

INDONESIA BEYOND *REFORMASI*: NECESSITY AND THE “DE-CENTERING” OF DEMOCRACY

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The writers would like to extend their gratitude to Keoni Indrabayu Marzuki and Tiola for their insightful contributions.

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I. INTRODUCTION: TRANSITIONAL POLITICS IN INDONESIA

President Suharto’s New Order, long established as a counter-regime to the heady days of Sukarnoist *realpolitik* based on a *raison d’etre* of developmentalism and economic progress, suffered a calamitous shock to the very foundation that it was built upon. The Asian Financial Crisis that swept throughout Southeast Asia in late 1997 took Indonesia and the New Order by storm. In its wake, it had nullified the astounding economic progress that the New Order had undertaken and stood for as its vanguard since the collapse of Sukarno’s Guided Democracy, revealing the disrepute within.¹ The accompanying rapid avalanche of events toppled the New Order, and plunged the Indonesian state into the brink of an existential

1. By the end of January 1998, the decline of the Rupiah reached a psychological mark of Rp11 050 per US Dollar. Unemployment increased from 4.68 million in 1997 to 5.46 million in 1998 while underemployment ballooned from 28.2 million in 1997 to 32.1 million in 1998.

crisis that threatened to endanger the country's very survival. Clarion's call for reforms (*reformasi*) especially towards the rooting out of entrenched KKN practices (*Korupsi, Kolusi dan Nepotisme*: Corruption, Collusion and Nepotism) sounded amidst concerns of imminent Balkanization and communal unrest that sought to tear the nation asunder.² Being thrust precipitously into the edifice of political volatility, President Bacharuddin Jusuf Habibie as the immediate successor of Suharto was unceremoniously charged with charting a new direction despite lacking strong legitimacy within and outside of the New Order circle. His presidency, though short-lived, was to prove tremendously pivotal setting to the tenor of what was to become the *Reformasi* agenda.³

Now almost fifteen years into the era known as *Reformasi* in Indonesia, scholars are still wrestling with how to characterize the new polity. Indonesia had undoubtedly democratized, however, it was not without its recurring defects. "Hybrid regime," "Collusive democracy," "Patrimonial democracy" and "Patronage democracy" are some of the terms that have been used to describe the new polity as Indonesia transits from a procedural form of democracy to a consolidation phase.⁴ While it is evident that checks and balances against centralized authoritarianism have been implemented, many would acquiesce that the scourge of the New Order KKN and other ills has not entirely been extirpated from the system. Some argued that hegemonic forces under Suharto survived and merely reorganized themselves in accordance to the new political climate.⁵ This

2. KKN, an acronym for "*Korupsi, Kolusi dan Nepotisme*: Corruption, Collusion and Nepotism" was a common refrain underlying the public's discontent with aspects of Suharto's authoritarian regime. By default, KKN became the de facto definition for good governance during the early years of *Reformasi*.

3. In his memoir, Habibie noted that the domestic and foreign press expected his presidency to last only 100 days. See Bacharuddin Jusuf Habibie, *Decisive Moments: Indonesia's Long Road to Democracy* (Jakarta: Ilthabi Rekatama, 2006).

4. These characterizations of the new Indonesian polity are taken from Larry Diamond, "Thinking about Hybrid Regimes", *Journal of Democracy*, Volume 13, Number 2 (April 2002): 21-35; Dan Slater, "Indonesia's Accountability Trap: Party Cartels and Presidential Power after Democratic Transition," *Indonesia* 78 (October 2004):61-92; Douglas Webber, "A Consolidated Patrimonial Democracy? Democratization in Post-Suharto Indonesia," *Democratization* 13 (June 2006): 396-420; Gerry van Klinken, "Patronage Democracy in Provincial Indonesia," in Olle Tornquist, Neil Webster and Kristian Stokke, eds., *Rethinking Popular Representation* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009). See also Edward Aspinall, "The Irony of Success," *Journal of Democracy*, Volume 21, Number 2 (April 2010): 20-34.

5. See Richard Robison and Vedi R. Hadiz, *Reorganizing Power in Indonesia: The Politics of Oligarchy in an Age of Markets* (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2004) pp. 10-4.

paved the way for more substantial arguments citing the resilience of strong oligarchic tendencies within the new Indonesian democracy.⁶ Nonetheless, it would also be imprecise to say that Indonesia had not moved beyond the New Order and its ways of conducting affairs. Beginning with Habibie, institutions like the military and the regime party Golkar, which formed the bulwark of the New Order, were incrementally disempowered from their hegemonic position via systematic constitutional reforms. Decentralization quickly assumed in succession of the “big bang” approach.⁷ Democratization occurred at a less expeditious pace though it eventually expanded beyond national levels to include provincial, regional and district (*bupati*) levels.⁸ Reforms made during Habibie’s presidency were palpably decisive and momentous and set the framework for what was to come – the periods after had more room for deliberation. These reforms, though predicated largely upon the work of elites, can be seen to have their first impulses from below with the masses, as contended by others. Consequently, there were counter-arguments implying that reforms were largely the crystallized efforts of a mobilized civil society and powerful movements from below.⁹ A third position summoned the lenses of pluralism to account for the discrepancies between conceptual definitions of oligarchy and the differences in policy outcomes.¹⁰ Of all arguments purportedly attempting to characterize the contemporary Indonesian polity, the former (Winters’ oligarchic theory) stood out as the dominant approach.

Many applauded Indonesia’s foray into democratization but lamented when it fell far short of expectations especially during its consolidation phase.¹¹ Some suggested that it was from the begin-

6. See Jeffrey A. Winters, “Oligarchy and Democracy in Indonesia,” *Indonesia* 96 (October 2013):11-33.

7. The defining aspects of the “Big Bang” approach according to the words of World Bank economist Anwar Shah is that it is “holistic (comprehensive)” and “implemented at lightning speed.” See Anwar Shah and Theresa Thompson “Implementing Decentralized Local Governance: A Treacherous Road with Potholes, Detours, and Road Closures,” in Jorge Martinez-Vazquez (ed.) *Reforming Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations and the Rebuilding of Indonesia* (Edward Elgar Press, 2004) pp. 317.

8. Local direct elections were recently rescinded.

9. See Edward Aspinall, “Popular Agency and Interests in Indonesia’s Democratic Transition and Consolidation,” *Indonesia* 96 (October 2013): 101-21.

10. See Thomas B. Pepinsky, “Pluralism and Political Conflict in Indonesia,” *Indonesia* 96 (October 2013): 81-100.

11. Direct elections at the local level were recently scrapped. See Jonathan Chen and Adhi Priamarizki, “Why abolishing direct local elections undermines Indonesia’s democracy” in *East Asia Forum*, 9 October 2014.

ning an essentially top-down, elite-driven process, thus it was not a surprise that reforms and democratic deepening efforts remained stagnant after a period of time.¹² Others pointed to the plebeian nature of the emergence of *Reformasi* as movements initiated from the ground, but did not dismiss the variable impact it had later on.¹³ Both points of views, though valid, are unable to answer the conflicting and sometimes frustratingly paradoxical nature of democratic change in Indonesia.¹⁴ This paper seeks to answer such a question by positing that a wholly deterministic expectation of Indonesia progressing along a standard transitional paradigm towards full democratization in its teleological sense misses the mark. Rather, it looks at the inherent motivations and conditions behind the causes for democratization. One must note that the notion of *tabula rasa*, or even a “fresh start” is clearly something of a myth while democratization alone does not objectively possess a standard. While a minimalist conception of democracy has been achieved, existing legacies of the New Order that are the characteristic of Indonesia and structuralist’s misdiagnosis have undoubtedly hindered a further deepening of democratization, resulting in what is known as a “protracted transition.” This paper also asserts that a more judicious method in analyzing the state of democratic health in Indonesia is in a systemic look at what had changed and what had remained since reforms were instituted.

Phenomenal progress on democratization and decentralization were made very early on but lost steam as due contingencies and structures that discouraged and deterred the entrenched practices of clientelism, brokerage and patronage were not accounted for or anticipated. In fact, it had proliferated where it once was centralized. This latter development, however, should not be confused with the genuine efforts at reforms made under the brow of extreme desperation and stress especially during the brief interregnum after the fall of Suharto. The early *reformasi* presidents’ path-breaking reforms were forged under parlous conditions in a “crisis-

12. See for example Dwight Y. King, *Half-hearted Reform: Electoral Institutions and the Struggle for Democracy in Indonesia* (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 2003) pp.221-4. King argued that Indonesia’s democratic transition began as “a ‘pact’ from above and evolved into ‘reform’ involving election-validated representatives of the masses.

13. See Edward Aspinall, *Opposing Suharto: Compromise, Resistance and Regime Change in Indonesia* (California: Stanford University Press, 2005).

14. See Richard Robison, “What sort of democracy? Predatory and neo-liberal agendas” in *Indonesia In: Globalization and Democratization in Asia: The construction of identity* (Routledge 2002), pp. 92-113.

ridden” environment; their primary intent, as one cannot deny, was for the preservation of the unitary state from forces that threatened to break it apart. This paper argues that *necessity* was the primary catalyst that mandated transitional change in Indonesia but was evidently not enough. No longer inconvenienced by a narrower range of options as the countless problems that had plagued Indonesia in 1998 were gradually resolved, political firefighting became less onerous while reforms consequently lost their panache. Reforms then followed a less compelling trajectory –one that was very often beholden or subjected to political expediency and private interests rather than the collective interests of democratic change. The subsequent democratization consolidation phase was thus alluded to a “politics-as-usual” mode where politics of the old subsequently resurfaced.¹⁵

We argue that Indonesia’s path to democracy was borne out of *necessity* brought about by a state of extreme precariousness and then molded by *its lack thereof*. Its lack thereof precisely reflected the internal power struggle and elite competition between remnant groups of the New Order vying under a different set of circumstances. Notwithstanding the given peculiarities of Indonesia’s transition, the current state of democracy in Indonesia is clearly one that is also shaped by the patrimonial character of the New Order.¹⁶ While imminent *necessity* acts as a temporary stop to ensure that these predatory tendencies of Indonesia’s political system do not come to the fore, its dissolution subsequently opened up the avenues for them to remerge. For even necessity has its limitations and these limitations lie in its eventual demise. Such a pattern inevitably contributed to perceptions of Indonesia’s reform process as being perceived as a vacillating “two steps forward, one step back.”¹⁷ The study can thus be chronologically divided into two parts. The first part mainly features the predominantly necessity-based reforms

15. “Politics-as-usual” mode, in contrast to the “crisis-ridden” mode, carries with it the impending notion of bureaucratic and narrow clientelistic relationships as being more salient. See Harold Crouch, *Political Reform in Indonesia after Suharto* (Institute of Southeast Asian Studies: Singapore 2010), pp. 7-14.

16. Chehabi and Linz have indicated that “if the sultanistic regime is replaced by a democracy, chances are this democracy will display strong clientelist tendencies, with the democratically elected leaders using the resources of their office to build nationwide patron-client relationships.” See Houchang E. Chehabi and Juan J. Linz, “A Theory of Sultanism”, in *Sultanistic Regimes*, Chehabi and Linz eds. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998).

17. See Damien Kingsbury, Two steps forward, one step back: Indonesia’s arduous path of reform in *Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)*, January 2012.

presented within administrations of the early reform period including the short-lived presidencies of Habibie, Abdurrahman Wahid and Megawati. The second part features the non-necessity-based reforms that constitute the “democratic consolidation” phase of the Yudhoyono presidency and beyond. This study highlights and evaluates both the specific “steps forward” (*necessity* present) as well as the contentious “steps back” (*necessity* absent) Indonesia has taken so far in its *reformasi* journey in an attempt to redefine the new polity. We conclude that post-*reformasi* Indonesia has increasingly tended toward a “decentered democracy.”

II. NECESSITY MAKES STRANGE BEDFELLOWS: THE GLOBAL AND DOMESTIC CONTEXT FOR DEMOCRACY IN INDONESIA

By the late 1990s, the world was riding along what was known as the “third wave of democracy.”¹⁸ The domino effect of increased democratization around the world, beginning with the Carnation Revolution in Portugal, gathered momentum with its spread to Latin American and Asian Pacific countries in which more than thirty countries have since shifted from authoritarian forms of government to a proto-democratized one.¹⁹ As global consciousness towards the “snowballing” effect of increased cries for democratization heightened, it made its presence locally felt. In the last few years of New Order Indonesia (while it was still considered dangerous to criticize or question the legitimacy of the authoritarian administration), students and intellectuals were already flirting with the literature and ideas of a greater openness in politics with their closest example – Philippines-style “people power” – as their inspiration.²⁰ Democratization (in the sense of holding free and fair multiparty elections) as a main bulwark of the country vis-à-vis developmentalism (*pembangunan*) gained currency but did not acquire an impulse strong enough to bring it to fruition.²¹ That was changed by the rapid-fire collapse of the Indonesian economy fol-

18. See Samuel P. Huntington, “Democracy’s Third Wave”, *Journal of Democracy*, Volume 2, Number 2 (Spring 1991): 12-34.

19. In Asia, authoritarian regimes were replaced with democracies in the Philippines in 1986, in South Korea in 1987 and in Thailand in 1982. Indonesia, on the other hand, was a latecomer.

20. See Edward Aspinall, *ibid.* pp. 118-27.

21. Periodic elections were held under the Suharto regime although it as engineered under strict control such that the ruling hegemonic party vehicle always emerged a significant majority winner.

lowing the onslaught of the Asian Financial Crisis. Following a whirlwind of events, President Suharto was forced to resign by May 1998. In his place, Vice-President Habibie was quickly sworn in to the presidency but it was already predicted that his tenure would be short.²²

Immediately after Habibie's swearing-in ceremony, he was besieged by the contentious task of quickly assembling a suitable cabinet in a politically fragile environment. In a matter of days, the Development Reform Cabinet (*Kabinet Reformasi Pembangunan*) was formed.²³ Not entirely reformist in nature, its most immediate concern was to accommodate both national and international demands for political reforms. Whereas in the past the Suharto New Order's legitimacy was primarily based upon the promise of economic developmentalism, the dismal shape of the Indonesian economy then implied that an alternative legitimation had to be sought.²⁴ In its place came imminent plans to democratize and decentralize.²⁵ Even though Habibie himself never showed any strong democratic leanings during his long tenure under the Suharto government, he opted to move in the direction of democratization, which was now seen as a panacea to the political instability, in the midst of unpromising circumstances and a huge legitimacy problem.²⁶ Scholars dubbed this brief period of crucial reforms – that covered both the short-lived presidencies of Abdurrahman Wahid and Megawati Sukarnoputri – as a “crisis-ridden” reform phase,

22. Habibie himself noted that reports in the domestic and foreign press expected that his presidency to last only 100 hours. The slightly more optimistic ones nonetheless predicted that he will not last for more than 100 days. See Habibie *ibid.* pp. 77.

23. See Habibie, *ibid.* pp. 81-4.

24. Ironically the New Order regime had sacrificed development at the regions as a result of its centralization approach.

25. Early in his Cabinet meetings in mid-1998, President Habibie already had in place a Reform Working Group. A few immediate reform initiatives then pioneered was the preparation of a national reform agenda and limiting the presidential term of office. Habibie's democratization programme was then formalized at a Special Session of the MPR (People's Consultative Assembly) in November 1998 that brought elections forward to June 1999. Major reforms during Habibie's tenure include the releasing of political prisoners, the reform of the anti-subversion law, the lifting of restrictions on the press, the formation of new political parties and the holding of new general elections. See Habibie, *ibid.* pp. 115-23. See also Crouch *ibid.* pp. 25-7.

26. Incidentally as Indonesia emerges as a democracy in late 1998-1999, it marked the beginning of a significant recession in democracy. See Larry Diamond, “Indonesia's Place in Global Democracy” in *Problems of Democratization in Indonesia: Elections, Institutions and Society*, Edward Aspinall and Marcus Mietzner, eds. (Institute of Southeast Asian Studies: Singapore 2010), pp. 21-7.

drawing attention to the particularly parlous conditions present within Indonesia.²⁷

To better analyse the tumultuous state of affairs during Indonesia's transitional period and how Indonesia achieved its goals of democratic transition quite rapidly in the first few years of *reformasi* yet fell behind precipitously, we turn to the idea and nature of necessity (or *necessità*). Made famous by the works of Italian philosopher and strategist Niccolò Machiavelli, the question of necessity usually carries implications of imminence that often slips into some form of moral ambivalence. With the preservation and longevity of the state possessing an overriding importance as the ultimate end, necessity becomes a substitute for what is seen to be good or virtuous – including being invariably tied to the use of violence *if necessary*. While most discussions had centered upon necessity as a primary facet of security in the invocation of wars and harsh measures, it may not always be the case. For the case of Indonesia's political transition, the absorptive capacity of timely democratization did not necessitate the aberrant use of violence as a means to achieve state unitary. It did, however, imply that one form of legitimation (economic developmentalism) had to be traded for another (democratization). On the other hand, while democratization and devolution of powers certainly did not appeal as much to the New Order figures who used the ways of centralized, authoritarian rule, the *necessity* imposed by the extremely fractious situation ironically allowed for an opening for reforms that did just that.

This concept of necessity, in line with an inference of what Machiavelli had written, is grounded in an understanding of human nature that can be extended to the state. Machiavelli contends that men and by extension states are acquisitive and ambitious.²⁸ This works well for a free state whose ends are undoubtedly for acquisition and self-preservation. However, it is in the advent of a crisis that *necessity* ultimately jolts the state into the arms of a common, collective good.²⁹ In his letters, he mentioned that “men are led by

27. See Crouch *ibid.* pp. 15, 21-8.

28. Notwithstanding his views on the more macabre nature of men – in *The Prince* Machiavelli mentioned that men in general have a “natural and ordinary” desire to acquire. He adds in *The Discourses to Livy* that they are “so unquiet that however little the door to ambition is opened for them, they at once forget every love”. See Niccolò Machiavelli, *The Prince* (III) pp. 14 and *The Discourses to Livy* (III.2).

29. Machiavelli mentions “that men never do good unless necessity drives them to it; but when they are too free to choose and can do just as they please, confusion and disorder become everywhere rampant.” See *Discourses* I.3. See also *Discourses* III.12 where Machiavelli contends “. . . how useful a part necessity plays in human affairs, and

necessity to do what it was not their intention to do.”³⁰ Mansfield probably provides a more succinct juxtaposition of what necessity encompasses from his readings of Machiavelli. He notes that “necessity. . . refers to what is humanly necessary, as opposed to what is necessary for the fulfilment of human nature.”³¹ In other words, necessity can be seen as a drive or compulsion (or even coercion) that makes states act regardless of, or despite of, its inclination. It may not be the result derived from a severe imposition, but in the case of Indonesia in 1998, where state legitimacy was seriously challenged, it certainly is.

With the concept of necessity as a backdrop, Machiavelli goes on to add that when the necessity that restrains men and states to virtuous action for the benefit of the common good comes not from rulers and princes but from external circumstances, it is known for all intents and purposes as an act of fortune (*Fortuna*) – or unpredictability. As such, subjected to the vagaries of *Fortuna*, if necessity ever changes, Machiavelli demonstrates that it may not be necessarily controllable by princes or statesmen. He then makes the argument that while fortune/unpredictability can be restrained with prudence, it is a rare gift. Rather, both man and state alike benefit from the greatest extent unintentional necessity brings to them. He argues that “to many things that reason does not bring you, necessity brings you.”³²

to what glorious deeds it may lead men. As some moral philosophers in their writings have remarked, neither of the two most noble instruments to which man’s nobility is due, his hands and his tongue, would have attained such perfection in their work or have carried men’s works to the height which one can see they have reached, if they have not been driven to it by necessity.” In classical thought, necessity is also reflected as the drive behind virtue including Ovid’s *ingenium mala saepe movent* (difficulty is what wakes up the genius) and a Latin saying that sophistication is born out of hunger/necessity (*artificia docuit fames*).

30. See Niccolò Machiavelli letter to Francesco Vettori of 10 December 1513. Note also Machiavelli’s comments - “It should be stressed that the *necessity* being imposed upon the individual is an important sense more formal than specific: an obligation to respect some system of law and property rather than *the* specific system now obtaining” cited in J.G.A. Pocock, *The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1975) p. 376.

31. Mansfield drew his conclusion largely from Machiavelli’s discussion of the creation and foundation of cities which he sets down in the *Discourses*. Machiavelli observes that the virtue of the founder of the cities can be recognized both in the choice of site and the ordering of the laws. He also added that “men work either by necessity or by choice. . . there is greater virtue to be seen where choice has less authority.” See Harvey C. Mansfield, *Machiavelli’s Virtue* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996) pp. 55.

32. See *Discourses* I.6. To add, Machiavelli envisioned the dawn of necessity to be part of a cyclic process. He mentioned “usually provinces go most of the time, in the

Similarly, the early turbulent years of the post-Suharto era necessitated changes that ran counter to the interests of elites and oligarchs – only later to be counteracted by a reassertion of their influence. The dramatic change compelled those with established powers to re-adjust themselves in an environment with almost completely different rules. As argued, democratization would deprive the former hegemonic regime-backed party Golkar of its guaranteed victories in elections while decentralization would imply transference of resources away from the central elites. A restriction on direct political involvement of the Indonesian military would essentially deny the kickbacks it derived from its territorial network. Necessity thus plays an immensely direct role in setting the seemingly immutable democratization and decentralization process in motion in Indonesia – the distinct attributes and features that make up the Suharto New Order were consequently abandoned or nullified. *Reformasi* Indonesia had indeed dealt a stake unto what was left of the New Order. The point where necessity loses its very brief hold after its initiation to democratic reforms is the point where both oligarchic and elite predatory forces come to the fore. This has been categorically defined as a “politics-as-usual” atmosphere within *reformasi* Indonesia and is seen to have emerged after the erratic and often informal rule of Abdurrahman Wahid, a man widely seen as a democrat.³³ To be more precise, although it was widely seen that it was only until the Yudhoyono administration that the “transitional period” in Indonesia was brought to an end, it was also the period seen as the beginnings of the encroachment of oligarchic and other predatory influence upon the newly instituted political system.³⁴ The Yudhoyono period is nonetheless noted for its stabilizing effect upon Indonesian politics whereby for the first time direct

changes they make, from order to disorder and then pass again from disorder to order, for worldly things are not allowed by nature to stand still. As soon as they reach their ultimate perfection, having no further to rise, they must descend; and similarly, once they have descended and through their disorders arrived at the ultimate depth, since they cannot descend further, of necessity they must rise. Thus they are always descending from good to bad and rising from bad to good. For virtue gives birth to quiet, quiet to leisure, leisure to disorder, disorder to ruin; and similarly, from ruin, order is born; from order, virtue; and from virtue, glory and good fortune.” See Machiavelli in *Florentine Histories*, Book V.

