

44895



National Library of Canada

Bibliothèque nationale du Canada

CANADIAN THESES ON MICROFICHE

THÈSES CANADIENNES SUR MICROFICHE

NAME OF AUTHOR/NOM DE L'AUTEUR Robert M. Galois

TITLE OF THESIS/TITRE DE LA THÈSE Social Structure in Space: The Making of Vancouver, 1886-1901.

UNIVERSITY/UNIVERSITÉ Simon Fraser University

DEGREE FOR WHICH THESIS WAS PRESENTED/ GRADE POUR LEQUEL CETTE THÈSE FUT PRÉSENTÉE Ph.D.

YEAR THIS DEGREE CONFERRED/ANNÉE D'OBTENTION DE CE GRADE ~~1979~~ 1980

NAME OF SUPERVISOR/NOM DU DIRECTEUR DE THÈSE E.M. Gibson

Permission is hereby granted to the NATIONAL LIBRARY OF CANADA to microfilm this thesis and to lend or sell copies of the film.

L'autorisation est, par la présente, accordée à la BIBLIOTHÈQUE NATIONALE DU CANADA de microfilmer cette thèse et de prêter ou de vendre des exemplaires du film.

The author reserves other publication rights, and neither the thesis nor extensive extracts from it may be printed or otherwise reproduced without the author's written permission.

L'auteur se réserve les autres droits de publication; ni la thèse ni de longs extraits de celle-ci ne doivent être imprimés ou autrement reproduits sans l'autorisation écrite de l'auteur.

DATED/DATE 27. 11. 79 SIGNED/SIGNÉ _____

PERMANENT ADDRESS/RÉSIDENCE FIXE Department of Geography
Simon Fraser University
Burnaby, B.C. V5A 1S6



NOTICE

The quality of this microfiche is heavily dependent upon the quality of the original thesis submitted for microfilming. Every effort has been made to ensure the highest quality of reproduction possible.

If pages are missing, contact the university which granted the degree.

Some pages may have indistinct print especially if the original pages were typed with a poor typewriter ribbon or if the university sent us a poor photocopy.

Previously, copyrighted materials (journal articles, published tests, etc.) are not filmed.

Reproduction in full or in part of this film is governed by the Canadian Copyright Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-30. Please read the authorization forms which accompany this thesis.

THIS DISSERTATION
HAS BEEN MICROFILMED
EXACTLY AS RECEIVED

AVIS

La qualité de cette microfiche dépend grandement de la qualité de la thèse soumise au microfilmage. Nous avons tout fait pour assurer une qualité supérieure de reproduction.

S'il manque des pages, veuillez communiquer avec l'université qui a conféré le grade.

La qualité d'impression de certaines pages peut laisser à désirer, surtout si les pages originales ont été dactylographiées à l'aide d'un ruban usé ou si l'université nous a fait parvenir une photocopie de mauvaise qualité.

Les documents qui font déjà l'objet d'un droit d'auteur (articles de revue, examens publiés, etc.) ne sont pas microfilmés.

La reproduction, même partielle, de ce microfilm est soumise à la Loi canadienne sur le droit d'auteur, SRC 1970, c. C-30. Veuillez prendre connaissance des formules d'autorisation qui accompagnent cette thèse.

LA THÈSE A ÉTÉ
MICROFILMÉE TELLE QUE
NOUS L'AVONS REÇUE

SOCIAL STRUCTURE IN SPACE
THE MAKING OF VANCOUVER, 1886-1901.

by

Robert M. Galois
B.A., University of Exeter, 1965
M.A., University of Calgary, 1970

A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT
OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
in the Department
of
Geography

© Robert M. Galois 1979
SIMON FRASER UNIVERSITY
November 1979

All rights reserved. This thesis may not be
reproduced in whole or in part, by photocopy
or other means, without permission of the author.

PARTIAL COPYRIGHT LICENSE

I hereby grant to Simon Fraser University the right to lend my thesis, project or extended essay (the title of which is shown below) to users of the Simon Fraser University Library, and to make partial or single copies only for such users or in response to a request from the library of any other university, or other educational institution, on its own behalf or for one of its users. I further agree that permission for multiple copying of this work for scholarly purposes may be granted by me or the Dean of Graduate Studies. It is understood that copying or publication of this work for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written permission.

Title of Thesis/Project/Extended Essay

Social Structure in Space: The Making of
Vancouver, 1886-1901.

Author:

(signature)

Robert M. Galois

(name)

27.11.79

(date)

APPROVAL

Name: Robert Michael Galois

Degree: Doctor of Philosophy

Title of Thesis:

Social Structure in Space: The Making of
Vancouver, 1886-- 1901.

Examining Committee:

Chairperson: L.J. Evenden

E.M.W. Gibson
Senior Supervisor

P.L. Wagner

R.C. Harris

R. Hayter

T.G. McGee
External Examiner
Professor of Geography and
Director of the Asian Research Institute
University of British Columbia

Date Approved: November 16, 1979

ABSTRACT

Rejecting notions of an autonomous urban process, the thesis is concerned with the structure of social inequality and its spatial expression in Vancouver, 1886 - 1901. It is posited that historical materialism provides a theoretical apparatus with which to approach this question. The meaning of this theoretical foundation is established in the first part of the study. The basic concepts of historical materialism are delineated and the uneven development of capitalism, in its temporal and spatial dimensions, is examined to establish the requirements for the study of a particular place: Vancouver. A theory of social class is seen as crucial to this endeavour, and the theoretical work of Poulantzas is critically examined to this end.

The appropriation of empirical material is conditioned by the theoretical foundations now established. This commences with an examination of structure and process in the Canadian social formation in the nineteenth century. The intention here is to define the context within which Vancouver was created. Attention is then focussed on Vancouver and the linkages with the external context is examined from this perspective. This permits the characterization of the pattern of growth of the city: as a commercial, financial and managerial centre.

The class structure as expressed in space, in residential

terms, within the city is then examined in detail for the year 1901. Abstracting from process, the patterns of social and spatial unevenness are presented in cartographic form and discussed with reference to the theoretical expectations. These empirically defined spatial patterns generally reflected the basic bi-polar structure of the social relations. The processes through which this internal structure was created are then examined. The role of monopoly capital (CPR), the local bourgeoisie and the relationship between capital and labour are examined.

In sum the study demonstrates the importance of avoiding the reification of space, of seeing spatial patterns as an expression of the structure of social relationships. Moreover, the social relationships relevant to the "making" of Vancouver were shown to be national and even international in scope. Finally, these social relationships were by no means static, but rather dynamic and dialectical in nature. The study closes with some suggestions for further research.

To My Parents

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Scholarship is necessarily a collective and co-operative endeavour. In view of this it is a pleasure as well as an obligation to thank the many people who have helped in diverse ways towards the production of this thesis.

Primarily I should like to thank Ed Gibson. He provided the initial inspiration and endured the lengthy burden of supervision with amazing good humour. I especially value his tolerance in the face of a study which took a direction he can have hardly anticipated. Thanks are also due to the other members of my supervisory committee, Phil Wagner and Cole Harris, and to Terry McGee, the external examiner, for their valuable time and their wisdom.

Also of considerable importance in shaping the form of the thesis were the various members, past and present, of the Vancouver Local of the U.S.G.. Together they have contributed more than I know. It is perhaps invidious to single out any individual amongst the group, but I should especially like to thank Alan Mabin. His critical comments on an unwieldy draft helped overcome a period of severe mental constipation.

There are also a number of people who helped with particular aspects of the preparation of the thesis who must be mentioned.

Ian Hutchinson who guided me through my initial apprehension of the "computer"; Bernard Curtin who helped substantially with the typing; the always courteous staff of the Vancouver Public Archives, Special Collections at U.B.C. and the Provincial Archives of British Columbia; and Ray Squirrel, without whose aid I would still be floundering in the cartographic seas.

The Dean of Graduate Studies and the Department of Geography at Simon Fraser University provided welcome financial assistance towards the preparation of the maps.

To all of the above, thank you.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page.
Approval	ii
Abstract	iii
Dedication	v
Acknowledgements	vi
List of Tables	ix
List of Figures	xii
List of Maps	xiii
List of Abbreviations	xv
CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION.	1
CHAPTER 2 THE BASIC CONCEPTS OF HISTORICAL MATERIALISM.	9
CHAPTER 3 THE PROCESS OF UNEVEN DEVELOPMENT: TIME, SPACE AND PLACE.	45
CHAPTER 4 SOCIAL CLASS: THE THEORETICAL DIMENSION.	78
CHAPTER 5 THE CANADIAN SOCIAL FORMATION: STRUCTURE AND PROCESS IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY.	117
CHAPTER 6 THE INTEGRATION OF VANCOUVER INTO THE GLOBAL ECONOMY OF THE LATE NINETEENTH CENTURY.	203
VOLUME 2	
CHAPTER 7 THE INTERNAL STRUCTURE OF VANCOUVER IN 1901: SOCIAL AND SPATIAL DIMENSIONS.	255
CHAPTER 8 THE DEVELOPMENT OF VANCOUVER IN THE LATE NINETEENTH CENTURY: STRUCTURE AND PROCESS.	361
CHAPTER 9 CONCLUSION.	462
APPENDICES	474
BIBLIOGRAPHY	487

LIST OF TABLES

Table 3:1 - Long Movements in the Capitalist Mode of Production.	48
Table 5:1 - Employment in Manufactures, 1871 - 1891.	163
Table 5:2 - Employment in Agriculture, 1891 - 1911, in '000s.	165
Table 5:3 - Foreign Capital Invested in Canada, 1867 - 1913, in millions \$ Canadian.	170
Table 5:4 - Bank Concentration, 1880-1910; as % of Total Assets.	177
Table 5:5 - Density of Chartered Bank Branches in Canada, 1868-1910.	178
Table 6:1 - Population of Vancouver, 1886-1901.	204
Table 6:2 - Annual New Company Registrations in Vancouver, 1886-1901.	205
Table 6:3 - Annual Occurrence of Business Assignments in Vancouver, 1890-1901.	208
Table 6:4 - Annual Formation of Operating Companies with Offices Registered in Vancouver, 1886-1901.	211
Table 6:5 - Annual Formation of Operating Companies with Head Offices in U.K., Plus Those with Directors Resident in U.K. - by Type of Capital.	214
Table 6:6 - Annual Formation of Operating Companies with Head Offices in U.S.A., Plus Companies with Directors Resident in U.S.A. - by Type of Capital.	220
Table 6:7 - Annual Formation of Operating Companies with Head Offices in Ontario & Quebec, Plus Companies with Directors Resident in Ontario & Quebec - by Type of Capital.	225
Table 6:8 - Chartered Banks in Vancouver - by Year of Entry.	229
Table 6:9 - Annual Formation of Operating Companies with Head Offices in Vancouver and Directors Resident in British Columbia outside Vancouver.	231

Table 6:10 - Annual Formation of Operating Companies with Head Offices in Vancouver with All Directors Resident in Vancouver - by Type of Capital.	232
Table 6:11 - The Creation of the Vancouver Hinterland: Operating Companies Registered in Vancouver - by Region of Operations.	239
Table 7:1 - Boarding Houses and Furnished Rooms outside the City Centre, 1901.	281
Table 7:2 - Dollar a Day Hotels, 1901.	282
Table 7:3 - Higher Tariff Hotels, 1901.	283
Table 7:4 - Distribution of Bourgeoisie - by Fraction and Area.	300
Table 7:5 - Working Class in the Area West of Granville - by Fraction.	308
Table 7:6 - Working Class in East End - by Fraction.	308
Table 7:7 - Working Class in Yaletown and East of Granville - by Fraction.	309
Table 7:8 - Percentage of Bourgeoisie & Working Class in Vancouver - by Area.	312
Table 7:9 - Bourgeoisie & Working Class as a Percentage of Area Population.	313
Table 7:10 - Percentage Class per Area - All Classes.	317
Table 7:11 - Area by Percentage Class - All Classes.	318
Table 7:12 - Chinese Bourgeoisie in Vancouver, 1901.	343
Table 7:13 - Chinese & Japanese Employment in Vancouver.	344
Table 8:1 - Investment in Commercial Buildings on D.L. 541 by CPR Directorate and Vancouver Management - to 1889.	371
Table 8:2 - CPR Expenditure on Land Clearing and Grading - to Dec. 1886.	374
Table 8:3 - Selected Hourly Wage Rates, 1901 - by City.	419

Table 8:4 - Weekly Expenditure on Staple Foods, Fuel & Lighting for a Family of Five, 1900 - by City.

425

Table 8:5 - Housing for Workingmen by City, 1901. (in \$ per month).

427

LIST OF FIGURES

Fig. 8:1 - CPR, Price of Lots in D.L. 541, 1886.	375
Fig. 8:2 - Vancouver Improvement Co., Price of Lots in D.L. 181 & 196, 1886.	394

LIST OF MAPS

Map 1 - Topography of the Vancouver Area.	276
Map 2 - Distribution of Work-Places, Vancouver 1901.	277
Map 3 - Divided and Double Building Lots, Vancouver 1901.	280
Map 4 - Residential Distribution of All Classes, Vancouver 1901.	285
Map 5 - Probable Areas of Under-Representation, Vancouver 1901.	289
Map 6 - Residential Distribution of the Bourgeoisie, Vancouver 1901.	291
Map 7 - Residential Distribution of the Medium and Large Bourgeoisie, Vancouver 1901.	294
Map 8 - Residential Distribution of the Large Bourgeoisie, Vancouver 1891 & 1901.	298
Map 9 - Residential Distribution of the Working Class, Vancouver 1901.	302
Map 10 - Residential Distribution of the Aristocracy of Labour & Labourers, Vancouver 1901.	307
Map 11 - Residential Distribution of the New Petty Bourgeoisie, All Fractiions, Vancouver 1901.	315
Map 12 - Residential Distribution of the New Petty Bourgeoisie, Professional Fraction, Vancouver 1901.	321
Map 13 - Residential Distribution of the New Petty Bourgeoisie, Managerial Fraction, Vancouver 1901.	324
Map 14 - Residential Distribution of the New Petty Bourgeoisie, Manual Labour Fraction, Vancouver 1901.	327
Map 15 - Residential Distribution of the New Petty Bourgeoisie, Supervisory Fraction, Vancouver 1901.	330
Map 16 - Residential Distribution of the New Petty Bourgeoisie, Mental Labour Fraction, Vancouver 1901.	333
Map 17 - Residential Distribution of the Traditional Petty Bourgeoisie, Vancouver 1901.	338

Map 18 - Chinese and Japanese Work-Places and Residences, Vancouver 1901.	349
Map 19 - C.P.R. Landholdings, Vancouver, c. 1886.	364
Map 20 - Bank of Montreal, Work-Place and Residence Linkages, Vancouver 1901.	380
Map 21 - British Columbia Sugar Refinery, Work-Place and Residence Linkages, Vancouver 1901.	384
Map 22 - T. Dunn & Co., Work-Place and Residence Linkages, Vancouver 1901.	397

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

BCER: British Columbia Electric Railway Company Ltd.

BCMR: British Columbia Mining Record (Journal).

BCMTT: British Columbia Mill Timber and Trading Company.

BCSP: British Columbia Sessional Papers.

BCSR: B.C. Sugar Refinery.

BIFVR: Burrard Inlet and Fraser Valley Railway.

CPR: Canadian Pacific Railway.

CR: Company Records.

CSP: Canada Sessional Papers.

D.L.: District Lot.

HBC: Hudson's Bay Company.

Ind.: Independent (Newspaper).

ITU: International Typographical Union, Local #226

LG: Labour Gazette (Journal).

PABC: Provincial Archives of British Columbia, Victoria.

RCCJI: Royal Commission on Chinese and Japanese Immigration .

VBT: Vancouver Board of Trade.

VCC: City of Vancouver, City Clerk, Correspondence Inward.

VCM: City of Vancouver, Council Minutes.

VDW: Vancouver Daily World (Newspaper).

VERL: Vancouver Electric Railway and Light Company.

VIC: Vancouver Improvement Company.

VN: Vancouver News (Newspaper).

VNA: News-Advertiser (Newspaper).

VPA: Vancouver Public Archives.

VTLC: Vancouver Trade and Labour Council.

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

"... there can be no 'innocent reading', i.e. no reading that does not involve, at least implicitly, a theory which determines the character of the reading" (Callinicos, 1976, p. 33).

The inspiration for a study may come from many different sources. In the present case the sources are personal and social, as well as intellectual. Anybody of working class origins undertaking a Ph.D. may be said to have seen the structural patterns of social inequality from at least two perspectives. Such an experience does not necessarily pose the question of the processes generating and sustaining social inequality, but it makes curiosity about these issues readily explicable. Yet a study requires more than an area of concern or interest, it demands the formulation of particular questions.

THE SEARCH FOR A QUESTION.

The starting point in this process involved delimiting some basic and reasonable parameters, i.e. the historical geography of the working class in nineteenth century Vancouver. Within this area it was clearly possible to pose some relevant and unanswered questions. What, for example, was the spatial distribution of the working class, their residential patterns, and how did this relate to their patterns of everyday life?

Further reflection, however, suggested that this question,

or questions, was too narrow. It presupposed the answers to, or alternatively it posed, some broader questions. For the working class, if social inequality has any meaning, residential patterns are by no means of their own choosing. In other words, in the absence of adequate secondary sources, it was necessary to enquire into the class structure of the city as a whole and the spatial expression of this in residential terms.

Similar difficulties arose in terms of the restriction of the study to residential patterns. While this represents an important aspect of the spatial structure of any settlement, it is but one aspect. The development of residential patterns is part of the broader question of the development, in this case, of Vancouver.

Nor did the development of Vancouver, the creation of its particular social and spatial structure occur in splendid isolation. Vancouver in the late nineteenth century existed in, and was part of the general process of capitalist development in Canada, which in turn was part of a global system. If the development of Vancouver is to be understood, then far more than a gestural reference to this broader context is required.

In sum, this study seeks to provide some answers to the general question of how Vancouver developed in the late nineteenth century. Within this framework it focusses on the

precise questions: what were the patterns of social and spatial, especially residential, inequality in Vancouver?, and how were they created?

RELEVANT LITERATURE.

The array of literature relevant to the questions just formulated is obviously vast, but a primary requirement is to establish a theoretical basis upon which the study may be undertaken. Acknowledged or not, empirical investigation is guided, if not confined by its theoretical foundations. Hence the questions posed are theoretical as well as empirical. Since the empirical questions concern the development of Vancouver the theory of urbanization represents a logical starting point for a review.

In a recent survey of this literature Abrams makes a number of important points. He decisively rejects, and suggests a de facto rejection, of the notion of the town as a "generic social entity". Attempts at the identification of an autonomous urban process have not been successful, and moreover they involve the reification of the town. "Taken as a whole", Abrams (Abrams & Wrigley, 1978, p. 30) writes, "the record of urban history and urban sociology suggests that it is extraordinarily difficult to resist the idea that 'a town is a town'; and that strong measures need to be taken to protect the scholar from that sort of fantasy". And the elaboration of urban typologies is "really no

less mystifying" (Ibid, p. 15).

Abrams major point is that instead of viewing the "urban" as an autonomous field with its own processes, it should be regarded as a particular locus or manifestation of the social process. Similar conclusions have been reached by, among others, Harvey (1973), and Anderson. The latter comments that,

"We can now drop the uneasy inverted commas from 'urban' and see it in terms of social relations in space and the interactions of social processes with spatial and physical structures" (Anderson J., 1975, p. 8).

Hence the fundamental requirement for approaching the questions asked in this thesis is a general social theory, and one which is capable of incorporating the spatial manifestations of the social processes it describes.

The literature on the internal structure of cities is clearly related to, and sometimes overlaps, that on urban development. As such it is subject to similar limitations, yet it does require a brief separate treatment. This literature may be grouped under two headings; ecological models and social area analysis.

The nature of the former and its deficiencies have been so frequently exposed that it may receive short shrift. Rooted in "ecological determinism" the models are, at best descriptive

devices, with the sector model apparently the most valid (Johnston, 1972, pp. 85-90). It need only be added that Engels, in 1845, described a similar spatial structure in Manchester, but he accounted for it in terms of class relationships [1].

The alternative approach which does apparently relate class and space is social area analysis. The conception of class, however, "is limited in scope, amounting to "statistical categories and nothing more" [2]. As such the quest for "social areas becomes a taxonomic exercise, social area being based on the view that society increases in scale over time" (Eyles, 1974, p. 43). Process is reduced to a simple evolutionary model in which change is seen as both cumulative and linear, culminating inevitably in the present [3].

The extension of social area analysis into factorial ecology has added considerable technical sophistication to this type of analysis, but it has done nothing to improve the theoretical foundations. Eyles (1974, p. 43) assessment of factorial ecology as "an example of what Mills called abstracted empiricism, representing the technical sterility of much present day geography" appears valid.

If the internal structure of a city is to be grasped it requires a social theory which encompasses social classes as more than statistical categories and incorporates conflict as an

integral feature of social change. In addition it must be capable of addressing the spatial expression of social inequality. It is the contention here that historical materialism provides just such a necessary theoretical foundation [4]. On reaching a similar conclusion, Harvey (1973, p. 17) remarked that,

"I do not turn to it [Marx's analysis] out of some a priori sense of its superiority (although I find myself in tune with its general supposition of and commitment to change), but because I can find no other way of accomplishing what I set out to do or of understanding what has to be understood".


THE STRUCTURE OF THE STUDY.

The decision to adopt historical materialism as a theoretical framework raises almost as many difficulties as it resolves. Originating in the work of Marx and Engels, historical materialism has suffered a variety of subsequent fates, in addition to being ignored or rejected [5]. It is a highly contested and also often incomplete theoretical endeavour. A considerable variety of different interpretations have developed since the death of its founders. It is not necessary here to review this process, but its occurrence does necessitate the careful delineation of the particular position adopted. In general terms this thesis follows the theoretical work of Althusser, directed at the clarification of the basic concepts of the discourse [6]. In view of the nature of this position it is important that the basic concepts, as used in this thesis, be specified carefully. This is the task of Chapter 2.

Although historical materialism is capable of incorporating the spatial dimension comparatively little work has been done in this regard. The notion of "uneven development" is immediately suggestive and Chapter 3 examines this with the aim of establishing the theoretical requirements for the study of a particular place, in this case Vancouver.

Finally, a theory of class is of central importance to a study of social and spatial structure. Once again a variety of different interpretations exists within the corpus of historical materialism. Chapter 4 elaborates the particular theory adopted in this thesis, building on the basic concepts established in Chapter 2.

The first part of the thesis, therefore, is concerned with the theoretical foundations for the remainder of the study. It spells out the manner in which the empirical material was appropriated and guides its presentation. The theory specifies the questions asked and the way in which the answers are attempted.



FOOTNOTES

[1] See Engels, 1969, pp. 78-80. The pattern he describes is basically one of concentric rings. Harvey (1973, p. 133) has commented that it "seems a pity that contemporary geographers have looked to Park and Burgess, rather than Engels for their inspiration", which poses interesting questions for the history of geographic thought.

[2] The comment is by Hutcheson (in Laxer (Ed.), 1973, p. 63) and is directed at the sociological work of Porter, but it is equally valid in the present context. Hutcheson adds that these "artificial statistical groups . . . do not have any life of their own or any coherence" (Ibid, p. 62).

[3] For a discussion of the ideological basis of this view, see Arblaster (1972).

[4] For a discussion of the relevance of historical materialism to historical geography, see Gregory (1976).

[5] For an account of the genesis of historical materialism, see Therborn (1976, esp. pp. 317-413); for a schematic account of later developments, see Anderson P. (1976).

[6] In his study of the emergence of historical materialism, Therborn (1976, p. 354) states,

"Although the immense secondary literature on Marx and Engels has in general paid scant attention to this problem of conceptual clarification, it has been given priority in the range of work inspired by Althusser. Apart from those of Althusser himself, important contributions have been made above all by Etienne Balibar, Charles Bettelheim, Nicos Poulantzas and Pierre - Phillipe Rey".

Therborn also adds that these people have sought to develop as well as clarify the concepts.

CHAPTER 2

THE BASIC CONCEPTS OF HISTORICAL MATERIALISM.

"In the beginning was the Relation"
(Bachelard, cited in Lecourt, 1975, p. 39).

Historical materialism is primarily concerned with the structure of social relations and rests on the proposition that the production and reproduction of the means to support human life is the basis of every social order [1]. Therborn (1976, pp. 352-353) writes that historical materialism focuses on,

"... the ever pre-given complex social totality, the always already existing social world', its structure, its effects on man living in it, its laws of motion' and its possible transformation"
(Therborn, 1976, pp. 352-3).

Furthermore it is not,

"... synonymous with economic theory and history: it is rather a science of historical social totalities comprising economic bases, a political-juridical and ideological superstructures"
(ibid., p. 379n)[2].

Society is seen as a totality, but one with a particular structure and subject to a particular form of process [3].

The structure of social relationships is viewed in terms of a number of levels - economic, political and ideological - which are asymmetrically related. Not all the levels are of equal importance. There is, in other words, a base and superstructure. The introduction of this metaphor broaches the critical issue of determination. It is a critical issue because it raises the

question of the equation of historical materialism with economic determinism [4]. The criticism is important, not only because it is common, but also because, for some exponents of historical materialism, it is valid [5].

In the present context a clarification of the meaning of determination is essential. "Determine", Raymond Williams writes, has two sets of meanings which are relevant to the present problem [6]:

"There is, on the one hand, from its theological inheritance, the notion of external cause which **TOTALLY PREDICTS OR PREFIGURES**, indeed totally controls a subsequent activity. But there is also, from the experience of social practice, a notion of determination as **SETTING LIMITS, EXERTING PRESSURES**" (Williams, 1973, p.4, emphasis added).

It is in the sense of "setting limits, exerting pressures" that the concept of determination will henceforth be employed.

The non-economic levels, the political and ideological superstructure, are not reducible in a mechanistic fashion to the economic. They have a degree of autonomy and their own relatively autonomous histories. It is not possible, therefore, having established the structure and process of the economic base, to simply "read off" the corresponding political and ideological structures. Nevertheless the economic level does establish parameters for the general forms of the superstructure [7].

The asymmetry of the relationships between the various levels can be further clarified by distinguishing between the concepts determinant and dominant. In this context the asymmetry means that one of these levels is considered to be dominant in that it conditions the nature of the other levels and the totality as a whole. The economic level is determinant, however, precisely in that it determines which level will be dominant (see Therborn, 1976, p. 401: Althusser and Balibar 1970, p. 224)[8]. It is in this sense that Althusser conceives of the asymmetrical totality of historical materialism as a 'structure in dominance'. One level of the structure is dominant, but the level which is dominant is determined (in the last instance) by the economic (Althusser and Balibar, 1970, p. 319).

THE DIALECTIC.

The structured totality, however, can only be fully understood in motion, in terms of the processes which operate within it. The dynamism, the capacity for transformation, is represented by the dialectic.

The dialectic is a complex topic, the intricacies of which are beyond the scope of the present discussion [9]. The central concept, however, is that of contradiction, a notion that is "alien equally to economics and sociology" (Therborn, 1976, p. 393). In brief the concept of contradiction "refers to the unity of opposites" (ibid). It is in this sense that the

relationship between social classes is interpreted. Under the capitalist mode of production the bourgeoisie and the working class are contradictory, or opposite, the one to the other. Yet at the same time neither can exist alone; each represents the conditions of the other's existence. Therborn (1976, p. 394) writes,

"an exploitative mode of production, then, is contradictory in the sense that it is at the same time both a specific unity of opposing classes, of immediate producers and appropriators of surplus-labour, and a conflict and struggle of these opposing classes".

Clearly it is here that the concept of the class struggle as the dynamic force in history is located. This notion contains two aspects. Firstly that of inherent opposition on a structural level eq., bourgeoisie/workers at the economic level. Secondly it contains the possibilities of action or inaction, it encompasses the notion of intention. In other words the capacity for action to attempt to transform some or all aspects of a given situation. It is in this sense that people make their own history, and they make it on all levels of the totality, not simply at the level of the economic. The class struggle exists, and it is contested, on all levels, economic, political, and ideological. People "... are overdetermined" Therborn comments "... by the circumstances in which they live, ... On the other hand they can also change their circumstances, because they are themselves changing and contradictory, a unity of opposites in motion" (Therborn, 1976, p. 398).

MODE OF PRODUCTION.

The mode of production is one of the central concepts in the corpus of historical materialism. It is also a complex and difficult concept and so requires careful elucidation. In summary terms a mode of production may be seen as a combination or articulation of the forces of production (productive forces) and the relations of production. These two sets of relations are structured by the dominance of the latter, the relations of production [10]. In order for this definition to take on its full meaning the next necessary step is a specification of the two component sets of relationships; firstly the forces of production and then the relations of production. This analytical separation is a valid, and necessary, procedure for expostulation but it should be remembered that neither relationship can exist alone; they are a conceptual pair and exist as such.

The concept of the forces of production at its most general level refers to the manner of people's "appropriation of nature", to the way in which the material basis of society is secured. It encompasses the series of procedures and operations by which raw "objects of nature" are successively transformed into utilisable products. This work upon nature (and transformed nature) can be signified by the term labour process [11]. As such the forces of production concerns matters of technique and organisation. It represents what Therborn has called a "technical anchorage" for the relations of production. In effect this means that the

forces of production constitute the conditions of existence for corresponding relations of production" (Tharborn, 1976, p. 359). The specific components of this "technical anchorage" are threefold; a) the direct producer, b) the object of labour, and c) the means of labour.

The direct producer refers to those persons actually performing the work or labour: the source of labour power [12]. The object of labour denotes the object towards which labour power is directed or upon which labour is performed. In some ways it is equivalent to raw materials, but has a broader meaning than the normal usage of this term. It is the object of labour which is transformed during the labour process into a product which, minimally, is useful (a use-value), and under capitalism is also an exchange value. The means of labour consists of those implements which are utilised in the labour process, and which are themselves the products of labour. Included, therefore, are tools and machinery together with the sources of energy and mechanisms of transportation.

The foregoing treatment of the forces of production, in terms of a series of components, may have given a slightly false impression, which should be clarified before proceeding further. Whereas the term component implies a series of discrete elements, the productive forces are in reality indivisible. Quantitative changes, therefore, in one or more aspects, affect the whole of

the forces of production, changing what may be termed their "level". Whilst such quantitative changes, broadly equivalent to productivity are important, they are considered as less important than the overall structure of the productive forces.

Yet the labour process cannot simply be considered in isolation. It always exists or takes place under particular determinate relations of production. This set of relationships between people in the production process involves ownership of the means of production and the provision of labour. Ownership, in turn, contains a dual aspect: economic ownership and possession.

Economic ownership, not to be confused with juridical ownership [13], involves the, "real economic control of the means of production, i.e., the power to assign the means of production to given uses and so dispose of the products obtained" and hence the surplus created (Poulantzas, 1975, pp. 18, 116).

Possession refers to the "capacity to put the means of production into operation" and thus involves the "direction and relative control of a certain labour process" (Ibid, 1975, pp. 18, 116). This involves the co-ordination and organization of the different aspects and elements of the labour process together with the supervisory and coercive roles (maintenance of labour discipline) necessitated by the antagonistic social relations of production.

Conversely the direct producers, the non-owners, have surplus-labour extracted, although the form this takes varies from one mode of production to another. The labour of the producer, therefore, can be divided into two segments: necessary labour and surplus labour. Necessary labour refers to the average socially necessary labour time expended by the direct producer in order to ensure his/her own reproduction (and also the family) [14]. Surplus labour refers to the additional time expended by the direct producers in the labour process above and beyond the necessary time. It is in and through this aspect of the relations of production that the two fundamental classes, master-slave, lord-serf, bourgeoisie-working class, of any mode of production have their existence, and hence definition.

Under capitalism ownership and possession are united, and the direct producer is, therefore, separated from the means of production [15]. This separation represents a crucial aspect of capitalism, for it is precisely the consequent incapacity to produce his/her own means of subsistence that forces the direct producer to seek employment as wage labour. This separation is the precondition for the transformation of labour power into a commodity, wage labour [16]. Surplus labour, therefore, is appropriated in the form of surplus value, as commodities. It is this process of the creation and appropriation of value, and the relationships involved, which serve to define the two fundamental classes of the capitalist mode of production [17].

Whilst this definition is sufficient to account for the form of existence of a mode of production, it cannot account for its continued existence. In other words, if a mode of production is to survive there must be some mechanism for its reproduction at the economic level. The foregoing definition covers production, but not reproduction.

In order to account for the reproduction of a mode of production at the economic level, additional concepts are required. Products have not only to be produced but also circulated and consumed (productively and individually). Production and circulation represent different moments or spheres in the economic reproduction of the mode of production as a whole. All are necessary for successful reproduction and all involve different processes, or aspects of the processes as a whole. Therefore each has a degree of autonomy; one is not reducible to the other. This is of particular importance under capitalism where the different "moments" are frequently temporally and spatially separate. At the same time all are necessary for the unity of the whole. And, within this unity, it is the "sphere of production" which is "determinant in the last instance" (Fine & Harris, 1976b, p.101).

Finally, the actual existence and reproduction of a mode of production takes place in a totality which is more than economic. Nevertheless the economic level exists in a totality which it

conditions, or determines. It exists in conjunction with political and ideological structures. The latter are not reducible to the former, but represent the conditions of existence of the mode of production itself.

THE POLITICAL LEVEL

For historical materialism the emergence of the political level is "indissolubly tied" to the emergence of the state and both are necessary for the establishment of modes of production involving classes. In such modes of production involving contradictory relations of production, the state operates to contain these. It functions to maintain the cohesion and facilitate the continued reproduction of the mode of production as it exists within a social formation. This is achieved by force, if and when necessary, but also by attempting to "represent" the interests of the various classes at the political level (Hindess and Hirst, 1975, pp 28-41).

Two important points follow from this conceptualisation. Firstly the state is a class state in that it operates to maintain the dominance of the existing dominant class: to preserve the existent class relations. On the other hand, the state is not simply an instrument in the hands of the dominant class. This is a critical point, for it is precisely this relative autonomy that enables the state to fulfil its cohesive function by both representing class interests and ensuring the

continued dominance of one of them.

The capitalist state, as the institutionalised form of political power in capitalist social formations consists of the interrelationship of a variety of institutions or apparatuses [18], including the following : the executive, legislature, administration, military and police, judiciary and 'sub-central' government (Milliband, 1973, pp. 46-50) These institutions by their very structure serve to maintain existing social relations, - i.e., the dominance of the bourgeoisie - but they do not necessitate the actual presence of that class. "The rule of capital", Therborn (1977, p. 30) writes "requires a state - for internal and external protection - but ... the state does not have to be managed personally by the bourgeoisie". Herein lies the source of the autonomy of the capitalist state, but its cause must be sought elsewhere.

The bourgeoisie as a class is not a unitary block, but is internally divided into fractions: industrial, mercantile and financial (see below Chapter 4). These fractions have different and frequently competing interests which are unified through the state in opposition to the dominated classes. The state thus represents the 'general interest' of the nation, but with that interest defined as preserving the existing social structure. Within this important limitation, it is the relative autonomy of the state that enables the dominated classes to extract a variety

of concessions. The state, then, represents an unstable equilibrium of compromise which serves to resolve conflicts within the dominant class and contain and defuse the opposition of the dominated classes. As Poulantzas writes:

- " ... this relative autonomy allows the [capitalist] state to intervene not only to arrange compromises vis-a-vis the dominated classes, which, in the long run, are useful for the actual economic interests of the dominant classes or fractions; but also (depending on the concrete conjuncture) to intervene against the long-term interests of ONE OR OTHER fractions of the dominant class: for such compromises and sacrifices are sometimes necessary for the realisation of their political class interests" (Poulantzas, 1973, p. 285).

The typical form that the capitalist state has come to take is that of a capitalist or bourgeois democracy, but its creation should be in no way be regarded as an inevitable mechanical process. It required struggle, both by the bourgeoisie to remove the pre-existing structures, and by the dominated classes to achieve and improve their own mode of representation within the framework of the state (Therborn 1977) [19].

IDEOLOGICAL LEVEL

As with the political level, there is no fully developed theory of the ideological level in historical materialism. Although there has been vigorous debate in recent years with respect to the nature of this instance of the totality, no consensus has yet emerged [20]. Nevertheless, this process has served to provide a number of insights as well as illuminating

some common ground.

Ideologies are frequently seen as systems or sets of ideas. This is a useful starting point, but only that. If the conceptualisation of ideology is allowed to remain at this level, then it exists firmly in the terrain of idealism. For historical materialism ideology must be rooted in social existence, in the social context of the people who alone are the bearers of ideas - systematic or otherwise. Thus ideology exists in and through social practice, and, as these practices are regularised, they take on institutional forms. In other words, for historical materialism, ideology contains not simply ideas, but also social institutions. (Mepham, 1974, p. 118; Laclau, 1975, p. 90) This is obvious enough in terms of religion, education and the communications or "media" industry, although perhaps less in terms of such cultural activities as sport [21].

If ideology is a system of ideas together with institutional forms, the question arises as to the role that ideology plays in society. Mepham (1974) has suggested that it is largely one of mystification, that is of obscuring reality (the social relations of society) by concentrating on appearances, a view which is similar to that of Althusser (1971) in his couplet ideology/science. In the latter instance ideology becomes the opposite, the other, of science, where science alone can produce knowledge of reality. The problem here is one of circularity:

any system that differentiates between science and ideology in this manner is itself based, as a precondition, on just this differentiation [22].

The basic problem here, the factor which produces this epistemological dilemma, is that the conceptualisation of ideology is incomplete. It fails to incorporate class. By restoring the "intimate connection" between class and ideology the dilemma is resolved (McCarney, 1976, p. 31). There is not one ideology but several and they are rooted in, and expressive of, the lived experience of the different classes. In this way it is perfectly possible for the ideology of one class (the bourgeoisie) to mystify the reality of another class (workers) by obscuring their mutual basis in exploiting/exploited social relations.

But if there are several ideologies, with appropriate institutions, they are not all of equal weight. One ideology is dominant. The dominance here is of crucial importance, for it means more than a mere superiority in any quantitative sense. It means that the dominant ideology permeates into the ideology of subordinate classes and conditions the mode of expression and form of existence of the latter. It is in this sense that E. P. Thompson has written of the experience of the English working class after the defeat of Chartism.

"This 'caesura' (between the defeat of Chartism and the appearance of strong unions and eventually the Labour Party) is exactly the period in which the characteristic class institutions of the Labour Movement were built up - trade unions, trades councils, T.U.C., co-ops, and the rest - which have endured to this day. It was part of the logic of this new direction that each advance within the framework of capitalism simultaneously involved the working class more deeply in the status quo. As they improved their position by organisation within the workshop, so they became more reluctant to engage in quixotic outbreaks which might jeopardise gains accumulated at such cost. Each assertion of working class influence within the bourgeois democratic state machinery simultaneously involved them as partners (even if antagonistic partners) in the running of the machine ... reformist pressures from secure organisational bases, bring evident returns ... British reformism is strong because, within very serious limits, it has worked" (Quoted in Mepham, 1974, p. 121).

Here is an excellent example of the hegemony of bourgeois ideology. It has permeated into the pores of the institutions of a potentially (and historically as Thompson has elsewhere shown) revolutionary class. In this way the fundamental questions of social relations are obscured by the workers' own ideology and institutions which themselves, albeit in an ambiguous manner, contribute to the cohesion and hence continuity of society.

SOCIAL FORMATION

It is important that a clear differentiation be made between a mode of production and a social formation. This statement is necessary simply because the two terms are often used interchangeably. This conflation of concepts has had a detrimental effect on historical materialism in that it has

obscured the specificity of both concepts (Santos, 1977, p. 2). The task here, then, is twofold: firstly, to differentiate social formation from mode of production, and secondly, to indicate the relationship between the two.

Initially, and as a first approximation, social formation may be regarded as roughly equivalent to "society" in its normal usage. This serves to indicate something of the scope and range of the concept as well as some indication of its content. Social formation is a very broad or general concept, but at the same time one which contains within it a variety of subordinate concepts, most specifically that of mode of production itself.

Whilst social formation is broadly equivalent to society, it is not at all equivalent to society in general, but only to a specific society. A social formation always contains two specifying dimensions - time and space - and so it exists concretely, in a particular time and within a particular space. It is, therefore, an inherently geographical concept and so a full account of any given social formation must necessarily incorporate the geographical milieu [23].


A social formation thus refers to a particular space, but this raises the question as to the extent of the space referred to, or, more precisely, on what criteria should the space be delimited. In general terms the criterion is political, being

the extent of political jurisdiction or sovereignty. For capitalist societies such a delimitation poses no problems in that the social formation corresponds to the nation state in spatial extent [24].

Thus far the importance of the spatial component and its extent have been stressed but nothing has been said concerning the relationships existing within the space itself. At this point it is necessary to return to the mode of production, both to differentiate it from and relate it to the social formation.

Two points need to be made with respect to this question. Firstly the social formation is the locus of existence of the mode of production. The mode of production is a theoretical concept and the reality to which it refers exists only within a particular social formation. Thus a mode of production, incorporating a set of basic or invariant relationships, may appear in a variety of different forms incorporating the spatio/temporal particularities of the social formation. In other words whilst two social formations may contain the identical mode of production this does not mean that the social formations are identical.

The second point is that a social formation usually contains more than one mode of production. This, in turn, poses the problem of the relationship between the modes of production.



This problem can be resolved by regarding the social formation as a structure in dominance. The two, or more, modes of production, are articulated the one upon the other, with one in a position of dominance [25]. It is the dominant mode which prescribes the manner of existence of the other modes. The former in its process of reproduction establishes the form of integration or articulation of the latter with itself. In this way the reproduction of the social formation as a whole may produce dissolution or conservation effects upon subordinate modes [26]. Within the reproduction of the social formation as a whole it is the reproduction of the dominant mode which establishes parameters, limits, and opportunities, for subordinate modes.

Space, it has been argued, is an integral aspect of a social formation; for a social formation to exist it must exist spatially. Should space, then, be regarded as equivalent to the economic, political, and ideological levels; should it be viewed as constituting a new or different level? To argue this, as Santos (1977) appears to do, is to argue for the autonomy of space.

Yet to argue for the autonomy of space is to fetishise, or reify space, to invest space with the capacity to act independently and in its own right (see Anderson J., 1973, pp. 1-6). To accept the autonomy of space is to slide away from

historical materialism, since it is to deny the centrality of people, acting in and through constituted social relations, in creating their own manner of existence.

Rather than viewing space as autonomous it should be seen as a necessary condition for social existence. Society, a social formation, can only exist in and through space. At the same time space is not neutral. It represents not only a condition of existence, but also a set of opportunities and restraints. To take an appropriate example, the environment of British Columbia in 1870 offered a variety of opportunities for industrial development, eq., timber, fish, minerals, but the location of these resources in relation to world markets severely limited their utilisation.

Spatial forms, the built environment, and spatial patterns or distribution, once existent may be seen as resistant to change. Yet the conservation or transformation of these forms or patterns is consequent upon social action, social struggle, and can only be accomplished at a social cost.

Finally space is not neutral in the sense that society, the social formation is not neutral. Space is structured in conformity with the process of reproduction of the social formation and this process is a consequence of asymmetrical social relations. In other words the exploitative social

relations at the heart of a social formation may be expected to have spatial consequences which are advantageous to the dominant social class and deleterious to the dominated social class.

Implicit in the foregoing is the essential inseparability of space and time. For example, the set of environmental opportunities and restraints in British Columbia in 1870 were not constant, except in the sense that they were constantly transformed with the passage of time. This is important in that the social formation is the locus of existence of social processes, and to state this is, necessarily, to involve time. The reproduction of a social formation represents its history, its passage through time. The history of a specific social formation is specific to it alone. It contains not only a set of spatial or environmental particularities but also its own evolved and evolving political and ideological characteristics. These, possessing their own sphere of autonomy, necessarily contain their own trajectories of development, their own body of tradition. As noted earlier in discussing the totality, these will influence the manner and form in which the social formation reproduces itself, they are irreducible aspects of history.

Each social formation contains its own spatio-temporal specificities and is therefore unique and can only be analysed in that light. The commonality of certain fundamental processes involves their expression, their concrete existence, in a variety

of forms.

THE CAPITALIST MODE OF PRODUCTION AND ITS REPRODUCTION.

As generalized commodity production the capitalist mode of production is founded on the contradictory relationship between capital and labour [27]. Separated from the means of production, and hence subsistence, the direct labourer exchanges his/her labour power as a commodity. The continued reproduction of the capitalist mode of production both requires and reproduces this separation. Surplus labour in this structure is extracted in the form of surplus value materialized as commodities. The realization of surplus value, in the form of profit, rent and interest, involves a complex articulation of the spheres of production and circulation.

The reproduction of the capitalist mode of production, however, takes a particular form: expanded reproduction. Since capitalist production is solely for the purpose of exchange, the production of commodities and not direct consumption, the production process is undertaken on the assumption that more value will exist after production than before. In consequence the capitalist mode of production is inherently expansionary; the ultimate "purpose" of capitalist production is accumulation or increase of capital [28]. This does not imply that every capitalist enterprise is always successful in this endeavour, far from it. The destruction of capital, the consequence of failure

to expand, is also a necessary part of capitalism, being both a cause and consequence of the pattern of uneven development.

The temporal and spatial implications of this uneven development are explored in Chapter 3. Here only one basic point needs to be made. Unevenness, and hence uneven development, is integral to the very concept of contradiction and the particular concept of the totality under historical materialism, with the latter involving the uneven relation between contradictions. Clearly the capitalist mode of production will both incorporate and express this fundamental unevenness. "So uneven development", writes Althusser (1977, p. 213),

"... is not external to contradiction, but constitutes its most intimate essence. So the unevenness that exists in the 'development' of contradictions, that is, in the process itself, exists in the essence of contradiction itself".

The question to be addressed in Chapter 3, concerns the temporal and spatial forms that this unevenness takes.

Finally, the accumulation of capital does not take place through "capital in general", but through individual capitals operating in a matrix of competition. The capacity of individual capitals to realise surplus-value is measured in the market place. Here the commodities of the individual capitalist entrepreneur encounter competition in terms of price, of the same or substitute commodities produced by other capitalists. The

market price less the costs of production is a measure of the surplus realised, which may, therefore, vary considerably for different capitals. The extent of the return to the individual capital, however, is crucial. For it is this profit which enables the development of the level of the productive forces, the reduction of future costs of production and the capacity for the realisation of future profits. The relative success or failure in this single endeavour is expressed through the twin processes of concentration and centralisation of capital. In other words the logic of capitalist competition is the reduction of competition [29].

PERIODIZATION OF THE CAPITALIST MODE OF PRODUCTION.

The expanded reproduction of the capitalist mode of production had some important effects on the forms of that production; effects which became apparent in the last quarter of the nineteenth century. The increasing scale of capitalist production units, a consequence of successful accumulation, resulted in a tendency towards the formation of "monopolies" [30].

The incidence of the formation of "monopolies" was uneven, varying between sectors and branches of particular economies and between economies [31]. This pattern may be seen as a function of the differential progress in the concentration and centralization of capital, but there was also a technical

component. The advance in the level of the productive forces (technical breakthroughs) generated by the reproduction of the capitalist mode of production not only served to increase productivity but also the quantity of fixed capital investment. These new, more efficient labour processes frequently required very large initial outlays of capital, which could not be raised on an individual basis, but only through organisation (see Mandel, 1968, pp. 393-394). The 1890's, for example, was a period marked both by radical technological innovations, and by the rapid emergence of trusts [32].

For historical materialism the tendency towards the formation of "monopolies" represents the establishment of a new stage of the capitalist mode of production. In other words historical materialism recognises that the capitalist mode of production consists of a competitive and monopoly stage, with the latter beginning, in some social formations, in the last quarter of the nineteenth century. It must be emphasised, however, that the recognition of stages does not imply a linear stage theory; competitive capitalism co-existed (and continues to co-exist) with monopoly capital.

Before discussing further the implications of this periodization it is necessary to consider the meaning of the term "monopoly capital", as this represents a possible source of confusion. In some ways the choice of term is unfortunate since

monopoly has a distinct meaning in every day usage, but one which is at odds with that in historical materialism. The monopoly of historical materialism is more comparable to common usage of oligopoly. "We use the term 'monopoly'", Baran and Sweezy (1968, p. 20n) write "to include not only the case of a single seller of a commodity for which there are substitutes, but also the much more common case of 'oligopoly', i.e., a few sellers dominating the markets for products which are more or less satisfactory substitutes for one another".

The important point is that the large corporation (monopoly capital) functions in a qualitatively different way compared to firms operating under conditions of widespread competition (Mandel, 1968, p. 433). These changes are not restricted to situations of complete monopoly.

"Power to restrict supply and raise prices need not be absolute to be worth while, it helps to ensure profits if the number of sellers is so small that each will recognise the benefits of a live-and-let-live policy" (ibid., citing Stocking and Watkins).

It follows that there are no simple technical criteria for designating the boundary between monopoly and non-monopoly capital. Rather there are a number of indicators - size of capital, extent of integration (vertical and/or horizontal) of different labour processes, level of productivity, extent of market control, capacity for self-financing - but these are only relative indices. If monopoly capitalism is to be understood as

a stage of the capitalist mode of production, then it must be seen as a transformed form of the expanded reproduction of capital (Poulantzas, 1975, pp. 109-114).

What is intended here by the notion of a transformed form? If the capitalist mode of production is to reproduce itself then an 'invariant' core of productive relations must be maintained, i.e., the production of surplus-value by the direct worker through the sale of his/her labour-power. Although the manner in which surplus-value is produced remains constant the same cannot be said of the way in which it is appropriated. Poulantzas (1975, p. 117) writes " ... the stages of capitalism are characterised by the differential forms of the dominant capitalist mode of production" and these differential forms " ... involve the forms of the appropriation of surplus-value". Since the appropriation of surplus-value is the prerogative of capital, the periodization under discussion refers to modifications in the structure of the place of capital in the relations of production.

The place or function of capital in the relations of production is twofold. It consists, as already noted, of the powers of ownership and possession. The concern here is with the manner in which these powers are articulated and realized; first under competitive capital and then under monopoly capital. Under the competitive stage the dual aspects of the place of capital remained united; often in the person of a single individual.

Here is situated the figure of the classical entrepreneur who not only owned the means of production but also co-ordinated and supervised [33].

In contrast to competitive capital, monopoly capital is characterised by a separation of the powers of economic ownership and possession. Poulantzas (1975, p. 124) again, "The dominant form that replaces competitive capitalism ... is that of a single economic ownership subordinating (subsuming) relatively distinct relationships of possession".

Moreover Poulantzas (ibid., pp.124-5) suggests that the powers of both economic ownership and possession are themselves no longer unitary. Both are fragmented to some extent so that degrees of ownership or possession may be recognised. Thus possession is represented by a hierarchy of management, with descending degrees of power [34].

An example of monopoly capital operating in Vancouver in the nineteenth century may be cited to illustrate the use of the concepts discussed above: the Canadian Pacific Railway (CPR). In the case of the CPR the legal ownership was widely scattered, with a considerable quantity, if not the majority, of shares being held outside Canada. Economic ownership, however, remained in Canada, as did possession [35]. The former was concentrated amongst a small group of people located in Montreal and Toronto.

The latter, in varying degrees, was much more dispersed. Thus day to-day responsibility for the operations of the Pacific division was vested in a general superintendent resident in Vancouver.

The "fracturing" of the place of capital under monopoly capital has considerable implications for the class structure of society, a topic examined in detail in Chapter 4. For the present moment it will suffice to register this significance, which is rooted in the fact that the place of capital is the place of the bourgeoisie, the dominant class of the capitalist mode of production.

This discussion of monopoly capital has concentrated on the level of the relations of production and the productive forces. Since these relations are fundamental in determining the structure of the capitalist mode of production such a concentration was both necessary and inevitable. Yet if changes, or transformed forms, are emerging at this fundamental level then they may certainly be expected to have implications and consequences elsewhere.

For example, Poulantzas argues that the nature of the state under monopoly capitalism is transformed. Instead of being the largely external guarantor of the conditions required for capitalist reproduction, as under the competitive stage, the

state becomes more directly involved, in short the interventionist state. The implications of monopoly capital were also international, reflecting the widening and deepening of the sphere of capital in a particular way. Braverman (1974, p. 232) encapsulates monopoly capitalism in the following way:

"Monopoly capitalism thus embraces the increase of monopolistic organisations within each capitalist country, the internationalization of capital, the international division of labour, imperialism, the world market and the world movement of capital, and changes in the structure of state power."

These spatial implications of monopoly capitalism will be further examined in the process of considering spatial unevenness under the capitalist mode of production in general.

FOOTNOTES

[1] For summary statements of the theoretical foundations of historical materialism, see Marx (1976b), Marx & Engels (1975, esp. Engels to Schmidt, and Engels to Bloch, pp. 392-396), and Engels (1947, pp. 35-38, 316); see also Harnecker (1976).

[2] Hobsbawm writes that historical materialism " ... implies the recognition of societies as systems of relations between human beings, of which the relations entered into for the purpose of production and reproduction are primary ... It also implies the analysis of the structure and functioning of these systems as entities maintaining themselves, in their relation with both the outside - non human and human - and in their internal relationships" (Hobsbawm, 1968, p. 273).

[3] Therborn (1976, p. 392) comments that " ... it has been a characteristic effect of most major schools of sociology from Comte and Saint Simon to Talcott Parsons". See also Raymond Williams (1963), where he traces the changing usage and ideological purpose of the concept of culture in England from the inception of industrial capitalism to 1950.

[4] "Historical materialism", Hobsbawm (1968, p. 269) comments, "was habitually described - sometimes even by Marxists - as 'economic determinism'".

[5] Economic reductionism, economism, mechanical materialism all of these epithets have been variously applied, is generally ascribed to writers such as Plekhanov and Kautsky. Some have laid the blame for this kind of development at the door of Engels as a result of his attempt to generate a general dialectical "philosophy of nature". See, for example, Coulter (1971).

[6] For an extended discussion of the origins and usage of "determine", see Williams (1976, pp. 87-91). See also Engels letter to Bloch, where he attempted to clarify some of the misconceptions about his own and Marx's writings (Marx & Engels, 1975, pp. 394-396).

[7] Engels expresses this general relationship in the following manner,

"In a modern state, law must not only correspond to the general economic conditions and its expression, but must also be an INTERNALLY COHERENT expression which does not, owing to inner contradictions, reduce itself to nought. In order to achieve this, the faithful reflection of economic conditions suffers increasingly" (Quoted in Therborn, 1976, p. 404).

[8] Under feudalism the characteristic feature at the economic level is the exploitative relationship between peasants and landowners; the latter extracting the surplus beyond subsistence from the former. This may be in the form of "direct labour or rent in kind or in money", Hilton (1976, p. 30) notes, but it "is transferred under coercive sanction to the other". This coercive sanction takes an extra-economic form since feudal production requires that the peasantry be in possession of the land (means of production) and production was not primarily for the market, non-economic means were required to extract the surplus. These could take a variety of forms from direct military force to the strength of custom or tradition, including of course religion. In such a context, and regarded from a theoretical viewpoint, a non-economic level would be dominant under feudalism, see Anderson P. (1974).

[9] For historical materialism the dialectic is not the same as the dialectic for Hegel (See Althusser, 1977). The idealistic and teleological (unfolding of the Idea) nature of the Hegelian dialectic render it invalid for utilisation within a materialist framework. Instead Althusser argues that there are no "simple" contradictions, but always a complex, uneven hierarchy. The "reflection in contradiction itself" of these "conditions of existence" are encapsulated in the concept of overdetermination (Ibid, p. 209). Callinicos has summed up Althusser's clarification of the materialist dialectic as being "radically non-teleological". History "... is not the working out of some plan imprinted in the nature of man. It is the result of struggles between different and opposed classes. These struggles are historically determined and conditioned but history leaves their results open. There is no rational 'necessity' a la Kautsky which decides which class will be victorious ... history is determined but not predetermined" (Callinicos, 1976, p. 71, 102).

[10] See, for example, Hindess and Hirst (1975, p. 9): Therborn (1976, p. 394): and, Godelier (1966, p. 335).

[11] Balibar (Althusser and Balibar, 1970, p. 214) uses the term "real appropriation connection". Althusser has also used the term "technical relations of production", but this usage tends to obscure the social character of these relations. (ibid., p. 246n)

[12] In fact this refers only to productive labour in contradistinction to unproductive labour. This is an important differentiation which is taken up in Chapter 4.

[13] This is an important distinction under the capitalist mode of production. Legal ownership refers to the right to a portion of the profits (if any) that are distributed, e.g., a shareholder. Thus whilst economic ownership includes legal

ownership the converse is not the case. Historically economic ownership has tended to concentrate whilst legal ownership has become more diffuse. For a recent study of the concentration of economic ownership in Canada, see Clement (1975): see also note 35, below.

[14] Subsistence should not be interpreted as some biological minimum. The reproduction of labour involves cultural and historical norms which are specific to time and place, see Marx (1976a, pp. 274-280).

[15] Properly speaking this refers only to the competitive stage of the capitalist mode of production. With the development of the imperialist stage, ownership and possession are again separated, but in a new way. This new separation does not involve a return of possession to the direct producers. The nature of this new separation is explained below.

[16] See Hilton (Ed.) (1976). This book is a collection of essays incorporating and supplementing the "debate" between Dobb and Sweezy over the characteristic of this transition. Dobb's initial work which provoked the debate is contained in Dobb, 1963, originally published in 1947, whilst often provocative and illuminating this debate has by no means settled the issue as to the nature of the transition. It remains a hotly contested issue, which, in itself, is situated the broader, and unresolved, problematic of how any transition between modes of production occurs; see also Brenner (1977). "Workers", as Kuczynski (1967, p. 161) has commented with reference to Europe,

"were faced with alternatives of finding employment as workers or begging, that is, starving. Since begging by the able-bodied could be punished, and starving did not seem to be a practical alternative, there was only one choice left, to yield to economic pressure and find employment as workers".

[17] This rests upon Marx's development of the labour theory of value. As Meek (1956, p. 164) has remarked, "the concept of value as embodied labour in effect expressed Marx's view that the economic process should be analysed in terms of the social relations between men and men in the production of commodities". For a recent discussion of the relevance of the concept of value, see Fine & Harris (1976a, 1977). For a contrary view, see Hodgson (1977).

[18] The list here is taken from Miliband (1973, pp. 46-50). Althusser and Poulantzas also include a further set of institutions - church, trade unions, the family - as part of the State apparatuses under the heading of ideological state apparatuses. This formulation has been decisively rejected by

among others, Laclau (1975, p. 100):

"There is here a subtle transposition which goes from defining the state as the instance which constitutes the factor of cohesion between the levels of a social formation to the assertion that everything that contributes to the cohesion of a social formation pertains, by definition, to the State".

[19] The democratic form is by no means the only shape of the state which is compatible with capitalism. At times of severe crisis, other harsher types of state can and have emerged. Thus various forms of dictatorship have been necessary to preserve capitalist social relations in some social formations eg., Fascism in Germany, Japan; see Therborn, 1977.

[20] See Althusser (1971), Hirst (1976) and various issues of the journal, Radical Philosophy, for recent contributions.

[21] In addition institutions centered on the economic (trade unions) and political levels (parties) also play significant ideological roles. Althusser, in stressing this material aspect of ideology, has gone so far as to term all of the above institutions ideological state apparatuses. To accept this view, however, is to lose the specificity of the ideological through the "conflation of (the) State and civil society", with the former subsuming the latter (Anderson, P., 1977, p. 36).

[22] As McCarney (1976, p. 29) argues:

"Whatever criteria of truth and objectivity are employed will, it seems have to be internal to some particular system or other and so cannot help begging the fundamental question at issue. There seems to remain no point in conceptual space from which an 'objective' verdict on the merits of alternative systems could be delivered. One cannot for instance, legitimately contrast the vision of reality revealed by one with the structure of appearances embodied in another. The distinction between reality and appearance can at best have application only within systems and not across them".

[23] Santos has argued this point most cogently, even going so far as to suggest that the concept should be known as a "Socio-Economic and Spatial Formation" (Santos, 1977, p. 2). His arguments are important, both for geography and historical materialism, but the terminology is rather cumbersome, so that the simpler usage of social formation will be retained here.

[24] For pre-capitalist societies the situation is less clear, but a general equivalence with the anthropological concept of culture area appears not unreasonable.

[25] In a recent survey of the literature on modes of production, Foster-Carter identified two different "levels of meaning" in the concept of articulation: "join together" and "give expression to". He adds that it is a metaphor used to "indicate relations of linkage and effectivity between different levels of all sorts of things" (Foster-Carter, 1978, pp. 53-54).

[26] For a discussion of these concepts, see the "Theoretical Comments" of Charles Bettelheim, in Emmanuel (1972, especially pp. 297-298). For their application in geographic literature, see McGee (1977).

[27] Mandel (1968, p. 126) writes, "Everything is the object of economic life, everything that is produced is henceforth a commodity: all foodstuffs, all consumer goods, all means of production including labour-power itself".

[29] It is worth noting that this characteristic was apparent very early in the history of the capitalist mode of production, see Pollard (1968, pp. 286-287). At the same time the reduction of competition does not imply not the elimination of competition. Even in a situation of perfect monopoly, competition remains in the form of the production of substitute commodities eq., land, water and air transport.

[30] Mandel (1968, p. 399) cites the following description,

"In the old days a manufactory could be an individual concern. Next ... a partnership... Then it grew beyond the capital available by two or three joining together as a partnership, and limited companies became necessary ... Now we have reached a further stage again, when a number of limited companies require to be grouped together in what we call a combine".

In addition to the clear recognition of the increased and increasing size of individual capitals, this statement also contains an indication of one of the corollaries of this process, i.e., a movement away from competition. Not only did the size of individual capitals increase, but there was also a tendency for the number of capitals/production units to decrease in number in certain branches of industry. In other words, beginning around 1870 there was a tendency away from competition towards the establishment of monopolies (Baran and Sweezy, 1968, p. 221). This was manifested in a variety of different forms, ranging from associations, both informal and formal, where the constituent

capitals retained a large degree of autonomy, to complete mergers and the establishment of trusts, in which "all legal and financial independence of the constituent companies vanishes" (Mandel, 1968, p. 402).

Mandel (1968, pp. 401-403) lists the following types - Gentlemen's agreements, price regulating associations, pools, cartels, trusts (in their original sense, e.g., Standard Oil Trust up to 1890), holding companies and merger trusts. Sweezy (1942, pp 262-265) provides a slightly different list.

[31] Thus in the United States, the giant company appeared first in the transportation network (the Union Pacific was completed in 1869) and was extended into steel production, food processing and the machine building and electrical equipment industries. (Braverman, 1974, pp. 261-263; Baran & Sweezy, 1968, pp. 40ff).

The tendency for the development of monopolies also varied between social formations. Of the leading social formations in the late nineteenth century it began earlier and developed more rapidly in the U.S.A. and Germany than in the U.K. (Dobb, 1963, p. 310). The reasons for this were complex and by no means fully understood, but it was undoubtedly an important aspect of the growing challenge to the international predominance of the U.K. social formation. For a comparison between the U.K. and the U.S.A. in this respect, see Payne (1974).

[32] Mandel (1968, p. 403) writes,

"In the U.S.A. the period 1897-1904 saw the birth of the majority of the monopoly trusts, as the results of a great merger movement. The number of trusts which was only 23 in 1890 and 38 in 1896, reached 257 in 1904".

[33] As Pollard (1968, p. 127) notes, "In the industrial revolution the typical entrepreneur was his own manager". It was possible also for the economic ownership and possession to be shared among a small number of individuals and yet remain united, e.g., partnerships, family firms. Thus one American historian has pointed out that,

"Before 1850 very few businesses needed the services of a full time administrator or required a clearly defined administrative structure. Industrial enterprises were very small, in comparison with today (1962). And they were usually family affairs. The two or three men responsible for the destiny of a single enterprise handled all its basic activities - economic and administrative, operational and

entrepreneurial" (Braverman 1974, p. 260, citing A. D. Chandler: STRATEGY AND STRUCTURE; CHAPTERS IN THE HISTORY OF THE INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISE).

[34] These relationships together with the resultant periodization for advanced capitalist social formations are presented in chart form in Poulantzas (1975, pp. 134-135).

[35] See Paterson (1976) and Naylor (1975). The latter writes (Vol. 1. p. 272) that, "It was CPR policy to spread ownership of the equity, apart from the blocs of stock held by the promoters themselves among a large number of small shareholders to assure continuity of control even after construction was completed". This policy was furthered by avoiding bonded debt but all this policy of "avoiding bond financing meant was that the federal government, rather than the CPR syndicate, did the borrowing - an index not so much of financial acumen as of political manipulation" (Ibid., p. 271).

CHAPTER 3

THE PROCESS OF UNEVEN DEVELOPMENT: TIME, SPACE AND PLACE.

"If geography desires to interpret human space as the historical fact it is, only the history of world society linked to that of local society can serve as the basis for understanding spatial reality, or for transforming that reality into one useful for mankind" (Santos, 1977, p. 3).

The previous Chapter has outlined the basic concepts of historical materialism as understood in terms of this thesis. It has also introduced the notion of the dynamic of the capitalist mode of production. This Chapter seeks to explore this aspect more fully, to place the concepts in motion, so to speak. This is undertaken through an examination of uneven development. The purpose of this examination is to elucidate the necessary requirements for the study of a particular city: Vancouver.

Unfortunately the process of uneven development is not entirely unproblematic. While, as noted in the previous Chapter, it may be seen as a fundamental characteristic of, at least, the capitalist mode of production, there is no developed theory of uneven development as such. Certainly uneven development is frequently observed and often invoked, both as cause and effect. Yet there remains no coherent general statement with respect to the overall process [1]. The theory is at best partial. The following discussion, then, represents an attempt to bring together a rather diverse literature. In so doing it has been decided to make a separation, for convenience of exposition,

between temporal and spatial unevenness. Finally, as the discussion shows, there is considerable need for theoretical development in this area, but the purpose of the discussion is not to seek to resolve these difficulties, but rather to establish the parameters for the study of a particular place during a particular time period.

TEMPORAL UNEVENNESS.

Historically the unevenness of the process of capitalist development, the alternation of boom and slump, is obvious enough, and hardly open to dispute. The key problem, then, is the relationship of this industrial or business cycle to the capitalist mode of production, and the processes which generate this alternating rhythm.

For historical materialism, following on the work of Marx, the cycle of boom and slump, the periodic crises, is an integral and necessary part of the capitalist mode of production. It is, in fact, the form which development takes under capitalism (Amin, 1974, p. 497). Hence an explanation for the process is internal to the system itself. The answer here lies in the contradictory nature of the accumulation process which, through the tendency of the rate of profit to fall, creates barriers to further accumulation [2]. The crisis may be expressed in the sphere of exchange, realization problems, or in terms of a shortage of labour power. At the same time crises represent the means by

which such contradictions are overcome. Crises, in other words, engender the periodic restructuring of capital which facilitates further accumulation [3].

Put slightly differently, the cyclical pattern of growth inherent to the capitalist mode of production represents the periodic restructuring of capital. In periods of crisis only the more efficient capitals survive, the less efficient ones are devalued and destroyed, through their inability to produce and realise an adequate or even any, rate of profit. In this way the manner of capitalist growth promotes, by its very nature, the concentration and consolidation of individual capitals (Barratt Brown, 1974, p. 58).

In addition to the fluctuations of the industrial and business cycle some authors have detected a pattern of longer term movements in the development of the capitalist mode of production [4]. These have been termed either long cycles (Schumpeter) or long waves (Mandel) [5] extending over a period of approximately 50 years. The findings of Schumpeter (1964) and Mandel (1975) relevant to this study are illustrated in table 3:1.

From the data there emerges an agreement as to the general pattern of economic development, although there are some notable variations in terms of precise turning points. The last quarter

Table 3:1

Long Movements in the Capitalist Mode of Production.

Schumpeter			Mandel		
Cycle	Phase	Duration	Wave	Phase	Duration
1	up	1787-1813	1	up	1793-1825
	down	1814-1842		down	1826-1847
2	up	1843-1869	2	up	1848-1873
	down	1870-1897		down	1874-1893
3	up	1898-1925	3	up	1894-1913

of the nineteenth century, the period of Vancouver's early development, was dominated by the down phase of the second cycle or wave, but with the mid 1890's marking the transition to a new upswing. This pattern is in accord with the more empirical findings of economic historians, who have dubbed the period 1873-1896, as the "Great Depression" [6].

Apart from the obvious reference to the path of economic development, long periods contain an important technological dimension. Each long cycle or wave designates the introduction and expansion (upswing) and the generalisation (downswing) of fundamental technological innovations. Thus the second cycle or wave is characterized by "railroadization" (Schumpeter) or the machine production of steam driven machinery (Mandel). Thus the last quarter of the nineteenth century - and Vancouver's early development, encompasses the generalisation of railways and steam power plus the early stages in the utilisation of electrical,

chemical and combustible techniques [7]. In this way the concept of long periods, taken together with the industrial cycle provides a unified descriptive tool for the period relevant to this thesis [8].

But do the theories of long term movements provide no more than a descriptive tool? To answer this question it is necessary to examine the processes which have been postulated as explanatory. At this more abstract level Schumpeter appears clearly inadequate. For Schumpeter, "innovation", that is applied invention, as a consequence of entrepreneurial initiative is the primary motive force. Hence an untheorized and external force is introduced to explain the internal dynamic of the system. Mandel represents a considerable advance since he seeks to relate these radical innovations and their associated long waves to long term movements in the average rate of profit [9].

Others, however, have been less than sanguine in their reception of Mandel's theoretical efforts. One line of criticism refers to the question of periodicity. Whilst long term movements are undeniable, their regularity, as asserted by Mandel is rejected [10]. This is inevitably related to the posited causes of the long waves and to the second line of criticism which objects to the excessive role of technology in Mandel's schema. Clawson (1976, p. 73) has even gone so far as to accuse Mandel of "technological determinism" [11].

In the light of these criticisms it seems reasonable to conclude that the case for regular long-term cycles or waves remains 'not proven'. This is not to deny that long term movements have occurred in the capitalist economy, but the necessary processes generating regularity have not been fully established, although a fundamental restructuring is undoubtedly involved [12].

The restructuring engendered during the "long depression" included the beginnings of monopoly capital and the growing export of capital for the capitalist production of raw materials (including lumber and minerals). After the mid 1890's these processes accelerated, facilitated by technological developments: the expansion of the capitalist mode of production in a new form.

Clearly the temporal unevenness of capitalism, crises and restructuring, had spatial consequences. It is this aspect of the process of uneven development that must now be considered.

SPATIAL UNEVENNESS.

Areal differentiation or variation in and through space is an obvious enough fact. Equally obviously it is a fact, or series of facts, whose interpretation has been a key concept in geographic writing [13]. If a historical materialist approach is adopted the problem of areal differentiation remains, but the concern of geographers might then be with the form that it (areal

differentiation) takes under different modes of production. This is basically the conclusion reached by Schiebling (1977, p. 56) after reviewing the current debate on the "crisis" in French geography. He writes (ibid) that "Geography is the study of forms and spatial structures historically produced and specified by modes of production" [14]. The point is well made and important, and yet, at the same time, obvious. It is important since it indicates a theoretical starting point, and its obvious quality is indicative of the primitive stage of theoretical development in this sphere. While the debate on the theory of spatial unevenness has begun, the results thus far are, at best, preliminary [15].

Here the discussion will concentrate upon spatial unevenness under the capitalist mode of production. This requires an analysis initially at the abstract level of the mode of production, in order to establish the spatial consequences of continued reproduction. When this has been completed it will be necessary to move to the more concrete level of the social formation, since, as Santos (1977) has noted, the social formation is an inherently spatial concept.

How then is spatial unevenness to be interpreted under, and integrated within the theory of the capitalist mode of production. In order to avoid overstating the case it should be noted immediately that spatial unevenness is always, to a certain

extent, pre-given; that is in the sense of the irreducibility of nature to society [16]. At the same time, and spectacularly so under capitalism, "extra-human natural existence has been reduced more and more to a function of human social organization" (Schmidt, 1971, p. 28). In other words, while an irremovable dialectic between society and nature remains, the latter is appropriated in forms determined by the former.

In a similar fashion there is an irreducible dialectic between the "pre-given" socially created landscape and its current reproduction under the capitalist mode. In other words capitalism operates under the constraints of a pre-given spatial order, but one which is appropriated according to the logic of capital.

With these points established it is now possible to pose the necessary question as to whether there is any general tendency of the capitalist mode of production which could generate spatial unevenness? In attempting to answer this question it will be necessary, at first, to abstract from, or exclude the temporal dimension. It seems fairly clear that if any such tendency does exist it must be sought, at the most fundamental level, in the process of the accumulation of capital.

It is the competitive need to accumulate which generates the concentration and centralization of capital. This, together with

it opposite, the destruction or devalorization of capital, may be expected to have spatially uneven consequences, especially since accumulation also involves the continual "revolutionizing of the productive forces". The latter, in turn, is expressed through the expanded physical scale of the means of production, and hence further contributes towards the tendency for spatial agglomeration. Particularly since the very process of the development of the productive forces is itself temporally uneven between different sectors of the economy.

It is now necessary to re-admit the temporal dimension and recall that accumulation is the process through which capital is reproduced. Yet the reproduction of capital requires more than the production of commodities, it also requires their circulation; viz. the articulation of the spheres of production and circulation. This introduces an additional complexity into the argument which, for Harvey, is of considerable importance. He argues (Harvey, 1975) that transportation, the physical circulation of commodities, mediates two contradictory aspects of accumulation: geographical intensification and geographical expansion, with the latter ultimately producing the "world market". Thus the development of transportation, the drive to reduce the time of circulation, represents the tendency towards the "annihilation of space by time" [17]. Moreover, this contradiction and its mediation, with the heavy fixed capital investment involved in transportation, serve to structure the

geographical landscape in capital's image. Hence, "Some sort of centre - periphery relation is bound to arise out of the tension between concentration and geographical expansion" (Ibid, p. 13).

The point is important and valid, but the explanation is incomplete. On the one hand the introduction of circulation into the argument serves as a reminder that the capitalist mode of production at the economic level refers not merely to production, but to the articulation of production with exchange and distribution. On the other hand the consideration of circulation is restricted to physical circulation (i.e. circulation within the sphere of production) and omits the circulation of value as a distinct sphere. Yet the latter, through the effects of the development of the productive forces, also contributes to uneven spatial development. Bookchin (1974, p. 51) makes the point in terms of agglomeration in the following manner,

"The factory may be singled out as the agent which gives the city structural form and its social purpose. By the word factory I mean more than an industrial enterprise: the factory is the locus of mobilised abstract labour, of labour power as a commodity, placed in the service of commerce as well as production. Accordingly, the term applies as much to an office building and a supermarket as to a mill and to a plant. Once the factory becomes an element in urban life, it takes the city over almost completely".

The expanded production of commodities invokes the expansion of the facilities for keeping track of the value produced and circulated.

The re-introduction of the temporal dimension would not be complete without incorporating the preceding discussion of temporal unevenness. What, if any, is the linkage between spatial unevenness and the periodic crises of the capitalist mode of production? Harvey (1975, p.13) answers this question succinctly when he writes,

"Temporal crises in fixed capital investment, often expressed as 'long waves' in economic development ... are therefore usually expressed as periodic re-shapings of the geographic environment to adapt it to the needs of further accumulation".

That is the periodic restructuring of capital is at once temporal and spatial; and both expressions are fundamentally rooted in the contradictory process of accumulation. Piot (1978) makes essentially the same point when she argues that the structure of space varies with the periods of the capitalist mode of production.

Finally it is also clear that a full treatment of spatial unevenness should also incorporate the political and ideological levels. The state for example through the implementation of a variety of policies, such as the National Policy in Canada, may either promote or inhibit economic development in given localities [18]. At the ideological level it is equally clear that space and its structure is ideologically laden. The structured system of "meaning" that constitutes ideologies in class societies take on material form not only as ideological

apparatuses, but also as symbolic expressions in and through space. The work of Gibson (1972) and Tafuri (1976), for example, has clearly demonstrated the "value-laden" nature of spatial forms with particular reference to urban planning and architecture.

At this stage it is now possible to confront the central question as to whether there is a law, or laws, of uneven spatial development under capitalism? Strictly speaking the answer here should be no; there is not a law as such, but rather a tendency. Thus while it may be argued that the capitalist mode of production reproduces itself unevenly and that this expressed spatially, it is also expressed in the context of a pre-given spatial order. Moreover, while capital may be expected to seek out the most preferable spatial conditions for its reproduction, these conditions are not immutable. The unevenness of capitalist production can either exacerbate or reduce the pre-given spatial unevenness: developed areas may undergo a decline and vice versa. Certainly there are historical examples of such transformations having occurred (See, for example Mandel, 1963) On the other hand the sheer increase in the quantity of capital, particularly fixed capital, involved in a developed region, would seem to render the destruction of any significant part of it unlikely. The existant spatial structure, Santos (1975) has suggested, may inhibit change.

Here then is a seeming paradox. But the paradox is more apparent than real. Its resolution lies in conducting the analysis at a level appropriate to the question. In this instance the persistence, or otherwise, of a once created spatial structure can only be answered in the particular. The historico-geographic specificities of the structure must be taken into account: in other words the analysis must be undertaken at the level of the social formation [19].

SPATIAL UNEVENNESS AND SOCIAL FORMATION

It will be useful to commence by recalling the characteristics embodied in the concept of the social formation. It is initially a specific spatial entity with its own historical development. Within the social formation there exist a number of modes of production and stages of modes, which are articulated with one another, but with one of these modes or stages occupying a position of dominance.

The first of these points, the spatio-temporal specificity, is relatively straightforward, although it should be remembered that the differential rhythms of the processes contained within the social formation means that the temporality is in no way linear. Articulation refers to the set of relationships which exist between different modes and through which dominance/subordination is effected. Thus the dominant mode may be said to determine the conditions of existence of the dominated

mode(s) and the reproduction of the social formation as a whole. At the same time of course, the dominated mode(s) become a constituent part of the reproduction of the dominant mode, or as Poulantzas (1975, p. 49) puts it, the articulation "is constitutive of its [the dominant mode's] own existence and reproduction".

Although the processes involved are manifold their overall consequences may be viewed in terms of conservation or dissolution effects; whether a dominated mode is successful, or otherwise, in retaining its "place" in the social formation. It is important that this be seen as a consequence of a complex of processes and not the result of a simple one [20].

Historically the rise to dominance of the capitalist mode of production, in what are now called the advanced capitalist countries, involved the destruction or domination, over a period, of time, of the pre-capitalist (primarily feudal) mode of production. This articulation of capitalist with pre-capitalist modes was characterized by Marx as "primitive accumulation" [21] and regarded as forming a dialectical unity with the establishment of capitalism itself.

Yet the impact of industrial capitalism on pre-or-non capitalist modes of production was not uniform. Thus, in a dialectical process, the capitalist mode of production not only

destroyed petty commodity production, but also facilitated its creation. In other words, petty commodity production has continuously been destroyed and recreated in new forms under the dominance of the capitalist mode of production. This dominance is expressed in terms of the relations of unequal exchange [22]. It is precisely this dialectical relationship between petty commodity production and the capitalist mode of production that Poulantzas refers to in terms of the conservation and dissolution effects of the latter upon the former.

This articulation becomes more complex with the advent of monopoly capitalism. Not only does monopoly capital dominate petty commodity production, but also competitive capital. Hence the scope for unequal exchange and appropriation of surplus by, in this case, monopoly capital is expanded by its articulation with dominated modes and stages of modes.

The foregoing discussion has been confined to the development of advanced capitalist social formations. In the case of underdeveloped social formations, or "third world countries" the entry of capitalist production has not produced the same results; not least because of the timing and manner of its entry. There the articulation of the capitalist mode of production - often mediated by merchant capital [23] - with pre-capitalist modes, has not resulted in the complete elimination of the latter. Instead the pre-capitalist modes have

been preserved, albeit in a modified form, usually as a supplier of cheap raw materials and cheap, often seasonal, labour for capitalist production [24].

The above theoretical excursus was undertaken with a view to establishing a framework for the continued discussion of spatial unevenness, the primary focus of this section. Returning then to this central problem, the question may be posed as to what are the spatial implications of the structure of social formations?

As a first, and fairly obvious point, it may be stated that, in so far as modes of production 'actually exist', then they must occupy space. Moreover different modes, and stages of modes, involving different processes/relationships may be expected to utilise and structure space in different ways. Hence a social formation, comprised of different modes, will consist of a variety of distinct and distinctive "spaces".

These created spaces, although distinct, are related or articulated. Moreover the relationships are asymmetrical containing the mutual moments of domination and subordination. In other words the dominance of the dominant mode or stage will exist spatially - it will occupy "advantageous space" - space which facilitates its own expanded reproduction. Clearly this is in conformity with the initial conceptualization of space under historical materialism - as a necessary aspect of all processes.

Therefore space is a part of articulation: articulation is spatial. The dominance of monopoly capital, for example, generates spatial unevenness as one aspect of its articulation with other modes. Monopoly capital structures not only its own spatial existence, but determines, dialectically, in its articulation with subordinate modes, the spatial conditions of the latter.

In sum this section has attempted to demonstrate that spatial unevenness must be interpreted at the level of the social formation as well as that of the mode of production. More precisely, that while the articulation of modes of production (with the capitalist mode dominant), within a social formation generates spatial unevenness, it must be interpreted in conjunction with the spatial inequalities produced within the reproduction of the capitalist mode itself. The conclusion is an interim one, however, for there remains one further dimension to be considered: spatial unevenness between social formations.

