

ABSTRACT

Title of dissertation: ROYAL SUBJECTS, IMPERIAL CITIZENS: THE MAKING OF BRITISH IMPERIAL CULTURE, 1860-1901

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ABSTRACT: The dissertation explores the development of global identities in the nineteenth-century British Empire through one particular device of colonial rule – the royal tour. Colonial officials and administrators sought to encourage loyalty and obedience on part of Queen Victoria’s subjects around the world through imperial spectacle and personal interaction with the queen’s children and grandchildren. The royal tour, I argue, created cultural spaces that both settlers of European descent and colonial people of color used to claim the rights and responsibilities of imperial citizenship. The dissertation, then, examines how the royal tours were imagined and used by different historical actors in Britain, southern Africa, New Zealand, and South Asia. My work builds on a growing historical literature about “imperial networks” and the cultures of empire. In particular, it aims to understand the British world as a complex field of cultural encounters, exchanges, and borrowings rather than a collection of unitary paths between Great Britain and its colonies.

ROYAL SUBJECTS, IMPERIAL CITIZENS:
THE MAKING OF BRITISH IMPERIAL CULTURE, 1860-1901

by

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DEDICATION

To Jude

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Writing a dissertation is both a profoundly collective project and an intensely individual one. As goes the usual caveat, the strengths of this work can be attributed to the former and its weaknesses only to the latter. It has been produced with the assistance and support of countless people. These acknowledgements cannot fully express my gratitude to them, but I will do my best.

Professor Richard Price has been a patient and able advisor, who has shared his enormous knowledge, insight, and experience while allowing me to intellectually venture out on my own and to develop my own worldview as a historian (occasionally intervening, pulling me out of the conceptual quicksand). He personifies the kind of academic humanism that inspired me to become a historian in the first place.

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Finally and most importantly, I must express my love and devotion to my family, who supported their first college graduate in an enterprise that sacrificed financial benefits for personal fulfillment. This dissertation is for my grandfather, who was raised on a farm during the Great Depression, served as a medic in the Pacific theater during World War II, and toiled in the coalfields and steel mills of southwestern Pennsylvania. He had an insatiable interest in the world, reading the local newspaper everyday from cover to cover, and it was he who first inspired and continually nurtured my interest in the past. This work is also for my parents and grandmother, who encouraged me to pursue my dreams, no matter how unreasonable they seemed to be; and for my wife and best friend, Tracy, who has offered more love and support than I ever could have asked for. It could not have been written without them.

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INTRODUCTION

During World War II, the Tswana-speaking peoples of Botswana explained their participation in the British war effort through the mythology of a long-dead queen:

We were so frightened to hear that our husbands were going to war... We had no slight idea what the war was about, the thing is, we only heard that Queen Victoria has asked for help, so they are going to fight for the Queen. We then know that this involves us, if they [the Germans] are fighting the Queen, as we were her people. We were under her, and she helped us against our enemies and with other things, so we had to help her. We didn't know how long they were going to take there. Even if we were afraid we just encouraged them to go in the name of God, we will also pray for them whilst gone, so that they can help the Queen as she helped us.¹

Amongst the Tswana, Queen Victoria (r. 1837-1901) was, and is, remembered as *Mmamosadinyana*, “Mrs/the little woman,” a legacy of the nineteenth-century mythology of the Great (White) Queen.² Despite the obvious conceptual dissonance between these two imaginings of Queen Victoria, of the Great White Queen and the little woman, the proliferation of her image so profoundly informed the contours of British imperial culture that it shaped the *mentalités* of British colonial subjects decades after her death.

While colonial administrators at home and abroad constructed and disseminated the myth of the Great (White) Queen, as a fundamental ideological apparatus of the nineteenth-century British Empire, Victoria’s subjects around the world appropriated, remade, and re-imagined this representation through sometimes overlapping, sometimes competing lenses of social class and status; political rights and citizenship; personal

¹ Botswana National Archives, Gaborone, Tape 36. Miriam Pilane interview, undated. Translated from Setswana. Cited in Ashley Jackson, “Motivation and Mobilization for War: Recruitment for the British Army in the Bechuanaland,” *African Affairs* 96, no. 384 (July 1997): 401. Pilane confused Queen Victoria and Queen Elizabeth II.

² Jackson, 401; Neil Parsons, *King Khama, Emperor Joe and the Great White Queen: Victorian Britain through African Eyes* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998).

experiences; and local histories, traditions, and mythologies. The powerful and lasting image of Queen Victoria demonstrates both the employment of cultural symbolism by British colonial states as a strategy of imperial rule and its appropriation by the Queen's subjects, from colonial governors to "traditional" political elites, from settlers of European descent to Western-educated *respectables* of color. Moreover, its malleability and adaptability reflects the fragilities and instabilities of a British imperial culture, made in the movement of people, ideas, and commodities through the networks of the British world and through encounters with local people as much as, or more than, in the imperial metropole.

The Royal Tour

The General Election of 2010 resulted in a hung parliament, with no political party winning enough votes to form a majority government. After days of negotiation, the Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats formed a coalition government. Labour Prime Minister Gordon Brown dutifully left 10 Downing Street and traveled to Buckingham Palace to submit his resignation to the queen. In short order, the queen "called upon" the prime minister apparent of the new coalition government, the Conservative leader David Cameron, and asked him to form a government.³ Despite the claims of the monarchy or American political commentators, these political performances were a constitutional fiction. The last prime minister to be dismissed by a monarch was Lord Melbourne, by

³ The official account celebrates this fiction: "The Queen received the Right Honourable David Cameron this evening and requested him to form a new administration. The Right Honourable David Cameron accepted Her Majesty's offer and Kissed Hands upon his appointment as Prime Minister and First Lord of the Treasury." *The official website of the British Monarchy*. <http://www.royal.gov.uk> (accessed 12 May 2010).

William IV in 1834. The great political theorist Walter Bagehot submitted, in 1867, that the British constitution gives the monarch three rights: “to advise, to be consulted, and to warn.”⁴ Queen Elizabeth, as a constitutional monarch, has no power or right to interfere in the political process, and she would almost certainly have a revolt on her hands if she tried.

Bagehot also distinguished between the “dignified” functions of the monarchy and the “efficient” (e.g. real) power of Parliament.⁵ Both Victoria and Elizabeth inherited a constitutional monarchy that had been deprived of its “efficient” powers, lost between the Civil Wars of the seventeenth century and the constitutional settlements of the nineteenth century. Modern scholars of British studies have debated the transformation of the monarchy’s role in the increasingly democratic and mass culture of nineteenth- and early twentieth-century British society (see chapter one). William Kuhn has argued that the British monarchy willingly participated in and eased the transformation of an *ancien régime* into a modern democracy.⁶ While Kuhn’s study is skillful and enlightening, much evidence points in the opposite direction, toward the notion that Victoria and her Prince Consort Albert sought to salvage as much political and social influence for the monarchy as they could. Despite the failures of Victoria and Albert in this regard, as their descendants largely accepted the monarchy’s loss of “efficient” powers, they did participate – often quite unwillingly – in the reinvention of the British monarchy during the nineteenth century.

⁴ Walter Bagehot, *The English Constitution*, ed. Paul Smith (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 9.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ William Kuhn, *Democratic Royalism: The Transformation of the British Monarchy, 1861-1914* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1996).

As young Princess Elizabeth sat on the coronation throne in 1953, she inherited a social role and a set of ritual practices that had been developed during the reign of Victoria. In this context, Frank Prochaska has written on the monarchy's embrace of philanthropy, particularly by Prince Albert, in the creation of what he calls a "welfare monarchy."⁷ Elizabeth and her family have embraced this role. Prince Charles' notable charitable work, contributing to the causes of global warming and organic farming, for instance, can certainly be seen in this light. But, above all, Elizabeth inherited a set of ritual practices, as David Cannadine has argued, that had roots in an earlier period but were developed and perfected over the course of the nineteenth century.⁸ Empire Day (now Commonwealth Day), jubilees, and royal tours of empire were the "inventions" of a nineteenth-century British state that sought to inspire obedience and loyalty in the queen's subjects across the globe.⁹

The royal tour is one of the most significant and underappreciated components of the modern monarchy's ideological apparatus.¹⁰ Victoria's sons, the Prince of Wales,

⁷ Frank Prochaska, *Royal Bounty: The Making of a Welfare Monarchy* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995).

⁸ David Cannadine, "The Context, Performance and Meaning of Ritual: The British Monarchy and the 'Invention of Tradition, c. 1820-1977,'" in *The Invention of Tradition*, ed. Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 101-64.

⁹ The idea of "invented traditions," as contested and debated in the historiography, is discussed in several chapters. The most significant of these revisions to the original volume is Terence Ranger, "The Invention of Tradition Revisited" in *Legitimacy and the State in Twentieth Century Africa: Essays in Honour of A.H.M. Kirk-Greene*, ed. Terence Ranger and Olufemi (Vaughan. London: Macmillan, 1993).

¹⁰ The scholarship on the royal tours, particularly by Canadian historians, is thoughtful and important. My study differs for this work in several important ways. In particular, it is framed around a comparative analysis of the royal tours of the southern British world. See Philip Buckner, "Casting Daylight Upon Magic: Deconstructing the Royal Tour of 1901 to Canada," *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 31 (May 2003): 158-189; Buckner, "The royal tour of 1901 and the construction of an imperial identity in South Africa." *South African Historical Journal* 41 (1999): 326-48; Ian Radforth, "Performance, Politics, and Representation: Aboriginal People and the 1860 Royal Tour of Canada," *The Canadian Historical Review* 84 (March 2003): 1-32; Radforth, *Royal Spectacle: The 1860 Visit of the Prince of Wales to Canada and the United States* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2004); Henry

Albert Edward, and Prince Alfred, were the first royals to visit the British Empire during 1860 tours to Canada and the Cape of Good Hope, planned by Prince Albert and the Colonial Secretary, the Duke of Newcastle (chapter one). While the royal tours of 1860s had some origins in the royal progress or the grand tour – intended to encourage public visibility of and interaction with the British royal family and to educate young royals in the lessons of empire – they were a decidedly novel political and cultural invention. They were made possible by new modes of transport and communication, the steamship and the telegraph, and their movements were disseminated by an expanding culture of print in Britain and the empire and through a new, magical medium called photography. By the mid-nineteenth century, royals could travel in comfort and safety by land and sea because of British naval dominance, the expansion of settler communities, and the “neutralization” of indigenous peoples. During an age of imperial consolidation, the royal tour “create[d] a new function, purpose, and justification for monarchy” at home and abroad.¹¹

Wade, “Imagining the Great White Mother and the Great King: Aboriginal Tradition and Royal Representation in the “Great Pow-wow” of 1901,” *Journal of the Canadian Historical Association* 11 (2000): 87-108. Also see Cindy McCreery, “Telling the Story: HMS Galatea’s 1867 visit to the Cape,” *South African Historical Journal* (December 2009), 817-37; McCreery, “The Voyage of the Duke of Edinburgh in HMS Galatea to Australia, 1867-8,” in *Exploring the British World: Identity, Cultural Production, Institutions*, ed. Kate Darian-Smith, Patricia Grimshaw, Kiera Lindsey, and Stuart McIntyre (Melbourne: RMIT Publishing, 2004), 959-978. Two popular histories have also been useful to me in conceptualizing this project: Theo Aronson, *Royal Ambassadors: British Royalties in Southern Africa, 1860-1947* (Cape Town: D.Philip, 1975); John Fabb, *Royal Tours of the British Empire, 1860-1927* (London: B.T. Batsford, 1989). Neil Parsons has skillfully explored the reversal of the royal tour, when African “royals” came to Britain. See Neil Parsons, “No longer rare birds in London’: Zulu, Ndebele, Gaza, and Swazi envoys to England, 1882-1894,” in *Black Victorians / Black Victoriana*, ed Gerzina, Gretchen Holbrook (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2003), 110-41; Parsons, *King Khama, Emperor Joe, and the Great White Queen* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998).

¹¹ David Cannadine, *Ornamentalism : How the British Saw Their Empire* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 101.

The modern Elizabethan monarchy has embraced the royal tour as an essential function of the British monarchy. After all, Elizabeth II had been in Kenya, en route to a tour of Australia and New Zealand when she learned of her father's death in 1952. Elizabeth is the most traveled monarch in history, having visited every country in the Commonwealth except Cameroon, a total of nearly 200 visits.¹² These visits might be simply dismissed, as a "little woman" playing the Great Queen, encountering cheering "subjects" and exotic savages in an anachronistic performance, and as a post-imperial nation clinging to the remnants and legacies of its former glory. It also reflects the ways that Britain has been unable to settle on its international partnerships (A "special relationship" with the United States? The bonds of history and kinship with a former empire? Or a membership in a European Union?) – an indecisiveness that is both a cause and product of Britain's global decline.

There is something to be said, however, for a more profound connection between Commonwealth citizens and the British monarchy, an emotional attachment that cannot be undone so easily by republicans or academics.¹³ The work of "British world" scholars (discussed more later) has effectively demonstrated the importance of these bonds. While the queen may gaze back at Commonwealth citizens from Australian or New Zealand dollar bills every day, the royal tour makes real the shared past and heritage between

¹² See Mary Hill Cole, *The Portable Queen: Elizabeth II and the Politics of Ceremony* (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1999); "The role of the Monarchy in the Commonwealth," *The official website of the British Monarchy*. <http://www.royal.gov.uk> (accessed 12 May 2010).

¹³ There has been some criticism that American scholars have examined the history of the British Empire with a republicanism and post-imperial eye that blinds them to the bonds of kinship and identity forged between the British metropole and its colonies, in part because the national mythology of the United States is founded in the rejection of this relationship. For instance, Max Beloff and several other members of the British academic community expressed outrage when an American, William Roger Louis, was chosen to be the editor-in-chief of the *Oxford History of the British Empire* project in 1996. See Dane Kennedy, "The Boundaries of Oxford's Empire," *International History Review*, 23, no. 3 (September 2001): 605.

former colonies and their British head of state.¹⁴ The 2005 film *Her Majesty* dramatizes the Elizabeth II's 1953 tour of New Zealand through the character of Elizabeth Wakefield, a young girl who fulfills her dream of meeting the beautiful, young queen.¹⁵ Likewise, the global outpouring of sorrow over the death of Diana, the Princess of Wales, in 1997 gives proof of the public's emotional attachment to royalty in a "rational" modern world.¹⁶

At the same time, the meanings of these performances were far more fragile than these examples suggest. During the spring of 2002, the queen and Prince Philip embarked on a royal tour of the Commonwealth countries of Jamaica, New Zealand, and Australia, to celebrate Elizabeth's fiftieth anniversary as queen. In 1999, a few years earlier, Elizabeth's Commonwealth throne had barely survived an Australian referendum on the monarchy, the pro-monarchy vote beating out the republican cause by only a few percentage points.¹⁷ During one carefully planned encounter of this visit, the Queen and Prince Philip met a group of natives wearing loin cloths and body paint at the Tjapukai Aboriginal Culture Park, where a fire lighting ceremony was performed for their benefit. Prince Philip allegedly asked them if they "still [threw] spears at each other."¹⁸ From the perspective of the monarchy and the Australian planners, this encounter was meant to

¹⁴ Anne Rush has explored this phenomenon during royal tours to Jamaica. See Anne Rush, *The Bonds of Empire: West Indians and Britishness 1900-1970*, Ph.D. diss., American University (Washington, D.C., 2004), 410-434; Rush, *Bonds of Empire: West Indians and Britishness from Victoria to Decolonization* (New York: Oxford University Press, forthcoming).

¹⁵ *Her Majesty*, dir. Mark J. Gordon (2005).

¹⁶ In Britain, Queen Elizabeth became intensely unpopular after her initial refusal to publicly mourn this death of her daughter-in-law.

¹⁷ 54.4% of Australians voted against the republican referendum.

¹⁸ "Prince Philip's spear 'gaffe,'" BBC News: Asia-Pacific, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/low/asia-pacific/1848813.stm> (accessed 30 October 2007).

convey British and Australian reconciliation with the Aborigine population and evidence of Australia's modernity and multi-culturalism.¹⁹ The fire-lighting Aborigines articulated their own counter-narrative within the ritualistic order of the tour: "This opportunity to showcase our culture to the world will perhaps influence at least some people to rethink their attitude to indigenous culture... We are not a curiosity but a relevant and integral part of 21st-century Australia," said "troop leader" Warren Clements. "We here, represent a new spirit of freedom - freedom from dependence on government handouts, freedom from a century of oppression, freedom from the cycle of poverty."²⁰ Clements re-imagined the royal tour with his own vision, of a renewed future for his people within an Australian nation.

The Making (and Unmaking) of Imperial Culture

As the Aboriginal citizens of Australia contested the meaning of the visit, Queen Victoria's subjects at home and abroad made sense of the royal presence in complicated and profoundly different ways. Colonial administrators and local elites may have imagined the royal tours as instruments of imperial rule and social control, as methods of inspiring obedience and loyalty to empire; transcending the divisions of wealth, status, and class at home and in settler societies; naturalizing British rule in Africa, Asian, and Pacific societies; and creating an illusion of consent with the "ruled." However, the meanings attached to the tours and imperial culture itself, made in the empire, could not be dictated to or controlled by Whitehall, Windsor, or government houses in Cape Town

¹⁹ Of course, this narrative ignores the difficult legacies of colonial rule and settlement still experienced by first Australians.

²⁰ "Prince Philip's spear 'gaffe,'" BBC News.

or Bombay. Like Victor Frankenstein's monster, they had a life of their own – and produced unintended consequences. This work is about these complex processes of reception and appropriation. It decenters the empire, to reveal how ideas about loyalty, citizenship, and empire informed the political, cultural, and social universes of nineteenth-century colonial subjects.

This dissertation is about the Victorian royal tours of empire, between the first royal visits in 1860 to the last tours organized during Victoria's reign, taken after her death in 1901. Victoria herself never traveled farther away than Ireland and the Continent, but her children and grandchildren traveled the world as soldiers, sailors, and ambassadors. They interacted with her colonial subjects during welcoming ceremonies, parades, balls, dinners, and Durbars. It was during these visits that the ritual practices of the twentieth-century royal tour were developed and perfected. It was also over the course of these visits that young royals were educated in the idea of imperial monarchy. George V, who traveled around the world between 1879 and 1882 as Prince George and in 1901 as the Duke of Cornwall and York, was the first reigning monarch to visit the empire in 1912. Edward VII, who visited Canada in 1860 and 1901 as the Prince of Wales, would try to have himself declared "King of Greater Britain" upon taking the throne (see chapter one). These experiences also nurtured in royal children an acceptance of their purely "dignified" role in the political and social worlds of Britain and the empire, a development that Victoria and Albert had long resisted.

The work examines how the royal tours were imagined and used by different historical actors in Britain, southern Africa (with focus on the Cape Colony and Natal), New Zealand, and the Indian Empire. It is a tale of royals who were ambivalent and

bored partners in the project of empire; colonial administrators who used royal ceremonies to pursue a multiplicity of projects and interests or to imagine themselves as African chiefs or heirs to the Mughal emperors; local princes and chiefs who were bullied and bruised by the politics of the royal tour, even as some of them used the tour to symbolically appropriate or resist British cultural power; and settlers of European descent and people of color in the empire who made claims on the rights and responsibilities of imperial citizenship and a co-ownership of Britain's global empire.

These colonial subjects were linked together across the transnational space of empire by the political and cultural networks of the British world and the shared discourses of imperial culture.

While the dissertation is about the royal tours, it makes an argument about imperial culture. As Nicholas Thomas argues, imperial culture:

cannot be understood if it is assumed that some unitary representation is extended from the metropole and cast across passive spaces, unmediated by perceptions or encounters. Colonial projects are constructed, misconstrued, adapted and enacted by actors whose subjectivities are fractured – half here, half there...²¹

In this context, the dissertation suggests that the diverse responses to the royal tours of the nineteenth century demonstrate how an imperial culture, forged in the empire, was constantly made and remade, appropriated and contested. It provincializes the British Isles, to center “the periphery” in the political and cultural constructions of ideas about empire, Britishness, citizenship, and loyalty. It also problematizes the role of the British Isles in the history of empire, to show that metropolitan culture had no monopoly on the creation of imperial culture and that the British people, from the working classes to the

²¹ Nicholas Thomas, *Colonialism's Culture: Anthropology, Travel and Government* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994), 60.

Great Queen herself, had a complex relationship with empire. The work builds on growing historical literatures about diaspora, citizenship, and the cultures of empire. In particular, it aims to understand the British world as a complex field of cultural encounters, exchanges, and borrowings rather than a collection of unitary and unidirectional paths between Great Britain and its colonies.

The mythology of Queen Victoria... the justice-giving Great (White) Queen... *Mmamosadinyana* had a profound influence on nineteenth-century British imperial culture – and the political and cultural fragments that were reshuffled and remade in the identity politics of the twentieth century. It was disseminated, in particular, by colonial officials at home and in the empire as a legitimizing apparatus of the “imperial connection” (for white settlers) and British rule (for others). This mythology was profoundly informed how many of the Queen’s English-speaking subjects – *respectable* people of color in the Cape Colony or Bombay, British settlers in Dunedin or Natal, and even self-ascribed Britons of Irish, South Asian, or Dutch descent – imagined themselves and their communities, but with new meanings attached and with consequences unintended by colonial officials. For others who interacted with British rule, this mythology was informed by experiences with a rather illiberal and unjust empire, made by rumors and second-hand knowledge (represented by the Tswana memory of her during World War II), or did not register at all. These were, quite admittedly, the experiences of the vast majority of Queen Victoria’s subjects, who could hardly be considered “imperial subjects” and remained far outside of an “imperial culture.” These important historical actors are not a part of this study of imperial culture.

There were other cultural and political influences, too, that are not considered – or are considered rather ephemerally – in the conceptual framework of this dissertation. The idea of America became an important political and cultural trope at the end of the nineteenth century and, arguably, overtook imaginings of Britain and British constitutionalism during the first decades of the twentieth century. Duncan Bell has reflected on how Britishers at home and abroad, among them Cecil Rhodes, thought about the United States as potential (and even dominant) partner in an Anglo-American hegemony capable of perpetuating the “peace” and influence of British rule.²² In southern Africa, for instance, the African Methodist Episcopal (AME) Church, a missionary church founded by African Americans in Philadelphia, and (Marcus) Garveyism helped shape the form of twentieth-century African politics.²³ The mythologies of New Zealand and Australia, as better and more democratic offspring of Britain, were often constructed in relation, or at least with comparisons to, the United States.

Moreover, the mythology of the Great Queen, discourses on Britishness and imperial citizenship, and the royal tour itself co-existed with, and sometimes co-mingled with, other “invented traditions.” The idea of African-ness or Indian-ness emerged in a complicated intellectual and cultural milieu -- arguably, the meetings and Durbars of the royal tours, developing concepts of pan-Africanism or “Negro improvement,” and the birth of nationalist (even if initially loyalist) political organizations. The neo-

²² Duncan Bell, “Dreamworlds of Empire: Race, Utopia, and Anglobal Governance, 1880-1914,” at *Britain and Her World System 1815-1931: Trade, Migration, and Politics*, Institute du monde anglophone, Université Paris III – Sorbonne nouvelle, March 2010.

²³ James Campbell, *Songs of Zion: The African Methodist Episcopal Church in the United States and South Africa* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995); Robert Vinson, *The Americans Are Coming!: Black Political Prophecies of ‘American Negro’ Liberation in Segregationist South Africa* (Athens: Ohio University Press, forthcoming) and “Sea Kaffirs: ‘American Negroes’ and the Gospel of Garveyism in Segregationist South Africa” *Journal of African History* 47, no. 2 (July 2006): 281-303.

traditionalism of “ancient” customs and practices, found in the Gaelic revival of the Irish diaspora and the hand-spinning of Gandhi, also informed the political and cultural worldviews of colonial subjects. Despite the intellectual controversy over “invented traditions” – that traditions were always being made and re-made, that not all nineteenth-century traditions were constructed so crassly and with such instrumentalist goals in mind, and that people (whether African or British or South Asian) understood those traditions on their own terms – its recognition of these traditions as new, as decidedly modern, is rather important.

Finally, the geographical and conceptual limits of this study also ought to be admitted. For one, the geographical scope of the dissertation – of Britain, the Cape Colony and Natal, New Zealand, and the Raj – is framed in such a way as to compare the experiences of different analytical “kinds” of colonies and their populations and to explore their interconnectedness through the imperial networks of the British world. While the conceptual framework has been rather useful for the purposes of this study, it has also been limiting. After all, the empire was a very big place. Beyond the countless other colonies outside of this study’s scope, Britain’s influence extended to an “informal” empire of trade, as evidenced, for instance, by Prince Alfred’s visits to Japan or the Prince of Wales’ trip through the United States. Moreover, the idiom of imperial citizenship is the artificial construct of a twenty-first century historian; it was never uttered by any colonial subject (as far as I know). People in Britain and the empire did, however, talk about Britishness, particularly British constitutionalism, citizenship, and the “rights of Englishmen.” Like all works of history, it uses artificial constructs and limits to make sense of and try to reconstruct the past in an intelligible way.

Foundations and Contributions

In explaining the foundations and contributions of one's work, the scholar plays his intellectual cards, as it were. This dissertation engages with diverse literatures of British, African, South Asian, and Australasian scholarship and is informed by the work of historians, cultural theorists, and anthropologists. While a story about empire and imperial culture, it contributes to the history of the British monarchy; a social history of Britishers and "others" at home and abroad; and the history of Britishness and citizenship in the empire. These influences and interventions shall be discussed in due course, but the immediate subjects at hand are the historiographical contours that have shaped the work as a whole.

The intellectual influences on this work are too numerous to list ad nauseum, but several stand out as particularly important. It has been informed by several generations of social historians, from Edward Thompson to Jonathan Rose, who challenged, and challenge, elite-dominated constructions of the past and the agency of non-elite historical actors.²⁴ It has also been informed by the scholarship of colonial and imperial history and of African, Asian, and Pacific "area studies," which were often inspired by the same Thompsonian tradition; this large and diverse body of work, from post-colonial theory and Subaltern Studies to the New Imperial History, have revised the more traditional intellectual paths of colonial and imperial history, giving attention to the dynamics of power (often inspired by the works of Antonio Gramsci and Michel Foucault) in both the actual story of the past and the processes by which those stories became "history." These scholars have also skillfully examined the role of class, gender, and race in the making of

²⁴ E.P. Thompson, *The Making of the English Working Class* (Vintage, 1996); Jonathan Rose, *Intellectual Life of the British Working Classes* (Yale University Press, 2003).

empire and have located “the colonized” at the center of the historical narrative rather than on its political, social, and cultural peripheries.

Imperial networks. The work also embraces the concept of imperial networks, transnational discourses formed and communicated through the political and cultural circuits of empire, in order to understand how the exchange of ideas and shared knowledge shaped the contours of imperial culture. Traditional scholarship on the subject of the British Empire has understood Britain’s relationship with its colonies as binary oppositions between center and periphery. What these narratives lack are the transnational or global cultural and political spaces that were at work in the nineteenth century British world.

The reception of the royal tours was not shaped along a single circuit between the metropole and individual colony but connected across the transnational space of empire, what Alan Lester and Elizabeth Elbourne call “imperial networks.”²⁵ Lester and Elbourne conceptualize the development of colonial discourses – government, settler, humanitarian, and “native” – that were disseminated and shaped by these global networks of empire. They demonstrate that peoples across the empire were culturally connected to one another – through print media, through travel, through capital and business interests,

²⁵ Alan Lester, *Imperial Networks: Creating Identities in Nineteenth Century South Africa and Britain* (New York, Routledge 2001); Elizabeth Elbourne, “Indigenous People and Imperial Networks in the Early Nineteenth Century: the Politics of Knowledge,” from *Rediscovering the British World*, ed. Phillip Buckner and R. Douglas Francis (Calgary, Alberta, University of Calgary Press, 2005): 59-86. As a counterpoint to this literature, Simon Potter has argued that the global circuits of print media were more open and democratic during the early part of the nineteenth century – when metropolitan newspapers essentially re-printed verbatim the language and rhetoric of settler newspapers – than later in the century, when a monopoly print capitalism brought these networks into the control of several powerful news agencies. See Simon J. Potter, “Webs, Networks, and Systems: Globalization and Mass Media in the Nineteenth- and Twentieth-Century British Empire,” *Journal of British Studies* 46 (July 2007): 621-646.

and through Victorian lobbying groups, missionary societies, and political clubs.²⁶ While not everyone was “connected” to these networks of empire, this scholarship draws a more complex discursive web of “global politics, capital, and culture” than more traditional approaches to empire have suggested.²⁷

There is some danger of misusing this conceptual framework by suggesting that these cultural and political networks were open, democratic, or evenly distributed. These “webs of trade, knowledge, migration, military power, and political intervention,” as Tony Ballantyne and Antoinette Burton argue, “allowed certain communities to assert their influence and sovereignty over other groups.”²⁸ These networks were “governed” by modalities of power. Information itself, neither free nor evenly distributed, was regulated and controlled by British wire services and privileged the voices of the wealthy, the influential, and the white. Moreover, we must remember that these discourses are artificial, made by scholars to explain a transnational movement of ideas, and represent a rather fractured and unstable historical reality.

A British World? The work is also influenced by the recently scholarly attention given to the British diaspora, the spread of British peoples, ideas, and institutions around the globe, and the development of transnational, and sometimes non-ethnic, manifestations of Britishness (see chapter four). In a recent compilation of essays on the

²⁶ Benedict Anderson’s analysis of “creole functionaries” on administrative pilgrimages *within* imperial administrative units is useful. Colonial administrators, missionaries, and even settlers traveled throughout the British world, meaning that their “imagined communities” were often transnational rather than national. See Anderson, *Imagined Communities* (New York: Verso, 1991): 56-57. Also see Catherine Hall on Gov. John Edward Eyre in *Civilising Subjects*, 23-66. It is telling that people of color usually did not travel *within* the empire, only from “home” to Britain itself and back.

²⁷ Tony Ballantyne and Antoinette Burton, “Introduction: Bodies, Empires, and World Histories,” in *Bodies in Contact: Rethinking Encounters in World History* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2005), 8.

²⁸ “Introduction: Bodies, Empires, and World Histories,” *Bodies in Contact*, 3.

British world, Carl Bridge and Kent Fedorowich, for instance, contend that the white colonies of settlement have been marginalized in the literature on empire and that the British diaspora and the colonies of settlement – Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and South Africa – ought to be an important subject of inquiry for historians.²⁹ From the nineteenth century to the middle of the twentieth century, the “white” settlement colonies had been the primary analytical frame for imperial historians. John Seeley, the nineteenth-century father of imperial history, understood the history of Britain to be one of expansion, the movement of British people and institutions to new Britains overseas.³⁰ The *Cambridge History of the British Empire*, the magnum opus of early twentieth-century imperial history, dedicated individual volumes to the colonies of settlement.³¹ Since the 1960s, post-colonial scholars and “new” imperial historians have challenged these conceptual frameworks as privileging the experiences of white settlers over “the colonized” and reproducing a Whiggish history of British expansion and liberty that itself was the ideological apparatus of empire.

The British world movement represents an intellectual pendulum swing away from post-colonial thought, a reaction against its particular view of the imperial past. The concept of Britishness as an adaptable and malleable identity, unbounded by the limits of skin color or ethnicity, is one of the most useful and unique contributions of this

²⁹ Carl Bridge and Kent Fedorowich, “Mapping a British World,” in *The British World: Diaspora, Culture, and Identity* (Portland, OR: Routledge, 2003), 1-15. Also see John Darwin for the idea of Britannic nationalism, “A

Third British Empire? The Dominion Idea in Imperial Politics,” in *The Oxford History of the British Empire*, vol. IV, *The Twentieth Century*, ed. Judith M. Brown and William Roger Louis (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 64-87.

³⁰ John Seeley, *The Expansion of England* (1883).

³¹ J. Holland Rose, A. P. Newton, E. A. Benians, eds., *The Cambridge History of the British Empire*, 9 vol. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1926-61).

literature.³² Britishness, and ideas about British liberty and constitutionalism, informed how many colonial subjects imagined their political, cultural, and social universes. In particular, this dissertation proposes that a notion of imperial citizenship, a brand of loyalism that made claims on the rights and responsibilities of Britishness and a co-ownership of a global British Empire, profoundly shaped the politics and identities of many colonial subjects. “Respectable” people of color in the empire, e.g. colonial subjects of African and Asian descent, appealed to their status as loyal subjects and imperial citizens to challenge the injustices of imperial rule and to appeal to the unredeemed promises of imperial citizenship (chapter three). For white and “other” settlers, e.g. people of South Asian or Chinese descent living in South Africa or New Zealand, manifestations of Britishness and imperial citizenship were used to make and claim community identities and mythologies and to challenge perceived injustices, whether its source was the imperial government, land-hungry settlers, or a competing colony or settlement (chapter four). In this context, the royal tour serves as a litmus test, where different manifestations of Britishness in different locales can be traced for change and continuity over space and time.

The work itself is an important contribution to several historiographies. In the context of a British or imperial historiography, it challenges the conception that British or imperial culture was forged in a metropolitan experience and imported to the colonies, as if Britishness could be packed in a suitcase and taken abroad. Colonial subjects

³²³² Carl Bridge and Kent Fedorowich, eds., *The British World: Diaspora, Culture, and Identity* (Portland, Oregon: Frank Cass, 2003); Phillip Buckner and R. Douglas Francis, *Rediscovering the British World* (Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 2005); Saul Dubow, “How British Was the British World? The Case of South Africa,” *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 37, no. 1 (2009): 1-27; John Lambert, “‘An Unknown People’: Reconstructing British South African Identity,” *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 37, no. 4 (December 2009): 599-617; Andrew Thompson, “The Language of Loyalism in Southern Africa, c. 1870-1939,” *English Historical Review* 118, no 477 (2003): 617-650.

abroad, it argues, had a formative influence on discourses on Britishness, citizenship, and empire that was as, or more important than, that of metropolitan society. British culture at “home” had a complex and often limited relationship with Britain’s overseas empire. Chapter one argues that Queen Victoria and her children demonstrated a limited and banal interest in empire, one that often failed to inform how they thought about themselves and the British monarchy as an institution. Chapter five, as an intellectual bookend of sorts, returns the focus of the study to Britain, to argue that the British public expressed a limited consciousness of empire and that support was limited and even contested.

The dissertation also posits that colonial actors, from African and South Asian intellectuals to the neo-Britons of settlement colonies, were legitimate contributors to British culture. Despite their profound differences, the nationalist historiographies of the former colonies, from the national histories of settler colonies such as New Zealand and Australia to the post-colonial works by scholars of Asian and African descent, share a conceptual teleology, to identify the end of empire and the emergence of independent states as a foregone conclusion in an age when it was decidedly not.³³ This tendency downplays the significant and vitality of nineteenth-century British imperial culture, where real and imagined connections to a larger British world and where many colonial subjects made claims on a co-ownership of empire. Colonial subjects in the empire were as important to the creation of nineteenth-century British politics and culture as anyone at “home.”

³³ Ranajit Guha , for instance, criticized the role of Western-educated Indian “collaborators” and India’s imperial overlords in misrepresenting the Indian past. Ranajit Guha, *Dominance without Hegemony: History and Power in Colonial India* (Harvard University Press, 1998).

Chapter Overview

Chapter one examines the broad gap between the projection of Queen Victoria as a symbol of empire and the Victorian royal family's deep sense of ambivalence about the British Empire. The Great Queen initially refused every royal tour after 1860, only to be later convinced of their importance by colonial officials. The chapter uses letters and correspondence from the Royal Archives and the India Office to demonstrate that, after the death of her consort Prince Albert, Queen Victoria was a reluctant participant in the tours and that her children and grandchildren were generally bored as royal tourists. They complained of the tedious and demanding ritual practices and rarely considered the tours' political and cultural implications for empire. Victoria had little to do with the political and cultural fashioning of the Great Queen as a symbol, which was culturally repossessed by her subjects at home and abroad to remake and contest the meaning of empire.

Chapter two examines how "native" princes and chiefs in Africa, South Asia, and New Zealand encountered the empire and British royals during the tours of empire. It uses the imperial archive, the records of the British monarchy, the India Office, and the Colonial Office, as well as the rich and important work of historians and anthropologists to understand how the language and actions of "traditional" political elites reflect discourses of appropriation and contestation. This chapter focuses, in particular, on the ways that princes and chiefs symbolically resisted British appropriation of local political traditions or used connections with the British to invent or accentuate their own status and authority. It also explores how colonial administrators, such as Lord Lytton in India or Theophilus Shepstone in Natal, sought to naturalize British rule by re-imagining themselves as Mughal governors or African chiefs in an imperial hierarchy, atop of which

sat the Great Queen. When these “imagined traditions” confronted the more complicated and messy realities of colonial rule, as they did during the royal tours, the results reflected both how British were shaped by and beholden to their own perceptions of local political cultures and how the real and cultural violence of imperial rule informed the encounter. Moreover, they demonstrate the conceptual dissonance between the imagined traditions of rule, as products of colonial knowledge, and the slippery and allusive nature of local political cultures, which could never be fully grasped or controlled.

Chapter three explores how a modern politics and mass culture were mobilized by Western-educated *respectables* of color in the Cape Colony and British India. British political theorists and colonial administrators broadly recognized the comparability of Western-educated “natives” across imperial culture, a transnational class nurtured and educated in Western culture through missionary efforts and “Anglicization” movements, who had been imagined by Thomas Babington Macaulay as the middle men of empire. Using the rich resources of independent African and South Asian newspapers, which covered and editorialized the royal tours at length, this chapter argues that these men imagined themselves to be British people. The newspaper editors of this analysis, often asserting themselves to be the more authentic heirs of British constitutionalism, challenged the injustices of colonial rule, advocated a non-racial respectable status and an imperial citizenship, and claimed ownership of the British Empire.

Chapter four examines how colonial settlers imagined their relationships with a British “homeland” and a larger British world. By examining the robust English-language print cultures of South Africa and New Zealand, which were established in the earliest days of British colonization, the chapter examines how provinces and colonies, social

classes, and ethnic groups used the forum of the royal tour to self-fashion local and communal mythologies and identities. It pays particular attention to the development of unique manifestations of British citizenship and identity, not only in individual colonies – in New Zealand or the Cape Colony – but also in provincial and urban cores – in the Eastern Cape or Dunedin, for instance.

While the royal tours were used by colonial officials and local elites as instruments of propaganda and social control, colonial subjects in the empire often used the languages of Britishness and imperial citizenship to challenge injustices, whether local or imperial, or to challenge racial or ethnic determinism. Irish, South Asian, and Chinese “other” settlers used visits as an opportunity to contest their political and social exclusion and to claim the rights of imperial citizens. Over time, political and technological change ended the localism and provincialism that undermined the role of the “imperial factor” in southern Africa and New Zealand, and discourses of nationalism and whiteness came to dominate local politics and traditions. The heritage and language of Britishness, however, informed the politics and mythologies of English-speaking settlers well into the twentieth century.

Chapter five returns to Britain, to examine how the British public responded to the royal tours and how the overseas empire informed metropolitan culture. It engages with both an older social history of Britain and the innovative recent work of a group of scholars who have been called New Imperial historians in order to understand the place of empire in popular politics and consciousness. It argues that British people at home made sense of the empire by domesticating it, by interpreting it through a lens of personal concerns, group identities (e.g. social class or political party), or national pride. It uses

debates in the House of Commons, mainstream and radical newspapers, women's and children's periodicals, and reports on popular protests to suggest the limits and complexities of imperial consciousness in Britain. There was intense public opposition to some of the tours, particularly on the part of working-class journals such as *Reynolds's Newspaper*, but they were also neglected and ignored. Even in the Houses of Parliament, support for empire was hardly uncontested or unlimited.

Chronology and Cast of Characters

Since this work is organized thematically, examining different discourses of British imperial culture over time, the reader may experience some sense of chronological dislocation. This brief overview is meant to outline the chronology of the royal tours between 1860 and 1901. The travels of British royals over this time were extensive, so examining all of them is out of the question. I have chosen to focus on the southern British world and, specifically, on comparisons between the three different colonies in part because they are routinely treated as vastly different creatures and examined through different analytical lenses: the Indian Empire as a colony of conquest, New Zealand as a colony of settlement, and South Africa as something in-between. While these categories are conceptually useful, this work shall argue they (both the specific cases and the general categories) shared important similarities and connections that defy such analytic categories.

Certain tours are conceptually highlighted as case studies while others are neglected. I use the travels of Prince Alfred, a royal sailor, during the 1860s and 1870s extensively and largely ignore the movements of his younger brother Arthur, a British

soldier, because the latter was stationed for long periods of time in the same place and rarely received the fanfare that his brother did. I give little attention to the world tour of Albert Edward's sons Albert Victor and George (V) during the 1870s and 1880s, because there is little documentation on it, or Albert Edward's tour of Canada in 1860, because it has been skillfully treated in great depth by Canadian scholar Ian Radforth.³⁴

Albert Edward, Prince of Wales. In 1860, Queen Victoria was invited by the Canadian colonies to inaugurate the Victoria Bridge over the St. Lawrence River. Victoria did not want to go but agreed to send her oldest son, Albert Edward, the Prince of Wales. His father the Prince Consort and the Colonial Secretary, the Duke of Newcastle, conceived of the tour as a historic moment in the history of the British Empire. Newcastle traveled with the prince and acted as his handler. Albert Edward spent several months in Canada and the United States. He watched Charles Blondin cross the Niagara Gorge on a tightrope and stayed with the President James Buchanan at the White House. After his father's death in 1861, Albert Edward traveled extensively through the Holy Land. After Albert Edward nearly died of typhoid fever in 1870, the same disease that killed his father, the queen grew increasingly reluctant to part with him. He planned a tour of the Indian subcontinent with colonial officials in 1875, which his mother refused to permit. After receiving a reluctant consent from Victoria, he traveled throughout British India in 1875-76, the costs of which sparked controversy and protest in Britain.

Alfred, Duke of Edinburgh. Queen Victoria's second son, Alfred, was one of the greatest royal travelers in history. In 1860, as his brother inaugurated the great bridge over the St. Lawrence, he tipped the first truck of stone into Table Bay, symbolically

³⁴ Ian Radforth, *Royal Spectacle: The 1860 Visit of the Prince of Wales to Canada and the United States* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2004).

commencing the construction of Cape Town's breakwater. As a royal sailor, he sailed on the ship *Euralyus* to the West Indies and Buenos Aires before arriving at the Cape, and returned to Britain via the coast of western Africa. After 1866, he commanded his own ship, the *Galatea*, on which he spent the next five years touring the world. Between 1867 and 1868, he visited Gibraltar, the Cape Colony, and Australia. In March 1868, he was shot and injured by an Irish Australian man named Henry James O'Farrell, who claimed to be part of an empire-wide Irish conspiracy (see chapter four). He recovered in Britain before setting out again in 1869, visiting New Zealand several times and traveling around the Indian subcontinent in 1869-70. He became commander of the Channel Fleet (1883-1884), the Mediterranean Fleet (1886-1889), and commander-in-chief (1890-93) before he took his place as the Duke of Saxe-Coburg and Gotha in 1893.

George, Duke of Cornwall and York. Prince George's older brother and next in line to the throne, after their father, Albert Victor died of influenza in 1892. His death left Prince George in an unexpected position, as heir presumptive to the British throne. The two had traveled around the world as sailors in the Royal Navy, 1879-1882, visiting Gibraltar, the West Indies, the Falkland Islands, Southern Africa, Australia, and Singapore.³⁵ In 1901, George, as the Duke of Cornwall and York, and his wife Mary went on a world tour of the empire. The duke and Joseph Chamberlain, the Colonial Secretary, spent months in 1900 conspiring to convince the queen to allow the visit. While she eventually conceded and gave her reluctant permission, she died before the tour began in January 1901. George inaugurated the new federal parliament in Australia, toured war-torn South Africa, and paid homage to imperial service to the South African

³⁵*The Cruise of Her Majesty's Ship "Bacchante," 1879-1882.* London: MacMillan, 1886.

War in Canada and New Zealand.

Note on Terminology

I have chosen to consistently use “British” and “Britishness,” rather than “English” or “Englishness,” throughout the work to reflect the general historiographic consensus. Conceptually, Britishness has been understood as more open-ended and less prone to ethnic or racial determinism. Englishness is seen as more ethnically- and racially-inclusive, representative of a “Little Englanderism” that ignores or rejects the role of the Celtic fringe, of Scotland, Wales, and Ireland, in the making of modern Britain and the British Empire as well as the ways that Britishness was appropriated and claimed non-white and non-British people around the world.

I use the term “people of color” to cover a wide array of origins and ancestries, to explain what might be construed as a “negative” category of people who understood themselves or were seen as by “settlers” as “non-white” or “non-European,” including indigenous people (who themselves were often the product of ‘mixing’), Indians, and people who saw themselves as a product of multiple ancestries (e.g. Cape “Coloured”). Even so vaguely defined, these groupings are still unstable and uncontained, so I will attempt, whenever possible, to use more specific terms and to use identifiers, such as status or profession, that are not racial or ethnic in origin.

It is also important to recognize that group identifications were self-fashioned and imposed by different historical actors. They also changed over time. In the Cape Colony, the chattel slaves of the early nineteenth-century colonial culture were the “Cape Malays” of the second half of the nineteenth century, and the “Cape Coloureds” of the twentieth

century. I sometimes use contemporary language, both to reflect historical usage and to challenge the ethnic and racial determinism of twentieth-century ethnography. For instance, I describe Moshoeshe, the paramount chief of modern day Lesotho, as the “Basuto” king to destabilize Sotho as a natural category and to reflect on the role of Moshoeshe in the invention of a “Basuto.” When I use Xhosa or Zulu, I am referring to a language group and not a timeless tribe of Xhosa or Zulu peoples. I also use “South Asian” and “Indian” interchangeably, not to impose a colonial construct on “the colonized” but to identify someone as a subject of British India, which included the modern nations of India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh.

CHAPTER ONE: The Great Queen and Imperial Culture

There are perhaps more statues of Queen Victoria on earth than any other non-religious figure in history. She sits or stands among whizzing automobiles in Auckland, in front of neo-Gothic facades in Mumbai, and near the waterfront that bears her name in Cape Town – in bustling metropolises and provincial towns, near churches, mosques, and temples. She was a ubiquitous symbol of Britain and its empire, made real to people across the world through images, statues, and visits. Her image as a maternal and justice-giving queen was used and appropriated by her subjects in Britain and abroad – politicians, administrators, settlers, and local people – to various ends. Yet, Queen Victoria's participation in crafting and disseminating a vision of imperial culture that centered on her person, more than the institution of the monarchy itself, was surprisingly limited and often very reluctant. While Victoria relished Benjamin Disraeli's efforts to title her as the imagined heir to the Mughal emperors, for instance, she played a limited and sometimes resistant role in the cultivation of her imperial image. Her attitude and that of her family toward empire was deeply ambivalent. How the Victorian royal family understood and participated in the royal tours is the subject of this chapter.

The Victorian royal family was an imperial family. Through the ideological work of colonial officials, Queen Victoria's subjects across the empire imagined her to be a justice-giving imperial mother. In 1876, she was styled the Empress of India by Parliament, an event celebrated by a royal Durbar in Delhi. Her children and children traveled extensively through the empire. Her son Edward was the first Prince of Wales to visit the empire. Her grandson as King George V would become the first reigning

monarch to visit in the empire (see the conclusion). As David Cannadine has argued, the empire lent itself to a monarchy in need of cultural refashioning, and the monarchy in turn gave itself to the empire.³⁶ Place names, monuments, and royal visitors all commemorated this developing solidarity, through which the “imperial monarchy intruded itself into the individual lives and collective consciousness” of its subjects.³⁷

This chapter aims to understand how Victorian royals thought and talked about the empire through the lens of the royal tour. In this context, the work suggests that the Victorian royal family was deeply and profoundly ambivalent about the British Empire. Victoria’s consort, Prince Albert, is the most important exception to this observation, but he died shortly after the first tours. After his demise in 1861 and a decade of mourning, Queen Victoria consistently resisted the royal tours. She unsuccessfully struggled to assert her royal prerogative and to control her image which had been, by that point, almost fully appropriated by officials at home and the empire as well as by her colonial subjects around the world.

As for royal children, they were generally bored by royal rituals and offer us limited reflection on their colonial encounters. Even as they sat in hunting camps in the Punjab or greeted cheering subjects in Cape Town or Auckland, they rarely wrote of the empire in their correspondence home. When they did, it was generally expressed in the language of the tourist, of distance rather than closeness. For them, the empire simply *was*, and this sense of banality and even disinterest shows through in their reactions to the royal tours. The occasional glimmer of imperial consciousness on part of royal children,

³⁶ Cannadine, *Ornamentalism*.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, 103.

the future George V most notably, points to a royal generational difference: that a younger generation of royals came to accept their ceremonial place in imperial culture without the political fight put up by Victoria and Albert. Through this process, the invented tradition of the 1860s and 1870s became the standardized ritual practices of the twentieth century. The novelty and the controversy transformed into a banality.

The Queen/Mother

To suggest the limits of Queen Victoria's imperial consciousness is not to say that she did not care about her empire. As her extant letters demonstrate, she was a prolific writer on imperial affairs, particularly during the decades before Prince Albert's death (1861) when he served as her de facto personal secretary and exerted political influence over his wife and colonial affairs. Over the course of her long reign, Victoria wrote to prime ministers, colonial secretaries, and colonial governors frequently. She loudly voiced her (often unsolicited) approval or disapproval of colonial policies to the government, writing an average of 2,500 words on every day of her adult life.³⁸ She tried to learn "Hindoostani" and corresponded with several South Asian princes.³⁹ She employed a trusted Indian servant named Abdul Karim.⁴⁰ She even adopted a Maori child as her godson after his parents, the Ngapuhi chief Hare Pomare and his wife Hariata,

³⁸ Christopher Hibbert, introduction to *Queen Victoria in her Letters and Journals* (London: John Murray, 1984), 1.

³⁹ See Michael Alexander, *Queen Victoria's Maarajah: Duleep Singh, 1838-93*, 2nd ed. (London: Phoenix, 2001).

⁴⁰ Neil Parsons, *King Khama, Emperor Joe and the Great White Queen: Victorian Britain through African Eyes* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998), 227.

lamented the death of Albert.⁴¹ And, after becoming the Empress of India, she insisted on signing her name as “Victoria RI,” that is *Regina Imperatrix* or Imperial Queen.⁴²

At the same time, her relationship with the empire was often more ambivalent and complicated than these examples suggest. Her imperial interests focused on India, and the vast majority of her letters on foreign affairs are on the subject of Europe. When she wrote to her globetrotting children and grandchildren, she very rarely discussed imperial politics, focusing her attention on family, marriages, and children. And, after the death of her beloved husband Albert, her interest in governance and policy wavered significantly, only to be rekindled during the 1870s by political and public pressure. Even then, she, like the British public, rediscovered the empire during periods of crisis. Despite her outward interest in empire, she was always reluctant to allow her children and grandchildren to take long journeys abroad.⁴³

Unlike Britain’s other Great Queen, Elizabeth I, Victoria did not and could not rule as a man in a woman’s body. This reality was not a result of her gender but because, as several scholars have persuasively argued, she inherited a castrated, feminized monarchy.⁴⁴ Her uncle, William IV, was the last British monarch to dismiss a prime

⁴¹ Alison Drummond, “Queen Victoria Had a Maori Godson,” *Te Ao Hou: The New World*, no. 24 (October 1958): 60-61.

⁴² John MacKenzie, “Introduction,” from *The Victorian Vision: Inventing New Britain*, ed. John MacKenzie (London: V&A Publications, 2001), 19.

⁴³ Royal visits to the empire, with the exception of the Prince of Wales’ visits to Canada and India in 1860 and 1875-76 respectively, are virtually ignored in the historical biographies and the published letters of Queen Victoria and Prince Albert, as well as those of their children and grandchildren.

⁴⁴ David Cannadine, “From Biography to History: Writing the Modern British Monarchy,” *Historical Research* 77 (August 2004): 303. For an interesting take on this issue in the context of women’s history, see Clarissa Campbell Orr, “The Feminization of the Monarchy, 1780-1910: Royal Masculinity and Female Empowerment,” in *The Monarchy and the British Nation*, ed. Andrzej Olechnowicz (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 76-107.

minister (Viscount Melbourne in 1834). In *The English Constitution* (1867), Walter Bagehot unofficially demarcated the limits and rights of the constitutional monarchy inherited by Victoria – to be consulted, to advise, and to warn; he went as far as to suggest that the political transformations of the nineteenth century had allowed a “Republic [to] insinuate[...] itself beneath the folds of the monarchy.”⁴⁵ But, like so much of the British constitution, these were unwritten agreements, forged over centuries of political and cultural negotiation. To Victoria, these were suggestions at best. In one letter to her eldest daughter Victoria, she lamented what a “miserable thing [it was] to be a constitutional Queen.”⁴⁶

The true litmus test of this nineteenth-century constitutional settlement was whether or not politicians could willingly ignore or circumvent Victoria’s imagined prerogative. William Gladstone, about whom the queen expressed the bitterest sentiments, rarely shared what he considered Victoria’s political meddling with his colleagues. Similarly, as we shall see, when Joseph Chamberlain wanted the Duke of York to go on a royal tour during the South African War, he circumvented the queen’s objections by collaborating (or conspiring?) with the duke to convince her. The fact that the queen’s protests and attempted interventions rarely altered plans or policies is telling.

Both Gladstone, the grand old man of nineteenth-century liberalism, and Chamberlain, the former Birmingham radical turned imperialist, embraced and co-opted the monarchy as a national-imperial symbol compatible with their political worldviews, perhaps the clearest evidence of the monarchy’s extremely limited political prerogative

⁴⁵ Walter Bagehot, *The English Constitution* (Project Gutenberg e-text). <http://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/etext03/thngl10.txt> (accessed 10 February 2009).

⁴⁶ Quoted in Christopher Hibbert, 4.

by the fin-de-siècle. What the 1860s and early 1870s proved was that Queen Victoria *could* refuse her public services, but only at grave risk to the monarchy's existence as an institution. The Great Queen became a symbol to be managed and manipulated, a process that Victoria unsuccessfully sought to limit and control.

* * *

Queen Victoria hardly needs another biography. Historians, professional and popular, have written prolifically on her. The historian Walter Arnstein assesses that Victoria has been “the subject of more biographies than any other woman born before 1800” and that she is only outranked over the whole of written history by the Virgin Mary, Joan of Arc, and Jane Austen.⁴⁷ The earliest biographies of the queen were written while she was still alive, and her life story was told in print across the British world during jubilees, royal tours, and other events.⁴⁸ Interest in Victoria's life has remained constant from her death into the twenty-first century. Most of her biographers were upper-crust admirers rather than trained historians, and thus Victoria's life story has been frequently told and retold along the same dusty tracks.⁴⁹

⁴⁷ Walter Arnstein, *Queen Victoria* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 1. This historiographical overview of Queen Victoria's biographies is deeply indebted to Arnstein's introduction.

⁴⁸ See, for instance, *Victoria's Golden Reign: A Record of Sixty Years as a Maid, Mother, and Ruler I* (London: Richard Edward King, 1897).

⁴⁹ There are notable exceptions, of course. Using newly published diaries and letters, Frank Hardie identified a lacuna in the history of the British monarchy, one that survives to this day: a failure to fully grapple with the ways in which Victoria sought to restore some of the monarchy's lost political influence, for the queen-in-Parliament to represent a closer-to-equal relationship (though she certainly was not naïve enough to think that those days would ever return). Frank Hardie, *The Political Influence of the British Monarchy*, 2nd ed. (London: Frank Cass, 1963). The *Letters of Queen Victoria*, edited first by A.C. Benson and Viscount Esher and later by G.E. Buckle, was released in nine volumes between 1908 and 1932.. The social historian Dorothy Thompson's skillful portrait of Victoria, *Queen Victoria: Gender and Power* (1990), focused on the queen as a woman, but in a very different way than the more traditional biographies of Strachey and Longford. Thompson argued that, despite Victoria's rather unprogressive views on the roles of women in society and politics, her rule strengthened the institution of monarchy and quite accidentally forwarded the cause of gender equality. Dorothy Thompson, *Queen Victoria: The Woman, the*

An intellectual sea change came with Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger's 1983 groundbreaking volume *The Invention of Tradition*, in particular David Cannadine's essay "The Context, Performance and Meaning of Ritual: The British Monarchy and the 'Invention of Tradition,' c. 1820-1977."⁵⁰ It has become the standard and the flashpoint for virtually all scholarly discourses about Victoria and her monarchy since its publication. Cannadine's essay also represents an important turning point in historical writing on the British monarchy from biographical modes of storytelling to historical modes of analysis.⁵¹ Even while the focus of professional historians have moved toward social and cultural history and away from identifying historical periods with their monarchs (though doing so remains shorthand), the interest in the monarchy as an "self-perpetuating elite institution" has grown and flourished largely as a result of Cannadine's groundbreaking study.⁵² Thus, while this analysis focuses on the person of Queen Victoria, it is crucial to conceptually frame the historiography of the Victorian monarchy since the 1980s in the context of Cannadine's invention thesis.

Hobsbawm and Ranger's *Invention of Tradition* theorized a novel understanding of historical traditions, namely that they were invented by European ruling elites to legitimize and perpetuate their political, social, and political power. It reflected a broader movement in the historiography of modern European nationalism in understanding the

Monarchy, and the People (New York: Pantheon Books, 1990). The edition published in the U.K. by Virago Press was subtitled *Gender and Power*.

⁵⁰ David Cannadine, "The Context, Performance and Meaning of Ritual: The British Monarchy and the 'Invention of Tradition,' c. 1820-1977," in *The Invention of Tradition*, ed. Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 101-164.

⁵¹ David Cannadine, "From Biography to History: Writing the Modern British Monarchy," *Historical Research* 77 (August 2004): 289-312.

⁵² *Ibid.*, 298.

nation and its ideological superstructure as historical constructions of the recent past rather than as proof of timeless and organic national communities.⁵³ As Hobsbawm explained in his introduction:

We should not be misled by a curious, but understandable paradox: modern nations and all their impedimenta generally claim to be the opposite of novel, namely rooted in the remotest antiquity, and the opposite of constructed, namely human communities so “natural” as to require no definition other than self-assertion. . . . And just because so much of what subjectively makes up the modern “nation” consists of such constructs and is associated with appropriate and, in general, fairly recent symbols or suitably tailored discourse (such as “national history”), the national phenomenon cannot be adequately investigated without careful attention to the “invention of tradition.”⁵⁴

The invented tradition thesis has been frequently and justifiably criticized over the last twenty-five years: for identifying the novelty of nineteenth-century traditions without noting their more organic roots in the past; for denying the agency of non-elites in interpreting and appropriating traditions on their own terms; and for representing national traditions on purely instrumentalist terms without recognizing the varied ideological lenses through which they were interpreted.

Terence Ranger, for one, has responded to these criticisms with the notion of imagination, through which invented traditions could be negotiated and re-invented:

“These multiple imaginations were in tension with each other and in constant contestation

⁵³ See Eugen Weber, *Peasants into Frenchmen: The Modernization of Rural France, 1870-114* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1976); Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983); Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities* (New York: Verso, 1983); Eric Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism Since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Anthony D. Smith, *National Identity* (Reno, Nevada: University of Nevada Press, 1991); Rogers Brubaker, *Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992); Mroslav Hroch, *Social Preconditions of National Revival in Europe* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000)

⁵⁴ Eric Hobsbawm, introduction to *The Invention of Tradition*, ed. Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 14.

to define the meaning of what had been imagined – and imagine it further.”⁵⁵ This study, not surprisingly, is anchored in both Cannadine and his revisionists, including Ranger. These works helped transform how historians talked and thought about nationalism and its symbols. Despite the caveats, the invention of tradition, as developed in a lengthy scholarly conversation over the last three decades, is an undeniably useful concept for understanding the political, social, and cultural transformation of the Victorian monarchy in the developing national-imperial British state of the nineteenth century.

Writing in the early 1980s, when the modern Elizabethan monarchy was experiencing a period of unpopularity stemming from a series of family controversies, Cannadine challenged the timelessness of the British royal ceremonials carried on by Queen Elizabeth II, arguing that they were largely the product of the late nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries. By focusing on ritual (what Bagehot had called the dignified, as opposed to the efficient, powers of the Crown), he understood “theatrical show” to be “central in explaining the emergence of popular monarchy” during the nineteenth century, which “shap[ed] a national identity based on tradition, hierarchy, and peculiarity.”⁵⁶ In this context, the Victorian monarchy’s newfound *raison d’être*, to ceremonially perform as the symbolic core of the British nation, redefined the institution’s purpose during a transformative age of political reform. It adapted to the novel by representing itself as timeless.

⁵⁵ Terence Ranger, “The Invention of Tradition Revisited,” *Legitimacy and the State in Twentieth-Century Africa: Essays in Honour of A.H.M. Kirk-Greene*, ed. Terence Ranger and Olufemi Vaughan (London: Macmillan, 1993), 81.

⁵⁶ David M. Craig, “The Crowned Republic? Monarchy and Anti-Monarchy in Britain, 1760-1901,” *Historical Journal* 46 (March 2003): 170.

Queen Victoria, Cannadine argues, was fundamental to this reinvention of the British monarchy. Victoria's eventual willingness to come out of mourning and embrace her public duties in the 1870s helped transform the monarchy into a "symbol of consensus and continuity to which all might defer."⁵⁷ Within Cannadine's chronological frame, the golden age of royal ceremony began after 1876, when Victoria became Empress of India.⁵⁸ The Golden (1887) and Diamond (1897) Jubilees represented high watermarks in this symbolic (re)invention, during which the monarchy was celebrated in grand style in Britain and across the empire. Across the British world, colonial administrators invented (or imagined) other traditions during imperial Durbars and royal visits.⁵⁹

Thus, the last decades of the nineteenth century were "a time when old ceremonials were staged with an expertise and appeal which had been lacking before, and when new rituals were self-consciously invented to accentuate this development."⁶⁰ Victoria's funeral and Edward VII's coronation, he argues, passed on these traditions to the next generation of the British monarchy. While it is true that royal ritual was not entirely new to the British monarchy – and one need only revisit Elizabeth I's royal progresses to realize this fact – they were underused and largely out of practice by the

⁵⁷ Cannadine, "The Context, Performance and Meaning of Ritual," 133.

⁵⁸ This moment is one of the few references made by most biographers of Victoria to her role as an imperial monarch. Yet, much of this analysis focuses on Disraeli's negotiation of the new royal title, despite its unpopularity among many in Britain, rather than on anything truly imperial.

⁵⁹ See chapter 2 of this dissertation as well as Bernard Cohn, "Cloth, Clothes, and Colonialism: India in the Nineteenth Century," in *Colonialism and Its Forms of Knowledge* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996), 106-162.

⁶⁰ Cannadine, "The Context, Performance and Meaning of Ritual," 108.

time the young Victoria came to the throne in 1837.⁶¹ If Victorian ceremonials had roots in the past, they were used in a new context and for new reasons. The royal tours were made possible by the steamship and the railway, on which young royals could travel in safety and comfort, and their images and narratives transmitted over telegraph wires and a burgeoning popular press in Britain and the colonies.

Cannadine's conceptualization of royal rituals as invented traditions has been challenged on other grounds, both political and scholarly. The pitched intellectual battle over the work of Cannadine and his students has often turned polemical, with Cannadine labeled a "Tom Paine" and a "republican" (though he claims moderate political leanings).⁶² As feelings about the monarchy have fundamentally defined left and right since the French Revolution, if not earlier, it is not surprising that the debate over the Victorian monarchy has developed an overtly political dimension. Despite the polemics, the scholarly debate that has ensued has added a new depth and richness to the historiography of the British monarchy.

William Kuhn, in his monograph *Democratic Royalism: The Transformation of the British Monarchy, 1861-1914* (1996), challenged Cannadine's interpretation of the royal past from the stance of a strident anti-Marxist.⁶³ Kuhn argued that royal ceremonies were essentially religious acts, with many British subjects feeling a deeply

⁶¹ See Natalie Mears, *Queen and Political Discourse in the Elizabethan Realms* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005); Anna Keay, *The Magnificent Monarchy: Charles II and the Ceremonies of Power* (New York: Continuum, 2008); Robert Bucholz, *The Augustan Court: Queen Anne and the Decline of Court Culture* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1993).

⁶² For more detailed analyses of these debates, see John Cannon, "The Survival of the British Monarchy," *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society* 5 (1986): 143-64 and *The Modern British Monarchy: A Study in Adaptation* (Reading: University of Reading Press, 1987).

⁶³ William Kuhn, *Democratic Royalism: The Transformation of the British Monarchy, 1861-1914* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996), 4-5.

emotional and organic connection with their monarch.⁶⁴ He skillfully identified an exaggerated degree of artificiality inherent to Hobsbawm/Cannadine concept of invented traditions, downplaying nineteenth-century traditions roots in the past and overplaying the ability of European ruling elites to hoodwink the powerless.

While Kuhn was right to challenge the instrumentalism of Cannadine's vision, he also ignores that royal ceremonies, despite their appeals to divine right, have always been fundamentally political in their motivations from the earliest days of the English/British monarchy. While appealing to the sincere reactions of many of the monarchy's subjects, he also dismisses public criticism of the monarchy, most notably during Queen Victoria's long absence from public life, as insignificant. Furthermore, in arguing that Queen Victoria willingly acquiesced to the demands of a more democratic political order, Kuhn ignores how profoundly obstructionist the queen really was. Queen Victoria had condemned democracy, swearing that she would not allow it on her watch. She also famously criticized the women's rights movement (without which there would be no true democracy in Britain) as a "mad, wicked folly." Queen Victoria sought to limit the further advance of constitutional monarchy and to restore the monarchy to its glory days of power and influence, or at least to maintain the status quo. In the end, she might have given in to democracy, but certainly never embraced it.

The most recent work by David Cannadine brings this historiographical analysis full-circle. Cannadine's 2001 book *Ornamentalism: How the British Saw Their Empire* built on the intellectual foundations of his *Invention of Tradition* essay while re-situating

⁶⁴ Ibid., 6-10.

his argument to reflect the recent “imperial turn” in the British studies.⁶⁵ While *Ornamentalism* will be more fully unpacked for its limits and usefulness later in this study, it is important to note the importance of Cannadine’s recent work in framing the Victorian monarchy’s reinvention of itself in terms of the empire. Most work on Victoria, including Cannadine’s earlier work, largely ignored this dimension of the monarchy’s resonance. At best, most of the works described above mention the 1876 Royal Titles Act or political correspondence over imperial affairs.

Cannadine’s conceptual frame in *Ornamentalism* represents the limits of the biographical and historical literature on Queen Victoria and the Victorian monarchy, namely the conceptual space between Queen Victoria as a symbol and Queen Victoria the historical figure. As it turns out, Queen Victoria had very little control over the way her image was used and interpreted. On one hand, this fact reflects the complex ways in which her image was used and appropriated by her subjects at home and in the empire. On the other hand, it demonstrates the way governing elites in Britain and the empire consciously used her image and the institution of monarchy to legitimize their own power and to forward their own agendas. Victoria struggled to restore the efficient powers of the monarchy and to control the use of her image. That she generally failed on both fronts is a core argument of this chapter.

* * *

To restate this argument: Queen Victoria’s interest in the empire was extremely limited. Her ubiquity across the British world as a symbol of Britain and “her” imperial dominions largely reflected an effort by government and colonial officials to use her

⁶⁵ David Cannadine, *Ornamentalism: How the British Saw Their Empire* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001).

image to their own ends, rather than any ideological work on her part. Victoria could certainly be described as an *imperialist*, if of the banal variety. She was fascinated by India, but mostly out of nostalgia for Albert, who himself demonstrated a keen interest in the subcontinent. While she did write prolifically on imperial affairs, particularly during crises, she was far more interested in European politics. Moreover, her interest in empire might be seen as an extension of her national concerns, in relation to other European powers, more than (or rather than?) peculiarly imperial ones.

Colonial propaganda presented her as the maternal and justice-giving Great Queen, an idea many dispossessed peoples clung to well into the twentieth century. She did, at times, exhibit a strong interest in colonial peoples. Walter Arnstein argues that she demonstrated a brand of Victorian multiculturalism, seeing “herself far less as the head of a homogenous nation-state than as the head of a multi-ethnic and multi-religious Empire” and “insist[ing] time and again that other traditions and religions and even rulers in the Empire deserved respect.”⁶⁶ At the same time, she believed that the British Empire was a good thing and that the spread of British rule (rather than German, French, or Russian) would push civilization forward. As the Great Queen, she had little power to live up to the legend of the Great (White) Queen, even if she did choose to spend her political capital on defending her subjects. That said, she rarely did.

Queen Victoria never visited her empire, with the exception of Ireland in 1849 and 1900.⁶⁷ She did travel around the British Isles and to the Continent extensively. One

⁶⁶ Arnstein, 202.

⁶⁷ James Murphy has written a very skillful study of the British monarchy and Irish society, particularly Victoria’s royal tour of 1900, the insights of which will be revisited in the later chapter on imperial rule. See James Murphy, *Abject Loyalty: Nationalism and the Monarchy in Ireland during the Reign of Queen Victoria* (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2001). For more on Victoria’s travels see David Duff, ed., *Victoria Travels: Journeys of Queen Victoria between 1830 and*

useful way to truly understand how Victoria felt about her colonial subjects is to examine what happened when the empire came to visit her. Like her children and grandchildren touring the empire, these colonial encounters in the imperial metropole infrequently registered in her letter and diaries. When they did, she often described them in the language of the tourist, namely in the curiosity of cultural difference.

During these encounters, she was regularly used to convey and legitimize decisions made by the government regarding imperial affairs. When the Bechuana chiefs Khama, Sebele, and Bathoen came to Britain in 1895 to appeal for imperial justice against the land-hungry Cecil Rhodes, Queen Victoria met with them at Windsor Castle. She addressed the chiefs, her words presumably approved in advance by Joseph Chamberlain, telling them that she was “glad to see [them], and to know that they love[d her] rule” and confirming their settlement with Chamberlain, that reaffirmed imperial protection in their dispute with Rhodes.⁶⁸ Like her children, Victoria was used as an imperial symbol, even if she herself had a more ambivalent and limited relationship with her colonial subjects.

The Prince Consort

Prince Albert (1819-1861), the architect of the first royal tours, was the second son of the Ernest, the prince of Saxe-Coburg Gotha in east central Germany, today part of Bavaria and Thuringia. He met his cousin Princess Victoria in 1836, the year before she

1900, with extracts from her journal (New York: Taplinger, 1971). A very curious, if interesting, volume about Victoria’s imaginary visit to Jamaica was published in the 1980s by Doubleday, recently republished by Random House in 2002: Jonathan Routh, *The Secret Life of Queen Victoria: Her Majesty’s Missing Dairies* (Garden City, NJ: Doubleday, 1980)

⁶⁸ Parsons, 227-228.

became queen. As the second son of a duke, Albert had limited career options, and wooing Victoria would be akin to striking matrimonial gold. Victoria gave an early indication of interest in Albert, only to pull back from the discussion of marriage altogether. The infamous series of controversies during Victoria's early reign – the Lady Flora Hastings Affair, the Bedchamber Crisis, and her all-too-close relationship with Viscount Melbourne – forced her to reconsider. Albert was calculated to be a safe choice by Victoria's advisors, for he was “handsome and merry, and—given his penniless and youthful state—malleable.”⁶⁹ After a second encounter with Albert, Victoria quickly fell quite madly in love with Albert and proposed.

The political establishment in Britain was little interested in offering Albert much of a welcome. As a German, his background and motives were questioned and debated. He was refused a peerage and was granted an annual allowance dismally small by historical standards. Even his naturalization was debated in Parliament. These questions mostly went away once he demonstrated his political prowess, though critics always remained apt to blame Albert's failures on his “Germanism.”

Within six months of his marriage to Victoria, his wife was pregnant. By the terms of the 1840 Regency Act, Albert would become regent if Victoria became unable to rule before the majority of her eldest child. While he was not officially titled Prince Consort by Parliament until 1857, Albert increasingly took over the public duties of the monarchy over the course of Victoria's nine pregnancies and acted as her private

⁶⁹ Stanley Weintraub, “Albert [Prince Albert of Saxe-Coburg and Gotha] (1819–1861),” *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, Oxford University Press, Sept 2004; online edn, Jan 2008 [http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/274, accessed 17 Feb 2009]. Weintraub also wrote a full-length biography of Albert. See Stanley Weintraub, *Uncrowned King: The Life of Prince Albert* (New York: Press Press, 1997).

secretary. He proved himself to the British political establishment as a thoughtful and efficient political operator. He paid visits to politicians, was always present when Victoria met with her ministers, and drafted most of her letters. He quickly established himself as a patron of culture and the sciences and worked endlessly on his various projects, the most famous of which was the Great Exhibition of 1851. He was hardworking, tireless, and ruthlessly efficient.

This is not to say that Albert dominated his wife or sought to usurp the throne (despite claims by contemporary observers and historians to the contrary). In private, he and Victoria argued frequently, and these violent and passionate quarrels become the stuff of legend amongst the royal staff. Queen Victoria was no push-over. She knew, and reminded Albert, who was the reigning monarch. She also adored Albert and valued his opinion. In the historical record, it is often extremely difficult to tell where Victoria ends and Albert begins. His influence as Victoria's closest advisor and personal secretary over this period (1840-61) is undeniable. It was also comparatively short.

Albert was, as Cannadine put it, "fascinated by statecraft" and "was determined to play a full part in the political life of his adopted country."⁷⁰ He was the cultural engineer of the Victorian monarchy and, in the context of this work, of an imperial culture centered on the monarchy. Albert sought to salvage as much royal prerogative from constitutional settlements of nineteenth century as possible and was the first architect of the British imperial monarchy. In this context, the monarchy's loss of political and cultural ground in the aftermath of Albert's death was not a reflection of some inherent weakness on Victoria's part. It stemmed from to her long disengagement with British

⁷⁰ David Cannadine, *History in Our Time* (New York: Penguin Books, 2000), 42.

society during which other discourses of power filled the void. In a sense, Victoria's withdrawal from public life quietly did the work of a minor political revolution. It impelled the very changes that Albert had sought avoid.

* * *

Albert was the prime mover in the first royal tours of 1860. It was Albert who had encouraged the Duke of Newcastle to accept the invitation from Canada and for his wife to embrace George Grey's proposal for a South African visit. It was Albert who worked through the arrangements and negotiations for the visits and imagined the ideological work that they would achieve.⁷¹ He wrote to his close friend Baron Stockmar: "What a cheering picture is here of the progress and expansion of the British race, and of the useful co-operation of the Royal Family in the civilisation which England has developed and advanced!"⁷² In a toast given at the Trinity House in June 1860, Albert remarked:

It will be a curious coincidence, that at the same time – a few weeks hence – though almost at the opposite poles, the Prince of Wales will inaugurate, in the Queen's name, that stupendous work, the great bridge over the St. Lawrence in Canada, while Prince Alfred will lay the foundation stone of the breakwater for the harbor of Cape Town. What vast considerations, as regards our country, are brought to our minds in this simple fact! What present greatness! What past history! What future hopes! And how important and beneficent is the part given to the Royal Family of England to act in the development of those distant and rising countries, who recognize in the British Crown, and their allegiance to it, their supreme bond of union with the mother country and each other!⁷³

⁷¹ Albert's extraordinary attention to detail can be witnessed in his lengthy letter to the Duke of Newcastle detailing arrangements for the Prince of Wales' tour of Canada. This is the only letter I located in all of my research signed by Albert's hand. Albert to the Duke of Newcastle, July 8, 1860, Ne C 12771/1.

⁷² Theodore Martin, *The Life of His Royal Highness the Prince Consort*, vol. 5 (London: Smith and Elder, & Co., 1875), 83.

⁷³ "A Toast Given at the Dinner of the Trinity House, June 23, 1860," *The Principal Speeches and Addresses of His Royal Highness the Prince Consort* (London: John Murray, 1862), 243-44.

Long before Disraeli's Crystal Palace Speech (1872) or the Royal Titles Act of 1876, Albert conceived of a new place for the monarchy in British society, namely a British imperial culture that was culturally anchored in the monarchy and monarchism. His careful planning of both of his sons' tours indicates the importance of the visits to him. His public excitement and the laborious private negotiations over the royal tours reflect a concerted effort to reshape the monarchy and to create a new kind of imperial culture.

While Albert was the key historical actor in this process of invention, he is also a most difficult historical figure to locate.⁷⁴ The bereaved Queen Victoria destroyed many of his papers as she would later destroy many of her own.⁷⁵ What remains of them is possessed by the Royal Archives, a depository personally funded and owned by the queen and therefore not subject to any public-information legislation. With no public index and many papers considered private, there is no way to know what one has not seen. I saw virtually no materials at Windsor written by Albert's hand. This is, of course, a disappointing historical roadblock.

Fortunately, there are some scholarly detours around this problem. In 1866, the queen commissioned Theodore Martin to write an official multi-volume biography of Albert, *The Life of His Royal Highness the Prince Consort*.⁷⁶ Despite Victoria's editorial

⁷⁴ While Ian Radforth never explicates having a similar problem in research his work on the Prince of Wales' visit to Canada, one must suspect that he did from his limited discussion of Albert. Ian Radforth, *Royal Spectacle: The 1860 Visit of the Prince of Wales to Canada and the United States* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2004), 17-27.

⁷⁵ Hibbert, 5.

⁷⁶ Theodore Martin, *The Life of His Royal Highness the Prince Consort*, 5 vol. (London: Smith and Elder, & Co., 1875). Roger Fulford, the other major biographer of Albert, gives no mention to the royal tours of 1860. See Roger Fulford, *The Prince Consort* (London: Macmillan, 1949).

control over the work, which itself is based on the letters, diaries, and speeches that she provided, it is a more even-handed biography than one might expect. Martin, however, never searches for the ideological content of Albert's work on the 1860 tours, other than to say that Albert had "taken the greatest pains to organise them both so as to ensure their being carried out successfully."⁷⁷ His work reflects the interest shared by most other historians of the royal tour, in the ceremonies and reaction to colonial visits rather than the long processes of negotiation that were required to make them happen.

Finding Albert in the extant archival records is possible by other means. One way has been to trace Albert's letters out into the world. In this context, the papers of the Duke of Newcastle, the Colonial Secretary in 1860, have been of some use.⁷⁸ The most useful strategy has been to consider Albert's influence over Victoria in the formal channels of communication between the monarchy and tour planners in the metropolitan government and the empire. While Albert may have been the "uncrowned king" of the United Kingdom, Victoria was the reigning monarch and the official author of most correspondence on the subject of the royal visits. The origins of Victoria's changing attitude about royal visits after 1861, then, reflects both the deep psychological and emotional effect of Albert's death as well as the end of his influence on royal policy.

⁷⁷ Martin, 194.

⁷⁸ Of course, following Albert's paper trail to the empire would be of similar use. For financial reasons, the research of this dissertation has been geographically limited to the United Kingdom. Should money become available at a later date, this work would be among the first to be taken up.

Royal Children

The Victorian monarchy, like that of Victoria's great grandfather George III and unlike those of her uncles George IV and William IV, nurtured an image of itself as a respectable and, arguably, bourgeois family.⁷⁹ During the era of the French wars, as Linda Colley has famously argued, this social transformation of the British monarchy – partly self-imposed, partly the result of generational assimilation of German princes into a British institution – had helped protect British royals from the cultural dismemberment and not-so-metaphoric decapitation experienced by their cousins on the Continent. It is one way that the monarchy, as an institutional bastion of traditionalism and elitism, survived into a “modern” age.

In this context, Victoria and Albert raised their children to be useful, both to their family and to the nation. There was nothing particularly imperial about their or their children's upbringing, with exception of the heirs to the throne. Victoria and Albert considered the royal tradition of military service most important. In an age before proconsular apprenticeship, service in Her Majesty's armed services was the primary route through which royal sons could earn their spurs and see the world.⁸⁰ Their children

⁷⁹ On this, see Linda Colley, *Britons: Forging the Nation, 1707-1837* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992), 195-236. Also see *The Victorian Vision: Inventing New Britain*, ed. John MacKenzie (London: V&A Publications, 2001).

⁸⁰ In 1863, John O'Shanassy, the Premier of Victoria, suggested the Prince Alfred might become king of Australia. Cindy McCreery, “A British Prince and a Transnational Life: Alfred, Duke of Edinburgh's Visit to Australia, 1867-8,” in *Transnational Ties: Australian Lives in the World*, ed. Desley Deacon, Penny Russell and Angela Woollacott (Canberra, Australia: Australian National University E-press, 2008), 59. Also see *A Proposal for the Confederation of the Australian Colonies, with Prince Alfred, Duke of Edinburgh, as King of Australia. By a Colonist*. (Sydney, Australia: J.J. Moore, 1867). During the negotiations over the Royal Titles Act in 1876, Disraeli suggested that Victoria's two sons might be titled the Duke of Canada and the Duke of Australia. Extract from the Queen's Journal, February 26, 1876, *The Letters of Queen Victoria*, Second Series, vol. II, 448. Arthur, duke of Connaught, would later serve as Governor-General of Canada under his nephew George V. Also see David Cannadine, *History in Our Time* (New York: Penguin Books, 2000), 39-40.

Alfred (navy) and Arthur (army) served as did their grandchildren Albert Victor and George (both in the navy).

While the Great Queen and Empress of India had never traveled outside of the British Isles or the Continent, her children and grandchildren traveled the world as servicemen and royal ambassadors. Their encounters with the Great Queen's subjects across the globe importantly shaped how the monarchy was received and understood in the empire. Yet, these travels were not solely, or even primarily, imperial in nature. Outside of the empire, royal children spent time in Europe, the Middle East, East Asia, and the United States. Moreover, after Albert died in 1861, Queen Victoria grew extremely, even hostilely, reluctant to send her children, particularly those closest to the line of succession, out into the world without good reason (e.g. military service). Even then, her well-traveled children and grandchildren did not express a vibrant interest in the world or Britain's empire.

Victoria and Albert were extremely strict with their children and had very specific ideas about how their children should behave and represent the monarchy whilst abroad. As we shall see, governments and colonial administrators were deeply concerned with the dynamics of royal rituals in relation to the legitimacy of imperial hierarchy. Who would represent the sovereign and how she was represented were crucial questions for both the monarchy and for governing elites who ran the empire. In this context, their interests converged; thus, ritual standards were one discursive site where the monarchy could negotiate. It was the site of contestation through which the attitudes of Queen Victoria, her children, and grandchildren can be examined. It was also through these negotiations,

over the course of forty years, that the rules and precedents of the royal tour became the standard practices in the twentieth century.

Through public patronage, national service, and royal ritual, Albert the Prince Consort sought to connect the monarchy to notions of progress and improvement. He spent his years as a British royal nurturing an image of the monarchy as a patron of the arts and sciences, most famously in organizing the Great Exhibition of 1857. To Albert, the monarchy needed to excise the demons of excess and decadence associated with the previous two reigns and make a new image for itself of a respectable and moral royal family, one that echoed the reign of George III. In this vein, he demanded that his children be useful – to commit to a difficult regiment of learning and improvement and to serve their nation in Her Majesty’s military forces.

For this reason, royal visits could not, he decided, invoke images of the royal progress of past times (with some exception for India). Royal children were to visit the empire as respectable and upstanding subjects, who dressed in respectable and simple clothing of modern royals, rather than the effete regalia of monarchy’s past. India was different, because colonial administrators identified the need to appeal to an “Oriental mind” that yearned for medieval spectacle. But, most of this was left for imperial Durbars, where the viceroy rather than royal children represented the queen in an official capacity.

