

Stephen Priest Kant's Deduction (2012 Draft)

# KANT'S DEDUCTION

by

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I argue that Kant's transcendental solution to the problem of how experience is possible is in one sense insufficiently empirical but in another sense insufficiently metaphysical. *Pace* Kant: The transcendental is the transcendent.

Without synthesis experience would not be possible according to Kant. Unless intuitions were subsumed under concepts and we could be conscious that what we think is the same as or meaningfully connected to what we thought a moment before, 'all reproduction in the series of (re)presentations would be useless'. (A103. 133) Our having concepts depends upon some of them being categories. That we have the categories we do is also a necessary condition for our experience of the physical world. (A 135. 135) But Kant thinks these conditions of experience themselves need justification, so the Transcendental Deduction involves a discussion of the self. Why so?

He says that 'All necessity without exception is grounded in a transcendental condition'. (A 106. 135) In other words, if *p* is necessary then there is always some non-empirical explanation of *p*'s necessity. There is an equivocation on 'necessary' here. Read psychologically, 'necessary' means something like 'could not conceivably be otherwise', read logically or metaphysically 'if true, then could not be false' or, 'if the case then could not be otherwise'. Kant tends to assimilate these senses, perhaps not in the last resort without good reason, because it might turn out that the cognitive constraints on our thinking delimit precisely what counts as a logical or metaphysical possibility. Then no sense could be attached by us to a distinction between 'possible' and 'thinkable by us self-conscious beings'. But *prima facie* the senses are quite distinct.

A condition or a ground of *x* is what makes *x* possible. So if *a* is a condition or ground for *x* *a* is at least a necessary condition for *x*. By the use of 'transcendental' here Kant is excluding the need for an empirical search for conditions. Transcendental knowledge is knowledge of how knowledge is possible, and these conditions are not to be met with in experience because, allegedly, they are what make experience itself possible.

If there are conditions for experience then it seems coherent to suppose they are transcendental partly at least in Kant's sense. This is because, suppose we wish to

explain how x is possible. Then the conditions for x's possibility cannot (except tautologically) be part of x, otherwise they would already stand in need of explanation themselves. They would be ever part of the *explanans* and never the *explanandum*.

Non-trivial grounds for experience lie outside experience. However, Kant neglects a possibility for which there is conceptual room. Some ground might be transcendental in relation to some experience and be empirical in relation to a distinct experience. I call such non-Kantian grounds transcendental. Kant neglects transcendental grounds because he tries to show how experience as a whole is possible. He assumes that experience as a whole has wholly transcendental grounds. This however is a *non-sequitur* and might be false.

If Kant's project is coherent, we need to ask next what exactly the transcendental unity of apperception is invoked as a condition of. I have isolated the following as ultimately grounded in the transcendental unity of apperception (TUA) as their condition. There is no further transcendental condition for the TUA, but each of these requires the TUA:

- a) Synthesis
- b) Concepts of Objects in general
- c) all objects of experience
- d) the forms of intuition (space and time)
- e) the laws of nature
- f) rules
- g) the objective reality of our empirical knowledge
- h) appearance in experience
- i) the categories
- j) the unity of consciousness

Clearly some of these are conditions for each other. For example, the categories (i) are conditions for concepts of objects in general (b) and the laws of nature (e). Also, the unity of consciousness (j) is a condition for all the items listed under (a) to (i) inclusively. Although (a), synthesis, seems to ground it reciprocally, even the unity of consciousness is made possible only the TUA. As Kant says 'There must be a transcendental ground of the unity of consciousness'. (A 106. 135)

Because it grounds all other conditions Kant says 'This original and transcendental condition is not other than transcendental apperception' (A 107. 136). We need now to understand what this is and decide whether it exists.

Kant distinguishes transcendental from empirical apperception. Empirical apperception is the intellectual component of self-consciousness, of which inner sense is the experiential component. In addition to this alleged faculty of self awareness there exists a non-empirical or transcendental capacity to be conscious of

one's numerical identity over time. It is perhaps for this reason that Kant's theory of the self is more satisfactory than Hume's. Without naming Hume, Kant at A 107. 136 presents a very Humean view of introspection. He says:

'Consciousness of self according to the determinations of our state in inner perception is merely empirical and always changing. No fixed and abiding self can present itself in this flux of inner appearances. Such consciousness is usually named inner sense or empirical apperception.' (A. 107. 136)

Compare Hume's famous remark that he never happens upon any single enduring impression of self that could give rise to the idea of himself as persisting over time. The TUA is invoked to solve the problem of the self Hume bequeathed: What makes my experiences mine? But, is it needed? Is it true that no single abiding self is presented to oneself in self-awareness? What makes one set mine and another yours? There are two component hidden in this question, one to do with individuality or uniqueness the other to do with subjectivity.

Taking individuality first, if we ask 'what makes this mental field yours, and this mine then this can be analysed partly along these lines: What makes  $x$  not  $y$  and what makes  $y$  not  $x$ ? Once we possess well defined concepts of any two entities, then if they are numerically distinct then to say  $x$  is not  $y$  or  $y$  is not  $x$  is to point out a logical or modal property of  $x$  or  $y$ . I am not you and you are not me. My soul is not your soul and yours is not mine. If, as we are postulating, I am my soul and you are yours in a weakened transcendental sense, then these sentences express the same proposition. The non-identity of numerical distinct particulars is not just a modal property of each but one that is logically primitive. I mean the rule  $x, y (x \neq y) = (x \neq y \neq x)$  does not admit of any non-tautological explanation, or any derivation from premises which do not themselves employ the axiom of identity. We could say it follows from A,  $x, y (x = y) = (y = x)$  than A  $x, y (x = y) = (y = x)$  but this is hardly likely to convince someone who was unconvinced by the negative formulation of the principle. We should, I think, point out that someone who putatively denies either principle has not succeeded in saying anything sensible, not even in producing a denial.

The idea of uniqueness, it's being logically primitive that each  $x$  is just the  $x$  that it is and not some  $y$ , is part of the answer to what makes my mental states mine and your yours. That I am not you and you are not me is not a point just about selves. It is a particular case of the modal fact that  $x$  is not  $y$  and  $y$  is not  $x$  if they are numerically distinct.

But an important issue remains. This is what 'I am not you' says that 'this one is not that one' has not expressed already. What information does 'I am this' provide over and above 'This exists'? What information does 'You are that' provide over and

above 'That exists'? To understand this we need to supplement the account of individuality or uniqueness with one of subjectivity.

A traditional and Kantian account of subjectivity would go something like this. Many items fall within my experience but one in particular never does. This the I that actually has or is the owner of these experiences. This is subjective in the sense that it is always experiencer but never itself the object of any experience. Now, there is a great deal wrong with this account of subjectivity; especially, its assumption that experience is to be understood as a relationship between subject and object. But, if there is anything which really exists which is experienced but not often experienced it is the soul. Again, though, this is a contingent fact and one that is capable of empirical verification. I mean, for example, although it is often pointed out by physiologists that the soul does not directly sense itself, has no 'feelings' (Hearth) it does not follow that it could not in principle observe itself, as Wittgenstein has pointed out (BB).

So, the soul is the transcendental subject in the sense that typically, when transforming the physiological input into the mental field, it is not thus transforming itself (except, in an imaginative way when it thinks of itself).

It is also a contingent fact that the soul is the transcendental subject. I mean by this something else might have been. As Wittgenstein points out, if my skull were to be opened it is logically possible it should be found to be empty. It seems also, that some highly intelligent people have very little soul tissue.

Suppose the physiological structure of the soul were quite altered so that it could transform itself wholly into part of the mental field: in the way at present it transforms light waves into colours with hue and saturation. This is not difficult to suppose. After all, the physiological input it transforms already is quite immense in amount and complexity. Then, I maintain, there would in just that degree be no such thing as subjectivity. The soul is a gap or void in the field of its mental states. If this gap were to be closed there would remain individuality but not subjectivity. It is the opacity, most of the time, of the soul; its not featuring amongst its own mental field, most of the time, that gives rise to the subject-object relational structure of experience.

One final point is partially illustrative and partly constitutive of this account of subjectivity: It is true that when you see your eyes do not see themselves. We do not on that account speak of one's eyeballs as 'subjective', even though prima facie they are good candidates for the 'subject' position in some account which entails perception is a relationship between perceiver and object perceived. If we wish to talk about a subject of visual perception then the eyeballs should feature in such an account. No doubt other physiologically necessary conditions for a person seeing an object will also be mentioned: the optic nerve part of the soul etc are causally necessary, so also arguably are other aspects of the person which are subjective: contingently subjective. But the physical eyes are clearly contingent transcendental

conditions for that experience we call seeing. This is most clearly metaphysically testable: damage or remove someone's eyes and they cannot see. To put it in Kantian terms: the eyes are a transcendental condition of seeing even though it is analytic that we use the eyes to see. The eye is just whatever the organ of sight is.

I should not wish to conclude from this that subjectivity is physical because that term has misleading connotations. Its use here might suggest that descriptions of the subjective could be reduced to descriptions of the objective. This translation is not I think feasible, even if one and the same set of entities is described in two vocabularies: one subjective and one objective. But, if subjectivity is not physical then it is not clearly mental either. The eyeballs as part of the subject are not mental or spiritual even though subjective.

I suggest the empirical testing of the subjectivity of eyeballs may be extended to the soul as subject of the mental field in general with advances in neurology. Of course the soul and the eyeballs are physical in what I shall call the naive-Newtonian sense of 'physical'. This concept of physical employs as its paradigm of the physical object a physical object as observed. We need to make room, if we wish to retain the word 'physical' to talk about subjectivity, for this: I am a physical object, or there is something it consists in to be a physical object, and this does not consist in observing a physical object.

We are now equipped to answer the original questions. I have knowledge of my numerical identity over time for the following reasons: I am, transcendently speaking, my soul. My soul endures over time  $t_1 \dots t_2$ , and that soul that I am is able to formulate the judgement 'I am now, at  $t_2$ , numerically the same being as at  $t_1$ '. This judgement is possible because the field of consciousness between  $t_1$  and  $t_2$  has an uninterrupted history. (I leave aside cases of falling asleep, comas etc because solving Hume's problem does not require addressing the issue of 'breaks' in experience). There is no awareness of this history, except the judgement, the propositional thought, that it exists and is of a certain nature.

This transcendental account of one's identity over time is then just the account of the identity of one's soul over time. If we wish, we may say of the history of the mental field: 'I am that history'. This is the correct analysis of what Kant calls the empirical self. I am metaphysically that transformation of my environment that I effect as my soul, transcendently.

In a sense then the problem of personal identity does not arise because it was misconceived. It was the wrong sort of question to ask. I am (metaphysically) a set of mental states. Once we have answered the questions; What does it mean to call them mine, and what makes them a set in a way that identifies oneself with them, no residual questions remains of the form: how do I know I endure? or what is the permanent element in the set that is really me? I am the whole set, not an element in the set. This captures another part of the truth contained in the Humean account of

subjectivity. It is true that I am not an item within my experience, but neither on the other hand am I an item outside it. I am it.

This is to answer the question 'What am I?' or 'What is the self?' in an empirical tone of voice. If we ask it in a - transcendental voice, the answer is: I am a soul: A specific soul with a unique spatio-temporal career.

