

## ABSTRACT

Title of Document: THE CHANGING SPATIAL DISTRIBUTION  
OF THE POPULATION OF THE FORMER  
SOVIET UNION

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When it existed, the Soviet Union was a closed economic and migration space with tightly-controlled movement of goods, people, and ideas across its borders. It was also an ethnically complex region with 130 different nationalities, fifty-three with territorially-based ethnic homelands, of which fifteen became the successor states to the Soviet Union. The breakup of the Soviet Union, the transition towards market economies, and the liberalization of the societies have together greatly impacted the lives of people in the region. Many found themselves in countries or regions with dramatically shrunken economies or as ethnic minorities in newly independent states and many have chosen migration as a strategy of adaptation to the new circumstances in which they found themselves. Using established migration theory, this dissertation examines the causes of migration among the fifteen successor states since 1991. The main test was to compare the relative impact of economic factors versus ethnic factors driving migration movements in the post-Soviet space. The results showed that while some of the movements could be classified as people migrating to their ethnic homelands, a majority could be explained by neoclassical economic theories of migration and the large income differentials that have resulted from the economic transition. Other theories that have been found to explain migration in other world migration systems were found to also be applicable in the former Soviet Union.

THE CHANGING SPATIAL DISTRIBUTION OF THE POPULATION OF THE  
FORMER SOVIET UNION

By

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# **Chapter 1. Introduction**

## **1.1 The Triple Transition and Its Impact on Migration**

Since the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991, the fifteen successor states have been embarking on a “triple transition” which is having a profound impact on migration patterns in the region (Hanson and Bradshaw 2000, 17-42). The first is the political transition from one to fifteen countries. Each of the newly independent countries is a nation-state based on one ethnic group but because of past migrations during the Soviet period, all contain significant minority populations. For all but three of the states, Russians were the second largest ethnic group, making up between 2 and 38 percent of the population of the non-Russian states. The emergence of fifteen new or newly-resorted nation states has caused a reconsideration of homeland spaces and a reshuffling of the ethnic hierarchy within them. The second is the economic transition from centrally-planned to market economies. The state’s role in economic planning and management has greatly diminished and economies are now guided much more by the market. The third is the social transition to more liberal societies, including freedom of movement and the right to emigrate. The Soviet Union exerted considerable control over migration and the spatial distribution of the population but now people have much more freedom to choose their places of work and residence.

The breakup of the Soviet Union provides an ideal human geography laboratory for examining migration caused by moving from one economic and political system to another. Two changes in the Soviet system have had large effects on migration within the region. First, the countries went from having a very flat income distribution



among households and regions to several of the successor states having among the highest income inequalities in the world. Thus, a major driver of migration, regional income disparities, which had not been very significant in the Soviet economic system, has become increasingly important as a cause of migration among post-Soviet countries. Second, the Soviet Union was made up of a complex and overlapping system of fifty-three ethnic homelands. At the time of the breakup, sixty million persons, over 20 percent of the Soviet population, instantly became classified as members of one of many diaspora groups, based on ethnicity, living outside of their homelands. The extent to which these two factors - the changing economic and ethnic geography - have influenced migration patterns across the post-Soviet space is the subject of the research conducted in this dissertation.

## **1.2 Key research questions**

To ascertain the determinants of migration in the post-Soviet space, empirical migration data is tested against two different migration theories. One theory is based primarily on economic factors and the other is based primarily on ethnic factors.

While recognizing that people often move for a multitude of reasons, I theorize that these two separate bodies of theory could explain most of the change in the spatial distribution of the population between the Soviet and post-Soviet periods, which is not explained by one alone.

Neoclassical economic theory states that migration is caused by differentials in wages and employment and is seen as the foundation of several migration theories, where

each explains a different aspect of the migration process (Massey et al. 2005, 8; The World Bank 2006b). This is the oldest migration theory and the one that is the dominant factor in explaining international migration movements. At the same time, given the ethnic complexity of the Soviet Union, the influence of ethnic factors—especially diaspora migration—also needs to be considered in explaining migration in the region. While there have been numerous changes in international borders, the reconstitution of political space that occurred as a result of the breakup of the Soviet Union is one of the largest in human history. The scale of the mixing of ethnic groups within the Soviet Union was considerable, creating large ethnic diaspora populations upon the country's demise. This unique aspect of the country's history must be taken into consideration when assessing migration patterns in the region. If one were to attempt to explain migration across the former Soviet space using just economic factors or just ethnic factors, each explanation would easily and quickly be discarded for ignoring the other. Thus, two different hypotheses are to be tested:

***Hypothesis 1.*** As predicted by neoclassical economics, the increase in the differences in income levels among countries across the former Soviet Union will lead to increased migration from low-income to high-income countries.

***Hypothesis 2.*** According to diaspora migration theory, following the breakup of the Soviet Union, there will be net immigration of persons living outside their ethnic homelands.

When applying these two theories to migration movements in the former Soviet Union (FSU), the four different combinations of outcomes shown in Table 1 are possible. The first are movements from a low-wage to a high-wage country and a return to one's ethnic homeland. An example is that of ethnic Russians who migrated from Central Asia to Russia. These countries have a gross domestic product (GDP) per capita that is less than one-third of Russia's and approximately 30 percent of the Russians living in these countries had left since 1989 (Heleniak 2004).

**Table 1: Possible Combinations of Neoclassical and Diaspora Migration Theory**

	<b>Neoclassical migration theory holds</b>	<b>Neoclassical migration theory is violated</b>
<b>Diaspora migration theory holds</b>	1. Migration from low-wage to high-wage country <i>and</i> migration back to homeland	2. Migration from high-wage to low-wage country <i>and</i> back to homeland
<b>Diaspora migration theory is violated</b>	3. Migration from low-wage to high-wage country <i>and</i> out of homeland	4. Migration from high-wage to low-wage country <i>and</i> out of homeland

A second possibility is migration from a high-wage to a low-wage country and migration to one's homeland. A case of this would be the migration of Russians from the Baltic states to Russia. With recent European Union (EU) accession and rapid economic reforms, the Baltic states have per capita GDPs 30 percent higher than Russia. There has been a migration of about 12 percent of the Russian population in the Baltic states to Russia, with the majority in the early 1990s, as migration of Russians out of the Baltics is now just a few hundred a year.

The third combination of these hypotheses is movement from a low-wage to a high-wage country and migration out of one's homeland. Examples would include migration on a permanent or temporary basis of titular members (titular meaning the nationality upon which the ethnic homeland is based) from the lower-income Caucasus or Central Asian states to Russia. This type of movement, legally or illegally, seems to be dominating post-Soviet migration.

A fourth combination is represented by migration from a high-wage to a low-wage country and migration out of one's homeland. This would be represented by an ethnic Russian migrating from Russia to Tajikistan, where the GDP per capita is one-eighth that of Russia.

While the tests to be performed here focus separately on one factor causing migration, the interplay between economic and ethno-political factors will also be considered. Being excluded from citizenship, forced to learn linguistically-distant languages, or facing ethnically-based workplace discrimination can easily translate into fears for one's economic future. For example, one study indicates that the timing of the imposition of language laws in Central Asia, which elevated the local languages to that of the state language in place of Russian, was partially responsible for the initiation of the large exodus of Russians (Smith et al. 1998, 207).

There is not one unified migration theory that is capable of explaining all aspects of this complex process but rather a fragmented set of theories which have been

developed largely along disciplinary boundaries. Thus, in addition to economic and ethno-political factors, which are thought to be the main drivers of migration in the former Soviet Union, elements of these other theories also need to be considered. Thus, following chapters which separately examine the validity of economic and diaspora migration theories as possible explanations of the causes of migration in the region is a chapter which considers the role of these other theories of migration.

**Data used:** Three sets of data are needed to statistically test the validity of neoclassical and diaspora migration theories on post-Soviet migration patterns. The first are flow data for a 15-by-15 matrix of migration among the FSU states for as many years as possible from 1989 to 2007. The second needed data set is information on wages, income, or GDP per capita. Finally, data on the ethnic composition of the migration flows are needed for each year. In addition to these statistical data, other information on migration will be used to provide a more nuanced analysis. One important aspect of political geography that will be included in the analysis is the defining of a body of citizens. This in essence defines the ‘borders’ of the homeland. Since these are all new states (or newly-restored states), defining a body of citizens was a crucial element influencing early post-Soviet migration flows. Related to this were laws on language, border management, irregular migration, visas, and return and readmission.

**Contribution of the research:** The unique contribution of this research is that the FSU as a *migration system* has never been fully explored. The FSU has been

excluded from most current theoretical treatments of international migration. In works by Massey and colleagues, which form much of the theoretical basis here, international migration is analyzed according to five major regional migration systems centered on North America, Western Europe, the Gulf region, Asia and the Pacific, and South America. The FSU is some distant and rather vague periphery of the European migration system (Massey et al. 2005, 108-33). One of the leading readers on international migration includes but one very short paragraph saying only that there was lot of migration among FSU states (Castles and Miller 2003, 88). In a recent overview of international migration, Philip Martin, a prominent observer of current migration trends includes one sentence on fears of migration of Russians. In another sentence, he notes that there was a large migration of Jews to Israel during the 1990s (Martin and Widgren 2002, 29), never stating that the migration was from the Soviet Union - as if they simply parachuted in!

Much of the research that has been done to date on migration in the former Soviet Union has been carried out by international organizations such the International Organization for Migration (IOM), the United Nations Population Division, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, United Nations Children's Fund, the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Their goals were to quantify and classify the flows that were taking place and to develop measures to deal with their consequences (e.g. refugee flows, east-west migration, and brain drain). To date, academic treatment of migration flows in the post-Soviet space has been scant. A review of leading journals in geography, migration, demography, and FSU area

studies found articles on internal migration in Russia (Mitchneck and Plane 1995; Round 2005; Gerber 2006; White 2007), reviews of census results (Rowland 2003, 2004a, 2004b, 2005, 2006, 2007), analyses of migration in one country or region or of one ethnic group (Zvidrins 1994; Barrington 1995; Shevtsova 1995; Kuddo 1997; Tammaru and Kulu 2003; Thompson 2004; Diener 2005a, 2005b; Radnitz 2006; Skrentny et al. 2007; O'Loughlin, Panin, and Witmer 2007), and a number of articles on Jewish or German emigration from the FSU.<sup>1</sup> However, there were no articles that comprehensively analyzed the *FSU migration system* since the breakup of the country and the period of economic transition.

A recent study titled *Overview of the Migration Systems in the CIS Countries*<sup>2</sup> was actually just a listing of laws and policies regarding migration (International Centre for Migration Policy Development 2005). The International Organization for Migration's recent overview of global migration devoted a scant four pages to the CIS (International Organization for Migration 2005, 153-56). Previous IOM studies of migration in the region are overviews which attempted to determine the direction and magnitude of flows from available data and not analytical studies of the determinants of migration (International Organization for Migration 1997a, 1999, 2002). The IOM also produced a number of studies, many based on small surveys of

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<sup>1</sup> The contents of the following journals were reviewed from 1995 to the present, *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*, *The Professional Geographer*, *International Journal of Population Geography*, *International Migration Review*, *International Migration*, *Population and Development Review*, *Population Studies*, *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, *Eurasian Geography and Economics*, *Europe-Asia Studies*, and *Nationalities Papers*.

<sup>2</sup> CIS stands for Commonwealth of Independent States. It is a loose successor to the Soviet Union and consists of all of the FSU states except the three Baltic states. This was an intergovernmental body established to regulate economic, trade, and political relations among the successor states.

migrant groups that produced a number of interesting insights into various aspects of migration in the region (International Organization for Migration 1997b, 1997c, 1998, 2003a, 2003b). A 1996 study by the UN Economic Commission for Europe was similarly descriptive (UNECE and UNFPA 1996). The goal of a UN Population Division study was to compile and document migration flow data for the CIS and other transition economies (UN Population Division 2002a). A recent World Bank study of migration in the broader Europe and Central Asia region (to which this researcher was a contributor) included some analysis of the determinants of migration but never really came to a satisfactory explanation (Mansoor and Quillin 2007, 75-95). Thus, the FSU is a blank space in world migration system and theory which this research attempts to begin to fill.

*Geographic scale of analysis:* The scale of geography that migration movements will be examined is the fifteen newly independent successor states that emerged following the breakup of the Soviet Union. This is obviously a very aggregate scale but provides a starting point for analysis of the causes of migration in the region and tests of the applicability of migration theories that have been found to operate elsewhere in the world. At the time of the last census conducted in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) in 1989, there were 169 geographic units at the subnational level.

### **1.3 Outline of Dissertation**

The dissertation consists of one descriptive and four substantive chapters. Following this introduction, the second chapter will be a descriptive overview of migration



trends across the former Soviet Union during the past decade and a half. This is done in order to provide background for the theoretical tests that will be carried out in subsequent chapters. Chapter 3 examines all possible causes of migration in the former Soviet Union against current international migration theories. The fourth chapter will test the applicability of economic theories of migration to the migration movements across the FSU. Chapter five measures and tests the extent to which diaspora movements were a factor in migration in the post-Soviet space. The sixth chapter attempts to combine the two major migration theories tested here, discusses the implications of migration for the region, points out how the conclusions add to a better understanding of post-Soviet migration and of migration in general, and suggests extensions for further research.

## Chapter 2: An Overview of Migration in the Post-Soviet Space<sup>3</sup>

### 2.1 Introduction

On 12 January 1989, the Soviet Union conducted what would turn out to be its final population census. That census enumerated 285 million persons spread across the fifteen then-union republics ranging from 147 million in Russia to 1.6 million in Estonia. Since that date, the Soviet Union has split up into fifteen independent states.<sup>4</sup> These states are often divided into several regional groups based on shared cultural, linguistic, and historical features (Figure 1). The three Baltic states of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia were the last to be incorporated into the Soviet Union, just after World War II and have recently joined the European Union. The three states of the Transcaucasus - Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia - are part of an ethnically complex world region with Armenia and Georgia being Christian and Azerbaijan being Muslim. The five Central Asian states of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan are predominantly Muslim, were among the least developed regions of the Soviet Union, and are the poorest of the successor states. The three Slavic states of Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus share a common Orthodox religion and similar Slavic languages. The outlier is Moldova, formerly Bessarabia, which was annexed by the Soviet Union from Romania after World War II and is often considered the poorest country in Europe.

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<sup>3</sup> This is a condensed version of Heleniak 2008b.

<sup>4</sup> In fact, because of the breakup of the country, the results of the 1989 USSR population census were never completely published by the USSR Statistical Committee.

**Figure 1: The States of the former Soviet Union**



The successor states have, to widely varying degrees, instituted the tenets of market economies by privatizing large segments of their economies, liberalizing prices and foreign trade, and generally withdrawing the state from economic planning and decision-making. Many of the countries have adopted nominally liberal democratic structures, while others have become autocratic dictatorships. Most of the countries have liberalized society by allowing freedom of speech and movement, including the right to emigrate. The countries have opened up to the outside world by allowing increased foreign trade, travel, and communication, and have taken up membership in international organizations. These changes in the societies and economies of the fifteen successor states have combined to greatly alter the spatial distribution of the population of these countries in the decade and a half since the last Soviet population

census. The purpose of this chapter is to provide a broad overview of the migration movements that have taken place during the initial post-Soviet period as background to the analytical chapters that follow. The focus of this chapter is on migration movements among the fifteen successor states and between them and the rest of the world. This is not to ignore some of the large migration movements that have taken place at other geographic scales, such as out of the Russian north or the concentration of population into many of the capital cities, but full treatment of these flows is beyond the scope of this dissertation (Hill and Gaddy 2003; Andrienko and Guriev 2004; Gerber 2006; Heleniak 2008a).

## **2.2 Migration and Population Change in the FSU**

The migration movements that have taken place across the FSU over the past decade and a half have been described as one of the greatest international migration movements of the twentieth century (Radnitz 2006). During the 1990s, more than nine million persons moved across the new international borders. There are obvious enumeration errors in these numbers but it is sufficient to say that there was and continues to be considerable migration across the region, all countries were impacted by migration, and for some it was an extremely significant economic and social issue. Figures 2 and 3 show population change in the FSU states between 1989 and 2004 separately for natural increase (births minus deaths) and net migration. Of the fifteen states of the FSU, only five had population increases over the period - Azerbaijan and the four Central Asian states of Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. All are predominantly Muslim populations which tend to have higher

fertility rates. Though all had large amounts of emigration their populations continued to increase as these countries all have rather young age structures and continue to have high fertility rates and high rates of natural increase. In most FSU countries, natural increase is combined with net emigration but the populations continue to grow (which is the pattern for most countries in the world). The data underlying these maps are shown in Table 2 disaggregating population change into natural increase (or decrease) and net migration.

**Table 2: Population Change in the Former Soviet Union, 1989 to 2004**

	Total population (ths.)		Absolute change (ths.)			Percent change		
	1989	2004	Total	Natural increase	Migration	Total	Natural increase	Migration
<b>Russia</b>	147,400	144,534	-2,866	-8,635	5,769	-1.9	-5.9	3.9
<b>Ukraine</b>	51,707	47,442	-4,265	-3,482	-782	-8.2	-6.7	-1.5
<b>Belarus</b>	10,152	9,849	-303	-332	29	-3.0	-3.3	0.3
<b>Moldova</b>	4,338	4,247	-91	147	-238	-2.1	3.4	-5.5
<b>Latvia</b>	2,667	2,319	-347	-149	-199	-13.0	-5.6	-7.4
<b>Lithuania</b>	3,675	3,446	-229	6	-235	-6.2	0.2	-6.4
<b>Estonia</b>	1,566	1,351	-215	-62	-153	-13.7	-4.0	-9.8
<b>Armenia</b>	3,449	3,212	-236	399	-635	-6.9	11.6	-18.4
<b>Azerbaijan</b>	7,021	8,266	1,245	1,476	-232	17.7	21.0	-3.3
<b>Georgia</b>	5,401	4,544	-857	242	-1,099	-15.9	4.5	-20.4
<b>Kazakhstan</b>	16,465	14,951	-1,513	1,892	-3,406	-9.2	11.5	-20.7
<b>Kyrgyzstan</b>	4,254	5,037	783	1,174	-390	18.4	27.6	-9.2
<b>Tajikistan</b>	5,109	6,640	1,531	2,302	-771	30.0	45.1	-15.1
<b>Turkmenistan</b>	3,518	5,158	1,640	1,269	-155	46.6	36.1	-4.4
<b>Uzbekistan</b>	19,882	25,707	5,825	7,125	-1,300	29.3	35.8	-6.5


Sources: (UNICEF, Innocenti Research Centre). All population figures have been adjusted following population censuses conducted in the years 1999 to 2002. Net migration was computed via the residual method except for Turkmenistan. For Turkmenistan, actual net migration figures from this source were used because net migration computed via the residual method produces an implausibly high net immigration into the country. Thus, the sum of natural increase and net migration do not equal total population change.

Several regional groupings of countries are obvious. The three Slavic and three Baltic states all had more deaths than births because of low fertility and older age structures. The five predominantly Muslim countries of Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan all had rather large natural population increases due to higher fertility rates and younger age structures. It is these differences in rates of population growth that have contributed to some of the migration in the region and


which might become an even greater factor in the future. Only two states, Russia and Belarus had population gains from migration and for Belarus this was near zero. All other FSU states had net emigration and some of the losses were rather large. The most significant were in a number of the southern FSU states which had measured out-migrations of between ten and twenty percent of their pre-transition populations.

The net migration figures shown in Table 2 are computed via the “residual method,” where the difference between the number of births and deaths is subtracted from total population change and net migration is a “residual.” This method is commonly used either in the absence of migration data or where migration data are thought to be unreliable or unrepresentative. This method requires that both population estimates and data on births and deaths are reasonably accurate. In some of the former Soviet states, there are problems with data on births and deaths. However, in spite of these problems, it was felt that the vital statistics registration system deteriorated far less than the systems for measuring migration. Nearly all the FSU states have now conducted their first population censuses as independent states, which have allowed them to calibrate and adjust their population totals. These revised population totals are reflected in the table.

**Figure 2: Natural Increase in the former Soviet Union 1989 to 2004**




**Figure 3: Net Migration in the former Soviet Union, 1989 to 2004**



It is Russia that has become the migration magnet within the region, with a recorded net immigration of 5.8 million over this period and estimates of a nearly equally large unrecorded migration and considerable circular migration. Combined, all of the other countries had a total out-migration of some nine million. This includes some migration to outside the FSU region as well as some undetermined amount of statistical error. Figure 4 shows that Russia has been a net recipient of migrants from all other FSU states except Belarus, and a net sender to all countries outside the former Soviet Union. The countries from which Russia has received the largest number of migrants are those from which there has been a large return of ethnic Russians – Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan. Three countries outside the FSU have been the primary destinations for migrants from Russia (as well as the other FSU states), Germany, Israel, and the United States. These flows consist primarily of ethnic Germans, Jews, and Russians, likely reflecting a combination of ethnic and economic factors driving their decisions to migrate.



**Figure 4: Net Migration Flows to and from Russia, 1989 to 2007**



For the non-Russian FSU states, most have just one or two main migration partners and this typically includes Russia. Flows to countries other than Russia and a second partner are usually quite small. Table 3 shows the main migration destinations of those states. Three states outside the region were the recipients of large numbers of persons during the 1990s immediately after the breakup of the Soviet Union – Germany, Israel, and the United States. For the first two, it was obviously primarily persons who could claim German or Jewish ethnicity. These flows have dissipated considerably since then and the destinations to outside the FSU have diversified. In some cases, such as the three Transcaucasus countries, there was no or minimal migration even to neighboring countries because of ethnic violence or territorial

disputes. Starting even before the breakup of the Soviet Union and continuing in the early years afterwards, there were flows of displaced persons between Armenia and Azerbaijan but the border between the two has essentially been closed for the past fifteen years. There was also minimal migration among the three Baltic states in large part because the borders of these states closely reflected ethnic concentrations and the predominant minority group in these countries were Russians. Initially, there was considerable migration from these states to Russia but this spike was short lived. Later, there was out-migration from these states to the old EU after these states acceded in 2004, though much of this was temporary labor migration and would not show up in records of permanent migration. For the Central Asian states, the primary destination has been to Russia although there has been some recent increases in flows to Kazakhstan which is the most developed and wealthiest of the Central Asian states.

**Table 3: Main Receiving Countries of the non-Russian FSU States**

<b>Country</b>	<b>Main destination countries</b>
Ukraine	Emigration to Russia, Israel and the United States, gains from most other FSU states
Belarus	Immigration from Russia, emigration to Israel and Germany
Moldova	To Russia, Israel, Romania, and Western Europe
Latvia	Initially to Russia and then after EU accession to Western Europe
Lithuania	Initially to Russia and then after EU accession to Western Europe
Estonia	Initially to Russia and then after EU accession to Western Europe
Armenia	To Russia and the United States, some early refugee flows from Azerbaijan
Azerbaijan	To Russia, some early refugee flows from Armenia
Georgia	To Russia
Kazakhstan	To Russia and Germany but recently from flows from other Central Asian states
Kyrgyzstan	Initially to Russia and Germany, continued to Russia but also to Kazakhstan
Tajikistan	To Russia
Turkmenistan	To Russia
Uzbekistan	To Russia

Sources and notes: Based on data in figure 6 and review of data and literature on migration trends and destinations.

### ***2.2.1 The Breakup of the Soviet Union and 28 million “New” Migrants***

The United Nations defines international migrants as persons living outside their country of birth. The international stock of migrants has increased from 75 million in 1960 when this figure represented 2.5 percent of the world’s population to 191 million in 2005 which is 3.0 percent of the population (UN Population Division 2007). Between 1985 and 1990, the number of international migrants increased by 56 million from 99 million to 155 million, and from 2.3 to 2.9 percent of the global population. Of that increase, twenty-seven million were attributable to the reclassification of persons who had moved inside the USSR before 1990 to international migrants when the country disintegrated (Zlotnik 1998; UN Population Division 2007).

In 1989, at the time of the last Soviet census, 2.4 million persons or 0.8 percent of the population had been born outside of the Soviet Union (CIS Statistical Committee and East View Publications 1996). This low figure is not surprising since for most of the period between the end of World War II and the breakup of the Soviet Union, there was little migration either into or out of the Soviet Union and little shifting of international borders. However, there was considerable migration among the states of the former Soviet Union. In 1989, there were twenty-eight million persons who were residing in a republic other than the one in which they were born. This should be regarded as the number of “statistical migrants” that were created by the breakup of the Soviet Union, which greatly contributed to the increase in the world stock of migrants. This amounted to 9.8 percent of the Soviet population. The bulk of these

were in the three Slavic states, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan. In percentage terms, the countries with the largest migrant stock populations were Estonia, Latvia, and Kazakhstan. All of these countries were prime destinations of Russian and Russian-speaking migrants during the period after World War II.

Table 4 shows the change in the migrant stock in Russia between 1989 and 2002. It shows that the migrant stock has increased, according to the UN definition, from 11.5 to 13.6 million or from 7.8 to 9.3 percent of the population. The foreign-born population in Russia who were born in Ukraine and Belarus decreased considerably, as did the native-born population of Russia. For all three groups, this is due to there being more deaths than births among these populations because of their older age structures, lower life expectancies, and lower fertility rates, and for the Ukrainian-born and Belarus-born populations, net emigration. For foreign populations born in other countries of the former Soviet Union, there was a large increase from all except the three Baltic states. This was because net migration of ethnic Russians who were born in these states, as well as titular ethnics from these states who migrated to Russia following the breakup of the Soviet Union.

**Table 4: Population by Place of Birth in Russia, 1989 and 2002**

	1989	2002	Difference between 1989 and 2002
Total population	147,022	145,167	-1,855
Russia	135,550	131,609	-3,941
Azerbaijan	479	846	368
Armenia	151	481	330
Belarus	1,409	936	-473
Georgia	423	629	206
Kazakhstan	1,825	2,585	760
Kyrgyzstan	261	464	203
Latvia	100	103	3
Lithuania	116	86	-30
Moldova	229	278	49
Tajikistan	154	383	229
Turkmenistan	141	175	35
Uzbekistan	530	918	388
Ukraine	4,596	3,560	-1,036
Estonia	65	67	2
Other countries and not indicated	994	2,047	1,053
Total migrant stock	11,472	13,558	
Percent foreign born	7.8	9.3	

Sources: (CIS Statistical Committee and EastView Publications 1996; Goskomstat Rossii 2004a, Vol. 10, Table 3.)

With the breakup, Russia became the home to second largest migrant stock in the world after the United States. Ukraine has the fourth largest and Kazakhstan is also among the top twenty in the world in terms of migrant stock. In terms of migrants as a share of their populations, Latvia, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, Estonia, and Russia are among the top twenty-five countries in the world. For all of the FSU states, except for Russia, the stock of international migrants has dropped in the post-Soviet period in absolute terms and in all but Russia and Ukraine, it has dropped in percentage terms. According to the 2002 Russian census, 5.2 million persons had migrated to Russia who lived elsewhere in the FSU in 1989. Thus, of the total of 13.6 million, this could be regarded as the approximate number of new migrants, as opposed to the number of

statistical migrants who become such when the country dissolved. Overall, the estimated number of migrants in the FSU declined from 30.0 million in 1990 to 26.6 million in 2005 (UN Population Division 2007).

In addition to these persons living outside their countries of birth, at the time of the breakup of the Soviet Union, 54.3 million persons lived outside of their titular homeland, of which 43.4 million were representatives of the fifteen newly independent states (Zaionchkovskaya and Korobkov 2002, 14). Ethnic minorities made up between 7 and 60 percent of the FSU states in 1989. Between 6 and 33 percent of the titular groups lived outside their homelands elsewhere in the FSU.

Thus, when the Soviet Union broke apart, there were large diaspora populations based on either ethnicity or place-of-birth. The reaction of these populations to suddenly finding themselves residing outside of their ethnic homelands is one of the major research questions to be tested. Initially in the post-Soviet period, diaspora migration referred to people returning to an ethnic or place-of-birth homeland and many of the movements fell into this category. Diaspora migration has become a prominent theme in discussions of development. Though there it refers to people migrating out or countries purposefully sending their citizens abroad to work in order to send remittances to aid with economic development (Newland 2004). It seems as if, after an initial wave of return diaspora migration in the post-Soviet space, the flows are beginning to resemble those in low-income countries elsewhere in the world but this remains to be proved. Large portions of the labor forces of many of the FSU states are

working abroad and several of the countries have among the highest remittance shares of GDP in the world.

It is Russia that has become the migration magnet within the post-Soviet space, with a documented gain of 5.8 million persons through migration over the period. Though this amounts to only 3.9 percent of its 1989 population, the issue of migration has become a rather contentious topic of debate in the country. In part, this is because the estimated extent of illegal migration into Russia is roughly of the same magnitude as that of legal migration (Krassinets 1998). The extent of net emigration was rather significant from a number of the states, with Armenia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, and Tajikistan showing that 15 percent or more of their populations had migrated out of the country on a permanent basis. These large population losses from migration actually understate their true impact on the economies and societies of these countries because those leaving are disproportionately young, better educated, and more skilled than those who remain. Also, from all of these countries, there has been considerable temporary and circular migration. As will be examined in detail, these current trends of natural increase or decrease that each country is currently experiencing are expected to continue into the foreseeable future which will impact migration patterns within the region.

### **2.3 Measuring Migration in the Former Soviet Union**

Even developed countries with good statistical systems often have difficulty fully measuring all migration movements across their borders. This is especially the case in

countries with more open borders and a high volume of migration. The countries of the FSU have faced more challenges than most countries in measuring migration movements across their external borders and among regions within them. The major factor was that migration went from being mostly internal within a country and being under a system that exerted considerable control over the movements of its population to being international across fifteen newly independent states that had much less control over their external borders and in some cases no control over people's spatial movements. When the Soviet Union was dissolved in 1992, the republic statistical offices, which had been branch offices under the control of the USSR statistical committee, quickly became independent national statistical offices. Their ability to monitor social and economic change varied widely because of the differing financial, human, and other resources they had at their disposal. In the harried environment of state building they were facing in the early 1990s, reforming statistical systems and the proper measurement of migration often fell far down on the new governments' priority lists.