33. See Crouch *ibid.* pp. 28-32.

34. Ironically it was only until after 2006 (two years into the administration of the first Yudhoyono Presidency) that Freedom House ratings for Indonesia were adjusted throughout all categories to result in a status that was “Free” (from “Partly Free”). It stayed within the same “Free” status for another 8 years. Indonesia then reverted to a status of “Partly Free” only recently in 2014.

presidential elections were held. It was also accompanied by a decade-long hold onto power by Yudhoyono, the longest serving president in *reformasi* Indonesia by far. However, while oligarchic forces resumed their intransigent hold on Indonesia's democratic institutions and procedures, it was challenged equally by an opposing non-oligarchic force that can be said to be made up of primarily grassroots volunteerism.

The concept of necessity thus serves as a particular prism in which to examine the intentions and conditions that result in a democratic change often perceived as spectacular within Indonesia in an era where democratization was starting to ebb. Necessity did indeed dislodge the distinguishable features of New Order Indonesia. However, it had failed to curtail and probably would not have halted the pace of a resumption of "old" oligarchic and patronage interests seen collectively during the pre-*reformasi* era as KKN. Necessary change is often inherently irrevocable as it represents the constituent building blocks of the new regime or era – that is, unless further compulsion brought about by a crisis situation induces it to change. On the other hand, once devoid of necessity the change that is brought about is often retractable and is less of a permanent fixture in the political landscape. Correspondingly, when examined in context of the emerging problems that democratization brings along following the imminent demise of necessity, a more nuanced and realistic outlook of the nature of Indonesia's democracy and its future can then be assessed.

III. NECESSITY-BASED REFORMS

A. What Necessity Inevitably Entailed: Changes to Defining Features of the New Order

The dawn of *reformasi* in Indonesia essentially involved the unravelling of prominent structural features that were idiosyncratic of the Suharto regime – that is, authoritarian and centralized. These two variables intertwined as the regime that prioritized economic development above all and this placed a high premium upon political stability. Invariably a product of Revolutionary and "Old Order" Indonesia, due to his experiences both in the battlefield and as a keen observer of politics, Suharto was very much in opposition to the fissiparousness of both civilian politicians and the Indonesian people.³⁵ Elson, in a succinct summary of Suharto, mentions a curi-

35. See R.E. Elson, *Suharto: A Political Biography* (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge 2001), pp. 42-4.

ously interesting depiction of Suharto's highly conservative understanding and view of Indonesian history including the fact that Suharto "did not trust those (the) people" and viewed them "like children" in which they "became an objectified category upon which Suharto had to work to give them what they really needed in the interests of the total society."³⁶ On the other hand, the Army was considered in light of its "special status and duty in the affairs of the independent Republic," which meant it had to adopt a "paternalistic role in uplifting the people's material and spiritual fortunes." The army's self-proclaimed contribution to the country's independence became the justifying clause for various privileges accorded to them. Due to the unique considerations of Indonesia at that time, Suharto sought to reshape the two components of the Indonesian political system – namely the armed forces and the electoral system – while instituting a wholly alien institution and electoral vehicle – that of Golkar (or "functional groups").³⁷ Thus emerged what was the defining features of a centralized and authoritarian rule under Suharto amongst surrounding political contours that included the *dwifungsi* ("dual function") role of the armed forces, the hegemonic dominance of Golkar as a strategic electoral vehicle and the devolution of the national and regional offices. The new *reformasi* era, however, had to replace these defining features of the New Order with those of their own.

1. *Military Reform: From Dual Function (Dwifungsi) to Unitary State of Republic of Indonesia (NKRI)*³⁸

The new *reformasi* government had to first rid itself of the direct influence of the military (then known as ABRI: *Angkata Bersenjata Republik Indonesia*) in the role of politics that had been deemed too pernicious and untenable by the Indonesian public since the fall of Suharto. First conceived during Suharto's First Development Cabinet to drive development and security, the military aspired to a dualistic role in Indonesian society known as *dwifungsi* (dual function). According to the *dwifungsi* concept, the military acts as a force in the fields of defence and security (*Hankam*, *Pertahanan Keamanan*) as well as that of a socio-political guarantor (*Sospol*, *Sosial Politik*) in government and society. This entails that the military plays a direct hand in government matters, which to-

36. See Elson *ibid.* pp. 303.

37. See Elson *ibid.* pp. 180-90.

38. NKRI or *Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia* refers to the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia.

wards the end of Suharto's rule, became increasingly violent and manipulative.³⁹

With the sudden fall of Suharto as a patron, public antagonism and recrimination were directed at the military institution. The military involvement in cases of human rights abuses including the abduction of student activists, the Trisakti shootings and the May riots forced the already demoralized military into the corner. With the fears of being split by factional infighting within and demoralized by an increasingly hostile public, even with Lt. Gen. Prabowo Subianto by then out of the picture, it became necessary to institute both house-cleaning (*de-Prabowo-isasi* or "de-Prabowo-ization") and reform initiatives in order to distance the military from its New Order Package (*Paket Orde Baru*) links.⁴⁰ In September 1998, then Commander-in-Chief, General Wiranto, and a few of his advisors engineered a reform framework for the military in a seminar held in Bandung in what was to become the "New Paradigm" (*Paradigma Baru*) doctrine under the auspices of the Habibie government.⁴¹ It was the first reform initiative by the military. Again, General Wiranto was hardly a reformer but had been nonetheless necessitated by particular circumstances to attempt limited reforms, although a great many officers and men seemed inclined to the status quo. He understood that what was crucial and *necessary* at that time was for the military to create a new public image and credibility by shedding the military's label of *alat mati pemerintah* or "the government's killing tool."⁴² He also understood and felt first-hand of the *dwifungsi*-democratization dilemma that would inevitably accom-

39. Such a role that the military takes on inevitably grew out of its experiences during the revolutionary period with the military seen as representing the interest of the people and a unique "people's army" that was duty-bound to participate in the affairs of the state. See Leonard C. Sebastian, *Realpolitik Ideology: Indonesia's Use of Military Force* (Singapore: ISEAS, 2006) pp. 323.

40. See Jun Honna, *Military Politics and Democratization in Indonesia* (New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003) pp. 164.

41. The rivalry within the Indonesian military at that time was essentially a struggle over patronage networks in the "red-and-white" camp led by Gen. Wiranto and the "green" Islamic officers led by then Lt. Gen. Prabowo Subianto – a product of Suharto's divide-and-rule strategy. The Prabowo circle was then subsequently removed. The leading advisors that promulgated reforms within the military were primarily from Gen. Wiranto's "red-and-white" camp including ABRI Chief of Staff for Social and Political Affairs, Lt. Gen. Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and two other members of the general ABRI staff, Maj. Gen. Agus Widjojo and Maj. Gen. Agus Wirahadikusumah. See Marcus Mietzner, *Military Politics, Islam, and the State in Indonesia* (Singapore: ISEAS, 2009) pp. 135

42. See Jun Honna *ibid.*, pp. 168-9.

pany it. Of course, Wiranto also sought to distance himself from the abuses of power while rebranding as a born-again reformer, a calculated position, nonetheless, to assume consolidation of position and influence within the military. The “New Paradigm” asserted that the military would no longer seek to “occupy” positions in the government but play a role only in “influencing” government decisions, exercising its influence “indirectly.”⁴³ It would also “share” power with the civilian political forces instead of dominating the government. Comprised of the “14 Strategic Action Plans,” the military embarked on a period of ambitious reforms that steadily allowed for the detachment from the reins of centralized representation and authority. Beginning with the gradual liquidation of the military’s Central Council of Socio-political Affairs (*Wansospolsus*) and Regional Council of Socio-political Affairs (*Wansospolda*), it was accompanied by the withdrawal of seconded military officers holding positions in government and bureaucracy, also known as *kekaryaan*. In early 1999, reforms cascaded down to the gradual removal of military representatives in the national and regional legislatures.⁴⁴ This was followed by the process of splitting the police force from the military on April 1, 1999 and the highly symbolic move of changing its name from ABRI to TNI (*Tentara Nasional Indonesia*, Indonesian National Military) to distance itself from the New Order. However, all this did not come close to the blow that the military would suffer as seen from its political inability to block President Habibie’s decision in holding a referendum on deciding the fate of East Timor. President Habibie’s links with the more militant elements of ICMI (*Ikatan Candekiawan Muslim Indonesia* or the Association of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals) also proved to be a tenuous factor between both institutions as they compete for

43. Four Key aspects of the New Paradigm are 1. ABRI’s disengagement from the ‘the forefront of politics’; 2. Shifting ABRI’s role from that of ‘controlling’ politics to ‘influencing’ politics; 3. Shifting ABRI’s political commitment from the forefront of things, from a ‘direct’ role to an ‘indirect’ role; and 4. Sharing power with civilians. See *Markas Besar Tentara Nasional Indonesia* [TNI Headquarters], *TNI Abad XXI. Redefinisi. Reposisi, dan Reaktualisasi Peran TNI dalam Kehidupan Bangsa* [TNI 21st Century, Redefinition, Reposition, and Reactualisation of TNI’s Role in Duties] 4th edition (Jakarta: CV Jasa Bumi, June 1999) and A. Malik Haramain, “Gus Dur dan Reposisi Militer [Gus Dur and Military Reposition]” in Khamami Zada (ed.) *Neraca Gus Dur di Panggung Kekuasaan* [Gus Dur’s Scales in Power Stage], (Jakarta: Lakspedam, August 2002), pp. 69 -118.

44. Such reforms evidently received substantial resistance from different quarters that involved compromises. Eventually, the military accepted electoral laws that reduced its representation in the DPR by half and in the regional legislatures by 10 percent.

influence in the new *reformasi* political theatre. More credit, however, should be given to the “reform-minded” faction in the military for pushing through reform initiatives despite the apparent impasse within Wiranto’s own political ambitions of consolidating power for himself and those within his circle.⁴⁵

Under President Abdurrahman Wahid (or Gus Dur), however, reforms proceeded apace, but were stymied momentarily by unsuitable appointments to the role of Commander-in-Chief, with status-quo officers rising to the fore. Initially, the military expected that Wahid would be sympathetic to the military and agree with its plans to conduct internal reform gradually. Gus Dur acted in contrast to the military’s expectation by intervening in the process with the hope of expediting the reform process.⁴⁶ Wary of Wiranto’s influence within the military, Gus Dur sacked him from the powerful post of Coordinating Minister for Political and Security Affairs (Menko Polkam) following allegations human rights abuses in East Timor. Wiranto was replaced by Juwono Sudarsono as the first civilian to head the Defence Ministry.⁴⁷ Gus Dur then sought to promote officers loyal to him which led to further intra-military rivalry. However, this resulted in each faction (now the Tyasno-Wirahadikusumah group and the Admiral Widodo circle) competing as representatives of democratization reforms to bolster their legitimacy. Gus Dur embroilment with impeachment matters eventually shelved all reform initiatives by the latter part of 2000. It must be said that the early term of Gus Dur set a high expectation on the prospect of military reform, in which he constantly hinted on the notion of civilian supremacy. He indicated this assertion through his approaches on domestic conflicts, such as his efforts to impose a ceasefire with the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) and his

45. General Wiranto became more active in political affairs after distancing himself from the Habibie-ICMI circle. With competitors general allied with Prabowo and ICMI out of the picture, he started promoting officers who shared the same background with him much to the chagrin of reform-minded officers who felt that such a move will jeopardize reform initiatives.

46. These processes include expediting the preparation period for the police’s separation from the military that is considered too lengthy, implicit attempts at reforming the Territorial Command Structure, the tacit reduction of military representation in Parliament and attempting to commit to a second version of New Paradigm reforms including the addition of reform programmes. See Sukardi Rinakit, *The Indonesian Military after the New Order* (Copenhagen: NIAS press, 2005), pp. 134 - 141.

47. See the International Crisis Group, *Indonesia: Keeping the Military Under Control*, Jakarta/Brussels: ICG, 20 September 2000.

personal approaches to separatist movements in Papua.⁴⁸ However, political expediency and elite competition eventually caught on and the momentum for reforms eventually dissipated.

Besides the efforts arising from the civilian sector, the TNI initiated internal reforms by publishing a document entitled *The Role of the TNI in the twenty-first Century* in 2001. The document clearly stated the TNI's commitment to forgo its socio-political role and reassert its pledge in preserving national defence by developing a joint warfare doctrine, increasing its organizational effectiveness and transferring its responsibility for domestic security to the POLRI (Indonesian national police, *Kepolisian Negara Republik Indonesia*).⁴⁹ The military also made crucial steps including the revocation of its socio-political role while inserting the study to humanitarian law within the military curriculum, transferring duties of the military tribunal from the TNI Headquarters to the Supreme Court as well as establishing stringent requirements for active officers to retire from operational duty before joining the elections as a political candidate.⁵⁰ In addition, the TNI revised its principal and services doctrine gradually in order to strengthen its national defence capabilities while abandoning its internal security functions.⁵¹

Gus Dur's replacement, President Megawati Sukarnoputri, was the least reformist amongst the presidents as she paid even less attention to military reform. She appointed a few of her confidantes to top positions in the TNI, such as General Ryamizard Ryacudu, Vice Marshall Chappy Hakim, General Endriartono Sutarto and Vice Admiral Bernard Kent Sondakh, who were resistant to the notion of a rapid-paced reform. They in turn reinstated massive restructuring within the military that sought to roll process the reform process.⁵² Hailing from the conservative camp, the generals under Megawati were known for their strong nationalistic stance and a general close-mindedness towards reforms. Momentum for reform had been steadily lost; however, the locus of the military having a direct hand in politics or *dwifungsi* have been shifted to that of the maintenance of national unity or NKRI. Further reforms have been tinged with political calculations of various sorts, although the

48. See Crouch *ibid*, pp. 137.

49. See Leonard C. Sebastian and Iis Gindarsah, "Taking Stock of Military Reform," in Jurgen Ruland, Maria-Gabriela Manea and Hans Born (eds.) *The Politics of Military Reform: Experiences from Indonesia and Nigeria*, (Berlin: Springer, 2013) p. 34

50. See *ibid*

51. See *ibid*

52. See Rinakit *ibid*, pp. 214-215

emasculatation of the intervention of the military in parliamentary matters by then had plateaued.

Megawati's ideological disposition became an overweening influence in the rollback on reforms following a tacit return to instituting military autonomy during her presidency. Megawati's conservative view on territorial integrity, human rights and individual freedoms contributed substantially to her alliance with non-reformist military officers.⁵³ The parliament's impeachment of Gus Dur on the other hand also reduced her trust over civilian politicians in supporting her administration.

The entrenchment of a more conservative paradigm at the helm of the TNI was not the only factor influencing the sluggish pace of military reform. The implementation of martial law in Aceh and the rising global terrorist threat also contributed to the slowdown in reforms. Many of Jakarta-based politicians were impatient with continued communal conflicts in Eastern Indonesia and the potential influence of separatist movements in the provinces of Aceh and Papua. Many believed that the Habibie and Gus Dur Administration's soft approach was a massive tactical blunder as it did not produce positive outcomes. A reversion to a tougher hard-line stance with the involvement of the military was thus seen as the best way to end the quandary.⁵⁴ This avenue of greater military involvement and facility also gave the TNI a window of opportunity to restore its domestic security role in conjunction with the rise of international terrorism. TNI opportunistically dismissed attempts at reforming its territorial command structure citing its inherent intelligence potential and capabilities of aiding counter-terrorism efforts.

Instead of *dwifungsi*, the almost flagrant use of the term "NKRI" (*Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia*: Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia) to justify the imminent presence of the TNI reenergized its role within the domestic security realm. Linking the idea of "*kemanunggalan TNI dengan rakyat*" (unification between TNI and society) as a means of countering terrorism, the then Army Chief-of-Staff General Ryamizard Ryacudu, allegedly rejected the more reformist concept of civil-military relations. He concluded that a "return to barracks" ideology was unsubstantiated as the TNI would have to assume a new role in maintaining the integrity of the nation in the face of threats within. This was accom-

53. See Marcus Mietzner *ibid*, pp. 226

54. See *ibid* pp. 227

panied with renewed fears of the West in fostering the disintegration of the unitary state of Indonesia. Above all, the military was suspicious of the growing influx of Western Liberal ideas such as democracy and human rights that would likely compromise the integrity of the state.⁵⁵ Despite overall sluggishness underlining the military reform progress, Megawati's Administration nonetheless managed to pass a significant Law on the TNI that was very promising in terms of reform.⁵⁶ However, the law left the territorial command issue untouched.⁵⁷

The waning progressive movement within the TNI was thus effectively dampened as key proponents of military reform such as Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY), Agus Widjojo, Agus Wirahadikusumah and Saurip Kadi were no longer active in the military.⁵⁸ In her term, Megawati marginalized Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono as his growing popularity made him a threat to her presidential ambitions of re-election. Although Yudhoyono later went on to win the 2004 elections, the intense rivalry between Megawati and SBY did not end. The anti-reform military officers managed to side-line Agus Widjojo as his idea of reforming the territorial command structure had drawn large criticisms from his more conservative colleagues. Widjojo's removal eventually thwarted all attempts at revamping the controversial territorial command structure.⁵⁹

The rise of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) as the fourth post-reform president put a momentary stop to the roadblocks that had been preventing a full-scale reform of the military. Yudhoyono was seen as a reformist officer able to bridge the gap between con-

55. See Harold Crouch *ibid*, pp. 142

56. According to the Law on TNI, the Ministry of Defence will be in charge of formulating defence policies and strategy and coordinating with the TNI under its authority. The President of the Republic of Indonesia nonetheless has the right to the use military power (article 3). This law also asserted the Indonesia military's focus on national defence and a requirement to provide support to the POLRI (Indonesian police force) for internal security (article 7.2). It states that the TNI's posture will be structured upon the state's defence posture in overcoming military and armed threats (article 11.1). The law also mentioned that active military officers cannot hold positions in political parties, join politics, do business and also become members of parliament or other political positions (article 39.1). The Law on TNI limited the Indonesian military's use of the state budget as its only source of funding (article 66.1).

57. See Harold Crouch *ibid*, pp. 160 and Law no. 34, year 2004 on TNI.

58. See Damien Kingsbury, *Power Politics and the Indonesian Military* (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003), pp.186.

59. See Marcus Mietzner *ibid*, pp. 232.

servative military doctrines and a civil supremacy.⁶⁰ To be fair, Yudhoyono managed both well. His biggest contribution was in the balance between protecting the core military institution while preventing its encroachment within the society.⁶¹ He also established strong civilian control over the military that essentially ended the tumultuous democratic transition period.⁶² Other achievements include improving welfarism in terms of salaries and benefits within the military, procuring marquee military platforms and diminishing factionalism among high ranking officers.⁶³

The strong civilian control over the armed forces had since resulted in a more transparent TNI when compared with Megawati's Administration – one that was shrouded in secrecy.⁶⁴ Yudhoyono also succeeded in establishing a strong foothold within the TNI by installing loyalists in the top TNI positions including General Agustadi Sasongko as Army Chief-of-Staff as well as Brother-in-laws Erwin Sudjono as Kostrad Commander and Pramono Edhie Wibowo as Special Force (Kopassus) Commander.⁶⁵

Various initiatives in intensifying institutional reforms to the military were rather ineffective, especially on the issue of self-financing by members of the TNI. Although the TNI agreed to divest all their business units to the government, its implementation was far from perfect. TNI, however, also excluded a total of 219 core businesses from being divested, arguing that these units were essential for the soldiers' welfare and economic concerns.⁶⁶

While there are indications that military reform initiatives revived under Yudhoyono, its pace was rather slow as well. This sluggish pace was primarily due to the large body of vested interests within the military that still sides with the status quo and are resis-

60. See Yuddy Chrisnandi, "Post-Suharto Civil-Military Relations in Indonesia" in *RSIS Monograph No. 10* (Singapore: S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, 2007), pp. 53.

61. See Marcus Mietzner, "The Political Marginalization of the Military in Indonesia," in Marcus Mitzner (ed.), *The Political Resurgence of the Military in Southeast Asia*, (New York and Oxon: Routledge, 2011) pp. 131-138.

62. See Marcus Mietzner, "Praetorian Rule and Redemocratisation in South-East Asia and the Pacific Island: The Case of Indonesia", *Australian Journal of Political Affairs*, Vo. 67 No. 3, (2013) pp. 306.

63. See Zoltan Barany, *The Soldier and the Changing State*, (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2012) pp. 205.

