Abstract

Title of dissertation:	THE SPANISH CIVIL WAR: A NEW INSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION OF THE SOCIAL ORDER AND MILITARY FACTIONS DURING THE SECOND REPUBLIC (1931-1939)
	Alvaro La Parra Perez, Doctor of Philosophy, 2014
Dissertation directed by:	Professor John J. Wallis Department of Economics

This dissertation presents a new view that emphasizes the role of intra-elite fights in understanding the failure to consolidate democracy during the Second Spanish Republic. The two traditional explanations have emphasized the action of "blocks" and often reflect the ideological tensions behind the interpretation of the Second Republic. Rather than seeing elites as blocks or focusing on ideological divisions, my view focuses on the heterogeneity of interests within elites and how the redistribution of political and economic rents during the Republic relates to the support or animosity of elite factions vis-à-vis the republican government.

I apply my view to one specific Spanish elite -the Army- showing that, contrary to traditional interpretations, the military was a non-monolithic organization that was divided into different factions with conflicting interests. I explore the impact that factional military interests had on officers' chosen side (rebel or loyal) during the Spanish Civil War that ended the Republic. The econometric analysis uses a new data set that identifies officers' sides and uses information from military

yearbooks to follow officers' individual histories between 1910 and 1936. The results confirm that the Army was a non-monolithic organization where factions behaved differently and responded to the impact from republican military reforms. Officers in favored corps and those that enjoyed greater promotions between 1931 and 1936 were more likely to support the republican regime. I also explore the effect of hierarchy on officers' choice. Results show that subordinates tended to follow the side chosen by their senior officers.

THE SPANISH CIVIL WAR: A NEW INSTITUTIONAL
INTERPRETATION OF THE SOCIAL ORDER AND MILITARY
FACTIONS DURING THE SECOND REPUBLIC (1931-1939)

by

Alvaro La Parra Perez

Dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of the
University of Maryland, College Park in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
2014

Advisory Committee:

Professor John J. Wallis, Chair

Emeritus Professor Roger Betancourt

Assistant Professor Ethan Kaplan

Professor Peter Murrell

Professor David B. Sicilia

Acknowledgements

fact that some research assistants share one or both family names with me only proves that familiar ties are very dangerous when a researcher needs help with his work. I would also like to thank the personnel of the Library of Congress, the Archives in the Bruch military headquarters of Barcelona, and the *Biblioteca Central Militar* in Madrid for their assistance during my archival research. Finally, thanks to W.W. Norton & Company, Inc for its permission to reproduce Figure 1 in the Appendix.

This thesis is dedicated to Lucía, the partner without whom none of this work would be possible and probably the only person looking forward to the end of this doctoral journey as much (or even more) than me. To her, my infinite love and gratitude.

Table of Contents

PART III. Implications: the Army and Beyond

List of Tables

List of Figures

Part I

The Second Republic in Spanish History

Chapter I

Introduction

> "Competing explanations [in History]
> tend to have a heavy ideological cast"
> Douglass North (1981: 52)
>
> "Truth and love against the force of evil"
> Christy Moore, Viva la Quinta Brigada

In the introduction to the French edition of his startling account of his months at Auschwitz Birkenau, Elie Wiesel points that "oblivion would mean danger and insult. Forgetting the victims would be like killing them again" (2007:23).[1] One could think that in Spain, where the end of the Republic was brought by a Civil War with almost 600,000 victims and cruel political repression, a similar thought is shared, but it is not. The interpretation and study of the Spanish Civil War is still dominated by the passions and political tensions that surrounded the beginning of the conflict.

During Franco's thirty-six year dictatorship, many generations of Spaniards studied the military coup that started the Civil War as an uprising aimed at avoiding the communist dictatorial threat that loomed over Spain in 1936. The dictatorship issued from the Civil War often referred to terms like "holy crusade" or similar metaphors to justify the coup against the republican government in July 1936. The Spanish Civil War was literally seen as a fight between good and evil, a struggle between defendants of the faith and totalitarian atheist communists.

With the arrival of democracy and the increase in freedom of expression and political rights after Franco's death in 1975, the alternative view of the Republic

---

[1] « L'oubli signifierait danger et insulte. Oublier les morts serait les tuer une deuxième fois ».

(which reflected the view of "the other band" in the Civil War) regained force in Spain. From this perspective, the republican regime represented an ideal of democracy that extended political rights to all sectors of the Spanish population (women voted for the first time in 1933), attempted a modernization of society by separating the Church from the State and redefining the privileges and control the Catholic Church had traditionally exerted over culture and the education system, and represented one of the first serious attempts to redistribute power in favor of the masses. For proponents of this view, the Republic is an iconic event in the political imaginary against which the current social order that emerged after Franco's death is compared. For some, the Republic embodied an idea of secular liberal democracy that should have been pursued after the dictatorial break. The current transition to democracy is criticized for being oblivious to the role that some political figures had during Franco's regime.[2] The claims of associations fighting to recover the bodies of relatives who died during the war, the recognition of republican clandestine opposition to Franco's dictatorship, and the investigation of Franco's crimes against humanity are subjects of debate in today's Spanish political and judicial arenas.

To be clear, this characterization is over-simplified and does not pay justice to the rigorous work that historians have done in the recent years. If during Franco's dictatorship the official propaganda dominated the explanations and views of the Republic, the last decades have benefitted from an impressive number of academic

---

[2] Manuel Fraga Iribarne is one of the best examples of the integration of Francoist political figures in the Spanish transition to democracy. Fraga was minister in many Franco's governments between 1962 and 1969. After Franco's death, he was deputy Prime Minister and Minister of the Interior (1975-1976) and one of the "fathers of the (democratic) Constitution" of 1978. He founded and became the president of the main Spanish conservative party (Alianza Popular which became the Partido Popular in 1989). He occupied political posts as president of the region of Galicia and senator until his death in 2012.

works about this period of Spanish history. But, even in the work of historians, one finds the footprint of political passions in the implications derived by the two historical views that dominate the debate about the Republic and its failure to consolidate democracy. One side argues that the sources of instability and the failure of the republican regime to consolidate democracy came from conservative elites (Preston, 2007; and Casanova, 2010, are two useful syntheses of this approach). Conservative elites blocked the reformist efforts of the republican governments and worked to overthrow the republican regime because it threatened their control over the Spanish political and economic systems. In this view, the military coup of July 1936 was the ultimate proof of powerful conservative groups' lack of loyalty towards the Republic. The alternative view argues that leftist organizations and the partisan political framework set by the ruling republican-socialist coalition between 1931 and 1933 were the main factors that paved the way to political polarization and conflict in Spain (Payne, 2006; Álvarez and Villa, 2010). According to this view, the Constitution approved by a republican-socialist coalition in 1931 was partisan and alienated conservative groups. The radicalization of the Socialist faction and its abandonment of the parliamentary game after the victory of the center-right in the 1933 elections together with anarchist political violence and activism were the final sources of the political polarization that ended in the Spanish Civil War. These two views come to opposite explanations for the failure of the Republic and relate to contemporary political passions and divisions when evoking the failure of the regime that Payne named "Spain's first democracy."

The Spanish Republic offers an interesting case study not only to historians but also to economic historians interested in institutional development and institutional change. Besides having a durable influence in today's Spanish political imaginary, the republican regime was the most ambitious attempt to reform the Spanish

political and economic institutions. For the first time in Spanish history, women were given the right to vote and mass political parties were organized to compete in free elections. Yet, despite the greater "inclusiveness" of the republican political system, the republic is a an example of a failed democracy that could not contain the instability and violence that erupted in July 1936, leading to the Spanish Civil War and Franco's dictatorship. Understanding why the Republic failed goes beyond ascertaining historical facts. Other social sciences must be mobilized in order to interpret the events that punctuated the life of the Republic and to analyze the incentives and mechanisms that guided the actions of relevant political and economic agents.

Despite the profound disagreement between the two traditional interpretations in understanding the Republic, there is little doubt that significant progress has been made in our knowledge of the facts that led to the failure to consolidate democracy in Spain. Some historians have gone as far as saying that "the most relevant questions [about the Civil War] are already answered" (Casanova, 2014). This dissertation argues that, far from having a final answer for "the most relevant questions", our understanding of the Republic, the Civil War and the failure to consolidate a more open and competitive social order in 1930s Spain can benefit from recent developments in institutional development, economics, and political science. The 75 years that have elapsed since the end of the Civil War give opportunities to develop a new view that goes beyond the passions and ideological cleavages that have dominated the debate thus far.

To be clear, I do *not* deny the validity of the two traditional interpretations of the Republic. Rather, I develop an alternative analysis of the Republic that *adds* to the current ones. There is no doubt that both traditional views are consistent with

many important aspects of the Republic, like the conspiracies developed by those elites that traditionally held power before the Republic or the political polarization that resulted from the action of radical workers' organizations. However, my emphasis on intra-elite conflict is equally important because reformist governments in power between 1931 and 1933 altered and redistributed the rents accruing to political and economic elites. The Army is one of the clearest examples of the relevance of intra-elite divisions. When the coup against the Republic broke out in July 1936, the military split into two sides. The fact that the Army did not act as a "block" (by unanimously following the coup or opposing to it) is central to understanding why the coup led to a long three-year conflict rather than immediate change of regime or the persistence of the republican *status quo*.

Following the block of power perspective, the main determinant in officers' choices has been ideology: liberals remaining loyal to the republican government and conservatives joining the rebel ranks. Without denying the importance of ideology in officers' choices, I show that the way republican military reforms altered the economic and professional rents perceived by military factions help us understand officers' likelihood to go rebel or remain loyal to the Republic.

The new view of the Republic challenges a basic assumption of the existing historical approaches. Rather than assuming that homogenous liberal and reactionary groups existed, and that interaction between those homogenous groups explain the arc of the Republic, my approach focuses on the internal dynamics and the sources of violence and tension within Spanish political elites. It departs from the traditional accounts in two ways. First, it emphasizes the need to focus on elite dynamics during the Republic. In this sense, the new view of the Republic delves into the main idea suggested by Tuñón de Lara (1967) that the internal dynamics

6

of Spanish social orders predating the Republic were dominated by intra-elite relationships between different groups that made up the blocks of power. Second, rather than blocks of homogeneous actors, Spanish elites are taken as non-monolithic organizations formed by several factions with different and conflicting interests. These differences are traced through the history of the Republic. The idea that elite groups cannot be characterized by a representative agent with a unique objective function and its importance in understanding political and economic development was developed by North, Wallis and Weingast (2009, hereafter NWW; see also, North, Wallis, Webb and Weingast, 2013, for case studies of developing countries). The importance of factionalism in understanding elite dynamics has also been studied by Rivero (2013), who traces the analytical implications of factionalism in the civil control of the military and the formation of military juntas and dictatorships.

My emphasis on intra-elite conflict during the redistribution of economic and political power between 1931 and 1936 departs from the "elites vs. masses" framework. It reduces the role played by far-left workers' organizations highlighted by traditional explanations and focus on elite heterogeneity. It results in a new research agenda to study different aspects of the Republic. I do not claim that the traditional views are invalid or that the limited access view provides a definitive and ideologically free approach to the life of the Republic. I argue that the traditional views are too simple and elites' interests and factional conflict is a useful field of study to understand the life of the republican regime. I draw on important advances and insights of the traditional views and use recent advances in social science to address limitations in older methods by emphasizing the importance of intra-elite conflict and the interaction between the political and the economic sphere to understand elites' conflicts. This, hopefully, improves our understanding

of the economic and political development issues involved in the failed attempt to consolidate democracy in Spain. When the first shot was fired on July 17, 1936, the conflict had escalated to become ideologically polarized and incendiary claims were made to destroy the rival (in the name of God or in the name of the future proletarian revolution). By then, it was already too late for any hope of establishing a stable and more democratic regime in Spain.

My approach is applied to the Spanish Army during the Republic. The republican regime operated in a framework without political control of the military and the men on horseback were an important element of the Spanish coalitions that ruled the country. In other words, the Republic operated in an environment in which the support or animosity of military factions was an important determinant of the degree of institutional instability. As pointed out above, the military coup of July 1936 that led to the Spanish Civil War and Franco's dictatorship bears witness to the importance of the Army in understanding the sources of instability that the republican regime faced. My study of the Spanish Army focuses on the different factions that composed the Spanish Army and how the republican military reforms between 1931 and 1933 affected their interests.

The application of my view to the Army in the Republic has two main contributions with respect to the existing literature. First, I build a new dataset for active officers in 1936. The dataset combines data in Engel (2008) and the Spanish military yearbooks to provide information on the side officers' chose during the civil war as well as histories of individual officers between 1910 and 1936. The dataset develops the first quantitative measurement of officers' identification with Spanish military factions, their rank, their corps, and professional trajectory during the Republic. Second, I offer the first quantitative study of the impact that republican military policies had on officers' careers and how it relates to officers'

likelihood to support or rebel against the Republic in 1936. In other words, were officers and factions harmed (benefited) by republican military reforms more (less) likely to revolt against the Republic?

A probit regression is used to estimate officers' probability of rebelling against the Republic in July 1936. The results confirm that the Army was not a monolithic organization. Military factions behaved differently and responded to republican military reforms. Aviation and the Assault Guard (two of the most favored corps during the Republic) showed greater loyalty towards the epublican regime. The impact that republican reforms of the promotions system had on military factions also appears as a significant determinant of the side an officer chose. In particular, the results show that promoted officers were more likely to support the republican regime. Revisions to promotion procedures in 1931 and 1933 harmed the prospects of officers belonging to the *africanista* faction, therefore increasing their likelihood to rebel. Finally, I also explore the effect of hierarchy. Results show that subordinates with a rebel senior officer were more likely to rebel. Given that members of the *africanista* faction held higher ranks in 1936, the hierarchical effect offers another indirect channel through which republican reforms could have affected military factions and the number of rebel officers in July 1936.

The lack of political control of the military and the study of the Army constitute the most exhaustive application of my view to Spanish elites. In order to show how my view can be applied to other elites and its pertinence in understanding the institutional arrangement in which the Republic operated, I also provide an introduction to the characteristics of the Spanish political and economic systems. The republican regime held the most free and inclusive elections in Spanish history

until 1978[3], but the Republic still operated in an institutional arrangement that lacked some of what Hofstadter (1967) characterized as some of the most important characteristics of a competitive political system, like a legitimate opposition. The economic system, which I treat through the cases of the financial system and trade regulations, continued to be characterized by a non-competitive logic. My analysis points to a non-trivial balance between persistence and change in the Republic: the republican regime changed the nature of the coalition that ruled Spain, but the republican coalition operated in a non-competitive institutional arrangement that had important similarities with the ones that characterized previous regimes: elite factions fought for being the beneficiaries of economic regulations giving access to markets and other lucrative economic privileges. If elites were key in the Spanish social orders before 1931 (Tuñón de Lara, 1967), the same was true during the Republic.

Two comments concerning my study of the Spanish political and economic system are in order. First, they should be taken as complementary, not independent. The logic in one domain reinforced the characteristics of the other in what NWW term "double balance". The lack of openness and competition in the Spanish economy was sustained by a not fully competitive political system and vice versa. Second, I do not present a comprehensive analysis of Spanish politics and economics during the Republic. The examples offer, at best, a brief incursion on the political and economic spheres to illustrate the non-competitive logic and the lack of open access that dominated the institutional arrangement in which the Republic operated. I also hope that they constitute an additional argument in favor of the intra-elite

---

[3] It took three years since Franco's death to legalize parties, approve a new Constitution and hold open, competitive and fair elections again.

perspective that I propose. The examples also serve to illustrate new fields beyond the Spanish Army where my view of the Republic can be applied.

The dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 offers a historical background and summary of the Republic. Chapter 3 presents two of the most important approaches developed to understand the life of the Republic: the "block of power" and the "polarization view". Chapter 4 presents my alternative view on the republican regime and uses the Army to show how it can be applied in studying Spanish elites during the Republic. Chapters 5 to 8 present the empirical application of my view to the case of the Spanish Army. Chapter 9 analyzes the political and economic systems in Spain during the republican regime to show that some basic characteristics of consolidated democracies were missing and that the economy was still subject to a non-competitive logic in some important aspects. This chapter develops the implications of my view beyond the particular case of the Army and suggests other fields of application for future work. Chapter 10 concludes.

Chapter II

Historical Background

> "For a whole century, the greater share of Spain's
> political worries centered around the military!"
> Manuel Azaña (quoted in Payne, 1967: 272)

The violent end of the Republic in a Civil War started by a military coup was not an isolated event in Spanish history. In fact, most regimes that predated the Republic were ended by military interventions. Lack of political control of the military and the resulting intervention of men on horseback was common. A brief look at regimes before the Republic shows that instability, fights between elites, and military intervention in politics were the rule rather than the exception.

During the reign of Queen Isabella II (1843-1868), Spain experienced at least eight pronunciamientos[4] (military coups) aimed at reforming Spanish political life and changing the government (Carr, 1966: xx-xxiii). Vilar summarized the mechanics of these coups and shows how conflict between elite factions commonly took the form of military coups (1977: 65):

> "Periodically a well-known process took place. Exiles, secret societies, often foreign intrigue, obscurely encouraged by partisan opinion, and aware that legal channels had been closed by official pressure, elected a general, frequently a leader in exile, or at least in disgrace. (…). A manifesto was read to the troops, who abandoned their barracks. Arrests were carried out, commands changed, while express messengers and telegrams called on other garrisons, previously approached, to make a pronouncement in the same terms. Madrid usually declared the situation under control (this was often true since out of scores of failures only half a dozen *pronunciamientos* were successful)."

---

[4] Brenan (1960) documents eighteen *pronunciamientos* for the same period. This discrepancy may be due to the difficulty of drawing a difference between military riots, mutinies, and "*pronunciamientos*". To some extent this can be taken as an indicator of how the Army was frequently involved in plots against the government.

The reign of Isabella II was followed by an unsuccessful Liberal Constitutional Monarch (Amadeo of Savoy, 1870-1873) and an ephemeral Republican experiment that last twelve months (1873-1874) with four different presidents. The First Republic finished after General Martinez Campos carried out a successful pronunciamiento that restored the Bourbon Monarchy to Spain. King Alfonso XII became the head of a Constitutional Monarchy during the period known as *La Restauración* (the Restoration) between 1874 and 1923.[5]

The main architect of the Spanish Restauración was Antonio Cánovas del Castillo (1828-1898). Cánovas was an admirer of the British Parliamentary democracy, but Spanish political and economic reality led him to construct a political system in which the main concern was finding a stable coalition between some factions of the most powerful elites in Spanish society. In Brenan's words:

> "Cánova's work had been to patch up provisionally the differences that in the previous century had separated Church, Army, and politicians by allowing them all to enrich themselves together (…)". (Brenan, 1960: 13).

The result was a system in which two political parties (the Liberal and the Conservative) alternated in power through conveniently arranged elections. The manipulation of electoral results was particularly evident in rural areas, where *caciques* (heads of clientelistic networks) distributed political favors and, when necessary, coerced voters or altered the list of voters (so dead people "voted") to ensure that the "correct" list obtained the majority. The progressive degeneration of the political equilibrium after Canova's assassination in 1898; disputes between military factions; and other social, political, and economic tension contributed to

---

[5] Vilar (1977) dates the *Restauración* in the 1874-1917 and Brenan opts for a disconcerting 1874-1898. I have chosen the period 1874-1923 in order to associate the term "Restauración" with a very concrete political order characterized by a constitutional monarchy and a "controlled democracy" as explained below. Primo de Riveras's dictatorship (which starts in 1923) marks a clear end to this political arrangement and thus it is considered as the end of the *Restauración*.

the increasing instability of the Spanish social order. In 1923, the King welcomed a *pronunciamiento* led by General Primo de Rivera's military to establish a "Directorate" (military dictatorship) that kept the monarch as head of the State.

The "military Directorate" established by Primo de Rivera became a civil one in 1925 and a Consultative Assembly in 1927. After Primo de Rivera stepped down in 1930, two shorter and softer dictatorships took place under the rule of Berenguer and Aznar. In April 1931 Berenguer's cabinet organized what was considered a "superficial harmless municipal poll". Despite the usual electoral manipulations, the elections discredited the Directorate that had governed in Spain since 1923 with the King's support. Republican parties won in the biggest cities where manipulations were more difficult (in part due to the smaller strength and presence of caciques and clientelistic networks). It was impossible to ignore the support that Republican parties received in the biggest cities. After verifying that he could not count on the support of the Army, the King fled the country and a provisional republican government took power. The Republic (1931-1939) was peacefully declared on April 14th, 1931.

Far from an improvised government, the republican cabinet in charge after the King's escape had been agreed upon in the Pact of San Sebastián (1929). The secret meeting in San Sebastián assembled the main political figures opposing the dictatorship and the King. The group signed a program based on three pillars: the country would be divided into autonomous communities[6], political and religious liberties would be protected, and Spain would become a republic. After the

---

[6] The Spanish autonomous communities are often considered as a de facto federalist organization. Nevertheless, some important differences between autonomous communities and federal states exist: the ability to change the constitution, for example, only exists at the national level.

Republic was declared, the revolutionary committee started to work on a constitution that embodied the other points agreed to in San Sebastián.

Elections to form the parliament that would draft the new constitution were held in July 1931. The coalition of moderate and left-wing parties that formed the backbone of the Pact of San Sebastián obtained a comfortable victory: 250 out of 330 seats were in hands of Left Republicans, socialists and regionalist Catalan parties. Consequently, the new government mirrored the provisional government in place before the elections.

The new constitution, approved in December 1931, was modeled on the Weimar Republic and was a "child of its time." The constitution shared many features with other European inter-war constitutions (Corcuera Atienza, 1991). The Constitution concentrated legislative and ministerial power in a single-chamber parliament to avoid the control of the Senate that elites traditionally held.

Besides drafting the new constitution, the government placed in power by the July 1931 elections attempted a series of important social and economic reforms affecting important aspects of the political and economic Spanish system like the Army, the relationships between the Catholic Church and the state, and land distribution.

The reforms of the Army aimed at reducing its size to reduce the excess number of officers that the Army had had since the mid-nineteenth century (Payne, 1967), reform the methods of promotion, eliminate some ranks, and redesign the existing corps and the administrative structure of the Army. Chapter V presents a detailed analysis of the most relevant military reforms and their impact on the different military factions that coexisted within the military.

The Concordat of 1851 between the Roman Catholic Church and the Spanish state recognized Catholicism as the official religion of the country. The Church had played an important role in the legitimatization of previous regimes in Spain and had enjoyed a *de facto* monopoly on higher education. Article 26 of the constitution approved in December 1931 proclaimed religious freedom and separation between Church and State. It aimed at depriving some Catholic groups of the special privileges they had traditionally enjoyed. The Jesuits (one of the most powerful and wealthy groups of the Catholic Church in Spain) were particularly affected: Article 26 called for the dissolution of Orders that required a special oath in addition to the normal canonical vow, something that only applied to the Jesuits and that resulted in their dissolution. Jesuits' properties were sequestrated even if, in practice, the Order had many opportunities to evade the law (Jackson, 1972).

The Agrarian Reform was brought to the Parliament and approved in the fall of 1932. It addressed the problems posed by the unequal land distribution in the center and Southwest parts of Spain. There, latifundia (big landholdings largely owned by the Spanish aristocracy) coexisted with an abundant mass of landless population. The reform included the expropriation of some type of lands (mostly uncultivated land and lands that were systematically worked by tenants and not the landlord himself) and created an Institute of Agrarian Reform (*Instituto de Reforma Agraria*, IRA) to distribute land among a number of families.

The impact of the reforms (particularly the ones affecting the redistribution of land) was limited by the inefficient administrative system in charge of its implementation and the opposition the reforms raised among affected individuals and organizations.[7] More importantly, the reforms were limited by the victory of

---

[7] As an example, the IRA expected to distribute land to 60,000-75,000 families per year. Only 12,260 families received land between 1932 and 1934 (Malefakis, 1971)

center and moderate parties in the elections of November/December 1933. The Center-Right governments[8] in place between December 1933 and December 1935 implemented a series of counter-reformist policies aimed at paralyzing and, whenever possible, reversing the policies established by the previous left-wing government concerning the distribution of land or the reform of the Army. The opposition of radical left organizations to the Center-Right government was violently expressed in the Catalan regional upsurge and the workers' revolutionary strike in Asturias in October 1934. It took two weeks for the Army to suppress the revolution in Asturias. The Catalan revolt was much more short-lived: barely one day.

The radical left and liberal Republican parties united their forces in the so-called Popular Front, and won the elections in 1936. Reformist policies resumed. A military coup on July 18th, 1936 brought an abrupt halt to the "regular" political life of the Republic. The coup led to a three year Civil War and ultimately resulted in the victory of the putschist officers and Franco's thirty-six year dictatorship (1939-1975).

---

[8] The plural in "governments" is completely justified: between December 1933 and December 1935 the Republic had 10 governments. In other words, on average each government lasted 79.5 days (Linz, 1978)

Chapter III

Traditional Views of the Second Spanish Republic

The passions that surround the visions of the Republic and Civil War also translate to the academic views of the period that have dominated the debate. I divide current explanations and views of the Republic into two categories: the "block of power view" and the "polarization view". The "block of power view" focuses on the role that conservative elites (Army, Church, landowners...) had in opposing the reforms of the Republic and contributing to its fall. This view places the conflict in an "elites vs. masses" framework. The "polarization view" highlights the political tensions brought by anarchist and socialists, particularly after November 1933. It is not difficult to see how the two sides of the political spectrum in today's Spain might feel more attracted towards one explanation or the other. Both, the "block of power" and the "polarization view" fit the facts that occurred during the Republic but provide different explanations for the failure to establish and consolidate democracy. At a deeper level, the two views present a fight between two clearly defined, homogenous groups (democrats vs. elites, radical leftists vs. moderates...). Chapter IV presents my alternative view that emphasizes the heterogeneity of interests within elites and intra-elite conflict.

III.1. The "Block of Power" View

The concept of a "block of power" was developed by the Spanish historian Manuel Tuñón de Lara (Tuñón de Lara, 1967). A "block of power" is defined as the coalition of elites that controls and exerts power over a territory. Tuñón de Lara applied the concept to the *Restauración* (1874-1923) and the military and civil

dictatorships that followed (1923-1931). I use the "block of power view" to designate one traditional view of the Republic that takes its name from its emphasis on the opposition to the republican regime manifested by these elites that dominated the country between 1874 and 1931. Scholars supporting this view consider that conspiracies and disloyalty stemming from these groups (Church, landowners, Army...) were the main source of instability during the Republic and the ultimate reasons for the Republic's failure.

The "block of power view" frames the life and instability of the Republic as an "elites vs. masses" conflict. Attempts of the republican-socialist coalition in power between 1931 and 1933 to redistribute power in favor of the masses alienated industrialists, landowners, the Catholic Church and other elites that had dominated Spanish politics and economics before the Republic.

The archeologist Pere Bosch-Gimpera, who lived during the Republic, analyzed the politics of his time at a conference at the Universitat de Valencia in 1937 in the following terms: "under the Second [Republic], the superstructure was still alive and the dominant castes had not resigned themselves to step down"[9] (2007: 487). Fifty years later, Tuñón de Lara used a similar argument: "the key fact is that traditional elites preserved their economic power and their social influence but were not involved in power. Clearly, besides creating a conflictive situation, this was likely to result in the break of legitimacy" (Miralles and de la Granja, 1994: 127).[10]

---

[9] "Sota la segona [república], la suprastructura tenia encara massa supervivències i les castes dominants no s'han resignat a deixar el camp lliure"

[10] "El hecho clave es que las elites tradicionales conservaron su poder económico y, en general, su influencia social, pero no tuvieron participación en el Poder. A nadie escapa que este hecho, de por sí, entraña una situación conflictiva, y que a la larga es susceptible de producir una ruptura del consenso sobre la legitimidad"

19

Preston (2007) and Casanova (2010) formulate two recent syntheses of the "block of power" ideas.

The "superstructure" hindering the political action of the Republic had a monolithic character manifested in the elites' opposition to the reform policies attempted by the first liberal-socialist governments. The popular expectations raised by the liberal-socialist attempted reforms in land and industry were rapidly dashed by the problems and obstacles of implementing the reforms, partly because of elite obstructionism. The victory of the Popular Front and the return of liberal Republicans to government in 1936 after two years of conservative rule was a new opportunity to reactivate the reformist agenda, but then "the coup de grâce, the challenge that finally overthrew the Republic by force of arms, came from above and from within - that is to say, the military command and the powerful ruling classes that had never tolerated it " (Casanova, 2010: 37).

In summary, the reforms attempted by left-wing republicans and socialists faced the opposition of conservative groups (Army, Church, landowners...) that represented the interests of the old Spanish elites. These elites, when in power between 1933 and 1935, showed no interest in acting according to the Republican political framework. It is true that during the rule of conservative governments, some far-left organizations (including the most radical wing of the Socialist Party which had been part of the first republican governments between 1931 and 1933) played a role in destabilizing the regime, but this view emphasizes the old elites' political and military opposition as the key to understanding the instability of the Republic. General Sanjurjo's failed military coup in 1932 was the first serious proof of the problems the Republic had with controlling military plots and violence

organized by factions in the army. The fatal military coup in 1936 represented the culmination of old elites' disloyalty to the regime.

In some important aspects, the "block of power view" can be taken as an application *avant la lettre* of Acemoğlu and Robinson's model of democratization and institutional change (2006). In Acemoğlu and Robinson's model, elites (the initial holders of political and economic power) only accept the redistribution of power that happens in democracy whenever the masses are able to organize and pose a credible threat to elites' survival. Transition to democracy is the long-term credible commitment that elites can offer to avoid being eliminated by better organized masses. However, Acemoğlu and Robinson also consider the possibility of having an unconsolidated democracy in which the balance of power can quickly shift back in favor of elites. The reversion usually takes place through a coup that brings economic and political power back to elites and ends with democratization (2006: 224-246).

III.2.The "Polarization View"

The "polarization view" emerged as a reaction to the emphasis the "block of power view" puts on conservative elites' obstruction of Spanish democratization. It emphasizes political polarization and tensions provoked by leftist parties and unions as the main obstacles to consolidating democracy in Spain. Proponents of the "polarization view" argue that the Constitution approved by the republican-socialist coalition in 1931 lacked a necessary consensus and pushed a partisan view that alienated center-right and conservative parties (Linz, 1994; Payne, 2006; Álvarez Tardío and Villa García, 2010).

Drawing on Sartori's model of political polarization (Sartori, 1976), Linz emphasizes political polarization as the main source of instability during the Republic:

> "Although the army became the ultimate cause of the breakdown, the crisis and loss of legitimacy of the regime and the polarization in the society had progressed to great extremes before the army acted. It would be a mistake to consider this insurrection the main cause. In more than one sense, the regime had already broken down" (1978: 198)

Sartori's definition of polarized pluralism includes a political system with at least five parties. The government is represented by a coalition that has to face "anti-system parties" that undermine the legitimacy of the regime, and mutually exclusive opposition parties that attack the government from both the right and the left. These elements erode legitimacy and increase instability in the political system. It seems questionable that the anti-system parties played an important role in Spain.[11] Nonetheless, Linz uses this theoretical framework to explain the main problems of the Republic. The first element of the argument is the constitution approved by the left Republicans and Socialists in power between 1931 and 1933. Linz argues that the Constitution promoted exclusion and pushed a partisan view for the new Republican regime, resulting in increased opposition from conservative parties.

Payne points to a second element of polarization and disloyalty taking place after 1934: the radicalization of the Socialist Party:

> "Truly serious violence developed only after political polarization became extreme in 1934. The shift by the Socialists to violence and insurrectionary tactics created a much more severe polarization in Spain than ever developed in [Italy, Germany and Austria] where the Socialists and even the communists followed more moderate tactics" (1990: 283-4)

---

[11] The Fascist and the Communist parties were residual at least until 1936. They became more important during the Civil War (1936-1939).

