

THE BALTIMORE BUSINESS COMMUNITY AND
THE SECESSION CRISIS, 1860-1861

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CHAPTER I

FOREIGN TRADE AND MANUFACTURING, 1860

1. General Statistics

Baltimore in 1860 was the nation's fourth city, with a population of 212,418--well behind New York, Philadelphia, and Brooklyn, but comfortably ahead of Boston, New Orleans, Cincinnati, and St. Louis. One-fourth of the city's inhabitants were foreign-born, chiefly German and Irish; one-eighth were free Negroes; one per cent were slaves.¹ Together with its environs, Baltimore comprised over one-third of the population of Maryland, and had already become the financial, commercial, and manufacturing center of the Chesapeake Bay region and its hinterland. The city sprawled around the estuaries of the Patapsco River at tidewater, pushing more and more wharves into the Northwest Branch and edging relentlessly, after the manner of cities, into the once-rural areas of lower Baltimore County. Already, in 1860, the factory chimney was taking its place in the Baltimore skyline along with the black spars and the counting-house, but the city was then, as always, a seaport, and her other activities owed their existence to the nineteen feet of channel--at mean low water²--which connected the Basin and Harbor, in the Northwest Branch, with Chesapeake Bay.

¹U. S. Bureau of the Census, Eighth Census of the United States, 1860. Vol. I, Manufacturing (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1865), pp. 214, 611. The population broke down as follows: White, 184,520, including 52,497 foreign-born (32,613 German and 15,536 Irish); free Negro, 25,680; slave, 2,218.

²J. Thomas Scharf, History of Baltimore City and County (Philadelphia: Louis H. Everts, 1881), p. 289. The process of deepening the channel to a minimum depth of 22 feet had been going on for some time, rather slowly, but the war postponed completion of the task.

It was a big port, and a busy one. Four ships a day, on the average, arrived from or cleared for foreign harbors during 1860,³ and the total value of Baltimore's foreign trade in that year exceeded \$21,000,000.⁴ The figures since 1856, the record year for the pre-war period, show that the city was nearly recovered from the Panic of 1857, and reveal a slight and fairly consistent excess of exports over imports.

TABLE 1

ANNUAL VALUE OF IMPORTS AND EXPORTS, 1856-1860
(in millions of dollars)*

Year	Imports	Exports
1856	10.1	13.3
1857	11.0	11.4
1858	7.9	10.2
1859	10.4	8.7
1860	10.2	10.9

*Source: Baltimore Board of Trade, Eleventh Annual Report . . . , 1860 (Baltimore: Rose & Co., 1860), p. 51.

Baltimore had the best balance of all the major ports, as the following table indicates, but her total volume of trade was considerably behind that of Boston, New Orleans, and that perennial champion, New York.

³Compiled from the Reading Room Record Books of the Baltimore Merchants' Exchange. (Hereafter cited as RRRB.) These volumes, containing a daily record of arrivals and clearances, are in the Maryland Historical Society, Baltimore, Maryland.

⁴Baltimore Board of Trade, Eleventh Annual Report of the President and Directors, 1860 (Baltimore: Rose & Co., 1860), p. 51. (Hereafter cited as BBOT.)

TABLE 2

VALUE OF FOREIGN TRADE, 1860, BY CHIEF PORTS
(in millions of dollars)*

Port	Imports	Exports	Total
New York	233.6	120.6	354.2
New Orleans	22.9	107.8	130.7
Boston	39.3	13.5	52.8
Baltimore	10.2	10.9	21.1
Philadelphia	14.6	5.5	20.1

*Sources: U. S. 36th Congress, 2nd Sess., Senate Ex. Doc. 1087, Vol. VIII, Report of the Secretary of the Treasury on the Commerce and Navigation of the United States for the Year ending June 30, 1860 (Washington: George W. Bowman, 1860). Hereafter cited as Report on Commerce and Navigation. See also BBOT, 1860, p. 51.

2. Imports

Of the many items in Baltimore's list of imports, by far the most important were coffee and sugar.⁵ The coffee intake in 1860 was valued at \$3,291,000, and the sugar at \$3,043,000, the two products together comprising more than sixty per cent of the city's total imports. The bulk of the coffee came from Rio de Janeiro, with Pernambuco and a few lesser Brazilian ports supplying the remainder. This trade, which dated back to the early 1800's and had been increasing steadily since 1823, employed a large fleet of sturdy, tall-masted barks in the long "up-and-down" voyage between Rio and the Chesapeake. Baltimore ranked behind New York and New Orleans in the importation of coffee, and was

⁵See Appendix, Table 5, for a list of Baltimore's principal imports.

losing ground proportionately, but continued to possess a large, well-established share of the total business.⁶ The sources of the sugar were more varied, although Cuba, Porto Rico, and other islands in the West Indies furnished a growing majority, followed by Demerara (British Guiana), Brazil, Manila, and Louisiana.⁷ New York, receiving two-thirds of the nation's sugar imports, probably did not consider Baltimore's thriving trade as serious competition.⁸

Compared with coffee and sugar, Baltimore's other imports were less significant. High on the list of "secondary items," and important in its own department, was copper ore. Coming principally from Chile and Cuba, and to a lesser extent from Peru and the West Indies, more than \$600,000 worth of the reddish ore was received by the city's two large copper smelting companies in 1860. This figure represented nearly half of the national import, but the manufacture of copper in other areas depended more upon domestic ores. Following copper on Baltimore's list was iron and its various manufactures, coming chiefly, as might be expected, from Cardiff and the other British iron ports. Railroad iron, bar iron, unspecified manufactures, and pig iron made up ninety per cent of the \$450,000 receipts. As in so many instances, New York led the field in this department, receiving three-fifths of the foreign-made iron, while Boston, New Orleans, and Philadelphia took most of the

⁶Frank R. Rutter, South American Trade of Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Studies in History and Political Science, Fifteenth Series, IX (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1897), p. 32.

⁷BBOT, 1860, pp. 40-41. Most of the sugar from Louisiana, Brazil, and Manila came to Baltimore via Northern ports.

⁸See Appendix, Table 7, for a comparison of the principal imports of the major cities.

balance.

Baltimore's share in the importation of textiles was negligible. The receipts of cotton goods, valued at \$275,000 in 1860 and consisting chiefly of piece goods and hosiery, were dwarfed by the flow of manufactured cotton to New York; the other major ports, although far behind New York, ranked considerably ahead of Baltimore. This story was even more pronounced in the case of woolens, which constituted the country's largest import--Baltimore's receipts amounted to \$230,000, New York's to \$34,000,000. As for silk goods, which ranked behind woolens and just ahead of cottons in value as a national import, New York's share was even greater, Baltimore's virtually non-existent.⁹ The greedy city at the mouth of the Hudson likewise seized the lion's share of the \$10,000,000 flax and linen import, another item barely mentioned in the Baltimore figures. Cotton goods and woolens placed sixth and eighth, respectively, among Baltimore's imports, and therefore deserve notice as items in her foreign trade, but the heavy direct shipments from the looms and mills of Great Britain and western Europe went primarily to New York, sent lesser quantities to Boston, Philadelphia, and New Orleans, and favored Baltimore with the merest trickle.

Conditions were vastly different in the guano trade. This valuable fertilizer, found in large quantities on the mainland of Peru and in many tiny islands off the Peruvian coast, was a major factor in the successful efforts at soil reclamation then under way in Virginia,

⁹Report on Commerce and Navigation, pp. 489-491, values Baltimore's importation of silk and its manufactures at \$1,900 for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1860; BBOT, 1860, p. 53, lists the receipts of silk for the calendar year at less than \$1,000.

Maryland, and states farther south, and was shipped chiefly to Baltimore for distribution to this growing Southern market.¹⁰ The Peruvian government held a monopoly on all the guano deposits under its jurisdiction, consigned it to two or three chosen houses in the United States, paid these houses a commission based on the proceeds from the sales, and fixed prices so as to make a \$15 per ton profit.¹¹ Using these figures to compute the value of Baltimore's guano imports, the receipts--50,000 tons in 1860--must have amounted to at least \$750,000.¹² On the basis of tonnage, Baltimore led all of her rivals in the importation of this aromatic but highly useful commodity, receiving sixty per cent of the total amount--a majority worthy of New York.¹³

Another item of moderate importance was molasses, which came from the big sugar-producing areas in the West Indies and Demerara. Here again, Baltimore's share was comparatively small--a little over \$250,000 out of a \$5,000,000 trade--but the molasses import was well divided among the leading ports, and the city was not hopelessly outdistanced by her rivals. Raw hides and skins, another Latin American product, were valued at \$228,000 in Baltimore while the combined receipts in

¹⁰Avery O. Craven, Soil Exhaustion as a Factor in the Agricultural History of Virginia and Maryland, 1606-1860, University of Illinois Studies in the Social Sciences, Vol. XIII, March, 1925 (Urbana, Ill.: University of Illinois, 1925), pp. 148 ff.; Rutter, op. cit., pp. 39, 42-43, 49.

¹¹Rutter, op. cit., pp. 40-41, 49.

¹²Ibid., p. 49, n. 2. The low figures in the records--\$233,672 in the Report on Commerce and Navigation, and \$154,621 in BBOT 1860--are based on the cost of loading the guano: \$1.50 to \$2.00 per ton. A far better estimate of the value of the guano import, as Rutter indicates, is obtained by using the profit per ton realized by the Peruvian government.

¹³Report on Commerce and Navigation, pp. 412-413. Baltimore received more than twice as much guano as her nearest competitor, New York.

New York and Boston, where the bulk of the trade had been permanently diverted after 1850,¹⁴ totaled more than \$9,000,000. New York and New Orleans received three-fourths of the manufactured and unmanufactured tobacco shipped from abroad, with San Francisco running third and Baltimore a poor fourth. Her tobacco imports, coming chiefly from Cuba and Bremen, amounted to less than \$220,000; most of Baltimore's tobacco-laden vessels were outward bound.

A comparatively new and growing branch of Baltimore's trade was the importation of fruit from the Mediterranean. Although Baltimore business men looked forward to "a still further increase" in the foreign fruit trade,¹⁵ most of the vessels that cleared Palermo or Malaga with their cargoes of oranges, raisins, and lemons were bound for New York and Boston, the total receipts of fruit in these two ports amounting to nearly twenty times those of Baltimore. Other imports with a value in excess of \$100,000 were salt and saltpeter, the majority of it from Liverpool; earthen and willow wares from Great Britain and France; and fish, under the Reciprocity Treaty, from British North America. The combined importation of alcoholic beverages--wines, brandy, spirits, beer, ale, and porter--was valued at slightly less than \$100,000. Burnt bone and bone dust from the La Plata River (the "River Plate," as it was known in maritime parlance), soda ash and like products from Great Britain, dolls and toys from northern Europe, non-woolen rags from the Italian states, hair from South America and

¹⁴Rutter, op. cit., p. 25.

¹⁵BBOT, 1860, p. 28.

mohair from Britain and Germany, cocoa from Venezuela and the West Indies, and palm oil from Africa, round out the items worth mentioning.

3. Exports

If sugar and coffee were the giants among Baltimore's imports, her export trade was equally overshadowed by tobacco and flour. America's principal exports during the 1850's were cotton, specie and bullion, together comprising two-thirds of the total value of exports in 1860.¹⁶ Most of the cotton was shipped from New Orleans and the other cotton ports--Mobile, Charleston, and Savannah--and nearly all of the specie and bullion was shipped from New York; shipments of these commodities from Baltimore were insignificant.¹⁷ But in tobacco and flour, which ranked third and fourth on the national export list, Baltimore occupied a strong position. Nearly \$4,000,000 worth of tobacco cleared Baltimore during 1860, in vessels bound for Holland, the German ports, England, France, and Spain. The city trailed New Orleans but ran well ahead of New York and the other ports, and exported more than twenty per cent of the national total. In the flour trade Baltimore shipped roughly fifteen per cent, or 400,000 barrels with a value of \$2,100,000. Brazil and the West Indies were her two largest customers, each taking one-third, with Britain and British North America receiving most of the balance. Baltimore was second to New York as an exporter of flour, comfortably outranking Richmond, Philadelphia, and Boston. In value, tobacco and flour made up three-fifths of Baltimore's exports.

¹⁶See Appendix, Table 8, for a comparison of the principal exports of the major cities.

¹⁷See Appendix, Table 6, for a list of Baltimore's principal exports.

Wheat was the third commodity. In the latter half of the year, a suddenly increased demand from Great Britain sent ship after ship up the Chesapeake to fill her hold with grain; by December 31, over half a million bushels, valued at nearly \$850,000, had cleared Baltimore for Liverpool, London, and other points in the British Isles. Some \$50,000 worth of biscuit and bread rounded out the export of wheat and its products. Following wheat and wheat flour came corn and corn meal--at a respectful distance, but fairly important nonetheless, with a combined export value of nearly \$500,000. Rice, valued at less than \$100,000, and an unimportant quantity of rye, rye meal, and barley, made up the rest of the trade in grains. Great Britain, British North America, and Cuba consumed the bulk of the corn meal; British North America, Porto Rico, and the smaller islands in the West Indies took most of the corn; and Cuba, Bremen, and Britain consigned most of the cargoes of rice. New York, as usual, led in the export of most of the grain products, but Baltimore's share of the trade was substantial and, in the aggregate, larger than that of her other rivals.

New York and Boston exported four-fifths of American cotton manufactures, leaving Baltimore in third place with a modest five per cent. Altogether, including white, printed, and colored cloth, cotton duck, and other manufactures, Baltimore's export of cotton goods was valued at \$565,000--one more set of items for the hard-working schooners and stocky brigs to deliver in Valparaiso or Halifax or Havana or the River Plate, one more cargo for the holds of the tall barks and full-rigged ships that rolled down to Rio on the coffee shuttle.

Meat and other animal produce constituted a large and important group of American export commodities. The shipment of actual livestock

(horses, cattle, and hogs) was the least significant item in this category, and was hardly practiced at all from the major Atlantic ports; Canada and the Maritime Provinces formed the only real market for live animals, hence Detroit, Vermont, and various small New England ports handled most of the trade.¹⁸ The most valuable animal exports were the so-called provisions--pork, beef, ham and bacon, butter, cheese, lard. Including tallow as well, Baltimore's total trade in animal products amounted to \$850,000, mostly consigned to Cuba, Porto Rico, and the numerous small West Indian islands, where the master of a schooner, if he had something to sell, could load his vessel with sugar for the Chesapeake. In all of these products, New York enjoyed a lead that ranged from comfortable to commanding; Great Britain was usually the largest single market for provisions, and New York was eager to find goods that might help balance the westward flow of woolens, cottons, cutlery, and other English manufactures. Baltimore, however, vied on better terms with New Orleans, Boston, Portland, and Philadelphia for the runner-up position in the export of each commodity, and despite the enterprise of the New York merchants, there was enough trade left over to go around.

Baltimore's export of wood and its manufactures, valued at nearly \$400,000, included everything from household furniture and naval stores down to staves and heading, shingles, boards, oak bark, and plain lumber. In the export of general wood manufactures, New York, Portland, and Boston were far ahead, followed shortly by Philadelphia and, a distant fifth, Baltimore. New York and Boston dominated the household

¹⁸ Report on Commerce and Navigation, pp. 322-323. Vermont's "sea-ports" were, of course, on Lake Champlain.

furniture trade; New York and the New England ports shipped most of the boards, plank, scantling, and other lumber; New York, New Orleans, and Norfolk exported most of the staves and heading. North Carolina, source of the naval stores, sent the greater part to New York and Boston for overseas shipment. Only in the oak bark trade (an important item in the tanning of leather), did Baltimore stand up among the leaders, and this branch of the wood export was relatively unimportant. Baltimore wood products probably found their chief markets in Cuba and the West Indies, which consumed the largest percentages of American timber and its manufactures; England, naturally, demanded the bulk of the naval stores. In 1860, Baltimore was not, comparatively speaking, an important center for the export of wood products.¹⁹

The national export of adamantine and other candles was not large, totaling only a little over \$700,000 in 1860. The chief customers were Cuba, Porto Rico, and the British West Indies, and Baltimore handled a sizeable share of the trade, finishing behind New York but ahead of the other major candle-exporters, Boston and Philadelphia. In the even smaller refined-sugar trade, Baltimore actually led the pack, shipping well over one-third of the total and enjoying, for once, a thumping fourteen-to-one advantage over New York. The greatest demand for refined sugar came from Chile, Brazil, British North America, Africa, Uruguay, and Argentina--an example of how far some of the original brown sugar from the cane-fields of Cuba and Porto Rico had

¹⁹Lumber was actually a big item in Baltimore's trade, but it figured almost entirely in domestic and interior trading. See below, pp. 38-39.

to travel before reaching the ultimate consumer.

Although one of the most essential items in nineteenth century economic activity was coal, the United States in 1860 exported less than 200,000 tons; American mines were engaged primarily in supplying American furnaces, and the other major coal-using nations had more accessible sources of supply. Of the total shipment, valued at nearly \$750,000, Baltimore exported about one-seventh and finished second only to New York. Various Great Lake ports, notably Cleveland and Oswego, handled the large Canadian demand; New York sent coal to China and the Maritime Provinces; and Baltimore supplied the familiar markets of Cuba and South America. Cuba was also the largest single market for American iron manufactures, but Baltimore's share of this \$5,000,000 trade, in spite of her extensive dealings with Cuba, amounted to less than two per cent, and was dwarfed by the shipments from New York, Philadelphia, and Boston.

This brief synopsis of the foreign trade of Baltimore has shown, first of all, the great predominance of New York in almost every major commodity, a predominance that makes the thriving business in the other ports seem puny by comparison. Baltimore's own lines of trade were clearly marked. Aside from a large tobacco trade with Bremen, Holland, England, and France, and a sizeable export of wheat and flour to Great Britain, all of Baltimore's important maritime activity was connected with Latin America--the one area of successful competition with the Big City to the northward. Most of the flour, cotton goods, corn and corn meal, provisions, wood, coal, refined sugar, and candles that followed tobacco as Baltimore's major exports found their way to the West

Indies, Brazil, and other ports south of the border. Those commodities formed the return cargoes for the big trade in Latin American products on which Baltimore's foreign trade was based: sugar and molasses from the Indies and Demerara, coffee from Brazil, copper ore from Chile and Cuba, guano from Peru and a host of tiny islands, hides from the River Plate, "segars" from Havana. European textiles and other manufactures, Mediterranean fruit, and the wood and wood products from the Maritime Provinces and the west coast of Africa, were comparatively minor items.

Even the big tobacco shipments to Europe had a Latin American twist. It was a complicated and roundabout triangular trade, evidently worked out as a rather laborious method of competing with New York's near-monopoly on the Atlantic shuttle. Tobacco-laden ships clearing Baltimore for Bremen or Rotterdam returned via Peru, doubtless selling European merchandise to the South Americans, and completed the triangle laden with guano for Baltimore.²⁰

4. Manufacturing

As a manufacturing center, Baltimore had an increasing but still moderate importance. The city and its environs contained forty per cent of the manufacturing establishments in Maryland, employed well over half of the invested capital, and turned out more than three-fourths of the

²⁰The existence of this tobacco-guano triangle was indicated by the RRRB. The volumes covering arrivals and clearances in 1860 showed that all of the vessels arriving with guano from Peru later cleared for Bremen or Holland. There were no clearances from Baltimore direct to Peru, and in the trade with northern Europe this was balanced by an excess of clearances over arrivals (involving Baltimore) at the German and Dutch ports. See Appendix, Tables 16 and 17.

annual value of the products.²¹ The Baltimore area produced more during 1860 than any Southern city, St. Louis included, and, indeed, more than any Southern state with the exception of Virginia.²² On the other hand, Baltimore was far out-distanced by the large industrial centers in New England, New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania. The statistics on manufacturing reveal the tremendous difference between the South and the North at this time, and show that Baltimore, essentially a border city, would have added some twenty per cent to the South's total industrial output but formed an insignificant fraction of the production in the North.²³ In the Chesapeake Bay area Baltimore was the only real manufacturing center, comfortably ahead of Richmond.

Baltimore's most important industry, based on the annual value of the product, was the manufacture of men's clothing, in which 119 establishments turned out well over \$3,000,000 worth of goods.²⁴ This figure trailed, but compared favorably with, the output of men's clothing in New York, Philadelphia, Cincinnati, and Massachusetts, and comprised a little less than four per cent of the nation's \$80,000,000 industry.²⁵ Second in value to the production of men's clothing, and to a certain extent connected with it, was Baltimore's \$3,000,000 cotton textile industry, produced by eleven mills scattered through lower Baltimore

²¹U. S. Eighth Census, 1860, Vol. III, Manufacturing, p. 228.

²²Ibid., passim.

²³See Appendix, Table 9, for comparison of manufactures by sections.

²⁴See Appendix, Table 10, for list of Baltimore's principal manufactures.

²⁵See Appendix, Table 11, for a list of the principal manufactures of the United States by leading city or county industrial centers.

County and one within the city limits.²⁶ New England, of course, led in the production of cotton goods, and Baltimore's share was less than three per cent.

Baltimore also contained forty-one mills for the grinding of flour and meal, an industry which in 1860 was far and away the country's largest. It was not confined to big cities, nor to concentrated areas, but the Baltimore milling center was one of the most important--ahead of Philadelphia and New York, equal to Richmond, and only a short way behind Buffalo and St. Louis.

At this time there were thirty-nine sugar refineries in the United States, turning out an annual product valued at over \$42,000,000. New York's fourteen establishments were responsible for something less than half of this amount. If her refineries were approximately equal in size, Baltimore's two plants must have been among the largest in the nation, with a combined product worth \$2,300,000.²⁷ In any case, Baltimore's share of the sugar refining business was a substantial one.

The iron factories in the Baltimore area turned out bar and sheet iron, castings and stoves, pig iron, blooms, bridges, and bedsteads; there were twenty-four establishments, and the combined value of the

²⁶The manufactures of Baltimore County have been considered, in this study, as a part of the Greater Baltimore industrial area.

²⁷The Eighth Census only lists one sugar refinery in Baltimore, but Scharf, *op. cit.*, p. 418, and the Baltimore City Directory for 1860, comp. by J. G. Woods (Baltimore: J. G. Woods, 1861), name two--the Baltimore and the Maryland Steam Sugar Refining Companies. Shipping merchants Kirkland, Chase & Co., agents for the latter refinery, temporarily suspended in the fall of 1860, and their refinery may have ceased operations for a few weeks just as the Census was taken.

iron products was nearly \$2,000,000. Pennsylvania had no rivals in the iron industry; New York was firmly in second place; and Maryland, with most of her iron-works in Baltimore, ranked fairly far down on the list. The area also possessed ten firms employed in the manufacture of machinery and steam engines, but once again the \$1,500,000 annual product lagged considerably behind those of New York, Pennsylvania, and other Northern states.