What I hope to have done is sketch an answer to Hume's and Kant's question which is consistent with actual and foreseeable neurology, and thus which is metaphysically testable. This has required rewriting Kant's word 'transcendental' to allow for a conditions being - transcendental and contingently transcendental. Kant could not possibly allow this adaptation of his term, indeed, 'metaphysically transcendental' is contradictory for him. But I propose the concept be amended to allow as examples of transcendental objects eyeballs and souls: not other people's eyeballs and souls as they appear to me but each person's own eyeballs and souls as used by oneself. nscious'. It follows a fortiori that 'X is conscious cannot yield as a logical consequence 'X is what a person merically identical over time' falls into this second logical category:

- (1) 'I am an object of inner sense'
- (2) 'All time is merely the form of inner sense'
- (3) 'Consequently I refer each and all of my successive determinations to the numerically identical self, and do so throughout time, that is, in the form of my inner intuition of myself'
- (4) "'The personality of the soul" says nothing more than that in the whole time in which I am conscious of myse

TUA2

We have seen that some of the conditions for the possibility of experience which Kant identifies as transcendental are transcendental and to that degree empirical. This is a fact that would have appalled Kant, but one I argue for in the light of contemporary neuroscience.

To further substantiate this I examine Kant's solution to the Hume-Kant problem of the self.

Accepting Hume's point that no 'fixed and abiding self' appears in self-consciousness, Kant concludes from this that

'What has necessarily to be [re]presented as numerically identical cannot be thought as such through empirical data' (A. 107 136).

If we read 'empirical' weakly to mean 'knowable through experience' and not strongly to mean 'knowable through sense experience' then all that prevents this claim being false is its including the term 'necessarily'. Now, it may be that Kant thinks it is a necessary truth that persons are conscious of their numerical identity through time. This is perhaps criterial of being a person. But, if it is, this is partly a matter of stipulation. There could in principle be beings who were just like persons except they were not conscious of their numerical identity over time. I should not wish to deny that they would be deficient in not just that respect but in consequential respects also. But it is logically possible that such beings should be numerically identical and a fortiori numerically continuous over time without their in addition being aware of this fact. (I use words like 'aware' and 'conscious of' just to mean 'know' here). So, the insertion of 'necessarily' by Kant is just some unpacking of what is implicit in his concept of a person. If we abandon that criterion of personhood, then the claim becomes synthetic and, arguably, false. This is because what can be represented as numerically identical can be thought as such through empirical data.

Indeed, Kant has an element of the correct account when he uses 'thought' here: because 'I am my experiences' or 'I am the same being that existed yesterday' are thoughts in the propositional sense, and not experiences.

There is another construal of the claim which emphasises a non-empirical component. This is the notion 'numerically identical'. It could be that Kant conflates this with the modal concept of self-identity. The latter as employed for example in the logical axiom  $x (x = x)$  is certainly not an empirical concept. This despite the fact it is obviously persistently metaphysically verified and never metaphysically falsified. But the idea of numerical identity is an empirical one. If we say A is B but A is not C then we are exercising an empirical power to discriminate between A and C and to assimilate A and B. Thus this notion of sameness has a broadly empirical use. Nor does the fact that 'A is B but not C' a thought imply that the concept of numerical identity is not empirical, only that it is indeed a concept.

By drawing attention to this we just point out that arguably no concepts are straightforward empirical items: they are perhaps rules, or dispositions or skills. But we should discriminate non-empirical from empirical concepts by the sort of use they have. Whatever the correct ontology of concepts, 'A is (numerically) B' clearly has an empirical use.

So, what is represented (thought) as numerically identical not only can be but frequently is thought through empirical data.

Nor is there any objection to extending this empirical account to oneself. Just as we may say person A at  $t_1$  is person B at  $t_2$ , so we may add to this 'I am person A'. In



other words, substituting the first person pronoun for 'A' or 'B' does no violence to the empirical subject matter of the terms of the identity statement. In all this we have to read 'empirical' weakly not strongly.

So, an extended and amended Humean account is really enough.

Kant though thinks a non-empirical account of a) my numerical identity over time and b) my consciousness of my numerical identity over time is needed. It should be clear now why I think this further quest for conditions is redundant, but it bears examination nonetheless.

Kant thinks there must be a condition which precedes all experience, and which makes experience itself possible (A. 107. 136). The necessary conditions for some phenomenon, in this case experience, will typically turn out to comprise a large set. I have mentioned empiricaltranscendental conditions: the soul as a biological condition for experience, optic nerves and operative eyeballs as necessary conditions for seeing in particular. But clearly, that there is, for example, something rather than nothing at all is also a necessary condition for experience.

It is primarily a matter for empirical investigation what the conditions for experience are. The procedure should be: select some candidate condition C, remove C and decide whether experience still exists. Kant's conditions are not testable in this way. He says:

'There can be in us no modes of knowledge no connection or unity of one mode of knowledge with another, without that unity of consciousness which precedes all data of intuitions and by relation to which representation of objects is alone possible' (A. 107. 136)

Clearly the unity of consciousness referred to here is not identical with the unity of consciousness he mentioned at A 106. 135 as requiring a transcendental ground, because he says now: 'This pure unchangeable consciousness I shall name transcendental apperception' (A. 107. 136).

In the first use of 'unity of conscious' this denoted something in need of a ground, in the second it is a ground, in fact the ground of the first mentioned unity. This equivocation on 'unity of consciousness' is unfortunate because it is inconsistent with one transcendental and plausible interpretation of Kant's position. It could be that the empirical and the transcendental unity of consciousness are not numerically distinct, but one and the same unity described in two ways, viz metaphysically or transcendently. This though is precluded by the principle we mentioned earlier; x's being a condition of y precludes x's being y. Perhaps the difficulty could be avoided

in this way: that a transcendental description of the unity of consciousness is possible is a necessary condition of an empirical description of that same unity being possible. The transition from an ontological medium to a distinction between descriptions mitigates the incoherence to some degree. Not entirely though. Kant says transcendental apperception is a kind of intellectual self consciousness: the true thought of my numerical identity over time. This, which is perhaps a disposition or a possibility cannot plausibly be identified with the set of occurrent mental states comprising my unity of consciousness.

Dispositional and occurrent states are distinct (even though occurrences realise dispositions). It is not *prima facie* clear for example how a tendency or a propensity could be numerically identical with an experience where the two sorts of mental state seem so qualitatively dissimilar.

So it is better for Kant to drop his talk of the TUA as a unity of consciousness and replace it with a dispositional account. This is not because occurrent self consciousness does not exist but because it accords better with Kant's later talk of the TUA as a possibility of self-consciousness.

The needs, and the semi-logical, semi-psychological structures Kant invokes to meet them can be accounted for within the empiricist-physiological model I have outlined. The first use of 'unity of consciousness' translates into 'mental field'. The second misleading 'unity of consciousness', which is 'transcendental' - refers to the soul (or perhaps as the account is enriched, to activity of the soul or propensity to soul activity). This translation also retains the attempts to render the two uses of 'unity of consciousness' consistent in terms of different descriptions.

To do much of the cognitive work Kant requires we may abandon 'self-consciousness' and even its 'possibility' but may employ instead a 'member of the mental field'/'physiological item' distinction instead. Thus, colours for example have hue, saturation, shade etc as components of the mental field, but are lightwaves of certain lengths under a physiological description. As items in the mental field they are straightforwardly empirical, as purely physiological they are - transcendental, that is, empirical-transcendent. They are transcendental because they are not *qua* light waves direct objects of visual perception. They are empirical transcendental because they are indirect objects of observation, in fact theoretical objects of empirical science. Similarly, a mental image may be metaphysically coloured, of the lake district, etc but - transcendentially, metaphysically a soul state.

Added to the ambiguity between one unity of consciousness describable in two ways and two numerically distinct unities of consciousness, one empirical and one transcendental is another, closely related one. Kant draws a distinction between the unity of consciousness (*Einheit des Bewusstseins*) and 'all data of intuition' (A 107. 136). He says the unity of consciousness precedes ( ...) the data of intuitions. Whatever 'precedes' means it implies not only if not A then not B but if not A then B then A is not B. For example, if it means that A exists chronologically before B then,

just so long as A exists but B does not exist then A is not B. This does not preclude the possibility that if A exists and then if B exists, A and B might be identical in one sense of that term: they might fall under the same sortal. Thus I at an earlier time am identical with ( am numerically the same person as) myself at a later time.

The chronological interpretation of the unity of consciousness-data of intuitions relation can be excluded by appeal to the context of Kant's critical epistemology. He is clear that knowledge and experience are not possible without both the categorical contribution of the understanding and a sensory input. This precludes the existence (in the case of persons) of any unity of conscious at anytime chronologically prior to the having of some intuitions. This follows if the existence of the unity of consciousness entails for Kant either having some experiences, or knowing something. If it does not include this then the term is being used vacuously.

But, if this is right, a difficulty arises for the logical reading of 'precedes' too. This is because we have just established that intuitions are in a sense a condition for any unity of consciousness. Kant though at A 107 is asserting the converse: the unity of consciousness is a condition for intuitions. The problem is only insuperable if A's being a condition for B precludes B's being a condition for A (whether or not this turns out to be what Kant intends here). Clearly 'logical condition for' can be a reciprocal relation. (For example, having size might be a condition for having shape and having shape might be a condition for having size, at least in the case of physical objects.)

But the relation 'logically prior to' does not admit of this reciprocity. If A is logically prior to B then it is logically impossible for B to be logically prior to A. If this is what Kant means by 'precedes' here then some further ground needs to be found for saying the unity of consciousness makes possible the data of intuition in at least one way which is not reciprocated. There is more than one such way. Before examining these I shall briefly restate the issue in the vocabulary I have introduced.

Is there a sense in which A is logically prior to B but in which A is not prior to A, where A and B are given these values: experience, experiences; set of mental states, mental states, mental field, results of soul-transformations? In discussing logical priority, one issue must be left completely aside. This is the causal priority of the soul over experiences: the contingent truth that the existence of a soul is a causal condition for there being experiences in the case of human beings.

The priority of the unity of consciousness over all data of intuition can be understood in at least two complementary ways. One involves emphasising that Kant, in these passages, is trying to answer the question How is experience possible? The other is noticing that answering this question requires for him mentioning some transcendental facts, but not empirical facts.

Our knowledge of all data of intuition is, in one sense, empirical: I know I am having some experiences because I am able to exercise inner sense, but knowledge of that prior unity of consciousness which allegedly precedes all data of intuition is not

empirical. 'Empirical' has to be read weakly here to mean not just 'knowable through sense experience' but 'knowable through experience'. In particular Kant wants to emphasise that the transcendental ground of experience cannot be discovered introspection. I think an argument for this conclusion is embedded in the text at A 107. Here it is extracted:

- (1) 'Consciousness of self according to the determinations of our state in inner perception is merely empirical and always changing'
- (2) 'No fixed and abiding self can present itself in the flux of inner appearances'
- (3) 'What has necessarily to be represented as numerically identical cannot be thought as such through empirical data'

Therefore

- (4) 'There must be a condition which precedes all experience, and which makes experience itself possible'

The three premises are thoroughly Humean. The first amounts to: In introspection I am aware only of changing experiences, and knowledge of these is contingent, the second to: in introspection I am not aware of any permanent or continuous self, and the third to: no necessary truth, for example the fact of my self identity, can be an empirical truth.