SPATIAL UNEVENNESS BETWEEN SOCIAL FORMATIONS

Here the focus shifts to a world level, to the process of uneven development and its spatial aspects on a world scale. The question is enormous and the literature concerned with it is on a corresponding scale [25]. The purpose here, however, is not to survey the literature but only to make a number of theoretical points. Obviously such an approach involves the simplification

of complex and often contentious issues.

A central feature of this literature and an area of general agreement is the recognition of a fundamental dichotomy on a world scale: that between what may be called the advanced capitalist social formations and the underdeveloped social formations [26]. Moreover it is generally accepted these are but two sides of the same coin, twin aspects of a single process - the dominance of capitalism [27].

The most influential theoretical perspective on imperialism has been that of Lenin. He linked imperialism with the development of monopoly capitalism and designated imperialism as the second, and last, stage of the capitalist mode of production [28].

Lenin's work has suffered a dual fate. On the one hand it has been seen as a "complete" analysis of the question and elevated to the level of dogma. Whilst, no doubt, comforting for its adherents, the consequent inmutability has scarcely increased the explanatory power of the theory nor attempted to resolve subsequent criticism. These criticisms, the second reaction, have been plentiful and valid, concerning both theoretical and empirical inadequacies and errors of commission and omission. [29].

Nonetheless some parts of Lenin's theory retain their validity (Slater, 1975b, pp. 17-18), and none more so than the recognition of the transformation of the capitalist mode of production (monopoly capital) and its relation to the export of capital. This, together with the basic concepts of historical materialism can provide the basis for understanding uneven development on a world scale (Regan, 1975, ch. 6) viz - spatial unevenness between social formations.

Poulantzas (1975, p. 37 ff.) argues that the capitalist mode of production has two inherent tendencies: a) to reproduce itself within its own social formation b) to expand beyond its own social formation. The latter of these assumes particular importance in the imperialist/monopoly stage, which develops in the metropolitan countries [30]. This stage, as a product of the historical progression of the concentration and centralization of capital and the conjuncture of the "Great Depression" 1873-1896 - shortage of home investment opportunities (see Dobb, 1963, ch. 7), commences around 1880 (Poulantzas 1975, Amin 1974, vol. 1, p. 159)

The establishment of this stage is reflected in a "fundamental cleavage" in the relations between social formations; between metropolitan and peripheral social formations [31]. Moreover, individual social formations exist within the context of a global structure in which;

"There are no longer independent social formations whose relations among themselves are relatively external. The process of imperialist domination, and dependence henceforth takes the form of the reproduction, within the dominated social formations themselves, and in forms specific to each of them [32], of the relations of domination which binds them to the imperialist metropolises" (Poulantzas, 1975, p. 43).

Imperialist domination here refers to the asymmetrical relations between social formations. As Castells (1977, p. 44) writes,

"A society is dependent when the articulation of its social structure, at the economic, political, and ideological level, expresses asymmetrical relations with another social formation (or formations) that occupies in relation to the first, a situation of power. By a situation of power I mean the fact that the organization of class relations in the dependent societies expresses the form of social supremacy adopted by the class in power in the dominant society".

To deal with "underdevelopment" is equivalent, therefore, to analysing the development/dependence dialectic, that is to say, to studying the penetration of one social structure by another [33].

The consequence of this pattern of relationships, as established in the late nineteenth century, was reflected in the international division of labour, with industrial production concentrated in the metropolises and the production of raw materials in the periphery. Underlying this pattern was the flow of surplus from the periphery to the centre. This took place by a variety of mechanisms, both direct (repatriation of profits)

and indirect (unequal exchange) means and within a context of political and ideological domination/subordination.

Yet there was one small and select group of social formations which did not fit comfortably into this dichotomous pattern. In the late nineteenth century these were what Amin has termed "centres in formation" i.e., proto-metropolitan social formations such as Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa [34]. These social formations represent a lacuna in the theory of imperialism, but one which cannot be filled here. Instead, and more modestly, the omission may be noted and the recognition guide the empirical study of the Canadian social formation in the nineteenth century. On the other hand, there is no reason to indicate that this problem invalidates the broad outlines of the theory of imperialism, uneven development on a world scale, as it has been described above.

THE STUDY OF PLACE.

Ideally and logically the discussion should now turn to the question of urbanization and its theoretical specification historical materialism. Unfortunately no definitive statements are presently available in this regard, and to attempt to derive or deduce one here is, if not absolutely premature, at least beyond the scope of the present thesis. Instead, and potentially as a contribution towards such a theoretical insertion, it is necessary to establish the requirements for the study of a

particular place, rather than a class of places. Nonetheless the earlier discussion of uneven development does provide the basis for certain insights which are relevant to both the general and the particular, and which can now be specified.

Implicit in the discussion of spatial unevenness, although not specified as such, is the recognition that uneven development occurs and may be identified on a number of different scales: international, national, regional, local. The specification of scale, as Anderson J. (1975) has noted, is an important consideration in terms of the study of uneven development. Yet to say this is not to claim that scale is in any way determinant, or that one scale may be comprehended in isolation.

Bearing the question of scale in mind, three points may usefully be made with reference to the general question of urbanization. Firstly that it can profitably be approached from within the framework of uneven development, as one expression of the overall process. Secondly that urbanization may be regarded as a particular form that uneven development takes, at the local scale, under capitalism. Or alternatively, that the forms of urbanism under capitalism are generated by the uneven development inherent to the mode of production [35]. Finally, urbanism also raises the important problem of what may be termed unevenness within, i.e. the internal spatial structure of a given place. This last point clearly merits further consideration.

It is important to begin with the recognition that capital is not a thing, but, at root, a social relationship. Thus accumulation, the dynamic of the capitalist mode of production, represents the form through which social relations are reproduced. Two points may be seen to flow from this recognition.

In the first place the establishment of labour power as a commodity involves certain pre-conditions; viz, the separation of the direct labourer from the means of production and the means of subsistence. It may therefore be said that the concentration of population is a form that this takes. In other words the free labourer is propelled spatially towards the capitalist workplace.

But this was a dialectical process. While on the one hand the free labourer is drawn towards the workplace, he/she is also repelled. The separation from the means of subsistence implies that the means of subsistence themselves, including shelter, become commodities, objects of capitalist production. That is the generalization of the labour market is accompanied by a generalization of the housing market in which "the specificity of the employment linkage was no longer the case"; instead 'urban stratification' was the rule" [36]. Thus the social separation of capitalist class relations increases the "likelihood of spatial separation" and hence "capitalist production implies the separation of home and work, a separation which has increased over time for persons involved in capitalist production"

(Feldman, 1977, pp. 34, 37).

The second point concerns the question of the class structure under capitalism and its relation to accumulation. Here it may be argued that accumulation involves an expanded and eventually extended social division of labour. This point will be elaborated upon in Chapter 4, but for the moment it serves to indicate that a simple, and reductionist, bi-polar model of the class structure is inadequate. The expanded production of capital involves transformations at the level of the class structure. Hence if it is accepted that social separation increases the likelihood of spatial separation, then a theory of class is clearly a requirement for the comprehension of this facet of spatial unevenness.

These points, together with the previous discussion, now make it possible to formally state the requirements for the study of a particular place; in this instance the city of Vancouver at the end of the nineteenth century. Briefly stated these are as follows:-

- 1) A particular place exists within the context of a larger spatial unit - the social formation - and must be situated within this context since the former is conditioned by the latter. Hence a requirement for the study of Vancouver is an understanding of the structure and development of the Canadian social formation.

Further, that this understanding must be informed by the manner in which the Canadian social formation was inserted into the world economy as a centre in formation.

2) The internal structure of a place is at least partially determined by the way in which it is integrated into the social formation. In other words, it is necessary to specify the manner in which Vancouver was integrated into the Canadian social formation in order to comprehend the overall development of the city as well as its internal structure and the relationship between the two. Thus the external linkages help to condition the pattern of unevenness within.

3) Since spatial unevenness is predominantly social under capitalism, a clear specification of a theory of class under that mode of production is a necessary pre-requisite: both to understand the nature of the social formation and, more especially, residential patterns.

The remainder of this thesis will be concerned with both fulfilling these specifications and utilising their results in the study of Vancouver. In order to complete the more abstract theoretical requirements the next Chapter will consider the theory of class. Succeeding Chapters follow on the Canadian social formation in the nineteenth century, the form of Vancouver's integration into the social formation, the pattern of

spatial unevenness within Vancouver and finally a review of the internal processes through which these patterns developed.

FOOTNOTES

[1] See, for example, Mandel (1970).

[2] Accumulation is defined as "the increase in the value of capital by the transformation of part of surplus value into additional capital. That part of surplus value which is not accumulated will be unproductively consumed by capitalists or their dependents" (Mandel, 1975, p. 591). Hence it represents that part of profit which is available for investment.

[3] There has been a recent revival of interest in crisis theory within the literature of historical materialism; not surprising in the present conjuncture. For recent surveys and contributions to what is an ongoing debate over the mechanisms involved, see Fine & Harris (1976a & 1977); Hodgson (1977); Itoh (1977); Weeks (1977); and, Alcaly (1978).

[4] For a review of the writings on this topic, see Mandel (1975, ch. 4); Day (1976).

[5] The difference here is not purely semantic but relates to the conceptualization of these long term movements. Thus Schumpeter seems to have viewed as comparable to the business cycle, whilst Mandel, adopting the perspective of historical materialism comments,

"... long waves are not possessed of the same 'natural necessity' as classical cycles (7-10 years). Second, that while classical cycles can be explained exclusively in terms of the internal dynamics of the capitalist mode of production, the explanation of long waves demands a more concrete study of the capitalist curve and the interrelationships between the latter and all aspects of social life" (Mandel, 1975, p. 129).

At the same time, Mandel has himself been criticised for suggesting that there is any necessity of regularity, see Day, (1976).

[6] See for example Hobsbawm (1969, ch. 9) and Dobb (1963, ch. 7). These are both general works relying upon more detailed studies. On the other hand not all economic historians have accepted this designation. For this contrary view, see Saul (1969).

[7] It should be noted that Schumpeter, and hence by implication Mandel, have been criticised by Baran and Sweezy (1968, pp. 224-6). The latter writing of the U.S.A. social formation claim that the period of railway construction continues

until 1907, and its completion was responsible for stagnation in the U.S. economy between 1908 and 1915. This empirical doubt, if valid at a global level, poses a theoretical problem also, since the period 1908-1915 should comprise part of the long term upswing.

[8] This should not be taken to imply that the short and long term movements are independent of each other: Mandel (1975, p. 122) is clear on this point when he writes that "... these long waves do not assert themselves in a mechanical fashion but function through the articulation of the classical (industrial) cycles" and thus, "The long wave is conceivable only as the result of these (classical) cyclical fluctuations and never as some kind of metaphysical superimposition upon them".

[9] Mandel (1975, p.145) describes his own contribution to the theory of long movements, as being,

"... to relate the diverse combinations of factors that may influence the rate of profit (such as a radical fall in the cost of raw materials; a sudden expansion of the world market or of new fields for investment of capital; a rapid increase or decline in the rate of surplus value; wars and revolutions) to the inner logic of the process of long-term accumulation and valorization of capital based upon spurts of radical renewal or reproduction of fundamental productive technology. It explains these movements by the inner logic of the process of accumulation of the self-expansion of capital itself".

Valorization represents the translation of a German term - VERWERTUNG - used by Marx to describe "the process whereby capital increases its value by the production of surplus value" (Mandel, 1975, p. 598). An alternative translation is "self expansion".

[10] Day (1976) reviews Mandel's work in the light of a debate between Trotsky and Kondratieff on this issue in the 1930's. Day supports the position of the former, and sees this criticism as applicable to Mandel; he writes (Ibid, p. 71),

"... the turning points of capitalist development were regulated by external conditions and by the relative autonomy of superstructural phenomena. The turning points were, therefore, unpredictable in character and no automatic periodicity was possible".

[11] Such a judgement is perhaps overly harsh, but it cannot be denied that Mandel has not adequately considered the social component of the productive forces, i.e., reducing them to technology and ignoring the relations of production and social

division of labour. This, in turn, points to a significant lacuna in Mandel's theoretical structure: the absence of any adequate theory of the origins of fundamental technological change (Rowthorn, 1976, p. 63, Clawson, 1976, p. 73).

[12] See Gordon (1978). For a description of some of the forms of restructuring in the nineteenth century, see Mandel (1975, pp. 52ff & 130).

[13] At the risk of some simplification, two major trends may be identified within this body of literature a) ideographic b) quantitative.

The former, eschewing any formalized theory has concentrated on the descriptive accounting of unique or unique combinations of phenomena; as such it may be said to have been concerned with qualitative variation. The latter, on the other hand, has employed formal, and frequently elaborate, theoretical models and has been concerned with quantitative variations in space. The theoretical models employed in such analyses have almost always been borrowed from other disciplines and are rooted in social physics and/or neo-classical economics. For criticism of the geographic literature see, for example, Harvey (1973) & Slater (1975a).

[14] "La géographie est l'étude des formes et des structures spatiales produites historiquement et spécifiées par les modes de production".

[15] Lacoste (1976, pp. 98-99) has indicated some of the reasons for this theoretical backwardness: he writes,

"the limited interest which Marx showed towards geographical problems still has grave consequences today. For Marxists the essence of political argument, whether it is a question of regional, national or international problems, is defined in relation to time expressed in historical terms, but reference is only very rarely made to space and still in a very allusive and negligent fashion".

[16] For Schmidt this represents a key aspect of Marx's dialectical thought, and his concept of nature. Schmidt (1970, p. 158) writes,

"If, then, the work situation has the same moments through all historical changes, this must also be true above all of the modern technologically mediated relation of man to nature. Men endeavour to change the in-itself of things into a for-us. Yet ultimately the forms with which they have imprinted the stuff of nature (as opposed to the forms originally proper to it) remain something external and different to nature. Despite its

increasing mediation, NATURE NEVER BECOMES SOMETHING COMPLETELY 'MADE' BY US, as Marx wrote following Vico. This point expresses the most fundamental mark of distinction between the idealist and materialist dialectic" (emphasis added).

[17] See Harvey (1975, pp. 11-13). The phrase is apparently derived from Marx (1973, p. 539).

[18] Rosa Luxemburg (1977, originally her PhD thesis completed in 1899) long ago showed how, in the Russian social formation, changes in the tariff policy both promoted and inhibited regional development in a spatially uneven manner. Moreover she indicates the power of intra-class conflict which culminated in particular policy changes together with their spatial consequences. For a discussion of the National Policy, see below Chapter 5.

[19] It is the failure to distinguish between the concepts of mode of production and social formation and the relevant level of analysis involved that is responsible, in part, for the inadequacies of much of the literature on the questions of development/underdevelopment and imperialism. This differentiation would appear to be the conceptual basis for Harvey's (1975, pp. 19-20) comments that it is

" ... the task of careful historical analysis to discover which of these manifestations (of imperialism) is dominant at a particular stage of development of capitalist social formations. Marx's general theory does not pretend to predict particular forms and manifestations. All it does is to indicate the underlying imperative contained within the capitalist system, to accumulate capital and to do it, of necessity, on an expanding and intensifying geographical scale".

See also Amin (1974, vol 1, p 21) and Poulantzas (1975, p. 48 ff., section on periodisation). The former remarks that,

"The theory of accumulation on a world scale ... which is the theory of relations between centre and periphery, can only be a general theory. By this I mean that it cannot confine itself to the narrow framework of the capitalist mode of production, but must extend to the wider setting of the theory of capitalist formations" (Amin, 1974, Vol. 1, p. 21).

[20] For a dominated mode, and this is particularly the case in the articulation of the capitalist and petty commodity mode, the latter may be destroyed at one point and, at the same time, brought into existence in a new form at another. This

formulation is crucial for comprehending the longevity of petty commodity production. Under a linear stage theory the continued existence of petty commodity production becomes, at best, enigmatic, and at worst, embarrassingly incomprehensible.

[21] Primitive accumulation thus involves a complex process, but its consequences are the separation of the labourer from his means of production (and subsistence) viz labour power becomes a commodity and available for capitalist production - and also the accumulation of capital. Historically merchant capital played an important role in primitive accumulation (see Kay, 1975). It should be noted that for many now advanced capitalist social formations, primitive accumulation was both internal and external. For a full discussion, see Marx (1976a, Part 8, pp. 873-940).

[22] Unequal exchange is rooted in differential productivity - socially necessary labour time per unit of product. It occurs when commodities embodying different quantities of socially necessary labour are exchanged as equivalents - as equals. The greater productivity of capitalist, and especially monopoly capitalist production thus facilitates an appropriation of value.

[23] On merchant's capital, see Marx (1976a, ch. 20) and Kay (1975).

[24] See Slater (1975b esp. pp. 24-28). Slater is here following the work of Bettelheim and of Mandani on the Ugandan social formation. In this case the advent of capitalist production resulted in the elimination of the feudal mode, but preserved the communal mode and expanded the petty commodity mode. Slater, (ibid, p. 27-8) comments that,

"... it will be seen that in all cases [of underdeveloped social formations] there is a specific co-existence of different modes of production. At the same time, the capitalist mode of production, although being dominant does not become exclusive, and the process of capitalist accumulation has been and continues to be characterized by a structural dependency which, despite variations in its forms as among Third World countries, possess an inner uniformity which may be most effectively examined in terms of the development of underdeveloped capitalism".

This clearly poses the key aspect of underdeveloped social formations: their relationship to developed countries. The question will be further examined below. See also Amin, (1974, vol. 1, p. 261ff).

[25] For criticisms of the "traditional" literature see, for, example, Amin (1974); Frank (1975); Regan (1975); and, Slater (1975b). The latter two authors pay particular attention to the geographic aspects and the contributions of geographers.

[26] This terminology is not uniformly utilised, but the content or meaning reflected by them is generally accepted.

[27] The main alternative within historical materialism to that outlined below is that of dependency theory. For a criticism of this approach, see Regan (1975, esp. chap. 3).

[28] This stage was characterized by the following five features (Lenin, 1965, p. 106):

"a) The concentration of production and capital has developed to such a high stage that it has created monopolies which play a decisive part in economic life.

b) The merging of bank capital and industrial capital and the creation, on the basis of this 'finance capital' of a financial oligarchy.

c) The export of capital as distinguished from the export of commodities acquires exceptional importance.

d) The formation of international monopolist combines which share the world among themselves.

e) The territorial division of the whole world among the biggest capitalist powers is completed".

[29] Among the failings may be listed, for example, the inadequate conceptualization of "finance" capital, the misconstruing of the direction of capital exports and the failure to incorporate the political level in the analysis (role of the state). For a full discussion of these and other points see Slater (1975b, pp. 11-18); Regan (1975, pp. 89-94).

[30] It must be remembered that what is being discussed here is in no way a linear stage theory. Thus the establishment of the monopoly stage of capitalism does not eliminate competitive capitalism. Rather they are articulated, together with other modes, under the dominance of the former.

[31] This is not to deny that there had not been previous line(s) of cleavage, but rather to say that they now took on a new form as a consequence of a new process. Poulantzas thus recognises prior cleavages produced by colonial and commercial

capitalist relationships, both of these based on the export of commodities (Poulantzas, 1975, p. 43.). On this point see also Castells (1977, pp. 43-49).

[32] Amin (1974, vol. 2, pp. 361-379) suggests a spatial and typological division between social formations of Latin America and Asia, and those of Africa.

[33] Amin has indicated some of the economic forms on which this dominance/penetration is based. These include (Amin, 1974, vol. 1, p. 292 -295).

a) Peripheral economies are merely producers of primary products.

b) The periphery does most of its trade with the centre, whereas the central economies carry out most of their exchanges amongst themselves.

c) This results in "the worsening of the terms of trade", (see also pp. 134-5).

d) The import of foreign capital, which "must necessarily lead sooner or later to a flow of profits in the reverse direction, causing growth to be blocked".

[34] There had of course been other, and earlier, "centres in formation" most notably in Europe and the USA. These, however, had achieved "metropolitan" status by the end of the nineteenth century. An alternative description of these social formations is as "settler colonies", in which case Argentina and Uruguay should be added to the list. This raises the important question of the different subsequent trajectory of these two last social formations.

[35] The point here is not that urbanism, the city, is a social form that is restricted to capitalism. To make such a claim would be to fly in the face of history. Rather it is to argue that the form of urbanism is determined by the mode of production (see Watkins, 1975; Merrington, 1975; and, Houston, 1976). In this thesis consideration is restricted to the capitalist mode of production in its first two stages - competitive and monopoly.

[36] Feldman (1977), is here citing the work of Vance (1966 & 1967).

CHAPTER 4

CLASS STRUCTURE: THE THEORETICAL DIMENSION

"The division of society into classes precisely means, both from the theoretical and methodological point of view and from that of social reality, that the concept of social class is pertinent to all levels of analysis: the division into class forms the frame of reference for every social stratification" (Poulantzas, 1975, p. 199).

The basic intention of this Chapter is to elucidate the concepts, by and through which, a class analysis of society, and in particular capitalist societies, may be conducted. The nature of this intention may be further specified by indicating what is not involved in, or being sought, in such a process. In particular, it is not the purpose of this Chapter to produce an ahistorical typology of class categories, i.e., a set of empirically defined criteria by which individual societies may be "classified". Instead the aim is to clarify the nature of the concepts of social relationships which are the constitutive basis of social classes. If such an attempt is successful then it will provide the necessary conceptual means with which the reality of particular societies may be appropriated. Thus, and in consequence, the process must begin at a high level of abstraction.

Before embarking upon this endeavour, however, two further preliminary points must be made. Firstly the concept, or more properly the notion, of class is not peculiar to, nor was it "invented" by historical materialism. It both predates the

inception of historical materialism and has continued subsequently as a part of other theoretical discourses [1]. At the same time, the particular conceptualizations of class within and without historical materialism is markedly different. It follows, therefore, that to adopt the perspective of historical materialism is to both reject and, implicitly criticize alternative conceptualizations. Some of these implicit criticisms will be made explicit in the subsequent analysis.

Secondly, and as has already been noted, historical materialism is in no way a unified theoretical field, and this is nowhere more true than in terms of the "meaning" ascribed to social class. In part, no doubt, this stems from the highly truncated nature of Marx's own attempt to deal specifically with the concept of class [2]. One response to this lacuna, and one adopted by Dahrendorf (1959) for example, has been to attempt to complete or reconstruct Marx's unfinished Chapter on classes. Yet the method adopted to achieve such a "reconstruction" renders the results of the exercise of dubious quality. Thus Dahrendorf's compendium of quotations from Marx, says more about Dahrendorf's purpose than Marx's [3].

At the same time, and as a further source of confusion, it must be admitted that Marx's usage of "class", even within a single work such as CAPITAL, VOL. I, was by no means constant (Ollman, 1968, p. 576). How then should Marx's work be

interpreted and how should the concept of class be constructed within historical materialism? The empiricist approach as utilized by Dahrendorf is clearly inadequate. Ollman (1968, p. 580) has suggested an alternative when he writes, "As a concept 'class' cannot be detached from the structural knowledge it seeks to express and of which it is, in the last analysis, an integral part".

In other words, the meaning of "class" is contingent upon and defined by the meaning ascribed to Marx's mode of social analysis; and, in so far as Marx's work marked a beginning and not an end, "class" is contingent upon the interpretation placed upon historical materialism as a theoretical corpus.

In terms of this thesis, Chapter 2 has already adopted and presented a particular interpretation of historical materialism. There the discussion already contains, in an unelaborated form, a "definition" of class, so that the ensuing analysis represents an attempt to specify, in its full complexity, this implicit meaning. In so doing the presentation will be heavily dependent upon the work of Poulantzas (1973a, 1973b & 1975). For it is the contention that his work is not only consistent with conceptualizations presented in Chapter 2, but, and most importantly, it represents the most sustained attempt to develop and clarify the conceptual tools required for a class analysis of contemporary capitalism.

The reference to contemporary capitalism calls for a brief comment on the relevance of such an analysis to this thesis. It must be recognised at the outset, (and Poulantzas, 1975, pp. 9-11 so admits), that Poulantzas has not produced a comprehensive theory. It is directed towards, and derived from, an analysis of present day (1975) capitalist societies, and those of European social formations in particular. While these limitations must be recognised they do not invalidate an extension, albeit a careful one, of the theory to other social formations in other periods. The major thread of Poulantzas's argument is conducted at a sufficient level of abstraction to permit its application to, and the introduction of, alternative spatio/temporal specificities. The remainder of this Chapter, then, will consist of a presentation and critical evaluation of Poulantzas's mode of class analysis [4].

To begin, then, with a definition. Social class, for Poulantzas (1975, p. 14) is, "... a concept which denotes the effects of the structure within the social division of labour (social relations and social practices". And again: "Social class is a concept that refers in particular to the overall effects of the structure on the field of social relations and on the social division of labour" (ibid, p. 199).

While these summary definitions present Poulantzas's definition of classes, in terms of the present discussion they

serve more as indicators, as signposts to a conclusion. If the full meaning of these definitions is to be extracted then they must be situated in the context of their conceptual foundations: it is necessary to retreat in order to advance. Hence it is necessary to turn to the theoretical principles on the basis of which Poulantzas has constructed the aforementioned definitions.

Classes are no mere abstract concept, they exist in, and are defined through class struggle, which is seen as "the motor of history" (ibid., p. 14). As a starting point such a statement is apparently unexceptional, at least within the confines of historical materialism. Yet appearances can be deceiving, and they are in this particular instance. For Poulantzas the class struggle is not restricted to periodic outbreaks of overt and conscious hostility (strikes, political agitation, etc.). Rather the class struggle is situated in the inherently contradictory, or antagonistic social relations embedded within a given mode of production. Classes are "only defined by their mutual opposition" (ibid, p. 14), and this opposition is independent of the will of individuals. Thus, of the capitalist mode of production Poulantzas can write, "The extended reproduction of capital is nothing other than the class struggle". To adopt such a position is not, of course, to deny the crucial importance of conscious activity in determining the outcome of class struggle: to do this would be to abandon the terrain of historical materialism, and, more importantly, to embrace absurdity.

What Poulantzas is seeking to establish here is not a denial of the importance of consciousness, and class consciousness, but rather to situate it within a context, its material basis: this being the fundamentally antagonistic social relations which inhere in a given mode of production. In other words, Poulantzas is concerned primarily with, and also the primacy of, the structural determination of social classes. In so doing he is clearly and explicitly rejecting the fundamentally Hegelian position of writers such as the "early" Luckacs (1971) who assert the primacy of consciousness in defining the existence of classes (Poulantzas, 1975, p. 16)[5]. Furthermore it seems logical to regard the construction of a theory of structural determination as a necessary pre-condition of any theory of class consciousness. It is towards the former that the work of Poulantzas, and this thesis, is primarily directed.

The importance of this distinction, for Poulantzas, is reflected in their conceptual separation, in his invocation of the conceptual couplet; class place and class position. Class places refers to the process of structural determination and hence to objective places "in the social division of labour as a whole" (ibid., p. 14). More specifically, and to anticipate somewhat, to identify certain people (agents) as members of the bourgeoisie,

"... is not to ascribe to them some kind of intrinsic quality such as their class origin, but is

rather a reference to the place that these agents occupy, i.e., their situation in relation to the relationships that define the place of capital and in relation to the powers that they exercise and that derive from these relationships in a constitutive way" (ibid., p. 175).

Class positions, on the other hand, refer to the particular actions undertaken or "positions" adopted in a specific conjuncture, that is any given concrete historical instance. In any such instance it is by no means necessary for class place and class position to coincide, but such a divergence does not alter the class place per se. Thus,

"The typical example of this is the labour aristocracy, which in certain conjunctures takes up class positions that are in fact bourgeois. This does not mean, however, that it becomes, in such cases, a part of the bourgeoisie; it remains, from the fact of its structural class determination, part of the working class ..." (ibid., p. 15).

If these points are accepted, then the central question becomes one of defining the processes involved in the structural determination of class places. Class place has so far been referred to in conjunction with the concept of the social division of labour and so, before proceeding any further with the discussion, it is necessary to specify the meaning of this concept. This is particularly important since Poulantzas's usage differs from that of the "normal" meaning of the social division of labour in materialism. Moreover it represents a conceptual innovation or transformation in CLASSES IN CONTEMPORARY CAPITALISM as compared with Poulantzas earlier work [6].

For Marx, the social division of labour refers to the various different branches or sectors of production [7], and this represents the normal usage within historical materialism. In contrast to this Poulantzas follows the conceptualization developed by Bettelheim (1975) [8]. Therein Bettelheim (1975, p. 57) writes,

"Property and possession are exercised through a series of FUNCTIONS - coordination, direction and control of labour processes, appropriation of the means of production for given uses, appropriation of products. These functions can be carried out by the property owners themselves ... or by their representatives ... The social distribution of these functions and of the polar executive functions constitutes the SOCIAL DIVISION OF LABOUR. It is the same with the division of tasks constitutive of labour processes or the TECHNICAL DIVISION OF LABOUR. This is always subordinated to the social division of labour, which means that the modalities of the distribution of tasks is always socially determined" (emphasis in original).

Before continuing to examine the source of these powers or functions it seems advisable at this stage to attempt to counter one possible criticism of the discussion so far: that of economism, the reduction of classes and class determination to economics or the economic level. Poulantzas, in fact, is quite categorical in his rejection of economism, and he specifically incorporates political and ideological relations within the determination of class places [9]. The social division of labour refers not simply to economic functions but their political and ideological concomitants.

This statement does more than simply reiterate the importance of political and ideological conditions in the determination of classes, it also serves to link up with the previous question concerning the meaning of the social division of labour. It does this by linking the social division of labour to the production process. Thus the next step in pursuing this question must be to specify the content of the production process.

The production process has in fact a double content. It refers to both the social labour process, the production of "use values" (appropriation of nature) and to social conditions under which this labour takes place. That is the production process is " ... also a PROCESS OF REPRODUCTION OF RELATIONS OF PRODUCTION". (Bettelheim, 1975, p. 111). It is in this sense that Marx's statement that the capitalist mode of production "produces capitalists and wage labourers" should be interpreted [10] (Poulantzas, 1975, p. 27).

Turning now to the relations of production, it will be possible to examine the twin aspects of the production process from the perspective of the social actors or "agents" involved. In so doing, for reasons of simplicity, the discussion will be restricted specifically to the capitalist mode of production [11]. Capitalist relations of production refer, then, to the manner in which the direct producer (worker), the means of

production, and the non-producer (owner) are brought together, or articulated. Bettelheim (1975, pp. 55-56) has specified the meaning of the relations of production in the following manner,

"BY THIS TERM WE MEAN A SYSTEM OF POSITIONS ASSIGNED TO THE AGENTS OF PRODUCTION IN RELATION TO THE PRINCIPAL MEANS OF PRODUCTION. This system determines the POSITION of immediate producers and, eventually, that of nonproducers. These positions are nothing other than the places where particular FUNCTIONS are carried out (the process of the appropriation of nature, the coordination of these processes, the distributions of their results" (emphasis in the original).

Thus, on the one hand, there is the relationship between agents and the means of production, through which commodities are actually produced. This involves the twin aspects of the relationships workers - means of production and owner - means of production. On the other hand there is the relationship between "agents", i.e., owner-worker. It is this relationship which ensures the extraction of surplus value, although it is extracted in the form of commodities (Poulantzas, 1975, pp. 18-19).

These relationships, then, define the dominant class (owners) and the dominated class (workers) under the capitalist mode of production as well as defining the relationship between them as an exploitative or antagonistic one. For Poulantzas it is the ownership of the means of production and the exercise of powers derived therefrom that defines the bourgeoisie. These powers consist of economic ownership - the real control of the means of production, the commodities produced and the surplus

extracted - and possession - the capacity to put the means of production into action. The working class, dispossessed of the means of production (and hence subsistence) and thus compelled to sell its labour power, is that from whom surplus value is extracted: i.e., those performing productive labour. The necessity under capitalism, for the extraction of surplus value ensures that these class relations are antagonistic. Hence capitalist production "means at the same time, and as one and the same process, class division, exploitation and class struggle" (ibid., p. 20).

While these economic relationships play the primary role in the determination of class places, they are not the sole determinants. The relations of production only exist in conjunction with, and tied to, particular political and ideological relations; that is the latter are constitutively linked with the former. The political and ideological relations act to "sanction and legitimize" the class powers situated within the relations of production. Private property or the private ownership of the means of production, if it is to exist and be reproduced, must be recognized as such and "accepted" as legitimate (necessary, inevitable, etc.). Moreover these political and ideological relations are not something which are "added on to the relations of production", rather they are "themselves present ... in the constitution of the relations". Hence,

"The process of production and exploitation is at the same time a process of the reproduction of the relations of political and ideological domination and subordination" (ibid., p. 21).

It is necessary to take this discussion one step further in order that class boundaries may be established with more precision and that the class analysis moves beyond the simple identification of polar class places: bourgeoisie and working class. For Poulantzas the aforementioned political and ideological relations give a particular form to the social division of labour, the distribution of the various functions involved in class powers. And it is the form that this division, takes which dominates the technical division.

Thus the necessity for a supervisory role in the capitalist relations of production (supervisors, foremen, managers) is not simply a consequence of the technical organization of a complex labour process. Rather it is primarily a result of the necessary antagonisms of capitalist relations (extraction of surplus value). Hence supervision takes the form of the exercise of political and ideological powers of control and domination of the labour force. These political and ideological relations, situated within the production process, play a vital role in determining the class places of "supervisors", a point which will be examined in more detail subsequently (ibid., p. 21). There is no reason, therefore, to expect a social formation to contain only two classes, in fact the opposite is the case. At the same

time the polarization between the two major classes of the dominant mode conditions the existence of other classes (ibid., pp. 22-23).

Secondly classes are not unitary or homogeneous groupings. They contain important internal divisions, divisions which Poulantzas designates by the term "fraction". Thus the bourgeoisie, for example, is composed of different fractions which correspond to the different forms of capital, i.e., productive or industrial capital (bourgeoisie), commercial capital (bourgeoisie) and money or banking capital (bourgeoisie) (ibid., pp. 33-34).

With these basic principles established it is now possible to turn to Poulantzas's analysis of contemporary capitalist societies [12]. This calls for a brief outline of the class structure that he identifies, and then, in more detail, an examination of the class boundaries, that is the nature of the relationships that separate the different classes. For contemporary capitalist societies Poulantzas identifies three distinct classes. The first two are the major, polar classes of the capitalist mode: the bourgeoisie and the working class. The third class, which has a somewhat different status from the previous two, is the petty bourgeoisie, which consists of "new" and "traditional" components. It should be reiterated at this point that none of these classes are unitary groupings, but are

composed of a variety of class fractions.

The discussion will now focus on the class boundaries, that define, firstly, the limits of the bourgeoisie, and, secondly, the limits of the working class. In so doing it will be possible to consider the relations which determine these two classes as well as those determining the petty bourgeoisie. To begin then, with the limits of the bourgeoisie.

To approach this question is to define the place of capital and to confront the question of class places of both managers and the personnel of state apparatuses. It may be noted at this time that the position adopted by Poulantzas involves a rejection of all Weberian notions of the unfolding rationality of advanced "industrial" societies. These latter theories, apart from their inherent teleology and, usually, notions of social harmony, involve the fetishization of technology and the confusion of economic ownership with legal ownership [13].

The place of capital consists of the dual relations of the economic ownership and possession of the means of production. The former, to reiterate involves the power to assign the means of production to particular uses, and control over the surplus value that is produced; the latter involves the direction of the labour process.

Yet if these relationships define the place of capital it does not follow that they appear in the same form. This is a consequence of the dynamism of the capitalist mode of production, i.e., the requirement for expanded reproduction. The concentration and centralization of capital that results from this produces a modification in the social division of labour, a transformation in the forms of the relation of production. In other words, the place of capital is modified with the development of the mode of production itself.

Poulantzas recognizes two stages of the capitalist mode of production: competitive and monopoly. In the competitive stage economic ownership and possession are unified in the figure of the individual entrepreneur. In the monopoly stage, on the other hand, economic ownership and possession become dissociated with the latter exercised by non-owners or managers [14]. Yet the exercise of possession, as a function of the place of capital, of the bourgeoisie, means that managers who exercise such powers are members of the bourgeoisie:

"The directing agents who directly exercise these powers and who fulfill the 'functions of capital' occupy the place of capital, and thus belong to the bourgeois class even if they do not hold formal legal ownership. In all cases, therefore, the managers are an integral section of the bourgeois class" (Poulantzas, 1975, p. 180).

Although the discussion has been restricted to the economic relations of the bourgeoisie it should be remembered

that the place of capital also involves political and ideological relations. These include "the hierarchical authority of the despotic organization of the work in the factory" and "the secrecy of knowledge' and 'bureaucratic secrecy' in the division between mental and manual work" (ibid.). These political and ideological powers of "capital" may be merely noted at this time, but they will assume greater significance at a later point. For the present it may be recorded that in the determination of bourgeois class places the economic level (relationships) is dominant as well as determinant.

In the case of the class places of the members of the various state apparatuses the situation is more complex. In order to proceed with the analysis it is necessary to recall Poulantzas's conceptualization of the state as a cohesive factor in a social formation, and thereby ensuring the reproduction of the latter and hence as a condensation of class forces. More precisely, while the state, " ... sanctions and legitimizes class domination, the state also provides the cohesive factor of the entire social formation, and in reproducing the social relations of this formation it condenses in itself all of the formation's contradictions" (ibid., p. 156).

For Poulantzas the personnel of the state apparatus constitute a social category, a concept which, in this case, refers to both the relative autonomy of the state and the fact

that its members belong to different classes. It is the "heads" of the different state apparatuses who are members of the bourgeoisie, because in a capitalist state, they manage the state functions in the service of capital" (ibid., p. 187). That is, the "heads" of the state apparatuses operationalize,

"... the role of the state in the reproduction of the social division of labour, more specifically in the reproduction of the relations of political and ideological domination and subordination" (ibid., p. 188).

The state, in its forms under both competitive and monopoly capital [15], serves to assure the economic, political, and ideological "conditions" for the reproduction of capital, and, as such, the agents "in charge" of this process are members of the bourgeoisie.

The "indirectness of this determination means that the heads of state apparatuses neither constitute a fraction of the bourgeoisie nor do they simply belong to one of the other fractions. Poulantzas's argument on this point is by no means easy to follow, and thus it seems advisable to quote him in full. He writes (ibid., p. 187),

"As against the managers, who themselves occupy the place of capital, the bourgeois class membership of the heads of the state apparatus is refracted and mediated by the role of the state in the cohesion and reproduction of the social relations of a capitalist [social] formation. It would be more exact to say that the division of the bourgeoisie into fractions is indirectly reflected within the heads of the state apparatus, i.e., by way of the

differentiations and dislocations between the various branches of the apparatuses of the state, which within the limits of the unity of the state power reproduce the contradictions of the power bloc" (ibid., p. 187).

Above all this would appear to indicate that the places of such agents cannot be fully determined A PRIORI, but only within the class struggle in particular social formations.

Turning now to the other side of the coin, to the polar opposite of the bourgeoisie, the working class and the boundary which defines it, it seems advisable to reject one common conceptualization immediately. This is the notion that the working class can be defined by the wage relationship per se, even if a differentiation between wages and salaries is included. The reason for this is clear. Wages as a category belongs to the sphere of circulation, and as such it is a derivative category which is theoretically posterior to production and the relations of production (see Marx, 1959, pp. 877-884). In other words it is in and through the relations of production that the class places of the working class must be defined.

Bearing this in mind, how then does Poulantzas define the working class? The answer to this question is deceptively simple. The working class is that which performs productive labour under the capitalist mode of production [16]. This apparent simplicity, however, conceals a theoretical complexity which must now be examined. In so doing, answers to two related

questions will be sought: what comprises productive labour? and why should it constitute the basis of a class boundary?

Productive labour should not be confused with surplus labour, nor is it labour of a specific, material content. Following Marx, productive labour under the capitalist mode of production is that which produces surplus value. It is this relationship which lies at the heart of the capitalist mode and which represents its central contradiction. As such, the performance of productive labour represents a sound theoretical basis for delimiting, at least initially, the working class.

Taking the argument a step further, productive labour is that performed in the employment of productive capital. It follows from this that the employees of commercial and money capital, neither of which produces surplus value although they do, of course, obtain a profit, (see Marx, 1959, Part IV), do not perform productive labour and, hence do not form part of the working class. If this point is to be properly understood then it must be clearly recognised that the argument is situated at the level of capital as a whole, (social capital, and not at the level of individual capitals. Poulantzas (1975, p. 212) makes this very clear when he writes,

"Surplus labour is thus extracted from wage earners in commerce [banking etc.,] but these are not directly exploited in terms of the dominant capitalist relation of exploitation, the creation of

surplus value. It is only for the individual capitalist that their labour is exchanged for variable capital, while from the standpoint of the social capital as a whole and its reproduction, their remuneration is an unproductive expense and forms part of the FAUX PRAIS of capitalist production".

Thus unproductive labour may well be exploited, in the sense that surplus or unpaid labour is performed, but it does not contribute per se to the expanded reproduction of social capital.

Against this view Saint-Pierre (1974, pp. 18-19) has suggested a category of "indirectly productive labour" to cover those employees of commercial and money capital from whom surplus labour is extracted. But this new category is of a rather dubious theoretical status. It is clear that the labour employed by commercial and money capital, however necessary it may be, like that labour which Saint-Pierre does recognise as unproductive (ibid., p. 19) is paid by a deduction from the surplus value generated by productive capital. To accept this new category would be to obscure the fact that it is the production of surplus value, and not its distribution, which is central to the capitalist mode: the extraction of surplus labour in the form of surplus value and not the extraction of surplus labour per se.

There are, however, certain ambiguities in the foregoing discussion which must be clarified at this point. The first of these concerns the meaning of the term employees of commercial

and banking capital. An alternative formulation (Gough, 1972, pp. 53-56) is that of "labour in the process of pure circulation". The important point here is that, following Marx (1956, pp. 139-155), what is being referred to is the circulation of value as opposed to the physical circulation of commodities. The latter, including most notably the labour of transportation and storage, does contribute to the production of surplus value. In other words certain labour processes undertaken by "commercial enterprises" may be considered as productive, and, of equal importance, not all labour processes undertaken by "industrial enterprises" are necessarily productive (Poulantzas, 1975, pp. 212-2). This point is of particular significance when considering monopoly capital when, following the concentration of capital, vertical integration extends into the retail field.

The second question concerns the category of unproductive labour which is more extensive than has so far been indicated. Within this category falls all labour which is "not exchanged against capital but rather against revenue or income" (ibid., p. 213). Such labour, once again, represents a deduction from, rather than an addition to, surplus value and includes, for example domestic servants and state employees (except those employed in "nationalized industries").

It seems advisable, at this point, to provide a brief summary of the argument so far concerning productive and

unproductive [labour]. Fortunately Gough (1972) following an examination of Marx's writings on this topic, provides a concise summary which is consistent with the position adopted here. He writes that,

"... productive labour is labour which is exchanged with capital to produce surplus value. As a necessary condition it must be useful labour, must produce or modify a use value - increasingly in a collective fashion; that is, it must be employed in the process of production. Labour in the process of pure circulation does not produce use values, therefore cannot add to value or surplus value. It does not add to the production of use values because it arises specifically with commodity production out of problems of realizing the value of commodities. Alongside this group of unproductive workers are all workers supported directly out of revenue, whether retainers or state employees. This group differs from circulation workers, however, in that they do produce use values - all public teachers, doctors, etc, would be included in this category today" (Gough, 1972, p. 58).

Yet even this is not the end of the matter. Poulantzas advances the argument one highly questionable step further. He contends that productive labour is broadly equivalent to labour producing material, in the strong sense of the term, commodities. This is an important point, since it involves the definition of the working class, and in order that there be no misrepresentation Poulantzas's definition must be quoted in full. He defines productive labour as that which,

"... produces surplus value while DIRECTLY REPRODUCING THE MATERIAL ELEMENTS THAT SERVE AS THE SUBSTRATUM OF THE RELATIONS OF EXPLOITATION: LABOUR THAT IS DIRECTLY INVOLVED IN MATERIAL PRODUCTION BY PRODUCING USE-VALUES THAT INCREASE MATERIAL WEALTH" (1975, p. 216, emphasis in the original).

In so far as Poulantzas (*ibid.*, pp. 210-223) is basing himself firmly on various of Marx's Texts, this position is manifestly incorrect. Marx did not equate capitalist production with the materialization of labour in commodities (Gough, 1972, pp. 52-53, *Atelier*, 1974, p. 78)[17]. There is more involved here, of course, than some quest for the holy grail of what Marx really said, some kind posthumous imprimatur of keeper of the keys to the meaning of the sacred texts. At most what is involved is the interpretation of the capitalist mode of production. The position that has been argued, against Poulantzas, is that it is the accumulation of capital, the production and extraction of surplus value which is the essence of the capitalist mode. If this argument is accepted, then there is no alternative but to reject that aspect of Poulantzas's conception of productive labour which restricts it to material production [18].

With this criticism in mind it is now possible to consider more fully the designation of productive labour as the site, *per se*, of a class boundary. In fact, for Poulantzas, productive labour is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for defining the class place of the working class. To explain this statement it is necessary to incorporate political and ideological relations into the analysis. This will involve a consideration of the labour of supervision and the division between mental and manual labour, both of which will be appropriated through the

concept of the collective worker.

The concept of the collective worker consists of the recognition by Marx of the growing complexity and socialization of labour processes under the capitalist mode of production. In order to work productively in this context of socialized labour, " ... it is no longer necessary for the individual himself to put his hand to the object; it is sufficient for him to be an organ of the collective labourer, and to perform any one of its subordinate functions" (Marx, 1976a, pp. 643-644). Furthermore, as one aspect of the collective labourer, there is a technical need (technical division of labour) for the exercise of a supervisory function, in the sense of the co-ordination of the diverse aspects of the labour process.

Yet this supervisory function is not purely technical any more than the labour process under capitalism is a purely technical process. The latter involves, as a production process, the extraction of surplus value and antagonistic relations of production. Hence supervision is part of the social division of labour (which dominates the technical) and involves the control over the extraction of surplus value - maintenance of work discipline, despotism of the factory, etc. As such supervision involves the exercise of class powers derived from the place of capital. These powers are defined by Poulantzas in terms of the political relation of domination of the labour force

(1975, pp. 225-228).

Hence the class place of supervisors - foremen to middle management - although they involve the performance of productive labour are excluded from the working class on the basis of political relations. It may be said in this instance the economic level "determines" that the political is dominant [19].

These class places, excluded from both the two principal classes, make up part of what Poulantzas terms the new petty bourgeoisie. This is a class location which is shared by certain other components of the collective worker but which is determined by the ideological relations: that is by the division between mental and manual labour.

One potential source of confusion on this topic can be removed immediately. For Poulantzas, the division between mental and manual labour is in no way reducible to the empirical distinction between "clean" and "dirty" jobs. Furthermore the distinction is not an absolute one, since even the most manual of operations in the labour process involves some mental content (see Gramsci, 1971, pp. 8-9), rather the mental/manual distinction under capitalism [20] represents a tendency towards a separation which in itself is an effect of the separation of the direct producer from the means of production. "What is lost" in Marx's words "by the specialized workers is concentrated in the

capital which confronts them" [21]. The "what" in this context refers to the knowledge of the labour process as a whole. This knowledge, from which the direct producer is excluded, thus appears "as the property of another and as a power which rules over him" [22]. The dominant ideology acts to legitimize this separation, which is nowhere revealed more clearly than in the differential training accorded to individuals destined for "mental" and "manual" labour respectively.

Poulantzas (1975, p. 238) sums up his conceptualization of the mental/manual division by saying that,

"... every form of work that takes the form of knowledge from which the direct producers are excluded, falls on the mental labour side of the capitalist production process, irrespective of its empirical/natural content, and that this is so whether the direct producers actually do know how to perform this work but do not do so (again not by chance), or whether they in fact do not know how to perform it (since they are systematically kept away from it), or whether again there is quite simply nothing that needs to be known" [23].

The meaning of this definition can be further specified by reference to two examples. The first of these concerns the places of engineers and technicians [24]. Engineers and technicians are concerned with the technological application of science to the production process, a task which assumes particular importance in a mode of production concerned with continually "revolutionizing" the productive forces. Clearly such labour requires a knowledge of the production process which,

if not complete or total, far exceeds that of the eventual "operator" of any such technological application. Such applications are not, however, simply or purely technical since they are conditioned by their insertion in a process for the extraction of surplus value. These conditions constitute the technological applications as "a materialization of the dominant ideology" and engineers and technicians as the bearers/supports (TRAGER) "of the reproduction of ideological relations actually within the production process" (ibid., pp. 236-237).

As a further point it should be noted that just as these technical applications are not simply technical, they also embody more than ideology. They also involve the rhythm or tempo of the labour process and, as such, play a role in determining the "efficiency" of labour and output norms: that is they involve political relations. The mental labour of engineers and technicians,

"... separated from manual labour, represents the exercise of political relations in the despotism of the factory, legitimized by, and articulated to the monopolization and secrecy of knowledge i.e., the reproduction of the ideological relations of domination and subordination" (ibid., p. 240).

This leads Poulantzas to the general conclusion that these political relations "are always legitimized and encased by the dominant ideology, and it is this form of ideology (relation to 'knowledge') that prevails in the capitalist relations of the production process" (ibid.).

Hence engineers although they perform productive labour are not part of the working class. Their place in the social division of labour involving the exercise ideological/political powers over the working class determines that they are part of the new petty bourgeoisie.

The second example concerns the general category of clerical workers. This is an extremely broad category which encompasses not only those office workers who could be considered as part of the collective worker and hence productive, but also those defined as unproductive: commercial workers, bank, insurance and advertising employees, and the majority of civil servants by way of examples. All of these are located on the mental side of the mental/manual division.

Clerical workers, unlike engineers and technicians, do not directly exercise any "functions of political domination over the working class" (ibid., p. 271). Nevertheless their labour does embody certain aspects of the dominant ideological relations, in that they are involved with those aspects of "knowledge" from which the working class in its labour process, is excluded. This labour is in fact encased in a whole series of rituals, know-how and 'cultural elements that distinguish it from the working class" (ibid., p. 258). These include the "secret knowledge" of the "correct" forms of verbal and written communication, the correct form of dress and the whole politesse and set of manners"

associated with selling [25]. "Politeness" a contributor to the Canadian Banker observed, "is one of the first things for a junior [clerk] to grasp the true meaning of" [26]. What is involved here it would seem, is what may be termed an "ideology of respectability". Clerical labour is defined in opposition to, and serves, in an ideological sense, to devalue manual labour, thus acting to legitimize the dominant political and ideological relations (ibid, p. 272).

The physical and social separation of "office" and "works" reflects the separation between clerical and manual workers, which according, to Lockwood, "is based primarily on the conception of the secret and confidential nature of office work", (cited in ibid., p. 272; see also Giddens, 1973, pp. 182-183). Hence the tendency for clerical workers to "identify with management" an identification which is also recognised by manual workers.

Thus Poulantzas argues that clerical workers do not form part of the working class and are, instead, one component of the new petty bourgeoisie [27]. It seems safe, therefore, to conclude that in the nineteenth century clerical workers did not form part of the working class. Additional confirmation for this conclusion is provided by the work of Anderson on "Victorian Clerks". Of particular interest, in view of the previous discussion is his description of the "paternalistic relationship"

between clerical workers and their employers (Anderson, G, 1976, pp. 30-41). This serves to stress the ideological "identity" of clerical workers, and their separation from manual workers [28].

It is now possible to summarize the location of the boundary of the working class, as designated by Poulantzas and accepted in this thesis. Working class places are those involved with the production of surplus value (i.e., productive labour but not in the restricted sense of material production) as this intersects with the manual side of the mental/manual division. There remains the need to address some additional remarks to the question of the new petty bourgeoisie as a class and its commonality with the traditional petty bourgeoisie.

It is important to reveal at the outset that Poulantzas recognises that the new petty bourgeoisie is not a class like the "others". The new petty bourgeoisie does not exist in isolation, but only in a context of polarization. For Poulantzas (1975, p. 205), polarization refers to, and, and results from "... the fact that the class struggle in a capitalist social formation is centred around the two basic classes of this formation (the principal contradiction), the bourgeoisie and the working class". At the level of the relations between classes this means that other classes (including fractions), of which the new petty bourgeoisie is one example, are polarized towards or away from the two main classes. Moreover, since classes do not "first

exist" and then enter into class struggle, but rather are defined in terms of the class struggle, polarization plays a role in the structural determination of the new petty bourgeoisie.

The process of polarization can involve economic, political and ideological relations, but in the case of the new petty bourgeoisie it is the last two which are of particular significance and where "complex distortions and adaptations are involved" (ibid, p. 207). The different fractions of this class are determined in this manner, in that they are polarized towards one of the two major classes. The best example of this is what Poulantzas terms the reproduction of the mental/manual division actually within mental labour. This has as its effect the bureaucratization of mental labour, and, in the case of lower level clerical workers, a polarization towards the working class. In other words this represents Poulantzas's conceptualization of the "proletarianization" of clerical workers alluded to previously. Clerical workers, whose labour has been largely mechanized, represents a fraction of the new petty bourgeoisie which, in its structural determination, is polarized towards the working class (ibid, pp. 316-321).

Polarization also plays a role in Poulantzas ascription of the new and traditional petty bourgeoisie to a single class. After initially noting the divergent economic relations of these two groupings, Poulantzas goes on to point out that they have a

negative criterion in common, since they neither belong to the working class or the bourgeoisie. He then contends that this negative criterion "does not just have a simple excluding role" but that in a context of polarization "it actually produces economic 'similarities' which have common political and ideological effects" (ibid, p. 206).

These common effects [29], including individualism, notions of a natural state and social mobility, are adduced from a sequential examination of the new and traditional petty bourgeoisie (ibid, pp. 290-299). Yet at this important juncture Poulantzas's argument becomes both sketchy and generalized. Thus one critic has quite reasonably commented that Poulantzas provides a partial view of the ideologies of the old and new petty bourgeoisie, and it is equally plausible to characterize them as opposed at this level as well as at the economic and political levels" (Wright, 1976, p. 24). Important differences may well be concealed beneath the single designation of individualism.

At this stage, and particularly with reference to "nineteenth century" and not current advanced capitalist social formations, it seems advisable to retain an open, and hopefully enquiring, mind on this issue, and to record a verdict of "not proven". That is Poulantzas has not demonstrated the validity of his case, but still recognising that it may be possible to

provide such a demonstration. Nonetheless, in terms of this thesis, and bearing in mind that it is not concerned with contemporary, but "nineteenth century" capitalist social formations, it seems advisable to start from the assumption that the traditional and new petty bourgeoisie do not form parts of the same class.

With this theoretical basis established it is now possible to move towards the empirical examination of the spatial expression of social class in Vancouver. The initial step in this direction must be a broad overview of the particular society within which Vancouver was created, that is an examination of the structure of the Canadian social formation in the nineteenth century.

FOOTNOTES

[1] As Marx observed in a letter to Weydemeyer,

"As to myself, no credit is due to me for discovering either the existence of classes in modern society, or the struggle between them. Long before me bourgeois historians had described the historical development of this class struggle and bourgeois economists the economic anatomy of the classes" (Marx & Engels, 1975, p. 64).

[2] The fifty second and final, Chapter of CAPITAL VOL. 3 is succinctly entitled "classes" but covers little more than a single page before terminating with Engels' laconic remark "here the manuscript breaks off" (Marx, 1959, pp. 885-886).

[3] The sources of Dahrendorf's compendium come from works written as early as 1844 and as late as 1879, and include works published by Marx, manuscripts and correspondence. All sources are treated as if of equal significance, hence Dahrendorf rejects, at least implicitly any notion of development in Marx's thought. the result "is valuable as a presentation of quotations, but as a contribution to the understanding of the Marxist problematic about social classes it is absolutely worthless" (Harnecker, 1976, p. 135). On the development of Marx's thought, see Althusser and Balibar (1970).

[4] This presentation is heavily indebted to a reading group on classes in contemporary capitalism conducted by the Vancouver local of the USG. The group presented its findings at the annual conference of the USG held in Regina, May 1977, see USG (Vancouver local), (1977). Participants in the group included A. Wallace, N. Edelson, A. Mabin, B. Curtin, J. Bradbury, B. Bradbury and J. Little.

[5] Lukacs' position, or problematic, is rejected by Poulantzas on the twin grounds of teleology and idealism. From Lukacs' viewpoint "the theoretical problem of the structures of a social formation is reduced to the problematic of their origin, itself related to the self-development of the class/subject of history. The process of the organization of the class/subject into a political class (class for itself) corresponds very closely to the Hegelian notion of historicity of the concept" (1973, p. 60; see also pp. 196-206). On the links between the early Lukacs and German idealist philosophy (especially Weber, Simmel and Dilthey) and the impact of this thought on the theoretical core of history and class consciousness, see Jones (1971) and Therborn (1976). The latter writes "the young Lukacs was a Young Hegelian and a historicist in the contemporary German tradition. For him, society was essentially a spiritual entity,

and class consciousness the determinant of a class's historical role, of social organization and social change" (*ibid.*, p. 342).

[6] It is an essential failing, and consequently a source of some confusion, that this conceptual change is not made explicit in the English translation of the later work. In *POLITICAL POWER AND SOCIAL CLASSES* (1973), originally published in French in 1968, the conceptual equivalent of the social division of labour is the social relations of production.

[7] Thus Marx (1976a, p. 471) writes,

"If we keep labour alone in view, we may designate the division of social production into its main GENERA such as agriculture, etc. as division of labour in general, and the splitting up of the broad divisions into species as division of labour in particular".

This type of division will be designated as the division of labour in society.

[8] Bettelheim's book originally appeared in French in 1970, i.e. subsequent to the publication of *POUVOIR POLITIQUE ET CLASSES SOCIALES* (1968) and prior to the publication of *LES CLASSES SOCIALES DANS LE CAPITALISME AUJOURD'HUI* (1974).

[9] Poulantzas spells this out with particular clarity in a personal communication to Wright (1976, p. 18n): "I think that one of our most serious political-theoretical adversaries is *ECONOMISM*, which always pretends, as soon as we try (with all the theoretical difficulties we encounter here) to stress the importance of the political-ideological, that we abandon the primacy of economics".

[10] See, for example, Marx (1976a, pp. 1060-1065; and 1959, pp. 877-884).

[11] By so doing it should not be inferred that the basic conceptualizations are inapplicable to other "exploitative" modes of production (slave, feudal). They are, but in terms of this thesis, it seems advisable to specify the discussion in terms of the capitalist mode; for the sake of brevity and clarity.

[12] Contemporary takes on a special meaning for Poulantzas which is derived from his periodization of the capitalist mode of production. In brief, contemporary refers to the third, and current, phase of the monopoly stage of the capitalist mode, see Poulantzas (1975, pp. 42-48; and table on pp. 134-135).

[13] For a criticism of various "sociological" theories see

Poulantzas (1975, pp. 175-183 and 194-197); Westerqaard and Resler (1975, pp. 12-29); Wright (1977); and, Dos Santos (1970).

[14] This is an important historical simplification in Poulantzas' argument here. As Pollard (1968), for example, has shown the dissociation of economic ownership and possession commenced under competitive capitalism, the joint stock company, in fact, preceded the development of monopoly capitalism. At the same time the dissociation clearly became of much greater significance under monopoly capitalism, where several distinct labour processes were centralized under a single economic ownership. This criticism does not, however, invalidate Poulantzas' (1975, p. 181) major point concerning the class places of "managers", particularly since he does not view them as as a separate class, nor even a separate fraction of the bourgeoisie. He considers managers as being identified with that fraction of capital whose agents they are. In sum then, this criticism involves the recognition of managers of non-monopoly capital as members of the bourgeoisie. Such a feature presumably became more common as effect of the articulation of monopoly and non-monopoly capital.

[15] On the difference between the form of the state under these two stages of the capitalist mode, see Poulantzas (1975, pp. 97-108, 167-8).

[16] It should be noted that each mode of production has its own particular definition of productive labour. Thus productive labour under the capitalist mode is in no way comparable to productive labour under, say, the feudal mode. The concept has to be elaborated for each mode of production. For a brief summary of the arguments on this point see L'ATELIER DE RECHERCHE MARXISTE, U.Q.A.M (1974, pp. 35-37).

[17] One particularly clear statement on this question by Marx should suffice to resolve any ambiguity.

"The materialization, etc., of labour is, however, not to be taken in such a Scottish sense as Adam Smith conceives it. When we speak of the commodity as the materialization of labour - in the sense of exchange-value - this itself is only an imaginary, that is to say, a purely social mode of existence of the commodity which has nothing to do with its corporeal reality; it is conceived as a definite quantity of social labour or of money. It may be that the concrete labour whose result it is leaves no trace in it (cited in Gough, 1972, p. 53: original in THEORIES OF SURPLUS VALUE, VOL. 1, p. 171).

[18] It is thus of considerable importance in the light of the expansion of capitalist "service" industries. Following Poulantzas' conceptualization the labour in such enterprises would be designated as unproductive.

[19] A graphic confirmation of the location of this class boundary, together with an elaboration of its empirical content is found in a recent study by Nichols and Benyon of a particular production process under monopoly capital. Of middle managers they write,

"For the most part this view of workers as things - as people - objects to be worked on - takes more subtle forms. But that managers think like this is not surprising, in view of these men's technical training, and the job they are paid to do, which involves thinking in terms of labour costs and treating the labour power of other men as a commodity ... The theories of psycho sociology notwithstanding they've had to learn the hard way about 'man-management' and how to defend their 'right to manage.' (Bad managers are managers who behave like bastards because they are bastards. Common or garden 'bastards' are men who find that as managers there are unpleasant things they have to do)" (Nichols and Beynon, 1977, p. 34).

And of foremen:

"... of course within the factory they use their working class culture to cajole and - as management would say - 'motivate the men they overlook"; and, "They remain the subalterns of industry; to be more exact, of capital" (ibid., pp. 66 and 73).

[20] Poulantzas (1975, p. 236) is careful to point out that the mental/manual division is not restricted to the capitalist mode, but that it takes on a particular form under this mode.

[21] This quotation is cited by Poulantzas (1975, p. 235), but in his text it appears in the form of the original English translation of volume 1 of Capital by Moore and Aveling. The version included here is taken from the new translation by Ben Fowkes (Marx, 1976a, p. 482). The original translation of Marx's words, as they appear in Poulantzas' text read as follows: "What is lost by detail labourers is concentrated in the capital that employs them".

[22] See note 21. The original translation reads, "as the property of another, and as a ruling power".

[23] A vivid glimpse of this division, together with the contradictions inherent in it, is provided by Nichols and Beynon (1977, p. 139). They cite one workers description of the labour process,

"Well, as I've told you, its largely a matter of touch on this job and I don't care what anyone says, if you've been on a plant for a few years you get to know what's happening to it in a way that you can't get from reading on the dials. Well anyway, we had a lot of trouble with this plant (the grinder) as you know, and this one occasion it had just settled down and we had this new manager. A real slide-rule fella he was. Well he came in one morning and said "Do this. Do that". And I KNEW that if I did it, then that would be it. Well we were all a bit fed up with this particular manager so I said to myself: "If that's what you want, that's what you'll have ". And over she went - a couple of hundred ton of shit (chemical fertilizer) on the floor".

[24] It is important to remember that what is being discussed here is a particular place in the capitalist production process and not an occupational category as such. Thus Poulantzas recognizes that engineers can occupy bourgeois and even working class places, see Poulantzas (1975, pp. 244 & 249).

[25] This "knowledge" is of course the product of a distinct form of training or education, distinct that is from the training of manual labour. "The training of mental labour essentially consists, to a greater or lesser extent, in the inculcation of a series of rituals, secrets and symbolisms which are to a considerable extent those of general culture", with the term used, presumably, in its strictest sense (Poulantzas, 1975, p. 268). It has also been recorded that some understanding of the "business" in a general sense remains a "desirable qualification of the clerical worker" (Giddens, 1973, p. 194).

[26] The same source added that, "Bank officials always keep a careful watch over their staff, noting their companions, and how their spare time is spent" (Kingsford, 1905, p. 167).

[27] It should be noted, however, that this is a disputed position, even within the confines of historical materialism. The contrary position, as exemplified by Braverman (1974, Chapter 15), contends that clerical workers have been "proletarianized" by monopoly capital. There is a considerable difference, though, between Braverman's problematic and that of Poulantzas. Nonetheless it seems safe to say that Braverman's work suffers from certain "theoretical indeterminacy" (see Coombs, 1978, pp. 91-93) and this is particularly clear in the field of ideological

relations. Thus, in Braverman's hands mental labour is reduced, in empiricist fashion, to the equivalent of "brain work" (1974, pp. 315-319). Given that the concept of mental labour, and hence the mental/manual division, has been emptied of its content, at least in terms of ideological relations, it is not surprising that it plays no part in the structural determination.

Yet even if the idea of "proletarianization" were acceptable it would be of very limited use for the empirical section of this thesis. For the idea of proletarianization implies a process whose origins, in the sense of class places, lie outside the working class.

[28] Anderson G. (1976, p. 123) cites one vivid piece of testimony which illustrates this point:

"I was vividly 'class conscious' as a clerk and the men in the shops, whose apprenticed sons were earning more than I, were regarded as my social inferiors. The atmosphere of the office reeked of smug respectability. I was on the side of the master and against the men, and being masters' men, we clerks were naturally petted and cossetted, but our wages - beg pardon, salaries - were beneath contempt. What fools we were".

[29] Poulantzas modifies his terminology during his exposition from the stronger "common" to the weaker "analogous", i.e. the effects are not the same merely similar - see, for example (1975, p. 294).

CHAPTER 5

THE CANADIAN SOCIAL FORMATION: STRUCTURE AND PROCESS IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY.

"In development and structure, Canada is one of the most curious of all capitalist countries" (Kuczynski, 1972, Vol.2, p. 54).

The designation of the Canadian social formation in the late nineteenth century as a "centre in formation" represents a useful first step in its analysis. It serves to situate it in an overall world context and to differentiate it from both the metropolitan and the underdeveloped and underdeveloping social formations. At the same time it is indicative of an ongoing process of development, of a transition from hinterland to metropolis. Yet this process was not an unequivocal one. The progression towards metropolitan stature was relative, and cannot be simply viewed as the exchange of a subordinate for a dominant position vis-a-vis other social formations. Although the late nineteenth century saw Canada make some significant steps in the direction of becoming an advanced capitalist country, this did not mean, at that time or indeed subsequently, that Canada eliminated all external domination.

In the Canadian case it can be argued that the transition to advanced capitalist status was such that it produced not only development but also continued and renewed dependence. Moreover, the late nineteenth century marked a particularly important stage in this process.

These years witnessed the formal independence of the Canadian social formation and the elaboration of a strategy of development. This strategy of internal development was itself strongly conditioned by the pre-existing pattern of external linkages and forms of dominance. Yet at the same time as this initial strategy was being enacted the pattern and form of external dominance was itself being transformed. This disjuncture between internal and external processes was to have important and enduring consequences in structuring Canada's continued dependence on other social formations. Finally the late nineteenth century saw the first steps in Canada's contribution towards the creation of underdevelopment in the third world, steps which contributed to Canada's own development and its clear differentiation from "third world" social formations.

For the purpose of this study the primary concern is the internal structure of the Canadian social formation in the post Confederation period until the end of the nineteenth century. Yet from the previous discussion two points emerge which must guide and situate such an analysis. Firstly that the external linkages are of considerable importance in determining the internal structure, and secondly that these external linkages must be examined in the pre as well as post Confederation periods (see Naylor, 1972, Clement, 1975).

As Innis, and more recently Brebner (1966), has pointed out

a central facet of Canadian history is the fact that Canada has made up a very junior member of a North Atlantic triangle, whose other components were Britain and the U.S.A. [1]. This implied not only that Canada was dominated by one or both, of these other social formations, but as the Oregon Treaty of 1848 and the Treaty of Washington of 1871 exemplify, that Canada's internal requirements were often subordinated to the state of the relationship between these two more powerful social formations. Thus Canadian interests could be, and were in the nineteenth century, sacrificed to preserve or restore satisfactory relationships between Britain and the USA, the one the dominant world power, thanks to its primacy in capitalist production, for most, if not all, of the nineteenth century. The other, whose history was marked by, continued, if not consistent expansionism (Jones, 1972) and which had burgeoned into a formidable rival of the former by the end of the century. Canadian development thus occurred within the context of the formal British Empire on the one hand and the continental expansionism of the U.S.A. on the other. The relative importance of these external forces changed during the nineteenth century, with the former tending to decrease and the latter to increase as the century progressed. Nonetheless the internal structures created by the initial dependence on Britain had lasting effects, not the least of which was that it conditioned the subsequent form of dependence on the USA. In order to explain, and justify this assertion, it is necessary to begin by examining the relationships between Britain

and the "Canadian" colonies in the pré-confederation period. As Drache (1971, p. 3) has remarked,

"In so many respects Canadian history has its origins in the material conditions created by a political economy which Canada's pre-industrial economy set in motion. It is no exaggeration to claim that Canadian history has been locked into this one pattern".

It should be stressed at this point that what follows does not represent an attempt to write a "history" of Canada. Rather it is an attempt to present and analyse the major structural relationships which have conditioned the particular (and peculiar) process of development of the Canadian social formation.


PRE-CONFEDERATION PATTERNS.

The disparate components of the Canadian social formation that were united in the years between 1867 and 1873 although of divergent origins and compositions were linked by a common history of subordination to the British social formation. This subordination involved political and ideological as well as economic dimensions. Political in that the autonomy and powers of the colonial "states" were circumscribed by and subject to the dictates of Westminster: ideological in that Britain provided the models for cultural institutions and the measuring rod of cultural values and achievements. In Quebec the situation was obviously more complex in that French language and institutions were predominant, yet this numerical superiority concealed an

inferior status. The unilingual French speaker suffered a burden that the unilingual English speaker did not. English was the language of "business". Thus Quebecois endured a double imposition, a colonialism twice imposed.

This external dominance of capitalist production was indirect in that it was effected by means of commercial capital, both British and indigenous. It was this commercial capital which facilitated the movement of staples - fish, fur, lumber, wheat - from the Canadian hinterland to the British metropolis and the reciprocal movement of manufactured goods and surplus population.

The involvement of Canadian commercial capital in long distance import/export trade soon generated an acute need for short term financing or accommodation. It was to fill this need that the Canadian banking system was established, beginning, effectively, with the Bank of Montreal in 1817 (Naylor, 1975, Vol. 1. p. 69). These origins within the needs of the commercial capital were reflected in the structure and operation of the Canadian chartered banks. They were unabashedly colonial in structure, following the British model, and commercial in orientation. Geared towards the staple trades they did not make industrial loans (ibid., p. 67; Clement, 1975, p. 53). Furthermore their monopoly of the note issue effectively limited any competing financial system which would support the



development of productive capital [2]. Canada had nothing comparable to the British country banks or the U.S.A. banking system (Naylor, 1975, Vol. 1, p. 156). Instead the dominance of a commercial bourgeoisie produced a commercial banking system, with the latter representing an expanded field of activity for the former (Naylor, 1972, p. 7). The early Canadian banks " ... were creations of merchants for merchants" (Pentland, 1950, p. 472). One contemporary observer summed up the situation in the following manner:

"Our foreign commerce, confined and shackled as it is, and it has been, is entirely in the hands of the British manufacturers ... Our farmers are indebted to our country merchants, our country merchants are deeply bound down in the same manner, and by the same causes to the Montreal wholesale dealers. Few of these Montreal commission merchants are men of capital; they are generally the factors or agents of British houses, and thus a chain of debt, dependence and degradation is begun and kept up, the links of which are fast bound round the souls and bodies of our yeomanry; and that with few exceptions from the richest to the poorest, while the tether stake is fixed in British factories" [3].

The occupation of this strategic position by export/import, wholesale merchants and bankers was of considerable importance. It enabled the commercial/banking bourgeoisie to secure a position of power, not only economic but also political, within the colonies. Together with fragments of an imperial bourgeoisie and a rentier (large, often absentee land owners) bourgeoisie [4], it was the large commercial bourgeoisie which dominated the various colonial states. (Naylor, 1972, pp. 5-6) The mutual intertwining of interests, often personal as well as structural,

rooted in external linkages is aptly reflected in the names applied to these power elites or hegemonic groupings, each with its own bank [5].

This dominance at the political level ensured the creation of what may be termed commercial colonial states, states oriented towards and structured to facilitate commercial objectives. The state, for example played a key role in the development of a transportation network (canals and later railways) through guarantees to British capital and ensured their commercial orientation. Commercial in that the transportation network was primarily geared towards sustaining and promoting external trade, hence reflecting and benefiting commercial capital, but not, and this is highly significant, productive capital [6]. This is an extremely important point and one which will be elaborated upon below.

Commercial capital with its external orientation, also required and promoted urban development, since it focused collection and distribution at particular locations. Montreal was undoubtedly the most important of these centres, but Toronto, Halifax and even Victoria fulfilled similar functions in the pre-Confederation period. Indeed it may be said that each colony contained a similar structure, with one or more commercial centres oriented primarily externally. Moreover the predominance of these external linkages - export/import - militated against

the development of inter-colonial trade. The colonies, as Mackintosh (1964, p. 19) has commented, were "economically separate and isolated units".

Thus far the analysis can be said to differ little from that of Creighton and Innis as manifested in the "Laurentian thesis". All that needs to be added is the primacy of the St. Lawrence as a routeway and the primacy of the Montreal commercial bourgeoisie located on its banks. Now there can be no disputing the validity of these two points, but it is important to avoid geographical determinism with which the Laurentian thesis is tinged. It was not the St. Lawrence which created a dominant commercial bourgeoisie, rather it was a dominant commercial bourgeoisie which created a particular usage of the St. Lawrence.

Moreover if it is accepted that the subsequent development was strongly conditioned by the dominant commercial bourgeoisie and its erection of a latitudinal (east-west) transportation network, as the "Laurentian thesis" asserts, it must be noted that this was a highly contradictory process. The understanding of this last point requires a clear comprehension of the nature and functioning of commercial capital, and, particularly, its differentiation from productive capital.

Commercial capital, as Marx observed, represents the first, and hence, oldest form of the existence of capital (Marx, 1959,

p. 325). It is older than the capitalist mode of production since it requires only that commodities be produced and not that commodity production be generalized [7]. Since commodities may be produced under many different modes (slave, feudal, petty commodity production) it follows that commercial capital may exist under many different modes, since "its function consists exclusively of promoting the exchange of commodities". In other words commercial capital is concerned with the exchange, but not the production of commodities [8].

As such, Marx notes, commercial capital, is one of the historical premises for capitalist production [9]. Nonetheless the existence of commercial capital does not, in and of itself, either require or promote the development of capitalist production, at least in a direct fashion.

Moreover commercial capital can act as a fetter on the development of capitalism, and the dominance of commercial capital should be regarded as an index, not of development, but rather the lack of it. Marx (1959, p. 326) writes,

"The less developed the productive forces, the more the wealth in money is concentrated in the hands of merchants or appears in the specific form of merchant's capital".

And again,

"... whenever merchant's capital still predominates we find backward conditions. This is true within

one and the same country, in which, for instance, the specifically merchant towns present far more striking analogies with past conditions than industrial towns" (ibid., p. 327).

Commercial capital, confined as it is to circulation, does not produce surplus but merely appropriates surplus produced elsewhere. In social formations dominated by non-capitalist modes commercial capital exists as an independent form, as capital par excellence, extracting surplus generated by these one or more modes. When the capitalist mode of production is dominant merchant capital is relegated to one sphere of the reproduction of capital as a whole, one form of capital with a specific function. In the first instance capital is concentrated in circulation as opposed to production, which in turn inhibits the development of the level of the productive forces, and the expanded reproduction of capital as a whole. Thus the structure of the first case inhibits the transition to the second. The restriction of investment in productive capital limits the expansion of productive capital which alone can assure the dominance of the capitalist mode of production.

These points are clearly of direct relevance to the nature of the Canadian social formation of the pre-Confederation period. If, as is widely accepted following the Laurentian thesis, commercial capital and a commercial fraction of the bourgeoisie was dominant in Canada, then this is an indication of the lack of development. In fact production was not carried out primarily by

capitalist, but rather by petty commodity means, both in agriculture and manufacturing: the family farm and the family business. Capitalist production as a corollary was limited in both scope and extent, restricted for a considerable period by a shortage of both capital and labour power. The commercial orientation of the dominant fraction of the bourgeoisie generated the former and the "strength" of petty commodity production the latter. It should be noted, furthermore that a commercial bourgeoisie was structurally compatible with petty commodity production. Commercial and banking capital and their representatives the commercial/banking bourgeoisie required only that commodities be produced. As such there was no real need for this bourgeoisie to be concerned with production as such. Indeed it could be argued that the promotion of capitalist production would produce an industrial bourgeoisie, and hence a threat to the hegemony of the former.

There is one important exception to the foregoing remarks, an exception with considerable implications. This concerns the development of a transportation network. Largely as a response to competitive developments in the USA, the Canadian bourgeoisie was obliged to develop its own transportation network, first in the 1820's in terms of canals, and later, in the 1850's, railways. Now this can clearly be regarded as an investment in productive capital, yet, and this is crucial, it was for commercial purposes: the maintenance of long distance trade. Moreover the

transport industry in itself occupies an equivocal position, as Marx (1956, p. 155) noted,

"The transport industry forms on the one hand an independent branch of production and thus a separate sphere of investment of productive capital. On the other hand its distinguishing feature is that it appears as a continuation of the process of production within the process of circulation and FOR the process of circulation".

The Canadian transportation network was an investment in productive capital but it was an investment guided by the dominant commercial/banking bourgeoisie and directed towards sustaining its own position. Investments in canals began this process, but railways continued it and were of much greater significance and the discussion will be limited to the latter [10].

By the 1840's a series of external developments, the development of capitalist production in the United States, its expansionism together with the loss of protected British markets with the advent of free trade, rendered railway construction an urgent item on the agenda of the Canadian bourgeoisie. Yet the construction of an adequate railway network(s) posed considerable problems, not the least of which was the amount of capital required. Although beyond the resources of the Canadian bourgeoisie there was one possible solution, the import of capital. It was a solution which the Canadian bourgeoisie, in protecting its own position, did not hesitate to take. Indeed in

many ways it was in a fortunate situation in that its structural links vis-a-vis the British social formation gave it ready access to the British capital market.

The flow of British capital into Canadian railway projects was both direct and indirect. Indirect in that it was mediated by the colonial states. Here the dominance of the state by the commercial/banking bourgeoisie played a key role. Capital raised through government bonds was directed to railway companies via land and cash grants, subsidies and government guarantees. Indeed it has been estimated that one railway alone, the Grand Trunk, was responsible for over one quarter of the total public debt of the provinces of the Canadas by 1857 [11].

This pattern of capital movement was further eased by the fact that the commercial/banking bourgeoisie were not only the dominant economic and political force, they were also, to a considerable extent, the promoters and directors of the railway companies. The circle of impulse and benefit, in both the short and long term, was apparently complete. Sir Allan MacNab, a prominent member of the commercial/banking bourgeoisie, and a Prime Minister of the Canadas in the 1850's, aptly encapsulated the situation with his comment that railways were his politics (Myers, 1972, p. 169). He was, of course, "interested" in a number of railroads [12].

It is tempting, perhaps, to interpret this pattern in terms of a "conspiracy" theory, laying stress on bribery and corruption and conflicts of interest. Indeed such a muckraking approach was adopted by Myers and to a lesser extent by Naylor [13]. To reject such an approach is not to deny the occurrence of bribery and corruption, especially so since Myers presents enough evidence to convince even the most ardent empiricist. Rather it is to seek to situate such occurrences within the structure of the Canadian social formation. In this sense the canal and railway construction represented a strategy for development, in its own interests, by the dominant fractions of the Canadian bourgeoisie. The form, and capacity to enact this form, represented a response to both external pressures and the relative weakness of other classes and class fractions within the Canadian social formation.

Yet development is a contradictory process, and the aforementioned example was no exception. The failure of the "transportation" strategy, or at least its limited success, was apparent by the mid 1860's and was clearly expressed in the fiscal crisis of the colonial state. The failure to compete with a now fully capitalist United States [14] became apparent as the Civil War ended and was exacerbated further by the ending of Reciprocity. The cessation of hostilities and the restoration of the U.S.A. transportation system adversely affected the earnings of the Canadian railways, especially the Grand Trunk. The

consequent pressure on government together with a financial "panic" in London [15], rendered further access to the London money market "impossible" (Naylor, 1975, Vol. 1, pp. 30-35). In this conjuncture Confederation was advanced and accepted, as a viable solution [16]. It should not be inferred that the forces that contributed towards Confederation can be reduced to a fiscal crisis. Nonetheless the conjuncture of a fiscal crisis and its resolution had an important impact on the structure of the new state that emerged. This is a topic that will be further examined below, for the moment it is sufficient to note that the state was marked by a significant degree of centralization.

Although railway development on a commercial basis was a failure for the hegemonic fraction of the Canadian bourgeoisie it did stimulate the development of capitalist production and hence an indigenous industrial bourgeoisie [17]. This was for a number of reasons.

In part, of course, the railways themselves represented productive industrial capital, but only within the aforementioned limitations. More importantly railway construction served to stimulate production oriented towards the internal market and organised on a capitalist basis. This effect was increased in 1859 when the need for additional government revenues, required for railway financing, resulted in the "incidental protection" of a tariff barrier for some sectors of production. In some

instances, the production of rolling stock, rolling mills, iron foundries, the stimulus was direct; in others the effect came through improved accessibility [18]. Even the lumber industry, one of the staples, appears to have begun a transition to a capitalist organization [19], although this was more marked in some areas than in others [20].