Other industries of major importance were the beef, pork, and oyster-packing houses, whose annual product totaled \$2,000,000; two copper smelting plants, which turned out more than one-fourth of the nation's copper; eleven carriage factories, forty furniture factories, and thirteen lumber mills; more than 250 boot and shoe establishments; twenty-one leather tanneries and two large tallow factories; ten soap and candle makers; 127 cigar-makers; four woolen textile mills; 28 distilleries and breweries; 37 firms producing tin, copper, and sheet-iron ware; sixteen shipbuilders and sixteen other establishments engaged in ship-smithing, sail and cordage making, etc.; sixty-eight bakeries; four manufacturers of agricultural implements; and forty-four brick-making establishments. These industries, together with the previously mentioned cotton textile, men's clothing, flour, sugar, and iron producers, accounted for nearly all of the value of the city's industrial products, employed most of the workers, and represented the bulk of the invested capital.

The close connection between Baltimore's industry and her foreign trade is easily seen. In addition to meeting the local demand, the millers were turning out flour for the long voyage to the coffee plan-

tations around Rio; the meat-packers were putting up beef and pork and ham and bacon for the brigs and schooners which returned from the West Indies with sugar for the Baltimore refineries. The copper smelting plants depended on the arrival of vessels laden with Chilean or Cuban ore, while ships with hides from the River Plate kept the tanneries at work, and the boot and shoe makers liked busy tanneries. Latin Americans bought clothing, textiles, iron manufactures, tallow, and candles from Baltimore manufacturers. The firms engaged in preserving fruit watched for the ships from Malaga and Palermo. The various aspects of trade and industry seem to fall in place neatly, like the pieces of a puzzle.

The pieces fit, but many are missing; the picture is only half-drawn. There are important areas of Baltimore's economic activity for which the records are incomplete or non-existent or seldom looked at, yet which greatly modify, supplement, and complete the total picture.²⁸ These are the records of the domestic trade, of the goods that moved in and out of Baltimore by freight car, by canal boat and wagon, by steamboat and coasting schooner--the figures that reveal the source of Baltimore's exports and the ultimate destination of her imports. When this side of the story is evaluated, in so far as such an evaluation is possible, the city can be connected not only with foreign ports and

²⁸The statistics and data in this chapter have been taken largely from carefully kept records which, if not entirely accurate in every instance, at least provide the closest measurement possible. The census gathered figures on the size, type, and number of manufacturing houses, and the customs-house counted the ships and valued the cargoes that moved to and from ports outside the United States. Any attempt to discover Baltimore's connection with other parts of the country must delve deeper into the records.

foreign products, but with various areas in the interior and along the coast. Only then will it be possible to gain a complete understanding of Baltimore's intricate commercial and manufacturing network.

CHAPTER II

INTERIOR AND COASTWISE TRADE, 1860

1. Routes to the Interior

The highways by which American seaports traded with other parts of the country before the Civil War included roads, canals, railroads, navigable rivers, and the ocean. In 1860, statistics for produce arriving in Baltimore by wagon are completely lacking. The city's Corn and Flour Exchange, in listing the annual receipts of grain, computed the totals arriving by rail and water, then simply added a flat ten per cent of this figure as "receipts per wagons."¹ Farmers and storekeepers in Baltimore's immediate hinterland, unless situated conveniently close to Chesapeake Bay or a rail line, naturally traded with the city by wagon, but long-distance wagon traffic could not compete with the railroad, the canal boat, the river steamer, or the coasting schooner where any of these methods of transit were available. Goods arriving by wagon, in the absence of figures, may be regarded as of minor importance, doubtless adding to the totals something like the ten per cent allotted by the Corn and Flour Exchange in the case of grain. The amount of produce arriving by wagon from any point beyond the local market was bound to be negligible.

Unlike New Orleans, New York, and Mobile, Baltimore had no navigable streams extending from her wharves into the interior, but Chesapeake Bay and its tributaries provided a more than adequate substitute.

¹Baltimore Corn and Flour Exchange, Sixth Annual Report of the President and Directors, 1860 (Baltimore, 1860), p. 11.

Steamboats and sailing craft connected Baltimore with every deep-water arm of the Bay--with the northeastern and southern sections of Maryland, with the Eastern Shore, with southern and eastern Virginia--and with the communities on the James, York, Potomac, and Rappahannock rivers. The Bay and its rivers had been influential in creating for Baltimore a large, varied, and expanding "local" market extending many miles from the forest of spars and rigging in the Northwest Branch.

Chesapeake Bay also enabled Baltimore to claim the rank of terminus on two busy canals to the northward--the Chesapeake and Delaware, a thirteen mile link between the two bays, and the Susquehanna and Tide Water, which paralleled the Susquehanna into the Pennsylvania anthracite region. By the former, Baltimore was moved many miles closer to Philadelphia and New York; by the latter, she was able to tap the resources of eastern and central Pennsylvania in successful competition with Philadelphia.²

As a rail center the city could afford to be proud of itself. The star, of course, was the Baltimore and Ohio, Baltimore's own railroad and vital link with the West. The B. & O. could send its trains clattering past Harper's Ferry and through the Appalachians clear to the Ohio River, where, at Wheeling, Benwood, and Parkersburg, tall side-wheelers exchanged cargoes with the box cars, and trains across the river waited with produce from Illinois and the Lakes.³ A good

²See James W. Livingood, The Philadelphia-Baltimore Trade Rivalry, 1780-1860 (Harrisburg: Pennsylvania Historical & Museum Commission, 1948), ch. III, esp. pp. 56 ff. This competent study contains much valuable information about the economic development of eastern and central Pennsylvania.

³Edward Hungerford, The Story of the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad, 1827-1927 (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1928), I, 264-267, 305.

connection with the growing American Midwest had long been a necessity for the big Atlantic ports. During the 1850's, New York had built to Lake Erie at Buffalo and Dunkirk; Boston had finally gotten through to Albany and a connection with the recently organized New York Central; Philadelphia had pushed the Pennsylvania Railroad into Pittsburgh--and Baltimore had reached the Ohio at three points in western Virginia. The B. & O. also gave the city a line to Washington, but the road's great value was as a highway between the seaboard and the trans-Allegheny interior, and even before becoming a through route West it had done a tremendous service both for Baltimore and for the industries, farms, and towns in western Maryland and northwestern Virginia.⁴

The other major rail connections were with the North and East. The Northern Central, representing another Baltimore scheme to cut in on Philadelphia's backyard,⁵ extended past York and Harrisburg to Sunbury--and anthracite coal. The line had several important junctions (notably one with the Pennsylvania at Harrisburg), which enabled Baltimore to approach a host of rich markets in territory not naturally her own. The Philadelphia, Wilmington & Baltimore Railroad was a major link in the chain of roads providing an all-rail route, of sorts, between Boston and Washington; by 1860, the P.W. & B. was building up its business in the shipment to New York and Philadelphia of Western produce brought to Baltimore by the B. & O., and thus securing a slice

⁴Milton Reizenstein, The Economic History of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, 1827-1853, Johns Hopkins University Studies in History and Political Science, Fifteenth Series, VII-VIII (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1897), pp. 72-77.

⁵See Livingood, op. cit., ch. VI, esp. pp. 116, 139.

of valuable through freight traffic.⁶ Strictly local lines in 1860 were the Western Maryland, reaching eighteen miles or so into the region west of the city; and the Annapolis & Elk Ridge, a Western Shore route that joined the B. & O. at the Relay House, eight or ten miles from downtown Baltimore.

2. The Coastwise Trade

Baltimore's final route to other American markets was traveled by the coasters, as the hundreds of vessels in this trade were called. They were not particularly different from their sisters in the foreign trade--some were built with shallower drafts, the better to navigate across the bars of Albemarle and Pimlico Sounds or into tiny Maine harbors; the average size was smaller than that of the overseas trader; but the multitude of schooners and the lesser fleets of brigs, barks, and ships that moved up and down the Atlantic coast were simply all-purpose sailing craft which, if duly registered, could and often did operate in both the foreign and coastwise trade.⁷

It is possible only to approximate the relative volumes of foreign and coastwise shipping, but even the available data show that the usually neglected coasters more than pulled their weight in the maritime activity of Baltimore.⁸ In 1860 the Merchants' Exchange recorded 632

⁶Philadelphia, Wilmington & Baltimore Railroad, Twenty-third Annual Report of the President & Directors to the Stockholders, 1860 (Philadelphia, 1861), p. 16.

⁷Only American ships were allowed to engage in the coastwise traffic, however. Foreign ships occasionally discharged a cargo in one American port and traveled up the coast to another in quest of a return load, but they were definitely barred from the coasting trade.

⁸The RRRB volumes provide the best source, supplemented by shipping news in the papers. The volumes, in addition to recording the daily

arrivals from foreign ports and 602 clearances for foreign ports,⁹ with American vessels outnumbering foreign craft about two to one. During the same twelve months there were 2,123 coastwise arrivals and 2,173 coastwise clearances, and these figures were by no means complete.¹⁰ The following table of arrivals compares the figures kept by two different sources.

TABLE 3
TOTAL ARRIVALS, FOREIGN & COASTWISE, 1860

Source	Steamers	Ships	Barks	Brigs	Schooners	Total
BBOT	510	121	190	287	1,318	2,426
<u>RRRB</u>	481 ^a	122	202	286	1,670 ^b	2,755

^aSteamer arrivals in the RRRB were supplemented by checking the lists in the Baltimore Price-Current for 1860.

^bThe big difference in the number of schooners is explained by the fact that the Board of Trade included no Bay craft in its computation of arrivals, while the RRRB reported the arrival of over 350 schooners from other Chesapeake Bay ports. See below, n. 10.

arrivals and clearances, listed the name and type of ship, the master, the consignee or sender, and, in the case of incoming vessels, the cargo.

⁹The foreign arrivals recorded by the RRRB for the calendar year 1860 compare favorably with those listed in the Report on Commerce and Navigation, pp. 557, 561, for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1860. (RRRB: 632 arrivals, 602 clearances; Report on Com. & Nav.: 617 arrivals, 593 clearances. The slight edge in the figures for the calendar year is accounted for by the greater exports of wheat to Britain and the larger imports of sugar from the West Indies that took place in the last six months of the year. Cf. BBOT, 1860, pp. 52-55, and Report on Commerce and Navigation, 1860, pp. 349, 499.

¹⁰In the first place, the RRRB made no attempt to report all of the arrivals and clearances for the immediate Bay area, although they noted several hundred. (See Appendix, Tables 16 and 17, for a breakdown of foreign and coastwise arrivals and clearances.) There were also omissions in the RRRB figures for steamships, which were partially remedied by checking the lists in the Baltimore Price-Current. Otherwise the RRRB was the most reliable source for this type of shipping information.

Even with an incomplete count of the Bay craft, the figures seem to give the coasters a heavy majority. This advantage is more apparent than real, as a study of the relative sizes of the different types of ships will indicate. For the purpose of computation, an arbitrary average tonnage has been given to each type, based on lists of typical vessels built during the 1830-1860 period.¹¹ Ships were averaged at 750 tons, barks at 325, brigs at 225, schooners at 100, and steamers at 500. The results are best shown in the following table.

TABLE 4
CLEARANCES, 1860*

Cleared for		Ships (750 T)	Barks (325 T)	Brigs (225 T)	Schooners (100 T)	Steamers (500 T)	Total
Foreign ports	No. 96 Tonn. 72,000	137 44,525	204 45,900	157 15,700	9 4,500	603 182,625	
Coastwise ports	No. 16 Tonn. 12,000	66 21,450	80 18,000	1,540 154,000	471 235,500	2,173 440,950	

*Source: RRRB, Vols. for 1860; Baltimore Price-Current, 1860.

In numbers, the coastwise clearances had a seven to two edge over the foreign clearances; in tonnage, allowing for the greater number of large vessels--ships, barks, brigs--in the foreign trade, the coastwise margin was reduced to five to two. Even an approximation of the tonnage involved provides a better measurement of the actual volume of trade than the mere number of ships. But in any case, even allowing

¹¹For lists of various vessels' dimensions, see Robert G. Albion, The Rise of New York Port, 1815-1860 (New York: Chas. Scribner's Sons, 1939), Appendix XVI, pp. 408-409; BBOT, 1860, p. 51; Fred E. Dayton, Steamboat Days (New York: Frederick A. Stokes Co., 1925), pp. 311, 316, et passim.

for error in the above estimates, it is fairly safe to say that Baltimore did a much greater amount of trading with other American ports than with foreign countries; the coastwise trade should not be omitted if the full scope of the city's economic activity is under consideration.

✓ Of equal significance is the breakdown of this coastwise traffic into its local, Northern, and Southern segments. The little coasting schooners and their larger brethren connected Baltimore with 156 American ports, from Galveston on the Gulf to Passamaquoddy on the Maine-New Brunswick border. In the Chesapeake Bay region it is a little difficult to isolate the local commerce from that going to farther points. Steamers shuttled back and forth on fairly regular schedules from Baltimore to Norfolk, Richmond, and occasionally to Fredericksburg and West Point and the Patuxent River, but the newspapers and Reading Room Record Books were careless in reporting their departures and arrivals; they paid somewhat more attention to the many schooners connecting Baltimore with the major Bay ports--Richmond, Norfolk, Alexandria, Petersburg, Fredericksburg. The point is that steamer and schooner service to these towns did not necessarily mean local traffic, for they were all important railheads with lines extending into central and southwestern Virginia and the "South proper." Purely local traffic, for the most part, moved in sloops, bugeyes, pungies, and tiny schooners--typical Chesapeake Bay craft too small and too numerous to be noted in their constant coming and going.¹²

¹²Maryland Historical Society, "Sailing Craft of the Chesapeake Bay" (Baltimore: Maritime Museum of the Maryland Historical Society, 1951). A small pamphlet containing brief descriptions and illustrations of the various Bay craft.

Baltimore's trade with the North and South is more easily compared. Excluding Maryland ports from both categories, and including all Virginia ports with the South, there were 794 Southern arrivals and 899 Southern clearances during 1860, as compared with 1,275 Northern arrivals and 1,200 Northern clearances. The comparative tonnages, using the same arbitrary values for each type of vessel, indicate that the North led the South in clearances, 252,225 tons to 170,925, and in arrivals, 263,575 to 158,000. Roughly sixty per cent of Baltimore's coastwise trade, then, was with Northern ports.

The coasters were by no means all regular traders--i.e., they did not shuttle constantly back and forth between Baltimore and a given port. Many schooners came down to Baltimore from New York or Boston to discharge a cargo of dry goods or boots and shoes, picked up a cargo of oysters or provisions, and proceeded to Charleston for a load of cotton, or to North Carolina for naval stores, whence they returned directly to their original port. This triangular trade, with its slight variations, explains the excess of Northern arrivals over Northern clearances, while the reverse held true for Baltimore's Southern trade. A few vessels also switched back and forth from the coastwise to the foreign trade, but most of them were employed with fair regularity between Baltimore and a given area--the various Maine ports, for instance, or the Hudson River towns. In addition to the spasmodically reported Bay steamers, there were regular steam packet lines from Baltimore to Philadelphia, New York, Boston, Charleston, Savannah, and--for a very brief period--Providence.¹³ Sailing packet

¹³Dayton, *op. cit.*, pp. 316-317. The Providence service was operated at a loss for a few weeks during 1860, and abandoned until 1873.

lines supplemented the steamer service to these and other points, and the other coasters alternated between a shuttle and a search for promising markets, wherever they might be found. Among the individual ports, Baltimore had the heaviest traffic with New York and Boston, followed by Richmond, Philadelphia, Charleston, Providence, Savannah, Norfolk, and Portland. Now that the outlines of the coasting trade and the main routes of overland travel have been summarized, the picture can be fairly well completed by an examination of the scope and direction of Baltimore's total activity in each important commodity. ✓

3. Principal Trades

By all estimates, the largest of the city's commercial interests was the dry goods trade, with an annual business of \$30,000,000.¹⁴ Dry goods included cottons, woolens, silks, and linens. The total value of Baltimore's manufacture and foreign importation of these materials during 1860 amounted to \$4,000,000, but the source of the \$26,000,000 balance is not hard to find. It came in the coasters from Northern ports, their holds filled with all the various types and weaves of cloth from the mills of New England and Philadelphia and the warehouses at the foot of Manhattan. "Schooner from New York--dry goods," "schooner from Boston--dry goods," "schooner from Philadelphia--dry goods," repeated the shipping columns of the Baltimore Pride-Current, week after week. Many of these textiles, of course, were manufactured in Europe--in Manchester, Leeds, Lyons, Brussels; nevertheless they were

¹⁴"Principal Trades of Baltimore," Hunt's Merchants' Magazine and Commercial Review, XLII (May, 1860), 565; BBOT, 1860, p. 47. See Appendix, Table 18, for a list of the principal trades.

imported by Northern merchants and sent to Baltimore in Northern vessels. Even though the ultimate source of the cotton manufactures was Southern (no attempt was made to break down these "dry goods" into their component cloths), the actual trade in the finished product, as far as Baltimore was concerned, represented chiefly a heavy tie with the North. Only the cotton for Baltimore's own mills, valued at \$2,600,000 and coming coastwise from Charleston, Savannah, and Mobile, or via B. & O. from the Southwest, could be called an undiluted Southern Connection.

The destination of these dry goods is harder to pin-point. Aside from meeting a substantial local demand and shipping a moderate quantity (\$500,000) abroad, most of the trade was with "Western and South-Western states, and nearby Virginia and North Carolina."¹⁵ The trade in dry goods with the "South proper," the Board of Trade went on, rather sadly, "has always been limited, notwithstanding our geographical and political connection with them."¹⁶ Hunt's Merchants' Magazine sounded a brighter note for the Southern dry goods connection, announcing that improved transportation facilities plus "a succession of good crops," which had enabled Southerners "to meet their indebtedness more promptly," was resulting in an increasing volume of trade with this section.¹⁷ The Baltimore & Ohio shipped 13,000 tons of dry goods to

¹⁵BBOT, 1860, p. 47.

¹⁶Ibid.

¹⁷"Principal Trades of Baltimore," op. cit., p. 565.

the Ohio River, and 7,000 tons to points east of the Ohio;¹⁸ 1,300 additional tons went from Baltimore to Pittsburgh via the Northern Central and Pennsylvania railroads.¹⁹ This merely indicates a market somewhere away from the Atlantic seaboard, since the Ohio River was a gateway to the West, Northwest, and Southwest alike. The most important markets for Baltimore textiles, then, can rather vaguely be summed up as Western, Southern, and local.

Baltimore by 1860 was a large and growing center for the manufacturing and marketing of ready-made clothing, chiefly men's, a business which was valued at \$7,000,000 annually. Three million dollars of this figure was actually made in Baltimore, using either textiles from the city's cotton mills or a part of the incessant "dry goods" arriving daily by schooner from the North. Since Northern clothing factories also supplied the \$4,000,000 balance of the trade, it was an activity which, as it increased, further strengthened Baltimore's Northern connections. The demand for this clothing is rather unsatisfactorily described, by the only source that mentioned distribution of the product at all, as "South, West, and local."²⁰

Second to dry goods was the trade in flour and grain, with a \$12,000,000 annual business. Wheat and corn streamed in to the Baltimore mills from western Maryland and the valley of Virginia, where

¹⁸See Appendix, Tables 12-15, for lists of goods transported to and from Baltimore via the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad.

¹⁹Northern Central Railway Company, Sixth Annual Report of the President and Directors to the Stockholders, 1860 (Baltimore: Jas. Lucas & Son, 1861), p. 40.

²⁰"Principal Trades of Baltimore," op. cit., pp. 568-569. Clothing was not separately itemized in the reports of the railroads, and must have been lumped together in the "Miscellaneous" category so dear to record-keepers of the day.

farmers were enjoying a new prosperity in the combination of an efficient route to market--the B. & O.--and a large, steady demand--South America, the West Indies, Britain, and the Northern states.²¹ An equal amount of grain moved eastward on the B. & O. all the way from the road's Ohio River terminals, showing that the Midwestern producers were as important to Baltimore as the Maryland-Virginia group. The third large source, perhaps the largest of all,²² was in those areas of eastern and central Pennsylvania tapped by the Northern Central.

More than 350,000 of the 966,000 barrels of flour inspected in Baltimore during 1860 came from the Ohio River towns, again indicating a Midwestern source of supply, while the balance was ground in mills nearer the city and whisked downtown on B. & O. and Northern Central freight trains. Now and then a schooner came up from Richmond and Petersburg with flour and grain, but this addition to the total was insignificant. Strictly minor items in the grain trade were oats and rye, most of which came from Pennsylvania, for the horses and distilleries, respectively, of Baltimore City.

Of the 3,000,000-odd bushels of corn received in Baltimore during 1860, 1,350,000 bushels were shipped coastwise, 470,000 to foreign ports, 220,000 were ground by city millers, 500,000 by distillers, and 500,000 bushels were sold for city consumption.²³ Without specific evidence one

²¹Craven, *op. cit.*, pp. 129-131.

²²Northern Central Railway, *Annual Report, 1860*, p. 40. The Northern Central lists a southward shipment of 16,236 tons of grain in 1860, as compared to 15,956 tons arriving in Baltimore via B. & O.--8,813 from the Ohio River and 7,143 from western Maryland and the valley of Virginia. The Northern Central does not specify how much of this southbound grain actually went clear to Baltimore, and a certain portion of it must have been destined for local mills and markets along the right-of-way. However, the majority must have gone to the Baltimore milling centers.

²³BBOT, 1860, p. 29.

way or the other, it is quite probable that the large shipments of coastwise corn had destinations both North and South. The story is slightly different in the case of wheat. Half of the 2,850,000 bushels received were ground into flour, 600,000 bushels were shipped abroad, and a slightly lesser amount was shipped coastwise.²⁴ Again, there is no breakdown of the coastwise shipment, but the Northern demand for wheat, either as an export commodity or for consumption, was far greater than that of the South, and it is extremely likely that the bulk of Baltimore's coastwise wheat cargoes was destined for Northern ports.²⁵

Nearly 400,000 barrels of flour were shipped abroad, and an equal amount was consumed locally; of the 120,000 barrels sent coastwise, by far the greater part must have gone to the Northern manufacturing centers, or to New York for export. The producing end of Baltimore's grain and flour trade, then, lay chiefly in the West and North, and in the South only insofar as the Shenandoah Valley and western Maryland were Southern areas. The consumers lived in Rio, Havana, Halifax, Sheffield, Porto Rico--and also, undoubtedly, in Lynn, Haverhill, Fall River, Trenton, and Newark. The South was by no means excluded from this trade, but the North and West were the key areas.

²⁴Ibid., p. 28.

²⁵Chesapeake & Delaware Canal Company, Forty-first General Report of the President and Directors, 1860 (Philadelphia: Alexander, 1860), pp. 12-13. A total of 131,807 barrels of flour and 792,000 bushels of wheat moved eastward (toward Philadelphia) on this canal during 1860, against a negligible shipment in the opposite direction. Not all of this wheat and flour was from Baltimore, of course, but the figures help to show that the Northern demand was heavy. See also the reports of arrivals in the New York Times, 1860, passim. Ninety per cent of the sailing vessels arriving in New York from Baltimore were laden with coal; wheat, flour, and lumber followed in that order.