The conclusion, that there is a non-empirical condition for experience, is facilitated by the remark: 'To render such a transcendental supposition valid [ ...]' where the transcendental supposition is my self-identity over time. The conclusion at (4) is the conjunction of two claims, the first of which does follow from (1) - (3) on a certain reading of them, the second of which only follows if we supplement Kant's argument with additional premises. The first conjunct of (4) is: 'There must be a condition which precedes all experience'. If we read 'condition' here to denote the condition for ability or my self-identity over time then this does go through if we allow Kant to assume there is such a condition: that my self-identity over time is the sort of truth that admits of having conditions, and secondly if we allow him to assume he has exhausted the empirical and the transcendental possibilities. I shall later deny this second assumption and say there are transcendental and empirical conditions for my self identity over time, but these are not present to introspection.

But if 'transcendental truth' and 'empirical truth' are mutually exclusive predicates, as Kant assumes they are, then the first conjunct of the conclusion follows: there is a condition of my self-identity over time which is not metaphysically discoverable.

If 'transcendental' and 'empirical' are jointly exhaustive of the possibilities, then this condition must be transcendental. We need to read the argument in this highly Kantian way to obtain half its conclusion.

The second conjunct of 4) is that this condition 'makes experience itself possible'. I think this only follows on several new assumptions. So far Kant's premises are only sufficient to yield 'there is a transcendental condition of my self-identity over time', not 'there is a transcendental condition of experience in general' still less, 'they are one and the same condition'. What does Kant need to make the premises yield this?

There are various ways this might be done but one in particular is most in keeping with Kant's intentions. Suppose A is a condition for C. Using this model we can say my self-identity over time is a condition for my experience, but there is a further condition for my self identity over time, *viz* the transcendental unity of apperception so, the transcendental unity of apperception via the transitivity of the relation 'is a condition for' is a condition for experience. This is, I think, what Kant intends. He certainly does not assimilate the TUA to one's self identity over time. These are not the same. The TUA is the non-empirical possibility of my awareness of my self-identity over time. It is a non-empirical disposition of self-conscious thought of a particular restricted sort. As he will later put it, it is the possibility of the 'I think' (*Ich denke* [...]) prefixing any of my thoughts.

It should be clear now why the relation 'precedes' between the transcendental unity of consciousness and all data of intuitions is in at least one sense non-reciprocal. All data of intuitions are experiences, and the transcendental unity of consciousness is precisely a condition for experiences.

There could in an extremely minimal and truncated sense be a sort of entity which would count as an experience if not subsumed under the TUA. Kant for example is mentioning what he takes to be a logical possibility here (and not something that entails a contradiction): 'It would be possible for experiences to crowd in on the soul and yet to be such as would never allow of experience' (A 111). Not only could those experiences not be parts of one and the same experience, they would not be experiences of anyone even considered singularly.

There is a further interpretation which retains the asymmetry between the TUA and the data of intuition. This requires making a distinction between the transcendental unity of apperception and the transcendental unity of consciousness (TUC). This distinction is not well made out by Kant, but there are grounds for drawing it.

If the TUA is a disposition to self consciousness, to have the thought 'I think', then the TUC is what is thus thought as a unity. There is a relation of mutual dependence between the TUA and TUC, but mutual dependence is not identity so they are not identical. Unless the disposition to the use of 'I think [...]' were

possible, the TUC would not exist. Reciprocally, unless there were thoughts capable of being prefaced by 'I think' the TUA would not be possible either.

There are even grounds for saying that the TUC does already possess a kind of unity not immediately provided by the TUA. This is the unity of the categories, not the category of 'unity' but the completeness and a priority of the twelve.

Clearly, that we have categories is for Kant a condition of our having experience, and that we have the specific categories we do is a condition for our having the sort of experience we do. On this second interpretation, the unity of consciousness is the unity of the categories and these 'precede' all data of intuition in a way that is a familiar theme in Kantian epistemology. The categories are prior to experience in that they are not empirical concepts derived from experience but a priori concepts intellectually imposed upon it. They also fall under the description 'conditions for experience'.

Finally, these contentions taken together substantiate the ordinary language fact that any experience is somebody's experience. The verb 'experience' takes a grammatical subject and an object. This though should not mislead us into unquestioningly adopting the ontological assumption that experience is necessarily a relationship.

The unity of categories - data of intuition reading is also substantiated by Kant's remarks that

'There can be in us no modes of knowledge, no connection or unity of one mode of knowledge with another' without the TUC as a condition for data of intuition. Nor could there be '(re)presentation of objects.' (A. 107)

On this reading, Kant is reiterating his critical epistemological claim that *a priori* concepts and sensory input are jointly necessary for knowledge, but with a special proviso: The unity of the categories is also a condition, and this unity is logically prior to the possibility of intuitions being experiences. But Kant thinks these conditions of experience themselves need justification.

TUA3

Disposition and Occurrence

There is a deep ambiguity in the concept of the TUA and this needs to be addressed now. Sometimes Kant offers a dispositional account of the TUA but sometimes, less frequently, an occurrent account. The dispositional account is invoked in arguments which purport to establish purely formal or analytic conditions of experience, the occurrent account in arguments which purport to prove the existence of transcendental synthetic a priori conditions for experience.

An example of the occurrent view is this: 'This pure original unchangeable consciousness I shall name transcendental apperception.' (A107) This could be understood as a psychological faculty that is perpetually exercised (that is, exercised by a subject at all and only those times when that subject experiences). That would be to read 'unchangeable' to imply 'perennial' or something equivalent. But that is not the most perspicuous reading. The force of this analogy must not be entirely lost:

'The numerical unity of this apperception is thus the *a priori* ground of all concepts, just as the manifoldness of space and time is the *a priori* ground of the intuitions of sensibility.' (A107)

'Unchangeable' means 'unchangeable in principle'; not the sort of fact that could change if there is experience. This is not just the formal point that I am self identical, not just a special case of  $x (x=y)$ , but an ontological commitment to a unified consciousness. We could put it this way. The unity of consciousness is a condition for states of consciousness. Indeed, we could develop Kant's analogy further on this own terms. Intuitions are either temporal or else both spatial and temporal. In other words they occupy portions of space-time. But, purportedly distinct spaces and times are in fact parts of one and the same space and time. So, also purportedly distinct experiences of mine are in fact parts of one and the same experience. Here in contrast is an example of the dispositional view:

'This unity of consciousness would be impossible if the mind in knowledge of the manifold could not become conscious of the identity of function whereby it synthetically combines it in one knowledge.' (A 108)

'The unity of consciousness' refers to the TUC not the TUA. The TUA is precisely consciousness 'of the identity of function' mentioned in the same sentence. 'Could' here does not commit Kant to the view that TUA is a kind of occurrent or perpetual of subliminal self consciousness. On the contrary, it is the possibility of being self conscious in a specific sense: being capable of the thought 'I think [...]']'.

Contained in this notion of self-knowledge is the possibility of this sort of thought: 'I am numerically identical, now at  $t_2$  with a person having some experiences at an earlier time  $t_1$ '. This is what Kant intends to capture by 'original and necessary consciousness of the identity of the self'. (A 108)

*Prima facie* there is a problem about the dispositional reading which can be avoided by amending Kant's theory slightly. The difficulty is deciding a referent for 'the mind' in the above passage. If 'the mind' refers to the same faculty as 'original unchangeable consciousness' then the dispositional account is in danger of regressively falling back into the occurrent account. This is because 'mind' would then conceptually imply an existing transcendental ground even for the TUA and the

TUC. This is a conclusion Kant would not wish to be committed to. He is on one very plausible reading committed to just that because 'mind' is the subject of the verb 'could' in 'could not become conscious of [...]'. As we have seen, the TUA is a condition for the TUC, so on the principle if A is a condition for B, and B a condition for C, then A is a condition for C, the mind is a condition for the TUA (as subject of it), the TUA is a condition for the TUC so the mind is a condition for the TUC.

Clearly this is unsatisfactory from a Kantian point of view on at least two grounds. It could be read as a case of that very Cartesian reification of the subject he opposes in the Paralogisms chapter. Secondly, if 'mind' is not given a Cartesian analysis it has not here been given a Kantian one. It is in fact left unexplicated by Kant in this passage.

The solution is to analyse 'mind' here in a way consistent with Kant's use of the psychological concepts he has introduced so far. Two routes are open. One is to identify the mind with the totality of functions mentioned in the passage, the other is to preferentially identify it with just one or more of them. The totality analysis is substantiated *prima facie* by something Kant says. The mind becomes conscious of the identity of function whereby it synthetically combines (the manifold) in one knowledge. (A 108) If the mind is that which is conscious of that identity, and that which synthesises the contents of the manifold then the mind cannot be identical with either of those. This is true if A's being the subject of some experiences E1 ... En precludes A featuring amongst those experiences or being the totality of them. The mind is the subject of three activities: knowledge of the manifold, consciousness of self-identity, and synthesis. The totality analysis would be facilitated if 'being the subject of' does not entail 'being ontologically distinct from'. Then it could be argued that the mind is nothing over and above the exercise of these various functions. It is then synthesising activity, not what synthesises, it is consciousness of self-identity over time, not what is thus conscious, it is knowledge of the manifold, not the possessor of that knowledge.

If Kant does not adopt this or a comparable reductivist solution then he is in the incoherent position of assuming a subject for the TUA: a condition for the condition of all conditions (that is not itself).

There seem to be no criteria for excluding one or more of the various psychological functions from subsumption under 'mind' or preferentially choosing one to be called 'the mind'. If such criteria can be produced there are no Kantian grounds for precluding such an amendment.

There is a further and unKantian solution to the analysis of 'mind'. For this, 'analysis' must not be read as 'explanation of the meaning of the word "X"' but as 'saying what X really is'. Clearly, although these procedures sometimes coincide, this is not necessarily so. In keeping with the psycho-physical identity theory in terms of which I have tried to resolve some Kantian issues, the solution to What is the mind? here is; the mind is the soul. Indeed, it is because we have souls but each person



cannot directly sense their own that Kant is misled into smuggling in the mind as the covert subject of experience.

In Kantian terms 'mind' is redundant in the A 107-8 account of the possibility of experience, but if he would consider all metaphysical and, in my sense, transcendental, conditions of experience then the soul is the obvious candidate. It is the transcendental subject of experience.

Kant then proceeds to identify as one and the same function, the consciousness of self-identity and the consciousness of the unity of consciousness:

'The original and necessary consciousness of the identity of the self is thus at the same time a consciousness of an equally necessary unity of the synthesis of all appearances according to concepts.' (A 108)

This identification is maintained despite the use of 'equally' in 'equally necessary'. 'Necessary' here can be read as 'necessary for experience'. A difficulty, however, is that if A and B are equally necessary for C then, implicitly, A is distinct from B. If the identity of the consciousness of unity and the consciousness of identity depend for their being one and the same act on the identity of their object then Kant's view is inconsistent: he would have asserted what his own analysis is precluded.

One remedy is to say that my self-identity over time consists in the unity of my consciousness. This would be either a contingent identification or a constitutional claim, but one that is useful for Kant to make. It is only contingent, if a fact at all, because my identity over time could be or be constituted by something other than the unity of my consciousness (for example by my soul). Nevertheless if we read 'is' here as the 'is' of constitution we can coherently assert that the unity of consciousness is self-identity over time without thereby subscribing to the false view that 'unity of consciousness' and 'self-identity over time' are synonymous.

