

IMPERIALISM, NATIONALISM, REVOLUTION:

THE CUBAN CASE

by

MARTIN JAMES LONEY

B.A.(Hons.), University of Durham, 1966

A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF

THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF

MASTER OF ARTS

in the Department

of

Political Science, Sociology and Anthropology

© MARTIN JAMES LONEY 1969

SIMON FRASER UNIVERSITY

September, 1969

APPROVAL

Name: Martin James Loney

Degree: Master of Arts

Title of Thesis: Imperialism, Revolution and Nationalism,
The Cuban Case

Examining Committee:

Professor Kathleen G. Aberle,
Senior Supervisor

Professor David C. Potter,
Examining Committee

Professor Maurice Halperin,
External Examiner
SIMON FRASER UNIVERSITY
BURNABY 2, B. C.

Date Approved: September 24, 1969.

This thesis is an attempt to place the Cuban Revolution of 1959 in its historical perspective. The thesis attempts an understanding of why the Cuban Revolution occurred, and what role the United States had in its occurrence. As the title suggests, the hypothesis is that the Cuban Revolution was, in large part, a nationalist response prompted by American economic and political influence in Cuba. In addition, the thesis tests a number of hypotheses on underdevelopment, advanced by P. Baran and A.G. Frank, by examining the empirical data for Cuba.

I relied for data mainly on English language publications but, in addition, I made a four week trip to Cuba in 1967 which was useful in providing some insights into how the Cubans, themselves, viewed the Revolution and in researching some primary sources. Finally, I consulted a small number of Spanish language works.

An examination of Cuban history from settlement in 1510 shows that Cuba was atypical of Latin America. Development in Cuba did not really blossom until the second half of the 18th century. In the early 19th century, when mainland

Latin America was fighting for independence, Cuba was undergoing a period of unprecedented prosperity. This combined with the fear of a slave revolt ensured Cuban loyalty to the Spanish crown.

When the Cuban independence struggle did break out it contained elements of social revolution not present in the mainland wars. Blacks, working class whites and some sections of the landlords joined forces against the Spanish and their supporters on the island, particularly the Peninsulares and the sugar producers.

In addition, the United States had, during the 19th century, begun its economic penetration abroad. By the outbreak of the War of Independence the United States had invested \$50,000,000 in Cuba. Exports to Cuba amounted to some \$27,000,000 a year. This interest stimulated United States' intervention in the war, which many Cubans felt aborted victory.

Growth of United States' investment and trade in the 20th century went hand in hand with political control over

Cuba. In 1933 the Americans were instrumental in overthrowing Grau san Martin's radical nationalist government. After 1933, while American control was less glaring, the United States continued to exercise considerable political influence until 1959.

The consequence of United States' economic investment was to stimulate and perpetuate the sugar monoculture. The Cuban economy stagnated, literacy rates fell and there was a net export of capital to the United States.

United States' economic domination prevented the emergence of a national bourgeoisie or a national landowning class. Cuban political institutions were consequently weak. The sugar monoculture and lack of alternative development resulted in a high degree of unemployment. The Cuban Communist Party, active since the early 1920's, had considerable support among the working class.

In these circumstances Castro's guerilla army was able to act as a catalyst for Cuban discontent. Cuban

underdevelopment had not only shown that the 'capitalist' method of development was inadequate but had also produced a general hostility to United States' control and large sectors of the rural and urban population - much of the working class, some of the intelligentsia, the rural proletariat and the peasantry - who would back revolutionary social change.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

✓ I.	Introduction	1
II.	Early Developments in Cuba	44
	a. The Conquest	44
	b. Economic Developments in the 18th and 19th Centuries	47
	c. The United States and Cuba	56
III.	The Battle for Independence	62
	a. United States Policy and Cuban Independence	70
	b. The Triumph of the Sugar Monoculture	72
	c. The Development of the Cuban Working Class	77
	d. Jose Marti	81
	e. The Vanguard Party	86
	f. The War of Independence	87
	g. Humanism or Imperialism?	92
	h. Consequences of Intervention	109
✓ IV.	From Spanish Rule to American Empire	112
	a. The Internal Development of Cuba	125
	i. The Politicians	125
	ii. The Class Structure	133
	b. Working Class Organization and Ideology	142
	c. The Development of the Cuban Monoculture	153

V.	The Aborted Revolution - A Summary Overview	167
	a. The United States and Machado	193
	b. 1933-1934. Mediation, Revolution, Reaction	194
✓ VI.	Batista in Power	203
	a. The United States	203
	b. From Repression to Reform	208
	c. The Cuban Communists	213
VII.	The Autenticos in Power	226
✓ VIII.	The Eve of Revolution: A Socio-Economic overview	237
✓ IX.	Conclusion	263
X.	Footnotes	270
XI.	Bibliography	320

LIST OF TABLES

I.	NATIONAL AND PER CAPITA INCOME IN CUBA, 1903-1954	182-184
II.	SELECTED ITEMS IN THE CUBAN BALANCE OF PAYMENTS, 1919-1949	185-187
III.	CUBAN EXPORTS AND IMPORTS	188-191
IV.	CUBAN EXPORTS, IMPORTS AND NATIONAL INCOME, 1903-1949	192
V.	HOUSING CONDITIONS IN CUBA, 1953	258
VI.	CUBAN FARMS BY SIZE GROUPS, 1945	260
VII.	TYPE OF LANDHOLDING AND CULTIVATION	261
VIII.	SEASONAL FLUCTUATION OF UNEMPLOYMENT IN CUBA, MAY 1956 - APRIL 1957.	262
IX.	ATTITUDE TOWARD REVOLUTION BY PREREVOLUTIONARY EMPLOYMENT	263

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The acknowledgements fall naturally into two parts. In the first place there are those to whom I am specifically indebted, in particular to Nathan Popkin who helped me in developing the major hypothesis, and to Kathleen Aberle whose criticism and encouragement throughout the preparation of the thesis ensured not only an improvement of the content but also that the thesis was eventually completed. In addition I should mention the assistance given to me by Sharon Vance. Her constructive criticism and dexterity at the typewriter prevented the thesis from paralysing its writer.

Secondly I would like to acknowledge the P.S.A. Department which provided an environment, rare in the modern multiversity, in which writing a thesis was a worthwhile and educational pursuit. The Department has shown to its students what it means to search for truth, to maintain academic integrity and to pursue solutions to pressing social issues. At a time when social science is continuously retreating in the face of reality, it is a healthy sign.

The P.S.A. Department has shown what a "critical university" should be. In practice it has provided insight and stimulation to its students and faculty, in spite of constant harassment by the university administration and by other faculty members. There have of course been those who deserted and those who, losing the argument, cried foul, but to those who stayed and made education in at least one North American department relevant, the writer owes a vast debt. It is a debt which P.S.A. students will pay by translating into practice the results of our studies.

Martin Loney.

DEDICATION:

to the P.S.A. Department, faculty and students.

"The more reactionary a ruling class, the more obvious it becomes that the social order over which it presides has turned into an impediment to human liberation, the more is its ideology taken over by anti-intellectualism, irrationalism, and superstition. And by the same token, the more difficult it becomes for the intellectual to withstand the social pressures brought upon him, to avoid surrendering to the ruling ideology and succumbing to the intellect workers' comfortable and lucrative conformity. Under such conditions it becomes a matter of supreme importance and urgency to insist on the function and to stress the commitment of the intellectual. For it is under such conditions that it falls to his lot, both as a responsibility and as a privilege, to save from extinction the tradition of humanism, reason, and progress that constitutes our most valuable inheritance from the entire history of mankind."

- Paul Baran
The Commitment of the Intellectual

I.

INTRODUCTION

The major thesis of this dissertation will be that the Cuban Revolution of 1959 can be seen as the outgrowth of Cuban nationalism. There is a direct link through the 19th century Wars of Independence and the unsuccessful revolution of 1933, to the band of 'Barbudos' who took power in 1959. This link is seen with greater clarity by the Cubans than by many western academics. In 1962, in a speech dedicated to Antonio Maceo, the famous 19th century fighter, Armando Hart, former guerilla and now a member of the Central Committee of the Cuban Communist Party, said, "The greatness and profundity of our revolutionary movement today derives from a series of historical situations which are to be found in great part in the character of the struggles for independence and in the process of national formation in our country."¹

Nationalism is clearly not an isolated factor. It can only be understood against the historical development of a specific set of social and economic relationships. Or as George Plekhanov argued, "The history of ideologies is to a large extent to be explained by the rise, modification and breakdown of association of ideas under the

influence of the rise, modification and breakdown of definite combinations of social forces."2

The second but integrally related thesis will be that the attempted revolution of 1933 and the Revolution of 1959 were a reaction to the economic insecurity and underlying stagnation which resulted from the economic structure; a structure which the United States of America, in large measure, created and supported. In analysing the Cuban economy we will attempt to substantiate and utilize some of the hypotheses of A.G. Frank, P. Baran and H. Magdoff on imperialism, development and underdevelopment.

The first issue to be considered is what assessment we can make of the colonial situation and the imperialist situation. The basic point is that colonialism or imperialism is a relationship of domination for the purpose of economic exploitation. "The agencies of the colonial power regard the colony itself as essentially a productive source of wealth."3 We will see in the course of this paper some of the techniques used to gain this wealth. This is not the entire story, for the relationships are not simple. In order to maintain imperialism as a world system, certain

countries may be retained for their strategic or political importance - a modern example is Vietnam. Countries may be retained when they have passed the point of profitability because it is felt that their release would jeopardise the retention of other countries.

Colonialism, neo-colonialism and imperialism have the same objective-economic exploitation. Which method is used will depend upon historical factors and what is deemed to be most effective. As Gallagher and Robinson point out in The Imperialism of Free Trade the type of relations maintained within an imperialist system will depend on what is demanded by local conditions. Referring to British policy in the mid-19th century, they observe "the usual summing up of the policy of the free trade empire as 'trade not rule' should read 'trade with informal control if possible, trade with rule when necessary'."4 In Cuba we can see different superstructures of imperial rule from the early days of actual American occupation through the 1934 abolition of the Platt Amendment without observing any significant change in America's basic aim of economic exploitation.

The extent of American imperialism is not officially

admitted, and yet to examine United States' relations with Latin America is to examine the attempts of the United States to maintain its economic interests in the hemisphere. The Monroe Doctrine of 1823 was not a move in favour of Latin American independence. It was intended to indicate to the European powers that Latin America was an American sphere of influence.⁵ In 1846 the United States gave a very clear indication of its regard for Latin American independence. As a result of war with Mexico, the area which now includes Texas, Arizona, New Mexico, California, Nevada, Utah and part of Wyoming, was added to the union.

In 1904 Roosevelt revitalized the Monroe Doctrine, adding what became known as the Roosevelt Corollary.⁶ The Monroe Doctrine now not only barred European intervention in the hemisphere but justified United States' intervention in Latin America to maintain "law and order". With this doctrine, Roosevelt attempted to provide some post-facto justification for the United States' seizure of Panama from Colombia. "By virtue of the Monroe Doctrine, marines were landed, elections supervised, customs controlled, central banks administered - and de facto protectorates established over various Caribbean states."⁷

As the 20th century progressed, the old methods of maintaining continental hegemony became increasingly difficult. In the thirties, the rise of fascism forced the United States to adopt a more conciliatory approach to Latin America lest the nations of the continent look elsewhere for allies.

The accession of Truman to the Presidency marked a further revitalization of the Monroe Doctrine. The doctrine was now justified by a new myth, that of aggressive international communism.⁸ After 1945, United States' intervention in defense of its Latin American empire was justified as defense against external communist aggression. The 1947 Treaty of Rio de Janeiro, or the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, pledged each of its signatories to a united response in the event of any attack on an American state.⁹ The Treaty was subsequently used both to justify sanctions against Cuba and an invasion of the Dominican Republic. In 1948 the Ninth Pan-American Conference gave birth to the OAS and also for the first time to an explicit identification and condemnation of the alleged communist threat.¹⁰ In 1951 a meeting of Foreign Ministers in Washington saw the

creation of an Inter-American Joint Defense Board for the "military planning of the common defense".¹¹

In 1954 at the tenth Pan-American meeting in Caracas, Dulles commented, "There is not a single country in this hemisphere which has not been penetrated by the apparatus of international communism, acting under orders from Moscow."¹² The major political resolution of the Caracas Conference noted " ... that the domination or control of the political institutions of any American state by the international communist movement ... would constitute a threat to sovereignty ... (resulting in) appropriate action in accordance with existing treaties."¹³ The motion was, as Guatemala pointed out, directed against the Guatemalan revolution and any such moves by other countries. By now the Treaty of Rio de Janeiro clearly covered internal revolt as well as any possible external aggression. A few months later the United States liberated the continent from the communist threat in Guatemala. Colonel Castillo Armas and the United Fruit Company replaced President Arbenz and the Guatemalan revolution.¹⁴

If rule is exercised by indirect control, then this will

involve the development of a compradore bourgeoisie, that is to say, a social class committed to retaining and expanding the imperial link, whose own position is firmly based on their role in the imperialist relationship. The compradore bourgeoisie may, for example, work for the foreign company or foreign government; they may be involved in exporting to or importing from the metropolis; they may be involved in the tourist trade or in any number of activities essentially predicated on the maintenance of the status quo.

The interests of this social class will come into direct conflict with the interests of other groups in the society. They will conflict with the desire of the national bourgeoisie to industrialize the country, since this may well demand taxes on imports and exports, or redirection of resources toward national industry, or curbing of foreign investment and an attack on the economic dominance of American branch companies. Compradore interests will conflict with the peasantry, particularly where the extension of plantation farming brings increasing immiseration to the peasants, as it absorbs more of the most productive land and directs attention away from the problems of peasant agriculture - for example, by monopolizing whatever credit is available.

The organized proletariat may become a labour aristocracy and confine themselves to economistic demands, but a far larger sector, the lumpenproletariat, will be virtually excluded from the economy. This group, occasionally employed, as for example at harvesting time or in boom periods, will be forced to subsist on the fringes of the economy, continually increasing in number by the extension of rural poverty and with no prospect of absorption, since the export-oriented economy will not provide the necessary industrialization. This group, trapped in the culture of poverty, will provide no support for the status quo but may be attracted by revolutionary ideologies.¹⁵

The effect of satellization by a foreign country must be clearly set out in order that the mythology of much of conventional economics can be dispelled. Both Baran and Frank would argue that in general, foreign investment does not, as is claimed, give rise to development in the recipient country. For Frank, it, in fact, produces increasing underdevelopment. Baran notes that "Foreign concerns embarking upon the production of exportable staples (with the exception of oil) have, as a rule, started their activities with relatively little investment of capital."¹⁶ (Land, the main item of purchase, was generally obtained at nominal cost, and future investments could well be financed out of profits.) In fact there has been a net drain of capital from the satellite countries to

the metropolis. In the years 1950-1965, for example, the flow of investment from the United States to Latin America was \$3,800,000,000. The income on investment in Latin America transferred to the United States was \$11,300,000,000, a net difference of \$7,500,000,000 - the contribution of the poor to the affluence of the rich.¹⁷

The spread effect of investment that does take place is limited. Most of the capital investment is spent on imported goods, and the actual domestic outlay for production may be small. "In Venezuela, for example in the early 1950's, petroleum accounted for over 90% of all exports (and for a large part of the total national product), but the oil industry employed only 2% of Venezuela's labour force; and its local currency expenditures (exclusive of government payments) did not exceed 20% of the value of exports."¹⁸ Furthermore, although "in some countries with very small populations and large raw material developments the proportion of people employed in connection with them is of course larger - even there, the share of total receipts of the industries that is paid out in wages is approximately the same."¹⁹

Not only are the positive effects of foreign investment

slight and repatriation of profits considerable, but, argues Baran, "it is very hard to say what has been the greater evil - the removal of their economic surplus by foreign capital or its reinvestment by foreign enterprise."²⁰ For the overall effect of the investment of foreign capital in fact is to create an economic and social structure which inhibits development, creates a monopolistic structure in industry and prevents the transition from merchant capitalism to industrial capitalism. Baran rejects the argument that any wealth accruing to the underdeveloped countries from the foreign exploitation of their raw material resources is a net gain since otherwise the resources would lay idle.

For as the case of Japan indicates, there is no proof that given an independent course of development these countries would not have ultimately utilized their own resources on far more advantageous terms. In addition, the production of export goods may well involve a sacrifice in the production of domestic goods, particularly where agricultural products are concerned. Foreign companies engaged in plantation farming often displace native subsistence farmers. Substantiation for this point is found in the arguments of many Cuban writers, particularly Fernando Ortiz and Guerra y Sanchez (whose work we will treat later). Baran concludes

Baran's argument is that...

with an argument strikingly similar to that propounded by Frank in his later work. "Thus, if apologists of imperialists insist that one 'must be able to show that merely geographic investment is actually harmful to the recipient country, which must mean that it results in a lower real income for the inhabitants than they would otherwise have attained' (quotation from A.N. MacLeod) such a demonstration can be readily supplied if due allowance is made for the handful of compradores who are the only inhabitants of the underdeveloped countries who derive substantial benefits from the operations of foreign raw material enterprises."²¹

Pierre Jalee draws attention to the patterns of trade which operate between metropolitan and satellite countries.²² Eighty-five percent of the exports of the Third World consist of raw materials and another five percent of common metals, products of the first stage of smelting.²³ The dominance of the international market, in many primary products, by one or two major buyers, the worsening terms of trade, and the fact that expansion in international trade has been much more rapid in manufactured goods than in primary products, have all worked to the disadvantage of 'developing' nations. The reciprocal trade agreements made with the developing

[Handwritten notes and scribbles in the bottom right corner, including the word 'developing' and other illegible text.]

countries have served to perpetuate their internal economic imbalance between manufactures and primary products, at the price of sacrificing the possibility of building up local manufacturing industries. We will see in our section on 'The Development of the Cuban Monoculture' and in our 'Socio-Economic Overview' of Cuba that trade relations between Cuba and the United States served to perpetuate Cuban underdevelopment.

A recent example of the extent to which trade treaties between the Third World and the First World served to perpetuate the status quo is provided by the treaty signed at Yaounde in 1963 between the Common Market and eighteen African countries. The treaty specifically excludes from tariff benefits a number of items from the African states unless they are in the raw state; for example, coffee must be neither roasted nor decaffeinated, tea must be packed in bulk, pepper must not be crushed or powdered. In return for the abolition of customs dues on specific raw materials the eighteen must move toward the abolition of customs dues on all products originating in the six. Only by special appeal can a country invoke protective duties for an infant industry.²⁴

Marx had noted that as capitalism developed " ... a new and international division of labour, a division suited to the requirements of the chief centers of modern industry springs up and converts one part of the globe into a chiefly agricultural field of production for supplying the other part which remains a chiefly industrial field."²⁵ We will find that Cuba served this role in its relations with the United States.

Both Baran and Frank analyse the constellation of social forces and structures produced by imperialism. Baran is less exact, at least as regards Latin America, than is Frank.

Baran analyses three major groupings in the ruling class - the merchants, "expanding and thriving within the orbit of foreign capital"; the native industrial monopolist, "in most cases interlocked and interwoven with domestic capital and with foreign enterprise, who entirely depend on the maintenance of the existing economic structure and whose monopolistic status would be swept away by the rise of industrial capitalism"; and the feudal landowners. The interests of these three groups "run entirely parallel".²⁶

Handwritten signature

In fact, as Frank had documented for Chile and Brazil, there may at certain periods be quite intense conflicts between native industrialists - not necessarily monopolistic - and compradore elements, although by virtue of the nature of underdevelopment the national bourgeoisie are not strong enough to challenge successfully the compradore bourgeoisie, and at times of crises when the danger of social revolution is seen they may well ally with the compradore bourgeoisie. In addition, within Latin America it is difficult to discover any feudal landowners. Whatever relations may exist between landlord and worker, large scale farming is predicated on production for the market.

Our analysis of Cuba will show few signs of the emergence of a national bourgeoisie - perhaps because of the size of the country and the degree of penetration of American capital; but it will confirm that there were no traces of feudalism in Cuban agriculture.²⁷

Not only is the actual effect of imperialism to retard growth, but, argues Baran, "the main task of imperialism in our time (is) to prevent, or, if that is impossible, to slow down and to control, the economic development of

underdeveloped countries."28 Among the reasons dictating this is the fact that any government oriented toward national development may see nationalization of raw material industries as being a convenient means of providing capital for development. However, even if a policy of nationalization is not pursued, increased economic activity will bring increased factor costs and therefore lower profits for the foreign companies. In addition, rising native industry will demand tariff protection. In a later article on imperialism, Baran and Sweezy note that in its policy, "to make a world safe for Standard Oil", the United States' government as agent - or executive committee - for the interests of the multi-national companies will view with alarm any tendency to restrict the area of their operations.

It is this demand for

"Lebensraum by the multi-national companies which produces a United States attitude adamantly opposed to genuinely nationalist or revolutionary movements - for the success of a revolutionary movement effectively decreases the free world of U.S. corporate expansion. To put it bluntly, the Cuban revolution cost the Standard Oil Company \$62,269,000 as a result of expropriations."29

Handwritten notes:
 Standard Oil Company
 expropriations
 Cuba
 \$62,269,000
 Standard Oil Company
 expropriations
 Cuba
 \$62,269,000

The experience of Brazil provides eloquent testimony to this point and indicates that United States opposition is not confined to socialist movements or even to more pragmatic movements of the Juan Bosch variety. The attempt in Brazil by Goulart to limit the role of United States' investment and to curtail United States' political influence was aborted by a United States backed coup d'etat. Goulart acted as a supporter of the Brazilian national bourgeoisie, yet the social strains produced by development, the rising working class militancy, and intensifying opposition from United States' interests, forced the national bourgeoisie into a liason with the compradore bourgeoisie against Goulart, who by 1964 was being labelled as a communist. The government brought into power by the 1964 coup ended Goulart's restrictive controls on foreign investment and repatriation of profits and substituted a policy of overt support for the United States in place of Goulart's policy of neutralism.30

We will now deal briefly with some of the approaches to revolutions and/or colonial situations.

Chalmers Johnson, in attempting a theoretical understanding of revolutionary change, constructs an equilibrium model of society in which change is possible provided that the "value structure and environment change in synchronization with each other".³¹ He accepts Parsons' four basic functions for a system to fulfill in order to survive, namely "socialization, adaptation, goal attainment, and integration", and uses the Parsonian concept of equilibrium to indicate a healthily functioning system. Yet it is doubtful that Cuba in any period of her history fulfilled the criteria by which equilibrium is judged. When, however, Johnson later writes, "If a system is basically functional - and that includes being free from foreign domination or interference - efforts at artificial mobilization (that is, for revolutionary change) will fall on barren soil"³², he immediately renders his equilibrium model inapplicable to a major portion of the world. This makes the model less than constructive, since he eliminates precisely those areas in which revolution seems most likely to take place, leaving us

only with a model of that type of society which is least likely to be revolution-prone.

One can say, with certainty, that at no time prior to 1959 did Cuba fill this final prerequisite of the "basically functional" system.

What is left from Johnson is the concept of a fully functional system with shared values and institutional mechanisms for evolutionary change. Cuba can only be seen as a continually "disequibrated social system" which makes the crucial question not why revolution took place but rather why it did not take place earlier.

At this stage it may be useful to deal with the more purposeful approach of G. Balandier, who, while treating the colonial situation, introduces concepts which may be equally fruitful in analysing a neo-colonial or imperialist situation.

Balandier notes that "it is an apparent fact that among colonial peoples, the quest for norms coincides with the quest for autonomy."³³ This quest inevitably produces conflict with the colonial power - "the history of colonial

societies reveals periods during which conflicts are merely latent, when a temporary equilibrium or adjustment has been achieved, and periods during which conflicts rise to the surface and are apparent on one level or the other according to circumstances (religious, political and economic) - moments when the antagonism and the gulf between the colonial people and a colonial power are at their maximum and are experienced by the colonial rulers as a challenge to established order, but by the colonial peoples as an effort to regain their autonomy."³⁴

Balandier also draws attention to the "extremely heterogeneous character of the culture"³⁵ of colonial societies. Not all groups are equally oppressed. In Cuba, for example, we can clearly distinguish between the Spanish, the Creoles, resident foreigners, and the blacks, who, in the absence of an enduring native population, largely assumed their role. We do not have a unilinear picture of colony-metropolis conflict, but rather, possibilities of conflict between the different colonial groups, aided by the metropolitan "divide and rule" policy, which provide the backdrop for the general tension between the colony and the metropolis. In Cuba, for

example, we see conflict between Creoles and slaves and Creoles and Peninsulares, with the former diminishing as the major conflict of the Cubans with Spain, and hence with the Peninsulares intensifies.³⁶

We can also see periods when "conflicts are merely latent" as, for example, in the early period of colonialism up to 1800. This relatively stable period hardly fits in with any commonly understood concept of equilibrium, however, for the conflicts were latent only at the colonial-metropolis level, and were continually intense within the colonial situation, taking the form of Indian, Negro, and occasionally, poor white revolts.


The last point which we will deal with is particularly significant in the context of societies under foreign domination. Nationalism contains in Latin America three basic demands which are expanded upon below. In brief, they are demands for autonomy, national integration, and, essentially allied to this, for modernization. Nationalism may be left wing or right wing, it may merely be an electoral gambit, or the profound ideology of a revolutionary movement. In Cuba, for example, Machado espoused a program of "business

nationalism" which was openly supported by United States' interests in Cuba. As one historian put it,

"This official nationalism' was good for domestic consumption, and an aspiring presidential candidate, Gerardo Machado, proceeded to build a reputation as a foe of the Platt Amendment. American business knew Machado, and were not worried about his future policies."37

The nationalism of Fidel Castro, on the other hand, can be said to have implied revolutionary changes in society.

If we accept the thesis perhaps most comprehensively presented by A.G. Frank, that the national bourgeoisie is incapable of taking the leadership in development in Latin America, then we could argue that the realization of the dominant goal of nationalism - the removal of foreign control or influence - requires a revolutionary change in Latin America.



Two conservative writers on the subject note that "a major ingredient of Latin America nationalism in this century has unquestionably been anti-Americanism or Yankee phobia." Earlier, they point out that,

"In Europe the masses were integrated into the national society and inculcated with nationalism under the leadership of a truly national bourgeoisie, that is, one clearly identified with the fatherland, the patrie. In Latin America, however, the elites during the rise of nationalist sentiment have for the most part been made up of persons tied to the export economy and to foreign capital and enterprise."

Yet as they later add, "today it is widely believed that political independence is a frail and worthless fabric unless reinforced by economic independence."³⁸ The ideology of these writers prevents them from providing any solution to this clear conflict between the goals of nationalism and objective reality and they confine themselves to explaining the ways in which nationalism has been channeled by the existing elites to perpetuate the status quo - while leaving unfulfilled the major demands of nationalism. The difference between the bourgeoisie in Europe and its Latin American counterpart can be profitably expanded. The European bourgeoisie, alienated from the old feudal structure, rejected not only the economic system which this implied but also the resultant value system. An aggressive class, they successfully fought for political, social and economic domination. In Latin America emulation, not alienation, became the goal of the bourgeoisie. They sought not to overthrow the old hacendados with their highly status conscious social ethic but rather to become like them.

If western development was stimulated by the Protestant ethic, Latin American underdevelopment has certainly been abetted by the 'Hispanic ethic'.

Professor R.T. Ely writes of the mid-nineteenth century Cuban upper class "conspicuous among their other distinguishing traits was an inordinate love of pure ostentation."³⁹ James Steele, the United States' Consul in Cuba for six years, described the upper-class criollo as follows:

"This man is a born dandy. Born in a slave country, the presumptive possible or actual heir to a share in some sugar plantation, or, if not living by his wits or upon his relations, the young Cuban imagines that his destiny is to ornament the tropics, to be a thing of beauty and kill time while he is thus elegantly occupied."⁴⁰

In 1964 Robin Blackburn, in what remains the best sociological study of the Cuban Revolution, wrote of the Cuban bourgeoisie,

"Havana's extensive and resplendent suburb of Marianao offers a vivid image of the Cuban bourgeoisie in the days of its prosperity. Its posthumous presence is eloquent; in the cemetery itself the marble vaults of the rich are fitted with internal lifts, air conditioning and telephones. Social snobbery was rife in Havana. Spanish titles were eagerly bought and gossip columns running to several pages with payment for insertion helped to subsidize the newspapers and magazines. Thus while Cuba's wealthy classes were unable to prevent the upstart 'Sergeant' Batista from running the country, they consoled themselves until 1952 at any rate with banning him from the Havana Yacht Club because of his Afro-Chinese ancestry."⁴¹

Though Cuba's oligarchy had been decimated by the Wars of Independence and the slump in the sugar industry in the twenties, the bourgeoisie nevertheless continued to emulate the values and life styles passed down by this class.

Claudio Veliz, in an extremely valuable article, analyses the potential contribution the middle sectors can make in Latin America. A crucial question, since it is precisely this sector to which the Alliance for Progress looks to lead Latin America out of the shadow of Castroite revolution. His conclusion substantiates our early remarks. Referring to their prescribed role in the Alliance for Progress he writes, "These middle groups have been vested with the responsibility of doing what they do not want to do."⁴² Before the Second World War the urban middle sectors gained some political power in center-left populist parties but had little economic base for it. In the mushrooming of industry which took place in the course of the Second World War when European and American exports ceased to reach Latin American markets, they achieved economic power, the leadership of the middle classes, gaining considerable fortunes.

"These economic changes were too swift, unexpected and accidental to result in significant social changes. No apparent contradictions developed between the aristocratic landowner and the wealthy radical leader; on the contrary they became fast friends and political colleagues once the rising bureaucrat (or industrialist) had bought land and race horses, joined the local country club, and taken his first golf lessons. Thus in a relatively brief period of time, the violently outspoken reformist leaders of 1938 became the sedate, technically minded and moderate statesmen of the 1950's."43

Now, sharing not only political but also economic power with the old aristocracy, there remained only one more prize to gain, that of social prestige.

"These aristocratic groups represent the social peaks which the urban middle sectors want to climb. Now, throughout the continent the middle sectors are willing and ready to outdo the conservatives in their devotions to established institutions."44

Are these the groups that the United States really supposes will lead "the revolution without the revolution"?

It is fitting that Frantz Fanon should provide the epitaph,

"The national middle class which takes over power at the end of the colonial regime is an under-developed middle class. It has practically no economic power and in any case it is no way to commensurate with the bourgeoisie of the mother country which it hopes to replace. ... The national bourgeoisie will be quite content with the role of the Western bourgeoisie's business agent. ... In its beginning the national bourgeoisie of the colonial countries identifies itself with the decadence of the bourgeoisie of the West. We need not think that it is jumping ahead; it is in fact beginning at the end. It is already senile before it has come to know petulance, the fearlessness or the will to succeed of youth."45

Nationalism, which in Latin America emerged as the outgrowth of a colonial situation, can reasonably be expected to concentrate on the issue of autonomy. It has, of course, other goals, depending upon the environment which gives rise to it. Among these goals are that of modernization, and directly linked to it the idea of integration or the creation of one nation, and eliminating the rural-urban imbalance. In many parts of Latin America integration also means the assimilation of the native Indian population who are disproportionately concentrated in the rural areas. Again, if we accept Frank's hypothesis we can argue that such goals imply a revolutionary change in society, for the existing imbalance and "backwardness" of Latin America is a direct product of foreign domination or "the metropolis-satellite relationship", according to Frank, one function of which is the domination of these countries by the compradore bourgeoisie.

Nationalism is elusive of definition. It obviously includes the concept of a nation, which can be said to exist de facto if not de jure "when an active and fairly numerous section of its members are convinced that it exists".⁴⁶ This definition by Hugh Seton Watson has the advantage of avoiding defining any particular factors, linguistic, geographic, racial or cultural, which can always be falsified in

in some particular case. But the crucial issue for our study is the dynamic concept of nationalism, the process of the emergence of national consciousness.

Perhaps the best term for this emergence is social mobilization - the process whereby people become aroused and aware of the issue of the nation or the concept of the nation. This may be precipitated by a number of factors. What concerns us here is its emergence in a colonial or imperialist situation. In this context it will be stimulated by the intensity of the objective conflict of interest between the superior - subordinate powers. Where this conflict is sufficiently intense to give rise to mass violence, the process of rebellion will increase social mobilization, either through the invasion of the armies of the colonial power, or by the efforts of leading nationalist groups in the colony to extend their support, or by a combination of both. Johnson notes that "Foreign invasion and internal resistance organization have taken, in recent years, a predominant role in mobilizing pre-political populations."⁴⁷ In Cuba the successive attempts at independence culminating in the War of 1895-1898 involved a steadily broadening base of action and a steady extension of national consciousness.

Boyd C. Schafer notes that a similar process took place in Europe: "Revolution and war stimulated national feeling everywhere in Europe during the years of 1792-1815."⁴⁸

Wars of independence do not have to succeed in order to stimulate nationalism. The social mobilization will take place regardless, and in addition, Kalman Silvert notes the need for national symbols. "There is an objective shortage, not only because the process of social integration has been completed nowhere, but also because of a relative shortage of war heroes, great exploits and glittering conquests, the raw material of national mythology."⁴⁹ Whatever the case of other Latin American countries, twentieth century Cuba possessed a proud heritage of national heroes - Marti, Maceo, Gomez, Flor Cormbet, to name but a few. In 1953, the year of Marti's centenary and the first year of Batista's dictatorship, five hundred articles on him were published.⁵⁰

These past national heroes may be of particular importance where their aims are felt to have been frustrated, as they clearly were in Cuba. The concept of the frustrated revolution of 1895 filled Cubans, particularly the young,

and the students, with the drive to fight on. In his History Will Absolve Me speech of 1953, Castro said "I carry in my heart the teachings of the Master" and also described Marti as the "instigator of the 26th of July".⁵¹ It is no accident that the first guerilla column in 1957 was named Jose Marti Column Number 1.

Schafer also notes the use of nationalism in providing a sense of identity in turbulent times.

"Hope, fear, hate in a time of insecurity and disintegrating values, these were fundamental in the growing nationalism. The nation became as answer to men's anxieties, a solution for their frustrations, and a refuge in a time of trouble. For many it became the hopeful road to a heavenly city of the future upon this earth."⁵²

In the mystical quality of much of Jose Marti's nationalism we can see an example of this.

John H. Kautsky points out that the colonial situation will itself produce greater tension in society as change takes place, whether it be in traditional village life threatened by growing plantations or the frustrations of rural immigrants in the expanding cities. He notes that

"anti-colonialism (then) must here be understood as opposition not merely to colonialism narrowly defined but also to a colonial economic status - the social tensions which modernization and industrialization

produce everywhere and which in Europe were necessarily turned inward, resulting in conflicts dividing societies, are in underdeveloped countries largely turned outward. Instead of blaming each other for the difficulties growing out of modernization, the various social strata all blame the colonial power, the result being not internal conflict but that internal unity of anticolonialism which is the basis of nationalism in underdeveloped countries."⁵³

While this argument tends to ignore the fact that in an economic colonial situation conflict may well be internal in the sense of being directed against compradore elements, the point is in general valid.

Karl Deutsch, in Nationalism and Social Communication, stresses the need for the "presence of sufficient communication facilities to produce the overall result."⁵⁴ Such facilities inevitably increase as the colonial power opens up the country to increase export and import potential.

Social mobilization is important not only in increasing nationalism but in giving rise to what is known as the revolution of rising expectations, which may well be incorporated in nationalist ideology. In an article on Social Mobilization and Political Development, Deutsch constructs a hypothetical model designed to demonstrate the increasing conflicts which will emerge if certain aspects of mobilization run ahead of government competence to meet the new demands.

Deutsch identifies a number of subprocesses which combine to create social mobilization - mass media exposure, demonstration of modern techniques, increase in voting participation, increases in literacy, change of locality of residence, population growth. If the government is unable or unwilling to match these changes with substantial increases in the national income and a reallocation of income from the top ten percent to the bottom ninety percent, then revolutionary change may be demanded. One possibility, for example, is that the increase in the rate of exposure to the mass media in rural areas will not be matched by either modernization in these areas or a similar increase in the proportion employable in urban areas. If radical action is not taken, then "the dangerous gap between the fast growing mass media audience and the slow growing circle of more adequately employed and equipped persons is likely to remain and increase."⁵⁵ Deutsch concludes that "A major transformation of the underlying political and social structure of a country could occur - and could pose a potential threat to the stability of any insufficiently reform-minded government there - even during a period of substantially rising per capita income."⁵⁶

One point that is worth noticing is that like social mobilization, nationalism may produce one of two effects. It

may provide a means of strengthening the nation and increasing cohesion, or it may, in so far as it gives rise to demands which by the very nature of the system cannot be fulfilled, produce a revolutionary conflict. For this reason it should be stressed again that while the rise of nationalism in nineteenth and twentieth century Europe may actually have allayed internal conflict as C. Wright Mills and others suggest, in Latin America it seems destined to carry this conflict to revolutionary proportions. The crucial difference is clearly between an independent Europe and a satellite Latin America.

"Until the advent of Castro the United States was so overwhelmingly influential that ... the American Ambassador was the second most important man in Cuba, sometimes even more important than the President (of Cuba)."⁵⁷ Knowledge of this was not confined to the American embassy; it was an everyday fact of Cuban history and was known as such. It must be stressed again that Cuba was the nation which had fought hardest against Spain and yet had achieved least. This was known by most Cubans, and the United States' domination was held responsible. Nationalism in Cuba, it will be seen, was directed against United States imperialism, and the whole compradore social structure to which it had given rise.

Kautsky notes the crucial role of intellectuals in the emergence of nationalism and the revolutionary process. "The key role of intellectuals in the politics of underdeveloped countries is largely due to their paradoxical position of being a product of modernization before modernization has reached or become widespread in their own country."⁵⁸ Intellectuals are generally the first group in society to be influenced by nationalist ideas. They are exposed to notions of progress, new value systems, and often, foreign education. In seeking to utilize their educational experience they will suffer all the frustrations inherent in underdevelopment: unemployment, underemployment, domination by the old oligarchy, preferential employment for foreign nationals, lack of constitutional channels through which to implement modernizing ideas. They are prone to the acceptance of nationalist ideas, which provide or appear to provide a solution to the problems of their society, and they will attempt to transmit these to other groups. Kautsky writes,

"The intellectuals assume the leadership of nationalist movements, because, unlike the other groups, they have broken out of the rigid class lines of the old society, they have a vision of the future and some idea, however vague or impractical, of how to attain it, and they are almost by definition skilled in the use of the written and spoken word. Furthermore, the intel-

lectuals have the simple advantage over members of other groups of having free time on their hands. Unemployed or underemployed and yet often receiving enough support from their wealthy families to be able to live, they have time to devote to politics, to speaking, reading, writing, to agitating and organizing, and time to spend in jail or in exile and, often soon thereafter, in the government."⁵⁹

An understanding of this differential potential for articulation, particularly operative in the highly stratified underdeveloped world, is very important for avoiding the type of mistakes Draper makes in his analysis of the "middle class revolution".⁶⁰

Claudio Veliz, in the article cited earlier, notes something of crucial importance in Latin America. With the commitment of the middle sectors or bourgeoisie - the terms seem to be largely interchangeable for many writers in Latin America - to emulation of the old oligarchies, "The intelligentsia ceased to identify itself with the political, social and economic leadership of the urban middle sectors soon after the Second World War, when it became obvious that the new radical plutocrats had abandoned their reformists programs and were committed to a defense of the established institutional structure."⁶¹ While in Europe the intellectuals had relied on the middle classes to reform society, in Latin America the intellectuals have abandoned this class.

"Most of the continent's intellectuals are in opposition and have adopted a quiet but forcefully critical attitude - They do not think - like Dickens, Balzac, Dumas or for that matter Walt Whitman, Mark Twain (sic), or Ralph Waldo Emerson - that they are living in a dynamic society where occasional injustices and mistakes can be put right with goodwill and bourgeois decency. On the contrary, they are extremely sceptical, critical and pessimistic."62

In Cuba the intellectuals were of paramount importance in both of the twentieth century revolutions of 1933 and 1959. The student directorate, acting with the sergeants, overthrew Machado in September 1933. The short-lived government which ensued was described by an American observer: "The civil government was controlled by a group of 'revolutionary' intellectuals, backed principally by university students."63 In 1953 the Moncada Barracks attack which gave birth to the July 26th Movement (the date of the attack) was largely student or ex-student-led and manned. Intellectuals continued to play a prominent role in the movement. José Martí, an example of the Latin American pensador par excellence, was the prime figure in organizing the 1895 War of Independence against Spain.

We should perhaps deal with what we could call the conspiracy school approach to nationalism and communism,

typified in this quotation from Arthur P. Whittaker's

Nationalism in Latin America.


"With the third important change in the character of Latin American nationalism we enter upon the penultimate phase of its development to the present time. As described by Victor Alba this change began in the 1930's under communist influence and consisted in the emergence of a new type of Latin American nationalism which was 'negative, chauvinistic, sterile and isolationist'. In the minds of its communist instigators this new nationalism was a weapon of political-cultural warfare; it was designed to divide Latin America from the United States and the rest of the Western world and to facilitate Communist penetration of Latin America by causing discord and creating confusion among its people. In furtherance of this purpose the Communist conspirators used Latin American intellectuals as their cats' paws propagating subversive ideas. They disparaged everything that tended to unite the Latin Americans with one another as well as with the United States and Europe. To this end they formulated a narrow nationalism by playing up the glories of each national culture in Latin America."64

That foreign communist parties have been subject to the dictates of the perceived interests of the USSR is not at issue. However, it should be pointed out that communist parties to be successful must become identified with nationalist goals, and that in Latin America it is not necessary to "sow discord" or "create disunity". It already exists as an observable fact. Anti-Americanism is another social fact. José Figueres, ex-President of Costa Rica, explained before a Congressional Committee why Nixon was spat upon in Venezuela. "People cannot spit upon a foreign policy, which is what they

wanted to do - I must explain that the art of spitting, vulgar though it is, is without substitute in our language for expressing certain emotions."65 Figueres went on to recount the customary complaints of economic exploitation and United States' support for dictatorships. Finally, since the intellectuals are the first group exposed to nationalism and its most articulate exponents, in addition to being leading figures in the communist parties, one can hardly describe them as cats' paws.

