

ABSTRACT

Title of thesis:

FRAMED:
HOW COLIN POWELL'S U.N.
SPEECH ON IRAQ SET THE NEWS
AGENDA FOR AMERICAN AND BRITISH
TELEVISION NEWS

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Numerous scholars and press critics have asserted that American news coverage of the run-up to the Iraq war was less skeptical than British coverage. This thesis explores the validity of that claim in the television news coverage of one key event: Colin Powell's February 5, 2003 address to the United Nations in which he made the case for war. How effective was the Bush administration in using Powell's presentation to set the news agenda in America and Great Britain? Contrary to expectations, a qualitative content analysis found British network ITV framed the event in much the same way as did American networks ABC, CBS, and NBC.

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by

Christopher Shlemon

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Preface

I joined Independent Television News of London (ITN) as a member of its Washington Bureau staff on January 28, 1986...the same day Space Shuttle Challenger exploded over Florida after liftoff. That unforgettable event set the tone for what has been a fascinating journalistic journey. For over a quarter of a century I've had the privilege of covering a great many of the major political events, breaking news stories, natural disasters and cultural trends which have affected not only the United States--but the entire world.

I found myself working for Independent Television News of London (ITN) having already gained valuable experience editing and producing news stories for local television stations in Tampa, Phoenix and Dallas before joining NBC News in Washington, D.C. The opportunity to work for television news organizations on both sides of "the pond" has afforded me a rare vantage point from which I have been able to closely observe the unique approach taken by journalists in each nation as they crafted their stories and produced their nightly newscasts.

In culture and values, Britain is comparable in many ways to the United States but in just as many ways it could hardly be more different. In interviews I conducted for this thesis, several of my British colleagues expressed their perception of a gulf between Americans and Britons that applies to the journalists in both countries. The Americans tend to be optimistic and believe in the ideals of the Republic while their British counterparts are more jaded and skeptical. British reporters are less inclined to report in a patriotic mode than American journalists.

The British were America's staunchest ally when the invasion of Iraq was launched in 2003. I work with many of the journalists who were assigned to cover that conflict. Some were embedded with U.S. and British military units. Some reported from Washington, London, Baghdad and other capitals of the nations involved.

Some were not assigned to specific military units and roamed unilaterally throughout the war zone. One, ITN's John Irvine, was stationed in Iraq's capital and became the first television correspondent to greet U.S. troops as they rolled into Baghdad for the first time.

As I listened to accounts of their experiences on the front lines, I was always fascinated by the differences in which my colleagues from Great Britain viewed the war in comparison to my American colleagues. It intrigued me that while these colleagues were all covering the same conflict, it seemed at times as though they were reporting about an entirely different war.

My purpose in writing this thesis was to investigate whether British and American reporting were as different as my first impressions suggested and if so, what was the best explanation for those differences.

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First and foremost, my utmost gratitude to Dr. Christopher Hanson, whose knowledge, advice, guidance, encouragement and sense of humor enabled me to complete this research work.

Secondly, to all the producers, editors and correspondents I have had the privilege and honor of working with at ITN over the last quarter of a century. They remain the best in the television news business.

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Chapter 1: The Key Moment of Public Salesmanship on the Path to War

It was the day the Bush administration played its ultimate trump card. An event tailor made for television. The cameras captured Colin Powell's every move as he entered the United Nations Security Council chamber at 10:30 a.m. on Wednesday, February 5th, 2003, and quickly worked the crowd. Powell was smiling, winking, shaking hands and gently slapping the backs of the representatives of the world community assembling to hear what had been skillfully promoted in advance by the Bush administration as its "most compelling case for war made by arguably their most credible spokesman."¹ At the request of President George W. Bush, Powell arrived at the Security Council equipped with secretly recorded audio tapes, satellite images and a simulated vial of anthrax to argue that Iraq possessed and was concealing weapons of mass destruction. This high stakes spectacle was intended to convince skeptical allies and reluctant Arab regimes that disarming Saddam Hussein --- by force if necessary --- was essential. Powell's performance was to be the pivotal moment in America's run up to war with Iraq. "We've really got to make the case against Hussein", President George W. Bush told Powell in an Oval Office meeting in late January, 2003, "and I want you to make it." Bush added, "Maybe they'll believe you," because only Powell had "the credibility to do this".²

Vice President Cheney weighed in as well. After a discussion of the upcoming U.N. address Cheney is said to have jocularly poked Powell in the chest saying, "You've got high poll ratings, you can afford to lose a few points."³

"With war hanging in the balance, and the power and prestige of the United States on full display, it was a moment of high drama that owed as much to the player as to the play."⁴ Opinion polls taken at the time clearly demonstrated that in the eyes of many

¹ Miller, Greg, "Flaws Cited in Powell's U.N. Speech on Iraq", *Los Angeles Times*, (July 15, 2004)

² De Young, Karen, "Falling on His Sword", *Washington Post*, (October 1, 2006)

³ De Young, Karen, "Falling on His Sword"

⁴ De Young, Karen, "Falling on His Sword"

Americans, this “player” was both trustworthy and credible. A nationwide survey released that morning found that when it came to formulating U.S. policy toward Iraq, Americans trusted Powell more than President Bush by 63 to 24 percent. In a Gallup poll conducted the week prior to Powell’s U.N. appearance, almost 9 out of 10 Americans said the presentation would be an important determinant in their opinions about an attack on Iraq.⁵

Television, the Most Influential Medium

In “*The Enemy Within*”, Michael Massing argues that the second Iraq War was the most important and controversial story covered by the U.S. press in a generation. Massing believed it showcased the media’s strengths as well as its many weaknesses, “Especially the way in which political realities shape, define, and ultimately limit what Americans see and read.”⁶ The drama and intrigue surrounding Powell’s star turn made it a natural television news story. His extraordinary high tech “show & tell” came complete with visual pyrotechnics, including what he claimed were satellite images of Iraqis hiding weapons from U.N. inspectors, secretly recorded audio tapes of Iraqi military personnel engaged in a game of cat and mouse with those same inspectors, evidence of a mobile biological weapons facility and a stage prop vial of simulated anthrax.

It was a stunning performance, the likes of which had not been witnessed since Adlai Stevenson, (U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations during the Kennedy administration), revealed before the Security Council and a nationwide television

⁵Moore, David. “Powell’s U.N. Appearance Important to Public, Secretary of State enjoys more credibility on Iraq than Bush”. *Gallup News Service*, (February 4, 2003) <http://www.gallup.com/poll/7720/powells-un-appearance-important-public.aspx>

⁶ Massing, Michael, “The Press: The Enemy Within”, *The New York Review of Books*. December 15, 2005. <http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2005/dec/15/the-press-the-enemy-within/?pagination=false>

audience, secret aerial surveillance photos in order to convince the world the Soviet Union was installing nuclear missiles in Cuba aimed at the United States.

Many scholars believe the manner in which television news covers major events such as the Iraq War is highly influential in shaping the public's perception of that event.⁷ The focus of this thesis is the methods used by American and British television news organizations to frame their coverage of Powell's critical moment on the world stage.

By 2003, revolutionary advances in technology, (including the advent of the internet), presented the public with the most wide-ranging choice of alternative news sources ever offered. These news outlets combined to generate a greater volume of information about the run-up to the war, Powell's presentation and the ground war which followed than any conflict in world history. Yet what set television apart from all other mediums was its capability to provide live, unedited, real-time coverage. In fact, once the ground war began, viewers were able to witness, "the world's first real-time video from a battlefield".⁸ This held tremendous appeal for the millions of news consumers who preferred watching video images to reading the written word. No matter how people viewed its merits, "the Iraq war was something of a blockbuster, a must see event."⁹

In early 2003, during the initial phases of the Iraq War, the Pew Research Center conducted a survey that asked respondents to choose which medium enabled them to best understand major news events. 55% of those surveyed expressed a

⁷ Scholars theorize that specific news story selection, (often referred to as "agenda setting") by the mass media is the process by which media present certain issues frequently and prominently resulting in large segments of the public perceiving those same issues as more important than others. This theory of "agenda setting" was originally developed by Maxwell McCombs and Donald Shaw in their groundbreaking work, "*The Agenda Setting Function of Mass Media*" and has been the subject of a vast amount of additional scholarly research.

⁸ Hiebert, Eldon, "Public Relations and Propaganda in Framing the Iraq War", *The Institute of Communications Studies*, (2003).

⁹ Rutherford, Paul, *Weapons of Mass Persuasion: Marketing the War Against Iraq*. (University of Toronto Press. 2004)

preference for seeing pictures or watching video footage of those news events. During that same period in 2003, roughly one third of the American public regularly watched one of the nightly network news broadcasts.¹⁰

The case was much the same in the United Kingdom. According to figures published in 2003 by the Independent Television Commission, television served as the main source of international news for 67% of the British public¹¹ These impressive viewership figures, which translate into a nightly news audience of over 30 million viewers,¹² present a compelling case for studying how British and American television news organizations prepared and delivered news of Powell's presentation to those millions of viewers.

The fact that so many people on both sides of the Atlantic depended on television for their news about Iraq is the principal reason it is widely considered the most influential of the news mediums that covered the conflict.

¹⁰ According to the Pew Research Center, 16% of those surveyed regularly watched the CBS Evening News with Dan Rather; 16% watched ABC's World News Tonight with Peter Jennings; and 17% watched the NBC Nightly News with Tom Brokaw. Pew Research Center, "News Audiences Increasingly Politicized", (Released. June 8, 2004). <http://www.people-press.org/2004/06/08/news-audiences-increasingly-politicized>.

¹¹ According to the Independent Television Commission 16% of those surveyed chose newspapers, 13% radio and 1% the internet. Independent Television Commission. "Massive Increase in TV Audience During War".(October 21, 2003) http://www.ofcom.org.uk/static/archive/itc/uploads/Massive_Increase_in_TV_news_audiences_during_war.pdf

¹² Pew Project for Excellence in Journalism. "The State of the News Media 2004", <http://stateofthemedias.org/2004/network-tv-intro-2/audience/>

The Bush Administration Frames the News Agenda

The Bush administration devoted extraordinary resources and expertise to framing the news coverage before, during and immediately after Powell's presentation in an attempt to set the news agenda and advance its case for war. An essential line of its narrative detailed how Secretary Powell spent much of the week and weekend prior to his U.N. appearance entrenched within the confines of CIA headquarters in Langley, Virginia, rigorously scrutinizing highly classified materials to present the world with evidence of Iraq's WMD program. That evidence would be, in the words of several members of the administration, "compelling".¹³

In his February 3, 2003 daily White House press briefing, Press Secretary Ari Fleischer said of the upcoming Powell presentation, "The process has been a week-long... interagency collaboration that involves the CIA, the NSC, the State Department, the DOD... so that the people of the United States and people around the world can have as much information as is possible about why we feel so strongly and know that Iraq has biological and chemical weapons... I think it will be compelling."¹⁴ Other officials within the Bush administration provided background briefings to reporters in which they claimed Powell would provide definitive and undeniable proof that Iraq continued to produce and conceal an arsenal of weapons of mass destruction in open defiance of U.N. mandates that it destroy them.

Time magazine reported that high level administration sources confirmed to them that Powell would, "Attack on three fronts, presenting evidence of elusive weapons of mass destruction, persistent obstructions of inspections and links to terrorism. The

¹³ In his memoir "*At the Center of the Storm*", former CIA Director George Tenet wrote that "Colin asked to come out to CIA headquarters...to work through the speech and make sure it was as solid as possible."

¹⁴ Briefing by White House Press Secretary Ari Fleischer, February 3, 2003.
<http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=61031>

drama is likely to come as much in the delivery--high-tech photos, raw audiotapes--as in the substance.”¹⁵

Members of the Bush team were not subtle about pushing their message on members of the press. ITN’s David Smith covered the White House for British television during this period and was the recipient of phone calls from the White House Press office. “The people around Bush were extraordinarily effective at pounding their message. Making journalists feel that if they didn’t pound on that message they were not with the program, not with the story, and somehow missing it. They were real pros at one message and kept pounding on it.”¹⁶

The choice of Colin Powell to publically put forward the Bush administration’s war agenda was a stroke of public relations genius. In an administration filled with “neo-con” war hawks, Powell was generally seen as the dove of the group. ITN’s David Smith believed, “When people saw a formidable case being laid out by the dove of the administration that was a very careful calibration on the part of the White House to make sure the media bought into the idea. The choice of Colin Powell was a way of inoculating the Bush administration against anybody saying this is ‘not credible’ because if Powell was the front man, it had to be true.”¹⁷ In his memoir “*Decision Points*”, George W. Bush recounted, “I asked Colin to make the presentation to the U.N. He had the credibility as a highly respected diplomat known to be reluctant about the possibility of war. I knew he would do a thorough, careful job.”¹⁸

¹⁵ “*Disecting the Case*”, Time Magazine, February 10, 2003.
<http://www.time.com/time/printout/0,8816,1004194,00.html>

¹⁶ David Smith was an award-winning television correspondent for ITN Channel 4 News. He is currently Director of the United Nations Information Office in Argentina. Smith was based in Washington D.C. at the start of the Iraq War and covered Colin Powell’s presentation for ITN. This interview was conducted on April 18, 2009 at his home in Washington, D.C.

¹⁷ David Smith was interviewed on April 18, 2009.

¹⁸ Bush, George W., *Decision Points*, (Crown Publishers. 2010)

As I will demonstrate in Chapter 4, the Bush administration pushed three frames:

#1: Colin Powell is highly trustworthy, thoroughly prepared, effective and credible

#2: Colin Powell will present/presented strong evidence that Iraq possessed or was acquiring WMDs.

#3: Colin Powell will present/presented strong evidence of a link between the Iraqi government and Al Qaeda.

Numerous books and academic studies have analyzed the media's coverage of the run-up, Powell's presentation and the war which followed. Each of these publications scrutinized the journalistic practices of the various American and international news organizations that reported on the conflict. They frequently praised the skeptical and hard-hitting nature of the British coverage while at the same time criticizing the American press for being "incredibly soft", "patsy-like" and overwhelmingly accepting of war as a foregone conclusion. A refrain that echoed throughout was, "Why couldn't American journalists have acted more British?"¹⁹ Some observers claimed that unlike their American counterparts, British journalists demonstrated "an unwillingness to accept official claims at face value".²⁰

¹⁹ Hansen, Susan, "Superiority Complex, Why the Brits Think They're Better", *Columbia Journalism Review*. (May 8, 2007).

http://www.cjr.org/behind_the_news/superiority_complex_2.php?page=all

²⁰ Robinson, Piers, "*Pockets of Resistance: Theorising media-state relations and the case of British media and the 2003 Iraq Invasion*", Presented at the International Studies Association Annual Convention, Montreal, (March 2011)

Others claimed British journalists reporting on the Iraq story seized the opportunity to corral facts and ask tough questions about hugely consequential events while American reporters viewed the war as an opportunity to present an "exciting" story within narrow limits.²¹

BBC reporter John Kampfner offered his observation on the key difference between American and British reporters. "You can see the difference between American and British journalists at summits. The American journalist stands up when the President comes in, backs rigid, at attention, and the British are slouched in their chairs. The impression I have from the U.S. media is it regards the people in authority, the people in government, as good men who need to be proved otherwise. In Britain, we work from the assumption that they need to prove to us that they're telling the truth."²²

Many American television journalists who covered Powell's presentation bristle at the notion that they failed to exhibit sufficient skepticism and simply followed the administration's lead. When asked if he believed American journalists failed to analyze the material Powell presented with enough skepticism, ABC's Ted Koppel replied, "I've always maintained there's a difference between facts and truth. Journalism deals in facts—not truth." Koppel said both British and American spy agencies believed Iraq had weapons of mass destruction. "That was a fact at the time...it just didn't happen to be true. But if we're going to wait until we can demonstrate the truth of everything we report, we're never going to get on the air. The sad reality of it is that when most of the world's intelligence agencies are under the mistaken impression that Saddam Hussein still has weapons of mass destruction, it would take a fairly extraordinary journalistic enterprise to be able to say, 'You know something, they're all wrong and I have proof that he does not have those weapons.' "Proving a negative is an incredibly difficult thing to do."

²¹ Baker, Russ, "The U.S.vs.The U.K." *The Nation*,(April 28, 2003) www.thenation.com/article/us-vs-uk

²² New York Magazine, "*The Media at War*" http://nymag.com/nymetro/news/media/features/n_9067/

Koppel added, “We don’t deal in truth. Truth takes much too long to affirm.”²³

NBC’s Tom Brokaw echoed Koppel’s sentiments. “Part of our obligation is not just to be skeptical, but to present other evidence and in fact we didn’t have anything that we could point to that said that he (Powell) was dead wrong. He had the director of the CIA sitting behind him and the U.S. United Nations Ambassador sitting behind him and he said this represents the best intelligence that we have.”²⁴

However, former BBC correspondent Matt Frei believes the British media did view the events surrounding Powell’s presentation and the rationale for war through a very different prism than their American counterparts. “There was a much greater skepticism in the British public and the British media about the reasons for going to war. There is an instinctive, almost knee jerk skepticism in the British media. We just don’t believe what we’re told. There was a feeling that with WMD there was something fishy, something didn’t quite smell right. In Britain they smelled something was fishy and in the U.S. they didn’t.”²⁵

²³ Ted Koppel worked as a correspondent at ABC News for over 40 years—25 of those as anchor of ABC’s Nightline. In 2003 he was embedded with the US Army’s 3rd Infantry Division as it crossed from Kuwait into Iraq after the U.S. invasion began. A colleague and I interviewed Koppel on March 16, 2004 in his Nightline studio in Washington as part of an ITN Ch. 4 series we were producing on the one year anniversary of the invasion of Iraq.

²⁴ Tom Brokaw was anchor of NBC Nightly News for 21 years and had visited the Iraq region several times. ITN Channel 4 News interviewed him on March 16, 2004 in his studio at Rockefeller Center as part of their coverage of the one year anniversary of the Iraq invasion.

²⁵ Matt Frei is currently ITN CH. 4 News Washington D.C. correspondent after a long career at the BBC as correspondent and anchor of BBC World America. He was interviewed in the ITN Washington Bureau in March of 2011.

The Purpose of This Study

The Purpose of study is twofold:

1. To explore whether this supposed split in American and British coverage was evident in reportage of Powell speech, the most important news event in the run-up to the war.
2. To assess the effectiveness of the Bush administration in imposing the news frames it wanted on Powell speech coverage, both American and British, in order to make the case for war.

As explained in detail and justified below, this study is a qualitative content analysis of commercial broadcast evening news coverage over a five day period encompassing the administration's promotion of Powell's speech, the speech itself and the immediate aftermath.

The findings were not what I expected, as I explain in Chapter 5.

In Chapter 2, I present a literature review in order to put this study into context and demonstrate that gaps in the research remain to be filled. In Chapter 3, the precise research questions I intend to answer are listed and an explanation of the methods I will use to answer them is provided. In Chapter 4, I will explain how the Bush administration sought to control the news agenda and frame Powell's presentation in a manner which pushed their war agenda. In Chapter 5, I conclude with my findings, provide an analysis of those findings, their significance, what they say about the practice of journalism and what they tell us about the need for further research.

Chapter 2: Literature Review

Several categories of literature cast light on this study. As far as I can tell from my research, this is the first systematic comparison of American and British broadcast television news coverage of Colin Powell's presentation to the United Nations.

First I will present literature that examines the "Rally Round the Flag" effect. Scholars have noted, "The history of press coverage in wartime shows that the norm is a patriotic, servile press once the shooting starts",²⁶ and during war times the public will often "rally round the flag" and expect the media to do the same.²⁷ The second category of literature examines the relationship between the military and the media. Although this relationship has always been contentious, each side reluctantly concedes that it needs the other in order to operate effectively and successfully.

A short history of the perpetually evolving relationship between television news and the military is examined. Interestingly, this relationship originated during the Korean War. Literature which examined American and British media coverage of Colin Powell's presentation and the Bush administration's selling of the Iraq war is then reviewed. Many authors leveled criticism against the American press and heaped praise upon the British press for the divergent manner in which journalists from each nation covered the lead up to the Iraq War and the ground war which followed.

²⁶ Aday, Sean, Livingston, Steven & Hebert, Maeve, "Embedding the Truth: Cross Cultural Analysis of Objectivity and Television Coverage of the Iraq War", *Harvard International Journal of Press/Politics*. (2005)

²⁷ Hafez, Kai. "The Iraq War 2003" in *Western Media and Public Opinion: Case Study of the Effects of Military (Non-) Involvement on Conflict Perception*. *Global Media Journal*. Volume 3 Issue 5. (Fall, 2004.)

http://lass.calumet.purdue.edu/cca/gmj/OldSiteBackup/SubmittedDocuments/archivedpapers/fall2004/pdf_files/hafez.pdf

A great deal of this literature provides possible explanations for why the British and American media performed as they did. Some authors suggest reporters were merely reflecting the mood of their nations at that time.

Others claim that a combination of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks and the subsequent actions of the Bush Administration coupled with its adept use of public relations techniques created an environment of fear and patriotic fervor that many journalists had no previous experience navigating. As a result, critics claim some journalists and news organizations responded by acting as patriots unwilling to question their government's motives. Others claimed most British journalists seemed able to balance support for their armed forces while at the same time expressing a degree of skepticism about the reasons those soldiers were being sent to fight in Iraq.

The “Rally Round the Flag” Effect

The authors of *“Embedding the Truth”* write that the public depends on the press to act as a watchdog and serve as the public's eyes and ears on the battlefield and in the halls of policymakers. However, “The history of press coverage in wartime shows that the norm is a patriotic, servile press once the shooting starts.”²⁸

Research by German academic and author Kai Hafez found, “As a lesson from history we have learned that once a country gets militarily involved, large parts of public opinion support the government and differences in opinion that are visible before the war become irrelevant.” In the case of the Iraq War, with the September 11th terrorist attacks as a backdrop, public support for American action to prevent another terrorist attack, this time fueled by fears that Saddam Hussein possessed WMD, led to the creation of a journalistic environment some have dubbed “the rally round the flag” effect. Hafez explained that at times of war, the public will often “rally round the flag” and expect the media to do the same. He noted that several news

²⁸ Aday, Sean, Livingston, Steven & Hebert, Maeve, “Embedding the Truth: Cross Cultural Analysis of Objectivity and Television Coverage of the Iraq War” *Harvard International Journal of Press/Politics*. (2005)

organizations not only rallied “round the flag”, but went a step further when they, “Helped stir public emotions with special reports entitled ‘Countdown Iraq’ on MSNBC or ‘Showdown with Saddam’ on CBS.” “Especially for big U.S. networks, it seems that any attempt at objectivity was abandoned once the war had started.”²⁹

Overtly patriotic journalism is not a uniquely American phenomenon tied to the Iraq War. There is also a body of work which criticizes British journalists for a past history of blatantly patriotic news coverage in times of war, specifically during coverage of the Falklands/Malvinas War. When the home nation of a media organization is directly involved in the fighting, research shows that reporters offer supportive coverage of their armed forces. The Glasgow University Media Group described “an acquiescent, patriotic, and jingoistic British media during the 1982 Falklands Conflict”.³⁰ Robin Luckham found during Falklands War coverage, British “reporters came to identify closely with the military. The patriotic imperative so deeply rooted in the political and media culture, together with journalistic self-censorship and the hyper-jingoism and crude ‘enemy’ baiting”...all (served) to transform new militarism into spectator sport with the war consumed as a form of entertainment.”³¹

In “*War Policy, Public Support and the Media*”, William Darley writes that a notable example of the “rally round the flag” phenomenon was observed when monitoring British public opinion polling during the Thatcher government’s handling of the Falklands/Malvinas War. At the beginning of the conflict, both the British public and the British press were highly critical of the Thatcher government for its lack of

²⁹ Hafez, Kai. “The Iraq War 2003” in *Western Media and Public Opinion: Case Study of the Effects of Military (Non-) Involvement on Conflict Perception*. *Global Media Journal*. Volume 3 Issue 5. (Fall, 2004.)
http://lass.calumet.purdue.edu/cca/gmj/OldSiteBackup/SubmittedDocuments/archivedpapers/fall2004/pdf_files/hafez.pdf

³⁰ Glasgow University Media Group, *Bad News*, (Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1980)

³¹ Luckham, Robin, “Of Arms and Culture”, *Current Research on Peace and Violence*, VII, 1, 1-64, (1984)

preparedness and handling of the initial stages of the Falklands confrontation. “However, as the crisis unfolded, and as the Thatcher government took decisive steps to retake the islands from Argentina by armed intervention, the level of public support in Great Britain steadily grew—from 44 percent approving military action to reassert control over the Falklands in early April 1982 to more than 80 percent in late May 1982.”³² In *“Pockets of Resistance”*, Piers Robinson explained, “In the context of war, patriotism acts as a fundamental driver of supportive coverage. Even when a newspaper adopts an overtly oppositional stance toward government war policy the need to show patriotic support for the nation’s troops in action overrides this.”³³ However, a show of support for the men and women fighting on the front lines does not necessarily translate to a show of support for the policies and people who sent them into battle and this is where British and American coverage of the Iraq War began to deviate.

The Relationship Between the Military and the Media

*“There can be few professions more ready to misunderstand each other than journalists and soldiers.”*³⁴

In *“Military and Media”*, Anil Singh introduces the notion that these two institutions are forever linked while operating in a state of perpetual opposition. The media will always insist on having open access to the battlefield while the military always wishes to prevent disclosure of classified or sensitive information and deny the enemy any useful intelligence.³⁵ Singh provides an excellent example which occurred during the American Civil War.

³² Darley, William M. “War Policy, Public Support and the Media”. *Parameters*, (Summer 2005) <http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/parameters/Articles/05summer/darley.pdf>

³³ Robinson, Dr. Piers, “ Pockets of Resistance: Theorising Media-state Relations and the Case of British Media and the 2003 Iraq Invasion.” Presented at the International Studies Association Annual Convention, Montreal. Panel: “Media, War and Accountability”, (Thursday March 17th, 2011).

³⁴ Singh, Dr. Anil Kumar, *Military and the Media*. (Lancer Publishers & Distributors. 2006)

³⁵ Singh, Dr. Anil Kumar. *Military and Media*.

Union General William Tecumseh Sherman disdained reporters whom he felt were "spies" and whose dispatches were "false, false as hell." Sherman was dismayed that reporters were, in effect, providing the enemy with detailed information of his battle plans. His complaints did have merit. The advent of a revolutionary new communication technology being developed at the time of the Civil War, the telegraph, greatly accelerated the reporting process. There were several instances where this technology enabled war correspondents' dispatches about preparations for a battle to appear in Northern newspapers before the actual fighting had begun.

Sherman complained that these newspapers were then forwarded to Confederate operatives before his forces had a chance to attack.³⁶ Sherman became so enraged by a New York Herald reporter's dispatch from Vicksburg that he had the reporter court-martialed for violating Sherman's order prohibiting battlefield reporting.³⁷

According to Philip Knightly in "*The First Casualty*", the aims of the military and the media are forever irreconcilable. The military wants to win the war as quickly as possible and prefers to do so away from the public eye because the face of battle is often horrific. The news media want to observe the military in action, bear witness and record the first draft of history. Knightly asks, "If doing that as objectively and truthfully as possible means writing and broadcasting stories damaging to their nation's war effort, what are correspondents to do? Does the journalist within the correspondent prevail, or the patriot? And what if reporting patriotically involves telling lies. Is this journalism or propaganda?"³⁸ But Thomas Rid writes in "*War and Media Operations*" that the military does in fact need the media. According to Rid,

³⁶ Baron, James, Sherman, "Letters Show Civil War General Regarded Reporters as "Spies". New York Times. (June 21, 1987.) <http://www.nytimes.com/1987/06/21/us/sherman-letters-show-civil-war-general-regarded-reporters-as-spies.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm>

³⁷ Singh, Dr. Anil Kumar. *Military and Media*.

³⁸ Knightly, Philip. *The First Casualty: The War Correspondent As Hero And Myth-maker From the Crimea to Iraq*. (The Johns Hopkins University Press. 2004).

aside from providing the public with information, media coverage of war also serves two separate military functions.

On one hand, media reports can be used defensively as an instrument of “counter information” to shield the public from enemy propaganda, and on the other hand media reports can be offensively used as an instrument of “perception management” and psychological warfare against the enemy.³⁹

In “*Pen and Sword*”, Mary Mander contends it is inaccurate to suggest the media and the military are antagonistic cultures. She believes readers should understand war journalism as one culture being integrated into a second culture which incorporates the military and its sense of system. Mander illustrates her point by citing the fact that when situated in the field reporting on the troops, correspondents are required to wear military uniforms, are often granted officers’ privileges and are otherwise “fully integrated into the military system”⁴⁰

Manuel Torres writes that most major developments in journalism can be traced back through the history of war reporting. He suggests that as far back as Colonial times the many communications technologies used to deliver reports to the public were developed to their maximum potential during wartime. “The media’s desire to cover conflicts has stimulated the growth of the press... and coverage of wars has contributed to characteristics that define journalism.”⁴¹

³⁹ Rid, Thomas, *War and Media Operations: The U.S. Military and the Press from Vietnam to Iraq*, (Routledge. 2007)

⁴⁰ Mander, Mary. *Pen and Sword: American War Correspondents, 1898-1975*. (University of Illinois Press, 2010)

⁴¹ . Torres, Manuel, “War Coverage”, *American Journalism, History, Practices, Principals*, W. David Sloan & Lisa Mullikin Parcell eds. (MacFarland and Company Inc. 2002) p.236

Television Goes to War

The first conflict to occur in the television age was the **Korean War** (1950 to 1953), although it is generally not considered a television war. At that time, less than 20 percent of American homes owned a television set.⁴² The percentage was much the same in Great Britain.⁴³ Satellite technology for transmission of video images had not yet been invented. This meant film shot by news teams in Korea needed to be transported by aircraft back to studios in the United States or Great Britain before it could be broadcast. Under these conditions immediacy or the delivery of “breaking news” was impossible because the equipment to do so only existed on the pages of science fiction magazines. However, this situation suited the military because of concerns that operational security would be compromised by sensitive information such as troop movements being “leaked” to the media and immediately broadcast were non-existent. The result was an era in which the broadcast media and the military operated in a relative state of harmonious co-existence. This harmony ended after telephone links were established between Korea and the U.S. enabling correspondents to deliver live audio reports from the war zone. In August of 1950, CBS reported an infantry landing as it was in-progress. This live report sent shock waves through the upper ranks of the military which claimed operational security had

⁴² "Television." The World Book Encyclopedia. Chicago: World Book Inc., (2003) p. 119.
<http://hypertextbook.com/facts/2007/TamaraTamazashvili.shtml>

⁴³ Bain, A.D. "The Growth of Television Ownership in the United Kingdom", *International Economic Review*, 3, (1962.)

been breached. The media, as is generally the case, countered that the public had a right to the information as soon as it was available.⁴⁴

Press coverage of warfare and military attempts to censor that coverage was not a new phenomenon. Throughout world history military leaders have attempted and at times succeeded in limiting press accessibility to combat zones. As the technology available to the media improved, the ease and speed of transmitting news from the front increased exponentially. From this point forward, technological advances would only serve to intensify the struggle between the military's ability to wage war and television's ability to cover the battle.

Attempts at press censorship were not exclusive to the American military. During the 1956 **Suez Crisis** which followed Egypt's decision to nationalize the Suez Canal, British broadcast correspondents were only allowed limited access to the war zone and all media reports bound for radio and television were first cleared by military censors. All media operating in the war zone were also assigned a public relations officer or a minder, "Whose job it was to point the media in the right direction."⁴⁵

Labeled by most scholars as "America's first television war", **The Viet Nam War** dominated television news coverage more than any other event in that era, (1965 to 1975).⁴⁶ From 1965 to 1970, the height of American involvement in that war, nearly thirty percent of national news coverage--- per day--- was devoted to the Viet Nam

⁴⁴ The Museum of Broadcast Communications, "War On Television"
<http://www.museum.tv/eotvsection.php?entrycode=warontelevis> (accessed April 2012)

⁴⁵ Shaw, Tony Eden, *Suez and the Mass Media: Propaganda and Persuasion During the Suez Crisis*. (I.B. Tauris & Co. Ltd. 1996)

⁴⁶ Patterson, Oscar, "An Analysis of Television Coverage of the Vietnam War", *Journal of Broadcasting* Volume 28, issue 4, (1984)
<http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/08838158409386549>

War on the nightly network newscasts.⁴⁷ So important was the coverage of this conflict that the major broadcast networks, NBC, ABC and CBS went so far as to establish news bureaus in Saigon, the capital of South Viet Nam.

Technological advances including portable color cameras and lightweight sound equipment enabled news crews to provide viewers with powerfully dramatic and vivid images of warfare which had never before been broadcast on American television.