On another interpretation of the relation between consciousness of identity and consciousness of unity, they are not numerically identical. How we read Kant here depends upon the criteria for the individuation of psychological functions. But 'thus at the same time' could be taken merely to imply that it is not possible for there to be consciousness of one's self identity without consciousness of the unity of consciousness. Or, on a similar reading, the consciousness of the unity of consciousness is the means of being conscious of one's self identity over time. Either of these variants is consistent with the consciousness of identity not being strictly (ie numerically) identical with the consciousness of the unity of consciousness. Rather the relation is now either or both of 'is a necessary condition for' or 'end and means'. Indeed, if A is a necessary condition for B then it follows A is not B (if we leave aside the modal consideration that everything is necessary for itself). Also if B is the means to A as an end it follows that B is not A. Kant gives us no criteria for selecting any of these options in particular. He writes at a certain level of generality.

At A 108-9 there is a suggestion that is consistent with both the necessary condition and the means-end readings. He says the unity of the synthesis of all appearances is 'according to concepts' (A108), and 'that is, according to rules'. Here he is thinking of concepts as rules for making experience intelligible.

The employment of rules which is psychologically unavoidable and a condition for experience has two consequences. One is to make appearances 'necessarily reproducible', and the other is to 'determine an object for their intuition'. (A108) 'Necessarily reproducible' must be a reference to numerically distinct appearances of the same sort, because it would be a mistake to suppose that one and the same appearance could be reproduced at distinct time intervals, unless extra reasons were provided for allowing one and the same appearance to exist intermittently. I read 'determine' here to mean 'make what it is' so, for example, a concept determines an object if and only if it (at least partly) makes it what it is.

The employment of rules, and the resulting component parts of the intelligibility of objects can be read as a necessary condition or as parts of the means by which the consciousness of unity facilitates the consciousness of identity. The consequences of rule following, and perhaps the rule following itself, are partly constitutive of the unity of consciousness. This activity of subsuming the object of intuition under concepts generates 'the concept of something wherein they (appearances) are necessarily connected' (A108). This something, though Kant does not make this explicit, is the unity of consciousness.

So, the passage as A108 can be read as an explication of what is involved in the expression 'unity of consciousness' as well as a partial account of how we (putatively) come to find objects intelligible. This accords well with his earlier claim that the consciousness of the unity of identity of the self is (in a loose sense) a consciousness of the unity of the synthesis of appearances according to concepts.

Although the necessary condition and the means and ends analyses are mutually consistent, neither, taken singularly or jointly, is consistent with the identity analysis which entails the claim that the consciousness of unity is 'at the same time' the unity of consciousness. Kant provides no criteria for preferring one interpretation over the others.

Kant at A108 introduces a complication into his account which is, I think, a mistake. He says:

'The mind could never think its identity in the manifoldness of its (re)presentations and indeed think this identity a priori, if it did not have before its eyes the identity of its act, whereby it subordinates all synthesis of apprehension to a transcendental unity.' (A108)

There are three errors here. Firstly 'mind' is invoked again in an unanalysed way. Secondly, 'before its eyes' is a metaphor with all the misleading connotations

associated with 'inner sense' and criticised in the last chapter. Thirdly, he is now not just claiming that it must be possible to be conscious of one's self-identity through the unity of consciousness but that one must in turn be aware of this very act, or more specifically of the 'identity' of that act of self-conscious thought. 'Identity' is equivocal. It might mean what it meant in 'numerical self-identity'; that it is one and the same capacity for rational self-reflection which is exercised at different times. Or, possibly, by knowing the identity of the act I just know what it is. The first sense would be a specifically Kantian one, the second an ordinary language use of the term.

But, which ever is the correct analysis of 'identity' Kant has introduced a new condition which threatens to become regressive, and said something inconsistent with the explanation of the TUA he has presented so far. The postulation is regressive, because although it enables us (putatively) to know of the existence of the transcendental unity of apperception, and not just know of the need for the TUA, the question newly arises: how was that knowledge possible? and so on. Kant introduces conditions for conditions for conditions, but the regress is halted quite arbitrarily; where he no longer pursues a chain of reasoning to its logical conclusion. The awareness of the exercise of that disposition which is the TUA is blatantly inconsistent with the idea of the TUA as the ultimate condition for other psychological functions. This is because Kant is committed to the view that 'the mind could not think its identity in the manifoldness' unless it was aware of 'the act whereby it subordinates' synthesis to a transcendental unity'. (A108) So not just this act, but the awareness of this act, is a condition for the mind thinking its identity. But the possibility of the mind's thinking its identity is the TUA. But, allegedly, there are no further psychological conditions of the TUA.

Kant has unduly complicated his account by raising it to a meta-level that is really redundant. All he needs for the argument to go through (accepting his other assumptions for the moment) is that the act of synthesis exist, not that the awareness of the activity of synthesis exist, still less yet another sort of activity described as the act whereby synthesis is 'subordinated to a transcendental unity'. It is very difficult to imagine what such an act could amount to. The 'synthesis of apprehension I' he says is empirical (A108), but the unity it is subordinated to is transcendental (A108), so allegedly there is an act which relates the empirical and the transcendental, and the mind can have this act 'before its eyes'.

Rather than invoke psychological function upon psychological function with dubious coherence Kant should adopt this approach. Suppose, as he does, one wished to make the unity of consciousness a condition of experience, and a condition of self identity over time. Then all that is needed, in Kantian terms, for oneself, the unity of one's consciousness, and experience to be possible is that the objects of intuition are in fact synthesised. There is no additional need to invoke the consciousness of this unity or even the possibility of the consciousness of this unity to explain how that unity is possible. It might (though I should dispute this) be

invoked to explain something else: namely how self knowledge is possible. It is not true that the possibility of self-consciousness is a condition for experience. There are no doubt beings who are conscious, in the sense that they have experience, but who are not self conscious. If Kant, as he sometimes suggests, is trying to give an account of how self-conscious beings can experience, of how this is possible, then it becomes analytic that self-consciousness or something very much like it will be invoked amongst the conditions of their experience.

Although Kant is discussing the transcendental conditions for experience the regressive character of the account parallels an analogous regress in the empiricist entailments of his philosophy of mind. For example, he says: 'All representations have, as representation, their object, and can in turn become objects of other representation'. (A108)

This model of experience of experience is subject to the same criticisms levelled at inner sense. Again analogously, the thesis of the intentionality of the mental could be salvaged without resort to the meta-claims.

Kant offers in addition to the possible identification of the TUA and the TUC yet another identification. He says of 'our empirical concepts in general relation to an object' that 'this relation is nothing but the necessary unity of consciousness'. Unless this identification held according to Kant, 'knowledge would be without an object' and our empirical knowledge would have no 'objective reality'. (A109-10)

So the relation of our concepts to the objects of intuition is the unity of consciousness. There are two complementary ways of understanding this.

Firstly, it is a recapitulation of the mutual dependence of concepts and intuitions which is a tenet of his critical epistemology. That mutual dependence is thus partly constitutive of what he now refers to as the 'necessary unity of consciousness'. Secondly, he says the relation is 'also [...] the synthesis of the manifold'. (A109) This is perfectly consistent, as synthesis is the activity of the subsuming intuitions under concepts.

As well as this though he says the 'pure concept of the transcendental object' (A 109) confers objective reality on our empirical concepts, and that this in turn rest on the 'transcendental law' that all possible objects of experience conform to a priori rules of synthetical unity. I understand the latter to be the categories and the principles as a priori transcendental rules for their application. So unless we self-conscious beings were equipped with the categories, and unless the principles were true, our experience could not be of an objective reality.

He seems to subscribe to the further view that we must possess the concept of an objective reality in order for our experience to be objective. This is the force of 'concept' of the transcendental object which 'cannot contain any determinate intuition'. (A109) I think it is false that we have to believe or even possess the fairly sophisticated idea of our experience being of an objective realm in order for it to be true of us that our experience is in fact objective in that sense. On Kantian terms the

categories, especially of substance and causation having a real empirical application is sufficient for our experience being objective. He need not have further recourse to a conception of objectivity. If we do have that conception, or if we believe our experience to be of an objective world then it is a necessary condition of our experience being objective that that conception be accurate, or that belief be true. This is right if there is an analytic connection between experience being objective and being of an objective world, say if no experience is objective unless it is experience of an objective world. It is worth maintaining this analytic connection because it is worth distinguishing objective experience from experience that just seems objective (for example, from the inside). At (A 110) Kant ends this discussion by saying:

'In other words appearances in experience must stand under the conditions of the necessary unity of apperception.' (A 110)

This is a rather loose way of summarising a discussion which has not invoked the necessity of the possibility of awareness of my numerical identity, but just explicated what this identity consists in. 'In other words' should really be deleted unless we subscribe wholly to the occurrent and not at all to the dispositional account of the TUA. Then on the occurrent reading the TUA can be identified with the TUC, and that in turn with the conditions of the objectivity of experience in synthesis.

There is clear sense in which this unity is transcendental. When I am having some experiences it is true that I am subsuming intuitions under concepts, but this is not a fact that is introspectively available to me. It is not an item within my experience but a condition for and a structure of my experience.

The passage at the end of (A 110) does to an extent mitigate against the assimilation of the TUA to the TUC. There he speaks of the 'synthetic unity of appearances in accordance with concepts' and at (A111) says this is 'based on a transcendental ground of unity'. I assume if A is 'based on' B then A cannot be identical with B. He can be read consistently if we do not identify the synthetic unity of appearances (SUA) with the TUA but with the TUC. The evidence for this identification is extremely strong. He has already mentioned the essential role of synthesis in constituting the necessary unity of consciousness. Now he goes on to draw the same analogy with space and time for the SUA as he did for the TUC:

'When we speak of different experiences we can only refer to the various perceptions, all of which, as such belong to one and the same general experience.' (A 110)

He says the SUA is the 'form' of experience, as were space and time and the 'one single experience' of (A 110) is just the TUC.

Kant's next move seems to me illegitimate. He says that unless the SUA were based on a 'transcendental ground of unity' then synthesis would be 'altogether accidental'. (A 110) On my account, in two important senses synthesis is accidental: It is a contingent fact that there do exist any experiences at all. Secondly, it is a contingent fact that the conditions for experience exist also. On top of this, the best candidate for a transcendental condition of experience is the soul, and this, in a weak sense compatible with its being transcendental, is empirical. The transcendental ground he refers to is the TUA, construed dispositionally.

Kant is misled by a familiar Kantian equivocation on 'necessary'. He assimilates 'necessary for experience' to 'logically necessary' or 'formally necessary' or, here 'non-accidental'. Two tasks should be separated: firstly the quest for conditions for experience and these may pace Kant be empirical, contingent and transcendental, and secondly, the conceptual analysis of concepts like 'experience', 'self', 'consciousness'. Kant persistently assimilates these two tasks. Even though '*p* is necessary for experience' entails '*p* cannot be refuted by experience', this kind of necessity is weaker than logical necessity.

Even if the premise just quoted about the need for a transcendental ground were true, the following conclusion is a *non-sequitur*:

'Otherwise it would be possible for appearances to crowd in upon the soul, and yet be such as would never allow of experience'. (A 111)

The TUA, whether understood as a transcendental unity of consciousness or as a disposition to think the unity of that consciousness, just does not explain the transition from an input of intuitions, to the experience of objects. If anything does explain this transformation it is the existence of the soul. Indeed, it is rather a condition of there existing a disposition to think 'I think [...]' that there should be something to think about, some propositional content of the thought 'I think [...]'. This content is either explicable partly in terms of experiences or else requires experiences. So, far from the TUA effecting the transition from appearance to experience, it presupposes that that transition is already achieved.

Two further criticisms: Arguably, what stands in need of a transformation into experience should not be called 'appearances'. This is because appearances are grammatically appearances to something or other. Also, they are arguably appearances of something or other. As we have seen, for them to count even as appearances in this sense on Kant's very own terms a great deal of empirical and transcendental psychological machinery has to be invoked.