In the Soviet Union, the *propiska* or resident permit system required persons to register before being allowed to migrate to a new location. This system was a useful tool in tracking migration flows. Migration into and out of the Soviet Union was limited, and there were few refugees or internally displaced persons (at least in the sense that the rest of the international community would define them). Some of the countries have been able to erect the necessary administrative procedures and institutions to be able to manage and count migration. For example, the three Baltic



states needed to align their visa regimes, reinforce border controls, and improve migration data collection as one of the many preconditions for EU accession.

Conversely, in some countries that went through periods of war and social unrest, migration movements into and out of the country went unrecorded for periods of time (UN Population Division 2002a). The visa-free travel among the CIS states for most of the 1990s contributed to an environment of rather porous borders, which made the recording of migration flows rather difficult. The extent to which the successor states have instituted systems to properly measure total migration flows and to disaggregate these flows by age, gender, nationality, and other useful characteristics necessary for both analysis and policymaking varies considerably.

Like most other countries, the population censuses in the FSU states are an important source of information about migration, especially migrant stock information (UN Statistical Commission and UNECE 2006, 1). Also like many other countries, it was the undercount of migration that was the major deviation from pre-census population estimates. Russia's 2002 census found 1.8 million more than estimated while many of the main sending countries in the region had significant undercounts (UNICEF, Innocenti Research Centre 2005a, 2005b). The undercount for Russia was only 1.3 percent of the pre-census population estimate. Even the Baltic states, more stable countries with more well-developed statistical systems undercounted migration. Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania had undercounts of 1.6, 4.7, and 5.6 percent respectively based on their 2000 round of censuses. The largest difference in the region between pre-census estimates and census counts was Armenia where

intercensal estimates thought that there were 3.8 million people in the country but the census only enumerated 3.2 million, a difference of 16 percent (UNICEF). All of these large differences between intercensal population estimates and census enumerations were due to poor or non-existent systems for tracking migration. For the 2010 round of censuses in the region, there are efforts to improve the migration-related questions to capture data related to new migration realities of the countries.

The difficulty in measuring migration in the FSU should be compared with those of the United States, long a traditional migration destination. Prior to the 2000 census in the United States, the population was estimated at 275 million, but the census revealed a count of 281 million, a difference of six million, almost all attributable to an undercount of the huge migration into the United States during the 1990s. The United States has long grappled with an issue that the FSU states are only beginning to deal with in trying to estimate temporary or circular migration. Estimates are that between seven and nine million foreign-born persons in the United States are unauthorized in some way, and each year another 350,000 to 500,000 illegal aliens, undocumented workers, and other persons in violation of immigration law enter the country (Martin and Midgley 2006, 9, 20). Until recently, most of the FSU states only recorded only long-term or permanent moves, and many of the movements over the past decade are of a temporary or circular nature.

The absence of appropriate migration legislation in the early period of independence explains why much of the migration was undocumented, illegal, or quasi-legal. In


recent years, there has been an increased effort on the part of the successor states to regulate migration movements across their borders. An International Labor Organization study estimated that there are between 3.0 and 3.5 million illegal guest migrants in Russia (Krassinets 1998). Only about 300,000 guest workers possessed proper documentation. A person can become illegal through illegal entry, residence, or activity; but in the early period of independence, these categories were murky at best. About a half million of the total were persons who entered Russia illegally with the goal of seeking asylum but who were denied. The bulk, between 2.0 and 2.5 million, were those who entered through visas or legally without needing a visa and who are working in violation of their visa status. An estimated 2 million of these undocumented labor migrants are from Central Asia (UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 2004). This includes an estimated 600,000 Tajiks, 10 percent of the Tajik population, roughly comparable to the share of the Mexican population working in the United States. Like other non-Russian ethnic groups in the FSU, most Tajiks speak at least some Russian and most view their stay in Russia as temporary and intend to return. The permanent legal net migration of Tajiks to Russia during the 1990s was only 5 percent of this total. There are estimates of up to 500,000 Kyrgyz working in Russia as well, although the Kyrgyz embassy claims only 30,000, with the true number lying somewhere between the two. Between 600,000 and 700,000 Uzbeks are working abroad as well. From Moldova, 600,000 individuals, or 14 percent of the population, are working abroad, with over half in Russia but many others in Western European countries.

The numbers of migrant workers in Russia from some of the non-Russian FSU states is quite significant. Based on national estimates from the origin countries in the early 2000s there are 800,000 to 900,000 Armenians working abroad, 600,000 to 700,000 Azeris, 250,000 to 300,000 Georgians, 400,000 to 450,000 Kyrgyz, 500,000 Moldovans, 600,000 to 700,000 Tajiks, 2.0 to 2.5 million Ukrainians, and 600,000 to 700,000 Uzbeks (International Centre for Migration Policy Development 2005). The vast majority of these were in Russia.

## **2.4 Migration Partners of the FSU States**

An important aspect of understanding the causes of migration are the patterns of migration by country. This is similar to analyzing a country's major foreign trade partners. As noted, there are problems with the completeness of migration data in the former Soviet Union but nonetheless some broad patterns can be deduced from the data which are available. Fortunately, the largest country in the region, Russia, which is also the main migration partner of most other FSU states, has a fairly complete set of migration data, although it does not include the undocumented and circular migration into the country. Figure 5 shows the patterns of net migration between Russia and selected other countries both inside and outside the FSU. The pattern for Russia is that it has been gaining people through migration from all of the other FSU states and losing them to countries outside the region.

**Figure 5: Russia, Net Migration by Country, 1989 to 2007**




Source: (Goskomstat Rossii 1995, 1996b, 1999, 2005a, 2007b).

Figure 6 shows the migration partners for the other FSU states. The trends for Belarus, Moldova, and Ukraine are roughly similar to those for Russia with all three being net recipients from most other FSU states and net donors to outside the region (Figure 6B). Russia was obviously a major migration partner for all three states. Not recorded in these statistics is the increasingly large amount of labor migration from Ukraine and Moldova to Western Europe. The main migration partners of the three Baltic states are the three Slavic states (Figure 6A). They had much smaller exchanges with other FSU states and though they had some emigration to outside the FSU, it was much smaller than the three Slavic states. Also not recorded were the flows of labor migrants from the Baltics to the EU when they became members in 2004. For the three Caucasus countries, Russia has been the primary migration destination (Figure 6C).


**Figure 6: Migration Partners of the non-Russian FSU States (selected years)**

**6A: Net Migration in the Baltics by Country**




Notes: Data for Latvia cover the years 1990-2003, for Lithuania 1990-2000, and for Estonia 1989-1998.

**6B: Net Migration in Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova by Country**




Notes: Data for Ukraine are 1990, 1993-96, 2000. Data for Belarus are for 1990-2001. Data for Moldova are 1990-1997.

**6C: Net Migration Transcaucasus Country**



Note: Data for Armenia cover the years 1990-1995 and 2001, for Azerbaijan 1990-2003, and for Georgia 1990-92. Data for Georgia do not include migration with countries outside the FSU.

**6D: Net Migration in Central Asia by Country**



Note: Migration data are for the following years, Kazakhstan 1990-96, 2000, Kyrgyzstan 1990-96, Tajikistan, 1990-95, Turkmenistan 1990-95, and Uzbekistan, 1990-96 and 1998.

There was some exchange between Armenia and Azerbaijan in the early 1990s at the time of the dispute over Nagorno-Kharabakh but these flows have virtually stopped as the border has been closed. There is actually quite little migration exchange at all among these three states and most exchange is to outside the region, primarily with Russia. For the five Central Asian states, Russia again dominates as a migration destination as flows to other FSU states is rather minimal (Figure 6D). There is some evidence that Kazakhstan is becoming a favored migration destination for persons from the other Central Asian states. For both Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, there were also large migrations of ethnic Germans to Germany. The concentrations of ethnic Germans in these states were the result of relocations to Central Asia during the Soviet period. This brief summary of the major migration partners of each FSU seems to indicate that it was combination of both ethnic and economic factors driving the destination choices without strongly pointing to either one conclusively. Russia is a major migration partner of many of the non-Russian FSU states simply because of its population size but also because much of the migration during this period consisted of the “return” of many Russians and Russian-speakers. This seems to indicate that much was diaspora return migration. At the same time, there was also considerable migration of non-Russians to Russia as well indicating perhaps more economic factors driving those streams. The migration to outside the FSU was highly concentrated to a few countries but also among a few ethnic groups but how much was really ethnically motivated as a desire to return to one’s homeland is questionable. Many of the ethnic Germans in Central Asia had long shed most attributes of Germanness including language, but given a choice between living in a

rapidly shrinking Central Asian economy and prosperous Germany, many quickly rediscovered their ethnic roots.

## **2.5 Migration Turnover in the Former Soviet Union**

It has often been said that population of the Soviet Union was rather immobile because of the legal restrictions on mobility, the lack of flexible housing and mortgage markets, the sheer size of the country, the lack of geographic disparities in income, and other factors. There was certainly migration during the Tsarist and Soviet periods; however, there were always a number of obstacles that inhibited migration. During the Soviet period, migration became increasingly regulated, as evidenced with the *propiska* system, introduced in 1932. As discussed below, the ability of the FSU successor states to control migration is much less than that of the Soviet Union. Another intervening obstacle was and remains distance. Gravity models hold that migration decreases with distance because of increased costs of transport and less availability of information about conditions in more distant destinations. The Soviet Union was and Russia has become the world's largest country territorially. These factors combined with others, such as a rigid housing market, have always given the population of the FSU a reputation as a country with rather low rates of mobility. The Soviet population, as opposed to say the U.S. population, tended to migrate less often and to remain in the regions in which they were born. Over half of the Soviet population continues to live in the region in which they were born (CIS Statistical Committee and East View Publications 1996). It is difficult to compare levels of population mobility over time and across space between different countries. This is



because of different systems for collecting migration data (survey vs. administrative), differing time periods for measuring moves, and differing distance or geographic boundaries as to what constitutes a move. In recent Soviet censuses and some of the censuses conducted in the successor states, there was a question asking whether you were living in the place that you were born, a measure of lifetime migration

From data available for the late Soviet period, it is possible to get some idea of migration turnover just prior to the breakup of the Soviet Union (Goskomstat SSSR (State Committee on Statistics of the USSR) 1990). It seems as if the Soviet population was becoming increasingly less mobile during the later years of the country's existence, a trend which seems to have continued into the post-Soviet period. In 1979 about 5.5 percent of the Soviet population had moved in that year. During the 1980s, migration turnover steadily declined, so that by 1989, only 4.1 percent of the population migrated. The last two Soviet censuses included a question on place of birth that was used to measure lifetime migration. In 1979, 52.9 percent of the Soviet population still lived in the region where they were born (CIS Statistical Committee and East View Publications 1996).<sup>5</sup> In 1989, this share had risen to 55.1 percent, consistent with the trend of decreasing mobility in the last decade of the Soviet Union's existence.


Figure 7 shows migration turnover in Russia during the 1990s. The data includes all persons who moved within a region, across regions, or internationally. The migration

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<sup>5</sup> Region as asked in this question in the census referred to an oblast-level unit, roughly equivalent to a U.S. state. In the 1989 census, there were 169 such units.

rates indicating that about 3 percent of the population of Russia moved in 1991 is roughly consistent with both the migration flow data presented above as well as the 1989 census data. The data clearly show a downward trend in mobility during the 1990s and after 2000. In fact, the number of people moving has halved over the period, so that in 2005, only 1.5 percent of the population migrated. Limited data for the other CIS states indicate roughly the same levels and trends as in Russia.

**Figure 7: Migration Turnover in Russia, 1991 to 2007**



Source: (Goskomstat Rossii (State Committee on Statistics of Russia)) (various publications).

Though the picture of mobility in the post-Soviet space is somewhat clouded by the poor-quality data, it is possible to draw some tentative conclusions from the data that are available. These point to trends of decreasing levels of population mobility, at least on a permanent basis. The statistical systems of the successor states have been slow to begin to capture these new temporary, circular, and often illegal flows. In the

early 1990s, more of the migration that did take place was international, while after 2000, much of the recorded migration is within countries. The overall decreased mobility rates point to an inability of the population of the FSU states to adjust to regional economic change. This might be due to a lack of financial resources to be able to move, a lack of information about destination regions, or the slowness in the development of housing and mortgage markets, which enable mobility. This inability to migrate away from regions with deteriorating economies has led to pockets of increased poverty but also temporary labor migration to other regions and other countries.

## **2.6 Changes in the Ethnic Composition of the Post-Soviet States**

The Soviet Union was a multiethnic country which disbanded along its ethnic seams and may not be done breaking apart along those lines. It became this way through centuries of expansion of Tsarist Russia and later the Soviet Union that incorporated lands of non-Russian groups. This was accompanied by both spontaneous and state-sponsored out-migration of Russians and other groups into the non-Russian, non-Slavic periphery and the mixing of members of these groups within the closed migration space of the Soviet Union. Following the 1926 census, one's nationality became an important social marker stamped on a person's passport. The Soviets used the results of this census to draw the boundaries of the homelands of the groups that had come under their control, provided they were geographically concentrated and constituted a majority of the population in their homeland. There was some gerrymandering in the demarcation of these homelands. Because of this, as well as

migration out of their homelands, in-migration of other groups, differential rates of natural increase, and ethnic reidentification, the shares that the titular groups made up of their homelands and their concentration within them varied considerably at the end of the Soviet period. Data on ethnicity in the Soviet Union were collected at the time of the censuses and were self-reported with no verification required. The responses in the last Soviet census were then classified into 128 different ethnic groups.<sup>6</sup> All successor states who conducted a census followed the Soviet practice and included a question on ethnicity. The result of these centuries of ethnic mixing are that each successor state contained large minority populations and had large numbers of their ethnic kin residing in other FSU states.

For the fifteen newly independent states, the share that the titular population made up of their homelands ranged from Armenians, who made up 93 percent of Armenia, to Kazakhs, who totaled just 40 percent of Kazakhstan, although this was up from a low of 30 percent at the time of 1959 census. The only other groups that made up more than four-fifths of their own homelands were Azeris, who were 83 percent of the population of Azerbaijan, and Russians, with 82 percent of the population of Russia. Both Latvians and Kyrgyz constituted only 52 percent of their homelands. In most cases, Russians were the largest minority group, with a range from 1.6 percent of the

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<sup>6</sup> An example of one of these ethnic groups which is not included in the analysis because they were not a titular group of one of the fifteen newly independent states is the Tatars. In 1989, there 6.6 million Tatars in the Soviet Union, of which 5.5 million resided in Russia, making them the second largest ethnic group in Russia after ethnic Russians (CIS Statistical Committee and East View Publications 1996). Only one-third of Tatars in Russia resided in their ethnic homeland of Tatarstan. The reason that Tatarstan did not become independent when the country broke apart was that it was a second-level ethnic unit. It was not a union republic because it lacked an external border to the Soviet Union.


population of Armenia to 38 percent of the population of Kazakhstan and 20 percent or more of the populations of Estonia, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, and Ukraine.

The titular groups of the three Caucasus states were somewhat disbursed among them, with the population of Georgia being 8 percent Armenian and 6 percent Azeri, and Azerbaijan being 6 percent Armenian. The titular groups of the three Baltic states were much less spread out among each other, and Russians were the main minority group, although there were small Ukrainian and Belarussian populations in each and a sizable Polish minority in Lithuania, part of which had been Polish territory before World War II. Central Asia, because of the more recent development of ethnic consciousness and borders not drawn to match homelands, had more diverse populations, with Uzbeks making up 9 percent of the population of Turkmenistan, 13 percent of Kyrgyzstan, and 24 percent of Tajikistan. Uzbekistan itself had significant minority populations of Kazakhs and Kyrgyz. Always the outlier, Moldovans made up just two-thirds of the population of Moldova, with Russians and Ukrainians both constituting about 13 percent.

In terms of the concentration of ethnic groups within their own homelands, Armenians were the least concentrated, with one-third of Armenians in the Soviet Union living outside Armenia (but elsewhere in the Soviet Union), in spite of making up the largest share of their own homeland (Figure 8). Of course, because of the changing borders of the Armenian homeland and other historical factors, there is a large Armenian diaspora population both elsewhere in the Soviet Union as well as

outside. Tajiks had the second-lowest share residing within their homeland, with three-quarters in Tajikistan and another 22 percent in Uzbekistan. At the other extreme, over 90 percent of Turkmen, Estonians, Latvians, Georgians, and Lithuanians resided in their homelands. For most groups, if there was significant spreading of their diaspora group, it was to Russia, where 12 percent of Armenians and Belarussians and 10 percent of Ukrainians lived.

**Figure 8: FSU Nationalities Inside and Outside Homelands, 1989**



Source: (Goskomstat SSSR 1991). Outside homeland refers to those living elsewhere in the FSU.

Another qualifier to the above discussion, and the analysis to follow in later chapters, is that many of these data on changes in the nationality composition of the FSU successor states are based on counts of the permanent population. Much of the available data on the nationality composition of migration are based on long-term, permanent, legal migration. Illegal, irregular, and various forms of temporary or circular migration have not been well captured in the migration statistics of the FSU

states (nor have they been in many other countries with well-developed statistical systems). Much of the previous analysis of concentrations within homelands is based on those who reside *permanently* in their homelands.

In the last few decades of the Soviet Union's existence, there was growing concern about the spatial mismatch between industrial resources and additions to the labor force. The bulk of the Soviet Union's industrial infrastructure was located in central Russia, the Urals, Ukraine, and Belarus. Meanwhile, most of the increments to the labor force were coming from the Central Asian states. For decades, additions to the labor force had been a major factor fueling Soviet economic growth as labor productivity grew slowly. There was a rather rigorous debate as to whether more investment should be made in the republics of Central Asia, where the populations were growing the fastest, or to induce young Central Asians to migrate to and work in central Russia and other more industrialized regions of the Soviet Union. In the post-Soviet period, the number of persons of the Central Asian titular nationalities living *permanently* in Russia increased moderately from 882,000 in 1989 to 963,000 in 2002, with about half this increment attributable to migration. However, there is considerable evidence that the number of Central Asians who are migrating to Russia on a *temporary* basis for labor purposes has increased considerably. In the early period following the breakup of the Soviet Union, ethnic considerations and a desire to be in one's homeland may have dominated migration decisions. But in the second half of the 1990s, economic considerations and the desire to feed one's family took over. In each year since 1994, there has been positive net migration into Russia of

each of the Central Asian titular ethnic groups. This encompasses legal, recorded immigration. If illegal, temporary migration were added, the evidence points to what can be called a massive migration to Russia, with economic considerations being primary and cultural considerations a distant second. For many Central Asians, Russia has become a major migration destination to an extent that Soviet planners and Western Sovietologists could have never imagined.



## **Chapter 3. The Migration System in the former Soviet Union**

### **3.1 The former Soviet Union as the Forgotten Migration System**

Many of the major advances in migration theory that were formulated in the late twentieth century occurred while the Soviet Union was a closed economic and migration space. In its centrally-planned economic system, the exchange of goods, ideas, money, and most notably people across its borders was tightly controlled. In contrast to most other countries, which at that time were trying to keep people out, the Soviet Union was making strenuous efforts to keep people in. Because it was a closed and isolated country for over seventy years, it is understandable that as theoretical advances were being made to comprehend the migration movements of the twentieth century that the Soviet Union was almost completely omitted from the discussion. Migration theory was being developed beyond the original push-pull framework of Ravenstein by a number of scholars examining different aspects migration. Most prominently, it was Massey and colleagues who examined and tested the validity of existing migration theory and applied it to the world's major migration systems, as existing explanations were insufficient to explain the complexities of contemporary migration forcing a re-evaluation of theories of international migration (Massey et al. 1993, 2005). Their goal was to examine the determinants of international migration, not the consequences. In a series of books and articles, he and his colleagues discussed five major global migration systems – North America, Western Europe, Asia and the Pacific, the Gulf region, and the Southern Cone of South America.

Because of its isolation, examination of the migration system in the Soviet Union, as well as other communist states in Eastern Europe, has been marginalized.

For several reasons beyond being an almost completely closed migration space, the determinants of migration within the Soviet Union differed from those found elsewhere. One was the high degree of state control over both international and internal migration. Emigration of select groups was allowed only at times of political expediency and there was almost no immigration to the country. Permission was required to migrate internally and resident permits were required of all citizens which indicated their legal place of residence. The country had an avowed goal of a narrow income distribution and the equalization of incomes and the standard of living across regions, thus dampening a factor that drives migration both internationally and internally elsewhere in the world.

Table 5 depicts the factors influencing migration during the Soviet era and in the post-Soviet period. Migration has gone from being internal within one country with restricted emigration, to being international across fifteen newly-independent states. Over time, there was a gradual hardening of the external borders, which ran counter to Marxist thought, which predicted that national borders would dissipate and that people would unite along class lines (Chandler 1998). By the end of the Soviet Union's existence, it had become a closed economic space with rigid control of the movement of goods, people, and information across its borders.

**Table 5: Factors influencing migration in the USSR and FSU**

<b>Migration in the USSR</b>	<b>Migration in the FSU successor states</b>
<b>One country, all migration internal</b>	<b>Fifteen countries, with large “migrant” populations</b>
<b>Internal migration tightly controlled via <i>propiska</i>, with emigration to other countries forbidden</b>	<b>Less control over movements and emigration permitted</b>
<b>Administratively-set prices, narrow income distribution, uniform standards of living</b>	<b>Market-determined prices, broader income distribution, and disparities in living standards</b>
<b>Elaborate system of subsidies causing non-market enterprise and regional “profitability”</b>	<b>Removal of subsidies has allowed some sectors and regions to profit, others to go bankrupt</b>
<b>No open unemployment</b>	<b>Open unemployment, quite high in some countries or regions</b>
<b>Closed economy, tightly-controlled foreign trade</b>	<b>Open economies, globalization, membership in international institutions</b>

Internally, migration was tightly controlled, initially via the infamous GULAG (*Glavnoe Upravlenie ispravitel'no-trudovykh LAGerei*, Main Administration of Corrective Labor Camps) system and later with the use of resident permits and wage incentives. Since 1990, freedom of internal movement and emigration to other countries have been permitted. In general, migration has become much freer, including visa-free travel among the successor states. The system of administratively-set prices led to a narrow income distribution and uniform living standards across regions. Wide disparities in income levels and living standards among regions have now emerged. Enterprise profits in the post-Soviet states are now determined by market mechanisms. The economies of the FSU states have increasingly opened up to outside influences and there is an increased flow of goods, information, and people between them and the rest of the world and most have taken up membership in international institutions.

Most state-owned enterprises have been privatized since 1991. Prices are now set by market forces. Overt unemployment has resulted in large numbers of unemployed persons in countries and regions with steep economic downturns. Elimination of the budget transfers from the USSR budget has benefited Russia and the Baltic states at the expense of the underdeveloped Central Asian states. Much investment now comes from foreign direct investment (FDI). However, the spatial allocation of FDI has been far from uniform across countries or regions within them, further exacerbating already-large regional disparities. The per capita differences of FDI into the FSU states have been startling. The stock of FDI ranged from a high of \$3,013 per capita in Estonia to just \$11 per person in Tajikistan (Broadman 2005, 365-66). Factors explaining higher levels of FDI include political stability or having a significant oil and gas sector. As a result, flows into the Baltic states, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Russia have been much higher than in others. The reforms have resulted in dramatic differences in terms of standard of living, economic development, and poverty rates (Ivakhnyuk 2006, 1). The countries of the former Soviet Union started the transition with some of the lowest levels of income inequality in the world but some now have among the most unequal (The World Bank 2002, xiv). There are problems with the measurement of income inequality among households and regions in the FSU states and other transition countries. However, the general trend in the FSU states has been a rapid increase in inequality from the late 1980s until the late 1990s and then a leveling off (Mitra and Yemtsov 2006). The same steep rise in inequality took place among states and regions. At the same time,

the transition-induced output declines differed considerably among the FSU states leading to a widening of output levels (The World Bank 2002, 5). This was due to a variety of factors including initial conditions, historical factors, speed of reforms, and level of ethnic violence. Length of consecutive years of output decline ranged from four years in Armenia to ten years Ukraine. The depths of the cumulative output decline ranged from 18 percent in Uzbekistan to 78 percent in Georgia, making the Great Depression in the 1930s in the United States seem mild in comparison. In 1990, the ratio of the FSU state with the highest gross national income (GNI) per capita to the lowest was 4.7. In 2005, this ratio had risen to 11.3. The more comprehensive coefficient of variation showed a similar trend, going from 0.50 to 0.70 over the same period (The World Bank 2007). Disparities among regions have risen even more. The high-low ratio among the regions of Russia went from five to thirty-six between 1990 and 2002 and the coefficient of variation went from 0.43 to 0.72 (Goskomstat Rossii (State Committee on Statistics of Russia) 2007a). Thus, a key variable that typically contributes to migration among countries or among regions is becoming increasingly significant in the FSU. There have been considerable internal migration flows within the FSU states, especially to the capital and other large cities. However, the focus here is on migration among the fifteen successor states to the Soviet Union.

While most of the world's countries are ethnically heterogeneous to a degree, and are becoming more so with increased migration, the Soviet Union was almost unparalleled in its ethnic complexity. There were 130 different ethnic groups enumerated in the 1989 population census conducted just prior to the country's

demise, of which fifty-three had ethnic homelands. In fact, it was along these ethnic seams that the country split apart as each of the fifteen successor states is the homeland of a different ethnic group. Prior to the country's breakup, there had been considerable mixing of the different ethnic groups outside of their traditional homelands because of past migration movements. At the time of the 1989 population census conducted just prior to the dissolution of the country, sixty million persons, over 20 percent of the Soviet population, were members of one of many ethnic diaspora groups living outside of their homelands.

These differences however did not lead to a unique "Soviet" theory of migration. Though nearly all of the migration was internal, people moved for many of the same reasons as they did elsewhere, though the factors influencing those movements differed in their relative impact and levels. If there were ever any differences in the determinants and types of migration movements in the former Soviet Union (FSU), with the breakup of the country, transitions to market economies, and social liberalization, including freedom of movement and right to emigrate, there are certainly not now. The types, scope, and factors affecting migration in the former Soviet Union are beginning to resemble those elsewhere in the world. The recent incorporation of the FSU into the global economic and migration system makes it worthy of renewed interest among migration scholars. The purpose of this chapter is to bring the migration system in the FSU into discussions of migration theory, to evaluate each of the major migration theories against the movements in the FSU, and

finally to see if there are ways in which the movements found in the region can inform migration theory.

### ***3.1.1 Defining the Migration System in the FSU***

A “migration system” is defined as a spatial process with a clear geographic form and structure (Massey et al. 2005, 60). They are international labor markets which exchange relatively large numbers of migrants but are also characterized by certain feedback mechanisms that connect movements of people to flows of goods, capital, ideas, and information. They might originate in colonial ties established under imperialistic systems but they don’t have to. Since the Soviet Union was an almost entirely self-contained migration space, it would be hard to argue that it was not a separate migration system. One clear distinction between the Soviet Union and other migration systems in existence when the main bodies of international migration theory were being developed was that almost all of the migration that took place was internal migration. It is only after the breakup of the country that it has become international. This feature of internal migrants becoming international migrants without moving makes the migration system in the FSU unique but also requires some caution. First, these “new” international migrants didn’t actually become so without moving, as is often claimed. They had moved previously from one Soviet republic to another and in doing so traveled geographic and cultural distances similar to other international movements. These movements during the Soviet period were considerable, resulting in large diaspora populations based on either place-of-birth or

ethnicity when the country dissolved. Second, distinction needs to be made between those flows of migrants that occurred during the Soviet period and new flows that have occurred since the breakup and the economic transition, as the patterns and causes of these movements differed between the Soviet and post-Soviet periods.

### ***3.1.2 Migration Flows since the Breakup of the Soviet Union***

As with any migration system, a large portion of flows are not captured by the statistical system. This is even more the case in the FSU system with its new countries and its still-developing migration statistics systems. While a wide range of estimates are given for undocumented migration into Russia with an implausible upper limit of 35 million, the consensus estimates are that there are some four to five million (Andrienko and Guriev 2005, 16). Given the deterioration of the statistical systems in the FSU states and of the systems for recording migration flows in particular, more than the usual degree of caution should be applied when analyzing data on migration across the region. However, based on the data available a broad picture of the direction and magnitude of the flows can be constructed. Based on available data for legal permanent migration, for most FSU states, over 95 percent, and usually virtually all immigration originated in another FSU state. The same data where available shows that between 75 and 95 percent of emigration went to another FSU state. In 1989, 100 percent of recorded immigrants were from other FSU states, a figure that has declined only slightly to 96 percent in 2007. In 1989, 94 percent of emigrants went to other FSU states (Goskomstat Rossii (State Committee on



Statistics of Russia)). This share declined to about half in the early 2000s before increasing to 68 percent in 2007. Though there are flows to outside the region, at least initially most of the international migration movements that take place are between countries within the region.

In FSU migration and foreign-relations vernacular, foreign countries are divided into the “near abroad” (those that were part of the Soviet Union) and the “far abroad” (the rest of the world). There are four major groups of migration interactions between countries of the former Soviet Union and those outside the region. The first was rather significant migration flows to Germany, Israel, and the United States in the 1990s, much of this ethically-motivated or refugee migration. These flows dissipated over time in part because these destination states tightened entry restrictions. For instance from Ukraine after 2000, only 25,000 to 50,000 persons a year migrated to outside the FSU, many to countries that already had significant Ukrainian diaspora populations (UNICEF, Innocenti Research Centre 2005d).

A second set of migration flows outside the FSU migration system was the increased interaction between the three Baltic states and the EU, both before and after they became EU members in 2004, and their decreased migration interaction with other FSU states. A third set of flows is the emigration of wealthier and more educated segments of Russian society, who have emigrated abroad or who shuttle between Russia and other high-income countries, in some cases assisted by firms offering intermediary migration services (Rybakovsky and Ryazanstev 2005, 10). A fourth is

migration exchanges with low-income countries mainly in the form of labour migration. There is anecdotal evidence of considerable migration to Russia from Afghanistan, China, Vietnam, Nigeria and other countries (Rybakovsky and Ryazanstev 2005). The extent of these flows is difficult to determine because most is temporary and unrecorded, though data indicate that they are not insignificant as there were 42,000 Vietnamese and 48,000 Turks working in Russia in 2003 (Rybakovsky and Ryazanstev 2005). In total, there were persons from 120 different countries working in Russia, although the numbers from some might be small. There seems to be evidence that from some of the FSU states, a portion of labor migration is directed towards countries outside the FSU. According to one survey conducted in 2003, from Georgia, two-thirds of migrants went to other FSU states, mainly Russia and one-third went to Western Europe, Israel, the United States, Turkey, and Greece (Badurashvili 2005, 9). Another survey of migrants from Georgia showed slightly different percent distribution indicating that 45 percent of migrants went to Russia, followed by 15 percent to Greece, 9 percent to Germany, and 8 percent to Turkey (Lianos 2005, 16). More than 100,000 Moldovans work in the Mediterranean countries or Israel (Zaionchkovskaya and Korobkov 2002, 30). However, from Tajikistan 98 percent of migrants went to Russia (Bakozoda 2005, 20), and from Kyrgyzstan, 89 percent went to either Russia or Kazakhstan (Sulaimanova 2005, 14). These numbers indicate that while most international movements involving an FSU state are with another, that increasingly the system is opening up to countries outside the FSU.