These images were usually delivered to T.V. sets in living rooms across the nation within 48 hours of the event. In a situation unique from all other wars, reporters had virtually complete and unencumbered access to the combat zones of Viet Nam. The sole requirements for media accreditation consisted of a valid passport, proper immunizations and a letter of certification from their home office.⁴⁸

Early coverage of the conflict tended to reflect official U.S. government declarations of military successes. However, as the war progressed, the tenor of the coverage changed dramatically as the media began to openly challenge American war policy. By the end of American involvement in 1975, many in the military were blaming negative news coverage for the loss of public support for the Viet Nam War. The media in turn blamed the military for attempting to mislead the public about the war. The end result was a mutual mistrust that would, from that point forward, have an impact on all media coverage of future military conflicts.⁴⁹

⁴⁷ Bailey, George, "Television War: Trends in Network Coverage of Vietnam 1965-1970" *The Journal of Broadcasting and Electronic Media*. (Spring, 1976)
<http://heinonline.org.proxyum.researchport.umd.edu/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/jbem20&id=149&collection=usjournals&index=journals/jbem>

⁴⁸ Newseum, "War Reporting and Technology" .
<http://www.newseum.org/warstories/technology/flash.htm> (accessed April 2012)

⁴⁹ Hallin, Daniel C., *The Uncensored War: The Media and Vietnam*, (University of California Press, 1986)

The 1982 **Falklands/Malvinas War**, in which Great Britain successfully regained control of the South Atlantic islands that Argentina's military government had invaded has been mockingly described as “the worst reported war since the Crimean War”.⁵⁰ Media reports from the war zone were tightly controlled by the British government. There were no direct television transmission links available and for the first 54 days of the 74 day war no photos that had been taken by members of the British media were published.⁵¹ “Reports were censored, delayed, and occasionally lost.”

This caused relations between the press and the British Navy to sour, become tense and uncooperative. In one instance, two British correspondents who had prefaced their news stories by stating that they were being censored had that very fact censored from their reports.⁵²

Post Viet Nam, three notable “small scale” American military operations were launched, each tainted by the atmosphere of mistrust that now lingered between the military and the media.

Operation Urgent Fury was the controversial October 1983 mission that followed a bloody coup on the island nation of Grenada. The mission was launched under the guise of rescuing U.S medical students caught in the crossfire on that Caribbean island. However, it also provided the Reagan administration with an excuse to eliminate a Marxist regime allied to Fidel Castro's Cuba.⁵³ During this operation the U.S. military was said to be so concerned with potential negative coverage they

⁵⁰ Barnes, Julian. “The Worst Reported War since the Crimean”, *The Guardian*, (February 24, 2002) <http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/2002/feb/25/broadcasting.falklands>. (accessed April 2012)

⁵¹ Newseum, “War Reporting and Technology”. <http://www.newseum.org/warstories/technology/flash.htm> (accessed April 2012)

⁵² Barnes, Julian. “The Worst Reported War since the Crimean”.

⁵³ “The Invasion of Grenada”, <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/americanexperience/features/general-article/reagan-grenada/> (accessed March 2011)

attempted to eliminate all media participation in the invasion. In fact, all civilian reporters were excluded entirely from the invasion force.

This virtual media blackout resulted in a firestorm of criticism from news organizations and members of Congress that forced the Pentagon to adopt a pool system that was to be activated during future U.S. military operations.⁵⁴ In a “pool system” a limited number of news media are allowed to cover an event or specified activity with the stipulation that they then must share or distribute their reporting of that event as well as any audio or video they have gathered with all the other members of the pool. Grenada still stands as the first American military operation ever to exclude the press with the explicit aim of assuring that only the official version of combat was released to the public.⁵⁵

By most accounts this newly created pool operation failed during its first deployment as part of **Operation Just Cause**. In December of 1989, U.S. military forces invaded Panama with orders to depose Dictator Manuel Noriega and restore a democratic form of government to that strategic ally. Ahead of the invasion, the U.S. military activated an American press pool for the first time but failed to provide the logistics necessary to have reporters accompany troops into battle.

One member of the press pool reported that by the time reporters were able to gain access and conduct independent inquiries, the action was largely over and to the extent the media “got any news at all, it was pretty much by accident.”⁵⁶

⁵⁴ Singh, Anil Kumar, *Military and Media*, (Lancer Publishers and Distributors , 2006)

⁵⁵ Denniston, Lyle. “Planning for Future Grenadas” . *The Quill*, (January,1984)

⁵⁶ Carpenter, Ted Galen. *The Captive Press: Foreign Policy Crises and the First Amendment*. (The Cato Institute, 1995).

Operation Desert Storm was launched in 1991 to liberate Kuwait from Iraqi forces that had invaded and incorporated that nation as Iraq's 19th province. As in previous wars, a pool system was implemented and the media once again needed to rely on military forces for access to the battlefield. This pool system restricted journalists to group meetings with selected military units under the accompaniment of a military minder. The military also instituted a security-review procedure which dictated the media were allowed no "unilateral coverage" and at times pool coverage of events and that all stories and photographs had to be cleared by the Pentagon.⁵⁷

The American military showcased the war as a marvel of U.S. military technology, providing television with official footage of precision guided missile strikes. Patriot missiles were shown streaking into the sky, jet fighters were launched from the decks of aircraft carriers and smart bomb videos were replayed incessantly at military news briefings. All of this "war porn" made ideal televisual images but very few journalists had up close access to the battlefield where real people were actually dying during the ground invasion that roused Iraq from Kuwait.⁵⁸

In 1992's **Operation Restore Hope**, scores of international media positioned themselves in Somalia to cover a year's long factional civil war that inflicted starvation and intense suffering upon millions of innocent Somalis attempting to flee the battle zones. Coverage of this conflict was unique because these journalists were able to maintain a degree of independence and operate freely throughout the country. They were not forced to rely on the military for communications and logistical support.

This unfettered access created the bizarre situation whereby U.S. Marines came ashore in Somalia only to be confronted-- not by the enemy-- but by "one of the most surreal interactions between military personnel and television crews" ever witnessed

⁵⁷ Tobin, Brian. *The United States at War, Censorship in the Gulf War*, (Salem Press. 2005)
http://salempress.com/store/samples/us_at_war/us_at_war_censorship_gulf_war.htm

⁵⁸ Jeffords, Susan. *Seeing Through the Media: the Persian Gulf War*. (Rutgers University Press. 1994).

on live television. As the initial wave of U.S. forces made a nighttime landing on Somali beaches they were fully illuminated by the television lights of the international news organizations waiting for their arrival.⁵⁹

Literature Written on Iraq War Television Coverage

As stated earlier, In “*The Enemy Within*”, Michael Massing argues that the second Iraq War remains the most important and controversial story covered by the U.S. press in a generation. “It showcased the media's strengths as well as its many weaknesses...especially the way in which political realities shape, define, and ultimately limit what Americans see and read.”⁶⁰ The set of events that ranged from Powell’s appearance at the U.N. to the invasion and capture of Baghdad were perfect news stories for the television networks to cover. The time frame in which these events occurred was short enough to allow television to devote considerable manpower and resources to it and the Pentagon and British Ministry of Defense provided journalists with front row seats to the action.⁶¹

In most every piece of literature written about media coverage of the run-up and initial stages of the Iraq War, American journalists have been criticized for their patriotic “boosterism”. Many authors maintained there were profound differences in the tone and manner in which British and American reporters framed that conflict. Some researchers attributed the patriotism displayed by the American press to a desire to

⁵⁹ Museum of Broadcast Communications. “War on Television”
<http://www.museum.tv/eotvsection.php?entrycode=warontelevis> (accessed April, 2012)

⁶⁰ Massing, Michael. The Press: The Enemy Within. The New York Review of Books. December 15, 2005. <http://www.readability.com/articles/shuqkthi>

⁶¹ Lewis, Justin. Television, Public Opinion and the War In Iraq. The Case of Britain. *International Journal of Public Opinion Research* Vol. 16. No. 3. (2004).

appear patriotic in a time of national crisis. One of the key challenges journalists encounter when covering a war in which their home nation is involved is how to provide a balance between patriotism and neutrality. According to many authors, finding this balance was especially challenging for American journalists covering the march to war with Iraq.

One often stated explanation for this challenge is that in late 2002, a perfect storm of international incidents was brewing, causing a unique convergence of events. These events included the 9/11 terrorist attacks, a fear of further terrorist attacks, the war in Afghanistan and an administration lead by President Bush who had defiantly proclaimed to the world, "You are either with us or with the terrorists".⁶² Left in its wake were journalists who, when asking probing questions of the Bush or Blair governments about their rationale for a war with Iraq, were labeled as unpatriotic, or worse, accused of siding with the enemy. "Who can forget when simply questioning the evidence of WMD made you appear weak kneed --even 'French.'" ⁶³ Other forms of pressure also effectively inhibited the press. The President held few press conferences and rarely submitted to truly open exchanges. The Bush administration, very disciplined and well known its secrecy, deftly managed to employ the threat of denied access as a means of intimidating journalists who dared step out of line.

This threat of denied access included an end to one-on-one interviews with government officials, being frozen out or ignored in press conference question-and-answer sessions and threats of exclusion from important presidential trips.⁶⁴ It seemed as though the reporters who stayed in Washington, not the reporters who

⁶² Dowd, Maureen, *Bushworld: Enter at Your Own Risk*. (The Berkeley Publishing Group. 2004).

⁶³ Mitchell, Greg, *So Wrong for So Long: How the Press, the Pundits--and the President--Failed on Iraq*. (Sterling Publishing. 2008)

⁶⁴ Schell, Orville. "Why the Press Failed". *TomDispatch.com*. (Published July 14, 2004). <http://www.commondreams.org/cgi-bin/print.cgi?file=/views04/0714-16.htm> (accessed April 2012)

were travelling with the troops in Iraq, were the “embedded” ones forced to operate under fear of censorship or sanctions for stepping out of line.⁶⁵

Lehmann wrote that at times such as 9/11 when a nation is in a period of acute crisis and feels itself directly and continuously threatened, the political leadership can more easily enlist the media in building support for its policies. “The media, especially those in the nation’s capital, accept governmental cues with less skepticism than in more “normal” times.”⁶⁶

In “*Reporting War, Journalism in Wartime*”, Allen and Barbie suggest it is precisely at times like these that, “A reporter’s sense of national identity, however defined, needs to be considered in a way that sheds light both on how it can underpin journalism’s strengths while, simultaneously, recognizing the constraints it can impose on the integrity of practice.”⁶⁷ Most of the literature on media coverage has criticized the American press for not finding the balance that Allen refers to, at least in the run up and initial stages of the war. In “*So Wrong for So Long*”, Greg Mitchell sharply chastised the American media for, at first, aiding in persuading the nation war was necessary and then for waiting too many years before attempting to point the way out. In a twist on the famous Will Rogers quote, “The first thing you do when you find yourself in a hole is to stop digging,” Mitchell wrote, “In regard to the Iraq catastrophe, the media not only helped create the hole, it did not do enough to help America dig out.”⁶⁸ Continuing his condemnation of journalists whom he felt did not ask enough

⁶⁵ Lewis, Justin. “Television, Public Opinion and the War In Iraq”.

⁶⁶ Lehmann, Ingrid A. *Exploring the Transatlantic Media Divide over Iraq: How and Why U.S and German Media Differed in Reporting on U.N. Weapons Inspections in Iraq: 2002-2003* (Joan Shorenstein Center on the Press, Politics and Public Policy, 2005)

⁶⁷ Allen, Stuart & Zelizer Barbie, *Reporting War: Journalism in Wartime*. (Routledge. 2004)

⁶⁸ Mitchell, Greg, *So Wrong for So Long: How the Press, the Pundits--and the President--Failed on Iraq*. (Sterling Publishing. 2008)

tough questions of government officials thereby shirking their responsibilities, Mitchell advised, "What journalists need to know is that 'governments lie', better to be overly skeptical than overly credulous."⁶⁹

In "*Beyond the Front Lines*", Philip Seib claimed the tendency to succumb to "boosterism" during times of war, while often common among members of the press corps, was at an abnormally high level during Iraq War coverage. "The Iraq war offered more than the usual amount of boosterism, partly because the competition among news organizations, especially on television, was so fierce."⁷⁰ The fierce competition was fueled by the growth of news on cable television. Cable TV siphoned from traditional networks what little remained of an ever shrinking pie of advertising revenue. Some observers claimed that in their effort to keep viewers from fleeing to cable, American network news began to choose style over substance. In "*Weapons of Mass Persuasion*", Paul Rutherford put a positive spin on this by writing that although its journalistic practices were open to criticism, television news at least succeed in serving up a dose of "infotainment" with its war coverage. "The news media did weave a series of sometimes compelling stories about the invasion, the weaponry, the coalition soldiers and the downfall of a regime."⁷¹ Justin Lewis believed the television networks, "Set the moral complexities and debates about the motives and justifications for war to one side as they focused on a war to topple the most demonized leader of recent times."⁷²

⁶⁹ Mitchell, Greg, *So Wrong for So Long*.

⁷⁰ Seib, Philip, *Beyond the Front Lines: How the News Media Cover a World Shaped by War*. (Palgrave Macmillan.2004).

⁷¹ Rutherford, Paul, *Weapons of Mass Persuasion: Marketing the War Against Iraq*. (University of Toronto Press. 2004)

⁷² Lewis, Justin. "Television, Public Opinion and the War In Iraq."

In early 2002, almost a year before Colin Powell's speech, military training for correspondents who would be covering a conflict with Iraq had already begun. Technological advances now made it easy and inexpensive for individual journalists to transmit material and provide live transmissions from virtually anywhere on the globe. Thus began a new chapter in the tumultuous relationship between the media and the military. As was the case with all previous conflicts, these new technologies forced the military to reassess its relationship with the media.⁷³ Admiral 'T' McCreary, the Navy's Chief of Information, recognized the landscape had shifted again, "Once somebody decides to start a war and you start shooting, from the uniform perspective we need the support of the American people for our troops and what better way for people to understand that than to put the face of the troops as the face of the war."⁷⁴

Lt. Col. Rick Long, former head of media relations for the U.S. Marine Corps, stated, "Frankly, our job is to win the war. Part of that is information warfare. So we are going to attempt to dominate the information environment."⁷⁵

This led to the creation of "embedding", a system in which U.S. and U.K. journalists would be assigned to specific military units and have the ability to report directly from the battlefield under combat conditions. However, there would be several preconditions to these arrangements. Before being assigned to a unit, the journalists intending to work as embeds were required to receive media boot camp training in preparation for rugged desert conditions and possible WMD attacks.

⁷³ Tumber, Howard & Palmer, Jerry. *Media at War: The Iraq Crisis*. (Sage Publications Ltd., 2004)

⁷⁴ Lewis, Justin, "Television , Public Opinion and the War in Iraq"

⁷⁵ Kahn, Jeffery, "*Postmortem: Iraq war media coverage dazzled but it also obscured*", UC Berkeley News,(March 18, 2004) http://www.berkeley.edu/news/media/releases/2004/03/18_iraqmedia.shtml

They were also required to sign an agreement not to broadcast or publish, “Specific information on friendly force troop movements, tactical deployments and dispositions which would jeopardize operational security or lives.”⁷⁶ But with its promise of dramatic and immediate coverage of coalition soldiers in action, embedding was quite attractive to most news organizations.⁷⁷ While there is nothing new about journalists travelling with military units, the scale and technological sophistication of the embed operation for the over 600 journalists taking part was unprecedented.⁷⁸ Some media observers worried that this arrangement would result in heavily jingoistic coverage, a loss of journalistic independence and objectivity and a fear that embeds would in effect “be in bed” with their units.⁷⁹ Others worried embedding would be yet another example of stage managed war coverage because of the military’s wish to control the ‘big picture’.

Military brass did openly hope it would lead to positive stories about individual soldiers, the type of stories that would engender support for the war by putting a human face on the American war effort.⁸⁰

Pentagon officials also acknowledged another public relations aspect of the program embeds would be using embeds to wage “information warfare” against Saddam Hussein. They believed embeds would act as independent observers on the ground

⁷⁶ Katovsky, Bill and Carlson, Timothy. *Embedded: The Media at War in Iraq*. (First Lyons Press. 2003.)

⁷⁷ Robinson, Piers; Goddard, Peter; Parry, Katy & Murray, Craig. “Testing Models of Media Performance in Wartime: U.K. TV News and the 2003 Invasion of Iraq.” *Journal of Communication*. (September 29, 2009).

⁷⁸ Lewis, Justin. “Television, Public Opinion and the War in Iraq: The Case of Britain”. *International Journal of Public Opinion Research*. Vol.16 No. 3. (2004)

⁷⁹ Aday, Sean; Livingston, Steve and Hebert, Maeve, “Embedding the Truth: A Cross Cultural Analysis of Objectivity and Television Coverage of the Iraq War”, *Harvard International Journal of Press/Politics*. (2005)

⁸⁰ Lewis, Justin. “Television, Public Opinion and the War in Iraq: The Case of Britain”. *International Journal of Public Opinion Research*. Vol.16 No. 3. (2004).

to counter any Iraqi claims that U.S. and Coalition forces had engaged in atrocities.⁸¹ Studies have shown that concerns journalists working as embeds would lose objective independence while reporting on their military units were not realized. An analysis conducted by Sean Aday, Steven Livingston, and Maeve Hebert entitled “*Embedding the Truth*”, found that although many media critics feared embedded journalists would adopt a form of “Stockholm Syndrome”, (sympathizing with their units and producing fawning coverage of the U.S. war effort), they determined there was no evidence to support these fears.

Aday and his co-authors established that, in fact, embedded reporters had among the highest percentage of neutral stories (91 percent) of any category of reporter⁸² and that embeds were no more likely than other reporters to be supportive in stories about battle, strategy, or tactics.⁸³

A study of British embeds by Justin Lewis found that during British television newscasts a majority of the news reports sent from the region were reports from embeds and, for the most part, British reporters were acutely aware of the need to maintain a sense of distance. Lewis found that few embeds experienced overt attempts to censor their reports. Not only did embedded reporters often provide accounts that contradicted official military claims, in important respects their reports did not differ significantly from those filed by reporters acting unilaterally.⁸⁴

Some media critics claimed the sanitized version of combat presented to western viewers distorted those viewer’s perceptions and understanding of war’s gruesome

⁸¹ Katovsky, Bill and Carlson, Timothy. *Embedded: The Media at War in Iraq*. (First Lyons Press. 2003)

⁸² The categories of reporters included embeds, unilaterals, those in fixed positions such as various nation’s capitals or those assigned to cover a specific government beat.

⁸³ Aday, Sean, et.al. “Embedding the Truth”.

⁸⁴ Lewis, Justin. “Television, Public Opinion and the War in Iraq: The Case of Britain” *International Journal of Public Opinion Research*. Vol.16 No. 3 (2004).

consequences to a much greater degree than stories produced by correspondents “in bed” with military units. While the U.S. networks focused “on the technologically advanced nature of the American military armada, the Arab and Muslim press tended to focus on the destruction and suffering visited on Iraq by this military armada.”⁸⁵

By early 2003, relatively inexpensive high tech tools developed for journalists operating in the field enabled the production and broadcast of these vastly different portrayals of the war. The revolutionary digital gear that America and her allies possessed was now also easily obtained by Middle Eastern broadcasters whose audience possessed very different perceptions of the events unfolding in their region of the world. This meant, for the first time, television news operations in Arab countries had the means to provide an alternative perspective of the conflict. Quite often Arab broadcasters offered a dramatically different narrative than that presented by their western counterparts.

This alternative “pro-Arab” point of view allowed start-up television networks such as Qatar based Al Jazeera the ability to wield tremendous influence over the Arab street and an ever growing Muslim audience.⁸⁶ In contrast to most western news broadcasts, Al Jazeera did not hesitate to show dead Iraqi soldiers and dead Iraqi civilians, including men, women and children.⁸⁷ Two iconic images illustrate the dramatically different manner in which this war was portrayed in the Arab world and in the west. “The American image was of Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein’s statue being toppled from its plinth in a Baghdad square—a symbol of victory. The Arab image,

⁸⁵ Sharkey, Jacqueline. “The Television War. Unparalleled Access and Breakthroughs in Technology Produced Riveting Live Coverage of the War in Iraq”, *American Journalism Review*, (May 2003). http://www.ajr.org/article_printable.asp?id=2988

⁸⁶ PBS Newshour. “A Different Language, Arab Media”. Broadcast April 16, 2003. http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/media/jan-june03/arabnews_04-06.html

⁸⁷ These types of reports were said to have infuriated the Pentagon, with retaliation coming in the form of two Al Jazeera news bureaus in the region being bombed by Coalition forces.

shown mostly in the Muslim world, was of an Iraqi woman digging with her bare hands a shallow grave for her husband and son---a symbol of suffering.”⁸⁸

Literature Written on Colin Powell’s U.N. Presentation and WMD

Much has been written about the “kid glove” treatment the American press offered Secretary Powell. In *“A Dubya in the Headlights: President George W. Bush and the Media”*, Joseph Hayden writes that since journalists trusted and admired Colin Powell, they were not predisposed to questioning his integrity or his presentation to the UN. According to Hayden, “The press wiggled out on Beatlemania” over Powell’s dramatic presentation. Hayden recounts the impression left by what he termed Powell’s “forensic tour-de-force” on the editor of a Pittsburgh newspaper. The editor wrote:

“I don’t know how the United Nations felt about Colin Powell’s ‘J accuse’ speech against Saddam Hussein. I can only say that he convinced me, and I was as tough as France to convince.”

Hayden writes that Hearst columnist Marianne Means recalled,

*“Until Secretary of State Powell’s convincing exposure of Iraq’s sneaky efforts to hide weapons of mass destruction, I was opposed to the administration’s sword-rattling. I believe Powell, Solid stuff.”*⁸⁹

In his critically acclaimed book *“Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq”*, Tom Ricks recounts similar reactions from journalists.

“Powell was one of the nation’s most trusted figures, especially to moderates and liberals. Liberal columnists such as Mary McGrory and (William) Raspberry, who would be highly skeptical of assertions by (Vice President) Cheney were more willing to listen to someone like Powell.” “What persuaded more than anything was Powell’s

⁸⁸ Knightly, Philip. *The First Casualty: The War Correspondent As Hero And Myth-maker From the Crimea to Iraq*. (The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2004)

⁸⁹ Hayden, Joseph R., *A Dubya in the Headlights: President George W. Bush and the Media*, (Lexington Books, 2009)

personal credibility 'he persuaded me', Mary McGrory wrote in the Washington Post immediately after Powell's speech...Around the country, other editorials were even more glowing. 'Impressive' said the San Francisco Chronicle. 'Masterful' said the Hartford Courant."⁹⁰

In his presentation to the U.N., Powell claimed Iraq maintained a robust WMD program. Although this claim would later prove to be false, at the time it was used repeatedly by the Bush administration as the foundation for launching the war on Iraq. In her on-line study "*Media Coverage of Weapons of Mass Destruction*", Susan Moeller suggests the reasons the Bush administration was able to frame an agenda based on WMD were due in part to the climate of fear in the U.S. after the September 11th terrorist attacks. "Media reporting on the President amplified the administration's voice: when Bush said to the country that Americans are vulnerable to WMD in the hands of terrorists, the media effectively magnified those fears." The net effect of this was to keep the administration's message dominant.

The "inverted pyramid" style of news presentation often used by journalists helped the White House shape news coverage. In this method, reporters create a story that leads with a statement by the most "important" player, (for instance the President or the Prime Minister). According to Moeller, many journalists think inverted pyramid journalism is impartial, ("just the facts, ma'am") reporting", when in effect it is anything but "objective".⁹¹

Moeller writes, "The tendency of the U.S. media to lead with the most "important" information and the most "important" players gave greater weight to the administration's point of view on WMD issues, at the expense of alternative perspectives, which were deemed less important because they were unofficial. Many stories "stenographically" reported the administration's perspective on WMD, giving too little critical examination of the way officials framed the events, issues, threats

⁹⁰ Ricks, Thomas E., *Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq*, (Penguin Press, 2006)

⁹¹ Moeller, Susan D., "*Media Coverage of Weapons of Mass Destruction*", Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland. (March, 2004) <http://www.cissm.umd.edu/papers/display.php?id=32>

and policy options. When journalists did take on the administration, especially when the White House's perspective formed the "conventional wisdom", their stories were often buried or their criticism was more implicit than explicit."⁹²

"Established operating principles of the American media make it easier for the incumbent President to dominate news coverage by setting the terms of public discussion."⁹³

Moeller's research suggested that although the U.S. and U.K. coverage tended to repeat the Bush administration's assertion that a core objective of the "War on Terror" was to prevent WMD from falling into the hands of terrorists, the British reported more critically on public policy than did their American colleagues. "The British press folded in more news "analysis" and even commentary into stories that in the U.S. were treated in an inverted-pyramid-style, breaking news fashion." The U.S. media presented relatively few alternative perspectives to those of the White House partly because U.S. politicians and other Americans critical of the Bush administration supported President Bush's declaration and articulation of the "War on Terror".

Moeller suggests that U.K. journalists openly disputed the messages and the assertions of the Bush administration about the purported Iraqi WMD while American reporters appeared more muted in their coverage — most often relying on quotations from Democratic politicians to make the opposing case.⁹⁴

⁹² Moeller, Susan D., "Media Coverage of Weapons of Mass Destruction"

⁹³ Moeller, Susan D., "Media Coverage of Weapons of Mass Destruction".

⁹⁴ Moeller, Susan D., "Media Coverage of Weapons of Mass Destruction".

Summary

Marshall McLuhan notably observed that, "The Viet Nam war was lost in the living rooms of America, not on the battlefields of Vietnam." McLuhan's writings are often cited by those who believe television can, and in fact did, play an influential role in shaping viewer's perceptions of that war. According to McLuhan, "Television brought the brutality of war into the comfort of the living room".⁹⁵

Others disagree with McLuhan's observations and claim that the influence of television in shaping public opinion and Viet Nam War policy has been dramatically overstated. These observers believe the press did not so much create public opposition as reflect it.

Edward Bickham served as former Special Advisor to Former British Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd during the first Gulf War.

"As a medium (television) plays too much to the heart and too little to the head. It presents powerful, emotive images, which conjure strong reactions. Anecdotes about individual suffering make compelling television, but they rarely form a good basis to make policy. Foreign policy should be made by democratic governments... not in

⁹⁵ McLuhan, Marshall, The Montreal Gazette. May 16, 1975.

reaction to which trouble spots the news gathering organizations can afford to cover from time to time.”⁹⁶

Whether or not television coverage influences government policy or merely reflects those policies continues to be debated among scholars and authors. The question as to whether or not television coverage played a role in shaping public perceptions of the prelude to war, Colin Powell’s presentation at the U.N. and the war with Iraq which followed remains unanswered. However, the power of a televised video image to create a visual and emotional experience for the viewer remains the dominant force in generating public awareness.

This thesis, as far as I have been able to ascertain from my research, is the first systematic comparison of American and British television news coverage of Secretary Powell’s presentation. In interviews I conducted while researching this topic, several British journalists told me they believe Americans are, by their very nature, optimistic while the people of Great Britain are deeply skeptical—almost to the point of being cynical. As a result, the British believed their journalistic coverage of Powell’s speech was more skeptical and hard hitting than that of their American counterparts.

The findings of my research suggest when it came to American and British television coverage of Colin Powell’s U.N. presentation, these assumptions were not supported.

⁹⁶ Bickham, Edward “Playing To the Heart of the Nation,” *Spectrum*, (Autumn 1993).

Chapter 3: Hypothesis and Research Questions

A number of scholars who have analyzed news coverage of 20th Century wars concluded the following: When a western democracy goes to war, its news media initially tend to reflect the positions of the government and the sentiments of its citizens.⁹⁷ When the branches of government and public opinion are in sync, the mainstream news media will tend to echo rather than question these prevailing opinions.⁹⁸ But when the branches of government and the opinions of its citizens are divided, news coverage of the rationale for and the conduct of a war will be more skeptical, reflecting the divisions within the government and society.⁹⁹

⁹⁷ Entman, Robert M. , *Projections of Power: Framing News, Public Opinion, and U.S. Foreign Policy*, (University of Chicago Press, 2004)

⁹⁸ In "Visualizing Deviance, A Study of News Organizations" the authors note that "the media serve to construct an order that is consonant with the needs and interests of dominant groups" Baranek, Patricia,; Chan, Janet and Ericson, Richard, *Visualizing Deviance: A Study of News Organization*, (University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 1987,).

⁹⁹ Entman, Robert, . *Projections of Power*.

This thesis examines whether or not American and British television news coverage reflected these tendencies in their coverage of Colin Powell's pre-war presentation to the United Nations Security Council detailing U.S. claims that Iraq possessed and was hiding weapons of mass destruction in defiance of U.N. mandates that it disarm itself of these weapons. As noted earlier, this war was initiated by the Bush Administration and was initially supported overwhelmingly by Congress and the American public.¹⁰⁰

In Great Britain there was no such consensus. According to opinion polls taken at the start of the war in 2003, only 29 percent of the British public supported taking military action against Iraq.¹⁰¹ Yet despite this opposition, Prime Minister Tony Blair led his nation into the war while echoing the Bush Administration's rationale.

Blair also did so while strong elements within the three major British political parties, his own Labour Party, the Liberal Democratic Party and the Conservative Party opposed his actions and stridently voiced their objections in Parliament.¹⁰²

Hypothesis

¹⁰⁰ Gallup News Service. "Seventy-Two Percent of Americans Support War Against Iraq, Bush approval up 13 points to 71%". Gallup Poll released March 24, 2003.
<http://www.gallup.com/poll/8038/seventytwo-percent-americans-support-war-against-iraq.aspx>

¹⁰¹ "Blair's Popularity Plummets", *The Guardian*, February 17, 2003.
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2003/feb/18/politics.iraq>

¹⁰² Smith, Philip, *Why War? The Cultural Logic of Iraq, the Gulf War, and Suez*, (University of Chicago Press, 2005)

My hypothesis in this study is that television news coverage of Colin Powell's appearance would reflect these Anglo-American contrasts. In other words, U.S. television news coverage would strongly reinforce the Bush Administration frames in reporting on Secretary Powell's presentation to the United Nations, but British television news coverage would be more skeptical. In order to examine the validity of my hypothesis, I set out to answer the following research questions:

Research Questions:

1. How did the Bush administration specifically frame the story leading up to Colin Powell's appearance before the United Nations Security Council on February 5, 2003?
2. To what extent did American television news coverage reinforce these frames? To what extent did this coverage raise questions about these frames?
3. To what extent did British television news coverage reinforce these frames? To what extent did this coverage raise questions about these frames?
4. How effective was the Bush administration in setting its news agenda via Powell's presentation in the U.S. and British media?
5. Was the British television news coverage more skeptical than the American coverage?
6. What are the most plausible explanations for similarities and/or difference in the news coverage?

Research Methods

The core of this study is a qualitative content analysis examining how, over a five day period, American and British television nightly network news broadcasts framed U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell's February 5, 2003 presentation to the United Nations Security Council. The objective of this analysis was to assess the degree to which the networks utilized the frames promoted by the Bush administration. I reviewed official government statements, news reports quoting official government sources and editorials authored by members of the Bush administration, all of which preceded Powell's presentation, in order to identify the specific frames advanced by the administration.

I determined the Bush administration was pushing three main frames—the themes repeated most often in their preliminary statements:

#1: Colin Powell is highly trustworthy, thoroughly prepared, effective and credible.

#2: Colin Powell will present/presented strong evidence that Iraq possessed or was acquiring WMDs.

#3: Powell will present/presented evidence of a link between the Iraqi government and Al Qaeda.

Two coders, myself and a colleague, (a television news producer with several years of experience producing network television news stories) analyzed the newscasts of American networks ABC, NBC, CBS and British network ITV that aired during the week which began Monday February 3rd and ended Friday February 7th of 2003. This one week period was chosen in order to ascertain the manner in which each network previewed Powell's appearance, reported on his actual presentation and then analyzed and dissected his evidence in the two days which followed. We determined that 63 individual news stories and live reports from journalists on location in Iraq, the

United States and Great Britain made reference to Powell's presentation. These 63 stories were then partitioned into 708 individual "sentences".¹⁰³ I collected and studied the "sentences" from each news story that mentioned frame number one. I tallied the number of these sentences that, #1, Endorsed the frame. #2, Were neutral or disseminated information about the frame without editorializing. #3, Raised questions about the validity of the frame. I went through the same process with "sentences" that mentioned frames two and three.

Why These Networks Were Chosen For Study

This study examined the coverage of Powell's presentation that appeared on the primary evening news broadcasts of American networks, CBS, ABC and NBC and the British network ITV.

NBC Nightly News is the flagship evening television news program of the NBC television network. **ABC World News Tonight** is the flagship evening news program of the ABC television network. **CBS Evening News** is the flagship evening television news program of the CBS television network. Each of these news programs were broadcast live by most of their affiliated stations on weeknights between 6:00 p.m. and 7:00 p.m. Eastern time. In the early stages of the Iraq War, NBC Nightly News had an average viewership of 11.4 million viewers, ABC's World News Tonight registered 9.9 million viewers and the CBS Evening News registered just over 8 million viewers per newscast.¹⁰⁴

ITV News at 10 is the flagship nightly news presentation of Britain's ITV network. Broadcast later at night, (10 p.m.) than the American newscasts, it is produced by

¹⁰³ For analytical purposes, each news story was broken down into individual sentences. For instance an ABC News story stated: " Secretary Powell will play audiotapes of intercepted communications between Iraqi officials, who are said to be talking about "hiding things." The tapes are in Arabic and will be translated during Powell's speech. It is highly unusual for audio intercepts to be released." This paragraph was then partitioned into three individual sentences.

¹⁰⁴ Nielsen Media Research, 2003, <http://stateofthemediamedia.org/2004/network-tv-intro-2/audience/>

ITV's news content provider Independent Television News of London (ITN).¹⁰⁵ During the early stages of the Iraq war ITV News at 10 had nightly viewership of approximately 4.7 million viewers.¹⁰⁶

These four news programs were chosen for comparison for a variety of reasons. They are the primary daily news broadcasts for their networks and are supported by advertising revenue. Each had viewership figures numbering in the in the millions.¹⁰⁷ All of these newscasts were generally thirty minutes in length. This study omitted the other British broadcast network, BBC, for two reasons. BBC News is government funded, thus is not subject to the same mix of pressures as the commercial networks. Furthermore, the BBC does not make available to the public transcripts or video of the newscasts broadcast during this time period thus making a transcript comparison with the other networks impossible.¹⁰⁸ News providers such as CNN, MSNBC, Fox News and Britain's Sky News were not included because they are cable outlets. Their viewership figures were considerably smaller in comparison to the broadcast networks selected for this study.