Almost without exception, the beef, pork, ham, bacon, butter, and lard that made up Baltimore's \$7,000,000 provisions trade came from the West, in the freight cars of the Baltimore & Ohio and the Pennsylvania-Northern Central. Baltimore's own packing houses put up nearly \$1,000,000 worth of provisions in 1860, and one-third of the B. & O. shipments came from western Maryland and northern Virginia, but the West raised and slaughtered and packed most of the nation's meat; Cincinnati was still Porkopolis, and Chicago was on her way. In addition to a booming export trade in provisions--to the West Indies and South America, as usual--and a good local demand, Southern seaboard states kept the packing houses and coasting schooners busy,²⁶ while other quantities of provisions were probably shipped to New England for consumption and to New York for export.²⁷ Closely allied to the provisions trade was the \$4,000,000 livestock trade, again involving the West, the B. & O., and the Northern Central. A growing share of this livestock moved straight through from the West to New York and Philadelphia, via the Philadelphia, Wilmington & Baltimore line;²⁸ the rest provided business not only for the packing houses but also for the tanneries. Hides from Buenos Aires and Montevideo as well as from Ohio and Indiana were utilized by the Baltimore tanners, whose product competed with that of "numerous country tanners South and West, who

²⁶Scharf, op. cit., p. 382.

²⁷There are two bases for these conjectures. One is the almost complete absence of packing houses in New England, coupled with the heavy coasting trade between Baltimore and Boston which was almost bound to involve provisions as one cargo on the northward leg of the voyage. As for New York--her merchants were everywhere, and most of the products of the entire Atlantic coast were drawn to the East River for export. See Albion, op. cit., pp. 122 ff., et passim.

²⁸Philadelphia, Wilmington & Baltimore R.R., Annual Report, 1860, p. 16.

send their leather to this market for sale."²⁹

And the big buyers, as might be expected, were the Northern boot and shoe manufacturers, who got into the market coming and going. They bought the leather made by the Baltimore manufacturers and the "numerous country tanners South and West," shipped it coastwise or by rail to Philadelphia and New York and above all to New England, kept their factories whirring, and funneled schooners full of boots and shoes into Baltimore as fast as they could be sold and distributed.³⁰ Baltimore's own boot and shoe establishments had an annual output worth over \$900,000, but the Northern product dominated the market. The Baltimore Board of Trade grumbled a little about the higher prices resulting from leather which became a boot or shoe via a New England factory when the whole process could have been performed more cheaply by local bootmakers,³¹ but the simple fact was that there were not enough factories in Baltimore to meet the demand. Here was another major tie with the North.

The city's annual molasses and sugar trade was estimated at \$8,000,000. The big Baltimore refineries received the raw product not only from the West Indies and Demerara, but from Louisiana and Manila and Brazil via New York and the New England ports. Direct foreign imports accounted for three-fourths of the receipts; Louisiana sugar for the Baltimore market sometimes came direct, but more frequently it had been to Portland or Boston first.³² The refined sugar

²⁹BBOT, 1859, p. 61.

³⁰Ibid.

³¹Ibid.

³²Ibid., 1860, pp. 40-41.

and syrups went chiefly to the South and West, the local market, and into the Pennsylvania territory served by the Northern Central, while the Chesapeake & Delaware Canal carried sizeable amounts in both directions.³³ The sugar connection seems to have involved North, South, and West more or less indiscriminately, although in a larger sense the West, which furnished most of the flour and provisions on which the sugar trade depended, was the most important section.

The tobacco trade, with an annual business of some \$7,500,000, touched Baltimore in several ways. One major item was the heavy shipment of leaf tobacco to Holland, Bremen, France, England, and Spain-- Baltimore's most lucrative direct export to Europe. Bay craft, wagons, and freight cars brought Maryland leaf into the city from every corner of the state where tobacco could be grown, the receipts from this source constituting two-thirds of the total. All but a fraction of the rest was classified as Ohio leaf, and Kentucky and Virginia supplied the balance; the Ohio and Kentucky product further swelled the list of important commodities that rolled eastward over the "Main Stem" of the Baltimore & Ohio. Slightly more valuable than the export of leaf was the trade in manufactured tobacco--plugs for the backwoodsman, snuff for the dandy, cigars for the merchant, and a pipeful for just about anybody. Baltimore's 127 cigar-makers competed with "segars" from Havana, and there was a market for both; large quantities of Virginia manufactures did not freeze out a moderate import of European

³³ Baltimore & Ohio Railroad, Thirty-fourth Annual Report of the President and Directors, 1860 (Baltimore: Kelly, Hedian & Piet, 1860), pp. 99-101; Northern Central Railway, Annual Report, 1860, p. 40; Chesapeake & Delaware Canal Company, Annual Report, 1860, pp. 12-13.

brands. And these tobacco products--whatever Baltimoreans did not buy--went to Porto Rico and the West Indies by brig and schooner, to Philadelphia by canal boat, and across the Alleghenies behind a hard-working B. & O. freight engine.³⁴

This trade was a complex affair, and one of the interesting side angles concerns the farmer--any farmer--in Southern Ohio who raised a little tobacco. Perhaps he sent a hogshead or two of leaf down to the river, whence it moved by steamboat to the B. & O. warehouse at Parkersburg, Virginia, thence by freight car across the mountains to Baltimore, under the eyes of the inspector, and eventually into the hold of a square-rigger waiting to clear for Bremen. Once across the Atlantic, this same leaf might have moved in another steamboat up the Weser or the Maas or the Rhine, passed through a factory, recrossed the ocean to New York or Boston, thence by schooner to Baltimore, by rail to Parkersburg, down the Ohio, and into a pouch from which this same farmer, a year or so later, might be lighting his pipe.

Among the miscellaneous food products, perhaps the least complicated of the city's important trades was that of coffee. Valued at \$4,000,000, it came almost exclusively from Brazil and went almost exclusively to the West, with the North taking most of the balance.³⁵

³⁴BBOT, 1860, p. 51; Chesapeake & Delaware Canal Company, Annual Report, 1860, p. 13; Baltimore & Ohio R. R., Annual Report, 1860, pp. 99-101.

³⁵Baltimore & Ohio R. R., Annual Report, 1860, pp. 99-101; Northern Central Railway, Annual Report, 1860, p. 40. Out of the 15,000-odd tons of coffee imported, 12,700 tons went westward on the B. & O., and 1,300 more went into Pennsylvania on the Northern Central. Coffee was second in importance only to dry goods as westbound freight on the Baltimore & Ohio.

Nearly eighty per cent of the \$4,500,000 oyster trade also had a Western market.³⁶ The oysters were either preserved or packed raw, in ice, and sent to St. Louis, the chief distributing point, although there was also some demand for this Chesapeake Bay product in San Francisco, Australia, Europe, and South America.³⁷ The modest trade in salted fish, less than one-tenth as valuable as the oyster trade, depended on the Maritime Provinces and New England, and also found its chief market in the West. The last major food product was the \$1,500,000 foreign fruit business, which linked the Mediterranean and the Caribbean to Cincinnati and Louisville and Charleston and other points "South and West."³⁸

According to the Board of Trade, a large proportion of Baltimore's hardware business involved foreign manufactures.³⁹ This may have been true, but whether the hardware was turned out in Birmingham and Sheffield or in New England, nearly all of it came to Baltimore from Northern ports; out of a trade valued at \$4,000,000 annually, less than \$100,000 worth of "iron manufactures" was imported directly from Europe in 1860, while "hardware" is mentioned constantly among the cargoes arriving from New York, Boston, Providence, and smaller New England towns.⁴⁰ The large markets were again South and West, with the Southern portion increasing steadily.⁴¹

³⁶"Principal Trades of Baltimore," op. cit., p. 567.

³⁷BBOT, 1860, p. 48.

³⁸Ibid., p. 28.

³⁹Ibid., p. 61.

⁴⁰Compiled from RRRB, Vols. for 1860, and shipping lists in the Baltimore Price-Current, 1860, passim.

⁴¹BBOT, 1860, p. 51.

By far the largest bulk commodity handled in Baltimore, and one with a large total value, was coal. This trade, estimated at over \$3,000,000 in 1860, had two main sources--the big bituminous fields of Cumberland and western Virginia, tapped by the Baltimore & Ohio, and the anthracite regions of east-central Pennsylvania, accessible by the Northern Central Railway and the Susquehanna & Tide Water Canal. More than 700,000 tons of the two types of coal came into the city during 1860 on these three routes,⁴² and whatever the industries, engines, and furnaces of Baltimore did not want was readily swallowed up by the North--the George's Creek Coal and Iron Company alone sent 185 coal-laden schooners to New York, Boston, and Providence during the year.⁴³ The bituminous trade was evidently hurt by the high freight rates on the Baltimore & Ohio, by the low prices of anthracite, and by competition from the great Philadelphia market and from Nova Scotian coal,⁴⁴ but the increase in city consumption, the good connections with Pennsylvania anthracite, and the size of the Northern demand kept the total trade in a flourishing condition.

As previously indicated, Baltimore in 1860 controlled the bulk of the guano trade.⁴⁵ The demand was almost entirely Southern,⁴⁶ and

⁴²Baltimore & Ohio R. R., Annual Report, 1860, pp. 99-101; Northern Central Railway, Annual Report, 1860, p. 40; Livingood, op. cit., p. 80. The B. & O. carried 400,000 tons of bituminous into Baltimore; the Northern Central and the S. & T-W. Canal brought the anthracite (300,000 tons) in equal portions.

⁴³Compiled from RRRB, Vols. for 1860.

⁴⁴BBOT, 1860, p. 23; "Principal Trades of Baltimore," op. cit., pp. 570-571.

⁴⁵See above, pp. 5-6.

⁴⁶Rutter, op. cit., p. 43.

the biggest users were farmers from Virginia and Maryland, where the influence of guano upon the recent agricultural revival in these states was tremendous.⁴⁷ The North's connection in this trade was limited to a few coastwise shipments from New York and Philadelphia as a minor supplement to Baltimore's heavy receipts from Peru.

Baltimore added to her heavy importation of Chilean and Cuban copper ore by receiving shipments of domestic ore from the mines in western Maryland and Tennessee, via the B. & O., and from mines in the Southern seaboard states, via coaster.⁴⁸ The entire demand for refined and ingot copper from the Baltimore smelting companies was obviously from the North, since all of the copper rolling mills, sheeting mills, and bolt factories were located in New England, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania; the Chesapeake & Delaware Canal alone carried over 6,000,000 pounds of copper to Philadelphia in 1860.⁴⁹

The lumber that went into Baltimore's buildings, and into the ships, carriages, furniture, pianos, barrels, and other wood products manufactured in the city, came largely via canal and railroad from the forest-rich Susquehanna Valley.⁵⁰ Lesser amounts came from the West in B. & O. flat cars and from Georgia pine regions in Savannah and Charleston

⁴⁷Craven, op. cit., pp. 148-150.

⁴⁸Baltimore & Ohio R. R., Annual Report, 1860, p. 106; RRRB, Vols. for 1860. The B. & O. brought 7,849 tons of "iron and copper ore" to the city in 1860, while copper ore ranked behind cotton, rice, and lumber as a cargo of the schooners from Charleston and Savannah.

⁴⁹Chesapeake & Delaware Canal, Annual Report, 1860, p. 12.

⁵⁰Susquehanna & Tide-Water Canal, Annual Report, 1860, quoted in Livingood, op. cit., p. 75; Northern Central Railway, Annual Report, 1860, p. 40. The canal sent over 110,000,000 square feet of lumber southward in 1860, most of it to Baltimore, and 35,000 tons of lumber moved southward on the Northern Central. The principal Susquehanna product was white pine.

schooners. Naval stores, of course, came from the Tarheel State, and increasing amounts of miscellaneous wood products such as boards, planks, staves, scantling, etc., were being imported from Maine and the Maritime Provinces.

The city's \$2,000,000 iron trade involved both pig iron produced in the Baltimore area and goodly quantities received via Northern Central from Pennsylvania furnaces. Much of this pig iron was used in local manufactures, and 10,000 tons were shipped westward on the Baltimore & Ohio. Earthenware, china, queensware, glassware, and similar merchandise coming to the city from Europe and the North found a market "West and South."⁵¹ The North supplied Baltimore with nearly all of the books and papers--a trade valued at \$3,000,000--the hats and caps, drugs, paints, varnish, plaster and other products which the city used or sold to its Southern and Western customers. Foreign wines for planters' tables came to Baltimore largely from New York; whiskey for Southern tables came largely from the West; the tea marketed in Baltimore came from China in the great clippers, but up the Chesapeake only in humdrum schooners from New York and Boston.

4. Summary

The primary elements in Baltimore's economic set-up, as more and more of her major lines of trade are revealed, become increasingly clear. Like all great commercial centers, the city extended its interests into many areas and passed a great variety of products through its factories

⁵¹"Principal Trades of Baltimore," op. cit., p. 574.

and warehouses; there was nothing simple about the activities of the Baltimore business community in 1860. It is true, for instance, that the city's volume of trade with the South was extensive: Southern cotton, Southern lumber and naval stores, Southern rice and tobacco and farm produce, poured in to the Baltimore market in return for goods which Baltimore made available to the South--provisions, boots and shoes, textiles and clothing, hardware, sugar, meal, molasses, wines, whiskey, and a host of other items. Through the coasting schooners that moved into every navigable arm of Chesapeake Bay, connecting with the Southern railheads, and down the Atlantic coast into Albemarle Sound, Charleston, Savannah, Florida, and the Gulf; and through the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad with its Mississippi Valley connection, Baltimore enjoyed a heavy and profitable commerce with every corner of the Southland. Any interruption or breaking up of this commerce would have ruined many merchants and greatly weakened the city's entire economic structure--and Baltimore merchants knew it.

But Baltimore also looked westward. The West, with a more diversified economy, a greater population, and a much faster rate of growth, was equal to the South as an actual market and far greater as a potential one. Westerners drank nearly all of the coffee, ate most of the oysters and salt fish, wore as many boots and made as many clothes and consumed as much sugar and used as much hardware. The West's greatest value was as a source of supply. Without Western wheat and flour and beef and pork, Baltimore's entire trade with Latin America would have collapsed; without Western leaf tobacco, the major trade with Europe would have been considerably diminished. The Baltimore & Ohio and the

Pennsylvania-Northern Central were superior to the Mississippi as a means of reaching Cincinnati and St. Louis; already, though the '50's had been the boom decade on the Western rivers, the railroad was overshadowing the steamboat. A loss of the Western market and products would undoubtedly have been more damaging to Baltimore's economy than the loss of the South.

In the final analysis, the North was the most important section of all. If there was a dominant theme running through the outline of Baltimore's principal commercial activities, it concerned the city's dependence upon Northern ships and Northern factories for the products involved in the Southern and Western trades. A brief run-down of the major items--dry goods, clothing, boots and shoes, hardware, earthenware, hats and caps, books, drugs, paint--reveals that Baltimore neither imported from abroad nor manufactured enough to meet the demand, and whether the importers and jobbers wanted these products from Europe or from New England, New York, and Pennsylvania, they generally had to procure them from the Northern market. The North also furnished all of the anthracite and most of the lumber, and consumed much of the bituminous coal, nearly all of the copper, and a sizeable quantity of wheat and flour. There was certainly no mistaking the combined importance of the West and North. The twin props on which Baltimore's prosperity depended, and without which the house would have fallen, were the iron rails of the Baltimore & Ohio and the steamships and coasting schooners from Sandy Hook and Boston Harbor.

Dependent on all the major sections, the Baltimore merchants could study the political crisis in 1860 from the economic standpoint and be

convinced that preservation of the Union--in its entirety--was all-important. What might happen if the Union dissolved, in spite of the best efforts at compromise, was something else again. Baltimore had numerous political, social, and cultural ties with the South, including the powerful common bond of slavery; more significant from the business point of view was the damage inherent in the loss of the Southern market. Yet if Baltimore and the state of Maryland chose to secede, the loss of the Western and Northern commercial ties would be more than damaging. It would be suicidal--and in their ledgers and account books, if not in their hearts, the Baltimore merchants knew this, too.

CHAPTER III

BEFORE SUMTER

1. The Election of 1860

The people of Maryland, along with those of the other border slave-states, approached the election of 1860 with a good deal of excitement, not unmixed with apprehension. There were four candidates, four parties, four platforms, and an excessive amount of speech-making on many topics, but the real issue of the campaign was slavery, and with it the question, no longer academic, of whether the nation could endure half slave and half free. Abraham Lincoln had once remarked that he did not think it could. Many Southerners, foreseeing Lincoln's triumph at the head of a sectional, anti-slavery party, did not think so either, and most of the leading politicians of the Gulf states had already announced that the election of Lincoln would mean the disruption of the Union.¹ As a slave state, Maryland had the same grievances as the states farther South, and was definitely opposed to the election of a Republican president. On the other hand, socially and geographically much less Southern, and with far less of a stake in the institution of slavery,² Marylanders could not get too enthusiastic about the idea of a broken Union; talk of secession was almost as alarming as the speeches of the abolitionists.

¹Dwight L. Dumond, The Secession Movement, 1860-1861 (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1931), p. 99.

²Charles B. Clark, "Politics in Maryland during the Civil War," Maryland Historical Magazine, XXXVI (September, 1941), pp.248-252. The number of slaves in Maryland had been decreasing since 1790, while the number of free Negroes, negligible in 1790, was by 1860 almost equal to the slave population.

For the Baltimore business men the problem was especially difficult. The diversity and complexity of their economic interests has already been noted. They had gratefully seen and recorded the business upswing of 1860,³ only to be faced with threats of a post-election panic and depression; the possible secession of the cotton states, with an attendant disruption of established trade patterns, was more alarming still. Whatever their personal differences regarding the political situation, the Baltimore mercantile community naturally and unanimously desired to stay prosperous, and they faced the November election with the uneasy knowledge that there were uncertain times ahead for prosperity.

Although John Breckinridge, the candidate of the Southern Democratic Party, ultimately carried the state, most of the Baltimore business men chose to support John Bell and Edward Everett, the Constitutional Union candidates. The commercial interests of Maryland, largely centered in Baltimore, had early been supporters of the Whig Party and Henry Clay's American System.⁴ Maryland remained a Whig stronghold during the 1830's and 40's, and when the organization died out in the next decade, many former Whigs attached themselves or gave temporary support to the American or Know-Nothing Party.⁵ Even in Maryland, where the movement had been strongest, Know-Nothingism was dying out by 1860; for Whigs who had

³Board of Trade, Annual Report, 1860, p. 5; Corn and Flour Exchange, Annual Report, 1860, p. 5.

⁴Arthur C. Cole, The Whig Party in the South (Washington: American Historical Association; London: Oxford University Press, 1913), pp. 2-4.

⁵Ibid., pp.308-310, 315, 320; Laurence F. Schmeckebier, History of the Know-Nothing Party in Maryland, Johns Hopkins University Studies in Historical and Political Science, Series XVII, Nos. 4-5 (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1899), pp. 66-67.

consistently opposed the Democracy, the Constitutional Union Party was the next logical stopping-place.⁶

The Bell and Everett party contained more than an appeal to late Know-Nothings and die-hard Whigs. Its platform was Southern enough to satisfy all save the most ardent pro-slavery advocates,⁷ enabling Baltimore merchants who had small taste for Breckinridge Democracy to vote without compromising their Southern sympathies. Most attractive of all, however, was Bell's attitude towards the Union, which he favored, and towards slavery, which he ignored. This suited the Baltimore capitalist perfectly. He usually had friends and accounts in New England and the cotton country alike, and the topic of slavery impressed him chiefly as an obstacle in the path of smooth, expanding business relations; the less said about it, the better. The Constitutional Unionists talked about forgetting sectional strife and keeping the Union intact, and this was precisely the sort of thing profit-minded Baltimoreans wanted to hear.

For these reasons, then, the business men turned out to support Bell and Everett in large numbers. On Wednesday, October 24, during the last frenzied fortnight before election, "a number of influential merchants of our city" met to make plans for participating in the forthcoming Union demonstration on November 1, and Marston & Brothers, dealers in chinaware and crockery, donated the hall over their establishment at Baltimore and

⁶Schmeckebier, op. cit., pp.114-115; see also Dumond, op. cit., p. 92, who maintains that the entire Union Party was composed of "survivors of the Whigs with the American element especially prominent."

⁷Dumond, op. cit., pp. 93-94; Emerson D. Fite, The Presidential Campaign of 1860 (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1911), pp.242-243. The Union platform, while frowning at secession, definitely stressed state rights and constitutional protection of minorities.

and Hanover streets for future merchants' meetings.⁸ A group of merchants also chartered the Bay steamer Pioneer for the purpose of attending a "Grand Union" demonstration at Easton, over on the Eastern Shore,⁹ and on October 27 another Bell-Everett group assembled at the Marston brothers' hall to discuss the Baltimore Union demonstration.¹⁰

On October 30 and again on November 1 the Bell-Everett supporters held large mass meetings, for which the Baltimore business men turned out in droves.¹¹ The printed lists included most of the leading bankers, manufacturers, commission merchants, flour millers, dry goods and hardware firms, and embraced a large cross-section of every economic activity in Baltimore. The November 1 affair included a parade of the Minute Men, a volunteer militia outfit dedicated to the support of the Unionist candidates, who marched by torch-light past the illuminated stores of pro-Union merchants. The Clipper, enthusiastic Bell-Everett and former Know-Nothing organ, announced somewhat over-optimistically that "this large turnout of citizens, and the general sympathy manifested in it by all the crowds of spectators, is the best evidence the community could desire of the popularity of the cause of the Union, and its certain triumph at the ballot-box next week." Even the Daily Exchange, a Breckinridge paper, admitted

⁸Baltimore Clipper, October 27, 1860.

⁹Ibid., Among the members of the committee in charge of this operation were Samuel Hazlehurst, manufacturer and member of the Board of Trade; William F. Larrabee, junior partner of a boot and shoe establishment; and John T. McPherson, produce commission merchant.

¹⁰Ibid., October 29, 1860. William Woodward, Daniel Miller, Charles W. Lentz, Charles Grinnell, and E. George Matthews were among the merchants who presided at this meeting.

¹¹Clipper, October 31, 1860; Baltimore Daily Exchange, November 2, 1860. Enoch Pratt, William McKim, Johns Hopkins, Chauncey Brooks, Archibald Stirling, Benjamin Deford, E. A. Abbott, William Chesnut, Adam Denmead, and George W. Howard were among the hundreds of leading capitalists serving as officers of these meetings.

that the turnout was large, the affair colorful, and the crowd enthusiastic.¹² In any case, a large and imposing body of merchants helped to organize the demonstrations, served as officers, and evidently approved of the numerous speeches which fixed responsibility for the country's troubles on the Republicans and Southern Democrats alike.¹³ The Clipper was completely carried away by the affair, concluding happily that it was "in fact an outpouring of the people. . . . an expression of the great popular heart."¹⁴

Mercantile support for the Southern-rights party of Breckinridge and Lane was less in evidence. At the last important pre-election meeting of the Southern Democrats, only a handful of business names were listed as officers.¹⁵ Joshua Vansant, prominent hat and fur dealer, was on the Breckinridge ticket for Maryland's third Congressional district,¹⁶ which included ten Baltimore wards; throughout this period Mr. Vansant remained one of the most outspoken champions of Southern rights. Other business men, especially those whose names appeared later among the group demanding a state convention and the convening of the state Legislature, were undoubtedly Breckinridge Democrats, but the names among the Constitutional Union supporters would seem to indicate that a majority of the business

¹²Clipper, Exchange, November 2, 1860.