64. See *ibid.*

65. See Harold Crouch *ibid.*, pp. 152

66. See Marcus Mietzner *ibid.*, pp. 49.

tant to greater reforms.⁶⁷ The Yudhoyono Administration nonetheless was the chief architect of two major milestones of military reform involving the implementation of enactments towards civilian control while severing the TNI's dependence on off-budget financing as well as instituting more professionalism by exposing officers to joint-training or enhancement programmes.⁶⁸ The relatively successful reform progress failed to progress deeper and was in fact stymied as the Yudhoyono Administration eventually shifted its focus from military reform into defence transformation following the introduction of the Minimum Essential Force (MEF).⁶⁹

Although several grey areas of reform were still left unresolved (including the demarcation between “defence” and “internal security,” the army's territorial structure, military finance and latent human rights allegations), the accumulated “civilianization” meant that *dwifungsi* had lost its punch and legitimacy. The likelihood of the military ever regaining control of the government became small. Further limitations on the military such as its withdrawal from the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR: *Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat*) and their insistence on maintaining institutional political neutrality kept the TNI at bay from formal politics.⁷⁰

2. *Taming Golkar: From Hegemony to Political Party*

The emergence of the “Functional Groups” (*Golongan Karya* or *Golkar*) was essentially borne out of Suharto's general loathing of the squabbles and partisanship between political parties.⁷¹

67. See Damien Kingsbury, “Indonesia in 2006: Cautious Reform,” in *Asian Survey* Vol. 47, No. 1 (2007), pp. 155.

68. See John B. Haseman, “Indonesian Military Reform: More than a Human Rights Issue,” in *Southeast Asian Affairs 2006*, eds. Daljit Singh and Lorraine Carlos Salazar (Singapore: Institute of South East Asian Studies, 2006), pp. 113-122.

69. The Minimum Essential Force (MEF) is a concept that systematically outlined – for the first time in a long while – Indonesia's strategic requirements until 2024 based on projected actual threats (terrorism, separatism, border disputes, natural disaster, horizontal conflicts, energy scarcity) and potential threats (climate change, sea lanes of communications violations, environmental degradation, pandemics, financial crisis, cyber crime, foreign aggression, and water and food crisis). See Evan Laksmana, “From ‘Military Reform’ to ‘Defense Transformation’” in *The Jakarta Post*, 15 September, 2014.

70. See Crouch *ibid*, pp. 149-150.

71. Golkar was not seen as a real political party but an assemblage of various groups. Its origins were from an obscure organization created by the Indonesian military called “Joint Secretariat of Functional Groups” (*Sekretariat Bersama Golongan Karya, Sekbar Golkar*) founded to counterbalance the increasing influence of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI).

Golkar became a unique electoral vehicle that encapsulated Suharto's own worldviews. It served three primary functions: a non-ideological, pragmatic and programmatic regime vehicle; a patronage-dispensing apparatus and a platform that had access to the high levers of political power.⁷² Ever since the first elections were held in New Order Indonesia in 1971, Golkar became the undisputed electoral machine and hegemonic instrument of the regime.⁷³ Conditions then were skewed very much in Golkar's favour. Based on the assumption that Indonesian voters are seen as a *floating mass*, the population was largely depoliticized while only Golkar was allowed to establish branches within sub-districts and villages. *Necessity*, especially after the fall of Suharto, however, implied that the basis for Golkar to function as a hegemonic entity had lost its legitimacy, notably after the introduction of multiparty elections. Golkar necessitated a transition from its former hegemonic role to that of a political party. Such a move, however, did not completely dislodge Golkar from its axis of influence and party due to its prevalent institutional advantage and territorial reach although several aspects of the former hegemonic vehicle had been steadily diluted.

In conjunction to the structural changes within the military in the aftermath of May 1998, Golkar followed suit. The military and especially the army as well as the Indonesian civil servant corps (*Korps Pegawai Negeri Republik Indonesia*, KORPRI) had been the main pillars of Golkar's electoral hegemony during the New Order – their relationship had always been rather symbiotic. Initially Golkar still conveyed its influence amongst the “floating mass” (*massa mengambang*) due very much to its amorphous transformation.⁷⁴ Even after reforms were instituted during the transitional phase, Golkar was still seen as a viable platform that officers in the

72. See Elson *ibid.*, pp. 186-8.

73. Golkar had remained dominant throughout the electoral process in the New Order. From 1971-1997, its results had never dipped below 60 percent. (Parliamentary votes for Golkar then were 62.8% (1971), 62.1% (1977), 64.2% (1982), 73.2% (1987), 68.1% (1992) and 74.5% (1997). See Jürgen Rüländ, “Indonesia” in *Elections in Asia and the Pacific: A Data Handbook*, Volume II (D. Nohlen, F. Grotz and C. Hartman eds.)

74. The “floating mass” refers to a section of the Indonesian people who are not particularly involved in political activities. The New Order Regime restricted political activities only to regencies at the *kabupaten* level. Such a measure provided great opportunities for Golkar to influence the so-called “floating mass” notwithstanding the fact that many are also civil servants of the state. See Harold Crouch, “The New Order: The Prospect for Political Stability in Indonesia,” in J.J. Fox (ed.), *Indonesia: Australian Perspectives* (Canberra: Research School of Pacific Studies, 1980) pp. 659.

territorial structure could utilize for later appointments to civilian positions.⁷⁵ Nonetheless, by July 1998, Golkar declared itself independent and separate from the military when delegates at the extraordinary national party congress approved reformulation of Chapter III of the party constitution. This was followed by the replacement of a new reformist-sounding credo “Golkar is independent, open and oriented towards functional work and achievement” (DPP Partai Golkar) over the old New Order version of “Golongan Karya is an organization of socio-political power oriented towards functional work and achievement (*karya* and *kekaryaan*)” (DPP Golongan Karya) – essentially severing its former ties with the military.⁷⁶ With these new arrangements in place, decisional autonomy was transferred to the civilian politicians with the abolishment of the Supervisory Council – to be replaced by the new Advisory Council. The Advisory Council plays an overseeing role and has veto powers to annul decisions made by the national leadership meeting (*rapat pimpinan nasional* or *rapim*). These changes within Golkar were in tandem with reforms within the military. However, until 2004, the military and particularly certain military elites did not completely absolve themselves from their ties to the now Golkar Party.

The 1999 elections were to be a crucial test of the independence of Golkar. Golkar’s severance with the military, however, had not been clear-cut and its role as a neutral political party have received mixed reviews. General Wiranto was eyeing for the post of vice-presidency at that time and in order to placate the military, then-president and Golkar-nominee Habibie had hinted of his approval. According to Rinakit, just three days before the election, the military leadership gathered all local commanders in the army headquarters and exhorted them to “support the fortunes of Golkar” so as to improve Wiranto’s chances of becoming vice-president.⁷⁷ A rival of Wiranto, General Wirahadikusumah lamented that the military was still “far from neutral.” However, others have observed a noticeable distance between Golkar and the military.⁷⁸

75. See Harold Crouch, “Wiranto and Habibie: Military-Civilian Relations since May 1998” in *Reformasi: Crisis and Change in Indonesia*, Arief Budiman, Barbara Hatley and Damien Kingsbury eds. (Clayton: Monash Asia Institute 1999) pp. 143.

76. See Dirk Tomsa, *Party Politics and Democratization in Indonesia: Golkar in the post-Suharto era* (New York: Routledge Contemporary Southeast Asia Series: 2008), pp. 73-4.

77. See Rinakit *ibid*, pp. 162.

78. These include Mietzner who thought that the “TNI had remained neutral both in rhetoric and in practice”; Van Klinken who felt that the 1999 election was “the first

The reign of Gus Dur demonstrated more clearly the formal divide between the military and Golkar. It was seen evidently from the fall-out emanating from the MPR session when General Wiranto went to great lengths seeking to outdo then party chairman Akbar Tandjung in order to seal his vice-presidency under the Wahid administration. Towards the end of the Wahid presidency both Golkar and the military faction seemingly worked in concert to impeach Gus Dur, nonetheless neither really had the interest of the other in mind. This pattern would continue during the Megawati administration whereby both Golkar and the military would support the same policies. However, no evidence can be found that decision-making within Golkar was directly influenced by the military. It perhaps became even clearer during the 2004 elections that the once over-lapping patronage networks between the party and the military had linked both organizations had been essentially severed.⁷⁹

Under Suharto's reign, Golkar enjoyed the privileges derived from the authoritarian government in garnering votes without much effort based on its strong affiliation with the Indonesian military and the *pegawai negeri sipil* or civil servant corps. An impressive clientele network within Golkar attracted even more people to join its ranks. In addition, Suharto's role as Golkar's ultimate patron ensured its unity and strength. Suharto's role within Golkar was thus crucial as it placed him above all other patronage networks which had the added effect of preventing factionalism. However, Suharto was also no stranger to stirring up internal rivalries within so as to ensure that no new power centers would emerge to challenge his hegemony.⁸⁰

election since the formation of Golkar in which the military did not back that party"; and Aspinall who mentioned that in the elections in Aceh some Golkar members even actively castigated the military. See Marcus Mietzner in *Indonesian Civil-Military Relations: The Armed Forces and Political Islam in Transition 1997-2004*, unpublished PhD thesis (Australian National University 2004); Gerry Van Klinken, "Democracy, the Regions, and Indonesia's Future," in *Pemilu: The 1999 Indonesian Election, Annual Indonesia Lecture Series No. 22*, Clayton: Monash Asia Institute (Susan Blackburn eds.), pp. 23-8. Edward Aspinall, "The 1999 General Election in Aceh" in *Pemilu: The 1999 Indonesian Election, Annual Indonesia Lecture Series No. 22*, Clayton: Monash Asia Institute (Susan Blackburn eds.), pp. 29-42.

79. See Tomsa 2008 *ibid*, pp. 78-80.

80. See Dirk Tomsa, "Still the Natural Government Party? Challenges and Opportunities for Golkar Ahead of the 2014 Election," *South East Asia Research*, Vol 20, No. 4, (2012), pp. 500.

The fall of Suharto created an opportunity for smaller patrons in Golkar to emerge as new leaders. At least three main factions subsisted, divided based on ethnicity and region: the Sulawesi group (led by Jusuf Kalla), the Sumatra group (led by Akbar Tandjung) and the Javanese group (represented by Agung Laksono).⁸¹ These three rival groups sought to undermine each other when in competition for Golkar's top political positions⁸², such as the position of chairman and the presidential candidacy. The Sulawesi group had been reluctant to support Akbar's vice-presidential candidacy for the 2001 presidential election while the latter also tried to undermine Jusuf Kalla's vice presidential candidacy with Joko Widodo in the 2014 presidential elections by supporting the Prabowo Subianto – Hatta Rajasa camp.⁸³ The clientelistic approach between the various factions has since been a mainstay characteristic of the party's institutional dynamics post-Suharto. This situation put Golkar at risk to internal factionalism. Eventually some of the factions actually broke ranks with Golkar as a result of the internal dynamics within it. However, these breakaway splinters have taken a different trajectory by relying on the personal traits and characteristics of their founders rather than that of a well-institutionalized yet impersonal party.⁸⁴ The three most prominent Golkar's splinters are Prabowo Subianto's Gerindra party, Wiranto's Hanura party and Surya Paloh's Nasdem party.

Golkar had successfully transited from a former hegemonic position under Suharto to a functioning political party in a democracy, although it had retained several aspects of its former dominance including its comprehensive organizational apparatus, access to patronage and resources, a huge reservoir of professional cadres and high levels of name recognition.⁸⁵ In order to assert its new image, Golkar held a party convention in 2003 to choose its presidential candidate for the 2004 presidential elections. The Golkar party chairman at that time, Akbar Tandjung poignantly mentioned that

81. See Leo Suryadinata, "The Decline of the Hegemonic Party System in Indonesia: Golkar after the Fall of Soeharto," in *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, vol 29, No. 2, (2007) pp. 353.

82. See *ibid*, pp. 345.

83. See *ibid* and "Akbar Surati Kader Golkar Dukung Prabowo-Hatta [Akbar Persuading Golkar Cadres to Support Prabowo-Hatta]," in *Inilah.com*, 25 May 2014. <http://nasional.inilah.com/read/detail/2103875/akbar-surati-kader-golkar-dukung-prabowo-hatta#.VG82N4uUfTg><http://nasional.inilah.com/read/detail/2103875/akbar-surati-kader-golkar-dukung-prabowo-hatta#.VG82N4uUfTg> accessed on 21 November 2014.

84. See Chrisnandi and Priamarizki *ibid*, pp. 3.

85. See Tomsa 2008, pp. 181-3.

“the convention intent was to prove that the ‘Golkar *Baru* [New Golkar]’ jargon as a democratic entity can be trusted.”⁸⁶ Thus the previous stigma of being associated with the military and the New Order had been essentially removed. Golkar continued to shine politically nonetheless. In the 2004 legislative elections, it once again became the most dominant party by securing 21.62 percent of national votes (or 128 seats in the parliament).⁸⁷ Golkar’s dominance was to be seen in the subsequent elections by consistently finishing among the top three positions despite the party’s inherent factionalism.

3. *Decentralizing the Executive and Devolution to the Regions*

Centralization of powers formed the basic tent of Suharto iron-clad grip and its prior implementation was spurred on by a retinue of circumstances beginning in his second presidential term (1973-1983). Signs of emerging elite competition then among those close to Suharto proved to be a scourge. The Malari incident would provide the incentive for Suharto to further consolidate his regime such that the apex of the New Order would not be easily threatened by the grievances emerging from society-based participatory forces.⁸⁸ Following intentions of “socializing (*memasyarakatkan*) Pancasila and Pancasila-ise (*mempancasilakan*) society,” a bill on regional autonomy was passed in 1974 as a means to intensify centralized rule by providing a uniform vertical administration system across the archipelago.⁸⁹ Within the bill wide discretionary powers were given to the Minister for Home Affairs while Suharto had the personal right to directly appoint provincial governors.⁹⁰ This bill was to last for 25 years before it was upended.

While the Habibie government consisted of parliamentary features carried-over from the Suharto regime, this was to undergo a drastic change. Perhaps better known more for his initiation of the

86. See Chrisnandi and Priamarizki, *ibid.*, pp. 4.

87. See General Elections Committee (KPU).

88. The Malari incident (or *Peristiwa Malari*, short for *Malapetaka Lima Belas Januari*, “Fifteenth of January Disaster”) was a student demonstration that took place during a state visit by Japanese Prime Minister, Kakuei Tanaka, from 15 to 16 January 1974. The protest was reputedly against corruption, high prices, and inequality in foreign investments but due to intervention by agent provocateurs, demonstrations became riots, which eventually turned into a pogrom.

89. See Nazaruddin (ed.) in *Jejak langkah Pak Harto 27 Maret 1973-23 Maret 1978*, pp. 268, 311, 386 [22 July, 16 December 1975, 16 August 1976].

90. See Elson *ibid.*, pp. 209.

“big bang” approach to decentralization – particularly in its devolution to the regions – the structure of the Indonesian parliament would also undergo some inherent changes.⁹¹ In the last days of the Suharto regime, some attention was given to the idea of limited degree of decentralization, although no significant progress had been made to implement the idea.⁹² On the contrary, President Habibie gave much attention and overwhelming precedence to the idea of large-scale decentralization almost immediately after he was sworn in.

Given the tenuous political circumstances then in 1998/99, rapid-fire decentralization was one of the ways seen as having an ameliorating effect while achieving the additional purpose of undercutting potential separatist challenges. Two definitive laws were passed in 1999 that would change the regional landscape of Indonesia. They were the Law on Regional Government (No. 22/1999) and its accompanying Law on Fiscal Balance between the Central Government and the Regions (No. 25/1999) which permitted a large transfer of authority and resources directly to the district level, bypassing the provinces.⁹³ The new regional government laws set aside a limited number of fields for the central government including foreign affairs, defence and security; justice; monetary and fiscal affairs; religion; and the potentially omnibus “other matters.” These latter matters were clarified as “macro-level planning, fiscal equalization, public administration, economic institutions, human resource development, natural resources utilization, strategic technologies, conservation and national standardization.” In other words, the existing hierarchical structure of regional government under the then New Order government was abolished in order to be replaced by provincial and district governments having their own exclusive fields of activity.

91. The term “big bang” derives its origin from the World Bank. According to Anwar Shah, a World Bank economist, a “big bang” approach comprises of a “holistic (comprehensive)” approach that is “implemented at lightning speed”. See Anwar Shah and Theresa Thompson, “Implementing Decentralized Local Government: A Treacherous Road with Potholes, Detours and Road Closures” in *Reforming Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations and the Rebuilding of Indonesia*, edited by James Alm, Jorge Martinez-Vazquez, and Sri Mulyani Indrawati (Cheltenham UK/Northampton MA, USA: Edward Elgar, 2004), pp. 317.

92. See Harold Crouch *ibid.*, pp. 92.

93. See Crouch *ibid.*, pp. 92. For official English-language versions of the two laws, see [http://www.indonesia-ottawa.org/current_issues/autonomy/docs/](http://www.indonesia-ottawa.org/current_issues/autonomy/docs/http://www.indonesia-ottawa.org/current_issues/autonomy/docs/) as a prefix to Law22_99_n-eluc.pdf and to Law25_99_n-eluc.pdf.

Following the implementation of the new regional laws, governors no longer exercised authority over district heads. They would eventually be selected by their respective Regional People's Representatives Council or DPRD (*Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah*) in which the provincial DPRD was only allowed to "consult" the president about the candidates for governor as "government representative" before voting whereas bupati and mayors would simply be elected by the district DPRD that was only required to "inform" the governor of the election as a formality.⁹⁴ The fiscal laws gave regional governments greater autonomy in determining how funding could be used. It stated that 25 percent of central government revenue be allocated in block grants (*Dana Alokasi Umum*: DAU) which would be further broken down into 10 percent to the provinces and 90 percent to districts. In provisions that specifically targeted resource-rich regions, the law was also liberalized to allow local governments to retain much larger shares of revenues produced in their regions.⁹⁵ These decentralization approaches resulted in large transfers of funds and authority from the center to the regions. This is notwithstanding that the two separatist provinces, Aceh and Papua, which were eventually granted "Special Autonomy" status that allowed them to retain much higher proportions of oil and natural-gas revenues. The speed of the transitional process, however, led to much disruption and confusion.

In a parallel fashion, both legislative and executive functions of the government at the national level also underwent similar decentralization tendencies. During the Suharto period, the People's Consultative Assembly or MPR (*Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat*) consisted of 500 members of the House of Representatives or DPR (*Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat*) with the addition of 500 more appointed members, all approved by the president while nominally representing the regions and functional groups. The legislative body or DPR, functioned as a "rubber stamp" for the Suharto government and was even described perfectly by Iwan Fals, a famous Indonesian ballad singer, as a "choir singing in agreement (*paduan*

94. Nonetheless, this system would change again after direct local elections were instituted in 2005. It must be noted that it is also only recently (September 2014) that direct local elections were aborted in favor of the previous system once again.

95. The provinces are guaranteed of defined proportions of the revenues produced from their regions – in particular, 15 percent of petroleum receipts, 30 percent of gas-related receipts and 80 percent of forestry, mining and fisheries-derived income.

suara lagu setuju).⁹⁶ This sort of parliamentary formation is in conjunction with elections that were “effectively a legitimacy tool for the New Order regime.”⁹⁷ When seen together, the meticulously controlled and manipulated election process disconnected the link between the parliamentarian legislators and their constituency.⁹⁸ Due to the implicit threat then on legislators implementing constitutional amendments without the approval of the military or Suharto, legislation implementation was virtually nil from 1971-1997.⁹⁹ This was to change drastically.

During President Habibie’s brief term, initial reforms on the parliamentary system were instituted under the behest of Dr. Ryaas Rasyid, assisted by a seven-member team of American-trained political scientists.¹⁰⁰ Under the team, the electoral system shifted from one based on proportional representation (PR) to that of one based on a mixed system whereby 420 of the 550 seats in the DPR were single-member seats while PR would be retained for only 75 seats. This was built on the belief that single-member constituencies would make legislatures more responsive and accountable. Reforms back then were also geared towards the holding of elections in 1999. Mindful of the potential fallout from a fragmented body politic like those of the 1950s in Indonesia, the team made sure that political parties had functioning organizations that were “national” rather than based on a single ethnic group or regions with separatist incli-

96. In an added note, the work of legislators then was also usually described jokingly with the five “D verbs” (*datang, daftar, duduk, diam, duit*) or “show up, register, sit down, shut up and take the money”. For a comprehensive narration of the process without the parliament then see Patrick Ziegenhain, *The Indonesian Parliament and Democratization* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2008), pp. 45-59.

97. See Hermawan Sulisty, “Electoral Politics in Indonesia: A Hard Way to Democracy” in *Electoral Politics in Southeast & East Asia*, Aurel Croissant, Gabriele Burns and John Marei eds. (Singapore: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 2002), pp. 77.

98. See Adam Schwartz, *A Nation in Waiting: Indonesia in the 1990s* (St Leonards: Allen & Unwin, 1994), pp. 272.

99. Although at the start (1966-1971) and end (1997-1999) of the New Order 27 and 8 bills were proposed respectively. See Sisilia Srisuwastuti, “DPR dan Fungsi Legislatifnya” in *Indonesia dalam Krisis*, Salomo Simanungkalit eds. (Jakarta: Buku Kompas 2002), pp. 198-200.

