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Review of The Costs of Federalism by Robert T. Golembiewski and Aaron Wildavsky

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assessment of distinctive features of state versus local levels of government in relation to women's issues and women's participation in elected elites, remain largely undeveloped. However, with these reservations aside, *Political Women* is recommended as a long-overdue set of readings filling an important literature gap.

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The Costs of Federalism: Essays in Honor of James W. Fesler. Edited by Robert T. Golembiewski and Aaron Wildavsky. (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1984. Pp. 330. \$29.95.)

This *festschrift* for James W. Fesler provides a wide variety of perspectives on federalism, broadly defined. As with so many contemporary essay collections, there is no single theme or conceptual framework to unite these analyses. Although the book's title implies a focus on the "costs" of federalism, none of the essays addresses this issue explicitly. Some of the essays do discuss consequences which their authors view as costs, yet there is an equal interest in federalism's benefits, and some essays treat federalism as a dependent variable in considering the conditions that make it possible. Nor do the essays assume a single conceptualization of federalism. In his introductory essay, Wildavsky offers an umbrella definition of federalism as "the diverse organizational elements of modern pluralist democracy" (p. 4) which is necessary to encompass the variety of subjects discussed. The essays range from Nelson Polsby's analysis of the prospects for American pluralism, which does not (except in the essay's title) mention federal structure, to Fred Greenstein's essay on President Eisenhower's views on administrative delegation, to Carolyn J. Tuohy and Robert G. Evans' discussion of decentralized health planning in Ontario. Although there is no unifying theme in this volume, these original essays are of high quality and taken together or individually will be of interest to political scientists with divergent concerns.

The weaker of these essays are in a section titled "A Plurality of Conceptions" (pp. 21-69), which includes the Polsby essay mentioned above and contributions from Theodore Lowi and Wildavsky. Lowi argues that the historical absence of a socialist movement in the United States is largely a consequence of the federal structure, but his claim to the originality of this thesis is undermined by his own quotations from Madison's *Federalist*

#10. Wildavsky's essay, "Federalism Means Inequality," is full of intriguing insight but suffers from a fuzzy conceptualization of equality defined largely through the familiar distinction between equality of "opportunity" and "result." He fails to explain why his conclusion that "federalism and equality of result cannot coexist" (p. 68) applies only to "result." Federalism's role as a support for segregation in the South suggests otherwise.

The best of the volume's essays offer empirical descriptions of centralization/decentralization issues in contemporary regimes. Two describe recent developments in American intergovernmental relations: First, Donald Kettl offers a model of the segmentation of intergovernmental politics between congressional preoccupation with distribution, issue network dominance of substantive ends, and third-party dominance, often in the form of nonprofit organizations, of service delivery. Second, David Caputo traces the impact on American cities of first the expansion then the reduction of federal aid to the cities. In an essay on campaign finance reforms, Herbert Alexander argues that recent efforts by both the Republican and Democratic parties to increase centralized fund raising through the party organization are not likely to alter significantly the highly decentralized character of campaign funding sources. A comparative perspective on these American developments can be found in Alfred Diamant's elegant description of the French Socialist government's program of administrative decentralization. He says these reforms, although grounded in incremental evolution in the postwar period, are dependent on "continued Socialist political control at all levels of government" (p. 162), an increasingly problematic situation.

Rounding out the book are three proposals for reform: One is Garry Brewer's proposal for "termination" as the missing ingredient in the recent industrial policy debate. Second, Golembiewski suggests a comprehensive shift from functional to areal organization in the federal bureaucracy. And, finally, James E. Swiss offers practical recommendations for improving administrative efficiency in the food stamp and AFDC programs.

In sum, the diversity of topics discussed in this book is its virtue, and perhaps a reflection of the man in whose honor it was written. In his concluding essay, Golembiewski emphasizes Fesler's ability as a teacher to "seek value from multiple orientations and perspectives" and to "encourage us to follow our methods of choice, while inspiring us with his standard of excellence" (p. 299). These abilities have clearly borne fruit in the work of his students presented in this volume demonstrating that diversity, a principle benefit of

federalism, has also been a benefit of Fesler's legacy to political science.

WILLIAM E. HUDSON

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Knowledge and Discretion in Government Regulation. By Ted Greenwood. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1984. Pp. xii + 283. \$34.95.)

Trained originally as a physicist, Greenwood has specialized in science and technology policy during his career in political science. He therefore brings an interesting perspective to government regulation concerning risk assessment of health or safety standards.

This book is based in part on interviews with "numerous" public and private officials focused on the EPA hazardous air pollutant program and the OSHA occupational health program. It is a revision of a 1981 report conducted under contract with the Office of Science and Technology Policy. The various chapter notes indicate a substantial review of the literature, relevant statutes or regulations, and major court cases. Therefore, the book is clearly an interesting and distinctive contribution to the science policy literature and helps extend that literature to issues of government regulation.

Its objective is, by "studying the interaction" between knowledge and discretion, to generate "a set of observations and an analytical framework useful for understanding and analyzing any public policy arena where science or engineering knowledge plays an important role" (p. vii). A central issue is that "the boundary between knowledge and discretion in regulation is fuzzy and their interaction is complex" (p. 221).

Knowledge means the state of scientific and engineering theory or information concerning a standard and what potential risks will be involved. "The central role of scientific and engineering knowledge is one of the most prominent features of environmental, health, and safety regulation and sets it apart from many other areas of social policy" (p. 273). More critically, this central role is greatly affected by "conflicting interpretations of deficient knowledge" (p. 2). Scientific knowledge is neither complete nor reliable. Nevertheless Greenwood concludes that federal agencies are generally competent in assembling and applying available scientific knowledge to final standards. "Final action by regulatory agencies is usually well grounded on scientific and engineering knowledge" (p. 273). The degree of success is affected by such factors as agency personnel,

structure, and procedures—but these factors are controllable.

The crucial problem lies in agency discretion (granted statutorily by Congress) to set standards based on administrative judgment. The book is therefore directed at "the nature of administrative discretion, how it is exercised, and how and to what extent it is constrained by knowledge" (p. 3). Values, policy orientations, and political considerations have a major role to play, because discretion must necessarily supplement deficient knowledge. "The most important causes of controversy in the regulatory arena are the exercise of discretion and procedural inadequacies" (p. 273). There are at least four dimensions to discretion: the ability to interpret statutory language, the right to balance conflicting values, the freedom to determine priorities, and the need to answer scientific issues.

The book contains valuable information on the two programs studied, and Greenwood's insights into the policy process are useful. However I found the presentation is to be unbalanced. The information and insights seemed to be subordinated to the author's clearly expressed goal of creating a general analytical framework capable of application to other policy arenas dependent on scientific information. The general framework overwhelmed the two policy areas studied. As a result, I found much of the presentation stilted. There is too much exposition of highly abstract arguments. I do not mean to be critical of the basic research involved: Much of Max Weber's most seminal work in sociology could be described in exactly the same terms. But the book is basic rather than applied research, despite its empirical foundation and policy orientation. In this sense, the book strikes me as unbalanced.

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Presidents, Politics, and Policy. By Erwin C. Hargrove and Michael Nelson. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1984. Pp. xii + 288. \$25.00, cloth; New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1984. \$11.95, paper.)

Scholars of the presidency have viewed presidential influence as a reflection of a wide and quite varied range of factors: his constitutional powers, abilities as a strategic bargainer, personality, organizational skills, and popularity with the public, to list only a few. But few attempts have been undertaken to integrate these disparate insights into a coherent account of the modern presidency. Hargrove and Nelson attempt