In summary, in the "polarization view" the main problems of the Republic were increasing polarization and loss of legitimacy. Two factors explain these facts: the (partisan) constitutional framework designed by the Liberal-Socialist government in 1931 and the radicalization of the Socialist Party that contributed to violent revolts and repression after 1934.[12] This view emphasizes the inability of the Republic (in particular the left-wing coalition that controlled the government between 1931 and 1933 and after February 1936) to control political violence and implement a system based on broad, moderate coalitions and loyal political opposition.

On April 10, 1977 (eighteen months after Franco's death and in the middle of the transition to democracy), the conservative newspaper ABC still echoed a rough and politicized version of the "polarization view" in its critique of the legalization of the Communist Party. Its editorial read: "Those [the communists] *that dragged Spain to the worst conflict in its history* with their mistakes, intransigence, and methods and that made necessary so many victims and sacrifices to achieve peace, are suddenly put on an equal footing with those that offered their lives to defend Spain from what the "Communist Party" longed for and almost achieved: the admission of the country among (...) the countries behind the Iron Curtain" (p. 2, my emphasis).[13]

---

[12] Authors like Linz (1978) qualify this picture, with its extreme critique of the action of left-wing parties, and also point out that the mismanagement of the repression of the revolutions in Asturias and Catalonia by the center-right government was an additional source of polarization.

[13] "Quienes arrastraron a España, por sus errores, por su intransigencia y por sus métodos al agravamiento de la más terrible conflagración de nuestra historia, haciendo necesario para la paz tantísimos muertos y tantísimos sacrificios, se ven, del día a la mañana, en plano de igualdad con cuantos ofrecieron sus vidas para defender a España de aquello que el "Partido Comunista" anhelaba y a punto estuvo de conseguir: la instalación en nuestra patria en la órbita en la que hoy giran (...) los países de detrás del "telón de acero"".

Part II

A New View of the Second Spanish Republic: the Case of the Army

Chapter IV

A New View of the Second Spanish Republic and the Army

"Esa historia puede ser también interpretada de otra forma"
[This may also be interpreted another way].
Julián Casanova (2010: 147)

The two traditional views of the Republic provide valuable insights to understanding some of the problems that the consolidation of democracy faced during the Republic. My view does not disprove them, but aims at providing a new perspective that opens new questions and fields of study to understand the incentives that relevant groups and organizations had to rise against the republican regime. I see the republican regime as a coalition of elites and I emphasize the role of intra-elite competition in the dynamics of the Republic.

The arrival of the Republic in 1931 implied a change in the composition of the coalition that ruled the country. An important part of the problems that the republican regime faced in containing violence must be sought in the redistribution of political and economic power between elites. This section applies the basic characteristics of my view to the Spanish Army.

Rather than framing the Republic as an "elites vs. masses" scheme or focusing on the role of far-left organizations, my approach emphasizes the conflicts between elite factions to understand some important sources of instability during the republican regime. The republican regime implemented a new intra-elite arrangement and I focus on identifying the relevant political and economic elites during the period, the factions into which they were divided, and how republican reforms redistributed power between factions. I show that elites were not monolithic groups and the conflicts of interests between the different groups that composed them are a key to understanding the institutional dynamics of Spain

during the Republic. The stability of the republican regime was affected by the conflict between those factions that grew from the new social order implemented after April 1931 and those that lost political and economic privileges.

I use the Army as an example to illustrate how my view can be applied to one particular elite group. The Army was an important organization in determining the fate of regimes predating the Republic and even a superficial look at the history of the republican regime reveals that it remained key in affecting the stability of the Spanish institutional arrangements in the 1930s. As a major political player, the military shows how Spanish elites were divided into different factions that held different and conflicting interests. This chapter depicts the main divisions within the military that form the basis for the empirical analysis to test how those conflicts related to officers' propensity to be for or against the republican government when the military coup broke out in July 1936.

IV.1. The Army as a Political Elite in Spain

Focusing on elites means studying "persons who, by virtue of their strategic locations in large or otherwise pivotal organizations and movements, are able to affect political outcomes regularly and substantially" (Higley, 2010: 163). The power and influence of elite members is inseparable from the organizations they belong to. In Wallis and North's words, "elites are always connected to organizations in some way" (2014: 2). Army officers were some of the most important political elites in the country.

Besides finding economic and political support from powerful economic groups like landowners or industrialists, Spanish regimes also needed the backing of relevant sectors of the Army to ensure its stability. Men on horseback were part of the elite coalition that sustained or hindered the consolidation of different regimes and

governments, and their role in the political system went beyond being "an instrument at the service of political blocks or currents of thought"[1] (Lleixà, 1984: 86). The Spanish Army was a relevant political player in its own right and its interests are important in understanding the path of Spanish development.

The role of the military as a relevant player in the process of political and economic development in developing countries is not new. In his theory of the emergence and consolidation of national states, Tilly (1992) distinguishes four stages in warfare and state organization that he terms patrimonialism, brokerage, nationalization, and specialization. The stage that best characterizes Spain in the 1930s is *nationalization*: "a period (...) when states created mass armies and navies drawn increasingly from their own national populations, while sovereigns absorbed armed forces directly into the state's administrative structure, and similarly took over the direct operation of the fiscal apparatus, drastically curtailing the involvement of independent contractors" (1992: 29). The Spanish Army in the 1930s, however, was still far from Tilly's stage of specialization in which the Army specializes in military operations and the government takes over the economic control and management of the Army. Tilly's specialization stage is close to NWW's notion of political control of the army (2009: 169-181). In their view, political control of the military is a complex idea that encompasses the selection of military leadership by civil authorities, the control of military force through nonmilitary means, and the separation of decisions about when to fight and how to spend on fighting from the direction of military activity. The Spanish Army came under effective political control only in the 1980s (Serra, 2010). The Republic operated in an institutional

---

[1] "[La actuación del Ejército en los últimos cien años de la historia de España] ha sido propia de un instrumento puesto al servicio de un bloque de partidos y corrientes de opinión"

environment in which the Army was a relevant political player and its interests were relevant for the stability of the ruling coalitions.

Violence and military interventions were a constant in Spanish political history well before the Republic. During Isabella II's reign (1843-1868) Spain had one civil war, two successful military *pronunciamientos* (military coups) that led to changes of government, several failed mutinies, and a final military coup that overthrew Isabella II. The brief reign of Amadeo I (1870-1873) and the chaotic First Republic (1873-1874) were also dominated by military unrest that ultimately led to the fall of the first republican experiment in Spain.

During the *Restauración* (1874-1923) the Army was still a key player in the dominant coalitions. As Puell de la Villa points out, "the Army was considered an autonomous class with its own structures of power that ran parallel to the ones of the civil administration (...) and that directly depended on the monarch" (2009:114). Military officers sat in the Senate and the Parliament and the Minister of the War between 1874 and 1917 was always an Army officer. The political relevance of the Spanish military was embodied in laws that increased its political power. In March 1906, for example, the Law of Jurisdictions gave the military courts control over all the "crimes against the Fatherland and the Army". The Law of Jurisdictions was a step in the process whereby "the officer corps came to consider itself the ultimate arbiter in politics" (Preston, 2007: 28). Another significant law reflecting the political power of the Army was the Royal Order of January 15 1914, which allowed direct communication between the King and Army officers. This Order was particularly significant for two reasons. First, it confirmed that, despite being a parliamentary monarchy *de jure*, during the Restauración the Army enjoyed a *de facto* political power not subject to parliamentary control.

Second, the law was symptomatic of the King's need to attract support from sectors of the Army. Some scholars see the 1914 Royal Order as another step in the consolidation of the King-soldier (single ruler) that commanded general obeisance from the Army (Cardona, 1983: 78; Puell de la Villa, 2009: 110). Rather than confirming the existence of a single agent with total control of the Army, the law was indicative of the King's need to attract and ensure the support of powerful officers and sectors of the Army in order to forge a coalition that stabilized the regime. In Lleixà's words, the King acted as "the principal hinge that united the civil and military branch of the state" in a social order in which the Army had to be "*coordinated* but not subordinated to the remaining public powers" (1986: 66, his italics).[2]

The end of parliamentary monarchy in the *Restauración* was also marked by military intervention. In 1923, Primo de Rivera, an Infantry officer, took power after a military coup and established a dictatorship that lasted seven years (1923-1930). Between 1923 and 1925 Primo formed a "Military Directory" (*Directorio Militar*) in which the Army took control of the majority of the Spanish political system. In González Calleja's words, "the Directory freed the Administration from political parties and turned it to hundreds of pressure groups, mainly the Army, which rapidly occupied the main administrative posts" (2005: 69).[3] After 1925, the regime became a "Civil Directory" but Primo stayed as the head of the government, only subordinated to the King. After Primo stepped down in 1930, two shorter

---

[2] "[El Ejército como centro de poder] debía ser luego *coordinado*, que no subordinado, con los restantes poderes públicos. (...)La Corona (...) actuaba como el principal gozne unitivo de las ramas civil y militar del Estado"

[3] "El Directorio libró a la Adminstración del influjo de los partidos politicos para entregarla indefensa al de ciertos grupos burocráticos de presión, especialmente el Ejército, que se lanzó con avidez a ocupar los principales puestos gubernativos"

dictatorships led by Berenguer and Aznar (both Army officers) followed until April 1931, when the Republic was declared.

Regimes before the Republic varied in character but in all of them the Army was a relevant political player in its own right. NWW's words restate the inevitable conclusion: "If active support of the military forces is necessary to hold or obtain control of the civilian government institutions, then a society does not have political control of the military. If military officers serve as officers (...) in the civilian government, for example as legislators or executives, then a society does not have political control of the military" (NWW, 2009: 170). The Republic inherited and operated in an institutional arrangement lacking political control of the military.

IV.2.Heterogeneity of Interests within Elites

Focusing on intra-elite conflict immediately suggests that elites do not share a unique goal and are divided into different factions that hold different and conflicting interests. However, Marxist sociology or neoclassical theories of the state tend to depict elites as monolithic organizations (Tilly, 1992; North, 1981; Acemoğlu and Robinson, 2006 and 2012; Bates, 2008). Elites or social classes are modeled as single agents whose goals are given by their (unique) objective functions.[4] The Army is not an exception to this view: it is often the case that the military is either subsumed as a single "elite agent" or is taken as elites' coercive agent to prevent democratization (Acemoğlu, Ticchi, and Vindigni; 2006).

---

[4] Institutional dynamics and tensions are often explained by the fight between elites masses objective function. Marx's class struggle or Acemoglu and Robinson's Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy (2006) are examples of this view.

Single agent theories are useful theoretical artifacts, but elite organizations differ from this paradigm in crucial ways.[5] The Spanish Army provides a good example because it contained many factions with conflicting interests. This was not a particularity of the Spanish military because, as Rivero points out, "internal dissensions within the armed forces are the rule rather than the exception" (2013:5). The plurality of interests within the military meant that, when deciding over a specific military policy, Spanish governments attracted some military factions but alienated others. This is particularly relevant in understanding the political dynamics of Spain in the 1930s because, as NWW explain, developing societies lack a Weberian state: violence is dispersed among different groups, and the state is unable to get a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence. These societies try to preserve order by creating elite coalitions that reflect a *double balance*[6] between economic and political power, but threats from other elites that are not part of the coalition persist. As a result, developing societies are more unstable and more likely to suffer through coups and civil wars than developed countries. The single agent theory of the state puts the cart before the horse by assuming that the result of political and economic development (i.e. the concentration of coercion in the state) already exists. Weberian states or sufficiently centralized states (Acemoğlu and Robinson, 2012) characterize developed societies, not developing ones. In a framework with dispersed violence, the Army is more than a simple agent of political and economic elites: it is *part of* the elite factions that dominate politics

---

[5] Despite their ubiquitous use in Economics and their pertinence to answer some particular questions, the limits of single agent models to deal with certain economic problems are being raised in other fields besides institutional development. For instance, in his study of the evolution of inequalities and the distribution of income Piketty states that "economists have neglected the distribution of wealth, (...) partly because of the profession's undue enthusiasm for simplistic mathematical models based on the so-called representative agents" (2014: 16).
[6] NWW define the double balance as "a correspondence between the distribution and organization of violence potential and political power on the one hand, and the distribution and organization of economic power on the other hand" (2009: 20).

and economics in developing societies; indeed the Army itself is composed of factions.[7]

In the case of the Spanish military, divisions existed along geographical and corporatist lines. From a geographical point of view, the Army was divided into two groups: the *peninsulares* or *junteros* (officers posted in the Iberian Peninsula), and the officers in the Spanish North-African colonies (*africanista* officers). The *africanistas* were strong proponents of promotions by combat merit, whereas the *peninsulares* preferred promotions strictly determined by seniority (see next chapter for a deeper discussion of factions' conflicts, their importance in Spanish history, and the way they were affected by Republican military reforms).

The interest of organizations within the Army were also differentiated along corporatist lines. The Aviation Corps was the newest corps in the Army and its independence was not well established in 1931. The greater or smaller independence accorded to the corps by different regimes influenced the support that aviators brought to them. Also, the more technical corps (i.e. Artillery and Engineers) preferred a military education system with separate academies from less technical units (i.e. Infantry and Cavalry). Conflicts around education between artillerymen and engineers on the one side and infantrymen and cavalrymen on the other side were also recurrent in Spanish history.

The conflicts between military factions might seem technical but, as shown in the next chapters, they had important consequences in terms of redistributing economic and professional power among elite (military) factions and are linked to officers' likelihood to rise against the Republic. Those intra-elite fights for economic

---

[7] The USSR and its control of the Army probably represents the most important exception to what otherwise is a (rather) general rule for developing countries: the army is not under political control and appears as a major political player in its own right.

and professional prestige resulted in greater support from those factions that won with republican reforms and greater likelihood to rebel stemming from those factions that lost.

Chapter V

Military Factions in the Spanish Army

> "The old internal divisions that existed within the Army before 1931 did not disappear with the coming of the Second Spanish Republic"
> Puell de la Villa (2012: 83)

The Army might seem to be the one group within the Spanish elite where we should least expect to see competing factions and economic ties that link or alienate those factions to the ruling coalition. Not only is the Army widely viewed as a monolithic organization, but ideology has always played a key role in understanding the Army's split in July 1936. This chapter shows that economic and professional conflicts between military factions were significantly associated with officers' likelihood to rebel or remain loyal to the republican government when the military coup broke out.

The view of the Army as a homogenous group has traditionally been based on military values like discipline and respect of hierarchy. The increasingly conservative character attributed to the Army since the 1870s reinforces a view of the Army as the executor of the ruling elites' wishes against potential threats from masses or others (both internal and external). The Army was a major player in Spanish politics. The military used its power to hold and promote its own interests as an organization and the diverse interests of its members. When studying General Mola's motivations to lead the plot that produced the 1936 military coup against the Republic, Payne points out that "Mola was determined that the revolt would be basically an army movement, not obligated to any special interests. (...) Like most officers, he was uninterested in political parties and political ideologies."

(1971:94). Understanding the interests of the military is important in itself for the light it sheds on the motivation of officers during the Republic and Civil War. It is also important, however, because it challenges the idea that the Army had a single, monolithic, and homogenous interest in bringing down the Republic. This chapter studies the different groups and interests that coexisted within the Army and the impact that republican military reforms had on these. I use a newly constructed dataset to explore the impact of republican military reforms on officers' careers and use that information to explain and predict why individual officers' chose to side with the Republic or the rebels during the Spanish Civil War.

One could argue that the idea of different interests within the Army is not something new. Did not the military coup of July 1936 become a Civil War precisely because the Army split into two sides? How does my view help to explain the split with respect to traditional views? The split of the Army in 1936 has traditionally been explained by ideological divides within the military: conservative officers supported the coup whereas liberal or left-radical factions remained loyal (Navajas, 2011, is one of the clearest examples of this view). My view points to the redistribution of political and economic power between elites to understand factional incentives to revolt or support the republican government, so it departs from traditional studies' focus on understanding the sources of variation in officers' differential support to the republican government.

The most important difference between my view and traditional modelling of elites is my emphasis on the heterogeneity of interests within elites. This chapter deals with the study of the different factions that coexisted within the Spanish Army, their interests, and how the Republic and previous regimes adopted policies that

redistributed power between factions. This constitutes the basis for the empirical analysis developed in the next chapter.

V.1. The Traditional View of the Army

Despite the fact that the end of the Republic was triggered by a military coup and that studies of the Spanish Army are abundant, there has been little systematic research on officers' behavior during the Republic and the influence that republican military reforms had on officers' sides during the Civil War. The Army and its political importance are documented in Payne (1967), Boyd (1979), Ballbé (1983), Cardona (1983), Seco (1984), Lleixà (1986), Busquets and Losada (2003), and Puell de la Villa (2009). There are also many studies of the army and military reforms during the Republic (Aguilar Olivencia, 1986; Ruiz Vidondo, 2004; Alpert, 2006; Navajas, 2011). The main events during the military coup of July 1936 are described in detail in Salas (1940). Puell de la Villa (2012) is one of the most recent attempts to quantify the divisions of the Army in July 1936. None of these provide a quantitative multivariate analysis to understand the importance that republican military reforms and military factions had on the military coup that started the Spanish Civil War. This chapter adds to the recent literature that studies the influence that institutional and legal rearrangements had on the behavior of political and economic actors during the Republic. Domènech (2012) and Domènech and Miley (2013) are the two most recent efforts in that direction. They study how labor conflict and mobilization in rural Spain during the Republic followed legal and structural reforms in the labor market that favored the actions of labor unions. This chapter also complements the evidence of politicization, the use of clientelistic networks, and the politic appointments in the Spanish bureaucracy during the Republic shown in Lapuente and Rothstein (2013). Finally,

the view and institutional framework established in this chapter relates to the literature on political and economic development of which Tilly (1992); Acemoğlu and Robinson (2006, 2012); and North, Wallis and Weingast (2009) are the most important recent contributors.

How is the Army seen by the "block of power view" and the "polarization view", the two views that have traditionally dominated the interpretation of the Republic (see chapter III)? Within the "elites vs. masses" analytical framework, proponents of the "block of power view" usually depict the Army as an organization that defended the interests of landowners, industrialists, bankers, and the privileged conservative groups that organized the 1936 coup to regain power. The Army was an integral part of the "elite block" that opposed the reformist attempts of the Republic to redistribute power in favor of the masses: "the masters of social and economic power were united with the Church and the army in being determined to prevent any attacks on property, religion or national unity" (Preston, 2007: 40). The army is viewed as little more than the elites' military arm. The military alliance with Spanish elites is often explained by arguing that the Army grew increasingly conservative after 1874 (Navajas, 2011) and could not accept the regional concessions to Catalonia during the Republic because they attacked the unity of Spain (Preston, 2007: 47, 58).

Important changes in the relationship between the Army and the republican government occurred in the months that followed the declaration of the Republic. Between 1931 and 1933, Manuel Azaña approved a series of military reforms that had different impacts on groups within the military, particularly on officers. These reforms reconfigured the relationship between the Spanish government and the

military factions, and they influenced officers' likelihood to revolt against the Republic when the military coup that started the Civil War broke out in July 1936.

The importance of Azaña's military reforms in influencing officers' sides in July 1936 is explained by political changes during the Republic. The military coup happened five months after the *Frente Popular* won the elections held in February 1936. The *Frente Popular* was a liberal-socialist coalition similar to the one that had attempted a series of reforms on distribution of land and the relationships between the State and the Church between 1931 and 1933. Azaña's military reforms were part of the 1931-1933 reformist programs. After center-right governments had stopped and partly reversed the earlier reforms between 1933 and 1935, the return of liberal forces to power in 1936 (with Azaña as President and the main political figure of the republican government) was interpreted as the return to the reformist programs of the first two years of the Republic. The military factions that lost with Azaña's reforms between 1931 and 1933 had good reasons to worry about their prospects with the return of liberal government in 1936.

V.2. Military Factions, and Republican Military Reforms

The most important changes in the Spanish Army during the Republic took place during Manuel Azaña's term in office as the Minister of War between April 1931 and September 1933. Some scholars emphasize the legalism of Azaña's reforms and his desire to limit the influence of the Army in Spanish politics (Cardona, 1983: 117), while others emphasize his attempts to reaffirm the political neutrality of the military (Navajas, 2011: 92). But Azaña's reforms could not be politically neutral: the Minister faced political choices that, given the conflicts of interests within the Army, would necessarily benefit some factions and hurt others. Many

contemporary testimonies to the 1931-1933 military reforms bear witness to the existence of losing factions and discontent in certain military sectors (e.g. Cebreiros, 1931; Mola, 1940:925-1170). The military coup in July 1936 took place only four months after the elections in February, and two months after Manuel Azaña was named President of the Republic in May. Understanding how Azaña's 1931 and 1933 reforms affected the factions in the Army is crucial to understanding the incentives military groups had to support or oppose the republican ruling coalition in July 1936.

V.2.1. Corporatist Divisions in the Army

The most important Army corps were Artillery, Engineering, Infantry, Cavalry, and Aviation corps. Each of these corps had actively been involved in politics or conflicts that shaped the life and stability of regimes before the Republic.

The Aviation corps is a good example of the Spanish Army's involvement in politics and the changing nature of the military alliances that each regime established. After playing an active role in disputes and conspiracies against Primo de Rivera's dictatorship, the Aviation corps was one of the major beneficiaries under the Republic. Republican military reforms consolidated the corps and increased its professional and economic standing. During his mandate as Minister of the War between 1931 and 1933, Azaña cancelled all the decrees against aviation officers approved by Primo de Rivera, increased the independence of the corps vis-à-vis the remaining structure of the Army when creating the *Cuerpo General de Aviación*, and gave aviators economic bonuses for their services (Cardona, 1983: 157).

Corps in the Army had rivalries based on different interests concerning military education or methods of promotion. The most important corporatist conflict was

between Artillery and Engineers and Infantry and Cavalry. Artillery and Engineers were the most elite branches and received longer and more technical educations. These corps defended the existence of separate academies with respect to Infantry or Cavalry. Primo created a General Military Academy where all the corps shared the first two years of studies, increasing the animosity of engineers and artillerymen towards his regime. During the first years of the Republic, Azaña aligned with the interests of the technical corps by closing Primo's Military Academy and reestablishing three military academies: one for the Infantry, Cavalry, and Quartermaster corps; another for the Artillery and Engineers corps; and a third for Military Health corp. Officers pursued their *entire* careers within these corps.

Artillerymen and Engineers were also strong supporters of promotions determined by seniority, rather than promotions based on combat merit. Methods of promotions are studied in the next section because they were a key aspect that generated divisions in the Army between troops in Africa and the mainland.

Some officers in the Spanish Army were part of the Assault Guard (*Cuerpo de Seguridad y Asalto*). This police force specialized in the suppression of demonstrations in large cities and was under the authority of the Spanish Interior Ministry (*Ministerio de la Gobernación*). Members of the Assault Guard had to be "strong and athletic youths, taller than 5'11" and of proven republican loyalty"[8] (González Calleja, 2012: 113).It was considered one of the most loyal republican units.

For other corps whose interests were not directly affected by Azaña's military reforms (e.g. Civil Guard or Frontier Guards), expectations on their loyalty vis-à-

---

[8] "Sus agentes habían de ser jóvenes fuertes y atléticos, con una estatura superior a 1,80 m y de probada fidelidad a la República".

vis the republican government in 1936 are less clear. The Civil Guard was a militarized police force in charge of preserving order in rural areas. Based on their historical dependence on old Spanish elites, González Calleja states that "during the Republic, civil guards kept their reticence towards the regime" (2012: 103), but he also recognizes that in 1936 the government of the *Frente Popular* eliminated from its ranks those officers significantly involved in the repression against leftist movements in the previous years.

V.2.2. Promotions and Geographic Divisions in the Army

The second division in the Spanish Army was along geographical lines and revolved around the methods of promotion preferred by the geographical factions that coexisted within the Army. Officers in Spain were divided into three broad rank categories (Table 1): the highest category was the General Officers (GO, which included the ranks of Lieutenant General, Major General, and Brigadier General), the second group was the Senior Commissioned Officers (SCO; Colonels, Lieutenant Colonels, and Majors), and the third group was the Junior Commissioned Officers (JCO; Captains, Lieutenants, and *Alféreces*). For each rank, officers were classified on a scale according to their seniority in the rank. Whenever there were vacant posts in a given rank, top officers on the scale of the rank below were eligible for promotion. Depending on the law in force, promotions between ranks or promotions within the scale in a given rank could also be determined after remarkable actions in the battlefield (promotions by combat merit) or by appointment of the military authority (promotions by election). Officers' attached great importance to changes in their position on the scale because it determined their eligibility to be promoted to the next rank and increase their economic and social standing in the Army.

The geographical factional conflict between troops posted in mainland Spain (*Peninsulares*) and those posted in Africa (*Africanistas*) revolved around the preferred method of promotion. The former preferred promotions strictly determined by seniority, whereas the latter were strong proponents of allowing promotions determined by combat merit. *Peninsulares'* criticism of combat merit often pointed to problems of arbitrariness and favoritism. In this sense, the military journal *La Correspondencia Militar* wrote in 1912:

> "There are 2,300 senior officers of Infantry and Cavalry who do not want to be politicians, and who reject any government policy that tries, by means of favoritism, to introduce hated rivalries into the Army. They regard any reward for service that is opposed to their vehement desire to ascend by seniority as a menace to their only safeguard, the scale of seniority" (Payne, 1967: 124).

Despite its ecumenical and apolitical pretensions, the article itself is indicative of the political activism of the Army in its attempts to influence the methods of promotions and the tensions that existed around that issue. Favoritism and arbitrariness aside, the reasons for that type of activism were linked to officers' self-interest and the impact that methods of promotion had on the careers and economic rewards they expected. On one hand, *Africanista* officers were regularly involved in combat against native tribes in North Africa between 1910 and 1927, and therefore defended promotions by combat merit as a way to obtain faster progress through the scale. On the other hand, *Peninsulares* opposed promotion by combat merit because, lacking opportunities for combat, they could not benefit from that type of promotion. Allowing promotions determined by combat merit harmed their future prospects in favor of the *Africanista* faction. This was particularly worrying in an Army that suffered a severe problem of excess officers. Nazario Cebreiros, an officer of the Spanish Army in the first half of the twentieth century, showed how self-interest loomed behind officers' defense of one method of

promotion over the other. This is how Cebreiros described officers that benefited

from promotions by combat merit during Primo de Rivera's dictatorship:

> "When the Juntas [*peninsulares*' lobbies[9]] had an unyielding force, they were
> *junteros* [i.e. *peninsulares*] and fierce defendants of promotions by seniority
> when they were at the [Iberian] Peninsula; but if, following their desires or
> by chance, they crossed the strait [of Gibraltar], then they became rapidly
> convinced that promotion by seniority was not in the interest of the State"[10]
> (Cebreiros, 1931: 14).

Thus, rather than acting as the agents of liberal or conservative elites in Spain,

officers "would be more concerned with promoting their own interests as military

men above or outside of party conflicts" (Payne, 1967: 37). The governments'

decision over the methods of promotion would attract the support of the

peninsulares (if emphasis was put on seniority) or the *Africanistas* (if promotions

by combat merit were allowed). Decisions over methods of promotion were

important determinants of the support that geographic factions of the Army gave

to Spanish governments. [11]

In a series of laws passed between 1924 and 1926, Primo de Rivera allowed

promotions by combat merit[12] and by election[13]. The Republic inherited a military

structure where combat merit and election had determined several officers' ranks.

---

[9] More precisely, The Military Defense Juntas were peninsular organizations of military men who "were opposed to *Africanistas*, the *méritos* system, the palace clique, and the generals" (Payne, 1967: 127).

[10] "Cuando las Juntas tenían una fuerza incontrastable, eran junteros: y terribles defensores de la escala cerrada, mientras estaban en la península; pero si, por voluntad o por suerte, pasaban el Estrecho, entonces se convencían rápidamente de que la escala cerrada no convenía a los intereses del Estado (...)."

[11] To a certain extent, those decisions also reflected the relative force of each faction. When in 1917 the government approved a law that restored promotions by combat merit, the *peninsulares* reacted creating the Defense Juntas and forcing the fall and creation of a new government. One of the first measures of the new government was restoring the preeminence of promotions determined by seniority as demanded by the peninsular faction (Alpert, 2008: 126; Cardona, 1983: 145).

[12] Law of May 11, 1924

[13] Law of July 26, 1926.

In another controversial law, Primo had also eliminated the closed scale[14] for Artillery and Engineers, - an event without precedent in the history of these corps which had always relied on seniority to determine the promotions in their ranks.

Between 1931 and 1933, Azaña reversed Primo's policies and implemented a series of military reforms that altered the promotion system. Two decrees passed in 1931 cancelled Primo's promotions by elections[15] and revised those promotions that the dictator passed on combat merit grounds.[16] Promotions were cancelled except if, at the moment of revision, they could be justified using the seniority criteria. Many officers who had been promoted by Primo lost position in the scale as a result of Azaña's revisions of promotions by combat merit.

Far from a technical debate, the reform of methods of promotion had a considerable political impact in Spain. In his diary, Azaña echoes the rumors that Melquiades Álvarez, an important political figure of the Republic, "has agreed to combat in the Parliament the cancellation of promotion by combat merit"[17] (1981: 20). The interests of the Army were important political issues during the Republic and military factions had enough political relevance to make their voices heard in the Spanish Parliament.

Azaña's reforms of the methods of promotion were completed with the passage of a law on May 2, 1932 that established the promotion criteria followed during the Republic. The law was partly inspired by a law of 1918, which had been approved under the pressure of *Peninsulares* and other proponents of the seniority criteria

---

[14] The "closed scale" was another term to designate systems in which promotions were only determined by seniority.

[15] Order of May 18, 1931. Only the promotions by election that could be justified on seniority grounds were maintained.

[16] Order of June 3, 1931.

[17] "Otros afirman que Melquíades se ha comprometido a combatir en las Cortes la anulación de los ascensos por méritos de guerra"

for promotions. The republican-socialist government established that promotions would be determined by seniority within the ranks corresponding to JCO, SCO, and GO (See Table 1). In addition to the seniority criteria, promotions from JCO to SCO (i.e. from Captain to Major) or from SCO to GO (i.e. from Colonel to Brigadier General) required the successful completion of a course and a final exam.

The reform of promotion methods in 1932, as well as the reversion of many of Primo's promotions, affected officers and military factions' attitude vis-à-vis the Republic through three different channels. First, by strengthening the role of seniority and study in determining promotions, the 1932 law favored *peninsulares*' interests and alienated the *Africanista* faction. Second, emphasis on seniority was also in line with the interests of those corps historically attached to the closed scale, namely engineers and artillerymen. Third, the officers who lost positions or were demoted a rank after revising Primo's promotions by combat merit would have been more likely to be against the newly formed Azaña's republican government in 1936.[18]

V.2.3. Elimination of Ranks

One last aspect of Azaña's military reforms did not affect any military faction in particular but had significant consequence for some officers' career prospects. In 1931, a decree eliminated the rank of Lieutenant General, the highest rank in Infantry, Cavalry, Artillery, and Engineers Corps.[19] This measure affected the officers that in 1931 aspired to achieve the rank of Lieutenant General in the future,

---

[18] On April 19, 1932, Azaña wrote in his diary that General Goded, who was executed four year later after his failed attempt to lead the military coup in Catalonia, was "very angry because the reforms cut off his career" (Azaña 1981: 459; "está muy dolido de que las reformas le hayan cortado la carrera")

[19] Diario Oficial del Ministerio de la Guerra n. 132, June 17, 1931, p. 788.

namely Majors and higher ranks. By worsening their professional prospects (and, of course, the economic rewards and prestige that were attached), it is possible that these officers were more likely to oppose Azaña's government in 1936 (Cardona, 1983).

The empirical study focuses on the impact of these four republican military reforms on the choices of officers in 1936: cancellations of promotions by election and combat merit and establishment of promotions by seniority, the creation of separate military academies, the greater independence and economic rewards given to aviators, and the disappearance of the rank of Lieutenant General. Needless to say, each active officer in 1936 could have been affected in conflicting ways by these policies. An *africanista* aviator that held a rank higher than Major in 1931 had reasons to support the republican government in 1936 (Azaña had benefited his corps), but also reasons for being against it (the revisions of promotions by combat merit and the establishment of the seniority system went against the *africanistas'* interests and the elimination of Lieutenant Generals harmed the prospects of those holding the rank of Major or higher in 1931). Table 2 summarizes the different policies and the way they affected the different groups and factions that coexisted within the Spanish Army. One of the virtues of the multivariate analysis performed in Chapter VII is to isolate the relationship between each different dimension of officers' interests and the likelihood to rebel against the republican government. Before stepping into the empirical analysis, a detailed discussion of the data set and the way I build variables that measure officers' membership to military factions is needed.