Royal children were to appear in the empire as first subjects of the queen rather than as her representatives. For this reason, the queen and the Viceroy of India, Lord Northbrook, agreed that there could be no Durbar when the Prince of Wales visited India

in 1875.⁸¹ When her sons and grandsons traveled as royal sailors, they were expected to perform their duties, much to the surprise of the queen's colonial subjects. Propriety demanded that only the governor of a colony, the queen's official proxy, could represent her, and this fact had to be reflected in imperial ceremonies. On certain occasions, tour planners made certain that the governor and the royal visitor were not seen together, so as to avoid any confusion in the minds of colonial peoples.⁸²

While the letter of imperial rule dictated that royal children could not represent the queen, this conceptual distinction was not easily maintained on the ground. When royal children arrived, they immediately became the center of attention. Sometimes, exceptions were granted for Princes of Wales, to pass out medals or honors, but never without a debate about the precedents and consequences of doing so. In 1875, the queen opposed the idea of the Prince of Wales rather than Lord Northbrook distributing the Star of India.⁸³ During the investiture ceremony, as things turned out, Edward and Northbrook sat together, and Edward awarded the Star of India to the guests of honor under "special warrant from the Queen."⁸⁴

⁸¹ Lord Northbrook to Lord Salisbury, April 29, 1875, Prince of Wales in India, 1875-6, vol. 1, 1875, RA VIC/MAIN/Z/468/10.

⁸² Queen Victoria to Lord Salisbury, May 27, 1875, Prince of Wales in India, 1875-6, vol. 1, 1875, RA VIC/MAIN/Z/468/11. This problem was deemed of particular importance in India, particular because a Raj ruled by the Crown rather than a trading company was a rather new idea in the 1870s. This issue was also discussed in the preparations for Alfred's visit of 1875. Lord Northcote to Baron Lawrence, August 1, 1868, Papers of Sir John Lawrence, BL MSS Eur F90/29 no. 40.

⁸³ Lord Salisbury to Queen Victoria, Prince of Wales in India, 1875-6, vol. 1, 1875, RA VIC/MAIN/Z/468/CFP/24. Salisbury appealed to the precedent of the 1860 Canadian tour, which he saw as allowing a temporary suspension of this policy on grounds that "there is some real danger that if the Queen's own son is put in a position of obvious inferiority, the true relation of the Viceroy to the Queen will be misunderstood or ignored."

⁸⁴ J. Fayer, *Notes on the Visits to India of Their Royal Highnesses the Prince of Wales and Duke of Edinburgh, 1870-1875-76* (London: Kerby & Endean, 1879), 75.

This standard also made sense in the context of the royal tours as an educational experience. When the Prince of Wales' returned from Canada in 1860, under the "delusion that the tumultuous welcome [he experienced] was for [him]," Albert forcefully reminded him that "it was nothing of the kind. It was simply an expression of loyalty to the Queen."⁸⁵ For royal sons serving in the military, the tours were as much about discipline and service as seeing the world. For the heirs to the throne, they were meant to give them public responsibilities and to see the empire over which they would one day rule. As didactic tools, they were imagined as grand tours of empire, not leisurely tourist expeditions.

For this reason, Victoria and Albert took a particular interest in carefully selecting fellow travelers for their children and grandchildren. The Prince of Wales went to Canada, as Ian Radforth describes, with a group of middle-aged men and was prohibited from interacting with the younger midshipmen aboard the H.M.S. *Hero*.⁸⁶ Albert made sure that General Robert Bruce, the Prince of Wales' governor, was always "under the same roof" with Edward while in North America so as to avoid any moral wandering on the prince's part.⁸⁷ There was a long conversation between the monarchy and Indian administrators over Alfred's traveling companion for his 1870 visit to India. The queen thought that the young prince was "rather easily led away" and thus in need of a "steady,

⁸⁵ Quoted in Richard Hough *Victoria and Albert*, 157.

⁸⁶ Ian Radforth, *Royal Spectacle: The 1860 Visit of the Prince of Wales to Canada and the United States* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2004), 44.

⁸⁷ Albert to the Duke of Newcastle, July 8, 1860, Papers of the Duke of Newcastle, University of Nottingham, Ne C 12771/1.

firm” traveling companion who would exercise a good influence.”⁸⁸ For the queen, this was one of the few prerogatives that she could dictate during later tours.

Alfred

Victoria’s second son Alfred is perhaps best known in European history for almost becoming the Greek king. He was selected in a Greek plebiscite to fill the throne left vacant by the deposition of King Otho. The prospect of accepting this “election” was interpreted by the British government to be a violation of the 1830 London Protocol, designed to limit the influence of any individual “protecting power” on an independent Greek state.⁸⁹ He married the daughter of Tsar Alexander II and later became the hereditary duke of Saxe-Coburg Gotha. He lived a somewhat uninspiring life as a German duke and died an early death.

Yet, Alfred’s teens and twenties, when he toured the world as a royal sailor, are the far more interesting and, arguably, historically significant episodes in his life. He was the one of the greatest, if not the greatest, royal traveler in history. In terms of distance traveled and places seen, he ranks with the greatest of Victorian adventurers. In August 1870, Lieutenant-Colonel Arthur Balfour Haig, Alfred’s Equerry, estimated that, since

⁸⁸ Lord Northcote to Baron Lawrence, August 1, 1868, Papers of Sir John Lawrence, BL MSS Eur F90/29 no. 40.

⁸⁹ Alfred has received surprisingly (or perhaps not surprisingly) little attention from scholars. The only book-length biography of Alfred is Jon Van der Kiste and B. Jordaan, *Dearest Affie : Alfred, Duke of Edinburgh, Queen Victoria's Second Son, 1844-1900* (Gloucester: A. Sutton, 1984). Van der Kiste updated his biography in short-form for *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography* “Alfred, Prince, duke of Edinburgh (1844–1900),” *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, Oxford University Press, Sept 2004; online edn, Jan 2009 [<http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/346>, accessed 16 Feb 2009]. Cindy McCreery, who was of assistance in the competition of this work, has published several more recent works on Alfred. See Cindy McCreery, “A British Prince and a Transnational Life”; “‘Long may he float on the ocean of life’: the first royal visit to Tasmania, 1868,” *Tasmanian Historical Studies* no. 12 (2007): 19-42. In addition to these sources, I have relied heavily on works on Victoria and Albert, which generally focus on their marriage and their relationships with their children.

leaving Wellington sixteen months prior, the prince's ship had traveled more than 31,000 nautical miles, or one and one-half times the circumference of the world.⁹⁰ This astounding figure represents a mere segment of Alfred's life at sea. He traveled to Australia, New Zealand, South America, South Africa, China, India, Japan, and many other places in his twenty-year-long naval career. Alfred was probably seen in the flesh by more people in the colonial empire than anyone in the history of the British royal family, including Elizabeth II

By 1860 when he set sail for South Africa, Alfred had become the great hope of Victoria and Albert. He was not the most intellectually gifted boy, Victoria frequently observed, but he demonstrated a curiosity and common sense that his older brother the *bon vivant* rarely did. Having passed his naval exams by age 14, Alfred was sent off to sea by his father and spent the next decade of his life traveling the world. Queen Victoria, less guarded in her letters to daughter Vicky, abandoned her usual reverence for Albert in expressing her anger over Alfred's departure:

I have been shamefully deceived about Affie... It was promised to me that the last year before he went away to sea, he should be with us, instead of which he was taken away... Papa is most cruel upon the subject. I assure you, it is much better to have no children than to have them only to give up!⁹¹

By the early 1870s, Alfred had somewhat inexplicably lost favor with his mother, who had grown closer to her eldest son in the decade since Albert's death. This reversal of fortunes is even more surprising, given that, during a 1868 visit to New South Wales, Alfred was nearly killed by a would-be assassin's bullet in what was imagined to be an

⁹⁰A.B. Haig to General Ponsonby, August 27, 1870, RA VIC/MAIN/S/27/54.

⁹¹ Quoted in Richard Hough, *Victoria and Albert*, 162.

empire-wide Fenian conspiracy. Victoria came to despise and pity Alfred as extremely unlikable and self-absorbed.⁹²

* * *

As for Alfred himself, the personality of the young man who had visited southern Africa in 1860, demonstrating a keen interest in whatever Governor George Grey had to show him, was quickly transformed by life in the navy. He became far more interested in the hyper-masculine culture of the sea and far less interested in the cultures of the empire. He shared his father's love of hunting and often begrudgingly completed his duties as a royal visitor so that he might be rewarded with a hunt. He even tried to divert the itinerary of his 1869 tour in order to stop in Natal for a hunting expedition.⁹³ Of course, these interests were important components of a British imperial culture, but they represented a subconscious, banal imperialism rather than an explicit, ideological one.⁹⁴

When Sir George Grey, the Governor of the Cape Colony, invited Alfred to South Africa, his parents saw an opportunity. They imagined his naval apprenticeship and his royal visit would combine "his professional studies as an Officer in H.M. Fleet" with the "acquirement of such knowledge of Foreign Countries as he may have opportunities of obtaining."⁹⁵ His first voyage out, in 1860, took him to South Africa, with stops at South

⁹² Writing to her daughter Victoria after the attempt on Alfred's life, Victoria wrote: "I am not as proud of Affie as you might think, for he is so conceited himself and at the present moment receives ovations as if he had done something." Queen Victoria to Princess Victoria, July 8, 1868, *Queen Victoria in Her Letters and Journals*, 205.

⁹³ Alfred to Queen Victoria, December 28, 1869, RA VIC/ADDA20/1303.

⁹⁴ Several scholars of empire have argued that hunting was a function of colonialism. It reflects an imperial consciousness much different than the one being examined here, however. Most importantly, see John MacKenzie, *The Empire of Nature: Hunting, Conservation and British Imperialism* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1997).

⁹⁵ John Russell to W.D. Christie, April 30, 1860, RA VIC/ADDA20/49.

American ports on the trip out and on the West African coast on the journey back. His governor Major Cowell was given full discretionary powers over him, and Alfred was expected to be treated as a normal sailor in the Royal Navy except in instances approved in advance.⁹⁶

The message was relayed in letter after letter to local officials and to the officers of his ship, HMS *Euralyus*. Some exception was intended for the Cape Colony, where Alfred was planned to inaugurate the construction of a new Table Bay breakwater.⁹⁷

While these rules were rarely, if ever, followed, on land, they were followed at sea:

Alfred was seen on duty at the gangway when the ship arrived in Table Bay, and the sight of him swabbing the deck apparently impressed the Xhosa chief Sandile far more than any imperial spectacle. While this performance of work ethic was meant to shape both Alfred and his audience, to nurture a particular image of the monarchy, it also represented the childrearing philosophy of Victoria and Albert who sought to nurture the merit of service in their children and grandchildren.

Victoria and Albert intended for the *Euralyus* to be a royal classroom, where their son could learn discipline and see the world, while avoiding the various digressions of his older brother. For his parents, the trip had clear didactic purposes, with welcomed political side effects for the empire. Toward the end of the 1860 tour, reported to Albert that the desired results were “purchased... very cheaply” and that Alfred had reflected on and understood the state of affairs in southern Africa.⁹⁸ While Albert Edward’s grand tour

⁹⁶ Status in this sense would be revisited again and again during the royal tours, as we shall see.

⁹⁷ Gardner D. Engleheart to the Governors of the Cape, St. Helena, Sierra Leone, May 5, 1860 RA VIC/ADDA20/62.

⁹⁸ Major John Cowell to Albert, August 29, 1860 and September 5, 1860, RA VIC/ADDA20/69.

of Canada was more clearly planned and acted out as an imperial event, Alfred's tour of southern Africa was designed by Victoria and Albert with a much simpler set of goals.

Between 1860 and the early 1870s, Alfred transformed from an active and intellectually curious young prince into an adult far more settled in his ways, the bore that his mother frequently described. He toured South Africa in 1860; traveled the world, visiting South Africa, Australia, New Zealand, and India, between 1867 and 1870; and commanded a ship in the Mediterranean fleet during the 1870s. Despite his early curiosity, Alfred's worldview on empire and the royal tour can be detected from his earliest tour and retained a significant degree of consistency over time.

Alfred wrote frequently to his mother, and these letters offer valuable insights into his understandings of his travels. Details about colonial cultures or his experiences were rarely reported back to Victoria by Alfred, but were usually conveyed by his co-travelers and through newspapers sent back by colonial officials. Victoria and Alfred most frequently discussed family and European politics. Home life, impending marriages, and Continental affairs rather than the empire dominated these conversations. As his letters illustrate, Alfred himself rarely demonstrated an interest in colonial subjects and instead found the meaning of the royal tours in the masculine culture of the navy and in his favorite pastime, hunting.

Growing up in the navy, Alfred's life was shaped by its culture. The homosocial space of a Royal Navy ship cultivated a brand of masculine camaraderie and friendship that Alfred cherished, to such a degree that he later had trouble socializing back on land in Europe. Despite the highly regimented nature of the navy, life aboard ship for Alfred was one of playful, and sometimes violent, horseplay and a fair dose of taunting and

vexation. Once, when he arrived at Malta, his fellow midshipmen aboard the *Euralyus* “bumped him on the deck” with each shot of the royal salute.⁹⁹ This playfulness was somewhat of a departure from his strict upbringing by his parents.

Feelings of camaraderie eased the strict regime and social separation of a navy life. Lieutenant-Colonel Haig reported to Queen Victoria the profound isolation of life at sea and the importance of human connections. One night per week, part of the main deck was transformed into a stage, lit by a row of lanterns.¹⁰⁰ With an “orchestra” of a piano and a fiddle, the sailors performed songs, readings, and recitations to entertain their audience, who, “determined to be amused, . . . sit there, and laugh, and cheer to their hearts’ content.”¹⁰¹ The ship even had its own band of Minstrels, who would perform “Negro melodies” in blackface.¹⁰² On other nights, Alfred might be found playing the violin while other men sat or laid about reading or doing crochet.¹⁰³ Alfred grew very comfortable and content with this life and these relationships.

When he was nearly killed by an assassin’s bullet in 1868, he received an outpouring of outrage and concern from Australians and colonial subjects from across the empire. The Royal Archives and National Archives contain an impressive array of these letters, odes, and declarations to Alfred, which demonstrate the sincere concern felt by colonial subjects for the young prince. Recovering in Australia, Alfred wrote to his mother about the aftermath of the attempt on his life, expressing how deeply touched he

⁹⁹ Richard Hough, *Victoria and Albert*, 163.

¹⁰⁰ Arthur Balfour Haig to Queen Victoria, August 27, 1870, RA VIC/MAIN/S/27/54.

¹⁰¹ Ibid.

¹⁰² Ibid.

¹⁰³ Ibid.

was by the outpouring of loyalty and concern, not from her colonial subjects but from his crewmates:

I shall never forget... the manner in which I was spontaneously cheered by the whole squadron especially by my own ship's company & the manner they received me on board. I was very much overcome by it & had to go to my cabin and remain there.... I think it was the proudest moment of my life, to find that the nearly 600 men I command really loved me.¹⁰⁴

Of course, he did convey his thanks to his mother's subjects, but this deeply emotional response had little to do with what happened on land. The relationships he had developed on board his ship were far more important and meaningful than anything that happened as a royal tourist of the empire.

When off of the ship, hunting was never far from Alfred's mind. His father had adored the royal estate at Balmoral, in part because he could spend hours stalking deer in the Scottish Highlands.¹⁰⁵ Alfred frequently and excitedly reported to his mother his hunting adventures while on tour. In South Africa, he and George Grey awaited a rumbling herd of wild animals, rounded up and driven toward them by a group of local natives, and began firing upon them *en masse* during a rather grotesque "hunting" trip in 1860.¹⁰⁶ He went hunting with the Maharajah of Benares in 1870, "roll[ing] over an enormous tiger" that "got away very badly wounded."¹⁰⁷ He hunted antelope, elephants,

¹⁰⁴ Alfred to Queen Victoria, March 27, 1868, RA VIC/ADDA20/1281.

¹⁰⁵ Richard W. Butler, "The History and Development of Royal Tourism in Scotland: Balmoral, the Ultimate Holiday Home?" from *Royal Tourism: Excursions Around Monarchy*, ed. Philip Long and Nicola J. Palmer (Bristol: Channel View Publications, 2007), 55-57.

¹⁰⁶ Saul Solomon, *The Progress of His Royal Highness Prince Alfred Ernest Albert through the Cape Colony, British Kaffraria, the Orange Free State, and Port Natal in the Year 1860* (Cape Town: Saul Solomon & Co., 1861), 86-92.

¹⁰⁷ Alfred to Queen Victoria, January 24, 1870, RA VIC/ADD/A/20/1306.

ostriches, partridges, peasants, deer, and many other exotic animals. While encountering his mother's subjects, it seems, his mind often wandered to the hunt.

Like other royal children, when he did write to his mother about his visits, it was often to complain. He openly complained to his mother during his visit to India in 1869-70. From Calcutta in 1869, he griped that "ever since my arrival it has been one unceasing state ceremony, Levées, large dinners, state receptions, visits, balls, & drawing rooms in rapid succession."¹⁰⁸ He reported that, the previous day the festivities began at eight-thirty in the morning and continued until one-thirty that morning.¹⁰⁹ Early in January 1870, he again wrote to his mother complaining of his duties:

I received the Native Princes on board this is a very tedious ceremony. They each come separate with the Viceroy's agent who is attached to him and a few native attendants, he is brought in by the foreing [sic] secretary & sits down on my right with the foreign secretary & his attendants on his right & my staff on my left. The conversation consists of asking after one another's health, the beauty of the weather ... & some remarks as to his loyalty & attachment to the throne... I then give him some horribly strong scent... and some remarks as to his loyalty and attachment to the throne.... Then I give him some horribly strong scent... and some nuts.... The only difference in the seven [?] visits was the number of guns in his salute & the number of steps.¹¹⁰

Royal children routinely complained about such visits and their tedium. His letters home reflect boredom with his imperial duties, preferring his shipmates to local dignitaries and hunting trips to dinners at the Government House.

Alfred was not wholly disinterested in the empire, but it was a banality of his life. He probably traveled more than any royal before or after him, yet he hardly thought about

¹⁰⁸ Alfred to Queen Victoria, December 28, 1869, RA VIC/ADDA20/1302.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid.

¹¹⁰ Alfred to Queen Victoria, January 9 1870, RA VIC/ADDA20/1304.

or commented on his role as one of the British Empire's greatest travelers. While colonial subjects who met him often commented on his warmth and graciousness, on his skill as a royal ambassador, these encounters virtually never registered in his letters home. For his parents, traveling the world as a sailor in the Royal Navy was a method of teaching Alfred a profession and giving him an opportunity to see the world. For everyone else who was touched by the visits, he was a symbol of diverse manifestations of imperial identity and citizenship. For Alfred, the meaning of his royal tourism was found in the joys of navy life and the pursuit of his favorite pastime, hunting.

Albert Edward, the Prince of Wales

Victoria and Albert had high expectations for young Albert Edward (Edward VII), the heir to the throne, and his parents' rigorous educational program for him reflected these desires. They sought to avoid the decadent excesses of his uncles and to train Edward as an informed and thoughtful king in the model of Albert. The young prince, however, was not an intellectually curious child and was rather quickly considered somewhat of a lost cause by his parents. He was not Albert and more closely resembled his polar opposite. Victoria and Albert favored his older sister Victoria, and later Alfred and Arthur.¹¹¹ As a consequence of his perceived failures, Edward wrote very little and left historians very little textual evidence, other than what was written on his behalf by his private secretary Francis Knollys and in the official histories of the monarchy.

¹¹¹ H. C. G. Matthew, "Edward VII," *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography* (Oxford University Press, Sept 2004; online edn, May 2008). <http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/32975> (accessed 3 March 2009).

In British history, Edward has come to represent cultural and moral excess, a reaction against the strictness and austerity of Victorianism. Yet, his reaction was initially to his father not his mother, with whom he had much in common. He found his father's rules and morals stifling and his expectations unachievable. In this regard, the image of the Savile Row Prince of Wales, wearing midnight blue dinner jackets, smoking, attending the theatre, philandering, and generally living up to his reputation as a rakish playboy is accurate. He was, as Bagehot suggested, "an unemployed youth," with no obvious role in life other than waiting to be king.¹¹² He performed adequately at Oxford and Cambridge, matriculating at Trinity College in 1861. He unsuccessfully tried out life in the army during the summer of 1861, only for gossip about his romantic encounter with the actress Nellie Clifden to be spread around London. And, when his father died, his mother would blame him and all of his trouble-making for his death.

As a royal tourist, however, Edward proved rather successful in carrying out his ceremonial duties in the empire, which required more in terms of charm and far less in terms of intellect. His performance in the 1860 royal tour of Canada was a rare occasion when his parents openly expressed satisfaction in his performance.¹¹³ He was the first heir to the throne to visit the empire and was very well-traveled, taking frequent trips to the Continent; traveling to North America in 1860; cast off to Jerusalem, Cairo, and Constantinople in 1862 after his father's death; and making a trip to India in 1875-76. Even if he was far out-traveled by his younger brother Alfred, he was the most

¹¹² Bagehot, *The English Constitution*.

¹¹³ Queen Victoria to the Duke of Newcastle, August 4, 1860, Duke of Newcastle Papers, University of Nottingham, Ne C 12744/1.

“globalized” Prince of Wales in history (though this honor would immediately pass to his son, George).

Despite his success as a royal ambassador, his mother did not allow him to act as her representative in performing the monarchy’s public duties, despite her own refusal to perform them, and denied him access to her government and colonial papers.¹¹⁴ While he consequently never developed a well-defined knowledge or consciousness of the empire, he did express an interest in local peoples, particularly the Indian princes, during his visits and sought to recast himself more visibly as an imperial monarch once king. In a sense, he became a better-traveled version of his mother, captured by the *idea* of being an imperial monarch but without an obvious understanding of what exactly being one meant.

* * *

Albert Edward’s royal tour of Canada in 1860 came not at the impetus of any metropolitan office but at the invitation of Canadian legislature.¹¹⁵ Like Alfred’s tour, the idea for a royal visit to the empire germinated in the empire. Victoria had been invited to Canada several times in the 1850s, a prospect she considered impossible.¹¹⁶ She proposed

¹¹⁴ Matthew. “The queen, however, was strongly hostile to the prince’s taking on public duties in Britain. She tried to maintain the code of behaviour which Albert had prescribed, which was one in which Albert was the chief male prince. The queen, as Sidney Lee put it, kept her son ‘in permanent in *statu pupillari*. She claimed to regulate his actions in almost all relations of life.’ Maintaining a sort of fiction that Albert was alive and active, she forbade the prince’s presence on royal commissions and public bodies, and, despite her own almost total seclusion, he was not allowed to represent her at public occasions.”

¹¹⁵ As Prince of Wales, Albert Edward was the ranking son of Queen Victoria. In some sense, the decision to discuss Albert Edward after Alfred is decidedly subversive. After all, Alfred was a far greater traveler than Albert Edward and deserves first attention in a study such as this one. I have relied heavily on Ian Radforth’s excellent history of the 1860 tour of Canada rather than re-tracing what he has already done. Ian Radforth, *Royal Spectacle*, 17.

¹¹⁶ Radforth, 17.

that once the Prince of Wales was old enough, he would visit Canada.¹¹⁷ As was the case during the Duke of Cornwall's royal tour forty years later, it was intended to thank colonials for their contributions to an imperial war effort, in this case the Crimean War.¹¹⁸ Moreover, the idea of the heir to the throne inaugurating the new Victoria Bridge across the St. Lawrence River, one of Victorian era's greatest engineering marvels, as his younger brother across the Atlantic tipped the first truck of stone into Table Bay built on much of the ideological work Albert had done as the prince consort – to connect the monarchy to notion of progress.

There is little sense that Edward realized the importance his parents and the Canadian government placed on the visit. He wrote to his mother in the mode of a tourist, rather than as a future imperial monarch. He performed well and impressed his handlers. Yet, he was a teenager who was simply performing the duties being asked of him. He wrote to his mother after performing his first public duties as a royal ambassador in Newfoundland: "I had to receive fourteen addresses, rather a large number for the first time."¹¹⁹ He commented on an encounter with First Peoples in the language of a sightseer, which would be repeated during his 1875 tour of India; he noted that they treated him civilly and wore "more modified costumes than those that are generally represented in pictures."¹²⁰

¹¹⁷ Ibid., 18. Also see Sidney Lee, *King Edward VII: A Biography*, vol. 1 (London: Macmillan, 1925), 85.

¹¹⁸ Ibid.

¹¹⁹ Lee, *Edward VII*, vol. 1, 89.

¹²⁰ Ibid., 90.

Whilst in North America, he often reported on the beauty of the New World and matter-of-factly on his experiences with colonial people. Even his official biographer, Sidney Lee, admitted a complete lack of imperial consciousness by Edward: “If the Prince’s descriptions of his experiences... proved bare and informal, they were relieved by some naïve comments on the persons whom he met, by comparisons of scenes which were new to him with familiar places at home, and by occasional notes on surviving memories of his grandfather.”¹²¹ Even while in the empire, his mind remained very much at home.

* * *

When the idea of a royal visit by the Prince of Wales to India was raised in 1875 by the Council of India, the queen was reluctant to grant her permission.¹²² While his younger brother Alfred had recently visited India, Edward had survived a bout of typhoid fever in 1871, the disease that likely killed his father, and the queen was unwilling to part with him. The queen had not always opposed the idea of Edward traveling to India; before his father died, Albert had imagined India to be on the itinerary of his planned travels in the Near East.¹²³ The queen did not want to give up her son. She was surprised and angered, then, when Lord Salisbury, the Secretary of State for India, announced to her his plan for the prince’s tour of India.

The Prince of Wales, however, was determined to go to India, although his motive, other than escaping his mother’s grip, is unclear. The government went forward

¹²¹ Ibid., 88.

¹²² Ibid., 373.

¹²³ Ibid., 370.

with plans for the visit despite the queen's apparent reluctance. Upon finding out, Victoria wrote to Lord Salisbury to articulate her unhappiness about the plans:

[The queen] wishes [Lord Salisbury] to know that while she gave her consent, she did so very reluctantly as she thinks the risk and responsibility very great for the Prince of Wales is no longer in his former health and invariably over does his powers of endurance and the distance from home is enormous!¹²⁴

Two months later, she explained in a letter to Lord Northbrook, the Viceroy of India, that she had given “a very unwilling consent” and that “she had expected [the visit] should have been very carefully considered and weighed in the Cabinet before being announced to the Viceroy.”¹²⁵ She indicated that she wanted to convey her “real feelings and views on this subject” to him and sought his “impartial opinion” on the visit. Noting these reservations, Salisbury and Northbrook continued to forge their plans for the visit.¹²⁶

The queen grew irritated by her exclusion from the planning process. She complained to Salisbury that she had personally “received no information” from the Secretary of State about the tour arrangements, even though “the newspapers are full of them.”¹²⁷ Victoria demanded that she be “accurately informed on every point” and that “her sanction may be obtained before anything is decided.”¹²⁸ She focused her efforts on preserving Edward's health over the duration of the visit by trying to limit his

¹²⁴ Queen Victoria to Lord Salisbury, March 18, 1875, Prince of Wales in India, 1875-6, vol. 1, 1875, RA VIC/MAIN/Z/468/3. Emphasis in the original text.

¹²⁵ Queen Victoria to Lord Northbrook, May 17, 1875, Prince of Wales in India, 1875-6, vol. 1, 1875, RA VIC/MAIN/Z/468/7.

¹²⁶ See chapter 2 for details on colonial administrators' motives and planning.

¹²⁷ Queen Victoria to Lord Salisbury, May 27, 1875, Prince of Wales in India, 1875-6, vol. 1, 1875, RA VIC/MAIN/Z/468/11.

¹²⁸ Ibid.

engagements. She also sought to approve of the prince's party, mainly so she could excise any of his troublesome friends from the list. Furthermore, the queen insisted, in agreement with Salisbury, that the Prince of Wales was to travel to India as a first subject rather than as a representative of the queen. Northbrook was her true representative, as she understood imperial hierarchy. Her son could not, then, hold a Durbar or take any ceremonial precedence over the viceroy. Although the tour was being pushed forward despite her reservations, the queen imagined herself as the proper master of the planning process; this notion was very much an illusion.

The extant letters of Edward offer some limited insight into his understanding of the royal tour of India. In terms of his imperial consciousness, he shared much in common with his mother. While he articulated an interest in local people, he also demonstrated a certain naivety about the empire, seeing it as an uncomplicated place. He recounted, for instance, his encounter with the Gaekwar of Baroda (see chapter two) in simple terms to his mother: that he gave the young gaekwar, "a very intelligent boy, quite overloaded with jewels," some gifts, which pleased the boy, and received in return "some very pretty things."¹²⁹ In conveying an image of Bombay to his mother, he described his travels through the streets of the city in the language of a tourist: "You see mixed together natives of all classes, creed & origin. Their Houses are very picturesque & they are all painted different colours. The lowest classes & children hardly wear any garments

¹²⁹ Prince of Wales to Queen Victoria, November 14, 1875, Prince of Wales in India, 1875-6, vol. 1, 1875, RA VIC/MAIN/Z/468/98.

at all.”¹³⁰ This assessment reflects a limited knowledge of his surroundings and enough cultural distance to avoid the moral implications of his sightseeing.

Like his mother, Edward expressed a much more profound interest in the hereditary princes of India than anything else in the Raj. He complained to his mother about the abuse of the princes by colonial administrators:

What struck me, most forcibly, was the rude and rough manner with which the English “Political Officers” (as they are called, who are in attendance upon them) treat them. It is indeed much to be deplored, and the system is, I am sure, quite wrong. Natives of all classes in this country will, I am sure, be more attached to us and to our rule, if they are treated with kindness and firmness at the same time, but not with brutality & contempt.¹³¹

While the dynamics of ornamentalism and imperial rule will be discussed in chapter two, Cannadine’s notion that the British “saw” their empire in terms of an imperial social hierarchy, rather than race or color, is useful in this context.¹³² In the looking glass of empire, did Edward see a mirror image of the Victorian monarchy, deprived of its power and pushed around by government officials? It would not be a conceptual leap, however, to suggest that royals recognized some semblance of *similarity*. This does not mean that his sympathy did not also invoke *difference* (racial or otherwise) or that what he imagined reflected anything but an invented “idea” of India. Edward’s simple and banal imperialism represented a limited kind of imperial consciousness; deprived of any real

¹³⁰ Ibid. Colonial administrators generally guarded him from the worst examples of suffering and poverty.

¹³¹ Ibid. A similar sentiment would later be echoed by his son George upon returning to Britain from India in 1905-06.

¹³² Cannadine, *Ornamentalism*.

power in the imperial hierarchy, he was not all that different than the princes with whom he sympathized.

This said, the notion of being an imperial monarch stuck with Albert Edward. When his mother died, he recommended to the government that he be stylized as “King Edward the Seventh, by the Grace of God of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and all of British dominions beyond the seas, and Emperor of India.”¹³³ His first proposal even included Charles Dilke’s famous phrase “Greater Britain,” coined by his travel narrative of the same name (Joseph Chamberlain quickly excised this language, fearing it might alienate the king’s loyal non-British subjects in the white settler colonies).¹³⁴

Much like Victoria, Edward delighted in the idea of being an imperial monarch in name. The effect of traveling twice to the empire, to Canada in 1860 and to India in 1875, on this newly-found imperial consciousness is difficult if not impossible to calculate. The request was certainly influenced by his reading of Dilke but was more directly inspired by the suggestion of Sir Alfred Milner, the Governor of the Cape Colony and High Commissioner for Southern Africa. This debate that raged over this title, between the Colonial Office and the colonies, hardly registered at all in Britain.

¹³³ Joseph Chamberlain to Edward VII, April 15, 1901, Papers of Joseph Chamberlain, University of Birmingham, JC 11/12/37/60. He also decided to stylize himself as King Edward VII rather than as King Albert Edward, which had always been the name he agreed with his mother to take.

¹³⁴ Charles Dilke, *Greater Britain: A Record of Travel in English-Speaking Countries during 1866 and 1867* (London: Macmillan, 1869). “The King has preferred [sic] Milner’s original suggestion – to introduce the phrase “Greater Britain” obvious objections – French, Canadian, Cape Dutch.” Arthur Balfour to Joseph Chamberlain, April 16, 1901, JC 11/12/32. “My recollection is that when [the phrase “Greater Britain”] came into popular use, after the publication of Sir Charles Dilke’s book, . . . it was generally understood to designate lands settled and inhabited by emigrants from the United Kingdom, more especially the Australian Colonies, and would not have been interpreted as including the Crown Colonies, or the Cape, where languages other than English were habitually spoken” (H. Bertram Cox). Colonial Office minutes, April 10, 1901, JC/11/12/33/59.

George

Prince George shared much in common with his uncle, Alfred. Between 1879 and 1882, George traveled the world as a royal cadet aboard HMS *Bacchante* with his older brother Albert Victor.¹³⁵ During his 1879-1882 tour of the world, George visited many places, both British and not: among them, Gibraltar, the Mediterranean, the West Indies, the Falklands, the Cape, Australia, Fiji, Japan, China, the Straits Settlements, Ceylon, Egypt, and Palestine. His understanding of his royal duties was profoundly informed by his years in the Royal Navy, and he felt a deep respect for and connection with naval culture and with the people with whom he developed relationships during this period of his life. As the second son of the Prince of Wales, he had little prospect of becoming king, that was, until his older brother Albert Victor died suddenly of influenza in 1891. Despite the similarities, George developed a different and more complex understanding of empire than his uncle, in part through his relationship with Joseph Chamberlain.

His consciousness of the empire as grandson and son of a monarch and later as King George V represents a generational difference with his grandmother and father and reflects broader changes in British society. His coronation at Westminster Abbey in June 1911 was celebrated by a Festival of Empire in London, and he was the first reigning monarch to visit the overseas empire, holding a coronation Durbar in Delhi in 1912. Growing up in the high age of European imperialism, his understanding of the empire represents a turning point between a nineteenth-century monarchy that struggled and

¹³⁵ John N. Dalton, *The Cruise of Her Majesty's Ship "Bacchante," 1879-1882: Compiled from the Private Journals, Letters, and Note-books of Prince Albert Victor and Prince George of Wales*, 2 vols. (London: Macmillan, 1886).

failed to retain its political relevance and a twentieth-century monarchy that came to accept its ceremonial role in British and imperial culture, best illustrated by Elizabeth II's frequent travels in Britain and abroad. Ironically, George V reigned over the beginnings of the transformation of the British Empire from an empire on which the sun never set into a collection of associated states (later institutionalized as the Commonwealth) and the decline of Britain as a global power.

His first invitation to the empire as an adult royal was soundly rejected by the queen. Apparently enthused by the outpouring of colonial loyalty to the queen during the Diamond Jubilee celebrations of 1897, the Government of New Zealand invited the Duke and Duchess of York to visit New Zealand and Australia.¹³⁶ Queen Victoria very quickly refused, citing her reluctance to allow a prince so close to the throne to travel so far away from home.¹³⁷ She scolded the Cabinet for even considering the proposal and asserted that she would “never give [her] consent to this idea.”¹³⁸ George, in a letter to the Colonial Secretary Joseph Chamberlain, wrote that he was sorry about his grandmother's decision, considering that “it is so very important to do all we can to please the Colonies at this moment, and to so bind them more closely to the Mother Country.”¹³⁹ The government's unquestioning acceptance of the queen's refusal was extremely rare, if not

¹³⁶ Earl of Ranfurly to Joseph Chamberlain, November 25, 1897; JC 29/6/6/6 Extract from Address by the Governor of New Zealand to the House of Representatives, September 23, 1897, JC 29/6/6/5.

¹³⁷ Joseph Chamberlain to Queen Victoria, February 7, 1898; JC 29/6/6/10 Joseph Chamberlain to the Earl of Ranfurly, February 1898, JC 29/6/6/2.

¹³⁸ JC 11/38/10. This document is unsigned, undated, and was written on a plain sheet of notepaper. Context clues, however, make obvious that it conveys the queen's opinion of the New Zealand invitation. Whether it was written by the queen or her personal secretary Arthur Bigge is unclear. I must acknowledge Helen Fisher at the Special Collections Library, University of Birmingham, for her assistance on this matter.

¹³⁹ Duke of York to Joseph Chamberlain, February 15, 1898, JC 29/6/6/11.

unheard of, during this period. The fact that neither Chamberlain nor the Duke of York took a particular interest in the visit and pressed the queen on the issue, as was usually the case, perhaps explains this capitulation.

In 1900, Chamberlain again proposed a royal tour, this time in response to an Australian invitation to inaugurate the new federal parliament in Melbourne. While his initial proposal focused on Australia, but quickly incorporated a Canadian invitation, he conceived of a much larger global tour of empire. Chamberlain conceived of the tour as an opportunity to thank the colonies for their service in the South African War and to forward his own ideas about imperial unity. Prince George was very enthusiastic about the prospect of this trip and corresponded frequently with the Colonial Secretary about the state of the negotiations with his grandmother. As on previous occasions, Queen Victoria was extremely reluctant to allow the Duke of York to go to Australia.¹⁴⁰ Chamberlain and George, assisted by the Prince of Wales and the prime minister, Lord Salisbury, spent several months negotiating with the queen and, in effect, conspiring with one another to convince the queen to permit the tour.

Despite the queen's reluctance, the semi-official account of the tour, written by fellow traveler Joseph Watson, was curiously titled *The Queen's Wish*.¹⁴¹ The idea of the queen as a willing and enthusiastic participant reflects a key ideological component of the royal tour, principally that Queen Victoria sought to share her children and grandchildren

¹⁴⁰ She was also unhappy about the Australians' choice of "Australian Commonwealth" as the new federation's name because she thought that it reflected republican sentiments. Chamberlain assured her that they simply wanted to use a different name than the Canadians. Extract from the Queen's Journal, June 27, 1900, *The Letters of Queen Victoria*, Third Series, vol. III, 566-567.

¹⁴¹ Joseph Watson, *The Queen's Wish: How It Was Fulfilled by the Imperial Tour of T.R.H. the Duke and Duchess of Cornwall and York* (London: Hutchinson, 1902). Books published in Britain about the royal tours shall be discussed in greater detail in Chapter Five.

with her colonial subjects as a gesture of maternal goodwill. Yet, the queen was always a reluctant partner in royal visits. She wished to keep her children and grandchildren close to home. Only through the work of others was she ever persuaded to allow such travels.

Over the course of several months in 1900, Victoria had to be coaxed and convinced by the government and by her family to allow George's visit to a newly-federated Australia. George took the lead in advocating in favor of the visit to his grandmother. He wrote to Chamberlain in early July 1900 to indicate that he had made some progress with his grandmother on the subject of the royal tour, since she "seemed less unfavorable to the suggestion than on a former occasion," and that his father the Prince of Wales would speak to her on the importance of the visit, "a most important event connected with the birth of the Empire."¹⁴² By mid-August, George found her to be "not adverse" to the idea of a brief visit to Australia, though she refused any consideration of a stop in Canada.¹⁴³ He wrote in the manner of an intelligence-gatherer, suggesting to Chamberlain that "it would be better if you did not mention that you had heard from me."¹⁴⁴ For George, his prospects of his royal tour looked promising.

The queen, however, would waiver and then refuse, again. Two days later, the queen's personal secretary Sir Arthur Bigge wrote urgently to Chamberlain, explaining that "Her Majesty did not seem to be so much in favour of the proposal as the Duke assumed her to be after their conversation two days ago."¹⁴⁵ She was unhappy that the prime minister or the Cabinet apparently had no knowledge and thus no opinion of the

¹⁴² Duke of York to Joseph Chamberlain, July 1, 1900, JC 11/37/7.

¹⁴³ Duke of York to Joseph Chamberlain, August 15, 1900, JC 11/38/11.

¹⁴⁴ Ibid.

¹⁴⁵ Sir Arthur Bigge to Joseph Chamberlain, August 17, 1900, JC 11/38/12.

proposal and concluded, according to Bigge, that “if [she] was asked now [she] should feel inclined to refuse.”¹⁴⁶ The queen’s age and the need to have royal children on hand to attend ceremonies in her place further discouraged her willingness to consent.¹⁴⁷ She was perhaps more reluctant to grant permission for royal visits than ever before.

Bigge, a personal servant of the queen, informed Chamberlain that he sensed that, when the proposal was put clearly and formally to the queen, she would realize the importance of the visit to Australia, “the practical birthday of a new Empire.”¹⁴⁸ Lord Salisbury feigned ignorance, Bigge informed Chamberlain, because the Prince of Wales wished to first speak to her on the matter. If the government was respectful of her concerns and appealed to her through official channels rather through than her grandson, he encouraged, she would be far more receptive. Even the queen’s personal secretary, it seems, conspired with George and Chamberlain in the scheme to bring a royal son to the empire.

After receiving a formal proposal from Salisbury, the queen finally agreed to the visit, with very specific stipulations. She agreed to the visit if the South African War had concluded by the time of the tour; if she remained in good health; if his visit was no longer than five months; and, if George agreed to visit Canada and India another time.¹⁴⁹

Bigge confided to Chamberlain that she “does not like the idea” but was convinced of its

¹⁴⁶ Ibid.

¹⁴⁷ Ibid. Her son Alfred had died in late July 1900, and her grandson Albert Victor died in 1892. These deaths left her son the Prince of Wales and his immediate successor the Duke of York, in addition to Prince Arthur, the Duke of Connaught. She determined Arthur to be even more indispensable than George. Queen Victoria to Joseph Chamberlain, August 26, 1900, JC 11/38/17.

¹⁴⁸ Ibid.

¹⁴⁹ Queen Victoria to Lord Salisbury, August 26, 1900 JC 11/38/14.

importance by Salisbury.¹⁵⁰ While worried that he might be considered a disloyal servant of the queen, he even suggested that the limitations set by the queen might be overcome with time. Chamberlain would assure him of his loyalty and indicated that other proposals for visits, from Canada, for instance, could still be considered until later stages in the planning process.¹⁵¹ George similarly proposed to Chamberlain that Canada might be reconsidered at a later time.¹⁵² They had gotten what they wanted and could seek more concessions from the reluctant imperial monarch later.

As things turned out, Victoria died a few months later in January 1901. The South African War would not end for another year. Edward VII was slow to allow the heir to the throne to go ahead with the tour but ultimately approved it, at the insistence of Arthur Balfour, the Conservative Party leader.¹⁵³ George would visit not only Australia but also New Zealand, Mauritius, South Africa, and Canada, with stops in Aden, Ceylon, and Singapore. This world tour was hardly the “queen’s wish.” While those who planned and participated in the tour regarded a federated Australia as representing the symbolic beginnings of a new imperial century, it more clearly represented the newly developed role of the monarchy in a British world, forged and refined over the previous four decades.

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¹⁵⁰ Sir Arthur Bigge to Joseph Chamberlain, August 26, 1900, JC 11/38/15.

¹⁵¹ Joseph Chamberlain to Sir Arthur Bigge, August 29, 1900, JC 11/38/18.

¹⁵² Duke of York to Joseph Chamberlain, September 9, 1900, JC 11/38/22.

¹⁵³ H. C. G. Matthew, “George V,” *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography* (Oxford University Press, Sept 2004; online edn, Jan 2008). <http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/33369> (accessed 2 March 2009).

George's letters to Joseph Chamberlain before and during his 1901 tour demonstrate a deep knowledge of and interest in imperial politics. He had enthusiastically promoted the tour to his grandmother, in part because he foresaw "the greatest possible benefits to the Empire."¹⁵⁴ Before the tour began, he articulated a desire to distribute medals to colonial troops, this while expressing concern over the sack of Kumasi on the Gold Coast.¹⁵⁵ He might be compared to his grandmother in his interest in empire, except that George had been to the empire and understood many of the political and cultural intricacies that would have been lost on Victoria.

Other than describing the loyalty of Australians, which he attributed to the rule of his grandmother, the South African War, and the work of Chamberlain, he articulated a sophisticated understanding of colonial policy.¹⁵⁶ His letters reflect a profound knowledge of Australian politics, particularly after such a short time in the country: the rivalries between the different states, trade policy, policies regarding "Black" and Chinese labor, drought and agricultural production, and many other topics. His correspondence reads like colonial intelligence, a seismic shift from previous royal tours. To describe George's more developed awareness of empire is not to romanticize his knowledge or concern for empire. He remained an observer, an outsider, who encountered the empire ever so briefly.

The royal tour only developed George's sense of being better connected to the empire than his predecessors and the rest of British society. Returning to Britain late in

¹⁵⁴ Duke of York to Joseph Chamberlain, August 15, 1900, JC 11/38/11.

¹⁵⁵ Duke of York to Sir Arthur Bigge, November 15, 1900, *The Letters of Queen Victoria*, Third Series, vol. III, 620.

¹⁵⁶ Duke of York to Joseph Chamberlain, June 2, 1901, JC 11/12/77.

1901, he gave a speech at Guildhall on December 5 that he claimed reflected the colonial mood, asserting “that the Old Country must wake up if she intends to maintain her old position of pre-eminence in her Colonial trade against foreign competitors.” This sentiment reflects the political work of his imperial tutor, Joseph Chamberlain.¹⁵⁷ In this regard, George represented a departure from his father and grandmother, in having a clear sense of his role as an imperial monarch. He advocated imperial unity and defense and traveled to the empire once he became king. Yet, it was in George that the British monarchy took on its familiar twentieth-century form, as an institution that had come to accept its purely symbolic role in both British domestic society and at the center of a global empire and Commonwealth.

* * *

Victorian royals did not always embrace the imperial roles in which they were cast. They understood the empire to be an important part of the British world, but they were often reluctant and unequal partners in the projection of a royal image to colonial subjects. Queen Victoria objected to royal visits to the empire. Royal children who visited the empire complained about the tedious and boring ceremonies and encountered empire with a tourist’s sense of distance. Their awareness of empire was banal and limited, quite in opposition to the image of the Great Queen.

The image of Queen Victoria was transmitted to and appropriated by Britain’s colonial subjects around the world. It was used by colonial administrators to support and legitimize imperial rule and by colonial subjects to demand imperial citizenship as loyal

¹⁵⁷ *The Times*, December 6, 1901. Chamberlain also gave a speech at the Guildhall celebratory luncheon, where he contrasted the current relationship between Britain and its colonies to the period of the 1860 royal tour of Canada, when the imperial connection was being questioned both at home and in Canada.

subjects to the queen. It often reached the farthest reaches of the British colonial empire, often far beyond the zone of effective military or political control. And, long after her death, subject peoples continued to appeal to her memory in demanding rights and fairness. Queen Victoria was the most potent cultural symbol in the history of the British Empire.

The origins of this mythology are important for understanding not only the relationship between Britain and its empire but also the significance of empire to British society. The monarchy, like British society as a whole, proved to have a sometimes ambivalent and always complex relationship with the empire. In this context, the imperial cooptation of the monarchy by colonial and government officials was as important as its cultural re-invention. After the death of Albert, colonial administrators and legislatures in the empire in league with imperial activists in the home government repossessed royal imagery for their own purposes, a process that the later chapters shall discuss. The next chapter, however, takes us to the empire to explore how African, Maori, and South Asian political elites encountered British royals and imperial rule.

CHAPTER TWO: Ornamentalism, Encounters, and Imperial Rule

During the second half of the nineteenth century, imperial ritual emerged from a *Pax Britannica* of warfare and conquest a principle technology of imperial rule.¹⁵⁸ The development of the royal tour, in particular, reflected both continuity with the ritual encounters that had characterized the imperial experience since the first boats arrived on the beaches and the change of a new era of consolidation supported and legitimized by self-actualizing mythologies of empire, including that of the Great White Queen.¹⁵⁹ The emergence of imperial ritual also reflected a profound anxiety over the failures of imperial governance and reform during the first half of the nineteenth century. The royal tours, while neglected by a historiography of imperial rituals focused on Indian Durbars and British jubilees, were central to a emerging ritual order of rule by displaying British power, nurturing the mythology of the Great Queen, and appropriating local traditions (real and imagined) into an imperial culture. Colonial officials developed the royal tour as a site of encounter where they could control and display an iconic order of empire, free of the everyday politics of rule.¹⁶⁰

¹⁵⁸ The use of the term “technology” in this context reflects an understanding of colonial rule inspired by scholars such as Nicholas Dirks, Bernard Cohn, Michel Foucault, and others – namely, that empire was sustained by a diverse constellation of methods from machine guns and naval power to ritual, propaganda, and surveillance. The royal tours, while they appealed to ritual practices and ideas about political legitimacy that were not new, emerged during a particular moment during the nineteenth century (as I describe here) and were made possible by technological innovations.

¹⁵⁹ See James Belich, “Empire and Its Myth,” from *Amongst Friends: Australian and New Zealand Voices from America*, ed. Patty O’Brien and Bruce Vaughan (Dunedin: University of Otago Press, 2005) 149; James Belich, *Making Peoples: A History of New Zealanders* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1996), 230.

¹⁶⁰ In this context, the Foucaultian idea of governmentality is useful and relevant: “To govern a state will therefore mean to apply economy, to setup up an economy at the level of the entire state, which means exercising toward its inhabitants, and the wealth and behavior of each and all, a form of surveillance

As a social history of the empire, the next two chapters trace the relationship between status and imperial culture across the southern British Empire, in an arc from southern Africa to India to New Zealand. A comparative analysis risks collapsing a diversity of experiences into a shared colonial condition. Colonial ethnographies and perceptions of otherness were multi-layered and hierarchical. For instance, historians have argued that the British recognized, in their Indian empire, a form of civilization, albeit one stuck in a medieval rut or preserved in a romanticized European past.¹⁶¹ They saw things there that they could recognize as culture, religion, politics, and social hierarchy. In contrast, they “found” only superstition, savagery, and tribalism in Africa and amongst the Maori.

These important and relevant contrasts withstanding, the prejudices of British culture toward South Asians, Africans, and the Maori developed and hardened over the course of the nineteenth century: a result of the perceived failure of the humanitarian project, particularly the abolition of slavery (1833-34); the dark days of the Indian Mutiny (1857), Morant Bay “rebellion” (Jamaica, 1865), and dozens of “little wars”; the rise of responsible government in the colonies (1848-1923) and of the settler lobby in imperial politics; and the emergence of scientific racism.¹⁶² During the second half of the

and control as attentive as that of the head of a family over his household and goods.” In “Governmentality,” in *The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality*, ed. By G. Burchell, C. Gordon, and P. Miller (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), 91. The panopticonal colonial state had an elaborate and complex system of intelligence gathering and surveillance, particularly in India. For instance, the Indian newspapers were read and translated by special British officials, who wrote reports and disseminated them to government houses across the Raj. British colonial hegemony, however, was a false hegemony – because it was based on flawed knowledge.

¹⁶¹ David Cannadine, *Ornamentalism: How the British Saw Their Empire* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000); Ian Baucom, *Out of Place: Englishness, Empire, and the Locations of Identity* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999), 78-79.

¹⁶² See Catherine Hall, *Civilising Subjects: Metropole and Colony in the English Imagination, 1830-1867* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002).

nineteenth century, British imperial culture overwhelmingly understood South Asians, Africans, and the Maori to be inferior peoples, even if it did respect more masculine, “martial races” such as the Zulu or the Sikhs, or Asian princes over African chiefs.¹⁶³ These changes also represented the profound anxiety of British imperial culture – a response to both the failures of governance and local demands for home rule – to which the advent of the royal tour was a response.

Despite the importance of identifying British attitudes toward colonial “others,” scholars must also not be imprisoned by the overdrawn conceptual distinction between South Africa and New Zealand, as colonies of European settlement, and India, as a colony of conquest.¹⁶⁴ All three served as the battlefields for brutal wars of imperial conquest. All were settled by British migrants, who struggled to recreate “little Britains” in the Eastern Cape, Dunedin, and presidency towns such as Bombay or Calcutta. And, colonial governments in the Cape, New Zealand, and the Raj developed policies and practices designed to limit and control indigenous and mixed race people while, simultaneously, creating restricted spaces for their civic participation in the political and social life of British-dominated politics and society. In the context of doing a comparative imperial history, they must be understood not only for their differences but also for their similarities.

Even more importantly, colonial administrators, humanitarian activists, and other colonial actors looked toward the empire not only through the lens of vertical categories

¹⁶³ On this issue, see Mrinalini Sinha. *Colonial Masculinity: The "Manly Englishman" and the "Effeminate Bengali" in the Late Nineteenth Century* (New York: St. Martin's, 1995).

¹⁶⁴ I was introduced by this observation by Robert Travers at the spring 2008 colloquium on British political thought at the Folger Shakespeare Library.

of race and nationality but also along a (horizontal) hierarchy of class and status.¹⁶⁵ They saw hereditary elites, “educated natives,” workers, and peasants as comparable categories across the social spaces of the empire. Colonial officials developed customs and practices such as royal visits in a long-term cultural interaction with Native Americans, South Asians, Africans, Maori, and Australian Aborigines, one dominated by Europeans but informed by the (imagined or real) demands and expectations of their dance partners.¹⁶⁶ British imperial rituals themselves were a product of colonial knowledge, made and re-made, translated and mistranslated through encounters with local people. At the same time, the practices and ideologies of imperial rule were produced in and disseminated through a larger imperial culture, with India often serving as the model.¹⁶⁷ The result was a set of cultural practices used with, in the context of the first chapter, princes and chiefs across the empire, perhaps most spectacularly in the Raj, during the Imperial Assemblage of 1877 and Imperial Durbars in 1903 and 1912, and during Durbar-inspired rituals in New Zealand (1869), South Africa (1901), and even Nigeria (1912).¹⁶⁸

The royal tours reflect efforts by imperial administrators and ideologues to naturalize British rule in Africa, South Asia, and the Pacific.¹⁶⁹ The imperial historian of

¹⁶⁵ Cannadine, *Ornamentalism*.

¹⁶⁶ Inga Clendinnen, *Dancing with Strangers: Europeans and Australians at First Contact* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005).

¹⁶⁷ Thomas Metcalf, *Imperial Connections: India in the Indian Ocean Arena, 1860-1920* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008).

¹⁶⁸ Andrew Apter, *The Pan-African Nation: Oil and the Spectacle of Culture in Nigeria* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005); George Ferguson Bowen, *Thirty Years of Colonial Government: A Selection from the Despatches and Letters*, vol. 1, ed. Stanley Lane-Poole (New York: Longmans, 1889), 364.

¹⁶⁹ This naturalization of imperial rule was then reflected back onto history of the empire, as represented in the *Cambridge History of the British Empire* (1929-1961). The volume on “British India,” for instance, started in 1498 with Vasco da Gama!

India Christopher Bayly has argued, principally against a post-colonial literature that condemned the colonial archive and conceptualized British rule as a constant process of oppositionality and othering, that the British are better understood as a South Asian social group, who encountered and were forced to adapt to sophisticated cultural and political cosmologies.¹⁷⁰ While Bayly emphasized the agency of local peoples in the colonial encounter, post-colonial scholarship has largely rejected both the “Cambridge school” represented by Bayly and nationalist historiographies as the legacies of imperialism, characterized by totalizing and elitist paradigms of modernity and progress that ignore the processes of violence and immiseration experienced by the colonized.¹⁷¹ In a rather different vein, historical anthropologists such as Bernard Cohn and Nicholas Dirks have focused on the intimate relationship between knowledge and power in the colonial encounter, arguing that the accumulation of British knowledge about local peoples was appropriated, bastardized, and employed for the purposes of colonial rule.¹⁷²

Colonial administrators, such as Lord Lytton in India or Theophilus Shepstone in Natal, sought to naturalize British rule by re-imagining themselves as Mughal governors or African chiefs in an imperial hierarchy, atop of which sat the Great Queen.¹⁷³ When

¹⁷⁰ C.A. Bayly, *Rulers, Townsmen, and Bazaars: North Indian Society in the Age of British Expansion, 1770-1870* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983) and *Empire and Information: Intelligence Gathering and Social Communication in India, 1780-1870* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996). This conceptualization of the imperial past has been rightfully criticized as a denial of conquest that ignores the cultural and physical violence, which characterized British encounters with colonial “others” from the earliest days of the empire.

¹⁷¹ See Ranajit Guha, *Dominance without Hegemony* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997), 152-214.

¹⁷² Bernard Cohn, *Colonialism and Its Forms of Knowledge* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996); Nicholas Dirks, *Castes of Mind: Colonialism and the Making of Modern India* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001).

¹⁷³ Bernard Cohn, “Representing Authority in Victorian India,” in *The Invention of Tradition*, ed. Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 165-210.

these imagined traditions confronted the more complicated and messy realities of colonial rule, as they did during the royal tours, the results reflected both how British were shaped by and beholden to their own perceptions of local political cultures and how the real and cultural violence of imperial rule informed the encounter.¹⁷⁴ Imperial rituals, as products of colonial encounters, translations, and mistranslations across the beaches of empire, demonstrate what happened when this map of “roles, rules, and structural relationships,” to use the language of Dirks, was imposed on a more complex fabric of life.¹⁷⁵

Problematizing the space between colonial knowledge and South Asian social communication, Bayly argues that “the problems the British faced in understanding and controlling events in south Asia derived as much from the shape of India’s information order and the superficiality of colonial rule as from any particular cultural bias or prejudice resulting from the assimilation of knowledge to power.”¹⁷⁶

The royal tours demonstrate the conceptual dissonance between the imagined traditions of rule, as products of colonial knowledge, and the slippery and allusive nature of local political cultures, which could never be fully grasped or controlled. In this context, while the royal tour as a technology of rule functioned, in the immediate term, to

¹⁷⁴ Eric Hobsbawm, “Introduction: Inventing Traditions,” in *The Invention of Tradition*, ed. Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 1-14; Terence Ranger, “The Invention of Tradition Revisited,” *Legitimacy and the State in Twentieth-Century Africa: Essays in Honour of A.H.M. Kirk-Greene*, ed. Terence Ranger and Olufemi Vaughan (London: Macmillan, 1993). Royal tours were somewhat rare occasions but the British appropriation of the South Asian Durbar extended to political agents and governors and outside of the Raj to the rest of the empire. For a useful, but brief, overview of imperial rituals and the Durbar, see Barbara N. Ramusack, *The Indian Princes and Their States*, III, vol. 6, *New Cambridge History of India* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 90-92. According to Ramusack, Lord Amherst (1823-28) was the first governor to tour India, but Lord Canning (1856-62) was the first to visit the Indian princes “systematically” in the aftermath of the 1857 war.

¹⁷⁵ Greg Denning, *Beach Crossings: Voyaging Across Times, Cultures, and Self* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004), 186.

¹⁷⁶ C.A. Bayly, *Empire and Information: Intelligence Gathering and Social Communication in India, 1780-1870* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 7.

display British power, it failed in the long term to naturalize British rule by successfully nurturing loyalty to an imperial hierarchy or a belief in an imperial culture.¹⁷⁷

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The effectiveness of colonial rule was underpinned by a culture of violence. A monopoly of violence, however, was not sufficient for the purposes of administration and rule, particularly for a British colonial state with a rather limited allocation of manpower and resources. Even by the interwar period of the twentieth century, when the territorial holdings of the empire were the most expansive, only 1,200 men administered the whole of colonial Africa.¹⁷⁸ At its height, the Indian Civil Service (ICS) was staffed by less than 1,500 men to rule over a population of 353 million people.¹⁷⁹ This was not an empire that could be run on brute force alone; the use of violence was not only expensive but also limited, to some degree, by public opinion at home. Maps shaded red on schoolhouse walls did not reflect the stark reality of British rule on it the ground. The map of British power might be more sensibly colored with brighter and darker shades of red, marking the frontiers and peripheries of British influence, and with the grey holes and gaps that resisted the red ink of empire.

Consequently, the British supplemented and subsidized military conquest and physical control with “cultural technologies of rule.”¹⁸⁰ As the historical anthropologist

¹⁷⁷ These failures reflect on the ways in which imperial rule was trapped within the conceptual space of deeply flawed colonial knowledge, from which it could never extricate itself. The empire was, in some sense, hoisted by its own petard.

¹⁷⁸ John W. Cell, “Colonial Rule,” in the *Oxford History of the British Empire*, vol. IV, *The Twentieth Century* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 232.

¹⁷⁹ Ibid.

¹⁸⁰ Nicholas Dirks, “Foreword,” *Colonialism and Its Forms of Knowledge*, by Bernard Cohn (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), ix

Bernard Cohn argued, imperial rituals were part of this culture of rule that sought to appropriate and institutionalize local rituals and methods into “colonial knowledge,” the conquering of “not only a territory but an epistemological space.”¹⁸¹ By collecting data and knowledge about the cultures of the colonized, colonial officials “believed they could explore and conquer this space through translation,” through the acquisition of the local language, law, and traditions for the purposes of governance.¹⁸² This knowledge informed the methods of colonial administration, from taxation to imperial ritual. By appropriating or inventing traditions of rule, the British Empire could administer millions of colonial subjects through local “collaborators,” a diverse constellation of practices we identify as indirect rule.¹⁸³

Despite these efforts, the ornamental practices that were developed between 1860 and 1901 largely reflected the colonial imagination, of the ancient village community (*panch*) of India or the tribe of Africa or the Pacific, rather than the reality of local political traditions or culture.¹⁸⁴ The royal tour was an ethnological exhibition of empire, where colonial knowledge – savage tribes, medieval princes, and native Christian converts who were “almost the same, but not quite” – were performed and reified,

¹⁸¹ Bernard Cohn, *Colonialism and Its Forms of Knowledge*, 4.

¹⁸² Ibid.

¹⁸³ Frederick Lugard’s book, *The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa* (1926), is considered the manifesto on indirect rule, but it presented an ideology of rule that had been developed and used in the empire throughout the nineteenth century. From the earliest days of the empire, in fact, such strategies had been employed. In 1608, Captain Christopher Newport of Jamestown crowned Chief Powhatan in a coronation ceremony in an effort to make the independent chief an English vassal. During the ceremony, the chief refused to kneel to receive his crown, making the top of his head almost unreachable. See Nicholas Canny, “England New World and the Old, 1480s-1630s,” *OHBE*, vol. 1, *Origins of Empire*, 157.

¹⁸⁴ Cell, 244; Nicholas Dirks, “Introduction,” *Colonialism and Culture*, ed. Nicholas Dirks (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1992), 3.

justifying liberal and order-giving British rule.¹⁸⁵ As invented traditions, they sought to impose a British vision of “traditional” order on the empire. As Timothy Mitchell argues about colonial representations of Egypt: “The colonial process would try and re-order Egypt to appear as a world enframed... It was to be made picture-like and legible, rendered available to political and economic calculation.”¹⁸⁶ On the ground, however, this vision was far more complicated, informed by local encounters and past histories, and could not be dictated by reified colonial knowledge.

Most importantly, royal rituals were not performed in a historical vacuum but were informed by a violent and difficult history of encounters. These tours were not far removed from other kinds of imperial ritual: the everyday violence or threat of violence that proved so fundamental to the efficacy of colonial rule.¹⁸⁷ Moreover, these processes of imperial consolidation followed a long period of warfare and conquest. This chapter argues that imperial rituals, made by limited and flawed colonial knowledge, failed to naturalize British rule and often produced results unintended and undesired by colonial officials.

* * *

The colonial “conquest of knowledge” became an important development of the historical literature on empire over the last few decades, a product of the cultural turn and the valuable contributions of historical anthropologists, such as Bernard Cohn and the

¹⁸⁵ See, for instance, Annie E. Coombes, *Reinventing Africa: Museums, Material Culture, and Popular Imagination in Late Victorian and Edwardian England* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994).

¹⁸⁶ Timothy Mitchell, *Colonising Egypt* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 33.

¹⁸⁷ See Richard Price, *Making Empire: Colonial Encounters and the Creation of Imperial Rule in Nineteenth-Century Africa* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 157.

Comaroffs.¹⁸⁸ The scholarship of historical anthropology added a conceptual richness and texture both to more functionalist approaches to anthropology and to the historical study of empire. It encouraged historians to “read the signs” and to think more thoughtfully about the role of culture and power in the colonial enterprise.¹⁸⁹ Many historians have taken up this call with diverse and fascinating results.

In this context, David Cannadine’s *Ornamentalism* uses the grand ceremonies of the Raj as evidence to make a more general claim that the British saw the social order of the empire as analogous to their own society, “as unequal [one] characterized by a seamless web of layered graduations.”¹⁹⁰ Cannadine articulates a fundamentally Schumpeterian vision of empire as an atavism of British society, made and ruled by conservative, rural, and hereditary elites who identified Indian princes or African chiefs as their social (but not racial) equals and partners (if unequal ones) in governance.¹⁹¹ For the former, however, the recognition of social rank was fundamentally practical, aimed at producing technologies of rule. Lord Lytton, the Viceroy of India, complained to Queen

¹⁸⁸ Bernard Cohn, *Colonialism and Its Forms of Knowledge*, 16. As Nicholas Dirks identifies in his foreword to *Colonialism and Its Forms of Knowledge*, Cohn “had begun to apply an anthropological perspective to the history and its forms of knowledge” decades before the path-breaking work of Michel Foucault and Edward Said. Dirks, “Foreword,” 1. Also of use is Clifton Crais, *White Supremacy and Black Resistance in Pre-Industrial South Africa: The Making of the Colonial Order in the Eastern Cape, 1770-1865* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992).

¹⁸⁹ Clifford Geertz, “Thick Description: Toward an Interpretive Theory of Culture,” in *The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays* (New York: Basic Books, 1973), 3-30; Raphael Samuel, “Reading the Signs,” *History Workshop Journal* 32, no. 1 (1991): 88-109

¹⁹⁰ Cannadine, *Ornamentalism*, 4.

¹⁹¹ Joseph Schumpeter, *Imperialism and Social Classes* (New York: Meridan Books, 1955 reprint). Schumpeter’s sociological assessment of empire challenged the conceptualizations of his contemporaries, John Hobson and V.I. Lenin. Schumpeter argued that imperialism was not a function of industrial or financial capitalism, but at atavism of a previous age.

Victoria shortly after the Prince of Wales' visit in 1875-76 that British rule hitherto relied too heavily

on popular gratitude we have undoubtedly effected in the position of the *ryot* [farmer], by means of costly canals and irrigation works which have greatly embarrassed our finances, and are as yet so little appreciated by the Hindoo rustic that they do not pay the expense of making them.¹⁹²

Instead of wasting British time through improvement projects and economic development, Lytton proposed, the British ought to hold a grand Durbar to celebrate Victoria's new title, Empress of India. In this context, as a form of indirect rule, ornamentalism represented a less expensive and more practical method of rule more than any sense of shared status or values.

In a related vein, Cannadine's neglects racial and cultural difference, the lacuna that has most irked his critics. The cultural construction of difference, a theoretical concept that has informed so many thoughtful and important studies, was a powerful and increasingly potent tendency of British imperial culture during the nineteenth century.¹⁹³ Reading through the official correspondence on the royal tours, one finds that construction of otherness, however, does not adequately explain the processes of imperial rule in their totality. On one hand, British elites may have recognized some semblance of sameness, even if for the practical purposes of rule. On the other, they were often frustrated with tedious ceremonies and complicated social organization, which they imagined as a reflection of local cultures rather than the product of colonial knowledge.

¹⁹² Lord Lytton to Queen Victoria, 4 May 1876, *Letters of Queen Victoria*, Second Series, vol. 2, 460-468.

¹⁹³ Linda Colley, *Britons: Forging a Nation, 1707-1837* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992); Edward Said, *Orientalism* (New York: Vintage Books, 1974). The cultural construction of difference was, of course, not unique to imperial Britain or Europe.

The royal tour sought to appropriate local modes of legitimacy and systems of order into imperial culture, to naturalize British presence in local histories. The adoption of Mughal ceremonies in the Raj is the most well-known example of this phenomenon.¹⁹⁴ In southern Africa, “secret” Malay performances, usually performed in the dead of night, and Zulu “war dances” were incorporated into imperial rituals during the tour of 1860.¹⁹⁵ Broken chiefs and handpicked rajas could be trotted out as symbols of imperial progress and supremacy. The unknown and dangerous of an earlier era was transformed and appropriated into the known and the safe of imperial ritual. They became incorporated into an imperial culture.

From the perspective of the ruled, this ritual order hardly felt like the other side of an imperial looking glass. In this, the conceptual difference between South Asian “civilization” and African and Australasian “tribalism” in the colonial mind breaks down. As the future Edward VII witnessed, the hereditary elites of the Raj were pushed around and abused by colonial administrators during imperial rituals. They were the social products of imperial incorporation and became dependent upon the colonial state for their legitimacy. While Indian princes may have maintained a greater semblance of local

¹⁹⁴ The first sustained contacts between the English and the Mughal Empire occurred during the reign of Jahangir (r. 1605-27), who, unlike his great warrior predecessor Akbar (r. 1556-1605), demonstrated a keen interest in developing court rituals and an imperial culture. As John Richards argues, “The court with its great palace and household and the satellite palaces of the great nobles were glittering ornaments of life in the capital. Court ceremonial and conspicuous display served to impress all those in submission to the Timurid ruler. However, in Jahangir’s reign and thereafter, ossifying ceremony immobilized the principal actors. The emperor especially was encased in a daily round of ceremony. The muffling effect of court life made it more difficult for Jahangir to engage in decisive action in person and more likely that he would delegate active military command. As he lost dynamism, however, the emperor gained in sacral qualities.” The English, then, encountered the Mughals at precisely the moment when its political order was becoming more obviously centered on imperial ritual and cemented the moment of encounter as the reflection of an eternal and unchanging order. John Richards, *The Mughal Empire* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 100-101.

¹⁹⁵ Major John Cowell to Albert, August 16, 1860, RA VIC ADD/20/69.

authority and autonomy than African and Maori chiefs, they similarly became rungs in an imperial hierarchy, subject to British “advice” and intervention. While the accepted paradigm of difference should not be dismissed, a closer look at the colonial encounter of the tour, presented here, suggests that they are overdrawn.

This work does not intend to offer comprehensive coverage of the encounters between local elites and their British rulers during the royal tours. One could write an entire study, or multiple studies, on these encounters. Instead, it uses well-known and well-documented encounters in order to explore how ornamentalist politics were received and appropriated over the first forty years of the royal tour. It could be criticized, with some justification, for its reliance on the imperial archive and English-language sources.¹⁹⁶ While these shortcomings reflect the training and knowledge of the author, they also demonstrate the difficulties of writing a comparative and global history that truly engages with local languages and culture. This work, however, is deeply engaged with the work of African, South Asian, and Pacific scholars, without whom it could not have been written. Moreover, within these methodological and documentary limits, it cross-examines the colonial archive, searching for the instabilities and tensions revealed even whilst looking through imperial eyes.

These limits admitted, the chapter aims to understand, as much as possible, the royal tours from the perspectives of local elites. This chapter posits that local elites interpreted royal encounters through a lens of past histories and experiences and in ways

¹⁹⁶ One recently published narrative of “the colonized” -- the diary of Amar Singh, the son of a prominent nobleman of Jaipur – clearly demonstrates the processes of accommodation and negotiation inherent to colonial rule that this chapter aims to highlight. Yet, such sources, outside of the newspapers, are rather rare. *Reversing the Gaze: Amar Singh's Diary, a Colonial Subject's Narrative of Imperial India*, eds. Susanne Hoeber Rudolph, Lloyd I. Rudolph, and Mohan Singh Kanota (Boulder: Westview Press, 2002).

that colonial officials failed to fully understand or appreciate. Local elites made their own meanings, which both reflected the violent and difficult legacies of colonial rule and (re)appropriated imperial symbolism for their own purposes.

The encounters of this chapter reveal a diverse array of experiences, all of which demonstrate the limits of imperial ritual as a technology of rule. It begins in southern Africa in 1860, with the Xhosa chief Sandile, the King of Basutoland, Moshoeshoe, and the Zulu government chief named Ngoza. The first had been broken by British rule. The second continued to fend it off but sought British protection against settler incursions into his kingdom. The third was made by British rule. Moving in time and space to 1868 New Zealand, I will explore the implications of the Alfred's visit to the Maori King movement, which Governor George Bowen sought unsuccessfully to incorporate into imperial culture. The chapter then continues on to the Prince of Wales' tour of India in 1875, where the tales of the Nizam of Hyderabad and the Gaekwad of Baroda explicate the limits of the royal tour as a technology of rule. Finally, the chapter concludes with a brief discussion of the 1901 royal tour as a way of understanding the consolidation and limits of British ornamentalist politics, which had reached their developmental zenith as methods of imperial rule at precisely the moment they were being effectively transcended in imperial political culture by "modern" forms of citizenship and dissent.¹⁹⁷

¹⁹⁷ This does not mean to suggest that a powerful tradition of chiefship did not continue to profoundly influence local and national politics after 1901, particularly in the countryside and on African reserves. The argument here is one about British and imperial politics, the African voices of which became overwhelmingly urban and Western educated. See Paul Landau, *Popular Politics in the History of South Africa, 1400–1948* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).

Moshoeshoe (1860)

By 1860, when the fifteen-year-old Alfred, Queen Victoria's second son, visited South Africa, King Moshoeshoe, or Moshesh, of Basutoland (Basotoland, now Lesotho) was an old man of over 70 years. A state-builder on the southern highveld of southern Africa, Moshoeshoe incorporated a diverse array of subjects, including those fleeing the expansion of the Zulu kingdom and the growth of European settlement, under his rule by offering patronage and security. He was not a hereditary chief leading a timeless tribe, but someone who used the instability brought on by shifting local politics and colonial intervention to create political sovereignty. In this sense, the nature of his rule was not a novelty to the political culture of southern Africa but the very essence of it. In effect, his kingship was an invented tradition.

A savvy political leader, Moshoeshoe won the fealty of his subjects through generosity, protection, and accommodation; he spoke both Sesotho and Zulu, enabling him to converse with a diverse number of his subjects, and rewarded loyal Basuto through a cattle-loaning system called *mafisa*.¹⁹⁸ In 1840, one of Moshoeshoe's Zulu-speaking subjects told the French missionary Thomas Arbousset's translator that those who had fled to Basutoland "are no longer foreigners in your country... Dingane, I served him for a while; I have also served his father... Believe me, friend, Dingane is nothing to me any more, nor to my family. We are Basotho."¹⁹⁹ While the mythology of Moshoeshoe as the founder of a modern Basuto nation is a product of later Basuto chiefs'

¹⁹⁸ Elizabeth Eldredge, *Power in Colonial Africa: Conflict and Discourse in Lesotho, 1870-1960* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2007), 28-32.

¹⁹⁹ Thomas Arbousset, *Missionary Excursion into the Blue Mountains, Being an Account of King Moshoeshoe Expedition from Thaba-Bosiu to the Sources of the Malibamatso River in the Year 1840*, ed. and trans. David Ambrose and Albert Brutsch (Moriya, Lesotho: Morija Archives, 1991), 107.

ideological work to fend off incorporation into the Union of South Africa, he did effectively build an identifiably modern, non-ethnic state that appealed to and appropriated both African political traditions and facets of European culture, most significantly by welcoming European missionaries, taking on the French missionary Eugene Casalis as his European advisor, and importing guns.²⁰⁰

Moshoeshe had paid tribute to King Shaka with cattle and ostrich feathers and avoided conflict with later Zulu kings during his reign; he also fended off attacks by the Nguni-speaking Amangwane and by the Amandebele, to whom he offered cattle as gifts in exchange for their retreat.²⁰¹ By the 1830s, Moshoeshe had forged alliances with other chiefs in the region to emerge as the most powerful ruler in the region, the *Morena e Moholo* or Paramount Chief. Conflict with settler farmers in the fertile Caledon Valley, however, threatened his sovereignty and the territorial integrity of his kingdom.

Moshoeshe allowed European settlers, mostly Boers, to graze their herds in his territory, informing them in a “Circular” that his permission did not constitute permanent settlement and that they were required to respect his paramountcy.²⁰² While the farmers had petitioned Moshoeshe for this right, proof that they recognized his authority in the territory, they soon claimed ownership of the land as property, which had never been Moshoeshe’s intention. In 1843, the Governor of the Cape George Napier made a treaty with Moshoeshe that officially recognized his sovereignty between the Orange and

²⁰⁰ Scott Rosenberg, “Promises of Moshoeshe: Culture, Nationalism, and Identity in Lesotho, 1902-1966” (Ph.D. diss., Indiana University, 1998); Scott Rosenberg, “Monuments, Holidays, and Remembering Moshoeshe: The Emergence of National Identity in Lesotho, 1902-1966” *Africa Today*, 46, no. 1 (Winter 1999): 49-72.

²⁰¹ Eldredge, 28.

²⁰² Eldredge, *South African Kingdom*, 48-49.

Calendon Rivers, and 25 or 30 miles north of the Calendon.²⁰³ The motivations behind the protection of Basutoland as a “colonial enclave” was not entirely or even primarily altruistic, however; it was principally aimed at checking Boer expansionism in the interior of southern Africa.²⁰⁴

British intervention in Basutoland left Moshoeshe with a quasi-sovereignty that recognized him as the Paramount Chief for the purposes of colonial rule but largely relinquished the territorial control of his kingdom to British administrators. In 1845, Governor Maitland ceded further “alienable” territories to the Boers; three years later, Governor Harry Smith annexed the territory between the Orange and the Vaal, giving more land to the Boers and separating Moshoeshe from his African neighbors.²⁰⁵

Having stockpiled weapons at his capital, Thaba Bosiu, he was able to successfully defend himself twice, in 1851 and 1852, when British expeditions sought to punish him for the cattle raiding of his subjects. In 1854, the British abandoned this arrangement and left Moshoeshe to deal with his land-hungry settler neighbors on his own.²⁰⁶ The British government renounced its sovereignty north of the Orange River and recognized the Orange Free State, an independent Boer republic in Moshoeshe’s backyard.²⁰⁷ In 1858, Moshoeshe’s well-positioned military force was able to fend off an army mustered by

²⁰³ Eldredge, *South African Kingdom*, 50.

²⁰⁴ Laura Benton, “The Geography of Quasi-Sovereignty: Westlake, Maine, and the Legal Politics of Colonial Enclaves,” *International Law and Justice Working Papers* 5 (2006). <http://www.iilj.org/publications/2006-5Benton.asp> (accessed 31 May 2009), 46.

²⁰⁵ Eldredge, 51.

²⁰⁶ Leonard Thompson, *Survival in Two Worlds: Moshoeshe of Lesotho, 1786-1870* (Claredon, 1975), 175; also see Peters Sanders’ conceptually similar work on Moshoeshe, published the same year, *Moshoeshe, Chief of the Sotho* (Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann, 1975).

²⁰⁷ Thompson, 169.

the Free State. In the aftermath of this war, Sir George Grey negotiated a new boundary, but Moshoeshoe knew that the white settlers encroaching on his kingdom would not be appeased.

Despite the capricious nature of British protection in the past, the Basuto king continued to assert his loyalty to the queen and his alliance with the British as the only hope for the long-term stability and autonomy of his besieged kingdom. Victoria was not the first powerful chief to whom Moshoeshoe had paid tribute, and Moshoeshoe the skilled diplomat understood the British to be the lesser of two evils. His requests for imperial protection, ignored by George Grey, used the 1860 tour to bypass the colonial bureaucracy and appeal directly to Prince Alfred, handing him a letter to the Great White Queen herself.²⁰⁸

The meeting between Moshoeshoe and Prince Alfred at Aliwal North on the Orange River was, like other royal encounters, pre-scripted by colonial officials. The meeting place was a symbolic one; it was at Aliwal North where Moshoeshoe had signed a deal brokered by George Grey in 1858 to settle Basutoland's boundary with the Orange Free State and would later, in 1869, be forced to cede rich territory to the OFS in a second treaty. J. Austen, the Superintendent of the Wittebergen Native Reserve, brought 600 armed locals, performing war-songs and appearing appropriately "native" to meet Alfred.²⁰⁹ By inviting Moshoeshoe to meet Prince Alfred and planning an act of imperial theatre, complete with native warriors pacified by British rule, colonial administrators in southern Africa sought to incorporate the great chief into imperial culture. Moshoeshoe

²⁰⁸ Leonard Thompson, *Survival in Two Worlds: Moshoeshoe of Lesotho, 1786-1870* (Claredon, 1975), 268.

²⁰⁹ Solomon, 75.

was cast in a small role as the loyal African chief, who came onstage to express loyalty to and submit to the Great Queen. Moshoeshoe did play his role but also appropriated the imperial ritual, turning it on its head.²¹⁰

The British viewed Moshoeshoe in deeply ambiguous terms. Part of this ambiguity was a reflection of Moshoeshoe's uncertain relationship with the British state in South Africa, as not wholly inside or outside of its dominion. He was the unconquered sovereign of a semi-independent African kingdom. On one hand, Moshoeshoe was represented as a brave general and a skilled politician.²¹¹ He was described as sympathetic to European missionaries and expressed loyalty to Britain. His conflict with local settlers from the Orange Free State was depicted as a struggle against Boer tyranny. On the other hand, dressed like a respectable Victoria gentleman, complete with a top hat, Moshoeshoe was described as a comedic product of cultural mimicry, like a child in his father's suit. It troubled the progressives in Cape Town, who otherwise petitioned on his behalf, that Moshoeshoe was "still professedly... a heathen," despite his openness to Christian missionaries.²¹² In particular, he was judged harshly for his acquisition of many wives and for the distribution of women to loyal subjects.²¹³ Moshoeshoe was seen as astute but potentially menacing, cunning but absurd.

²¹⁰ Cetshwayo, during his visit to England in 1882, compared himself to Queen Victoria: "She, like myself, was born to rule men. We are alike." Neil Parsons, "No Longer Rare Birds": Zulu, Ndebele, Gaza, and Swazi Envoys to England, 1882-1894," in *Black Victorians/Black Victoriana*, ed. Gretchen Holbrook Gerzina (Rutgers, 2003), 114.

²¹¹ Solomon, 76; *Natal Mercury*, October 11, 1860.

²¹² Solomon, 76.

²¹³ *Ibid.*

In meeting Prince Alfred, Moshoeshoe made his own spectacle. He arrived on horseback, with three hundred followers amid muskets firing and “the hurrahs and shouts both of Europeans and natives.”²¹⁴ When the fire and smoke cleared, the chief “took off his hat, bowed gracefully, and stretched out his hand” in the direction of Alfred.²¹⁵ He caused much excitement, even more than Alfred did, as the assembled group of onlookers crowded around him, hoping to shake his hand.²¹⁶ When one observer, a local writer, suggested that Moshoeshoe might retire after his long ride, he said to “let them come. I like to see them, and will tire them all out yet.”²¹⁷ While imagined as a minor player in an act of imperial theatre by colonial officials, Moshoeshoe was more than capable of creating his own spectacle.

The local natives brought to Aliwal North played their roles as tamed savages. Moshoeshoe’s entourage was equipped with flags and banners, with messages in Sotho about Alfred and his mother: “God save the Queen,” “You are welcome, chief, son of the Queen,” “[The] Basuto place their trust in the Queen.”²¹⁸ Local people from the native reserve were lined up on each side of the road, those dressed in European-style clothing on one side, “the more savage-looking ones in the native war-dress” on the other.²¹⁹ The *Cape Argus* described their responses in detail:

²¹⁴ *Cape Argus*, quoted in Solomon, 77.

²¹⁵ *Natal Mercury*, October 11, 1860.

²¹⁶ Solomon, 77.