Yet the development of capitalist production requires more than the availability of capital and a market, it also requires a supply of labour. A combination of processes served to ensure that such a supply was available in the period of the railway boom. An agricultural "crisis" had developed in Lower Canada as early as the 1830's and to this was added the "closure" of the "farming frontier" in Upper Canada around 1850 (Harris and Warkentin, 1974, pp. 83, 114; Pentland, 1959, pp. 457-459). Finally, famine and political events in Europe propelled a stream of immigrants, especially Irish, into Canada. In fact the sudden increase in labour supply was such that it exceeded demand, and these years were marked by emigration as well as immigration [21]. The conclusion of Pentland (1959, p. 455) that "the essential structure of a capitalist [labour] market existed in the 1850's ..." seems well founded. Further confirmation of this is provided by the revival and growth of the Canadian labour movement [22].

Some indication of the extent of the growth of the

capitalist mode of production is suggested by the increase in "industrial" employment from 71, 000 to 145,000 between 1851 and 1861 in the province of the Canadas. Yet these figures are deceptive and must be treated with some caution. "Industrial" employment is not necessarily the same as employment in capitalist production. Industrial employment as utilized for census purposes represents an occupational category and, as such, does not differentiate between capitalist production and petty commodity production [23].

It is precisely the failure to differentiate between capitalist and petty commodity production, that has permitted some authorities to suggest that Canada was a "capitalist" country from the mid nineteenth century. Pentland (1950, p. 457) writes,

"About the middle of the nineteenth century, the Province of Canada was transformed from a raw, staple-producing area to a rounded, integrated economy that might be called metropolitan. By 1850 change had gone too far to be turned back ... Purely extractive industry was overlaid with a secondary development involving an elaborate transportation system, capitalistic agriculture, an extensive list of manufactures ... and a creditable financial structure".

The critical point here would appear to be the description of agriculture as "capitalistic" [24]. How then does Pentland describe this capitalistic agriculture, what is involved? In brief this can be answered as follows; ownership of the means of production, the production of commodities and investment. If the

last term is somewhat vague, Pentland (1959, p. 463) provides clarification. "Investment", he notes, "was large; but it was in the form of hard work and self-maintenance translated into improved farm land".

If this represents anything it represents an excellent description of petty commodity production. Capitalist production is not a thing but a relationship that involves the extraction of surplus-value from the process of bringing together means of production and labour power - other peoples' labour power. In petty commodity production on the other hand the predominant source of labour is that of the owner of the means of production - the individual, or more properly, the family.

Ryerson is correctly more circumspect in his overall assessment of the significance of capitalist production in this period. He (1973, p. 268) comments that, "Certainly, the [18]50's and 60's marked the prelude if not indeed the first actual stage of the Industrial Revolution in this country".

Yet Ryerson's ambiguity or uncertainty on this point is rooted in the same basic misconception as Pentland: the failure to differentiate clearly between capitalist and petty commodity production. This is revealed clearly in the assessment that,

"Small scale individual capitalist enterprises were characteristic of Nova Scotia manufactures. The

1,444 saw mills employed only two or three persons each at the time of the 1871 census" (ibid., p. 215).

If such description is accepted as capitalist then, at the level of the relations of production, and with equal reason, the family farm should be so described: a suggestion already rejected. Not wishing to embark upon a statistical argument on the meaning of average figures it may be admitted that some saw mills in Nova Scotia could have been organised on a capitalist basis, but the majority were individual, partnerships or family operations.

The purpose of this critical excursus has been to argue that the capitalist mode of production, although developing, was not dominant within the Canadian social formation before Confederation. Clearly such a position is consonant with an earlier one on the dominance of the commercial/banking fractions of the bourgeoisie and the relative insignificance of an indigenous industrial bourgeoisie. It, was, moreover, this pattern of relationships which conditioned Confederation and subsequent developments. Yet before embarking upon an analysis of Confederation and post-Confederation structures it seems advisable to summarise the argument that has been presented in the first segment of this Chapter.

In sum then, the component parts of the Canadian social formation in the early nineteenth century were dominated by the

capitalist mode of production located in Britain. Later, and to a lesser extent in the pre-confederation period, this external dominance was shared by the United States. The pattern of external dominance elevated the channels of external linkages within Canada to a position of considerable importance. This facilitated the internal dominance of commercial and banking capital which was expressed in the hegemony of commercial and banking fraction of the bourgeoisie. On the political level this was reflected in a series of separate commercial state structures within a colonial context.

Production, however, took place primarily under the aegis of petty commodity production. Aboriginal modes were subject to rapid dissolution effects whilst capitalist production was inhibited by the commercial orientation, expressed in the shortages of labour, lack of an internal market and shortage of capital for productive purposes. Thus it was an externally situated capitalist mode of production which dominated the internal articulation of modes largely through the mediation of internal commercial and banking capital. Internally petty commodity production was quantitatively pre-eminent.

Capitalist production, however, was given a boost by the "transport strategy" of development, involving canal construction from the 1820's, but more particularly railways from the late 1840's. Nonetheless the orientation of the new transport network

remained commercial and external, reflecting the continued dominance of the commercial/banking bourgeoisie. In consequence the capitalist mode of production did not achieve a position of dominance within the Canadian social formation. The industrial fraction of the bourgeoisie in Canada was, therefore, relatively weak, economically, politically, and ideologically.

The "transport strategy" was not a success for the commercial/banking bourgeoisie. The structural inhibition of capitalist production together with the dependence upon external capital for railway construction combined with an adverse international conjuncture in the mid 1860's to generate a fiscal crisis in the colonial states. This fiscal crisis provided a key impulse towards the consolidation of the colonial states in Confederation, and influenced the structure of the state thus created.

CONFEDERATION TO 1900: CHANGE AND CONTINUITY

It seems appropriate to begin this discussion with a brief review of the new Canadian state created in the period between 1867 and 1873. This new and much enlarged state not only represented the arena within which the conflicts of the contending social forces were enacted, but it was also an important force in shaping their course and outcome. The state and state apparatuses it has been argued (see above chap. 2) serve to maintain the cohesion of the social formation, but in so

doing they do not operate in a "neutral" fashion.

The previous section has suggested that commercially structured colonial states were impelled towards some new arrangement by a fiscal crisis; consolidation of debt and an expanded tax base were important objectives. To this were added a "fear" of continued U.S. expansionism in the "West". There was also a general preference for British political models, and a rejection of alternative U.S. ones. This was undoubtedly attributable to pre-existing linkages with Britain and the continued and continuing ideological linkages [25].

There is wide agreement that the state structure generated by Confederation was a centralized one: that is one in which the major "powers" resided at the centre, with the central or federal government. The British parliamentary system was adhered to, but more importantly,

"... the central government was very purposefully strengthened by giving to it 'all the great subjects of legislation', and declaring that any un-named or residual powers should reside in the central government. The provinces were given only specific jurisdictions such as roads, direct taxation [26], municipal institutions, legislation concerning property and civil rights', and education. And even here, the federal government was empowered to remedy any provincial infringement of the educational rights of the minorities" (Mcnaught, 1969, p. 135).

Moreover, within this general pattern of centralization it was the centralization of fiscal powers that was of vital

importance. It not only restricted provincial control over the purse, but it meant " ... that the merchant-capitalist oligarchy who controlled the federal government had no difficulty in raising funds for their development projects " (Naylor, 1975, Vol. 1, p. 5). Naylor's use of terminology here is somewhat loose but his major point is well made. It would be more precise to replace merchant-capitalist oligarchy with the dominance of the commercial and banking fractions of the bourgeoisie (see above). The more so, since the importance of banking capital was increasing [27]. Thus it is possible to agree with Morton (1963, p. 328) that Confederation was "an amazing tour de force carried by a political elite", providing that this political elite is situated in commercial and banking capital.

In sum, confederation was a conservative achievement. It assured a continuance of the pre-existing balance of class forces, but in an enlarged arena. "It added not one voter to the electorate, and secured no right, old or new, to the subject" [28]. Yet the centralization of powers contained the seeds, to put it no higher, of centralized development, that is of spatial unevenness within the Canadian social formation. While the federal control of fiscal powers clearly pointed towards such a result the vesting of control over the "land and resources" of Ruperts land, the area of the yet to be created Prairie Provinces, assured it [29].

Mention of Rupert's Land serves as a useful reminder that Confederation in itself did not represent a completed process. It should be seen instead as the creation of an apparatus for use, and, moreover, one in which the usage would, in a dialectical manner, help to define and transform the nature of the apparatus. Confederation should be viewed in conjunction with three key developments, which were contingent upon Confederation, but at the same time expressed its content and meaning. These "basic national decisions" [30] have been identified by Mackintosh (1964, ch. 2) as concerning:-

- 1) The acquisition of land
- 2) the construction of a transcontinental railway
- 3) the "National Policy"

THE PURCHASE OF RUPERTS LAND.

The purchase of Ruperts Land by the Canadian government from the Hudson's Bay Company was a very important step in that it made possible the attainment of several different objectives [31]. In an immediate sense it involved a considerable increase in the area of the Canadian social formation and served, de jure, to counter a threat of renewed American expansionism, a threat made more urgent by the completion of the Union Pacific Railway in 1869 [32]. The incorporation of British Columbia was the next logical step and this was accomplished in 1871. A social formation of continental scope had been created, de jure at least [33].

If external pressures were influential, particularly with respect to the timing, in the acquisition of the prairie lands, then internal forces were also pushing in the same direction. The purchase represented the acquisition of a vast potential Western hinterland for the bourgeoisie of Eastern and particularly Central Canada. Not only to the dominant commercial/banking fractions but also to the smaller, but growing, industrial fraction. The "West" was a vast potential space for the expansion of petty commodity production, a fact of considerable importance since the "frontier" had long since closed in the east. If the anticipated expansion occurred it could be articulated by commercial and banking capital with capitalist production in the east and overseas. The net result would be a flow of surplus from "West" to "East", or at least to the "Centre".

The realisation of this opportunity required the development of a new transport network. As has been noted, the hegemonic fraction of the bourgeoisie had had some, if not entirely happy, experience with such requirements. The scale of the new endeavour presented a considerable problem, but the context proffered a solution. The purchase of Ruperts Land together with the centralized control of the "lands and resources" of the area, provided a means of financing railway construction. The dominant fraction of the Canadian bourgeoisie, via the state, were able to indulge in a positive shower of largesse, largely in the form of

land grants, which, not coincidentally, descended largely upon themselves.

From the foregoing it is clear that at least two of the "basic national decisions" were inter-related. The problem of a national transportation system was not only prefigured in the western expansion, but a part of the means of solution was created by the form in which expansion occurred. Yet the construction and elaboration of a transport network was such a momentous development that it necessitates a more detailed consideration.

To approach the question of transportation in the period now under review is to confront, almost exclusively, the phenomenon of the Canadian Pacific Railway. Fortunately, since the purpose here is not to provide a narrative, it is not necessary to follow in detail the complex machinations that lie behind the construction and operation of the company [34]. What is required is an analysis of the major structural features and consequences of this process.

RAILWAY DEVELOPMENT: THE CPR

The construction of a Canadian trans-continental railway was a reflection not only of the internal developing situation but, at the same time, represented a continuity of external linkages. "The dominant theme", Glazebrook (1938, pp. 301-302) has

commented "in the project of a Canadian railway to the Pacific had always been that of a line through Canadian territory, reaching both Atlantic and Pacific parts, and serving as a link in a British route from Europe to the Orient". Nor was mere imperial sentiment involved, although this was blossoming at the time. The "all red route" represented a more direct route to the "orient" and was largely supported by British capital [35]; in addition its final link, across the Pacific, was encouraged by a British mail subsidy. These factors were not without significance in influencing the location of the western terminus. Glazebrook (1938, p. 311) again,

"The extension from Port Moody to Vancouver also assisted in the development of traffic with the Orient, a side of their business which the Canadian Pacific was anxious to encourage. A mail subsidy from the British government in 1889 was followed by the building of Canadian Pacific steamers, and the full operation of a trans-Pacific service by 1891".

Nor, as a final point, were the shareholders of the newly re-constituted Hudson's Bay Co. entirely disinterested in the success of the railway. Their continued "well being" rested in large part on anticipated land sales, for which the railway was a *sine qua non*.

Yet this apparently propitious coincidence of favourable forces notwithstanding, the "railway project" required rather a long gestation period. It was not until 1885, some eighteen years after Confederation and fifteen after the formal

acquisition of Rupert's Land, that the last spike was driven in the CPR main line [36]. Apart from the very magnitude of the task itself, the lengthy interval between promise and fulfilment was in no small part influenced by the prolonged economic downturn of the "Great Depression". Indeed the early history of the CPR was strongly conditioned by the trajectory of the Great Depression of 1873-1896 (see above Table 3:1). The collapse of the first company in the wake of the "Pacific scandal" coincided with the onset of the depression. The formation of the second, and successful, company in 1880, together with much of the actual construction, occurred during a cyclical upturn [37]. Finally it was only with the advent of a renewed economic advance, beginning in 1896, that the success of the CPR was finally assured. Earnings and profits progressed to new levels [38], and in 1901 CPR stock sold at par for the first time (Innis, 1923, p. 284n).

If the construction of the CPR and its operation was contingent upon Canada's place in the world economy, and the overall dynamic of capitalist production on a world scale, it was also a reflection of the internal structure. The CPR through its leading figures contained important linkages to the pre-existing structure and centres of economic power. George Stephens, the first president of the CPR, had formerly been president of the Bank of Montreal, and R.B. Angus, a long time member of the CPR executive committee, had been general manager of the same bank. Donald Smith, on the other hand, represented a link with the

Hudson's Bay Co., as well as further reinforcing the linkage with the Bank of Montreal [39]. Not surprisingly the Bank of Montreal acted as a banker for the CPR, and played an important role in providing interim financing underwriting the issue of the latter's bonds and mediating, as a trustee, government financial support (Naylor, 1975, Vol. 1, p. 272; Innis, 1923, p. 117; Glazebrook, 1938, pp. 279-280). The continuity with pre-existing patterns of commercial and banking capital is apparent.

The real importance of the CPR, though, was not so much that it represented continuity, but the change that it both embodied and promoted. For the creation of the CPR marked a new stage in the development of the Canadian social formation: it marked the advent of monopoly capital. Myers (1972, pp. xxxi-xxxii) has suggested that the movement towards consolidation began in 1879 with the absorption of "a considerable number of smaller and formally independent railways (some of which were already amalgamated) ... by the large systems such as the Grand Trunk Railway, and later by the Canadian Pacific Railway ..." [40]. Undoubtedly Myers is correct in ascribing chronological priority to the Grand Trunk of what is here termed monopoly capital, but in terms of historical significance the primacy of the CPR is equally clear [41].

Yet the claim that the CPR represented monopoly capital remains at the level of an assertion. Obviously some

substantiating argument and documentation are required to support a claim of this importance. It may be as well to begin with the question of size. The CPR, by world standards, was a very large company. Its capital stock, set at \$25,000,000 at inception, had increased to \$65,000,000 before 1890, and was further expanded in 1902, reaching almost \$99,000,000 three years later (Innis, 1923, p. 101, 284). By way of comparison, the largest industrial company in the U.K. in 1905 had a total capitalization of only \$87,000,000 approximately. In the U.S.A., on the other hand, the giant U.S. Steel was something of an exception and was by far the largest company in existence with a total capitalization of \$1,370,000,000. Yet even in the USA there were only five other industrial enterprises larger than the CPR (see Payne, 1974, pp. 348-351; unfortunately railway companies are not included in the data, so a direct comparison here is impossible).

Furthermore the CPR, together with the Grand Trunk, and later the Canadian Northern, dominated the railway industry, and hence long distance transportation, within Canada. They achieved this by a process of consolidation; the outright purchase of smaller companies or, virtually the same in effect, the long term lease of running rights [42]. As early as 1886, the CPR had obtained control of no less than fifteen other railways by such means [43]: and this marked the beginning rather than the end of the process. The consequences, of the restriction in the forms of competition, were spelled out most clearly in the vexed issue of

freight rates.

The CPR was not, however, simply a railway company. It was by no means restricted to a single, if spatially diffuse labour process. Very early, if not from its inception, it had embarked on a process of expansion and vertical integration, encompassing a number of distinct and separate, although related labour processes. The railway operations led readily enough into the hotel business. The importance of the external linkages, and especially the mail subsidy of 1889 produced CPR ships. The huge land grants which the CPR received, both in its charter and by subsequent acquisitions, resulted in a real estate operation [44]. As a further extension of its field of operations the Dominion Express Company, a CPR subsidiary, was involved in telegram and telegraph communication (Glazebrook, 1938, p. 301). A more radical departure occurred in 1898 with the entry into the smelting industry with the purchase of a smelter at Trail, B.C.. This move, via a process of amalgamation, soon generated an integrated mining complex with the formation of the Consolidated Mining and Smelting Company in 1906 [45].

The diversity of labour processes in the above enterprises, together with their spatial extension clearly required a complex managerial hierarchy. There was, in other words, an extended separation between economic ownership and possession, a key characteristic of monopoly capital.

Economic ownership, the control over the allocation and distribution of surplus, was centralized in Montreal, this notwithstanding the fact that the majority of the capital was foreign owned. Naylor (1975, Vol. 1, p. 272) has suggested that this result was not fortuitous:

"The real reason for favouring equity financing turned on the desire to avoid the loss of control of the line to bond holders in the event of its being unable to cover its interest charges. It was CPR policy to spread ownership of equity, apart from the blocs of stock held by the promoters themselves, among a large number of small shareholders to assure continuity of control even after construction was completed".

Possession, or control of the actual operation of labour processes, was exercised in varying degrees by a local management corps [46]. As the chain of command flowed from the centre to the periphery, so the flow of surplus was in reverse direction, although an important quantity was destined for a foreign shores.

There seems little doubt, then, according to the criteria outlined in Chapter 2, that the CPR may be regarded as an example of monopoly capital. This was an important event since it involved the transformation of the internal structure of the Canadian social formation; it involved a modification in the articulation of the modes (and stages of modes) of production. For the present it will suffice to note that, as with the previous "railway boom" the construction of the CPR contributed to the expansion of capitalist production. It also facilitated a

considerable expansion of petty commodity production, most obviously on the Prairies. At the same time the advent of the CPR did little to alter the pre-existing power structure in Canada. The commercial and banking fractions of the bourgeoisie had been involved in railways before the CPR and were involved in the CPR. Situated in the sphere of circulation the CPR was geared, primarily, towards sustaining the long distance staple trade. The commercial/banking bourgeoisie remained dominant after the advent of the CPR, as it had been before, although, it could be argued, that banking capital was assuming more importance in this alliance, as witnessed by the important role of the Bank of Montreal. Finally, as both promoter and expression of a new internal articulation the CPR was involved in the process of the development of spatial unevenness within Canada.

No discussion of the development of the railway network in Canada in the post-Confederation period would be complete without reference being made to the role of the state. In the pre-Confederation period, it will be recalled, the dominant fractions of the bourgeoisie, the railway developers and politicians were frequently the same people. After Confederation this "personal" interpenetration of the economic and political levels was somewhat reduced. It did not cease, of course; Donald Smith served as an MP before the incorporation of the CPR and J. C. Abbott, a director of the CPR at one time, went on to

become Prime Minister. The pattern of personal linkage was more apparent in the smaller lines, together with bonuses and land grants that were chartered (see Myers, 1972, pp. 289-300 for a fairly lengthy list). This modification should not be interpreted as indicating a weakening of political influence by the dominant fraction of the bourgeoisie, nor of the structural relationship between the state and railway development. Rather it reflected both the growing complexity of Canadian society and the maturation of the state. Personal representation in the state apparatus became less necessary with the elaboration of the apparatuses themselves. A separate government department of railways was established in 1879 (Glazebrook, 1938, p. 263) and the parliamentary railway committee "openly a tool of the railways" (Naylor, 1975, Vol. 2, p. 29) served to ensure that a "sympathetic" milieu was maintained.

Sir John A. MacDonald would appear to have been in no doubt about the continued relationship between railway development, and the CPR in particular, and government. He wrote to George Stephen in 1889 that "My own position as a public man is as intimately connected with the prosperity of the CPR as yours is, as a railway man" (cited in Glazebrook, 1938, p. 300). Nor was the relationship unidirectional. In the 1891 election, for example, it would appear that a narrow Tory victory rested largely upon "... the CPR's returning a Tory in every riding but one through which its main line passed" (Naylor, 1975, Vol. 1, p. 280; see also Glazebrook, 1938, pp. 300-301) [47].

Nonetheless it is in the field of government action, the enactment and implementation of particular policies, that the relationship between the dominant fractions of the bourgeoisie and the state is most clearly revealed. As Panitch (1977, pp. 96-100) has argued, one of the central, and earliest, roles of the Canadian state was the encouragement of the private accumulation of capital [48]. Nowhere is this more clearly expressed than in the case of the development of the CPR.

The original contract between the Canadian government and the CPR is evidence enough; it is summarized by Glazebrook (1938, p. 226) as follows:

"The sections already built were to be handed over [free of charge] to the company, while others under contract ... were to be completed by the government [49]. The remainder was to be built by the company, and the whole was to be finished by 1891. Subsidies were to be ... \$25,000,000 and 25,000,000 acres of land, both payable in instalments on the completion of each twenty miles of line ... land not fit for settlement [in the railway belt] was to be replaced elsewhere. Land for the roadbed, shops, stations and so on was granted. Materials for original construction might be imported free of duty. The railway with its grounds and buildings, 'rolling stock and appurtenances' used for the construction and operation, and the capital of the company were to be forever free from any taxation. The land grants were not to be taxed for twenty years, unless sold or occupied in the meantime. For twenty years no railway should be authorized south of the Canadian Pacific, except a line running south-west, but such a line might not continue to within fifteen miles of the border. Finally, the company was empowered to issue \$25,000,000 in bonds secured upon the land granted. These bonds were to be held by the government, which might sell all but one-fifth and hand the proceeds to the company".

At this point one can do little better than repeat the question posed by Myers (1972, p. 266): "When had any Company, excepting the Hudson's Bay Company, been invested with such extraordinary privileges and powers, immunities and rights?" Yet this was by no means the whole story.

During the construction period in particular, although not solely during that period, the survival of the CPR was seriously threatened by shortage of funds. "One financial crisis succeeded another" (Glazebrook, 1938, p. 279) and the chief recourse of the company in such circumstances was to the state. Glazebrook's (ibid., p. 278) verdict is clear, "... the company would have failed time after time if it had not been carried over crises by public funds".

It is probably impossible to calculate the total value of the support proffered to the CPR, but some partial estimates have been made and are indicative of the magnitude. The land grant alone, by 1930, had yielded a surplus of approximately \$82,000,000, [50] and by no means all of the land had been sold at this stage [51]. It should also be noted that the majority of these sales occurred after 1900, with the advent of the "wheat boom".

Turning now to the loans, Morton (1963, p. 51) has estimated that these had reached a total of \$89,000,000 during the

construction period alone. Naylor (1975, Vol. 1, p. 278) has suggested a considerably higher figure of \$163,000,000 although by the year of 1888, of which "federal and provincial governments had contributed over \$150,000,000 and the municipalities another \$13,000,000". Naylor's estimate includes reference to the important point that it was not merely the federal but also the junior levels of the state which subsidised the CPR [52].

There were numerous examples of provincial and even municipal governments providing support for the CPR and, indeed many other railway projects (see Naylor, 1975, Vol. 1, pp. 278ff and Vol. 2, p. 109ff; see also Robin, 1972, for reference to British Columbia). Yet there is one case which is of particular interest for the present study and which it will pay to examine briefly. This concerns the extension of the CPR from its originally projected terminus at Port Moody to Vancouver.

It is not clear exactly when this decision was made, but by June of 1884, if not earlier, the CPR had entered into negotiations with the B.C. provincial government over the "terms" [53]. In August of that same year W. C. Van Horne, a vice president of the CPR, journeyed to Victoria in connection with the negotiations and was sufficiently confident of the outcome to announce publicly that "he thought it proper to say that it was the Company's intention to carry the road to Coal Harbour [Vancouver] or some point in that vicinity" (Victoria Times, Aug.

11th, 1884). Van Horne's confidence was well founded for in November an agreement was reached and signed in February of 1885 [54].

In return for extending the line to Vancouver the CPR received from the Provincial government approximately 6,000 acres of land, consisting primarily of D.L. 541 and D.L. 526. It was on the former that much of downtown Vancouver was subsequently built. The advantage gained by the CPR in this transaction is readily apparent, what is less clear is why the Provincial government should give the CPR a "bonus" for doing something that was in its own interest anyway [55].

Considerable light is shed upon this question when it is realised that concurrent with the negotiations between the CPR and the provincial government, there was another series of negotiations between the CPR and the "Coal Harbour Syndicate". Included in this syndicate were some of the leading members of the commercial bourgeoisie of Victoria such as D. Oppenheimer (later mayor of Vancouver). E. C. Baker and W. Powell. C. T. Dupont, and E. G. Prior [56]. The group was well connected containing members of both federal and provincial state apparatuses. Baker was M.P. for Victoria, which had enabled him to establish connections with the CPR (Brooks, 1976, pp. 31-32); Powell was a long time Superintendent of Indian Affairs for British Columbia and a "personal friend" of Sir John A.

MacDonald: also included was the Provincial Secretary, John Robson [57].

Powell and Openheimer had purchased land in the vicinity of Coal Harbour in a previous "anticipated boom [58], but it was in May 1884 before Van Horne's public announcement, that new purchases began. At that time 1000 acres of the Hastings Saw Mill property were purchased for \$75,000 and this was followed, "a few months later" by the purchase of "the remainder of the Hastings Mill property and other lands in the neighbourhood of Coal Harbour, for the sum of \$325,000, their purchases altogether aggregating \$400,000" (Victoria Times, Nov. 17th, 1885).

There followed protracted negotiations with the CPR which were successfully concluded in October 1885 [59]. In return for agreeing more precisely as to the location of its projected terminus the CPR received yet more land [60]. Article 4 of the agreement reads as follows,

"The lots forming part of the land hereby affected [D.L. 181, 185 and 196] ... shall be divided between the said parties of the first part [Syndicate] or such of them as shall be entitled to the same respectively, and the said Trustees [CPR], the said parties of the first part being entitled to two thirds of the said lots and the said Trustees to one third of all lots" [61].

Some years later, and in an expansive mood, John Robson reflected on his, and the provincial state's role in consumating these transactions. He noted that D. Oppenheimer had

"interested" him in the syndicate purchase, and continued,

"It has been charged of course that I was personally interested in the matter, but as a public man interested in the Province of B.C. it followed as a matter of course that I should evince an interest in anything which promised to work for the development of the Province. I was interested in a civic sense, I was interested in a Provincial sense, and I was also interested in a broader, even a national sense. I am not ashamed to admit these things, but rather pleased to have them cast against me [62], and as a public man I am not afraid to stand before any audience and say that I employed the most effective means in my power to bring that great national institution [the CPR] to its proper terminus. It has been charged that I was actuated by selfish motives, and that I was paid for such service, but such is not the case. I was a man with public duties to perform, and I was conscious that I was doing right" [63].

The relevance of the events just outlined to the subsequent process of urbanization scarcely requires further emphasis. Nonetheless it is important for this thesis that the events be situated in the context of the structural relationships involved and revealed in these events. To fail to take this step would be to leave the explanation at a superficial level and to subscribe, at least implicitly, to a "conspiracy theory". In order to achieve this it is necessary to recall some of the argument of preceding sections. The CPR was the creation of a segment of the dominant fractions of the Canadian bourgeoisie in a context of external dependence and internal opportunity. Taking the form of monopoly capital, the CPR conformed with external requirements and facilitated the dominance of the central Canadian bourgeoisie through the expanded social formation.

The CPR represented not just a means of transporting commodities but a new form of articulation of modes, and now, stages of modes of production. It was the vehicle through which surplus would flow from the periphery to the centre; it was a part of the process of uneven development, of spatial unevenness.

On approaching the West coast, a vital link in the imperial chain, the CPR encountered a regional bourgeoisie. This bourgeoisie, predominantly based in commercial capital, had its own separate, although not independent imperial linkages [64]. It also dominated the provincial state apparatus [65]. In those circumstances of potentially conflicting interests an accommodation developed. This accommodation between that part of the dominant fraction of the central Canadian bourgeoisie and a part of the dominant commercial fraction of the regional bourgeoisie has been described above.

As a result the development of Vancouver was conditioned by the determinant position of monopoly capital controlled in Central Canada. Yet the very arrival of the CPR constituted an opportunity for the development of a local bourgeoisie, whose origins were in commercial capital. This set of relationships was imposed on a small pre-existing settlement [66] comprised of industrial capital (capitalist mode of production - Hastings saw mill) articulated with petty commodity production and circulation at the adjacent Granville townsite.

The meaning and contradictory development of this complex articulation will be explained in Chapter 8. For the moment it will suffice to stress the pre-eminence of the CPR (monopoly capital) and note that its interests were by no means coincident with those of the local bourgeoisie; contradictions could develop even on the side of capital. These relationships are clearly revealed in the speech of R. B. Angus, a director of the CPR, to the Vancouver Board of Trade:

"It has been a matter of very great concern to the Board of Directors that there have not been very cordial relations between the City of Vancouver and the Company of late years ... It is quite a serious matter this one of taxation ... But as to the position the company occupies here we came to get those wharves; we came from Port Moody to get accommodation for our wharf project; do not interfere needlessly with these projects by putting an embargo on the business of the company at this most important point. There is no point on the whole railway that the Board of Directors take more interest in. They have looked on this city as one of their own creations, a child of the railway, and so capable of looking after itself - self-willed I was about to say - we find some difficulty dealing with it" [67].

Finally the penetration of Central Canadian monopoly capital (i.e., CPR) into the periphery served not only to confirm and contribute to this spatial unevenness, through the flow of surplus, but it helped to generate a new pattern of unevenness actually within the periphery. Urbanization was an important aspect of this process.

This has been partially grasped by Careless (1977, p. 128)

when he writes,

"Land lines gave value to the sea lanes for Vancouver. That fact was clearly evidenced by its rapid urban development after the CPR had reached its waterfront in 1886-7, as compared with the relative stagnation of New Westminster, the river port, and Victoria, the older island centre"

In other words there was a periphery within a periphery. But it is important to understand this relationship clearly and not in a fetishized way. It was the direct articulation of the local bourgeoisie in Vancouver with monopoly capital, as opposed to the indirect articulation of the local bourgeoisies of New Westminster and Victoria that permitted the more rapid growth of the former and the spatial extension of its local dominance. In other words the new spatial relations were an expression of a new articulation of class relations.

The discussion has concentrated on the impact of railway development in creating one small part of the Canadian periphery. It should not, however, be construed as being representative of the periphery as a whole. The precise consequences of railway development, the Intercolonial, Grand Trunk Pacific and Canadian National as well as the CPR, in the peripheralization process depended upon the pre-existing structure of the area affected. This is an extremely large topic and beyond the scope of this thesis. Nonetheless it is clear that railway development, as monopoly capital, after 1880 contributed towards the simultaneous creation of centre and periphery. Yet railways were not the only

contributors to this process, and it is to some of these other contributing forces that the discussion must now turn.

THE NATIONAL POLICY.

There is fairly general agreement that the National Policy was designed, in part at least, to promote industrial development within the Canadian social formation. Although "incidental protection" had existed prior to 1878 the policy inaugurated in that year involved a new structure and levels of tariffs that was clearly protectionist. In Mackintosh's (1964, p. 30) words, the legislation, "from a long term point of view represented a decision to promote industrialization in terms of a Canadian rather than a North American market". In terms of this thesis the "decision to promote industrialization" may be taken to mean the promotion of industrial production by capitalist means. This clearly raises the important question of the rise to internal dominance of the capitalist mode of production in the Canadian social formation.

Before embarking upon a discussion of this topic, however, it seems advisable to recall that the National Policy was not an isolated decision, but was taken in a particular context, some of the elements of which the preceding sections have attempted to analyse. Thus, for example, as Naylor (1975, Vol. 1, pp. 55-57) has pointed out, the National Policy involved revenue objectives which were related to the financing of railway development [68].

Furthermore the National Policy was involved in a general world conjuncture of depression, the "Great Depression", to which protectionism was a common response [69].

With this external context in mind attention may now be directed towards the internal structure of the Canadian social formation. Hence the relevant issue becomes that of the internal articulation of modes of production and more particularly the timing of the rise to dominance of the capitalist mode within this articulation.

This is a complex question and, it should be admitted at the outset, one to which no definitive answer is possible at this time. The reason for this lies both in the nature of the question itself and the nature of the information available. [70]. Dominance, in this instance, refers to the primacy of the capitalist mode in determining the manner of reproduction of the social formation as a whole. In terms of subordinate mode(s), i.e., petty commodity production, this would mean that the means of production and subsistence were either produced as commodities by the capitalist mode, or access to the same was subject to the structure of value generated by the capitalist mode. This clearly involves an expanded market for, and extraction of surplus by, the capitalist mode as a whole. Aside from everything else, including problems of appropriate data and the external dependence of the Canadian social formation, what is

involved here is a process of transition and, as such, is not reducible to a single point in time.

In spite of these difficulties it is necessary that some attempt at answering the question of the timing of the dominance of capitalist production be essayed. This will be done in terms of a variety of more or less indirect indices, not only economic, but political and ideological also. The latter two are deemed appropriate since the social formation is a structured and articulated whole, and hence, changes at one (e.g., economic) level may be expected to have consequences at other levels. These indices will be reviewed in a generally chronological manner.

Since the National Policy itself represented a policy favouring capitalist production, it could be argued that its implementation was itself a product of the dominance of productive capital. Clark (1939, pp. 6-7), for example, has argued that the Ontario Manufacturers Association, formed in 1875 (and which may be taken as a manifestation of the industrial bourgeoisie) played a key role in both lobbying for, and in determining the structure of, the National Policy [71]. Against this Naylor (1975, Vol. 1, pp. 35-44) has made two important points. Firstly that the attitude of the industrial bourgeoisie towards the National Policy was equivocal, and that on the whole "Reciprocity" was frequently a preferred option. Secondly the

National Policy was supported by, what have been termed the dominant fractions of the Canadian bourgeoisie, the banking and commercial bourgeoisie [72]. It seems reasonable to suggest, then, that the capitalist mode of production was not dominant at the inception of the National Policy.

Once in place, however, the national Policy undoubtedly contributed to a marked development of capitalist production, in the Maritimes as well as in Central Canada (Acheson, 1972). The National Policy was not the sole reason for this, since it was accompanied, until 1882, by the stimulus of both railway construction and a cyclical upswing. Something of the progress of capitalist manufacturing is revealed in Table 5:1.

Table 5:1

Employment in Manufactures, 1871 - 1891.

Year	PCP	CMP [73]	Total
1871	76,396 40.6%	111,546 59.4%	187,942 100%
1881	86,436 33.9%	168,499 66.1%	254,935 100%
1891	119,508 32.3%	250,087 67.7%	369,595 100%

PCP - Petty Commodity Production
CMP - Capitalist Mode of Production

Source: Census of Canada

For a number of reasons the data in Table 5:1 should be approached with some caution, and regarded therefore, as indicative only: they do not provide conclusive proof of the

dominance of the capitalist mode. Firstly there is what may be termed a "generalization" factor involved in the data presented. Computation and categorization was at the the national level for each sector of "manufacturers" [74]. Hence each entire sector was categorized as either capitalist or petty commodity production. This all or nothing procedure has certainly produced a degree of error in the data presented. The extent of the error is not known and considerably more research would be required to produce precise figures [75]. Secondly it must be remembered that Canada, at the end of the nineteenth century, was primarily a rural country, and productive activity was by no means restricted to "manufactures". Indeed if total employment is used as a criterion, then agriculture was considerably more important than "manufactures". This, together with the fact that agriculture was primarily carried out by petty commodity means, is clearly revealed in Table 5:2. As a final point with respect to the data presented here, it should be noted that the rise to dominance of the capitalist mode involves a complex set of relationships. As such it is not reducible to a simple plurality of one or even several indices: dominance does not equal a majority.

From the data presented below it seems clear that both capitalist and petty commodity production expanded considerably in Canada in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, with the former increasing in relative importance. As a tentative

Table 5:2

Employment in Agriculture, 1891 - 1911, in '000s

Employment	Region	1891	1901	1911
Total	Atlantic	133	122	111
Family		44	24	13
Paid		15	8	14

Total	Quebec	205	194	202
Family		72	57	34
Paid		15	17	33

Total	Ontario	331	303	301
Family		113	82	33
Paid		41	45	48

Total	Prairies	46	79	280
Family		11	20	22
Paid		6	12	49

Total	B.C.	8	10	24
Family		1	1	1
Paid		2	3	8

Total	Canada	723	708	918
Family		241	184	103
Paid		79	85	152

Family - Unpaid Family Labour
 Paid - Wage Labour

Adapted from:
 Urquhart & Buckley (1965, p.355)

hypothesis, at this stage, it may be suggested that the transition to dominance of the capitalist mode of production commences in the immediate post National Policy period.

Some support for this hypothesis is provided by Naylor (1975, Vol. 2, p. 230) when he argues that in 1882 Canada underwent its first capitalist crisis. He writes,

"For the first time [in 1882] in Canada's history it was haunted by the spectre of general overproduction and resultant industrial crisis, rather than just

the commercial crises or problems of periodic collapse of primary product prices as of old. From the excess capacity of the National Policy investments came pressure for Canadian autonomy to make its own commercial treaties, and by 1886 Canada was no longer automatically bound by British treaties".

Unfortunately Naylor does not provide any supporting data to sustain his argument on this point. Yet it was in the wake of this cyclical downturn that a Royal Commission was established to enquire into the relations between labour and capital [76]. This would seem to be a clear indication, at the political and ideological levels, of the growing importance of capitalist production and the contradictions engendered thereby.

If the capitalist mode of production was growing in relative strength, it would be logical to expect that this would have some repercussions in terms of the Canadian labour movement. Such indeed was the case as the 1880's witnessed some important innovations in the union movement, while socialist ideas also gained currency [77]. In 1881 the Knights of Labour, an omnibus union centered in the U.S.A. and a "pioneer of industrial unionism", entered Canada [78]. Two years later in 1883 the first steps were taken towards the establishment of a national trade union organization [79]. They were finally successful in 1886 when the Canadian Trades and Labour Congress achieved permanent form (Lipton, 1973, pp. 72-73).

In his study of the "Canadian Left" Penner (1977, pp. 30-31)

has summarized the period under consideration in a manner consonant with the position taken here. He writes,

"Thus it appears that one of the first expression of ideological independence within the labor [sic] movement comes from the recognition that the National Policy, far from expressing working class interest, assumed that this interest in wages, working conditions, and social measures must be subordinated to the more abstract values of a non-class character. This note of rejection of the National Policy and of its concomitant appeal to patriotism and nationalism is to be found with increasing frequency in the several labor periodicals which began to appear in the late seventies and early eighties".

In the light of these varied, but clearly related, occurrences it seems reasonable to conclude that in the 1880's the capitalist mode of production commenced its transition to dominance in the Canadian social formation. Or alternatively, and probably more correctly, it may be stated that there is a variety of evidence to support the hypothesis.

While the 1880's witnessed the beginning of this transition process and period, they did not see its end. In 1896 a new impetus was provided by the ending of the "Great Depression" and the start of a new long term secular upswing. This new conjuncture was expressed within the Canadian social formation first by a mining boom and later by a wheat boom (see Naylor, 1975, Vol. 1, pp. 10-15).

The former, centred primarily in British Columbia and

Ontario, was largely capitalist in structure and hence contributed directly to the growth of the capitalist mode of production. The impact of the latter was less direct. It involved a considerable expansion of agricultural production, but by petty commodity producers (see above Table 5:2). Yet thanks to the National Policy itself, together with the structure of freight rates, the net result was an expansion in the home market for capitalist producers: located primarily in Central Canada. In 1901 employment in capitalist organized "manufactures" reached 344,000 and by 1911 the figure was 515,203 [80].

It was at this same time, particularly in the first decade of the twentieth century, that the Canadian bourgeoisie embarked upon a programme of foreign investment directed towards the Caribbean and Latin American countries (Naylor, 1975, Vol. 2, ch. 16). This is a fairly good indication that Canada was becoming less a "centre in formation" and more a centre, albeit a minor one, that had been formed. The transition to an advanced capitalist social formation, that is with capitalist production internally dominant, may be said to be completed with the ending of the first World War.

Up to this point the discussion has concentrated upon the fact, and timing, of capitalist development, which has meant that questions of process have been ignored. This is an omission which must be rectified, particularly since the process itself,

the manner in which capitalist production became dominant had significant implications. The remainder of this discussion, then, will be concerned with two key aspects of the general process: foreign investment and monopoly capital.

Foreign capital investment in Canada was explicitly encouraged by the National Policy (Naylor, 1975, Vol. 1, p. 36). In a sense there was nothing new in this, since Canada had previously relied on British capital for the purposes of constructing the infrastructure. This early foreign investment had primarily taken the form of British portfolio investment, government bonds and fixed interest securities. As a result of this type of investment surplus had flowed out of Canada, but a high degree of economic ownership and possession had remained in Canada. The articulation of the British and Canadian social formations at the economic level was largely external.

What was new under the protective system of of the National Policy was the explicit encouragement of direct, and particularly American, investment [81]. The extent of this shift, further encouraged by the move towards imperial preference in 1897 [82], is revealed in Table 5:3. As can be seen there the encouragement of direct investment in no way signalled either the end of portfolio investment or the restriction of direct investment to American sources. Nonetheless the trend is clear: the growth of American and direct investment.

Table 5:3

Foreign Capital Invested in Canada, 1867 - 1913,
in millions \$Canadian

Source	Type	1867	1900	1913
U.K.	Direct		65	200
	Portfolio	185	1,000	2,618
	Total	185	1,065	2,818
U.S.A.	Direct	15	175	520
	Portfolio		30	315
	Total	15	205	855
Other	Direct			50
	Portfolio		35	147
	Total		35	197

Total Direct		15	240	770
Total Portfolio		185	1,065	3,080
Grand Total		200	1,305	3,850

Direct as % of Total		7.5	18.5	20.0
U.S.A. as % of Total		7.5	15.5	21.5

Source: Levitt (1970, p. 66).

The significance of this new trend was considerable. It encouraged, and was part of the process of the development of monopoly capital, especially in the USA. In Canada it marked the beginnings of "branch plant" development. Whereas prior to 1878 there was a total of 6 American branch plants in Canada, in 1879 alone a further 13 were established [83]. By 1887 there were already 48 such branch plants in Canada and by 1912 the total had reached "some 200 ... and the number was rising" (Wilkins, 1970, p. 141), rising, in fact to 453 in 1914 (Naylor, 1975, Vol. 2, p. 75).

While direct investment is not equivalent to monopoly capital, it nonetheless can represent an important step towards

the creation of monopoly capital. For direct investment clearly involves the separation of economic ownership and possession, and, moreover, economic ownership that extended beyond the social formation. In the Canadian case the growth of direct American investment marked the beginnings of structural change, both internal and external.

Prior to the period under consideration, Canada had been dependent upon the British social formation. Yet this dependence, at least at the economic level, had been external; it existed and was mediated by the Canadian commercial and banking bourgeoisie. With the growth of direct investment, the dependence became direct and internal. In other words the development of foreign ownership involved the penetration actually inside the Canadian social formation by an external bourgeoisie, primarily American. This involved the creation of a comprador bourgeoisie, a limitation on the power of the indigenous bourgeoisie and, in the long run, conditioned the reproduction of the social formation as a whole.

The significance of direct investment was in fact greater than the figures in Table 5:3 suggest. For the distribution of direct investment, economically or spatially, was neither random nor uniform. It was concentrated, after 1880, in resource industries in the periphery and in manufacturing in Central Canada [84]. This conformed with, and contributed to, the

developing pattern of spatial unevenness in Canada, with the periphery being restricted to the export of unprocessed or partially processed resources, albeit by capitalist means in this instance.

Moreover there was a tendency for American direct investment in the manufacturing sector to be concentrated in what were, at the time, the technologically advanced industries; i.e. those of the second industrial revolution which came to the fore with the economic upswing of 1896 (see Chapter 3). Wilkins (1970, pp. 141-2) provides a partial listing:

"In the electrical industry, Westinghouse was well established; in automobiles, Ford and General Motors had plants in Canada; in rubber, Goodyear and U.S. Rubber manufactured; in explosives, du Pont had manufacturing plants; in harvesting equipment, International Harvester had a large factory - and so it went" (This list is for 1912) [85].

This pattern, together with the Canadian patent laws, helped to generate a new layer of dependence in the Canadian social formation. The reliance upon "foreign" technology, research and development conducted by American companies, produced a form of ideological as well as economic dependence [86]. Naylor (1975, Vol. 2, pp. 56-57) comments,

"... it was in the new high technology industries of the second industrial revolution that the dependence [on U.S. innovations] grew to an absolute. In these industries, applied science was extremely important, and in this regard the Canadian educational system was an abysmal failure ... Until World War I, no industrial research was done in Canada".

MONOPOLY CAPITAL

There was a clear tendency towards the formation of monopoly capital in the Canadian social formation in the period following the inception of the National Policy. In part this has already been discussed in terms of railway development and the entry of direct foreign investment, but the tendency was much more widespread than represented by these categories. Bliss (1974, ch. 2) in writing on the "business history" of this period has characterized it as one of "flight from competition". This is an accurate characterization as long as it recognises that the flight was from a particular form of competition, i.e. price competition, and that this, in turn, was only possible for successful, i.e., competitive capitals. The tendency towards monopoly capital in no way eliminated competition from the capitalist mode of production, it merely transformed its form: the tendency towards monopoly capital was also expressed in terms of effects on competitive capital.

The full range of steps in the progression towards monopoly capital were present in Canada after 1880, from informal "gentlemen's agreements", to the formal agreements and associations, to cartels and outright mergers and 'take overs' (see Naylor, 1975, Vol. 2, chap. 14; Bliss, 1974, chap. 2)[87]. The tendency also covered each of the different forms of capital; industrial, commercial, and banking. Not surprisingly it was the less formal organizations, the easiest to establish and hence

most fragile, that were first to form and the most common. Employers associations existed in the 1860's (Bliss, 1974, p. 36) and by 1905 the Labour Gazette (pp. 279-288) listed 220 such organizations. Of such developments in Vancouver, to cite the relevant example, the Monetary Times (Sept. 26, 1903, p. 388) commented that,

"Vancouver B.C. employers are up with the spirit of the times, a spirit which has been forced on them! The employers of five hands and over have been combined into a very strong association... The retail merchants have also been combined ... the Ship Owners of Vancouver also combined ... Four newspaper publishers in the city also joined forces this week for protection (sic). There were previously combined the shingle manufacturers, the lumber manufacturers, the building manufacturers, box factories, the master plasterers and the master painters. All these different bodies are to affiliate with the Employer's Association".

Even this list is by no means complete. Mergers, with the exception of the railway companies (see above), were relatively unusual before the 1890's, although examples did occur. The first wave of consolidation occurred in the early 1890's and was followed by another commencing with the long term upswing in 1896, and a new and larger wave in 1907 (Acheson, 1972, p. 19; Naylor, 1975, Vol. 2, pp. 193-4). Such mergers were far more important in terms of the actual monopoly capitals.

With respect to commercial capital the mercantile association and cartel was the most frequent structure. A good example of this was the Dominion Wholesale Grocers Guild. Formed

initially in Ontario and Quebec in 1884, this mercantile cartel spread from coast to coast (Bliss, 1974, p. 33). Concerned with fixing prices these "wholesale merchants were able to assure their control over both producer and retailer by driving a wedge between them" (Naylor, 1975, Vol. 2, p. 163).

The retailing function during this period was carried on primarily at the petty commodity level or by small capital. This made joint action more difficult, although some trade associations did operate [88]. There were, however, two other types of development which should be noted. The 1890's saw the beginning, albeit slowly, of department or chain stores [89]. Secondly some of the larger industrial capitals were beginning to undertake their own marketing and retailing; an example of industrial capital absorbing and dominating part of commercial capital [90].

It would appear that mergers were of more importance for industrial capital, although the less formal structures were common. Naylor (1975, Vol. 2, ch. 14) provides examples of mergers covering a variety of different economic sectors, including textiles, agricultural implements, resource industries, food processing, iron and steel and consumer goods. It must be remembered, of course, that any given merger did not per se produce monopoly capital. Such a description would depend upon the nature of the merger and the structure of the industrial

sector concerned, nonetheless the occurrence of mergers does represent an important tendency towards monopoly capital.

The pattern of these mergers of industrial capital was twofold. The majority in the early period, before the merger wave of 1907, were purely "industrial" in nature. That is they were designed to improve the competitive position of the merging capitals, although this could be achieved by a variety of means short of the real integration of production. Other mergers were speculative in nature. Their purpose was financial and frequently involved the watering of stock (Naylor, 1975, Vol. 2, pp. 193-4).

It should be noted that banking capital on occasions played an important role in these mergers of industrial capital. They not only provided interim financing, important in facilitating mergers, but could actually instigate mergers. Thus of one merger in the cotton industry Naylor (1975, Vol. 2, pp. 168-9) remarks,

"Several banks, including the Federal, the Nova Scotia, and the Montreal had made heavy advances to some of the mills and insisted on cartelization and cutbacks as a precondition of further advances".

This was not an isolated instance and while it is not known how frequently it occurred it is an indication of the strength of banking capital [91].

There was, in fact, a marked tendency towards monopoly capital in banking capital although it was not uniform across the field. It was clear in terms of the banks themselves, but more ambiguous with respect to other financial intermediaries. The banks, however, occupied a preponderant position in the field in the nineteenth century, and in 1901 represented 53% of the total assets of all financial intermediaries [92].

The number of banks in Canada reached a peak of 51 in 1875, and declined thereafter to a total of 35 in 1901. During this period 7 new banks had been formed, 17 had failed and there had been 6 mergers (Neufeld, 1972, pp. 78-9). Yet these figures only partially reveal the tendency towards concentration. As Table 5:4 shows banking was in fact dominated, in terms of assets by a small number of banks, and the trend was increasing. Moreover the banks, with the formation of the Canadian Bankers Association in 1890, had moved towards eliminating price competition (control of interest rates) and the delimitation of geographic "spheres of

Table 5:4

Bank Concentration, 1880-1910: as % of Total Assets

Banks	1880	1890	1900	1910
2 Largest	34.6	27.3	29.7	30.5
7 Largest	47.4	46.4	51.0	56.4
All others	52.6 (37)	53.6 (34)	49.0 (29)	43.6 (23)

Figures in brackets (37) represent the number of banks

Source: Neufeld (1972, p. 99).

Table 5:5

Density of Chartered Bank Branches in Canada, 1868-1910.

Year	Total Branches	People per Branch (in 000's)
1868	123	28.9
1879	295	14.4
1890	426	11.3
1900	708	7.6
1910	2,367	3.0

Source: Neufeld (1972, p. 102).

influence" (Naylor, 1975, Vol. 1, pp. 77-78, 96). Competition took the form of the proliferation of the branch system (see table 5:5)

A good picture of the nature of concentration in Canadian banking, as well as the different structure of American banking, is given in a speech to the Canadian Bankers Association by its president [93] in 1901:

"If one visits a meeting of the American Bankers Association, nothing strikes one so much as the fact that it is practically a great convention; hundreds and sometimes thousands of bankers attend ... On the other hand ... the interest of banking in Canada, of our 36 banks with five or six hundred branches is represented by 40 or 50 men, and practically by 15 or 16 members of the executive Council. ... The consensus of the bankers of Canada upon any public question can be arrived at without difficulty. We have the great advantage of knowing without coming together, from the fact that we are acquainted with each other, and have often met to discuss subjects, what is the thought upon a public question. For that reason we exercise in this country a force that seems to be out of all proportion to our members. The opinion of the banking world of Canada becomes concentrated in the Executive Council, and therefore the consensus is easily arrived at. We cannot judge

of the importance of our annual meeting by the number present. In fact the importance is clearly in inverse ratio to the numbers" (cited in Naylor, Vol. 1, p. 77).

The concentration was also expressed in spatial form, of which the branch system was a primary manifestation and mechanism. Economic ownership was concentrated in Central Canada (Montreal and Toronto) and to a lesser extent in the Maritimes (Halifax), while the labour process extended into the periphery through the branch system. The structural importance of Central Canada was both reflected in and confirmed by the shift in headquarters, from Halifax to Montreal, by the leading Maritime banks in the first decade of the twentieth century (see Naylor, 1975, Vol. 1, p. 93). This spatial structure, together with the articulation of banking capital with the periphery, resulted in the flow of funds and surplus from the periphery to the centre.

There is reason to suggest that banking capital as a whole was in the process of becoming the dominant form of capital within the Canadian social formation at the turn of the century. If such was the case, and evidence will be presented shortly, then Canada may be said to have been approaching a structure of finance capitalism. The concept of finance capitalism has been a contentious one, and while it is not intended to review this debate here, it is necessary to clearly specify its usage [94].

This has been done by Thompson G. (1977, p. 247) in the

following terms,

" ... finance capital represents an articulated combination of commercial capital, industrial capital and banking capital, and furthermore within this articulation it is banking capital which dominates the other forms of capital. However, although banking capital is DOMINANT, it is not determinant within this articulation. In other words, that aspect of the circulation of social capital concerning the provision of funds for finance dominates the other aspects, but the determinant moment in the combination is occupied by the place of capital within the 'industrial' circuit".

Furthermore, following the work of Hussain, Thompson G. (ibid, p. 250) suggests the following minimum requirements for the existence of finance capital,

"this requires the existence of spectrum credit comprehensive such that every item of the means of production can be financed on credit. For this the minimum is as follows - (a) a market for financial assets; (b) centralization of finance [banking] capital and the existence of specialized financial organization; and (c) fiduciary and credit money".

With respect to these three points (b) has been discussed above and for (c) it may be noted that the majority of innovations in credit instruments occurred prior to 1900 (Neufeld, 1972, p. 476). Finally, point (a), Neufeld (1972, p. 495) has commented that the "two decades before the First World War saw rapid development of the stock exchanges, just as it saw rapid development of so many aspects of the other Canadian capital market".

This point is reiterated by Acheson (1972) in his study of

level of formal requirements. He notes (pp. 23-24),

"The increasing reliance on the stock market as a technique for promoting and securing the necessary financial support to develop the massive Nova Scotia steel companies, emphasized the growing shift from industrial to finance capitalism. Centered on the Montreal stock market the movement brought control of industrial corporations under men who had neither a communal nor a vocational interest in the concern".

The significance here is less Acheson's determination of finance capital, since his usage is undefined and almost certainly not that described above, than the relationship described. The latter part of this statement refers to this evolving pattern at the level of classes and conforms with some observations made by Naylor. These concern the extension, through the use of banking capital, of some parts of the dominant fractions of the Montreal bourgeoisie into industrial capital. Naylor (1975, Vol. 1, pp. 108-110) cites examples of the cotton, sugar and iron and steel industries where banking capital played a central role in facilitating not only mergers, but control exercised from Montreal by the pre-existing bourgeoisie. Thus while banking capital remained strongly oriented towards commerce [95], its impact on industrial capital was clearly expanding, and, moreover, was at the same time promoting the tendency towards monopoly capital in industry.

CONCLUSION.

This Chapter has attempted to analyse the developing structure of the Canadian social formation in the nineteenth century and to begin a consideration of the development of Vancouver by situating the origins of the latter in the context of the former. The Canadian social formation has been seen as conditioned by its articulation with both the U.K. and the U.S.A. social formations. These external linkages facilitated the internal dominance of a bourgeoisie situated in commercial and banking capital.

This bourgeoisie, under pressure of external events, achieved the conservative accomplishment of Confederation. This was no single event, however, but part of a process of the transformation of the social formation, albeit a transformation which exhibited features of continuity as well as change. Confederation opened the possibility for the expansion of the social formation to a continental scale. These possibilities were realized through the related policies of the purchase of Rupert's Land, the construction of the CPR, and the implementation of the National Policy.

These policies promoted the development of capitalist production in Canada, while continuing the dominance of the banking/commercial bourgeoisie. At the same time these policies produced a particular pattern of spatial unevenness focused on

central Canada and inaugurated the process of the development of monopoly capital. This was expressed initially in the form of the CPR itself, but effects were soon found in other sectors of the economy, most notably in banking.

The origins of Vancouver were conditioned most directly by the CPR. On reaching the Pacific coast this instrument of the central Canadian bourgeoisie reached an accommodation with the local bourgeoisie of Victoria and, to a lesser extent, New Westminster. This accommodation conditioned the development of a local bourgeoisie in Vancouver, grounded initially in real estate, while at the same time it gave the CPR a determinant position in the nascent city.

FOOTNOTES

[1] For a collection of Innis' writings see Innis (1956); for a recent critical assessment of his contribution to Canadian political economy, see Clement & Drache (1978).

[2] The monopoly dates from 1837, after which date private banks were prohibited from issuing notes. The existence of private banks was largely contingent upon the absence of chartered banks and "general financial facilities in small towns and villages". In large cities, such private banks as existed, were frequently inter-linked with the brokerage business (Neufeld, 1972, p. 166-7). In British Columbia the restriction on note issue was only enacted in 1865 (ibid., p. 168).

[3] The speaker was W.L. Mackenzie in the Colonial Advocate, Queenston, 1824; cited in Ryerson (1973, p.91).

[4] Absentee land ownership was most excessive in Prince Edward Island, where virtually the entire island had been alienated "mostly [to] absentees living in Great Britain" (Myers, 1972, p. 84). This was, however, only the most extreme example of a common feature (see Teeple, 1972).

[5] Clement (1975, p. 53) writes,

"Each bank was closely associated with the dominant power interest in its province (sic): the Bank of Montreal was controlled by the Chateau Clique ... the Bank of Commerce and Bank of Upper Canada were the Family Compact's response to the Bank of Montreal: the Halifax Banking Company (later the Bank of Nova Scotia) was the Maritimes answer".

On the West Coast the slower tempo and scale of development left the Family-Company-Compact (Ryerson, 1973, p. 405) dependent on imperial banks: the Bank of British Columbia and the Bank of British North America. The transition from colonial to responsible government, beginning in the 1840's, did little to change this structure (ibid, pp. 202-203). In the case of British Columbia, however, the failure of the bourgeoisie to develop its own banking institutions was subsequently to reduce it to dependence on the branch banking system controlled in Central Canada.

[6] The major exception to this pattern was the lumber industry of the Ottawa valley. Lower (1973, p. 176) writes,

"When Canada became a Dominion, the Ottawa valley, most conspicuous habitat of these men, was already firmly in their possession - a group of able and

energetic capitalists, independent of English or American financial support or technical skill".

[7] The generalization of commodity production is one of the characteristics of the capitalist mode of production - see chapter 2.


[8] Commercial capital exists in the sphere of the circulation of commodities as opposed to the productive sphere. This has been demonstrated diagrammatically by Thompson G. (1977, p. 241) by combining the circuits of productive and commercial capital. The former can be represented by:

$$M - C < \begin{matrix} MP \\ LP \end{matrix} \dots P \dots C' \dots M'$$

where M = money; C = commodity; MP = means of production; P = production process; LP = labour power; ' represents an increase in value.

and the latter by M - C - M'

The combined circuits are as follows where arrow represents exchanges:



It may be noted that productive capital is involved in circulation since it both buys and sells commodities as a prelude to and a consequence of production. Thus its circuit both

precedes (1 and 2) and succeeds (2 and 3) the sphere of circulation. Commercial capital (a and b), however, is restricted to circulation.

[9] It promotes the concentration of money wealth, and the expansion of commodity production through facilitating the process of exchange.

[10] Pentland (1950, pp. 464-465) has estimated that a total of approximately \$125 million of British capital had been invested in Canada by 1860, primarily for the development of transportation. Of this total only \$25 million is attributed to what Pentland terms the "canal period" ending in 1849.

[11] The total public debt was \$52 million in 1857, increasing from \$22 million in 1852. Of the new issue of some \$29 million in this project "over half ... was directly due to the Grand Trunk Railway demands" (Naylor, Vol. 1, p. 28).

[12] Some railway charters issued by Canadian Governments to sitting legislators during this period were:

- 1845 St. Lawrence & Atlantic Railroad Co. - A.T. Galt, P. McGill.
- 1847 New Brunswick & Nova Scotia Railway - A.N. McNab, J. Ross and four other members of the legislature.
- 1849 Montreal & Vermont Junction Railway - R. Jones, J. Young.
- 1850 Quebec and Richmond Railway Co. - L. Massuse, L. Methof, J.B. Forsyth and F.R. Angus.
- 1850 Quebec & St. Andres Railroad Co. - J.B. Forsyth.
- 1851 Montreal & Kingston Railway - J. Young, G. Hoffatt, A.N. Morin, L.H. Holton, A.T. Galt, G.E. Cartier and I. Gould.
- 1852 Grand Trunk Railway - A.T. Galt, P. McGill, G. Pemberton, G.E. Cartier and L.H. Holton.
- 1853 Dalhousie & Thorold Railway - J.A. McDonald, W.H. Merritt.
- 1853 London & Sarnia Railway - J. Young and A.N. McNab.
- 1853 Hamilton & Port Dover Railway - A.N. McNab.
- 1854 Quebec & Saquenay Railway - P.J.O. Chauveau.
- 1855 Hamilton & South Western Railway - J. Young and A.N. McNab.
- 1856 Canadian South Western Railway Co. - W. Cayley, H.H. Cameron, J. Robinson and other members..
- 1857 Strathay & Port Frank Railway - M. Cameron.

Source: Clement, 1975, Appendix 1.

[13] Naylor's 1972 work is more theoretical than his 1975 two volume study. The former can be seen as the theoretical forward for the latter, in which it is embodied in rich empirical context. Unfortunately this has been achieved at the expense of theoretical and conceptual clarity. The result is an

important if somewhat chaotic work. In addition, or perhaps in consequence, there is a tendency to obscure structural relationships behind a cloud of individual or collective venality and stupidity. As a result Hann's comments directed at the 1972 work, seem more applicable. "The conquering heroes of the Laurentian epic", Hann (1975, p. 2) notes, "have been transformed into inept mercantile clowns frittering away our national destiny".

[14] Foner (1955, p. 11) has commented, "The ending of slavery by the Civil War assured the establishment of industrial capitalism as the dominant economic system throughout the country".

[15] Following the failure of Overend, Gurney in 1866.

[16] Province of Canada bonds which had descended as low as 71 promptly rose to 92 on publication of the terms of Confederation in London (Naylor, 1975, Vol. 1, p. 33).

[17] In 1858 the Association for the Promotion of Canadian Industry was founded. Although the Association soon disappeared (with the tariff changes of 1859) it represented "... the first attempt on the part of Canadian manufacturers to express themselves collectively, and reflected the new forces of industrial capitalism which accompanied the development of manufacturing with the railway building of the fifties" (Clark, 1939, p. 1).

[18] See Ryerson (1973 ch. 12 & 13) for a survey of capitalist development in this period.

[19] Lower (1932, p. 46) observes,

"By 1850 farmers no longer to any extent went into the woods as entrepreneurs; in fact, the crown lands were no longer open to all comers, but the system of timber limits had arrived. The operators were for the most part substantial men, managing many camps and bringing down many rafts. They could talk to the Quebec merchants on equal terms and they were much more conversant with conditions of the market than a small amateur could be".

Although Lower does not use the concepts, this seems clearly to refer to a transition from petty commodity production to capitalist production. Moreover the description is suggestive of the (at least potential) contradiction between the industrial and commercial bourgeoisie. See also Harris and Warkentin (1974, p. 199).

[20] The transition was facilitated by the growing importance of "deals" as opposed to "square" timber (see Lower, 1973, pp. 159-179). The Ottawa valley became the leading centre for the capitalist production in the lumber industry, but there appears to have been considerable regional variation as the following data suggest:

	New Brunswick	Nova Scotia
Nos. of Sawmills	565	1144
Nos. of employees	7434	2858

Source: Census of Canada.

If these data are accepted as accurate then it would appear that sawmilling in Nova Scotia was carried out on a petty commodity basis.

[21] In part this was attributable to the continued expansion of the agricultural frontier in the United States, but also to the relative lack of development of capitalist production in Canada. For a discussion of emigration from the Atlantic region, see Warkentin (in Harris & Warkentin, 1974, p. 188).

[22] See Lipton (1973, pp. 16-25) and Langdon (1975). Significantly the 1850's saw the beginnings of international unionism in Canada. The British Amalgamated Society of Engineers entered in 1853, to be followed in 1859 by the International Moulders Union from the U.S.A. (Langdon, 1975, pp. 8-9). This has been seen as a reflection of, and a reaction to, the external dominance of the Canadian social formation at the ideological as well as the economic level (see Kuczynski, 1972, Vol. 2, p.66).

[23] The full list of categories used was as follows: agriculture, commercial, domestic industrial, professional, not classified, and reflects better the "purpose" of the classification, which was certainly not to differentiate between modes of production.

[24] In 1851 according to occupational categories, agriculture totalled 165,000, industrial, commercial and professional 101,000, and not classified 148,500. Even assuming all of the industrial, commercial and professional could be assumed to be capitalist, an entirely unreasonable assumption, the importance of agriculture to the argument remains.

[25] Such "sentiments" were not uniform throughout society, but then the decision to establish Confederation and the form that it took were not "popular" decisions. Popular referring

here to decisions taken by the "people" or society as a whole. The shape and form of Confederation was "determined" by the pre-existing power structure. Indeed Morton, (1963, p. 320) has commented that "it was most doubtful whether a popular vote would [have] ratified the Resolutions". Indeed without much more information than they had, it was certain that the voters in New Brunswick and Nova Scotia at least would repudiate the plan their governments had accepted.

[26] It must be remembered that in 1867 direct taxation was the "least preferred" method of raising revenue.

[27] The following is a list of Canadian financial intermediaries, by date of appearance:

- 1809 Fire & Casualty Insurance Companies.
- 1817 Chartered Banks.
- 1844 Terminating Building Societies.
- 1847 Life Insurance Companies.
- 1855 Permanent Building Societies, or Mortgage Loan Societies.
- 1866 Government Note Issue.
- 1867 Federal Government Post Office Savings Bank.
- 1870 Government Insurance & Pension Account.
- 1874 Trusteed Pension Plans.
- 1882 Trust Companies.
- 1900 Caisse Populaire & Credit Unions.
- 1901 Closed End Investment Trusts.

Source: Neufeld (1972, Table 2:1).

Neufeld (1972, p. 35) lists dates of establishment of financial intermediaries in Canada - the sphere of banking capital. Banking capital it must be remembered is not restricted to the capital of banks, but refers rather to loanable capital (see Thompson G., 1977).

[28] Morton (1963, p. 320) is here referring to the Quebec Resolution, but these, largely unchanged, form the basis of Confederation. Thus the state created in 1867 was not a fully developed liberal democratic, or bourgeois, state (see Therborn, 1977). This was not achieved until 1922 when universal adult suffrage was adopted (see Ward, 1950, ch. 12, for a history of the franchise in Canada).

[29] This should not be taken to imply that spatial unevenness did not exist before Confederation. The point to be noted is that in the pre-Confederation period external linkages occupied a position of primary importance - the colonies were largely isolated from one another. After Confederation the external articulation remained but it was mediated, to an

important degree, by an internal structure, at the political level, which in itself promoted uneven development.

Thus the Government of British Columbia complained that federal expenditures in the province up to 1901, were considerably less than the revenues raised; the former being almost \$29,000,000 while the latter exceed \$42,000,000 (BCSP, 1901, p. 568). Also the "lands and resources" of the Prairie Provinces remained at the disposition of the federal government until 1930. For a discussion of the policies relating to this issue, see Morton (1963).

[30] In so far as their implementation affected the whole social formation these were indeed "national decisions". On the other hand they were not decisions made by the nation as a whole: they were class decisions, rooted in the class structure of Canada and the course of the class struggle. Also Mackintosh (1964, p. 21) comments that they were "decisions looking toward economic integration within a national economy". The important point, however, is the form that this integration took. On this point Mackintosh is less helpful although he does provide much useful information.

[31] The purchase was finally completed on 15 July 1870, having been delayed for six months by the first Riel rebellion. In return for surrendering its rights the Hudson's Bay Company received 300,000 in cash, plus 50,000 acres around the various trading posts, and, in addition, two sections in every township, making a reservation of one twentieth of the entire region in the fertile belt from the Red River to the Rocky Mountains. (Myers, 1972, pp. 145-146). By 1930, approximately 4 million of the 6.6 million acres had been sold by the Company for a total return of almost \$60 million (Martin, 1973, pp. 26-27).

[32] A group of American "capitalists" had in fact approached the Hudson's Bay Company in 1866 "as to possible arrangements of purchase" of the Company's lands, which proved a decided stimulus to further activity" by Canadians (Innis, 1923, pp. 44-45).

[33] Such a development was entirely consonant with imperial requirements, at least, that is to say with the requirements of that portion of the British bourgeoisie concerned with Canadian linkages. In fact the Hudson's Bay Company had been restructured in 1863 coming under the control of banking capital and a part of a much larger design. "The purchase of the Hudson's Bay Company in 1863 by the International Financial Society, a London investment banking firm, had as its objective the reorganization of the Grand Trunk Railway on a transcontinental basis". (Naylor, 1975, Vol. 2, p. 235). This early precursor of financial capital (see below) had the "far eastern trade" as its objective (ibid.).

[34] Indeed it is doubtful if the full story is yet known. Access to Company records has thus far been restricted to Company eulogists (McDougall, J. L. CANADIAN PACIFIC, Montreal, McGill U.P. 1968) and commercial myth makers (Berton, P; THE NATIONAL DREAM, Toronto, McClelland & Stewart).

[35] Innis (1923, p. 276) states that in 1883 90,000 out of 550,000 shares were held in Britain. In 1921 the distribution was:-

U.K.	47.8%	U.S.A.	24.10%	Canada	17.73%
France	3.04%	Other	7.33%		

The shares in British hands were distributed among a large number of shareholders: the 47.8% of shares held in U.K. were held by 62.88% of the total shareholders. On the "possibilities" of British Columbia as a point of "convergence along the All Red Line" and its potential as a "greater Britain on the Pacific", see Gosnell (1908).

[36] On November 7th at Craigellachie (Innis, 1923, p. 128).

[37] Some construction had taken place in the interim between 1873 and 1880, but the pace was modest and it was undertaken by the government. This was a function of both the economic circumstances and the change in government following the "Pacific Scandal". For details see Glazebrook (1938 ch. 8) and Innis (1923, ch. 2). A trough in 1879, was followed by a peak in 1882 and the cycle was completed in 1885. For a discussion of business cycles in Canada for the relevant time period, see Chambers (1964) and Hay (1966).

[38] The CPR had in fact paid dividends from its inception:

"To August 1893, 3 per dividends were paid from a deposit of \$15,942,645 made by the company with the government in accordance with an agreement under the Loan Act, and were not therefore paid from the immediate earnings of the company. To provide for the payment of dividends after the exhaustion of the deposit at that date, a reserve fund was started" (Innis, 1923, p. 282).

The actual dividends paid were:-

1884-89	3%	1897-98	4%
1890-93	5%	1899-1902	5%
1894	2.5%	1903	5.5%
1895	1.5%	1903-06	6%
1896	2%		

Source: (ibid., p. 283). For details on receipts, see ibid. (ch. 9).

[39] Donald Smith had been a wintering partner (i.e., Canadian, or resident in Canada) partner in the Hudson's Bay Company. It was while, in England in 1870, representing the claims of the wintering partners "to a share of the proceeds of the Company's territory to Canada in 1869 [that] he proceeded to take advantage of the rumors that the sale of land to Canada had greatly weakened the Company's position, and bought a majority of the company's stock at a very low price" (Innis, 1923, p. 97n). Donald Smith was also appointed a director of the Bank of Montreal in 1873 (Myers, 1972, p. 298).

[40] Glazebrook (1938, p. 286) reached a similar conclusion, "Companies, large and small, were adding to their mileage [in the 1870's]; but already the tendency was for the absorption of the smaller by the larger".

[41] It may be noted that while the Grand Trunk and the CPR were both heavily dependent on foreign capital, in the case of the Grand Trunk, unlike the CPR, a significant degree of economic ownership and control (see chapter 3) were retained abroad. "At the same time [as the Grand Trunk Reorganization Act, 1862] the control of the company was further transferred to England by making the London office a principal one concurrently with that in Montreal, and permitting general meetings to be held in London" (Glazebrook, 1938, p. 185).

[42] The CPR had, in fact, a "western" monopoly clause written into its contract. This was surrendered in 1888, partly as a result of pressure from Manitoba (presumably the local commercial capital and petty bourgeoisie), but also as a mechanism for justifying a further government loan of \$15,000,000. The results of this "concession" are recorded by Glazebrook (1938, p. 309):

"The Northern Pacific [a U.S.A. company] built a number of lines in Manitoba, but instead of conducting a rate war with the CPR divided the traffic with that company. Continuing complaints from the west led to a series of inquiries into freight rates".

Avoidance of price competition is, of course, a normal tactic of monopoly capital.

[43] See Glazebrook (1938, p. 292) for a list.

[44] This was largely handled internally by the CPR, as one of its departments, although part of this was hived off to the CPR controlled Canadian North West Land Co. This appears to have been a not entirely successful attempt to raise additional, and much needed capital (see Myers, 1972, pp. 271-3; Martin, 1973,

p. 81: and, Innis 1923, pp. 104, 107). The company was, however, resurrected in a reorganized form subsequent to the economic upturn of 1896 and the advent of a "land boom" on the Prairie in 1902-3 (Naylor, 1975, Vol. 1, p. 275; Vol. 2, p. 10).

[45] See Robin (1972, p. 19) and Chodos (1973, p. 64). The latter notes that the initial purchase of the smelter was part of the take over of the Columbia and Western Railway (citing CPR Annual Report), but the motive was undoubtedly commercial. Thus T.G. Shaughnessy, then vice president of the CPR, commented that the company,

"was not going into the smelting business to make money out of it. The company realized that in order to make the lower grade ores abounding in the Trail district profitable it would be necessary to afford miners cheaper transportation and smelting rates, and smelting would therefore be provided at cost" (cited in Church, 1961, pp. 185-186).

[46] In Vancouver in 1901, for example, the CPR management apparatus included: a general superintendent of the Pacific Division, an executive agent, a local treasurer, a chief engineer, a townsite agent, a freight agent, a ticket agent, an auditor, a telegraph manager, a ship's husband for CP steamships, and an agent for the Dominion Express Company, see Henderson's British Columbia Gazetteer and Directory for 1901.

[47] The Tory or Conservative Party, the dominant party in the post-Confederation period had its origins in "... the bosom of the Montreal business establishment" (Panitch, 1977, p. 94).

[48] Panitch (1977, p. 96) has described this role in the following manner:

"In terms of the capital accumulation function, the Canadian state has generally undertaken four main tasks. It has provided a favourable fiscal and monetary climate for economic growth via private enterprise. It has underwritten the private risks of production at public expense through grants, subsidies, fast write-offs, depreciation allowances, etc. (Confederation itself was produced by the desire to facilitate capital accumulation by guaranteeing loans from London to build the railways). It has played a crucial role, via control of land policy and immigration policy, in creating a capitalist labour market, and especially in recent decades in absorbing the social costs of production of capitalist enterprise, through sanitation services, medicare, unemployment

insurance, educational facilities. And it has directly provided the technical infrastructure for capitalist development when this was too risky or costly for private capital to undertake for itself".

[49] Over 700 miles was built by the government (Myers, 1972, p. 267).

[50] Martin (1973, p. 83). The figure includes the yield from lands granted to railways subsequently taken over by the CPR; approximately 7.6 million acres in the Prairies alone (ibid., pp. 56-7).

[51] In 1926 the CPR still owned approximately 3.5 million acres of the "main line" grant. Of the original land grant 6.7 million acres had reverted to the government in 1886 in the process of resolving a "periodic" crisis (Martin, 1973, pp. 49 & 86).

[52] Since Martin's figures appear to refer only to Federal support this may well account for the discrepancy between his estimate and that of Naylor.

[53] W. C. Van Horne to William Smithe (June 14th, 1884) contains the first specific mention of the extension to Coal Harbour (Vancouver). There had, however, been previous communications and a letter of May 23rd, 1884 contains a reference to a prior visit to Montreal by Smithe and a meeting with Van Horne in which the general topic was discussed (see Correspondence Relative to the terminus of the Canadian Pacific Railway, in BCSP, 1885). Brooks suggests that the decision to abandon Port Moody as the site for the Pacific terminus was taken by 1882, if not earlier (see Brooks, 1976a, pp. 133 & 185-188, and Morley, 1974, p. 78).

[54] See Correspondence Relative to the Terminus of the Canadian Pacific Railway. The agreement was passed by the provincial Legislature in Feb. 21, 1885 by a vote of 16 to 7, see Victoria Times (Feb. 21st, 1885).

[55] Neither the site of Port Moody, nor the harbour were particularly suitable for the needs of a terminus and important link in the "all red route"; see Robin (1972, p. 63) for example.

[56] See Brooks (1976b, p. 33) for a more extensive listing.

[57] On Robson's involvement, see Victoria Times (Sep. 9th, 1884), and also the report of a speech by Robson at a banquet honouring the retirement of D. Oppenheimer of Vancouver (Matthews, 1934, p. 56, Mss at VPA). On Powell, see Crmsby

(1971, p. 227). On Baker and the overall importance of inside information, see Brooks (1976a, pp. 195-200).

[58] This had occurred in 1877 and Sanford Fleming has recorded that "this Burrard Inlet mania ... is a huge land job in which the minister and his friends are involved" (cited in Glazebrook, 1938, p. 259). Powell had purchased D.L. 182 and 183, and Oppenheimer part of D.L. 185, see New Westminster District Assessment Roll, 1879, in PABC.

[59] See Register of Absolute Fees, Vol. 10, pp. 52-53, New Westminster Land Registry. Application was made on 12 Oct. 1885 and the agreement was registered on Nov. 17th.

[60] See clause 10 of the agreement as published in the Victoria Times (Nov. 18th, 1885).

[61] The "Short Description" of the lands involved as recorded in the Register of Absolute Fees reads, "A strip of land 200 feet wide across the following lands - viz. Lot No. 181, the East Part of Lot 196 and portions of the westerly 85 acres of 196 and Lot 185 and one third of the remainder thereof"; see also Victoria Times (Nov. 18th, 1885).

Macdonald N. (1977, p. 11) has estimated that the CPR in fact did not receive its full one third of the lots; see also Map 19.

[62] Needless to say not all of the commercial bourgeoisie of Victoria were in favour of the Coal Harbour developments or the land grants. On the one hand their dominance of the province could be threatened, and on the other, the land market had been cornered. Something of the situation at the time is conveyed in a letter written by D. Oppenheimer to I. W. Powell on July 20th, 1885:

"The items you object to were contracted and paid for at the time the Agreement for the extension of the Main line of the CPR to Coal Harbour and English Bay between our Local [i.e., provincial] Government and the C.P.R. syndicate was hanging in the balance at the Hall of our Legislature and the passage of same was Life or Death to us. You know the result and what it cost me. You also know that all our local papers took issue with us and I had to give some patronage" (Powell Correspondence, PABC).

[63] Matthews (1934, p. 56).

[64] On the early development of the commercial bourgeoisie in British Columbia and its pattern of external linkages, see

Reid (1976), and Careless (1969, 1972 & 1977).

[65] Panitch (1977, p. 93) has argued,

"The dominant classes, or rather class fractions, in the provinces, often unable to constitute a unity with their counterparts, either through political parties or in economic coalitions, have used the provincial state to express their interests". It should be remembered, however, that the power of the provincial state exists, in a relationship of tension with the federal state, which in the late nineteenth century, it has been argued was markedly centralized. In such a context conflict and contradiction were not uncommon, as witnessed by the disallowance of provincial legislation by the federal government. Underlying these contradictions at the state, or political, level were divergent class interests".

[66] For the early history, i.e., pre CPR, of the Vancouver area, see Morley (1974): Green (1947): Howay (1937a, 1937b, 1940): and, Boutilier (1940).

[67] See VBT, General Minutes (Oct. 19th, 1897). The local bourgeoisie duly accommodated to the CPR view of things and By Law no. 313 was introduced. This was approved by the electorate for money By-Laws by a margin of 523 to 315 (VNA, Oct. 14th, 1898).

[68] Naylor (1975, Vol. 1, p. 57) suggests that the CPR was the major beneficiary: he states that "Revenues from the tariff would accrue to the CPR syndicate composed of George Stephen, Donald Smith, R. B. Angus, and other members of the Montreal commercial community, where pressure for the tariff and campaign support were instrumental in producing the National Policy". Naylor has omitted the growing importance of banking capital, both structurally, and in this particular conjuncture. Mackintosh (1964, p. 33) also links the protective tariff to the settlement and transportation policy.

[69] See, for example, Bukharin (1972, pp. 76-79). He dates the onset of protectionism in various countries as follows - Russia 1877, Spain, 1877, Austria-Hungary 1878, Germany 1879, France 1882, USA 1883, and comments (ibid, p. 77) "There is not the slightest doubt that we have before us a general tendency towards protecting the national economies' by a high tariff wall".

[70] The question asked is, of course, a product of the concepts utilized, hence the lack of research on this precise

topic is not surprising, given the limited amount of historical research completed using the concepts formulated in this thesis. Outside of the conceptual framework of historical materialism, the problematic of the dominance of the capitalist mode of production in Canada scarcely exists, or does so only in a distorted form.

[71] This interpretation would appear to have been shared by some members of the Canadian Manufacturers Association (name changed in 1887); see "The Canadian Manufacturers Association", in INDUSTRIAL CANADA, Vol. 2, No. 4, Nov. 1901, pp. 81-82.

[72] Naylor recognises only the commercial bourgeoisie: see above note p. Also the National Policy operated in the interests of the dominant fraction; facilitating both the financing of railway development, and financial take-overs and mergers of industrial capital through one assured market - see below p.