Communist Parties are only successful to the extent that they can provide or seem to provide an answer to felt social problems. To the extent that their policies are dictated by non-national considerations they will be handicapped in gaining support.

Chalmers Johnson found that in China, nationalism and communism became linked, and that the Communist Party gained its greatest mass support in the anti-Japanese war, providing in many areas of the country the only effective organization through which resistance to Japan was possible. Repression by the Japanese merely increased Communist support. "Peasants who survived the mopping-up campaigns were forced to conclude that their only hope lay in resistance, and the communists



were widely regarded as the most competent organizers of resistance."⁶⁶ In Cuba Castro's movement never underwent the process of 'people war' but it did, particularly in Oriente, provide the most effective instrument of resistance against Batista and Rolando Masferrer's mercenary army.

Another point made by Johnson can also be fruitfully applied to Cuba. In dealing with the acceptance of the legitimacy of Mao's government by the Chinese masses he writes, "The peasants did not question the nature of their post war government because the communist party had achieved not only power but also authority - its new record made its communist ideology legitimate."⁶⁷ Castro and the 26th movement had also demonstrated their abilities in routing Batista. With regard to the question of ideology, it is useful to remember that during the course of the war, while the Chinese Communist Party presented its broad version of society, it did not take great action on its specific points, since this would have alienated some sections of its "united front". While Castro undoubtedly presented a less clear picture, it can be argued that he did at least give some idea of the new society he envisioned. He did this by press contacts, particularly with American reporters, and in Cuba through the circulation of the History Will Absolve Me speech and the rebel news-

papers which emerged irregularly from the guerilla fronts and civic resistance movements.

In his trial speech Castro made a number of statements concerning his social policy. He promised a return to the radical constitution of 1940, land distribution, profit sharing schemes, protection for small sugar planters, nationalization of the telephone and utilities industries, full employment and improved housing.⁶⁸ Castro did not state that he was a socialist, but it was clear from any reading of his speech that he intended drastic social transformation and that he did not rely on foreign companies or native capitalists to accomplish this. He attacked both foreign ownership and the capitalist approach to industrialization.⁶⁹ Castro also indicated his support for the Bolivian revolution and for all progressive struggles in Latin America.⁷⁰

The writer had the opportunity to read some of the rebel publications in the archives of the National University of Havana. A large part of the newspapers - generally duplicated and only four sides in length - was devoted to recounting the position of the guerilla army and asking for support. An undated issue of the Sierra Maestra from Camaguey declared a boycott of all British goods after the sale

of eleven Spitfire aircraft to Batista. The Las Villas' Sierra Maestra on November 17, 1958 urged shopkeepers to cancel buying orders as a means of weakening the government.

The papers did, however, give some evidence of what the rebel army intended to do when in power. The national edition of the Sierra Maestra of December 1958, in an article entitled Message to the Man of the Field, thanked the peasants for supporting the revolution.

"Your children, your brothers and sisters, and your relatives have supported the ranks of the Revolutionary Army and have given their blood generously for liberty - the revolution wants you and your brothers to learn to think for yourselves. Because of this it wants you to have schools, so that your children and you learn to read and write and think and live a better life. The revolution wants you to have security of tenure in your house and in your job. Because of this it recognizes your right to the land that you cultivate. It wants you to have good health and count on the protection of the law."

The same issue also gave details of "Ley No.3" from the "Territorio Libre de Cuba" (the territory under rebel army control) which gave to the small peasants the land they cultivated. The paper also urged the formation of buying, selling and producing cooperatives on the lands they would own. To avoid any confusion it should be stated that in most cases the peasants cultivating this land subsequently received

ownership and were organized after the revolution in A.N.A.P. (National Association of Small Farmers). I was assured that the Association made no attempt to force peasants to sell their land but provided stimulants to cooperative operation and bought the land of those who no longer wished to work it (for example, the old), or received it on the death of its owners.

In Las Villas, Raul Castro formed collective farms in the areas under his control.

Fidel Castro may have been many things to many men but it should not have been too difficult for anyone to see that his proposals implied a radical restructuring of society. Indeed perhaps an example of this realization was the old style politicians in the Autentico party, who, distrustful of Castro, kept arms in Havana in anticipation of pulling off a coup rather than sending them to the Sierra Maestra.

Robert Taber, who provides the most thorough account of the development and tactics of the M26 movement, records that he wrote in his notebook on March 2, 1957:

"With regard to Batista's opposition, the U.S. embassy in Havana feels that the oppositionists are divided among themselves principally by fear of the political demands that Fidel Castro might make were he to emerge as the hero of a popular revolution. They don't want him on their team; they feel he's too young, fiery, militaristic, anti-Yanqui; in their opinion, a potential dictator worse than the present one."71

In addition, like Mao, Castro achieved not only power but also authority, and that his movement clearly utilized, and identified itself with Cuban nationalism and anti-Americanism.

It is also useful to distinguish between communism as the ideology of Communist parties and Marxism as an explanation of the nature of a society, a theory of action and a prediction of change. In fact in Cuba, while the Communist Party played a role in the revolutionary process, it is arguable that the turn to 'Marxism-Leninism' was dictated more by demands for independence and equality than by any machinations of the Cuban Communist Party.

One final point should be made regarding nationalism. That is that its significance is not restricted to the pre-revolutionary period or to the question of the destruction of the old society. It is also important in building the

new. Nasser is able to allay internal conflict by focusing on Zionist aggression.⁽¹⁾ Castro is able to strengthen his hand and silence his opponents by calling for unity in the face of imperialism or by identifying his opponents with the interests of the foreign power. Joan Robinson noted in 1965:

"The 64 dollar question that visitors returned from Cuba are asked is always: Does Fidel Castro still command the loyalty of the Cuban people? The shortest answer seems to be: yes, he does and, if he did not, President Johnson is making sure that he would."⁷²

II. EARLY DEVELOPMENTS IN CUBA

Most writers who have discussed the Cuban Revolution of 1959 have concentrated primarily on the modern period of Cuban history. The revolution has been viewed and interpreted against the situation in Cuba in the 1950's.

This writer is of the opinion that a more comprehensive viewpoint can be gained by looking at 1959 as the culmination of a historical process, a process which was much different in Cuba from that in other Latin American countries.

a. THE CONQUEST

Columbus discovered Cuba in 1492, and, finding little ready wealth, moved on. In 1510, Diego Velasquez was commissioned to conquer and settle this island.¹

Velasquez' arrival in 1511 was met with immediate opposition from the native Indian population. This opposition was led by Hatuey, a native chief from the island of Guahaba (Gonave, off Haiti). Hatuey warned the Cuban Indians of the brutality of the Spanish colonizers and advised them that rather than welcome the Spanish - as had the Indians of Hispaniola - they should resist.

Hatuey led resistance to the Spanish in the eastern end of the island (Oriente Province). In the face of the superiority of the Spanish forces he resorted to guerilla tactics but was betrayed and captured in February 1512 and burned to death at the stake.

The Indians continued to resist but the Spaniards, pushing westwards, either killed or enslaved the native population. Spanish brutality, the burden of working in the mines, malnutrition, and disease, resulted in the rapid extermination of the Indian population.

The supply of gold in Cuba was rapidly exhausted and many of the conquistadors moved on to the richer promise of Mexico and Peru.²

Economic development for the first two hundred years was slow. Havana became an important port in the trade between Spain and the mainland colonies, but was subject to constant attacks by Spain's enemies - France, England and Holland. Heavily taxed by the church and the crown, the island's economic growth was retarded.³

The cattle industry developed most rapidly since it re-

quired little labour and was facilitated by extremely large grants to the more powerful of the conquistadors. 4

The first major importation of African slaves took place in 1524 and the first slave revolt in 1533.⁵ The reason for the early introduction of slaves lay in the rapid decline of the native population and the need to find an alternative labour force. There was no great influx of new migrants from Spain and in any case new immigrants would move to establish independent farms while land was still available.⁶ Since the conquistadors were loathe to work themselves and sought to maximize their profits, the introduction of slavery was quite logical.

Because economic growth was slow, so was the import of slaves. Guerra y Sanchez, a Cuban writer, has argued that this allowed Cuba to develop a national identity based on a large number of small and independent producers. While other Latin American and Caribbean countries rapidly moved to an extensive plantation system which turned them into one huge latifundio, Cuba's slow growth allowed a more balanced development of its social structure. This development was to be later thwarted by the rapid growth of the sugar industry and plantation agriculture.⁷

During the first two hundred years of settlement Cuba

functioned primarily as a supply station for ships en route between Spain and the mainland colonies. However, the gradual development of Cuba's agriculture indicated the potential wealth of the colony.

b. ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN THE 18TH AND 19TH CENTURIES

At the beginning of the 18th century a number of settlements were developed in the interior of the island. The major products were cattle, sugar and tobacco. Interior development was a natural result of the shortage of further available land in the coastal areas. The western zones were the first to be colonized; the central and eastern zones remained scarcely colonized until the end of the 18th century.⁸

The original large cattle latifundia were subdivided as they were colonized for the production of cane and cacao. The increasing demand for land brought the cattle ranchers and sugar planters into opposition with the small tobacco planters, many of whom lost their land as sugar production developed.⁹

Sugar production in Cuba started in earnest around 1590, financed by Crown loans. Expansion was stimulated by the decline in sugar production in other parts of the Antilles.¹⁰

Overall economic growth was hampered by Spain's restrictive commercial policies. Chronic financial problems in the metropolis meant that Spain had to extract a particularly heavy profit from its colonies, while simultaneously its declining power meant that in some cases it was not even able to provide sufficient ships for its monopolistic trade. In addition, Spanish commercial groups concentrated on the trade with Veracruz to the detriment of other colonies. Even this trade was curtailed by the Spanish merchants' desire to keep prices high by maintaining scarcity.¹¹

The monopolistic controls exercised over the tobacco growers (Vegueros) resulted in open revolt in 1717, 1720 and 1723.¹²

In Spain the growth of capitalism produced an increased interest in colonial products and attempts were made to take the monopoly of colonial trade out of the hands of Cadiz and Seville.¹³

Four additional factors stimulated rapid development in Cuba. In 1792¹⁴ the British occupied Havana, allowing unrestricted trade in slaves and merchandise and introducing freedom of worship. In return they took back to Europe Havana cigars, soon to

become the island's most famed export. The Spanish regained control in 1763 but were unable to apply the old restrictive policies - trade was now allowed between a variety of Cuban and Spanish ports and with the British North Americas. The American Revolution, 1776 - 1783, increased the demand for Cuban products.

The final and probably most important stimulus to Cuban development was the decline of competing countries. Santo Domingo, which had reached a high point in production in 1789, rapidly ceased to be a major sugar producer. The slave revolts, led initially by Toussaint l'Ouverture, resulted in the destruction of most of the island's crops.¹⁴ The British West Indies were also declining, a decline which was speeded by Cuban competition and by the attacks of British free traders on the trading privileges of the West Indies.¹⁵

The rate of growth in the Cuban economy can be gauged from the following figures. In 1765, six ships were engaged in the trade between Spain and Cuba. By 1778 the number had grown to two hundred. The increase in sugar production was the most spectacular. In 1763 exports were less than 21,000 arrobas per annum (the arroba is 25.35 pounds). By 1841, exports were nearly thirteen million arrobas.¹⁶

The late 18th century also saw the development of coffee production. This too was stimulated by the Haitian revolution which had eliminated Haitian coffee from the world market.¹⁷

This rapid economic growth was matched by a rapid growth in population. Population in 1774 stood at 172,000 - including 76,000 coloured, of whom 44,000 were slaves.¹⁸ Many of these slaves were new arrivals - 10,000 had been imported in the nine months of British rule.¹⁹ By 1817, population had risen to 631,000, the majority of whom, by that time, were black, that is to say, 340,000, compared to 291,000 white.²⁰ Between 1792 and 1821, over 250,000 Negroes entered Havana and an additional 60,000 entered Cuba through other ports. One writer commented, "... all large fortunes existing in Havana were made by trading in human flesh."²¹

The additional white population was drawn from both Spain and the loyalist population of the mainland colonies (20,000). Thirty thousand emigres arrived from Haiti.²² The social composition of the island is especially significant in understanding why Cuba did not fight for independence with the mainland colonies.

The Haitian emigres were quick to warn the Creoles and

Peninsulares of the dangers of slave revolt, while the loyalists, "... were usually more ardent in their support of royal authority than the peninsular Spaniards themselves."²³

Cuba's late development meant that at a time when the rest of the continent was in revolt, Cuba remained relatively peaceful. The majority of the white population were not Cuban born, while the spectre of Haiti haunted those who might otherwise have turned to revolution.²⁴ This is of crucial importance, for Cuba's battle for independence was to merge with United States expansionism and to shape the whole course of Cuban history. During the 19th century, local oligarchies were establishing their power in other Latin American countries, but in Cuba, Spain still ruled. The struggles for independence which occurred in the early 19th century constituted a far more elitist affair than Cuba's Ten Year War or the subsequent War of Independence. It will become clear when we analyse the course of the Cuban independence movement that it was very different from the landlord-led and controlled independence movements on the mainland colonies. From the outset, the germs of social revolution were present in Cuba, while throughout the rest of Latin America, ten years of war had failed to radicalize the independence movements or shake the control of the land-owning oligarchy.²⁵

We should not conclude from the foregoing that Cuba in the

early 19th century was a model of social tranquillity. The events in neighbouring colonies inevitably had an effect on Cuba, where the question of independence was now at least a matter for discussion - a discussion inevitably linked to the question of slavery.²⁶

In 1792 and 1793, slave uprisings occurred on sugar plantations around Havana, Puerto Principe and Trinidad. In 1795 a revolt led by a free Negro, Nicolas Morales, swept the eastern region of the island.²⁷ The rebels demanded equality between blacks and whites and distribution of land to the poor. Of far more significance than the demands was the fact that it united the poor, regardless of colour. In this unity we can see the seeds of the force which was to form the independence movement. The poor whites found in the slave society little hope for progress, and deprived of land by the growing plantations and of manual work by the use of slaves, they had little reason to identify with the ruling groups.²⁷

While the upper class was united in its desires to retain slavery, it was divided quite clearly between the Creoles - principally Cubans of Spanish descent, and the Peninsulares - Spaniards often resident in Cuba for only a short period. The upper class Creoles were mainly landowners while the Peninsulares held a monopoly of trade. The native Creoles desired to institute trade with all countries and gain a voice in

political affairs either by the granting by Spain of autonomy, or by assimilation. That is, they desired a situation whereby Cuba would be treated as a Spanish province.²⁹ For some Cuban intellectuals and students, Cuban independence was a matter of life and death and in the course of the 19th century they were to play a major role in fighting for that independence.³⁰

The Cubans were successful in gaining some concessions from Spain. In 1817 the tobacco monopoly was ended and in 1818 they were given permission to trade under heavy duties with all nations. It is true that the Spanish also ended the slave trade, by decree, in 1817, but the slave owners were sure that the decree could be circumvented.³¹

The reforms did not satisfy all Cubans and between 1829 and 1830 a great deal of conspiratorial activity took place concerning the demand for Cuban independence. The most famous movement was the Soles y Rayos de Bolivar or the Suns and Rays of Bolivar set up by Jose Francisco Lemus, a native Cuban who had served as colonel in the Colombian army. It is significant to note that he directed most of his propaganda to poor whites and students, urging them to unite with the Negroes to fight for independence. He also reunited free Negroes with the movement and advocated the abolition of slavery.

The conspiracy rapidly spread, relying on the support Lemus had looked for, but was put down by the Spanish.³²

The next major conspiracy became known as La Escalera.³³ It was discovered in 1844 in Matanzas. The goal of the conspiracy was to launch a revolution aimed at gaining equality for blacks and whites. The discovery of the conspiracy was used as an opportunity to suppress many reform groups.

Meanwhile, technological developments had taken place which were making slavery increasingly obsolete. In 1820, the steam engine was first introduced into the sugar grinding mill.³⁴ By 1840, according to a Cuban historian, increasing mechanization was taking place with the introduction into Cuba of techniques employed in the European beet sugar industry. These had the effect of enlarging the size of the dominant mills³⁵ and reducing the demand for slave labour. At least as important in reducing slave labour were the difficulties which the British abolitionists placed in the way of the continuation of the slave trade. Having abolished slavery in their own colonies they had no interest in its maintenance by their competitors.³⁶

The increases in wage labour and the decline in slave labour encouraged the creation of the first workers' organizations.

The number of tobacco workers was increasing between 1835 and 1850, and in the same period the number of cigar makers rose from 2,000 to 15,000.³⁷ Insecurity in the industry in the fifties prompted the formation by the workers of Mutual Aid Societies. These spread from Havana to the interior of the island, and were generally open to all white workers. The free blacks formed their own Mutual Aid Societies.

In 1865, La Aurora, the first working class newspaper, was started, financed by the tobacco workers and edited by a former tobacco worker, Saturnino Martinez. Through La Aurora, one of the most significant innovations in Cuban social history was initiated - the readings in the cigar factories. The readings were a means of politically educating the tobacco workers, and when combined with La Aurora, served to inject into the Cuban working class some of the ideas currently popular in Europe and Asia. The readings were banned within a year and in May, 1868, the publication of La Aurora was suspended. Nevertheless, we can see in this period the emergence of some political consciousness among Cuban workers. Under Martinez' leadership the working class was schooled not in the ideas of class conflict but in the ideas of self-improvement and co-operation.³⁸

The intellectuals were becoming discontented. After its

secularization in 1842, the University of Havana and the few schools on the island became centers of nationalist sentiment.³⁹

Finally, the cracks in the ruling class became wider as a result of the increasing divergence of interests between the sugar planters and the peninsulares on the one hand, and the other large scale farmers. The expansion of the sugar industry, facilitated by the growth of railroads, was threatening the position of the cattle ranchers of central Cuba. Sugar industry was growing rapidly - production had risen from 50,000 tons in 1820 to 260,000 tons in 1850.⁴⁰ More serious than that was the devastation which Spain's discriminatory pricing policy had brought on the coffee growers. In 1834, in reprisal against discriminating tariffs imposed in Cuba on American flour, the United States had imposed a tariff on Cuban coffee. Cuban coffee exports fell rapidly from sixty-four million pounds in 1833 to five million pounds in 1850 and to nothing by 1860.⁴¹

Before considering the actual precipitants of the Ten Years' War we should, in order to complete the picture, examine the nature of Cuba's relationship with the United States.

c. THE UNITED STATES AND CUBA

Trade with the United States increased rapidly following

The Mexican Revolution. At times it was officially approved, at other times it took place through smuggling. Spain was not always in a position to exercise control. Its involvement in European wars meant that Cuba was reliant on the United States for basic imports.⁴² This reliance, initially a temporary phenomenon, soon became a basic feature of the Cuban economy.⁴³ The desire of the American merchants to preserve the trade with Cuba was instrumental in delaying recognition of the other Latin American republics, since they wished to avoid any action which might antagonize Spain.⁴⁴

In 1818, the Spanish decreed free trade for Cuba but imposed heavy duties on exports and imports. In spite of this, trade with the United States rapidly increased.⁴⁵ In 1851, the Consul General of Cuba in the United States reported that Cuba was, in effect, an economic colony of the United States while still governed by Spain.⁴⁶ By 1860, the distribution of exports went overwhelmingly to the United States, being divided as follows: United States, 62%; Great Britain, 22%; Spain, 3%. Spain was still the largest importer, supplying 30% of imports as against 20% each, for Britain and the United States.⁴⁷

It was particularly in this period that the United States was also penetrating the local economic structure in the merchandizing sector. United States firms became major marketers and providers of credit in the sugar and tobacco industries.⁴⁸

This economic interest of the United States naturally had political ramifications, there was a conflict between growing trade with the United States and the continued political control by Spain.

The United States began to play a significant role in Cuban politics in the early 19th century. In 1810, representatives of the planters entered into negotiations with the United States consul to explore the possibilities of annexation.⁴⁹ The planters were interested in annexation for two reasons: firstly, to preserve slavery in apparently unshakeable form by joining the southern states; secondly, to extend their freedom to trade. The fortunes and impetus of the annexation movement were similarly affected by two factors; the threat or actuality of slave revolt, and the degree of strictness of Spanish control over Cuba and Spanish resistance to reform.

The southern groups were interested in adding to the strength of the slave interests while North American merchants were anxious to extend trade and investment in Cuba. The Northern abolitionists opposed Cuban annexation since it would add to the slave owners' influence, while the general attitude of the United States' government was to wait until such a time as Cuba might fall easily into United States' hands without the dangers of war with Spain.

Fear that Spain might abolish slavery even drove the Peninsulares into the annexationist movement. The annexationists, however, suffered the same disadvantages as did the slave owners who had supported the idea of independence but had feared its results. Unless Spain would willingly give up Cuba, there was no way the peninsulares could be sure that a revolt against Spain would not result in Spain immediately freeing the slaves and using them to put down the white planters. A war with Spain could produce precisely the results which annexation was designed to avoid.⁵⁰

The United States, while waiting for a chance to gain Cuba, made every effort to prevent any change in its status. In 1825, Secretary of State Clay warned Colombia and Mexico not to support any expedition to liberate Cuba. General Jose Antonio Paez, commissioned by Bolivar to free Cuba, noted in his memoirs that United States opposition torpedoed the venture.⁵¹

In 1840 the United States officially stated, "... that in case of any attempt from whatever source to wrest from Spain this portion (Cuba) of her territory, she may depend upon the military and naval resources of the United States to aid her in preserving or regaining it."⁵²

In 1848, following the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, which concluded a profitable war with Mexico, the Polk administration initiated plans to buy Cuba.⁵³ Polk was encouraged to make this decision by the imminent possibility of a pro-annexationist planters' revolt supported by independent United States' interests, an occurrence which might endanger the whole stability of the island. Spain, however, refused United States overtures.

In the United States the dispute over Cuba became a major issue. The pro-annexationists were predominantly southern and were interested in preventing the abolition of slavery in Cuba which they felt would set a bad example, and in finding more land suitable for plantation farming and increasing the south's political power. The anti-annexationists comprised hard-headed northern business interests anxious not to embroil the United States in costly foreign adventures and to upset the political balance in the Union, as well as abolitionists and those who argued that the 'manifest destiny' of the United States did not lie in building an empire.⁵⁴

While the debate continued the annexationists acted. However, the cause of annexation was rapidly losing its appeal in Cuba. Two invasions of Cuba were launched in 1850 and 1851, supported by southern slave owning interests and a few Cuban planters, but they found little support on the island.⁵⁵

United States efforts to purchase Cuba did not cease, although following the 1850 Compromise, care had to be taken not to antagonize the north by adding another slave state. President Buchanan, however, continued to the end in his efforts to acquire Cuba from Spain 'by fair purchase', making his final statement of intent in 1860 "...with the framework of the Union crashing about his ears."⁵⁶

III.

THE BATTLE FOR INDEPENDENCE

On October 10th, 1868, the standard of revolt was raised in Oriente. The 'Grito de Yara' was proclaimed by Manuel de Cespedes and thirty-seven fellow planters.

The immediate causes of the revolt were: The failure of the reformers to gain any significant concessions from Spain, the attempt of the government to collect a newly imposed tax, and the likelihood of the imminent arrest of the conspirators.¹ For the initiators of the revolt, mainly coffee planters, the underlying cause was the restrictive trade controls which Spain exercised. However, the other social tensions which we previously discussed had some influence on the course of the war.

Significantly, the leaders of the revolt owned few slaves and they released these immediately.² Anxious to gain the support of the sugar hacendados, their proposals on slavery were modest. They proposed gradual, indemnified emancipation. In spite of this, the sugar hacendados rapidly identified with Spain. In the sugar zone of Santiago de Cuba in Oriente, they gave ten thousand pesos to the government to help in suppressing the revolution. The support of the sugar

planters and the peninsulares was crucial in enabling Spain to retain the island. They provided finances, troops and political support - few colonial powers have had such considerable local assistance. Indeed, the sugar planters had little reason to do otherwise. With the advantage of hindsight we can see the increasing obsolescence of slave labour; however, it still was of key importance for the sugar planters. In addition, they were passing through a singularly prosperous period - the price of sugar had risen from six cents to ten cents a pound.³ The Cuban sugar industry was not affected by United States' reprisals against Spain's mercantilism,⁴ while the American Civil War had resulted in the ruin of sugar production in the southern states, thereby increasing the demand for Cuban sugar.⁵

Although the Civil War had increased demand for Cuban sugar it had also made the Cuban slave owners turn against any suggestion of annexation. The new annexationists were now the coffee planters and others who saw the United States as a natural market from which they did not wish to be excluded by tariff barriers. At a convention of rebel delegates, held in April 1869 to draw up a constitution for a free Cuba, the conservative elements gained a declaration from the convention that they were fighting for annexation to the United States. Annexation was also seen as a means of keep-

ing the radical elements of the revolution under control.⁶

The forces of the Mambises, as the Cuban rebels were known, grew rapidly, their numbers increasing from 147 to 12,000 in the first month. They were poorly armed but within nine days they captured the city of Bayamo with a population of ten thousand. The main source of support came from Negroes (free and slave) and poor whites.⁷

For the purpose of this thesis the aspects of the independence struggle which concern us most are the social composition and goals of the movement. The revolutionaries in the mainland colonies had liberated the slaves and, in fact, many blacks and some Indians served in the armies.⁸ However, the Indians who formed the base of the social pyramid were not consistently involved. They fought on both sides and generally became involved by virtue of compulsion or because they followed a local leader.⁹ In fact, both Bolivar and San Martin relied on foreign volunteers for much of their leadership and their rank and file.¹⁰ Kirkpatrick actually suggests that in some cases they liberated countries against the wishes of their local population. San Martin received little thanks from Argentina - not until 1880 was he officially honoured.¹²

In contrast, the Cuban War of Independence was more akin to what we now term a 'people's war'. Relying on mass support and mass involvement, the rebels had to defeat far heavier Spanish opposition than had their mainland counterparts. Guerilla warfare had been used in the mainland revolutions but it was not the major tactic. In contrast, shortage of arms and the influx of vast Spanish armies forced the Cuban rebels to rely, consistently, on guerilla warfare. In 1868, as in 1968, this demanded popular support. It was already 'the war of the flea', involving confinement of the enemy to the cities, attacks on his supply routes, and harrassment of his advance guards and his outposts.13

The failure of Cespedes and the other coffee planters to gain support from the sugar planters combined with growing rank and file pressure, led to a radicalization of the movement.

The 'glorious revolution' of 1868 which brought a liberal government to power in Spain gave the Cuban reformers new hopes. The Spanish removed the reactionary Lersundi from his position as Governor of the island and appointed the liberal, Dulce, who was on good terms with the Creole reformers. Dulce attempted to bring about a series of

reforms; however, his policy was thwarted by the pro-Spanish party which had reactivated the 'volunteers' - a para-military organization which policed the towns, freeing the regular army for action in the countryside. The volunteers were led by members of the island's oligarchy, merchants and large land-owners, and largely manned by Spanish immigrants who had come to Cuba as adventurers seeking to make money. They numbered from 40,000 to 73,000.¹⁴ Philip Foner, who has written the most complete English language account of the independence struggle, categorized the pro-Spanish forces as "... the clergy (with some notable exceptions), the contractors, the bureaucracy, the well-to-do merchants, the bankers, the sugar factors, the dealers in slaves, and the majority of the great slave-owning sugar planters who held the best land in Cuba."¹⁵ In effect, the privileged class of Cuban society.

The intransigence of the volunteers was supported in Spain by merchants anxious to retain their Cuban profits. The volunteers systematically persecuted anyone they suspected of having sympathies with the rebels. Within a year they had forced Dulce to leave the island and had driven many reformers over to the side of the rebels.¹⁶ Their actions meant that there would be no compromise.

The forces of the Mambises were torn by dissension.

There evolved a split which reflected the social composition of the movement. On the one side were the aristocratic planters such as Cespedes who intended, as had the mainland planters, to gain independence without social revolution.¹⁷ On the other side were the rank and file and leaders such as Antonio Maceo, son of a slave, and Maximo Gomez, a Dominican exile, who had entered the war to fight for an end to Negro slavery and soon combined this with a fight against general social injustice.¹⁸ During the first year the conservatives had the upper hand. In November 1868, Cespedes declared the death penalty for those who encouraged slave revolts and desertions. Slavery was to be abolished, but gradually.¹⁹ In spite of this, Maceo, who rose rapidly to the rank of Lieutenant Colonel in the Liberating Army, liberated slaves whenever he captured a sugar mill.²⁰

By late 1869 the radical elements had won two major concessions. In October, Cespedes declared the destruction of the cane fields on the island. In November, he finally approved the practice of urging the plantation slaves to revolt.²¹ Military considerations were combined with popular pressure to produce these changes in policy. The sugar planters had continued to support the government financially and politically, while the rebel army could

rely on the freed blacks to swell its ranks. The delay in making these two decisions had been crucial, for while the rebels had taken the Spanish by surprise in 1868, by 1869, the Spanish had had time to reinforce their Cuban garrison. In addition, some demoralization had taken place in the rebel army because of delays in abolishing slavery. Had the proclamation occurred a year earlier, the sugar planters would have been unable to provide such considerable support to the Spanish, while many more slaves might have fled from the west of the island to support the rebels.²²

These decisions did not mean that unity had now been achieved. Not until 1875 did Maximo Gomez carry the war into the western regions and when he did so it was in the face of official objections.

The basic division between the conservatives and the radicals within the movement must be held responsible for the ultimate failure of the Ten Years War. In 1875 Gomez was pushing into the west and creating havoc in what had been the major strong point of the Spanish and the peninsulares. The new President of the revolutionary government, Cisneros, gave orders that troops were to be sent to Gomez so that he could proceed from Las Villas into Matanzas and Havana. At this point the Secretary of War

in the revolutionary government, Vincente Garcia, renounced his allegiance to the revolutionary government and called a conference of dissatisfied elements. This had the effect of pulling many of the troops out of the field and ending the push westwards. Garcia attracted both radical and conservative support, attacking the Cisneros government for being too mild and at the same time condemning Gomez' policy of putting the torch to the western regions.

The conservatives, in spite of their success in moderating the pace and policies of the war, did not achieve either the neutralization of the rich hacendados or receive any funds from rich Cuban emigres in the United States. The main foreign support for the revolution came from the tobacco workers in Tampa and Key West. A further adverse result of the conservative's actions was the growth of racism in the rebel army, particularly directed against Maceo, who was accused of wanting to create a black dominated republic. In 1875, soldiers in Las Villas refused his leadership and in 1876 Maceo found it necessary to write to the President of the republic, officially refuting the charges.

In September of 1876 Gomez was forced out of command in Las Villas, ending any hopes of a push to the west. In

the spring of 1877, the Spanish moved into the offensive. The war was in its closing stages. On February 11th, 1878, following heavy rebel losses, the Pacto del Zanjón was signed. Its major provisions were amnesty and freedom for slaves who had joined the rebel armies. The two major goals, independence and the abolition of slavery, were not met.

Maceo rejected the peace terms and renewed the war against Spain but, hopelessly outnumbered, the remaining rebels were forced to surrender, having first sent Maceo abroad. The Protest of Baragua, as it became known, was, nevertheless, of major importance in restoring Cuban pride and faith in some of the revolutionary leadership and in ensuring that the Pacto del Zanjón would remain no more than an uneasy truce.²³

The major cause for the rebels' failure was undoubtedly internal dissension, but we should not overlook the role played by the United States during the war.

a. UNITED STATES POLICY AND CUBAN INDEPENDENCE

The recognition of Cuban belligerency by the United States would have allowed the free shipment of arms and

ammunition to Cuba and weakened the legitimacy of the Spanish position. Recognition of belligerency was supported by a majority of Americans and by the Congress.²⁴ Secretary of State Fish successfully blocked recognition and gave more positive aid to Spain. He ordered the release of thirty gunboats to the Spanish navy which joined the Cuban blockade, and prevented expeditions in support of the rebels from leaving. Fish's main reason for opposition to the recognition of belligerency appears to have been a combination of racial prejudice and a desire for eventual American control.²⁵ American business interests which had Cuban connections, supported Fish's policy.²⁶

Cuban independence had the support of other Latin American governments and, in 1872, Colombia proposed a scheme whereby they, in conjunction with the United States, would intervene with Spain for the independence of Cuba and, if necessary, pay an indemnity to Spain. Fish torpedoed the scheme.²⁷ Throughout the Ten Years War the United States government remained unhelpful to the cause of Cuban independence.

Before considering the final outbreak of the War of Independence, we should consider the major developments

which took place in Cuba. These were the extension and mechanization of the sugar industry, and, going hand in hand with this, the decline in slave labour and growth in American investment. Finally, we must consider the continued proletarianization of the Cuban independence forces and the birth of an incipient working class movement.

b. THE TRIUMPH OF THE SUGAR MONOCULTURE

The sugar landlords in general had survived the Ten Years War remarkably well. Some Spanish landlords had become indebted to American shipping merchants who later foreclosed.¹ But the industry as a whole moved inexorably on, production rose from 223,000 tons in 1850 to 1,000,000 tons in 1894, while in the same period the number of mills fell from 2,000 to 207.²

This concentration in the sugar industry was prompted by the process of mechanization we mentioned earlier. Mills which were slow to adopt the new techniques were put out of business. In addition, many of the new techniques demanded large scale production while the smaller firms could not obtain the capital to modernize. The demand for capital naturally

favoured those firms who had links with American interests.³ The spread of railroads made competition national in scope. The sugar centrales, anxious to secure their source of supplies, produced a new social stratum in the Cuban countryside, the colonos. The colono was a small farmer producing sugar but without independent marketing or grinding facilities. The large centrales gained control of the colonos either by economic domination via credit or exclusive buyer contracts, or by buying the colono's land outright.⁴ By 1887, thirty-five to forty percent of Cuba's crop was manufactured under the colono system.⁵

Changes in the world market necessitated greater efficiency and lower costs in Cuba. Competition from European beetsugar and Hawaiian cane sugar combined with the formation of an American sugar trust, the American Sugar Refining Company, lowered the price of Cuban sugar. The price fell by seventy percent, from 1877 to 1894.⁶

The technological and market imperatives had social consequences. Guerra y Sanchez argues that Cuba's relatively slow development had provided an opportunity for the development of a Cuban national identity but that the growth of large plantation agriculture threatened this.⁷ Eric Williams writes "By 1860 we read

of 'monster' plantations in Cuba, the largest comprising 11,000 acres, of which over one tenth was in cane employing 866 slaves and producing 2,670 tons of sugar a year."⁸ Fernando Ortiz, the undoubted authority on the subject, also dates the domination of the latifundium around the end of the Ten Years War and he indicates a point that, for this study, is of great importance, that sugar expansion resulted in the proletarianization of parts of the white agricultural society and extended control and interest of the few powerful owners.⁹

In 1862, 365,000 free Cubans ran their own 'squatter' farms, as many Cubans as were employed by the sugar mills, cattle raising and tobacco farms and coffee plantations combined.¹⁰ The continued development of the sugar industry threatened the livelihood of many white Cubans, forcing some into unemployment and others into total dependency upon the large sugar mills. By 1887, thirty-five to forty per cent of Cuba's sugar crop was grown under the colono system.¹¹ Mao Tse Tung, in analysing the class forces in Chinese society commented that among those whom he defines as the petty bourgeoisie; owners, peasants, master handicraftsmen and the petty intellectuals - the most revolutionary group would be those, "... who belonged ... to the so-called prosperous families in the past (who) are going through a gradual change in their condition ... are

now going downhill with every passing year ... spiritually they suffer very much because they have in mind the contrast between past and present. Such people are quite important in the revolutionary movement, constitute a mass following of no small number and form the left wing of the petty bourgeoisie."¹²

The decline in demand for slave labour, which had been caused by mechanization, continued, and in the face of this and abolitionist pressure, slavery was terminated in 1836. The blacks remained, however, second class citizens; the white establishment and its political parties, the Autonomists and the Conservatives were overtly racist.¹³

American penetration was not confined to sugar. Harry Magdoff has noted that the late 19th century was marked by a drive in the advanced capitalist countries to gain control over raw material supplies.¹⁴ Cuba was no exception. American corporations rapidly came to have a monopoly in mining. The Bethlehem Steel Company was prominent and had a particular interest in manganese, which was in short supply.¹⁵

In 1895, Richard Olney, United States Secretary of State, estimated United States investment in Cuba stood

at fifty million dollars.¹⁶ However, in this period American control was not complete. British, German and French merchant bankers competed for trade with Americans, and the British owned many enterprises.¹⁷ The most important item of American control was the sugar market; America consumed between 75% and 80% of Cuba's sugar output.¹⁸ America was also Cuba's major tobacco customer and, in return, between 1887 and 1897, Cuba purchased about one-fifteenth of America's exports. The McKinley Tariff of 1890 introduced elements of reciprocity and removed the duty on raw sugar. It was attacked by Marti on the grounds that it facilitated dumping of United States surpluses in Latin America and increased Cuban dependency on the American sugar market. By raising the tariff on refined sugar to protect American refiners, and on tobacco, the Act compelled many Cuban refineries to close down and ruined the American market for all but high grade tobaccos. This had the effect of intensifying Cuba's monoculture and perpetuating a primary production economy.¹⁹

Cuba's relationship with America is important both in understanding the outbreak of the War of Independence in 1895 and American policy toward that war. In 1893, the world depression began. In 1894 the Wilson-Gomez tariff imposed a forty per cent duty on raw sugar which wiped out Cuba's advantage in the American sugar market. The value

Of Cuban sugar exports fell by one third. In retaliation, Spain imposed discriminatory duties on American imports to Cuba. The effect was to restore the position of Spanish merchants and to raise prices in Cuba.⁴⁷ Dissatisfaction with colonialism was now generalized. When we review the War of Independence and subsequent Cuban-American relations we will find eloquent testimony of the impact that United States' investment and trade had on United States' 'diplomacy'.

c. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE CUBAN WORKING CLASS

Poor whites in Cuba suffered not only from the expansion of the Cuban sugar industry but also from the fluctuating cost of living and the economic insecurity of the colonial economy.⁴⁸ A tariff war waged by Spain against the United States, in an attempt to recapture a larger portion of the Cuban trade, culminated in 1883 with the 'near ruin' of the Cuban economy.⁴⁹ At the same time price decline in the American sugar market added to Cuba's depressed economic conditions. While sugar production rose, prices continued to decline. The price of duty-paid raw sugar in New York fell from ten cents per pound in 1870 to 5.9 cents per pound in 1884 and to 3.2 cents per pound in 1894.⁵⁰

Charles Page correctly notes in his history of Cuban labour that the spread of radical ideology and class consciousness among the Cuban working class by its leaders took place "... while ... the workers were learning pragmatically from the ever worsening economic conditions."⁵¹ In these circumstances it is not surprising that the workers rejected the moderate reformism of Saturnino Martinez and adopted the revolutionary views of the new generation of leaders, the anarcho-syndicalists.

Saturnino Martinez first came to prominence as editor of La Aurora, founded before the Ten Years War. His reformist leadership of the Cuban labour movement was unchallenged for twenty years but, writes Page, "... his tangible accomplishments were negligible." In 1885 the Circulo de Trabajadores was founded in Havana by anarcho-syndicalists, and in 1887 they started their own paper, El Productor. They demanded not only national liberation but also social revolution. The movement had links with European and American anarchists and during the War of Independence, Italian and Spanish anarchists collaborated with the Cuban rebels.⁵² During the 1870's, guilds had begun to appear in many trades across the island. Among those who formed guilds were the coopers, cobblers, carpenters,

bricklayers bakers and portworkers.⁵³ Labour militancy increased and action seems to have been oriented not so much to improving labour's position as to maintaining it in the face of increasing deprivation. As we would expect, economic insecurity and 'relative deprivation' produced a response from those affected. In 1882, tailors in Havana struck in an effort to resist a wage cut. In 1883, in an attempt to evade the consequences of inflation, labour organizations in Havana demanded payment in gold.⁵⁴

The early labour movement did not find its operations easy. The importation of strike breakers was common; a carter's strike was broken by troops, and bakers who had struck for higher wages were imprisoned. The headquarters of the Circulo de Trabajadores, were continually raided by the police.⁵⁵ Under the 1879 penal code, Unionists could be prosecuted either under Article 260 for disturbing the 'public peace' or under Article 567 for conspiring 'to increase or lower wages excessively'.

In spite of this the unions continued to grow. In 1892, the Circulo de Trabajadores convened the first National Workers' Congress. The congress was indicative of the increased development of the Cuban labour movement, and marked the decisive triumph of the revolutionary views

of the anarcho-syndicalists.⁵⁶ By 1899, Martinez' portrait had been turned to the wall of the tobacco workers' hall while he himself had become secretary of the official Chamber of Commerce.⁵⁹ One thousand delegates attended the conference in 1892. They came mainly from Havana, but there was also representation from Pinar del Rio, Matanzas, Santa Clara, Cienfuegos, Puerto Principe and Santiago de Cuba. The conference was in clear defiance of Article 567 of the Penal Code of 1879, and within five days the leaders were arrested, but not before they passed the following resolution:

- "(1) The Congress recognises that the working class cannot emancipate itself unless it adopts the ideas of revolutionary socialism, and therefore urges the Cuban workers to study and adopt its principles.
- (2) The preceding statement can be no obstacle to the triumph of the aspirations for liberty of the Cuban people, because it would be absurd that the man who aspires to individual liberty should oppose the liberty to which the Cuban people aspire, although that liberty might only be relative and consist in freedom from the yoke of another people."⁵⁸

Page notes that "... the formative period of the labour movement in Cuba, from 1865-1902 ... is of less importance in organizational achievement than in the education and advancement of the Cuban working class along lines of class consciousness."⁵⁹ It is our point that an understanding of the character of the War of Independence cannot be gained unless the ideology and condition of the Cuban working class

ia acknowledged. In our discussion of the development of the Cuban revolutionary party we will see that labour militancy was not confined to Cuba and that the emigre tobacco workers provided the key financial base for the launching of the Cuban revolution. First, however, we should touch briefly on the role and character of Jose Marti, the son of a Spanish army sergeant stationed in Cuba, who was exiled in 1869 at the age of sixteen for his part in publishing a patriotic newspaper and who was rapidly to become the leader of the Cuban independence movement.

d. JOSE MARTI

Marti played the crucial role in bringing together the diverse branches of the revolutionary movement in Cuba and outside. The Pact of Zanjón had brought to a close the Ten Years' War but it had not brought peace to the island. The Pact had promised political rights to Cubans equal to those enjoyed by Puerto Rico - which the Cubans were told were similar to those enjoyed by the provinces of Spain. It did not take long for the Cubans to find out that Puerto Rico was still legally in a state of siege.