A feature of migration in the Soviet Union that deserves mention was large amount of forced migration, the most notable being the Gulag migration to Siberia during the Stalin period. In addition, there were the deportations of entire ethnic groups after World War II, many of whom had not been allowed to return to their ethnic homelands until after the breakup of the Soviet Union (International Organization for Migration 1998; Pohl 2000). Their deportation within one country and return across newly-created international borders was an issue that the international community had little experience in dealing with (International Organization for Migration 1997a). Commensurate with the breakup of the Soviet Union and several ensuing ethno-territorial conflicts, there some large flows of refugees and IDPs (internally displaced persons). The numbers of such persons seemed to peak in the mid-1990s at about 1.2 million IDPs and 600 thousand refugees (UNICEF, Innocenti Research Centre). The numbers have fallen considerably since then as there has been some return. However, there remain a number of “frozen conflicts” that lack durable solutions.

The flows of people in the former Soviet Union can be classified as a migration system according to Massey’s criteria not just because most of the movements remain within the region but also because of feedback mechanisms, not the least of which is political linkages. There is considerable path dependency among countries in the region including transport, linguistic, cultural, and economic ties in addition to geographic proximity that have lead to and will continue to contribute to the bulk of migration taking place within the region. Soviet development policy aimed at income equalization masked many of the development differences among the fifteen

republics. With the dissolution of the country and the centrally-planned economic system, many of these differences are becoming apparent. The FSU system is beginning to resemble one where some countries have abundant capital, declining labor forces and others with a limited supply of capital, low rates of job creation, and abundant reserves of labor, thus creating the conditions for labor migration.

### **3.2 Literature on migration in the FSU**

The migration system in the fifteen FSU successor states is new, understudied, and there is a lack of information and data on migration processes, though increasing amounts are beginning to emerge. Until recently, much of the literature examining the Eurasian migration system as a whole has been produced by various international agencies. The primary goal of much of this research was to simply understand the magnitude and direction of migrant flows among the states in the region and between Eurasia and the rest of the world (UNECE and UNFPA 1996; International Organization for Migration 1997a, 2002; UN Population Division 2002a; International Centre for Migration Policy Development 2005; Rios 2006; Mansoor and Quillin 2007). The 1990s was a period of rather chaotic migration movements across the region when fifteen new states replaced the Soviet Union, ethnic violence and separatist movements spawned large refugee and internally displaced populations, and the legal structure regulating migration movements and citizenship in the new states was quite ambiguous. In 1996, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the International Organization for Migration organized the CIS Migration Conference to take stock of and attempted to deal with the migration

movements occurring as a result of the breakup of the Soviet Union (UNHCR and IOM 1996).<sup>7</sup> These were all valuable contributions and necessary at the time but were rather descriptive and little analysis was contained in them to understand that causes of migration across the region.

### ***3.2.1 Research on Migration during the Soviet Period***

While data and information on migration were scarce during the Soviet period, there was a sufficient amount available to be able to provide interesting insights. Much of this was based on data from the various population censuses and the limited amount of administrative statistics that were made available. These resulted in a number of studies examining internal migration processes and urbanization in the USSR (for a complete list see Rowland 1986). Among these were a series of studies by Lewis and colleagues examining the links between migration, urbanization, modernization, and ethnic mixing and the impact of population redistribution on society (Lewis, Rowland, and Clem 1976; Lewis and Rowland 1979). Following from these was Kaiser's study of nationalism and homelands in the Soviet Union (Kaiser 1994). In a series of books and articles, Chauncy Harris carefully documented and analyzed the growth of cities in the Soviet Union, which had undergone one of the most rapid urbanizations in history (Harris 1945, 1971). There were a number of studies by Soviet scholars on what was then internal migration in the Soviet Union examining labor market conditions and quality of life factors in regression models (Andrienko

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<sup>7</sup> The full name of the conference was the "Regional Conference to address the problems of refugees, displaced persons, other forms of involuntary displacement and returnees in the countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States and relevant neighboring states".

and Guriev 2005, 18-19). Much of this was based on resident-permit data which were quite complete given the tight administrative controls at the time. The aim of much of this research was to support the centrally-planned economy and its efforts to achieve an optimum spatial distribution of the population. There were also interesting studies of border controls and the role they played in migration control (Chandler 1998).

### ***3.2.2 Data on Post-Soviet Migration***

In addition to the transition of their economic systems, the fifteen FSU successor states also needed to transform their statistical systems to monitor the new economic and social situations in their countries, including the new types, directions, and magnitudes of migration (UN Statistical Commission and UNECE 2001). With other aspects of state-building on their agenda, the statistical systems of the FSU states were slow to adapt to the new migration realities and the lack of both macro- and micro-level data on migration is a major obstacle to understanding migration in them (Andrienko and Guriev 2005). During the early 1990s, borders among the new states were extremely porous and for those countries affected by ethnic violence, there were extended periods where population movements went entirely unrecorded (UN Population Division 2002a). With significant technical assistance from the international community, the FSU states are beginning to erect the necessary systems to properly count border crossings.

The study of migration has moved away from reliance on official statistics and aggregate data towards a more extensive use of household surveys, life histories, and in-depth community studies (Massey et al. 2005, 15). The problem in the FSU region is that for most of the 1990s, with the transition of the statistical systems, official statistics and aggregate data on migration were poor or non-existent and household surveys that included questions or modules on migration were just coming into existence. It has only been recently that anthropologists and sociologists, either native to the region or from outside, have been able to gather life histories and to conduct in-depth community surveys of people and migrants in the region (Gerber 2005a). With time, there has been an increasing number of household surveys that have included questions or modules on migration (Netherlands Economic Institute 1998).

With the opening of the FSU countries to the rest of the world, there has been an increased opportunity to conduct surveys on migration and other social and economic topics using modern survey methods. A portion of these have been poverty and other types of household surveys either conducted or financed by international organizations similar to those elsewhere in the world. Given the importance of migration and remittances to many countries in the region, there have also been a number of migration-specific surveys that have been conducted. This includes three micro-surveys of migrants in Moldova in 2004 conducted for the IOM, USAID (U.S. Agency for International Development), and the IMF (The World Bank 2005, 14-15), surveys of labor migrants from Georgia and Tajikistan (International Organization for Migration 2003a; Olimova and Bosc 2003; Badurashvili 2005), surveys of migration

and return in Georgia, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan (Sulaimanova 2005; Lianos 2005; Bakozoda 2005), and surveys of migration processes in Armenia using data from various transportation means to estimate migration (Ministry of Statistics, State Register and Analysis of the Republic of Armenia 1999). Several surveys of the attitudes of Russians towards migrants have been carried out (Alexseev 2002, 2006). This is important because the attitudes of any population towards migrants or “others” becomes a mutually reinforcing stance of government policy. Such surveys are important for determining how widespread are the attitudes behind the widespread immigrant violence in Russia (Finn 2008). There remain a number of potentially useful macro and micro datasets on migration behavior in Russia that remain closed to researchers that some have advocated opening (Andrienko and Guriev 2005, 33).

### ***3.2.3 Current literature on causes of post-Soviet migration***

As noted, research on migration in the region during the Soviet period was not the focus of many migration scholars. Likewise, those in the country were isolated from the international community and not exposed to many of the advances in migration theory in the second half of the twentieth century. Recently, there has been increased attention to migration processes in the region as well as migration research being carried out at universities and institutes within the region who now have access to and knowledge of the migration research and techniques that have been developed outside the region. In addition to the reviews of the migration situation in the region being conducted by international organizations, there is a small but increasing volume of



academic literature on various aspects of migration in the region. This is being conducted by scholars from outside the region, an increasing number of scholars within the region who have increasingly been exposed to western migration scholars and their ideas, as well as émigrés who left the Soviet Union, only to return years or decades later with the requisite language skills and contacts. There has also been considerable fruitful collaboration between the two groups (see for example Braichevska et al. 2004). There have also been studies of attitudes of Russians towards migrants and various “others” (Alexseev 2006), studies of the impact of remittances on poverty reduction (Gorlich, Johnson, and Luecke 2006), and surveys of migration intentions among Kyrgyz (Agadjanian, Nedoluzhko, and Kumskov 2008), among others. This list is not comprehensive but as mentioned, the literature on migration in the FSU is growing. A number of studies have examined the causes of internal migration in Russia using increasingly better datasets (Andrienko and Guriev 2005, 19). One of the most-researched topics has been the status and intentions of the twenty-five million person Russian diaspora, many of which at least in part focused on the possible causes for some portion to return to Russia (Dunlop 1993, 1994; Kolstoe 1995; Chinn and Kaiser 1996; Zevelev 2001; Heleniak 2004). A World Bank study of migration in Eurasia noted that while diaspora migration was the major factor driving migration in the immediate post-Soviet period, economic factors dominate currently, and that demographic factors will play an increasingly important role in the decades ahead (Mansoor and Quillin 2007). Other World Bank studies have focused on the importance of migration and remittances to poverty

alleviation in some of the poor and more remittance-dependent countries in the region such as Moldova (The World Bank 2005).

### **3.3 The Initiation of International Migration across the post-Soviet Space**

As is often stated, there is not one universal theory of migration but rather a fragmented set of theories which had been developed in isolation somewhat along disciplinary boundaries. The major theories that seek to explain the initiation of international migration are neoclassical economics, new economics of migration, segmented or dual labor market theory, and world systems theory. In their book, *Migration Theory: Talking Across Disciplines*, Brettel and Hollifield, discuss the dominant theories, major research questions, and levels of analysis that the disciplines of anthropology, demography, economics, history, law, political science, and sociology employ in their analysis of migration (Brettel and Hollifield 2000). The theories developed to understand contemporary international migration operate at widely divergent levels of analysis. As such, there are also differences in the types of data and information each discipline uses to answer questions about the migration process. Some disciplines focus more on the causes of migration while others focus on the impacts. This section considers international migration processes that are taking place across the FSU against the major contemporary migration theories that address the initiation of initiate international migration. The first section of chapter 6 deals with factors that perpetuate migration once started.

### ***3.3.1 Neoclassical economics***

Neoclassical economic theory of migration has both macro and micro models of international migration (as well as internal migration) and is the oldest explanation for these movements. In the micro version, rational people decide to migrate following careful consideration of a cost-benefit calculation which they believe will lead to a positive return from movement. Migration is seen as an investment in human capital. Income in one's own country is multiplied by the probability of unemployment and subtracted from the expected net earnings in a destination which are discounted by the probability of finding work and by the probability of being deported. The costs of migration, both financial and psychic, are subtracted from this difference. If the calculation is positive, the person should choose to migrate. The macro version holds that international migration is caused by differences in the supply and demand for labor with workers moving from labor-abundant to labor-scarce countries. The millions of individual migration decisions made under these conditions make up migration streams. Though, international migration is clearly related to differentials in wages and employment (little movement generally occurs in their absence), economic disparities alone do not explain international movement

The countries of the former Soviet Union started the transition period with some of the flattest income distributions across society and among regions of any country in the world. But with the economic transition, income disparities have widened considerably so that several, including Russia, now have among the most unequal distributions. Thus, a major impetus to migration – income differentials between

countries and regions – that wasn't much of an influence in the Soviet Union has become a major factor in the post-Soviet space. The ratio of the country with the highest to the lowest GNI per capita increased from 4.7 in 1990 to 12.0 in 1998 before declining to 11.3 in 2005. The coefficient of variation of GNI per capita increased from 0.50 in 1990 to 0.70 in 2005 (The World Bank 2007). More important for migration was that the gap between Russia and the non-Russian states (not including the three Baltic states) which increased considerably.

A number of articles on migration in the FSU state that much of the migration towards Russia is caused by economic differentials without really modeling or proving this (Zaionchkovskaya and Korobkov 2002, 7). These also include a recent IOM report on migration in the region noted that the causes of migration have shifted from conflict and diaspora migration in the 1990s to primarily economic causes after 2000 (Rios 2006, 1). A report examining socio-economic versus political causes of migration in the region was simply a listing of possible variables influencing migration and a description of them (Scherbakova 2000). One problem with attempting to model migration across the region is that so many of the movements across the region are missed by official statistics because of the newness of the states, the migration flows, and the migration statistics systems designed to measure them. An implicit assumption of neoclassical economics theories of migration is that the movements are one-way and permanent while many of the movements in the region are of a circular or temporary nature, much like elsewhere in the world. Models done for the United States and other migration streams tend to do better when

undocumented migration is included as well as documented, as is the case for the United States (Massey et al. 2005, 75). This certainly seems to be the case for the FSU as there is a considerable amount of migration that is not captured by the statistical systems of the new states. Estimates of undocumented or illegal migration to Russia range up to an implausibly high level of fifteen million, with more realistic estimates in the range of three to five million (International Centre for Migration Policy Development 2005). From some of the non-Russian FSU states, 10 to 30 percent of their labor forces are working abroad in Russia or elsewhere and most of these movements are unrecorded.

However, a number of surveys of migrants indicate that the wide disparities in income levels and the possibility for high earnings was the cause of their decision to migrate. The earnings differences for migrants from Georgia was rather impressive as they earned on average \$95 a month before migrating and \$611 during their time working aboard (Lianos 2005, 36). While their incomes declined upon return, they earned on average \$220, which is still substantially more than when they left. A similar pattern was found among migrants from Tajikistan who earned \$30 on average before migration, \$274 while aboard, and \$91 upon return (Bakozoda 2005, 43). Prior to migration, 55 percent of Kyrgyz migrants earned less than \$50 dollars a month, and one-third earned less than \$25 a month and the average migrant increased their wages by \$321 a month during the first trip aboard. There was the same increase in post-migration income as the share earning less than \$25 a month decreased from 34 to 14 percent. A desire to improve their economic conditions was cited by over

half of Georgian migrants as their reason for migration (International Organization for Migration 2003a, 20). In a survey of migrants in Kyiv, 38 percent cited economic reasons behind their decision to migrate, in many cases from outside the former Soviet Union, figures that challenged the notion that most are using Ukraine as a transit country to Western Europe (Braichevska et al. 2004, 25).

One nuance of the neoclassical model is that there are differences as to where the effect of human capital is the greatest, at home or abroad. This might lead to different migration propensities among people of different education and skill levels. The differentiation of migrants along skill and education levels is understood even in the most aggregated models. But most tests treat migrants as homogeneous actors but selective evidence seems to point to most migrants in the FSU being more highly educated than non-migrants, while some have no qualifications (Olimova and Bosc 2003, 28-29). There appears to be some evidence that there is skill sorting among migrants by sector and destination with more educated migrants from Moldova going to Western Europe and less educated migrants going to Russia (Gorlich, Johnson, and Luecke 2006, 11). Expatriates from many of the FSU states working abroad are classified as highly-skilled but many were working below their skill level because wages for unskilled or semi-skilled work in destinations countries was higher than skilled work at home (The World Bank 2006a, 5). There seems to be more evidence of the applicability of neoclassical explanations of migration in the FSU at the micro level rather than at the macro level. This might be due to the lack of reliable data that properly capture all of the flows in the region. Future research should attempt to

construct better migration data sets and also to disaggregate the flows by education or skill level.

### ***3.3.2 New economics of migration***

Neoclassical economic theories of migration use individuals as the unit of analysis, whereas new economics of migration uses households and provides a framework for labor migration from less developed countries. Households or communities act collectively to maximize expected income but also to minimize risk, which they do by diversifying the allocation of resources. In migration terms, they do so by keeping some members at home while sending others abroad or by sending people to geographically diverse labor markets. International migration is a necessary strategy for capital accumulation from many lower-income countries because of the lack of capital, credit, crop insurance, and futures markets, and unemployment and retirement insurance (Massey et al. 2005, 21-26). The absence of these creates the need for capital accumulation usually in the form of cash. Either neoclassical economics or the new economics of migration by itself would constitute an incomplete explanation of international migration. A key difference between neoclassical and new economics of migration is that neoclassical almost always assumes permanent migration in order to achieve higher lifetime earnings while new economics of migration implies considerable circular migration and perhaps eventual return to origin or homeland. New economics of migration seems to have a bit more traction or at least more evidence when applied to the flows in the FSU. Temporary or circular migration can

be better explained by new economics of labor migration than by neoclassical theory (The World Bank 2006b), and much of the current migration in the FSU consists of such flows, especially from major sending states in Central Asia (UNDP Regional Bureau for Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States 2005, 141). In one survey of migrants from Tajikistan, 90 percent indicated that they had no intention settling abroad permanently (The World Bank 2006a, 4). There are several ways to demonstrate that the new economics of migration is operative in explaining migration flows in the region. One is to point to the importance of remittances at both the macro and micro levels.

***Remittances as a share of GDP in the FSU:*** To earn income from labor and then to remit those earnings to their country of origin is the reason that people migrate abroad but the scope and scale of remittances seems to have been underestimated or underappreciated in the 1990s. As evidence of the importance of migrant remittances among countries in the region, in 2007 Tajikistan with 46 percent of its GDP coming in the form of remittances and Moldova with 38 percent were two most remittance-dependent countries in the world (The World Bank 2007). Kyrgyzstan (19 percent of GDP from remittances), Armenia (9 percent), and Georgia (7 percent) are also countries highly reliant on remittance income, with remittance/GDP shares well above the average for all developing countries of 2 percent. There is a strong inverse correlation between the ratio of non-Russian FSU states per capita GDP to Russia and remittances as a share of GDP. In other words, the lower GDP per capita relative to Russia, the higher the dependence on remittances. This would seem to support both



neoclassical and new economics of migration theories. From Moldova, one-quarter of the workforce is working abroad and workers' remittances constitute 27 percent of GDP in 2004 (The World Bank 2005, 1). Over the course of 2003-2004, nearly 600,000 Moldovans or 40 percent of the workforce worked abroad at some point (The World Bank 2005, iv). The majority of these movements are short-term and temporary with the average time spent abroad being 20 months. Most Moldovans have not moved aboard permanently but they go abroad repeatedly, as attachment to home is important (Cuc et al. 2005, 37). This seems to support new household economics as an explanation for migration more so than neoclassical economics. Given Moldova's geographic position between wealthy neighbors to the east such as Russia and the even more prosperous EU to the west, there are plenty of opportunities for Moldovans to increase their lifetime earnings by permanent migration abroad. Estimates are that from Georgia, about 8 percent of the population was working abroad, from Tajikistan approximately 400,000 persons, about 15 percent of the workforce, and from Uzbekistan, between 600,000 and 700,000 persons or 5 percent of the labor force (Badurashvili 2005, 10; UNICEF, Innocenti Research Centre 2005b, 2005c). From Kyrgyzstan, there are between 500,000 and 700,000 labor migrants, which is one-quarter of the labor force (Sulaimanova 2005, 42).

Diaspora migration as is increasingly used in the development literature, refers to a country actively sending its citizens abroad in order to earn labor income (Newland 2004). The size and importance of remittances has become so significant that this has become a prominent development and poverty-reduction strategy for many low-

income countries. The term “diaspora migration” takes on slightly different meanings in the post-Soviet context. When the country dissolved, 10 percent of the population became international migrants or place-of-birth diaspora members and 20 percent found themselves living outside their ethnic homelands. Many of the early migration movements in the region were of people moving back to their ethnic homeland or country of birth. More recently, so-called diaspora migration movements have begun to resemble those elsewhere in the world between low- and high-income countries. That is people leaving the lower-income countries in the region for higher-income countries, both inside and outside the region, in order to earn incomes not available at home. As noted, in terms of remittance shares of GDP, several of the FSU states are among the highest in the world. Also, based on data which are available, ten of the FSU states were listed as being among the top emigration countries in the world in 2005 (The World Bank 2007). In a number of the more migration-dependent countries in the region, private investment levels are quite low such as Moldova where in 2004, it was only 18 percent of GDP (The World Bank 2005, 4). A large portion of the recent increase in investment was due to remittance-financed construction.

***Household reliance on remittances in the FSU:*** At the household level, there is ample evidence of the operation of new household economics of migration as an explanation for migration across the region including the number of households that rely on remittances for a portion of their income. In Moldova, 40 percent of households report that 65 or more percent of their household income comes from

remittances and another quarter state that between 35 and 65 percent is from remittances, thus pointing to considerable diversification (The World Bank 2005, 22). For migrants from Georgia, 72 percent send remittances back and one-third of households interviewed indicated that a family member had traveled abroad for work in the previous six months (Badurashvili 2005, 15). Another survey of migrants from Georgia indicated that 85 percent traveled alone without other family members (Lianos 2005, 17-18). In the survey, 50 percent said that the migration decision was theirs alone while 46 percent said that it was a family decision. One-third of migrants received money from friends or relatives to finance the first move abroad. Fifty-five percent of the time, the person who made the decision as to how remittances would be used was the spouse, and in only 4 percent of cases was it the migrant themselves. These data seem to point that a large portion of the migration from Georgia occurs within the context of a household, lending support to new household economics migration theories. In Armenia, another country heavily dependent on migrant remittances and with a long history of emigration, remittances made up about 16 percent of household income in 2002 to 2004 (UNICEF, Innocenti Research Centre 2005a). Migrants to Russia from the other FSU states spent on average 18 months while working there and earned \$1,782 (UNICEF, Innocenti Research Centre 2005a). A study of migrants in Russia found that they were using labor migration as a strategy of household adaptation to economic hardship at home (Andrienko and Guriev 2005, 19). According to data from a survey of Tajik migrants, 40 percent said that they had between five and ten dependents, 30 percent said that they had between one and four and only 24 percent said that they had none (Bakozoda 2005, 17). From Tajikistan, 82

percent of migrants went aboard alone, but 91 percent said that they were married or had a partner (Olimova and Bosc 2003, 34). Of these migrants, one-quarter remitted half of their incomes earned aboard and 27 percent remitted more than half. From Kyrgyzstan, 75 percent of migrants went aboard alone, but 65 percent that the migration decision was made by the family (Sulaimanova 2005, 16). According to surveys the number of migrants remitting income was quite significant, 63 percent of migrants from Tajikistan, 50 percent from Georgia, and 38 percent from Kyrgyzstan (Qullin et al. 2007, 13). On average from these three countries, about 40 percent of income was remitted back to the origin country, indicating that migrants were not working for themselves but to improve the living standards of a larger household.

The gender dimensions of migration along geographic lines also seem to support the diversification of income sources as there seems to be a definite gender division to different destinations among FSU states. In one sample from Georgia in 2003, 70 percent of males went to other FSU states and only 30 percent to the outside the FSU, while for females, 60 percent went to destinations outside the FSU (Badurashvili 2005, 9). Migration from Georgia during the Soviet period was predominantly male as men filled traditional economic niches in Russia and other FSU states in construction and retail trade (Hoffmann and Buckley 2008). With the opening up of countries outside the former Soviet Union to labor migrants from Georgia and increasing restrictions on migration to Russia, potential migrants from those countries have had to look elsewhere. Increasingly, this has been to Europe, Turkey and Israel but in more traditionally female occupations as health aides, nannies, and domestic

help. As labor migration from Georgia becomes increasingly feminized and destination regions shift, this has caused a restructuring of gender roles in a traditionally macho society. A similar gender division of labor migrants by country is seen from Moldova, a country that straddles the FSU and Europe. Sixty-six percent of migrants from Moldova are males, with three-quarters of Moldovan migrants to Russia being male and working in traditional male occupations (Cuc et al. 2005). However, to Spain, Italy, Turkey, Greece, and Cyprus over 60 percent of Moldovan migrants are female as there is more demand for them in traditionally female occupations.

The support at the macro and micro levels for new household economics as an explanation for migration in the region are just a portion of the available evidence. That many of the flows in the region are temporary or circular in nature lends further support. While there seems to be more support for this explanation than for neoclassical economics does not discount it as an explanation as all migration theories should be thought of as complimentary. People from the poorer countries in the region wouldn't be seeking temporary labor in the higher-income countries unless the necessary income gaps were present, which they are, and unless there were gains to be made from migration, which there are.

### ***3.3.3 Segmented or Dual Labor Market Theory***

Neoclassical and the new economics of migration focus on individuals or households while segmented labor market theory focuses on the labor demands of industrial

societies. Segmented labor market theory compliments neoclassical and new economic models of migration, it does not supplant them. Migration is caused by structural or demographic factors creating a primary sector with secure employment conditions, high wages, and social security standards and a secondary sector that has low wages, little security, and difficult working conditions. In order to avoid structural inflation, employers do not turn to low-skilled natives but to migrants, often unauthorized migrants, who will accept lower wages. Hierarchical constraints on motivation – similar to structural inflation but instead rewarding jobs with low prestige rather than low wages. Also part of this theory is the concept of ethnic enclaves which are a hybrid of the two with immigrants being able to parlay their education and experience more easily into economic gains. They are usually founded by a first wave of immigrants who have become successful entrepreneurs who then employ their ethnic kin. Another part of this theory is the demography of labor supply which says that because of a slowdown in traditional sources of low-wage labor - females, teenagers, and rural-urban migrants – employers have turned to international migrants. There is a built-in demand for immigrant labor that stems from these various characteristics of industrial societies.

***Segmented labour markets in Russia:*** The theory is primarily demand based, looking at the markets in the country of destination. Thus demonstration of this theory in the FSU should focus on the labor market in Russia, the main migration labor market in the region. Of any of the migration theories, visible evidence is greatest, in fact almost overwhelming, for segmented labor market theory in any migration-magnet

society. In the United States, Europe, or Russia there are a number of labor market segments and occupations dominated by immigrants, where one would be quite surprised to find a native. However, the distinction between primary and secondary labor markets is often arbitrary, leading to a greater instability in empirical estimates.

Among the types of evidence supporting the efficacy of segmented labor market theory in Russia are data, studies, or anecdotal evidence that a native-immigrant labor market is developing. This might include evidence of a selection bias among immigrants into Russia. Another factor that is important to the development of dual labor markets are the rights of migrant laborers. In the post-Soviet case, citizenship was an issue with USSR passports being replaced for those of the newly independent states as were visa issues (International Centre for Migration Policy Development 2005). The lack of citizenship rights has the ability to increase social inequalities and to exclude migrants (Brettel and Hollifield 2000 cite Heisler). During the 1990s, with the dismantling of one state and the erection of fifteen new ones in its place, there was considerable legal ambiguity. This uncertainty could and did lead to considerable abuse of migrant laborers, especially in Russia (Human Rights Watch 2009).

There is considerable evidence that the *gastarbeiter* (guest workers) in Russia are segmented into different labor market spheres along ethnic and gender dimensions, with industrial and transport workers mostly from Ukraine (as was the case during the Soviet period), people from Azerbaijan, China, and Vietnam mainly employed in trade, other Chinese working in agriculture, Turks working in building, and higher-

educated persons from the United States and Europe employed in higher-income positions in credit, finance, insurance, and management (Rybakovsky and Ryazanstev 2005, 14). The main flow of Tajiks into Russia are into sectors such as construction, engineering, oil and gas, all sectors that are experiencing labor shortages (Olimova and Bosc 2003, 23). Some of this is caused by the increased migration of Russians to Western Europe. A study of illegal employment in Russia showed that most work in construction, repair work, and commerce in the service sector, petty wholesale trade, private transport, home repairs, and dacha construction, restaurant service (Krassinets 1998, 14). In rural areas, work in agriculture is common. The lack of detailed studies of the labor market conditions of migrants in Russia, as has been done rather extensively in other migration magnets, is cited as a current research gap (Andrienko and Guriev 2005, 21). However, according to one survey, a sector of “migrant jobs” seems to be developing with only 30 percent of Russians feeling competition from immigrants for jobs.

One limitation to more systematic studies of a dual or segmented labor market developing in Russia is that the concept of foreign-born has slightly different character than elsewhere. For instance in the United States, there is a clear distinction between the native-born and foreign-born populations both statistically and conceptually and what this means to their life chances. There has been a wealth of studies conducted on the foreign-born population in the United States using census, administrative, and other data. The “foreign-born” in Russia could include a well-educated Russian born in one of the non-Russian FSU states who migrated to Russia



after the breakup of the FSU. They would face quite different life chances than a poor, low-skilled Tajik migrant or any of the other millions of labor migrants in Russia. Migrants in Russia are probably even less likely than those in the United States to be included in surveys and studies such as those done by Pew Hispanic Center which are based on the Current Population Survey (Passel and Cohn 2009).


*The demography of labor supply in the FSU:* More so than most higher-income countries in the world, the Russian population is declining and this is a cause for concern as many of the traditional sources of low-wage labor and new entrants to the labor force have dried up. Russian women have long had very high labor-force participation rates. The percent urban in Russian reached 70 percent in 1980 and has risen to only 73 percent since then. In recent years, rural-urban migration has averaged less than thirty thousand a year and the rural population size in Russia is old and stagnant (Goskomstat Rossii (State Committee on Statistics of Russia) 2005a). The size of the working-age population peaked in 2007 at 90 million and is projected to decline by fifteen million to seventy-five million by 2025 (Goskomstat Rossii (State Committee on Statistics of Russia) 2005b). Unless labor productivity can be raised to make up for this population decline, one of the few sources of growth that Russia has to be able to sustain economic growth is migration. Thus, Russia appears to have a built-in demand for labor migration. The geographic imbalance of labor force growth was an issue even during the Soviet period (Feshbach 1977). The debate centered on whether the fast-growing Muslim populations in Central Asia would migrate to labour-deficit areas of the Soviet Union according to universal laws of

migration or whether their cultural attachment to their ethnic homelands would induce them to stay in the impoverished republics of Central Asia. There was considerable debate among the Soviet leadership as to whether to make investments in the regions of Central Asia where the working-age populations were growing or to make efforts to induce the labor forces of those republics to migrate to central Russia and other regions where the bulk of industrial resources were located. In the post-Soviet period, this issue has resurfaced in a manner that nobody during the Soviet period could have imagined. It appears that there is validity on both sides of the debate as to whether Central Asians would migrate out of the region. In the post-Soviet period they obviously have in droves but mostly on a temporary basis as most surveys and anecdotal evidence points to their continued attachment to their homelands in Central Asia.