²¹⁷ *Ibid.*

²¹⁸ *Ibid.*. *Molimo o boluke Mofumagali, U thile hauthle morena, mora, Mofumgali, Basuto ba tsepile Mofumagali.*

²¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 78.

[Those wearing European clothing], as the Prince and his party passed, all bowed to the ground, shouting "Khosi! Khosi! Khosi!" while the line of savages gave a simultaneous shudder and shrunk behind their shields, against which they rattled their assegais. The gesture was a very horrid one, but was meant for a very respectful and dutiful greeting, and the Prince bowed from one side to the other, as if they had been so many ladies and gentlemen in Hyde Park.²²⁰

Such a “horrid” performance demonstrated the placidity and progress of previously threatening natives and the effectiveness of imperial rule. As the local natives performed “war dances” and “burst forth into the tune of ‘God Save the Queen’ in their own language,” Moshoeshoe, Alfred, and Grey paraded beneath the banners and arches to a house for Dutch religious services, after which the gifts were exchanged.²²¹

The exchange of gifts was always an important ritual of royal encounters with indigenous people, and the meeting between Moshoeshoe and Alfred was no exception. It was a practice most clearly associated with expensive royal visits and Durbars of the Raj but had been a part of British imperial culture in some form since the earliest days of British exploration.²²² Moshoeshoe gave Alfred three tiger-skin karosses, one from his

²²⁰ *Cape Argus*, quoted in Solomon, 78; quoted almost verbatim in *Natal Mercury*, October 11, 1860.

²²¹ *Natal Mercury*, October 10, 1860. Some of this performance was conducted by Moshoeshoe’s son, Isekelo. The settler newspapers, such as the *Mercury*, described these performances as spontaneous expressions of loyalty rather than choreographed imperial rituals. The *Mercury* also reported natives singing, “Our chief has come whom we longed for” (presumably about Alfred).

²²² From the first encounters, Europeans understood gift exchanges to be a requirement of local ritual cultures. In 1625, the Levant Company decided to keep Thomas Roe on as ambassador in face of royal pressure to remove him, in part, because “it sought to avoid an expensive investment in a new officer and his new gifts for local leaders.” Alison Games, *Web of Empire: English Cosmopolitans in an Age of Expansion, 1560-1660* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 159. When Albert Edward visited India in 1875, as we shall see, British MPs and the public protested the costs of the tour, which were weighed down by a large budget for gifts, sparking protests across Britain. Despite these complaints, the culture of gift giving was adopted as a standard ritual practice of imperial rule across the empire from the its earliest days and might be better understood as a co-invention, made in the colonial encounter, rather than a British invention or a local “imposition.”

brother Letsie who was too ill to come.²²³ Moshoeshoe, according to colonial accounts, asked the prince for “some token in the prince's handwriting... that he might take back with him and show his people.”²²⁴ Alfred obliged, giving the Basuto king a signed photograph of himself, the gift of royal image that was so typical of such exchanges.²²⁵

On the surface, this encounter appears to conform exactly to the message that Grey sought to convey through the royal tour: a rather savage, unsophisticated present from the African and a product of British progress and technology, if basically a trinket, from Alfred. The kaross from Moshoeshoe might be seen as a symbolic investment in British rule as Moshoeshoe ultimately appealed to Queen Victoria as a loyal ally who sought her protection and patronage. Moshoeshoe's interest in the photograph shows it offered a powerful, even magical, representation of the monarchy's efficacy.²²⁶ As Thomas Spear has argued, political legitimacy is always “subject to local discourses of power,” and Moshoeshoe was merely re-ascribing and inventing his own sovereignty and authority, in part by appealing to his relationship to Britain and its Great Queen.²²⁷ While what Alfred and Moshoeshoe discussed is unknown, their interviews were translated, it must be noted, by George Grey, giving him the power to embellish, omit, and invent the

²²³ *King William's Town Gazette*, September 4, 1860.

²²⁴ Solomon, 79.

²²⁵ John Cowell to Albert, August 19, 1860, RA VIC ADD/20/69.

²²⁶ A European certainly would be astounded by a photograph at this very early date.

²²⁷ Thomas Spear, “Neo-Traditionalism and the Limits of Invention in British Colonial Africa,” *Journal of African History* 44 (2003):, 9.

language of the encounter.²²⁸ After the gift-giving, Alfred retired for much-needed rest as locals bustled around the illuminated village and a massive bonfire in the market square.

The next day Alfred and Moshoeshoe met again. The ceremonies commenced with more “war-dancing and the chanting of songs in an aboriginal fashion.”²²⁹ The settlers of Aliwal and the French missionaries from Basutoland addressed the prince, expressing their loyalty to the queen. After delivering a letter addressed to Queen Victoria to the prince, Moshoeshoe and his counselors sat for a photograph, which remains the best-known image of the Basuto king.²³⁰ Photography, as scholars have argued, was a form of colonial knowledge that acquired and appropriated the “other” into the realm of the known.²³¹ The photograph of Moshoeshoe represented a cultural appropriation of his image into imperial culture, proof of a civilization-giving and liberal British imperialism. At the same time, Moshoeshoe used his role in imperial rituals, his relationship with the Great Queen, and even his own photograph to re-make his own symbolic role in the “nation” of Basutoland.

Moshoeshoe came to see the teenage prince not because he longed to pay his respects to the Great Queen but because he stood imperial intervention might be the only thing that stood between his kingdom and the settler “scourge.”²³² While the British

²²⁸ *Natal Mercury*, October 10, 1860.

²²⁹ Solomon, 80.

²³⁰ The image was featured on a 1970 Lesotho postage stamp.

²³¹ Paul Landau, “An Amazing Distance: Pictures and People in Africa,” introduction to *Images and Empires: Visuality in Colonial and Postcolonial Africa* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002), 1-40.

²³² Moshoeshoe to Alfred, August 18, 1860, *Basutoland Records* (Cape Town: W.A. Richards and Sons, 1883), 568.

reports convey a Moshoeshoe amazed by the presence of a flesh-and-blood prince – proof that the Great White Queen did really exist – the Basuto king was no stranger to the potential risks of inviting British “protection.” He also recognized, from experience, that the British were fickle allies and that imperial protection was limited and subject to the political winds in Cape Town and London. Thus, regardless British policy toward his kingdom, he would continue running guns and stockpiling arms to defend his kingdom against British and Boer alike.

Yet, as a political strategist, he recognized the value of loyalty to the Queen and allegiance to the empire in fending off the settler threat. He knew that being attached to the British Empire was the only way to protect his kingdom from local settlers and sought to use it to re-invent his own political authority. As colonial administrators such as Grey sought to channel local protest into the fundamentally apolitical formulation of imperial ritual, Moshoeshoe used the opportunity to express “a hope that the relations which existed between him and the British government in the time of Sir Harry Smith and other Governors might be restored,” that is, some degree of British protection against the incursions of Boer settlers.²³³ Grey immediately moved to end this unscripted conversation, telling the Bausto chief that “his best course would be to embody his request in a letter to the Queen instead of addressing himself to the Prince” and that “Prince Alfred will not hear anything further on the subject.”²³⁴ The effect of his letter to

²³³ Major John Cowell to Albert, August 19, 1860, RA VIC ADD/20/69. It is unclear if Moshoeshoe was pandering to his audience by celebrating past British justice or if the period of British annexation now appeared to be, relatively speaking, a more promising arrangement.

²³⁴ Major John Cowell to Albert, August 14, 1860, RA VIC ADD/20/69.

the figurehead queen was probably nil, but the attempt reflects on the ways that the symbolic space of imperial rituals could be used and subverted by their participants.

Moshoeshoe's political genius not in the creation of a "nation" of Basutos but in his brand of *realpolitik* informed by the experiences of his long reign. His foreign policy, with both Africans and Europeans, relied on peacemaking, alliances, and incorporation when possible, gunrunning and warfare when these *détentes* expired.²³⁵ As his performance in 1860 suggests, Moshoeshoe's skillful brand of *realpolitik* prevented the complete annihilation of his sovereignty, but he also let "the snake in the house."²³⁶ His successors, increasingly sewn in by European settlement, were less successful in maintaining local sovereignty. In 1871, Basutoland came under British protection, administered by the Cape Colony, and subjected to what amounted to a British residency.²³⁷ While the most fertile lands of Moshoeshoe's kingdom, the fertile crest west of the Caledon, were ceded to land-hungry Boer settlers, it remained a quasi-independent African state under British protection through the twentieth century. During the early 1880s, when several chiefs including Mkorosi rebelled against Cape-appointed magistrates, its administration was taken over by London. Major General Charles Gordon's proposition to replace the magistrates with British residents modeled on India, while rejected, reflects the slow devolution of Basuto as a political state from sovereignty

²³⁵ Moshoeshoe's skillful foreign policy with Europeans is clearly illustrated in his meeting with President Boshof of the Orange Free State and Governor George Grey of the Cape Colony in 1855. There is a clear narrative disjuncture between Moshoeshoe's challenges to the political legitimacy of European complaints against him and the self-legitimizing evolution of European policy toward war against him. See André du Toit and Hermann Giliomee, *Afrikaner Political Thought*, vol. 1 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983), 188-194.

²³⁶ Eldredge, 82.

²³⁷ Sandra Burman, *Chieftdom Politics and Alien Law: Basutoland under Cape Rule, 1871-1884* (New York: Macmillan, 1981).

to quasi-sovereignty.²³⁸ It also reveals a comparability of British policy in colonial enclaves across the global political space of empire. As the 1901 tour will demonstrate, Moshoeshoe's successors had few opportunities to challenge the symbolic space of the royal visit.

Sandile (1860)

Alfred's 1860 meeting with the Xhosa chief Sandile was meant to display the wondrous effects of British civilization on a humbled foe. From Queen's Town, Sandile was invited by Alfred, at the request of Governor George Grey, to go to Natal and on to Cape Town by sea and, in the near future, to Britain.²³⁹ *The King William's Town Gazette* saw the invitation as an opportunity "to extend [Sandile's] knowledge by visiting various parts of the colony... [and to] witness the [ceremonial] demonstrations made at Cape Town" "where he will behold many thousands assembled to welcome [the prince]."²⁴⁰ Grey proposed the idea to the Colonial Office by arguing that "the good feeling and confidence thus created between the two Races [by Alfred's visit] should be fully matured" by having "some of the leading Kaffirs" travel to Cape Town so that they might have "an opportunity of becoming tolerably well acquainted with our power, and modes of thought and action."²⁴¹ Both Grey and *The Gazette* understood that exposing Sandile to

²³⁸ Benton, 47-48.

²³⁹ *King William's Town Gazette*, August 24 1860

²⁴⁰ *King William's Town Gazette*, August 24 1860; Major John Cowell to Albert, August 14, 1860, RA VIC ADD/20/69.

²⁴¹ George Grey to CO, September 20, 1860, NA CO 48/404/48-52. Grey articulated his motivations for establishing Zonnebloem, the "Kaffir College," in very similar language: "that England might exercise, through means of an institution which conferred great benefits upon them, her due

royal ritual and the modern splendor of Cape Town and London was a means of securing his loyalty and obedience. For them, Sandile was a symbol, representative of British progress and expansion in South Africa.

At the opening of the South African Library and Museum in Cape Town, with the Xhosa chief present, Grey gave a long speech not about the violence and destruction that had characterized Britain's relationship with men like Sandile but about the glorious possibilities of civilization and Christianity that awaited southern Africa. According to Grey, Alfred came from an island that represented, when Egyptian civilization prospered, "almost the confines of the habitable earth, and was only peopled by hordes of painted and lawless savages," "slumber[ing] in savage barbarism."²⁴² Great Britain had risen over the centuries to become "the centre of Christianity and civilization,-- from that great heart, the ceaseless pulsations of which scatter truth, swarms of industrious emigrants [sic], crowds of traders, and streams of commerce throughout the world."²⁴³ The Britain of the past represented the Africa of the present in the hierarchy of civilizations. In this vein, Grey focused, in particular, on the issue of Western education, of civilizing Africans and making them useful to Europeans.

This was the rhetoric of liberal imperialism, of an empire of liberty and free trade rather than one of violence and conquest. The vision of empire also reflects Grey's "native policy" of cultural assimilation," which he pursued during his tenures as governor in both New Zealand and the Cape colony. In his own words, the policy of cultural

influence over the native chiefs around us." Janet Hodgson, *History of Zonnebloem College*, MA. thesis (University of Cape Town, 1975), 178.

²⁴² Enclosure to George Grey to CO, September 20, 1860, NA CO 48/404/57-60.

²⁴³ Ibid.

assimilation was designed to “induce [indigenous people] to adopt our customs and laws in place of their own, which the system I propose to introduce will gradually undermine and destroy.”²⁴⁴ The processes of converting indigenous people to Christianity and civilization, through institutions such as Grey’s “Kaffir College” called Zonnebloem, did not so simply represent a civilizing mission, whereby well-intentioned British men and women could raise African civilization as they had their own. It was part-and-parcel of the broader processes of destruction and neutralization brought on by decades of frontier wars and millennial movements, such as the Xhosa cattle killing of 1856-57, which helped make such cultural imperialism possible.

In his speech, Grey went on to describe the methods of this enlightenment, through the spatial expansion of European people and culture:

Those who have preceded us here as colonists [presumably the Boers] have done much to lay the foundation for such an attempt; they have already spread over a great extent of territory, large numbers of the coloured races have accepted the doctrines of Christianity and have adopted some of the arts of civilized life, and many others are daily following their example in some respects. But still we are a small and scattered people, with many dangers and enemies around us and in our front.²⁴⁵

The rugged frontier settlers, “patient of fatigues and want, self-reliant, and many of them good and pious men,” stood at the vanguard of this mission.²⁴⁶ Grey had his eye on the “high plateau [that] exists in the interior of the continent, healthy and habitable for

²⁴⁴ Letters Dispatched by High Commissioner, Cape Archives, Cape Town, South Africa, Grey to Maclean, September 17 1855, CH 30/4, cited in James Gump, “Sir George Grey’s Encounter with the Maori and the Xhosa, 1845-1868,” *Journal of World History* 9 (March 1998): 90.

²⁴⁵ Enclosure to George Grey to Colonial Office, September 20, 1860, NA CO 48/404/57-60.

²⁴⁶ *Ibid.*

Europeans.”²⁴⁷ The progress represented by the opening of the museum, the spread of civilization, and the presence of Sandile was embodied in the person of Alfred.²⁴⁸ The language of the civilizing mission was not always so directly tied to the more violent and expansionist tendencies of colonialism, but in Grey’s case it clearly was. He equated progress with cultural destruction and physical expansion.

Yet, Sandile was not a passive symbol or prop of British propaganda but someone with a long history of experiences with British rule in southern Africa. The idea that Sandile would experience the spectacle of imperial order and thus become a more docile subject ignored the long history of violence and British duplicity on the Eastern Cape. Yet, in a letter Grey claimed was written by Sandile to the captain of Alfred’s ship *Euraylus*, John Tarleton, the Xhosa chief celebrated and honored British rule in South Africa while describing his encounter with Prince Alfred:

The invitation [to travel to Cape Town] was accepted with fear. With dread we came on board, and in trouble have we witnesses the dangers of the great waters; but through your skill have we passed through this tribulation... We have seen what our ancestors heard not of. How have we grown old and learn’t wisdom. The might of England has been fully illustrated to us; and now we behold our madness in taking up arms to resist the authority of our mighty and gracious Sovereign. Up to this time have we not ceased to be amazed at the wonderful things we have witnessed, and which are beyond our comprehension. But one thing we understand, the reason of England’s greatness, when the Son of her great Queen becomes subject to a subject, that he may learn wisdom, when the sons of England’s chiefs and nobles leave the homes and wealth of their fathers and with the young Prince endure hardships and sufferings in order that they may be wise, and become a defence to their country, when we behold these things we see why the English are a great and mighty nation.... And now great chief we end by expressing our gratitude that we

²⁴⁷ Ibid.

²⁴⁸ Ibid.

have had this opportunity of seeing so much. From our hearts we thank you for your kindness and attention to us. We have been cared for in every way and all our wants supplied. The chiefs under you have shown us every kindness, and the people under them have acted to us as countrymen and brothers; this we more highly esteem as it was unlooked for and unexpected. We feared we had come among a strange people who would look upon us as their enemies, but it has been otherwise... What we have here seen, and all the kindness received shall never be forgotten.²⁴⁹

Richard Price posits that this letter was a forgery by Grey, written to legitimize his ideology and methods to colonial officials back in Britain and to represent “a public, official recognition of the capitulation of the Xhosa.”²⁵⁰ Since the main argument of this chapter is that indirect rule and ornamentalism were generally limited in effect as methods of rule for older indigenous political figures, who had experienced the destruction and violence of British rule, Sandile’s history with the British is worth considering in addition to his more specific encounter with Prince Alfred.

Sandile was well-versed in British deception. The War of the Axe concluded in 1847 when the chief was invited by the British to negotiate a settlement, only to be locked up in a “small unheated” room and threatened of deadly consequences if he tried to escape.²⁵¹ He was the half-brother of Maqoma, a chief who had been publicly threatened and embarrassed by Sir Harry Smith, the Governor of the Cape Colony, in the

²⁴⁹ Enclosure to George Grey to Duke of Newcastle, September 20, 1860, Sandile to Chief [Captain] Tarleton, CO 48/404/50-56.

²⁵⁰ Price, 473.

²⁵¹ Jeff Peires, *The Dead Will Arise: Nongqawuse and the Great Xhosa Cattle-Killing Movement of 1856-* (Indiana, 1989), 4. A British settler named George Southey had murdered the Gcaleka Xhosa chief, Hintsá, in 1835 after Smith had lured him to his camp with the promise of negotiations. Colonists or soldiers had kept Hintsá’s ears, and possibly his genitals, as souvenirs. See Alan Lester, *Imperial Networks: Creating Identities in Nineteenth Century South Africa and Britain* (Routledge, 2001), 124-125

aftermath of the war.²⁵² Smith had annexed their father Ngqika's territory as Queen Adelaide Province in 1835. When Sandile was called to a meeting by Smith in 1850, the chief wisely refused to go and was subsequently deposed. Over the next decade, warfare with the British and a millennial movement that climaxed in the Xhosa cattle killing of 1856-7 ripped the fabric of the Xhosa societies apart. The South African historian Jeff Peires describes the Sandile Alfred met as a broken man who "existed as a mere cipher, drinking heavily and clinging ever harder to traditional customs," not a likely candidate for the conversion imagined by George Grey.²⁵³ To add insult to injury, Sandile was required to tour "what were once his own dominions" with Grey and Alfred.²⁵⁴ Royal rituals and imperial splendor could not so easily excise the past.

The figure of Sandile was used as to symbolize the success of colonial native policy and African docility even before Alfred encountered him. In Graham's Town, Alfred was presented with a transparency of Sandile, "in his kaross, holding forth a branch, emblematic of peace, and trampling an assegai under his foot," at the residence of W.R. Thompson.²⁵⁵ Sandile and some of his people, accompanied by the Resident Commissioner Charles Brownlee, joined Alfred's entourage on its way to Queen's Town. Saul Solomon's narrative of the tour noted that Africans "were in strange guise enough, and in their partial adaptation of European habiliments, seemed more *outré* than if

²⁵² Peires, 6. Also see Richard Price, "Violence, Humiliation and Paternalism in Imperial Culture: Sir Harry Smith and the Xhosa Chiefs 1835-1850." North American Conference on British Studies, Denver, CO, October 7-9, 2005.

²⁵³ Jeff Peires, "Sandile," *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, online edn (Oxford University Press, Sept 2004). <http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/53768>, accessed 15 April 2008.

²⁵⁴ Major John Cowell to Albert, August 15, 1860, RA VIC ADD/20/69.

²⁵⁵ Solomon, 40.

dressed, or undressed in the barbaric simplicity of native costume.”²⁵⁶ Sandile greeted Alfred, who spent some time interviewing him, although no extant account of their conversation exists. When asked to go to Cape Town by sea, Sandile’s followers apparently begged him not to go. While this was dismissed by settlers and the press as the childish fears of uneducated people, their concerns were well-justified, given the history between the British and the Xhosa chiefs, including Sandile himself.

In addition to attending the dedication of the new library and museum, Sandile was present at the most elaborate and celebrated ritual of the visit: the ceremonial tipping of the first truck of stone into the bay, beginning the construction of the Table Bay breakwater. He was an object of attention for the crowd, with whom he briefly interacted before the festivities began. It is unclear what exactly Sandile was supposed to get out of this ceremony. In his visit to the home of Rev. William Thompson of the London Missionary Society, Sandile told the missionary, “Now I see how foolish I have been, in trying to resist such a mighty power, but I will do so no longer.”²⁵⁷ While perhaps no more reliable than the letter from Grey, since it passed through Brownlee’s translation and was recorded by the missionary’s daughter, this remark better reflects Sandile’s experiences with British rule. He had been battered and bruised by it, and no level of pomp and circumstance would convert him to the progress of British rule.

²⁵⁶ Solomon, 63. Dressing partly or fully in the style of Europeans was, paradoxically, a frequent criticism of indigenous people by European commentators, e.g. for trying to pass as “white” or civilized. Of course, those who dressed in “native” styles (whether traditional or invented) were depicted as noble savages, or just plain savages. This reflects on the dilemma experienced by people of color in an imperial world, that they, in striving toward respectability, were seen by Europeans as, at best, “almost the same, but not quite.” See Homi Bhabha, *The Location of Culture* (New York: Routledge, 1994), 122.

²⁵⁷ “An Evening Visit from Sandili, the Kaffir Chief, to the Rev. W. Thompson, of Cape Town,” *The Juvenile Missionary Magazine* 18 (January 1861): 19.

Sandile had no reason to trust the British, even with the royal son present. In his performance of loyalty to the Queen, Sandile knew that he had to speak and act carefully. He interpreted the royal tour through his own life experiences and acted in a way that demonstrates the instabilities of metropolitan-produced narratives of benevolent monarchy and loyal subjects. It is also worth noting that, when Alfred and Sandile visited Zonnebloem College, George Grey's "Kaffir College" aimed at inoculating chiefs' sons with a dose of British civilization, the students were more excited to meet Sandile, as a symbol of resistance to colonial domination, than to meet the son of the Great White Queen.²⁵⁸ Like Moshoeshoe, this abused and broken chief could produce spectacles of his own making.

In the end, Sandile would indelibly corrupt his place in colonial propaganda. Nearly twenty years later, in 1877, the Ngqika Xhosa chief rose up against the British in support of the Gcaleka Xhosa king Sarhili in a conflict known as the War of Ngqayecibi (1877-78, also called the Ninth Frontier War). Besieged in the Isidenge forests, Sandile was killed in battle by loyalist Mfengu volunteers. As David Bunn has demonstrated, Sandile participated in another kind of imperial ritual in death.²⁵⁹ His body was left to decompose in the bush for two days before British authorities collected it. As Sandile's grave was about to be filled in, Commandant Schermbrucker gave a eulogy, a warning against disloyalty to the queen:

²⁵⁸ Janet Hodgson, "Xhosa Chiefs in Cape Town in the Mid-19th century," *Studies in the History of Cape Town* 2 (1980): 59. Cited in Vivian Bickford-Smith, "Revisiting Anglicisation in the Nineteenth Century Cape Colony," in *The British World: Diaspora, Culture and Identity*, ed. Carl Bridge and Kent Fedorowitch (Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 2003), 91.

²⁵⁹ David Bunn, "The Sleep of the Brave: Graves as Sites and Sins in the Colonial Eastern Cape," in *Images and Empires*, 78-89.

[Sandile] has been denied the honours which are usually accorded even by the enemy. Had he fallen on the side of his Queen... he would have been buried in a manner befitting his rank. This is the last chief of the Gaikas; let his life and death be a warning to you... Instead of being lords and masters in the country they once owned, [Sandile's followers] will now be servants.²⁶⁰

His was buried between the bodies of two British troopers in order to “to keep the blackguard quiet.”²⁶¹ In life, his symbol was used to exhibit the effectiveness of liberal imperial rule in southern Africa, a powerful chief humbled by the power of the British and the generosity of the Great Queen. In revolt and death, he represented the consequences of challenging this imperial order. Sandile’s rebellion may have failed, but he repossessed the meaning of his life, revealing the dissonance between the symbols and practices of rule in southern Africa.

Ngoza (1860)

Alfred met another chief while visiting Natal in 1860, Ngoza kaLuduba, who was described by colonial officials as the supreme chief of the Zulu. Ngoza had served in the Zulu army under King Dingane and entered the colony of Natal in 1843, where he worked in a settler’s kitchen until he caught the attention of the Secretary of Native Affairs in Natal, Theophilus Shepstone, in 1847.²⁶² Working as an agent for Shepstone against a “recalcitrant” local chief, Ngoza was installed as a native strongman (*induna*) in

²⁶⁰ Quoted in Bunn, 78. Bunn reports that the London newspapers instead focused on the “decency of funeral rites.”

²⁶¹ Bunn, 79. In 1862, the last Mughal emperor, Bahadur Shah Zafar II, who was symbolically restored as the sovereign of India during the 1857 war, was buried in an anonymous grave filled with lime, to insure rapid decomposition, in Rangoon. Wiliam Dalrymple, *The Last Mughal: The Fall of a Dynasty, Delhi, 1857* (New York: Bloomsbury, 2006), 1.

²⁶² Pieres, 54.

the Mngeni valley of Natal.²⁶³ Shepstone placed more and more African settlers under his authority, and he became “a government chief, one of the *iziphakanyiswa* – those ‘raised up.’”²⁶⁴ The appropriation of Zulu titles and political traditions, as the British imagined them, were central to the imperial culture that the royal tours were designed to nurture.

When Alfred came to southern Africa in 1860, the Zulu kingdom was represented not by King Mpande and the independent Zulu kingdom north of Natal but by Shepstone’s government chief Ngoza in “war dances” choreographed by Shepstone himself. Instead of wearing the attire of respectable African chief (hat, coat, etc.), he wore a costume of feathers, tiger skins, and ostrich feathers that borrowed from some combination of local traditions and European ideas about what a Zulu chief ought to look like.²⁶⁵ As the supreme chief, Ngoza led the dances, “under the effective management and direction of T. Shepstone.”:

Goza’s bands began the ball, coming up towards the spectator like a surging line of inky surf, making, at the same time, a whole hurricane of noise. They advance, they retreat, they leap aloft into the air, they kneel and crouch to the ground, placing their shields before them. They become frantic, brandishing their spear-sticks, and kicking with knee and foot against their shields. They see the enemy, and yell at him like a pack of demoniac hounds. How they would tear and rend him if they could but get him! Now they retreat, holding their shields behind them, and hissing like a host of wriggling serpents between their teeth. Awful fellows!²⁶⁶

²⁶³ John Robinson, the first Prime Minister of Natal (1893-97), called a “henchman of Mr. Shepstone.” John Robinson, *A Life Time in South Africa: Being Recollections of the First Premier of Natal* (London: Smith, Elder, and Co., 1900), 108. The index of his book refers to Ngoza as “Zulu attendant on Mr. Shepstone.”

²⁶⁴ Pieres, 54.

²⁶⁵ Solomon, 97.

²⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, 97-98. This exact quote is reproduced in Pieres, 56. I found it independently through my research of the 1860 royal tour.

The performance represented British dominance over the feared Zulu and, therefore, the success of colonial rule over native peoples. The *Natal Mercury* understood it as proof that “these barbarous things” had been “tamed” under the “easy yoke of the British Government,” which offered protection and safety from the cruelty of local chiefs.²⁶⁷ The fierce dance by one young Zulu prompted the *Mercury* to explain that, while such a man would have elicited horror and fear in London, “Natalians know [that the] poor creature is perfectly harmless, and would repeat the performance on any day of the week for a pinch of snuff.”²⁶⁸ These carefully choreographed performances were designed to tout the successes of British rule and to incorporate local traditions, real and imagined, into an imperial culture, into the realm of the safe and the knowable.

The government chief Ngoza performed as the representative of the Zulu chiefs and master of ceremonies, an act that ignored both the reality of Zulu politics and the dominant role of Shepstone and his officers in crafting the performance. The subjugated Zulu king was a former kitchen worker without regal ancestry; the kingdom of Shaka to the north was ruled by Mpande and remained outside of the British pale. Ngoza dressed for his performance in the attire of a savage rather than that of a subordinate colonial administrator. The Zulu war dances were adapted, even invented, by Shepstone, who choreographed them to maximize the intended effect.

Ngoza’s chiefship, then, was a product of colonial rule, made by Shepstone to appropriate local forms of political authority. What Shepstone and other colonial officials failed to appreciate was that political traditions in southern Africa (and elsewhere in the

²⁶⁷ *Natal Mercury*, n.d.

²⁶⁸ *Ibid.*

empire) were always in the making. Successive forms of political authority, as the examples of Moshoeshoe and Shaka demonstrate, did not reflect the natural persistence of ancient traditions or tribal bloodlines but were products of innovating and re-imagining local political culture. In a sense, both Shepstone and Ngoza were participating in a local tradition of political adaptation. In the context of African politics, the creation of Ngoza and other chiefs reflected the profound disruption of the Shakan period on African politics in the region, a disorder that the British used to the benefits of colonial rule by organizing new chiefships as a bulwark against the Zulu kingdom.²⁶⁹ For Shepstone, as we shall see, making his own Zulu “tribe” in the borderlands of the British Empire was one part of a more ambitious program. Ngoza, a former soldier and laborer, used his invented chiefship to make a place for himself in the world, one where he was theoretically an important ruler, if in practice a low-level colonial administrator.

Recent work on Shepstone, or Somtsewu kaSonzica (something like “father of whiteness”), as Africans knew him, has offered a complex portrait of a colonial administrator driven by a profound opportunism, an insidious desire to control and manipulate African politics for the purposes of colonial rule, and sympathy for what he considered to be “African interests.”²⁷⁰ Jeff Guy and Thomas McClendon argue that Shepstone’s upbringing, speaking “Kaffer from childhood,” in Xhosa-speaking areas of the eastern Cape by Wesleyan missionary parents equipped him to be a skilled observer

²⁶⁹ John Lambert, “Chiefship in Early Colonial Natal, 1843-1879,” *Journal of African Studies* 21, no. 2 (June 1995): 269-285.

²⁷⁰ Thomas McClendon, “Interpretation and Interpolation: Shepstone as Native Interpreter,” *Intermediaries, Interpreters, and Clerks: African Employees in the Making of Colonial Africa* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2006), 77-93; Jeff Guy, *The View Across the River: Harriette Colenso and the Zulu Struggle against Imperialism* (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2002). Notably, the Victorian novelist Rider Haggard’s work, informed by his time working as a colonial administrator under Shepstone, powerfully mythologized Shepstone as the “great white chief.”

of local politics and culture.²⁷¹ Guy posits that Shepstone personally occupied and monopolized a cultural space between African oral traditions and written colonial knowledge, which he used to accentuate his own status and power in both conceptual universes.²⁷² While the “Shepstone system” of indirect rule angered the frontier settlers of Natal, who understood his native reserves as both inhibiting European use of the land and limiting their access to native labor, its principle objective was to “secure white power in a colony which had never been conquered” and where European settlers represented a tiny minority.²⁷³

The crowning of Ngoza as a Zulu king represented Shepstone’s grand designs in their infancy. His system of indirect rule and role as a kingmaker would reach their maturity in 1872 when he participated in the ceremony that installed Cetshwayo as the king of Zululand.²⁷⁴ During the ceremony, Shepstone performed as the great founder of the Zulu kingdom, Shaka.²⁷⁵ In his official reports of the event, Shepstone overstated the importance of his presence and its implications for British power in Zululand, a reflection of his systematic attempt to mythologize himself as the great white chief in the eyes of both Europeans and Africans.²⁷⁶ In this context, he played up his role as a law-giver to

²⁷¹ McClendon, 79-80.

²⁷² Guy, 37.

²⁷³ Ibid., 35. Also see Norman Etherington, “The ‘Shepstone system’ in the Colony of Natal and beyond the Borders,” in *Natal and Zululand from Earliest Times to 1910 : A New History*, eds. Andrew Duminy and W.R. Guest (Pietermaritzburg: Natal University Press, 1989), 170-192; See Mahmood Mamdani, *Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), 62-108.

²⁷⁴ Hamilton, 72-75.

²⁷⁵ Ibid., 75.

²⁷⁶ McClendon, 90.

the Zulu, whose failure to adequately appreciate his gift later justified the invasion of Zululand.²⁷⁷ As Carolyn Hamilton's skillful analysis of the event demonstrates, however, the ceremony began before Shepstone arrived, a subtle act of subversion that demonstrates that Cetshwayo and his counselors comprehended Shepstone's intentions and sought to undermine them. Moreover, the Anglo-Zulu War (1879) reveals the limits – or the insidiousness – of the Shepstone system and British impatience with any semblance of independence on part of local rulers.

The performances of Ngoza and his “tribe” during the royal tour of 1860 demonstrate the colonial appropriation of local traditions for the purposes of rule and to the personal opportunism of Shepstone, as an occasion to embellish his status as the great white chief. It also shows the artificiality of indirect rule, which reflected tried to appropriate African political traditions but failed to effectively control local symbolic spaces. Yet, Ngoza and other enterprising African men, those intermediaries and interpreters who occupied the places in between two or more cultural universes, could ascend from the white man's kitchen to become the heir to the great Shaka.

Kingitanga (1869-70)

Kingitanga, or the Maori King Movement, was a political and cultural movement that sought to create a zone of sovereignty to counter British rule.²⁷⁸ It was consciously

²⁷⁷ Ibid., 90. In some sense, Shepstone's vision of himself as a law-giver is reminiscent of Jeremy Bentham's conception of himself as a legislator to the world, whose the application of enlightened, scientific rule would help establish proper civilization around the world.

²⁷⁸ I am reminded of Derek Peterson's work on colonial Kenya in *Creative Writing: Translation, Bookkeeping, and the Work of Imagination in Colonial Kenya* (Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann, 2004). Also see Jenifer Curnow, “A Brief History of the Maori-Language Newspapers,” *Rere atu, taku manu! Discovering History, Language, and Politics in the Maori Language Newspapers*, ed. Jenifer Curnow et al. (Auckland: Auckland University Press, 2002), 17-41.

modeled after Queen Victoria, the story goes, inspired by the 1852 encounter of Tamihana Te Rauparaha, the son of chief Te Rauparaha, with Queen Victoria during a visit to Britain.²⁷⁹ It was founded as a pan-Maori movement, aimed at uniting the diverse populations of Maori people across the islands of New Zealand, in a context of intensified land acquisition by the Crown legalized and institutionalized by the Treaty of Waitangi.²⁸⁰ Most prominent among the Maori “kingmakers” was the Ngati Haua chief Wiremu Tamihana (known to the British as William Thompson, the “Maori Warwick,” or “Maori Kingmaker”), a Christian chief who was educated by the Church Missionary Society but had refused to sign the Treaty of Waitangi.²⁸¹ In 1858, Potatau Te Wherowhero was elected and crowned Kingitanga, his kingdom centered in Waikato on the North Island and supported by a collection of local communities (*iwi*).

In time, Kingitanga developed its own cultural symbols of authority (*mana*), such as a national flag, and articulated its counter-sovereignty by establishing King institutions, such as the independent Maori Land Court, and in an imagined community of print: through government documents, in works of history, and through a series of King newspapers, including *Te Hokioi o Niu Tireni e Rere atu na* (January-May 1863).²⁸²

²⁷⁹ Angela Ballara, “Introduction,” from *Te Kingitanga: The People of the Maori King Movement* (Auckland: Auckland University Press, 1996), 1.

²⁸⁰ Two other pan-Maori movements emerged in Taranaki during the 1850s: Kai Knarara, a religious movement, and the “anti-land selling” movement. See James Belich, *Making Peoples*, 232.

²⁸¹ The treaty and its mythology was used both to legitimize British dominion over all of New Zealand and to support the claims of the Maori against colonial abuse; this complex legacy reflects the multiplicity of meanings gleaned from the treaty – which was, in fact, a set of treaties, and said quite different things in English than in Maori. It might be compared to Victoria’s 1858 proclamation, which claimed India as a Crown Colony and promised in the queen’s name to end the abuses and injustices of the East India Company. See Belich, *Making Peoples*, 193-211.

²⁸² Curnow, “A Brief History,” 21-22, 26-28. George Grey, the Governor of New Zealand, was so concerned with *Te Hokioi o Niu Tireni e Rere atu na* that he organized an alternative Maori-language newspaper called *Te Pihoihoi Mokemoke I runga I te Tuanui*.

For a period in the 1860s and 1870s, Pai Marire, a syncretic religious movement comparable to the cattle killing and other millennial movements in South Africa, rapidly spread among adherents of the King Movement; influenced by Christianity, it rejected European influences and interactions, and its most radical believers used it to justify violence against European settlers. King territory was marked off by an almost cosmic pale, or *aukati*, over which neither Maori nor settler was to cross. The Maori state claimed legitimacy and sovereignty through an imagined pan-Maori community, which the British saw as a clear threat to their rule in New Zealand and the myth of empire.

Potatau's son Tawhiao (r. 1860-1894) would inherit the ire of the British Empire. The British government sought to alienate non-aligned chiefs from the movement through diplomacy and warfare. Governor Gore Browne and his replacement Sir George Grey sought to isolate Kingitanga and "dig around the [movement] until it fell."²⁸³ Browne was sacked for his failure to crush local Maori assisted by Kingite troops during the 1860-61 Taranaki War.²⁸⁴

Using questionable intelligence-gathering tactics and relying on untrustworthy native informants, Grey built the case and "pumped reports into London alleging a widespread Maori conspiracy to attack Auckland."²⁸⁵ An 1863 ultimatum from Grey demanded submission to Queen Victoria, but colonial troops crossed over the *aukati* before the Maori could even respond, beginning the Waikato War (1863-46).²⁸⁶ Tawhiao

²⁸³ Ballara, 11.

²⁸⁴ James Belich, *Making Peoples*, 235-36.

²⁸⁵ James Belich, *Making Peoples*, 231. Grey even alleged that the Maori were working in concert with French missionaries.

²⁸⁶ Evelyn Stokes, "Te Waharoa, Wiremu Tamihana Tarapipipi." *Dictionary of New Zealand Biography*, <http://www.dnzb.govt.nz>.

finally retreated to Tokangamutu (Te Kuiti) in Ngati Maniapoto territory. As a consequence, the colonial government confiscated 1.2 million acres of Maori land, including most of the Waikato district in a process the Maori called *Raupatu*. In response, Kingitanga isolated itself even further from the British and from loyalist *kupapa*, or Queenite, Maori. Tawhiao banned the surveying and selling of land and closed the land court. It was in this context, of an unsuppressed King Movement and continued violence between Maori and the British, most often blamed on the Kingitanga, that Prince Alfred arrived in New Zealand during 1869 as part of an extensive world tour.

Governor George Bowen sought to use Alfred's royal visit to negotiate the surrender of Tawhiao, by enticing him to violate his own sacred *aukati* and to culturally undermine his claims to sovereignty by submitting to the son of Queen Victoria. The King Movement had organized a conference at Upper Waikato at the end of April 1869.²⁸⁷ The Resident Magistrate in Waikato, William Searancke, was invited to the meeting and described its composition: 1,700 armed men, "besides some friendly natives," Maori leaders, and many civilians – a mass meeting that totaled around 3,500 attendees.²⁸⁸ The resident magistrate noted that, while the Maori king's followers were considered rebels by the British government, they overwhelmingly rejected the recent violence on part of Te Kooti, a Maori guerilla fighter on the North Island who had recently escaped from imprisonment on the Chatham Islands, some 800 kilometers off the coast of New Zealand.²⁸⁹

²⁸⁷ Bowen to Colonial Office, May 2, 1869, NA CO 209/211/158-162.

²⁸⁸ Ibid.

²⁸⁹ Ibid.

Searancke judged Tawhiao's speech to be "couched in ambiguous language" but "pacific in tone."²⁹⁰ When Searancke pressed Tawhiao to meet with Prince Alfred, the Maori king agreed to consider the proposition.²⁹¹ Despite the conciliatory tone on part of Tawhiao, Bowen noted that "nothing can be absolutely certain in dealing with a race liable, as are the Maoris, to be actuated by sudden and fanatical impulses."²⁹²

Bowen's failure to make sense of Kingitanga is reflected in his troubled anthropology of Maori motives. As these overtures for negotiation were being made by the Maori king, the settler press was accusing Tawhiao of planning an uprising and of supporting Te Kooti's raids on the North Island.²⁹³ The threat that the King Movement posed to the British government was not violence, as Tawhiao had refused violence unless directly threatened, but of a counter-sovereignty beyond the pale of British control.²⁹⁴ In this context, Bowen sought to used Alfred and the propaganda of Queen Victoria's greatness and power to undermine this sovereignty by forcing Tawhiao to submit to British rule. Bowen complained to the Colonial Office that the "adherents of the so-called Maori King" had been "since 1860, either been in arms against the Crown,

²⁹⁰ Ibid.

²⁹¹ Ibid.

²⁹² Ibid.

²⁹³ *Daily Southern Cross*, July 5 1869, quoting *Wanganui Times*, June 24 1869. Also see *Daily Southern Cross*, May 10 1869.

²⁹⁴ James Belich has argued that Maori counter-sovereignty threatened, more than "land greed or clever conspiracy," "the myth of empire": "The precedents and prophecies of empire and settlement, the self-images of governors and settlers, the ethos of a colonising and progressive race, demanded that the British rule the whole of New Zealand in fact as well as name." See James Belich, *Making Peoples*, 230-31.

or have dwelt apart in their mountains and forests in sullen and hostile isolation, like the Jacobite clans in the Scotch Highland.”²⁹⁵

In the correspondence between the Government House at Auckland and the Colonial Office, Bowen focused on demonstrations of loyalty by “friendly” Maori while Kingitanga and the on-going raids by Te Kooti were framed as fringe movements, minor disturbances far outweighed by overall Maori gratitude to British rule. Yet, his dispatches to the home government asserted the necessity of limiting Alfred’s travels to the cities and avoiding the interior of the North Island.²⁹⁶ The chiefs of the North Island met Alfred at Auckland, those of the South Island at Wellington. The governor assessed the prince’s visit as occasion to confirm and reward “the loyalty of the clans now in arms for the Crown.”²⁹⁷ He recognized the opportunity to neutralize and undermine the Maori king through the presence of British royalty.

* * *

Bowen was most interested in symbolic acts of submission by chiefs to the British Queen. During the ceremonies, “several of the Maori Chiefs have laid at the feet of the ‘Queen’s Son’ as tokens of homage, the hereditary ornaments which had been treasured by their ancestors for many generations,” which he compared to the Scottish Brooch of Lorn.²⁹⁸ For instance, Tamihana Te Rauparaha (Katu), the son of the Ngati Toa chief Te Rauparaha, presented Alfred with a greenstone ornament representing Kaitangata, a character of Maori mythology, which had “been an heirloom in his tribe for five-hundred

²⁹⁵Bowen to CO, June 3 1869, NA CO 209/211/334-400.

²⁹⁶ Bowen to CO, March 30, 1869, NA CO 209/210/565-568.

²⁹⁷ Ibid

²⁹⁸ Bowen to CO, May 2, 1869, NA CO 209/211/172-178.

years.”²⁹⁹ The message of this exchange was abundantly clear to Bowen: that Katu was giving over a traditional symbol of Maori authority to the British monarchy.³⁰⁰

Yet, Katu’s father Te Rauparaha had built his own mana on the patronage of European whaling stations and the lucrative musket trade. He had agreed to the Treaty of Waitangi because he understood it to protect his territorial sovereignty.³⁰¹ Te Rauparaha, like Kingitanga, resisted European efforts to purchase more land and refused entry to surveyors, inciting settlers to send a party that tried (unsuccessfully) to arrest him.³⁰² Settler rumor and paranoia encouraged fear of Te Rauparaha, who was believed to be scheming an invasion of Auckland, and in 1846 Governor George Grey had him arrested and held on the naval ship *Calliope* for 10 months without charge.³⁰³ He was released to his people in Otaki in 1849, left to live out the last year of his life as a broken man.

His son, Katu, was baptized by the CMS missionary Octavius Hadfield in 1841 and traveled the islands as an evangelical missionary.³⁰⁴ He lived in a European-style

²⁹⁹ Kaitangata was a Maori man who was sought after by a woman in the sky named Whaitiri (Thunder) because she mistakenly thought he was a cannibal. For an early anthropological account of Kaitangata, see J.F.H. Wohlers, “The Mythology and Traditions of the Maori in New Zealand,” *Transactions and Proceedings of the Royal Society of New Zealand*, 7 (1874): 15. Bowen reported to the Colonial Office that Alfred had been given “the Kai-tangata” (literally ‘Man-eater’).”

³⁰⁰ Another figure from the King Movement, Tupu Atanatiu Taingakawa, son of the great kingmaker Wiremu Tamihana, similarly conferred, through a family representative, a symbol of chiefly authority, a *mere* – a greenstone scepter – to the prince. Bowen to CO, May 19, 1869, NA CO 209/211/226-233.

³⁰¹ Steven Oliver, “Te Rauparaha,” *Dictionary of New Zealand Biography*, <http://www.dnzb.govt.nz> (accessed 14 August 2009).

³⁰² Ibid.

³⁰³ Ibid.

³⁰⁴ Ibid.

estate, his lucrative sheep farm, wore European clothes, and kept servants.³⁰⁵ It was in 1848, when he traveled to Britain, with other Wesleyan Missionary Society missionaries aboard the *John Wesley*, that he was introduced to Queen Victoria as an example of a “civilized native.”³⁰⁶ Despite being a founding member of Kingitanga, he broke with the movement in 1860 over what he saw to be the king’s antagonistic positioning.³⁰⁷ By the mid-1860s, he was serving, ironically perhaps, as the senior land assessor for the colonial government.³⁰⁸ Katu might be seen, with justification, as a collaborator who willingly participated in the dispossession of his own people. But, like the respectable people of color who act as the main characters in the next chapter, he sought to use new cultural and political forms inspired by Christianity and the British monarchy to invent new traditions aimed at protecting local people by uniting them.

The handing over of a sacred symbol of his father’s mana offers a message far more ambiguous than the one imagined by Bowen. Te Rauparaha was a man broken and beaten by the British despite his earlier partnership with European settlers and his later reluctance to fight them, in spite of settler pressure to sell his land against what he saw to be the agreed terms of the Treaty of Waitangi (and the government generally agreed with him). His son’s presentation of the Kaitangata greenstone could hardly represent a tribal submission of “traditional” Maori rule to the great and powerful British monarchy. For

³⁰⁵ Steven Oliver, “Tamihana Te Rauparaha,” *Dictionary of New Zealand Biography*, <http://www.dnzb.govt.nz> (accessed 14 August 2009).

³⁰⁶ Ibid.

³⁰⁷ Ibid.

³⁰⁸ Ibid.

one, Katu imagined himself to be a modern, Christian Maori, a hybridized product of the colonial encounter. His gift to Prince Alfred might be considered an investment.

In investing his family's legacy in the British monarchy, and in effect co-opting it for Maori culture, he sought the patronage and protection of the Great Queen. He declared loyalty to the queen, not to the colonial government. Of course, colonial officials saw the handover as the absorption of local hierarchy and tradition into imperial culture. According to Bowen, "this last survivor in a long line of Chieftains and warriors" told him that, "as there were none of his name and lineage to succeed him, as 'his house was gone, like the Moa [Maori birds hunted to extinction by European settlers],' – he had, as it were, bequeathed this dearly prized talisman of his fathers, as a token of love and honor, to 'the Son of the Queen of England and New Zealand.'"³⁰⁹ His family's mana, like his father, had gone the way of the Moa. Colonial officials such as Bowen may have imagined the royal tour as a way to incorporate Maori chiefs into the great imperial hierarchy, but the encounter on the ground reflected a far more complicated and ambiguous relationship.

* * *

Shortly before Prince Alfred's scheduled departure in May 1869, he was invited, by two loyalist chiefs from Waikato, Wi Patene and Te Wheoro, to a proposed "meeting [with Tawhiao's] Maoris, at Ngaruawahia, the old Maori capital."³¹⁰ Its purpose was "to tell you [Prince Alfred] and the Governor their thoughts, so that peace and goodwill may

³⁰⁹Bowen to CO, May 2, 1869, NA CO 209/211/172-178.

³¹⁰ Bowen to CO, June 3, 1869, NA CO 209/211/334-400.

arise in this Island of troubles.”³¹¹ The Maori king, they claimed, wanted to see *him*, the prince of the Queen, for, “although the Governor represents the power and authority of your Mother, . . . you are Her own Child; You are the Queen Herself; therefore it is that the Maori tribes long to see your face.”³¹² The chiefs assumed that the prince’s presence would be helpful to negotiations between the government and the King Movement.

It is unclear if the colonial government had any role in prompting the meeting although it had worked for months to arrange a meeting between Alfred and the Maori king.³¹³ One letter to the editor of the *Taranaki Herald* argued later, when Alfred returned to New Zealand in 1870, that “a chief who claims independent sovereignty” meeting Prince Alfred was “almost equivalent to a recognition of his claim.”³¹⁴ Perhaps the loyalist Maori recognized an opportunity for Tawhiao to make peace in the presence of British royalty. The Maori knew, as the Xhosa did, that leaders who went to negotiate with the British often did not come back. And, they knew, after the Treaty of Waitangi, that the protections offered in signed treaties did not seem to count for much. They perhaps assumed that the presence of the queen’s son might offer some protections, that the Great Queen, knowing of whatever agreement was made with her son’s involvement, might intervene to defend its stipulations.

Bowen was “convinced that it is of vital importance to endeavour to arrive at a peaceful understanding, not inconsistent with the sovereignty of the Queen, with the so-called ‘Maori King,’ by which title his adherents appear to mean little more than a great

³¹¹ Ibid.

³¹² Ibid.

³¹³ *West Coast Times*, Jun 11 1869.

³¹⁴ *Taranaki Herald*, September 10 1870.

Chieftain and Magistrate analogous to the semi-independent Rajahs of British India.”³¹⁵ While refusing the legitimacy of Tawhiao as a monarch, and thus comparable in some way to Queen Victoria, Bowen also lamented that the Maori king had not been militarily crushed when the government had the resources available to it.³¹⁶ To supplement the sword, he sought to culturally destroy the Tawhiao’s legitimacy with a bigger and better monarch by persuading him to submit to her greatness and power. Rewi, one of Tawhiao’s principal generals, urged him to attend on grounds that he had “long fought the Pakeha, but that war had caused the Maoris to lose many men and much land, and that he was now as strong for peace as he had been for war.”³¹⁷ Tawhiao never crossed his *aukati* and never met Prince Alfred, who left on June 1.³¹⁸ *The Taranaki Herald* offered, at the royal tour’s conclusion, a far more nuanced and complicated picture than that offered by colonial propaganda:

[Prince Alfred's] stay in Auckland was the longest, where he enjoyed himself, a greater part of the time, with pheasant shooting... He was to have left on the 28th May, but owing to a wish expressed by some of the inhabitants of Auckland, that he should stop and visit the Maori King, who they were trying to persuade to come half-way to meet the Prince, His Royal Highness postponed his departure till the 1st June. We cannot see what good was likely to have resulted from the interview, but it might have done a great deal of harm. Old political questions would have been raised, and Tawhiao would have quoted scripture largely to bear out his arguments, which we fear, his Royal Highness would have found it difficult to refute. Altogether we think that Tawhiao (the Maori King), has shown greater wisdom in refusing.... [The prince] will... only take away a very different impression of the Colony to what it really is; for he has *only*

³¹⁵ Bowen to CO, June 3, 1869, NA CO 209/211/334-400.

³¹⁶ Ibid.

³¹⁷ Ibid.

³¹⁸ *Taranaki Herald*, June 5 1869; *Daily Southern Cross*, June 4 1869.

visited the cities of New Zealand. Had he called at some of the smaller towns, or gone where the rebellion was rife, and seen a 'real war dance,' he would have had a better knowledge of the place, the peoples, and of the difficulties.³¹⁹

For the next several decades, Tawhiao refused various concessions from the colonial government in exchange for an oath of allegiance. In 1884, he went to Britain to appeal directly to Queen Victoria: to ask her for an independent Maori parliament and inquiry into land confiscations. Instead, he met with the Colonial Secretary Lord Derby, who told him that the imperial government would not intervene in local affairs. As the discussion of the 1901 visit of the Duke of York shall demonstrate, the Maori kings continued to resist military and cultural annexation by the British, and the British continued to resist their claims of sovereignty.

Inspired by the Great Queen, Kingitanga appealed to the idea of indigenous political and cultural unity as a means of challenging imperial rule. It was an invented tradition in its most real sense, a new movement that transcended older rivalries and political traditions. It did not reject the authority of Queen Victoria, but demanded a political and cultural sovereignty – that its adherents made real in print, institutions, and symbolism – that they saw as the rightful legacy of Waitangi. The royal tour, as imagined by colonial administrators, sought to inspire obedience and loyalty in “traditional,” “tribal” leaders, who would submit to the authority of the Great Queen and the legitimacy of the great imperial hierarchy of rule. In New Zealand, Prince Alfred encountered a much more confusing empire, but not the Maori king who refused to submit.

³¹⁹ *Taranaki Herald*, June 9 1869

The Gaikwar of Baroda (1875)

Albert Edward, the Prince of Wales, arrived on the Indian subcontinent in 1875 near the end of a long political drama: the poisoning of the British Resident of Baroda and the subsequent ousting of the Gaekwad (or, in British parlance, Gaikwar) of Baroda, Malhár Rao, by the British government of India.³²⁰ A “quasi-independent” state ruled by an Indian gaekwad, Baroda’s structure was typical of the system of princely rule invented by the East India Company, arguably in the tradition of the Mughals, and reinforced by the settlement of 1858.³²¹ The gaekwad was allowed to govern the internal affairs of Baroda, with the advice of a British resident. While Indian princes were often more independent in practice than African chiefs, who often acted as little more than the bottom rung of the colonial hierarchy, the gaekwad’s rule was always subject to British “advice” and intervention, though the most blatant and obvious interferences were mostly avoided. On the eve of the Prince of Wales’ visit, however, the British Resident of Baroda, Colonel Robert Phyre, was poisoned, leading to a series of events that demonstrated the British theory of paramountcy and limits of indirect rule.

³²⁰ This incident appears in the Victorian and more traditional twentieth century imperial historiography but is not covered by the more recent historiography of empire. In the nineteenth century, it became milestone event in an intellectual discourse on British paramountcy and “feudal” Indian states. Mihir Kumar Ray, *Princely States and the Paramount Power, 1858-1876: A Study on the Nature of Political Relationship Between the British Government and the Indian State* (Rajesh Publications, 1981); William Lee-Warner, *The Native States of India* (Delhi: Rakesh, 1893); C.L. Tupper, *Indian Political Practice: A Collection of Decisions of the Government of India in Political Cases*, 4 vols. (Delhi, 1895); Edward C. Moulton, *Lord Northbrook’s Indian Administration, 1872-1876* (New York: Asian Publishing House, 1968); I.F.S. Copland, “The Baroda Crisis of 1873-77: A Study in Government Rivalry,” *Modern Asian Studies*, vol. 2, no. 2 (1968), 97-123

³²¹ Lauren Benton, “The Geography of Quasi-Sovereignty: Westlake, Maine, and the Legal Politics of Colonial Enclaves,” *International Law and Justice Working Papers* 5 (2006). <http://www.iilj.org/publications/2006-5Benton.asp> (accessed 31 May 2009). Also see Lauren Benton, *A Search for Sovereignty: Law and Geography in European Empires, 1400-1900* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009).

Historians have described the removal of the gaekwad as a defining moment in the relationship between the Raj and local princes. Lauren Benton has argued that British officials were purposely evasive in defining legal and political sovereignty in “colonial enclaves” such as Baroda, simultaneously asserting respect for local traditions (“divisible sovereignty”) and claiming British paramountcy in the tradition of the Mughal and Maratha: as Benton puts it, “to decide where law ended and politics began.”³²² Charles Lewis Tupper, a British official in the Punjab during the 1890s, argued that South Asian princes “whether by compulsion or otherwise” had historically related themselves subordinate with “the hegemony of some paramount power.”³²³ To the English legal scholar John Westlake, the distinction between the princely states and “the dominions of the queen” became, over the course of the nineteenth century, “niceties of speech,” a strategy of rule rather than a legal or political reality.³²⁴ The Baroda case crystallized and forwarded British claims of unlimited paramountcy, justified as indigenous political practices, signaling “more than a gap between theory and practice” but a British expression of unlimited sovereignty.³²⁵ More importantly, the case reflects that colonial

³²² See Benton 7-8, 34.

³²³ Charles Lewis Tupper, *Our Indian Protectorate: An Introduction to the Study of Relations between the British Government and its Indian Feudatories* (London: Longmans, Green, and Cop, 1893), 143. Cited in Benton 15. The British were not completely delusional to think that they were emulating the practices of Mughal rule. Local princes, who functioned as the imperial governors of Mughal rule, were subject to removal and annexation by the imperial core. Under Akbar and Jahangir, a sophisticated playbook of rule – from royal rituals to surveillance – were developed, foreshadowing in some ways the developments of British rule. John Richards, *The Mughal Empire*.

³²⁴ *The Collected Papers of John Westlake*, 220. Quoted in Benton, 7.

³²⁵ Benton, 9. Benton smartly rejects the notion of “this [legal] formulation as a simple rationale for unconstrained power... First, British preoccupation with preserving the princes as allies after the events of 1857 created persistent pressure from within to accommodate their authority. Second, though they were sometimes labeled as collaborators, the rulers and subjects of native states routinely challenged British jurisdictions and extra-legal interventions. Third, British policy was riddled with contradictions.” Benton, 22.

officials defined the relationship between the Raj and South Asian princes with a purposeful ambiguity that allowed imperial rule to expand and contract without the requirement of legal precedent.

Baroda's relationship with the British was rather strained by the 1870s. The state's ruling dynasty dated to the eighteenth century, and it had come under British protection in 1802. During the mutiny of 1857, Gaekwad Khande Rao remained loyal to the British. The British-backed princely regime became increasingly oppressive during the 1860s, just as the cotton boom caused by the American Civil War began to slump: rents were up, production of foodstuffs was down.³²⁶ The state's coffers were emptied, and hostility to the princely regime developed in the countryside. Whole villages were abandoned.

In 1870, Khade Rao died, leaving his younger brother Malhar Rao, released from prison by the British on unproven charges of trying to poison his older brother, to serve in place of the unborn heir. In 1872, Malhar Rao was accused of poisoning his predecessor's diwan, but he refused an inquiry by the British and disposed of the body without an examination. Philip Wodehouse, the Governor of Bombay, appointed Colonel Robert Phayre as the British Resident in 1873 with the intention of reining in the gaekwad; Phayre apparently had little patience for princely rule or ornamental politics and sought even greater control over the gaekwad than the British government would allow. Phayre's dogged resolution to challenge corruption and misrule in Baroda, often against the wishes

³²⁶ Moulton, 128.

of officials in Bombay and Calcutta, demonstrates the importance of local “men on the ground” in shaping global imperial politics.³²⁷

Phayre wasted no time in developing an antagonistic relationship with the gaekwad and local notables. Phayre reported to the British government a public flogging during which one victim died and requested a commission to investigate general misrule in Baroda, including the gaekwad’s treatment of the hard-pressed countryside.³²⁸ During a meeting with the sirdars of Baroda, he informed them that he was forming a revenue commission to investigate the state’s finances and that if they misrepresented their wealth, he would “find them out.”³²⁹ Phayre also complained about the condition of the Baroda Contingent, a cavalry at British service funded by the gaekwad, and sought to put a European in charge of the force. And, he “sent increasingly alarming accounts of conditions to the Bombay Government,” beginning to report even the most minor problems to the government.³³⁰ Only “latent insanity,” he claimed, could explain the gaekwad’s “inordinate thirst for wealth and self-gratification” but blamed “evil advisors,” particularly his allegedly illiterate and inexperienced diwan, Sivaji Rao, and his finance ministers for “the positive reign of terror” in Baroda.³³¹ Phayre, it seems, subjected the

³²⁷ In some sense, this contributes to and complicates the role of the colonial periphery in imperial politics, particularly the ideas forwarded by Ronald Robinson and John Gallagher. It suggests that there were peripheries within peripheries, competing zones and cores outside of metropolitan Britain. Ronald Robinson and John Gallagher, *Africa and the Victorians: The Climax of Imperialism on the Dark Continent* (New York: St. Martin’s, 1961).

³²⁸ Moulton, 131-132.

³²⁹ “Crisis in Baroda,” BL MSS Eur D870.

³³⁰ Moulton, 133.

³³¹ Quoted in Moulton, 134.

gaekwad to an ideal of British principles of rule, constantly antagonizing and prodding him: hardly the relationship between an independent ruler and a British “advisor.”

Having read in an Indian newspaper that the British planned to dethrone him, the gaekwad appealed to the British Resident, begging him for mercy, according to Phayre’s account. Phayre claimed that the gaekwad “fell at [his] feet, put off his cap, and bowing his head to the ground burst into tears, and began to declare that he had no wish whatever to oppose the Government in anything; that he was really its dependent.”³³² This might have been wishful thinking on the part of Phayre, of how he imagined his encounter with a morally weak Oriental despot faced with looming British justice. The gaekwad, by Phayre’s account, declared his program of reform and cooperation at a meeting of his ministers. But, within days, Phayre was already complaining to Bombay about a royal game reserve that was denying local ryots their livelihoods. The Bombay government decided to act decisively against the gaekwad, but Lord Northbrook in Calcutta disagreed, arguing that an investigation was needed to determine whether or not Phayre’s claims were overstated.

The struggle between the central British administration in Calcutta and the local British government in Bombay to control official policy in Baroda is a clear example of the kind of push and pull that occurred between a multiplicity of cores within the British Empire.³³³ Northbrook sought to control what he saw as an overzealous policy of interference by Phayre and the government of Bombay, overseen by Philip Wodehouse as

³³² Moulton, 135.

³³³ I.F.S. Copeland’s well-known 1968 article on the “Baroda crisis” framed the dispute as one between two British governments, largely ignoring the gaekwad as an independent historical actor. I.F.S. Copland, “The Baroda Crisis of 1873-77: A Study in Government Rivalry.”

governor (though Wodehouse was generally a restraining force in his council's desire to control Baroda's governance). Northbrook established a commission to investigate, appointing Colonel Robert Meade, Chief Commissioner of Mysore, as chair as well as Faiz Ali Kan, former Diwan of Jaipur. Northbrook refused, temporarily, Bombay's desire to remove the gaekwad's top ministers and denied its exclusive jurisdiction over the Baroda Contingent. Northbrook's restraint reflected the fragile stability that existed between the British government of India and princely states more than any sense of idealism about aristocratic values or rule.

Malhar Rao soon invited Dadabhai Naoroji, who had in 1872 unsuccessfully argued on the gaekwad's behalf against the government in a dispute over the gaekwad's position relative to the governor during official ceremonies and had made a case for him in London during the current crisis, to be his diwan.³³⁴ Naoroji, a Hindu intellectual educated at Elphinstone College, was a forerunner of the loyalist *respectables* examined in the next chapter. Living much of his adult life in Britain, he dedicated his intellectual career to educating the British public about the inequity of British rule in India – most famously in *Poverty and Un-British Rule in India*, which underlined the extraction of wealth from India by the British – and became, in 1892, the first British MP of South Asian descent.³³⁵

Even as a prominent member of the Indian National Congress and its predecessor organizations, he imagined himself as an imperial citizen, whose country deserved a more equitable and *British* system of governance. He also took interest in other imperial

³³⁴ Moulton, 137.

³³⁵ Dadabhai Naoroji, *Poverty and Un-British Rule in India* (London: Swan Sonnenschein and Co., 1901).

politics, advocating home rule for Ireland. Naoroji returned from Britain in 1873 to take up his position as the gaekwad's prime minister, just as the Baroda Commission began its meetings. His participation in the Baroda Affair, like Sandile's advisor Tiyo Soga, reflects on the fragility of the constructed dichotomy between "traditional," princely/chiefly rule and "modern," nationalist politics; the gaekwad, quite ingeniously, sought to utilize the emerging political strategies and tools that would so effectively serve nationalist politics. Nevertheless, his ultimate failure demonstrates both his state's dependence and subordination to imperial rule and the limits of a divided public opinion in defending a hereditary ruler.

The commission offered a far more limited investigation than Phayre sought. It refused many of the complaints put forward but ultimately decided against the gaekwad, voting for the replacement of his ministers and more direct control of Baroda's affairs by the British Resident.³³⁶ Northbrook held back, giving the gaekwad the opportunity to respond to the report. The gaekwad never responded, but the government's final decision on the matter reflected Northbrook's moderation: that "the Gaikwar himself [would be responsible] for the good government of his State under a warning that, if before 31st December 1875, he [did] not reform his administration he [would] be deposed from power."³³⁷ The decision illustrates the dual-edged sword that indirect rule was for native rulers: on one hand, *some* British officials such as Northbrook erred on the side of hereditary rule and the status quo; on the other, the threat of British interference was

³³⁶ Moulton, 139.

³³⁷ *Ibid.*, 141.

ever-present. Moreover, in this case, the antagonistic Phayre remained the British Resident at Baroda.

The gaekwad dismissed his former ministers and appointed Naoroji his diwan, a move Phayre opposed. The gaekwad's court began referring to Phayre as "tum," a term used to address servants and other subordinates, and the gaekwad informed him that he would be called upon when his advice was needed.³³⁸ But, once the delayed Baroda Commission's final report was released, Naoroji and other ministers tried to resign, only for their resignations to be refused by the gaekwad. Phayre was reprimanded by Wodehouse for interfering in the selection of a diwan and was ordered to cooperate with Naoroji. He continued to obstruct Naoroji's progress though and insulted the gaekwad by refusing to recognize his son, apparently conceived before marriage, as his heir. Rao finally agreed with Northbrook to remove his diwan but protested that "Colonel Phayre has been my prosecutor with a determined and strong will and purpose, and that he should now be made to sit in judgment upon me is... simply unfair to me.... It is clear that he has prejudged the case, and that I cannot expect an impartial report from him."³³⁹ This is not to suggest that the gaekwad was a just and upright ruler but that he did aspire to reform his court, even if for the purposes of self-preservation, and Phayre was a roadblock to both.

On the night of November 9, 1875, Phayre noticed a strange-looking substance in his sherbet. Upon examination, the residency surgeon confirmed the presence of arsenic

³³⁸ Ibid., 143.

³³⁹ Quoted in Moulton, 146.

in the drink.³⁴⁰ Phayre immediately blamed the gaekwad and ignored the advice of Northbrook to resign his post. Against Wodehouse's opinion, Northbrook removed Phayre, replacing him with the more experienced Lewis Pelly as Agent to the Governor-General, who reported directly to him.³⁴¹ Pelly, the gaekwad, and Naoroji commenced an ambitious program of reform: relieving the ryots of certain taxes and reducing state expenditure, for instance. The gaekwad and Naoroji rapidly grew apart, however, ultimately resulting in Naoroji's departure and a rather abrupt halt to the British-sponsored reform.³⁴²

Pelly soon discovered, in the investigation started by Phayre, that the gaekwad had been secretly communicating with a servant, who confessed, in exchange for a pardon, that the gaekwad had provided the poison and instructed him to use it against Phayre.³⁴³ After the evidence was vetted by the Advocate-General of Bombay, Pelly advocated the immediate removal of the gaekwad. The commission appointed by the viceroy, three British officials and three prominent Indians from other princely states could not agree on the gaekwad's guilt, but he was ultimately deposed on grounds of

³⁴⁰ As Laura Benton amusingly notes, "Reading [Phayre's] correspondence, one begins to suspect that there were others besides the Baroda ruler who took pleasure in imagining him dead." Benton, 25.

³⁴¹ Moulton, 147.

³⁴² Pelly was shocked with resentment directed toward him and the sympathy for the gaekwad. He asked Northbrook, "What in your opinion is the real feeling of the people in the Gaekwar's dominions on the whole affair? Is the sympathy of which I read in the newspapers real or bought? And if real, from what does it arise?... From an English view of the case it seems to be that the course the Government of India has taken has been calm and just, and that the sympathy expressed for a man who, in addition to more than the ordinary vices of an Asiatic ruler, and besides having oppressed his people, has brought himself, to say the least of it, under the strong suspicion of a cowardly act of trying to poison the British Resident, is either disloyalty to the British Government... or arises from some idiosyncrasy of the Native mind beyond my comprehension." Pelly to Northbrook, March 27, 1875, BL MSS Eur C 144/17.

³⁴³ Moulton, 149.

“misrule.”³⁴⁴ Since the British claimed no criminal jurisdiction over Baroda, the removal of the gaekwad was “an act of State, carried out by a Paramount Power.”³⁴⁵

The arrest of the gaekwad was ritualized by both the British administrators at Baroda and by the gaekwad himself. While the stir of anticipation was partially spontaneous, it also reflected a fetish with spectacle on part of British officials as well as a desire to make an example of the troublesome gaekwad:

Early this morning, the cantonments were in a flutter of excitement. The newly-arrived troops, which had taken up their quarters in the maidan [public space] opposite the Residency, were all astir; the 9th Native Regiment marched, to the stirring music of their band, to the vicinity of the new encampment; by the red, yellow, and blue ropes, which did duty as reins and ornaments to the saddler, stood in the Residency compound; near the main gate a saluting party of the 9th infantry were drawn up, and as it was their duty to present arms, when officers or civilians passed in or out from the presence of Sir Lewis Pelly, they had plenty to do in consequence of the unusual pedestrian traffic which followed between the encampments and the Residency.... It required no soothsayer to affirm that something unusual was happening.³⁴⁶

The gaekwad surrendered in a ritual performance of his own that doubled as a final act of defiance. To British officials in India, the ritual arrest of the gaekwad represented the administration of British justice, the liberation of Baroda from a corrupt, Oriental despot. The removal of an “autonomous” prince by means of ambiguous and questionable legal justifications, however, profoundly informed the meanings of another imperial ritual: the royal visit.

This entire drama unfolded on the eve and during the Prince of Wales’ 1875 tour

³⁴⁴ Benton, 23.

³⁴⁵ BL MSS Eur F/12/88/4. Cited in Benton, 33.

³⁴⁶ “Arrest of the Gaekwar of Baroda,” *Bombay Gazette*, BL MSS Eur D870.

of South Asia. Historians have almost universally described royal visits, associated ornamental rituals, and the trappings of indirect rule as evidence that the British who ruled the empire valued tradition and the stability of hereditary aristocracies, a kind of looking glass through which they imagined an *ancien régime* that had been replaced by a bourgeois and democratic modernity at home. Yet, as the melodrama of Phayre and the gaekwad demonstrates, these feelings were hardly universal, and the methods of indirect rule were often unrefined, their motives conflicted and directed by multiple authorities. Like the Nizam of Hyderabad whose drama will be discussed in the next section, British ornamental politics managed to antagonize and alienate the Gaekwad of Baroda. The Prince of Wales, his mother, and Lord Northbrook all scowled upon the removal of a hereditary ruler such as Rao. After all, they recognized that it undermined the very principle of hereditary rule that justified their own prominent roles in British and imperial culture. Yet, this reluctance was not enough to prevent the gaekwad's removal, which was justified by the less-than-airtight case against him.

The affair was more than the political tableau of Albert Edward's arrival. It informed the meaning of the visit for the educated classes and hereditary elites of British India. For many of them, the removal of the gaekwad was not an anomaly or exception but exemplified the very nature of British rule in India. The educated elites of the Raj represented the royal visit as a logical extension of this brand of British despotism.³⁴⁷ The *Rájshahye Samáchár* (Karachmāria in East Bengal) saw the prince's visit as intended "to create an impression of the power of the British, and to wound the feelings of Native

³⁴⁷ Some of the independent newspapers, most notably the *Moorshednad Patriká* (Brahmapur, Orissa), defended the Indian administration's even-handed reform in Baroda. December 18, 1874, *Report on Native Papers*, no. 1, 1.

Princes... for the object of making a parade before others of its popularity with the natives.”³⁴⁸ The *Sádháraní* (Chinsurah, West Bengal) wondered how “the Native public... [could] rejoice at the visit of the Prince of Wales, at a time when their hearts are sad with the deposition and misfortunes of Malharrao.”³⁴⁹ In the minds of many of the Queen’s Indian subjects, the despotism of British rule, specifically the Baroda Affair, and the charade of the royal tour were conceptually linked discourses of governmentality, opposite sides of the same coin.

Rájshahye Samáchar, comparing the government’s action against the gaekwad to the fable of the wolf and the lamb, in which the wolf justifies eating of the lamb through tenuous accusations, interpreted the charge of misgovernance as a common and “very convenient one,” “a feeble attempt at justification of its measures.”³⁵⁰ Questioning British dedication to the rule of law, the editors criticized the banishment of 64 people from Baroda without a trial.³⁵¹ Many of the independent newspapers expressed a willingness to punish the gaekwad if proven guilty but argued that the evidence against him was limited.³⁵² British neglect of both the rule of law, which constantly legitimized imperial rule over local misrule and despotism, and local political traditions informed the meaning of the visit. Both British and Indian newspapers reflected on the political significance of

³⁴⁸ *Rájshahye Samáchar*, August 6, 1875, *Report on Native Papers*, no. 34 of 1875, 1.

³⁴⁹ *Rájshahye Samáchar*, August 31, 1875, *Report on Native Papers*, no. 34 of 1875, 2.

³⁵⁰ *Sádháraní*, August 8, 1875, *Report on Native Papers*, no. 33 of 1875, 5.

³⁵¹ *Ibid.*

³⁵² *Saptahik Samachar*, January 9, 1875, *Report on the Native Papers*, no. 3 of 1875, 4. “Considering that the Magistrates do not convict, even a common man, in the absence of any stronger evidence, on that merely of the Police, it is highly improper that a respectable and dependent prince... should be suspected of being guilty on the bare testimony of the Police Commissioner.”

the meeting in the context of the removal of Mulhar Rao and made vastly different conclusions. No matter how charismatic or gentle the prince was in his interactions with the child-prince, he could never overcome the perception that British rule in India was fundamentally illiberal.

Instead of meeting the troublesome Malhar Rao, who Northbrook described to the queen as “entirely unworthy of [her] sympathy,” the Prince of Wales encountered Sayaji Rao III, a young, diamond-clad boy of “about 10 years old.”³⁵³ The Prince of Wales had his first visit from the young prince in Bombay. As “it is hard to find small-talk for a little boy,” Albert Edward talked to him about “illuminations and horsemanship” (he encouraged him to pursue his interest in the latter).³⁵⁴ During the return visit to Baroda, the young gaekwad grasped onto the Prince of Wales’ right hand, leading him toward an elephant that would carry him to the Durbar for local dignitaries at the Residency.³⁵⁵ Later, the British prince would be treated by the young gaekwad to rhinoceros and elephant fights and a hunting exhibition for cheetahs.³⁵⁶

To British observers, the experience reflected the political revolution that was afoot in Baroda, where the guiding hand of British progress was transforming a corrupt Oriental despotism. The child prince would rule over his kingdom in a manner suitable to a loyal subject of the queen. British administrators continued

³⁵³ Northbrook to Victoria, June 14, 1875, *Prince of Wales in India*, vol. 1, RA VIC/MAIN/Z/468/23; Knollys to Ponsonby, November 14, 1875, *Prince of Wales in India*, vol. 1, VIC/MAIN/Z/468/102.

³⁵⁴ William Howard Russell, *The Prince of Wales' Tour: A Diary in India* (London: Rivers & Co., 1878), 148.

³⁵⁵ J. Drew Gay, *The Prince of Wales in India; or, from Pall Mall to Punjaub* (New York: R. Worthington, 1877), 85. Gay was the special correspondent for the *Daily Telegraph* during the tour.

³⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 82-98.

to direct a policy of purposeful ambiguity in legally and constitutionally defining their relationship with Gaekwad; Pelly advocated making no new treaty with the princely state on grounds that “a treaty more or less implies equality, and this has ceased to exist.”³⁵⁷ Meade reported to Northbrook his satisfaction that Albert Edward’s visit to Baroda had been an “entire success in every respect”:

We of course took all proper measures to ensure our being duly acquainted with any suspicious or doubtful proceedings on the part of those who are known to be dissatisfied with the new arrangements... To the community generally the Prince’s visit has given the upmost satisfaction, and I feel convinced that it will be regarded as a seal to the new settlement, and will have a very important effect in checking intrigues from any and every quarter... We may also hope that it will leave a deep and lasting impression on the young Gaekwar, and attach him firmly to the Crown.³⁵⁸

Yet, the encounter reveals the far more complex relationship between the rulers and the ruled. The removal of an Indian prince and the hand-picked selection of his successor by the British administration demonstrate the instabilities of ornamental rule. The happy meeting between the Prince of Wales and a child prince could not undo the past or the perception by many South Asians that British rule was unjust and despotic and that imperial rituals served to legitimize it. A looking glass, this encounter was not.

Nizam of Hyderabad (1875)

Tour planners marveled at the political effects of the royal presence on South Asian princes. In their minds, the brand of ornamentalism imagined by Cannadine, indulging an Asiatic yearning for spectacle, represented an ideology

³⁵⁷ Pelly to Northbrook, February 20, 1875, BL MSS Eur C 144/17.

³⁵⁸ Meade to Northbrook, November 23, 1875, BL MSS Eur C 144/17.

and a set of ritual practices absolutely fundamental to imperial rule. Sir Henry Daly, the Political Agent for Central India, described to Northbrook the “miraculous” effects of the Prince of Wales on the native princes of British India: “There is a sentiment in their feudalism which has been touched and reached.”³⁵⁹ On the other hand, the Indian newspaper *Rájshahye Samáchár* argued that the British wrongly “seem to think that, as Asiatics, we are very fond of glitter and sport; and it was only by such displays and demonstrations that the Mahomedan Emperors, though foreigners in both creed and language, succeeded in gaining the affections of the natives. This is not correct.”³⁶⁰ As we shall see in the next chapter, the independent Indian newspapers chastised colonial officials for their abuse of the local princes and their failure to govern justly and equitably. But, before examining the political discourses of the royal tours, it is important to evaluate the practices and policies crafted by tour planners in the name of Asiatic spectacle, the worst excesses of which were exemplified in their treatment of the Nizam of Hyderabad.

The practices developed during the royal tours demonstrate that the science of observing and acquiring knowledge of Indian traditions, practices, and mentalités for the purposes of rule profoundly informed the relationship between the British and their South Asian subjects. It also reveals that colonial knowledge by its very nature was a partial and incomplete reflection of reality. Thus, when

³⁵⁹ Extract from a Confidential Report from Sir H. Daly to Northbrook, no. 29, Prince of Wales in India, vol. 1, RA VIC/MAIN/Z 468 CFP.

³⁶⁰ *Rájshahye Samáchár*, August 6, 1875, Report on Native Papers, no. 33 of 1875, 7-8.

the theory of rule became practice during the royal tours, the conceptual distance between the rulers and the ruled often widened instead of narrowed.

British administrators in India were enamored with a colonial knowledge of Asiatic ritual, through which they sought to institute and reify an imperial hierarchy of rule, atop of which sat the Great Queen. Their knowledge, much like Greg Denning's metaphorical map, relied on British observations rather than local knowledge – and lacked the nuance, complexity, and context of the rituals performed by the Mughal state or other local polities. Moreover, British officials constantly sought to refine, improve, and simplify the elaborate and time-consuming system of imperial rituals.

Without a sense of irony, British administrators sought to modernize the “feudal” institutions of the Mughal royal tour and Durbar for use by the viceroy, governors, and visiting royals during imperial visits of state. Raj officials carefully studied the historical relationships between different South Asian states and princes – as a reflection of a timeless social order rather than of the push and pull of local politics – in order to determine a proper ritual order. Philip Wodehouse, the Governor of Bombay, conveyed his “fear that some of the Native Princes, so tenacious of their privileges, might resent any disregard of their rights in matters of ceremony & etiquette, especially with regard to the exchange of visits.”³⁶¹

British administrators also sought to simplify imperial rituals. For instance, the Duke of Edinburgh or the Prince of Wales could not logistically pay

³⁶¹ Wodehouse to Salisbury, n.d., Prince of Wales in India, vol. 1, RA VIC/MAIN/Z 468 CFP.

return visits to the many rulers who they encountered during their visits to India. To solve this problem, formal return visits were limited to the most prominent Indian princes; less important chiefs were housed in government buildings or hastily constructed tent villages, where the British prince could, in a matter of hours, pay return visits to dozens South Asian princes at their “home residences.”

³⁶² In 1875, Wodehouse established that Indian rulers who received less than a 17-gun salute would not be granted the traditional return visit from the Prince of Wales.³⁶³ This arrangement left Albert Edward with “only six visits to be paid at their own houses and nine concentrated visits.”³⁶⁴

At these temporary royal hotels, Alfred and Albert Edward met with Indian rulers in rapid succession.³⁶⁵ These “no-gun (or low-gun?) men” were hurried into and out of their visits with the British prince, for which they had often traveled long distances at great expense.³⁶⁶ Moreover, as the example of the nizam shall demonstrate, their attendance was not considered optional by British officials. In Ajmere in Rajasthan, tour planners expected the Prince of Wales to meet with 12 chiefs in less than two hours, with 10 minutes allotted for each

³⁶² Northbrook to Victoria, no. 39, November 14, 1875, BL MSS Eur C144/8; Wodehouse to Salisbury, n.d., Prince of Wales in India, vol. 1, RA VIC/MAIN/Z 468 CFP; Northbrook to Wodehouse, enclosure, August 3, 1875, Wodehouse Papers, BL MSS Eur D726/7.

³⁶³ Philip Wodehouse to Northbrook, October 22, 1875, BL MSS Eur C 144/17.

³⁶⁴ Philip Wodehouse to Northbrook, October 22, 1875, BL MSS Eur C 144/17.

³⁶⁵ Northbrook to Victoria, no. 39, November 14, 1875, BL MSS Eur C144/8; Wodehouse to Salisbury, n.d., Prince of Wales in India, vol. 1, RA VIC/MAIN/Z 468 CFP.

³⁶⁶ Gay, 41.

prince.³⁶⁷ Alfred's complaint to his mother (chapter one) about the tedium of imperial ceremonies was stirred by such an event.³⁶⁸ In 1875, Wodehouse and Northbrook agreed that the Prince of Wales, in order to appease Indian custom, would "give, except in very few instances [e.g. more powerful princes], cheap things in exchange for those he receives."³⁶⁹ Even for more powerful princes who were granted more respect and attention, such as the Gaekwar of Baroda and the Nizam of Hyderabad, who received return visits at their residences rather than in a tent or a government apartment, the royal tour represented an expression of imperial domination more than a British respect for India's "natural rulers."

From the perspective of the Prince of Wales (chapter one) and the independent Indian press (the next chapter), South Asian princes were often abused and disrespected during imperial rituals. Many princes profoundly enjoyed entertaining a fellow prince – taking the Duke of Edinburgh or the Prince of Wales hunting for game or treating him to animal fights and local cuisine – but these men often retained some semblance of sovereignty, far away from the administrative dominance of the Simla, Calcutta, and Bombay.³⁷⁰ South Asian elites were far more likely to visit the prince in a tent temporarily designated an official residence and to experience the "rough and rude manner" of British

³⁶⁷ General Samuel James Browne, Memorandum to Accompany the Draft Program of the Tour of HRH the Prince of Wales to India, Enclosure C, Proposed Program on the Occasion of the Visit of HRH the Prince of Wales to Ajmere, BL MSS Eur F486/3.