The Spanish Governor, Martinez Campos, advised Madrid,

"It must be emphasized: the inhabitants of this province wish to be a province and I am here recording their complaints - which today they present in a calm voice and which tomorrow they may demand too loudly and violently."60

The warning fell on deaf ears; an underground movement spread throughout the island."Over and above local pride, there were certain lessons learned from the past war, principally the lesson that a merely regional movement was too vulnerable. The effectiveness of a future war would depend upon its being a simultaneous rebellion throughout the whole island."61 The underground movement made steady progress. In August 1879, uprisings took place in Oriente and the central part of the island, but they were quickly put down.

Martí learned the lessons of the past well - any future war must be well prepared and well led. He, more than any other figure, was to provide this leadership and preparation.

Comparable with Bolívar, as a Latin American figure, Martí is a classic example of the Latin American pensador. A man of profound thought and dynamic action, he was equally skilled as an essayist, pamphleteer, orator and organizer. In 1875, he returned from exile to join his family, now in

Mexico. In 1877 he made a brief visit to Cuba; returning in 1878 he became actively involved in politics as an advocate of independence rather than assimilation to Spain. After the risings of August 1879 he was sent to Spain under 'surveillance'. He left Spain for the United States in 1881 and engaged himself in the work of the Cuban Revolutionary Junta, established by General Garcia three months after the signing of the Pact of Zanjon.

During the course of the Ten Years War nationalism had increased. Cubans now had heroes and martyrs. A Cuban writes of one such occasion,

"The murder of the students (by volunteers in November 1871) gave to patriotic Cubans the unique value of symbol and precedent which martyrdom always gives to a cause. The circumstances of that sacrifice - the youth of the victims, the fact that they were students, the monstrous disparity between the alleged offense and the punishment meted out, the violent and fanatical conduct of the volunteers and the spineless complicity of the Insular government - made November 27th the sacred symbol of Cuba."⁶²

Maceo's refusal to accept the Pact of Zanjon had rescued patriotism from defeat, but it was under Marti's leadership that Cuban nationalism was to mature.

When Calixto Garcia left New York for Cuba to give support to the rebellion which had been flaring more or

less openly since 1879, Marti became acting president of the Revolutionary Junta. Marti was only twenty-eight years of age. After Garcia's defeat, Marti wrote to another revolutionary leader, Emilio Nunez, giving him permission to surrender. He wrote in part, "Men like you and me must desire for our land a radical and solemn redemption imposed, if necessary and possible, today, tomorrow and always, by force."⁶³

Patience was essential. The movement in Cuba was weak and the initiative was now in the hands of the reformists or autonomists who wished to persuade Spain to concede some limited freedoms. Marti had no confidence in their methods but realized that at this stage the revolutionary forces could not act, before the next war, reformism had once again to prove its impotence. In New York he rapidly became a public figure. After a speech commemorating the centennial of Bolivia, one of his biographers wrote, "From that time on Marti became in New York something more than the living symbol of Cuba ... he was the incarnation of what he himself would sacramentally call 'Our America'."⁶⁴

Marti's American vision was broadened by his stays in Venezuela, Mexico and Guatamala, but his pan-Americanism

was of a different brand than that popular in the United States. When in 1881, Senator Hawley said "And when we have taken Canada and Mexico and we reign without rivals on the continent, what kind of civilization will we come to have in the future?". Marti replied in the Venezuelan paper, La Opinion Nacional, "A terrible one indeed - that of Carthage."⁶⁵ A.M. Hennessey is one of the few western academics who recognizes the importance of Marti in later Cuban developments. Not only did Marti's visionary utopia of a new independent Cuba contrast harshly with American occupation and later subserviency but in his character and ideas, he fired Cuban revolutionaries for the next sixty years. Hennessey, by no means a communist sympathizer, writes perceptively.

"Castro sees himself as a disciple who undertakes the second liberation of Latin America which the 'Apostle' had preached. 'I carry in my heart the teachings of the Master' he said in his History Will Absolve Me speech of 1953 in which he also described Marti as the 'instigator of the 26th July' ... Even the landing from the Gramma on an isolated part of the south coast of Oriente was a replica of Marti's landing in 1895. Castro cast himself in a role inspired by Marti's belief in the supreme importance of the individual leader."⁶⁶

The Cuban leaders still claim direct links with Marti. In Havana his photographs, portraits, statues and books

abound. His works are read in all schools, his name mentioned on many revolutionary occasions and while the analysts of Marti's ideas may dispute his ideological affinity to Castroism, there is no doubt that for many Cubans he provides a significant link between Castro's advocacy of continental revolution today and the authentic history of Cuban nationalism.

Jorge Manach writes a fitting conclusion in the epilogue to his biography of Marti:

"With the Spanish power ended on the island, the military occupation by the United States, over the protests of patriotic Cubans, appeared to throw over the destiny of Cuba the shadows which Marti had with foreseeing earnestness wished to ward off ... Marti's ideal did not consent to mutilations. It continued to live and to give sustenance to new Cuban generations."67

e. THE VANGUARD PARTY

On January 5, 1892, El Partido Revolucionario Cubano, led by Marti, came into existence in New York. Marti immediately sought approval for the new party from all the emigre clubs. In March, a newspaper, Patria was launched. By September, Marti felt strong enough to offer Maximo Gomez the military leadership.

In 1884, Marti had split with Gomez because of the latter's dictatorial attitude and his demand for control by the military over the revolt. The controversy over civilian or military leadership (curiously paralleled in Latin America today) was resolved by Marti's success in building a civilian party and by the entrusting of full military command to Gomez. A year later, Maceo was approached in Costa Rica where he was leading a colony of Cubans. He too accepted Marti's offer of a prominent role in the revolution.

Finally, Marti took pains to establish a co-ordinated underground in Cuba itself. "Thus", writes one historian, "Jose Marti demonstrated again and again that he could supply the organizational qualities so painfully lacking in the previous efforts."⁶⁸

f. THE WAR OF INDEPENDENCE

Gomez gave the order to the rebels to be ready by February 1894 but delays on the island, where the rich mill owners were pleading for time to harvest and grind the sugar before any rebellion should start, slowed the commencement. The rebels were further delayed in January

1895 when, following an official Spanish protest to Washington, the rebels equipment in the United States was confiscated.⁶⁹ The rebels lost \$58,000 of war materials, the result of three years preparation. However, so impressed were the emigres with the scale of organization and equipment undiscovered until January, that the tobacco workers in Key West and Tampa quickly raised \$5,573 and a further \$2,000 was borrowed from the President of Santo Domingo, who supported the rebellion.

New supplies were quickly gathered and Maceo and the party from Costa Rica landed in Cuba on the 31st of March.⁷⁰ The previous month, the rebels' standard had been raised at Baire by General Bartolome Maso, a rich hacendado, and a black, General Guillermo Moncada, both veterans of the Ten Years' War. On April 11th, Gomez and Marti landed from the Dominican Republic.

The outbreak of revolt can have come as no surprise to the Spanish. The Peace of Zanjón had become, at best, an uneasy truce. A woman visitor in 1887 to the leading American sugar estate of Edwin Atkins observed that

everyone travelled with rifle and pistols, and that the place was surrounded by armed guards.⁷¹ There had been periodic outbreaks of fighting since 1877. It is perhaps useful to recall the intensity of the Ten Years' War to set the stage for what is to come. Fifty thousand Cubans and perhaps as many as 208,000 Spaniards had lost their lives.⁷² The war had cost Spain Three million dollars for which it billed Cuba, and a total of seven million dollars of damage had been done in Cuba.

In the next four years General Weyler was to set new records of brutality. The Cuban War of Independence has been compared to the later colonial wars of Algeria and Viet Nam.⁷³ Coming at a time of growing American involvement abroad and at a time when Cuba was far more advanced than the Spanish colonies of the early 19th century, inevitably the war bore little resemblance to those earlier Latin American struggles.

Martí was killed in his first battle on May 19th. Estrada Palma temporarily took Martí's place as head of the Cuban revolutionary party. When we discuss his role as first president of the new Cuban republic, it will be ap-

parent that he did not share Marti's anti-imperialist fervour.

Gomez and Maceo fought on and quickly put the Spanish forces on the defensive. By January 1897, Gomez was encamped in Marianao, just outside Havana. The whole island was in arms. At this stage, 'butcher' Weyler was sent over to replace Martinez Campos. Weyler led 200,000 Spanish troops, the local militia and, of course, the ever faithful voluntarios. Recognizing, like his modern counterparts, the disadvantages of a hostile population, Weyler introduced strategic hamlets - campos de reconcentracion. While these had little effect in endearing Weyler to the Cubans, they were instrumental, along with other measures, in killing some 250,000 to 350,000 Cubans.⁷⁴

On December 7th, 1896, the rebel forces suffered a major setback. Maceo was shot in the back and killed while reviewing his troops only eighteen miles from Havana. In an attempt to save Maceo's body, Gomez's son, Francisco, was also killed. The rebels suffered heavily from the loss of morale. However, by the following June, Gomez had overcome these setbacks and routed the Spaniards at Saratoga.

More important than the count of the actual battles

fought is an understanding of the nature of that war. It is best summed up by Armando Hart, a member of the central committee of the Cuban Communist Party. In 1962, in a dedication to Maceo, he said,

"The greatness and profundity of our revolutionary movement today ... derives from a series of historical situations which are to be found in great part in the character of the struggles for independence and in the process of national formation in our country. The fact that we were the last colony that liberated itself from Spanish domination, forced us to develop a larger struggle, in which social conditions matured and historical situations emerged. The struggle for the independence of Cuba was influenced by the struggle against the expansion of the United States. The other liberation movements against the colonial bond in Latin America were not influenced by this anti-imperialism ... For the whole length of our war of independence, there was present as a threatening reality the possibility of falling into the bowels of the American monster."⁷⁵

It is instructive to draw a comparison with the American war against the British. The Cubans had no powerful friends, their supplies were either sneaked through the Spanish and American coast guards or came from inside the island. Havana's prostitutes collected in cartridges, not money, from the Spanish soldiers and sent them east.⁷⁶ An American, Carleton Beals, wrote:

"The Cuban struggle represents a much more brilliant, arduous and self-sacrificing effort than our own revolution. The Spanish royal forces were far more overwhelming. Whole regiments of so-called American patriots threatened to return home unless their back wages were fully paid up

and they received cash bonus for re-enlistment. The Cuban patriots fought the war without pay. Far more resources and abnegation were needed than to achieve our own freedom."77

The Cuban revolutionaries did not have a clear field on the island. The rich Creoles again raised the spectre of black tyranny. In fact, a majority of the troops may have been black,78 which gives some indication of the social composition of the army. The name given the rebels - mambises - was of African origin.79 Many mill owners continued grinding despite the orders that only those paying taxes to the independence forces could do so. As a result, Gomez' march west was a blaze of burning haciendas. In Cuba, with its population of 1,570,000, the Spanish had twice as many troops (218,000) as they had had in the whole of mainland Latin America during the War of Independence there.80

g. HUMANISM OR IMPERIALISM?

"In the name of humanity, in the name of civilization, in behalf of endangered American interests which give us the right and the duty to speak and to act, the war in Cuba must stop."

- McKinley's message to Congress,
April 11, 1898. 81

"While we are conducting the war and until its conclusion, we must keep all we get; when the war is over, we must keep what we want."

- McKinley during the course of the war.⁸²

A great deal has been written on the United States intervention in Cuba by those who, like Ambassador Harry F. Guggenheim, believe that "American intervention gave Cuba its independence"⁸³ and by those who, like William Appleman Williams, view history from a more realistic perspective.

There is not sufficient space here thoroughly to investigate and recount the controversy, but even Guggenheim conceded that the United States had an economic interest in terminating the conflict between Spain and Cuba. The controversy may, in large part, reflect a division of opinion in the United States itself. Among the general public in the United States, there was a great deal of sympathy for the cause of Cuban independence and outrage at the savagery with which Cuban patriots were treated. Among upper class Americans there was scepticism about the ability of the Cubans to govern themselves and fear about the safety of Cuban investments and trade.⁸⁴ Initially the sugar interests urged against recognition of belligerency.⁸⁵ However, as the war developed it became clear that the United States could not protect its interests merely by abstaining.

Edward Atkins, owner of the Soledad, the largest sugar plantation on the island, urged his friend, United States Secretary of State Richard Olney, not to recognize belligerency since this would absolve the Spanish from protecting American property. Some thought the solution still lay in annexation. Tentative efforts at purchase were made, but Cleveland thought the solution lay in Spain's retaining control, but conceding sufficient reforms to restore peace. Henry Clews, a frequent correspondent of the President, declared against American annexation: "We really gain all the advantages through existing trade relations."⁸⁶

The Cubans were also divided. Maceo wrote to Estrada Palma, head of the Cuban junta in New York: "As everybody is interested in the fastest termination of the war, I see in the public papers that it is being discussed if the United States should intervene in this war or not, and suspecting that you, inspired by reasons and motives of patriotism are working without rest to advance the Cuban cause as much as you can, I venture to tell you that we do not need such intervention in order to triumph in a more or less rapid time, and if we want to reduce this time, send to Cuba 25 or 30 thousand rifles and a million

bullets in one or two expeditions."87 Estrada Palma was not, however, so clear cut in his approach - which may be why he became so acceptable as first President of the new republic.

However, initially, there was little chance of American intervention against Spain. "During the first year of the war, the administration can be said to have made a fair trial insofar as it could, of helping Spain to smother the insurrection."88 But, in spite of this and the fact that the Spanish Minister at Washington told the State Department that the rebels were "mere bandits already in flight"89, the revolt continued - to America's continuing cost.

The cost to the American government from loss of customs revenue, the patrolling of the United States coast against Cuban expeditionaries, and the investigations and representations on behalf of injured United States citizens - or Cubans who claimed United States citizenship - ran into several million dollars; a considerable sum considering the size of the federal budget at the time.

In spite of press campaigns and vote-catching politicians, Cleveland managed to stem the tide for

recognition of Cuban belligerency and active aid to the rebels. In 1897, McKinley became President. Cleveland, in his final annual message to Congress in December 1896, had demanded a cessation of the war in Cuba and the granting of autonomy to the Cubans. He warned that if this was not done, America might intervene to protect its interests on the island. Olney, in his 1896 report, backed up this position. This stand, writes one historian, "contributed to the causes of the war in 1898: they (Olney and Cleveland) emphasized the involvement of American material interests and provided a rationale for the right to use force, if necessary, to protect these interests."⁹⁰

The Republican platform, headed by McKinley, had promised a more militant Cuban policy. The Democratic platform had extended 'sympathy' to the Cubans. The Republicans had said that the United States should "actively use its influence and good offices" in obtaining independence for the Cubans.⁹¹ The Republicans were also committed to restoring prosperity to an economy still shaky after the 1893 depression. To do this, healthy trade must be restored, and the damage to American investments in Cuba ended.

Two books, which are milestones in the recording of Cuban history, written in the mid-1920's, emphasize the role of popular feeling in beginning the war. Jenks wrote, "If ever there was a war which the people of a country, as distinguished from their political and business leaders, demanded, it was the war which the United States began, April 21st, 1898."⁹² Beals emphasizes the role of the press, particularly the Hearst press, in whipping up popular fervour - and, of course, selling newspapers.

Undoubtedly, these were both factors, but later studies have tended to emphasize other points. Referring to the six month period following McKinley's accession, La Feber writes: "It should be especially noted that neither the yellow journals nor a towering wave of public opinion, so often viewed as the sole causes of the ultimate war, significantly influenced the administration's policies during these months."⁹³ This period culminated in the sending of instructions to Woodford, United States' minister in Spain, which amounted to a declaration of no-confidence in Spain's abilities to regain control of the island. The statement noted American involvement by virtue of the threat the struggle posed to United

States' prosperity and carried an ultimatum that if Spain could not end the war, the United States would have to intervene.

Any attempt to explain United States' involvement must, without a study that would itself be of thesis length, be open to correction, but I will attempt to summarize what seem to have been the major factors. There were a number of specific reasons underlying United States' intervention in Cuba but it is important first to set the stage.

The last thirty years of the 19th century saw large-scale mechanization which took place hand in hand with the concentration of the industries affected, primarily steel, electricity, industrial chemistry and oil.⁹⁴ Magdoff comments "The new industries, the new technology and the rise of competition among industrialized nations gave a new importance to the role of raw materials"; this created a "... pressure to gain control over distant territories whose value assumed new relevance."⁹⁵ While the pursuit of raw material resources was no doubt the most important ingredient of the early imperialist phase, the United States had additional reasons for expansion.

The exploration and occupation of the United States was almost complete. Industry now saw new markets for its goods and new investment opportunities.⁹⁶

The desire to control raw material sources, to find new avenues of investment and to build up foreign markets, fitted well together, for what was ultimately necessary was that business should be able to exercise the same kind of political pressure abroad as it could do at home. What better way than to become the major investor in a foreign country?

Investment not only secured raw material sources, it increased the market for the investing country's exports.

For example, the export of capital for railways stimulated the demand for rails, locomotives railway cars and other products of the iron steel and machine industry.⁹⁷ The foreign interests created by this investment can, in turn, use their influence to control the market by obtaining protective tariffs and other barriers against outside competition.⁹⁸

The major target for United States expansion was Latin America. Cuba had received a higher proportion of United States' investment than any other Latin American country.

In addition, the United States had a special interest in the Caribbean. There were a number of specific reasons which prompted United States' intervention:

- (a) the desire for the normalization of trade with Cuba and protection of United States' investments;

- (b) an interest in acquiring the Philippines as a base for winning a predominant share in the markets of China. As Senator Teller put it, Americans would not take Cuba "... whatever we may do as to some other islands."⁹⁹ The treaty signed in Paris in 1898, which concluded the brief Spanish-American war, gave to the United States all that Senator Teller might have asked. The Philippines, Guam and Puerto Rico passed into American possession and Cuba came under American protection. Ostensible humanitarian interest and defense of American dignity had enabled America to "... realize its old ambitions of transforming the Caribbean into a United States' lake and of having its strategic base in the East."¹⁰⁰ The strategic value of the Philippines was not merely military.

"... they represented to the United States what Hong Kong did to England."¹⁰¹

- (c) a desire to emphasize United States' prerogatives in the continent and to ensure against European intervention.¹⁰² To be sure, this latter point should not be exaggerated for few Americans actually thought any European power could step into Spain's shoes. Nevertheless, to maintain this American supremacy on the continent, America had intervened in 1895 in the border dispute between Venezuela and British Guiana. The Americans forced the British to back down and divide the disputed territory with Venezuela. Secretary of State Olney issued an ultimatum to the British in which he stated in part, "Today the United States is practically sovereign on this continent and its fiat is law upon the subjects to which its confines its interposition."¹⁰³ McKinley's 1896 election platform reflected the expansionist mood of the times. It called for American control of the Hawaiian Islands, an American canal across Nicaragua, purchase of the Dutch West Indies, reaffirmation of the Monroe Doctrine and the eventual withdrawal of European powers

from the hemisphere.104

(d) popular pressure stimulated by the 'yellow press'.

Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, on March 21, 1898, sent a message to McKinley in which he stated, "... if the war in Cuba drags on through the summer with nothing done we should go down to the greatest defeat ever known before the cry 'Why have you not settled the Cuban question?'"105 The circulation of the Journal, nearly defunct when William Randolph Hearst bought it, rose to nearly a million. Hearst "boasted he spent a cool million on the Journal to bring on war."106 The reconcentration policy and brutality of General Weyler lent much to popular indignation in the United States. It should be noted that the rebels, for their own reasons, were attempting to destroy the island's prosperity and therefore were a factor in creating the widespread disease and starvation. This, they believed, would encourage popular militancy and make Cuba increasingly unprofitable for Spain.

(e) a growth in jingoism, not only of the masses but of important officials. Jenks describes Theodore Roose-

velt, then Assistant Secretary of the United States' Navy, as having "a state of mind bordering upon the pathological", and quotes from one of Roosevelt's highly praised speeches in 1897, "... we feel that no national life is worth having if the nation is not willing, when the need shall arise, to stake everything on the supreme arbitrament of war, and to pour out its blood, its treasures and tears like water rather than submit to the loss of honour and renown."¹⁰⁷

In November 1897, Roosevelt had shown his mettle by usurping the powers of his superiors and ordering Commodore George Dewey to stand ready to take the Philippines. The order was never countermanded by the McKinley administration. The jingoism, however, should be seen as effect rather than cause of American policies. While, no doubt, many American leaders themselves believed in America's 'manifest destiny' it must, like 'the white man's burden', be treated as an elaborate rationalization.

(f) mixed business pressures. On the one hand, any suggestion of war spread tremors on the stock exchange; but, on the other hand, many saw war as good business,

a chance to increase sales and profits. In supporting this viewpoint the Pittsburgh press, mouthpiece for the area's steel interests, said "It is not to be doubted that this (war with Cuba) expresses the feeling of the real business interests of the country ... The mistake made in some quarters is supposing that the stock jobbers are the business interests."108 W.C. Beer, who did a survey of leading business men's opinion, substantiated this, and a rundown of the wealthy backers of the Cuban league shows many prominent businessmen among them. The President was also under pressure from the powerful Sugar Trust to do something to restore peace and, of course, cheap raw sugar in Cuba. For a President like McKinley whose "stronghold was the industrial and financial community", these views must have been of great importance, for "without its wholehearted support, the status and power of the Presidency would have availed him little; he could have hoped for no more leadership or legislative success than Cleveland. It was simply out of the question for him to embark on a policy unless virtually certain that Republican businessmen would back him."109

(g) "American naval authorities had a strategic interest in

the island which lay athwart the entrances to the Gulf of Mexico, on which border five of the United States."¹¹⁰

(h) the release of a letter by the Spanish minister, De Lome which spoke of McKinley's "... ingrained and inevitable coarseness" and described him as a "common politician", incited further indignation. The letter was released February 9, 1898. Six days later the American battleship, The Maine, blew up in Havana. The ship had been sent to Cuba to safeguard United States' citizens in case of emergency. There was no evidence that Spain was involved in the explosion. The United States' Naval inquiry fixed blame upon a submarine bomb but did not name its source.¹¹¹ Nevertheless, uproar swept the United States. One historian, alive at that time, wrote, "in the writer's opinion, there was no moment in the United States, during the recent World War I when enthusiasm for the cause approached the furore of '98."¹¹² The pressure on the administration for action reached fever point. The French Ambassador noted: "A sort of bellicose fury has seized the American nation." In a Colorado community, McKinley was hanged in effigy.¹¹³ The uncertainty

as to whether war would be declared or not brought a halt to the rapid recovery underway in business. The city editor of the New York Herald, an adviser of McKinley, wrote on March 25th: "Big corporations here now believe we will have war. Believe all would welcome it as relief to suspense."¹¹⁴

(i) fear of a rebel victory. The American consul in Santiago advised that "Property holders without distinction of nationality, and with but few exceptions, strongly desire annexation, having but little hope of a stable government under either of the contending forces." He also added, "Such a move would not be popular among the masses." One writer to McKinley advised, "Independence, if obtained, would result in the troublesome, adventurous and non-responsible class" seizing power.¹¹⁵ It is a fair assumption that those who were influential in making United States' policy in 1898 did not want social revolution ninety miles from home any more than their counterparts did sixty-one years later. It now appeared probable that the rebels would win, at least in the long run.

On April 11th, in a message which virtually amounted to a declaration of war, McKinley noted that the rebellion could "not be extinguished by present methods", but recognition of the rebel government was neither "wise nor prudent". As Beals comments: "The insurgents were merely to be steam-rollered by us, not Spain."¹¹⁶ McKinley had earlier spoken against recognition of the rebel government: "In case of intervention our conduct would (then) be subject to the approval or disapproval of such a government. We would be required to submit to its direction and to assume to it the mere relation of a friendly ally."¹¹⁷ There is, in any case, great doubt that the administration ever had in mind the interests of the Cuban patriots. They were concerned that the brutality of Spain's policies, exaggerated by the United States' press, was putting the heat on Washington, and that the revolt was ~~damaging~~ trade. Six weeks before the war broke out, the State Department told Spain to discontinue harsh military methods, but asked Spain to pacify the island immediately by putting down the guerillas with orthodox military measures.¹¹⁸ Whatever may have been the feeling of the American masses, it was not to liberate the Cuban

patriots that America went to war.

Gomez, Commander-in-Chief of the Cuban forces, specifically told the Americans to send no troops, but, if they genuinely wished to help, to send arms. It may be recalled that Marti had launched the rebellion early precisely to pre-empt American intervention.

Finally, McKinley decided for war; so firmly that he did not inform Congress that Spain had conceded virtually every American demand - although previously he had been a dove on the issue of war with Spain. At the beginning of April, Woodford, American minister at Madrid, wrote Washington that Spain was ready to "go as far and as fast as she could" and that with time he could "before next October get peace in Cuba and protection to our great American interests."¹¹⁹ On April 15, the Secretary of the Navy, Long, wrote the editor of the Boston Journal: "Do you realize that the President has succeeded in obtaining from Spain a concession upon every ground which he has asked, that Spain has yielded everything up to the present time except the last item of independence for Cuba ..."¹²⁰

Why did McKinley decide to fight instead of continuing diplomatic pressure? The answer seems to be that by April he was sure that European powers would not intervene, that America was ready and could easily defeat Spain, that business opinion was now firmly for war, and that there were votes in war.

A joint resolution of both houses was signed April 20th; relations with Spain were broken off on the 21st.¹²¹ The activities of Rubens, the Cuban junta lawyer and the beet sugar interests in the United States had persuaded Senator Teller to introduce an amendment disclaiming all "disposition of intent to exercise sovereign jurisdiction or control over said island except for pacification thereof."¹²²

h. CONSEQUENCES OF INTERVENTION

The decision to intervene was opposed by a majority of Cubans, for as a result of American intervention, the Cubans (other than the Cuban Junta), convinced that the Spanish had already been beaten, came to look upon intervention as having aborted the revolution. "The Cuban belief that Spanish power had already been broken by the

time the United States intervened in 1898 ... gave a keen edge to anti-Americanism and the coincidence of national independence with a new phase of American imperialism made for an easy transference of the nationalist antagonism from Spain to the United States."¹²³

In the course of the ensuing war, the rebels were largely ignored, as they were in the ensuing peace. Ill-prepared American troops joined the thousands already dead, and as usual, a few made a fortune and others became heroes. The United States occupied Cuba for the next four years and intervened regularly thereafter under the Platt Amendment, adopted in 1902. Moon, in his manual on imperialism, best describes the situation:

"The scheme of quasi-independence which was finally applied to Cuba was an interesting improvement on European methods of imperialism. It was designed to reconcile the Cuban desire for self-government with American strategic and economic interests - to accomplish the non-political objects of imperialism without the disagreeable political methods."¹²⁴

The United States also obtained Puerto Rico and the Philippines.

In financial terms, The United States was not to be disappointed. The value of American exports to Cuba in-

creased from \$27,000,000 in 1897 to \$200,000,000 in 1914,
by which time Cuba was the United States' sixth largest
customer. American investments increased from \$50,000,000
in 1896 to \$265,000,000 in 1915.125

IV. FROM SPANISH RULE TO AMERICAN EMPIRE

The Teller Amendment, adopted after pressure from the Cuban junta in New York and the beet-sugar interests in the United States, had disclaimed all "disposition of intent to exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction or control over said island (Cuba) except for the pacification thereof."¹ Any reading of Cuban history in the twentieth century produces the inescapable conclusion that the amendment became virtually a dead letter.

True, there remain those in the United States who thought that the benefits of the American way of life should be restricted to white Anglo-Saxons. The New York Evening Post, an anti-annexationist paper, based part of its argument on the fact that Cuba was inhabited by a "'mongrel race' which was unfit to share the benefits of American citizenship."² But a good deal of the argument concerned whether control should be exercised by means of 'formal' or 'informal' empire. The Platt Amendment, incorporated into the Cuban constitution represented something of a compromise. Even this did not fully satisfy the an-

nexationists, who continued to work for American intervention and annexation at every opportunity. The Platt Amendment was seen by many as being merely a temporary measure before chaos, justified annexation, and in any case it was a possible channel of complete control. Governor Wood wrote to Roosevelt October 28, 1901, as follows

"... there is, of course, little or no independence left to Cuba under the Platt Amendment ... with the control which we have over Cuba, a control which will soon undoubtedly become a possession ... we shall soon practically control the sugar trade of the world or at least a very large part of it. I believe Cuba to be a most desirable acquisition for the United States ... the island will under the impetus of new capital and energy not only be developed but gradually Americanized and we shall have in time one of the richest and most desirable possessions in the world."3

The Cuban historian, Herminio Portell Vila, summed up the thoughts of many Cubans,

"Cuba underwent an American military occupation ... which emasculated the revolution through the imposition of the Platt Amendment ... it finally gave a shock to the country which after years of bloody struggle thought it had obtained its independence and established its right of self-determination but found instead that another country's influence had been permanently substituted for that of Spain."4

"Brokers, recommending securities to their clients, advised that the possibility of annexation gave Cuban stocks additional speculative value."5

The American investments and trade had been important in stimulating the initial intervention and as they rose in scale they exercised an ever greater degree of influence on American policy. The value of American exports to Cuba increased from approximately \$27,000,000 in 1897 to \$200,188,222 in 1914. In 1896 American investments in Cuba stood at \$50,000,000; by 1915 they had risen to \$265,000,000.⁶ Not all the American investments were costly. In 1905 the Nipe Bay Company had picked up 122,000 acres of sugar cane in Oriente Province for \$100.⁷ In 1901, an American by the name of Preston had purchased 75,000 hectares of land in the same area at six dollars a hectare, which was substantially below the value of the timber covering the land.⁸

American officials in Cuba reported to Washington soon after the conclusion of peace with Spain that priority should be attached to trade relations with Cuba rather than to the building of stable political institutions.⁹

The movement for reciprocity in trade was soon underway. President Roosevelt urged the adoption of reciprocity because, in his own words, "... it is eminently

for our interests to control the Cuban market by every means to foster our supremacy in the tropical lands and waters south of us."¹⁰

Reciprocity was incorporated in a treaty with Cuba and became effective in December 1903. Cuban sugar received a twenty percent preferential reduction in the American tariff, and some American products received from twenty to forty percent reductions in the Cuban tariff. This, as we shall see, paved the way for the sugar monoculture.

The Platt Amendment named after the senator who introduced it, established a virtual American protectorate in Cuba. Its incorporation into the new Cuban constitution was demanded as a price for American withdrawal. Under its terms, the Cuban government could not contract any foreign debt which exceeded its capacity to pay. Cuban sovereignty over the Isle of Pines had to be relinquished until further notice and the United States was allowed to establish naval bases on Cuban territory. Finally, the United States had the right to intervene in Cuba "to protect life, property and personal liberty."¹¹

America's first intervention took place on September 28, 1906. The Cuban President, Estrada Palma, had attempted to maintain power by falsifying election results. Civil war broke out between Palma's moderate party and the Liberal Party. Both sides demanded intervention, as did American businessmen in the island. Some historians report that Roosevelt was reluctant to intervene, but the Platt Amendment had set the stage. Cuban politicians, either the 'ins' or the 'outs' could use it as an excuse to gain American intervention which would - hopefully - benefit them. America sent a commission to the island headed by William Howard Taft. Estrada Palma resigned and Taft proclaimed himself Governor and was soon succeeded by Charles Magoon. Magoon was regarded by Cubans as the founder of corruption on the island.

American economic interests in Cuba continued to increase. American investments rose 536% between 1913 and 1928. In 1906, American-owned sugar mills produced 15% of the Cuban sugar crop. By 1920, the figure had risen to 48.4% and by 1929 following the 'dance of the millions' and the ensuing sugar slump, American control had risen to between 70% and 75%.¹² Not that economic control was

exercised only by ownership; in fact, United States' influence on Cuba was such that Cuba sold her entire war-time sugar crop to the United States at well below world prices, which, indirectly, contributed to the 'dance of the millions'. When the United States cancelled the war-time sugar contracts in 1919 the price rose from four cents per pound to nineteen cents per pound by 1920. The value of the crop in 1920 stood at a record high of \$1,022,000,000. By 1921, it had fallen to \$292,000,000. Fortunes were wiped out over night. Labour, which had benefited little from the boom, suffered in the ensuing inflation and responded with increasing militancy.¹³ The crash in the sugar market wiped out any chance Cuba might have had of developing an independent land-owning oligarchy which would have lent legitimacy to the status quo.¹⁴ Banks foreclosed on many sugar properties and concentration and Americanization were further stimulated by the policy of increasing efficiency and production, to retain profits in the face of lower world prices. Much of the new capital provided for this was American.

The process of concentration in agricultural holdings had been underway since the early 19th century with increasing rapidity. During the War of Independence many

farmers had fled into the cities and lost claim to their lands. Others had had their crops destroyed and sold out. The number of farms fell from 90,960 in 1894 to 60,711 in 1899 and had fallen to 38,105 by 1943.¹⁵ In 1935, a Foreign Policy Association Report noted that the expansion of sugar and of the large American sugar corporations had left little role for the independent farmer.¹⁶

American control of the banking system was also ensured, since American banks were generally the only ones with sufficient reserves to meet the crisis which followed the 'dance of the millions'. Considering the level of United States' investment in Cuba relative to United States' holdings elsewhere, it is appropriate that United States' domination of the Cuban banking system should occur at the outset of the United States' move into overseas banking.¹⁷

In 1912, the United States again intervened in Cuba's internal affairs, this time in the face of protests from Cuban President Jose Miguel Gomez. This intervention was prompted by a Negro uprising in Oriente on May 20 of that year. United States' marines were sent and three

thousand Afro-Cubans died in the rebellion.¹⁸

After the 1912 intervention, American control became more subtle. In a few instances, marines were landed to guard United States' property.¹⁹ A major intervention occurred in 1917 when Menocal was re-elected for a second term of office. The Liberals revolted. The United States landed marines at Guantanamo but the Cuban government put down the revolt without using them. In 1919, a large strike in Havana prompted the United States to send a cruiser, two gun boats and ten submarine chasers to the port.²⁰ The strike was brought under control and no marines were landed. In July, 1917, marines had been sent to Camaguey, ostensibly for training, in reality on the request of the President of the Cuba Company to protect its investment in an area which the company president described as a "hotbed of Bolshevism".²¹ Whether it was part of their 'training program' or in pursuit of their 'obligations' under the Platt Amendment is unclear, but in August, 1921 the marines in Camaguey became involved in a labour dispute. They attempted to arrest two former employees of the Cuba Railroad who, having been dismissed for strike agitation, had attacked the assistant general

superintendent of the railroad. Finally, as a result of a motion by the Cuban House of Representatives, a belief that the danger had passed in that area, and the desire to appease Cuban nationalism, the marines were withdrawn. R.F. Smith comments, "The withdrawal of the marines from Camaguey did not sacrifice any American interests, yet it was an important concession in the eyes of Cubans."²² As such, it was in line with the new velvet glove policy.

The desire to find more subtle means of control came from an increasing awareness of the importance of international trade to the American economy, from the fear of alienating other Latin American republics with too overt an action and from a desire to retain Latin America markets and reduce European competition. Finally, the change in the United States policy was stimulated by an awareness that overt American intervention could, in the face of growing Cuban nationalism, produce precisely the instability which the United States feared. In response to a request by Boaz Long in September 1920, for marine reinforcements at Camaguey, Woodrow Wilson replied that premature intervention would "bring about the very thing we want to avoid"²³ (that is, damage to United States' property).

Excellent documentation of the interplay of American business and diplomacy in Cuba is found in Professor R.F. Smith's study. In any case it is quite easy to establish this link for the earlier days of United States' imperialism. Secretary of State Hughes told the United States' Chamber of Commerce, in 1922, that the Department of State,

"... aims to be responsive in its own essential sphere to what it recognizes as the imperative demands of American business. It aims at the co-ordination of the work of all departments bearing upon the same great object of American prosperity."²⁴

It seems there is really no argument. In 1921, Sumner Welles and General Enoch Crowder drew up a list of six desirable characteristics for any Cuban president. What Professor Smith calls the Alfa and Omega were "first, his thorough acquaintance with the desires of this government; sixth, his amenability to suggestions or advice which might be made to him by the American legation."²⁵ Whatever else may be said of Cuban presidents prior to 1959, they certainly adhered to these two characteristics - with the exception of the 1933 government of Grau san Martin which was never recognized by the United States.

One major device of control which developed was that of the loan, which had the dual benefit of bailing

the Cuban economy out of its enduring crisis and thereby helping its investors and exporters, and of providing a lever to demand 'quid pro quos' from the recipient Cuban government. In 1917-1918 the State Department used the need for a loan to gain settlement of the claims of the Ports Company and the Cuban Railroad Company.

In August 1922, the Cuban Congress adopted a \$55,000,000 budget, and a few weeks later enacted a gross sales tax, two of the American demands for the 'moralization program'. The way was open for a loan contract and in early 1923, a \$50,000,000 contract was awarded to a syndicate headed by J.P. Morgan and Company. The prospectus stated that the loan had State Department approval under the Platt Amendment. To add further security, General Enoch Crowder, who had been sent to Cuba in 1920 by Woodrow Wilson to settle the political and financial crisis, was appointed America's first ambassador to Cuba.²⁶

American and Cuban businessmen could be confident that Crowder would keep the Cuban government on an even keel. First, in Cuba with Charles Magoon,

Crowder had shown that he would stand nononsense from the Cuban government. In return for approval of a \$5,000,000 loan, Crowder had

"demanded and received the right to audit the Cuban government's books ... a short time later Crowder again demanded that as the United States' representative he should be free to investigate the operations of any department of the Cuban government. One month after the election (which Crowder supervised) United States' experts were scurrying all over the island examining the tax system, banking laws, public works contracts and so on."27

This resulted in the resignation, in protest, of the entire Cabinet. Zayas appointed a new Cabinet popularly known as 'Crowder's Cabinet'.

In addition to using a less overt form of intervention, the United States made three concessions to growing Cuban nationalism. The first, the withdrawal of marines from Camaguey, has already been mentioned. In March 1925 sovereignty over the Isle of Pines was returned to Cuba. The final concession was made regarding rights of Cuban immigration to the United States. The first concession in this issue was made in 1924 and when the issue came up again in 1928 the American Ambassador to Cuba sent a letter to the Senate Committee on Immigration which provides some insight into the criteria applied to these

decisions:

"I can readily foresee a campaign of intense anti-Americanism if such a measure (of restriction) is passed. The vast American interests here would certainly suffer to a greater or lesser degree."28

In November 1924, Gerardo Machado was elected President. American policies remained basically the same, but in the face of increasing political tensions in Cuba, the world slump and the Cuban depression, the old policies proved inadequate.

Assisted by ever-willing American bankers, Machado moved the Cuban government further into debt. In February 1927, the Chase Bank advanced a \$10,000,000 credit to finance road construction which, it was believed, would relieve the economic crisis. In 1928, a further \$50,000,000 credit was advanced and in February 1930, a further \$20,000,000 was advanced. The State Department was worried about Cuba's ability to repay, but, finding it difficult to force Machado to accept its proposed reforms, it had no choice but to acquiesce or accept the resulting instability. The Chase Bank not only had a loan of \$80,000,000 with the Cuban Government; it also had Jose Obregon, Machado's son-in-law,

on its payrolls and had loaned \$130,000 on personal account to the President as well as \$45,000 to the President's construction company. In 1930, the Chase National Bank still had \$9,000 outstanding on its loan to Machado's shoe factory.²⁹

The American Government was disturbed at developments in Cuba, but the general feeling was that once the depression passed the crisis would resolve itself. In the meantime Machado at least maintained order, and loans could and were used to shore up the regime. From 1931 onwards, however, increasing thought was given to the question of removing Machado.

On August 11, 1933, ranking army officers united with American Ambassador Welles in demanding Machado's resignation. On August 13, Dr. Cespedes was appointed President, but reform had come too late. Within a month the Cuban revolution of 1933 was underway and Cespedes was thrown out.

a. THE INTERNAL DEVELOPMENT OF CUBA

i. THE POLITICIANS

In the preceding section we have briefly sketched

American interest in and control over Cuba in the period 1900-1933. What we must now consider are the developments in Cuba which resulted from this semi-colonial relationship.

The period of American occupation had led to the disbanding of the rebel army. No coherent and legitimate organization could immediately take power and proceed to work towards Marti's vision of the new Cuba. In addition, Antonio Maceo and Marti had been killed in battle. The third major leader, Maximo Gomez, though offered the nomination for the presidency in 1901, refused to run. It is difficult to make any prediction as to the course of Cuban politics had American intervention not taken place. What is certain is that Cuban political development cannot be divorced from the United States' intervention.

The first Cuban President, Thomas Estrada Palma, had been prominent in the Ten Years War and had served as representative of the revolutionary government in New York. His nationalism was of a strange variety; he regarded stable government as being more important

than independence.³⁰ His election was uncontested. General Bartolome Maso, the anti-Platt Amendment candidate, refused to contest the elections, and the Electoral Board of Scrutiny contained only Nationalists and Republicans - backers of Estrada.³¹

The first taste of political corruption came immediately in the payment of the Veterans' debts. Even General Maximo Gomez appears to have been a party to these raids on the treasury.³² In the 1904 elections, both sides used fraud freely. The National Liberal Party, backed by Emilio Nunez and Maximo Gomez, had as its leading plank "abrogation of the Platt Amendment".³³ In 1905, Maximo Gomez died and Nunez joined the Moderate Party.