Chapter VI

Data Set and Variables

"If you cannot measure it, you cannot improve it."
Sir William Thomson (1824-1907)

With some rare exceptions (e.g. Puell de la Villa, 2012) current studies of the Spanish Army are qualitative and do not rely on a heavy use of data and statistics. Two reasons can explain the absence of a systematic quantitative approach to the Spanish Army during the Republic. First, the Republic is a relatively recent historical event that also suffered thirty-six years of obscurantism and propagandistic interpretations during Franco's dictatorship (1939-1975). Despite the effort of foreign Hispanists like Paul Preston, Stanley Payne or Gabriel Jackson, the progress in the study of primary sources of the Republic has been slow and full of administrative obstacles. Possibilities for research progressively increased after the arrival of democracy in 1978 and the slow opening of Spanish archives, which is still far from complete. Second, even when data was available for researchers, the task of gathering and preparing the information for its analysis required an enormous amount of time that limited the scope or the feasibility of the study. I benefit both from the advantages conceded by time and technological progress. The archival and bibliographical work patiently gathered by historians in the last decades has resulted in an impressive amount of information ready to be used in the study of the Republic. Carlos Engel deserves special mention in this aspect. His thirty-year work reviewing official bulletins and his bibliography related to officers during the Republic is crystallized in a book (Engl, 2008) that constitutes the first leg of my data set. For the second leg (the combination of information contained in military yearbooks), I have enjoyed the advantages of modern researchers' access to powerful software. As Piketty points out, "advances in

computer technology have made it much easier to collect and process large amounts of historical data" (2014:20). This is a not a negligible advantage when having to process, merge, and manipulate data sets with more than 15,000 observations recorded in six or more different military yearbooks.

In order to test the relationship between military policies, factional interests, and officers' behavior during the 1936 coup, I build a dataset that uses data collected by Engel (2008) as well as a new data set that I have collected from the Spanish military yearbooks between 1910 and 1936. The dataset gathers information on the 15,098 officers that were active in the Spanish Army in July 1936. It contains information on their individual characteristics in 1936, the evolution of their careers during the Republic, and their proximity to the *africanista* faction by looking at their geographical location between 1910 and 1927.

Engel (2008) is currently the most complete and exhaustive study of Spanish officers' chosen sides during the military coup and Civil War. Besides the side that officers chose, his dataset also provides information on officers' ranks in July 1936, the garrison where they were posted, the cities where the officers were physically located at the outbreak of the military coup (when possible), and some relevant officersℕ biographical information about their ups and downs during the conflict. His data covers both the Army and the Navy.

The Spanish military yearbooks were published by the Spanish Ministry of War and contain information on officers' dates of birth, dates of entry in the Army, corps, ranks, seniorities in the rank, and positions on the scale. The yearbooks were usually published in January and they reflected changes that had occurred during the previous year. The 1936 military yearbook was published in late April, so it

reflected all the changes in ranks and positions on the scale that occurred between January 1935 and April 1, 1936 (i.e. three and a half months before the coup).

Information on the military yearbooks is merged with Engel's data using officers' names. Officers' dates of birth and dates of entry in the Army are also used to match officers in the military yearbooks between 1931 and 1936 in order to determine their evolution on the scale and changes of rank during the Republic. Matches between names in 1936 and military yearbooks between 1910 and 1927 are used to determine officers' geographical location in that period and their proximity to the *africanista* faction.

The final sample is formed by the 11,873 active officers in July 1936 that belonged to the corps of General Staff, Infantry, Cavalry, Engineers, Artillery, Aviation[20], Transportation (*Cuerpo de Tren*), Civil Guard (*Guardia Civil*), and Frontier Guards (*Carabineros*). The 3,078 active officers in July 1936 that are excluded from the final sample fall into two categories. The first category is formed by corps in which all the officers rebelled: "Sea Companies Corps" (*Patrones de Compañía*, eight officers) and the African Regulars (*Oficialidad del Tercio*, eight officers after excluding those that actually belonged to the Aviation corps). Following Puell de la Villa (2012), the second category is formed by those officers belonging to corps that are excluded because they lacked the ability to command armed forces or, strictly speaking, were not part of the Spanish Army: Quartermaster, *Intervención* (fiscal control of the Army), Medical corps, Pharmacy, Church, Military

---

[20] The Aviation corps, the youngest of all corps which was in the process of consolidation, was not fully separated from the other corps in the 1936 military yearbook. The yearbook only separates the aviation officers from the rank of "alférez" (see table 1). Higher rank aviation officers were included in other corps like Infantry, Cavalry, Artillery or Engineers (see Cebreiros, 1931: 250 for the historical origin of this "dual scale" in the Aviation corps). Engel (2008) provides information to identify the officers belonging to the Aviation corps with a rank higher than *alférez*, so I use his data to find which officers in the 1936 yearbook were aviators.

Veterinarians, Military Offices, Music directors, Horseback riding teachers, Topographic Brigade, Infantry Moorish Officers, and Moorish Cavalry (3,062 officers).

VI.1. Officers' Affiliation at the Outbreak of the Civil War

There is not precise and consensual data for the side that officers chose at the outbreak of the Civil War. In his study, Engel restricted his data to active officers in July 1936.[21] He used the bulletins from the Spanish Ministry of War (*Diario Oficial del Ministerio de la Guerra,* DOMG) during the War period (1936-1939) and *Boletín Oficial del Estado* (BOE, equivalent to the American Congressional Record) between 1936 and 1945[22] to find dispositions and information concerning officers in the Army during the Civil War and the post war (promotions, trials, death penalties, expulsions, imprisonments…) to determine the side they chose.

Officers that were put in jail, sentenced to death or expelled from the Army by the republican government are labelled as rebels. Officers that were in the Army in July 1936 and remained in the military after the rebel victory in 1939 without any penalty or punishment in their records are considered rebels too. Following the same logic, officers punished on rebel's official bulletins or those that only appear

---

[21] After eliminating some repetitions and excluding the corps of Handicapped and the Moorish troops, my data show that the 1936 military yearbook contained 15,258 active officers in April 1936. 160 (1.05%) of those officers were excluded due to inconsistencies with the data provided by the military yearbook (e.g. typos in dates of birth) leaving us with 15,098 active officers. 14,893 of those officers (98.64%) could be matched with Engel's data, so 205 officials remained unmatched. Consulting the *Diario Oficial del Ministerio de la Guerra* (DOMG, bulletins of the Minister of the War) between April and July 1936, I was able to determine that among those 205 unmatched officials, 66 had retired, 9 passed to the reserve, and 25 passed away between April 1 and July 17 1936. This leaves us with 105 officers (0.7% of the 14,893 that constitute the population of reference) for whom either Engel did not provide data or I was unable to find the documental evidence proving that they were not active in July 1936.

[22] During the war, there were two *Boletín Oficial del Estado*: one issued by the military junta controlling the rebel area and another issued by the republican government in Madrid.

as part of the Republican Army until 1939 are labelled as "republicans" (i.e. loyal to the republican regime).

Besides these clear cases, there are other examples in which officers' classifications demand greater subjective judgment. First, Engel identifies the "republican geographical loyal officers", namely officers that "stayed loyal to the republic for geographical reasons" (Navajas, 2011: 137). Rather than be influenced by their convictions or preferences, officers in this category probably stayed in the republican ranks during the conflict because they happened to be in republican controlled areas when the coup broke out. When officers stayed on the republican side during the Civil war but were integrated into Franco's army without punishment or sanction when the conflict ended, they were labeled "republican geographical loyal officers". There were also cases of "rebel geographical loyal officers" that, after fighting on the rebel side, were obliged to abandon Franco's troops due to their "ambiguous" behavior or because their loyalty to the rebel cause was doubted. Given that republican geographical loyal officers did not have a strong identification with the Republic (otherwise they would have been repressed during Franco's purge after the war) they are classified as rebels in my final sample. The reverse reasoning applies to geographical loyal officers on the rebel side, so they are labeled as "republicans". The final sample contains 536 geographical loyal officers in total (4.5% of total officers). A second problematic category of officers is formed by those officers that were affected by the "Varela law"[23]. The law imposed retirement from the Army on those officers "whose lack of aptitude put

---

[23] Law of July 12, 1940 that updated, completed, and reenacted the Decree 100 of December 15, 1936 (see next footnote).

their subordinates at risk because of their indecisiveness or ineptitude."[24] Given the impossibility of differentiating between officers affected by the law given their poor management skills (therefore not showing any weakness in their adhesion to the rebel cause) and those for whom weak loyalty resulted in hesitant command of the troops, all these officers in the sample are labeled as "rebels". 61 officers (0.5% of the final sample) were affected by the Varela law.

VI.2. Promotions during the Second Spanish Republic

One important consequence of Azaña's military reforms was the loss of position or demotions for some officers after revising some previous promotions based on combat merit or election. In order to account for officers' professional evolution during the Republic and identify those that lost with the revision of promotions, I create a variable that accounts for officers' changes of position on the scale and effective rank promotions or demotions between 1931 and 1936.

The information in Spanish military yearbooks between 1931 and 1936 is used to measure officers' changes on the rank scale. First, given officer i's rank r and corps c in year t, the relative position of officer i in the scale can be obtained as follows:

$$RP_{i,t,r,c} = \frac{\text{Position }_{i,t,r,c}}{\text{Total\_officers}_{t,r,c}}$$

Where Position$_{i,t,r,c}$ is officer i's position on the scale of rank r and corps c according to the military yearbook of year t. It is useful to keep in mind that military yearbooks in t reflect the changes on the scales and ranks that occurred during t-1. Total_officers$_{t,r,c}$ is the total number of officers that appear on the scale for rank

---

[24] Decree 100, BOE number 57, December 15, 1936.

r of corps c in the military yearbook of t. Note that those officers with a higher position on the scale (i.e. those closer to being promoted) have a lower RP. The officer in the last position of the scale has a RP equal to 1 whereas the first officer on the scale has a RP equal to $1/\text{Total\_officers}_{t,r,c}$.

Officers' RP are computed for every year between 1931 and 1936. Change of position on the scale between t-1 and t is calculated as follows:

$$\Delta\,\text{Position}_{i,t,r,c} = \begin{cases} RP_{i,t-1,r,c} - RP_{i,t,r,c} & \text{if } r \text{ in } t-1 = r \text{ in } t \\[2ex] \Delta r + RP_{i,t-1,r,c} & \text{if } r \text{ in } t-1 < r \text{ in } t \\[2ex] \Delta r - (1 - RP_{i,t-1,r,c}) & \text{if } r \text{ in } t-1 > r \text{ in } t \end{cases}$$

Where Δ r= change in rank between military yearbook of t and military yearbook of t-1 (Δ r = 1 if the officer is promoted one rank, Δ r = -1 if the officer is demoted one rank, Δ r = 2 if the officer is promoted two ranks, etc.).

If $0 < \Delta\,\text{Position}_{i,t,r,c} < 1$, officer i did not change his rank in t-1 but improved his RP in the scale with respect to t-2. If $1 < \Delta\,\text{Position}_{i,t,r,c} < 2$, officer i was promoted one rank in t-1. When $-1 < \Delta\,\text{Position}_{i,t,r,c} < 0$, officer i did not change his rank in t-1 but worsened his RP with respect to t-2. If $-2 < \Delta\,\text{Position}_{i,t,r,c} < -1$, officer i was demoted one rank in the year t-1.[25]

The expression to compute $\Delta\,\text{Position}_{i,t,r,c}$ can be better understood through an example. In 1931, Infantry colonel José Moscardó Ituarte held the 129th position

---

[25] The sample does not contain any case of one officer being promoted or demoted more than 2 ranks over two consecutive years.

among the 177 officers that formed the scale for Infantry colonels. Therefore, Moscardó's RP in 1931 was 0.729 (=129/177). In 1932 the revision of promotions under the Republic resulted in officer Moscardó's demotion to the rank of Lieutenant Colonel. He occupied the 14th position out of 160 Infantry Lieutenant Colonels. This implied a change in position between 1931 and 1932 equal to -1.271 (= -1-(1-0.729)). The (1-0.729) reflects the "fall" down the Infantry Colonel scale. The "-1" (Moscardó's Δ r between 1931 and 1932) reflects the punishment or economic and psychological costs of being demoted one rank. In 1933 Moscardó regained the rank of Colonel reaching the 67th position out of the 79 colonels on the scale. The resulting change in position between 1932 and 1933 equaled 1+0.0875. The 0.0875 reflect his progress in the Infantry Lieutenant Colonel scale (note that Moscardó's RP in 1932 was 14/160=0.0875). The "+1" (Moscardó's Δ r between 1932 and 1933) represents Moscardó's promotion to the rank of Colonel. The RP in the 1933 scale for Infantry colonels was 0.848. In 1934, Moscardó maintained his rank of colonel and progressed to the 49th position in a year in which 71 officers formed the scale for Infantry colonels. Therefore Moscardó's RP in 1934 was 0.69. This implied a change in position in 1934 equal to 0.158 (=0.848-0.69).

I create the variable Δ Position$_{i,1931\text{-}1936}$ to measure changes in relative officers' positions during the Republic. Δ Position$_{i,1931\text{-}1936}$ measures officer i's change in relative position during the Republic by aggregating the changes that officers experienced in each year between 1931 and 1936:

Change position 1931-1936 = Δ Position1931-1936$_i$ = $\sum_{t=1931}^{t=1936} \Delta$ Position$_{i,t,r,c}$

<u>VI.3. Africanista Officers</u>

In his study of the *africanista* group, Mas points out that "the majority of the [*africanista*] group was formed by officers who stayed many years in Morocco, Ifni or Sahara posted in *La Legión* [Spanish Foreign Legion], African regular Army, Marksmen, Nomads, Mehal-las, Police, Intervention Corps, and so on"[26] (1988: 8-9). Balfour and La Porte defend a similar idea in their discussion of the military *Africanist* culture "in the course of the intermittent wars with the tribes of northern Morocco between 1909 and 1927, a new military culture called *Africanismo* was forged among an elite of colonial officers" (2000: 309). This elite excluded some of the officers posted to Africa "who had not volunteered to fight in, but had been posted to Morocco, and for whom military intervention there had little ideological or political appeal" (Balfour and La Porte 2000: 313). In the same line but more generally, Navajas affirms that "regular and Foreign Legion forces were the core of military africanism" (2011:66). In all these definitions, the *africanista* faction is restricted to a subset of those officers posted to Africa between 1909 and 1927. Following these definitions of the *africanista* military factions, Military yearbooks between 1911 and 1927 are used to construct a variable called "Years Core Africa (1910-1927)" that measures the number of years that active officers had spent posted to the special forces of the Spanish Protectorate between 1911 and 1927 as of July 1936. The special units permanently posted to the Spanish Protectorate in Africa comprised the Spanish Foreign Legion (*Tercio de Extranjeros*), the Native

---

[26] "La mayoría del grupo en cuestión lo forman los Cuadros de Mando que permanecieron largos años en Marruecos, Ifni o Sahara o destinados en La Legión, Regulares, Tiradores, Nómadas, Mehal-las, Policía, Intervenciones, etc., es decir, en lo que genéricamente se llamaron Fuerzas Especiales".

Regulars (*Grupos de Fuerzas Regulares Indígenas*), the Mehal.las, the Harkas, the Native Police (*Policía Indígena*), and African Military Intervention.[27]

VI.4. Other Officers' Individual Covariates

Information in the 1936 Spanish military yearbook is also a source for information on officers' corps, ranks, and tenure (computed as the difference between 1936 and an officer's year of entry in the Army). Engel provides additional information on each officer's military division[28], garrison in July 1936, the area where the officer was during the coup (republican or rebel-controlled area), and the city where the officer was when the coup broke out in July 1936. Information on officers' garrisons and their locations is used to create a dummy "Leader" that takes the value 1 for the officer(s) in the garrison holding the highest rank and 0 for the rest.

The dummy variable "Assault Guard" takes the value 1 for those officers recruited from different corps to be part of the Assault Guard and 0 for the others.

Finally, the dummy variable "Worse Prospects after 1931" identifies those officers with worse professional prospects after the rank of lieutenant general was

---

[27] Despite the fact that almost the entire troops of the Mehal.las, Harkas or Native Regulars were formed by African soldiers, the great majority of their officers were Spanish.
[28] Spain was divided in eight military divisions plus Balearic Islands and Canary Islands. The first divisions included the provinces of Madrid, Toledo, Cuenca, Ciudad Real, Badajoz, and Guadalajara; the second, Seville, Huelva, Cádiz, Córdoba, Malaga, Granada, Almeria, and Jaen; the third, Valencia, Alicante, Albacete, Murcia, and Castellon; the fourth, Barcelona, Tarragona, Lerida, and Gerona; the fifth, Zaragoza, Huesca, Soria, and Teruel; the sixth, Burgos, Navarre, Guipúzcoa, and Logroño; the seventh, Valladolid, Zamora, Salamanca, Avila, Segovia, and Caceres; finally, the eight division comprised Coruña, Lugo, Orense, Pontevedra, Oviedo, and Leon. The African territories formed a separate military administrative entity. I divide the Spanish possessions in Africa in seven regions: Western district (formed by Tetuán, Xauen, Ceuta, Larache, Arcila, and Alcazar), Eastern district (Melilla, Chafarinas Islands, Rock of Velez, and Rock of Alhucemas), Rif, Ifni, Juby Cape, Río de Oro, and Gulf of Guinea. The thirteen officers in the Gulf of Guinea are excluded from the later empirical analysis because all rebelled.

eliminated in 1931. It takes the value 1 for officers that held the rank of Major or higher in 1931 and 0 for the rest.

VI.5. Summary Statistics

Table 3 shows the summary statistics for the whole country. On average, officers had been in the Army for twenty two years[29] and 92% of them were posted to a garrison in July 1936. The remaining 8% were sick, injured, arrested or awaiting a destination. 8% of officers were leaders or held the highest rank in the garrison when the coup took place.[30] When looking at the distribution by corps, Infantry was the largest with 41% of officers in the sample. Artillery (18%), Engineers (8%), and Cavalry (8%) followed. One third of the sample had been posted to Africa for at least one year. On average, officers spent a quarter of a year posted to special African units.[31] As it relates to professional evolution during the Republic, on average officers improved their relative position by 0.85 between 1931 and 1936. That is, the average official had a positive evolution in the scale within his rank (because 0.85>0) but did not promote to a higher rank between 1931 and 1936 (because 0.85<1). Finally, 12% of officers in the sample held a rank of Major or higher in 1931 and thus had worse career prospects when the rank of Lieutenant General was eliminated in 1931.

Table 4 presents summary statistics for officers in rebel-controlled and republican-controlled areas separately (see Figure 1 for the geographical limits of each area). On average, areas under republican control had more experienced officers (average

---

[29] The date of entry in the Army marks the moment in which the officer entered the military academy. Studies in the academy usually took five years and then the officer passed to the scale (Ruiz Vidondo, 2004). This explains the minimum value of 5 for the variable "tenure" in the sample.
[30] In July 1936 some garrisons were awaiting the designation of a new leader.
[31] If we focus on the 1335 officers that spent at least one year posted to special African units, the average stay in Africa was slightly above two years.

tenure of 23 years against 21.5) with a higher ranks.[32] Rebel areas had more officers posted than republican areas, where 9.2% of officers were awaiting their destinations or were not ready to serve. When looking at the composition by corps, General Staff, Engineers, Aviation, Frontier Guards, Transportation, and Civil Guard were more present in republican areas, whereas officers from Artillery, Infantry and Cavalry were relatively more numerous in areas under rebel control. Officers in rebel-controlled areas spent more years posted to special African units than officers in areas under republican control.[33] Finally, a greater proportion of officers in republican areas were negatively affected by the elimination of the rank of Lieutenant General. Nevertheless, officers in republican-controlled areas also benefited from greater improvements in their relative positions between 1931 and 1936.

The most relevant statistic relates to the split of the Army between rebel and republican officers. Despite the fact that distribution of officers between areas under republican and rebel control was relatively equal at the time of the coup (48.22% and 51.78% respectively, see Table 5), 80% of officers in the sample supported the coup against the Republic. This result is at odds with any theory that emphasizes the importance of factions and conflicts of interests within the Army but obscures an important difference in the distribution of affiliations shown in Table 5: 93.11% of officers in rebel-controlled areas aligned with the rebel Army, whereas in areas under republican control the distribution was more even (35% officers remained loyal to the Republic and 65% rebelled). The literature does not provide an explanation for this difference. Here it is argued that the different

---

[32] The nine ranks shown at Table 1 are given a number that increases with their position in the military hierarchy.
[33] When focusing only on officers that spent at least one year in special African units, officers in rebel areas spent 2.16 years against 2 years for officers in republican-controlled areas.

behavior of officers in each area was due to authorities' different responses in each area.

In a law passed on July 18 (the day after the coup started in the Spanish African territories), the republican government in Madrid stated that "all the troops in which officers have positioned themselves against republican legality are discharged"[34]. Manuel Azaña, President of the Republic when the coup broke out, commented on the intentions and effects of the law:

"Aiming at leaving the leaders of the coup without troops, the government freed all soldiers from obeisance to their superiors. Obviously, this decree was not followed in those cities already under rebel control, but it applied to important towns under republican command (Madrid, Barcelona, Cartagena, Valencia, and so on). Soldiers abandoned the garrisons and almost everyone went back home"[35] (2011: 55-6, translation is mine).

In other words, officers in areas under republican authority had some freedom and time to decide their side in the conflict.

The situation in rebel-controlled areas was very different. Since the early stages of the planning of the coup, the putschists sought to establish strong discipline and meticulous repression of opposing forces. While organizing the coup in April 1936, General Emilio Mola Vidal issued a series of secret orders that called for extreme violence to shock and intimidate loyal republican opposition. In another secret instruction dictated on the 20th of June (three days after the coup broke out in

---

[34] *Gaceta de Madrid*, n. 201, July 19, 1936, p. 201.
[35] "El gobierno desligó de la obediencia a sus jefes a todos los soldados, pensando dejar sin tropas a los directores del movimiento. Este decreto, naturalmente, no fue obedecido en las ciudades ya dominadas por los militares, pero sí en las importantes plazas en poder del gobierno (Madrid, Barcelona, Cartagena, Valencia, etcétera). Los soldados abandonaron los cuarteles y casi todos se marcharon a sus casas".

Africa), Mola declared that "the timid and the hesitant should be warned that he who is not with us is against us and will be treated as an enemy" (Preston, 2012:132).[36] The prescription was rapidly put into practice in the areas that fell under rebel control after the first hours or days of the coup. On the night of 17 July, only hours after the coup started, the rebels shot 225 soldiers and civilians in Morocco (Preston, 2012:133). In Cádiz, the first region of southern Andalucía that rebels controlled one day after the coup started, General Queipo del Llano issued an edict on 18 July decreeing that anyone who opposed the rising would be shot. In the northern mainland under rebel control, General Mola followed a similar logic when instructing the authorities in the area: "It is necessary to spread terror. We have to create the impression of mastery, eliminating without scruples or hesitation all those who do not think as we do" (Preston, 2012: 179). Officers in rebel controlled areas could not escape the climate of terror, coercion, and strict discipline that the putschists created (see, for example, Navajas, 2011: 163-197).

The dynamics of the coup can be summarized in a three-stage sequence. In the first stage, the coup against the military republican authorities was attempted by a small group of generals and high-ranking officers. In those areas where the coup was successful, the second stage involved rebel authorities taking control of the areas and imposing their coercive military government; in those areas where the coup failed, republican authorities controlled the region and issued the law discharging the troops. Finally, in the last stage, officers chose their sides in the conflict given their personal preferences and the degree of coercion imposed by authorities in the region in the second stage.

---

[36] Mola's instruction was mainly addressed to civil repression, but, as Rivero points out, "it is likely that Mola had specific military units in mind that may remain loyal to the government" (2013: 25).

Chapter VII

Determinants of Officers' Choice of Sides during the Civil War

The data set with active officers' individual information enables us to study the impact of republican military reforms on the choices made by officers' in the Civil War. I estimate the relationship between officers' chosen sides and military reforms through the following probit regression:

$$\text{Prob}(\text{Rebel}_i=1)=\Phi(\beta_0+\beta_1 S_i+\beta_2 C_i+\beta_3 A_i+\beta_4 \Delta P_i+\beta_5 WP_i+\beta_6 X_i)+\varepsilon_i$$

Where:

S_i= Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if officer i was in an area under rebel control on July 22 and 0 otherwise.

C_i= Officer i's corps.

A_i= Number of years that officer i spent posted to a special unit of the Spanish Army in Africa between 1910 and 1927.

ΔP_i= Change of position for officer i between 1931 and 1936.

WP_i= Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if officer i had the rank of Major or higher in 1931 and 0 otherwise.

X_i= Officer i's additional covariates (rank, tenure, military division, and dummy for being posted or leader of the garrison).

The study of the dynamics of the coup in §VI.5 shows that the environment in which (most) officers chose their sides in republican-controlled areas was very different from the way they chose their sides in rebel-controlled ones. After estimating the main regression for the whole country, I run the same regression for each area separately (§VII.1) to study the determinants of officers' decisions in each area. My results show a significant relationship between officers' chosen sides and the impact of military reforms for those officers that were in republican-

controlled areas. Moreover, one of the ideological explanations traditionally advanced in Spanish history (that the *Africanista* faction massively joined the coup due to its conservatism) is not supported by my evidence. The results suggest that the channel that explains the greater involvement of some *africanista* officers in the rebellion against the Republic is the negative impact of republican reforms implemented between 1931 and 1933 on *africanista* officers' careers (§VII.2). Finally, I show that the main results do not substantially change after addressing potential problems of endogeneity (§VII.3) and using alternative definitions for the variables and alternative functional forms for regressions (§VII.4).

VII.1. Results for the Whole Country and Geographic Areas under Republican and Rebel Control

Table 6 presents probit marginal effects for the main regression of the whole country. Results indicate that officers with higher ranks and lower tenures were more likely to revolt. This result is at odds with Puell de la VillaNs statement that "the greater the rank, and therefore the familiar charges, the greater the resistance to support the conspiracy"[37] (2012:92). The result is still consistent with rational economic behavior: risk aversion motives meant lower ranking officers were less likely to revolt due to their lower ability to cope with an eventual failure of the coup. That lower ability to cope with the negative consequences that would result if the coup ultimately failed could be explained by the fact that, in general, officers with lower ranks had less wealth than high-ranking officers.

When looking at the results by corps, the coefficients only provide partial confirmation for the hypothesis derived in section 3.2.1 about corps loyalty to the

---

[37] "(...) cuanto mayor era el empleo, y por tanto las cargas familiares, mayor fue la resistencia a embarcarse en la conspiración"

Republic: Infantry and Cavalry were not significantly more likely to revolt than Artillery (the reference variable for corps in the regression) or Engineers. Aviation has the expected negative sign. Aviators were 14.6 points less likely to revolt than Artillerymen, Engineers or Cavalrymen. Frontier Guards (police in charge of the frontiers and fighting fraud and smuggling) were also significantly less likely to revolt against the Republic. Some scholars have argued that officers from General Staff corps were more involved in conspiracies against the Republic (Navajas, 2011: 96). The results do not support that claim. One result that is often mentioned and that is confirmed by the data is the greater loyalty of officers in the Assault Guard to the republican government. Members of these units were on average 22 points less likely to revolt.

In line with the discussion in section 3, officers in rebel-controlled areas are found to be 21 points more likely to rebel against the Republic. Results are also supportive of the idea that officers were responsive to changes in their career prospects. The coefficient for "Change Position 1931-1936" indicates that for each rank that officers advanced between 1931 and 1936, the likelihood to rebel in 1936 decreases 1.5 points.

Results for the whole country provide weak support for significant relationships between officers' chosen sides and republican military policies or factions in the Army. Given the different conditions that officers faced in rebel and republican areas, separate results for each area are shown in Tables 6 and 7. The different dynamics of the coup in the two territories is confirmed. In areas under rebel control (Table 7), only tenure and some corps variables have a significant impact on officers' affiliation. As in the regression for the whole country, the republic could count on greater loyalty from Infantry, Aviation, Frontier Guards, and

Assault Guards. Transportation and Civil Guard were also (weakly) less likely to support the coup. The impact of Azaña's military policies did not have any significant influence on officers' behavior in rebel-controlled areas. *Years in Core Africa*, however, shows a surprising (even if relatively small) negative and significant sign indicating that *africanista* officers were 0.8 points less likely to revolt in the rebel areas, going against the traditional idea that *africanista* officers were more likely to join the coup.

The significant relationship between republican military policies and officers' chosen sides found for the whole country are mainly driven by officers' behavior in republican-controlled areas. Table 8 shows the results for officers in areas under republican control: Aviation and Assault Guards remained significantly more loyal to the Republic, but Artillerymen and Engineers are not found to be more loyal than Infantrymen or Cavalrymen. In contrast to rebel-controlled areas, in areas under republican control Azaña's military reforms had a significant impact on officers' chosen sides. Change of position between 1931 and 1936 has a negative sign, implying that officers with a negative change of position (demoted officers) were more likely to revolt: for each rank that officers lost (advanced) between 1931 and 1936, the probability to revolt increased (decreased) by 3.1 points. Moreover, the elimination of the rank of Lieutenant General in 1931 also had a significant impact in the expected direction: those officers that in 1931 held a rank of Major or higher and had worse career prospects after the top rank in the Army was eliminated were 6 points more likely to revolt.

In summary, the results suggest that Azaña's reforms had a significant impact in republican-controlled areas. In those areas, officers were subject to less coercion and had greater freedom to reveal their preferences when choosing their side in the

conflict: factions or officers that benefitted from the reforms (e.g. those that, like *peninsulares*, were less affected by the revisions of promotions and could keep their position on the scale or improve it when others were demoted) were more likely to support the Republic in 1936. Those officers hit by demotions in 1931 or 1933 and those that lost with the elimination of Lieutenant Generals were more likely to revolt.

The literature usually emphasizes that officers affected by Azaña's reforms "were prominent in both sides during the Civil War"[38] (Alpert, 2006: 140; translation is mine). This conventional wisdom neglects the importance that revisions of promotions had in determining officers' affiliations in July 1936. After controlling for other variables, the results in Table 8 suggest a different story. Officers cared about their evolution on the scale and the promotions they received. By hindering officers' progress on the scale or leading to demotions of rank, early republican military reforms increased the likelihood of revolt for those officers whose promotions were revised and then cancelled.

VII.2. Africanista Officers and the Revision of Promotions

The results confirm the influence that changes on the scale had on officers' affiliations but do not provide any direct link between the *africanista* faction and officers' affiliations during the coup. Indeed, the variable "Years in Core Africa (1910-1927)" is not significant for the whole country or republican-controlled area. The small negative coefficient in areas under rebel control does not have a ready interpretation. Contrary to the intuition in the literature, results suggest that spending more years posted to a special African unit between 1910 and 1927 is not

---

[38] "Muchos de estos 500 militares [afectados por las revisiones de las promociones] figurarían relevantemente en ambos bandos durante la guerra civil"

associated with greater probability to rebel in 1936. The closing of the General Military Academy directed by General Franco or the alleged anti-republican *africanista* culture that are often invoked to explain *africanistas*' aversion towards Azaña and his republican government (see for example Balfour and La Porte, 2000) did not increase *africanistas*' propensity to revolt when compared to *peninsular* peers. This surprising result goes against the widespread idea that something in the military culture or ideology of *africanistas* made them more likely to join the rebel lines at the outbreak of the coup.