³⁶⁸ Alfred to Queen Victoria, January 9 1870, RA VIC/ADD/A/20/1304.

³⁶⁹ Wodehouse to Northbrook, August 1, 1875, BL MSS Eur C 144/17.

³⁷⁰ One of the best examples is such encounters, between Jung Bahadur Rana and Prince Alfred in 1870, is richly documented in *The Prince of Edinburgh in the Oudh and Nepal Forests: A Letter from India* (Private Circulation, 1870).

political agents than to embark on a private hunting exhibition with the queen's son.³⁷¹ The controversy over the removal of the Gaekwad of Baroda, which represented the excesses of colonial despotism to many South Asian observers, demonstrates an oppressive political culture of imperial rule that deeply informed how Indian rulers understood the royal tours.

British policy toward the nine-year-old Nizam of Hyderabad, prince of an expansive Muslim state in southeastern India, reflects this continuity between the Baroda controversy and the ritual practices of the royal tour. The unwillingness of Mahbub Ali Pasha's handlers to allow him to make the voyage to Bombay in 1875, in order to pay his respects to the visiting Prince of Wales, was a particularly contentious issue in the political discourses of British India. The loyalty of Muslim rulers had been questioned by the Viceroy Lord Northbrook from the beginning of his tenure.³⁷² Yet, the nizam was an odd choice for harassment by the Anglo-Indian press, who spearheaded the public relations campaign against the young prince; after all, he had been nurtured, from birth, to serve as a docile agent of British rule. He was given an "English schoolboy's education," supplemented by lessons on Persian, Urdu, calligraphy, and the Koran, by a British tutor. After his father died in 1869, he was led to a ceremonial rug, representing the throne of Hyderabad, and invested, hand-in-hand with his

³⁷¹ Prince of Wales to Queen Victoria, November 14, 1875, *Prince of Wales in India, 1875-6*, vol. 1, 1875, RA VIC/MAIN/Z 468 CFP/98.

³⁷² Edward C. Moulton, *Lord Northbrook's Indian Administration, 1872-1876* (New York: Asian Publishing House, 1968), 125.

diwan and regent, Sir Salar Jung, and the British Resident of Hyderabad.³⁷³ The experiences of his short life hardly suggested that he was an enemy of the Raj or the Prince of Wales, worthy of the scorn and harassment he received from the settler press and the British government.

Colonial officials considered attendance at imperial rituals compulsory. Lord Northbrook wrote to Philip Wodehouse that, short of compelling circumstances, Indian princes were expected to attend the ceremonies.³⁷⁴ He found the nizam's excuse to be "insufficient."³⁷⁵ The *Sulabh Samáchar* (Calcutta) found a British invitation to be more akin to a summons.³⁷⁶ The Nizam of Hyderabad's diwan and co-regent Sir Sálár Jung attested to the nizam's inability to make the arduous journey to Bombay and even considered making overtures for compromise, offering the nizam's presence within a day's journey of Baroda "in either the territory of the British Government or his own."³⁷⁷ He omitted this suggestion from his final draft to the British Resident at Baroda, C.B. Saunders, fearing that he would make the sick boy travel even farther.³⁷⁸ Saunders had little

³⁷³ Harriet Ronken Lynton and Mohini Rajan, *The Days of the Beloved* (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1974), 28-33.

³⁷⁴ Northbrook to Wodehouse, October 9, 1875, Wodehouse Papers, BL MSS Eur D726/7.

³⁷⁵ Northbrook to Victoria, September 13, 1875, no. 36, VK MSS Eur C144/8.

³⁷⁶ *Sulabh Samáchar*, November 30 1875, *Report on Native Papers*, no. 52 of 1875, 2.

³⁷⁷ Captain John Clerk to Northbrook, September 10, 1875, BL MSS Eur C 144/17.

³⁷⁸ *Ibid.*

sympathy or patience for the nizam's predicament and immediately doubted the claim, treating Jung, in the words of *Sulabh Samáchar*, "like a common clerk."³⁷⁹

Captain John Clerk, the nizam's British tutor, wrote to Lord Northbrook "on the subject that is now before Your Excellency as to High Highness the Nizam meeting His Royal Highness the Prince of Wales."³⁸⁰ Clerk was a sympathetic observer of the child prince, but his account also reflects a more general European stereotype about Asiatic rulers and their weak disposition of health and nerve:

notwithstanding all the pressure that the Resident has brought to bear on the Regency, and notwithstanding the malignantly worded telegram (from England), and subsequent newspaper articles in the *Bombay Gazette, &c.*, which the Resident seems to regard as of so great importance... When I came out (in January last) I found His Highness extremely weak and delicate; not a week passed that he was not in the hands of the doctors, either with fever or bowel complaint, or glandular swellings of the neck, resulting from his scrofulous inheritance. By dint of constantly—daily, I may say—urging the necessity of proper diet, open air exercise, and that they would allow him to take our medicines, tonics, &c., &ec., gradually an improvement set in... But when you Excellency considers all the circumstances attendant on a journey, and for the intended purpose which must inevitably lead to great excitement and nervousness to a boy who is eminently excitable and nervous—that His Highness has never been five miles away from his capital – that he has never been absent a day from his mother... Were His Highness older, and of a sound constitution, not only

³⁷⁹ *Sulabh Samáchar*, November 30 1875, *Report on Native Papers*, no. 52 of 1875, 2. Also see William Howard Russell, *The Prince of Wales' Tour: A Diary in India* (London: Rivers & Co., 1878), 76. "The correspondence between the Resident at Hyderabad and Sir Salar Jung a copy of which had been sent on from England was read and discussed among the old Indians and I think there was only one opinion expressed respecting the taste and tone of despatches which intimated that the Resident believed the reasons assigned for the Nizam's inability to go to Bombay were fictitious and that the Dewan had some secret purpose to serve in asserting that the journey would according to the physicians be dangerous to the life of the boy who is delicate and nervous and who has never yet been separated from his mother It is well sometimes that we have no foreign critics no external public in Europe or Asia to bear upon our conduct in India I say sometimes because I believe that generally our rule will bear criticism."

³⁸⁰ Captain John Clerk to Northbrook, September 10, 1875, BL MSS Eur C 144/17.

do I think the Regents, but also all of the important Nobles of the state, would look upon the fact that His Highness is going to meet and welcome His Royal Highness in India... as conferring a very great honor on them all.³⁸¹

British officialdom's long-standing distrust of native information required the more trustworthy information of a British observer. This report did not, however, dissuade most British officials involved from believing that the nizam's illness was a "mere excuse."³⁸²

Clerk's reports on the press and public opinion in Baroda also demonstrate the fragility of imperial rule. He blamed the independent Indian press for disseminating untruths about him and for encouraging the resentment of nizam's subjects toward the British government of India: "They set on every kind of report-- that I had come to make *their* Nizam Christian—that this was the first step in upsetting all their old institutions and customs – that all would be made English in a few years in ideas—and then that the Government of India would step in and take the country."³⁸³ Clerk understood these fears as almost pathological, a product of the paranoid and fear-mongering enemies of the British. The nizam's court, however, was attended by Saunders and a cadre of residency staff as well as Clerk, his tutor, who complained in the very same letter that the young ruler knew very little English because he spent too much of his study time reading the Koran! Moreover, the Gaekwad of Baroda had just been arrested and sacked. On one hand, Clerk's account of the nizam reflects the blissful ignorance

³⁸¹ Ibid.

³⁸² Lord Napier to Northbrook, August 18, 1875, BL MSS Eur C 144/17.

³⁸³ Captain John Clerk to Northbrook, September 10, 1875, BL MSS Eur C 144/17.

of the ambitious official on the ground, looking to enact reforms on his own model of British education and scientific rule. At the same time, it reveals a more profound weakness in the relationship between the rulers and the ruled – that the British failed to comprehend the effects of their practices and policies on local politics.

The nizam was ultimately “excused” from attending royal rituals in Bombay by Northbrook after fulfilling the “humiliating” requirement of sending a “medical certificate” as proof of illness.³⁸⁴ Sauders was removed, not because of his adamancy that the nizam attend the rituals in Bombay but because he was “injudicious and [dis?]courteous” in his treatment of the nizam.³⁸⁵ This controversy of treating the child prince and his diwan with such enmity infuriated the editors of the independent Indian press and initiated a battle of words between the “native” press and the Anglo-Indian newspapers. The *Bhārat Sangskārak* (Calcutta) even went as far as to conceptually link the treatment of the nizam with the Baroda Affair, as proof to the true relationship between British Residents and Indian princes.³⁸⁶ This was a relationship not represented in the controlled space

³⁸⁴ *Native Opinion*, 31 October 1875, 1.

³⁸⁵ Ponsonby to the Queen, January 3, 1876, *Prince of Wales in India, 1875-6*, vol. 2, 1876, RA VIC/MAIN/Z 469 CFP/4. British authorities feared that he would file a grievance against the British government upon returning to Britain.

³⁸⁶ *Bhārat Sangskārak*, December 3, 1875, *Report on Native Papers*, no. 51 of 1875, 1. “The correspondence of the Indian Foreign Office with Sir Sālār Jung, on the subject of the attendance of the young Nizam at Bombay... affords but another instance of the high-handedness and the undue interference made by the British Government in the affairs of Native Princes... If the attitude of [the] Government towards the Nizam’s court was not threatening and tyrannical, we do not know what else it was. This incident enables us, though but partially, to realize the degree of oppression practised on the unfortunate Mulharrao by Colonel Phayre, while the fact remains that all other Residents are very likely to act in the same way.”

of the royal visit, where docile acceptance of British dominance was the only acceptable form of political expression.

The South Asian press assumed the sincerity of the Nizam's illness but used the opportunity to express their concern that the process of attending British ceremonies was often so humiliating to Indian princes that they would often rather stay home. They would rather be accused of disloyalty by the British than experience the undignified process of being ordered around and having their status disrespected by colonial officials. Weeks later, the *Bombay Gazette* criticized "the refusal of the Nizam to meet the Prince of Wales," "in holding back the hand of friendship to the Heir to the Throne of England... [as] a sullen declaration of hostility to the British Government in India."³⁸⁷ To *Native Opinion*, such an attack was "calculated to generate... feelings of distrust and antipathy to British power in India."³⁸⁸ While the British busily fanned the embers of discontent, the independent press (as we shall see in the next chapter) demanded the rights and privileges of loyal subjects and imperial citizens, and used the royal tour as a forum to articulate their grievances against the Raj.

In the end, the Prince of Wales did meet the nizam's regent and prime minister, Sir Sálár Jung, who was, as Albert Edward's secretary Francis Knollys reported back, "the most astute and far seeing politician in India."³⁸⁹ British administrators who attended to the Prince of Wales concluded that Jung was quite

³⁸⁷ *Bombay Gazette*, quoted in *Native Opinion*, 28 November 1875, 2.

³⁸⁸ *Native Opinion*, 28 November 1875, 2.

³⁸⁹ Knollys to Ponsonby, November 14, 1875, Prince of Wales in India, 1875-6, vol. 1, 1875, RA VIC/MAIN/Z/468/102.

happy to rid himself of Saunders and would use the opportunity to pursue, “with oriental cunning,” the restoration of Berar Province.³⁹⁰ The conclusion that the nizam’s representative’s intentions were always devious and insincere demonstrate why British ornamental politics could never succeed as long-term methods of imperial rule. Their culturally acquisitive processes reflected more than the missteps of “dancing with strangers” but more insidious desire to control political discourses that proved to be counter-productive, the consequences of the very interventionist nature of indirect rule.

The Royal Tour of 1901

The encounters between British royals and local hereditary elites around the turn of the century illustrate the changes that British imperial culture had undergone in the previous forty years. Colonial officials sought to close off the limited public space created by public ritual through a developing system of colonial rule and reshape local political cultures to serve British administrative desires, by eroding and appropriating the autonomy and legitimacy of hereditary elites. While chiefs were displaced by urban, *respectable* elites within certain political discourses, they remained politically relevant at the local level long after the end of British rule.

Nevertheless, as local elites became dependents and functionaries of colonial rule, they were transcended in the realm of imperial and national politics by the “modern” politics of Western-educated *respectables*, who often had little patience for their “traditional” politics.

³⁹⁰ Ponsonby to the Queen, January 3, 1876, Prince of Wales in India, 1875-6, vol. 2, 1876, RA VIC/MAIN/Z 469 CFP/4; Salar Jung to Saunders, December 15, 1875, BL MSS Eur E 190 1/32/4.

Those rulers who could not be controlled or neutralized were isolated, imprisoned, or destroyed. This transformation of imperial culture was achieved not only through destruction and control but also by means of the royal tours and other imperial rituals, which sought to remake local political traditions to justify and legitimize British rule. As the next chapter will further demonstrate, however, British attempts to appropriate local political cultures were only partially successful. While the British recognized static, timeless political traditions, what they sought to grasp was far more elusive – always adapting, always in the making.

The New Zealand welcome for the Duke of York in 1901, who was traveling around the world to celebrate Australian federation and to thank imperial troops for their service to empire in the South African War, incorporated and appropriated, perhaps more than any other place in the empire, the symbols of local culture. In this context, Maori children singing the national anthem in their native language and battle sites of the Maori wars were co-opted as symbols of a national-imperial culture. Upon arriving in Auckland, the duke was presented with an ornate box, made with native woods and decorated with a Maori “war canoe” and kiwi, by the Premier of New Zealand, Richard Seddon, aboard the *Ophir*.³⁹¹ On Victoria Street in Auckland, an arch welcomed the duke and duchess in English and professed “Aroha, Tonu, Ake, Ake, Ake” (translated as “Love for Ever and Ever”).³⁹² Of course, triumphal arches representing different ethnicities were standard decorations for royal visits, but the 1901 empire tour was perhaps most remarkable for the ways in which local customs and traditions were re-

³⁹¹ Watson, 227-229.

³⁹² *Ibid.*, 232.

made and appropriated both for the purposes of imperial rule and as part of the development of a nascent national mythologies.

The duke and duchess participated in a Durbar-like ceremony in Rotorua, near the Bay of Plenty on the North Island, called the Haka. Colonial officials invited each Maori group to send 100 representatives to pay tribute to the Duke of York.³⁹³ Local Arawa Maori, in the tradition of imperial rituals, performed a “war dance,” waving ceremonial battle-axes and singing a song of welcome.³⁹⁴ The Duchess of York encountered, in the funhouse mirror of empire, a Maori dancer named Kiri Matou, who was locally known as “The Duchess,” a woman represented in colonial photography as entranced, even mad.³⁹⁵ The main event at Rotorua, however, was the Haka, where representatives from many of New Zealand’s Maori groups assembled, many of whom had never encountered one another before or were former enemies. In the grand ceremony, the Maori chiefs “in full battle array, faced the Duke and Duchess when they entered the Royal pavilion.”³⁹⁶ Performing the role of the paramount chief, the duke wore, “across the shoulders, a kiwi mat, and carried a greenstone mere, the genuine native insignia of chieftainship.”³⁹⁷ In a colonial exhibition of the Maori nations, men and women performed, professed their loyalty, mourned the loss of Queen Victoria, and brought gifts.³⁹⁸ The *Poverty Bay Herald*, commenting on the sheer number of gifts received by the duke, proposed that a

³⁹³ *The Colonist*, March 20, 1901.

³⁹⁴ Watson, 240.

³⁹⁵ *Ibid.*

³⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, 254-255.

³⁹⁷ *Ibid.*

³⁹⁸ *Poverty Bay Herald*, May 14, 1901.

“Maori Museum” ought to be built in Rotorua so that New Zealand could preserve the “Native relics” still left in the colony.³⁹⁹ Bringing together the diverse groups and cultural practices of the Maori, which had threatened the stability of European expansion in the Pacific in previous decades, the Haka transformed them into safe and controlled symbols of imperial culture: proof of “how completely the Maori hatchet has been buried.”⁴⁰⁰

Still outside of the pale, Kīngitanga was one community that had effectively limited the incursion of imperial rule, in part by resisting symbolic appropriation. While the settler press portrayed the Maori king’s absence as evidence of the colonial policy of isolation, the historical record suggests that colonial administrators retained the hope that the duke’s visit might present the opportunity to penetrate the symbolic space of Mahuta, the Maori king.⁴⁰¹ After initially agreeing to come to Rotorua with several hundred followers, Mahuta stated that he was “not inclined” to go but invited the duke and duchess to Ngaruawahia, the capital of King Country, for a state visit.⁴⁰² The government refused to alter the duke’s plan so that he might stop at Mahuta’s capital.⁴⁰³ The Maori King Movement, by resisting both military and cultural colonization, was able to resist the processes of acquisition so central to British rule.

³⁹⁹ *Poverty Bay Herald*, June 25, 1901. The sentiment that Maori artifacts were more easily located at the British Museum than in New Zealand reflects a nascent national consciousness, whereby New Zealand was more than an overseas extension of Great Britain. Curiously, the *Herald* compared New Zealand’s plight to that of Greece!

⁴⁰⁰ Donald Mackenzie Wallace, *The Web of Empire: A Diary of the Imperial Tour of Their Royal Highnesses the Duke and Duchess of Cornwall and York in 1901* (London: Macmillan, 1902), 232.

⁴⁰¹ *Bay of Plenty Times*, May 29, 1901.

⁴⁰² *Hawera & Normanby Star*, April 24, 1901; *Wanganui Herald*, 18 May 1901.

⁴⁰³ *West Coast Times*, May 29, 1901.

When the Duke of York visited war-torn South Africa, colonial officials adopted the ritual practices that had been perfected in the Raj, bringing together “Chiefs of all of the principal Tribes in the Cape Colony, of Basutoland and Bechuanaland,” over 100 in all.⁴⁰⁴ As Indian officials had found, this method was far more efficient than having the king’s son trek around southern Africa, as Alfred had, and ensured the protection of an heir to the throne visiting a warzone. During earlier tours, individual attention from visiting royalty, during visits and “return visits,” was meant to demonstrate British respect for the most important local elites, with less important notables left to meet with the prince in groups or during brief interviews. There was, not surprisingly, a significant correlation between elites deserving of personal attention and those who had not fully come under the control of British rule. By 1901, these individual visits were extremely rare outside of India.

The most prominent guests at this Durbar-like ceremony in Cape Town were Lerothodi of Basutoland (Lesotho), the grandson of Moshoeshoe, and King Khama of Bechuanaland (Botswana), who had visited Britain in 1895 to ask Queen Victoria for protection from the land-hungry mining magnate and politician Cecil Rhodes.⁴⁰⁵ Both Basutoland and Bechuanaland had effectively come under British rule over previous decades. Basutoland, a British protectorate from 1868 and a Crown colony ruled by a British governor from 1884, had been forced to cede its arable land west of the Caledon River to the Boers, reducing the size of Moshoeshoe’s original kingdom in half.

⁴⁰⁴ Arthur Bigge to Gov. Walter Hely-Hutchison, August 23, 1901, NA CO 48/553/881; Watson, 328.

⁴⁰⁵ Neil Parsons, *King Khama, Emperor Joe, and the Great White Queen: Victorian Britain through African Eyes* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998).

Bechuanaland south of the Molopo River came under British protection in 1885 and was governed by the High Commissioner of South Africa from 1891.⁴⁰⁶

The great chiefs of southern Africa came to meet their future king “in European dress, weirdly diversified.”⁴⁰⁷ Lerothodi was dressed in a way that was remarkably similar to his grandfather’s attire four decades earlier, in a “faultless frock coat and silk hat.”⁴⁰⁸ Alan Soga’s *Izwi Labuntu*, an independent African newspaper, described their attire as of “the usual grotesque and comical variety” and wondered if “our officials delight to caricature our native races.”⁴⁰⁹ Similarly, the settler *Natal Mercury* had decided that these “Dusky Dandies” were “not yet... civilized up to the dressy stage.”⁴¹⁰ The official account of the tour, written by Donald Mackenzie Wallace, noted that:

From the picturesque point of view [African chiefs wearing "European costume"] is of course a mistake, for the noble savage never looks well in badly made or even in a well-fitting frock-coat and trousers; but perhaps he is more amenable to the influences of civilisation when he discard his war-paint and feathers.⁴¹¹

With a dozen tiger, leopard, and silver jackal rugs, their gifts to the duke, laying on the ground, the chiefs gathered in a semi-circle, facing the duke and duchess, who were sitting under a tree.⁴¹²

⁴⁰⁶ Anthony Sillery, “Founding a Protectorate: History of Bechuanaland, 1885–1895,” *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies* 29 (1966): 664-664.

⁴⁰⁷ Watson, 328; Wallace, 349.

⁴⁰⁸ *Watson*, 328.

⁴⁰⁹ *Izwi Labuntu*, August 27, 1901, September 3, 1901.

⁴¹⁰ Cited in *South African Spectator*, July 13, 1901. “Let [the man of color] be represented not as a savage but as a product of civilization.” September 7, 1901.

⁴¹¹ Wallace, 349.

⁴¹² Watson, 329-30.

Each approached the heir to the British throne and, introduced by the Resident Commissioners and interpreted with the help of John Smith Moffat, the son of Scottish missionary Robert Moffat, or African interpreters expressed his loyalty to the king and mourned the loss of the Great Queen.⁴¹³ The gifts presented by the chiefs – cheetah or jaguar karosses, leopard and jackal skins, as well as Zulu shields and assegais – demonstrates one ethnographic accomplishment of the previous half century: that the distinctions between different political and social groups that imperial culture could be collapsed into a single category of “traditional rulers.”⁴¹⁴ This ceremony reflects the consolidation of colonial rule in South Africa over the previous forty years and the ways that royal ritual had been developed and made more efficient since 1860. Moreover, as the next chapter shall demonstrate, it demonstrates that the educated *respectables* of South African society, who effectively used print culture and the networks of the British world to challenge the injustices of colonial rule, dominated “native” imperial politics. They lampooned and critiqued these ceremonies, as we shall see, as a conscious effort by colonial officials to exclude them in favor of an ethnographical exhibition.

Reminiscent of the performances staged by Shepstone in 1860, S.O. Samuelson, the Under-Secretary of the Native Affairs Office, choreographed and directed Zulu war dances for the Duke of York’s visit. During the spectacle, the Zulu “chiefs and their followers advanced with leaps and wild gesticulations [toward the prince] brandishing their spears, shields, and clubs, till they reached a white chalk line which marked the

⁴¹³ Ibid., 329.

⁴¹⁴ Wallace, 350.

place where they were to halt.”⁴¹⁵ While Dinuzulu, the last king, had returned to Zululand in 1898 from banishment at St. Helena, he was not presented to the duke. The appropriation of Zulu culture, real or imagined, had long been important to the ideological work of colonial rule in what is now KwaZulu-Natal from the days of Shepstone. This work took a dramatic and violent turn in 1879, when the Zulu under Cetshwayo were defeated by British troops at the Battle of Ulundi. Cetshwayo was deposed, and the divided Zulu kingdom erupted into civil war.⁴¹⁶ The colonial policies aimed at neutralization and annexation of the Zulu kingdom in the aftermath of the war proved more important than the war itself, however, but represent continuity rather than change, part-and-parcel of the British desire to control and appropriate the symbols and political legitimacy of the Zulu dynasty and the legacy of Shaka.

Like other ornamental rituals, the chiefs of Zululand expressed their loyalty and mourned the loss of the Great Queen in a single address “translated” by Samuelson and delivered through Henry McCallum, the Governor of Natal.⁴¹⁷ Of course, there was no indication of who authored the address, and it reads like virtually every other address of “native” loyalty during the royal tours. The duke’s response acknowledged the Zulu as worthy opponents of the past and loyal subjects of the present while he appealed to the mythology of the Great White Queen, most notably her adoration of her “native children.”⁴¹⁸ By 1901, the ritual precedents had been firmly established, pioneered by

⁴¹⁵ Watson, 322.

⁴¹⁶ See Jeff Guy, *The Destruction of the Zulu Kingdom: The Civil War in Zululand, 1879-1884* (New York: Longman, 1979), 61-78.

⁴¹⁷ Watson, 322.

⁴¹⁸ Watson, 324.

administrators such as Grey and Shepstone. South Africa's hereditary elites resembled, in terms of their political ability to act and control their fates, Sandile far more than they looked like Moshoeshoe, and the political discourses of the colonized had been effectively usurped by the educated *respectables* of South Africa's burgeoning urban communities.

The significant exception to this rule, of the decline and growing dependency of hereditary elites in the context of British imperial culture, were those political traditions that were able to resist colonial appropriation by nurturing proto-national identities.⁴¹⁹ For the Basuto, the state building of Moshoeshoe and the development of a Basuto identity and culture centered on the mythology of Moshoeshoe helped promote imperial protection of the kingdom as different from the rest of southern Africa. The Maori King Movement succeeded, with similarly limited yields, in resisting colonial appropriation and retaining some semblance of autonomy into the twentieth century. The mythology of Shaka and a Zulu national identity lingered in the historical memory of southern Africa, reemerging most prominently in moments of crisis, such as the Bambatha "uprising" (1906), and much later in the tribal-nationalist politics of the Inkatha Freedom Party.⁴²⁰ Those who adapted and invented "modern" nationalist politics and defied cultural appropriation did so only by resisting the more violent and destructive impulses of imperial culture.

* * *

⁴¹⁹ Again, it is important to note that chiefship remained a vibrant and important political tradition at the local level.

⁴²⁰ Jeff Guy, *The Maphumulo Uprising: War, Law And Ritual in the Zulu Rebellion* (Scottsville: University of Kwazulu Natal Press, 2005); Carolyn Hamilton, *Terrific Majesty: The Powers of Shaka Zulu and the Limits of Historical Invention* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998).

Cannadine's notion of ornamentalism is not without merit. The men who ran the British Empire overwhelmingly came from aristocratic and military families and traveled extensively throughout Britain's colonial domains. They sought out local political traditions to serve the purposes of colonial rule and developed a set of ritual practices, centered on a social group who they saw as compatible to the needs of local politics and colonial governance. They did not, by and large, express solidarity with or see "past" the racial difference of local elites. They were understood as different, and inferior.

The royal tours and other imperial rituals were practices that exploited colonial knowledge. After decades of colonial wars, most notably the Indian Mutiny, British administrators sought to close the ritual spaces that had served as sites of negotiation since the earliest days of the British Empire.⁴²¹ These processes of cultural appropriation had difficulty isolating local political traditions, because they were not the static and ancient customs they were imagined to be. Local politics were allusive, slippery, always in the making. Imperial culture often misunderstood them – or delegitimized them by adapting them to the purposes of British rule, making them little more than tax collectors and labor recruiters. Local hereditary elites used similar tactics, of incorporating imperial culture or constructing counter-discourses of identity, to challenge these efforts. Over time, the challenges to the royal tour as a cultural practice, for these very reasons, were articulated less by hereditary elites, who became dependent on the British Empire as their reason for existence, and more and more by the educated *respectables* who came to dominate local political discourses.

⁴²¹ See, for instance, the performance of the drunken Zulu king Soloman ka Dinuzulu at an imperial ritual in 1930. See Shula Marks, "The Drunken King and the Nature of the State," in *The Ambiguities of Dependence: Class, Nationalism and the State in Twentieth-Century Natal* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1986), 14-42.

These Western-educated elites, who serve as the leading historical actors of the next chapter, criticized the excesses of imperial rule and the conceptual instability between the language of British imperialism and the practices of imperial rule. By and large, however, they did not challenge empire as an idea or the importance of the British Empire as their political, cultural, and social universe. They embraced an imperial citizenship, centered on Queen Victoria, and their status as British people to challenge the injustices of British rule as fundamentally un-British. As colonial administrators focused on the methods of indirect rule, these historical actors adapted and re-made local political cultures through the methods of “modern” politics, namely print culture. In identifying themselves with the imperial, they came to dominate local political discourses, even if their voices were largely ignored by the British.

CHAPTER THREE: Britishness, Respectability, and Imperial Citizenship

This chapter focuses on the intermediaries of empire, on Western-educated *respectables*, who made and were made by the contact zone of empire.⁴²² They developed deep-seated political and cultural connections with empire and often came to see themselves as part of an imperial culture. Many of them recognized certain benefits of British rule, and a few even imagined themselves to be British people. At the same time, they were intensely aware of the dominance, dispossession, and exclusion of colonial rule, the British Empire of Mike Davis' *Late Victorian Holocausts* rather than that of Cannadine's *Ornamentalism*.⁴²³ For them, the acquisitive nature of British rule did not end once the processes of warfare and annexation were over; it continued to appropriate local political cultures and traditions for the purposes of imperial rule.

During the second half of the nineteenth century, these local elites and *respectable* often imagined and even agitated for a future in the empire, not one outside of it. Nationalist organizations such as the Indian National Congress and the South African Native National Congress clung to the language of imperial citizenship until the early decades of the twentieth century. Most of Queen Victoria's colonial subjects had limited interactions with the British Empire and their knowledge of it often came from

⁴²² There is a rich and important historiography emerging on this topic. In particular, see Benjamin N. Lawrance, Emily Lynn Osborn, Richard L. Roberts, eds., *Intermediaries, Interpreters, and Clerks: African Employees in the Making of Colonial Africa* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2006).

⁴²³ Mike Davis, *Late Victorian Holocausts: El Niño Famines and the Making of the Third World* (New York: Verso, 2002). Davis' book traces the correlation between a capitalist empire of free trade and the El Niño-induced famines of the nineteenth century. Also see Geoff Eley, "Beneath the Skin. Or: How to Forget about the Empire Without Really Trying," *Journal of Colonialism and Colonial History* 3 (Spring 2002).
http://muse.jhu.edu/login?uri=/journals/journal_of_colonialism_and_colonial_history/v003/3.1eley.html (accessed March 15, 2008).

indirect sources rather than direct exchanges, from rumor, myth, and second-hand knowledge. These intermediaries of empire, however, imagined the British Empire to be their political and cultural universe.⁴²⁴ It may be easy, with the benefit of retrospect, to condemn these historical actors as out of touch with the zeitgeist of history, but they had no luxury of knowing what was to come. This chapter examines the reception of nineteenth-century royal tours to the Cape Colony and the British Raj by “respectable” people of color, reflecting the ways that ideologies and mythologies of the imperial met, interacted with, and were remade by local politics and histories.⁴²⁵

Imperial cultural broadly recognized a certain comparability of “educated natives,” a transnational class nurtured and educated in Western culture through missionary efforts and “Anglicization” movements. Most famously, Thomas Babington Macaulay’s Minute on Indian Education (1835) advocated the formation of “a class who

⁴²⁴ This is not to say that Indian nationalism was a creation of British imperial culture in the sense suggested by an older generation of historians such as David Washbrook or Anil Seal. While Seal has been framed, perhaps with some justification, as an imperial apologist, this study argues that imperial culture was ripped from its conceptual foundations and reappropriated by local peoples; the emergence of Indian nationalism out of imperial culture, then, was not an accidental consequence of British importation of ideas about nationhood or modernity. Moreover, its focus on “elites,” rather than the “subaltern masses,” is a reflection of their intimate relationship with British rule, not a conceptual elitism. For more on this older historiography, see Anil Seal, *The Emergence of Indian Nationalism: Competition and Collaboration in the Later Nineteenth Century* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1968); David Washbrook, *The Emergence of Provincial Politics: the Madras Presidency 1870-1920* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1976).

⁴²⁵ The role of Britishness in South Africa has been the subject of many recent studies. See Vivian Bickford-Smith, “Writing About Englishness: South Africa’s Forgotten Nationalism,” in *Empire and After: Englishness in Postcolonial Perspective*, ed. Graham MacPhee and Prem Poddar (Berghahn Books, 2007); Vivian Bickford-Smith, “Revisiting Anglicisation in the Nineteenth Century Cape Colony,” *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 31 (May 2003): 82-95; Bickford-Smith, *Ethnic Pride and Racial Prejudice in Victorian Cape Town* (Cambridge University Press, 1995); John Lambert, “Britishness, South Africaness and the First World War,” *Rediscovering the British World*, ed. Philip Buckner and R. Douglas Francis (Calgary University Press, 2005); Bill Nasson, *Abraham Esau’s War: A Black South African War on the Cape, 1899-1902* (Cambridge University Press, 1991); Nasson, “Why They Fought: Black Cape Colonists and Imperial Wars, 1899-1918,” *International Journal of African Historical Studies* 37 (Winter 2004): 55-70; Andrew Thompson, “The Languages of Loyalism in Southern Africa, c. 1870-1939,” *British Historical Review* (June 2003): 617-650; Elizabeth Van Heyningen and Pat Merrett, “The Healing Touch’: The Guild of Loyal Women of South Africa 1900-1912,” *South African Historical Journal* 47 (November 2003): 24-50.

may be interpreters between us and the millions whom we govern; a class of persons, Indian in blood and colour, but English in taste, in opinions, in morals, and in intellect.”⁴²⁶ Missionaries did not found their schools with such instrumentalist ideologies but sought to civilize and Christianize Africans and Asians, with equality considered as “a future possibility.”⁴²⁷ Colonial schools such as Elphinstone College in Bombay (f. 1824), the Lovedale Missionary Institution (f. 1840) and Zonnebloem College (f. 1858) in South Africa were founded with different if related intentions, but all helped produce the class of native intelligentsia examined here.

Scholars, however, have rarely presented these Western-educated people of color in such light. Post-colonial and other area studies scholars have treated the historical actors presented here in skillful and sophisticated ways but struggle perhaps too diligently to excise them from the specter of collaboration, to really see them as sly subverters of the colonial order or to understand “mimicry” as a form of anti-colonial resistance.⁴²⁸ On the other hand, scholars of British history and British imperial history fail to see them as relevant to their political discourses.⁴²⁹ With these historical traditions in mind, Saul

⁴²⁶ Thomas Babington Macaulay, “Minute of 2 February 1835 on Indian Education,” Modern History Sourcebook, <http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/1833macaulay-india.html> (accessed 10 April 2009).

⁴²⁷ Catherine Hall, *Civilising Subjects: Metropole and Colony in the English Imagination 1830-1867* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002), 176.

⁴²⁸ Leon de Kock. *Civilising Barbarians: Missionary Narrative and African Textual Response in Nineteenth-century South Africa* (Johannesburg: University of Witwatersrand Press, 1996); Homi Bhabha, *The Location of Culture* (New York: Routledge, 1995). On the problem of authenticity, see Carol A. Breckenridge and Peter van der Veer, “Orientalism and Postcolonial Predicament,” *Orientalism and the Postcolonial Predicament*. eds. Carol A. Breckenridge and Peter van der Veer (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1993), 14-16.

⁴²⁹ For Ronald Robinson and Jack Gallagher, local “collaborators” functioned as agents of imperial rule in exchange for a specific set of social and economic benefits. The most developed statement

Dubow has proposed a new understanding of Britishness, as a global cultural space open to borrowing, appropriation, and redefinition, arguing for the usefulness of:

a concept of Britishness that dispenses, as far as is possible, with connotations of racial or ethnic ancestry and which decouples the idea of Britishness from a British state or the ‘ethnological unity’ of Greater Britain hankered after by J.R. Seeley. It does so by challenging the unstated assumption that the British Empire refers to territories and peoples which were somehow *owned* or collectively possessed by the United Kingdom and proposes instead a more capacious category capable of including elective, hyphenated forms of belonging... Britishness, in this sense, is better seen as a field of cultural, political, and symbolic attachments which includes the rights, claims, and aspirations of subject-citizens as well as citizen-subjects – ‘non-Britons’ as well as neo-Britons’ in today’s parlance.⁴³⁰

This chapter aims to explore the responses of pro-empire, “respectable” people of color in the British Cape Colony – specifically, a comparatively small group of cosmopolitan newspaper writers who claimed British rights and imperial citizenship derived from their loyalty to the empire and the monarchy. The newspaper editors of this analysis were advocates of a non-racial respectable status and identity, who saw themselves as imperial citizens and as the authentic heirs of British constitutionalism.

The royal tours offer a fascinating lens through which to write a global history of loyalism and Britishness in the British Empire. These respectable people of color in South Africa and India shared a basic worldview with a global class of respectable subjects across the British Empire, all of whom commented on and responded to the royal tours in comparable, if different languages of loyalty. This global history of Britishness

of this approach is Ronald Robinson, “Non-European Foundations of European Imperialism: Sketch for a Theory of Collaboration,” in *Studies of the Theory of Imperialism*, ed. Edward Roger John Owen, Roger Owen, and Robert B. Sutcliffe (New York: Longman, 1972), 117-142.

⁴³⁰ Saul Dubow, “How British Was the British World? The Case of South Africa,” *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 37 (March 2007): 2-3.

and imperial citizenship serves to provincialize the British Isles in rather profound ways, to demonstrate that many people of color could and did embrace an imperial identity despite the racial determinism, violence, and dispossession that came to dominate the colonial experience during the nineteenth century. Like so many other products of transcultural contact, they were *bricoleurs*, using the cultural building blocks of a larger world to make sense of their lives. During the royal tours, they appealed to the liberal-humanitarian rhetoric of empire, which cloaked the more brutal reality that often laid beneath the surface, to demand their rights as imperial citizens and loyal subjects of the queen.⁴³¹

* * *

This chapter proposes to describe an alternative narrative to the nationalist meta-narrative that dominates much of the historical literature. During the nineteenth century, colonized peoples, the dominant historical narrative tells us, developed modern, nationalist political cultures that would transform into the anti-colonial or post-colonial nationalist and racial identity politics of the twentieth century. They discovered that they were African, Indian, or Australian, black or white, or some other national, ethnic, or racial identity. The dominance of nationalist and racialist identity politics during the twentieth century are often read back onto the nineteenth-century empire, where more open-ended and inclusive notions of Britishness and imperial identity remained vibrant

⁴³¹ Such discourses of loyalty in the empire have a long history. During the American Revolution, African slaves, such as an ex-slave who renamed himself “British Freedom,” often imagined King George III to be a liberator. Of course, black Americans served both imperial and patriot causes in the war, motivated, alternatively, by the promise of “British freedom” or the American promise of equality. Many of them were ultimately betrayed – or granted small, infertile plots in Nova Scotia after the war. Yet, this mythology lived on, even in the American republic, revisited by David Walker and Frederick Douglass in the decades before the American Civil War. Simon Schama, *Rough Crossings: Britain, the Slaves, and the American Revolution* (New York: HarperCollins, 2006), 1-18.

political traditions.⁴³² While the failure of Britain to fulfill the promises of imperial citizenship or the rising socio-cultural dominance of imperial “whiteness” (see chapter four) may have pushed these communities away from an imperial identity, this failure could not have been foreseen by the historical actors at the time. Destabilized by events such as the Union of South Africa (1910) or the Amritsar Massacre (1919), these counter-discourses of identity and belonging survived well into the twentieth century, used by colonial soldiers to challenge the military color bar during the World Wars or by the *Windrush* Generation to contest racial discrimination at “Home.”⁴³³

The history of British imperial citizenship is relevant and important not only to the history of Britain and its colonies but also to the narratives of world and transnational histories. The recent work of Marilyn Lake and Henry Reynolds traces the development of a “global colour line” and the transnational counter-discourses that emerged to challenge the dominance of the white, the male, the European.⁴³⁴ They reconceptualize the Eurocentric narrative of human rights, from the Declaration of the Rights of Man and

⁴³² Douglas Lorimer argues that “our fascination with the stereotype of the Other runs the risk of denying historical agency to the subjects of the racist gaze... If our categories of analysis are ahistorical – that is, if they omit the forces of resistance and preclude the possibility of change – then our language is also a source of oppression rather than liberation.” Douglas Lorimer, “Reconstructing Victorian Racial Discourses: Images of Race, the Language of Race Relations, and the Context of Black Resistance,” in *Black Victorians / Black Victoriana*, ed. Gretchen Holbrook Gerzina (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2003), 203. Also see Douglas Lorimer, “From Victorian Values to White Virtues: Assimilation and Exclusion in British Racial Discourse, c. 1870-1914,” in *Rediscovering the British World*, ed. Philip Buckner and R. Douglas Francis (Calgary: Calgary University Press, 2005), 109-134.

⁴³³ This profound, if often conflicted identification with Britain and Britishness on part of colonial and Commonwealth immigrants has been prominently featured in literature and film. See Zadie Smith, *White Teeth: A Novel* (New York: Vintage International, 2001); Andrea Levy, *Small Island: A Novel* (Picador, 2005).

⁴³⁴ Marilyn Lake and Henry Reynolds, *Drawing the Global Colour Line: White Men’s Countries and the International Challenge of Racial Equality* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008); Marilyn Lake, “Towards a New Genealogy of International Human Rights,” Scholar-in-Residence Series, Miller Center for Historical Studies, University of Maryland, February 2, 2009.

the Citizen to the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights.⁴³⁵ While European constructions of human rights often “rested on and reinforced imperial distinctions between so-called civilized and uncivilized peoples,” men and women of color across the colonized world constructed alternative discourses of rights that transcended national and racial communities.⁴³⁶ While the historical actors of this chapter imagined a non-racial political and cultural community that was uniquely imperial and framed their rights in the language of British traditions, they undoubtedly participated in a larger struggle against a “global colour bar,” the results of which could not have been predicted at the time.

Respectability in World History

The rise of the bourgeoisie was long an accepted framework for nineteenth century European history. It was central to the Marxist conception of history that a commercial and professional capitalist middle class displaced the feudal aristocracy as the ruling elite of society. Over the last several decades, historians have skillfully deconstructed this paradigm, displacing it with a new orthodoxy that reflects both social continuity and change. Rumors of the aristocracy’s demise, it has been duly noted, were greatly exaggerated. P.J. Cain and A.G. Hopkins most notably argued that “gentlemanly capitalists” combined “the prestige of inherited social position with progressive, market-oriented ambitions” to achieve social and economic dominance in the City of London.⁴³⁷

⁴³⁵ Lake, “Towards a New Genealogy,” 1-3. Lake identifies Lynn Hunt’s recent work on human rights, in particular. See Lynn Hunt, *Inventing Human Rights: A History* (New York: Norton, 2007).

⁴³⁶ Lake, “Towards a New Genealogy,” 3.

⁴³⁷ P.J. Cain and A.G. Hopkins, “Gentlemanly Capitalism and British Overseas Expansion II: New Imperialism, 1850-1945,” *Economic History Review* 40 (February 1987): 1.

Similarly, scholars have argued for the continued relevance of the landed elites in the processes of industrialization and empire during the nineteenth century.⁴³⁸

While the rise of the middle class thesis in Europe has been challenged and largely displaced (or revised), the ethos of respectability associated with bourgeois attitudes and values remains relevant, particularly in the context of empire. There were many ways for one to visualize, articulate, and represent respectability, through social networks, gender roles, dress, manners, consumption, and language. Vivian Bickford-Smith defines respectability, “that ubiquitous Victorian value,” as “the acceptance of the values of the English elite: thrift, the sanctity of property, deference to superiors, belief in the moralising efficacy of hardwork and cleanliness.”⁴³⁹ The civic pride and sense of improvement, described in Asa Briggs’ *The Age of Improvement*, and the gender ideology of separate spheres were important cultural expressions of respectability that, arguably, had been in place since the late seventeenth century.⁴⁴⁰ Respectability, however, was not the cultural monopoly of the middling sort, but a malleable set of social and cultural values embraced by royalty, landed elites, and working class families.⁴⁴¹ As F.M.L. Thompson argued in his survey of nineteenth century Britain, *The Rise of Respectable Society*:

⁴³⁸ David Cannadine, *The Decline and Fall of the British Aristocracy* (New York: Vintage, 1999); Richard Price, *British Society, 1680-1880: Dynamism, Containment and Change* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999).

⁴³⁹ Vivian Bickford-Smith, *Ethnic Pride and Racial Prejudice in Victorian Cape Town* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 39.

⁴⁴⁰ Asa Briggs, *The Age of Improvement, 1783-1867* (New York: Longmans, Green, 1959); Leonore Davidoff and Catherine Hall, *Family Fortunes: Men and Women of the English Middle Class, 1780-1850* (New York: Routledge, 1987).

⁴⁴¹ Linda Colley, *Britons: Forging a Nation, 1707-1837* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992).

every group operated its own social controls, often devised in reaction to behaviour patterns which law and authority sought to impose, which worked through notions of what was acceptable and what was unacceptable conduct within the group, enforced by common opinion which could be expressive effectively by anything from raised eyebrows to smashing the tools of offenders against a code. This was respectability: but internalized and diversified; it has not turned out to be the cohesive force which its middle-class and evangelical proponents had imagined.⁴⁴²

The notion of respectability in Britain as a malleable and empowering cultural form can and should be extended to the study of the British Empire, where both settlers of European descent and people of color often imagined themselves to be respectable people.

If respectability, as described by Thompson, was far more complicated in Britain than an earlier generation of historians suggestion, such is doubly so for the empire. Scholars have been intrigued by the projection of social relationships in the empire back onto to Britain (or vice-versa). As a result of the racialization of imperial culture, Britishness and respectability became increasingly associated with “white skins, English tongues, and bourgeois values.”⁴⁴³ The educated native came to represent, among other caricatures, “the Dangerous Native,” “a misadjusted, urbanized, male agitator, his lips dripping with wild and imperfectly understood rhetoric about rights” or the “money-grubbing,” acquisitive, and effeminate *babu*.⁴⁴⁴ Simultaneously, men and women of color

⁴⁴² F.M.L. Thompson, *The Rise of Respectable Society: A Social History of Victorian Britain, 1830-1900* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1988), 360; Susan Thorne, *Congregational Missions and the Making of an Imperial Culture in Nineteenth-Century England* (Princeton, NJ: Stanford University Press, 1999).

⁴⁴³ Bickford-Smith, 39, appealing to Roberts Colls, “Englishness and Political Culture,” in *Englishness: Politics and Culture 1880-1920*, ed. Robert Colls and Philip Dodd (New York: Routledge, 1986), 45.

⁴⁴⁴ Michael Oliver West, *The Rise of an African Middle Class* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2002) 14; Sinha. *Colonial Masculinity*, 15-16.

throughout the British Empire, who had not born in nor (in most cases) had never seen the British Isles and who had no *ethnic* claim to “being” British, imagined themselves to be British people.

While definitions of citizenship in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth-century British world were increasingly defined along ethnic and racial lines, there also persisted more open-ended and universalist discourses of imperial citizenship. They centered, in particular, on a mythologized image of Victoria the Good, the maternal, justice-giving queen. Colonial societies were inundated with this mythology, which was a fundamental “component of the ideological apparatus of the imperialist state.”⁴⁴⁵ While the African and Asian intelligentsias of this chapter were fundamentally social conservatives, interested in protecting and enhancing their own power and status, they also demanded a radical transformation of imperial culture by demanding the inherent rights and responsibilities of loyal subjects and imperial citizens.

In expressing the social position of such *respectables*, Max Weber’s distinction between class and status proves to be most helpful. To Weber, status (*ständische Lage*) meant:

an effective claim to social esteem in terms of positive or negative privileges; it is typically founded on: 1. style of life, hence 2. formal education, which may be (a) empirical training or (b) rational instruction.... Status *may* rest on class position of a distinct or ambiguous kind. However, it is not solely determined by it.... A ‘*status group*’ means a plurality of persons who, within a larger group, successfully claim: 1. a special social esteem, and possibly also 2. status monopolies.⁴⁴⁶

⁴⁴⁵ Hugh Cunningham, “The Languages of Patriotism, 1750-1914,” *History Workshop Journal* 12 (Autumn 1981): 22. I appeal to the language of Cunningham because his analysis posits the working classes of Britain “imposed their own interpretations,” much like the *respectables* of this chapter, on the imperialist propaganda that was hoisted upon them.

⁴⁴⁶ Max Weber, “Status groups and classes,” *The Essential Weber*, ed. Sam Whimster (New York: Routledge, 2004), 177-178.

The claims of the colonized to respectable status might be considered an aspiration-to-class, to a non-racial, universal middle class, but not class in itself. Moreover, they did not aspire to be white or to be *ethnically* British. They did not, as Leo Switzer argues, “participat[e] in choral and reading groups, debating societies, sewing and singing groups, and in... tennis, croquet, and cricket..., rugby, and even horse racing” because they aspired to British “middle-class culture.”⁴⁴⁷ They saw themselves to be modern and cosmopolitan, observers and readers of a larger world. As respectable, civilized British subjects, they simultaneously claimed to be advocates for “Native” peoples and peered down at those whom they considered socially and culturally beneath them, regardless of race.

These public men inherited, in a very real sense, the tangled and complicated legacy of British liberalism. They believed, as Uday Singh Mehta has argued in the context of British liberals, in both individual freedoms and political representation as well as a “cosmopolitanism of reason” that failed to successfully confront difference in the absence of comparable rationality and respectability.⁴⁴⁸ As a related set of global political discourses, Victorian liberalism broadly embraced a universalism that sought to impose its own limited conception of civilization on others. For British liberals, this meant that empire was not a paradox, but a natural and logical extension of their

⁴⁴⁷ Les Switzer, “The Beginnings of African Protest Journalism,” *South Africa's Alternative Press: Voices of Protest and Resistance, 1880-1960*, ed. Les Switzer (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 61.

⁴⁴⁸ Uday Singh Mehta, *Liberalism and Empire: A Study in Nineteenth-Century British Liberal Thought* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999), 20.

worldview. The South Asian and African intelligentsia of this chapter imagined their own citizenship and respectability, related to other social and cultural groups, with a similar brand of cosmopolitanism, that is, with their own imperial eyes.

There is an obvious danger in interpreting the development of Asian and African intelligentsias as a function of modernizing “Angloglobalization,” as an imposition of the British civilizing mission rather than as the result of a complex and multi-faceted set of encounters across the world.⁴⁴⁹ Niall Ferguson, perhaps the most brash proponent of such an outlook, argues for the modernizing legacy of the British Empire against those who identify instead the “racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia, and related intolerance,” all of which, he argues, “existed long before colonialism.”⁴⁵⁰ British governance, Ferguson believes, brought great benefits, including “the English language,” “representative assemblies,” “the triumph of capitalism,” and “the Anglicization of North America and Australasia.”⁴⁵¹ From the opposite side of the political and intellectual spectrum, post-colonial scholars, most notably Frantz Fanon, have described the processes by which the colonized internalize their inferiority by trying to be white (e.g. wearing a white mask), by dressing, talking, and acting “white.”⁴⁵² In a related if less polemical vein, the cultural anthropologists Jean and John Comaroff described the “colonization of the mind” of African peoples by evangelical missionaries, of inoculating potential converts with the “quotidian” practices of a middle class, industrializing British

⁴⁴⁹ Niall Ferguson, *Empire: The Rise and Demise of the British World Order and Its Lessons for World Power* (New York: Basic Books, 2002).

⁴⁵⁰ Ferguson, xxv.

⁴⁵¹ *Ibid.*, xxiii-xxv.

⁴⁵² Frantz Fanon, *Black Skin, White Masks*, trans. Charles Lam Markmann (New York: Grove Press, 1967).

society.⁴⁵³

Rather than understanding the practices and behaviors of respectability as a British imposition, it makes more sense to understand them as part of a more complex field of cultural encounters. The cosmopolitan newspaper writers of this chapter were avid readers of the political and cultural currents of a larger world and saw themselves to be modern people. C.A. Bayly, in his *The Birth of the Modern World*, has described the global convergence toward “uniformity” in modes of dress and self-fashioning, gender and social orders, as well as ideas about virtue, sobriety, and good manners as a defining feature of the modern world.⁴⁵⁴ This notion of uniformity perhaps oversimplifies a more complex and localized set of processes, but it does point to the ways in which Victoria-era imperialism and globalization created innumerable sets of cultural connections and borrowings.

The Independent Press: India

Independent Indian newspapers began to proliferate British South Asia during the second half of the nineteenth century. While these newspapers only had a circulation of about 100,000 readers in 1873, the highest single circulation totaling 3,000, they articulated and disseminated a powerful political message that, despite fervent loyalty to the Crown and the British Empire, frightened many colonial officials.⁴⁵⁵ Independent

⁴⁵³ Jean and John Comaroff, *Of Revelation and Revolution: Christianity, Colonialism, and Consciousness in South Africa*, vol. 1 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991).

⁴⁵⁴ C.A. Bayly, *Birth of the Modern World, 1780-1914: Global Connections and Comparisons* (New York: Routledge, 2004), 8-19.

⁴⁵⁵ Uma Das Gupta, “The Indian Press 1870-1880: A Small World of Journalism,” *Modern Asian Studies* 11 (Spring 1977): 229.

vernacular or native newspapers, as they have been called, were typically owned by British-educated, town-dwelling, English-speaking Indians.⁴⁵⁶ The newspaper writers of *Native Opinion* and *The Hindoo Patriot* combined political activism against local and imperial injustice and corruption while celebrating India's place in the British Empire. Although the social origins of Viswanath Narayan Mandalik, the founder of *Native Opinion*, differ from Harish Chandra Mukherjee and Kristo Das Pal, the successful editors of *The Hindoo Patriot*, all three men combined service and loyalty to the empire, local political interests, journalism, and literary endeavors. All three were part of elite political cultures in large urban centers, where the British offered a degree of self-governance, and thus part of a sub-imperial culture that sought to improve its own status and power through its connections to Britain and by controlling local wealth and politics. They generally peered down at those socially and culturally beneath them but celebrated the princely elites of South Asia as heroes and leaders. While several other publications shall be incorporated into the analysis of the independent South Asian press, these prominent organs of "native opinion" are featured mostly prominently.

Native Opinion was a weekly published in both English and Marathi between 1867 and 1889 founded and edited by Viswanath Narayan Mandalik; a man named Narayan Mahadeo Paramanand took over editorial duties soon after the paper's founding though Mandalik continued to contribute many or most of the articles.⁴⁵⁷ Mandalik was a *chitpávan* Brahmin born in Murud on the Konkan Coast, south of Bombay in 1833.⁴⁵⁸ He

⁴⁵⁶ Ibid., 216.

⁴⁵⁷ Ibid., 217.

⁴⁵⁸ *Eminent Indians on Indian Politics*, ed. Chunilal Lalubhai Parekh (Bombay: Education Society's Steam Press, 1892), 171.

took a law degree at the Elphinstone Institution, the predecessor to Elphinstone College, before beginning a career in colonial service, working for the (in)famous and widely-traveled colonial official Bartle Frere in the Sindh, who subscribed to *Native Opinion*, in addition to working as an educational inspector, as a sub-judge at Bassein, as director of the government book depot in Bombay, and as the assistant to the Income Tax Commissioner.⁴⁵⁹ He was also a political activist and politician in municipal and imperial politics, becoming mayor of Bombay and serving as a member of the city's exclusive legislative council.⁴⁶⁰

The newspapers in the Bombay Presidency, home of *Native Opinion* and one of the most populated urban spaces on the subcontinent, acted as organs for local educated natives, who were generally excluded by the high property and wealth requirements of municipal citizenship.⁴⁶¹ By 1885, there were already 43 Indian newspapers in Bombay, and the municipality was characterized by a vibrant but socially exclusive local political culture.⁴⁶² The extension of commercial and property rights to local elites under the East India Company and development of limited self-governance by means of a series of Municipal Acts (1865, 1872, 1888) under the Raj were designed to produce a local class of intermediaries and to reduce the financial burden of the imperial government.⁴⁶³ Local politics were dominated by Anglo-Indian settlers and by an elite cadre of Indian traders,

⁴⁵⁹ Ibid., 171-172.

⁴⁶⁰ Das Gupta, 228.

⁴⁶¹ *Eminent Indians on Indian Politics*, 801.

⁴⁶² Sandip Hazareesing, "The Quest for Urban Citizenship: Civic Rights, Public Opinion, and Colonial Resistance in Early Twentieth-Century Bombay," *Modern Asian Studies* 34 (October 2000): 801.

⁴⁶³ Ibid., 798-801.

industrialists, and landlords, who dominated the Bombay Municipal Corporation.⁴⁶⁴ On the whole, Bombay's Indian newspapers "campaign[ed] for an extension of the municipal franchise as well as for greater and more direct Indian representation on both Provincial and Imperial Legislative Councils; they also focused on exposing corruption amongst the dominant *shetia* [e.g. magnate] class, while keeping up attacks on the colonial state on a range of civil rights' issues."⁴⁶⁵ Mandalik's politics transcended this social bifurcation of Bombay political discourse, between property-owning "colonial-indigenous" elites and of an activist intelligentsia, reflecting a radicalism on his part that is not suitably reflected in the historical literature.⁴⁶⁶

The Bengal Recorder (f. 1849) of Calcutta was renamed *The Hindoo Patriot* in 1853 and purchased by Harish Chandra Mukherjee in 1855.⁴⁶⁷ Mukherjee was born in 1824 to a "high-caste Brahmin" family of "poor circumstances" in Bhowanipore.⁴⁶⁸ While the editorship of the paper was in the hands of Kristo Das Pal by the time of the royal tour in 1875, Mukherjee's political activism as editor established *The Patriot* as an important voice in local and imperial politics, most notably for supporting the indigo

⁴⁶⁴ Ibid., 800-802. For the 35 years between 1888 and 1923, the municipal franchise remained virtually unchanged, with one percent of the population (11,500 municipal residents) enfranchised in 1914. According to Hazareesing, of 72 members of the Bombay Municipal Corporation consisted of 17 landlords, 15 mill owners, seven merchants, and 12 European businessmen in 1914. Also see A. D. Gordon, *Businessmen and Politics: Rising Nationalism and a Modernising Economy in Bombay 1918-1933* (Delhi, 1978).

⁴⁶⁵ Ibid., 801.

⁴⁶⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁶⁷ Charles Edward Buckland, "Harish Chandra Mukerji" and "Grish Chandra Grose" in *Dictionary of Indian Biography* (London: Swan Sonnenschein, 1906), 162, 304.

⁴⁶⁸ Srikanta Roy, *Bengal Celebrities* (Calcutta: City Book Society, 1906), 75; Charles Edward Buckland, "Harish Chandra Mukerji" in *Dictionary of Indian Biography* (London: Swan Sonnenschein, 1906), 304-305.

ryots (peasants or farmers) against landowning planters during the 1859 Indigo Revolt, after which he spent the rest of his life (d. 1861) fighting the planters' libel suits against him.⁴⁶⁹

Kristo Das Pal was born in 1839 in Calcutta to a family of the Teli professional caste, and like Mukherjee was celebrated in the Indian literature of his time as a self-made man.⁴⁷⁰ He studied at the Oriental Seminary, a non-denominational English-language school for Hindu boys, and at Presidency College, Calcutta, the oldest college in India and important cultural center for early nineteenth century Anglicization.⁴⁷¹ As a member of the British Indian Association, a loyalist political organization dominated by Bengali zamindars, he drafted the congratulatory letter to the British government in India following the suppression of the 1857 revolt and later became the organization's secretary.⁴⁷² Much like Viswanath Narayan Mandalik, he came to serve imperial and municipal governments, as a municipal commissioner and on the legislative council of Bengal.⁴⁷³ As a follower of Mukherjee, he combined fierce criticism of local and imperial corruption and injustice with empire loyalism and respectability.

The capital of the Raj, Calcutta had a configuration of "colonial-indigenous" *respectables* and municipal governance similar to Bombay. Calcutta, like Bombay, was

⁴⁶⁹ Charles Edward Buckland, "Harish Chandra Mukerji" in *Dictionary of Indian Biography*, 305.

⁴⁷⁰ Charles Edward Buckland, "Kristo Das Pal" in *Dictionary of Indian Biography*, 326-327.

⁴⁷¹ *Ibid.*

⁴⁷² Nagendra Nath Ghosh, *Kristo Das Pal: A Study* (Calcutta: S. Lahiri and Co., 1887), 9, 14.

⁴⁷³ *Ibid.*, 15.

spatially organized into a central White Town and a peripheral Black Town.⁴⁷⁴ P.J. Marshall has argued that “the whites of Calcutta lavished money and effort on creating for themselves the amenities of what they regarded as civilized British urban life on a scale that left abundant pickings for Indians who were minded to take advantage of their prodigality.”⁴⁷⁵ As the cosmopolitan, urban writers of the *Hindoo Patriot* (and *Native Opinion* in Bombay, for that matter) demonstrate, “an Indian intelligentsia... responded in a most creative way to aspects of European culture that became available to them in the city.”⁴⁷⁶ That is not to say that they mimicked or sought to emulate European settlers but that they embraced certain aspects of European social and cultural life, building styles, voluntary associations, music, and dress, for instance, as acts of self-fashioning or self-ascription. For the Indian elites of the city, and for those who sought political and social inclusion in municipal politics, their notions of respectability formed the very core of how they imagined themselves as people.

South Asian scholars and Indian nationalists have long identified the municipal politics of Bombay and Calcutta as the hotbeds of proto-nationalism, where future nationalists learned and practiced politics. Hugh Tinker argued in his *Foundations of Local Self-Government* (1954):

When the Indian National Congress was formed, almost all its front rank leadership was recruited from the municipal corporations of the Presidency capitals, to the exclusion of the rest of India. These men alone

⁴⁷⁴ See Swati Chattopadhyay, “Blurring Boundaries: The Limits of ‘White Town’ in Colonial Calcutta”, *Journal of the Society of Architectural Historians* 59 (June 2000): 154-179; P.J. Marshall, “The White Town of Calcutta under the Rule of the East India Company,” *Modern Asian Studies* 34 (May 2000): 307-331.

⁴⁷⁵ Marshall, 307. In this vein, see Dane Kennedy, *The Magic Mountains: Hill Stations of the British Raj* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1996).

⁴⁷⁶ Marshall, 307.

had acquired experience of public debate, they had formed some kind of philosophy of political action, and through encounters with senior British officials, they had learned something of the art of dealing with the bureaucracy.⁴⁷⁷

During the 1870s and 80s, the “colonial-indigenous” oligarchy represented by the generation of Mandalik and Pal was being challenged and transcended in both cities by a new generation of more radical young politicians. In Calcutta, the future nationalist Sisir Kumar Ghose, editor of the *Amrita Bazar Patrika*, referred to the entrenched interests that dominated the Calcutta Municipal Corporation, Hindu zamindars, the intelligentsia of the British Indian Association, and local Anglo-Indian traders and settlers, a “self-seeking plutocracy.”⁴⁷⁸ After Bombay was granted a partly elective municipal corporation in 1872, Ghose and his newly-found Indian League began a campaign in 1875, months before the Prince of Wales’ visit, for municipal reform; they framed their campaign in populist language but ended up demanding “equitable and well devised representation.”⁴⁷⁹ Ghose’s perceived radicalism alienated him from most of his supporters in the Indian League, many of whom came to support the British Indian Association’s opposition to the government’s proposed reform on grounds that it restricted the rights of ratepayers by giving the imperial government increased rights of intervention.⁴⁸⁰ The ruling BIA compromised with the young men of the Indian League

⁴⁷⁷ Hugh Tinker, *Foundations of Local Self-Government in India, Pakistan and Burma* (London: Athlone Press, 1954). Cited in Chris Furedy, “The Bhadraklok and Municipal Reform in Calcutta, 1875-1900,” Working Paper of the Institute of Asian and Slavonic Research, University of British Columbia (August 1972): 2.

⁴⁷⁸ Furedy, 6-9.

⁴⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, 10.

⁴⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, 12.

by proposing a reduced property franchise for voters while maintaining the price tag on respectability.⁴⁸¹

Post-colonial and nationalist historiographies frame the 1870s and 1880s as a period of transition when political figures such as Mandalik and Pal, who represented an old guard of loyalism and elitism, were being transcended by a new vanguard of proto-nationalists. This belief in intellectual change or political awakening is not wrong but belongs to an older historiographical tradition that largely ignores the ambiguous cultural space between collaboration and resistance. On one hand, the old guard's politics, during the royal tour, for instance, were far more radical than the nationalist historiography admits; for alleged mouthpieces of entrenched colonial-indigenous elites, they certainly offered scurrilous criticisms of corrupt and unjust British rule in India. On the other, the so-called radical proto-nationalist intelligentsia of Calcutta and Bombay continued to couch their politics in the language of loyalism and respectability until very late in the day.

The Independent Press: South Africa

In South Africa, independent African newspapers were the products and by-products of evangelical missionary schools. In fact, the editors of *Imvo Zabantsundu*, *The South African Spectator*, and *Izwi Labantu* were all Christian mission students; two were the sons of prominent African clergymen. Unlike the South Asian editors, they were excluded from service in colonial or local governments, yet all three actively participated

⁴⁸¹ Ibid.

in the local and imperial politics of South Africa.⁴⁸² As missionary students, their brand of sub-imperialism centered on a civilizing mission for those socially beneath them. Through education, they argued, all people of color might achieve civilization and citizenship. And, unlike their South Asian counterparts, they looked toward hereditary and colonial-appointed chiefs with scorn, as atavisms in a modern age. During the royal tour, they all appealed to *British* constitutionalism and justice, investing their status as African *respectables* in promoting the vote, education, and empire loyalism.

This brand of respectable politics became acutely pronounced, and challenged, during the South African War (1899-1902), an imperial war fought between the British Empire, including thousands of African and Coloured subjects, and the Afrikaner republics. The propaganda of the war was cast in language that contrasted British liberty with Afrikaner tyranny. The Prime Minister Lord Salisbury appealed to the mythology of the Great Queen when he told the House of Lords in October 1899 that:

the moment has arrived for deciding whether the future of South Africa is to be a growing and increasing Dutch supremacy or a safe, perfectly established supremacy of the English Queen.... With regard to the future there must be no doubt that the Sovereign of England is paramount; there must be no doubt that the white races will be put upon an equality, and that due precaution will be taken for the philanthropic and kindly and improving treatment of those countless indigenous races of whose destiny, I fear, we have been too forgetful.⁴⁸³

People of color overwhelmingly recognized this difference and served the imperial war effort in great numbers, through “irregular armed service, scouting, spying and intelligence, supplying crop, livestock, and other goods, and in providing remount,

⁴⁸² Robert Ross, *Status and Respectability in the Cape Colony, 1750-1870: A Tragedy of Manners* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 174.

⁴⁸³ HL Deb 17 October 1899 vol 77 cc21-22.

transport riding, and other labour for logistical services.”⁴⁸⁴ While local *respectables* challenged the practices of British rule, they broadly attested to the centrality of the British constitution and their great patron the Great Queen as bulwarks against colonial and Afrikaner abuse: “for them, Britain and its Empire stood for justice, fairness and equality before the law, which meant above all non-racialism in the sense of ‘equal rights for all civilized men.’”⁴⁸⁵ The royal tour of 1901 was designed to reinforce this propaganda and to thank colonial subjects across the world for their service to the empire.

The year 1901 also marked the first negotiations aimed at ending the war. When the Boer general Louis Botha tried to negotiate the non-racial franchise out of the war settlement, he posed a threat not only to the franchise, but to respectable status itself, serving to crystallize the difference between British liberty and Afrikaner tyranny. The Cape’s non-racial franchise was one of the most prized possessions of African *respectables*. It was remarkably democratic for the nineteenth century: the 1853 constitution required property worth £25 or a salary of £50 in order to vote.⁴⁸⁶ The non-racial franchise slowly eroded through a series of registration and voting acts (1887, 1892, 1894), which purged many African and Coloured voters from the voting rolls.⁴⁸⁷ Yet, even after 1892, nearly half the voters in the colony were people of color.⁴⁸⁸ John Tengo Jabavu, editor of *Imvo Zabantsundu*, Francis Z.S. Peregrino, of the *South African*

⁴⁸⁴ Bill Nasson, *The South African War, 1899-1902* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999).

⁴⁸⁵ Christopher Saunders, “African Attitudes Toward Britain and Its Empire,” in *The South African War Reappraised*, ed. Donal Lowry (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000), 141-143

⁴⁸⁶ Ross, *Status and Respectability*, 174; Stanley Trapido, “The Origins of the Cape Franchise Qualifications of 1853,” *Journal of African History* 5 (Winter 1964): 37

⁴⁸⁷ Ross, *Status and Respectability*, 174.

⁴⁸⁸ *Ibid.*

Spectator, and Alan Kirkland Soga, editor of *Izwi Labantu*, differed in their political allegiances and in their opinions on the war, but all celebrated and promoted the importance of formal politics within the bounds of the British constitution.

Imvo Zabantsundu (*Native or Black Opinion*) of King William's Town was the first newspaper published independently by a person of color in South Africa. It was a weekly newspaper published in English and Xhosa by a 25-year old Methodist lay preacher named John Tengo Jabavu starting in 1884, with around 10,000 readers in the Cape, Natal, Basutoland, and the Afrikaner republics.⁴⁸⁹ Jabavu's family identified themselves as Mfengu ("Fingo") people, but he was educated at the Methodist mission station at Healdtown and took up a teaching post at Somerset East. He was an avid student and teacher of languages, including English, Latin, and Greek, and wrote for the liberal settler newspaper *Cape Argus* under a nom-de-plume.⁴⁹⁰

Between 1881 and 1884, he had edited *Isigidimi Sama Xosa* (*Xhosa Messenger*) for the Scottish missionaries at Lovedale but was ousted for openly criticizing the Cape government one too many times.⁴⁹¹ Jabavu became an important and active figure in Cape politics, campaigning for white politicians and advocating a brand of non-racial, respectable liberal politics. He was allied with a group of progressive Cape politicians, which included John X. Merriman, James-Rose Innes, Saul Solomon, and J.W. Sauer,

⁴⁸⁹ Les Switzer, "The Beginnings of African Protest Journalism," 60. Jabavu apparently focused on the English language columns while his subeditors generally wrote the Xhosa language pieces.

⁴⁹⁰ D.D.T. Jabavu, *The Life of John Tengo Jabavu, Editor of Imvo Zabantsundu, 1884-1921* (Lovedale: Lovedale Institution Press, 1922), 11-12.

⁴⁹¹ Les and Donna Switzer. *The Black Press in South Africa and Lesotho: a descriptive bibliographic guide to African, Coloured, and Indian newspapers, newsletters, and magazines 1836-1976* (G.K. Hall, 1979), 4. Catherine Higgs, *The Ghost of Equality: The Public Lives of D.D.T. Jabavu of South Africa, 1885-1959* (David Philip, 1997), 11.

and was a sought-after electioneer in districts where African votes affected election outcomes. His political allies also provided the funding for the newspaper, which was printed on the presses of the *Cape Mercury*.⁴⁹²

Framing South African politics as a struggle between British liberty and Afrikaner tyranny and republicanism, he was, until 1898, a staunch and vocal opponent of the Afrikaner Bond, the Cape political party that represented Boer interests, and worked tirelessly to organize an English-speaking progressive coalition in order to defeat it.⁴⁹³ In 1897, his dream of a broad-church English party emerged in the form of the Progressive Party, led by Cecil Rhodes, with whom he briefly allied; political disagreements with the Progressives and the alliance of his friends John X. Merriman and J.W. Sauer with the Bond, however, pushed him toward a shift of allegiance.⁴⁹⁴ In March 1898, Jan Hofmeyer, the Bond leader, proclaimed that he was not and never had been hostile to African political rights, beginning his campaign to vie for African voters.⁴⁹⁵ Jabavu declared Hofmeyer the new standard-bearer for “true British principle” in South African politics, in opposition to Cecil Rhodes’ “equal rights for white men only.”⁴⁹⁶ His

⁴⁹² Switzer, “The Beginnings of African Protest,” 60-61.

⁴⁹³ Stanley Trapido, “White Conflict and Non-White Participation,” (Ph.D. Diss., University of London, 1970), 290, 304. It should be noted that the Bond itself was pronouncedly loyal to Queen Victoria. But, the rhetoric of Cape politics often conflated the political party and Cape Afrikaners with the Afrikaner republics. See Mordechai Tamarkin, *Cecil Rhodes and the Cape Afrikaners: The Imperial Colossus and the Colonial Parish Pump* (New York: Routledge, 1996), 61; Hermann Giliomee, *The Afrikaners: Biography of a People* (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2003).

⁴⁹⁴ Stanley Trapido, “White Conflict and Non-White Participation,” 309; de Kock, 336-377.

⁴⁹⁵ Trapido, “White Conflict and Non-White Participation,” 331.

⁴⁹⁶ Harris, 15; de Kock, 336-377, citing *Imvo Zabantsundu*, 31 March, 1898; Jeff Pieres, ‘John Tengo Jabavu,’ *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, online edition (Oxford University Press). <http://www.oxforddnc.com> (accessed 14 April 2008); Trapido, “White Conflict and Non-White Participation,” 331.

allegiance to the Bond, combined with his pacifism during the South African War would make him a lightning rod of political controversy, to the point that his voice, *Imvo Zabantsundu*, was silenced in August 1901 by the military government of the Cape.

Francis Z.S. Peregrino, editor of the Cape Town English-language newspaper *The South African Spectator*, came to South Africa only in 1900 because, he said, “at the outbreak of war... [he] turned his thoughts to South Africa and anticipating that when peace had been proclaimed and the whole country is under the British flag, progress and prosperity are bound to follow, [and] he made up his mind to come here to devote his pen and brain to the service of the native people.”⁴⁹⁷ He had been born in Accra in Gold Coast to a family involved with local missionaries Wesleyan missionaries: his uncle was “one of the first three colored missionaries appointed by the Wesleyan Church.”⁴⁹⁸ He was educated in England and lived there until c. 1890, when he moved to the United States.⁴⁹⁹ He demonstrated particular interest in the African Methodist Episcopal (AME) Church, an evangelical missionary organization founded by African Americans in Philadelphia, and pan-Africanist ideology. He often deferred to his colleagues at *Izwi* on local matters he considered controversial, such as the suppression of *Imvo*, but always stressed the need for cooperation among people of color. Despite only coming to South Africa a year before the royal tour, he was chosen by a committee of other respectable men of color to present the “native address” to the Duke and Duchess of Cornwall. Having widely traveled the British world, Peregrino articulated his belief in British citizenship through

⁴⁹⁷ *South African Spectator*, September 7 1901.

⁴⁹⁸ *Ibid.*

⁴⁹⁹ *Ibid.*

education, the ballot box, and empire loyalism.

With 15 months of the paper's founding in 1897, Alan Kirkland Soga became editor of *Izwi Labantu* (*Voice of the People*), founded by Walter Benson Rubusana and published in Xhosa and English from East London. Soga's mother was Scottish, and he was educated in Scotland.⁵⁰⁰ His father Tiyo Soga, an important advisor to the Xhosa chief Sandile during the royal tour of 1860, was trained at the University of Edinburgh and became the first African Presbyterian Minister.⁵⁰¹ Alan Soga was apparently a clerk in Tembuland as late as 1897 when he resigned, according to the *Cape Argus*, because he could not

consistently with the position he occupied in the service, render the Natives the assistance which is desirable in the present crisis... He charges that his action, which has been taken on his own initiative, will act as an incentive to Native and Coloured friends to vote solidly for the British party and the maintenance of that supremacy which is necessary for their welfare in the future.⁵⁰²

Izwi Labantu was founded, in a very real sense, to counter the dominance of Jabavu and his paper, which was by then seen by many of his opponents as an organ of the Afrikaner Bond.⁵⁰³ Soga apparently had a distaste for Jabavu, as a Mfengu, but this ethnic rivalry was a minor sub-plot to a far more vibrant political one. While subsidized by the arch-

⁵⁰⁰ George M. Fredrickson, *Black Liberation: A Comparative History of Black Ideologies in the United States and South Africa* (Oxford University Press, 1995), 41; Stanley Trapido, "White Conflict and Non-White Participation," 333.

⁵⁰¹ Trapido, "White Conflict and Non-White Participation," 333. On Tiyo Soga, see Mcebisi Ndletyana, ed., *African Intellectuals in 19th and early 20th Century South Africa* (Human Sciences Research Council, 2008).

⁵⁰² *Cape Argus*, July 23 1898, cited in Trapido, "White Conflict and Non-White Participation," 333.

⁵⁰³ Switzer, "The Beginnings," 65.

imperialist Cecil Rhodes and his Progressive Party, Soga's paper maintained a stridently independent editorial perspective.⁵⁰⁴ He loudly supported the British cause in the war against his nemesis Jabavu, who also claimed to be pro-British, and could hardly contain his satisfaction when *Imvo Zabantsundu* was banned.

Men of the (British) World

The cosmopolitan publishers of independent African and South Asian newspapers were bi- or multi-lingual men, who were well-versed in the political discourses of the larger British world, and beyond.⁵⁰⁵ *The South African Spectator* boasted on its masthead to be “positively cosmopolitan. We know a man and not color: principles, and not creed.”⁵⁰⁶ Jabavu, for instance, was a founder of Imbumba Yama Nyama (South African Aborigines Association) and was in contact with the Aborigines' Protection Society in Britain, which included Charles Dilke and Thomas Fowell Buxton among its members, and frequently wrote letters to their newspaper *The Aborigines' Friend*.⁵⁰⁷ He was a leader of a “Native Combination” in 1885 that agreed, unsuccessfully, to form a branch of the Empire League, and considered himself a proud “Gladstonian Liberal.”⁵⁰⁸ He petitioned and corresponded with government officials in Britain, mailing copies of *Imvo*

⁵⁰⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁰⁵ Elizabeth Elbourne has written rather skillfully on the development of a broader ‘Aborigine’ consciousness across the ‘imperial networks’ of the British world. See ‘Indigenous Peoples and Imperial Networks in the Early Nineteenth Century: The Politics of Knowledge,’ in *Rediscovering the British World* (University of Calgary Press, 2005).

⁵⁰⁶ *South African Spectator*, August 23 1902.

⁵⁰⁷ Higgs, *The Ghost of Equality*, 12; *Imvo Zabantsundu*, April 30 1901, 3; Trapido, “White Conflict and Non-White Participation,” 290, 297.

⁵⁰⁸ Trapido, “White Conflict and Non-White Participation,” 291-292.

Zabantsundu to British MPs.⁵⁰⁹ Yet, as Peregrino's life story demonstrates, South African culture was not only shaped by Britain and the British Empire but by the United States, pan-Africanism, and other transnational currents. The South Asian writers were perhaps more deeply enmeshed in an Anglo-Indian culture, but they demonstrated an avid interest in the history and politics of Britain and the British Empire.⁵¹⁰ Mandalik translated Elphinstone's *History of India* into Marathi and Gujarathi, translated works of Hindu law into English, gave several papers at the Royal Asiatic Society, and edited the transactions of the Literary Society of Bombay.⁵¹¹ Similarly, Pal was an important member of the British Indian Association and often allied himself with local British merchants and settlers.

These men did not desire to be white, or to be ethnically British, but imagined themselves to be, in a very real sense, British people. These South Asian and African intellectuals were creating and participating in an imperial political culture that was often communicated in both the vernacular (Xhosa and Marathi, for instance) and the lingua franca of empire (English). Their message was accessible to the imperial, to colonial administrators and sympathetic parties in Britain and the empire, and to the local, to literate and non-literate people in their local communities. During the royal tours, they negotiated, contested, and re-made the national, or transnational, "imagined community" of empire in print.

⁵⁰⁹ Ibid., 290, 297.

⁵¹⁰ I use the term Anglo-Indian to mean a hybrid British-Asian culture, not its more traditional definition of British culture in India.

⁵¹¹ *Eminent Indians on Indian Politics*, 173.

Colonial officials were deeply concerned by the politicization of Africans and South Asians in the empire. The writers of the independent South African and Indian newspapers were socially conservative in the sense that they sought to protect and enhance their own social power and status. While their politics were often radical, particularly in challenging the dominant racial discourses of imperial culture, they always framed their notions of citizenship in loyalty to the monarchy and the British Empire. Importantly, both the Indian National Congress (f. 1885) and the South African Native National Congress (f. 1912), seen as the foremost anti-colonial and nationalist political organizations of the twentieth century, swore allegiance to the British monarch. Colonial officials, however, conflated politicization with disloyalty. The British government carefully watched the independent press, with local agents charged with reporting Indian opinion.⁵¹² During the 1875 royal tour, the Viceroy of India Lord Northbrook wrote to Philip Wodehouse, the Governor of Bombay, asking him to make a secret inquiry about intentions of the “Native newspapers in Bombay,” who he later accused of stirring false rumors and of “exceeding what is consistent with the conduct of loyal subjects.”⁵¹³ *Imvo Zabantsundu* was shut down as a traitorous organ of enemy propaganda by the military government of the Cape.

Officials also worried that the dissemination of news and information from the newspapers, through the gossip of the local bazaar or “the Native school master who read

⁵¹² See *Indian Newspaper Reports, c. 1868-1942, from the British Library, London* (Marlborough: Adam Matthew Publications Ltd., 2005). These reports from the India Office collection at the British Library reproduce many newspapers that have been otherwise lost forever.

⁵¹³ Northbrook to Wodehouse, June 3 1875, January 8, 1876, December 4 1876, BL MSS Eur D726/7.

it to them,” would inevitably lead to the politicization of non-literate people of color.⁵¹⁴ In 1878, the colonial government of India sought to crack down on “seditious writings” of the native newspapers that constantly complained of the “injustice and tyranny” of the British government in India.⁵¹⁵ The Viceroy’s Council under Lord Lytton passed Act IV of 1878, through which newspapers were subject to seizure if found to “contain any words, signs, or visible representations likely to excite disaffection to the Government established by law in British India, or antipathy between any persons of different races, castes, religions, or sects in British India.”⁵¹⁶ While this rather extreme measure was repealed in 1881 by Lord Ripon’s government, the concern reveals the cultural potency that the native press really had.⁵¹⁷ At the same time, the fact that such virulent political discourses, ones that often criticized colonial or imperial rule, could survive in an empire where, for instance, mutinous sepoys were attached to canons and blown to bits, says something rather curious about the Janus-faced nature of British rule.

India (1875)

Colonial officials imagined, or invented, Queen Victoria to be a true heir to the Mughal emperors. The ritual and spectacle of the Prince of Wales’ visit of 1875 was designed to recreate a feudal, Mughal past, to visualize a cosmic connection between past

⁵¹⁴ H.S. Caldecott to Gordon Sprigg, February 11, 1896, Rhodes Papers, vol. 6.2, No. 96. Cited in Stanley Trapido, “White Conflict and Non-White Participation,” 321.

⁵¹⁵ Das Gupta, 213.

⁵¹⁶ Act for the better control of publications in Oriental languages, Act IX. of 1878.

⁵¹⁷ “Indian Newspaper Reports, c. 1868-1942, from the British Library, London,” http://www.adam-matthew-publications.co.uk/collections_az/Indian-News-6/description.aspx (accessed 15 May 2009).

and present that would legitimize and justify British rule in India.⁵¹⁸ For the *respectables* who wrote *Native Opinion*, *The Hindoo Patriot*, and other independent newspapers, however, the royal tour was not about Mughal-style spectacle, but about modern, imperial politics. They celebrated the rajahs and nawabs as the natural leaders of the people while advocating proper spectacle as necessary to appease the “Oriental mind.”⁵¹⁹ Yet, during the royal tour, the writers of the South Asian native press imagined themselves to be imperial citizens who possessed British rights and responsibilities, a counter-discourse through which they defined their politics against the very *un*-British rule of the Raj.

The independent press participated in a vibrant imperial political culture, openly contesting the unjust policies and practices of British rule. While editorial biases may have differed – based on place, status, patronage, and political outlook – the discourses of imperial citizenship were widely embraced across Indian print culture.⁵²⁰ They challenged the mercantilist suppression of Indian industry; the “despotism” of British magistrates and the police; the inaction of the British government to widespread famine; and, the heavy burden of taxation.⁵²¹ During the tour, they challenged the costs and purposes of the events and defended the Indian princely elite, who they saw as victimized

⁵¹⁸ Cannadine, *Ornamentalism*; Bernard Cohn, “Clothes, Clothes, and Colonialism,” from *Colonialism and Its Forms of Knowledge: The British in India* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996), 106-162.