The Liberal Party lived on and was joined by the remnants of the Conservative Republican Party, led by Jose Miguel Gomez, a presidential aspirant. The remainder of the Conservative Republican Party had joined the newly formed Moderate Party.

In so far as political criteria were relevant in

the scramble for the spoils of office, the Liberals could be said, at least at this period, to be more radical and anti-American than the Moderates. The latter were backed more by those people for whom, in the words of the Cuban historian Herminio Portel Vila, "the interests of the fatherland were subordinated for the interests of exporting duty-free sugar to the United States."³⁴

In 1905, the Moderates backed Palma for re-election; the Liberals backed Miguel Gomez. Palma resolved to be re-elected, and the Liberals, alleging - with some justice - intimidation and corruption, refused to participate in the elections. Palma was re-elected unopposed. Miguel Gomez, opponent of the Platt Amendment, left for the United States to seek intervention, while other Liberals raised the banner of revolt. Estrada Palma, urged by Roosevelt to make intervention unnecessary, said that without United States' help he would be incapable of maintaining order.³⁵ The result was the Governorship of Charles Magoon until 1909.

Unfortunately, I do not have adequate information to do more than offer a few suggestions as to why the

revolutionary leaders of the 1890's should have become the 'Plattists' of the 1900's. The demoralization of the rebels which resulted from American occupation, the devastation of Cuba by the Spanish, and the different interests of the groups who made up the revolutionary army were undoubtedly all contributory factors. In addition, the increasing Americanization of Cuba meant for many that the only resource was employment by an American company or service in the government, which was virtually American controlled. From the ruins of the War of Independence no clear, mass-based party determined to carry on the revolution seems to have been formed, and, in the absence of any mass participation, politics became the prerogative of the ambitious and unscrupulous.

The major nationalist and populist leaders of the independence movement Marti and Maceo, had been killed. Gomez was old and embittered.³⁶ For the affluent sectors of Cuban society, the threat of popular revolt was more fearsome than American control and, indeed, protection. Like Estrada Palma the rich regarded

stability as more important than independence and were not prepared to jeopardise that stability and their own privileges by attacking American control. An alliance was formed early between those sectors of the wealthy who had opposed the war and those who had fought in it, but on the conservative side. Hence, the first government of the republic contained autonomists - those who had supported autonomy under the Spanish crown.

The above explanation is unsatisfactory but is the best the writer can offer. The leaders of the 1933 revolution were to show themselves men of straw when they took office in the 1940's. One could also argue that the problem has been wrongly presented, for if we should direct ourselves to the economic, social and political structure we might rephrase our question. We may rather ask, given the Americanization of Cuba, the direct and indirect controls exercised by the American government, and the domination of the economy by American companies, what other course was open? When Grau san Martin's Pentarchy did try to pursue a genuinely nationalistic and reformist

program in 1933, the United States government insured its defeat. In the words of George Washington, "Experience has proven that foreign influence is one of the most pernicious enemies of republican government."³⁷

In 1908, Jose Miguel Gomez was elected President. The Moderates had nominated General Menocal. Defeated, they reorganized and formed the Conservative Party. Of the six national elections from 1908 to 1933, each party won three; ideological differences were hardly crucial. Each time, the victor had the support of the outgoing administration. Zayas served as the vice-president in the Liberal Administration of Gomez and became President as a Conservative in 1920. In supporting him, the previous President, Conservative Mario Menocal, was merely returning a favour, since Gomez had endorsed Menocal's candidature. Zayas continued the tradition and endorsed the Liberal candidate Gerardo Machado as his successor.

The HRAF Report describes the politicians of this period well,

"Each man was an effective organizer and used the various available techniques to gain and keep power - the distribution of patronage, especially by means of the national lottery and government jobs, cultivation of the army, well-timed amnesties and pardons, vote buying and appeals to the United States government. Each retired from political life in considerable comfort."38

Maurice Zeitlin contrasts Chilean and Cuban experiences. He notes that in Chile conflict between British and American interests had permitted the development of conflicting power centers - essential to political democracy. At the same time, Chile's more developed economy and internally based ruling class prevented direct political control by the United States. The role which Chilean ruling groups had played in the independence struggle and their successes in developing the country gave them legitimacy. The participation of the old aristocracy in the political process had added prestige to political office. In contrast, in Cuba, the leading colonial families had been pro-Spanish and had little popular support. Their new power base became not internal but American. The major independence leaders were killed and American penetration into agriculture prevented the emergence of any landholding aristocracy

with a power base in the countryside, and destroyed what paternal relations existed.

In Chile, the constitution was a Chilean product; in Cuba, it emerged from the period of United States occupation; hence, "the legal order was identified with the interests of an imperialist exploiter." In Cuba there was, consequently, little respect for elective office. "Politics was a dirty word, opportunism, corruption and gangsterism were identified with public office."³⁹

ii. THE CLASS STRUCTURE

The middle class, which is regarded by many political scientists - from Aristotle to Lipsett - as the political class 'par excellence' (by which they mean the 'conserving' class par excellence), was very weak in Cuba. Lowry Nelson, who studied Cuba in the late 40's, doubted that it even existed.⁴⁰ The HRAF study notes:

"the middle class lacked substantial foundation in moderate-scale capital investment and a set of ideals and traditions differentiating itself from other classes. When delineated by economic criteria the middle class was small; in terms of self-identification, it scarcely existed."⁴¹

In 1926 Professor Leyland Jenks wrote "There have been but two classes in Cuba: a handful of very wealthy families of broad culture, and the mass of the people, indifferently poor."⁴²

Who else could provide the political leadership - the old landed oligarchy? No, those who survived the Wars of Independence were rapidly eliminated in the face of extending American competition; the 'dance of the millions' spelled their final death. Clearly, the working class were not in charge, the militant labour struggles provide eloquent testimony to this. If, then, the government had some social class basis, what was it ?

The national bourgeoisie were even less significant than the middle class; in fact, it is doubtful that they could in any meaningful sense be regarded as a social class at all.⁴³

Mao wrote that in China the ideology of the national bourgeoisie - which Mao seems to equate with the middle

class - could be summed up as "raise your left fist to knock down imperialism and your right fist to knock down the Communist Party."⁴⁴ In Cuba, we can find no evidence that the national bourgeoisie ever came into fundamental conflict with imperialism. Cuban-owned industry did not seriously rival foreign-owned industry, in fact, it was more likely to be dependent upon it for its prosperity. Cuba was perhaps more fully colonial than most other situations we might examine. The upper classes and petit bourgeoisie - minor government functionaries, teachers, small traders, etc. - were crucially dependent either upon the American link or upon the Cuban client government. Government, in fact, became a major source of employment for many and could consequently command their adherence. In the course of the depression and during the Second World War some independent industrial and agricultural development took place which suffered with the reassertion of metropolitan ties but this does not appear to have produced any notable conflict.⁴⁵

Boorstein, in a brief survey of pre-revolutionary Cuba, provides the best explanation of the economic

base -

"national industry in Cuba was limited to a few types of goods. There were local slaughter houses, bakeries and factories producing milk and dairy products, soft drinks and candy ... how could Cuban national industry grow? The poverty which blanketed the countryside limited the effective demand ... Cuba's internal market was dominated by imports ... the sugar mills, mines and almost all the large manufacturing plants in Cuba were foreign enclaves ... most retail stores, other than the small ones in wooden shacks, depended on imports ... For whom did the financially successful professionals work in Cuba? Where were the jobs and the money? The most expensive lawyers worked for the big companies, the big importers and the commercial speculators, the real estate operators. The engineers and chemists worked for the large foreign-owned or foreign-oriented sugar companies, manufacturing plants or mines. The architects worked for the real estate companies, the rich or the government. And the doctors, dentists and nurses served the rich and middle classes, most of whose income was tied directly or indirectly to imperialism."⁴⁶

In their culture, the upper class Cubans were torn between emulation of the old Spanish aristocratic values, reflected in the role of women, and the vigorous trade in titles and emulation of the chromium plate civilization of the north. "The typical social institutions of the upper class were the country club and the yacht club, avowedly imitative of similar resorts in the United States."⁴⁷ The authors of the HRAF report add that

"much of its (the upper classes) capital was invested abroad or in foreign controlled interests in Cuba - with the result that the upper class appeared to many other Cubans partly foreign in composition and largely foreign in the orientation of its social and economic interests."48 Leyland Jenks, writing of the period 1910 to 1917, noted that "the favour which American business firms generally enjoyed was such that numerous undertakings set up by Cubans purely with Cuban capital flourished American firm names."49

It was this client class of the United States and its companies which provided the local backing for the United States' client governments.

In 1933, after the installation of Grau san Martin's revolutionary nationalist government, the United States' historian Hubert Herring wrote

"there are the substantial business interests, Cuban and American, which clamour for intervention. The Cuban business community is as fully insistent as the American. The landowner, the factory owner, the tax payer generally indulges in no talk of Cuban patriotism. He says in effect, 'We must be realistic, economically we are a part of the United States and we might as well admit it and have done with talking of Free Cuba.'"50

The absence of any clearly delineated national bourgeoisie and the general lack of radicalism or reformism among the Cuban upper classes bears out A.G. Frank's hypothesis that with the international penetration of capitalism, the "contemporary structure of capitalism does not provide for the autonomous development of a national bourgeoisie independent enough to lead, (or often even to take an active part in) a real national liberation movement or progressive enough to destroy the capitalist structure of underdevelopment."⁵¹

The links of Cuban government with the United States interests were quite specific. According to Beal's account, the links were not merely with United States' interests but with the dominant sector of the United States' interests. He argues that Menocal, President from 1912-1920, had been "an official in the large Cuban American sugar corporation and owed his political success largely to that connection." Control had, however, shifted in the early twenties to the banks and public utilities interests - Machado represented these interests. Henry Catlin, President of the Cuban Electric Company, subsidiary of the Electric Bond and

Share Company, gave his vice-president, Machado, half a million dollars for his election campaign. "Affiliated interests put up another half a million." Catlin interests also purchased real estate property from Machado at many times its value. Beals writes "with such funds and the active backing of the electric and banking interests, Machado was easily elected." Machado, who had originally gained his position on the public utilities business, as Minister of the Interior, under Gomez, rewarded his backers. "The government remitted taxes to the light and power interests to the tune of several million dollars." Catlin also served as legal advisor to the Chase National Bank which, it will be recalled, had profitable loan connections with the Machado regime.⁵²

The most famous Cuban historian, Herminio Portell Vila, takes the same view. He points out that the first administration of Cuba was supported by the Tobacco Trusts and the Speyer interests; the second, that of Gomez, was supported by the Morgan interests; Menocal was supported by the sugar interests; Zayas, by the Morgan Company, the National City Bank of New

York and the railroad companies. Machado, finally, was supported by the Electric Bond and Share Company (controlled by the Morgan Company), by the National City Bank of New York, (which controlled the Chadbourne Plan, which protected the General Sugar Company in which the bank had interests), and by the railroad interests and, of course, the Chase National Bank, which made important loans to Machado. Vila adds that his opponent, Menocal, had little chance of election, since the sugar interests which backed him had recently lost out in the tariff battle in the United States. Vila concludes:

"Cuba has been transformed into an immense American factory ... the role played by the Cuban President in the situation has been that of a foreman. He has to keep order in Cuba to retain his post because order is very essential to the work of the factory."53

We have so far dealt with the elite which dominated Cuban society. Considering the vast divide which separated the 'two nations', rich and poor in Cuba, it should come as no surprise to find that the perspective of the poor bore little in common with that of the rich. What the rich lacked in militancy and nationalism, the poor more than compensated for. Significantly, the first major strike in the New Republic, the 'Strike of the Apprentices'

had been highly nationalistic.⁵⁴ The strike had commenced with the demand that Cuban children be admitted into apprenticeships in the tobacco industry which had previously been reserved for the Spaniards. The strike had rapidly become a general strike which paralyzed Havana and led to pitched battles between workers and police.

In Cuba, the class struggle was exacerbated by foreign domination. In taking militant action, the workers, particularly those in the major industries, very often found themselves face to face with a foreign company. The sugar industry which took over from the tobacco industry the role of vanguard in the Cuban labour movement was, as we previously noted, dominated by American capital. In 1924, the railroad workers were engaged in a vicious twenty-one day strike which resulted in the removal of the British administrator from his post. The tobacco workers' union was finally smashed by Machado in a strike against the American Tobacco Trust.⁵⁵

In examining its impoverished conditions, its corrupt government, often even its local top managers, labour was presented with the irrefutable fact of fo-

Foreign domination, a point which the revolutionary labour leadership was quick to stress. The workers could see that the revolution of Marti had gone astray, that the fantastic sacrifices of the War of Independence had brought neither independence nor social justice.

b. WORKING CLASS ORGANIZATION AND IDEOLOGY

Professor Maurice Zeitlin's brilliant work on the Cuban working class provides strong substantiation for the argument that frustrated nationalism was a key element in the Cuban Revolution. He writes:

"the politics of the Cuban working class were 'socialist' and often revolutionary for most of the four score odd years that a working class may be said to have existed in Cuba. ... The fundamental sources of revolutionary politics in Cuba's working class were the colonial status of the country and the political economy resulting from that status. ... The working class developed a sense of exploitation inseparably linked to the national colonial status because the class struggle took on nationalist content. That is, a struggle for the enlargement of working class rights and the improvement of the working class condition was in the main directed against foreign economic interests - especially those of the United States."⁵⁶

Professor W.A. Williams, who recognizes the role of the United States in Cuba and argues that "not even the

most elaborate and sophisticated exercise in disingenuousness can, in the end, circumnavigate the existence of an American empire which included Cuba."57, nevertheless, states

"It is true that Cubans generally acquiesced in this pattern of foreign control. The minority of the population who enjoyed direct connections with, and benefits from, American interests understandably favoured the status quo. The majority also gained in a limited and sporadic way from American influence. But it is quite wrong to interpret such acquiescence and the failure to sustain an overt, intense and continuous anti-Americanism as meaning either that the Cubans forgot about their inferior position or that they approved of the situation. Given the vast discrepancy of the power between the United States and Cuba, such acquiescence represented the closest approximation to sanity that was possible under the circumstances. No nation can play the martyr continuously. Even so, diplomatic records of the United States bear blunt and detailed witness to the way that 'adequate' Cuban rulers and policy makers in Washington constantly worried about the eruption of anti-imperialist feeling and about the possibilities of still another revolution."58

This writer would take issue with Williams on two points: Firstly, that the majority gained from American influence even in a "limited and sporadic way" and, secondly, that there was no continuous anti-Americanism. The aborted revolution of 1933 and the revolution of 1959 were not overnight manifestations. Whether we look

at the politics of the Cuban working class and of its leaders, first anarcho-syndicalists and later communist, or at the electoral anti-Americanism of political parties, particularly the Liberals, we cannot deny that anti-Americanism was a continuous phenomenon. Even Machado developed 'business nationalism' 59, which proved quite acceptable to American businessmen and provided a good backdrop to the American concessions to nationalism referred to above.

During the 1920's Cuban nationalism increased. This was reflected at the one level by Zayas' success in 1923 in dismissing 'Crowder's' cabinet. Crowder, in fact, according to Professor Jenks, can claim much credit for increasing Cuban nationalism, as can his successors. Cubans were less willing to accept American intrusion and more prepared to resist it. We will see when we deal with economic developments and the Machado regime that the benefits from American rule were hardly considerable.

Havana newspapers, contemplating Cuba's problems, were not loathe to blame Americans. Upon the formation

of Crowder's cabinet, in June 1922, one paper came out with double page headlines declaring "HATRED OF NORTH AMERICANS WILL BE THE RELIGION OF CUBANS". The article beneath warned that "the day will have to arrive when we will consider it the most sacred duty of our life to walk along the street and eliminate the first American we encounter."⁶⁰ Other journals were more specific in their criticisms of Cuban society. An article in June 1924, in Cuba Contemporanea, mentioned the following:

- "(1) The subordination of our entire national economy to the production of sugar.
- (2) The exaggerated ascendancy of foreign capital invested in Cuba, interest upon which is paid outside the island.
- (3) The insufficiency of agricultural production for the essential necessities of the people.
- (4) The advantageous competition of many foreign industrial products with similar ones of our country.
- (5) The lack of a national banking system.
- (6) The domination of our commerce by foreign personnel.
- (7) The increasing numbers of migratory immigrants, through lack of sufficient restrictive legislation."⁶¹

All of these points, let it be noted, were a direct result of United States economic domination. By 1929, United States investment in Cuba stood at \$1,525,000,000,

27.3% of the total United States' investment in Latin America as a whole. Translated into per capita terms, this meant that United States' investment in Cuba was seven times as great as for the continent as a whole.⁶²

Cuban intellectuals were among the most vehement nationalists. Many of them later came together in support of either the nationalist ABC or the left-wing student platform. Others joined the Cuban Communist Party. The writings of Cuban intellectuals such as Fernando Ortiz, Herminio Portell Vila and Teresa Casuso give us some insight into the feelings of Cuban intellectuals of the time.

American domination was more intense in Cuba but in other areas of the continent nationalism and its concomitant expression, anti-Americanism was growing. 1924 marked the formation of the Peruvian APRA which had as one of its major goals, action against 'Yankee imperialism'.⁶³

Nationalism, of a kind, was also apparent at the official level. Gerardo Machado's campaign for the presidency in 1924, on a program of 'moralization'

and national revival, increased nationalistic expectations. Machado promised to remove the legalistic aspects of American control as embodied in the Platt Amendment which had become a symbol of American influence. The political repression and economic crisis, which characterized his regime, ensured that these expectations remained unfulfilled.

1925 marked the official formation of the Cuban Communist Party, although a group known as 'Agrupacion Comunista', led by a student, Julio Antonio Mella, had existed since 1921. Also in 1925, the newly established Confederacion Nacional Obrera de Cuba (National Workers Confederation) held two congresses, though at this stage the anarcho-syndicalists were still dominant. After 1925, the Communist Party's influence grew rapidly in the labour movement. Its major base for organization was the sugar industry. In the first two decades of the century the use of imported contract labour and the residues of slave consciousness had made organization difficult, but by the twenties a clear wage worker consciousness had developed. The high degree of concentration in the

Cuban sugar industry made it more readily susceptible to Communist appeals, anarcho-syndicalism being an ideology, more popular among craft-workers in small shops. Leon Trotsky, in his development of the 'Law of Uneven and Combined Development' notes the additional conflict which is created by the implanting of advanced industrial structures in societies which contain strong elements of backwardness. In his history of the Russian Revolution, he notes the key role played by organized workers in the large factories both in providing the social base for the Bolsheviks and in establishing the Soviets.⁶⁴

In Cuba the sugar industry had five major characteristics:

- (a) it was largely foreign owned.
- (b) it was characterized by high rates of unemployment and underemployment. Charles Magoon reported during his governorship that

"practically all the sugar cane cutters remain without work during six months of the year and by August find themselves without money and without means of maintaining themselves and their families. The important economic problem, then, is to get work for the men during the six months that pass between Zafra and Zafra."⁶⁵

The situation remained basically unchanged until 1959.

- (c) it was highly concentrated and exercised the power not merely of an employer but also as a controller of services and housing within its area.
- (d) it was the most highly industrialized sector of the economy.
- (e) it occupied the strategic position in the Cuban economy.

Both the anarcho-syndicalists and the Communists made efforts to organize the sugar industry. Communist ideology proved more acceptable to the workers in the sugar mills. The trade union movement had started out among the cigar workers where, because of the craftsmanship involved, and the small size of the undertaking, syndicalism had been the major ideology. With the inclusion of the sugar workers into organized labour, Communism was given a major boost.⁶⁶

The Communists were active not only among the sugar mill workers but also formed 'revolutionary fractions' in several other unions, notably the railroad workers', the weavers' and the tobacco workers'

unions.67

The Communists logically emphasized the 'colonial' status of Cuba. Their most important 'front' organization was the Anti-Imperialist League. One student of Latin American Communist Parties noted, "The league's activities were typified by its organization of a group of 150 workers to distribute leaflets denouncing the Pan-American Congress being held in Havana in 1928."68

The Communists were also influential among the students. Julio Mella, the first Secretary-General of the party, led a student strike in the University of Havana in 1925 which resulted in Machado closing it down for a time.69

It is interesting to note that Carlos Balino, who headed the Marxist labour groups which combined with the student groups to form the Communist Party, had been active as an organizer of patriotic clubs among Cuban emigres to support the War of Independence against Spain.

The union of workers and students in the Communist Party was not surprising. In the 1902 tobacco workers' strike, students had taken to the streets in support. Julio Mella had been active in organizing workers' education classes among the unions in Havana. The links between students and workers were important both in the aborted 1933 revolution and in 1959.⁷⁰

Almost immediately after its formation, the Communist Party was outlawed, and its leaders arrested. Mella was exiled to Mexico where, on January 10th, 1929, he was assassinated.⁷¹ Carlos Balino died in jail awaiting trial. In spite of this the party continued to increase in strength and became, according to Professor R. Poppino, "one of the most influential revolutionary organizations in the country."⁷² It is not unreasonable to assume that the Communist Party's stress on imperialism and Cuba's colonial status had the effect of increasing and radicalizing Cuban nationalism.

Following the assassination of the anarcho-syndicalist secretary of the CNOC, control passed into the hands of the Communists. Cesar Vilar became its general

secretary. Under Communist leadership, the CNOC, though officially outlawed, called a one day anti-Machado strike on March 20, 1930, and held a major May Day demonstration the same year.

An indication of the abilities and vigor of Cuba's early Communists is given by the fact that in 1932, at the height of the repression, the first Congress of Sugar Workers was held secretly in Santa Clara. This resulted in the formation of the Sindicato Nacional de Obreros de la Industria Azucarera.

Mention should be made of the role that Cuba's black minority played. They remained a radical element in Cuban society, partially unassimilated, and sometimes played a leading role in the radical strikes which swept Cuba in 1933-1934. The Communist Party had a large number of Afro-Cuban leaders. Both Blas Roca and Lazaro Pena were of partly African origin. The leader of Realengo 18, rural Soviet, which held out against Batista until 1934, was black, as was Jesus Menendez, secretary-general of the sugar workers' union, who was later murdered by Autenticos.73

Negroes had suffered increasing discrimination because of the "unconscious influence of the American point-of-view" which counteracted the increased tolerance which had resulted from the independence struggles.⁷⁴ The revolutionary government of Grau san Martin promised them social justice and equality, but racism, while never as intense as in the United States, remained in existence at least until 1959.⁷⁵ Batista was, until 1952, barred from membership in the Havana Yacht Club because of his Afro-Chinese ancestry.⁷⁶

c. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE CUBAN MONOCULTURE

In the War of Independence, the Cuban sugar industry had been virtually destroyed. Its revival, however, was rapid and was inextricably associated with the American intervention in Cuba.

The American historian, Leyland Jenks noted,

"The preference (i.e. given in the Reciprocity Treaty of December 1903) guaranteed Cuba a chance to expand her output of sugar until she supplied all that the United States needed from abroad. It meant life and growth for the Cuban sugar industry ... so far as this meant profit to sugar mill proprietors, it was, of course, foreigners who were chiefly concerned."⁷⁷

Once the industry expanded beyond the point where its sales

could be absorbed in the United States, it had to move on to the world market price. Jenks concludes, "... to the extent that the Reciprocity Treaty did enable Cuba to make of the American market an exclusive prize, its price benefits accrued solely to purchasers of Cuban sugar in the United States, chiefly, it appears, to the seaboard refiners."⁷⁸ Until 1959, the bulk of Cuba's sugar output was refined in the United States which naturally meant that a good deal of the profit and employment derived from the industry did not even touch Cuban hands.⁷⁹

In the War of Independence, the sugar industry had been virtually burned to the ground. An opportunity for a restructuring of the economy was there - though perhaps the political and social prerequisites were absent. The Cuban historian, Herminio Portell Vila, noted, "... the economic aims of the Revolution of 1895 were frustrated with victory almost in sight and everything still remains to be done in exterminating this dangerous monster (sugar) if Cuba is to survive."⁸⁰

In his damning work on the Cuban monoculture, the

most famous Cuban social scientist of the twentieth century, Fernando Ortiz, wrote, " ... the principle characteristics typical of the Cuban sugar industry today (1947) ... are the following: mechanization, latifundism, share-cropping, wage-fixing, supercapitalism, absentee landlordism, foreign ownership, corporate control and imperialism." The social effects of this are described:

" ... there is not a small holding of land nor a dwelling that does not belong to the owner of the central, nor a fruit orchard or a vegetable patch or store or shop, that does not form a part of the owner's domain. The small Cuban landowner, independent and prosperous, the backbone of a strong rural middle class, is gradually disappearing. The farmer is becoming a member of the proletariat."

His policy conclusions are blunt and nationalist.

"Cuba will never be really independent until it can free itself from the coils of the serpent of the colonial economy that fattens and winds itself about the palm tree of our republican coat of arms, converting it into the sign of the Yankee dollar."⁸¹

The immiseration of the native population, as the result of a one crop export economy, is not

peculiar to Cuba. Baran writes " ... the establishment and expansion of these (export-oriented) plantations have brought about the systematic pauperization, indeed, in many cases, the physical annihilation of large parts of the native population." He cites as an example the north-east of Brazil, one of Brazil's most fertile areas, where the expansion of the sugar industry produced a major shortage of food stuffs.⁸²

Another Cuban scholar, Ramiro Guerra y Sanchez, is equally hostile to the Cuban monoculture. This hostility was shared throughout the intellectual community. As Sidney Mintz writes in his foreword to the English edition of Sugar and Society in the Caribbean, " ... even were Dr. Guerra's analysis¹⁵ of no relevance to today's events, his book would still be significant for the way it expresses the social values of the Cuban scholarly community of the post World War I years."⁸³

Dr. Guerra's book first appeared in 1927 and in new editions in 1935 and 1944 - new but substantially

unchanged as were the phenomena with which he was dealing. His view of the past is perhaps coloured by his white heritage, but he makes the point that up until the second half of the nineteenth century, Cuba had a substantial number of small but prosperous independent farmers. Writing of the early nineteenth century he states, "Cuban agrarian society was firmly established and Cuba could rely on thousands of solidly united families attached to their own soil and personally directing its cultivation - a generally prosperous people anxious for progress, for political autonomy and for the opportunity to serve their country."⁸⁴ The development of the latifundium was to end this apparent state of grace.

... of
...
...
...
...

In the customary manner, the latifundia extended their tentacles over the island. Competition encouraged the centrales to exercise control over the colonos either by binding them by contract to the centrale or buying their land outright, thus ensuring a constant and cheap supply of sugar. In the period of American government, General Wood extended the centrales' ad-

vantages, giving centrales rights to build private railroads and so-called 'subpuertos', private coastal piers. These, " ... not only permitted great economies but protected the centrales against all competition in their particular zone."85 Paul Baran comments on this type of development " ... nor did the railways, trunk roads and canals, built for the purpose of foreign enterprise, evolve into pulsing arteries of productive activities; they merely accelerated the disintegration of the peasant economy and provided additional means for a more intensive and more thorough mercantile exploitation of the rural interiors."86 There were other traditional devices of imperialism too for example, the importation, under contract, of Jamaican and Haitian labourers which was designed to keep the price of labour in the sugar industry low. Dr. Guerra laments, " ... who would have imagined that Cuba's presidents and ministers of state, almost all of them men of the revolution, with their special permits to contract for and import Haitians and Jamaicans, would vindicate the captains-general O'Donnell, Roncali, Canedo and Concha, who little more than fifty years

before, had facilitated the traffic of slave dealers on the grounds that the cultivation of cane made the slaves indispensable."⁸⁷

Dr. Guerra outlines the process of aggrandizement of the large sugar central. First it buys enough land to obtain a dominant position, then slowly squeezes the surrounding small producers out, buying their lands at rock bottom prices or foreclosing on debts or merely using its monopoly distribution to fix its own buying prices. "The latifundium is gradually strangling every type of independent farmer, ruining him economically, lowering his standard of living and making his existence intolerable."⁸⁸ By 1929, foreign owned sugar companies were milling 78% of the cane. The cane census of 1931 revealed that only 8.1% of the total sugar cane land was cultivated by free colonos.⁸⁹

The centrale dominated all other activities in its area, paying not only a monopoly price for its purchase from the tenants but charging monopoly prices at its local store. Ortiz wrote of these large estates,

" ... and all this huge feudal territory is practically outside the jurisdiction of public law; the norms of private property hold sway there. The owner's power is as complete over this immense estate as though it were just a small plantation or farm. Everything there is private - ownership, industry, mill, houses, stores, police, railroad, port. Until the year 1886 the workers, too, were chattels like other property."90

Is it any wonder that the sugar industry in the 1920's should provide such an easy organizing ground for the Communists, or that the sugar industries were the first to establish 'soviets' in 1933, or that, considering the nature of ownership, the workers should combine both militant unionism with fiery nationalism? After all, the sugar workers had little to lose. Many of them were unemployed for eight months in the year.

The concentration of land and power in the hands of a few was not particular to Cuba. In his analysis of Brazilian underdevelopment, Frank notes that in 1950, 80% of those dependent on agriculture owned only 3% of the land. Conversely, 20% of the agricultural population owned 97% of the land. Frank writes: " ... this monopoly control of the land, in turn, permits these few owners to participate often primarily as commercial

monopolists in the monopolistic structure of capitalism."⁹¹

Contrary to the conventional wisdom of many economic pundits, foreign investment in sugar did not have any great dynamizing effect on the Cuban economy. In the early period statistical gains in national income were noted, as can be seen from Table I, but this hardly reflected any increase in national welfare. Nor did the sugar industry have any great interest in development. The demands of the Zafra necessitated a pool of unemployed labour available at low cost. Just as grape farmers in Southern California today condemn government welfare programs since the regulations often make it unprofitable for the worker to work the occasional day, so their counterparts in Cuba could not be expected to be in the forefront of any battle for reform.

The utilization of land also reflected the priorities of the sugar companies. The IBRD estimated that 60% of Cuban farmland was tillable but only 20% was under cultivation.⁹² Frank comments on the Chilean situation:

"If agricultural production does not expand as we should like it to, then this is because those in control of resources potentially useable for greater agricultural production channel them into other uses. They do so not because they live outside the capitalist market and/or don't care much about it, but, on the contrary, because their integration in the market bids them do so. If forty per cent of the economic surplus produced in agriculture is appropriated by monopolized commercialization; if holding land is useful for speculation, for access to credit, for evasion of taxes, for access to supplies of agricultural commodities or to means of limiting their supply in order to profit from their distribution through monopolized trade channels; if capital earns considerably more in urban real estate, commerce, finance and even industry - then there should be little wonder that those in a position to increase or decrease agricultural output do not increase it very rapidly."⁹³

Cuba was not exceptional; in the north-east of Brazil, it is estimated that with 80% of the land owned by the Latifundia only one quarter of that land was being used.⁹⁴ Frank also argues that weakened ties with the metropolis raise rural living standards and that when, for example, the United States increased its demand for Brazilian sugar, living standards in north-eastern Brazil, the producing area, fell accordingly.⁹⁵

In Cuba, the profits of the sugar companies were often shipped abroad. Intensifying international competition produced a drive for lower production costs, generally at the expense of the workers and colonos and always for the benefit of foreign consumers. Cuba was deprived of poten-

tial capital for investment and development was consequently restricted. A.G. Frank noted that in Chile, the export sector had been the principal source of potentially investable economic surplus and that foreign ownership of the export sector had retarded growth.⁹⁶ In Cuba, lower production costs and modern techniques had, in fact, worsened the lot of the Cuban working class.

Favourable trade arrangements with the United States meant that it was often cheaper to import food stuffs than to produce them locally. Cuban facilities - technological, credit marketing, government support and financial resources - all favoured sugar. Those who wished to enter a new field had to go it alone. The existing sugar companies favoured the more dependable profits of the sugar industry and of course the profits of the American imports sold in the company store. The United States Department of Commerce reported in 1956 that " ... habit, experience and capital as well as credit and marketing facilities all favour continued dependence on sugar; other crops except for tobacco have few of these long-established advantages."⁹⁷

In addition the sugar industry introduced a high

degree of instability into the Cuban economy. The value of the crop fell from a peak of \$1,022,000,000 in 1920 to \$292,000,000 in 1921 and \$56,000,000 in 1932. This was the famous 'Dance of the Millions' in which many Cubans became bankrupt. The Cuban economy, in fact, ran on a veritable sugar cycle.⁹⁸

Dr. Guerra also notes that the companies in their desire to minimize competition and protect their monopoly have, " ... an increasingly harmful and destructive effect on society's circulatory system, its public railroads."⁹⁹

United States intervention in the War of Independence had given United States' interests an opportunity to reassert and strengthen the primacy of the sugar industry. They achieved this by virtue of favourable trade agreements, particularly the 1903 Reciprocity Treaty, and by a steady takeover of the smaller farm enterprises. Baran, after analysing the effects of foreign investment in underdeveloped countries, concludes that it had reduced real income for most of the population of the recipient countries.¹⁰⁰ While Guerra y Sanchez and Fernando Ortiz

do not phrase their writings in such neat, analytical terms, it is certainly their opinion that in welfare terms, the Cuban sugar industry had made a negative contribution to Cuban life.

Dr. Guerra's critique of the Cuban economy is radical. He observes many of the same phenomena that Baran and Frank have commented on but his conclusions are reformist, perhaps because he fails adequately to recognise the power of those who benefited from the existing structure. Dr. Guerra favoured an end to further latifundia expansion, diversification, an end to the importation of foreign labour, protection for the colono and "land of his own for the farmer". He did, however, conclude with a prophetic remark

" ... a country that is politically unfree, but that possesses and cultivates its own lands, can win its freedom as Cuba did, but a free people who relinquish their land to another have taken the path to economic servitude and social and political decay. Within a quarter of a century either the latifundium or the republic will no longer exist."¹⁰¹

It is interesting to note in both Ortiz and Guerra the strains of Jose Marti's ideals - the belief in the

creation of a free independent Cuba with a large and numerous middle class of independent farmers and craftsmen. Ortiz continually contrasts the virtues of the small tobacco farmers with the large monopolistic centrales. "The vega is independent, unlike the cane fields and the colony that springs up about them ... in the tobacco industry there are no centrales."¹⁰²

Dr. Guerra writes, " ... possibly more than forty per cent of the total area of Cuba is dominated by the latifundiums, and the Cuban farmer living within these huge territories cannot cherish the deepest and most intense aspiration of the man who wishes to provide for his family's future; to own a piece of property on which he can build his home and cultivate, as a free worker, his own land."¹⁰³

Both books are eloquent testimony to the nationalism of Cuban intellectuals, to their condemnation of the effects of United States' intervention, and to the existence of a 'Cubanness' that did not admit of American solutions.

V. THE ABORTED REVOLUTION - A SUMMARY OVERVIEW

Machado, in typically Cuban style, reneged on his pledge not to seek re-election and in addition had the constitution altered so as to automatically extend his term by two years. His regime was the most repressive in Cuban history. Machado had shown his attitude towards labour when, as Minister of the Interior, in the Gomez Government in 1910, he had used troops to end a strike in Santa Clara Province.¹ As president-elect, on a visit to the United States, he stated that, " ... he would not permit strikes in Cuba which could last more than twenty-four hours."²

On his accession to power, he immediately set upon the task of destroying the militant unions. The premises of the CNOC and the Federacion Obrera de la Habana were destroyed. A railroad strike in Camaguey was put down by troops and thirty strikers killed. In addition, "Machado informed the major employers throughout the country that he would send police to any factory where it became necessary to arrest and deport any foreign agitators."³

In 1927, Chester Wright, American Secretary of the

Pan-American Federation of Labour and editor of the AFL International Labour News, took evidence to Washington of one hundred forty-seven assassinations committed by the Machado regime. William Green of the AFL protested in February, charging that "a condition of virtual terrorism existed". In April to May, Machado visited Washington and met Green at the Belgian legation. Green then issued a public statement saying that the conditions of Cuban workers would 'be improved'. Beals states, "Wright presently was out of his two jobs, and despite the fact that the condition of Cuban workers has grown steadily worse, that assassinations have continued, that men then jailed are today in jail without trial, Green never once has lifted his voice in their behalf."⁴

The AFL was not the only guilty party. Two paid Machado agents formed a fake Federacion Cubano de Trabajo which was affiliated to the Pan-American Federation of Labour at a time when all legitimate unions had been driven underground.⁵

American business interests reacted predictably to

Machado. Professor Zeitlin notes that " ... they were enthusiastic about Machado's repression of labour."6

Professor R.F. Smith writes that the United States' Department of State was kept informed of Machado's activities and the growing opposition to them,

" ... but there was no change in the department's policy of supporting Machado. One reason for this position was the continued support of the Machado administration by American business interests."7

This support was communicated by letter and by lobby.

On his trip to the United States in 1927, Machado was fêted by numerous organizations including the Chase National Bank, the Importers and Exporters Association, the Electric Bond and Share Company, the New York Chamber of Commerce and the J.P. Morgan Company.8

American support for Machado did not merely emanate from the business community. In 1928, President Calvin Coolidge, in an address to the sixth Pan-American Congress in Havana, stated,

"Today Cuba is her own sovereignty. Her people are independent, free, prosperous, peaceful and have all the advantages of self-government. They have reached a position in the stability of the government, in their genuine expression of their public opinion at the ballot box and in the recognized soundness of their public credit that has commanded universal respect and admiration."9

Machado had more problems than his predecessors. The labour movement had markedly increased in strength and while repression weakened it, it did not destroy it. In addition, economic events over which he had little control were steadily increasing social discontent. The Fordney-McCamber Tariff Act of September 1922 had raised the United States' tariff on Cuban sugar from 1.0048 cents a pound to 1.7648 cents a pound. It had been passed as a result of pressure from the beet sugar interests who, in a glutted world market, could not compete with lower cost Cuban producers. In 1929 the Hawley-Smoot Tariff Act raised the tariff to two cents a pound.¹⁰

The Machado regime reacted to this by raising tariffs on some American goods, and, in 1927, proclaimed a policy of national self-sufficiency.¹¹ In fact, as a result of this some four hundred small scale Cuban enterprizes were started,¹² but the availability of Cuban capital and the constantly declining market ensured that this development was limited. In addition, according to the United States' Department of Commerce, the policy of tariff protection was implemented " ... cautiously, influenced not only by

the opposition to protective tariffs voiced by sugar and importing interests but also by its own concern over Cuban dependence on foreign markets."13 Nevertheless, the development of Cuba's meat product, dairy and fruit, vegetable canning industries owe their origins to this tariff restriction.14

The depression was the final blow for the Cuban economy. One commentator writes, " ... the collapse of the sugar market in 1929 was the biggest catastrophe in Cuban history."15

Real per capita income plummeted from 239 pesos in 1924 to 109 pesos in 1933. National income fell from 783,000,000 pesos in 1924 to 296,000,000 pesos in 1933. Barbara Walker, in an unpublished study entitled The Labour Policy of Cuban Governments Since 1925, describes the conditions of the workers in the 30's.

"The effect of this economic crisis produced widespread unemployment throughout Cuba and lowering of what were already low wages among the workers as well as the failure by the government to pay its employees regularly or fully. The number of unemployed was approximately 500,000 out of a population of some four millions. The wage of a city labourer fell from three dollars to fifty cents a day, the rural wage of one dollar and fifty cents to two dollars and fifty cents fell to from three to twenty-five cents ... many of the rural population were reduced to work merely one or two months out of the year."16

Cuba was suffering from what A.G. Frank would term 'super satellite development'. He suggests that a major cause of contemporary backwardness is to be found in the intense exploitation of a country's raw materials in the past. "When the market for their sugar or the wealth of their mines disappeared and the metropolis abandoned them to their own devices, the already existing economic, political and social structure of these regions prohibited autonomous generation of economic development."¹⁷ Cuba faced a sugar market which grew little after 1926 and fluctuated a great deal. The rapid growth which sugar had produced in the first quarter of the century was over and Cuban governments now had to deal with an economy with a built-in tendency to stagnation, ⁽An economy which was dominated by sugar and the United States. One economist asks whether there was " ... within this framework any way of absorbing unemployment and raising living standards."¹⁸ In fact, between 1923 and 1958, the Cuban economy showed little progress.

Frank suggests that with the loosening of metropolitan ties, two different reactions may take place - the one 'passive capitalist involution' toward a subsistence economy of extreme underdevelopment as in the north and

north-east of Brazil, the other 'active capitalist involution' or autonomous industrial development such as that which has taken place at certain times in the industrialization drives of, for example, Mexico, Argentina and India.²⁰ This contradicts the commonly accepted thesis that development takes place by a kind of 'spread effect', through closer links with the developed countries.

In fact in Cuba, the tendency seems to have been toward passive involution. While some independent development appears to have been initiated, Tables II, III and IV clearly indicate any weakening of ties with the United States produced an immediate and drastic decline in the national income. Cuba was so closely dependent upon the United States' economy that not until 1959, when a complete break was made, could Cuba begin a course of independent development.

Table I, taken from Professor Zeitlin's thesis, indicates not only the erratic fluctuations of the Cuban economy and its overall stagnation but also shows that no previous government had had to cope with problems of a similar magnitude.

Figures from the IBRD Report (Table II) provide an explanation for this sharp drop in income and substantiate our argument on Cuban monoculture. Cuban exports dropped from \$434,000,000 in 1924 to \$272,000,000 in 1929 and \$80,700,000 in 1932. Unfortunately full figures on the breakdown of exports are not available. Table III, however, does indicate that the widest fluctuations occurred in the sugar trade and that in fact in the period under consideration other export items increased. The chart gives a graphic description of the close correlation of exports, imports and national income.