Second, 'soul' is smuggled in as 'mind' was in the earlier passages. It is left unclear what the soul is upon which the appearances would hypothetically crowd. This much is at least clear: the soul (unlike the mind) cannot possibly be a generic term for the various mental functions in their mutual dependencies. This is because

Kant is speculating what, *per impossibile* on his terms, would be the case if these functions were in fact suspended. In order to say something coherent here he needs to make an ontological assumption explicit. For example does 'soul' denote a Cartesian ego, or might it denote the soul? The Paralogisms preclude the first option. I recommend the second.

Despite these defects in its formulation the question, Kant's concept of the TUA is designed to answer is a genuine one. Indeed, at (A111) he defines 'appearances' (in this context) as 'intuition without thought', that is, hypothetically, as a passively received input not subsumed under categories. This is a sensible way of posing the problem, but I should be inclined to say that if there is anything which genuinely is a passively received input not directly experienced then this should be understood as purely physiological: lightwaves, perhaps, or soundwaves. A reformulation of Kant's question would then be: What facilitates the transition from the physiological level of description to the phenomenological level of description? In keeping with the idea of a soul transformation I hold the metaphysical hypothesis that it is the soul which effects this transition.

Thus it can remain true on Kantian lines that perceiving an object constitutes it, that is: partly at least makes it what it is, but this constitution is a transition from a physiological description being uniquely true of the object to a phenomenological description also being true of it. We could call this view 'physiologist-idealism' or 'monism'.

Thus we can write Kant's 'crowd in upon the soul' in this way: there could in principle be a physiological input via the physical senses to the soul but no experiences or secondary qualities thereby be caused to exist. Indeed, it remains true in the world of which both physical and psychological descriptions are true that light and soundwaves are 'nothing to' the person who sees and hears in a sense strongly analogous to Kant's. Kant though is thinking of the logical conditions for experience again, and it is part of the meaning of 'experience' for him that a concept is applied to an intuition in the unity of consciousness.

If, as I maintain, the existence of light waves, soundwaves and objects which resist pressure are conditions for objective experience then this is nonetheless a contingent fact about them. This for three reasons: They are empirical conditions not of any possible experience but of just the sort of experience we do have. Secondly, the sort of experience we do have could, in principle, have been produced by some other set of conditions. Finally, there could, as just noted, have been a world just like ours with only one difference: no psychological or phenomenological descriptions are true of it: only physiological descriptions. Thus, in a third sense, the items falling under a physiological description only contingently fall under the additional one: 'conditions for experience'.

Kant does not leave open the possibility that his question, What are the conditions for a sensory or inner input being experience? It might allow of an empirical answer.

[The first premiss is the assumption of the simplicity of the self. Kant does not criticise this proposition directly at CPR 372-3, presumably because he thinks it vulnerable to all the objections he has amassed so far.]

TUA 4

The conditions for experience are empirical or analytic, or transcendental in the sense used so far. Kant makes the possibility of self-consciousness a condition of experience:

'All possible appearances, as representations belong to the totality of a possible self consciousness.' (A113)

But this is either analytic: All my experiences are mine, or else a non-empirical ontological claim. It is non-empirical because there is no conclusive empirical evidence that any given experiences belong to a single self consciousness. Although 'all my experiences are mine' is analytic, Kant makes the more general claim here that all possible experiences are someone's which is also analytic. It entails the specific claim, if I exist and have experiences.

Now, the claim that all experiences are someone's does not yield the conclusion that all experiences are episodes in a self-consciousness, unless the additional assumption is added that any being which experiences has a capacity for self-consciousness. This assumption is false unless 'capacity for' is read weakly as 'could in principle be' or something equivalent. It is metaphysically possible and probably true that some beings, certain animals, are capable of experience but not self-consciousness. They have experiences and those experiences form parts of a single experience, a single 'life' experience. In Kantian language, the correct formulation should be that all experiences are parts of some consciousness, not some self-consciousness. But this clearly is not his view.

Kant is led to suppose self-consciousness is a condition for experience partly because of his tacit, and rather Cartesian, emphasis on the first person singular case. It is especially apparent in the later discussion of the 'I think [...]' and at (A113), his canonical formulation is the first person singular claim that all my experiences are mine. If we give this a third person rendering: all her or his experiences are her or his, or it's then there is no implicit reference to self-consciousness. But the use of the token reflexive 'I' means that the true utterance of 'all my experiences are mine' does at least presuppose a capacity for self-reference, even if not self-consciousness. None of this is to deny that Kant has independent arguments for the existence of the TUA.



It is a hypothesis about how he might be misled into thinking the grounds 'X experiences' provides for 'X is capable of self-consciousness' are stronger than they are.

'Totality of self consciousness' (A113) is yet a further amendment to the relation between TUA and the TUC. It is a generic name for both in their mutual dependence. He means that unified consciousness which has a disposition to think its own self-identity. Both these notions are included in the claim that 'as self-consciousness is a transcendental representation, numerical identity is inseparable from it (A 113).

Two points about 'representation': This is a case where it is correct to translate *Vorstellung* as 'representation' and not 'presentation', because clearly if the TUA could be presented it would be empirical. If on the other hand we deny this, and say I am presented with myself in self-consciousness, then we force Kant to subscribe to a view manifestly inconsistent with his Humean conclusion that the self is not available to introspection. Secondly, 'representation' is a kind of thinking in this case and not a kind of experiencing. It is the thought of one's own self-identity over time.

The claim that numerical identity is inseparable from self-consciousness is ambiguous. One interpretation can be dealt with straight away. This is: That the axiom of identity is true is a condition for there being self-consciousness. This is right but only in the modal sense that the truth of  $x (x=x)$  is a necessary condition for the existence of anything whatsoever. But if we read 'numerically identical' as something like, 'same one at  $t_2$  as at  $t_1$ ' then we need to decide what 'inseparable' means here. In one sense the claim is clearly separable. It is possible to produce many true statements of the format 'A at  $t_1$  is (numerically identical with) A at  $t_2$ ' without any need to invoke the concept of self-consciousness. So, it is clear that in that sense, the doctrines are separable. That only leaves the possibility that self-consciousness requires consciousness of numerical identity over time. This is feasible because if A and B are in some sense inseparable, but we know that A is separable from B, then B must be inseparable from A. How can this be? He is using 'inseparable' as a non-reciprocal relation, or a one-way relation. If A is separable from B but B is not separable from A then if A exists then B may or may not exist but if B exists then A exists. It is thus unfortunate that Kant says 'numerical identity is inseparable from it (self-consciousness)' because what he means is self-consciousness is inseparable from numerical identity.

This is the only remotely plausible interpretation of Kant's intention here. But adopting it leads to difficulties and possibly inconsistency. To begin with, the TUA is the condition of all other conditions of experience. It is at variance with this claim that my continued self-identity over time is presupposed by the TUA. Secondly, the TUA is supposedly constitutive of the TUC, the unity of my consciousness, and this in turn is a condition of my continued existence over time. So an order of priorities has to be decided: Either the TUA makes my numerical identity possible, or my numerical identity makes the TUA possible. A third possibility is that the

dependence is in this case reciprocal, but that option, or the second would require Kant's giving up the earlier assumption that the TUA is the ground of all other psychological structures.

There are arguments which could be mounted in defence of each of these options. For example, if the TUA includes my disposition to think my numerical identity, then arguably this is only possible on two conditions: firstly, I have to exist in order to think (a Cartesian assumption) and my self-identity is a modal condition of my existence; secondly, I have to be self-identical over time to be (correctly at least) thought as such. These considerations suggest Kant should adopt the first option and make the TUA's possibility dependent on my self-identity. One objection to this doctrine though is that it rules out *a priori* the possibility of a punctual or instantaneous self-consciousness. Also, in principle, a being could be self-conscious at some time and at some later time, where there further was no intervening time when such a being was not self-conscious. This would not make Kant's numerical identity condition redundant though, because it is a condition of this continuous consciousness being correctly called 'self consciousness' that it is what it is a consciousness of at t1.

The middle interpretation, that the TUA is a condition for my continued self-identity over time seems only remotely plausible on one construal. This is that it makes possible the use of 'my' or indeed, the first person pronoun 'I'. Other than this, the TUA cannot be what my continued self-identity consists in because it is the (possibility of) consciousness of that identity. It is a principle, part of the grammar of 'conscious of', that if A is conscious of B then neither A nor B can be identical with the consciousness that relates them. (even if, as allegedly in self-consciousness, A and B are not numerically distinct).

So, it is the possibility of a unity of consciousness that can be referred to in the first person which is facilitated by the TUA. Its role in making personal identity possible is to allow us to speak of personal identity. Some other account is needed of what entitles us to speak truly of personal identity.

The final possibility, that the dependence between TUA and 'numerical identity' is two-way should now be clear. The self-identity of that which I am is a condition for the TUA. The personality of that which persists over time is bestowed by the TUA: This is the most sympathetic way of reading Kant here even though it does require weakening the claim that the TUA is the condition of the possibility of all other psychological structures.

Kant says not only that numerical identity is 'inseparable from self-consciousness' but that it (self identity) is a 'a priori certain' (A 113). There are at least three ways of taking this.

Most straightforwardly, but most trivially, it is *a priori* that  $x (x=x)$ . More contentiously, but more interestingly it is *a priori* that I am self-identical over time. This could, arguably be inferred from the minimal premise 'I exist' without the need

to make any empirical observations. For example it could be maintained that 'I' could be given no sense in the absence of some ground for someone's persistence over time. But there could perhaps be punctual selves or intermittent selves. Even if there were intermittent selves these could be thinkable as discrete episodes constituting one and the same self. This is awkward, but not utterly implausible, rather as someone could attach sense to this: 'I continued the same dream last night that I started the previous night'.

Finally there is a more obscure interpretation. Straight after the claim that self-identity is *a priori* certain, Kant says 'for nothing can come to our knowledge save in terms of this original apperception'. (A 113) 'For' here suggests this sentence is intended as a reason for accepting that self identity is *a priori* certain. I think it can only function as such on a new interpretation of '*a priori*'. This is to be roughly equivalent to the sense of '*a priori*' in Kant's talk of '*a priori* categories'. Obviously the categories are not *a priori* in just the sense in which judgements or propositions are *a priori* because categories are not truth value bearers and only truth-value bearers can be the subject of the complex predicate 'knowable to be true or false independently of (sense) experience'. The categories are *a priori* in the sense of not being abstractable from sense experience on any Lockean account, yet imposed psychologically on the contents of experience in rendering it intelligible. Now, 'this original apperception' is *a priori* in this sense. The TUA is not an empirical faculty, neither in its exercise, nor in its origin. But like the categories it is a condition for experience. These three points taken together are sufficient for its being *a priori* in the new sense.

On the last interpretation then, my numerical identity is *a priori* certain because in a sense just so long as I have experiences, that presentations are something 'to me' as Kant puts it, so my numerical identity is guaranteed. The assumption is that there are no un-owned experiences. An experience is an episode in a self-conscious mind, and this can be known *a priori*, given just: at least one experience exists. So when Kant says 'appearances are subject to *a priori* conditions' (A113) he is not just referring to the categories, but to the TUA and the TUC, including my numerical identity over time.

