

MILITARY REFORM: IMPROVING OUR DEFENSES*

*by Congressman Jim Courter***

I. Introduction

We have all heard the horror stories: the \$436 claw hammers, \$1100 diodes, and \$7000 coffee pots. We have heard the charges that our military, despite increases in defense spending, is less ready to go to war than four years ago. Most have heard about the shoddy workmanship at Hughes Aircraft in Tuscon, Arizona, and the faulty (inadequately tested) microchips from Texas Instruments. And many of us have heard Willis Wiloughby, Jr., Deputy Chief of the Naval Material Command on the subject of reliability, maintainability and quality assurance comment that things are badly done all over the country from contaminated parts to unsoldered wires, to terminals with no wires on them.

These perceived abuses are ripe for political grandstanding and media sensationalism. A *New York Times* editorial, entitled "The Pentagon Brew," is a prime example:

Every taxpayer should visit one of the Air Force's C-5 transport planes. He should climb the flimsy \$74,000 aluminum folding ladder, sink into the \$13,000 crew chief's seat, and rest his arm on the \$670 foam-rubber-and-naugahyde armrest. There, sipping coffee from the \$7,622 coffee brewer, he can ponder just how much extra security the Pentagon has bought with its four year, \$755 billion military spending program.¹

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¹ N.Y. Times, Oct. 10, 1984, § A26.

The media hype has so colored public perception that the Pentagon and defense contractors sometimes get a bum rap. What the media ignores, however, is that it was the Pentagon that discovered and brought attention to many long-term endemic procurement practices. In many cases, defense contractors were only meeting poorly conceived government specifications.

It is not only the horror stories themselves that threaten a strong American defense, but also the misperceptions they create that have started to erode the consensus for a strong defense. The polls reflect this: in a recent national survey, sixty-four percent of those polled felt that the budget deficit could be solved by cutting military spending. Fifty percent felt that too much was being spent on defense, and only fifteen percent felt that too little was being spent.

The Military Reform Caucus has put together a program for defense procurement reform that I would like to outline. But first, I want to discuss the background of the Caucus and correct some of the misperceptions that exist.

The Caucus is an ideologically diverse group. It now has 100 members in the House and Senate, and its membership covers the spectrum from conservatives to nuclear freeze proponents.

Those of us who work inside the Caucus find this diversity to be a positive trait. For those outside the Caucus, it is often confusing and frustrating. For our adversaries, it is a trait which makes the Caucus a difficult target for criticism. Caucus members, however, all share a desire to set aside time to study military issues, to seek out alternative points of view, and to look for ways to solve problems which cause us to get less defense than we should for our money.

The misconceptions about the Military Reform Caucus are many. If you think that all the members of the Caucus oppose construction of large aircraft carriers, the answer is "no," we do not. If you think we share a common position on the MX missile, the F-18 fighter, the B-1, or any other weapon, the answer is "no," we do not. If you have heard that we oppose the use of high technology, and want to replace our current arsenal with large quantities of inferior weapons, the answer is "no," that is not our position. If you have been told that we have formulated a common military reform defense budget, or that the Caucus wants to cut defense spending, then you have been misinformed.

In reality, while our members obviously take their own positions on these issues, the Caucus has taken only a few well-chosen positions on legislative matters. If there is one message to convey it is this: the views of any one member of Congress speaking in the name of military reform do not necessarily apply to the entire membership of the Military Reform Caucus.

As an overseer, there is the House Armed Services Committee which is composed of fine, dedicated members, and employs what I believe to be the most able, hardworking, intelligent and underpaid staff on Capitol Hill. The Committee is by no means a rubber stamp for the Pentagon. Witness the work of our Investigations Subcommittee on the Marines in Lebanon, or the many actions the Committee has taken to reduce or modify the Pentagon's annual budget requests.

The Armed Services Committee does have a serious shortcoming, however. Unlike other congressional committees, the Armed Services Committee fails to seek out and hear the views of those who dissent from the consensus opinion on defense. This lack of consideration of alternative opinion by the Armed Services Committee creates a void which the Military Reform Caucus has attempted to fill. The Caucus has invited all types of defense analysts to its meetings, often in a debate format. The Caucus has also adopted legislative initiatives, some of which have been enacted into law.