[73] Capitalist production in this Table is defined as the employment of five or more people per establishment, this being an appropriate cut-off point for indicating when the extraction of surplus value becomes the predominant source of income for the owner of the establishment. Establishments employing less than five persons are categorized as petty commodity production.

In 1901 the census includes information only on establishments employing five or more persons, thus employment on petty commodity production is not available. Employment in capitalist manufactures increased to 344,035 in that year.

[74] In 1871 there was a total of 109 sectors (42 PCP, 67 CMP), in 1881 this increased to 122 (38 PCP, 84 CMP) and in 1891 reached a total of 163 (49 PCP, 114 CMP).

[75] As an interim check, the 1891 figures were recomputed on a Provincial level. The results obtained were PCP 33.2%, CMP 66.8% which suggests that Table 5:1 underestimates slightly the magnitude of the CMP. The Provincial figures reveal a considerable variation in the importance of the CMP. The full data for 1881 are:

Employment in Manufactures by Province, 1881

Province	PCP		CMP		Total
	No.	%	No.	%	
P.E.I.	3,213	55.7	2,554	44.3	5,767
N.S.	11,982	58.2	8,408	41.8	20,390
N.B.	5,404	27.1	14,518	72.9	19,922
Quebec	22,028	25.7	63,645	74.3	85,673
Ontario	43,772	37.1	74,536	62.9	118,038
Manitoba	656	34.1	1,265	65.9	1,921
B.C.	782	27.2	2,089	72.8	2,871
N.W.T.	39	47.0	44	53.0	83
Canada	84,876	33.2	170,059	66.8	254,935

Source: Census of Canada

[76] Kealey has produced an abridged version of the report. In his introduction Kealey (1973, p. ix) comments that,

"The Macdonald government initially responded to the rapid growth of industrialism and to the rise of vocal labour reformers with a series of investigations. Studies of manufacturing were commissioned in 1882 and again in 1885. The first reported shock and indignation at child labour, the employment of women and inadequate sanitary and safety facilities. The second, largely a eulogy to Macdonald's National Policy of high protective tariff's, demonstrated dramatically the rapid growth of factory production in Canada. Factory acts were introduced at nearly every session of the federal parliament in the eighties to control the worst excesses of modern industry, but no legislation was enacted".

[77] The best example of socialist ideas in Canada is "THE POLITICS OF LABOUR" by T. Phillips Thompson, first published in 1887. Thompson was considerably influenced by the writings of Marx. Other "radical" thinkers had a significant impact on the Canadian ideological landscape, most notably Henry George and Edward Bellamy. These latter "ideas" achieved organizational form in terms of Single Tax organizations and Nationalist (i.e., nationalization) association (see Robin, 1968, pp. 23-33). For a description of working class movements in Europe during this time period, see Abendroth (1972).

[78] See Lipton (1973, pp. 68-72); Robin (1968, p. 20). By 1884 the Knights of Labour had reached British Columbia and two

years later there were 600 members in Vancouver alone (Robin, 1968, pp. 21-25). British and American models and ideas were of considerable importance in the development of the Canadian Labour Movement. This reflected both the origins of the working population and the structural dependence of the social formation as a whole: "... just as the main bourgeois political culture of Canadian society reflects the impact of Britain and the United States, so did the development of the Canadian working class and its political outlook" (Penner, 1977, p. 24).

[79] There had been a prior attempt at a national organization in the form of the Canadian Labour Union in 1873. This appears, however, to have been largely confined to Ontario and it disappeared in 1878 (see Lipton, 1973, pp. 35ff, Robin, 1968, p. 17).

[80] Of these 471,126 were classified as wage earners and 44,077 as salaried, see Census of Canada, 1911 (Vol. 3, pp. 210-211).

[81] To the attractions of a protected market were added bonuses and subsidies from all levels of government (Wilkins, 1970, p. 143). Wilkins, somewhat incredulously, cites one example of this,

"An American promoter who had interests in iron ore and timber resources in Western Ontario and who planned to make steel rails successfully lobbied for a clause in the Dominion Railway Act of 1900 which stipulated that every railroad receiving national subsidies must use rails 'made in Canada', if they could be obtained 'upon terms as favourable as other rails can be obtained.' American controlled companies in Canada would make the rails!" (ibid.).

Finally the structure of Canadian patent laws provided a further inducement (see Naylor 1975, Vol. 2, ch. 10; Scheinberg 1973; and, Bliss 1974).

[82] Whereas the National Policy offered protected access to the Canadian market for foreign owned companies situated in Canada, the move towards imperial preference promised a privileged access to the British Empire market. The latter was a key factor in prompting the entry of Ford into Canada (see Wilkins, 1970, pp. 142-143).

[83] The source of these figures is H. Marshall et al (1936): Canadian-American Industry, cited in Naylor (1975, Vol. 2, p. 72). These figures, together with those in Table 5:3 show that while the National Policy was not solely responsible for this new trend, which may be seen as part of the developing

world conjuncture, but it greatly accelerated its impact in Canada.

[84] Wilkins (1970, p. 110) and Lewis (1938, pp. 575-612) provide data on a sectoral basis for American investment in Canada. Paterson (1976, Tables 3.4 and 3.5) shows the distribution of British direct investment in Canada by sector and by province. In 1900 64.7% of such investments were in mining and 56.4% in British Columbia. British Columbia ranked above all other provinces as the location for British investment throughout the period 1890 - 1914: land and finance were the leading sectors in 1890 and 1895 respectively.

[85] See also lists for 1902 included in Lewis (1938, pp. 596-7). Although the pattern had become more pronounced by 1912, it undoubtedly existed before that. Early examples listed by Wilkins include, Bell Telephone Company of Canada, "initially controlled by American Bell Telephone Company"; Windsor and Hamilton Powder Mills, which in 1876 "became part of the American powder trust group of companies"; and Imperial Oil, in which Standard Oil purchased a 75% interest in 1898 (Wilkins, 1970, pp. 50-51, 61-62, & 140).

[86] The history of the Canadian General Electric (CGE) provides an interesting example of the importance of "foreign" control of technology. Established in 1892 as part of a consolidation that created the General Electric Co. in the USA, the CGE was directly, though not wholly, owned by the parent company. The Canadian shareholders, however, retained an option to purchase the stock of CGE, which they subsequently exercised so that by 1905 CGE was "entirely Canadian" owned. Yet CGE was not really an independent company. The overall organization of CGE is described by Wilkins as follows,

"... one in which General Electric would be the center, and then there would be foreign satellite companies, with exclusive rights, patents, agencies. General Electric would restrict British Thomson-Houston to sales in England and not allow it to sell elsewhere ... General Electric became the residual legatee of everybody's exclusive rights ... [and] thus could effectively say, 'You can't sell in a particular territory because we hold the patents - your patents too - and have granted them to others'" (Wilkins, 1970, pp. 93-95).

This reflects both the flexibility of American monopoly capital and the complexity of its articulation with the Canadian social formation.

[87] This statement should not be interpreted in an

evolutionist sense. It in no way implies that every monopoly capital began as a gentleman's agreement amongst a series of small individual capitals and proceeded through a series of stages until becoming an integrated monopoly capital. Many capitals involved in internal agreements remained at that stage and monopoly capital could be formed outright e.g., CPR. What is intended here is to convey the recognition that there was a tendency for individual capitals to increase in size, but this was accompanied by and, in part, the same results were achieved by the co-ordination of otherwise separate capitals. In other words the tendency towards concentration took many forms, some more secure than others.

[88] See Bliss (1974, pp. 36-37): and, Naylor (1975, Vol. 2, p. 167).

[89] For example, Simpson's and Eaton's, (Bliss, 1974, p. 37). The Hudson's Bay Co. was also in the process of transforming itself from a fur trading company into a wholesaling company. It was in 1902 that Woodwards was incorporated in Vancouver as a result of a merger of three businesses.

[90] See Braverman (1974, pp. 262-3): Wilkins (1970, pp. 38ff) for the pioneering example of the Singer Company in the USA. In Canada, Imperial Oil, for example, operated a system of agents, see Henderson's British Columbia Directory and Gazetteer for 1901.

[91] Acheson cites an attempt by the Bank of Montreal to produce a merger in the cotton industry in the Maritimes in 1890. He writes (1972, p. 17),

"At this point two events occurred almost simultaneously. Parks refused to consider sale of the St. John Mill to the new corporation, and the Bank of Montreal, having ascertained that the Montreal syndicate would buy the mills from any seller, demanded immediate payment in full of the outstanding debts of the company [\$122,000 owed to the Bank of Montreal] - a most unusual procedure".

In this case, however, the pressure was successful. See also Naylor (1975, Vol.1, pp. 107-110).

[92] The figures had been as high as 75.1% in 1869, and slipped below 50% between 1889 and 1898; for full data see Neufeld (1972, pp. 614-619). In addition individual banks were "closely associated" with individual trust companies (Bank of Montreal - Royal Trust, Royal Bank - Montreal Trust, Bank of Commerce - National Trust), which represented a small but growing sector of financial intermediaries (see Neufeld, 1972, p. 295:

Naylor, 1975, Vol. 1, p. 100).

[93] Sir Edmund Walker, also President of the Bank of Commerce.

[94] For a review of different "classical" interpretations and their application to Canada, see Niosi (1977). It should be pointed out that Niosi denies the existence of finance capitalism in Canada, but his criterion for such an assessment rests upon the lack of industrial shares held by banks i.e., there was no direct control of industrial corporations by banks as majority shareholders. This criterion is markedly different from the one used in this thesis, in which banking capital is not restricted to the capital of banks and control is seen as being exercised by "indirect" or less obvious mechanisms. The approach in this thesis is structural whereas that of Niosi seems restricted to the empirical level. This, of course, is not to deny the validity of Niosi's empirical findings, but rather to insist that they be situated.

[95] Naylor (1975, Vol. 1, p. 110) comments that, "Their [the banks] primary function began and remained that of financing commodity movements".

CHAPTER 6

THE INTEGRATION OF VANCOUVER INTO THE GLOBAL ECONOMY OF THE
LATE NINETEENTH CENTURY.

"Here now is the chance for Foreign Capital to step in and by the formation of prospecting and locating companies in the mining centre of Vancouver to reap a bountiful harvest". (Oppenheimer, 1889, p. 9).

The previous Chapter has outlined the basic context within which Vancouver developed, and viewed the city's origins through the lens of the Canadian social formation. Now it is necessary to both sharpen the focus and invert the field of vision: to examine the processes through which Vancouver was integrated into the external world. To present the view from Vancouver.

This is undertaken through the medium of company formation in Vancouver, which provides an indication of the role of external capital and control in the development of the city. Particular attention is directed towards the pattern of these external linkages and their probable internal consequences. The same approach also makes possible a consideration of the mechanisms through which a hinterland to Vancouver was created as well as its spatial form. Finally, the emergent patterns of spatial unevenness mediated through Vancouver are linked with the broader temporal rhythms of the late nineteenth century.

TEMPORAL UNEVENNESS IN VANCOUVER

The question of temporal patterns is an important one and represents a logical starting point for this analysis. In

Chapter 3 the period of Vancouver's early development was characterized by the movement from long term depression into a long term boom. The 1880's and early 1890's were marked by the "long depression", with a long term upswing commencing around 1896. This long term movement, though, occurred in conjunction with shorter term fluctuations. What, then, was the impact, if any, of this temporal unevenness within Vancouver; and how, or more precisely when, did the city grow?

The question thus becomes one of finding a suitable index of this process. It might be argued that the growth of population

Table 6:1

Population of Vancouver, 1886-1901[1]

Year	(A) Population	(B) % Change
1886	1,000	---
1887	5,000	+500
1888	8,500	+ 70
1889	10,500	+ 24
1890	12,000	+ 20
1891	13,685	+ 14
1892	15,000	+ 10
1893	16,000	+ 7
1894	17,000	+ 6
1895	17,862	+ 5
1896	19,000	+ 6
1897	20,000	+ 5
1898	22,000	+ 10
1899	24,000	+ 9
1900	24,750	+ 3
1901	26,133	+ 5

Column (B) represents the percentage increase in a given year, with the preceding year as 100%.

Source: VBT, Annual Report, 1901-1902, p. 80.

would be a suitable measure. Certainly reasonably reliable data, anchored by the decennial census are available and shown in Table 6:1. While these data are interesting and, discounting the early years of rapid growth, are suggestive of more rapid growth in 1898, population is far too crude an indicator for the question at issue.

In terms of this thesis it is clear that some index of the rate of accumulation, or the formation of new capital is required. Such data are, of course, not available and the nearest substitute for which data exist on any broad and consistent scale is that concerning company formation. Although far from ideal such data should give some indication of the formation of at least new capital [2]. The data are presented in Table 6:2

Table 6:2

Annual New Company Registrations in Vancouver, 1886-1901

Year	(A) All Companies	(E) Operating Companies
1886	7	5
1887	5	4
1888	5	5
1889	11	7
1890	42	32
1891	24	16
1892	26	20
1893	33	21
1894	30	15
1895	36	25
1896	64	44
1897	138	77
1898	62	44
1899	52	35
1900	46	35
1901	62	44

Source: Company Records

Within the context of the present argument it is column B of this Table which is of the greatest significance and therefore it is necessary to provide the criteria for defining a company as "operating". Wherever possible data on paid up capital have been utilized and a minimum figure of \$1,000 established as a cut off point. Unfortunately for many companies, especially mining companies, such data are not available. In such cases a listing of the company in the Vancouver city directory was deemed to be an adequate indicator. Furthermore a search was made of the Annual Reports of the Minister of Mines for information pertaining to the operation of mining companies. It is probable that some operating companies have escaped this investigative net, but there is reason to suggest that they were few in number and slight in importance [3].

The pattern revealed by Table 6:2 column B is fairly clear. However, it should be remembered that it is the trend rather than the absolute numbers that is important, since the level of company registration would be expected to increase with the size of the city.

The year 1890 stands out as a clear peak of activity, only to be followed by a marked though irregular downturn which reached its nadir in 1894. Recovery began in 1895 and was well underway the following year. The data suggest a spectacular peak in 1897, but this, in part, is misleading. There was undoubtedly

a tremendous boom in mining activity, but much of it was purely speculative in nature. Indeed such was the extent of speculation and over-capitalization that a new and somewhat more stringent Company Act was introduced in the course of that year [4]. How far the apparent downturn in activity in 1898 is attributable to the new legislation is uncertain, but Table 6:2 suggests that this downturn continued through 1900, to be followed by an upturn in 1901. To these figures may be added a number of railway companies which were established by Private Acts and which involved Vancouver residents, entirely or in part. There were ten such companies formed and which operated in some sense of that word, although two of these failed in the construction stage and were subsequently dissolved. The formation of these railway companies complemented the pattern already described in that six were formed between 1890 and 1893 and the remainder between 1897 and 1901.

Further confirmation of this temporal pattern is contained in Table 6:3. This has been culled from the pages of the B.C. Gazette, although only for the years 1890 - 1901. The data are for assignments of businesses and refer primarily to individual enterprises, partnerships and non-limited companies. As such the data include businesses that could be designated as falling within the petty commodity mode. Nonetheless the pattern is very much the same, although, referring as it does to business failures, it takes the form of the mirror image of Table 6:2. In

this case the data suggest that 1893 was as bad as 1894, and that 1898 was as good as the previous year. Apart from these minor differences, however, the pattern that emerges from the two sets of data are remarkably similar.

Table 6:3

Annual Occurrence of Business Assignments in Vancouver, 1890-1901

Year	Number	Year	Number
1890	4	1896	9
1891	2	1897	5
1892	3	1898	4
1893	13	1899	9
1894	12	1900	13
1895	8	1901	11

Source: B.C. Gazette, 1890-1901.

Yet it should be noted that many of the companies in Table 6:2, while they were controlled in Vancouver, albeit to a limited extent in the case of extra-provincial companies, in fact operated outside the city. The extent of this will be considered in more detail subsequently. It is the contention here that the external operation of companies controlled in Vancouver still contributed to the growth of the city via the flow of profits into the city and the creation of employment directly and indirectly [5].

Finally, lest there should be any doubt about the existence of the 1890's depression, it may be stated that its existence was perfectly apparent to contemporary observers. Thus the Vancouver Daily World, in its summary of Vancouver's first decade,

commented that 1893 marked, "the beginning of a considerable trade depression, whence in the year of grace, 1896, we are happily emerging, gradually but surely" (VDW, souvenir edition, Jun. 29th, 1896).

SPATIAL INTEGRATION

Any discussion of the development of Vancouver and its integration into and within external structures must inevitably begin with the CPR. The initial parameters of this relationship have already been indicated in Chapter 5. There it was argued that the development of Vancouver, at least from its incorporation as a city in 1886, was determined by its direct articulation with the monopoly capital controlled in Central Canada, viz. the CPR. The CPR created a pattern, not merely of physical, but also of structural linkages; a pattern of external, albeit contradictory domination. From the beginning the CPR created a segment of the local bourgeoisie, in the form of its local management corps, which was concerned with the extraction of surplus, the use of which was determined elsewhere. It is also important to remember that the CPR was not merely a railway company. It also consisted of, or was interested in, shipping, the Hotel Vancouver, an express company, an opera house, a portland cement plant, a telegraph system, and most important of all in the early years, real estate [6]. Furthermore the leading members of the local management were involved in the direction of a number of other companies. H.B. Abbott (general

superintendent pacific division), J.M. Browning (land commissioner) and W.F. Salsbury (local treasurer) served, between them and at various times, on the boards of 28 companies registered in Vancouver. How far their achievement of such positions was directly or indirectly attributable to their relationship with the CPR is unclear and worthy of further research, but the likelihood that no such correspondence existed is extremely limited and such positions may reasonably be regarded as an effect of the CPR [7].

Although it has been argued that the CPR was the determinant force in Vancouver's early development and that it established a pattern of external dominance or control, the city should not be thought of as a "company" town, at least in the narrow sense of the term [8]. Something of the broader pattern as it developed in the years before 1901 is indicated in Table 6:4.

Before commenting upon the pattern that emerges from Table 6:4 it is necessary to consider some of its empirical limitations. One problem concerns the use of local residents as the means of articulating external control. This question has already been raised with respect to the local management of the CPR, but in the present context it exists on a broader scale since it encompasses local managers of banks and finance companies. In the majority of cases (20 out of 37), however, where these people appear as company directors, the companies

Table 6:4

Annual Formation of Operating Companies with Offices Registered in Vancouver, 1886-1901

Year	A	B	C	D	E
1886	1	3	1	4	-3
1887	0	1	3	1	+2
1888	1	3	1	4	-3
1889	0	3	4 ^a	3	+1
1890	6 (1)	10	16	16 (1)	0
1891	3 (2)	4 (1)	9	7 (3)	+2 (-1)
1892	5 (1)	6	9	11 (1)	-2 (-3)
1893	3 (1)	4	14	7 (1)	+7 (+6)
1894	1	5	9	6	+3
1895	0	10	15	10	+5
1896	4	18	20	22	-1
1897	16 (2)	25	38	41 (2)	-3 (-5)
1898	25	8	10	33	-23
1899	10	15 (1)	10	25 (1)	-15 (-16)
1900	10	10	15	20	-5
1901	7	14 (1)	23	21 (1)	+2 (+1)

A: Companies with Head Offices outside British Columbia

B: Companies with Directors resident outside Vancouver

C: Companies with All Directors Resident in Vancouver

D: Totals columns A + B

E: Totals column C minus column D

Figures in brackets (1) refer to Railway Companies established by Private Act.

Source: as for Table 6:2

fall into column C anyway. In the remaining cases, even if all were assumed to be acting as representatives rather than in their own right it would not substantially alter the overall pattern suggested by Table 6:4.

Secondly, there is cause to suggest that column C, representing the extent of local control, is an overestimate. In part this stems from the procedures adopted in calculating this

figure. A negative identification criterion was utilised in terms of identifying directors from Vancouver. In other words, unless evidence was available to indicate an external residence then residence in Vancouver was assumed. A final point concerns the designation of extra-provincial companies as non-operating. Further research in the localities of registration might produce some modifications in the classification; but once again this would not appear likely to modify the overall pattern [9].

The data suggest three major points. Firstly, that in the initial boom external control tended to predominate, although in an uneven manner, and until 1890 this control was exercised through directorships. A change is apparent in 1893, which suggests that the depression was a consequence of a lack of new external investment [10]. The third point that emerges is that the late nineties boom was to a large extent fuelled by and controlled by external capital, external to Vancouver that is.

It should be remembered, of course, that the data refer to the number of companies or capitals involved and says nothing of the size of the capitals. While attempts at quantification at this level would be largely spurious, owing to gaps in the records, there is evidence to suggest that the larger companies were those which involved external control, in one of the two forms suggested in Table 6:4.

The argument may be pursued a stage further by enquiring into the spatial origins of external control, together with the different types of capital involved - productive, commercial or money. There were four major locations of control external to Vancouver; U.K., U.S.A., Central Canada and the remainder of British Columbia. The first two of these reflect the structural location of the Canadian social formation in the world economy, whilst the third corresponds with the internal structure of the Canadian social formation. The fourth and last indicates the pattern of linkages within British Columbia which contributed to the development of Vancouver and the creation of the city's hinterland. The findings with respect to these various categories are presented in Tables 6:5 to 6:8.

A number of points emerge from the data presented in Table 6:5. The first of these concerns a preference by British capital for the exercise of its control through the retention of the head office in the U.K.. In part this reflects the fact that for some of these companies only a small part of their activities were located in Vancouver or the province as a whole. This was certainly the case for a number of insurance companies such as the Yorkshire Guarantee and Securities Corporation Ltd. (1890) and the Scottish Temperance Life Assurance Co. Ltd. (1891), but the number of such companies was relatively few. This pattern was in fact typical of British direct investment in Canada as a whole. It would seem to reflect a desire to retain strict and

Table 6:5

Annual Formation of Operating Companies with Head Offices in U.K., Plus Those with Directors Resident in U.K. - by Type of Capital.

Year	(A)	(B)	(C)	(D)	(E)	(F)	Total
	Prod Dir:HO.	Min Dir:HO.	Trans Dir:HO.	Com Dir:HO.	Mon Dir:HO.	M/C Dir:HO.	
1886	:	:	:	:	: 1	:	1
1887	:	:	:	:	:	:	0
1888	: 1	:	(1):	:	:	:	1(1)
1889	:	:	:	:	:	:	0
1890	:	: 1	:	: 2	: 3	:	6
1891	: 1	:	:	(1):	: 1	:	2(1)
1892	: 1	:	:	:	: 1	:	2
1893	:	:	:	:	: 1	:	1
1894	:	:	:	:	:	:	0
1895	:	:	:	:	:	:	0
1896	1 : 1	: 2	:	:	1 :	:	5
1897	:	: 12	: 1	:	:	:	13
1898	: 4	: 11	:	1 :	: 1	: 1	18
1899	1 :	: 3	: 1	:	:	: 1	6
1900	1 : 1	: 4	:	: 1	:	:	7
1901	: 1	: 1	:	:	:	1 :	3
totals	3 : 10	0 : 34	1 : 2	2 : 3	1 : 8	1 : 2	
grand total	13	34	3	5	9	3	67

Prod - Productive; Min - Mining; Trans - Transport; Com - Commercial; Mon - Money; C/M - Commercial/Money; Dir - Directors; HO. - Head Office.

Figures in brackets (1) indicate companies where U.K. directors were appointed in years subsequent to the formation of the company. In both cases in this Table the appointments were made after 1896.

Source: as for Table 6:2

centralized control of such investments, but at the same time it has been regarded as one of the causes of the long run failure of such investments (Paterson, 1976, p. 112).

It is also clear from Table 6:5 that the type of British investment varied over time. In the early period there was a marked concentration of money and commercial capital (columns D - F), as opposed to productive capital (columns A - C). This consisted of insurance companies already mentioned, together with finance and real estate companies such as the Vancouver Land and Securities Corporation Ltd. (1890), the Vancouver City Land Co. Ltd. (1890) and the Northern Counties Investment Trust Co. Ltd. [11]. This emphasis reflects the early reliance of the local bourgeoisie in Vancouver on British capital in the promotion and development of real estate [12]. The only important exception to this was the Anglo-British Columbia Packing Co. Ltd. Formed in 1891 by the take over of nine canneries, this company not only marked the entry of British capital into salmon packing, but also the first step towards the concentration of capital in the industry [13].

In the period beginning in 1896 British investment appears not only to have increased but changed in type. Money and commercial capital was outweighed by productive capital in general, and investment in mining in particular; the latter represented by a total of 27 companies. This again conforms with the overall pattern of British direct investment in Canada in this time period. Paterson (1976, pp. 50 & 52) has shown that in 1900 64.7% of such British investment was directed towards British Columbia and 56.4% towards mining [14].

In terms of the present thesis the important point is that all of this investment in mining (productive capital) was external to Vancouver, but that it was, to some limited extent, controlled in Vancouver [15]. This same pattern emerges when the remainder of British investment in productive capital is considered. Of these companies five were involved in canning and one was a timber company. The productive aspects of the operations of these companies were located outside the city [16]. In only one instance, the Vancouver Engineering Works Ltd., was British capital involved in developing the productive base of the city itself [17], and even in this case it represented the take over of an existing establishment [18].

This pattern of taking over existing established companies also occurred in another sector of productive investment, that of transportation. British capital rescued and restored the badly under-capitalized street railway system. This operated both within Vancouver and linked Vancouver with the neighbouring city of New Westminster. The British Columbia Electric Railway Co. Ltd. (BCER) took over the Consolidated Railway Co. in 1897 and was probably the most important British investment in Vancouver [19]. The street railway system had had an extremely erratic history and was now placed on a sound financial footing for the first time. It should be emphasized that the importance of the BCER to Vancouver was not simply internal. It also helped to link Vancouver to, and so helped create, the city's immediate

hinterland, not merely to New Westminster but eventually into the Fraser Valley [20]. British capital also took over the telephone system in Vancouver with the formation of the British Columbia Telephones Ltd.. Once again the local management was in Vancouver whilst the company operated well beyond the city. In this case, however, the company was not a success since it was dissolved in 1905 [21]. Nonetheless British capital played an important role in securing the infrastructure not only for Vancouver, but also in the creation of a hinterland.

In conclusion it seems clear that British capital played an important role in the development of Vancouver and in guiding the form of that development. Much of the capital that was invested in Vancouver itself was in the form of commercial and money capital, which undoubtedly contributed towards the development of the city as the commercial and financial center of the province.

Although the majority of British investment in productive capital, as identified here, was not located in Vancouver it was, so to speak, channeled through Vancouver. In other words British capital invested in mining, and to a lesser extent canning, did not contribute significantly to the productive base of the city, but it did create a locus, albeit subsidiary in international terms, of managerial control. At the same time there was also significant British investment in the infrastructure necessary to facilitate the very operation of this control. British capital,

in other words, contributed towards the spatial concentration of a particular facet of the social division of labour in Vancouver: management and the ancilliary mental labour, an important relationship in terms of the class structure of the city.

As a final point, there is some evidence to suggest that personal contacts played an important role in this process. The case of Henry Bell-Irving and the Anglo-British Columbia Packing Co. Ltd. has already been noted [22]. Nor was this an isolated instance, although no systematic research has been carried out on this question. Nonetheless some further examples may be cited;

"J.J. Banfield of [Vancouver] British Columbia, an insurance and financial agent, promoted several companies in the Liverpool area for investment in real estate and mortgages by journeying to England and personally drumming up support" [23].

This appears to refer to a time after the strict limits of this thesis, since in the period 1898-1901 Banfield was interested only in mining companies, none of which had ostensible links with British capital. The relationship is revealing, however, and it was not an isolated case. Thus Campbell Sweeny records that in 1895 the union steamship company was in financial difficulties and that the Bank of B.C. refused to give G.T. Legg, a director of the former, "time to go to England, and get his friends there to put up money" [24]. Significantly Legg subsequently served as the Vancouver representative for three British registered finance companies [25].

One final example may be cited as indicative of this type of relationship. This concerns Edward Mahon, a leading member of the Vancouver bourgeoisie and a financial and mining broker. In the case of two companies both he and a J.F. Mahon, recorded as a resident of the U.K., both appear on the board of directors [26]. The evidence here is at best only indicative, but it does suggest an important type of relationship and one worthy of further research [27].

A rather different pattern emerges when the other major source of non-canadian capital and control operating in Vancouver is considered, that emanating from the U.S.A.. Here some cautionary remarks with respect to the data are required, in addition to the general limitations previously discussed.

There is reason to suggest that Table 6:6 underestimates the entry of American capital into Vancouver and through Vancouver into the province. On the other hand it is extremely difficult to assess the size of error involved; all that can be indicated are the potential sources of error together with some potential additions. The chief causes of error concern the inadequacy of the historical record taken together with the criteria chosen to indicate American capital and control; location of head office and residence of directors. While there is little difficulty with the first criterion, in the case of the second there are a number of companies where a large U.S.A. shareholding is not




Table 6:6

Annual Formation of Operating Companies with Head Offices in U.S.A., Plus Companies with Directors Resident in U.S.A. - by Type of Capital.

Year	(A)	(B)	(C)	(D)	(E)	(F)	Total
	Prod Dir:HO.	Min Dir:HO.	Trans Dir:HO.	Com Dir:HO.	P/C Dir:HO.	Mon Dir:HO.	
1886	:	:	:	:	:	:	0
1887	:	:	:	:	:	:	0
1888	:	:	:	:	:	:	0
1889	:	:	:	:	:	:	0
1890	1 :	:	:	:	:	:	1
1891	:	:	:	:	:	:	0
1892	:	1 :	:	:	:	1 :	2
1893	:	:	1 :	1 :	:	:	2
1894	1 :	2 :	:	:	:	:	3
1895	:	1(1) :	:	:	(1) :	:	1(2)
1896	2 :	2(1) :	:	:	:	1 :	4(1)
1897	:	1(1) :	:	:	:	:	1(1)
1898	:	1 :	2 :	:	1 :	:	4
1899	:	:	1 :	:	:	:	1
1900	1 :	3 :	:	:	:	:	4
1901	1 :	1 :	:	:	:	:	3
<hr/>							
totals	6 : 1	13 : 4	1 : 0	1 : 0	2 : 0	1 : 0	
<hr/>							
grand total	7	17	1	1	2	1	29

Prod - Productive; Min - Mining; Trans - Transport; Com - Commercial; Mon - Money; E/C - Productive/Commercial; Dir - Directors HO. - Head Office.

Figures in brackets (1) indicate companies where U.S.A. directors were appointed in years subsequent to the formation of the company. In both case in this Table the appointments were made after 1897.

Source: as for Table 6:2

reflected in terms of U.S.A. directors. One mining company is known to fall in this category, as more importantly, did the Hastings Saw Mill Co. Ltd. [28]. This company was formed in 1887 to take over the existing mill and formed an important part of

the local economy. At the same time approximately two thirds of the shares were held in the U.S.A. [29]. The Hastings Saw Mill Co. Ltd. was, in turn, taken over by the B.C. Mills Timber and Trading Co. Ltd., as part of a regional concentration in the lumber industry in 1890. Since the new company was a private company it has been impossible to determine if U.S.A. capital continued to be involved; certainly none of the known directors was American.

Another important company in which American involvement is less certain is the B.C. Sugar Refining Co. Ltd. (BCSR). Once again there were no American directors and information on shareholdings has not survived, but a local bank manager has recorded that in 1890 B.T. Rogers, subsequently manager and president of the company was "in Vancouver with a view to putting up a sugar refinery with \$150,000. Mr. Hammeyers of New York to be interested" [30].

Finally, there were three railway companies which were initially established by Private Act, and involving Vancouver residents, which were taken over and operated by the Great Northern Railway or one of its subsidiaries. In only two of these cases, however, did this occur in the time period under consideration here. These companies certainly involved considerable capital, but it would appear that they were no longer controlled through Vancouver [31].

With these limitations in mind it is now possible to turn to the data in Table 6:6 and the pattern that emerges therefrom. It will be seen that in certain respects the aforementioned "additions" conform with the pattern apparent in the data in the table.

Perhaps the most striking feature of Table 6:6 is the contrast with the data presented in Table 6:5. The first point to note is the relatively small representation of American capital, with fewer than half the number of companies involved. Nor is there much evidence to suggest that American capital came in larger units. In fact the opposite appears to be nearer the mark. The largest known paid up capital of a company with American involvement was only \$150,000, although the aforementioned uncertainty with respect to the BCSR should be borne in mind [32].

Unlike British capital, American capital seems clearly to have favoured registration of companies in British Columbia, as opposed to "home" registrations. This conforms with the "branch plant" type of investment and has been seen as contributing to the long run success of American capital by providing a more flexible mode of control, together with tariff advantages. However, in the time period under consideration here, American capital does not appear to have been notably successful, although the limitations of the data must qualify this remark.

In terms of the type of capital involved there is also a contrast between Tables 6:5 and 6:6. The American capital entering and passing through Vancouver was almost exclusively productive. Only three of twenty eight companies do not fall into this category [33]. Mining clearly predominates but there was also some American interest in the lumber industry (3 companies) and manufacturing. These figures would increase if the "additions" noted above were included, and so further confirm the pattern that emerges from Table 6:6.

In at least one respect, and an important one for this thesis, there was a distinct similarity between the British and American capital. This similarity consisted of the fact that much of the latter, like the former, although controlled to some extent in Vancouver, did not operate there. This is obvious enough in the case of mining companies, which was the predominant form of American investment through Vancouver. But this characteristic was not limited only to mining companies. There is evidence that the lumber companies did not operate in the city [34], and even the plant of the Automatic Can Co. of B.C. was located in New Westminster and not in Vancouver [35].

In sum then, the entry of American capital may be seen as contributing towards a similar pattern of development as has already been described for British capital. Notwithstanding some important differences between the two, American capital also

contributed towards the development of Vancouver as a commercial, financial and managerial centre. The only question mark in terms of this conclusion concerns the unresolved issue of the involvement of American capital in two major productive enterprises located largely within the city; the sugar refinery and the saw milling complex of the BCMTT.

Thus far the discussion has concerned the entry of foreign capital and control; the direct articulation between the city of Vancouver and the U.K. and U.S.A. social formations. It is now necessary to consider a further source of external domination, but in this instance one located within the Canadian social formation. As has been argued in the previous Chapter such a source emanated from the bourgeoisie of Central Canada. The data representing the entry of Central Canadian capital and control into and through Vancouver are presented in Table 6:7.

Once again it is necessary to begin with some qualifications before embarking upon a substantive analysis. The first point must be to reiterate the importance of the CPR to Vancouver, and record that the company does not appear in Table 6:7. A more serious omission concerns the absence of Central Canadian banks. They were extremely important institutions and, by 1901, exercised a nearly complete monopoly on banking in Vancouver. Yet as they were not required to register provincially they do not appear in Table 6:7. Their importance, however, merits a

Table 6:7

Annual Formation of Operating Companies with Head Offices in Ontario & Quebec, Plus Companies with Directors Resident in Ontario & Quebec - by Type of Capital

Year	(A)	(B)	(C)	(D)	(E)	Total
	Prod Dir:HO.	Min Dir:HO.	P/C Dir:HO.	Com Dir:HO.	Mon Dir:HO.	
1886	(1) :	:	:	:	:	(1)
1887	:	:	:	:	:	0
1888	:	:	:	:	:	0
1889	:	:	:	:	:	0
1890	:	:	:	:	:	0
1891	:	:	:	:	1	1
1892	:	:	:	:	2	2
1893	:	:	:	:	:	1
1894	1	:	:	:	1	2
1895	:	3(1) :	1 :	:	:	4(1)
1896	:	3 :	:	:	1	4
1897	:	6(2) :	:	:	1	7(2)
1898	:	1 :	1 :	:	6	8
1899	1 : 1	3 :	1 :	:	2	8
1900	1 : 2	1 :	:	:	2	6
1901	1 : 2	:	:	2 :	3	8
totals	4 : 5	21 : 1	2 : 0	2 : 0	0 : 20	
grand total	9	22	2	2	20	55

Prod - Productive; Min - Mining; Com - Commercial; Mon - Money;
P/C - Productive/Commercial; Dir - Directors HO. - Head Office.

Figures in brackets (1) indicate companies where Ontario & Quebec directors were appointed in years subsequent to the formation of the company. In all cases in this Table the appointments were made after 1897.

Source: as for Table 6:2

separate treatment and this will be delayed until after analysis of the data in Table 6:7. For the moment it will suffice to say that their existence conforms with the major patterns that emerge from that data.

The extent of Central Canadian involvement in and through Vancouver, in terms of the number of companies, was considerably greater than that of American capital and roughly equivalent to that of British capital. There are indications, particularly if the CPR and the banks are included, that a more precise measure of the quantity of capital would favour Central Canada [36].

If the extent of British and Central Canadian involvement was of roughly the same order, its timing was somewhat different. The entry of Central Canadian capital does not show the same cyclical pattern as British capital. In part this is a reflection of the lack of involvement in the early period; no companies before 1891, and only four by 1893 (CPR and banks excluded). In that year a total of twelve British companies had "entered" Vancouver. This late start was compensated for, however, in the latter half of the decade, with an upturn becoming marked by 1897 [37].

In terms of the type of capital involved the pattern that emerges from Table 6:7 clearly reflects the structure of the Canadian social formation as analysed in Chapter 5., and provides some further confirmation of the validity of that analysis. The importance of money capital is readily apparent and was comprised largely of insurance, mortgage and loan companies, many of substantial size. Also it should be remembered that Table 6:7 does not include the Central Canadian banks. In fairness,

however, it must be recorded that there is a tendency for over-representation in column (E). This is a consequence of some duplications following upon the concentration of capital among these companies during the late 1890's.

At the same time productive capital, in a different way, is also over-represented. Column 1 contains a number of companies which were undoubtedly productive in Central Canada, but whose activities in Vancouver and its hinterland were almost certainly largely, if not entirely commercial. In fact four, and probably five of the companies listed in column A come under this heading [38]. Of the remaining companies the majority were relatively small, with the exception of the Vancouver Gas Co. Ltd. [39]. Thus in terms of adding to the productive base of Vancouver the contribution of Central Canadian capital appears to have been small, except for the CPR, although this was by no means wholly productive capital.

There is one further exception to this which does not appear in Table 6:7. There is clear evidence of Central Canadian involvement in the BCSR [40]. The first president of the company was one Forrest Angus, who was listed as a resident of Victoria. It appears, though, that he was a relative of R.B. Angus, one of the leading lights of the CPR itself [41]. In view of this relationship it is noteworthy that the board of directors of the company also contained, and continued to contain after Forrest

Angus' name disappears, at least one member of the local management of the CPR [42].

The main body of Central Canadian productive investment was not directed towards production in Vancouver but towards extracting minerals from the hinterland it was helping to create. Central Canadian capital certainly controlled some substantial mining companies [43], and there is evidence to suggest that it was the major controlling source in this sector. Referring to mining in the province as a whole the B.C. Mining Record commented that by 1900, "the greater number of B.C.'s mines are now in the hands of Canadian [i.e. Central Canadian] capital; English capital runs Canadian very close, and American is nowhere" (BCMR, Oct. 1900, p. 370)[44].

To complete this discussion of the entry of Central Canadian capital into and through Vancouver it is necessary, as previously noted, to consider the role of banking capital, a particular form of money capital. The entry of chartered banks into Vancouver is represented in Table 6:8.

Central Canadian banks were clearly in no great rush to enter Vancouver, but, equally clearly, by 1901 they dominated the field, particularly after the take over of the Bank of B.C.. The early entry of the Bank of Montreal undoubtedly reflects its close links with the CPR [47]. The majority of the banks,

Table 6:8

Chartered Banks in Vancouver - by Year of Entry

1886	Bank of British Columbia (U.K.) (a)
1887	Bank of Montreal (Central Canada)
1888	Bank of British North America (U.K.)
1895	Imperial Bank of Canada (Central Canada)
1898	Canadian Bank of Commerce (Central Canada)
1899	Merchant's Bank of Halifax (b)
1899	Mclson's Bank (Central Canada)
1901	Bank of Hamilton (Central Canada)

a) Taken over by Bank of Commerce in 1901.

b) Originally centred in Halifax, became the Royal Bank of Canada in 1900, and in 1907 the headquarters were moved to Montreal [45].

Source: Campbell Sweeney Ms., City Directories, VNA [46].

however, only arrived in 1895 or later (cf. Table 6:7), and in the process contributed towards the creation of Vancouver as a financial centre [48]. In 1898 this had reached the stage where it became necessary for the banks to establish a clearing house in Vancouver [49].

In sum then, the Central Canadian banks together with Central Canadian capital further confirmed the pattern of Vancouver's spatial integration into the broader economy. The city was being developed to an important extent by external capital as a financial, commercial and managerial centre. Much of the productive activity in which this capital was involved was external to the city, a factor which contributed towards the creation of an extensive hinterland.

In order to complete this discussion of Vancouver's spatial integration it is necessary to take two further steps: to consider capital controlled within British Columbia and to discuss the creation of Vancouver's hinterland.

The first of these refers to those companies registered in Vancouver the economic ownership of which resided within the province, and, to varying degrees, in Vancouver. Here it is possible to separate out those companies in which there was a pattern of regional linkages and those in which control resided solely in Vancouver. This should serve to shed some light on both the pattern of regional linkages mediated through Vancouver and the structure of the local bourgeoisie in the city. The examination of these relationships is necessary for a proper understanding of the development of Vancouver in the late nineteenth century.

To begin this discussion Table 6:9 shows the companies registered in Vancouver with one or more directors resident elsewhere in the province.

The type of capital involved in these regional linkages, as represented in Table 6:9 was primarily productive, at least in a formal sense. Of the total of 85 companies, 37 were in mining, 6 in transport, and a further 33 were generally productive. Only 10 were commercial, and one financial; plus one for which the

Table 6:9

Annual Formation of Operating Companies with Head Offices in Vancouver and Directors Resident in British Columbia outside Vancouver.

Year	Victoria	New Westminster	Other B.C.
1886	3	1	0
1887	1	0	0
1888	1	1	0
1889	1	(1)*	0
1890	3 (1)	2	1 (1)
1891	2	(1)*	(2)
1892	2	1	2
1893	1	2	2
1894	0	1	1 (1)
1895	2	1 (1)	(1)
1896	5 (1)	2 (3)	4 (2)
1897	(1)	3	7 (1)
1898	2	3	0
1899	2	5	3
1900	3	0	3
1901	3	2	3
Totals	34	30	34

Figures in brackets (1) indicates the number of companies with directors resident in particular localities appointed in years subsequent to that in which the company was formed. In all cases except two, those marked with *, this occurred after 1897.

Source: as for Table 6:2

classification is uncertain and has been designated as productive/commercial. The majority of these companies, however, operated outside Vancouver. Thus of the 33 classified as generally productive slightly less than half operated, entirely or partially, outside the city. To this total may be added the mining companies and, to a certain extent, those involved in transportation.

Table 6:40 shows those companies registered in Vancouver

whose directors were all resident in Vancouver. A negative criterion was used in identifying these companies and the Table is probably an overstatement of the extent of purely local

Table 6:10

Annual Formation of Operating Companies with Head Offices in Vancouver with All Directors Resident in Vancouver - by Type of Capital.

	(A) Prod	(B) Min	(C) Trans	(D) P/C	(E) Com	(F) Mon	(G) M/C
1886			1				
1887	3						
1888	1						
1889	1	1	1			1	
1890	8		3	2 (1)		3	
1891	2	2 (1)	(2)	1	2		
1892	5				3	1	
1893	3	6	1		4		
1894	1	4	1		3		
1895	5	5			3		2
1896	4 (1)	12 (2)			2		
1897	3	21 (6)	1		5 (1)		2
1898	2	3		1	4		1
1899	3	2			2	1	1
1900	4	2	1	1	6		1
1901	8	2	1	1	8	1	1
totals	54	69	12	6	43	8	7

Prod - Productive; Min - Mining; Trans - Transport; P/C - Productive/Commercial; Com - Commercial; Mon - Money; C/M - Commercial/Money

Figures in brackets (1) indicate companies which are known to have been operating only after the year of registration of the company.

Source: as for Table 6:2

control [50]. This is most significant with respect to mining companies, but for the purposes of the present discussion it does not present a significant problem.

It seems fairly clear that in the early years, up to approximately 1891, the primary focus of investment concerned the internal development of Vancouver. Productive investment, at least as measured in Table 6:10, would appear to have been predominant in this period. Also it is clear that regional linkages with Victoria and New Westminster played an important part in this early development. After 1891, however, the growth of Vancouver was combined with, and facilitated by, the creation of a hinterland for the city. The new pattern of regional linkages is indicated, very partially and very crudely by column (C) in Table 6:9. This topic will be explored more fully in due course, but for the moment attention will be directed towards the early period and the question of the structure of the local bourgeoisie in Vancouver.

The involvement of the bourgeoisie in Victoria and New Westminster in the early development of Vancouver is not surprising [51]. It clearly reflects the contemporary pattern of economic development in the province, together with the particular structural origins of Vancouver outlined in Chapter 5. Given this conjuncture, it is equally unsurprising to encounter evidence which suggests that a good proportion of these early regional linkages were concerned, directly or indirectly, with the promotion of real estate in the Vancouver area (VNA, Mar. 14th, 1895). There was, for example, an important regional involvement in the provision of the necessary urban

infrastructure: the water works and gas works companies both involved Victoria residents, while members of the bourgeoisie in both Victoria and New Westminster were instrumental in the complex history of the street railway system [52].

At the same time, although not always separately, the regional linkages played an important part in the development of the productive base of the city. The most significant example of this was in the lumber industry. The president and general manager of the most important lumber company operating in Vancouver, the B.C. Mills Timber and Trading Co., was a resident of New Westminster [53].

In addition Table 6:10 also shows the temporal priority of the formation of productive capital. Up to and including 1891 there had been 20 companies formed which involved productive capital, other than in mining (columns A & C). In this time period only six companies were formed involving commercial and money capital.

Given this last point it could be argued that the local bourgeoisie of Vancouver was primarily located in productive capital; that in terms of the local bourgeoisie productive capital was dominant in this early period. There are, however, a number of reasons for arguing that this was not the case, and that commercial activities predominated.

The first such reason is the very origins of Vancouver in a series of real estate deals and the participation of a segment of the local bourgeoisie, with regional aid, in the provision of the urban infrastructure. This was clearly a pre-requisite for the realization of profits from real estate promotion. Even before the city was incorporated,

"... franchises for water, gas and street railways had been secured by SPECULATORS who evidently regarded the Terminal City as a cow that could be milked to great advantage" (VNA, Mar. 14th, 1895; emphasis added).

Also of particular significance in this regard is the fate of the Hastings Saw Mill. Initially purchased as part of the land speculation, the actual mill, as opposed to the land that accompanied it, was sold in 1886. The reasons for this sale, as recorded at the time, are revealing:

"The owners of the property being thus relieved of the mill and the site will apply the proceeds of the sale in improving the real estate which embraces a large tract of land in the vicinity of the mill" (VNA, Dec. 2nd, 1886).

Subsequently the mill became part of the BCMTT, which, it would appear, was controlled not in Vancouver but in New Westminster.

The primacy of commercial as opposed to productive functions in this case is clear. Moreover, it should also be noted that a number of productive companies listed in Table 6:10 column (A) also had commercial linkages. That is their establishment was

linked to real estate promotion: the latter required the development of productive capital, but in a subordinate position [54].

A further indication of the primacy of commercial capital may be obtained by moving from the economic to the political level. Representatives of commercial capital played a dominant role in local politics in these early years and beyond. Until 1897 every Mayor of Vancouver had been either a real estate agent or a wholesale or retail merchant [55]. The two subsequent mayors up to 1901 were a provincial land surveyor and a District Registrar of Titles; hardly representatives of productive capital.

This last point suggests that the structure of the local bourgeoisie did not change substantially in the decade after 1891. Table 6:10 suggests that if mining companies are excluded commercial and money capital grew more rapidly than productive capital after 1892. In part this reflects the creation of a hinterland and the expansion of wholesaling activities in Vancouver [56].

Yet it is clearly not acceptable simply to ignore the considerable number of mining companies. They were undoubtedly important in the creation of a hinterland, and they must necessarily be considered in terms of the structure of the local bourgeoisie. In many ways the investment of mining companies

controlled from Vancouver also functioned in a manner similar to that of commercial and money capital, at least in terms of the city itself. The contribution to the productive base of the city was negligible and the management of the companies from Vancouver must have been largely commercial and financial in nature. Nor does this include those mining companies which were primarily speculative in nature.

Moreover, it seems highly probable that many mining companies were established less for the purpose of production than for the sale of mining property. What is implied here is that the bourgeoisie in Vancouver played a brokerage role in terms of mining companies. In other words there was a movement of the local bourgeoisie away from the promotion of real estate and into the promotion of mining companies. The restructuring of the local bourgeoisie in this respect was important but limited in scope. The commodity involved was different but the function remained the same [57]. Nonetheless this process was an important aspect of the creation of a hinterland, and certainly, by the late 1890's there was no shortage of mining brokers in Vancouver.

In sum then, there is reason to suggest that in terms of locally controlled capital, it was the commercial and money forms which were dominant. This reflects, and in all likelihood, was generated by the way in which Vancouver was integrated into the

broader economy by externally controlled capital.

Reference has frequently been made to the question of the creation of a hinterland for Vancouver, or more properly for capital invested in and through Vancouver. As a final section of this Chapter it is necessary to focus attention more specifically on this topic. The question is obviously a complex one and the following remarks make no pretence of being in any way exhaustive. Indeed the process of the creation of a hinterland for Vancouver was undoubtedly part of a broader process involving the other coastal cities. Attention here will be limited to the former aspect only and carried out through the analytical lens of an examination of the locus of operations of all those companies registered in Vancouver; at least all of those defined as operating. These are shown in Table 6:11.

The extent of Vancouver's hinterland as measured by companies registered in the city was clearly considerable. Indeed there was only one region unrepresented, and that was in the extreme north of the province. The major concentration was in the coastal areas immediately adjacent to Vancouver, but there was a substantial representation and linkage with the south central part of the province extending from Yale to Cariboo. On the other hand, the figures for the Kootenays are generally somewhat lower, which presumably reflects the competition from the bourgeoisie of other, more proximate centres: Rossland and Spokane [59].

Table 6:11

The Creation of the Vancouver Hinterland: Operating Companies Registered in Vancouver - by Region of Operations [58].

(A) Region	(B) Type of Company	(C) Year of Entry	(D) Nos. of Companies
Cassiar	----	---	---
Skeena	CAN, Min.	1891	5
Omineca	MIN	1898	1
Cariboo	MIN	1893	13
Lillooet	MIN	1893	16
Kamloops	MIN	1890	23
Vernon	R. EST, Bank, Util.	1890	4
Boundary	R. EST, Min.	1893	13
Golden	MIN, Agric.	1891	4
Fort Steele	MIN, R. Est.	1896	4
Revelstoke	MIN.	1891	6
Slocan	MIN.	1896	12
Nelson	R. EST, Min, Util.	1892	7
Rossland	MIN.	1895	2
Nanaimo	COMM., Util, Min.	1895	18
Alberni	MIN.	1896	4
New	INDUS, Min, Can, Agric, Util,		
Westminster	Comm, R. Est.	1890	45
Victoria	COMM, Indus, Min, Util.	1895	6

Min - Mining; R. Est - Real Estate; Util - Utilities; Agric - Agricultural; COMM - Commercial; Indus - Industrial; Can - Canning.

In column C, the type of company indicated in upper case represents that of the first company to enter the region.

Source: as for Table 6:2

Mining clearly played a crucial role in what was essentially a restructuring of the provincial economy in the latter half of the 1890's [60]. The bourgeoisie in Vancouver played an important role as well as being the beneficiaries of this process. On the other hand Table 6:11 shows that in certain respects the spatial reordering had been prefigured before the major mining booms. Thus six regions had linkages with Vancouver by 1892, before

mining was at all extensive. Furthermore in seven regions the initial links with Vancouver were established by non-mining companies. Significantly real estate promotion, or real estate companies, played an important part in establishing these early links, especially in the Okanagan area. This tends to further confirm the structural similarity between real estate and mining companies as argued in terms of the structure of the Vancouver bourgeoisie.

It seems fairly clear that from very early Vancouver developed as a financial, commercial and managerial centre, and that this was determined by external capital. Henry Bell-Irving, who was certainly in a position to know, recognised this in his presidential address to the Vancouver Board of Trade. He remarked that,

"By the establishment in Vancouver of the four powerful banks, the Banks of British Columbia, Montreal, British North America and the Imperial, besides numerous well known mortgage and investment companies, representing large capital, the city (of Vancouver) has become and is generally recognised as a financial centre for the Province" (VBT, Annual Report 1895-1896, p. 16).

It has been the burden of this Chapter to demonstrate the pattern of external dominance was in fact more extensive, although its orientation was much the same. The majority of the external capital channeled through Vancouver was destined to operate outside the city. On the other hand, the productive base of the city itself was oriented strongly towards primary

processing, of lumbering in particular.

This perspective on the process of Vancouver's spatial integration, however, is a very partial view of the development of the city. To start with it is the view, so to speak, from the side of capital. Yet capital, as this thesis has attempted to argue, is not a thing but a relationship. The capitalist mode of production cannot be reduced to the operation of capital, because, quite simply, capital cannot operate alone. Capital in whatever form requires the application of labour. This dimension has been singularly absent from this Chapter, as has any consideration of non-capitalist modes of production.

These omissions can be rectified and the discussion of Vancouver's development rounded out by examining the internal structure of the city. This is clearly the task of the next Chapter where the consequences of the form of Vancouver's spatial integration on its internal spatial structure will be examined. It is the concept of social class, given a spatial content, which provides the vehicle for this enquiry, thereby linking it theoretically with this discussion of spatial integration.

At the same time the analysis undertaken in this Chapter has some important implications in terms of the class structure of Vancouver, as well as for the processes through which the the internal spatial structure was created. The designation of

Vancouver as a commercial, financial and managerial centre suggests that the new petty bourgeoisie will comprise a significant component of the class structure of the city. Moreover, the recognition of a local bourgeoisie centred in commercial and money capital is likewise indicative. At the same time the local bourgeoisie was far from independent or autonomous. It existed in a situation of articulation with capital controlled outside the city, of which the most significant was undoubtedly the CPR. The implications of these relationships for the social and spatial structure of Vancouver and the processes through which they were realized make up the burden of the ensuing Chapters.

FOOTNOTES

[1] Discounting the question of the reliability of census data itself, contemporary estimates of city populations tend to be unreliable. This reflects not only mechanical difficulties but also that such estimates were notoriously susceptible to "boosterism". Thus to cite but one example, the Vancouver Province (Sep. 17th, 1898) on the basis of the newly published city directory announced that the population of the city was 27,195. The data in the above are presumably derived from the assessment rolls and therefore reasonably accurate.

[2] Through a search of the B.C. Gazette for the years 1886-1901 a complete list of all companies registered in Vancouver during this period was compiled. In terms of this study registration in Vancouver has two aspects. Firstly that the company's head office was located in Vancouver, or, if the head office was located outside the Province, that the Provincial office was located in Vancouver. This list by no means encompasses all of the companies operating in Vancouver, nor those in which members of the bourgeoisie in Vancouver were involved, but which were registered elsewhere. To obtain such a comprehensive list would be a mammoth undertaking requiring a team of researchers. For the purposes of this study the above limitation was adjudged both reasonable and rational. The list was supplemented by a number of company's, mostly railway company's, created by Private Act of the Provincial Legislature. A search was then made through the Company Record Office for information on all of these companies - especially for information on the paid up capital. Unfortunately the records for this period are far from complete in all respects. Thus any real attempt at qualification was vitiated.

[3] The discrepancy between columns A and B is undoubtedly partly attributable to the gaps in the historical record, but it is also indicative of the speculative nature of many companies, and mining companies in particular. The B.C. Mining Record (Oct., 1901, p. 323), in a moment of candour concerning the overcapitalization of mining companies, observed that one way the investor was separated from his money was by the promoters retaining an inordinate "number of shares and thus enabled (sic) them to take advantage to an undue extent of any increase in value, which by skillful scheming they were able to create on the stock market". In other words many mining companies consisted largely of "water". The use of a minimum figure of \$1,000 figure for the paid up capital in cash (i.e. not in shares issued) has hopefully eliminated most, if not all, of such companies from column B. It should be recognised, however, that in the process some genuinely "operating" companies have been eliminated. Given the inadequacy of the historical record, this seems to be the lesser of the two evils. Thus for the remainder of this Chapter

the discussion of company data refers only to "operating" companies.

[4] In a study of the mining industry in the West Kootenay and Boundary regions, Church (1961, pp. 146-148) has calculated that in 1897 there were 422 incorporations before the passage of the new Company Act in May of that year, compared with 85 registrations in the remainder of the year. Of these 85 registrations, almost half were in fact re-incorporations. Church also stresses the extent of "fraudulent capitalizations" in the early months of 1897.

[5] The B.C. Review (Jan, 27th, 1900), after commenting on the varied resources of the Province and their utilization, added that, "The offices of many of the companies are in Vancouver, and either directly or indirectly the city reaps the benefit of this vast trade".

[6] The assessed value of the CPR landholdings in Vancouver stood at \$1,000,000 in 1887 and this figure had doubled by 1891 (VNA, Jan. 5th, 1887 & Macdonald N., 1977, pp. 18-19). This was notwithstanding the fact that by the end of 1888 a total of \$868,059 had been obtained by the sale of land in Vancouver. The CPR report for 1888 notes that the revenue from these land sales went into the construction of hotels in Banff and Vancouver (Macdonald N., ibid.).

[7] A full list of the companies involved is as follows:-

- 1) B.C. Sugar Refining Co. Ltd. - Abbott, Browning:
- 2) B.C. Sugar refinery Ltd. (a later incorporation of (1) which acted as a holding company for the former - Abbott:
- 3) Carbonate Mining Co. Ltd. - Abbott:
- 4) Horsefly Hydraulic Mining Co. Ltd. - Abbott:
- 5) Van Winkle Consolidated Hydraulic Mining Co. Ltd. - Abbott:
- 6) B.C. Goldfields Explorations & Concessions Co. Ltd. - Abbott, Browning:
- 7) Fern Gold Mining & Milling Co. Ltd. - Abbott:
- 8) Prescott Mining Co. Ltd. - Abbott:
- 9) Vancouver & Lulu Island Railway Co. Ltd. (leased by the CPR but later taken over by the BCER) - Abbott, Salsbury:
- 10) Maud Hydraulic Mining Co. Ltd. - Abbott, Browning:
- 11) Cinnabar Mining Co. of B.C. Ltd. - Abbott, Salsbury:
- 12) Two Friends Mine Ltd. - Abbott.
- 13) Crow's Nest Land & Development Co. Ltd. - Abbott:
- 14) Nelson Poorman Gold Mining Co. Ltd. - Abbott:
- 15) Douglas Pine Mining Co. Ltd. - Abbott:
- 16) Rock Creek Gold & Copper Mining Co. Ltd. - Abbott:
- 17) Stave Lake Power Co. Ltd. - Abbott.
- 18) Oriental Traders Co. Ltd. - Browning:
- 19) Diplock Book & Stationery Co. Ltd. - Browning:

- 20) Montreal & B.C. Prospecting & Promoting Co. Ltd. - Browning:
- 21) North Star Mining Co. Ltd. - Browning:
- 22) Montreal Hydraulic Mining Co. of Cariboo Ltd. - Browning:
- 23) Cariboo Hydraulic Mining Co. Ltd. - Browning:
- 24) Union Steamship Co. Ltd. - Salsbury:
- 25) Okanagan Land & Development Co. Ltd. - Salsbury.
- 26) New Westminster & Burrard Inlet Telephone Co. Ltd. - Salsbury:
- 27) Black Creek Hydraulic Mining Co. of Cariboo Ltd. - Salsbury:
- 28) Safety Powder Co. Ltd. - Salsbury.

Of the 28 companies, 17 were mining companies and 22 operated entirely or in part outside Vancouver.

[8] There is some evidence to suggest that monopoly capital eschewed the absolute control implied by the term "company town", exercising its control in articulation with local competitive capital. In an interesting study of the relationship between U.S. Steel and Gary, Indiana, Greer (1976, p. 478) concludes that,

"... from the very outset U.S. Steel found that while its power in the community was immense, it was not absolute. Limited in its actions by considerations of both profits and political hegemony, the Corporation necessarily had to compromise with the local small business community. While the Gary works were under the exclusive control of U.S. Steel, in the community a heterogeneous group governed. The governance of course took place in a setting congenial to the Corporation's underlying interests, but it involved concessions by the Corporation in a variety of peripheral areas. Political control was in the hands of a group of local entrepreneurs who, whatever their particular divergences from U.S. Steel, could be counted on to support the free enterprise system fervently in the face of any labour insurgency from below".

[9] The major source of information on foreign companies was the B.C. Review. Published in London (1897 - 1905), this was primarily concerned with mining companies. The full enumeration of all extra-provincial companies is as follows:-

Year	No.	Year	No.	Year	No.
1888	1	1893	2	1898	30
1889	0	1894	1	1899	10
1890	3	1895	1	1900	14
1891	3	1896	3	1901	10
1892	5	1897	16		

Source: as Table 6:2.

[10] An attempt was made in 1894 to establish a stock and mining exchange in Vancouver, presumably as a means of attracting capital, but the endeavour appears to have failed, see B.C. Gazette, Sep. 13th, 1894 and B.C. Stock & Mining Exchange Co. Ltd., CR, file #209 (1890).

[11] Also important, but not appearing in Table 6:5 was the Bank of B.C., the first bank to operate a branch office in Vancouver, opening on Sep. 1st, 1886 (Campbell Sweeny, Diary). The Bank of British North America, with its head office in London, was also an early entry into the banking field in Vancouver; see Table 6:8.

[12] In an editorial on the real estate boom, the News Advertiser (Sep. 13th, 1889) remarked,

"One most important factor in the progress of Vancouver ... is the steady influx to this city of foreign capital for investment in real estate. Of this outside capital the largest proportion has come from England".

[13] The following companies were involved in the take over by the Anglo-B.C. Packing Co. Ltd.: B.C. Packing Co., E.A. Whadams, British American Packing Co., Canoe Pass Canning Co., Duncan Batchelor & Co., Marshall & English, North Pacific Canning Co. and Garry Point Canning Co. Ltd.. Of the nine companies involved seven were located in the vicinity of the Fraser River and two on the Skeena River (VNA, May 5th, 1891). Henry Bell-Irving, a commission merchant and an important member of the Vancouver bourgeoisie, played an important role in the formation of the Anglo-B.C. Packing Co. Ltd. Not only was he a director of the Garry Point Co. but he became an important shareholder (\$147,000) of Anglo-B.C. and acted as agent for the company (see Add Mss 1, Vol. 4, Apr. 11th, 1893). Furthermore an apparent family relation, J. Bell-Irving, was on the original board of directors (VNA, May 5th, 1891).

[14] This investment does not appear to have been particularly successful. The average life of the mining companies included in Table 6:5 for which data was available (20 out of 27) was 7.2 years. See Paterson (1976, pp. 80-82) for possible reasons for the "failures" of British investment.

[15] The Vancouver bourgeoisie, or some fractions of it, appear to have been anxious to promote the entry of foreign capital for mining through Vancouver. David Oppenheimer, mayor of the city and a prominent real estate owner and wholesale merchant, published a pamphlet on the "Mineral Resources of British Columbia" in 1889 in which he commented that miners and prospectors,

"... should be able to find people ready to receive them with open arms at a mining centre like Vancouver, as they are willing to sell their claims or a controlling interest in the same at a small sum, or bond their location! Capitalists who are willing to negotiate with them need not risk any money until they have sent their confidential reports...

Here now is the chance for foreign capital to step in and by the formation of prospecting and locating companies IN THE MINING CENTRE OF VANCOUVER to reap a bountiful harvest" (Oppenheimer, 1889, p. 9, emphasis in original).

It was in 1889 that the first mining company with its headquarters in Vancouver, the Vancouver Enterprise Mining Co. Ltd., was established (see B.C. Gazette, Mar. 28th, 1889). Thus an important segment of the local bourgeoisie was attempting to develop a brokerage role which it had already established through real estate. The attempt became successful with the restructuring of the mid 1890's.

[16] The Canadian Canning Co. (Eburne), United Canneries of B.C. Ltd. (Steveston & Vancouver), Carlisle Canning Co. (Washington State and Skeena River), Cleeve Canning & Cold Storage Co. Ltd. (Vancouver & New Westminster), Wallace Brothers Packing Co. Ltd. (Skeena River) and Takush Harbour Co. Ltd.

[17] To this figure may be added a smelting company, the B.C. Smelting Co. Ltd. This was established in 1898 but achieved little. nb smelter bonus & real estate.

[18] The engineering works of Armstrong & Morrison, see B.C. Gazette, Jul. 4th, 1901.

[19] By 1901 the BCER had a paid up capital of \$1,635,199, together with a bond issue of \$1,216,666 (Canada, Sessional Papers, 1902, no. 20, p. 19). The BCER's operations were by no means confined to Vancouver.

[20] For a contemporary survey of the railway, see VDW (souvenir edition, Jun. 1896). For a scholarly account, see Roy (1973). The BCER took over the Vancouver & Lulu Island Railway in 1907 and eventually extended its lines to Chilliwack.

[21] B.C. Telephones Ltd. operated the following:-

Victoria & Esquimalt Telephone Co. Ltd.; Vernon & Nelson Telephone Co. Ltd.; Kootenay Lake Telephone Co. Ltd.; Nanaimo Telephone Co. Ltd.; and Canada Western Telephone & Telegraph Co.

Ltd.. The general superintendent was W.H. Kent, of 657 Burrard Street, Vancouver.

[22] See above note 13. Bell-Irving also acted as attorney, or agent, for one British registered mining company. The Comstock Mines (B.C.) Ltd. was established in Sep. 1897 to take over the property of another mining company on which Bell-Irving had served as a director, Alliance Prospecting Syndicate of B.C. Ltd. (see B.C. Gazette, Sep. 9th, 1897 and CR, file #313 (1897)).

[23] See Paterson (1976, p. 42). He is quoting H.J. Boam: British Columbia, Its History, People, Commerce, Industries & Resources; London, 1912, p.208.

[24] See Campbell Sweeny, Diary (Jan. 15th, 1895).

[25] The companies were Canadian & American Mortgage & Trust Co. Ltd., Edinburgh American Land Mortgage Co. Ltd., and United Trust Co. Ltd.

[26] The companies were the North Vancouver Land & Development Co. Ltd., CR, file #60 (1890); and Vancouver Investment Co. Ltd., CR, file #411 (1890). Edward Mahon was also a director of an other company which, by the criteria of this thesis, involved British capital; the Prospecting Syndicate of B.C. Ltd., CR, file #250 (1890).

[27] One potential source for such research is the B.C. Review, a commercial and financial review published in London. The B.C. Review recorded a number of the Vancouver Bourgeoisie as visitors to London between 1897 and 1900; some of them with the intent of floating mining companies, e.g. T. Dunn (Jan. 8th, 1898), R.C. Campbell-Johnstone (Feb. 12th, 1898) and D. Bell-Irving (Jan. 7th, 1899). In addition the B.C. Review carried advertisements for a variety of Vancouver real estate agents, mining brokers, mining engineers and solicitors (see issues of Jul. 16th, 1898, Nov. 25th, 1899, Dec. 30th 1899 and Jan. 20th 1900).

There was also a reverse process of visitors to Vancouver investing in the city:

"Many of these persons have been led to visit Vancouver and inspect their property with the frequent occurrence that they added to their investments. Indeed the general result of such visits may be summed up concisely: 'I came, I saw, I bought'" (VNA, Sep. 13th, 1889).

[28] Boston & Cariboo Mines Ltd., CR, file #149 (1897). 9,295 of the 10,000 outstanding shares were held in Boston.

[29] See CR, file #6 (1862).

[30] See Campbell Sweeny (Diary, Jan. 28th, 1890); and, Rogers (1958, pp. 8-9).

[31] The Nelson & Bedlington Railway and the Kaslo & Slocan Railway were both operated by the Kootenay Railway & Navigation Co. Ltd., located in Kaslo. This was, in turn (or became check) a subsidiary of the Great Northern Railway. The third company was the Vancouver, Victoria and Great Eastern Railway & Navigation Co., which was still under construction in 1902.

[32] This was for the Automatic Can Co. Ltd., CR, file #372 (1890). The Michigan Lumber Co. Ltd., CR, file #26 (1890) had a nominal capital of \$1,000,000 and its paid up capital is unknown, but it seems unlikely to have been substantial as the company only survived two or three years. Formed in 1890, it was last listed in the city directory in 1893. Some mining companies also had large nominal capitals, but these frequently bore little relation to the paid up capital, as already noted.

[33] This figure should probably be increased to four, since the Edison General Electric Co. Ltd. (col. A, 1892), whilst it was undoubtedly an example of productive capital, its operations in Vancouver were probably chiefly commercial in nature.

[34] The Union Logging Co. Ltd. (CR, file #282 (1890)) appears to have been concerned with logging as opposed to the processing of timber, so that its "external" activities seem highly probable.

[35] See Henderson's British Columbia Directory & Gazeteer, 1901.

[36] The inadequacy of the measure of the number of companies is obvious and readily admitted. It would, however, require considerable further research to provide a more precise measure, such as paid up capital, assuming the data to be available. It may be noted though that some of the Canadian companies, excluding the CPR, were substantial. Thus to cite three diverse examples where the paid up capital is known: Consolidated Cariboo Hydraulic Mining Co. Ltd. - \$4,000,000; Canada Cycle & Motor Co. Ltd. - \$5,500,000; and Canada Permanent & Western Canada Mortgage Corporation Ltd. - \$5,951,350. The paid up capital of each of these companies was larger than the nominal capital of the largest British "controlled" company. On the other hand, the operations of the former companies and others like them was by no means restricted to British Columbia, let alone Vancouver. It would be a complex process to estimate the quantities of capital in such companies which were invested in and through Vancouver.

[37] If banks were included it would further emphasise this temporal pattern, see Table 6:8.

[38] They were: Imperial Oil Ltd, William Hamilton manufacturing Co. Ltd., Canada Cycle & Motor Co. Ltd., and Canadian General Electric Co. Ltd., and less certain the Toronto Type Foundry Ltd..

[39] This company was originally established in 1886, and at first its directors were all from Vancouver and Victoria. In 1902 its paid up capital had reached \$500,000, at which time Messrs. Mackenzie and Mann, of railway fame, owned 18,700 of the 25,000 shares. The first recorded indication of their involvement in the company was in 1898 when they appear as directors. The Bank of Montreal may have been involved in facilitating this takeover since, in 1898, 16,403 shares are listed under the name of Campbell Sweeney, the local manager of the Bank of Montreal (CR, file #29 (1878)).

[40] While visiting Montreal, and before coming to Vancouver, B.T. Rogers met Van Horne and R.B. Angus. As a result of this meeting, "... not only did Mr. Van Horne and Mr. Angus agree to take shares, but Mr. Angus had also interested Mr. Donald A. Smith, Mr. Duncan McIntyre, Mr. W.D. Matthews, Mr. E. Osler and other directors of the CPR". American capital was also involved in the formation of the company (See Rogers, 1958, p.9).

[41] My thanks to E.M. Gibson for this information.

[42] Angus retired as president in 1897 and was succeeded by B.T. Rogers (Rogers, 1958, p. 20). See also CR, file #97 (1878), #133 (1890), and #330 (1897).

[43] The Consolidated Cariboo Hydraulic Mining Co. Ltd. has already been mentioned. To this can be added the following companies, with their paid up capital: Toronto-Lillooet gold Reefs Co. Ltd. - \$905,000; Dominion Copper Co. Ltd. - \$3,200,000 (in 1903); and North Star Mining Co. Ltd. - \$1,300,000.

[44] For a study of the role of British, American and Central Canadian investment in the mining industry of the West Kootenay and Boundary regions up to 1900, see Church (1961).

[45] On the Bank of Commerce, see Ross (1920), and on the Royal Bank, see Ince (n.d.). Of the Halifax banks, including the Royal, Naylor (1975, Vol. 1, p. 98) has observed that, "their behaviour patterns were not at all typical of the Maritimes, but was indistinguishable from the central Canadian ones ..." This was certainly true in the case of Vancouver.

[46] The City Directories for Vancouver were generally

published as part of a British Columbia Directory. See Bibliography for details of the editions consulted for this and other points.

[47] That this relationship reached down to the local level is attested to by Campbell Sweeny, the manager of the Vancouver branch, who records,

"received tenders for new bank buildings ... Campbell Sweeny had contended that the site on the (N.E.) corner of Dunsmuir & Granville Street was not the best. Wanted N.W. corner of Hastings & Granville Street, or if that not obtainable a corner of Georgia & Granville Streets, but CPR influence too strong for him. Mr. Van Horne said we would live to thank him for putting us where we are" (Diary, Apr., 1892)

There is also some evidence that Campbell Sweeny and H. Abbott, of the CPR, were acquainted before their arrival in Vancouver. Sweeny wrote to Abbott in 1886 enquiring about local conditions and received a reply in August that year, one year before the Vancouver branch opened its doors.

[48] Whereas in 1901 there were eight different banks operating in Vancouver, there were only five in Victoria, the original commercial and financial centre in the province.

[49] See Campbell Sweeny, Diary (Jun. 3rd, 1898). The data on bank clearings illustrate the financial primacy of Vancouver within the province:

Year	Vancouver	Victoria
1899	42.2	33.5
1900	46.2	32.0
1901	46.7	30.6

Figures in \$000,000's

Source: Vancouver Board of Trade, Annual Reports.

[50] See above, discussion following Table 6:4, for details.

[51] It should be added that a number of the bourgeoisie in Vancouver had previously resided in Victoria and/or New Westminster. This was particularly the case in the early years, but the migration was not restricted to that period.

[52] Vancouver Waterworks Co. Ltd. was established by Private Act in 1886, and, after arbitration, was purchased by

the City of Vancouver in 1891 for \$452,530 (VCM, Nov. 2nd, 1891). A full list of shareholders may be found in Vancouver Waterworks Company, Add Mss 63. For Vancouver Gas Company Ltd., see CR, file #29 (1878); by the late 1890's the company was controlled in central Canada. On the history of the street railway system, see Roy (1970).

[53] The B.C. Mills Timber and Trading Company was registered by Private Act in 1890. It represented the largest lumber company in Vancouver and was headed by John Hendry of New Westminster. The company was formed by the merger of the Hastings Saw Mill Co. Ltd. (CR, file #6 (1862)), with substantial Victoria interests, and the Royal City Planing Mills Co. Ltd. (CR, file #10 (1878)), of which Hendry was the managing director, and which operated mills in New Westminster as well as Vancouver. Hendry was also involved in two other industrial companies which operated in Vancouver: the B.C. Sugar Refinery (CR, File #330 (1897)) and the Vancouver City Foundry and Machine Works Co. Ltd. (CR, file #51 (1878)). The first of these was a considerable success, the second was only short lived.

[54] See Chapter 8 for details.

[55] The full list is as follows:

Year		Occupation
1886-1887	M.A. Maclean	Real Estate
1888-1891	D. Oppenheimer	Real Estate & Wholesale Merchant
1892-1893	F. Cope	Dry Goods Merchant
1894	R. Anderson	Real Estate
1895-1896	H. Collins	Dry Goods Merchant
1897	W. Templeton	Commission Merchant
1898-1900	J.F. Garden	Land Surveyor
1901	T.O. Townley	District Registrar of Titles

Source: Barak et al. (n.d.), City Directories.

[56] The News Advertiser commented on the growth of wholesaling, general trade depression notwithstanding, and added that,

"The augmented demand comes principally from the interior of the Province, and is mainly due to the advantages Vancouver possess as a distributing centre, and to the fact that of late a large number of wholesale firms have located here. The Kootenay and Okanagan districts do a brisk trade with Vancouver" (VNA, Dec. 13th, 1893).

It was in 1893 and 1894 respectively that Oppenheimer Brothers and T. Dunn, two of the leading wholesale companies in

Vancouver, adopted the corporate form of organization.

[57] The interest in mining promotion began as early as 1888. In that year the City Council paid for the publication of a pamphlet to promote mining speculation (VNA, Nov. 13th, 1888). The pamphlet stated that miners and prospectors,

"....should be able to find people ready to receive them with open arms at a mining centre like Vancouver, as they are willing to sell their claims or a controlling interest in the same at a sum, or bond their location ... Here now is the chance for foreign capital to step in and by the formation of prospecting and locating companies in the mining centre of Vancouver to reap a bountiful harvest" (Oppenheimer, 1889, p. 9).

[58] The regions used are those of the Mining Districts as they existed in 1901. The only exception to this is for the Victoria District, which has been subdivided into its two constituent Mining Divisions - Victoria and New Westminster, see B.C. Minister of Mines, Annual Report 1899, pp. 571-587.

In addition to the data presented in Table 6:11, referring to British Columbia, there were a small number of companies registered in Vancouver which operated outside the province. Three of these were canning companies which operated in Washington State (and of them also in Alaska), three were commercial companies operating in the Yukon, and, curiously, a British company licensed to operate in Kenya.

[59] See Bescoby (1935), and Church (1961) for details on mining and commercial development in the Kootenays.

[60] The mining booms in British Columbia in the 1890's were part of a much broader trend in the world economy, as described in Chapter 3. Of the mining booms in this period Vilar (1976, p. 328) has remarked,

"What has been pointed out under very different historical conditions also holds true here: a fall in the general prices expressed in terms of precious metals indicates a revaluation of the metal and an incentive to explore for it. After repeated attempts, success was finally achieved, and it is remarkable how the discoveries and the opening of the mines coincided in time over enormous distances, and took very different forms".

He also comments on the "incidence of real speculation" and "the deployment of genuine industrial techniques" in mining

during the 1890's (ibid, p. 330). The annual production of lode gold mines in British Columbia increased from 1,170 ozs. in 1893 to 210,384 ozs. in 1901 (B.C. Minister of Mines, Annual Report, 1901, p. 921).

SOCIAL STRUCTURE IN SPACE
THE MAKING OF VANCOUVER, 1886-1901.

VOLUME 2

by

Robert M. Galois
B.A., University of Exeter, 1965
M.A., University of Calgary, 1970

A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT
OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
in the Department
of
Geography

© **Robert M. Galois 1979**
SIMON FRASER UNIVERSITY
November 1979

**All rights reserved. This thesis may not be
reproduced in whole or in part, by photocopy
or other means, without permission of the author.**

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page.
CHAPTER 7 THE INTERNAL STRUCTURE OF VANCOUVER IN 1901: SOCIAL AND SPATIAL DIMENSIONS.	255
CHAPTER 8 THE DEVELOPMENT OF VANCOUVER IN THE LATE NINETEENTH CENTURY: STRUCTURE AND PROCESS.	361
CHAPTER 9 CONCLUSION.	462
APPENDICES	474
BIBLIOGRAPHY	487

CHAPTER 7

THE INTERNAL STRUCTURE OF VANCOUVER IN 1901: SOCIAL AND SPATIAL DIMENSIONS.

"As far as class formation is concerned, any analysis of spatial structure must include a consideration of the way in which the development of class structure varied over space" (Slater, 1975a, p. 173).

With the insights gained of the basic parameters of the development of Vancouver it is once again possible to shift the focus of attention and scale of enquiry. To the view from Vancouver must be added a careful scrutiny of the internal social and spatial structure of the city. The concern in this chapter, then, is the class structure of Vancouver, which is presented through a detailed examination of the residential patterns in 1901. The discussion, therefore, abstracts from process to concentrate upon a static distribution. While this technique facilitates exposition, it inevitably produces certain distortions. It will be the task of the succeeding chapter to rectify this by restoring the dynamism of process.

In order to undertake the task at hand there are two necessary pre-requisites. The first of these involves the empirical location of the class boundaries theoretically outlined in chapter 4. This, in turn, requires an evaluation of the data available for use in the enquiry. Secondly, it is necessary to present a brief outline of other relevant features of the internal spatial structure: the physical landscape, the distribution of workplaces, and the housing market.

THE SOURCES OF DATA.

It is necessary at the outset to raise the question of the data source, for it poses a set of related problems, the resolution of which is of considerable importance in establishing the validity of any subsequent analysis. The issues raised by the data source concern the overall quality of the data, their reliability and comprehensiveness, together with its suitability or relevance for the theoretical categories through which the analysis is undertaken. The procedures by which the data have been handled also require consideration.

The primary data source has been the city directory for 1901. Although not ideal, it does provide a substantial coverage of the working population of the city and has been adjudged adequate for present purposes [1]. There are, however, certain omissions which must be indicated and commented upon briefly.

The first of these concerns the absence of women and children. Only those women in the workforce and a number of widows, who were presumably property owners, are included. This clearly precludes any real consideration of the overall process of the extended reproduction of labour and its relation to class structure, but it does not vitiate an analysis at the level of class places [2].

Another gap concerns certain ethnic groups, notably the

Chinese and Japanese. The information on these people in the directories is extremely limited, being restricted largely to a few merchants and boarding houses. Fortunately some other sources of information are available which can shed some light on the position of these groups. Such information, however, lacks the spatial precision of the directories and as a result these groups have been excluded from the main body of the analysis and will be considered separately.

Finally, the population of parts of the commercial area of the city are under-represented. This refers particularly to the area of cheap, dollar-a-day, hotels within the area bounded roughly by Cambie, Pender, and Water Streets and Westminster Avenue. Fortunately the manuscript voters lists provides additional, although less reliable information on this area, the population of which included a considerable number of short term residents [3].

THE EMPIRICAL LOCATION OF CLASS BOUNDARIES.

BOURGEOISIE AND TRADITIONAL PETTY BOURGEOISIE. If the overall quality of the data in the directory may be regarded as adequate there remains the question of its suitability for the type of analysis outlined in chapter 4. In order to resolve this question it is necessary to discuss more precisely the type of information contained in the city directories.