However, the importance of officers' change of position offers an indirect link between Azaña's reforms and *africanista* officers' attitude vis-à-vis the Republic through factional economic and professional interests rather than culture or ideology. Table 9 runs a regression to determine the factors that influenced officers' change of position between 1931 and 1933 (years of republican-socialist government with Azaña as Minister of the War) and Table 10 performs a similar regression for the 1934-1936 period in which Spain had a series of center-right governments opposed to the 1931-1933 coalition and the *Frente Popular* that ruled in July 1936.[39] The dependent variable in Table 9 is the sum of Δ Position$_{i,t,r,c}$ for the years 1932, 1933, and 1934. The dependent variable in Table 10 adds Δ Position$_{i,t,r,c}$ for the years 1935 and 1936.

The negative coefficient for "Years in Core Africa (1910-1927)" in Table 9 shows that between 1931 and 1933, officers who spent more years in African special units progressed less on the scale. Table 10 shows that this effect does not exist for the

---

[39] Given that the variable *tenure* measures the time passed between officer's year of entry in the Army and 1936, it can be used to control for officers' seniority in the Army either in 1931-1933 or in 1933-1935.

1934-1935 period and is even reversed: when center-right governments ruled, *africanista* officers had greater positive changes in their position. For each year posted to a special African unit, relative position between 1934 and 1936 improved by 0.059. In other words, the results suggest that the *africanista* faction did significantly worse during Azaña's term as Minister of the War.

Azaña's main measure affecting officers' ranks and positions on the scale was the revision of promotions in 1931 and 1933. *Africanista* officers' poor performance during Azaña's mandate could be in part due to the revisions of promotions under Azaña. Table 11 explores this possibility by showing the average marginal effects of a probit regression in which the dependent variable ("Lost position in 1931 or 1933") identifies the officers affected by the revision of promotions. "Lost position" takes the value 1 when the officer lost a rank or worsened his absolute position on the scale in 1931 or 1933 and 0 otherwise. Tenure, rank and corps in 1931 and years posted to a special African unit are used as independent variables to explain the likelihood of being affected by Azaña's revisions of promotions. Results show that for each year posted to special African units, the probability of being affected by the revisions of promotions increased by 0.017. Officers posted more years to African special units were more likely to suffer a loss of position or demotion in 1931 or 1933 after promotions by combat merit and selection were revised. Appendix C at the end shows that almost one third of *africanistas*' worse professional progress between 1931 and 1933 can be explained by the revisions of promotions. The remaining two thirds can be attributed to other unexplained discriminations against the *africanista* faction.

In his study of the Spanish Army, Navajas claims that the importance of the *africanista* faction and its impact on the Spanish Army in 1936 has been overstated for three reasons: the African wars had finished well before 1936 (in 1927), some *africanista* officers had also belonged to the *peninsular* faction and only later became *africanistas*, and there were no significant ideological differences between *peninsulares* and *africanistas* (2011: 110). The importance of self-interest in determining officers' support to *africanista* demands for promotions by combat merit has already been explained and the non-significance of the variable "Years Core Africa (1910-1927)" to determine officers' sides in July 1936 is consistent with *peninsulares* and *africanistas* sharing a similar culture and ideology. Concerning the importance of African wars before 1927 and *africanista* officers' incentive to rebel in 1936, results in this and previous sections suggest a different conclusion. Combat against Moroccan tribes led to promotions by combat merit during Primo de Rivera's dictatorship that were revised (and often cancelled) by Azaña between 1931 and 1933. *Africanista* officers were significantly hit by these revisions and the resulting demotions. Section 5.1 shows that there was a negative relationship between changes in rank or positions on the scale and the probability to revolt. Therefore, *africanista* officers had greater incentives to rebel against Azaña's Popular Front than *peninsulares*. Rather than guided by ideology or any particular military culture, the involvement of *africanista* officers in the 1936 military coup can be linked to the negative impact that revision of promotions in 1931 and 1933 had on their careers, professional prospects, and economic well-beings.

VII.3. Addressing Problems with Africanista Culture

The impact that revising promotions had on *africanista* officers could have been deliberate: if the *africanista* faction shared some unobservable ideological

characteristic that made them politically dangerous for the Republic and the republican-socialist coalition in power between 1931 and 1933, Azaña's reforms could have targeted *africanista* officers to reduce their importance in the Army by revising their promotions and lowering their positions on the scale and their ranks. In that case, the positive relationship found between change of position in 1931 and 1936 could be driven by Azaña's deliberate attempt to target political rivals in the Army between 1931 and 1933. Balfour and La Porte make a similar point:

> "The vast majority of Africanist officers, irrespective of their tendency, joined the uprising of July 1936. Above and beyond their shared military culture, they were united around a common political culture characterized by authoritarianism and a right-wing mythology of patriotism (...)." (2000: 319)

In order to isolate the effect of changes of position and rank from other unobservable ideological variables, I use two alternative measures of an officer's change of position in the Republic: change of position between 1934 and 1936[40] and change of position between 1934 and 1936 excluding the sergeants promoted to the rank of *alférez* by the law of December 5, 1935.

Using change of position between 1934 and 1936 has one important advantage with respect to the dummy variable for being demoted in 1931 or 1933. Between January 1934 and December 1935, the Republic was ruled by a series of center-right governments that held opposite views in comparison to the previous republican-socialist coalition or the government of the *Frente Popular* that followed in 1936. There is an abundance of anecdotal evidence pointing to the reversal in military policy between January 1934 and December 1935 with respect to Azaña's previous mandate. Cardona summarizes Hidalgo's policy as head of the Minister of War

---

[40] Change position 1934-1936 $= \Delta \, \text{Position}_{i,1934\text{-}1936} = \sum_{t=1935}^{1936} \Delta Position_{i,r,t,c}$

69

between January and November 1934 as an attempt to detract from Azaña's reforms and benefit some of the former minister's enemies (1983: 198). Moreover, José María Gil Robles, the main figure of the leading republican conservative party and the Minister of the War between May and December 1935, described his term in the Ministry as follows: "I relieved many officers of their post, I deprived of command many officers that did not deserve such responsibility and, consequently, I purged the Army of clearly undesirable elements" (1968: 238). The "clearly undesirable elements" could have been Azaña's loyal officers[41], even if Gil Robles adds that "not a single sanctioned officer could point to arbitrariness or present himself as the victim of an ideological prosecution"[42].

It is possible that Gil Robles' claim is true and promotion and changes of position between January 1934 and December 1935 were made through the channels of seniority and study that the law of May 1932 established (see section 3.2.2). However, if there was any bias at all, it was likely in favor of sectors of the Army that were contrary to Azaña's party and were therefore more likely to rebel against the government of the Popular Front in July 1936. If anything, one should expect a *positive* bias in the effect that the coefficient of change of position between 1934 and 1936 had over the probability to revolt in 1936.

Results in Columns 1, 3, and 5 of Table 12 show that changes of position between 1934 and 1936 have a negative influence on the likelihood to revolt in the whole country (Column 1) and republican-controlled areas (Column 3). In other words,

---

[41] That's Cardona's interpretation when he states that under Gil Robles' mandate "notorious *africanista* and peninsular conspirators replaced liberals and republicans" (Cardona, 1983: 212).

[42] "Ordené la disponibilidad de numerosos jefes y oficiales, privé del mando a muchos que no lo merecían y depuré, en consecuencia, de elementos claramente indeseables a gran parte del Ejército. Ni uno solo de ellos pudo, sin embargo, alegar arbitrariedad en la medida sancionadora, ni presentarse como víctima de una persecución por motivos ideológicos."

those officers with greater (lower) increase in their position of the scale or rank were less (more) likely to revolt in republican-controlled areas. This confirms our previous finding that negative shocks on scale position or rank increased the likelihood of revolt. The coefficient for promotions between 1934 and 1936 is equal to zero in rebel-controlled areas (Column 5).

Columns 2, 4, and 6 in Table 12 take one further step in isolating the impact of change of position between 1934 and 1936 from unobservable "ideological" variables. In a law passed in December 1935, many sergeants were promoted to the rank of *Alférez* and appear in the 1936 military yearbook as "Alférez (law December 5, 1935)"[43]. Some scholars argue that non-commissioned officers like sergeants had a different mentality than commissioned officers (Puell de la Villa, 2012: 96). Furthermore, Azaña's policies greatly improved the situation of non-commissioned officers between 1931 and 1933 (Cardona, 1983: 200). It is possible then that those sergeants promoted to alférez in December 1935 shared some ideological bias in favor of the Republic or Azaña's *Frente Popular* in July 1936. In order to avoid this potential bias, I run a regression with changes of position between 1934 and 1936 that excludes all the sergeants promoted to the rank of "Alférez (Law of December 1935)". Results are shown in Table 12 for the whole country (Column 2), areas under republican control (Column 4), and areas under rebel control (Column 6). Results are not substantially different. The positive relationship between improving the position on the scale and remaining loyal to the Republic in July 1936 still exists and is significant for areas under republican control.

---

[43] The sample contains 2166 officers (18.72%) with the rank "alférez (ley de 5 de diciembre de 1935)".

By using a probit model, our main specification assumes that errors are normally distributed. Other possibilities when having a binary dependent variable are the logit model (which assumes that errors follow a logistic distribution) and Ordinary Last Squares (Linear Probability Model, LPM). Table 13 compares previous results for probit average marginal effects for the entire country, republican-controlled areas, and rebel-controlled areas areas (Columns 1, 4, and 7 respectively) with results using a Linear Probability Model (Columns 2, 5, and 8) or a Logit model (for which average marginal effects are shown in Columns 3, 6, and 9). Signs, significance and magnitude are essentially the same across specifications.

Table 14 explores alternative definitions or specifications for variables used in baseline regressions for the whole country (reproduced in Column 1), republican-controlled areas (Column 5), and rebel-controlled areas (Column 9). Column 2, 6, and 10 show the results for regressions with officers that Engel (2008) attributes a "pure label" (either clearly republican or clearly rebel). The 536 geographical loyal officers (both republican and rebel) are eliminated from the sample. Additionally, 36 officers for whom Engel expressed some doubts when classifying them as rebels or republicans and the 61 officers affected by Varela's law are also excluded. The final subsample contains 11,187 officers. Results do not show any relevant change in the statistical significance, sign or magnitude of the coefficients for the whole country (Column 2) or areas under republican and rebel control taken separately (Columns 6 and 10 respectively).

An alternative definition for the variable $\Delta \text{Position}_{i,t,r,c}$ is explored in Columns 3, 7, and 11 of Table 14. The variable $\Delta \text{Position}_{i,t,r,c}$ measures changes in officers' relative positions for two years to account for the change in the rank scale, rank

promotions, and rank demotions. The use of officers' relative positions might be problematic given the important reductions in the size of the scale of the Army between 1931 and 1932. One of the goals of Azaña's military reforms was to reduce the excess of officers in the Spanish Army. In April 1931, Azaña passed a law allowing voluntary retirement from the Army with full pay. The policy was very successful in reducing the size of the Spanish Army because in 1932 between 8,000 and 8,200 officers (out of 20,576) had retired (Alpert, 2008: 99). Δ Position$_{i,t,r,c}$ reflects the change of RP$_{i,t,r,c}$ between t-1 and t, a discrete time framework. In continuous time, Δ Position$_{i,t,r,c}$ for those officers keeping the same rank between two consecutive periods is equal to the total differential of RP$_{i,t,r,c}$, $\big($i.e. dRP$_{i,t,r,c}\big)$:

$$\frac{\partial \text{RP}_{i,t,r,c}}{\partial \text{Position}_{i,t,r,c}} \cdot d\text{Position}_{i,t,r,c} + \frac{\partial \text{RP}_{i,t,r,c}}{\partial \text{Total}_{\text{officers}_{t,r,c}}} \cdot d\text{Total\_officers}_{t,r,c} = d\text{Position}_{i,t,r,c}$$

$$- \frac{\text{Position}_{i,t,r,c}}{\text{Total}_{\text{officers}_{t,r,c}}} \cdot d\text{Total\_officers}_{t,r,c} = d\text{Position}_{i,t,r,c}$$

$$- \text{RP}_{i,t,r,c} \cdot d\text{Total\_officers}_{t,r,c}$$

Where $\frac{\partial x}{\partial y}$ indicates the partial derivative of x with respect to y, and dx stands for change in variable x.

The previous result shows that $_d$RP$_{i,t,r,c} < 0$ if

$$d\text{Position}_{i,t,r,c} < \text{RP}_{i,t,r,c} \cdot d\text{Total·officers}_{t,r,c} \qquad\qquad (1)$$

In other words, when an officer *progresses* on the scale while keeping his rank (that is, $-1 < d\text{Position}_{i,t,r,c} < 0$) and there is a reduction in total officers on the scale (dTotal·officers$_{t,r,c} < 0$) such that (1) holds, the resulting change in the officer's

73

relative position will be *negative*, meaning that he worsened his relative position within the scale for rank r in corps c. Using change in relative position implicitly assumes that the officer only cares about his relative position on the scale. Progresses in absolute positions that still result in a negative change in officers' relative positions are taken as (relative) demotions on the scale. This could be exaggerating officers' computational sophistication when evaluating their changes of position on the scale. For those officers that, between t-1 and t, kept the same rank and experienced both a negative Δ Position$_{i,t,r,c}$ and an improvement in their absolute position on the scale, I calculate an alternative measure

$$\Delta \text{ Position2}_{i,t,r,c} = \frac{\text{Position}_{i,t\text{-}1,r,c}}{\text{Total officers}_{t\text{-}1,r,c}} - \frac{\text{Position}_{i,t,r,c}}{\text{Total officers}_{t\text{-}1,r,c}}$$

Δ Position2$_{i,t,r,c}$ measures the difference between an officer's relative position in t-1 and his relative position in t, had the number of officers on the scale in t remained unchanged with respect to t-1. Δ Position2$_{i,t,r,c}$ will be greater than 0 for any officer that improved his absolute position on the scale. This assumes that officers' perceived improvements in absolute position as something positive (maybe because it advanced them to the top of the scale where they were eligible to be promoted to the next rank) independent of the resulting change in their relative position. Δ Position2$_{i,t,r,c}$ is also applied to those officers that experienced a positive change in their relative position despite worsening their relative position on the scale. Changes of position for the remaining officers in the sample are calculated according to the standard formula for Δ Position$_{i,t,r,c}$ in section 4.2. Results show that the new computation of change of position does not alter the main finding for the coefficient linking changes of position to the probability of rebelling in 1936.

The coefficient remains strongly significant for the whole country (Column 3) and republican controlled-areas (Column 7), keeping its negative sign and magnitude.

Columns 4, 8, and 12 in Table 14 measure officers' proximity to the *africanista* faction with a broader definition than the one used in the baseline specification. Rather than considering only officers posted to special units in Africa, the variable "Years in Africa (1910-1927)" measures the number of years that each officer spent in *any* garrison or military unit posted to Africa between 1910 and 1927. This measurement of "africanism" is broader than the one used in section 5.2 which was restricted to officers posted to special African units. Results do not change for the whole country (Column 4) or republican-controlled areas (Column 8). The variable for years in Africa is not significantly different from zero. In areas under rebel control (Column 12) the coefficient passes from being significantly negative to being not significantly different from zero.[44]

---

[44] There is no a unified theory of class or identity formation. The proxies I use assume that the longer the officer stays in Africa, the more exposed he is to the *africanista* culture and therefore, the closer he might be to the *africanista* faction. A plausible alternative, however, is that identification with *africanism* declines with the time elapsed since the exposure to the *africanista* culture. That is, an officer that only stayed one year –say 1915- posted to an African unit will be less identified with the *africanista* culture in 1936 than an officer that also stayed only for one year in Africa but in a more recent date, say 1925. In order to account for this possibility, I weight each year "t" in which officers were posted to African special units between 1910 and 1927 with a discount factor $\beta = \frac{1}{(1+r)^{1936-t}}$; where r is officer's discount rate. Then I aggregate the weighted years to find the "discounted years" that officers spent in African special units. There is no evidence for the rate at which africanista officers discounted the pass of time, so I use r=0.05 which is consistent or reasonably close to many of the discount rates found in modern studies (see Frederick et al., 2002). The results –available upon request- when using this version of the africanista. I variable do not result in any significant change: the coefficient is not significant for the whole country or republican-controlled areas and is significantly negative in rebel-controlled areas.

Chapter VIII

The Impact of Hierarchy and Alternative Military Policies

The analysis of officers' decisions in the previous chapters leaves some important questions unanswered (e.g. how did superiors' decisions influence subordinates' choices of side?) and opens new ones (how would alternative military policies between 1931 and 1933 have changed the distribution of officers supporting the rebel or the republican side?). The study of hierarchical relationships and the determination of the chain of command in the Army faces important challenges given the complexity of the structure of the military and the fact that the military coup took place in the summer and many officers were not in their garrisons when the coup broke out. §VIII.1 offers some tentative results concerning the effect of hierarchy, making the best use of the information contained in my data set and the sources it uses. The decision of superior officers appears to be a significant determinant of the choices of subordinate officers in republican-controlled areas (an officer's likelihood to rebel significantly increases when the superior officer rebels) but the previous results still hold and are fundamentally robust to the introduction of hierarchical effects. Coefficients found in §VII.1 are used to estimate the change in officers' choices had the Republic maintained the rank of Lieutenant General and not revised and canceled some promotions between 1931 and 1933 (§VIII.2). Results show that these alternative policies would have resulted in a significant increase of 26% in officers supporting the republican government in republican-controlled areas, but a modest 2% increase in the republican's chances of winning the Civil War.

<u>VIII.1. Hierarchy</u>

Until this point, the study of officers' alignments during the coup has implicitly assumed that officers chose their side given their individual characteristics, the impact that Azaña's military policies had on their careers, and the intensity of the coercion established by the authorities in the region. A final effect in which a senior officers' side influenced a subordinate's choice could exist. In other words, after learning about the coup and the type of coercion imposed by the authorities, officers might have waited for their superior's decision before taking their side. This is particularly plausible in an organization that emphasized the importance of hierarchy from the academy onward (Puell de la Villa, 2012: 89) and where one of the main demands of officers' reluctance to join the coup was that "orders to move must come through the proper channels from senior commanders" (Payne, 1971: 99). Salas also points out that "in garrisons where the decision [to rebel] was taken by the natural and legitimate leaders, success always accompanied their action: the units obeyed the orders and resistances (...) were defeated without problem"[45] (1973:92).

The study of hierarchy must confront two difficulties: the precise identification of the chain of command in the Spanish Army and determining officers' geographical locations when the coup broke out in July 1936.

In a complex organization with more than 15,000 active officers, determining the exact structure of the Spanish military is an arduous task beyond the scope of this chapter. Nevertheless, the army's chain of command can be roughly approximated

---

[45] "En las guarniciones en las que la decisión partió de los jefes militares naturales y legítimos, el éxito acompañó invariablemente a su acción: sus unidades obedecieron sus órdenes y las resistencias (...) fueron vencidas con pocas dificultades".

by using the Spanish Army's own basic division: brigades and regiments (see Figure 2). The military's central headquarters were in Madrid. The mainland army was divided into eight military divisions with the Balearic Islands, Canary Islands, and African territories constituting three additional military regions. At the top of each division or military region, a Major General commanded the brigades and the other troops posted to the division. Brigades were led by Brigadier Generals who commanded two regiments. Other troops in the division were the Engineers units (typically led by a Colonel in the Engineers Headquarters), the Civil Guard (led by a General and subdivided into *tercios* and *comandancias*), and the Frontier Guards (which were divided into *comandancias*). Two corps (Aviation and Assault Guard) were under the authority of central commands in Madrid. There were also Catalan special units (*mossos* and *somatenes*, and Catalan municipal police forces) and Basque ones (e.g. *miñones* and *migueletes*).

The second difficulty arises because, when the military coup broke out in July 1936, many officers had abandoned their garrisons and were on summer leave. Engel (2008) provides information for those officers that were known to be out of their garrisons in July 1936. In order to assess the impact of hierarchy, the sample is restricted to those officers that were posted to a garrison (10,964 or 92.3% of the final sample). After excluding those officers for whom Engel provides information indicating that they were not at the garrison when the coup broke out, the final sample for the analysis of hierarchy is formed by 10,458 officers (or 95.3% of posted officers). The sample contains 791 military units (e.g. regiments, *comandancias*, or headquarters) with a total of 875 leaders (officer holding the highest rank in the garrison or the military unit).[46]

---

[46] Some military units (e.g. those in which the leadership was vacant) held many officers that shared the highest rank in the unit.

The impact of hierarchy on officers' sided is measured through a dummy variable ("Follow") that takes the value 1 when the leader of the garrison rebelled and 0 otherwise. For each leader i in a given garrison or military unit, "Follow" takes the value 1 if the leader of the unit above him (in other words, i's immediate superior) rebelled and 0 otherwise.[47] Given that Madrid, Catalan and Basque governments did not rebel, it is assumed that the ultimate authority for military units controlled by those governments remained loyal to the Republic.

Results introducing the impact of hierarchy in the main specification are shown in Table 15. The sample for regressions shown in Table 15 is restricted to posted officers that were in their garrisons when the coup broke out.[48] For the whole country (Column 1), the probability of rebelling increases by 7.4 points when the leader of the garrison or the officer commanding the superior military unit rebelled. Columns 2 and 3 of the table separate the sample geographically into the areas that remained republican and those that rebelled. The effect of hierarchy found for the whole country appears to be driven by officers' behavior in areas under republican control (Table 15 Column 2), where officers were 14.4 points more likely to revolt when senior officers supported the coup against the Republic. In the rebel area (Column 3), the leaders' behavior did not have a significant impact on subordinates' alignment. Despite the restriction of our sample to posted officers whose presence in the garrison can be determined, the remaining variables in the analysis do not show important changes in sign or significance with respect to regressions in Tables 5 to 7.

---

[47] When the leadership of the garrison was vacant, the authority is assumed to rely on the leader of the garrison or military unit above.

[48] Posted officers that Engel (2008) reported to be out of the garrison when the coup broke out are excluded from the sample because they were not under the direct authority of their superior.

These results for the effect of hierarchy must be taken with caution given the rough approximation of the chain of command in the Army and the lack of precise individual information for all officers' geographical locations in July 1936. Despite Engel's impressive effort to synthesize available information, there is no exhaustive study of each officer's geographical location during the coup. As the study of the Spanish Civil War progresses and more data becomes available, it is possible that more officers will be found to have been outside the garrison in July 1936 due to summer leaves or other motives. Nevertheless, the coefficients for "Follow" are significant and large enough to suggest that, at least in the republican areas, choices made by leaders had an impact on the choice of side made by subordinates. The different dynamics of the coup in areas under rebel control reduced the hierarchical effect.

The analysis of hierarchy also adds to our previous discussion of the impact of demotions on officers' alignments. In section 5.2., *africanista* officers were shown to be more likely to revolt against the Republic via the negative shock in their careers after promotions were revised. Table 16 analyzes the impact that some variables had on officers' ranks in 1936. The dependent variable measures rank and goes from 1 (*alférez* after the 1935 Law, the lowest rank in the Spanish military) to 10 (corresponding to the highest rank held by the three Lieutenant Generals that remained in the Army). The positive coefficient associated with "Years Core Africa (1910-1927)" indicates that officers that were posted for more years to special African units held higher ranks in 1936. This result is significant even controlling for tenure (years in the army) to account for the fact that *africanista* officers were likely to be older than other officers because they were already in the Army before 1927. Therefore, the revisions of officers' positions negatively affected

officers' loyalty to the Republic through two channels: first, it increased the likelihood of revolt for those officers whose position worsened and whose evolution on the scale was slowed down. Second, those officers more likely to be against the Republic could influence the alignment of an important number of officers, thanks to their higher ranks and the hierarchical effect in officers' decisions. *Africanista* officers were more likely to act against the Republic through these two channels.

VIII.2. Counterfactual Policies and Impact on Officers' Chosen Sides

The results suggest that republican authorities' military policy decisions affected officers' chosen sides during the Civil War. Promotions or demotions of officers under the Republic significantly relate to officers' likelihood to revolt against the Republic in two senses. First, if the rank of Lieutenant General had not been eliminated in 1931, officers with the rank of Major or higher in that year would not have had worse promotion prospects and would have been more likely to support the Republic in 1936. Second, officers that promoted more rapidly during the Republic were less likely to revolt.

Table 17 shows the results from a regression that estimates the impact that revision of promotions had on officers' changes of position between 1931 and 1933. Results indicate that those officers whose positions were revised in 1931 or 1933 saw their total change in relative position reduced by 0.421 with respect to officers not subject to the revisions. In other words, had Azaña not implemented the revision and cancellation of some promotions, those officers that did experience revisions would have improved their relative position by 0.421 for the 1931-1933 period.

Concerning the elimination of Lieutenant Generals, the coefficient of "Worse Prospects in 1931" in Table 8 suggests that holding rank constant, the probability

of rebelling would have decreased by 0.06 for those officers that held the rank of Major or higher in 1931. A word of caution concerning the interpretation of the coefficient for the variable "Worse Prospects in 1931" is needed. The variable is a dummy that takes the value 1 for officers having the rank of Major or higher in 1931 and 0 otherwise. Among Azaña's military reforms usually mentioned in the literature, only the progressive elimination of the rank of Lieutenant General can be directly linked to the interests and prospects of the group identified by "Worse Prospects in 1931". The dummy variable may, however, capture some other (unobservable) resentment or aversion towards Azaña's republican coalition among the officers that held the highest ranks in 1931 and were still active in 1936. For the moment, the worse professional and economic prospects after the access to the rank of Lieutenant General disappeared is the clearest explanation linking Azaña's policies with 1931 high ranking officers' greater likelihood to revolt in July 1936.

In order to assess the distribution of officers in a counterfactual where Azaña did not cancel promotions and kept the rank of Lieutenant General, I proceed in two steps. First, I compute the change of position between 1931 and 1933 that would have occurred had officers not experienced revisions of promotions. The coefficients in Table 16 suggests that without revisions of promotions, officers would have improved their change in relative position between 1931 and 1933 by 0.421. Table 8 shows that an increase of one unit in relative position between 1931 and 1936 decreased the probability of rebelling by 0.031. Combining both results, a world without revisions of promotions between 1931 and 1933 would have resulted in a decrease of 0.031×0.421 in the likelihood of revolt for those officers that suffered a revision of promotions and were in republican-controlled areas in 1936. Second, Table 8 also suggests that keeping the rank of Lieutenant General would have

decreased the probability to revolt for those officers that had the rank of Major or higher in 1931 by 0.06. Combining the two results, it is possible to estimate officers' probability to rebel in a scenario where promotions were not revised and the rank of Lieutenant General was kept.

Predictions for officers' probabilities to rebel in republican-controlled areas when using coefficients in Table 8 result in 1,070 officers remaining loyal to the Republic. The remaining 4645 officers are predicted to rebel. Using the counterfactual probabilities to rebel in a scenario without revisions of promotions and keeping the rank of Lieutenant General, 1129 officers are predicted to remain loyal to the Republic. Therefore, the direct effect of the counterfactual policies is a 5.5% increase in officers being loyal to the Republic in republican-controlled areas.

An additional step is required to compute the total effect of the counterfactual scenario. Among the 59 officers that switched their predicted side as a direct consequence of the counterfactual policies, 31 (52.5%) held the highest rank in their garrison or military unit. Results in Column 2 of Table 15 suggest that the hierarchical effect of leaders passing from rebelling to being loyal would be a 0.144 decrease in subordinates' probabilities to rebel. The inclusion of the hierarchical effect in the counterfactual for republican-controlled areas results in 1355 officers predicted to be loyal. In other words, the estimated total effect of the counterfactual policies equals to a 26.6% increase in loyal officers in areas under republican control with respect to the probabilities estimated with coefficients in Table 8.

How important could an increase in the number of officers who remained loyal to the Republic have been? Contest functions provide one means to perform a crude estimation of how the increase in loyal officers would have translated into greater

probabilities to win the war for the Republic. Contest functions are used to compute players' probabilities to win in a contest. The probability of winning is usually assumed to be increasing with respect to one's effort and decreasing with respect to other players' efforts (see Jia et al., 2012, for a review). One possibility to model the probability of winning the contest as function of efforts with two players is the logistic function:

$$p_1(e_1,e_2) = \frac{\exp(\mu e_1)}{\exp(\mu e_1) + \exp(\mu e_2)} = \frac{1}{1 + \exp(\mu(e_2 - e_1))} \quad (2)$$

Where $p_1(e_1, e_2)$ represents player 1's probability to win the contest and e_i stands for player i's effort.

In the case of the Spanish Civil War, the two contestants were the Rebel and the Republican Army. The effort can be (roughly) approximated by using the quantity of officers on each side. The constant μ is assumed to be equal to 1.

The sample contains 2,356 loyal officers against 9,517 rebels. In other words, rebels consisted of 80.16% of officers and republicans consisted of 19.84%. Using the shares of officers as a proxy for the effort of each side in (2), the contest function yields a probability of 0.3536 for the Republic winning the War.[49] Table 5 shows that 1,969 out of the 5,715 officers in areas under republican control remained loyal to the Republic. The 26.6% increase in loyal officers estimated in the counterfactual

---

[49] The low probability of victory attributed to the Republic is due to the naïf measurement of the effort of the two contenders in the Spanish Civil War. Despite the republican government could only count with one fifth of total officers, it held control of the main industrial cities in mainland Spain. Furthermore, during the first days of the Civil War rebels faced many problems to secure the supply of arms to the troops in the north of the Iberian Peninsula. The majority of the Navy and the Aviation remained loyal to the republic, so the transportation of rebel forces from Africa to mainland Spain was also very difficult during the first days of conflict (see Preston, 2007: 115-116). Mussolini and Hitler's help after August 1936 solved some of the most important logistic problems of the rebels.

would therefore result in 2,493 loyal officers and 3,222 rebel officers in republican-controlled areas. In the whole country, the distribution of officers would have been 2,880 loyal officers (24.26% of total) against 8,993 rebel officers (76.74%). Using the counterfactual shares of rebel and republican officers in equation (2), the probability of the Republic winning the Civil War would have been 0.3741. In other words, the implementation of alternative military policies would have resulted in a 2.05 point increase in the probability of the Republic winning the War.

The computations for the distribution of officers in the counterfactual scenario reflect a partial equilibrium because they only take into account part of the effects of alternative military policies. The analysis does not consider how counterfactual promotions would impact careers after 1933 or those of officers not affected by revisions between 1931 and 1933. Given that more promotions in the counterfactual for officers that would have avoided revisions would reduce the possibility to promote or would crowd-out other officers from enjoying promotions, the omission of these effects could result in an overestimation of the importance of counterfactual policies to reduce officers' likelihoods to rebel. However, the counterfactual also omits other potential channels that could increase officers' loyalty towards the Republic. First, keeping the rank of Lieutenant General would have increased the possibility for upward mobility. With officers experiencing greater changes of position between 1931 and 1936, the likelihood for revolt would have been lower. Second, the hierarchical effects in the counterfactual are only computed within the garrison. The analysis omits the complex inter-garrison effect, that is, the impact that leaders that switch to be loyal in the counterfactual would have over leaders of subordinated garrisons or military units. These two channels would result in an underestimation of the ability of counterfactual policies to reduce the number of rebel officers.

The rough counterfactual estimates are presented as a way to get a handle on the question of "how big" were the effects. The increase in the number of republican officers by 26.6% seems like a large number, but the increase in the probability that the Republic would win the Civil War by 2% seems like a small number. The point of the empirical estimates, however, is not to show whether a different set of republican policies would have averted the rebellion or led to victory in the Civil War that followed. The point is to show that the Army did respond to Republican policies, but that the Army did not respond in a monolithic way. Groups with different interests did exist within the Spanish Army in the early 1930s, and the way they responded to the coup in 1936 is, in part, explained by those different interests.

Part III

Implications: the Army and Beyond.

Chapter IX

Persistence and Change during the Second Republic

<div align="right">

"If we want things to stay as they
are, things will have to change."
Tancredi

</div>

Despite the differences in interpretations, both the defendants of the "block of power" and the "polarization view" contemplate a counterfactual that could have brought stability to the Republic: the formation of a broad, inclusive coalition.

