pluralism and Democracy in India*, 54.

⁸³ Kasuri, *Neither a Hawk Nor a Dove*, 130.

⁸⁴ Nabaneeta Dev Sen, "The Role of Poetry and Literature in Implementing a Pluralistic Democracy: Writing at the Time of Siege," In *Pluralism and Democracy in India*:

Conclusion

In a 2011 poll 74% Indians and 70% Pakistanis said improved relations between the two countries was important. In the same poll 67% Indians and 69% Pakistanis expressed support for more bilateral trade.⁸⁵ A majority of Pakistanis condemn attacks on India. In 2001 a majority of Pakistanis supported sending help to Indian earthquake victims.⁸⁶

In the past and in the present, there has been room for agreements between the two countries. There exists a peace process between the two and the evidence of that is reflective through the various bilateral engagements ranging from border agreements, water, trade, minorities, Kashmir and nuclear confidence building measures (CBMs).⁸⁷ In 1960 the countries signed the 1960 Indus Water Treaty.⁸⁸ More recently support existed between the two countries for the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India pipeline treaty.⁸⁹ Each country has been willing to extend aid to the other in times of crisis, for instance in 2010 India offered Pakistan \$5 million⁹⁰ to assist with flood victims.⁹¹ In April 2005 bus service was opened in Kashmir as part of the Indo-Pak Composite Dialogues designed to settle all outstanding disputes between the two countries.⁹²

Many who have been affected by violence within these two countries have worked to stop it. The Naga Mothers Association's (NMA) 'Shed No More Blood' campaign has been effective in diminishing the violence as have the Kashmir-Association of the Parents of the Disappeared Persons (APDP).⁹³ Here are models for bringing people together rather than driving them apart.

Historically leaders in both countries have shown a willingness to engage in peaceful overtures such as Benazir Bhutto's scaling back support for Sikh separatists and Nawaz Sharif and Atal Behari Vajpayee's

Debating the Hindu Right, ed. by Wendy Doniger and Martha C. Nussbaum, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 105-24.

⁸⁵ Cohen, *Shooting for a Century*.

⁸⁶ Ibid.

⁸⁷ Syed R. Hussain, "The India Factor," In *Pakistan Beyond the Crisis State*, ed. Maleeha Lodhi, (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2011), 323.

⁸⁸ Talbot, *Pakistan: A New History*.

⁸⁹ Ibid.

⁹⁰ Which Pakistan did not accept.

⁹¹ Talbot, *Pakistan: A New History*.

⁹² Kasuri, *Neither a Hawk Nor a Dove*

⁹³ Ritu Menon, "'Shed No More Blood': Women's Peace Work in India." In *Pluralism and Democracy in India: Debating the Hindu Right*, ed. Wendy Doniger and Martha C. Nussbaum, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 269-79.

signing of the Lahore Declaration. Jinnah wept when he was confronted with the suffering of Pakistani Hindus⁹⁴ and Nehru chided those who did not see Hinduism as an inclusive and tolerant religion.⁹⁵ In 1997 Inder Gujral unilaterally shut down covert operations in Pakistan and in 2008 Asif Ali Zardari pledged that Pakistan would not be the first to use nuclear weapons.⁹⁶

One of the most ambitious and comprehensive effort at reconciliation between the two countries began in 2004 when Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee was greeted warmly in Islamabad by Pakistani President Musharraf.⁹⁷ The Composite Dialogues which followed survived a change of party leadership in India and the Mumbai bombings and created a blue print for resolving all outstanding issues between the two countries including a framework agreement for addressing the problem of Kashmir.⁹⁸ Reconciliation was only stopped by pressures from within the two sides due to the Mumbai episode in 2008 and also due to Musharraf's fall from power.

A majority of citizens in both countries are looking for a lasting peace and the benefits this will bring. Since Partition, leadership in both countries have reached out to each other to achieve this end. There is a common history and culture and there are many challenges faced in each country that can be addressed more effectively if peaceful relations ensue. It is clear that there is room for reconciliation. The two nations have tried to make this work. Perhaps it's time for the music to start again.

A majority of citizens in both countries are looking for a lasting peace and the benefits this will bring.

*"Living in the past not only ruins the present but also destroys the hope for the future"*⁹⁹

⁹⁴ Burke and Quraishi, *Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah*.

⁹⁵ Hasan, "The BJP's Intellectual Agenda: Textbooks and Imagined History."

⁹⁶ Cohen, *Shooting for a Century*.

⁹⁷ Kasuri, *Neither a Hawk Nor a Dove*, 168.

⁹⁸ Ibid.

⁹⁹ Aamenah Khurram, "Living in the Past," in *Karachi: Our Stories in Our Words*, ed. by Maniza Naqvi, (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2012), 194-95.

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