It is difficult to compare cable news programming with a network evening newscast. Cable news offers a continuous news broadcast (sometimes referred to as "rolling

¹⁰⁵The author of this thesis, Chris Shlemon, has worked as a senior producer/editor in the Washington DC bureau of ITN since 1986. He covered the Powell presentation to the United Nations in 2003.

¹⁰⁶ Independent Television Commission, "Massive Increase in TV Audience During War", (October 21, 2003)
http://www.ofcom.org.uk/static/archive/itc/uploads/Massive_Increase_in_TV_news_audiences_during_war.pdf

¹⁰⁷ ITV also airs an early evening newscast but its 10 pm bulletin is regarded as their flagship presentation. <http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b007mpic>

¹⁰⁸ Numerous phone calls and e-mails to the BBC video library and its news desk in London were made in an attempt to obtain transcripts or video of their February 2003 broadcasts. All requests for material were refused.

news”) that is stretched throughout the day. By contrast, the nightly network newscasts are only offered once per day. This is an important distinction because a single newscast forces a unique and difficult task upon the producers, editors and journalists charged with producing these programs. Of the multitude of news events that occur in a single day, they must decide which select few were the most compelling and interesting. They must then determine the most important aspects and salient points of those selected few stories and produce and edit the stories into a coherent newscast of less than 30 minutes (when commercial breaks are factored in).

Through these editorial decisions, the journalists, consciously or unconsciously, are framing the story. Framing is a device commonly utilized by journalists to interpret and provide context to a particular story. As scholars have defined it, in the world of journalism framing news stories, “Is a question of slant, structure, emphasis, selection, word choice and context,”¹⁰⁹ and the method reporters use to “bundle key concepts, stock phrases, and iconic images to reinforce certain common ways of interpreting developments.”¹¹⁰ The impact of these decisions on viewers cannot be ignored. Many scholars have determined that issues which receive extended coverage by national news organizations become more important to viewers while issues which are ignored lose credibility.¹¹¹

¹⁰⁹ Cappella, Joseph & Jamieson, Kathleen Hall, *Spiral of Cynicism: The Press and the Public Good*. (Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 57

¹¹⁰ Norris, Pippa and Just, Marian, *Framing Terrorism, The News Media The Government and the Public*, (Routledge, 2003)

¹¹¹ Scholars theorize that specific news story selection, otherwise referred to as “agenda setting” by the mass media is the process by which mass media present certain issues frequently and prominently resulting in large segments of the public perceiving those same issues as more important than others. This theory was originally developed by Maxwell McCombs and Donald Shaw in their groundbreaking

Limitations of this Research

This study has several limitations which will make my conclusions tentative.

Because I am analyzing a relatively small number of news reports, my numerical findings are essentially qualitative. They lack statistical significance, although they provide insights and a starting point for further research.

Written transcripts provide only a single dimension of what was a multi-dimensional event. Therefore, the greatest limitation of this study was the inability to capture and compare the nuances of the audio and visual elements involved in a television news story. Everything a television viewer experiences-- seeing and hearing a government official speaking, various facial expressions, the tone of a reporter's voice, the multitude of video images which are edited into the news piece and the background sounds that accompany those images-- are what make a television news story distinctive from a newspaper or radio story.

work, "*The Agenda Setting Function of Mass Media*". "Agenda setting" has been the subject of such a vast amount of additional scholarly research that is too voluminous to mention here.

The use of only one British television network necessitates caution in drawing cross-national comparisons.

Limiting the study to coverage of Powell's speech is another clear limitation. Further study would be needed to determine if the coverage patterns I perceived are also present in coverage of other key events in the run-up, outbreak, and fighting of the Iraq war. Some media observers claim the British were quicker than the Americans to recognize the Iraqi insurgency and to dispute the Bush administration claims that all was going well after the combat phase of the war had ended. Further study and research would have enabled a comparison of coverage to see if the critics were correct.

Confining the study to broadcast outlets is a similar limitation. More study is needed to determine if the patterns I perceived in broadcast coverage were also evident in other news media.

Future Research

The scope of this research was very limited and cannot be generalized beyond this single case. Examining only the ABC, CBS, NBC and ITV television coverage of Colin Powell's appearance before the U.N. offers only a snapshot in time, an incomplete picture of the media coverage of a much larger and complex event. The coding of a much greater number of news broadcasts aired by a greater variety of media outlets encompassing the build up to the war, WMD claims by the American and British governments, the military campaign, the post war occupation and the insurgency which followed is required. Only then can a fuller determination be made as to whether the British broadcast media were more adversarial and exercised a greater degree of autonomy than their American counterparts--- and if so, how those differences affected the coverage.

Chapter 4:

Powell's Presentation,

The Key Moment of Public Salesmanship for the War

In the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, the administrations of American President George W. Bush and British Prime Minister Tony Blair declared the greatest threat to world security was posed by Iraq in the person of Saddam Hussein. In order to eliminate the threat, government officials in the U.K. and the U.S. began constructing a case for war. President Bush frequently stated America remained vulnerable to further terrorist attacks, a hostile regime in Iraq was willing to share their WMD or weapons of mass destruction (chemical, biological, nuclear technology) with terrorists and that preemptive action was the only method of prevention. The President laid the groundwork for American action in a televised address to the nation in the fall of 2002.

“We have seen that those who hate America are willing to crash airplanes into buildings full of innocent people,” Bush said. “Our enemies would be no less willing, in fact they would be eager, to use biological or chemical or a nuclear weapon. Facing clear evidence of peril, we cannot wait for the final proof, the smoking gun that could come in the form of a mushroom cloud.”¹¹²

Prime Minister Tony Blair stated, “Given the post 9/11 climate, if there was any possibility that Saddam Hussein could develop weapons of mass destruction, we would stop him.”¹¹³

The stage was now set for Colin Powell and the pivotal moment in the run up to war. Heavily promoted in advance by the Bush administration as a high tech secret intelligence “show and tell” containing information prepared by America’s premier spy agencies, Powell’s presentation was framed by the administration as the event which would reveal definitive evidence that Iraq continued to produce and conceal an arsenal of weapons of mass destruction in open defiance of UN mandates. “It was intended to be the Bush administration’s most compelling case for war made by, arguably, their most credible spokesman.” George Bush believed it was only Powell who had the credibility to lay the evidence before the American people and the world. “We’ve really got to make the case against Hussein and I want you to make it” President Bush said to Powell during an Oval Office meeting before his U.N. appearance.¹¹⁴

¹¹² President Bush delivered an address to the nation from Cincinnati, Ohio on October 7, 2002 in which he outlined his views on the Iraqi threat.
<http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB80/new/doc%2012/President%20Bush%20Outlines%20Iraqi%20Threat.htm>

¹¹³ Former British Prime Minister Tony Blair appeared before Britain’s Official Iraq Inquiry on January 29, 2010 to give testimony explaining his government’s rationale for going to war with Iraq.
<http://www.iraqinquiry.org.uk/media/45139/20100129-blair-final.pdf>

¹¹⁴ De Young, Karen, “Falling on His Sword”, *Washington Post*, (October 1, 2006)

At the request of the President, Powell entered the U.N Security Council chamber accompanied by CIA Director George Tenet on the morning of February 5, 2003. They brought secretly recorded audio tapes, satellite images, a vial of simulated anthrax and reports from Iraqi defectors. In his book, *“Legacy of Ashes, The History of the CIA”*, Tim Weiner writes, “Colin Powell had spent days and nights with Tenet, checking and rechecking the CIA's reporting. Tenet looked him in the eye and told him it was rock solid.”¹¹⁵ With CIA Director Tenet sitting at his shoulder, Powell told the Council members and a worldwide television audience,

"Every statement I make today is backed up by sources, solid sources. These are not assertions. What we are giving you are facts and conclusions based on solid intelligence. There can be no doubt that Saddam Hussein has biological weapons and he has the ability to dispense these lethal poisons and diseases in ways that can cause massive death and destruction."

Powell went on to detail a “sinister nexus” between Baghdad and the Al Qaeda terrorist network, stating that Iraq's denials of any ties with the organization were not credible.¹¹⁶

We now know Powell’s high-profile presentation included several claims-- Iraqi links to Al Qaeda, hidden biological weapons and a nuclear arms program-- which have since been discredited. In fact much of the evidence revealed by Powell in his attempt to convince the world military action against Iraq was necessary was false. Iraq did not possess movable biological weapons facilities, was not involved in a "sinister nexus" with al-Qaeda and no evidence of active WMD production facilities or usable stockpiles was ever found. ¹¹⁷

¹¹⁵ Weiner, Tim, *Legacy of Ashes, The History of the CIA*, (Doubleday, 2007)

¹¹⁶ United Nations News Centre, “Powell presents U.S. Case to Security Council of Iraq's Failure to Disarm”, (February 5, 2003)

¹¹⁷ In his book, *‘It Worked For Me, In Life and Leadership’* (Harper Collins, 2012), Powell writes, "A failure will always be attached to me and my U.N. presentation," "I am mad mostly at myself for not having smelled the problem. My instincts failed me." He also faulted U.S. intelligence officers for lacking the "courage" to alert him that he was receiving bad data on Iraqi WMD. "Why did no one stand up and speak out during the intense hours we worked on the speech?" “Some of these same analysts

Evaluating the News Coverage

“Paramount among the responsibilities of a free press is the duty to prevent any part of the government from deceiving the people and sending them off to distant lands to die of foreign fevers and foreign shot and shell”. (Justice Hugo Black)¹¹⁸

The public relies on the media to separate facts and tangible realities from assumptions and spin.¹¹⁹ Critics of American news coverage have suggested that in reporting on Powell’s presentation the American press effectively acted as a mouthpiece for the Bush administration, bought into Powell’s presentation “lock, stock, and barrel”¹²⁰ and did not sufficiently investigate the evidence he presented while the British media appeared more skeptical of his claims concerning Iraqi WMD.

later wrote books claiming they were shocked that I had relied on such deeply flawed evidence." Powell said he relied on the CIA to help develop his U.N. presentation but that he was not aware at the time that "much of the evidence was wrong."

In an interview promoting his book, Powell explained, “I had every assurance in the intelligence community that the information in that speech, which we went over and over for four straight days and nights, was solid. It was the same information that had been presented to Congress. It was the basis upon which Congress had passed a resolution authorizing war if the president thought it necessary. It’s the same information the president had when he’d put similar things to what I said into the State of the Union address a few weeks before my speech. And so we all had that same base of knowledge but mine was the most visible, the most symbolic of all the presentations. And when I gave it, people stopped and listened. And so when it all started to come apart because the sourcing turned out not to be good and there were things in there that were simply wrong, with respect to the existence of WMD, I just watched it all fall apart before my eyes and I became sort of the symbol of it all. And I have been asked about it almost every day now for nine years. And I have to live with it.” *“What Colin Powell Learned From Iraq”*, U.S. News and World Report, June 14, 2012, <http://www.usnews.com/opinion/articles/2012/06/14/what-colin-powell-learned-from-iraq>

¹¹⁸ Concurring opinion by Supreme Court Justice Hugo Black in United States Supreme Court Decision “New York Times Co. vs. The United States”. (June, 1971). http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/historics/USSC_CR_0403_0713_ZC.html

¹¹⁹ Moeller, Susan D., “Media Coverage of Weapons of Mass Destruction”

¹²⁰ Kellner, Douglas, “The Media In and After 9/11”, *International Journal of Communication* (2007)

In their book “*Bring, ‘em On: Media and Politics in the Iraq War*”, Artz and Kamalipour suggest the American media deemed the Bush administration’s rhetorical appeals “newsworthy and legitimate” and as a result provided favorable coverage and promotion of the administration’s goals, often by dramatizing the same copy points emphasized by government speakers. “U.S. elite media coverage acted and reacted to the ongoing struggle for international power with noticeable allegiance to the American administration’s pronouncements.”¹²¹ Many observers believe the use of public relations or “propaganda” techniques was an essential part of the run-up to the war in Iraq and officials in the United Kingdom and the United States framed the issues, story lines and slogans to serve their purposes.¹²²

Gershkoff and Kushner write that issue frames affect beliefs and the relative importance individuals attach to beliefs and the media have an opportunity to shape public opinion through tone, content manipulation, and issue frames. “Since much of the media coverage of any political event prominently features quotes from political leaders and excerpts of official speeches, such media coverage gives public officials a second venue, beyond their direct pronouncement, from which to propagate their message.”¹²³

In March of 2004, one year after the invasion of Iraq by U.S. and international forces, ABC News correspondent Ted Koppel was asked to reflect on his network’s coverage of Powell’s appearance at the United Nations. Koppel said he did not believe there was a failure of American or British journalism to more thoroughly question Powell’s evidence. “I really think that (Powell) came to the U.N. and I have spoken to him

¹²¹ Artz., Lee and Yahya R. Kamalipour, Yahya R., *Bring ‘em On: Media And Politics In The Iraq War*, (Rowman and Littlefield Publishers Inc. 2005)

¹²² Hiebert, Eldon, “*Public Relations and Propaganda in Framing the Iraq War*”, (The Institute of Communications Studies, 2003)

¹²³ Gershkoff, Amy and Kushner, Shana,, “The 9/11-Iraq Connection in the Bush Administration’s Rhetoric”, *Shaping Public Opinion, September, 2005, Vol. 3/ No.3.*
https://sgadaria.expressions.syr.edu/wp-content/uploads/2012/03/Iraq-article_Gershkoff_Kushner.pdf

since then, both privately and on camera, and I'm absolutely convinced that when he went to the CIA and talked to analysts, examining photographs and documents himself, that when he sat down before the U.N. General Assembly, he was saying what he believed to be the truth."¹²⁴

In March of 2004 Former NBC News anchorman Tom Brokaw was asked the same question. "It was our responsibility to report on what he had said that day and frankly I had nothing that I could point to that was contrary to what he was testifying to."

"Part of our obligation is not just to be skeptical, but to present other evidence and in fact we didn't have anything that we could point to that said that he was dead wrong."¹²⁵

Never-the-less, critics claimed the American press, by not more thoroughly questioning Powell's claims, had been "duped", and in doing so, had assisted the Bush administration in duping the American public. Susan Moeller reported in her study of the media's coverage of WMD, "The U.S. media typically confirmed the Bush administration's political and diplomatic agenda setting. Through their reporting on the President, the media amplified the administration's voice, so when Bush said to the country that Americans are vulnerable to WMD in the hands of terrorists, the media effectively magnified those fears."¹²⁶

The Bush Administration's News Agenda

¹²⁴ Ted Koppel was interviewed by Chris Shlemon and an ITN colleague in the ABC Nightline studio of their Washington, D.C. Bureau in March of 2004 as part of a special report on the one year anniversary of the start of the Iraq War.

¹²⁵ Tom Brokaw was interviewed by ITN in the studio of NBC Nightly News in New York City in March of 2004 as part of a special report on the one year anniversary of the start of the Iraq War.

¹²⁶ Moeller, Susan D., "Media Coverage of Weapons of Mass Destruction".

If the coverage sample in the present study is any indication, the Bush administration appears to have been quite effective in setting the news topic agenda. This is evidenced by the fact that during the week of Powell's presentation, (Monday February 3rd through Friday, February 7th, 2003) the nightly newscasts in this study devoted 45% of their entire news coverage to Iraq, WMD and the possible march to war—including devoting nearly their entire broadcasts to Iraq on Wednesday, February 5th, the evening of Powell's appearance at the U.N.¹²⁷

Dominating the news topic agenda is one thing, setting the frames for specific news content quite another. This study was conducted by means of viewing and transcribing videotaped recording of the selected evening newscasts as well as examining written transcripts accessed through Factiva.

The objective of this analysis was to assess the degree to which the networks utilized the frames promoted by the Bush administration and whether or not the network newscasts endorsed these frames, were neutral toward the frames or expressed a degree of skepticism toward them.

Identifying the Bush Administration's Frames

In order to identify the specific frames promoted and advanced by the Bush administration, I reviewed official government statements, news reports quoting official government sources and editorials authored by members of the Bush administration, all of which appeared in the days immediately before Powell spoke at the United Nations. For example, the following two statements reinforced the administration's central theme: Saddam Hussein possessed WMD, is hiding them in violation of U.N. resolutions and war is merited unless he disarms.

¹²⁷ These percentages were calculated by counting the total number of seconds a Powell or Iraq related story ran on a newscast and dividing that number by the total running time of the entire newscast. In most cases this time was 22 minutes when allowing for commercials. For Iraq related coverage during the entire week, NBC averaged 38% (89% on February 5th), ABC averaged 61% (100 % on February 5th) CBS averaged 35% (89 % on February 5th) and ITV averaged 30% (85 % on February 5th).

On January 28, 2003, President George W. Bush went before a joint session of Congress to deliver the annual State of the Union Address. As he neared the end of the nearly one hour speech, Bush set the stage for what was to come the following week:

“The United States will ask the U.N. Security Council to convene on February the 5th to consider the facts of Iraq's ongoing defiance of the world. Secretary of State Powell will present information and intelligence about Iraq's illegal weapons programs, its attempts to hide those weapons from inspectors and its links to terrorist groups. We will consult, but let there be no misunderstanding: If Saddam Hussein does not fully disarm for the safety of our people, and for the peace of the world, we will lead a coalition to disarm him”.¹²⁸

On February 3rd, 2003, an editorial by Colin Powell ran in the Wall Street Journal laying the foundation for what he would present to the United Nations in two day's time.

“On Wednesday, I will present to the Security Council U.S. intelligence showing further evidence of Iraq's pattern of deception...While there will be no "smoking gun," we will provide evidence concerning the weapons programs that Iraq is working so hard to hide. We will, in sum, offer a straightforward, sober and compelling demonstration that Saddam is concealing the evidence of his weapons of mass destruction, while preserving the weapons themselves”¹²⁹

It was through public pronouncements such as these that the Bush administration set out what they hoped would be the news frames for Powell's presentation. I determined the administration was pushing three main frames—the themes repeated most often in their preliminary statements:

#1: Colin Powell is highly trustworthy, thoroughly prepared, effective and credible.

¹²⁸ President George W. Bush, State of the Union Address to a Joint Session of Congress, January 28, 2003.

¹²⁹ Colin Powell, “*We Will Not Shrink From War*”, Wall Street Journal February 3, 2003

#2: Colin Powell will present/presented strong evidence that Iraq had or was acquiring WMDs.

#3: Colin Powell will present/presented evidence of a link between the Iraqi government and Al Qaeda.

The Origins of These Frames

#1: Colin Powell is highly trustworthy, thoroughly prepared, effective and credible.

In a preview of Powell's presentation published in the New York Times on February 2, 2003 unnamed senior Bush administration officials were quoted as stating there had been little dissension among the President's top advisers about the information Powell would be presenting to the U.N. "I haven't detected anyone who thinks this a not compelling case," the official said.¹³⁰ The "compelling case" narrative was echoed by White House Press Secretary Ari Fleischer in his February 3, 2003 press briefing. Fleischer stated that Secretary Powell had been thoroughly engaged in a process involving America's premier spy agencies. "We feel so strongly and know that Iraq has biological and chemical weapons." Fleischer told the assembled White House press corps. "I think people will form their judgments, having watched the Secretary, and people will come to their conclusions about it. I think it will be

¹³⁰ *Threats and responses: Terror Links; Split at CIA and F.B. I. ON Iraqi Ties to Al Qaeda*. New York Times. February 2, 2003. <http://www.nytimes.com/2003/02/02/world/threats-responses-terror-links-split-cia-fbi-iraqi-ties-al-qaeda.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm>

compelling.”¹³¹ The “compelling” talking point was deployed yet again during State Department spokesman Richard Boucher’s February 3, 2003 briefing. “This presentation will, we think, be compelling. It’ll be a straightforward explanation of the facts... Iraq is not cooperating, Iraq is concealing evidence, and Iraq is trying to preserve its weapons of mass destruction.”¹³²

Bush Senior Advisor Karl Rove Powell has since written of the Bush Administration’s faith in Powell’s effectiveness. According to Rove, Powell, “Had wide bipartisan respect... he was not viewed as a “hawk.” He had enormous credibility from having personally reviewed the evidence exhaustively.”¹³³

#2: Colin Powell will present/presented strong evidence that Iraq had or was acquiring WMDs.

In his January 30, 2003 White House Press Briefing, Press Secretary Ari Fleischer was asked if the intelligence Powell would be presenting was contemporaneous. Fleischer replied, “It doesn’t matter if it’s new or old if it can still kill you. So whether there is information that is one day old, or one year old that Saddam Hussein has biological and chemical weapons, the impact is not whether the information is new or old; the impact is whether he has them or not.”¹³⁴

¹³¹ Press Briefing by White House Press Secretary Ari Fleischer, February 3, 2003. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=61031>

¹³² Briefing by State Department Spokesman Richard Boucher, February 3, 2003. <http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2003/17156.htm>

¹³³ Rove, Karl, *Courage and Consequence, My Life as a Conservative in the Fight*, (Threshold Editions, 2010)

¹³⁴ http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/press_briefings.php?year=2003&Submit=DISPLAY

The Washington Post published an article on the morning of Powell's presentation stating that CIA Director George Tenet would be at Powell's side during his presentation in order to further underline the importance of Powell's appearance and the quality of the intelligence concerning transfer of banned technologies from other countries, and shifting of weapons systems within Iraq. "Satellite photos and other evidence would also be presented."¹³⁵

TIME magazine reported high level administration sources told them Powell would, "Attack on three fronts, presenting evidence of elusive weapons of mass destruction, persistent obstructions of inspections and links to terrorism. The drama is likely to come as much in the delivery--high-tech photos, raw audiotapes--as in the substance."¹³⁶

#3: Colin Powell will present/presented evidence of a link between the Iraqi government and Al Qaeda.

The New York Times reported on February 2nd, 2003 that in demonstrating there were links between Iraq and Al Qaeda, Powell would focus on intelligence about possible connections between Saddam Hussein, an Islamic militant group that may have produced poisons in a remote region of northern Iraq and an al Qaeda terrorist leader named Abu Mussab al-Zarqawi.¹³⁷

¹³⁵ "They Will Present Case Against Iraq: CIA Head May Join Powell at the UN". Washington Post, February 5, 2003

¹³⁶ "Dissecting the Case", Time, February 10, 2003.
<http://www.time.com/time/printout/0,8816,1004194,00.html>

¹³⁷ *Threats and responses: Terror Links; Split at CIA and F.B. I. ON Iraqi Ties to Al Qaeda*". New York Times. February 2, 2003. <http://www.nytimes.com/2003/02/02/world/threats-responses-terror-links-split-cia-fbi-iraqi-ties-al-qaeda.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm>

Time Magazine reported that in order to convince skeptics Saddam had formed an alliance with the same kind of terrorists who caused the Sept. 11 attacks Powell would disclose there were links between Baghdad and “the murky band of Kurdish fundamentalists called Ansar al-Islam.” These government officials claimed Ansar was an al-Qaeda trained operation located in Afghanistan which harbored Al Qaeda refugees. Time reported these officials were “also talking up the presence of al-Qaeda bigwigs in Baghdad.”¹³⁸

Analysis of the Network Transcripts

With these three official frames as reference points, I undertook a close reading of the newscast transcripts of Monday February 3rd, 2003 through Friday February 7th, 2003. This one week period encompassed the run-up to Powell’s presentation, the speech itself and the immediate aftermath. First I collected and studied the “sentences” from each news story which mentioned frame number one. I tallied the number of these “sentences” that endorsed the frame, the number that disseminated the frame without editorializing and the number that raised questions about the validity of the frame. I went through the same process with “sentences” that mentioned frames two and three. In total, 708 “sentences” were analyzed.¹³⁹

By carefully assessing, categorizing and counting references to the frames, I hoped to draw clearer conclusions than would be possible with more impressionistic

¹³⁸ *Disecting the Case*, Time, February 10, 2003.
<http://www.time.com/time/printout/0,8816,1004194,00.html>

¹³⁹ For analytical purposes, each news story was broken down into individual sentences. For instance an ABC News story stated: “ Secretary Powell will play audiotapes of intercepted communications between Iraqi officials, who are said to be talking about “hiding things.” The tapes are in Arabic and will be translated during Powell’s speech. It is highly unusual for audio intercepts to be released.” This paragraph was then partitioned into three individual sentences.

assessments. I therefore defined categories of analysis as precisely as I could. In 10 cases the same “sentence” reinforced two of the three frames—Frame #1, Colin Powell is highly trustworthy, thoroughly prepared, effective and credible and frame #2, Colin Powell will present/presented strong evidence that Iraq had or was acquiring WMDs. In those instances I counted the “sentence” as representing both frames.

For example, an ABC story that aired the night before Powell’s presentation reported, “*Secretary Powell will play audiotapes of intercepted communications between Iraqi officials, who are said to be talking about “hiding things.”*”¹⁴⁰ This supports frame #1 which states, “Powel would be thoroughly prepared”. It also supports Frame #2 which states, “Powell presented strong evidence”.

The other coder and I disagreed on how a “sentence” should be categorized in 8 out of the 708 “sentences” under study.¹⁴¹ (The three categories are described in detail in the following section.) In those cases we consulted, we determined that one of us had erred and we then aligned our categorization

I defined the three “sentence” categories as follows:

1. Endorsed the frame.

For the purpose of this study “sentences” were counted as endorsing the Bush administration’s frame when the reporter, interview subject or quoted source echoed the official line without attribution.

Example: “*Terror ties. Piece by piece, the new case laid out today **linking Iraq to Osama bin Laden’s al-Qaeda network.***”¹⁴²

In this category when reporters repeated a Powell claim without attribution or did not assess its validity, they had abandoned their role as professional skeptics and were

¹⁴⁰ ABC News, February 4, 2003.

¹⁴¹ The second coder was a television news producer with several years of experience producing network television news stories.

¹⁴² NBC News, February 5, 2003

acting as conduits helping the Bush administration frame the story and advance the case for war.

In this category I also counted every on screen statement spoken by Colin Powell or other officials making the Bush administration's case. I did so because in written transcripts, the words of the reporter and the words attributed to an official can appear very similar in tone. In television news stories, the tone of an on screen sound bite is generally quite different from the script lines spoken by the reporter. According to Gershkoff and Kushner's study, "Media coverage prominently featuring quotes from political leaders and excerpts of official speeches offers those officials a second venue, beyond their direct pronouncement, from which to propagate their message."¹⁴³

2. Merely disseminated information about the frame.

Sentences were counted in this category if they conveyed the official frame with attribution to the source, but with no overt or implied endorsement or skepticism toward the frame.

Examples: "He said"; "Powell went on to cite"; "Powell's next point was that..."

3. Raised questions about the frame.

Sentences were counted in this category when the words of a reporter, interview subject or quoted source conveyed skepticism about the administration's frame. Sentences containing skeptical attribution such as "he claimed" or "he alleged" were also counted in this category

¹⁴³ Gershkoff, Amy and Kushner, Shana, "The 9/11-Iraq Connection in the Bush Administration's Rhetoric".

Example: “*In another blow to the U.S. case, sources in London tell ABC News that British intelligence is highly skeptical about a theory that al-Qaeda is connected.*”¹⁴⁴

I then compared the level of skepticism in the American and British coverage, looking for similarities, differences and patterns of coverage.

Evaluating News Coverage of the Frames

I will first list a White House frame as described in the previous section then assess whether or not the news organizations accepted or advanced that frame, were neutral toward the frame or raised questions about the frame.

Official Frame #1

Colin Powell is highly trustworthy, thoroughly prepared, effective and credible.

George Bush reportedly said that only Powell had the "credibility to do this", and Powell was in fact a widely popular public figure.¹⁴⁵ A nationwide poll taken the day before the presentation found 63% of Americans choose Powell over the President

¹⁴⁴ ABC News, February 5, 2003.

¹⁴⁵ De Young, Karen, “*Falling on His Sword*”, Washington Post, (October 1, 2006)

as the leader they trusted more to make decisions about U.S.- Iraq policy.¹⁴⁶ The Bush administration heavily promoted a narrative detailing how Secretary Powell spent much of the week and weekend prior to his speech ensconced inside CIA Headquarters in Langley, Virginia pouring over highly classified information. They claimed it would be a rigorously prepared presentation which would also be, in their words, “compelling”.^{147 148}

At first it would seem this is a rather innocuous frame. After all, opinion surveys already showed most Americans believed Powell to be both trustworthy and credible. It would also not be unreasonable to expect him to be thoroughly prepared in advance of his appearance before the United Nations.

However, the Bush administration clearly wanted news media to frame Powell in this way because by endorsing this frame the networks were helping the President push his war agenda. The administration wanted the public to believe Colin Powell would come prepared with evidence and if he was convinced there was a case for war there very likely was a strong case for war. When asked about Powell’s credibility, NBC anchor Tom Brokaw stated, “Secretary Powell (is) a figure of great integrity in this country (and) obviously has great influence and credibility.”¹⁴⁹

While all four broadcast networks, both British and American, utilized this frame as a component of their reports, ABC and NBC had more “sentences” which referred to it than the other two networks. (See Table 1)

¹⁴⁶ Moore, David, “Powell’s U.N. Appearance Important to Public, Secretary of State enjoys more credibility on Iraq than Bush” *Gallup News Service*, (February 4, 2003)

¹⁴⁷ Briefing by White House Press Secretary Ari Fleischer, February 3, 2003.

¹⁴⁸ Briefing by State Department Spokesman Richard Boucher, February 3, 2003.

¹⁴⁹ Tom Brokaw was interviewed by ITN Channel 4 News on March 16, 2004 in his studio at Rockefeller Center as part of their coverage of the one year anniversary of the Iraq invasion.

ABC illustrated and endorsed Powell's effectiveness by reporting, *"The Secretary of State's presentation to the UN Security Council yesterday has had an effect on public opinion. An ABC News - Washington Post poll finds that 71 percent of Americans aware of his speech at the U.N. yesterday think he made a convincing case for war."*¹⁵⁰

NBC endorsed his credibility. *"We asked were the American people, were they convinced by Colin Powell? Look at these numbers, 66 to 11. High marks from the American public for Colin Powell... Look for this president, Colin Powell, who's a very important messenger because he's perceived as the one most reluctant to go to war... to campaign vigorously across this country, television airwaves saying, this is why we must take Saddam Hussein out now."*¹⁵¹

Martha Raddatz of ABC said Powell would come prepared with compelling evidence including, *"Audiotapes of intercepted communications between Iraqi officials, who are said to be talking about 'hiding things'".* Quoting an editorial Powell had written for the Wall Street journal in advance of his appearance Raddatz added it would be a *"straightforward, sober and compelling demonstration that Saddam Hussein is concealing weapons of mass destruction."*¹⁵²

David Martin of CBS reinforced the notion that the Secretary was not only well prepared but that his speech would be effective. *"Powell has drafted CIA director Tenet to appear with him before the U.N. Security Council tomorrow in what promises to be a turning point in the confrontation with Iraq."*¹⁵³

¹⁵⁰ ABC News, February 6, 2003.

¹⁵¹ NBC News, February 6, 2003.

¹⁵² ABC News, February 3, 2003.


¹⁵³ CBS News, February 4, 2003.

Britain's ITV, although endorsing this frame less often than ABC and NBC, did endorse Powell's effectiveness. Anchorman Trevor McDonald reported, "*A poll on ITV suggests that Mr. Powell's words had helped to make a convincing case for war.*"¹⁵⁴

¹⁵⁴ ITV News, February 5, 2003.

Table 1

Official Frame #1
Colin Powell is Highly Trustworthy Thoroughly Prepared, Effective and Credible



	ABC 29 "Sentences"	CBS 7 "Sentences"	NBC 64 "Sentences"	ITV 15 "Sentences"
ENDORSED THE FRAME	20 / 69%	3 / 43%	25 / 39%	6 / 40%
MERELY DISSEMINATED INFORMATION	6 / 22%	4 / 57 %	33 / 52%	4 / 27%
RAISED QUESTIONS ABOUT THE FRAME	3 / 10%		6 / 9%	5 / 33%

Number of "sentences" within a news story that this frame was mentioned, the percentage this represents and the category to which it applied

Official Frame #2:

Colin Powell will present/presented strong evidence that Iraq had or was acquiring WMDs.

This was arguably the most important of the three frames because it focused on the specific claims and evidence Powell presented at the U.N. with the intent of persuading the world that armed intervention against Iraq was necessary.

The function of the journalists covering this event was to put Powell's presentation into context and report to their viewers. Measured in percentage terms, Britain's ITV did exhibit a greater degree of skepticism than the three American networks. However, ITV endorsed this frame more often than ABC. In reporting on this frame, ABC merely disseminated information or was neutral more often than any of the other networks in this study. (See Table 2).

This frame was most often endorsed by CBS and NBC. For example in the February 5th broadcast, John Roberts of CBS did not use qualifiers in portions of his report thereby presenting Powell's evidence as fact. "*(Powell) showed video of an Iraqi mirage fighter jet testing a biological sprayer.*" (Colin Powell on screen): *'Note the spray coming from beneath the mirage. That is 2,000 liters of simulated anthrax that a jet is spraying'*. John Roberts: *"But the most chilling moment came in this intercept, in which an Iraqi officer tells a subordinate to erase all references to nerve agents from over-the-air or wireless communications."*¹⁵⁵

NBC was inconsistent and, at times, offered no uniformity in their reporting. Within the same news piece qualifiers were sometimes used and sometimes not. For instance, Andrea Mitchell appeared neutral when she reported: *"Powell said three defectors have told US intelligence Saddam has 18 trucks carrying mobile biological*

¹⁵⁵ CBS News, February 5, 2003.