Table II also indicates that in 1925 the balance on current account began to show a deficit. The favourable merchandise balances were no longer adequate to cover the service items such as freight charges and insurance and the outflow of remittances on account of portfolio and direct investment. Until 1930 net capital inflow, primarily from the loans discussed earlier, averted any serious balance of payment crisis. The IBRD Report comments,

"In the 1930's the positive balance of payments was largely due to the fact that Cuba did not have an independent monetary system and thus could not keep incomes up in the face of catastrophic decline in exports. Internal stability had to be sacrificed to an unusual extent for the sake of external adjustment."21

This analysis bears a striking resemblance to the one propounded by H. Magdoff who writes " ... recourse to either severe internal adjustments or devaluation is a common feature of the economically and financially dependent nation and is much less frequent in the centers of financial power."²² Underdeveloped countries frequently dependent on sales of one or two major products are prone to balance of payments crises, while loans, often required to solve problems caused by market instability, may add to the problem, for like payment on foreign investment they will constitute an outflow on the balance of payments.

Developed countries with a more flexible export-import makeup are generally net recipients of investment income and income on such items as banking, insurance and shipping. At the same time, the central banks of the developed countries have " ... the power and the mechanisms made available by this power to smooth out deficit problems."²³

Table II also reveals that between 1924 and 1933, in every year but one, 1930, there was more money leav-

ing Cuba in repatriated profits than entering in new investment. A summation of the return on portfolio and direct investment subtracted from the net new investment (taking the figures for 1931 and 1932 as zero) shows that between 1924 and 1932 there was a net financial drain of \$169,000,000, though, as the table shows, this period was not unique.

This confirms, if confirmation were needed, the point made by Magdoff, Baran and Frank that underdeveloped countries, far from benefiting from capital transfers, are in fact net capital exporters. Frank calculates that a conservative estimate would place capital outflow from the seven largest Latin American countries (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Peru, Venezuela, Colombia, Mexico) to the United States between 1950 and 1961 at \$2,081,000,000.²⁴ Cuba suffered an additional capital loss between 1924 and 1932 on services. Its deficit on this item was \$244,900,000.²⁵ A deficit of this nature appears to be typical in the trade relationships of underdeveloped countries. Frank has noted that with capital outflows of this nature, capital scarcity is no surprise.²⁶ Indeed these figures provide some explanation for the failure of Machado's

policy of national self-sufficiency which we noted earlier. It should also be stressed that any attempt to explain and analyse Cuban nationalism must be made on the basis of such economic facts.

Government attempts to solve the Cuban economic crisis were unsuccessful. One major scheme, the so-called 'Chad-bourn Plan', designed to control world sugar production, actually intensified the economic crisis. Restrictions in production caused increased unemployment and a consequent decline in the other commercial activities. The Cuban share of the American market fell from 49.4% in 1930 to 25.3% in 1933.²⁷ A special Cuban feature of the plan saddled Cuban taxpayers with bankers' losses upon some \$42,000,000 worth of sugar.²⁸

Not only did Machado have to face the growing labour unions; he also had to face the other political forces which aimed at a vast social transformation of Cuba. In previous periods there had been rebellions against the government, but these were either groups with particular interests, such as the Veterans and Patriots Association's

fight with Zayas, primarily over pensions, or the frequent contesting of election fraud, as in 1905 and 1917, to name the two major outbreaks. In this case the conflict was confined to the two major parties, and while posing a threat to order, it did not pose any revolutionary alternative.

The Communist Party was undoubtedly the most powerful opponent of Machado. Its ranks grew from 350 in 1929 to 2,800 in January 1933 and 5,000 in September 1933.²⁹ More important than its numerical membership was its overwhelming influence in the union movement. In 1930 the CNOC, though driven underground organized a one day strike against the government. On March 20 the strike was put down, but in May the CNOC led a large May Day demonstration against the regime.³⁰

In addition to the Communist Party, two other groups which differed distinctly from the traditional parties should be mentioned.

The first, the ABC or 'Abecedarios', is variously described as "revolutionary terrorist", "National

Socialist", and "semi-fascist".³¹ Its program could probably be more accurately described as corporatist. Professor H. Herring wrote in 1933,

"The ABC is the dominant group among the nonconformists (i.e. the new political forces) ... Its manifesto issued last December stands as the most memorable document to come out of the dark years. It is a call to a new Nationalism."³²

Beals reviewed the policies of the ABC, which attacked Cuba's colonial status and presented "An extensive program of thirty-five measures ... by which the people of Cuba can regain control of the national wealth and their government, and retain it after it is regained."³³ Its organization was cellular, its tactics terroristic. The majority of its militants were university students. Among others they assassinated the Chief of the Secret Police and the President of the Senate. Generally unable to find the assassins, the government retaliated with indiscriminate terror which had the effect of further alienating the population. Ruby Hart Phillips, a reporter in Cuba at the time, writes, " ... every branch of government, including the police and the secret service divisions, were honeycombed with ABC members."³⁴ The organization seems to have been supported by some students and professors and also by some professionals. The group, however, was

never " ... successfully transformed into a cohesive political organization."35 .

An offshoot of the ABC, the Organizacion Radical Revolucionaria Cubana should also be mentioned. This group was more rural than urban, seeking to arm the people on the grounds that terrorism alone was insufficient and could only serve as a preliminary to armed uprisings.³⁶ Unfortunately fuller information is not available. The writer has been unable to find any empirical data on peasant nationalism at that period but a later study done by Lowry Nelson in 1945-1946 notes that the instability of the one-crop economy, which was heavily dependent upon an export market, had, " ... led to demands of the peasants for agrarian reform, for driving out the foreigner, for distributing the land among small holders and for a national policy of partial food autarchy."³⁷

In addition, Nelson notes that considerable corruption attended the " ... rapid expansion of the sugar plantations, when money flowed freely and the acquisition of land and the quieting of doubtful titles were matters of great urgency on the part of land buyers."³⁸ As is

inevitable in a process like this, the peasants, denied access to financial resources and legal aid, emerged the losers. While we are unable to prove that this was directly reflected in peasant ideology, it seems a fair supposition.

The Student Directorate was the other major political force. Formed in 1927, the students engaged in frequent clashes with the regime culminating in 1930 with the closing of the university. Teresa Casuso, a member of the 'generation of the thirties' and later Ambassador Plenipotentiary for Castro, before defecting, describes the agitation's end as, " ... to clean up the government and free Cuba from its colonial status."³⁹ Among the student's demands were " ... eliminating the Platt Amendment, revising the Commercial Treaty with the United States ... nationalizing certain sources of production."⁴⁰ The students split into two groups, Communists and non-Communists.⁴¹ In addition, the traditional politicians such as Menocal tried to organize opposition to the regime. Many, like Menocal preferred to do so from the safety of Miami.⁴² Some of these traditional figures led a revolt against Machado in 1931 but this was suppressed by the army.⁴³

TABLE I

NATIONAL AND PER CAPITA INCOME IN CUBA
1903-1954

<u>Year</u>	<u>National Income*</u>	<u>Per Capita Income**</u>		
		<u>Monetary</u>	<u>Real</u>	<u>Index***</u>
1903	193	105	176	102
1904	222	118	198	115
1905	264	137	228	132
1906	249	126	204	119
1907	250	122	188	109
1908	238	114	181	105
1909	300	139	206	120
1910	347	156	222	129
1911	295	129	199	116
1912	397	168	244	142
1913	379	156	223	130
1914	400	159	234	136
1915	519	200	289	168
1916	644	241	283	164
1917	678	247	210	122
1918	734	259	198	115
1919	862	295	214	124
1920	1,191	396	257	149
1921	588	191	195	113
1922	656	207	214	124
1923	761	233	232	135

(continued next page)

TABLE I
NATIONAL AND PER CAPITA INCOME IN CUBA
1903-1954

<u>Year</u>	<u>National Income *</u>	<u>Per Capita Income **</u>		
		<u>Monetary</u>	<u>Real</u>	<u>Index***</u>
1924	783	234	239	139
1925	708	206	199	116
1926	604	172	172	100
1927	648	179	188	109
1928	584	158	164	95
1929	571	151	159	92
1930	517	134	155	90
1931	392	100	136	79
1932	283	70	108	63
1933	294	71	109	63
1934	364	86	116	67
1935	435	102	128	74
1936	510	118	145	84
1937	614	139	161	94
1938	468	105	133	77
1939	488	108	139	81
1940	431	94	119	69
1941	678	145	166	96
1942	710	150	152	88
1943	933	195	189	110
1944	1,212	249	240	139
1945	1,145	232	219	127

(continued next page)

TABLE I
NATIONAL AND PER CAPITA INCOME IN CUBA
1903-1954

<u>Year</u>	<u>National Income*</u>	<u>Per Capita Income**</u>		
		<u>Monetary</u>	<u>Real</u>	<u>Index***</u>
1946	1,244	237	196	114
1947	1,649	310	204	119
1948	1,624	300	182	106
1949	1,520	277	179	104
1950	1,623	291	180	105
1951	1,934	342	190	110
1952	1,984	345	197	114
1953	1,701	288	170	99
1954	1,723	292	180	105

* Millions of pesos

** Pesos

*** 1926 equals 100

Source:

Figures for 1903-1945 inclusive, are estimates from Julian Alienes y Urosa, op. cit., p.52. No data on national income were gathered in Cuba for these years; and Alienes estimated the national income figures from a combination of other data available, e.g., bank interest, bank deposits, public revenues, exports. Figures for 1946-1954 are from IIC, p.184. "Real per capita income" was calculated by deflating monetary per capita income by means of the Old United States wholesale price index (1926 equals 100), for the years 1903-1951, since there existed no Cuban index. This method was used by both sources. The Havana wholesale price index (August 1952 equals 100) was used thereafter. The Index of per capita income in the last column was computed by the author.

Zeitlin thesis.

TABLE II

SELECTED ITEMS IN THE CUBAN BALANCE OF PAYMENTS

1919-1949
(Million dollars)

YEAR	MERCHANDISE TABLE			SERVICE ITEMS EXCEPT FOR RETURN ON CAPITAL (net)	RETURN ON PORTFOLIO INVEST MENTS (net)	RETURN ON DIRECT INVEST- MENTS (net)	CURRENT ACCOUNT BALANCE
	EXPORTS	IMPORTS	BALANCE				
1919	574.6	356.6	218.0	-43.6	0.0	-39.1	135.3
1920	794.0	557.0	237.0	-61.5	1.0	-42.9	133.6
1921	279.8	354.4	-74.6	-44.0	0.0	-25.4	-144.0
1922	327.7	180.3	147.4	-30.5	0.0	-34.3	82.6
1923	422.6	268.9	153.7	-36.5	0.0	-39.5	77.7
1924	434.9	289.9	145.0	-35.3	-2.0	-45.5	62.2
1925	354.0	297.3	56.7	-34.9	-2.0	-51.5	- 31.7
1926	301.7	260.8	40.9	-34.8	-2.0	-58.5	- 54.4
1927	324.4	257.4	67.0	-38.0	-3.0	-51.8	- 25.8
1928	278.1	212.8	65.3	-33.3	-3.0	-42.5	- 13.5
1929	272.4	216.2	56.2	-22.9	-3.2	-37.3	- 7.2
1930	167.4	162.5	4.9	-14.3	-4.2	-26.6	- 40.2
1931	118.9	80.1	38.8	-12.6	-5.7	-21.0	- 0.5
1932	80.7	51.0	29.7	-10.3	-5.2	-14.9	- 0.7
1933	84.4	42.4	42.0	- 8.5	-4.9	-12.2	16.4
1934	107.7	73.4	34.3	- 8.3	-1.4	- 5.9	18.7
1935	128.0	95.5	32.5	- 8.9	-1.3	- 6.5	15.8
1936	154.8	103.2	51.6	- 3.3	-1.2	-11.8	35.3
1937	186.1	129.6	56.5	0.0	-0.9	-18.6	36.8
1938	142.7	106.0	36.7	- 1.8	-1.7	-19.3	13.9
1939	147.7	105.9	41.8	- 1.6	-1.6	-19.4	19.2
1940	127.3	103.9	23.4	0.4	-1.4	-18.0	3.6
1941	211.5	133.9	77.6	1.0	-1.3	-29.8	46.6
1942	182.4	146.7	35.7	-19.3	-1.1	-28.9	- 13.6
1943	350.6	177.4	173.2	-27.8	-1.0	-20.8	123.6
1944	427.1	208.6	218.5	-22.1	-0.9	-26.2	169.3
1945	409.9	238.9	171.0	-30.2	-0.9	-19.8	120.1
1946	534.6	299.8	234.2	-47.6	-5.9	-34.4	146.3
1947	772.7	519.7	252.8	-60.7	-9.8	-64.1	118.2
1948	724.1	527.4	196.6	-59.8	-7.0	-44.5	85.3
1949	593.2	451.0	141.8	-34.0	-4.4	-26.0	77.4

(continued next page)

TABLE II
SELECTED ITEMS IN THE CUBAN BALANCE OF PAYMENTS
1919-1949
(Million Dollars)

YEAR	AUTONOMOUS CAPITAL ITEMS		
	NET NEW INVEST- MENT ^a	SINKING FUNDS AND OTHER AUTONOMOUS CAPITAL ITEMS (net) ^b	TOTAL AUTONOMOUS CAPITAL MOVEMENT (net)
1919	14.0	-12.2	1.8
1920	30.0	- 3.2	26.8
1921	14.0	- 3.2	11.8
1922	63.0	- 4.2	58.8
1923	94.0	-11.2	83.8
1924	28.0	- 3.2	24.8
1925	17.0	- 3.2	13.8
1926	58.0	- 3.2	54.8
1927	42.0	- 4.2	37.8
1928	16.0	- 4.2	13.8
1929	18.0	- 5.2	12.8
1930	32.0	- 7.2	24.8
1931	n.a.	-11.0	-11.0
1932	n.a.	-15.0	-15.0
1933	n.a.	- 6.0	- 6.0
1934	n.a.	- 1.0	- 1.0
1935	n.a.	- 2.0	- 2.0
1936	n.a.	- 2.3	- 2.3
1937	n.a.	- 2.6	- 2.6
1938	n.a.	- 2.0	- 2.0
1939	n.a.	- 1.2	- 1.2
1940	- 5.2	- 0.7	- 5.9
1941	-12.0	- 0.6	-12.6
1942	17.1	- 1.3	15.8
1943	5.9	- 1.5	4.4
1944	-13.9	- 1.5	-15.4
1945	- 3.4	- 1.3	- 4.7
1946	-10.5	- 1.6	-12.1
1947	-10.4	-19.2	-29.6
1948	- 8.8	- 7.0	-15.8
1949	- 5.3	- 3.2	- 8.5

^a For the years 1931-39, the movements are uncertain. It is likely that disinvestment rather than new investment took place.

^b Includes subscriptions to I.M.F. and I.D.R.D.

TABLE II

SELECTED ITEMS IN THE CUBAN BALANCE OF PAYMENTS
1919-1949
(Million Dollars)

INTERNATIONAL RESERVE MOVEMENTS

YEAR	NET GOLD MOVEMENT	NET MOVEMENT OF DOLLAR CURRENCY AND COIN	NET CHANGE IN BANK'S FOREIGN BALANCES	TOTAL RESERVE MOVEMENTS (net)	RESIDUAL
1919	n.a.	n.a.	27.6	n.a.	-
1920	n.a.	n.a.	12.6	n.a.	-
1921	7.9	63.9	n.a.	n.a.	-
1922	0.0	- 2.0	n.a.	n.a.	-
1923	0.0	5.8	n.a.	n.a.	-
1924	3.5	- 0.6	n.a.	n.a.	-
1925	0.6	16.1	n.a.	n.a.	-
1926	0.7	0.7	n.a.	n.a.	-
1927	2.7	20.8	n.a.	n.a.	-
1928	- 1.2	13.3	n.a.	n.a.	-
1929	- 0.5	6.0	n.a.	n.a.	-
1930	11.0	25.4	n.a.	n.a.	-
1931	3.7	6.0	8.6	18.3	- 7.8
1932	5.3	15.6	-11.6	9.3	5.0
1933	5.0	- 8.4	3.3	- 0.1	-10.3
1934	3.5	2.2	- 7.4	- 1.7	-16.0
1935	1.3	7.4	-16.3	- 7.6	- 6.2
1936	0.2	5.0	-33.1	-27.9	- 5.1
1937	0.0	- 1.1	5.3	4.2	-38.4
1938	0.0	- 1.1	13.2	12.1	-24.0
1939	1.3	0.8	13.1	15.2	-33.2
1940	0.0	- 3.7	- 8.7	-12.4	14.7
1941	0.0	-16.3	-22.7	-39.0	5.0
1942	-15.0	-74.8	4.2	-85.6	56.2
1943	-30.0	-63.1	-11.0	-104.1	-23.9
1944	-65.0	-99.9	-36.7	-201.6	47.7
1945	-79.9	-14.6	- 7.7	-102.2	13.2
1946	-35.0	-20.1	-23.8	-78.9	-55.3
1947	-53.0	-44.4	-25.9	-123.3	34.7
1948	-10.0	-21.6	- 8.4	-40.0	-30.5
1949	-10.0	-53.7	11.2	-74.9	6.0

(-) Represents current account receipts; decreases in foreign exchange holdings or claims; exports of gold.

(-) Represents current account payments; increases in foreign exchange holdings or claims; imports of gold.

Source: 1919-45, Wallich, op.cit., pp.330-32. 1945-49, International Monetary Fund, Balance of Payments Yearbook and International Financial Statistics. Reprinted from I.B.R.D. Report, p.729.

CUBAN EXPORTS AND IMPORTS
(Million Dollars)

TABLE III

I EXPORTS

CLASSIFICATION	1913 ^a	1920	1921	1923-25 Average	1928	1935-39 Average	1940
Sugar and sugar products	122.2	729.4	234.1	350.5	224.9	121.2	95.6
Tobacco and manufactures	32.7	43.7	32.8	38.9	39.0	14.3	12.1
Mineral products	4.4	5.9	2.4	2.0	3.3	4.7	6.2
Food products	3.5	2.5	4.0	5.7	4.1	5.6	7.0
Animals and animal products	2.7	1.4	.9	1.7	2.8	2.7	2.2
Forest products	1.7	1.5	.9	.8	1.2	1.5	2.0
Miscellaneous	3.6	5.6	4.7	5.2	2.8	1.9	2.2
TOTAL EXPORTS	170.8	795.0	279.8	404.8	278.1	151.9	127.3

^a Fiscal year 1913-1914.

Source: Dirección General de Estadística.
Reprinted from IBRD Report , p.742.

TABLE III

CUBAN EXPORTS AND IMPORTS
(Million Dollars)

I Exports (con't)

CLASSIFICATION	1941	1942-44	1945	1946	1947	1948	1949
		Average					
Sugar and sugar products	167.0	249.4	294.8	350.3	662.7	637.7	511.5
Tobacco and manufactures	14.1	31.8	50.4	55.6	34.6	32.9	29.9
Mineral Products	10.2	14.4	29.4	23.6	11.4	8.3	6.5
Food products	10.6	13.1	19.4	29.7	20.4	15.1	10.2
Animal and animal products	4.0	4.5	6.2	7.6	5.9	5.2	5.5
Forest products	1.8	2.8	5.4	3.2	3.5	3.0	5.0
Miscellaneous	3.8	3.0	4.3	5.9	8.1	7.7	9.7
TOTAL EXPORTS	211.5	319.0	409.9	475.9	746.6	709.9	578.3

Source: Direccion General de Estadistica.
Reprinted from IBRD Report, p.742.

TABLE III
CUBAN EXPORTS AND IMPORTS
(Million Dollars)

CLASSIFICATION	1913 ^a	1920	II IMPORTS		1923-25 Average	1928	1935-39 Average	1940
			1921	1922				
Food and beverages	49.6	194.7	115.0		101.2	82.6	28.9	27.9
Machinery and vehicles	15.4	78.1	69.9		36.3	21.1	11.9	10.9
Chemicals and drugs	7.9	32.2	17.5		18.8	15.0	12.0	10.5
Minerals and manufactures	6.0	26.2	21.2		19.2	18.2	10.5	10.4
Metals and manufactures	9.4	36.0	30.0		20.4	12.2	9.4	8.7
Cotton and manufactures	10.5	68.5	30.4		26.6	16.5	11.6	9.7
Vegetable fibres and rayon	5.4	16.9	8.6		10.4	10.4	7.9	8.6
Paper and manufactures	2.4	8.1	6.9		4.5	6.3	4.4	4.8
Wood and vegetable products	3.5	12.9	7.7		5.9	4.7	2.6	2.1
Miscellaneous	23.9	84.4	49.8		42.2	29.2	8.8	10.3
TOTAL IMPORTS	134.0	558.4	357.0		285.5	216.2	108.0	103.9

^a Fiscal year 1913-1914.

Source: Direccion General de Estadística.
Reprinted from IBRD Report, p.742.

TABLE III

CUBAN EXPORTS AND IMPORTS
(Million Dollars)


II IMPORTS (con't)

CLASSIFICATION	1941	1942-44	1945	1946	1947	1948	1949
		Average					
Food and beverages	36.0	58.3	81.3	83.8	178.5	162.8	147.2
Machinery and vehicles	13.8	8.2	17.9	34.9	77.9	97.8	81.2
Chemicals and drugs	13.7	19.9	26.9	31.9	46.5	45.9	41.3
Minerals and manufactures	12.5	15.4	20.5	25.3	40.2	48.4	41.2
Metals and manufactures	12.9	10.1	19.4	25.4	43.8	45.6	39.8
Cotton and manufactures	14.8	17.2	42.0	24.9	37.6	33.4	25.4
Vegetable fibres and rayon	9.7	18.5		27.3	42.9	42.8	31.6
Paper and manufactures	6.0	7.8	11.7	14.1	17.9	20.2	16.7
Wood and vegetable products	2.6	3.9	4.4	5.0	7.9	8.6	7.0
Miscellaneous	11.9	18.3	14.8	27.6	26.7	22.0	20.0
TOTAL IMPORTS	133.9	177.6	238.9	300.2	519.9	527.5	451.4

Source: Direccion General de Estadística.
Reprinted From IBRD Report, p. 742.

TABLE IV

CUBAN EXPORTS, IMPORTS and NATIONAL INCOME.
1903-1949



Source: Exports and Imports: See Table.
National Income: Julian Alfonso y Urosa, *Características Fundamentales de la Economía Cubana*,
Banco Nacional de Cuba, p. 52.

a. THE UNITED STATES AND MACHADO

Harry F. Guggenheim, United States Ambassador in Cuba, for the period 1929-1933, denied in his subsequent book, The United States and Cuba, that the United States had given any particular support to the Machado regime.⁴⁴ Beals and R.F. Smith, however, present overwhelming evidence to substantiate the charge that the United States did give positive support to Machado. In any event, what is relevant to our argument here is that the United States was identified with Machado.

Ambassador Guggenheim himself points out in the book that both sides identified the United States with Machado. A member of the Committee of Cultural Relations of Latin America wrote the New York Times in 1931,

"The American Embassy in Havana, of course, receives a cross-fire of propaganda from both sides. The government propaganda would make it appear that the Machado administration is firmly buttressed by the support of the American Ambassador, which means the United States, with the consequent implication that its position is unshakeable. The opposition, which is apparently too uncoordinated to threaten effectively the stability of the Machado government, must find a scapegoat somewhere and justify to itself and its following its inability to dislodge Machado. The Ambassador serves as a convenient scapegoat and the attempt to make him such gives play to the deep-seated sentiment in Cuba, hostile to American influence."⁴⁵

b. 1933 - 1934 MEDIATION, REVOLUTION, REACTION

By 1933 the Machado regime was tottering, Assistant Secretary of State Sumner Welles was appointed Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to the Republic of Cuba to try and mediate a settlement.

Welles contacted the traditional politicians of the Union Nacionalista, the ABC, the OCRR, the Conservative opposition and the Liberal opposition. Most were prepared to accept his proposed mediation.⁴⁶

Even as Welles tried to arrange a political deal, however, events were moving too fast for him. In early 1933 the first of a series of sugar mills, the Mazabal Central, was taken over by the workers.

On July 25, the Havana bus drivers struck in opposition to increased city taxes. By August 5, under the CNOC leadership, the strike had become general and was directed against the Machado regime. Welles had not thought to invite the Communists to his mediation.

On August 8, however, the CNOC ordered the workers back. Machado had offered to recognise the legality of the CNOC, release imprisoned workers, and grant other reforms. The workers, however, remained on strike, backed by the Trotskyist influenced Federacion Obrera de la Habana. The strike only terminated with Machado's departure on August 12. The Communists lost some support as a result of their back to work call.⁴⁷

On August 11, Machado's major support, the 15,000 strong army, crumbled. On the night of August 11, ranking army officers demanded his departure.

Carlos Manuel de Cespedes was named President, and appointed an ABC dominated cabinet. Cespedes was, " ... acceptable to the officers, the upper class and most of the politicians, but the masses, the students, the anarchists, the communists thought differently."⁴⁸ Welles, who had arranged Cespedes' accession with the officers, found that he had lost control.⁴⁹

On September 4, a sergeants' revolt led by Fulgencio

Batista, an ABC member,⁵⁰ ousted the commissioned officers, overthrew the Cespedes' government and, in cooperation with the student directorate, set up the Pentarchy, which survived for five days. It was replaced on September 10 by a provisional government headed by Grau san Martin.

Professor Zeitlin writes, "The revolution was directed not only against Machado, but also against United States' political and economic domination."⁵¹ Dana Gardner Munro commented, "The principle revolutionary groups not only sought to destroy the evils of the traditional political system, but also to do away with the United States' economic imperialism."⁵² Hubert Herring, in explaining the failure of the Cespedes' regime, wrote, "First, it was regarded as American-made; it suffered from American-approval."⁵³

Reporter Ruby Hart Phillips wrote disapprovingly in her diary on September 5,

"The Palace group is talking loudly about running Cuba without American interference. How stupid. Cuba will always be under the influence of the United States ... As I write this, a sergeant broadcasting over the radio boasts of what the Cuban army will do to the Americans if they dare to land."⁵⁴

The United States' Foreign Policy Association Commission on Cuban Affairs commented succinctly,

"In 1895 the people of Cuba went to war to achieve national freedom from the rule of Spain. In 1933 they embarked on a second revolt, to attain economic independence and security and to free themselves from political misrule."⁵⁵

One of the first acts of the Grau regime was to promulgate a statute for the Provisional Government which laid down the guiding principles for the new government. The first principle was that the government would maintain the "absolute independence and national sovereignty" of Cuba.⁵⁶

United States warships were rushed to Cuban waters in anticipation of any developments.

The Grau regime could not be described as revolutionary socialist. Its underlying policy was nationalist and it sought to reform and control the Cuban structure rather than to revolutionize it. At the same time as it was passing a decree establishing an eight hour day and fixing a minimum wage for cane cutters, the regime was engaged in an attack on two fronts.

In August, sugar workers, generally under communist leadership, had initiated the seizure of many sugar centrales. The first seizure was in Punta Alegre in Camaguey Province. By September, some thirty-six mills representing 30% of the island's crop were in the workers' hands.⁵⁸

Ann Walker described the process as the "... most nearly successful movement anywhere in the Western Hemisphere to establish a sovietized regime."⁵⁹ The Foreign Policy Association Report noted that Cuba was "... in the throes not only of a political but also of a social revolution ... for a time Cuba was threatened by a serious communist movement."⁶⁰

Grau reacted by sending troops into the centrales to evict the 'agitators' and to restore control to the owners. Hundreds of labour leaders were arrested and on September 29 in Havana, troops fired on a demonstration honouring the ashes of ex-communist leader, Julio Mella.⁶¹

On October 2, government troops evicted the former army officers from a hotel in which they had established themselves.

While Grau's action against the communists may in part have resulted from a desire to appease the American interests, it was probably also prompted by Communist opposition to what they saw as a "Bourgeoisie-Landlord" government.⁶³ The communists refused offers of participation in the Grau cabinet and refused to advise on social legislation.⁶⁴ In any event, division on the left weakened the reform movement. Short of support from the communists, and continuously opposed by the Americans and conservative forces in Cuba, the Grau government was in a weak position.

The "Fifty Percent Law", primarily an appeal to nationalism and an attempt to undermine the communist drive, demanded that all enterprises employ at least 50% Cuban workers. It had the effect of ensuring the opposition of the 600,00 Spaniards in Cuba.⁶⁵

Other legislation was more radical. Payments on

the controversial Chase Loan were suspended; the Delicias and Chaparra sugar mills, the \$10,000,000 property of the Cuban-American Sugar Company were seized following continued labour troubles; the Cuban Electric Company first had its rates lowered and later, following labour disputes, was intervened.⁶⁶ A series of labour measures were passed including the establishment of a Ministry of Labour, the establishment of a minimum weekly wage and indemnified rest period, and provision for an eight hour day. The refusal of management to accept many of these measures resulted in further strikes.⁶⁷

Unable to establish what to many important groups was the ultimate in legitimacy - American recognition, and weakened by right-wing attacks from the ABC and the military, and by left-wing criticisms from the student directorate and the Communist Party, the Grau government fell on January 14. Batista, who now emerged as the most powerful figure, demanded the appointment of Mendieta as President. Mendieta's succession marked a return to the older politicians and policies and a victory for the conservative forces. His accession did

not restore order to Cuba but it ensured that further reform could not take place. Grau had combined reform with repression. Mendieta, with the the help of Batista, concentrated on the latter.

On the 5th of March, 1934, striking tobacco workers protested. When troops were sent to protect strike breakers, the protest spread to other sectors. Dock workers, truck and bus drivers, telephone employees and others struck in support. The strike, again led by the Communist Party, was smashed. Many leaders were shot and unions dissolved. The back of the radical movement was effectively broken.⁶⁸

On February 12, 1935, a walkout of teachers and students closed down every school in Cuba. They demanded cessation of military rule and the freeing of political prisoners. Labour leaders, still recovering from the set-backs of 1934, waited nearly a month before issuing a strike call for March 11. This strike was also suppressed. In the process Antonio Guiteras, radical Minister of the Interior in the Grau government, and Ruben Martinez Villena, a

leading Communist, were killed.⁶⁹

Even following the overthrow of the Grau government, no unity emerged among the radical forces. The 'Autenticos', as the Grau group came to be called, could not forgive the communists for their opposition to the Grau regime and their failure to make an immediate response to the student-teacher walkout in 1935.⁷⁰ The Communist Party, in line with international tactics in the period, tried unsuccessfully to form a popular front. This failure contributed to its subsequent alignment with Batista.

The repeal of the Platt Amendment did little to improve Cuban feelings towards the United States since many Cubans held the United States responsible for the repression of the 1933 revolution.⁷¹ In 1935, the Foreign Policy Association Report noted "... the widespread belief that the present (i.e. Mendieta/Batista) government is controlled by American diplomacy."⁷² A belief not without substance. F.A. Kirkpatrick noted in 1939 that "Batista, like other intelligent dictators, seeks to conciliate business interests and to win foreign esteem by keeping order."⁷³

VI. BATISTA IN POWER

a. THE UNITED STATES

With Batista's emergence as the man behind the throne in Cuba, America moved quickly to establish 'good relations'. On August 24, 1934, a new reciprocal trade agreement was signed reducing the rate on Cuban raw sugar from 1.5 cents per pound to .9 cents per pound and giving other tariff benefits for rum, tobacco and vegetables. In return, the Cuban government lowered import duties on many American goods and made concessions facilitating American imports.¹

The United States also acted to resolve the internal conflict between the groups interested in promoting the export trade with Cuba and Cuban investment on the one side and the American beet sugar interests on the other. The Jones-Costigan Act of March 1934 imposed a quota on Cuban sugar imports.²

Finally, the United States took care of the Cuban government's financial problems by establishing the second export-import bank which in March loaned Cuba

\$3,774,724 and in December \$4,359,095. These funds were used by the Cuban government to buy silver - which had the effect of satisfying the silverites in the Democratic Party.³

In this way the United States government kept its local backers satisfied and restored its control over Cuba, a control which would last until 1959 and which would perpetuate Cuban underdevelopment.

The immediate results were highly satisfactory. American exports rose from \$22,700,000 in 1933 to an average of \$147,100,000 for the period 1941-1945.⁴ In 1938 and 1940 the Cuban government made arrangements to meet its obligations under the Public Works' loans contracted by Machado and which had been defaulted under the Grau regime.⁵ This debt repayment was prompted by American pressure on sugar tariffs and by threatening refusal of a new loan for Cuba.⁶

One point, however, should be noted: the scale of United States' involvement in Cuba was declining as a consequence both of the general decline in world trade

caused by the depression and of the growth of alternative sources of sugar. Consequently, some diversification of agriculture seems to have taken place; the country became self-sufficient in a number of foodstuffs formerly imported and the ratio of food imports to total imports dropped from an average of 37.8% in 1924-1929 to 26.7% in 1935-1939. Annual sugar production fell from an average of 4,803,600 tons in 1926-1930 to an average of 2,819,400 tons in 1936-1941.⁷ United States investment in Cuban agriculture declined from \$575,000,000 in 1929 to \$263,000,000 in 1950.⁸

The development of the non-sugar agriculture sector appears to offer some substantiation of one of A.G. Frank's hypotheses, that is, that "the satellites experience their greatest economic development and especially their most classically capitalist industrial development if and when their ties to the metropolis are weakest."⁹ Frank mentions the depression of the thirties as one such period. In Cuba we find, as mentioned earlier, that four hundred small scale industrial enterprises developed in the late twenties, though Cuba's close integration with the United

States makes it a poor test for the hypothesis. Cuba's size, combined with this high degree of integration, gave it little potential for independent development. United States' penetration was higher than in most Latin American countries; in fact, in 1929, in spite of Cuba's size, the level of United States' investment was higher than anywhere else in Latin America.¹⁰ The Cuban economy could fairly be described as an 'appendage' of the United States economy. Cuban dealers were accustomed to ordering by phone direct from the United States.¹¹ Chile and Brazil, the cases Frank studied in detail, clearly had greater potential for independent growth; nevertheless, Cuba does provide some evidence to support Frank's hypothesis.

Again in the Second World War period we notice the development of new industry in Cuba, a development which is stimulated by the decreasing availability of imports. Events following the Second World War provide evidence to support Frank's subsidiary hypothesis that a reassertion of the old links will terminate the new development. The United States Department of Commerce publication, Investment in Cuba, notes that a return to "normalcy"

777
You
had
just
the
same
kind
of
thing
happened
in
Brazil
and
Chile
and
Argentina
and
Mexico
and
Colombia
and
Venezuela
and
Cuba
and
the
rest
of
Latin
America
and
the
Caribbean
and
the
Middle
East
and
Africa
and
Asia
and
Australia
and
New
Zealand
and
the
Pacific
and
the
Indian
Ocean
and
the
Atlantic
and
the
Arctic
and
the
Antarctic
and
the
rest
of
the
world

found these new industries facing difficulties and produced demands for a tariff protection, some of which were met.¹²

On the other hand, the increased demand for Cuban sugar caused by World War II weakened the movement which had taken place in favour of agricultural diversification. Imports of milk, meat, butter, cheese and eggs all rose. Coffee, which had reasserted its position as an export item (from importing an average of 23,000,000 pounds in the twenties, Cuba had exported an average of 8,000,000 pounds in the thirties) was again imported. In contrast, potato and rice production expanded. In the early fifties output in the non-livestock agricultural sector grew satisfactorily. However, in 1955, food imports started to rise again and continued to do so until the revolution.¹³

The fifties were also marked by a rise in United States' investment from \$657,000,000 in 1950 to \$1,001,000,000 in 1958.¹⁴ To state that is not to prove cause, but the juxtaposition would appear worthy of further investigation in the light of A.G. Frank's analysis.

all
Frank

At one point the evidence appears, at first glance, contrary to Frank's analysis. He suggests that the reduction of metropolitan ties will raise the growth rate of the economy.¹⁵ In fact, in Cuba, so crucial were sugar exports in the national income that their decline was readily apparent in a reduced G.N.P. However, Frank himself notes that in cases of "super satellite development" the result of a decline in demand may not be alternative growth but stagnation.¹⁶

b. FROM REPRESSION TO REFORM

Backed by the sergeants he had promoted in 1933, Batista retained the support of the army and took steps to broaden this base of support. In 1936 he launched a program of school construction in the interior of Cuba using the army as both builders and teachers.¹⁷ In 1937 he brought forward a three year plan designed to pull Cuba out of the depression and generate economic growth. The plans fitted well with Batista's corporatist philosophy, which he explained in July 1936 when he stated,

"I believe that Cuba should have a renovated democracy under which there should be discipline of the masses and of institutions so that we can establish a progressive state under which the masses can be taught the new idea of democracy and learn to discipline themselves - we want to teach the masses that capital and labour both are necessary and should cooperate. We want to drive out Utopian ideas."¹⁸

The three year plan envisaged a government-directed economy including controls of the sugar, tobacco and mining industries. projects for reforestation and water development, distribution of some land to the poor, and government mediation in disputes between labour and capital.¹⁹ The plan was, according to Professor Williams, "defeated by the depressed economic conditions it was supposed to counteract."²⁰

In 1939 the Constitutional Constituent Assembly, summoned by Batista, met to draft a new constitution. Batista was prompted to summon this convention by the obvious continued crisis of the Cuban economy and probably by a further desire to legitimize his position. In addition there was of course grass roots support for such reforms as might emerge from the convention. Demonstrations had retained the anti-Americanism of earlier decades and demonstrators gave vocal support to Mexico's nationalization of its oil resources, while calling for the "total economic liberty" of Cuba from American control.²¹

Batista was not the first politician to appreciate the utility of having radical documents as a means of appeasing radical demands. The constitution hurt no vested interests

since it remained as, at best, a goal to be worked for and, if not, a mere pious statement of intent. It provided an admirable backdrop to Batista's candidacy for the Presidency in 1940, undercutting san Martin's Autenticos who still had the popularity which they had achieved as leaders of the 1933 reform movement.

Professor Williams' major hypothesis in his book, The United States, Cuba and Castro, is that Castro's commitment to the Cuban Constitution of 1940 necessitated a revolution since "the constitution of 1940 could not be put into operation save through a profound social revolution".²² Insofar as this is a structural analysis of the objective changes required to implement the articles of the constitution this writer is in complete agreement with Williams.

The constitution allocates to the state the major role in economic and social development, making private interests clearly subsidiary to the public good. It is a strongly nationalistic document demanding that no pacts or treaties be concluded " ... that in any form limit or menace national sovereignty or the integrity of the territory "²³ (Article 3). Article 90 states in part, "the law shall restrictively

limit acquisition and possession of land by foreign persons and companies and shall adopt measures tending to revert the land to Cuban ownership."24 Article 90 also empowers the state to limit the size of property holdings for individuals and corporations. Article 271 empowers the state to " ... direct the course of the national economy for the benefit of the people in order to assure a proper existence for each individual."25

The constitution established minimum wages, a forty-four hour week, and social insurance benefits.

Business Week of October 12, 1940 provided an admirable summary of the situation.

"Sudden and drastic enforcement of the new regulations is not anticipated. Cuba is too closely tied to the United States, both economically and politically."26

This writer does not agree with Williams when the latter goes on to argue that Castro's commitment to the 1940 constitution provided a major spur to his revolutionary moves in 1959. The HRAF Report points out that "critics of the central government tended to regard the 1940 constitution as a goal still to be reached and to judge governments harshly in terms of their progress in implementing it during the years it was

in effect."²⁷

Undoubtedly Castro was influenced by the perspective advanced by the 1940 constitution and found in his interpretation of it an added legitimacy for the movement he was leading. By publicly upholding the 1940 constitution as a model for the new Cuba he was able to claim that he was in fact the rightful defender of Cuba's integrity and traditions. This in itself does not make the 1940 constitution a major revolutionary precipitant.

It seems far more probable that Castro's revolutionary perspective emerged from the same social conditions that had produced the radical 1940 constitution and that the determination of himself and the guerilla leaders to carry out revolutionary changes in Cuba was consolidated by the experiences of the M26 movement between 1953 and 1959.²⁸ American reaction to Castro's initial reforms in 1959 further radicalized the revolution²⁹ and the presence of a large cohesive politically conscious working class facilitated and encouraged the transition to socialism.³⁰

c. THE CUBAN COMMUNISTS

After the adoption by the Comintern of a popular front policy in 1934, the Cuban Communists acknowledged their previous 'mistakes'.

"The basic error of the party consisted in mechanically setting the class interests of the proletariat against the interests of the national liberation struggle, the aims of the bourgeois democratic, agrarian and anti-imperialist revolution in Cuba ... This ... position ... objectively facilitated the coming to power of the present reactionary government."³¹

Having rejected a position of extreme factionalism, they were to adopt within five years a position of equally extreme class collaboration.

In 1937, the Cuban Communists had at least a working arrangement with Batista's 'reactionary government' and were allowed to organize a front party, the Partido Union Revolucionaria.³² In 1938, they started publication of a daily newspaper, Hoy. Since they now openly supported Batista, while urging him to "yet more democratic positions"³³, it was not to be expected that the paper would be closed. Finally on September 2, 1938, for the first time in its history, the Cuban Communist Party was legalized. This

legalization followed a visit by Blas Roca and Joaquin Ordoqui to Batista's headquarters. It was suggested that the quid pro quo for legalization may have been continued support for Batista and support for the summoning of a Constituent Assembly.³⁴

In 1940 the Communists supported Batista's successful candidacy for the Presidency. By 1941, with the entry of the U.S.S.R. into the war, the United States, too, was a recipient of Communist praise. In 1943, Blas Roca, Secretary General, wrote in the party publication, Fundamentos del Socialismo en Cuba,

"The Cuban people need and desire close and cordial relations with the United States because they will derive innumerable advantages from these. They must continue after the end of the war also because they are indispensable to the favourable development of the Cuban economy, on which the progress of the nation depends."³⁵

Teresa Casuso summed up the position, "For the Communist Party during the war, the phenomenon of imperialism no longer existed, the very word was taboo."³⁶

In 1943, Juan Marinello, a leading Communist, entered the Batista Cabinet as Minister without Portfolio, the first Communist in any Latin American country to become a government member.³⁷

While this cooperation with Batista had advantages in giving the party a free hand in recruitment and union organization, its utility in furthering the causes of the socialist revolution, which was the party's supposed reason for existence, is more doubtful. Professor Zeitlin comments, "It was the irony of Cuban labour history that in the guise of revolutionary politics and under communist leadership, reformism and class collaboration became the dominant policies of working class organizations."³⁸ It will be useful to consider the party's reasons for collaboration.