Figure 9 shows the past and projected population size of Russia and the eight southern tier FSU states (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan) that are the source of the bulk of current labor migrants. In 2000, the total population of these states was exactly half that of Russia but by 2050, will be over 90 percent. According to a UN study of replacement migration, for Russia to maintain the same population size in 2050, there will have to be an immigration to Russia of 28 million persons, 508 thousand a year, and to maintain the same labor force size, there will have to be an immigration of 36 million, or 650 thousand annually (United Nations 2001). By comparison, in the post-Soviet period, migration to Russia has averaged 360 thousand a year. Russia is hardly unique

is this regard of having a declining population and labor force, thereby creating at least a structural demand for migrants. In the UN study, Russia was one of ten countries or regions considered along with the United States, United Kingdom, Germany, France, Italy, Japan and the EU. This demographic imbalance certainly creates the pre-conditions for migration to Russia but that alone is not sufficient. Other factors have to also be at work such as government policies and economic conditions in both sending and receiving states. As the UN study states, immigrants to one country are also emigrants from another. One shortcoming of the UN simulations is that they assume that migration is permanent when many of the movements across the region have been shown to be circular or temporary. Thus, there appears to be at least anecdotal evidence that a segmented labor market is developing between natives and migrants in Russia and that this is being reinforced by the differential rates of population growth between Russia and some of the non-Russian FSU states.

**Figure 9: Population Size of Russia and the Southern FSU States, 1950 to 2050**



Source: (UN Population Division, 2003).

### ***3.3.4 World systems theory***

Historical-structural theory posits that there disadvantaged nations kept in dependency status by more geopolitically advantageous nations and that all countries do not follow the same orderly progression towards becoming advanced industrial societies. An extension of this is world systems theory which divides the world into core and periphery countries depending on their degree of dependence on the global capitalist system. The trust of world systems theory is that the penetration of capitalist economic relations into non-capitalist or pre-capitalist societies in search of land, labour, and raw materials creates a mobile population that is prone to migrate. As capitalism has expanded, more of the human population has become engaged in the global economy. This system of capitalist expansion creates a system of material links which facilitates the movement of goods, products, and information but also people by reducing the costs of transport and communications. This is one of the central tenants of globalization, that as the costs of transportation and communications are reduced in cost that the speed and amount of interactions increases. In this process both military and ideological links are established which further facilitate migration. Migration is more likely to occur between colonial powers and their former colonies because of cultural linguistic, administrative, investment, transportation, and communication links that were established during the colonial period. Related to this is the concept of global cities, which posits that the global economy is managed from a relatively small number of cities that have a highly-educated workforce which creates a demand for services of unskilled workers, often filled by immigrants.

During the Soviet period when the economy was centrally-planned, the FSU was only peripherally included in the global economy. With the transition to a market economy, it is now firmly engaged. World systems theory posits that international migration is a natural consequence of the penetration of the global economy into peripheral developing regions. The obvious consequence of the countries of the FSU joining the rest of the global economy has been increased international migration. The theory holds that international migration follows capital flows but in the opposite direction as changes are brought about in local economies that create an uprooted mobile population. Significant amounts of foreign direct investment, official development assistance (ODA), and other types of capital flows have been sent to the FSU states since they opened their economies to the outside world. This globalization of their economies was simultaneous with the transition of their economies away from central planning. Together these brought about massive disruptions to local economies and steep economic downturns, often creating mobile populations. The removal of the legal and administrative barriers to migration and emigration that existed under Soviet communism allowed the flow of people but the main cause was the penetration of the global economy into these states.

In order to facilitate business, material links are created to move goods, products, information, and capital but they also facilitate the movement of people by reducing the costs of transport and communications. In nearly all cases, these were international pathways that hadn't previously existed. When the countries of the

former Soviet Union and the Eastern Europe opened up to the rest of the world a flood of multinational companies, international agencies, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), religious, and military organizations entered these countries in large numbers. This exposed people of those countries to western culture, the English language, businesses and people from the sending countries which creates links that often resulted in international migration.

International migration is the result of the spread of capitalism into developing world, in this case former Communist world, but also within FSU. The theory also holds that international migration is especially likely between past colonial powers and their former colonies. Though the migration links between Russia and the non-Russian FSU states are not what the developers of world systems theory had in mind, the patterns are similar to those of other colonial powers and their former colonies. There is considerable migration between India and Britain and between Algeria and France because of linguistic, cultural, and economic ties created during colonial period. It is easy to draw parallels between British colonial legacies and the Soviet Union with regards to development in Central Asia (Diener 2008). In the same way, linguistic, cultural, administrative, transport, and communication links between Russia and most of the non-Russian FSU states developed during the communist period have remained in the post-Soviet period and have facilitated migration towards the former colonial power of Russia. When the Soviet Union broke apart, Russia had three-quarters of its territory and half of its population but even these shares understate its political, economic, and cultural dominance of the non-Russian states. It was from the central

core of the Russian Empire centered around Moscow that it expanded outwards to encompass increasingly large numbers of non-Russian and non-Slavic peoples in a manner similar to other colonial powers. In fact, it was the spread of the Russian Empire and then the Soviet Union into the periphery that caused a mobile population from these countries in the first place.

World systems theory has a complex and diffuse structure, which while on the surface seems to be a plausible explanation for migration, does not seem to lend itself nicely to hypotheses testing. However, according to Massey, there are several straightforward and testable propositions (Massey et al. 2005, 55). One is that international flows of labour should follow international flows of capital but in the opposite direction. Prior to 1992 when the Soviet Union was a closed economy, there was little foreign direct investment into the country and the small amounts were tightly controlled. In 1992, net inflows of foreign direct investment were 1.6 billion dollars (The World Bank 2007, in current U.S. dollars, from balance of payment data). By 2005, FDI into the region had risen to 32.8 billion dollars. This increase was not just due to inflation as the average amount of FDI increased from 0.5 percent of GDP in the FSU states on average in 1992 to 5.7 percent in 2005. Likewise, official development assistance and official aid has increased from 1.3 billion dollars in 1992 to 4.2 billion in 2004 and aid as a percent of GDP has gone from 1.0 percent of GNI on average to 5.2 percent in 1999 before declining to 3.8 percent in 2005. FDI is different from state investment which is where the majority of it came from during the Soviet period. Foreign investment brings foreign ownership, ideas, people and

links with outside actors. There wasn't the flood of migrants to the west from the Soviet Union that was expected or feared when the borders were opened. But the opening of the borders, or more precisely, the removal of legal restrictions on emigration, was not an isolated act but occurred within the context of overall economic restructuring and social liberalization. This gave people the freedom to migrate but the economic restructuring, caused in part by the large new inflows of FDI, gave them the impetus to do so, thus lending support to world systems theory as an explanation for migration in the region. The increased FDI and economic restructuring are causing structural changes which are having an impact on labor supply and thus migration patterns.

***Moscow as an emerging global city:*** According various "laws" of urban hierarchy such as Zipf's law, the population of Moscow was smaller than it should have been (Andrienko and Guriev 2005, 15). This was in part due to restrictions on city growth during the Soviet period. In the post-Soviet period, Moscow has become a magnet for migrants from both within Russia and outside the country. The population of the capital grew from 8.8 million to 10.4 million between the 1989 and 2002 censuses, all due to migration as there were more deaths than births in the city due to its older age structure and low fertility (Goskomstat Rossii (State Committee on Statistics of Russia) 2005a). The under-estimation of the influx into Moscow during the 1990s was one of the major surprises in the 2002 population census (Heleniak 2003a). Moscow has the highest average income in the country, four times the national average (Goskomstat Rossii (State Committee on Statistics of Russia) 2007a). It also



has by far, the most unequal income distribution in the country. However defined, Moscow has emerged or re-emerged as a global city during Russia's economic transition. There is a great deal of wealth and a highly-educated workforce concentrated in the city which has created a demand for unskilled workers in construction and the underdeveloped service sector. There are an enormous number of millionaires and billionaires in Moscow. As in other migration systems, much of the flows are directed towards the global city and Russia's capital is no exception. One-quarter of the large number of Tajik migrants in Russia are in Moscow (Olimova and Bosc 2003, 24). Between the population censuses of 1989 and 2002, the number of Chinese nationals permanently residing in Moscow grew thirty-five times, that of Vietnamese fourteen times, Tajiks twelve times, Moldavians five times, Azerbaijanis approximately five-fold, and the number of Armenians and Georgians increased 2.8 times, evidence of Moscow emerging as a new global city that has become a mecca for labor migrants (*ITAR-TASS* 2006).

### ***3.3.5 Conclusions***

This chapter has broadly considered the migration movements taking place in the former Soviet Union against the body of current international migration theory. The next two chapters turn to more detailed examination of the two factors theorized to have the strongest impact on post-Soviet movements – the influence of widening income differentials and the large numbers of people who found themselves outside their ethnic homelands when the country broke apart.

## **Chapter 4. Economic Factors Influencing Migration across the FSU States**

### **4.1 Introduction**

When it existed, the Soviet Union was a closed economic and migration space with tightly-controlled movement of goods, people, and ideas across its borders. The centrally-planned economic system of the Soviet Union exerted considerable control over the spatial distribution of economic activity and the population. Internally, the country had a rather flat income distribution among the population and among regions, thus dampening a major driver of migration. With the economic transition, income disparities among countries and regions have widened considerably. There never was a uniquely “Soviet” migration theory and people moved across the Soviet Union for many of the same reasons that they moved elsewhere in the world (Lewis, Rowland, and Clem 1976). What did make the Soviet system unique was the degree of state control over migration movements and the attempts at equal living standards across the entire space. With these two causes now removed, the factors influencing migration across the former Soviet space should be becoming more similar to those elsewhere in the world. The question asked in this chapter is to what degree these new economic disparities among the states of the former Soviet Union play a role in influencing post-Soviet migration flows.

As stated above, this dissertation primarily tests two different factors as being the primary causes of migration among the FSU states. The first are economic causes which are operationalized by neoclassical economic theory of migration. The second are ethnic or political causes expressed as diaspora migration or a desire on the part of

people to migrate to their ethnic homeland. Given just economic or ethnic factors influencing migration, there could be four possible combinations of neoclassical and diaspora migration theories (see Table 1). The first is that people migrate from a low-income country to a high-income country and to their homeland. In this case, both theories hold. A second combination would be when people migrated from a high-income to a low-income country but that the movement was to their ethnic homeland. Here, neoclassical migration theory is violated but diaspora theory holds. A third situation would be when people migrated from a low-income to a high-income country but migrated away from their homeland. This case would represent a violation of diaspora theory but would support neoclassical migration theory. The fourth possible scenario is migration out of one's ethnic homeland and from a high-income to a low-income country, in which case, both diaspora and neoclassical migration theories would be violated.

According to the United Nations, a migrant is someone living outside their country of birth. Because of past internal movements within the Soviet Union, the breakup of the country added some 27 million persons to the global stock of migrants (UN Population Division 2002b, 6). People migrate out of their country of birth for a variety of reasons but the factor explaining most international migration movements are the wide and growing disparities in income among countries. The FSU is new to the global economy and the wide disparities among the FSU states are a recent phenomenon.

In its simplest form, neoclassical economic theory of migration states that the international migration of workers is caused by differences in wages between countries and that migration will not occur in the absence of such differentials (Massey et al. 2005, 19). Neoclassical theory cannot explain all international migration movements but it is the oldest theory of migration and often a point of departure for other migration theories. There are both micro and macro versions of neoclassical theory. Micro theories state that potential migrants make a cost-benefit calculation of potential earnings in their current and other locations. Wage or income differentials are a necessary but not sufficient condition for migration to occur, with a 30 percent “cliff” often mentioned as a needed differential for migration to be contemplated (Massey et al. 2005, 19). Macro theories state that aggregate migration flows are sums of moves undertaken on the basis of individual cost-benefit equations. People moved within the Soviet Union for many of the same reasons that they moved elsewhere in the world and undertook the same cost-benefit equation. Two major differences were the high degree of state control over the spatial allocation of the population and the flat regional income disparities, or the lack of the 30 percent cliff.

The Soviet economic system was centrally-planned, all enterprises were state-owned and prices were established administratively not via the market. There was a policy aimed at the equalization of the standard of living across all regions causing regional wage differentials to be quite small, dampening a major variable influencing inter-regional migration (Bradshaw and Vartapetov 2003). Wages under Soviet central planning had an allocative function and were set by central authorities (Gregory and

Stuart 1986, 229-30). To encourage mobility to labor deficient regions, wages were regionally differentiated, whereby persons in the Far North could earn 2.8 times that of a person with the same occupation in central Russia. The centralized budget of the USSR had a redistributive goal that benefited some states at the expense of others (Dmitrieva 1996, 25). Because the Bolshevik Revolution that founded the Soviet Union was ostensibly to benefit the proletariat the country was often referred to as a worker's paradise. As such, the USSR had no overt unemployment and the lack of influence of unemployment was a major deviation from theory in explaining Soviet-era migration patterns (Mitchneck 1991). There was considerable state control over labor allocation, accomplished through a resident-permit system and wage incentives, in which the Soviet planners implicitly used elements of neoclassical theory in their labor allocation schemes (Gerber 2006). The economic transition has contributed to wide disparities in both the economic performance of regions as well as social outcomes and living standards. The main drivers of inequality have been identified as: wage decompression and the growth of the private sector, restructuring and unemployment, changes in government expenditure and taxation, price liberalization, inflation, and arrears, asset transfer and the growth of property income, and technological change and globalization (Mitra and Yemtsov 2006, 11-16). It is sometimes difficult to separate out the transition-related drivers of inequality from broader globalization factors. However, the purpose is not to explain the causes of regional divergence but rather to use them as starting points for analysis of migration.

## 4.2 Methods and data

### 4.2.1 Neoclassical theories of migration

Neoclassical economics has both micro and macro theories of migration. Micro theories originated with Harris and Todaro examining rural-urban migration in a two-sector model (Harris and Todaro 1970). There were later refinements by Massey and colleagues noting that aggregate migration flows are the sums of individual moves undertaken on the basis of numerous individual cost-benefit calculations. This leads to a macro application of neoclassical economic theory (Massey et al. 2005).

According to macro theories, international migration is caused by differences in the supply and demand of labor. Economic factors that determine wage rates are important as are demographic factors such as differential population growth rates between countries. This theory leads to several propositions, including that migration of workers is caused by differences in wage rates between countries and that the elimination of these differentials will end labor migration and that migration will not occur in the absence of such differentials. An important caveat is that even in the most aggregated macro models, there is a heterogeneity of migrants at different skill levels that needs to be taken into account. The models constructed here for the FSU states are at a quite aggregated level. In neoclassical economic theory, a version of the common formula for migration decision-making at the individual level is as follows:

$$ER(0) = \int_0^n P_1(t)P_2(t)Y_d(t) - P_3(t)Y_0(t)e^{-rt} dt - C(0)$$

Where  $ER(0)$  is the expected net return on migration;  $P_1(t)$  is the probability of avoiding deportation (1.0 for legal migrants and  $<1.0$  for undocumented migrants);

$P_2(t)$  is the probability of employment at destination;  $Y_d(t)$  is earnings at destination;  $P_3(t)$  is probability of employment at origin;  $Y_0(t)$  is earnings at origin;  $r$  is a discount factor; and  $C(0)$  are the total costs of the move, including psychological (Massey et al. 2005, 20). In the post-Soviet case, it is these differences in incomes at origin and destination which are being modeled at the aggregate level. The probability of finding employment at both origin and destination are also taken into consideration.

However, in the immediate post-Soviet period there was visa-free travel among the FSU states and few controls over migration so deportation risk was low and this not taken into consideration. The situation in recent years has changed and there is now more regulation over migration, especially on the part of Russia.

Until now, there appears to have been little research attempting to apply neoclassical theories of migration to the FSU. In a piece examining political versus economic causes of migration, Korobkov points out that political/ethnic factors dominated the immediate post-Soviet period while economic factors seem to be the most dominant currently and the importance of remittances to some of the smaller FSU states (Korobkov 2007). He points to the large GNI per capita gaps between Russia and the southern tier FSU states that are the source of much of the labor migration into Russia but does not conduct any formal tests to demonstrate that these gaps are the cause of migration. The results of a study of non-Uzbeks in Uzbekistan demonstrated that nationalism influenced people's migration decisions only insofar as it affected their material well-being (Radnitz 2006). The study also showed that economic factors such as low pensions, unemployment, were a major factor behind non-migration. A

recent study of migration perspectives in the CIS states pointed out that the region is characterized by large disparities in levels of economic development and labor markets that vary greatly in terms of wage levels, unemployment rates, and available jobs (Rios 2006, 1). Another study found that the demographic imbalances among countries in the region combined with large economic disparities would inevitably lead to migration (Ivakhnyuk 2006). A study titled *Socio-Economic and Political Mechanism of Population Migration in the republics of the Former Soviet Union* was rather descriptive and while it pointed out that there were large income disparities among the FSU states, it offered little in the way of actually testing or proving this (Scherbakova 2000). Thus, this appears to be the first rigorous application, albeit at a rather crude level, of neoclassical economic migration theory to the post-Soviet migration situation.

#### ***4.2.2 Modeling migration in the post-Soviet space***

The theory behind the models is derived from neoclassical theories of migration described above. As income gaps between FSU states widens, the amount of migration between them should increase. Neoclassical migration theory does not explicitly address distance but this set of models will incorporate it in the form of a gravity model. The probability of finding work and in the case of international migration, being deported, also needs to be factored into the model. Two different sets of models will be created. The first model will be a time series regression for each FSU state using net migration for the dependent variable and annual change in



GNI and unemployment as independent variables. The second will use migration to Russia from the non-Russian FSU states as the dependent variable and distant and relative GNI as the independent variables. This is done because, as mentioned above, Russia has become the major migration destination within the region.

The formula for the time-series models is:

$$\frac{m_t^i}{P_t^i} = (Y_t^i - Y_{t-1}^i) / Y_{t-1}^i + e \quad (\text{Model 1})$$

Where  $m_t^i$  = net migration in country  $i$  in year  $t$ ,  $P_t^i$  = population of country  $i$  in year  $t$  and  $Y_t^i$  = Real (PPP adjusted) GNI per capita. For countries where data are available, unemployment was included in the following model:

$$\frac{m_t^i}{P_t^i} = (Y_t^i - Y_{t-1}^i) / Y_{t-1}^i + U_t^i + e \quad (\text{Model 1, with unemployment})$$

Where  $m_t^i$  = net migration in country  $i$  in year  $t$ ,  $P_t^i$  = population of country  $i$  in year  $t$  and  $Y_t^i$  = Real (PPP adjusted) GNI per capita, and  $U_t^i$  = unemployment rate in country  $i$  in year  $t$ .

The basic form of the gravity model as applied to migration is:

$$M_{ij} = \frac{P_i P_j}{d_{ij}^2} k$$

Where  $M_{ij}$  is the size of the migration flow between country  $i$  and  $j$ ,  $P_i$  and  $P_j$  are the population sizes of the two countries,  $d_{ij}$  is the distance between the two countries, and  $k$  is a constant (in this case a gravitational constant, meaning it has the same value for all country pairs). Distance in this case is the distance between the capitals of the FSU countries, which in all but one case is the largest urban settlement in the country and a reasonable proxy for the population center.

The basic gravity model can be linearized as:

$$\ln M_{ij} = a_0 + a_1 \ln P_i + a_2 \ln P_j + a_3 \ln d_{ij} \quad (\text{Model 2A})$$

Where  $M_{ij}$  is the size of the migration flow between country  $i$  and  $j$ ,  $P_i$  is the population size of country  $i$  and  $P_j$  is the population size country  $j$ ,  $d_{ij}$  is the distance between the two countries, and  $a_0 = \ln k$  is a constant. The hypothesized key variable in the post-Soviet case is the widening disparities in GNI per capita, so an extension of the basic gravity model incorporates GNI per capita into an extended form model:

$$\ln M_{ij} = a_0 + a_1 \ln P_i + a_2 \ln P_j + a_3 \ln d_{ij} + a_4 \ln G_i + a_5 \ln G_j \quad (\text{Model 2B})$$

Where  $G_i$  is the origin country's GNI per capita and  $G_j$  is the destination countries GNI per capita.

The models will be tested using ordinary least squares (OLS) regression. In the first set of time-series regression, net migration should correlate positively with changes in income and negatively with changes in unemployment. In other words, as incomes decline, so should net migration and as unemployment goes up, net migration should decline. According to theory, in the second set of models with migration to Russia, it would be expected that the coefficients for distance would be negative and the coefficients for GNI per capita would be positive.

#### ***4.2.3 Dependent and independent variables***

***Immigration, emigration, and net migration:*** The dependent variable in the models is migration, which will be operationalized in several different ways. As mentioned above, even in countries with well-developed statistical systems, complete recording of all international migration flows is a problem. One only needs to look at the example of the large undocumented migrant population in the United States for evidence of this. The 1990s was a time of economic transition in the states of the former Soviet Union but also a period of transition of their statistical systems. There were issues of data quality with all socio-economic statistics, probably more so with migration statistics. In some countries in the region, there were periods of little or no recording of migration flows and there continues to be considerable undocumented migration. Even for Russia, which provides migration data in considerable detail, there is assumed to be a large number of migrants into the country not captured by the

statistical system. Thus, the insufficient or poor quality of migration statistics somewhat limits the type and sophistication of the migration models that can be analyzed for the region, and may hamper the results of those models that are constructed.

The first set of models will use net migration as the dependent variable. The advantages of using net migration data is that it is possible to construct a time-series of net migration for all FSU states for all years since 1989 using data on population and natural increase (births and deaths). The disadvantage is that “net migration” describes a group of non-existing people (Jennissen 2003, 177). Rodgers states that, the use of net migration rate as the dependent variable in explanatory models of migration can produce a misspecification of the fundamental relationships under inquiry (Rogers 1990). Though net migration is often used in population forecasts, there are fallacies in doing so (Plane and Rogerson 1994, 192). Net migration gives information on the direction of the flows and the impact that migration has on population change but does not indicate the size of gross flows. In the case of low net migration, the researcher does not know whether this is the result of low inflows and outflows or high inflows and outflows. Applying net migration to any base population is incorrect because that is not the proper at risk population. Flows in opposite directions often result from structural changes in national or local economies and the composition of the flows might be quite different. In the immediate post-Soviet situation, the flows might be offset because of diaspora migration. For example,

between Russia and Ukraine, there might be flows of Russians going one way and Ukrainians going the other.

With those caveats in mind, net migration will be used in the first set of models for several reasons. The main one is that net migration is the best and only data available on flows for some of the FSU states during this period. Net migration is commonly used in the absence of other sources in countries with less well-developed statistical systems. The use of net migration has been used in migration modeling of flows even in developed countries (Jennissen 2003). In the case of the FSU states in the immediate post-Soviet period, the use of net migration is thought to be less inappropriate because the flows reflect overall economic and development disparities and are not thought to represent structural changes which often send countervailing flows in opposite directions.

For most countries, the method of producing net migration estimates will be via the residual method where natural increase (the difference between births and deaths) is subtracted from total population change. The base year for the analysis is 1989, the date of the last Soviet population census. The population data from that census are deemed to be fairly reliable. All but one of the FSU states conducted their first census as an independent state in the 2000 round of population censuses (the exception being Uzbekistan). As is standard practice, following those censuses, almost all went back and revised the inter-census time series of population estimates. The major discrepancy was in the recording of migration. Population data were taken from the

UNICEF TransMONEE database (United Nations Children's Fund, Transition Monitoring in Eastern Europe)<sup>8</sup> (UNICEF, Innocenti Research Centre) database which collects a wide-range of data directly from the statistical offices of the FSU states. Data for the second set of models of migration into Russia were taken from an annual compendium of migration data produced by Federal State Statistics Service of the Russian Federation (Goskomstat Rossii (State Committee on Statistics of Russia) 2006a).

***Gross national income (GNI) and GNI per capita:*** As per neoclassical migration theory, it is the difference in wage or incomes levels between countries that is the major driver of migration. In the absence of comparable income data among countries, GNI per capita are used as a surrogate. GNI data are available for some countries in the late 1980s but became available for all only in 1990, thus GNI per capita growth rates are not available for all years for all countries. Data on GNI and GNI per capita are from the World Bank's annual World Development Indicators CD-ROM. The measure shown in Figure 10 is gross national income per capita adjusted for purchasing power parity.<sup>9</sup> As can be seen in the figure, with some variation the countries followed similar paths since 1990 in terms of GNI per capita of steep declines from 1990 to mid-decade followed by recoveries in the late 1990s


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<sup>8</sup> Both of these acronyms are somewhat dated. The original name of UNICEF was the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund. It was created to provide care to children in countries that had been devastated by World War II. TransMONEE was a database that was established to monitor the situation of children in nine countries in Eastern Europe but was later expanded to encompass all 27 former communist countries of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union.

<sup>9</sup> Purchasing power parity is the ratio of the number of units of one country's currency needed to purchase the same quantity of goods in another country's currency. The ratio can be expressed in the currency of either of the countries but in practice when comparison is made among a number of countries are usually expressed in U.S. dollars.

and after 2000. The relative ranking of countries was more or less preserved but there have been increases in disparities among them, which is hypothesized to be the main driver of increased migration across the region. The ratio of the country with the highest to the lowest GNI per capita increased from 4.7 in 1990 to 12.0 in 1998 before declining to 11.3 in 2005. The coefficient of variation of GNI per capita increased from 0.50 in 1990 to 0.70 in 2005. More important for migration was that the gap between Russia and the non-Russian states (not including the three Baltic states) increased considerably.

**Figure 10: Gross National Income per Capita in the FSU States, 1990 to 2005**



Source: (World Bank 2007). Data are current international dollars adjusted for purchasing power parity.

**Distance:** The Soviet population was often regarded as being comparatively immobile given the level of state control on migration, the lack of well-developed housing and mortgage markets, and that many benefits were disbursed through the

work place making people reluctant to change jobs. At least among the populations of some FSU states, the populations appear to be quite mobile and to favor international migration over internal as there are more opportunities outside their home country. The distances used in the gravity models are Euclidian or straight-line distances (GeoBytes).<sup>10</sup> For the purposes of analyzing labor mobility, especially in the post-Soviet space, this might be somewhat misleading. They do not take into account cost-distance or time-distance, the cost of traveling to another place or the time involved. Most of the capital cities of the Central Asian FSU states, which have had so much out-migration in the post-Soviet period, are located closer to Kabul, Afghanistan than they are to Moscow. The furthest away, Dushanbe, Tajikistan is 1,929 miles from Moscow but just 251 miles from Kabul. However, much of the transport infrastructure that was developed during the Soviet period linked these cities and the rest of their populations much more closely with Moscow and the rest of Russia than with places outside the Soviet Union. There are often psychic costs associated with labor migration. While migrants from Central Asia and the Caucasus are leaving their home countries, they are traveling to parts of what used to be their country and most have at least some knowledge of Russian. Until recently, the borders among most of the FSU states could be regarded as quite thin, or easily accessible as there were few barriers to migration. In addition to other reasons for many choosing to migrate within the FSU was that option of migrating to Western Europe was not a viable option as the borders were quite thick and there were numerous restrictions for most. Distance is a metaphor for access to markets and while further away in Euclidian

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<sup>10</sup> For Kazakhstan, the former capital of Almaty was used instead of the new capital of Astana as it is a better representation of the population center of the country.




terms, Moscow and other large cities in Russia are much more accessible and constitute much larger economic and labor markets than cities and countries located closer.

***Unemployment:*** According to neoclassical migration theory, the probability of finding work in a destination region is a major factor in individuals' migration decisions, which is weighed against the probability of finding at the origin. The Soviet Union was supposed to be a worker's paradise and because of that, theoretically everyone in the economy was employed and there was no open unemployment. In fact, it was a crime to be unemployed. Because of this, when the Soviet Union broke apart, there was no system for measuring unemployment equivalent to the labor force surveys that are conducted in many countries. To widely differing extents, the successor states have begun to put in place systems to measure unemployment according to commonly accepted international standards. However, these systems are far from complete across the region and sufficiently long time series data on unemployment to be used in modeling migration are only available for some countries in the region. These are taken from the International Labour Organization's database of labour statistics LABORSTA (International Labour Organization). A chart of available data on unemployment is shown in Figure 11. The most notable feature is that only one country has a time series going back to 1990. The other is that for most countries, unemployment peaked in the late-1990s and has been falling since then. One factor that will hamper modeling migration is that many

of the less-developed countries in the region from which so much migration emanates, are those that lack long unemployment time series.

**Figure 11: Unemployment Rates for Selected FSU States, 1989 to 2007**



Source: (International Labour Organization, LABORSTA).

### 4.3 Results: Neoclassical economic migration theories in the post-Soviet space

This section presents the results of the models constructed of migration across the FSU. Two different sets of models were constructed. The first is migration within each country and the second for the migration with Russia, which has become the major migration destination within the region.

#### 4.3.1 Model 1 - Time Series

Table 6 shows the results of the time-series models with net migration rates (per thousand) as the dependent variable and annual change in GNI and unemployment

rates as independent variables. For all fifteen countries, bivariate regressions were run with annual change in GNI used as the explanatory variable. For eight countries where there was sufficient data, multivariate regressions were run where unemployment rates were added. These are shown on the second line for each country. In the bivariate regressions, the coefficients for fourteen of the fifteen countries were in the expected direction. Of those, seven were significant at the 0.05 level and five were significant at the 0.01 level. Thus, it is only for these countries that annual change in GNI accounts for a significant portion of the variation in net migration. The only bivariate regression for which the sign is not in the expected direction is Russia. A likely explanation is the large amount of unrecorded migration into the country over this period, which almost equaled recorded migration. Thus, annual change in GNI appears to a pretty good although not universal explanatory variable for migration.