*weapons labs. ...He showed a satellite photo **he says** reveal chemical weapons bunkers. **He says** those outlined in red contain active weapons”*¹⁵⁶

However, within that same news story NBC’s Mitchell was also guilty of giving credence to some of Powell’s claims and presented them as authentic. She failed to state that the aircraft shown in Powell’s photos were “allegedly” able to spread chemical weapons and instead delivered her script line as if this were a fact. In another section of the same news piece, Mitchell neglected to raise any questions about the authenticity of the audio tapes Powell played for the chamber. Much like John Roberts of CBS, she described one of Powell’s exhibits as frightening in nature.

*“Powell played a tape of a Mirage jet **retrofitted to spray simulated anthrax** and a model of Iraq’s unmanned drones, **capable of spraying** chemical or germ weapons within a radius of at least 550 miles.” “They showed satellite photos, quoted defectors, played audiotapes of intercepted conversations. **One chilling example...**”¹⁵⁷*

ABC merely disseminated information or was neutral more often than any of the other networks. For example, ABC’s Peter Jennings qualified all of the Powell quotes presented in his news piece.

*“Mr. Powell **said** repeatedly that Iraq was doing everything it could to hide its forbidden weapons from UN inspectors. And he played a tape which **he said** were two Iraqi officers talking about an inspection they knew was coming.” “Mr. Powell **said** Iraq had sent several of its scientists into hiding, rather than talk to the United Nations....He showed artist’s renditions of **what he said** were mobile laboratories for biological weapons. And using yet another prop, **he said** that Iraq had thousands of times the amount of anthrax that caused havoc and death at the US Capitol.”*¹⁵⁸

As was anticipated in this study’s hypothesis, Britain’s ITV raised several questions and exhibited a degree of skepticism concerning every aspect of Powell’s

¹⁵⁶ NBC News, February 5, 2003

¹⁵⁷ NBC News, February 5, 2003

¹⁵⁸ ABC News, February 5, 2003

presentation. Anchor Trevor MacDonald opened the February 5th broadcast by announcing, “Colin Powell set out a case for the prosecution, a case for war. It was comprehensive, **but was it credible?**”¹⁵⁹ Later in the broadcast Bill Neely reported:

*“A lot of it is **open to interpretation**, for example what exactly did those satellite photographs show...so suggestive yes, damning probably not. The U.S. admitting a lot of this is **circumstantial evidence**. The big question for you as well as Paris, Moscow and everywhere else is circumstantial evidence enough to justify the war that the US thinks is coming.”*¹⁴²

While not as frequent as ITV, all three American networks did raise questions or exhibit skepticism about certain aspects of Powell’s claims. ABC’s Martha Raddatz reported:

*“The satellite imagery **is more open to interpretation**. Secretary Powell **said** this was a satellite picture of a storage area for chemical or biological weapons... A satellite image taken two months later at the same area, **Powell said**, showed the vehicles gone, buildings bulldozed and, to keep inspectors from being able to sample the soil, **he claimed**, the top layer had been hauled away.”*¹⁶⁰

CBS’s David Martin said, “Some of Powell’s examples were based on unnamed sources whose **reliability can be challenged**.”¹⁶¹

ITV, CBS and NBC also travelled to Iraq in order to present the Iraqi perspective of Powell’s evidence. ITV’s Jon Irvine reporting live from Baghdad:

*“We’ve just heard that there will be a point by point rebuttal by the Iraqis tomorrow. But tonite in general terms **Saddam Hussein’s top advisor described Colin Powell’s claims as ridiculous and beneath a country supposedly leading the world**. On the issue of the telephone intercepts for example he said they could have been produced by a third rate intelligence outfit.*

¹⁵⁹ ITV News, February 5, 2003

¹⁶⁰ ABC News, February 5, 2003

¹⁶¹ CBS News, February 5, 2003.

*The Iraqi people are constantly being told that American claims about banned weapons are baseless, referring to the Washington government one newspaper here said today and I quote “ the nut cases in the administration of evil have no proof of their claims”.*¹⁶²

Elizabeth Palmer of CBS reporting from Baghdad:

*“Just two hours after Colin Powell’s speech ended, the Iraqis were on the offensive. **An angry Gen. Amer al-Saadi, head of Iraq’s monitoring agency, told the world’s media that Powell’s evidence was manufactured.** He was especially scathing about the telephone intercepts he said were not genuine. AL-SAADi: From what we have heard, any third rate intelligence outfit could produce such a recording.”*¹⁶³

NBC’s Ron Allen, also in Baghdad, reported:

*“General Amir Al-Saadi, the man Powell accused of heading a spy committee designed to deceive and frustrate the inspectors, called the charge against him and the rest of Powell’s presentation “nonsense.” General AMIR AL-SAADi: **‘This was a typical American show, complete with stunts and special effects’**”.*¹⁶⁴


¹⁶² ITV News, February 5, 2003.

¹⁶³ CBS News, February 5, 2003

¹⁶⁴ NBC News, February 5, 2003

Table 2

**Official Frame #2:
Colin Powell will present/presented
strong evidence that Iraq had or was acquiring WMDs.**



	ABC 125 "Sentences"	CBS 176 "Sentences"	NBC 80 "Sentences"	ITV 138 "Sentences"
ENDORSED THE FRAME	24 / 19%	69 / 39%	31 / 39%	34 / 25%
MERELY DISSEMINATED INFORMATION	70 / 56%	69 / 39%	31 / 39%	60 / 43%
RAISED QUESTIONS ABOUT THE FRAME	31 / 25%	38 / 22%	18 / 22%	44 / 32%

Number of "sentences" within a news story that this frame was mentioned, the percentage this represents and the category to which it applied

Official Frame #3

Colin Powell will present/presented evidence of a link between the Iraqi government and Al Qaeda.

In her book, No Questions Asked: News Coverage since 9/11, Lisa Finnegan reiterated a tenet of good journalism:

“The American media was clearly taken with Powell’s presentation. Journalism professors and cranky editors working with novice reporters have been known to quip “If your mother says she loves you, check it out.” In other words, never take anything at face value. Go and find out if it is true.”¹⁶⁵

Along with assertions that Iraq was in possession of weapons of mass destruction, Bush administration officials claimed there existed a direct link between Saddam Hussein and Al Qaeda and therefore by association, a connection between Iraq and the September 11th terrorist attacks. This claim of a link between Iraq, Al Qaeda and terrorism was a central justification used by the Bush administration in their attempts to convince the American people war was necessary. The administration alleged ties between Saddam Hussein and Jordanian terrorist Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, a figure Secretary of State Powell claimed was a “collaborator of Osama Bin Laden.”

Both ABC and NBC News extensively questioned this frame’s validity. (See Table 3).

ABC’s Brian Ross investigated the Al Qaeda connection:

“Powell showed a satellite photograph of what he said was a chemical weapons training center in Northern Iraq used by al-Qaeda and protected by a group called Ansar Al-Islam. Their ties to Al-Qaeda are also well-documented. But they operate in a part of Iraq not controlled by Saddam Hussein and their leaders say they seek to overthrow Saddam Hussein and his government.”

“The man considered the leader of Ansar Al-Islam told ABC news this week, his group opposes Saddam Hussein, because, unlike Osama Bin Laden, Saddam Hussein is not a good Muslim.”

¹⁶⁵ Finnegan, Lisa, *No Questions Asked. News Coverage Since 9/11*, (Praeger Publishers, 2007)

“In another blow to the U.S. case, sources in London tell ABC News that British intelligence, as well is highly skeptical about, a theory that al-Qaeda is connected to Iraq.”¹⁶⁶

NBC ran a news piece by Jim Miklaszewski which also questioned the validity of Powell’s claims of an Al Qaeda link:

“There was plenty of new detailed information about Iraq’s alleged ties to terrorists. But a Pentagon official says when Powell got to possible links between Baghdad and al-Qaeda, he was skating on thin ice.”¹⁶⁷

Britain’s ITV did not report on this frame to the same degree as the three American networks. (See table 3). Interestingly, all three American networks also broadcast clips of the same critical Iraqi voice discrediting Powell’s Al Qaeda link claim. The voice belonged to Saddam Hussein himself and was delivered in the form of an interview conducted by anti-war British Politician, Sir Anthony Benn which ran on ITV’s sister network, Channel 4 News the night of Powell’s presentation. In the clips of that interview broadcast by the networks, Benn asked Saddam Hussein, *“Do you have links with al Qaeda?”* Hussein answered, (through a translator): *“If we had relations with the organization of al Qaeda, we would not be ashamed to admit it. Therefore, I would like to tell you directly, that we have no relationships with al Qaeda.”*¹⁶⁸


¹⁶⁶ ABC News February 5, 2003

¹⁶⁷ NBC News, February 5, 2003

¹⁶⁸ ABC News, NBC News and CBS News, February 5, 2003.

Table 3

Official Frame #3
Colin Powell Will Present/Presented Evidence of a Link Between Iraq and Al Qaeda



	ABC 27 "Sentences"	CBS 15 "Sentences"	NBC 24 "Sentences"	ITV 9 "Sentences"
ENDORSED THE FRAME	1 / 4%	1 / 6%	5 / 21%	1 / 11%
MERELY DISSEMINATED INFORMATION	14 / 52%	10 / 67%	9 / 37%	5 / 56%
RAISED QUESTIONS ABOUT THE FRAME	12 / 44%	4 / 27%	10 / 42%	3 / 33%

Number of "sentences" within a news story that this frame was mentioned, the percentage this represents and the category to which it applied

Summary of Framing Analysis

The introduction to this thesis stated that in the years since the invasion of Iraq by U.S. and international forces, numerous books and academic studies have analyzed the media coverage of the run-up to the war, Powell's presentation and the war itself. These books and studies frequently praised the skeptical and hard-hitting nature of the British coverage while at the same time criticizing the American press for being "incredibly soft" and "patsy-like". The constant refrain was "why couldn't American journalists have acted more British?"¹⁶⁹ Some observers claimed that unlike their American counterparts, British journalists demonstrated "an unwillingness to accept official claims at face value".¹⁷⁰ Others claimed British journalists reporting on the Iraq story seized the opportunity to corral facts and ask tough questions about hugely consequential events while American reporters viewed the war as an opportunity to present an "exciting" story within narrow limits.¹⁷¹

The findings of this study suggest these blanket criticisms did not apply to broadcast network news coverage of Colin Powell's pivotal U.N. appearance. In fact the data suggests ABC News expressed a degree of skepticism virtually equal to that of Britain's ITV in covering this story. 32% of the 162 "sentence" references to the three official frames in ITV stories raised questions or were skeptical of these frames while 25.5% of the 180 sentences referenced in ABC stories were skeptical of the official frames. Coverage by NBC and CBS was less skeptical, 21% of the 198 "sentences" in CBS stories raised questions or were skeptical. (See Table 4)

¹⁶⁹ Hansen, Susan, "Superiority Complex, Why the Brits Think They're Better", *Columbia Journalism Review*. (May 8, 2007)
http://www.cjr.org/behind_the_news/superiority_complex_2.php?page=all

¹⁷⁰ Robinson, Piers, "*Pockets of Resistance: Theorising media-state relations and the case of British media and the 2003 Iraq Invasion*", Presented at the International Studies Association Annual Convention, Montreal, (March 2011)

¹⁷¹ Baker, Russ, "The U.S.vs.The U.K." *The Nation*,(April 28, 2003) www.thenation.com/article/us-vs-uk

NBC stories had the least number of skeptical sentences, but not by a significantly smaller margin than CBS. 20% of the 168 “sentences” counted in NBC stories raised questions or were skeptical while 21% of the 198 “sentences” counted in CBS stories were skeptical.


The data also demonstrates the Bush administration’s effectiveness in dominating the news coverage. (See Table 5) 220 or 31% of all “sentences” endorsed the three administration frames while 315 or 44 % of all “sentences” merely disseminated information about the three frames.

In other words 75% of the “sentences” endorsed or were neutral toward the three frames the Bush administration was pushing.

CBS and NBC endorsed the official Bush administration frames most frequently while at the same time appearing to be the least skeptical of the networks in this study. (See Table 4) While British network ITV and American network ABC virtually mirrored each other in their coverage of the Powell event and its immediate aftermath.

Table 4


**Percentage Totals of all “Sentence” References
To All 3 Frames**



	ABC 180 total “sentences”	CBS 198 total “sentences”	NBC 168 total “sentences”	ITV 162 total “sentences”
ENDORSED THE FRAME	45 / 25%	73 / 37%	61 / 36%	41 / 25%
MERELY DISSEMINATED INFORMATION	90 / 50%	83 / 42%	73 / 44%	69 / 43%
RAISED QUESTIONS ABOUT THE FRAME	46 / 25.5%	42 / 21%	34 / 20%	52 / 32%

Total number of “sentences” that referenced one of the three official frames; the percentage associated with that number and the categories assigned to those “sentences” .

Table 5



708 Total "Sentences"
220 or 31% of all "Sentences" Endorsed the 3 Frames
315 or 44 % of all "Sentences" Merely Disseminated Information
174 or 25 % of all "Sentences" Raised Questions

Answers to the Research Questions

1. How specifically did the Bush administration frame the story leading up to Colin Powell's appearance before the United Nations Security Council on February 5, 2003?

The Bush administration devoted extraordinary resources and expertise to framing the news coverage before, during and immediately after Powell's presentation in an attempt to set the news agenda and advance their case for war. Central to their efforts was the choice of Colin Powell to push their war agenda. Powell was the crucial point man and provided "diplomatic cover" for the Iraq war plans of the administration as the White House deftly hyped Powell's "moderate" credibility.¹⁷² Officials hoped to foster a belief among the American people that, "If Powell was the front man, and it had to be true."¹⁷³

The three frames the Bush administration pushed were:

Colin Powell is highly trustworthy, thoroughly prepared, effective and credible.

Colin Powell will present/presented strong evidence that Iraq possessed or was acquiring WMDs.

Powell will present/presented strong evidence of a link between the Iraqi government and Al Qaeda.

¹⁷² Solomon, Norman, *War Made Easy, How Presidents and Pundits Keep Spinning us to Death*, (John Wiley and Sons, 2005)

¹⁷³ David Smith, former ITN Channel 4 Washington Correspondent, covered Powell's address to the U.N. and is currently Deputy Director, United Nations Information Center. This interview was conducted on April 18, 2009 at his home in Washington, D.C.

#2. To what extent did American television news coverage reinforce these frames? To what extent did this coverage raise questions about these frames?

In percentage terms both NBC and CBS reinforced or endorsed the Bush administration frames at an equal rate. 37% of the “sentences” in CBS stories and 36% of the “sentences” in NBC stories endorsed the frames set forth by the Bush administration. By contrast, ABC endorsed the frames 25% of the time.

For example, John Roberts of CBS reported, *“The most chilling moment came in this intercept, in which an Iraqi officer tells a subordinate to erase all references to nerve agents from over-the-air, or wireless communications.”*¹⁷⁴ As did NBC’s Andrea Mitchell. *“They showed satellite photos, quoted defectors, played audiotapes of intercepted conversations. One chilling example.”*¹⁷⁵ When it came to questioning the Bush frames. CBS and NBC questioned the frames 21% and 20% respectively, while ABC raised questions at a slightly higher rate, 25%. ABC investigated Powell’s claims of an Iraq-Al Qaeda link. *“In another blow to the US case, sources in London tell ABC News that British intelligence, as well is highly skeptical about, a theory that al-Qaeda is connected.”*¹⁷⁶

	ABC 180 total “sentences”	CBS 198 total “sentences”	NBC 168 total “sentences”
ENDORSED THE FRAME	44 / 25%	73 / 37%	61 / 36%
MERELY DISSEMINATED INFORMATION	90 / 50%	83 / 42%	73 / 44%
RAISED QUESTIONS ABOUT THE FRAME	46 / 26%	42 / 21%	34 / 20%

Total number of sentences that referenced one of the three official frames; the percentage associated with that number and the categories assigned to those sentences

¹⁷⁴ CBS News, February 5, 2003

¹⁷⁵ ABC News, February 5, 2003.

¹⁷⁶ ABC News, February 5, 2003

3. To what extent did British television news coverage reinforce these frames? To what extent did this coverage raise questions about these frames?

Britain's ITV reinforced or endorsed the Bush administration frames in 25% of the referenced "sentences". ITV raised questions about the Bush frames 32% of the time. This was the highest percentage of all the networks in this study.

	ITV 162 total "sentences"
ENDORSED THE FRAME	41 / 25%
MERELY DISSEMINATED INFORMATION	69 / 43%
RAISED QUESTIONS ABOUT THE FRAME	52 / 32%

Sentences that referenced one of the three official frames and the percentage associated with that number

For example, ITV did endorse frame number one which stated that Powell would be well prepared with evidence: *"Powell will have electronic intercepts indicating Iraqi deception and links to terror groups; satellite photos, including trucks the US says are mobile biological labs; proof of Iraq's attempts to purchase illegal weapon components."*¹⁷⁷ But ITV also questioned the content of that evidence. *"A lot of it is open to interpretation for example what exactly did those satellite photographs show...so suggestive yes, damning probably not."*¹⁷⁸

¹⁷⁷ ITV News, February 3, 2003

¹⁷⁸ ITV News, February 5, 2003

4. How effective was the Bush administration in setting the news agenda via Powell’s presentation in the U.S. and British media?

The data in this study suggests the Bush administration effectively managed to dominate the television news coverage of the four networks. 31% of all “sentences” endorsed the three Bush administration frames and 44 % of all “sentences” were neutral or merely disseminated information about the three frames. In other words over 75% of the “sentences” in this study endorsed or were neutral toward the information the Bush administration was pushing.

5. Was the British television news coverage more skeptical than the American coverage?

Measured in percentage terms and number of “sentences” counted as raising questions, Britain’s ITV raised more questions or was the most skeptical of the four networks in this study. However, ABC News was a close second.

	ABC 180 total “sentences”	CBS 198 total “sentences”	NBC 168 total “sentences”	ITV 162 total “sentences”
RAISED QUESTIONS OR SKEPTICISM ABOUT THE FRAMES	46 / 25.5%	42 / 21%	34 / 20%	52 / 32%
<p>Total number of sentences categorized as raising questions or skepticism and the percentage associated with that number.</p>				

6. What are the most plausible explanations for similarities and/or differences in the news coverage?

There were many similarities in the coverage of Britain’s ITV and America’s ABC. While both CBS and NBC did not mirror ITV as closely as ABC, in percentage terms these networks did produce similar reports to their British counterpart.

	ABC 180 total “sentences”	CBS 198 total “sentences”	NBC 168 total “sentences”	ITV 162 total “sentences”
ENDORSED THE FRAME	45 / 25%	73 / 37%	61 / 36%	41 / 25%
MERELY DISSEMINATED INFORMATION	90 / 50%	83 / 42%	73 / 44%	69 / 43%
RAISED QUESTIONS ABOUT THE FRAME	46 / 25.5%	42 / 21%	34 / 20%	52 / 32%

Total number of sentences that referenced one of the three official frames; the percentage associated with that number and the categories assigned to those sentences .

This may have been due to the fact that even though there were literally life or death repercussions resulting from this event, Colin Powell’s presentation was covered in the same manner television news organizations routinely report on press conferences or other “official” government pronouncements. The government is engaged in an institutionalized relationship with the television news media, which gives government officials the opportunity to establish the initial framing of the topic in question. This interpretation then “commands the field” in all subsequent treatments and sets the terms of reference within all further coverage or debate that takes place.¹⁷⁹

¹⁷⁹ Scriven, Michael and Lecomte, Monia, *Television Broadcasting in Contemporary France and Britain*, (Berghahn Books, 1999)

Never-the-less, ITV did offer a degree of skepticism greater than the American networks. The effect of the September 11th terrorist attacks may account for this difference. For instance, ITN's Matt Frei told me the September 11th attacks were much more strongly felt in the United States than in Great Britain. "So to question the motives for war, the existence of WMD was considered by more in the U.S. as unpatriotic than it was in the U.K."¹⁸⁰ Susan Moeller suggests, "The US media presented relatively few alternative perspectives to those of the White House." This was due in part to U.S. politicians and other Americans critical of the Bush administration not only substantially supporting President Bush's declaration and articulation of the "War on Terror", but doing so well into the summer and fall of 2003.

By contrast, from the very beginning there was more consistent and vocal opposition among senior British political figures to some of the Blair government's WMD policies."¹⁸¹ In "*Misperceptions, the Media and the Iraq War*", Kull, Ramsay and Lewis contend that lack of resources and money were the prime reason the U.S. media did not investigate the claims of the Bush administration more thoroughly. They contend it was considerably cheaper for the television news networks to adopt the talk show and infotainment formats than to engage in more traditional investigative reporting.¹⁸²

¹⁸⁰ Matt Frei is currently ITN CH. 4 News Washington D.C. correspondent after a long career at the BBC as correspondent and anchor of BBC World America. He was interviewed in the ITN Washington Bureau in March of 2011.

¹⁸¹ Moeller, Susan D., "*Media Coverage of Weapons of Mass Destruction*", Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland. (March,2004)

¹⁸² Kull, Steven, Ramsay, Clay and Lewis, Evan, *Misperceptions, the Media and the Iraq War*, (The Academy of Political Science, 2002)
<http://www.abdn.ac.uk/sociology/notes06/Level4/SO4530/Assigned-Readings/Seminar%2011.2.pdf>

Avenues for Further Study

In seeking differences and similarities between American and British journalistic practices, two distinct areas of interest continued to present themselves:

- 1: The lack of a script approval process for British television journalists.
- 2: The claim by the British journalists I interviewed that American reporters exhibited a deference to power which inhibited their ability to ask government officials tough and probing questions.

Could either of these elements have made a difference in the manner in which each nation covered the events surrounding the Iraq War?

#1 Script Approval

Does the Lack of a Script Approval Process Allow British Journalists Greater Freedom When Reporting?

“Scriptwriting 101” would define a news script as the document a reporter creates when writing a broadcast news story. My personal experience in producing news stories for American television news organizations and a British television news network has lead me to believe that the most basic and observable difference between the two centers on the script approval process. Generally reports produced by British correspondents are not subjected to any level of script approval. As a result, it is not uncommon for the executive producers and foreign editors based in London not to see the finished product until it airs on their evening newscasts. In fact, the British television news journalists I have worked with have only been required to submit their scripts for prior approval when legal questions arise. Every British journalist I interviewed for this thesis believed script approval acts as a form of censorship. Their rationale was that executive producers, sitting behind desks thousands of miles away from where the story is taking place, should not be in a position to approve or disapprove of what a reporter in the middle of the action is experiencing and reporting.

The polar opposite seems to be the case in the United States because script approval is a routine process in the American system. The American journalists I interviewed were equally as adamant that the American system of prior script approval simply provides a check and balance system which acts to catch any factual errors, which if aired, could not only prove embarrassing for the news organization and harm its reputation. Mistakes or errors could also invite legal action.

The limited scope of this thesis did not allow for a thorough study of whether or not the script approval process had an effect on the television coverage of the Iraq War. The British journalists believed that it did while the American journalists I spoke with were unwavering that it did not. Lindsay Hilsum of ITN told me, “Much more trust is invested in the correspondents in the British system.”¹⁸³ ITV’s Bill Neely added, “The essence of journalism is that the journalist goes out, discovers things and tells the world, including the journalist’s own desk, what has happened.”¹⁸⁴ ITN’s David Smith told me, “I never once, in 25 years at ITN, I never had anyone approve a script. I wasn’t having someone in London tell me what the story was. But an American TV correspondent would always, at whatever level, need to submit their scripts for approval. No self respecting British correspondent would ever accept script approval. Why, because you were giving away control of the product to people who were not on the ground with you. And it’s a fundamental difference between the two reporting cultures.”¹⁸⁵

Further research into the script approval process is necessary to ascertain whether or not this is true.

¹⁸³ Lindsey Hilsum was interviewed by Chris Shlemon in the ITN Washington D.C. Bureau in May of 2010.

¹⁸⁴ Bill Neely was interviewed by Chris Shlemon in the ITN Washington, DC Bureau in March of 2011.

¹⁸⁵ David Smith was interviewed by Chris Shlemon at his Washington, D.C. home on April 18, 2009.

#2 Deference to Authority

All of the British journalists I spoke with believe British television news organizations asked tougher questions and were less reverential when interviewing government and military figures during the run up to the war. They said, unlike Americans, British journalists did not readily accept the government responses or positions.

ITN's David Smith explained, "The way journalists talk to British politicians is very different than the way American journalists talk to American politicians. In Britain it is far more 'in your face'. It's far more, 'Where's the evidence for that?' 'How can you say that?' The way that the American reporter will speak to the figure in authority is considerably more deferential than in the U.K. I was paid to be rude to Tony Blair; I was paid to challenge the British Foreign Secretary. This is because I would not wish to be seen as putting myself in a deferential position towards that person. I don't think that anyone who works for ABC News or CNN is going to win plaudits or pay raises for having a real go at the President."¹⁸⁶

ITN Channel 4's Lindsey Hilsum told me that, "the Brits are much less reverent than the Americans. It's a big cultural difference - the British people voted for these politicians therefore they have the right to see them squirm under questioning. That's our job! As British broadcast journalists, we are more skeptical of government than American broadcast journalists. We do believe our government is lying unless they can prove otherwise and on the whole I think Americans think the government is telling the truth unless it becomes clear otherwise."¹⁸⁷

¹⁸⁶ David Smith was based in Washington D.C. during the early years of the Iraq War. This interview was conducted by Chris Shlemon on April 18, 2009 at Smith's home in Washington, D.C.

¹⁸⁷ Lindsey Hilsum was interviewed by Chris Shlemon in the ITN Washington D.C. Bureau in May of 2010.

NBC's Kerry Sanders agreed—up to a point. He told me, “Brits are cynical. We are not as openly arrogant in our reporting because we choose to let the viewer at home draw the own conclusions rather than telling someone how to think.”¹⁸⁸

The public relies on the media to separate facts and tangible realities from assumptions and spin. Examining British and American broadcasts to determine if the British did indeed exhibit less deference to authority, therefore presenting a more balanced picture of the war would fill in another piece of this research. The question to be answered: If American journalists were less deferential toward government officials would the public have been provided with a wider variety of questions and answers from which they could draw their opinions about America's march to war with Iraq?

¹⁸⁸ Kerry Sanders' interview was conducted by Chris Shlemon via e-mail in June of 2011.

Conclusion

*“The alliance between the United States and Great Britain is a partnership of the heart, bound by the history, traditions and values we share. But what makes our relationship special — a unique and essential asset — is that we join hands across so many endeavors. Put simply, we count on each other and the world counts on our alliance”.*¹⁸⁹ **U.S. President Barak Obama and British Prime Minister David Cameron**

“Television news remains the most viewed, valued and trusted source of information in most countries around the globe....its journalism connects more regularly and compellingly with audiences than that produced by other news media.”¹⁹⁰

This thesis explored whether there were similarities or, more importantly, fundamental differences in the approach taken by British and American television news organizations during their coverage of the pivotal moment in the run up to the Iraq War and Secretary of State Colin Powell’s February 5, 2003 presentation to the United Nations Security Council on Iraq’s weapons program.

I was able to ascertain from my research that this is the first systematic comparison of American and British broadcast television news coverage of this pivotal event in the run-up to war with Iraq.

The Bush administration heavily promoted Powell’s appearance as a high tech secret intelligence “show and tell”. His speech was designed to provide definitive evidence that Iraq continued to produce and conceal an arsenal of weapons of mass destruction in open defiance of U.N. mandates that they destroy those deadly weapons.

¹⁸⁹ U.S. President Barak Obama and British Prime Minister David Cameron jointly published this editorial titled “An Alliance the World Can Count On” in the Washington Post on March 12, 2012 ahead of Cameron’s official state visit on March 13, 2012.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/barack-obama-and-david-cameron-the-us-and-britain-still-enjoy-special-relationship/2012/03/12/gIQABH1G8R_story.html

¹⁹⁰Cushion, Stephen, *Television Journalism*, (Sage Publications, 2012)

Although Powell has stated he struggled to ensure all of his arguments were sound and backed by intelligence from several sources, we now know much of what he told the Security Council that day was untrue. No weapons of mass destruction were found and no linkage between Saddam, Al Qaeda and the attacks of September 11, 2001 has been proven. For many critics Powell's appearance has become the primary point of reference in the failure of U.S. intelligence leading up to the war with Iraq.¹⁹¹

Widespread debate and controversy has also accompanied the role U.S. media played in reporting on this event. Many observers have criticized the American press for not exhibiting adequate skepticism toward the evidence Powell presented. By contrast, British journalists have been praised for demonstrating, "an unwillingness to accept official claims at face value".¹⁹²

My original hypothesis stated the three U.S. television network newscasts would strongly reinforce the frames pushed by the Bush administration in their reporting of the events surrounding Colin Powell's appearance at the U.N. while British television news reporting would be relatively more skeptical of the administration's narratives. The results of this study suggest this hypothesis was only partially correct. Although Britain's ITV, as measured in terms of the percentage of skeptical "sentences" counted for this study, exhibited a degree of skepticism and raised questions about the Bush administration frames to a greater degree than the American networks, American television journalists reported on Powell's appearance in a neutral manner and with a degree of skepticism more often than they endorsed the administration's frames.

¹⁹¹ Kurtz, Howard, "The Post on WMDs: An Inside Story", *Washington Post*, (August 12, 2004)

¹⁹² Robinson, Piers, "*Pockets of Resistance: Theorising media-state relations and the case of British media and the 2003 Iraq Invasion*", Presented at the International Studies Association Annual Convention, Montreal, (March 2011)

Much like their British counterparts, the American networks did not simply reinforce the Bush administration frames as they were defined by this study.

In other words, the findings set out in this research report indicate that blanket accusations of a compliant American press are too sweeping.

The results were not what I had expected to find -- for several reasons. Post September 11, 2001, the Bush administration had clearly stated to the world "you are either with us or you are with the terrorists",¹⁹³ and that applied to media organizations as well. As Susan Moeller suggests in her research, the U.S. media, U.S. politicians and other Americans not only substantially supported President Bush's declaration and articulation of the "War on Terror" but did so well after Colin Powell's presentation and into the summer and fall of 2003. By contrast, there was more consistent and vocal opposition among senior British political figures to some of the Blair government's WMD policies,"¹⁹⁴ This reflected public sentiment in Great Britain which was against going to war with Iraq.

My surprise at these findings is also due to what I heard during the interviews I conducted with British journalists while researching this study. The British universally insisted a wide chasm existed between the skepticism exhibited by British reporters and their American counterparts. They were adamant that in their coverage of the Iraq War, they exhibited superior journalistic practices. They believe British journalists are skeptical by nature and therefore did not take at face value what government officials were saying about Iraq.

¹⁹³ President George W. Bush, Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People, September 20, 2001. <http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html>

¹⁹⁴ Moeller, Susan D., "*Media Coverage of Weapons of Mass Destruction*", Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland. (March,2004)

For example, Lindsey Hilsum of ITN told me, “As British broadcast journalists we are more skeptical of government than American broadcast journalists. We do believe our government is lying unless they can prove otherwise. On the whole I think Americans think the government is telling the truth unless it becomes clear otherwise. It’s because that’s our job to think that everything’s a lie.”¹⁹⁵ ITN’s Matt Frei echoed those sentiments. “There was a much greater skepticism in the British public and the British media about the reasons for going to war. They bought none of the Al Qaeda bullshit that Powell was talking about. They just didn’t buy it. There is an instinctive, almost knee jerk skepticism in the British media. We just don’t believe what we’re told.”¹⁹⁶

American journalists bristled at the notion they failed to be skeptical and thorough and were equally as adamant that the coverage of the events surrounding Powell’s presentation was competent and matched that of their British counterparts.

ABC’s Ted Koppel said criticisms, including a lack of skepticism on the part of American journalists, were unjustified given the unique nature of the situation. “The sad reality of it is that when most of the world’s intelligence agencies are under the mistaken impression that Saddam Hussein still has weapons of mass destruction, it would take a fairly extraordinary journalistic enterprise to be able to say ‘you know something, they’re all wrong and I have proof that he does not have those weapons’. Proving a negative is an incredibly difficult thing to do. The fact that 9/11 happened made it possible for an American President to say, ‘We have been assaulted as never before in this country and should anyone with access to WMD perform a similar act it would be so devastating that we cannot allow that to happen.’”

“I think lots of questions were raised beforehand... perhaps not enough.”¹⁹⁷

¹⁹⁵ Lindsey Hilsum was interviewed in May of 2010 in the ITN Washington D.C. news bureau.

¹⁹⁶ Matt Frei was interviewed in the ITN Washington DC News Bureau in March of 2011.

¹⁹⁷ Ted Koppel was interviewed in the ABC Nightline studio of their Washington, DC Bureau in March of 2004.

APPENDCIES

Interviews

Tom Brokaw was interviewed by ITN in the studio of NBC Nightly News in New York City on March 16, 2004.

Matt Frei was interviewed by Chris Shlemon in the ITN Washington D.C. News Bureau in March of 2011.

Lindsey Hilsum was interviewed by Chris Shlemon in May of 2010 in the ITN Washington D.C. news bureau.

Ted Koppel was interviewed by Chris Shlemon and an ITN colleague in the ABC Nightline studio of their Washington, D.C. Bureau in March of 2004.