Kant's conclusion is worth quoting, because it involves him in an inversion of what is really the case:

'All appearances stand in thoroughgoing connection according to necessary laws, and therefore in a transcendental affinity, of which the empirical is a mere consequence.'  
(A 113-114)

I call this an 'inversion' because it makes the empirical a consequence of the necessary and transcendental. Now, in principle there may be instances of this order of priorities obtaining. We have mentioned that logical axioms are conditions for

anything's existing. Also, an idealist argument could be mounted to the effect that a transcendental subject of consciousness is a necessary condition of any object of experience. So, I should not wish to stipulate a priori that the empirical cannot in principle be a 'mere consequent' of the necessary or the transcendental. In this particular case though Kant needs standing on his head or setting on his feet.

If there is a condition to be singled out as necessary for experience then it is the soul. But *pace* Kant the soul is metaphysical because transcendental. Unless this empirical condition obtained: my soul exists, statements of the forms 'All my experiences are mine' would not be true. This is because the indexicals 'my' and 'mine' require referents. So, although 'All my experiences are mine' is a necessary truth, indeed it is analytic, it is only true on condition it may be formulated, and the conditions for its formulation are empirical. In this sense the necessary is a consequence of the empirical.

Indeed, if the soul is the transcendental subject then in a clear further sense the transcendental is a consequence of the empirical. Souls are empirical objects, but my soul, to me, is in addition a contingently transcendental object.

Kant says (A114) that the reader will find his order or priority - transcendental over empirical 'strange and absurd'. But we should not find it so surprising, as he says, if we consider that 'nature is not a thing in itself but is merely an aggregate of appearances, so many [re]presentations of the mind' (A 114). I think the relation between presentations in the mind, and empirical processes is not best viewed as causal or conditional, this raised the question of priorities, but as ontologically ultimately not distinct. Then we can say this relation is identity. In fact this is quite consistent with Kant's position here. He says nature is 'mere appearance' and 'so many presentations in the mind'. I agree with this just so long as he concedes that the appearances and the presentations in the mind are also nature; that is, empirical objects. The use of 'merely' produces an idealist construal of the identity theory, it suggests two incompatible positions: firstly; A is B, and secondly B does not really exist. Suppose we do not read 'merely' this way and say 'B is nothing over and above A'. If 'is' has any force here then it follows also that 'A is nothing over and above B'. Also, 'is identical with' is a reciprocal relation. If A is identical with B then B is identical with A. Otherwise, 'is' is a mistake and should be replaced by 'is a property of' or some similarly weaker expression.

I conclude again that Kant has not exhausted all the empirical possibilities in his search for conditions of experience.

My evidence that a version of the identity theory is consistent with Kant's view of the empirical - transcendental relation partly rests on his remarks at (A 114). There he isolates 'three subjective sources of knowledge': sense, imagination and apperception. These are subjective because they are psychological faculties of the experiencer, also they are transcendental as *a priori* conditions for experience. But then Kant, crucially, says this: 'Each of these can be viewed as empirical, namely in

its application to given appearances'. (A113) In other words, these three faculties can each be understood under either a transcendental or an empirical description. There is no ontological distinction here. The criteria for choosing between descriptions are epistemological. Each faculty is individuated by its function and each of these has both a transcendental and an empirical function. This possibility of redescription using 'transcendental' or 'empirical' is important for showing that transcendental idealism and materialism are mutually consistent. Kant's considered view is though; that a transcendental description is possible of one these three categories is a necessary condition of any empirical description being true of it. He thinks this because of his assumption that the conditions for experience cannot themselves be either experiences or experienced. But if he leaves room for contingent transcendental conditions, which could in principle be experienced, then there is no residual reason for allocating priority to 'transcendental' over 'empirical' in the description of conditions for experience.

Although empirical apperception is a sort of self-consciousness, it is not numerically distinct from what is known by the name as the 'transcendental unity of apperception'. The latter is the thought of one's self identity, and the possibility of this thought makes possible the unity of consciousness over time. Clearly, the neo-Leibnizian term 'apperception' is intended to subsume a variety of type of self-awareness, ranging from the purely formal possibility of self-reference in the TUA, to the more discursive empirical self-consciousness which is a person's alleged acquaintance with their own mental states. There is no need to think of these as the exercise of distinct faculties though. Indeed, there are strong reasons for reading Kant as saying they are the non-empirical and empirical exercise of one and the same capacity for self-awareness. This rests partly on his view that apperception can be understood either under an empirical or under a transcendental description. But, perhaps more significantly, he speaks not only of the TUA as a condition for experience but of apperception as a condition of experience. At A114 for example there is no mention of transcendental unity, just of apperception. This is a strong ground for identifying empirical apperception with apperception in the TUA. If we deny this then we force Kant into the view that empirical apperception qua empirical is a condition for experience. This seems manifestly false. Although something like empirical apperception is arguably a condition for self-experience, indeed on at least one account that is analytic, it by no means follows that empirical apperception is a condition for all experience. There are no doubt many, perhaps the majority-of-moments when a being perceives an object but is not thereby aware of perceiving the object. I see little textual evidence that Kant subscribed to a perennially occurrent or persistent view of self-awareness, nor indeed that he saw any need to postulate such a phenomenon. On the contrary although he does not use the term, his theory of self-consciousness is despositional.

If we read Kant this way we can say that empirical apperception is exercised in the awareness of one's own mental states and that this same faculty for reflection is capable of more formal abstract self-reflection also: the consciousness of one's self-identity over time. The TUA then becomes the possibility of the second sort of reflection. But the TUA, empirical apperception, and in the last resort experience are each explained by reference to one faculty or capacity called 'apperception'.

One further distinction is necessary. At (A116) Kant speaks of pure apperception, and the question arises of whether he is mentioning anything not exhausted by either empirical apperception or the transcendental unity of apperception. He says all perceptions have an a priori ground, and in particular empirical consciousness is grounded in 'pure apperception'. (A 116) Kant gives an explanation of pure apperception: 'that is [...] the thoroughgoing identity of the self in all possible (re) presentations'. This seems a rather different claim from either: The TUA is a condition for experience, or: Apperception is employed in empirical consciousness to facilitate the reproduction and recognition of experiences. He is saying; that I am the persistent subject that endures through the course of my experiences is a condition of my having them. This is not just a reaffirmation of the need for the TUA: the TUA was the possibility of the consciousness of one's self-identity. Pure apperception is that self-identity itself.

So the distinction between Pure Apperception (PA) and the TUA is reasonably well made out.

Less well made out, at least on the face of it, is the distinction between PA and the TUC. The TUC was after all the unity of consciousness made possible by the TUA which in turn was itself a condition for experience. Kant has to show that there is a new role for pure apperception which has not already been exhausted by the TUC. I think it is not desirable to read Kant as advocating in PA a distinct psychological reality from the TUC. On the other hand he is drawing our attention to a new feature of what is presupposed by experience, or redescribing familiar facts with a change of emphasis. He is pointing to the identity of the self in all its intuitions. This is a formal point about my experiences: that they are mine. Hence he calls it 'pure', meaning 'non-empirical', 'apperception'.

'All my experiences are mine' is *a priori* and analytic. The transcendental unity of consciousness is supposed to show how this formal condition is realised in our psychology. Although I have just called a Kantian principle 'analytic' Kant thinks it is a necessary truth with an explanatory role in showing how experience is possible. Formally, all my experiences are mine, but materially or metaphysically every experience I have is an episode in one and the same unified consciousness that the TUA enables to be called 'I' or 'mine'. Pure apperception is closely related to the TUA even though it is not it. It is that numerical identity over time which the TUA is the possibility of my consciousness of.

Hence Kant explicitly says PA is the thoroughgoing identity of the self throughout experiences. This seems a much more plausible condition for experience than the TUA. It is arguably a real condition of there being any experience whatsoever, not just self-conscious experience. This though rests on the assumption that there cannot be experience without an experiencer, subject. Although this assumption is deeply rooted in thought and grammar that does not make it true.

[we can only refer to the various perceptions, all of which, from an input of intuitions, to the experience of objects. If anything does explain this transformation it is the existence of the soul. Indeed, it is rather a condition of there existing a disposition to think 'I think [...]' that there should be something to think about, some propositional content of the thought 'I think [...]'.

## TUA 5

Another, complementary, way of understanding the TUC/PA relation is this. That the TUC should not obtain is one way, just one way, in which PA would break down. In that important sense the TUC is what my self-identity amounts to: it is the particular way in which the formal condition of experience is realised. It is, so to speak, the cash value of the formal remarks.

This mutual dependence between the TUC and PA is to be taken seriously. My self identity over time is, is constituted by, the unity of consciousness, and the unity of consciousness is my synthesising of intuition, or to put it less misleadingly, is nothing over and above a certain synthesising of intuitions. This amounts to one and the same phenomenon being describable in two ways: by the use of a subjective vocabulary or an objective vocabulary.

I shall now try to substantiate this interpretation by analysing Kant's text at (A116-117). He says 'all perceptions are grounded a priori in pure intuition' and explains this partly by the clause 'that is, in the thoroughgoing identity of the self in all intuitions'. (A116) Part of the rest of what he means is that all perceptions are necessarily temporal, a doctrine he assumes established in the Transcendental Aesthetic. By 'the identity of the self' here he means precisely the TUC. But he says 'empirical consciousness' is in pure apperception' (A116). He means that one's perceptions are what make up the unity of consciousness.

Consciousness, and its unity are nothing over and above (ontologically) a set of perceptions. Thus perceptions may be described subjectively, as had by me, as items in that self-same enduring consciousness which is mine; or objectively, as intentionally directed towards objects, or as having intuitions as their content.

This way of reading Kant is borne out by this passage: 'Intuitions are nothing to us, and do not in the least concern us if they cannot be taken up into consciousness'. (A116) He means that objectivity and subjectivity are mutually dependent, so that the conditions for experience of objects ('something presented') are exactly the same here

as the conditions for experience or knowledge: *viz* the unity of experiences in one and the same consciousness.

The identity of this consciousness over time is therefore a condition for the perception of objects. He has not abandoned his further view that consciousness of this self-identity, or the unity of consciousness, is an additional condition for experience. He says:

'We are conscious *a priori* of the complete identity of the self in respect of all (re)presentations which can ever belong to our knowledge, as being a necessary condition of the possibility of all (re)presentations.' (A116)

It must be emphasised that consciousness of the identity of the self not to be confused either with introspective acquaintance with a self, nor with a kind of perennial or enduring self-awareness. Kant intends neither of these things. It is the possibility of the thought of ones self identity that he insists upon and this capacity may be exercised intermittently. This has an important consequence for the understanding of 'transcendental' in TUC.

The unity of consciousness is not itself an item for inner experience. If it were so available it would be merely empirical (and 'accidental') but Kant says the unity of consciousness (in this context) is 'transcendental'. Indeed, he refers at A116 to the 'transcendental principle of the unity of all that is manifold in our representations'. This is yet additional support for the view that the unity of consciousness is not anything distinct from the unity of representations. In fact, I think we could call the manifold 'the unity of (re)presentations' here. As unity of consciousness it is described subjectively, as manifold it is described objectively.

Kant is essentially a philosophical monist despite the plurality of psychological and formal structures he distinguishes (and despite his use of the plural form noumena). I call his philosophy of mind 'materialism' even though what is essential to it, the transcendental ground, is described either mentally or physically and either subjectively or objectively, but is intrinsically neither.

The only realism Kant admits is empirical realism. Within empirical realism, unless physical descriptions hold psychological descriptions cannot hold. This is ensured by the categories and the forms of intuition.