In 1935, despite the setbacks in the two preceding years, the Communists were still a powerful force in Cuban politics. They provided the leadership of the CNOC or Cuban National Federation of Labour ³⁹, which in the words of the 1935 Foreign Policy Association report " ... stands out as the most powerful and aggressive labour group, and as the only organization really national in scope." The program of the Confederation was based on "Marxist doctrines".⁴⁰

The party was also strong in other areas. In April, 1934, its strength was in excess of 6,000 members, it

also claimed 3,500 members in the Young Communist League between sixteen and eighteen years of age. The Communist Party had 300 members in its student wing at the National University plus a number of members in the Havana Institute, the Havana Normal School, the two technical schools at Rancho Boyeros and in some provincial institutes and Normal schools. The Radical Women's Union constituted the female wing of the Communist movement. The party's largest front organization, the anti-imperialist league, had a membership of 5,000.⁴¹

At the second party congress of April 1934, the party advocated continued activity in organizing labour, encouragement of peasant land seizure and the distribution of large land holdings, mobilization of the unemployed, propaganda work in the army, navy and police and agitation among the Negroes, including the demand for Negro self-determination in the black belt of Oriente Province. The party declared itself ready to engage in election campaigns in order to forward its ideas and persuade the electorate that the only solution to Cuba's problem lay in the "agrarian and anti-imperialist revolution."⁴²

The reasons prompting the Cuban Communist Party to apparently abandon this position appear to have been Batista's more 'democratic' approach following the accession of Laredo Bru to the Presidency 43, the Comintern policy of unity against fascism, and the desire of the Cuban Communists to rebuild their organization. The Communist Party and the unions had been severely weakened by steady repression in 1934, and in the 1935 strike, had been virtually destroyed. C.A. Page in his study of Organized Labour in Cuba wrote of the 1935 general strike:

"The government mobilized its full resources against the danger, imprisoned many leaders, dissolved the unions, and made full use of the military under colonel Batista. The backbone of the movement was broken."⁴⁴

The Communists' major stronghold, the very militant Sindicato Nacional de Obreros de la Industria Azucarero (SNOIA), was completely destroyed. Most of the SNOIA syndicates had been closed during the 1934 harvest. The remainder fell victim to the repression of the 1935 strike.

It can be argued that the communists could have remained in opposition to Batista and operated illegally. Whether this might in the long term have resulted in their playing the leading role in a subsequent revolution, we

can only speculate. Nevertheless, the character of the party was to a great extent determined by its legal status, its access to the corridors of power in this period and the stress which it continued to lay on the maintenance of democratic forms in which it could function.

The Communist Party did get some tangible benefits from its cooperation with Batista both in terms of encouraging pro-labour measures and in consolidating Communist Party strength. It is arguable, however, that had the Communist Party not existed some other intermediary would have been found between Batista and organized labour. In any event, the following were the most important labour measures of that period.

- (1) Decree No. 798 of 1938 which provided for collective bargaining contracts and job tenure.
- (2) Decree No. 3185 of 1940 establishing a 44 hour week with pay for 48 hours and providing for equal pay for equal work.
- (3) Decree No. 1123 of 1943 giving the Confederacion de Trabajadores (CTC) corporate status.⁴⁶

Eusebio Mujal Bumiol of the Autenticos wrote with some

exaggeration "The Ministry of Labour (under Batista) ... has been converted, as the people of Cuba know, into a branch of the Communist Party."⁴⁷

Unions also achieved substantial wage increases. The Federacion Nacional Obrera Azucarera (FNOA), the successor to SNOIA, which had been formed in 1939 under communist leadership, achieved in 1942 a 50% increase in wages ordered by Presidential Decree No.100. Decree No. 371, in 1944, provided for a further 10% increase. In November 1944 a retirement fund, the Retiro Azucarero, was established by Presidential Decree following delays in the legislature.⁴⁸

The Communist Party also made substantial organizational gains. By January 1939, claimed party membership stood at 23,300.⁴⁹ In May 1938, the party had commenced publication of a daily newspaper, Hoy, which in 1939 became the official organ of the newly formed Confederacion de Trabajadores de Cuba (CTC) and became one of the major dailies.⁵⁰

The CTC, formed in January 1939, was under Communist

leadership from its inception and elected a leading Communist, Lazaro Pena, as its Secretary-General. The Communists gained control not only because of their ideology and previous action among the workers, but also because, in the words of a contemporary Christian reformist, "Reformist elements were absorbed and dominated by the superior capability, integrity of principles, and moral strength of the communist leaders."⁵¹

The organization of the CTC, with government approval, paved the way for the debilitation of the Cuban labour movement. During the years of Batista's rule, the labour movement relied not on militant class struggle but upon its ability to influence the government and obtain the promulgation of decree laws.⁵² This trend was consolidated by the open policy of class collaboration following Soviet entry into World War II.⁵³ Hence the corruption of labour in the late forties and early fifties had its origin in earlier communist leadership. It is even alleged that the CTC had been subsidized by Batista from the National Lottery.⁵⁴

Electorally, the communists also progressed. They supported Batista for the Presidency in 1940 and elected

ten members to the Chamber of Deputies and members to city councils throughout the island. In Santiago de Cuba, historically the center of Cuban radicalism, a communist was elected mayor and in Manzanillo, another communist was elected mayor.

In the 1944 elections the communists backed Batista's nominee for the Presidency, and while he lost out to Grau san Martin, the communists did succeed in electing three members to the Cuban Senate and nine to the Chamber of Deputies. The Cuban Communist Party was the best organized and most powerful Communist Party in the hemisphere.⁵⁵

The Communist Party was not, however, a revolutionary organization; indeed under the influence of 'Browderism' and in the wake of Tehran, the Communist Party rejected any claims to revolutionary leadership. Blas Roca, party secretary, quoted with approval Sumner Welles remark that "the imperialist era has been ended".⁵⁶ Blas Roca was later to concede that, contrary to fulfilling any Leninist role, the Communist Party took the "revolutionary edge ... off the masses".⁵⁷

Nevertheless, the communists had been instrumental in achieving some improvements for the masses. They had shown themselves capable and financially (if not politically) incorruptible.

Until 1946 the communists and the Autenticos cooperated. The opening of the Cold War, however, gave Autentico labour leaders a chance to oust the communists from the unions, which they did with encouragement from the AF of L and the Cuban government. The communists were forcibly evicted from the CTC headquarters in July 1947, and the CTC Conference held in May was declared to have been illegal.⁵⁸

In the face of systematic repression by the Autenticos, the communists reaped the results of their previous failure in militancy. Union officials who had joined the party as the avenue to promotion deserted to the Autenticos. A strike called by the communists was only partially successful.⁵⁹ While communist influence remained, communist control was broken.

The IBRD Report of 1950 noted that communist influence was still strong in the unions: "Some authorities estimate

that perhaps 25% of Cuban workers are still secretly sympathetic to them."⁶⁰ Professor Zeitlin's empirical study of Cuban workers indicated that "twenty-nine percent of the workers in our sample classify themselves as pre-revolutionary friends or supporters of the communists."⁶¹ The IBRD also made an important observation, "It must be remembered that nearly all the popular education of working people on how an economic system works and what might be done to improve it came first from the Anarcho-syndicalists and most recently - and most effectively - from the communists."⁶²

These indications of Communist Party support jar with the claims of the proponents of various types of the betrayal thesis. Goldenberg writes "although the communists exerted some influence on the organized workers and were able to maintain their leadership of the trade unions as long as they enjoyed official favour, the party was never very strong anywhere."⁶³ T. Draper writes, "The Cuban Revolution was essentially a middle-class revolution that has been used to destroy the middle-class."⁶⁴ This view found wide support. G. Masur noted, in support of Draper's

hypothesis, that the majority of the men in the Castro government were from middle-class occupations - hardly surprising in a country characterized by high levels of illiteracy and an unequal access to education.⁶⁵

On the other hand, Communist Party support should not be overstated. In the 1948 elections the party gained only 7.33% of the total vote, 50,000 less votes than they had gained in the 1946 elections (a drop from 196,000 to 143,000 votes). Undoubtedly, lack of finance handicapped the party's electoral activities. In Cuba, election expenses were generally high. One senator was alleged to have spent one quarter of a million dollars on his campaign.⁶⁶

In the 1950 parliamentary elections the communists suffered a further decline. They lost all three Senate seats and registered only 55,000 votes. The Communists still had sufficient strength in some unions to lead direct action. In 1950 the sugar workers struck during the Zafra. The communists organized 'fight committees' which successfully gained the workers' wage demands. "The Communists thus demonstrated their effectiveness and their continued support among a

large number of workers in the country's major industry."67 In their trade union activities the communists were aided by the corruption and inefficiency of the established union hierarchy. The quality of Cuban labour leadership at the official level was such that the United States' Department of Commerce could by 1956 assure potential investors that Cuban labour leaders were generally reasonable and that "their demands in matters of wage and fringe benefits since 1952 have generally not been immoderate."68 One explanation of the discrepancy between the apparent communist strength among the union rank and file and relative weakness at the polls may be the propensity of women voters to vote against left-wing parties and the low level of organization among the non-sugar rural workers.

To sum up, at the height of its influence, the Communist Party had abdicated revolutionary leadership. Nevertheless, historically, it had played an important role - more valuable perhaps in opposition - in politicizing the Cuban people and paving the way for 1959. Perhaps only Professor Zeitlin has adequately recognized this role.

VII.

THE AUTENTICOS IN POWER

The election to power in 1944 of Grau san Martin aroused high hopes in many Cubans. Grau defeated Batista's candidate Dr. Carlos Saladrigas. Grau san Martin, it will be recalled, had headed the radical Nationalist Government of 1933 which had collapsed as a result of internal dissension and American pressure. He was a leading member of what had become known as the 'generation of the thirties', those people who had fought Machado's tyranny. Another prominent member of that generation later wrote,

"Grau, in his second term, was one of the very worst presidents that we have ever had ... corruption spread throughout the island ... The country fell into one of its most shameful states in our history."¹

Under Grau and his successor, Prio Soccarras, violence and corruption continued to characterise Cuban politics.² The most damning indictment of the Cuban political system in this period is the ease with which Batista, in 1952, seized power while Prio went quietly into exile.

The Autentico Party had been formed in 1934, after Mendieta's succession to the Presidency. The party had been constituted by a number of radical groups opposed to Batista. Its initial manifesto stressed economic and political nationalism and social justice. It was avowedly concerned with instituting fundamental reforms in Cuban society and until 1939, the official strategy of the party was to seize power by violence.³ After four years in power, however, it was clear that revolution was the rhetoric rather than the reality of Autentico politics.⁴ Not that the Autenticos could be described as reactionary, a title perhaps more appropriately applied to the Liberal-Democratic coalition which opposed them. In fact, the Autenticos were viewed as pro-labour and regarded with suspicion by foreign investors.⁵ In power, however, they concentrated on dividing among themselves the spoils of office rather than engineering structural changes in the economy.⁶

The corruption of the Autenticos combined with the personal ambition of Senator Eduardo Chibas produced in

1946 the formation of the Ortodoxo Party which had basically the Autentico program - "economic independence, political liberty and social justice" - but placed its major emphasis on an anti-corruption program which received much popular support.⁷

Grau san Martin used the term 'Cubanidad' to indicate his government's supposed nationalist stance.⁸ Indeed the Autenticos made continual use of nationalist symbols. In 1948 in their campaign against Nunez Portuondo and the Democratic-Liberal alliance, the Autenticos major opponents, the Autenticos used Marti as the symbol of their heritage, identifying Nunez Portuondo with Machado.⁹ Prio Soccarres, the Autentico candidate, had played a leading role in the battle against Machado. It was propagandized that with such a record he could be trusted to defend Cuba's integrity.¹⁰ One of the major electoral assets of the Autenticos was that "the party stood vigorously for Cuban dignity and independence in relations with the United States."¹¹ At least the party claimed to take such a stance; in fact, after his election

in 1948, Prio Socarras immediately broke a pledge against soliciting foreign loans and proceeded to further break 'revolutionary' traditions by inviting in foreign capital.¹²

On social issues the Autenticos attacked the 1948 Liberal-Democratic coalition as the heirs of Machado and accused them of being a "coalition of millionaires".¹³ At the same time "the landed commercial and manufacturing classes were assured by inference that the basic institution of private property would be protected."¹⁴ For the rest, the campaign stressed the necessarily vague slogan of "the revolution". The slogan had "the magic ring which pied-pipered the hopeful common people to the polls."¹⁵ One indication of the sincerity of the Autenticos 'revolutionary' goals is illustrated by the fact that their major partner in the 1944 and 1948 election campaigns was the reactionary Republican Party.¹⁶ In fact, by 1948 the idea of implementing the revolution existed in the propaganda rather than the reality of Autentico politics. Javier Pazos, who was active in the July 26 Movement, though he subsequently became an emigre, noted

the difficulties the Autentico politicians faced in trying to oust Batista. "All their plans centered around some distant putsch but the fear of igniting a social revolution which they knew they would not be able to control without help from the army prevented them from working towards any specific objective."¹⁷ This comment is revealing not only of the ideology of the Autentico leaders but also of the degree of contradiction in Cuban society after eight years of Autentico rule.

The use of radical rhetoric was designed to appeal to those voters who did feel the need for fundamental changes in Cuba. W.S. Stokes, who provides the major information on this period, suggests that, in fact, the majority of voters may have desired such changes.¹⁸ The disillusionment which these voters felt and the sense of betrayal were reflected in an increasing opposition to the Autentico Party. In 1948 the Ortodoxo Party gained 16.4% of the vote. A public opinion poll of December 1951 showed that the Autenticos were by no means assured of winning the 1952 election. The poll indicated that the Autenticos had 33.8% of the vote while the more radical and certainly more

honest Ortodoxos now had 30%.¹⁹

It would also seem reasonable to suggest that the continued overt betrayal of electoral promises and images must have been reflected in the popular view of the Cuban political process; while the electoral tactics of the Autenticos encouraged nationalism and the desire for reform, their actions in office did not live up to these expectations.

The Communist Party, purged from the unions and refused any electoral alliances, reverted to an anti-imperialist position, a position which, no doubt, was encouraged by the Soviet Union's role in the developing Cold War. On March 6, 1949, the Party called on Cubans to free themselves from "Yankee Imperialism". Six days later the anti-imperialists received assistance from the United States Navy. Three sailors desecrated the statue of Jose Marti in Central Park. Narrowly saved from lynching by the intervention of the Cuban police, the sailors triggered off anti-American demonstrations. The United States Navy ordered all ships not to enter Cuban ports. A wreath placed on the statue by the American Ambassador, in an attempt at conciliation, was destroyed.²⁰

In 1951 Batista announced his candidacy for the Presidency. When it became apparent that he would lose the election, he turned to his associates in the army.²¹ On March 10 he led a virtually bloodless coup d'etat (only two soldiers in the palace were killed). The consistent use of violence in the ordinary run of Cuban politics had provided some legitimacy for this method of political action.²² In addition, Batista benefited from the corruption of the previous Autentico governments and from his remaining labour support dating from his last government.²³ His support had been sufficient to have him elected Senator in absentia in 1948. His support in the army was attributable to the fact that many military leaders owed their positions to the sergeant's revolt of twenty years earlier.

The Association of Sugar Farmers and the Bankers' Association offered Batista immediate support. The National Association of Manufacturers and the Commercial Exchange offered full cooperation. The United States granted immediate recognition. The leading Cuban business journal, Economia y Financera, said, according to the New York Times,

that while they were unable to praise Batista's coup, they could not deny its justification: "Private business today has more guarantee than under recent consitutional government."²⁴

The PSP (Cuban Communist Party) repudiated the coup, calling "the Yankee imperialists the instigators of the coup".²⁵ When in April two Soviet diplomats were subjected to regular customs inspection, the U.S.S.R. broke diplomatic relations with Cuba. PSP opposition to the United States' policy on the Korean War made any cooperation more difficult. Finally, in October 1953, Batista declared the party illegal.²⁶

Some party members actually entered Batista's party - Partido Accion Prgressista - where they were welcomed since they could assist in providing working class backing. Whether they entered Batista's party as opportunists or in line with party policies is unclear.²⁷

With the Autentico labour leaders, Batista was more successful. Immediately upon taking power, Batista

declared the CTC dissolved and placed Eusebio Mujal, Secretary-General of the organization, under house arrest. Within three days, however, the CTC had pledged support for the new regime and its legal status was restored.²⁸


Cuba's experiment with democratic forms had been terminated abruptly, but without difficulty. The Autenticos had succeeded in engendering little popular support, they had not fulfilled their revolutionary promises, they had not secured the support of business, in fact the response to the coup was initially mild. The Autenticos had left few people who were prepared to defend them on the barricades while those who did step forward did not identify with the old Autenticos. From a party of nationalistic reform the Autenticos had become a party of graft corruption and political opportunism. One can say in retrospect that they had denied Cuba its one possibility of peaceful reform - if, in fact, one can argue that historically there was a choice. Alternatively, the Autentico Party and its development can be viewed as the logical outcome of the inherent problems of the Cuban economy and society. As was noted earlier, with

little national industry or other employment opportunities for talented Cubans and with overwhelming economic control in the hands of a foreign country, one can reasonably ask how could Cuban development have been different? Where, in fact, given similar circumstances, has honest progressive government emerged?

VIII. THE EVE OF REVOLUTION: A SOCIO-ECONOMIC OVERVIEW

The revolution of 1959 was unusual in being achieved by the actions of a very small minority of the population and in the face of very little opposition - with the exception of Batista's army. It is important, therefore, to appreciate the underlying causes of discontent in Cuba which enabled Batista's dictatorship to precipitate the revolution and Castro's small guerilla band to act as a catalyst for this revolution.

One point which should be made very clearly is that Cuba was in no sense a country dominated by the peasantry, that it had no traces of feudalism in its agricultural structure and that, in fact, its agricultural workers, partly because of the presence of unionized and militant sugar-mill workers in the countryside, had a wage-earner consciousness rather than a peasant consciousness. They did not envision the division of the large sugar estates, rather their nationalization. They did not demand land but rather higher wages and better conditions.



Dr. M. Zeitlin describes the Cuban Revolution as "the first socialist revolution to take place in a clearly capitalist country."¹ He points out that by far the strongest, most cohesive politically conscious class was the working class. The ruling class was dependent economically on an export economy and dependent economically and politically upon American backing and military force. The ruling class lacked legitimacy for the working class and, unlike the situation in pre-revolutionary Russia, the ruling class could not expect support from any section of the peasantry. It had no social base in the countryside. In areas where, in fact, a peasantry could be said to exist, such as the Sierra Maestra, it was bitterly opposed to a central government and kept in line by force - in the Sierra Maestra, Rolando Masferrer, a pro-Batista Senator, had a private army of 1,000.

Many writers, both pro and anti Castro, dwell at some length on the overall standard of living in Cuba.² Suffice it to say that in per capita terms, Cuba was one of the wealthiest countries in Latin America. What is important, however, are not the overall statistics but those

indices which indicate the distribution of national wealth and even more important, the rate of change in national wealth.




Table V gives some indication of rural-urban disparity. Per capita income in the countryside was estimated at \$91.25 as compared to a national average of \$500.00.³ Other indices show the same rural-urban disparity.



In 1953, 43.7% of the population were classified as rural, a decline of 11.6% since 1919.⁴

One reason for rural poverty can be seen in Table VI. Less than 8% of all holdings accounted for slightly over 70% of the farmland; one half of one percent controlling more than one third of the total farm acreage. The large land holdings were not of a kind to maximize productivity. Table VII indicates the low land usage of these large farms (that is, those run by owners and administrators). The IBRD Report estimated that 60% of land in farms was tillable, while in 1950 just over 20% was under cultivation.⁵



Some decline had taken place in the role which sugar played in the economy. American investment in agriculture declined as a proportion of total agricultural investment from 62.2% in 1929 to 41% in 1950 and 31.6% in 1957.⁶ The area of total land controlled by the sugar mills declined from 26.7% in 1939 to 24.3% in 1953 and 20.9% in 1959.⁷ Nevertheless, most writers are agreed that even in 1955-1957, "the country depended mainly on sugar".⁸ Sugar production was still the prerogative of a few. The twenty-eight largest sugar cane producers controlled over 20% of all land in farms - nearly one-fifth of the island. Sugar also continued to enjoy its previous odium. Lowry Nelson wrote,

"The large sugar plantation ... is regarded by many as a monster that must be slain. That part of the animus is due to foreign ownership is very apparent."⁹

Cuban sugar was characterized more by longevity than invention. The following note will, because of the irreproachability of its source, serve as a fitting epitaph to its pre-1959 role. Irving Pfau, of the American Universities' field staff observed in 1960 that

" ... Cuba's sugar business / was / notable for its size, cartelization, inefficiency, apathy and huge profits. It has made many personal and corporate fortunes but has added virtually nothing to man's knowledge of the cane itself, its cultivation, the chemistry of its conversion into sugar, molasses, alcohol and other by-products or the usefulness of these derivatives."10

The malfunctioning of the Cuban economy is apparent from the fact that in 1958, \$80,000,000 worth or 25% of Cuba's food consumption was bought abroad.11 Between 1948 and 1953, foodstuffs accounted for 28.5% of total imports. Foodstuffs were the largest item on the import bill. The principle items in the trade were lard, rice, wheat and wheat-flour, pork, beans, dairy products and eggs. With the exception of wheat and lard all the items were also produced locally.12

In seeking to explain the chronic stagnation of pre-revolutionary Cuba, Professor Seers wrote,

"Two institutional explanations for this chronic stagnation stand out. The first is that the great majority of land was held in large estates ... the second reason is the trade treaties with the United States."13

It is not the thesis of this paper that 'nationalism' was the sole causal factor of the 1959 revolution, rather that the shape of Cuban society was determined by the American link and that, in so far as this structure gave rise to conflict and revolutionary movements, it also gave rise to anti-Americanism. This connection between the problems of the Cuban economy and the American link may not always have been immediately apparent, but Cuban intellectuals and the Cuban Communist Party were not slow to clarify the situation.

Some economic diversification had taken place by 1958 but not in sufficient amount to solve the problem. The IBRD had reported in 1950 that,

"The Cuban workers and their leaders are a prey to the anxieties which result from the instabilities, the stagnation, and the chronic unemployment of the Cuban economy. They see all about them the fearsome consequences to workers and their families from loss of jobs. They lack confidence in the will or ability of employers, investors and the government to create new enterprises and new employment. They have vivid memories of past abuses by employers and of past oppression by governments."¹⁴

Systematic data on unemployment are not available before 1957 but the agricultural census of 1946 gave some

figures on its effects on the 400,000 paid temporary workers who constituted one-half of the occupied agricultural population. Fifty-two percent of these workers worked no more than four months in a year; only 6% had worked in excess of nine months.¹⁵ A survey of 5,000 families throughout Cuba between May 1956 and March 1957 gave the results in Table VIII. This table indicates not only a high general level of unemployment and underemployment crucially connected with the operation of the sugar industry but also shows that even at the height of the Zafra (February to April), 9% remained unemployed. In 1957, the United States Chamber of Commerce publication, Investment in Cuba, noted that, "The solution / to the problem of unemployment / is a matter of creating alternative opportunities for the employment of workers, primarily those in the sugar industry."¹⁶ Charles Magoon had made a similar statement half a century earlier, progress in Cuba was, at best, slow.

One of the major theses of Professor Zeitlin's work on the Cuban revolution is that this economic insecurity was a major contributory factor in inducing support for the 1959 revolution. He quotes with approval the con-

clusion of Zawadski and Lazarsfield on a study of unemployed Polish workers in the thirties:

"The experiences of unemployment are a preliminary step to the revolutionary mood but ... they do not lead by themselves to a readiness for mass action. Metaphorically speaking, these experiences only fertilize the ground for revolution, they do not generate it."17

Zeitlin estimates that unemployment and underemployment averaged 20.2% in 1957 and 19% in 1958.18 The result of his own surveys of political attitudes indicates that "workers with the least pre-revolutionary economic security are the ones who are most likely to support the revolution."19

Zeitlin also found that the Communist Party had significantly higher support before 1959 among those who had experienced high unemployment.20

Unemployment was not confined to labour resources.

Investment in Cuba reported:

"Few countries carry a heavier overhead of underutilized productive facilities. Cuba's sugar mills work for only a few months a year, its railways, highways and ports handle less than their capacity of traffic and many of its industries are handicapped by obsolete and inefficient production practices."21

The problem in Cuba was not one of a shortage of production

facilities, it was not one of an absence of entrepreneurial skill, it was not one of a shortage of available capital to invest; the problem was one of a socio-economic milieu which prohibited rational expansion and diversification. According to Investment in Cuba, "an impressive class of entrepreneurs" existed who, while generally tied to the sugar industry, formed an available reservoir of talent for more diverse activities.


The IBRD Report concluded that in Cuba the problem was not one of low capital formation so much as the misallocation of available capital. From 1947 to 1949, private construction, mainly of the luxury variety, accounted for 25% of gross capital formation. Very little was invested in new ventures or in expanding existing plants.²³ Investment in Cuba noted that while by 1956 some new investments had been made, the situation remained fundamentally unchanged. While savings averaged 13.1% of the GNP, 1950-1954, 27% of these savings were used for building construction while a further portion were used to purchase foreign assets.²⁴

Both Baran and Frank have documented the view that

capital shortage does not constitute the prime problem in underdeveloped countries. The problem lies both in the distribution of available capital and in the absence of outlets for native investment. The latter problem arises because foreign owned and foreign based industry supply most of the necessary manufactured goods or establish local assembly plants.²⁵

The problem was such that the National Bank of Cuba, in a report issued in 1956, questioned the possibility of maintaining the living standard of 1947. Investment in Cuba commented: "The difficulties of even maintaining the 1947 standard of living in the decade ahead (1956-1966) are of such proportions as clearly to require a very high degree of cooperation among the various sectors of the economy as well as sound and aggressive leadership on the part of the government."²⁶

Economic progress in the twentieth century in Cuba had been slight. In some areas an actual decline in welfare had taken place. In 1925-1926, 63% of the Cubans' school-age population was enrolled in primary school; in 1955 only



51% were enrolled, a lower enrollment than in all but three Latin American countries.²⁷

Cuba, since the early 1920's, had stagnated. The IBRD reported, "The present per capita income of about \$300 is only slightly above that of the 1920's."²⁸ Seers concluded,

"Cuba in the thirty-five years from 1923 to 1958 showed little progress. The stagnation was more serious and lasted longer than in any other Latin American economy, excepting perhaps the economy of one or two small and poor nations such as Bolivia and Haiti."²⁹

The writer is unable to find any data on the historical development of income distribution. Lowry Nelson does, however, note that in the fluctuations inherent in the one crop economy, there was considerable mobility "up and down the social hierarchy", and that "great masses of the poor have been pushed further down the scale".³⁰ It is possible that if systematic data were collected, they might well confirm, as Baran and Frank suggest for other countries, that much of Cuba's population had suffered immiseration as a result of imperialist expansion.

Another point which should be noted regarding income

distribution is that while racism in Cuba never approached that in the south of the United States, those classified as 'coloureds' - Chinese, blacks and mestizos - were "Predominantly the 'hewers of wood and drawers of water' for the whites."³¹

American investment, which had been declining prior to 1950, had increased from 1950 onwards. Total United States' investment stood at \$990,000,000 in 1929, \$657,000,000 in 1950 and \$1,001,000,000 in 1958.³² In the period 1928-1946, United States' overseas investment was, in general, low. Total direct investment actually declined from \$7,500,000,000 to \$7,200,000,000. However, as domestic profit margins began to shrink and earnings abroad to rise, foreign direct investment rose from \$7,200,000,000 to \$40,600,000,000 in 1963.³³ While Cuban investment, it may be assumed, was influenced by the same general factors, the statistics are not what the reader would expect. In the period 1929-1954, United States' investment in Latin America rose by 74.3%, while in Cuba, the value of United States' investment declined by 25.4%. Two factors help to explain this trend.

On the one hand, the depression of 1929 lowered the value of United States-Cuban holdings; on the other, the major increases in United States' investment in Latin America were in the fields of oil manufacturing and minerals. Cuba was a recipient of only a small amount of manufacturing investment and had little to offer in the way of oil and minerals.³⁴ The largest single increase in United States' investment in Cuba took place in the field of public utilities. The United States, in 1958, owned 90% of Cuban telephone and electrical services and 50% of public service railways.³⁵

Two notable changes did take place in the ^{WW} structure of United States' investment in Cuba. Most of the Cuban sugar industry had, by 1958, passed into Cuban control though, of course, the market was still controlled in the United States. The share of sugar production emanating from Cuban-owned sugar mills rose from 22.4% in 1939 to 58.7% in 1955. The American share fell from 55% of total production to 40%. The investment of other nationalities suffered the greatest decline. Non-American foreign-owned mills produced 34% of of the total output in 1939; in 1955 the same category accounted for just over 1% of total production.³⁶

diff. investment & better control.

120
587
—
467

The fall in non-American foreign holdings was not confined to sugar. British holdings, which included a section of the railway industry, declined from 44,000,000 pounds in 1913 to less than half a million pounds by 1955.³⁷

Control of the Cuban banking sector also passed into Cuban hands. Deposits held by Cuban banks rose from 16.8% in 1939 to 60.2% in 1950.³⁸ The growth of Cuban-owned banks was mainly due to their ability to capture new business rather than a concomitant decline in the business of foreign-owned banks. They were aided by the adoption of a peso monetary system - in 1951 the United States' dollar ceased to be legal tender - the establishment of a national bank, and a less conservative approach to financing than that adopted by the foreign banks. Nevertheless, by 1954, they had still not recouped the position they held in 1920 when they had 80% of the business.³⁹

In spite of this decline in the proportion of foreign investment, in early 1960, United States' investment in Cuba was the second largest in Latin America, exceeded

only by Venezuela where United States' investment was high because of the capital-intensive oil industry. Direct United States' investment accounted for 31.6% of Cuban agriculture and 11.9% of Cuban industry (figures as of 1957).⁴⁰ Control was more extensive than these figures suggest. Dudley Seers wrote that in many ways the Cuban economy was merely an appendage of the United States' economy and suffered from a lack of independence which would have hindered any policy of diversification.⁴¹

United States' companies frequently invested in established Cuban concerns or set up local subsidiaries.⁴² The Cuban branch became dependent upon the United States parental company, which stood to make a handsome profit on its dealings with the subsidiary.⁴³ Cuban capital was invested in collaboration with American capital, not in competition with it.

Industry which was described as Cuban frequently belonged to naturalized citizens. The largest 'Cuban-owned' sugar enterprise was owned by Julio Lobo of German origin; the famous Bacardi Company was owned by the Espins of

French origin and the Boschs of German origin.⁴⁵ One searches in vain for the 'national bourgeoisie'.


Some further comments should be made on the nature of United States' investment in Cuba. While the value of United States' investment in Cuba started to rise after 1946, not all of this increase in investment represented new capital. In fact, while United States' direct investment in Cuba increased from \$553,000,000 in 1946 to \$713,000,000 in 1954, the total net flow of private capital into Cuba (of which the overwhelming majority must have been United States' capital) was only \$103,400,000. The majority of new investment took place from the ploughing back of profits. Not all profits were reinvested. In the same period, profit remittances abroad averaged \$65,300,000.⁴⁶ Paul Baran wrote, "The increase of western assets in the underdeveloped world ... is primarily a result of the reinvestment abroad of the economic surplus secured abroad."⁴⁷

In case it might be thought that the period quoted is exceptional we should note that in the war years a net outflow of capital funds took place in addition to normal


profit remittances. This was partly caused by Cubans investing abroad. By 1955 Cuban investments in the United States were estimated at \$150,000,000.⁴⁸ In 1952-1958, a period of rapidly rising United States' investment, only \$120,900,000 of approximately \$330,000,000 of new investment was financed by new capital funds, while in the same period gross outflow on dividends and interest amounted to \$369,100,000.⁴⁹

Cuba was subjected to a further capital drain in the form of remittances sent to the Spanish mainland by Spaniards resident in Cuba. Spaniards dominated the retail industry. Prior to 1935, remittances had been between ten and twenty million dollars. By 1955, the amount had fallen but may still have been in excess of \$5,000,000.⁵⁰

Foreign corporations made high profit in Cuba. The eight largest American corporations made an average net profit of 23% between 1935 and 1957 though this high rate of profit was not unusual for foreign investors.⁵¹ The high rate of profit left its mark on Cuba's balance of payments.



Between 1952 and 1958 Cuba suffered a balance of payments deficit of nearly half a billion dollars which was covered in the main by payments from Cuba's reserves. The deficit was caused in part by government corruption, which at this level was reflected in the export of capital to foreign accounts, but the major cause of the deficit was the failure of merchandise sales to cover the traditional deficit on other items. In the period under examination the deficit on the item of transportation alone stood at \$431,000,000.⁵² Cuba, like other countries in Latin America, was forced to pay heavily for 'services'. A.G. Frank calculates that Latin America as a whole spends over 60% of its entire foreign exchange earnings on services.⁵³



Between 1950 and 1954 transportation accounted for 8.1% of payments on current account. Remittances of profits accounted for another 6.9%. In addition, Cuba, in spite of its large tourist industry, suffered a further deficit on travel which accounted for 4.1% of expenditures in the period under consideration; or, to put the figures differently, in the period 1945-1954, while receipts from tourism averaged \$17,100,000, expenditures averaged \$27,600,000, a net yearly

drain of \$10,500,000.⁵⁴ This reflects, among other things, the unequal income distribution in Cuba.

Cuba's major trading partner was the United States, which in 1954 purchased 68.5% of Cuba's exports as compared to an average of 85% between 1941-1945 or an average of 76.9% between 1931-1940. In the same period the United States provided 75.3% of Cuba's imports in 1954, as compared with an average of 81.2% in 1941-1945 or 65.4% in 1931-1940.⁵⁵

It was inevitable, given both a high degree of stagnation and insecurity and a high degree of American control and investment, that Americans should receive a considerable amount of opprobrium for the situation. Some would argue that imperialism was made a scape-goat.⁵⁶ This writer would disagree, but in any event developments in Cuba substantiate a hypothesis suggested by G. Balandier, that conflicts in a colonial situation become generalized and take the form of a challenge to the colonial order.⁵⁷

In 1935, the Foreign Policy Report had concluded: "The conditioning influences, both national and international,

which surround Cuban communism suggest that it may become a major factor only if the forces of nationalism and capitalism permit the Cuban masses to fall into a state of desperation similar to that prevailing before the fall of Machado."⁵⁸

The economic conditions of the mass of people suffered no precipitous decline. What did happen was that constant stagnation and insecurity seemed, under the existing conditions, inevitable. Then in 1952, Batista seized power. The Autenticos had promised the 'revolution' but had achieved little. Batista promised less and achieved a tyranny unparalleled since Machado. The Cuban political system had little claim to legitimacy. It had not fulfilled the historic goals of Cuban nationalism - however vague these goals may appear - it had not produced a strong economy, and finally, it had not even preserved democracy.

Cuba appears to have been a classic example of a country whose links with a metropolitan power had restricted and distorted its development. Internally, the

sugar centrales had acted to draw the surplus out of the colonos, a surplus which in turn had been exported to the United States. It seemed, as Frank put it, that "short of liberation from this capitalist system as a whole" Cuba was "condemned to underdevelopment".⁵⁹

In 1952 a young lawyer emerged on the scene, speaking in the traditional language of the revolutionary Cubans. He promised an end to tyranny, unemployment and injustice. Batista's coup had served as a catalyst which would bring to the fore a new type of Cuban politics aimed at the creation of a new social order. Castro did not lead a mass revolution, but what he could rely on was that Batista had little support outside the army. When he gained power he could also rely on a vast number of Cubans - the blacks, the illiterate, the unemployed and the nationalist students - to back a program of radical change.⁶⁰

TABLE V
HOUSING CONDITIONS IN CUBA, 1953
(In percentages)

	URBAN	RURAL	CUBA
BUILDINGS			
Masonry	51.8	2.7	33.5
Wood	34.6	16.4	27.7
Palm or wood thatch	9.7	75.4	34.3
Other	3.9	5.5	4.5
FLOORS			
Tile	53.3	2.6	34.4
Cement	26.9	18.2	23.6
Wood	6.6	7.5	6.9
Earth	9.3	66.2	30.6
Other	3.9	5.5	4.5
CONDITIONS			
Good	53.8	25.7	43.4
Fair	37.6	48.4	91.6
Poor	8.6	25.9	15.0
WHEN BUILT			
Before 1920	36.1	8.1	25.7
1920 to 1945	35.8	46.6	39.8
After 1945	28.1	45.3	39.5
LIGHTS			
Electric	87.0	9.1	58.2
Acetylene	.3	1.9	.9
Kerosene	12.3	87.6	40.1
Other	.4	1.4	.8
WATER			
Inside piping	54.6	2.3	35.2
Cistern	5.2	4.6	5.0
Outside Piping	22.0	8.1	16.8
River, well or spring	18.2	85.0	43.0
TOILETS			
Water closet, inside	42.8	3.1	28.0
Water closet, outside	18.9	4.8	13.7
Privy	33.3	38.0	35.1
None	5.0	54.1	23.2
BATHS			
None	35.1	90.5	55.6
Tub or shower	64.9	9.5	44.4
REFRIGERATION			
Mechanical	26.5	2.4	17.3
Ice	11.0	1.1	7.3
None	62.5	96.5	75.2

Based on 1,256,594 Living units (793,446 urban, 463,148 rural).
Source: Censos de Poblacion, Viviendas y Electoral, 1953.
Reprinted from Seers, p.98.

TABLE VI
CUBAN FARMS BY SIZE GROUPS
1945

SIZE GROUPS (hectares) ^a	(number)	FARMS (percent)	AREA (thousand hectares)	(%)
0.4-24.9	111278	69.6	1021.9	11.2
25.0-99.9	35911	22.5	1608.0	17.7
100.0-499.9	10433	6.5	2193.6	24.1
500.0-999.9	1442	0.9	992.5	10.9
1000 and over	894	0.5	3261.1	36.1
TOTALS	159958	100.0	9077.1	100.0

^a One hectare equals 2.471 acres.

Source: Cuban Agricultural Census, 1946. Reprinted from Seers, p. 75.

TABLE VII

<u>TYPE OF TENURE</u>	<u>% OF LAND UNDER CULTIVATION</u>
administrator	14.9%
owner	16.2%
renter	28.3%
subrenter	36.8%
sharecropper	40.7%
squatter	21.0%

Source: IBRD Report, pp.90-91.

TABLE VIII

SEASONAL FLUCTUATION OF UNEMPLOYMENT IN CUBA
MAY, 1956 - APRIL, 1957.

PERIODS	THOUSANDS OF UNEMPLOYED	% OF LABOUR FORCE
May-June	435	19.7
August-October	457	20.7
November-January	353	10.6
February-April	200	9.0
AVERAGE	361	16.4

Source: Symposium de Recursos Naturales de Cuba. Reprinted, Seers, p.83.

TABLE IX

ATTITUDE TOWARD REVOLUTION BY PRE-REVOLUTIONARY EMPLOYMENT

MONTHS WORKED PER YEAR BEFORE REVOLUTION	FAVOURABLE	INDECISIVE	HOSTILE	(N)
6 or less	86%	9%	5%	63
7 - 9	74%	10%	16%	19
10 or more	62%	13%	25%	105

Source: Zeitlin Book, p.55.

IX. CONCLUSION

We have attempted to demonstrate that the Cuban Revolution was the consequence of a series of historical developments, the most important of which was the emergence in mid-19th century and steady growth of United States economic interest in Cuba.

United States' investment in Cuba and the political ramifications of this development served to develop a monocultural economy in Cuba or in A.G. Frank's terms, it served to "underdevelop" Cuba. We have attempted to provide some evidence to support an application of this model to Cuba.

A direct consequence of United States' investment was the growth of anti-Americanism in Cuba, a sentiment which expressed the negative part of Cuban nationalism. Anti-Americanism can only be understood, as we have pointed out, in its socio-economic context. High levels of unemployment and political corruption were very clearly connected with American domination. Alienation from aspects of the social system tended therefore to become generalized in opposition

to the United States. Finally, many Cubans held the United States responsible not only for the abortion of the War of Independence but also for the suppression of the 1933 Revolution.¹




The Cuban Communist Party played a very important role in politicizing Cuban workers and providing a coherent ideological alternative to the status quo. On the other hand, no coherent group could be organized in defence of the status quo. The degree of American penetration was such that there was no nationally rooted governing class in Cuba. Batista had demonstrated in his 1952 coup that the Cuban political system had little strength. By 1958, Batista could not even count on the support of the Cuban bourgeoisie, many of whom gave active or passive support to Castro - though not to the idea of a socialist revolution.² The strength of the Cuban bourgeoisie can also be judged from their failure to generate any serious internal political opposition to the socialist stage of the revolution, and from the speed with which they left for their ideological and financial alma mater, the U.S.A.

This sentence is not correct

Disputed

When Castro came to power he had the support of most of the population. He could, in particular, rely on the thirty percent or so of the working class who, historically, had supported the Communist Party. It is important to remember that in 1933 an unsuccessful revolution had been directed to securing Cuba's national independence. At that time some observers seriously raised the possibility of a Communist revolution in Cuba. Twenty-six years later the basic conditions in Cuban society remained the same - unemployment, economic stagnation, political corruption and American control. In 1933, it had been the tyranny of Machado which had provided the final straw. In 1958, it was the tyranny of Batista. The important difference was that in 1959, the revolutionaries, having defeated Batista's army, now had a monopoly of coercive power. They did not have to guard against an internal coup from the army and they were strong enough to resist the attempts of the United States to divide them. In addition, the rebels of 1959 remembered 1933. Many, like Guevara, were aware of what happened in Guatemala and Bolivia; they were not inclined to repeat the same mistakes.