These directories contain three separate listings. The first is a listing by address, which includes both residences and what may generally be termed places of work, including both public and private, and commercial, financial and industrial. The second is an alphabetical listing by individual surname. This is by far the most comprehensive listing and usually includes information on the individuals occupation place of work and residence [4]. The final listing, and least comprehensive of all, is a general classified business directory.

The directories clearly provide two vital sets of information; those on residential location and occupation. But these alone are inadequate. A class analysis, as chapter 4 was at pain to point out, is not reducible to an analysis of occupational categories. To reiterate, a merchant may belong to the bourgeoisie or the petty bourgeoisie, and a blacksmith, for example could possibly belong to either of these two classes or to the working class. Clearly some additional information is necessary beyond that of occupational category.

The classified business listing and the information on the place of work provide some of the necessary additional data. The first of these is of considerable help in differentiating between those who are employers or self employed from those who are employees, that is in delimiting the boundary between the working class and the bourgeoisie and the traditional petty bourgeoisie.

More important though is the information on work place. This has facilitated the development of a work place listing which represents the number of people working at a given location. This information is important for determining the boundary separating the bourgeoisie from the traditional petty bourgeoisie.

If suitable information is available, the question now becomes one of what criteria should be applied to it. Chapter 4 has approached this problem only in general terms, but now it is necessary to be much more precise. One possibility, and one adopted in chapter 5 was to use a particular number of employees as marking the dividing line, i.e. all employers of of a work force of five or more were deemed to be members of the bourgeoisie, while the remainder were traditional petty bourgeoisie. Such a criterion may be acceptable, and even necessary, when dealing with aggregated census data, but its arbitrary quality represents a point of theoretical weakness. A more precise and theoretically rigorous definition is desirable, especially when handling the disaggregated data provided by the directory.

The criterion adopted here is one which recognises that the key element of the capitalist mode of production is the employment of wage labour and the extraction of surplus value or surplus labour, while the petty commodity mode consists of

individual and family businesses. Thus a business is designated as capitalist, and the owner a member of the bourgeoisie if the number of family members involved is exceeded by the number of non-family employees. For example, a business involving two partners or family members employing three or more other non-family members would be designated as capitalist, whereas a business involving two partners or family members and employing two non-family members would be designated as being a petty commodity business. This criterion is at once operationally viable and also incorporates an assessment of the relative importance of wage labour to a particular business [5].

Nonetheless in a number of cases this basic criterion is inappropriate and a number of occupational categories have been considered, in toto, as designating a bourgeois class place. In most instances these are occupations concerned largely or entirely with the movement of capital as such and do not necessarily require the employment of wage labour. The most important of these are real estate agents [6], financial agents, brokers [7], commission agents and wholesale merchants [8]. More problematical is the designation of all contractors and builders as members of the bourgeoisie. This occupational category would seem, by its very nature, to imply the employment of wage labour, and in some instances the directories provide confirmation of this through the constructed list of work places. In the majority of cases, however, the directories are silent.

Fortunately in the case of one such contractor some additional information is available. This is in the form of the wage books for 1898-1899 of C.T.W. Piper, who was a contractor [9]. The evidence contained in the wage books is revealing and worthy of further consideration.

Piper ran the business in conjunction with his son C.J. Piper, who acted as a clerk and received a higher remuneration than any other "employee" [10]. Taking one calendar year beginning on Nov. 4th, 1898, C.T.W. Piper employed a total of 28 men other than his son [11]. Yet this simple figure is highly misleading because the majority of these employees worked only very briefly. In fact there were only two really full time employees, the Clive brothers, who worked 52 and 50 weeks in the year. Apart from these two workers no other employee worked for more than seven weeks. All of the additional workers were employed for a total of only 63 weeks [12]. Thus, on average, the Piper construction business consisted of father and son plus three full time employees. During this time period the firm worked on a total of nine different contracts.

Piper was clearly a fairly small contractor and although it would be rash to claim that he was typical, the evidence does support the designation of contractors as members of the bourgeoisie. Moreover the wagebooks clearly indicate the temporary nature of employment in the construction industry.

This undoubtedly accounts for the fact that there is no work place listed in the directory for such workers and the number of such workers further tends to support the contention of the capitalist structure of the construction industry [13].

There are a number of other occupational categories which it has also been necessary to deal with "in toto", since the relevant information is unavailable. In these latter cases, however, they have been classified under the petty commodity mode. These include occupations such as farmer, rancher and prospector, which may reasonably be expected to have involved individual or family businesses.

Finally, in terms of delimiting the bourgeoisie, the data collected from the company records has also been of considerable value. These records include listings of the directors of the companies. In view of the incompleteness of these records their utilization has not been restricted to the specific year of 1901. Directors between the years of 1898 and 1901 have been included as members of the bourgeoisie.

WORKING CLASS AND NEW PETTY BOURGEOISIE. The determination of the bourgeoisie and the traditional petty bourgeoisie serves, by exclusion, to help define the remaining classes; the working class and the new petty bourgeoisie. Some further discussion of these two classes is called for though, in order to specify their

content and the boundary between them. In this case occupational data provided in the directory is generally adequate for the purposes of classification.

It was argued in chapter 4 that the working class is not characterized simply by the performance of wage labour, but initially by the performance of productive wage labour. That is labour which produces surplus value in the process of production, transportation and storage of commodities. Rather than provide a long list of occupations which may be deemed as involving productive labour, and hence constituting part of the working class, it seems more appropriate to concentrate upon certain groups which are excluded from the working class and fall into the new petty bourgeoisie. The more so since the performance of productive labour is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for membership of the working class.

The delimitation of the working class and the new petty bourgeoisie involves the deployment of political and ideological as well as economic criteria. It is necessary, therefore, to consider briefly each of these different levels in order to reach a full determination of this class boundary.

Starting at the economic level the new petty bourgeoisie includes those occupations which involve the performance of unproductive labour; labour which is solely or primarily

concerned with keeping track of value, the protection of value and the realization process. This criterion encompasses such obvious white collar occupations as clerks, both retail and office, travellers, salesmen and bookkeepers, but it also extends to such nominally independent occupations as manufacturer's agents [14]. But unproductive labour is not restricted to white collar occupations. It also extends to occupations which might be viewed as blue collar, such as conductors, caretakers and watchmen.

At the political level the critical point concerns the exercise of some degree of control over the labour process. This covers various levels of management and extends down to foremen, supervisors and inspectors as well as occupations such as chief clerk or chief mechanic [15]. Also included here are occupations such as timekeepers, whose function may be broadly viewed as contributing to the maintenance of labour discipline and thereby aiding in the extraction of surplus value or surplus labour.

A consideration of ideological relations involves the inclusion of a number of other occupational categories within the new petty bourgeoisie. Here the concern is with those occupations whose performances may be regarded as contributing to the inculcation, maintenance and utilization of the dominant ideology. This obviously covers teachers and policemen, for example, but also extends to certain occupations which involve

dealing with the general public. On this basis waiters and telephone operators have been designated as members of the new petty bourgeoisie.

With the empirical terrain of the new petty bourgeoisie established in broad outline it is now possible to broach the more complex question, both theoretically and empirically, of the internal structure of this class. The new petty bourgeoisie exist in a context of polarization between the two major classes in a highly fractured state. The class places of the new petty bourgeoisie represent the effects of the extended social division of labour, which is, in turn, fuelled by the accumulation of capital.

These class places, however, represent a unity, but a unity which exists only in its diversity. The new petty bourgeoisie consists of a number of different fractions, each of which, subject to the effects of polarization, will be polarized towards or away from one of the major classes. Yet these relationships, the social division of labour, polarization and class fractions are all processes in continual change. Thus the class fractions of the new petty bourgeoisie, their content and their boundaries, are not constant. They do not represent absolute, but empty categories into which the empirical data can then, so to speak, be poured. This dynamic quality means that any static analysis such as mapping is likely to produce a distorted impression.

Given the nature of this study this is unfortunate but unavoidable, and it will be the task of chapter 8 to restore the dynamism of process.

For the present, however, the next step must be a brief discussion of the various fractions of the new petty bourgeoisie recognised in this study. These are:-

- 1) Professional
- 2) Managerial
- 3) Unproductive manual labour
- 4) Supervisory
- 5) Mental labour

PROFESSIONAL. Professional represents a fairly distinct group with a considerable degree of autonomy both over their own labour process and also, directly or mediated through the state, of the mechanisms of recruitment into their own ranks. Moreover their place in the social division of labour is closely linked to either the economic, political or ideological requirements of capital. Some, such as engineers or architects, may exercise a fairly direct control over the labour process. Others, such as lawyers or teachers, are involved in sustaining or inculcating the hegemonic ideology. Moreover such would appear to be the case whether the professional is employed on the basis of salary or a fee, and hence in the latter case, ostensibly independent. Thus no differentiation has been made between professionals who were

employees and those who were self employed. Finally, and in confirmation of the proximity between professionals and the place of capital, it should be recorded that a number of professionals qualify as members of the bourgeoisie; lawyers being particularly prominent in this regard.

It seems fairly clear, therefore, that this fraction of the new petty bourgeoisie will be polarized towards the bourgeoisie. Indeed, the trade union paper in Vancouver commented that "there is no class of persons that have as little sympathy for the trade unions of workingmen as the professional class" (Ind., Sep. 8th, 1900).

MANAGERIAL. This fraction is involved in the exercise of those powers derived from a significant degree of possession of the means of production, and hence is concerned with the control of the labour process, productive and unproductive, and the exercise of relations of political domination. Its upper boundary has already been discussed in terms of the limits of the bourgeoisie. The lower boundary, for theoretical and empirical reasons, is less clear. These two problems are in fact related and refer to the lack of precision in occupational data with respect to the dynamic of the social division of labour [16].

Here this group has been taken to include all managers and assistant managers, the aforementioned nominally independent

agents, insurance agents, ship's captains, certain state functionaries such as postmaster, chief of police, and that segment of the CPR managerial hierarchy whose job title includes the term agent - passenger agent, route agent, ticket agent. In the case of the CPR the term agent seems to refer to those individuals in charge of particular aspects, or divisions, of the overall labour process.

The managerial fraction of the new petty bourgeoisie may logically be expected to be polarized towards the bourgeoisie.

MANUAL LABOUR. This fraction is engaged in the performance of unproductive manual labour. It is therefore in a subordinate position and is differentiated from the working class by the fact that surplus labour and not surplus value is extracted. It encompasses occupations such as stewards, porters, janitors, caretakers, letter carriers, messengers and street car conductors.

In fact it is by no means easy to separate empirically this fraction from the working class. One example should serve to illustrate this problem. A fireman employed by the CPR may be assigned to the working class, but the same job category, fireman, also refers to a body of city employees who perform a very different function and who belong to the fraction under consideration here. The difficulty arises when the job category

is not accompanied by information on the place of work. In such circumstances the individuals have been assigned to the working class. As a result of such procedures the manual fraction is under-represented, but this distortion should not substantially affect the overall analysis.

Unproductive manual workers may be expected to be polarized towards the working class. Thus letter carriers and street car conductors, for example, were involved in the union movement by 1901 [17].

SUPERVISORY. The effects of polarization on the preceding fractions have been fairly straightforward and unambiguous. In the case of this and the subsequent class fraction the situation is more complex. More complex because certain effects of the dynamism of the social division of labour are concentrated here, the "skilling" and "de-skilling" of occupational categories within the new petty bourgeoisie as a whole [18].

The supervisory fraction is involved in the lowest levels of control of the labour process and the implementation of political domination. It has been taken here to encompass such occupations as inspector, including state functionaries, supervisors, foremen, ship's mates, tallymen and the police, together with various other designations such as chief clerk and head waiter.

The effects of polarization on this fraction are likely to be of a contradictory nature. On the one hand, they are involved, albeit to a limited degree, in the exercise of the powers emanating from capital, and thus may be expected to be polarized in that direction. On the other hand, some at least, are involved directly in the labour process and may perform productive labour. This would be particularly so in the case of smaller capitals where the social division of labour was not extensive.

Also pertinent here is the question of the mechanisms by which individuals were recruited to this fraction. This is a difficult problem and one requiring much more research, both empirical and theoretical, but certain comments are possible at this stage.

These occupations generally involve the acquisition of a certain degree of technical expertise, an expertise which may be differentiated from manual dexterity. Given the limited nature of technical education in the nineteenth century, and Vancouver was no exception (see Foster, 1970) such expertise was likely to have been acquired in the workplace itself. It seems likely therefore, that some or perhaps many of the individuals in this category will have been recruited from, and retained an ideological community with, the working class.

Indeed there is some fairly clear evidence that such processes did in fact occur, at least in the printing industry. In 1901 P.W. Fowler, W.B. Hughes and George Wilby were listed in the city directory as foremen and assistant foreman respectively. All three were members of the International Typographical Union, Local 226, and, by 1901, long time residents of Vancouver. Fowler and Hughes had both arrived by 1890 and began there careers in Vancouver as printers, i.e. as members of the working class, and Wilby had been a member of the ITU since 1895 [19].

How common this process was remains, of course, unknown and it must be admitted that the printing industry was probably somewhat exceptional, at least in terms of the stability of the workforce. Nonetheless, the example does serve to show the existence of the process intimated and the contradictory forces operating on the supervisory fraction.

MENTAL LABOUR. This fraction consists primarily of clerical labour of various kinds and, at this time period, was primarily involved in the circulatory moments of capital. Included here, then, are clerks of various kinds - retail, office, legal - together with bookkeepers, stenographers, typewriters, cashiers, travellers, waiters and waitresses. Also included in this fraction are a number of other occupations which may be said to have a significant mental labour component such as journalists, law students, nurses and telephone operators.

The effects of polarization on this particular fraction also appear to be of a contradictory nature. On the one hand the ideological position of mental labour as a whole would suggest a polarization towards the bourgeoisie. Against this, mental work could also involve the performance of surplus labour.

There is evidence to indicate that this fraction was the point of entry into the labour process for some of the children of the bourgeoisie. Unfortunately the lack of any definite data on family composition in the City Directory makes an overall assessment of this process impossible. Nonetheless in a number of cases the evidence is fairly clear. At 1320 Burnaby Street lived W.F. Salsbury, the local treasurer of the CPR (and a director of a number of companies), along with a W.F. jr. and a F.T. Salsbury; the latter two being listed as a clerk and a bank clerk respectively. The company of McDowell, Atkins and Watson included on their staff as clerks, M.S. McDowell and J.M. Watson, although in this case neither lived with the respective principals of the company. Similarly the wholesale company of Oppenheimer Brothers included two clerks by name of Oppenheimer among their Powell Street staff. Membership of this fraction, in some instances at least, was probably only a training ground for the next generation of the bourgeoisie.

There is also reason to suggest that the subsidiary nature of this type of mental labour, in family terms, was not

restricted to the bourgeoisie. The lack of data on family structure rules out direct confirmation of this proposition, but circumstantial evidence does point towards the probability that recruitment into mental labour extended to people of working class origins. It is, after all one of the strengths of the class structure under capitalism that the classes are not castes.

The educational system may be assumed to play an important role in distributing individuals into the particular class fraction under consideration here. The basic requirements for entry would be literacy, numeracy and the necessary politesse, which given free and universal education would have been fairly widely distributed.

Two further points can be made concerning the contradictory forces operating upon the structural location of the mental labour fraction. The first of these concerns the question of the feminization of the labour process. In so far as this serves as an indicator of a "de-skilling" process it is suggestive of a tendency towards a polarization in the direction of the working class. It is important to note therefore, that within the limitations of the data mental and especially clerical labour was the principal area of female employment in Vancouver in 1901.

The second point concerns the development of unionization within mental labour. Two examples of this are known, the Retail

Clerks international Protective Association #279, formed in April 1899, and the Waiters and Bartender's Alliance #28, formed in July 1900 [20].

What is happening here, it would seem, is the beginning of a process involving a shift in the boundary between the mental and manual fractions of the new petty bourgeoisie, the process of de-skilling being the consequence of an extension in the social division of labour [21].

Since this process of the movement of the boundary between mental and manual was in a preliminary stage, and also because of the imprecision of the data (e.g. the single category of clerk), all clerical labour has been included within the mental category. Nonetheless, the existence of this tendency must be borne in mind when considering probable residential locations of this fraction.

The implications of the preceding discussion are that the distribution of the mental labour fraction of the new petty bourgeoisie is likely to be a complex one. Bourgeois and bourgeois leaning elements are undoubtedly present, and may well predominate, but some overlap with the working class is also indicated.

THE SPATIAL CONTEXT.

THE PHYSICAL LANDSCAPE. As can be seen in Map 1 the physical setting of Vancouver is far from uniform. It consists of a highly variegated environment with an interpenetration of land and sea. The deep water harbour of Burrard Inlet and the shallower body of False Creek with its tidal flats are separated by the Vancouver peninsula. There is also considerable local variation in relief. The Vancouver peninsula consists of two hills, the westerly one being the higher, separated by a small, low lying and originally tidal area. South of False Creek the land rises fairly rapidly away from the water's edge. To this description should be added three features not apparent on Map 1. These consist of the mountains to the north of Burrard Inlet, the Gulf Islands of Georgia Strait and the mountains of Vancouver Island to the west, and Stanley Park. All these features contributed to the "most exquisite" surroundings for the city, especially the western portion [22].

WORK PLACES. Map 2 shows one important aspect of the social appropriation of the environment just described, the distribution of workplaces. Confining attention initially to the overall pattern, several features require comment. Firstly, in the West End there is a noticeable lack of places of employment. Of the few located in this area the majority are situated on the periphery. Within the residential area west of Thurlow Street there was only a school and a greenhouse or nursery. The "facts

B

25

25

50

75


100

125

150

25


1 of



B u r r a r d

2 of

I n l e t




F a l s e


Map 1 Topography of the Vancouver Area

n l e t


3 of




C r e e




Contour Interval 25 Feet



4 of 1





75

Dupont St

Princess St

50

25

50

Keeler St

Harris St

Barnard St

Prior St

Grove St

Grove Crescent

Venables St

Park Ave

s e

Cree k

6 of 6

Front St. E.

Dufferin St. E.

Lorne St. E.

Landsowne Ave. E.

Fifth Ave. E.

Sixth Ave. E.

Seventh Ave. E.

Eighth Ave. E.

Ninth Ave. E.

Tenth Ave. E.

Eleventh Ave. E.

Twelfth Ave. E.

Thirteenth Ave. E.

Fourteenth Ave. E.

Fifteenth Ave. E.

Westminster Ave.

Westminster Road

Scotch St.

Prince Edward St.

Victoria St.

St. George St.

Caroline St.

Scott St.

Burton St.

St. Ann's St.

Dundas St.

Queen St.

North Dr.

25

50

75

150

150

100

125

B

25

25

50

75


100

125

150

25


1 of



B
u
r
r
a
r
d

2 of 1

I
n
l
e
t




F
a
l
s
e

Map 1 Topography of the Vancouver Area


n l e t

3 of




s e


C r e e



Contour Interval 25 Feet




4 of




F a l s e

5 of



B
U




1 of



B u r r a r d

2 of

l i n e t




F a l s e

Map 2 Distribution of Work - Places, Vancouver 1901


n l e t

3 of



s e

C r e



Type of Work - Place



Industrial Capital



Petty Commodity Production & Circulation




Commercial & Money Capital




Agricultural



State Establishments




4 of



F a l s e

1/2 1 1 1/2
1/2 1 1 1/2
Mi.
Km.

5 of



C r e e k

6096

A

A

A

A

A

A

A

Scotia St

s e

V

S

of production" are noticeably absent.

On the other hand, there are two major areas of employment and several minor ones. The first is located along and adjacent to the waterfront: on Burrard Inlet east of Burrard Street and on both sides of False Creek, chiefly between Granville Street and Westminster Avenue. The second major area covers the central part of the city, extending between Granville Street and Westminster Avenue and as far south as Smithe and Prior Streets.

The nature of these two employment areas was very different. Map 2 shows the first to be occupied almost exclusively by productive capital, and it represents the major working area of the working class. The second area is more complex, but it may safely be described as the "commercial" centre of the city. As such it is the primary locus of commercial and money capital, although there are a number of productive and petty commodity establishments, especially east of Cambie Street. This area is a centre of unproductive labour.


Three minor areas may also be noted: Yaletown (adjacent to the CPR shops), the area east of Westminster Avenue and north of False Creek, and the area in the vicinity of the junction of Westminster Avenue and Westminster Road. Each of these areas, to varying degrees, contains a mixture of productive, unproductive and petty commodity establishments.

THE HOUSING MARKET. Contemporary descriptions and recent studies have outlined the basic features of the spatial patterns of housing quality in Vancouver at the beginning of the twentieth century. The B.C. Review (Mar. 31st, 1900) observed that the "better class of residences" were located in the West End, a fact amply substantiated by Robertson (1977). In contrast, "an altogether different class of building ... more of the cottage class" was found in the East End. South of False Creek the situation was variable with a "few large houses in Fairview", but principally the "smaller class of residence" (B.C. Review, Mar. 31st, 1900). Gibson (1972, see Map 5) has provided support for this general description and added that Yaletown contained the homes of members of "organized labour".

This general description may be supplemented in two ways. The first, shown in Map 3, concerns lot sizes. Basically the West End was subdivided into 66 foot lots, whereas in the areas east of Burrard Street the lot sizes were 33 foot or 25 foot. Map 3, however, shows that in some parts of the West End the lots had been subdivided and that in some areas beyond the West End houses had been built on double lots. This suggests both some "lower" quality housing in the West End and some "higher" quality housing elsewhere.

The other important supplement concerns the recognition that not all housing consisted of single family dwellings. In a new

B



1 of

7


11

B
u
r
r
a
r
d

Map

2 of

l
i
n
e




F
a
l
s
e

Map 3 Divided and Double Building Lots, Vancouver 1901


n l e t

3 of



s e

C r e e



Divided Lots




Double Lots

0
0

1/2

4 of



F a l s e

Front St. E
Dufferin St. E
Lorne St. E
Landsowne Ave. E
Fifth Ave. E
Sixth Ave. E
Seventh Ave. E
Eighth Ave. E
Ninth Ave. E
Tenth Ave. E
Eleventh Ave. E
Twelfth Ave. E
Thirteenth Ave. E
Fourteenth Ave. E
Fifteenth Ave. E

Front St. W
Dufferin St. W
Lorne St. W
Landsowne Ave. W
Fifth Ave. W


Howe St
Granville St
Raymond St
Nichols St
Horne St
Hamilton
Carroll St
Sandy St

Spruce St
Oak St
Laurel St
Willow St
Heather St
Ash St
Bridge St
Tukon St
Alberta St
Columbia St
Manitoba St
Ontario St

12
1
1 1/2
1 Mi.
Km.



5 of 1



Dupont St

Princess St

Keeler St

Harris St

Barnard St

Prior St

Grove St

Venables St

s e

C r e e k

6096

Front St E

Dufferin St E

Lorne St E

Landsowne Ave E

Fifth Ave E

Sixth Ave E

Seventh Ave E

Eighth Ave E

Ninth Ave E

Tenth Ave E

Eleventh Ave E

Twelfth Ave E

Thirteenth Ave E

Fourteenth Ave E

Fifteenth Ave E

Westminster Ave

Quebec St

Scotia St

Washington Road

Soprin St

Fifth Ave E

Prince Edward St

Victoria St

St George St

Carlton St

Scott St

Burns St

St Camille St

Dock St

Green St

Reserve St

city like Vancouver, with a ratio of males to females at approximately 6:4, the relevance of this point is clear.

Table 7:1 provides a listing of some of the boarding houses located in the areas beyond the commercial centre. The most interesting point that emerges is the number of these establishments located on the margins of the West End. Five are on Burrard Street, two more on Pender Street on blocks abutting Burrard Street, and one on Georgia Street just over a block from Burrard Street. Nor is Table 7:1 complete. For example, the city directory lists the resident of 786 Bute Street as a widow, Mrs. B.L. Wolfe. Crosschecking of the directory, however, reveals that Mrs. Wolfe had a number of companions in her abode, eleven in fact.

Table 7:1

Boarding Houses and Furnished Rooms outside the City Centre, 1901.

544	Burrard St.	109	Heatley Ave.
552	Burrard St.	439	Homer St.
638	Burrard St.	514	Homer St.
868	Burrard St.	606	Homer St.
989	Burrard St.	919	Pender St.
719	Georgia St.	1064	Pender St.
813	Georgia St.	240	Powell St. (*)
717	Hamilton St.	513	Richards St.

(*) Japanese boarding house

Source: Henderson's British Columbia Gazetteer and Directory, 1901.

Tables 7:2 and 7:3 provide information on the quality and distribution of hotel accommodation. The simple differentiation

into cheap and expensive hotels, on the basis of information on the tariffs, provides a broad indicator of the quality of the accomodation.

Table 7:2

Dollar a Day Hotels, 1901

Hotel	Address	Hotel	Address
Acadia	222 Abbott	Gold House	64 Water
Arlington *	302 Cordova W.	Golden Gate *	1200 Granville
Avenue	101 Dupont	Grand *	614 Cordova W.
Balmoral	2 Cordova W.	Granville	24 Water
Barnard Castle	852 Powell	Imperial	135 Water
Blackburn House	318 Westm. Ave	Kings	218 Carrall
Boulder	3 Cordova W.	Klondyke	210 Carrall
Bridge	1080 Westm. Ave	New Fountain	29 Cordova W.
Cabinet	170 Water	Norden	23 Cordova W.
Carter House	154 Water	Ottawa *	612 Pender
Central	42 Cordova W.	Palace	353 Carrall
City	47 Powell	Queens *	427 Cordova W.
Clarence *	600 Pender	Regina	300 Water
Colonial *	1300 Granville	Revere House *	600 Cordova W.
Columbia	40 Cordova E.	Secord	401 Powell
Cosmopolitan	101 Cordova W.	Sherman House	322 Water
Delmonico *	605 Pender	Sunnyside	1 Water
Dougal House	312 Abbott	Terminus	34 Water
Europe	33 Powell	Union	?
Gambrinus	?	Waverley *	600 Georgia
Glasgow	505 Westm. Ave	Western	175 Water

* Locations west of Cambie Street and north of Cordova Street

Source: Report of Collector of Votes, Vancouver City, BCSP, 1901, pp. 699-700; addresses from Henderson's British Columbia Gazetteer and Directory, 1901.

The distribution of the cheap, dollar-a-day hotels is striking. They are primarily located in the eastern part of the city centre, with two in the East End. Of the forty addresses listed, thirty are located in this eastern area. Two of the remainder are in Yaletown (Golden Gate and Colonial) and only

eight in the western part of the city centre, mostly close to the CPR terminus.

Table 7:3

Higher Tariff Hotels, 1901

Hotel	Address	Hotel	Address
Alhambra	6 Water	Metropole	307 Abbott
Badminton *	603 Howe	Strand *	624 Hastings W
Commercial	340 Cambie	Vancouver *	701 Granville
Leland *	628 Hastings W		

* Locations west of Cambie Street and north of Cordova Street

Source: see Table 7:2

The distribution of the more expensive hotels, Table 7:3, exhibits an opposite, though less pronounced, tendency. Four of the seven, including the Hotel Vancouver, are located in the western part of the commercial centre [23]. All of these hotels are located west of Carrall Street.

Rather than attempting to summarize these points on the spatial context and drawing out their implications in terms of residential patterns, it seems advisable to turn directly to the latter. The information on the spatial parameters can then be incorporated into the discussion whenever and wherever appropriate.

RESULTS.

Since this analysis is concerned with the differential spatial distribution of classes and class fractions, a


preliminary requirement is data on the overall distribution of the population. This is shown in Map 4, which thus serves as a referent against which other distributions may be compared.

The population in Map 4 represents the total population included in the subsequent analysis. This population is less than the total listing in the directory. Not all of the slightly more than 9,000 names included in the directory are accompanied by information on residential location. Utilizing a limited number of assumptions this figure has been limited to approximately 7,000 [24].


The assumptions here are twofold. Hotel owners and employees, unless otherwise indicated, are assumed to have lived on the premises [25]. Secondly, owners of businesses, primarily retail outlets, are assumed to have lived on the premises if no other residential information is available. An examination of Goad's Fire Insurance Atlas indicated the general existence of such accommodation, and hence the reasonableness of the assumption.

The decision to use the individual block as the unit of aggregation for mapping has had the effect of reducing the population. The residential information required for inclusion is block specific, so that addresses such as 3rd Avenue, Mount Pleasant, or 8th Avenue and Willow do not provide the necessary

B




1 of



B
u
r
r
a
r
d

2 of

l
i
n
e
t




F
a
l
s
e

Map 4 Residential Distribution of All Classes, Vancouver 1901


n l e t

3 of



s e

C r e e




Number of People
per Block


- 1 1 - 9
- 2 10 - 29
- 3 30 - 59
- 4 60 - Over



Non - Residential Blocks



4 of




F a l s e

12

1 Mi.

1 1/2 Km.

5 of 2



specificity, and these individuals have been excluded. At the same time use was made of subsequent directories to provide the specificity where possible. The end result of this requirement is that the data are rather fragmentary for some of the extremities, especially south of False Creek.

It should also be noted that Map 4 represents absolute numbers, and not densities as such. Since the block is the unit of mapping, a certain distortion is introduced by the variability of block size, of which the Map takes no account. The distribution revealed in Map 4 shows considerable spatial variation. The major concentrations are, firstly, an area east of Granville Street and south of Pender to Smith Street. This area includes the highest single value, 92 people, and almost all blocks fall within the top two categories; this is an area of multiple dwellings.

Secondly an area west of Granville Street to Bute Street and south from Pender Street to Helcken Street. The values here are less uniformly high. The area includes many of the boarding houses discussed earlier (see above) and is also the part of the West End in which many of the original 66 feet lots have been subdivided (see Goad's Fire Insurance Atlas).

The third area is the section of the commercial centre east of Cambie Street. This extends eastwards beyond Westminster

Avenue into the East End. The eastern limits of this area are by no means precise since, while the population decreases eastwards, there are some important irregularities and discontinuities.

A fourth area, but one of lesser concentration, existed in Yaletown, with its peak in the south east of the area. There is also an area west of Yaletown and south of Davie Street which appears as something of an extension of Yaletown. This latter area is also one in which many, if not most of the original 66 foot lots have been subdivided.

South of False Creek the main concentration, although at a much lower level, is situated around the junction of Westminster Avenue and Westminster Road, decreasing in an irregular fashion away from that intersection. Still lesser concentrations are to be found in the vicinity of the three bridges crossing False Creek - Centre Street, Bridge Street and Westminster Avenue. Elsewhere south of False Creek the populations are low.

The other major area of low values is in the West End, especially in the more southerly and westerly portions. Elsewhere the low values are irregularly distributed, except for a small band on the extremities of the East End.

Two final comments need to be made concerning areas of probable under-representation on Map 4. The first of these


concerns the Chinese and Japanese who, as previously mentioned, are largely absent from the directory. These were primarily situated on the eastern fringe of the commercial area, and will be considered in detail in a subsequent section.

The second locus of concern is the commercial area itself, especially the section between Cambie Street and Westminster Avenue, which included many cheap hotels. In order to check the suspicion of under-representation in this area a comparison was made with data obtained from the manuscript voters list for 1901. The results are shown in Map 5. The Map generally confirms the suspected under-representation, although not for the entire area. The under-representation is principally confined to the blocks bordering on Water Street and between Alexander and Powell Streets, most of which should be raised one interval of the scale used on Map 4. The result is that this area should be seen as the most densely populated part of the city. At the same time a significant proportion of the population was transient in nature [26].

BOURGEOISIE.

With these preliminary points established it is now possible to concentrate upon the major task at hand; the residential patterns of the different classes and class fractions. The order of presentation will be firstly to examine the bourgeoisie, as the dominant social force, and then the working class, the

B



10f




B
u
r
r
a
r
d

Map

l
i
n
e
t

2 of




F
a
l
s
e

Map 5 Probable Areas of Under - Representation,
Vancouver 1901


n l e t

3 of



s e

C r e




Number of People
per Block


- 1 1 - 9
- 2 10 - 29
- 3 30 - 59
- 4 60 - Over

 Non-Residential Blocks

Blocks with a Higher
Population than in
Map 4.



4 of



F a l s e

12

1 Mi.

12

1

1 1/2

Km.

5 of 1

1 2

Dupont St

3

Princess St

Keefer St

Harris St

Barnard St

Prior St

Grove St

Grove

Crescent

Vanables St

Park Ave

s e

C r e e k

6 of 6

Front St. E

Dufferin St. E

Lorne St. E

Landspowne Ave. E

Fifth Ave. E

Sixth Ave. E

Seventh Ave. E

Eighth Ave. E

Ninth Ave. E

Tenth Ave. E

Eleventh Ave. E

Twelfth Ave. E

Thirteenth Ave. E

Fourteenth Ave. E

Fifteenth Ave. E

Westminster Ave

Westminster Road

Scotia St

Prince Edward St

Victoria St

St. George St

Carolina St

Scott St

Burns St

St. Catharines St

Lock St

Manitoba St

Ontario St

Scotias St


other principal class. Attention will then be focused on the subsidiary classes, the new petty bourgeoisie and the traditional petty bourgeoisie, in that order.

Map 6 shows the distribution of the bourgeoisie in Vancouver in 1901, according to the fairly catholic criteria enumerated earlier. A number of features are immediately apparent in the map. Firstly, the importance of the West End, the area west of Burrard Street, is obvious. This area contains the largest single concentration, fifteen in number, in the block bounded by Melville, Thurlow, Georgia and Bute Streets, and a fairly high representation throughout the north eastern portion, roughly to the height of land.

Also important is the area extending from Burrard Street to the western part of the commercial area, to Seymour Street (cf. map 2). This area contained the better quality hotels and the Vancouver Club. The CPR owned Hotel Vancouver was the most prestigious of these hotels and counted eleven members of the bourgeoisie among its residents [27]. This area also included a number of houses built on double size lots, i.e. double the 33 feet lots.

Also on the west side of the city as a whole are two other areas of relative concentration [28]. The first of these, between Cambie and Carrall Streets, included three of the better quality


B



2 of

B u r r a r d

I n l e t




F a l s e

Map 6 Residential Distribution of the Bourgeoisie,
Vancouver 1901



n l e t

3 of



s e

C r




Number of Class
Members per Block

- 0 0
- 1 1-2
- 2 3-5
- 3 6-9
- 4 10-Over


Non-Residential Blocks



4 of



5 of



hotels and also one instance where the hotel owner has been assumed to reside on his property. More surprising is the area between Hamilton and Homer Streets, lying outside the commercial area.

Turning to the East End the most obvious and significant point is the much lower representation, with no block containing more than five members of the bourgeoisie. The area of higher ground and higher house values - Alexander, Cordova E. and Hastings W. Streets are well represented, although the distribution is not confined to these areas.

South of False Creek the pattern is less clear, although again, and partly because, the numbers are low. The maximum in any one block is three. In the main the distribution is biased towards the higher land. However, the major concentration, in so far as there is one, is around the intersection of Westminster Avenue and Westminster Road.


The discussion so far has focused upon those areas of relative and absolute concentration; those areas with the greater numbers of the bourgeoisie. Yet in some important ways this is to miss the point. One feature of the bourgeoisie, of the wealth of the bourgeoisie, is the capacity to buy private space, to avoid concentration. This is an important point and one which requires further examination of Map 6.

The significant feature in this respect concerns the West End. In addition to being an area of concentration, it is also an area in which the bourgeoisie is extremely widely distributed. There are very few residential blocks west of Burrard Street which do not contain a member of the bourgeoisie.

Finally, it is worth noting the areas of omission; those in which the bourgeoisie do not reside, or only very few of them. Two such areas stand out: Yaletown and the East End. There are clearly elements of a bi-polar distribution, although this is of a complex and not a simple nature.

At the same time a number of anomalies remain concerning the distribution of the bourgeoisie, anomalies which deserve further enquiry. Until now the bourgeoisie has been considered as a unified entity, a class without internal divisions. The theory of historical materialism suggests that this is not the case and that important divisions exist in terms of both size and function (productive and unproductive). This, then, suggests a fruitful line of enquiry.

Map 7 represents an attempt to provide some further information on the importance of the amount of capital represented by individual members of the bourgeoisie. The Map shows the distribution of two related populations. The first of these is the directors of all companies with head offices



1 of

B

U


Dupont St

Pinecrest St

B u r r a r d

I n l e t

2 of




F a l s e

Map 7 Residential Distribution of the Medium and Large Bourgeoise, Vancouver 1901


n l e t


3 of





s e

C r e






F a l s e



5 of



s e

C r e e k

60/6

Dupont St

Princess St

Keefer St

Harris St

Barnard St

Prior St

Grove St

Venables St

Park Ave

Grove

Crescent

Front St E

Dufferin St E

Lorne St E

Landsowne Ave E

Fifth Ave E

Sixth Ave E

Seventh Ave E

Eighth Ave E

Ninth Ave E

Tenth Ave E

Eleventh Ave E

Twelfth Ave E

Thirteenth Ave E

Fourteenth Ave E

Fifteenth Ave E

Mimosa St

Ontario St

Westminister Ave

Scotia St

Prince Edward St

Victoria St

St. George St

Caroline St

Scott St

Burns St

St. Catherine's St

Dock St

Glen Dr

West Dr

Westminister Road

Scotia St

registered in Vancouver, and known to have been operating for at least part of the period 1898-1901 [29, see above chap 6]. The assumption involved with respect to this population is that the criterion serves to exclude the least important members of the bourgeoisie, the small bourgeoisie.

The overall distribution shown in Map 7 indicates that the major elements described and contained in Map 6 remain, but there are also some interesting differences. The two major areas of concentration, the West End and Burrard to Seymour Streets, stand out even more clearly, with the Hotel Vancouver particularly prominent. The Homer to Hamilton Streets and the Cambie to Carrall areas are of reduced significance, especially the latter. The East End is thinly represented although the orientation towards Alexander, Cordova E. and Hastings E. Streets, together with the higher ground is much clearer. South of False Creek the significance of the higher ground is also more readily apparent, with only two members of the bourgeoisie residing north of 5th Avenue. The area between Centre and Bridge Street has also taken on more importance. Finally the Yaletown area is entirely unrepresented.

The second distribution illustrated in Map 7 is a sub set of the first. It represents an attempt to delimit the leading members of the bourgeoisie in Vancouver, the large bourgeoisie. The criterion selected to achieve this delimitation is the

holding of directorships in at least three different companies. Although not a perfect measure, containing no reference to the size of capitals involved, it should be adequate for present purposes.

The distribution in this case is striking: only one individual living east of Granville Street. Once again the West End and the Hotel Vancouver are particularly prominent. South of False Creek the area between Centre and Bridge Streets, and more specifically between Birch and Spruce Streets, assumes a greater importance while the lower land is completely unrepresented.


Since the large bourgeoisie are so concentrated in the West End it is advisable to consider that area in more detail, to consider its internal structure. The north eastern area, north of Alberni stands out as the area of greatest concentration, with the north side of Seaton Street, overlooking the sea, of particular prominence. On the other hand, there are lesser clusters in those parts of the West End more distant from the city centre; the more westerly and southerly parts of the area. In fact it would appear that the large bourgeoisie are disproportionately represented in these localities. It might be argued, then, that the large bourgeoisie were leading a movement in this direction, away from the city centre into an area of lesser population and where the 66 feet lots remained intact.

Map 8 attempts to examine the validity of this assertion. The population shown is a sub set of the large bourgeoisie; in this instance the long term residents of Vancouver, i.e. residence in the city since at least 1891. The Map compares and links the residential locations of this group in 1891 and 1901. It shows changes in residential locations, the directions of these changes, together with "permanent" residences, i.e. no change in location over the time period.


The most obvious feature of Map 8 is the movement in a southerly and westerly direction. In fact, every change in location, i.e. every arrow, contains a southerly or westerly component in its orientation. Every movement that is except one. Thomas Dunn, a prominent wholesale merchant, moved from the 1100 block on Georgia Street to the 1000 block on the same street. The map also shows a pattern of movement into the more distant portions of the West End, and also into the area between Birch and Spruce Streets.

Equally interesting and important are the areas abandoned, or the points of departure. Two areas stand out. An area adjacent to the western part of the commercial centre and the East End. This suggests these areas by 1901 had something of a residual nature. At the same time it should be pointed out that the data refer to the large bourgeoisie of 1901 and not of 1891 [30].

B



1 of 1




FIRST AVE. W.

B u r r a r d

Map

2 of

l i n e t




F a l s e

Map 8 Residential Distribution of the Large Bourgeoisie,
Vancouver 1891 & 1901


n l e t


3 of



s e

C r e





F a l s e

To New W

1/2


1

1/2

1 Mi.

Km.

5 of



Dupont St

Princess St

Keefer St

Harris St

Barnard St

Prior St

Grove St

Grove

Crescent

Venables St

To New Westminster

C r e e k

60/6

Front St E

Duffen St E

Lorne St E

Landsowne Ave E

Fifth Ave E

Sixth Ave E

Seventh Ave E

Eighth Ave E

Ninth Ave E

Tenth Ave E

Eleventh Ave E

Twelfth Ave E

Thirteenth Ave E

Fourteenth Ave E

Fifteenth Ave E

Westminster Ave

Westminster Park

Scotia St

Prince Edward St

Victoria St

St George St

Caronde St

Scott St

Burns St

St Camilles St

Cook St

Glen Dr

Kenmore Dr

Finally, attention may be directed towards the locations of permanent residence, that is the individuals who occupied the same residence in 1891 and 1901. The majority of these are located in the West End, and chiefly in the north eastern section, suggesting that this was an early area of bourgeois residence. Outside of the West End the Hotel Vancouver stands out as the long-time residence of the two Oppenheimer brothers [31]. Two individuals were long-time residents south of False Creek; one in the area between Spruce and Birch Streets, and the other on the higher land between Westminster Avenue and Westminster Road.

The bourgeoisie may also be differentiated on the basis of the type of capital which they represent; productive or unproductive (i.e. in circulation - commercial and money capital). At the level of particular individuals it is by no means always easy to assign any given individual to a particular fraction. For example, to which fraction should a merchant who was a director of a mining company belong? In such circumstances, and they were not uncommon, the occupational category listed in the city directory has been taken as primary. Thus in the example just posed the individual would be considered to fall in the circulation category. Also included here are lawyers and such rentier elements indicated by the occupational category of gentleman and speculator.

Table 7:4 shows the results, for selected easily definable areas, of such a division. The data indicate that there was a marked difference between the West End and other areas. It should also be noted that the somewhat anomalous area of bourgeois concentration in Map 6, the three block area in the second highest category between Homer and Hamilton Streets, is of the same relative composition as Yaletown and the East End, i.e. 15 productive and 6 circulation. In addition many of the individuals falling into the productive category were involved in enterprises located outside of the city [32].

Table 7:4

Distribution of Bourgeoisie - by Fraction and Area.

Area	Productive	Circulation
West End	75	235
East End	56	29
Yaletown	6	4

Source: Company Records and Henderson's British Columbia Gazetteer and Directory, 1901.

These results, taken together with Map 2, and noting the differentiation by type of capital, and Map 6 and Map 7 suggest two points. Firstly that the tendency for the separation between workplace and residence was less developed for the small bourgeoisie. Secondly, that this was particularly the case for those members of the bourgeoisie representing small productive capital. That is, the bourgeoisie residing outside the primary bourgeois area tended to be involved with small and/or productive capital.

The internal structure of the bourgeoisie clearly reflects and supports the discussion in chapter 6 of the pattern of external linkages. Moreover it shows certain of the internal spatial effects of those "external" relationships.


WORKING CLASS.

Map 9 shows the residential pattern of the working class. In addition to the categories of the absolute numbers, the Map also contains a second measure of the concentration of the working class. All blocks in which at least 50% of the total population is working class have been distinguished. While this measure may be taken as providing reliable information for blocks falling into the top two and even the top three categories, for those blocks falling into the fourth and lowest category the results must be viewed with some scepticism.

Three major areas of working class concentration may be distinguished in Map 9. Firstly, an area extending from the eastern part of the commercial centre, from Abbott Street into the East End. In view of the previously noted under-representation of certain blocks in the commercial area it seems probable that this area should be extended westwards slightly to include all of the blocks on the south side of Water Street.

Taken as a whole this area contains both high absolute

B




1 of 1



B u r r a r d

2 of

l i n e




F a l s e

Map 9 Residential Distribution of the Working Class, Vancouver 1901


n l e t

3 of



s e

Cre




Number of Class
Members per Block

- 0 0
- 1 1- 4
- 2 5- 9
- 3 10-19
- 4 20-Over




Non - Residential Blocks

Blocks in which at Least
Half the Population is
Working Class.



4 of



F a l s e

1/2

1 Mi.


1/2

1

1/2 Km.



5 of



numbers and a relative concentration, although there are variations which require examination. The absolute numbers generally decline with distance from the city centre, but in a rather irregular fashion. Thus there are three blocks in the highest category east of Hawkes Street. This is presumably not unrelated to the easterly extension of productive employment sites (cf. Map 2, and n.b. especially the BCSR, Map 21).

In terms of relative concentration there are some important variations. Of particular interest are those blocks which have a high number of working class residents, but less than 50% of the total population. In the main these blocks are concentrated in the northern and western blocks of the East End. They are located on the blocks adjacent to Alexander, Cordova E. and Hastings E. Streets, and those adjacent to those parts of Westminster Avenue on relatively higher ground [33]. There are also a small number of blocks, on the southern fringes, adjacent to Harris and Barnard Streets, whose presence in this category is somewhat anomalous at this stage of the analysis.

The second area is Yaletown. The highest numbers are located in the south east portion, but only one block in the entire area is excluded by the measure of relative concentration. Moreover, this measure suggests an extension of Yaletown on the north east side, although the absolute numbers are rather low.

The third area of concentration is the area east of Seymour and south of Pender Streets. This is an area of high total population (cf. Map 4), and located between the commercial area to the north and west and industrial sites to the south and east, together with a few inside the area itself (cf. Map 2).

The measure of relative concentration of the working class further points towards the complex nature of this area. Of the twelve blocks falling into the highest category in Map 9, only one half number at least half of their population among the working class.

There are moderate numbers of working class people living in the area west of Granville Street, extending into the West End in an irregular fashion as far as Bute Street. Thereafter the numbers fall markedly [34]. In all of this area, however, there are only two blocks in which the working class number 50% or more.

The presence of a working class population in this area is somewhat surprising. The relative peak in the distribution in the area adjacent to Yaletown is suggestive, and the subdivision of lots and the existence of boarding houses in the northern part must also be borne in mind. These may well be factors attracting what is usually termed the "aristocracy of labour".

In the area south of False Creek, taken as a whole, it is by no means easy to discern any particular pattern. In part this is probably due to the lower numbers, more fragmentary data and the more recent settlement of the area. The working class are widely and fairly evenly distributed, although certain relative concentrations and omissions can be picked out. The lowland around the bridges stand out as areas of relative concentration and of working class majority. This is clear in the case of Westminster Avenue, but less obvious in the case of the other two bridges where the numbers are a good deal lower. Other peaks, blocks falling into the third category, are located almost symmetrically at a short distance from Westminster Avenue, but on the higher ground.

The most obvious area of omission is the higher ground located between Oak and Birch Streets. Less clear is the area directly adjacent to Westminster Avenue, especially on the sloping land north of the intersection with Westminster Road; here the working class is present, but not as a majority. It will be recalled that commercial development south of False Creek was concentrated in this area.

The working class is not without its internal divisions, and mention has already been made of the "aristocracy of labour". Map 10 attempts to shed some light on this highest strata of the working class. It does so by comparing their residential location


with those of labourers, taken as representative of unskilled workers.

Map 10 uses two different criteria in an attempt to distinguish the aristocracy of labour from other members of the working class: high wages and union membership. Since data on both of these criteria are fragmentary the populations defined by them have been represented discretely, although there is some overlap between the two. Finally, these two populations represent samples only [35]. The Map contains, therefore, three different cartographic populations which refer to two segments of the working class.

Taken as a whole the distribution of these three populations conforms with the overall distribution of the working class shown in Map 9, although there are a number of variations between the groups. The most pertinent of these variations are as follows. First, in the western part of the city, the West End together with the area west of Granville Street and north of Yaletown; Table 7:5 shows the distribution for the three groups in this bourgeois area.

In so far as the data can be taken to represent the aristocracy of labour, the evidence is fairly clear. It was the aristocracy of labour which was primarily responsible for the working class presence in the western part of the city.

B




1 of 1



B
u
r
r
a
r
d

I
n
l
e
t

2 of




F
a
l
s
e

Map 10 Residential Distribution of the Aristocracy of Labour and Labourers, Vancouver 1901


n l e t

3 of




s e

C r e e



Aristocracy of Labour


- Skilled Workers
- Union Members



Labourers (Unskilled Workers)

2 Number of Labourers Residing in the Block

4 of




F a l s e

12 1 Mi.
1 1.2 Km.



5 of 1



Dupont St

Princess St

Keefe St

Harris St

Barnard St

Prior St

Grove St

Grove Crescent

Venables St

Front St E

Duffern St E

Lorne St E

Landsowne Ave E

Fifth Ave E

Sixth Ave

Seventh Ave E

Eighth Ave E

Ninth Ave E

Tenth Ave E

Eleventh Ave E

Twelfth Ave E

Thirteenth Ave E

Fourteenth Ave E

Fifteenth Ave E

Fifth Ave E

Prince Edward St

Victoria St

St George St

Cardinal St

Scott St

Burns St

St Catherine's St

Lock St

Gift Dr

Nearby

6096

s e

C r e e k

Table 7:5

Working Class in the Area West of Granville - by Fraction

No.	High Wages	Union Membership	Labourers
Total Pop.	26	20	12
All Areas	183	153	330
% W. of Granville	14.2	13.0	3.6

Source: See Appendix A

In the East End, east of Westminster Avenue [36], the reverse situation obtained (see Table 7:6). Unskilled labour is clearly over-represented in this area as a whole, and especially on the peripheries.

Table 7:6

Working Class in East End - by Fraction

No.	High Wages	Union Membership	Labourers
Total Pop.	53	31	135
All Areas	183	153	330
% in East End	29.0	20.3	40.9

Source: as Table 7:5

In the other areas of working class concentration the variation between the aristocracy of labour and unskilled labour was less, particularly in Yaletown. The figures for the latter were 8.9%, 11.1% and 10.6% respectively. In the case of the area north of Yaletown and east of Granville Street (bounded by Helmcken, Granville, Pender and Beatty Streets) the data are more ambiguous [37].

Table 7:7

Working Class in Yaletown and East of Granville - by Fraction

No.	High Wages	Union Membership	Labourers
Total Pop.	28	34	39
All Areas	183	153	330
% in Yaletown & E. of Granville	15.3	22.2	11.8

Source: as Table 7:5

Given the nature of the data involved, the uncontrolled nature of the samples, the evidence cannot be taken as conclusive. But it does clearly suggest some variations within the working class areas and also a tendency for the aristocracy of labour to be biased towards the part of the city west of Carrall Street. This point is more obvious if union membership is taken as the defining criterion.

By way of summarizing the discussion thus far it is possible to subdivide the city into a number of areas. Such a subdivision will also be of value in considering the subsidiary classes and the spatial effects of polarization upon them. At the same time any attempt at subdivision must steer a course between the opposite poles of precision and comprehensibility. The more precise the subdivision the more numerous the areas recognised and the less comprehensible is the overall result. In this instance it has been decided to err on the side of comprehensibility.

The city has been subdivided into eleven areas and the divisions between them, at some cost to precision, have been kept as simple as possible. Since the block has been used as the unit of aggregation, streets have been used as the line of demarcation. In some instances this produces a certain distortion as the back alley, rather than the street front, would be a more precise dividing line. These points, however, can be borne in mind when interpreting the results.

The areas recognised are as follows:-

- 1) The West End - the area west of Burrard Street.
- 2) The area west of Granville Street and north of Yaletown - i.e. bounded by Granville, Helmcken and Burrard Streets.
- 3) The area east of Granville Street - bounded by Granville, Helmcken, Beatty and Pender Streets.
- 4) Yaletown - the area south of Helmcken between Burrard and Homer Streets.
- 5) The East End - the area east of Westminster Avenue.
- 6) The eastern part of the city centre - the area between Abbott Street and Westminster Avenue.
- 7) The western part of the city centre - bounded by Abbott, Pender and Granville Streets.

The area south of False Creek is rather more difficult to subdivide, and the subdivisions here are somewhat less meaningful. There are several reasons for this. Firstly the lower density of population and the more preliminary stage of the settlement process. In other words the social sorting appears to be less advanced, so that the theoretical problem has a material

foundation. This is further complicated by the more fragmentary and less reliable nature of the data - incomplete addresses are more common for residents of this area. The area recognised for the area south of False Creek are:-

- 8) The area north of 5th Avenue and east of Bridge Street.
- 9) The area south of 5th Avenue and east of Bridge Street.
- 10) The area south of 7th Avenue between Bridge Street and Centre Street.
- 11) The remainder - the area west of Centre Street plus the area north of 7th Avenue between Centre and Bridge Streets.

Tables 7:8 and 7:9 present the data for the bourgeoisie and the working class in two ways. Table 7:8 shows the percentage distribution of the classes in the various areas, and Table 7:9 shows the bourgeoisie and working class as a percentage of the population of each area. It should be pointed out at this stage that the population of each area includes only those whom it has been possible to assign to a class place, i.e. it excludes the unknowns.

In addition Table 7:8 includes (the figures in brackets) the population of each area as a percentage of the population of the city as a whole. Table 7:9, on the other hand, shows the total membership of the bourgeoisie and the working class as percentages of the total population. The positive and negative signs merely indicate the relationship between the percentage for each class in each area to the figures for the area as a whole

and the class as a whole.

An example will clarify this point. In Table 7:8, 43.4% of the bourgeoisie reside in the West End, as against 5.8% of the working class. Since the West End contains 18.1% of the total Table 7:8

Percentage of Bourgeoisie & Working Class in Vancouver - By Area.

Area % of Total Pop.	Bourgeoisie % of Total	Working Class % of Total
West End (18.1)	43.4 +	5.8 -
W. of Granville (8.7)	13.6 +	4.4 -
E. of Granville (16.4)	11.2 -	16.7 +
Yaletown (5.2)	1.3 -	8.5 +
East End (23.3)	10.7 -	32.2 +
E. of Abbott (7.4)	3.1 -	9.4 +
W. of Abbott (5.2)	5.7 +	3.2 -
N. of 5th Ave (2.1)	1.5 -	3.2 +
S. of 5th Ave (9.4)	6.7 -	11.2 +
S. of 7th Ave (1.2)	1.6 +	0.9 -
Remainder (3.0)	1.2 -	4.5 +

Source: see above, pp. 256-262.

population it follows that the bourgeoisie is over-represented, and the working class under-represented in the area. The positive and negative signs indicate these relationships.

Table 7:9

Bourgeoisie & Working Class as a Percentage of Area Population

Area	Bourgeoisie (10.6%)	Working Class (44.5%)
West End	25.4	14.2
	+	-
W. of Granville	16.7	22.3
	+	-
E. of Granville	7.2	45.1
	-	+
Yaletown	2.7	72.6
	-	+
East End	4.9	61.5
	-	+
E. of Abbott	4.4	56.2
	-	+
W. of Abbott	11.7	27.9
	+	-
N. of 5th Ave	7.3	66.9
	-	+
S. of 5th Ave	7.5	53.0
	-	+
S. of 7th Ave	14.8	33.3
	+	-
Remainder	4.3	68.1
	-	+

Source: as Table 7:8

In Table 7:8 it will be noted that in all instances except one the signs of the two classes are opposite, and are frequently symmetrically distributed around the figure for the percentage population of the area. The one exception is the area south of 5th Avenue. In Table 7:9 the signs for the two classes are in all cases opposite, indicating that in each area one class is relatively over-represented and the other under-represented. This data, together with the data in Maps 6 to 9, clearly indicate that there was a considerable, if complex, degree of polarization in residential terms, between the bourgeoisie and

the working class.

At the level of class places the structural polarity of the bourgeoisie and the working class was expressed spatially in terms of residential patterns. Although by no means complete, there was a clear separation between the residential distribution of these two fundamental classes. This pattern, then, provides a framework for the discussion of the subsidiary classes.

NEW PETTY BOURGEOISIE.


The new petty bourgeoisie it has been argued is a class unlike the others, being highly fractured. Furthermore the distribution of the different fractions of which it is composed is more important and revealing than that of the class as a whole. The distribution of the new petty bourgeoisie as a whole is shown in Map 11.

Consideration of this Map can be limited to a few brief comments, in order to concentrate upon the subsequent maps showing the distribution of the different fractions. The West End is strongly represented, particularly the north eastern portion, but the new petty bourgeoisie resided throughout the West End. Also strongly represented are the areas either side of Granville Street. Less prominent are the East End and the commercial area, particularly the eastern section, and more markedly so, Yaletown. South of False Creek there is a fairly broad distribution with no

7

B

10f



B u r r a r d

2 of

l n l e




F a l s e

Map 11 Residential Distribution of the New Petty Bourgeoisie, All Fractions, Vancouver 1901


n l e t

3 of



s e


C r e e




Number of Class
Members per Block


- 0 0
- 1 1 - 4
- 2 5 - 9
- 3 10 - 19
- 4 20 - Over

Non-Residential Blocks



4 of





C r e e k

6 of 6

Duquoin St

Princess St

Keefer St

Harms St

Barnard St

Prior St

Grove St

Front St E

Dufferin St E

Lorne St E

Landsowne Ave E

Fifth Ave E

Sixth Ave E

Seventh Ave E

Eighth Ave E

Ninth Ave E

Tenth Ave E

Eleventh Ave E

Twelfth Ave E

Thirteenth Ave E

Fourteenth Ave E

Fifteenth Ave E

Westminster Ave

Scotia St

Prince Edward St

Victoria St

St George St

Carroll St

Scott St

Burns St

St. Charles St

Dock St

Wardens Road

Spring St

obvious concentration. All in all the Map shows a bias towards the western part of the city.

Before turning to consider the fractions individually and the maps of their residential location reference may be made to tables 7:10 and 7:11, which summarize the results in the same way as Tables 7:8 and 7:9. The areas are those previously designated and the Tables also incorporate data for classes other than the new petty bourgeoisie. The Tables are also subdivided vertically in accordance with the anticipated polarization of the different fractions, and hence serve to indicate some preliminary findings in that regard.

Table 7:10 shows the percentage of each class and class fraction by area. It indicates that the professional and managerial fractions are clearly polarized towards the bourgeoisie. In most cases the signs for these fractions are the same as for the bourgeoisie, although there are some variations; primarily in the area south of False Creek. It should be noted that the variations are those of under-representation in areas where the bourgeoisie is over-represented, and not of over-representation in areas where the working class is over-represented.

Similarly the data suggest that the manual fraction is polarized towards the working class, although once again there

Table 7:10

Percentage Class per Area - All Classes.

	B	Pr	Mgr	Sup	Ment	Man	W	TPB
W. End (18.1)	43.4: +	41.5: +	34.1: +	26.0: +	25.1: +	5.1: -	5.8: -	16.1: -
W. of Granv. (8.7)	13.6: +	12.8: +	18.3: +	8.4: -	13.2: +	9.0: +	4.4: -	8.2: -
E. of Granv. (16.4)	11.2: -	10.0: -	17.6: +	14.4: -	19.1: +	19.2: +	16.7: +	18.1: +
Yaletown (5.1)	1.3: -	1.6: -	0.6: -	5.6: +	3.2: -	5.1: -	8.5: +	2.2: -
E. End (23.3)	10.7: -	16.3: -	13.2: -	24.0: +	15.9: -	25.6: +	32.2: +	18.5: -
E. of Abbott (7.4)	3.1: -	0.9: -	2.9: -	3.2: -	6.0: -	11.5: +	9.4: +	10.9: +
W. of Abbott (5.2)	5.7: +	2.5: -	5.5: +	4.4: -	7.2: +	10.3: +	3.2: -	9.0: +
N. of 5th. (2.1)	1.5: -	0.3: -	1.5: -	2.4: +	1.2: -	0.6: -	3.2: +	1.2: -
S. of 5th. (9.4)	6.7: -	10.9: +	3.3: -	8.0: -	6.2: -	10.3: +	11.2: +	12.1: +
S. of 7th. (1.2)	1.6: +	0.6: -	1.6: +	1.6: +	1.5: +	0.0: -	0.9: -	1.4: +
Remainder (3.0)	1.2: -	2.5: -	1.5: -	2.4: -	1.3: -	3.2: +	4.5: +	2.3: -

B - Bourgeoisie; Pr - Professional Fraction; Mgr - Managerial Fraction; Sup - Supervisory Fraction; Ment - Mental Labour Fraction; Man - Manual Labour Fraction; W - Working Class; TPB - Traditional Petty Bourgeoisie.

Source: as Table 7:8

are some exceptions which require explanation. Such explanations may be postponed temporarily, but it should be pointed out that the manual fraction is probably considerably under-represented in both Tables. Both of these issues will be pursued subsequently.

For the moment the discussion will remain at a more general level and consider the supervisory and mental fractions. It was

Table 7:11

Area by Percentage Class - All Classes.

	B	Pr	Mgr	Sup	Ment	Man	W	TPB
W. End	25.4:	10.4:	7.3	5.1:	25.1	0.6:	14.2	10.2
	+	+	+	+	+	-	-	-
W. of Granv.	16.7:	6.7:	8.2	3.4:	29.4	2.3:	22.3	10.9
	+	+	+	-	+	+	-	-
E. of Granv.	7.2:	2.8:	4.1	3.1:	22.4	2.6:	45.1	12.6
	-	-	+	-	+	+	+	+
Yaletown	2.7:	1.4:	0.5	3.8:	11.9	2.2:	72.6	4.9
	-	-	-	+	-	=	+	-
E. End	4.9:	3.2:	2.2	3.6:	13.2	2.4:	61.5	9.1
	-	-	-	+	-	+	+	-
E. of Abbott	4.4:	0.6:	1.5	1.5:	15.4	3.4:	56.2	17.0
	-	-	-	-	-	+	+	+
W. of Abbott	11.7:	2.2:	4.1	3.0:	26.7	4.4:	27.9	19.9
	+	-	+	-	+	+	-	+
N. of 5th.	7.3:	0.7:	2.6	4.0:	12.7	0.7:	66.9	6.6
	-	-	-	+	-	-	+	-
S. of 5th.	7.5:	5.3:	1.4	3.0:	12.7	2.4:	53.0	14.8
	-	+	-	-	-	+	+	+
S. of 7th.	14.8:	2.5:	4.9	4.9:	25.9	0.0:	33.3	13.6
	+	-	+	+	+	-	-	+
Remainder	4.3:	2.9:	1.9	2.4:	8.1	2.4:	68.1	9.0
	-	-	-	-	-	+	+	-
All Areas	10.6:	4.5:	3.9	3.5:	19.3	2.2:	44.5	11.5

B - Bourgeoisie; Pr - Professional Fraction; Mgr - Managerial Fraction; Sup - Supervisory Fraction; Ment - Mental Labour Fraction; Man - Manual Labour Fraction; W - Working Class; TPB - Traditional Petty Bourgeoisie.

Source: as Table 7:8

argued that the effects of polarization on these fractions would be contradictory and preliminary findings bear out this expectation. Not only is there a frequent opposition between the signs of these two fractions vis-a vis each other, but also in terms of the two major classes. For both the supervisory and mental fractions there are examples in which they, or rather one of them, and the working class are over-represented. On the other

hand agreement with the "sign" of the bourgeoisie is more common. One further point concerning these fractions is that they are more evenly distributed than either of the two principal classes, or the other unambiguously polarized fractions of the new petty bourgeoisie - professional, managerial and manual.

In the main Table 7:11 further confirms the points just made. One exception concerns the supervisory fraction and suggests that the position of this fraction is less contradictory than indicated in Table 7:10. In Table 7:11 there are no instances in which the supervisory fraction is over-represented in an area in which the working class is over-represented. This and a number of other points can be more appropriately considered by examining the fractions individually, and their distribution in cartographic form, thereby interrogating these preliminary findings.

PROFESSIONAL. Theory indicated that this fraction of the new petty bourgeoisie should be polarized towards the bourgeoisie, and its residential pattern should reflect this. The preliminary tabulated findings have indicated this to be the case, and Map 12, showing the detailed distribution lends further credence to this finding.


The West End is the most important residential area of the professional fraction, and together with the area west of

Granville Street contains over 50% of the total population [38]. One significant point, however, is added by Map 12. This concerns the West End and the presence of the professional fraction in those portions of the West End distant from Burrard Street, i.e. in the area approximately south of Haro and west of Bute Streets. This area was one into which the larger bourgeoisie were tending to move (cf. Map 8). Thus the presence of the professional fraction in this area is important additional evidence of polarization towards the bourgeoisie.

The professional fraction is also present in moderate numbers in two other areas in which the working class is in the majority and/or over-represented. Map 12 sheds some further light upon these areas: east of Granville Street and the East End. In the area east of Granville Street Map 12 shows that the professional fraction is located primarily, although not entirely, in the western half of this area. This conforms fairly well with the distribution of the bourgeoisie in the area and also with relatively lower concentrations of the working class (cf. Maps 6 and 9).

In the East End Map 12 reveals a somewhat similar pattern, although the orientation of the axis is different. Map 6 indicated that the bourgeoisie resident in the East End tended to congregate in the north western half of majority primarily in the south eastern half of the area, with the low lying blocks in the

B




1 of 1

B u r r a r d

2 of

l i n e t




F a l s e

Map 12

Residential Distribution of the New Petty Bourgeoisie, Professional Fraction, Vancouver 1901

n l e t

3 of



s e


C r




Number of Class
Members per Block


- 0 0
- 1 1
- 2 2
- 3 3
- 4 4 - Over

 Non-Residential Blocks



4 of





C r e e k

6 of 6

s e

Venables St

Dupont St

Princess St

Keeler St

Harris St

Barnard St

Prior St

Grove St

Front St E

Dufferin St E

Lorne St E

Lansdowne Ave E

Fifth Ave E

Sixth Ave E

Seventh Ave E

Eighth Ave E

Ninth Ave E

Tenth Ave E

Eleventh Ave E

Twelfth Ave E

Thirteenth Ave E

Fourteenth Ave E

Fifth Ave E

Prince Edward St

Victoria St

St. George's St

Ontario St

South St

Burns St

St. Catherine's St

Book St

Westminster Ave

Spoolin St

Westminster Road

Spoolin St

extreme north west excepted. The professional fraction in the East End conform rather better with the pattern of the bourgeoisie in the area, with the exception of the blocks adjacent to Westminster Avenue. There are also two blocks of high representation in the south eastern portion which should be noted.

This last point reflects the varied nature of the East End which the foregoing simplification belies. At the same time it is noteworthy that this particular congregation of professionals was comprised mostly of teachers. And, with two public schools in the East End (cf. Map 2), this residential location is less surprising. Moreover teachers, together with clergymen, comprise 50% of the total population of the professional fraction of the East End [39].

In the area south of False Creek, and more precisely the area south of 5th Avenue and east of Bridge Street, this same structure of the professional fraction was repeated. The professional fraction is over-represented in this area, but once again over 50% of this population was comprised of teachers and clergymen [40].

MANAGERIAL. As already indicated by the tabular data the distribution of the managerial fraction exhibits a basic congruity with that of the professional fraction and the

bourgeoisie. Map 13 provides further information to support this finding and introduces certain complexities.

Once again the West End stands out as the most important residential area, although to a somewhat lesser degree than for the bourgeoisie or the professional fraction. This is compensated for, however, by the greater importance of the area west of Granville Street. Taking these two areas together, they contain 52.4% of the managerial fraction, as against 54.3% for the professional fraction and 57.0% for the bourgeoisie. Moreover the managerial fraction are also represented in the important area south of Haro and west of Bute Streets. These facts alone strongly support the contention that this fraction is polarized towards the bourgeoisie and that this is expressed in residential terms.


The question may be taken further by enquiring into two other areas; east of Granville Street and the East End, which together contain slightly over 30% of the population of this fraction. In the area east of Granville Street the managerial fraction is over-represented, but only very slightly. The proximity of this area to both the commercial area and a variety of productive places of employment would seem to go some distance towards explaining the absolute numbers. But what of the distribution within this area?

B



7


1 of



B
u
r
r
a
r
d

I
n
l
e
t

2 of




F
a
l
s
e

Map 13 Residential Distribution of the New Petty Bourgeoisie, Managerial Fraction, Vancouver 1901


n l e t

3 of



s e

C r e




Number of Class
Members per Block


- 0 0
- 1 1
- 2 2
- 3 3
- 4 4 - Over




Non - Residential Blocks




4 of



F a l s e



5 of 1



C r e e k

6096

Dupont St.

Princess St.

Keefe St.

Harris St.

Barnard St.

Prior St.

Grove St.

Variables St.

Front St. E.

Dufferin St. E.

Lorne St. E.

Landsowne Ave. E.

Fifth Ave. E.

Sixth Ave.

Seventh Ave. E.

Eighth Ave. E.

Ninth Ave. E.

Tenth Ave. E.

Eleventh Ave. E.

Twelfth Ave. E.

Thirteenth Ave. E.

Fourteenth Ave. E.

Fifteenth Ave. E.

Park Ave.

Westminster Ave.

Scotia St.

Prince Edward St.

Victoria St.

St. George St.

Caroline St.

Scott St.

Burns St.

St. Catharines St.

Books

Washington Road

Soprin St.

Here the evidence is not entirely clear. While the western half is better represented this emphasis is far from overwhelming. At the same time it should be remembered that this area, including the eastern part, is one in which the small bourgeoisie were present in moderate numbers (cf. Map 6).

Similar questions arise in terms of the East End, but the degree of under-representation is much greater in this area. Within the area the managerial fraction is fairly evenly divided between the north west and south east portions. Yet unlike the professional fraction the blocks adjacent to Westminster Avenue were attractive locations. While it is difficult to determine any specific reason for the distribution within the area it should be noted that ship's captains comprise more than 50% of the managerial fraction in the East End [41].

In sum, although there is some ambiguity in the evidence it may reasonably be concluded that the residential pattern of the managerial fraction exhibits a clear polarization towards the bourgeoisie.

MANUAL LABOUR. There is reason to believe, as already noted, that this fraction is somewhat, if not considerably underestimated in the data presented in Tables 7:10 and 7:11. This stems primarily from the difficulty in separating certain parts of this fraction from the working class itself, due to


limitations in the data. Any conclusions with respect to this fraction must, therefore, be somewhat tentative. Nonetheless and limitations notwithstanding, it would be surprising if there were not indications of a spatial polarization towards the working class.

Tables 7:10 and 7:11 have indeed shown this to be the case, although a number of questionable areas remain. Map 14 shows the detailed distribution and provides some additional information. As an initial point, and one reasonably clear from the Tables, is the very limited presence of the manual fraction in the West End. Map 14 also reveals that there is a total absence from the area south of Haro and west of Bute Streets.

The major areas requiring further investigation are the areas west of Abbott Street and south of 5th Avenue. In both of these areas the manual fraction is relatively over-represented while the working class is not. The area west of Abbott Street included a number of cheap hotels, so the presence of hotel employees, an important part of this fraction, is not surprising. At the same time it must be admitted that there is a certain circularity in the argument here. Thus it was assumed, albeit on a reasonable basis, that such employees resided at their workplace unless otherwise indicated.

In the area south of 5th Avenue Map 14 adds little

B




1 of 1



B
u
r
r
a
r
d

l
n
l
e
t

2 of 1




F
a
l
s
e

Map 14 Residential Distribution of the New Petty Bourgeoisie, Manual Labour Fraction, Vancouver 1901


n l e t

3 of



s e

C r e e




Number of Class Members per Block


- 0 0
- 1 1
- 2 2
- 3 3
- 4 4 - Over

Non-Residential Blocks



4 of





s e

C r e e k

6 of 6

Dupont St

Princess St

Keeler St

Harris St

Barnard St

Prior St

Grove St

Venables St

Front St. E

Dufferin St. E

Lorne St. E

Landsowne Ave. E

Fifth Ave. E

Sixth Ave. E

Seventh Ave. E

Eighth Ave. E

Ninth Ave. E

Tenth Ave. E

Eleventh Ave. E

Twelfth Ave. E

Thirteenth Ave. E

Fourteenth Ave. E

Fifteenth Ave. E

Park Ave

Westminster Ave

Quebec St

Ontario St

Westminster Road

Scotia St

Prince Edward St

Victoria St

St. George St

Carolina St

Scott St

Burns St

St. Catherine St

Lock St

Chert St

Wentworth St

Manitoba St

information since the distribution is fairly scattered. The reason for the relative over-representation here (cf. Map 2) would seem to lie in the lack of productive employment in the area. There was, however, a post office and a fire station and employees at these institutions plus tramway conductors (cheap travel?) were an important part of the fraction south of False Creek.

On the other hand Map 14 does shed some light on the distribution of the manual fraction in the East End. There is an emphasis on the south and eastern part of the area, together with the extreme north western blocks, where the working class was in the majority (cf. Map 9). In the area east of Granville Street the evidence on the internal distribution is more ambiguous. In Yaletown on the other hand, the concentration, if that is an appropriate term for such small numbers, is not on the periphery but in the heart of the area.

All in all the evidence is not entirely convincing, but it is important that the limitations in the data are borne in mind. In view of this it is not unreasonable to suggest that the evidence of polarization towards the working class considerably exceeds that in the opposite direction.

SUPERVISORY. This fraction, occupying a contradictory structural location, may logically be expected to present a rather ambiguous

residential pattern. Tables 7:10 and 7:11 have served to provide a preliminary indication that this was indeed the case. Map 15 shows the detailed distribution and helps illuminate the problem.



Initially it should be noted that the West End has the highest representation of any area. At the same time it is noticeably lower than for either the bourgeoisie or the professional and managerial fractions. Taken with the area west of Granville Street, these areas contain 34.4% of the population of the supervisory fraction, as compared with the 50+% of the former. Map 15 adds two further points concerning the West End. Firstly, the supervisory fraction is only present to a limited extent in the area south of Haro and west of Bute Streets. Secondly, the area of the West End adjacent to Yaletown is quite well represented.

Turning to the working class areas, Tables 7:10 and 7:11 show that the supervisory fraction is slightly under-represented in the East End, although it contains the second highest percentage. In the case of Yaletown the evidence is contradictory. The fraction is over-represented in terms of the population of the area, but the area is very slightly under-represented in terms of the population of the fraction.

Map 15 reveals two additional and contradictory points with respect to Yaletown. Firstly, within the area there is a

B


1 of



B u r r a r d

2 of

l n l e t




F a l s e

Map 15 Residential Distribution of the New Petty Bourgeoisie,
 Supervisory Fraction, Vancouver 1901


n l e t

3 of



s e

C r e e




Number of Class
Members per Block


- 0 0
- 1 1
- 2 2
- 3 3
- 4 4 - Over




Non - Residential Blocks



4 of





tendency towards concentration in the south eastern part, the part with the greatest concentration of the working class, but in contrast to the, albeit limited, distribution of the bourgeoisie in the area (cf. Maps 6 and 9). Secondly, there are a number of members of the Supervisory fraction located in the blocks immediately adjacent to Yaletown. In the East End, on the other hand, Map 15 shows that the population is fairly evenly divided between northwestern and south eastern sections.

The other area in which the working class is in the majority and the supervisory fraction is present at or above the average is north of 5th Avenue. But the numbers involved here are so small as to make any firm conclusion impossible.

Finally some comments on the area east of Granville Street are called for. The distribution within this area is somewhat unusual. The concentration, unlike that of other classes and fractions, is neither east or west, but rather south of Robson.


The evidence concerning the supervisory fraction is, in one sense, ambiguous. But it can be argued that this is precisely what should be anticipated given the structural location of the fraction. It would clearly be impossible to account for this distribution in terms of polarization towards simply one of the primary classes. The evidence, therefore, may be taken to indicate a contradictory residential pattern.

MENTAL LABOUR. The mental fraction is by far the largest fraction of the new petty bourgeoisie. The numerical importance of this fraction, the proliferation of clerks and bookkeepers, is consonant with the form of Vancouver's integration into the broader economy (see chap. 6). Yet if this class fraction may be related to the broader processes generating spatial unevenness on a macro-scale, the question to be asked now concerns its place in the internal pattern of spatial unevenness.

In fact this fraction, particularly in the part of the city north of False Creek, appears to be fairly evenly distributed [42]. Yet this superficial evenness is misleading if taken in isolation, since it belies a rather complex distribution. Indeed, given previous findings in this Chapter concerning social and spatial unevenness, the polarization in residential terms, this more even distribution becomes problematic. On the other hand, the more even distribution in this particular context does suggest the contradictory structural position of this fraction. This is an important preliminary point, but one requiring further elucidation.

To begin with, and Map 16 confirms this, the distribution is biased towards the western part of the city. The West End contains the largest population of this fraction, and together with the area west of Granville Street, includes 38.3% of the total. The area south of Haro and west of Bute Streets is also

B




10f

B u r r a r d

2 of

l n l e t




F a l s e

Map 16 Residential Distribution of the New Petty Bourgeoisie,
Mental Labour Fraction, Vancouver 1901



n l e t

3 of



s e


C r e




Number of Class Members per Block

- 0 0
- 1 1
- 2 2
- 3 3
- 4 4 - Over

Non-Residential Blocks




4 of



F a l s e


5 of



s e

C r e e k

6 of 6



fairly well represented, but the subsidiary nature of this form of employment must be borne in mind here. Nonetheless this distribution does suggest a reasonably clear degree of polarization towards the bourgeoisie [43].

The evidence concerning the contradictory polarization towards the working class is somewhat less clear. Both Yaletown and the East End, while below the average, are fairly well represented, certainly much more so than the bourgeoisie in these areas. Within Yaletown Map 16 shows that the population is fairly evenly distributed. In the East End there is also a widespread distribution, but in this instance with a bias towards the north western part of the area.

The predominantly working class area east of Abbott Street is also well represented, but perhaps the most interesting area is that west of Granville Street. This area is second in terms of the percentage of the fraction present (table 7:11), a fact which in itself differs from the distribution of the bourgeoisie and the fractions polarized unambiguously towards it. Within the area, at least north of Smithe Street, the distribution is fairly even, with the exception of the blocks adjacent to Beatty Street. This reflects a considerable overlap with the pattern of working class residence in the area, and a somewhat closer approximation to its distribution, compared with that of the bourgeoisie.

Taken in isolation the facts concerning the polarization towards the working class are not particularly convincing. Yet these facts do not exist in isolation and should not be so considered. The point here is that, like the supervisory fraction, the distribution of the mental fraction cannot be explained simply in terms of polarization towards the bourgeoisie. At the same time, better data, more precision concerning occupational categories, more information on family structure, would undoubtedly benefit the analysis of this fraction.

TRADITIONAL PETTY BOURGEOISIE.

Unlike the various fractions of the new petty bourgeoisie, the traditional petty bourgeoisie exists, formally, outside the capitalist mode of production. Its members are in possession of their own means of production or circulation, and are not involved in the extraction of surplus value or surplus labour; more precisely, they are not dependent on the extraction of such surplus.

Yet the traditional petty bourgeoisie in the case of Vancouver were closely articulated with the capitalist mode and hence subject to the contradictory pressures of the latter. In other words the traditional petty bourgeoisie was in a situation analagous to that of the supervisory and mental fractions of the new petty bourgeoisie. On the one hand there was pressure towards

bourgeoisification, which is a rather clumsy term but its meaning is readily apparent. On the other hand failure to compete with expanding capitalist production and circulation involves a process of proletarianization. In sum, then, the residential pattern of the traditional petty bourgeoisie should display the same general features as that of the supervisory and mental fractions of the new petty bourgeoisie.

Tables 7:10 and 7:11 indicate this to be the case, and Map 17 confirms this, although the distribution also has some unique features. The most general feature, and in many ways the most indicative, is the relatively even distribution. The significance of this in terms of the overall class Map of Vancouver has already been argued and attention can be focused on the details of the distribution.


The unique aspect of the traditional petty bourgeoisie is that the highest concentration, in terms of the percentage population by area, is in the commercial areas. The areas east and west of Abbott Street stand out and the area south of 5th Avenue and the area east of Granville Street, to varying degrees, also come under this category [44]. This pattern clearly reflects the limited, or lack of, separation between residence and workplace, together with the limited level of the productive forces [45] (cf. Map 2).

The traditional petty bourgeoisie is also present in substantial numbers in the predominantly working class area of the East End. Indeed, as Table 7:10 shows, this area contains the largest percentage of the class as a whole, if only by a very small margin. The distribution within the area (Map 17) shows that there is a concentration in the north west. Yet this division is not particularly precise, and a closer inspection reveals the the traditional petty bourgeoisie resided in a number of blocks in which the working class was in a majority. Indeed the block containing the largest single concentration in the area falls into this category (cf. Map 9). In a number of ways the East End was similar to the area east of Granville Street, fronting on the commercial area and containing a variety of workplaces actually within the area (cf. Map 2).

Finally the traditional petty bourgeoisie is also present in the bourgeois parts of the city. With the exception of the area south of of 7th Avenue, where the numbers involved are small and the data least reliable, they are under-represented in all these areas, but the margin is fairly small. Furthermore as Map 17 shows, the class was present in moderate numbers in the area south of Haro and west of Bute Streets.

In sum then, the distribution of the traditional petty bourgeoisie has certain unique elements. At the same time it does contain a reflection in spatial terms of the contradictory

B




1 of 1

B u r r a r d

Map

2 of 1 n l e t





F a l s e

Map 17 Residential Distribution of the Traditional Petty Bourgeoisie, Vancouver 1901

n l e t

3 of







Number of Class
Members per Block

- 0 0
- 1 1
- 2 2
- 3 3
- 4 4 - Over

Non-Residential Blocks




4 of




F a l s e

12 1 11.2 1 Mi. Km.