⁵¹⁹ *Native Opinion*, 14 November 1875.

⁵²⁰ *Native Opinion* and *The Hindoo Patriot* have been identified for the uses of this study because they were available and their origins can be traced. Many of the independent newspapers no longer exist outside of British intelligence on them.

⁵²¹ These sentiments were most clearly articulated by the Calcutta-based *Amrita Banar Patrika* on the eve of the royal visit. *Amrita Banar Patrika*, August 5, 1875, *Report on Native Papers*, no. 33 of 1875, 4.

by the visit. Despite this contestation, they generally expressed a loyalty to the empire and a hope that the queen's son would convey India's plight to his great mother and to the British people.

For British settlers and administrators, politicization of his kind was a symptom of ingratitude and disloyalty. During the tour, the editors of the native press were derided for their alleged disloyalty to the queen by the settler press, who were encouraged by Raj officials to correct their "mistruths."⁵²² The Anglo-Indian *Bombay Gazette* identified the native press, singling out the editors of *Native Opinion*, as "the chief mischief makers in India... who, while professing loyalty to the British Government, lose no opportunity of trying to excite... the bitterest antipathy to British rule and British civilization."⁵²³ The editors of *Native Opinion* understood politics as vital to loyalism and citizenship and thus celebrated the attacks on the Anglo-Indian press as "a very high compliment."⁵²⁴

Rájshaye Samáchár defended Indian loyalty against these rhetorical attacks:

We do not understand how loyalty can be impeached... or how the omission of a particular act can be construed as disrespect to the British Crown; or how it can be thought that the Prince of Wales is not honored if some particular part of the town be not illuminated on a particular day; or how natives can be supposed wanting in proofs of god-will to the British Government, because they do not expend a certain sum of money for the purpose... We do not understand why, thus hankering after a feigned loyalty, Government betrays the levity of its heart; except it be for the object of making a parade before others of its popularity with the natives.⁵²⁵

⁵²² Northbrook to Wodehouse, December 4, 1875, January 18, 1876, BL MSS Eur D726/7.

⁵²³ *Bombay Gazette*, quoted in *Native Opinion*, November 28, 1875.

⁵²⁴ *Native Opinion*, November 28, 1875.

⁵²⁵ *Rájshaye Samáchár*, August 6, 1875, *Report on Native Papers*, no. 34 of 1875, 1.

In general, the authors of the independent Indian press argued that the British rule in India was carried out under a veil of secrecy and that the anti-native rhetoric of the Anglo-Indian newspapers, often as the mouthpieces of Raj officials, was a source of Indian hostility to the British government, not the political agitation of Indian newspapers.⁵²⁶ This heated debate reflects the activism and contestation of the independent Indian press, to which Act IV was a response. They defended themselves as the British government's "most valuable friends" in India and challenged the ineptitude and mean-spiritedness of the colonial officials who chose to ignore their advice.⁵²⁷ While professing their loyalty to the queen and the British Empire, they criticized the tour – the costs, the corruption, and the heavy-handedness – and demanded investments and reforms that would benefit the British citizen-subjects of India.

The South Asian intelligentsia who wrote *Native Opinion*, *The Hindoo Patriot*, and other newspapers professed their pride in India and its prominent place in the British Empire and understood the empire as their political and cultural universe. *Native Opinion* celebrated that India as "the brightest jewel in the Empire's Crown" without which Britain "would sink to the level of a second rate power in Europe and [lose] all her Asiatic influence."⁵²⁸ They identified the conceptual space between the British political tradition, as "the mother of law and the nursery of freedom," and British rule in practice, which denied "citizens of a free empire" the rights and privileges of Britishness.⁵²⁹ These men did not criticize the Raj because they were disloyal or because they opposed the idea

⁵²⁶ *Native Opinion*, November 28, 1875.

⁵²⁷ *Sádháraní* (Chinsurah), August 7, 1875, *Report on Native Papers*, no. 37 of 1875, 1.

⁵²⁸ *Native Opinion*, September 5, 1875.

⁵²⁹ *Hindoo Patriot*, October 4, 1875.

of empire. To the contrary, they challenged the practices and policies of the British government in India because they imagined themselves to be loyal and respectable subjects of the queen.

In this context, South Asian journalists identified the royal visit as an opportunity for the Indian government to enact fundamental reforms toward a more just rule. Mandalik's *Native Opinion* saw the royal tour as a fitting occasion for the British to extend "constitutional rights and privileges" to their Indian subjects.⁵³⁰ While they identified the importance of graciously welcoming their queen's son, the editors challenged the royal tour –the spectacle of illuminations, fireworks, and dinners – as empty and expensive ritual practices without constructive results, including guaranteed rights for the Queen's Indian subjects.⁵³¹ They complained that the government of India acted in a principally un-British way, by making laws "in defiance of all public opinion and in the aggressiveness observable in every department of the administration," in the style of an "enlightened despotism."⁵³²

These *respectables* were deeply invested in the Prince of Wales as a transformational figure. They knew that the British monarchy had "no power whatever and can therefore not reduce any kind of taxes, nor remove any kind of grievance" but believed, in cultural tradition of the patriot queen, that Victoria the imperial matriarch could exert influence on the government to change their ways.⁵³³ The *Amrita Banar*

⁵³⁰ *Native Opinion*, February 13, 1876.

⁵³¹ *Native Opinion*, October 17, 1875; *Hindoo Patriot*, August 16, 1875.

⁵³² *Native Opinion*, October 31, 1875.

⁵³³ *Native Opinion*, August 29, 1875; *Hindoo Patriot*, November 8, 1875. This understanding of the monarchy as a fountain of justice, and separate from colonial government, was a product of imperial propaganda. It reflected, at the same time, a certain reality of the situation, that the queen was a figurehead

Patrika proposed the formation of associations in every district “to represent the wants and grievances of the people as the wealthy and well-to-do inhabitants of Calcutta will only take care to make everything appear in brilliant colours.”⁵³⁴ To them, the prince’s interest in India was genuine and well-intentioned, but the realities of poverty and misrule would be veiled by the ritual stagecraft of the visit:

But the way in which His Royal Highness has resolved to travel in India is not likely to make him acquainted with the country and its people. For under the present arrangement he will only be able to come in contact with the leading men, who will doubtless seek to appear before the Prince in gay and glittering apparel suited to their rank... Thus it will be impossible for [the prince] to know whether natives have any grievance at all. He will see through official eyes, and will be made to think after the officials... The Prince will return and tell his mother that there is no nation so happy as the people of India, and the English papers will proudly proclaim that under the British rule India is flowing with wealth and corn.⁵³⁵

They and their countrymen needed to challenge colonial control of the visit and articulate their grievances to the prince. Only then could their imperial citizenship be redeemed, in the benevolence and love of the justice-giving Great Queen.

While educated elites wanted the royal tour to be an opportunity for the British to extend rights and privileges, to see an improved standard of living for loyal subjects of the queen, they instead witnessed the corruption and meanness of the Raj. The collection

with limited influence over government policy. As chapter 1 demonstrated, Victoria was often used to deliver and thereby legitimize the decisions of the British government.

⁵³⁴ *Amrita Banar Patrika*, August 5, 1875, *Report on Native Papers*, no. 33 of 1875, 4.

⁵³⁵ *Amrita Banar Patrika*, November 27, 1875, *Report on Native Papers*, no. 48 of 1875, 3. *The Hindoo Patriot* hoped that, if the Prince of Wales would be able to see “the real truth about [Indians’] conditions,” so that “the million which will be expended in his honor will not have been expended in vain.” *Hindoo Patriot*, October 4, 1875. Similarly, the *Dacca Prakásh* argued that Indians should “lay before His Royal Highness all their wants and grievances, the poverty of India, the disgrace and humiliating position of the Native Princes, the ruin of the arts, manufactures, and the natural industries of the country, through the selfishness of foreign merchants, and the misery of the upper classes.” *Dacca Prakásh*, August 8, 1875, *Report on Native Papers*, no. 33 of 1875, 5.

of voluntary subscriptions on part of local organizing associations to fund tributes to the prince were procured by “extortion and oppression” and demands for “minimum donations.”⁵³⁶ According to several testimonies, voluntary subscriptions were cajoled out of everyone from the princes to the poorest Indians by bullying and force: “scores of poor clerks, who could ill afford it, had to come down handsomely or incur the displeasure of their chiefs.”⁵³⁷ The *Grámbártá Prakáshiká* (West Bengal) argued that the local zamindars would recoup their tour expenses by “squeezing out... the hard-earned income of a poverty-stricken tenantry who have barely recovered from the ravages of the recent famine.”⁵³⁸ The criticism of these practices were directed at the princes, landowners, and organizing committees that collected money, but the more fundamental critique pointed toward the financial demands of the Indian government.

While the British government subsidized the tour, paying for the costs of the voyage and the gifts, local communities funded the festivities and tributes of the visit. The South Asian intellectuals of the independent press questioned the costs of the tour on “this poor country,” as the taxed riches of India flowed to British officers civil servants or back to Britain and livelihoods of local weavers were “sacrifice[d] for the benefit of the Manchester merchants.”⁵³⁹ The native press criticized exorbitant spending by the government and the princes if not directed toward “some permanent institution” as a

⁵³⁶ *Native Opinion*, August 29, 1875.

⁵³⁷ *Native Opinion*, December 12, 1875.

⁵³⁸ *Grámbártá Prakáshiká*, November 20, 1875, *Report on Native Papers*, no. 48 of 1875, 4.

⁵³⁹ *Hindu Hitoishini* (Decca), August 7, 1875, *Report on Native Papers*, no. 33 of 1875, 5; *Som Prákash* (Changripottah), August 9, 1875, no. 33 of 1875, 6; *Sáptahik Samáchár* (Ranaghat), *Report on Native Papers*, no. 33 of 1875, 7.

monument to the visit.⁵⁴⁰ They argued that fixing roads and bridges, draining dirty, bacteria-infested water, and performing other improvements, even if only within the prince's eyesight, would be far more useful than fireworks. These demands were not symptoms of nationalism or even resistance to empire as an idea. These men were demanding, as loyal subjects, building projects and education, a government responsive to the needs and opinions of its subjects, and the right to critique and challenge the government – that is, a brand of citizenship made in and of the empire.

* * *

The *respectables*' conceptualization of citizenship sought to transcend the differences between Briton and Indian but did not propose democratic or social equality amongst South Asians. To the contrary, it was deeply informed by notions of respectability and status. They wrote in populist rhetoric but often peered condescendingly downward at the unrespectable masses. Mandalik's paper, for instance, was disappointed by the lack of Oriental spectacle in Bombay during the tour. Before the tour began, *Native Opinion* had proposed that the Prince of Wales appear in the kind of "grandeur and ceremony" that would impress "the oriental mind," that is, riding an elephant in the manner of "the Grand Mogul," "throwing gold and silver pieces to the poor."⁵⁴¹ They lamented after the procession that their suggestions were ignored. For the masses, it seems, they advocated not for rights and citizenship but for spectacle that would inspire loyalty and "Asiatic reverence" for the heir to the throne.⁵⁴²

⁵⁴⁰ *Native Opinion*, October 17, 1875; *Hindu Ranjiká*, August 18, 1875, *Report on Native Papers*, no. 35 of 1875, 1.

⁵⁴¹ *Native Opinion*, November 14, 1875.

⁵⁴² *Native Opinion*, October 17, 1875.

As the “most valuable friends” of the British, they understood themselves to represent the Indian people.⁵⁴³ As a social and cultural conduit between the rulers and the ruled, these men imagined that they had a special and important place in Anglo-Indian society as a “better class of Indians.”⁵⁴⁴ Their claims to populism were not completely unfounded, however. They lamented the profound poverty of India and the plights of the *ryots* and the weavers. They challenged the structures of rule, the police and the courts system, that affected the lives of all Indians within the reach of imperial rule. However, women, who were the subject of intense debate by British officials, humanitarians, and activists, were wholly absent from their discussions, reflecting on the ways in which a hybrid ideology of “separate spheres” informed their notions of respectability.

As the stories of the Gaekwar of Baroda and the Nizam of Hyderabad demonstrate (chapter two), this South Asian press intelligentsia looked to the princes and chiefs as the natural leaders of Indian society and scorned their treatment by Raj officials. The royal tours, many of them argued, were “only intended to create an impression of power of the British, and to wound the feelings of Native Princes.”⁵⁴⁵ The British government and the Anglo-Indian press, they contested, failed to honor the hereditary elites of the Raj and instead questioned their motives and loyalty. The recent past in mind, both *Native Opinion* and *The Hindoo Patriot* appealed to the faithful devotion of the Indian princes as expressed to the Prince of Wales, which was not

⁵⁴³ *Sádháraní* (Chinsurah), August 7, 1875, *Report on Native Papers*, no. 37 of 1875, 1.

⁵⁴⁴ I appeal to the language of Martin Wainwright in part because his work reflects on the intersection between social rank and imperial identities. At the same time, his work suggests that these discourses were uniquely characteristic of Britain, an argument that this chapter rejects. Martin Wainwright, *“The Better Class” of Indians: Social Rank, Imperial Identity, and South Asians in Britain, 1858-1914* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2008).

⁵⁴⁵ *Rájshayé Samáchar*, August 6, 1875, *Report on Native Papers*, no. 34 of 1875, 1.

not show loyalty, for it they had chosen they could have backed the revolted soldiery in '57 and turned their own arms against the British government... It is extremely doubtful that the English could have successfully resisted the sweeping tide of opposition from the natural leaders of the people.⁵⁴⁶

Despite having been “wronged, robbed, and degraded,” the South Asian princes remained loyal to the British Crown.⁵⁴⁷ In exchange for their loyalty, the rajahs and nawabs were treated with contempt and abuse. They were pushed and prodded by colonial officials during the royal tour, much to the chagrin of the independent press. To the South Asian *respectables*, the problem with British rule was not disloyalty on part of South Asian people, but the ineptitude and abuse of the Raj.

The papers argued that relationship between India’s “natural leaders” and the British government had devolved since 1857, from one of relative equality to one between masters and servants. Before the rebellion, the hereditary elite could “dream that they were the allies and equals of the British government.”⁵⁴⁸ By 1875, Britain’s South Asian rulers had been “curtailed,” “reduced to mere shadows.”⁵⁴⁹ Their power had been appropriated – and misused – by the British. One of the most important rituals of the tour, the distribution of the Star of India, was seen as a fundamentally empty gesture. Beyond the “profuse distribution of empty titles,” the authors of *Native Opinion* wondered, “has the prince to do nothing in return for the millions that will be spent in his honor, except

⁵⁴⁶ *Hindoo Patriot*, October 4, 1875 and *Native Opinion*, October 17, 1875. The language of the two passages are virtually identical.

⁵⁴⁷ *Native Opinion*, October 17, 1875.

⁵⁴⁸ *Native Opinion*, October 17, 1875.

⁵⁴⁹ *Native Opinion*, October 31, 1875; *Bishwa Dût*, December 23, 1875, *Reports on Native Papers*, no. 1 of 1875, 2.

the giving of a few paltry presents?”⁵⁵⁰ Unlike the South African writers, who saw princes and chiefs an atavism of a savage past, the editors of the independent Indian press celebrated and honored hereditary political elites as natural leaders, whose legitimacy had been undermined and reduced by British rule.

* * *

The Prince of Wales left the subcontinent in 1876, the same year Queen Victoria became the Empress of India. In many ways, the analysis of the Great Queen’s new title by the independent South Asian press mirrored their coverage of the royal tour. To the editors, elevating Queen Victoria to the title of empress was “calculated to produce in our minds a feeling of pride and grandeur and renown of the Empire.”⁵⁵¹ While arguing that “the progress of the country in civilization and modern appliances during the last twenty years has been immense,” the writers of *Native Opinion* suggested that a new title meant little “without any rights or privileges being granted or promised to the people of India.”⁵⁵² These are obviously not the sentiments of opposition to British rule in itself, but the protests of loyal subjects and imperial citizens.

The Indian National Congress was founded a decade later in 1885, not as an agent of nationalism or anti-colonialism but as a loyalist organization. Dadabhai Naoroji, the second president of the INC, declared in his 1886 inauguration speech:

It is our good fortune that we are under a rule which makes it possible for us to meet in this manner (*Cheers.*) It is under the civilizing rule of the Queen and people of England that we meet here together, hindered by none, and are freely allowed to speak our minds without the least fear and

⁵⁵⁰ *Native Opinion*, October 17, 1875.

⁵⁵¹ *Native Opinion*, March 19, 1876.

⁵⁵² *Native Opinion*, September 19, 1876.

without the least hesitation. Such a thing is possible only under British rule, and British rule only. (*Loud cheers.*) Then I put the question plainly: Is this Congress a nursery for sedition and rebellion against the British Government? (*Cries of 'No, no.'*) Or is it another stone in the foundation of the stability of that Government?⁵⁵³

Later INC “Radicals” belittled pro-British “Moderates,” or “Loyalists,” as collaborators disconnected from the true feelings of the Indian people.⁵⁵⁴ The notion of imperial citizenship, of South Asians who identified with and embraced the British Empire, does not fit comfortably in the nationalist narrative. Empire loyalism on part of Indian *respectables* such as Viswanath Narayan Mandalik, Kristo Pal, and other educated elites had radical implications for their politics. They were, in a very real sense, the intellectual predecessors of the nationalist politicians of the twentieth century. Yet, their intellectual contributions to both imperial (and British) political culture and Indian nationalism illustrate the cultural and political vitality of empire loyalism and imperial citizenship.

Twentieth-century nationalism and identity politics have been read back onto the history of the nineteenth-century empire. These discourses of imperial identity and citizenship failed to resonate with the British, even as imperial activists at home were imagining a global community of imperial federation. Despite the rejection, many South Asians held tightly to the historical relationship between Britain and India and the cultural remnants of imperial citizenship. These discourses became delegitimized more and more by the excesses of British rule, such as the Amritsar Massacre (1919) and their failure of the British government to enact substantial political reforms. Still, they

⁵⁵³ Dadabhai Naoroji, “The Inaugural Address of the Second Indian National Congress,” in *Inaugural Addresses by Presidents of the Indian National Congress*, ed. Dinker Vishnu Gokhale (Bombay: Ripon Printing Press, 1895), 7.

⁵⁵⁴ See Robert N. Minor, “Sri Aurobindo's Dismissal of Gandhi and His Nonviolence,” in *Indian Critiques of Gandhi*, ed. Harold Coward (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2003), 89-90.

survived. Mohandas Gandhi's career as a human rights activist, as it were, began with a Victorian lawyer in Natal not the dhoti-wearing "traditionalist" of the 1930s and 40s. Bill Nasson points to the Indian Royal Air Force pilot of World War II who named his Hurricane fighter *Amristar*, a reflection of imperial rule's complex legacy.⁵⁵⁵ South Asian immigrants who arrived in postwar Britain experienced conflicted and dualistic notions of belonging -- their loyalty to Britain still challenged. These encounters demonstrate the strange and convoluted legacy of British imperialism that can be defined neither by the language of collaboration or resistance nor by identity politics of modern nationalism.

South Africa (1901)

Constructions of race and difference profoundly informed the making of modern South Africa. Scholars have long sought the origins of the twentieth-century racial order in the nineteenth-century British Empire in southern Africa. They have searched the cosmopolitan world of Cape Town, the frontier farms and mission stations of the Eastern Cape, and the goldfields of the Rand, producing a thoughtful and useful historical literature that has reshaped the contours of South African historical studies.⁵⁵⁶ Urban segregation, spatial controls and native reserves, passcards, and political disenfranchisement all emerged, not in the 1948 victory of the National Party or even in the 1910 Union of South Africa, but in British colonial state of the nineteenth century.

⁵⁵⁵ Bill Nasson, *Britannia's Empire: Making a British World* (Stroud, Gloucestershire: Tempus, 2004), 169.

⁵⁵⁶ Timothy Keegan, *Colonial South Africa and the Origins of the Racial Order* (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1997); Nigel Penn, *The Forgotten Frontier: Colonist and Khoisan on the Cape's Northern Frontier in the Eighteenth Century*. Athens: Ohio University Press, 2006).

The non-racial politics of the South African newspapermen -- John Tengo Jabavu (*Imvo Zabantsundu*), Alan Soga (*Izwi Labantu*), and Francis Z.S. Peregrino (*South African Spectator*) – demonstrate that this modern racial order was not a foregone conclusion. While they and their progressive settler allies were characterized by what might be described as imperialist tendencies, to transform others in their own image, the notions of citizenship they articulated cannot be conflated with the more racialist and exclusionary politics of imperial culture. They invested their notion of imperial citizenship in the politics of respectability and in the medium of an independent print culture. They imagined a future in the empire, where all respectable citizen-subjects of the queen shared the same rights and privileges.

The most prized possession of their respectability – the “liberal” Cape franchise – came under attack during the late nineteenth century. In this context, these *respectables* understood the South African War to be a defining moment in the future social and political order of southern Africa. They feared, rightfully so, that the post-war settlement would solidify white dominance, a union of British and Boer, over the non-white populations of southern Africa. And, the Cape franchise was one of the earliest and most controversial impasses during the negotiations to end the war. Jabavu foresaw, appealing to the language of *The Aborigine’s Friend*, that *white* settlers would “come together... over the body of ‘the nigger,’” to subjugate all people of color.⁵⁵⁷ Jabavu, Soga, and Peregrino sought to avert this fate and to make a new future for South Africa by claiming their rights as British subjects. Alan Soga fiercely disagreed with John Tengo Jabavu’s

⁵⁵⁷ *Imvo Zabantsundu*, April 30, 1901, 3. Quote from *The Aborigines’ Friend*. By 1908, Soga was conceding the same point, condemning “white civilization” for “its history... laid in a trail of blood and savagery.” *Izwi*, October 24, 1908, cited in Christopher Saunders, “African Attitudes to Britain and the Empire,” in *The South African War Reappraised*, 143.

pacifism, and their fierce political rivalry only developed further over the course of the war. While they disagreed with each other over the politics of the war, they all interpreted its meaning through the lens of an imperial citizenship.

The Duke and Duchess of Cornwall – the future King George V and Queen Mary – visited South Africa less than a year after the death of George’s grandmother, Victoria. The tour itself was a by-product of the South African War, designed by Joseph Chamberlain the Colonial Secretary to convey thanks for imperial service in the war and to bolster loyalty during troubled times for the empire. The future king almost did not visit South Africa, due to an outbreak of plague, but traveled around the Cape in the middle of an imperial war. The death of the Great Queen and the on-going conflict profoundly informed the responses by people of color to the royal tour. They had firmly stood by the empire in a time of war and appealed, as loyal subjects of the Great Queen and their new king, and future subjects of the Duke of Cornwall, for a post-war South Africa where all people shared the rights and responsibilities of imperial citizens.

* * *

The death of Queen Victoria in 1901, in the middle of the war, profoundly informed the politics of the visit. “The vaunted teleology of the Queen’s rule” – the promise of “the mother’s compassion and justice” – was a product of colonial propaganda that was appropriated by local *respectables*.⁵⁵⁸ In her death, they sought to redeem this promise by promoting a social order that did not deny any of her loyal subjects their rights. *Imvo Zabantsundu* expressed grief over the loss of this queen “so precious to all of her subjects because of her transcendent virtues, and not less to her

⁵⁵⁸ De Kock, 139.

Native subjects in South Africa.”⁵⁵⁹ Jabavu celebrated the Victorian era as an age of improvement, of “increasing comfort and well-being for the masses,” liberty “advancing in all directions,” new and improved technology, the advance of education and Christianity, and less crime.⁵⁶⁰ Of course, the *Pax Britannica* was also an era of violence, dispossession, and even disenfranchisement for people of color in South Africa and the empire. But, Victoria the “Mother, wife, and Queen” as a symbol represented progress toward justice and equality for *all* of her subjects, an unfulfilled promise.⁵⁶¹ *The South African Spectator* predicted, as a consequence of her death, “the dawn of a new era, one of understanding and perfect concord between the races.”⁵⁶²

In face of intense criticism, most notably from Soga, the “pro-Boer” Jabavu sought to prove his loyalty to the empire through expressions of grief. In a letter to *Imvo Zabantsundu*, “N.S.B.” complimented the Jabavu’s impeccable loyalism and his deep, heartfelt articulation of grief (the author also noted that the paper’s black border of mourning was much more pronounced than that of other King William’s Town journals).⁵⁶³ “Whatever may be said of the loyalty of the newspaper and their Editors,” N.S.B. wrote, John Tengo Jabavu was “not surpassed by any.”⁵⁶⁴ The South African War was a rather dark period in Jabavu’s political career, and his need to express loyalty was

⁵⁵⁹ *Imvo Zabantsundu*, January 28, 1901, 3.

⁵⁶⁰ *Imvo Zabantsundu*, January 28, 1901, 3; March 18, 1901. I am, of course, appealing to Asa Briggs’ *The Age of Improvement, 1783-1867* (Pearson, 1959, 2nd edn 2000). On February 18, 1901, *Imvo Zabantsundu* humorously noted that ‘the Queen was the salt of the British constitution.’ ‘The laws may be good, but like food required salt.’

⁵⁶¹ *Imvo Zabantsundu*, January 28, 1901, 3.

⁵⁶² *South African Spectator*, February 23, 1901.

⁵⁶³ *Imvo Zabantsundu*, February 11, 1901, 3.

⁵⁶⁴ *Imvo Zabantsundu*, February 11, 1901, 3.

particularly acute. The political discourses over his loyalty in the days following Queen Victoria's death, particularly his very public disagreements with Soga, reflect on the complexities of "native politics."

Jabavu's "support" for the Afrikaner Bond was framed without a discourse of British politics. While Soga identified him as a traitor, the real danger Jabavu represented to the wartime British government of the Cape was in demanding the rights of citizenship and in rejecting the jingoism of the war, arguing that, from the perspective of the colonized, there was *very* little difference between British and Boer settlers. Despite the intense criticism, *Imvo* claimed itself to be the most authentic voice of *British* political culture in South Africa and participated in a larger imperial political discourse about loyalty, jingoism, and the war.

Both Soga and Peregrino strongly supported the British war effort. The pacifism and pro-Boerism of *Imvo* was unacceptable to Soga, who belittled Jabavu's politics as treason in a time of war. He condemned those who, like Jabavu, dared to conflate Briton with Boer. Both of the pro-war papers (*Izwi Labantu* and *The South African Spectator*) advertised Boer atrocities and promoted African service to the empire. In this context, Peregrino confidently asserted that

the loyalty of the colored people during these troublons [sic] times has been spontaneous and unquestionable. From all parts of the Colony they appeal to be allowed to bear their share in the responsibilities, and to participate in the sacrifices necessary to the firm, and permanent establishment of His Majesty's beneficent rule under which the colored people, are afforded full protection.⁵⁶⁵

⁵⁶⁵ *South African Spectator*, February 4 1901.

As an advocate of the war, Soga was also a militant supporter of men such as Cecil Rhodes and Alfred Milner, the brand of arch-imperialist who represent the empire's most xenophobic and expansionist tendencies. Few histories of the British Empire account for such complexities – of pro-empire, pro-Boer, even pro-imperialist people of color. They did not support British rule as the better of two evils, but as an investment in a just and more equitable future that lived up to the promises of Britishness.

* * *

An analysis of the debates and issues, always legitimized and justified within a frame of loyalism, of these months between Victoria's death and the arrival of the Duke of York is telling. The pages of the newspapers, for instance, debated the value of literary education for "Natives," which proved to be vitally important to the status-based vision of such *respectables*. Letters articulating the dangers of "Native education" were fiercely refuted. The editors even advocated that the "Native memorial" to the late Queen Victoria ought to be a scholarship for worthy African students, in order to celebrate the "progress of education and religion during Queen Victoria's reign."⁵⁶⁶ That said, their point was not that all Africans deserved a "literary education," but that no subject of the king should be denied one on the basis of his or her race. At the same time, these discourses reflected a sub-imperial belief in the "civilizing mission," to raise up their savage brethren to the heights of civilization, to transform South Africans in their own image.

⁵⁶⁶ *Imvo Zabantsundu*, March 18, 1901, 3; April 1, 1901, 3; April 9, 1901. Soga, however, saw the discussion as fruitless until people of color could unite together for the cause. "Educated natives, who are supposed to lead the race, are torn with racial antagonism, and individual jealousies and ambition. They fail to recognise the true limits of individual ambition, authority, and precedence." July 23, 1901.

Cape politics figured most importantly in the pages of the papers. The editors of the independent South African press were by and large not democrats; they generally believed that only *men* of a certain education and status ought to possess the vote.⁵⁶⁷ In the months before the royal visit, the planned resignation of Richard Solomon, the elected representative in the Cape Parliament for Tembuland, infuriated Jabavu.⁵⁶⁸ Jabavu has been criticized by nationalist historians for accepting, even advocating, white representation for African constituencies, as might be evidenced in the discussion over Solomon's seat.⁵⁶⁹ Jabavu's vision for the South African future, and that of the "better class" of Africans, was distinctly centered on non-racial status, and his politics reflected both this bias and his sense of political pragmatism. As African liberals, they emphasized the need to work within the political and legal bounds of the constitution. Solomon was chastised by *Imvo Zabantsundu* for resigning mid-term and for making the announcement in advance, which would "engender" "excitement" and would give time for the electorate to be "vigorously canvassed."⁵⁷⁰

These concerns demonstrate the complex political discourses of educated elites in South Africa. On one hand, the concern over "excitement" was presumably classist, distaste for the possibility of popular reaction and disorder in the towns and countryside

⁵⁶⁷ The issue of gender was largely ignored by these men. Global respectability was often anchored in ideologies of gender difference. I posit that women were largely ignored in the independent press during this period because they were considered irrelevant to the public sphere of politics. This is not to say that women did not participate in politics because they certainly did. However, this brand of respectable politics, and the idea of respectability in itself, was rooted in their absence.

⁵⁶⁸ Solomon was the son of a missionary, educated at the South African College and Cambridge, served as Attorney-General of the Cape (1898-1900), and was knighted by the queen. Walter H. Wills, *The Anglo-African Who's Who and Biographical Sketchbook, 1907* (Jeppestown Press, reprint 2006), 342. He was apparently leaving his post to join the government of Transvaal.

⁵⁶⁹ Harris, 12.

⁵⁷⁰ *Imvo Zabantsundu*, February 18, 1901, 3.

of Tembuland, even though the franchise itself was rather limited. On the other, it reflects the concern that “sojourners in the territories [settlers, missionaries, business interests?] will claim to be heard before the permanent residents.”⁵⁷¹ Jabavu advocated that the voters of Tembuland should be allowed “the freest possible scope in selecting a representative,” without outside interference and manipulation, and that they should “insist on their undoubted rights, and put forward their own candidate.”⁵⁷² In this context, the issue was not *specifically* African rights, but that of just and fair elections in which “irrespective of race” all of “His Majesty’s [qualified] subjects’ could vote.⁵⁷³ Racial politics would only serve to “retard the true progress of the country.”⁵⁷⁴

These men also promoted respectability by emphasizing the virtues of cleanliness and sobriety. *The Spectator* published an editorial on that most ubiquitous Victorian value, cleanliness, titled, “Let Us Be Clean”: a tirade against “the picturesque filth which is permitted to strut about the streets to the delight of the enemies of the race, and the advocates for the inferior treatment of the race but to the disgust of the *decent and respectable citizen*.”⁵⁷⁵ Elsewhere Peregrino worried that “the rising generation [were being allowed] to sink to the level of the Hooligan” and the “contagion” of lawlessness.⁵⁷⁶ “Cleanliness, honesty, industry, and self-respect,” he argued, “are habits

⁵⁷¹ *Imvo Zabantsundu*, February 18, 1901, 3.

⁵⁷² *Imvo Zabantsundu*, February 18, 1901, 3.

⁵⁷³ *Imvo Zabantsundu*, February 18, 1901, 3.

⁵⁷⁴ *Imvo Zabantsundu*, February 18, 1901, 3.

⁵⁷⁵ *South African Spectator*, February 9, 1901. Emphasis added.

⁵⁷⁶ *South African Spectator*, February 23, 1901, November 23, 1901.

which sit as well on [whites] as on [people of color].”⁵⁷⁷ Self-fashioning themselves as respectable and modern, these men of the (British) world advocated rights for all loyal and respectable subject-citizens, regardless of race or ethnicity.

* * *

On the eve of the royal visit, Jabavu’s *Imvo Zabantsundu* was suppressed by the military government of the Cape. Colonial officials kept a careful eye on independent African newspapers, and Jabavu’s pacifism and “pro-Boer” politics were deemed too dangerous for the royal visit and the war effort. Soga was elated by the silencing of Jabavu, even if they shared an enormous amount in common despite their differences. *Izwi* celebrated its rival’s demise with the headline, “IMVO R.I.P”:

NEMESIS—which publishes arrogant and tyrannical abuse of prosperity, has found out our native contemporary at last.... Frankly, we have consistently opposed the pro-Boer policy of “Imvo,” and its unfriendly attitude towards those friends of progress and good Government, who made it possible for that paper to establish itself... We feel deeply the humiliation cast upon the native press, just entering on the threshold of life.... What an opportunity for our enemies to seize upon!.... The magnanimity of the British race is wonderful. Perhaps the moral lessons to be gained by this serious blow, will not be altogether lost, but will work out for the good to the future of the native press that has to be.⁵⁷⁸

Soga, in haste to judge an old rival, unfairly concluded that Jabavu was disloyal, the same error that was often made by settlers and colonial officials about the African press as a whole. They confused independent political opinions with disloyalty.

⁵⁷⁷ *South African Spectator*, February 8, 1902.

⁵⁷⁸ *Izwi Labantu*, August 27, 1901. *The Spectator* deferred to *Izwi*, citing Soga as a “greater authority” on the issue of *Imvo* but criticized “the ingratitude and abuse” shown toward “a friend.” *South African Spectator*, September 7, 1901.

In the context of this political crisis, the royal tour represented an important opportunity for the South African intelligentsia to mourn the loss of the Great Queen, to celebrate their new king, and to demonstrate loyalty to *their* empire. Peregrino looked forward to the “spontaneous outbursts of loyalty” that would remind the king’s subjects why they were fighting and inform the rebels as to the futility of their exercise.⁵⁷⁹ These men were particularly heartened by the inclusion of notable *respectables* in the tour. *Imvo Zabantsundu* celebrated that loyal Africans would be recognized important members of the imperial community.⁵⁸⁰ Despite this inclusion, the independent press came to question imperial dedication to the king’s loyal subjects of color, in part because they were marginalized in royal ceremonies in favor of hereditary elites.

Peregrino, who had only arrived in South Africa a year earlier from the United States, was chosen by the community to deliver a “native address” to the Duke and Duchess of Cornwall. He denied rumors that the Colonial Office had screened his address or that a “white man” had presented it to the duke.⁵⁸¹ The address was overwhelmingly directed not at the duke’s father, Edward VII, but to the memory of his grandmother, Victoria the Good, under whom “the shackles of slavery were struck off our feet.”⁵⁸² The duke, in his response to his meeting with African *respectables*, probably gave the same speech he delivered during all of his meetings on the empire tour, slightly modified for his audience. Moved, Peregrino noted that the Duke of York “dwelt not on any

⁵⁷⁹ *South African Spectator*, August 24, 1901.

⁵⁸⁰ *Imvo Zabantsundu*, June 21, 1901, 3.

⁵⁸¹ *South African Spectator*, August 24, 1901. It would be highly unusual for such an address *not* to be screened by the colonial government before the event. Colonial officials strictly disallowed political commentary (as they saw it) by any person put before a royal visitor.

⁵⁸² *South African Spectator*, August 24, 1901

distinctions of race and color” and was “deeply touched by the display of loyalty.”⁵⁸³

Whether or not the duke was acting out a scripted performance, in a part that he had played dozens of times, is mostly irrelevant; more importantly, South African elites such as Peregrino invested, and found, in him the promise of imperial citizenship.

While encouraged by this encounter, all three men were concerned that the stagecraft of colonial officials would suppress demonstrations of spontaneous loyalty by common people and misrepresent the character of South Africa’s native population.⁵⁸⁴ Specifically, they were concerned that the people of South Africa would be represented by “chiefs and headmen,” rather than “the most enlightened of our people.”⁵⁸⁵ To Soga, this exclusion would deny the duke and duchess a “fair opportunity of gauging the true state of civilization and improvement arrived at by the natives.”⁵⁸⁶ Much of their scorn was directed at the ornamental rituals described in the previous chapter, the Durbar-like rituals and war dances, and the hereditary elites who performed in them.

They argued that these rituals misrepresented the progress of South Africa during the reign of Queen Victoria and focused the duke’s attention and a corrupt and dependent aristocracy. *The Spectator*, for instance, mocked plans for the performance of a Zulu war dance as “buffoonery,” a cultural relic of an uncivilized past.⁵⁸⁷ *Izwi Labantu* shared the

⁵⁸³ *South African Spectator*, August 24, 1901.

⁵⁸⁴ *Imvo Zabantsundu*, June 21, 1901.

⁵⁸⁵ *Imvo Zabantsundu*, June 21, 1901.

⁵⁸⁶ *Izwi Labantu*, August 27, 1901.

⁵⁸⁷ *South African Spectator*, July 13, 1901. “Let [the man of color] be represented not as a savage but as a product of civilization.” September 7, 1901. *Izwi* argued in a similar vein to the *Natal Times*, asserting that “The Chiefs and native commoners presented... all wore European dress of the usual grotesque and comical variety... Thus do our officials delight to caricature our native races.” August 27, 1901, September 3, 1901.

“amazement and feelings of disgust at the perpetuation of customs that are condemned by all civilized natives” and suggested that natives ought to sing the national anthem instead.⁵⁸⁸ They argued that the genuine loyalty of both the lower classes and of the enlightened, respectable classes was being suppressed by the colonial officials.⁵⁸⁹ It was the African intelligensia, who “fully realise[d] the trend of British policy, and the advantage that loyalty offers.”⁵⁹⁰

In the aftermath of the tour, Soga and Peregrino pressed for a war settlement that considered the service and loyalty of South Africa’s non-white population. To use John Darwin’s explanatory frame in a somewhat subversive way by applying it to “the colonized,” the intelligentsia of the independent South African press were articulating a brand of “Britannic nationalism,” of imperial citizenship and identity, even so far as to advocate imperial federation!⁵⁹¹ Loyalty to the monarchy was framed in a vision of British rights and respectable status. The editors of these papers were not only claiming Britishness but also arguing that their understanding of it was more authentic, closer to its *true* ideals, as clearly articulated in their debates over the terms of peace. In April 1901, *The Spectator* had argued that the settlement must be ended on “amicable” terms but that

it would be contrary to all precedent and altogether at variance *with British traditions* to surrender the rights and endanger the safety of the loyal native and colored citizen even to that end. We believe that in view of all the circumstances precedent to the assumption of hostilities, that an

⁵⁸⁸ *Izwi Labantu*, July 2, 1901.

⁵⁸⁹ *Imvo Zabantsundu*, June 21, 1901.

⁵⁹⁰ *Izwi Labantu*, August 20, 1901.

⁵⁹¹ Darwin, John, “A Third British Empire? The Dominion Idea in Imperial Politics,” in *The Oxford History of the British Empire*, vol. IV, *The Twentieth Century*, ed. Judith M. Brown and William Roger Louis (Oxford University Press, 1999); *Imvo Zabantsundu*, April 9, 1901.

unconditional surrender would have been in order, but failing that, we believe that the conclusion of peace on any basis other than that of equal rights to all His Majesty's *civilized subjects*, would be a retrogression.⁵⁹²

When the *Imvo Zabantsundu* returned to the presses in October 1902, over a year after being proscribed, Jabavu began not with a defense of his politics but with an ode to Queen Victoria and the profound progress accomplished during her reign.⁵⁹³ He went on to imagine a post-war South African politics where “Dutch, British, and Natives have a right to be” and all “should be accorded the common rights of *citizenship*,” of shared “prosperity” and “responsibility.”⁵⁹⁴ This imperial political culture survived its betrayal during the South African War in tact. Yet, its message continued, with few exceptions, to fall on deaf ears, both in Cape Town and London.

The alternative print culture of South Africa expanded rapidly in the decade following the war. No fewer than nine new African, Coloured, and Indian newspapers began publication between 1901 and 1910.⁵⁹⁵ Jabavu and Soga remained fierce political rivals. When Soga helped found the Native Press Organization (NPA), Jabavu refused to participate.⁵⁹⁶ They participated in separate political organizations and organized separate protests.⁵⁹⁷ In April 1901, *Izwi Labantu* closed.⁵⁹⁸ *Imvo Zabantsundu* survived, with the editorship succeeded by Jabavu's son Alexander in 1921, but Jabavu's consistently

⁵⁹² *South African Spectator*, April 20, 1901.

⁵⁹³ *Imvo Zabantsundu*, October 8, 1902.

⁵⁹⁴ *Imvo Zabantsundu*, October 8, 1902.

⁵⁹⁵ Switzer, *South Africa's Alternative Press*, 4-5.

⁵⁹⁶ Switzer, “The Beginnings,” 67.

⁵⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, 68-69.

⁵⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, 68-69.

erratic politics (which was nothing new) and the emergence of a new generation of political leaders limited his influence. F.Z.S. Peregrino continued to publish *The South African Spectator* until 1908, but he has left little in terms of a historical record.⁵⁹⁹

* * *

The fate of African loyalism in the empire and its limits in the aftermath of the South African War are exemplified in the life of Sol Plaatje (1876–1932), a co-founder of the South African Native National Congress. The Tswana-speaking Plaatje was educated at the Berlin Missionary Society's station near Boshof in the Orange Free State, where his father was a deacon, but was by and large an auto-didactic, teaching himself English, Dutch, German, and “at least” five African languages.⁶⁰⁰ During the Siege of Mafeking (1899-1901), Plaatje served the British war effort by gathering and communicating intelligence from African informants and wrote about his experience in his *Mafeking Diary*, first published in 1973.⁶⁰¹ He edited two newspapers, *Koranta ea Bechoana*, or *Bechuana Gazette* (1902-10), and *Tsala ea Bechoana*, or *Friend of the Tswana* (1910-12), both of which were published in English and Tswana. Like the other historical actors of this chapter, he emphasized the importance of cleanliness and sobriety, a respectability of action and disposition essential to citizenship.

As a political activist for African rights, he advocated for a non-racial citizenship and appealed directly to imperial responsibility to South Africans as the legacy of Queen

⁵⁹⁹ Manu Herbstein, “F.Z.S. Peregrino and *The Fortnightly Spectator*: Query,” May 27, 1998, H-Albion <manuherb@africaonline.com.gh> (accessed May 8, 2009).

⁶⁰⁰ Brian Willan, *Sol Plaatje: South African Nationalist, 1876-1932* (London: Heinemann, 1984), 15-20.

⁶⁰¹ Sol Plaatje, *Mafeking Diary* (Northern Illinois University Press, 1990 reprint). Above all, his diary demonstrates the importance of African participation to the war effort, a contribution long ignored by both British and Afrikaner accounts of the South African War.

Victoria. Peter Limb has ably challenged Plaatje's empire loyalism, and Brian Willan's pathbreaking 1984 biography of the South African political and literary figure, arguing that Plaatje "simultaneously and often sarcastically... assert[ed] loyalty to the Crown whilst denouncing the hypocrisy of Empire and challenging the cultural domination of colonialism with its African stereotypes."⁶⁰² Yet, Plaatje was participating in an established tradition of imperial politics in southern Africa, even if he must be considered a transitional figure between a political discourse of loyalty and one of resistance. His life demonstrates the ways in which the nationalist politics of the twentieth century were born in the intellectual milieu of imperial politics.

The end of the South African War brought about a transformation of South African politics that would effectively shut out non-whites and inspire a nationalist politics. The Treaty of Vereeniging (1902) brought the whole of South Africa effectively under British rule, with promises of local rule under the British Crown for the former Boer republics. The issue of African voting rights was temporarily avoided, and the pre-war franchises remained largely intact. The Union of South Africa (1910), created a federal state that abandoned the enfranchisement of non-whites in the name of "[white] unity and reconciliation."⁶⁰³ Jabavu wrote, "That cow of Great Britain has now gone

⁶⁰² Peter Limb, "Sol Plaatje Reconsidered: Rethinking Plaatje's Attitudes to Class, Nation, Gender, and Empire," *African Studies* 62, 1 (2001): 38; Brian Willan, *Sol Plaatje: South African Nationalist, 1876-1932*.

⁶⁰³ L.M. Thompson, *The Oxford History of South Africa*, ed. M. Wilson and L.M. Thompson, vol. II: *South Africa, 1870-1966* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1971), 358. Quoted in Hyam, 77. Hyam and Henshaw argue that "African interests... were [not] sacrificed [by the British] at the altar of Anglo-Afrikaner reconciliation" or that the British did not consider African interests in their policy toward South Africa, but that the British government possessed a limited realm of action if they wished to maintain southern Africa as part of the British Empire. Also see Bill Nasson, *The South African War*, 232-33.

dry.”⁶⁰⁴ Despite this imperial betrayal, the loyalist South African Native National Congress, co-founded by Plaatje, John Dube, and others in 1912 as a response to the political and social order of the union, continued to agitate the British government – the monarchy, in particular – to redeem the promises of imperial citizenship.⁶⁰⁵

Plaatje’s impassioned opposition to the Natives’ Land Act of 1913, which sought to dispossess and segregate the “native” population of southern Africa, took him to the imperial metropole as a representative of the SANNC and inspired his greatest work, *Life in South Africa Before and Since the European War and the Boer Rebellion* (1916).⁶⁰⁶ He arrived in Britain on the eve of the Great War, in 1914. During the war, the SANNC pledged to “hang up their grievances” and support the imperial war effort.⁶⁰⁷ Plaatje framed his plea for imperial intervention against the Natives’ Land Act in the familiar language of imperial loyalty. His case was helped by the recent rebellion of Boer settlers against South Africa’s support of the British war effort, and he employed this incident to contrast Boer tyranny and republicanism with African loyalty.⁶⁰⁸ In his book on the subject, he used recent South African history to appeal to the unredeemed promises of imperial citizenship:

⁶⁰⁴ *Imvo Zabantsundu*, August 31, 1901. Quoted in Ronald Hyam and Peter Henhaw, *The Lion and the Springbok: Britain and South Africa since the Boer War* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 77.

⁶⁰⁵ See for instance, “Petition to King George V, from the South African Native National Congress,” 16 December, 1918, *South African History Online*. http://www.sahistory.org.za/pages/library-resources/articles_papers/karis/Karis_v1_pt2_doc38.htm (accessed May 8, 2009). I do not mean to suggest that the SANNC was the first African political organization of its kind. As the forerunner of the African National Congress, however, it was the longest-lasting and most influential African political organization.

⁶⁰⁶ John Tengo Jabavu notably supported the act as he had the Glen Grey Act and other restrictions on land ownership and voting rights.

⁶⁰⁷ Willan, 197.

⁶⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, 187.

With the formation of the Union, the Imperial Government, for reasons which have never been satisfactorily explained, unreservedly handed over the Natives to the colonists, and these colonists, as a rule, are dominated by the Dutch Republican spirit. Thus the suzerainty of Great Britain, which under the reign of Her late Majesty Victoria, of blessed memory, was the Natives' only bulwark, has no apparently been withdrawn or relaxed, and the Republicans like a lot of bloodhounds long held in the leash, use the free hand given by the Imperial Government not only to guard against a possible supersession of Cape ideas of toleration, but to effectively extend through the Union the drastic native policy pursued by the Province which is misnamed "Free" State, and enforce it with the utmost rigour.⁶⁰⁹

The promises of imperial citizenship would go unfulfilled. Britain failed to effectively intervene, largely because imperial policy had moved toward self-government for the white colonies of settlement. As South Africa drifted out of the British orbit of influence, so went the promises of imperial justice.⁶¹⁰

Nonetheless, the legacy of imperial citizenship survived. In his 1994 autobiography, *Long Walk to Freedom*, Nelson Mandela, one of the world's most famous anti-colonial nationalists, "confess[es] to being somewhat of an Anglophile."⁶¹¹ He continues:

When I thought of Western democracy and freedom, I thought of the British parliamentary system. In so many ways, the very model of the gentleman for me was an Englishman. Despite Britain being the home of parliamentary democracy, it was that democracy that had helped inflict a pernicious system of inequality on my people. While I abhorred the notion

⁶⁰⁹ Sol Plaatje, *Native Life in South Africa Before and Since the European War and the Boer Rebellion* (Whitefish, MT: Kessinger Publishing, 2004 reprint), 12-13.

⁶¹⁰ The Balfour Declaration (1917) and the Statute of Westminster (1931) recognized the white Dominions as co-equal partners with Britain. In 1961, the white South African electorate voted to quit the Commonwealth, and South Africa subsequently declared itself a republic.

⁶¹¹ Nelson Mandela, *Long Walk to Freedom* (New York: Little, Brown, and Company, 1994), 302.

of British imperialism, I never rejected the trappings of British styles and manners.⁶¹²

Mandela recognized, of course, that his case of Anglophilia reflected the complex legacies of imperialism and its “colonization of consciousness.”⁶¹³ At the same time, Mandela’s sentiments are cultural artifacts of imperial citizenship as an idea, of the unredeemed promises of British political traditions in South Africa. The fact that these discourses, or their remnants, have little resonance in the modern world demonstrates one of the fundamental lessons of history: that the past is a strange and incomprehensible place, where we should resist the urge to impose our own values and sensibilities.

Conclusions

Bill Nasson has demonstrated in his excellent studies of African service to the empire during the South African War and World War I, a “vigorous, Western-educated minority” “retain[ed] their optimistic faith in the British imperial project, despite its palpably wounding betrayal of their tenuous rights and interests,” until the end of empire and beyond.⁶¹⁴ These people were neither, as older generations of historical literature have presented them, colonial collaborators nor proto-nationalists, but pro-empire African (and Asian) liberals whose identities often centered on loyalism and respectability. Loyalism was not so simply a means to an end. Patriotism and service to

⁶¹² Mandela, 302. This excerpt has been frequently cited. See, in particular, Tom Lodge, *Mandela: A Critical Life* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 6; Christopher Saunders, “Britishness and Otherness,” *Humanities Research* XIII, no. 1 (2006): 68..

⁶¹³ See, in particular, Mandela, 96-97.

⁶¹⁴ Bill Nasson, “Why They Fought: Black Cape Colonists and Imperial Wars, 1899-1918,” *International Journal of African Historical Studies* 37 (Winter 2004): 55. On African participation in the Anglo-Zulu War, see P.S. Thompson, *Black Soldiers of the Queen: The Natal Contingent in the Anglo-Zulu War* (Tuscaloosa, University of Alabama Press, 2006).

the empire, specifically, was a “chance to acquire... a just and recognized status as loyal subjects of the Crown.”⁶¹⁵ Demonstrations of loyalty and patriotism were not inauthentic – a subversive” ploy – nor were they articulated without knowledge of the obvious inequality and abuses of colonial rule.

These *respectables* claimed British political traditions and claimed Britishness in an effort to transform the very *un*-British practices of colonial rule. As Leon de Kock argues, they demonstrated “evidence of *desired identification* with the colonizing culture as an *act of affirmation*, a kind of publicly declared ‘struggle’ that does not oppose the terms of a colonial culture but insists on a *more pure* version of its originating legitimation.”⁶¹⁶ They imagined their political, cultural, and social universe as an imperial and transnational one. Educated in missionary and other British schools, these elites were nurtured by the British to be the intermediaries of empire. In embracing an imperial culture, however, the “native” intelligentsia of India and South Africa, and other locales across the British Empire, articulated a vision of imperial citizenship that challenged the conceptual space between the theory and reality of British rule.

This emergence of this imperial political culture paralleled the development of the ritualistic practices described in the previous chapter. As British rule sought to appropriate one form of politics, which they imagined to be ancient and static, local *respectables* were forging a new one, which they imagined to be modern and cosmopolitan. While the colonial experiences of India and South Africa were unquestionably different, the development of comparable political practices and traditions

⁶¹⁵ Nasson, “Why They Fought,” 60.

⁶¹⁶ Leon de Kock, “Sitting for the Civilization Test: The Making(s) of a Civil Imaginary in Colonial South Africa,” *Poetics Today* 22 (Summer 2001): 392.

and the emergence of a transnational class of Western-educated elites reflects on the shared experiences of colonial rule across the global spaces of the British Empire. The historical actors of this chapter also demonstrate the limits of collaboration and resistance as ways of describing the colonial past.

Imperial citizenship represents a vibrant cultural and political tradition of the nineteenth- and early twentieth-century British world. Its failure as a discourse was as much about British inaction to live up to the promises of the liberal Empire as violent and illiberal action. As a transitional period, the late nineteenth-century empire was a dynamic and interconnected political space where a modern, global politics of respectability and imperial citizenship was made. In this context, the nationalist political movements of the twentieth century have their origins in local political traditions as well as the intellectual milieu of imperial politics. The cosmopolitan and modern authors, intellectuals, and activists of this chapter are relevant and important to the history of Britain and Britishness, even if their claims to Britishness and citizenship fell on deaf ears. In the imperial networks of empire, their message was short-circuited.

CHAPTER FOUR: Settler Cultures and Britishness

Historians of empire have recently turned their attention to the British colonies of settlement, in a project aimed at reassessing the role of Britishness and imperial identities in the political, cultural, and social worlds of colonial settlers.⁶¹⁷ For these scholars, the colonial societies of the “British world” were neither mere extensions of metropolitan society nor foreordained nation-states but transnational cultural spaces that were informed both by local circumstances and contingencies and by a political, cultural, social, and historical relationship with Britain and the British diaspora. In this context, British national identity must not be understood as a set of ideas and beliefs packed in a suitcase and carried to “Greater Britain” but a competing collection of identities made in and of the imperial experience.⁶¹⁸ Britishness was a “composite, rather than exclusive, form of identity,” which was appropriated and adapted, made and remade by British and non-British colonial subjects around the world.⁶¹⁹ In this regard, imperial culture was made by colonial subjects in the empire, who had as much of a claim on discourses of Britishness and imperial citizenship as Britons at home.

Through the royal tours by Queen Victoria’s children and grandchildren, colonial officials in Britain and abroad sought to make real the emergent mythology of imperial monarchy and the justice-giving Great Queen and thus to bind Britain’s colonial empire

⁶¹⁷ Carl Bridge and Kent Fedorowich, eds., *The British World: Diaspora, Culture, and Identity* (Portland, Oregon: Frank Cass, 2003); Phillip Buckner and R. Douglas Francis, *Rediscovering the British World* (Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 2005).

⁶¹⁸ Krishan Kumar, *The Making of English National Identity* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003); Robert J.C. Young, *The Idea of English Ethnicity* (New York: Routledge, 2008).

⁶¹⁹ Saul Dubow, “How British Was the British World? The Case of South Africa,” *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 37, no. 1 (2009): 7.

more closely to the “motherland.” While these visits went virtually unnoticed in Britain, they were celebrated and remembered in the colonies of settlement as founding moments in burgeoning imperial and local narratives of belonging. In the empire, the narrative of the royal tour was taken up and remade by the colonial press and by social elites as a means of developing local mythologies of order and belonging.⁶²⁰ They, and the colonial subjects who challenged and contested their elite-constructed mythologies, interpreted the royal tour through a lens of Britishness and imperial citizenship, through which they demanded British liberty as their endowed rights as citizen-subjects. In this context, what it meant to be a Natalian Briton or a Auckland Briton, or to be a New Zealander or a British South African, was shaped and informed by class cooperation and conflict, social status and identity, ethnic and cultural heritage, local politics, and cultural and economic contact with a larger world.

In more traditional historical narratives, historians located proto-nationalist and post-imperial narratives and mythologies in nineteenth-century colonial societies, where Australians, New Zealanders, and South Africans awoke from the slumber of empire to become aware of their uniqueness as citizens of nation-states.⁶²¹ However, as recent scholarship has demonstrated, imperial citizenship remained ascendant, even amongst many “other” settlers (e.g. Dutch-speaking Boers or South Asian immigrants) who

⁶²⁰ See Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (New York: Verso, 1983); Alan Lester, *Imperial Networks: Creating Identities in Nineteenth Century South Africa and Britain* (New York: Routledge, 2001); Jane McRae, “‘Ki nga pito e wha o te ao nei’ (To the four corners of this world): Maori Publishing and Writing for Nineteenth-Century Maori-Language Newspapers,” in *Agent of Change: Print Culture Studies after Elizabeth L. Eisenstein*, ed. Sabrina Alcorn Baron, Eric N. Lindquist, Eleanor F. Shevlin (Amherst, MA: University of Massachusetts Press, 2007): 287-300.

⁶²¹ Richard Jebb, *Studies in Colonial Nationalism* (London: Edward Arnold, 1905); Doug Cole, “The Problem of ‘Nationalism’ and ‘Imperialism’ in British Settlement Colonies,” *Journal of British Studies* 10 (1971): 160-182.

themselves were not ethnically British, the Scots, Welsh, and Irish of the “Celtic fringe” who had historically complex relationships with an English “core” at home, and non-white *respectables* who appealed to their rights as loyal subjects and imperial citizens. At the same time, within colonial states and the larger diasporic community, competing communities of empire, in Dunedin and Otago, Cape Town and Natal, articulated unique discourses of Britishness and citizenship that claimed a more perfect understandings of Britishness and challenged other cores and even the Mother country as “better Britains.”⁶²² It is historically important, in this context, to consider and compare the cultural spaces between the values and beliefs of urban settlers in government cities such as Cape Town and Auckland and the miners of Dunedin or the frontier ranchers of the Eastern Cape.

For settlers, the royal tours and the associated mythology of Queen Victoria inspired a notion of imperial citizenship that demanded both local autonomy (responsible government) and expanded connections to a broader empire, especially the markets and financial resources of the metropole. Settler political discourses, as we shall see, both complained of the metropolitan government’s reluctant imperialist drive and challenged imperial meddling in local affairs (sometimes within the same breath!). Despite disagreements with the “home” government, and often because of them, unique visions of Britishness and imperial citizenship thrived in the political and cultural discourses of the late-nineteenth-century British world. The ascendance of imperial identities was nurtured by a sense of ethnic and historical heritage and, in particular, by the development of a

⁶²² John Darwin, *The Empire Project: The Rise and Fall of the British World-System, 1830-1970* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), esp. 11-12, 177-179.

transnational imperial monarchy as a symbol of that heritage.⁶²³

Over time, the languages of nationalism and whiteness came to culturally overwhelm discourses of imperial citizenship, even if they were deeply imbricated in its language and history. Imperial identities were undermined by the conceptual dissonance between local manifestations of Britishness and the action (or inaction) of the metropolitan government. Settler discourses also took on a more overtly racial tone, with discourses of whiteness coming to more effectively counteract local and ethnic differences at the expense of non-white “others” and, to a lesser degree, the imperial connection. In the emerging post-colonial world, local attachment to Britain and the empire evolved, or dissipated, in dramatically different, but often comparable, ways across the British world.

Yet, as the examination of the royal tours over time will demonstrate, imperial identities remained vitally important to local politics and mythologies during the second half of the nineteenth century, even if their cultural potency was increasingly under challenge, particularly in the form of long-existing grievances over Britain’s failure to reward their loyalism and fulfill the promises of imperial citizenship (the South African War serving as perhaps the most vivid example of this imperial “problem”). The decline of provincialism and localism, the competition and rivalries which bolstered imperial identities over national ones, was slowly undone by technological change and political contingencies. While these changes reflect the slow evolution of colonial identities toward the languages of nationalism, settler responses to the royal tours demonstrate the

⁶²³ Of course, such discourses of identity and citizenship often reflected a xenophobia that excluded non-English/British or non-whites. At the same time, the language of loyalism on part of these sometimes excluded groups regularly appealed to the life and legacy of Queen Victoria a means of transcending the stricter, more exclusive bonds of citizenship.

cultural vitality of imperial citizenship as a discourse and the historical problem of a post-imperial world as a foregone conclusion in the nineteenth-century colonies of settlement.

Colonial Print Cultures

The British diaspora brought not only British people to sites of settlement around the world but also British institutions, ideas, and things – the common law, football, and the English language.⁶²⁴ The printed word served as the means by which the British reified knowledge of local customs and peoples, made colonies of laws and legislation, and imagined new narratives of community. Colonial settlers brought with them distinctly British notions of civil society, of which the newspaper was a core institution. In print, settler editors and writers espoused narratives of belonging and identity, that is, imagined communities. These communities were rarely singular in nature (e.g. national or proto-national) but multiple and overlapping. One could be Natalian, South African, and a citizen-subject of the British Empire without internal conflict (although this dissertation argues that the local and the imperial transcended the national in importance).⁶²⁵

Print culture spread almost as rapidly as people into sites of settlement. The emergence of a local newspaper was considered evidence that the community was of cultural or political significance, on the map, as it were. So important was the press to the New Zealand Company that the *New Zealand Gazette* was published in London in 1839

⁶²⁴ Niall Ferguson, *Empire: The Rise and Demise of the British World System and the Lessons for Global Power* (New York: Basic Books, 2003).

⁶²⁵ There are, of course, a whole litany of other possible “imagined communities” of place, gender, class, status, profession, etc. with which this analysis will engage later.

before its printing press was transported to Wellington, where it was “set up on a beach” and published in 1840.⁶²⁶ The *Nelson Examiner* was published two months after settlement, the *Otago News* nine months after arrival, and the *Lyttelton Times* (Canterbury) “immediately after the landing.”⁶²⁷ As the collections of the British Library and the National Library of New Zealand demonstrate, nineteenth-century New Zealand had a remarkably rich print culture, particularly for a colony that had been founded for all intents and purposes less than 30 years before the first royal visit.⁶²⁸

Southern Africa had a longer and equally rich history of print culture. In Cape Town, the government published *The Cape Town Gazette and African Advertiser* in English and Dutch starting in 1800, five years after they had claimed the Cape. The first privately-published newspapers in Cape Town were the *South African Commercial Advertiser* (1824-69) and *South African Chronicle* (1824-6), followed by *Cape Argus* (1857-present) and the *Cape Times* (1876-present), among others. Print culture spread to the British “cores” outside of Cape Town with the movement of people: the *Graham’s Town Journal* (1831-present), the *Natal Mercury* (1852-present), and the *King William’s Town Gazette* (1856-75). From the earliest days of British settlement, newspapers were an important part of settler communities and how settlers imagined themselves.

Of course, there are limits and problems in using colonial newspapers to understand settler cultures. Newspapers often served as mouthpieces for social elites whose interests that may or may not have represented the larger community. Moreover,

⁶²⁶ J. Reginald Tye, “New Zealand,” in *Periodicals of Queen Victoria’s Empire: An Exploration*, ed. J. Don Vann and Rosemary T. VanArsdel (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1996), 208.

⁶²⁷ Tye, 208.

⁶²⁸ Many of the National Library of New Zealand’s newspapers have been digitized as part of the *Papers Past* project. <http://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz>.

their audience tended to be town-dwelling and educated.⁶²⁹ As Alan Lester argues, colonial newspapers served “the free, the propertied, and the ‘respectable.’”⁶³⁰ Even if British settler populations of the late nineteenth century were surprisingly literate, and the influence of a single newspaper copy might have been multiplied an unknown number of times through word of mouth, life in a nineteenth-century British colony was not always conducive to daily newspaper reading. Distances were far, and many settlers did work that severely limited their leisure time, regardless of literacy. And, even when settlers did read, it is extremely difficult to gauge how they interpreted and responded to what they read.

Despite these limits, newspapers were important sites of political and cultural discourse in colonial civil societies. Relative freedom of the press allowed for fierce debates about local and imperial politics. The *Cape Argus* declared, in 1856, that it “emanated from no party, will connect itself with no section of the community, and its first great care will be to secure free expression for the opinions of all, with a view to reconcile rather than stir up party differences.”⁶³¹ On the whole, British settler communities considered criticizing the government, particularly on grounds of British traditions and history, to be patriotic. Questioning the empire or the queen was considered out of bounds by most, a discursive boundary motivated by genuine devotion, fear of being labeled disloyal, or some combination of both. More importantly in the context of this study, local mythologies of belonging were made and disseminated

⁶²⁹ Tye, 209.

⁶³⁰ Alan Lester, “British Settler Discourses and the Circuits of Empire,” *History Workshop Journal* 54 (2002): 30.

⁶³¹ *Paging Through History: 150 Years with the Cape Argus* (Cape Town: Jonathan Ball, 2007), 7.

through the medium of print. They were the means of establishing a local story of what it meant to be British, a Capetonian, a New Zealander, a loyal citizen-subject of the queen, or any other number of identities.

More recently, British scholars have argued that the making of a British national identity was deeply imbricated in the processes of colonization. This observation importantly reflects on the ways in which, as Sir John Seeley contended during the late nineteenth century, British history has been a story of expansion and of the dissemination of British ideas, institutions, and people across a global “Greater Britain.”⁶³² Krishan Kumar has argued that English (as opposed to British) national identity has its origins as a “missionary nationalism,” by its very nature a product and function of late nineteenth-century imperialism.⁶³³ The English, Kumar asserts, “as the core nation of the world-wide British empire, came to emphasize their ‘civilizing mission,’ as carriers of constitutionalism and rule of law.”⁶³⁴ Similarly, Robert J.C. Young has posited that Englishness was made “for” the global diaspora, “an ethnic identity designed for those who were not precisely English, but rather of English descent.”⁶³⁵ This idea of a worldwide federation of English-speaking peoples – which often included the United States – was disseminated in popular works by Charles Dilke, J.A. Froude, and John

⁶³² J.R. Seeley, *The Expansion of England: Two Courses of Lectures* (Boston: Roberts Brothers, 1883).

⁶³³ Krishan Kumar, *The Making of English National Identity* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003).

⁶³⁴ Krishan Kumar, “The Making of English National Identity,” *New Global History* (November 2004): 6. http://www.newglobalhistory.org/docs/Kumar_English%20National%20Identity.pdf (accessed 11 May 2009).

⁶³⁵ Robert J.C. Young, *The Idea of English Ethnicity* (New York: Routledge, 2008), 1.

Seeley.⁶³⁶ While useful in understanding this place of the empire in British culture, these conceptions of British identity by and large understand the empire's importance in terms of a national consciousness at home, ignoring the ways in which British settlers understood and informed a "Greater" British national identity.

The metropole did not possess a monopoly on the production of Britishness. This chapter proposes that, by decentering the empire and understanding British identity from the perspective of settler communities, we can better understand Britishness and imperial citizenship as a transnational political and cultural discourse. Benedict Anderson was on to something in this context when he argued that ideas about nation-ness developed among "creole pioneers" in the political and cultural conditions of eighteenth-century colonial Latin America before it did in most of Europe.⁶³⁷ Disputes with this interpretation aside, British national identity must be similarly understood, as forged in and of the imperial experience. Stopping in Simon's Town, at the Cape, on the return trip from the Galapagos Islands in 1836, Charles Darwin described an empire where "little embryo Englands are hatching."⁶³⁸ In the second half of the nineteenth century, Britishness became a transnational identity that became as important, if not more important, to the neo-Britons of the empire as it was to the old Britons at home. It came to transcend other identities in a way that it never had before and never would again.

⁶³⁶ See, in particular, the chapter on "England Round the World."

⁶³⁷ Anderson, 47-66. They failed to take root because the relative technological and economic backwardness of the Spanish Empire, he argued.

⁶³⁸ Cited in Dubow, "How British Was the British World," 9. A. Desmond and J. Moore, *Darwin* (London: Michael Joseph, 1991), 184.

Britishness and Citizenship

Over the last decade, a series of conferences concerning the “British world” (London in 1998, Cape Town in 2002, Calgary in 2003, Melbourne in 2004, Auckland in 2005, etc.) have put forward a new research agenda for understanding the making of new Britains across the globe. These scholars have sought to bring the study of British national identity to the empire. In a recent compilation of essays, Carl Bridge and Kent Fedorowich rightly contend that the white colonies of settlement have been marginalized in the literature on empire in favor of metropolitan-centered narratives or the rule of the non-white empire.⁶³⁹ They argue that the mass migration and settlement of thousands of neo-Britons, who “found they could transfer into societies with familiar cultural values,” is crucial to the story of Britishness.⁶⁴⁰

At the same time, this recent work on the British world is instructive about the pitfalls of exaggerating the homogeneity of imperial identity and citizenship. Bridge and Fedorowich’s sense that British culture could simply be packed in a suitcase and disseminated to the empire misses the true complexity and instability of imperial culture. In their attempt to reintegrate the colonies of settlement into the history of the British Empire, the historians of the British world movement disempower their subjects within a conceptual framework, whereby Britishness can be unproblematically transplanted to new places. These scholars sometimes ignore the adoption of British identity by indigenous peoples, creoles, or non-British white settlers, failing to recognize, for

⁶³⁹ Carl Bridge and Kent Fedorowich, “Mapping a British World,” in *The British World: Diaspora, Culture and Identity* (Portland, OR: Routledge, 2003), 1-15. Also see John Darwin on the idea of Britannic nationalism, “A Third British Empire? The Dominion Idea in Imperial Politics,” in *The Oxford History of the British Empire*, vol. IV, *The Twentieth Century*, ed. Judith M. Brown and William Roger Louis (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 64-87.

⁶⁴⁰ Bridge and Fedorowich, 3.

example, the uniqueness of specifically colonial brands of Britishness.

Local mythologies of Britishness and imperial identity developed in colonial cores throughout the empire. Even if people talked about South Africa, Australia, or New Zealand, there was little obvious at the time about these geographical entities' futures as unified states. The federation of Australia took over twenty years to negotiate. As late as 1901 the *Otago Witness* predicted that the Duke of York's visit would "quicken the growing desire" of New Zealanders to join the Australian Commonwealth.⁶⁴¹ Several movements to federate South Africa into a single British-controlled polity were stillborn; only British victory in the South African War (1899-02) gave way to the Union of South Africa (1910).⁶⁴²

On the other hand, these cores frequently pulled away from one another and sometimes from the metropole, often appealing to a more genuine Britishness against a perceived injustice or incredulity. During the middle decades of the nineteenth century, politicians in Graham's Town, Uitenhage, and Port Elizabeth sought to form a new British colony in the Eastern Cape, separate from the government at Cape Town.⁶⁴³ English-speaking frontier ranchers in South Africa perhaps shared more in common with their Trekboer neighbors than with the merchants and officials of the capital, just as the miners of the New Zealand boom town of Dunedin looked toward Auckland or Wellington on the North Island with suspicion and even scorn. Even colonial officials

⁶⁴¹ *Otago Witness*, March 20, 1901.

⁶⁴² Governor George Grey had advocated South African federation during the early 1860s, and the Colonial Secretary Lord Carnarvon made efforts to federate the South African colonies on a Canadian model during the 1870s. Christopher Saunders and Ian R. Smith "Southern Africa, 1795-1910," in *OHBE*, vol. III, *The Nineteenth Century* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 606.

⁶⁴³ See Basil A. Le Cordeur, *The Politics of Eastern Cape Separatism, 1820-1854* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1981).

recognized the differences in local cultures; during the 1901 tour, Australian planners carefully organized the visits to Sydney and Melbourne based with their well-known characters in mind. The Earl of Ranfurly, Governor of New Zealand (1897–1904), complained to Joseph Chamberlain that “the old provincial centres are unfortunately extremely jealous, the one of the other.”⁶⁴⁴ From these competing cores came unique colonial cultures and visions of citizenship.

Moreover, imperial citizenship and even Britishness were embraced by non-English and non-British subjects of the queen. As Donal Lowry has demonstrated, empire loyalism was a crucial means by which ethnic “outsiders” participated in imperial culture.⁶⁴⁵ The royal tours, themselves manifestations of “the personal nature of the monarchy,” were particularly well-suited forums for the expression of empire loyalism and citizenship.⁶⁴⁶ Just as *respectables* of color professed their loyalty and Britishness, a significant number of non-British settlers – Dutch-speaking Boers, South Asians, Germans, Chinese, among others – professed loyalty to the queen and the empire, thus challenging more exclusive and ethnicity-bound visions of imperial citizenship. Scottish, Irish, and Welsh settlers, who lived in and served the empire in disproportionate numbers relative to their populations in the British Isles, often claimed ownership of and citizenship within the British Empire, despite their history of conflict with an English core at home. While ideas about imperial citizenship, and even Britishness, among non-British and non-English settlers did not replace or displace other identities, they were far

⁶⁴⁴ Ranfurly to Chamberlain, July 4, 1901, NA CO 209/262/435-440.

⁶⁴⁵ Lowry, Donal. “The Crown, Empire Loyalism and the Assimilation of Non-British White Subjects in the British World: An Argument Against ‘Ethnic Determinism.’” *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 31 (May 2003): 96-120.

⁶⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 99.

more robust and significant than what the historiography of the past has suggested.⁶⁴⁷

As the last chapter suggested, the language of whiteness came to dominate settler notions of citizenship over time. This is not to say that colonial Britishness was not steeped in theories of cultural difference or even race from early on, to the contrary. But, the conceptual linkage between Britishness and whiteness was one of several competing understandings of what it meant to be British during the nineteenth century. The collapse of the liberal-humanitarian program, the rise of responsible government and the limits of imperial control on settler populations, as well as the development of scientific racism all contributed to the ascent of whiteness in the British world. Despite these developments, British-educated *respectables* of color continued to advocate for a co-equal future in the British Empire. When “friends of the natives,” such as Saul Solomon (South Africa) and A.O. Hume, a “white” founder of the Indian National Congress, or missionaries challenged the dispossession and disenfranchisement of people of color in the empire, they were often doing so with a sense of British tradition, godliness, or constitutionalism in mind.⁶⁴⁸

While the development of whiteness as the dominant social and political discourse of the British world lies somewhat outside of the conceptual and chronological limits of this study, understanding the ways in which race and “otherness” informed definitions of Britishness and citizenship during the royal tours helps us understand the

⁶⁴⁷ John MacKenzie, *The Scots in South Africa: Ethnicity, Identity, Gender and Race 1772-1914* (New York: Palgrave, 2007); Aled Jones and Bill Jones, “The Welsh World and the British Empire, c. 1851-1939: An Exploration,” in *The British World: Diaspora, Culture, and Identity*, ed. Carl Bridge and Kent Fedorowich (New York: Routledge, 2003), 57-81.

⁶⁴⁸ This is not to suggest that “friends of the natives” and missionaries were not without racial or ethnic prejudice, but they understood their relationship with colonial “others,” in the context of their sense of British identity, much differently than other settlers.

fluid and heterogeneous nature of imperial culture. Over time, whiteness became increasingly central to definitions of citizenship in the settler communities, transcending ethnic and local rivalries often at the expense of non-white peoples. In the context of the royal tours, this transformation manifested itself in the incorporation of Maori or African places and people into a mythology of white settlement – what Vivian Bickford-Smith has called “local colour.”⁶⁴⁹ While Britishness and imperial citizenship remained politically and culturally robust by 1901, they were waning not waxing, pointing to the long-term effects of responsible government, the decline of provincialism and localism, the emergence of national networks of transportation and communication, and the development of national political cultures. Yet, by the end of the nineteenth-century century, these processes were just getting started.

* * *

As British colonies of settlement, South Africa and New Zealand offer fertile conceptual terrain for comparison. Yet, in many ways, they were vastly different places. The Cape of Good Hope had been settled by the Dutch East India Company (VOC) in 1652, only to be taken over by the British at the turn of the nineteenth century as a consequence of the French Wars. European settlement of New Zealand was of much more recent vintage, with systematic colonization as a territorial extension of New South Wales beginning only in 1839 by the British New Zealand Company. British emigration to New Zealand was comparatively robust, and settlers of British origins were the largest European ethnic group by far. In southern Africa, the British encountered a large population of European settlers, whose kin had arrived from the Netherlands, France, or

⁶⁴⁹ Vivian Bickford-Smith, “Providing Local Colour? ‘Cape Coloureds’ and Cape Town’s Identity From the Late Nineteenth Century to the Near Present,” American Historical Association, January 8, 2010.

Germany generations earlier, and immigration schemes aimed at peopling Africa with British people, as we shall see, never effectively took root. The Cape Colony was positioned on one of history's greatest maritime trade routes, while New Zealand sat almost literally at the edge of the earth. If New Zealanders imagine their society to be a progressive, peaceful, and democratic, South Africa is best known for racial unrest and apartheid. While the British South African colonies and New Zealand were granted what amounted to home rule during the second half of the nineteenth century, New Zealanders overwhelmingly embraced the "imperial connection" into the twentieth century. The relationship between metropole and colony in the South African context was far more complicated, and hostile. The differences appear stark.

At the same time, these two colonies of settlement share much in common. Both South Africa and New Zealand experienced mineral revolutions during the nineteenth century, the rushes of which lured new immigrants and resulted in makeshift boom towns that became important urban centers. In 1861, a Tasmanian miner named Gabriel Read discovered gold in Otago, starting a rush that temporarily swelled Dunedin into New Zealand's largest city.⁶⁵⁰ In southern Africa, the discovery of gold (1867) and diamonds (1884) unleashed social and economic revolution that would forever transform a backwater of the British Empire into a global depot of wealth and make Johannesburg, in the Boer republic Transvaal, a metropolis. Gold rush New Zealand attracted thousands of settlers and sojourners from the Pacific Rim, including a considerable population of Chinese immigrants. In South Africa, settler mining magnates acquired cheap, "unskilled" laborers through agreements with local chiefs, the creation of native labor

⁶⁵⁰ Philippa Mein Smith, *A Concise History of New Zealand* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 78-82.

bureaus that monopolized the supply and price of labor and displaced African laborers from their homelands, as well as the importation of South Asian “coolies.”

The people of New Zealand and South Africa both experienced political, social, and cultural dislocation and destruction as a result of contact with European settlers. They experienced it in its more overt forms, of dispossession and warfare, and in the subtler expressions of “assimilation,” which, as we have seen, some embraced. In New Zealand, the Treaty of Waitangi (chapter two) was not a single treaty, but several.⁶⁵¹ The English-language treaty guaranteed the Maori the “rights and duties” of British subjects and the possession of their land and property, which they could only sell to the Crown, if they wanted to sell it.⁶⁵² In the English treaty, the Maori ceded “absolutely and without reservation” full sovereignty of New Zealand.⁶⁵³ The Maori-language version bifurcated sovereignty into British governorship (*kawanatanga*) and Maori chieftainship (*rangatiratanga*), a difference that helps explain why the treaty quickly became the founding document of conflicting mythologies about New Zealand’s past.⁶⁵⁴ For the Maori, Waitangi represented alternatively betrayal or a promise to fulfilled by the Great Queen. In Pakeha myths of settlement, it represented the consent of the Maori in conquest.⁶⁵⁵ In spite of widespread dispossession and warfare (as discussed in chapter two), the Maori became deeply rooted in settler narratives of belonging.

⁶⁵¹ James Belich, *Making Peoples: A History of New Zealanders from Polynesian Settlement to the End of the Nineteenth Century* (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2001), 194.

⁶⁵² Ibid.

⁶⁵³ Ibid.

⁶⁵⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁵⁵ Ian Hugh Kawharu, ed., *Waitangi: Maori and Pakeha Perspectives of the Treaty of Waitangi* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989).

In southern Africa, local peoples experienced dispossession and destruction on a vast scale. Since the arrival of the Dutch in 1652, the Khoisan-speaking people of the Western and Northern Cape suffered under the biological, military, and cultural plague of European contact, particularly as the balances of power began to weigh heavily on the side of Europeans. A 1713 small pox epidemic completed the processes by which these people had largely been destroyed by disease, were incorporated in European labor pool, or fled beyond the Dutch pale. Over the course of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, Xhosa, Tswana, Sotho, and Zulu peoples confronted expanding European settlement, resulting in religious conversion, warfare, trade, epidemics, dispossession and resettlement, and physical and political control. For the Xhosa, in particular, who engaged in a century of land wars with white settlers, the consequences were horrific. The British never recognized these original South Africans as a people, as they had the Maori, so the diverse political traditions of the subcontinent never established a single, symbolic treaty with the British Empire. The double language of the British in their relations with local people – simultaneously claiming liberal rule and respect for local politics while dispossessing local peoples through military and legal force – bore remarkable resemblance to what happened in New Zealand, however.

In both New Zealand and southern Africa, “respectable” people of color were granted a limited role in colonial civil society. In southern Africa, the “liberal” non-racial franchises of the Cape Colony and Natal (see chapter three) gave John Tengo Jabavu and other propertied men of African descent to participate in South African politics and agitate on behalf of subject peoples, though the election of people of color to colonial legislatures remained outside of the realm of acceptable practice by gentlemen’s

agreement. In New Zealand, four seats in Parliament were created for Maori members in 1867, with all Maori men over the age of 21 enfranchised regardless of wealth.⁶⁵⁶ In both cases, these extensions of the franchise – in some ways like the royal tour – encouraged an illusion of consent, of colonial governments bestowing upon loyal and happy local peoples a limited share of British liberty, masking the dispossession and brutality of colonial rule. At the same time, it reflected the continued cultural efficacy of a stadial theory of civilization, that imagined the assimilation of worthy “savages” into British colonial civilization.

In measure of Britishness, too, the two might be more comparable than first examinations suggest. While New Zealand’s reputation as the “Britain of the South” creates little question of its heritage, the presence of a large Dutch-speaking settler population and a comparatively small number of British settlers has resulted in less historical attention to the Britishness of South Africa.⁶⁵⁷ Even Charles Dilke and J.R. Seeley, two of the nineteenth century’s greatest imperial theorists, “were sceptical of South Africa’s potential as a British colony of settlement.”⁶⁵⁸ Yet, New Zealand’s population was not homogenous. It had growing communities of German and Chinese settlers, for instance. Moreover, by 1901, Scottish and Irish settlers accounted for about half of the immigrant population born in the British Isles. South Africa had important enclaves of British settlement in Cape Town, Natal, and the Eastern Cape. The British

⁶⁵⁶ Belich, 265-66. European settlers held 76 seats.

⁶⁵⁷ John Lambert, “‘An Unknown People’: Reconstructing British South African Identity,” *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 37, no. 4 (December 2009): 599-617; Andrew Thompson, “The Language of Loyalism in Southern Africa, c. 1870-1939,” *English Historical Review* 118, no. 477 (2003): 617-650; Saul Dubow, “How British Was the British World? The Case of South Africa,” *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 37, no. 1 (2009): 1-27.

⁶⁵⁸ Dubow, 4.

government made several attempts to supplement these numbers, most notably settling 4,000 British immigrants in 1820, and even had a plan to transport British convicts to the Cape in 1850.⁶⁵⁹ These statistics do not even start to account for non-British “other” settlers who might have embraced the idea of being a British citizen-subject.

Despite extensive marketing by immigration schemes, which often described distant Britains as lands of milk and honey, the Creole British settlers of the colonies of settlement could never overcome the stigma that they were provincial cousins of the “real” Britishers at “home.” They could never become “English English,” to use Benedict Anderson’s expressive language, and only in rare cases served the empire outside of their provinces in Natal or Otago or in colonial capitals at Cape Town or Auckland.⁶⁶⁰ In Britain, humanitarians harangued their abuse of local peoples as radical politicians condemned the costs of colonial defense and frontier wars instigated by landhungry settlers. In the eyes of many at home, Creoles were second-rate Britishers, provincial carbon copies of the original. The British historian and imperial thinker J.A. Froude, for instance, described the Liberal Cape politician John X. Merriman as one of those “Cape politicians [who] strut about with their constitution as a schoolboy newly promoted to a tail coat.”⁶⁶¹ While some scholars have stressed the romanticization of colonial Britishness – as perfected in the open spaces and less depressing environments of the southern hemisphere – the sense that Creole Britons were inauthentic informed the

⁶⁵⁹ Nigel Worden, E. Van Heyningen, and Vivian Bickford-Smith, *Cape Town: Making of a City* (Cape Town: David Philip, 1998), 176.