Casanova points out that "all the European republics that emerged in the 1920s and 1930s, except for Ireland, but including Germany, Austria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Portugal and Greece, ended up threatened by reactionary forces and overthrown by Fascist or authoritarian regimes. And in all cases, not only Spain, the necessary criterion for the consolidation and stabilization of democracy was that a large majority of the population would accept, or at least tolerate, these new regimes that had been introduced so swiftly and with hardly any bloodshed" (2010: 36; see also Palafox, 1991: 288). Casanova emphasizes the failure of the Republic to consolidate a democratic majority capable of overriding the opposition of the old Spanish elites. In other words, reformists failed to consolidate a stable popular majority against the interests of landowners and other elites. Military violence, Civil War and Franco's dictatorship were the ultimate consequences of this inability to control and neutralize political opposition and military violence.

Supporters of the "polarization view" also ascribe to similar ideas when envisioning alternatives that could have brought stability to the republican regime. They argue that if the polarization and political violence produced by radical groups were the major problems during the Republic, a desirable counterfactual would have been

an inclusive, broad coalition of moderate parties. In his analysis of the breakdown of democracy in Spain, Linz points out that "in order to consolidate itself, a new regime must do two things: implement policies that will satisfy a large number of potential supporters and link them to the regime, with negative effects on the smallest possible number of opponents; and follow policies that will satisfy the leadership of the coalition which installed the new regime, avoiding policies that would provoke dissent and splits in the coalition" (1978: 151). Alvarez and Villa adopt a similar perspective in their critique of the political program implemented by the liberal-socialist coalition during the two years of the republic. These authors argue that the left envisioned an exclusive (almost sectarian) republic that quickly alienated an important majority of Spanish society after the Constitution was passed in 1931. They compare the Republic to the Third French Republic (1870-1940) and blamed liberal republicans for not being willing to implement the type of broad moderate coalitions that Gambetta established fifty years before in France (Alvarez and Villa, 2010: 43; see also Payne, 2006: 10 for a defense of the Third French Republic as appropriate historical counterfactual to the Republic).

Both views implicitly assume that the main problem of the Republic was political: the Republic failed to find an adequate political compromise that would give stability to the country. Franco's military coup and the implementation of questionable political decisions (partisan constitutional framework, ideological radicalization...) reflect the political failure. Tortella (1983: 133) summarizes this idea when he asserts that "rather than economic, the problems during the [Republican] period were political." In other words, the two approaches consider that democracy could have been self-sustaining as long as the Republic would have been able to form a moderate coalition that defeated the interests of old elites and was inclusive and moderate like the one formed by the Third French Republic. In contrast, I argue that the challenges democracy faced in the 1930s in Spain were

deeper and went beyond the purely political sphere or the willingness and ability to form a broad and moderate coalition. My focus to understand the dynamics of the Republic lies in the intra-elite competition that operated in an economic and political system that lacked the conditions for free entry and open competition, much like previous regimes did before 1931.

My analysis leads to a distinction between persistence and change in the Republic. So far, the studies of the republican regime have emphasized its rupture with respect to previous regimes. The Republic extended political rights to the Spanish population and also redistributed power between elites' factions as Chapter V shows for the case of the Army. However, in fundamental aspects, the Republic *continued* the dominant logic of the Spanish political and economic system before 1931. Paraphrasing Tancredi's quote, things changed to remain the same. This is not to deny the important reforms that the Republic implemented in the Spanish political system and other aspects of Spanish society. Enfranchising women, holding free and fair elections and aiming at extending education to all the social classes in Spain were important advances that increased the political rights and freedom of the Spanish population. However, the persistence of some fundamental characteristics of the Spanish political and economic sphere implied that the Republic did not operate in the open institutional environment that characterizes developed countries. My analysis of the Spanish political and economic system serves two purposes. First, the privilege-driven logic and lack of basic conditions for democratic turnout that persisted during the Republic provide an additional reason to focus on elites when studying the institutional dynamics of the Republic. The same economic tools that were used before 1931 to create coalitions of elites were also in place during the republican regime and we need to understand how they were used to favor a different group of elite factions. Second, my brief

incursion into the institutional arrangements during the Republic opens new potential fields of application for my view of the Republic beyond the case of the Army. This analysis, admittedly partial and somewhat impressionistic, should be taken as a first step in developing a more systematic study of the institutional arrangement in Spanish politics and economics during the Republic and how these two dimensions interacted and reconfigured elites' power between 1931 and 1936.

IX.1. Privilege in the Spanish Economy

IX.1.1. The Spanish Financial System

The financial system undertakes important changes in the process of economic development. The financial structure of developing countries is characterized by having few, small and not very specialized organizations (usually commercial banks). At the other extreme, developed countries have financial markets with a high degree of specialization and organizations that hold a much larger share of total financial assets (see Goldsmith, 1969). These differences between the financial structure in developing and developed countries only draw on economic aspects, but modernization of the financial system runs parallel to a change in the relationship between the government and the economic system of the country. The small size of the banking system in the early stages of development is, in part, the result of the government's restriction of entry. Control of the number of organizations is usually achieved by requiring government-granted charters to create new financial organizations. Privileged individuals with close links to the government are in a better position to obtain charters and create new organizations that enjoy the oligopolistic rents created by restricted entry in the market. In return, governments can obtain revenue from chartered banks by taxing the banks' rents or establishing the obligation to hold a given share of banks' capital in the

form of government bonds (see Haber 2007), and from deriving rents from the oligopolistic privilege granted to a few financial institutions (see Wallis, Sylla, and Legler, 1994, for the case of nineteenth-century United States). Haber and Calomiris (2014) also analyze the Mexican case. One of the most important changes in the transition to a modern financial structure is the shift to free banking. The ability to create new organizations by following standard administrative steps opens the market to potential contestants and promotes competition. The result is a different dynamic in the relationship between the government and the banks.

The Spanish financial system was not an exception to the logic that dominates non-developed financial structures. The first laws regulating the financial system ("Ley de Sociedades por Acciones" [Joint-Stock Company Law] of 1848, and both the Ley de Bancos de Emisión [Banks of Issue Law] and the Ley de Sociedades de Crédito [Credit Company Law] of 1856) established that any new bank had to obtain the approval of the government. Besides controlling access to financial markets, Spanish governments also reinforced their influence by creating public banks between 1872 and 1929 like the Banco Hipotecario de España (Spanish Mortgage Bank), the Banco de Crédito Industrial, the Banco de Crédito Local, and the Banco Exterior de España. The logic of privilege and "special relationships" were prominent in these institutions: they were given some privilege to issue particular types of bank notes (notably mortgage notes in the case of the Spanish Mortgage Bank). The banks loaned important amounts to the Spanish government, and they were protected from competition (Martín Aceña, 1991). The Spanish Central Bank was also given the monopoly on issuing paper money in 1874.

When the Republic was declared in 1931, the Spanish financial system had made important progress with respect to nineteenth-century standards: the Spanish

system had experienced a sustained increase in the number of banks, those banks had grown larger and more specialized, and there was an increase in the ratio of financial intermediation, that is, the ratio of financial institutions' assets to national product. However, the financial intermediation ratio in Spain was still below the French, British, German and American ratios, showing the relative backwardness of the Spanish financial system with respect to developed countries (Martín Aceña 1987: 120-121).

The financial structure of Spain did not experience important changes during the Republic. The number of banks in Spain declined from 127 in 1930 to 115 in 1935 (García Ruiz, 1993: 600) in marked contrast with the 24,504 banks reported to exist in the United States in 1929 (Haber, 2008:32). Public banks represented more than 50% of total credit in Spain in 1935, not showing any significant shift with respect to the years and regimes before the Republic (Martin Aceña, 1991: 364). The difficult economic conditions of the 1930s surely played an important role in the previous trends, but, for our purposes, it suffices to notice that the Republic operated a similar financial institutional regime as the previous Spanish regimes.

The institutions that dominated the financial system continued to manipulate entry into the Spanish banking system and to concede privileges with financial organizations to forge coalitions between powerful economic and political factions. This is an example of the continuity and change during the Republic: the logic dominating the financial sector was not very different from the one that prevailed in previous regimes, but the Republic could use those same instruments to favor building a new coalition that favored different factions and groups. Understanding the way that republican regimes used the regulation of the financial sector could shed light on the support and animosities that the Republic generated among elite factions. An extension of the logic developed here for the case of the Army would

focus on the financial elites, the way they were benefited or harmed by republican financial reforms and how the impact of financial reforms relates to their willingness to side with one side or the other during the Civil War.

IX.1.2. Trade Regulation: the Political Economy of Protectionism

The logic of privilege that restricted access to markets was one of the reasons for the protectionism that prevailed in twentieth-century Spain. In his classic study of the logic of collective action, Olson (1971) derives the following condition for the provision of a public good: $F_i \geq C/V_g$, where Vg stands for the group "g" gain, F_i is the fraction of V_i accruing to individual i, and C is the cost for I of acting to obtain the public good. Given that tariffs and other protectionist policies for a given industry are public goods for all the firms in an industry, this analysis helps us understand the determinants that any particular firm has to push for protection.

It seems reasonable to assume that F_i is monotonically decreasing with respect to the number of firms operating in the sector.[1] This means that oligopolistic or monopolistic firms have greater incentives to lobby for the protection granted by the government. The oligopolistic nature of the industry might be due to purely economic factors (e.g. high fixed costs or pure economies of scale) but also, as the example of the bank industry showed, to the government restricting access to markets. Consequently, the privileges that the government concedes to particular groups or organizations can translate into concrete trade policies like tariffs or protectionist policies benefitting some organizations in particular sectors.

In his study of African countries during the second half of twentieth century, Bates (2005) shows how trade regulations are used by governments to benefit and form

---

[1] There exists the possibility of a market with an oligopolistic structure with a leader firm and followers. If followers remain so independently of the size of the market, their Fi might remain constant independently of the market composition.

coalitions with elites and powerful groups in the country. Effective protection over some industrial sectors is used as part of industrialization programs and to restrict foreign competition and decrease the price of inputs in an attempt to forge a coalition with urban elites. Bates' examples also extend to other policies like import licenses (granted to groups loyal to the government) or the foreign-exchange controls that often go hand-in-hand with attempts to cope with trade deficits and limit the imports of the country.

Protectionist tools were widely used in Spain. The end of the nineteenth century marked a protectionist turn in the Spanish trade policy, reinforced during the first third of the twentieth century with the "Ley de Bases Arancelarias" (1906) and the Cambo's Tariff (1922). The Republic continued protectionist policies and the creation of committees that regulated trade in Spain. If anything, rather than a break with respect to previous regimes, the Republic reinforced and expanded the existing protection and regulation of the Spanish economy (Fraile, 2000; Comin, 2001). During the rule of lthe iberal-socialist government (1931-1933) Cambo's Tariff was maintained and new special tariffs were approved in 1931 and 1933. The government also implemented exchange controls and import quotas. A decree passed on April 4, 1931 extended government support to some industries. The conservative government in power after January 1934 also created committees in charge of protecting and regulating the market for wheat and other sectors of Spanish agriculture. Even industries that were competitive at the beginning of the twentieth century (e.g., steel[2]) used tariffs and other regulatory tools to protect

---

[2] Steel is one industry in which purely economic factors (e.g. economies of scale derived from high fixed costs) might lead to an oligopolistic structure. The Spanish steel industry showed a greater degree of concentration than the other European countries (Fraile, 1991). This could indicate some degree of privilege granted by the state, but, more research on the structure of the industry and the related legislative action in the first third of twentieth century is needed to confirm this hypothesis.

their oligopolistic structure and preserve the national market from foreign competition.

I argue that protectionism and legislative action during the Republic are useful in understanding the type of coalitions that republican governments tried to form with particular economic groups. The protectionist and other trade regulatory tools that previous regimes used to form coalitions with some groups and organizations were also part of republican regimes' economic toolkits. Once again, the shifting nature of the coalition that dominated the Republic (i.e. the change in groups that benefited from economic privilege and regulations once the Republic was established) was built and evolved over a persistent, non-competitive institutional arrangement that had dominated the Spanish economy before 1931. The Republic changed the nature of the ruling coalition, but, as the example of trade regulation shows, did not alter the fundamental logic that dominated the economic institutional arrangements in Spain. There are two possible objections that can be raised against the claim that trade policy is another example of how republican governments kept manipulating the economic system to attract the support of some economic elites: the official motivation behind protectionist policies and the widespread use of protectionism and trade regulation as a result of the Great Depression.

The laws that created new tariffs and protected Spanish markets from foreign competition were usually motivated by invoking nationalist arguments against foreign interference in the Spanish economy. The arguments depended on an immense optimism about the possibilities of the country to rely on its resources, and even defended the efficiency of autarky (San Roman, 2001). It is not surprising that the decrees and laws creating new tariffs did not mention the privilege given to some groups. As Bates shows, those economic privileges and rents favor one

minority (the producers in the industry or the groups allowed to overcome import restrictions) and harm the rest of the society, which has to pay higher prices for the protected industries or goods. Mentioning these effects would not have helped to make the laws more popular or acceptable. Despite the sectors that might have defended the supposed benefits of autarky, Spanish economists did not ignore the gains of trade and were even politically active in denouncing the inefficiencies generated by tariffs and other regulatory devices in place. In Francisco Comin's words, "pressure from politicians and lobbies prevailed over [economists' proposals]" (Comin, 2001: 943).[3] The competitive, open economic system described by economic theory clashed with the logic that prevailed in Spain before and during the Republic.

The second objection that can be raised against the claim that protectionist and trade regulations during the Republic were a continuation of the strategy followed by previous regimes in Spain to favor some sectors and organizations focuses on the international economic environment in which the governments of the Republic had to operate. When facing the deep economic problems after 1929, many countries reverted to protectionism, exchange controls, and import quotas. It could be argued that, despite a hypothetical desire to open the Spanish economy, the republican governments in Spain were dragged by the protectionist flow that had overwhelmed European economies and the decrease in economic freedom experienced by Western European economies (Prados de la Escosura, 2014). The problem with this argument is that, as Eichengreen and Irwin (2010) have shown, the protectionist answer to the Great Depression mainly came from countries that stayed on the Gold Standard. Governments faced the alternatives of deflation

---

[3] "...las presiones de los políticos y de los grupos de interés acabaron imponiéndose a la racionalidad de las propuestas [de los economistas]"

under the Gold Standard, currency depreciation, or direct controls over trade and payments to maintain gold and foreign exchange reserves. Those countries that decided to remain on the Gold Standard "resorted to protectionist policies to strengthen the balance of payments and limit gold losses" (Eichengreen and Irwin, 2010: 872). Spain had de facto left the Gold Standard in 1883. The economic imperative to apply protectionist trade policies in Spain in reply to the economic crisis was, at best, weak.

Thus, trade policy is another example of the mix of institutional persistence and change that existed during the Republic. Republican regimes changed the composition of the ruling coalition, but it did so through the same type of economic instruments used by previous regimes. Trade policy is another example of the interest of focusing on intra-elite competition to study the life of the Republic and offers another potential field of study for future research on the type of coalitions that republican governments attempted to establish with Spanish economic elites other than the Spanish Army. Which factions and economic groups won with the republican trade policy? Which factions lost the effective protection they had enjoyed until the arrival of the Republic? How did these changes in trade policy relate to a faction's willingness to support the Republic when the Civil War broke out?

IX.2. The Spanish Political System during the Second Spanish Republic: the Absence of Legitimate Opposition

While there is little doubt that the political systems in today's developed countries are democracies, the exact definition of "democracy" is still a subject of debate. Alexis de Tocqueville noted the problem in defining "democracy" two centuries ago when he pointed out that "it is our way of using the words "democracy" and

"democratic government" that brings about the greatest confusion" (quoted by Sartori, 1987: 3). Recent developments in political science have not helped to clarify things because there is no mainstream definition of democracy. Ben Yishay and Betancourt (2014) distinguish between those scholars that provide a minimalist definition, in which the defining characteristic of a democracy is that free elections are held, and those that adopt a wider view of democracy, encompassing the protection of civil and political liberties. Among the proponents of the former view, Acemoglu and Robinson characterize a democratic society as one in which "there is one-person-one vote" [2006:24]. Schumpeter (1942) defines democracy as "…the institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people's vote" (p. 48)". Tilly is a proponent of the latter vision. In *Democracy*, Tilly points out that "a regime is democratic to the degree that political relations between the state and its citizens feature broad, equal, protected and mutually binding consultations" (2007: 13) adding that "…roughly speaking, political rights correspond to broad, equal, mutually binding consultations, whereas civil liberties refer especially to protection" (p. 45).

Finding a unique or consensual definition of democracy is beyond the scope of this work. Furthermore, these definitions are concerned about defining if a political system is democratic *at a given moment of time*. The study of the Republic and its failure to consolidate democracy in Spain relates to a different, more dynamic question: which conditions are necessary to sustain democracy over time?[4] This is

---

[4] To be clear, Acemoglu and Robinson are also concerned about the conditions for sustaining democracy and devote two chapters in their book to democratization and the consolidation of democracy. The full quote above is "A democratic society is not only one where there is one-person-one-vote today but also one that is expected to remain democratic at least in the near future" (2006:24).

an extremely complex question for which social sciences do not provide a clear answer. In *The Idea of Party System*, Richard Hofstadter identifies one condition that, if not sufficient, seems necessary to sustain democracy over time: the emergence and consolidation of a "legitimate opposition". Hofstadter writes about the acceptance of political parties as legitimate contenders in elections in nineteenth century United States of America. Competitive one-person-one vote elections require that, if an incumbent party is defeated, it recognizes the legitimacy of the other party to gain power and govern. Hofstadter identifies the concept of a "legitimate opposition" as key in the emergence of a party system. Legitimate opposition must be constitutional (directed certain policy or political program, not against the legitimacy of the constitutional government itself), responsible (defends a set of policies that it thinks are feasible given the historical and economic framework), and effective (its possibilities of winning office are real). Haber neatly summarizes that a legitimate opposition is "one that uses formal institutions to oppose the policies of the government, rather than oppose the government itself" (2008:17).[5]

The fact that Spain did not enjoy a fully developed democracy has not escaped the notice of historians. Casanova points out that "the political system was shaky and, as occurred in all the countries of Europe, with the possible exception of the United Kingdom, the rejection of liberal democracy in favour of authoritarianism was rife" (2010: 148). Payne also comments that "in 1931 Spain inhabited a dangerous 'frontier zone' in which its new political institutions would attempt to approximate those of advanced northern Europe but in which its society and culture, despite

---

[5] Note that the existence of a legitimate opposition that fulfills Hofstadter's characteristics is also a precondition to fulfill both the minimal and more ambitious definitions of democracy presented above.

recent rapid progress, had still not achieved levels equivalent to those of northern countries" (2006: 11). The problems of consolidating the idea of "legitimate opposition" during the Republic is a concrete example of the "shakiness" or lack of democratic culture in which the Republic operated. Despite acknowledging the flaws and limits of the Spanish political system, Casanova and Payne fail to integrate the flaws into their analysis of the Republic. They continue to think about big, moderate, and inclusive coalitions when they propose counterfactuals or conditions needed to stabilize the republican regime. My brief incursion on the logic that dominated the Spanish political and economic system, however, suggests an institutional equilibrium dominated by privilege and limited access that points to elites (and their factions) as the key actors.

The short history of the Republic is full of examples in which one side of the political spectrum questioned the ability of the other side to govern. Proponents of the "polarization view" often blame the 1931 Constitution for alienating and excluding important sectors of the Spanish economic and political system (e.g. see Alvarez and Villa, 2010). However, conspiracies and animosity towards the regime were in place well before the Constitution was debated and approved by the government elected in June 1931. In April 1931, only days after the Republic was established, monarchical political forces started to plot in conjunction with members of the Spanish Army. The conspiracy involved meetings and fundraising to overthrow the republican regime. In December 1931 the magazine *Acción Española* was created. The journal became one of the main channels for radical conservative opposition to the Republic and provided some of the most significant arguments in favor of a military intervention to put an end to the reformist agenda of the republican-socialist government (Gonzalez Calleja, 2011: 28-57). These

101

conspiracies crystallized in the 1932 failed military coup against the republican government led by General Sanjurjo.

The 1936 coup was much more successful, destabilizing and finally overthrowing the republican regime.[6] The 1936 coup happened in a moment in which the CEDA (the most important conservative political party[7]) had shifted away from the idea of legitimate opposition. The CEDA had traditionally been divided between "accidentalists" –those that argued that the form of government is accidental rather than fundamental- and "catastrophists" –enemies of the Republic that thought that it had to be overthrown by some uprising and catastrophe. The accidentalist strategies defended by Gil Robles[8], the leader of the CEDA, until 1936 were defeated by the catastrophist postulates of more radical factions within the party in 1936. After the victory of the Popular Front in 1936, the strategy of the conservative opposition became "more concerned with destroying the Republic than with taking it over" (Preston, 2003:83; see also Gonzalez Calleja, 2011:285-89).

The center and center-left of the republican spectrum also show important deviations from Hofstadter's concept of legitimate opposition. After the victory of conservative parties in the elections of 1933, representatives of liberal republican parties (including Manuel Azaña) and the socialist party pressed the president of the Republic and the prime minister to cancel the results and form a new all-leftist coalition government (Payne, 2006:41). Even more worryingly, factions of the

---

[6] The second half of the dissertation studies in much more detail the political relevance of the Army in the political context of the Republic and the motivations behind the 1936 military coup.

[7] The Partido Radical –despite of its name, a moderate republican center-right party that had ruled between 1934 and 1936 in conjunction with the CEDA- had lost most of its strength due to many corruption cases that involved some of its most important leaders.

[8] Sometimes Gil Robles' postulates in the debates between accidentalists and catastrophists were, at best, ambiguous. In an interview published by the newspaper Renovación on January 2, 1934 the leader of the CEDA affirmed that if the revision of the Constitution that he was planning as member of the ruling coalition failed, "we shall have to look for other solutions" (Townson, 2002: 240).

Socialist Party (a member of the ruling coalition of 1933) turned to more radical postulates after the electoral defeat and contributed to the armed insurgency in Asturias in October 1934. Indalecio Prieto, allegedly a member of the moderate faction of the Socialist Party, even smuggled weapons to organize the workers' revolt in Asturias.

These are impressionistic but significant examples of the great distance between the reality of the Spanish political system during the Republic and the idea of legitimate opposition. This is true even when we look at the biggest parties in the governing coalitions during the Republic. The distance was even more striking in the smaller and more radical organizations in the Spanish political system on both sides.

A small group of intellectuals, usually belonging to or close to the most conservative groups of the Catholic Church, developed a critique of the Republic based on the natural law premise that power and authority can only come from God. Interestingly, proponents of these ideas characterized the republican liberal-socialist in power between 1931 and 1933 as a "tyrannical government"[9] and justified the legitimacy of any uprising aimed at overthrowing it (Gonzalez Calleja, 2011: 57-66). The far left logically invoked a different threat than an atheist tyranny looming over Spain, but its public discourse on the political reality in Spain was also dominated by a totalitarian threat: fascism. Indeed, fascism was everywhere:

> "By 1933 it had become increasingly common for many different groups to call their opponents fascists. This practice was most indiscriminate among the Communists, who often called Socialists "social fascists" while also labeling the

---

[9] Calvo Sotelo, one of the main political figures on the right, raised a similar idea when he talked about "the republican dictatorship" in one of his articles published in the newspaper *La Nación* (10-27-1931, pp. 1-2).

democratic Republic "fascist" or "fascistoid". The liberal democrats of the Radical Party were termed "integral fascists". The CNT [an anarchist trade union] repaid the Communists in their own coin, calling Stalinist Communism "fascist", while also sometimes referring to "Republican fascism" and the "social fascism" of the Socialists. Some Catholics, in turn, had called the heavy-handed Azaña government [1931-1933] "fascist"" (Payne, 2006: 64)

The denunciation of tyranny or the denunciation of the fascist danger show parallels with some of the political ideas and threats expressed by other thinkers in eighteenth-century Britain or United States. Bailyn (1967) describes how the ideas and reality of British politics during eighteenth-century created an immense fear of factions and conspiracies that were seen as threats to the mixed government deemed to preserve liberties in the country. If conspiracies and corruption[10] triumphed, the result would be tyranny and slavery. These same fears travelled from Britain to the British colonies and are at the root of some of the most important political works of the time. For example, Madison's *Federalist Paper* n. 10 where he explores the best design of a union suited to "break and control the violence of faction". The concept of legitimate opposition and the acceptance of political parties as contenders in the political arena are taken for granted in developed countries, but they are the result of a long historical evolution. The United States that Hofstadter studies are not the only example: France, another "first-mover" in developing an open political and economic system, fully legalized mass parties in 1901 (Przeworski, 2010: 23).

The fear of faction in eighteenth century Britain and the fear of fascism in Spain during the Republic can be interpreted as paranoid exaggerations of the time,[11] but

---

[10] See Wallis (2006) for the notion of "systemic corruption" as understood in republican theory and eighteenth century Britain and United States as opposed to the modern notion of "venal corruption".
[11] Needless to say, the fear of faction in the 1930s was justified. Here I am only referring to abuse in the use of the term "fascist" when using it to designate any political rival as in Payne's quote above.

only if the analysis fails to integrate a complementary aspect of Spanish institutional design: the structure and logic of the Spanish economy. NWW (2009) developed the idea of a "double balance" according to which the control of violence in any given social order implies mutually reinforcing links between economics and politics. In other words, politics and economics are not independent but reinforce each other. The fear of fascism or tyranny in Spain in the 1930s reflected a deeper truth about the Spanish social order: the political system during the Republic was threatened by powerful groups that could take over the Spanish political and economic system. Lapuente and Rothstein (2013) show the politicization of the Spanish bureaucratic system during the Republic. Both sides (liberal and conservative governments) used patronage networks and politically-appointed administrative posts to influence electoral results in many districts and reward (punish) political friends (enemies). More importantly for the idea of double balance, the politicization of the bureaucratic system also translated into the economic sphere. Economic institutions in Spain were characterized by privilege and the absence of competition in many important senses. The forces in control of the political system could reward and redistribute economic power to particular groups to favor some concrete group of elites and organizations.

IX.3. Implications: Elites, the Key Actors

My analysis suggests that the economic and political spheres were not competitive. The concession of certain economic privileges by restricting access to the market or protecting certain sectors benefited some factions and excluded others. The focus on elites, their factions, and the conflicts between them is partly consistent with the "block of power view" and its emphasis on the role that conservative elites played in finishing the Republic. However, this traditional view of the Republic frames the conflict in an "elites vs. masses" model. The logic of privilege that

dominated the Spanish economy and the lack of a legitimate opposition were part of an institutional arrangement dominated by intra-elite fight, rather than a conflict between (monolithic) elites against the masses. Contrary to radical collectivist pressures, the Republic preserved its "bourgeois character" so the beneficiaries of tariffs, import licenses or bank charters were organized elites, not the masses or the Spanish proletariat. The heterogeneous character of elites and the conflict of interests between their factions made that those groups not benefitting from the privilege and arrangements devised by the ruling coalition had incentives to conspire and overthrow the regime in place to establish a new one that would be more in line with their interests.

My intra-elite perspective offers a new way to interpret some of the concepts that the literature on institutional development and political science have developed to understand the process of change and political survival of a given regime. Take the case of the idea of "selectorate" presented by Bueno de Mesquita, Smith, Siverson, and Morrow (2004). They define the "selectorate" as "the set of people whose endowments include the qualities or characteristics institutionally required to choose the government's leadership and necessary for gaining access to private benefits doled out by the government's leadership" (2004: 42). The selectorate is also described as the group of people that are citizens and therefore have the right to vote or the political rights that lead to choose the people in government. Despite the Republic's opening elections to all the Spanish population that had reached the age of 23, my analysis of the Spanish political and economic system suggests that, if we want to understand the relevant group of agents and organizations that were key not only to choosing the government but also to determining its stability (or instability) during the Republic, we need to focus on intra-elite dynamics.

106

As much as elites' support or animosity determined the fate of regimes before 1931 (Tuñón de Lara, 1967), the same held true during the Republic. Despite holding the most free and fair elections up to that date, the logic of the economic system during the Republic and the lack of fundamental conditions for democratic turnover persisted. The Republic changed the nature of the coalition that ruled Spain while the institutional arrangements that characterized Spanish social orders largely persisted.

My approach shares some important characteristics with the traditional views of the Republic. First, I highlight the central role that the control (or lack of control of) violence had during the republican regimes. Either by focusing on conservative elites or radical workers' organizations, the "block of power" and the "polarization view" also stress violent opposition to the Republic as the key to understanding its failure to consolidate democracy. Any view of the republican regime must look for the sources of conflict and the incentives that political and economic agents had to rise against the Republic. My view focuses on the intra-elite conflict between those factions that won with republican reforms and those that lost. Second, my view shares the perspective on internal dynamics adopted by the two traditional views rather than explaining the failure of the Republic through international factors. It is true that the international environment made the life of the republican regime more difficult. The Republic was established in a difficult international economic environment and there is little doubt that the crisis affected the (few) sectors in Spain that had access to international markets (Palafox, 1991). Nevertheless, the Great Depression had a relatively small impact on the Spanish economy because the foreign sector was small (less than 20% of national income in most of the years between 1900 and 1936 (Tortella, 2001: 310)) and the country did not suffer deflationary pressures. Spain had abandoned the Gold Standard in 1883 and this,

together with persistent trade deficits, led to the devaluation of the peseta. The devaluation of the Spanish currency softened the impact of the crisis on prices and exports (Palafox, 1991: 149-163). Finally, the banking system did not collapse as in Germany, Austria or Italy (Tortella, 1983). The international interference during the Civil War (Hitler and Mussolini's military help to rebel troops being decisive for their victory) took place after the final crises had broken out, so it cannot be a valid explanation for the reasons leading to the instability of the Republic. All these factors point to the internal dynamics of the Spanish social order when one explores the sources of instability and problems faced by the Republic. Much like the "block of power" and "polarization view", my view focuses on internal, not international, factors.

My view departs in some important ways from the ideas advanced by proponents of the "polarization view". For example, Payne emphasizes the threats that socialist, anarchist, and radical organizations posed to the stability of the Republic:

> "The main responsibility in this situation [hate, sectarianism, and political polarization in 1936 Spain] was borne by those on whose shoulders government responsibility rested – the middle-class republican left of Azaña" (Payne, 1971: 101).

There is no doubt that political violence stemming from anarchist and, after 1933, socialist organizations posed significant challenges to Spanish governments during the Republic.[12] In 1934, the workers' revolt organized by socialist trade unions led to almost two weeks of fights between the workers and the Army that resulted in 1100 rebel workers dead, 300 victims belonging to Spanish security forces, and 2000 persons wounded. However, despite the activism of workers' organizations,

---

[12] Anarchists were active well before 1931. They were responsible for many revolutionary strikes and terrorist attacks like the murder of Antonio Cánovas del Castillo, father of the Spanish Monarchic Restoration, in 1897.

historical record is not consistent with anarchist or radical socialist organizations being able to overthrow the republican regime. Using Acemoglu and Robinson's terminology (2006), in the Republic the revolutionary constraint did not appear to be binding. Anarchists were behind many efforts to subvert the legal order during the Republic. Between January 1932 and December 1933, the CNT organized three major national insurrections aimed at declaring libertarian communism all around the country. As Payne himself recognizes, the results were always the same: "each [anarchist revolutionary strike] failed to mobilize a broader revolt and was soon put down, each time costing scores of lives and bringing severe repression of the CNT" (2006: 23). Socialists also showed their ability to coordinate, together with anarchists, on a more serious revolt in October 1934. Despite the fact that the workers' uprising in Asturias posed a more serious threat that led to significant losses of human lives, the conflict did not last more than two weeks after the Army intervened.

Anarchists formed an inherently anti-elite party, but the socialists' greater pragmatism during many periods of the Republic and previous regimes in Spain offers a more qualified balance: besides being an important agent in Primo de Rivera's corporative state[13], the Socialist Party was also a member of the coalition that ruled the Republic between April 1931 and November 1933. It was not until 1934 (when the government of the Republic passed to center-right parties) that some factions of the Socialist Party openly confronted "the bourgeois regime".