5 of



pressures to which the class was subjected.

Although the discussion of the new and traditional petty bourgeoisie does not complete the examination of the residential patterns of Vancouver some summary remarks are appropriate at this stage. The inclusion of these subsidiary classes and fractions provides a much more complex picture of the residential aspect of the spatial structure of Vancouver. In the main, however, the evidence on the distribution of the various fractions of the new petty bourgeoisie and the traditional petty bourgeoisie reflect their structural class places and the effects of polarization thereon. The important point here is not that class is an explanatory or independent variable through which spatial unevenness may be analysed. But rather that spatial unevenness is necessarily social and must be approached through an examination of the structure of social relations; the former representing an effect of the latter.

THE ETHNIC DIMENSION.

For both theoretical and empirical reasons the question of the ethnic or racial dimension requires a separate consideration. On the theoretical plane it could be argued that ethnicity and not class was primarily responsible for patterns of internal spatial unevenness, for residential patterning. If this were found to be the case then it would considerably weaken, if not entirely negate, a historical materialist analysis. As Poulantzas has

remarked (1975, p. 199), for historical materialism "the division into class forms the reference for every social stratification". At the same time to provide a complete review of the ethnic composition of Vancouver would require a separate thesis in its own right [46]. Hence it is necessary to introduce some limitation for the present consideration of the topic. But any such limitation must recognise and include within the analysis the most significant features of the ethnic division within Vancouver.

Here, and not entirely fortuitously either, this theoretical requirement coincides with one of the empirical lacunae of the previous analysis. It is clear that in nineteenth century Vancouver the most distinctive ethnic division was that separating the Chinese and Japanese from the remainder of the population [47]. The remainder of this discussion will focus on the social and spatial location of the Chinese and Japanese in Vancouver at the turn of the twentieth century. In so doing it will serve to test the capacity of the theory to incorporate this dimension and also to complement the presentation of empirical data.

It is important to establish at the outset that racism was an important facet of the social fabric in Vancouver. Numerous examples of racist views and actions could be cited, but one will suffice for present purposes. The speaker is Henry Bell-Irving,

director of several companies, commission merchant, agent for Anglo-British Columbia Packing Co. Ltd., sometime alderman and president of the Vancouver Board of Trade, member of the Vancouver Club and resident of Seaton Street: all in all a prominent member of the Vancouver bourgeoisie.

"I believe white labour in British Columbia would be greatly benefitted by a large number of Chinese in the country. The conditions of life would be very much easier in the development of our resources if white men and their families had servants like the Chinese to do the dirty work for them. I think it is the destiny of the white men to be worked for by the inferior races" (RCCJI, p. 144).

Racism, it may be argued, was firmly established within the dominant ideology. It was a facet of bourgeois hegemony at the ideological level.

While racism must be recognised and accepted as a necessary part of the position of the Chinese and Japanese, can it also be regarded as a sufficient explanation? For historical materialism the answer must clearly be in the negative. Implicit in the former explanation is the assumption that the Chinese and Japanese may be treated in an undifferentiated fashion. For historical materialism, on the other hand, the internal structure

of these groups is of considerable importance. The question may thus be asked as to what, if any, was the internal structure, i.e. the class structure, of the Chinese and Japanese communities in Vancouver?

The evidence on this point is unequivocal: there was a class structure within these communities. Its existence was also clearly recognized in society at large. After reporting what was probably a routine racial "incident", except that it concerned a Chinese missionary, the News Advertiser suggested that, "some discrimination should be made and a Chinese merchant or professional man should not be treated as if he were a coolie" (VNA, Dec. 14th, 1890).

Table 7:12 provides some more precise information on the class structure of the Chinese community. The group of merchants, together with the proprietors of the 35 Chinese laundries, may be taken as comprising the bourgeoisie [48], and possibly the traditional petty bourgeoisie within the Chinese community of 2,053 [49]. The data on the Japanese is much less comprehensive, but equally clearly there was a Japanese bourgeoisie in Vancouver. The city directory, in addition to the Japanese Consul, includes the names of four Japanese merchants, one contractor/boarding house proprietor and six boarding house proprietors [50].

Table 7:12

Chinese Bourgeoisie in Vancouver, 1901.

Merchants (comprising 47 firms)	143
Classified as follows - by firm	
Importers & Wholesale dealers	8
Retail Grocers	7
Opium Manufacturers	2
Green grocers, Butchers & Poultry Dealers	15
Rice Millers	3
Dealers in Silk & Fancy Goods	2
Merchant Tailors	2
Manufacturing Clothiers	8

Source: RCCJI, p. 213.

If there was clearly a Chinese and a Japanese bourgeoisie, - it is equally clear that most members of these communities did not belong to this class. While it is not possible to be absolutely certain, it is fairly evident that most of the Chinese and Japanese population should be regarded as working class. The most important identifiable exception to this were domestic servants, who being paid out of revenue and hence performing unproductive labour, may be regarded as members of the new petty bourgeoisie. Table 7:13 contains the available data on Chinese and Japanese employment. The list is obviously incomplete, but it is possible to supplement it with some additional, less precise information. Thus the CPR sometimes employed up to 500 Japanese and Chinese in snow clearing and 570 Chinese on their steamships running to Hong Kong. How many of these could be considered as residents of Vancouver, however, is an unanswerable question. In addition an unknown number of Chinese and Japanese were employed in canneries [51], as fishermen, in cordwood

cutting and in general contract labour. Although the evidence is incomplete it seems obvious that the majority of the Chinese and Japanese population were members of the working class.

Table 7:13

Chinese & Japanese Employment in Vancouver.

Occupation	Chinese	Japanese
Sawmill Labourers	173	333
CPR Labourers	33	
Market Gardening	134	
Laundry Workers	192	
Tailors	90-100	20- 30
Brickmaking	23- 24	39
Total	645-656	392-402
Domestic Servants	292	

Source: RCCJI.

If it is accepted that there was an identifiable class structure within these ethnic communities, then two questions remain: did this have a residential expression, and, how was it related to the larger residential pattern of the city as a whole?

That social class affected the quality of living conditions within the Chinese and Japanese communities is beyond doubt. The City Health Inspector, in a report to the Royal Commission on Chinese and Japanese Immigration noted that,

"The number of Chinese and Japs (sic) known to the health department is as follows. There were at the beginning of September, 1900, 65 Japanese boarding houses registered with approximate number of inmates of 1,200 on percentage (sic) per house 18.6. There

were 105 [52] Chinese boarding houses, registered inmates about 1,500, percentage 14.29 per house. There are also a number of Chinese and Japs who are not counted in the above viz. - MERCHANTS, and domestic servants living in families" (see VCC #13292 n.d, emphasis added.).

Discounting the domestic servants, who clearly represent a special case, and one about which there is little readily available evidence, this statement indicates a difference in the type of accomodation occupied by what can be broadly termed the Chinese and Japanese bourgeoisie and the Chinese and Japanese working class. At this stage the next logical step would be to present descriptive evidence of the two types of accomodation. Unfortunately, in the case of Vancouver, it has not been possible to locate a description of the housing of the bourgeoisie, only of the workers.

The RCCJI does include an excellent description of the former type of accomodation in Victoria's Chinatown. It seems highly improbable that Chinese merchants in Vancouver lived in conditions that differed significantly from those in Victoria.

The Royal Commission states of the latter that,

"Entering a large mercantile house, in the rear of which is located the largest opium factory in the Dominion, we were met at the door by the proprietor, who received our visit cordially. A large stock of goods occupied the shelves on each side of the room. Accepting an invitation extended to us by the proprietor, we were admitted into the gentleman's private apartments, consisting of four rooms well furnished after the oriental style. Here we were introduced to his family, consisting of wife and three small children. The surroundings were

sufficiently neat and orderly to satisfy even the most fastidious taste" (RCCJI, p. 15).

This description may be compared with that of one of the better Chinese lodging houses in Vancouver,

"The Armstrong lodging house was a two story brick building with 27 rooms upstairs. The rooms were 20 feet long 13 feet wide and 10 feet high, and were capable of holding six persons in each, according to the by-law. This was one of the best lodging houses in the city ... The furniture of the room would consist of a Table, six bunks, and a stove; no more. As a rule the six occupants would rent the room from a keeper who leased the building from the owner ... This was a fair example of the manner of living among the working Chinamen" (Ibid, p. 14).

If this was a fair example it should be added that there was a good deal that was far worse, in the form of a variety of shacks tenements and cellars [53]. In Victoria the worst accommodation was "invariably located in the centre of a block, surrounded by Chinese houses" (Ibid, p. 15). In Vancouver Goad's Fire Insurance Atlas indicates that a similar pattern was developing, although the worst housing conditions appear to have developed in the area just south of Dupont and east of Carrall Streets, and on the foreshore of False Creek [54].

The Medical Health Officer for Vancouver drew particular attention to this area. In 1896 he recorded that,

"The condition which at present prevails is that nearly all of the buildings on the south side of Dupont Street between Carrall and Columbia Avenue are standing over a huge cesspool" (VCC, #8590).

Later that year, following his recommendations, a "number of delapidated cottages" were destroyed [55]. But only three years later he reported that,

"... the building of tenements encroaching on the foreshore of False Creek south of Dupont Street [and] ... A most serious menace to the health of the whole vicinity will develop if prompt and continued action is not taken - there is at least one of the existing tenement shacks on this foreshore which should be condemned and burnt" (VCC, #9613).

The following year he was concerned with a "row of six shacks" on lot 8, Block 14, D.L. 196, which were,

"... in a most unsanitary condition. A case of leprosy was removed from one of the cabins in 1897. Thorough disinfecting measures were put through at that time ... but nothing was done or has been done since then to improve the general sanitary (or rather unsanitary) conditions present.

There are now two storey shacks with a foul privy at the end of it, situated also on Carrall Street lot 7, block 14, D.L. 196, must also be condemned in its present condition" (VCC, #10696).

Although insanitary conditions were not restricted to this area, Chinese laundries generally posed problems, it was undoubtedly an area of particular concern for the health authorities [56]. Some improvements were made, both in this area and with respect to the general problem of Chinese laundries, but the Royal Commission still noted that the living conditions of the Chinese working class in Vancouver were still worse than anywhere else in the Province (RCCJI, p. 16).

In sum then, there is clear evidence of a class structure


within the two ethnic communities, and that this was reflected in the living conditions. Moreover, there is evidence, if not as precise as might be desired, that this was expressed spatially, albeit on a micro-scale. In many ways the Chinese and Japanese communities were a microcosm of the larger society in which they were inserted, or alternatively, with which they were articulated.

It remains to discuss the location of these communities within the spatial structure of the city as a whole. Map 18 shows the limited information contained in the city directory on both the Chinese and Japanese, and refers to both workplaces and residences [57]. It thus represents a reasonable approximation of the distribution of these groups.

The Chinese were concentrated primarily in Chinatown, on either side of Dupont Street. The scattering of Chinese outside of this area were almost entirely laundries, including one on Granville Street and one south of False Creek. The Japanese were somewhat less concentrated but centred primarily on Powell Street. The chief exceptions to this were the Japanese Consul and a Japanese merchant who lived on Granville Street.

The Chinese and Japanese, then, were chiefly located in areas which the working class were in the majority, but at the same time on the margins of the commercial centre. In other

B




1 of



B u r r a r d

2 of


l n l e



Map 18 Chinese and Japanese Work - Places and Residences,
Vancouver 1901


n l e t


3 of




s e

C





5 of



DuPont St

Princess St

Keefer St

Harris St

Barnard St

Prior St

Grove St

Venables St

Park Ave

s e

C r e e k

6 of 6

Front St E

Duffenn St E

Lorne St E

Landsowne Ave E

Fifth Ave E

Sixth Ave E

Seventh Ave E

Eighth Ave E

Ninth Ave E

Tenth Ave E

Eleventh Ave E

Twelfth Ave E

Thirteenth Ave E

Fourteenth Ave E

Fifteenth Ave E

Manitoba St

Ontario St

Westminster Ave

Scotia St

Westminster Road

Prince Edward St

Victoria St

St George St

Caroline St

Scott St

Burns St

St. Camillus St

Dock St

Glenn Dr

Reynold

words, these ethnic communities were articulated to the social and spatial structure of Vancouver in a particular way. Certainly racism may be seen as reflected in the relative concentration of the Chinese and Japanese. Yet the location of the concentrations reflects both the class structure of the society as a whole and the class structure of the ethnic groups. While ethnicity involves an additional complexity to the analysis, it does not negate, but rather complements, a class analysis. The additional information on these ethnic communities both supplements and supports the previous analysis of the social and spatial structure of Vancouver in 1901.

This chapter has approached the internal spatial structure of Vancouver in a synchronic manner. Through an empirical examination of social classes it has endeavoured to specify the forms in which the social structure was realized in space at a particular point in time. The inclusion of the ethnic dimension enriched the discussion and supported the use of social class as the basic frame of reference for the consideration of the social and spatial structure.

Yet the abstraction from process involved in the approach of this chapter has left the discussion, at best, partial and incomplete. Important questions remain in terms of the reasons why the social structure was realized in the particular spatial forms that have been described. To approach the set of questions

involved here is to return to the issue of the development of Vancouver, but to focus on the internal dimension. This involves taking up again some of the points discussed in chapters 5 and 6 in the light of the findings of this chapter.

FOOTNOTES

[1] The two preferred sources, assessment rolls and census manuscripts, which could provide information on both residential location and occupation of individuals are not available for Vancouver for the time period under consideration. Under these circumstances it has been necessary to turn to the City Directory as the best source available. The Directory used is contained within Henderson's British Columbia Gazetteer and Directory, 1901. This lists some 9,000 names for a population of 26,000: see below for further discussion.

[2] This is not to deny the importance of extended reproduction, but rather to situate it. Poulantzas (1975, p. 21) remarks on the role of women, that "... what is involved is not simply certain over-determined effects on them of the division of society into classes, but, more precisely, a specific articulation, within the social division of labour, of the class division and the sex division".

[3] On the reliability of the voters list, see Report of the Collector of Voters for the Vancouver City Electoral District (BCSP, 1901, pp. 693-700). Of the area in question the Collector remarks that,

"Many of the smaller hotels, where there is barely the minimum number of 16 beds required to be provided as a condition for holding a hotel license, are quoted as the abode of a number of men far out of proportion to the usual ratio ... It will be seen [on an attached list] that 437 persons are returned as living in dollar-a-day hotels and salons in the city. Of these a large proportion belong to occupations which necessitate residence elsewhere" (Ibid, p. 697).

A more impressionistic account of this general area at a slightly later time is contained in Grainger (1964, pp. 13-17).

[4] The residential part of the address listing is restricted to a single name, presumably the head of the the household. The information in the alphabetical listing has been supplemented in certain cases by checking it with the manuscript voters list. The cases where information from this second source have been used are for those individuals whose directory listing is incomplete; e.g. no information on occupation, or the address is not specific to a particular block. Data from the Directories of 1900 and 1902 were also used in a similar manner to improve the overall quality of the data actually employed in the analysis.

[5] The separation of the traditional petty bourgeoisie from the bourgeoisie is one of the theoretical lacunae within the corpus of historical materialism. Nonetheless the criteria adopted here do lie within the compass of one of Marx's few comments on this topic. He writes (1973, p. 588),

"If the capitalist employed one worker in order to live from that one's surplus time, then he would obviously gain doubly if he himself also worked, with his own funds, for he then he would gain, in addition to the surplus time, the wage paid the worker. He would lose in the process, i.e. he would not yet be in the situation of working as a capitalist, or the worker would only be a helper, and thus would not stand in relation to him as capital.

Thus, in order that money may become transformed into capital, it is necessary not only that it should be able to set surplus labour in motion, but also that there should be a CERTAIN QUANTITY OF SURPLUS LABOUR, the surplus labour of a given mass of necessary labour, i.e. of MANY WORKERS at once" (emphasis in original).

[6] There is considerable evidence that real estate agents in nineteenth century Vancouver were not merely intermediaries between land owners and prospective purchasers. They also owned land themselves, see Macdonald N. (1977, p.18); and a list of purchasers of CPR land in Fairview (VNA, Jul. 27th, 1890).

[7] Neufeld (1972, pp. 24-25), states that the "institutions that facilitate a change in ownership of financial claims are essentially financial brokers". The commission of the "pure" broker is,

"... payment for those services [of facilitating the transfer], and its size together with the volume of business must be such that he receives a competitive RETURN ON HIS CAPITAL while paying competitive rates for hired services, including his own" (emphasis added).

[8] Marx (1959, p. 295) regarded "wholesale commerce" as the purest form of merchant's or commercial capital, and added that,

"... the number of workers employed in wholesale commerce are in no way related to the comparative size of the establishment. This is so, because in commerce much more than in industry the same function requires the same labour time, whether

performed on a large or a small scale. This is the reason why concentration appears earlier historically in merchant's business than in the industrial workshop".

[9] Piper also operated a small sawmill in South Vancouver by 1901. The data refer only to the contracting business, see Piper C.T.W., Add Mss 30, VPA.

[10] In the year following Nov. 4th, 1898, C.J. Piper was paid a sum of \$755.86. The next highest annual wage bill was that paid to a labourer/carpenter designated only as Clive II. C.J. Piper was paid at an hourly rate of 33 cents and although some highly skilled employees, notably masons, were paid at the same or higher rate, they were only employed for short periods.

[11] It is important to consider a whole year because the construction industry was highly seasonal.

[12] Even this is something of an exaggeration since the figure was calculated on the basis that any employment during the week represented one weeks work.

[13] The following data are relevant to and sustain this following point. It covers a number of occupational categories which were employed by contractors. All of the categories listed below appear in the Piper Wage Books, and the only category included in the Wage Books and not represented here is that of labourer:

Occupation	Total Listed	Workplace Listed or Self-employed	No Workplace Listed
Bricklayer	30	1	29
Carpenter	415	51	364
Stonemason, mason & stonecutter	45	0	45
Painter	113	35	78
Plasterer	29	0	29
Totals	632	87	545

Source: Henderson's British Columbia Gazetteer and Directory, 1901.

The same directory list 150 builders and contractors.

[14] An "independent" agent linked with a single capital has been designated as belonging to the new petty bourgeoisie. Such agents are regarded as acting as the representative of a particular capital and their independence as more apparent than real.

[15] The CPR management hierarchy is listed primarily in terms of "agents" of different kinds - ticket agent, passenger agent, fuel agent. For a fairly full listing, see William's British Columbia Directory 1892 (pp. 1030a and b). It should be noted that some managers are included among the bourgeoisie: the Company Records have been utilized to handle the problem of the upper limit of the managerial fraction. Only those listed in the Company Records as directors have been classified as members of the bourgeoisie.

[16] By 1895, if not earlier, there were also private institutions teaching skills required for mental labour; e.g. Pacific Shorthand College and Lyster & Currie offered courses in shorthand and typing (see advertisements in VNA, Jan. 17th & Feb. 2nd, 1895).

[17] Federated Association of Letter Carriers #12, and the Amalgamated Association of Street Railway Employees, see Appendix B.

[18] On this point, see Braverman (1974, pp. 129 ff.), although the concepts he uses are somewhat different.

[19] For data on the ITU, see Bartley (1938, esp. pp. 9-21). See City Directories for 1892 and 1901 for occupational categories.

[20] See LG (Vol. 2, Sep. 1901, pp. 184-189). The VNA (Aug. 9th, 1899) reports that the Clerks Union had approximately 50 members. No indication of the membership of the Waiters union has been discovered.

[21] In this connection it is important to note that there had been some important steps in the concentration and consolidation of commercial capital in Vancouver. McDowell, Atkins & Watson Co. Ltd. established in 1895 was the result of a merger between H. McDowell & Co. Ltd. and Atkins & Atkins; the company operated 7 stores in Vancouver plus others in Victoria and Nanaimo. Its paid up capital increased from \$49,000 in 1899 to \$100,000 in 1902 (see, CR file #240 (1890) and Henderson's British Columbia Gazetteer and Directory, 1901). Nelson, McPherson, Sutherland Drug Co. Ltd., established in 1901, was a merger between Nelson Drug Stores Co. Ltd., R.G. McPherson (druggist), J.K. Sutherland (druggist) and J.W. Morrow (druggist). The company operated 5 stores in Vancouver and one in Chilliwack (see, CR file #583 (1890) and #683 (1897)).

Slightly after the time period of this thesis, but worth noting in this context, is that in 1902 Woodward Departmental Stores Ltd. was formed. This consisted of a merger of the businesses of C. Woodward (general merchant), Davidson Bros.

(jewellers) and R.G. Buchanan & Co. (house furnishers) (see, CR file #839 (1897)). This is clear evidence of the motive force impelling an extension of the social division of labour.

[22] The phrase is from a roughly contemporary source, which continued that the city was,

"... surrounded on three sides by water with the harbour and mountains lying to the North, the Gulf of Georgia to the West and South, and Stanley Park with its tall fir trees at the Western boundary of the city, the situation of Vancouver may well be termed an ideal one, possessing all the scenic advantages of mountain and wood and water" (Johnson, 1907?, p. 211).

[23] An early observer described the relationship of the Hotel Vancouver to the city in the following manner,

"The city begins very piano towards the east in low, cramped up, wooden houses, and then goes crescendo westwards from two-storied buildings to those of six. I need hardly mention, I suppose, the buildings of six were the hotel" (VNA, Jan. 1st, 1889).

[24] If the Chinese and Japanese population are excluded, the data cover somewhere in the region of three quarters of what may loosely be termed the economically active population.

[25] VDW (Dec. 31st, 1889) in a short item concerning the labour market includes some information on the wages of hotel and restaurant employees. In all cases the wages are so many dollars per month PLUS board. Thus the assumption involved here is an eminently reasonable one.

[26] On this point, see, Report of the Collector of Voters for the City of Vancouver Electoral District (in BCSP 1901, pp. 693-700).

[27] In the block bounded by Granville, Georgia, Howe and Robson Streets. For the addresses of other hotels, see Table 7:3.

[28] Carrall Street represented the numerical dividing line for those streets running in an east-west direction.

[29] The source of the data is the same as that used in chapter 6, i.e. Company Records. The bourgeoisie identified in this manner are also incorporated in Map 6.

[30] The criteria for membership of the large bourgeoisie

was applied for 1901, not 1891.

[31] The third brother, David, also resided there until his death in 1898.

[32] Primarily mining and canning, see chapter 6. These results further support the argument made there concerning the dominance of a "commercial" bourgeoisie.

[33] This may be compared with the northern and southern extremities of this portion of Westminster Avenue, where the relative concentrations are higher; see Map 4.

[34] The mapping interval chosen tends to exaggerate the working class presence in this area. Of all the blocks falling into category three (10 - 19 people) in this area the maximum value is 15, and of the five blocks west of Burrard Street, three are at the minimum value in this category.

[35] See Appendix A.

[36] If the definition of the East End is extended to include the area east of Carral Street, then the variation is even more marked; the figures become 33.8%, 22.2% and 47.3% respectively.

[37] If the area considered is restricted to the major area of concentration (bounded by Smithe, Seymour, Pender and Beatty Streets) the amount of variation is reduced somewhat: the figures become 12.7%, 18.9% and 10.3% respectively.

[38] All percentage data included in this and the following sections is extracted from Tables 7:10 and 7:11.

[39] Apart from the fact that these occupations could be viewed as belonging to the lower end of the professional ranks, both clergymen and teachers are concerned with inculcating and sustaining the dominant ideology. Such a role involves dealing with the working class and their children directly. Given the presence of such ideological apparatuses within working class areas, a similar residential location for a number of these professionals is not particularly surprising.

[40] There were two schools south of False Creek. One in the area under consideration and the other at 9th Avenue and Centre Street.

[41] The information on the type of ship commanded is very limited and it is possible that more detail on this topic - size of ship, number of hands - would help explain this distribution more precisely. There is, however, a conformity with the

predominance of productive bourgeoisie in the East End.

[42] This may be compared with the distribution of the bourgeoisie and the working class. The ranges, in terms of the % class by area (table 7:10) and area by % class (table 7:11) are: bourgeoisie 1.1% - 43.4% and 2.7% - 25.4%; working class 0.9% - 32.2% and 14.2% - 72.6%; mental fraction 1.2% - 25.1% and 8.1% - 29.4%.

[43] The subsidiary and/or preliminary nature of the employment, at least in certain cases, adds further support to this contention.

[44] Granville Street was an important part of the commercial area (see Map 2) and the form in which the boundaries have been drawn mask some important features of the distribution in this area. Of the 37 members of the traditional petty bourgeoisie residing in the blocks between Granville and Seymour Streets in this area, 19 resided on Granville Street, 7 on Pender Street and only 8 on Seymour Street.

[45] The strength of this conclusion is weakened by the assumptions involved in handling the data.

[46] For a study of ethnic groups in Vancouver with some historical information, see Wallhouse (1961). Among other things she concludes (ibid, pp. 355-356) that,

"Economic segregation is the most important form of segregation in Vancouver today ... Generally, the lower the economic sections of the population have a narrower range of choice as to the location of residence and thus new immigrants, the unsuccessful, the single men, the non-permanent residents and the more poorly paid groups tend to congregate in the East Hastings District of the city".

[47] There were, after all, no Royal Commissions established in this period to enquire into the immigration of, for example, English, Italian, French or American people.

[48] There were a number of Chinese landowners in the main area of Chinatown, i.e Dupont Street. By Law no. 421, for raising money to pave Dupont Street in 1902, contains a complete list of landowners. A total of 7 Chinese names appear as owners of 15 lots. A Check with the City Directory listing for 1901 provides a positive identification of a Chinese merchant as a landowner in only one case. Whether the remaining Chinese landowners were Vancouver residents or absentees is impossible to determine (see B.C. Gazette, Jul. 24th, 1902). For the number of Chinese laundries, see RCCJI, p. 175.

[49] The population figure is from RCCJI (p. 12).

[50] Japanese merchants, and to some extent Chinese merchants also, acted as contractors for Japanese and Chinese labour. C. Uchida, listed as a grocer in the 1901 City Directory, appears in an alternative source as a contractor employing 36 men to supply E.H. Heaps shingle mill with bolts (RCCJI, p. 130). This pattern of sub-contracting, with a Japanese or Chinese merchant supplying the labour power and controlling, directly or through a subordinate, the labour process was prevalent in the canning industry (see evidence of Frank Burnett of United Canneries of B.C. Ltd., RCCJI, pp. 145ff).

[51] Henry Bell-Irving stated that the Fraser River canneries employed an average of 75 Chinese, and that there were 500 Japanese and native Indian fishermen. Frank Burnett estimated that United Canneries of B.C. Ltd. employed between 200 and 600 Chinese. Once again how many of these people resided in Vancouver for part of the year must remain an open question (see RCCJI, pp. 143-145).

[52] Chinese laundries also acted as boarding houses and whether they are included in this total is not clear. On this point, see the evidence of I.M. Maclean, Medical Health Officer (VCC, Nov. 16th, 1900, #13295-13303; and RCCJI p. 176).

[53] The Lodging House Inspector recommended in 1899 that a resolution be passed "condemning all cellars below ground as unfit for human habitation used for this purpose by Chinese and Japs (sic)", (VCC, #11897).

[54] D.L. 196, blocks 14 and 15.

[55] The Medical Health Officer had recommended in 1895 that "all the cabins on the foreshore (of this area) should be condemned and destroyed" (VCC, #13297). The action referred to took place the following year, when the "site (was) filled in with sand up to the street level" (VCC, #8581).

[56] The Health Inspector had caused some improvement in the sanitary conditions of Chinese laundries, but added "constant supervision is required over same" (VCC, #13298).

[57] In only two instances is a residence separate from workplace listed for Chinese and Japanese individuals and frequently the information is restricted to the designation "Chinese" or "Japs". The two exceptions are instructive, however, in that both individuals may be considered as members of the bourgeoisie and resided in areas separate from the main concentrations of the Chinese and Japanese, in rather "better" locations. N. Hamamura, a merchant who also kept a Japanese

boarding house at 207 Hastings Street E., resided at 129 Robson Street. W.A. Cumyow, a Chinese interpreter and contractor, had an office at 404 Granville Street and resided at 458 Hastings Street E..

CHAPTER 8

THE DEVELOPMENT OF VANCOUVER IN THE LATE NINETEENTH CENTURY:
STRUCTURE AND PROCESS.

"CPR's the government here [in Vancouver]" (D. Sladen in "On the Cars and Off", London, 1895, cited in Roy, 1960, p. 57).

"Vancouver it shall be, if I have the ultimate decision".

The speaker was W.C. Van Horne concerning the naming of the "new" settlement on Burrard Inlet. That Van Horne did have the ultimate decision neatly symbolizes much of the early development of the city of Vancouver [1]. All of the serious studies of Vancouver in this time period attest, in their various ways, to the importance of the CPR (e.g., Roy, 1960 & 1963, Gibson, 1972, Macdonald N., 1977, Macdonald R., 1977, Robertson 1977).

Although by no means exhaustive these studies have done much to unearth the facts of the case. Thus a good deal is already known about the role of the CPR in Vancouver and even the spatial aspects of the problem are not virgin territory. In this respect the works of Gibson and Robertson are of particular importance. At the same time it must be recognised that these various studies have all operated, explicitly or implicitly, under conceptual frameworks different from that utilised in this thesis. While this Chapter, hopefully, presents some new information, it also seeks to re-interpret some of the old. The CPR is the obvious point of commencement.

The CPR was identified in Chapter 5 as monopoly capital and

its development situated in the context of the Canadian social formation including the articulation of the latter with the UK and the USA social formations. As monopoly capital the CPR involved multiple labour processes and the separation of ownership and possession, with economic ownership located in central Canada.

In addition, the advent of the CPR to the Pacific coast involved an encounter and an accommodation with relatively autonomous local bourgeoisies in Victoria and New Westminster [2]. It should be noted, however, that the "deal" between the CPR and the local bourgeoisie of the coastal cities served to both strengthen the position of the CPR in Vancouver and give at least a part of these local bourgeoisies a stake in the city's development. In the latter case, the migration of some of the individuals to Vancouver was involved. Hence the development of Vancouver was never simply an internal process but was conditioned by the presence of monopoly capital and thus a direct articulation with central Canada, together with elements of a "regional" bourgeoisie which was at once relatively autonomous and dependent upon the CPR. The contradictory nature of this relationship was of considerable importance in the early development of the city and must now be enquired into more deeply, both from the side of monopoly and non-monopoly capital.

Capital, of course, represents only one side, albeit the

dominant one of a relationship. The discussion of the development of Vancouver requires that capital be examined in its contradictory relation with labour in the particular local context. This represents the task of the final section of this Chapter.

MONOPOLY CAPITAL: THE ROLE OF THE CPR.


Map 19 represents, as far as it has been possible to determine, the extent of the CPR landholdings resulting from its dual agreements with the Provincial Government and the local landholders and within the area studied in detail in Chapter 7 [3]. A number of points may be made with reference to the information shown on Map 19. Firstly, the CPR landholdings extended beyond the confines of the area shown. The majority of the CPR land grant, some 5,795 acres, was contained in D.L. 526, south of False Creek [4]. Although this land was important in the longer term, with respect to the parameters of this thesis the crucial CPR landholding was undoubtedly the 485 acres of D.L. 541, situated at the heart of the Vancouver peninsula. Secondly, as a result of a separate Crown Grant, the CPR was an important landholder in the Old Granville Townsite [5].

Thirdly, the CPR landholdings were not confined to the areas covered by the Crown Grants. As a consequence of the private agreements that it was able to extract, the CPR had a substantial interest in the West End, the area west of Burrard Street. Even

B

1 of 1


D.L.
185



B u r r a r d

l n l e t

2 of




F a l s e

Map 19 CPR Landholdings, Vancouver c.1886


n l e t

3 of




S e

C r e




CPR Owned Land



4 of

Small vertical text or logo at the bottom right corner.



541

F a l s e

1 Mi.

1.2 Km.

5 of

D.L.
196

Princess St.

Keefe St.

Harris St.

Barnard St.

Prior St.

Grove St.

Grove

Crescent

Venables St.

C
r
e
e
k

Front St. E.

Dufferin St. E.

Lorne St. E.

Landsowne Ave. E.

Fifth Ave. E.

Sixth Ave. E.

Seventh Ave. E.

Eighth Ave. E.

Ninth Ave. E.

Tenth Ave. E.

Eleventh Ave. E.

Twelfth Ave. E.

Thirteenth Ave. E.

Fourteenth Ave. E.

Fifteenth Ave. E.

Park Ave.

Westminster Ave.

Waddington Blvd.

Scotia St.

Prince Edward St.

Victoria St.

St. George St.

Caroline St.

York St.

Burns St.

St. Catherine St.

Book St.

Gain Dr.

Wentworth

in the East End the CPR was a substantial landowner. Fourthly, the CPR, through its right of way, controlled virtually the entire foreshore abutting on to Burrard Inlet. In other words the CPR substantially controlled access to the primary deepwater anchorage. Finally, the extent of the CPR landholdings also serve to indicate something of the location and extent of the initial landholdings of the local "syndicates". Here again, though, it must be remembered that substantial quantities of the land acquired in the initial "grab" was located beyond the confines of Map 19. This is a topic which will be pursued in more detail at a later stage.

For the moment it may be concluded that the CPR was the leading landowner in the area of the prospective city. On a comparative level the CPR received "much more land in Vancouver than in other western Canadian cities" (Macdonald N., 1977, p. 11). The strategic core of the landholdings, at least for the early period was D.L. 541, but the CPR interest extended well beyond the confines of that locality.

Given the facts of the CPR landholdings the question may now be asked, what did the CPR do with them? Or, more precisely, how did the CPR utilise these landholdings and how did this affect the development of the city, including its spatial structure?

The answer, or rather answers, to this complex of questions

may initially be situated at a rather general level; that of the overall policy of the CPR towards its landholdings. Here an answer, from the horse's mouth so to speak, is readily available. As early as December 1884 Van Horne wrote to a correspondent that in Vancouver "our object should be of course to give the greatest possible value to our own lands and therefore the least to any other" (cited in Chodos, 1973, p. 24).

Robertson (1977, pp. 174-175, 200-201) has argued that the CPR pursued a "high rent land use policy" favouring a "high rent commercial and residential landscape" in the western part of the city. In the main this is undoubtedly correct, although it would be more precise to see D.L. 541 as the centrepiece of this policy. Thus W.F. Salsbury, on the removal of the CPR offices from the 400 block Cordova Street W. to the 600 block Granville Street, commented that it was,

"... a diplomatic move to encourage traffic towards Granville Street, which at that time was considered discouraging and not to be holding its own against developments in other parts of the city, especially the East End" (cited in Robertson, 1977, p. 228).

This is further substantiated by the evidence of the manager of the Hudson's Bay Company (HBC) in Vancouver, who noted that in the early 1890's the CPR made "a strong effort ... to create Granville Street as the main business artery" (Lockyer, 1920, p. 20).

Yet the CPR's activities in these early years were by no means confined to promoting the "commercial" development of D.L. 541. Its role in influencing industrial location was also important. This is a point which will be pursued in due course, but for the moment it will suffice to record that it is clear that the CPR sought to steer development onto its own land as a means of realizing the value, through sale and rent, of that property.

The mechanisms available to the CPR were many and varied. As has already been noted one ostensible reason for the CPR extending its line to Coal Harbour from Port Moody was the quest for the construction of wharves [6]. Not surprisingly these were located on the northern foreshore of D.L. 541, which, equally logically, became the location of the railway terminus and station itself. The location of this transportation nexus was of obvious importance in the development of the city. Through the CPR steamers traversing the Pacific and the railway linking Vancouver to the Atlantic, it was truly a "window on the world". It was a focal point within the city both in functional and symbolic terms.

Nor was the location of the other facilities directly involved in the railway operation without significance in terms of the pattern of commercial and residential development. The CPR locomotive and repair shops, the roundhouse, together with

the yards and freight sheds were all located on D.L. 541, on the foreshore of False Creek. The attractiveness of this location for the CPR was further increased by the passage of By-Law no. 33, which exempted the 75 acres of the foreshore and the works erected thereon from all municipal taxation "for the term of thirty years" [7].

The important point concerning these facilities, at least in the present connection, was their linkage to the CPR main line. This was by a track which cut across the peninsula to Burrard Inlet, just to the east of the Old Granville Townsite. In so doing it not only split the potential commercial area into two halves, but it also severed the main artery of the pre-existing settlement which linked the Old Granville Townsite with the Hastings Sawmill.

Nor should this be interpreted in a merely figurative or symbolic sense. Thus the Vancouver Board of Trade complained to the CPR about "trains stopping at Carrall Street" and requested that steps be taken to prevent this. The response of H.B. Abbott, the general superintendent of the CPR in Vancouver, is instructive; he "could not see his way to do this at present" (VBT, General Minutes, Apr. 20th, 1888). The issue was also raised before the City Council where a motion protested that the CPR continued "to blockade and impede traffic on several of the principal streets of the city, by making them shunting grounds"

(VCH, Feb. 16th, 1891). The City requested that the CPR take the minimum safety precaution of installing level crossings. Abbott's response to this request was equally blunt; the company would not pay the cost, in whole or in part, of such crossings [8]. A short time thereafter a person was killed on the Carrall Street crossing [9].

The CPR, as has been mentioned several times in this thesis, was not merely a railway company and a steamship company. The various additional facets of the company also played their part in "encouraging" development on D.L. 541. The early peregrinations of the general offices have already been mentioned in this regard. In 1901 they were located at the foot of Granville Street, adjacent to the terminus. In addition the telegraph offices and the offices of the Dominion Express Co. were also located on D.L. 541.

Of particular importance in these subsidiary but related activities was the Hotel Vancouver, situated at the key intersection of Granville and Georgia Streets and at the approximate height of land [10]. The CPR architect T.C. Scorby waxed eloquent at the prospect,

"Ample ground will be reserved surrounding the edifice wherewith to lay out ornamental and recreation grounds for the benefit and accommodation of hotel guests. Fountains will be played at different points in the grounds. The highest and most perfect art, or landscape gardening, will be

utilised. In short it is the intention to render the hotel and its surroundings so attractive that guests will be drawn thither from all parts. It will be a credit to the company whose energy and enterprise spanned the continent in the creditable manner in which they completed their contract, the pride of the City of Vancouver and an ornament in which everyone on the Pacific Coast will take an interest" (Victoria Times, Apr. 17th, 1886).

Nor did he, or the company for that matter, wax entirely in vain. The Hotel Vancouver soon became the residence for some prominent members of the Vancouver bourgeoisie, as well as being the locus for a variety of "prestigious" social events. In addition the Hotel served as an important commercial centre. It was the nodal point for commercial travellers who "worked" the district extending from Vancouver to Victoria, Nanaimo and New Westminster (VNA, Dec. 26th, 1892).

Adjacent to the Hotel Vancouver, in the 700 block Granville Street, and complementary to it, the CPR constructed the Vancouver Opera House. Begun in 1889 and "constructed in the most approved manner, at a cost of \$100,000" it soon became "the leading place of amusement in the city" (VDW, souvenir edition, 1891).

Another facet of the CPR policy was the investment in commercial buildings on D.L. 541, both by members of the directorate of the company and by the Vancouver management. Table 8:1 shows something of the extent of these activities, as of 1889.

Table 8:1

Investment in Commercial Buildings on D.L. 541 by CPR
Directorate and Vancouver Management - to 1889.

Block	Address	Value in \$
Strathcona (Donald Smith) a	700 Granville	50,000
New York (George Stephens) a	650 Granville	50,000
W.C. Van Horne a	601 Granville	40,000
J.M. Lefevre b	603 Hastings W.	45,000
Lady Stephens a	Hastings & Richards	20,000
Mr. Abbott c	550 Granville	18,500
Mrs. Abbott	Hastings & Richards	12,000
L.A. Hamilton	Hastings & Granville	5,000

a CPR Director

b Vancouver management

c It has not been possible to determine whether the Abbott involved was J.J.C. Abbott, CPR director in 1888 and Prime Minister 1891-2, or H.B. Abbott, the general superintendent of the Pacific Division and head of the Vancouver management. The latter seems more probable.

Source: VDW (Dec. 31st, 1889).

One addition to this list may be made: Lord Elphinstone, while not a director of the CPR as such, was involved with Donald Smith in the North West Land Company and owned a brick block on 710 Granville Street valued at \$20,000 [11]. J.M. Browning, the local land commissioner after the departure of L.A. Hamilton, was a trifle tardy in joining the club; the Browning block at 630 Granville Street was not completed until May 1895 (VNA, May 8th, 1895).

The impact of the CPR was by no means confined to the location of commercial and financial activities (circulation of value), it also had a considerable effect through the location of its industrial (or productive) facilities. The location of the

wharves and the various components of the railway operations have already been indicated and need not be repeated here. It is sufficient to add that the location of the "shops" and the roundhouse adjacent to Yaletown was of particular importance. Completed in 1888, they alone employed between three and four hundred people (VNA, Mar. 11th, 1888). The importance of the foreshore of False Creek in D.L. 541 as a centre of industrial activity was further increased when, at the "instance of Mr. W.C. Van Horne" the CPR erected a Portland Cement works there [12]. In addition, through its main line "right of way" the CPR controlled a further area of potential industrial sites. Indeed the Vancouver Trades and Labour Council (VTLC) complained in 1899 that the CPR owned nearly all industrial foreshore sites [13]. The development of the latter area was a complicated process, however, in that it was not undertaken by the CPR directly but was mediated through third parties and will be considered in more detail below.

The action of the CPR in determining the locus of commercial, financial and industrial activity inevitably had consequences in terms of the residential pattern, but the company was also directly involved in this field as well. The initial survey of the townsite was undertaken by L.A. Hamilton of the CPR. Although he had to accommodate to some pre-existing arrangements, the survey had some important consequences.

The first of these was the broadly east-west axis of the blocks and the termination of every other east-west street at Burrard Street in D.L. 185. As both Macdonald N. (1977, p. 13) and Robertson have commented the West End was therefore, from the beginning, a separate and distinct area (see Map 19). This effect was further emphasised by the large 66 feet lots into which the blocks were subdivided [14]. It has not been possible to determine how far Hamilton, or the CPR generally, was responsible for these large lot sizes. What is clear, however, is that the layout of D.L. 541, with a north-south axis, was conditioned by the CPR's desire to orient the principal streets of the latter towards its major landholding represented by D.L. 526 [15].

The CPR also pursued a policy of rapidly clearing land and preparing it for settlement. Once again D.L. 541 was the principal focus, but not the sole one. As an important landowner in D.L. 185, 196 and 181 the CPR was also active there. Table 8:2 shows the company expenditures by area on such activities up to December 1886 [16]. While emphasising its own concentrated landholdings the CPR also acted in concert with local landowners to develop their joint holdings, in both the West End and the East End [17].

If the CPR tried to concentrate early development on D.L. 541 it did not regard this area as uniform. The company's

Table 8:2

CPR Expenditure on Land Clearing and Grading - to Dec. 1886.

Area by D.L.	Activity	Expenditure in \$
541	Slashing	13,000
541	Clearing & Close Cutting	45,000
541	Opening & Grading Streets	18,000
196 & 181	Opening Streets	10,700
185, 196 & 181	Slashing	11,000

Source: Vancouver News (Jan. 5th, 1887).

assessment of D.L. 541 is revealed in Fig. 8:1. Two points are of significance in this data. Firstly the general price gradient, with Yaletown standing out as the area of lowest value: secondly, the preferential terms given for the erection of high-value buildings. While the second point was directed at commercial as well as residential buildings, it undoubtedly helped to attract high value residences to CPR land. It is also fairly certain that a similar policy was pursued in terms of CPR holdings on D.L. 185 and, moreover, that it involved the CPR even more closely in the development process. There is evidence to suggest that the CPR reserved the right to approve the building plans for at least some of the lots sold [18].

The CPR intervened even more directly in the housing market in a number of instances, both in terms of the upper and lower ends (bourgeoisie and working class). These direct interventions, in which the company itself undertook construction were limited in scale, but none the less significant for that. They served to establish, or rather confirm, the emergence of

Fig. 8:1

Canadian Pacific Railway Company

CITY OF VANCOUVER

- PRICE LIST OF CITY LOTS -

IN LOT 541; FORMERLY KNOWN AS THE GRANVILLE TOWN SITE

Granville Street, Corners, (North of Nelson St.),	\$1250	Others,	\$1000
" " " (South of Nelson St.),	1000	"	750
Hastings " "	1250	"	1000
Cordova " "	1250	"	1000
Pender " "	1000	"	750
Dunsmuir " "	\$750	Inside Lots, between Dunsmuir and Lane	500
Georgia " "	750	" " " Georgia and Dunsmuir	500
Robson " "	750	" " " Robson and Georgia	500
Smithe " "	750	" " " Smith and Robson	500
Nelson " "	600	" " " Nelson and Smith	400
Helmcken " "	600	" " " Helmcken and Nelson	400
Davie " "	600	" " " Davie and Helmcken	400
Drake " "	500	" " " Drake and Davie	250
Pacific " "	400	" " " Pacific and Drake	250

CONDITIONS OF SALE

Payments one-third cash, one-third in six months, and one-third in twelve months, with interest at 6 per cent. per annum.

A discount from the purchase price will be allowed if buildings are erected by the purchaser within one year as follows:

For buildings on each lot, worth \$2000 or over, 20 per cent.

For buildings on each lot worth \$5000 or over, 30 per cent.

Rebates to be deducted from the payment first succeeding the completion of the buildings; but in case two or more lots are taken, only the lot or lots actually built upon shall be entitled to the rebate.

Parties erecting permanent buildings to the satisfaction of the Agent of the Trustees, will be accorded an extension of time on the second and third payments at his discretion, but not exceeding two years.

For lots that have been cleared by the Company the purchaser will be required to pay the net cost of clearing in addition to the list price.

The Agent of the Trustees claims the right to depart at any time from this schedule of prices and conditions of sale.

H. ABBOTT

AGENT FOR TRUSTEES

VANCOUVER, June 1st, 1886.

certain features of the residential pattern. Thus the CPR constructed housing for certain members of its local management. The best example of this was the house of the general superintendent of the Pacific division, at 801 Hastings Street W., i.e. west of Granville Street [19]. The land commissioner, both Hamilton and his successor, Browning, also resided in a "company" house on the corner of Burrard and Georgia Streets (Robertson, 1977, p. 8). The penetration of the West End proper, and the ensuing style of development, was also to some extent promoted by the CPR local management who "constructed their own homes on lots which they had obtained at a reduced price from the CPR" [20].

At the other end of the social scale, the CPR also constructed a limited amount of working class housing in Yaletown, thereby confirming, if confirmation was indeed required, the residential character of that area. In September 1886, the Vancouver News recorded that,

"Blocks 112, 113 and 114 (D.L. 541) are being cleared for the railway company under the direction of D.B. Charleson, Superintendent of Clearing. These three blocks contain 9 acres or 135 lots. The company will erect workmen's cottages upon them, to be used by the employees of the railway machine shops to be put upon the banks of False Creek" (VN, Sep. 16th, 1886).

The cottages were to be similar to ones erected by the company at Kamloops, being,

"... neat and compact in every respect, being lathed and plastered inside and having tar paper between the weather boards and rustic. The cottages contain five rooms and will no doubt make comfortable dwelling houses" (ibid).

The next month it was announced that on lot 113 the CPR was building a boarding house for its workmen, complete with dining room and two stories high (VN, Oct. 5th, 1886).

Thus far the discussion has been restricted to a consideration of what may be termed the effects of the CPR's own direct and unmediated actions. Yet as monopoly capital, the determinant role of the CPR in the shaping of Vancouver was not limited to such direct effects. It was also expressed through the articulation of the CPR with other capitals, i.e. the articulation of monopoly and competitive capital [21]. It is these mediated or indirect effects which must now be considered.

INDIRECT EFFECTS OF THE CPR ON THE CREATION OF THE SPATIAL STRUCTURE OF VANCOUVER TO 1901.

The indirect or mediated effects of the CPR conformed with the processes that have already been discussed. In the main they served to further emphasise the tendencies resulting from the CPR's direct actions. Thus the attraction of commercial and financial facilities on to D.L. 541 was a continuing concern. On the other hand, certain additional facets are either more readily specified, or only become apparent through these indirect

effects.

In Chapter 5 a number of linkages between the CPR and money and commercial capital, at the level of the Canadian social formation, were discussed. There it was argued that these relationships played a vital part in the creation of the CPR itself. Yet these relationships operated, and had effects, at the micro as well as the macro level; they were expressed within the processes creating the spatial structure of Vancouver.

The intimate connections between the CPR and the Bank of Montreal at the national level received their due expression within Vancouver [22]. They became an additional aspect of attracting commercial and financial activity to D.L. 541. The Bank of Montreal branch in the city consequently was established in the 500 block Hastings Street W.. Moreover, when the decision to construct a new local headquarters was made, the location was determined, not by the local manager Campbell Sweeny, but by no less a personage than W.C. Van Horne, then president of the CPR [23]. The new location chosen by Van Horne was on Granville Street, which as already noted, was then deemed to be in need of stimulus.


Furthermore through the Bank of Montreal, the CPR also had some links with the first bank to be established in Vancouver, the Bank of British Columbia. The Bank of B.C. had its

headquarters in the U.K. and its agents in "Canada" and the U.S.A. was none other than the Bank of Montreal [24]. In view of this it comes as no great surprise to discover that the first premises of the Bank of B.C. in Vancouver were located in the CPR offices [25]. On outgrowing these facilities the Bank of B.C. moved its local branch to the block already occupied by the Bank of Montreal, and into a building designed by the CPR architect T.C. Scorby (VNA, Jun. 10th, 1888).

These early decisions undoubtedly played an important part in concentrating financial activity on D.L. 541, and more precisely in close proximity to the intersection of Granville and Hastings W. Streets. By 1901 all of the banks in Vancouver had their local headquarters within three blocks, and all but one within two blocks of this intersection [26]. Map 20 uses the Bank of Montreal as an example shed some light on the consequences for residential patterns of the location of these financial institutions. It thus shows the residence/workplace link for the "employees" of the Bank of Montreal. With one exception all of these employees were members of the new petty bourgeoisie, primarily the mental labour fraction [27]. As Map 20 indicates, all of these people lived either on, or west of, Granville Street [28].

A similar pattern of national linkages and local effects can be traced vis-a-vis the CPR and the Hudson's Bay Co. (see above

B




1 of 1

Barb...

B u r r a r d

2 of 1 n l e t




F a l s e

Map 20 Bank of Montreal, Work - Place and Residence Linkages,
Vancouver 1901


n l e t

3 of



s e

C r e e




- Bourgeoisie
- New Petty Bourgeoisie
- M Managerial Fraction
- N Mental Labour Fraction
- U Manual Labour Fraction



Bank of Montreal



4 of 0



F a l s e

1/2

1 Mi.


1/2

1

1 1/2

Km.

5 of



C
r
e
e
k

6 of 6

s
e

Wentworth St

Front St E

Dufferin St E

Lorne St E

Landsowne Ave E

Fifth Ave E

Sixth Ave E

Seventh Ave E

Eighth Ave E

Ninth Ave E

Tenth Ave E

Eleventh Ave E

Twelfth Ave E

Thirteenth Ave E

Fourteenth Ave E

Fifteenth Ave E

Princess St

Keefer St

Harris St

Barnard St

Prior St

Grove St

Venables St

Park Ave

Grove
Crescent

Westminster Ave

Ontario St

Scotia St

Prince Edward St

Victoria St

St George St

Carolina St

Scott St

Burns St

St Catherine St

York St

Green Dr

Keaton Dr

Wastewater Road

Spadina St

Chapter 5). The HBC opened its first store in Vancouver in January 1887 (Lockyer, 1920, p. 20). The store was located in the 100 block Cordova Street W., and on land originally owned by the CPR. The following year the HBC transferred the headquarters of its British Columbia operations from Victoria to Vancouver, a significant move in view of the inter-city rivalries of the time [29]. By 1890, however, the HBC had begun the process of shifting its premises directly on to D.L. 541. A branch store was opened at 618 Granville Street during that year, and two years later a "new store" was begun in the same block at the corner of Granville and Georgia Streets [30]. In 1893 the company's wholesale facilities were also established on D.L. 541, in the form of a warehouse at 323 Water Street, which was provided with "a siding from the CPR track" (VNA, Sep. 14th, 1893) [31].

As a final point on this topic, it should be noted that some important state apparatuses also located on D.L. 541 and in the vicinity of Granville Street. Thus the Post Office, after some intermediate steps was established at Pender and Granville, and the Customs Office in the 400 block Granville [32]. How far, if at all, the CPR influenced these locational decisions is not clear, but as was argued in Chapter 5, the links between the state and railway companies, both in structural and in personal terms, were very close in the Canadian social formation in the nineteenth century. Moreover, in the case of the Post Office, the "new" location was greeted by significant local opposition [33].


The best example of the CPR's "indirect" involvement in industrial location is in the case of the B.C. Sugar Refinery (BCSR). It is the best example because the facts are fairly well known and also because the BCSR was, in local terms, a substantial establishment and an important employer, so that its location was of particular significance [34].

The involvement of the CPR at a national and local level in the formation and operation of the BCSR has already been discussed in Chapter 6 [35]. Given the structure of Vancouver in this period such connections promised a profitable future for the company. Nor was such a prospect in any way diminished by the passage of city By-Law no. 94. In order to "encourage" the establishment of the sugar refinery the city agreed to provide the following facilities. Firstly a piece of land to serve as a site. The site was to be improved by levelling and grading and provided with a connection with the CPR main line track. The cost of the site and improvements was not to exceed \$30,000. Secondly, if and when the city acquired ownership of the water works [36] then the refinery would be entitled to "such water as they may reasonably require and be exempt from all water rates for a period of ten years" and with a reduced rate for the following ten years. Finally the company was exempted from municipal taxation for 15 years (see By-Law no. 94, clauses 1, 2, 5 and 7).

The Finance Committee, through its chairman Alderman J.M. Browning, was responsible for purchasing the site to be cleared and donated. This was the same J.M. Browning who was the CPR local Land Commissioner and first President of the BCSR [37]. The site selected was owned by two separate bodies. Firstly a section "lying between the present [CPR] railway track and block 47 (D.L. 181)" was owned by the CPR. Secondly, "block 47 and a portion of lots 7 and 8 block 48 (D.L.181) were owned by the Vancouver Improvement Company (VIC). One of the principals of the VIC was D. Oppenheimer, also at the time, mayor of the City (see VCC, #4508 & 4510).

Nor was this the end of the matter. Also incorporated in 1890 was the Oriental Traders Company Ltd., whose activities included importing "various goods from Asia such as raw sugar for processing by the B.C. Sugar Refinery" (Roy, 1960, p.34). Acting as a director of the Oriental Traders Company Ltd. was the inescapable J.M. Browning, and the offices of the company were located on D.L. 541 at Granville and Dunsmuir [38]. Finally as a spinoff and subsidiary of the BCSR, the B.C. Cooperage and Jute Co. Ltd. was established in 1892 [39]. This company supplied the refinery with barrels, and was situated on the other set of CPR industrial sites, the portion of D.L. 541 flanking False Creek.

The impact of the location of the BCSR on residential patterns is illustrated in Map 21, which is constructed on the



B

U


10f



B u r r a r d

2 of

l i n e t




F a l s e

Map 21 British Columbia Sugar Refinery, Work-Place and Residence Linkages, Vancouver 1901


n l e t

3 of.



s e


C r e




- Bourgeoisie
- ▲ Working Class
- New Petty Bourgeoisie
- M Managerial Fraction
- S Supervisory Fraction
- N Mental Labour Fraction
- U Manual Labour Fraction



B.C. Sugar Refinery



4 of



F a l s e

1/2

1 Mi.


1/2

1

1 1/2

Km.

5 of



Dupont St

Princess St

Keefe St

Harris St

Barnard St

Prior St

Grove St

Crescent

Venables St

C r e e k

6 of 6

Front St E

Dufferin St E

Lorne St E

Landsowne Ave E

Fifth Ave E

Sixth Ave E

Seventh Ave E

Eighth Ave E

Ninth Ave E

Tenth Ave E

Eleventh Ave E

Twelfth Ave E

Thirteenth Ave E

Fourteenth Ave E

Fifteenth Ave E

Wainwright St

Ontario St

Westminster Ave

Scott St

Westminster Blvd

Prince Edward St

Victoria St

St. George St

Carolina St

Scott St

Burns St

St. Catherine's St

Book St

Glen Dr

Near Dr

Sophia St

same basis as Map 20. The majority of the employees of the BCSR were members of the working class and resided east of Abbott Street and overwhelmingly in the East End. There were also employees of all fractions of the new petty bourgeoisie, other than professional, who resided in this area. West of Abbott Street there are two members of the working class in the area east of Granville Street, two members of the mental labour fraction and four members of the bourgeoisie, all of whom resided west of Granville Street [40].

Another industry located on the east side of the city which appears to have had links with the CPR was the Armstrong and Morrison pipeworks [41]. Deemed to be "of great importance to the city" it was situated on CPR land to the North of the tracks and close to the BCSR. Armstrong had a long standing association with the CPR, having been a contractor for the extension of the track from Port Moody to Vancouver. Moreover, he, together with Morrison, had acted as contractors on the construction of the CPR Crows Nest line (Roy, 1963, p. 135n).

The CPR also exerted an indirect or mediated influence on the residential development in a number of ways. The case of Christchurch Cathedral has already been mentioned briefly, but is worthy of further consideration here. As the most important Protestant church in a city where the leading members of the bourgeoisie "were overwhelmingly Protestant", its location was

significant [42]. The location at Georgia and Burrard Streets, no doubt increased the residential attractiveness of the area west of Granville. It was determined, together with preferential terms for the sale of the land, by Van Horne himself in 1888 [43].

The Vancouver Club, the leading "gentlemen's club" served an analogous role in a somewhat different sphere. Located in the 900 block Hastings Street W., it was conveniently situated, west of Granville Street, but adjacent to the commercial and financial centre and to the West End. Although registered as a company in 1891, the Vancouver Club was not fully operational until 1893, when J.M. Browning served as its first president [44]. This, no doubt, was in recognition of his efforts in obtaining preferential terms for the site of the club from the landowner, the CPR [45].

Another way in which the CPR affected the pattern of residential development was by means of the street railway system. The CPR, in the personage of H.B. Abbott, was involved in the acquisition of the first charter for a street railway in Vancouver in 1886 [46]. However nothing was done to implement this charter. The reasons for this are not entirely clear, though the Daily World did subsequently note that "it had not been deemed advisable to construct railways until the population warranted the expenditure" (VDW, Souvenir edition, Jun., 1896).

On the other hand, the failure to act on the first charter, which was operative for two years, may well have served to delay the development of a street railway in the city. Moreover such a delay was by no means inimical to CPR interests.

Thus it was not until 1888 that a second charter for a street railway was obtained, this time by members of the local bourgeoisie and construction began shortly thereafter [47]. While the street railway as constructed did pass through D.L. 541, it was undoubtedly used to promote land on the south and east side of the city (see below). Hence it may be argued, a valuable instrument for real estate promotion was "locked up" for two years by the initial charter. Whether the CPR, through Abbott, pursued such a policy cannot be proved, but these early years were of considerable importance in determining the form and structure of the city. Against this interpretation, though, it should be noted that G.A. Keefer was also involved in obtaining the first charter, and Keefer's other interests included the VIC, a major east side landowner.

The street railway, which began operating in June 1890, expanded the following year into the area south of False Creek. Here the CPR again entered the scene. In order to provide access to D.L. 526, the CPR "encouraged the Vancouver Electric Railway and Illuminating Co. Ltd., as the street railway had by this time become, to extend its line along 9th Avenue to Centre Street. The

encouragement for completing this Fairview belt line took the form of a bonus of lots in D.L. 526, estimated to be valued at \$40,000 [48].

Thus the role of the CPR in the city was both intensive and extensive, and there was undoubtedly some truth in Van Horne's claim that the company was "the heart and soul of Vancouver" (VBT, general minutes, Oct. 19th, 1897). Certainly the effects of the CPR were widespread and difficult to avoid, yet they were by no means randomly distributed, in space or any other dimension. However, while Van Horne's assessment of the importance of the CPR has some validity it should be accompanied by a question posed by a correspondent of the News Advertiser, "In what way has the corporation ever helped the city except to its own advantage?" (VNA, Aug. 10th, 1901). It need scarcely be added that the advantage of the CPR did not necessarily coincide with the advantage of the local bourgeoisie, let alone the working class or other subordinate classes in Vancouver.

COMPETITIVE CAPITAL: THE LOCAL BOURGEOISIE.

It has been argued that monopoly capital, the CPR, played a determining role in the development of Vancouver. Yet the process of development is not reducible simply to the role of monopoly capital. The latter, from the beginning, existed in articulation with non-monopoly or competitive capital. Indeed, the very arrival of the CPR, and in part its determinant

position, was the product of an accommodation with a pre-existing bourgeoisie in Victoria and New Westminster. This accommodation, in turn, played an important role in the creation of a bourgeoisie in Vancouver. It is the role of this local bourgeoisie and the nature of its articulation with the CPR which must now be explored to elucidate its role in the process of development.

To begin with it may be stated that the articulation of monopoly and competitive capital involved, on the one hand complementarity and dependence, and on the other hand contradiction and relative independence. Complementarity because, as capital, both were subject to the dynamic of the capitalist mode of production and, in addition, both were concerned with the expansion of the city. Dependence, because it was monopoly capital, the CPR, which was determinant and established the basic parameters of the process. This much is fairly straightforward theoretically and a number of specific examples of the complementary interest of the CPR and the local bourgeoisie have already been cited; e.g. the clearing of D.L. 196, 181 and 185, the location of the sugar refinery and the construction of the Fairview line.

The contradictory aspects of the overall process, on the other hand, are somewhat less obvious and have been either overlooked in the literature or reduced to a simple East-West

opposition. This section, then, will concentrate upon certain contradictory aspects of the development of Vancouver. A brief reminder of some of the relevant theoretical points may be useful at this juncture. It has been pointed out that while monopoly and competitive capital may have the same objectives, they do not have the same or equal means for obtaining them. Moreover, the capitalist mode of production as a whole involves many capitals, so that competition between different capitals is inevitable. Finally, capital is a unity of its different moments (productive, money and commercial capital) competing for the surplus value extracted. Capital, and the bourgeoisie as a class, is a unity but not a simple unity, rather it is a contradictory unity.

The question may now be asked as to what were the contradictions in early Vancouver, and how did they help to shape the development of the city? The initial point to be made, or rather recalled, is that the arrival of the CPR created an important segment of the local bourgeoisie, situated primarily in unproductive (commercial and money) capital. The dominance of a local commercial and financial bourgeoisie in the early period was based largely on real estate. It was the various attempts at realising and increasing the value of these landholdings which played an important part in the development of the city and its internal structure.

The initial landholders in what was to become the city of

Vancouver were in large measure residents of Victoria and New Westminster [49]. Some of these, most notably the Oppenheimer brothers, moved to Vancouver and became central figures in the local bourgeoisie. They were joined by a number of other individuals who were all directly or indirectly involved in real estate speculation and/or the promotion of the same; e.g. C.D. Rand, R.G. Tatlow, H.T. Ceperley, T. Dunn and J.W. Horne [50]. The majority of their landholdings, with the exception of those in D.L. 185 [51], were located to the east and south of the CPR holdings, and extended beyond the limits of the city [52]. In the early years, however, it was undoubtedly D.L. 196 and 181 which were the crucial areas. Situated immediately to the east of the Old Granville Townsite, the success or failure of the strategy adopted for this area would be of considerable importance for the promotion of the outlying areas.

How then were D.L. 196 and 181 developed? Robertson (1977, p. 195) has suggested that rather than compete with the CPR policy, the strategy adopted was one which "propelled much of the east side's early development as an industrial and working class sector of the city". Such a view has obvious merits, indeed, as Chapter 7 has shown, the East End did develop into a working class area and it did contain a variety of industrial establishments.

Yet there is some evidence to suggest that the development

of the East End was the outcome of a contradictory process and that the CPR was not an entirely external force [53]. The initial owners of D.L. 196 and 181 adopted a corporate form, the Vancouver Improvement Co. Ltd. (VIC), as a mechanism for the sale of the land. The company was registered on May 6th 1886, and its initial strategy was not complementary, but rather in conflict with that of the CPR.

The Victoria Times (Apr. 17th, 1886), while announcing the formation of the VIC, also added some further information on the plans of the company,

"Amongst other improvements in contemplation by the company is the erection of a large first class family hotel on block 58 in the subdivision lot 196 [54]. A whole block is to be reserved for the purposes of the hotel".

A few months later the Vancouver News reported that the VIC was to commence the construction of a three storey hotel in the Queen Anne style, "the plan being all ready and the site cleared", although on this occasion the location was designated as Powell Street (VN, Aug. 21st, 1886). Why this projected structure failed to materialise is not known, although it may be suggested that it was not unrelated to the rapid construction of the Hotel Vancouver. Nonetheless, this evidence, such as it is, does indicate that the VIC was initially interested in attracting high quality residential development on to its land on the east

side of the city.

A more general view of the VIC's assessment of the value of its land is contained in Fig. 8:2. This may be compared with the data in Fig. 8:1, showing the initial prices of CPR land on D.L. 541. There are some important similarities between these two sets of data. Thus the overall price range, CPR \$1,250 - 250 and VIC \$1,000 - 100 are broadly comparable. Moreover, the VIC, like the CPR, offered a discount for buildings of certain values. In addition the VIC attached specific conditions to the sale of land in certain blocks. Thus on blocks 57, 58, 60, 61, 66, 68 and 71, all located between Cordova E. and Princess Streets, double and triple lots were offered for sale on the condition that houses of \$2,500 were erected thereon.

Subsequent advertisements by the VIC reveal that this policy continued at least until the end of 1888 (see VNA, Dec. 21st, 1888). Furthermore the later advertisements suggest that some success may have been achieved as some of the lots offered for sale with building conditions shown in Fig. 8:2 no longer appear in the later advertisements. Although these successes were limited in scope, the VIC did attract a certain amount of high quality, and hence bourgeois, residential development in the early years of the city's growth. Moreover, as Fig. 8:2 indicates, it was to the north and westerly portions that the policy was directed, whereas the lowest lot values were to the

Vancouver Improvement Co'y Limited Property

LOTS 181 & 196

BLOCK 38	
Lot 1.....	\$1000
" 2.....	750
" 3, 4, 5, each.....	500
BLOCK 37	
Lots 11, 12, 13, each.....	\$1000
BLOCK 39	
Lots 5, 6, each.....	\$ 700
" 7, 8, each.....	800
" 9, 10, each.....	900
" 12, 13, 14, each.....	1000
BLOCK 40	
Lots 24, 25, 34, 35, each.....	\$ 500
" 36, 37, each.....	500
BLOCK 42	
Lot 13.....	\$ 500
BLOCK 43	
Lot 26.....	\$ 400
BLOCK 44	
Lots 12, 13, 14, each.....	\$ 325
" 15, 16.....	300
" 17, 18, each.....	275
" 30, 31, 32, each.....	350
25 % rebate on certain lots for \$1000 houses.	
BLOCK 48	
Lots 4, 5, 6, each.....	\$ 150
" 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, each.....	100
" 16.....	125
50 % rebate on certain lots for \$500 houses.	
BLOCK 49	
Lots 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, each.....	\$175
" 20, 21, each.....	200
" 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, each.....	160
50 % rebate on certain lots for \$500 houses.	
BLOCK 51	
Lots 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, each.....	\$350
" 11, 12, 13, 14, each.....	350
25% rebate for \$1000 houses erected in 6 months from date of purchase.	
Lots 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39.....	325
50% rebate on certain lots for \$800 houses.	
BLOCK 52	
Lots 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, each.....	\$350
50 % rebate for \$1000 houses.	
BLOCK 55	
Lots 14, 15, 16, 17, 29, each.....	\$650
BLOCK 58	
Lots 11, 12, each.....	\$650
BLOCK 57	
Lots 14, 15, each.....	\$600
" 16.....	675
" (17, 18, 19).....	1000
Condition that \$2500 house be erected in 6 months from date of purchase.	
Lots (22, 23).....	\$600
" (25, 27).....	600
" (28, 29).....	600
Condition that \$2000 houses be erected in 6 months from date of purchase.	
BLOCK 58	
Lot 10.....	\$400

BLOCK 83	
Lot 1.....	\$150
" 3.....	100
50 % rebate on one lot for \$500 house.	
Lots 2, 12, 13, 14, 15, each.....	\$100
" 16.....	150
Condition, \$1500 house on 2 or 3 lots.	
BLOCK 84	
Lots 9, 16.....	\$150
" 10, 11, 13, 14, 15.....	100
50 % rebate on \$500 houses erected in 6 months from date, on certain lots.	
BLOCK 85	
Lots 1, 20, each.....	\$ 250
" 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, each.....	200
Conditions: \$2000 house on two or more lots in 6 months from date of purchase.	
Lots 21, 40, each.....	\$275
" 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, & 225	
50% rebate on certain lots for \$1000 houses	
BLOCK 86	
Lots 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, each.....	\$200
" 20.....	250
\$2500 house to be erected on 2 or 3 lots in 6 months from date of purchase.	
" 21, 40.....	\$325
" 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, & 275	
50 % rebate on certain lots for \$1000 houses erected in 6 months from date of purchase.	
BLOCK 88	
Lots 16.....	\$250
" 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, each.....	200
Condition: \$2500 house as above.	
" 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, each.....	325
" 32.....	375
50% rebate on certain lots for \$1000 houses	
BLOCK 71	
Lots 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, each.....	\$300
Condition, \$2500 house.	
" (25 and 26).....	800
Condition, \$1000 house.	
" (28, 29 and 30).....	900
Condition, \$2000 house.	
BLOCK 72	
Lots 9, 10, 11.....	\$400
50% rebate on certain lots for \$2000 houses	
" 18, 19, 20, 21.....	\$300
" 24, 25, 26, 27, 28.....	300
25% rebate on certain lots for \$1000 houses	
BLOCK 73	
Lots 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14.....	\$400
20% rebate on certain lots for \$1500 houses	
" 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31.....	\$200
" 32.....	375
25% rebate for \$1000 houses.	
BLOCK 75	
Lots 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, each.....	\$325
" 16.....	400
" 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, each.....	300
" 32.....	375
50 % rebate on certain lots for \$1000 erected in 6 months from date of purchase	

BLOCK 79	
Lots 1, 9, each.....	150
" 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, each.....	100
50 % rebate on certain lots for houses of \$500.	
BLOCK 80	
Lots 1, 8, each.....	150
" 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, each.....	100
" 9, 16, each.....	150
" 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15.....	100
50 % rebate on certain lots for \$500 houses.	
BLOCK 82	
Lots 1, 20, each.....	275
" 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, each.....	225
" 21, 40, each.....	250
" 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, each.....	200
50 % rebate on certain lots for \$800 houses.	
BLOCK 83	
Lots 1, 20, each.....	\$375
" 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, each.....	300
" 21, 40, each.....	275
" 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, & 225	
50 % rebate on certain lots for \$800 houses, as above.	
BLOCK 85	
Lots 1, 16, each.....	\$375
" 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, each.....	300
" 17, 32, each.....	325
" 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, each.....	275
50 % rebate for \$1000 houses on certain of these lots as above.	
BLOCK 86	
Lots 1, 16, each.....	\$375
" 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, each.....	300
" 17, 32, each.....	325
" 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, each.....	275
50 % rebate for houses of \$1000 on certain lots, as above.	
BLOCK 88	
Lots 12.....	\$350
" 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, each.....	275
50 % rebate on certain lots for \$1000 houses.	
Lots 13.....	\$325
" 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21.....	250
50 % rebate as above for \$800 houses.	
BLOCKS 90 & 91	
Lots 1, 16.....	\$325
" 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15.....	275
" 17, 32, each.....	300
" 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, each.....	250
50 % rebate on certain lots for \$800 houses as above.	
BLOCKS 93 & 94	
Lots 1, 20, each.....	\$250
" 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, each.....	200
" 21, 40.....	225
" 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29.....	175

BLOCK 44
 Lots 12, 13, 14, each \$ 325
 " 15, 16, 300
 " 17, 18, each 275
 " 20, 21, 22, each 350
 25 % rebate on certain lots for \$1000 houses.

BLOCK 48
 Lots 4, 5, 6, each \$ 150
 " 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, each 100
 " 16, 125
 50 % rebate on certain lots for \$500 houses.

BLOCK 49
 Lots 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16,
 17, 18, 19, each \$175
 " 20, 21, each 200
 " 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29,
 30, 31, 32, 33, each 160
 50 % rebate on certain lots for \$500 houses.

BLOCK 51
 Lots 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, each \$350
 " 11, 12, 13, 14, each 350
 25% rebate for \$1000 houses erected in 6 months from date of purchase.
 Lots 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33,
 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39 325
 40% rebate on certain lots for \$800 house

BLOCK 52
 Lots 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27,
 28, 29, each \$350
 50% rebate for \$1000 houses.

BLOCK 55
 Lots 14, 15, 16, 17, 29, each \$650

BLOCK 58
 Lots 11, 12, each \$650

BLOCK 57
 Lots 14, 15, each \$600
 " 16, 675
 " (17, 18, 19) 1000
 Condition that \$2500 house be erected in 6 months from date of purchase.
 Lots (22, 23) \$600
 " (26, 27) 600
 " (28, 29) 600
 Condition that \$2000 houses be erected in 6 months from date of purchase.

BLOCK 58
 Lots, 10 \$400
 " (17, 18, 19) 1000
 " (20, 21, 22) 800
 Condition that \$2500 house be erected in 6 months from date of purchase.

BLOCK 60
 Lots 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 18, 14,
 15, 16, 17, 18, each \$ 325
 50 % rebate on certain lots for \$800 house.
 Lots 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33,
 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, each \$ 200
 " 40 300
 Condition that \$2500 houses be erected on either 2 or 3 lots in 6 months from date of purchase.

BLOCK 8
 Lots 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14,
 15, 16, 17, 18, each \$ 225
 50 % rebate on certain lots for \$800 houses.
 Lots 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32,
 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, each \$ 200
 \$2500 house conditional on either 2 or 3 of these lots.
 Lot 40 300

50% rebate on certain lots for \$1000 houses

BLOCK 66
 Lots 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15,
 16, 17, 18, 19, each \$200
 " 20 250
 \$2500 house to be erected on 2 or 3 lots in 6 months from date of purchase.
 " 21, 40 \$325
 " 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30,
 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, \$ 275
 50 % rebate on certain lots for \$1000 houses erected in 6 months from date of purchase.

BLOCK 68
 Lots 16 \$250
 " 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, each 200
 Condition: \$2500 house as above.
 " 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29,
 30, 31, each 325
 " 32 375
 50% rebate on certain lots for \$1000 houses

BLOCK 71
 Lots 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, each \$300
 Condition, \$2500 house.
 " (25 and 26) 800
 Condition, \$1000 house.
 " (28, 29 and 30) 900
 Condition, \$2000 house.

BLOCK 72
 Lots 9, 10, 11, \$400
 50% rebate on certain lots for \$2000 houses
 " 18, 19, 20, 21 \$300
 " 24, 25, 26, 27, 28 300
 25% rebate on certain lots for \$1000 houses

BLOCK 73
 Lots 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14 \$400
 20% rebate on certain lots for \$1500 houses
 " 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31 \$200
 " 32 375
 25% rebate for \$1000 houses.

BLOCK 75
 Lots 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13,
 14, 15, each \$325
 " 16 \$400
 " 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27,
 28, 29, 30, 31, each 300
 " 32 375
 50 % rebate on certain lots for \$1000 erected in 6 months from date of purchase

BLOCK 78
 Lots 1, 20, each \$400
 " 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 18
 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, each \$325
 " 21, 40, each 375
 " 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30,
 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40
 50 % rebate on certain lots for \$1000 houses, etc.

BLOCK 78
 Lots 1, 20, each \$275
 " 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13,
 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, each 225
 " 21, 40, each 250
 " 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30,
 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40
 50% rebate on certain lots for \$800 houses

50 % rebate on certain lots for \$800 houses.

BLOCK 83
 Lots 1, 20, each \$375
 " 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12,
 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, each 300
 " 21, 40, each 275
 " 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30,
 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40
 50 % rebate on certain lots for \$800 houses, as above.

BLOCK 85
 Lots 1, 16, each \$375
 " 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12,
 13, 14, 15, each 300
 " 17, 32, each 325
 " 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25,
 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, each 275
 50 % rebate for \$1000 houses on certain of these lots as above.

BLOCK 86
 Lots 1, 16, each \$375
 " 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12,
 13, 14, 15, each 300
 " 17, 32, each 325
 " 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25,
 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, each 275
 50 % rebate for houses of \$1000 on certain lots, as above.

BLOCK 88
 Lots 12 \$350
 " 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, each 275
 50 % rebate on certain lots for \$1000 houses.
 Lots 13 \$325
 " 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21 250
 50 % rebate as above for \$800 houses.

BLOCKS 90 & 91
 Lots 1, 16, \$325
 " 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11,
 12, 13, 14, 15 275
 " 17, 32, each 300
 " 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25,
 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, each 250
 50 % rebate on certain lots for \$800 houses as above.

BLOCKS 93 & 94
 Lots 1, 20, each \$250
 " 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12,
 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, each 200
 " 21, 40 225
 " 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39 175
 50 % rebate as above, \$600 houses.

BLOCK 95
 Lots 10, 18 \$ 150
 " 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17 100
 50 % rebate as above for \$500 houses.

BLOCKS 100 & 101
 Corner lots, each \$ 225
 Inside lots, each 175
 50 % rebate for \$600 houses for certain lots.

BLOCK 103
 Lots 1, 16, \$ 800
 " 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12,
 13, 14, 15 250
 " 17, 32 300
 " 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25,
 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31 250
 50 % rebate on certain lots for \$600 houses erected in 6 months from date of purchase.

BLOCKS 105, 106, 110, 111 & 114
 Corner lots, each 300
 Inside lots, each 250

Terms:

5% Discount for Cash, or 1/4 Cash,
 Balance in 4, 8, and 12 Months,
 6% Interest,

Where a rebate is allowed for a house it is understood that it is to be erected in 6 months from the date of purchase.

R. G. TATLOW & CO.

AGENTS FOR THE COMPANY,

1886.

CORDOVA ST., VANCOUVER, B.C.

2 of 2

1886

CITY ARCHIVES
 CITY HALL
 VANCOUVER, CANADA

south and east. While the leading members of the local bourgeoisie soon became residents of the West End (cf. Map 8), the early policy of the VIC, in opposition to the CPR, played an important part in the internal structure of the East End.

The contradiction between the CPR and the local bourgeoisie over the pattern of development was also expressed in terms of the location of the commercial and financial area. Here the local bourgeoisie attempted to attract, or at least to retain, development on the area east of D.L. 541, east of Cambie Street on the Old Granville Townsite and the western fringes of D.L. 196. Once again this policy met with some success. As has already been noted in connection with the Hudson's Bay Company, the CPR was still, in 1892, concerned with the need to attract commercial development onto Granville Street (see Lockyer, 1920, p. 20).


A variety of commercial and financial companies controlled by the local bourgeoisie were located in the area between Cambie Street and Westminster Avenue. Prominent among these was the Oppenheimer brothers wholesale grocery at 100 Powell Street, but Cordova Street W. was the primary focus. Here were located T. Dunn's wholesale hardware store, the VIC, Ran~~o~~ Brothers, the Vancouver Loan, Trust, Savings and Guarantee Co. Ltd. and the Pacific Coast Fire Insurance Co. Ltd.

Using Dunn's wholesale business as an example, Map 22 examines some of the residential consequences of the location of this part of the commercial area. The employees were primarily members of the new petty bourgeoisie and their residences were widely distributed. The majority, however, lived west of Granville Street, including two members of the bourgeoisie and two members of the managerial fraction. The residents of other areas included two in the East End, three east of Granville Street and four south of False Creek: the majority of these were members of the mental labour fraction.

The objective of the local bourgeoisie was also pursued through the medium of the local state apparatuses. Thus the VIC donated a site in the 100 block on Powell Street for the erection of the City Council Offices [55]. This occurred in 1886 and a further step was taken in 1888 with the decision by the city, with D. Oppenheimer by this time serving as the mayor, to purchase a site for the erection of a city market. The site selected was the 400 block on the east side of Westminster Avenue [56]. It was this site which was, in turn, to become the location of the City Offices, whilst the Powell Street site was turned over to use as a police station.

Federal state apparatuses, however, proved less accessible to the local bourgeoisie. A decision to shift the location of the Post Office to the corner of Pender and Granville Streets,

B
U




1 of 1

U
r
r
a
r
d

l
n
l
e
t

2 of





F
a
l
s
e

Map 22 T.Dunn & Co., Work-Place and Residence Linkages,
Vancouver 1901

n l e t


3 of






- Bourgeoisie
- ▲ Working Class
- New Petty Bourgeoisie
- M Managerial Fraction
- N Mental Labour Fraction

★ T. Dunn & Co.



4 of

Small vertical text, likely a copyright or publisher's mark.




F a l s e

1/2 Km. 1 Mi.



5 of



Dupont St

N

Princess St

Keefe St

Harris St

Barnard St

Prior St

Grove St

Crescent St

Verables St

s e

C r e e k

6 of 6

Front St E

Dufferin St E

Lorne St E

Landsowne Ave E

Fifth Ave E

Sixth Ave E

Seventh Ave E

Eighth Ave E

Ninth Ave E

Tenth Ave E

Eleventh Ave E

Twelfth Ave E

Thirteenth Ave E

Fourteenth Ave E

Fifteenth Ave E

Fifth Ave E

Prince Edward St

Victoria St

St George St

Caroline St

Booth St

Burns St

St Catherine St

Booth St

St John St

Keith St

Warramoba St

Ormeau St

Dufferin St

Westminster Ave

St James St

Walterton St

Supper St

into the heart of D.L. 541, was made as early as 1888. This decision was received with considerable local opposition. A petition was signed and the mayor, D. Oppenheimer, obligingly called a protest meeting [57]. The Board of Trade also registered its antagonism to the proposed new location.