¹³Clipper, November 2, 1860.

¹⁴Ibid.

¹⁵Exchange, October 30, 1860. Charles D. Slingluff, grocer and commission merchant; Thomas Winans, inventor and machinist; Wendell Bollman, German-born bridge-builder; William H. Ortwine, of the Howard Fire Insurance Company; and Charles J. Baker, bank director and manufacturer, were among the officers.

¹⁶Baltimore Sun, November 5, 1860.

community were loyal to the Union in November, 1860, or at least to the Bell-Everett version of the Union.

The Douglas Democrats did not amount to much in the Maryland election. One paper reported that a Douglas-Johnson meeting in Baltimore on November 2 was attended by some two thousand "very enthusiastic" persons,¹⁷ a number considerably in excess of the forthcoming Douglas vote in the city. In addition to such outstanding attorneys as Reverdy Johnson, Jr., Charles F. Mayer, and Henry May, a Douglas elector, this meeting was officered by a handful of business men, none of any prominence.¹⁸ Old-line Baltimore Democrats obviously found more to their liking in the Breckinridge platform, while those who wanted compromise and an end of sectional squabbling preferred the gentle offerings of Bell; there was little room left for Douglas.

Even less significant were the activities of the Maryland Republicans. In spite of the earnest labors of Montgomery Blair, who knew how to do such things, efforts at organizing a real Republican Party in the state met with strong opposition and scant success,¹⁹ and half-hearted attempts on the part of the Know-Nothings and Republicans to cooperate fell through completely before election time.²⁰ The only group in Baltimore

¹⁷Exchange, November 3, 1860.

¹⁸Among the names listed in the Sun and Exchange of November 3 were Robert T. Banks, importer of chinaware, and John W. Williams, planing mill and sash factory owner. The other officers included a potter, a restaurant owner, a tavern keeper, a coppersmith, and a Custom-House inspector--"capitalists" only in the broadest sense of the term.

¹⁹For a brief account of Blair's Republican endeavors in Maryland, see William E. Smith, The Francis Preston Blair Family in Politics (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1933), I, 487-489, 500-501. See also Dieter Cunz, "The Maryland Germans in the Civil War," Maryland Historical Magazine, XXXVI (September, 1941), 407-409.

²⁰George L. P. Radcliffe, Governor Thomas H. Hicks of Maryland and the Civil War (Baltimore: The Lord Baltimore Press, 1901), pp. 17-18.

with a taste for Republicanism in 1860 wast the lower and middle class German element--48er's and their friends, subscribers to the German-language Wecker, Baltimore's sole Republican newspaper.²¹ Republican business men were hard to find, partly because they were few in numbers and also, undoubtedly, because it was not overly healthy to be an avowed Republican in Baltimore at this time. Twice the Republicans attempted demonstrations in the city ("the Nigger-worshippers farce of a mass meeting," as the Clipper bluntly put it), and each time a hostile crowd gathered to hiss, jostle, heave rotten eggs, and force the Lincoln supporters to seek police protection and abandon their gathering.²²

Nevertheless one or two merchants appeared openly in the Republican camp. Francis S. Corkran, a lumber and coal dealer, was a Lincoln elector for one of the Baltimore districts,²³ and Philip Hiss, of the cabinet-making firm of Hiss and Austen, had been a Republican since the party's formation.²⁴ A. J. Randolph, another lumber merchant, had joined the Republicans shortly after the dissolution of the Whig Party.²⁵ James Carey Coale, a Baltimore-born Quaker, agent for Lloyd's and other marine underwriters, member of the Board of Trade, and director in several corportations, had been an anti-slavery man and a Republican since 1856.²⁶ There is no

²¹Cunz, "The Maryland Germans in the Civil War," op. cit., pp. 400-414. For a fuller treatment of the liberal German societies and the Wecker before and during the war, see Cunz, The Maryland Germans (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1948), pp. 248 ff., 259-261, 269-283, and esp. Chap. VIII, "The Civil War Years."

²²Clipper, October 30, 1860; November 2, 1860. The Sun and Exchange were less outspoken but no less contemptuous of Republican activities in Baltimore.

²³SUn, November 5, 1860.

²⁴Biographical Cyclopedia of Representative Men of Maryland and the District of Columbia (Baltimore: National Biographical Publishing Co., 1879), p. 94. Hereafter cited as Cyclopedia.

²⁵Ibid., pp.622-623.

²⁶Ibid., p. 452.

record of Coale ever having been threatened, mobbed, or ostracized for his political views--all of which were distinct possibilities in pre-Civil War Baltimore--and perhaps his fellow business men could dismiss as Quaker eccentricity the views of a man who had a good deal to do with the setting of marine insurance rates. Republicanism was not destined to be out and out heresy in Maryland business circles much longer, but in 1860 the men of capital, in keeping with the prevailing attitude in the city and state, had small use for the Northern sectional party.

It was soon obvious that the only strong parties in Maryland and Baltimore were the Constitutional Unionists and the Breckinridge Democrats, between which groups the rivalry was keen and spirited. In New York state, where a Republican victory appeared fairly probable, pro-Southern and pro-Union merchants in New York City used their influence and wealth to set up a fusion ticket among the other three parties, a measure which kept the city but not the state from going Republican.²⁷ In Baltimore there was no need to fuse against the Republicans, and evidently small desire to combine for any other purpose. The Clipper indignantly maintained that only Bell and Everett could solve the country's problems and put an end to the sectional dispute; a vote for the other parties was a vote for sectionalism and discord. Ignoring the Douglas group, the Clipper in the heat of the campaign referred to the other parties as "nigger-worshipping John Brownites" on one hand and "ungrateful, unprincipled and demoralized

²⁷Philip S. Foner, Business and Slavery (Chapel Hill, N. C.: University of North Carolina Press, 1941), Chap. VIII. Foner's book is a detailed and well-documented account of the political views and activities of the New York business community before the Civil War.

Yancey-Breckites" on the other.²⁸ The Exchange rather sharply reminded the Unionists that a vote for Bell merely increased the chances of a Republican victory, and that if the entire South, allied with conservative Northerners, united in favor of Breckinridge the Union could be maintained and Southern wrongs righted.²⁹ In spite of the essential similarity of the Bell and Breckinridge platforms, each group, in Baltimore and elsewhere in the South, approached the election with the strong feeling that it alone could save the Union.

One author has remarked that the election of 1860 was marked throughout the country by a serious and intelligent interest on the part of the people; violence was exceptional, and the record-breaking number of campaign speeches stressed an intellectual and historical approach.³⁰ On the whole, the election in Baltimore lived up to this standard. Even in a city famous for its low boiling-point there was little evidence of anything more than normal exuberance, plus some egg-throwing at the Republicans. Respectable citizens, recalling the violence and fraud of previous Baltimore elections, before and during the period of Know-Nothing rule,³¹ doubtless looked forward to voting day with day with a good deal of apprehension, but their fears were largely unfounded. The interested crowds

²⁸Clipper, October 26, October 27, November 3, 1860.

²⁹Exchange, November 5, 1860.

³⁰Fite, op. cit., pp. ix, xi. There were also noisy demonstrations, heckling of stump speakers, and, naturally, bitter and uncompromising attitudes, but Fite's point is that campaigning went far beyond mere mud-slinging, foot-stamping, and emotional appeals.

³¹Schmeckebeier, op. cit., discusses the election tactics of the Know-Nothings and their opponents during the 1850's, pointing out that Baltimore had had rioting, violence, and "roughs" previous to the advent of the American Party. See esp. pp. 18-19, 27-28, 36-45, 101-102, 115, et passim.

that gathered on Baltimore Street and around the newspaper offices, to hear and discuss election news, were much quieter and more peaceably disposed than in previous years, and one paper noted that "all the discussions and conversations were carried on in the best feeling and in a moderate tone of voice. The crowds continued throughout the day without the least disorder. . . ." ³² During the actual voting, "as a general thing the police had very little to do; there seemed to be no disposition on the part of the voters but to act in an orderly manner. . . ." ³³

The Unionists, with the support of Governor Hicks, Mayor George William Brown, ³⁴ and a majority of the city's business men, remained extremely confident of success until election day was almost over; the Breckinridge forces were correspondingly downhearted. ³⁵ These attitudes eventually changed as Breckinridge, after trailing his rival in the early returns, slowly pulled out in front and finally carried both city and state by a small plurality. ³⁶ The Exchange again complimented the city of Baltimore on the character and outcome of the election, and even the disappointed

³²Exchange, November 5, 1860.

³³Ibid., November 7, 1860. Both the Clipper and Exchange reported minor fist-fighting among the rowdy elements of the Bell and Breckinridge supporters, but this was obviously to be expected, and had little effect on the general atmosphere.

³⁴Radcliffe, op. cit., p. 19. Although Brown had just been elected on a Reform ticket, successfully aimed at sweeping the Know-Nothings out of office, he supported Bell in the presidential election in spite of the great number of former Know-Nothings in the Bell camp.

³⁵Exchange, November 7, 1860.

³⁶Sun, November 7, 1860, gave the following figures for Baltimore City: Breckinridge, 14,950; Bell, 12,618; Douglas, 1,502; Lincoln, 1,084. The official figures for the state were published in the Sun of November 24: Breckinridge, 42,482; Bell, 41,760; Douglas, 5,966; Lincoln, 2,294.

Clipper grudgingly admitted that order had "generally" prevailed.³⁷ In spite of the "Grand Union Demonstrations" and the activities of the business men in behalf of Bell and Everett, the Southern Democrats turned out to be the largest single group in the city, polling nearly fifty per cent of the popular vote.

The merchants who had voted for Breckinridge, while evidently fewer in number than the Bell supporters, undoubtedly constituted a fairly substantial group. In spite of the Unionist claims to the contrary, pro-Breckinridge Baltimoreans, capitalists or otherwise, were not necessarily the advocates of disunion and secession. The real sentiments of this group were probably well expressed by a post-election editorial in the

Exchange:

The city of Baltimore has protested against the fanatical spirit and the manifold aggressions of the Republican party, and has manifested her cordial sympathy with her wronged and overmatched sisters of the South. . . . Whatever, therefore, Maryland may do, the South may rest assured that Baltimore will unite with her in all lawful efforts to check any further agitation of the slavery question, and to compel the Republican party to respect the Constitutional guarantees which protect the institutions of the slave States.

And then the important modifier:

We say that Baltimore will unite in all lawful efforts to secure these ends, and it is but frank to say that in our judgment, she will only be the ally of the South, so long as the latter seeks to right herself through the laws under the Constitution. Though we in common with the South have just reason to feel aggrieved at the treatment we have received from the North, we do unhesitatingly assert that we have not yet been driven to the point at which revolution alone can remedy the wrongs of a people. We do aver, therefore, that Baltimore has not by her vote of yesterday sanctioned any

³⁷Exchange, Clipper, November 7, 1860. The Clipper, with a slightly sour-grapes attitude, qualified its approval of the peaceful elections by describing an attack on Union headquarters by a gang of Breckinridge followers, and went on to claim that the police, in quelling what disorder there was, were invariably sympathetic to the "Breck-ites."

disunion scheme or sentiment whatsoever, and it is our earnest hope that she may never feel herself impelled to seek for justice through secession. . . . At all events, we would trust to the guidance of worse men than Mr. Lincoln, rather than sanction at this juncture any step that would imperil the bonds of the Union, or shake the stability of the Republic.³⁸

Later editorials continued in this vein. The South was cautioned that Maryland's vote for the Southern candidate was not an endorsement of that section's "mad heresies and passionate bitterness"; there was still time and hope for compromise and conciliation, toward which all the states should strive. Maryland, as an "exposed and frontier slave-holding State," was just as concerned with Constitutional protection of slavery as were the Gulf states, but had "a heavier stake, proportionately, in the preservation of the Union, so far as her material prosperity is concerned, than any of her sister commonwealths." True, the South had been wronged, and it was up to the North to make redress, but again the warning followed that "the people of Baltimore are not prepared to follow the lead of those who recklessly choose to enter upon a path which must bring them face to face with evils worse than any we have yet endured."³⁹ Real secession sentiment in Baltimore, if it existed, had not yet come out into the open, and was certainly not apt to be present among even the pro-Southern merchants at this time.

Nor were the Bell and Everett business men by any means "unconditional Unionists" in November, 1860. The Clipper denounced "black republicanism" (there were seldom any mere Republicans in the Baltimore press

³⁸Exchange, November 7, 1860. The author's italics.

³⁹Ibid., November 8, November 12, 1860.

during this period; they were nearly all black) with fervor enough to satisfy William L. Yancey himself, and the Bell speeches in behalf of preserving the Union were all predicated on the assumption that Southern rights would be secured. Despite fist-fights and editorial sniping between Unionists and Southern Democrats during the campaign, the two parties in Baltimore were united on the common grounds of distrusting Republicans and the North generally, sympathizing with the states farther South, and seeking some means of settling the slavery question--in favor of the South --without disrupting the Union. Many merchants who voted for Bell in 1860 would swing to a more Southern point of view when secession became a fact along the Gulf, with chances of compromise correspondingly dimmer. The only real difference between the Bell and Breckinridge business men at this time lay in their ideas for solving the sectional dispute--the former by uniting the conservatives of both sections against the extremists, and the latter by uniting all the slave states into a group strong enough to force a compromise out of the North. Few capitalists had supported Douglas or Lincoln, and the real breach between the two principal groups was yet to come.

. 2. Business Depression

However much the Baltimore business community had hoped for compromise after the election, it soon became apparent that things were going to get a lot worse before they got better. Nervousness about the election results had brought on a slow recession in business conditions all over the country, starting as early as midsummer. From November on the gradual downward curve sharpened considerably. Two Baltimore banking houses

suspended the week before the election,⁴⁰ and on November 21 the rest of the city's bank officers met and decided on a general suspension of specie payments, which took place on the following morning.⁴¹ Although this resulted in a temporary relieving of "the existing money pressure," and "a very much improved feeling in commercial and financial circles,"⁴² the optimists who predicted a trade revival were largely whistling in the dark. Coffee, sold chiefly to the West, was "in good demand and quite firm, but it is almost the only article of merchandise in which there is any degree of animation or vitality."⁴³ The banking house of Samuel Harris & Sons failed on November 23, with liabilities estimated at \$200,000.⁴⁴ The falling off in arrivals and clearances at the port,⁴⁵ after a heavy spring and summer trade, was abnormal even for the customarily slack early winter season.

The one or two bright spots in the trading picture only reflected the political crisis. The action of the Dadeville, Alabama, house of Page & Fleishl was probably duplicated by several Southern firms; writing to a Baltimore hardware firm in late November, Page & Fleishl placed a small

⁴⁰Clipper, November 1, 1860. The houses suspending were Josiah Lee & Co. and Appleton & Co.

⁴¹Exchange, November 22, 1860. The Philadelphia banks followed suit, and the New York banks were expected to do likewise. For the action of the New York banks, see Foner, op. cit., pp.211-215.

⁴²Exchange, November 22, 1860.

⁴³Ibid., November 20, 1860.

⁴⁴Clipper, November 24, 1860.

⁴⁵Merchants Exchange Reading Room Record Books showed a decrease from ten or fifteen arrivals per day in early summer to an average of three or four per day in December--a far more noticeable falling off than in 1859.

order for chains and hoes, then added: "We have concluded to change our trade from New York to some point in the South owing to the great political excitement now existing in our section of the country. One of our firm will visit Baltimore in the Spring to buy a Stock of Goods . . ."46

A few Baltimore merchants also benefited, no doubt uneasily, from another marked development--the sudden Southern demand for firearms. Magruder, Taylor & Roberts received dozens of letters from Southern customers during the fall and winter, ordering everything from pikes and muskets to shot and shell,⁴⁷ and a newspaper noted that "those of our merchants who are engaged in the sale of fire-arms have their hands full of orders. Not a mail arrives from the South but comes charged with orders from all sections of that country for guns and pistols. . . ."48 A momentary rush of good business for a handful of firms was small consolation alongside the obvious trend in Southern sentiment; compromise and peace hardly lay in this direction.

Other indications of what the deep South had in mind were not lacking. During November and December the legislatures of six states passed bills providing for state conventions,⁴⁹ obviously to consider the question of secession. Agents of Baltimore firms, in their customary pilgrimage through the South to collect bills for last year's trade and to

⁴⁶Page & Fleishl to Magruder, November 28, 1860, Magruder, Taylor & Roberts papers, Maryland Historical Society, Baltimore, Md.

⁴⁷Ibid., November, 1860-February, 1861, passim.

⁴⁸Exchange, November 22, 1860. Five firms (Merrill, Thomas & Co., Poultney & Trimble, F. B. Loney & Co., William Harris, and A. McComas) were mentioned as doing a particularly heavy business.

⁴⁹South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Mississippi, Texas, and Louisiana. Alabama had passed a convention bill as early as February 24, 1860.

place orders for the next, reported not only unhappy business conditions but an unmistakable and generally hostile attitude in the cotton country. The experiences of the hardware firm of Magruder, Taylor, & Roberts were typical. Roberts wrote from Georgia in mid-November:

This country is in a great state of excitement and nearly every man I have seen is for secession. There is a general stagnation of business and little or no money in the country. I have met several men on their way home who could do nothing in the way of collections

. . . .
 You can form no idea of the condition of things out here. If a man dared to declare himself for the Union in this neighbourhood he would be regarded as a traitor to the South and an ally of the Black Republicans.⁵⁰

Still in Georgia three weeks later, the junior partner moaned that "times look awful blue. Business is almost entirely suspended. Nearly every man is for secession and a fight. I fear nothing can be done in the way of orders this winter . . ." ⁵¹ Other letters continued in this vein. Business conditions and chances for reconciliation seemed to be going downhill together.

3. The Legislature Question

In the midst of their troubles, and as a possible means of alleviating them, Baltimore business men considered the course of their own state. The first question, which arose immediately after the election of Lincoln, was whether or not the Maryland Legislature should be convened in special session. Governor Hicks studied the matter, read the petitions and letters urging him to convene, and others urging him not

⁵⁰John B. Roberts to Magruder, November 21, 1860, Magruder, Taylor & Roberts papers.

⁵¹Roberts to Magruder, December 10, 1860, ibid.

to, and decided against a special session during the fall and winter of 1860-1861.⁵² Those merchants who agreed with Hicks and felt that the Legislature had no business assembling might be called more solid Unionists than those who had merely voted for Bell; even with the outright secession of their "brethern of the South" staring them in the face they chose to sit it out, still hoping for compromise but unwilling to align themselves with the Gulf states. "It is not worth while," as one editorial put it, "for us of the border States to give more importance than necessary to the madness of the Southern disunion agitators. It is better to wait and see if the disease will not exhaust itself. . . ."⁵³

Even in January, with South Carolina already out of the Union and secession conventions about to assemble in three other states, another newspaper felt that "had Governor Hicks given way to the pressure brought against him, that fact would have been claimed as placing Maryland among the seceded States. . . ." Excitement would have been created, moderation lost, and public sentiment "manufactured . . . in favor of extreme action . . ."⁵⁴

It is harder to define the feelings of those in favor of an extra session. Outright secessionists, still a small minority, made up one fringe of this group. Many simply felt that Maryland should go on record

⁵²See Radcliffe, *op. cit.*, pp. 21-35, for the pros and cons of this question, and Hicks's reasons for not convening the Legislature. The Governor was already pursuing his course of keeping Maryland quiet, and hence in the Union, while the cotton states passed their ordinances of secession.

⁵³*Clipper*, November 26, 1860. The *Clipper* here enumerated several reasons (also put forth by Governor Hicks) why a special session was unnecessary, and generally ridiculed the idea.

⁵⁴*Baltimore American*, January 2, 1861.

as sympathetic to the cotton states, and some undoubtedly hoped that the state, speaking through her Legislature, could mediate between the two sections. They all felt that some sort of action in the emergency was called for, and that the present course was merely one of aimless drifting. The Exchange advanced the moderate view: "If Maryland would not be an object of contempt among her sister States, whether of the North or the South, it is incumbent upon her, soon, to take her own position, whatever may be the one which she desires to occupy. She cannot shape the issues of the times by dodging them, and the day for 'masterly inactivity' has gone by. . . ." ⁵⁵ And the Sun, discussing the need for united action on the part of the Southern states, sounded a more threatening note: "The people of the North . . . do not, perhaps, realize the fact that with the secession of the lower tier of States, that of all the rest of the slave States is inevitable. . . . If disunion proves inevitable, the line will be drawn North of Maryland . . ." ⁵⁶

Around the middle of December the business men in favor of a special session circulated a petition through the city, hoping to persuade the Governor to take the desired action. ⁵⁷ The circular, signed by some 250 names, mostly business firms, appeared in the daily papers on December 22, calling for a meeting that evening to discuss the importance of convening the Legislature. ⁵⁸ The assemblage listened to speeches praising

⁵⁵Exchange, November 23, 1860. Later editorials in the Exchange (November 29, December 12, December 27) had a slightly stronger tone, still recommending a special session.

⁵⁶Sun, November 27, 1860. On December 8 the Sun again stressed the imperative need for action on the part of Maryland.

⁵⁷ Exchange, December 17, 1860.

⁵⁸ Exchange, Clipper, Sun, December 22, 1860.

Southern patience, condemning Northern fanaticism, and stressing the need for action on Maryland's part in order to save the Union; it was then resolved to send a committee to Governor Hicks demanding that he convene the Legislature.⁵⁹

Editorial opinion regarding this meeting was naturally varied. A Union paper termed it "evident that a large preponderance of those in attendance were of the league known as Breckinridge Democracy--the Union men and Douglas Democracy generally believing that more can be accomplished by remaining in the Union, and demanding our rights under . . . the Constitution. . . ." ⁶⁰ The Southern press noted that the meeting "was composed, for the most part, of the best class of our citizens," admitted that "very decided evidences of dissent from the line of policy pursued by South Carolina were made manifest," but called attention to the "overwhelming and energetic demonstrations" against coercing a seceded state by the use of Federal troops.⁶¹ Meanwhile Hicks received the committee and again refused to take any action.⁶² This was the only attempt made directly by Baltimore merchants to secure a session of the Legislature.

General approval of the Governor's policy in business circles was far more widespread. Archibald Stirling, Sr., president of the Savings Bank of Baltimore, wrote to Hicks opposing a session of the Legislature,⁶³

⁵⁹Exchange, Clipper, December 24, 1860. ⁶⁰Clipper, December 24, 1860.