100. Four of the seven members of the reform-minded team (also known as “Team of Seven”) had been closely affiliated with Professor Dwight King at the University of Northern Illinois. Ryaas Rayiid had obtained an MA from Northern Illinois and PhD from the University of Hawaii. Both Dr Andi Mallarangeng and Dr Ramlan Surbakti had doctorates from Northern Illinois while Dr Afan Gaffar had gotten his MA there. The team also collaborated with international experts on electoral systems such as Donald Horowitz, Andrew Ellis and Ben Reilly.

nations.¹⁰¹ A threshold requirement was introduced to dis-incentivize the participation of small parties within the electoral process. Appointed military seats were also reduced from 75 to 55. Most changes actually took place within the Upper House of the People's Consultative Assembly or MPR (*Majelis Permusyawarah Rakyat*). It began with some slight changes to the composition of the powerful MPR, once dominated by Suharto's cronies and the military. These include the replacement of less controversial figures of the New Order that had not been influenced by nepotistic practices under Suharto.¹⁰² This was followed by legal changes in specific MPR decisions to put to end the selection of MPR members by the president.¹⁰³ In conjunction to the new *reformasi* era, a democratic impetus had been imbued into the new MPR decisions including castigation against the dominance of the executive branch and the large gap between center and periphery.¹⁰⁴ These changes within the MPR also heralded changes within the *reformasi* structure whereby the parliament and political parties are the new key players in Indonesian politics.¹⁰⁵

Initial changes within the structure of the parliament changed the balance of power between the initial powerful executive (comprising of the MPR and cabinet positions) and the legislative (comprising of the DPR and DPRD), affected by the Law on Structure and Composition of the MPR, DPR and DPRD (Regional Parliaments, *Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah*). While the MPR held an overweening power over the appointment of the president among other things, its executive power and influence were curbed.¹⁰⁶ The reformist team reduced the number of regional and social group representatives from 500 to 200, bringing down the MPR numbers from 1000 to 700.¹⁰⁷ The DPR was also imbued with new powers comprising of the right to establish regulations with the president, enacting the National Budget with the president and conducting su-

101. See Crouch *ibid*, pp. 47-8.

102. See Ziegenhain *ibid*, pp. 80-2.

103. Article 1(1) of MPR Decision no. VII/MPR/1998 ruled that the regional representatives (*utusan daerah*) should be elected by the provincial parliaments and the social groups' representatives (*utusan golongan*) appointed by the Election Commission.

104. See Ziegenhain *ibid*, pp. 97-103.

105. See Greg Fealy, "Parties and Parliament: Serving Whose Interests?" in Grayson Lloyd and Shannon Smith, *Indonesia Today: Challenges of History* (Singapore: ISEAS, 2001), pp. 97

106. The MPR during the New Order also consisted of the entire DPR plus 500 regional and functional group representatives all appointed by Suharto.

107. See Article 2 (2) of Law no. 4/1999.

pervisory activities among others.¹⁰⁸ The idea was to use the DPR to act as a check and balance mechanism with respect to the MPR and other executive powers. In the process, the DPR had become much more powerful than before.¹⁰⁹ Hence, the devolution of powers during the early phase of *reformasi* took place at two levels: at the regional/district level and at the national level. Essentially, free elections for both the DPR and MPR were instituted.

4. *Necessary Changes and Beyond: A Reflection*

The reform changes that took place under the early *reformasi* governments essentially severed the more uncanny features of the Suharto regime, changing the face of Indonesian politics completely. The foremost to go were the dominating influence of the military in the socio-political arena (*dwifungsi*). This was followed simultaneously by the depowering of the regime's election machine Golkar and the devolution of centralized power in the national parliament and to the regions. In a matter of merely five years after the fall of Suharto, the impetuses gathered by the necessity of removing the vestiges of Suharto's regime fast-tracked Indonesian politics into an era now dominated by new players. These large changes have in turn impacted various sectors of Indonesia, including most notably within the political economy. Many scholars however lamented the fact that little had changed. These arguments centered on the rise of oligarchy in Indonesia – the primary player that filled the vacuum in the absence of centralized, authoritarian rule. Among others, the tentacles of impending oligarchy in the *reformasi* era had its incubation during Suharto's New Order.¹¹⁰ Oligarchies were seen to dominate the scene post-*reformasi*. Arguing that *concentrated material power* had been the order of the day in which Indonesian politics would now be shaped by, Winters argued that *pribumi* oligarchs, fostered under what is termed the second stage of oligarchic expansion under Suharto's New Order, now ran the show.¹¹¹ *Necessity* had by now lost its compulsion and what re-

108. According to Article 33 Paragraph 33 (3), the DPR now had to rights to: require information from the President, conduct investigations, amend draft laws, make statements and opinions, propose draft laws, determine the DPR's budget and propose candidates for a certain posts specified by regulations.

109. See Leo Suryadinata, *Elections and Politics in Indonesia* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2002), pp. 86.

110. See Richard Robison and Vedi Hadiz *ibid*, pp. 54-61.

111. See Jeffrey Winters, *Oligarchy* (Northwestern University: Cambridge 2011), pp. 163-6.

forms that eventually came about can be those that were increasingly seen expediently as machinations of a different nature.

Reforms still continued apace in what is known as the “politics-as-usual” phase of democratization in Indonesia. By 2004, reforms were no longer carried out in the background of a crisis and uncertain future for the *reformasi* state. Following drastic decentralization and democratization measures instituted by the early *reformasi* administrations especially by the Habibie government, the crisis was not over but was perceived as “chronic and not acute”.¹¹² As the impetus for reform dissipates, what is seen as reforms in the “democratic consolidation” phase post-*reformasi* can be summed up as that of a compromise amongst the self-interests of the multiparty legislatures. Most extensive reforms taken at this stage involve those of imminent concern to the governing institutions themselves such as the constitution, legislatures, elections and regional government. Fragmentation of various power interests including the installation of the multiparty coalitions has been the main determining factor influencing the process and outcomes of these “politics-as-usual” reforms.

IV. NON NECESSITY-BASED REFORMS

A. After Necessity: A Political Tug of War

The point of transition from a “crisis-ridden” situation towards a “politics-as-usual” watershed point may be difficult to determine, but it is generally assumed to be the 2004 direct presidential election that brought the Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) administration to power.¹¹³ However, the period highlighting such a transition is much earlier than that. Many scholars contended that the convincing victory of SBY’s campaign marked the point which Indonesia launched into what is known as a “democratic consolidation” phase. The defining feature of that period – direct presidential elections – was perhaps a natural conclusion of the intense democratization process that was driving reforms within the parliament in Indonesia. Its advent was partly the result of backroom bargaining by the various members of the present dominant multiparty legisla-

112. See the report of the International Crisis Group (2000) entitled “Indonesia’s Crisis: Chronic but not Acute”. See also Crouch *ibid*, 337-9.

113. In particular Edward Aspinall writes that “the elections of 2004 brought to an end the ‘transitional period’ in Indonesia’s politics that began in 1998”. See Edward Aspinall, “Elections and the normalization of politics in Indonesia” in *South East Asia Research* 12, no. 2 (July 2005).

ture. However, we should not also discount that the character of reforms had also led to other innovations that were unique to Indonesia's decentralized system such as the direct local elections at the regional level. All these changes served to aptly classify the election year of 2004 in Indonesia as the longest and most complicated election in the history of democracy.

1. *The Evolution of Legislative Elections*

With the 1999 elections as the background, a process of trial-and-error had begun in which democratization priorities had to be balanced with the growing clout of political parties and increasing bargaining power. As Habibie was eager to immediately hold elections after his inauguration as failure to do so would have had a disastrous impact on his and Golkar's legitimacy, Golkar was forced to make substantive acquiesce to the demands of minority parties. There was a real fear that a relapse to majority rule by the hegemon Golkar, still vilified right after the New Order, would force smaller parties to walk out and thus delegitimize the results.¹¹⁴ As a result Golkar relented on three "crucial issues" – changing to a single-member district in accordance to the PR system, banning civil servants from party membership within Golkar, and dropping military representation in parliament – although they remained unresolved until the last week of the deadline.¹¹⁵ Eventually the new electoral laws allowed any party that could meet the broad criteria to compete, leading to 48 out of 200 parties formed since May 1998 qualifying. This was in conjunction to the given necessity during a crisis situation the holding of elections was crucial for the administration's legitimacy. The result is summarized in the table below:

114. Dwight King mentions that "Majority rule was trumped by small-party threats to walk out, which would delegitimize the results." See Dwight King *ibid*, pp. 68.

115. See Dwight King *ibid* Chapter 3. For the first crucial issue, a final compromise resulted in an extraordinarily complex system under which the distribution of seats within province-wide constituencies would be based on PR but individuals would be elected to represent particular districts within the province. For the last "crucial issue," although some parties were vehemently opposed to military representation within the parliament, some parties do not have such an extreme disagreement. Eventually a compromise was reached. The four key reform leaders, Megawati Sukarnoputri of the Indonesian Democracy Party of Struggle (*Partai Demokrasi Indonesia – Perjuangan*: PDI-P), Abdurrahman Wahid of the National Awakening Party (*Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa*: PKB), Amien Rais of the National Mandate Party (*Partai Amanat Nasional*: PAN) and the Golkar-affiliated Sultan of Yogyakarta issued what is known as the Ciganjur Statement that called for the gradual withdrawal of the military from active politics over a period of six years.

Table 1: 1999 Indonesian People's Representatives Council (DPR) Elections Result¹¹⁶

Political Parties	Seats in the Parliament without <i>Stembus Accord</i>	Seats in the Parliament with <i>Stembus Accord</i>
Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (<i>Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan</i> , PDIP)	153	154
Functional Groups Party (<i>Golongan Karya</i> , Golkar)	120	120
United Development Party (<i>Partai Persatuan Pembangunan</i> , PPP)	58	59
National Awakening Party (<i>Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa</i> , PKB)	51	51
National Mandate Party (<i>Partai Amanat Nasional</i> , PAN)	34	35
Crescent Star Party (<i>Partai Bulan Bintang</i> , PBB)	13	13
Justice Party (<i>Partai Keadilan</i> , PK)	7	6
Justice and Unity Party (<i>Partai Keadilan dan Persatuan</i> , PKP)	4	6
Nahdlatul Ulama Party (<i>Partai Nahdlatul Ulama</i> , PNU)	5	3
Love Nation Democratic Party (<i>Partai Demokrasi Kasih Bangsa</i> , PDKB)	5	3
Indonesian Unity in Diversity Party (<i>Partai Bhineka Tunggal Ika</i> , PBI)	1	3
Indonesian Democratic Party (<i>Partai Demokrasi Indonesia</i> , PDI)	2	2
United Party (<i>Partai Persatuan</i> , PP)	1	1
People's Sovereignty Party (<i>Partai Daulat Rakyat</i> , PDR)	1	1

116. See <http://www.kpu.go.id/index.php/pages/detail/2008/11/Pemilu-1999><http://www.kpu.go.id/index.php/pages/detail/2008/11/Pemilu-1999>, accessed on 20 October 2014. *Stembus Accord* refers to a system which allows fusion between political parties that fail to pass the parliamentary threshold.

Indonesian Islamic Union Party (<i>Partai Syarikat Islam Indonesia</i> , PSII)	1	1
Indonesian Nationalist Party – Marhaenist Front (<i>Partai</i> <i>Nasionalis Indonesia – Front</i> <i>Marhaenis</i>)	1	1
Indonesian Nationalist Party – Marhaen Masses (<i>Partai</i> <i>Nasionalis Indonesia – Massa</i> <i>Marhaen</i> , PNI-Massa Marhaen)	1	1
Indonesian Independence’s Supporters Union (<i>Ikatan</i> <i>Pendukung Kemerdekaan</i> <i>Indonesia</i> , IPKI)	1	1
Community Awakening Party (<i>Partai Kebangkitan Umat</i> , PKU)	1	1
Indonesian Masyumi Islamic Political Party (<i>Partai Politik</i> <i>Islam Indonesia Masyumi</i> , Masyumi)	1	-
Democratic Catholic Party (<i>Partai Katolik Demokrat</i> , PKD)	1	-
Total	462	462

From the point of view of elections, it was largely violence-free and held in a euphoric atmosphere.¹¹⁷ Nonetheless, the election results were beset by many teething problems. Despite the over-representation from the avalanche of political parties within parliament, it did not result in legislators being more responsive to their constituents’ aspirations. It also marked the ascendancy of horse trading (*dagang sapi*) and power sharing among the elites. In particular, Gus Dur’s first cabinet – a rainbow coalition (*kabinet pelanggi*) - reflected the power sharing among the elites as it had representatives from the five major parties (PDIP, Golkar, PKB, PPP and PAN) and the armed forces. In order to preserve his power in the government, it also compelled Gus Dur to compromise with the other political elites. The same pattern was to be imitated by the Megawati administration.

During 2002 and 2003, reforms were slowly undertaken to provide amendments to the 1999 electoral laws. By then, Indonesia had

117. The term *pesta demokrasi* (festival of democracy) was widely used to denote the electoral process, its first since 1955.

steadily transited closer into a “politics-as-usual” circumstance in which necessity had not been the expedient order of the day. The few areas of contention for the 1999 electoral laws have been reducing the size of large constituencies, enhancing fairness in the conduct of elections and promoting democratic practices within parties. However, the processes of enhancing the 1999 electoral laws had now gone through a different phase and would require the compromised acquiescence of the various major political parties. While the main parties in the DPR (now consisting of the PDI-P, Golkar and PPP) would not accept a proposed adoption of the district system, an “open list” version of the PR to replace the “closed list” gained traction. The former “closed list system” works on the premise that voters would simply select the party of their choice while seats would be distributed between parties in proportion to the votes obtained. Correspondingly, the seats are then allocated to candidates according to their order on party lists. Such a system received criticism for being open to manipulation by party machines which would put candidates that are high on their list regardless of whether or not they enjoyed local support. This meant that eventual legislators tended to be clients of the party “bosses” in both Jakarta and provincial capitals. It was also a known fact that many had “purchased” their positions.

On the other hand, the “open list” system altogether opened up another vista. The new system ensured that voters first select their party and then choose their own preferred candidates from those on the party’s list. It serves to loosen the grip of unresponsive party “bosses” while forcing candidates to appeal for the support of local voters instead of crouching behind party labels. This would also aggravate party factionalism as candidates from the same party would be competing against one another. The open list system naturally did not find favor with the party “bosses.” This inclination is also evident with bigger parties like the PDI-P and Golkar who preferred to retain the closed list while smaller parties were largely in favor of the open list system. The haggling, however, did not stop here. After making some electoral calculations, Golkar abruptly switched its position in favor of the open-list system but with the caveat that the constituencies should be based on the 400 or so administrative districts. By then there were already 550 seats in the DPR while around three-quarters would have consisted of populations too small for more than one representative and would thus in effect be single-member constituencies. Such an arrangement largely benefits Golkar as it has strong support outside of Java in

which district populations are quite small which leaves Golkar to dominate while other parties such as PDI-P and PKB with stronger bases in the larger multi-member constituencies in Java will stand to lose out. In the end a compromise was reached. Although seen as “open list,” it did not deviate from the original closed list system. Voters first select their party and also have - the option to choose a single candidate from the party’s list, instead of all seats. The order of the remaining candidates would be determined by the party’s list. Evidently, a large proportion of the voters chose only the party and did not bother with the individual candidates.

Another dimension which changed the political landscape was the increase in the number of constituencies and subsequently the number of seats in each of the provinces, especially the bigger ones.¹¹⁸ Such a move significantly reduced the anonymity of candidates in the big provinces, which aimed at making politicians more accountable to voters. North Sumatra became 3 constituencies while West, Central and East Java in total had 10 constituencies. With the rambunctious 1999 elections acting as a guiding post, the electoral laws also sought to reduce party fragmentation in the legislatures. Hence political parties needed to establish organizations in two-thirds of the provinces and two-thirds of the regencies (*kabupaten*) in these provinces, instead of just one third. In 2004, the threshold requirements of parties were raised to 2 percent as the first basis for elimination. The number of parties that qualified was halved to 24 after meeting all the eligibility criteria. With bargaining monopoly in the hands of the bigger political parties, the possibility of non-party candidates was eliminated and the entry of new players was restricted.¹¹⁹ It was not a surprise that 2004 was dubbed the most complicated election in the history of democracy. Results of the 2004 legislative elections are summarized below:

118. The number of constituencies numbered 69 under the new electoral law, containing between 3 and 12 seats that varies according to the population. Each member of the DPR would represent populations that range between 325,000 and 425,000. The largest 12-seat constituency represented more than five million people while the smallest three-seat constituency can have less than 1 million people.

119. For an in-depth analysis of the political situation during the 2004 elections see Stephen Sherlock, “The 2004 Indonesian Elections: How the System Works and What the Parties Stand For” in *Centre for Democratic Institutions*, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University (February 2004). Accessed 12/11/2014: http://www.cdi.anu.edu.au/_research/2004-05/D_P/Sherlock_Indonesian_Election04.pdfhttp://www.cdi.anu.edu.au/_research/2004-05/D_P/Sherlock_Indonesian_Election04.pdf.

Table 2: 2004-2009 Parliament Seats¹²⁰

No	Political Parties	Parliament Seats
1	Indonesia National Party – Marhaenism (<i>Partai Nasional Indonesia Marhaenisme</i>)	1
2	Crescent and Star Party (<i>Partai Bulan Bintang</i>)	11
3	United Development Party (<i>Partai Persatuan Pembangunan</i>)	58
4	Nationhood Democracy United Party (<i>Partai Persatuan Demokrasi Kebangsaan</i>)	4
5	Democrat Party (<i>Partai Demokrat</i>)	55
6	Indonesian Justice and United Party (<i>Partai Keadilan dan Persatuan Indonesia</i>)	1
7	Indonesian Democracy Enforcer Party (<i>Partai Penegak Demokrasi Indonesia</i>)	1
8	National Mandate Party (<i>Partai Amanat Nasional</i>)	53
9	Work Care Nation Party (<i>Partai Karya Peduli Bangsa</i>)	2
10	National Awakening Party (<i>Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa</i>)	52
11	Prosperous Justice Party (<i>Partai Keadilan Sejahtera</i>)	45
12	Reform Star Party (<i>Partai Bintang Reformasi</i>)	14
13	Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (<i>Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan</i>)	109
14	Prosperous Peace Party (<i>Partai Damai Sejahtera</i>)	13
15	Golkar Party	128
16	Pioneer Party	3
	Total Seats	550

Despite the distinctly labyrinth electoral process in 2004, it seems that the legislative elections yielded a much more slender parliament, although still dominated by the behemoths PDI-P and Golkar. The number of parties that won seats in the DPR declined from 21 to 16. Both dominant parties have come out of the electoral reform process relatively unscathed although both have suffered losses to a certain extent when compared with 1999. The PDI-P's share of votes dropped from 33.8 percent in 1999 to 18.5 percent (or 109 seats) while Golkar dipped slightly from 22.5 percent to 21.6 percent (or 128 seats). Nonetheless, in the process of political bartering some new parties benefitted. Among them were the Democrat Party (*Partai Demokrat*: PD), a political vehicle for retired

120. KPU *ibid*. Note that the total number of seats in the DPR had increased to 550 from 462.

General Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, and the Prosperous Justice Party (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera: PKS). Both the Democrat Party and PKS won 7.5 percent (or 55 seats) and 7.3 percent (or 45 seats) respectively. The Democrat Party deserves some special mention as it was the first of the ‘presidentialized parties’ to emerge. It was established in 2001 due to the desirability of having a political party vehicle in order to run for election. It is perhaps completely dependent on Yudhoyono as its chief patron. Presidential candidates form new parties precisely because the system then gives advantages to candidates who have the backing of parliamentary blocks. On the other hand, the PKS is an efficiently organized Islamist cadre party. Its cadres are mostly that of young, well-educated men. PKS is unique in that it combines Western management techniques with Islamist ideals.

By another measure the parliament turned out to be even more fragmented than 1999. In contrast to 1999, seven parties won more than 6 percent as compared to five. In total, the two leading parties (PDI-P and Golkar) occupied 40 percent compared to 55 percent in the previous DPR. This was the start to a more formal state of affairs of power-sharing in parliament that had its prototype under the “rainbow cabinet” of Gus Dur and Megawati. It would also pose newer problems such as the accountability dilemma of new presidents coming to power and the cartelization of parties given the new political configurations.¹²¹

Such a pattern of insipid competition within electoral reforms trailed the 2009 legislative elections as well. While the basic shape of the Indonesian democratic system had been established, details of how the system should evolve into were still being hashed out. Electoral law changes to the 2009 legislative elections sought to tease out some of these conflicting issues.¹²² With the 2004 election still heavily weighted in favor of party representation and control of candidates, there were attempts at converting the current system of a “semi-open” list to a “fully-open” one. The new law in 2008 provided for two important changes to the 2009 legislative elections towards a full “open-list” system. Firstly, voters could vote for either an individual candidate or a party – a vote would be valid even

121. For more information on the accountability dilemma that subsequent presidents will face, see Dan Slater “Indonesia’s Accountability Trap: Party Cartels and Presidential Power after Democratic Transition” in *Indonesia*, October 2004:78.

122. For a comprehensive summary of the new electoral laws for the 2009 legislative elections, see Stephen Sherlock “Indonesia’s 2009 Elections: The New Electoral System and the Competing Parties” in *Centre for Democratic Institutions* 2009/01.

if the voter did not mark the name of the party. Secondly, seats would be allocated to individual candidates in order of their personal votes, provided they received more than 30 percent of the quota for their district. These two measures allow voters to select an individual candidate and increase the possibility of a candidate with a high personal vote to take up a seat. If a party won a seat, the seat should be given to the candidate on that party's list with the highest number of votes. Such a change had a huge impact on the electoral process, changing the manner in which campaigns were run. Those who thought that their election was secured because of their respective placing on the party list now realized they had to campaign personally to establish their own individual profile with the electorate. The law essentially swung the balance in favour of the individual rather than that of party-based campaigning. This had the effect of weakening the central hold of party leaders while increasing competition between candidates within the same party.

In addition, there have been attempts yet again to reduce the number of parties through legislation. Law 10/2008 requires that any party that received more than 2.5 percent of valid votes would be assigned seats in the DPR. In addition to the 2.5 percent threshold, an effective threshold was also introduced to reduce the size of the electoral districts. For 2004, the number of seats per districts ranged from 3 to 12. In Law 10/2008, however, the range of district size was reduced from 3 to 10 seats. The effective threshold of the largest districts was increased by 10 percent, thereby placing substantive obstacles for new entrants and smaller political outfits from entering the fray. With these new electoral parameters in place some parties were barred from entering but this did not prevent 34 political parties from competing in the election.