⁶⁶⁰ Anderson, 92-93. Jan Smuts is perhaps the most well-known example of colonials transcending the political and cultural space of the periphery.

⁶⁶¹ W.H. Dunn, *James Anthony Froude; A Biography*, vol. 2, 1857-1894. Oxford, 1963; cited in Dubow, 6, 9.

attitudes and policies of imperial culture.

Even fighting for the empire during the South African War or the Great War or expressing loyalty to queen and country in rhetoric and action could not overcome this nagging inferiority complex. It heightened the already natural tendency to imagine and construct über-British societies on the edges of the world. Settlers competed with the motherland and other cores to make “better Britains” and to be more perfect Britishers – whether by building a prosperous commercial entrepôt at the Cape of Good Hope or by imagining a more democratic – even classless – society in New Zealand. These distant Britains also possessed their own imperialist drives -- looking to possess and dispossess in a manner that was often, to colonial officials, distasteful at best, crisis-inducing at worst. The failure of Britishness and imperial citizenship as binding and long-term identity in the colonies of settlement has its origins, ironically enough, in this cultural, social, and geographic chasm between Britain and neo-Britains overseas.

* * *

While the royal tours garnered little attention in Britain, they became defining moments in local mythologies of imperial community in the empire. David Cannadine’s attention to place names as a function of imagined communities of empire is relevant.⁶⁶² Alfred, who visited the Cape twice during the 1860s, became memorialized as South Africa’s prince, a hybrid tradition that appealed to both local and imperial narratives of belonging. To this day, the waterfront in Cape Town is named after Prince Alfred and his mother, long after South Africa declared itself a republic. For many years, a portrait of the sailor prince hung in the Alfred Room of the South African Library and Museum that

⁶⁶² Cannadine, *Ornamentalism*, 105.

he inaugurated during his 1860 visit.⁶⁶³ Most curiously, perhaps, was the christening of Prince Alfred's Hamlet in the Western Cape by a Dutch farmer named Johannes Cornelis Goosen. These examples reflect the ways that royal visitors were appropriated into local mythologies of imperial identity and citizenship.

The royal tours also demonstrate that imperial and national identities were mutually dependent rather than exclusive. The nationalist histories of the settlement colonies tend to frame the national stories of New Zealand or Australia or South Africa as one of inevitable independence and nationhood, colonial children grown into able-minded adults capable of self-rule. There is also a tendency to craft unique mythologies than separate child from mother: a social democracy of New Zealand or republicanism and white rule in South Africa. The role of Britishness and empire in these national stories, long underplayed, have recently been revisited by scholars of the British diaspora. Britishness and the "imperial connection" were profoundly important to many nineteenth-century colonial subjects, including those who were not ethnically British or who had touched the soil of the British Isles.

The royal tours presented unique moments to express an identification with both a British world and with locality or province. In 1860, Prince Alfred was baptized "our" South African prince by the colonial press, symbolizing a nascent imperial-national identity. An Australian colonist wrote a "seditious proposal published and suppressed on the eve of the Prince's [1868] visit," advocating a federation of the Australian colonies

⁶⁶³ Saul Solomon, *The Progress of His Royal Highness*, 126-136; also see Saul Dubow, *A Commonwealth of Knowledge: Science, Sensibility, and White South Africa, 1820-2000* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 68-70.

under the kingship of Alfred.⁶⁶⁴ The *South African Commercial Advertiser* similarly advocated that “each of the royal children [be] made viceroys of the important colonies, such as India, Australia, Canada, and the Cape.”⁶⁶⁵ These conceptualizations of the relationship between local and imperial reflect the bifurcated nature of colonial identities and the relevance of imperial belonging in the development of the self-governing white dominions of the British Empire.

While colonial administrators at home and abroad imagined the royal visits as a form of imperial propaganda, local social elites in the empire used the visits as an opportunity to promote class cohesion, to protect and enhance their own status, and to develop local mythologies of identity as tools of social control. As Saul Dubow has noted in the case of the Cape Colony, there was no conservative gentry – outside of colonial officials – in the colonies of settlement to “pour scorn on the jumped-up middle classes.”⁶⁶⁶ While most immigrants to New Zealand had social roots in the rural working classes of Britain, the colony’s emigration schemes attracted a surprising number of university-educated doctors, lawyers, and clergy.⁶⁶⁷

This altered social order meant that colonial elites, the “town fathers” of Cape Town or Auckland, embraced a Whiggish constitutionalism and belief in improvement that was unique from the ruling classes at home, and they were more likely to be involved in commercial enterprises that depended on the development of colonial infrastructure

⁶⁶⁴ A Colonist, *A Proposal for the Confederation of the Australian Colonies, with Prince Alfred, Duke of Edinburgh, as King of Australia* (Sydney: J.J. More, 1867).

⁶⁶⁵ *South Africa Commercial Advertiser*, August 1, 1860.

⁶⁶⁶ DuBow, 6.

⁶⁶⁷ Raewyn Dalziel, “Southern Islands: New Zealand and Polynesia,” in *OHBE*, vol. III, *The Nineteenth Century* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 582.

and imperial networks of trade. Local organizing committees were dominated by town fathers, who used the visits to their own ends. The colonial press, which was typically owned or influenced by local elites, used the royal tours to project a façade of social cohesion and harmony. In 1860, for instance, the *Graham's Town Journal* celebrated that, “high and low, rich and poor have combined in showing honor to the son of our Queen, and in doing justice to that spirit of genuine attachment to the Crown which is the boast of British subjects all the world over.”⁶⁶⁸ Loyalty to the Great Queen and her empire was not only used by colonial administrators to nurture an imperial culture but also by local social elites to justify and cement a social order.

While local elites gave particular meanings to the royal tours through the settler press, for many settlers, imperial rituals offered an opportunity to let loose, “to dance until midnight and drink till morning.”⁶⁶⁹ The “Hermit of Adderley-Street” reported, during Alfred’s 1860 tour of South Africa, that he had not thought of sleeping for three nights.⁶⁷⁰ In New Zealand, the *Timaru Herald* reported that “business of all kinds being suspended, and the citizens joining with the country residence... seem to have had but one thought, that of giving pleasure and doing honor to the Royal visitor.”⁶⁷¹ This is not to say that colonial subjects did not express their loyalty or identify with a British colonial empire but that they did so in a way that was informed by personal beliefs and experience, social class and profession, and locality. Local people vehemently protested when their employers refused to close their stores and workshops to celebrate the royal

⁶⁶⁸ *Graham's Town Journal*, August 15, 1860.

⁶⁶⁹ *South African Commercial Advertiser*, August 4, 1860.

⁶⁷⁰ *South African Commercial Advertiser*, July 28, 1860

⁶⁷¹ *Timaru Herald*, April 28, 1869.

visitor or when events were closed to the general public or charged for admission.

Through this participation and activism, settlers challenged elite control of civic culture and demanded the rights and responsibilities of British citizenship. At the same time, the celebration was also an opportunity to drink and party in the streets, to contest social mores and hierarchy, and to have fun.

Colonial administrators, social elites, and the press also incorporated local peoples into the ritual practices of the royal tour and the mythology of settlement as “local colour.” While the literature on the national myths of New Zealand and, in particular, South Africa, has focused on the emergence of whiteness as the dominant cultural discourse of the nineteenth century and early twentieth century colonial world, the symbology of non-white subjects, from the imagery of a Maori canoe to the “war dances” of Zulu or Sotho peoples, was vital to the construction of local, national, and imperial origins stories. The royal tours created an opportunity to highlight the loyalty and submission of former enemies.⁶⁷² They were used to nurture an ideology and mythology of empire that suppressed a history of violence and promoted an illusion of consent.⁶⁷³ Whereas the earlier chapters represented these mythologies from the perspectives of local peoples, this chapter will explore how they were appropriated by colonial governments and white colonial elites to justify and exonerate the project of empire.

Although tour planners developed and perfected the rituals of the royal tour over

⁶⁷² *Evening Post*, April 17, 1869. These understandings of the royal tour did not go unchallenged. For instance, the *Evening Post* of Wellington satirized the celebration of “loyal Maori,” who they claimed had been bribed with promises of alcohol and food.

⁶⁷³ A similar argument is made in the context of American history by Philip Deloria, in *Playing Indian* (New Haven: Yale University, 1999).

time, public celebrations in the British colonies, whether the visit of a governor or prince, the queen's birthday or royal jubilees, or Bonfire Night, shared a set of ritual practices that culturally distinguished empire feasts days, as it were, from every other day. There were illuminations, addresses, bonfires, fireworks, balls, parades, triumphal arches, military drills, and native performances. Emboldened across the pages of local newspapers were phrases such as "Prince Alfred's Edition" and "God Save the Queen!" Addresses to and from visiting dignitaries were frequently lampooned for their triteness and repetitiveness. Local settler performances sought both to reproduce British practices – proving that they were just as good as or better than metropolitan Britons – and to appeal to local origins stories, of the settlement of 1820 in the Eastern Cape or to the making of a more democratic "Britain of the South" in New Zealand. They also reflected rivalries within colonies – the geographical, cultural, and political space between urban Cape Town and the rural Eastern Cape, for instance – and between colonies – illustrated by the image of New Zealand as a younger, but better, version of Australia. While the ritual practices were shared across the space of empire, settler responses to the royal tour reflect the complexities of imperial culture and the ways in which the imperial and the local informed settler mythologies and worldviews.

The constructed narratives of the royal visit was contested and remade across the social, political, and cultural terrain of New Zealand and British South Africa. These stories were largely the political and cultural works of elites, articulated on the pages of settler print culture. In particular, this work focuses on the idea of competing cores within South Africa and New Zealand and within a larger British Empire. Previous chapters have examined very different discourses of loyalism, Britishness, and citizenship, from

elites and *respectables*. Likewise, across the chasm of class and status, settlers may have expressed loyalty to the Queen, but opposition to the powers that be in the Cape or Auckland. Or, they may have used the opportunity of the royal tour to dance, and celebrate, and drink. The point is not to unravel and expose every possible remaking of Britishness and citizenship in the context of the royal tour, but to show how complex and malleable these discourses were across the networks of the British world. Within this larger narrative, unique narratives and mythologies of belonging, that focused on the local and the imperial, figure importantly in understanding the emergence and transformation of an imperial culture.

South Africa (1860)

Prince Alfred performed the crowning achievement of his visit to South Africa in 1860 when he tipped a truck of stone into Table Bay, ceremonially beginning the construction of the Cape Town breakwater. Reading the language of Capetonian newspaper writers and colonial officials, who suggested that this day was one of the most important in all the history of South Africa, one would never guess how contentious an issue the harbor modernization project was. It was a historic day, they would suggest, when the Cape colony began to transform from a backwater of the British Empire to an important depot of commerce and trade. While southern Africa stood at the verge of the mineral revolutions that would transform its political economy forever, the Cape experienced an economic boom, the result of surging wool production and (as James Belich points out) importation.⁶⁷⁴ The government at Cape Town borrowed heavily to

⁶⁷⁴ James Belich, *Replenishing the Earth: The Settler Revolution and the Rise of the Anglo-World, 1783-1939* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009) 374-377.

fund the harbor modernization project, £400,000 over the life of the project, but justified it in the name of progress.⁶⁷⁵

Despite these celebrations, the settler societies of British South Africa were deeply divided over the project, between colonial politicians and merchants in the Western Cape, who would most benefit from the improvement project, and the settlers of the Eastern Cape, who were painfully far away from the harbor at Cape Town. In the midst of a royal visit, the settler newspapers of the Eastern Cape protested the injustice of being bullied into funding a harbor for Cape Town that would not benefit them from the general revenue of the colony. After Eastern members protested the plan, the *Graham's Town Journal* worried that the legislation would be “‘smuggled’ through [the Western-dominated Cape Parliament] in the absence of the Eastern members.”⁶⁷⁶ Part of the reason Governor George Grey sought to bring Alfred to South Africa, in a royal tour modeled on his brother’s planned visit to Canada, was to force the legislature’s hand on the issue of the breakwater.⁶⁷⁷ This struggle revived the spectre of Cape separatism and reflects the importance of Britishness and imperial citizenship in the language of politics and protest.⁶⁷⁸

Until recently, historians have long understood the story of settlers in South Africa during the long nineteenth century as an enduring struggle between the British, who came to dominate the Western Cape during the French Wars, and descendants of

⁶⁷⁵ Belich, *Replenishing the Earth*, 376; Solomon, 113.

⁶⁷⁶ *Graham's Town Journal*, July 31, 1860.

⁶⁷⁷ *Cape Town: The Making of a City*, 166; Solomon, xi.

⁶⁷⁸ On Cape separatism, see Basil A. LeCordeur, *The Politics of Eastern Cape Separatism, 1820-1854* (Cape Town: Oxford University Press, 1981).

Dutch settlers whose families had been “Afrikaners” (Africans) since as early as the seventeenth century. The narrative of this mythology, itself the backbone of the South African national story, begins with the Great Trek of Boer settlers out of the British pale during the 1830s and into the interior of southern Africa and concludes with two Anglo-Boer Wars (1880-81, 1899-1902) and the emergence of a white-dominated Union of South Africa. Recent historiography, however, has destabilized, if not toppled, these assumptions by reassessing the role of Africans in “white” conflict (e.g. the South African War) and the complex, and conflicting, political and cultural discourses of settler societies that defy the notion of shared interests among colonial settlers or between settlers and the metropolitan government.⁶⁷⁹

In the context of this study, the languages of Britishness and imperial citizenship were made and re-made by the diverse settler populations of southern Africa to imagine their communities (local and imperial), to claim British rights and responsibilities, and to protest unfairness and injustice. As the examination of the breakwater controversy and other settler petitions for imperial justice demonstrate, settler discourses on colonial politics were informed by unique visions of what it meant to be a citizen-subject of a larger British world. Political and cultural battles were often fought in the rhetoric of Britishness and imperial loyalism, even by many non-British people. During royal tours, settler communities appealed to their intense loyalism and adherence to British traditions and principles, as “better Britons.” They used the forum of the royal tour to protest or

⁶⁷⁹ Christopher Saunders, “African Attitudes to Britain and the Empire before and after the South African War,” in *The South African War Reappraised*, ed. Donal Lowry (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000), 140-149; Elizabeth Elbourne, “Indigenous Peoples and Imperial Networks in the Early Nineteenth Century: The Politics of Knowledge,” in *Rediscovering the British World*, eds. Phillip Buckner and R. Douglas Francis (Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 2005), 59-86.

advocate causes and to imagine what it meant to be a “Natalian Briton” or “British Kaffrarian,” rather than simply to be South African.

Cape Town. Founded in 1652 as a watering station for the Dutch East India Company, Cape Town was the oldest European urban center in southern Africa. From the seventeenth century, the Cape was an important crossroads in the Atlantic and Indian Ocean worlds of trade. At the turn of the nineteenth century, the Cape was claimed and reclaimed by the British from a French-dominated Netherlands during the French Wars. It remained the political, economic, and cultural core of British Southern Africa, unsurpassed until the discovery of gold and diamonds made new competitors far to the north. Cape Town’s status as an imperial core attracted the scorn of many subjects of the Queen, not only trekking Dutch farmers but also frontier ranchers and merchants in the Eastern Cape, British Kaffraria, and even Natal. The propertied and white elites of these colonial communities, through the colonial newspapers, often condemned the imperial and local politics of Cape Town in the language of imperial citizenship.

Cape Town has long held a unique status in the history of southern Africa and in the popular memory of modern Capetonians as a progressive and cosmopolitan urban space, where a ethnically diverse population socially and culturally intermingled, before the Afrikaner-inspired politics of whiteness and apartheid forcibly displaced this tradition.⁶⁸⁰ This idea of a British Cape liberal tradition juxtaposed to the racially-driven political and social exclusion of the Boer republics, and even the Eastern Cape, identifies the Western Cape as a forward-looking, enlightened place in the dark seas of South

⁶⁸⁰ For a discussion of this tradition, see Vivian Bickford Smith, *Ethnic Pride and Racial Prejudice in Victorian Cape Town*, 1-2. For an example, see George Frederickson, *White Supremacy: A Comparative Study in American and South African History* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1981), 262-282.

African history. As Vivian Bickford-Smith and other scholars of South Africa have been apt to note, this brand of exceptionalism is not backed by the historical evidence. During the nineteenth century, Bickford Smith argues, Cape Town was controlled by a social elite who were predominantly white and English-speaking.⁶⁸¹ By the last decades of the century, they had come to advocate, in face of rapid economic and social change, segregationist policies in the guise of urban progress.

In the context of imperial politics, Cape Town was an imperial core in southern Africa to both the subaltern classes of the city and to many peoples of the Eastern Cape, the Boer republics, and beyond.⁶⁸² As the home of the British government in the Cape Colony, it represented to many settlers the politics of an irresolute Colonial Office that was often influenced by humanitarian activists and reluctant to support costly expansionist efforts. It was also the home of a small but influential cadre of progressive politicians, “friends of the native,” and was the South African source of the limited non racial-franchise and legislation regarding the control and treatment of laborers. On the other hand, the Government House at Cape Town also served as the residence for colonial governors such as Benjamin D’Urban, Harry Smith, and George Grey, who were responsible for some of the most egregious acts of warfare and dispossession in the history of the British Empire. As Bickford Smith identifies, it was ruled by an elite that

⁶⁸¹ Frederickson clearly understood the *de facto* segregation of Cape Town that was shaped through the languages of class and status rather than that of race. “Since only the propertied could vote and only the wealthy and prominent could expect to be elected to office, the possibility of genuine democracy did not exist. Hence a predominantly nonwhite lower class could be excluded from power or meaningful participation without an overt application of racial criteria.” Frederickson, *White Supremacy*, 268.

⁶⁸² The *South African Commercial Advertiser* condescendingly noted that the “great unwashed of our town will live for some months to come, if on nothing else, at least on the gorgeous memories of that blessed period [the royal tour], which for them has secured so many cheap out door exhibitions.” August 1, 1860.

was propertied, white, and English-speaking, who controlled and defined discourses on citizenship and status. For Capetonians and other British subjects in southern Africa, Cape Town came to symbolize many different things, both the enlightenment of colonial rule and its worst excesses.

The ruling classes of Cape Town tended to represent their town as an emblem of civilization in southern Africa and a hub for all communication and commerce on the subcontinent. One leading Cape “liberal” was Saul Solomon, who published the *Cape Argus*. His narrative of the royal visit, *The Progress of the Royal Highness Prince Alfred Ernest Albert through the Cape Colony, British Kaffraria, the Orange Free State, and Port Natal in the Year 1860*, framed the tour’s importance in the material and political progress of southern Africa since the advent of British rule. Solomon, along with other politicians and newspaper editors in Cape Town, tended to represent British South Africa as an organic whole, with Cape Town as its heart. They spoke in the language of respectability and progress that reflects the language of Asa Briggs’ *The Age of Improvement*:

Before [the British, the Cape] was a military settlement: a port of call... Since then it has advanced at a rate as rapid as was consistent with the due consolidation of each advancing improvement effected. From the original Colony no fewer than four extensive offshoots – British Kaffraria, Natal, the Orange Free State, and the Transvaal Republic – have sprung into vigorous and lusty life... Regularly-constituted courts of law and trial by jury on the English model soon succeeded. The curse of slavery was removed... And in the fulness [sic] of time came the boon of the Free Constitution granted by Her Majesty nine years ago, under which the Cape possesses now the amplest privileges of constitutional self-government. And among the fruits of this new and liberal system the Colonists have been emboldened to venture upon undertakings for advancing the material prosperity of the county... The first of these was the railway from Cape Town to Wellington, now approaching completion; while the most recent of them, the Breakwater, with the other great harbor improvements in

Table Bay, has given occasion to the gratifying visit.⁶⁸³

The breakwater, in this context, represented a key historical moment in the progress of not just the Cape, but all of South Africa.

The Scotsman John Fairbairn, editor and sole proprietor (by 1860) of the Cape's first independent newspaper the *South African Commercial Advertiser*, was a prominent member of the Cape elite, espousing a worldview centered on free trade, self-help, and a notion of Britishness that embraced respectability.⁶⁸⁴ He had helped establish a free press at the Cape, after a long struggle with Governor Charles Somerset, in 1828.⁶⁸⁵ Fairbairn supported the campaign of Dr. John Philip, who would later be his father-in-law, for "Hottentot emancipation" and criticized "British settler and government expansionism on the colony's eastern frontier" in the *Commercial Advertiser*, inspiring the ire of white settlers on the frontier and in Cape Town.⁶⁸⁶ The conservative *Zuid-Afrikaan*, in Cape Town, and the *Graham's Town Journal* were founded, in part, in response to Fairbairn's politics and power. In the language of Britishness, he opposed a metropolitan scheme to import convicts to the Cape in 1849 and advocated an elected assembly.⁶⁸⁷ In age Fairbairn grew conservative and became "more and more pessimistic about the efficacy

⁶⁸³ Solomon, viii-ix; Asa Briggs, *The Age of Improvement, 1783-1867*, 2nd ed. (New York: Longman, 1999).

⁶⁸⁴ *Cape Town: The Making of a City*, 132.

⁶⁸⁵ Saul Dubow argues that this achievement, along with the work of missionary John Phillip to improve the conditions and treatment of Khoisan people, the anti-slavery movement, and agitation for representative government, are the founding myths of Cape liberalism. Dubow, *A Commonwealth of Knowledge*, 27.

⁶⁸⁶ Stanley Trapido, "John Fairbairn (1794–1864)," *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography* (Oxford University Press, Sept 2004); online edn, May 2009 [http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/53751, accessed 10 Sept 2009].

⁶⁸⁷ *Ibid.*

of the British mission” or the ability of the British government to control land-hungry British settlers.⁶⁸⁸

Prince Alfred’s visit in 1860 came near the end of Fairbairn’s life, by which time he came to question British progress in southern Africa. He would die in 1864. The coverage of the tour in the *Commercial Advertiser* hardly reflected this intellectual evolution in its focus on British civilization at the Cape but did demonstrate Fairbairn’s reconciliation with Dutch-speaking Afrikaners. More importantly, perhaps, was the fact that the *Commercial Advertiser* sought to transcend, or overlook, regional identities and to celebrate the organic unity of British South Africa. It was Cape Town, its institutions and symbols of progress, its editors argued, that stood at the political, cultural, and economic center of the subcontinent. In this context, the political discourses surrounding the visit – in particular, by naming the new breakwater after Alfred – transformed the controversy over the improvement from one about sectionalism and class into an issue of loyalty and disloyalty. This elite-constructed Capetonian imperialism, which borrowed from the languages of Britishness and imperial citizenship, was appropriated and turned on its head by frontier settlers and Cape Town laborers, people of color and women, as we shall see.

Cape Town was celebrated as a superbly British community, from its works of progress to its loyal citizenry. The *Commercial Advertiser* wanted Capetonians to remind Alfred of “the good stuff which makes Englishmen the most loyal as well as the most earnest of their kind” to such a degree that he would forget that he had ever left

⁶⁸⁸ Ibid.

Britain!⁶⁸⁹ It was duly noted that, as Alfred commenced the construction of a breakwater at Table Bay and other works of progress in the colony, his older brother was ceremonially opening the Victoria Bridge in Canada.⁶⁹⁰ This moment demonstrated the spread of British civilization and progress across a vast global space, from the British Isles across the world and from Cape Town across southern Africa. In appealing to Britishness, the social elites of Cape Town imagined a community that reinforced and justified their own place in Cape society and that of Cape Town in South Africa and the British Empire.

According to the *Advertiser*, the royal tour also transcended the everyday boundaries of class and ethnicity. In this context, the proprietors of Cape Town, through the newspaper, used the visit to reinforce their own social control of society with the language of loyalty. While some scholars have argued that the politics of whiteness came to transcend the divisions of language, ethnicity, and class, the cultural discourses of the 1860 tour were, arguably, more inclusive, even if non-whites had a markedly subordinate status in the imagined community of loyalism. The *Commercial Advertiser* urged: “Let no foolish nationalities stand in the way of a general rejoicing. No one need be ashamed to own himself a subject of the British crown, and one good subject is as good as another, whatever may be his origin, creed, or calling.”⁶⁹¹ The address to Alfred from the representatives of the Municipality of Cape Town similarly framed progress in the Cape in terms of a loyalism that transcended ethnicity.⁶⁹²

⁶⁸⁹ *South African Commercial Advertiser*, July 25, 1860.

⁶⁹⁰ Solomon, 113.

⁶⁹¹ *South African Commercial Advertiser*, July 25, 1860.

⁶⁹² *South African Commercial Advertiser*, July 25, 1860.

It was also important for the propertied in the Cape that their importance to the empire be recognized. In particular, they hoped that the son would return to his mother, the Great Queen, with reports of the Cape's progress and wealth.⁶⁹³ According to the *Advertiser*, Britons at home were all but completely ignorant of South Africa, imagining that "lion hunts are as common just outside of Cape Town as fox-hunting is in Leicestershire; that naked Kaffirs and Hottentots eat raw meat in our streets; and that the environs of our city are not very unlike the Desert of Zahara."⁶⁹⁴ The trip would make "19,999,990 of 20,000,000" British people more knowledgeable about South Africa.⁶⁹⁵ The editors argued that the Cape had been long neglected, a black sheep in an imperial system that favored "purer" British colonies such as Australia and New Zealand.⁶⁹⁶ It was because of the Cape's diverse population and lack of British institutions that the metropole had disregarded her, but it was now time for the colony to be recognized as a thoroughly British place, home of progress and trade and well as efforts to colonize the region with British people.⁶⁹⁷ Capetonians then, they argued, must put forward an "honest and hearty welcome" "as evidence of our love and loyalty as the most magnificent

⁶⁹³ *South African Commercial Advertiser*, August 8, 1860. In particular, Queen Victoria was imagined as a patriot queen, above the fray of politics and ethnic division. She had *personally* sent Prince Alfred with hopes of educating a young royal and learning about her South African subjects. It was to her, not the colonial government, that they expressed their loyalty. Duncan Bell, "The Idea of a Patriot Queen? The Monarchy, the Constitution, and the Iconographic Order of Greater Britain, 1860-1900," *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 34, no. 1 (2006): 3-23

⁶⁹⁴ *South African Commercial Advertiser*, July 28, 1860.

⁶⁹⁵ *South African Commercial Advertiser*, September 8, 1860. The *SACA* was wrong, however, since the royal tour was all but ignored by the British press. See Chapter Five of this work.

⁶⁹⁶ *South African Commercial Advertiser*, July 28, 1860.

⁶⁹⁷ *South African Commercial Advertiser*, July 28, 1860.

preparations of wealthier lands.”⁶⁹⁸ In competition with other colonies, the Cape needed to prove itself to be a little, and better, Britain to the mother country.

The analysis of this chapter focuses primarily on sites of British settlement – in Graham’s Town (Eastern Cape), King William’s Town (Kaffraria), and Natal – and the construction of local mythologies of belonging. The eastern frontier figured less importantly in the assessment of the royal tour made by the *Advertiser*. The editors, somewhat playfully, described the competition between colonial towns to demonstrate their loyalty, that Graham’s Town and King William’s Town would “do their utmost to exceed each other in fervent expressions of enthusiasm, by producing everything which is in their power to exalt themselves above the Table Mountain merchants and farmers of the West.”⁶⁹⁹ Despite any grievances between east and west, they could agree on the majesty of the British monarchy and their loyalty to Queen Victoria. The Cape frontier most significantly represented the vanquishing of uncivilized savages and the spread of British civilization and progress, of industrious farmers and merchants building neo-Britains in the rugged frontier of southern Africa. The debates over the breakwater, specifically, and the perceived unbalance of political power between the west and east were virtually absent from the Cape papers.

Graham’s Town. Founded as a military outpost on the Xhosa frontier in 1812, Graham’s Town was situated northeast of Port Elizabeth in the Eastern Cape, some 900 kilometers from Cape Town. As part of a government settlement scheme, funded by a £50,000 grant from Parliament, 4,000 British (mostly Scottish) settlers arrived in Albany

⁶⁹⁸ *South African Commercial Advertiser*, July 28, 1860.

⁶⁹⁹ *South African Commercial Advertiser*, August 1, 1860.

to farm the land with free labor and consolidate the frontier in 1820.⁷⁰⁰ Many of these 1820 settlers, as they were called, abandoned farming and moved into towns, including Graham's Town. The mythology of 1820, which was celebrated with its own ritual ceremonies, and life in a frontier town far away from the colonial capital at Cape Town nurtured unique local narratives of belonging.⁷⁰¹ According to Saul Solomon, Graham's Town "pride[d] itself, and not quite unreasonably, [as] the most thoroughly English town in Southern Africa."⁷⁰² Yet, as Clifton Crais has argued, settlers who came to build "England in the miniature," complete with a "manor house on the hill," required "growing markets, plentiful land, docile labourers and a cooperative colonial state."⁷⁰³ These needs created a matrix of interconnected social, cultural, and political conflicts – between white masters and servants, institutionalized in the immigration scheme itself, between European settlers and local peoples, and with Cape Town and the imperial government.

In the pages of the *Graham's Town Journal* (later, simply *The Journal*), political and cultural discourses appropriated the languages of Britishness and imperial citizenship, particularly through the mythology of 1820, to justify a particular political and social order in the Eastern Cape, which transcended ethnicity and class, legitimized and empowered social elites, and justified the subjugation of local peoples. *The Journal*, founded in 1831, was edited by an 1820 settler named Robert Godlonton. A former

⁷⁰⁰ Francis Fleming, *Kaffraria, and Its Inhabitants* (London: Smith, Elder, and Co., 1853), 16.

⁷⁰¹ Frank Riet, *The Settler Celebrations of 1870* (1970).

⁷⁰² Solomon, 37.

⁷⁰³ Clifton Crais, *White Supremacy and Black Resistance in Pre-Industrial South Africa : The Making of the Colonial Order in the Eastern Cape, 1770-1865* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 88.

London printer, Godlonton defended the Eastern settlers against liberal-humanitarian claims that they were acting in a very un-British way in their relations with the Xhosa and petitioned for greater imperial security and control against local peoples.⁷⁰⁴ Goldton's paper possessed a near monopoly in Albany, and its distribution reached as far as Britain and North America.⁷⁰⁵ Godlonton's politics and mythology of Britishness were deeply entrenched in the "collective biography of the settlement," particularly conflict with local peoples.⁷⁰⁶ His paper was founded in opposition to the "liberal" papers in Cape Town and with the distinct interests in the Eastern Cape in mind.⁷⁰⁷ While alternative political and cultural narratives existed, Godlonton's mythology, as expressed in the *Graham's Town Journal*, was the most widely disseminated and read.

In the pages of the *Journal*, the symbolic meaning of the visit was glossed from the memories and legacy of the 1820 settlers. The *Journal* argued that this frontier ethos ought to be reflected in welcoming Alfred. While the settlers at Cape Town could afford a much more elaborate display of loyalty, the paper argued, Graham's Town could "gratify the Prince to a much greater extent" with a greeting befitting the colonial frontier: a welcome ceremony featuring between 800 and 1000 "rough and ready" commandants, police, and the Cape Corps – accompanied by local "Fingoes and Kaffirs" performing in "war" dances.⁷⁰⁸ At the Healdtown Institution, Alfred paid special attention (according to the *Journal*) to paintings of

⁷⁰⁴ Alan Lester, *Imperial Networks*, 61-62.

⁷⁰⁵ Ibid.

⁷⁰⁶ Ibid., 48.

⁷⁰⁷ Le Cordeur, 63-68.

⁷⁰⁸ *Graham's Town Journal*, July 17, 1860.

the landing and the... encampment of the first party of British Settlers. This event took place rather more than 40 years ago. At that time there was no fixed property of any value in Port Elizabeth or Graham's Town; there was no trade carried on with the mother country; no wool sent home in exchange for British manufactures; the land was peopled by barbarians, who reveled in heathenish customs and rights... But England sent forth from her shores the pioneers of civilization... as he visits town after town, and native locations under the care of Christian ministers, will see how well England has done her duty – how well British ideas and habits are spreading amongst the population, and how deeply rooted is the love of loyalty in the hearts of those who were sent by their government forty years ago to establish a new colony.⁷⁰⁹

Absent from this mythology was the Western Cape or a larger South Africa. It was framed by the relationship between the hearty, rugged settlers of Albany and the spread of British civilization. To the Graham's Town settlers, Prince Alfred's most celebrated act, the inauguration of the Table Bay Breakwater, was the end result of a contentious dispute over the fairness of the Eastern Cape helping fund an improvement project for Cape Town. In the end, they felt bullied by the Western Cape-dominated government, Cape merchants, and Sir George Grey. According to the *Journal*, Capetonians at a public meeting about the plan in July "would have us believe the *Capetown* is the whole colony."⁷¹⁰ According to Godlonton, Graham's Town would have "no interest in, and will receive no benefit from, the proposed harbor works," yet principled Eastern opposition to the plan was portrayed by the Cape press as "factious" and disloyal.⁷¹¹ The farmers of Albany who used Algoa Bay in Port Elizabeth, a mere 100 kilometers from Graham's Town, justified the construction of a breakwater *there* as much if not more than at Cape Town. Moreover, the far more useful bill to construct a railway between

⁷⁰⁹ *Graham's Town Journal*, August 15, 1860.

⁷¹⁰ *Graham's Town Journal*, July 10, 1860.

⁷¹¹ *Graham's Town Journal*, July 10, 1860.

Graham's Town and Port Elizabeth had already been "thrown overboard," as an expendable "Eastern measure."⁷¹²

Opposition to the breakwater was framed in the language of British constitutional traditions. In the pages of the *Journal*, the settler community appealed to British ideas about fair play and the importance of representative government. The Eastern Cape legislators were not completely opposed to the project, they indicated, but wanted it to be reasonable and well-planned (not "unlimited" in its use of the colony's general revenue).⁷¹³ Moreover, the *Journal* appealed, responsible government and a legislature for the Cape Colony were without meaning to the Eastern Cape if their opposition was futile and their far and expensive travels to Cape Town a "farce."⁷¹⁴ As British subjects, they perceived a right to protest and to have a legitimate voice, rather than it being silenced by the commercial and government elites of Cape Town.

During the royal tour, the *Journal* revived the idea of Eastern Cape separatism – that is, the Eastern Cape as an independent Crown Colony, liberated from the corruption of the Western Cape – as a possibility. Albany had been home, in the 1820s, of "radicals" who sought larger land grants, greater control of labor, public offices, and official patronage – "to replicate the privileges and patronage of English rural society."⁷¹⁵ They had conflicted with Governor Charles Somerset – a movement which Basil le Cordeur

⁷¹² *Graham's Town Journal*, July 31, 1860.

⁷¹³ *Graham's Town Journal*, July 21, 1860.

⁷¹⁴ *Graham's Town Journal*, July 24, 1860, July 31, 1860.

⁷¹⁵ Timothy Keegan, *Colonial South Africa and the Origins of the Racial Order*, (Charlottesville, VA: University of Virginia Press, 1996), 61-74.

identified as “the origins of separatism” in the Eastern Cape.⁷¹⁶

The politics of separatism, while admittedly unorganized and often fleeting, were not the monopoly of Dutch-speaking Trekboers nor had their embers been doused by the 1860s, as le Cordeur suggested. Even if pursued as an option, however, separatism, the *Journal* claimed, would most certainly be sabotaged by Western Cape legislators, “so long as it is advantageous to the Cape people to remain as a united colony—so long as money can be borrowed upon the credit for improvement of the *West*.”⁷¹⁷ While careful in his use of language, Godlonton never explicitly advocated separation, but only hinted at it. He did foresee neighboring British Kaffraria’s possible future as a semi-independent colony, rather the personal fiefdom of the Cape governor, as prosperous and successful.⁷¹⁸ In expressing loyalty to the queen and articulating a unique vision of imperial citizenship, the settlers of Graham’s Town found Prince Alfred’s breakwater to be a very un-British project.

King William’s Town. The Table Bay Breakwater was not an issue of contention for the *King William’s Town Gazette*. The hope of Crown Colony status and expanded trade through East London or Port Elizabeth, not Cape Town, brought the editors of the local settler paper hope of “trade... carried on by the Indian Ocean instead of the Graham’s Town road,” a sentiment that demonstrates an interest in a wider world rather

⁷¹⁶ Le Cordeur, 1-36; Alan Lester, “Reformulating Identities: British Settlers in Early Nineteenth-Century South Africa,” *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers* 23, no 4 (2004): 518. Lester notes that many of these notables were “betrayed” by their white servants, who often abandoned their indentures and dared to venture out on their own.

⁷¹⁷ *Graham’s Town Journal*, July 10, 1860.

⁷¹⁸ *Graham’s Town Journal*, July 24, 1860.

than a subordinate and ambiguous relationship with the Cape Colony.⁷¹⁹ The *King William's Town Gazette* instead used the royal tour to mythologize the history of Kaffraria and its future as an independent colony and a “better Britain” that would begin with the visit of Prince Alfred to King William's Town.

Up the Buffalo River from East London (50 km) lies King William's Town (sometimes King Williamstown or just King). In 1835, the area around the town was annexed by Governor Benjamin D'Urban as Queen Adelaide Province, extending the border of the Cape Colony to the Kei, during a colonial war with Sandile's brother Maqoma (1834-36). Much to the chagrin of local settlers, this annexation was soon disavowed by the imperial government, reluctant to stir humanitarian protest and to expand its obligations any further. King William's Town and the former Queen Adelaide Province were annexed again in 1847 as British Kaffraria in the aftermath of the War of the Axe (1846-47). The root of its name, *kaffir*, means non-Muslim or “infidel” in Arabic but was used by the British generally to describe non-Christian Bantu-speaking people in southern Africa – the place of the kaffirs, the blacks. It occupied an ambiguous constitutional place in the British Empire and in the Cape Colony as its governance was the personal responsibility of the Cape governor even though it was not considered under the jurisdiction of the Cape Colony.

The origins of the *King William's Town Gazette* are more difficult to trace than those of the other papers, although it was also owned by Robert Godlonton. Like the other colonial papers, it reflected the views of the propertied and white settlers of Kaffraria. Given the extremely limited nature of political organization in the military

⁷¹⁹ *King William's Town Gazette*, August 3, 1860.

settlement, the paper had an inordinate influence over an emerging civil society. Its editorial point-of-view reflects Godlonton's hostility toward the Western Cape and liberal-humanitarian intervention in local affairs, but its unique perspective and original content suggest that the paper had its own worldview.

Like the Eastern Cape, British Kaffraria was a territory forged in war, and the mythologies of its settlers reflected this history of conflict with and pacification of local peoples. The place names of Kaffraria – King William's Town (after William IV) and East London – show the making of a "new Britain" on the banks of the Buffalo. Surprisingly, however, the most significant government-sponsored settler scheme brought not British but German settlers to the territory. In the aftermath of the Crimean War (1853-56), the British government sent several thousand soldiers from the British German Legion to Kaffraria, both to avoid their settlement in Britain and to establish military settlements on the frontier. Saul Solomon described the population of King William's town as "more multiform and motley than any other place of its size in the world," including British, Dutch, and German settlers as well as "the Hottentots, Fingoes, and the aboriginal Kaffirs in large force."⁷²⁰

For the settlers of King William's Town and Kaffraria, Alfred's visit was imagined to be a defining historical moment in this history of the young colony, when the sailor prince would deliver the letters patent that would transform British Kaffraria into a Crown Colony.⁷²¹ He would confer upon them, they hoped, "all the rights of British

⁷²⁰ Solomon, 57.

⁷²¹ *King William's Town Gazette*, July 20, 1860.

subjects.”⁷²² The *King William’s Town Gazette* also expressed hope that Albert, Aliwal, and Queen’s Town would be annexed as part of the territory, reflecting a brand of settler imperialism that was largely independent of the governments in Cape Town or London. They also sought a more robust immigration scheme that would bring “men with a little sense in their heads and cash in their pockets” who could settle the land and help make the new colony.⁷²³ They imagined the making of a better Britain on the banks of the Buffalo and identified the royal visit as an opportunity to promote more intensive colonization of Kaffraria.

In this context, the *Gazette* identified the importance of using the royal tour in reeducating “the world” on Kaffraria, to think of it no longer as a “source of disturbance” but as a “peaceful and promising land,” and an important part of the British Empire.⁷²⁴ The editors imagined that Alfred would return to the royal family reporting Kaffraria as “a promising little colony of true and deserving loyalists” and that the Colonial Office would look upon the colony “in a better light.”⁷²⁵ Kaffraria was “physically and morally” strong, but needed imperial support to grow and prosper beyond its present limits. Status as a Crown Colony and expanded territory would offer “the finest little Colony under the Southern Cross” new trade, improvement projects, better administrative organization, an annual subsidy of £40,000, and, they hoped, a firmer imperial commitment to growth and expansion.⁷²⁶

⁷²² *King William’s Town Gazette*, July 27, 1860.

⁷²³ *King William’s Town Gazette*, July 31, 1860

⁷²⁴ *King William’s Town Gazette*, July 20, 1860.

⁷²⁵ *King William’s Town Gazette*, July 27, 1860.

⁷²⁶ *King William’s Town Gazette*, July 27, 1860.

Without local government, the residents of Kaffraria had no means of securing funds for the standard royal welcome but the editors hoped that the imperial government might spare a few hundred pounds to pay for the triumphal arches, illuminations, and fireworks.⁷²⁷ All British Kaffrarians, as the editors referred to the subjects of the territory, were expected to “spare no reasonable effort or expense” in welcoming Alfred, who was bringing with him, after all, the founding documents of their colony.⁷²⁸ Kaffraria’s lack of wealth was outweighed, by estimation of the paper’s editors, with a “superiority of energy and loyal dispositions.”⁷²⁹ In the emergent mythology of Kaffraria, loyal Germans and vanquished local people were celebrated for their expressions of joy in meeting the prince.⁷³⁰ In an enclave of Britishness and imperial citizenship, the virtues of which (by this account) extended to German and Dutch settlers, but certainly not their African neighbors, the *King William’s Town Gazette* imagined a future for Kaffrarian Britons within the British Empire.

In the end, Alfred came empty handed. His tour “with all its pomp and circumstance” became “the overture to the great part we are yet to play.”⁷³¹ The colonists’ “best friend and well-wisher, Sir George Grey” temporarily became the subject of scorn, for denying Kaffraria her bright and prosperous future.⁷³² Despite this grand betrayal, the editors remained persistent in their loyalty, suggesting that the new colony

⁷²⁷ *King William’s Town Gazette*, July 20, 1860.

⁷²⁸ Ibid.

⁷²⁹ *King William’s Town Gazette*, August 7, 1860.

⁷³⁰ *King William’s Town Gazette*, August 14, 1860.

⁷³¹ *King William’s Town Gazette*, September 7, 1860.

⁷³² *King William’s Town Gazette*, July 27, 1860, September 7, 1860.

might be named Alfred in honor of their royal guest.⁷³³ By all accounts, the letters of patent had been issued on March 7, 1860 by the imperial government, two months before Alfred left Britain, so why they remained undelivered by July is somewhat unclear. Nevertheless, Kaffraria's life as a Crown Colony was a short one; it was annexed by the Cape in 1866, the *Gazette's* dream of an independent little Britain on the banks of the Buffalo dashed.

Natal. Vasco da Gama landed on the eastern coast of southern Africa on Christmas Day ("Natal" in Portuguese) 1497. Over 600 kilometers from Graham's Town and over 1200 kilometers from the Cape of Good Hope, Natal was settled in 1835 by a small group of British settlers under Lieutenant F. G. Farewell with the permission of the great Zulu king Shaka, whose kingdom lied just to the north. After the Battle of Blood River (1839), Boer settlers moved into Natal and established the Natalia Republic. When the British annexed Natal in 1843, many of the Natal Boers trekked over the Drakensburg Mountains into what became the Orange Free State. Natal was populated mostly by British settlers with a significant minority of Boers.

While it sat on the edge of the Zulu kingdom, Natal shared more in common with Cape Town than with Graham's Town and King William's Town. Durban was a port town, which made it an urban hub of commerce as well as a site for European settlers and other sojourners traveling to and from the Indian Ocean. It was a destination for many South Asian immigrants to South Africa, including Mohandas Gandhi. A "liberal tradition" developed in Natalian politics that might be compared to Cape Town, both in terms of its importance and limits. Natalians were long uncertain if the prince

⁷³³ *King William's Town Gazette*, September 7, 1860.

was going to visit Natal. There had been some “sapient prophets” who “predicted that the Prince would not find his way here at all,” while others expressed certainty that he would visit their part of the empire.⁷³⁴ On August 23, 1860, the Durban-based *Natal Mercury* announced that Alfred would in fact visit Natal, where he was sure to be “received by a community small in numbers, scanty in means, but rich in loyalty and enthusiasm.”⁷³⁵ As Natalian Britons, settlers imagined themselves, in the narrative of the *Mercury*, as free and loyal members of the empire, full of “self-love” for their homeland, who were ready to welcome the son of the Great Queen.⁷³⁶ During the festivities, children sang “God Save the Queen” to the young prince, and he inaugurated a new town hall in Durban. The performance of Zulu “war” dances, discussed earlier, demonstrated the past of Natal, the new town hall its future.

Like other cores, Natal – or, the *Natal Mercury*, anyway – invested hope for colonial reforms in the royal tour. The paper complained that the colony’s Executive Council, which consisted of the governor and his cabinet, possessed the power to “practically carry things their own way” at the expense of popular government.⁷³⁷ The *Mercury* editors demanded “real” representative government in the language of Britishness and imperial citizenship, arguing that “it is unreasonable to believe that Britons will long submit to the rule of men who come here only to curry favour in Downing Street.... or that Britons, even in a small and remote Dependency like Natal,

⁷³⁴ *Natal Mercury*, September 8, 1860. Also see *The Visit of His Royal Highness Prince Alfred to the Colony of Natal* (Jarrold, 1860).

⁷³⁵ *Natal Mercury*, August 23, 1860. Durban, or D’Urban, was named after Benjamin D’Urban, the Governor of the Cape (1834–1838).

⁷³⁶ *Natal Mercury*, September 8, 1860.

⁷³⁷ *Natal Mercury*, August 2, 1860.

will submit to be exceptions from the more general rule of free and popular government.”

⁷³⁸ They did not demand responsible government on the model of Canada or Victoria but advocated a mixed executive that represented both the local and the imperial.

The language of protest reflects both an emerging mythology of British Natal as well as notions of imperial citizenship that demanded the inherent rights and privileges required of free and loyal subjects. The narrative of Natal during the royal tour of 1860 is remarkably similar to those of the other cores of southern Africa:

We have no wish to regale our readers with any Utopian fantasies or chimerical delusions, but we cannot help describing, ... a savage race effectively subdued but gradually civilised; a European population, industrious, and progressive; a country finally reclaimed from the curse under which it has for so long labored, rapidly brightening beneath the influence of Christianity, and the aggressive inroads of civilization.⁷³⁹

This mythology was typical, both to southern Africa and the British Empire *writ large*, but it was also unique in its scope – that is, it was an understanding of Britishness and citizenship that embraced being Natalian, a “better Britain” on the farthest edge of southern Africa.

These are, of course, just a few stories that defined the languages of politics and belonging in British South Africa. The dominant narrative of the traditional historiography, of Britons and Boers, whites and blacks, conceals a more complex and fluid collection of identities. The settlers of the Eastern Cape, Kaffraria, and Natal had much in common with their trekboers who had fled British control of the Cape. They often imagined their communities as profoundly connected in the British Empire, yet often firmly disconnected from and hostile to Cape Town. Moreover, as a later section in

⁷³⁸ *Natal Mercury*, August 9, 1860.

⁷³⁹ *Natal Mercury*, September 13, 1860.

this chapter will discuss in greater detail, Dutch-speaking Boers (often dismissed as “Anglicized” Boers) often identified with the British Empire and expressed loyalty to Queen Victoria. As the discussion of the South African War and the royal tour of 1901 shall demonstrate, these discourses moved slowly away from identification with the empire and toward a greater recognition of a South African-ness centered on white skin – but these processes remained decidedly incomplete.

New Zealand (1869-71)

In 1869, Prince Alfred, by then the Duke of Edinburgh, visited a New Zealand in the midst of a brutal war of conquest. He was originally scheduled to visit the colony during his 1868 tour of Australasia, but this itinerary was cut short by a Fenian assassin’s bullet (see chapter one and below). In response, New Zealanders expressed an outpouring of sympathy for the queen and her son and asked that the duke return when he was better. When he did return in 1869, the North Island was threatened by the attacks of a guerilla fighter and religious leader named Te Kooti (see chapter two), who had led a daring escape from his imprisonment on the Chatham Islands. This “little war” was as much a civil war as a colonial conflict; pro-British “Queenite” Maori fought on the colonial side of the conflict, and Te Kooti was ultimately given refuge by the Maori King.⁷⁴⁰ This context of warfare and violence informed the meaning of Alfred’s visit, which became a forum for criticisms of the imperial government . Te Kooti’s campaign against the colony also destabilized the illusion of Maori consent that the visit was designed to nurture, heightening the obsessive pursuit of the Maori leader on part of the government.

⁷⁴⁰ Dalziel, 587.

The war affected not only the mood of the visit but also the itinerary. The New Zealand press complained that the Duke of Edinburgh's delayed visit had been drawn back, "so shortened that the chief towns only of the provinces will be honored with a visit."⁷⁴¹ This limited engagement denied people in the countryside or in smaller cities the opportunity to express their loyalty without traveling long distances to witness the visit. The *Otago Daily Times* also expressed concern over the very timing of the royal tour:

It is much to be regretted that the visit of His Royal Highness to New Zealand should have occurred at so inopportune a time. Not only does he find the colony harassed by the difficulties of a savage war, but he comes among a people so much occupied with the disasters that have befallen them that public rejoicings become a mockery. With the recollection of so many massacres still before us, it is not in human nature that we should give way to joyous demonstrations in the spirit of a Roman populace at the approach of Carnival. Every member of our community is in mourning... If his tour through the Islands should afford slight material for another descriptive volume in the shape of triumphal arches and public banquets, [Alfred] will not fail to remember the circumstances in which the colony is placed.⁷⁴²

In this context, the New Zealand settler press used the visit to express their discontent with the imperial government and to make demands as British citizens. The *Wellington Independent* claimed that, despite their unwavering loyalty to the queen, "the people of New Zealand have very great reason to resent... the Imperial Government."⁷⁴³ The *Otago Times* similarly complained that the relationship between New Zealand and the mother country were strained over the "refusal" of support from the imperial government and

⁷⁴¹ *Timaru Herald*, April 10, 1869.

⁷⁴² *Otago Daily Times*, April 19, 1869.

⁷⁴³ *Wellington Independent*, April 13, 1869.

that this separation would inform the festivities.⁷⁴⁴ Some editors even wondered if the duke had been coached by his imperial advisors to avoid explicit references to New Zealand's suffering.

This contestation was couched in the language of Britishness and imperial citizenship. The editors appealed to British citizenship, celebrating their loyalty to the monarchy and to the empire while noting their disaffection, caused by imperial bungling and hesitance in the struggle against the Maori. After a long dispute with the colonists, the imperial government withdrew all imperial troops from the islands, with the exception of one contingent, in 1865-66.⁷⁴⁵ Many members of the settler community, as the newspapers argued, were disappointed with the metropolitan government's decision to financially and militarily abandon the colony in the midst of a "rebellion." Imperial policy not only failed to "protect[] the lives of British subjects from cannibals" but "seriously compromise[ed] the credit of the mother country."⁷⁴⁶ The settler press imagined a friendly relationship with the Maori that had been sabotaged by imperial "mismanagement" and the "impolitic actions of Imperial officers stationed in the colony," sparking a powder keg of unending wars.⁷⁴⁷ The only remedy, as they saw it, was conquest. The visit was defined as a new beginning, when New Zealand was finally remembered by the mother country. Prince Alfred would learn of New Zealand's "sacrifices and hardships," and return to his mother, the justice-giving Great Queen, as

⁷⁴⁴ *Otago Daily Times*, quoted in the *Evening Post*, April 30, 1869.

⁷⁴⁵ Dalziel, 585-86.

⁷⁴⁶ *Otago Daily Times*, April 19, 1869.

⁷⁴⁷ *Otago Daily Times*, April 19, 1869.

their advocate.⁷⁴⁸

This work has understood the royal tours as representative of a new era of imperial consolidation, after decades of local wars in New Zealand, South Asia, and southern Africa. By the 1860s, the numbers of white settlers had begun to outpace a stagnant or declining Maori population, changing the balance of power in pakeha-Maori relations and giving settlers less incentive to rely on accommodation and cohabitation as strategies for dealing with the Maori.⁷⁴⁹

In this context, however, the processes of conquest – so central to the myth of empire – remained incomplete. While accounts of later tours focused on the stability and harmony of Pakeha-Maori relations, the narrative constructed in 1869-71 reflected on the savagery of the Maori and the instability of settler life. The proper welcome could not be provided when “relentless savages are watching the opportunity to fall upon some unprotected homestead for the purpose of shedding the blood of its inmates.”⁷⁵⁰ The entanglement of the local and the imperial in this context was paradoxical, as settler elites in New Zealand and elsewhere in the empire demanded an imperial citizenship that combined demands for local autonomy with an insistence for imperial intervention in the project of conquest.

Without a sense of irony, the settler press also exalted equalitarianism and a notable lack of social strife as a unique “national characteristic” of New Zealand Britons.⁷⁵¹ Building a new Britain in a more temperate land (“The English climate kills

⁷⁴⁸ *Wellington Independent*, April 13, 1869.

⁷⁴⁹ Belich, *Making Peoples*, 226.

⁷⁵⁰ *Otago Daily Times*, April 19, 1869.

⁷⁵¹ *Lyttelton Times*, April 24, 1869.

excessive cheerfulness”), New Zealanders were more free-spirited and playful.⁷⁵² They lacked the puritanical sternness and intolerance of Britain and America, balancing “the equality of social conditions that prevails in the United States” with “the English ideas and prejudices we have brought with us from the old country.”⁷⁵³ *The Lyttelton Times* gloated that even the working classes “lived in plenty” and afford an occasional luxury, representing an equality of opportunity that did not exist “home” in Britain or in the United States.⁷⁵⁴ The *Wellington Times* proposed the best welcome for the prince would involve settlers of all classes and standings, from “our leading merchants and traders” down to “our mechanics and labourers.”⁷⁵⁵ In Christchurch, local men paraded with trade or fraternal organizations: the fire brigade (“Ready, always ready!”), the Ancient Order of Foresters, butchers (“The Roast Beef of Old England”), engineers and iron workers, the Independent Order of Oddfellows of the Manchester Union, “Lancashire and Cheshire men,” and a group of Maori, a dose of “local colour,” dressed in blue coats and scarlet sashes and carrying the British flag.⁷⁵⁶ The image of democratic planning and widespread participation is not completely unfounded; at a March meeting organized to discuss the royal welcome, no less than 700 people attended!⁷⁵⁷

This notion of New Zealand as a particularly democratic and equal society remains central to the mythology of the post-imperial nation. In the 1860s, however, this

⁷⁵² *Lyttelton Times*, April 24, 1869.

⁷⁵³ *Lyttelton Times*, April 24, 1869.

⁷⁵⁴ *Lyttelton Times*, April 24, 1869.

⁷⁵⁵ *Wellington Independent*, April 13, 1869.

⁷⁵⁶ *Timaru Herald*, April 28, 1869.

⁷⁵⁷ *The Star*, March 10, 1869.

emergence of this national narrative was framed within British traditions and imperial culture, particularly the idea of a “better Britain.” New Zealand’s leader writers emphasized that, despite the extreme distance between their colony and the Motherland, that “sterling, true-hearted and loyal Englishmen are to be found in this distant dependency of the British Empire.”⁷⁵⁸ New Zealand was an egalitarian “far off Britain of the south.”⁷⁵⁹ This discourse did not go uncontested, however.

The royal tour was frequently challenged as an elitist production constructed by the colonial government and social elites to exclude the working public. As the discussion below shall demonstrate, settler publics in New Zealand’s major towns protested their Alfred’s limited and controlled interactions with the people of New Zealand; attempts by local elites to charge entrance fees to see the prince or to limit entry to “respectable” colonists; and the use of public buildings and spaces for private events. New Zealand’s poverty, vis-a-vis the Australia colonies, was also a constant point of contestation. The fact that New Zealanders could not and should not pay for a grand welcome in the style of the Australian visit and in face of communal and individual poverty was repeated again and again in editorials and letters.⁷⁶⁰ The propaganda of the royal tour and the mythology of New Zealand as a democratic Britain of the South, disseminated by social elites and the colonial press, was frequently contested, in counter-discourses that similarly appealed to imperial citizenship and British liberty.

⁷⁵⁸ *Timaru Herald*, April 28, 1869.

⁷⁵⁹ *Bruce Herald*, May 12, 1869.

⁷⁶⁰ *Daily Southern Cross*, April 22, 1869.

The sense of cultural and political difference across geographic spaces was less pronounced in New Zealand than in South Africa. In the days before “Vogelism,” the public works schemes of Prime Minister Julius Vogel during the 1870s that developed networks of infrastructure and communication that connected the provinces together, the settlements of New Zealand were separated by geography and the divergence of local interests.⁷⁶¹ An extension of Vogelism was the abolishment of the New Zealand’s “quasi-federal system,” which was developed with the advent of responsible government (1852) and nurtured sectional conflict between the provinces and led to occasional campaigns for separatism.⁷⁶² The competition between different centers of settlement lacked the vitriol of South African political and cultural discourses and but had a profound impact on the way that local people imagined their political, cultural, and social universes.

There were, undoubtedly, tensions and feelings of resentment between different regions and towns, not to mention conflict among people and groups of different social or political standings *within* these communities: between the more developed North Island and the more recently settled South Island, between town and frontier, and between centers of political and cultural importance, such as Auckland or Wellington, and provincial settlements. Henry Armstrong, a member of the Southland Provincial Council, complained that proper emigration could never be promoted until the Maori were neutralized and “provincial jealousies and selfishness die out, and our provincial politicians work together for the common good of the whole colony.”⁷⁶³ While the

⁷⁶¹ See Raewyn Dalziel, *Julius Vogel, Business Politician* (Auckland, 1986).

⁷⁶² R.C.J. Stone, *From Tamaki-Makau-Rau to Auckland* (Auckland: Auckland University Press, 2001); Dalziel, 584.

⁷⁶³ *Evening Post*, May 5, 1869.

hostility between the provinces of New Zealand lacked the political rage of South African politics – a fact reflected in the rather different nature of the analysis below – different colonial cores produced unique mythologies of identity and belonging that appealed to both the local and the imperial.

Auckland. On the North Island, Auckland had served as the capital of the colony from 1841 until 1865. Auckland was made the booms of the 1860s, promoted by immigrant schemes, the presence of colonial troops during the Waikato War, and the Thames gold rush in 1868.⁷⁶⁴ It was a planned settlement and administrative hub that served as a launching point for both the wars of the 1850s and 60s and the expansion of settlement into the hinterland. It was a port town dominated by a mercantile elite who sought to project an image of the settlement as a commercial and progressive place of economic growth and civic improvement. In 1869, this mythology was immediately threatened, as local social elites understood the situation, by Te Kooti's raids on North Island settlements and the neglect of the imperial government.

There was some effort to contrast Auckland and Wellington, the city that had recently taken its place as the colony's capital. *The Daily Southern Cross* compared the excess and waste of Wellington's royal welcome to Auckland's more somber and efficient plans to welcome Alfred.⁷⁶⁵ While New Zealanders were loyal to their queen and their homeland, given the circumstances, they were in no mood to expend precious funds on a scheme of the imperial government. At the same time, the *Daily Cross* proposed that the people of Auckland should follow Wellington's lead in avoiding long

⁷⁶⁴ Belich, *Making Peoples*, 368.

⁷⁶⁵ *Daily Southern Cross*, April 15, 1869.

and tedious addresses from friendly societies and municipalities – as had been done in Australia a year earlier.⁷⁶⁶ They also lampooned the local celebration of Aucklanders as the most loyal citizen-subjects of Queen Victoria in all the empire, positing that Aucklanders were “as loyal as the average subjects of the empire, and neither less nor more.”⁷⁶⁷ This was not merely a jesting comment about the most common trope of the royal tour, that “we” are the queen’s most loyal subjects; it also reflected a tinge of anger in the coverage of the visit, directed at an imperial government that was seen as failing to fulfill its obligations to its children.

The welcome for Alfred was bungled when the prince’s ship *Galatea* arrived days ahead of schedule with little notice. Local organizing committees were shocked by this development and scrambled to complete the construction of stages and triumphal arches as much as was possible in a very short period of time. Workers were “engaged from midnight,” preparing the decorations so that they would be ready in time.⁷⁶⁸ The *Daily Southern Cross* lamented that “his Royal Highness may be deprived of some of the special treats he had in store for him if he had waited another day”⁷⁶⁹ This frustration reflects the careful choreography of the visits, the performances of which were carefully planned by colonial officials and town elders in advance, and the lack of coordination and communication between imperial, colonial, and local officials. The example of Auckland in 1869 offers no historical drama but does show how relatively mundane controversies and problems – debates about loyalty and addresses or the early arrival of a visiting

⁷⁶⁶ *Daily Southern Cross*, April 23, 1869.

⁷⁶⁷ *Daily Southern Cross*, May 7, 1869.

⁷⁶⁸ *Daily Southern Cross*, May 10, 1869.

⁷⁶⁹ *Ibid.*

dignitary – became important topics of discussion in civic culture, reflecting on the exaggerated significance attached to the visits at the local level and the ways in which local mythologies could be exploited or nurtured by small events.

Wellington. Located on the southern end of the North Island, Wellington was founded as the first organized settlement in New Zealand, in 1839, with the settlement of several hundred settlers at the mouth of the Hutt River called Britannia. Flooded and destroyed the New Zealand Company moved the settlement to Lambton Harbour, the site of modern Wellington. It rapidly became a trade center that survived through trade with the Maori and benefited from local production of wool. It became the colonial capital in 1865, moved to reflect the developments of new settlements and the discovery of gold on the South Island. By 1867, it had population of only 7,460 residents. Wellington was a fledging urban center that was only starting to benefit from the attraction of capital and business brought on by its establishment as the capital. The mythology of Wellington came to focus on its role as the “Empire City,” as the first British settlement in New Zealand and the capital of a British Empire in the Pacific.

In 1869, the people of the Empire City were contrasted with their brethren in Australia, the older and more celebrated colony of the region. Waiting for Alfred to arrive, the *Wellington Independent*, for instances, compared the character of youthful New Zealand with its older cousin Australia, reflecting on the role of provincialism in inhibiting progress.⁷⁷⁰ The Australian colony of Victoria, they noted, possessed networks of railroads and communications that New Zealand lacked in the days before Vogelism. This infrastructure integrated the provinces and connected them to other major population

⁷⁷⁰ *Wellington Independent*, April 13, 1869.

centers on the continent, creating an environment that promoted “nation over province. Moreover, Victoria had a “real capital” – “Marvelous Melbourne”— where “the bulk of wealth and business is centered.”⁷⁷¹ New Zealand, on the other hand, was “made up of a number of distinct provinces, each with its capital town on the seaboard.”⁷⁷² The *Independent* imagined New Zealand to be a collection of outward-looking cores rather than a united whole.

In this emerging mythology, Wellington would be New Zealand’s Melbourne, a political and economic center, which would lead the colony into a future of prosperity and progress. At the same time, it was not developed enough to compete with Australia. In this context, Wellington, as the capital, could not compete with Australia or even “give His Royal Highness such a welcome as would do justice to the whole of the colony.”⁷⁷³ Thus, the *Independent* asserted that the people of Wellington should forsake the “scores of triumphal arches,” which the prince had seen in every other colony, to offer more austere but authentic expressions of loyalty to queen and empire (this, of course, did not happen).⁷⁷⁴ The royal tour was framed by local elites as an opportunity for Wellington to live up to local values and its unique destiny as the (British) Empire City of New Zealand.

The visit did elicit a language of contestation, but it was one articulated by the “haves” rather than the “have-nots” of Wellington’s social order. The Wellington papers complained that the Governor George Bowen, was conspiring to “not allow the Duke to

⁷⁷¹ Ibid.

⁷⁷² Ibid.

⁷⁷³ Ibid.

⁷⁷⁴ *Wellington Independent*, April 13, 1869.

mix with the general public more than can be possibly helped,” denying the duke opportunities to inspire loyalty amongst his mother’s subjects and the general public the opportunity to express their loyalty.⁷⁷⁵ The requests of loyal friendly societies to meet with the duke, for instance, were answered at the last possible moment, giving little opportunity for members to organize and assemble in time.⁷⁷⁶ Upon witnessing crowds gathered to meet the prince, Bowen failed to stop the carriages so that Alfred might spend a few moments interacting with his mother’s subjects.⁷⁷⁷ In the language of social control, the editors of the *Evening Standard* asserted: “where Kings, Queens, and Princes are concerned, these people are easily pleased, and it is therefore a greater pity to lose any opportunity of pleasing the people during a visit like the present.”⁷⁷⁸ As far as they were concerned, the governor had missed crucial opportunities not only for binding New Zealand closer to Britain but also, and perhaps more importantly, for securing the obedience of the lower classes. In Wellington, Alfred’s visit served local ends, to contribute to the mythology of the Empire City and its people as well as an imagined method of social control.

Canterbury. The coasts off of Canterbury had been whaling grounds for decades, the Banks Peninsula sighted by Captain Cook in 1770. The area was first settled by French and German settlers recruited by the Nanto-Bordelaise Company in 1840, who founded a small settlement at Akaroa after the British laid claim to the islands. The first sustained British settlement of the area was started in 1848 by Edward Gibbon

⁷⁷⁵ *Evening Standard*, April 14, 1869.

⁷⁷⁶ *Evening Standard*, April 17, 1869.

⁷⁷⁷ *Ibid.*

⁷⁷⁸ *Ibid.*

Wakefield's Canterbury Association. In 1850, four ships arrived with settlers on board, both gentry and laborers in a scheme to reproduce a traditional British social and religious order, focused on agriculture and the Anglican Church. Lyttelton was founded as the province's port city while Christchurch, further inland, was the "City of the Plains." The province was the first permanent settlement on the South Island, where there were fewer Maori than in the north. The settlement and mythology of Canterbury was inspired by a social experiment rather than as a commercial venture or a personal adventure.

The mythology of Canterbury constructed by the local settlers during the royal tour focused on the settlement's faithful reproduction of British society. According to the provincial superintendent William Rolleston, "nowhere" in his mother's empire would Alfred find British institutions "more firmly implanted" than in Canterbury.⁷⁷⁹ Without even a foundation stone for the prince to lay, the town of Christchurch, the provincial capital, could not compete with the splendor and wealth of Australian cities, yet its settlement "resemble[d] England more than any other portion of the colony."⁷⁸⁰ The *Timaru Herald* gloated: while "to the Duke receptions of all kinds must be more or less stale and wearisome... we are proud enough to think that his reception at the Christchurch railway station... was, in comparison with others, something more than ordinary... [it was] more grand and more complete."⁷⁸¹ In other words, they claimed that the duke would feel most at home and most welcome in Canterbury as the most authentic "little Britain" in the empire. At the same time, as the *Herald* professed that the

⁷⁷⁹ *Star*, April 14, 1869.

⁷⁸⁰ *The Lyttelton Times*, April 22, 1869.

⁷⁸¹ *Timaru Herald*, April 28, 1869.

demonstrations of loyalty to the queen were nearly excessive, it also lamented the limits of the tour, which included only the major towns and missed the Westland goldfields and the south.⁷⁸²

Alfred would also identify another characteristic of Canterbury with home: the importance of class. Despite the claims of inclusion and democracy elsewhere, the visit was a “class act” in the province of Canterbury. As elsewhere, events were planned by provincial elites, who limited and controlled attendance by putting a price tag on loyalty, that is, by charging an entrance fee. The entrance fee to the public festival in Canterbury was sixpence; proposals to invite local Maori or to distribute free tickets to the poor were soundly defeated by the members of the Popular Entertainment and Amusements Committee.⁷⁸³ These measures did not prevent a massive crowd pressing at the entrances to be let in, nearly causing “a disturbance.”⁷⁸⁴ A local settler, writing under the populist pseudonym “Vox Populi” (“voice of the people”), complained that seats in the gallery of the Provincial Council, “*public property*,” were being sold for “half-a-guinea each.”⁷⁸⁵ Elites’ ability to control the symbolic space of the royal visit was openly and loudly contested by another British political tradition: radical and public protest.

Otago. The settlement of Otago was designed to be a Scottish response to the English settlements of the New Zealand Company. George Rennie’s plan to build a “new Edinburgh” in New Zealand was taken up by members of the Free Church of Scotland during the late 1840s. Two ships, the *John Wickliffe* and the *Philip Lainge*, sailed from

⁷⁸² Ibid.

⁷⁸³ *Star*, April 17, 1869.

⁷⁸⁴ *Star*, April 23, 1869.

⁷⁸⁵ *Star*, April 21, 1869.

Greenock on the Firth of Clyde carrying 344 settlers to Dunedin in 1847.⁷⁸⁶ The town and the province expanded rapidly during the 1860s, bringing new non-Scottish immigrants to the goldfields; nevertheless, Otago's origins story highlights its importance as a settlement in a Scottish British Empire.

Public discourses on the royal visit focused on the province's cultural and geographical distance from the cities of the North Island and its Scottish heritage. While the local press celebrated Dunedin's place as a little Scotland, they also constructed a unique mythology that emphasized their disconnect from the elitism of the English-founded colonies to the north. The province was identified as a "the stronghold of Provincialism," a reference to the occasional outbursts of separatist sentiment.⁷⁸⁷ It was also mythologized as the "Edinburgh of the South Seas"⁷⁸⁸ In this context, the Duke of Edinburgh was *their* prince as a "city... founded by emigrants from Scotland's ancient capital."⁷⁸⁹ The Chinese immigrants to Otago, many of whom had been attracted to the South Island by the gold rush of the early 1860s, figured importantly in the community's "local colour" as well.

While the presence of the queen's son was celebrated as a historic occasion, there was some concern that the provincial values of people from the periphery of Britain and of New Zealand were being dishonored by the excessiveness and exuberance displayed during the duke's visit. The *Otago Witness* complained that "the citizens of Dunedin had

⁷⁸⁶ 2/3rds of the first settlers were Free Church Presbyterians.

⁷⁸⁷ *Bruce Herald*, May 12, 1869.

⁷⁸⁸ *North Otago Times*, May 7, 1869.

⁷⁸⁹ *Otago Witness*, May 1, 1869.

taken an epidemic, and gone simply Prince mad”⁷⁹⁰ The *Tuapeka Times* warned its readers to be careful in their expressions of loyalty to the prince:

We trust his [the duke's welcome will be hearty enough to prove the strong feeling of loyalty which is a strong characteristic of public opinion in this Province. At the same time, it is to be hoped that neither the necessity for economy nor the dignity which becomes a free people will be forgotten. The respect and affection all feel for our beloved Queen will be best displayed by proving ourselves worthy of self-government which has been conferred upon us, by avoiding all flunkyism and fulsome adulation.⁷⁹¹

This was not an entirely novel expression of restraint, but it did reflect the unique mythology of Otago as a frontier town and a capital of Scottish culture.

The political and cultural resentment articulated by the newspapers of Otago, against the elitist and imperialist “cores” of the North Island or Auckland, as a fascinating corollary to South African separatism. While Otago’s “provincialism” might have lacked the language of utter hostility articulated by the British settler elites of the Eastern Cape, it represents the complexities of imperial culture in the empire and of settler societies more generally. The Western Cape’s political dominance in southern Africa declined in relation to the mineral revolutions of the 1860s and 1870s and the rise of Johannesburg; Cape Town became a town of secondary importance as a white settler population looked past their past conflicts and the gravitational orbit of South African politics moved east. In New Zealand, localism and provincialism, which served to support the ideological apparatus of empire over one of a unified nation-state, were culturally undone by the political reforms of the 1870s, which ended the stronghold of provincial governments on the New Zealand body politic, and the Vogelism of the same period, which erased the geographical and cultural distances that separated the major population centers of New

⁷⁹⁰ Ibid.

⁷⁹¹ *Tuapeka Times*, April 24, 1869.

Zealand.

New Zealand (1901)

The South African War was a transitional moment in the history of the British Empire. The imperial war effort represented both the strengths of the British Empire, when young men from across the empire came to serve Queen and Empire, and its darkest moment, the near-defeat of the greatest empire the world had never known by some “farmers,” the use of brutal tactics and concentration camps under Kitchener, and the emergence of discontent in the colonies of settlement over the lack of imperial gratitude for their contributions and sacrifices. In a way, the stories of South Africa and New Zealand after this moment, during the first half of the twentieth century, could hardly be more different. The settlement of the South African War and the Union of South Africa in 1910 reconciled the white populations of the subcontinent, setting in motion the decline and end of British influence in southern Africa: the Maritz (Boer) Rebellion in 1914 and controversy over South Africa’s participation on the British war effort during both World Wars; the Statue of Westminster in 1934; and the declaration of a republic in 1961. The national story of New Zealand, on the other hand, remained intertwined with a British one even after the establishment of dominion status in 1934. It was forged in the blood of ANZAC troops during World War I, it is often claimed, and only quietly drifted away from British influence though remained proud of its British roots.

If the British colonies in New Zealand and southern Africa developed into modern nation-states over the second half of the nineteenth century and the first decades of the

twentieth century in profoundly different ways, the language of Britishness and ideas about British traditions of liberty and citizenship continued to inform political and cultural discourses of New Zealand and amongst English-speaking South Africans into the twentieth century. This may not be a surprisingly claim in the context of New Zealand, but, as Vivian Bickford-Smith and other scholars have argued, Britishness is the “forgotten nationalism” in the history of South Africa.⁷⁹² The story of the Duke and Duchess of Cornwall and York’s world tour of 1901 reflects both the changes and continuities in imperial culture, of colonies that had largely overcome their sectional divisions and had developed more self-confident and independent national identities. At the same time, while non-imperial identities were clearly on the move, Britishness and imperial citizenship continued to shape how people in the empire imagined themselves and their communities.

In the aftermath of Queen Victoria’s death in January 1901, the idea of her as an imperial mother, uniting the global offspring of Great Britain, became particularly meaningful to the cosmology of imperial citizenship. New Zealand celebrated its unique place in this history as the first colony founded during the reign of Queen Victoria.⁷⁹³ This mythology was localized further when combined with the notion that New Zealand was a particularly egalitarian and democratic society. Appealing to a concept that might be termed imperial democracy, *The Lyttelton Times* posed that the British monarch was, in fact, the elected “President of the Commonwealth,” chosen “as though we had a

⁷⁹² Vivian Bickford-Smith, “Writing About Englishness: South Africa’s Forgotten Nationalism,” in *Empire and After: Englishness in Postcolonial Perspective*, ed. Graham MacPhee and Prem Poddar (Berghahn Books, 2007). For a more traditional approach, see John Bond, *They Were South Africans* (London: Oxford University Press, 1956).

⁷⁹³ *Otago Daily Times*, June 12, 1901.

quinquennial election.”⁷⁹⁴ The *Evening Post* (Wellington) explained that the co-existence of monarchy and democracy, nation and empire was no paradox:

The youthful colonial democracy, untrammelled as it is by the long-drawn traditions of the past, is suddenly brought to a vivid realisation of the historical associations which centre round a throne, and because that throne is now the symbol of ordered liberty, no less than national unity, it feels stirring within it the inherited sentiment of loyalty which for the Briton suggests no servility, and leads to no loss of self-respect.⁷⁹⁵

In celebration of the Great Queen’s reign, the duke laid the foundation stones for statues of the late queen, paid for by local subscriptions, in an act that was repeated across the empire.⁷⁹⁶

Public discourse in New Zealand also focused on competition with newly federated Australia and New Zealand’s place in the Australasian British Empire. On the eve of the royal visit, the *Otago Witness* argued that the royal tour could “hardly fail to quicken the growing desire to join the Commonwealth.”⁷⁹⁷ Despite this expressed desire to join the Australian Commonwealth, there was constant discussion, as there had been during the earlier tours, of how New Zealand could compete with their richer and older Australian cousins. There was wide consensus in the settler press, however, that New Zealand could not compete with the spectacle of the Australia visit, nor could the provincial cities of the islands do little more than repeat the performances of Auckland; yet, Dunedin or Canterbury, local papers argued, were more genuine in their loyalty and

⁷⁹⁴ *Lyttelton Times*, June 11, 1901; *Otago Witness*, June 12, 1901.

⁷⁹⁵ *Evening Post*, June 18, 1901.

⁷⁹⁶ *Otago Witness*, July 3, 1901.

⁷⁹⁷ *Otago Witness*, March 20, 1901.

patriotism than Marvelous Melbourne or even Auckland.⁷⁹⁸ In this context, the *Otago Daily Times* of Dunedin opposed the government's plan to put on a military show to compete with, even "go one better," New Zealand's "more powerful neighbors," New South Wales and Victoria.⁷⁹⁹ These sentiments reflect a complexity about New Zealand's emerging national identity, which became decreasingly provincial in character but reflected multiple allegiances: with a colony-nation of New Zealand, with an Australasian British world, and with Home and the British Empire.

In this context, the complicated politics of the South African War figured importantly during the New Zealand royal tour, particularly the importance of New Zealand's service to imperial war cause. Ten contingents and some 6,500 New Zealanders soldiers to South Africa to serve the war effort, paid for by settler donations.⁸⁰⁰ Contrasted to the cultural discomfort of metropolitan Britons to standing armies, colonial cultures were comparatively militarized spaces, a characteristic than was amplified by conflict in South Africa. Military parades and inspections dominated the itinerary, with New Zealand volunteers traveling hundreds of kilometers to attend these functions. The most anticipated moment came when the Duke of Cornwall and York pinned medals of valor and service on New Zealand's imperial troops, which one paper suggested would prevent the volunteers from ever removing their uniforms again.

⁷⁹⁸ *Otago Witness*, June 19, 1901.

⁷⁹⁹ *Otago Daily Times*, May 31, 1901. "It is surprising that a Ministry which professes to be opposed to militarism, should be so sensitive upon this point. We venture to think that it is unwise for our small colony to enter into competition with 'our more powerful neighbors.'"

⁸⁰⁰ A.J. Harrop, "New Zealand and the Empire, 1852-1951," *Cambridge History of the British Empire*, vol. VII, New Zealand (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 219.

In pro-war discourses, protest against the war was dismissed, loyalty and service to the empire against Afrikaner despotism celebrated.⁸⁰¹ Moreover, most of the papers affirmed the imperial solidarity that the war had stirred, symbolized in the “blood, mingling in a common stream on the South African field, of Imperial soldier and imperial trooper.”⁸⁰² “When the Mother Country is in danger or difficulty we send our young men to fight for her, or it may be to die for her if the sacrifice is required.”⁸⁰³ New Zealand could be counted on, to give a hand when the mother country and the empire were threatened.

At the same time, some elements of the settler press condemned the neglect of the imperial soldier, the young New Zealander fighting for the empire in southern Africa, whilst the papers were filled with accounts of the royal visit. There were, of course, the medals awarded by the Duke of Cornwall, but the press had apparently forgotten about the war effort abroad. The editors of the *Lyttelton Times* complained that imperial and colonial officials were neglecting their boys in South Africa.⁸⁰⁴ Parents awaited news about the fate of their sons.⁸⁰⁵ Lord Kitchener’s plea for supplies “is utterly ignored, and the men are left to get through a particularly severe winter with none of the assistance that was considered so necessary twelve months ago.”⁸⁰⁶ This was a failure of both the government and the public, the *Times* argued, and did not reflect opposition to the war

⁸⁰¹ *Otago Daily Times*, June 14, 1901.

⁸⁰² *Otago Daily Times*, May 31, 1901, June 14, 1901.

⁸⁰³ *Otago Witness*, June 12 1901.

⁸⁰⁴ *Lyttelton Times*, June 11, 1901.

⁸⁰⁵ *Ibid.*

⁸⁰⁶ *Ibid.*

but a general apathy.⁸⁰⁷ While veterans and empire were celebrated, it was argued, those who were suffering and dying on the frontlines of an imperial war were forgotten.

Moreover, the colonial press frequently complained about how New Zealand's volunteer brigades, many of whom had seen war service and who were important players in the performance of the royal tour, were treated poorly and unfairly by the tour planners. The volunteers who attended the festivities in Wellington, for instance, complained that their sleeping quarters were a "veritable mudhole" and their meals were "underdone and scanty."⁸⁰⁸ For the troop review at Christchurch, volunteers had to take nine days of leave from their jobs, travel in open trucks in the blistering heat to the city, and sleep in uncomfortable and inadequate living conditions.⁸⁰⁹ This complaint, that the spirit of the visit was undermined by poor planning and social posturing, was common to all of the royal tours. The concern over the treatment of the volunteers, however, reflected the specific grievance about the relationship between a colony-nation and its motherland.

More than previous tours, the Maori represented "local colour" during the visit and were firmly appropriated by the emerging national mythology of New Zealand. The age of Maori wars behind them, tour planners incorporated, and the colonial press celebrated, Maori people and customs a part of the story of New Zealand. As chapter three demonstrated, the appropriation of local peoples into imperial culture sought simultaneously to prove the benefits of British civilization on vanquished peoples and to

⁸⁰⁷ Ibid.

⁸⁰⁸ *Bruce Herald*, June 25, 1901.

⁸⁰⁹ *Otago Witness*, May 29, 1901.

contrast the heights of British progress (the future) to quaint but no longer dangerous cultures of superstition and barbarism (the past). Moreover, their presence propagated an illusion of consent and the “myth of empire,” that white settlement and conquest was New Zealand’s destiny.⁸¹⁰ The Maori Durbar at Rotorua best illustrated Maori docility and consent, but there were large Maori ceremonies on the North Island in Auckland as well. There were also more subtle expressions of this mythology, of welcome signs welcoming the prince in both English and Maori, of “Haeremai,” or “Welcome,” painted on the Harbour Board Arch, or of Maori children singing “God Save the King.”⁸¹¹

This narrative sounds remarkably similar to that of southern Africa, but this discourse was different. It reflected a sense of racial harmony and even cooperation, symbolized in the Treaty of Waitangi. The *Otago Daily Times* described “Natives, the descendants of a race that proved the worthy foemen in bygone days” who “mingled freely with pioneer colonists and their native-born children.”⁸¹² Symbolically, expressions of loyalty to the British monarchy, in addresses or performance, proved most important in this mythology – as if the Maori were admitting their errors and willingly giving in to the greater and better power. The *Otago Daily Times* even suggested that “there are no more loyal Britishers in all the Empire” than the Maori.⁸¹³ Despite their convergences, the histories of “white-native” relations in New Zealand and South Africa

⁸¹⁰ James Belich, “Empire and its Myth,” in *Amongst Friends. Australian and New Zealand Voices from America*, eds. Patty O’Brien and Bruce Vaughn (Dunedin: Otago University Press, 2005)

⁸¹¹ *Otago Witness*, June 12, 1901.

⁸¹² *Ibid.*

⁸¹³ *Otago Daily Times*, June 15, 1901.

shared much in common – warfare, dispossession, tribalization, alcoholism, and poverty – and ended up variations of conquest, segregation, and control.