The attitude of the Board of Trade was to change, and in a most revealing manner. Representing more than those interested in real estate, its position realistically reflected the relationship between the bourgeoisie as a whole and monopoly capital. In March 1890 the Board passed a resolution asking the Dominion Government to "proceed at the earliest possible date" with the erection of the new Post Office on the proposed site. The revealing part is contained in a statement by the President after the passage of the resolution, he

".... did not wish it understood that there was any change of views as to where the Post Office was to be located, but merely that on condition that the appropriations be made this year the objections were waived" (VBT, Council Minutes, Mar. 4th, 1890).

The limitations of the local bourgeoisie are nicely encapsulated: better expansion on the CPR land than no expansion.

The attempts to encourage commercial and financial activity east of Cambie Street achieved some successes. Nonetheless the centre of gravity, so to speak, undoubtedly

shifted westwards, especially for financial institutions. This process was expedited by the depression of the mid 1890's, involving the failure of companies and the restructuring of capitals. Yet it had begun well before the impact of the depression was felt. The example of the Post Office has just been described, but even companies controlled by the local bourgeoisie had begun to migrate westwards by 1891. By that year H.T. Ceperley's brokerage office and the Vancouver Loan, Trust, Savings and Guarantee Co. Ltd. were located in the 500 block Hastings W. Street and Wulffsohn and Bewicke, the leading private bank, in the 400 block Cordova Street W..

Yet the Old Granville Townsite (Cambie - Carrall Streets) did remain an important commercial area. Westminster Avenue was less important, but did attract commercial development. The intervening area, truncated by the CPR tracks, was part of the commercial area in 1901, but here it was the traditional petty bourgeoisie and the Chinese who predominated (see Maps 17 & 18).

The most successful aspect of the attempt to promote the land values of D.L. 196 and 181 concerned the establishment of productive capital and its concomitant working class residences. The prior existence of the Hastings Saw Mill, located on the waterfront at the foot of Dunlevy Street, no doubt contributed towards this success. At the same time it should be remembered that there was no conflict with the CPR in this respect, indeed,

as witness the example of the B.C. Sugar Refinery and the Vancouver City Foundry and Machine Works, the CPR contributed towards the realization of this aim.

The real estate owners and those associated with them in the promotion of the land in D.L. 196 and 181 were involved in a variety of productive establishments located in that area. Thus the B.C. Iron Works [58], located on the north side of Alexander Street included C.D. Rand among its directors; G.L. Milne and C.D. Rand acted as directors of the Vancouver Candy Co. Ltd. [59], whose factory was located at 127 Hastings Street E.; the San Juan Lime Co. Ltd. [60], established close to the site of the sugar refinery, included as director J.M. Spinks, who, at the time, was in partnership with R.G. Tatlow as agents for the VIC; the local directors of the Vancouver City Foundry and Machine Works [61] included D. Oppenheimer, J.W. Horne and R.G. Tatlow. Oppenheimer was also a director of the B.C. Mills Timber and Trading Co., which controlled the Hastings Saw Mill and the Royal City Planing Mills located at the foot of Carrall Street [62].

Also included in this category, although broader in scope, are the enterprises established which were concerned with providing the physical infrastructure necessary for the development of the city, i.e. the supply of gas, water and electricity. All of these necessary utilities were, at least initially, controlled by private capital, with the major

facilities on the east side of the city. The Vancouver Gas Co. was located at the foot of Keefer Street, and its directors included G.L. Milne and D.R. Harris of Victoria, together with C.D. Rand and S. Brighthouse [63]. The Vancouver Waterworks Co., whose yard was located at 122 Alexander Street, was controlled entirely by Victoria residents, although a number of them were involved in real estate speculation in the Vancouver area [64]. The electricity supply was provided by the same company which operated the street railway system. The power house of the Vancouver Electric Railway and Light Co. was on Barnard Street between Westminster Avenue and False Creek, and the directors of the company included T. Dunn, C.D. Rand and H.T. Ceperley [65].

Mention of the street railway system serves as a useful reminder that the speculative real estate holdings were by no means limited to D.L. 196 and 181. Clearly the provision of transportation, and, more generally, access was a key factor in the attempt to realize the values of the more distant areas. The street railway system was an important part of this strategy, but not the only one.

The service began in July 1890 and the first lines ran from the intersection of Granville and Drake Streets northwards along Granville, through the city centre to Westminster Avenue and then south as far as the bridge. In addition, and highly significantly, a line also extended along Powell Street as far as

Campbell Avenue in the East End (see Roy, 1970, p. 23 and VDW, souvenir edition, 1896). These lines were supplemented the next year as the street railway extended south of False Creek. In November 1891 the Fairview line was opened linking Westminster Avenue and Centre Street along 9th Avenue.

A second part of the eventual street railway was the inter-urban line linking Vancouver and New Westminster. This project, organised in the form of the Westminster and Vancouver Tramway Co., not only served to promote the landholdings of its principals, including D. Oppenheimer and H.V. Edmonds, it also served to increase their landholdings [66]. Succour for these deserving members of the bourgeoisie was provided by the provincial state in the form of a land bonus; a munificent gesture which was entirely typical of the relationship between the state and the bourgeoisie during this period (see Robin, 1972; and, Roy, 1970, p. 78).

Despite their value, the VERL and the WEVT proved to be ephemeral children of the local bourgeoisie, soon succumbing to the rigours of the mid 1890's depression. Control of the street railway passed to the U.K. in the form of the B.C. Electric Railway Co. (BCER) [67]. This, in turn, generated a further set of contradictions; thus Roy (1970, p. 45) has commented,

"This conflict between the caution of the BCER's London financiers and the enthusiasm of the

Vancouver management for expansion is a major theme of the first period of the BCER's history".

To which may be added that the conflict involved not merely the Vancouver management of the BCER, but the Vancouver bourgeoisie [68].

Nor was the street railway the only form of transportation in which members of the local bourgeoisie were interested. T. Dunn, C.D. Rand and H.T. Ceperley served as directors of the Vancouver Gurney Cab Co., which provided a "hack" service. The stables of the company were significantly located on Westminster Avenue south of False Creek, in the 1500 block [69].

Finally, in this regard, the local state also played an important role in clearing the land and opening up streets upon which transport could take place. There is clear evidence, moreover, that this took place well in advance of the requirements of land for settlement purposes. In other words, the local state itself became a mechanism for boosting real estate values. This is a complex topic and one deserving considerable further research. Here consideration will be limited to one example that encapsulates, in a rather picturesque fashion, the nature of the process.

In an editorial of 1895, that is during the period of depression and well after the real estate boom had subsided, the

News Advertiser recorded,

"An incident which occurred recently reminds one of the scandalous jobbery in former years, which added so much to the city's debt and wasted money that could now be employed to such good advantage. A visitor to Vancouver was taking a trip up the [Burrard] Inlet, when, far away to the EASTWARD OF THE INHABITED PART OF THE CITY, he espied a long clearing in the woods. Like an aisle in some great cathedral church there was a cleft in the dense forest and on enquiry what was the reason for cutting such an avenue he was told that the same represented the line of Victoria street [70] which was opened to 'boom' some property in the days when the city's affairs were managed chiefly in the interest of real estate speculators. Now that expenditure was ONLY ONE OF MANY OF A SIMILAR CHARACTER, made without any consideration for the interest of the city" (VNA, Jan. 9th, 1895, emphasis added).

This statement is of interest for a number of reasons other than the light it sheds on the mechanisms of the "booming" of real estate. It serves to suggest that contradictions existed within the local bourgeoisie, which in turn points to, and indicates the need to discuss, the existence of contradictions between the local bourgeoisie and the CPR other than those concerning the promotion of real estate. Furthermore the statement was made at a time when the initial real estate boom had collapsed, although it had by then established the initial parameters of the settlement process [71]. The collapse of the real estate boom, in conjunction with the cyclical downturn, in turn revealed some of the contradictions of the 'booming' process. Thus the statement speaks of the question of the extent of the city debt. Finally it was in this conjuncture of

depression and the emergence of the contradictory nature of the real estate promotion that the local bourgeoisie underwent a re-structuration. The importance of real estate promotion declined and was replaced by the increased significance of commercial activity, particularly wholesaling, and the promotion of mining and mining stocks [72]. The new emphasis on the creation of a hinterland, of spatial unevenness in the Province, by the Vancouver bourgeoisie in turn contributed to the form of spatial unevenness in the city (e.g. concentration of financial activity, importance of the new petty bourgeoisie).

A number of these points may be further specified by a consideration of the attempt to promote and construct the Burrard Inlet and Fraser Valley Railway (BIFVR). This project is of particular interest because it was situated precisely in the conjuncture when some of the contradictions in the promotion of real estate appeared on the surface.

The BIFVR was intended to run from Vancouver eastwards along the Fraser Valley to a point near Chilliwack, where it would link up with the Northern Pacific Railway. Thus it represented the first significant attempt to break the monopoly of the CPR and introduce an element of competition into freight rates. At the same time there is no doubt that the promotion of the BIFVR was also a grandiose scheme for boosting real estate values, both within Vancouver and in the Fraser Valley; and at a time when the

peak of the boom had passed [73]. The final important feature of the scheme was an attempt to secure a bonus of \$300,000 from the city to aid in construction. A by-law to this effect was placed before the City Council in August 1892 (VNA, Aug. 16th, 1892).

The reactions to, and the struggle over this project are very revealing. The response of the CPR was prompt, and it took the form of a threat. Thomas Thompkins, the local contractor for work on a new CPR station and offices,

"... received a message from the CPR authorities in Montreal not to commence operations until it was seen whether the By-Law for granting a bonus to the BI&FVR or Northern Pacific carried, as in that case the Company would not erect the intended buildings and pay some \$2,500 per year in taxes on them" (VNA, Aug. 16th, 1892).

Not surprisingly the reaction of the local bourgeoisie was more complicated, particularly with respect to the proposed bonus by-law. This was passed by the Council and received the approval of the electorate for money by-laws (VNA, Sep. 25th, 1892). But this was achieved only at the cost of arousing considerable opposition, which failed to abate after the passage of the by-law. An injunction was obtained which, although eventually denied by the court, (VNA, Oct. 11th and Dec. 9th, 1892) led to the passage of a second by-law. This, in turn, became the subject of a legal action (VNA, Dec. 13th, 1892 and Jan. 29th, 1893). The matter was only resolved by the passage of an Act by the Provincial Legislature amending the Vancouver City Charter (VNA, Mar. 3rd, 1893).

The cause of this conflict was not the proposal for the entry of a second transcontinental railway into the city. Indeed this seems generally to have been approved of, but rather the means by which this could be achieved, i.e. the \$300,000 bonus was at the root of the confrontation [74]. Apart from legal questions the objections may be considered as falling into two basic categories.

The first view regarded the entry of a second railway as inevitable and probably imminent, and hence there was no need to provide a bonus to encourage something which would happen anyway. Secondly, and most importantly, was a concern for the impact on the City finances. Concern was voiced that taxes were already too high and also that they represented a threat to the city's "creditworthiness" [75]. A doggerel composed at the time sums up the latter objections in a succinct manner, as it concludes,

"Ah well, you'll waken soon!
Waken to find as citizens
You're saddled with a debt
Which has to be and must be paid
And that's just all you'll get"
(VNA, Dec. 9th, 1892).

Against these points it was asserted that the entry of the BIFVR would generate certain beneficial effects in the city, not the least of which would be competition for the CPR, thereby stirring the latter to adopt a more "liberal" policy in the city. Expenditure in the city would rise, facilities would be improved and the commercial hinterland expanded. In addition some

improvement in freight and passenger rates could be expected (VNA, Aug. 7th & Sep. 16th, 1892).

At the same time the protracted debate over the pros and cons of the BIPVR and the bonus also revealed some contradictions of the prior real estate "boom". The News Advertiser, in an editorial which supported the BIPVR and the bonus, had occasion to comment that,

"High values are not an unmixed good; perhaps we might say that they are really an evil, since they directly increase the expenses of living, and directly interfere with the successful prosecution of trades and manufactures" (VNA, Aug. 7th, 1892).

The point was repeated on a number of occasions in various forms and in various "letters to the editor". One, signed "Business", concluded that,

"Real Estate is already too high for the industrial and middle classes, and is discouraging investors and those who wish to buy homes for themselves. Boomers have been the curse of every city in the west" (VNA, Sep. 1st, 1892).

These points are important and will have to be taken up again in another context. For the moment, however, it should be added that in the end, the conflict over the BIPVR came to nothing. The line was not built as the Northern Pacific went bankrupt (VDW, souvenir edition, 1896).

Despite this ultimate failure, the attempt to promote the BIPVR is significant for a number of reasons. It clearly

demonstrates the contradictory relationship between the CPR and the local bourgeoisie. This is not withstanding the fact that, in the given conjuncture (City debt), the local bourgeoisie was itself divided on the issue. At the same time the initial success of the project, at least in terms of the by-law, helped to signal and exacerbate some of the contradictory consequences of the process of real estate "booming", of which the BIPVR was itself a part [76]. On the other hand the failure of the project would seem to have contributed to the restructuring of the local bourgeoisie, with the diminished emphasis on real estate speculation. Furthermore the failure left intact the contradictions between the CPR and the local bourgeoisie. This is a point which requires some further elaboration.

In the context of the long term secular upswing in the late 1890's which involved the expansion of the capitalist mode of production into, and within, the interior of the Province, especially the Kootenays, and the Yukon, this contradiction was expressed in two inter-related forms: the quest for improved communications, and for improved freight rates.

The local bourgeoisie of Vancouver was involved in and supported a variety of different railway projects in the years 1897-1901 [77]. Of these, however, only two had any significance, the Vancouver, Victoria and Eastern, and the Vancouver, Northern and Yukon. Yet even in these two cases the

real results were not achieved until after the period with which this thesis is concerned. It was only the "completion of the [New] Westminster Bridge in the summer of 1904 [which] ended the CPR's monopoly hold in Vancouver" (Roy, 1963, p.110).

The details concerning the attempts to construct these two railways have been recounted elsewhere and need not be repeated here [78]. One noteworthy feature, though, is that both the VVE and the Vancouver Northern were both ultimately controlled by the Great Northern Railway (Roy, 1963, pp. 57 & 92). This represents a further indication of the dependence of the local bourgeoisie on monopoly capital. Even had these two lines been completed in the time period considered here, they would not have reduced the ultimate dependence of the local bourgeoisie on monopoly capital. Merely, through the introduction of an additional monopoly capital, have changed the form of the articulation. Additional bargaining leverage may have resulted from the additional competition, but the control of the Great Northern was as external to Vancouver as was the CPR, if not more so.

Nonetheless the CPR did not relish any additional competition, in Vancouver or elsewhere, and took steps to prevent it. Van Horne, on a visit to Vancouver in 1897 registered his disapproval of such railway projects, saying that "any railway built into the Kootenay country between the Fraser river and the Columbia river, other than the CPR, would work the wrong way for

Vancouver and the coast interests of B.C." (VBT, General Minutes, Oct. 19th, 1897). This, of course, was at a time when the CPR was busy with the Crows Nest line, which provided a rail link between the Kootenays and Central Canada. The priority given this project was itself a testimony of the dependence of the bourgeoisie of all the coastal cities of B.C.. This position was aptly summarised by W.B. McInnes, M.P. for Vancouver Island, in a statement in the House of Commons,

"I may say that the people on the coast in British Columbia are not in favour of the building of the Crow's Nest line. You will readily understand that this line will merely give easier access to their country for the merchants of the east, and the result will be that the merchants of the coast, who naturally think that that trade, being within their own province, and they having developed it in the first place, and are entitled to it, will not be satisfied with the building of this line without the building of a similar line into the country from the coast which will enable them to compete with the merchants of the east on equal terms" (Canada, House of Commons, Debates, 1897, p. 4580).

In the case of Vancouver, however, the CPR adopted a more flexible approach to the question of competing lines than mere blanket opposition. On the one hand it proposed to make certain necessary improvements in its facilities in the city, including those it had halted in 1892 over the BIFVR, thereby sweetening the economic pie [79]. On the other hand the fulfillment of these projects was contingent upon a suitable response by the City Council. In this instance the suitable response took the form of a by-law granting the CPR further tax exemptions in addition to those granted in 1886 [80]. In addition the new

by-law contained a clause which protected the CPR against a repeat of the BIFVR. Thus, clause 2 stated that,

"... in the event of the City of Vancouver granting to any other railway company (than the Canadian Pacific Railway Company) coming into the city a bonus, subsidy or grant, or subscribing to the shares of such company within a period of eight years from the 9th of May, 1898, then all the real property of the Canadian Pacific Company in the city ... shall be, and the same is hereby exempted from any increase of taxation occasioned by the grant of such bonus, subsidy or grant or subscribing to shares of such company aforesaid ..." (VDW, Oct 12th, 1898).

In addition the CPR took some steps to improve communications in the vicinity of Vancouver. Construction of the Vancouver and Lulu Island Railway, a charter it had obtained in 1891, began in 1900 [81]. This would appear to have owed something to local pressure and the prospect of competition, but it was by no means unrelated to the CPR landholdings in D.L. 526 [82].

Grievances against the CPR freight rates were by no means confined to the period of the late 1890's, indeed they began almost with the inauguration of the CPR service [83]. Yet for the Vancouver bourgeoisie the problems raised by the CPR freight rates assumed a greater importance in the years around the turn of the century, for the same reasons that the broader question of transportation as a whole assumed a greater urgency. Nor were they any more successful at resolving this aspect of the problem; freight rates continued and continue, at the time of writing, to

be a contentious issue [84].

In terms of this thesis the position of the Vancouver bourgeoisie is conveniently summed up in a memorandum presented to a commission of enquiry by the Vancouver Board of Trade. The memorandum contained five clauses, four of which referred to the CPR and one to the White Pass and Yukon Railway [85]. The Board of Trade complained on the grounds that the CPR rates were higher than on American lines, as well as about the internal structure of the CPR rates, which they saw as discriminatory.

The four clauses referring to the CPR rates read as follows:-

- "1) Rates from all eastern points to all Pacific Terminals in the United States are five cents per hundredweight lower on almost all commodities than rates to corresponding points in B.C..
- 2) The rates given to B.C. jobbers from shipments easterly become equal to those quoted from Winnipeg westerly, when a point is reached drawn north and south through Golden B.C.. In other words the B.C. jobber is limited to a territory east to Golden, while the Winnipeg jobber ships to the same point westwards a distance of 1,007 miles from that city at equal rates. It is contended that a dividing line should be drawn at a line running north and south through Calgary, Alberta.
- 3) The existing rates from Pacific Terminals to interior points are excessive [86].
- 4) The system allowed to Eastern jobbers of making distribution of car-loads to various small shippers at car-load rates is unfair to B.C. jobbers" (VBT, council minutes, Aug. 30th, 1901 & VNA, Aug, 31st, 1901).

This section has attempted, from the perspective of the position of the local bourgeoisie, to examine its relationships

with monopoly capital, here limited to the CPR. As such it represents an exploration of the meaning of the articulation of monopoly and competitive capital. It has been argued that the interests of the local bourgeoisie were by no means coincident with those of the CPR and that contradictions frequently emerged. The working out of these contradictions and the effects of the local bourgeoisie, were an important facet in the development of the city, with consequences both on the spatial and structural form. In so doing, perhaps, an undue emphasis has been placed on the contradictory aspects of the articulation. It should be remembered, however, that monopoly and competitive capital are both capital, so that there is also a considerable identity or complementarity of interests. One real estate speculator in early Vancouver summed up this relationship succinctly when, in response to some criticism of the CPR, he wrote "Few of us came here for our health. We came here to make money ..." (VNA, Mar. 4th, 1890).

CAPITAL AND LABOUR.

So far this discussion of process has been limited to a discussion of the role of capital and to certain contradictory aspects thereof. Yet capital does not function alone, it operates as a relationship with labour. The accumulation of capital, in the end, depends upon the capacity of capital to extract surplus value from labour. Therefore any discussion of process must necessarily consider capital in relation to labour

and the response or struggle of labour against capital.

For historical materialism, at the abstract theoretical level of the mode of production, this relationship, capital and labour, is both primary and contradictory. Indeed it represents the focal point of the class struggle, the outcome of which is central to the development of the capitalist mode of production. Yet while this may be valid at an abstract and theoretical level, at the level of concrete reality much of this simplicity is lost. The contradiction between capital and labour does not exist in splendid isolation, inexorably unfolding towards some final goal. Rather it exists in a context of other contradictions, such as those examined in the previous section, together with those involving the new and traditional petty bourgeoisie. In this context the contradictory relationship between labour and capital, and its development, is both influenced by and influences these other contradictions. In the particular case of early Vancouver there is considerable evidence to suggest that much of the antagonism in the relationship was displaced onto the ethnic dimension. In this displacement, class lines became obscured, with sections of the bourgeoisie and the petty bourgeoisie supporting the working class. At the same time this ethnic division, as has been argued in Chapter 7, only existed within the context of the relationship of capital and labour and the existence and role of the former was a consequence of the development of the latter. In order to specify and elucidate

these points it is necessary to consider the whole question of the supply of labour available to capital in Vancouver, and more generally in the province of British Columbia. This more general context is relevant here, bearing in mind the structure of capital in Vancouver and its effects on the form of spatial integration, i.e. the creation of a hinterland.

Under the capitalist mode of production the requirements by capital for labour are necessarily uneven. The dynamic of the capitalist mode, its temporal unevenness, together with the transformation of the productive forces create a relative surplus population or a reserve army of labour. Yet this relative surplus is at one and the same time a precondition for the accumulation of capital [87]. Moreover the existence of the reserve army of labour represents an important feature of the class struggle between capital and labour. A reservoir of unemployed labour serves to both cheapen and discipline the body of employed labour.

Yet once the analysis moves from the abstract level of the mode of production to the level of the social formation the problem becomes more complex. At the level of the social formation, incorporating the spatial dimension, it becomes clear that there is no necessity for these twin aspects of the relation between capital and labour to coincide in space.

This is an important point in social formations such as the Canadian one, and especially in terms of British Columbia. In British Columbia in the late nineteenth century the supply of labour represented at once the means for the expansion of capital and at the same time a barrier to expansion. In other words, there was, generally speaking, no reserve army of labour in the area, the reserve army for capital in British Columbia was situated elsewhere. This spatial separation was an important aspect of the class struggle in the Province. On the one hand capital attempted to overcome the barrier, to create a reserve army of labour in situ, and hence to discipline and cheapen the existing labour force. A variety of techniques were available to capital in this respect, but the most important was the introduction of Chinese and Japanese labour. Labour, on the other hand, benefitting from the separation, attempted to sustain it. That is labour in British Columbia resisted the creation of a reserve army in situ, and the disciplinary and cheapening consequences in terms of their own labour power.

The initial question, then, is how to begin a consideration of the contradictory relationship between capital and labour in Vancouver. Since labour power is at once a commodity and the creative element, a logical starting point would appear to be the prevailing price of labour power, that is the wage rates. In addition it will be helpful if the prevailing wage rates in Vancouver and the province of British Columbia are placed in a

broader context, that of the Canadian social formation.

Unfortunately the information on wage rates for the relevant time period is fragmentary in nature and comparisons between different localities are fraught with danger. Nonetheless a certain amount of data are available and this permits some broad generalisations with respect to the regions of the Canadian social formation. It is clear that wage rates in Western Canada were higher than those in both Central and Eastern Canada. Moreover there are indications, although less assured, that within Western Canada the highest wage rates were to be found in British Columbia. Thus, within Canada, British Columbia was characterised by high, if not the highest wage rates. This high level encompassed both skilled and unskilled labour (see Table 8:3).

If, as has been claimed, British Columbia, including Vancouver, was an area of high wages, this only serves to pose some further questions. It is necessary to enquire into the reasons for the existence of high wages and to consider the implications of high wages on the relations between capital and labour. Clearly these are not separate but inter-related sets of questions.

It should be stated immediately that high wages represented a problem, although not an insuperable one, for capital; that is

Table 8:3

Selected Hourly Wage Rates, 1901 - by City [88]

	Municipal Labourer	Driller	Labourer	Stone- cutter	Car- penter
Halifax	.10-18 (54)			.30 (60)	.22 (54)
St. John					.22 (54)
Charlottetown	.10 (60)			.25 (60)	.12 (60)
Pictou		.20 (10)			
Quebec				.20 (60)	.20 (60)
Montreal	.20 (60)			.30 (60)	.17 (60)
Hull		.11 (11)	.11 (11)		
Ottawa	.13 (60)				.22 (54)
Toronto	.18 (54)			.43 (44)	.25 (48)
Winnipeg	.16-17 (54)	.20 (10)	.17 (10)	.50 (53)	.25 (60)
Calgary				.40	.27 (60)
Vancouver	.22 (48)	.25 (10)	.25 (10)	.45-56 (44)	.33 (50)

Table 8:3 Continued

Selected Hourly Wage Rates, 1901 - by City

	Plumber	Boiler- maker	Machinist	Pressmen	Tailor
Halifax	.22 (54)			.18 (55)	.22 (54)
St. John	.20 (54)				
Charlottetown	.20 (60)			.17 (54)	.20 (60)
Dartmouth		.22 (54)			
Quebec	.20 (60)			.17 (54)	
Montreal	.18 (60)			.15 (60)	
Ottawa	.22 (54)				
Toronto	.27 (54)			.26 (54)	
Hamilton			.22 (55)	.19 (54)	.28 (54)
London (Ont)		.20 (58)	.20 (58)	.18 (55)	.19 (54)
Winnipeg	.40 (54)		.27x (60)	.31 (52)	
Regina				.26 (54)	.20 (60)
Calgary	.30 (60)				
Vancouver	.40 (53)	.35 (55)	.30 (55)	.36 (54)	.37y (54)

Figures in brackets (54) represent the number of hours worked per week. In the case of drillers and labourers, the figures refer to the number of hours worked per day.

x - Figure is for 1903, not 1901.

y - Figure is for Victoria as no data is available for Vancouver

Source: Board of Inquiry into Cost of Living, Report (vol. 2, pp. 445-557).

it was a barrier to the accumulation of capital. The impact of the barrier within capital, however, was uneven. It affected productive capital primarily, since this, much less than unproductive (money and commercial) capital, was subject to external competition. This situation was aptly summarised by a spokesman for the mining industry who stated in 1902 that the absence of cheap labour, "has long been the principal obstacle to progress in British Columbia" [89].

In part the high wage rates in Vancouver, and British Columbia generally, may be attributed to the relative shortage of labour. The aboriginal population was limited in number and declining at the end of the nineteenth century [90]. Although native indian labour was used, and was important in industries such as fishing and canning, it was clearly inadequate. Thus the development of the capitalist mode of production in British Columbia required the importation of labour as well as capital.

In this respect and from the perspective of capital, only limited success was achieved in the years up to 1901. While population did increase, and fairly rapidly, it had reached 178,657 in 1901 as compared with 98,173 ten years previously, nonetheless, and again from the perspective of capital, there was no consistent surplus of labour. B.T. Rogers, president of the BCSR, stated in 1901 that, "I only know of once or twice of an over supply of labour in this province. For a long time I have

never seen an over supply of white labour..." (RCCJI, p. 191).

It would appear then, that capital failed to create any enduring surplus labour supply, a reserve army of labour, with which to combat the working class and high wage levels. Yet such a view is too simple, for, at least in the case of Vancouver, unemployment was a periodic, if not ever present, threat to the working class.

The pattern of employment in the city exhibited marked seasonal fluctuations. Employment during the summer months was considerably greater than during the winter. Fishing and canning, relying primarily upon the annual run of sockeye salmon (see Evidence, H. Bell-Irving, Fisheries Commission, CSP, 1893, Paper 10c), farming, logging and mining were all marked by a seasonal pattern of employment to varying degrees [91]. Even in the building industry employment was not year round, but varied between eight and ten months, according to the particular trade (LG, Jun., 1901, pp. 576-581). This coincidence of labour requirements may be presumed to have exerted an upwards pressure on wage rates.

A further complicating factor is that the dynamic of the capitalist mode of production, its temporal unevenness, itself generated a surplus of labour during periods of depression. In Vancouver, as has already been shown, there was a particularly

severe depression in the mid 1890's, from the end of 1892 through to approximately the end of 1895 [92]. During this period there was a prolonged surplus of labour, and this is presumably the "once or twice" referred to in the statement by B.T. Rogers. As early as June 1892 there was a public meeting of the "unemployed" and in 1894 the City Council took the extraordinary step of establishing a "relief committee" (VNA, Jun. 25th, 1892 & Feb. 6th, 1894).

The response of the bourgeoisie in this extended period of labour surplus confirms the importance of the latter. It was utilised for an attack on the working class, for an attack on wage rates. Thus in the lumber industry, to cite but one important example, in 1893 the wages of the loggers were reduced by 15% and a new system of payment for camp accommodation introduced [93]. The following year the wages of saw mill workers were cut "from about 11 to 35 per cent" [94].

The bourgeoisie, of course, attempted to promote immigration and enhance the labour supply, particularly through the medium of the state. In 1890 the Vancouver City Council passed a motion to send copies of each of the local papers for one year "to each of the 350 Working Men's Clubs (in England) as recommended by Mr. Dyke the Government Agent in Liverpool" (VCM, Feb. 24th, 1890). Against such attempts the working class often took such action as was within its limited power.

The following year, 1891, the VTLC addressed a petition to the House of Commons which included a protest that

"... the systematic and enormously increased expenditure of large sums of money in aiding and encouraging to this country mechanics, labourers paupers, indigent persons, orphans and children of vicious, tainted and criminal tendencies from abroad, is a gross injustice to the working people of Canada, and more especially to the working class, and ask the abolition of the system of legislation" (VTLC, minutes Apr. 24th, 1891).

One year later the VTLC endorsed a resolution drawn up by the New Westminster Trades and Labour Council, and sent to equivalent bodies in Eastern cities [95] which asked,

"... for your own sakes as well as ours, not to take any notice of any advertisements which might appear, or any agent who might try to decoy men from their homes and bring them here under false pretences, as there is no need of any more here" (VNA, Jun. 4th, 1892).

Nor were such responses restricted to the early part of the 1890's. In 1898 the retiring President of the VTLC reported that,

"Early in February the attention of the Council was called to advertisements appearing in the Eastern papers regarding scarcity of men in Vancouver. The Trades Council resolved that the Secretary draw up a true statement of the labour situation and send it to the different trades and labour councils in Eastern Canada, and try if possible to keep men from coming to the coast under misrepresentation. This was attended to and had some effect" [96].

Before leaving the question of the supply of labour some brief consideration of the CPR is necessary. In this respect, as in so many others, the CPR was a special case. The CPR was in a

powerful position vis-a-vis labour and it used this power by bringing in its own workforce. R. Marpole, H.B. Abbott's replacement as General Superintendent in Vancouver, stated in 1901 that the company had brought in 3,000 "white men" in the previous eight years (RCCJI, p. 195). Nor was this approach restricted to 1893 and later. A working class correspondent of the News Advertiser wrote in April 1892 that,

"The bricklayers and masons are considerably interested now in the rumours that a force of men are on their way from the East for the CPR work and for the contractors of the post office and hotel extension [presumably of the Hotel Vancouver].

Now, sir, it might be expected that the CPR would bring cheap eastern labour in here to work for long hours and for cheap wages, as was done in the Opera House two years ago, the men returning at the close of the job and taking their wages with them" (VNA, Apr. 19th 1892).

Thus the CPR, as monopoly capital, attempted to isolate itself from the conditions of the labour market in Vancouver. In this, however, its power was by no means absolute, and its success only partial. R. Marpole noted that of the 3,000 "white men" imported by the company, "there is not 10 per cent of them in the country today" and that "white labourers as a rule stay with us until they get something better" (RCCJI, p. 195) [97]. Nonetheless there is some evidence that the CPR wage rates in Vancouver were rather low. In 1901 the CPR trackmen (maintenance of way employees) earned \$1.35 per day at a time when unskilled labourers generally received approximately \$2 per day [98].

For historical materialism the question of the price of labour is not reducible to a simple equation of supply and demand. It also involves a consideration of the cost of reproducing labour power here taken to refer to the general question of the cost of living [99]. Once again in order to specify the conditions in Vancouver and British Columbia with respect to the cost of living some comparative data are required. Fortunately, such data do exist, at least for the year 1900. The data are shown in Table 8:4, but it must be approached with some caution since it is accompanied by the warning that, "the index

Table 8:4

Weekly Expenditure on Staple Foods, Fuel & Lighting for a Family of Five, 1900 - by City [100].

City	Population (1901)	Index No.
Halifax	40,832	5.4050
Charlottetown	12,080	4.9120
St. John NB.	40,711	5.2237
Quebec	68,940	4.8600
Montreal	267,730	6.0141
Hull	13,993	4.8748
Ottawa	59,928	5.1012
Toronto	208,040	5.0257
Hamilton	52,634	4.8798
London	37,981	4.5788
Winnipeg	42,340	5.8275
Regina	2,249	7.523
Edmonton	4,176	5.3350
Nelson	5,723	7.0050
Victoria	20,816	7.2300
Vancouver	26,133	6.4071
All Cities		5.4800

Source: Board of Inquiry into Cost of Living, Report (vol. 1, p. 80) ..

numbers are to be regarded as suggestive rather than as final measurements" (Board of Inquiry into Cost of Living, Report, Vol.2, p. 81).

While the data involve a false impression of mathematical precision, they do represent what was undoubtedly a real difference. This was clearly apparent at the time and this realisation was expressed in a variety of contemporary sources. The Labour Gazette, for example, stated that "most of the items which enter into the cost of living of workmen are more expensive in British Columbia and the far west than in Eastern Canada" (LG, Nov. 1901, p. 277). Similarly woodworkers claimed "they would be better off employed at 20 cents an hour in the east, instead of at 30 cents an hour in British Columbia, the cost of living making more than the difference (Ind., Aug. 24th, 1901).

In part the high cost of living in Vancouver and British Columbia generally may be attributed to its spatial isolation, that is to the cost of transporting commodities to the area. This, of course, raises once again the question of the role of the CPR and the impact of freight rates [101]. Nonetheless there is reason to believe that the high cost of living was by no means solely attributable to this cause. In fact it may be argued that the structure of capital in Vancouver and the pattern of development itself made an important contribution. In other

words real estate speculation and "booming" was involved in generating a high cost of living.

The reader will have observed that the data presented in table 8:4 omits one important aspect of the cost of living; i.e. housing. Table 8:5 provides some comparative data to remedy this omission. The pattern that emerges from the data is remarkably similar to that in Table 8:4 (food and fuel). On the other hand the reliability of the housing data is, if anything, probably less than for other aspects of the cost of living. In view of this unavoidable limitation some additional evidence is required.

Table 8:5

Housing for Workingmen by City, 1901
(in \$ per month)

City	Pop	House of 4 Rooms	House of 6 Rooms	House of 8 Rooms	Board & Lodging
Halifax	40,832	6-10	10-14	15-20	12-16
St. John NB	40,711	3.50- 6	7- 8	10-12	12-16
Quebec	68,840	5- 8	8-15	10-12.25	12-16
Montreal	267,730	6-10	8-15	12-22	14-18
Ottawa	59,928	6- 8	10-14	15 up	12-14
Hamilton	52,634	7	9	12	3 pw
Toronto	208,040	7-10	9-12.50	12-15	14-15
London	37,981	3- 4	5- 9.50	10-20	3-4 pw
Winnipeg	42,340	7-10	10-20	10-35	20-25
New Westm.	6,499	6- 8	8-12	10-20	20
Victoria	20,816	7	13	20	20-24
Vancouver	26,133	10-15	12-18	18-30	20-25

pw - per week

Source: Labour Gazette (Nov. 1901, pp. 280-281)

One particularly clear piece of evidence of the high cost of land values and hence the cost of shelter in Vancouver was the development of a considerable body of squatters. By 1894 there were at least 380 shacks located on the foreshore in various parts of the city [102]. Such initiative [103] on the part of the working class failed to strike an empathetic chord amongst the bourgeoisie. The majesty of the law was duly invoked and eviction notices served in 1894, at the height of the depression and unemployment [104]. The shack dwellers entered a protest and questioned "will the city authorities or real estate men (with empty houses for rental) gain if they succeed in our eviction?" (VNA, Aug. 8th, 1894). The question was soon answered when, a few days later, "the emissaries of destruction went out" [105]. Needless to say this assault upon effects failed to remove its cause and squatters again became a blemish on the fair countenance of the city [106].

One further example of testimony to the prevalence of high rents in Vancouver may be cited. This concerns the postal workers who sought to achieve some sort of regional differentiation in wages, a "special arrangement to suit the peculiar position of this western country". The reason for this was the "high price of every article of consumption and the EXCESSIVE HIGH RENTS" (Ind., Sep. 7th, 1901, emphasis added).

There is also some evidence to suggest that real estate

speculation outside of Vancouver contributed to the high cost of living, in that it inhibited the development of agriculture and the formation of a "settler" petty bourgeoisie. As a result there was a heavy reliance upon expensive imported food [107]. The argument here is not that speculation and high land values was the sole reason for this situation. Rather it is that real estate speculation was one contributing factor. Certainly this view was clearly articulated in contemporary opinion,

"Again go to New Westminster by road or rail and one hears the question constantly asked by strangers, 'Why is this land, the greater part of which could be easily cleared or drained, not occupied or being offered to settlers?' and we know well the universal reply: 'Oh, it is tied up by speculators'" (VNA, Aug. 12th, 1889).

This was not an isolated example of such opinion. Indeed this contradictory feature of local capitalist development was apparent even to the Vancouver Board of Trade which issued a condemnatory resolution [108]. Similar sentiments were even voiced in the Monetary Times of Montreal which commented in 1895 that,

"There is for example, far too large an aggregate of individual indebtedness in mortgage, in respect to more or less unproductive, because mainly unimproved real property, and in this regard, the advance of the province is and will for some time to come be retarded, as a result of a too general tendency in the past to pure speculation in unproductive real estate, either in the form of 'wild' land or vacant town lots" (Monetary Times, Nov., 15th, 1895, p. 628) [109].

The final process contributing towards high wage levels in Vancouver and British Columbia generally was the organisation of

the working class itself. As the labour paper, the Independent, commented editorially, "the labour movement in this province has been co-expansive with the growth and development of the country" (Ind., Mar. 31st, 1900). This was a consequence of an imported labour force familiar with the forms of working class organisation elsewhere, notably the U.K. and the U.S.A., together with relatively favourable conditions for organisation; i.e. the absence of any substantial surplus of labour. Moreover, as already argued, an organised working class struggled against the creation of such a surplus. A spokesman for the bourgeoisie [110] characterised this "deplorable" situation in the following way,

"There is no single place [in Canada where] labour is more independent than here [in British Columbia] ... they are so independent that just at the critical moment they turn round and strike, and throw the whole thing out of gear" (RCCJI, p. 410).

And,

"If it were so that we could get white men to come here and work for \$1.00 or \$1.25 a day we would welcome them with open arms, but you cannot; the moment you bring into this province a man from Quebec, Montreal or Toronto he immediately becomes a \$2 or \$3 a day man. That is the lesson taught by the experience of those who have imported labour. In other words he finds that, because of his equipment and intelligence and being able to take advantage of the conditions out here, he can get more than at home" (ibid, p. 408).

In Vancouver the organisation of labour began within a few months of the incorporation of the city. An assembly of the Knights of Labor was established in June 1886 and a second was

formed before the end of the year (Phillips, 1967, p. 13). It is not possible here to trace out in detail the subsequent development of the labour movement in Vancouver. Indeed such a study has yet to be undertaken for the time period of this thesis. Some indication of the development of unionization in the city is provided in Appendix B, but it must be admitted that data for this period is far from complete. Before commenting on the data it should be added that organisation in Vancouver extended beyond the level of individual unions. The Vancouver Trades and Labour Council was formed in 1889, and this was followed in 1901 by a Building Trades Council and an Allied Printing Trades Council (LG, Apr. 1901, p. 450 & Sep. 1901, pp. 184-189).

The data show that the working class in Vancouver took on organised forms fairly rapidly. Many unions, though, were short lived with the depression of the mid 1890's taking a heavy toll. This period of unemployment was a difficult one for many newly formed unions and was marked by a general retrenchment [111]. After 1897, however, unionisation again proceeded apace, and by 1899 the VTLC claimed to represent 2,000 people (VNA, Aug. 19th, 1899); and not all unions were members of the Council [112]. Clearly working class organisation, at least in terms of unions, was closely related to the very rhythm of temporal unevenness inherent in the capitalist mode of production.

It should be added, of course, that unionisation was not restricted to the working class. It extended into the new petty bourgeoisie, particularly the manual fraction, but with some representation in the supervisory and mental fractions. Yet the involvement of the latter was limited and the ambiguity of their position was clearly expressed in an editorial in the Independent. "The question of the 'slave of the desk'" the writer noted,

"is a general one, and that the clerk or the salesman is a wage slave as well as the manual labourer, if only he would realise it. Not only does this wage working 'gentleman' look down upon the horny-handed son of toil, but he really believes him to be a veritable 'brother to the ox', while he considers himself free as a bird in the air. Poor misguided being".

The editorial concluded with a series of questions:

"When will this class of wage earners comprehend the situation? Will they learn only by experience? Is the class struggle only understood by them when they lose the position they occupy, perhaps to find another worse than the one they leave" (Ind., Nov. 5th, 1900).

On the other hand, the working class itself was not a homogenous whole. The union movement by no means encompassed the entire working class. With one or two notable exceptions the unions formed in Vancouver up to 1901 were craft unions. As such they were reformist in nature and their membership was confined to skilled or at least semi-skilled workers [113]. Thus in 1901 the Independent called for the formation of new unions and, in so doing, recognised that "... there is first and foremost the large

number of what is usually termed the unskilled labourer. His organisation has so far proved one of the most difficult questions of the trade union movement" (Ind., Nov. 2nd, 1901). Although the craft unions did achieve certain beneficial results for some unskilled workers, the craft union as such was not an appropriate organisational form for the unskilled [114].

Given the context which has just been described a variety of responses were available to capital. These may be considered under two broad headings; firstly the intensification of the labour process or the advance in the level of the productive forces, and secondly, and more importantly here, the impact of cheap Asiatic labour [115]. At the same time these two alternatives were by no means mutually exclusive.

Under the first heading are included a variety of characteristic features of the development of the labour process under capitalism. Unfortunately data on labour processes in Vancouver in the nineteenth century are limited so that it is only possible to provide some indications of potential responses rather than a comprehensive survey.

One mechanism for intensifying the labour process was the introduction of piece rates. This was utilised to some extent in Vancouver. In 1890, for example, piece rates were briefly introduced into the sash and door industry, and four years later

in the construction industry [116]. In 1901 this method of payment was also used in cigar making and carriage making, and probably also in tailoring [117].

Another possibility consisted of the increasing mechanisation of production, the substitution of constant for variable capital, and a relatively high organic composition of capital. The lumber industry, especially the saw mills, falls into this category, as does the B.C. Sugar Refinery [118]. Henry Bell-Irving testified to a similar situation in the canning industry: "In ordinary years labour is getting more difficult to obtain. It has necessitated more machinery being employed" (RCCJI, p. 143). This was a view with which the Commissioners concurred, noting that "improved methods and machinery enable one man to do much more work than at any other time" (ibid, p. 285).

The degree of mechanisation of the labour process was of course uneven, but, accompanied as it was by the concentration and centralisation of capital, it contributed towards a tendency to the polarisation of society. The impact was felt most among semi and unskilled workers, whose labour was both devalued and tied to the inexorable rhythm of the machine. In addition such workers were largely unorganised, and hence in a weak position. The president of the VTLC in 1899 regretted the lack of a union for the unskilled and added, "... men are awakening to a realisation of the position they are being driven to by the force

of the circumstances and the accumulation of capital into narrower channels" (VNA, Jan. 7th, 1899).

Skilled workers, bolstered by craft unions, on the other hand, were able to acquire some limited degree of control, if not over the fact of mechanisation, at least of the means by which it was utilised [119].

The other major recourse of capital was to import Chinese and Japanese labour. By 1901 there were more than 3,000 Chinese and Japanese resident in Vancouver, being employed primarily as unskilled labour by productive capital. The Chinese had entered the city as early as 1886, and by 1891 their number had reached over 1,000, doubling in the next decade. The Japanese immigration only commenced in the 1890's and totaled over 1,000 by 1901.

For their employers, the Chinese and Japanese represented a necessary pool of cheap labour, costing generally half that of the equivalent caucasian labour. The necessity of this cheap pool of labour together with the dire consequences that would attend its removal, was amply testified to before the RCCJI. Thus to cite a few examples of this view, R.H. Alexander, of the Hastings Sawmill, stated that, "there is no mill in British Columbia that under present conditions could afford to increase the cost of production 70 cents per thousand feet [i.e. employ

only white labour] and operate successfully financially" (RCCJI, p. 105). J.G. Woods of the Moodyville Sawmill agreed, adding that, "if we had to pay \$750 a month more than now, the mill would be shut down, or the white men would have to scale down their wages" (ibid, p.107). H.H. Spicer noted that any attempt at exclusion "would act very strongly in shutting our mill down in future" (ibid, p. 129).

Henry Bell-Irving, on behalf of the Anglo-B.C. Packing Co., was equally impressed by the necessity for "cheap labour for production" and advocated free trade in labour with "all restrictions taken off the Chinese" (ibid, pp. 144-145). Walter Taylor, who operated a fruit cannery, would have preferred to see caucasian labour employed but "if that be not possible I want to see it [British Columbia] developed by whatsoever labour you can get" (ibid, p. 191). Finally, Richard Marpole of the CPR, on being asked whether the CPR could be operated without Chinese and Japanese labour replied categorically; "This division cannot be" (ibid, p. 196).

Yet it was not simply a question of the low wages paid to the Chinese and Japanese that made their importation so attractive. They also provided the elusive relative surplus of labour, or as it was termed at the time, it rendered the labour market into a "fluid condition". By this was meant that "any employer can, at any time, with little difficulty find all the

labour he may need, for as long or short a time as the exigencies of the particular matter in hand may require" [120]. An additional insight as to its meaning was provided by the testimony of another witness to the RCCJI. John Ibbotson, a fisherman, stated that his wife and three children, aged 10 to 22, had worked for a cannery for a total of 96 days. During this time they earned a total of \$74. "What I am trying to tell the Commissioners" Ibbotson elaborated, "is that they gave them so little work in 96 days they only earned \$74. They were held as a reserve" (ibid, p. 160).

In addition the pool of Chinese and Japanese labour helped to reduce the wages of unskilled caucasian labour [121], while also providing an antidote to the latter's "independence". J.W. Hackett, of the Robertson and Hackett sawmill, pointed to the necessity for cheap labour and added that "besides cheap white labour is very unsteady. You can get [white] labour for \$1.50 a day, but they won't stay with you" (ibid, p. 122). Another witness, a tallyman at the Hastings Sawmill, suggested that there was more than unsteadiness involved;

"I have heard it said that if they did not employ Japanese and they left the country, the whites would get saucy and go on strike or something of that kind; that is what some of the mill men told me" (ibid, p. 109, evidence of J.V. Cook).

This form of incorporation into Vancouver society goes a long way towards explaining the living conditions and the spatial

distribution of the Chinese and Japanese. Of particular interest in the latter respect is a probable arson incident occurring in 1888 [122], after which the News Advertiser (Aug. 21st, 1888) observed,

"... it is extremely desirable that the Chinese should be confined to one part of the city and as they have already taken possession of Dupont Street and neighbourhood let them stay there".

The introduction and increasing use of Chinese and Japanese as a source of cheap unskilled labour had complex and contradictory effects on the balance of class forces in Vancouver. On the one hand it served to split the working class and fracture its tenuous unity. By the same stroke it also served to displace, or obscure, the contradictions between capital and labour and focus attention on the ethnic dimension.

The prevalence of a racist ideology, the "inherent inferiority of the Chinese and Japanese", played its part here (see statement by H. Bell-Irving cited in Chapter 7). This displacement was further encouraged by the alignment of petty bourgeois and even bourgeois elements alongside the working class in its opposition to the Chinese and Japanese. Thus the latter were seen as inhibiting agricultural settlement, mainly by depriving settlers of a necessary cash income provided by seasonal labour; they failed to pay an adequate share of taxation and were a threat to health and housing standards; and they represented a deduction from the circulation of money and goods

in Vancouver by remitting funds home to China and Japan.

Opposition to Chinese and Japanese labour, and pressure for their exclusion was a standard feature of the organised labour movement throughout the period, expressed through unions and at the political level. Even when the working class in Vancouver achieved its own autonomous political vehicle, the Vancouver Labour Party in 1900, it continued to press for "oriental exclusion" [123].

On the other hand the failure of this reformist approach to achieve any substantial results contributed towards making radical approaches, to this and other questions, appear more relevant. The worsening conditions of caucasian unskilled labour, confronted as it was by the growing concentration of capital and a surplus labour market, added pressure in the same direction. It is significant, therefore, that in the nineteenth century socialist ideas and organisations established a reasonably secure footing among the working class in Vancouver.

The United Socialist Labour Party pressed not for asiatic exclusion, but for the institution of a minimum wage of \$2.50 per day for all labour [124]. In addition it was leading members of the USLP, Frank Rogers and Will McLain, who made the first attempt to extend union organisation to include the Japanese and Chinese. This was among Japanese fishermen in 1900 (Phillips,

1967, pp. 34-35). Nonetheless it was the VTLC and the VLP which was far stronger amongst the working class. The counter tendency towards exacerbating social polarisation was outweighed by the displacement affected through and onto the ethnic division in the working class.

FOOTNOTES

[1] See Morley (1974, p. 85). He is apparently quoting L.A. Hamilton's report of Van Horne's words. See also Matthews (n.d., vol. 2, pp. 143-144) for information on Van Horne's role in the naming of Vancouver.

[2] The relative autonomy was expressed in, and a consequence of, the differential lines of articulation of this segment of the Canadian social formation. Moreover this relationship was not terminated with the arrival of the CPR. Later recruits to the regional bourgeoisie added to and continued the direct linkage between British Columbia and, chiefly, the U.K. social formation -- see Chapter 6.

[3] The sources utilised in the preparation of this Map were as follows. A Map prepared by L.A. Hamilton (CPR Assistant Land Commissioner) and dated Feb. 24th, 1897; the copy consulted was in the form of a Map issued by Ross & Ceperley, real estate agents. Secondly this Map was compared with the City of Vancouver Assessment Roll of 1888. Thirdly, with reference to the Old Granville Townsite, the Crown Grant for the lots granted to the CPR is contained in the BCSP, 1886, p. 474. Finally the agreement with the local landowners contained a clause stating that the CPR should receive "a strip of land not exceeding 200 feet in width through the property hereby affected as may be selected by the said company for the purpose of extending the main line of the Canadian Pacific Railway to Coal Harbour and English Bay, the northern limit of which shall not be less than 375 feet from the mill, known as Hastings Saw Mill, and which said strip of land shall be used for the construction of the said railway" (Victoria Times, Nov. 18th, 1885).

[4] The Crown Grants for D.L. 526 and 541 were passed on Feb. 13th, 1886, see BCSP, 1886, pp. 473-474.

[5] The CPR received all of the unoccupied lots.

[6] "... we came to get those wharves; we came from Port Moody to get accommodation for our wharf projects...". The statement is extracted from a speech by R.B. Angus, for a more extensive quotation and source see above Chapter 5. It should be clear, however, that there were other important and compelling reasons which induced the CPR to seek an alternative to the Port Moody location.

[7] See By-Law no. 33 and VCM (Nov. 1st and 8th, 1886), for motions respecting the introduction of the By-Law. The intent of the council seems to have been to ensure that CPR development was retained on the north side of False Creek and not shifted to the south side. The pound of flesh was duly extracted.

[8] Letter to City Clerk dated Jan 3rd, 1891. By way of making the position of the CPR in the city perfectly clear, Abbott added a comparison between the situation in Vancouver and Toronto, "In the case of that city (Toronto) it is manifest that the railway and the city are of mutual advantage each to the other. The property holders are largely benefitted by the increase in value brought about by the concentration of business through the railways and the railways themselves are benefitted by the large amount of business derived directly from the inhabitants of the city itself... But in the case of Vancouver property owes its value entirely, if not solely, to the existence and operation of the CPR, while the company derives but a small income from the business furnished by the city itself. In other words the advantage of the connection is immeasurably in favour of the city" (VCC, #3366). Abbott, of course was something less than a disinterested observer.

[9] See VCC, #3553. The person killed was Japanese which, no doubt, tempered moral outrage.

[10] The first Hotel Vancouver was in fact built on Hastings Street W., but this was short lived (see VNA, Apr. 20th, 1887). The second Hotel Vancouver was opened in 1888; for further description (see VDW, souvenir edition, 1891).

[11] Elphinstone was a U.K. resident and the Canadian North West Land Company was intimately linked with the CPR. The former was established in 1882 "to acquire 5,000,000 acres of the CPR land grant. The controlling spirits in this company were Lord Elphinstone in England and Donald A. Smith in Canada" (Myers, 1972, p. 271). The company operated primarily in the Prairies, although its activities there were not uniformly appreciated (see *ibid*, pp. 272-273).

[12] The site was directly selected by Van Horne. For details of the site and plant, see VNA (Oct. 22nd, 1892; Apr. 2nd 1893; and, Sep. 10th, 1893).

[13] The comment is contained in a report submitted to the City Council concerned with the high cost of industrial sites in the city. The VTLC saw this as a result of the CPR's "monopoly" or near monopoly position. As an alternative the VTLC suggested that "If the east end of False Creek could be reclaimed at a comparatively small cost, it would hold in check this greed, and correct the impression that there can be no encouragement held out to the intending manufacturer willing to advance the principles of organised labour". The reclaimed land should be used for "... the establishment of a factory district" (see VCC, #11630, May 15th, 1899). The Vancouver Improvement Company, an important instrument of the local Vancouver bourgeoisie (see below) had previously tried to obtain control of much of this

same area, via the Federal Government. On that occasion the News Advertiser commented that, "The chances are that the applicants are speculators who want to get something for nothing and will make any purchaser pay handsomely for privileges they have obtained". The city should therefore oppose the attempt by the Vancouver Improvement Company and ensure that the sites only be "... given to those who propose utilising them in some manufacturing industry" (VNA, Dec. 24th, 1895, see also Dec. 4th, 1895, for details of the area concerned).

[14] Lots in other parts of the city were 33 feet and 25 feet.

[15] The local landowners had an important impact on the layout of the West End as Hamilton later testified, some fifty years after the event:

"A registered plan was based on the cancellation of the plan to the west end 'lot (D.L.) 185'. I had a new plan drawn making great changes in it. So made that all the streets leading westerly from the CPR property (D.L. 541) would run without any jog with those in lot 185. There were a number of owners in fact all but one consented to it. A Mr. Pratt (Spratt) who owned four lots on the waterfront where the Marine building is now being erected, had had a disagreement with the other landowners, and was determining the original plan. As we could not wait I had to adapt my plan as nearly as possible with the old plan, but in doing this was only able to give a continuous line for alternate streets. You can understand that I was obliged to switch my plan so as to have the principal streets to run northerly and southerly, inasmuch as they would thus lead to a large block of land belonging to the CPR south of False Creek [i.e., D.L. 526]" (Matthews, n.d., vol. 1, p. 168; see also Macdonald N., 1977, pp. 12-13 for further discussion).

The CPR also persuaded the City to "construct a road bridge across False Creek", thereby providing access to D.L. 526. In return the CPR agreed to provide a road through its land to the North Arm of the Fraser River (Macdonald R., 1977, p. 288).

[16] The Table does not include all such expenditure however. There was a small amount, \$5,800, spent on planking streets and sidewalks, but no idea as to area is given.

[17] The CPR signed an agreement with Messrs. Oppenheimer, Powell and Dupont to have the "85 acre tract [parts of D.L. 196 and 181] cleared forthwith" at a cost of \$10,000 in September

1886 (VN, Sep. 10th). The clearing of D.L. 185 was also begun on the basis of an agreement between the CPR and other landowners (ibid, Jan 8th, 1887). It was the employment of Chinese labour on this latter contract which led directly to the anti-Chinese riot of 1887 (see Roy, 1976).

[18] The case of Fripp vs. Twigge and Twigge heard before the B.C. Supreme Court in 1893. The details of the case are of no concern but Fripp, an architect, prepared a set of plans for the Messrs. Twigge for a house they intended to build on two lots, one of which was owned by the CPR. "These plans were then submitted by the plaintiff [Fripp] with the knowledge and consent of the defendants to the [CPR] Land Commissioner, who, after retaining them about a fortnight, approved and returned them" (VNA, May 10th, 1893). The lots involved appear to have been lots 18 & 19, block 29, D.L. 185. At least that is where the Messrs. Twigge resided in 1901 in a house built on a double lot.

A similar process was involved in the case of Christchurch Cathedral. In this instance the CPR sold 5 lots at the intersection of Georgia and Burrard Streets for \$2,500. J.M. Browning, the Land Commissioner, subsequently stated that this sale was undertaken "... with the distinct understanding that ... a handsome stone church should be erected upon them after plans to be submitted and approved by him" (VNA, Dec. 13th, 1892).

[19] The house was designed by the CPR architect T.C. Scorby (VN, Oct. 5th, 1886) and the company employed a landscape gardener to lay out the garden of Abbott's house and "other official residences" (ibid, Nov. 4th, 1886).

[20] See Robertson (1977, p.8). He cites the examples of H.J. Cambie and J.M. Lefevre. To these may be added, at least that of H.B. Abbott, who, on retiring as General Superintendent, moved to 720 Jervis Street, a lot originally owned by the CPR.

[21] This is something of a simplification since the very success of the CPR, in Vancouver and elsewhere, undoubtedly helped in the development of other monopoly capitals within the Canadian social formation. Thus, for example, the expansion of central Canadian banks to Vancouver, was itself a part of the tendency towards the formation of monopoly capital in the banking sector.

[22] As an additional sidelight it may be noted that personal connections were not restricted to the directors of the companies. On being appointed to the Vancouver branch, Campbell Sweeny wrote to H.B. Abbott to enquire about conditions in Vancouver and the reply by Abbott clearly indicates that the two men were already acquainted (see letter, Abbott to Sweeny, Aug. 9th, 1886, in Add. Mss. 42).

[23] For Sweeny's remarks on this, see Chapter 5 and Add Mss 22, diary entry dated Apr. 22nd, 1892. The Bank of Montreal was, of course, the banker of the CPR, and the decision by the latter to pay its workers in Vancouver by cheque in 1896 presumably benefitted the Bank and the "attractiveness" of its location (VNA, Jul. 28th, 1896).

[24] See advertisement for the Bank of B.C., "the first bank established in the city of Vancouver" (in VN, Dec. 29th, 1886).

[25] Ibid. The building was located on Cordova Street W.

[26] This was, no doubt, facilitated by the destruction of private banking in the city in the mid 1890's. This demise was in part attributable to the economic depression of that period and in part to the entry of new chartered banks controlled in central Canada. The latter began in 1895 with the opening of the Imperial (VNA, Dec. 12th, 1895). By 1901 the only bank not controlled in central Canada and operating in Vancouver was the Bank of British North America, with headquarters in London. Also by 1901 a start had been made on branch banking within Vancouver. The Royal Bank, formerly the Merchant's Bank of Halifax operated an East End branch at 420 Westminster Avenue, a further indication of the subordinate position of that part of the commercial area. The Royal's main branch was located at 500 Hastings Street W.

[27] The exception was Campbell Sweeny, the bank manager and superintendent of all the British Columbia branches of the Bank of Montreal, who was a member of the bourgeoisie.

[28] Three people lived on the bank premises on Granville Street; Campbell Sweeny and two members of the manual fraction of the new petty bourgeoisie, a porter and a messenger.

[29] See Campbell Sweeny Diary (Jul. 28th, 1888, Add Mss 22). This further supports the argument put forward in Chapter 5 regarding the shifting importance of Vancouver vis-a-vis Victoria and New Westminster and of the significance of the direct articulation of monopoly capital with the former.

[30] "The store was opened in 1893 at a time when there was, however, principally through CPR influences, a strong effort being made to create Granville as the main business artery" (Lockyer, 1920, p. 20; see also VNA, Oct. 12th, 1893, for a description of the new premises).

[31] Not all commercial capitals received such favourable treatment from the CPR. Thus a critical correspondent to the News Advertiser asked,

"Do not our merchants have to hunt up their consignments themselves because the CPR officials are notoriously short handed and do not - because they can not - notify the consignees promptly of the arrival of their consignments. It would be interesting to know how much of our Manitoba butter has been condemned as bad, when the fault lay entirely with the CPR's dilatoriness in forwarding and notifying arrival..." (VNA, Aug. 10th, 1901).

[32] On the location of Post Offices, see Matthews, n.d., vol.1, pp. 36-37.

[33] For further details see below.

[34] There is one "glowing" account of the history of the company. Its luminous perspective being influenced by the fact that the author was the wife of one president of the company and the mother of four subsequent presidents (see Rogers, 1958).

[35] While visiting Montreal, and before coming to Vancouver, B.T. Rogers met Van Horne and R.B. Angus. As a result of this meeting, "... not only did Mr. Van Horne and Mr. Angus agree to take shares, but Mr. Angus had also interested Mr. Donald A. Smith, Mr. Duncan McIntyre, Mr. W.D. Matthews, Mr. E. Osler and other directors of the CPR". American capital was also involved in the formation of the company (see Rogers, 1958, p.9).

[36] The City did purchase the water works from the Vancouver Water Works Co. Ltd., see Chapter 6, note 52.

[37] Browning was assured by the City Solicitor, A. Street G. Hammersley, that there was nothing illegal about his dual involvement (see VCC, #2153, Apr. 10th 1890).

[38] See CR, file #89 (1878) and Williams' British Columbia Directory, 1892.

[39] See CR, file #109 (1890). Rogers and Wm. Prentice, secretary of the BCSR, were two of the trustees; it was formally absorbed by the BCSR in 1899.

[40] As already noted the BCSR also owned and operated a cooperage located on the north side of False Creek at the foot of Beatty Street. It is possible that some of the individuals shown on Map 21 worked at the cooperage, since the workplace listing is often merely "BCSR". Of the eleven people listed as employees of the cooperage, all members of the working class, nine lived in Yaletown, one east of Granville Street and one south of False Creek, north of 5th Avenue.

[41] For a description, see B.C. Review (Aug. 4th, 1900, p. 31).

[42] See Robertson (1977, p. 80). Of his "West End elite" roughly analogous to the leading or large bourgeoisie (cf. Chapter 7), 123 out of 129 individuals for whom data was available, were Protestant and 42 Anglican.

[43] See VNA (Dec. 13th, 1892). That the CPR saw the church in the terms described above is further suggested by an ensuing conflict between the CPR and the church. In 1892 the CPR legal action over the failure of the congregation to complete the church in "accordance with the building conditions". The CPR wanted "immediate construction ... as that was the essence of the agreement" (VNA, Dec. 9th, 1892; for further details, see *ibid*, Dec. 13th, 14th, 15th, 17th and 24th, 1892).

[44] See CR, file #52 (1890) and Add Mss 306. Prior to the erection of its own premises the Vancouver Club was located in the Lefevre block, at Hastings and Seymour, and H.B. Abbott acted as president, see Williams' British Columbia Directory, 1892, p. 706.

[45] See Add Mss 42; Browning to Van Horne and reply by Van Horne; see also Robertson (1977, pp. 128-135).

[46] The charter was granted by a Private Act of the Provincial Legislature which received Royal Assent on Apr. 6th, 1886; see B.C. Legislative Assembly, Journal 1886.

[47] The Vancouver Street Railway Co. Ltd. was established on Dec. 3rd 1888 (B.C. Gazette, Dec. 13th, 1888). That the project was contemplated before this is revealed by a letter from H.T. Ceperley to the Mayor and Council, "On behalf of some capitalists I wish to know upon what conditions you will grant the privileges of constructing and operating a street railway in your city" (VCC, #681, Jul. 7th, 1888). By-Law no. 73 granting these privileges was finally passed in January 1889 (VCM, Jan 21st, 1889).

[48] J.H. Browning stated that the VERL "... had agreed to run a car every twenty minutes along the Fairview extension (9th Avenue) for the first year, and every ten minutes for the second and subsequent year, in consideration of which they [VERL] were to receive a bonus of several lots valued at the present time at \$40,000 (VNA, Aug. 16th, 1892); see also Roy (1970, pp. 13-24).

[49] Some of the leading figures were I.W. Powell, C.I. Dupont, G.L. Milne, E.C. Baker and John Robson, all of Victoria, and C.G. Major and H.V. Edmonds of New Westminster; see above Chapter 5 and Vancouver Assessment Roll, 1888.

[50] C.D. Rand was a director, with the Oppenheims of the Vancouver Improvement Co. Ltd., a leading real estate company (see CR, file #86, 1862), Tatlow acted as an agent for the same company. Ceperley entered into a partnership with A.W. Ross, an important figure in the early real estate deals (see Brooks, 1976a). J.W. Horne was an important landholder (see City of Vancouver, Assessment Roll 1888) and with Ceperley a director of the Vancouver Loan, Trust, Savings and Guarantee Co. Ltd. (see CR, file #9 (1890)). Dunn was a wholesale merchant, but was also involved in real estate speculation, owning land in D.L. 182 (Assessment Roll 1888). S. Brighthouse and W. Hailstone, the original pre-emptors of D.L. 185, were also important landholders, although they do not appear to have taken any very active role.

[51] The development of D.L. 185, in which the CPR was a major landowner, was directly affected by the CPR's strategy of attracting development onto D.L. 541 which has already been discussed. The only other exceptions to the above statement were D.L. 540 and 192 located south of False Creek and west of the CPR owned D.L. 926. This land, however, was of no significance in the period under consideration.

[52] See Robertson (1977, pp. 197-198). The original concentration of landholdings was supplemented by the auction of government land in 1888. As a result of this auction J.W. Horne obtained holdings beyond his original interest in D.L. 541.

[53] Robertson does recognise that conflict occurred in this regard, but he is primarily concerned with the complementary aspects. Thus he writes (1977, p. 229),

"Without denying the role that conflict played in shaping parts of the urban landscape, it is exceedingly important to realize that corporate coalitions and integration quickly became a basic feature of the elite society that was moving into the West End".

This is in contrast with Gibson (1972, chapter 3) who places an emphasis on social conflict.

[54] The block referred to is that bounded by Hastings E., Carl, Cordova E. and Jackson Streets.

[55] Lots 11-14, block 3, D.L. 196; see VCH (Aug. 2nd, 1886).

[56] See VDH (souvenir edition, June, 1896, p. 4). A sum of \$45,000 was borrowed to purchase the site. It should also be noted that the alternative site was on CPR land, block 28, D.L.

541, located south of the Old Granville Townsite and bounded by Cambie, Hastings W. and Abbott Streets, see VCM (Oct. 9th, 1888).

[57] See VNA (Nov. 4th, 1888), this includes a list of the signatories of the petition. Prominent among them were R.G. Tatlow and a number of lesser real estate agents.

[58] See CR, file #27 (1890).

[59] See CR, file #24 (1890). Milne and Rand continued as directors when the company was reorganised as Messrs, Ramsay Brothers Ltd. in 1892 (CR, file #89 (1890)), and Milne after a further reorganisation as Ramsay Brothers Ltd. in 1901 (CR, file #742 (1897)).

[60] See CR, file #42 (1878).

[61] See CR, file #51 (1890) and 61 (1890).

[62] The Hastings Saw Mill had been purchased by Oppenheimer along with a number of other members of the bourgeoisie in Victoria as part of the initial land assembly in the Vancouver area. The mill, however, minus the real estate, was sold to J. Hendry of New Westminster in 1889. Hendry at the time owned the Royal City Planing Mills with plants located in Vancouver and New Westminster. The establishment of the BCMTT formalised this concentration of productive capital, with D. Oppenheimer retaining an interest in the expanded concern (see Lawrence, 1957, p. 66; B.C. Legislative Assembly, Journal, 1890; B.C. Gazette, Dec. 12th, 1889; and, VDW, souvenir edition, 1891).

[63] See CR, file #29 (1878).

[64] E.g. D.M. Eberts, T. Earle and G.A. Keefer (see Assessment Roll 1888, D.L. 264A, 182 & 184); other directors were B.P. Rithet, J. Irving, J.W. Trutch. The company was subsequently taken over by the City (see above, note 38).

[65] The Vancouver Electric Railway and Light Company was the result of a merger between the Vancouver Street Railway Company and the Vancouver Electric Illuminating Company. The merger took place in 1889 and was ratified by a Private Act in 1890. It took place before either of the preceding companies had done very much towards the provision of the services their names indicated (see CR, file #88(1878), #57(1878) and #41 (1878); and B.C. Legislative Assembly, Journal, 1890).

[66] By-Law no. 128 granted permission for the Westminster & Vancouver Tramway to enter Vancouver and set down the route to be followed, thereby ensuring that entry was via the East End.

Clause 2 of the by-law reads, "over and along Park Avenue from the city boundary on the south, to Venables Street, and thence along along Venables Street to said Boundary Avenue, from a point on Campbell Avenue, where the survey for the said Tramway line from Venables Street intersects said Campbell Avenue, thence along Campbell Avenue to Hastings Street and thence along Hastings Street to Carrall Street".

[67] There was an intermediary in the form of the Consolidated Electric Railway and Light Co., later simplified to the Consolidated Railway Co.. This united not only the VERL and the W&VT, but also the street railway system in Victoria and the North Vancouver Electric Co. (see B.C. Legislative Assembly, Journals, 1894 - 1896, and Roy, 1970, pp. 32-42).

[68] This represents another clear indication of the general tendency towards the formation of monopoly capital and the importance of the separation between economic ownership and possession. The local Vancouver manager of the BCER acted "only as an agent of the directors in England" who controlled the surplus value generated. The directors, moreover, were not interested, at least initially, in re-investing profits, rather, "they were anxious to pay dividends on its [BCER] shares. By paying ordinary dividends for three consecutive years, the Company could make its preference shares eligible as trust investments under English law" (Roy, 1970, pp. 58 & 62).

[69] See CR, file #230 (1890).

[70] Victoria Avenue was still beyond the built up area of the city in 1901, thus it lies to the east of the area covered by the maps utilised in Chapter 7.

[71] The nature of the "speculative city" that was Vancouver at this time was summed up by F.M. Rattenbury, the leading architect in the province,

"Vancouver is building up so rapidly and few open spaces are reserved throughout the entire length, it will soon be too late, and the monotony and dreariness of miles of weary streets with hardly one spot where you can rest on a hot day in the cooling shade of the trees is too dreadful to contemplate".

Rattenbury continued by decrying the view of the Vancouver bourgeoisie as merely "commercial investments" and called for an architectural style "peculiar to the Pacific slope" (Peoples Journal, Feb. 25th, 1893; see also Mar. 4th & 11th, 1893; on the speculative nature of the development of Vancouver, see Metin, 1908, p. 319).

The News Advertiser also took up this theme and specified some of its causes as,

"... the excessive greed of the original owners of the townsite [who] caused the area to be laid out without any provision for a few squares or other open spaces ... We know of no other place of importance in which such an omission has occurred" (VNA, Mar. 28th, 1896).

[72] It is important that this be understood as a shift in emphasis rather than in terms of exclusivity. Thus, for example, as early as 1889 the local bourgeoisie became involved with mining companies, and in that year the City Council paid for the publication of a pamphlet to promote mining speculation (VNA, Nov. 13th, 1888). The pamphlet stated that miners and prospectors,

"....Should be able to find people ready to receive them with open arms at a mining centre like Vancouver, as they are willing to sell their claims or a controlling interest in the same at a sum, or bond their location .. Here now is the chance for foreign capital to step in and by the formation of prospecting and locating companies in the mining centre of Vancouver to reap a bountiful harvest" (Oppenheimer, 1889, p. 9).

On the other hand real estate speculation did not cease with the depression of the mid 1890's; indeed there is evidence that this even contributed towards a new concentration of landholding. Thus in a city tax sale of land in 1894, over 50% of the lots sold were purchased by two individuals - J.W. Horne and J.J. Banfield (see VNA, Nov. 30th, Dec. 4th & 5th, 1894).

[73] As early as 1889 Rand Bros. had been advertising acreage in the Fraser Valley (see advertisements in VNA). C.D. Rand was the president of the BIFVR. As one correspondent to the News Advertiser suggested, the scheme appeared to be designed, at least in part, to promote Rand's "mud flats at Langley" (VNA, Sep. 20th, 1892). The letter continues,

"... it is found that outside investors see no reasonable prospect of further advances at present in value and, therefore, decline to let Mr. Rand make many fat commissions. Then that gentleman turns round and says that he will put through a scheme which may, perhaps, give a temporary advance in city property, but will certainly advance that of the lands outside, while there will be fat pickings in the way of townsite bonuses from owners etc., all

of which will go into the pockets of the promoters, who are all working, as Mr. Oppenheimer would say, 'for the best interests of the city'".

[74] Henry Bell-Irving, who was responsible for initiating the injunctions against the bonus by-law explained his motives in a letter to the News Advertiser in the following terms,

"Personally, I have only kindly feelings for the gentlemen [the promoters of the BIFVR] and wish them well in their legitimate enterprises, but would certainly desire to draw the line when it comes to asking Vancouver ratepayers, already heavily taxed, to put their hands in their pockets in aid of such schemes" (VNA, Sep. 20th, 1892).

It should be added that Bell-Irving, in addition to being the agent for the Anglo-B.C. Packing Co. was also a commission agent and wholesale agent. This aspect of his business consisted of shipping direct from England by sea, a form of business which he pioneered in Vancouver.

[75] The News Advertiser (Sep. 24th, 1892) on the eve of the vote on the first by-law published a list of ten reasons for voting no:-

1..The city cannot afford it, having already a debt of \$2,000,000 with an annual fixed charge of \$100,000.

2. It would entail an additional monthly burden of \$1,265.59 for forty years.

3. If passed it would seriously impair the City's credit in the money market.

4. By crippling the City's borrowing power it would render impossible the extension of such needed improvements such as street grading, sewerage, sidewalks and extension of water supply to all parts of the city.

5. It would stand in the way of the Great Northern and other railways entering the city unless similar inducements were made.

6. The BIFVR has no corporate existence.

7. The city would be paying money for an agreement it could not enforce.

8. The city would be paying a huge sum for something it is morally certain to get on its own terms.

9. The Northern Pacific is already at Sumas and must be extended to Vancouver in order to have an outlet.

10. As the only seaport on the whole Pacific coast of Canada, Vancouver's unrivalled position renders the bonusing of railways unnecessary".

[76] In the civic election following final approval of the bonus by-law, i.e. for the 1894 election, the major issue in the campaign was precisely the question of civic debt and the reduction of civic expenses. In 1894 the total civic debt stood at over \$2,000,000 and a quarter of the annual revenue was devoted to servicing this debt (VNA, Sep. 30th, 1894). The City Council of 1894 embarked on a campaign of cutting the wages and salaries of civic employees (see VNA, Feb. 20th, 1894 for details).

[77] Members of the Vancouver bourgeoisie were involved in obtaining the following railway charters:-

Vancouver, Victoria and Eastern Railway and Navigation Co.	1897
Vancouver-nanaimo Railway transfer Co.	1897
Lardeau Railway Co.	1897
East Kootenay Railway Co.	1897
Bedlington and Nelson Railway Co.	1897
Downie Creek Railway Co.	1898
Canadian Yukon Railway Co.	1898
North Star and Arrow Lake Railway Co.	1898
Vancouver Northern and Yukon Railway Co.	1899
South Kootenay Railway Co.	1899
Grand Forks and Kettle River Railway Co.	1900
Rock Bay and Salmon River Railway Co.	1900
Midway and Vernon Railway Co.	1901
Coast-Kootenay Railway Co.	1901

Source: B.C. Legislative Assembly, Journals, 1897-1901.

Apart from the Midway and Vernon, and the exceptions noted in the text, these railway projects appear to have been purely speculative; they failed to achieve any substantive results (see Canada, Department of Transport: "A STATUTORY HISTORY OF THE STEAM AND ELECTRIC RAILWAYS OF CANADA, 1836 - 1937", compiled by R. Dorman).

[78] See Roy, (1963), and Howay, Sage and Angus (1942).

[79] See VNA (Oct. 23rd, 1897) for details. Van Horne told the City Council that "among other things needed in Vancouver are an extensive addition to the wharf system and the construction of a proper passenger station. At present it could hardly be called a passenger station at all. We had plans prepared some years ago, which have recently been improved in some respects". Construction of a new station began in April 1898, and a decision to extend the wharves was announced in October 1899 (VNA, Apr. 19th, 1898 & Oct. 31st, 1899).

[80] The main opposition to the By-Law came from the VTLC which went so far as to attempt to calculate the costs, in terms of lost taxation (see VNA, Sep. 2nd, 1898).

[81] See Roy (1970, p. 75), and B.C. Legislative Assembly, Journal, 1891.

[82] In fact this point was made to T.G. Shaughnessy, then president of the CPR, by the Vancouver Board of Trade in a meeting on Oct. 31st, 1899 (see VBT, General Minutes). This followed a meeting with the local management (ibid, Aug 30th, 1899). The line provided a link to Steveston, an important centre for the fishing and canning industries. It was subsequently operated by the BCER (see Canada, Department of Transport: "A STATUTORY HISTORY OF THE STEAM AND ELECTRIC RAILWAYS OF CANADA, 1836 - 1937", p. 615).

[83] See, for example, Report of Select Committee on Canadian Pacific Railway Charges (in B.C. Legislative Assembly, Journal, 1887, p. xxxv). The report notes that a rate reduction had been promised by the CPR but that "your committee is sorry to say that a most enormous rise has just taken place". In fact the CPR had just adjusted its rates to the higher levels introduced in the United States following the passage of the Inter State Commerce Act. The Committee concluded,

"This action of the Railroad Company [CPR] shows very plainly that they are not to work their road in the interests of Canada, and the raised rates are so prohibitive that they practically drive the trade out of British Columbia".

[84] See Jackman (1935, pp. 406-409), for details of examples concerning Vancouver in the first decade of the twentieth century.

[85] This was a British owned company.

[86] While clause 1, 2, and 4 refer most directly to commercial capital, clause 3 encompassed productive capital as well. Thus the newspaper account of the commission hearings

contains reference to a letter from the Vancouver Box Factory "showing that the excessive rates affected and retarded their business ... which in turn had an adverse effect on fruit growers in the interior of the province" (VNA, Aug. 31st, 1901).

[87] See Marx (1976, pp. 781-794); Marx states, for example, that,

"...if a surplus population of workers is a necessary product of accumulation or of the development of wealth on a capitalist basis, this surplus population also becomes, conversely, the lever of capitalist accumulation, indeed it becomes a condition for the existence of the capitalist mode of production" (ibid, p. 784).

[88] For earlier comparative data on wage rates, see Urquhart & Buckley (1965, pp. 86-87 and 94-95). The basic pattern in this earlier data is similar to that in Table 8:3.

[89] It may be added that the spokesman was opposed to the principal solution to this barrier, i.e. the importation of Chinese labour. Thus he continued,

"If the country is ever to be great, she must have a population able to attain greatness. She must breed white men for sailors to control the great carrying trade which geography and her deposits of minerals and coal and her seaboard ports have put within her reach, and you cannot breed white men if you fill the country with rice eating bachelor Chinamen" (BCMR, Dec. 1902, p. 399).

[90] See Duff (1969, pp 40-46). The total native population in the province was estimated at 28,000 in 1885. For a pioneering study of native Indian labour history in British Columbia, see Knight (1978). He comments that by the last quarter of the nineteenth century native Indians were integrated into "virtually every major resource industry in the province as workers and owner-operators" (Ibid, p. 10).

[91] See LG (Mar. 1901, p. 348) re fishing and canning, where the season varied between four and six months. A letter in the News Advertiser records the seasonal nature of other industries in the following terms,

"The season is fast approaching when the men engaged in the logging camps, the miners and prospectors and all whose summer occupations take them into the forests and mountains are obliged to seek the shelter of some city in which to spend the winter" (VNA, Oct. 12th, 1890).

[92] Unemployment appears to have affected the building trades first, which was an affect of the collapse of the real estate boom which, in Vancouver, preceded the onset of the more general cyclic depression (see VNA, Jun. 25th, 1892).

[93] "...the boarding house system will be introduced. Hitherto a man was hired during the summer at so much per month and board, while in the winter he was hired at a certain sum and had to pay 75 cents per day for his board. Now it is proposed to pay so much a month, and the man will have to pay \$5 a week for board. On wet days they do not work and so are not paid, but they have to pay their board all the same".

This new system was opposed since it was claimed that "in winter he (the logger) would scarcely earn anything but would get into debt in all probability" (VNA, Mar. 17th, 1893).

[94] This precipitated a brief and unsuccessful strike at the BCMTT (VNA, Dec. 2nd, 1894). For precise details on the wage reductions, see Board of Conciliation, Report of Commission of Labour Enquiry (BCSP, 1894-1895, p. 594). The lumber industry was not an isolated example. Wage cuts were also imposed on tailors (VNA, Sep. 20th, 1893), building trades (VNA, Jun. 25th, 1892), labourers (VNA, Feb. 7th, 1894), street cleaners (VNA, Mar. 7th, 1895), painters (Painters and Allied Trades Union, minutes, May 2nd, 1894), steamshipmen (VTLC, minutes, Mar. 1894 and Apr. 1895) and local miners (VNA, Jan. 19th, 1895). In all probability, this list is far from complete. 1894 also saw the quashing by "employers of labour" of an attempt to introduce compulsory arbitration (VNA, Apr. 15th, 1894).