Kant not only speaks of the unity of consciousness as 'transcendental' but also claims 'this unity of the manifold in one subject is synthetic' (A116), and 'this synthetic unity presupposes or includes a synthesis'. The synthesis it includes, or partly is, is the synthesising activity of subsuming intuitions under concepts which produces experience of objects. If we are to identify the self, or that unity of consciousness which I am, with anything at all in these passages it is with synthesising activity. The transcendental unity of apperception is a condition of this synthesis. This is because it is constitutive of the unity of consciousness. At (A118)



he says the necessary unity of synthesis is prior to apperception, but this means empirical apperception, not the TUA. There is a clear reason why, on Kantian terms, this should be so. Empirical apperception - my awareness of my own mental states would seem to presuppose a unified self as both the subject and the object of that awareness. This point is quite consistent with his view that there exists also a reciprocal dependence of the unity of consciousness, and thus of synthesis, on the TUA.

There is another sense in which 'the synthesis of the manifold in imagination' is 'transcendental'. (A118) We are not conscious of its operations. We know that on Kant's account intuitions are subsumed under concepts and categories, but this process is not introspectively available to us. This synthesis is therefore not (even weakly) empirical but transcendental. It is also *a priori* in the sense that it can be known to operate without our having to make observations (per impossible) of its operations. Similarly it is 'a priori necessary in relation to the original unity of apperception' (A118) because it partly constitutes that unity. It is part of what that unity is.

There is then a very close link between original apperception and the categories. We should suspect this because synthesis is partly the applying of categories, and synthesising activity is what the unity of consciousness amounts to ontologically. Kant spells out the relation in this remark:

'The unity of apperception in relation to the synthesis of imagination is the understanding.' (A119) (Kant's italics)

The understanding is the faculty which applies categories correctly not dialectically, the synthesis of imagination is the subsuming of intuitions under categories, and the unity of apperception is the self-aware consciousness with which the understanding is identical. Put another way, the unity of my consciousness is partly the twelve categories. This reinforces the claim that the unity of consciousness is a condition for experience. If it variously 'is', 'includes' or 'presupposes' the categories, then it follows that it is a condition of experience, because it has been argued independently by Kant that the categories are themselves conditions for experience.

Similarly for 'the understanding': Kant says, 'All appearances, as data, for a possible experience, are subject to this understanding'. (A119) In other words, the categories must be applicable to them for them to count as experienced at all. This is the force of 'appearances have a necessary relation to the understanding'. (A119)

Kant says with reference to the unity of apperception 'this same unity with reference to the transcendental synthesis of the imagination (is) the pure understanding'. (A119) Now, this makes it clear that Kant is not introducing two sets of faculties, one psychological and one transcendental, but that one and the same set may be understood under either description. In other words the pure understanding does not

exist in ontological addition to the understanding, nor is transcendental synthesis numerically distinct from empirical synthesis. On the contrary, either can be understood either as a condition for experience (transcendentally) or as a mental structure at work in producing experience (psychologically). This again, I think, emphasises the monism of Kant's approach to the mental.

I shall now try to go into a little more detail about this monism as a synthesis of subjective and objective. 'Subjective' and 'objective' are not well-defined terms in Kant's philosophy. *Prima facie*, for example at (A121-2), that which is subjective pertains to that which experiences, the owner of experiences, and that which is objective pertains to that which is experienced, the intentional object or content of experience, or what experience is of. I say 'prima facie' here because for a combination of semantic, epistemological and ontological reasons the distinction is not in the last resort a primitive one for Kant. At (A 121) he explains the necessity for a reproductive faculty of imagination to 'connect' or 'reproduce' experiences so as to be of objects. His next point is:

'But it is clear that even this apprehension of the manifold would not by itself produce an image and a connection of the impressions were it not that there exists a subjective ground which leads the mind to reinstate a preceding perception alongside the subsequent perception [...] which it has passed and so to form whole series of perceptions.' (A121)

'Mind', I take it, is here just a short-hand term for synthesising activity, and perhaps what is presupposes psychologically. The crucial expression is 'subjective ground'. 'Ground' (*Grund*) is a spatial metaphor, so we need not take it literally that the reproductive power of imagination 'rests' on some subjective entity. But if there is a ground of some process, then there is a condition of that process. This means, there is at least in principle an explanation of how that process is possible. Kant thinks there is such an explanation available, in terms of subjective rules.

The importance of rules in the use of the imagination is this. The exercise of a reproductive and connective faculty of imagination in perception is not in itself sufficient for experience of a world of enduring physical objects entering into causal interaction. There must be some constraints on what sort of presentation is to stand in relation to any other sort of representation. Additionally, there must be some constraint on what such relations can be; 'part of', 'before' or 'simultaneous with' and so on are possible candidates. The categories, the principles and the schematism deal together with the construction of our experience at this transcendental level and this sort of rule following is designed to explain how empirical judgements are possible. Rather as the schemata and principles show how the application of the categories is possible, so the rules of reproduction show how the application of empirical concepts

is possible. If this were not so then Kant would not call the subjective ground 'empirical':

'This subjective and empirical ground of reproduction according to rules is what is called the association of (re)presentations.' (A121)

So the unity of association is identical with the subjective ground and the imagination's conformity to rules. These are three ways of describing the same condition for experience.

Kant's next move is to claim that this in turn (I shall call it 'the subjective ground') stands in need of justification, in fact it requires an objective ground. Kant actually says the unity of association (the subjective ground) requires an objective ground otherwise there would be nothing to guarantee that our acquaintance with appearances would constitute knowledge. He means that without some further qualification there is nothing to distinguish imagination from perception, or, to put it another way, there is nothing to guarantee that our experiences are of objects. The objective ground will enable our experiences to be not merely states of the subject, but externalist intentional states, that is states directed towards mind-independent objects.

So, what is the objective ground? He says: 'This objective ground of all association of appearances I entitle their affinity'. (A122) It is clear that the objective ground, like its 'subjective counterpart is a capacity for rule following. It too is a possibility of following rules in reproducing experiences in their 'thoroughgoing connection'. (A122) This ground though is *a priori* [and can be apprehended prior to 'all exercise of laws of the . (A122)] Although this objective ground is a capacity for rule following, it is not one which we have the option not to exercise if we have some experiences. He says it 'constrains us to regard all appearances as data of the senses' (A122). He clearly does not mean that we have to mistake what we imagine for what we perceive but that we are automatically prevented from mistaking what we perceive for what we merely imagine. This view is perfectly consistent with his theory that the reproductive imagination is active within perception.

There are clear differences between the subjective and objective grounds. Apart from his calling one 'subjective' and the other 'objective', the first is 'empirical' (A121), the second is 'a priori' and 'antecedent' to the empirical laws of the imagination. This clearly entails the two grounds are not numerically identical. This textual evidence is quite inconsistent with any claim that the grounds are one and the same. However at (A122) Kant says this about the objective ground:

'This objective ground [...] is nowhere to be found save in the principle of the unity of apperception.' (A122)

The unity of apperception referred to here is the TUA. Empirical apperception is ruled out because the objective ground is 'prior' to the empirical, but all appearances must 'conform' to the TUA. The upshot is that neither the subjective nor the objective grounds could exist but for the TUA.

If the relation between the two is not identity then, the connection between them is nevertheless extremely close. In fact all appearances can be thought of as falling into one of two classes; those with a subjective association, or those with an objective affinity, where these two categories are mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive. That the subjective and objective grounds are numerically distinct precludes an appearance being thought under both. For such an appearance to be experienced at all requires it being thought under one, but only one of the two. This is part of what I mean when I say Kant's philosophy of mind is a monism. He tries to do justice to psychological dualisms here between subjectivity and objectivity without collapsing one into the other. The TUA makes the distinction between subjectivity and objectivity possible.

At (A122) Kant says 'synthetic unity is [...] objectively necessary'. This can be taken two ways. He could be just reiterating the point that the unity of apperception is a condition for objectivity, in the sense of 'objectivity' which stands in semantic contrast with 'subjectivity'. But there is nothing to preclude another reading in which 'objective' is used in the sense of 'what is the case'. Then we can say the TUA is 'necessary' for both subjectivity and objectivity. It is objective in a sense that subsumes the two old senses: it makes them possible. This interpretation is borne out by this passage:

'The objective unity of all empirical consciousness in one consciousness, that of empirical apperception, is thus the necessary condition of all possible perception.'  
(A123)

'All possible perception' includes, say, both inner and outer sense, but the first occurrence of 'objective' above does not denote the experience of objects. It is predicated of that which makes both inner and outer experience possible. It is a new sort of objectivity. This in turn is borne out by its making possible all appearances 'near or remote' (A123). I take it this spatial metaphor can be unpacked to mean 'subjective or objective', or 'inner or outer'. In either case, the TUA is 'objective' in a sense that is not contrasted with 'subjective'.

The reciprocal dependence of subjective and objective grounds is facilitated not only by the TUA but by the categories. At A126 Kant describes the categories as 'subjective grounds of [...] unity contained a priori in the original cognitive powers of the mind' but then says 'these subjective conditions [...] (are) at the same time objectively valid'. Although the subjective ground in the sense of the association of experiences and the objective ground in the sense of the affinity of appearances are

not numerically identical, one and the same ground or set of conditions for experience is describable using the semantically contrasting adjective subjective and objective. Here 'objective' should be read as 'pertaining to the object' or 'belonging to that which experience is of, or intentionally directed towards'. Clearly Kant can then hold this view consistently, just so long as 'pertaining to' and 'belonging to' are not prefaced by 'only' or 'just'.

There is no reason to commit Kant to the strong thesis than there are exclusively and irreducibly subjective or objective structures of experience. In fact we should expect the opposite as subjectivity and objectivity are each made possible by the TUA. There could not be a 'unity of nature' without a 'unity of consciousness' and vice versa. The existence and application of the categories is essential to each.

This synthesis of subjectivity and objectivity in the categories is consistent with Kant's critical epistemology. For example at A125 he claims: '[...] the order and regularity in the appearances, which we entitle nature, we ourselves introduce' but reciprocally; 'only by means of these fundamental concepts (the categories) can appearances belong to knowledge or even to consciousness, and so to ourselves' (A125). We should not understand the manifold of appearances or the unity of apperception as having any sort of existence logically or chronologically prior to the existence and exercise of the categories. It is not Kant's view that the categories unite or, to use a spatial metaphor, bring together the subjectivity of consciousness and the objectivity or nature. Rather this distinction between subjective and objective descriptions presupposes the prior application of the categories. In a sense terms like 'subjectivity' and 'objectivity' are abstractions from the unity of experience. I think this is the force of the following passage, which is a partial definition of 'categories':

'certain concepts which render possible the formal unity of experience and therewith all objective validity (truth) of empirical knowledge.' (A125)

The fact that the categories make possible the formal unity of experience needs to be borne in mind in distinguishing the TUA from pure apperception. We have seen that the TUA is a disposition to think one's self-identity over time. Pure apperception is, in a sense, that identity itself, or at least, what that identity consists in, how it is realised. This is why Kant says:

'The abiding and unchanging "I" (pure apperception) forms the correlate of all our (re)presentations in so far as it is possible that we should become conscious of them. All consciousness belongs as truly to an all comprehensive pure apperception.' (A123)

Kant is not saying that there must be occurrent consciousness of what 'I' denotes whenever there is experience. This would be inconsistent perhaps with his

endorsement of Humean scepticism about the self and certainly with the purely dispositional account of the TUA. It would make the TUA into a disposition that was always exercised so long as there was occurrent experience. Pure apperception, which is exactly the same as the abiding and unchanging 'I' as the above passage makes clear, just is the unity of consciousness facilitated by the categories at the same time as the unity of the manifold thought as nature. The consciousness of this unity of consciousness requires the TUA or something very much like it. Also, the existence of the unity of consciousness - pure apperception - would not be possible according to Kant unless the TUA obtained. If it were in principle impossible to form judgements of the form 'I think that p' then neither would that formal unity of consciousness called pure apperception be possible. The TUA is a formal condition of the unity of consciousness, but it is the use of the categories which materially or psychologically enables the unity of consciousness to exist. Indeed, the following could be read as suggesting that that is just what the use of the categories is: the uniting of the manifold of intuition with the unity of consciousness:

'[...] concepts which belong to the understanding are brought into play through relation of the manifold to the unity of apperception.' (A124)

But, as the argument above should have established, it is not possible for either the unity consciousness or the manifold to exist without the employment of the categories. This interpretation is substantiated by Kant's remark at A129 that the source of the categories is not 'the object' nor 'the self'. On the contrary they are the ground of that very distinction.