A more visibly progressive aspect of the electoral reforms before the dawn of the 2009 elections were the steps taken towards affirmative action for women candidates. Since 1998, women's organizations have called for the introduction of mechanisms within the electoral process to facilitate the entry of women into politics as an essential means for democratization and reform. Although female candidates won just 8 percent of the DPR seats in the 1999 elections (a figure that is barely higher than that of the seven percent representation of female candidates in the previous democratic election of 1955), some strides have been made during the immediate post-Suharto era to boost that figure. Following the passing of the 2004 electoral law, modest progress was made which stated that parties should "give consideration" to making 30 percent of their candi-

dates women. This clause was further strengthened with the introduction of the passage of Law 10/2008 that stipulated that 30 percent of all DPR should be female or one in every three candidates on the party list should be female.¹²³ The new clause would give women more chances to be elected as they would be better placed on the party's list and benefit from the rule that gave weighting to candidates high on the list. However, it was not as straightforward as it seemed given the new ruling that favored candidates who had cultivated their own personal profile among the electorate rather than based on the party list. Ultimately, the progress made for affirmative action was deemed not adequate enough. On one hand, the strengthening of the provision for the 30 percent quota under Law 10/2008 ensured that all eligible parties met the requirement. However, the absence of sanctions to enforce the ruling meant it was flouted by many parties. Results of the 2009 legislative elections are summarized below:

Table 3: 2009-2014 Parliament Seats¹²⁴

No	Political Parties	Parliament Seats
1	People's Conscience Party (<i>Partai Hati Nurani Rakyat</i>)	17
2	Great Indonesia Movement Party (<i>Partai Gerakan Indonesia Raya</i>)	26
3	Prosperous and Justice Party (<i>Partai Keadilan Sejahtera</i>)	57
4	National Mandate Party (<i>Partai Amanat Nasional</i>)	46
5	National Awakening Party (<i>Partai Kebangkitan Nasional</i>)	28
6	Golkar Party	106
7	United Development Party (<i>Partai Persatuan Pembangunan</i>)	38
8	Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (<i>Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan</i>)	94
9	Democrat Party (<i>Partai Demokrat</i>)	148
Total Seats		560

As seen in the table, the Democrat Party has made tremendous strides towards clinching a majority at close to 20.9 percent (or 148 seats) of the votes. This was a three-fold increase and it represented

123. This is also known as a "zipper" provision in international discourse on women in parliaments, indicating that male and female candidates should alternate in the party list like the teeth of a zipper alternate.

124. KPU *ibid*. Note that the number of seats in the DPR had increased to 560 from 550.

how elite competition allowed some parties to capitalize on the vacillating electoral parameters. The other two dominant parties, PDI-P and Golkar, suffered a further drop to their voting base at 14 percent (or 94 seats) and 14.5 percent (or 106 seats) respectively. The rise of newer ‘presidentialized parties’ further split the cake. The ability of the Great Indonesia Movement Party (Gerindra) and the People’s Conscience Party (Hanura) to divert votes from Golkar’s traditional supporters is an important factor in this election.¹²⁵ A notable point is that by the third consecutive legislative election of the reform era, the parties that had been in power within the DPR narrowed. Although 34 political parties competed for the elections in 2009, eventually only nine parties won seats within the national parliament. Legislative elections had come a long way since electoral reforms were instituted in 1998. Reforms had indeed altered the face of elections with political parties as its primary driver of democratization.

With necessity-based reforms taking a backseat as democracy in Indonesia consolidates, the contestation of power between winners of the reform process becomes more conspicuous. This was seen in the political tug-of-war process and elite competition especially between the dominant PDI-P and Golkar during the implementation of the new electoral laws. At this stage of electoral reforms, however, many pro-democracy advocates in the NGO community and amongst academic and media commentators have taken the position that political parties are instruments of oligarchic forces whose only interests are power and materialistic gain. Rather than to promote democratization, parties have evolved to be an obstacle to democracy. This is perhaps evident from the higher barriers of entry in the forms of the negotiated thresholds and “open/close list” system that excludes other competition. Yet there are noteworthy developments that ensured a greater democratization of electoral politics despite the weakness of the political parties. These include the fact that no sole party has assumed a hegemonic position in the new party system with parties forced to respond to voters’ resentment. The influence of the military had also waned. Another subtle indication is the *dealiranisasi* process, understood as

125. For a greater in-depth study of the ‘splinters’ of Golkar, that is both Gerindra and Hanura and later the National Democrat Party (NasDem) see Yuddy Chrisnandi and Adhi Priamarizki “Explaining the Trajectory of Golkar’s Splinters in Post-Suharto Indonesia” in *RSIS Working Papers* WP277, 17 July 2014.

being a shift and weakening of the Geertzian *aliran*.¹²⁶ This process demonstrated that “the selection of candidates by political parties, the decisions of voters and the partisan coalition building” in a lot of cases were not the direct result of long-term loyalties derived from specific milieus but of more pragmatic decisions made by the electorate. The formula for coalitions is increasingly being based on the sake of winning rather than tradition.¹²⁷

The necessity involving the implementation of parliamentary thresholds appeared initially to tackle the issue of an obstreperous and fragmented parliament. In the first two elections after *reformasi*, parliamentary seats won by various political parties resulted in fragmentation within the parliament. Thus, as rationalized, the bars had to be raised in order to curtail the fragmentation process. Nonetheless, it must be said that having a smaller number of factions does not ensure that legislation is carried out effectively and efficiently as seen in results from the National Legislation Project (Prolegnas, *Proyek Legislasi Nasional*) of 1999-2009. During the 1999 – 2004 period, the parliament only managed to create 175 laws from 300 Prolegnas bills (or 58 percent of the intended target). A better performance is seen in the 2004 – 2009 period as it managed to ratify 193 laws from 284 Prolegnas bills (or 68 percent of the intended target). Despite the smaller number of factions, the 2009 – 2014 parliament had the lowest performance of all. It merely cleared 126 laws from 247 Prolegnas bills (or 51 percent of the in-

126. *Aliran* refers to Clifford Geertz's delineations of the Javanese landscape into streams of consciousness/systems comprising the *abangan*, *santri* (traditionalists and modernists) and *priyayi* classes. The Geertzian paradigm places much emphasis on a cultural interpretation of social identity and structure that did not always conform to actual representations on the ground. Nevertheless, there was an attempt to translate this abstract conception into a more corporeal dimension along political lines. In a generalized manner, correspondence to the respective political parties are as follows: the *priyayi* with the PNI (Partai Nasional Indonesia), the *abangan* with the PKI (Partai Komunis Indonesia) and the *santri* with Masyumi Party (Partai Majelis Syuro Muslimin Indonesia, the modernist variant of Islam) and NU (Nahdatul Ulama, the traditionalist variant of Islam). In recent years, however, some political scientists have experienced a shift away from the traditional *aliran* groupings. For a more comprehensive understanding of such the shift, see Andreas Ufen, “From Aliran to Dealignment: Political Parties in Post-Suharto Indonesia”, *South East Asia Research*, vol. 16, no. 1, March 2008, pp. 5-41.

127. See Andreas Ufen, “Political Parties and Democratization in Indonesia” in *Democratization in Post-Suharto Indonesia* (Marco Bunte and Andreas Ufen eds.), pp. 160-9.

tended target).¹²⁸ Despite these poor legislative results, a smaller number of parliament factions would have had the effect of reducing essential cost and time required for the purposes of lobbying.

2. *The Introduction of Direct Presidential Elections*

The original 1945 Constitution (UUD 45) authorized the People's Consultative Assembly (*Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat*: MPR), the regional representatives and social groups to elect the president and vice president. Although the constitution was not necessarily authoritarian, it did not prevent the emergence of strands of authoritarianism as seen during the Sukarno presidency and subsequently the Suharto administration.¹²⁹ The country's "presidential" system was quite unique then as the president could not be deposed by a parliamentary vote of no confidence. Moreover, it was also the parliament that was delegated the task of electing both the president and vice president. The New Order's restrictions and tight control on political parties further contributed to the consolidation of centralized authoritarianism during Suharto's long administration (a total of 6 terms). With the fall of the New Order however, it became necessary to make certain amendments to the 1945 Constitution so as to expedite reforms that will minimize the emergence of an authoritarian streak.

The amendment process faced great resistance initially from status quo powers in the parliament, particularly amongst the military representatives and extreme nationalist politicians in which many identified themselves emotionally and wanted to preserve the original 1945 Constitution –seen as sacred and indisputable in some instances. On the other extreme, some nationalists and moderate Muslims concerned with the amendment process felt that by re-opening such debates may open the Pandora's Box for the re-emergence of divisive issues that had been thus far settled in the past, most notably the issue of establishing a state based on Islam in the Jakarta Charter.¹³⁰ Cornered by daily demonstrations, riots and

128. See "Bayu Dwi Anggono: Terjadi Pergeseran Pemahaman dalam Pembentukan Undang-Undang [Bayu Dwi Anggono: There is Changing on Understanding and Creating Laws]," in *HukumOnline.com*, 13 October 2014. [http://www.hukumonline.com/berita/baca/lt543b500c568f7/bayu-dwi-anggono—brterjadi-pergeseran-pemahaman-dalam-pembentukan-undang-undang](http://www.hukumonline.com/berita/baca/lt543b500c568f7/bayu-dwi-anggono—brterjadi-pergeseran-pemahaman-dalam-pembentukan-undang-undanghttp://www.hukumonline.com/berita/baca/lt543b500c568f7/bayu-dwi-anggono—brterjadi-pergeseran-pemahaman-dalam-pembentukan-undang-undang) accessed on 21 November 2014.

129. Harold Crouch, 2010, p. 44

130. *Ibid* p. 46-47

limited control over the military, however, compelled an exasperated Habibie to resort to launching the initial steps towards making some form of amendments to the 1945 Constitution in order. Habibie subsequently lifted restrictions on the formation of political parties and promised to hold an early general election on the basis of a new electoral legislation. A Special Session of the MPR was convened for the purposes of adopting a decree to advance the date of the next election that expedited the date from 2002 to “at the latest June 1999.”¹³¹ By then the parties in the MPR already had the broad accepted notion of the need to “correct” the “distortions” of the New Order period through limiting the powers of the president and strengthening the DPR. Although some reforms were undertaken during the four MPR sessions between 1999 and 2002, it was clear that the MPR still carried the monopoly of power and influence over the president. The MPR then adopted a series of constitutional amendments that further emphasized its authority, including the limitation of the president and vice president to two five-year terms. Other amendments changed the language of particular articles to stress the authority of the DPR.

Direct presidential elections only gained a more substantial currency following the dismissal of Abdurrahman Wahid. Although this was partly the result of Abdurrahman’s alienation of both his political enemies and friends since early in his term, it nevertheless was also the culmination of early reforms efforts that sought to empower the DPR, inevitably changing the character of the constitution from its original presidentialism toward parliamentarism. The ouster of Abdurrahman Wahid clearly demonstrated the vulnerability of the president, who had lost the support of the DPR, facing what was in effect the equivalent of a parliamentary style of no-confidence. To counter such a scenario, the MPR then adopted constitutional amendments that sought to redress the power imbalance by reaffirming the presidential character of the system in its sessions in 2001 and 2002. The largest party then, the PDI-P, whose chairperson Megawati Sukarnoputri was now the president, was also particularly interested in the formulation of clear rules that would safeguard her from a similar experience like Abdurrahman’s.

Direct presidential elections became a very distinct possibility as the old dismissal procedure with its lack of precision was deemed a violation of the national will. In the midst of strengthening specific clauses that would prevent a repeat of the rather arbitrary dis-

131. See MPR Decree No. XIV/1998.

missal process by the DPR, a more fundamental change was seen as the more crucial safeguard against a parliament slipping into parliamentarism – direct presidential elections. It was argued that a president directly elected by a majority of voters would acquire the need legitimacy that was distinctly different from that of a president that was elected by means of horse-trading between fragmented parties in the coalition. Abdurrahman's ouster made a clear point that an indirectly elected president had no insurance against challenge from a hostile legislature. Again, political calculations were well-placed and in accord with the arrangement of direct presidential elections. Golkar, as the party with strong representation in the regional government, could see gains in a direct election. To further consolidate its case with a win in the first round of elections in 2004, Golkar proposed that the leading candidate would need to obtain two-thirds majority in the provinces in conjunction to an absolute majority. The PDI-P, however, was initially hesitant to support direct elections due to the lack of confidence of Megawati's prospects under such circumstances.¹³² Eventually Megawati was persuaded by the implementation, opting for a second-round direct vote. With her endorsement, the presidential nature of the constitution was strengthened and consolidated. Mandate would now be directly received from the people and the presidential position would be much less vulnerable to the sort of pressures that had resulted in the dismissal of President Abdurrahman Wahid.

The restoration of a purer form of presidentialism relegated the role of the MPR to that of a symbolic body. Once perceived as an effective source of authority on behalf of "the people" with overweening powers to elect and dismiss the president, such duties were curbed substantially and delegated to the president and DPR. The MPR's very much reduced role now consisted of: amending the constitution, formally installing the president and vice president, and dismissing the president and/or vice president in accordance to the constitution. Two major institutions were also established in the process: the Regional Representative Assembly (*Dewan Perwakilan Daerah*: DPD) and the Constitutional Court. The DPD role was mainly in considering and monitoring regional matters. The Constitutional Court's main function was to assess whether the laws passed were in accordance with the constitution. This was to be the

132. There was a fear that Megawati would not be able to debate effectively with other candidates given her reluctance to be questioned in public about policy issues.

foundation onto which Indonesia's first direct presidential elections were to be founded upon.

a. The 2004 Direct Presidential Elections

Following the constitutional amendments, a new Law on the Election of the President and Vice President was required as it did not previously regulate direct presidential elections. During discussions of this law, the two largest parties at that time, Golkar and PDI-P, had a common interest in restricting the number of competitors. They proposed that only parties with at least 20 percent of votes gained during the general election for the DPR be able to nominate presidential candidates. The rationale was that too many parties might nominate candidates and confuse voters. This also theoretically implied that there could be no more than 5 pairs of presidential candidates, even though on the basis of the 1999 election results, the likelihood was that only two – Golkar and PDI-P – would predominate. Naturally such a proposition received strong opposition from smaller parties as the conditions were not deemed advantageous to them. Eventually, the threshold for parties to nominate candidates in the 2004 presidential elections was revised to 3 percent of parliament seats (16 seats) or 5 percent of the total votes.¹³³ This would be raised to 15 percent of seats and 20 percent of votes in the later elections.

The new electoral clauses allowed more candidates from various parties to be represented. This led to the first direct presidential election requiring two rounds of contests given the fragmented vote. As no single party won even a quarter of the votes in the legislative elections, it came down to presidential candidates seeking vice-presidential partners from different political persuasions. In 2004, the first round of the direct presidential elections eventually had five candidate nominations from the political parties. The National Mandate Party (*Partai Amanat Nasional*: PAN) nominated Amien Rais and Siswono Yudo Husodo, the United Development Party (*Partai Persatuan Pembangunan*: PPP) proposed Hamzah Haz and Agum Gumelar, and Golkar endorsed Wiranto and Salahuddin Wahid. Meanwhile, Megawati and Hasyim Muzadi were supported by the PDI-P. Besides the five candidates in the first round, Gus Dur - Marwah Daud Ibrahim, which was supported by PKB, also registered their candidacy. However, the pair failed to pass the health test required by the Election Commission. As its

133. Harold Crouch, 2010, p. 66

conclusion, retired General Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and incumbent President Megawati emerged as the two candidates with top votes at 33.6 percent and 26.3 percent respectively, qualifying for the second round. Results of the first round of direct presidential elections are summarized below:

Table 4: First Round of the 2004 Direct Presidential Elections¹³⁴

No	Candidates	Votes	Votes Percentage
1	Wiranto - Salahuddin Wahid	23,827,512	22.19%
2	Megawati Soekarnoputri - Hasyim Muzadi	28,186,780	26.24%
3	Amien Rais - Siswono Yudo Husodo	16,042,105	14.94%
4	Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono - Jusuf Kalla	36,070,622	33.58%
5	Hamzah Haz - Agum Gumelar	3,276,001	13.05%

For the second round of direct elections, the Yudhoyono – Jusuf Kalla pair edged out with a decisive 60.6 percent of the votes compared with Megawati – Hasyim Muzadi pair of 39.4 percent. In addition, Yudhoyono was also the leading candidate in 28 out of 32 provinces. The first direct presidential elections thus achieved what it sought to claim, that is handing over the mandate of people to a clear-cut majority winner. Yudhoyono’s administration thus acquired a high legitimacy. Results of the second round of direct presidential elections are summarized in the table below:

Table 5: Second Round of the 2004 Direct Presidential Elections¹³⁵

No	Candidates	Votes	Votes Percentage
1	Megawati Soekarnoputri - Hasyim Muzadi	44,990,704	39.38%
2	Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono - Jusuf Kalla	69,266,350	60.62%

b. The 2009 Direct Presidential Elections

The second round of direct elections in 2009 followed a similar trajectory that was set in 2004. The direct election format since provided impetus for the emergence of presidential parties. At this stage of democratic consolidation, it had become the key driving

134. KPU *ibid.*

135. *Ibid.*

force for the establishment of newer parties like Gerindra and Hanura. The shift to a more presidentialized character fostered the promotion of personalized politics and political parties – newer kinds of parties that would not have taken shape under the pre-2004 system of presidential election by the legislature. Nonetheless, with the last direct presidential elections as a guideline, entry-barriers for electoral competition were further tightened. Based on the 2008 Law on Presidential Elections, presidential candidates have to be nominated by a political party or coalition of political parties that gained 25 percent of popular vote or 20 percent of the total seats in the DPR.¹³⁶ This would logically imply that instead of five candidate pairs, only a maximum of 4 candidates pairs are now allowed to contest. Such implementation allowed for the possibility of only one round of elections. Contestation for the second round of direct presidential elections then entered an unprecedented personalized phase often seen as a “beauty contest.”¹³⁷ Predictably, the 2009 presidential election was concluded in a single round as the Yudhoyono - Boediono pair managed to secure more than 50% of the votes. Personal charisma now became the basis for future presidential contestations as Yudhoyono’s charisma was reinforced by the general public satisfaction with his policies. This election was to set a precedent for the future direct elections. Results of the 2009 direct presidential elections are summarized below:

Table 6: 2009 Presidential Elections Result¹³⁸

No	Candidates	Votes	Votes Percentage
1	Megawati - Prabowo Subianto	32.548.105	26.79%
2	Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono – Boediono	73.874.562	60.80%
3	Jusuf Kalla – Wiranto	15.081.814	12.41%

As necessity-based reforms transits into a “politics-as-usual” phase, political calculations had been the order of the day. This was also a clear demonstration of the genesis and evolution of direct

136. See Law No. 42 on Presidential Elections Year 2008.

137. A survey conducted in June 2008 by the national newspaper *Kompas* showed that 49.3 percent of respondents would vote on the basis of the candidates’ personal charisma.

138. Ibid. See also Rizal Sukma, “Indonesian Politics in 2009: Defective Elections, Resilient Democracy” in *Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies*, Vol. 45, No. 3, 2009: 317-36.

presidential elections. Despite the intervention of dominant parties to extend their hold over the electoral process, the direct presidential elections experience can be considered a democratic gain and innovation post-*reformasi* that is ironically entering into a less than conducive phase for substantial reforms. While dominant parties have influenced the process by lobbying for a stricter threshold for a higher barrier on entry; a parallel development in the form of direct regional/local elections neutralized the elite political contest.

3. *The Emergence of Direct Local Elections*

The implementation of local regional elections was one of the later steps that the *reformasi* government took that relates closely with the overall decentralization process since the fall of Suharto. The decentralization process in the early stages facilitated a shift in territoriality in the form of new provinces and districts. In 1996, Indonesia had 26 provinces and 293 districts or *kabupaten*, whereas by June 2003 there were 30 provinces and 393 *kabupatens* (without the partitioning of Papua).¹³⁹ The creation of new provinces allowed for the creation of new seats in the Regional People's Representatives Council or DPRD. With laws promulgated in 1999 as a progenitor, it allowed more powers to the DPRD in the selection of their own candidates and budget in the various regions and municipalities.¹⁴⁰ Spreading government to all parts of Indonesia and accommodating regional differences, regional aspirations and

139. Most of the new provinces including West Irian Jaya, North Maluku, Banten, Bangka-Belitung, Gorontalo and West Sulawesi were approved in 2000. The Riau Islands province was created in 2002. See Ehito Kimura, *Political Change and Territoriality in Indonesia: Provincial Proliferation* (New York: Routledge Contemporary Southeast Asia Series, 2013), pp. 61-5. See also Muriel Charras, "The Reshaping of the Indonesian Archipelago after 50 years of Regional Imbalance" in Maribeth Erb, Priyambudi Sulistiyanto and Carole Faucher eds., *Regionalism in Post-Suharto Indonesia* (New York: RoutledgeCurzon Contemporary Southeast Asia Series 2005), pp. 94-104.