II. Independent Testing

The Caucus' first legislative initiative was the Independent Operational Testing and Evaluation Office (IOTE), which was mandated by law in the 1984 authorization bill.² The Office was created because the Caucus believed that it was a conflict of interest to have the same office responsible for both developing and testing weapons. The purpose of IOTE is to guarantee that weapons procured and fielded have been properly tested under realistic conditions. Poor testing leads to more than wasted money and ill-equipped forces. It fosters the public perception that Congress and the Pentagon are careless with the taxpayer's money and soft on the shortcomings of military contractors' work. In World War II, U.S. Navy submarines filed reports of direct torpedo hits on enemy ships in which the torpedoes re-

² 10 U.S.C.A. § 1369 (West Supp. 1985).

peatedly failed to explode. This problem persisted for twenty months, until tests revealed a relatively simple defect in the firing mechanism that was easily corrected. Until the problem was corrected, our submarines missed countless opportunities for kills, and endangered themselves by revealing their presence through the thuds of dud torpedoes.

A more recent example of improper testing is the Army's DIVAD system, a division air defense system that protects troops from close-in air attack, using a radar-guided gun. The radar first attacks a target and analyzes its trajectory. When it fires, it aims by electronically predicting where the target will be in the five to eight seconds it takes for the gun to fire and reach the target.

What if the targeted aircraft executes a turn while the DIVAD is in the process of firing? The evidence is still being gathered, but it indicates that DIVAD can only hit targets on a constant trajectory—not a common characteristic of attack aircraft. In one recent test, DIVAD missed the drone it was supposed to hit, and instead zeroed in and scored a perfect hit on the exhaust fan of a nearby latrine. The latrine did not survive, I am told. The DIVAD system did not survive either, having been cancelled by the Secretary of Defense.

Clearly, Congress must focus on operational testing, the most crucial part of the weapons development process. The problem stems from a lack of realism in operational tests. Tests should simulate realistic battlefield conditions. Weapon systems that are intended to work in all weather and on all types of terrain are often tested in environments that minimize or eliminate the difficulties of bad weather or unusual landscape. Probable enemy counter-measures, such as evasion, counterattack, stealth or electronic jamming, are also not realistically simulated. Test personnel are often too well trained and rehearsed, ensuring better performance than that of the average soldier. Sadly, Congress has often been informed of test results which have discounted unsuccessful test outcomes.

To correct these deficiencies, IOTE will impose strict standards of operational testing. Independent reports on testing will be made to Congress. To ensure impartiality, the new Director of the Office will be appointed by the President and report di-

rectly to the Secretary of Defense.³

The current controversy surrounding DIVAD and the Bradley Fighting Vehicle could have been alleviated with an independent testing office. With a fully functioning Office, Congress should have greater confidence in the programs that function well, and a greater capacity to assure that mistakes are corrected before they cost the taxpayer billions of dollars.

III. Increasing Competition

A second issue which merits discussion is the need to increase the degree of economic competition for defense contracts. When I think of reforming procurement practices, I am often reminded of a cartoon I saw in the paper. A general was explaining why the nation would be put at risk by large cuts in the military budget. "Just remember," he said, "that for every billion dollars you cut from the defense budget, that means we'll have twelve less nuts and bolts with which to defend America." The cartoon is unfair, but characterizes a real public perception. What is needed is reform which will affect all types of purchases—from spare parts and supplies to fighter planes and missiles, including contracts for both production and research and development.

To reduce defense contract costs we need greater competition through formal advertising for competitive bids. The process should be open to all qualified companies which submit bids in response to advertised contract proposals. Presently, about thirty percent of our defense budget is spent on procurement, and only six percent of procurement is performed through a competitive process.

Senator Grassley has introduced legislation, dubbed the "Creeping Capitalism" bill,⁴ which would increase this percentage of procurement on competitive bidding to seventy percent, in gradual, five percent annual increments.

Today, most programs are contracted through the sole-source method or through "competitive negotiation." This is actually a misnomer, since there is little competition involved. Under the "competitive negotiation" method, a select group of

³ The newly appointed Director of the Independent Operational Testing and Evaluation Office is former pilot Jack Krings.

⁴ H.R. 1552, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 131 Cong. Rec. 1275 (1985).

contractors are invited to bid, and awards are made in a closed process free from market pressures and public scrutiny. As a result, the negotiated price is determined more by government cost estimates and congressional appropriations than by competition among rival suppliers.