⁶¹Exchange, December 24, 1860.

⁶²Clipper, December 27, 1860; see also Radcliffe, op. cit., p. 29.

⁶³Stirling to Hicks, December 17, 1860, Thomas H. Hicks papers, Maryland Historical Society, Baltimore, Md.

and on December 28 Stirling presided over a Union meeting at the Law Building, composed, as even the Southern press admitted, "of the most respectable class of citizens, irrespective of party."⁶⁴ Among the business men present was Henry M. Warfield, prominent miller and president of the Corn and Flour Exchange, who had recently attended the pro-Legislature gathering on December 22. Warfield now spoke in favor of the Union, although he and Charles W. Lentz, wealthy German merchant, objected to a proposed resolution endorsing Hicks' policy.⁶⁵ The resolution was duly passed, however,⁶⁶ along with another resolution calling for a Union mass meeting some time in January. The group adjourned after applauding speeches in favor of the Union and opposed to secession, yet desiring the maintenance of Southern rights--altogether a rather typical Baltimore viewpoint at this time.

At the end of the year some thirteen hundred citizens, predominantly business men, signed a memorial approving the Governor's action in refusing to summon the Legislature.⁶⁷ Hicks received a much larger memorial in January, signed by over five thousand Baltimoreans, again endorsing his policy. Although this list of signers was not published in the papers, it was claimed that the supporters included "nine-tenths of the business men of the city."⁶⁸ It is probably safe to assume that a good majority,

⁶⁴Exchange, December 28, 1860.

⁶⁵Sun, December 28, 1860.

⁶⁶Ibid.

⁶⁷Washington National Intelligencer, January 1, 1861, quoted in Carl M. Frasure, "Union Sentiment in Maryland, 1859-1861," Maryland Historical Magazine, XXIV (September, 1929), pp. 214-215.

⁶⁸American, January 1, 1861. The pro-Union American was doubtless guilty of exaggeration in arraying nine-tenths of the business men behind Hicks, but even allowing for partisan zeal, support of the Governor by the business community must have been impressive.

but by no means all, of the Baltimore business men agreed with Hicks that a special session of the Maryland Legislature was unnecessary, thus placing themselves solidly on the side of the Union at the end of 1860.

4. The Convention Question

Between January 3 and February 1, 1861, conventions in Mississippi, Florida, Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, and Texas met and passed ordinances of secession. Attempts at compromise in Congress had failed. It looked more and more as though Maryland and the other border slave states would have to abandon their hopes for an unbroken Union and choose between a Northern and a Southern confederacy. Perhaps even yet the border states, by acting carefully, could constitute a balance of power and promote some sort of reconciliation. In any event, it was argued by many, they would have to do something. When faced by a crisis that included the possibility of civil war, piously looking the other way seemed not only futile but dangerous.

Armed with these and other arguments, Marylanders who wanted their state to speak and act began to think about a convention. One of the reasons for desiring a session of the Legislature had been the hope that this body would pass a bill authorizing a convention. The Governor steadfastly refused to convene the Legislature; very well, said his opponents, perhaps we can engineer a convention in some other way. On December 28, even while the Union meeting was progressing at the Law Building, some other "leading merchants, jurists, and business men of Baltimore" gathered at Barnum's Hotel for a "Crisis Meeting."⁶⁹ Reporters were not admitted

⁶⁹Sun, Exchange, December 28, 1860. Thomas Winans and George W. Dobbin were among the business men in charge of the meeting; Severn Teackle Wallis and William H. Norris, strongly pro-Southern, were two of the "leading jurists."

to this gathering, and left Barnum's with the sole knowledge that the group was going to confer on "the position of Maryland in the national crisis, and her relations with the South. . . ."70

The activities of this meeting came out a few days later. They had decided to hold a conference of "the best informed, most eminent and influential citizens in the several counties of the State, to be held in Baltimore on the 10th of January . . ." The idea was to ascertain the sentiment in Maryland regarding the national situation, to have one more try at convening the Legislature, and, if this failed, to adopt "such ulterior measures as may be necessary for a reliable and intelligent exhibition of the position of the State . . . with regard to the present crisis."71

Many Baltimore business men participated in this conference, and in the various meetings which emerged from it, but their desire to put Maryland on record, through a convention or otherwise, was far from being prompted by disunionist motives. Union sentiment among the merchants remained overwhelming. When the conference duly assembled on the morning of January 10, the Baltimore City delegation included such strong Unionists as William McKim of Johns Hopkins, bankers, and John P. Kennedy, author and statesman; no secessionist meeting could have enlisted the support of these men.⁷² Although the delegation also contained the names of

⁷⁰Sun, December 28, 1860.

⁷¹Ibid., January 2, 1861.

⁷²Sun, January 11, 1861. See John P. Kennedy, The Great Drama; An Appeal to Maryland (Baltimore, 1861), reprinted in Frank Moore, ed., The Rebellion Record, I (New York: G. P. Putnam, 1862), 368-374, for this politician's strong Unionist views. (Hereafter cited as An Appeal to Maryland.) McKim and Hopkins were two of Baltimore's most influential capitalists and were constantly active in promoting the cause of the Union, both before and after the outbreak of war.

some strong Southern sympathizers,⁷³ this conference in the beginning was attended by men of all political faiths, united in an honest desire to seek a way out of the current dilemma. The secessionist label could be (and was) more aptly applied at a later date.

After two days deliberations, the conference expressed itself by the customary method of adopting resolutions. The first stated that "Maryland is this day, as she ever has been, true to the American Union." The second maintained that the Crittenden compromise measures⁷⁴ would be generally acceptable to Marylanders as a "fair and proper settlement" of the country's differences. The third provided for a committee to visit the Governor, and to request that he let the people vote on the subject of a convention, which would be duly called in February if the people so decided.⁷⁵ During the course of the proceedings the delegates questioned the right of secession and opposed the policy of coercion--still attempting to tread a chalk-line which the course of events was fast rubbing out.

⁷³Exchange, Sun, January 11, 1861. Ross Winans, George W. Dobbin, and banker J. Hanson Thomas were among the business men in this category, along with the pro-Southern attorneys S. Teackle Wallis and William Henry Norris. John W. Garrett, president of the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad, was also a Southern rights man at this time; for a brief analysis of Garrett's views see Festus P. Summers, The Baltimore & Ohio in the Civil War (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1939), pp.45 ff.

⁷⁴The Crittenden compromise suggested (1) restoring the line of 36°30' as a division between free and slave territories, (2) maintaining slavery and slave trade in the District of Columbia without interference by Congress, and (3) compensating slaveholders for all runaways not captured and returned.

⁷⁵Sun, American, January 12, 1861. Ross Winans, noted inventor, machinist, and railroad architect, was a member of the committee appointed to confer with Hicks.

The business community again gave striking evidence of its loyalty to the Union at the Mass Meeting of January 10, an evening affair at the Maryland Institute. William McKim, Benjamin Deford, William E. Hooper, and Joseph Cushing, Jr., all noted capitalists, planned the meeting and made the necessary arrangements. McKim wrote to Augustus W. Bradford, attorney and future Governor of Maryland, asking him to address the gathering and hoping that he would lend his "powerful aid in sustaining the cause of the Union at this momentous crisis of her fortunes. The object of this meeting is to express to our fellow countrymen the firm and unflinching determination of the citizens of Baltimore to stand by the Union, and to assert and maintain her rights, and the rights of her sister states, under the constitution."⁷⁶ To reassure Bradford, who had stayed completely out of politics since the defeat of his hero Clay in 1844,⁷⁷ McKim added that "no sectional or party questions" would be discussed. A petition in favor of the meeting was signed by more than twenty-three hundred names, nearly all of them business firms,⁷⁸ and at a gathering of some three thousand workingmen in the Maryland Institute on January 9, at which a dozen or more manufacturers served as officers, it was decided amid cheering to support and attend the Union meeting the following evening.⁷⁹ Even as the chain reaction of secession was starting to rattle through the Gulf states, the great majority of Baltimore's

⁷⁶McKim to Bradford, January 3, 1861, Augustus W. Bradford papers, Maryland Historical Society, Baltimore, Md.

⁷⁷Cyclopedia, p. 32.

⁷⁸American, Clipper, January 7, 1861.

⁷⁹Exchange, January 10, 1861. German H. Hunt, of Poole & Hunt, steam engine manufacturers; David L. Bartlett, of the stove warehouse and foundry of Hayward, Bartlett & Co.; David Carson, of Carson, Zimmerman & Co., lumber dealers; Edward Abbott, steam saw and flour mill operator; William E. Hooper, owner of the big cotton duck factory at Woodbury, North Baltimore; John M. Smith, linseed oil manufacturer; and Charles P. Stevens, junior partner in a furniture establishment, were among the business men presiding at this workingmen's meeting.

financial, commercial, and manufacturing interests went on record in support of the Union.

This support was not unconditional, but it must have appeared so to Northern and Southern observers. Between eight and ten thousand people jammed the halls of the Maryland Institute on January 10, listened to speeches describing the advantages of remaining in the Union and the perils attendant upon leaving it, and passed resolutions stressing the all-important need for unity of government, condemning secession as absurd, and proclaiming that the national government had a "just claim" to Maryland's "confidence and support."⁸⁰ This was fairly strong language from rich and respectable citizens of a slave state in January, 1861. True, the group advocated repeal of the personal liberty laws in the Northern states and was strongly in favor of the Crittenden compromise —had even asked Senator Crittenden to address the meeting.⁸¹ This was cold comfort to cotton staters who had already washed their hands of compromise and were expecting the border states to join them in a new confederacy. The general tone of these Union speeches in Baltimore must have sounded like Republicanism itself, or something very little better.

Indeed, Southerners were about ready to give Maryland up for lost in early 1861. All of the other border slave states had placed themselves in definite opposition to the policy of coercion by the Federal government,

⁸⁰American, Clipper, January 11, 1861. In addition to Bradford, attorney William H. Collins and Reverdy Johnson, well known lawyer and statesman, addressed the meeting.

⁸¹See letter, Crittenden to William McKim et al., January 2, 1861, printed in American, January 11, 1861. The Senator, after expressing his thanks, regretted that poor health and legislative duties made it impossible for him to comply, and wished the group his "warm and cherished sympathy, in all their Union sentiments. . . ."

and had otherwise given expressions of sympathy to the Southern cause, while little emerged from Maryland save the noise of the big Union meeting. The committee of six appointed by the conference of January 10 to see Governor Hicks ran into a familiar snag: Hicks would not even let the question of a convention be decided by popular vote.⁸² Merchants with Southern customers began to form an idea of what Maryland's present course was doing to their business. "I have no hope of selling goods to this country this season," lamented the junior partner of a Baltimore hardware firm, writing from Georgia. "I have not the shadow of a hope for the Union. . . . I regret the position of Maryland--the people here complain bitterly of her position."⁸³ "You can give up all hope of selling goods out here next spring," he added a few days later. "I am sorry to see Maryland so backward for I think it is time she has taken a position."⁸⁴

Continuing his travels through Georgia, the partner sent another complaint at the end of the year, complete with italics:

I would not think of ordering one dollar's worth of goods of any kind for spring sales.

In your last letter you still speak of the trouble blowing over. Of this I have not the shadow of a hope, for the Union is gone and the Southern people will have more use for muskets than hardware. What will Maryland do? Where will she be found when our rights are trampled upon? Your Union meetings answer with the Black Republicans. Would to God it were otherwise, for to day I am in Georgia and for the first time in my life am ashamed to say I am a Marylander. . . ."⁸⁵

⁸²Radcliffe, *op. cit.*, p. 33. Hicks agreed to consider the question of calling the Legislature if Congress failed to provide for reconciliation, but this must have seemed suspiciously like stalling tactics to the members of the committee.

⁸³Roberts to Magruder, December 23, 1860, Magruder, Taylor & Roberts papers.

⁸⁴Roberts to Magruder, December 28, 1860, *ibid.*

⁸⁵Roberts to Magruder, December 30, 1860, *ibid.*

The other junior partner wrote from South Carolina that all the able-bodied men had volunteered for military service. "You have never seen a more determined set of people in your life. . . . The universal cry and enquire is 'Taylor why the name of God does not Maryland come out and show us what she is going to do' and now let me ask you," he chided the head of the firm, "Union-loving as I know you are, if you really hope to accomplish anything by holding out any longer?"⁸⁶ In early February Taylor stopped in Montgomery and inhaled some of the enthusiasm surrounding the inauguration of Jefferson Davis. "I want no better country than the Southern Confederation," he exulted. "There can be no compromise now nor hereafter with these People and black republicans. Maryland and Virginia are looked for to join the South, and ought to do so very soon."⁸⁷ He continued his needling of the front office throughout his Southern travels. In Augusta, Georgia, he reported that "the sale of goods to the Southern Confederacy you may consider as cut off for this season and until Maryland goes out. . . ."⁸⁸ And from Memphis, later in the month: "Business appears still to be at a stand still. . . . as the matter now stands we cant do a thing nor will we ever unless Maryland joins the South. Whenever she does that we are certain of a very heavy trade with the cotton states and not until then. . . ."⁸⁹

Thus goaded by reports such as these from the South, a group of

⁸⁶J. H. Taylor to Magruder, January 23, 1861, ibid.

⁸⁷Taylor to Magruder, February 1, 1861, ibid.

⁸⁸Taylor to Magruder, February 21, 1861, ibid.

⁸⁹Taylor to Magruder, February 28, 1861, ibid.

merchants joined actively in another attempt to secure a convention. Many business firms appeared among the four-hundred-odd names requesting citizens of Baltimore "who are in favor of restoring the Constitutional Union of the States, and who desire the position of Maryland in the existing crisis to be ascertained by a Convention of the people . . ." to assemble at the Maryland Institute on February 1.⁹⁰ The presence of such pro-Southern attorneys and politicians as T. Parkin Scott, Coleman Yellott, William H. Norris, Robert M. McLane, S. Teackle Wallis, and ex-Governor Enoch Louis Lowe was evidence of the prevailing sentiment at the meeting, and neither William McKim nor Johns Hopkins, who had favored a convention in the conference on January 10-11, were in attendance this time. On the other hand, a few merchants who had cheered at the big Union meeting of January 10 had since decided that a convention was necessary.⁹¹ The events of January may have cause a slight shift in attitude among certain business men, away from the Union and toward a more Southern stand, but it is hardly likely that many of the merchants desiring a convention would have approved of a secession ordinance. The big hope was still that Maryland's voice might help to reconcile the two sections.

Nevertheless the tone of the meeting was outspoken in its devotion to Southern principles. The inflamed speeches were delivered, criticizing Hicks, denouncing the Republicans, and insisting that Maryland must speak

⁹⁰Exchange, Sun, January 31, 1861. Joshua Vansant, George W. Dobbin, Lambert Gittings, S. R. Dunnock, H. L. Whitridge, Gustav W. Lurman, Hamilton Easter, and Spence & Reid were among the business firms backing the meeting. The majority were shipping and commission merchants, dry goods jobbers and retailers, etc.; Hugh Sisson, owner of a steam marble works, and Thomas Winans were about the only manufacturers in the group. George S. Brown, of Alexander Brown & Sons, was the only prominent banker mentioned.

⁹¹John W. Bruff, Hamilton Easter, and Thomas Whitridge had backed the Union meeting. Bruff, Easter, and Whitridge's son Horatio were now in favor of a convention, which was increasingly looked to as a means of placing Maryland sympathy with the South.

up in order to save the Union. Most extreme of all were the resolutions holding that the secession of the Southern states was justifiable under the circumstances, and that should compromise fail Maryland would join Virginia and go with the South.⁹² Maryland by her vote for Breckinridge in 1860 had indicated where her true interests lay, it was said, yet Hicks had refused to let the people be heard at a time when, obviously, failure to join the South was tantamount to an alliance with the "black Republican" North.⁹³ There was a good deal of cheering, the loudest being reserved for the declaration that the interests of Maryland were identical with those of Virginia.⁹⁴ Having thus declared themselves, the group decided to hold ward meetings throughout the city, selecting five persons from each ward who would meet and elect twenty-two Baltimore delegates to a State Convention. It was hoped that this convention, which was scheduled for February 18 with or without the Governor's approval, would possess sufficient influence and strength to win official recognition of its acts.

The growing division of sentiment among the business community (and elsewhere) between "Union" and "Southern fights" supporters was reflected by the comments of the press regarding this convention movement. The Exchange felt that it "showed how very large a proportion of our citizens regard with anxiety and indignation the position of Maryland and the course of Governor Hicks. . . . It was a large and influential gathering,

⁹²Sun, February 2, 1861. One resolution adopted by the group included a clause recommending non-interference with the District of Columbia, in the event that Maryland should be forced to secede.

⁹³Clipper, February 2, 1861.

⁹⁴American, February 2, 1861.

and those who took part in it were animated by deep feeling and strong convictions. . . ."95 The Sun encouraged all "right-thinking" citizens to support the decisions of the meeting, since the Governor's refusal to call a convention was simply an attempt to "sell the State of Maryland to the leaders of Northern fanaticism. . . . It remain, therefore, for the people, in their sovereign capacity, to repudiate the dastardly transaction. . . ."96 On the other side, the American, noting that the attendance at the meeting "bore no comparison with the immense masses of people who crowded every inch of room in the Hall and vainly sought admittance to its doors on the occasion of the Union meeting" of January 10, insisted that an "irregularly called 'Sovereign Convention'" would only reflect the sentiments of a minority and would promote needless discord among Maryland citizens.⁹⁷ And the ever outspoken Clipper denounced the group as a "miserable little handful" of secessionists and "disturbers of the public peace" who were seeking to "attache Maryland to the tail of the Southern kite. . . ."98

On February 7, the representatives chosen at the ward meetings on February 5 met to elect delegates to the forthcoming convention. The support of a good-sized segment of the business community was evidenced by the large number of merchants present from some of the wards, and by the fact that half of the twenty-two delegates elected to represent the city

⁹⁵Exchange, February 4, 1861.

⁹⁶Sun, February 4, 1861.

⁹⁷American, February 1, February 2, 1861.

⁹⁸Clipper, February 2, 1861.

were business men.⁹⁹ S. Teackle Wallis reminded the delegates that the convention was not "sovereign," since the invitation to participate "was extended only to those who concurred in opinion and feeling with the meeting at the Institute" on February 1. The members should not, therefore, consider that they were acting for the people; they had not yet secured popular authority to do this, and the duties and rights of the convention were to be those of "conference and recommendation--nothing more."¹⁰⁰

Just before the election of delegates, a few business men withdrew their names from the list of nominees.¹⁰¹ This may have been mere unwillingness to serve, but it is likely that the decliners, after surveying the situation and listening to Wallis' remarks, had decided that they were engaged in something not quite right. Their sentiments may well have been expressed by the attorney Henry May, Douglas Democrat with a good deal of influence in business circles, who also declined the nomination, and explained why. He was, said May, essentially a Union man, but he did not approve of the Governor's course and he felt that Maryland should declare herself, However, believing that the people, when a lawful convention

⁹⁹See Exchange, February 6, 1861; American, February 9, 1861. The delegates included Joshua Vansant; bankers George S. Brown and J. Hanson Thomas; William G. Harrison, president of the George's Creek Coal and Iron Company; Peter Mowell, iron manufacturer and director of the Board of the Northern Central Railway; Ross Winans; Ezra Whitman, proprietor of an agricultural and seed warehouse; Charles H. Myers, liquor importer; John C. Brune, president of the Board of Trade; commission merchants Lambert Gittings and George H. Kyle. The familiar crew of pro-Southern lawyers--Wallis, McLane, Scott, Yellott, Norris--were also delegates.

¹⁰⁰American, February 9, 1861.

¹⁰¹Sun, February 9, 1861. Hugh A. Cooper, shipbuilder and director of the Board of Trade; Robert Hough, grocer and commission merchant; and William Devries, dry goods merchant, were among the ten nominees who withdrew.

was held, would express themselves in favor of the Union, May was "yet unwilling to join any partisan or irregular efforts to convene a State Convention. The call for the election of the members of your body was limited to those only who approved the resolutions of your mass-meeting No good can result, as it seems to me, from a convention so formed; but I fear that by the influence of party or sectional ideas that it may widen our unhappy differences at a time when we ought to be a united people. . . ."102

The city delegates were joined by representatives from the counties on February 18, in Baltimore's Maryland Institute Building, and the "Conference Convention" got under way as scheduled. Judge Ezekiel Chambers of Kent County, the presiding officer, opened the proceedings by denouncing secession as "the greatest curse that has ever fallen upon the nation," only to add that "submission and degradation" were far greater evils.¹⁰³ John C. Brune, president of the Board of Trade and member of one of Baltimore's most respected mercantile families, joined other speakers in opposing coercion, blaming Northern aggression for the country's present troubles, and underlining the point that Maryland's rights were even more important than the Union.¹⁰⁴ After due deliberation, the session wound up its activities on the second day by passing the inevitable resolutions. It was agreed that authorized representatives from Maryland

¹⁰²May to Samuel W. Smith, February 8, 1861, printed in Sun, February 9, 1861.

¹⁰³Exchange, American, February 19, 1861.

¹⁰⁴Clipper, February 19, 1861.

should be sent to confer with the Southern States, and especially with Virginia, and that a convention was therefore necessary. The resolutions called for an adjournment until March 12 in the hope that the Governor would call a convention in the interim; should Virginia secede before that date, however, the group was to reassemble immediately and recommend a convention on its own authority. Other resolutions again opposed the idea of coercion, which was held to include any attempt to execute or enforce laws in a seceded state, and again attacked the North for its violation of constitutional rights. A final resolution, after outlining Maryland's material and moral intimacy with Virginia, stated that the two should act together, first by trying to maintain Southern rights within the Union, and, failing that, by leaving the Union to join the Southern confederacy.¹⁰⁵

All of this was fairly solid Southern doctrine, but it represented a point beyond which the delegates at the conference convention would not go. When neither the Governor of Maryland nor the state of Virginia took the expected action following the February adjournment, the convention met again as scheduled on March 12. Attendance had fallen off considerably, and the only tangible result of two days of haggling was a decision to send a committee to the Virginia convention, then in session, and to wait upon the action of that state.¹⁰⁶ Disunion sentiment in many of the speeches and resolutions was stronger than ever, but the moderates,

¹⁰⁵American, Sun, February 20, 1861.

¹⁰⁶Sun, Exchange, March 14, 1861. Dr. J. Hanson Thomas, president of the Farmers & Merchants Bank, and attorney William H. Norris were the Baltimore members of this six-man committee.

headed by Judge Chambers, prevented the passage of any outright secession ordinances, and the resolutions as finally adopted merely echoed previous announcements; the most threatening clause merely stated that a war between the administration and the seceded states would at once dissolve the compact that still bound Maryland to the Union.¹⁰⁷ Even though the "seceders were in the ascendant," as one Southern rights paper put it, reference to the American flag brought forth waves of applause.¹⁰⁸ The convention adjourned on March 13, subject to recall by Judge Chambers, and never reassembled.¹⁰⁹ It represented the last concerted effort on the part of pro-Southern Baltimore business men to secure the calling of a state convention.