140. In particular, Laws no. 22/1999 and no. 25/1999 were instrumental in spearheading Indonesia's decentralization specific to the DPRD. Under the new law, it offered the election of members of local parliaments (DPRD) among the local citizenry, primarily from candidates offered by authorized political parties. The DPRD in turn were to elect the local *bupati* or mayor (and in the case of the provincial-level DPRD, the governor). The mayor/*bupati* is then accountable to the DPRD or local parliament and must present periodic accountability reports. The DPRD itself is also responsible for the formulation of the budget of the kabupaten and the municipality as well as in formulating other legislation. The DPRD 'supervises' the implementation of bylaws/edicts. See Vedi R. Hadiz, *Localising Power in Post-Authoritarian Indonesia*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2010, p. 75-80.

regional demands within the confines of the unitary state were the primary objectives of the decentralization program and its “Big Bang” approach.¹⁴¹ Before 2004, appointments at the local level (provinces, regencies/*kabupaten*, cities/*kota* and districts/*kecamatan*) were conducted via the DPRD. Although widespread anticipation was initially held for the “good governance” argument, which propounded the promise that local government would be more responsive to the needs and expectations of their constituencies, expectations fell far short.¹⁴² Similar to the national-level electoral changes, the introduction of regional autonomy laws in a “politics-as-usual” atmosphere introduced some significant procedural changes, but it did not prevent dominant political elites from the New Order of interfering to their advantage. According to Vedi Hadiz, the “predatory interests nurtured under the Suharto regime’s formerly vast, centralized system of patronage. . . have reconstituted themselves through new alliances, nationally and locally, and captured the institutions of Indonesia’s democracy to further their objectives.”¹⁴³ In line with the Hadiz argument, corruption in the local government had become quite pervasive. The Golkar Party especially has been a major player in these local elections that are often won through the “buying” of support. PDI-P also engaged in some form of money politics.

The failure of the DPRD became patently obvious when regional heads presented “accountability reports” to the DPRD and when new heads were elected. It had become somewhat of a familiarity that the dismissal of “accountability reports” by local candidates by the DPRD implied that a payment had not been met. It became customary that regional heads had to be willing to pay members of the DPRD a fee to withdraw their threat. Some even

141. Gerald S. Maryanov, *Decentralization in Indonesia as a Political Problem*, Jakarta and Kuala Lumpur: Equinox Publishing, 2009, pp. 1.

142. Ryaas Rasyid, Chief architect of the “Big Bang” Approach to decentralization was protective of the virtues of decentralization. In response to those who claim that decentralization would only transfer power from corrupt central officials to corrupt regional heads, he responded with: “That means that you think the DPRD is stupid, the journalists are stupid, the NGOs are stupid, the parties are stupid because they can be fooled by the corrupt head of a region. I don’t believe that, How can you be corrupt if you are abused every day, your name is in the newspapers, you are faced with demonstrations, and the DPRD can bring you down when you are wrong?” See *Kompas*, 19 December 2000.

143. See Vedi R. Hadiz, “Decentralization and Democracy in Indonesia: A Critique of Neo-Institutionalist Perspectives” in *Development and Change* 35, no. 4 (2004), pp. 711.

went as far to say that “accountability reports” functioned as “no more than fields for extortion by members of legislatures.”¹⁴⁴ In several cases, rumours of “money politics” emerged whenever the successful candidates did not herald from the party that held the most seats from the assembly. Signs of a changing atmosphere began to emerge in 2000 when the MPR decided to amend the constitution to provide for “the democratic election” of governors and district heads. Nonetheless, it was only with the ratification of the law on regional elections (*Pemilihan Kepala Daerah* or *Pilkada*) in 2004 that had dramatically changed the elections pattern at the regional level as it allowed direct regional elections for governors, mayors, and municipalities. Changes to the 1999 legislation were a product of conflicts related to a growing challenge to the authority of Jakarta (and provincial governors) by the district chiefs and mayors. The legislative changes prescribed both the desire to rein in those local candidates and the inclination for aspiring local political elites to gain institutional independency.¹⁴⁵ However, it was not perfect. Law No. 32/2004 is quite ambiguous, opening itself to different interpretations which necessitated supplementary explanations and regulations. It had also contained elements of a possible re-centralization.¹⁴⁶

In 2005, local direct elections also known as the *pilkada*, however, proceeded apace. There were few disturbances in general, although the non-voting rate was also at a high of 31.3 percent.¹⁴⁷ Studies of the phenomena of local elections at the regional level have been largely location-specific. In many of these studies, the party-candidate relationship had been a huge concern. It has been found that the candidate running for a position within the local constituency has been largely independent of the party. The individual now became the center of focus.¹⁴⁸ To an extent, the individualization of elections has been accompanied by the rise of primordial

144. See *Kompas*, 5 February 2003.

145. Maryanov *ibid* pp. 80.

146. For example, Law No. 32/2004 authorizes the central government to rescind local regulations that violate the Constitution or higher laws (Article 145). See also Nankyung Choi, “Indonesia’s Direct Local elections: Background and Institutional Framework” in *RSIS Working Papers*, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, 30 August 2007.

147. The rate of non-voters in the first round of the direct presidential election was 21.8 percent and 26.3 percent in the second round.

148. See Michael Buehler and Paige Tan, “Party-Candidate Relationships in Indonesian Local Politics: A Case Study of the 2005 Regional Elections in Gowa, South Sulawesi Province” in *Indonesia* 84 (October 2007).

and communal conflict, following calls for *putra daerah*, or the filling of local positions with native sons.¹⁴⁹ There has also been a parallel development in the form of the emergence of decentralized political dynasties at the local level as direct elections proceeded in the coming years.¹⁵⁰ Apart from the sheer complexity of the elections due to its scale, there was a growing problem of the extremely high costs involved in the massive voting process. Money politics proliferated. In 2013, a study from the Indonesian Public Institute (IPC) showed that a candidate needed to spend approximately between 20 billion Rupiah (1.64 million USD) to 50 billion Rupiah (4.1 million USD) for city level elections. Meanwhile, a candidate running for the gubernatorial elections must prepare funds between 20 billion Rupiah (1.64 million USD) to 100 billion Rupiah (8.2 million USD).¹⁵¹

On the other hand, direct local elections had also served its purpose by largely thwarting potential abuses from the DPRD and allowing regional constituents to be more representative. While political dynasties persist in some regions, others had the good fortune of electing local reformers and benefitting groups which were formerly neglected. Some of these candidates include Tri Rismaharini (Mayor of Surabaya), Basuki Tjahaja Purnama or “Ahok” (Deputy Governor of Jakarta, and now Governor), Ganjar Pranowo (Governor of Central Java), Ridwan Kamil (Mayor of Bandung) and the current Indonesian President Joko (Jokowi) Widodo.¹⁵² For exam-

149. It is believed that only *putra daerah* are able to secure privileged access for their respective communities in the allocation of resources and government positions. See also Marco Bunte, “Indonesia’s protracted decentralization: Contested Reforms and their Unintended Consequences”, in Marco Bunte and Andeas Ufen eds., *Democratization in Post-Suharto Indonesia* (New York: Routledge Contemporary Southeast Asia Series 2009), pp. 116-8.

150. A study conducted at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University has shown that there are at least 23 known political dynasties at the provincial and district levels throughout Indonesia occupying various positions as governor, mayor/regent, deputy mayor/regent, DPR members, DPRD members as well as members of the Regional Representatives Council (DPD). Families hailing from local political dynasties include the Choisyahs (Banten Province), the Yasin Limpos (South Sulawesi) and the Narangs (Central Kalimantan Province). See Yoes Chandra Kenawas, “The Rise of Political Dynasties in Decentralized Indonesia” RSIS Dissertation (2012/2013).

151. See “Biaya Tinggi Kampanye Pilkada Dinilai Pemicu Korupsi” in *Republika*, 19 July 2013. <http://www.republika.co.id/berita/nasional/umum/13/07/19/mq6zjb-biaya-tinggi-kampanye-pilkada-dinilai-pemicu-korupsi>.

152. See Jonathan Chen and Emirza Adi Syailendra, “Jokowi and Indonesian Democracy” in *The Diplomat*, 11 April 2014, <http://thediplomat.com/2014/04/jokowi-and->

ple, the city of Solo in Central Java had been the beneficiary of a new breed of reformers hailing from the grassroots. As the Mayor of Solo, Jokowi cultivated genuine rapport with his local constituents. The relationship that he enjoyed with the people of Solo reflected a new element of personal interaction and became his signature trademark demonstrating that local leaders could transcend mere formalities and the rigidity of top-down leadership so inherent in Indonesian leadership styles.¹⁵³ This included Jokowi's popular *blusukan* style involving impromptu visits to certain areas to hear directly from the people regarding their needs and criticisms of the performance of local government as well as his populist "cando" (*punya gaye*) approach designed to build bonds with the broad electorate. Jokowi's strong popularity with the grassroots and *wong cilik* (micro businesses and plebeians) in Solo and later in Jakarta would eventually aid him in a whirlwind rise to the presidency.¹⁵⁴

The *pilkada* process was the result of the extension of decentralization policy and a reaction to the abuses sustained due to an over-reliance on the DPRD. Outcomes of the direct electoral process, however, were rather uneven. On the one hand, it led to the widespread prevalence of voter fraud and decentralized political dynasties that benefitted some, but neglected others. Nonetheless, it also yielded genuine reformers who were truly representatives of their respective constituents. As necessity-based reforms started to roll back by the end of 2004, the emergence of a new breed of reformers at the local level due to opportunities derived from the *pilkada* system provided a platform for new elites to rise to the fore. This phenomenon of local reformers would not only provide a fresh impetus to the increasingly stagnant democratization process long dominated by the oligarchs heralding from the New Order but it

indonesian-democracy/<http://thediplomat.com/2014/04/jokowi-and-indonesian-democracy/>.

153. See Cahyadi Indrananto, *Pemimpin Daerah Sebagai Agen: Dramaturgi dalam Komunikasi Politik Walikota Solo Joko Widodo / Local Leaders as Agents: Dramaturgy on Political Communications of City Mayor Joko Widodo of Solo*, Postgraduate Thesis, FISIP, University of Indonesia, June 2012. With the rebranding of Surakarta (Solo) under Jokowi's mayor-ship as "Solo: The Spirit of Java", the city became a magnet for Arts and Music Festivals. In 2009, the city of Solo won the Indonesia Tourism Award as best travel destination in Indonesia for culture and heritage.

154. See Jonathan Chen and Emriza Adi Syailendra, "Youth and the 'Jokowi Effect': Strike while the Iron is Hot?" in *RSIS Commentaries* C013108, 17 June 2013, <http://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/CO13108.pdf><http://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/CO13108.pdf>.

would also eventually pose as the greatest challenge to the established powers.

V. 2014: A WATERSHED

A. The Rise of the Local

So far reforms in post-authoritarian Indonesia have treaded a seemingly vacillating path. Necessity-based reforms formed the bulwark of the early reform initiatives under President Habibie which were primarily concerned with democratization and decentralization for the sake of preserving the administration's legitimacy. Under circumstances seen as "crisis-driven," agency over reforms then rested largely with the desires for more genuine reforms, despite it being very much a trial-and-error attempt, both at the center and periphery. Its effect was to dislodge any vestiges of the New Order by setting up a wholly new political vista with new democratic rules and regulations. The advent of a "politics-as-usual" phase signalled the beginning of a political tug-of-war between the victors of the reform process. Many of these reforms appeared "procedural" and were inclined towards boosting the powers of the newly established elites of the reform era. At the same time, these reforms opened up the possibilities for new entrants and provided opportunities for a breed of locality-based leaders to challenge the status quo, which had since settled on stagnancy.¹⁵⁵ By this time, many observers of Indonesia had mentioned of a certain "regression" and "missing. . . political accountability."¹⁵⁶ It seems that the excited talk of reform has largely evaporated while being replaced by disappointment about lack of further progress, entrenched corruption and the continuing stranglehold of a self-serving political elite. By then, Yudhoyono's popularity had also declined significantly: from 75 percent in November 2009, his ratings declined to 63 percent in April 2010, 57 percent in January 2011, 47 percent in June 2011, 38 percent in September 2011, and 30 percent in May 2013. The apparent frustrations of the populace over familiar established elites provided fertile ground for the rise of a populist figurehead, one that is seen to be truly representative of the people's

155. See Yoes Chandra Kenawas and Fitriani, "Indonesia's Next Parliament: Celebrities, Incumbents and Dynastic Members?" in *RSIS Commentaries* No. 89, 8 May 2013.

156. See Greg Fealy, "Indonesian politics in 2011: democratic regression and Yudhoyono's regal incumbency", *Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies* 2011, 47:3, 333-353. See also Sandra Hamid, "Indonesian politics in 2012: coalitions, accountability and the future of democracy", *Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies* 2012, 48:3, 325-45.

concerns.¹⁵⁷ This underlying antagonism between established elites and local contenders was to emerge and culminate in the 2014 general elections.

1. Events leading up to Joko Widodo's "Working Cabinet"

Several changes towards the electoral system especially with the advent of an "open-list" system and direct elections at the regional and national level have modified how Indonesians vote. The effects can be seen in the form of a gradual erosion of party identification in Indonesia with the promotion of a growing individualism among candidates.¹⁵⁸ This candidate-centered trend is also prominently reflected in the party identification (party ID) numbers, i.e. the percentage of voters who say they 'feel close' to a particular political party in public opinion surveys. That number was 50 percent in 2004, but stood at a mere 15 percent in March 2014. Although money politics and familial dynasties have proliferated as a result of the reforms, a new and younger class of leaders responsive to local conditions also emerged – largely due to the *pilkada* system. Their rise was fortuitously assisted with an upsurge in social media usage among the general populace and a generous coverage by the press.¹⁵⁹ One of the prime candidates who had enjoyed a spectacular rise in popularity was Joko (Jokowi) Widodo. The city of Surakarta (Solo) had benefitted tremendously under his mayorship, having won several accolades including several heritage awards. He was seen both as a visionary yet down-to-earth leader who is close to the people. This quality put him in good stead when he decided to run for the Jakarta governor's seat under the PDI-P banner with Gerindra's nominee Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (Ahok).

157. See Marcus Mietzner, "Jokowi: Rise of a Polite Populist" in *Inside Indonesia* 116, Apr-Jun 2014.

158. See William Liddle and Saiful Mujani, "Leadership, Party and Religion: Explaining Voting Behaviour in Indonesia" in *Comparative Political Studies*, Vol. 40, No.7, July 2007. Liddle and Mujani have provided strong arguments (of a bivariate, multiple regression analysis) for the growing identification of individual leadership in the legislative and presidential choices of voters in the new Indonesian democracy. See also Dirk Tomsa and Andreas Ufen, "Introduction: Party Politics and Clientelism in Southeast Asia" in Dirk Tomsa and Andreas Ufen eds., *Party Politics in Southeast Asia: Clientelism and Electoral Competition in Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines* (London: Routledge Contemporary Southeast Asia Series, 2012), pp. 1-7.

159. For a comprehensive study on the effect of social media on the candidates running for the 2014 general elections in post-Suharto Indonesia see Jonathan Chen and Adhi Priamarizki, "Popular Mandate and the Coming-of-Age of Social Media's Presence in Indonesia Politics Post-Reformasi" in *RSIS Working Papers No. 268*, 18 February 2014.

Against all odds, the Jokowi-Ahok pair managed to oust long-standing incumbents Fauzi Bowo-Nachrowi Ramli in the Jakarta gubernatorial election by 8 percent on September 20, 2012.¹⁶⁰ It also made him quite a political superstar and a media doyen. Jokowi's win was to set a precedent to come – that personal appeal of a certain type of leader now counted as a crucial factor in votes. Much of this was facilitated by his hands-on style of *blusukan* (impromptu visits, regularly visiting poor areas in Jakarta). This was often personified as the “Jokowi effect” by the news media. Although his term as governor of Jakarta was brief, he was able to kick-start several important initiatives together with then vice-governor Basuki. These include a new system of bureaucratic recruitment called “*lelang jabatan*” (literally auction of office position), a universal health care program in Jakarta based on a Healthy Jakarta Card (*Kartu Jakarta Sehat* or KJS) and improvements to the transportation quandary in Jakarta such as the inauguration of the construction of the Jakarta MRT and monorail. By now the political winds had drifted in his favour. In a poll conducted in early 2013 by the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Jokowi was seen as hopeful presidential candidate although he was still a governor. At 28.6 percent of the vote, “Jokowi” was way ahead of his next competitor Prabowo Subianto (15.6%) and Aburizal Bakrie (7%). He was even more popular than Megawati Sukarnoputri, leader of his Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P). His sustained popularity was to eventually facilitate his bid as a presidential candidate under the PDI-P ticket.

Jokowi's bid for the presidency, however, was fraught with complications. Beginning with the legislative elections held in April 2014, Jokowi's popularity was cited as a crucial factor for the PDI-P to gain votes. The electoral parameters of the 2014 legislative election followed a similar pattern to that of 2009. Thresholds for electoral participation and votes were somewhat tweaked.¹⁶¹ However, there were no novel changes to the overall electoral system. This

160. See Leonard C. Sebastian and Yoes C. Kenawas, “Jakarta Governor's Election: Implications for 2014” in *RSIS Commentaries* CO12180, 27 September 2012.

161. Among the changes for threshold on electoral participation were that political parties must meet the following four requirements to qualify as contestants: They should have (1) regional chapters in all provinces; (2) have these chapters in 75% of the regencies/municipalities in the province; (3) have these chapters in 50% of the districts/kecamatan (at the Regency/Municipal level); and (4) have at least 30% women in the management of the central chapter of the political party. As for the threshold on votes, Law No. 8/2012 stipulates a threshold of at least 3.5% of the total national valid votes, upping the stakes from a threshold of 2% in the last general election in 2009. See

resulted in a higher barrier entry of eligible political parties. Eventually 12 political parties qualified for entry. Seen initially as a strong contender for the presidential nomination as a PDI-P representative, Jokowi's shot at the presidency was overshadowed by Megawati's sense of entitlement as Sukarno's daughter and therefore her perceived divine right to become the president of Indonesia once again. However, with Indonesia's third democratic election looming on the horizon, the party system had failed to produce a slate of appealing candidates that would find resonance with the electorate. The voters were presented with Hobson's choice with the usual range of rather worn-out or unappealing figures and the possibility of a fresh but inexperienced neophyte (Jokowi) who was reluctant to stand without receiving Megawati's blessing.¹⁶² The decision of whether to field Jokowi would become a perennial occupation of the PDI-P even into the early pre-presidential phase.

By now, Megawati's popularity running as presidential candidate for the PDI-P for the third time had significantly waned. Steadily with public opinion shifting towards Jokowi's favor, his profile within the party slowly grew. He began regularly attending party meetings dressed in clothes identifying with the PDIP's prominent red colors. More importantly, according to Mietzner, "he started to make references to party ideology and Sukarno, its founding father; and he developed networks within the party apparatus." It was also during this period when Megawati slowly and systematically introduced Jokowi to her inner circle in a bid to deepen her relationship with him. While the waiting and courting game continued, pro and anti-Jokowi groups made their opinions known, though not directly to Megawati. Nonetheless, she had made up her mind. Although concerned that a premature announcement of Jokowi's candidacy may open up the floodgates of attack against him and his allies, Jokowi was proclaimed as PDI-P's nominee on March 14, two days before the start of the parliamentary election campaigns. Jokowi then entered the campaign as the most popular presidential candidate, with the hope that his party would also dominate polls by riding on his popularity. Nonetheless, those numbers declined as the polls progressed. The gap between his primary rival, ex-military man Prabowo Subianto, narrowed

Jonathan Chen and Adhi Priamarizki, "Indonesia's Democratic Evolution: Political Engineering Post-Reformasi" in *RSIS Commentaries* CO13162, 30 August 2013.

162. See Stephen Sherlock, *Indonesia's third democratic transition: are the parties ready for the 2014 presidential election?* Centre for Democratic Institutions, Crawford School of Public Policy, ANU, 2013.

precipitously. It did not help that PDI-P eventually underperformed in the legislative elections and did not manage to gain 25 percent of the votes as envisaged.¹⁶³ Results of the 2014 legislative elections are summarized below:

Table 7: 2014-2019 Parliament Seats¹⁶⁴

No	Political Parties	Parliament Seats
1	National Democrat Party (<i>Partai Nasional Demokrat</i>)	35
2	National Awakening Party (<i>Partai Kebangkitan Nasional</i>)	47
3	Prosperous Justice Party (<i>Partai Keadilan Sejahtera</i>)	40
4	Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (<i>Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan</i>)	109
5	Golkar Party (<i>Partai Golkar</i>)	91
6	Great Indonesia Movement Party (<i>Partai Gerakan Indonesia Raya</i>)	73
7	Democrat Party (<i>Partai Demokrat</i>)	61
8	National Mandate Party (<i>Partai Amanat Nasional</i>)	49
9	United Development Party (<i>Partai Persatuan Pembangunan</i>)	39
10	People's Conscience Party (<i>Partai Hati Nurani Rakyat</i>)	16
Total Seats		560

The 2014 legislative elections produced for the first time a parliament that was more evenly fragmented.¹⁶⁵ Although PDI-P reinstated its place as the most dominant party after the Golkar Party at around 18 percent, medium-sized parties held sway. PDI-P's win, however, was disappointing. Many analysts cited the apparent disunity within PDI-P and their unwillingness to cooperate with Jokowi led to a lacklustre and disjointed campaign.¹⁶⁶ Nonetheless, PDI-P managed to form a coalition with the Nasdem Party by pass-

163. In a poll taken by the Indikator institute shortly before and after the beginning of the campaign, PDI-P was at 24.5 per cent, and Jokowi would have won a three-way presidential race with 56 per cent against Prabowo at 20 and Aburizal Bakrie at 9 per cent. But these numbers declined as the campaign progressed.

164. See KPU *ibid.*

165. See Jonathan Chen, "Aftermath of Indonesia's Legislative Elections: Too Many Cooks Spoil the Broth" in RSIS Commentaries CO14075, 22 April 2014. Prabowo's presidential campaign had the advantage of using the services of a prominent American public relations guru Rob Allyn. See also "The Selling of Prabowo" in *Tempo.com*, 5 July 2014.