We have not, because of limitations of space, dealt with the method by which Castro seized power or the developments in the revolutionary movement from 1953 to 1959 or with the internal and external forces which dictated a socialist solution once power was seized. It is my view that the analysis put forward by M. Zeitlin is the correct one, that is that the Cuban Revolution was driven to socialism by the reaction of the United States to any radical moves Castro made and by the fact that the Cuban Revolution was the first to take place in a thoroughly capitalist society. What we mean by this is that there were no elements of feudalism against which the revolution had to be directed and that the "... largest class, the most cohesive class, the most politically conscious class (as a class) was the working class, an organized, national cohesive class that spread and stretched throughout Cuba."3 The Cuban peasantry was numerically small; proletarianized, agricultural labourers dominated in the countryside and in addition the peasantry was not integrated into any cohesive, legitimizing national culture. In fact, the peasantry in the Sierra Maestra had come into conflict with the military before Castro's



arrival.

We can state on the basis of our own analysis that no previous attempts prior to 1959 to improve Cuba's economic performance had met with marked success and that no progress had been made in equalizing income distribution. We can also state that the failure of the Cuban economy to develop was integrally linked with United States' investment in and control over the Cuban economy. Cubans were, in general, aware of this. In fact, not only had American economic domination to be broken if development was to take place but, in addition, anti-Americanism was such as to make this not only an objective analytical fact but also an inevitable move once the opportunity arose. Socialism was not only a response of the internal alliance of political forces and the external reaction of the United States, it was a rational response to the need for economic development. In Cuba in 1959 it was not possible to develop an independent national capitalism. As the United States increasingly penetrates the advanced capitalist countries of Europe, it is not realistic to argue that an island ninety miles from the United States, with a population of six million could, without socialism, have broken away from United States' control - even supposing

that capitalism in any form could have served to develop Cuba.

It is important to note that Cuban history was atypical of that of the rest of Latin America. Cuban independence occurred nearly eighty years after the mainland struggles. American intervention meant that there was no period of real independence. That intervention combined with American investment and the sugar slump of the 1920's meant that Cuba had no national governing class. America dominated Cuba far more than it dominated the other nations of Latin America - economically, politically, geographically. This, in itself, would suggest that we cannot expect the Cuban experience to be repeated elsewhere. Even if we hold everything else constant, we would not expect a guerilla struggle to accomplish a revolution with such relative ease in a country where the ruling class had strong roots in the country - particularly in the rural areas - and an aura of constitutional and national legitimacy. But perhaps even more important than the specific historical situation of Cuba is the fact that never again will the United States be caught unawares, never again will the upper classes in Latin America favour a radical 'reformer' over a bloody dictator. The Cuban Revolution served to call the people of Latin America to arms, to

renew their fight for liberty. It also served to arouse the owners of the continent to redouble their efforts to retain control. The death of Che Guevara, in Bolivia, was a symbol of this struggle, but it was not the end. The Cuban Revolution, reminded revolutionaries everywhere that history is on our side.

[Faint, illegible handwritten text, possibly bleed-through from the reverse side of the page.]

X. INTRODUCTION

1. Armando Hart, "La Intransigencia del Movimiento Liberador Cubano", Pensamiento Critico, No.8, Sept. 1967, p.108.
2. G. Plekhanov, The Materialist Conception of History, International Publishers, New York, 1964, p.44.
3. G. Balandier, "The Colonial Situation: A Theoretical Approach", in I.Wallerstein, Social Change in the Colonial Situation, p.51 *date?*
4. J. Gallagher and R. Robinson in Nadel and Curtis, ed., Imperialism and Colonialism, p.108.
5. cf. A Aguilar, Pan-Americanism From Monroe to the Present, New York and London, 1968, p.25.
6. Ibid., pp.50-51.
7. S. Nearing and J. Freeman, Dollar Diplomacy, p.106.
8. A. Aguilar, p.80.
9. Ibid., pp.83-84.
10. Ibid., p.91.
11. Ibid., p.96.
12. Ibid., p.100.
13. Ibid., p.101.
14. Ibid., p.104.
15. Oscar Lewis, La Vida, London, 1968, p.51.
16. P. Baran, Political Economy of Growth, New York, 1962, p.178.
17. H. Magdoff, Economic Aspects of U.S. Imperialism, New York, p.27.

18. P. Baran, op.cit., p.181.
19. Ibid., p.182.
20. Ibid., p. 184.
21. Ibid., pp.189-190.
22. P. Jalee, The Economic Pillage of the Third World, New York, 1968, pp.28-55.
23. Ibid., p.33.
24. Ibid., pp.85-96.
25. Capital, V.1, Kerr edition, p.493. Quoted by P. Sweezy, Marx and the Proletariat, Monthly Review, V.19, No.7, December 1967, p.40.
26. P. Baran, op.cit., pp.194-195.

27. The following table indicates the relative penetration of foreign capital into Cuba, which can be seen, is far higher than in many larger Latin American countries. Distribution of United States' direct investments in Latin America by principal countries: 1958 (\$ Billion)

Venezuela	2.86 (reflecting the high capital cost of petroleum operations)
-----------	---

Brazil	1.35
Cuba	.86
Mexico	.78
Chile	.74
Argentina	.52
Peru	.43
Central America	.74

The figures are taken from Weisband, Latin America Actuality, p.33 and reprinted from A. Cyria, "Notes in the Latin American Revolution". Robin Blackburn writes "It is clear then that the Cuban capitalist class would not properly be described as a 'national' bourgeoisie. All major sections of Cuban capital were compromised in the exploitation of Cuba by United States capital and collaborated as subordinates in prolonging the retardation and stagnation of the economy." R. Blackburn, Prologue to the Cuban Revolution, New Left Review, No.21, p.61.

28. P. Baran, op.cit., p.31.
29. P. Baran and P. Sweezy, Notes on the Theory of Imperialism, Monthly Review, V.17, No.10, p.30.
30. cf. Roy Marini, Brazilian Interdependence and Imperialist Integration, Monthly Review, December 1965, V.17, No.7.
31. Chalmers Johnson, Revolutionary Change, Boston and Toronto, 1966, p.56.
32. Ibid., p.162. The four basic functions are enumerated, p.53.
33. G. Balandier, op.cit., p.52.
34. Ibid., p.57.
35. Ibid., p.50.
36. During the course of the development of the independence movement the question of slavery became paramount and policy moved from moderate reformism through gradual abolition to immediate emancipation. A clearly rational decision in that it allied the slaves with independence and struck at the economic base from which Spain and the rich sugar planters could fight in the Ten Years War.
37. R.F. Smith, The United States and Cuba, New Haven, 1960, p.113.
38. Whittaker and Jordan, Nationalism in Contemporary Latin America, New York, 1966, p.188.
39. R.T. Ely, "The 'Golden Age' of the Hacienda", in R.F. Smith, ed., The Background to Revolution, New York, 1966, p.95.
40. Ibid., quoted, p.99.
41. R. Blackburn, Prologue to the Cuban Revolution, New Left Review, No.21, pp.58.63.
42. C. Veliz, Obstacles to Reform in Latin America, World Today, January 1963, p.22.

43. Ibid., p.25.
44. Ibid., p.26.
45. Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth, New York, 1968, pp.149-153.
46. Hugh Seton Watson, Nationalism, Old and New, University of Sydney, 1965, p.5.
47. C. Johnson, Peasant Nationalism and Communist Power, Stanford, California, 1962, p.22.
48. Boyd C. Schafer, Nationalism, Myth and Reality, New York, 1965, p.134.
49. K. Silvert, Nationalism in Latin America, APSA Annals, V.334, March 1961, p.3.
50. C.A.M. Hennessy, The Roots of Cuban Nationalism, International Affairs, V.39, July 1939, p.354.
51. Ibid., p.355.
52. Boyd C. Schafer, op.cit., p.136.
53. J. Kautsky, Political Change in Underdeveloped Countries, Nationalism and Communism, New York, Wiley, 1962.
54. Quoted in C. Johnson, Peasant Nationalism and Communist Power, Stanford, California, 1962, p.21.
55. Karl Deutsh, Social Mobilization and Political Development, American Political Science Review, V.LV, No.3, September 1961, p.503.
56. Ibid., p.504.
57. August 30, 1960, 'Communist Threat to the United States Through the Caribbean' hearings before the Senate Subcommittee to investigate the administration of the International Security Act.
58. J. Kautsky, op.cit., p.45.

[Handwritten notes and scribbles on the right side of the page, including a large circular mark and illegible text.]

59. Ibid., p.51.
60. see particularly T. Draper, Castro's Revolution, Myths and Realities, New York, 1965.
61. C. Veliz, op.cit., p.28. "In the context of this paper it is permissible to take what is usually described as 'rising middle class' as synonymous with or at any rate similar to what goes elsewhere under the name of bourgeois capitalist group." C. Veliz, p.23.
62. Ibid., p.29.
63. C.A. Thompson, The Cuban Revolution: Reform and Reaction, Foreign Policy Reports, V.XI, No. 22, January 1936, p.262.
64. L.L. Synder, The Dynamics of Nationalism, pp. 297-298.
65. Ibid., p.291.
66. C. Johnson, Peasant Nationalism and Communist Power, p.5.
67. Ibid., pp.9-10.
68. Fidel Castro, "On Trial", History Will Absolve Me, London, 1968, pp.29-31.
69. Ibid., cf. pp.31, 32, 34. The 'Manifiesto Programa del Movimiento 26 de Julio', which stated the goals of the M26 Movement condemned the "colonial mentality and foreign domination" of the republic. Quotes M. Zeitlin, "Political Generations in the Cuban Working Class", Latin America, Reform or Revolution?, New York, 1968.
70. Fidel Castro, op.cit., pp.26, 30.
71. R. Taber, M26. Biography of a Revolution, New York, 1961, p.133.
72. Joan Robinson, Cuba, 1965, Monthly Review, Febraury 1966, p.18.

EARLY DEVELOPMENTS IN CUBA

1. The major source I have relied on for the early period is P. Foner, A History of Cuba and its Relations With the United States, V.1, New York, 1962.
2. Ibid., p.33.
3. Ibid., p.35.
4. Julio le Riverend, Economic History of Cuba, Havana, 1967, pp.70-71.
5. P. Foner, op.cit., p.48.
6. cf. Guerra y Sanchez, Sugar and Society in the Caribbean, forwarded by S. Mintz, New Haven, 1964, p.15. And E. Williams, Capitalism and Slavery, New York, 1966, pp.3-29.
7. This is a view of R. Guerra y Sanchez, Sugar and Society in the Caribbean. For a contrary view see le Riverend. Le Riverend argues that by the end of the sixteenth century a landholding oligarchy was already in existence and that many whites were forced to work for wages. Le Riverend, op.cit., pp.58-65. Foner would appear to support Guerra y Sanchez, see P. Foner, op.cit., p.45.
8. Le Riverend, op.cit., p.88.
9. Ibid., p.94.
10. Ibid., pp.104-105. cf. also Guerra y Sanchez, op.cit., p.40.
11. Le Riverend, op.cit., p.111.
12. P. Foner, op.cit., pp.40-41.
13. Le Riverend, op.cit., p.133.
14. cf. C.L.R. James, The Black Jacobins, New York, 1938, also P. Foner, op.cit., pp.62-63.

15. cf. E. Williams, Capitalism and Slavery, New York, 1966, pp.135-154.
16. Guerra y Sanchez, op.cit., p.42.
17. R. Blackburn, Prologue to the Cuban Revolution, New Left Review, No.21, p.54. It should be noted that before the Haitian slave revolts, Haiti was the world's largest single producer of sugar and coffee.
18. P. Foner, op.cit., p.46.
19. R. Blackburn, op.cit., p.54.
20. Ibid., p.55. We should note that Cuba's population was in practically every way atypical of other Latin American and Antilles colonies:
 - (1) had no remaining native population
 - (2) at the same time did not have a slave economy approaching the proportions of the British West Indies or Haiti where 30,000 whites tried to maintain control over 500,000 blacks.
 - (3) Cuba contained far more Peninsulares (Spanish-born residents) and loyalists emigres than the other colonies.cf. R. Blackburn, op.cit., p.55.
21. R.T. Ely, "The Golden Age of the Hacienda", in R.F. Smith, ed., The Background to Revolution, The Development of Modern Cuba, New York, 1966, p.62.
22. R. Blackburn, op.cit., p.55.
23. R.T. Ely, op.cit., p.165. Support for Spain was not unanimous. When the Revolutionary Junta of Caracas invited Cuba to join the Republic of Gran Colombia in 1810, the call was enthusiastically accepted by a meeting of poor whites in Havana and just as quickly rejected by the Junta Superior of Cuba representing upper class interests. With only 2% of their populations of African origin the mainland colonies could afford the luxuries of independence, but for the Cuban landowners, independence might have cost them their slaves, a price they were not willing to pay. R. Blackburn, op.cit., p.55.
24. P. Foner, op.cit., pp.81-89.

25. R. Blackburn, op.cit., p.55. One historian writes, "when the Wars of Independence ended no real social revolution had occurred. The structure of colonial society, inherited from Spain, remained essentially unaltered. To the mass of the population the change of masters was of no great consequence." G. Pendle, A History of Latin America, Great Britain, 1963, p.86.
26. cf. P. Foner, op.cit., pp.100-123.
27. The free negroes and mulattoes played a full part in the battle against slavery. Denied political and social equality, their own advancement depended upon eliminating slavery. Foner, op.cit., p.51.
28. C.L.R. James wrote of the Haitian poor whites, "the distinction between a white man and a man of colour was for them fundamental. It was their all." C.L.R. James, op.cit., p.23. A similar pattern was observed in the American south though in the south there were periods of unity between poor whites and blacks. cf. C. van Woodward, The Strange Career of Jim Crow, New York, 1957.
Cuba does not seem to have suffered the same phenomena which by creating a division among the oppressed militates against the growth of a revolutionary alternative. It is difficult to find any consistent explanation of this. Partially the reasons for the development of unity in Cuba can be seen in the realization of the pro-independence whites, that not only was slavery a profound obstacle on the way to independence but also that the slaves and ex-slaves would provide valuable support against the Spanish and pro-Spanish Cubans. In addition the profound anti-racism of the revolutionary leaders, black and white, must have had its impact on the rank and file. Foner notes that even in the early days of the independence movement, free blacks and slaves were welcomed. P.Foner, op.cit., p.107. This does not mean that racism was absent from working class movements. The formation of Mutual Aid Societies, in the 1850's, the precursors of the Cuban trade union, was along racial lines. P. Foner, A History of Cuba and Its Relations with the United States, V.II, New York, 1963, pp.138-139.

29. P. Foner, op.cit., V.I, pp.52-54 and 77. One traveller to Cuba noted in 1859 "according to the strictness of the written law no native Cuban can hold any office of honour, trust or emolument in Cuba." Richard Henry Dana, in R.F. Smith, ed., op.cit., p.88.
30. P.Foner, op.cit., V.I, p.108.
31. Ibid., p.95. The problem was overcome by smuggling. Le Riverend, op.cit., p.157, and by Spanish laxity. P. Foner, op.cit., V.I, p.108.
32. P. Foner, op.cit., V.I, pp.112-118. It is interesting to note that the terse slogan of the revolutionaries Independencia o Muerte bore similarity to one which emerged nearly 140 years later - 'Patria o Muerte'.
33. Suspected Negroes were tied to a ladder and lashed, hence 'La Escalera' (the staircase). P. Foner, op.cit., V.I, p.214.
34. F. Ortiz, Cuban Counterpoint: Tobacco and Sugar, New York, 1947, p.49. By 1861 mechanization was largely completed. Out of 1,442 mills, 949 were operated by steam power. United States Department of Commerce, Investment in Cuba, Washington, 1956, p.35.
35. According to Leyland Jenks, while production of sugar increased from 90,000 tons to 300,000 tons between 1827 and the early 50's, the number of sugar mills increased only from 1,000 to 1,500. L. Jenks, Our Cuban Colony, New York, 1928, p.25. After 1860, the number of mills began to decline according to one source from 2,000 in 1860 to 1,190 in 1877. Guerra y Sanchez, op.cit., p.63.
36. Le Riverend, op.cit., pp.138-139. According to the 1850 census, total population was 1,247,230 (605,560 white; 205,570 free Negroes - Free Negroes originally emerged from the practice of hiring slaves out. Everything the slave made above his required work allotment could be set aside to buy his freedom. Others escaped from slavery by fleeing to different parts of the island or by setting up 'small colonies' in the hills. Mulattoes resulted from illicit unions between slave owners and black

women. Some were freed, others took the status of their mothers. P. Foner, op.cit., V.I, pp.50-51; 436,000 slaves).

According to the 1862 census, total population was 1,359,238 (728,957 whites; 34,050 Asiatic; 7,439 Yucatecans - these two groups indicated the results of the Cuban landlord's search for alternative cheap labour.

Both groups came under contract; 4,521 Emancipados - the Emancipados were Africans taken from captured slave ships. They were, according to the law, to be placed in service for from five to seven years, then set free. In fact, many were worked to death and others re-enslaved. P. Foner, op.cit., V.I, pp.189-191; 221,417 free Negroes; 368,550 slaves). Hence, while population had risen, the number of slaves had declined considerably. P. Foner, op.cit., V.I, p.212, V.II, p.128.

C.A. Page estimates that free labour in employment rose from 105,000 in 1841 to 316,000 in 1861. To counteract the diminishing quantity and rising price of slaves, contract labour was introduced, between 1853 and the last importation in 1873, 132,435 Chinese embarked for Cuba. Others were imported from the Yucatan, but on the whole contract labour was not very satisfactory. C.A. Page, Organized Labour in Cuba, thesis, University of California, 1952, pp.3-5.

For an account of the British Abolitionist's activities see E. Williams, Capitalism and Slavery, New York, 1966. The British abolished slavery in 1833 and immediately set out to terminate slavery in Cuba in order to end the island's advantage over the British West Indies.

In 1840 David Turnbull, a noted abolitionist, was appointed Consul to Havana and was later accused of complicity in La Escalera, though by the time of the revolt he had, in response to Spanish pressure, been withdrawn as Consul. P. Foner, op.cit., V.I, pp.201-217.

C.L.R. James notes that British attitudes to slavery were not exclusively humanitarian. In Haiti, the British opposed slavery - except at those times when it seemed that the island might fall into their hands. cf. C.L.R. James, op.cit.

37. Le Riverend, op.cit., p.159.

38. C.A. Page, op.cit., p.18.

39. C.A.M. Hennessy, The Roots of Cuban Nationalism, International Affairs, V.39, July 1939, p.347. See also P. Foner, op.cit., V.I, p.108.
40. United States Department of Commerce, op.cit., p.35.
41. Blackburn, op.cit., p.56. P. Foner, op.cit., V.I, p.186. Le Riverend, op.cit., pp.139, 171, 172.
42. P. Foner, op.cit., V.I, pp. 44, 67, 69.
43. Ibid, p.71.
44. Ibid, pp.130-132.
45. Le Riverend, op.cit., p.177.
46. F. Ortiz, op.cit., p.64.
47. Le Riverend, op.cit., pp.178, 179.
48. Ibid, p.179. P. Foner, op.cit., V.II, p.12.
49. P. Foner, op.cit., V.II, p.9.
50. For an account of the Annexationist's Movement and United States' policy towards Cuba see P. Foner, op.cit., V.I, pp.124-169, V.II, pp.9-65.
51. P. Foner, op.cit., V.I, pp. 156, 167.
52. L. Jenks, op.cit., pp.9, 10.
53. P. Foner, op.cit., V.II, p.23.
54. Ibid, pp.30-40.
55. Ibid, pp.41-74.
56. Ibid, p.121.

THE BATTLE FOR INDEPENDENCE

1. P. Foner, A History of Cuba and its Relations With the United States, V.II, New York, 1963, pp.170-171.
2. R. Blackburn, Prologue to the Cuban Revolution, New Left Review, No.21, p.56. In the western region, according to the 1869 census, there were 300,989 slaves; in the central and eastern districts where the revolt was strongest there were only 62,297 slaves. P. Foner, op.cit., V.II, p.192.
3. L. Jenks, Our Cuban Colony, New York, 1928, p.25.
4. R. Blackburn, op.cit., p.56.
5. P. Foner, op.cit., V.II, p.132.
6. Ibid, p.193.
7. Ibid, p.174.
8. Charles C. Griffin, "Economic and Social Aspects of the Era of Spanish-American Independence" in L. Hanke, Readings in Latin American History, V.II, New York, 1966, p.5.
9. Ibid, p.8.
10. G. Pendle, A History of Latin America, Great Britain, 1963, pp.100, 104-105.
11. F.A. Kirkpatrick, Latin America, New York, 1939, p.108.
12. H. Herring, A History of Latin America, New York, 1960, pp.275, 283.
13. cf. R. Taber, The War of the Flea, New York, 1965.
14. P. Foner, op.cit., V.II, p.176. The volunteers were initially set up to meet the threat of annexation by the United States.
15. Ibid, p.182.

16. Ibid, p.181.
17. Ibid, p.189.
18. Ibid, p.254.
19. Ibid. pp.191-194.
20. Ibid, p.186. Gomez once stated "I went to war ... in order to fight for the liberty of the Negro slaves, and it was then, that realizing there also existed what could be called white slavery, I united the two ideas in my determination." P. Foner, op.cit., V.II, p.254.
21. Ibid, pp.194-195.
22. Ibid, p.195.
23. Ibid, pp.253-275. Amando Hart, "La Intransigencia del Movimiento Liberator Cubano", Pensamiento Critico, Havana, No.8, September 1967, p.275.
24. P. Foner, op.cit., V.II, p.200.
25. Ibid, p.201.
26. Ibid, pp.204, 243-244. This view of Fish is not unanimous. See for example, W. I^a R^eber, The New Empire, 1963. But Foner's analysis is convincing. Those who doubt the influence of business groups on the formulation of foreign policy are referred to W.G. Domhoff, Who Rules America?, New Jersey, 1967. Domhoff suggests that the upper class has more control over the executive branch than the legislative branch of Congress. Though Domhoff is dealing with the modern period it is interesting to note that Fish was an aristocratic New Yorker and that the bulk of the Cabinet supported his pro-Spanish position. Congress favoured the rebels. W.G. Domhoff, op.cit., pp.97-103, 111-114.
27. P. Foner, op.cit., p.250.
28. Edward Atkins acquired the Soledad Central by this means in 1882. He was to play a prominent part in Cuban politics. F. Ortiz, Cuban Counterpoint: Tobacco and Sugar,

- New York, 1947, p.64. P. Foner, op.cit., p.295.
29. R. Blackburn, op.cit., p.57. L. Jenks, op.cit., p.31, estimates the number of mills at 400.
 30. Le Riverend, Economic History of Cuba, Havana, 1967, p.166.
 31. Guerra y Sanchez, Sugar and Society in the Caribbean, New Haven, 1964, p.24.
 32. L. Jenks, op.cit., p.33.
 33. Ibid, p.30.
 34. Guerra y Sanchez, op.cit.
 35. E. Williams, Capitalism and Slavery, New York, 1966, p.152.
 36. F. Ortiz, op.cit., p.63. cf. also L. Jenks, op.cit., p.33.
 37. C.A. Page, Organized Labour in Cuba, thesis, University of California, 1952, p.2.
 38. Guerra y Sanchez, op.cit., pp.88-89. L. Jenks, op.cit., p.33.
 39. A.Fremantle, Mao Tse-Tung, An Anthology of His Writings, New York, 1962, pp.54-55.
 40. P. Foner, op.cit., V.II, p.293.
 41. H. Magdoff, The Age of Imperialism, Part 1, June 1968, Monthly Review, pp.16-17.
 42. P. Foner, op.cit., V.II, p.297. Le Riverend, op.cit., p.170.
 43. P. Foner, op.cit., V.II, p.297.
 44. L. Jenks, op.cit., p.37. Jenks, however, understates the degree of control. For example, by 1892, the British Consul in Havana could report that British trade with Cuba had "almost become a thing of the past." P.Foner, op.cit., V.II, p.341.

45. P. Foner, op.cit., V.II, p.298.
46. Ibid, pp.340-341. L. Jenks, op.cit., p.39.
47. P. Foner, op.cit., p.298. R. Blackburn, op.cit., p.56.
48. C.A. Page, op.cit., p.25.
49. Ibid, p.23.
50. P. Foner, op.cit., V.II, p.294.
51. C.A. Page, op.cit., pp.17-18.
52. Ibid, p.22.
53. Ibid, p.25.
54. Ibid, p.26.
55. Ibid, pp.16, 26.
56. P. Foner, op.cit., V.II, p.302.
57. C.A. Page, op.cit., p.20.
58. Ibid, p.31.
59. Ibid, pp.16-18.
60. J. Manach, Marti: Apostle of Freedom, New York, 1950, p.148.
61. Ibid, p.154.
62. Ibid, p.63.
63. Ibid, p.190. Fidel Castro has compared Marti's rejection of reformist and electoral remedies with his own stress on the need for revolutionary warfare in Latin America. Marti, however, placed far more emphasis on political leadership than 'Fidelista's' such as DeBray appear to. Granma, Weekly Review, October 13, 1968, p.3.

64. J. Manach, op.cit., p.225.
65. Ibid, p.217.
66. C.A.M. Hennessy, The Roots of Cuban Nationalism, International Affairs, V.39, July 1939, p.355.
67. J. Manach, op.cit., p.363.
68. P. Foner, op.cit., V.II, p.329.
69. P. Foner, op.cit., V.II, p.348.
70. Foner is unclear whether the landing took place on March 31 (V.II, p.353) or March 29 (V.II, p.355). Beals offers April 1 as the date. C. Beals, The Crime of Cuba, Philadelphia, 1933, p.95.
71. C. Beals, op.cit., p.103.
72. P. Foner, op.cit., V.II, p.274.
73. R. Blackburn, op.cit., p.57.
74. Ibid, p.57.
75. Armando Hart, op.cit., p.108.
76. C.J. Post, "The Little War of Private Post", R.F. Smith, ed., Background to Revolution, The Development of Modern Cuba, New York, 1966, p.60.
77. C. Beals, op.cit., p.108.
78. Foreign Policy Association, Commission on Cuban Affairs, Problems of the New Cuba, New York, 1935, p.31.
79. R. Blackburn, op.cit., p.88.
80. Ibid, p.57.
81. C.E. Chapman, A History of the Cuban Republic, New York, 1927, p.90.
82. C. Beals, op.cit., p.93.

83. H. Guggenheim, The United States and Cuba, New York, 1934, p.45.
84. H. Herring, op.cit., p.406.
85. W. MacGaffey and C. Barnett, Twentieth Century Cuba, New Haven, 1965, p.14.
86. W. La Feber, op.cit., p.287.
87. A. Hart, op.cit., p.120.
88. Ernest R. May, Imperial Democracy, New York, 1961, p.120. The declaration of neutrality, for instance, on June 12 1895, forbade Americans from enlisting in the Cuban cause, or fitting out warshipd for the rebels. Olney discouraged banks from making loans to the rebels, and the coastguard attempted to ensure against any expeditions from America.
89. C. Beals, op.cit., p.95.
90. W. La Feber, op.cit., p.300.
91. Ibid, p.333.
92. L. Jenks, op.cit., p.57.
93. W. La Feber, op.cit., p.335.
94. H. Magdoff, op.cit., pp.11-16. A. Aguilar, Pan-Americanism, From Monroe to the Present, New York, 1968, pp.36-37.
95. H. Magdoff, op.cit., p.16.
96. G. Pendle, op.cit., p.171.
97. H. Magdoff, op.cit., p.20.
98. Ibid, p. 21.
99. W.A. Williams, The United States, Cuba and Castro, New York, 1962, pp.6,7.
100. A. Aguilar, op.cit., p.41.

101. Ibid, p.46.
102. W.A. Williams, op.cit., p.6.
103. H. Herring, op.cit., p.799.
104. Ibid, p.799.
105. W. La Feber, op.cit., p.384.
106. C. Beals, op.cit., p.120.
107. L. Jenks, op.cit., pp.51-52.
108. W. La Feber, op.cit., p.385.
109. E.R. May, op.cit., p.118.
110. P.T. Moon, Imperialism and World Politics, New York, 1926, p.417.
111. H. Herring, op.cit., p.406.
112. C.E. Chapman, op.cit., p.87.
113. E.R. May, op.cit., p.143.
114. W. La Feber, op.cit., p.392.
115. Ibid, p.389.
116. C. Beals, op.cit., p.137.
117. L. Jenks, op.cit., p.47.
118. W. La Feber, op.cit., p.351.
119. C. Beals, op.cit., p.136.
120. L. Jenks, op.cit., p.42.
121. W. MacGaffey and C. Barnett, op.cit., p.14.

122. C. Beals, op.cit., p.138.

123. C.A.M. Hennessy, op.cit., p.352.

124. P.T. Moon, op.cit., p.419.

X 125. R.F. Smith, The United States and Cuba, New Haven, 1960,
p.24.

FROM SPANISH RULE TO AMERICAN EMPIRE

1. C. Beals, The Crime of Cuba, Philadelphia, 1933, p.138.
2. D. Healy, The United States in Cuba, 1898-1902, Madison, 1963, p.210.
3. Quoted, T. Casuso, Cuba and Castro, New York, 1961, pp.47-48. cf. also A. Aguilar, Pan-Americanism, From Monroe to the Present, New York, 1968, pp.44-45.
4. Portel Vila, in Curtis Wilgus, ed., The Caribbean Area, V.II, Washington, 1934, p.183.
5. C. Beals, op.cit., p.207.
6. R.F. Smith, The United States and Cuba, New Haven, 1960, p.24.
7. J. North, Cuba: Hope of a Hemisphere, New York: International, p.75. S. Shapiro, Cuba, A Dissenting Report, The New Republic, September 22, 1960, p.12. This price was not entirely atypical of the operations of foreign companies in underdeveloped areas. cf. P. Baran, Political Economy of Growth, New York, 1962, pp.178-179.
8. Gramma, Weekly Review, October 13, 1968, p.4.
9. R.F. Smith, op.cit., p.23.
10. Ibid, quoted, p.23.
11. Quoted, B. Goldenberg, The Cuban Revolution and Latin America, New York, 1965, p.102.
12. R.F. Smith, op.cit., p.29.
13. C.A. Page, Organized Labour In Cuba, University of California, 1952, pp.53-55.

14. cf. R. Blackburn, Prologue to the Cuban Revolution, New Left Review, No.21, p.58.
15. Commission on Cuban Affairs, Foreign Policy Association, Problems of the New Cuba, New York, 1935, pp.2,51.
16. Ibid, p.3.
17. For a discussion of the growth of United States' banking overseas see H. Magdoff, The Age of Imperialism, Part II, October 1968, Monthly Review, pp.23-28.
18. G.H. Cox in Curtis Wilgus, ed., op.cit., pp.200-201.
19. W. MacGaffey and C. Barnett, Twentieth Century Cuba, New Haven, 1965, p.22.
20. R.F. Smith, op.cit., p.83.
21. Ibid, p.105.
22. Ibid, p.107.
23. Ibid, p.84.
24. Ibid, quoted p.39.
25. Ibid, p.87.
26. Ibid, pp.82-102.
27. M. Zeitlin and R. Scheer, Cuba: Tragedy in Our Hemisphere, New York, 1968, pp.37-38.
28. Quoted, R.F. Smith, op.cit., p.112.
29. Ibid, pp.113-136.
30. B. Goldenberg, op.cit., p.103.
31. C. Beals, op.cit., p.197.
32. Ibid, p.198.

33. Ibid, p.199.
34. Quoted, B. Goldenberg, op.cit., p.103.
35. Ibid, p.103.
36. cf. Fidel Castro's speech on the 100th anniversary of the October 10th revolt. Gramma, Weekly Review, October 13, 1968, p.3. cf. also Armando Hart, "La Intransigencia del Movimiento Libertador Cubano", Pensamiento Critico, No.8, September 1967, p.120. Hart notes that with the death of Maceo and Marti, the revolution lost its major anti-imperialist leaders.
37. Quoted, Monthly Review, V.19, No.8, January 1968, p.40.
38. W. MacGaffey and C. Barnett, op.cit., p.21.
39. M. Zeitlin, "Determinants of Political Democracy in Chile", in M. Zeitlin and J. Petras, Latin America, Reform or Revolution?, New York, 1968, pp.226-231.
40. L. Nelson, Rural Cuba, Minneapolis, 1956
41. W. MacGaffey and C. Barnett, op.cit., p.47.
42. L. Jenks, Our Cuban Colony, New York, 1928, p.27. This view is not universally accepted. The authors of the United States Department of Commerce Publication, Investment in Cuba wrote, "the middle class forms an unusually large and influential portion of the total population." United States Department of Commerce, Investment in Cuba, Washington, 1956, p.4.
43. cf. R. Blackburn, op.cit., pp.59-64.
44. Mao Tse-Tung, "Analysis of the Classes in Chinese Society", in Anne Fremantle, ed., Mao Tse-Tung, An Anthology of His Writings, New York, 1962, p.52.
45. B. Walker, The Labour Policy of the Cuban Government Since 1925, University of California, 1947, p.30.

46. E. Boorstein, The Economic Transformation of Cuba, New York, 1968, pp.4-13.
47. W. MacGaffey and C. Barnett, op.cit., p.55. The habits of the Cuban rich had serious economic consequences. For example, women in the 'middle and upper classes' preferred imported styles in outer wear hence depriving the Cuban clothing industry of an avenue of development. Investment in Cuba, p.86.
48. W. MacGaffey and C. Barnett, op.cit., p.56.
49. L. Jenks, op.cit., p.184.
50. H. Herring, Can Cuba Save Herself?, Current History, November 1933, p.158.
51. A.G. Frank, Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America, New York, 1967, p.xii.
52. C. Beals, op.cit., pp.242-243. R.F. Smith, op.cit., p.114. L. Jenks, op.cit., p.269. T. Casuso, op.cit., p.51.
53. P. Vila, in Curtis Wilgus, ed., op.cit., pp.186-188.
54. cf. C.A. Page, op.cit., pp.40-41. M. Zeitlin, Working Class Politics in Cuba: A Study in Political Sociology, Berkely, 1964, pp.25-26.
55. C.A. Page, op.cit., pp.60-64.
56. M. Zeitlin, op.cit., pp.1,11.
57. W.A. Williams, The United States, Cuba and Castro, New York, 1962, p.1
58. Ibid, pp.8,9.
59. R.F. Smith, op.cit., pp.113-116.
60. Ibid, p.102.

61. Quoted, L. Jenks, op.cit., pp.272-273.
62. cf. R.F. Smith, op.cit., p.29.
63. cf. H. Kantor, The Ideology and Program of the Peruvian Aprista Movement, New York, 1966.
64. cf. Leon Trotsky, The Russian Revolution, Garden City, New York, 1959 and W.F. Warde, Uneven and Combined Development in History, New York, 1965.
65. M. Zeitlin, op.cit., p.16, for the later period see for example, the 1950 IBRD Report and the United States Bureau of Commerce Report, Investment in Cuba.
66. Professor M. Zeitlin suggests four main reasons for the Communist victory over the Anarcho-syndicalists. Briefly summarized they are:
 - (a) the success of the Russian Revolution
 - (b) The Communist use of electoral politics (which the Anarcho-syndicalists shunned).
 - (c) the increasing scale of Cuban industry, particularly the Cuban sugar industry.
 - (d) Machado, in his labour repression, killed or drove into exile many of the Anarcho-syndicalist leaders.
(cf. M. Zeitlin, Revolutionary Politics in the Cuban Working Class, Princeton, 1967.)
67. R.J. Alexander, Communism in Latin America, New Brunswick, 1957, p.271.
68. Ibid, p.270.
69. Ibid, p.270.
70. Professor S.W. Washington writes " ... an important characteristic of Latin America is that many uneducated have a respect for the few educated ... their views on politics are listened to by the uncultured ... when the students enunciate a principle to fight for they generally find a following." (C.S.N. Washington, "The Political Activity of Latin American Students " in Latin American Politics, R.D. Tomasek, ed., Garden City, New York, 1966.) In Chile, for example, as

70. (con't) early as 1906, students were engaged in spreading literacy among the workers. In 1931, their student union, FECH, initiated student strikes which sparked off the April resistance that toppled dictator Carlos Ibanes Campo. (cf. F. Bonilla, The Student Federation of Chile, Fifty Years of Political Action, Journal of Inter-American Studies, No.3, 1960.) A number of hypotheses have been suggested to account for the prominent role that intellectuals and students have played in revolutionary movements. Some of these were referred to earlier in the introduction. It is sufficient to state here that Cuban students predominantly engaged in liberal arts courses, could not help but be familiar with Cuba's nationalistic and revolutionary heritage. At the same time, they were confronted with the fact that the major occupations available entailed working with United States' companies or the Cuban client government. They were propelled into politics by the very inconsistency of the ideals which they inherited and the reality which they faced. (For a fuller discussion of the role of intellectuals in revolutionary movements see this writer's paper. The Social Composition and Recruitment of Revolutionary Movements.)
71. There is some dispute as to whether Mella was killed by a Machado agent or by an agent of the Mexican Communist Party. He had served for a short time as the general secretary of the party but had been expelled two weeks before his death. Victor Alba in his History of the Communist Parties of Latin America, suggests that it may have been the work of a double agent payed by both Machado and the Mexican Communists. Cited, R.J. Alexander, op.cit., p.271. Beals presents strong evidence that in fact the assassin was a Machado agent. C. Beals, op.cit., pp.266-269. In fact, the Cuban government had good reason to take action against Mella since he was in Mexico to organize a revolutionary force to invade Cuba. Gamma, Weekly Review, August 25, 1968, p.10.
72. R. Poppino, International Communism in Latin America - A History of the Movement, 1917-1963, New York, 1964, p.80.
73. R. Blackburn, op.cit., p.88.
74. Commission on Cuban Affairs, Foreign Policy Association, Problems of the New Cuba, New York, 1935, pp.30-32

75. W. MacGaffey and C. Barnett, op.cit., p.26.
76. R. Blackburn, op.cit., p.61.
77. L. Jenks, op.cit., p.139.
78. Ibid, p.140.
79. D. Seers, Cuba, The Economic and Social Revolution, Durham, North Carolina, 1964, p.13.
80. Quoted, F. Ortiz, Cuban Counterpoint: Tobacco and Sugar, New York, 1947, p.xx.
81. Ibid, pp.51,53,65.
82. P. Baran, Political Economy of Growth, New York, 1962, p.186. My brackets.
83. R. Guerra y Sanchez, Sugar and Society in the Caribbean, New Haven, 1964, p.xii.
84. Ibid, p.49.
85. Ibid, p.71.
86. P. Baran, op.cit., p.194.
87. R. Guerra y Sanchez, op.cit., p.72.
88. Ibid, p.73.
89. R. Blackburn, op.cit., p.58.
90. F. Ortiz, op.cit., p.53. There was nothing 'feudal' about the foreign ownership or production for profit of these large estates, nor did the sugar workers perceive the relationship as 'feudal'. For a discussion of the role of monopoly powers in the internal metropolis-satellite relationship, cf. A.G. Frank, Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America, New York, 1967, pp.17-21.
91. A.G. Frank, op.cit., p.198.

92. International Bank for Reconstruction and Development in Collaboration with the Government of Cuba. Economic and Technical Mission to Cuba. Report on Cuba: Findings and Recommendations of an Economic and Technical Mission Organized by the IBRD in Collaboration with the Government of Cuba in 1950, Washington, 1951, p.87. For a fuller discussion of Cuban agriculture see section entitled "The Eve of Revolution: A Socio-Economic Overview".
93. A.G. Frank, op.cit., p.114.
94. K.S. Taylor, Brazil's North East, Monthly Review, March 1969, p.26.
95. Ibid, p.199.
96. Ibid, p.18.
97. United States Department of Commerce, op.cit., pp.29-30.
98. R. Blackburn, op.cit., p.58.
99. R. Guerra y Sanchez, op.cit., p.106.
100. P. Baran, op.cit., pp.189-190.
101. R. Guerra y Sanchez, op.cit., pp.151-152.
102. F. Ortiz, op.cit., p.31.
103. R. Guerra y Sanchez, op.cit., p.81.

THE ABORTED REVOLUTION - A SUMMARY OVERVIEW

1. M. Zeitlin, Working Class Politics in Cuba: A Study in Political Sociology, thesis, Berkeley, 1964, p.33
2. Quoted, C.A. Page, Organized Labour in Cuba, University of California, 1952, p.61, from a Cuban source.
3. B. Walker, The Labour Policy of the Cuban Government Since 1925, University of California, 1947, p.35.
4. cf. R.F. Smith, The United States and Cuba, New Haven, 1960, pp. 115-117. C. Beals, The Crime of Cuba, Philadelphia, 1933, pp.247-248. Beals estimates the number of government murders as in excess of 1000. (cf. C. Beals, op.cit., p.239) Zeitlin notes that on one occasion, two hundred sugar workers were lynched after allegedly kidnapping a well-known hacendado. (cf. M. Zeitlin, op.cit., p.33.)
5. M. Zeitlin, op.cit., p.34.
6. Ibid, p.33.
7. R.F. Smith, op.cit., p.118.
8. Ibid, p.115.
9. G.H. Cox, in Curtis Wilgus, ed., The Caribbean Area, V.II, Washington, 1934, p.196.
10. R.F. Smith, op.cit., pp.43-71.
11. Ibid, p.50.
12. B. Walker, op.cit., p.30.
13. United States Department of Commerce, Investment in Cuba, Washington, 1956. p.72.
14. Ibid, p.77. B. Walker, op.cit., p.30, mentions cheese, condensed milk, cement, shoes, paints and toothpaste as products developed as a result of the 1927 protective tariff.