As matters stood just before the outbreak of hostilities, then, the Baltimore business community was still largely opposed to secession. The majority of them had attended Union meetings and endorsed the Governor's policy of keeping Maryland quiet. The group that had favored a convention was unable, at the last, to come right out in favor of secession. They came as close to it as they dared, but even in a body admittedly partisan, the moderate sentiment ultimately won out. The secessionist element among the business men was not strong enough to bring any noticeable pressure on the Governor, nor could it form a group large enough to be impressive without including merchants who, however pro-Southern,

¹⁰⁷Sun, Clipper, March 14, 1861; American, March 18, 1861.

¹⁰⁸Exchange, March 14, 1861.

¹⁰⁹See Radcliffe, op. cit., p. 42. Chambers was about to reassemble the "conference convention" after the war began, but considered the move unnecessary as soon as Hicks called a special session of the Maryland Legislature.

balked at the prospect of taking Maryland out of the Union. Coercion of the Southern states by the Federal government, with civil war in its wake, might be another question, but unless and until it arose the general sentiment in business circles favored staying in the Union and hoping, rather blindly, that everything would turn out all right.

CHAPTER IV

THE TRIUMPH OF UNION SENTIMENT

1. Economic Arguments for and against Secession

In April, with the Union definitely broken and the possibility of civil war daily growing stronger, the Baltimore business men were forced to take stock of their position and decide, if and when the unpleasant choice were thrust upon them, which way to jump. Aside from the moral and sentimental attachments and the legal and theoretical questions, there were strong economic arguments on both sides. For the most part, the business man did not bother to put these arguments on paper himself. He was usually quite aware of them, and whatever he needed to have spelled out for him was readily supplied by the more articulate lawyers, politicians, and editorial writers.

The publications of the leading business organizations were understandably non-committal. The Board of Trade, with a pro-Southern president¹ and two staunch Union vice-presidents,² spoke sorrowfully of the political causes for the nation's business worries, and hoped rather vaguely "that a speedy and amicable adjustment of our national troubles, consistently with the rights of the South . . . may soon restore to our country the degree of prosperity enjoyed prior to the late presidential election."³ Later in the same report the Board reminded whoever

¹John C. Brune, commission merchant and agent for the Maryland Steam Sugar Refinery.

²William McKim, banker, and Albert Schumacher, German-born shipping and commission merchant.

³BBOT, 1860, p. 5.

might be interested that Southern cotton production, based upon slave labor, was all-important to the factories of Europe and the North,⁴ but this remark indicated a desire to preserve the Union rather than to separate from it. The Corn and Flour Exchange, speaking for one of the most important branches of Baltimore trade and industry, remained even more firmly astride the fence, and could only suggest relying upon Providence in order to "catch the gleam of returning prosperity."⁵

The city's railroad interests were also more interested in conciliation than in taking sides. In late January the presidents of the three most important lines serving Baltimore⁶ met with other railroad executives in Washington and conferred with Buchanan and General Scott. Strongly recommending adoption of the Crittenden compromise measures, the rail chiefs maintained that public opinion in the areas served by their roads favored dropping the slavery controversy.⁷

One of the most widely heard arguments in favor of attaching Maryland to the South was concerned with the great number of Southern customers on the Baltimore merchants' account books. If Maryland remained

⁴Ibid., p. 24.

⁵Corn and Flour Exchange, Annual Report, 1860, p. 5. The directors of this organization were almost all Union men, but the president, Henry Warfield, leaned increasingly toward the South.

⁶John W. Garrett of the Baltimore & Ohio, Samuel Felton of the Philadelphia, Wilmington & Baltimore, and Anthony Warford of the Northern Central.

⁷Sun, January 25, 1861. Thomson of the Pennsylvania, Corning of the New York Central, and Mash of the Erie were among the other executives at this compromise-inspired railroad convention. Garrett, who had offered the services of his road to help put down the John Brown raid, was already swinging to the view that maintenance of the Union was all-important. When the final test came Garrett, a practical business man, did what was obviously best for his railroad and placed it firmly in the war effort on the side of the federal government. See Summers, op. cit., pp. 45 ff.

out of the Confederacy, it was argued, Southerners would turn away from their old Baltimore market, lower their tariff, and purchase directly from Europe.⁸ Baltimore in a high-tariff North could not compete in the sale of European goods to the South, while the once-popular goods of the "hated North," also handled extensively in Baltimore, would naturally be spurned in the cotton states.⁹ "The prosperity of the city of Baltimore," maintained banker J. Hanson Thomas in a resolution proposed at the conference convention on March 13, "is dependent mainly on its trade and connection with the South, and . . . the union of the State of Maryland with a northern confederacy would give a fatal blow to its commercial, manufacturing and mechanical interests."¹⁰

The manufacturers were told that by remaining in the Union they would lose their "natural customers" in the agrarian South; worse still, they could not develop their industries to any great extent when competing with "the superior wealth and population and established trade of the North and East. . . ."¹¹ On the other hand, industrial Baltimore in the Southern Confederacy would naturally and readily become the workshop for the new country, with infinite possibilities for expansion and growth.¹² Proponents of this line of reasoning discreetly omitted any reference to the Southern free-trade policy, an item more

⁸Exchange, March 13, 1861; see also letter from James Hodges, a Baltimore merchant, to E. B. Estes, Feb. 20, 1861, in Sun, March 8, 1861.

⁹Exchange, March 13, 1861.

¹⁰Sun, March 14, 1861.

¹¹Exchange, March 26, 1861.

¹²W. Jefferson Buchanan, Maryland's Hope; her Trials and Interests in Connexion with the War (Richmond: West & Johnson, 1864), p. 46. This pamphlet appeared much later in the conflict, but its appeal to Maryland to join the Confederacy contained many arguments that must have been in circulation ever since the election of Lincoln.

appealing to merchants than to manufacturers.¹³

As for Baltimore's trade with the West and North, the Southern argument continued, it would be hopelessly lost should Maryland cling to the Union. The big Northern cities would easily "absorb and divide" the Western market, and no "Northern commerce can ever seek a mart or channel in Baltimore when emptied of Southern staples--the apple of the Northern eye." Except for tobacco, Maryland and the North produced the same crops and without Southern goods could have no items to exchange.¹⁴ Yet Baltimore could easily become the first commercial city of the Confederacy, rivalling New York. As the "nearest, safest, most accessible Southern port," Baltimore would be readily sought by foreign vessels,¹⁵ and an enlarged direct trade with Europe, as one paper insisted, was essential to the city's commercial growth.¹⁶

Maryland's geographical position in a war between the sections threatened to have dire effects on trade and commerce. Secessionists pointed out that if Maryland and Virginia were on opposite sides, the Chesapeake Bay could be closed to Baltimore shipping by a Confederate blockade of the Capes. The city's other main trade rout, the Baltimore & Ohio, could even more easily be cut off, since the western section of the road and all of its important western terminals lay within Virginia's borders. Baltimore as a Northern city would thus be deprived

¹³See BBOT, 1860, pp. 9-10, and ibid., 1861, pp. 2-5, for the strenuous objections to the higher rates of the new Morrill Tariff. The Board was composed chiefly of merchants, and argued exclusively from the mercantile point of view.

¹⁴Buchanan, op. cit., p. 43.

¹⁵Ibid., p. 44.

¹⁶Exchange, March 14, 1861.

of her Southern, Western, coastal, and overseas markets, and her swift ruination as a commercial center would be the inevitable consequence.¹⁷

As one Baltimore merchant described it:

We can never remain as the mere caudal appendage of a Northern Confederacy. . . . If we should permit ourselves to be separated from the slave states, grass would grow in our streets, and Baltimore in a few years would present to the eye of the civilized world a greater commercial failure than the historian has ever recorded since trade took its flight from Venice.¹⁸

The advocates of the Union were able to answer these arguments point by point, and add a few of their own. The loss of the Southern market, they began, could never compare with the loss of the Western, and when Baltimore joined the South, after putting so much time and effort into perfecting a rail link with the West, all of this trade would be diverted to New York and Philadelphia.¹⁹ Even the pro-Southern Exchange cautioned the business men not to confine their trade exclusively to any one section--referring, in this case, to the South--and pointed out the great potentialities of the Northwest as a market in case the old established patterns were broken.²⁰ "An old shopkeeper" reminded his friends that the city's "great works of internal improvements, and her commercial arteries aim principally at the trade of the free States," and secession would "cut off our railroads from the country on which they now depend. . . ."²¹

¹⁷Coleman Yellott (state Senator), to Hicks, January 24, 1861, printed in Sun, January 26, 1861.

¹⁸Hodges to Estes, February 20, 1861, op. cit.

¹⁹Speech by Augustus W. Bradford, January 10, 1861, printed in American, January 11, 1861. See also editorial in Clipper, Feb. 1, 1861.

²⁰Exchange, January 23, 1861.

²¹Letter to the editors, Exchange, December 25, 1860.

Nor, said the Unionists, was the secessionist picture of Baltimore as the "great commercial capital" of the South a valid one. The city would be on the periphery of the new nation, not nearly so well situated as a distributing point for European goods as were Norfolk, Charleston, Savannah, or even New Orleans.²² Believers in "King Cotton" were reminded that foreign governments might not prove reliable to the South; Britain was already searching for "speedy deliverance from . . . her dependence upon the cotton growers of America."²³ Southerners who insisted that Maryland was economically inseparable from Virginia were forgetting that Virginia's "better half"--the western section, coal and farm country served by the Baltimore & Ohio--was pro-Union in composition and sympathy, and would undoubtedly break away from the older part of the state in the event of secession; furthermore, this western Virginia was far more important to the trade and industry of Baltimore.²⁴ It was even suggested that Maryland and western Virginia should unite politically and stay in the Union, letting the secession-minded, less enterprising inhabitants of southern and eastern Virginia join the Confederacy if they chose.²⁵

Manufacturers and merchants alike were destined to suffer under the vaunted Southern free-trade policy. The absence of a tariff would

²²Ibid. See also Kennedy, An Appeal to Maryland, in Moore, op. cit., I, 371-372.

²³American, February 26, 1861.

²⁴Kennedy, An Appeal to Maryland, in Moore, op. cit., I, 372-373.

²⁵Clipper, February 1, 1861.

ruin Baltimore's relatively new industries; "our great steam enginery, our railroad apparatus, our heavy works of the foundry, our cast and rolled metal, could never hold their own in the presence of free importations from England."²⁶ And Baltimore business men generally would be the greatest losers when the South, minus a tariff, sought revenue instead by means of direct taxation. It was estimated that the current Maryland tax rate would be increased eight or twelve times over by the demands of the Confederate government, and this draining off of profits would place a languishing commerce alongside the ruined industry.²⁷ If Baltimore avoided all this by staying in the Union, the argument went on, she would also discover that her products would not long be the object of Southern "discrimination." In time Southerners would find that a tariff only on Northern goods was unfeasible, and would adopt a policy of uniform free trade, thus enabling Baltimore to regain her customers in the cotton states.²⁸

Turning to geography, the Unionists were able to show that Maryland's location was actually the strongest argument in favor of clinging to the Union. West Virginia's obvious Union sympathy would prevent any real disruption by Southerners of traffic on the B. & O., but no Western produce could possibly desire an outlet in a Confederate Baltimore. In the other direction, a hostile North with superior maritime power could far more readily blockade the entrance to the Chesapeake, and by the

²⁶Kennedy, An Appeal to Maryland, in Moore, op. cit., I, 371.

²⁷Ibid. See also William H. Collins, First Address to the People of Maryland, 4th ed. (Baltimore: James Young, 1861), pp. 15-16.

²⁸Kennedy, An Appeal to Maryland, in Moore, op. cit., I, 371.

same token a friendly North could use that same naval strength to keep Baltimore's sea routes open.²⁹ Even Southerners admitted that the Potomac ran along the wrong side of the state; the absence of any tangible boundary between Maryland and Pennsylvania had created strong economic ties between the two,³⁰ and made it a simple matter for Northern armies to attack or defend Maryland, as the case might be, in the event of war. Finally, the presence of a hostile North along an open border would require Maryland slaveholders, for security reasons, to sell their slaves down South or depart with them, and Maryland would soon become a free state in a slave Confederacy, the object of the same suspicion which Southerners had long held toward non-slaveholding communities.³¹ Military invasion, naval blockade, high taxes, idle factories, loss of all Western, Northern, and foreign trade, and an eventual estrangement from the slave states, were pictured as the inevitable results of joining the Confederacy. The alternative was not a great deal brighter, but from the purely economic standpoint it seemed to have slightly more to recommend it--if only because it required less of an adjustment.

2. The News of Sumter

On April 13 the news of Sumter started trickling into Baltimore, and the business men began to realize that the middle ground could not

²⁹Ibid., p. 372; Collins, op. cit., pp. 7-8.

³⁰Buchanan, Maryland's Crisis, A Political Outline (Richmond, 1863), pp. 14-15, cited by Clark, "Politics in Maryland during the Civil War," op. cit., p. 260. In this pamphlet Buchanan was forced to admit, for this and other reasons--a strong influx of Northern and foreign population, for example--Maryland could never join the Confederacy.

³¹Collins, op. cit., p. 11.

last much longer. One large group of merchants met at the Eutaw House on the evening of the thirteenth and discussed the matter of Federal appointments in Baltimore, with the particular object of seeing that their man, one Charles J. R. Thorpe, obtained the job of Postmaster for the city. A committee of sixteen merchants had gone to Washington on April 4 in an effort to secure the desired appointment, but reported to the meeting that "the pressure of important business," understandably enough, had prevented Lincoln or his cabinet from granting an interview.³² Charles W. Lentz, wealthy German dry goods merchant, evidently spoke for the entire group when, in the course of a lengthy address, he insisted that only Union men should be appointed to office in Baltimore. Thorpe, argued Lentz, in addition to meeting the other requirements for the important position of Postmaster, was "in politics a firm, unconditional Union man." In any event the meeting unanimously adopted resolutions which embodied Lentz' main arguments, and selected a committee of five to have another try at an interview with the President.³³ Merchants who so earnestly desired the appointment of Union men in the city were obviously eager, even after the outbreak of hostilities, to make their peace with the administration and to cooperate with it in business matters; after Sumter such a move amounted to unqualified support of the Union.

The other element reacted immediately after reading about Lincoln's

³²American, April 15, 1861.

³³Ibid. Beside Lentz, the officers at this merchants' meeting included William Bridges, dealer in fruits and confections; John H. Lloyd, of Parlett & Co., tinsplate and metal dealers; William Welsh, wholesale tobacco and cigar dealer; Benjamin F. Norris, grocer; H. W. Hiser, commission merchant; William F. Larrabee, importer and dealer in leather; and C. H. Poumairat, provision merchant.

call for volunteers. Pro-Southern business men joined in ward meetings on April 17 and helped to elect delegates to a Southern-rights convention, held on the following day, which had as its object some sort of opposition "to the coercive policy of the Federal Administration."³⁴ The actual session of the convention was secret,³⁵ but the general tone of the proceedings was reflected in the resolutions put forth by Ross Winans and adopted by the assemblage. It was rather unnecessarily predicted that the government policy of trying to recapture forts in the seceded states would result in civil war; Northern militia should not be garrisoned in Southern forts anyway, and the presence of Northern troops in the District of Columbia was both an insult and a menace to Maryland. Finally, the resolutions asked Marylanders to "present an unbroken front" for the purpose of defending home and fireside, averting civil war, and repelling "any invader who may come to establish a military despotism over us."³⁶

Excitement throughout the city, meanwhile, was widespread. Churches were unusually crowded on Sunday, April 14, the day after Baltimoreans had heard about Fort Sumter. During the next few days people gathered

³⁴Exchange, April 18, 1861. Joshua Vansant, Ross and Thomas Winans, Hugh Sisson of the steam marble works, merchant tailors George P. Frick and J. A. Hambleton, commission merchants S. R. Dunnock, F. H. Scott, James Whiteford and William H. Owens, dye-and-chemical manufacturer Richard J. Baker, and James Hodges, importer of hosiery and dry goods, were the business names listed as supporting this convention.

³⁵Ibid., April 19, 1861.

³⁶Ibid., April 20, 1861. The Winans resolutions were the only results of the meeting handed out to the press. In view of the subsequent happenings in Baltimore, it is quite probable that, in addition to the customary chest-thumping, concrete ways and means of opposing the passage of Federal troops were discussed. There was no other real reason for keeping the session secret.

frequently about the newspaper offices to learn whatever they could. Business was entirely suspended, and rival militia organizations--the pro-Southern National Volunteers and the pro-Union men--assembled and marched about flexing their muscles, while Southern cockades and Union flags alike appeared to the tune of threats and mutterings.³⁷ The city's collective blood pressure, stimulated by such items as the President's call for volunteers, the secession of Virginia on April 17, and the threatening tone of the Winans resolutions, mounted steadily.

3. The Riot

On April 19 "the invader," represented by the Sixth Massachusetts Regiment of Infantry, fully equipped, plus an unarmed regiment of Pennsylvanians, arrived in Baltimore en route to the national capital. On the previous day a few companies of Pennsylvania artillery had marched through the city to board a B. & O. train for Washington, accompanied by an angry, hissing mob, but no real damage had been done;³⁸ the townspeople were still working themselves up. They went quite mad for a few hours on the 19th, however, and the ensuing riot between Massachusetts troops and Baltimore citizens was one of the worst in the city's history.³⁹ Richard T. Davis, a pro-Southern dry goods merchant, was among

³⁷Naturally, all of the papers described the happenings in the city in some detail. See esp. Exchange, April 15, 16, 19; Clipper, April 15, 16, 18, 19; American, April 19.

³⁸Clipper, April 19, 1861.

³⁹A detailed account of the riot is out of place here. For the best description, aside from the rather breathless stories in the daily papers, see George William Brown, Baltimore and the Nineteenth of April, 1861, Johns Hopkins University Studies in Historical and Political Science, Extra Vol. III (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University, 1887), pp. 42-59. Brown, Mayor of Baltimore at the time and one of the leading actors in the events of the day, wrote about the riot some twenty-five years after it occurred, but made use of newspapers, letters, telegrams, and contemporary histories to supplement his memory, and turned out a clear and creditable account.

those killed, having made the mistake of giving three cheers for Jeff Davis and the South at the moment when a trainload of stone-scarred Massachusetts boys, fresh out of the tumult downtown, was passing through southwest Baltimore on its way to Washington.⁴⁰ For a brief while-- indeed, for the only time during the entire period leading up to and during the conflict--the citizens of Baltimore were united about something. A mob with blood on its face was in the streets, breaking into stores and seizing arms and damaging property,⁴¹ and it was obvious that the arrival of any more Northern troops would precipitate a real, major league war. Secessionists who did not want the state occupied by Union soldiers and Unionists who did not want the mob to go completely haywire and plunge Maryland into the Confederacy were in solid agreement: no more troops must go through the city.⁴²

The authorities immediately took steps to bring things under control. Governor Hicks, Mayor Brown, and other leading figures made speeches at a huge public gathering in the Monument Square that evening in an attempt to pacify the unruly element and to assure the citizens that they would not again be "invaded" by Northern regiments. The various volunteer militia groups were enlisted under the Board of Police for the defense of the city, and Baltimore was placed under martial

⁴⁰Exchange, April 20, 1861; Brown, op. cit., pp. 52-53.

⁴¹Exchange, Clipper, April 20, 1861. Warehouses, hardware stores, and any business establishment that might contain some sort of weapon, were forcibly entered wherever the proprietors did not open the doors. Some stores, in self defense, hastily turned over their weapons to the city authorities. Judging from the newspaper accounts, it would not have taken long for this arms quest to develop into a plain looting expedition, and the merchants affected were probably unable to see the difference anyway.

⁴²Brown, op. cit., pp. 55-56.

law, with command of the militia being assigned to Colonel Isaac Ridgeway Trimble.⁴³ Hicks and Brown sent a dispatch to Lincoln informing him of the riot and asking that no more troops be sent, after which, by way of strengthening the request, three prominent citizens caught the next train for Washington with a letter from Brown to the President, disclaiming any responsibility for further bloodshed if additional Northern soldiers tried to pass through Baltimore.⁴⁴ Meanwhile the militia, acting under orders, burned the railway bridges on the Northern Central and Philadelphia, Wilmington & Baltimore, and cut the telegraph wires, thus severing all communication between Baltimore and the North. No provisions, arms, or coal was allowed to leave the city, and steamboats were required to secure express permission before clearing the harbor.⁴⁵ To prevent the general excitement from mounting, band-playing and flag-flying were prohibited, and all the bars were closed.⁴⁶

Indeed, it looked very much as though Maryland, or at least Baltimore, was rapidly and explosively seceding from the Union. Henry M. Warfield, President of the Corn and Flour Exchange, returned from Richmond with the news that Virginians were overjoyed at Baltimore's actions, and a Virginia customer wrote to the hardware firm of Magruder, Taylor &

⁴³Charles Howard (President, Baltimore Board of Police) to Trimble, April 21, 1861, Isaac R. Trimble papers, Maryland Historical Society, Baltimore, Md. For accounts of the speeches see Exchange, April 20, 1861; Brown, op. cit., p. 56; Radcliffe, op. cit., pp. 54-55.

⁴⁴Brown, op. cit., pp. 57-58. John C. Brune, George W. Dobbin, and Judge H. Lennox Bond--a Republican--were the letter-bearers.

⁴⁵Brown to Trimble, April 22, 1861, Trimble papers.

⁴⁶Clipper, April 23, 1861.

Roberts: "I hope the greatest fear in your city is over with and I hope we will have enough Southern troops to protect your State from Lincoln's rule. . . ."⁴⁷ Wealthy Union bankers subscribed \$500,000 for the defense of the city, while other pro-Union firms donated one hundred dollars each in an effort to speed the military preparations, and the machine shops of Ross Winans and Adam Denmead hummed and clanked in the production of arms.⁴⁸ What with the militia drilling and parading daily in the streets, the donation by several merchants of bread and provisions to feed the troops,⁴⁹ and the blanket prohibition on the export of all foodstuffs, weapons, and coal, Baltimore began to look more and more like an armed camp, preparing for a state of siege. And when Governor Hicks finally capitulated and summoned the Maryland Legislature into its long-awaited special session, the election of a Southern-rights delegation from the city was completely unopposed.⁵⁰

It was a dark period for the Union cause in Baltimore. Fear of

⁴⁷Ibid.; Davidson to Magruder, April 21, 1861, Magruder, Taylor & Roberts papers.

⁴⁸John Fulton, The "Southern-Rights" and "Union" Parties in Maryland Contrasted (Baltimore: W. M. Innes, 1863), p. 15. This violently pro-Southern pamphlet aimed at showing how completely secessionist Baltimore became immediately following the riot; bankers Johns Hopkins, Columbus O'Donnell, and John Clark, Union men all, had subscribed the \$500,000, and eight Union houses were named as contributing \$100 each. See also American, April 23, 1861; Trimble to Howard, May 13, 1861, Trimble papers.