166. See Ross Tapsell and Liam Gammon, "Field notes on the Jokowi campaign" in *New Mandala*, 4 July 2014.

ing the presidential threshold. With the PDI-P-Nasdem coalition formed, PKB, Hanura and former Jakarta's governor Sutiyoso's PKPI (the Indonesian Justice and Unity Party, *Partai Keadilan dan Persatuan Indonesia*) also decided to join. The coalition eventually started to split into two opposing camps. Jokowi chose Jusuf Kalla (JK) as his vice presidential candidate in deference to Megawati but made sure to publicly highlight the virtues of Kalla's seniority and his political adeptness. On the other hand, Prabowo teamed up with Hatta Rajasa from PAN and formed the *Merah Putih* (Red White) coalition with Golkar, PPP, PKS, and Yusril Ihza Mahendra's PBB (Crescent Star Party, *Partai Bulan Bintang*). The presidential election turned out to be a very close fight between the two coalitions with Prabowo's coalition almost tipping the scale in their favor.¹⁶⁷ The Jokowi-Kalla pair eventually prevailed within a single round of contestation (see table 8) even as the Prabowo-Hatta pair appealed for their case to the Constitutional Court. The Constitutional Court rejected Prabowo-Hatta's request for a judicial review. Similar to his victory in the Jakarta gubernatorial race in 2012, Jokowi's win at the presidential polls was very much the result of volunteers from the grassroots. The win for Jokowi was also seen as a crucial win for democracy in Indonesia.¹⁶⁸

Table 8: 2014 Presidential Elections Result¹⁶⁹

No	Candidates	Votes	Votes Percentage
1	Prabowo - Hatta Rajasa	62.576.444	46.85 %
2	Joko Widodo - Jusuf Kalla	70.997.833	53.15 %

During his campaign, the Jokowi coalition (known as *Koalisi Indonesia Hebat* or Great Indonesia Coalition) put forward a few significant ideas as evidence of his plans to turn Indonesia into a great nation. One of his more prominent ideas is developing Indonesia into a maritime axis, spanning both the Indian and Pacific Oceans. When the concept was first introduced, it was interpreted in various ways. Some perceived the concept in the form of a tradi-

167. See Jonathan Chen, "Indonesian Presidential Election 2014: Tipping Point?" in *RSIS Commentaries* CO14131, 8 July 2014.

168. Some scholars believed that the Prabowo coalition had the intention of rolling-back the democratic gains achieved thus far in post-reform Indonesia. See Edward Aspinall, "Indonesia's democracy is in danger" in *New Mandala*, 17 June 2014.

169. See KPU *ibid*.

tional power-centric approach, where being a maritime axis is about becoming a military maritime power. Others stressed a more economically-oriented approach by highlighting the improvements on infrastructure in enabling the fluid movement of goods.¹⁷⁰ Jokowi himself has emphasized that the concept focuses on the latter interpretation, and has actively promoted such an idea during his first official overseas trip in the annual APEC Summit and other encounters with foreign representatives as president.¹⁷¹ His team's ideas attained an even greater urgency and eventually took off upon his inauguration. Countries like the United States and Germany have expressed their willingness to support the Jokowi administration in materializing such a vision.¹⁷² Indonesia's state-owned port operator PT Pelabuhan Indonesia even went on to present the concept of an integrated port and industrial area in North Sumatra. PT Pelindo II, Pelindo III, and Pelindo IV will also subsequently specify their development plans in the near future, in line with the current president's vision.¹⁷³

Economic reform takes precedence in Jokowi's campaigns as well including tax reforms, cutting fuel subsidies, improving the quality of human resources, streamlining process for business licensing and others.¹⁷⁴ The president has an ambitious plan to spend more on villages, education, a reliable health care sector, as well as allocate more investment to develop transportation, ports and power systems. In order to achieve such goals, the new administration needs to cut fuel subsidies which have by far absorbed up to 17% of the budget through the years.¹⁷⁵ As president, Jokowi eventually managed to fulfil his promise of reducing the heavy fuel sub-

170. Budi Kurniawan Supangat and Dimas Muhamad, "Defining Jokowi's Vision of a Maritime Axis", *The Jakarta Post*, October 21, 2014, <http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2014/10/21/defining-jokowi-s-vision-a-maritime-axis.html>.

171. Rendi A. Witular and Hasyim Widhiarto, "Jokowi on World Stage, First Stop Beijing", *The Jakarta Post*, November 9, 2014, <http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2014/11/09/jokowi-world-stage-first-stop-beijing.html>.

172. "US Willing to Help Jokowi's Maritime Axis", *The Jakarta Post*, November 20, 2014, <http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2014/11/20/us-willing-help-jokowi-s-maritime-axis.html>.

173. Hasyim Widhiarto. "'Think Big', Jokowi Tells Ministers, State Firms", *The Jakarta Post*, November 18, 2014, <http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2014/11/18/think-big-jokowi-tells-ministers-state-firms.html>.

174. Prachi Priya, "Jokowi's Economic Challenges", *The Diplomat*, September 18, 2014, <http://thediplomat.com/2014/09/jokowis-economic-challenges/>.

175. "The Jokowi Administration: Indonesia's New President Rewrites Political Rules", *The Wall Street Journal*, <http://online.wsj.com/articles/the-jokowi-administration-1414430846#livefyre-comment>.

sidy scheme a month after taking office by increasing the premium fuel price from Rupiah 6,500 to Rupiah 8,500; and diesel fuel from Rupiah 5,500 to Rupiah 7,500.¹⁷⁶ In the course of his campaigns, Jokowi has also emphasized the importance of improving infrastructure to support economic growth. He has stated his plan to construct 2,000 kilometres of roads, ten airports, ten seaports, ten industrial estates and 5,000 traditional markets.¹⁷⁷ In the energy sector, the new administration emphasized the importance of renegotiating mining, oil and gas contracts with foreign companies to provide better terms for the Indonesian government.¹⁷⁸ In order to further supplement economic development, efficient and transparent governance is needed. Jokowi subsequently highlighted the importance of bureaucratic reform. His record in taming Jakarta's bureaucratic inefficiencies offers a promising new method in the recruitment and management of the state apparatus.¹⁷⁹

2. *A Commoner amongst Elites*

The initial formation of Jokowi's "Working Cabinet" faced a series of uphill battles even before it was inaugurated. Prabowo's Merah Putih Coalition (KMP: *Koalisi Merah Putih*) had emerged again as a formidable foe, beginning with the usurpation of the critical House Speaker leadership under new terms as stipulated in the controversial MD3 Laws (or Law on the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR), House of Representatives (DPR), Region's Representatives Council (DPD) and the Regional House of Representatives (DPRD). The full implementation of the MD3 Laws may prove obstructive to the reigning Jokowi coalition and his parliament.¹⁸⁰ Barely before his inauguration, the KMP made

176. "Fuel Prices Increase, Inflation to Rise Two Percent", *Tempo.co*, November 18, 2014, <http://en.tempco.co/read/news/2014/11/18/056622699/Fuel-Prices-Increase-Inflation-to-Rise-Two-Percent>.

177. Vikram Nehru. "Indonesian Economic Policies in a Jokowi Administration: A Preview", *Boao Review*. Accessed November 21, 2014, http://carnegieendowment.org/email/Asia/img/Indonesian%20economic%20policies%20in%20a%20Jokowi%20administration_a%20preview_final.pdf.

178. Maxensius Tri Sambodo and Alexander R. Arifianto. *Analysing the Economic Platforms in the Indonesian Presidential Election*. *ISEAS Perspective*, No. 40, July 2014. pp. 5.

179. Diaz Hendropriyono, "Jokowi's Much-Awaited Bureaucratic Reform", *The Jakarta Post*, September 14, 2014, <http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2014/09/14/jokowi-s-much-awaited-bureaucratic-reform.html>.

180. See Jonathan Chen and Keoni Indrabayu Marzuki, "MD3 Laws in Indonesia: Sword of Damocles over the Jokowi Presidency?" in *RSIS Commentaries CO14208*, 21 October 2014.

use of the MD3 Law to rule the abolishment of the *pilkada* system in their favor – the system that had catapulted Jokowi’s rise from humble mayor to president.¹⁸¹ Anticipating the apparent threats to his administration, the “Success Team” (or *Tim Sukses*) of Jokowi, now known as his “Transition Team,” was quick to spring into action immediately after the Election Commission (KPU) formally announced his victory. The Transition Team – which consisted of Rini Soemarno (Head of the Transition Team), Andi Widjajanto, Anies Baswedan, Akbar Faizal and Hasto Kristiyanto – was tasked to smoothen the transition process by various means, including joint discussions on the 2015 State Budget. It is also in charge of translating Jokowi’s vision into a policy blueprint in different sectors by involving numerous experts (that are clustered into different working groups or *kelompok kerja/pokja*) from all across the archipelago. Aside from developing blueprints for future policies, the team is also tasked to develop the cabinet structures and screen potential candidates for ministerial positions.¹⁸² Jokowi’s cabinet and basic structure would differ in several ways from Yudhoyono’s cabinet.¹⁸³ In terms of transparency, the selection process of ministers by the Jokowi team was also one that was unprecedented and befitting of someone outside the elite circle that values the opinions of the public to a certain extent.¹⁸⁴ Nonetheless, Jokowi would eventually face

181. See Jonathan Chen and Adhi Priamarizki, “Why abolishing direct local elections undermines Indonesia’s democracy” in *East Asia Forum*, 9 October 2014. Nonetheless, Yudhoyono issued a government regulation in lieu of law (Perppu) to annul the abolishment of the *pilkada* which took effect a month later. See “SBY Issues Perppu to Annul *Pilkada* Law,” *TheJakartaPost.com*, 3 October 2014. <http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2014/10/03/sby-issues-perppu-annul-pilkada-law.html>.

182. “Tim Transisi Jokowi-JK Tiga Tugas Utama (Jokowi-JK Transition Team’s 3 Primary Task),” *Antara News*, 4 August 2014, available at <http://www.antaranews.com/berita/447001/tim-transisi-jokowi-jk-punya-tiga-tugas-pokok>.

183. One of the notable differences between the cabinet of both administrations is that Jokowi and the Transition Team fused several ministerial posts into a single ministerial post. For example, the Ministry of Public Works and the Ministry of Public Housing from the Yudhoyono’s administration is fused into Ministry of Public Works and Public Housing. The Ministry of the Environment and the Ministry of Forestry is also being fused into a single ministry. While several ministries are an amalgamation of different ministries, Jokowi also splits one ministry into two ministries, for example the Ministry of Education and Culture into Ministry of Culture and Elementary & Secondary Education and Ministry of Research, Technology and Higher Education. Jokowi also introduces new ministries such as the Coordinating Ministry for Maritime Affairs to better suit his objectives.

184. Jokowi’s initiative to involve the Corruption Eradication Commission and Financial Transaction Reporting and Analysis Center in the selection process is commendable. See “ICW Nilai SBY Lebih Baik Dibanding Jokowi dalam Susun Kabinet

an uncomfortable position of a balancing act between pragmatic politics with an intention of breaking away from the mold of how politics is often conducted in the post-reform landscape.¹⁸⁵

Jokowi's status as non-political party elite would soon be evident when it comes to determining the composition of his cabinet. A report from *Tempo* magazine mentioned a "three-way tussle involving Jokowi, JK and Megawati" appearing during the formation of the cabinet.¹⁸⁶ The final announcement of his ministerial composition is quantitatively better considering that Jokowi initially announced that he will appoint 18 ministers with professional backgrounds and 16 ministers from the political parties (See Table 9).¹⁸⁷ Jokowi named his cabinet the "Working Cabinet" (*Kabinet Kerja*).¹⁸⁸

Table 9: The Widodo's Administration's "Working Cabinet" Line-Up

	Ministry Nomenclature (Bahasa Indonesia)	Ministry Nomenclature (English)	Minister	Affiliation (Professional/ Political Parties)
1	Menteri Sekretaris Negara	State Secretary Minister	Pratikno	Professional

(ICW Deems SBY is Better than Jokowi in Cabinet Forming)," in *Kompas*, 17 October 2014, available at <http://nasional.kompas.com/read/2014/10/17/16425331/ICW.Nilai.SBY.Lebih.Baik.Dibanding.Jokowi.dalam.Susun.Kabinet>.

185. See Jonathan Chen, "Indonesia's Presidential Dilemma: Can Jokowi Avoid the Accountability Trap?" in *RSIS Commentaries* CO14171, 2 September 2014.

186. See "Not All the President's Men," *Tempo English Edition Magazine*, 27 October – 2 November 2014, pp. 15.

187. Even though newly appointed ministers such as Rini Soemarno, Ryamizard Ryacudu and Sofyan Djalil are not directly related to the PDI-P, they have long been regarded as confidantes of Megawati and/or Jusuf Kalla. It also must be added that there is no clear distinction on the term professional, as this term could also refer to professionals that are cadres of a political party. "Latar Belakang Menteri Jokowi dari Parpol dan Profesional (Background of Jokowi's Ministers from Political Parties and Professionals)," *Tempo*, 27 October 2014, <http://www.tempo.co/read/news/2014/10/27/078617247/Latar-Belakang-Menteri-Jokowi-dari-Parpol-dan-Profesional/1/1>.

188. See "Jokowi's Working Cabinet (2014-2019)" in *Jakarta Post Headlines*, 27 October 2014.

2	Menteri Perencanaan Pembangunan Nasional / Kepala Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Nasional	Minister of National Development Planning and Head of National Development Planning Agency	Andrinof Chaniago	Professional
3	Menteri Koordinator Bidang Kemaritiman	Coordinating Minister for Maritime Affairs	Indroyono Soesilo	Professional
4	Menteri Perhubungan	Minister of Transportation	Ignasius Jonan	Professional
5	Menteri Kelautan dan Perikanan	Minister of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries	Susi Pudjiastuti	Professional
6	Menteri Pariwisata	Minister of Tourism	Arief Yahya	Professional
7	Menteri Energi dan Sumber Daya Mineral	Minister of Energy and Mineral Resources	Sudirman Said	Professional
8	Menteri Koordinator Bidang Politik, Hukum dan Keamanan	Coordinating Minister for Politics, Law and Security	Admiral (Ret.) Tedjo Edhy Purdijatno	Politician (Nasdem)
9	Menteri Dalam Negeri	Minister of Home Affairs	Tjahjo Kumolo	Politician (PDIP)
10	Menteri Luar Negeri	Minister of Foreign Affairs	Retno Marsudi	Professional
11	Menteri Pertahanan	Minister of Defence	General (Ret.) Ryamizard Ryacudu	Professional
12	Menteri Hukum dan Hak Asasi Manusia	Minister of Law and Human Rights	Yasonna Laoly	Politician (PDIP)
13	Menteri Komunikasi dan Informatika	Minister of Communication and Information	Rudiantara	Professional

14	Menteri Pendayagunaan Aparatur Negara dan Reformasi Birokrasi	Minister of State Administration and Bureaucratic Reform	Yuddy Chrisnandi	Politician (Hanura)
15	Menteri Koordinator Bidang Perekonomian	Coordinating Minister for the Economy	Sofyan Djalil	Professional
16	Menteri Keuangan	Minister of Finance	Bambang Brodjonegoro	Professional
17	Menteri Badan Usaha Milik Negara	Minister of State Owned Enterprise	Rini Soemarno	Professional
18	Menteri Koperasi dan Usaha Kecil dan Menengah	Minister of Cooperation and Small- Medium Enterprise	Anak Agung Gede Ngurah Puspayoga	Politician (PDIP)
19	Menteri Perindustrian	Minister of Industry	Saleh Husin	Politician (Hanura)
20	Menteri Perdagangan	Minister of Trade	Rachmat Gobel	Professional
21	Menteri Pertanian	Minister of Agriculture	Amran Sulaiman	Professional
22	Menteri Ketenagakerjaan	Minister of Manpower	Hanif Dhakiri	Politician (PKB)
23	Menteri Pekerjaan Umum dan Perumahan Rakyat	Minister of Public Works and Public Housing	Basuki Hadimuljono	Professional
24	Menteri Lingkungan Hidup dan Kehutanan	Minister of Environment and Forestry	Siti Nurabaya Bakar	Politician (Nasdem)
25	Menteri Agraria dan Tata Ruang / Kepala Badan Pertanahan Nasional	Minister of Agriculture and Spatial Planning	Ferry Mursyidan Baldan	Politician (Nasdem)

26	Menteri Koordinator Bidang Pembangunan Manusia dan Kebudayaan	Coordinating Minister for Human and Cultural Development	Puan Maharani	Politician (PDIP)
27	Menteri Agama	Minister of Religious Affairs	Lukman Hakim Saifuddin	Politician (PPP)
28	Menteri Kesehatan	Minister of Health	Nila Djuwita Anfasa Moeloek	Professional
29	Menteri Sosial	Minister of Social Affairs	Khofifah Indar Parawansa	Politician (PKB)
30	Menteri Pemberdayaan perempuan dan Perlindungan Anak	Minister of Female Empowerment and Child Protection	Yohana Yembise	Professional
31	Menteri Kebudayaan dan Pendidikan Dasar dan Menengah	Minister of Culture and Elementary & Secondary Education	Anies Baswedan	Professional
32	Menteri Riset, Teknologi dan Pendidikan Tinggi	Minister of Research, Technology and Higher Education	Muhammad Nasir	Professional
33	Menteri Pemuda dan Olahraga	Minister of Sports and Youth	Imam Nahrawi (sometimes also spelled as Nachrowi)	Politician (PKB)
34	Menteri Desa, Pembangunan Daerah Tertinggal dan Transmigrasi	Minister of Village, Disadvantaged Regions and Transmigration	Marwan Ja'far	Politician (PKB)
35	Jaksa Agung	Attorney General	H.M. Prasetyo	Politician (Nasdem)

While not a completely reformist cabinet with a few contentious names on the list, the Widodo Administration also faced a polarized parliament. The KMP swept all of the House's Commis-

sion Chiefs and the Oversight bodies.¹⁸⁹ Jokowi's Great Indonesia Coalition, sensing the impending threat, took matters into their own hands by establishing their own version of Deputy Speakers and Commission Chiefs. While Jokowi himself remained powerless in the struggle for control of the legislative body, the brouhaha within the Parliament effectively neutered the legislative body to fulfill their task, which is passing legislation. This may not be the intended motive of the original reform process when power is devolved from the executive to the legislative, but of the result of a protracted period of rivalry and in recent years of the hostile reaction to new entrants to the political stage at the national level.

3. *Revisiting Necessity and the Evolution of the Post-Reformasi Indonesian Polity*

Political reform in Indonesia has come a long way since 1998. While *necessity* was seen as the driving impetus behind reforms during the early *reformasi* years under a more extreme circumstance, Indonesia has proven that it can move beyond its transitional phase. Aguero, in his study of democratic transitions in Latin America, argued that the initial conditions of a democratic transition were decisive in determining the intended trajectory of a post-authoritarian reform.¹⁹⁰ Indeed early attempts at severing New Order links considered to be detrimental to reforms largely allowed Indonesia to systematically move on towards a more stable democratic consolidation stage. The significance of these early gains should not be downplayed within Indonesia's reform path. Crucially, the institutionalized role of the military in socio-political affairs was quickly dismantled. At that time, civilian consensus at that time was adamant that certain features of the New Order had to go in order to be committed to democratic reforms. This allowed for the subsequent unravelling of other New Order entities such as the hegemonic position of Golkar and the centralizing tendencies of the executive. With several of the New Order implements neutered, post-*reformasi* Indonesia readily worked on strengthening the foun-

189. See "Solusi Fadli Zon Soal DPR Tandingan (Fadli Zon's Solution to House Dualism)," *Tempo*, 3 November 2014, available at <http://www.tempo.co/read/news/2014/11/03/078619189/Solusi-Fadli-Zon-Soal-DPR-Tandingan>.

190. See Felipe Aguero, "Legacies of transitions: institutionalization, the military, and democracy in South America" in *Mershon International Studies Review*, 42 (2), pp. 383-404.

dation of civilian politics with the aim of preventing a return to iron-fisted rule by proxy of the military.¹⁹¹

While necessity-based reforms served its purpose of radically altering the Indonesian political system and in an often trial-and-error fashion, it did not eradicate the deep-seated clientelism and patronage that was part of the political psyche. The subsequent periods after democratic transition thus involved a political tussle by the victors of the reform process. This did not mean that reforms were discontinued. However, it did mean that the agency for reforms was transferred away from what was required in order to prevent an internal crisis within Indonesia from breaking out to one in which political calculations and one-upmanship became the order of the day. While the first series of reforms can be seen as dismantling what was left of the New Order, later reforms ironically reflected an add-on of parameters that sought to limit and restrict the playing field of political rivals in the form of greater democratization and decentralization. The outgrowth of new legislative provisions that emphasized an “open-list” system, direct presidential elections as well as the *pilkada* were all symptoms of this new state of affairs – competition among the new oligarchic elites of the reform era. While necessity by then had since lost its panache, the new rules for electoral politics fostered a different kind of electoral atmosphere – one that was increasingly candidate-centric and personalized, much to the detriment of the political parties.

This opening eventually allowed for newer social networks of clientelism to form but also fostered the rise of new local entrants onto the political scene. In a recent article, Aspinall commented on the nascent rise of the brokerage network that no longer adhered to the old rules of political patronage.¹⁹² In recent years, broker loyalty has increasingly been compromised by opportunist brokers via predation and defection. With much of the focus now shifting towards the individual, the balance of power steadily tilted towards the need for a capable broker or “Success Team” (*Tim Sukses*). On a parallel development, years of democratic electoral politics has

191. In a recent essay, Marcus Mietzner compared democratic transitions between Indonesia and Egypt. He concluded that a rapid return to civilian control was the main determinant for the success democratic transition in Indonesia as compared to that of Egypt which had fallen back into martial rule. See Marcus Mietzner, “Successful and failed democratic transitions from military rule in majority Muslim societies: the cases of Indonesia and Egypt”, *Contemporary Politics*, 18:28 (2014), pp. 1-18.