On the other hand, the advantages of open, freely competitive bidding through formal advertising are numerous. Competition can reduce unit prices; can increase the size of the defense industrial base by bringing new companies into competition for the Pentagon's procurement dollar; and can force companies, through competitive pressure, to be more innovative and cost-conscious.

The case of procurement of 30mm GAU-8 ammunition, a billion-dollar program, illustrates the benefits of open bid competition. The Air Force needed ammunition that could be fired from antitank cannons aboard fighter planes. The Air Force advertised performance specifications for the ammunition, listing criteria for accuracy, reliability and armor penetration. One company was awarded the first contract through negotiations in 1975, but the Air Force decided to award the production contract through competition in subsequent years.

Since 1976, two companies have shared this ammunition production under an innovative procedure. Bids are resubmitted each year, and the low bidder gets the major share of the contract. The winner's share increases in proportion to the size of the difference between the two bids. Under this scheme, the two producers, Honeywell, Inc. and The Aerojet Ordnance Co., face constant pressure to innovate and reduce costs. The bidding war has been lively, with the main production contract shifting between them three times since 1976.

Through this competitive bidding process, the Pentagon gets the benefit of a low price, an adequate reserve of ammunition, and the capabilities of two companies to boost production to meet wartime needs. As a result, the government is paying far less than the unit cost estimated for this ammunition at the program's inception, and it has saved about \$500 million over the life of the program.

While the Pentagon protests that competitive bidding is a stringent and unrealistic procedure, experience shows otherwise.

In fact, the Pentagon's objections to increased use of formal advertising for competitive bids seem to be based on a misunderstanding of the ways in which this method of procurement can be used to its advantage. The advantages of competition are borne out in histories of procurements that changed in midstream from a sole-source to a competitive basis. Competition has been used in wartime and peacetime and with items of varying levels of technological sophistication. The B-47 bomber, for example, was designed by one company, and built by three companies that submitted bids for the production contract. Contracts for research and development have also been awarded through competition. Price, reliability, maintenance costs and other factors may all be considered and ranked in order of importance in the evaluation of bids.

The most important effect of increased competition would be to upset the cozy relationship between the Pentagon and its suppliers. Incentives would be reversed, and suppliers would compete for defense contracts by cutting costs, not by adding new features that increase costs and profits on sole source contracts. Bureaucrats would be forced to decide exactly what they want before they solicit bids, and they would face resistance from contractors if they tried to change design specifications after contracts are awarded. Competitive bidding would not prevent design changes and program modifications, but the Pentagon would have to justify the changes and advertise them for bid.

The Pentagon has made some progress toward increased competition, but opposes legislation to increase the use of formal advertising for competitive bids. Congressman Stratton, the Chairman of the House Armed Services Procurement Subcommittee, has promised to hold hearings early in the 99th Congress so that the "Creeping Capitalism" bill can be more widely considered and acted upon.

IV. Warranties for our Weapons

The Caucus also helped pass a bill requiring warranties on weapons produced by defense contractors.⁵ Initially, the Pentagon opposed the warranty law, and inserted language in the Fiscal Year 1984 Supplemental Funding Request, as well as in the

⁵ 10 U.S.C.A. § 2403 (West Supp. 1985).

President's Fiscal Year 1985 Budget, which would have repealed the warranty requirement. Yet, Secretary Weinberger said that he was committed to implementing the law. The Pentagon then clarified its position and confirmed that it was seeking some form of repeal.

At House Armed Services Committee (HASC) hearings on warranties, the Department of Defense (DOD) testified that it was not seeking repeal, but rather a revision in the bill's language that would dilute the warranty requirement, making it easier not to press for warranties. The Navy disagreed with the DOD's amendment, prompting U.S. Navy Admiral Steven White to comment that the proposed legislation will make it more difficult to obtain warranties.

Admiral White also stated that if his contracting officers were given a law permitting them to decide on the cost-effectiveness of a warranty, he expected that it would become "a self-fulfilling prophecy" that all or many warranties would not be found cost-effective. He theorized that if a company did not want to provide a warranty, it could go to the contracting officer with the claim that the cost of a warranty would be exorbitant.