⁴⁹Clipper, April 24, 1861. James D. Mason, cracker-baker, was specifically named as having contributed food; "other merchants," according to the paper, were doing likewise.

⁵⁰Fulton, op. cit., p. 15; Clipper, April 23, 1861; American, April 25, 1861. Nine thousand votes were cast for a single Southern-rights ticket, with no opposition ticket put forward. Since the city had cast over thirty thousand votes in the last Presidential election, the opposition evidently thought it wiser to stay away from the polls in the

Northern reprisals after the riot and a general opposition to the idea of helping the Federal government coerce the seceded states had evidently prompted one-time Union business men to aid in preparing the city's defenses, and it was widely felt that Maryland, now faced with the choice, would join the Confederacy rather than help in making war upon it.⁵¹ Leopold Blumenberg, German-born manufacturer who answered Lincoln's call for volunteers by retiring from business and starting to recruit a Maryland regiment, was mobbed by Southern sympathizers, and saved from hanging only by the presence of a strong police guard at his house.⁵² A pro-Southern mob also attacked and damaged the presses of the pro-Republican Wecker, and forced the liberal German Turner societies to flee the city.⁵³ Both the police marshal, George P. Kane, and the commander of the militia, Isaac R. Trimble, were favorable to the South;⁵⁴

vote for delegates to the Legislature. Pro-Southern business men John C. Brune, Henry Warfield, Ross Winans, J. Hanson Thomas, and William G. Harrison were among the ten Baltimore delegates. The city election was necessary because charges of fraud in a previous election had caused the Maryland House of Delegates, in its last regular session, to declare the Baltimore seats vacant.

⁵¹Exchange, April 22, 24, 26, 1861.

⁵²Cyclopedia, pp. 477-478. In spite of this opposition, Blumenberg succeeded in raising his regiment--the Fifth Maryland Volunteers--and fought well under McClellan on the Peninsula and at Antietam. A Prussian officer before coming to Baltimore in 1854 to go into business, Blumenberg was wounded at Antietam, breveted brigadier general for gallantry on the field, and later, on his recovery, appointed Provost Marshal for the Third Maryland District.

⁵³Cunz, The Maryland Germans, pp. 305-306. Most of the Turners, who had formed the bulk of Baltimore's insignificant Republican element before the war, immediately joined the Union army. The Wecker was able to resume publication within a week or ten days.

⁵⁴Kane was constantly accused of being a secessionist by the pro-Union press. Though even his enemies admitted that he had done everything possible to prevent bloodshed on the 19th of April, he shortly afterward announced his determination to fight, if necessary, all Union

the police were accused of seizing only Union men in the various disturbances following the riot, and a few policemen lost their jobs for failing to enforce the prohibition on the flying of American flags.⁵⁵

"The disunion feeling has become very decided here," wrote one Baltimore firm, "and the general sentiment among those of us who have heretofore stood up for the Union, is that it is of no use to struggle for it any longer. . . ."⁵⁶

Actually, there was evidence that the contributions of Baltimore bankers and merchants to the defense of the city stood for something other than fear of Northern invasion. The men who subscribed money, donated provisions and arms, and otherwise aided in the military organization of Baltimore, dreaded the approach of Union soldiers not because they were invading Maryland soil, but because of the effect another encounter might have on the mob. The "roughs" who were storming about on the nineteenth thirsting for more Northern blood had, before being brought under control by the authorities, managed to do a little looting --not much, but enough to put the fear of God into staid property-holders; one more Massachusetts regiment, they felt, and we will not only be dragged out of the Union by a lawless mob, but have our stores

troops passing through Maryland. He was sufficiently suspect during the period of Federal occupation of Baltimore to be arrested by General Banks on June 27, 1861, and confined in Fort McHenry. See Radcliffe, op. cit., pp. 66-67; Brown, op. cit., p. 97. Trimble, when the militia was disbanded, left Baltimore and joined the Confederate army, eventually becoming a major-general.

⁵⁵Clipper, April 20, 26, 30, 1861.

⁵⁶Smith & Chappell to L. Downer, April 29, 1861, Smith & Atkinson papers, Maryland Historical Society, Baltimore, Md.

ransacked in the process.

It had been a hard winter for the Baltimore working men. Thousands had lost their jobs, and according to an inquiry made by Marshal Kane of several manufacturers, many establishments were maintaining a skeleton force on a part-time basis, "not because we required their labor, but because they required bread."⁵⁷ Mechanics and laborers had held meetings to discuss their plight and request aid from the city, but the relief measures had been half-hearted and inadequate,⁵⁸ and on April 8, less than two weeks before the riot, a large group of unemployed workers met and drew up an outline of their difficulties, closing their petition with the ominous suggestion that if relief were not forthcoming, the jobless would have to seek sustenance "in any manner that presents itself." At another meeting held two days later, it was decided that this language was too strong and the petition was dropped in favor of a milder one, but not before it had appeared in the press; thoughtful observers could hardly have missed the point.⁵⁹

Conditions were thus ripe for a disturbance, and when hot-blooded young Southern sympathizers and working men with too much time and not

⁵⁷Exchange, March 25, 26, 1861. In an editorial calling for aid to the working men, the paper claimed that 4,200 more laborers had been laid off during the first three months of 1861 than during the corresponding period a year before. In the same issue appeared the statements of a dozen or so manufacturers, showing the reduction in their labor forces since 1860--ranging from twenty-five to eighty per cent--and adding that many still on the pay-rolls were only employed for twenty or thirty hours a week.

⁵⁸American, February 1, 1861; Exchange, March 25, 1861; Clipper, April 9, 1861.

⁵⁹Clipper, April 9, 1861.

enough money were suddenly confronted with a Massachusetts regiment, some sort of explosion was inevitable. The order-loving citizens promptly made sure that the events of April 19 could not be repeated. Owing to the enrollment and organization of volunteers under General Trimble, as the Mayor himself put it, "many who would otherwise have been the disturbers of the peace became its defenders."⁶⁰ On May 6 the authorities felt that "the immediate and pressing danger to the safety of the city has . . . passed away," and ordered the volunteers disbanded,⁶¹ even though Northern troops were openly moving closer to Baltimore from Annapolis on the south and Pennsylvania on the north; the danger from without was greater than ever, but it was not the danger that the better element had been worrying about. General Trimble, in a final letter to the Mayor summarizing the activities of the volunteer force, wrote:

I will here conclude, by expressing the opinion, that the organization of these associations, and turning the popular excitement into this channel, giving a large and excited populace the idea that they were acting, as it were, officially as a police force, to defend the city and preserve order, has prevented many tumults, preserved private property, often threatened, and during the excitement, inspired confidence . . . that the city could be preserved, from internal disorder and riot, and from the attack of disorderly assailants from without. . . .⁶²

The seeming unanimity with which merchants and bankers helped to organize the city by no means indicated a desire for secession.

⁶⁰Brown, op. cit., p. 63. Brown added that many secessionists who had joined the military groups hoping that war was in the offing grew disgusted with the determination on the part of the authorities to keep the peace, and left Baltimore to join the Confederate army.

⁶¹Howard to Trimble, May 2, 1861; Mayor Brown to Trimble, May 6, 1861, Trimble papers. All arms were ordered turned over to the Marshal of Police upon dismissal of the militia.

⁶²Trimble to Brown, May 8, 1861, ibid.

4. The Reaction

It did not take the Baltimore business men long to discover that all of these efforts to make the city defensible were rapidly stifling trade and commerce. Observing that order had generally been restored within a week after the nineteenth of April, they began to come out strongly for a lifting of the restrictions and a restoration of the broken lines of trade. They got results, too. The Corn and Flour Exchange, cooperating with representatives from the Provisions Exchange, held meetings, circulated petitions, and sent committees to the city authorities regarding the prohibition on exports,⁶³ and on May 1, "in compliance with the unanimous wish of the mercantile community," the Mayor and Police Commissioners removed the ban on the export of provisions, breadstuffs, and coal.⁶⁴ On May 2 the Corn and Flour Exchange played host at a large gathering of merchants, assembled to discuss the matter of restoring communications with the North. The group wanted the railroad bridges repaired and trade with the Northern states resumed; they were tired of restrictions and felt that the dangers to Baltimore's safety no longer existed; and they drew up a petition, to be presented to the Maryland Legislature by a committee of ten, stating these facts and asking that rail and telegraph lines be restored.⁶⁵ The Board of Trade also appointed a committee to work on this problem, and although the Legislature refused to sanction a re-opening of the Northern rail

⁶³Exchange, April 30, 1861.

⁶⁴Brown and Howard to Trimble, April 25, 1861; Howard to Trimble, May 1, 1861, Trimble papers.

⁶⁵Baltimore Patriot, May 2, 1861; American, Exchange, May 3, 1861.

links on the grounds that it would facilitate a military invasion of the state,⁶⁶ the bridges were repaired by the middle of May and trains again began running northward to Philadelphia and New York.⁶⁷ When it came to matters of trade, the business community as a whole obviously considered its Northern ties too important to sever, coercion and civil war notwithstanding.

Undoubtedly, the brief taste of what would happen to their commerce when cut off from the Union also prompted many business men to take leading parts in the various Union meetings of late April and early May. The first of these, held on April 29, marked the real beginnings of a definite resurgence of Union sentiment. Officered in each case largely by business men, the gatherings repeatedly professed unwavering loyalty to the Union, condemned the mob violence of April 19, recommended opening all of the state's lines of travel to the Federal government, blasted the Southern sympathizers in the then assembled Maryland Legislature, and advocated the calling of a state Union convention which could act, no matter what the Legislature might decide to do, to keep Maryland from seceding or making any disloyal moves.⁶⁸ Delegates to a city convention, elected in ward meetings by those in sympathy with the idea, met on May 7 and made plans for the nomination of good Union candidates in the forthcoming June election of congressmen from Maryland's third and fourth districts. The convention also discussed

⁶⁶Radcliffe, op. cit., p. 79.

⁶⁷Clipper, May 7, 10, 12, 1861; BBOT, 1861, p. 4.

⁶⁸For accounts of these meetings, see the daily papers during the period April 29-May 15, especially the Clipper and American. The lists of presiding officers at the different meetings invariably included a substantial number of business men.

the proceedings of the state Legislature, agreed that a secession ordinance was not likely to be passed by that body, looked forward to the state Union convention scheduled for May 24, and planned to prepare an address to the citizens which would stress the advantages of remaining true to the Union.⁶⁹

Perhaps the best expression of the dominant feeling in business circles at this time was put forth by Henry May, the prominent attorney and Douglas Democrat who had a large business following in the city and who later was elected to Congress from Maryland's third (Baltimore) district. On May 14 May expressed his views in a letter answering a group of business men and other leading citizens who had invited him to be their candidate in the June election. After thanking his supporters and agreeing to enter the campaign, May announced that he was strongly opposed to the Republican Party, but that secession was no remedy, and that Maryland should remain in the Union at all costs, endure the evils of the present administration, and seek redress only through constitutional means; he wanted no parts of a revolution which, in his opinion, would destroy country and constitution alike.⁷⁰ He desired peace and detested the policy of coercion as much as ever, but he wanted to stay in the Union, and this was exactly what the majority of the business community wanted to hear.

⁶⁹Clipper, May 8, 1861. Well over half of the delegates to this city Union convention were bankers, manufacturers, and merchants.

⁷⁰Letter from Henry May, May 14, 1861, printed in American, May 15, 1861. Merchants Lambert Gittings, W. H. D. C. Wright, Eugene and F. A. Levering, Robert Leslie, James Hooper, Jr., Henry A. Thompson, A. H. Stump, Daniel Warfield, and George P. Thomas were among those who had invited May to run for Congress. For a discussion of the election in June see Clark, "Politics in Maryland during the Civil War," op. cit.,

Business men who felt differently were represented in the Legislature by the recently elected Southern-rights delegation from Baltimore.⁷¹ Hicks had originally summoned the Legislature to meet on April 26 at Annapolis, but when General Benjamin F. Butler, in order to avoid the excited Baltimoreans, moved his Union troops to Annapolis by water and landed there on April 21, the Governor decided that the presence of Northern soldiers would make the Maryland capital a bad place in which to conduct business, and shifted the place of assembling to Frederick.⁷² In view of the post-riot excitement, the widely felt opposition to aiding the Federal government in making war upon the Confederacy, and the known pro-Southern attitude of many of the Maryland delegates and senators, no one would have been overly surprised had the Legislature passed a secession ordinance.⁷³

Both Houses immediately set forth resolutions denying their constitutional power to do this, and although it was strongly implied that secession could be effected by a state convention, the lawmakers ended up by refusing to call a convention, either. They protested repeatedly and vigorously against the actions and policy of the Federal government,

XXXVI (December, 1941), pp. 382-383, 388. May was more moderate than his unconditional Unionist opponent, Henry Winter Davis, but it was really a contest between two Union men, with the State-rights candidate, R. M. McLane, receiving a negligible number of votes.

⁷¹See above, p. 50.

⁷²See Radcliffe, op. cit., pp. 68-70. Keeping the Legislature away from the influence of Northern troops was interpreted by Southern sympathizers as a sign that Hicks had abandoned his Union attitude. Actually, the Governor was also influenced by the known Union sentiment in Frederick, which he hoped would restrain the secessionist element among the lawmakers.

⁷³The actions of the Legislature, which fall somewhat outside the scope of this work, are described in Radcliffe, op. cit., ch. VIII.

even demanding that the Confederacy be recognized, but this represented the extent of their "secessionist" activities.⁷⁴ A "safety bill," aimed at setting up a commission with somewhat dictatorial powers which could take control of the state away from Hicks and, therefore, doubtless push it out of the Union, was introduced in the Senate by the ardent disunionist Coleman Yellott, but soon encountered strong and violent opposition, and dropped out of sight. The business men among the Baltimore delegates, representing Southern sentiment among the mercantile community, voted against this "safety bill" right from the beginning; furthermore, a committee appointed by the Union convention then meeting in Baltimore returned from Frederick with the statement that the Baltimore delegates had remained "totally opposed" to any action on the part of Maryland.⁷⁵

At the last minute, then, the Southern element had stepped up to the brink of secession only to back away. Union feelings in Baltimore were stronger than ever, and the issue was settled once and for all on May 13 by General Butler, who moved troops into the city from Annapolis and occupied Federal Hill. The citizens, by all accounts, evinced only

⁷⁴Maryland General Assembly, House of Delegates, Committee on Federal Relations, Report of the Committee . . . in Regard to the Calling of a Sovereign Convention (Frederick, Md.: E. S. Riley, 1861), *passim*. The resolutions contained in this report, which were adopted by a 43 to 13 vote in the House, denounced the government and bewailed Maryland's position, but admitted that neither a convention nor any other attempt at resistance was feasible.

⁷⁵Exchange, May 8, 1861. John W. Randolph, a pro-Union lumber merchant, was a member of this committee appointed to see what the Baltimore delegation--Warfield, Harrison, Brune, Winans, Thomas, et al.--had been up to. The committee reported that the delegation, though holding different political views, were "honorable and truthful men" who agreed with the Unionists that Maryland should not attempt to oppose the Federal government. S. Teackle Wallis assured the convention in Baltimore that the delegates had opposed the Safety Bill.

curiosity and enthusiasm at this reappearance of the "invader."⁷⁶ Within a day after Butler's arrival more than a dozen firms had written him, offering to supply his troops with provisions, bread, mattresses, blankets, lumber, tents, stoves, arms, and sleeping space.⁷⁷ Whether willingly or resignedly, the great majority of the business men had worked to keep Maryland in the Union, and the minority, even in the turbulent days following the nineteenth of April, had always lacked the nerve or the support, or both, to advocate secession openly and unequivocally. Commercial and industrial Baltimore had shown itself to be more of a Northern than a Southern city.

Conclusion

In choosing between Union and secession, the merchants were not so much concerned with following or not following their "economic interest" as with determining precisely what that economic interest was. There were good arguments on both sides, and men in the same line of business could study the situation, strictly from the profit viewpoint, and come up with opposite answers. For example, the wealthy German merchants who dominated Baltimore's large tobacco trade and belonged to the exclusive Germania Club were generally sympathetic to the tobacco-raising South,⁷⁸ yet some of the club's most eminent members--Albert

⁷⁶Clipper, American, May 14, 1861.

⁷⁷See letters from Baltimore business houses to Butler, May, 1861, Benjamin F. Butler papers, U. S. Library of Congress, Washington, D. C.

⁷⁸Cunz, "The Maryland Germans in the Civil War," op. cit., pp. 414-415, 418. Cunz, The Maryland Germans, pp. 310-311, covers the same ground.

Schumacher, Charles W. Lentz, and Georg W. Gail--were Union men. A clear majority of the banking, flour-milling, mining, manufacturing, coal, and lumber interests supported the Union, but in each case there were notable exceptions.⁷⁹ Importers, wholesalers, and retailers, dealing in such varied products as dry goods, liquors, coffee, hardware, boots and shoes, straw goods, provisions, oysters, hats, clothing, drugs, and guano, could be found on both sides, with the Union men predominating in almost every instance.⁸⁰

As was true throughout the country, place of birth was not always a safe guide. Jesse Marden, Baltimore manufacturer, was born in New Hampshire and had worked for years in Boston, yet remained an outspoken opponent of the policies of the Federal government,⁸¹ while shipping

⁷⁹E.g., bankers George S. Brown and J. Hanson Thomas, manufacturers Ross and Thomas Winans and Hugh Sisson, miller Henry M. Warfield, mining president John W. McCoy, lumber dealer Joseph H. Boyd, and William G. Harrison, president of the George's Creek Coal and Iron Company, were Southern-rights men. Most of the "big names" in these fields, however, appeared consistently in the Union camp.

⁸⁰It was, of course, impossible to determine the sympathies of all the business men in any one category, but a fair sampling was obtained from the business names supporting one cause or the other in the various meetings and conventions. The Union supporters in each field were invariably more numerous, but each branch of trade had at least one or two "Southern-rights men." Cf. American, January 7, 1861, and Clipper, December 22, 1860, for lists of merchants; the former group sponsored the big Union meeting of January 10, and the latter favored a session of the Legislature, supposedly for the purpose of placing Maryland on the side of the Southern states. See also the lists of officers at the Union meetings following the riot, in American, April 29, May 1, May 3, May 15, 1861; Exchange, May 6, 1861; Clipper, May 4, May 6, 1861. The Biographical Cyclopaedia, in its hundreds of sketches of leading Baltimore merchants and manufacturers, occasionally mentioned the sympathies of its subjects during the war; between eighty and ninety per cent were Unionists.

⁸¹Cyclopaedia, pp. 224-225.

merchant William Applegarth, Virginia-born and a slaveholder, supported both the Union cause and the Republican Party during the war.⁸² Families were split. The Mayer brothers, Brantz and Charles F., sons of one of Baltimore's wealthiest German merchants, took opposite sides,⁸³ and Thomas E. Hambleton, dry goods merchant and president of the Maryland Fire Insurance Company, praised the Unionist course of Governor Hicks⁸⁴ only to see his two sons, also business men, actively support the Confederacy.⁸⁵

Union men among the business community not only far outnumbered the pro-Southern element, but were generally willing to give their cause more unconditional support. At no time during the dark days between the election of Lincoln and the occupation of Baltimore by Butler's Northern troops did the Southern-rights merchants actually come out for secession. They voted for Breckinridge in 1860 in the name of Southern rights; they took part in meetings aimed at securing a state convention or a session of the Legislature; and they were determined to have no part in coercing the South, but in the absence of strong popular support they evidently felt that a stronger stand was impossible. Their failure to capitalize on the temporary, but widespread, resentment against the North following the April 19 affair was perhaps a realization that military resistance at this time was futile; in any event, the pro-Southern

⁸²Ibid., p. 93.

⁸³Ibid., pp. 679, 711.

⁸⁴Hambleton to Hicks, January 3, 1861, Hicks papers. The Governor's name, said Hambleton, "will stand out in the History of the stricken and bleeding country as the man and patriot who saved it by his firmness"--- a reference to the Governor's refusal to summon the Legislature or call a convention.

⁸⁵Cyclopedia, p. 261.

business men who took their seats in the House of Delegates on April 26 never supported any of the moves which might have led to the secession of Maryland. This secession, had it occurred at any time after the first of the year, would doubtless have been accepted by most of the pro-Southern merchants and actively welcomed by others, but their unwillingness to take a definite, unequivocal stand on the subject remained constant, whatever their private feelings might have been.

In 1860, the majority of the merchants had voted for Bell as a sort of "Southern-rights Unionist." During the winter, an even greater majority had endorsed the Governor's policy of refusing to call a convention or convene the Legislature. They had indicated this support in their circulars and Union mass meetings, and even more by their general passivity; Hicks could hardly have pursued his course so confidently in the face of strong pressure brought to bear by a hostile mercantile community. The merchants, after all, could get things done when they wanted to. They were able to secure a lifting of the ban on exports in the post-riot days, and they agitated with equal success for a restoration of the railroad and telegraph lines to the North. They doubtless hoped, even at the last, that their support of the Union would not entail taking part in a coercive war upon the South, but when, having elected to stay in the Union, they realized that neutrality was impossible they swallowed their disappointment and joined in the war effort.⁸⁶

⁸⁶For example, more than fifty of Baltimore's leading capitalists were members of a committee, appointed by Governor Bradford (Hicks' successor) in July, 1862, whose goal was to help, financially and otherwise, in the raising of Maryland volunteers for the Union army. See letter, Bradford to Gerard T. Hopkins, July 17, 1862, Gerard T. Hopkins papers, Maryland Historical Society, Baltimore, Md.

Hundreds of business men joined the Baltimore Union Club, which was

If the merchants did follow their economic interest, then most of them were quite correct in deciding to stick with the Union. But the factors that influence a man's decision at such times are almost impossible to determine, and the merchants, like the rest of the people, were pulled by many loyalties and attachments in 1861, nowhere more than in the border states. No matter how hard the business man might have tried to choose the better "economic" solution to his problem, his emotions and background were almost bound to interfere--if only by the secret method of convincing him that one economic answer was better than another. Even while they weighed the relative chances of profit in Confederate Baltimore and Union Baltimore, a deep regard for the South and its institutions was waging the inevitable tug-of-war against patriotism and the status quo.

Sympathy in business circles for the Southern cause did not, of course, die out when Butler's troops camped on Federal Hill, nor in the long roll-call of battles and campaigns that followed, and many merchants must have felt that they were staying in the Union through no choice of their own. Nevertheless they had consistently backed away from the alternative during the preceding months. From the election of Lincoln to the firing on Fort Sumter, and beyond, the general verdict among business men had been that the Republican Party was bad but secession was worse; this, perhaps, is an indication of "economic interest."

organized in 1863 to promote the cause generally and to bring good loyal men together. A "Union man" in 1863, unlike his counterpart two or three years before, did not simply favor preservation of the Union; he was actively engaged in preserving it, by supporting a war effort and the administration that waged it. See the Union Club Record Books, Vol. II, "Constitution and Signatures," for a list of members. A great many of the merchants who supported Hicks in 1861 joined this club, forgetting even their scruples against "coercion."