Of the eight countries where data for unemployment are also available, four of the coefficients move in the expected direction and four do not. Of the four where there are longer time series of both GNI and unemployment available (longer than ten years), two in the expected directions and the other two do not. The four where the variables are in the expected direction are Estonia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine. The four that don't are Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, and Russia. There seems to be no real good explanation for these groupings.

**Table 6: Time Series Regression Results of Migration in the FSU States, 1989 to 2003**

Country	Years	adjusted $r^2$	Coefficients		
			Constant	Yearly GDP per capita change	Unemployment
<b>Armenia</b>	13	0.47	-15.26	0.95 **	..
<b>Azerbaijan</b>	13	0.08	-1.40	0.05	..
<b>Belarus</b>	13	-0.06	0.47	0.04	..
<b>Estonia</b>	15	0.44	-7.98	0.67 **	..
<b>Georgia</b>	15	0.43	-4.70	0.83	-0.45
	6	0.67	-3.47	0.23	-0.45
<b>Kazakhstan</b>	13	0.30	-14.13	0.64 *	..
	10	0.76	-10.20	1.22	-0.73
<b>Kyrgyz Republic</b>	15	0.51	-4.52	0.56 **	..
<b>Latvia</b>	15	0.69	-14.09	1.08 **	..
	8	0.86	15.61	-0.65	-1.13
<b>Lithuania</b>	13	0.10	-4.85	0.10	..
	10	-0.02	-5.61	0.20	0.00
<b>Moldova</b>	15	0.37	-3.08	0.13 **	..
	5	0.66	3.65	-0.08	-0.53
<b>Russian Federation</b>	16	0.26	2.40	-0.11	..
	14	0.46	0.42	-0.15	0.25
<b>Tajikistan</b>	15	0.31	-6.47	0.45 *	..
<b>Turkmenistan</b>	12	-0.06	-2.36	0.03	..
<b>Ukraine</b>	15	-0.08	-1.07	0.01	..
	9	0.70	-0.87	0.08	-0.06
<b>Uzbekistan</b>	15	-0.06	-3.87	0.06	..

Sources and notes:

\* significance  $p < 0.05$

\*\* significance  $p < 0.01$

Net migration data: Figure 3.

GDP per capita data: (World Bank 2007).

Unemployment data: (International Labour Organization, LABORSTA).

From the regression for Kazakhstan for the period 1994 to 2003, the following equation results:


$$\text{Net mig}_t = -10.20 + 1.22\text{GNI}_t - 0.73\text{Unemp}_t$$

The interpretation of these coefficients is that every 1.22 percent increase in GNI results in a 1 percent increase in net migration and that a 0.73 percentage point increase in the unemployment rate results in a 1 percent decline in net migration.

These trends are graphically shown in Figure 12. Annual change in GNI and net

migration move more or less together. When continued GNI growth became positive in 2000, net migration lessened and in 2004 became positive. Unemployment and net migration move in opposite directions. As unemployment fell from highs of over 13 percent in the late 1990s, net migration became increasingly less negative.

**Figure 12: Net Migration, Annual GNI Change, and Unemployment Rate in Kazakhstan, 1990 to 2007**



Sources: Figure 3 (World Bank 2007; International Labour Organization LABORSTA).

#### 4.3.2 Model 2 - Russia

Table 7 shows the results of the regressions on migration between Russia and the fourteen non-Russian FSU states over the period 1989 to 2004. The dependent variables are migration between Russia and each of the other states over this period, a total of 448 migration flows. Two different models are constructed. The first is a basic gravity model with origin and destination population and distance as

independent variables. The second model adds origin and destination per capita GNI, as the gaps in GNI are theorized to be the main driving factor behind migration. In the table, both raw score and standardized coefficients are shown. Standardized coefficients are used to show the relative weights of each coefficient to the explanatory power of the model (the constant or Y-intercept is zero and therefore not shown).

**Table 7: Regression Results of Migration between Russia and other FSU States, 1989 to 2004**

Variable	Model 2A			Model 2B		
	B	beta	t	B	beta	t
Constant	-32.25		-15.17 **	-26.42		-8.8 **
Population of origin	0.97	3.52	15.22 **	1.02	3.64	15.66 **
Population of destination	1.36	3.73	21.43 **	1.26	3.79	19.37 **
Distance from origin to destination	0.10	0.10	1.99	0.02	0.15	0.15
GNI per capita at origin				-0.51	0.04	-4.73 **
GNI per capita at destination				0.06	0.14	0.56
<b>R2</b>		<b>0.484</b>			<b>0.494</b>	
<b>Adjusted R2</b>		<b>0.480</b>			<b>0.488</b>	

Notes:

B = regression coefficient

beta = standardized regression coefficient

\*\* significant at the 0.01 level

In the first model, the populations at origin and destination have the most explanatory value. The coefficient for distance is positive, and while small and not significant, it should be negative in such a model. A possible explanation for this (aside from misspecification) is the aforementioned large distances between some of the main countries sending large portions of their population to Russia and Moscow. As mentioned above, it is straight-line distance that is used in the equations which does not take into account ease or cost of transport. The adjusted  $R^2$  for the basic gravity model is 0.48 meaning that about half the variation in migration between Russia and

the other FSU states can be explained by variations in population and distance. The second model adds origin and destination GNI per capita. The  $R^2$  increases, as it should with the addition of more independent variables, but only slightly to 0.49. This is also a surprising result indicating that per capita GNI gaps were not a very significant factor in explaining migration as thought. The coefficient for the origin GNI per capita is negative and significant indicating that it is exerting a strong push factor and is the third most important variable after the two for population.

#### **4.4 Discussion**

Models such as those constructed here and applied to migration flows in the former Soviet Union have been used often to represent and determine the relative importance of different factors in explaining migration patterns. Such models cannot explain all of the myriad of factors that explain migration and those in this chapter were designed to only incorporate key factors operative in neoclassical economic theories of migration. The models suggest that annual GDP change was a significant factor but that unemployment rates were not. Thus, during the period of economic transition, time series regression models have proven to be effective in modeling the effects of steep declines and increases on migration patterns in the FSU states. It is perhaps not surprising that unemployment was not able to have much explanatory power given the paucity of migration data across the region and perhaps the lack information about unemployment levels in other FSU states that migrants consider. The models of migration and economic disparities in the former Soviet Union provide some but not entirely convincing evidence of the applicability of neoclassical economic migration

theories. Given the rather large regional disparities in the FSU, it is surprising that these tests of neoclassical economic migration theory did not prove more conclusive in explaining post-Soviet migration patterns. There are three possible explanations. The first reason has to do with problems with the model. There are some studies demonstrating that neoclassical economics is a weak predictor of migration (Straubhaar 1986). Related is that some of the variables or relationships might be non-linear, while here all were assumed to be linear. The income disparities among countries increased rather rapidly during the 1990s but have leveled off since then. Migration from the lower-income FSU states to higher-income countries persists because of these continued wide disparities. The element of time is not explicitly taken into consideration in these models and if comparable migration data existed to be able compare the Soviet and post-Soviet periods that might yield stronger results. Migration across the region is becoming more restricted, and though this does not diminish the impetus to migrate, it might curb the size of some of the flows, thus weakening the explanatory power of the models.

The second and more likely explanation has to do with possible problems with the migration data. A recent World Bank study found poor migration data to be a problem in explaining migration across the broader Europe and Central Asia region (Mansoor and Quillin 2007).<sup>11</sup> As new states, there is a considerable amount of undocumented migration that cannot be adequately captured. In further applications, it might be fruitful to attempt corrections to published migration data before re-

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<sup>11</sup> Within the World Bank, the Europe and Central Asia region consists of the fifteen states of the former Soviet Union and twelve states in Eastern Europe.



running the tests. The models use data on permanent migration when there is considerable temporary or circular migration.

A third explanation for the lack of evidence of economic variables in explaining post-Soviet migration patterns is that there might be other factors that more strongly influence migration and other migration theories might be more applicable or might carry more weight than neoclassical explanations. This represents a first pass at a rather aggregated level to apply neoclassical theories of migration to the post-Soviet migration situation. The models might have more applicability or explanatory power if parsed at lower geographic levels or by segment of migration streams. There have been several studies applying neoclassical theory to migration among the seventy-nine regions of Russia which have been found to be rather convincing (Gerber 2000, 2006). A general trend in the non-Russia states is that most have experienced considerable legal and undocumented migration into the capital cities which could be explained by these theories. When migration flow data are used as they were in these models, there is an assumption of homogeneity among migrants and potential migrants, which masks considerable variation in their migration tendencies or behaviors. If possible, a fruitful extension would be to divide migration streams by level of education or to examine the labor market segments that migrants occupy in their origin and destination countries as is done in segmented labor market theory.

## **Chapter 5. Ethnic Factors Influencing Migration among the FSU States**

### **5.1 Introduction**

The Soviet Union was almost unrivaled in its ethnic complexity. There were more than 90 ethnic groups whose historic homelands were in the Soviet Union (Anderson and Silver 1989, 469). The 1989 census, conducted just prior to the breakup of the Soviet Union, enumerated 128 different nationalities. At the time of the breakup, there were fifty-three ethnic homelands at different geographic scales, fifteen of which became the successor states to the Soviet Union. Largely because of migration, both forced and voluntary, there was considerable ethnic mixing during Soviet period. An important feature of migration in all the post-Soviet states is its ethnic character (O'Loughlin, Panin, and Witmer 2007, 253). What makes the Soviet Union and study of diaspora migration in the region unique is that with creation of new nation states, people instantly became members of different diaspora groups “without moving an inch or leaving their homes” (Harris 1993, 1). This represents an interesting case or natural experiment in which to examine how people react to becoming diaspora members by the reconfiguration of political space instead of by migrating.

The question posed in this chapter is whether diaspora migration – the migration of people to their ethnic homelands - was the dominant factor influencing migration patterns following the breakup of the Soviet Union and the accompanying economic transition. People who found themselves living outside their ethnic homeland when the country broke apart faced three options – stay and either passively or actively

fight for ethnic minority rights, irredentism, or migration to their ethnic homeland (Chinn and Kaiser 1996, 32-33). In some cases, such movement would represent “return migration” to their place of birth but for many it would be a move to an unfamiliar place. This chapter will measure the extent to which there was diaspora migration and ethnic segregation across the FSU, and the extent that the pull of the homeland caused these movements.

While there is considerable ethnic diversity in the Soviet Union which could provide interesting analysis of diaspora migration at different geographic scales or of smaller ethnic groups, this study will be at the level of the fifteen indigenous nationalities of the fifteen newly independent states. In 1989, these fifteen groups comprised 90.3 percent of the population of the USSR (Anderson and Silver 1989, 610) and 90.0 percent in 2000 (Tables 8 and 9). This represents a first attempt, at a rather broad aggregate level, to measure the extent of diaspora migration and changes in ethnic segregation in the first decade following the breakup of the Soviet Union.

## **5.2 Theories of Diasporas and Migration**

### ***5.2.1 Defining post-Soviet diasporas***

The Soviet Union categorized people based on their ethnicity, a combination of cultural and linguistic characteristics. The term used was *natsionalnost'* or nationality, which differs from the usage of the term in other countries where nationality refers to a person's country of citizenship or origin. It also differs from the

concept of race as used in censuses of the United States. The practice in the Soviet Union was that a person's nationality was more or less fixed when they received their internal passport (identity document) at age 16 (Arel 2001a).


There are various definitions of the term *diaspora* and there is no single useful definition (Shuval 2000). Recently, there has been something of a proliferation of studies and numerous attempts to define and explain what diaspora entails (Mavroudi 2007, 467). One definition states that a diaspora is that part of a people, dispersed in one or more countries other than its homeland, that maintains a feeling of transnational community among a people and its homeland (Chander 2001, 1020, cited in Lowell and Gerova, 2004, p. 1). In this sense, diaspora is related to globalization and linked to theoretical discourses on transnationalism (Shuval 2000, 4). Both concepts are becoming increasingly important in analysis of migration in the FSU with the opening of their economies to the rest of the world and economic restructuring. Traditional notions of diaspora revolve around the need to organize and categorize, what Mavroudi refers to as "bounded diaspora" (Mavroudi 2007, 469). Unapologetically, this is how diaspora will be defined here – as those persons who declared themselves to be one of the fifteen indigenous nationalities of the successor states in the 1989 Soviet census and who lived outside of their defined ethnic homeland. At that time, 43.4 million persons or 17 percent of the total number of these fifteen ethnic groups were classified as belonging to a diaspora. Since both ethnicity and homelands are social constructs, an important issue for testing diaspora migration in the post-Soviet context is whether people ascribe to these labels (Diener

2008, 4). Related to this is whether they view the designated ethnic homeland as their homeland, and what role this plays in their migration decisions.

### 5.2.2 Theories of and actors in diaspora migration

The three main actors relevant to diaspora migration are the host country, the homeland, and the diaspora group, which are engaged in a multifaceted and changing set of relationships (Figure 13). It is the changes in these relationships that are most important to post-Soviet diasporas and their decisions to migrate or remain in their host countries.

**Figure 13: Actors and Relationships in Diaspora Migration**



There is a range of possible relationships between a homeland and a diaspora group, from hostility to full incorporation of the body of citizens of the nation even though they live outside its borders. This is often manifested in the citizenship laws that the homeland creates and whether it “stretches the homeland” to include ethnic kin living abroad (Diener 2008). In the FSU, one of the first tasks of the new states was to decide on a body of citizens. Crucial to their diaspora was whether the new

citizenship laws bestowed automatic citizenship on their ethnic kin elsewhere in the Soviet Union based on their nationality, thus including a call to return to the homeland.

Related is increased attention to diasporas and migration in the development literature (Lowell and Gerova 2004; Newland 2004). Diasporas can stimulate economic development in their homelands through various mechanisms, including foreign direct investment, market development, technology and knowledge transfer, philanthropy, tourism, and political contributions (Newland 2004, iv). Discussion of diaspora in the development literature differs in tone from that in the humanities literature. In humanities, it has a negative tone and tragic connotation, while in policy discussions, it is quite upbeat and positive (Newland 2004, 1). The trend in many low-income countries has moved from indifference to actively courting their diaspora (Newland 2004, 3). Some of the more development-related diaspora discussion applies to the post-Soviet cases, where large numbers have migrated out of their homelands in search of economic opportunity after the breakup of the Soviet Union, either elsewhere in the Soviet Union or outside the former Soviet space. As a result, many of the lower-income FSU states have taken steps to enumerate their diaspora, simplify their return and the sending of remittances, and to ensure their protection while abroad through migrant labor agreements with host countries.

As Shuval states, the attitude of a diaspora group towards its homeland is often ambiguous (Shuval 2000, 6). Many choose not to leave as “home” is where they can

make a living and that might not be the homeland, giving credence to neoclassical migration theory. Of central importance in the host-diaspora relationship is the nation-state and its authority, especially with new states or new nation-states. A crucial element to post-Soviet diasporas was a reordering of the ethnic hierarchy when the newly independent FSU states became host countries. But, as Brubaker states, there is nothing preordained about the reconfiguration of space leading to redistribution of population and ethnic unmixing (Brubaker 1995, 203). Much depends on the manner in which the political reconfiguration occurred, on the rootedness of the new minority, on the anticipated and actual policies of the new successor states towards the new minority, on the availability and quality of resettlement opportunities in the national homeland, on the plausibility and attractiveness of mobilization as an alternative to migration, to have their voice heard, rather than migration.

The components of the theoretical paradigm of diasporas most relevant to the post-Soviet situation will be highlighted, beginning with characteristics of the diaspora group. The first characteristic to be considered is the chronology of the group. While some post-Soviet diasporas were created centuries ago, most occurred during the seven decades of the Soviet Union's existence and many individuals were adults at the time of the breakup who had migrated within their lifetimes. The causes of dispersion need to be considered, whether voluntary, forced, for employment, or other reasons. As Diener notes, the process of how groups came to live outside their homeland is key to their diasporic stance (Diener 2008, 13). Much of the history of

spatial movements during the Soviet period was a grim history of forced migration. This included the movement of entire ethnic groups, something that the Soviet Union was able to carry out because people had their nationalities stamped in their passports as permanent markers (Arel 2001b). Many others in the Soviet Union, especially Russians, went voluntarily as members of an elite cadre to industrialize and modernize the periphery.

Was there a cause for differentiation or a criteria for sub-groups within a diaspora group, or their status vis-à-vis people in the host country? There were certainly status differences between Russians vis-à-vis the Baltic indigenous groups and Russians vs. Central Asians. What was the level of retention of the ethnic culture, such as language? For Russians in the non-Russian FSU states, being of the majority nationality in the Soviet Union and living in large ethnic enclaves outside of Russia, their knowledge of the indigenous languages was rather low. Another characteristic was the spatial dimension of the diaspora, the physical location of members and relations among them. For the Russian diaspora, in the six of the capitals of the non-Russian FSU states, they were the largest or nearly the largest ethnic group (Harris 1993, 17). Thus, they could speak their own language and enjoy other aspects of their culture and did not need to mix with the members of the native ethnic group.

Characteristics of the homeland that are important to the diaspora paradigm are whether it is real or not, its legitimacy, and whether it is accepted by all diaspora members. Russians, and some others, might think of the USSR as their homeland, and



have problems coping with another. One of the most important factors in the fluid situation of the FSU are issues such as citizenship and language. How citizenship laws were crafted meant defining the borders of the homeland. Did they include a clause that granted citizenship to all members, including those living outside the homeland, outside the USSR? The new states had to demarcate borders, which had been loosely drawn during the Soviet period, but also define the nation and the initial body of citizens. Were state and nation consistent? This was a chance to define or redefine the homeland, in some cases to include a call for the diaspora to join the new nation. Diaspora migration differs from other types of migration because it includes a natural right to return (Shuval 2000, 5). Among the best examples of this are the states of Israel and Germany, which had been reconstituted in the mid-twentieth century (Joppke and Roshenhek 2001), both of which played prominent roles in post-Soviet migration. Other aspects of the homeland are its behavior toward returnees, which in the case of Russia was initially quite ambivalent or even hostile and the behavior of the returnees, their level of integration, and level of “at homeness.”

Crucial characteristics of the host are structural features such as the possibilities for social mobility, or the geographic dispersion or ghettoization of minority groups. In Russia, a classic native-migrant dual labor market has developed alongside a quite hostile, even at times violent treatment of minorities (Finn 2008, A16). What is the behavior of the government towards ethnic groups – indifference, disdain, hostility? Do states discriminate based on ancestry or ethnicity, which can be seen as a practice of nationhood (Skrentny et al. 2007, 794)? What is the relevance of the homeland to

the host government? For the non-Russian states, the Russian diaspora is often viewed as fifth column.

### ***5.2.3 The creation of ethnicity in the Soviet Union***

Tsarist Russia classified people based on religion and native language, treating the latter as a surrogate for nationality (Anderson and Silver 1989). When the Bolsheviks gained power following the 1917 Revolution, there was a debate among Soviet anthropologists, geographers, statisticians, ethnographers, and linguists as to how best to categorize the diverse population that they were now ruling. As Francine Hirsh skillfully describes, this debate and struggle were played out in the first Soviet censuses, which was done in part to create durable ethno-territorial units which would be economically viable (Hirsh 1997, 2005).

As Hirsch argues, establishment of the census category nationality was fundamental to creation of the multinational state (Hirsh 1997, 251). She divides the process into three overlapping phases: physical conquest (1917-1924), conceptual conquest (1924-1928), and consolidation (1927-1939). The first was the period of the civil war, conquest of periphery regions, and the marking of international borders. It was during this period that the Bolsheviks made promises of national self-determination for ethnic groups as a reward for support of the nascent regime. The second phase was that of the first population census when statisticians had to draw up the initial *List of Nationalities* into which people were categorized based on their ethnicity. The third

was when the Soviet government, mainly the Soviet of Nationalities, began to use the census results for the demarcation of ethnic homelands in places where people lived in geographic proximity. Those who had not managed to attain their own national-territorial regions found their very existence in question. There were shifts over time in both the number of ethnic groups and the borders of different homelands (Kaiser 1994). When the Soviet Union broke apart, it did so along these ethnic lines that were created and defined in the early Soviet period.

In some cases, nationalities were created among peoples who had little sense of common identity. The 1926 census results included some 200 peoples but was eventually pared down to 172 peoples who received official recognition.

Ethnographers wanted many categories in order to give recognition to all nuances and sub-categories of peoples. However, the government wanted fewer groups and requested a list of the major nationalities. By 1939, the official list of nationalities was more or less complete though over time the number of nationalities shrunk, mainly through consolidation of smaller groups with larger neighboring groups.

There were 102 nationalities that were listed in all seven Soviet censuses (Kingade 1992). A list of these nationalities is in Appendix 1. Following the 1939 population census, the concept of nationality became an important social marker and was embedded in the administrative structure. Nearly all identification documents had a place for the person's *natsionalnost*. This was a person's official nationality and might differ from their census nationality to which a response could be given without

documentation, thus providing an element of fungibility or ethnic re-identification between censuses.

#### ***5.2.4 The creation of ethnic homelands in the Soviet Union***

As the Russian Empire expanded, it incorporated larger numbers of non-Russian and non-Slavic groups, so that by 1921, sixty-five million of the total population of 140 million was non-Russian (Hirsh 1997, 254). It was in part, this bargaining process between the new regime and the non-Russian nationalities that gave impetus to the need to create ethnic-based homelands. Support for the Bolsheviks was given in exchange for promises of national self-determination within ethnic homelands.

During the chaos of the Civil War, some regions enjoyed brief periods of independence, which gave rise to nationalist ambitions when these states were incorporated as part of the USSR. Lenin's reading and interpretation of Marx favored the right of nations to control their own homelands, a move that was also slightly pragmatic.

The creation of ethnic homelands and ethnic spaces was crucial to the creation of diasporas in the Soviet Union and how these groups would react in the post-Soviet period. The creation of ethnicity and ethnic homelands was an iterative process that was most intense during the first decades of the Soviet Union's existence. The newly-created homelands and other non-ethnic administrative divisions replaced the *guberniyas* (province or government) of the Russian Empire which did not give

territorial recognition to ethnic groups. However, much of the recognition of distinct ethnic groups and homelands in the early Soviet period can be seen as a continuation of a process that began in the late Tsarist period. There was considerable uncertainty as to the language, life styles, and means of production of the peoples of these lands on the periphery many of which had only recently been brought into the Russian Empire (Anderson 2006). The settlement patterns found in the 1920s were not always synonymous with the historical homelands as perceived by the nationalists.

The drawing of homelands was imperfect in Central Asia (Diener 2008, 10), as well as other parts of the Soviet Union. By 1939, the process of drawing homelands was essentially finished and the resulting political administrative structure was very complex, reflecting elements of administrative convenience, recognition of ethnic groups, and traditionalism (Lydolph 1990, 27). In 1989, just prior to the breakup of the country there were fifty-three ethnic homelands in the FSU. This consisted of fifteen union republics, which became the successor states to the Soviet Union, twenty autonomous republics, eight autonomous oblasts, and ten autonomous okrugs, homelands in Siberia of the Small-Numbered Peoples of the North.<sup>12</sup> However, here the focus will be on the fifteen newly independent states and their corresponding

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<sup>12</sup> The Soviet Union's rather complex ethno-territorial structure had five levels corresponding to ethnic groups of different sizes and levels of ethnic consciousness. The highest level was the fifteen union republics, which all had an external border of the USSR, the ethnic group was considered to be advanced, and they had a population of one million, the majority of which consisted of members of the indigenous group. Autonomous republics were homelands of other important groups which lacked one of the requisites for union republic status. In 1989, there were sixteen autonomous republics in Russia, two in Georgia, one in Uzbekistan, and one in Azerbaijan. The six *krais* are not ethnic units but have ethnic units within them. They are only in Russia. Autonomous oblasts are homelands of lesser ethnic groups. There were eight autonomous oblasts in 1989, five in Russia and one each in Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Tajikistan. The ten autonomous okrugs are the lowest level and are homelands of small Siberian and northern ethnic groups and they are also only found within Russia.

indigenous nationalities. The next section examines the degree to which these newly-created homelands did attract ethnic groups during the Soviet period as a historical background to post-Soviet diaspora movements.

### ***5.2.5 Ethnic mixing in the Soviet Union***

An important influence on diaspora migration in the former Soviet Union was the degree of ethnic segregation during the Soviet period. The extent of ethnic mixing among nationalities during the Soviet period was of interest to Soviet social scientists and policy makers (Kingkade 1992, 253). Of keen importance to the Soviet government which was trying to create a class-less society was how to solve the “nationality problem,” meaning how to accommodate the aspirations of the multitude of ethnic groups now under their domain. There was a debate between Lenin and Stalin (who was the first Commissar of Nationalities) as to whether there would be eventual consolidation of ethnic groups into just a few (Lenin’s position) or a flourishing of smaller nationalities as Stalin thought. Likewise, the geographic distribution of nationalities was always a significant issue among Soviet policymakers (Kingkade 1992, 254). Though no longer part of one country, this issue is of vital importance to the successor states as each inherited sizable minority populations as part of the Soviet legacy. Over the course of the Soviet period, Russians remained a majority but were a declining portion of the population offset by a growing share of others, mainly Muslims (Anderson and Silver 1989). Ethnic Russians declined from 53.1 percent of the population in 1926 to 50.8 percent in 1989 (Kingkade 1992, 252).

That they managed to remain a psychologically important majority was due in part to assimilation of other ethnic groups. Largely because of much higher fertility rates than Slavic and other groups, Muslims increased their portion of the Soviet population from 12.4 percent in 1926 to 19.3 percent in 1989.

The Soviet history of ethnic mixing, out-migration of Russians and other Slavic groups into the non-Russian periphery, and ethnic diversification of the fifteen republics can be divided into two periods. Most of the observed *russification* of the non-Russian states occurred prior to 1959 (Kingkade 1992, 254). In the early Soviet period, between 1926 and 1959, there was a rather massive migration of Russians and Russian speakers into the non-Russian republics to undertake a comprehensive program of industrialization, collectivization, and control of all aspects of the economy and society (Harris 1993, 7). This led to huge increases in the Russian shares in many of these non-Russian states, and corresponding declines in the indigenous shares (figures 14 and 15).

The percent that Russians made up of the 14 non-Russian republics increased from 9.6 percent of the population in 1926 to 19.6 percent in 1970 before declining to 18.2 percent in 1989. For most of the Soviet period until 1975, there was out-migration from Russia to the non-Russian states. In that year, net-migration reversed and became positive in favor of Russia and stayed in that direction until the end of the Soviet period, and remains in favor of Russia vis-à-vis the other FSU states. In addition to the reversal of migration trends, some of the changes in the ethnic


composition of the states is due to large differences in rates of natural increase among ethnic groups.

There were differences between the six northern states and the eight southern ones in terms of the percent Russian and percent indigenous. In the eight southern republics collectively, the percent Russian peaked in 1959 at 22.1 percent and declined to 15.9 percent in 1989 (Figure 15A). In the six northern republics, the Russian percent continued to increase right up until the end of the Soviet period, going from 9.0 percent in 1926 to 20.3 percent in 1989 (Figure 14A). These differential ethnic shares between northern and southern states is due to a combination of differential natural increase and that Russians continued to stream into the Baltic and other Slavic states throughout the Soviet period, while they had begun to leave the Central Asian and Transcaucasus states earlier. This allowed the indigenous shares in the southern FSU states to increase since 1959 (Figure 15B), while the indigenous shares in the northern FSU states stayed the same or declined (Figure 15A). In terms of indigenous concentrations, the general trend has been towards concentrations of nationalities into their homelands over most of the Soviet period. The notable exception is Russians who dispersed across the Soviet Union outside of Russia. The percent of Russians residing outside of Russia went from 6.6 percent of all Russians in 1926 to 14.2 percent in 1959 and then to 17.4 percent in 1989.




**Figure 14: Percentage Russian and Indigenous in the Northern FSU States, 1926 to 1989**

**14A: Percent Russian in the Northern FSU States, 1926-1989**



Source: (Harris 1993, 4-6).


**14B: Percent Indigenous in the Northern FSU States, 1926-1989**



Source: (Harris 1993, 4-6).


**Figure 15: Percentage Russian and Indigenous in the Southern FSU States, 1926 to 1989**

**15A: Percent Russian in the Southern FSU States, 1926-1989**



Source: (Harris 1993, 4-6).

**15B: Percent Indigenous in the Southern FSU States, 1926-1989**



Source: (Harris 1993, 4-6).

### *5.2.6 Literature on diaspora migration in the post-Soviet space*

Much of the literature on diasporas in the post-Soviet space has focused on the Russian diaspora (Dunlop 1993, 1994; Shlapentokh, Sendich, and Payin 1994; Khazanov 1995; Kolstoe 1995; Melvin 1995; Segbers and Spegeleire 1995; Chinn and Kaiser 1996; Zevelev 2001; Barrington, Herron, and Silver 2003; Munz and Ohliger 2003, 129-258; Heleniak 2004). Part of the reason for this surge of interest was that many thought that the existence of 25 million Russians would be a destabilizing influence in the non-Russian states. This collection of literature makes an important contribution and together clearly elucidates the factors influencing the diaspora triad among Russia, the non-Russian FSU states, and the Russian diaspora, exploring such factors as the social and economic status of the Russians in these new states. There are a few scattered works examining other FSU diasporas (Vishnevsky 2003; Diener 2008). Most of the works on the Russian diaspora mention that migration to Russia is a possibility but few explore it any depth and only a few contain any data on migration. Dunlop, who wrote two articles speculating on the extent of Russian migration back to Russia following the breakup of the Soviet Union, but only in one provided any data on migration trends and this was in the early 1990s (Dunlop 1993, 1994). Brubaker, who has written extensively on nationalism and diasporas in Europe has said about migration of the Russian diaspora that we do not have a very good idea how many have already moved (Brubaker 1995, 212) and later good data on the Russian reflux are lacking (Brubaker 1998). One contribution that this chapter makes is that it is a first attempt to systematical quantify diaspora

migration movements across the FSU and to extend the analysis of ethnic mixing and segregation referenced above into post-Soviet period. The FSU has witnessed one of the greatest migrations in 20<sup>th</sup> century history but it remains understudied (Radnitz 2006). This analyzes one crucial aspect of those movements - diaspora migration.