Bill Neely was interviewed by Chris Shlemon in the ITN Washington, DC Bureau in March of 2011.

Kerry Sanders was interviewed by Chris Shlemon via e-mail in June of 2011.

David Smith was interviewed by Chris Shlemon on April 18, 2009 at Smith's home in Washington, D.C.

INTERVIEW TRANSCRIPTS

The following are portions of interviews conducted with the principals directly responsible for producing American and British news coverage of the run-up, Powell's appearance at the U.N. and the Iraq War that followed.

For over 40 years **Ted Koppel** worked as a correspondent for ABC News—25 of those as anchor of ABC's Nightline. In 2003 he was embedded with the US Army's 3rd Infantry Division as it crossed from Kuwait into Iraq after the U.S. invasion began. A colleague and I interviewed Ted Koppel on March 16, 2004 the ABC Nightline studio of their Washington, DC Bureau as part of an ITN series we were producing on the one year anniversary of the invasion of Iraq. We asked him about the American television coverage of Colin Powell's address to the U.N.

Question: Collin Powell's Speech to United Nations:

Ted Koppel: There is no doubt in my mind that he believed what he was saying at the time; there is no doubt in my mind that the president believed what he was saying; that Tony Blair believed what he was saying and I must confess based on what I thought I knew I believed that there were chemical weapons and biological weapons. I must tell you it was no joke to me a few months later when I was in Kuwait and we crossed the border into Iraq, believe me everyone one of us there soldier of journalist carried the gas mask on his hip, we were wearing biochemical suits, day and night, never took them off---and I was a true believer at the time.

I was also one of those who asked "why now, what's so urgent about it....what's the rush, why do we need to go in there now?" Looking back I have to ask myself "what would have happened if the UN weapons inspectors had been allowed to remain in Iraq, for another 3 months, another 6 months, another 9 months, another year. Do you really think that any of the people who believed there were weapons of mass destruction would have believed that the weapons inspectors had access to every to every place that they wanted to go? Do you think that they would have been convinced? The vice president, Dick Cheney, still claims to believe that there are weapons of mass destruction. So how would the weapons inspectors ever have convinced the true believers otherwise even if they'd had another six or eight or twelve months? I'm not sure that was a failure of journalism here or in the UK because in order to be able to prove otherwise....had Colin Powell been coming in there with cooked material that he and the CIA knew to be inaccurate,

I suppose eventually we might have been able to demonstrate that or someone might have leaked something to us. But I really think that he came to the UN, and I spoke to him since then, both privately and on camera, and I'm absolutely convinced that when he went to the CIA and talked to analysts, examining photographs and documents himself, that when he sat down before the UN General Assembly, he was saying what he believed to be the truth. Now it turns out that he was probably wrong, but I don't think that he was lying. I think he had bad information.

Question: On a Possible Al Qaeda Connection?

Koppel: I've been reporting it, didn't believe it then, don't believe it now. I think the evidence that was put forth on the linkage between Saddam Hussein and al Qaeda was always very flimsy and those that wanted to believe it believed it and those who were more skeptical among us did not. I don't think that falls into quite the same category as the weapons of mass destruction.

Question: How do you report on intelligence matters when you have to rely on politicians?

Koppel: I've always maintained there's a difference between facts and truth. Journalism deals in facts—not truth. There's a big difference between the two. If the CIA claims as it did that it has evidence of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, then we in journalism are totally justified in reporting as a FACT that the CIA and MI6 and whatever other intelligence sources we may have, believes that Iraq has weapons of mass destruction. That was a fact at the time, it remains a fact today...just didn't happen to be true. But if we're going to wait until we can demonstrate the truth of everything we report, we're never going to get on the air the newspapers are never going to get out. We don't deal in truth. Truth takes much too long to affirm.

The sad reality of it is that when most of the world's intelligence agencies are under the mistaken impression that Saddam Hussein still has weapons of mass destruction, it would take a fairly extraordinary journalistic enterprise to be able to say "you know something, they're all wrong and I have proof that he does not have those weapons." First of all proving a negative is an incredibly difficult thing to do.

Question: We're journalists muzzled and intimidated by the White House?

Koppel: At a certain point one has to take one's leaders at face value. There were no voices of dissent coming from the British or the French at that point. They weren't arguing about the fact that there were WMD. French intelligence thought that there were WMD; German intelligence thought that there were WMD. The only questions that were being legitimately raised was "why now?" We weren't questioning where there were or were not weapons of mass destruction we were saying "somebody explain to us what the nature of this imminent threat is because we don't quite get that."

And I think there were a lot of people who were raising it in terms of timing and in terms of the imminent danger to the United States, that was being questioned and I think that was the right question to ask at the time. But the issue about the weapons, no I guess nobody questioned that.

The British people were far more perceptive in their general skepticism than the politicians were either in the UK or here.

Question: What is your opinion on how the war was covered?

Koppel: Anyone who suggests that the coverage of the war was limited to the tanks rolling across the desert clearly was not reading the New York Times, of the Wall Street Journal or the Washington Post or Time or Newsweek. American television was reporting from the desert, from Washington, from Paris and Berlin. People choose to look at one scene that was being reported by one reporter at the time and failing to remember that was one small piece of the mosaic that was being put out every day. And that is the nature of journalism

One of the reasons that covering war or even understanding what is going on in war is so complicated is that the closer you are to the action the less you see of the broader picture. And therefore it becomes necessary to put together both the reports from the correspondents on the battlefield with what is being reported by people giving more of an overview back at home. I think by and large the press did an accurate job. I'm not sure what one would point at in the overall coverage that would cause people now to say the war wasn't covered appropriately or as accurately as it can be. It's reasonable enough to ask the question whether coverage is critical enough of what's going on. But when one can fairly say in retrospect that phase of the war, up to the capture of Baghdad was an enormously successful operation. To look back and say there wasn't enough criticism of it is another way of saying "it really went pretty much as planned". And from a military point of view it was a huge success. The failure happened once they took Baghdad and then it was sort of like "now what do we do?" And there really was no effective plan and I think that has certainly been covered in enormous detail to the mounting fury of the Bush administration.

Question: HOW DID THE TECHNOLOGY ON THE BATTLE FIELD AFFECT COVERAGE?

Koppel: I think the technology was brilliant...I have been arguing for many years we have to be careful of our own technology. That simply training a camera on an event and letting people back home watch it is a triumph of technology but it's not journalism. Journalism requires selection, editing, prioritizing, some things are more important, some things are less important, some things have to be put in context and that takes a little bit of time you don't do that live. I think we were beaten by NBC technologically, but after the first couple of days the technology was less important than the actual reporting and eventually it's always that way and eventually, even though the excitement of seeing a war on television is much greater than reading about it in a newspaper, if I really want to know what's going on I will still pick up my copy of the New York Times or the Washington Post even a day after I have been covering something to see, what, if anything, I've missed. And I'm always chagrined to learn that I've missed something.

The technology is such that when you are moving with an invading army and when much of the killing is done at long range, it's done by close air support, it's done by artillery pieces of multiple rockets that travel a distance of 30 or 40 miles, you rarely see the consequences of the violence or at least you don't see them until several hours later. When you are with an invading army, until that army moves into a city, you don't really have a great deal of contact with the local population. So if you were going to ask me "did I do an adequate job of talking to Iraqis?" Absolutely not, I barely saw any Iraqis from the time we crossed the border from Kuwait until we got to the outskirts of Baghdad. So there wasn't much of an opportunity for me to do man in the desert interviews. The problems with interpreters---and the language barriers are problems.

Question: HOW DO YOU KNOW IF A STORY IS TRUE?

Koppel: Journalism is a continuum which is broken up into daily pieces—sometimes hourly. I think the U.S. government at that point was desperate for a hero—at that time there were problems with the war for US sandstorms etc... So when the Lynch story was reported—in the first round of any story telling you go with what the authorities tell you. Then when you are able to check on it a little bit and to talk to other the story gets rectified as it goes along. It turns out to have no basis in fact. It was a great story that turned out not to have the additional advantage of being true. Anyone over the age of 21 in journalism who is still trusting is probably in the wrong business. It's not a question of trusting. I'm willing to bet that if you were out there when (Jessica Lynch) happened and if the authorities tell you that and you know that your competitors are all around you and they're going to go with that story tonight. I don't see picking up the phone and saying "hello, I really think that we ought to wait on this story for another 2 or 3 days because my nose tells me it's not entirely accurate". You go with it the first day based on what the authorities have told you. You quote your sources and you quote them accurately and then you go about checking. That's always been one of journalism's great problems. We have deadlines, we have to meet those deadlines and after the fact to go back and say "oh boy, were we taken in" it happens it's going to happen again. We try as best we can to avoid it but we're not going to be able to entirely.

It's only mea culpa if you go around assuming that it's your obligation everyday to be responsible for the truth of what you're reporting. I insist that what we deal in is not so much truth on a daily basis as facts. We try to establish the facts. We try to get sources. We try to get reliable sources. We try to get more than 2 or 3 reliable sources. But if what you presume to be your reliable sources are all lying to you or are themselves mistaken, you are going to report something that is untrue even though the facts were correct.

Question: AL QAEDA AND IRAQ BUSH WAS NOT CHALLENGED

Koppel: I don't know if anyone challenged the president directly, that is a difficult thing to do, I think that claim was challenged from the very beginning and is still being challenged to this day.

ASSESS YOUR COVERAGE OF THE RUN-UP TO WAR

Koppel: I think we did a fair to average job, I don't think it was a great job. I don't think we adequately focused on what I think everybody really thinks was behind the war and the occupation, and that was the need to safeguard oil from the Persian Gulf. That is one of the most strategically important areas of the world. The United States lost its surrogate in Iran, appears to be in the process in losing its surrogate in Saudi Arabia and needs another one. The fact that 9/11 happened made it possible for an American President to say 'we have been assaulted as never before in this country and should anyone with access to WMD perform a similar act it would be so devastating that we cannot allow that to happen" I think lots of questions were raised beforehand, perhaps not enough.

Did we do a great job? No but I'm not sure we ever do a great job. Every once in a while a journalist of another does a great job. As a group, I think we're all pretty lucky to do average or slightly better than average.

Tom Brokaw was anchor of NBC Nightly News for 21 years and had visited the Iraq region several times. ITN Channel 4 News interviewed him on March 16, 2004 in his studio at Rockefeller Center as part of their coverage of the one year anniversary of the Iraq invasion.

Question: Was coverage balanced enough in reporting on the administration's run up to the war?

Tom Brokaw: What we knew based on what they were saying is that we examined all of their claims and all their assertions about what was there, we presented other points of view as well, we carried live on the network the debate within the united nations, we covered pm Blair and the and the political difficulties that he was having at home; we put on all the experts that we could possibly find to determine whether or not this case added up and the way the admin claimed that it did.

Question: They claimed it added up?

Brokaw: They did claim that the case added up and many people believe who now don't believe obviously that there were WMD there—believed that they were there at the time including Hans Blix who thought that there were still things that they could find if they were able to go in there in terms of WMD.I think that it is a little disingenuous to suggest that television somehow accelerated the rush to war or that it was complicit with the administration in getting the U.S. into the war.

Question: DO YOU ACCEPT IF THAT YOU HAD BEEN MORE SKEPTICAL THE RUSH TO WAR MIGHT HAVE BEEN SLOWED DOWN OF WAR MIGHT HAVE BEEN AVERTED?

Brokaw: I doubt it, I think that is assigning far too much influence to those of us who are at my job—the idea that the 12 million people who watch us every night take everything that I say and go and make all their decisions based on that. I think that anyone who watched Nightly News during that time got a pretty good cross section of the views and the debate that was going on,

Question: POWELL AT UN OF 5TH OF FEBRUARY, DIFFERENCES IN COVERAGE OF THAT EVENT BETWEEN U.S. AND EUROPE?

Brokaw: Secretary Powell who is a figure of great integrity in this country, obviously has great influence and credibility, made by all accounts, even within the U.N. security council, what they felt was the best case that the administration had made so far it was still in my judgment a tenuous case because you had some radio intercepts you were talking about. That didn't come down to the smoking gun at that point, but it was our responsibility to report on what he had said that day and frankly I had nothing that I could point to that was contrary to what he was testifying to. Part of our obligation not just to be skeptical but to present other evidence and in fact we didn't have anything that we could point to say that he was dead wrong.

He had the director of the CIA sitting behind him and the United Nations ambassador sitting behind him and he said this represents the best intelligence that we have.

Question: BUSH MARCH 6 PRESS CONFERENCE IN WHICH HE MENTIONS 9/11 AND AL QAEDA 14 TIMES?

Brokaw: That connection between Al Qaeda and Saddam Hussein, we examined it and we kept saying on the air “show us the evidence of that, there is no evidence of that, we cited sources in the middle east and Europe---I went down to see Vaclav Havel in his last appearance in Washington and he said he had told the administration they had no evidence or hard intelligence that Atta had met with a member of Saddam's regime in Prague. That was reported very clearly here on NBC....we did the best job that we could of vetting everything that came up and putting it through the various filters that we had.

Brokaw: My own strong impression is that the American audience takes in what we report, what CBS ABC, FOX, MSNBC, CNN, what they read in the New York Times what they read in their local newspapers, what they hear on radio, and they kind of make a stew out of all of that and decide which parts of it work for them.

It's been kind of amusing to me to see reporters from the United Kingdom and from Europe generally coming here and finding criticism with American media about what happened in Iraq. When at the same time you had your prime minister who was an ally of this country... but if you look at it piece by piece by piece, it was pretty strong reporting that went on here, it was not a polemic as some of the printed press that I saw in Great Britain.

Question THE WAR ITSELF, ARE YOU PLEASED WITH COVERAGE OF THE WAR ITSELF?

Brokaw: Taken as a whole, I think that it went pretty well in terms of the coverage, there was a lot of critical coverage about the looting and about the general chaos as soon as so called major combat was over or the arrival of the American forces in Baghdad, I think the American People had an understanding of that. All of this is absorbed in a climate of some emotion, people are inclined to want their forces to do well they've got their sons and daughters over there. This is a country that had gone through 9/11 and it had not worn off yet. So our job is to try to provide a factual basis for people to make decisions but we can't always control the spirit in which they're going to receive that information.

We tried to present a composite picture, we didn't just leave it with the up close and personal from the embed reporters, we had maps and extensive graphic systems here, we had military analysts, we were getting information from the pentagon and the state department and we were getting information from our own folks in Baghdad and in other areas. So it just wasn't just doing a video poster for the United States military, we really did try to put that into some kind of context. We were constantly trying to provide some kind of a balanced picture it wasn't just getting up on a tank with a flag and waving it across the desert.

Question: DID THE WHITE HOUSE PRESS CORPS DO THEIR JOB?

Brokaw: It's a tricky piece; I don't think you can put the whole burden on the White House Press corps obviously that's a unique situation. This is a very controlling White House, there's no question about that, they have a strong message, the president doesn't appear very often on spontaneous occasions and we've made that clear, we've said that to our audience. I don't think the American television audience was bamboozled, I think they had a pretty strong sense about why this president felt that he had to go to war. We also raised real issues on the other side. "why couldn't the inspections go on longer, why couldn't you take 3 more months and try to do the diplomacy...all these issues were raised in one way or another but you could say that the administration did a very skilful job of getting their political point of view across.

The coverage of News is not just judged on a 24 hour basis, it's over a long term, this is a very complex situation, I've been doing this for 40 years and Iraq is about as complex as any situation I've encountered.

The British Perspective

Bill Neely is currently the International Editor for ITV News. He has reported for ITV as their Bureau Chief in Washington D.C. as well as from Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan, Mexico and Sri Lanka. He was embedded with British forces in Iraq in 2003. I interviewed him in the ITN Washington, D.C. bureau in March of 2011 and asked him about his thoughts on how the press reacted to Powell's presentation to the U.N. you need to get your science correspondent on it you need to probe absolutely everything."

Question: Did you "go native" as an embed.

Bill Neely: I was o.k. with it as long as the reporter understands that they were 'embedded' but not 'in bed with'. You have to maintain your independence and that is hard, that's a struggle because you come to rely on the military for your food and for your survival. You are at their mercy in some respects. You need to be very very vigilant about your own journalism and

Question: DO YOU THINK THAT BRITISH JOURNALISTS MUCH MORE SKEPTICAL THAT AMERICAN JOURNALISTS?

Neely: Absolutely, 100 percent true. And since I arrived here (in the U.S.) twenty years ago, I've been struck with how "deferential" is the wrong word, but it is approaching deference. The attitude of reporters, especially to the president. The president is the head of state; you might ask different questions to the prime minister than you would to the head of state. But when you ask questions to the prime minister, yes you respect him or her and you respect the office, but we're damned if we're gonna ask wimpy questions.

It not seen to appear macho or anything, this is important stuff and if we don't hold the head of state or of the government to account, who will? That's our job...to speak truth to power. And for the first two years of the Iraq war, nobody in American journalism spoke truth to power, nobody had the guts to ask George Bush some of the key questions some of the key questions about Iraq. It was a couple of years before American journalism really got it that the Iraq war was really not going well at all, was maybe a mistake in the first place, that maybe the intelligence was maybe skewed or just plain wrong. And maybe that there had been deception involved.

Question: Did you think any of those things before you went into Iraq?

Neely: Yes, I can tell you that 50% of the troops that I was with thought that maybe the war wasn't justified and that they said that privately. They said don't quote me on that, they said that's not my job anyway, we've been given a task to do and we're gonna do it damn well. But the homeland, America was attacked in 2001 so the reaction after that, at least for the first two years at the very least was understandable. It was difficult for reporters to voice any

doubts about the homeland security issue and about whether we were going about this the right way. You were seen as being unpatriotic because the Bush administration had said “you were either for us or you were against us” and that applied to media organizations as well. For British journalists it was equivalent to covering the IRA campaign over 30 years. I don’t think that all British journalists were neutral in that. One of the first experiences I had as a young journalist was watching news editors spike stories that had statements from the IRA. British journalists did not cover themselves in glory covering “the troubles”. There was a great deal of willful self censorship. It is not unique to American journalists that when the homeland is threatened you are just as robust with your own government as you are with the enemy.

The attitude of a journalist to a politician should be that of a dog to a lamp post.

I was at the UN, many U.S. journalists did not probe far enough what Colin Powell said at UN. If Colin Powell holds up the vial and says there is enough in here to kill thousands...then you need to get your science correspondent on it you need to probe absolutely everything. You need to be aggressive and antagonistic and that is certainly what a lot of American reporters are not. They are much less aggressive than British reporters who are not just the dog peeing against the lamppost...they’re barking and snapping and being a pain in the ass.

Question: WHY IS THAT .WHAT IS DIFFERENT IN OUR CULTURES?

Neely: American journalists have bought the national myth that America is the just the greatest country that the world has ever known and therefore most of the things America does, it does for really good reasons and even if your propping up corrupt regimes, or sending guns to Latin America even if you’re in bed with the Saudis who are politically repressive it’s ok because there is a greater goal and we’re the good guys. Just remember we’re the good guys. In Britain and France we’re tarnished by hundreds of years of bad things. There were times when we were on the right side of history and times when we’ve clearly been on the wrong side of history. We’ve lost an empire, we’ve been humbled, and the French have been invaded. In Europe we know we’re not the greatest country the world have ever known and we chuckle at American arrogance.

Neely: A British journalist thinks someone is lying, or trying to pull the wool over our eyes. Skepticism, even cynicism is our first thought. I think Skepticism ought to be the first thought of a journalist. Don’t take things at face value. There’s what they say, but what do they really mean?

Lindsey Hilsum is ITN Channel 4 News International Editor, and the author of “Sandstorm; Libya in the Time of Revolution, an account of the fall of Colonel Gaddafi.” She covered the Iraq War for ITN including the invasion of Baghdad by U.S. forces and the U.S Marine assault on Fallujah in November of 2004. She has covered the "Arab Spring" from Egypt and Bahrain, was stationed in Belgrade in 1999 when NATO bombed Serbia, Her reports from Africa, the Middle East and Russia have earned her several awards. I interviewed her in the spring of 2010 at the ITN Washington, D.C. Bureau and asked about her experiences reporting from Iraq.

Lindsey Hilsum: I got to Baghdad on February 6th, the day Colin Powell made his presentation at the U.N. It was extraordinary because we watched it in the Ministry of Information in Baghdad which was the only place where you could see it. With the Ministry of Information officials. It was surreal. The next day one of the officials took us out to one of the places Colin Powell had mentioned to try and proved to us that what he had said wasn't true.

The way that presentation was put together initially was quite convincing. You had the graphics the satellite photographs and the whole way it was done. And because as journalists we didn't trust what Saddam Hussein and his regime said because we knew that they lied. The point where I finally realized that what the Americans were saying wasn't true was just a few days before the war started. When Bush and the other started to bang on about how an airborne drone might be used for spraying chemical weapons. The Iraqis took us to see this drone. This drone was like a small balsa wood model airplane. We also found one that the Iraqis had painted pink which the Iraqis had taken to an air show in Jordan in order to try to sell them. This was not a secret weapon.

The AP correspondent that was with us said that “it had an engine the size of a weed wacker”. Our Iraqi driver came up to me and said quizzically “is this airplane a very big problem for America?” And I looked at him and we burst out laughing.

Question: Did you investigate the Claims that Colin Powell made before the UN?

Hilsum: We were restricted in what we could do by Saddam...you couldn't travel freely in Iraq you had to go where they took you to or where they let you go. The system of secret police and minders meant that it was extremely difficult to get away from that. So it was hard to investigate.

As British broadcast journalists we are more skeptical of government than American broadcast journalists. We do believe our government is lying unless they can prove otherwise. On the whole I think Americans think the government is telling the truth unless it becomes clear otherwise. This is because of our cynical and nasty nature.

It's because that's our job. It's our job to think that everything's a lie. It's a cultural difference. In Britain when we have an election, people will support whoever is elected until he's elected whereupon we immediately loathe him and want to bring him down. We support someone until they are the leader, then we want to get rid of him.

On the Iraq war we were all too credulous. Many of us believed there was some truth in what the government said and we believed Saddam Hussein probably had weapons of mass destruction. We didn't necessarily believe that those would be dangerous. We didn't necessarily believe that he could blow up the world. But from travelling to Iraq for many years, I knew that Saddam once had WMDs and he was still acting as though he still had WMDs so it was his action that made us suspicious, rather than believing what our government told us.

Question: WMD ON THE PRESS LEAVING BEFORE THE WAR BEGAN?

Hilsum: The Pentagon told them "get out", don't stay, it's too dangerous you might be taken prisoner. We can't promise that we won't bomb the ministry of information. There was huge pressure on them to leave. I think they buckled under that pressure. I believe the pentagon didn't want them there because they didn't want them to report that side of the story. I can't prove that but that's what I think. Of course the Pentagon couldn't guarantee their safety, it's a war and you can't guarantee safety. But it was also convenient for the pentagon to not have them there. The British government never said anything to us. Because if they did we'd tell them to piss off we wouldn't take the slightest bit of notice.

I had one minor pressure from our foreign editor at the time who said that he had heard from somewhere that women might be in more danger so that perhaps women should leave. I didn't appreciate that. But we had made a calculation to stay. We knew there was going to be a war; we knew that Bagdad was going to be bombed, we knew what Saddam was like we knew something of what the military campaign was going to be. There was no new information in the week leading up to the war to make us take a different decision. It was a calculated risk and we thought it was worth it.

Hilsum: We in Britain separated September 11 from Iraq. There was no connection. We could see there was no connection. In the broadcast media in America they blurred it. And that was hugely misleading. There was not much knowledge in American about the differences between Iraq and Afghanistan. I don't think that many people in America knew that Saddam Hussein was regarded as anti-islamist that he was a huge enemy of Islam.

JOHN IRVINE INTERVIEW

John Irvine broadcast nightly reports for ITV News and NBC News from Baghdad during the intense aerial bombardment at the start of the war. He was the first foreign correspondent to greet the arriving US troops to Baghdad. He was awarded the Royal Television Society Journalist of the Year award in 2003 for his coverage of the invasion. I interviewed him at ITN's Washington, D.C. Bureau on January 30, 2009.

John Irvine: The Iraqis were in control of Baghdad until the Americans arrived on April 9 2003. The Americans had started air raids about 3 weeks earlier, so there was a 3 week period (after the initial invasion) where Baghdad was still under the control of Saddam's regime. Immediately before the Americans arrived in Baghdad. We were worried that we could be taken hostage or killed in the 24 hour period when we were on our own—the apparatus of the regime broke down completely and everybody did a runner. We were reporting the war from Baghdad from their perspective.

I spent most of my time in Baghdad because we knew it (the war) was coming. From October 2002 onwards the drumbeat for war got louder and louder and louder and we saw the UN stuff happening and we just knew it was coming. I thought it said a lot about the American psyche that news managers were probably only really interested in one side of the war and that was the American invasion force side of the war.

GREETING THE MARINES IN BAGHDAD.

Irvine: The Americans called it "Thunder Run". We could see the Americans several miles away through our long camera lens. Everyone was reluctant to leave the safety of the hotel. We decided to go out and have a look for ourselves. We drove out and saw some looting going on. We saw Saddam's pictures everywhere and people throwing cans of petrol and their shoes at Saddam's pictures setting his pictures on fire. There was a celebratory air. We eventually came to this overpass and cars were reluctant to pass over it. We decided to cross it and we stopped when I saw a group of Iraqis. The Iraqis started cheering when an American humvee came rolling by. We could see an American checkpoint several miles away outside the Canal hotel which had been the headquarters for the UN weapons inspectors which had a certain irony to it. We shouted that "we're from British TV, can we come up?" They waved us up. I walked over and shook the hand of a marine and started chatting to the marines. They were actually arresting Iraqis who had been trying to steal UN cars. We decided to say that we were the first to report on the Americans arriving in Baghdad until somebody proves us wrong.

I walked up to them and said "hello my name is John Irvine from ITV TV...I said welcome to Baghdad".... Sergeant welcome to Baghdad. I didn't realize its importance for me at the time.

David Smith was an award-winning TV correspondent with ITN Channel 4 News. In January 2008, The Daily Telegraph identified him as one of the most influential Britons in America. He is currently Deputy Director of the United Nations Information Office in Argentina. He was based in Washington D.C. during the early years of the Iraq War and covered Colin Powell's presentation to the U.N. for ITN. I conducted this interview on April 18, 2009 at his home in Washington, D.C.

David Smith: In the days immediately after 9/11 it was very obvious we had a Washington press corps which, in my terms, was "supine" or accepting, buying whatever the White House line was. The press was saying that in a sense "we are all in this together" and the Bush White House created an environment in which it was possible in that period immediately after 9/11 –for 2 to 3 years afterwards, where the attitude of the White House press corps was very much quiescent adoption, tacit acceptance, quiet acceptance of whatever the White House gave them.

WHY DID THAT HAPPEN?

Smith: Because there had been an attack on the American mainland, the like of which we'd never seen in this country and never experienced before. There were attacks not only on the innocents on the 37th floor of the twin towers, but also on the people who tried to go and save them. A kind of brutal, naked, modern technological onslaught on an edifice in the heart of the financial capital of the world, specifically against the superpower. A superpower which for years had been convincing itself that it would never face that that sort of threat again. Just like in Britain in 1941, the journalist feels like he is now a part of the national struggle.

Smith: 9/11 created an environment for the American journalist that said "you're with us or you're against us". Just as the President had made that statement to the countries of the Middle East. American correspondents were reporting the necessity to go to war as seen through the eyes of the Bush Administration. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, the President and National Security Advisor Condi Rice with her mushroom clouds. But the perspective from Europe was "what's the evidence? What's the reasoning? What's the rationale?" So there was obviously a dichotomy, a split right there. Part of it was about the moment, Europe had not seen terrorism yet. The London subway bombings and Madrid train bombings had not happened yet.

Part of it is a much more rooted cultural difference. The media in Great Britain, even at a time of war, feels its duty is to always challenge authority, to question authority, to put authority through its hoops, rather than just accept that quiet adoption of what the administration was saying.

WHY IS THERE A DIFFERENCE IN APPROACH?

Smith: At home, the way journalists talk to British politicians is very different than the way American journalists talk to American politicians. In Britain it is far more “in your face”. It’s far more, “Where’s the evidence for that? How can you say that?” These are questions that day in and day out you will hear across the British airwaves. The way that the American reporter will speak to the figure in authority is considerably more deferential than in the U.K. I was paid to be rude to Tony Blair; I was paid to challenge the British Foreign Secretary. I don’t think that anyone who works for ABC News or CNN is going to win plaudits or pay raises for having a real go at the President. I would never say to the Prime Minister or Foreign Minister or the Queen...I would never say “Sir” or “Madame” on my television camera and yet I routinely hear American Journalists saying “Mr. President” or “Madame Secretary”. This is because I would not wish to be seen as putting myself in a deferential position towards that person. We would ask a no holds barred conversational question.

SO DOES THIS MEAN THAT AMERICAN JOURNALISTS WILL NEVER ASK TOUGH QUESTIONS OF GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS?

Smith: I think questions were asked but were asked in such a deferential manner that it was hard to know what the question was. For instance, during the Rumsfeld Pentagon briefings it was very “chummy” almost boys clubish atmosphere. There is then this very open dichotomy between two reporting cultures-- and it’s heading into war. The interesting thing is that we were co joined at the hip. Prime Minister Blair clearly agreed with Bush that Britain will be there for this adventure.

Smith: That creates a special moment where British journalists could not buy whatever the line was from the White House even though it might be in sync with whatever was being said by the government in London. Our audience would have given us hell and said “It is not your place to be buying into this; it is your place to be questioning.”

When Powell was at the UN making his masterful presentation, it’s why you would have seen me and others carefully writing what I think of as “health warnings”, “disclaimers”. My script said “The Americans say this...but it’s based on intelligence and Iraqi defectors”. And I quietly said to my audience, “Nudge, wink, are we to buy this?” The most important element is that American television ran very little of the nay sayers, the doubting Thomas’s, the skeptics, lead by the French, but also the Chinese and the Russians. I remember vividly saying to my producer that we must have a big chunk of the French, because the UN Security Council is the supreme court of the world—and there’s nothing more important than war and peace. And a major player in that Security Council was saying volubly, not once, but repeatedly “This needs more time. This is hasty. This is no moment to do this”

The people around Bush were extraordinarily good. I was on the receiving end some of their calls. The people around Bush were extraordinarily effective at pounding their message. Making journalists feel that if they didn’t pound on that message they were not with the program, not with the story, and somehow missing it. They were very good. Karl Rove and Karen Hughes were very very good, and real pros at one message, keep pounding on it, don’t allow dissent within the press ranks, and keep hammering it home. Take those

guys who aren't telling it the way you want it told and giving them a very stern message. They were very good at that side of the business. All of which is modern political hardball.

I'm not sure the American press corps, particularly TV was really armor plated enough to stand up and say "That's not what I do". "I'm not here to be a cheer leader". "The head cheer leader is called war and suddenly the press corps was cheerleading with it.

POWELL MAKES HIS PRESENTATION, AND BECAUSE HE WAS SO WELL RESPECTED NO ONE QUESTIONED THE CONTENT OF WHAT HE WAS SAYING?

Smith: The American media had been carefully seduced by the presence of Colin Powell. Why? Because, if General Powell was on board then this must be 100 percent for real. I think again that this was political hardball, political savvy. The Bush administration never dealt with the public glare without considering that. The choice of Colin Powell was a way of inoculating them against anybody saying "not credible". If Powell was the front man, it had to be true. So when people saw a formidable case being laid out by the dove of the administration that was a very careful calibration on the part of the White House to make sure the media bought into the idea.

IS ANY OF THIS BECAUSE WASHINGTON IS SO INCESTUOUS, EVERYONE—REPORTERS AND POLITICANS, GOES TO THE SAME COCKTAIL PARTIES, EVERYONE IS VERY BUDDY BUDDY?

Smith: I think we underestimate the pressure that the modern TV reporter comes under to get it all into 2 ½ to 3 minutes. We also forget the pressure TV reporters come under to reflect what the New York Times and the Washington Post are saying. At that time the heavy weights were saying "full speed ahead to war". The New York Times and the Washington Post lead the charge—all of which plays into the way that TV editors think.

So in a sense, going into the Powell presentation, the question is for the American media, "how good was his performance going to be?" The question for British reporters was "Has he got the goods?" From an American TV perspective, it was treated as a piece of theatre. It was not treated as an event that needed scrutiny and no holds barred questioning. It was treated as an event where people asked "How did he do?" The Bush White House has played into that and carefully manipulated it by choosing the consummate performer—And he happened to be the one dove, who might stand up to the hawks—so if he's bought on then it must be true.

What do you think about SCRIPT APPROVAL

Smith: I never once, in 25 years at ITN, I never had anyone approve a script. I wasn't having someone in London tell me what the story was. But an American TV correspondent would always, at whatever level, needs to submit their scripts for approval. It actually means that the New York grid, the New York center, says "The story is XYZ" That's based on what the New York Times is saying, What the Administration has told you at their lunch time

briefing, what you heard from the old intelligence hand that you had lunch with...it has all those elements written into it This as opposed to the story that the person on the ground who is paid and educated and primed to call it the way he or she sees it. The American correspondent is paid to deliver that which New York Center, or Atlanta or Burbank believes IS the story.

And it's a fundamental difference between the two reporting cultures. No self respecting British correspondent would ever accept script approval. Why, because you were giving away control of the product to people who were not on the ground with you.

So the narrative is always going to be hard hitting, the questions are always going to be tougher, the summary is always going to be more objective if it is done by one person seeing it with a clear, well informed field of vision rather than a central committee of people who have different views or read different things and want to see a composite.