Azaña's decision to form a coalition with the Socialist Party instead of relying on the centrist Radical Party surely gave more radical overtones to the first years of

---

[13] The *Unión General de Trabajadores* (UGT, the socialist trade union) controlled 60% of workers' posts in the work committees created by Primo de Rivera to regulate the Spanish labor market.

republican governments. Nevertheless the Republic never implemented a revolutionary program that transferred the control of the economy to the masses. *Jurados Mixtos* (mixed juries formed by members of trade unions and employers) gave more power to workers in regulating the labor market (Domènech, 2013), and the agrarian reform discussed between 1931 and 1932 contemplated some expropriations to help settlements of landless peasants. Still, after parliamentary debate, expropriations were restricted to a small portion of land, and there were not significant changes in the way industries were managed. The Republic was a bourgeois regime far from the libertarian communist or socialist projects vindicated by anarchists and the radical wing of the Socialist Party.[14]

The adequacy of the intra-elite perspective I propose to understand the Republic is supported by Lapuente and Rothstein's research on the politicization of the Spanish bureaucracy (2013). Lapuente and Rothstein show that electoral mobilization in Spain came before an impersonal bureaucracy developed. The result was a politicized administration that developed patronage and clientelistic networks. The privilege that dominated important sectors of the Spanish economy (§IX.1) points to a deeper problem behind the republican inability to consolidate a democratic and competitive social order in Spain: politics and economics reinforced each other in a double balance dominated by elite organizations that distributed and fought amongst themselves for political power and control of rents. It is therefore possible to use Lapuente and Rothstein's explanation for the lack of

---

[14] To be clear, I do not pretend to *disproof* the "polarization view". The claim that left-wing groups were unable to mount an effective threat to the social order during the Republic is still compatible with the "polarization view" if people fear that they would (a belief that became more realistic and likely when the political climate became more polarized in the spring of 1936). This shifts the focus of the debate to the beliefs held by political and economic agents during the Republic (i.e. the Republic broke down because there existed a widespread belief on the existence of an imminent radical leftist threat that pushed many groups to act to avoid it). If we take this "belief version" of the "polarization view", the main difference with my view is that I deal with the realities that characterized the political and economic Spanish systems, not agents' beliefs.

rule of law in Spain to characterize the interactions between politics and economics and the leading role of elites: "if the government by party X did not take advantage of the extensive control of the state apparatus [and economic policies] in the moment it had the upper hand, it would regret this when party Y (re-)gained power because it could be taken for granted that the party in power had the opportunity (...) to undertake a policy implementation benefiting its core supporters" (2014: 9).

The parties in power that benefited their core supporters were operating in a political and economic environment that lacked some basic conditions for open entry and competition. The politicization of the Spanish bureaucracy found by Lapuente and Rothstein was the consequence of the logic that dominated the political and economic sphere in the Republic. The characteristics of the political and economic spheres discussed in this chapter were the two sides of the same coin that sustained a social order based on privilege, limited access to markets, and the absence of some basic characteristics for democratic government turnover.

Chapter X

Concluding Remarks

"Continuez!" ["Keep on!"]
A. Gorz (quoted in Van Parijs, 2009)

Ideology has played an important role in understanding the Spanish Civil War. The conflict has often been portrayed as a fight between fascism and communism that predated some of the tensions later developed during World War II. This ideologically-charged vision of the Civil War is rooted in the two opposite views of the life of the Republic that have traditionally dominated the debate: a "block of power view" that uses the "elites vs. masses" framework and blames conservative elites for the failure to consolidate democracy in Spain and the "polarization view" that points to left-wing organizations' radicalism and sectarianism to understand the breakdown of the republican regime.

By looking at the logic that dominated the Spanish political and economic system, this dissertation points to a new view that emphasizes intra-elite conflict to understand the life of the Republic. Despite the reforms performed by republican regimes and the increase in political rights of the Spanish population, the Republic continued to operate in a political and economic environment that did not substantially alter the institutional arrangements in previous regimes. The lack of development of a legitimate opposition and the privilege-driven logic that dominated the economic system points to the pertinence of a view that emphasizes the role of elites, elites' interests, and the way republican policies affected and redistributed political and economic power between factions. Moreover, as illustrated by the case of the Army, elites were not homogeneous groups but were divided into factions that held different and often opposing interests. The main

conflicts that threatened the stability of the Republic were not of "elites vs. masses" but "elites vs. elites."

Economic historians dealing with institutional development often face a tension between the contingency of the case under study (the historical part) and the generality ambitioned by the model used to interpret the process of economic and political development. The alleged singularity of the Spanish case with respect to other Western countries is reinforced by some elements of its history, like the motto "Spain is different". The motto gained certain popularity during Franco's regime to promote the touristic appeal of the country, but also to justify facts like being a dictatorship in a mostly democratic Western Europe. The idea of Spain being different also connected with the romantic vision of the "Spanish pueblo" as an impulsive, temperamental, Latin community —particularly when compared to its European neighbors. This stereotyped view of Spain and its people has often been invoked when analyzing the development of anarchist and utopian movements in the Spanish countryside or even the instability of the country and its frequent conflicts and wars (e.g. Brenan, 1960). My analysis of the Spanish political and economic system in the 1930s has shown that Spain was *not* different. The lack of a legitimate opposition and the fear of factions and a totalitarian threat posed by rival parties were characteristic of the United States as late as the 1820s (Hofstadter, 1967). Fear of factions and the "winner takes all" logic (where "all" often includes political rivals' assets and even lives) are characteristic of non-democratic regimes and have been the rule rather than the exception in human history until the nineteenth-century. Use of limited entry in markets, legal restrictions to creating organizations, and protectionist policies aimed at benefitting some particular industries or groups are also typical instruments used

in developing countries through history and today, as Bates has shown for the case of African countries. In summary, it is possible to place the Spanish case in a much broader frame of institutional development that shares some important characteristics with other Western or developing countries. The specificity of the Spanish case (e.g. by studying the composition of Spanish elites and factional interests as I did with the Army) is compatible with putting the challenges and problems in establishing democracy in Spain in a more general institutional theory that goes beyond the contingencies of Spanish history.

The Army seems a first pertinent step for applying my view for many reasons. First, the military has traditionally been seen as a homogeneous group that backed traditional ruling elites in Spain. I showed how considering the conflicts between corps or between geographical factions in the Spanish Army can help to increase our understanding of elites' dynamics and behavior during the republican regime. Second, traditional views of the Republic explain the split of the Army in July 1936 mainly through ideology: conservative officers joined the coup whereas liberal ones remained loyal to the Republic. There is little doubt that in some instances ideology played a role in determining officers' attitudes towards the Republic. However, ideological explanations suffer important problems like the lack of data to identify officers' ideological affinities. Another problem with ideological explanations is that they obscure other possible motivations behind elites' agency during the Republic, like the links between the political and the economic spheres studied in Chapter IX. Gaining access to political power opened the possibility to manipulate the economic system in favor of loyal factions and groups. Sometimes the "ideology" is used as a black box that hides the complexity of the institutional arrangements and the interactions between the political and economic spheres in the Republic. It could also be the case that, as Przeworski points out, rather than

acting while guided by an ideal, "causality runs the other way: (...) protagonists want to do some things for other reasons and use philosophers [or ideology] to justify their positions" (2010: 9). Proponents of ideology as the main factor dividing the Army must find an appropriate way to deal with the problem of endogeneity. The identification of factional professional and economic interests and the study of how they were affected by legislation offers a more tractable way to study elites' incentives to back or rebel against the Republic.

The study of officers' behavior in the Spanish Civil War shows that the republican military reforms performed between 1931 and 1933 had a significant influence on officers' choices of side. The aviation corps (which benefited from more independence and greater economic rewards) was more loyal to the republican government. Officers that experienced more rapid promotion between 1931 and 1936 were more likely to stay loyal to the Republic. Officers whose professional prospects were worsened after the rank of Lieutenant General was eliminated were more likely to rebel in July 1936. These effects are significant for officers in areas of mainland Spain that remained under republican control in the first days after the military coup that started the Civil War. In the areas that quickly fell to the rebels, 94% of officers joined the coup and factional and military reforms barely show any significant relationship to officers' chosen sides. The different reaction of authorities in each area after the coup could be at the heart of officers' different behavior in rebel and republican-controlled areas. Rebel authorities immediately established a highly coercive regime whereas republican authorities freed soldiers from obedience to their superiors and therefore gave greater freedom to the officers to choose their sides.

Contrary to the ideas widely argued about officers' behavior during the Spanish Civil War and the 1936 military coup, results are not consistent with the *africanista* faction or infantry and cavalry officers being more likely to join the coup. The variable measuring officers' proximity to the *africanista* faction is not statistically different from zero for the country as a whole or for areas under rebel control, and the effect of being in the *africanista* faction is negative (even if small) for rebel-controlled areas. The *africanistas*' shared culture and ideology does not seem to have induced a greater support for the coup by the faction. However, the results show that *africanista* officers were negatively affected by the revisions of promotions that Azaña implemented between 1931 and 1933. This could be the reason behind *africanista* officers' lower change in position between 1931 and 1933 as compared to officers that were never posted to Africa. The trend disappears and is even reversed during the ruling of center-right governments (1934-1936), when members of the *africanista* faction had greater improvements in their position and rank than officers never posted to Africa between 1910 and 1927. Professional and economic prospects during the Republic seem more relevant than ideology or culture in explaining the likelihood of *africanista* officers to join the coup. These results show the limits of focusing only on ideology to explain elites' behavior during the Republic.

The results for the influence of hierarchy on officers' choices of side must be taken with caution until a detailed study of the chain of command in the Army and officers' exact locations in July 1936 are available. The current results indicate that hierarchy was also a significant determinant of officers' behavior in republican-controlled areas. The fact that subordinates tended to follow their superiors' sides and that *africanista* officers had higher ranks in the Army (and therefore could

command a higher number of troops) increases the importance of previous results relating the reforms of promotions and their negative impact on *africanistas'* incentives to support the Republic.

All in all, results suggest that the dynamics of the Republic and the 1936 military coup were more complex than the ideological block views that have dominated existing interpretations of the Republic's failed democratic experiment. The way republican military policies relate to officers' chosen sides during the Civil War is in line with NWW's insights into the dynamics of developing societies and the mechanisms of elite formation. NWW explain that social orders in developing societies ("natural states" in their words) control violence forming elite coalitions through the creation of economic rents. The economic system is used to generate rents that are captured by elite factions that consequently find it in their interest to cooperate rather than fight.

Azaña's reforms of promotions, the elimination of ranks, and the changes in the rewards going to particular corps were policies that changed officers' professional prospects and affected the distribution of economic rents among the different factions that coexisted within the Spanish Army. Results indicate that, at least in areas under republican control, those factions and officers that won with the republican military reforms were more likely to remain loyal to the republican regime led by Azaña. Had Azaña not implemented the revision of promotions and kept the rank of Lieutenant General, the counterfactual estimation suggests that the Republic would have counted with 26% more officers in the areas they controlled after the coup. A rough estimation using basic contest functions indicates that the increase in loyal officers would have translated into a 2% increase in the likelihood of the republican army winning the Civil War.

My work adds to the many advances that have been made in the last years to understand the life of the Republic. Despite the important work of historians to sort out and interpret the events and problems faced by the Republic, my view shows that, contrary to some claims, we are still far from being able to say that "the most relevant questions are already answered". My focus on elites and factional conflict *adds* to the body of knowledge on the Republic that complements current traditional views and highlights new important aspects of the life and conflicts within the republican regime. This work is a first step in the study of institutional development and the co-evolution of the Spanish political and economic systems in the 1930s.

When starting a dissertation, one (hopefully) has one specific question in mind for which the most concrete, rigorous, and precise answer is sought. However, it is usually the case that in the path towards the answer, one discovers more questions and limits of the current literature when addressing some of the aspects under scrutiny. The empirical application of my view to the military is only the initial step in a much broader research agenda. During its brief existence, the republican governments (particularly the ones in power between April 1931 and December 1933) implemented an ambitious reform program that affected many aspects of the Spanish political and economic system. The partial evidence presented in Chapter IX shows the political logic that dominated the Spanish political and economic system during the Republic. A lot can be gained by further exploring the privileges and distribution of power in finance, trade regulation, and other Spanish economic sectors.

We need to increase our understanding of the different factions and interests that coexisted within Spanish political and economic elites and the way republican reforms affected them. Understanding the redistribution of political and economic

power effected by republican governments will shed more light on factional opposition to the republican regime and the ultimate failure to consolidate democracy in Spain in the 1930s. The task goes beyond purely economic grounds. Hofstadter, Pocock, and Bailyn have provided magnificent accounts of the intellectual history of England and the United States and the role that fear of factionalism played in the political systems of those countries. We lack similar studies of Spanish politics during the Republic and before. Given the reinforcing character of politics and economics, more progress in this area will contribute to the study of the Spanish institutional development in the twentieth century.

The last century and a half has seen the expansion of political and economic freedoms to many countries. Despite being a relative latecomer −at least with respect to other European and Western countries-, in the last decades Spain has joined the group of democratic countries with high income per capita. A lot has been accomplished since Franco's death, but the country still has a long way to go to develop and consolidate its political structure and modernize its economy. The regional tensions with Catalans and Basques, the links between some financial organizations and regional governments that explain part of the most recent financial scandals, and rigidities in labor markets are only some of the most important challenges that Spain faces today. Some of these conflicts already existed during the Republic and point to the complex institutional challenges that Spain must face to consolidate its modernization. Far from being an exercise in erudition or an intellectual curiosity, the study of the Republic and the problems it faced in consolidating democracy offer valuable lessons for Spain's long march towards growth, democracy, and freedom.

Appendix A

The Construction of the Data Set

Data for active officers in July 1936 come from two bibliographical sources: the Spanish Military Yearbook and Carlos Engel's book *El Cuerpo de Oficiales en la Guerra de España* (2008).

The Spanish Military Yearbooks were published by the Spanish Ministry of War every year and reflected the organization and composition of the military in January.[1] I used Chapter IX in military yearbooks between 1931 and 1936 to extract information on officers' names and family names[2], corps, ranks, positions within the military scale, dates of birth, and dates of entry in the Army. The information of officers in each year was transcribed into six different files. Each officer was given a unique identification number formed by merging the date of birth (with format DDMMYYYY[3]) with the date of entry in the Army (with format DDMMYYYY[4]). Officers that shared dates of birth and dates of entry in the Army were eliminated. This resulted in the loss of 248 observations (1.5%) in the 1931 Military Yearbook, 127 observations (1.02%) in 1932, 143 observations (1.16%) in 1933, 144 observations (1.16%) in 1934, 155 observations (1.2%) in 1935, and 400 observations (2.7%) in 1936.

The individual ID for each officer is used to track his evolution between 1931 (promotions, demotions, and eventual changes of corps) during the Second Spanish Republic. I also used Chapter VII (in military yearbooks between 1910 and 1918), Chapter VIII (in military yearbooks between 1919 and 1923), Chapter X (in 1924 and 1925 military yearbooks), and Chapter XII (1926 and 1927 military yearbooks)

---

[1] Consequently, the Military Yearbook published in year "t" reflected the changes in composition and ranks occurred during t-1. The main exception is the Military Yearbook of 1936 which was published in April 1936 and therefore reflected the changes occurred between January 1935 and April 1936.

[2] Spaniards have two family names: the first corresponds to the father's first family name and the second to the mother's first family name.

[3] Where DD=Day of birth; MM=Month of birth; YYYY=Year of birth.

[4] Where DD=Day of entry in the Army; MM=Month of entry in the Army; YYYY=Year of entry in the Army.

to identify the officers that were posted to the African territories. Those chapters list the names of officers posted to each garrison and the city where the garrison was posted. I created a file for each year with the names and family names of those officers that were posted to garrisons in African territory. For every year between 1910 and 1927 I created one file with the names of all the officers posted to Africa and another only with those officers posted to special African units to account for the "core" of the *Africanista* faction (see §VI.3). The names in the files for officers posted to Africa between 1910 and 1927 were matched to the names of active officers in 1936 to determine the number of years that they had been posted to Africa. Merge was done using name and family name with the Stata command *mmerge*.

Engel (2008) contains information on officers' names and family name, sides during the Civil War (republican, rebel, republican geographical loyal, rebel geographical loyal, neutral, or unknown), garrisons to which officers were posted in July 1936, and, whenever possible, the cities where the officers were in case they were on leave. I digitized and transcribed the data to obtain each officers' side, name and family name, garrison where he was posted, city where the garrison was posted, city where the officer actually was when the coup broke out (in those cases where the officer was not in the garrison and the information is available), rank, and corps.

The officers and information contained in Engel's work were merged with the information transcribed from the 1936 Military Yearbook using each officer's name and two family names as officers' identification.[5] The match was made using the

---

[5] Engel's data set does not contain officers' date of birth and entry in the Army, so I could not use the ID created to match officers between different years. I excluded from the match navy officers

Stata code *reclink*. This code uses record linkage methods to match observations between two datasets where no perfect key fields exist. The code assigns a match score to each pair of coupled observations through a bigram string comparator to assess imperfect string matches. The unique pairs of observation for which the score is superior to a predetermined threshold are matched. After trial and error, I found that the threshold 0.9961 was the best to match observations while correcting some eventual typos in the transcriptions of Engel's data set and the 1936 Military Yearbook.

Before the matching, some problems with namesakes and lack of information had to be solved. 59 officers (0.39%) in the 1936 Military Yearbook were eliminated because they did not have date of birth and/or date of entry in the Army. Furthermore, 101 officers (0.62%) were also lost due to namesakes. To minimize those losses due to namesakes, I kept the oldest officer among those that shared names and family names. The final sample of the 1936 Military Yearbook to be matched with Engel's data set was formed by 15,098 officers (98.95% of the total initial sample). 14,189 officers from the 1936 Military Yearbook were matched with Engel's data set with score 1 (i.e. they were perfect matches). 704 additional officers had a matching score higher than 0.9961 and could be matched with Engel's corresponding observation. In summary, 14,893 officers (97.61%) were matched.

included in Engel's data set and students of military academies (those type of officers were not included in the Military Yearbooks) to minimize the problems with namesakes.

Appendix B

Tables and Figures

Table 1. Ranks in the Spanish Army (1931-1936)

General Officers (GO)	[Lieutenant Generals (*Tenientes Generales*)] Eliminated in 1932
	1. Major Generals (*Generales de División*)
	2. Brigadier General (*Generales de Brigada*)
Senior Commissioned Officers (SCO)	3. Colonels (*Coroneles*)
	4. Lieutenant Colonel (*Tenientes Coroneles*)
	5. Major (*Comandante*)
Junior Commissioned Officers (JCO)	6. Captain (*Capitán*)
	7. Lieutenant (*Teniente*)
	8. Alférez

Table 2. Summary of republican military policies (1931-1933) and the impact on military factions

| REPUBLICAN MILITARY REFORMS | GEOGRAPHIC FACTIONS | | CORPORATIST FACTIONS | | AVIATION |
	AFRICANISTAS	PENINSULARES	TECHNICAL CORPS (ARTILLERY, ENGINEERS)	NON-TECHNICAL CORPS (CAVALRY, INFANTRY)	
Cancellations of promotions by election and combat merit	✿ Might lose positions on the scale or be demoted one rank	✿ Might lose positions on the scale or be demoted one rank	✿ Might lose positions on the scale or be demoted one rank	✿ Might lose positions on the scale or be demoted one rank	✿ Might lose positions on the scale or be demoted one rank
Elimination of Lieutenant Generals in 1931	✿ Worse prospects if having a rank equal to or higher than Major in 1931 (see §V.2.3)	✿ Worse prospects if having a rank equal to or higher than Major in 1931 (see §V.2.3)	✿ Worse prospects if having a rank equal to or higher than Major in 1931 (see §V.2.3)	✿ Worse prospects if having a rank equal to or higher than Major in 1931 (see §V.2.3)	✿ Worse prospects if having a rank equal to or higher than Major in 1931 (see §V.2.3)
Promotions determined by seniority	✿ Against their preferences (see §V.2.2)	✿ In line with their preferences (see §V.2.2)	✿ In line with their preferences (see §V.2.1)	-	-
Separate Academies for corps	-	-	✿ In line with their preferences (see §V.2.1)	✿ Against their preferences (see §V.2.1)	-
More independence and greater economic rewards for aviators	-	-	-	-	✿ More professional independence and greater revenue

Members of the "*Peninsulares*' faction" could lose with the cancellation of promotions by election and combat merit and the elimination of the rank of Lieutenant General if the officer held the rank of Major or higher in 1931. They benefitted from the establishment of promotions by seniority.

Source: Author based on information presented in §V.2.

Table 3. Summary Statistics (Whole Country)

Variable	Observations	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Tenure	11870	22.26	8.48	5	59
Rank	11873	3.36	1.52	1	10
Leader	11873	0.07	0.26	0	1
Posted	11873	0.92	0.27	0	1
Military Districts					
Division 1	11836	0.22	0.42	0	1
Division 2	11836	0.11	0.31	0	1
Division 3	11836	0.08	0.28	0	1
Division 4	11836	0.09	0.29	0	1
Division 5	11836	0.06	0.23	0	1
Division 6	11836	0.09	0.29	0	1
Division 7	11836	0.07	0.26	0	1
Division 8	11836	0.08	0.27	0	1
Balearic Island	11836	0.04	0.19	0	1
Canary Island	11836	0.02	0.15	0	1
Western African District	11836	0.08	0.27	0	1
Eastern African District	11836	0.04	0.19	0	1
Rif	11836	0.01	0.07	0	1
Ifni	11836	0.00	0.05	0	1
Cape Juby	11836	0.00	0.04	0	1
Rio de Oro	11836	0.00	0.02	0	1
Gulf of Guinea	11836	0.00	0.03	0	1
Rebel Variables					
Rebel	11873	0.80	0.40	0	1
Rebel Area	11851	0.52	0.50	0	1
Corps					
General Staff	11873	0.02	0.14	0	1
Infantry	11873	0.41	0.49	0	1
Cavalry	11873	0.08	0.27	0	1
Engineers	11873	0.08	0.27	0	1
Artillery	11873	0.18	0.38	0	1
Aviation	11873	0.04	0.19	0	1
Frontier Guard	11873	0.06	0.24	0	1
Transportation	11873	0.01	0.09	0	1
Civil Guard	11873	0.12	0.32	0	1
Assault Guard	11873	0.03	0.17	0	1
Factions and military policies					
Years Core Africa (1910-1927)	11873	0.24	0.83	0	13
Change position 1931-1936	11873	0.85	0.65	-2.78	3.09
Worse prospects after 1931	11873	0.12	0.32	0	1

Table 4. Summary Statistics (rebel and republican-controlled areas)

Variable	Rebel-Controlled Areas			Republican-Controlled Area			p-value (equal means)
	Observ.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Observ.	Mean	Std. Dev.	
Tenure	6133	21.5	8.34	5715	23.08	8.557	0
Rank	6136	3.25	1.486	5715	3.477	1.554	0
Leader	6136	0.07	0.262	5715	0.071	0.257	0.493
Posted	6136	0.94	0.242	5715	0.908	0.289	0
Military Districts							
Division 1	6119	0.02	0.135	5714	0.445	0.497	0
Division 2	6119	0.16	0.364	5714	0.058	0.234	0
Division 3	6119	0	0.054	5714	0.169	0.375	0
Division 4	6119	0	0.061	5714	0.19	0.393	0
Division 5	6119	0.1	0.302	5714	0.006	0.077	0
Division 6	6119	0.12	0.327	5714	0.065	0.247	0
Division 7	6119	0.13	0.341	5714	0.004	0.066	0
Division 8	6119	0.13	0.336	5714	0.024	0.154	0
Balearic Island	6119	0.04	0.198	5714	0.031	0.173	0.003
Canary Island	6119	0.04	0.204	5714	0.001	0.035	0
Western African District	6119	0.15	0.359	5714	0.003	0.056	0
Eastern African District	6119	0.07	0.262	5714	0.001	0.03	0
Rif	6119	0.01	0.103	5714	0	0	0
Ifni	6119	0	0.064	5714	0	0	0
Cape Juby	6119	0	0.051	5714	0.001	0.023	0.004
Rio de Oro	6119	0	0.026	5714	0	0	0.045
Gulf of Guinea	6119	0	0.046	5714	0	0.013	0.002
Rebel Variables							
Rebel	6136	0.94	0.242	5715	0.655	0.475	0
Corps							
General Staff	6136	0.02	0.125	5715	0.023	0.15	0.006
Infantry	6136	0.47	0.499	5715	0.359	0.48	0
Cavalry	6136	0.09	0.287	5715	0.073	0.26	0
Engineers	6136	0.06	0.241	5715	0.104	0.306	0
Artillery	6136	0.19	0.394	5715	0.161	0.367	0
Aviation	6136	0.03	0.155	5715	0.05	0.218	0
Frontier Guard	6136	0.05	0.214	5715	0.077	0.266	0
Transportation	6136	0.01	0.077	5715	0.012	0.109	0.001
Civil Guard	6136	0.09	0.291	5715	0.142	0.349	0
Assault Guard	6136	0.02	0.132	5715	0.045	0.208	0
Factions and military policies							
Years Core Africa (1910-1927)	6136	0.25	0.877	5715	0.215	0.776	0.013
Change position 1931-1936	6136	0.84	0.646	5715	0.871	0.658	0.008
Worse prospects after 1931	6136	0.1	0.301	5715	0.131	0.338	0

Figure 1. Rebel and Republican Areas (July 22, 1936)

From *The Spanish Holocaust: Inquisition and Extermination in Twentieth-Century Spain* by Paul Preston. Copyright © 2012 by Paul Preston. Used by permission of W.W. Norton & Company, Inc.

Table 5. Officers' Side: Whole Country and by Area.

	Rebel Officers		Republican Officers		TOTAL	
Rebel-Controlled Area	5,751	93.74%	384	6.26%	6,135	100%
	60.57%		16.32%		51.78%	
Republican-Controlled Area	3,744	65.53%	1,969	34.47%	5,713	100%
	39.43%		83.68%		48.22%	
TOTAL	9,495	80.14%	2,353	19.86%	11,848	100%
	100%		100%		100%	

VARIABLES	(1) rebel	(2) rebel	(3) rebel	(4) rebel	(5) rebel	(6) rebel
Officers' individual covariates						
Tenure	-0.008***	-0.008***	-0.008***	-0.008***	-0.008***	-0.008***
	[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.001]
Posted	-0.003	-0.001	-0.007	-0.008	-0.010	-0.010
	[0.017]	[0.014]	[0.015]	[0.015]	[0.015]	[0.015]
Rank	0.029***	0.028***	0.025***	0.026***	0.023***	0.022***
	[0.003]	[0.003]	[0.003]	[0.003]	[0.003]	[0.004]
Leader	-0.101***	-0.102***	-0.068***	-0.068***	-0.064***	-0.066***
	[0.015]	[0.015]	[0.015]	[0.015]	[0.015]	[0.015]
Area (Rebel Area = 1)		0.220***	0.209***	0.209***	0.209***	0.209***
		[0.018]	[0.016]	[0.016]	[0.016]	[0.016]
Corps						
Cavalry			0.043*	0.044**	0.043*	0.043*
			[0.022]	[0.022]	[0.022]	[0.022]
General Staff			0.006	0.005	0.000	-0.002
			[0.025]	[0.025]	[0.025]	[0.025]
Infantry			-0.015	-0.013	-0.016	-0.016
			[0.017]	[0.017]	[0.017]	[0.017]
Engineers			0.025	0.025	0.026	0.026
			[0.024]	[0.024]	[0.024]	[0.024]
Aviation			-0.143***	-0.142***	-0.146***	-0.146***
			[0.026]	[0.026]	[0.026]	[0.026]
Frontier Guard			-0.081***	-0.080***	-0.085***	-0.082***
			[0.019]	[0.019]	[0.019]	[0.019]
Transportation			-0.160***	-0.160***	-0.177***	-0.178***
			[0.027]	[0.027]	[0.028]	[0.029]
Civil Guard			0.004	0.005	0.004	0.006
			[0.021]	[0.021]	[0.021]	[0.021]
Assault Guard			-0.219***	-0.219***	-0.221***	-0.220***
			[0.026]	[0.026]	[0.026]	[0.026]
Africa and professional prospects						
Years in Core Africa (1910-1927)				-0.005	-0.005	-0.005
				[0.005]	[0.005]	[0.005]
Change position 1931-1936					-0.015**	-0.015***
					[0.006]	[0.006]
Worse prospects after 1931						0.018
						[0.015]

Table 6 (Continued)
Military region

Division 2	0.138***	-0.005	0.008	0.008	0.008	0.008
	[0.025]	[0.026]	[0.021]	[0.021]	[0.020]	[0.020]
Division 3	-0.114***	-0.108***	-0.111***	-0.111***	-0.111***	-0.111***
	[0.025]	[0.024]	[0.021]	[0.021]	[0.021]	[0.021]
Division 4	-0.075***	-0.070***	-0.071***	-0.072***	-0.071***	-0.071***
	[0.023]	[0.022]	[0.018]	[0.018]	[0.018]	[0.018]
Division 5	0.217***	0.011	-0.003	-0.003	-0.004	-0.003
	[0.029]	[0.031]	[0.027]	[0.027]	[0.027]	[0.027]
Division 6	0.123***	0.006	0.004	0.003	0.004	0.004
	[0.031]	[0.026]	[0.023]	[0.023]	[0.023]	[0.023]
Division 7	0.278***	0.068**	0.062**	0.061**	0.061**	0.061**
	[0.029]	[0.031]	[0.026]	[0.026]	[0.026]	[0.026]
Division 8	0.160***	-0.009	-0.017	-0.017	-0.017	-0.017
	[0.033]	[0.032]	[0.026]	[0.026]	[0.026]	[0.026]
Balearic Islands	0.127***	0.029	0.013	0.013	0.013	0.014
	[0.044]	[0.027]	[0.022]	[0.022]	[0.022]	[0.022]
Canary Islands	0.211***	-0.002	-0.015	-0.015	-0.016	-0.016
	[0.037]	[0.038]	[0.033]	[0.033]	[0.032]	[0.033]
Western African District	0.233***	0.018	0.007	0.009	0.008	0.009
	[0.033]	[0.034]	[0.025]	[0.025]	[0.025]	[0.025]
Eastern African District	0.258***	0.040	0.016	0.017	0.016	0.017
	[0.042]	[0.042]	[0.037]	[0.037]	[0.037]	[0.037]
Rif	0.294***	0.069*	0.049	0.051	0.051	0.051
	[0.041]	[0.041]	[0.038]	[0.038]	[0.038]	[0.038]
Ifni	0.098**	-0.119**	-0.135***	-0.135***	-0.138***	-0.137***
	[0.048]	[0.048]	[0.042]	[0.042]	[0.043]	[0.043]
Cape Juby	0.040	-0.132	-0.092	-0.089	-0.093	-0.091
	[0.120]	[0.113]	[0.080]	[0.080]	[0.080]	[0.080]
Río de Oro	0.097	-0.117	-0.108	-0.108	-0.117	-0.113
	[0.155]	[0.150]	[0.128]	[0.128]	[0.130]	[0.131]
Prob > chi2	0	0	0	0	0	0
Pseudo R2	0.1539	0.1855	0.2148	0.2149	0.2155	0.2157
Observations	11,819	11,816	11,816	11,816	11,816	11,816

Robust standard errors in brackets

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Note: Cluster by garrison. *Rebel* takes the value 1 when the officer was part of the Rebel Army, was repressed by the Republican Army or was a republican geographical loyal; and 0 otherwise. *Tenure* is the number of years passed between officer's date of entry in the Army and 1936. *Posted* takes the value 1 if the officer was posted to a garrison and 0 otherwise. *Rank* is a variable that takes the value 1 for the lowest rank in the sample (*alférez*) and increases until reaching 10 for Lieutenant Generals. *Leader* takes the value 1 if the officer had the highest rank in the garrison or unit to which he was posted and 0 otherwise. *Area* takes the value 1 if the officer was in an area under rebel control and 0 otherwise. *Years in Core Africa* measures the number of years that the officer was posted to a special African unit (Mehal.la, Harka, Native Regular Forces, Foreign Legion, Native Police, or African Military Intervention) between 1910 and 1927. *Change position 1931-1936* aggregates an officer's change in relative position between 1932 and 1936. *Worse prospects after 1931* takes the value 1 if the officer held a rank equal to or higher than Major in 1931 and 0 otherwise.