### **5.3 Measuring Diaspora Migration and Ethnic Segregation**

There is no single test to conclusively prove that there was or wasn't diaspora migration across the FSU. Here, three different tests are carried out to determine the extent of diaspora migration and ethnic segregation using nationality data from the Soviet Union and post-Soviet states. The first cursory test will be to examine changes in the percent that the indigenous population comprises of its homeland and changes in the percent of each diaspora group residing outside its homeland. A second test will be to collect and examine available data on migration by nationality to determine the patterns and extent of diaspora migration. A final test will be to compute indices of ethnic segregation for 1989 and 2000.

#### ***5.3.1 Data on ethnicity and migration by ethnicity in the FSU***

The analyses carried out here to measure diaspora migration and ethnic segregation are based on two types of nationality data from the Soviet Union and post-Soviet states. The first are stock data from population censuses and the second are data on migration by nationality for selected countries. The last USSR population census conducted in 1989 included a question which asked each person his or her nationality.

Results were published for 169 regions and 128 different ethnic groups. In the 2000 round of population censuses, all of the successor states included a similar question on nationality. In the 2002 Russian census, nationality data were presented for 182 ethnic groups, reflecting a splintering of ethnic groups which could affect comparisons over time. For the non-Russian states, data on far fewer ethnic groups were either collected or compiled as many groups, especially smaller ones, are found primarily or only in Russia. From these sources, data were compiled for 1989 and 1999-2002 for the fifteen FSU states and the fifteen indigenous nationalities (tables 8 and 9). Thirteen of the fifteen FSU states conducted their first population census as independent states in the years 1999 to 2002. The exceptions were Turkmenistan, which conducted a census in 1995 and Uzbekistan, which has yet to conduct its first post-Soviet census. For these two countries, estimates were made. A second source is data on migration by ethnicity, compiled from frontier statistics. Given the poor or non-existent collection of migration statistics in some of the countries in the immediate post-Soviet period, it is not surprising that not all collected and published such information. Fortunately, the largest FSU state, Russia, and the major driver of migration in the region has among the most complete and comprehensive migration statistics of any of the countries.

**Table 8: Ethnic Composition of the USSR by Union Republic, 1989 (thousands)**

Union republic	Total	Armenians	Azeris	Belorussians	Estonians	Georgians	Kazaks	Kirgiz	Latvians	Lithuanians	Moldovans	Russians	Tadzhiks	Turkmen	Ukrainians	Uzbeks	Other
USSR	285,743	4,623	6,770	10,036	1,027	3,981	8,136	2,529	1,459	3,067	3,352	145,155	4,215	2,729	44,186	16,698	27,778
Armenia	3,305	3,084	85	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	52	0	0	8	0	72
Azerbaijan	7,021	391	5,805	8	0	14	2	0	0	1	2	392	1	0	32	1	372
Belarus	10,152	5	5	7,905	1	3	2	1	3	8	5	1,342	1	1	291	4	577
Estonia	1,566	2	1	28	963	1	0	0	3	3	1	475	0	0	48	1	40
Georgia	5,401	437	308	9	2	3,787	3	0	1	1	3	341	1	0	52	1	454
Kazakhstan	16,464	19	90	183	3	9	6,535	14	3	11	33	6,228	26	4	896	332	2,078
Kyrgyzstan	4,258	4	16	9	0	1	37	2,230	0	0	2	917	34	1	108	550	348
Latvia	2,667	3	3	120	3	1	1	0	1,388	35	3	906	0	0	92	1	110
Lithuania	3,675	2	1	63	1	1	1	0	4	2,924	1	344	1	0	45	1	285
Moldova	4,335	3	3	20	0	1	1	0	0	1	2,795	562	1	0	600	1	347
Russia	147,022	532	336	1,206	46	131	636	42	47	70	173	119,866	38	40	4,363	127	19,369
Tajikistan	5,093	6	2	7	0	1	11	64	0	1	1	388	3,172	20	41	1,198	179
Turkmenistan	3,523	32	33	9	0	1	88	1	1	0	2	334	3	2,536	36	317	129
Ukraine	51,452	54	37	440	4	24	11	2	7	11	325	11,356	4	3	37,419	20	1,735
Uzbekistan	19,810	51	44	29	1	5	808	175	1	2	6	1,653	934	122	153	14,142	1,684

Sources: (Goskomstat SSSR 1991).

**Table 9: Ethnic Composition of the Soviet Successor States, 1999-2002 (thousands)**

Country (census date)	Total	Armenians	Azeris	Belorussians	Estonians	Georgians	Kazaks	Kirgiz	Latvians	Lithuanians	Moldovans	Russians	Tadzhiks	Turkmen	Ukrainians	Uzbeks	Other
Former USSR	284,667	4,856	8,324	9,547	966	3,920	9,745	3,490	1,414	3,009	3,457	133,978	6,299	3,602	42,161	21,378	28,519
Armenia (October 2002)	3,213	3,145	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	15	0	0	2	0	51
Azerbaijan (January 1999)	7,953	121	7,206	1	0	15	0.200	0.100	0	0	0.400	142	0.050	0.200	29	0.200	440
Belarus (February 1999)	10,045	10	6	8,159	0	3	1	0.100	2	6	4	1,142	1	0.900	237	2	471
Estonia (March 2000)	1,370	0	0	17	930	0	1	0	2	2	0	351	0	0	29	0	37
Georgia (January 2002)	4,372	249	285	0	0	3,661	0	0	0	0	0	68	0	0	7	0	102
Kazakhstan (February 1999)	14,953	15	78	112	2	5	7,985	11	2	7	19	4,480	26	2	547	371	1,292
Kyrgyzstan (March 1999)	4,823	1	14	3	0.000	1	43	3,128	0.000	0.000	1	603	43	0.400	50	665	271
Latvia (March 2000)	2,377	3	2	97	3	1	0.258	0.023	1,371	33	2	703	0.093	0.045	64	0.306	99
Lithuania (April 2001)	3,484	1	1	43	0.419	0.000	0.145	0.000	3	2,907	1	220	0.000	0.000	22	0.159	285
Moldova (January 1999)	4,293	0	0	0	0	0.437	0	0	0	0	2,997	484	0	0	552	0	260
Russia (October 2002)	145,164	1,130	621	815	28	198	655	32	29	45	172	115,868	120	33	2,943	123	22,352
Tajikistan (January 2000)	6,127	1	1	0.464	0.020	0.161	1	66	0.104	0.040	0.341	68	4,898	20	4	937	131
Turkmenistan (January 1995)	4,418	34	37	4	0	1	87	2	0	0	2	299	3	3,402	23	407	118
Ukraine (December 2001)	47,843	100	45	276	3	34	6	1	5	7	259	8,334	4	4	37,542	12	1,212
Uzbekistan (January 1999)	24,231	47	29	20	0	0	966	250	0	0	0	1,202	1,204	140	110	18,861	1,401

Sources: (National Statistical Service of the Republic of Armenia 2003, 362-363; Goskomstat Azerbaijan 2001, 381; MinStat Belarus 2001, 70; Statistical Office of Estonia 2001, 14; State Department of Statistics of Georgia 2006; Aгенство по статистике Казахстана (Agency for Statistics of Kazakhstan) 2000, 6-7; Natskomstat Kyrgyzstan (National Committee on Statistics of Kyrgyzstan) 2000, 26; Central Statistical Bureau of Latvia 2000, 142-143; Statistics Lithuania 2004; Heleniak 2003b, 131-145; Goskomstat Rossii 2004a; Goskomstat Tajikistan (State Committee on Statistics of Tajikistan) 2002, 155; Goskomstat Turkmenistan (State Committee on Statistics of Turkmenistan) 1997, 12; Derzhgomstat Ukraine (State Committee on Statistics of Ukraine) 2004). Some detailed for Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan are taken from CIS Statistical Committee 2002b, 122-123). 0 indicates that no data were given in original source. Figures less than 1,000 are shown to the last person.

### ***5.3.2 Segregation indexes***

A final test is the construction of indices of segregation for 1989 and 2000 based on the 15-by-15 matrixes of ethnicity in tables 8 and 9. There is a long scholarly tradition of seeking to quantify ethnic diversity and residential segregation through statistical indicators, such as indices of segregation, dissimilarity, and isolation, to which this is one more addition (Phillips 2007, 7). Segregation measures have been used to measure the extent of and change in racial segregation across geographic units in the United States (Iceland, Weinberg, and Steinmetz 2002 (August); Massey and Denton 1993) and have been used in the analysis of ethnic segregation among nationalities in the Soviet Union (Kingkade 1992; Lewis, Rowland, and Clem 1976). Results showing a clear pattern of increased segregation of ethnic groups, along with evidence from the other tests, would support the hypothesis that there has been diaspora migration towards ethnic homelands.

## **5.4 Diaspora Migration and Ethnic Segregation of the FSU States**

### ***5.4.1 Homeland concentrations and change in diaspora groups***

The first examination is of trends in the percent that the indigenous nationality comprises of its homeland in 1989 and 1999-2002 and the percent of each ethnic group which resides in its homeland. Table 10 shows that there has been a clear trend towards increases in the share that indigenous groups comprised of their homelands,



as all but Russians had increases.<sup>13</sup> These increases were attributable to all three factors – net immigration of diaspora members combined with net emigration of non-indigenous members, differential rates of natural increase, and some undetermined element of ethnic re-identification. The declining percent that ethnic Russians constitute of Russia can be explained by their having a lower rate of natural increase than nearly all other ethnic groups in Russia, immigration into Russia of many non-Russian groups, and a likely element of ethnic re-identification away from Russian towards many of the smaller ethnic groups in Russia, between the censuses. In Central Asia and the Caucasus, the post-Soviet trends represent a continuation, and even acceleration of the indigenous nationality comprising an increasing share of their homelands (as seen in figures 14 and 15). In contrast, in the northern republics, there was a long-term trend of the indigenous republic comprising a smaller share of the population of its own republic after 1959, so the post-Soviet trends represent a reversal.

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<sup>13</sup> Because the base data for this and subsequent tables are from population censuses, they have no sampling error and conventional tests of significance do not apply. Any criteria adopted to discern substantive, rather than statistical significance are arbitrary. One method used in analysis of racial and ethnic residential segregation patterns in the United States was to use a criteria any change being more than 1 percent of range of indexes for the two years to be considered significant (Iceland, Weinberg, and Steinmetz 2002 (August), 14). According to these criteria, the range of the percent of ethnic groups living outside their homelands was 58.2, thus any change over 0.6 percentage points should be considered significant. As can be seen, all changes in the percent indigenous should be considered significant.

**Table 10: Percent Indigenous by Republic/Country, 1989 and 1999-2002**

	Percent indigenous		Percentage point
	1989	1999-2002	change, 1989 to 1999-2002
Armenia	93.3	97.9	4.6
Azerbaijan	82.7	90.6	7.9
Belarus	77.9	81.2	3.4
Estonia	61.5	67.9	6.4
Georgia	70.1	83.8	13.6
Kazakhstan	39.7	53.4	13.7
Kyrgyzstan	52.4	64.9	12.5
Latvia	52.0	57.7	5.6
Lithuania	79.6	83.4	3.9
Moldova	64.5	69.8	5.3
Russia	81.5	79.8	-1.7
Tajikistan	62.3	79.9	17.6
Turkmenistan	72.0	77.0	5.0
Ukraine	72.7	78.5	5.7
Uzbekistan	71.4	77.8	6.4

Sources: Based on data in tables 8 and 9.

In Table 11, a decrease in the share of the diaspora population residing outside the homeland would indicate that there has been diaspora migration back to the homeland.<sup>14</sup> As the last column in the table shows, the share of diaspora population residing outside of their homeland and elsewhere in the FSU decreased for all groups except Armenians and Georgians. The total number of these fifteen ethnic groups who lived outside their ethnic homeland elsewhere in the FSU declined from 43.4 million in 1989 to 34.0 million in 2000. In 1989, 16.8 percent of the total population of these groups could be classified as being diaspora members as defined here, a share that declined to 13.3 percent in 2000.

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<sup>14</sup> According to the criteria, the range of the percent of ethnic groups living outside their homelands was 32.6, thus any change over 0.3 percentage points should be considered significant. As can be seen, all changes in the percent of ethnic groups living outside their homelands should be considered significant.

**Table 11: Concentration of Major Ethnic Groups in their Homelands in the FSU, 1989 and 1999-2002**

Nationality	1989			1999-2002			
	Total in USSR	In Homeland	Percent outside	Total in FSU	In Homeland	Percent outside	Percentage point change, 1989 to 2002
Armenians	4,623	3,084	33.3	4,854	3,145	35.2	1.9
Azeris	6,770	5,805	14.3	8,322	7,206	13.4	-0.8
Belorussians	10,036	7,905	21.2	9,547	8,159	14.5	-6.7
Estonians	1,027	963	6.2	963	930	3.4	-2.8
Georgians	3,981	3,787	4.9	3,918	3,661	6.6	1.7
Kazaks	8,136	6,535	19.7	9,738	7,985	18.0	-1.7
Kirgiz	2,529	2,230	11.8	3,488	3,128	10.3	-1.5
Latvians	1,459	1,388	4.9	1,407	1,371	2.6	-2.3
Lithuanians	3,067	2,924	4.7	2,995	2,907	2.9	-1.7
Moldovans	3,352	2,795	16.6	3,455	2,997	13.2	-3.4
Russians	145,155	119,866	17.4	133,978	115,868	13.5	-3.9
Tadzhiks	4,215	3,172	24.7	6,295	4,898	22.2	-2.6
Turkmen	2,729	2,536	7.1	3,598	3,402	5.5	-1.6
Ukrainians	44,186	37,419	15.3	42,161	37,542	11.0	-4.4
Uzbeks	16,698	14,142	15.3	21,365	18,861	11.7	-3.6

Sources: Based on data in tables 8 and 9. Outside their homeland refers to elsewhere in the USSR or FSU.

Over the three previous intercensal periods (1959-1979, 1970-1979, and 1979-1989), the indigenous groups of the three Baltic states showed a tendency towards migration back to their homelands, while Ukrainians, Belarussians, Moldovans showed negligible out-migration. For Russians, net migration was close to zero. Armenians showed large repatriation over previous intercensal periods both from outside the USSR as well as from inside, with most of those coming to Armenia coming from neighboring Caucasus states of Azerbaijan and Georgia. Other groups migrated back to their home republics although in smaller amounts. The only exceptions were Tajiks who were showing evidence of out migration during the last census period (Anderson and Silver 1989, 640).

#### ***5.4.2 Migration by nationality***

Because of the deterioration of migration statistics, scattered data on migration by nationality are only available for six of the FSU countries; fortunately, this includes Russia, as well as Belarus, Latvia, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan. Data for the five non-Russian states are shown in Table 12. Data for Belarus show that two groups dominated migration, Russians, who had a moderate net emigration and Belarussians, who had significant net immigration. Latvia has been a country of emigration for all of the post-Soviet period, albeit recently at a slower pace. More members of all ethnic groups are leaving the country than arriving, including Latvians, counter to diaspora migration hypothesis. A portion of the emigration from Latvia in the past few years has been to the EU when Latvia gained membership in 2004 and its population gained access to the labor market. The data for Kyrgyzstan refer to years in the mid-1990s when the economy was in a steep depression and recorded emigration was fifty times the number immigrating to the country. Flows out of the country were dominated by Germans, Crimean Tatars, and Russians, all in accordance with diaspora migration. All groups, including ethnic Kyrgyz had net emigration. The Kazakh data refer to the 1994, at which time migration consisted primarily of three groups, Russians, Germans, and Kazakhs. Russians were leaving in large numbers but there was a smaller counter-flow. Germans were basically just leaving. The inflows and outflows of Kazakhs were roughly equal indicating considerable churning, of likely quite different social groups and sources and destinations. The Turkmen data show that all groups, including ethnic Turkmen, had

net emigration over the period, with Russians, Ukrainians, Armenians, and Kazakhs having especially large outflows under the rather repressive conditions in the country during that period. This small sampling of data shows some limited support for the existence of diaspora migration.

Table 13 contains data on net-migration by nationality between Russia and the non-Russian FSU states for the years 1989 to 2005. Data are presented for twenty nationalities, the fifteen FSU indigenous nationalities, two groups whose ethnic homelands are subnational units within Russia, Tatars and Bashkirs, one group whose homeland is divided between Russia and Georgia, the Ossetians, and Germans and Jews, whose homelands are outside of the FSU.<sup>15</sup> Over this period, 13.8 million persons legally and permanently migrated into or out of Russia from or to another FSU state (and were captured in migration statistics). The ratio of immigrants to emigrants was over two-to-one. Of these twenty ethnic groups, only four had net emigration from Russia, and for those who did the numbers who left was only slightly higher than number who arrived. That there was so much immigration of non-Russians contributed to Russians making up a smaller portion of the population of the country. The large number of non-Russians migrating to Russia – people leaving their ethnic homelands – demonstrates that diaspora migration was hardly universal. The size of the Armenian, Azeri, Georgian, Uzbek, and Tajik populations in Russia all increased substantially with Tajiks nearly doubling their size from migration. During the rather chaotic period of the early 1990s, there was net emigration of many non-

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<sup>15</sup> Combined these groups account for ninety-three percent of immigrants and ninety-four percent of emigrants with Russia over this period.

Russian ethnic groups from Russia. However, since 1994 a clear pattern has emerged of all of these ethnic groups having more people coming to Russia than leaving (with the exception of Kazakhs since 2001).

**Table 12: Nationality Composition of Migration in Selected FSU States, 1995 to 2006**


	Belarus (1995)			Latvia (1995, 2000-2006)			Kyrgyzstan (1994-1995, 1997)			Kazakhstan (1994)			Turkmenistan (1995-2005)		
	Net migration	Immigrat ion	Emigrati on	Net migration	Immigrat ion	Emigrati on	Net migration	Immigrat ion	Emigrati on	Net migration	Immigrat ion	Emigrati on	Net migration	Immigrat ion	Emigrati on
<b>Total</b>	7,199	33,301	26,102	-31,150	15,013	46,163	-22,388	423	22,811	-410,387	400,925	811,312	-130,971	26,877	157,848
Russians	-1,716	11,909	13,625	-19,672	4,774	24,446	-5,721	127	5,848	-251,934	105,732	357,666	-68,771	6,454	75,225
Ukrainians	-113	2,913	3,026	-3,502	705	4,207	-840	9	849	-32,325	18,137	50,462	-6,549	762	7,311
Belarussians	8,361	15,919	7,558	-2,568	538	3,106	-81	3	84	-6,420	3,270	9,690	..	..	..
Moldovans	-24	91	115	..	..	..	-13	0	13	-1,299	939	2,238	..	..	..
Latvians	-13	21	34	-1,268	3,167	4,435	-4	0	4	-83	60	143	..	..	..
Lithuanians	2	65	63	-224	750	974	-16	0	16	-341	250	591	..	..	..
Estonians	3	9	6	-6	221	227	-6	0	6	-112	51	163	..	..	..
Armenians	184	359	175	..	..	..	-11	2	13	-539	558	1,097	-4,099	649	4,748
Azeris	72	137	65	..	..	..	-18	0	18	-790	1,862	2,652	-2,175	1,022	3,197
Georgians	47	85	38	..	..	..	-8	0	8	-126	246	372	..	..	..
Kazakhs	-3	30	33	..	..	..	-18	2	20	5,484	229,655	224,171	-25,610	2,335	27,945
Kyrgyz	-10	5	15	..	..	..	-115	40	155	-255	552	807	..	..	..
Tajiks	19	34	15	..	..	..	-8	0	8	-197	282	479	..	..	..
Turkmen	6	20	14	..	..	..	-2	0	2	-47	74	121	-2,345	7,715	10,060
Uzbeks	8	63	55	..	..	..	-31	5	36	-2,217	2,409	4,626	-1,416	4,797	6,213
Jews	63	129	66	-1,833	387	2,220	-807	27	834	-1,328	161	1,489	..	..	..
Germans	81	133	52	-357	490	847	-14,361	121	14,482	-89,796	14,125	103,921	..	..	..
Other	232	1,379	1,147	-1,720	3,981	5,701	-328	87	415	-28,062	22,562	50,624	-20,006	3,143	23,149

Sources: (Central Statistical Bureau of Latvia; Natskomstat Kyrgyzstan 1995, 235, 1996, 225, 1997, 240; MinStat Belarus 1996b, 176; Goskomstat Kazakhstan 1996, 246; Malynovska 2006, 1030-116).

.. = migration data for a particular nationality were not given in the original source.

Figure 16 shows the net migration of Russians with each of the non-Russian FSU states since 1989. A rather clear pattern emerges as to the percentage of the Russian population that has left each state. From the three Transcaucasus states and Tajikistan, half or more of the Russian population have left. In all these states, there have been periods of ethnic violence coupled with steep economic downturns. From the Central Asian states, besides Tajikistan, about a quarter of Russians have left. From the Baltic states and Moldova, roughly one in eight Russians have left, and from the other two Slavic states, there has been minimal migration of the Russian populations. There has been a net migration of about 13.8 percent of the 25.3 million people in the Russian diaspora. This consists of immigration to Russia of 5.5 million and emigration of 2.0 million; thus, though the overall migration balance of the Russian diaspora has been positive, there is evidence of considerable churning.

**Figure 16: Net Migration of Russians with Russia, 1989 to 2005**




Source: (CIS Statistical Committee and East View Publications 1996; Goskomstat Rossii 1996a, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000b, 2001a, 2002, 2004b, 2005c, 2006b).



However, comparing the number of net migrants from non-Russian FSU states with the number of each nationality in Russia in 1989 suffers from two fallacies. One is the use of net migrants and the second is that those already in Russia are not the correct at-risk population for migrating. Though seldom used, a more proper calculation would be to compare all those of a particular ethnic group who migrated to Russia to all those of that group living outside of Russia at the beginning of the period (Plane and Rogerson 1994, 97). Of other groups whose migration to Russia appears significant based on their numbers outside Russia in 1989, this amounts to 3.5 percent of the Azeri population, 2.4 percent of the Georgian population, and only 1.3 percent of all Tajiks. The only group whose migration to Russia is significant are Armenians, who had 11 percent of their total population migrate to Russia. However, if illegal, undocumented, and other forms of temporary migration were included, it represents significant portions of some of the smaller ethnic groups migrating to Russia. As seen in Figure 17, there was a high correlation between countries that had high shares of the Russian diaspora migrate to Russia and high shares of the indigenous population migrate to Russia as well ( $r = 0.82$ ). For instance, the Tajik population in Russia increased by 98 percent through net migration, while there was also a 61 percent out-migration of the Russian population in Tajikistan. Thus, all persons of all nationalities seemed to be responding to the same migration signals and these weren't necessarily the call of the homeland.

**Figure 17: Correlation between Net Migration of Russians from the non-Russian FSU States and Net Migration of Non-Russian Peoples to Russia, 1989 to 2005**



Source: Goskomstat Rossii (State Committee on Statistics of Russia) 1994, 2000 a, 2002, 2004b, 2005 c).

**Table 13: Nationality Composition of Migration between Russia and the States of the former Soviet Union, 1989 to 2005**

	Net migration, 1989-2005	Immigration	Emigration	Numbers of each nationality in Russia, 1989	Net migration, 1989-2005 as percent of 1989 total	Numbers of each nationality outside Russia, 1989	Net migration, 1989-2005 as percent of 1989 total
<b>Total</b>	5,221	9,496	4,276	147,400	3.5		
Russians	3,341	5,543	2,060	119,866	2.8	25,290	13.2
Ukrainians	304	1,232	928	4,363	7.0	39,823	0.8
Belarussians	32	250	218	1,206	2.6	8,830	0.4
Moldovans	14	109	95	173	7.9	3,180	0.4
Latvians	1	6	6	47	1.7	1,412	0.1
Lithuanians	-1	12	13	70	-1.4	2,997	0.0
Estonians	1	4	3	46	2.6	980	0.1
Armenians	373	446	73	532	70.1	4,091	9.1
Azeris	92	227	135	336	27.2	6,435	1.4
Georgians	50	92	42	131	38.5	3,850	1.3
Kazakhs	-10	119	129	636	-1.5	7,500	-0.1
Kyrgyz	-2	21	23	42	-4.4	2,487	-0.1
Tajiks	37	56	19	38	96.8	4,177	0.9
Turkmen	0	20	20	40	-0.5	2,689	0.0
Uzbeks	21	86	65	127	16.5	16,571	0.1
Jews	8	24	16	537	1.4	841	0.9
Germans	84	148	64	842	10.0	1,197	7.0
Ossetians	49	54	5	402	12.1	196	24.9
Tatars	268	369	101	5,522	4.8	1,127	23.7
Bashkir	38	49	11	1,345	2.8	104	36.8
Other	380	629	249				

Sources: (Goskomstat Rossii 1994, 28-29, 2000a, 354-357, 2002, 368-371, 2003, 80, 2004b, 86-91, 2005c, 515-526, 2006b, 515-526).

Overall, Russia gained people from migration with the other FSU states and lost them to countries outside the FSU, though the losses were insignificant in comparison to the gains. Between 1995 and 2004, there was a net emigration to outside the Soviet Union of 615,000 primarily to three countries, Germany, Israel, and the United States. While there was net immigration of Germans and Jews to Russia from the other FSU states, there was overall net emigration of these groups from Russia to beyond the FSU, mainly to their homelands of Germany and Israel. The German population in the FSU has declined by nearly half and the Jewish population by about 60 percent (Heleniak 2003b). In the case of Germans, migration from Russia to Germany seems to support both neoclassical and diaspora migration theories. However, for many Germans, whose ancestors came to Russia several centuries ago, this might represent leaving their country of birth to move to a place they have never been to and know little about. For Jews, about half of those leaving Russia went to Israel, thus supporting both theories. One quarter went to Germany and another quarter went to the United States, thus satisfying neoclassical theory of migration to a higher income country but violating diaspora theory by not migrating to their ethnic homeland. Being a rather small country and economy, Israel has had some trouble absorbing the large influx of people from the FSU states, especially since many were highly educated and could not find suitable employment.

Of all immigrants to Russia over the period 1989 to 2005, ethnic Russians constituted only 58 percent, a group that could be described as diaspora migrants in the ethnic sense as defined here. The highest share that Russians made up of migrants to Russia

in any year was 66 percent in 1992, immediately after the breakup of the country. Russians also made up 48 percent of emigrants from the country, an indicator of something other than diaspora migration at work. Of the total movements to and from Russia with the other FSU states, about 57 percent could be classified as diaspora migration. This included the migration of ethnic Russians to Russia, Ossetians, Tatars, and Bashkirs to Russia (whose homelands were in Russia), and the migration of non-Russian ethnic groups out of Russia, as most who left Russia went to their homeland. At the same time, movements of Russians out of Russia and non-Russians to Russia could be seen as counter to diaspora migration. Such movements constituted 35 percent of total movements. Another 8 percent were neither or impossible to classify, including the migration of Germans and Jews into or out Russia. Thus, according to these data, diaspora migration was a significant factor behind post-Soviet movements but was hardly universal and can certainly not explain all of the moves that took place.

#### ***5.4.3 Ethnic segregation indexes***

The final tests are the calculation of segregation indexes, the first of which is the dissimilarity index. It measures the percentage of a group's population that would have to migrate for all areas to have a uniform ethnic or racial distribution. Thus, it is conceptually and methodologically ideally suited for measurement of the extent of diaspora migration. This index ranges from 0.0, indicating complete integration to 1.0, indicating complete segregation. The formula for calculating the dissimilarity

index and how it will be applied to the ethnicity data set for the fifteen FSU states is as follows:

$$\text{Dissimilarity Index (ID)} = \frac{1}{2} \sum_{i=1}^n \left| \frac{t_i}{T} - \frac{r_i}{R} \right|$$

Where:

$t_i$  = Indigenous population in  $i$ th Republic or FSU state

$T$  = Total indigenous population in the USSR or FSU

$r_i$  = Russian/non-indigenous population in  $i$ th Republic or FSU state (reference group)

$R$  = Total Russian/non-indigenous population in the USSR or FSU (reference group)

In one of the classic works examining population and nationality change in the USSR, Lewis, Rowland, and Clem calculated dissimilarity indexes for the period 1897 to 1970 (Lewis, Rowland, and Clem 1976). Kingkade found a pattern of decreased segregation and more mixing of ethnic groups over time with a dissimilarity index of 0.448 in 1926 and an index of 0.396 in 1989 (Kingkade 1992). Both analyses show a pattern of peak integration in the mid-1950s and increasing segregation since then.

An increase in the index from 1989 to 2000 would mean increased segregation, while a decrease would indicate increased integration. The indexes were calculated in two different ways, first using Russians for the reference group and second with all groups except the ethnic group in question as the reference group. In the first calculation, for 11 of the 14 non-Russian groups, the index went up between 1989 and 2000, indicating an increase in segregation (Table 14).<sup>16</sup> The second calculation produced similar results, with three groups showing a decrease in segregation, two of which

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<sup>16</sup> According to the criteria adopted to measure the significance in the change in the dissimilarity index, any change greater than 0.01 should be considered significant. Thus, the change in the dissimilarity index for Azeris, Georgians, Lithuanians, Tajiks, Turkmen, and Uzbeks were not significant.

were the same.<sup>17</sup> These results are consistent with the notion that the breakup of the Soviet Union caused expected movements of people away from areas of diversity, towards areas of ethnic homogeneity, in support of the diaspora migration hypothesis.

**Table 14: Dissimilarity Indexes by Nationality, 1989 and 1999-2002**

	With Russians as reference group			With other nationalities as reference group		
	1989	1999-2002	Change	1989	1999-2002	Change
Armenians	0.85	0.73	-0.12	0.80	0.68	-0.12
Azeris	0.91	0.90	-0.01	0.88	0.88	0.00
Belorussians	0.79	0.85	0.07	0.78	0.85	0.07
Estonians	0.93	0.96	0.03	0.94	0.96	0.03
Georgians	0.95	0.94	-0.01	0.95	0.93	-0.01
Kazaks	0.86	0.88	0.03	0.80	0.81	0.01
Kirgiz	0.96	0.97	0.02	0.88	0.89	0.01
Latvians	0.95	0.96	0.02	0.95	0.97	0.02
Lithuanians	0.96	0.97	0.01	0.95	0.97	0.01
Moldovans	0.85	0.88	0.03	0.83	0.86	0.03
Russians	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.63	0.67	0.04
Tadzhiks	0.96	0.96	0.00	0.90	0.88	-0.02
Turkmen	0.97	0.98	0.01	0.93	0.94	0.01
Ukrainians	0.78	0.84	0.06	0.79	0.85	0.06
Uzbeks	0.95	0.96	0.01	0.91	0.91	0.00
Other	0.15	0.10	-0.04	0.22	0.30	0.08

Source: Based on data in tables 8 and 9.