Question: WAS THIS A PERFECT STORM ALL THINGS CAME TOGETHER IN BUSH ADMINISTRATION, PRESS AND THE IRAQ WAR?

Smith: You cannot underestimate the shock factor of 9/11. You cannot underestimate an administration that had a rotten first day and then realized what was out there for them if they got their act together. You can't underestimate an American media under the gun of numbers showing initial outrage followed by blanket support for a hard line administration response.

What seems in hindsight to have been an inept period of leadership, at the time was extremely conscious of winning control of the news cycle. Governance in the days after 9/11 was about controlling the news cycle and using the news cycle to get to the political end they had in mind. They were extremely good at going into every week with a clear idea of where they wanted to be by the end of the week in terms of the message, how the message related to the goal, how the president was perceived at the center of that goal and then executing it. They put a primacy on controlling the news cycle and governance was primarily about having control of that news cycle this was a very effective machine at work, knowing how to pull the levers, not only in the US but around the world, in terms of presenting arguments and making the news cycle the engine room of their political goals.

Matt Frei is ITN Channel 4's Washington correspondent following a long career at the BBC as correspondent and anchor of "BBC World News America". I interviewed him in the ITN Washington, D.C. Bureau in March of 2011.

MATT FREI: 9/11 was much more strongly felt in the United States than in Great Britain. So to question the motives for war, the existence of WMD was considered by more in the U.S. as unpatriotic than it was in the U.K. The popular mood was much more against the war in the U.K. than it was in the U.S. The adversarial culture of the press in the U.K. The parliamentary system in the U.K. is adversarial. The members of Parliament face each other, they face off every day. The opposition party is called "Her Majesty's Loyal Opposition". It is a much more adversarial system than in the U.S. We take bitter division for granted, it's the way we like things.

Frei: There is an inbuilt deference in American society, much more than there is in Britain. There is deference in the institutions vested in the power of the people.

When I interviewed Bush my American executive producer said to me "Remember that you are interviewing the President of the United States, you can't interrupt his answers, you can't give him a hard time, you've got to be polite" You would never do that with a British Prime Minister, you just hammer them. However, we do show deference to our Queen. There is a knee jerk skepticism in the British media...we just don't believe what we're told.

You go to an interview with a Prime Minister and you assume he is going to lie thru his teeth. When you go to an interview with the President you think he might lie, but you give him the benefit of the doubt.

"There was a much greater skepticism in the British public and the British media about the reasons for going to war. They bought none of the Al Qaeda bullshit that Powell was talking about. They just didn't buy it. There is an instinctive, almost knee jerk skepticism in the British media. We just don't believe what we're told. So to get a feel for when this is the case and when you are being spun a lie is essential. The British public and the British media were in concert with that. There was a feeling that with WMD there was something fishy, something didn't quite smell right. It was a war of choice after all. We were not invaded. It took a year to prepare people for that war. The key difference was that in Britain they smelled something was fishy and in the U.S. they didn't." "But ultimately the Brits went to war with America and Blair wanted to do this. When the Americans say "jump", you jump."

SENTENCES CHOSEN FOR FRAMING ANALYSIS

1. Endorsed the frame. For the purpose of this study sentences were counted as endorsing the Bush administration's frame when the reporter, interview subject or quoted source echoed the official line without attribution.

Example: "Terror ties. Piece by piece, the new case laid out today **linking Iraq** to Osama bin Laden's al-Qaeda network."

In this category I also counted every on screen sentence uttered by Colin Powell or other officials making the Bush administration's case. Critics argue that the basic content of Powell's presentation was not questioned or thoroughly scrutinized in many of the American television news reports and that allegations made by Powell were treated as though they were facts. When reporters simply repeated Powell's claims and did not assess their validity they had abandoned their role as professional skeptics and were acting as conduits helping the Bush administration frame the story and advance the case for war.

2. Merely disseminated the frame. Sentences were counted in this category if they conveyed the official frame with attribution to the source, but with no overt or implied endorsement or skepticism toward the frame.

Examples: "He said"; "Powell went on to cite"; "Powell's next point was that..."

3. Raised questions about the frame. Sentences were counted in this category when the words of a reporter, interview subject or quoted source conveyed skepticism about the Administration's frame. Sentences containing skeptical attribution such as "he claimed" or "he alleged" were also counted in this category

Example: "In another blow to the U.S. case, sources in London tell ABC News that British intelligence **is highly skeptical** about a theory that al-Qaeda is connected."

** Denotes that sentence appeared in two frames.

#1 Colin Powell is highly trustworthy, thoroughly prepared, effective and credible.

- E: Endorsed the frame**
- M: Merely disseminated the frame**
- R: Raised questions about the frame**

FEBRUARY 3, 2003

NBC NEWS

M And TARGET: IRAQ. Secretary of State Powell now concedes there will be no smoking gun in Wednesday's speech to the UN,

M but says the case is strong against Saddam.

E MITCHELL: But the diplomacy, the inspections, the war all are on hold until the world hears from Colin Powell on Wednesday.

M Today he tried to lower expectations for his UN appearance.

M MITCHELL: In a Wall Street Journal column today, Powell wrote, "There will be no smoking gun," but said he would provide evidence Saddam is cheating

M. And Richard Haass, a top State Department official, told an Egyptian newspaper, "We will not present pictures of 30,000 stockpiled warheads if that's what you mean by evidence."

M Mr. RICHARD BOUCHER (State Department Spokesman): We're not trying to hype this presentation.

E MITCHELL: Why the rush to downplay the evidence? Partly concern over a Newsweek report describing Powell's case as "nearly open and shut."

M US officials say it is far more subjective.

****E** Powell will have electronic intercepts indicating Iraqi deception and links to terror groups; satellite photos, including trucks the US says are mobile biological labs; proof of Iraq's attempts to purchase illegal weapon components.

R But officials warn it is all open to interpretation.

R Mr. DAVID KAY (Former UN Weapons Inspector): Almost always it is ambiguous because it's trying to read from a picture or pick out a voice communications information.

E MITCHELL: So will Powell persuade other members of the Security Council like Russia, whose president, for the first time today, said he might back a second resolution authorizing force against Iraq.

ITV NEWS

M The United States says it will present some of that evidence to the United Nations on Wednesday.

R So Colin Powell will try to convince the UN security council,

M Today he promised compelling proof that Iraq is hiding evidence of its weapons.

E Ari Fleischer (White House spokesman) press conference SOT - I think it (evidence of weapons) will be compelling, but I think these will be judgments that people make and that is exactly why the President wants this done in public

****E** *Colin Powell will use surveillance photos and transcripts of secretly recorded conversations to try to show that Iraq is hiding weapons documents and laboratories in schools hospitals and even mosques.*

****E** *He'll highlight one phone conversation in which an Iraqi official is heard mocking the UN weapons inspectors, saying "Can you believe that they missed that?"*

R but there's no guarantee that this will convince anyone.

M Mr. Powell admitted today "there will be no smoking gun" and just in case he can't convince the UN, he warned "we will not shrink from war"

R Terrence Taylor a leading UN inspector in Iraq for 4 years says Powell's evidence will be circumstantial.

"**R** Taylor: it's a very very important week., I think its very hard to look as if it is like a court with evidence delivered in the same way. And proving beyond all reasonable doubt

R Taylor I think that s a standard by which one would expect in a court of law. We're not in that kind of situation. What we'll have is a mass of circumstantial evidence

FEBRUARY 4 NBC News: Nightly News

Profile: Secretary of State Colin Powell prepares for tomorrow's speech before UN Security Council

M COUNTDOWN: IRAQ. The secretary of state, less than a day away from a critical speech at the UN,

E TOM BROKAW, anchor: NBC News IN DEPTH tonight, the showdown with Iraq, and the countdown to a speech by Secretary of State Colin Powell at the UN tomorrow that could move the world closer to war.

Andrea Mitchell tonight, IN DEPTH.

Offscreen Voice: Mr. Secretary?

Secretary of State COLIN POWELL: Hi.

R Voice: Are you confident you will make your case, sir?

E Mr. POWELL: You'll see.

ANDREA MITCHELL reporting:

E The day before his make-or-break UN appearance, Colin Powell came to New York to practice his speech.

E He also tried to soften up Security Council skeptics like China, one of five members who can block UN support for war with Iraq.

****E MITCHELL:** *Powell will try to make that point tomorrow using equipment brought in to the Security Council today so he can show satellite pictures and play audio of intercepted communications between Iraqi officials.*

M President Bush called Russia's President Putin today to give him a preview. Tony Blair did the same with France's President Chirac, but failed to change his mind about the war option.

M Here in the Security Council tomorrow, France will be the hardest sell.

M But US officials believe if Colin Powell's evidence is strong enough to win over France, then other critics, even Russia, may follow.

R How good will the evidence be?

E But officials say Powell is convinced he can still establish a pattern that will be an indictment of Saddam Hussein. Andrea Mitchell, NBC News, New York.

CBS NEWS FEBRUARY 4

M DAN RATHER, CBS ANCHOR: So just what will Secretary Powell tell the Security Council tomorrow, and how might a conflict with Iraq affect the ongoing war on terror

M DAVID MARTIN, **CBS NEWS** (voice-over): Secretary of State Powell arrived in New York this evening to begin the final push to convince members of the U.N. Security Council Saddam Hussein must go.

E Powell has drafted CIA director Tenet to appear with him before the U.N. Security Council tomorrow in what promises to be a turning point in the confrontation with Iraq.

E Powell will display diagrams of mobile biological weapons vans, based on eyewitness descriptions from Iraqi defectors.

E He will also release transcripts of intercepted conversations between Iraqi officials talking about hiding materials from the U.N. weapons inspectors.

PETER JENNINGS, ABC NEWS

ABC FEB 3

M The Secretary of State Colin Powell is still going to lay out the case for war as scheduled in his speech to the United Nations speech on Wednesday.

M Raddatz: (VO) Secretary Powell is trying to lower expectation about his UN speech,

E writing in "The Wall Street Journal" today that he has no smoking gun, rather a "straightforward, sober and compelling demonstration" that Saddam Hussein is concealing weapons of mass destruction.

E Will there be any surprises? RICHARD BOUCHER, STATE DEPARTMENT SPOKESMAN
"Generally, no."

ABC Feb 4

M They are focusing on the presentation of Secretary of State Colin Powell, the one that he will make tomorrow to the United Nations.

E It has become a very significant milestone on the road to a possible war.

ABC's Martha Raddatz is at the United Nations tonight. Martha, you came up from Washington with the Secretary today. What gives? MARTHA RADDATZ, ABC NEWS

E Well, Peter, this speech is the result of days of negotiations over what to declassify.

E The presentation will end up being about 90 minutes long and will be divided into several parts.

**** E (VO)** *In one segment, Secretary Powell will play audiotapes of intercepted communications between Iraqi officials, who are said to be talking about "hiding things."*

M The tapes are in Arabic and will be translated during Powell's speech.

E It is highly unusual for audio intercepts to be released

M it has not happened since 1983, when the US played tapes of Soviet officers acknowledging they had shot down a Korean Airlines jet

E Secretary Powell is trying to lower expectations about his UN speech, writing in "The Wall Street Journal" today that he has no smoking gun,

E rather a "straightforward, sober and **compelling** demonstration" that Saddam Hussein is concealing weapons of mass destruction

****R** *The high-tech presentation will include satellite imagery **allegedly** showing Iraqi efforts to hide banned weapons.*

E The CIA continues to fight the release of some materials.

E Powell vetoed some of the evidence, especially some evidence presented by the Pentagon. Peter,

E he didn't think it was strong enough.

E Thanks very much, Martha. Martha Raddatz, who's here in New York tonight. A lot of people are gonna listen to this. We will broadcast it live at about 10:30 Eastern time tomorrow morning.

****E** *Third, defector testimony. Powell will rely on the word of some Iraqi defectors **who say that Saddam Hussein has mobile biological labs that are easily hidden throughout the country.***

ABC 5 February 2003

PETER JENNINGS, ABC NEWS

R Mr. Powell, as we said, was talking to many audiences. Some are inclined to believe him, others to doubt him.

REMEMBERING ANOTHER DRAMATIC UN PRESENTATION ADLAI STEVENSON CONFRONTED USSR

E (We cannot say whether Secretary Powell's appearance at the UN today will go down in history, though it may be a milestone on the road to war.

E But when he made his presentation with pictures, we thought, briefly, of another American official who used the Security Council to give a stunning performance. It was 1962, on the brink of war between the superpowers.

M That's our report on the broadcast. Tomorrow, we will test in Washington, around the country and overseas, to what degree Secretary Powell made a convincing case against Iraq. I'm Peter Jennings, thank you for joining us and good night.

R JIM SCIUTTO, ABC NEWS (OC) Peter, here in Europe, Secretary Powell's address emboldened the hawks, but did little to persuade the skeptics. Britain called on the Security Council to face up to its responsibilities.

FEBRUARY 5 2003 NBC NEWS

E TOM BROKAW, anchor: Secretary of State Colin Powell has given a lot of important speeches in his lifetime to a lot of large audiences, but no speech was more important than the one he gave today, and no audience was more attentive.

Andrea Mitchell:

E Powell came prepared, with CIA Director George Tenet.

M Working together until late last night and over the weekend at CIA headquarters, the two men **tried to build a case** of Iraq's deception and denial.

M Roger O'NEIL: The grad student at Georgia State University, like many college students, sweating through StairMasters and workouts, but not consumed by war talk. Powell's speech to the Security Council did capture their attention, though.

E O'NEIL: The speech was intended for skeptical countries, but also for a doubting America.

And today, the ears of the nation were tuned in. Roger O'Neil, **NBC News**, Savannah

TOM BROKAW, anchor: Also on the **NIGHTLY NEWS**, IRAQ WATCH tonight.

M As you might expect, Secretary Powell's speech at the UN is the lead story on television newscasts around the world. How's it playing?

M A German newscast describes Powell as a prosecutor presenting charges to a court.

E and they are more confident after Powell's presentation today they will get crucial support.

M The president today, watching Powell from his private study.

E On Capitol Hill, lawmakers glued to their televisions. Almost all, Republicans and Democrats, praising the strength of Powell's case.

E Senator JOHN WARNER (Republican, Chairman, Armed Services Committee): He laid the facts out in such a way that I don't know how reasonable men and women can differ with regard to the threat.

E Senator DIANNE FEINSTEIN (Democrat, Select Intelligence Committee): This is a shift for me. This was a very impressive chain of evidence.

M BROWN: But even supporters challenge the president to make the most of this moment and win UN backing.

E Senator JOSEPH BIDEN (Democrat, Foreign Relations Committee): That his presentation will embolden leaders who have been reluctant to risk any political capital in their own countries.

CBS NEWS FEB 5

M RATHER: The Powell report is by far the most comprehensive and detailed argument the United States has offered yet for going to war with Iraq. But how convincing was it?

M DAVID MARTIN, CBS CORRESPONDENT (voice-over): With CIA Director Tenet looking over his right shoulder, Secretary Powell gave an object lesson in both the power and the limitations of intelligence.

ITV NEWS February 5

E It was the moment the world has waited for.

E Americas best case against Iraq made by its top diplomat.

M Colin Powell produced 90 minutes of evidence and one conclusion

E Trevor McDonald: A poll on ITV suggests that Mr. Powell's words had helped to make a convincing case for war.

ABC NEWS Feb 6

E ABC PETER JENNINGS, The Secretary of State's presentation to the UN Security Council yesterday has had an effect on public opinion.

E An ABC News- Washington Post poll finds that 71 percent of Americans aware of his speech at the UN yesterday, think he made a convincing case for war

E Peter, reviews of the Powell speech here have generally been favorable.

E The Turkish government had been looking for help in making its case to a skeptical public about supporting the United States in a possible war with Iraq. And so, this certainly helped

FEBRUARY 6 2003 NBC News: Nightly News

M TOM BROKAW, anchor: First team. The president and Colin Powell, side by side, selling the case on Iraq.

M A new NBC News poll shows the American public more persuaded about going to war.

Powell's testimonies to UN, Senate committee softening resistance to idea of war with Iraq

M TOM BROKAW, anchor: On Capitol Hill, Secretary Powell's presentation to the UN and his testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee today softened resistance to the idea of war against Iraq.

R But, as NBC's Norah O'Donnell tells us tonight, members of both parties continue to raise troubling questions.

NORAH O'DONNELL reporting:

M With 150,000 US troops expected to be in the Persian Gulf by next week, today Secretary of State Colin Powell told senators that removing Saddam Hussein would be worth the cost of war. **E** COLIN POWELL: "Even though there may be some difficulties in--in the days of a conflict or even in the--in the months after a conflict, I think there is also the possibility that success could fundamentally reshape that region."

M O'DONNELL: But many in Congress worry the president has not yet told the public what it will cost in time and money to rebuild Iraq.

6 February 2003

NBC News: Nightly News

M TOM BROKAW, anchor: The administration's best one-two punch, President Bush and Secretary of State Powell, appeared together late today to warn that within weeks the Iraq situation would be brought to a conclusion one way or another, and they held out the prospect of a new UN resolution authorizing military action.

R But at the same time, the French continued to say they were not yet persuaded. There were major developments across a broad front today and we're going to begin tonight with NBC's **Campbell Brown**, who's at the White House. Campbell:

M **CAMPBELL BROWN** Tom, today the strongest signal yet from the White House that military action may be close at hand, with the president now focused on giving the UN Security Council one last chance.

E Building on Secretary of State Powell's presentation to the UN, the president emphasized the danger Saddam poses even to US troops who may have to take him on.

E President GEORGE W. BUSH: We have sources that tell us that Saddam Hussein recently authorized Iraqi field commanders to use chemical weapons.

M BROWN: The president, trying to take advantage of new momentum to win support for a second UN resolution authorizing military action, an idea the president has not fully embraced publicly until today.

E Pres. BUSH: Having made its demands, the Security Council must not back down when those demands are defied and mocked by a dictator.

M BROWN: White House sources say the target of his words, France, with veto power over any resolution. They fear the French will use the negotiations in the next few weeks to delay action.

M The president today set no firm deadline for a UN vote, but made it clear he believes inspections won't ever work, and the US is ready for war.

E Pres. BUSH: The game is over. All the world can rise to this moment. The community of free nations can show that it is strong and confident and determined to keep the peace. \

M BROWN: A key turning point will be February 14th. That's when UN weapons inspectors are scheduled to give their next briefing to the Security Council.

M White House officials are banking if that report is negative, few countries will be able to justify allowing the inspections to continue. Tom:

Newscast: President Bush's, Secretary Powell's favorable rating on rise since State of the Union address, Powell's speech to UN

TOM BROKAW, anchor: I'm joined now by NBC's Washington Bureau chief and moderator of "Meet the Press," Tim Russert. Tim, NBC News was in the field last night after Colin Powell's presentation. What are the American people saying about the president now?

E TIM RUSSERT Tom, the president's favorable rating has gone from up from 54 to now 61 percent to 31 percent negative. Why? The State of the Union message and the presentation Colin Powell made to the United Nations.

E We asked were the American people, were they convinced by Colin Powell? Look at these numbers, 66 to 11.

E High marks from the American public for Colin Powell.

M BROKAW: And what about the role of the United Nations if there is to be a war? The American people still want the UN to be involved?

M RUSSERT: Do they ever. This is a key question. Look at this. The American people believe 51 percent that the United States should take action against Iraq militarily only with UN support.

M RUSSERT: The American people have heard a lot about Iraq, but they want to know what is going to happen after the military action.

M Forty-nine percent believe that the administration has prepared us for war; 46 believe not quite so. The president has a lot of work to do with the American people.

E RUSSERT: Look for this president, Colin Powell, who's a very important messenger because he's perceived as the one most reluctant to go to war, Donald Rumsfeld, Condoleezza Rice, to campaign vigorously across this country, television airwaves saying, this is why we must take Saddam Hussein out now.

#2: Powell would present / presented strong evidence that Iraq had or was acquiring WMDs.

- E: Endorsed the frame**
- M: Merely disseminated the frame**
- R: Raised questions about the frame**

FEBRUARY 3, 2003 NBC NEWS

E ANDREA MITCHELL A blinding sandstorm as US troops exercise on the Iraqi-Kuwait border today, while UN inspectors find old missile parts near Baghdad.

M The British say they have solid evidence of Saddam's deception.

E Mr. TONY BLAIR (British Prime Minister): The evidence of cooperation withheld is unmistakable.

M US officials say it is far more subjective.

R But in Baghdad, Saddam Hussein was not waiting for Powell's speech. In his first interview in 12 years, airing tonight on British TV, he told an anti-war British politician he has no links to al-Qaeda and no illegal weapons.

R President SADDAM HUSSEIN: (Through translator) Iraq has no weapons of mass destruction whatsoever. We challenge anyone who claims that we have to bring forward any evidence and present it for public opinion.

****E** *Powell will have electronic intercepts indicating Iraqi deception and links to terror groups; satellite photos, including trucks the US says are mobile biological labs; proof of Iraq's attempts to purchase illegal weapon components.*

M MITCHELL: Today Hans Blix said Iraq must do more to cooperate, and said, ominously... Dr. HANS BLIX (Chief UN Weapons Inspector): Isn't there five minutes to midnight in your political assessment?

E MITCHELL: ...as weapons inspectors found another empty chemical weapons warhead, undercutting Saddam's denials.

E Mr. DONALD RUMSFELD (Secretary of Defense) This is a case of--of the--the local liar coming up again and people repeating what he said and forgetting to say that he never--almost never--rarely--tells the truth.

ITV NEWS Feb 3rd

M SUCHET The Prime Minister (Blair) talked today in ominous terms about the Iraq crisis we are entering the final phase he told MPs today,

M briefing them on his talks with president bush. He says the president has agreed to wait for a second UN resolution but not if it's a delaying tactic

E Prime Minister Tony Blair MP speech SOT - We are entering the final phase of a 12 year history of the disarmament of Iraq/ 8 weeks have now passed since Saddam was given his final chance, 600 weeks have passed since he was given his first chance/ the evidence of co-operation withheld is unmistakable

R TREVOR America claims to have tapes of Iraqi officials mocking the failure of UN inspectors to find some of their weapons.

M Our international editor Bill Neely reports now on the American intelligence briefing aimed at ending any doubt.

E George Bush has seen all he wants to, he's convinced Iraq has weapons of mass destruction.

R The rest of the world is looking for proof

E US President George W.Bush speech SOT – “We know our enemies have been working to acquire weapons of mass destruction, that is a fact”

R And there's the problem...Mr. Bush SAYS it's a fact, a skeptical world wants evidence.

M The United States says it will present some of that evidence to the United Nations on Wednesday.

M For months now the White House has said it knows Iraq has weapons of mass destruction. That it has evidence.

R But so far it has produced none.

R This is the week it must put up or shut up-- the week Iraq's fate could be sealed

****E** *Colin Powell will use surveillance photos and transcripts of secretly recorded conversations to try to show that Iraq is hiding weapons documents and laboratories in schools hospitals and even mosques.*

****E** *He'll highlight one phone conversation in which an Iraqi official is heard mocking the UN weapons inspectors, saying “Can you believe that they missed that?”*

FEBRUARY 4TH ABC NEWS

PETER JENNINGS,

M (OC) But the other big story in all of our lives is the potential for war with Iraq.

M And the Iraqi president, Saddam Hussein, has given his first television interview today to a non-Iraqi in 12 years.

M It was conducted by a former member of the British Parliament, Tony Benn, one of England's most famous and outspoken politicians. It's also been broadcast in the Middle East and in Britain. **And our man in Baghdad**, Dan Harris, has the details.

DAN HARRIS, ABC NEWS

R (VO) Speaking slowly and calmly, alternately sipping his coffee and playing with his pen, Saddam Hussein rejected the central allegation the US has leveled against him.

R SADDAM HUSSEIN, IRAQI PRIME MINISTER I tell you, as I have said on many occasions before, that Iraq no weapons of mass destruction whatsoever.

R He also played down the difficulties between Iraq and the UN weapons inspectors.

R SADDAM HUSSEIN It is in our interest to facilitate their mission to find the truth.

R The question is, does the other side want to get to the same conclusion? Or are they looking for a pretext for aggression?

M He did not, however, make any suggestions for addressing the inspectors' outstanding complaints, such as failure to set up private interviews with Iraqi scientists or surveillance flights using U-2 spy planes.

M Tony Benn said he conducted this interview to stop the war.

M While Saddam Hussein said repeatedly that he wants peace, he offered no compromises, accused the US of wanting to control Iraqi oil and, by extension, the entire world.

M And said, if invaded, the Iraqis will defend themselves. Dan Harris, ABC News, Baghdad.

R JENNINGS Some people now think the US case is stronger. Others say, again, the Administration is in too much of a hurry for war and that some of the evidence this morning is thin.

****E** (VO) In one segment, Secretary Powell will play audiotapes of intercepted communications between Iraqi officials, who are said to be talking about "hiding things."

****R** The high-tech presentation will include satellite imagery **allegedly** showing Iraqi efforts to hide banned weapons.

****E** Third, defector testimony. Powell will rely on the word of some Iraqi defectors **who say** that Saddam Hussein has mobile biological labs that are easily hidden throughout the country.

NBC NEWS FEBRUARY 4TH

****E** MITCHELL: Powell will try to make that point tomorrow using equipment brought in to the Security Council today so he can show satellite pictures and play audio of intercepted communications between Iraqi officials.

CBS NEWS FEB 4 2003

E and it is a possibility that Saddam would give Osama bin Laden a weapon of mass destruction which the administration says makes Iraq so dangerous.

M Powell will display diagrams of mobile biological weapons vans, based on eyewitness descriptions from Iraqi defectors.

E He will also release transcripts of intercepted conversations between Iraqi officials talking about hiding materials from the U.N. weapons inspectors.

DAN RATHER, ANCHOR: With the U.S. military possibly just weeks away from launching an attack to drive him from power, Saddam Hussein sat down this week for a rare interview, broadcast today on British television. Correspondent Bob Simon in New York has some excerpts tonight -- Bob.

R SIMON: But beyond any links to al Qaeda, the Bush Administration claims Saddam may be close to building nuclear weapons and probably has chemical and biological weapons, charges he continues to deny.

R SADDAM HUSSEIN (through translator): These weapons are not aspirin pills that one can hide in his pockets. And it's easy to work out if Iraq has weapons or does not have weapons. Chemical, nuclear and biological.

R Saddam Hussein: And we have said many times before, and we say it again today, that Iraq is free of such weapons.

E PITTS: A key component of the training here: biological and chemical weapons Saddam Hussein may have, and may well use, if there's a war with Iraq.

M And it's for that very real possibility that at least two American schools in Kuwait have decided to close their doors for six weeks

FEBRUARY 5 ABC NEWS

E On "World News Tonight" the Secretary Of State at the United Nations making the Bush Administration's case against Saddam Hussein.

E COLIN POWELL, SECRETARY OF STATE "Saddam Hussein and his regime will stop at nothing until something stops him."

E PETER JENNINGS (VO) The Administration's evidence, audio tapes, satellite photos.

M More than an hour of accusation, trying to convince the skeptics.

PETER JENNINGS, ABC NEWS

M (OC) Good evening, everyone. We're going to begin tonight with show and tell about deadly business.

M In the United Nations Security Council this morning, the Secretary Of State, Colin Powell, took almost an hour and a half to make the Bush Administration's case against Saddam Hussein.

M PETER JENNINGS Mr. Powell was talking to many different audiences, at home and overseas.

M It was the Bush Administration's justification for attacking Iraq if the Iraqi leader cannot be dealt with any other way.

M PETER JENNINGS (VO) First, let's listen to some of Mr. Powell as he tried to make a connection between Saddam Hussein and Al-Qaeda.

E COLIN POWELL, SECRETARY OF STATE "Ambition and hatred are enough to bring Iraq and Al-Qaeda together, enough so Al-Qaeda could learn how to build more sophisticated bombs and learn how to forge documents."

E POWELL: "And enough so that Al-Qaeda could turn to Iraq for help in acquiring expertise on weapons of mass destruction."

M Mr. Powell said repeatedly that Iraq was doing everything it could to hide its forbidden weapons from UN inspectors.

M And he played a tape **which he said** was two Iraqi officers talking about an inspection they knew was coming.

E COLIN POWELL "I'll come to see you in the morning. I'm worried. You all have something left. We evacuated everything."

E Powell: "We don't have anything left." Note what he says, "We evacuated everything." We didn't destroy it. "

E Powell; "We didn't line it up for inspection. We didn't turn it into the inspectors. We evacuated it to make sure it was not around when the inspectors showed up."

PETER JENNINGS

M (VO) There were several photographs **described by Mr. Powell as evidence** that Iraq was constantly moving weapons it shouldn't have.

E COLIN POWELL "At this ballistic missile facility, again, two days before inspections began, five large cargo trucks appeared along with a truck-mounted crane to move missiles. We saw this kind of house cleaning at close to 30 sites."

PETER JENNINGS

M (VO) Mr. Powell said Iraq had sent several of its scientists into hiding, rather than talk to the United Nations.

M That Iraq was still trying to develop nuclear weapons.

M He showed artist's renditions **of what he said** were mobile laboratories for biological weapons.

PETER JENNINGS

M And using yet another prop, **he said that** Iraq had thousands of times the amount of anthrax that caused havoc and death at the US capitol.

E COLIN POWELL "And Saddam Hussein has not verifiably accounted for even one teaspoon- full of this deadly material."

PETER JENNINGS

M (VO) Mr. Powell said the United Nations had no choice but to act.

E COLIN POWELL "Iraq has now placed itself in danger of the serious consequences called for in UN Resolution 1441."

E Powell "And this body places itself in danger of irrelevance if it allows Iraq to continue to defy its will without responding effectively and immediately."

PETER JENNINGS

. Our correspondents in New York and Washington and Baghdad have been working this all day. We're going to begin here in New York, at the United Nations, with ABC's Martha Raddatz. Martha?

EVIDENCE AGAINST IRAQ OPEN TO INTERPRETATION

5 February 2003

MARTHA RADDATZ, **ABC NEWS**

R (OC) Peter, clearly, a lot of this evidence is open to interpretation

M but the **intelligence community believes** the most compelling evidence is the intercepts because they are new and because it is the kind of evidence that is rarely released.

M (VO) Intelligence experts say there are several remarkable aspects to these intercepts.

M First, the timing. Secretary **Powell said** some were recorded as recently as last week.

M Second, the specific reference to nuclear inspector Mohamed El-Baradei and the direct references to chemical agents.

E COLIN POWELL, SECRETARY OF STATE "Nerve agents. Nerve agents. Wherever it comes up. Got it."

MARTHA RADDATZ

M (VO) Powell says the officers also speak of removing what they call a modified vehicle from the Al-Kindi Research Facility, a facility well known to weapons inspectors.

E TONY CORDESMAN, MILITARY CONSULTANT “This was a large production facility used for both chemical and biological weapons, and also had, at some point, elements of nuclear program, as well.”

MARTHA RADDATZ

R (VO) The satellite imagery is more open to interpretation.

M Secretary Powell said this was a satellite picture of a storage area for chemical or biological weapons with a decontamination vehicle and heavy cargo trucks nearby.

M A satellite image taken two months later at the same area, **Powell said**, showed the vehicles gone, buildings bulldozed and, to keep inspectors from being able to sample the soil,

R he claimed, the top layer had been hauled away.

R JONATHAN TUCKER, FORMER UNSCOM INSPECTOR “**We have to, of course, take Secretary Powell on faith**, to some extent, about the significance of the images because they are very difficult for a layman to interpret.”

MARTHA RADDATZ

M (OC) Many people were asking today why this intelligence wasn't released to inspectors before.

M The US insists it was. But, Peter, they say it was only intelligence that the inspectors could act on.

POWELL'S SPEECH TO THE UN OFFICIAL IRAQI REACTION

5 February 2003

PETER JENNINGS, **ABC NEWS**

R (OC) The Iraqis were dismissive of Mr. Powell's presentation.

R They essentially said the evidence was either fabricated or unreliable and proved nothing.

M ABC's Dan Harris has the reaction tonight, the official one, anyway, from Baghdad.

DAN HARRIS, **ABC NEWS**

M (VO) The Iraqis set up televisions for reporters to watch Secretary Powell's presentation.

R Then came out to dismiss it using terms such as ridiculous, baseless and unfounded.

RAMIR AL-SAAD, SCIENTIFIC ADVISOR TO SADDAM HUSSEIN “This was a typical American show, complete with stunts and special effects.”

DAN HARRIS

M Handling the defense for the Iraqis, Amir Al-Saadi, Saddam Hussein's Chief Science Advisor.

R Secretary Powell singled out Al- Saadi today as being part of a high-level committee created to monitor and mislead the inspectors.

R AMIR AL-SAAD: “That's absolute nonsense. Simply not true. The order given to me from, from early is to tell everything as it was.”

DAN HARRIS

R (VO) As for the satellite photos Powell displayed? Al-Saadi said they proved nothing.

R And the recordings of conversations between Iraqi officials, he said any third-rate intelligence outfit could produce such manufactured evidence.

M Both Al-Saadi and Iraq's ambassador to the UN, who addressed the Security Council today, asked why this evidence wasn't given first to the inspectors.

M (VO) A report whose goal, they say, was simply to sell the idea of aggression against Iraq. Dan Harris, **ABC News**, Baghdad.

PETER JENNINGS

M (OC) Okay, let's go back to the United Nations, now, today, where Mr. Powell was trying to make an aggressive push to convince, at least three nations, Martha Raddatz, Russia, China, France. How did he do?