I believe that the law, as originally written, is flexible enough to satisfy DOD's concerns. The law applies no specific warranty formula in each instance. Each weapon has unique functions, characteristics and design. The specific provisions of each warranty are negotiated between the Pentagon and contractors. Finally, the law exempts weapon contracts with total procurement costs of less than \$10 million from its warranty requirements.

How the law arose is very interesting. The HASC had cut the money needed for the warranties from Pratt-Whitney in their share of the "Great Engine War." (The Air Force estimates that this competitive dual sourcing for the F-15 engine will save the taxpayer as much as \$3 billion). The HASC believed correctly that Pratt-Whitney was charging far too much for the warranties (one-third the price of the contract); but eliminating the warranties completely in this case would create a dangerous precedent. It happened that Pratt-Whitney was asked to bid on different percentages of the contract, and the least attractive portion for them was to get only twenty-five percent of the contracts, so they inflated the price of the warranties to make that option less attractive to the Air Force.

When they were only given twenty-five percent of the Great Engine War contract, they were willing to bring the price of the warranties down to a realistic level. So Pratt-Whitney admitted that they had made the price of the warranties artificially high, and we were able to get the money needed for those warranties back into the contract through an amendment on the House floor, preserving the integrity of the legislation.

I believe those companies that are able to include attractive warranty provisions in DOD procurement contracts will be well rewarded for their efforts. It is an area on which both Congress and the Pentagon place a high priority.

These three reforms—*independent operational testing and evaluation, warranties and measures to increase competition*—were endorsed by both the Democratic and Republican parties.

V. The Underfunding Problem

In supporting procurement reform my goal is to assure that defense dollars are well spent. This fiscal responsibility will do more than improve the political consensus for a strong defense. If the reforms I have discussed can solve the Pentagon's chronic underfunding problem, then they will also contribute to increased military strength.

By "underfunding" I am referring to the fact that the Pentagon has consistently underestimated the funding it will need to meet its goals. While this underestimation occurs in individual programs, it shows up in the analysis of the budget as a whole. When this thesis was first aired a few years ago by a maverick analyst at the Pentagon, Chuck Spinney, it raised eyebrows. The Pentagon tried to refute his analysis by discrediting his methodology. Yet Spinney's view has been corroborated by other independent studies.

The underfunding problem was confirmed in 1984 in a Heritage Foundation study.⁶ It was reconfirmed in February 1984 by Rudy Penner, the republican Director of the Congressional Budget Office, who estimated that the current five-year defense

⁶ G. Kuhn, *Department of Defense: Ending Defense Stagnation, Mandate for Leadership II*, Heritage Foundation (1984), p.69.

plan understated weapons costs by nearly \$100 billion.⁷ The General Accounting Office also concluded that it would require an additional \$200 to \$300 billion over the same five-year period to meet the plan's goals.⁸ Suddenly, Chuck Spinney no longer looks like a maverick. Why is the Pentagon so off the mark? Basically, the studies considered past and present budget practices and reached the conclusion that the Pentagon has consistently underestimated the effect of inflation on weapon costs, the need for costly midstream program modifications and the costs of maintenance of high-technology equipment.

There are two major problems resulting from this chronic pattern of underestimated costs. First, there is a political problem. When weapon cost overruns occur, people conclude that defense programs should be scrapped because their cost does not seem to justify their utility. Second, because of rising unit costs our money buys less weapons and, thus, less military strength than we need. These problems raise a critical question: are the Pentagon's consistently low estimates of weapon costs solely the result of poor economic analysis, or is the Pentagon purchasing weapon systems that are too expensive to be built and too exotic for the military advantages they provide?

To answer this question, we need to conduct a cost-benefit analysis on all weapons systems to determine if high technology is always worth the price. Even if technological advances increase combat effectiveness—and not every application of new technology does so—we must calculate whether our defense is stronger with fewer numbers of high-technology weapons, or with greater numbers of less advanced weapons. This is a trade-off that is imposed by the laws of economic reality and it poses choices that the United States cannot avoid.

VI. The Quantity vs. Quality Debate: A Straw Man

Critics of military reform argue that military reformers seek to replace good weapons with larger quantities of inferior weapons. This "straw man," "quantity vs. quality" argument is misleading.

⁷ R. Penner, *The Five Year Defense Plan*, Congressional Budget Office (1984); see also *Washington Post*, Feb. 24, 1984.