The settler press also argued that imperial loyalism and national pride transcended the social and political chasms of local politics. In the presence of royalty, “even an anarchist might permit himself to cheer.”⁸¹⁴ In Otago, the *Otago Daily Times* celebrated the the crowds who assembled as representing a cross-section of colonial society: “the miner and the farmer had thrown down their implements, the teacher closed his school and the business man his store” “from remote corners of Otago” to pay their respects.⁸¹⁵ In a related vein, the Premier John Seddon planned the erection of special stands for elderly pensioners, “the men who have made the colony with their toil,” he reflected on the specialness of New Zealand within the empire: while other colonies were busy preparing arches designing pageantry, New Zealanders were caring for their founding settlers in old age.⁸¹⁶ While the *Otago Witness* complained that such representations of New Zealand as a “working man’s paradise” duped new workers into settling in New Zealand, only to find the same conditions they would find anywhere else in the empire, they also articulated a vision for what the royal tour ought to represent to the democratic social order of New Zealand:

Here is a splendid opportunity for drawing a contrast between New Zealand and all the other colonies of the Empire. They spent their ingenuity upon arches and designs of various kinds. We can show a spectacle that will be as pathetic, as significant of the progress we have been making... There are our pensioners, the men who have made the

⁸¹⁴ *Lyttelton Times*, June 11, 1901.

⁸¹⁵ *Otago Daily Times*, June 26, 1901.

⁸¹⁶ *Otago Witness*, June 12, 1901.

colony with their toil, and now we provide for their old age.⁸¹⁷

The myth of democracy and social harmony was contested and challenged across New Zealand, but the idea became central to the apparatus of an emerging nationalism, which focused on these unique attributes of New Zealand's national character. These traits simultaneously served to underline New Zealand's peculiarity as an egalitarian society and to trace the colony-nation's roots in the British diaspora.

The limits of this social harmony, even in the elite settler press, demonstrate the instabilities of the constructed narrative. Two authors ("Tea and Sugar" and "A Member of the MUIOOF") complained that the Employers' Association of Canterbury had decided to open their shops on the Saturday of the royal visit, denying members of the "various friendly societies of this city" and others to participate in the festivities.⁸¹⁸ In Wellington, *The New Zealand Lance* criticized the "bungling" and elitism demonstrated by the local planning committees in their welcome to the duke and duchess. The process, dominated by local elites, was characterized by a series of "squabbles, bickerings, and cross-purposes," what the *Lance* called "too many cooks spoiling the broth."⁸¹⁹ The local committee had committed more money to the festivities than they had in their coffers and proceeded with a "dictatorial spirit" that was unworthy of a democratic community.⁸²⁰ The *Lance* argued that putting up arches was contrary to the egalitarian spirit of New Zealand and that citizens should be encouraged, instead, to decorate their homes and

⁸¹⁷ Ibid.

⁸¹⁸ *Lyttelton Times*, June 17, 1901.

⁸¹⁹ *New Zealand Lance*, June 8, 1901.

⁸²⁰ *New Zealand Lance*, June 15, 1901.

businesses to their own liking.⁸²¹ And, the editors were enraged when they learned of plans to rope off the streets and erect barricades, which they argued might be a necessary practice in Russia or Germany but not amongst “free and loyal” “Anglo-Saxon peoples.”⁸²²

The narrative of democracy and egalitarianism both produced and challenged the mythology of New Zealand as a nation. *The Observer* of Auckland challenged the boundaries of acceptable discourse when it encouraged the citizen-subjects of the city to demonstrate restraint and self-respect, representing not only a fierce criticism of excessive celebration of the visit but also an emerging understanding of what it meant to be a New Zealander:

“Please don’t!” Imagine a horde of Dervishes wildly dancing round you, eager to shake a hand that has only just recovered from the previous town's manipulatory efforts; imagine the frightful fawning and sickening sycophancy a democratic community has subjected this lady and gentlemen to, who have done nothing to merit the horror of it all. And Auckland is prepared to do the thing on the same servile scale as the ridiculous multitude of the Commonwealth. It is good to be loyal... but is it worth while destroying in Royal eyes the qualities that have individualised us?⁸²³

The editors continued:

In this matter the reputation of the Auckland people is at stake... To those favoured individuals who are permitted to wear the bell-topper of distinction or the frockcoat of fealty, we humble as that they desist from kissing the royal hand, even if the Royal hand is in so helpless a state as to be of no assistance as a defence. As New Zealand is an example to all the world (in its own imagination) of progress... The Duke's name is not Baal, and he doesn't want to be worshipped... in coming to New Zealand's fortunately first and fairest city, the recollection we would like him to

⁸²¹ *New Zealand Lance*, June 8, 1901.

⁸²² *New Zealand Lance*, June 15, 1901.

⁸²³ *Observer*, June 15, 1901.

carry away is that Auckland's citizens had not established a reputation made in a day for fawning, sycophancy, or ill-manners.⁸²⁴

This commentary reflects the complex and conflicted nature of national identity in New Zealand. Many themes were the same in 1901 as they were in 1869: the role of social class in discourses and counter-discourses of belonging, a mythology of democracy and egalitarianism, and the legacy of the British diaspora in the traditions and mythologies of the colony-nation. There were also differences.

The end of the land wars and the spread of the European population had neutralized a large proportion of the Maori population, who became more than “local colour.” They emerged as principal actors in a story of New Zealand, from which the brutal and violent past was largely excised. In the context of declining provincialism and the development of infrastructure and technologies that resulted in a better connected New Zealand, there also emerged a more independent and self-confident national identity and politics that was based in both the uniqueness of New Zealand and its relationship with a British homeland.⁸²⁵ While there New Zealand and South eAfrica were more similar than scholars have previously suggested, a significant divergence can be detected during the era of the South African War, of a New Zealand that would retain a certain political, economic, and cultural closeness with the motherland and a South Africa that began to more aggressively push away.⁸²⁶ At the same time, while New Zealand grew increasingly reliant on British trade and capital, the goldfields and diamond mines of

⁸²⁴ Ibid.

⁸²⁵ The emergence of national political parties is perhaps the best indicator of this change. The Liberal Party as a national party was able to transcend and dominate New Zealand politics in a way that provincial parties or stitched-together regional and national alliances never could.

⁸²⁶ Dalziel, 592.

southern Africa were thoroughly saturated in British capital. Moreover, the traditions and mythologies of Britishness and empire continued to inform political and cultural discourses for both British settlers and “colonial others” in both places well into the twentieth century.

South Africa (1901)

The South African leg of the world tour was nearly cancelled because of an epidemic of bubonic plague in Cape Town.⁸²⁷ In response, the editors of the *Graham's Town Journal* asserted that “Capetown is not the Colony, and that a railway trip throughout the other ports and the chief inland towns would give their Royal Highnesses a better idea of the country, and bring them in touch with most of the loyal population.”⁸²⁸ This public relations nightmare, as the Colonial Office understood the situation, led to a hurried exchange of letters between London and the Cape. The visit was important as pro-empire propaganda in the midst of the South African War.⁸²⁹ Upon hearing of the possibility that H.M.S. *Ophir*, with royal passengers onboard, would coal at Simonstown and depart without a visit, W. F. Hely Hutchison, the governor at the Cape, encouraged the Colonial Secretary Joseph Chamberlain of the great political importance of the visit, that the “[Afrikaner] Bond’ was quite *fearful* ‘that the visit may

⁸²⁷ William Beinart and Lotte Hughes, “Plague and Urban Environments,” in *Environment and Empire* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 167-183.

⁸²⁸ *Graham's Town Journal*, June 13, 1901.

⁸²⁹ Joseph Watson, *The Queen's Wish: How It Was Fulfilled By The Imperial Tour Of T.R.H. The Duke And Duchess Of Cornwall And York* (London: Hutchison and Co., 1902), 306-337.

weaken their position.”⁸³⁰ The British High Commissioner Alfred Milner also apparently worried that “the disloyal section of the people would make great capital out of its abandonment.”⁸³¹ Thus, after expert opinion asserted that the health of the royal visitors would not be at risk, the duke and duchess traveled across South Africa, from Natal to Peitermaritzburg and on to Cape Town in the middle of a colonial war.

In the history of colonial South Africa, the South African War represents the end of an era of Anglo-Boer hostility and aggression, and the emergence of a white unity and dominance that these antagonisms had staved off. It also marked the symbolic end of the “imperial factor” in South African history, the beginnings of a united and independent nation-state that came to be dominated by Afrikaans-speaking settlers and would not take its cues from London. On the other hand, British political and cultural traditions profoundly informed the body politic of post-union South Africa. The example of Jan Christian Smuts, the grand old man of early twentieth century South African politics and two-time prime minister (1919-1924, 1939-1948), is instructive in this regard. While he was an Afrikaner who had fought on the Boer side during the South African War, he ended up leading the suppression of the Maritz Rebellion during the Great War and serving as a British field marshal during the Second World War. In Parliament Square, he is immortalized in bronze as an imperial hero and Commonwealth statesman. For the English-speaking populations of South Africa, particularly those who lived in the cultural bastions of Britishness, in Cape Town, Natal, and the Eastern Cape and those ethnic and racial “others” with whom the language of British liberty and citizenship resonated (see

⁸³⁰ Governor W.F. Hely Hutchinson to Joseph Chamberlain, April 25, 1901, JC 11/12/69.

⁸³¹ Joseph Chamberlain to Edward VII, n.d., JC 11/12/04.

chapter three and below), Britishness and imperial citizenship remained vibrant political and cultural discourses. In this context, the way that “British” settlers imagined the 1901 royal tour reflected the decline of regional identities and the continued relevance of Britishness and the “imperial factor.”

The war and recent death of Queen Victoria amplified the use of her mythology as a symbol of British liberty and progress, as the patriot queen. In this mythology, she represented all that was good about the British cause in the war and the continued relevance of Britain and the empire to South Africa. The tour was a somber affair, with its principal actors and their colonial observers to mourn the queen and the war dead. Tour organizers instructed men and women to wear dark or black clothing and discouraged shouting and cheering. Yet, she also represented the triumph of British rule in southern Africa in this discourse, the “freedom and progress” brought on by her rule.⁸³² Her subjects, “the only Queen” most of them had ever known, universally respected and loved her regardless of race or ethnicity.”⁸³³ The *Natal Mercury* claimed that she had “discerned true Colonial and Imperial policy long before many of her most eminent statesmen” and that her rule had convinced republicans across Britain and the empire to renounce their beliefs and embrace constitutional monarchy.⁸³⁴ This was a rosy picture that glossed over a history of violence, warfare, and dispossession, but it projected a powerful myth about what it meant to be a British citizen-subject in southern Africa.

In a related vein, the inauguration of the federal parliament of Australia

⁸³² *Cape Argus*, May 24, 1901.

⁸³³ *Natal Mercury*, July 19, 1901.

⁸³⁴ *Natal Mercury*, August 15, 1901.

represented a future possibility for South Africa in these discourses of imperial identity, with the colony rising from the ashes of war to achieve status as the third “great federation” of the British Empire.⁸³⁵ The progress of the Australia visit was carefully reported by the English-speaking press of South Africa and came to represent what the country might become, a federation that “will only be too readily granted to South Africa when the bitterness of war has passed, and Boer and Briton agree to pursue the ideal that has made the great Commonwealth in the South viz., ‘one people, one destiny.’”⁸³⁶ However, the editors of the *Cape Argus* argued that it “rests with the Boers and Afrikaners to decide when the era of self-government will be inaugurated.”⁸³⁷ The *Natal Mercury* prophesized the possible benefits of the royal tour, that it would cause the Boers to “better understand what British rule is, and what advantages it offers to all who are willing to accept it”⁸³⁸ While there was considerable foresight in this vision, of a rapprochement between the British colonies and the Boer republics, it was wrong in predicting which side would come to dominate a federated South African state. The leader writers of the British South African press did not have the benefit of retrospect, of knowing that the country would become an Afrikaner-dominated state, so there is little fairness in dismissing their compelling appeals to Queen and Empire as inconsequential.

In fact, the English language press portrayed the rebellious Dutch-speaking population as a defeated people. The *Natal Mercury* asserted that the Afrikaner cause was effectively crushed during the First Anglo-Boer War: “As they failed, the future South

⁸³⁵ *Natal Mercury*, August 13, 1901.

⁸³⁶ *Ibid.*

⁸³⁷ *Cape Argus*, June 29, 1901.

⁸³⁸ *Natal Mercury*, August 13, 1901.

Africa will be an all-British South Africa”⁸³⁹ The *Cape Argus* argued that the Boers had failed to effectively climb the civilizational ladder and now the British subject-citizens of South Africa had passed them to possess a political and cultural monopoly on progress and civilization:

When the Cape Colony passed into the Empire it was peopled by settlers a century behind the times. They had left Europe and its civilization in the 17th century and ever since then they had lived outside and beyond the reach of current progress...All labour... was performed by the aborigines.... There was little or no education... Their isolation at the Cape... made their ignorance hereditary... Such were the subjects Great Britain acquired in the beginning of the last century. They were the antithesis of Englishmen in habits both of life and of thought.⁸⁴⁰

One popularly conceived way of countering the influence of the Afrikaners in the post-war state was to promote British immigration, but multiple immigration schemes, the editors of the *Graham's Town Journal* contested, had been sabotaged and canceled by successive colonial governments, which feared angering the Boers.⁸⁴¹ After the war, this had been Alfred Milner's project in the Transvaal. Post-war South Africa was foreseen to be a very British place.

The colonial press of South Africa also highlighted the importance of empire and imperial citizenship to a post-war South African political and social order. To them, the war effort and the royal tour exemplified the “solidarity of the empire” and the “liberties of the people”⁸⁴² With the outpouring of loyalty to the duke and duchess by the people of the South African colonies, the editors of the *Natal Mercury* suggested that

⁸³⁹ *Natal Mercury*, August 3, 1901.

⁸⁴⁰ *Cape Argus*, April 16, 1901.

⁸⁴¹ *Graham's Town Journal*, July 28, 1901.

⁸⁴² *Natal Mercury*, August 15, 1901.

the idea that the Colonies were like fruit growing on the parent stem, ready to drop whenever ripe, was dispelled, and the simile of a great oak throwing out its mighty branches never to fall or rot away while the roots of the parent tree held the ground, was found to be more appropriate.⁸⁴³

Rather than drifting away from empire, these English-speaking leader writers argued that an emerging national identity was “perfectly compatible with attachment to the broader ideal of empire”⁸⁴⁴ The *Cape Argus* even appealed to the democracy and equality of New Zealand society as proof, arguing that New Zealand was more of a republic under Queen Victoria than the Boer republics were in their hostility to empire.⁸⁴⁵ Here, New Zealand became a model of what South Africa ought to become!

The British colonial press also constructed a mythology of the war that emphasized an imperial identity over or in concert with a national one. The *Natal Mercury* celebrated the imperial war effort in celebratory language:

No call to arms was needed, no request of help had to be made. At the first note of danger, Britain's sturdy sons in the ‘seven seas’ shouldered their rifles, read and willing to do or die for Queen and Empire. From north to south, from east and west they flocked around the grand old flag, and gave the world the most convincing spectacle it had ever seen of the firm foundation of the British Empire, and of the whole-souled devotion of the Colonies to the Crown... Colonial and Home-born have fought and died side by side for the common cause of Empire, and their blood has consecrated the great ideal of Imperial unity.⁸⁴⁶

In this context, the duke’s tribute to those who had suffered and died in the siege of Ladysmith, where he could not visit for security reasons, contributed to a mythology of

⁸⁴³ Ibid.

⁸⁴⁴ *Cape Argus*, May 10, 1901.

⁸⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁸⁴⁶ *Natal Mercury*, August 15, 1901.

imperial identity forged in the war effort.⁸⁴⁷ Alongside the World Wars, the South African War was a formative moment in the making of imperial and national identities in the colonies of settlement, processes that were more pronounced in the warzone, where the languages of Britishness and imperial citizenship justified the war and served as a vision for the future.

While it is completely reasonable for scholars to underscore the development of a national identity in the South African War and its aftermath, this narrative suppresses a counter-narrative that was not unfounded in its prophecies. It may have been wishful thinking on part of the British settler community to assume that a minority of the English-speaking population would dominate the majority Afrikaner population in a federated state, yet the risks of imperial withdraw and Afrikaner domination were well understood:

South Africa is necessary to the preservation of the Empire... England can never again think to shirk the responsibility of the defence of this country; nor can she afford to permit legislation of administration here that is not heartily Imperialist... The situation is not like that in, say New Zealand, where the loyalty of the whole population is undoubted, and where the stability of the Empire does not hang upon the retention of that very valuable dependency. Here, however, it is a very dangerous fooling to lose Imperial control over local government, and to place power in the hands of a faction who do not disguise their intention for using it against the Empire.⁸⁴⁸

This understanding of South Africa's future and the importance of Britishness was darker and more cynical than those discourses that focused on the almost natural progress of British liberty in South Africa, but it reflected the same fundamental principle: that the imperial connection was crucial to the South African body politic and could be

⁸⁴⁷ *Natal Mercury*, August 16, 1901

⁸⁴⁸ *Graham's Town Journal*, August 27, 1901.

abandoned neither by English-speaking South Africans nor the imperial government. This understanding was reflected later in pleas to the imperial government and the monarchy to refuse approval of the Union of South Africa in 1910.

While the royal tour was celebrated for bringing together the late queen's subjects, their loyalty, ethnic, racial, and geographical divisions profoundly informed perceptions of the visit. *The Natal Mercury* worried that the government-appointed planning commission suffered from a bad case of "officialdom" and neglected the needs and wants of the general public.⁸⁴⁹ There were other protests – over where duke and duchess would visit and how long they would spend in each locale; over the appropriateness of a royal visit during a war; and over the suspension of the constitution and the institution of martial law. In Graham's Town on the Eastern Cape, the *Journal* worried about the prospect of a royal tour in the middle of a bloody conflict, that time and resources were being unnecessary used and that celebration was inappropriate in these somber times.⁸⁵⁰ They argued that the communities of South Africa "have been depleted of their best men, are impoverished through the war and many of them are still under Martial law."⁸⁵¹ They argued that while Cape Town had profited richly from the war, even they could not offer a proper welcome to royal visitors.⁸⁵² South Africa was a "sad sister in the great colonial family" and not prepared for guests.⁸⁵³

⁸⁴⁹ *Natal Mercury*, June 12, 1901.

⁸⁵⁰ *Graham's Town Journal*, August 3, 1901.

⁸⁵¹ *Graham's Town Journal*, May 16, 1901.

⁸⁵² *Graham's Town Journal*, May 18, 1901.

⁸⁵³ *Ibid.*

Moreover, the spectre of Cape separatism and Eastern Cape provincialism survived the progress of the war, even if it posed little threat to the political order of a British-dominated South Africa. On the Eastern Cape, the *Graham's Town Journal* invested its politics in the language of British loyalism, particularly against the imperial and settler interests in Cape Town that failed to push forward completely against “the chronic and bitter conspiracy of Africanderism.”⁸⁵⁴ They condemned the editors of the *Cape Argus* who, they argued, observed their suffering with a spirit of apathy and condescension.

Nothing is more charming than the calm, untroubled attitude of the Cape Argus in regard to the present war. It shows no sign of weariness or discouragement, and indeed expresses decided satisfaction at the slowly sure, and surely slow progress of the campaign... The Argus man's calm is unruffled, and he is sure that the highest military authorities also, do not care a tinker's anathema what the opinion of the plundered and imperiled population... may be... [Imperial military planners have] forced itself generally upon the loyal inhabitants of the Midland and Northern districts of this Colony... Capetown... cares remarkably little about the sufferings of the rest of the Colony.⁸⁵⁵

As in an earlier age, the editors of the *Journal* remained hostile to the Western Cape, now seen as a hotbed of disloyalty and irresolution in a time of war.⁸⁵⁶ They condemned “a Bond ministry of weaklings and traitors,” “the disastrous session of Parliament last year, which very greatly encouraged disloyalty and rebellion,” a lack of “foresight and resolution... [in] calling out the available force and volunteers of the Colony, and planting

⁸⁵⁴ *Graham's Town Journal*, March 7, 1901.

⁸⁵⁵ *Graham's Town Journal*, May 28, 1901.

⁸⁵⁶ *Graham's Town Journal*, March 7, 1901.

them on the south bank of the Orange,” and the “failure to prevent the seditious from holding meetings and publishing falsehoods.”⁸⁵⁷

In particular, they challenged the extension of martial law to all of South Africa while the “focus of treason,” the Cape Town settler press, was left to “belch forth its lies and sedition.”⁸⁵⁸ The suspension of the constitution and the proposed imposition of partial law was condemned by many politicians and journalists as contrary to a British tradition of liberty. In response, the editors of the *Graham’s Town Journal* argued that the current system was “dangerous and unworkable system” and that most of the population was neither “so loyal or so politically intelligent” to be trusted with the privilege of responsible government.⁸⁵⁹ These echoes of Cape separatism were not anti-imperialist but were, in fact, couched in a language of Britishness and loyalism. These protests shared much in common with the language of contestation used by their enemies, the Boers, of the imperialism and meddling of the imperial government and Cape Town.

Despite the *Graham’s Town Journals* pronounced hostility toward Cape Town and its inhabitants, British South Africa had largely overcome the dominance of provincial identities to establish a more national British identity, developed through the emergence of responsible government, and the development of railways and telegraph wires and forged in war. The Treaty of Vereeniging (1902) and the Union of South Africa (1910) created the political and cultural conditions for a reconciliation between the hostile colonial populations of southern Africa. Of course, the reconstruction scheme of

⁸⁵⁷ *Graham’s Town Journal*, March 7, 1901.

⁸⁵⁸ *Ibid.* In particular, they were angered at the lack of outrage on part of the Cape Town papers when the northern towns Colesburg and Aliwal were invaded.

⁸⁵⁹ *Graham’s Town Journal*, March 9, 1901.

Sir Alfred Milner and his Kindergarten after the war sought to “Anglicize” South Africa through British immigration, education, and modernization, but he failed to overcome Boer political and cultural dominance.⁸⁶⁰ While these developments also cultivated the end of the so-called imperial connection and an emerging national identity, the end of empire and British influence in South Africa was not a foregone conclusion. British traditions and mythologies of belonging, that “forgotten nationalism,” continued to shape South African political culture, and an attachment to empire remained a cultural force well into the twentieth century. British flags were flown at city halls in Natal and the Eastern Cape until the 1990s!⁸⁶¹ Moreover, as the analysis below suggests, these discourses were not limited to settlers of English or British ancestry but to diverse populations who casted their lot with the British monarchy and the British Empire.

* * *

On March 12, 1868, Prince Alfred was shot in the back with a pistol at Clontarf, north of Sydney in New South Wales, by an Irishman named Henry James O'Farrell in a Fenian-inspired assassination attempt.⁸⁶² Months earlier, three Fenians, who became known as the Manchester Martyrs, had been executed for killing a policeman. The assassination plot aroused trepidation across the British world that an empire-wide Fenian conspiracy was underway, a fear best illustrated by the draconian Treason Felony Act passed by the parliament of New South Wales six days after the attack and modeled on

⁸⁶⁰ Saunders, 619-620.

⁸⁶¹ John Lambert, “‘An Unknown People’: Reconstructing British South African Identity,” 604

⁸⁶² Whether or not O'Farrell was actually a Fenian remains unclear. The Colonial Secretary of New South Wales at the time, Henry Parkes, who doubled as a police detective during the investigation, remained convinced, 30 years later, that O'Farrell was of sound mind. Henry Parkes, *Fifty Years in the Making of Australian History* (London: Longmans, Greene, and Co., 1892), 190-211.

the English Act of 1848.⁸⁶³ Without question, ethnic and sectarian tensions informed the political, social, and cultural discourses of the nineteenth-century colonies of settlement, as the outburst of anti-Irish rhetoric and violence in the aftermath of O'Farrell's act demonstrates. During Alfred's visit, Irish Catholics in Melbourne had rallied outside of the Protestant Hall, evoking the Battle of the Boyne in illumination-form.⁸⁶⁴ On the other hand, the Sydney Catholic newspaper *Freedman's Journal*, fearing that an Irishman would soon be revealed as the shooter, affirmed that, if such were the case, "Irishmen must bow their heads in sorrow, and confess that the greatest reproach which has ever been cast on them, the deepest shame that has ever been coupled with the name of our people, has been attached to us here in the country where we have been so free and prosperous."⁸⁶⁵ The act was condemned by Irish communities across Australia and the empire.

Curiously enough, even O'Farrell's commitment to republicanism appears questionable, and in interviews he advocated a future for the Irish within the British Empire. Excerpts from his diary and the transcript of an interview he had with the Colonial Secretary of New South Wales, Henry Parkes, were published in 1868 as *Fenian Revelations: The Confessions of O'Farrell who Attempted to Assassinate the Duke of*

⁸⁶³ John Manning Ward et al., eds., *The State and the People: Australian Federation and Nation-Making*,

1870-1901 (Leichhardt, NSW: Federation Press, 2001), 16.

⁸⁶⁴ Malcolm Campbell, "A 'Successful Experiment' No More: The Intensification of Religious Bigotry in Eastern Australia, 1865-1885," *Humanities Research* XII, no. 1 (2005): 70.

⁸⁶⁵ Cited in Campbell, 70.

Edinburgh.⁸⁶⁶ During his confession, O'Farrell claimed that he was part of a Fenian cell in Sydney ordered from England to assassinate the prince.⁸⁶⁷ While he condemned the execution of the Manchester Martyrs and damned England, he also expressed little sorrow in having failed, indicating that he "rather liked" the duke and voted against the plan to kill him in the first place.⁸⁶⁸ When Parkes interrogated him on his political beliefs, O'Farrell advocated not an independent republic of Ireland but a united republic of British Empire.⁸⁶⁹ He conveyed concern that the prince would be in grave danger should he steam on to New Zealand, only for the purposes of "a few more addresses."⁸⁷⁰ While perhaps an extreme example, O'Farrell's apparent loyalty to the empire, despite his hatred of the English and the monarchy, complicates more traditional narratives of ethnic and sectarian conflict in the British world.

Donald Lowry challenges, to a significant degree, the Colley thesis of Protestant national identity in assessing the role of the monarchy in the lives of "non-British" peoples of the empire.⁸⁷¹ In Canada, Lowry argues, ethnic outsiders could and did feel an intense and personal loyalty to the monarchy and the empire on par with their Anglo-

⁸⁶⁶ *Fenian Revelations: The Confessions of O'Farrell who Attempted to Assassinate the Duke of Edinburgh* (London: G. Slater, 1868).

⁸⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, 5.

⁸⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, 3, 13. He told Parkes that the Fenians did not target the Prince of Wales because he was "useful to the cause – the Republican cause, because he disgraces loyalty... He is turning England against royalty."

⁸⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, 12-15.

⁸⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, 9-10, 24. "Perhaps he wants to make up a million exactly, or a legion, 10,000; he has received a stream now from all parts of the colony... Will he take them all home with him? Will the *Galatea* hold them all? I think he ought to set fire to the lot and take the ashes of them all home."

⁸⁷¹ Donal Lowry, "The Crown, Empire Loyalty and the Assimilation of Non-British White Subjects in the British World: An Argument Against 'Ethnic Determinism.'" *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 31 (May 2003): 96-120.

Protestant compatriots. In fact, the “personal nature of monarchy, vertically acknowledged,” was better suited to the political assimilation of French Canadians, indigenous Canadians, Jews, and other “non-British” peoples than a republic by “avoid[ing] the controversies of what it meant to be a Canadian, Australian, or New Zealander.”⁸⁷² The revulsion of French Catholics to the French Revolution and an influx of American loyalists, for example, bolstered monarchism in the colonies. English Canada failed to take advantage of French Canadian loyalty to the empire, instead banning them from the militia and legislating exclusive language and education policies. In this vein, French Canadians opposed English-Canadians rather than Britain or the monarchy. Ethnic outsiders often emphasized loyalty and the opportunity of empire more than Anglo-Protestant subjects. Thus, like the historiography that has downplayed the ethos of republicanism in the metropole, Lowry posits that such outsiders played less of a role in opposition to the monarchy than has been suggested and that, in the case of Canada, anti-monarchy agitators were as likely or more likely to be Anglo-Protestant than Irish Catholic.

Much recent and important work has identified the investment and contribution to the British imperial project by the Scottish, Welsh, and Irish who administered, fought for, evangelized in, and settled the British Empire. Aled Jones and Bill Jones argue that scholars of Welsh history have, until recently, avoided any prolonged discussion of Welsh empire building because of “an unease with... participation in, or, to borrow from an Irish parallel, of ‘collaboration’ with, British imperial expansion.”⁸⁷³ While the Scots,

⁸⁷² Ibid., 99.

⁸⁷³ Aled Jones and Bill Jones, “The Welsh World and the British Empire, c. 1851-1939: An Exploration,” in *The British World: Diaspora, Culture, and Identity*, ed. Carl Bridge and Kent Fedorowich

the Welsh, and the Irish, in particular, had complicated pasts with the English “core” at home, they actively participated in British overseas commerce and colonization, often simultaneously claiming both British (or imperial) and Celtic identities.

John MacKenzie’s enlightening work on the Scots of South Africa contends that “migrants retained not only an awareness of layered or multiple identities, but also in many cases a sense of plural domicile.”⁸⁷⁴ In the context of the Irish, Donal McCracken has appealed to nationalist contestation of the South African War, even “pro-Boer fever,” across the cultural networks of the Irish diaspora as evidence of shared anti-colonial sentiment that connected not only Irishmen and women to their kin across the globe but also the “colonized” Irish and Boers to the causes of the other.⁸⁷⁵ While this work importantly contributes to the histories of identity and ethnicity in the British Empire – in face of a micro-industry of Celtic heritage and genealogy publishing – it often risks overestimating the role of homelands and diasporas at the cost of British and imperial identities.

Notions of belonging in the British Empire were multiple, overlapping, and often conflicted. A settler might simultaneously imagine his community as Irish, local, and imperial – not to mention other political and social worlds. The community of empire

(New York: Routledge, 2003), 58; Aled Jones, “‘The Other Internationalism? Missionary Activity and Welsh Nonconformist Perceptions of the World in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries,’” in *A Tolerant Nation? Exploring Ethnic Diversity in Wales*, ed. Charlotte Williams, Neil Evans and Paul O’Leary (University of Wales Press, 2003), 49-60. Also see Philip Constable, “Scottish Missionaries, ‘Protestant Hinduism’ and the Scottish Sense of Empire in Nineteenth and Early Twentieth-century India,” *Scottish Historical Review* 86 (October 2007): 278-313

⁸⁷⁴ John MacKenzie, *The Scots in South Africa: Ethnicity, Identity, Gender and Race 1772-1914* (New York: Palgrave, 2007), 7. Also see Stuart Allen, *Thin Red Line: Empire and the Scots, 1600-2000* (National Museums of Scotland, 2006); Edward Spiers, *The Scottish Soldier and Empire, 1854-1902* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2006).

⁸⁷⁵ Donal McCracken, *Forgotten Protest: Ireland and the Anglo-Boer War* (Belfast: Ulster Historical Foundation, 2003).

was an important, if an oft neglected, category of belonging for many people who lived on the towns of and frontiers of the southern British Empire, regardless of their ethnicity. For the most part, nineteenth-century incarnations of imperial citizenship were not defined along the lines of racial difference – though they did at times appeal to a civilizational difference (e.g. civilized vs. savage). Ethnic differences, too, did inform the political and social worlds of the nineteenth-century colonies of settlement, but not in the way imagined by the political rhetoric of the day or by the teleology of later nationalist historiography. The point here is not that notions of imperial community were uncomplicated, or even dominant, but that they did inform in the way that nineteenth-century colonial subjects thought about their political and social universes – and themselves.

The ethnic rivalry between the British and the Boers is one of the most indefatigable narratives of South African and British imperial history. The brief discussion in this chapter about the “Cape Dutch” and *De Zuid-Afrikaan* does not intend to uproot this traditional narrative completely, but rather to interrogate and problematize it. Despite the mythology of the Great Trek, whereby the nascent Afrikaner nation abandoned the British Cape Colony for parts east and north, many Dutch-speaking people, often dismissed as the “Anglicized” Cape Dutch, stayed in the Western Cape.⁸⁷⁶ Moreover, as we have seen, trekking Boers shared their animosity toward the British government at Cape Town with many English-speaking frontier settlers of the Eastern Cape. The British and the Dutch shared deeply embedded cultural, social, and political

⁸⁷⁶ It is also important to note that Dutch-speaking farmers developed a republican tradition and began trekking out of the colonial core at Cape Town long before the British arrived – in opposition to the Dutch East India Company (VOC).

associations, which were more likely an element of everyday life in South Africa than the more obvious sentiments of hostility and opposition.

Was the *Graham's Town Journal* correct to wonder, in 1860, if some “higher feeling than mere vulgar curiosity” brought the Dutch-speaking farmer from his home “miles away” to wait along the roadside to see Prince Alfred go by?⁸⁷⁷ During the 1887 jubilee year celebrations, the Afrikaner Bond, the political party that claimed to represent the interest of Dutch-speaking British subjects in the Cape, professed, “We assure you humbly and respectfully [of] our truly loyalty to your throne, and we feel proud that in the great British Empire there are not more loyal subjects than those we represent.”⁸⁷⁸ During royal visits to South Africa during both “Anglo-Boer” wars (1880-81 and 1899-1902), princes visited prisoner-of-war camps, where captured Boers claimed no animosity toward the British monarchy or the British Empire, only toward specific individuals and policies who sought to deny them their rights. Dutch-speaking British subjects, particularly those of the Western Cape who were more assimilated into an imperial culture, could object to the practices of British rule yet embrace the British monarch and a co-ownership of the empire itself. In a sense, the invention of Afrikanerdom during the late nineteenth and the twentieth centuries was as much a response to the cultural potency of a British loyalism as it was a function of opposition to British injustices.

Founded in 1830, the Cape Town newspaper *De Zuid-Afrikaan*, published in English and Dutch, “represented... a Dutch-Afrikaner bourgeoisie, many with commercial

⁸⁷⁷ *Graham's Town Journal*, August 15, 1860.

⁸⁷⁸ Cited in Hermann Giliomee, *The Afrikaners: Biography of a People* (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2003), 225.

and business interests, but with few direct ties to Britain. They were attuned to the feelings of the mass of older colonists, sympathetic to their sentiments on race and class relations, resentful of the more established British mercantile elite, and increasingly antagonistic to its humanitarian relations.”⁸⁷⁹ The politics of the *Zuid-Afrikaan* fiercely opposed the influence of liberal-humanitarians in Britain and Cape Town on the policies of British rule, particularly relationships between masters and slaves/servants, focusing most of its ire on John Fairbairn’s *South African Commercial Advertiser*.⁸⁸⁰ At the same time, as an 1878 editorial reflects, loyalism was extremely important to the identity and sense of legitimacy of the Cape Afrikaners, as described by Hermann Giliomee:

De Zuid-Afrikaan declared that the Afrikaners wanted no “republican freedom, equality and fraternity.” If aggrieved, they said: “Let us send a petition to the Queen.” If ever they formed a republic it would be along the lines of the white oligarchies in the southern states of the United States of America. It is striking that there is no reference here to the Boer republics. The colonial Afrikaners identified themselves with their kinsmen across the Orange River, but put the Cape’s interests first and rarely hid their sense of superiority over the northern Afrikaners.⁸⁸¹

While the *Zuid-Afrikaan* arguably had as much to do with the creation of an Afrikaner identity as its trekking neighbors and frequently opposed the injustices of British political and cultural domination, it imagined the future of the Dutch-speaking communities of South Africa in the British Empire and under a British monarch.

Expressions of loyalty to Queen Victoria and the British Empire by the *Zuid-Afrikaan* were not uncomplicated, of course. The fact that these identities were complicated and often conflicted does not mean that pronouncements of loyalty to Queen

⁸⁷⁹ Keegan, 106.

⁸⁸⁰ Keegan, 105-106; Giliomee, 112.

⁸⁸¹ Giliomee, 225.

Victoria were disingenuous. The *Zuid-Afrikaan* described the “natural” feelings of loyalty and interest in Alfred’s visit:

[The loyalty] of the Dutchman is of a more sedate, and perhaps a more faithful character [than the French], not so readily transferred from one object to another; but the loyalty of the Englishman springs directly from the heart, because it has its root in his nationality... what is loyalty at the Cape? The British-born colonist may share the loyalty of his more favored countryman who lives in the land of his forefathers; but even he cannot help feeling that, as a colonist, he is not all together what he would have been at home: even with his best intentions he cannot fully sympathize with those among whom he has cast his lot. And what shall we say of the descendents of those whose parents lived under the Dutch flag, and of the alien [e.g. Africans], destitute of political privileges, that stranger that lives in our gates,-- can they be expected to be loyal? All but the aliens enjoy equality of rights with the English, and owe a debt of gratitude to the Queen, for the liberal constitution so recently granted to this colony... so we can feel for our gracious Sovereign, -- and it is but natural that we should share to some extent the enthusiasm of our English-fellow colonists at a time when this colony is honoured by a visit of one of the Royal Family.⁸⁸²

While they certainly did not imagine themselves as Dutch-speaking Britons, the editors of *Zuid-Afrikaan*, a rather specific sub-set of a larger non-British population, articulated a vision whereby Dutch settlement could be reconciled in the British Empire, using a language that appealed to their loyalty to the Great Queen and the British liberty that she had bestowed upon them.

While the *Zuid-Afrikaan* commemorated the arrival of Prince Alfred and the return of Sir George Grey, carefully reporting their movements and the celebrations across South Africa, the editors also challenged the excesses of the visit and proposed the royal tour as an opportunity to reform the government of the Cape. The editors complained of the “great stir and bustle, and a vast deal of extravagance pretending to be demonstrations of loyalty,” through the course of which “some persons [will] have made

⁸⁸² *De Zuid-Afrikaan*, August 6, 1860.

themselves ridiculous and others contemptible.”⁸⁸³ At the same time, they hoped the royal presence and the arrival of Grey would change the political landscape of the Cape, for Grey to serve the interests of Capetonian settlers and not his “constituents” at home and to make better policy decisions than his predecessors.⁸⁸⁴ Like their counterparts in the Eastern Cape, they suggested that a railway would benefit the colony far more than a breakwater, but they agreed that its construction should move forward without delay. The editors also complained that expenditure by the Cape government far outpaced revenue and that the costs of the breakwater and the royal visit ought to be more carefully considered. These opinions were far from seditious; they shared much in common with the editorial pages of other papers. They reflected a rather profound pro-British loyalism, albeit one that refused to be subservient to the interests of an English-speaking majority or an imperial government in London.

The compatibility between non-British colonial subjects and imperial citizenship and loyalty are perhaps best illustrated in the paper’s commentary on immigration policy in the Cape Colony. As Cape Town waited for the arrival of Prince Alfred, the *Zuid-Afrikaan* challenged the stance of the *Cape Argus* on immigration to South Africa, namely its opposition to bringing German settlers to the Cape.⁸⁸⁵ According to the *Zuid-Afrikaan*, “the slightest allusion to the relative value of anything not directly imported from the United Kingdom is resented as a monstrous offence.”⁸⁸⁶ In challenging the “insularity” of the *Argus*, the editors of the paper presented an elaborate defense of

⁸⁸³ *De Zuid-Afrikaan*, July 9, 1860.

⁸⁸⁴ *De Zuid-Afrikaan*, July 9, 1860.

⁸⁸⁵ *De Zuid-Afrikaan*, July 16, 1860.

⁸⁸⁶ *Ibid.*

German immigration, including shared Anglo-Saxon origins, the contributions of Prince Albert to Great Britain, and the easy assimilation of Germans into other cultures. In other words, they argued that non-British subjects could be productive and loyal citizens of a British-dominated society.

When the Duke and Duchess of York and Cornwall visited southern Africa in 1901, the British colonies and the Afrikaner republics were in the middle of an embarrassing and bloody imperial war. It is extremely difficult to discern how Dutch-speaking South Africans perceived the British and the British Empire through the haze of constructed mythologies. The emerging story of Afrikaner nationalism focused on a long history of conflict with the British, from whom the trekboers fled during the 1830s and against whom the Boer republics fought for their liberty during the two Anglo-Boer Wars. In English language discourses, the dominant narrative highlighted the contrasts between British liberty and Boer despotism, as evidence by the progress of British civilization at the Cape and the protection of indigenous peoples on part of the colonial government. A corollary to this mythology, popularized in the English-speaking press during the royal tour, argued that most Boers were naturally loyal to the British monarchy but that they were led by demagogic political leaders into conflict with the British:

The Boers... even in their bitterest moments, always had a deep respect for the late Queen, and we believe that when there is created that spirit of brotherly feeling and sympathy which mutual interests are bound to bring about, our present chem?s will transfer the regard they had for Queen Victoria to her descendants.⁸⁸⁷

While this pronouncement was, to some degree, war propaganda, it also reflected at least a grain of truth, that many Dutch-speaking settlers were not inherently hostile to British

⁸⁸⁷ *Natal Mercury*, August 16, 1901.

rule in southern Africa. They shared much in common with the frontier settlers of the Eastern Cape, who maintained a suspicion and hostility toward the colonial government at Cape Town and an imperial government in London. Cape Afrikaner loyalty was informed by political contingencies, and the Jameson Raid, the imperial politics of the High Commissioner of the Cape Alfred Milner, and the South African War itself did much to erode their support of empire.⁸⁸⁸ Although their claims on Britishness were fragile and inconstant, Dutch-speaking South Africans did lay claims on British political traditions and the language of Britishness in a way that has been underplayed by historians.

* * *

Dunedin's Roman Catholic newspaper *The New Zealand Tablet* was a cultural product of the Irish diaspora. It published original content and re-published stories from Irish newspapers and Catholic publications around the world, from Ireland, America, and Australia, participating in a global conversation about Irish Catholic politics and identity.⁸⁸⁹ Heather McNamara argues that the *Tablet*, "like many other Irish diaspora journals, self-consciously identified itself within the history of Irish nationalist newspaper publishing, and conceived of its work for the Irish national cause a continuation of that tradition."⁸⁹⁰ At the same time, the newspaper simultaneously imagined the place of the Irish in an imperial community, reporting "Intercolonial" news about Irish Catholics from

⁸⁸⁸ Mordechai Tamarkin, "The Cape Afrikaners and the British Empire from the Jameson Raid to the South African War," in *The South African War Reappraised*, ed. Donal Lowry (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2000), 121-139.

⁸⁸⁹ Heather McNamara, "The New Zealand Tablet and the Irish Catholic Press Worldwide, 1898-1923," *New Zealand Journal of History* 37, no. 2 (2003): 153-170.

⁸⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, 155.

across the empire. Despite outright hostility toward “disloyal” Catholics by the mainstream settler press in New Zealand, particularly in the context of Irish nationalism and the politics of Irish Home Rule, the editor of the *Tablet*, Henry William Clearly (1898-1901), framed his paper’s reception of the visit by the Duke and Duchess of Cornwall around a discourse of imperial loyalism that he understood as antithetical neither to his Irish nationalism nor his Catholicism.

The *Tablet* offered detailed elaborate reports on the progress of the royal visit through New Zealand. In most of the reports, Clearly generally focused on the intensity of colonial loyalty to the British monarchy, rather than using the visit as an opportunity to shed light on the plight of Irish Catholics in the empire. He understood that Irish Catholic loyalty to the king and the empire might be misunderstood by outsiders:

To foreigners unacquainted with the story of British colonisation, the extraordinary enthusiasm of the preparations and demonstrations in these far outskirts of the Empire in connection with the royal visit must be a riddle indeed. Its secret lies partly in the personal worth and high popularity of the British Sovereigns of the present generation, but chiefly in the wise and statesmanlike extension of free representative institutions... Endowed with liberal Constitutions, the various colonies of the Australasian group were permitted to work out their own destinies, each in its own way. The result has been the growth of unexampled rapidity, peace, prosperity, equal laws, and that contentment which is the best safeguard of the existing order...⁸⁹¹

The fact that most of Clearly’s descriptions of the royal tour were virtually indistinguishable from those of the mainstream settler press perhaps reflects both the generous application of quotes and details lifted from other sources, which was endemic to nineteenth century print culture, a rhetorical strategy by the editors of the *Tablet* to emphasize and normalize Irish Catholic loyalty to king and empire. More importantly,

⁸⁹¹ *New Zealand Tablet*, June 13, 1901.

however, the language of the *Tablet* represented an understanding of community and citizenship that concurrently expressed loyalty to the pope in Rome, an Irish nation, the British monarchy, and the British Empire – without the confusions and complexities of modern identity politics. These notions of belonging were not articulated in the absence of knowledge about the cruelty and violence of British rule in Ireland, but with a profound understanding of them.

At the same time, Clearly used his newspaper to educate the Irish Catholics of New Zealand on the importance of loyalty and to highlight Catholic participation in the ceremonies of the visit and in the South African War, which provided the *mise en scène* for the 1901 royal tour. In describing the recent history of the relationship between the British royal family and Irish Catholics, he explained to his readers:

The late Queen Victoria was the first actual British constitutional sovereign. At an important period in the history of European monarchies she popularised British royalty by her personal virtues and her prudent regard for the limitations of her office... Whatever his defects or limitations, Edward VII... deserves the good-will of Irish people for the liberality of his personal views on questions ultimately affecting their national well-being; of Catholics, for his marked evidences of good-will toward our ecclesiastics and ecclesiastical institutions; and of all friends of civil liberty for the stern and uncompromising manner in which... he publicly declined... association with or countenance of the dark-lantern fanatics of the Orange lodge. The Duke and Duchess of York -- the future King and Queen -- are as yet little past the portals of their public life. They have to make their own mark in their own way. But all the traditions surrounding them are in their favor, and we bespeak them a right royal welcome on our shores.⁸⁹²

The newspaper highlighted the role of Catholics in royal rituals, reproducing in full the addresses given on behalf of the Catholics of the Diocese of Dunedin and Wellington as well as describing the appearance of “his Lordship Right Rev. Dr. Lenihan in his

⁸⁹² *New Zealand Tablet*, March 21, 1901.

beautiful purple robes, and the Very Rev. Father Benedict, O.P., in his snow-white habit, [who] were, amidst the sombre [sic] black of the entire assemblage, the two most striking figures present.”⁸⁹³ Lists of names carefully accounted for Catholic clergy who participated in the royal tour. While Clearly’s loyalism obviously did not represent the viewpoints of all Irish Catholics in New Zealand, the message he sought to project was clear – that Irish Catholics were loyal citizens of New Zealand and subjects of the king.

Despite this projection of Irish Catholic loyalism, Clearly identified his paper with Irish nationalism and called attention to British injustices toward the Irish. In fact, he appealed to a reciprocal relationship between the British Crown and its Irish Catholic subjects, whereby loyal Irish Catholics were owed the rights of imperial citizenship. The paper made a point to note that a crowded Catholic mass given by Father Joseph Cooney at the Lyttelton Pro-Cathedral was attended by colonial troops in town for the military display.⁸⁹⁴ While underscoring Catholic service to the imperial war effort, the *Tablet* did not ignore the injustices experienced by Irish Catholics under British rule, going as far as to compare the 1857 and 1886 Belfast “Orange riots,” described not as “haphazard collisions of excited mobs with ‘innards’ loaded with bad whiskey and brains aflame with sectarian hate” but as genuine civil wars, with the South African War.⁸⁹⁵ In 1886, they argued, appealing to evidence from the Royal Commission of Inquiry, “the results achieved by the mob-energy surpass those of many a ‘great battle’ of the South African war. At least 32 lives (chiefly of Catholics) were lost-- even women shot in the

⁸⁹³ *New Zealand Tablet*, June 27, 1901.

⁸⁹⁴ *New Zealand Tablet*, July 4, 1901.

⁸⁹⁵ *New Zealand Tablet*, June 20, 1901.

streets.”⁸⁹⁶ While Irish Catholics served *their* empire in South Africa, the British government allowed their kinsmen and women to be mowed down in the streets, like Boers or Bushmen. In using such rhetoric, the editors of the *Tablet* demonstrated the lengths of Irish Catholic loyalty – but also its limits.⁸⁹⁷

Clearly also identified another betrayal by the British, an affront to loyal Catholic subjects, in Edward VII’s coronation oath, for which they demanded an apology from the Duke of Cornwall. The coronation oath, last administered to Queen Victoria in 1838, required the new king to denounce the Holy Eucharist and devotion to the Virgin Mary as idolatry, which some observers claimed Edward read in a quiet voice with his head bowed.⁸⁹⁸ The Catholic and Protestant press together, the *Tablet* declared, called for “the removal therefrom of words which are as heartless an outrage upon the feelings of the King as they are upon those of his Catholic subjects... The same end can be secured without utilising a direct insult; and certainly to declare... that the use of Mass is ‘superstitious and idolatrous’ is to insult the whole body of Catholics.”⁸⁹⁹ Bishop Michael Verdon of Lyttelton celebrated in his address that the government was working to remove language offensive to “eleven millions of his faithful Catholic subjects” from the coronation oath and wished that “every part of the Empire may enjoy an unbroken era of peace, prosperity, wise and equal laws.”⁹⁰⁰ In expressing their loyalty to the Duke and

⁸⁹⁶ Ibid.

⁸⁹⁷ The newspaper was critical of the war effort, though couching its opposition not in “pro-Boerism” but in the cost of lives and money to the British taxpayer.

⁸⁹⁸ *New Zealand Tablet*, June 6, 1901.

⁸⁹⁹ Ibid.

⁹⁰⁰ *New Zealand Tablet*, June 27, 1901.

Duchess of Cornwall, the Irish Catholic settlers, as represented by *The New Zealand Tablet* sought peace and justice for themselves and their homeland *within* the British Empire, not outside of it.

* * *

The history of the British diaspora and the mythology of Britishness has only recently been seriously considered by scholars. While the *Cambridge History of the British Empire*, a magnum opus of a traditional approach to empire, dedicated entire volumes to the colonies of settlement, the emergence of new schools of imperial history in the aftermath of World War II – post-colonial theory, Marxist-inspired social history, and the New Imperial History – did not consider the white dominions as worthy sites of analysis in the own right; they were largely understood to be political, cultural, and social extensions of the metropole. Historians have recently begun to challenge this scholarly tendency, in the scholarship on the “British world” and a new and rich field of historiography that focuses on settler societies in Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa.

This chapter contributes to this important literature in the context of the royal tours of empire. It argues for the dynamism of Britishness and imperial citizenship amongst both British and “other” settlers, many of whom had never seen the British Isles or had no ethnic claim to Britishness. It proposes that settler communities across the southern British world – or, specifically, the colonial press and the social elites of those communities – imagined unique mythologies of belonging that connected the social, political, and cultural worlds of the local with a much larger imperial one. They took pride in the British traditions of political progress and liberty and co-ownership in a

global empire to claim the rights and responsibilities of a British-imperial citizenship.

Over time, the provincialism and localism of these British cores, in Otago and Natal, the Eastern Cape and Wellington, were transcended by new political orders, responsible government, and new networks of communication and transportation, all of which encouraged the development of national mythologies of belonging over local ones. Despite these changes, which posed significant challenges to the “imperial factor” in colonial societies, Britishness and imperial citizenship continued to inform the political and cultural lives of twentieth century South Africans and New Zealanders. While the two colony-nations diverged in obvious and well-known ways, they also continued to share the political and cultural traditions of Britishness and an imperial culture.

CHAPTER FIVE:
At Home with Empire?
Royal Tours and Imperial Culture at “Home”

This work began in Britain, with a Great Queen who had a complex and often ambivalent relationship with her empire and whose image was repossessed and reused by imperial activists, imperial administrators, and colonial subjects across the geographic and cultural space of the British world. The project then traveled throughout the nineteenth-century empire, to explore the vicissitudes and fragilities of imperial rule and citizenship in a “Greater Britain” where an imperial culture was made and remade. It now returns home to the British metropole to examine domestic responses and understandings of the royal tour by different historical actors in British society. Intervening in an important and contentious literature, the chapter argues that the empire mattered differently at different times and was interpreted through multivalent and complex political, cultural, and social lenses. On one hand, imperial stakeholders, from Prince Albert and Joseph Chamberlain to tour chroniclers and newspaper editors, sought to project their particular visions of the empire onto the royal tours. On the other, the tours were interpreted, remade, and domesticated in the political, cultural, and social spaces of metropolitan British society by politicians in the House of Commons, mainstream and radical newspaper writers, the editors of women’s and children’s periodicals, protestors in parks and squares in London or Manchester, and “everyday” Britons who experienced the royal tours from working men’s libraries, parlors, and kitchen tables across Britain.

British intellectuals debated the role of empire on domestic society from the earliest days of the Atlantic empire. David Armitage’s work on the “ideological origins of the British Empire” demonstrates how imperial thinkers of the seventeenth- and

eighteenth-century justified empire-building by associating it with a “free” society with an ideological apparatus that emphasized Britain’s empire as “Protestant, commercial, maritime, and free.”⁹⁰¹ Challenging the assumptions of this vision, eighteenth-century controversies over the corrupting influence of the Indian empire on British society might be seen as the most important intellectual origins of nineteenth- and twentieth century debates on domestic culture and empire. During the 1790s, Edmund Burke’s obsessive pursuit of Warren Hastings, the first Governor-General of Bengal, reflected the deep-seated anxieties of Britain’s ruling classes over the expansion of the overseas empire and its influence on the political and social order of Britain. The disruptive effects of *nouveau riche* nabobs on the ruling hierarchy of Britain and the fear of Oriental despotism and corruption seeping into British political culture motivated eighteenth-century political actors to interrogate, though, generally speaking, not to challenge, the usefulness of an expanding British Empire to society at home.

During the second half of the nineteenth century, imperial activists and intellectuals in Britain struggled to redefine the ideological apparatus of British imperialism, to push back against the shifting winds of colonial politics and the widespread failures of imperial governance: rebellions in Canada (1837-38), India (1857-58), and Jamaica (1865); growing agitation for increased local governance in the colonies of settlement and India; and the declining value of an “empire of free trade” in a world where Britain’s unilateral dominance was threatened by the growing political, economic, and military potency of the United States and Germany. In response, imperial stakeholders sought to cement the importance of the empire to British subjects at home

⁹⁰¹ David Armitage, *The Ideological Origins of the British Empire* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 182.

and abroad. The development of responsible government in the colonies of settlement, the imperial federation movement, empire exhibitions, Empire Day, the education system, and the royal tours were part of this apparatus.⁹⁰²

Prince Albert's efforts in 1860 to promote imperial unity and to make an imperial culture through the invention of the royal tour reflect an early attempt to cement the fragile pieces of empire, which became largely defunct in the monarchy as an institution with the death of Albert in 1861. Benjamin Disraeli's often-quoted Crystal Palace Speech (1872) conceptually linked modern Toryism and the fate of Britain to empire in a way that suggested a new importance of empire in British political culture.⁹⁰³ Sir John Seeley's *The Expansion of England* (1883) proposed, in support of greater imperial political and cultural unity, an understanding of British history that emphasized the expansion of England, first in the British Isles then overseas to the neo-Britains of America, Africa, and the Pacific, as the defining attribute of Britain's past, present, and future.⁹⁰⁴ Advocates of imperial federation at the turn of the century, most notably the former Birmingham Radical Joseph Chamberlain, agitated for a global political union of

⁹⁰² See, for instance, John MacKenzie, *Propaganda and Empire: The Manipulation of British Public*

Opinion, 1880-1960 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1984).

⁹⁰³ T.E. Kebbel, ed., *Selected Speeches of the Earl of Beaconsfield*, vol. II (London, 1882), 529-534. The links between the monarchy and text in Disraeli's speech were actually quite fragile. It also must be considered to be a response to Charles Dilke's controversial speech on the "Costs of the Crown" (London, 1871).

⁹⁰⁴ John Seeley, *The Expansion of England: Two Courses of Lectures* (London: Macmillan, 1931 ed.). For the later debate over tariff reform and imperial preference, which itself was an intellectual successor of these nineteenth century movements, see Frank Trentman, *Free Trade Nation: Consumption, Commerce, and Civil Society in Modern Britain* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008) and E.H.H. Greene, *The Crisis of Conservatism: The Politics, Economics and Ideology of the Conservative Party, 1880-1914* (New York: Routledge, 1996). Tariff reform as a platform proved to be an absolutely disastrous electoral strategy for the Conservative Party, who lost the 1906 election in a massive landslide.

British states in order to maintain Britain's relevance in a changing world and to preserve the political, cultural, and economic unity of the "British world." Others, such as Charles Dilke and even Cecil Rhodes, imagined a "Greater Britain" of English-speaking peoples including the United States, a "utopian dream" of Anglo-Saxon global hegemony and peace.⁹⁰⁵ All of these intellectual movements reflected a profound uncertainty about the future of Britain and its empire as well as a desire to educate the public at home and abroad about the importance of imperial relationship.

How this emerging intellectual machinery of ideology and propaganda informed the political, cultural, and social lives of Britons was a contentious debate for contemporary observers of British society – and has continued to be for modern historians. The social history of British imperialism produced a rich historical conversation that explored the intersection between class, imperial consciousness, and popular politics.⁹⁰⁶ More recent historians of British imperialism, among them self-branded New Imperial historians inspired by the "linguistic turn," post-colonial thought, and gender theory, have searched British domestic culture to find consciousness or sub-consciousness of empire and the construction of racial and gender difference throughout British society over time.⁹⁰⁷ Against this literature, Bernard Porter challenged its

⁹⁰⁵ Duncan Bell, *The Idea of Greater Britain: The Empire and the Future of World Order, 1860-1900* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000); "Dreamworlds of Empire: Race, Utopia, and Anglobal Governance, 1880-1914," *Britain and Her World System, 1815-1931: Trade Migration and Politics*, Institut du monde anglophone, Sorbonne nouvelle, Paris, France, 12-13 March 2010.

⁹⁰⁶ J.A. Hobson, *Imperialism: A Study* (New York: James Pott and Co., 1902); V.I. Lenin, *On Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism* (1916); Joseph Schumpeter, *Imperialism and Social Classes* (New York: August M. Kelley, 1951 reprint); Richard Price, *An Imperial War and the British Working Class: Working-Class Attitudes and Reactions to the Boer War, 1899-1902* (London: Routledge, 1972); P.J. Cain and A.G. Hopkins, *British Imperialism, 1688-2000*, 2nd ed. (New York: Longman, 2001).

⁹⁰⁷ See Kathleen Wilson, *A New Imperial History: Culture, Identity, and Modernity in Britain and the Empire* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004).

historical foundations with a somewhat reductionist brand of empiricism, searching carefully through the dusty archives, through school lesson books, the popular press, memoirs, and other sources to find what he sees as limited evidence of empire outside of governing elites.

These competing visions of Britain's imperial past speak conceptually and theoretically "over and under" one another rather than seriously engaging with one other. Duncan Bell has very ably critiqued this "either/or" approach to understanding the role of empire in British society:

Arguments about the lack of an imperial national identity set the bar very high, demanding that in order to classify an identity as imperial there has to exist pervasive and explicit (hence empirically demonstrable) support for the empire. Arguments about the imperialism of British culture tend to be based on far less stringent criteria, and thus on a different account of identity construction. Here a collective identity is regarded as imperial if the material and discursive contexts in which people are embedded and permeated with imperial themes and imagery. In such a society, individuals cannot easily escape being imperial—they are inflected, inscribed, interpellated, constituted, by the imperial encounter. Both accounts, though sometimes illuminating, are problematic. The former eschews the role of the empire in shaping non-measurable, sometimes subconscious, perceptions and understandings of the self and world. The latter is based on a set of generalizations that are often unwarranted, and, as Porter highlights, often mines a shallow evidentiary seam.⁹⁰⁸

Following Bell's line of thought, this chapter tries to understand British culture as an imperial culture through a more nuanced lens by tracing the projection and reception of the royal tour through different channels of British culture. Because few people rarely wrote privately about the royal tour and public opinion polling did not yet exist, the chapter relies on a rather traditional base of sources: books

⁹⁰⁸Duncan Bell, "Empire and International Relations in Victorian Political Thought," *Historical Journal* 49, no. 1 (2006): 281-298.

on the royal tours, Parliamentary debates, newspapers of various political stripes, and women's and children's periodicals. Using these sources, it concludes that the royal tour, and empire itself, were both celebrated and ignored, contested and domesticated in a way that does not conceptually square with either polarity of either historiographical camp. The tours were celebrated by the governing elites and imperial intellectuals, contested by radical politicians and newspapers, questioned for their costs and purposes by other political actors, domesticated by the women's periodical press, and transformed into lessons on boyhood by children's magazines.

* * *

The limits of imperial culture in Britain have been visited and revisited by historians for decades, of course, even if they have been underplayed in the recent "imperial turn." The evidence of apathy and contestation amongst British working class subjects and a liberal-radical press are strong. In the fictional mind of H.G. Wells' Mr. Britling, "nineteen people out of twenty, the middle class and most of the lower class, knew no more of the empire than they did the Argentine Republic or the Italian Renaissance. It did not concern them."⁹⁰⁹ While the general public possessed limited specific knowledge about imperial affairs, in the way that the average American could probably not identify Basra or Helmand or explain the difference between Shi'a and Sunni denominations of Islam, limited knowledge does not preclude a lack of imperial consciousness altogether. At the same time, discussions of imperial affairs cleared the benches in the Houses of Parliament, and imperial federation movements never took hold

⁹⁰⁹ Quoted in Hugh Cunningham, "The Conservative Party and Patriotism," in *Englishness: Politics and Culture, 1880-1920*, ed. Robert Colls and Philip Dodd (Dover: Croom Helm, 1986), 298-290.

in British political culture.⁹¹⁰ As this chapter suggests, outside of two extremes – of those Britons deeply invested in the British empire for political, social, or cultural reasons and those who virulently opposed some combination of empire, monarchy, and social elites – most people in Britain, a vast middle, lived their lives without the constant reminders of empire. When it did, during imperial crises or on national “feast days,” it often had complicated meanings, remade into national pride or sorrow, ethnic or cultural kinship with neo-Britons overseas, or racial hatred of Indians, Madhists, Boers, or Germans; or domesticated by discourses of social, class, and gender identities, or outright contestation and opposition to the monarchy, ruling elites, or the empire itself.

It may be seen as imprecise to conceptualize these phenomena as being something different than empire. But, to understand national pride, the spread of British culture and civilization, commercial enterprises, interest in the exotic or the interesting, and a more overt imperial mission as interchangeable, and as found everywhere in domestic culture, is to dissect British imperial culture with a sword rather than a scalpel. This chapter identifies both the limits and domestication of imperial culture in Britain as well as a radical contestation against it. While the royal tours were “small events” in the context of domestic British history, given little attention by the British popular press, their narratives were disseminated to the British public in different forms and elicited specific responses and reactions from “mainstream” and radical newspapers to public protestors, from MPs in the Houses of Parliament to women’s and children’s periodicals. The royal tours did not create the same outpouring of responses as did imperial crises such as the sieges of

⁹¹⁰ Krishan Kumar, keynote address at at Britishness, Citizenship, and Identity: The View from Abroad, University of Huddersfield, United Kingdom. June 2008.

Khartoum (1884-85) or Mafeking (1901), or the carefully crafted celebrations of Queen Victoria's Golden (1887) and Diamond (1896) Jubilees, which were arguably imperial in the ways that they were received. But, these conceptual limits also demonstrate the underlying value of using the royal tours to understand imperial consciousness in metropolitan society. They reflect how the British public responded to the more subtle waves of imperial culture.

While the royal tours rarely received the kind of attention at home that they garnered in the empire, the British public was duly informed of the movements of British royals across the world by newspapers and periodicals.⁹¹¹ In 1876, some 12,000 people went to the South Kensington Museum to see gifts received by the Prince of Wales from the Indian princes on the first day of the exhibit alone.⁹¹² The tours, particularly those by heirs to the throne, were covered by the mainstream and radical presses as well as specialized periodicals marketed to women and children. Examining this rich source base, this chapter will first explore the royal tours as projected by “instant books,” children's and women's periodicals, and a “mainstream” press to assess the ways that the royal tours were received by different audiences. It then proceeds to explore the tensions and instabilities of this narrative of Britain's imperial mission through the contestation articulated by a radical press (on one hand) and in Parliament (on the other). In the end, it argues that empire informed shaped British cultural, political, and social spaces,

⁹¹¹ The author of an *Anthanaeum* review of a book by J. Drew Gay on the Prince of Wales' tour of 1875 complained that the British public was so oversaturated with information about the royal tour that the book itself was useless in a sense. *Anthanaeum*, July 22, 1876, 105-106; J. Drew Gay, *The Prince of Wales in India: From Pall Mall to the Punjab* (New York: R. Worthington, 1877).

⁹¹² Nominal File for Royalty: Albert Edward, Prince of Wales, V&A MA/1/R1940. These items were displayed at the Paris Universal Exhibition in the spring of 1878. The collection then traveled to museums in Edinburgh, Glasglow, Aberdeen, and Nottingham. In 1880, the Prince of Wales donated the items to the South Kensington Museum, one of the foundations of its South Asian collections.

particularly by the turn of the twentieth century, but that it was often remade and domesticated for and by a metropolitan audience.

“Instant Books”

In “reading” popular culture, historians have turned, most popularly during the 1980s, to literary theory as a means of disentangling the relationship between domestic culture and empire from the materialism of class-based analysis and the economics of empire. Edward Said’s work in *Cultural and Imperialism* represents one of the earliest uses of literary theory to look for empire in unexpected places at home. In his essay on Jane Austen, he argued that an imperial consciousness saturated the domestic space of *Mansfield Park* as a permanent and ever-present background of the novel.⁹¹³ The Manchester “school” of imperial history, represented by John MacKenzie’s *Studies in Imperialism* series, has also been intensely interested in the role of empire in domestic society.⁹¹⁴ The application of Saidian literary theory and the Manchester school’s mode of social history to women’s and juvenile literature, propaganda, music hall songs, art, radio, and television is an incredibly useful exercise to examine how empire was projected and by whom. However, there is a conceptual tendency in this literature to interpret all relationships with empire, whether buying West Indian sugar, reading a children’s periodical with imperial themes and news, or attending an exhibition of colonial products or people, as roughly equivalent. Moreover, as the work of the cultural

⁹¹³ Edward Said, *Culture and Imperialism* (New York: Vintage, 1995), 80-97. Jean Rhys’ post-colonial novel *Wide Sargasso Sea* (1966) made explicit what she saw as the suppressed colonial backdrop of Charlotte Brönte’s *Jane Eyre* by telling the tale of Mr. Rochester’s madwoman in the attic as a Creole Jamaican who had been embraced during Rochester’s colonial adventure and discarded when she defied his code of decency. It is a fascinating commentary on paternalism, the double standard, race, and empire.

⁹¹⁴ John MacKenzie, ed., *Imperialism and Popular Culture* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1986).

theorist Michel de Certeau and the intellectual historian Jonathan Rose have emphasized, “ordinary people” interpreted and understood the cultural products and symbols of empire on their own terms and rarely through the lens of an ideological imperialism.⁹¹⁵

In the context, “instant books” published on the subject of the royal tours, which were sometimes simply reprints of newspaper reports but often doubled as political commentaries on imperial affairs, domesticated and tamed the empire for the metropolitan reader. They were written for a broad audience, who could experience the exotic empire of African “savages,” ancient Mughal customs, and patriotic neo-Britons vicariously through the printed word, all while sitting in an easy chair at home. There were official accounts, such as the account of *The Times*’ reporter Donald Mackenzie Wallace, *The Web of Empire*, and others written by domestic newspaper correspondents who traveled with the royal party⁹¹⁶ The distribution of such books is unknown, so it is rather difficult to gauge how many people read them. They nevertheless represent official or semi-official accounts of the royal tours, the cultural projection of the empire to the British reading public and a window into imperial culture at home. The political and intellectual cadences of these publications transformed over time from a travelogue genre to polemic tracts on imperial issues of the day. The earliest books (c. 1860-1875) took on the empire in a largely descriptive mode, an empire than simply *was*, while the later works (1901) more reflected an empire in the process of being politically redefined and relegitimized in the rhetoric of imperial federation.

⁹¹⁵ Michel de Certeau, *The Practice of Everyday Life*, trans. Steven Rendall (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1984)., Jonathan Rose, *The Intellectual Life of the British Working Classes* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2001).

⁹¹⁶ Donald Mackenzie Wallace, *The Web of Empire: A Diary of the Imperial Tour of Their Royal Highnesses the Duke and Duchess of Cornwall and York in 1901* (London: Macmillan, 1902).

Popular books were overwhelmingly written by “special” royal tour correspondents of British newspapers. The authors were typically familiar with imperial affairs or the royal court and often shared the social and political circles with well-connected political actors in Britain and the empire. “Embedded” in the royal party, they were not objective reporters “on the spot” but people profoundly invested in the politics of empire. More often than not, they were justifiably moved by local reactions to the royal tours and the charm of British royals. They often spoke in the language of imperial activists, particularly the idioms of “Greater Britain” and imperial federation by 1901, projecting a particular idea of empire that was patrician in origin. For instance, Donald Wallace MacKenzie, the quasi-official chronicler of the 1901, worked both as the special correspondent for *The Times* and as the duke’s assistant private secretary. While these books, as a sub-genre, all engaged with imperial affairs and accepted the importance of the empire to Britain, the works of the 1901 tour took a polemical turn toward imperial unity.

Every tour between 1860 and 1901 was documented in a book, or multiple volumes, marketed for popular consumption. Some books were only published in the colonies, such as Saul Solomon’s account of Alfred 1860 visit to southern Africa or Joseph Pope’s book on the 1901 tour, while others were published simultaneously in Britain and the empire, such as MacKenzie’s *Web of Empire*.⁹¹⁷ It is unclear if they became more popular over time, though there are clusters of publications surrounding the Prince of Wales’ 1875-76 to India and the world tour of the Duke and Duchess of Cornwall and York in 1901. Their reviewers in popular magazines and literary journals

⁹¹⁷ Joseph Pope, *The Tour of Their Royal Highness the Duke and Duchess of Cornwall and York through the Dominion of Canada* (Ottawa: S.E. Dawson, 1903).

often shared the authors' imperial activism but often mocked the writers' self-aggrandizement, the lack of literary style, or the utter silliness of the royal tour.

The earliest accounts of the tours were more straightforward narratives of the tour and accounts of the countries visited than their intellectual successors. Their authors often republished diaries or newspaper articles written during the royal tours with little commentary on imperial affairs or colonial governance. Written in the mode of the travelogue, they often begin and end on a navy ship outbound from or inbound to Britain rather than long treatises on the importance of the empire to Britain, which was a feature of later books. They did have a didactic purpose that related to the empire insofar as they sought to teach metropolitan Britons about India or Australia or the Cape Colony, but reflected a far different tone and content than what came later.

The Cruise of H.M.S. Galatea, Captain H.R.R. the Duke of Edinburgh, K.G., in 1867-1868 by the ship's chaplain John Milner and illustrated by Oswald Brierly, a widely traveled artist and naval expert, is an account of Alfred's 1868-71 voyages up until the assassination attempt in Australia.⁹¹⁸ After several paragraphs discussing the ship's commission, the work immediately begins a log of entries. Milner does share descriptions of the terrain and people as well as explanatory tracts on Tasmanian government or Australian natives. The illustrations virtually all depict landscapes, not people. Milner's work, and others like it, fit into the popular nineteenth-century genre of travel narratives, such as the well-known works by Anthony Trollope and Charles Dilke.⁹¹⁹ These

⁹¹⁸ John Milner, *The Cruise of H.M.S. Galatea, Captain H.R.R. the Duke of Edinburgh, K.G., in 1867-1868* (London: William Allen, 1869). The duke's hunting trophies and watercolors by Brierly were displayed at the South Kensington Museum in 1872. Delia Millar, "Brierly, Sir Oswald Walters (1817-1894)", *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography* (Oxford University Press, 2004).

⁹¹⁹ Anthony Trollope, *North America* (1862), *Australia and New Zealand* (1873), and *South Africa* (1878); Charles Dilke, *Greater Britain* (1868) and *The Problems of Greater Britain* (1890).

narratives were unquestionably a part of an imperial culture in Britain, a mode by which a British public experienced and learned about the empire and authors “possessed” or “colonized” a foreign landscape or people through writing.⁹²⁰ At the same time, these earlier works fail to reflect the profound anxiety and polemical languages of their successors, accepting the empire without question or ideology.

J. Drew Gay, the tour correspondent for *The Daily Telegraph*, published his letters to the paper from the Prince of Wales’ 1875-76 tour of India as *The Prince of Wales in India: From Pall Mall to the Punjab*.⁹²¹ It opens with a rather dramatic image, of two rhinoceroses violently butting horns as they are prodded on by their Indian masters, as a large crowd looks on.⁹²² Gay’s book is much more a descriptive travelogue of India than it is an account of the royal tour, focusing on Indian life from Durbars to prisons. It is a book of exotica about India rather than one about the royal tour the empire itself. Wading through these long descriptive letters, the reviewer of the book in *Literary World* suggested that readers of the volume might be able to recall the passage when they “lost consciousness, sinking into blissful slumbers.”⁹²³ The British presence in India is an accepted part of Gay’s narrative, but it is a background to an Indian travelogue.

In contrast, William Howard Russell’s account of the tour is a detailed political narrative of the tour (over 600 pages) that tracks the prince’s movement with less focus

⁹²⁰ See Mary Louise Pratt, *Imperial Eyes: Travel Writing and Transculturation* (New York: Routledge, 1992).

⁹²¹ J. Drew Gay, *The Prince of Wales in India: From Pall Mall to the Punjab* (New York: R. Worthington, 1877)

⁹²² Curiously, almost all of the book’s plates feature animals in some form (an elephant fight, a captive tiger, the “monkey temple” in Benares, and a hunting expedition).

⁹²³ *Literary World*, June 6, 1876, 369.

on the exoticism of India's people and landscape.⁹²⁴ Russell, a member of the Prince of Wales' inner circle and a reporter for *The Times*, had covered the Crimean War, the aftermath of the Indian Mutiny, the American Civil War, the Austro-Prussian War, and the Franco-Prussian War.⁹²⁵ Russell's book was an edited version of his diary, which tends to focus more on the logistics of the tour than the polemics of empire. Even in its examination of the political scandal over the tour, discussed in its introduction, Russell repeats Disraeli's defense of the tour and its mechanics with little commentary. In reviewing the book, *Athenaeum* complained, "The public are sick and tired of hearing of the Prince of Wales's visit to India, and the books before us [Gay's volume and another book by George Wheeler published by Chapman and Hall], we are thankful to say, are almost the 'last drops of the thundershower.'"⁹²⁶ This boredom with accounts of the royal tour was not uncommon.

William Maxwell, the son of a colonial administrator and one himself, was special royal tour correspondent for *The Standard*, wrote his "popular and handy" account called *With the Ophir Round the Empire*, with "hope of interesting rather than of instructing those who have felt the inspiration of that racial and Imperial pride which has come upon the people of Greater Britain in these later days."⁹²⁷ Maxwell's narrative, the introduction

⁹²⁴ William Howard Russell, *The Prince of Wales' Tour: A Diary in India; with some account of the Visits of His Royal Highness to the courts of Greece, Egypt, Spain and Portugal* (New York: Worthington, 1878).

⁹²⁵ Roger T. Stearn, "Russell, Sir William Howard (1820–1907)," *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography* (Oxford University Press, Sept 2004).

⁹²⁶ *Athenaeum*, July 22, 1876, 105-106.

⁹²⁷ William Maxwell, *With the Ophir Round the Empire: An Account of Tour of the Prince and Princess of Wales, 1901* (New York: Cassell and Company, 1902). "Popular and handy" quote from *The Imperial Asiatic Quarterly Review and Oriental and Colonial Recorder*, 3 ser. XIV, no. 27 & 28 (July-October 1902), 207.

of which reads as a long daydream about the spread of British people and institutions around the world, was clearly inspired by Dilke's *Greater Britain* and frames and borrows heavily from the language of the Imperial Federation movement. Indigenous people, in Maori villages or Zulu war dances, make frequent appearances, and dominate the volume's illustrative plates, but only as representatives of the exotic and the weird, contrasts to a prosperous (white) British Empire of liberty. While a disguised political treatise, meant to inspire feelings of patriotism about the empire, Maxwell's account is more a travel narrative, a guide through the cities and bush of the British Empire, meant to domesticate the empire for the home reader who would never experience it. It ends, very oddly, with the return home of the duke and duchess, without the usual explanation of the empire's importance to a British nation or the royal tour's significance to the empire.

Donald Wallace Mackenzie, foreign assistant editor for *The Times*, was assistant private secretary for the Duke of Cornwall and had written on and widely traveled the world.⁹²⁸ He penned two prominent books on foreign relations, *Russia* (1877) and *Egypt and the Egyptian Question* (1883), and had covered the Berlin Conference in 1878 (he "carried the text of the treaty from Berlin to Brussels sewn into the lining of his greatcoat").⁹²⁹ Lushly illustrated with photos and watercolors of the royal party, triumphal arches, the usual landscapes, and other exotica such as a "Winged Zulu and His Rickshaw," the book is an illustrated travelogue, similar to earlier volumes. At the same

⁹²⁸ Donald Mackenzie Wallace, *The Web of Empire: A Diary of the Imperial Tour of Their Royal Highnesses the Duke and Duchess of Cornwall and York in 1901* (London: Macmillan, 1902); G. E. Buckle, "Wallace, Sir Donald Mackenzie (1841–1919)," rev. H. C. G. Matthew, *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography* (Oxford University Press, 2004).

⁹²⁹ Buckle, "Wallace, Sir Donald MacKenzie."

time, it was written with an explicit political agenda: imperial unity. Its introduction, “How the Tour Was Brought About,” explained the tour in the political context of the South African War and Australian Federation, accentuating the strong link between the mother country personified in Queen Victoria and her colonial children.⁹³⁰

The narrative concludes with the duke’s pro-federation speech at Guildhall in December 1901, reproducing its text in full (see chapter one).⁹³¹ This imperial problem – namely the public’s apathy on the pressing issues of imperial unity – is repeated in Joseph Watson’s *The Queen Wish*, which also reprints the duke’s speech and emboldening his words, “The Old Country must Wake up.”⁹³² The last chapter of Mackenzie’s tour volume, “Colonial Patriotism and Imperial Federation,” takes a curious and somewhat unexpected turn in problematizing the politics of imperial federation.⁹³³ While an ardent supporter of imperial unity, Mackenzie appealed to his contacts with colonial politicians, who apparently warned him of the problems of a metropolitan-centered approach to imperial federation. In *The Gentleman’s Magazine*, E.A. Reynolds-Ball complained that Mackenzie’s account of the royal tour was:

a colourless and somewhat perfunctory record of this emphatically grand tour, Sir Donald Mackenzie Wallace seems to have lost an opportunity. He has contented himself with a bare record of what was actually one of the most significant voyages ever undertaken by the personal representative of a great Sovereign. Indeed, there is little to distinguish the work... from the bound-up volumes of newspaper articles which the special correspondents

⁹³⁰ Wallace, 3-11.

⁹³¹ Ibid., 442-447.

⁹³² Joseph Watson, *The Queen’s Wish: How It Was Fulfilled by the Imperial Tour of the H.R.H. the Duke and Duchess of Cornwall and York* (London: Hutchinson, 1902), 427.

⁹³³ Wallace, 451-463.

have already more than satisfied our curiosity.⁹³⁴

The most novel contribution of the book, Reynolds-Ball argued, was Wallace's analysis of colonial patriotism and imperial federation, which he heard as a "warning bell" that the colonies preferred to stay put as "volunteers in the service of Empire."⁹³⁵ *Academy and Literature* rather succinctly described its conclusions on the account – "the book is dull" – complaining that the reader is "whirled from ceremony to ceremony in a condition which approaches bewilderment."⁹³⁶

As a form of empire travel narrative, the "instant books" on the royal tours sought to educate readers on Queen Victoria's worldwide dominions, contributing to an imperial culture in Britain. Their basic formulation did not change radically over time but did change rather substantially from descriptive narratives to polemical treatises. They also came to reflect the political anxieties of imperial activists about the future of the empire during the last decades of the nineteenth century. At the same time, they were not, as I have argued, uncomplicated expressions of imperial ideology. Through the lens of his experiences during the royal tour, Wallace, himself an imperial activist and intellectual, problematizes the very idea of empire. On the level of readership, as several of the reviews complained, the long descriptive narratives of such volumes were unbearable for many to read. While it is difficult to gauge who read these books or how they were read, or if they were read, it is perhaps unreasonable to assume that British readers interpreted

⁹³⁴ E.A. Reynolds-Ball, review of *The Web of Empire*, *Gentleman's Magazine* (September 1902): 298-307. This "bare record" spanned some 500 pages.

⁹³⁵ *Gentleman's Magazine* (September 1902): 306-307. This sentiment is echoed in the review of *The Web of Empire*, *Review of Reviews* (July 1902): 92 and *Athenaeum* (June 14, 1902): 752.

⁹³⁶ Review of *The Web of Empire*, *Academy and Literature* (June 14, 1902), 604.

them as anything more than interesting travel narratives, full of interesting landscapes and exotic characters.

New Readerships

The royal tours were dutifully followed in the burgeoning print culture of women's periodicals during the second half of the nineteenth century, such as *The Englishwoman's Domestic Magazine*, *The Lady's Newspaper*, and *The Ladies' Treasury* which both echoed and reinforced a feminine culture of respectability and domesticity. *The Englishwoman's Domestic Magazine* (1852-82), for instance, was published and edited by Isabella and Samuel Beeton (of *Mrs. Beeton's Book of Household Management* fame) until 1865. By 1857, it had a readership of some 50,000 women, largely upper- and middle-class women but working-class readers as well.⁹³⁷ The magazine was illustrative of the developing genre of popular women's magazines that focused on domestic life and household management in addition to fashion and leisure, which had been the staples of exclusively upper-class women's journals of an earlier period.⁹³⁸ The Beeton's magazine constructed its reader as a respectable woman, rather than a lady, whose life was centered in the household.⁹³⁹ *The Lady's Newspaper* (1847-63) and *The Ladies' Treasury* (1857-95) were founded in a more traditional mode, with fashion and leisure featured predominantly in its pages, and was marketed to an upper-class audience; both periodicals embraced broader subjects, including imperial politics, in the competitive

⁹³⁷ Margaret Beetham, *A Magazine of Her Own? Domesticity and Desire in the Woman's Magazine, 1880-1914* (New York: Routledge, 1996), 59.

⁹³⁸ *Ibid.*, 59-62.

⁹³⁹ *Ibid.*, 61.

market of the 1860s that was revolutionized, in part, by the Beetons.⁹⁴⁰ The royal tours, specifically, and the empire, more generally, were covered with great interest in these journals, reflecting how empire was projected in print to “respectable” women across Britain.

The fields of women’s and gender history have emerged out of an intellectual ghetto, previously left to female scholars in their own conference sessions and journals, to reshape even the most traditional historical narratives – of politics, foreign policy, and imperialism. The imperial turn in British history, for instance, has transformed the masculine historical and historiographical terrains of the British Empire into far more complicated spaces. The New Imperial history has been shaped by the work of by female scholars such as Catherine Hall, Kathleen Wilson, and Antoinette Burton, who have reinvigorated the study of empire with a theoretical toolkit inspired by post-colonialism and gender studies. In this context, both women and the gendered constructions of race, nation, and class have come to the conceptual forefront of British imperial history.