MARTHA RADDATZ, **ABC NEWS**

R (OC) Well, I guess he didn't do so well, Peter, because all of those countries said the, the evidence that Mr. Powell presented today was reason to continue the inspections.

R In fact, in fact the French said that they believed the inspections should triple in size, triple the number of inspectors should be used.

R They offered helicopters, they offered airplanes. So, it looks like the Administration still has a bit of work to do.

FEBRUARY 5 2003 NBC News: Nightly News

E TOM BROKAW, anchor: Text, lies, and videotape.

M **Secretary of State Powell tells** the UN Saddam hides weapons, deceives inspectors and supports terrorists.

R Reaction from Europe, Baghdad, and across America. Did Powell's presentation convince the world it's now time for war?

NBC News: Nightly News

Secretary of State Colin Powell delivers speech to UN, provides evidence of Iraqi deception

5 February 2003

M The setting was the UN Security Council, but the audience was the world as he spelled out with visual aids and a prosecutor's rhetoric the administration's case against Saddam Hussein.

E **It was a masterful performance.** But was it enough? We're going to begin tonight with NBC's Andrea Mitchell.

Andrea: ANDREA MITCHELL reporting:

M Tom, armed with America's best intelligence, **Colin Powell tried to persuade** the world that Saddam Hussein will never let UN inspectors find his hidden weapons.

M Working together until late last night and over the weekend at CIA headquarters, the two men **tried to build a case** of Iraq's deception and denial.

E They showed satellite photos, quoted defectors, played audiotapes of intercepted conversations. **One chilling example:**

(Excerpt played of recording of men speaking foreign language)

E Mr. COLIN POWELL (Secretary of State): (Reading transcript): "Remove." "Remove." "The expression." "The expression, I got it." "Nerve agents." "Nerve agents, wherever it comes up." The senior officer is concerned that somebody might be listening. Well, somebody was.

E TEXT: COL: Captain Ibrahim? CAPT: I am with you, Sir. COL: Remove. CAPT: Remove.

[Repeats instructions] COL: The expression. CAPT: The expression. COL: "Nerve agents." CAPT: "Nerve agents." COL: Wherever it comes up. CAPT: Wherever it comes up. COL: In the wireless instructions. CAPT: In the instructions. COL: Wireless. CAPT: Wireless.

E MITCHELL: **Powell played a tape of a Mirage jet retrofitted to spray simulated anthrax, and a model of Iraq's unmanned drones, capable of spraying chemical or germ weapons within a radius of at least 550 miles.** **M** He showed a satellite photo he **says reveal** chemical weapons bunkers.

M He **says** those outlined in red contain active weapons.

E Mr. POWELL: "How do I know that? The truck you also see is a signature item. It's a decontamination vehicle in case something goes wrong."

E Powell: "Now look at the picture on the right. The bunkers are clean when the inspectors get there. They found nothing."

M MITCHELL: **Powell said** three defectors have told US intelligence Saddam has 18 trucks carrying mobile biological weapons labs.

M And Powell said while the UN was debating its first resolution against Iraq...

E Mr. POWELL: "...the missile brigade outside Baghdad was disbursing rocket launchers and warheads containing biological warfare agents to various locations."

E MITCHELL: What he didn't say, but **NBC News** has learned, the US knows that from a spy inside Iraq.

E As evidence Iraq was cheating the inspectors all along, Powell played a conversation taped the day before they returned to Iraq last November.

E Two top officers are overheard plotting to deceive chief nuclear inspector Mohammed El Baradei...

E Unidentified Voice: (Foreign language spoken)...Mohamed El Baradei

E TEXT:COL: Peace. We just have a small question. GEN: Yeah.COL: About this committee that is coming...GEN: Yeah. Yeah. COL: ...with Mohamed El Baradei [Director, International Atomic Energy Agency]

E Mr. POWELL: "But they're worried. "We have this modified vehicle. What do we say if one of them sees it?"

M MITCHELL: Finally, **Powell said** Iraq has failed the test, and so might the UN.

E Mr. POWELL: "This body places itself in danger of irrelevance if it allows Iraq to continue to defy its will without responding effectively and immediately."

R MITCHELL: But opponents, like the French foreign minister, didn't budge.

R Mr. DOMINIQUE de VILLEPIN (French Foreign Minister): There is room from *** (as spoken)*** enhancing the inspections regime.

R Mr. KOFI ANNAN (United Nations Secretary General): I still believe that war is not inevitable, but a lot depends on--on President Saddam Hussein and the Iraqi leadership.

R MITCHELL: And the Russian foreign minister, who met with Powell later, said the inspections must continue.

R US officials believe that the opponents to military action were reading from scripts prepared before Powell's presentation.

M If he can't win them over now, he made it clear today that the US is ready to go to war with Iraq without the UN. Tom:

BROKAW: Thanks very much. NBC's Andrea Mitchell tonight.

NBC's **Ron Allen** is in Baghdad tonight with more on that. Ron:

RON ALLEN reporting:

R Tom, tonight, Iraq is dismissing Powell's presentation as nothing new: baseless allegations complete with cartoon films.

M Today, one of the few places to hear Secretary Powell's speech in Baghdad was the Iraqi press center.

R It's what you might expect: strong, even mocking of the United States.

M In an unusual move, the UN session was broadcast live here, but for a very select audience only: Iraqi government ministers, sympathetic European legislators and anti-war activists.

R Later, General Amir Al-Saadi, the man Powell accused of heading a spy committee designed to deceive and frustrate the inspectors, called the charge against him and the rest of Powell's presentation "nonsense."

R General AMIR AL-SAAD (Iraqi Presidential Advisor): "This was a typical American show, complete with stunts and special effects. "

M ALLEN: The satellite photos, he said, Iraq has seen before.

M He insists the inspectors already have checked out numerous similar sites and found nothing.

M As for the intercepted conversations between Iraqis discussing hiding weapons, Al-Saadi says any third-rate intelligence agency could have produced such fabrications.

R Gen. AL-SAAD: "It is simply untrue and not genuine. The reason is simple: because we have nothing to hide, therefore, we don't talk about hiding anything."

M ALLEN: Iraq plans a detailed written response for the Security Council, and officials here are hoping they can convince the UN's chief inspectors that they're doing enough to come clean during two days of crucial talks this coming weekend. Tom:

E President GEORGE W. BUSH: We have sources that tell us that Saddam Hussein recently authorized Iraqi field commanders to use chemical weapons.

Newscast: Americans listened to Secretary of State Colin Powell's presentation to UN
5 February 2003 **NBC News: Nightly News**

M TOM BROKAW, anchor: Secretary of State Colin Powell's immediate audience today was the UN Security Council.

M But of course, he was also speaking to Congress and especially the American people, many of whom have expressed reservations about the prospect of war, especially without UN participation. We've asked NBC's Roger O'Neill to give us a sense of the nation following the secretary's remarks.

E Mr. COLIN POWELL (Secretary of State): (From television) "Iraq promised the inspectors..."

ROGER O'NEIL reporting:

M Eggs, hash browns and a plateful of evidence against Iraq was on the menu at Felipe's Diner in Los Angeles.

E Mr. POWELL: (From television) "...job is not to cooperate, it is to deceive".

M O'NEIL: Regulars here are generally supportive of the president's tough stand against Iraq, so the table talk after the satellite photos and intercepted phone calls Secretary Powell showed the Security Council was mostly hawkish.

M Unidentified Man #1: I think that the money used and spent in a war could better--has better uses here, especially here at home.

M O'NEIL: Kevin Dikse says America has now taken all the steps, even though he's against a war.

M Mr. KEVIN DIKSE: I don't think Saddam is going to give up. He--he--he's going to put up a fight, and that probably means that war is imminent.

M nidentified Woman #1: I just think it gives us more reason to go to war.

E Mr. POWELL: (From television) Saddam Hussein...

O'NEIL: ...hearing the sounds...

E Mr. POWELL: (From television) ...are concealing the...

E O'NEIL: ...the Powell presentation swayed. Perhaps America has made its case.

M Few high school students will sit still for 90 minutes. But at Johnson High in Savannah, they did today.+++++

M Unidentified Man #3: Yeah, I saw a lot of evidence, but I don't think we should go to war.

CBS NEWS FEBRUARY 5 2003

M In a dramatic session of the Security Council, Secretary Powell presented, what he called, "irrefutable" audio and photographic evidence that Saddam is hiding weapons of mass destruction.

R Iraq's ambassador called the allegations -- and I quote -- "utterly unrelated to the truth."

M With the United States preparing to forcibly disarm Iraq, if necessary, Security Council members China, France, and Germany said the inspectors should be given more time.

M It was the secretary of state as prosecutor today, Colin Powell appearing before a skeptical jury.

E COLIN POWELL, SECRETARY OF STATE: Indeed, the facts and Iraq's behavior show that Saddam Hussein and his regime are concealing their efforts to produce more weapons of mass destruction.

R ROBERTS: With no smoking gun, Powell was forced to connect a set of circumstantial dots for the Security Council.

E POWELL: You will now hear an officer from Republican Guard headquarters, issuing an instruction to an officer in the field.

M ROBERTS: In the rarest of moments, he played super-secret communications intercepts, he said, painted a clear picture Iraq was moving something.

E POWELL: We sent you a message yesterday to clean out all the areas -- the scrap areas, the abandoned areas. Make sure there is nothing there.

E ROBERTS: Recently declassified spy satellite photos showed a chemical weapons lab surrounded by cargo trucks and a forklift.

M A bunker, Powell said, was cleared out just before a convoy of inspectors -- seen in the lower right corner of the photo -- arrived.

R Clear evidence, he claimed, that Iraq was sanitizing inspection sites.

E And he left little doubt as to why UN officials have not found one scientist who will talk to them in private, or outside the country.

E POWELL: They were forced to sign documents acknowledging that divulging information is punishable by death. Anyone who agreed to be interviewed outside Iraq would be treated as a spy.

M ROBERTS: It was quite a show. On 10-by-10 video screens, Powell explained for the world how Iraq is allegedly producing biological weapons in up to seven different mobile labs,

E and he showed video of an Iraqi mirage fighter jet testing a biological sprayer.+++

E POWELL: Note the spray coming from beneath the mirage. That is 2,000 liters of simulated anthrax that a jet is spraying.

E ROBERTS: **But the most chilling moment** came in this intercept, in which an Iraqi officer tells a subordinate to erase all references to nerve agents from over-the-air, or wireless communications.

E POWELL: Why did he focus on wireless instructions? Because the senior officer is concerned that somebody might be listening.

R Well, somebody was.

E POWELL: Leaving Saddam Hussein in possession of weapons of mass destruction for a few more months or years is not an option; not in a post-September 11 world.

R RATHER (voice-over): And to those who say, Well, there's no smoking gun -- would you argue with that?

E POWELL: What do you mean by smoking gun? How about lots of smoke?

E POWELL: I think, I put forward a case today that says, there's lots of smoke. There are many smoking guns.

E POWELL: When we say that he has had thousands of liters of anthrax -- and we know it, he's admitted it, it's a matter of record, there's evidence; there's no question about it -- is that a smoking gun?

E POWELL: Is it a smoking gun that he has this horrible material somewhere in that country, and he's not accounted for it?

E POWELL: The very fact that he has not accounted for it, I say, it could be a smoking gun.

E POWELL: It's been a gun that has been smoking for years. And I think, the evidence that I presented today, the information that I presented today, suggests that he has not stopped in any of his efforts to develop these weapons of mass destruction.

R POWELL: Iraq responded quickly to the Secretary Powell's U.N. presentation, with indignant denials and angry accusations.

R GEN. AMER AL-SAAD, IRAQI PRESIDENTIAL ADVISOR: This was a typical American show, complete with stunts and special effects.

R ELIZABETH PALMER, CBS CORRESPONDENT (voice-over): Just two hours after Colin Powell's speech ended, the Iraqis were on the offensive. An angry Gen. Amer al-Saadi, head of Iraq's monitoring agency, told the world's media that Powell's evidence was manufactured.

R He was especially scathing about the telephone intercepts he said were not genuine.

R AL-SAAD: From what we have heard, any third rate intelligence outfit could produce such a recording.

R PALMER: As for the satellite photographs, al-Saadi says the U.N. inspectors have already seen and investigated them.

R AL-SAAD: Everything was explained, and it is in their reports. So that, again, was something that was absolutely unfounded.

R PALMER: Al-Saadi reserved special contempt for Powell's allegation that the Iraqis had falsified the death of a key scientist.

R AL-SAAD: It is really below the level of a country leading the world, now to come up with such allegations and ideas.

R PALMER: Time and time again over the past 20 years, the Iraqi government has proven its skill at hiding the truth behind official smoke screens.

M So it's impossible to know, how big a shock Colin Powell delivered to Saddam's officials today.

R (on camera): But one thing is clear. Although the Iraqis say they're preparing for an attack, they're also playing for time.

M They've accused Colin Powell, himself, of violating the U.N. Resolution by presenting his evidence in public, instead of giving it to the inspectors to be checked out.

M And they hope that an appeal to Secretary General Kofi Annan will slow down the march to war.

CBS News national security correspondent David Martin has a reality check.

E POWELL: What you will see is an accumulation of facts and disturbing patterns of behavior.

R MARTIN: With no smoking gun to unveil, Powell tried to piece together a giant jigsaw puzzle of suspicious behavior.

M First, a satellite photo of a bunker which, he said, had the tell-tale signs that chemical weapons were stored inside.

E POWELL: Inside that facility are special guards and special equipment to monitor any leakage that might come out of the bunker.

M MARTIN: Then the same bunker, after it had been cleaned up.

E POWELL: It was done on the 22nd of December, as the U.N. inspection team is arriving, and you can see the inspection vehicles arriving in the lower portion of the picture on the right.

E MARTIN: That doesn't prove Saddam Hussein has chemical weapons, but it certainly looks like he's hiding something from the inspectors.

E The closest thing to undeniable proof was that intercepted conversation, in which an Iraqi colonel dictated a message with an unmistakable meaning to a junior officer.

E UNIDENTIFIED MALE: Remove. Remove. The expression. The expression. I got it. Nerve agents. Nerve agents.

E MARTIN (on camera): When confronted with hard evidence like that, Iraq can only claim, the tape was fabricated.

R But some of Powell's examples were based on unnamed sources whose reliability can be challenged, I

R Like this statement about how Iraq is preventing U.N. weapons inspectors from interviewing scientists.

E POWELL: On orders from Saddam Hussein, Iraqi officials issued a false death certificate for one scientist, and he was sent into hiding.

E MARTIN (voice-over): But it fits the pattern described by all those pictures and intercepts.

M Other members of the Security Council now have to decide if the intelligence justifies going to war, but with more than 100,000 troops now surrounding Iraq, that is exactly where the United States is headed.

M RATHER: Powell, apparently, did persuade some countries to support a U.S. led war with Iraq. The White House today released a joint statement to that effect, signed by the foreign ministers of 10 East European countries, from Estonia in the north, to Albania in the south.

M But, as CBS's Richard Roth reports, much of the rest of the world, including some important U.S. allies, seem to remain unconvinced.

M RICHARD ROTH,): China, Russia and France all found America's case a convincing argument for doing more of what's already being done.

M DOMINIQUE DE VILLEPIN, FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTER (through translator): Let us double, let us triple, the number of inspectors; let us open more regional offices; let us go further than this.

M ROTH: But let's not go to war, said France.

M Britain said time's running out. But the British government's already pledged support for the United States, and didn't need convincing.

M Nor did America's strongest Middle East ally, Israel.

M BENJAMIN NETANYAHU, ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTER: I think, the case was overwhelming for Saddam's disarmament, either peacefully if Saddam so chooses, or through military action if he doesn't.

M But in Saudi Arabia, the government said it's urging the Security Council to consider an alternative, perhaps including an amnesty for Saddam's top generals, to induce them to stage a coup.

E ANDREWS: Dr. Jerrold Post, the former chief of profiling at the CIA, says Saddam's perception of victory in the '91 war made him more, not less, determined to have weapons of mass destruction.

E POST: After this triumph in 1990-91, he was a world class leader. World class leaders have world class weapons. Big boys have big toys. And...

E POST: That's one of the things, and I think, it's inconceivable for him to give up such weapons.

E ANDREWS (voice-over): So, to those who know him, Saddam is clearly toying with the U.N. inspectors. Abbass Al Janabi, who until he defected four years ago was in Saddam's family inner circle, says Saddam's game is to hide his weapons.

E He has no intention of disarming.

E ABBASS AL JANABI, IRAQI DEFECTOR: How can he implement his ambition without them? This is an hitch inside himself.

E ANDREWS: Saddam, remember, used mustard gas against Iranian soldiers, and nerve gas against Kurdish civilians. Most experts believe, he will do it again, and they think they know when.

E POLLACK: If, at some point, he does conclude that his fate is sealed, he is likely to lash out with everything he has -- nuclear, biological, chemical -- whatever he has got he will

M CBS ANCHOR: President Bush appeared before a nationwide television and radio audience late today, and said four ominous words: Quote -- "The game is over" -- a clear message to Iraq, war is near.

M Here is the latest in the quickening showdown with Saddam: The president said, Saddam has told Iraqi commanders to use chemical weapons if war comes.

E BUSH: That Saddam Hussein recently authorized Iraqi field commanders to use chemical weapons -- the very weapons the dictator tells the world he does not have.

M Before then, the White House fully expects Saddam to make another play for time by showing more cooperation with weapons inspectors.

E BUSH: No doubt, he will play a last-minute game of deception. The game is over.

M MARK PHILLIPS, CBS CORRESPONDENT: That an Iraqi scientist has finally talked privately with a U.N. inspector here, has been attributed by the Iraqis to a change of heart on the part of the scientist in question.

M It's unclear whether this also represents a change of heart on the part of the Iraqi regime.

M (voice-over): The scientist is Sinan Abdul-Hassan (ph), described as a biologist, here leaving the hotel where his three-and-a-half hour meeting with the U.N. inspectors took place. UNIDENTIFIED MALE: No comment.

R PHILLIPS: The commenting was left to advisor to Saddam Hussein, Amer al-Saadi, who denied Colin Powell's allegations, point by point,

R and who accused the U.S., essentially, of inventing the evidence Colin Powell presented.

M (on camera): There's been no indication whether today's first private session with an Iraqi scientist will be followed by any others.

M And no indication either, whether the Iraqis will be any more forthcoming when Hans Blix arrives here this weekend for what's looking more and more like their last chance to come clean.

M MARK PHILLIPS, CBS CORRESPONDENT (voice-over): With all roads seemingly heading toward war here, an increasingly desperate Iraqi regime is making concessions it has previously refused to make, and is trying even harder to convince a skeptical world it is not working on forbidden weapons.

M Exhibit A was the al-Rafah missile test facility, and its brand new and much larger, rocket engine test stand. It's here, Colin Powell told the U.N. this week, that the Iraqis are developing an illegal long-range rocket.

E COLIN POWELL, SECRETARY OF STATE: The one on the right is clearly intended for long-range missiles that can fly 1,200 kilometers.

R PHILLIPS: But the Iraqis insisted that all work here, including a test firing this week, has been under U.N. supervision, and that the new missile will be limited to the permitted 90-mile range.

M (on camera): The charge that Iraq is still producing prohibited weapon systems, and what's become the ritual denial here, have become the background noise to this countdown to war.

R There is only one admission the Iraqis can make that would put that countdown on hold, and that's the one the one they refuse to deliver.

E (voice-over): While the U.N. searched the chemical warehouse, the Iraqis still refuse to account for their missing weapons stocks or detail where, when, and how those stocks were destroyed. Instead the regime is making small concessions,

M today allowing three more scientists to be interviewed privately without the presence of government minders. The U.N. wants to talk to hundreds.

M Hans Blix knows he's got to come away from his weekend meetings here with significant new information from the Iraqis, or the inspection process is doomed. His only hope is that the Iraqis agree.

Mark Phillips, **CBS News**, at the al-Rafah missile test site, Iraq.

M (voice-over): Secretary of State Powell's briefing at the U.S. was meant to expose Iraqi deceptions, but it also exposed American blind spots.

E Satellite photos showed the Iraqis had cleaned up a chemical weapons bunker just before the U.N. inspectors arrived, but where did the weapons go?

E And where are those biological weapons vans?

R The U.S. has detailed drawings based on eyewitness accounts, but no photos because it doesn't know where they are.

R The U.S. has yet to spot any of Iraq's 30,000 chemical artillery rounds,

E but it does show one thing about these weapons of mass destruction: Saddam has already ordered his generals to use them if attacked

ITV News February 5

R Trevor: Good evening, America made its case for war against Iraq to the world today with what it claimed was proof that Saddam Hussein has not told the truth about his weapons program.

M Speaking to the United Nations security council, Secretary of State Colin Powell showed satellite images and played tapes of Iraqi military phone calls.

R Although tonight it looks as though he's changed few minds at the Security Council and Baghdad rejected his claims. From New York here's Bill Neely

R Neely: While it was the most dramatic presentation at the United Nations in half a century the question being debated here and in Paris and Moscow and elsewhere tonite is this.

R Did Colin Powell produce enough proof here to justify a war?

E Colin Powell (US Secretary of State) speaking – "Saddam Hussein and his regime have made no effort no effort to disarm as required by the international community "

E Then dramatically he played secretly recorded tapes of Iraqi officers discussing how to hide weapons from UN inspectors.

E Sound from tape Iraqis speak Screen displaying translated transcript of conversation between Iraqi officials, with one line underlined

M He showed satellite photographs of suspected weapons sites to show Iraq had cleaned them up before inspectors arrived

E Colin Powell(US Secretary of State) speaking "we saw this kind of house cleaning at close to 30 sites"

E From an Iraqi defector he produced drawings of mobile biological weapons factories.

E Then video of the war planes that would spray chemicals on an enemy.

E Colin Powell (US Secretary of State) speaking SOT – "why should anyone give Iraq the benefit of the doubt, I don't and don't think you will either after you hear next interception"

R Another tape from last month. Of Iraqi officers allegedly hiding chemical weapons.

E audio of speaking and Screen displaying translated transcript of conversation between Iraqi officials

E Itself not damning evidence, but part of a pattern

E Colin Powell (US Secretary of State) speaking SOT – “Clearly Saddam Hussein and his regime will stop at nothing until something stops him “

M Iraqi Ambassador, Mohammed Aldouri, wrote furiously, as Powell demonstrated how little anthrax it takes for mass murder.

E Colin Powell – “Saddam Hussein has not verifiably accounted for even one teaspoonful of this deadly material”

R Then to the sceptics, the Russians the French and others, this direct challenge.

E Colin Powell (US Secretary of State) speaking “How much longer are we willing to put up with Iraq's non compliance before we at UN say enough enough”

R Iraq called all of this accusations, not proof.

R Mohammed Aldouri (Iraqi Ambassador to UN) press conference– “Inspections are working and other means should not be allowed “

RThe French called it all suspicions, not proof they called for more inspectors.

R Dominique de Villepin (French Foreign Minister) press conference –“it is necessary to double or triple number of inspectors .”

R Jack Straw MP (Foreign Secretary) interview – “We could quadruple number of inspectors, can extend time they're inspecting for another 3 years and won't get to truth, on other hand if have active co-operation today we can resolve this in about a week's time “

E But time says Colin Powell, is running out fast.

R Trevor MacDonald: Bill, Colin Powell doesn't seem to have changed many minds at the security council itself though does he?

R Bill Neely: No and Powell admitted himself there was not Smoking gun here no single fact that would justify a war.

R A lot of it is open to interpretation for example what exactly did those satellite photographs show..so suggestive yes, damning probably not

R t he US admitting a lot of this is circumstantial evidence but as Jack straw told me in that interview, people are convicted on circumstantial evidence.

R The big question for you as well as Paris Moscow and everywhere else is is circumstantial evidence enough to justify the war that the US thinks is coming.

M Trevor: America's Colin Powell has unveiled intelligence information to try to prove that Iraq is hiding its weapons.

The UK View

****R** TREVOR Mc Donald: What do experts here think of the evidence of hidden weapons and about Colin Powells claims that there are now links between Iraq and al Qaeda links that stretch as far as Manchester and the murder of Steven Earl.

M James Mates: Chemical bunkers, recorded intercepts nuclear bomb parts and the threat of germ warfare,

M Colin Powell set out a case for the prosecution, a case for war.

R It was comprehensive, but was it credible?

R If he was to shift world opinion in favour of war, Powell would have to convince people that images like this one claimed to be a chemical weapons bunker before and after the Iraqis sanitized it, are genuine.

E One former weapons inspector told ITV news tonite that it certainly looked familiar

E Garth Whitty (Royal United Services Institute) “ All sorts of activity taken place there/ that would have aroused suspicion that there had been chemicals stored there that had been recently removed “.

M He showed video of chemical weapons delivery systems but it went further, not just chemical and biological weapons said Powell, but captured parts for making a nuclear warhead.

E They could have been for conventional weapons but some experts doubt it.

E Dr Alexandra Ashbourne (Defence Analyst) interview The key point that Colin Powell made is that Iraq has acquired aluminium tubes that are reinforced for beyond Americas civil or military specifications. He is also trying to acquire magnets/ he has two of three components necessary to build nuclear weapon

M Colin Powell has put Washingtons' case.

M He hopes it will be enough to win him a second UN resolution.

R But in coming back to the UN he is now asking their blessing , not their permission. James mates ITV News

OPINION POLL

M Trevor: Tonite ITV news has the first snap shot of public opinion since Colin Powell's presentation. So, has it made a difference?

M The number of doubters who are not convinced that Saddam Hussein is sufficiently dangerous to justify military action against him has fallen from 58 percent to 52 percent.

M And lastly the number for people who believe that Saddam Hussein does have chemical and biological weapons has gone up from 71 percent to 80 percent

UK GOVERNMENT VIEW

M TREVOR: So what America has described as hard evidence does seem to have persuaded some people but how has it gone down with politicians and opinion makers lets join our political editor Nik Robinson.

EVENING NEWS: NICK ROBINSON

M Robinson: I don't think this was ever going to be a mind changing day it was instead a step in a long argument, that George Bush and Tony Blair have been making for a year now and that's no surprise really .

R Not only was there no smoking gun as Bill Neely was saying, there was no body.

R What Colin Powell claimed there was was a big pile of freshly dug earth and a spade and he hoped people would focus hard on what that might mean

M That means in our poll those opposed outright to war have dropped from about a third to about a fifth of the population and that's reflected amongst opinion formers. Here in Westminster and in the newspapers too

E Iain Duncan Smith MP (Conservative Leader) interview – “For those of open mind the evidence today adds to evidence already in existence/ indicates clearly that Saddam is linked to terrorist organisations that threaten UK but also he has been hiding his weapons from inspectors and breaching UN resolution/ UN must now act “

E Charles Kennedy MP (Liberal Democrat Leader) interview – “Saddam has to realise that in international opinion the pressure is building from all quarters/ more he's willing to co-operate fully the less its likely to have to resort to military means to resolve this”

R Piers Morgan (Editor, Daily Mirror) interview – “Where is hard evidence that he has weapons of mass destruction and that he intends to use them/ found the al-Qaida link laughable”

M TREVOR: Nik, Hans Blix is coming to London tomorrow. This entire weapons inspection regime is beginning to look more like and irrelevance now.

M Robinson: well yes Trevor, although Hans Blix holds in his hands the key to the next step.

R The key perhaps even to war or peace.

M Because on valentines day he will have to make another report to the united nations.

M if he declares that the Iraqis are still not cooperating that in effect will be a declaration of war.

M If instead he says the first signs are they are moving, that will be a declaration that there can after all be some hope for the inspectors.

RTREVOR: Lets go now to Baghdad and join our correspondent Jon Irvine. Jon given the detailed nature of what Colin Powell was saying today, were you surprised at the blanket rejection of Iraq's response.

M Irvine: We've just heard that there will be a point by point rebuttal by the Iraqis tomorrow.

R But tonite in general terms Saddam Hussein's top advisor described Colin Powell's claims as ridiculous and beneath a country supposedly leading the world.

R On the issue of the telephone intercepts for example he said they could have been produced by a third rate intelligence outfit.

R The Iraqi people are constantly being told that American claims about banned weapons are baseless, referring to the Washington government one newspaper here said today and I quote " the nut cases in the administration of evil have no proof of their claims".

M Trevor: Dr Blix arrives in Baghdad over the weekend...quite frankly its difficult to see that being terribly fruitful now.

M Irvine: I think it is, Hans Blix is the man appointed by the world to be judge and jury on the issue of Iraqi weaponry.

M He's unhappy with the Iraqis at the moment he says their level of cooperation with the weapons inspectors in unsatisfactory, he's here to persuade them that they must do more.

E And frankly if he's nothing positive to report on February 14th its difficult to see how this whole thing can be resolved peacefully.

FEBRUARY 6 2003 NBC News: Nightly News

BROKAW And also on NBC NIGHTLY NEWS tonight, on our Iraq watch, as part of the buildup of US troops in the Persian Gulf, the Army's elite 101st Airborne Division now has gotten its deployment orders. That deployment is expected in the next few days and will include some 23,000 troops and 270 helicopters.

M Also for the first time, an Iraqi scientist, a biologist, was interviewed today by UN inspectors inside Iraq for more than three hours with no other Iraqi official present.

M The interview took place just a few hours after the UN's chief nuclear inspector demanded a drastic change in Iraq's cooperation.

E Much more on the Iraq watch, including this question: If Iraq does have nuclear weapons, could inspectors find the evidence?

FEBRUARY 6 CBS NEWS

CBS News: Evening News with Dan Rather

M President George W. Bush warned Saddam Hussein that "the game is over."

E U.S. forces are moving in on the region, and it appears nothing, not even recent interviews with Iraqi scientists, can prevent war.

M DAN RATHER, CBS ANCHOR: President Bush appeared before a nationwide television and radio audience late today, and said four ominous words: Quote -- "The game is over" -- a clear message to Iraq, war is near.

E Here is the latest in the quickening showdown with Saddam: The president said, Saddam has told Iraqi commanders to use chemical weapons if war comes.

M Turkey finally agreed to let the U.S. establish ground force bases on Iraq's northern border, but France again declined to support war with Iraq.

M And President Bush announced he wants the U.N. Security Council to approve another resolution that would authorize the use of force. But he does not consider such an additional resolution absolutely necessary before he acts.

John Roberts at the White House has the details behind today's headlines -- John.

E JOHN ROBERTS, CBS CORRESPONDENT: Dan, **CBS News** has learned that President Bush wants a very simple second resolution from the United Nations Security Council -- no deadlines, no fancy language -- one that simply points out, in very plain language, that Saddam Hussein has failed to comply with U.N. demands to disarm.

M ROBERTS (voice-over): That would trigger serious consequences. That would mean war.

E GEORGE W. BUSH, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES: The dictator of Iraq is making his choice. Now the nations of the Security Council must make their own.

M ROBERTS: President Bush all but said time is up for Saddam. But he declared his intention to keep working through the U.N. -- a move designed to give cover to leaders of his coalition of the willing -- under pressure at home not to blindly follow the U.S. to war.

M And, echoing his secretary of state's presentation yesterday, said there's no question, Saddam is deceiving the world.

E BUSH: That Saddam Hussein recently authorized Iraqi field commanders to use chemical weapons -- the very weapons the dictator tells the world he does not have.

M ROBERTS: As for when the U.S. will push for a vote on the second resolution, Colin Powell said this weekend's visit to Baghdad by the U.N. inspection chiefs will likely tell the tale.

E COLIN POWELL, SECRETARY OF STATE: It'll start to come to a head when Dr. Blix and Dr. ElBaradei return from Baghdad, and we see, whether or not, there is any chance of serious progress.

M ROBERTS: In fact, sources say the U.S. could introduce a resolution soon after Blix and ElBaradei's next report to the U.N., On February 14.

M Before then, the White House fully expects Saddam to make another play for time by showing more cooperation with weapons inspectors.

E BUSH: No doubt, he will play a last-minute game of deception. The game is over.

R ROBERTS: Security Council members France and Russia restated their opposition to war today.

M But diplomatic sources say tonight, they are confident that Russia will sign on with the United States, and they say, there are indications that France is beginning to move their way, too -- Dan.

M Germany seems set in opposition. But France and Germany aside, most European countries now say they will support a U.S.-led war against Iraq.

M RATHER: President Bush predicted today that Saddam will now -- quote -- "begin another round of empty concessions" -- unquote.

E And in Baghdad, right on cue, the Iraqis abruptly reversed themselves and let U.N. inspectors interview a selected scientist with, for a change, no government minder listening in.

CBS's Mark Phillips is in the Iraqi capital.

M MARK PHILLIPS, CBS CORRESPONDENT: That an Iraqi scientist has finally talked privately with a U.N. inspector here, has been attributed by the Iraqis to a change of heart on the part of the scientist in question.

M It's unclear whether this also represents a change of heart on the part of the Iraqi regime.
M (voice-over): The scientist is Sinan Abdul-Hassan (ph), described as a biologist, here leaving the hotel where his three-and-a-half hour meeting with the U.N. inspectors took place.

UNIDENTIFIED MALE: No comment.

R PHILLIPS: The commenting was left to advisor to Saddam Hussein, Amer al-Saadi, who denied Colin Powell's allegations, point by point,

R and who accused the U.S., essentially, of inventing the evidence Colin Powell presented.

M (on camera): There's been no indication whether today's first private session with an Iraqi scientist will be followed by any others.

M And no indication either, whether the Iraqis will be any more forthcoming when Hans Blix arrives here this weekend for what's looking more and more like their last chance to come clean.

Mark Phillips, **CBS News**, Baghdad.

M RATHER: For the first time ever, the U.S. State Department is warning American civilians overseas that al Qaeda and other terrorists could target them with -- and I quote -- "non-conventional weapons."