⁸ General Accounting Office, *Report on the Five Year Defense Plan*, (March 1984).

Military reformers do not oppose high technology. They recognize that the superior technological skill of the free world should be exploited to enhance United States forces. Developing sophisticated science and industrial technology bolsters America's economic strength. Science and technology also strengthens our nation's military capacity to deter war.

What reformers oppose is high technology for the sake of high technology. We are concerned about the costly "goldplating" of many of our weapons systems. Often these technological "add-ons" cause delays, and inflate weapon costs, while providing only a minimal increase in effectiveness on the battlefield. At times, our systems are weighed down with "state-of-the-art" technology that is not geared directly to the system's specific mission. The technological extras often are not adequately tested thereby jeopardizing the reliability of the entire weapon system.

These technological abuses are symptomatic of a bureaucratic procurement system which lacks competitive bidding and which measures a manager's success by the size of the program. The Army's Bradley Fighting Vehicle, which was originally designed to be a cannon-firing personnel carrier carrying twelve men into battle, is a case in point. The program has had a twenty-year life, during which its technological sophistication and design complexity has raised the cost twelve-fold (over \$1.8 million per vehicle), and has reduced its infantry deployment capacity to six men.

VII. Reform in Congress and New Initiatives

Congress places unnecessary burdens and expense on the Pentagon through its highly disorganized budget, appropriation and oversight practices. For military reform to be successful, Congress must change the way in which it handles defense appropriations and authorizations.

There are two studies on defense reorganization and reform that identify the changes needed within Congress. The first study was conducted by the Heritage Foundation.⁹ The other report, entitled the "Defense Organization Project" was done by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) at Ge-

⁹ Crackel, *Defense Assessment, Mandate for Leadership II*, Heritage Foundation (1984).

orgetown University.¹⁰

Both studies concluded that a properly structured two-year budget plan, constructed in the right way, offered a viable solution to congressional budget problems. In general, a two-year defense budget could enhance national security and give Congress the opportunity for effective oversight.

During the first year of the proposed budget, Congress would review the weapons and their costs as always. But during the second year, the Armed Services Committee could examine broader issues of strategy, the composition of our forces and whether the proposed procurement of weapons was consistent with military objectives. By shifting to a biennial cycle, both stability in weapons acquisition, as well as time for planning and oversight, would be increased.

To complement the two year budget plan, the Armed Services Committee should be given the responsibility to appropriate, as well as authorize, military expenditures. Witness the number of times Congress voted on the MX, Pershing and the B-1. There is no logical reason for the defense subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee to consider the same issues to be decided by the Armed Services Committee and ultimately the House. Restructuring Committee responsibility may not be politically feasible, but many members of Congress are extremely dissatisfied with the status quo.

There are two other worthwhile recommendations from these reports deserving serious consideration. The first is to strengthen the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) to reconcile interservice conflicts. This could be accomplished by making the Chairman of the JCS the principal military adviser to the President, replacing the JCS as principal adviser. The strengthened Chairman would still consult with the JCS in formulating advice and deciding joint issues, but would be given full authority over the policy decisions of the joint staff. The second proposal is to give the Commanders-in-Chief (CINCS) an active role in allocating military resources as well as greater operational authority over the component commands.

¹⁰ Lynn & Poleckman, *Defense Organization Project*, Georgetown Center for Strategic and International Studies (1985).

VIII. The Growing Role of the Guard and Reserves

The Military Reform Caucus has recognized the growing role of the Guard and Reserves in shaping military policy. As part of its commitment to these forces, the Caucus has supported funding increases for selected Guard and Reserve programs in Congress.

The United States military has counted on its Reserve forces since the time of the courageous Minutemen of the American Revolution. Long seen as a type of "poor cousin" of the active forces, these citizen soldiers are now more of an integral part of America's defenses than they have been at any time since World War II.

The Military Reform Caucus recognizes that the active military is now facing new constraints which make it imperative for the Guard and Reserves to shoulder a greater proportion of America's defense burden. Indeed, America's declining birthrate has decreased the size of the pool of young men and women available for military service. This demographic reality hinders the active forces' ability to attract a sufficient number of recruits. Under the Pentagon's current five-year recruiting plan, by 1989 the military will need to recruit 1 out of every 2.7 males, 18 or 19 years old, eligible for military service.