The participation of women in the British imperial project as imperialists has become one of the defining tropes of this literature. Antoinette Burton’s pathbreaking *Burdens of History* explored how British feminists used a maternalistic imperial project of “protecting” Indian women in order to justify their inclusion in a British body politic.⁹⁴¹ Women’s periodicals have been used by scholars to explain how “ordinary

⁹⁴⁰ Kathryn Ledbetter, “Bonnetts and Rebellions: Imperialism in *The Lady's Newspaper*,” *Victorian Periodicals Review* 37 no. 3 (Fall 2004): 252-272. Also see Eric Rappaport, *Shopping for Pleasure: Women in the Making of London's West End* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001); Jane Garrity, “Selling Culture to the ‘Civilized’: *Bloomsbury, British Vogue, and the Marketing of National Identity*,” *Modernism/Modernity* 6 (1999): 29-58 .

⁹⁴¹ Antoinette Burton, *Burdens of History: British Feminists, Indian Women and Imperial Culture, 1865-1915* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1994).

women” might have engaged with the empire from their kitchen tables or armchairs, from the position of women who were not on the political front lines of suffragism, feminism, labor or middle-class reform movements. Despite their dedication to educating women in and about a domestic space, nineteenth-century women’s periodicals offered extensive coverage of national and imperial affairs, from Parliamentary politics to colonial battlefields. Kathryn Ledbetter argues that *The Lady’s Newspaper*, for instance, sought to inoculate readers with an explicit “imperialist ideology,” reporting frequently on rebellions, battles, and imperial politics, and stories which coexisted alongside articles featuring recipes, fashion columns, and childrearing advice.⁹⁴² Yet, as Jonathan Rose’s important work suggests, applying a literary method that focuses on the producer of the text rather than its reader, here in the case of women’s periodicals, presents a rather incomplete picture of the past.

The royal tours were covered in British women’s periodicals through a lens of fashion, design, and other topics that made the empire, particularly India, relevant to domestic life. *The Englishwoman’s Domestic Magazine* reviewed with interest the exhibition of gifts from the 1875 Indian tour at South Kensington Museum (now the Victoria and Albert Museum).⁹⁴³ Much of their commentary focused on jewelry and textiles, traditional subjects for a women’s magazine exoticized by the Orient:

jewels such as the one reads of in the *Arabian Nights*--ropes of orient pearls interspersed with amulets of carved emerald and tasseled with gems which have shone [sic] upon the dusky necks of Indian ladies for generations past, jewel-studded waistbelts and gorgeous turban ornaments, bracelets gleaming and glittering like darting flames from serpent-scales

⁹⁴² Ledbetter, 254.

⁹⁴³ *Englishwoman’s Domestic Magazine*, August 1, 1876.

they simulate, bangles with bunches of bells attached to them, carbuncles of rare loveliness, and a pendant of pear-shaped pearls and diamonds, like some marvellous [sic] gift of a fairy godmother. Then there were the products of the looms of Ellore and Cashmere, shawls and beautiful carpets, and the fine muslins of Dacca, and near them cloths of gold tissue and brocades rich in embroidery.⁹⁴⁴

The Ladies' Treasury described in detail the interior design and planned accommodations of the royal train and the prince's temporary residences in India.⁹⁴⁵ While fashion, decoration, and consumer culture were traditional topics of upper-class women's periodicals, the editors' fascination with India and other exotic locales of the royal tours also reflected a keen interest in educating women on a wider world.

These politics, too, were often projected through the realm of the domestic and, in particular, motherhood. The symbolism of Queen Victoria, as mother to both her touring children and her subjects around the world, can be seen elsewhere, but this maternal trope was most pronounced and frequently applied in the pages of women's periodicals. In 1860, *The Lady's Newspaper* celebrated the Great Queen as mother and woman:

Blessed in her family, honoured and beloved by her people, looked up to and revered by foreign nations all over the world, be they savage as well as the civilised, the gracious Sovereign of the British Empire is not only the first lady of her own land, but the foremost woman of her age and time... Recent events have tended to bring out in a stron[g] light the high regard in which the Queen of these isles is held, not alone by her own people, but by nations at the uppermost ends of the earth.⁹⁴⁶

⁹⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁹⁴⁵ *Treasury of Literature and the Ladies' Treasury*, September 1, 1875. The latter report quoted the *Indian Times*.

⁹⁴⁶ *Lady's Newspaper*, November 24, 1860.

While it may be too much of an interpretive leap to understand this passage as empowering not only Queen Victoria but also women generally, it certainly places great emphasis on the social importance of women and mothers. When the Prince of Wales' tour of India was announced in 1875, *The Englishwoman's Domestic Magazine* celebrated Queen Victoria as a giving imperial mother, who had "wisely determined that her children should enjoy the advantages offered by modern facilities for travel" (this representation of the tour, as chapter one demonstrates, was far from the truth).⁹⁴⁷ The relationship between mother and children, whether her sons and daughters or native peoples, was celebrated; she protected her children, educated them, and looked out for their interests.⁹⁴⁸ The ideological messages in these representations of the Great Queen, of course, are profoundly ambiguous and were read in parlors across Britain in complex and different ways, to which it is difficult to pin an ideology of imperialism or a developed consciousness of empire.

This said, the periodicals did have a politics that transcended the household and the family to insert women into a "mainstream" political culture, often gleaning entire passages from *The Indian Times* or *The Morning Chronicle* and opening up a civic life to the woman at home. The description of the South Kensington Museum exhibit, for instance, concluded with a political message, that "the collection... is a substantial proof... of the right royal welcome the Prince of Wales received in India, and of the

⁹⁴⁷ *Englishwoman's Domestic Magazine*, May 1, 1875.

⁹⁴⁸ *Lady's Newspaper*, March 3, 1860; *Ladies' Treasury*, February 1, 1868.

perfect success that attended his memorable tour.”⁹⁴⁹ The *Domestic Magazine* evaluated the suitability of empress as a title for Queen Victoria in India (the authors concluded that it was perfectly suitable) and celebrated Britain’s relationship with its global subjects.⁹⁵⁰ They also took a pronounced interest in local peoples, from the African chief Moshoeshoe in 1860 to loyal “native Australians” in 1868, to the Gaekwar of Baroda in 1875.⁹⁵¹ The *Englishwoman’s Domestic Magazine* went as far as to defend the gaekwar, the editors positing that Colonel Phayre was poisoned by an overzealous servant rather than the gaekwar himself (see chapter two).⁹⁵² The editors of women’s magazines, usually male and middle class, believed that women ought to be educated about politics and a wider world.

While there was a political discourse about empire in women’s magazines, how they were made sense of by their readers is rather difficult to gauge. That they indoctrinated British women with an imperial ideology using the language of motherhood, domesticity, and the home is one plausible theory, one celebrated by cultural theorists and other scholars. But, when the empire and the wider world took were domesticated into a woman’s universe of experiences, relationships, and knowledge, the picture is seriously complicated. Like the “instant books” on the royal tour, the content of women’s periodicals focused on the exotic, the weird, and the interesting.

⁹⁴⁹ *Englishwoman’s Domestic Magazine*, August 1, 1876.

⁹⁵⁰ *Englishwoman’s Domestic Magazine*, March 1, 1876.

⁹⁵¹ *Englishwoman’s Domestic Magazine*, May 1, 1875; *Lady’s Newspaper*, October 20, 1860.

⁹⁵² *Englishwoman’s Domestic Magazine*, May 1, 1875.

Through the royal tours, women could travel the world and participate in British and imperial politics, escaping the humdrum of domestic life and the disenfranchisement of nineteenth-century British politics. *The Ladies' Treasury* allowed readers to travel vicariously with the Prince of Wales to the cave temple on Elephanta Island (Gharapuri Island) in Bombay harbor, a Hindu burning ground, and the Towers of Silence (Dakhma) in Bombay. Richly illustrated, the three-page *Treasury* description of the strange temple on Gharapuri Island was lifted directly from *The (Indian?) Times*:

Illuminated arches have been erected in front of the chief temple-cave, and from the peepul trees and cactuses, and other tropical shrubs, there gleamed the glowworm colours of the buttee-lamps with which the exterior of the caves was illuminated. And inside what a spectacle met one's eyes! Innumerable lamps had been suspended from the solid rock overhead which formed the roof of the temple, and they were now filling the cave with more than a dim and anything but religious light. Around the walls stood or sat strange massive figures of Hindoo gods, sculptured by unknown hands, nobody knows when.⁹⁵³

The prince, and the reader, explores the mysterious cave temple, its “grotesque and sadly mutilated forms of the figures, and the strange symbols which they carried in their hands, or the mystic emblems associated with them.”⁹⁵⁴ This worthy adventure is followed by an “English dinner party” in the middle of the cave temple, with Shiva at the prince’s back and complete with “European music” and champagne.⁹⁵⁵

There is no way to interview the readers of nineteenth-century women’s periodicals, and Mass Observation did not yet exist. Most women were readers,

⁹⁵³ *Ladies' Treasury: A Household Magazine*, February 1, 1876.

⁹⁵⁴ *Ibid.*

⁹⁵⁵ *Ibid.*

not writers, and have left very little for historians to understand how they made sense of their worlds. The textual evidence presented here, however, gives little suggestion that women thought about the empire in ideological or abstract terms. The royal tours, and the women's periodical press more generally, gave them the opportunity to escape and to participate in worlds and lives that were beyond their reach. They probably did not think about the origins of most things that they bought, West Indian sugar or Gold Coast coffee, for instance; and when they did, it was often in the name of trend or fashion. While these discourses may have become more explicitly imperial as time went on, as empire became a more dominant cultural force in British society, the complex processes of reception remained the same.⁹⁵⁶ Women's periodicals domesticated the empire and brought it indoors, as it were, but almost certainly failed to inoculate their readers with a developed consciousness of empire, let alone an "imperial ideology." There were certainly female imperial activists, as represented by the founding of the Victoria League in 1901; women also figured importantly in the anti-war movement during the South African War.⁹⁵⁷ For most women, though, the empire was a faraway place that was only intelligible once domesticated into personal experience and relationships. Only in this sense were they "at home with empire."

⁹⁵⁶ The development of a more active participation on part of women imperial politics, see Julia Bush, *Edwardian Ladies and Imperial Power* (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 2000); Elisa Riedi, "Women, Gender, and the Promoton of Empire: The Victoria League, 1901-1914" *Historical Journal* 45 (2004): 569-599.

⁹⁵⁷ Liz Stanley, "'A Strange Thing is Memory': Emily Hobhouse, Memory Work, Moral Life and the 'Concentration System'" *South African Historical Journal* vol. 52, 1 (2005): 60-81. Women activists were overwhelmingly involved in humanitarian efforts, which, too, can hardly be considered "imperialist" in a traditional sense.

The role of a developing education system, born in the Education Act of 1870, children's publications, popularized during the last decades of the nineteenth century, and groups such as the Boy Scouts and Girl Guides in inoculating young Britons with a spirit of patriotism and imperial identity has been a popular topic for historians of empire. The schoolroom, with its maps colored pink and pro-empire textbooks, have been understood as important sites of imparting the message of a dominant culture on children, a means of inoculating and internalizing a spirit of empire in the young.⁹⁵⁸ Popular culture more generally has also gained attention from scholars interested in the place of empire in the lives of children. In MacKenzie's *Imperialism and Popular Culture*, J.S. Bratton examined the inoculation and internalization of an imperial spirit by British lads through juvenile fiction.⁹⁵⁹ Bernard Porter has challenged the place of empire in school lessons and popular readings for children, arguing that its cultural resonance has been overstated.⁹⁶⁰

Putting Porter's conclusions aside for a moment, he does point to the problem of reconstructing school and private lives of nineteenth-century British children. The education system was local and market-based, and there is no way of knowing how British girls and boys made sense of cultural artifacts that we may identify as imperial in nature. There are a few such artifacts for the royal tour. Celebrating the royal tour and the inauguration of the Australian Commonwealth in 1901, *The Practical Teacher*, a journal

⁹⁵⁸ Stephen Heathorn, *For Home, Country, and Race: Constructing Gender Class and Englishness in the Elementary School, 1880-1914* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000).

⁹⁵⁹ J.S. Bratton, "On England, 'Home and Duty: The Image of England in Victorian and Edwardian Juvenile Fiction,'" in *Imperialism and Popular Culture*, ed. John Mackenzie (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1986), 73-93.

⁹⁶⁰ Porter, 64-85.

that provided educators with background for their lessons, gave its readers the basic contours of Australasian history, statistics about the imports and exports of different regions, and a conclusion that prophesized that Australian federation might be the first step on a path to imperial federation.⁹⁶¹ Donald MacKenzie's book on the 1901 was published in an "edition for schools." The subject of the royal tour could function as lessons on geography or history, probably focused on the spread of British liberties more than a polemics-inspired inoculation of an imperial spirit. This, of course, reflects some consciousness of empire, albeit one that is rather difficult to truly gauge.

Children also encountered the royal tour in children's magazines, which developed during the publishing boom of the late nineteenth century that made print more affordable and accessible to the British consumer. Children's magazines actually gave very little attention to the royal tours, particularly considering that they would appear to be fine tool for teaching students about Britain's global empire. When they did, they often incorporated a traveling prince into a fictional narrative of adventure of exploration; explained some aspect of a British or foreign culture; or celebrated the place of the British in a wider world. This world served as the locale for celebrating a spirit of adventure, playfulness, and youthful curiosity and was certainly not restrained by the space of empire.

Of all of the royal tours, the adventures of the sailor prince, Alfred (1860-71), probably received the most spirited attention from children's periodicals in Britain. Alfred's life at sea – the duty and order of the navy as well as the travel, adventure, and boyish play of a teenage prince abroad – reflected the didactic goals of period magazines

⁹⁶¹ *Practical Teacher*, May 1901, 574-576.

such as *Our Boy's Diary*, *Boys of England*, and *Little Folks*. Their stories demonstrated some interest in empire but more importantly sought to socialize young boys to a conception of masculine youth that would help transform them into proper, duty-bound British men. Alfred served his country in the navy; enjoyed a good game or romp on the deck with his mates; and met interesting and strange characters in his adventures. In this regard, Alfred represented a masculine national identity of boyhood more than a message of imperial spirit or ideology.

The biographical details of the young Alfred's life became a lesson for young Britons. *Chatterbox* celebrated the sailor prince as renaissance boy of sorts:

Young as the prince is, he has passed a very active and varied life. When not engaged with his ship, he has been out on his travels by land. He has learned how to spear salmon in Norway, and how to drive a sledge in Canada. His studies have not been neglected either: he passed the winter of 1863 at Edinburgh, and the summer of 1864 at Bonn in Germany, residing in both places in order to pass through their universities.⁹⁶²

The anecdotes of Alfred's life were meant to be morality plays for British lads about how to behave properly: leaving a Christmas party early to attend the funeral of a crewmate; demonstrating proper respect for the holy land in Palestine; showing dignity and grace in his meeting with the Xhosa chief Sandile, an "old Negro" in Sierra Leone, or Queen Pomare in Tahiti or tact and humility in his relationships with his fellow sailors despite his exalted station; and playing cricket in India.⁹⁶³

⁹⁶² *Chatterbox*, December 2, 1867.

⁹⁶³ *Chatterbox*, December 2, 1867; *Every Boy's Annual* LVII; *Our Boy's Diary*, June 1, 1867; *Juvenile Missionary Magazine*, December 1, 1869. Children's missionary magazines represent a specific genre, related to but culturally different than more general children's and boys magazines. They do share certain characteristics, namely the construction of a Christian masculinity.

The lessons of Alfred's life were reinforced and made appealing to young Britishers though adventure and excitement. Stories of adventure, fictional and not, were standard fare for nineteenth-century boys' magazines, a response to consumer demand and a means of imparting a particular notion of boyhood on their readers. Hunting figured as the most important of Alfred's adventures in the pages of these periodicals, conveying a kind of imperial culture but not exactly empire itself.⁹⁶⁴ *Kind Words* relayed the exciting tale of an African elephant hunt, told in a letter by Alfred himself in the pages of *The Cruise of the H.M.S. Galatea* ("a book beyond the reach of most of our readers"), with the mighty beast taken down in the end by shots from the royal party and with the assistance of a "Hottentot."⁹⁶⁵ In 1870, the same paper published a brief but beautifully illustrated story about the prince's Indian tiger hunt, with Alfred dramatically slaying a tiger from atop an elephant.⁹⁶⁶ These stories did impart some knowledge of the empire on young readers, though inoculating an imperialist spirit was a secondary or tertiary goal of these writers at best. Young Alfred was well-mannered but adventurous, duty-bound but playful, a near perfect model for inspiring the brand of masculinity that such papers sought to inspire.

Alfred's brother the Prince of Wales gained notoriety in elite social circles and press gossip for his rakish and womanizing ways from a rather early age. He was the moral antithesis of the constructed image of the sailor prince. It may not be surprising, then, that several stories written for children about the 1875 tour focused on other persons

⁹⁶⁴ John Mackenzie, *The Empire of Nature: Hunting, Conservation, and British Imperialism* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1988).

⁹⁶⁵ *Kind Words: A Magazine for Boys and Girls*, February 4, 1869.

⁹⁶⁶ *Kind Words: A Magazine for Boys and Girls*, October 13, 1870.

and things rather than the prince himself. *Little Folks*, for instance, used the visit to tell its readers the tale of “one of the bravest men whom England can boast”: Sir Robert Clive, “a warrior to whose courage and genius we owe our present possession of India--an empire whose people, it is calculated, number more than 150,000,000 souls.”⁹⁶⁷ He daringly fended off the French and earned the respect of Indians for his bravery.⁹⁶⁸ Clive was, in a sense, a stand-in, the masculine hero that the Prince of Wales was not. While the lesson of this story was overtly imperial, it also appealed to a standard of national masculinity that was not wholly imperial.

In a more playful moment, the same paper described the gifts given to the prince during his Indian tour on exhibit at the South Kensington Museum: gold and silver pieces (“Hindoos are so patient that they will sit all day long, if necessary, slowly and carefully beating out the gold upon the silver”); tea and dessert services, water pitchers, and plates; armor and weapons; fashion and clothing.⁹⁶⁹ About the last items, the editors teased their readers: “There are beautiful Kashmir shawls that little folks' mamas will like very much, and which, I dare say, little folks would like to give them for a birthday present; but don't the wish they may get them!”⁹⁷⁰ There is perhaps no more domesticated understanding of empire possible – even more than vicariously wandering around the museum, examining gifts that were exaggerated versions of luxury goods available for purchase in London or Manchester – than of an Indian shawl as a present for one’s mum!

⁹⁶⁷ *Little Folks*, n.d., 1901.

⁹⁶⁸ *Ibid.*

⁹⁶⁹ *Ibid.*

⁹⁷⁰ *Ibid.*

The Prince of Wales did not go completely ignored but did pose unique challenges to the magazines' narrative of boyhood. Unlike his brother Alfred and the next Prince of Wales, his son George, who both served in the British navy, he was an "unemployed youth" who possessed an air of gentility and even foppishness⁹⁷¹ Upon the prince's return to Britain from India in 1876, the *Boys of England* was a lone example of trying to fit the square peg of the Prince of Wales into the round hole of adventurous masculinity.⁹⁷² Having traveled from "Chicago, or farther West than that to Calcutta," his journeys so far were already "more extensive than those of Ulysses or Marco Polo" but never far from "home" in his mother's dominions.⁹⁷³ Moreover, as all of his mother's subjects recognized, he was a "good fellow."⁹⁷⁴ In the end, the storyteller concluded, "I could, of course, tell you a lot about his adventures in India; but as you have read them in the papers, I won't repeat."⁹⁷⁵ The Prince of Wales proved to be a limited model for the brand of masculinity imagined by nineteenth-century boys' papers.

The royal tours were covered by an expanding and increasingly specialized magazine publishing industry in Britain. Certainly, women and children readers expressed some interest in the royal tour, and it must be admitted that the role of empire played some role in this demand. However, the authors of these genres, in a sense, domesticated the royal tour of empire, projecting it through cultural optics that were not

⁹⁷¹ Walter Bagehot, *The English Constitution*, introduction by Miles Taylor (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001 reprint).

⁹⁷² *Boys of England*, n.d., 1901.

⁹⁷³ Ibid.

⁹⁷⁴ Ibid.

⁹⁷⁵ Ibid.

centrally imperial in purpose or content. Empire was generally a backdrop not a foreground. In the pages of women's periodicals, the royal tours were a conceptual space for women to passively observe the exotic and interesting as well as to actively engage with politics and a wider world. For children, particularly boys, the locale of empire was part of the *mis-en-scene* for a morality play about boyhood and masculinity, in which the Alfred the sailor prince could have no understudy. In both cases, the royal tour served as a cultural vehicle for other sentiments and beliefs, of which imperialism was often a secondary, tertiary, or non-existent concern.

The First Tours (1860-1871)

While colonial societies celebrated the first royal visits during the 1860s as historical events, they were scantily noticed, outside of the court and colonial administrators, in Britain. Compared to its predecessor and successor ages, the political crises of the late eighteenth century and the "high age" of empire during the late nineteenth century, mid-Victorian Britons had very little to say about empire. This ignorance of or apathy about the royal tours reflects the quietness of empire as a political and cultural discourse in mid-Victorian Britain as well as the newness and experimental nature of the royal tour as a technology of propaganda, which administrators at home failed to exploit. It also demonstrates, in a sense, the stability and instability of British culture during the 1850s and 1860s. In other words, scholars have identified the period as both a stable "Age of Equipose" where social and political elites quietly benefited from the settlements of 1830s and 1840s and "the empire of free trade" of the post-Napoleonic era and, alternatively, as an unstable culture of social tension and contestation that had

survived the era of Chartism into a supposed age of plenty. The earliest tours failed to unleash the fury of the latter, however, in part because they were approved and funded without public debate and because they were rarely if ever used by political elites to inoculate the British public with a pro-imperial message.

The Prince of Wales' 1860 tour of North America was featured in rather lavish images in the *Illustrated London News* and the *London Journal* and was celebrated by political elites in Britain as an important historical moment.⁹⁷⁶ The Palmerston government allocated around £10,000 for the tour, which was packaged with other spending as "Civil Contingencies" to avoid political and public scrutiny and contestation.⁹⁷⁷ The British press duly reported on the prince's progress through the North American colonies and the United States. It was rarely editorialized on and caused no public fuss, however, because it caused no controversy and could sell only so many newspapers. The tour correspondent for the *ILN*, admitting that most Britons probably had little interest in the prince's visit to Canada, encouraged his readers to consider the historical significance of the tour and the important relationship Britain had with "new Britains" overseas:

Many of your home readers may not be able to enter the same enthusiasm as the colonists into the report of the Royal celebration. They may fail to see the full force and beauty of some of our municipal and collegiate addresses, and they may be partially indifferent to features of some of our most brilliant local displays. But intelligent Englishmen cannot be uninterested spectators of an event which proclaims to the world the sympathies of the four millions of people who uphold British power and maintain a British system of government over have the continent of North

⁹⁷⁶ *Morning Post*, June 8, 1860.

⁹⁷⁷ Ian Radforth, *Royal Spectacle: The 1860 Visit of the Prince of Wales to Canada and the United States* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2004). 27.

America--a large proportion of these four millions being neither Englishmen by birth nor education, yet clinging to the British throne with an attachment which might put even your home loyalty to the blush.⁹⁷⁸

On the other hand, while praising this outpouring of loyalty as a “generous idea,” *Lloyd's Weekly Newspaper* complained about “the nauseous, groveling spirit in which some of our colonial brethren have received and written about a boy of eighteen [the Prince of Wales]... This is not loyalty--it is a slavish and degrading idolatry.”⁹⁷⁹ *Reynolds's Newspaper*, a radical journal, chastised both native and colonial Britons for the “sycophancy” of idolizing an eighteen-year-old royal:

The accounts of this pampered and idolized youngster's pilgrimage through North America are not calculated to elevate one's estimate of human nobleness. The Nova Scotians, New Brunswickers, and Canadians are quite as base and sycophantic in their bearing towards royalty as their fellow-subjects at home. In the narrative of the Prince's progress, we can discern nothing new. There are the same fulsome and lying addresses from big-bellied mayors--the same crawling and crouching from esurient officials--the same shouting and cheering from mobs of slavish and idiotic plebeians with which are familiar and nauseated at home. There are even more disgusting things than these... But Canadians are not all flunkeys. There are in that country, as in this, many who are not afraid to protest against the miserable servility of their fellow-citizens... This adulation [in Canada], the future historian will record, was not confined to the dominions of his mother: for to the same of human nature be it recorded, many of the Republican journals [in the United States]... have surpassed the royalty-ridden press of England and the Canadas in heaping lying and ridiculous panegyrics on the puffed, pampered costly, and useless specimen of humanity.⁹⁸⁰

⁹⁷⁸ *Illustrated London News*, September 15, 1860.

⁹⁷⁹ *Lloyd's Weekly Newspaper*, August 26, 1860.

⁹⁸⁰ *Reynolds's Newspaper*, September 9, 1860, September 16, 1860.

From the pleas of the *Morning Chronicle* to the outright condemnation of *Reynolds's Newspaper*, the responses to the tour reflected a certain apathy in British culture on the subject of empire and the survival of radicalism and republicanism.

Outside of these negative emotional responses to the tour, the coverage of the Prince of Wales' visit was much more subdued and lacked an overtly political character. To the editors of the *Times*, the tour was notable for the positive effects that it would have on Canadian subjects and for its promotion of trans-Atlantic travel among Britons.⁹⁸¹ They sighed with relief when he returned to Britain, asserting: "We confess that we view the termination of this progress--an experiment so new and in some respect so perilous--with feelings of very considerable relief. The state of Canada was by no means fitted in all respects for a Royal visit."⁹⁸² When the moment was celebrated as important and historical, the appreciation for the prince's tour went beyond an imperial consciousness to celebrate his visit to the United States and a larger "Angloworld." In describing a friendly exchange between Queen Victoria at the American president James Buchanan, the *Birmingham Daily Post* reveled in an early manifestation of the Special Relationship: "The Americans are highly delighted with this new proof of her Majesty's good feeling, and it will doubtless impart additional fervour into the welcome which they are preparing for the future King of England."⁹⁸³ There were those, of course, who celebrated the tour through an imperial lens, celebrating the glorious mission of Britain's overseas empire, but these manifestations of imperial consciousness were somewhat uncommon.

⁹⁸¹ *Times*, March 20, 1860, July 9, 1860.

⁹⁸² *Times*, October 31, 1860.

⁹⁸³ *Birmingham Daily Post*, July 26, 1860.

As for Alfred, his arrival in Cape Town during the summer of 1860 landed with minimal impact in the British media. The story appeared in a paragraph-length wire from the *Cape and Natal News* on page seven of the *Times*.⁹⁸⁴ Stories from the Cape press were reprinted, and brief wire reports kept readers aware of the prince's movements. On September 26, 1860, the *Daily News*, the *Morning Post*, and the *Morning Chronicle* all published the same wire from the Cape, "Prince Alfred at the Cape of Good Hope," without comment near the back of the paper.⁹⁸⁵ *The Illustrated London News*, published a beautiful picture of Cape Town but little else. More dramatically, *Reynolds's Newspaper* offered a similar line to its critique of the Prince of Wales' tour of Canada:

The arrival of Prince Alfred from his pleasure trip in the *Euryalus*, and the reported summer trip of the Prince of Wales to Canada... are incidents which, considering the high price we have to pay for our navy, the difficulty of getting sailors, and the severe pressure to which the Government has always to be subjected before the slightest concession is made to the just demand of our workings sailors, ought to try some portion of public attention to the manner in which the money voted by parliament... Nobody outside the pale of the palace flunkeys supposes that either of the young princes will be called upon to render real service to the country by land or sea... Is it not, therefore, a wicked waste of the public money... on the training of this petted and pampered boy?⁹⁸⁶

Otherwise, Alfred's visit failed to stir much trouble in part because the top story of the week, Garibaldi's military campaign in Italy, received the most attention from the British press. This was true of both royal tours of 1860, which tended to be secondary or tertiary stories in relation to the Italian crises and other events in Europe. Alfred's world travels

⁹⁸⁴ *Times*, August 2, 1860.

⁹⁸⁵ *Daily News*, September 26, 1860; *Morning Post*, September 26, 1860; *Morning Chronicle*, September 26, 1860.

⁹⁸⁶ *Reynolds's Newspaper*, March 4, 1860, April 1, 1860.

during the 1860s and 1870s – and those of his nephews Albert Victor and George during the 1880s – received virtually no attention at home. Celebrated in the colonies as glorious and historic moments, they were non-events in Britain.

Piecing together the bits and piece of evidence, one might assume that the early royal tours, particularly that of Albert Edward in 1860, made a significant political and cultural impact in Britain. But, pulling our lens back to examine the whole of British political and print culture, they were rather insignificant. They were new and drew little criticism outside of *Reynolds's Newspaper* and other radical journals. Moreover, they were invented in a period when the existence of an overseas empire received comparatively little attention in popular culture. The reason for the royal tours, as imagined by Prince Albert and the Duke of Newcastle, was to popularize the idea at home and in the empire – as Sir John Seeley tried to do much later – that Britain was an imperial nation. This agenda, put next to Disraeli's Crystal Palace Speech in 1872, reflected a certain apathy, even malaise, in British culture on the subject of empire. In the context of the royal tours, British culture would be briefly provoked out of its silence by the Prince of Wales' planned visit to India in 1875, which unleashed a radical torrent of anger against a monarchy that had become neglectful and unpopular and an empire that was ruled expensively and illiberally.

The Prince of Wales in India (1875)

The announcement, on March 20, 1875, of the Prince of Wales' intention to visit India sparked almost immediate controversy in British politics.⁹⁸⁷ During the summer,

⁹⁸⁷ *H.R.H. The Prince of Wales* (London: Grant Richards, 1898), 95.

crowds gathered across communities in Britain to protest the costly extravagance of the royal tour to India. The republican newspaper *Reynolds's Newspaper* complained of “the rattle of the royal begging box.”⁹⁸⁸ In the House of Commons, the Prime Minister Benjamin Disraeli moved to expedite the funding bill through committee and onto the floor of the house in order to avoid further protests. In this act, he gained the unqualified support of the Leader of the Opposition, his long-time rival William Gladstone. In the Commons, Radical MPs challenged the very idea of the grant while others questioned its methods. Radical newspapers across Britain contested the discursive limits of criticizing the monarchy and the empire in its language of opposition. While the “mainstream” press and most MPs (those who bothered to show up, anyway) overwhelmingly supported the grant and the tour, rhetorically defining opposition as deviant behavior, neither the tour nor the empire itself were accepted without limits, even in the Houses of Parliament, and were openly contested on the floor, in the pages of radical newspapers, and on the streets of Britain.

During the summer of 1875, crowds assembled at the Reformers' Tree in Hyde Park, at the base of Nelson's column in Trafalgar Square, and in communities across Britain – in Leicester, Leeds, Northampton, Stafford, and Birmingham – in order to protest the use of public funds to pay for a princely pleasure trip.⁹⁸⁹ Charles Bradlaugh, the well-known atheist, republican, and trade unionist, distributed circulars for a mass meeting in Hyde Park:

Grant to the Prince of Wales his Indian Visit.--A meeting will be held in Hyde Park on Sunday, July 18th, to protest against the grant now being

⁹⁸⁸ *Reynolds's Newspaper*, July 11, 1875.

⁹⁸⁹ *H.R.H. The Prince of Wales*, 95; *Lloyd's Weekly Newspaper*, July 18, 1875.

made to the Prince of Wales. Your presence is earnestly requested, in order to show that [Radical opponents of the bill in the Commons] Messrs. Macdonald P.A. Taylor, and Burt really represented the popular feeling on this question.--Charles Bradlaugh.⁹⁹⁰

An anti-grant placard was posted around the East End: “Plunder! 142,000 to the Prince of Wales! This sum has been asked for to enable Albert Edward to visit India. The people are starving, but royalty must revel in luxury. Working men, are you content to be constantly robbed?”⁹⁹¹ The discourses of support and contestation, on the floor of the Commons and in protests organized by radical activists, both appealed to the imagined wants and needs of the British working classes.⁹⁹²

In Trafalgar Square, Charles Murray stood on the edge of the fountain, forbidden by the police to speak from the lions at the bottom of Nelson’s Column, and cried out that “the working men had no objection to the Prince of Wales leaving England--(‘Let him go!’)--indeed, the whole royal family might go, ‘and never come back’--(cheers and laughter)--but he objected to their going at the people's expense.”⁹⁹³ In Hyde Park, Charles Bradlaugh, spoke to an estimated crowd of some 10,000. When “eight persons who voted against [the resolution] were set upon by the crowd... police had to intervene.”⁹⁹⁴ At a meeting at the guildhall in Northampton, local leaders demanded a complete accounting of the

⁹⁹⁰ *Reynolds’s Newspaper*, July 18, 1875.

⁹⁹¹ *Ibid.*

⁹⁹² Dror Wahrman, *Imagining the Middle Class* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995).

⁹⁹³ *Reynolds’s Newspaper*, July 18, 1875.

⁹⁹⁴ *The Times*, Jul 19, 1875.

Prince of Wales' income from the Duchy of Cornwall and other sources of revenue.⁹⁹⁵ In Hull, the chairman of the local radical club suggested that the financial burden of sending the Prince of Wales to India could only be taken up by the British people if “the people of India would keep him there.”⁹⁹⁶ Across Britain, Disraeli and the prince were booed and hissed, and supporters of the grant were threatened – with the ballot box.

The mainstream British press dismissed these public meetings as inconsequential. The *Ipswich Journal* (Suffolk) explained:

It may be possible to get together and meeting, and perhaps a large one, of working men, and obtain from them a formal resolution condemning such votes... But that there is any sort of feeling extensively prevailing amongst the working men against the Monarchy and its necessary cost, there is not the faintest shadow of evidence.⁹⁹⁷

The Times belittled the size of the assembled crowd.⁹⁹⁸ Several journals shared the story of an elderly woman who, upon passing the Hyde Park meeting “hymn-book in one hand and Prayer-book in the other,” shouted a blessing for the Prince of Wales.⁹⁹⁹ While nowhere near the size of the enormous crowds at Peterloo or at Kennington Common, which numbered in the tens of thousands, these popular protests had significant implications for British political culture. They represented a strong undercurrent of

⁹⁹⁵ *Lloyd's Weekly Newspaper*, July 18, 1875.

⁹⁹⁶ *Reynolds's Newspaper*, July 18, 1875.

⁹⁹⁷ *Ipswich Journal*, July 17, 1875. These attitudes were disseminated to the empire through the British press. Echoing this hostile attitude toward the protesters, the *Tuapeka Times* (New Zealand), for instance, reported that “the meeting called by the Radical Clubs, in Trafalgar Square, London, to protest against the Indian journey, was a failure.” *Tuapeka Times*, August 18, 1875.

⁹⁹⁸ *The Times*, Jul 19, 1875.

⁹⁹⁹ *Funny Folks*, July 31, 1875.

popular radicalism in British society, the character of which may have been transformed by the mid-century failures of Chartism and quieted by the “Age of Equipoise” but which remained a fundamental component of British political culture during the second half of the nineteenth century. They also demonstrated how imperial crises or controversy could disrupt quotidian practices, to create a heightened consciousness of empire on part of everyday people – but one that encouraged criticism and contestation as much as jingoism and celebration.

In the House of Commons, the costs of the Prince of Wales’ proposed tour of India were also fiercely debated. During the debates over the tour, then, the expressed sentiments of MPs, from Tories to Radicals, reflected certain limits and fragilities in the political classes’ commitment to empire. While the debates were contained within certain discursive limits, many MPs expressed a profound discomfort in offering unlimited support for expensive imperial projects such as the Prince of Wales’ Indian adventure. Radical and some Liberal MPs challenged the financial burden and political consequences of the tour on the Indian subcontinent, echoing the critical sentiments of the independent South Asian press. In particular, the working classes were the subject of some of the most raucous debates in the Commons over the tour, with MPs of all political stripes claiming to represent their *true* interests. While Conservatives and most Liberals argued that the working classes were the most dependable supporters of the empire in British society, Radicals protested that the workers were not only uninterested in the royal tour and the empire but that they were actively opposed to them.

Before the funding proposal was put before the House of Commons, Prime Minister Benjamin Disraeli, who had played a significant role in convincing the Queen of

the trip's importance, debated the tour's budget and itinerary at length with the Cabinet and other prominent figures in imperial affairs.¹⁰⁰⁰ While it appears likely that Disraeli and the Cabinet had some sense that the tour would be criticized by some quarters of the British society, they were apparently taken by surprise when a small but vocal number of MPs actively opposed the grant. On July 5, Disraeli reported to the Queen that Sir Bartle Frere, who was considered to be an old hand on Indian affairs, had agitated the Cabinet for additional funds, insisting that the proposed Parliamentary grant of £60,000 was completely inadequate for the purposes of offering proper gifts to the Indian princes and that a minimum of £100,000 ought to be expended on the tour.¹⁰⁰¹ At this point, there was a growing feeling in the Government that the visit's ballooning budget and the concern that the Prince of Wales' friends planned to turn the tour into a taxpayer-funded pleasure trip and hunting expedition would derail the Parliamentary grant. Even Disraeli's great political rival, the William Gladstone, took up Disraeli's cause, urging him to put the grant to a vote before its opponents could organize further.¹⁰⁰² Disraeli and Lord Salisbury, the Secretary of State for India, had already invested considerable time in convincing the Queen to allow the visit; they now faced hostile MPs and an angry crowd.

Outright opposition to public funding for the tour was limited to a few Liberal and Radical MPs, and the grant passed the Commons with an overwhelming majority. Criticism of the grant, however, represented a radical strain of British politics, which was

¹⁰⁰⁰ Disraeli to Victoria, May 19, 1875, *Prince of Wales in India, 1975-6*, vol. 1, RA VIC/MAIN/Z 468 CFP.

¹⁰⁰¹ Disraeli to Victoria, June 5, 1875; Disraeli to Victoria, July 5, 1875, Bartle Frere to Lord Northbrook, November 6?, 1875, *Prince of Wales in India, 1975-6*, vol. 1, RA VIC/MAIN/Z 468 CFP.

¹⁰⁰² Ponsonby to Victoria, July 10, 1875, *Prince of Wales in India, 1975-6*, vol. 1, RA VIC/MAIN/Z 468 CFP.

echoed in public protests and in alternative newspapers across Britain. Moreover, the Parliamentary debates on the grant demonstrate certain limits and ambiguities in elite political discourses on the subject of empire, with serious questions raised over the costs and purposes of the royal visit.

Disraeli recommended that the Commons grant £60,000 for the royal tour of India, “a sum which will allow His Royal Highness to accomplish all that he can reasonably desire, and will maintain his position with being splendour.”¹⁰⁰³ The visit was framed as “semi-official,” whereby the prince would not represent his mother (that was the sole employ of the viceroy) but would perform as heir to the throne.¹⁰⁰⁴ The Conservative government proposed that Albert Edward would “receive and make presents,” with careful consideration of costs for the Prince of Wales and the South Asian princely elite.¹⁰⁰⁵ “Experienced Anglo-Indians” attested that the gifts “should not in decency be less than £500 apiece.”¹⁰⁰⁶ Disraeli suggested to the house that accounting for and legislating the details of present giving and receiving would be “something most undignified.”¹⁰⁰⁷ “A Conservative M.P.” gave *The Times* an unofficial estimated budget: traveling expenses, £5,000; railway journeys, “presents to railway managers, money presents to officials hotel expenses, what is called ‘backsheesh’” (shared with the Indian

¹⁰⁰³ HC Deb 08 July 1875 vol 225 cc1148.

¹⁰⁰⁴ HC Deb 08 July 1875 vol 225 cc1149. The Marquess of Hartington, for instance, suggested that the gifts that the prince was to receive “should not be of any intrinsically costly character, but should rather be interesting specimens of the products and manufactures of the country” and that the gifts that he was to give be “good specimens of English products and manufacture.” HC Deb 08 July 1875 vol 225 cc1151.

¹⁰⁰⁵ HC Deb 08 July 1875 vol 225 cc1149.

¹⁰⁰⁶ “A Conservative M.P.” to the editor, *The Times*, July 15, 1875.

¹⁰⁰⁷ HC Deb 08 July 1875 vol 225 cc1146; *The Times*, July 9, 1875.

Exchequer), £10,000; carriages and horses, £12,000; outfitting of "gentlemen of the suite and attendants," £5,000; presents, £36,000.¹⁰⁰⁸ Despite Disraeli's protest, these numbers were scrutinized and contested, with MPs, newspaper editors, and other political actors asking who would bear the financial burden of the tour (the Indian Exchequer or the British working classes?); if the grant was too much, or not enough; whether the British taxpayer should pay for gifts, and who should own the gifts given to the prince.

The costs of the visit on the Indian people were a central topic of debate in the Commons, reflecting several competing visions of the Indian empire. Disraeli estimated the costs to the Indian Exchequer to be "not more than £30,000."¹⁰⁰⁹ The Council of India, a body appointed by the Sovereign, Governor-General, and Secretary of State for India to "represent" Indian interests, had already agreed to pay for all expenses "on Indian soil." While some Radical MPs pointed to the fact that the Council of India did not represent the Indian people, others argued that it was the duty of loyal Indian subjects to pay for their fair share. After Disraeli's initial statement outlining the grant, the Marquess of Hartington immediately raised concerns about the costs of the visit to the Indian treasury and for Indian princes, who would acquire gifts for the prince.¹⁰¹⁰ Liberal MP Henry Fawcett protested that "England, and not India should bear the expenses of the visit" and "regretted that £30,000 will come out of the Indian revenue in order to enable the Viceroy to dispense hospitality during the visit of His Royal Highness."¹⁰¹¹ Samuel

¹⁰⁰⁸ "A Conservative M.P." to the editor, *The Times*, July 15, 1876. He suggested that, by his accounting, the last number (£36,000) was thousands of pounds less than what was actually required.

¹⁰⁰⁹ HC Deb 08 July 1875 vol 225 cc1148.

¹⁰¹⁰ HC Deb 08 July 1875 vol 225 cc1149.

¹⁰¹¹ HC Deb 08 July 1875 vol 225 cc1150. He went on to say that the "English people" would "cheerfully" pay "£30,000, £40,000, or £50,000 of additional expense" for the visit.

Laing (Orkney and Shetland) lamented that, whilst the “Indian Empire was acquired and maintained mainly by the prestige of English character,” burdening the Indian treasury “for the sake of a paltry £30,000” risked nurturing the idea that that British rule was “shabby, illiberal, and unworthy of a great nation.”¹⁰¹²

If some MPs triumphantly celebrated the place of Britain in India in order to justify that the full burden of the trip be placed on the British government, Radicals challenged not only the tour by the very nature of rule on the subcontinent, echoing the critical language of South Asian *respectables*. Disraeli provided further political refuge to his opponents by appealing to the prince’s 1860 tour of Canada, when the North American colonies had contributed some £40,000 (10,000?) to the costs of the visit.¹⁰¹³ After backbenchers loudly jeered this comparison, Gladstone defended Disraeli, arguing that “India has representation – the best representation we can give her” in the Council of India.¹⁰¹⁴ Moving toward the margins of acceptable discourse, Edward Hyde Kenealy (Stoke) argued that, as a result of the “iniquitous and wicked trial of the Guikwar of Baroda, the whole Mahomedan population were incensed, and... they would be more and more incensed having no representative in the House, if they were called upon to pay a sum of £30,000 for the expenses of the Prince of Wales’ visit.”¹⁰¹⁵ Whilst assenting to the grant, the great British Radical John Bright used the debate to criticize British rule in India:

¹⁰¹² HC Deb 15 July 1875 vol 225 cc1506.

¹⁰¹³ HC Deb 15 July 1875 vol 225 cc1493.

¹⁰¹⁴ HC Deb 15 July 1875 vol 225 cc1498.

¹⁰¹⁵ HC Deb 15 July 1875 vol 225 cc1522.

The people of India are really a subject race, and I do not expect that the visit of the Prince of Wales among them would make them forget that great fact, which must be constantly to many of them the subject of dissatisfaction and sorrow. But there are influences which [the prince] may employ, there are circumstances which may arise, which may have a beneficial effect upon the public mind in that country. . . . All persons will admit. . . that [the Prince of Wales] is of a kindly nature, that he is generous on all occasions, and that he is courteous to a remarkable degree. Now, one of the things which to my mind is always most distressing with reference to our rule in India is that Englishmen there are not kind, are not courteous, in the main, to the population of the country.¹⁰¹⁶

Despite his scathing criticism of imperial rule, the “quondam radical” was lampooned in the radical press for his support of the bill:

His Royal Highness, Prince of Wales,
To India Would go,
To gratify some dream of life
He held since long ago.
John Bright was by to sanction
And support the royal grant,
Though many thousand people,
Pine in poverty and want.¹⁰¹⁷

It was the Liberal Wilfrid Lawson (Carlisle), however, who offered the most damning criticism of the Indian empire and the royal tour:

If we are to [vote in favor of the grant on grounds of] the grand scale and pageant theory the sum we are asked to vote is perfectly ridiculous. . . . Why these Great Moguls and people we have been hearing about. . . would beat him hollow. He cannot equal them for £142,000; and if they outdo is magnificent and pomp we shall be doing more harm than good to our position in that country. Sir, we toot India – got possession of it by a

¹⁰¹⁶ HC Deb 15 July 1875 vol 225 cc1521-1522.

¹⁰¹⁷ *Reynold's Weekly Newspaper*, August 1, 1875; *People's Advocate*, September 18, 1875, cited in Antony Taylor, “Anti-Monarchism and the Radical Tradition, 1850-72,” in *Re-Reading the Constitution*, ed. James Vernon (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 177.

mixture of force and fraud – we hold it now by force; but we can only continue to hold it by fair and honest dealing, and not by indulging in costly shams... Who asks for this visit? Not a shadow or a scrap more of evidence is given to us... The House of Commons was never in my experience asked to vote a considerable sum of money on such paltry, measure, and insufficient grounds.¹⁰¹⁸

This language of protest, in the Commons and in the press, challenged the very nature of imperial rule itself.

A coalition of Radical, trade unionist, and Irish MPs, including Alexander Macdonald (Stafford), John O'Connor Power (County Mayo, Ireland), Peter Biggar (Cavan, Ireland), Thomas Burt (Morpeth), and Peter Taylor (Leicester), dared to go beyond this Liberal-Radical discourse about the financial burden of the tour to articulate language that criticized the tour, the monarchy, and the empire itself. Because these MPs were not simply playing out of their ideological playbooks, they were tapping into – but also encouraging – popular sentiment against the costs of royalty and empire, which was reflected in public meetings across the British Isles. Alexander Macdonald argued that the British working classes were opposed to the grant and that approving it would “create [more] disloyalty than all the Republicanism, internationalism, or any other ‘ism’ put together.”¹⁰¹⁹ The Irish PM John O'Connor Power indicated that the country benefited in no way from the visit and that royal presence in both India and Ireland was a placebo, that failed to treat the grievances of colonial peoples.¹⁰²⁰ The Prince of Wales, Peter Biggar recommended, “should give [gifts] out of his own private purse, and not out the

¹⁰¹⁸ HC Deb 15 July 1875 vol 225 cc1504-1505.

¹⁰¹⁹ HC Deb 08 July 1875 vol 225 cc1153.

¹⁰²⁰ HC Deb 08 July 1875 vol 225 cc1156.

pockets of the working people of this country.”¹⁰²¹ *The Examiner* echoed this critical sentiment about the costs of the royal tour:

Far graver issues [than the cost of the tour to India] are involved in the broad question whether the revenue either of India or England should be charged with the expense of what is essentially a private visit paid by a member of the Royal Family to a dependency of the British Crown... Such being the case there certainly seems some questionably taste, to say the least of it, in a proposal to make the British taxpayer defray the cost of a personal freak of the Prince.¹⁰²²

While only a small number of Britons probably shared their virulent opposition to the grant, these politicians appealed to a language of radicalism and protest that was a longstanding tradition in British political culture.

However, several MPs challenged the sentiment that the working classes of Britain were so wholeheartedly against the grant, arguing that *they*, rather than discontented Radical intellectuals, trade unionists, and Irish nationalists, really represented the working classes. The Leeds banker William Beckett-Denison (Notts) challenged Macdonald’s claims that he represented the working classes of Britain and argued that the “project” had their “unqualified approval.”¹⁰²³ Colonel Francis Beresford (Southwark) accused the Radicals of being out-of-touch with the British public, estimating that 9/10ths of the British working classes would “repudiate [their]

¹⁰²¹ HC Deb 08 July 1875 vol 225 cc1157.

¹⁰²² *The Examiner*, July 17, 1875.

¹⁰²³ HC Deb 08 July 1875 vol 225 cc1154.

doctrines.”¹⁰²⁴ Lord Elcho (Haddingtonshire) professed that the working classes were “animate[d]” by a “loyalty and public spirit” and a “pride in the Empire.”¹⁰²⁵

The debates in the Commons about the royal tour were in some sense as much about a domestic political game, about channeling or appropriating a sense of populist outrage, than they were really about the empire. The working classes as a discourse, made in a language of politics, were simultaneously used to justify the tour and its costs and to attack the Disraeli government and the monarchy. At the same, they also demonstrated certain limits of imperial culture at home, where crisis or controversy in the empire could awaken a profound radicalism in certain quarters of the British public and a forceful reactionism on the part of those with a vested interest in the empire. In the final vote, only 16 MPs voted against the grant, an overwhelming victory for Disraeli; yet, only about half of the MPs actually voted. British imperial culture and culture of royal ceremonial, as the actual debates reflect, was far more fragile and complicated than some of the literature has suggested.

* * *

The Prince of Wales’ visits to Canada in 1860 and India in 1875-76 were the only royal tours to receive extensive coverage in the British press before the world tour of the Duke and Duchess of Cornwall and York in 1901. Alfred’s journeys, as we have seen, passed under the media radar largely undetected. The early coverage, in the summer and fall of 1875, focused on the planning process and public debates over the costs of the tour. Mainstream newspapers such as *The Times* wrote about the protests across Britain,

¹⁰²⁴ HC Deb 08 July 1875 vol 225 cc1156.

¹⁰²⁵ HC Deb 08 July 1875 vol 225 cc1158.

for instance, in a language of condescension, as representative of an extreme fringe of British political culture that simply did not understand the significance of the Indian visit. There were some questions over the costs, but little open contestation. The Liberal advocate *Lloyd's Weekly Newspaper* argued, echoing the sentiments of Liberal MPs in the Commons, that the government of India should not bear the costs of the visit.¹⁰²⁶ The debates of the summer were rapidly displaced by the detailed coverage of the fall and winter, when illustrated newspapers such as *The Graphic* and *The Illustrated London News* printed drawings of the visit that highlighted the exotic clothing, people, and animals of the Indian subcontinent. The articles in these papers and others were overwhelmingly not “imperial” in focus and tone. There were, of course, reminders of the benevolence and greatness of British rule in India. But, the coverage itself focused on the exoticism of India, on the royal tour as an exhibition of the interesting and the bizarre for the British reader to vicariously observe through the person of the Prince of Wales.

The republican *Reynolds's Newspaper*, however, challenged the boundaries of this discourse and criticized the costs and purposes of the royal visit – and the empire itself. *Reynolds's*, a penny paper founded in 1850 and published once weekly on Sundays, was part of the mid-Victorian growth of a popular press in Britain that made the printed word broadly available to the British working classes. If it is to be argued, with some justification, that the pro-imperial music hall productions or penny papers were produced with a market and an audience in mind, the presence of a radical, anti-imperial press should be understood on comparable grounds. By 1870, *Reynolds's* had a circulation of some 350,000, around the same distribution as *The Daily Mail* during the

¹⁰²⁶ *Lloyd's Weekly Newspaper*, July 18, 1875.

“high imperial” 1890s, and was particularly popular in the manufacturing centers of the Midlands.¹⁰²⁷ It was edited by George W. M. Reynolds, a journalist, activist, and author, who was radicalized by Thomas Paine, the politics of the French Revolution, and Chartism; in his various papers, he supported, among other causes, “trade unionism, the Paris commune, Irish independence, and the sepoy in the Indian mutiny.”¹⁰²⁸ Reynolds was accused by his detractors, including Charles Dickens and Karl Marx, of peddling smut, of exploiting populist outrage and pseudo-working class credentials to sell newspapers, and of aspiring to the very classes whom he condemned. While these claims accurately reflect Reynolds’ entrepreneurial spirit – or, to put it less nicely, his desire to sell as many newspapers as possible – he was nonetheless fiercely dedicated to radical causes and represented the opinions, wholly or in part, of his thousands of subscribers.

Reynolds’s Newspaper was a forum for republicans and other radicals; its editors and correspondence overwhelmingly condemned the Prince of Wales’ tour of India in 1875-76.

The newspaper published the full text of declarations by the Birmingham Republican Association, and other groups, as well as numerous letters of protest.¹⁰²⁹ “John Jones” wrote to the paper:

It seems to be that his highness [the Prince of Wales is being brought rather low when he is obliged to ask the help of us poor workmen of the United Kingdom to purchase presents to be given to Indian despots. We

¹⁰²⁷ “Gone and (largely) forgotten,” *British Journalism Review* 17, no. 2, (2006): 50-52.

¹⁰²⁸ Louis James, “George William MacArthur Reynolds (1814–1879),” *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography* (Oxford University Press, Sept 2004; online edn, May 2008). <http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/23414>, accessed 14 April 2010. Also see M. H. Shirley, “On wings of everlasting power: G. W. M. Reynolds and *Reynolds’s Newspaper*,” PhD diss., University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 1997.

¹⁰²⁹ *Reynolds’s Newspaper*, July 25, 1975.

cannot afford to let him have our pitiful earnings to squander and show his “generosity”... If he wants to travel, let it be at his own expensive, or else let him advertise a subscription list, so that he admirers -- toadies, lords, bishops, and M.P.'s-- may open their purses for his poor highness.¹⁰³⁰

While Jones’ sentiment reflects a brand of orientalism, it also implicitly compares a corrupt Indian ruling class to a corrupt British one, a condemnation of both the class and its imperial project. *Reynolds’s* even declared a certain solidarity with the Indian people, reprinting critical articles by papers such as *Amrita Bazar Patrika* and echoing their sentiment that the common people of Britain and India would gain little from the tour.¹⁰³¹

While the exoticism of India was celebrated in the images of the *Illustrated London News* and the liberalism of Britain’s Indian empire worshipped in the pages of *The Times*, *Reynolds’s* coverage took on a decidedly different flavor. It is impossible to determine the editors’ political intentions in their articles on the Indian visit, which were culled from telegraph wires and other newspapers, but the content focused heavily on the ornamental excess of the royal visit, the prince’s encounters with “Oriental despots,” and the limited political effects of the visit on the Indian populace. They repeated a “correspondent of the *Advertiser* at Lahore,” who observed that “with the exception of natives of position, who were brought more immediately into contact with the Prince, it struck me that there was little enthusiasm about the royal visit amongst the general mass of the native community.”¹⁰³² The paper published so many accounts of animal fights put on for the prince’s entertainment that one reader complained that “it cannot be otherwise than painful to all Christian and right-minded persons to read, from day to day, accounts

¹⁰³⁰ *Reynolds’s Newspaper*, August 1, 1875.

¹⁰³¹ *Reynolds’s Newspaper*, September 5, 1875.

¹⁰³² *Reynolds’s Newspaper*, February 27, 1876.

of the barbarous scenes witnesses, and apparently enjoyed, by the Prince in his journey through India.”¹⁰³³ Not all of the paper’s coverage on the royal tour was openly hostile, and sometimes the reprinting of wire or press reports simply represented the public’s – even the radical public’s – curiosity about the visit. At the same time, it reflected a tradition of radical dissent in British political culture that was powerfully echoed in Trafalgar Square, in the House of Commons, and in the pages of independent South Asian and African newspapers. While many Britons cared little for the royal tour – or the public fuss over funding it – the tradition of radicalism and dissent must be considered dynamic and important to British imperial culture as much as Kipling’s verse or saber-rattling newspapers.

From the streets of London or Birmingham and the floor of the House of Commons to the pages of political and humor publications, the Prince of Wales’ visit to India was debated and contested in British political culture. On the other hand, political elites and the mainstream press overwhelmingly supported the tour, presenting it to the public as proof of the justness and progress of British global rule or as an opportunity for the public to encounter the exotic peoples and traditions of South Asia. For most Britons, neither of these discourses probably mattered much. At the same time, these discourses were probably as likely to evoke hostility toward social elites and the empire as much as they were to nurture any sort of pride or celebration. Like other reminders of empire – bits of the map colored red, Union Jacks, coffee or sugar or rubber, or Empire Day – the royal tour was background noise to everyday life, accepted but not deeply contemplated by the vast majority of Britons or domesticated into something intelligible to the British

¹⁰³³*Reynolds’s Newspaper*, March 5, 1876.

housewife or schoolboy.

High Age of Empire? (1901)

The 1880s and 1890s have long been recognized as a high imperial age in the history of Britain and its empire. Even Bernard Porter, the “empire denialist” admits an uptick in the cultural pervasiveness of empire in late-nineteenth-century British society. It was during this period that British culture was bombarded in the products, symbols, and propaganda of empire, representing a historical age when the idea of British culture as a truly imperial culture was most true, until the absences, failures, and newcomers of the post-imperial age genuinely brought the empire home during the second half of the twentieth century. For scholars of the New Imperial history, this kind of periodization is not really conceptualized, so that the imperial culture of Britain in, say, the 1880s is never compared or contrasted to that of the 1780s or 1680s! This said, the 1880s and 1890s were an age of empire.

If the late nineteenth century was the high mark of imperial culture in Britain, it was not a society of unchallenged imperial hegemony. In the historical literature, the South African War (1899-1902) is the most frequent example of pro-imperial sentiment in popular culture used by historians: the enlistment of working class soldiers, “mafficking,” the terrorizing of anti-war protestors, and the “Khaki Election” of 1900, which was an overwhelming victory for pro-imperial Unionists. Yet, as an older social history of popular imperialism demonstrated, British culture was far more complicated than these examples suggest. Working-class enlistment into the British armed forces only

experienced an upswing after the economy began to sink.¹⁰³⁴ Radical and “Lib-Lab” MPs frequently criticized the conduct of the South African War.¹⁰³⁵ The “pro-Boer” anti-war movement vehemently opposed the “methods of barbarism” being carried out in the name of the British people and the empire, and as Richard Price argued in *An Imperial War and the British Working Class*, without working class anti-war activists, there would not have been protests to break up to begin with!¹⁰³⁶ The General Election of 1900 was a complicated one, where social issues and the war figured importantly, and if it was a referendum on anything, it was about patriotism and national pride more than empire specifically.¹⁰³⁷ And, the celebrations of Mafeking Night are difficult to read. Were the British people celebrating empire? Britain’s redeemed honor?¹⁰³⁸ Fallen and living heroes?¹⁰³⁹ Were they simply letting loose? Or participating in old-fashioned hooliganism?¹⁰⁴⁰

These complications do not mean to suggest that British society was not informed by the existence of an overseas empire, but that its influence was complex – and limited. Britain was never culturally inundated with empire from top to bottom as some historians have conceptualized, even during the age of high imperialism. As Bernard Porter and

¹⁰³⁴ Henry Pelling, *Popular Politics and Society in Late Victorian Britain* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1968), 92.

¹⁰³⁵ Pelling, 36.

¹⁰³⁶ Richard Price, *An Imperial War*, 176.

¹⁰³⁷ For a counter view, see Paul Readman, “The Conservative Party, Patriotism, and British Politics: The Case of the General Election of 1900,” *Journal of British Studies* 40 (January 2001): 107-45.

¹⁰³⁸ Price, 133.

¹⁰³⁹ Bernard Porter, *The Lion’s Share*, 115.

¹⁰⁴⁰ Bernard Porter, 138.

others have duly noted, the frequently cited examples represented crashing waves in a sea of more subtle expressions. The 1901 visit of the Duke and Duchess of Cornwall to the empire, to inaugurate an Australian federation and a war-torn South Africa, is used here not to generalize about the nature of British society as a whole but to demonstrate the limits of an imperial culture in Britain during the “high age of empire.”

1901 was a somber time in the history of the British Empire. In January, the Great Queen, the longest reigning monarch in British history, died, arousing expression of sadness and mourning across the British world. The South African War was in its third embarrassing year. In November 1900, Lord Kitchener had been promoted to commander-in-chief of imperial forces in South Africa and commenced a “scorched earth” strategy, burning Boer homesteads and towns and imprisoning Africans and Boers, women and children in wartime concentration camps. In Britain, this elicited political recriminations and fueled the anti-war movement that what Britain was doing was inhumane and unjust. The royal tour went forward, and the British press dutifully reported the movements of the duke and duchess. But, the mood was rather different. It was taken in the shadow of the war, which dominated much of the media coverage. And, the crowning achievement of the tour – the opening of the parliament of a federated Australian state – received limited attention outside of the ruling elites. The British government of India requested a visit; this application was denied.

There were no popular protests against the tour, as there were against the Prince of Wales’ Indian tour of 1875. The royal grant to undertake the tour was approved by the Chancellor of the Exchequer under the Conservative government of Lord Salisbury,

Michael Hicks Beach, without a Parliamentary vote.¹⁰⁴¹ One might argue that empire was such a banality of British culture by 1901 that the tour hardly caused a stir or that the Government avoided the controversies of 1875 by not putting the visit up for a public vote – and subjecting the issue to public protest. At the same time, the lack of popular outrage against the parliamentary grant reflects, as James Vernon has argued, that the popular politics of the early and mid-Victorian periods had been channeled into and suppressed by the more formalized political sphere of the ballot box, the political party, and the labor union.¹⁰⁴² While popular radicalism was less evident in 1901 than it was in 1875, it was not completely absent. It was channeled through the emerging labor movement, particularly through the person of Keir Hardie.

Keir Hardie (Merthyr Tydfil and Aberdare), the first member of the Independent Labour Party elected to Parliament and a founding member of both the ILP and the Labour Party, challenged the constitutionality of the Parliamentary grant to fund the tour. The socialist Hardie had some history of criticizing the monarchy and its role as a national institution. In 1894, after 251 miners had died in an explosion at a Welsh colliery, Hardie requested that a note of condolence be included in the announcement of the future Edward VIII's birth; this was declined. Hardie's politics reflected, in some sense, the influence of earlier radicals, from the Chartists to Dilke, on the Independent Labour and Labour movements. In a long speech that condemned the poor choice of "mourning stationary in connection with the death of the late queen" ("Its hideous black border was offensive to the eye and the taste") and the military-style funeral conducted for a

¹⁰⁴¹ HC Deb 25 March 1901 vol 91 cc1207.

¹⁰⁴² James Vernon, *Politics and the People* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993).

constitutional monarch, Hardie condemned the appropriation procedures used to fund the royal tour:

He also objected to the Vote of £20,000 which took the form of a grant to the Duke and Duchess of Cornwall and York in connection with their visit to the colonies. The object for which that expense had been incurred had been neither considered nor sanctioned by the House of Commons, and he asked whether it was in accordance with constitutional practice and procedure that the nation should be called upon to bear such expenses without the House of Commons having first sanctioned the expenditure... If this expenditure was not being incurred under any rule or decision of the House, by whose authority was it undertaken?¹⁰⁴³

The Chancellor of the Exchequer, Michael Hicks Beach, retorted, defending the lack of legislative oversight in the royal grant:

He has asked by whose authority the expenditure has been incurred. By my authority. I am convinced that there is perhaps no item in all the Estimates that are presented this year which would be more cheerfully voted by the House of Commons than that of the expenses of this tour, undertaken, as it is at personal sacrifice to the Duke and Duchess and the King and Queen, in the discharge of a solemn duty, undertaken at the request of our great colonies in Australasia and Canada and in other parts of the world, and calculated. I believe, to be of immense advantage in consolidating and welding together our Empire, and in instructing its future ruler as to the greatness of his responsibilities.¹⁰⁴⁴

While the camp of Radical MPs who opposed the 1875 tour included Irish nationalists in their camp, Hardie receive little help from this Irish colleagues. The MP William Redmond, leader of the Irish Parliamentary Party, offered his acceptance of the funding, with some reservations:

With regard to that he had nothing whatever to say. He thought if they sent them there it would be rather hard to ask them to go without their

¹⁰⁴³ HC Deb 25 March 1901 vol 91 cc1204-1205.

¹⁰⁴⁴ HC Deb 25 March 1901 vol 91 cc1207.

travelling expenses. The Irish felt it, no doubt, a hard thing that they should be called upon to pay a proportion of that expense, which really did not affect them much, but from the English point of view, and from the ordinary commercial business point of view, he did not blame the Government for paying the travelling expenses of their Royal Highnesses. With regard to the Vote of £35,000 for the funeral of Her late Majesty, he did not desire to say a single word.¹⁰⁴⁵

By 1901, the royal tour had been developed as a ritual practice, carefully directed by Colonial Office at home and from Government Houses around the world. Officials at home had learned how to fund the tours in a way that would avoid scrutiny and how to exploit them as a tool of pro-empire propaganda. Despite this work, the 1901 world tour of the Duke and Duchess of Cornwall and York did not escape the critique of Keir Hardie, the sentiments of whom represented not only his constituency in Merthyr Tydfil but also thousands of workers and radicals across the British Isles.

While empire was by and large an accepted part of life for Britons by the turn of the century, interest in the royal tour was contained to elite political discourses – of colonial administrators, “newspapers of record” such as *The Times*, and the ruling classes. There were no protests in the streets, and outright public opposition was far rarer than it had been in 1875. Yet, even elite conversations did not focus on empire proper, saying little about Britain’s colonies in South Asia or tropical Africa, for instance, which were conspicuous by their absence on the tour itinerary, or subject peoples, but instead focusing on the spread of British liberty through the British diaspora. As Britons read about the duke’s travels, they were exposed to a particular concept of empire, a Dominion idea of empire, that complicates what constituted empire and what this had to do with *imperialism*.

¹⁰⁴⁵ HC Deb 25 March 1901 vol 91 cc1209.

Most accounts focused on the federal Parliament in Australia, which Queen Victoria, they said, had gladly lent her grandson to inaugurate, as a shining example of the constitutional liberty: “the tie between England and her colonies is rendered materially stronger by the absolute freedom which that elasticity confers upon each of them in the task of moulding her own destinies in accordance with her opportunities and her needs, and thus of retaining majesty while acknowledging subjection.”¹⁰⁴⁶ There were references to the South African War, illustrated with images of the Duke of Cornwall inspecting imperial troops or pinning a medal on a worthy hero, which appealed to the shared cultural heritage of a Greater Britain.¹⁰⁴⁷ This cultural projection of the royal tour shared key conceptual linkages with the imperial federation movement, which consistently failed to gather political traction, and many of the cultural and political actors who promoted it. From the perspective of a larger British public, the royal tour was a much quieter affair. For those working class men fighting an imperial war in South Africa or working in the mills of Leeds or Birmingham, for those anti-war and human rights activists who condemned British violence and brutality in South Africa, and for Keir Hardie and an emerging labor party, their dedication to empire and their interest in a royal tour or an Australian parliament was limited at best.

* * *

Bernard Porter’s examination of empire’s social and cultural role in British culture points toward the limits, fragilities, and instabilities of imperial culture in metropolitan society. This chapter, informed by his contribution to the historiography,

¹⁰⁴⁶ *Times*, May 9, 1901, November 2, 1901; *Morning Post*, September 8, 1900.

¹⁰⁴⁷ *Illustrated London News*, September 21, 1901.

asks not “how much” but “in what way” empire informed everyday practices and experiences; how perceptions of and the importance of empire in Britain changed over time; how the idea of empire was imagined by British people at home and abroad in diverse and complex ways over the long history of what we call the British Empire; and how social status, gender, and politics shaped these perceptions. These questions are not aimed at dismissing or displacing the work of the New Imperial history, which has importantly placed the story of Britain within global networks of goods, culture, and people and introduced the tools and concepts required to write a truly global history of the British Isles. It does, however, try to complicate and qualify the relationship between British society and a British empire overseas, as one that was tenuous and unstable, always being made and remade and contested.

This study decenters the empire by situating Britain on the periphery of an imperial culture that was made in and of the imperial experience. Historians have tended, often accidentally, to look at the British Empire from the metropole looking out, privileging the cultural products of British culture and the imperial consciousness of British people over the experiences, identities, and beliefs of British subjects overseas. Britain was, or became, an imperial nation, but this was never a guaranteed outcome. During the 1860s, as the chapter argues, empire had a limited influence on British popular culture. The responses to the royal tours of the 1860s reflected these limits as well as the continued relevance of radicalism and republicanism during an Age of Equipoise. The 1875 tour of the Prince of Wales unleashed this undercurrent of contestation and demonstrated that the project of empire had neither unanimous nor unlimited support, even in the Houses of Parliament. While the 1901 world tour by the

Duke and Duchess of Cornwall and York shows an acceptance and consciousness of empire that had not existed in 1860, it also reflected the role of contestation, even if it had been channeled away from the streets and limited to the formal limits of a political movement, and the transmutability of empire as a concept.

During the second half of the nineteenth century, imperial culture in Britain was made and remade, embraced and contested. The British people, like their queen, were complex and always changing, their visions of empire shaped and domesticated by politics, social class, gender, and any number of other hats, as well as historical contingencies. They could be said to be an imperial people, an “island race” informed by encounters and exchanges with a larger world, but not without limits and challenges.¹⁰⁴⁸ The royal tours demonstrate, in a small way, how an understanding of these ambiguities contributes to a more complex understanding of British imperial culture.

¹⁰⁴⁸ Kathleen Wilson, *An Island Race: Englishness, Empire and Gender in the Eighteenth Century* (New York: Routledge, 2002).

CONCLUSION

The dissertation has reflected on a diverse cast of characters, culled from different historical sites and representative of different discourses of British imperial culture: a Great Queen dispossessed of the power to control her own image; royal children bored with the tedium of their royal ambassadorships; African chiefs, Indian princes, and a Maori king who contested the mythology of the Great Queen; colonial governors who used the visits as opportunities to impress and defeat the Britain's enemies; Western-educated *respectables* who used an idiom of British constitutionalism to demand imperial citizenship; colonial settlers who claimed to be "better Britons"; and Dutch-speaking South Africans and an Irish assassin who envisioned a future for the Irish in the empire. These examples demonstrate the ways in which imperial culture was made, not at Windsor Castle, or in the halls of the Colonial Office, or in Government Houses in Calcutta or Cape Town or Auckland, but by human actors in the empire, who made sense of their political, cultural, and social worlds the best they could and with the tools that they had as subjects of a global empire. These encounters demonstrate how imperial culture, fragile and unstable, uncontainable and uncontrollable, was made in the empire.

* * *

In 1912, King George V was the first and last reigning British monarch to visit the British Indian Empire. His coronation Durbar in Delhi represented both the political and cultural pinnacle of the ritual apparatus developed during the second half of the nineteenth century and the ways that it was unraveling in the years before the First World War. It also demonstrated the complex modes of reception and appropriation, how ideas

about empire, citizenship, and identity were forged in encounters and experiences “on the ground,” as it were, and how colonial knowledge was always imperfect and partial.

The Delhi Durbar was the greatest act in the performance of imperial culture by British royals, and in some sense its last. The Royal Jeweller crafted a lighter model of the imperial crown, costing the Indian treasury £60,000, for the long Durbar on a hot Delhi day.¹⁰⁴⁹ Sir Philip Gibbs, the biographer of George V, described the scene at the Durbar as “the most brilliant, the most imposing, the most gorgeous State Ceremony the world has ever known.”¹⁰⁵⁰ The ritual also marked the transfer of the imperial capital from Calcutta to Delhi, a former center of Mughal power. During one part of the ceremonies, the king and Queen Mary “sat on the marble balcony... showing themselves to the [thousands of] people” at Delhi Fort, the palace of the Mughal Emperor Shah Jahan, in a ceremony proposed by the king himself.¹⁰⁵¹ The 1912 Coronation Durbar was one of the grandest ritual performances in the history of the British Empire, a culmination of the royal tours and the British ornamental imagination.

The ritual practices of the royal tour were on full display in Delhi. George V received and gave addresses. The Viceroy gave and received visits with the princely elite, and the king granted private audiences to the more important princes. Massive tents were erected to serve as residences for visiting dignitaries. Like his uncle, Prince Alfred, he went tiger hunting in the Nepal forests.¹⁰⁵² He inspected imperial troops and the living

¹⁰⁴⁹ A.N. Wilson, *After the Victorians: The Decline of Britain in the World* (New York: Macmillan, 2005), 129.

¹⁰⁵⁰ Philip Gibbs, *George the Faithful: The Life and Times of King George V* (London: Hutchinson & Co, 1936), 212.

¹⁰⁵¹ *London Illustrated News*, January 6, 1912.

¹⁰⁵² *Times*, September 21, 1911.

veterans of the Indian Mutiny.¹⁰⁵³ Curiously, the great controversy of the Durbar involved a familiar character, and his alleged disrespect toward the King-Emperor:

No incident of the Coronation Durbar at Delhi aroused more interest than did the manner in which the Gaekwar of Baroda played homage. The cinematograph films show that, when coming to perform this, he was swinging a stick in his hand, which to say the least of it, was decidedly unusual, and that, having bowed curtly and retreated a pace or two, he turned his back on the King-Emperor and walked off, instead of leaving the Presence backwards as did others doing homage. Considerable comment having been caused by this, the Viceroy, with his Highness's consent, published a letter in which the Gaekwar assures Lord Hardinge of his loyalty and allegiance to the throne, sets down his failure to observe strict etiquette to nervous confusion in the presence of their Majesties before the great assembly, says that, being second of the Feudatory Princes and failing to see exactly what the Nizam of Hyderabad did, had no chance of observing the others do" homage.¹⁰⁵⁴

The Gaekwad of Baroda was Sayaji Rao III, the young prince who the Prince of Wales had met in 1875. He had recently converted to a liberal nationalism, making contributions to the Indian National Congress and the campaign of Dabhadi Naoroji for MP in Britain.¹⁰⁵⁵ As a result, he had been carefully monitored by the British resident in Baroda. While there is no evidence that the gaekwad purposely snubbed the king, his political sympathies, which transcended the difference between "traditional" and "modern" politics, certainly make one wonder. Ritual contestation, after all, had a long tradition in the encounters between British royals and local people.

The coronation Durbar represented more than the far reaches of the British ritual imagination. It was a calculated response to the development of a more radical and separatist Indian nationalism during the first decade of the twentieth century. In 1906, the

¹⁰⁵³ *London Illustrated News*, January 6, 1912.

¹⁰⁵⁴ *London Illustrated News*, January 6, 1912.

¹⁰⁵⁵ Lawrence James, *Raj: The Making and Unmaking of British India* (New York: St. Martin's, 1997), 338.

INC split into factions: the *Garam Dal*, the radicals led by Bal Gangadhar Tilak, and *Naram Dal*, the loyalist “Moderates” under Gopal Krishna Gokhale. On one hand, the 1905 partition of Bengal – a British tactic of divide and conquer – unleashed a firestorm of political contestation from Bengali nationalists. On the other hand, the Indian Councils Act of 1909, the Morley-Minto Reforms, instituted political reforms that allowed Indians to be elected to local and provincial councils for the first time, a concession that failed to appease an increasingly mass nationalist movement. In 1912, George V, his visit used as an opportunity to counter the propaganda of Indian nationalism, announced the re-unification of Bengal, bonuses for military and civilian servants of the government, and grants for educational advancement.¹⁰⁵⁶

The Durbar invoked the mythology of the patriot king, the Great (White) King who loved and protected his subjects. While the British monarch had long been an object of petitions and demands – to make right the wrongs of other British subjects or governments – this mythology was most carefully and successfully crafted and nurtured during the long reign of Queen Victoria. George V, and the monarchs who followed him, exploited the ritual and ideological apparatus of the nineteenth-century empire to legitimize and justify the monarchy and the empire long past the sell-by date of both. At the same time, as the coronation Durbar demonstrates, these ritual practices, which were limited and unstable from their inception, were increasingly undermined, delegitimized, and challenged by emerging mythologies of belonging and identity politics.

¹⁰⁵⁶ Richard Burn, “Political Movements, 1909-1917,” in *Cambridge History of the British Empire*, vol. 5, *The Indian Empire, 1858-1918*, ed. H.H. Dowell (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1932), 575-576.

The First World War has been identified by scholars as a transformative moment in the history of Britain and the British Empire. The war was a breaking point for many “loyalist” people of color in Britain’s African and Indian empires, who became increasingly disillusioned by the broken promises of imperial service and citizenship during and in the aftermath the war.¹⁰⁵⁷ In India, British soldiers opened fire on civilians protesting the Rowlatt Act, an extension of the oppressive wartime “emergency measures,” in the Amritsar Massacre (1919), which proved to be a turning point for many Indian nationalists. The white colonies of settlement earned their spurs during the war, as reflected in the Balfour Declaration (1926) and the Statute of Westminster (1931), completing the long evolution from responsible government and home rule to independent Dominion status. In New Zealand and Australia, emerging national mythologies were forged in the blood on ANZAC troops in the trenches of Gallipoli. In the aftermath of the war, however, Britain became more and more dependent on the empire for trade and the maintenance of its global power in a changing world order, symbolized by the Covenant of League of Nations as well as the financial and political rise of the United States.

The political and cultural wind of change, to borrow Harold Macmillan’s 1960 turn of phrase, was already blowing through the empire, however. The changes attributed to the war represented significant continuity with the previous decades rather than a radical break with the past. The development of home rule, designed to avoid another imperial disaster like the American and Canadian revolts, and settler disputes with the imperial government had nurtured these changes for the last half century. In South

¹⁰⁵⁷ Bill Nasson, “Why They Fought: Black Cape Colonists and the Imperial Wars, 1899-1918,” *International Journal of African Historical Studies* 37, no. 1 (2004): 55-70.

Africa, *respectables* of African and Coloured descent were profoundly disillusioned by the failure of the imperial government to intervene against the disenfranchisement of the Union of South Africa (1910) or the dispossession of the Native Lands' Act (1913). In South Africa, In India, the British failed to live up to the promises of the war, encouraging the growth of the mass anti-nationalist movement that had rapidly developed in the decade before the war. The changing politics of Sol Plaatje and Mohandas Gandhi, from imperial citizenship to non-cooperation and contestation, reflect the changing nature of imperial politics for local peoples.

The second half of the nineteenth century was a transitional period in the history of the British Empire, when notions of imperial identity and citizenship came to dominate (however briefly) the cultural and political landscape of imperial culture. This is not to say that local and nationalist identities were not forged, but that they did so in the milieu of imperial politics. By and large, Queen Victoria's English-speaking subjects imagined their political and cultural universes with an inward gaze toward their local communities and an outward gaze toward Britain and the empire. The politics of this era were, overwhelming, not separatist or anti-imperial, nationalist in a twentieth century sense, but embraced Britishness and imperial citizenship, the rights and responsibilities of citizen-subjects of the queen and the co-ownership of a global empire. While these ideas manifested themselves in diverse and often conflicting ways, they informed the lives of "overseas Britons," many of whom had no ethnic or racial claim to Britishness, and made an imperial culture that could not be dictated from Britain, from colonial capitals, or by local social elites. During the twentieth century, they would reemerge in the demands of

World War II veterans, the claims of the *Windrush* generation, and British Muslims in the aftermath of the 7/7 bombings.

In Britain, the revived public consciousness of the empire resulted from the experiences of the war and anxieties about Britain's future as a world power. Between 1903 and the war, for instance, the Tariff Reform League advocated for Imperial Preference, a protectionist zone designed to counter the growing industrial power of the United States and Germany.¹⁰⁵⁸ While the British Empire was at its greatest geographical extent in the aftermath of the war, it was an empire in decline. At the same time, British society was becoming a mass, democratic society – symbolized by the abolishment of the House of Lords' legislative veto power (1911), the enfranchisement of women over 30 (1919), and the development of a modern mass media.

As David Cannadine has argued, these transformations made the monarchy a greater novelty, with Buckingham Palace becoming a tourist trap rather than a center of power, and royal memorabilia, which became popular during the Golden and Diamond Jubilees, transforming a “sacred” monarchy into a consumer fetish. The development of radio and film made the monarchy more accessible – in some sense making the royal tour obsolete – but during an era when the imperial monarchy and its empire were both on the wane.¹⁰⁵⁹ Today, Queen Elizabeth II may be a symbolic head of state for millions of

¹⁰⁵⁸ See Andrew Thompson, *Imperial Britain: The Empire in British Politics, c. 1880-1932* (New York: Longman, 2002); David Thackeray, “The Crisis of the Tariff Reform League and the Division of ‘Radical Conservatism,’ c. 1913-1922,” *History* 91, no. 301 (2006): 45-61; E.H. Green, *The Crisis of Conservatism: The Politics, Economics and Ideology of the Conservative Party, 1880-1914* (New York: Routledge, 1996). Of course, the years of the tariff reform campaign represented a long-time in the wilderness for the Conservatives, making one wonder how much the issue mattered to most voters..

¹⁰⁵⁹ The monarchy recovered some of its cultural significance during World War II, for instance, but experienced blows to its prestige during the Abdication Crisis (1936) and following the death of Princess Diana (1997). The tabloid press, an invention of the nineteenth century, also contributed to these processes of trivialization.

people across the globe, but she lacks the symbolic influence of the Great Queen. Her people may adore her, but largely because she has no power over them and because they are not her subjects but citizens.

* * *

The second half of the nineteenth century was a unique era in the history of the British Empire, where a politics of Britishness and imperial citizenship dominated imperial culture in the empire and where an identity politics in the modern sense were just starting to emerge. Conceptions of imperialism and nationalism were not antithetical, but constitutive of one other. After all, most nineteenth-century people lived in empires; it was the standard form that most states took and the space that most political battles were pitched. The British Empire was unquestionably the largest of the nineteenth century's global states, far larger than even the Ottoman or Russian Empires or the French overseas empire, and this fact was informed how both the people who ran it and many who lived in it thought about their worlds.

Queen Victoria's subjects imagined their political, cultural, and social spaces locally, nationally, and globally (e.g. within the empire) without any sense of contradiction or confusion. In a very real sense, identification with the empire and imperial culture itself were made in larger discourses, made in the imperial networks of the British world, and in local encounters and mythologies, by African intellectuals in Graham's Town, settler farmers in Otago, or "traditional" political elites in Basutoland or Hyderabad. In the metropolitan "center," in the halls of Windsor or in the public houses of Birmingham, imperial culture was domesticated by middle-class women and working

class activists – or was ambiguous, banal, or distant. It was imposed on queens and royal children by colonial administrators and on the British public by imperial activists and intellectuals.

Recent works of the “imperial turn” represent the imperial experience in a far more sophisticated analytic than its predecessors, often influenced by the important work of “area studies” scholars in the fields of African, South Asian, and Australasian history (who have as much of a claim on doing a history of empire as British scholars). British imperial history has likewise been influenced and reshaped by scholars of the former colonies of settlement, many of whom have embraced the British world model described above. The dialectic of collaboration/resistance has been largely rejected and the role of imperial politics more seriously considered. The current work has been profoundly shaped by and (hopefully) contributes significantly to this scholarly milieu by offering a study of the unique encounter and experience offered by the royal tour of empire. It is a dissertation about how the empire was imagined and experienced by different historical actors, representing unique discourses of imperial culture, across the space of the nineteenth-century British Empire. It importantly recenters the making of imperial culture, locating the empire itself in the center of these processes, and offers for consideration – standing on the shoulders of several recent scholars – the centrality of Britishness and imperial citizenship to Queen Victoria’s colonial subjects.

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