The three groups showing a decrease in their dissimilarity indexes are Armenians, Georgians, and Azeris, the three indigenous nationalities of the Caucasus states. Armenians and Georgians were the two groups less concentrated in their ethnic homelands. In the second calculation, Azeris showed no change in segregation while Tajiks had a decrease. These are consistent with other results as all of these groups had large out-migrations from their homelands. The decline in the index for Armenians, from 0.85 to 0.73, indicates movement away from clustering in regions with large Armenian populations, towards areas with predominantly non-Armenian populations (at least at the level of the 15 FSU states). As noted above, the share of

<sup>17</sup> The criteria for significant change was 0.01, meaning that the change for Azeris, Georgians, Kazaks, Kirgiz, Lithuanians, Turkmen, and Uzbeks were not significant.

Armenians living outside of Armenia increased during the 1990s, nearly doubling their numbers in Russia, in spite of Armenia finally achieving the long-sought goal of having its own homeland. Thus, according to the dissimilarity index, the second hypothesis is supported as migration towards ethnic kin is the predominant pattern in the immediate post-Soviet period. The only major violation is that of Armenians.

Entropy indexes and entropy scores for 1989 and 2000 are shown in Table 15, also often called the information-based index of inequality or Theil's H. The formula used for the entropy index (H) is as follows:

$$H = \sum_{i=1}^n \left[ \frac{t_i(E - E_i)}{ET} \right]$$

Where:

$$E_i = p_i \ln \left( \frac{1}{p_i} \right) \text{ Entropy score for unit}$$

$$E = P \ln \left( \frac{1}{P} \right) \text{ Entropy score for entire area or 'diversity' score}$$

$t_i$  = total population of area  $i$

$T$  = total population

$p_i$  = proportion of area  $i$ 's population that is minority

$P$  = proportion of total area's population that is minority

It is an index of diversity which measures the weighted-average deviation of each areal unit from the entire area's entropy or racial and ethnic diversity. It varies between 0.0, when all areas have the same composition to 1.0, when all areas contain only one group. Used in the calculation of the entropy index are entropy scores, which range up to a maximum of the natural log of the number of ethnic groups used in the calculation (in this case,  $\log 15 = 2.708$ ). The maximum score occurs when all groups have equal representation in the geographic area. An increase in the entropy



index would indicate higher concentration of ethnic groups while a lower value would indicate increased segregation. For the entropy scores, higher values correspond to increased diversity while lower values mean increased segregation.

**Table 15: Entropy Scores by Republic, 1989 and 1999-2002**

	1989	1999-2002	Change
USSR/FSU	1.76	1.86	0.11
Armenia	0.33	0.12	-0.22
Azerbaijan	0.69	0.42	-0.27
Belarus	0.76	0.68	-0.08
Estonia	0.98	0.87	-0.12
Georgia	1.07	0.65	-0.42
Kazakhstan	1.36	1.22	-0.14
Kyrgyzstan	1.36	1.13	-0.23
Latvia	1.19	1.10	-0.09
Lithuania	0.75	0.63	-0.13
Moldova	1.07	0.93	-0.14
Russia	0.67	0.70	0.03
Tajikistan	1.10	0.68	-0.43
Turkmenistan	1.06	0.90	-0.16
Ukraine	0.78	0.67	-0.11
Uzbekistan	1.09	0.91	-0.17
Thiel's H	0.54	0.60	0.06

Source: Based on data in tables 8 and 9.

For all of the FSU states except for one, the entropy scores declined, indicating increased segregation within each state and that each had become less diverse.<sup>18</sup> This is consistent with the general pattern of emigration of minority members and immigration of diaspora members, predominant across nearly all of the FSU states and in support of the diaspora migration hypothesis. The trend of increased segregation reflects a continuation that has been underway since 1959 within the republics (Kingkade 1992, 259). The explanation behind Russia's increased entropy

<sup>18</sup> The criteria for significant change was 0.01, meaning that all were considered significant.

or diversity score is explained by the immigration of many groups besides ethnic Russians to Russia combined with higher rates of natural increase among most non-Russian groups. The entropy index increased from 0.54 in 1989 to 0.60 in 2000, indicating the expected increased segregation and a trend towards concentration of ethnic groups into their homelands.

Table 16 shows the isolation indexes by ethnic group for 1989 and 1999-2002. There is also an interaction index but when there are only two ethnic groups, the two indexes sum to 1.0, so interaction indexes are not computed. The formulas for the interaction and isolation indexes are as follows:

Interaction index (Pxy)

$$\sum_{i=1}^n \left[ \left( \frac{x_i}{X} \right) \left( \frac{y_i}{t_i} \right) \right]$$

Where:

n = number of areas  
 x<sub>i</sub> = minority population of area  
 X = total minority population  
 y<sub>i</sub> = majority population of area  
 t<sub>i</sub> = total population of area

Isolation index (Pxx)

$$\sum_{i=1}^n \left[ \left( \frac{x_i}{X} \right) \left( \frac{x_i}{t_i} \right) \right]$$

Where:

n = number of areas  
 x<sub>i</sub> = minority population of area  
 X = total minority population  
 t<sub>i</sub> = total population of area

The isolation index measures the extent to which minority members are exposed only to one another. It measures the degree of potential contact or possibility of interaction between a group and members of other ethnic groups. The measure ranges from 0.0 when there is a high degree of interaction and low segregation to 1.0 when there is a low degree of interaction with other groups and high level of segregation. An increase in the isolation index would indicate that groups are becoming more isolated and have less interaction with other ethnic groups. As can be seen, the isolation index went up

for almost all ethnic groups but by rather small amounts, with only Russians and Ukrainians showing any sizeable increase in their isolation index between the censuses.<sup>19</sup> The increase for these two groups can be explained by their large-scale out-migration from the non-Russian and non-Ukrainian states back to their respective homelands, or in the case of Ukrainians, also to Russia where there was a large Ukrainian population. All of the groups had and continue to have rather high isolation indexes when computed at this geographic scale because they are highly concentrated into their ethnic homelands and a few other regions of concentration. The units of analysis in this research are the fifteen successor states. If the 169 or so sub-national units in the FSU were used, it is likely that the indexes would also have gone up between the two censuses because of increased concentration but would be lower, showing more exposure to other ethnic groups. In general, the smaller the geographic units, the lower levels of isolation.

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<sup>19</sup> The criteria for significant change was 0.003, meaning that only the change for Russians and Ukrainians were significant.

**Table 16: Isolation Indexes by Ethnic Group, 1989 and 1999-2002**

	<b>1989</b>	<b>1999-2002</b>	<b>Change</b>
Armenians	0.994	0.994	0.000
Azeris	0.993	0.994	0.001
Belorussians	0.986	0.989	0.003
Estonians	0.998	0.999	0.000
Georgians	0.995	0.997	0.002
Kazaks	0.980	0.980	0.000
Kirgiz	0.995	0.995	0.000
Latvians	0.997	0.998	0.000
Lithuanians	0.997	0.998	0.001
Moldovans	0.995	0.995	0.001
Russians	0.706	0.748	0.042
Tadzhiks	0.992	0.992	-0.001
Turkmen	0.997	0.997	0.000
Ukrainians	0.931	0.948	0.017
Uzbeks	0.977	0.976	-0.001

Source: Based on data in tables 8 and 9.

#### ***5.4.4 Explaining diaspora migration in the FSU***

To briefly summarize, the data showed that all but Russians constituted a larger share of the population within their homeland in the first round of post-Soviet censuses. All but two diaspora groups were more concentrated into their homelands. Data on migration by nationality for the non-Russian states showed mixed support for diaspora migration. The data for Russia showed that a majority of the migration could be classified as diaspora migration but that a sizeable portion, one-third, was actually counter to diaspora migration, people actually leaving their homelands. The segregation indexes demonstrated a nearly universal pattern of increased segregation, or ethnic unmixing. Thus, according to the preceding analysis of ethnic migration and ethnic change in the FSU states, diaspora migration was an important but hardly universal trend. The movement of peoples to their ethnic homelands can explain a great deal but certainly not all of the movements in the post-Soviet space, as there are

numerous exceptions. Diaspora migration and ethnic segregation are more convincing when based on permanent migration or permanent place of residence. When temporary or undocumented migration are included, diaspora migration as an explanation behind post-Soviet movements becomes even less convincing. What explains this weakness of diaspora migration as an explanation for post-Soviet movements with the emergence of 15 nation-states? To understand, it is useful to return to some of the key variables in the diaspora triad and examine how they operated in the post-Soviet situation.

The one diaspora group that had a smaller share living in the homeland and more mixing with non-ethnics was Armenians. Armenians not only made up the largest share of the population in its homeland but also had the largest share living outside its homeland elsewhere in the FSU, and likely outside the FSU. Since the actual Armenian nation has shifted so much throughout the centuries, there is the question of whether Armenians view the current state of Armenia as their homeland (Diener 2008, 15). The presence of large Armenia communities abroad could actually facilitate further emigration (Yeganyan 2006, 2). There seems to be considerable evidence of this as the Armenian population in Russia more than doubled between the 1989 and 2002 censuses, going from 523,390 to 1,130,491. There were increases in the number of Armenians in all but two of the eighty-nine Russian regions with especially large increases in Moscow city and oblast and the regions nearest Armenia in the Southern Federal District. The Armenian population in the Stavropol Kray (region) more than doubled between 1989 and 2002 (O'Loughlin, Panin, and Witmer

2007, 255), from a base of 70,000 to 149,000, representing 13.2 percent of all Armenians in Russia. Perhaps the homeland is not the draw but concentrations of ethnic kin are. There are many diaspora-led organizations in Armenia but they are mostly humanitarian (Lowell and Gerova 2004, 12). The Armenian government only pays lip service to the role they can play in country's transition, though it has recently passed a dual citizenship law in order to facilitate ties with the diaspora.

For all diaspora groups across the FSU movement became much easier, when in October 1992, the twelve CIS members signed the agreement Concerning visa-free movements of CIS citizens over the territories of the CIS members states, know as the Bishkek Agreement (International Centre for Migration Policy Development 2005, 27).<sup>20</sup> This replaced the *propiska* or resident-permit system that existed in the Soviet Union. With other matters of state-building occupying the newly independent states, this lead to a period of rather porous borders (Arel 2002, 806). This movement of labor was facilitated by geographic proximity, historical links, a well-developed transport infrastructure, and a common lingua franca (Rios 2006, 2).<sup>21</sup> With the greatly diverging economic fortunes of the FSU states during the economic transition, and easier movements, it wasn't always the newly-independent homeland that provided the biggest draw.

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<sup>20</sup> Later, Russia, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan opted out of the agreement.

<sup>21</sup> Of the fourteen non-Russian FSU state indigenous groups, 57 percent claim fluency in Russian as a first or second language, with shares ranging from 83 percent of Belarussians to 25 percent of Uzbeks (CIS Statistical Committee and East View Publications 1996).

An important element influencing the migration decisions of diaspora groups across the FSU space were the policies and attitudes of the governments and populations of the new nation states. There are differences between policies of the governments towards minorities and everyday nationalism espoused by members of the majority group which are crucial to differentiate, though they do influence each other. The most important within these new states were the citizenship and language laws they adopted. Most adopted some form of the zero-sum option allowing those present on territory and children of citizens to become citizens. Many made the acquisition of citizenship for ethnic kin aboard somewhat easier (International Centre for Migration Policy Development 2005, 22). Though few besides Kazakhstan had programs that facilitated the return of the diaspora and even Kazakhstan's program wasn't well-funded and assisted very few *oralman* (Buldekbayev 2006, 39).<sup>22</sup> Only the Latvia and Estonia adopted quite exclusionary citizenship laws, limiting citizenship to pre-WW II citizenship and their dependents (Legislationline 2004 (9 August); Legislationline 2004 (11 August)).

Central Asia provides interesting examples as all of the states adopted rather broad definitions of citizenship, allowing all ethnic groups easy access (Peyrouse 2007, 12). However, all Central Asian states went through a process of indigenization which made employment of non-indigenous difficult through requiring mastery of national languages. The push factor of non-indigenous was an unintended consequence. This process of nationalization in the region had actually begun before independence but accelerated after 1991. Especially linguistic nationalization provided a strong

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<sup>22</sup> Ethnic Kazakh immigrants are known as *oralman* – a term meaning "people who came back."

impetuous to migrate, as language was the factor tied most closely with employment (Peyrouse 2007, 6). Acceleration of Kazakhization and anxiety over deterioration of their status are key factors triggering exodus of Russians (Dave and Sinnott 2002, 18). All Central Asian states established the indigenous language as the state language and Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, and Tajikistan designated Russian as the language of interethnic communication. However, knowledge of indigenous languages was often weak among them because of the dominance of the Russian language and measures such as imposing the Cyrillic alphabet on languages not designed for it which retarded language development (Peyrouse 2007, 16). There was a wide disparity between proficiency and use. And the census results might have over inflated actual capabilities (Dave and Sinnott 2002, 10). This push to increase capability in the indigenous languages has resulted in deteriorating Russian language education. In many cases, it is not minority Russians who leave but they send their children to Russia to study and they end up staying. The process of indigenization has occurred in all FSU states and might have influenced census results when census takers were given marching orders to ensure majorities. This might account for some of the discord between census results showing increased indigenous shares and migration data showing them leaving their countries (Arel 2001b, 16a).

Government policy and the attitudes of the population towards minorities are not always consistent. For example, despite policies at the governmental level, relations between Estonians and non-Estonians in Estonia has been quite good (International Organization for Migration 1997c). In Latvia, the school system seems to separated



on the basis of language, a situation that both Latvians and Russians seem to have found acceptable (Karklins 1998). In one interesting study in Uzbekistan, based on a combination of surveys and focus groups, Russians were asked whether laws adopted since independence were intended to improve, worsen, or did not affect the position of the national minorities. Only 11 percent said they were intended to worsen, 35 percent said to improve, and 41 percent said they did not affect, and 13 percent had no answer (Radnitz 2006, 654). Russia is where there seems to be greatest discord between government policy and public attitudes towards minorities. The Russian government has recently taken steps to reduce inflows of irregular migrant workers, increase registration, and increased control over entry and stay (Voronina 2006, 75). There is an increased awareness on the part of the Russian government of the role that migrants play in the Russian economy, but there is much evidence of violence on the part of the Russian population towards others. Starting in mid-1990s, there has been growing evidence of violence towards ethnic and/or religious others (Alexseev 2006, 1). According to the Moscow Human Rights Bureau, forty-nine people were killed by radical nationalists in the first quarter of 2008, up from twenty-seven in 2006 and forty-five in 2007. Half of those killed so far in 2008 have been from Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, or Uzbekistan, which supply the bulk of the estimated 850,000 migrant workers in Moscow (Finn 2008, A16). In a 2005 survey, in a response to a question as to whether Russia for ethnic Russians is a sensible or good idea, 58 percent either totally or mostly agreed (Alexseev 2006). In response to a question as to whether all migrants, legal and illegal, and their children should be deported, 46 percent agreed.

At the time of the breakup, there were 2 million Germans and 1.4 million Jews in the Soviet Union. Thus, with the relaxation of exit restrictions both Germany and Israel figured prominently in post-Soviet migration patterns and provide interesting examples of how the national community is produced, reproduced, and contested. Both had adopted similar ethnic-priority immigration policies after WW II (Joppke and Roshenhek 2001, 1), where immigrations were not viewed as immigrants but rather the return of co-ethnics. Following the breakup of the Soviet Union and the relaxation of exit restrictions, this caused a rethinking of citizenship laws and a reevaluation of the scope of the body of citizens. There were differences between how Israel and Germany reacted to this situation where Jewish immigration in Israel continued and the principle of ethnic German immigration in Germany became quite restrictive. In both cases, their laws on return likely produced co-ethnics where there were none before, lured by the prospect of being able to live in a country with vastly better living conditions, thus, an example of neoclassical economic migration theory at work. In Germany, the principle of ethnic German immigration has come to an end (Joppke and Roshenhek 2001, 42).

The newly independent homelands facilitated the citizenship of co-ethnics but could hardly be said to be encouraging their return. Few initially attempted to stretch the homeland when return migration was not desired by allowing dual citizenship.

Belatedly, Kyrgyz and Armenia have adopted dual citizenship in 2006 (Legislationline 2007 (26 February)), as did Moldova (International Centre for Migration Policy Development 2005, 170). With the realization that there would

continue to be large diaspora populations, there have also been efforts on the part of many of the states to reach out to these groups, often with the establishment of an official government department for relations with the diaspora. There are an estimated 600,000 to 1.5 million Tajiks working abroad prompting the Tajik government to establish a program for external labour migration for 2006-2010 approved in January 2006 (Umarev 2006, 99). Approximately, 500,000 Kyrgyz go to work in Russia annually, a process that Russia facilitates (Peyrouse 2007, 13). About 7 percent of the economically active population of Uzbekistan work abroad (Maksakova 2006, 133). The majority of whom do not wish to migrate abroad permanently but export of labour is now part of government employment policy, as there is now a National Agency for External Labour Migration Abroad within the Ministry of Labour and Social Protection. In the case of Uzbekistan, it appears that representatives of the majority group, Uzbeks, responded similarly to that of minority groups, Russians and others, and migrated, responding to economic signals not just ethnic (Radnitz 2006, 657).

## **5.5 Implications**

This analysis of diaspora migration across the FSU offers strong but hardly universal evidence for the pull of one's ethnic homeland in explaining migration. This is consistent with another study, that found that political/ethnic factors explaining post-Soviet migration were a secondary concern and that they were important only as they influenced livelihoods (Radnitz 2006, 654). As elsewhere across the world, people migrate out of their homelands if need be for economic reasons. Some of the FSU states now have among the highest shares of workers' remittances as a share of GDP

in the world.<sup>23</sup> With the expected declines in the Russian population and growing Central Asian populations, these differences in labor supply are likely to become a major factor driving international migration in the region in the future (Rios 2006, 1). There are already signs of the shift to diaspora migration seen elsewhere where the diaspora is seen as tool for economic development (Lowell and Gerova 2004, 8). The populations of the former colonial regions, the non-Russian states, are following the Russians back to the center, a process seen elsewhere in places such as France and Great Britain with their former empires (Arel 2002, 806).

As Brubaker states, empires usually do not collapse in one fell swoop but the process is usually protracted over a long period (Brubaker 1995). This chapter has focused on diaspora movements at the level of the fifteen FSU states. There are homelands at lower levels and a number of unresolved ethno-territorial disputes which might lead to further territorial disintegration and diaspora migration. With many minorities groups electing not to move and to remain minorities, are new identities being created such as Uzbek-Russians to denote those ethnic Russians who have chosen to remain, no longer being privileged representatives of an empire but of unclear new status.

What about group identity among the large Armenia migrant communities in Russia? Geography is central to understanding diaspora both in theory and practice, ideas about diaspora also raise questions about space and place, but the diaspora literature has failed to fully explore this transformation of space (Mavroudi 2007, 474). This

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<sup>23</sup> In 2005, of 152 countries for which data are available, four of the FSU states, Moldova, Tajikistan, Armenia, and Kyrgyzstan, are among the top twenty countries in the world ranked by remittances as a share of GDP, all with more than 13 percent (The World Bank 2007).

has been a first attempt to quantify and explore diaspora movements but there are additional layers that can be explored in this complex part of the world.

## **Chapter 6: The Perpetuation of International Migration across the former Soviet Union**

### **6.1 Introduction**

The previous chapters discussed factors that cause international migration to begin and how these factors operate across the post-Soviet space. This section turns to factors that perpetuate international migration across the region before attempting to combine the two main migration theories operating in the post-Soviet space. These factors might be quite different from those that initiated the migration flows initially. Nearly two decades after the breakup of the Soviet Union and the economic transition, it has become apparent that international migration among the successor states, and increasingly with countries outside the region, has become a permanent feature in spite of government efforts to halt or control these processes. This is due in part to factors which perpetuate migration streams now that they have been underway for several decades. These migration-facilitating factors have both informal and formal elements. The major components of this theory are social capital theory and cumulative causation.

### **6.2 Social Capital Theory**

The key aspect of social capital theory (also referred to as network theory) as it relates to migration is its convertibility, specifically convertibility into foreign wages and their accompanying remittances. People access social capital through membership in networks and use them to increase utility or reduce risk. Migrant

networks are a particularly good examples of the use of social networks for the acquisition and accumulation of other forms of capital. They are defined as sets of interpersonal ties that connect migrants, former migrants, and non-migrants in origin and destination through ties of kinship, friendship, and shared community origin. They increase the likelihood of and returns to migration and reduce the risks of migration. With each act of migration, the likelihood of further migration increases. When migration has occurred the social relationship changes, usually increasing in value because of the access to foreign earnings and employment. Evidence of this theory can be demonstrated in two ways, at a macro level showing a “family and friends” network and a micro level, showing links between migrants.

***Migrant networks in the FSU:*** Some migration movements and migration networks often pre-date the breakup of the Soviet Union, albeit on a smaller scale because of labor-requirement programs, education, the military, and even the *Komsomol*, the Soviet Youth Organization that was a feeder organization for the Communist Party. From Tajikistan, these links established during the Soviet period from previous work in certain enterprises and previous shift-work were criteria used to select destinations for work in Russia (Olimova and Bosc 2003, 22-23). There has historically been a large Armenia population in Russia, and elsewhere, as Armenians are considered one of the classic Diaspora populations. There were fears that the presence of large Armenian communities in Russia might fuel further emigration (Yeganyan 2006). This fear seems to have been born out as the Armenia population in Russia more than doubled from 523,390 in the 1989 census to 1,130,491 in the 2002 census and the

number of Armenians increased in all but two regions of Russia (Goskomstat SSSR (State Committee on Statistics of the USSR) 1991; Goskomstat Rossii (State Committee on Statistics of Russia) 2004a, vol. 4). The Armenian diaspora in Russia was highly integrated into Russia society and those that were there often employed new migrants in businesses (Gevorkyan, Gevorkyan, and Mashuryan 2008).

From Moldova, 60 percent of migrants reported the existence of family and friend networks behind their destination choice (The World Bank 2005, 15-16). This was confirmed in another study which demonstrated that networks of Moldovan migrants had a significant positive effect on the decision to migrate (Anderson 2008). The existence of larger such networks in Russia and other FSU states help to lower the cost of migration to those countries and to allow higher earnings. Likewise with migrants from Georgia, networks from the past as well as Russian-language skills, cause them to direct most of their labor migration towards Russia, at least prior to the summer of 2008 when Russia and Georgia went to war over several separatist regions in Georgia (Badurashvili 2005, 14). From Georgia, 68 percent of migrants indicated that they had received help from family, friends, and relatives already abroad indicating the existence of extensive migrant networks (Lianos 2005, 25). For migrants from Tajikistan, 63 percent indicated that relatives and friends in the destination country helped them settle (Bakozoda 2005, 28). From Kyrgyzstan, 78 percent said that they had help from friends or relatives from their country in settling (Sulaimanova 2005, 19). In Tajikistan, migrant networks have grown up out of traditional social institutions like the *avlod*, which is a patriarchal community of



blood relatives who have a common ancestor and common interests, and often shared property and coordinated household budgets (Olimova and Bosc 2003, 56-57). The *avlod* is extremely influential in determining who migrates, when and where they go, financing the migration, and how responsibilities for work at home will be distributed. These groups are then reproduced abroad forming a very insular group.

Migrant networks are seen as part of transnationalism which reflects the move away from examining migration as a bipolar process but more as a unbounded space which includes the community of origin, the destination(s), and also the journey to and from. Migrant networks are used not only to facilitate migration but also for the sending of remittances, with between 36 and 22 percent of remittances from Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan sent back with friends traveling home (Qullin et al. 2007, 16). Labor migrants from Kyrgyzstan in Russia and Kazakhstan have created migrant associations and other NGOs to deal with protection of rights, business development for migrants abroad and at home, and to provide support for cultural programs such as celebrating Kyrgyz holidays and mobilizing Kyrgyz citizens aboard for voting (Sulaimanova 2005, 44). Having seen the effects of ethnic enclaves and migrant networks elsewhere, the Russian migration service is trying to legislate their development by restricting the percent of migrants in any region to less than 20 percent of the population (WorkPermit.Com 2007).

***Migrant-supporting institutions in the FSU:*** More formally, once international migration has begun, private, public, and non-profit institutions arise to help facilitate

the migration process. Because there are often many more people seeking access to higher-income countries than those countries allow, institutions and groups fill a niche that seeks to promote and facilitate migration, often outside the law. These are often seen as a more formal complement to migrant networks. The services private firms provide include smuggling across borders, labor contracts, legal and counterfeit documents, lodging and other assistance at destination. As can be seen this is a mix of both legal and illegal services provided to migrants. Another increasingly large and lucrative institution are the myriad of means of sending or conveying migrant worker remittances. Humanitarian organizations provide counseling, language services, shelter, legal advice, and other social services. There appears to be evidence that there are a large number of legal, illegal, and quasi-legal organizations facilitating migration in and through the region, and that they have grown considerably over recent years (International Organization for Migration 2002, 42-44). These agencies procure passports, workbooks, and permanent resident permits. In some cases, these are legitimate agencies hired for their expertise in being able to work with unwieldy bureaucracies and in other cases, they are illegal operations supplying forged documents. There has also been a rapid growth in job placement agencies for migrants, again a combination of legal and illegal agencies, the latter often being a conduit for trafficking of people.

A large and growing migration-assistance organization in the region are remittance-transfer companies. Firms such as Western Union and MoneyGram have been in the money sending businesses for decades but have only recently entered the FSU and

with such a large potential market many others low-cost competitors are entering (The World Bank 2005, 21). There has also been an impressive growth of money transfer operators (MTOs) in the region which have grown up around remittance transfers and that this competition has served to greatly lower the cost of sending remittances (Qullin et al. 2007, 22-23). The postal networks in the FSU have historically delivered a broad array of services in addition to delivering the mail. One of these is money transfer and the postal systems in many of the FSU states have modernized their operating systems to better cope with the increased demand for remittance transfers.

There seems to be evidence that migration associations are developing in Russia as in other countries (Hill 2004, 13). In some cases assisting with the emigration of more educated Russians (Rybakovsky and Ryazanstev 2005, 10). There are also various organizations and social institutions acting as intermediaries in organizing the employment of illegal migrants in Russia (Krassinets 1998, 14). As international migration becomes institutionalized (for this reason it is often referred to as institutional theory), it becomes independent of the factors that originally caused it. Governments will have an increasingly difficult time controlling migration because many of these migration-supporting institutions lie outside of their control and it is difficult to regulate.

### **6.3 Cumulative Causation**

This theory as applied to migration states that each act of migration makes subsequent movements more likely. This is done through various means including through the

expansion of migrant networks and their expansion into other networks. People seeing others from their communities improve their incomes through migration give them a sense of relative deprivation inducing them to migrate. As more people from a country or community migrate, a culture of migration develops increasing the probability of further migration. For individuals, once somebody has migrated once, they are likely to do so again. In some cases, for young adults it becomes a right of passage. Over time, certain labor market segments become labeled as immigrant jobs and natives become reluctant to fill these jobs, thus leading to structural demand for immigrants.

Findings from a survey of migrants in Georgia, a country of significant permanent and temporary emigration, that the presence of an experienced migrant positively increases the chances for other household members to migrate (Badurashvili 2005, 18). The same is true from Armenia where relatives join those already abroad (Yeganyan 2006, 19). From Moldova, one of the most migration- and remittance-dependent countries in the FSU, migration and remittances seem to reinforce each other fueling further migration (Cuc et al. 2005, 13). Moldovans working abroad facilitate further emigration or temporary labor migration of others. Like elsewhere, once groups of Moldovans are established abroad, others find it easier to join this initial cohort and use them for informational, logistic, and financial support. It is apparent that given the large shares of the working-age populations migrating abroad from some of the FSU states that migration-dependent development strategy is beginning to emerge.

#### **6.4 Other aspects of post-Soviet migration that need to be considered**

There are two topics which have been said to be neglected in explaining international migration - population growth and the role of migration policy (Massey et al. 2005, 281). Both are key issues in migration in the FSU system. Population growth because of the large differential population growth rates among countries in the system both now and in the future. Migration policy because of its evolving nature on the part of both sending and receiving countries in the region. The proper placement of differential rates of population growth among countries into theory is problematic as some see it as simply a component of the supply and demand for labor, while others view it as a factor outside the models. Evaluation of migration policy has typically focused on the effectiveness of specific policies, and it is often seen as subordinate to the other aspects of migration theory. If migration policy is factored into migration theory at all, it is seen as efforts to manipulate factors operative in the other theories. In the FSU migration system and others, this might be the best point of entry in analyzing the role of the state for both sending and receiving states, especially once they accept migration as an inevitability.

*The role of migration and population policy in the FSU:* Immigration control is defined as the ability of a State to import migrants when it wants, where it wants, with the qualities it desires, in numbers it specifies, under conditions it defines, and for durations it chooses (Massey et al. 2005, 287). The leadership of the Soviet Union

would be extremely envious of the vast array of modern technological and geospatial tools currently available to governments and private companies to monitor the behavior, attitudes, and movements of people. There are numerous privacy issues associated with modern computers, consumer electronics, and geospatial technology that the Soviet leadership likely would have ignored and used to their advantage in tracking and manipulating the spatial distribution of the population. There is certainly an element of this in Russia's current migration policy as Russia's authoritarian past and the lack or low visibility of migrant support groups allow it a heavier hand towards migrants than liberal western democracies. Initially following the breakup of the Soviet Union and the emergence of fifteen new or newly independent states in its place, migration was quite unregulated including visa-free travel among the successor states. The 1990s was a period with very little government control over the movements taking place across the region. After 2000, there was a trend towards tightening border controls and restricting the free movement of peoples across borders (International Organization for Migration 2002, 19).