15. B. Goldenberg, The Cuban Revolution and Latin America, New York, 1965, p.104.
16. B. Walker, op.cit., p.32.
17. A.G. Frank, The Development of Underdevelopment, Monthly Review, V.18, No.4, September 1966, p.28.
18. D. Seers, Cuba, The Economic and Social Revolution, Durham, North Carolina, 1964, p.15.
19. Ibid, p.13.
20. A.G. Frank, op.cit., pp.148-149.
21. International Bank for Reconstruction and Development in Collaboration with the Government of Cuba. Economic and Technical Mission to Cuba, Report on Cuba: Findings and Recommendations of an Economic and Technical Mission Organized by the IBRD in Collaboration with the Government of Cuba in 1950, Washington, 1951, p.728. From 1914 to 1932, the dollar was virtually the only medium of exchange. After 1932, more Cuban currency was issued and an attempt was made to maintain parity with the dollar. In 1951, the dollar ceased to be legal tender. United States Department of Commerce, op.cit., p.131.
22. H. Magdoff, The Age of Imperialism, Part II, October 1968, Monthly Review, p.43.
23. Ibid, p.44.
24. A.G. Frank, On the Mechanisms of Imperialism: The Case of Brazil, Monthly Review, September 1964, p.285. cf. also, H. Magdoff, Economic Aspects of United States Imperialism, V.18, No.6, November 1966, Monthly Review, pp.27-28. P. Baran, Political Economy of Growth, New York, 1962, pp.178-179. P. Baran and P. Sweezy, Monopoly Capital, New York, 1967, p.196.
25. See Table II.

26. A.G. Frank, Services Rendered, Monthly Review, V.17, No.2, June 1965, p.44.
27. cf. R.F. Smith, op.cit., pp.69-71. W. MacGaffey and C. Barnett, Twentieth Century Cuba, New Haven, 1965, p.26.
28. L. Jenks, in Curtis Wilgus, ed., op.cit., p.164.
29. M. Zeitlin, op.cit., p.37.
30. Ibid, p.34.
31. cf. for example, T. Casuso, Cuba and Castro, New York, 1961, p.66. C. Beals, op.cit., p.318. B. Goldenberg, op.cit., p.104. W. MacGaffey and C. Barnett, op.cit., pp.24-25.
32. H. Herring, The Downfall of Machado, Current History, XXXIX, October 1933, p.24. The ABC is nowhere described as Marxist, but its manifesto, Al Pueblo de Cuba, stated "Fundamentally economic in its interpretation of the historic Cuban problem, the ABC program does not share the blind confidence of the old liberalism in the automatic advantages of democracy." B. Walker, op.cit., p.41. It is well to beware of attempts to impose European typologies on Latin American movements. The Fascism of the ABC was no more comparable to European Nazism than was the oft alleged Fascism of Peron. For a discussion of Corporatismo in Cuba see W.A. Williams, The United States, Cuba and Castro, New York, 1962, pp.58-68. See also, W.A. Williams, Historiography and Revolution, The Case of Cuba, Studies on the Left, V.3, No.3, Summer 1963, p.85.
33. C. Beals, op.cit., p.318.
34. R.H. Phillips, Cuba, Island of Paradox, New York, 1959, p.47.
35. W. MacGaffey and C. Barnett, op.cit., p.25. The lack of cohesion of the ABC is manifested by the fact that Batista, an ABC member, overthrew the short-lived government of Carlos Manuel de Cespedes, which was dominated by ABC members. A section of the ABC subsequently revolted against Grau san Martin's student-backed government, yet it is reported that students constituted one of the major social bases of the ABC. It seems that the only unifying element in the party was opposition to Machado. Once potential power was in reach the ABC split not only between right and left but also for less clearly ideological reasons.

36. C. Beals, op.cit., p.318.
37. L. Nelson, Rural Cuba, Minneapolis, 1956, p.106.
38. Ibid, pp.111-112.
39. T. Casuso, op.cit., p.58.
40. B. Walker, op.cit., p.39.
41. C. Beals, op.cit., p.314.
42. Ibid, p.313.
43. Commission on Cuban Affairs, Foreign Policy Association, Problems of the New Cuba, New York, p.10.
44. H. Guggenheim, The United States and Cuba, New York , 1934.
45. Ibid, pp.186-187.
46. R.F. Smith, op.cit., pp.147,225.
47. M. Zeitlin, op.cit., pp.37-40.
48. B. Goldenberg, op.cit., pp.105-106.
49. Casuso notes that the ultimatum to Machado was actually delivered at Welles' instigation. T. Casuso, op.cit., p.60. Certainly, Welles thought he had solved the problem - warned on August 20th by the New York Times correspondent of a pending revolution, Welles 'laughed'. cf. R.H. Phillips, Cuba, Island of Paradox, New York, 1959, p.57.
50. W. MacGaffey and C. Barnett, op.cit., p.26.
51. M. Zeitlin, op.cit., p.39.
52. Ibid, quoted, p.40.
53. H. Herring, Can Cuba Save Herself?, Current History, November 1933.
54. R.H. Phillips, op.cit., p.65.

55. Commission on Cuban Affairs, Foreign Policy Association, op.cit., p.1.
56. Ibid, p.13.
57. C.A. Thompson, The Cuban Revolution: Reform and Reaction, Foreign Policy Reports, V.II, No.22, January 1936, p.262.
58. B. Walker, op.cit., p.47.
59. Ibid, p.47
60. Commission on Cuban Affairs, Foreign Policy Association, op.cit., p.14.
61. Ibid, p.184.
62. C.A. Thompson, op.cit., p.265.
63. M. Zeitlin, op.cit., p.42.
64. C.A. Page, op.cit., p.76.
65. C.A. Thompson, op.cit., p.266.
66. Ibid, pp.266-267.
67. C.A. Page, op.cit., pp.77,85.
68. M. Zeitlin, op.cit., p.46. See also Commission on Cuban Affairs, Foreign Policy Association, op.cit., p.185.
69. M. Zeitlin, op.cit., p.44. Guiteras became a symbol of the Cuban labour movement. By far the most vociferous member of the Grau cabinet, he had been an " .. ardent exponent of revolutionary nationalism and anti-imperialism." C.A. Page, op.cit., p.76. In the late 1940's a group of disillusioned Communist labour leaders formed a group known as Accion Revolucionaria Guiteras to train labour leaders in the syndicalist doctrines expounded by Sorel. C.A. Page, op.cit., p.173.
70. The Communists subsequently acknowledged that their tactics and strategy in this period had been mistaken. M. Zeitlin, op.cit., p.42.

71. M. Zeitlin, "Political Generations in the Cuban Working Class", Latin America, Reform or Revolution?, New York, 1968, p.279.
cf. also H. Herring, Another Chance for Cuba?, Current History, XXXIX, March 1934.
72. Commission on Cuban Affairs, Foreign Policy Association,
op.cit., p.19.
73. F.A. Kirkpatrick, Latin America, New York, 1939. p.391.

BATISTA IN POWER

1. R.F. Smith, The United States and Cuba, New Haven 1960, pp.158-159. The Hawley-Smoot Tariff Act carried a duty of two cents a pound on raw sugar but Roosevelt had already used his powers under the 1930 Tariff Act to cut this to 1.5 cents a pound.
2. Ibid, pp.160-161.
3. Ibid, p.163.
4. Ibid, p.166.
5. Ibid, p.172.
6. cf. R.F. Smith, op.cit., pp.171-173. W.A. Williams, The United States, Cuba and Castro, New York, 1962, pp.60-61.
7. D. Seers, Cuba, The Economic and Social Revolution, Durham, North Carolina, 1964, pp.68-71.
8. Ibid, p.16.
9. A.G. Frank, The Development of Underdevelopment, Monthly Review, V.18, No.4, September 1964, p.24.
10. D. Seers, op.cit., p.16.
11. Ibid, p.20.
12. United States Department of Commerce, Investment in Cuba, Washington, 1956, p.138.
13. D. Seers, op.cit., pp.70-73.
14. Ibid, p.16.
15. A.G. Frank, op.cit., p.26.
16. Ibid, pp.27-28.

17. W.A. Williams, The United States, Cuba and Castro, New York, 1962, p.59.
18. Ibid, quoted, p.59.
19. Ibid, p.60.
20. Ibid, p.60.
21. Ibid, p.60.
22. Ibid, p.68.
23. Ibid, p.64.
24. Ibid, p.65.
25. Ibid, p.65.
26. Ibid, p.67.
27. W. MacGaffey and C. Barnett, Twentieth Century Cuba, New Haven, 1965, p.133.
28. Che Guevara wrote "The men who arrive in Havana after two years of arduous struggle in the mountains of Oriente and the plains of Camaguey and the mountains, plains and cities of Las Villas, are not the same men ideologically that landed on the beaches of Los Colorados, or who took part in the first phase of the struggle. The distrust of the 'campesino' has been converted into admiration and respect for his virtues; their total ignorance of life in the country has been converted into a knowledge of the needs of our guajiros; their flirtations with statistics and with theory have been fixed by the cement that is practice ." Che Guevara, Notes for the Study of the Ideology of the Cuban Revolution, New York, Studies on the Left, V.I, No.3.
29. For a catalogue of this process see Zeitlin and R. Scheer, Cuba, Tragedy in Our Hemisphere, New York, 1963.
30. cf. M. Zeitlin, Working Class and Revolution - Cuba, unpublished paper, p.2.
31. W. MacGaffey and C. Barnett, op.cit., p.154.

32. R.J. Alexander, Communism in Latin America, New Brunswick, 1957, p.278.
33. W. MacGaffey and C. Barnett, op.cit., p.155.
34. R.J. Alexander, op.cit., p.278.
35. Quoted, B. Goldenberg, The Cuban Revolution and Latin America, New York, 1965, p.118.
36. T. Casuso, Cuba and Castro, New York, 1961, p.84.
37. R.J. Alexander, op.cit., p.284.
38. Zeitlin, Working Class Politics in Cuba: A Study in Political Sociology, Berkeley, 1964, p.47. It should be noted that the Cuban Communist Party was not unique in co-operating with a quasi-military government. In Peru, between 1939 and 1945 the Communist Party co-operated with General Manuel Prado, in Venexuela, the 'Black Communists' (the Soviet-aligned group) co-operated with Marcos Perez Jiminez and of course in Argentina the labour movement provided strong backing for Peron. Professor Zeitlin suggests as an explanation for this phenomena that in order to retain power the relatively weak national ruling group had, in the face of a strong labour movement to either repress that group or co-operate with it and give some measure of social reform. (M. Zeitlin, op.cit., pp.51-52) Blackburn distinguishes the tactical alliances which Odria and Batista made from the genuinely populist movements, which came to power with a mass base as distinct from rulers who seized power and then went in search of legitamacy and support. R. Blackburn, Prologue to the Cuban Revolution, New Left Review, No.21, p.73.
39. Commission on Cuban Affairs, Foreign Policy Association, Problems of the New Cuba, New York, 1935, p.195.
40. Ibid, pp.191-193.
41. Ibid, p. 196.
42. Ibid, pp.197-198. The Party's analysis of Cuban society suffered from the imposition of foreign concepts. They were apt to refer to the socio-economic structure as 'feudal imperial-

ist'. (cf. M. Zeitlin, op.cit., p.42) As late as 1960 they were still referring to sections of Cuban agriculture as semi-feudal (Blas Roca, The Cuban Revolution: Report to the Eighth National Congress of the Popular Socialist Party of Cuba, New York, 1961, p.95.) in fact large scale Cuban agriculture was exclusively catagorized by production for profit not for use or prestige. In fact in Cuba, it is difficult to find any evidence of feudal relations even in the area of employment. The Cuban Communist Party are not, however, unique in analysing as feudal the realtionships which are clearly capitalistic. The same analysis has been made by many others in Latin America, both academics and radicals. For a more considered view see A.G. Frank, Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America, New York, 1967, and also Rodolfo Stavenhagen, "Seven Fallacies About Latin America", in Latin America: Reform or Revolution?, M. Zeitlin and J. Petras, ed., New York, 1968.

43. cf. C.A. Page, Organized Labour in Cuba, University of California, 1952, pp.89-90.
44. Ibid, p.88.
45. Ibid, p.93.
46. Ibid, p.107.
47. Ibid, p.104. cf. R.J. Alexander, op.cit., p.280. Mujal, in the maelstrom of Cuban politics, first led the Autentico attacks on the communists in the unions in the late forties, then served himself as pro-Batista leader in the corrupt unions of the fifties.
48. C.A. Page, op.cit., pp.96-97. The wage increases were facilitated by the wartime boom in the Cuban sugar industry and by Batista's support.
49. R.J. Alexander, op.cit., p.279. Of the Communist Party's 23,300 members, 18,000 were new members who had joined in the three months of the party's legal existence. Such an influx of members obviously weakened the party's political position, it could hardly claim to be the revolutionary vanguard while opening its doors to all and sundry. Many

no doubt, joined because they saw in the new Batista-C.P. alliance a road to their own advancement. For ambitious trade-unionists, party membership could well be an asset. Thus we find that in 1952 many ex-Communist labour leaders went over to Batista and formed the labour wing of his party. cf. M. Zeitlin, Working Class Politics in Cuba: A Study in Political Sociology, Berkeley, 1964, p.55.

50. Ibid, p.284. C.A. Page, op.cit., p.103.
51. Quoted, C.A. Page, op.cit., p.102.
52. M. Zeitlin, op.cit., p.66.
53. Ibid, p.59.
54. Ibid, p.62.
55. A United States Congressional committee found that in 1953, after the Autentico purges of the unions that the Cuban party still had the highest per capita membership. Membership by country was as follows: Argentina, 40,000; Bolivia, 2,000; Brazil, 60,000; Chile, 40,000; Colombia, 5,000; Costa Rica, 5,000; Cuba, 30,000; Dominican Republic, negligible; Honduras, negligible; Mexico, 5,000; Nicaragua, 500; Panama, 1,000; Paraguay, 2,000; Peru, 10,000; Uruguay, 15,000. (W.S. Stokes, Latin American Politics, New York, 1959, pp.285-268) The Cuban Communists, too, believed themselves to be the best organized party. cf. W.S. Stokes, "The Cuban Revolution and the Presidential Elections", Hispanic American Historical Review, XXXI, No.1, February 1951, p.48.
56. M. Zeitlin, op.cit., p.62.
57. Ibid, p.63.
58. Ibid, p.65.
59. cf. C.A. Page, op.cit., pp.119-129.
60. International Bank for Reconstruction and Development in Collaboration with the Government of Cuba. Economic and Technical Mission to Cuba. Report on Cuba: Findings and Recommendations of an Economic and Technical Mission Organized by the IBRD in Collaboration with the Government of Cuba in 1950, Washington, 1951, p.365.

61. M. Zeitlin, Revolutionary Politics and the Cuban Working Class, Princeton, 1967, p.57.
62. International Bank for Reconstruction and Development in Collaboration with the Government of Cuba. Economic and Technical Mission to Cuba, op.cit., p.366.
63. B. Goldenberg, op.cit., p.118.
64. T. Draper, Castro's Revolution, Myths and Realities, New York, 1965, p.10.
65. G. Masur, Nationalism in Latin America, New York, 1966, pp.198-225.
66. W.S. Stokes, op.cit., p.62.
67. M. Zeitlin, Working Class Politics in Cuba: A Study in Political Sociology, Berkeley, 1964, pp.68-72. cf. also, C.A. Page, op.cit., pp.210-213.
68. United States Department of Commerce, op.cit., p.22.

THE AUTENTICOS IN POWER

1. T. Casuso, Cuba and Castro, New York, 1961, p.85.
2. cf. W.S. Stokes, National and Local Violence in Cuban Politics, Southwestern Political Quarterly, September 1953.
3. W.S. Stokes, "The Cuban Revolution and the Presidential Elections of 1948", Hispanic American Historical Review, No.1, February 1951, p.39
4. Ibid, p.63.
5. W.S. Stokes, Latin American Politics, New York, 1959, p.208.
6. W.S. Stokes, "The Cuban Revolution and the Presidential Elections of 1948", Hispanic American Historical Review, No.1, February 1951, pp.40-42.
7. Ibid, p.43. In 1951, Castro stood as a Congressional candidate on the Ortodoxo ticket - J. Dubois, Fidel Castro: Rebel, Liberator or Dictator, Indianapolis, 1959, p.13.
8. W. MacGaffey and C. Barnett, Twentieth Century Cuba, New Haven, 1965, p.51.
9. W.S. Stokes, op.cit., p.64.
10. Ibid, p.67.
11. Ibid, p.40.
12. Ibid, p.76.
13. Ibid, p.64.
14. Ibid, p.63.
15. Ibid, p.63.

16. Ibid, p.45.
17. The Revolution, Cambridge Opinion, No.32, p.18.
18. W.S. Stokes, op.cit., p.76.
19. E. Goldenberg, The Cuban Revolution and Latin America, New York, 1965, p.111.
20. R.H. Phillips, Cuba, Island of Paradox, New York, 1959, p.251.
21. B. Goldenberg, op.cit., p.111. A Public Opinion survey in December 1951 gave Batista 14.2% of the votes.
22. W.S. Stokes, National and Local Violence in Cuban Politics, Southwestern Political Quarterly, September 1953, pp.58-63.
23. Blas Roca, The Cuban Revolution: Report to the Eighth National Congress of the Popular Socialist Party of Cuba, New York, 1961, pp.8-9.
24. Quoted, Zeitlin, Working Class Politics in Cuba: A Study in Political Sociology, Berkeley, 1964, p.77.
25. Ibid, quoted, p.77.
26. W. MacGaffey and C. Barnett, op.cit., p.159.
27. cf. R.J. Alexander, Communism in Latin America, New Brunswick, 1957, p.219. M. Zeitlin, op.cit., p.78.
28. M. Zeitlin, op.cit., p.79.

THE EVE OF REVOLUTION: A SOCIO-ECONOMIC OVERVIEW

1. M. Zeitlin, Working Class and Revolution - Cuba, unpublished paper, p.2.
2. cf. for example, L. Huberman and P. Sweezy, Cuba, Anatomy of a Revolution, New York, 1968. T. Draper, Castroism, Theory and Practice, New York, 1965. B. Goldenberg, The Cuban Revolution and Latin America, New York, 1965.
3. Rural estimate based on 1956 survey by Agrupacion Catolica Universitaria, D. Seers, Cuba, The Economic and Social Revolution, Durham, North Carolina, 1964, p.65. Estimate of National Income made by Seers (on the basis of T. Oshima's calculations). D. Seers, op.cit., p.18.
4. United States Department of Commerce, Investment in Cuba, Washington, 1956, p.176.
5. International Bank for Reconstruction and Development in Collaboration with the Government of Cuba. Economic and Technical Mission to Cuba. Report on Cuba: Findings and Recommendations of an Economic and Technical Mission Organized by the IBRD in Collaboration with the Government of Cuba in 1950. Washington, 1951, p.87.
6. B. Goldenberg, op.cit., p.140.
7. D. Seers, op.cit., p.76.
8. B. Goldenberg, op.cit., p.121.
9. L. Nelson, Rural Cuba, Minneapolis, 1956, p.104.
10. Quoted, M. Zeitlin and R. Scheer, Cuba: Tragedy in Our Hemisphere, New York, 1963, p.27.
11. R. Blackburn, Prologue to the Cuban Revolution, New Left Review, No.21, p.61.

12. United States Department of Commerce, op.cit., p.140.
13. D. Seers, op.cit., p.7.
14. International Bank for Reconstruction and Development in Collaboration with the Government of Cuba. Economic and Technical Mission to Cuba. op.cit., p.358.
15. D. Seers, op.cit., p.82.
16. United States Department of Commerce, op.cit., p.23. In 1906, Magoon had reported that "Practically all the sugar-cane countries remain without work during six month of the year." that is, between Zafras, Quoted, M. Zeitlin, Working Class Politics in Cuba: A Study in Political Sociology, Berkeley, 1964, p.16.
17. M. Zeitlin, Revolutionary Politics and the Cuban Working Class, Princeton, 1967, p.47.
18. Ibid, p.49.
19. Ibid, p.55.
20. Ibid, pp.56-58.
21. United States Department of Commerce, op.cit., p.6.
22. Ibid, p.3.
23. International Bank for Reconstruction and Development in Collaboration with the Government of Cuba. Economic and Technical Mission to Cuba. op.cit., p.513.
24. United States Department of Commerce, op.cit., pp.12-13.
25. P. Baran, Political Economy of Growth, New York, 1962, A.G. Frank, Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America, New York, 1967. cf. also, A.G. Frank, The Sociology of Development and the Underdevelopment of Sociology, Catalyst, Summer 1967, p.45+.
26. United States Department of Commerce, op.cit., p.7.

27. D. Seers, op.cit., p.170.
28. International Bank for Reconstruction and Development in Collaboration with the Government of Cuba. Economic and Technical Mission to Cuba. op.cit., p.7.
29. D. Seers, op.cit., p.13.
30. Lowry Nelson, "The Social Class Structure in Cuba", in Materiales Para el Estudio de la Clase Media en la America Latina, Washington, 1950, p.48.
31. Ibid, p.64. The blacks, predictably, gave the strongest support to the Communist Party. W.S. Stokes, The Cuban Revolution and the Presidential Elections of 1948, Hispanic American Historical Review, No.1, February 1951, p.72.
32. D. Seers, op.cit., p.16.
33. P. Baran and P. Sweezy, Monopoly Capital, New York, 1967, pp.196-197. This rise in United States' foreign investment was encouraged by an increasing shortage of domestic raw materials and a desire to sell under foreign tariff barriers. In addition, it reflected the increasing monopolization of the United States industry. cf. H. Magdoff, The Age of Imperialism, Part I, Monthly Review, June 1968, pp.31-37,42,44-46.
34. United States Department of Commerce, op.cit., pp.10,11. Cuba has potentially valuable sources of iron-ore and nickel which may be realized when technological innovations make production profitable. Ibid, p.59. While some naptha and petroleum have been found, the prospects are not particularly good. Ibid, pp.67-69. Batista received a gold telephone from the Cuban Telephone Company in appreciation for his assistance in increasing the rates. S. Shapiro, Cuba, A Dissenting Report, The New Republic, September 22, 1960, p.9.
35. R. Blackburn, op.cit., p.60.
36. United States Department of Commerce, op.cit., pp.10,37. cf. also, B. Goldenberg, op.cit., p.126.

37. United States Department of Commerce, op.cit., p.11.
38. Ibid, p.10.
39. Ibid, pp.124-125.
40. B. Goldenberg, op.cit., p.140.
41. D. Seers, op.cit., p.120. Investment in Cuba listed "ease of access to the main industrial supply centers of the United States" as one of the four major causal factors of Cuba's slow growth. The three other factors listed were; size of the market (this seems dubious, the same report points out elsewhere that the market was larger than that of New Zealand, Chile or Norway. United States Department of Commerce, op.cit., p.189.); over-concentration on sugar and the traditionally favourable balance of payments position. United States Department of Commerce, op.cit., p.71. Overconcentration on sugar was the result of United States' investment and reciprocity. cf. United States Department of Commerce, op.cit., p.137. The balance of payments was favourable only in the sense that a fall in sugar exports produced an immediate slump in the Cuban economy and therefore resulted in an import decline. In addition, between 1949-1958, there was an adverse balance on current account in every year but one. Ibid, p.141. L. Huberman and P. Sweezy, Cuba, Anatomy of a Revolution, New York, 1960, p.141. It appears, therefore, that even on the basis of this report, Cuba's underdevelopment could not be divorced from its links with the United States. The report noted that many factors favoured the continuance of high United States imports. "Cuban buying habits, ease of communication, prompt deliveries and excellent transportation facilities give United States' merchandize a competitive advantage in the Cuban market even when preferential tariff treatment is not involved and assure the United States of a high percentage of the Cuban import trade." Ibid., p.143. It is little wonder Cuban competitors never really emerged.
42. R. Blackburn, op.cit., p.60.

43. For a brief review of a similar relationship in Brazil see A.G. Frank , On the Mechanisms of Imperialism: The Case of Brazil, Monthly Review, September 1964, pp.291-292. Hamza Alavi documents the case of India, "Imperialism, Old and New", Socialist Register, 1964. Alavi argues that rather than foreign capital being attracted to the underdeveloped countries by cheap labour, "Monopoly capitalism prefers to expand productive capacity at home ... (and) to extend its sway abroad in order to capture markets." Ibid, p.121. He argues that monopoly capitalism seeks to prevent competing industrialization and endeavors to insure that it participates in whatever industrialization takes place. This participation results in an emphasis on assembly and packaging plants for foreign products. The established companies, in the advanced countries, are able to make sizeable profits not only from the sale of parts to their foreign partners but also from royalty fees for "technical services", use of patents and brand names, etc., according to Alavi, foreign share holders may own only a small proportion of total stock but the share ownership is a device to insure that the profitable relationship between a new company and an established corporation continues to exist.
44. R. Blackburn, op.cit., p.60.
45. Ibid, p.61.
46. United States Department of Commerce, op.cit., pp.10,141.
47. P. Baran, op.cit., p.179. See also Pierre Jalee, The Economic Pillage of the Third World, New York, 1968, pp. 70-84. Jalee endorses the view that there is a net transfer of capital from the Third World to the developed countries. Carlos Fuentes, Wither Latin America ?, New York, 1963, states that for Latin America as a whole, between 1950 and 1955, the United States invested two billion dollars and received profits totalling three and a half billion dollars.
48. United States Department of Commerce, op.cit., pp.141, 15.

49. L. Huberman and P. Sweezy, op.cit., pp.141-142. The figure of \$330,000,000 is calculated by taking the United States Department of Commerce figure of \$642,000,000 of investment in 1950, \$686,000,000 of investment in 1953 and the figure of \$1,001,000,000 of investment claimed by the United States' embassy in January 1960. cf. United States Department of Commerce, op.cit., p.10. Panorama Economica Latina Americana, No. 249-250, 1968, p.29.
50. Commission On Cuban Affairs, Foreign Policy Association, Problems of the New Cuba, New York, 1935, p.45. United States Department of Commerce, op.cit., p.12.
51. S. Shapiro, "Cuba, A Dissenting Report", The New Republic, September 22, 1960, p.12. B. Goldenberg, op.cit., p.140, cites a revolutionary government claim that the average rate of profit on foreign capital was 23%. cf. P. Baran and P. Sweezy, op.cit., pp.193-198. P. Baran, op.cit., pp.228-231. Lenin noted that one of the attractions of foreign investment was high profit rates. V.I. Lenin, Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism, Peking, 1965, p.73.
52. L. Huberman and P. Sweezy, op.cit., p.141.
53. A.G. Frank, Services Rendered, Monthly Review, V.17, No.2, June 1965, p.42.
54. United States Department of Commerce, op.cit., pp.141-142. For an indication of the generally high level of exports required to meet debt payments and profit remittances, see H. Magdoff, The Age of Imperialism, Part 3, Monthly Review, November 1968, V.6, No.20, p.58.
55. United States Department of Commerce, op.cit., p.139.
56. B. Goldenberg, op.cit., pp.136-137.
57. cf. G. Balandier, "The Colonial Situation: A Theoretical Approach" in I. Wallerstein, Social Change in the Colonial Situation, New York, 1966.

58. Commission on Cuban Affairs, Foreign Policy Association, op.cit., p.200
59. A.G. Frank, Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America, New York, 1967, p.11. cf. also, James O'Connor, "On Cuban Political Economy", in M. Zeitlin and J. Petras, ed., Latin America, Reform or Revolution?, New York, 1968. O'Connor argues that "monopoly capitalism" blocked further Cuban development. "Monopoly controls blanketed Cuba's social economy and blocked the fulfillment of the island's true economic potential by wasting land, labour and capital and other economic resources." Ibid, p.487. Hence, "socialist, economic planning in Cuba was less an ideological product than an expression of hard economic necessity." Ibid, p.492.
60. Castro said in 1953 that he counted on support from the 700,000 unemployed; the 500,000 farm labourers "living in miserable shacks who work four months of the year"; the 400,000 industrial labourers and dockers "whose homes are slums, whose salaries pass from the hands of the boss to those of the money lenders, whose future is a pay reduction and dismissal"; the 100,000 small farmers "who live and die working on land that is not theirs"; 30,000 teachers and professors, dedicated but underpaid ; 20,000 small businessmen in debt and suffering from government corruption and 10,000 young professionals, frustrated by lack of opportunity. Fidel Castro, History Will Absolve Me, London, 1968, pp.28-29.
- It is important to note a further element in Castro's support. Cuban political and social developments had left their mark on the Cuban population. When Castro initiated his guerilla movement in Oriente he could rely on a considerable local familiarity with radical politics and strong memories of the War of Independence. cf. W.J. Pomeroy, Questions on the Debray Thesis, Monthly Review, July-August, 1968, pp.36-37. Zeitlin noted in his study of the political attitudes of the Cuban working class that the second most likely group to support Castro after the actual rebel generation, were the older workers, the generation of the 30's who had gone through the earlier period of revolution. cf. "Political Generations in the Cuban Working Class", in M. Zeitlin and J. Petras, ed., op.cit.,

pp.264-288. One of the major points which Tana de Gamez makes in her novel of the Cuban Revolution was that the revolutionaries remembered previous struggles in Cuba. One of the heroes of the novel, Frank Ibanez, had, for example, lost a father to Machado. cf. Tana de Gamez, The Yoke and the Star, Novel of the Cuban Revolution, New York, 1966.

CONCLUSION

1. M. Zeitlin, "Political Generations in the Cuban Working Class" in M. Zeitlin and J. Petras, ed., Latin America, Reform or Revolution?, New York, 1968, p.279.
2. Che Guevara, Cuba: Exceptional Case, Monthly Review, V.13, No.3-4, July-August 1961, pp.58-59. cf. also, S. Torres and J. Aronde, DeBray and the Cuban Experience, Monthly Review, July-August 1968, p.49.
3. M. Zeitlin, Working Class and Revolution - Cuba, unpublished paper, p.2.
4. S. Torres and J. Aronde, DeBray and the Cuban Experience, Monthly Review, July-August 1968, pp.46-47.

XI. BIBLIOGRAPHY
WORKS CITED

- ✓ Aguilar, A. Pan-Americanism, From Monroe to the Present, New York: Monthly Review Press, 1968.
- Alexander, R.J. Communism in Latin America, New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1957.
- ✓ Baran, P. Political Economy of Growth, New York: Monthly Review Press, 1962.
- Baran, P. and Sweezy, P. Monopoly Capital, New York: Monthly Review Press, 1967.
- Beals, C. The Crime of Cuba, Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott Company, 1933.
- ✗ Boorstein, E. The Economic Transformation of Cuba, New York: Monthly Review Press, 1968.
- ✓ Castro, F. History Will Absolve Me, London: Lorrimer, 1968.
- ✓ Casuso, T. Cuba and Castro, New York: Random House, 1961.
- ✓ Chapman, C.E. A History of the Cuban Republic: A Study in Hispanic American Diplomacy, New York: Macmillan, 1927.
- ✓ DeBray, R. Revolution in the Revolution, New York: Grove Press, 1967.
- Domhoff, W.G. Who Rules America?, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1967.
- ✓ Draper, T. Castro's Revolution, Myths and Realities, New York: Praeger, 1965.

- ✓ Draper, T. Castroism, Theory and Practice, New York: Praeger, 1965.
- ✓ Dubois, J. Fidel Castro: Rebel, Liberator or Dictator, Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1959.
- ✓ Fanon, F. The Wretched of the Earth, New York: Grove Press, 1968.
- ✓ Foner, P. A History of Cuba and Its Relations with the United States, Volumes, I, II, New York: International Publishers, 1962, 1963.
- Foreign Policy Association. Commission on Cuban Affairs. Problems of the New Cuba: Report of the Commission on Cuban Affairs, New York: Foreign Policy Association, 1935.
- ✗ Frank, A.G. Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America, New York: Monthly Review Press, 1967.
- ✓ Fremantle, A. Mao Tse-Tung, An Anthology of His Writings, New York: The New American Library, 1962.
- ✓ Fuentes, C. Whither Latin America?, New York: Monthly Review Press, 1963.
- ✓ Gamez, T. The Yoke and the Star, A Novel of the Cuban Revolution, New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1966.
- ✓ Goldenberg, B. The Cuban Revolution and Latin America, New York: Praeger, 1965.
- Guerra y Sanchez, R. Sugar and Society in the Caribbean, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964.
- Guggenheim, H. The United States and Cuba, New York: Macmillan, 1934.
- Hanke, L. Readings in Latin American History, Volume II, New York: Cromwell, 1966.

- ✓ Healy, D. The United States in Cuba, 1898-1902, Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1963.
- Herring, H. A History of Latin America, New York: Knopf, 1960.
- Huberman, L. and Sweezy, P. Cuba, Anatomy of a Revolution, New York: Monthly Review Press, 1960.
- ✓ International Bank for Reconstruction and Development in Collaboration with the Government of Cuba. Economic and Technical Mission to Cuba. Report on Cuba: Findings and Recommendations of an Economic and Technical Mission Organized by the IBRD in collaboration with the Government of Cuba in 1950, Washington: IBRD, 1951.
- X Jalée, P. The Economic Pillage of the Third World, New York: Monthly Review Press, 1968.
- James, C.L.R. The Black Jacobins, New York: The Dial Press, 1938.
- Jenks, L. Our Cuban Colony, New York, Vanguard Press, 1928.
- Johnson, C. Peasant Nationalism and Communist Power, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1962.
- ✓ Johnson, C. Revolutionary Change, Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1966.
- ✓ Kantor, H. The Ideology and Program of the Peruvian Aprista Movement, New York: Octagon Books, 1966.
- ✓ Kautsky, J. Political Change in Underdeveloped Countries, Nationalism and Communism, New York, Wiley, 1962.
- Kirkpatrick, F.A. Latin America, New York: Macmillan, 1939.
- LaFeber, W. The New Empire, Published for the American Historical Association, Cornell University Press, 1963.

- ✓ Lenin, V.I. Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism, Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1965.
- ✓ Lewis, O. La Vida, London: Panther Books, 1968.
- ✓ MacGaffey, W. and Barnett, C. Twentieth Century Cuba, New Haven: Anchor Books, 1965.
- ✓ Magdoff, H. Economic Aspects of U.S. Imperialism, New York: Monthly Review Press, 1966.
- ✓ Manach, J. Marti: Apostle of Freedom, New York: Devin-Adair, 1950.
- ✓ Masur, G. Nationalism in Latin America, New York: Macmillan, 1966.
- ✓ May, E.R. Imperial Democracy, New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1961.
- ✓ Miliband, R. and Saville, J. The Socialist Register, New York: Monthly Review Press, 1967.
- ✓ Moon, P.T. Imperialism and World Politics, New York: Macmillan, 1926.
- ✓ Nadel, G. and Curtis, P. Imperialism and Colonialism, New York: Macmillan, 1964.
- ✓ Nearing, S. and Freeman, R. Dollar Diplomacy, New York: Monthly Review Press, 1966.
- ✓ Nelson, L. Rural Cuba, Minneapolis: Minnesota University Press, 1956.
- ✓ North, J. Cuba: Hope of a Hemisphere, New York: International Publishers, 1961.
- ✓ Ortiz, F. Cuban Counterpoint: Tobacco and Sugar, New York: Knopf, 1947.

- Pendle, G. A History of Latin America, Great Britain: C. Nicholls & Co. Ltd., 1963.
- Phillips, R.H. Cuba, Island Of Paradox, New York: McDowell-Obolensky, 1959.
- Plekhanov, G. The Materialist Conception of History, New York: International Publishers, 1964.
- Poppino, R. International Communism in Latin America - A History of the Movement, 1917-1963, New York: The Free Press, 1964.
- Riverend, J. Economic History of Cuba, Havana: Book Institute, 1967.
- ✓ Roca, B. The Cuban Revolution: Report to the Eighth National Congress of the Popular Socialist Party of Cuba, New York: Century Publishers, 1961.
- ✓ Seers, D. Cuba, The Economic and Social Revolution, Durham, N.C.: The University of North Carolina Press, 1964.
- Schafer, B.C. Nationalism, Myth and Reality, New York: Harcourt Brace, 1965.
- ✓ Smith, R.F. ed., Background to Revolution, The Development of Modern Cuba, New York: Knopf, 1966,
- Smith, R.F. The United States and Cuba, New Haven: College and University Press, 1960.
- ✓ Stokes, W.S. Latin American Politics, New York, Crowell, 1959.
- ✓ Taber, R. M26. Biography of a Revolution, New York: L. Stuart, 1961.
- Taber, R. The War of the Flea, New York: L. Stuart, 1965

- ✓ Tomasek, R.D. Latin American Politics, Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Co. Inc., 1966.
- ✓ Trotsky, L. The Russian Revolution, Garden City, New York: Double day and Co. Inc., 1959.
- U.S. Department of Commerce. Bureau of Foreign Commerce, Investment in Cuba, Washington, 1956.
- ✓ Wallerstein, I. Social Change in the Colonial Situation, New York: J. Wiley, 1966.
- Warde, W.F. Uneven and Combined Development in History, New York: Pioneer Publishers, 1965.
- Watson, H.S. Nationalism, Old and New, Sydney: Sidney University Press, 1965.
- ✓ Whitaker, A. and Jordan, D. Nationalism in Contemporary Latin America, New York: The Free Press, 1966.
- Wilgus, C. ed., The Caribbean Area, Volume II, Washington: George Washington University Press, 1934.
- ✓ Williams, E. Capitalism and Slavery, New York: Capricorn Books, 1966.
- ✓ Williams, W.A. The United States, Cuba and Castro, New York: Monthly Review Press, 1962.
- ✓ Woodward, C. The Strange Career of Jim Crow, New York: Oxford University Press, 1957.
- ✓ Zeitlin, M. Revolutionary Politics and the Cuban Working Class Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967.
- ✓ Zeitlin, M. and Petras, J. Latin America, Reform or Revolution?, New York: Fawcett Publishing Company, 1968.
- ✓ Zeitlin, M. and Scheer, R. Cuba: Tragedy in Our Hemisphere, New York: Grove Press, 1963.

ARTICLES:

- ✓ Hamza, A. "Imperialism, Old and New", Socialist Register, New York: , 1964.
- ✓ Baran, P. and Sweezy, P. "Notes on the Theory of Imperialism", Monthly Review, V.17, No.10, March 1966.
- ✓ Blackburn, R. "Prologue to the Cuban Revolution", New Left Review, No.21.
- Bonilla, F. "The Student Federation of Chile, Fifty Years of Political Action", Journal of Inter-American Studies, No.3, 1960.
- DeBray, R. "Problems of Revolutionary Strategy in Latin America", New Left Review, September-October, 1967.
- DeBray, R. "Latin America: The Long March", New Left Review, No.33, September-October, 1965.
- ✓ Deutsh, K. "Social Mobilization and Political Development", American Political Science Review, V. LV, No.3. September 1961.
- ✗ Frank, A.G. "The Development of Underdevelopment", New York: Monthly Review, V.18, No.4, September 1966.
- Frank, A.G. "On the Mechanisms of Imperialism: The Case of Brazil", New York: Monthly Review, September 1964.
- Frank, A.G. "Services Rendered", New York: Monthly Review, V.17, No.2, June 1965.
- ✓ Frank, A.G. "The Sociology of Development and the Underdevelopment of Sociology", Catalyst, Summer 1967.
- Guevara, C. "Cuba: Exceptional Case", New York: Monthly Review, v.13, No.3-4, July-August 1961.

- ✓ Guevara, C. "Notes for the Study of the Ideology of the Cuban Revolution", New York: Studies on the Left, V.I, No.3.
- Hart, A. "La Intransigencia del Movimiento Libertador Cubano", Havana: Pensamiento Critico, No.8, September 1967.
- X Hennessy, C.A.M. "The Roots of Cuban Nationalism", International Affairs, V.39, July 1939.
- ✓ Herring, H. "Another Chance for Cuba", Current History, XXXIX, March 1934.
- Herring, H. "Can Cuba Save Herself?", Current History, November 1933.
- Herring, H. "The Downfall of Machado", Current History, October 1933.
- Magdoff, H. "The Age of Imperialism", New York: Monthly Review, Parts I,II,III, June, October, November, 1968.
- Marini, R.M. "Brazilian Interdependence and Imperialist Integration", New York: Monthly Review, V.17, No.7, December 1965.
- Nelson, L. "The Social Class Structure in Cuba", Materiales Para el Estudio de la Clase Media en la America Latina Oficina de Ciencias Sociales Union Panamericana, Washington, 1950.
- Pazos, J. "The Revolution", Cambridge: Cambridge Opinion, No.32.
- Pomeroy, W.J. "Questions on the Debray Thesis", New York: Monthly Review, V.20, No.3, July-August 1968.
- Robinson, J. "Cuba, 1965", New York: Monthly Review, February 1966.
- Shapiro, S. "Cuba, A Dissenting Report", The New Republic, September 22, 1960.

Silvert, K. "Nationalism in Latin America", APSA Annals, V.334, March 1961.

✓ Stokes, W.S. "The Cuban Revolution and the Presidential Elections of 1948", Hispanic American Historical Review, No.1, February 1951.

Stokes, W.S. "National and Local Violence in Cuban Politics", Southwestern Political Quarterly, September 1953.

Sweezy, P. "Marx and the Proletariat", New York: Monthly Review, V.19, No.7, December 1967.

Taylor, K.S. "Brazil's North East", New York: Monthly Review, V.20, No.10, March 1969.

✓ Thompson, C.A. "The Cuban Revolution: Reform and Reaction", Foreign Policy Reports, V.11, No.22, January 1936.

Torres, S. and Aronde, J. "Debray and the Cuban Experience", New York: Monthly Review, V.20, No.3, July-August 1968.

✓ Veliz, C. "Obstacles to Reform in Latin America", World Today, January 1963.

Williams, W.A. "Historiography and Revolution, The Case of Cuba", Studies on the Left, V.3, No.3, Summer 1963.

UNPUBLISHED PAPERS:

Cyria, A. "Latin America Actuality. Notes on the Latin American Revolution".

✓ Loney, M. "The Social Composition and Recruitment of Revolutionary Movements".

Zeitlin, M. "Working Class and Revolution - Cuba".

THESES:

Page, C.A. Organized Labour In Cuba, University of California, 1952.

Walker, B. The Labour Policy of the Cuban Government Since 1925, University of California, 1947.

Zeitlin, M. Working Class Politics in Cuba: A Study in Political Sociology, University of California, Berkeley, 1964.

ASSORTED COPIES:

Gramma, Weekly Review, Havana, Cuba.

Panorama Economica Latina Americana, Havana, Cuba.