131

Table 7. Probit Average Marginal Effects for Being a Rebel (Areas under Rebel Control).

VARIABLES	(1) rebel	(2) rebel	(3) rebel	(4) rebel	(5) rebel
Officers' individual covariates					
Tenure	-0.003***	-0.003***	-0.004***	-0.003***	-0.003***
	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.001]
Posted	-0.007	-0.000	-0.002	-0.002	-0.003
	[0.014]	[0.011]	[0.011]	[0.011]	[0.011]
Rank	0.003	0.000	0.001	0.001	0.002
	[0.003]	[0.003]	[0.003]	[0.003]	[0.003]
Leader	-0.060***	-0.044***	-0.043***	-0.042***	-0.041***
	[0.011]	[0.012]	[0.012]	[0.012]	[0.012]
Corps					
Cavalry		0.015	0.018	0.018	0.018
		[0.014]	[0.014]	[0.014]	[0.014]
General Staff		-0.020	-0.022	-0.023	-0.021
		[0.015]	[0.015]	[0.015]	[0.016]
Infantry		-0.023**	-0.020*	-0.020*	-0.020*
		[0.011]	[0.011]	[0.011]	[0.011]
Engineers		-0.007	-0.007	-0.007	-0.007
		[0.015]	[0.015]	[0.015]	[0.015]
Aviation		-0.111***	-0.109***	-0.110***	-0.110***
		[0.019]	[0.019]	[0.020]	[0.020]
Frontier Guard		-0.066***	-0.064***	-0.065***	-0.067***
		[0.014]	[0.013]	[0.014]	[0.014]
Transportation		-0.076*	-0.077*	-0.081**	-0.080**
		[0.039]	[0.040]	[0.040]	[0.041]
Civil Guard		-0.035**	-0.032**	-0.033**	-0.034**
		[0.014]	[0.014]	[0.014]	[0.014]
Assault Guard		-0.142***	-0.141***	-0.141***	-0.142***
		[0.023]	[0.023]	[0.023]	[0.023]
Africa and professional prospects					
Years in Core Africa (1910-1927)			-0.008**	-0.008**	-0.008**
			[0.003]	[0.003]	[0.003]
Change position 1931-1936				-0.003	-0.003
				[0.005]	[0.005]
Worse prospects after 1931					-0.012
					[0.011]
Military region					
Division 2	-0.035	-0.017	-0.018	-0.018	-0.018
	[0.030]	[0.027]	[0.027]	[0.027]	[0.027]
Division 3	-0.078	-0.067	-0.068	-0.068	-0.067
	[0.052]	[0.050]	[0.050]	[0.050]	[0.050]
Division 4	-0.062	-0.059	-0.057	-0.057	-0.056
	[0.045]	[0.043]	[0.043]	[0.043]	[0.042]
Division 5	-0.013	-0.012	-0.013	-0.013	-0.013
	[0.029]	[0.028]	[0.028]	[0.028]	[0.028]
Division 6	0.004	0.007	0.006	0.006	0.006
	[0.030]	[0.028]	[0.028]	[0.028]	[0.028]

Table 7 (continued)

Division 7	0.026	0.032	0.031	0.031	0.031
	[0.030]	[0.028]	[0.028]	[0.028]	[0.028]
Division 8	-0.015	-0.011	-0.012	-0.012	-0.013
	[0.030]	[0.028]	[0.028]	[0.028]	[0.028]
Balearic Islands	-0.004	0.003	0.002	0.002	0.002
	[0.035]	[0.029]	[0.030]	[0.030]	[0.029]
Canary Islands	-0.014	-0.015	-0.014	-0.014	-0.014
	[0.032]	[0.029]	[0.029]	[0.029]	[0.029]
Western African District	-0.006	-0.004	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000
	[0.030]	[0.027]	[0.027]	[0.027]	[0.027]
Eastern African District	0.005	-0.005	-0.003	-0.003	-0.003
	[0.032]	[0.030]	[0.030]	[0.030]	[0.030]
Rif	0.019	0.013	0.017	0.017	0.017
	[0.032]	[0.031]	[0.031]	[0.032]	[0.031]
Ifni	-0.075**	-0.075**	-0.074**	-0.075**	-0.075**
	[0.033]	[0.030]	[0.030]	[0.030]	[0.030]
Cape Juby	-0.088	-0.055	-0.053	-0.054	-0.054
	[0.064]	[0.044]	[0.043]	[0.043]	[0.043]
Río de Oro	-0.066	-0.044	-0.045	-0.047	-0.049
	[0.083]	[0.069]	[0.069]	[0.069]	[0.069]
Prob > chi2	0	0	0	0	0
Pseudo R2	0.0802	0.1304	0.1329	0.133	0.1334
Observations	6,103	6,103	6,103	6,103	6,103

Robust standard errors in brackets

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Note: Sample with the officers that were in areas under rebel control by July 22. Cluster by garrison. *Rebel* takes the value 1 when the officer was part of the Rebel Army, was repressed by the Republican Army or was a republican geographical loyal; and 0 otherwise. *Tenure* is the number of years passed between officer's date of entry in the Army and 1936. *Posted* is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the officer was posted to a garrison and 0 otherwise. Rank is a variable that takes the value 1 for the lowest rank in the sample (alférez) and increases until reaching 10 for Lieutenant Generals. *Leader* takes the value 1 if the officer had the highest rank in the garrison or unit to which he was posted and 0 otherwise. *Years in Africa* measures the number of years that the officer was posted to a special African unit (Mehal.la, Harka, Native Regular Forces, Foreign Legion, Native Police, or African Military Intervention) between 1910 and 1927. *Change position 1931-1936* aggregates an officer's change in relative position between 1932 and 1936. *Worse prospects after 1931* takes the value 1 if the officer held a rank equal to or higher than Major in 1931 and 0 otherwise.

Table 8. Probit Average Marginal Effects for Being a Rebel (Areas under Republican Control).

VARIABLES	(1) rebel	(2) rebel	(3) rebel	(4) rebel	(5) rebel
Officers' individual covariates					
Tenure	-0.012***	-0.014***	-0.014***	-0.013***	-0.014***
	[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.001]
Posted	0.004	-0.016	-0.015	-0.019	-0.021
	[0.025]	[0.027]	[0.028]	[0.028]	[0.028]
Rank	0.060***	0.056***	0.055***	0.051***	0.046***
	[0.006]	[0.006]	[0.006]	[0.006]	[0.006]
Leader	-0.113***	-0.053*	-0.053*	-0.046*	-0.054*
	[0.027]	[0.027]	[0.027]	[0.028]	[0.028]
Corps					
Cavalry		0.071	0.067	0.065	0.065
		[0.045]	[0.045]	[0.045]	[0.045]
General Staff		0.032	0.033	0.025	0.019
		[0.048]	[0.048]	[0.048]	[0.048]
Infantry		-0.010	-0.013	-0.019	-0.019
		[0.033]	[0.034]	[0.034]	[0.034]
Engineers		0.064	0.065	0.068	0.067
		[0.047]	[0.047]	[0.047]	[0.048]
Aviation		-0.174***	-0.177***	-0.184***	-0.183***
		[0.048]	[0.048]	[0.048]	[0.048]
Frontier Guard		-0.106***	-0.108***	-0.115***	-0.104***
		[0.037]	[0.038]	[0.038]	[0.038]
Transportation		-0.243***	-0.244***	-0.275***	-0.280***
		[0.048]	[0.048]	[0.050]	[0.049]
Civil Guard		0.044	0.042	0.041	0.049
		[0.042]	[0.042]	[0.042]	[0.042]
Assault Guard		-0.300***	-0.300***	-0.303***	-0.298***
		[0.046]	[0.046]	[0.046]	[0.046]
Africa and professional prospects					
Years in Core Africa (1910-1927)			0.010	0.009	0.010
			[0.008]	[0.008]	[0.008]
Change position 1931-1936				-0.030***	-0.031***
				[0.011]	[0.011]
Worse prospects after 1931					0.060**
					[0.026]
Military Region					
Division 2	0.085*	0.099***	0.099***	0.099***	0.101***
	[0.046]	[0.036]	[0.036]	[0.035]	[0.035]
Division 3	-0.155***	-0.155***	-0.155***	-0.154***	-0.153***
	[0.036]	[0.032]	[0.032]	[0.032]	[0.032]
Division 4	-0.099***	-0.097***	-0.097***	-0.096***	-0.093***
	[0.034]	[0.029]	[0.029]	[0.029]	[0.029]
Division 5	0.066	0.033	0.033	0.034	0.035
	[0.092]	[0.088]	[0.088]	[0.087]	[0.088]
Division 6	-0.024	-0.014	-0.014	-0.014	-0.013
	[0.045]	[0.041]	[0.041]	[0.041]	[0.041]

Table 8 (continued)

Division 7	-0.115	-0.127*	-0.126*	-0.122	-0.122
	[0.080]	[0.075]	[0.075]	[0.075]	[0.075]
Division 8	-0.045	-0.054	-0.053	-0.052	-0.049
	[0.086]	[0.075]	[0.075]	[0.076]	[0.075]
Balearic Islands	0.055	0.031	0.031	0.033	0.037
	[0.039]	[0.035]	[0.035]	[0.035]	[0.035]
Canary Islands	-0.064	-0.101	-0.098	-0.097	-0.102
	[0.181]	[0.175]	[0.175]	[0.178]	[0.176]
Western African District	-0.018	-0.035	-0.037	-0.037	-0.033
	[0.147]	[0.145]	[0.145]	[0.144]	[0.143]
Eastern African District	-0.174	-0.182	-0.177	-0.183	-0.174
	[0.150]	[0.141]	[0.141]	[0.136]	[0.133]
Cape Juby	-0.105	0.000	-0.012	-0.018	-0.012
	[0.168]	[0.126]	[0.121]	[0.118]	[0.120]
Prob > chi2	0	0	0	0	0
Pseudo R2	0.066	0.0975	0.0977	0.0989	0.0997
Observations	5,713	5,713	5,713	5,713	5,713

Robust standard errors in brackets

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Note: Sample with the officers that were in areas under rebel control by July 22. Cluster by garrison. *Rebel* takes the value 1 when the officer was part of the Rebel Army, was repressed by the Republican Army or was a republican geographical loyal; and 0 otherwise. *Tenure* is the number of years passed between officer's date of entry in the Army and 1936. *Posted* is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the officer was posted to a garrison and 0 otherwise. Rank is a variable that takes the value 1 for the lowest rank in the sample (alférez) and increases until reaching 10 for Lieutenant Generals. *Leader* takes the value 1 if the officer had the highest rank in the garrison or unit to which he was posted and 0 otherwise. *Years in Africa* measures the number of years that the officer was posted to a special African unit (Mehal.la, Harka, Native Regular Forces, Foreign Legion, Native Police, or African Military Intervention) between 1910 and 1927. *Change position 1931-1936* aggregates an officer's change in relative position between 1932 and 1936. *Worse prospects after 1931* takes the value 1 if the officer held a rank equal to or higher than Major in 1931 and 0 otherwise.

Table 9. OLS Analyzing Determinants of Officers' Changes of Position between 1931 and 1933 (Azaña's Term as Minister of the War)

VARIABLES	Change Position 1932-1934
Years Core Africa (1910-1927)	-0.053***
	[0.005]
Tenure	-0.001
	[0.001]
Rank 1934	0.140***
	[0.007]
Corps 1934	
Cavalry 1934	-0.180***
	[0.018]
General Staff 1934	-0.488***
	[0.029]
Infantry 1934	-0.226***
	[0.012]
Engineers 1934	-0.008
	[0.018]
Frontier Guard 1934	0.181***
	[0.023]
Civil Guard 1934	0.188***
	[0.019]
Constant	-0.041**
	[0.020]
Observations	8,187
R-squared	0.218

Standard errors in brackets

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Note: *Change position 1932-1934* adds the change in relative position between 1931 and 1933. *Tenure* is the difference between 1936 and officer's year of entry in the Army. *Rank 1934* is a variable that takes the value 2 for the lowest rank in the sample in 1934 (alférez) and increases until reaching 10 for officers being Lieutenant Generals in 1934.

Table 10. OLS Analyzing Determinants of Officers' Change of Position between 1934 and 1935 (Center-Right Governments).

VARIABLES	Change Position 1935-1936
Years Core Africa (1910-1927)	0.038***
	[0.006]
Tenure	0.038***
	[0.001]
Rank 1936	-0.238***
	[0.003]
Corps 1936	
Cavalry 1936	0.117***
	[0.019]
General Staff 1936	0.138***
	[0.034]
Infantry 1936	-0.006
	[0.013]
Engineers 1936	0.128***
	[0.018]
Frontier Guard 1936	-0.297***
	[0.021]
Civil Guard 1936	-0.083***
	[0.017]
Constant	0.561***
	[0.016]
Observations	11,870
R-squared	0.351

Standard errors in brackets

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Note: *Change position 1935-1936* adds the change in relative position in 1935 and 1936. *Tenure* is the difference between 1936 and the officer's year of entry in the Army. *Rank 1936* is a variable that takes the value 1 for the lowest rank in the sample in 1936 (*alférez* law of 1935) and increases until reaching 10 for the remaining Lieutenant Generals in 1936.

Table 11. Determinants of Suffering a Loss in Relative Position in 1931 or 1933. Probit Average Marginal Effects.

VARIABLES	Lost Position 1931 or 1933
Years Core Africa (1910-1927)	0.017***
	[0.001]
Tenure	-0.000
	[0.000]
Rank 1934	0.013***
	[0.003]
Cavalry 1934	0.107***
	[0.013]
General Staff 1934	0.083***
	[0.015]
Infantry 1934	0.055***
	[0.013]
Frontier Guard 1934	0.079***
	[0.015]
Civil Guard 1934	0.028*
	[0.016]
Prob > chi2	0
Pseudo R2	0.2064
Observations	7,468

Standard errors in brackets

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Note: The sample is composed of 1936 officers in the total sample that were active in 1934. The dependent variable *Lost position 1931 or 1933* takes the value 1 when the officer had a lower absolute position in 1932 or 1934. *Years Core Africa (1910-1927)* measures the number of years that the officer was posted to special African units between 1910 and 1927. *Tenure* measures the years passed between officer's date of entry in the Army and 1936. *Rank 1934* is a variable that takes the value 2 for the lowest rank in the sample in 1934 (*alférez*) and increases until reaching 10 for Lieutenant Generals. Controls for corps reflect officers' corps in 1934.

Table 12. Probability of Rebelling Using Change of Position between 1934 and 1936 (Center-Right Governments).

VARIABLES	Whole Country		Republican Area		Rebel Area	
	rebel (1)	rebel (2)	rebel (3)	rebel (4)	rebel (5)	rebel (6)
Officers' individual covariates						
Tenure	-0.008***	-0.008***	-0.013***	-0.014***	-0.003***	-0.004***
	[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.001]
Posted	-0.012	-0.010	-0.026	-0.022	-0.003	-0.004
	[0.016]	[0.015]	[0.029]	[0.028]	[0.011]	[0.012]
Rank	0.019***	0.024***	0.039***	0.050***	0.002	0.001
	[0.004]	[0.007]	[0.007]	[0.013]	[0.003]	[0.005]
Leader	-0.064***	-0.060***	-0.050*	-0.057**	-0.042***	-0.037***
	[0.016]	[0.016]	[0.028]	[0.029]	[0.012]	[0.013]
Area (Rebel Area = 1)	0.209***	0.182***	No	No	No	No
	[0.016]	[0.016]				
Corps						
Cavalry	0.045**	0.037	0.071	0.051	0.018	0.017
	[0.022]	[0.023]	[0.045]	[0.046]	[0.014]	[0.015]
General Staff	0.006	-0.003	0.034	0.013	-0.019	-0.015
	[0.025]	[0.024]	[0.049]	[0.046]	[0.015]	[0.016]
Infantry	-0.014	-0.015	-0.015	-0.022	-0.019*	-0.015
	[0.017]	[0.017]	[0.034]	[0.033]	[0.011]	[0.012]
Engineers	0.027	0.011	0.069	0.029	-0.007	0.001
	[0.024]	[0.022]	[0.048]	[0.043]	[0.015]	[0.017]
Aviation	-0.145***	-0.147***	-0.180***	-0.186***	-0.109***	-0.108***
	[0.026]	[0.025]	[0.048]	[0.046]	[0.019]	[0.020]
Frontier Guard	-0.084***	-0.080***	-0.109***	-0.101***	-0.067***	-0.064***
	[0.019]	[0.020]	[0.038]	[0.038]	[0.014]	[0.016]
Transportation	-0.181***	-0.174***	-0.289***	-0.276***	-0.077*	-0.075*
	[0.029]	[0.030]	[0.050]	[0.051]	[0.040]	[0.041]
Civil Guard	0.005	-0.002	0.046	0.020	-0.034**	-0.023
	[0.022]	[0.022]	[0.043]	[0.041]	[0.014]	[0.017]
Assault Guard	-0.221***	-0.219***	-0.302***	-0.281***	-0.142***	-0.158***
	[0.026]	[0.029]	[0.046]	[0.047]	[0.023]	[0.031]
Years in Core Africa (1910-1927)	-0.004	-0.004	0.011	0.009	-0.008**	-0.007**
	[0.005]	[0.005]	[0.008]	[0.008]	[0.003]	[0.004]
Worse prospects after 1931	0.019	0.017	0.063**	0.057**	-0.013	-0.011
	[0.015]	[0.015]	[0.026]	[0.027]	[0.011]	[0.012]
Change position 1934-1936	-0.020***		-0.044***		-0.000	
	[0.007]		[0.013]		[0.006]	

139

Table 12 (Continued)

Change position 1934-1936 (without alféreces 1935)		-0.025***		-0.050***		-0.002
		[0.008]		[0.014]		[0.007]
Military region	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Prob > chi2	0	0	0	0	0	0
Pseudo R2	0.2159	0.2085	0.1004	0.1024	0.1333	0.153
Observations	11,816	9652	5,713	4770	6,103	4882

Robust standard errors in brackets

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Note: Cluster by garrison. *Change position 1934-1936* is the result of adding the change in relative position in 1935 and in 1936. *Change position 1934-1936 without alféreces 1935* excludes the officers that in 1936 had the rank "Alférez (Law 1935)". See Table 6 for the definition of the remaining variables.

Table 13. Comparison between Results for Probit Average Marginal Effects, Logit Average Marginal Effects, and LPM. Results for Whole Country, Area under Republican Control, and Area under Rebel Control.

	Whole Country			Republican Area			Rebel Area		
	Probit Mg. Effects	OLS	Logit Mg. Effects	Probit Mg. Effects	OLS	Logit Mg. Effects	Probit Mg. Effects	OLS	Logit Mg. Effects
VARIABLES	(1) rebel	(2) rebel	(3) rebel	(4) rebel	(5) rebel	(6) rebel	(7) rebel	(8) rebel	(9) rebel
Officers' individual covariates									
Tenure	-0.008***	-0.008***	-0.008***	-0.014***	-0.014***	-0.015***	-0.003***	-0.003***	-0.003***
	[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.000]
Posted	-0.010	-0.010	-0.010	-0.021	-0.017	-0.022	-0.003	-0.007	-0.006
	[0.015]	[0.017]	[0.014]	[0.028]	[0.026]	[0.031]	[0.011]	[0.011]	[0.008]
Rank	0.022***	0.023***	0.021***	0.046***	0.050***	0.051***	0.002	0.000	0.002
	[0.004]	[0.004]	[0.003]	[0.006]	[0.007]	[0.007]	[0.003]	[0.004]	[0.002]
Leader	-0.066***	-0.079***	-0.069***	-0.054*	-0.063**	-0.060*	-0.041***	-0.085***	-0.034**
	[0.015]	[0.019]	[0.020]	[0.028]	[0.030]	[0.033]	[0.012]	[0.022]	[0.015]
Area (Rebel Area = 1)	0.209***	0.209***	0.212***	No	No	No	No	No	No
	[0.016]	[0.018]	[0.017]						
Corps									
Cavalry	0.043*	0.028	0.037**	0.065	0.063	0.072	0.018	0.008	0.011
	[0.022]	[0.021]	[0.017]	[0.045]	[0.042]	[0.044]	[0.014]	[0.009]	[0.009]
General Staff	-0.002	0.007	0.001	0.019	0.021	0.027	-0.021	-0.015	-0.022
	[0.025]	[0.026]	[0.025]	[0.048]	[0.046]	[0.053]	[0.016]	[0.020]	[0.018]
Infantry	-0.016	-0.013	-0.013	-0.019	-0.019	-0.020	-0.020*	-0.014	-0.016*
	[0.017]	[0.016]	[0.016]	[0.034]	[0.034]	[0.038]	[0.011]	[0.009]	[0.009]
Engineers	0.026	0.035	0.025	0.067	0.062	0.075	-0.007	0.000	-0.007
	[0.024]	[0.024]	[0.021]	[0.048]	[0.042]	[0.049]	[0.015]	[0.011]	[0.014]
Aviation	-0.146***	-0.168***	-0.185***	-0.183***	-0.188***	-0.221***	-0.110***	-0.150***	-0.204***
	[0.026]	[0.036]	[0.045]	[0.048]	[0.053]	[0.059]	[0.020]	[0.038]	[0.060]
Frontier Guard	-0.082***	-0.113***	-0.083***	-0.104***	-0.116***	-0.117**	-0.067***	-0.094***	-0.083***
	[0.019]	[0.022]	[0.026]	[0.038]	[0.040]	[0.046]	[0.014]	[0.022]	[0.027]
Transportation	-0.178***	-0.213***	-0.250***	-0.280***	-0.295***	-0.333***	-0.080**	-0.079	-0.150
	[0.029]	[0.043]	[0.053]	[0.049]	[0.051]	[0.057]	[0.041]	[0.053]	[0.118]
Civil Guard	0.006	0.003	0.010	0.049	0.047	0.055	-0.034**	-0.035**	-0.036**
	[0.021]	[0.023]	[0.020]	[0.042]	[0.043]	[0.044]	[0.014]	[0.016]	[0.017]
Assault Guard	-0.220***	-0.305***	-0.320***	-0.298***	-0.322***	-0.356***	-0.142***	-0.268***	-0.300***
	[0.026]	[0.042]	[0.052]	[0.046]	[0.051]	[0.053]	[0.023]	[0.071]	[0.078]
Africa and professional prospects									
Years Core Africa (1910-1927)	-0.005	-0.001	-0.004	0.010	0.009	0.010	-0.008**	-0.009	-0.006**
	[0.005]	[0.005]	[0.005]	[0.008]	[0.008]	[0.009]	[0.003]	[0.006]	[0.002]

Table 13 (Continued)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Change position 1931-1936	-0.015***	-0.015**	-0.014**	-0.031***	-0.031***	-0.032**	-0.003	-0.004	-0.002
	[0.006]	[0.007]	[0.006]	[0.011]	[0.012]	[0.013]	[0.005]	[0.006]	[0.003]
Worse prospects after 1931	0.018	0.018	0.018	0.060**	0.058**	0.064**	-0.012	-0.025	-0.011
	[0.015]	[0.017]	[0.013]	[0.026]	[0.027]	[0.027]	[0.011]	[0.017]	[0.010]
Military region									
Division 2	0.008	0.013	0.010	0.101***	0.096***	0.103***	-0.018	-0.019	-0.014
	[0.020]	[0.024]	[0.018]	[0.035]	[0.031]	[0.032]	[0.027]	[0.024]	[0.025]
Division 3	-0.111***	-0.178***	-0.124***	-0.153***	-0.163***	-0.181***	-0.067	-0.103	-0.082
	[0.021]	[0.034]	[0.030]	[0.032]	[0.035]	[0.040]	[0.050]	[0.094]	[0.096]
Division 4	-0.071***	-0.109***	-0.072***	-0.093***	-0.095***	-0.107***	-0.056	-0.079	-0.075
	[0.018]	[0.029]	[0.022]	[0.029]	[0.030]	[0.035]	[0.042]	[0.068]	[0.076]
Division 5	-0.003	-0.002	-0.000	0.035	0.016	0.039	-0.013	-0.009	-0.007
	[0.027]	[0.025]	[0.027]	[0.088]	[0.067]	[0.096]	[0.028]	[0.024]	[0.024]
Division 6	0.004	-0.001	0.003	-0.013	-0.016	-0.018	0.006	0.011	0.007
	[0.023]	[0.027]	[0.021]	[0.041]	[0.040]	[0.046]	[0.028]	[0.023]	[0.019]
Division 7	0.061**	0.032	0.052***	-0.122	-0.127	-0.152*	0.031	0.028	0.020
	[0.026]	[0.024]	[0.019]	[0.075]	[0.080]	[0.091]	[0.028]	[0.022]	[0.015]
Division 8	-0.017	-0.010	-0.017	-0.049	-0.045	-0.054	-0.013	-0.010	-0.009
	[0.026]	[0.027]	[0.028]	[0.075]	[0.077]	[0.091]	[0.028]	[0.024]	[0.025]
Balearic Islands	0.014	0.008	0.013	0.037	0.030	0.037	0.002	0.003	0.003
	[0.022]	[0.022]	[0.020]	[0.035]	[0.033]	[0.037]	[0.029]	[0.024]	[0.022]
Canary Islands	-0.016	-0.011	-0.014	-0.102	-0.099	-0.116	-0.014	-0.013	-0.012
	[0.033]	[0.027]	[0.036]	[0.176]	[0.174]	[0.224]	[0.029]	[0.026]	[0.028]
Western African District	0.009	-0.007	0.014	-0.033	-0.029	-0.028	-0.000	0.002	0.001
	[0.025]	[0.023]	[0.025]	[0.143]	[0.125]	[0.174]	[0.027]	[0.022]	[0.021]
Eastern African District	0.017	-0.014	0.025	-0.174	-0.181	-0.216	-0.003	-0.003	-0.001
	[0.037]	[0.025]	[0.035]	[0.133]	[0.154]	[0.157]	[0.030]	[0.024]	[0.025]
Rif	0.051	0.019	0.061**	-0.012	No	No	0.017	0.022	0.017
	[0.038]	[0.027]	[0.025]	[0.120]			[0.031]	[0.024]	[0.016]
Ifni	-0.137***	-0.112**	-0.203**	No	No	No	-0.075**	-0.100**	-0.110
	[0.043]	[0.049]	[0.085]				[0.030]	[0.044]	[0.073]
Cape Juby	-0.091	-0.083	-0.128	No	-0.006	-0.016	-0.054	-0.083	-0.071
	[0.080]	[0.092]	[0.124]		[0.127]	[0.130]	[0.043]	[0.095]	[0.069]
Río de Oro	-0.113	-0.099	-0.177	No	No	No	-0.049	-0.091	-0.064
	[0.131]	[0.178]	[0.203]				[0.069]	[0.191]	[0.100]
Constant		0.860***			0.897***			1.038***	
		[0.030]			[0.046]			[0.030]	
Prob ¿ chi2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
R2 / Pseudo R2	0.2157	0.203	0.2142	0.0997	0.123	0.0993	0.1334	0.078	0.1322
Observations	11,816	11,816	11,816	5,713	5,713	5,713	6,103	6,103	6,103

Robust standard errors in brackets

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 14. Alternative Definitions for Variables. Probit Average Marginal Effects

	Whole Country				Republican-Controlled Areas				Rebel-Controlled Areas			
		Sure Affiliation	Change position	Africa 1910-1927		Sure Affiliation	Change position	Africa 1910-1927		Sure Affiliation	Change position	Africa Chao 1910-1927
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
VARIABLES	rebel	rebel	rebel	rebel	rebel	rebel	rebel	rebel	rebel	rebel	rebel	rebel
Officers' individual covariates												
Tenure	-0.008***	-0.008***	-0.008***	-0.008***	-0.014***	-0.015***	-0.013***	-0.014***	-0.003***	-0.003***	-0.003***	-0.003***
	[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.000]	[0.001]	[0.001]
Posted	-0.010	-0.009	-0.010	-0.010	-0.021	-0.013	-0.021	-0.022	-0.003	-0.011	-0.003	-0.002
	[0.015]	[0.018]	[0.015]	[0.015]	[0.028]	[0.034]	[0.028]	[0.028]	[0.011]	[0.013]	[0.011]	[0.011]
Rank	0.022***	0.025***	0.022***	0.022***	0.046***	0.054***	0.046***	0.047***	0.002	0.003	0.002	0.002
	[0.004]	[0.004]	[0.004]	[0.004]	[0.006]	[0.007]	[0.006]	[0.007]	[0.003]	[0.003]	[0.003]	[0.003]
Leader	-0.066***	-0.068***	-0.066***	-0.067***	-0.054*	-0.055*	-0.053*	-0.054*	-0.041***	-0.040***	-0.041***	-0.042***
	[0.015]	[0.016]	[0.015]	[0.015]	[0.028]	[0.030]	[0.028]	[0.028]	[0.012]	[0.011]	[0.012]	[0.012]
Area (Rebel Area = 1)	0.209***	0.228***	0.209***	0.209***	No				No	No	No	No
	[0.016]	[0.016]	[0.016]	[0.016]								
Corps												
Cavalry	0.043*	0.047**	0.043**	0.041*	0.065	0.080	0.066	0.069	0.018	0.013	0.018	0.015
	[0.022]	[0.024]	[0.022]	[0.022]	[0.045]	[0.050]	[0.045]	[0.045]	[0.014]	[0.014]	[0.014]	[0.014]
General Staff	-0.002	-0.021	-0.002	-0.003	0.019	-0.010	0.019	0.018	-0.021	-0.027*	-0.020	-0.022
	[0.025]	[0.025]	[0.025]	[0.025]	[0.048]	[0.052]	[0.049]	[0.048]	[0.016]	[0.014]	[0.016]	[0.016]
Infantry	-0.016	-0.014	-0.016	-0.017	-0.019	-0.015	-0.019	-0.016	-0.020*	-0.019*	-0.020*	-0.023**
	[0.017]	[0.017]	[0.017]	[0.017]	[0.034]	[0.036]	[0.034]	[0.034]	[0.011]	[0.011]	[0.011]	[0.011]
Engineers	0.026	0.028	0.026	0.026	0.067	0.064	0.068	0.067	-0.007	0.003	-0.007	-0.008
	[0.024]	[0.025]	[0.024]	[0.024]	[0.048]	[0.051]	[0.048]	[0.048]	[0.015]	[0.017]	[0.015]	[0.015]
Aviation	-0.146***	-0.134***	-0.146***	-0.147***	-0.183***	-0.171***	-0.184***	-0.181***	-0.110***	-0.102***	-0.110***	-0.113***
	[0.026]	[0.025]	[0.026]	[0.027]	[0.048]	[0.047]	[0.048]	[0.048]	[0.020]	[0.019]	[0.020]	[0.019]
Frontier Guard	-0.082***	-0.092***	-0.082***	-0.083***	-0.104***	-0.133***	-0.104***	-0.102***	-0.067***	-0.063***	-0.067***	-0.071***
	[0.019]	[0.020]	[0.019]	[0.019]	[0.038]	[0.043]	[0.038]	[0.038]	[0.014]	[0.013]	[0.014]	[0.014]
Transportation	-0.178***	-0.213***	-0.178***	-0.178***	-0.280***	-0.379***	-0.280***	-0.280***	-0.080**	-0.072	-0.080**	-0.081**
	[0.029]	[0.034]	[0.028]	[0.029]	[0.049]	[0.052]	[0.049]	[0.049]	[0.041]	[0.051]	[0.040]	[0.041]
Civil Guard	0.006	0.012	0.006	0.005	0.049	0.064	0.049	0.051	-0.034**	-0.032***	-0.034**	-0.037***
	[0.021]	[0.022]	[0.021]	[0.021]	[0.042]	[0.046]	[0.042]	[0.042]	[0.014]	[0.012]	[0.014]	[0.014]
Assault Guard	-0.220***	-0.217***	-0.220***	-0.220***	-0.298***	-0.316***	-0.298***	-0.297***	-0.142***	-0.124***	-0.142***	-0.144***
	[0.026]	[0.026]	[0.026]	[0.026]	[0.046]	[0.049]	[0.046]	[0.046]	[0.023]	[0.020]	[0.023]	[0.023]
Africa & professional prospects												
Years in Core Africa (1910-1927)	-0.005	-0.006	-0.005	-0.002	0.010	0.009	0.010	0.000	-0.008**	-0.007**	-0.008**	-0.003
	[0.005]	[0.006]	[0.005]	[0.003]	[0.008]	[0.009]	[0.008]	[0.005]	[0.003]	[0.003]	[0.003]	[0.002]