[95] The specific cities mentioned were Winnipeg, Toronto, Ottawa, Quebec, Montreal, Hamilton and London (Ont.) (VNA, Jan. 26th, 1892).

[96] It should not be inferred that the working class was opposed to immigration per se, but rather to attempts to flood the labour market. The aforementioned source continues,

"Yet there were large numbers who did not belong to any trade union who arrived here. It is comparatively easy to reach the ears of Union men, but very difficult to reach the ears of non-unionists who in turn will say nothing good of the place if they happen to fail. We want thousands more in this Province, but if we induce people to come here under misrepresentation the place will receive a black eye and our progress will be retarded and our growth will be slow" (VNA, Jul. 23rd, 1898).

Another interesting facet of the attempt to promote immigration is that on at least one occasion advertisements were directed specifically towards the encouragement of female

immigrants. In 1896 the City Clerk received a response from Salt Lake City which stated that,

"I find advertised in a paper that at your city they are scarce of women and will pay a pretty good thing for some of our women. If that may be true I will tell you what I will do for you.... I would get a car load of young ladies and widows to ship to your city and country" (VCC, #8299, May 15th, 1896; see also #8349, Apr. 19th, 1896 for a response from Philadelphia).

In part this may be seen as a reflection of the chronic shortage of domestic servants, but it was also, very probably related to the instability of the labour force.

[97] This policy of relying upon imported labour apparently continued well into the twentieth century (see Foster, 1970, p. 50). The CPR also attempted to foster an ideological identification of its workers with the company by such means as employee excursions and an annual picnic (see VNA, Jul. 27th, 1890, Sep. 10th, 17th and 19th, 1899). Nor was the CPR alone in the use of this tactic, it was employed by the BCER, the B.C. Iron Works and the Hastings Sawmill (VNA, Jun. 13th, 1900, and Aug. 4th, 1895).

[98] This rate of \$1.35 was only achieved following a strike; it had previously been \$1.25 (VNA, Jun. 18th to Aug 31st, 1901). The data refer to caucasian labour. The low wages, presumably, go a long way towards explaining the instability of the CPR workforce. R. Marpole, when asked if it would be possible for the CPR to raise its wages replied, "Certainly not" and added, "I do not think it possible to raise the wages in any industry in this Province. It would be a most impolitic thing to do" (RCCJI, p. 196).

[99] For Marx the value of labour power is determined by the socially necessary labour required for its reproduction;

"... the value of labour power is the value of the means of subsistence necessary for the maintenance of its owner ... If the owner of labour power works today, tomorrow he must again be able to repeat the same process in the same conditions as regards health and strength. His means of subsistence must therefore be sufficient to maintain him in his normal state as a working individual. His natural needs, such as food, clothing fuel and housing vary according to climatic and other physical peculiarities of his country. On the other hand, the number and extent of his so called necessary

requirements, as also the manner in which they are satisfied, are themselves the products of history, and depend therefore to a great extent on the level of civilisation attained by a country; in particular they depend on the conditions in which, and consequently on the habits and expectations with which the class of free workers has been formed" (Marx, 1976a, pp.274-275).

[100] See Board of Inquiry into Cost of Living, Report, vol. 2, pp. 75, for details on the construction of the index.

[101] It may be noted that sea transportation helped to regulate the CPR rates for Vancouver, which may go a long way towards explaining the fact that the cost of living in Vancouver, as shown in Table 8:4, was lower than elsewhere in the province. The CPR claimed that "coast rates are based on water competition via the isthmus or Cape Horn from the eastern seaboard" (see Report upon Railway Commissions Railway Rate Grievances and Regulative Legislation, CSP, 1902, paper No. 20a, p. 70).

[102] See VNA (Aug. 19th and 27th, 1894). In 1893 70 shacks were located on the foreshore west of the BCSR (VNA, Sep. 12th, 1893). False Creek was another important location.

[103] This was not the only initiative in terms of housing. In 1892, "the watchman at the Hastings Sawmill found five men who had converted a box car in the yard into a temporary lodging house" (VNA, Nov. 1st, 1892). The men were duly arrested.

[104] The delay in employing legal action appears to have been the result of jurisdictional problems. Thus in 1891 the Board of Trade passed a resolution urging the City Council to request the "Department at Ottawa to take immediate action towards the removal of the shacks from the foreshore of Vancouver and False Creek" (VBT, council minutes, Apr. 21st, 1891).

[105] On one day over 100 shacks were demolished (VNA, Aug. 19th, 1894). The City Solicitor later testified that special constables were employed on the task for fear of a "riot" (VNA, May 15th, 1895).

[106] English Bay was subsequently recorded as containing a body of tent dwellers or "campers" (see VNA, Jul. 21st, 1896 and Aug. 3rd, 1899).

[107] "The agricultural lands of the province are wild and vacant and unproductive, while foreign and outside produce is imported annually to the extent of \$3,500,000. While the lands of B.C. remain in the condition cited the working classes of the towns and cities must pay the duties collected and the freight

rates charged on the long haul of imported stuff used by them (Ind., Feb 16th, 1901; see also RCCJI, Evidence Alex Philip, Secretary of Richmond Farmers Institute, p. 46 where the same figure for imports of agricultural imports is cited).

[108] The resolution read,

"Whereas the sale of large tracts of land to non-residents or speculators tends to the exclusion of bona-fide settlers and is a decided drawback to the increase of the farming population so desirable to the province; Resolved that the government be requested to make such amendments to the provincial Land Act as will reserve the Crown lands suitable for farming intact for actual settlers" (VBT, general minutes, Mar. 22nd, 1889).

[109] In later years the blame for the lack of agricultural settlers was largely attributed to the presence of Chinese and Japanese (see RCCJI, pp. 44-63). This may be seen as a reflection of shifting class alliances, which at the same time ignores the question of why the Chinese and Japanese were present at all.

[110] The spokesman was R. Cassidy, who appeared before the Royal Commission as counsel for the Japanese, but he clearly represented the position of the bourgeoisie, whether employed by them or not.

[111] The period of the depression witnessed a different response by the working class to the capitalist mode of production. In this period there was a new, or renewed, interest in the co-operative movement. A co-operative club of Vancouver was established in 1894 (VNA, Jul. 27th, 1894) and attempts were made to establish co-operative colonies. The News Advertiser (Oct. 23rd, 1894) recorded that a meeting was held to "arrange for the establishment of another co-operative colony between the City and New Westminster". There was at least one other such colony on Vancouver Island (VNA, Nov. 11th, 1894). In addition attempts were made to establish both producers and retail co-operatives (VNA, Dec. 6th, 1895 and Sep. 5th, 1896). The latter appears to have had some enduring success as there was a co-operative store on Granville Street, in Yaletown, in 1901.

[112] In February 1901, 32 out of 39 unions in Vancouver were affiliated to the VTLC (LG, Feb., 1901, p. 306).

[113] The most notable exceptions were the Knights of Labor and the American Railway Union. The Knights of Labor were the product of an earlier form of utopian unionism whose membership was "inclusive and only professional gamblers, stockbrokers,

lawyers, bankers and those who lived in whole or in part by the sale or manufacture of intoxicating liquors were excluded" (Grob, 1969, p. 35). The American Railway Union was the forerunner of a more radical industrial unionism which was "based on the principle of the unity of all the workers in the industry ... uniting skilled, semi-skilled and unskilled workers in an entire industry" (Foner, 1955, pp. 246-276). In terms of Vancouver it is significant that the first such union was directed against the CPR. The ARU was followed in 1902 by the United Brotherhood of Railway Employees. This too was represented in Vancouver and was involved in a protracted and violent strike in 1903 (see McCormack, 1977, pp. 44-48; Phillips, 1967, pp. 37-41; and, Orr, 1968).

[114] Francis Williams, a member of the tailor's union and the Vancouver Labour Party Candidate in 1900, pointed to "the benefits that had resulted to the City labourers through the action of the Trades Council [VTLC] which had resulted in shorter hours and a Saturday half-holiday" (Ind., May 29th, 1900). See also VCC, #9461, for details of resolutions submitted to City Council by the VTLC, and Table 8:3.

[115] The designation as more important must be seen as referring only to the specific time and place under consideration here.

[116] See VTLC, minutes (Dec. 5th and 26th, 1890): and, VNA (Aug. 22nd, 1894).

[117] See LG (Feb., 1902, and Feb. 1901, pp. 312-313). Piece rates prevailed in the tailoring industry in Victoria at this time.

[118] Foster (1970, pp. 38-39) provides some examples of the "trend to machine operation, well illustrated by the lumber industry". In the case of the sugar refinery the labour force was "97 per cent unskilled labour" which, given the heavy capital investment, is a sure indication of mechanisation (see RCCJI, p. 191).

[119] Foster (1970, p. 40) cites a clear example of this. The International Typographical Union #226, in June 1893,

"... secured a one year machine scale agreement with the World and the News Advertiser. The machine scale enabled journeymen typographers to learn to use the newly introduced linotype machine while on a lower salary. The adoption of the scale ensured that journeymen employed prior to the installation of the machines would be given an opportunity to learn to operate the machines while still employed

continuously. One explanation of the typographers early success in securing machine scale agreements with the employers suggests that the employers had no alternative" (see also, Bartley, 1938, p.12).

[120] The term "fluid condition" was employed by R. Cassidy, the counsel for the Japanese before the Royal Commission (RCCJI, p. 404). The definition was provided by C. Wilson, who appeared as counsel for the province (ibid, p. 289).

[121] According to the evidence of T.S. Baxter (RCCJI, p. 125) the wages in saw mills in 1890, before the employment of Chinese and Japanese was \$26 per month plus board. In 1901 this had fallen to \$17 per month plus board.

[122] The incident concerned a house on Pender Street, between Richards and Seymour Streets, and according to the News Advertiser (Aug. 21st, 1888),

"From the appearance of the place there is no doubt that it was deliberately set on fire. This was done no doubt because it is going to be occupied by Chinamen and the residents of the neighbourhood do not desire the Celestials to obtain a footing there".

[123] For the platform, see Ind. (May 19th, 1900). The party was modeled after a similar party in Winnipeg, which was in turn based on the Independent Labour Party in Britain (McCormack, 1977, Chap. 5). The delegates to the VLP were almost entirely from the VTLC and its orientation was "reformist" (Ind., May, 19th, 1900). The term "reformist" is taken from McCormack, who uses it to distinguish this from other trends in the labour movement, designated as "rebels" and "revolutionaries".

[124] See Ind. (Jun. 9th, 1900). The United Socialist Labor Party received sufficient support to erect and open its own meeting hall. This was located at 805 Westminster Avenue. The VTLC labour hall, in contrast, was located on Homer Street (VNA, Sep. 27th, 1900).

CHAPTER 9

CONCLUSION

This Chapter stands in a dialectical relationship to the preceding ones. It is brief. The objectives are twofold, to provide a concise statement of the main argument developed in this thesis, and to venture some personal assessment of the study as a whole.

THE ARGUMENT.

Using the concepts of historical materialism, this thesis has argued that the question of urban development must be situated in the broader context of social development. More specifically, examining the development of a particular place, nineteenth century Vancouver, required a consideration of the forms of temporal and spatial unevenness generated by capitalism. At an abstract theoretical level, this involved an examination of the contradictory and tendential logic of the capitalist mode of production, expressed in periodic crises, together with its social foundations and spatial expressions.

The social basis was specified through a critical elaboration of the theory of social class developed by Poulantzas. The spatial consequences were introduced through the use of the concept of social formation. This concept played an important role, for it was also the means by which the discussion moved from the theoretical to the empirical level and the

abstract concepts were incorporated into an empirical enquiry. The development of Vancouver in the late nineteenth century was firmly situated in the context of the Canadian social formation. The trajectory of the latter was examined with a view towards establishing the patterns of external dominance and internal structure. As a centre in formation the Canadian social formation occupied an unusual position. It was dominated by capitalist social formations, primarily the U.K. and to a lesser extent the U.S.A.. The pattern of external dominance was mediated by, and in turn facilitated, the internal dominance of a commercial and banking bourgeoisie, located in central Canada.

In this context, confederation represented a step in the process of the re-creation of the social formation on a continental scale. Subsequent facets of this process were the purchase of Rupert's Land, railway development and the National Policy. The last two, in particular, contributed to the rise to internal dominance of capitalist production. This involved not only the expansion of capital per se, but its development in a new or transformed form: monopoly capital, with the CPR as the primary example.

The complex of processes alluded to had significant spatial effects within the social formation. The dominant fraction of the bourgeoisie, located primarily in Montreal and Toronto, created a pattern of spatial unevenness with themselves at the core.

Vancouver developed as part of this process. An accommodation between the local bourgeoisie of the coastal cities of British Columbia and the CPR ensured the latter a determinant role in the early development of the city. At the same time the accommodation contributed significantly towards the structure of the local bourgeoisie in Vancouver, rooted initially in commercial capital, especially real estate located in the south and east of the city.

In the subsequent development of Vancouver this initial structure of external control was supplemented by the influx of substantial additional capital. The major sources of external capital and control were threefold. Two of these were external to Canada; the U.K. and the U.S.A., with the former the more important. This pattern reflected the external relationships of the Canadian social formation. The third source was central Canada, which both reflected and contributed to the internal structure of the social formation. The consequences of these relationships in Vancouver were twofold. The creation of the city as a commercial, financial and managerial centre for the province; and a new pattern of unevenness within the province, a hinterland focussed on Vancouver. This pattern implied a substantial number of new petty bourgeoisie class places in the social fabric of the city.

The local bourgeoisie in Vancouver played an active part in the establishments of these new relationships in space. Centred

primarily in commercial and money capital, they began by promoting real estate within the city, but soon extended their horizons. Later, in the 1890's, they expanded their brokerage role to include the promotion of mining companies.

The internal implications of these structural processes were examined in social and spatial terms through the medium of the residential class structure in 1901. Abstracting from process, the social polarity of the bourgeoisie and the working class and the bourgeoisie was clearly reflected in space. Given the variegated environment appropriated for settlement, the spatial pattern was not a simple bi-polar one, but the differentiation was marked. The form of Vancouver's spatial integration involved the creation of a substantial number of new petty bourgeoisie class places. When these and the traditional petty bourgeoisie were examined some complex patterns were observed. In the main, however, these were explicable in terms of the differential effects of the polarization of these classes towards one of the two primary classes. The new petty bourgeoisie was considered in terms of a number of fractions: the professional and managerial fractions were polarized towards the bourgeoisie and the manual fraction towards the working class. The supervisory and the mental labour fractions, together with the traditional petty bourgeoisie, occupied contradictory structural and spatial locations.

For theoretical and empirical reasons the ethnic dimension was accorded a separate treatment. The examination of the Chinese and Japanese communities was found to supplement, and not contradict, the main thrust of the class analysis. These communities exhibited a clear internal class structure, with spatial consequences. Their distribution within the city as a whole was seen to reflect a particular articulation with the broader social and spatial structure through the medium of racism.

Finally, the creation of these social and spatial patterns was examined in terms of the internal processes of development. The CPR was argued to be the determinant force in the early development of the city. Through direct and indirect means the CPR was largely responsible for the spatial form in which the landscape was appropriated. It attracted the commercial and financial centre onto its land and established the industrial nature of False Creek, and the adjacent working class area of Yaletown. In addition the CPR conditioned the residential nature of the East and West End, and the extension of settlement south of False Creek.

The relationships of the local bourgeoisie with the CPR were characterized by complementarity and contradiction, although the discussion focussed primarily on the latter. The leading members of the local bourgeoisie, initially concerned with real estate

promotion, attempted to create spatial forms consonant with their own interests. They were most successful where this was complementary with the CPR's objectives, e.g., the industrial/working class development of the East End. A significant example of the contradiction between the local bourgeoisie and the CPR concerned the attempt to build the BIFVR. Occurring at the end of the initial real estate boom this example also served to reveal divisions within the local bourgeoisie and, significantly, some contradictions of the real estate "booming" process. The latter was expressed in terms of the City's indebtedness. The BIFVR, proposed as Vancouver's hinterland was initially being created, also pointed to what was to remain an enduring contradiction with the CPR: freight rates.

The development of the city involved not only the deployment of capital of various kinds, but also the unfolding contradiction between capital and labour. Except for the depression of the 1890's, capital in Vancouver had difficulty in creating a reserve army of labour in situ. In consequence wage rates were high and labour, from the perspective of capital, was unpleasantly "independent". This situation, in part, was attributable to the contradictions of real estate "booming", but also to the organization of labour, especially skilled workers.

Capital responded by advancing the level of the productive forces and importing Chinese and Japanese labour. While the

former served to exacerbate or focus the contradiction between capital and labour, the latter acted to displace it. Particularly since petty bourgeois and even bourgeois elements sided with labour on this issue. Although not the only issue acting to displace the contradiction between capital and labour, attention was limited to the ethnic dimension in this regard. Up to 1901 the unfolding of the central contradiction was in the direction of displacement.

Originating from a concern over social inequality this thesis has placed the structure of social relationships at the forefront of the discussion. It has attempted to describe and account for some of the major spatial patterns created through the "making" of Vancouver, and it has done so by means of the concepts of historical materialism. Central to this endeavour has been the avoidance of the fetishism, or reification, of space, all too common in geographical studies. Instead space and spatial patterns have been viewed as inherently social, as necessary expressions or concomitants of class relationships. Relations between areas and spatial relations are replaced by the social process in space: Vancouver's hinterland was not created by the city, but by the bourgeoisie of the city in the pursuit of profit.

Nor, as this example implies, was the making of Vancouver a self-contained, autonomous process. It occurred within, and was a

part of, the unfolding structure of relationships, national and international, that constituted the Canadian social formation. Thus, for example, the established linkages between the CPR, the Bank of Montreal and the Hudson's Bay Company were inscribed, in fine, on the Vancouver landscape.

Finally, although the process through which Vancouver was created was evolutionary, it was in no way linear as conventional ecological explanations imply. It was a contradictory, dialectical process with no necessary outcome. The temporal and spatial unevenness of the reproduction of capitalist social relations belies any simple incremental extrapolation.

PROBLEMS AND POSSIBILITIES.

If the previous section may be taken as a review of what has been argued in this thesis, it is now necessary to invert the perspective; to consider what has been omitted. In short some assessment of the inadequacies of the study, together with its implications for further research, is needed.

The initial intention of this study was to attempt a fairly complete discussion of the early development of Vancouver. In reality, however, it has only established the pre-conditions for such a study. The most significant point here is that the discussion remains primarily at the level of class places and does not proceed to examine the complexity of class positions

adopted in different conjunctures. In other words there is no consistent consideration of an unfolding of conscious class struggle in Vancouver.

The issue was touched upon in Chapter 8 most particularly, but the discussion is far from complete. In part this reflects the conceptual difficulties encountered in Chapter 2 in terms of the theory of the ideological level and the theory adopted in Chapter 4. Yet a full account of the social process in space must clearly incorporate this additional dimension. For example the traditional petty bourgeoisie generally supported the working class opposition to Chinese and Japanese immigration. But what was the broader pattern of the relationship between these two classes? Did the traditional petty bourgeoisie deflect working class political demands?, as Johnson (1972) has suggested at a national level. Did the substantial traditional and new petty bourgeois components of the class structure in Vancouver facilitate the maintenance of social cohesion?

To answer such questions and complete the study would require a detailed examination of the various cultural and political institutions in Vancouver, their class composition and ideological positions. The concept of displacement, deployed in the discussion of the ethnic dimension, would seem to be of considerable relevance here.

The last point raises a number of related issues. In the study the only source of displacement examined was that of the ethnic dimension. It seems highly improbable that this was in fact the case. There were, in all likelihood, a number of other non-class relationships which may have acted in a similar direction, and which centre around the complex question of the social reproduction of labour. Important here are a series of related issues such as the sexual division of labour, family structure and forms of housing tenure. To say these are non-class relationships is not to suggest that they are independent of class structure, but rather to pose the question of how they are articulated with the latter. In the case of Vancouver there are empirical difficulties in dealing with these issues, but there are also theoretical problems. For example, how extensive was home ownership among the working class in Vancouver, and, if extensive, how did this affect social relationships? Did it represent a sphere of independence from capitalist production relations, or did it serve to promote social cohesion? Nonetheless it may be argued that the incorporation of such issues into the discussion would not weaken but enrich a class analysis, in the same manner as the incorporation of the ethnic dimension. The point here is that a class analysis provides the basis for a discussion of these other important questions.

Another ~~problem~~ devolves around the question of how

"typical" was the development of Vancouver? At the empirical level it was obviously unique, but at a more abstract level this seems highly unlikely. Indeed if this were the case then the whole theoretical basis of the enquiry would be thrown into doubt. While it would be presumptuous to call for a replication of this study for other localities, if the study has any merit it lies in the questions asked about the development of Vancouver and their means of resolution. Comparable answers for other cities would greatly facilitate the theoretical understanding of the uneven process of development in capitalist social formations. Nor need the approach, in general terms, be limited to studies of particular cities. A regional enquiry could be undertaken in the same general manner, although the precise tactics would have to be modified.

To cite but one example arising in terms of this study. Chapter 6 provides a very partial view of Vancouver's spatial integration. It by no means exhausts this topic and would greatly benefit from further information on the structure of other cities in the province, and the province as a whole. The labour movement in British Columbia at the turn of the century has been recognised as the most radical in Canada. It could, perhaps, be argued that this was a result of the form of development in the province, with management and control concentrated in Vancouver and production in the periphery. Was the labour movement in Vancouver - the violent strike of 1903 against the CPR -

radicalized through its links with the radical miners of the periphery?

Also of concern in this respect are the temporal boundaries of the study. Even if the argument presented here is accepted it merely broaches the issue of subsequent development. Once again the major point is theoretical rather than empirical, the dialectical relationship between forces promoting continuity and change. It is one of the strengths of historical materialism that it is directed towards such questions.

Finally, the measure of this study lies less in what it has achieved than in what it may stimulate. Nor does it represent an end in itself, but part of an ongoing process, personal and social. If capitalist social relations are to be transcended and not merely reproduced, then they must also be understood in all their complexity and diversity, past as well as present. Neither task is small, nor are they separate, but the recognition of the social basis of "spatial" problems and the spatial expression of social inequality is essential to both.

LIST OF APPENDICES

	Page.
A. Sources Used in the Preparation of Tables 7:5 to 7:7.	475
B. Unions in Vancouver, 1886 - 1901.	478
C. Vancouver Improvement Co. - Price of Lots in D.E. 181 & 196, 1886.	481

APPENDIX A

Sources Used in the Preparation of Tables 7:5 to 7:7.

High Wages

The data available on wages is not always easy to compare. Included in the sample are occupational categories in which precise data has been located. The list of these occupations, together with the number of individuals included and the wage rates is:

Occupation	Number	Wages in \$	Source
Sawyer	21	5.00 p. day	LG. Dec. 1900
Filer (Saw Filer)	12	3.50-6.50 p. day	"
Printer	35	.40-50c p. hour	LG. Jan. 1901
Bricklayers	24	.50c p. hour	LG. Jun. 1901
Masons (Stonemasons)	18	.40-50c p. hour	"
Stonecutters	30	.45-56c p. hour	LG. Jul. 1901
Plasterers	28	.40-50c p. hour	"
Gas & Steam Fitters	9	3.80 p. day	LG. Jun. 1902
Loco Drivers (Engineers)	7	100-135 p. month	Gosnell, 1897 p. 422
Total	183		

The terms in brackets (Saw Filer) represent occupational categories used in the City Directory which have been taken as referring to the same occupations. The sample in this Table is clearly biased towards the construction industry.

Union Membership

The data on union membership is limited. The major source employed has been local newspapers (News Advertiser and Independent), and in particular the weekly reports of the Vancouver Trades and Labour Council. These reports frequently

mention the names of members of individual unions. Due to the paucity of information the Map and Tables include union membership for the period 1898 - 1901, but only if the individuals in 1901 were still listed under the occupation appropriate to the union to which they are known to have belonged. Also eliminated are individuals who, although union members, are excluded from the working class on the grounds of performing supervisory or unproductive labour. The majority of the people included in this sample were officials of the unions to which they belonged, although the organizational structure of unions at the local level in this time period was still very flexible.

The unions included in this sample, together with the number of individuals for each union is:

Union	Number
Canadian Association of Stationery Engineers	4
Journeyman Bakers & Confectioners	6
Journeyman Barbers International	8
International Brotherhood of Blacksmiths	2
Boilermakers & Iron Shipbuilders of America	7
Bricklayers & Masons International	5
Amalgamated Society of Carpenters and Joiners	5
United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners	2
Brotherhood of Railroad Carmen of America	2
Cigar Makers International	8
International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers	1
Amalgamated Society of Engineers	5
B.C. Fishermen's Protective Union	1
Brotherhood of Freighthandlers	7
Iron Moulders Union	4
Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen	3
International Longshoremen's Union	4

International Association of Machinists	11
Brotherhood of Painters & Decorators	7
Operative Plasterers International Association	2
United Association of Plumbers, Gasfitters & Steamfitters	5
International Printing Pressmen's Union	2
Brotherhood of Railway Trainmen	2
Pacific Coast Shingle Weavers	1
Shipwrights & Caulkers Association	7
Mainland Steam Shipmen's Association	1
Stevedores & Freighthandlers Union	4
Journeyman Stonecutters Union	6
Amalgamated Association of Street Railway Employees	10
Journeyman Tailors Union of America	8
Toolsharpeners Union of B.C.	1
International Typographical Union	9
Amalgamated Woodworkers International	2
Total	153

For more information on these unions, see appendix B.

Labourers

Although unskilled workers was by no means restricted to labourers it is difficult to disentangle this group as a whole, owing to the lack of precision of occupational categories, e.g. mill hand. It was decided, therefore, to use labourers as a sample of unskilled workers. The total number of labourers listed in the City Directory for 1901 with residential information is 330.

APPENDIX B

Unions in Vancouver, 1886 - 1901.

Year	Union	Date Established	Status 1901
1886	Knights of Labor Assembly #5506	E. Jun.	Oct. 1893
1886	Knights of Labor Assembly #8608	E. Sep/Oct.	1887- 1888?
1887			
1888	Stevedores Union	17th Nov.	(a)
1888	International Longshoremen Association #211	E. 17th Nov.	Operating
1888	Vancouver Plasterers Union	29th Apr.	Jun. 1892
1888	Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen #144	E. 3rd Apr.	Operating
1888	International Typographical Union #226	E. 7th Feb.	Operating
1889	Barbers Union	1st Oct.	Only Ref.
1889	Building Labourers Union (Hod Carriers)	7th May	1895
1889	United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners of America #617	11th Jun.	Operating
1889	Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers Regina Lodge #216	1st Jan.	Operating
1889	Bricklayers & Stonemasons Union	18th Apr.	1894
1890	Amalgamated Society of Carpenters & Joiners	E. 19th May	Operating
1890	Iron Moulders Union #281	E. 17th Sep	Operating
1890	Journeyman Lathers Protective Union	1st Feb.	Jun. 1892
1890	Painters & Decorators Union #62	26th Jul.	1895
1890	Order of Railway Conductors	E. 25th Nov	Operating
1890	Journeyman Stonecutters Association of North America	E. Jan.	Operating
1891	International Association of Machinists #182	E. 5th Jan.	Operating
1891	Journeyman Plumbers & Steamfitters	18th Jul.	Aug. 1894
1891	Clerks Association	26th Apr.	1892
1891	Tailors Union	19th Dec.	1893
1891	Tinners & Cornice Makers Union	18th Jul.	Sep. 1892
1892	Mainland Steamshipmen's Union #6	E. 13th Nov	Operating
1893	Fraser River Fishermens Benevolent Association	15th Jul.	1893
1894	Cigar Makers International Union #357	E. Sep.	Operating
1895	American Railway Union	22nd Jun.	Jul. 1897
1896	Amalgamated Society of Engineers #575	E. 22nd May	Operating

1897			
1898	Boilermakers & Shipbuilders of America #194	E. 3rd Mar.	Operating
1898	Bricklayers & Masons International Union #1	E. 21st Nov.	Operating
1898	Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen	12th Nov.	Operating
1898	United Association of Plumbers, Gas & Steamfitters of USA & Canada	E. 18th Nov.	Operating
1898	International Printing Pressmens Union #69	E. 27th Oct.	Operating
1898	Amalgamated Association of Street Railway Employees #101	E. 19th Nov.	Operating
1898	Journeymen Tailors Union of America #178	E. 1st Jan.	Operating
1899	Cornice Makers & Tin Plate Workers	13th May	(b)
1899	Journeymen Bakers & Confectioners International Union #46	E. 9th Oct.	Operating
1899	Journeymen Barbers International Union #120	E. 28th Aug.	Operating
1899	Brotherhood of Freighthandlers	15th Apr.	Operating
1899	Brotherhood of Painters & Decorators of America #138	E. 15th Mar.	Operating
1899	Operative Plasterers International Association #89	E. 23rd Nov.	Operating
1899	Tool Sharpeners Union of B.C.	E. 4th Mar.	Operating
1900	International Brotherhood of Blacksmiths #157	E. 11th Apr.	Operating
1900	Fishermens Union #2	E. Mar.	Operating
1900	Brotherhood of Railroad Carmen of America #58	E. 19th Jul.	Operating
1900	Pacific Coast Shingle Weavers	5th May	Operating
1900	Shipwright & Caulkers Association	E. 9th Nov.	Operating
1900	Stone Quarrymen & Rockdrillers	7th Apr.	(c)
1900	Waiters & Bartenders Alliance #28	E. 21st Jul	Operating
1900	Amalgamated Woodworkers International Union #145	E. 13th Dec.	Operating
1901	Bookbinders Union #105	E. 1st Aug.	Operating
1901	International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers #213	E. 6th Nov.	Operating
1901	Firemens Protective Union #21	E. 1st Aug.	Operating
1901	Federated Association of Letter Carriers #12	E. 15th May	Operating
1901	International Stage Employees Union	19th Jan.	Operating
1901	Musicians Mutual Protective Union	E. 21st Apr	Operating

Date Established: E. refers to those unions where the date of establishment is known. Otherwise the dates in this column refer to the first known reference to the union in Vancouver.

Status 1901: Operating refers to those unions known to have been in existence in 1901. The dates in this column refer to the last

known reference to the union in Vancouver.

(a) The Stevedores union had a rather complex history, although it appears that there was a union in existence throughout the period since 1888. Initially established as the Co-operative Stevedores Association #1 (VCC, #7369), this was disbanded and reformed as Knights of Labor, Assembly #677 in 1892 (VNA, Apr. 17th, 1892). The union left the Knights of Labor in 1896 (VNA, Dec. 5th, 1896) and the Stevedores and Freighthandlers Union #1 was established shortly thereafter.

(b) The only reference found to this union recorded that "it had just been formed ... [and] had appointed their officers and would apply for an International Charter" (VNA, May 13th, 1899).

(c) No reference found for this union in 1901.

Source: LG, VNA, Ind., VTIC minutes.

APPENDIX C

Vancouver Improvement Co., Price of Lots in D.L. 181 & 196, 1886.
(see Fig. 8:2 for a copy of the original)

Block 36

Lot 1 - \$1,000; Lot 2 - \$750; Lots 3, 4, 5 - \$500 each.

Block 37

Lots 11, 12, 13 - \$1,000 each.

Block 39

Lots 5, 6, - \$700 each; Lots 7, 8, - \$800 each; Lots 9, 10 - \$900 each; Lots 12, 13, 14 - \$1,000 each.

Block 40

Lots 24, 25, 34, 35 - \$500 each; Lots 36, 37 - \$500 each.

Block 42

Lot 13 - \$500

Block 43

Lot 26 - \$400

Block 44

Lots 12, 13, 14 - \$325 each; Lots 15, 16 - \$300 each; Lots 17, 18 - \$275; Lots 30, 31, 32 - \$350. 25% rebate on certain lots for \$1,000 houses.

Block 48

Lots 4, 5, 6 - \$150 each; Lots 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 - \$100 each; Lot 16 - \$125. 50% rebate on certain lots for \$500 houses.

Block 49

Lots 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19 - \$175 each; Lots 20, 21 - \$200 each; Lots 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33 - \$160 each. 50% rebate on certain lots for \$500 houses.

Block 51

Lots 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 - \$350 each; Lots 11, 12, 13, 14 - \$350 each. 25% rebate for \$1,000 houses erected in 6 months from the date of purchase. Lots 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39 - \$325. 50% rebate on certain lots for \$800 houses.

Block 52

Lots 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29 - \$350 each. 50% rebate for \$1,000 houses.

Block 55

Lots 14, 15, 16, 17, 29 - \$650 each.

Block 56

Lots 11, 12 - \$650 each.

Block 57

Lots 14, 15 - \$600 each; Lot 16 - \$675; Lots (17, 18, 19) - \$1,000. Condition that \$2,500 house be erected in 6 months from date of purchase. Lots (22, 23) - \$600; Lots (26, 27) - \$600; Lots (28, 29) - \$600. Condition that \$2,000 houses be erected 6 months from date of purchase.

Block 58

Lot 10 - \$400; Lots (17, 18, 19) - \$1,000; Lots (20, 21, 22) - \$800. Condition that 2,500 house be erected in 6 months from the date of purchase.

Block 60

Lots 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18 - \$325 each. 50% rebate on certain lots for \$800 houses. Lots 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39 - \$200 each; Lot 40 - \$300. Condition that \$2,500 houses be erected on either 2 or 3 lots in 6 months from date of purchase.

Block 61

Lots 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18 - \$225 each. 50% rebate on certain lots for \$800 houses. Lots 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39 - \$200 each. \$2,500 house conditional on either 2 or 3 of these lots. Lot 40 - \$300.

Block 63

Lot 1 - \$150; Lot 3 - \$100. 50% rebate on one lot for \$500 house. Lots 2, 12, 13, 14, 15 - \$100 each; Lot 16 - \$150. Condition \$1,500 house on 2 or 3 lots.

Block 64

Lots 9, 16 - \$150; Lots 10, 11, 13, 14, 15 - \$100. 50% rebate on \$500 houses erected in 6 months from date, on certain lots.

Block 65

Lots 1, 20 - \$250; Lots 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19 - \$200. Condition \$2,000 house on two or more lots in 6 months from date of purchase. Lots 21, 40 - \$275 each; Lots 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39 - \$225 each. 50% rebate on certain lots for \$1,000 houses.

Block 66

Lots 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19 - \$200 each; Lot 20 - \$250. \$2,500 house to be erected on 2 or 3 lots in 6 months from date of purchase. Lots 21, 40 - \$325; Lots 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39 - \$275. 50% rebate on certain lots for \$1,000 houses erected in 6 months from date of purchase.

Block 68

Lot 16 - \$250; Lots 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 - \$200 each. Conditions: \$2,500 house as above. Lots 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31 - \$325; Lot 32 - \$375. 50% rebate on certain lots for \$1,000 houses.

Block 71

Lots 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12 - \$300 each. Condition \$2,500 house. Lots (25 and 26) - \$800. Condition, \$1,000 house. Lots (28, 29 and 30) - \$900. Condition, \$2,000 house.

Block 72

Lots 9, 10, 11 - \$400. 50% rebate on certain lots for \$2,000 houses. Lots 18, 19, 20, 21 - \$300; Lots 24, 25, 26, 27, 28 - \$300. 25% rebate on certain lots for \$1,000 houses.

Block 73

Lots 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14 - \$400. 20% rebate on

certain lots for \$1,500 houses. Lots 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31 - \$300; Lot 32 - \$375. 25% rebate for \$1,000 houses.

Block 75

Lots 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 - \$325 each; Lot 16 - \$400; Lots 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31 - \$300 each; Lot 32 - \$375. 50% rebate on certain lots for \$1,000 erected in 6 months from date of purchase.

Block 76

Lots 1, 20 - \$400 each; Lots 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19 - \$325 each; Lots 21, 40 - \$375 each; Lots 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39 - \$300. 50% rebate on certain lots for \$1,000 houses etc..

Block 78

Lots 1, 20 - \$275 each; Lots 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19 - \$225 each; Lots 21, 40 - \$250 each; Lots 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39 - \$200. 50% rebate on certain lots for \$800 houses.

Block 79

Lots 1, 9 - \$150 each; Lots 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 - \$100 each. 50% rebate on certain lots for houses of \$500.

Block 80

Lots 1, 8 - \$150 each; Lots 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 - \$100 each; Lots 9, 16 - \$150 each; Lots 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 - \$100. 50% rebate on certain lots for \$500 houses.

Block 82

Lots 1, 20 - \$275 each; Lots 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19 - \$225 each; Lots 21, 40 - \$250 each; Lots 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39 - \$200 each. 50% rebate on certain lots for \$800 houses.

Block 83

Lots 1, 20 - \$375 each; Lots 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19 - \$300 each; Lots 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39 - \$225 each. 50% rebate on certain lots for \$800 houses, as above.

Block 85

Lots 1, 16 - \$375 each; Lots 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 - \$300 each; Lots 17, 32 - \$325 each; Lots 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31 - \$275 each. 50% rebate for \$1,000 houses on certain of these lots as above.

Block 86

Lots 1, 16 - \$375 each; Lots 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 - \$300 each; Lots 17, 32 - \$325 each; Lots 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31 - \$275 each. 50% rebate for houses of \$1,000 on certain lots, as above.

Block 88

Lot 12 - \$350; Lots 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 - \$275 each. 50% rebate on certain lots for \$1,000 houses. Lot 13 - \$325; Lots 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21 - \$250. 50% rebate as above for \$800 houses.

Blocks 90 & 91

Lots 1, 16 - \$325; Lots 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 - \$275; Lots 17, 32 - \$300 each; Lots 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31 - \$250 each. 50% rebate on certain lots for \$800 houses as above.

Blocks 93 & 94

Lots 1, 20 - \$250 each; Lots 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19 - \$200 each; Lots 21, 40 - \$225; Lots 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39 - \$175. 50% rebate as above, \$600 houses.

Block 95

Lots 10, 18 - \$150; Lots 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17 - \$100. 50% rebate as above for \$500 houses.

Blocks 100 & 101

Corner lots - \$225 each; Inside lots - \$175 each. 50% rebate for \$600 houses for certain lots.

Block 103

Lots 1, 16 - \$300; Lots 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 - \$250; Lots 17, 32 - \$300; Lots 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 28, 29, 30, 31 - \$250. 50% rebate on certain lots for \$600 houses erected in 6 months from date of purchase.

Blocks 105, 106, 110, 111 & 114

Corner lots - \$300 each; Inside lots - \$250 each.

TERMS

5% Discount for Cash, or 1/4 Cash, Balance in 4, 8, and 12 Months, 8% Interest.

Where a rebate is allowed for a house it is understood that it is to be erected in 6 months from the date of purchase.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

BOOKS AND PAMPHLETS

- Abendroth W. (1972): A SHORT HISTORY OF THE EUROPEAN WORKING CLASS, New York, Monthly Review.
- Abrams P. & Wrigley E.A. (1978): TOWNS IN SOCIETIES; ESSAYS IN ECONOMIC HISTORY AND HISTORICAL SOCIOLOGY, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
- Althusser L. (1971): LENIN AND PHILOSOPHY, New York, Monthly Review.
- Althusser L. (1977): FOR MARX, London, New Left Books.
- Althusser L. & Balibar E. (1970): READING CAPITAL, London, New Left Books.
- Amin S. (1974): ACCUMULATION ON A WORLD SCALE; A CRITIQUE OF THE THEORY OF UNDERDEVELOPMENT, New York, Monthly Review. In 2 Vols. paginated consecutively.
- Anderson G. (1976): VICTORIAN CLERKS, Manchester, Manchester University Press.
- Anderson P. (1974): LINEAGES OF THE ABSOLUTIST STATE, London, New Left Books.
- Anderson P. (1976): CONSIDERATIONS OF WESTERN MARXISM, London, New Left Books.
- Baran P. & Sweezy P. (1968): MONOPOLY CAPITAL: AN ESSAY ON THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL ORDER, Harmondsworth, Penguin.
- Barratt Brown M. (1974): THE ECONOMICS OF IMPERIALISM, Harmondsworth, Penguin.
- Bartley G. (1938): AN OUTLINE HISTORY OF VANCOUVER TYPOGRAPHICAL UNION #226, Vancouver, Vancouver Typographical Union.
- Bettelheim C. (1975): ECONOMIC CALCULATION AND FORMS OF PROPERTY, New York, Monthly Review.
- Blackburn R. (Ed.), (1972): IDEOLOGY IN SOCIAL SCIENCE; READINGS IN CRITICAL SOCIAL THEORY, London, Fontana.
- Bliss M. (1974): A LIVING PROFIT; STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL HISTORY OF CANADIAN BUSINESS 1883 - 1911, Toronto, McClelland & Stewart.

- Bookchin M. (1974): THE LIMITS OF THE CITY, New York, Harper & Row.
- Braverman H. (1974): LABOUR AND MONOPOLY CAPITAL; THE DEVELOPMENT OF WORK IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY, New York, Monthly Review.
- Brebner J.B. (1966): NORTH ATLANTIC TRIANGLE; THE INTERPLAY OF CANADA, THE UNITED STATES AND GREAT BRITAIN, Toronto, McClelland & Stewart.
- Bukharin N. (1972): IMPERIALISM AND WORLD ECONOMY, London, Merlin Press.
- Callinicos A. (1976): ALTHUSSER'S MARXISM, London, Pluto Press.
- Castells M. (1977): THE URBAN QUESTION, London, Edward Arnold.
- Chodos R. (1973): THE CPR; A CENTURY OF CORPORATE WELFARE, Toronto, James, Lewis & Samuel.
- Clark S.D. (1939): THE CANADIAN MANUFACTURERS' ASSOCIATION, Toronto, University of Toronto Press.
- Clement W. (1975): THE CANADIAN CORPORATE ELITE; AN ANALYSIS OF ECONOMIC POWER, Toronto, McClelland & Stewart.
- Clement W. & Drache D. (1978): A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO CANADIAN POLITICAL ECONOMY, Toronto, McClelland & Stewart.
- Cottrell P.L. (1975): BRITISH OVERSEAS INVESTMENT IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY, London, Macmillan.
- Dahrendorf R. (1959): CLASS AND CLASS CONFLICT IN INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY, Stanford, Stanford University Press.
- Dobb M. (1963): STUDIES IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF CAPITALISM, New York, International Publishers.
- Drache D. (1971): REDISCOVERING CANADIAN HISTORY, Toronto, Hogtown Press (reprinted from, CANADIAN JOURNAL OF HISTORY AND SOCIAL SCIENCE, Vol. 6, No. 3).
- Duff W. (1969): THE INDIAN HISTORY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA, Vol. 1, THE IMPACT OF THE WHITE MAN, Victoria, Provincial Museum of Natural History and Anthropology.
- Easterbrook W.T. & Watkins M.H. (1967): APPROACHES TO CANADIAN ECONOMIC HISTORY, Toronto, McClelland & Stewart.
- Emmanuel A. (1972): UNEQUAL EXCHANGE: A STUDY OF IMPERIALISM, New York, Monthly Review.

- Engels F. (1947): ANTI-DUHRING, Moscow, Progress Publishers.
- Engels F. (1969): THE CONDITION OF THE WORKING CLASS IN ENGLAND, London, Panther.
- Poner P.S. (1947): THE HISTORY OF THE LABOUR MOVEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES; Vol. 1, FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO THE FOUNDING OF THE AMERICAN FEDERATION OF LABOUR, New York, International Publishers.
- Poner P.S. (1955): THE HISTORY OF THE LABOUR MOVEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES; Vol. 2, FROM THE FOUNDING OF THE A.F. OF L. TO THE EMERGENCE OF AMERICAN IMPERIALISM, New York, International Publishers.
- Frank A.G. (1975): ON CAPITALIST UNDERDEVELOPMENT, Bombay, Oxford University Press.
- Giddens A. (1973): THE CLASS STRUCTURE OF THE ADVANCED SOCIETIES, London, Hutchinson.
- Glazebrook G.P. de T. (1938): A HISTORY OF TRANSPORTATION IN CANADA, Toronto, Ryerson.
- Gosnell R.E. (1897): THE YEAR BOOK OF BRITISH COLUMBIA AND MANUAL OF PROVINCIAL INFORMATION, Victoria, n. pub..
- Grainger M.A. (1964): WOODSMEN OF THE WEST, Toronto, McClelland & Stewart.
- Gramsci A. (1971): SELECTIONS FROM THE PRISON NOTEBOOKS, New York, International Publishers.
- Green G. (1947): HISTORY OF BURNABY AND VICINITY, Published Privately.
- Grob G.N. (1969): WORKERS AND UTOPIA: A STUDY OF IDEOLOGICAL CONFLICT IN THE AMERICAN LABOR MOVEMENT 1865 - 1900, Chicago, Quadrangle.
- Hann R. (1975): FARMERS CONFRONT INDUSTRIALISM; SOME PERSPECTIVES ON ONTARIO AGRARIAN MOVEMENTS, Toronto, New Hogtown Press.
- Harnecker M. (1976): THE BASIC CONCEPTS OF HISTORICAL MATERIALISM, Sydney, Department of General Philosophy, University of Sydney. Translated from Spanish and edited by W. Suchting and E. Sadler.
- Harris R.C. & Warkentin J. (1974): CANADA BEFORE CONFEDERATION, New York, Oxford University Press.

- Harvey D. (1973): SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE CITY, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Heron C. (Ed.) (1977): IMPERIALISM, NATIONALISM AND CANADA, Toronto, New Hogtown Press.
- Hilton R. (Ed.), (1976): THE TRANSITION FROM FEUDALISM TO CAPITALISM, London, New Left Books.
- Hindess B. & Hirst P.Q. (1975): PRE-CAPITALIST MODES OF PRODUCTION, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul.
- Hobsbawm E.J. (1962): THE AGE OF REVOLUTION 1789 - 1848, New York, Mentor.
- Hobsbawm E.J. (1969): INDUSTRY AND EMPIRE; PELICAN ECONOMIC HISTORY OF BRITAIN, Vol. 3, Harmondsworth, Penguin.
- Hobsbawm E.J. (1976): THE AGE OF CAPITAL 1848-1875, London, Weidenfeld & Nicolson.
- Horn M. & Sabourin R. (Eds.) (1972): STUDIES IN CANADIAN SOCIAL HISTORY, Toronto, McClelland & Stewart.
- Howay F.W., Sage W.N. & Angus H.F. (1942): BRITISH COLUMBIA AND THE UNITED STATES; THE NORTH PACIFIC SLOPE FROM FUR TRADE TO AVIATION, Toronto, Ryerson.
- Imlah A.H. (1958): ECONOMIC ELEMENTS IN THE PAX BRITANNICA, New York, Russell & Russell.
- Ince C.H. (n.d.): THE ROYAL BANK OF CANADA: A CHRONOLOGY 1864 - 1969, published privately by Royal Bank of Canada.
- Innis H.A. (1923): A HISTORY OF THE CANADIAN PACIFIC RAILWAY, Toronto, University of Toronto Press.
- Innis H.A. (1956): ESSAYS IN CANADIAN ECONOMIC HISTORY, Toronto, University of Toronto Press.
- Jackman W.T. (1935): ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES OF TRANSPORTATION, Toronto, University of Toronto Press.
- Johnson J. (1907?): CHILDHOOD, TRAVEL AND BRITISH COLUMBIA, Abertillery, Eng., P.W. Raffran.
- Jones G.S. (1976): OUTCAST LONDON: A STUDY IN THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CLASSES IN VICTORIAN SOCIETY, Harmondsworth, Penguin.
- Kay G. (1975): DEVELOPMENT AND UNDERDEVELOPMENT; A MARXIST ANALYSIS, London, Macmillan.

Kealey G. (Ed.) (1973): CANADA INVESTIGATES INDUSTRIALISM, Toronto, University of Toronto Press.

Knight R. (1978): INDIANS AT WORK: AN INFORMAL HISTORY OF NATIVE INDIAN LABOUR IN BRITISH COLUMBIA, 1858 - 1930, Vancouver, New Star Books.

Kuczynski J. (1967): THE RISE OF THE WORKING CLASS, New York, McGraw-Hill.

Kuczynski J. (1972): A SHORT HISTORY OF LABOUR CONDITIONS UNDER INDUSTRIAL CAPITALISM IN GREAT BRITAIN & THE EMPIRE, 1750 - 1944, 2 Vols. in 1, London, Frederick Muller.

Lacoste Y. (1976): LA GEOGRAPHIE CA SERT A FAIRE LA GUERRE, Paris, Maspero.

Langdon S. (1975): THE EMERGENCE OF THE CANADIAN WORKING CLASS MOVEMENT, Toronto, New Hogtown Press.

Laxer R. (Ed.) (1973): CANADA LTD., Toronto, McClelland & Stewart.

Lenin V.I. (1965): IMPERIALISM, THE HIGHEST STAGE OF CAPITALISM, Peking, Foreign Languages Press.

Lecourt D. (1975): MARXISM AND EPISTEMOLOGY, London, New Left Books.

Levitt K. (1970): SILENT SURRENDER; THE MULTINATIONAL CORPORATION IN CANADA, Toronto, Macmillan.

Lewis C. (1938): AMERICA'S STAKE IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENTS, Washington D.C., Brookings Institution.

Lipton C. (1973): THE TRADE UNION MOVEMENT IN CANADA 1827 - 1959, Toronto, NC Press.

Lower A.R.M. (1973): GREAT BRITAIN'S WOODYARD: BRITISH AMERICA AND THE TIMBER TRADE, 1763 - 1867, Montreal, McGill-Queen's University Press.


Lukacs G. (1971): HISTORY AND CLASS CONSCIOUSNESS: STUDIES IN MARXIST DIALECTICS, Cambridge (Mass.), Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

Luxemburg R. (1977): THE INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT OF POLAND, New York, Campaigner Publications.

Mackintosh W.A. (1964): THE ECONOMIC BACKGROUND OF DOMINION - PROVINCIAL RELATIONS, Toronto, McClelland & Stewart.

- Macmillan D.S. (Ed.) (1972): CANADIAN BUSINESS HISTORY, SELECTED STUDIES 1497 - 1971, Toronto, McClelland & Stewart.
- Mamdani M. (1976): POLITICS AND CLASS FORMATION IN UGANDA, New York, Monthly Review.
- Mandel E. (1968): MARXIST ECONOMIC THEORY, London, Merlin Press.
- Mandel E. (1975): LATE CAPITALISM, London, New Left Books.
- Martin C. (1973): 'DOMINION LANDS' POLICY, Toronto, McClelland & Stewart.
- Marx K. (1954): THE EIGHTEENTH BRUMAIRE OF LOUIS BONAPARTE, Moscow, Progress Publishers.
- Marx K. (1956): CAPITAL Vol. 2, Moscow, Progress Publishers.
- Marx K. (1959): CAPITAL Vol. 3, Moscow, Progress Publishers.
- Marx K. (1973): GRUNDRISSE; FOUNDATIONS FOR THE CRITIQUE OF POLITICAL ECONOMY (ROUGH DRAFT), Harmondsworth, Penguin. With an introduction by Martin Nicolaus.
- Marx K. (1976a): CAPITAL, Vol. 1, Harmondsworth, Penguin. With an introduction by Ernest Mandel.
- Marx K. (1976b): PREFACE AND INTRODUCTION TO A CONTRIBUTION TO THE CRITIQUE OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, Peking, Foreign Languages Press.
- Marx K. & Engels F. (1975): SELECTED CORRESPONDENCE, Moscow, Progress Publishers.
- Matthews J.S. (n.d.): EARLY VANCOUVER, 2 Vols., Published Privately.
- McCormack A.R. (1977): REFORMERS, REBELS AND REVOLUTIONARIES: THE WESTERN CANADIAN RADICAL MOVEMENT 1899 - 1919, Toronto, University of Toronto Press.
- McNaught K. (1969): THE PENGUIN HISTORY OF CANADA, Harmondsworth, Penguin.
- Meek R. (1956): STUDIES IN THE LABOUR THEORY OF VALUE, New York, Monthly Review.
- Metin A. (1908): LA COLOMBIE BRITANNIQUE, Paris, Librairie Armand Colin.

- Miliband R. (1973): THE STATE IN CAPITALIST SOCIETY, London, Quartet.
- Morley A. (1974): VANCOUVER: FROM MILLTOWN TO METROPOLIS, Vancouver, Mitchell Press.
- Morton W.L. (1963): THE KINGDOM OF CANADA, New York, Bobbs-Merrill.
- Myers G. (1972): A HISTORY OF CANADIAN WEALTH, Toronto, James, Lewis & Samuel.
- Naylor R.T. (1975): THE HISTORY OF CANADIAN BUSINESS 1867 - 1914, 2 Vols., Toronto, James Lorimer.
- Nichols T. & Beynon H. (1977): LIVING WITH CAPITALISM; CLASS RELATIONS AND THE MODERN FACTORY, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul.
- Neufeld E. (1972): THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM OF CANADA; ITS GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT, Toronto, Macmillan.
- Oppenheimer D. (1889): THE MINERAL RESOURCES OF BRITISH COLUMBIA, Vancouver, News-Advertiser.
- Ormsby M. (1971): BRITISH COLUMBIA: A HISTORY, Toronto, Macmillan.
- Paterson D.G. (1976): BRITISH DIRECT INVESTMENT IN CANADA 1890 - 1914: ESTIMATES AND DETERMINANTS, Toronto, University of Toronto Press.
- Penner N. (1977): THE CANADIAN LEFT: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS, Scarborough, Prentice-Hall.
- Phillips P. (1967): NO POWER GREATER: A CENTURY OF LABOUR IN BRITISH COLUMBIA, Vancouver, B.C. Federation of Labour.
- Polanyi K. (1957): THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION: THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC ORIGINS OF OUR TIME, Boston, Beacon Press.
- Pollard S. (1968): THE GENESIS OF MODERN MANAGEMENT: A STUDY OF THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION IN GREAT BRITAIN, Harmondsworth, Penguin.
- Porter G. & Cuff R. (Eds.) (1973): ENTERPRISE AND NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, Toronto, Hakkert.
- Poulantzas N. (1973): POLITICAL POWER AND SOCIAL CLASSES, London, New Left Books.

- Poulantzas N. (1975): CLASSES IN CONTEMPORARY CAPITALISM, London, New Left Books.
- Robin M. (1968): RADICAL POLITICS AND CANADIAN LABOUR 1880 - 1930, Kingston, Industrial Relations Centre, Queens University.
- Robin M. (1972): THE COMPANY PROVINCE; Vol 1, THE RUSH FOR SPOILS, Toronto, McClelland & Stewart.
- Rogers M. (1958): B.C. SUGAR REFINERY, Vancouver, privately published by BCSR.
- Ross V.T. (1920): HISTORY OF THE CANADIAN BANK OF COMMERCE, 2 Vols., Toronto, Oxford University Press.
- Ryerson S. (1973): UNEQUAL UNION; ROOTS OF CRISIS IN THE CANADAS 1815 - 1873, Toronto, Progress Books.
- Saul S.B. (1969): THE MYTH OF THE GREAT DEPRESSION, 1873 - 1896, London, Macmillan.
- Schmidt A. (1971): THE CONCEPT OF NATURE IN MARX, London, New Left Books.
- Schumpeter J. (1964): BUSINESS CYCLES: A THEORETICAL, HISTORICAL AND STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF THE CAPITALIST PROCESS, New York, McGraw-Hill. Abridged Edition, with an introduction by Rendig Fels.
- Stetler G.A. & Artibise A.J. (Eds.) (1977): THE CANADIAN CITY; ESSAYS IN URBAN HISTORY, Toronto, McClelland & Stewart.
- Sweezy P. (1942): THE THEORY OF CAPITALIST DEVELOPMENT, New York, Monthly Review.
- Tafuri M. (1976): ARCHITECTURE AND UTOPIA: DESIGN AND CAPITALIST DEVELOPMENT, Cambridge, Mass., Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
- Teepie G. (Ed.) (1972): CAPITALISM AND THE NATIONAL QUESTION IN CANADA, Toronto, University of Toronto Press.
- Therborn G., (1976): SCIENCE, CLASS AND SOCIETY; ON THE FORMATION OF SOCIOLOGY AND HISTORICAL MATERIALISM, London, New Left Books.
- Thompson E.P. (1963): THE MAKING OF THE ENGLISH WORKING CLASS, New York, Vintage.
- Thompson T.P. (1975): THE POLITICS OF LABOUR, Toronto, University of Toronto Press.
- 

- Union for Radical Political Economics [U.R.P.E.] (1978): U.S. CAPITALISM IN CRISIS, New York, U.R.P.E..
- Urquhart M.C. & Buckley K.A.H. (1965): HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF CANADA, Toronto, Macmillan.
- Vancouver Board of Trade (1889-1902): ANNUAL REPORT, Vancouver, News Advertiser.
- Vilar P. (1976): A HISTORY OF GOLD AND MONEY, 1450 - 1920, London, New Left Books.
- Ward N. (1950): THE CANADIAN HOUSE OF COMMONS: REPRESENTATION, Toronto, University of Toronto Press.
- Westergaard J. & Resler H. (1975): CLASS IN A CAPITALIST SOCIETY: A STUDY OF CONTEMPORARY BRITAIN, London, Heinemann.
- Wilkins M. (1970): THE EMERGENCE OF MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE; AMERICAN BUSINESS ABROAD FROM THE COLONIAL ERA TO 1914, Cambridge Mass., Harvard University Press.
- Williams R. (1963): CULTURE AND SOCIETY, 1750 - 1950, Harmondsworth, Penguin.
- Williams R. (1976): KEYWORDS; A VOCABULARY OF CULTURE AND SOCIETY, London, Fontana.
- Woodruff W. (1966): IMPACT OF WESTERN MAN: A STUDY OF EUROPE'S ROLE IN THE WORLD ECONOMY 1750 - 1960, London, Macmillan.

ARTICLES

- Acheson T.W. (1972): "The National Policy and the Industrialization of the Maritimes 1880 - 1910", ACADIENSIS, Vol. 1, No. 2, pp. 3-28.
- Alcay R. (1978): "An Introduction to Marxian Crisis Theory", in U.R.P.E. (1978), pp. 15-22.
- Anderson J. (1973): "Ideology in Geography; An Introduction", ANTIPODE, Vol. 5, No. 3, pp. 1-6.
- Anderson P. (1977): "The Antinomies of Antonio Gramsci", NEW LEFT REVIEW, No. 100, pp. 5-78.
- Arblaster A. (1972): "Liberal and Socialist Values", SOCIALIST REGISTER 1972, pp. 83-104.
- L'Atelier de Recherche Marxiste U.Q.A.M. (1970): "Le Concept de

- Travail Productif", SOCIALISME QUEBECOIS, No. 24, pp. 35-40.
- Boutilier H.R. (1946): "Vancouver's Earliest Days", B.C. HISTORICAL QUARTERLY, Vol. 10, pp. 151-170.
- Brenner R. (1977): "The Origins of Capitalist Development: a Critique of Neo-Smithian Marxism", NEW LEFT REVIEW, No. 107, pp. 25-92.
- Brooks G.W.S. (1976b): "Edgar Crowe Baker: An Entrepreneur in Early British Columbia", B.C. STUDIES, No. 31, pp. 23-43.
- Careless J.M.S. (1969): "The Lowe Brothers 1852 - 1870; A Study in Business Relations on the North Pacific Coast", B.C. STUDIES, No. 2, pp. 1-18.
- Careless J.M.S. (1972): "The Business Community and the Early Development of Victoria", in MACMILLAN D.S. (Ed.) (1972), pp. 104-123.
- Careless J.M.S. (1977): "Aspects of Urban Life in the West 1870 - 1914", in STETLER & ARTIBISE (Eds.) (1977), pp. 125-141.
- Chambers E.J. (1964): "Late Nineteenth Century Business Cycles in Canada", CANADIAN JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS AND POLITICAL SCIENCE, Vol. 30, pp. 391-412.
- Clarke S. (1977): "Marxism, Sociology and Poulantzas' Theory of the State", CAPITAL AND CLASS, No. 2, pp. 1-31.
- Clawson P. (1976): "A Review of Ernest Mandel's 'Late Capitalism'", REVIEW OF RADICAL POLITICAL ECONOMY, Vol. 8 No. 3, pp. 71-74.
- Coombs R. (1978): "'Labour and Monopoly Capital'", NEW LEFT REVIEW, No. 107, pp. 79-96.
- Coulter J. (1971): "Marxism and the Engels Paradox", SOCIALIST REGISTER 1971, London, Merlin Press, pp. 129-156.
- Davis A.K. (1972): "Canadian Society as Hinterland versus Metropolis", in HORNE & SABOURIN (Eds.) (1972), pp. 447-475.
- Day R. (1976): "The Theory of Long Waves; Kondratiev, Trotsky, Mandel", NEW LEFT REVIEW, No. 99, pp. 67-82.
- Dos Santos T. (1970): "The Concept of Social Classes", SCIENCE & SOCIETY, Vol. 43, No. 2, pp. 166-193.

- Eyles J.D. (1974): "Social Theory and Social Geography", PROGRESS IN GEOGRAPHY, Vol. 6, pp. 27-89.
- Feldman M.M.A. (1977): "A Contribution to the Critique of Urban Political Economy", ANTIPODE, Vol. 9, No. 1, pp. 30-50.
- Fine B. & Harris L. (1976a): "Controversial Issues in Marxist Economic Theory", SOCIALIST REGISTER 1976, pp. 141-178.
- Fine B. & Harris L. (1976b): "'State Expenditure in Advanced Capitalism': A Critique", NEW LEFT REVIEW, No. 98, pp. 97-112.
- Fine B. & Harris L. (1977): "Surveying the Foundations", SOCIALIST REGISTER 1977, pp. 106-120.
- Foster-Carter A. (1978): "The Modes of Production Controversy", NEW LEFT REVIEW, No. 107, pp. 47-77.
- Godelier M. (1966): "Structure and Contradiction in 'Capital'", in BLACKBURN (Ed.) (1972), pp. 334-368.
- Gordon D.M. (1978): "Up and Down the Long Roller Coaster", in U.R.P.E. (1978), pp. 22-35.
- Gosnell R.E. (1908): "A Greater Britain on the Pacific", B.C. MAGAZINE, Vol. 2, No. 1, pp. 7-12.
- Gough I. (1972): "Marx's Theory of Productive and Unproductive Labour", NEW LEFT REVIEW, No. 76, pp. 47-70.
- Greer E. (1976): "Monopoly and Competitive Capital in the Making of Gary, Indiana", SCIENCE & SOCIETY, Vol. 40, No. 4, pp. 465-478.
- Gregory D. (1976): "Rethinking Historical Geography", AREA, Vol. 8, No. 4, pp. 295-299.
- Harvey D. (1975): "The Geography of Capitalist Accumulation: A Reconstruction of the Marxian Theory", ANTIPODE, Vol. 7, No. 2, pp. 9-21.
- Hay K.A.J. (1964): "Early Twentieth Century Business Cycles in Canada", CANADIAN JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS AND POLITICAL SCIENCE, Vol. 32, pp. 354-365.
- Hirst P.Q. (1976): "Althusser and the Theory of Ideology", ECONOMY AND SOCIETY, Vol. 5, No. 4, pp. 385-412.
- Hobsbawm E.J. (1968): "Karl Marx's Contribution to Historiography", in BLACKBURN (Ed.) (1972), pp. 265-283.

- Hobsbawm E.J. (1971): "From Social History to the History of Society", DAEDALUS, Vol. 100, No. 1, pp. 20-45.
- Hodgson G. (1977): "Papering over the Cracks", SOCIALIST REGISTER 1977, pp. 85-105.
- Howay F.W. (1937a): "Early Shipping in Burrard Inlet 1863 - 1870", B.C. HISTORICAL QUARTERLY, Vol. 1, pp. 3-20.
- Howay F.W. (1937b): "Early Settlement on Burrard Inlet", B.C. HISTORICAL QUARTERLY, Vol. 1, pp. 101-114.
- Howay F.W. (1940): "Coal Mining on Burrard Inlet 1865 - 66", B.C. HISTORICAL QUARTERLY, Vol. 4, pp. 1-11.
- Hutcheson J. (1973): "Class and Income Distribution in Canada", in LAXER (Ed.) (1973), pp. 57-83.
- Itoh M. (1978): "The Formation of Marx's Theory of Crisis", SCIENCE & SOCIETY, Vol. 42, No. 2, pp 129-155.
- Johnson L.A. (1972): "The Development of Class in Canada in the Twentieth Century", in TEEPLE (Ed.) (1972), pp. 141-183.
- Johnston R.J. (1972): "Towards a General Model of Intra-urban Residential Patterns; Some Cross-Cultural Patterns", PROGRESS IN GEOGRAPHY, Vol. 4, pp. 83-124.
- Jones G.S. (1971): "The Marxism of the Early Lukacs: An Evaluation", NEW LEFT REVIEW, No. 70, pp. 27-64.
- Jones G.S. (1972): "The History of U.S. Imperialism", in BLACKBURN (Ed.) (1972), pp. 207-237.
- Kingsford G.E.. (1905): "Concerning the Junior Bank Clerk", JOURNAL OF THE CANADIAN BANKERS ASSOCIATION, Vol. 12, No. 2, pp. 167-169.
- Laclau E. (1975): "The Specificity of the Miliband - Poulantzas Debate", ECONOMY AND SOCIETY, Vol. 4, No. 1, pp. 87-110.
- Lees L.H. (1974): "The Study of Social Processes: Two Directions in Recent Urban History", JOURNAL OF SOCIAL HISTORY, Vol. 7, No. 3, pp. 330-337.
- Lockyer H.T. (1920): "The rise of the HB Co. Vancouver Retail Establishment", BEAVER, Vol. 1, No. 3, pp. 20-22.
- Lower A.R.M. (1932): "The Trade in Square Timber", in EASTERBROOK & WATKINS (Eds.) (1967), pp. 28-48.

- Macdonald N. (1977): "The Canadian Pacific Railway and Vancouver's Development to 1900", B.C. STUDIES, No. 35, pp. 3-35.
- Mandel E. (1963): "The Dialectic of Class and Region", NEW LEFT REVIEW, No. 20, pp. 5-31.
- Mandel E. (1970): "The Laws of Uneven Development", NEW LEFT REVIEW, No. 59, pp. 19-38.
- McCarney J. (1976): "The Theory of Ideology; Some Comments on Mepham", RADICAL PHILOSOPHY, No. 13, pp. 28-31.
- Mepham J. (1974): "The Theory of Ideology in 'Capital'", WORKING PAPERS IN CULTURAL STUDIES, No. 6, pp. 98-123.
- Merrington J., (1975): "Town and Country in the Transition to Capitalism", NEW LEFT REVIEW, No. 93, pp. 71-92.
- Naylor R.T. (1972): "The Rise and Fall of the Third Commercial Empire of the St. Lawrence", in TEEPLE (Ed.) (1972), pp. 1-42.
- Niosi J. (1977): "Who Controls Canadian Capitalism?", OUR GENERATION, Vol. 12, No. 1, pp. 19-35.
- Ollman B. (1968): "Marx's Use of 'Class'", AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY, Vol. 73, pp. 573-580.
- Panitch L. (1977): "The Role and Nature of the Canadian State", in HERON (Ed.) (1977), pp. 85-105.
- Payne P.L. (1974): "The Emergence of the Large Scale Company in Great Britain 1870 - 1914", in THIRD INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE OF ECONOMIC HISTORY 1965, PAPERS, Vol. 5, Paris, Mouton, pp. 339-352.
- Pentland H.C. (1950): "The Role of Capital in Canadian Economic Development before 1875", CANADIAN JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS AND POLITICAL SCIENCE, Vol. 16, No. 4, pp. 457-474.
- Pentland H.C. (1959): "The Development of a Capitalistic Labour Market in Canada", CANADIAN JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS AND POLITICAL SCIENCE, Vol. 25, No. 4, pp. 450-461.
- Piot M. (1978): "Mode of Production and Space", U.S.G. NEWSLETTER, Vol. 4, No. 1, pp. 41-46.
- Poulantzas N. (1973b): "On Social Classes", NEW LEFT REVIEW, No. 78, pp. 27-54.

- Preteceille E. (1976): "Urban Planning: The Contradictions of Capitalist Urbanization", ANTIPODE, Vol. 8, No. 1, pp. 69-76.
- Rowthorn B. (1976): "'Late Capitalism'", NEW LEFT REVIEW, No. 98, pp. 59-83.
- Roy P. (1973): "Direct Management from Abroad: The Formative Years of the British Columbia Electric Railway", in PORTER & CUFF (Eds.) (1973), pp. 101-121.
- Roy P. (1976): "The Preservation of the Peace in Vancouver: the Aftermath of the Anti-Chinese Riot of 1887", B.C. STUDIES, No. 31, pp. 44-59.
- Saint-Pierre C. (1974): "De L'Analyse Marxiste des Classes Sociales", SOCIALISME QUEBECOIS, No. 24, pp. 10-34.
- Santos M. (1975): "Space and Domination - A Marxist Approach", INTERNATIONAL SOCIAL SCIENCES JOURNAL, Vol. 27, No. 2, pp. 346-363.
- Santos M. (1977): "Society and Space; Social Formation as Theory and Method", ANTIPODE, Vol. 9, No. 1, pp. 3-13.
- Scheibling J. (1977): "Debats et Combats sur la 'Crise' de la Geographie", LA PENSEE, No. 194, pp. 41-56.
- Scheinberg S. (1973): "Invitation to Empire; Tariffs and American Economic Expansion in Canada", in PORTER & CUFF (Eds.) (1973), pp. 80-100.
- Short J. (1976): "Social Systems and Spatial Systems", ANTIPODE, Vol. 8, No. 1, pp. 77-83.
- Slater D. (1975a): "The Poverty of Modern Geographical Enquiry", PACIFIC VIEWPOINT, Vol. 16, No. 2, pp. 159-175.
- Teeple G. (1972): "Land, Labour and Capital in pre-Confederation Canada", in TEEPLE (Ed.) (1972), pp. 43-66.
- Therborn G. (1977): "The Rule of Capital and the Rise of Democracy", NEW LEFT REVIEW, No. 103, pp. 3-41.
- Thompson E.P. (1967): "Time, Work-Discipline, and Industrial Capitalism", PAST AND PRESENT, No. 38, pp. 56-97.
- Thompson G. (1977): "The Relationship between the Financial and Industrial Sector in the United Kingdom", ECONOMY AND SOCIETY, Vol. 6, No. 3, pp. 235-283.

- Tomlinson E. (1978): "Althusser, Balibar and Production", CAPITAL AND CLASS, No. 4, pp. 127-129.
- Vance J.E. (1966): "Housing the Worker: the Employment Linkage as a Force in Urban Structure", ECONOMIC GEOGRAPHY, Vol. 42, pp. 294-325.
- Vance J.E. (1967): "Housing the Worker: Determinative and Contingent Ties in Nineteenth Century Birmingham", ECONOMIC GEOGRAPHY, Vol. 43, pp. 95-127.
- Weeks J. (1977): "The Sphere of Production and the Analysis of Crisis in Capitalism", SCIENCE & SOCIETY, Vol. 41, No. 3, pp. 281-302.
- Williams R. (1973): "Base and Superstructure in Marxist Cultural Theory", NEW LEFT REVIEW, No. 82, pp. 3-16.
- Wright E.O. (1976): "Class Boundaries in Advanced Capitalist Societies", NEW LEFT REVIEW, No. 98, pp. 3-41.
- Wright E.O. (1977): "Marxist Class Categories and Income Inequality", AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW, Vol. 42, pp. 32-55.

GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS

GOVERNMENT OF CANADA

- Board of Inquiry into Cost of Living: REPORT, 2 Vols., Ottawa, Kings Printer, 1915.
- British Columbia Fishery Commission: REPORT 1892, in CSP 1893, paper 10c.
- Department of Labour: LAEOUR GAZETTE, published monthly commencing in Sep., 1900.
- Department of Railways and Canals: ANNUAL REPORTS, in CSP.
- Department of Transport: A STATUTORY HISTORY OF THE STEAM AND ELECTRIC RAILWAYS OF CANADA, 1836 - 1937", compiled by R. Dorman, Ottawa, Kings Printer, 1938.
- Report upon Railway Commissions, Railway Rate Grievances and Regulative Legislation, in CSP, 1902, paper 20a.
- Royal Commission on Chinese and Japanese Immigration: REPORT, in CSP, 1902, paper 54.

GOVERNMENT OF BRITISH COLUMBIA

Board of Conciliation and Arbitration: REPORT OF COMMISSION OF LABOUR ENQUIRY, BCSP, 1894-1895, pp. 589-594.

British Columbia Gazette: 1886-1901, Victoria, Queens Printer.

Legislative Assembly: COLLECTOR OF VOTERS FOR VANCOUVER ELECTORAL DISTRICT, REPORT, in BCSP, 1901.

Legislative Assembly: CORRESPONDENCE RELATIVE TO THE TERMINUS OF THE CANADIAN PACIFIC RAILWAY, BCSP, 1885, pp. 129-136.

Legislative Assembly: CORRESPONDENCE RESPECTING EXTENSION OF CPR TO COAL HARBOUR, BCSP, 1886, pp. 457-475.

Legislative Assembly: JOURNALS, 1886-1901, Victoria, Queens Printer.

Legislative Assembly: PROPOSED AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF BRITISH COLUMBIA AND THE CANADIAN PACIFIC RAILWAY, BCSP, 1885, pp. 385-386.

Legislative Assembly: REPORT OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE, CANADIAN PACIFIC RAILWAY CHARGES, in BCLA Journal, 1886.

Legislative Assembly: TABULATED LIST OF COMPANIES INCORPORATED, LICENSED AND REGISTERED IN THE PROVINCE OF BRITISH COLUMBIA, in BCSP, 1913.

Minister of Mines: ANNUAL REPORTS, 1886-1901; in BCSP, and also published separately.

DIRECTORIES AND ATLASES

British Columbia Directory: Victoria, R.T. Williams. Years of Publication - 1889, 1891, 1892, 1893, 1894, 1895, 1897-1898.

British Columbia Gazetteer and Directory: Victoria, L.G. Henderson. Years of Publication - 1889, 1890, 1891, 1897, 1898, 1899-1900, 1900-1901, 1901, 1902, 1903.

Vancouver Fire Insurance Atlas: C.E. Goad, 1893 - 1901 (at Vancouver Public Archives).

NEWSPAPERS AND CONTEMPORARY JOURNALS

B.C Review: London, 1897-1901.

British Columbia Mining Record: Vancouver, 1895-1901.

Daily Colonist: Victoria, 1884-1886.
 Independent: Vancouver, 1900-1901.
 Industrial Canada: Toronto, 1900-1901.
 Journal of the Canadian Bankers Association: Toronto.
 Monetary Times: Montreal, 1886-1901.
 News-Advertiser: Vancouver, 1887-1901.
 Peoples Journal: Vancouver, 1893.
 Province: Vancouver, 1898-1901.
 Vancouver Daily World: Vancouver, 1888-1901.
 Vancouver News: Vancouver, 1886-1887.
 Victoria Times: Victoria, 1884-1886.

THESES AND UNPUBLISHED ESSAYS

- Anderson J. (1975): "THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF URBANISM: AN INTRODUCTION AND BIBLIOGRAPHY", London, Department of Planning, Architectural Association School of Architecture (mimeo).
- Bescoby I.M.L. (1935): "SOME SOCIAL ASPECTS OF THE AMERICAN MINING ADVANCE INTO CARIBOO AND KOOTENAY", M.A. Thesis, Department of History, University of British Columbia.
- Barak B. et al (n.d.): "A CHRONOLOGY OF THE BASIC ADMINISTRATIVE DEVELOPMENTS IN THE CIVIC GOVERNMENT OF VANCOUVER: 1886-1950", Mss Vancouver Public Archives.
- Brooks G.W.S. (1976a): "EDGAR CROME BAKER: AN ENTREPRENEUR IN EARLY BRITISH COLUMBIA", M.A. Thesis, Department of History, University of British Columbia.
- Church J.S. (1961): "MINING COMPANIES IN THE WEST KOOTENAY AND BOUNDARY REGIONS OF BRITISH COLUMBIA, 1890 - 1900: CAPITAL FORMATION AND FINANCIAL OPERATIONS", M.A. Thesis, Department of History, University of British Columbia.
- Foster J.K. (1970): "EDUCATION AND WORK IN A CHANGING SOCIETY: BRITISH COLUMBIA 1870 - 1930", M.A. Thesis, Department of Educational Foundations, University of British Columbia.
- Gibson E.M.W. (1972): "THE IMPACT OF SOCIAL BELIEF ON LANDSCAPE

- CHANGE; A GEOGRAPHICAL STUDY OF VANCOUVER", Ph.D. Thesis, Department of Geography, University of British Columbia.
- Houston D.B. (1976): "THE MODE OF PRODUCTION AND THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF U.S. URBAN FORM", Department of Economics, University of Pittsburgh, Working Paper No. 34.
- Lawrence J.C. (1957): "MARKETS AND CAPITAL; A HISTORY OF THE LUMBER INDUSTRY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA", M.A. Thesis, Department of History, University of British Columbia.
- McDonald R.A. (1977): "BUSINESS LEADERS IN EARLY VANCOUVER, 1886 - 1914", Ph.D. Thesis, Department of History, University of British Columbia.
- McGee T.G. (1977): "CONSERVATION AND DISSOLUTION IN THE THIRD WORLD CITY: THE SHANTY TOWN AS AN ELEMENT OF CONSERVATION", Department of Geography, University of British Columbia, (mimeo).
- Matthews J.S. (1934): "HIS WORSHIP MAYOR DAVID OPPENHEIMER, MAYOR OF VANCOUVER, 1888, 1889, 1890, 1891", Unpublished Essay, at Vancouver Public Archives.
- Orr A.D. (1968): "THE WESTERN FEDERATION OF MINERS AND THE ROYAL COMMISSION ON INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES IN 1903", M.A. Thesis, Department of History, University of British Columbia.
- Ralston H.K. (1965): "THE 1900 STRIKE OF THE FRASER RIVER SOCKEYE SALMON FISHERMEN", M.A. Thesis, Department of History, University of British Columbia.
- Regan C.R. (1975): "GEOGRAPHY, DEPENDENCE AND DEVELOPMENT", M.A. Thesis, Department of Geography, Simon Fraser University.
- Reid D. (1976): "BRITISH IMPERIALISM AND CONFEDERATION: THE CASE OF BRITISH COLUMBIA", M.A. Thesis, Department of Political Science, University of British Columbia.
- Robertson A.E. (1977): "THE PURSUIT OF POWER, PROFIT AND PRIVACY: A STUDY OF VANCOUVER'S WEST END ELITE, 1886 - 1914", M.A. Thesis, Department of Geography, University of British Columbia.
- Roy P. (1960): "THE RISE OF VANCOUVER AS A METROPOLITAN CENTRE 1886 - 1929", B.A. Essay, Department of History, University of British Columbia.
- Roy P. (1963): "RAILWAYS, POLITICIANS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF

- VANCOUVER 1886 - 1929", M.A. Thesis, Department of History, University of Toronto.
- Roy P. (1970): "THE BRITISH COLUMBIA ELECTRIC RAILWAY COMPANY 1897 - 1928; A BRITISH COMPANY IN BRITISH COLUMBIA", PhD Thesis, Department of History, University of British Columbia.
- Slater D. (1975b): "GEOGRAPHY AND UNDERDEVELOPMENT (Part 2)", Amsterdam, Centre for Latin American Research and Documentation, (mimeo).
- U.S.G., Vancouver Local (1977): "A REVIEW OF POULANTZAS' 'CLASSES IN CONTEMPORARY CAPITALISM'", Paper presented to the U.S.G. Conference in Regina.
- Walhouse P. (1961): "THE INFLUENCE OF MINORITY ETHNIC GROUPS ON THE CULTURAL GEOGRAPHY OF VANCOUVER", M.A. Thesis, Department of Geography, University of British Columbia.
- Watkins A. (1975): "URBANIZATION AND THE MODE OF PRODUCTION", New York, Research Centre for Economic Planning (mimeo).

MANUSCRIPTS

- Bell-Irving Family: Diaries, Letter Books, Accounts, Add. Mss. 1, Vancouver Public Archives.
- Campbell Sweeny: Diary, Personal Papers, Add. Mss. 22, Vancouver Public Archives.
- Canadian Pacific Railway: Add. Mss. 42, Vancouver Public Archives.
- City of Vancouver: Council Minutes, Vancouver Public Archives.
- City of Vancouver: Assessment Roll, 1888, Vancouver Public Archives.
- City of Vancouver: City Clerk Correspondence Inward, Vancouver Public Archives.
- City of Vancouver: Office of the City Clerk, By-Laws, Vancouver Public Archives.
- City of Vancouver: Voters list, 1901, Vancouver Public Archives.
- Company Records: Register of Companies, and PABC.
- F.C. Innes & Co.: Letters, Add. Mss. 38, Vancouver Public Archives.

Hastings Saw Mill Co.: Papers, Special Collections, University of British Columbia.

New Westminster District: Assessment Roll, 1879, PABC.

Painters and Allied Trades Union: Minutes, Membership Rolls, Add. Mss. 304, Vancouver Public Archives.

Piper C.T.W.: Wage Books, Add. Mss. 30, Vancouver Public Archives.

Powell I.W.: Correspondence, PABC.

Register of Absolute Fees: New Westminster Land Registry Office.

Vancouver Board of Trade: Council Minutes, General Minutes, Add. Mss. 300, Vancouver Public Archives.

Vancouver Club: Constitution, Membership Rolls,, Add. Mss. 306, Vancouver Public Archives.

Vancouver Trade and Labour Council: Minutes, Special Collections, University of British Columbia.

Vancouver Waterworks Co.: Share Register, Add. Mss. 63, Vancouver Public Archives.