Migration policy in post-Soviet Russia has gone through several phases (Voronina 2006, 71-84). A first phase can be characterized as a formative period covering roughly 1992 to 1994 when laws on refugees, citizenship, and mobility were passed and the federal migration service was established. The main thrust of policy during this phase was assistance to the returning Russian diaspora who were classified as forced migrants. The second half of the 1990s was marked by increased attention and legislation aimed at labor migrants. Around 2000, migration fell a bit from the

governments' agenda and the Federal Migration Service was dissolved. It was restored after 2000 under the Ministry of Internal Affairs, a law enforcement agency, reflecting the new emphasis on the enforcement of illegal migration. A new restrictive citizenship policy was passed in 2002 following a rigorous public debate on the need for migrants and their place in Russian society. Linking migration policy with demographic reality in Russia has been a vigorous and ongoing debate as to the necessity of migrants and related issues of Russian cultural identity, criminal activity of migrants (Andrienko and Guriev 2005). More recently has been a reform of migration policy in Russia with the goal of more orderly migration and the realization that Russia needs migrants because of its declining population. This also includes programs to register all migrants and issue labor quotas for how many labor migrants are allowed annually.

Many of the main sending countries in the region have been playing an active role in promoting and protecting their citizens abroad, trying to take advantage of remittances, and establish links with diasporas abroad (International Organization for Migration 2002, 19). This includes Moldova which has reached bilateral labor agreements with four countries and is pursuing negotiations with nineteen others (The World Bank 2005, 19). From Uzbekistan, export of labour is considered a component of the government's employment policy and has designated a government agency to administer this policy (Maksakova 2006, 133). In Tajikistan and Azerbaijan, labor migration issues and policy have been actively incorporated into their poverty reduction strategies (International Organization for Migration 2005, 155). Tajikistan

also passed legislation in 1999 and 2002 on external migration, concluded labor migration agreements with key partners, mainly Russia, and has undertaken surveys of Tajik migrants in construction in Russia and the use of remittances (Bakozoda 2005, 71-73). Tajikistan has also instituted a system of migration cards that people are required to complete when leaving the country to better track labor migrants abroad (Chudinovskikh 2006, 9). Others, Kyrgyzstan among them, have sought to develop retirement insurance schemes for labor migrants, which would facilitate return migrant to country of origin. Kyrgyzstan has recently passed various pieces of legislation on external migration designed to regulate and license labor requirement agencies and to protect Kyrgyz migrants when abroad (Sulaimanova 2005, 42-43). Even high-income countries in the region such as Lithuania are devising means to track migrants who go abroad, obviously mostly to the EU, and the impact of this labor migration (Ambrozaitiene 2006).

While the CIS has become de facto one large labor market, it remains to be seen whether the new migration policy trends between the main sending and receiving countries will make it into one on a de jure basis. More so than in other migration systems, there is a large incongruity between actual migration flows and the legislative base that regulates them. This situation is not helped by the migration administrative bodies being rather unstable entities (Chudinovskikh 2006, 9). At present, the role of state policy towards migration seems to have little influence in affecting the flows across the region although its influence seems to be increasing.



*Differential rates of population growth among FSU states:* According to Massey, the integration of demographic factors into a broader theory of international migration is a goal that remains to be fully accomplished (Massey et al. 2005, 281). But was this really an omission? It seems as if it were an integral part of neoclassical theory as a factor in the supply and demand for labor. International migration is a vital demographic link joining origin and destination economies – both generally and in the FSU. The world has long been marked by countries at very different stages of the demographic transition leading to quite divergent rates of population growth. These different rates of population growth are often associated with different levels of economic development and combined are an underlying cause of much of the current international migration. There is often a vigorous debate among more advanced, low-population-growth countries as to the amount of migration to allow. This debate is also taking place among countries in the FSU with low-growth or negative-growth populations and those that continue to have higher population growth rates. This problem is made more acute among several of the FSU states, most prominently Russia, because six of the FSU states are among about a dozen countries in the world currently experiencing negative natural increase where deaths are exceeding births. The dire demographics in Russia are well-documented and the debate over the proper level and role of migration is contentious (Demko, Ioffe, and Zayonchkovskaya 1999; DaVanzo and Grammich 2001; Alexseev 2002, 2006; Heleniak 2009). However, as times goes on, with continued migration between certain high-population-growth origins and low-population-growth destinations, feedback mechanism develop in both. The economies of both origin and destination become dependent on continued

migration. This links differential demographic growth to some of the other theories such as social capital theory and cumulative causation. After a half-century or more it is proving exceedingly difficult to stem Mexico-U.S. migration. Likewise, after nearly two decades, it might be difficult to stem migration from the less-developed FSU states into Russia.

## Chapter 7: Conclusions

### 7.1 Which migration theories worked best?

Of the various international migration theories, all had validity and at least some evidence could be found to support all of them when applied to movements in the FSU. There was little evidence found that contradicted any of them. For some, more evidence could be found than for others. For neoclassical economics of migration, there seemed to be more evidence and support at the micro level than at the macro level in spite of the seeming appeal of macro explanations given the increased income disparities among the successor states. The most evidence seems to be for the new economics of migration at both macro and micro levels as international migration has become an important coping strategy for many countries and households in the region in the first post-Soviet decades. This is especially valid since most of the more recent movements appear to be of circular and not a permanent nature. There seems to be only anecdotal evidence to support segmented labor market theory in Russia although this seems to be area of possible inquiry through analysis of the native born and foreign born populations in surveys such as the Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (RLMS).<sup>24</sup> However, because of the subterranean and illicit nature of much migration into Russia, much of the testing of segmented labor market theory might need to remain at the anecdotal level. Though difficult to substantiate, there seems to be support for world systems theory as an explanation behind the causes of migration in the region with their increased interaction with the global economy. Support is

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<sup>24</sup> In the most recent round of 11,872 respondents, 267 were foreign-born.

found for both social capital theory and cumulative causation as explanations for continued migration in the region. Given the degree to which these migration institutions and networks have developed across the region, it seems as if migration will continue to be a fact of life for many in the region. The role of governments in attempting to regulate or control migration, especially Russia, is increasing although they will not be able to fully control flows.

The drawbacks in testing the causes of migration in the FSU are similar to those for other migration systems. These include using actual wages rather than expected wages to model neoclassical migration theory. Also, there is the lack of rigorous tests of how well the models perform against each other. It is often difficult to hold constant the elements of one theory and to control for the other theories, even conceptually let alone in the real world but that is an aspect that human geographers have to deal with. There is limited insight to be made by relying on official migration statistics as so many of the flows are still not captured by official statistics. Other migration datasets on the flows in the region need to be and are being created. Insights could be made by examining administrative sources other than just the immigration and emigration statistics used to compute migration as a component of population change. Many of the expanding number of household surveys in the region contain questions or modules on migration in addition to a number of explicit surveys on migration (Gorlich, Johnson, and Luecke 2006; Agadjanian, Sevoyan, and Menjivar 2007). Because of the importance of migration in the region, many

countries are including additional questions on migration and mobility in their 2010 round of population censuses (UN Statistical Commission and UNECE 2006).

The study of migration in the FSU using the most recent international migration theories is still in its infancy although it is expanding rapidly. In terms of the study of migration in the FSU, the 1990s could be characterized as a period of simply trying to quantify the scope, direction, and types of movements that were taking place across the region. These studies contributed to a broad understanding of the types of flows that were taking place. Since 2000, there has been an increased number of studies testing the efficacy of various migration theories and more nuanced studies of migration processes in the region. The importance of migration for many people and countries in the region has become apparent. It has also become a fertile area for increased understanding of migration and for testing the boundaries of migration theory.

## **7.2 The Current Migration Situation in the FSU**

At the time of this writing, in spring 2009, the global economy was in the midst of a recession of uncertain depth and duration. The differential impacts of this economic decline by sector, social segment, country, and region are only beginning to be understood. Even at this early stage one impact that does appear clear is that mobility, migration, and the sending of remittances are all likely to fall considerably. The foreign-born population in the United States peaked in 2007 and has been declining since,

as has the undocumented migrant population (Papademtriou and Terrazas 2009). Remittances from the United States to Mexico are expected to decline for the first time since records have been kept. Spain, a country of enormous amounts of recent labor migration is paying those newcomers to leave, at least temporarily. Japan, a country long fearful of migration, is also paying migrants to leave but on a permanent basis. Thus far, there are only tentative signs of a slowdown in migration to Russia and most temporary labor migrants seem inclined to stay, at least for the time being. This in spite of the number of work permits being cut in half in 2009 from four million to two million (Ratha and Mohapatra 2009, 5). According to the World Bank, remittances in the Europe and Central region (the FSU plus the former communist states of Eastern Europe) are expected to decline by 10 percent in 2009, the largest projected decline in any region. While the precise impacts of this economic turndown on migration in the FSU cannot be predicted with certainty, the theories evaluated here can provide the broad parameters of how the economic slowdown could affect migration and remittances in the region.

### **7.3 Combining Neoclassical and Diaspora Migration Theories**

In this research, several different bodies of international migration theory were applied to the movements in the post-Soviet space to determine which offered the best explanation. Two were offered as the primary explanatory theories, neoclassical economic theory of migration and diaspora migration, or a desire to return to one's ethnic homeland. Diaspora migration is not considered to be one of the major migration theories but has to be considered as a factor in explaining migration in the

unique post-Soviet environment, when the country split into fifteen ethnic-based states. Referring back to the combination of hypotheses in the introduction, migration flows can be crudely categorized into four combinations to determine which has the most explanatory power. The first is movement from a low-income to a high-income country and a return to one's ethnic homeland, where both neoclassical and diaspora migration theories are satisfied. The second is movement from a high-income to a low-income country which includes a migration to an ethnic homeland, where neoclassical theory would be violated but diaspora theory supported. The third combination of these two hypotheses is movement from a low-income to a high-income country combined with migration out of one's ethnic homeland, which would be counter to diaspora migration theory but which would support neoclassical migration theory. A fourth is migration from a high-income to a low-income country and movement out of one's homeland, where both of these theories are violated. Given these combinations of economic and ethnic causes as the main factors driving post-Soviet migration, which has the most explanatory power?

Previously, proof was separately offered in support of both neoclassical and diaspora migration theories but here an attempt is made to combine the two theories to examine the interplay between them. This is done by seeing how many persons migrated from a low-income country to a high-income country and vice-versa and to an ethnic homeland and out of an ethnic homeland. Chapter four noted that 57 percent of migration moves between Russia and the non-Russian FSU states could be classified as diaspora migration as defined here – a move to one's defined ethnic

homeland. Another 35 percent could be classified as the opposite, a move away from an ethnic homeland and that another 8 percent of moves were not able to be classified. However, those figures did not take into account the influence of neoclassical economic influences on migration. At an individual level, people often move for more than one reason. Because of this, the interplay or combination of migration motivations is important.

The classification according to neoclassical migration theory was relatively straight forward; people either migrated from or to a country with a higher or lower GDP per capita. The classification of diaspora migration was a bit more problematic, as there were many movements which did not involve a migration to or from an ethnic homeland, such as the migration of an ethnic Ukrainian from Armenia to Russia. (These flows of people leaving one FSU state and migrating to Russia instead of their ethnic homeland were not insignificant, especially among the large Ukrainian and Belarussian populations). Thus, a certain amount of moves were not able to be neatly categorized according to this combination of theories. People often migrate with others and the migration choice or motivation is not their own, such as moves with a spouse or other family member. Because Russia is the migration magnet in the region (and also because it has the most complete data on migration by ethnicity), the migration flows to and from Russia for 1995, 2000, and 2005 were classified into these four combinations (Table 17). In the data, ethnic groups were classified as those indigenous to Russia and those indigenous outside of Russia. Indigenous meant that they had a defined ethnic homeland in Russia or that their major population



concentration was in Russia. In 1995, only Lithuania and Estonia had a higher GDP per capita than Russia. In 2000 and 2005, all three Baltic states had a higher GDP per capita than Russia.

**Table 17: Migration by Category to and from Russia, 1995, 2000, and 2005 (percent of all moves)**

<b>1995</b>		
	<b>Neoclassical migration theory holds</b>	<b>Neoclassical migration theory is violated</b>
<b>Diaspora migration theory holds</b>	<b>51</b>	<b>7</b>
<b>Diaspora migration theory is violated</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>14</b>
Note: 12 percent of all moves cannot be classified.		
<b>2000</b>		
	<b>Neoclassical migration theory holds</b>	<b>Neoclassical migration theory is violated</b>
<b>Diaspora migration theory holds</b>	<b>47</b>	<b>6</b>
<b>Diaspora migration theory is violated</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>11</b>
Note: 9 percent of all moves cannot be classified.		
<b>2005</b>		
	<b>Neoclassical migration theory holds</b>	<b>Neoclassical migration theory is violated</b>
<b>Diaspora migration theory holds</b>	<b>43</b>	<b>4</b>
<b>Diaspora migration theory is violated</b>	<b>34</b>	<b>10</b>
Note: 9 percent of all moves cannot be classified.		
Sources: 1995 migration data: (Goskomstat Rossii 1996c, 42-47) 2000 migration data: (Goskomstat Rossii 2001b, 96-106). 2005 migration data: (Goskomstat Rossii 2006a, 89-100). GDP data: (World Bank 2007).		

As can be seen, in each of the three years shown, most moves could be classified as satisfying both theories. The move was to a higher-income country and also back to an ethnic homeland. The category with the second-highest share of moves was where neoclassical migration theory was satisfied but diaspora migration theory was violated. This would be a move to a high-income country but away from one's ethnic

homeland. This type of movement away from a low-income country of origin, country of birth, or other type of homeland dominates the types of movements among the world's migrants. The category with the smallest number of moves was always where neoclassical migration theory was violated but where diaspora theory held. This would involve a migration from Russia of a group not indigenous to Russia to their lower-income ethnic homeland. Thus, while about half of moves could be classified as a move to an ethnic homeland, these were far outnumbered by moves to a higher-income country. From the 1990s to the 2000s, the relative strength of neoclassical explanations for migration became stronger and the influence of diaspora migration became less. The largest increase in the relative share of any category was the relative increase in those moves where neoclassical migration theory held but diaspora theory was violated, which went from 17 percent of all moves in 1995 to 34 percent in 2005. Again, these data are based on records of permanent, documented migration. If the large numbers of undocumented and temporary moves were included, the share of moves from a low-income to a higher-income country would be even more significant. In the period 1989 to 1993, there was no discernable trend in the patterns of ethnic migration between Russia and the other FSU states. But since 1994, there has been a clear trend of more members of non-Russian ethnic groups migrating to Russia on a permanent basis than leaving, further evidence of the lessening pull of the homeland and the increased pull of economic opportunity.

In addition to neoclassical migration theory having support, it seems as if new household economic theories of migration has considerable evidence in its support

across the region, however it would not be applicable without other aspects of migration theory also being an influence, In this sense, the theorized efficacy of diaspora migration theory has been somewhat turned on its head. While a significant portion of the flows are people returning to a homeland, it is not people returning to their homelands but rather people temporarily leaving their homelands in large numbers which is precisely the evidence in favor of this theory of international migration. Ethnic or cultural factors and a desire to maintain ties to one's homeland can explain the temporary nature of much of the migration that is taking place. Though there are variations among countries in the region, diaspora migration went from calls to return to efforts to facilitate migration out of the country in an effort to gain remittance income. In regards to segmented labor market theory, as mentioned above, there is considerable anecdotal evidence of this in Russia but as yet few systematic studies to rigorously demonstrate that a native-migrant labor market divided has occurred. There certainly does not seem to be studies or people advocating for anything like integration of immigrants into Russia as there in other more-established immigrant destinations. There seems to be considerable evidence to support world systems theory operating as a cause of migration in the region at several scales, both from outside the region to within and also from within. Though the data on foreign direct investment in the region seem to be even more problematic than migration statistics, some conclusions can be made which demonstrate the operation of world systems theory and its impact on migration in the region (Crane, Peterson, and Olikar 2005). Similar to tracking migration, the use of mirror statistics on investment flows can be helpful in gaining a better picture.<sup>25</sup> Though only about

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<sup>25</sup> With both migration and foreign investment, the receiving country can often track these flows much

one-fifth of Russian FDI goes to the CIS states, about 11 percent of total inward investment into these states is from Russia and in some of the smaller economies, this constitutes a rather substantial portion. Under world systems theory, these flows should induce migration in the opposite direction and there is considerable evidence that it does. The migrant social networks and the formal and informal institutions which have been developed that support migration will make it difficult for governments to regulate the flows underway. As mentioned, after 2000 there have been recent efforts on the part of both sending and receiving states in the region to better regulate the migration flows that are taking place as opposed to unfettered movements of the 1990s. However, like elsewhere in the world, there is a lack of concordance between government intentions and the actual migration movements which are taking place.

One aspect of government policy and its impact on migration where it is difficult to make links are the different political regimes that developed during the post-Soviet period. These nearly span the range of the political spectrum. They include liberal democracies where there is considerable room for opposition voices such as in the Baltic states. Two of those states, Latvia and Estonia, have excluded large segments of their populations from citizenship, namely most ethnic Russians, though most of these groups have chosen to stay. Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Kyrgyzstan for periods and for some currently have various forms of dictatorships where there is little room for opposition. Most of these were inherited

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better than the sending country and are often used for analysis. The term “mirror” statistics refers to using data from the receiving country.

from the Soviet period where the person who was the republic secretary of the Communist Party at the time of the breakup was able to remain in power. Of these, Turkmenistan had among the most repressive leaders in the form of Saparmyrat Nyýazow, who called himself *Turkmenbashi*, leader of the Turkmen. Until his death in 2006, he seemed to be able exert control over nearly all aspects of life in the country including migration out of the country which was far less than from other Central Asia states. This included canceling dual citizenship for the Russian diaspora in the country. On the other hand, Alexander Lukashenko, the President of Belarus, regarded as the last dictator in Europe, has been able to stabilize the Belarus economy and is the only FSU states that is a net recipient of migrants from Russia. Russia, under Vladimir Putin since 2000 has made strenuous efforts to better control migration into the country and to a very limited extent has succeeded. The lack of full incorporation of the role of the state into migration theory was cited as a shortcoming (Massey et al. 2005, 286-92). More so, there seems to be little correlation between type of regime among countries in the region and their influence on migration patterns.

The creation of the Soviet Union has been described as one of the world's largest social experiments. Thus, the break up of the Soviet Union and economic transition was an interesting natural experiment that allows observations of its effect on migration trends. After a period of considerable political, social, and economic change during the 1990s, the pace of change has subsided. The economies of the FSU were growing (at least until 2008) and all had reached pre-transition levels of output.

Further episodes of border change in this politically unstable region cannot be ruled out but the large movements of refugees and internally displaced persons of the 1990s have subsided. This has been a first effort to understand the migration system in the region and factors driving movements in that system. Though it was isolated and part of a unique social and economic system for three-quarters of a century, it appears that the theories which govern migration elsewhere in the world are also applicable to migration in the FSU region.

There are two aspects of this research which make it unique. The first is the application of neoclassical migration theory, which has been found to explain a considerable portion of international movements, to a region of the world that has not been studied using traditional migration theory. The second is the testing of the role of the homeland in explaining diaspora migration movements in a novel way. In recent decades, diaspora migration has been viewed and examined as persons leaving their ethnic or place-of-birth homeland. Because of the unique situation of the creation of large diaspora populations resulting from the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the question was asked whether these people would return to their homelands. The result of applying these two migration theories to the case of the region is that it appears as if people across the post-Soviet space are responding to migration signals as people are elsewhere in the world and that there was not a separate “Soviet” migration theory. Migration was central to the making of Tsarist Russia and the Soviet Union and the accompanying mixing of ethnic groups. It appears to also be playing a central role in the post-Soviet states. Even after barely a decade since the

breakup of the Soviet Union and onset of economic transition, people in the successor states seem to be responding to the same economic and demographic signals that drive migration streams elsewhere in the world.

#### **7.4 Implications of Migration for the Region**

The focus of this research has been on the causes of migration in the FSU. But the findings can inform discussion of the implications of migration for the countries and peoples of the region. Under neoclassical economic theory of migration, one of the main drivers of migration has been the large rise in income disparities within countries and among countries. With the transition to a market economy, income disparities among households, regions, and countries rose rapidly. These disparities rose rapidly during the 1990s but seem to have leveled off. For instance, the Gini index for per capita income in Russia rose from 0.260 in 1991 to 0.409 in 1994 and was at 0.404 in 2003 (Mitra and Yemtsov 2006, 6). Similar trends of a sharp rise in income inequality before a leveling off, or even a decline were experienced by all of the FSU states for which data are available. As shown in chapter 3, among the FSU states there was a similar pattern of increased disparities for per capita GDP before a leveling off around 2000. Thus, while the disparities within society or among regions or countries are no longer expanding, they are quite wide and are likely to remain so over the medium-term future, while not ruling out reversals in the relative income rankings of countries over the long run. The implications of this for migration in the region is there will likely remain an impetus to migrate either permanently or

temporarily to another country or region because of the gains to be had from these movements.

In the study of the relative importance of between-group inequality in Russia, the most important factor was the region in which a person lived (Mitra and Yemtsov 2006, 31). This was more important than sector of employment, age, gender, or level of education. Though this was demonstrated for Russia, it is also likely the case within and among the other FSU states. The effects of the economic transition has led to the emergence of pockets of poverty at various geographic scales. While the economic fortunes of towns, cities, regions, and countries constantly ebb and flow with structural, technological, and economic change, the pace of these changes across the FSU over the past fifteen years has been unusually rapid. It is often the reluctance or inability of people to migrate away from these regions that leads to impoverished places. In an interesting study called *Boom Towns and Ghost Countries: Geography, Agglomeration, and Population Mobility*, the concept of ghost countries was introduced (Pritchett 2004). While the concept and image of ghost towns across the American West are common, the author poses the question of why massive or complete depopulation couldn't occur at higher geographic scales if there was sufficient population mobility. As shown previously, a number of the FSU states have lost enormous shares of their populations on a permanent basis since 1990 and many others migrate away temporarily. The Far North is an enormous swath of Russian territory that has recently had significant population decline from out-migration. At the extreme are the regions of Magadan and Chukotka in northeast corner of Russia



across from Alaska that have had out-migrations of 57 and 75 percent of their populations respectively (Heleniak 2008a). Using a combination of economic and population criteria, the study identifies various ghost regions and countries. One region is the northern Great Plains in the United States which has been sustaining a loss of population for decades. At a national level is Ireland which went from a peak population of 8.1 million in the mid-1800s to less than 3 million in 1950 before only recently climbing to more than 4 million in 2005, which is still *less than half of the size 150 years ago*. He excludes potential new ghost countries such as those in the FSU but with their shrinking economic bases, wealthier neighbors, and increased mobility, the possibility of some of the poorer FSU states falling into this category cannot be ruled out.

It seems as if for the foreseeable future, there will be continued reliance on migration and remittances among some of these states and temporary migration as predicted by the new economics of labor migration. These migrants will continue to occupy select labor market niches along ethnic lines in Russia and other relatively wealthy FSU states as per segmented labor market theory. These destination regions will continue to have a native-migrant dual labor market. One question to be asked is whether Russia will attempt to use the existence of large numbers of migrants from the other FSU states as a form of soft-power leverage in their dealings with poorer and migrant-dependent states of the FSU.<sup>26</sup> As predicted by world system theory, migration is likely to remain a feature of the post-Soviet states because of their

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<sup>26</sup> Along with three colleagues, we have been awarded a National Science Foundation grant to study these issues of migration and security in the FSU in a project titled "People, Power, and Conflict in the Eurasian Migration System".

increased involvement with the global economic system and in the inward investment into them. Similarly, there will likely be continued migration into Russia for the same reasons because of Russia's continued and increased investment in the other CIS states (Crane, Peterson, and Oliker 2005). According to social capital theory, these migration movements are likely to be difficult for governments to control because of networks and institutions developed in the first post-Soviet decades and previous. The term "transnationalism" as applied to migration suffers from a number of definitional ambiguities that don't properly specify its spatial and temporal parameters. Whether such transnational migrant communities are developing among ethnic migrant communities in the FSU is an interesting question that requires further investigation, in part because of the newness of many of these migration streams. This certainly seems to be a rich area for study as transnationalism has supplanted concepts of return, circulatory, or permanent migration (Kivisto 2001, 552).

### **7.5 Extensions and Further Research**

Migration theories operate at quite different scales, often along disciplinary boundaries, using different variables (Brettel and Hollifield 2000). Here, the scale of geography that migration movements were examined was the fifteen newly-independent successor states that emerged following the breakup of the Soviet Union. This is obviously a very aggregate scale but provided a starting point for analysis of the causes of migration in the region and tests of the applicability of migration theories that have been found to operate elsewhere in the world. Extensions to this

research using the frameworks and theories laid out here could be extended and deepened in a number of directions.

The most obvious for a geographer would be to apply the analysis at lower scales of geography. At the time of the last census conducted in the USSR in 1989, there were 169 geographic units at the subnational level, though there has been considerable re-organization of the second-order administrative boundaries of the FSU states since then. Applying neoclassical economic theories of migration at the subnational level would provide considerable nuance beyond the fifteen FSU states. There has been some research done on the patterns of migration among the regions of Russia (Sutherland and Hanson 2000; Gerber 2000, 2005a, 2005b, 2006; Hill and Gaddy 2003; Thompson 2008). However, there has been little done at this level for the other FSU states. Like Russia, all of them have undergone considerable regional economic changes which have altered migration patterns. As mentioned, when the Soviet Union broke apart there were fifty-three different ethnic homelands and this analysis only focused on the causes of migration in the fifteen which became sovereign states. To varying degrees, nearly all of them took efforts to elevate the status of the titular group, often at the expense of minorities. While the processes affecting diaspora and economic migration are somewhat different at the subnational level than at the national level, it still might be an interesting course of inquiry.

The tests of migration applied here using data from the FSU states assumed homogeneity of migrants. There is obviously much nuance to migration by economic

sector, social groups, persons of different level of education and sector, and by age and gender. In the FSU region, there is also considerable variation in migration patterns by ethnic group that could be examined far beyond what was analyzed here. Beyond issues of fungible and situational ethnicity, there was an implicit assumption that the most important type of diaspora for determining possible migration intentions was ethnicity. However, there are other types of diasporas that might be more important. With the creation of some twenty-eight million statistical migrants, or persons living outside their place of birth when the USSR was dissolved, place-of-birth diasporas might have a greater push or pull than ethnic diasporas. A person might have a greater attachment to a place where they were born and raised than to a distant ethnic homeland to which they have little connection. It would be interesting to test which had the greater impact on migration - ethnic or place-of-birth homelands.

Related to further disaggregation is the need for more careful examination of exceptions to the theories. For example, why have Armenians and Georgians become more dispersed throughout the FSU while all other groups have become more concentrated. Insight could be gained by more careful analysis just one migration stream in an attempt to evaluate how all of the international migration theories impact on that one migration and remittance corridor. This is what was done analyzing the factors driving Mexico-U.S. migration (Massey and Espinosa 1997). This was done by conducting surveys in both origin and destinations of Mexican migrants to the United States to better understand their migration experience and the motivating

factors behind their migration. The same methodology could be applied to any number of migration streams across the FSU.

Finally, one problem that seemed to hamper complete understanding of migration patterns and their causes across the region was the lack of reliable data on migration processes in the region. This is a problem in many parts of the world but more so in these new states where many of the types of migration across countries and within countries are of recent origin. Better data on migration is obviously necessary for migration policy-making and there are efforts to improve migration statistics in the region. For analytical purposes, the creation of better data sets on migration and the more creative use of existing data could aid in gaining a better understanding of migration in the region. The 2010 round of population censuses are underway in the region where there were efforts to improve the types of migration data collected (UN Statistical Commission and UNECE 2006). The results of these censuses should offer interesting insights into migration and population change in this fascinating region twenty years after the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the start of economic transition.

## Appendices

<b>Appendix 1: Nationalities included in all Soviet Population Censuses</b>				
<i>Slavic</i>	<i>Other European</i>	<i>Non-European</i>	<i>Moslem</i>	<i>Other</i>
Russian	Moldavian	Armenian	Uzbek	Other Non- response
Ukrainian	Lithuanian	Georgian	Tatar	
Belorussian	Jewish	Chuvash	Kazakh	
Polish	German	Korean	Azeri	
Bulgarian	Latvian	Buryat	Tadzhik	
Czech/Slovak	Mordvin	Yakut	Turkmen	
	Estonian	Gypsy	Kirgiz	
	Udmurt	Gagauz	Avar	
	Mari	Nents	Lesgi	
	Komi	Evenk	Dargin	
	Permyak	Khant	Kumyk	
	Greek	Chukchi	Lak	
	Hungarian	Even	Tabasaran	
	Saami	Nanay	Nogay	
	Karelian	Mans	Rutul	
	Romanian	Koryak	Tsakhur	
	Finn	Dolgan	Agul	
	Veps	Nivkh	Bashkir	
	Albanian	Ostyak	Chechen	
	Izhor	Ol'ch	Oset	
		Udekh	Kabardin	
		Kamchadal	Alpak	
		Ket	Uygur	
		Orochon	Ingush	
		Yukagir	Karachay	
		Negidal	Kurd	
		Tuvan	Abkhazian	
		Kalmyk	Khakas	
		Altay	Balkar	
		Assyrian	Circassian	
		Shor	Dungan	
		Udin	Iranian	
		Mongol	Abazin	
		Karaim	Tat	
		Indian	Belduzh	
		Eskimo	Afghan	
		Tofalar		
		Aleut		

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## **Curriculum vitae**

Timothy Edmund Heleniak was born in Seattle, Washington. He earned a Bachelor of Arts degree in Sociology from Eastern Washington University in 1983. Upon graduation, he started work with the U.S. Census Bureau in the Soviet Branch of the Center for International Research, where he did economic, demographic, and geographic analysis of the Soviet Union. In 1995, he earned a Master of Business Administration degree in Finance from the University of Maryland. In 1992, he moved to the World Bank where he worked until 2003. At the Bank he worked on both analytical and lending projects, primarily in the countries of the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Those projects focused on population, health care, social protection, regional development, and the statistical systems. During the 2001-2002 academic year, he was a Research Fellow at the Kennan Institute of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. From 2000 to 2003, he was an Adjunct Professor at Georgetown University in the Center for Eurasian, Russian, East European Studies. From 2003 to 2005, he worked as a Project Officer at the Innocenti Research Centre of the United Nations Children's Fund in Florence, Italy, monitoring and doing analysis of children's and social trends in the countries of the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. In 2005, he entered the PhD program in Geography at the University of Maryland. During that time he has worked as a Faculty Research Assistant on a project supported by the National Science Foundation's Office of Polar Programs doing research on migration and regional development in Siberia and the circumpolar North.