M This worldwide caution says, such weapons -- again, quote -- "including chemical or biological agents, must be considered a growing threat" -- unquote.

ITV NEWS FEBRUARY 6

WASHINGTON DAY AFTER POWELL APPEARANCE

M TREVOR: good evening, yesterday it was his secretary of state, this evening President Bush himself weighed in to remind the world of the urgent need to bring down Saddam Hussein's regime.

M Speaking at the white house in the last few minutes he said "the Iraqi leader had one last chance to save himself. But was throwing it away."

M He urged the united nations not to lose its resolve

M An offer earlier today by Iraq to let UN weapons inspectors interview Iraqi scientists unaccompanied appears to have cut no ice with Mr Bush

M Robert Moore in Washington: A short time ago President Bush and secretary of state Colin Powell met at the white house to discuss the next few weeks diplomacy.

M And the message very clearly from President Bush, If the United nations hesitates to act, the US will act instead.

M VIDEO: The president is making clear that following America's presentation to the United nations yesterday, time is rapidly running out.

M Within the last 30 minutes, Mr. Bush, after meeting with Colin Powell issued his strongest warning so far that diplomacy could only achieve so much.

E George Bush : "We will not wait to see what terrorist states could do with chemical biological radiological or nuclear weapons."

E George Bush:, "Sadam Hussein can now be expected to begin another round of empty concessions transparently false denials, no doubt he will play a last minute game of deception the game is over."

E George Bush:, "All the world can rise to this moment the community of free nations can show that it is strong and confident and determined to keep the peace."

E George Bush:, "Saddam Hussein has the motive and the means and the recklessness and the hatred to threaten the American People. Saddam Hussein will be stopped".

M Moore: Colin Powell had himself been talking to senators earlier today.
M He is taking some encouragement from the fact that opinion polls show that show a small increase in support among Americans for military action.
M Following his presentation at the UN yesterday the next crucial date will be in 8 days time as UN inspectors provide their latest and almost certainly final report on Iraq's disarmament.
M Another round of military deployments have just been ordered. Sending thousands more troops to the Persian Gulf. In every order being given and every speech being delivered.
M Mr. Bush is now bracing the American people for war.
Robert Moore ITV News Washington
M Trevor: Robert, given the president's resolve tonight, it really undercuts anything the weapons inspectors might do in Baghdad later on because as he said –the game is over.
M Moore: Well the White House made it very clear they are expecting some tactical concession from the Iraqis possibly over those private interviews with Iraqi scientists.
M Or Saddam Hussein possibly permitting the UN to operate U-2 spy planes. But President Bush saying it's too late for that.
M And indeed Colin Powell here on Capitol Hill saying very much the same, telling senators today "within weeks the Iraqi situation will be brought to a conclusion one way or another."

BAGHDAD VIEW

M Trevor: Let's go now to Baghdad and join our correspondent Jon Irvine. Jon, the timing of this decision by Iraq to allow scientists to talk to the weapons inspectors now without supervision, without their minds...is interesting...but might get them precisely nowhere.
M John Irvine: Yes isn't it interesting Trevor, just hours after the chief weapons inspectors come out of Downing Street saying Iraqi cooperation must improve dramatically the Iraqis announce this concession.
M Some scientists are prepared, we're told, to be interviewed by the UN in private. The testimony of these experts is seen as vital.
M Metaphorically speaking they're supposed to know where the bodies are buried when it comes to banned weaponry.
M And of course that none of these interviews have taken place up till today at least has been used by the White House in particular as a stick to beat the Iraqis with in terms of a failure to comply and cooperate.
M Trevor: But it does look as though President Bush has already made up his mind so this is to some extent irrelevant really.
M Irvine: Well the Iraqis don't regard it as being irrelevant and certainly the UN here is quite pleased they say it's a good move but that they will not be satisfied until they can speak to scientists of their choosing rather than just to volunteers.
M But the Iraqis believe they have breathed new life into the inspection process they believe they've given Hans Blix something positive to say when he reports to the UN again Friday week.
R Nick Robinson: The prime minister's reception was equally frosty. A television debate showed once again that the public aren't with him, and he knows it.
R Woman saying that people she knows oppose what is happening at the moment

E Tony Blair MP (Prime Minister) speaking "Supposing there were a second resolution, would that make a difference?"

M Woman says "Yes"

M Nick Robinson: It may not be the easy thing to do to confront Iraq he said, but it is the right thing.

MS Blair sat next to Newsnight host Jeremy Paxman

E Tony Blair speaking "Even if I am the only person left saying it, I am going to say it - it is a threat and a danger we have to confront"

M Robinson: Echoing Tony Blair in London today, the UNs chief weapons inspectors. Their next stops Baghdad and their message couldn't be plainer.

E Mohamed El Baradei (Head of the International Atomic Energy Authority) speaking to press, "Iraq is not cooperating fully needs to show drastic change in terms of cooperation"

FEBRUARY 6 ABC NEWS

M On "World News Tonight", President Bush says the game is over with Saddam Hussein.

ROAD TO WAR IRAQ PLANS

PETER JENNINGS, ABC NEWS

M (OC) Good evening, everyone. President Bush said today the game is over with Saddam Hussein.

M And in the strongest language he's used so far, Mr. Bush all but said that war was inevitable.

M The President made a brief appearance at the White House with the Secretary of State, to put some pressure on members of the UN Security Council.

M After he said the game is over with the Iraqi leader, he said the United Nations, having demanded that Iraq give up any weapons of mass destruction or suffer the consequences, must not back down.

M Actually, Iraq did bend a little today, and we'll get to that in a minute.

M But if you heard the President today, bending a little was not going to make any difference. ABC's Terry Moran is at the White House. Terry, they think they have momentum.

TERRY MORAN, ABC NEWS

M (OC) They do, Peter. One day after Secretary of State Powell's presentation at the UN, they feel some diplomatic momentum and are pressing what they consider to be their advantage.

TERRY MORAN

M (VO) Flanked by Secretary of State Powell, Mr. Bush described Saddam Hussein as a mortal threat to the US.

E PRESIDENT GEORGE W. BUSH, UNITED STATES: "Saddam Hussein has the motive and the means and the recklessness and the hatred to threaten the American people. Saddam Hussein will be stopped."

TERRY MORAN

R (VO) Referring to Powell's presentation yesterday of pictures of an Iraqi jet, apparently outfitted to disperse chemical weapons, Mr. Bush claimed the regime's unmanned aerial vehicles, or UAVs, could target America directly.

E PRESIDENT GEORGE W. BUSH, "A UAV launched from a vessel off the American coast could reach hundreds of miles inland."

TERRY MORAN

M (VO) US intelligence sources say that scenario is not likely.

M But the White House argues the risk is real.

M The President also used sharp language to challenge the UN Security Council.

E PRESIDENT GEORGE W. BUSH "Now, the Security Council will show whether its words have any meaning."

E PRESIDENT GEORGE W. BUSH "Having made its demands, the Security Council must not back down when those demands are defied and mocked by a dictator."

TERRY MORAN

M (VO) Testifying before Congress today, Secretary Powell made clear the administration is not willing to wait long for the UN to act.

E COLIN POWELL, SECRETARY OF STATE "We are reaching an endgame in a matter of weeks, not a matter of months."

BAGHDAD UN INSPECTIONS

February 6 2003

PETER JENNINGS, ABC NEWS

M (OC) In Baghdad today, the Iraqis gave in to one of the UN inspectors' longstanding demands.

M They allowed the inspectors to interview an Iraqi scientist in private. ABC's Dan Harris in the Iraqi capital tonight.

DAN HARRIS, ABC NEWS

M (VO) About an hour and 15 minutes into a news conference, called to rebut Colin Powell's presentation, the Iraqis announced that some of their scientists are now willing to meet privately with the weapons inspectors.

M GENERAL AMIR AL SAADI, SADDAM HUSSEIN'S CHIEF SCIENCE ADVISOR "One of them, today, in fact, as we are speaking, is being interviewed, alone."

DAN HARRIS

M (VO) That scientist, identified only as a biologist by the name of Dr. Sinan, met with the inspectors at their hotel for more than three hours tonight.

M (OC) Even while the interview was taking place, however, a senior UN official was playing it down, saying the Iraqi government suggested the Dr. Sinan be interviewed, and that one private interview does not constitute a trend.

M (VO) The chief weapons inspectors, who stopped in London today on their way to Baghdad for high-level meetings this weekend, indicated they want much more.

E MOHAMED ELBARADEI, DIRECTOR GENERAL, INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, "I think the message coming from the Security Council is very clear, that Iraq is not cooperating fully, that they need to show drastic change in terms of cooperation."

DAN HARRIS

M (VO) The inspectors assume that the issues of private interviews and U2 surveillance flights will both be resolved this weekend.

M The real question, said one UN official, is what else the Iraqis have to offer. Dan Harris, ABC News, Baghdad.

OPINION WAR WITH IRAQ

ABC NEWS

M But Prime Minister Tony Blair still faced tough questions today during a town hall meeting on Iraq.

E TONY BLAIR, BRITISH PRIME MINISTER "I do really believe, I may be wrong in believing it. But I do believe it."

JIM SCIUTTO

R (OC) In France, no change at all to the government's position, say officials. They want more time and money for UN inspectors.

R It's the same in Germany. And in one of the more interesting expressions of anti-war feeling, in Italy, members of Parliament opposed to war disrupted a speech by the Italian Prime Minister.

R Across Europe, there's clearly a large segment of the public that remains unconvinced
BOB WOODRUFF, ABC NEWS

R (OC) Peter, most of the Arab world reacted with a great deal of skepticism to the speech, calling the evidence "unconvincing."

R Some newspapers around the region wondered if the recordings and photos were fabricated.

R And there is a widespread view in many Arab countries that the war is now inevitable and that the speech was just an attempt to get the world ready.

M But here in Kuwait, a very different reaction. Because this country is so close to Iraq, the speech frankly scared a lot of people.

M When Colin Powell showed that video of how the Iraqis could use an aircraft to spray anthrax on populated areas, people really reacted to that. And many have started to leave the country.

6 February 2003 ABC NEWS

M PETER JENNINGS, ABC NEWS(VO) Just a brief review of the main story, President Bush said today the game is over with Saddam Hussein.

M And in the strongest language he has used so far, Mr. Bush all but said that war with Iraq was inevitable. T

M the Secretary of State Colin Powell told the Congress today that the situation is reaching what he called an endgame, and it would be a matter of weeks and not months.

FEBRUARY 7 NBC NEWS

E If Iraq does have nuclear weapons, could inspectors find the evidence?

February 7 ABC News

ENGLAND INTELLIGENCE JUST PLAGIARISM?

PETER JENNINGS, ABC NEWS

M (VO) The British Prime Minister is struggling with a major embarrassment in his campaign to discredit Saddam Hussein.

R Today, the British government admitted that one of its damning reports about Iraq was largely copied, often word for word, from already published academic papers, some of them here, the report was cited by Colin Powell in his address to the United Nations the other day.

R Britain's apparent plagiarism has cast doubt on the credibility of its intelligence, and the British public is already deeply opposed to war.

E PETER JENNINGS Finally this evening, some notes about things to keep an eye on. The UN weapons inspectors go back to Baghdad this weekend, they have not been happy with Iraqi cooperation so far.

M We'll see if the Iraqis do any better and if that means anything to the Bush Administration.

M The President was more outspoken about war this week than he has been before. Game over, he said.

M Next Friday, the weapons inspectors come back to report to the UN Security Council, look for a lot of talk in the days ahead about another Security Council resolution, which says that Iraq has failed to meet its obligations and should face serious consequences.

M That's a euphemism for being attacked.

7 February 2003 NBC News: Nightly News

M TOM BROKAW, anchor: And with these increased warnings about terrorism, the momentum continues to build on the possibility of war with Iraq.

M As the chief arms inspectors head back to Baghdad, President Bush, impatient with the United Nations, said today it better make up its mind soon about whether to side with the United States.

R Baghdad, meanwhile, is putting out its own message. And NBC's Ron Allen is there.

R Today an Iraqi counterattack. It's show and tell at two suspicious missile sites to rebut Secretary of State Colin Powell's charge that Iraq is deceiving the inspectors.

E Mr. COLIN POWELL " At this ballistic missile site on November 10, we saw a cargo truck preparing to move ballistic missile components."

R ALLEN: Today, the plant manager insisted Powell's photos only showed what happens every day.

R 'This is a factory,' he said. 'It takes parts from one place and ships them to another.'

R Iraq insists numerous UN inspections and even the test firing of a missile here have proved these weapons comply with UN restrictions. But tomorrow, the chief inspectors will arrive with a warning.

E Mr. MOHAMED ELBARADEI (International Atomic Energy Agency):" We need to show quick progress and we need to show drastic change on the part of Iraq in terms of cooperation in all these areas."

M ALLEN: In Washington, President Bush said it's all up to Saddam Hussein.

E President GEORGE BUSH, "He's treated the demands of the world as a joke up to now, and that's his choice to make. He's the person who gets to decide war and peace."

M ALLEN: Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld rallied hundreds of US troops in Italy today as he continued to build a coalition for war.

M But council members Russia, China, and France continue to press for more time.

M Late tonight, Iraq is claiming four weapons scientists now have been interviewed privately by the inspectors, apparently beginning to meet a key UN demand as the chief inspectors prepare to give Iraq what may be a last chance to fully comply and disarm. Ron Allen, NBC News, Baghdad.

CBS NEWS FEB 7

Iraq Attempts Concessions

M DAN RATHER :Iraq is speeding up attempts to prove that it is cooperating, as the United States military continues to increase its presence in the Persian Gulf.

R DAN RATHER, President Bush spoke by telephone today with the leaders of France and China, seeking support for a new U.N. Security Council resolution authorizing war with Iraq. They said, no.

R In a related development, France's U.S. ambassador predicted two-thirds of the Security Council will vote, not for war, but to extend arms inspections.

R Russia says, it too, opposes authorizing war, and wants inspections to go on.
E But the chief U.N. nuclear-arms inspector feels time is running out. He warned Iraq today, it must make -- quote -- "quick progress" to avoid war.
CBS's Mark Phillips is in Baghdad.

R MARK PHILLIPS, CBS CORRESPONDENT (voice-over): With all roads seemingly heading toward war here, an increasingly desperate Iraqi regime is making concessions it has previously refused to make, and is trying even harder to convince a skeptical world it is not working on forbidden weapons.

R Exhibit A was the al-Rafah missile test facility, and its brand new and much larger, rocket engine test stand.

E It's here, Colin Powell told the U.N. this week, that the Iraqis are developing an illegal long-range rocket.

E COLIN POWELL, SECRETARY OF STATE: The one on the right is clearly intended for long-range missiles that can fly 1,200 kilometers.

R PHILLIPS: But the Iraqis insisted that all work here, including a test firing this week, has been under U.N. supervision, and that the new missile will be limited to the permitted 90-mile range.

R The charge that Iraq is still producing prohibited weapon systems, and what's become the ritual denial here, have become the background noise to this countdown to war.

M There is only one admission the Iraqis can make that would put that countdown on hold, and that's the one they refuse to deliver.

E While the U.N. searched the chemical warehouse, the Iraqis still refuse to account for their missing weapons stocks or detail where, when, and how those stocks were destroyed.

M Instead the regime is making small concessions, today allowing three more scientists to be interviewed privately without the presence of government minders. The U.N. wants to talk to hundreds.

M Hans Blix knows he's got to come away from his weekend meetings here with significant new information from the Iraqis, or the inspection process is doomed. His only hope is that the Iraqis agree.===

M RATHER: If war does come, the Iraqis will face a big force, but much smaller than used in the Gulf War of the 1990s. More than 100,000 U.S. military personnel are already in position to strike now; many more are on the way.

E CBS's David Martin has more about those troops, and what the Iraqis may or may not be preparing to meet them.

M DAVID MARTIN, CBS CORRESPONDENT (voice-over): The 101st Airborne Division flies its helicopters into Florida, where they will be put aboard ships for the long ride to the Persian Gulf.

M The American preparations for war are highly visible.

E The Iraqi preparations, at least ones the United States worries about, are not.

M Saddam Hussein has four Republican Guard divisions stationed around Baghdad. One has moved out to cover the western approaches to the city.

M A regular army division has moved south to defend Basra. But the last time these units fought the American Army, they either surrendered or were destroyed.

M American satellites have watched the Iraqis build fighting positions in rings around Baghdad, but they are mainly earthen berms which might slow a ground force, but offer no protection from air strikes.

E Pentagon officials say they see nothing in Iraqi troop deployments that concerns them. It's what they don't see that worries them.

E Secretary of State Powell's briefing at the U.S. was meant to expose Iraqi deceptions, but it also exposed American blind spots.

E Satellite photos showed the Iraqis had cleaned up a chemical weapons bunker just before the U.N. inspectors arrived, but where did the weapons go?

E And where are those biological weapons vans?

E The U.S. has detailed drawings based on eyewitness accounts, but no photos because it doesn't know where they are.

E The U.S. has yet to spot any of Iraq's 30,000 chemical artillery rounds,

E but it does know one thing about these weapons of mass destruction: Saddam has already ordered his generals to use them if attacked.

M The United States Army is ready to fight and win in a war against Iraq, according to a top commander.

E HARRY SMITH, CBS CORRESPONDENT (voice-over): Ready to fight, and ready to face poison gas, if necessary.

E MCKIERNAN: We are. We train in that type of environment, and it would be dramatically difficult conditions, but it would not stop a coalition military effort.

SMITH (on camera): How do you assess the enemy right now?

E MCKIERNAN: We watch the regime, and we watch his military capability every day. Our situational awareness of what Iraqi military forces can do and can't do is pretty darn good right now.

E SMITH (voice-over): The U.S. military allowed CBS an exclusive first look inside the command center at Camp Doha, Kuwait -- an eye-popping, high-tech war room that maintains contact with virtually every unit in the field. It will be tested next week in a classified dress rehearsal for combat called "Lucky Warrior."

M McKiernan says his forces will have a huge technological advantage, but that's not how wars are won.

ITV News

FEBRUARY 7 2003 IRAQ: REPORTERS VISIT WEAPONS SITE/INSPECTORS:

M To try to head off that threat of American action, Iraq stepped up its propaganda offensive today.

R Western reporters were shown a missile site to prove it wasn't concealing illegal weapons, as America had claimed at the UN on Wednesday. The UN chief weapons inspector,

M Hans Blix, says that Iraq is beginning to "make an effort" to co-operate with his team.

R A Convoy of cars carried Iraqi officials and journalists to a site alleged by the US to have been used for testing missiles .

R We climbed onto alleged missile test bed

R It is alleged was used to test missile engines

R The roof on skeleton of building, the USA claim it is to shelter a missile test site from spy satellites

M An Iraqi scientist entered this car after a private interview with UN weapons inspectors

E Prime Minister Tony Blair MP " We are entering the final phase of a 12 year history of the disarmament of Iraq/ 8 weeks have now passed since Saddam was given his final chance, 600 weeks have passed since he was given his first chance/ the evidence of co-operation withheld is unmistakable "

E - Prime Minister Tony Blair MP “Seeing the back of Saddam not just good for the peace and security of the world but the first beneficiaries of it will be the people of Iraq”

R Charles Kennedy MP (Liberal Democrat Leader) standing speaking –“Government have still to make a credible case and that case has to be based on credible evidence”

ITV News IRAQ: GOVERNMENT DOSSIER PLAGIARISM CONTROVERSY:

R 'We all have lessons to learn' - Number Ten today after it was forced to admit an intelligence dossier published on Monday was not all it pretended.

R A spokesman confessed that it should have credited the authors of the articles it used in the document, particularly Ibrahim Al Marashi - he's the graduate student who's thesis was copied, grammatical errors and all.

R The controversy, revealed exclusively on Channel 4 News last night, has put the government's propaganda offensive on the back foot.

#3 Powell would provide evidence of a direct link between Saddam Hussein and the Al Qaeda terrorist network

- E:** Endorsed the frame
- M:** Merely disseminated the frame
- R:** Raised questions about the frame

FEBRUARY 4

ABC NEWS

M A second segment, Powell will present evidence **that the US believes** shows a link between Iraq and al-Qaeda,

M detailing the movements of al-Qaeda associates, who have **allegedly** taken refuge in Iraq

R ABC DAN HARRIS The Iraqi president likewise denied any connection with al- Qaeda.

R SADDAM HUSSEIN If we had a relationship with al-Qaeda, and we believed in that relationship, we wouldn't be ashamed to admit it.

NBC NEWS

M But US officials believe if Colin Powell's evidence is strong enough to win over France, then other critics, even Russia, may follow.

R How good will the evidence be?

R Today Powell was still reviewing whether they can prove significant links between Saddam and al-Qaeda.

E But officials say Powell is convinced he can still establish a pattern that will be an indictment of Saddam Hussein

M But in Baghdad, Saddam Hussein was not waiting for Powell's speech.

R In his first interview in 12 years, airing tonight on British TV, he told an anti-war British politician he has no links to al-Qaeda and no illegal weapons.

E **NBC** Terror ties. Piece by piece, the new case laid out today linking Iraq to Osama bin Laden's al-Qaeda network.

CBS NEWS FEB 4TH

David Martin

M Tenet is on record as saying Iraq has "provided training to al Qaeda members in the areas of poisons and gases,"

E and it is a possibility that Saddam would give Osama bin Laden a weapon of mass destruction which the administration says makes Iraq so dangerous.

M But none of what Powell plans to unveil tomorrow touches on the most pressing threat: new intelligence picked up within the past few weeks that al Qaeda is preparing to conduct terrorist attacks against the U.S. with the specific intent of causing mass casualties.

M Intelligence analysts believe these attacks would be intended to take advantage of America's seeming preoccupation with preparing for a war against Iraq and the rising tide of anti-Americanism those preparations are using.

M Although there have been recent arrests of al Qaeda operatives in Europe, intelligence officials do not believe they have broken up the plots, which appear to be targeted against American interests, both overseas and in the U.S.

M Officials say there is no specific evidence al Qaeda plans to use chemical or biological weapons, and that another attack could take the form of the night club bombing in Bali or the attempt to shoot down an Israeli airliner in Kenya.

M Whatever al Qaeda is planning, the intelligence that something big is in the works has prompted both the FBI and the new Department of Homeland Security to begin discussions on issuing a nationwide alert.

R ANTHONY WEDGEWOOD BENN, BRITISH POLITICIAN: Do you have links with al Qaeda?
SADDAM HUSSEIN, PRESIDENT OF IRAQ (through translator): If we had relations with the organization of al Qaeda, we would not be ashamed to admit it. Therefore, I would like to tell you directly, that we have no relationships with al Qaeda.

M ROBERTS: Powell also laid out suspected ties between Saddam and al-Qaeda,

R claiming a bin Laden lieutenant, Abu al Zarqawi, was running a European al-Qaeda network from Baghdad, and had set up this poison factory in northern Iraq.

M Saddam's ties to terrorism, Powell said, are a threat the world cannot let stand.

M there were similar denials that Iraq was harboring al Qaeda operative Abu Musa`ab Al-Zarqawi.

M They say, he was last known to be in northern Kurdish-controlled Iraq, an area they can't get into because of the U.S. patrolled no-fly zone.

FEBRUARY 5 ITV NEWS

M And he said there was a link between Iraq and the Al Qaeda terrorist network.

R TREVOR Mc Donald: What do experts here think of the evidence of hidden weapons and about Colin Powell's claims that there are now links between Iraq and al Qaeda.

M Links that stretch as far as Manchester and the murder of Steven Earl.

R The third part of Powell's speech was about the links he claimed Saddam has with al Qaeda.

M Pointing the finger at this man, Powell said Al Zarqawi was based in Baghdad

M he linked Zarqawi to al Qaeda and to the ricin.

M DC Stephen Oake (killed while carrying out terrorism inquiry)

E Colin Powell (US Secretary of State) speaking "British unearthed a cell there last month. one British police officer was murdered during the disruption of the cell"

R Although tonight it looks as though he's changed few minds at the security council and Baghdad rejected his claims.

ABC NEWS

M First, let's listen to some of Mr. Powell as he tried to make a connection between Saddam Hussein and Al-Qaeda.

R But is there really a connection between Iraq and al-Qaeda?

M An **ABC News** exclusive tonight, we talk to the man who is accused of working with the Iraqis.

LINK BETWEEN IRAQ AND TERRORISM BUSH ADMINISTRATION INTENT ON MAKING THE CASE

PETER JENNINGS, **ABC NEWS**

M (OC). The Bush Administration was very intent today to establish a link between Iraq and terrorist activity, most notably Al-Qaeda. ABC's Brian Ross has been looking into the link for us. Brian?

BRIAN ROSS, **ABC NEWS**

M (OC) Peter, **the Secretary Of State said** today there was a sinister nexus between Iraq and the Al-Qaeda terrorist network.

M The nexus being a small, little-known terrorist group, now at the center of the US case.

M (VO) Powell showed a satellite **photograph of what he said** was a chemical weapons training center in Northern Iraq used by al-Qaeda and protected by a group called Ansar Al-Islam.(PH) graphics: Weak Link?

E COLIN POWELL, SECRETARY OF STATE "Baghdad has an agent in the most senior levels of the radical organization, Ansar Al-Islam."

BRIAN ROSS

M (VO) There's no doubt Ansar Al-Islam(PH) is a radical Islamic terror group.

M Their own videos show it.

M Their ties to Al-Qaeda are also well-documented.

R But they operate in a part of Iraq not controlled by Saddam Hussein and their leaders say they seek to overthrow Saddam Hussein and his government.

R MULLAH KREKAR, ANSAR AL-ISLAM "They are our enemy. Really, they are also our enemy."

R (VO) The man considered the leader of Ansar Al-Islam lives openly in Oslo, Norway, where he sought asylum after he says Saddam Hussein tried to kill him.

R Mullah Krekar told **ABC news** this week, his group opposes Saddam Hussein, because, unlike Osama Bin Laden, Saddam Hussein is not a good Muslim.

R MULLAH KREKAR: " We believe that Saddam Hussein, him and his group and his ministers also, they are outside of Islamist zone."

M (VO) **Secretary Powell said today** that this Al-Qaeda leader, Abu Zarkawi,(PH) had brought together the men of Mullah Krekar and the others groups, in a joint alliance against the West.

R MULLAH KREKAR, "I didn't meet him. I didn't contact him. I didn't speak with him also."

R (OC) **In another blow to the US case, sources in London tell ABC News that British intelligence, as well is highly skeptical about, a theory that al-Qaeda is connected, Peter, to Iraq.**

R **ABC** DAN HARRIS (OC) Beyond calling it untrue, the Iraqis didn't have much of a response today to Powell's charge that they have links to Al-Qaeda.

R That will come tomorrow, they say, when they provide a detailed response to every point raised in the Powell report.

NBC NEWS FEBRUARY 5

Newscast: Bush administration provides details of alleged link between Saddam Hussein and al-Qaeda

M TOM BROKAW, anchor: And today for the first time, the administration provided details for what it has always insisted was a connection between Saddam Hussein and al-Qaeda.

R How strong is that case?

Here's NBC's **Jim Miklaszewski** at the Pentagon now.

Jim: **JIM MIKLASZEWSKI** reporting:

M Tom, there was plenty of new detailed information about Iraq's alleged ties to terrorists.

R But a Pentagon official says when Powell got to possible links between Baghdad and al-Qaeda, **he was skating on thin ice.**

R In making his case, Powell claimed the ties between Osama bin Laden and Saddam Hussein go back nearly 10 years, and the threat continues today.

E COLIN POWELL (Secretary of State): "A nexus that combines classic terrorist organizations and modern methods of murder."

M MIKLASZEWSKI: But the strongest terrorist link made today was not with bin Laden, but with this man, Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi, who Powell described as a bin Laden collaborator.

M Powell claimed that Zarqawi and his lieutenants helped establish this terrorist training camp in northern Iraq that is producing the deadly toxin ricin and other poisons, and that **M** members of Zarqawi's network have been arrested recently in London and Paris, plotting terrorist attacks.

R Powell also claimed that two dozen Islamic extremists with ties to al-Qaeda have set up a base in Baghdad to coordinate the flow of people, money and supplies.

E COLIN POWELL: "Iraqi officials deny accusations of ties with al-Qaeda. These denials are simply not credible".

M MIKLASZEWSKI: The most direct terrorist link between Iraq and bin Laden apparently comes from a senior al-Qaeda leader now in custody.

M According to Powell, the detainee says in December, 2000, bin Laden turned to Iraq for help in developing chemical and biological weapons, and got it.

R In his detailed testimony, however, Powell did not link Saddam Hussein to any current terrorist activity.

E But in a follow-up appearance, British Foreign Minister Jack Straw came close.

E British Foreign Minister JACK STRAW: "It defies imagination that all of this could be going on without the knowledge of Saddam Hussein."

R MIKLASZEWSKI: But US officials stress there is no evidence that links Saddam Hussein to 9/11 here in the US, or any other terrorist attacks. Tom:

R***The Arab network, Al-Jazeera--which carried the speech live--suggested that Powell's allegations of a link between Iraq and al-Qaeda are designed to manipulate support from as many nations as possible.

FEBRUARY 6 ABC NEWS

M The President is now saying he has no doubt that Iraq is in league with al-Qaeda,

M and bluntly told the members of the UN Security Council they risked irrelevancy if they don't support war.

CBS NEWS FEB 6

R There were similar denials that Iraq was harboring al-Qaeda operative Abu Musa`ab Al-Zarqawi.

R They say, he was last known to be in northern Kurdish-controlled Iraq, an area they can't get into because of the U.S. patrolled no-fly zone.

The United Nations News Center Summarized Powell's presentation in a news release published following his appearance.

UNITED NATIONS NEWS CENTRE FEBRUARY 5, 2003

Powell presents U.S. case to Security Council of Iraq's failure to disarm

Armed with satellite images, transcripts of intercepted telephone conversations and other intelligence data, United States Secretary of State Colin Powell today presented the United Nations Security Council with what he called "solid" evidence that showed Iraq still has not complied with resolutions calling for it to disarm.

"My colleagues, every statement I make today is backed up by sources, solid sources. These are not assertions. What we're giving you are facts and conclusions based on solid intelligence," Mr. Powell told the ministerial-level session of the 15-member body. Before hearing Mr. Powell's presentation, the Council members decided to grant Iraq's request to allow its representative sit at the Council table and make a statement at the end of the meeting.

The U.S. Secretary of State stressed that Iraq still poses a threat and remains in "material breach" of Council resolutions. "Indeed, by its failure to seize its one last opportunity to come clean and disarm, Iraq has put itself in deeper material breach and close to the day when it will face serious consequences for its continued defiance of this Council," he said. "We must not fail in our duty and our responsibility to the citizens of our countries."

"This body places itself in danger of irrelevance if it allows Iraq to continue to defy its will without responding effectively and immediately," Mr. Powell warned. "The issue before us is not how much more time we are willing to give the inspectors to be frustrated by Iraqi obstruction, but how much longer are we willing to put up with Iraq's non-compliance before we say: 'Enough!'"

Referring to the audio-visual evidence he presented to the Council, Mr. Powell said the material had U.S. and foreign origins, and came from technical sources, such as intercepted telephone conversations and photos taken by satellites. "Other sources are people who have risked their lives to let the world know what Saddam Hussein is really up to," he said.

"I cannot tell you everything that we know, but what I can share with you, when combined with what all of us have learned over the years, is deeply troubling," Mr. Powell said. "What you will see is an accumulation of facts and disturbing patterns of behaviour. The facts and Iraq's behaviour demonstrate that Saddam Hussein and his regime have made no effort - no effort - to disarm as required by the international community. Indeed, the facts and Iraq's behaviour show that Saddam Hussein and his regime are concealing their efforts to produce more weapons of mass destruction."

The satellite photos shown by Mr. Powell reflected what he called "concealment" activity undertaken in response to the resumption of UN inspections last November, while other images depicted suspected manufacturing sites for biological and chemical weapons. Mr. Powell also played tapes of intercepted conversations between Iraqi military personnel that he said indicated a concerted effort to hide or destroy evidence of weapons of mass destruction. Mr. Powell also said there has been no indication that Saddam Hussein has ever abandoned his nuclear weapons programme. According to testimony provided by defectors, Iraq already possesses two of the three key components needed to build a nuclear bomb, a cadre of scientists with the necessary expertise and a bomb design. "Since 1998, his efforts to reconstitute his nuclear programme have been focuses on acquiring the third and last component - sufficient fissile material to produce a nuclear explosion," he said.

Turning to terrorism, Mr. Powell said Iraq had a long history of supporting terrorist organizations and that there was a potentially "more sinister nexus" between Baghdad and the Al-Qaida network. He said Iraq's denials of any ties with the organization are not credible.

"None of this should come as a surprise to any of us," Mr. Powell said. "Terrorism has been a tool of Saddam for decades. Saddam was a supporter of terrorism long before these terrorist networks had a name, and this support continues. The nexus of poisons and terror is new; the nexus of Iraq and terror is old. The combination is lethal."

"We know that Saddam Hussein is determined to keep his weapons of mass destruction and make more," Mr. Powell said. "Given Saddam Hussein's history of aggression, given what we know of his grandiose plans, given what we know of his terrorist associations, and given his determination to exact revenge on those who have opposed him, should we take the risk that he will not someday use these weapons at a time and a place and in a manner of his choosing - at a time when the world is in a much weaker position to respond?" Mr. Powell said the United States "will not - we cannot - run that risk to the American people. Leaving Saddam Hussein in possession of weapons of mass destruction for a few more months or years is not an option. Not in a post-September 11th world."

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