By the same token, merchants who later gave active support to the administration and the war may have done so as soon as they discovered that it paid off. It is probably safe to say that economic interest, combined in some indeterminate ratio with patriotism, and strengthened by a strong sense of what was practicable, kept the Baltimore business community loyal to the Union during the secession crisis, and that this loyalty in turn prevented the secession movement in the state from gaining any real momentum.

APPENDIX

TABLE 5

BALTIMORE IMPORTS, 1860, IN ORDER OF VALUE^a

Commodity	Value (in 000's)	Commodity	Value (in 000's)
Coffee	\$ 3,291	Wool	\$ 78
Sugar	3,043	Soda, ash & caustic	71
Manures, guano	750 ^b	Dolls & toys	67
Copper ore	600	Flax & linens	57
Iron & manufactures	451	Rags	54
Cotton goods	275	Hair	51
Molasses	259	Vegetable oils, all types	48
Woollen goods	232	Saltpeter	46
Raw hides	228	Bone, burnt	45
Tobacco & manufactures	219	Wines	38
Fruit, all types	160	Spirits	38
Fish & fish oils	115	All other (137 items)	343
Wares, earthen & willow	101		
Salt	88		
		Total	\$10,272

^a Source: BBOT, 1860, pp. 52-53.

^b Estimated. See p.6.

TABLE 6

BALTIMORE EXPORTS, 1860, IN ORDER OF VALUE*

Commodity	Value (in 000's)	Commodity	Value (in 000's)
Tobacco	\$ 3,966	Indian corn	\$ 313
Flour	2,154	Meal, corn & rye	182
Provisions		Candles, all types	142
Beef	92	Sugar, refined	139
Butter	71	Coal	104
Cheese	19	Rice	95
Hams & bacon	79	Iron & manufactures	87
Lard	355	Tea	53
Pork	157	Gold	51
Tallow	80	Gold & silver coin	51
Total Provisions	853	Biscuit & bread	48
Wheat	841	Naval Stores	41
Cotton & manufactures	565	All other (55 items)	952
Wood & wood products	331	Total	\$10,968

*Source: BBOT, 1860, pp. 54-55.

TABLE 7

 IMPORTS, 1860, BY PORTS AND PRINCIPAL COMMODITIES*
 (In Millions of Dollars)

	Total U.S.	New York	Boston	Phila.	Balt.	New Orleans	San Fran.
Total	362.1	233.6	39.3	14.6	10.2	22.9	9.5
Woollen goods	37.9	34.0	1.1	1.2	.2	.6	.3
Silk goods	32.9	30.7	1.4	.1	-	.4	-
Cotton goods	32.5	22.6	4.1	1.8	.3	2.9	.2
Sugar	31.0	20.7	3.2	2.5	3.0	.6	1.0
Coffee	21.8	8.5	1.0	1.7	3.3	5.1	.6
Iron, steel & mfrs.	21.5	12.3	3.0	1.4	.4	1.7	.1
Linens & mfrs. of flax	10.7	8.6	.7	.5	-	.5	-
Raw hides & skins	10.5	6.9	2.3	.4	.2	-	-
Tea	8.9	8.3	.2	-	-	-	.3
Specie & bullion	8.5	2.3	-	-	-	2.2	2.2
Tobacco & mfrs. of	6.0	3.3	.1	.1	.2	1.1	.7
Tin & mfrs. of	5.8	4.5	.5	.2	-	.4	-
Molasses	5.2	1.6	.8	.5	.3	.2	-
Spirits, distilled	5.1	3.4	.4	.3	-	.5	.5
Leather & mfrs. of	5.1	4.5	.2	-	-	.2	-
Wool, raw	4.8	2.4	2.2	-	.1	-	-
Wines	4.7	2.9	.1	-	-	1.2	.3
Chinaware, etc.	4.5	2.4	.5	.5	.1	.6	-
Fruits	4.2	2.4	.7	.1	.1	.4	-
Laces	4.0	3.5	.3	-	-	-	-
Clocks & watches	2.9	2.6	.2	-	-	-	-
Linseed	2.7	.8	1.8	-	-	-	-
Soda, all types	2.5	1.3	.3	.6	.1	.1	-
Glass, etc.	2.1	1.7	.2	-	-	.1	-
Clothing, ready made	2.1	1.5	.1	-	-	.1	.1
Gunny cloth, bags	2.0	.2	1.3	-	-	.2	-
Lead & mfrs. of	1.8	1.6	.1	-	-	-	-
Furs	1.8	1.7	-	-	-	-	-
Jewelry, gems, etc.	1.7	1.5	.1	-	-	-	-
Rubber & mfrs. of	1.6	1.3	.1	-	-	-	-
Copper	1.6	.4	.4	-	.6	-	-
Hats & bonnets	1.6	1.5	-	-	-	-	-
Rags	1.5	1.0	.3	-	-	-	-
Indigo	1.4	.6	.7	-	-	-	-
Salt	1.4	.3	.1	.1	.1	.3	-
"Articles from Brit. Provinces under Reciprocity Treaty"	20.4	.7	2.3	.1	.1	-	-

*Sources: Report on Commerce and Navigation, 1860, pp.404-523; BBOT, 1860, pp.52-53. The Baltimore figures are for the calendar year; the other figures are for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1860.

TABLE 8

EXPORTS, 1860, BY PORTS AND PRINCIPAL COMMODITIES*
(In Millions of Dollars)

	Total U. S.	New York	Bost.	Phila.	Balt.	New Orl's	Cotton Ports	Rich- mond
DOMESTIC EXPORTS								
Total	373.1	120.6	13.5	5.5	10.8	107.8	78.0	5.0
Cotton	191.8	12.4	.3	-	-	96.1	75.9	-
Specie & bullion	56.9	50.3	2.3	-	-	.2	-	-
Tobacco & mfrs of	19.2	2.6	.6	.1	3.9	7.4	-	3.0
Flour	15.4	6.6	1.0	1.0	2.1	.5	-	1.8
Cotton goods	10.9	5.9	2.4	-	.5	.2	-	-
Iron & mfrs of	5.7	3.2	.4	.6	.1	-	-	-
Lard	4.5	2.0	.1	.1	.3	1.2	-	-
Wheat	4.0	2.3	-	.1	.8	-	-	-
Lumber, wood mfrs	6.7	1.5	.9	.3	.3	.3	.3	-
Naval Stores	3.8	2.7	.1	-	-	-	.2	-
Pork	3.1	1.6	.3	.1	.2	-	-	-
Beef	2.6	1.8	.1	.2	.1	-	-	-
Rice	2.5	1.0	.1	-	.1	-	1.0	-
Indian corn	2.3	1.1	-	.2	.3	.1	-	-
Staves & headings	2.3	1.3	-	-	-	.4	-	-
Whale oil	2.3	2.0	.1	-	-	-	-	-
Hams & bacon	2.2	1.5	-	.1	.1	-	-	-
Livestock	1.8	.3	-	-	-	-	-	-
Copper, brass, etc.	1.6	1.4	-	-	-	-	-	-
Oil cake	1.6	1.1	.1	.1	-	-	-	-
Tallow	1.6	1.0	.1	.2	.1	.2	-	-
Cheese	1.5	1.4	-	-	-	-	-	-
Skins & furs	1.5	1.3	-	-	-	-	-	-
Spirits, distilled	1.4	.5	.5	-	-	-	-	-
Butter	1.1	.7	.1	.1	.1	-	-	-
Drugs & Medicines	1.1	.8	-	-	-	-	-	-
Household furn.	1.0	.4	.3	-	-	-	-	-
Rye, oats, etc.	1.0	.4	-	-	-	-	-	-
Hides, raw	1.0	.2	-	-	-	.3	-	-
FOREIGN RE-EXPORTS								
Total	26.9	17.5	1.6	-	.1	.6	-	-
TOTAL EXPORTS, DOMESTIC & FOREIGN	400.1	138.1	15.1	5.5	10.9	108.4	78.0	5.1

*Sources: Report on Commerce and Navigation, 1860, pp. 310-402, BBOT, 1860, pp. 54-55. The Baltimore figures are for the calendar year; the other figures are for the year ending June 30, 1860. The "Cotton Ports" shown above include the export totals of Mobile, Savannah, and Charleston.

TABLE 9

COMPARISON OF MANUFACTURES, BY SECTIONS, 1860*

Section	No. of Estabs.	Capital invested	Cost of raw material	No. of Hands	Annual cost of labor	Annual value of product
		(in millions)			(in millions)	
New Eng.	20,671	\$ 257	\$ 245	392,000	\$ 104	\$ 468
Middle	53,287	435	444	546,000	152	802
West	36,785	194	225	210,000	63	384
South	20,631	96	86	110,000	28	155
Pacific	8,777	23	28	50,000	29	71
Terr.	282	3	1	2,000	1	3
Total U.S.	140,433	\$1,009	\$1,031	1,311,000	\$ 378	\$1,885

*Source: U.S. Eighth Census, 1860, Vol. III, Manufactures, p. 725. Delaware and Maryland were classed with the Middle states; Kentucky, Missouri and Kansas were classed with the Western states.

TABLE 10

LIST OF PRINCIPAL MANUFACTURES, 1860, IN BALTIMORE CITY AND COUNTY
ARRANGED IN ORDER OF THE ANNUAL VALUE OF PRODUCT*

Product	No. of Estabs.	Capital invested (000's)	Cost of raw material (000's)	No. of Hands	Annual cost of labor (000's)	Annual value of product
Clothing	128	\$1,240	\$1,889	5,900	\$ 910	\$ 3,208,000
Cotton goods	12	1,584	1,258	1,900	435	3,130,000
Flour & meal	41	562	2,518	150	52	3,045,000
Sugar refin'g	2	250	2,200	175	60	2,300,000
Provisions	34	860	1,311	1,800	251	2,017,000
Iron, total	24	1,248	1,093	1,300	440	1,974,000
Machinery	10	1,335	694	1,500	604	1,492,000
Copper smelt'g	2	600	1,050	150	60	1,300,000
Boots-shoes	268	226	374	1,400	360	912,000
Cigars	127	216	238	500	176	672,000
Liquors	28	225	433	167	53	639,000
Shipbldg.	16	305	251	442	191	607,000
Leather	21	360	393	121	41	559,000
Marble, stone	13	169	251	247	86	560,000
Furniture	39	267	195	475	150	538,000
Bread	68	72	278	193	54	469,000
Woolen goods	4	203	179	221	50	435,000
Soap & candles	10	143	346	71	23	433,000
Lumber	13	169	264	183	71	425,000
Gas	1	1,100	132	230	84	375,000
TOTAL	1,310	\$13,789	\$18,068	21,800	\$5,353	\$29,592,000

*Source: U.S. Eighth Census, 1860, Vol. III, Manufacturing, pp. 220-223. The Total includes all city and county manufacturing, not merely those listed.

TABLE 11

COMPARISON OF PRINCIPAL MANUFACTURES OF BALTIMORE CITY AND COUNTY
WITH THOSE OF OTHER LEADING INDUSTRIAL CENTERS, 1860,
ACCORDING TO ANNUAL VALUE OF PRODUCT*
(In Millions of Dollars)

Product	Baltimore City & County	New York City	Brooklyn Brooklyn	Philadelphia	Boston & Suffolk County	Cincinnati, Hamilton County	St. Louis	Pittsburgh Allegheny Co.	Essex County, New Jersey	Essex County, Massachusetts	Middlesex Co., Massachusetts	Worcester Co., Massachusetts	Providence, Rhode Island
Total	29.5	159.1	34.2	135.9	37.6	46.9	27.6	26.5	27.9	40.9	44.6	37.7	29.2
Clothing	3.2	22.3	.4	12.0	5.2	6.5	.8	1.1	3.0	-	.4	.4	1.1
Cotton goods	3.1	-	-	7.2	-	.4	.2	1.0	-	6.3	12.2	5.8	7.6
Flour & meal	3.0	2.6	.3	3.0	.1	1.8	5.0	1.3	-	.7	.7	.7	.5
Sugar refining	2.3	19.3	3.8	6.3	2.3	.4	1.8	-	-	-	-	-	-
Provisions	2.0	3.6	-	4.4	.1	4.5	1.7	.3	-	-	.1	-	.1
Iron, total	1.9	4.6	.4	4.3	3.1	1.7	1.5	5.3	.5	.2	.6	.3	.7
Machinery, engines	1.5	4.5	1.3	2.4	.9	2.0	1.5	1.0	.7	.5	.9	1.7	.8
Copper smelting	1.3	-	-	-	.5	-	-	.3	-	-	-	-	-
Boots & shoes	.9	3.8	.3	5.4	.3	1.4	.4	.4	.9	14.5	9.2	9.6	.3
Cigars	.6	1.1	.1	1.2	-	.5	.3	.1	.2	.1	-	-	.1
Liquors	.6	3.2	3.4	3.4	1.1	4.7	1.7	.7	.9	.1	.3	-	.1
Shipbuilding	.6	1.1	1.2	.3	.8	.2	-	.1	-	.4	.2	-	-
Marble & stone	.5	2.4	.4	1.0	.5	.5	.1	-	-	-	-	-	.1
Leather	.5	.4	.1	2.1	.6	1.0	.3	.4	2.7	3.9	2.5	1.4	.3
Furniture	.5	3.9	.3	1.8	.9	2.5	.2	.2	.1	.2	.5	1.7	.2
Bread	.4	3.3	1.1	2.0	.5	.6	.2	.2	.2	.1	.3	.1	.2
Woolen goods	.4	-	-	4.4	-	-	-	.1	.5	5.6	3.2	6.0	4.0
Soap & candles	.4	1.8	.8	1.5	-	3.2	1.6	.6	.1	.3	.9	-	.1
Lumber	.4	1.7	.3	.5	.8	1.0	.4	.8	.9	.7	.4	.3	.3
Gas	.3	3.8	.7	1.8	.6	.3	.4	.1	.1	.1	.1	-	.2
Cooperage	.3	.5	.5	.4	.1	.4	.4	.1	-	-	.1	-	-
Hides & tallow	.3	-	-	.6	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Paper	.3	1.0	.4	1.1	-	.1	-	-	.3	.6	1.3	.6	-
Printing	.3	11.1	.1	5.0	2.4	1.5	.2	.5	.1	.1	.3	-	.1
Agric. implements	.2	-	.2	.1	-	.2	.1	.2	-	-	.1	.5	-
Carriages	.2	.7	.1	1.1	.1	.5	.1	.1	.7	.2	.1	.2	.2
Brick	.2	-	-	1.2	-	.2	.6	.2	-	-	.3	-	-
Saddlery, harness	.2	.3	-	.9	.2	.1	.3	-	1.4	-	-	-	-
Tin & metalware	.3	.7	.4	.6	.1	.4	.3	.2	.2	.1	.1	.1	.2
Hats & caps, etc.	.1	1.0	1.6	1.4	.2	.2	-	-	4.0	.6	-	.4	-

*Source: U.S. Eighth Census, 1860, Vol. III, Manufactures.

TABLE 12

COMMODITIES TRANSPORTED EASTWARDLY TO BALTIMORE
 VIA BALTIMORE & OHIO R.R. MAIN STEM
 (EXCLUSIVE OF WASHINGTON BRANCH)
 Year ending September 30, 1860*

Commodity	Amount (Tons)	Commodity	Amount (Tons)
Coal	400,530	Lard and Butter	4,876
Flour (776,202½ bbls)	77,620	Meal, etc.	4,747
Live Stock	36,359	Cotton	3,534
Provisions	25,212	Leather	3,066
Whiskey	24,594	Bark	2,629
Lumber	23,421	Wool	2,130
Grain	15,956	Lard Oil	2,030
Tobacco (30,145 Hhds)	15,156	Granite, lime, soap, limestone	1,754
Iron and copper ore	7,849	All other	15,212
Iron	6,116		
		Total	672,792

*Source: Baltimore & Ohio R. R., Annual Report, 1860, p. 105.

TABLE 13

COMMODITIES TRANSPORTED EASTWARDLY TO BALTIMORE
 FROM THE OHIO RIVER TOWNS ONLY
 (THROUGH FREIGHT)
 Year ending September 30, 1860*

Commodity	Amount (Tons)
Flour (352,513 bbls)	35,249
Pork & bacon	24,287
Live Stock	23,764
Whiskey (125,474 bbls)	22,614
Tobacco (20,651 Hhds)	11,137
Grain	8,813
Lard & Butter	3,878
Cotton (14,182 bales)	3,491
Lard Oil	1,904
Wool (14,359 bales)	1,754
Leather	1,038
All other	11,022
Total Through Freight	149,074

*Source: Baltimore & Ohio R.R., Annual Report, 1860, p. 106.

TABLE 14

COMMODITIES TRANSPORTED WESTWARDLY FROM BALTIMORE
 VIA B. & O. RR TO ALL POINTS EAST OF OHIO RIVER
 (LOCAL FREIGHT)
 (Year ending September 30, 1860)*

Commodity	Amount (Tons)	Commodity	Amount (Tons)
Grain (to Ellicott's Mills)	17,004	Syrup	1,112
Groceries	7,621	Brick	1,075
Manure, guano	7,281	Fish	1,060
Dry Goods	7,165	Vegetables	963
Pig Iron	7,104	Iron	769
Lumber	6,789	Agric. Implements, Mach'yry	589
Coal	4,068	Marble, Granite	458
Plaster	3,151	Furniture	371
Salt	2,121	Oysters	331
Hides	1,835	† All other	5,672
Sugar	1,506		
Cotton	1,225	Total Local Freight	80,573
Coffee	1,203		

*Source: Baltimore & Ohio R.R., Annual Report, 1860, pp. 99, 101.

TABLE 15

COMMODITIES TRANSPORTED WESTWARDLY FROM BALTIMORE
 VIA B. & O. R. R. TO THE OHIO RIVER TOWNS
 (THROUGH FREIGHT)
 (Year ending September 30, 1860)*

Commodity	Amount (Tons)	Commodity	Amount (Tons)
Dry Goods	12,862	Syrup	2,248
Coffee	11,557	Vehicles & Machinery	1,064
Groceries	8,696	Lead, tin, &c.	1,003
Drugs, oils, paints, etc.	7,077	Iron	791
Sugar	6,291	China, glass, & Queensware	705
Tobacco	3,751	Furniture	485
Pig Iron	3,536	Marble	424
Hardware	3,169	All other	6,747
Fish	3,228		
Oysters	1,214	Total Through Freight	75,457

*Source: Baltimore & Ohio R.R., Annual Report, 1860, p. 100.

TABLE 16
BALTIMORE ARRIVALS, 1860*

From	Steamers	Ships	Barks	Brigs	Schooners	Total
Foreign						
Brit. North Amer.	30	37	67
West Indies	7	58	61	126
Porto Rico	1	30	24	55
Cuba	10	1	23	45	30	109
Mexico	3	...	3
Brazil	...	2	43	16	3	64
Demerara	8	14	...	22
River Plate	...	1	8	2	1	12
Peru	...	37	10	47
Chile	...	6	4	10
Other South America	...	1	1	3	5	10
Africa	...	3	...	3	...	6
Great Britain	...	33	6	39
Bremen	...	20	13	33
Mediterranean	...	3	6	12	1	22
Other Europe	...	4	2	6
Manila	...	1	1
Total	10	112	132	216	162	632
Coastwise						
Gulf, Florida	5	12	33	50
Georgia	45	1	20	66
South Carolina	27	...	4	4	57	92
North Carolina	105	105
Richmond	67	1	4	8	164	244
Other Virginia	30	4	2	10	191	237
Maryland & D.C.	18	1	35	54
Philadelphia	114	1	1	...	57	173
Other Pa., Del., N.J.	2	21	23
New York City	99	7	15	3	288	412
Other New York	27	27
Conn. & R. I.	6	...	1	1	92	100
Boston	63	1	37	16	201	318
Other Mass.	1	95	96
Maine & New Hamp.	1	13	112	126
Total	471	14	70	70	1,498	2,123

*Sources: RRRB, Vols. for 1860; Baltimore Price-Current, 1860.

TABLE 17
BALTIMORE CLEARANCES, 1860*

To	Steamers	Ships	Barks	Brigs	Schooners	Total
Foreign						
Brit. North Amer.	...	2	3	23	24	52
West Indies	8	65	74	147
Porto Rico	27	21	48
Cuba	9	4	20	31	18	82
Mexico	2	...	1	3
Brazil	...	2	41	10	6	59
Demerara	8	15	...	23
River Plate	...	11	12	1	...	14
New Granada	...	1	3	14	8	26
Other South.Amer.	...	2	2	1	2	7
Africa	...	2	...	2	1	5
Great Britain	...	26	18	10	1	55
Bremen	...	23	9	32
Holland	...	27	5	1	...	33
Mediterranean	...	3	5	4	1	13
Other Europe	...	2	1	3
China (via N. Y.)	...	1	1
Total	9	96	137	204	157	603
Coastwise						
Gulf, Florida	...	3	6	6	32	47
Georgia	46	2	...	2	20	70
South Carolina	35	...	9	8	75	127
North Carolina	1	178	179
Richmond	64	3	188	255
Other Virginia	28	2	4	4	183	221
Maryland & D. C.	18	1	51	70
Philadelphia	115	1	1	...	56	173
Other Pa., Del., N.J.	36	36
New York City	100	5	2	6	215	328
Other New York	22	22
Conn. & R. I.	6	151	157
Boston	59	...	42	31	156	288
Other Mass.	4	102	106
Maine	2	13	75	90
California	...	3	...	1	...	4
Total	471	16	66	80	1,540	2,173

*Sources: RRRB, Vols. for 1860; Baltimore Price-Current, 1860.

TABLE 18

ESTIMATED ANNUAL VALUE OF BALTIMORE'S PRINCIPAL TRADES, 1860*
(In Millions of Dollars)

Trade	Value	Trade	Value
Dry Goods	30.0	Lumber	1.6
Flour & grain	12.1	Foreign fruits	1.5
Clothing, ready-made	7.0	Drugs, paints, &c.	1.5
Sugar	7.0	Foreign wines, spirits	1.5
Provisions	7.0	Whiskey	1.5
Tobacco, leaf & mfrs.	6.8	Earthenware	1.2
Oysters	4.5	Molasses	1.0
Coffee	4.0	Cigars	.8
Hardware	4.0	Hat	.7
Boots and shoes	3.6	Soap & candles	.7
Leather	3.9	Ship building	.6
Live Stock	3.8	Piano	.4
Coal	3.1	Salted fish	.3
Guano	3.0	Wool	.4
Books and papers	3.0	Tea	.3
Cotton	2.6	Naval Stores	.2
Copper	2.5	Preserved fruit	.2
Iron	2.0	Salt	.1

*Source: "Principal Trades of Baltimore," Hunt's Merchants' Magazine, XLII (May, 1860), 565, quoting Baltimore American annual statement for 1860.

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