143

Table 14 (Continued)

|												
Change position 1931-1936	-0.015***	-0.015***	-0.015***	-0.016***	-0.031***	-0.032***	-0.032***	-0.031***	-0.003	-0.003	-0.002	-0.003
	[0.006]	[0.006]	[0.006]	[0.006]	[0.011]	[0.012]	[0.011]	[0.011]	[0.005]	[0.004]	[0.005]	[0.005]
Worse prospects after 1931	0.018	0.013	0.018	0.018	0.060**	0.060**	0.061**	0.060**	-0.012	-0.018*	-0.012	-0.013
	[0.015]	[0.015]	[0.015]	[0.015]	[0.026]	[0.027]	[0.026]	[0.026]	[0.011]	[0.011]	[0.011]	[0.012]
Military region												
Division 2	0.008	0.015	0.008	0.009	0.101***	0.113***	0.101***	0.100***	-0.018	-0.008	-0.018	-0.016
	[0.020]	[0.021]	[0.020]	[0.020]	[0.035]	[0.038]	[0.035]	[0.035]	[0.027]	[0.025]	[0.027]	[0.027]
Division 3	-0.111***	-0.135***	-0.111***	-0.111***	-0.153***	-0.202***	-0.154***	-0.154***	-0.067	-0.062	-0.067	-0.066
	[0.021]	[0.022]	[0.021]	[0.021]	[0.032]	[0.036]	[0.032]	[0.032]	[0.050]	[0.044]	[0.050]	[0.050]
Division 4	-0.071***	-0.076***	-0.071***	-0.071***	-0.093***	-0.109***	-0.094***	-0.094***	-0.056	-0.051	-0.056	-0.056
	[0.018]	[0.019]	[0.018]	[0.018]	[0.029]	[0.032]	[0.029]	[0.029]	[0.042]	[0.038]	[0.042]	[0.042]
Division 5	-0.003	-0.003	-0.003	-0.003	0.035	0.058	0.035	0.036	-0.013	-0.008	-0.013	-0.011
	[0.027]	[0.027]	[0.027]	[0.026]	[0.088]	[0.096]	[0.088]	[0.087]	[0.028]	[0.026]	[0.028]	[0.028]
Division 6	0.004	0.011	0.004	0.004	-0.013	0.004	-0.013	-0.013	0.006	0.014	0.006	0.007
	[0.023]	[0.023]	[0.023]	[0.023]	[0.041]	[0.045]	[0.041]	[0.041]	[0.028]	[0.026]	[0.028]	[0.028]
Division 7	0.061**	0.068**	0.061**	0.062**	-0.122	-0.118	-0.122	-0.124*	0.031	0.038	0.031	0.033
	[0.026]	[0.027]	[0.026]	[0.026]	[0.075]	[0.073]	[0.075]	[0.075]	[0.028]	[0.027]	[0.028]	[0.028]
Division 8	-0.017	-0.017	-0.017	-0.017	-0.049	-0.039	-0.049	-0.050	-0.013	-0.008	-0.013	-0.011
	[0.026]	[0.027]	[0.026]	[0.026]	[0.075]	[0.078]	[0.075]	[0.075]	[0.028]	[0.026]	[0.028]	[0.028]
Balearic Islands	0.014	0.003	0.014	0.014	0.037	0.005	0.037	0.036	0.002	0.005	0.002	0.004
	[0.022]	[0.024]	[0.022]	[0.022]	[0.035]	[0.038]	[0.035]	[0.035]	[0.029]	[0.029]	[0.029]	[0.029]
Canary Islands	-0.016	-0.012	-0.016	-0.016	-0.102	-0.094	-0.103	-0.105	-0.014	-0.008	-0.014	-0.015
	[0.033]	[0.032]	[0.033]	[0.033]	[0.176]	[0.177]	[0.175]	[0.176]	[0.029]	[0.027]	[0.029]	[0.029]
Western African District	0.009	0.008	0.008	0.008	-0.033	-0.028	-0.034	-0.031	-0.000	0.007	-0.000	-0.001
	[0.025]	[0.026]	[0.025]	[0.025]	[0.143]	[0.146]	[0.143]	[0.144]	[0.027]	[0.025]	[0.027]	[0.027]
Eastern African District	0.017	0.037	0.017	0.017	-0.174	-0.167	-0.175	-0.179	-0.003	0.013	-0.003	-0.004
	[0.037]	[0.042]	[0.037]	[0.037]	[0.133]	[0.133]	[0.133]	[0.133]	[0.030]	[0.029]	[0.030]	[0.030]
Rif	0.051	0.094	0.051	0.050	No	No	No	No	0.017	0.043	0.017	0.015
	[0.038]	[0.089]	[0.038]	[0.038]					[0.031]	[0.045]	[0.031]	[0.031]
Ifni	-0.137***	-0.162***	-0.137***	-0.137***	No	No	No	No	-0.075**	-0.075***	-0.075**	-0.074**
	[0.043]	[0.041]	[0.043]	[0.044]					[0.030]	[0.027]	[0.030]	[0.030]
Cape Juby	-0.091	-0.101	-0.091	-0.094	-0.012	-0.008	-0.012	0.000	-0.054	-0.047	-0.054	-0.055
	[0.080]	[0.078]	[0.080]	[0.080]	[0.120]	[0.123]	[0.120]	[0.124]	[0.043]	[0.038]	[0.043]	[0.043]
Río de Oro	-0.113	-0.123	-0.113	-0.114	No	No	No	No	-0.049	-0.040	-0.049	-0.050
	[0.131]	[0.124]	[0.131]	[0.130]					[0.069]	[0.060]	[0.069]	[0.069]
Prob > chi2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
R2 / Pseudo R2	0.2157	0.263	0.2157	0.2156	0.0997	0.1242	0.0998	0.0995	0.1334	0.1525	0.1334	0.1317
Observations	11,816	11,187	11,816	11,816	5,713	5,230	5,713	5,713	6,103	5,957	6,103	6,103

Robust standard errors in brackets

***p<0.01, **p<0.05 *p<0.1

Figure 2. General Structure of the Army

Government		Government		
Central Headquarters	Central HQ	General Staff		Aviation HQ
Military District	Major General	General Staff in division		
	Brigadier General	Engineers HQ / Civil Guard HQ	Frontier Guards HQ	
Province	Regiment Regiment	Units Tercio Tercio		Assault Guards Squadrons
		Comandancia Comandancia	Comandancia	

VARIABLES	Whole country (1) rebel	Areas under republican control (2) rebel	Areas under rebel control (3) rebel
Follow	0.074***	0.144***	0.008
	[0.013]	[0.025]	[0.009]
Officers' individual covariates			
Tenure	-0.008***	-0.013***	-0.003***
	[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.001]
Rank	0.023***	0.049***	0.002
	[0.004]	[0.007]	[0.003]
Leader	-0.045***	-0.020	-0.036***
	[0.017]	[0.033]	[0.013]
Area (Rebel Area = 1)	0.197***	No	No
	[0.018]		
Corps			
Cavalry	0.040*	0.049	0.018
	[0.021]	[0.042]	[0.015]
General Staff	-0.022	-0.027	-0.026*
	[0.027]	[0.052]	[0.014]
Infantry	-0.019	-0.031	-0.023*
	[0.016]	[0.031]	[0.012]
Engineers	0.030	0.074*	-0.006
	[0.023]	[0.042]	[0.015]
Aviation	-0.124***	-0.143**	-0.108***
	[0.031]	[0.058]	[0.020]
Frontier Guard	-0.077***	-0.106***	-0.069***
	[0.018]	[0.036]	[0.014]
Transportation	-0.008	-0.020	
	[0.180]	[0.275]	
Civil Guard	0.006	0.040	-0.037***
	[0.020]	[0.039]	[0.014]
Assault Guard	-0.191***	-0.241***	-0.141***
	[0.027]	[0.035]	[0.024]
Africa and professional prospects			
Years in Core Africa (1910-1927)	-0.012**	-0.006	-0.008**
	[0.006]	[0.010]	[0.004]
Lost position 1931 or 1933	-0.018***	-0.036***	-0.003
	[0.006]	[0.013]	[0.005]
Worse prospects after 1931	0.012	0.044	-0.010
	[0.016]	[0.029]	[0.012]

Table 15 (Continued)

Military region			
Division 2	0.010	0.107***	0.070***
	[0.023]	[0.040]	[0.011]
Division 3	-0.082***	-0.105***	No
	[0.022]	[0.034]	
Division 4	-0.064***	-0.086***	No
	[0.017]	[0.027]	
Division 5	-0.012	No	0.073***
	[0.031]		[0.015]
Division 6	0.013	0.007	0.096***
	[0.022]	[0.038]	[0.014]
Division 7	0.082***	No	0.123***
	[0.031]		[0.015]
Division 8	-0.012	-0.101	0.075***
	[0.027]	[0.067]	[0.013]
Balearic Islands	-0.011	-0.022	0.086***
	[0.024]	[0.035]	[0.018]
Canary Islands	0.002	No	0.081***
	[0.035]		[0.016]
Western African District	0.035	No	0.093***
	[0.031]		[0.013]
Eastern African District	0.034	No	0.086***
	[0.038]		[0.017]
Rif	0.048	No	0.104***
	[0.040]		[0.021]
Ifni	-0.124***	No	0.014
	[0.036]		[0.017]
Cape Juby	-0.108	No	0.034
	[0.071]		[0.033]
Río de Oro	-0.091	No	0.040
	[0.131]		[0.063]
Prob > chi2	0	0	0
Pseudo R2	0.2389	0.1153	0.1438
Observations	10,387	4,861	5,524

Robust standard errors in
brackets
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: If the officer is not a leader, *Follow* takes the value 1 if the leader of the
garrison rebelled and 0 otherwise. If the officer is a leader in the garrison, *Follow*
equals 1 if the leader in the unit or garrison above rebelled and 0 otherwise. For
a brief definition of the other variables, see Table 6.

Table 16. Determinants of Rank in 1936

VARIABLES	(OLS) Rank 1936
Years Core Africa 1910-1927	0.373***
	[0.015]
Tenure	0.075***
	[0.002]
Cavalry	0.026
	[0.052]
General Staff	1.374***
	[0.092]
Infantry	-0.254***
	[0.035]
Engineers	0.048
	[0.051]
Aviation	0.192***
	[0.070]
Frontier Guard	-0.582***
	[0.058]
Transportation	-0.839***
	[0.132]
Civil Guard	-0.707***
	[0.047]
Constant	1.796***
	[0.042]
Observations	11,870
R-squared	0.244

Standard errors in brackets

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Note: *Rank 1936* takes the value 1 for the lowest rank in the sample (*alférez* law 1935) and increases until reaching 10 for the three Lieutenant Generals that remained in the Army in 1936. *Years in Core Africa (1910-1927)* reflects the number of years that the officer was posted in a special African unit (Mehal.la, Harka, Native Regular Forces, Foreign Legion, Native Police, or African Military Intervention) between 1910 and 1927. *Tenure* is the number of years passed between an officer's entry in the Army and 1936. Corps variables relate to officers' corps in 1936.

VARIABLES	Change position 1931-1933
Lost Position 1931 or 1933	-0.421***
	[0.024]
Tenure	0.000
	[0.001]
Rank 1934	0.137***
	[0.007]
Corps 1934	
Cavalry 1934	-0.154***
	[0.018]
General Staff 1934	-0.461***
	[0.028]
Infantry 1934	-0.238***
	[0.012]
Engineers 1934	-0.009
	[0.018]
Frontier Guard 1934	0.185***
	[0.022]
Civil Guard 1934	0.175***
	[0.019]
Constant	-0.043**
	[0.020]
Observations	8,187
R-squared	0.235

Standard errors in brackets

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Note: *Change position 1932-1934* adds the changes in relative position between 1931 and 1933. *Lost position 1931 or 1933* takes the value 1 if the officer lost positions in his scale or was demoted one rank in 1931 or 1933 and 0 otherwise. *Tenure* is the difference between 1936 and officer's year of entry in the Army. *Rank 1934* is a variable that takes the value 2 for the lowest rank in the sample in 1934 (*alférez*) and increases until reaching 10 for officers being Lieutenant Generals in 1934.

Table 18. Impact of Revisions of Promotions on the *Africanista* faction

VARIABLES	(1) Lost Position 1931 or 1933
Dummy Core Africa (1910-1927)	0.017***
	[0.001]
Tenure	Yes
Rank 1934	Yes
Corps 1934	Yes
Prob > chi2	0
Pseudo R2	0.217
Observations	8,187

Standard errors in brackets

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Note: The sample is composed of 1936 officers in the total sample that were active in 1934. The dependent variable *Lost position 1931 or 1933* takes the value 1 when the officer had a lower absolute position in 1932 or 1934. *Dummy Core Africa (1910-1927)* takes the value 1 if the officer spent at least one year posted to special African units between 1910 and 1927 and 0 otherwise.

Table 19. Determinants of Officers' Changes of Position between 1931 and 1933 Excluding the Effect of Revisions of Promotions

VARIABLES	Change position 1932-1934 Counterfactual without Effect of Revisions (OLS)
Years Core Africa (1910-1927)	-0.036***
	[0.005]
Tenure	-0.001
	[0.001]
Rank 1934	0.147***
	[0.007]
Corps 1934	
Cavalry 1934	-0.175***
	[0.017]
General Staff 1934	-0.458***
	[0.028]
Infantry 1934	-0.223***
	[0.012]
Engineers 1934	-0.009
	[0.018]
Carabineers 1934	0.220***
	[0.022]
Civil Guard 1934	0.188***
	[0.019]
Constant	-0.066***
	[0.020]
Observations	8,187
R-squared	0.227

Standard errors in brackets

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Note: *Change position 1932-1934* adds the changes in relative position between 1931 and 1933 excluding the effect of revisions. *Tenure* is the difference between 1936 and officer's year of entry in the Army. *Rank 1934* is a variable that takes the value 2 for the lowest rank in the sample in 1934 (*alférez*) and increases until reaching 10 for officers being Lieutenant Generals in 1934.

Appendix C

Africanistas and Demotions

Results in Table 9 showed that *africanista* officers were promoted less often than peers with the same characteristics that were never posted to any special African unit between 1910 and 1927. Results in Table 18 suggest that this could be partly due to the revisions of promotions between 1931 and 1933. The positive coefficient associated with the variable "Dummy Core Africanista" indicates that those officers that spent at least one year in special African units between 1910 and 1927 were more likely to suffer a revision of promotions in 1931 or 1933. However, besides the revisions of promotions, there might be other channels that negatively affected *africanista* officers during Azaña's mandate as Minister of the War. This annex measures the extent to which Azaña's revisions explain the lower change of position and rank of the *africanista* faction during the first years of the Second Republic.

I first compute a counterfactual for officers' careers that eliminates the effect of revisions between 1931 and 1933. In the counterfactual, officers suffering a negative change in absolute position in 1931 and/or 1933 are assumed to keep their position on the scale (so their change in their relative position in that year is set equal to zero). Then, total change in position during liberal republican governments is calculated by adding changes in relative position between 1931 and 1933. The new total change of position without the effect of revisions is used in Table 19 to study how the fact of being an *africanista* officer affected changes in relative position during Azaña's mandate as Minister of the War.

The coefficient for years posted to African special units in Table 19 is -0.36 and significantly different from zero, meaning that there were factors beyond the revision of promotions that negatively affected *africanista* officers' changes of position during the ruling of republican liberal governments. Given that Table 9 showed a decrease of 0.053 in changes of position for each year posted to Africa

when including the effect of revisions, Azaña's cancellation of promotions can explain 32% of *africanista* officers' worse professional progress between 1931 and 1933. The remaining two thirds of the coefficient found in Table 9 can be attributed to some sort of discrimination against *africanista* officers when Azaña's government determined promotions. The idea of some type of discrimination against the *africanista* faction is supported by the fact that members of that group did significantly better than *peninsulares* between 1934 and 1936 (see Table 10). This suggests that *africanista* officers did not share any unobservable characteristic that precluded them from being promoted as much as *peninsulares* between 1931 and 1933.

References

[1].   ACEMOĞLU, Daron and James A. ROBINSON. *Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2006.

[2].   ACEMOĞLU, Daron and James A. ROBINSON. *Why Nations Fail. The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty*. New York, Crown Publishers, 2012.

[3].   ACEMOĞLU, Daron, Davide TICCHI, and Andrea VINDIGNI. "A Theory of Military Dictatorships". *American Journal of Macroeconomics*, 2(1), 2010, 1-42.

[4].   AGUILAR OLIVENCIA, Mariano. *El Ejército Español durante la Segunda República (claves de su actuación posterior).* Madrid, Econorte, 1986.

[5].   ALPERT, Michael. *La Reforma Militar de Azaña (1931-1933).* Granada, Comares, 2008.

[6].   ÁLVAREZ TARDÍO, Manuel and Roberto VILLA GARCÍA. *El precio de la exclusión. La política durante la Segunda República*. Madrid, Encuentro, 2010.

[7].   ARRARÁS IRIBARREN, Joaquín. *Historia de la cruzada española. 1939-1943 (vol. II).* Madrid-Santander, Tela, 1940.

[8].   AZAÑA, Manuel. *Memorias políticas y de guerra, I.* Barcelona, Crítica, 1981.

[9].   AZAÑA, Manuel. *Causas de la guerra de España*. Madrid, Diario Público, 2011.

[10].   BALFOUR, Sebastian and Pablo LA PORTE. "Spanish Military Cultures and the Moroccan Wars, 1909-1936". *European History Quarterly*, 30(3), 2000, 307-332.

[11].   BALLBÉ, Manuel. *Órden público y militarismo en la España constitucional (1812-1983)*. Madrid, Alianza Editorial, 1983.

[12].   BATES, Robert H. *Markets and States in Tropical Africa. The Political Basis of Agricultural Policies*. Berkeley, University of California Press, 2005.

[13].   BATES, Robert H. *When Things Fell Apart. State Failure in Late-Century Africa*. New York, Cambridge University Press, 2008.

[14].   BAILYN, Bernard. *The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution*. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1967.

[15].   BEN YISHAY, A. and Roger BETANCOURT. "Unbundling Democracy: Political Rights and Civil Liberties", *Journal of Comparative Economics*, forthcoming 2014.

[16].   BOYD, Carolyn P. *Praetorian Politics in Liberal Spain*. Chapel Hill, The University of North Carolina Press, 1979.

[17].   BRENAN, Gerald. *The Spanish Labyrinth: An Account of the Social and Political Background of the Spanish Civil War*. Cambrige, Cambridge University Press, 1960.

[18].   BUENO DE MESQUITA, Bruce; Alastair SMITH, Randolph M. SIVERSON, and James D. MORROW. *The Logic Political Survival*, Cambridge, The MIT Press, 2004.

[19].   BUSQUETS, Julio and Carlos LOSADA. *Ruido de sables. Las conspiraciones militares en la España del siglo XX*. Barcelona, Crítica, 2003.

[20].   CALOMIRIS, Charles W. and Stephen H. HABER. *Fragile by Design. The Political Origins of Banking Crises & Scarce Credit*. Princeton, Princeton University Press.

[21].   CARDONA, Gabriel. *El poder militar en la España contemporánea hasta la guerra civil*. Madrid, Siglo Veintiuno, 1983.

[22].   CARR, Raymond. *Spain, 1808-1975*. Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1966.

[23].   CASANOVA, Julián. *The Spanish Republic and Civil War*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2010.

[24].   CASANOVA, Julián. "La Guerra Civil que nunca se aprendió en las escuelas" Web *El País* April 1. 2014. Web 15 April. 2014. <http://blogs.elpais.com/ historias/2014/04/la-guerra-civil-que-nunca-se-aprendio-en-las-escuelas.html>.

[25].   CEBREIROS, Nazario. *Las Reformas Militares. Estudio crítico.* Santander, Talleres Tipográficos J. Martínez, 1931.

[26].   COMIN COMIN, Francisco. "Hacia la economía dirigida y protegida, a pesar de las críticas de los economistas (1907-1935)" in Enrique FUENTES QUINTANA (ed.), *Economía y Economistas Españoles*, Barcelona, Galaxia Gutemberg, 2001, vol. 6, p. 941-989.

[27].   CORCUERA, Javier. "El constitucionalismo de entreguerras y la Constitución española de 1931". *Historia Contemporánea*, 6: 15-45, 1991.

[28].   DOMÈNECH, Jordi. "Rural labour markets and rural conflict in Spain before the Civil War (1931-6)". *Economic History Review*, 66(1), 2012, 86-108.

[29].   DOMÈNECH, Jordi and T. J. MILEY. "Structural change, collective action, and social unrest in 1930s Spain". Working Paper, Universidad Carlos III, 2013.

[30].   EICHENGREEN, Barry and Douglas A. IRWIN. "The Slide to Protectionism in the Great Depression: Who Succumbed and Why?" *The Journal of Economic History*, 70(4), p. 871-897, December 2010.

[31].   ENGEL MASOLIVER, Carlos. *El Cuerpo de Oficiales en la Guerra de España.* Valladolid, Alcañiz Fresno's Editores, 2008.

[32].   FRAILE BALBIN, Pedro. *Industrialización y grupos de presión. La economía política de la protección en Espana 1900-1950*, Madrid, Alianza Editorial, 1991.

[33].   FRAILE BALBIN, Pedro. "La intervención económica durante la Segunda República" in Juan Velarde (coord.) *Historia de un esfuerzo colectivo*, Madrid, Fundación BSCH, vol. 1, 2000, p. 403-456.

[34].   FREDERICK, Shane; George LOEWENSTEIN; and Ted O'DONOGHUE. "Time Discounting and Time Preference: A Critical Review", *Journal of Economic Literature*, XL, June 2002, pp. 351-401.

[35].   GARCIA RUIZ, José Luis. "Banca y crisis económica en España, 1930-1935: Un nuevo enfoque", *Revista de Historia Económica*, 11(3), December 1993, p. 595-620.

[36].   GIL ROBLES, J. M. *No fue posible la paz*. Barcelona, Ariel, 1968.

[37].   GOLDSMITH, Raymond W. *Financial Structure and Development*. New Haven, Yale University Press, 1969.

[38].   GONZÁLEZ CALLEJA, Eduardo. *La España de Primo de Rivera. La modernización autoritaria 1923-1930*. Madrid, Alianza Editorial, 2005.

[39].   GONZÁLEZ CALLEJA, Eduardo. *Contrarevolucionarios. Radicalización violenta de las derechas durante la Segunda República, 1931-1936*. Madrid, Alianza Editorial, 2011.

[40].   GONZÁLEZ CALLEJA, Eduardo. "Las fuerzas de orden público y la República", in Jorge Martínez Reverte (coord.), *Los militares españoles en la Segunda República*. Madrid, Editorial Pablo Iglesias, 2012, pp. 99-134.

[41].   HABER, Stephen, "Political Institutions and Financial Development. Evidence from the Political Economy of Bank Regulation in Mexico and the United States", in Stephen Haber, Douglass C. North and Barry R. Weingast (ed.), *Political Institutions and Financial Development*, Stanford, Stanford Universtity Press, 2008, pp. 10-59.

[42].   HIGLEY, John. "Elite Theory and Elites" in K.T. LEICHT and J.C. JENKINS (eds.), *Handbook of Politics: State and Society in Global Perspective*, Handbooks of Sociology and Social Research, Springer Science+Business Media, 2010.

[43].   HOFSTADTER, Richard. *The Idea of a Party System. The Rise of Legitimate Opposition in the United States, 1780-1840*. Berkeley, Univresity of California Press, 1969.

[44].   JACKSON, Gabriel. *Spanish Republic and the Civil War, 1931-1939*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1972.

[45].   JIA, H.; S. SKAPERDAS; and S. VAIDYA, "Contest functions: .Theoretical foundations and issues of estimations". *International Journal of Industrial Organization*, 31, 2012, 211-222.

[46].   LAPUENTE, Victor; and Bo ROTHSTEIN, "Civil War Spain versus Swedish Harmony: The Quality of Government Factor". *Comparative Political Studies*, Published online before print December 23, 2013, doi: 10.1177/0010414013512 598.

[47].   LINZ, Juan J., "From Great Hopes to Civil War: The Breakdown of
          Democracy in Spain", in Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan. *The
          Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Europe*, Baltimore, The Johns
          Hopkins University Press, 1994, pp. 142-215.

[48].   LLEIXÀ, Joaquín. *Cien años de militarismo en España.* Barcelona,
          Anagrama, 1986.

[49].   MALEFAKIS, Edward, *Reforma Agraria y Revolución Campesina en la
          España del Siglo XX*, Barcelona, Ariel, 1971.

[50].   MARTIN ACEÑA, Pablo. "Development and Modernization of the
          Financial System, 1844-1935" in Nicolás SANCHEZ-ALBORNOZ (ed.) *The
          Economic Modernization of Spain, 1830-1930*, New York, New York
          University Press, 1987, p. 107-127.

[51].   MARTIN ACEÑA, Pablo. "Los orígenes de la banca pública" in Francisco
          COMIN and Pablo MARTIN ACEÑA(eds.) *Historia de la empresa pública
          en España*, Madrid, Espasa Calpe, 1991, p. 331-373.

[52].   MAS CHAO, Andrés. *La Formación de la Conciencia Africanista en el
          Ejército Español (1909-1926).* Madrid, Talleres del Servicio Geográfico
          del Ejército, 1988.

[53].   MIRALLES, Ricardo and José Luis DE LA GRANJA, "Poder y élites en la
          obra de Manuel Tuñón de Lara", Historia Social, 20: 115-133, 1994.

[54].   MOLA VIDAL, Emilio. *Obras completas*. Valladolid, Librería Santarén,
          1940.

[55].   NAVAJAS ZUBELDIA, Carlos. *Leales y rebeldes. La tragedia de los
          militares republicanos.* Madrid, Síntesis, 2011.

[56].   NORTH, Douglass C. Structure and Change in Economic History. New
          York, W. W. Norton & Company, 1981.

[57].   NORTH, Douglass C.; John J. WALLIS and Barry R. WEINGAST,
          *Violence and social orders. A Conceptual Framework for Interpreting
          Recorded Human History*. New York: Cambridge University Press,
          2009.

[58].   NORTH, Douglass C.; John J. WALLIS, Steven B. WEBB, and Barry R.
          WEINGAST (eds.). *In the Shadow of Violence. Politics, Economics, and*

the Problems of Development. New York, Cambridge University Press, 2013.

[59].   Olson, Mancur. *The Logic of Collective Action. Public Goods and the Theory of Groups.* Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1971.

[60].   Palafox, Jordi. *Atraso económico y democracia. La Segunda República y la economía española, 1892-1936.* Barcelona, Crítica, 1991.

[61].   Payne, Stanley G. *Politics and the Military in Modern Spain.* Stanford University Press, 1967.

[62].   Payne, Stanley G. "The Army, the Republic and the Outbreak of the Civil War", in Raymond Carr (ed.), *The Republic and the Civil War in Spain.* London, Macmillan, 1971, pp. 79-107.

[63].   Payne, Stanley G. *The Collapse of the Spanish Republic, 1933-1936.* New Haven, Yale University Press, 2006.

[64].   Piketty, Thomas. *Capital in the Twenty-First Century.* Cambridge, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2014.

[65].   Prados de la Escosura, Leandro. "Economic Freedom in the Long Run: Evidence from the OECD Countries (1850-2007)". Center for Economic Policy Research Working Paper, March 2014.

[66].   Preston, Paul. *The Spanish Civil War. Reaction, Revolution, and Revenge.* New York, Norton & Company, 2007.

[67].   Preston, Paul. *The Spanish Holocaust. Inquisition and Extermination in Twentieth-Century Spain.* New York, Norton & Company, 2012.

[68].   Przeworski, Adam. *Democracy and the Limits of Self-Government.* Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2010.

[69].   Puell de la Villa, Fernando. *Historia del Ejército en España.* Madrid, Alianza Editorial, 2009.

[70].   Puell de la Villa, Fernando. "Julio de 1936: ¿Un ejército dividido?", in Jorge Martínez Reverte, *Los militares españoles en la Segunda República.* Madrid, Editorial Pablo Iglesias, 2012, pp. 77-98.

[71].   Rivero, Gonzalo. "Oligoply of Violence", New York University, unpublished manuscript, 2013.

[72]. RUIZ VIDONDO, José María. *Las Principales Reformas Militares de Azaña.* Basauri, Grafite Ediciones, 2004.

[73]. SALAS LARRAZÁBAL, Ramón. *Historia del Ejército Popular de la República (Vol. 1).* Madrid, Editora Nacional, 1973.

[74]. SAN ROMAN LOPEZ, Elena. "Protección e intervención en el primer tercio del siglo XX" in Enrique FUENTES QUINTANA (ed.), *Economía y Economistas Españoles*, Barcelona, Galaxia Gutemberg, 2001, vol. 6, p. 1023-1041.

[75]. SARTORI, Giovanni. *Parties and Party Systems.* New York, Cambridge University Press, 1976.

[76]. SARTORI, Giovanni. *The Theory of Democracy Revisited. Part One: The Contemporary Debate.* Chatham, Chatham House Publishers, 1987.

[77]. SCHUMPETER, J. A. *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy.* New York, Harper Colophon, 1942.

[78]. SECO SERRANO, Carlos. *Militarismo y civilismo en la España contemporánea.* Madrid, Instituto de Estudios Económicos, 1984.

[79]. SERRA, Narcís. *The Military Transition. Democratic Reform of the Armed Forces.* London, Cambridge University Press, 2010.

[80]. TILLY, Charles. *Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990-1992.* Oxford, Blackwell, 1992.

[81]. TILLY, Charles. *Democracy.* New York, Cambridge University Press, 2007.

[82]. TORTELLA, Gabriel. "Los problemas Económicos de la Segunda República". *Revista de Estudios Políticos*, 1983, 31-2: 121-135.

[83]. TORTELLA, Gabriel. *El desarrollo de la España contemporánea. Historia económica de los siglos XIX y XX.* Madrid, Alianza Editorial, 2001.

[84]. TOWNSON, Nigel. *La República Que No Pudo Ser.* Madrid, Taurus, 2002.

[85].   TUÑÓN DE LARA, Manuel. *Historia y realidad del poder (El poder y las élites en el primer tercio de la España del siglo XX).* Madrid, Cuadernos para el diálogo, 1967.

[86].   VAN PARIJS, Philippe. "De la sphère autonome à l'allocation universelle" in Christophe FOUREL (ed.), *André Gorz, un penseur pour le XXIe siècle.* Paris, La Découverte, 2009, pp. 161-175.

[87].   VILAR, Pierre. *Spain. A Brief History.* New York, Pergamon Press, 1977.

[88].   WALLIS, John J. "The Concept of Systematic Corruption in American Economic and Political History" in GOLDIN and GLAESER, ed. *Corruption and Reform.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp. 23-62, 2006.

[89].   WALLIS, John J. and Douglass C. NORTH. "Leviathan Denied: Governments, Rules, and Social Dynamics", Working Paper presented at the Economic History Workshop at Yale University, April 2014.

[90].   WALLIS, John J., Richard SYLLA, and John LEGLER "The Interaction of Taxation and Regulation in Nineteenth Century Banking", in Claudia GOLDIN and Gary LIBECAP, eds., *The Regulated Economy: An Historical Approach to Political Economy*, NBER, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp. 121-144, 1994.

[91].   WIESEL, ELIE. *La Nuit.* Paris, Les Éditions de Minuit, 2007. English edition: *Night.* New York, Hill and Wang, 2006.