There are several ways to address this demographic crunch, but the first two are not at all attractive. One solution would be to return to the draft. Another way would be to shrink the size of our forces and commitments. The most efficient and militarily acceptable solution would be to expand and improve our Guard and Reserve forces to round out our active forces.

The Guard and Reserves have the potential to draw needed manpower. The Reserves are attractive to many people who are not interested in a full-time, extended period of services in the active forces. Also, an active force of two million creates a large pool of people with military experience that could be attracted to service in the Guard and Reserves after leaving active duty.

The second compelling reason for expanding the Guard and Reserve forces is the projection of continued increases in federal spending. With the country's deficit growing wider, the public will exert more pressure to scale down the defense budget, one of the largest areas of discretionary spending available for reduc-

tions. The cost effectiveness of Guard and Reserve forces will help stretch the defense dollar.

The Guard and Reserves must play a growing and significant role in the future to prevent our conventional forces from eroding. Demographics and defense budget reductions will continue to weaken our military manpower unless the decline can be offset by bolstering the Guard and Reserve.

IX. Strategy, Tactics and Training

Our military must decide upon the most effective way to fight. The more effective our conventional forces, the less chance another country will confront us. If deterrence fails, our forces must be capable of succeeding militarily, ending conflict on the lowest possible level.

In the past, the United States has placed too much emphasis on the "attrition" style of warfare. "Attrition" emphasizes wearing down the opponent's forces by overwhelming them with superior firepower. Success in battle goes to the side with the most destructive weapons and soldiers. The Union won the Civil War with firepower, overwhelming the Confederacy with more men, guns, supplies and firepower. The United States used the same tactics to defeat the Germans in 1918, and the Axis powers in World War II.

The attrition style of warfare, however, is largely outdated. A different style of warfare—"maneuver warfare"—is needed. The object of maneuver warfare is to destroy the enemy's cohesion, by disrupting the opposing commander's ability to think clearly. By acting and reacting more quickly than the enemy, dangerous situations are created which catch the enemy off guard. Consequently, the commander cannot cope with these rapidly changing situations, and the battle is lost. As the strategist Clausewitz has said, "the object in war must be to break the opponent's will. When the will is broken, victory results." Maneuver warfare is designed to achieve this result.

John Boyd, a retired Air Force colonel who helped design the F-16 airplane, is well known for his historical analyses of warfare. He has developed a theory showing the real nature of combat. His OODA (observation-orientation-decision-action) loop theory shows the importance of maneuver strategy. The actor

begins by observing. The observations create a "snapshot" of his position in time and place, in relation to his opponent. The faster one side acts upon these fleeting snapshots, the more that side disorients the opposition with swift maneuvers. The party that consistently moves faster through the OODA loop cycle will win. The party that is faster in the cycle alters the situation, throwing the slower party's decisions out of "sync." The slower party's actions become less responsive with each succeeding cycle. The will of the slower party is broken when he realizes his actions no longer work. He will either panic or collapse, leading to defeat.

Maneuver warfare requires experimentation in exercises and training. A strategy of maneuver requires strong and innovative leadership. We need changes in our military education and incentive systems to develop such leaders. We need to give more freedom of action to our second lieutenants.

We must institutionalize maneuver warfare into operational strategy. It is encouraging that the Army's Field Manual 100-5 has approved the doctrine of maneuver. But for United States' military strength to be benefitted, the strategy must be implemented in training and used in combat.

X. Military Reform: Improving our Defenses

The Military Reform Caucus does not have all the answers, nor does it seek to manage the Defense Department. Yet the Caucus must continue to challenge the Pentagon's assumptions and its ways of doing business. By so doing, efforts to effectuate military reform will continue to be beneficial to taxpayers and to national security.

Military reform can improve our nation's military capability, but it is not a panacea. Nor can the idea of military reform be construed as having any foreign policy implications. Whether or not we use military force should be decided according to the degree to which our interests are threatened, not by a foreign policy based on isolation, withdrawal or a diminished view of our global interests and responsibilities.

As much as anyone else, I hope for peaceful diplomatic solutions to conflicts. The presence of a strong and capable military will help us avoid conflict, and help us prevail when conflict can-

not be averted. For these reasons I am involved in military reform—because I want to see America defended by the best military it can possibly have.