192. See Edward Aspinall, “When Brokers Betray: Clientelism, Social Networks, and Electoral Politics in Indonesia” in *Critical Asian Studies* 46:4 (2014), pp. 545-70.

changed the Indonesian voters' expectations. Indonesian voters in greater propensity have grown shrewd. This was, of course, assisted by their agency for "pragmatism" and "transactionalism" very much in their favor with the implementation of political parameters and reforms that sought to increase the appeal of the personal vote. Candidates are increasingly being assessed on their ability to deliver cash, goods or other more tangible benefits to their constituents.¹⁹³ The "open list" system and the local elections at the regional levels in conjunction with the rise of new social media in Indonesia within the last few years implicated the need for a new kind of leader among the constituents – someone who is in touch with the grassroots yet savvy enough in embracing new methods of campaign. Jokowi was certainly the beneficiary of the former and readily seen to be comfortable with the latter. His surprising win at the 2012 gubernatorial elections against all odds have been partly attributed to the strong social media presence by volunteers both on YouTube and other media fronts such as Facebook, Twitter and Instagram.¹⁹⁴

The evolution of the post-*reformasi* Indonesia polity especially after *necessity* had lost its appeal was not always disappointing. Elite rivalries had produced in the "politics-as-usual" climate unique opportunities. In some circumstances, aspects of *necessity* are still very much evident especially at the regional and district levels in which rivalries between political parties were less set in stone. Nonetheless, the vast changes in political landscape and the vicarious effects of new social media threaten to upend the estab-

193. See Edward Aspinall, "Parliament and Patronage" in *Journal of Democracy*, Volume 25, Number 4, October 2014, pp. 96-110.

194. See Diatyka Widya Permata Yasih and Andi Rahman Alamsyah, "The paradox of virtual youth politics" in *Inside Indonesia 118*, Oct-Dec 2014. "Cameo Project", a team comprising of Jakartan film and photography enthusiasts recorded a self-made parody on the daily travails of Jakartan life. It was uploaded onto YouTube and immediately went viral, drawing viewership of over 2 million. What stood out apart from its slick, semi-professional production and well-coordinated storyline comically depicting the unsavoury aspects of Jakartan life, is its unstinting support for the Jokowi-Ahok (short for Joko Widodo-Basuki Tjahaja Purnama) pair. The group could be seen donning the pair's signature chequered shirt in the video, street-dancing, singing and rapping over the cover song of popular teenage band One Direction's "What Makes You Beautiful" – edited in Bahasa Indonesia and retrofitted to appeal to the young. This was followed by a similar barrage of other YouTube videos, Twitter accounts, forums and blogs with their own brand of parody and support for change in the Jakartan metropolis. See also Jonathan Chen and Adhi Priamarizki, "Popular Mandate and the Coming-of-Age of Social Media's Presence in Indonesia Politics Post-Reformasi" in *RSIS Working Papers* No. 268, 18 February 2014.

lished leaders of the old mold under familiar lines of patronage. This has led to a hardening of positions in a usually multiparty, “rainbow” coalitional Indonesian parliament. The open hostility of the Merah-Putih Coalition (KMP) towards Jokowi’s cabinet and the general half-hearted support of PDI-P towards Jokowi’s presidential campaigns were symptoms of this recent development. Senior cadres within PDI-P in the pro-Mega camp felt that Jokowi was still the same junior figure in the party which he joined in 2005 in the same year that he ran for Mayor of Solo.¹⁹⁵ The KMP went on to politically outmaneuver the reigning minority coalition of Jokowi by its attempts at utilizing the MD3 Laws to reinstate their own parliamentary speakers.¹⁹⁶ The Golkar Party has also sought to reinvigorate their dominance as leader of the KMP following their attempts at reversing the *pilkada* system from direct to indirect elections. While the KMP controlled the majority of seats at the national DPR level (See Table 10), Golkar had won more seats at the DPRD level of close to 70 percent.¹⁹⁷

Table 10: The *Merah Putih* Coalition and Indonesia Hebat Coalition seats at the Provincial Level¹⁹⁸

No	Provinces	<i>Merah Putih</i> Coalition	<i>Indonesia Hebat</i> Coalition
1	Aceh	38	33
2	Sumatera Utara	63	35
3	Sumatera Barat	49	16
4	Riau	45	20
5	Jambi	36	19
6	Sumatera Selatan	40	30

195. See Erwinda Maulia, “Sour Grapes are Election Victor’s Spoils for PDI-P” in *Jakarta Globe*, 27 November 2014.

196. Setya Novanto, a close aide of the party chairman Aburizal Bakrie became parliamentary speaker of the DPR. See “Setya Novanto Ketua DPR 2014-2019 [Setya Novanto, DPR Speaker 2014-2019],” *Kompas.com*, 2 October 2014. http://nasional.kompas.com/read/2014/10/02/02475091/Setya.Novanto.Ketua.DPR.2014-2019?utm_source=WP&utm_medium=box&utm_campaign=Kpopwp.

197. See “Hajriyanto: 70 Persen Perolehan Kursi Golkar di DPRD,” *Vivanews.com*, 7 May 2014. <http://politik.news.viva.co.id/news/read/502443-hajriyanto—70-persen-perolehan-kursi-golkar-di-dprd>.

198. See “UU Pilkada Sah, Koalisi Prabowo Borong 31 Gubernur [*Pilkada* Law Ratified, Prabowo Coalition Could Win 31 Governors],” *Tempo.co*, 8 September 2014. <http://www.tempo.co/read/news/2014/09/08/078605241/UU-Pilkada-Sah-Koalisi-Prabowo-Borong-31-Gubernur>. See also “Staging a Political U Turn,” *Tempo English Edition Magazine*, 29 September – 5 October 2014 edition, pp. 17

7	Bengkulu	27	18
8	Lampung	51	34
9	Bangka Belitung	29	16
10	Kepulauan Riau	26	19
11	DKI Jakarta	57	49
12	Jawa Barat	65	35
13	Jawa Tengah	56	44
14	DI Yogyakarta	33	22
15	Jawa Timur	55	41
16	Banten	52	33
17	Bali	27	28
18	Nusa Tenggara Barat	47	18
19	Nusa Tenggara Timur	34	31
20	Kalimantan Barat	37	39
21	Kalimantan Tengah	24	21
22	Kalimantan Selatan	36	19
23	Kalimantan Timur	35	20
24	Kalimantan Utara	22	13
25	Sulawesi Selatan	63	22
26	Sulawesi Tengah	27	18
27	Sulawesi Utara	25	18
28	Sulawesi Tenggara	33	12
29	Gorontalo	33	12
30	Sulawesi Barat	34	11
31	Maluku	25	20
32	Maluku Utara	25	20
33	Papua	35	21
34	Papua Barat	28	17

This combination presents an uncanny alliance between the once-hegemonic party and a coalition bent on disrupting the current parliament. Abolishing the *pilkada* system under a flimsy pretext was not well-received by the public. A recent poll by the Indonesian Survey Circle (LSI) showed that more than 81 percent of participants felt that a local leader must be directly elected by the people without any interference from the DPRD. Much blame was apportioned to ex-President Yudhoyono who promptly issued Government Regulations in Lieu of Law (*Peraturan Presiden Pengganti Undang-Undang*, Perppu) to repeal revisions on the *Pilkada* Law

temporarily.¹⁹⁹ It lasts until the next round of the DPR's General Assembly and the likelihood of a further battle in the DPR would be imminent.²⁰⁰

In all likelihood, the driving force of a "crisis-ridden" environment that necessitates change may have dissipated. Nonetheless, apropos to a "politics-as-usual" situation, much has also shifted within the landscape of Indonesian politics that is increasingly reflective of the need for a substantially different kind of leadership. With agency rather than passivity a growing feature of the various local constituents due to the twin effects of an individualization and increased scale of elections propped by the nascent rise of new social media outlets, there is a need to "blend in with the times."²⁰¹ Elites of the old patronage system (namely money politics, predatory interests and at times violence) who relied less on representativeness among the *wong cilik* (commoners or "little people") and the rousing popularity that accompanied it even as Indonesia's political structure drifts toward that direction, risks losing touch in a political atmosphere that hinges a lot more on aspects of vertical accountability. Vertical accountability, or the reciprocal relationship between the masses and the elites, stresses on the responsiveness to the common will of the constituency.²⁰² This runs counter to the entrenched patronage politics of the early reform period – a visible continuation of leadership patterns of the New Order – that seeks to downplay the newfound aspects of greater local agency.

199. See "SBY Issues Perppu to Annul *Pilkada*," in *The Jakarta Post*, 3 October 2014, <http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2014/10/03/sby-issues-perppu-annul-pilkada-law.html>.

200. "Berlaku Sementara, Perppu Masih Butuh Restu DPR," in *Metrotvnews.com*, 13 October 2014, <http://news.metrotvnews.com/read/2014/10/13/304308/berlaku-sementara-perppu-masih-butuh-restu-dpr>.

201. Machiavelli in *The Discourses* mentioned about the need for men to "adapt oneself to the times if one wants to enjoy good fortune". Thus the theme of necessity runs through even in a "politics-as-usual" situation. Using the example of Fabius Maximus, he cites two reasons why one cannot change one's ways. First, it is the impossibility of going against what nature inclines one to. Second, having got on well by adopting a certain line of conduct, it is impossible to persuade one that they can get on well by acting otherwise. He went on to reiterate that the downfall of cities come about because institutions in republics do not change with the times, but change very slowly because it is more painful to change them since it is necessary to wait until the whole republic is in a state of upheaval. See Machiavelli, *The Discourses* (Book III.9).

202. Vertical accountability refers to the reciprocal relationship linking masses and the elites – a bind that establishes itself most prominently via the ballot box. See Guillermo O'Donnell, "Delegative Democracy" in *Journal of Democracy* 5, 1 (1994): 55-69.

VI. CONCLUSION: WHAT KIND OF DEMOCRACY IS INDONESIA?

Returning back to the introduction, the main puzzle of the paper is in the identification of the current political polity of post-*reformasi* Indonesia. Earlier we have seen the onset of different circumstances that have led to different reform trajectories. For the first instance, it was seen as necessary that vestiges of the New Order had to go given the parlous and potentially precarious state of affairs. While *necessity*-based reforms had succeeded to a certain extent in severing what was left of the Suharto's regime (the military's *dwi-fungsi* role, the hegemony of Golkar as well as decentralizing the executive and regions), Indonesia had transited into a different phase. As a "politics-as-usual" atmosphere re-dominated the political landscape, reforms entered into a wholly different trajectory whereby rivalry between the new elites of *reformasi* became the order of the day. While the pace of reform was not as qualitatively swift or conclusive, its scope and variety had ironically increased as the democratic consolidation phase set in. Both direct elections at the national and regional level emerged as a result. These new democratic varieties quite novel in their implementation gradually changed the existing political configuration that led to the rise of the local . Thus one can see the vacillating "steps forward" (*necessity*-based) in the early stages of *reformasi* and "steps backward" (non *necessity*-based) trajectories of the period whereby a modicum of stability had set in. Looking back, several political scientists have sought to define this complex polity of Indonesia in various shades. Some have insisted that Indonesia post-*reformasi* was not very different from New Order Indonesia and cited the nature of democracy as one that is distinctly patrimonial, even predatory, or one that is still very much entrenched within the politics of patronage.²⁰³ Others have been more optimistic of the developments Indonesia took since the fall of the New Order. These scholars often cite the prevalence of popular agency in bringing about

203. For the case of a democracy termed as "patrimonial" see Douglas Webber, *ibid.* For what is defined as a "patronage democracy" in Indonesia see Gerry van Klinken, *ibid.* See also Syarif Hidayat, "*Pilkada*, money politics and the dangers of "informal governance" practices" in M. Erb and P. Sulistiyanto (eds), *Deepening Democracy in Indonesia? Direct Elections for Local Leaders (Pilkada)*, Singapore: Institute of South-east Asian Studies, pp. 125-46.

change to the polity and posing a few challenges to the dominant oligarchs who had seen filled in the vacuum left behind.²⁰⁴

These scholars of differing persuasions that had qualitatively assessed the state of democracy in Indonesia have approached post-reform Indonesia with opposing lenses when it comes to their perceptions in viewing democratic developments and decentralizing reforms, yielding vastly different trajectories. Generally utilizing a minimalist perspective of assessment, the conclusions of the state of democracy in Indonesia have been seen as that of a “procedural” or a “hybrid” one.²⁰⁵ On the other hand, a maximalist perspective involves a greater scope that encompasses liberal-socialist parameters, which is concerned more with enhancing the quality of democracy. Actors and other agents of the democracy apart from institutions feature greatly when utilizing such a perspective. By far, there had only been a single attempt at effectively quantifying the dynamics of democratization in Indonesia.²⁰⁶ While it serves a very important function in structurally assessing empirically whether democracy has been substantive enough, the process is often laborious.²⁰⁷ This paper, however, seeks to hypothesize a less laborious but no less rigorous attempt at defining the state of democracy in Indonesia by looking at reform developments at the various phases and its implications. What was gathered was that democratic developments in Indonesia had entered a different phase almost inadvertently. Rival competition among various actors had increasingly led to a “de-centering” of democracy in Indonesia. Electoral mecha-

204. For cases supporting democratic advancements brought about from the bottom see Edward Aspinall, “Popular Agency and Interests in Indonesia’s Democratic Transition and Consolidation,” *Indonesia* 96 (October 2013): 101-21. See also Marcus Mietzner, “Indonesia’s 2014 Elections: How Jokowi Won and Democracy Survived” in *Journal of Democracy*, Volume 25, Number 4, October 2014, pp. 111-25.

205. A minimal definition of democracy involves a shallow reading of the extent of democracy primarily exclusive to institutions. See Joseph Alois Schumpeter, *Capitalism, Socialism, Democracy* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1943). “Hybrid” regimes usually refer to polities that combine democratic and authoritarian features, thus seeing these regimes as neither democratic nor authoritarian. See Larry Diamond, “Elections Without Democracy. Thinking about Hybrid Regimes” in *Journal of Democracy*, 13 (2): 21-35.

206. See Olle Tornquist, *Assessing Dynamics of Democratization: Transformative Politics, New Institutions, and The Case of Indonesia* (Palgrave Macmillan, New York 2013).

207. Tornquist defines a substantive democracy as the process in achieving “the conditions and the efficiency of the institutions, as well as people’s capacity to use them, that respected scholars deem to be intrinsic in building popular control on the basis of political equality of the issues that people (who are affected by the government or lack of government of these issues) deem to be public affairs”.

nisms that had been crucial in facilitating such a shift in democratic focus was reviewed earlier including the switch to a fully “open-list” system, direct presidential elections and the emergence of direct local elections. Citizen-state interactions and civil society participation have boosted very much in scope and intensity not only with the advent of decentralization efforts, but also with the ballot box being brought directly to the people. On the other hand, newer forms of social media that facilitate such an interaction and oversight of political figures have made its way into great acceptance by Indonesians at large in various levels of society. As a result, old-style patrimonial politics is no longer the only path to local and increasingly state-wide power with local elites and rising new leaders devising more innovative strategies other than money politics and violence in the bid to gain the popular vote. Vertical accountability has gradually become the order of the day in big and small elections.

A recent study on good governance at the local level in Indonesia proves such a point. In the district of Kebuman, Central Java, researchers Ina Choi and Yuki Fukuoka have noted that the rise of local elites (in this case it was the Bupati of Kebumen, Rustrining-sih) who have committed themselves to better governance through greater intervention by international donors combined with the process of decentralization.²⁰⁸ As a result, instead of reverting to the old patronage norms and modalities, Indonesian local elites can now raise their profiles as “reformists” by drawing benefits from greater intervention by the donor community. This follows closely the new path that has now been blazed by current president of Indonesia, Joko Widodo (Jokowi) and attempts by the older established elites to resist it. Jokowi first started out in the initial experimentation with direct elections at the local level in 2005 as mayor of Solo. His well-noted performance as a reformer was first acknowledged by international observers and then gained widespread interest domestically with greater coverage of Jokowi and the city of Solo. His win in Jakarta was a watershed moment as it sealed his fate as a commoner and populist, a beneficiary of the *pilkada* system that had managed to defeat the longstanding incumbents in Jakarta. His participation as presidential candidate of the PDI-P was even more astounding as competition at the national level was seen to be the preserve of party elites. His inauguration as

208. See Ina Choi and Yuki Fukuoka, “Co-opting Good Governance Reform: The Rise of a Not-so-Reformist Leader in Kebumen, Central Java” in *Asian Journal of Political Science* (2014), pp. 1-19.

Indonesia's sixth president post-*reformasi* is a testament to the new blazing path to power – one that although not perfect, looked to be unfettered distinctly by the usual constraints of old patronage politics, and rather by popularity and popular representation.

This “de-centered” approach to democracy in Indonesia is relatively new, although decentralization measures had taken place since 1998. However, its effect can be felt. As the polity of post-*reformasi* Indonesia shifted invariably over the years, this new development can be seen as a boon to observers. However, its presence may again be threatened. Recent efforts at abolishing the direct *pilkada* system and converting it back to an indirect approach is perhaps one of the few mechanisms the old established elites have since utilized to reverse the “de-centering” steps democratization in Indonesia had taken. On the other hand, Jokowi now widely seen as a reformist president received widespread acknowledgment of his representativeness and is keen to change the political landscape of Indonesia despite the pressure from the opposition and the lack of support within his own party. Nonetheless, one thing can be sure – the “de-centering” of democracy in Indonesia is here to stay.

GLOSSARY

ABRI / TNI	: <i>Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia</i> (The Republic of Indonesia Armed Forces), after <i>Reformasi</i> , it changed to <i>Tentara Nasional Indonesia</i> (Indonesian National Armed Forces)
Aliran	: “Streams”, constellation of traditional groups
Blusukan	: Impromptu Visits
Bupati	: Regent
DPP	: Central Committee Council (<i>Dewan Pengurus Pusat</i>)
DPR	: People’s Representatives Council (<i>Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat</i>)
DPRD	: Regional People’s Representatives Council (<i>Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah</i>)
Dwifungsi	: Dual Functions refers to the Indonesian military’s defence and security as well as socio-political role
GAM	: Free Aceh Movement (<i>Gerakan Aceh Merdeka</i>)
Gerindra Party	: Great Indonesia Movement Party (<i>Partai Gerakan Indonesia Raya</i>)
Golkar	: Functional Groups (<i>Golongan Karya</i>)
Hankam	: Defence and security (<i>Pertahanan dan Keamanan</i>)
Hanura Party	: People’s Conscience Party (<i>Partai Hati Nurani Rakyat</i>)
ICMI	: Indonesian Association of Muslim Intellectuals (<i>Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia</i>)
Jokowi:	: Joko Widodo, 7th Indonesian President
Kabupaten	: Regency
KIH	: Great Indonesia Coalition (<i>Koalisi Indonesia Hebat</i>)
KKN	: Corruption, Collusion, Nepotism (<i>Korupsi, Kolusi, Nepotisme</i>)
KMP	: Red White Coalition (<i>Koalisi Merah Putih</i>)
KORPRI	: Indonesian Civil Servant Corps (<i>Korps Pegawai Negeri Republik Indonesia</i>)
Malari	: 15 January havoc (<i>Malapetaka 15 Januari</i>)
Kopassus	: Special Forces Command (<i>Komando Pasukan Khusus</i>)
Kostrad	: Army Strategic Command (<i>Komando Cadangan Strategis</i>)
KPU:	: General Elections Committee (<i>Komisi Pemilihan Umum</i>)
Masyumi Party	: Council of Indonesian Muslim Associations Party (<i>Partai Majelis Syuro Muslimin Indonesia</i>)
MD3	: MPR, DPR, DPRD and DPD (People’s Consultative Assembly, People’s Representative Council, Regional People’s Representatives Council. And Region’s Representatives Council)
MEF	: Minimum Essential Force
MPR	: People’s Consultative Assembly (<i>Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat</i>)
New Order Regime	: A regime during Soeharto’s presidency (<i>Rezim Orde Baru</i> , 1966 – 1998)
New Paradigm	: New Paradigm (<i>Paradigma Baru</i>) refers to the concept introduced by the Indonesian military to cope with <i>Reformasi</i> environment

NKRI	: Republic of Indonesia Unitary State (<i>Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia</i>)
NU	: Nahdlatul Ulama, a traditionalist Sunni Islam group in Indonesia, was established on 1926 as a reaction to the modernist Muhammadiyah organization
Pancasila	: Five principles (Indonesia's state foundation)
PAN	: National Mandate Party (<i>Partai Amanat Nasional</i>)
PD	: Democrat Party (<i>Partai Demokrat</i>)
PDI-P	: Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (<i>Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan</i>)
Pilkada	: Regional Leaders Elections (<i>Pemilihan Kepala Daerah</i>)
PKB	: National Awakening Party (<i>Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa</i>)
PKI	: Indonesian Communist Party (<i>Partai Komunis Indonesia</i>)
PKS	: Prosperous Justice Party (<i>Partai Keadilan Sejahtera</i>)
PNI	: Indonesian National Party (<i>Partai Nasional Indonesia</i>)
POLRI	: Indonesian National Police (<i>Kepolisian Negara Republik Indonesia</i>)
PPP	: United Development Party (<i>Partai Persatuan Pembangunan</i>)
Pribumi	: Native or indigenous people
Prolegnas	: National Legislation Project (<i>Proyek Legislasi Nasional</i>)
Putra Daerah	: Local sons or people in a particular region
Reformasi	: Reformation, An era after the fall of Soeharto
Sospol	: Social and Political (<i>Sosial dan Politik</i>)
SBY	: Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, 6th Indonesian President
UU	: Laws (<i>Undang-Undang</i>)
UUD 1945	: 1945 Constitution (<i>Undang-Undang Dasar 1945</i>)
Wansospolsus	: Central Council of Socio-Political Affairs (<i>Dewan Sosial Politik Pusat</i>)
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