There is a temptation, which should be resisted, to understand the categories as merely subjective when Kant says they are an a priori and not an empirical source of the law abidingness of nature. Similarly, there is a temptation to think of them as purely objective when he insists they have only an empirical use. Instead we should think of the understanding as the condition of the possibility of both. So although it is 'the lawgiver of nature' (A126) this nature 'is only possible in the unity of apperception' (A127) where this unity is both a unity of experiences and a unity of appearances. This is what he means when he says 'the unity of apperception is thus the transcendental ground of the necessary conformity to law of all categories'. It makes possible a unity that is describable in two ways, or has both subjective and objective properties; subjectively it is a unity of experience, objectively a unity of appearance.

[the soul, and this, in a weak sense compatible with its being transcendental,]

TUA 6

TD in B Version

At first Kant seems to retract this position in the opening pages of the Transcendental Deduction in the B version. For example at (B130) he says the 'manifold of (re)presentation' is nothing more than 'the mode in which the subject is affected', and says we cannot represent to ourselves anything as combined in the object which we have not ourselves combined. It seems as though Kant is producing a subjectivist rewriting of the theory in the A version. This subjectivism is seemingly confirmed by his description of the combination of presentations as 'an act of the self-activity of the subject, it cannot be executed save by the subject itself' (B130). This though would be a misreading.

There are two complementary reasons for Kant's shift of emphasis here. Firstly, it is part of his critical epistemology to adopt a broadly Cartesian starting point. I mean by this that his model of the individual's psychology is fundamentally first person singular and not third person plural in orientation. Secondly, we have seen that one and the same set of structures, all made possible in the end by the TUA, may be described in a subjective or an objective vocabulary. Here he is deploying the subjective one. There is nothing in that to preclude the adoption of the objective one on other occasions which, as we shall see, he often does. That he has not initiated a subjectivist departure from the A version is I think confirmed by his saying there must be a 'unity which precedes a priori all concepts of combination' and this, he warns us, must not be confused with the category of unity.

Section 16 of the B version of the TD is called The Original Synthetic Unity of Apperception, and I shall take this as another name for the TUA. That it is nothing distinct from the TUA should become apparent in its analysis. Kant defines it in this famous passage:

'It must be possible for the "I think" to accompany all my (re)presentations; for otherwise something would be (re)presented in me which could not be thought at all, and that is equivalent to saying that the (re)presentation would be impossible, or at least would be nothing to me.' (B 132)

For any thought '*p*' it must be possible, if it is to be true that *p* is a possible thought of mine, that *p* could be prefaced by 'I think' to form the complex thought 'I think that *p*'. Kant's use of 'possible' here makes it clear that the TUA includes a disposition to self-consciousness. Kant is not thereby committed to the rather implausible doctrine the all my thoughts have the grammatical form 'I think that P'.

There are two Kantian reasons why the 'I think' principle is needed. The first concerns the unity of consciousness. If it were in principle impossible for any of my (putative) thoughts to be preceded by 'I think' then no sense could be attached to their being 'mine' at all. Secondly, it is a tenet of Kantian epistemology that the passive reception of intuitions is by itself insufficient for experience and knowledge. Any

such intuitions must be thought, that is, subsumed under the categories, to count as items of experience and knowledge. I have to thereby be aware or conscious of my sensory input for it to be part of my experience. He is not saying I have to be conscious of the fact that I am experiencing, while I am experiencing, in order to experience, but I must have the capacity to do precisely that in order for some experience to be mine. That capacity is a condition of the unity of consciousness which, in turn is a condition for experience.

There is an interesting equivocation in the passage quoted above about the idea of an unthought presentation. The first view is that unthought presentations are impossible, the second is that they are possible but not items of experience (they are 'nothing to me' as Kant puts it). The more plausible of the two interpretations is the first.

*Qua* presentations, presentations are presentations to someone or other, necessarily. It would therefore not make sense to speak of presentations being nothing to someone. Of course, we could give an empirical sense to this: colloquially a person is presented with something they find unintelligible, but that is not what Kant means. He entertains, on the second view, the possibility of there existing presentations which are not items of experience, but it is more consistent with the rest of his epistemology to think of this as an absolute or logical impossibility.

Certainly Kant's claim that 'that (re)presentation which can be given prior to all thought is entitled intuition' (B132) should not be taken to imply that unthought intuitions are possible items of experience. We should not give 'prior to' any chronological reading. Rather, he is claiming that intuitions are a condition of thought. He is emphasising one side of the thought/intuition reciprocal dependence. We should understand 'prior to' as implying both that intuitions are not thoughts and that intuitions supply the 'occasion' of thoughts. Reception is a necessary condition of thinking, but 'prior to' does not imply that intuitions could be either known or experienced without thought.

Finally the equivocation between 'impossible' and 'nothing to' can be made intelligible in terms of the idea of a soul transformation I introduced earlier.

To do this we have to regard the passively received input of intuitions in a rather unKantian way: as purely physiological. These intuitions, not on Kant's view but on my re-writing, are light waves, sound waves etc, but not colours or sounds phenomenologically described. For Kant the transition from intuition to object of experience is effected by thought. On my view the transition from intuition *qua* physiologically described process to event phenomenologically described is effected by the soul. Thus we are faced with a similar dilemma to Kant. There could in principle be a world physiologically identical to our own in which, for example photons bombarded the rods and cones of the retina, but in which no phenomenological colours existed. Should we then say colours are 'impossible' or just 'nothing to' the subject (here, again, physiologically described)?



It is, I think a matter of conceptual stipulation rather than factual discovery. If colours are necessarily phenomenological, and if intuitions are necessarily objects of experience then we should use the 'impossible' formulation. If some sense can be attached to 'colour only describable in the vocabulary of physics' or 'intuition that is not experienced' then we should adopt the 'nothing to' idiom.

Substituting 'physiological input' for 'intuitions' retains two other features of Kant's account. If it is true that there are no unthought (Kantian) intuitions, no uninterpreted intuitions, no intuitions passively sensed in their bare particularity, then this is exactly true also of physiological processes such as light and sound waves. Light waves for example have to contact the retina, an electrical message pass along the optic nerve, and patterns of synaptic firing occur in the soul in order for colour to be perceived. The soul is active (a spontaneity) but the senses passive (a receptivity) in the production of (phenomenological) colour.

In interpreting the passages at (B132) it is important to retain the distinction between the TUA and PA, otherwise the dispositional nature of the TUA will be lost sight of. Kant says:

'All the manifold of intuition has [...] a necessary relation to the 'I think' in the same subject in which this manifold is found.' (B 132)

There is a psychological and a logical way of reading this. Logically, 'I think my thoughts' is analytic. Psychologically we need to read 'necessary' in roughly the sense of 'necessary for' or 'necessary condition for'. Then we can say that the thought of a unitary subject, the very same unitary subject who is receiver of the manifold, is a necessary condition for any intuition being an item of experience.

Both interpretations are complementary, and Kant would not wish perhaps to make such a sharp difference between them as I have done. Some passages suggest that in his understanding of 'necessary', 'could not be otherwise' collapses into 'could not conceivably be otherwise for us self-conscious subjects'.

In the above passage, the expression 'I think' is a direct reference to PA, and only an indirect reference to the TUA. This is because it is true of every thought I have that I think it, but it is only true of some that I have the meta-thought 'I think that P'. This distinction needs insisting upon. If I am thinking, or for Kant in general if I am experiencing then 'I think' is true of me but its being true of me does not entail its being explicitly formulated in a meta-act of psychological self-judgement.

That last requirement is what the TUA consists in: the possibility of at least the intermittent thought of the identity of one's consciousness. I call the 'I think' above an indirect reference to the TUA just because the TUA makes the PA possible.

There is perhaps an additional justification. There are certainly not two 'I thinks', just two different sorts of exercise of one and the same capacity. We could call one 'conscious' and the other 'self-conscious'. But clearly, from the fact that I am thinking

it does not follow that I am thinking that I am thinking, or conscious that I am thinking. One Kant's view though, it must be possible to be thus self-conscious, otherwise no sense could be attached to a unitary I which thinks. Indeed, there would be no guarantee of a unity of consciousness at all.

Kant calls the 'I think' a 'spontaneity' (B132) consistently with his view that thought is active but sensibility passive. His remarks at B132 makes it quite clear that he is not using the 'I think' to refer directly to the TUA at this point but to the PA. He says: about the 'I think':

'I call it pure apperception to distinguish it from empirical apperception or again original apperception.' (B 132)

where pure apperception (PA) 'is that self-consciousness which while generating the representation 'I think' [...] cannot itself be accompanied by any further representation'. (B 123)

So PA generates the 'I think' of the TUA, but it is itself a self-consciousness. Kant's use of 'generates' here should not lead us to suppose he has abandoned his view that the TUA makes the PA possible. Indeed, he says 'The unity of his apperception I likewise entitle the transcendental unity of self-consciousness' (B132). The subject of 'this apperception' is 'pure apperception' so it looks at this point and though Kant is collapsing the PA into the TUA after all. This though is not the most consistent reading to give the text. He is identifying the unity of PA with the TUA. This is a rather loose way of saying that the unity of PA is produced by the TUA. Kant wishes to emphasize the reciprocal dependence of the TUA and PA, and indeed say they are logico-psychological structures of one subject, but in doing this he is tempted to say PA and the TUA are identical. This is a lapse which he should avoid. The reason for this is that even if it is true that A is a necessary and a sufficient condition for B, and B is a necessary and a sufficient condition for A, it does not logically follow that A and B are numerically identical, though it may well follow that A and B can be coherently thought of as two aspects of one whole. It is the latter relation that Kant needs for the TUA and PA, not the assimilation of one faculty to the other.

Two clear statements at (B132) show Kant's considered view that the TUA and PA are not the identical structure. He says he distinguishes 'pure apperception' from 'original apperception', which I take to be the TUA. Secondly, although the I think has a necessary relation to all my intuitions, he says the I think is a representation which must be capable of accompanying all other representations (B132). If X is capable of accompanying Y it does not follow that it must always do so. If it can sometimes not do so then X is not Y.

While the I think of PA is an occurrent and perpetual condition of experience, the I think of TUA is a dispositional condition of experience which is intermittent in

its exercise. It does not follow from this that in any other sense there are two sorts of 'I think'. On the contrary, the unitary subject thinks his/her thoughts, but amongst these is capable of one sort of thought in particular: self-conscious thought of the sort 'I think that P'. It is because of this capacity (the TUA) that Kant calls PA a 'self-consciousness' at B132, not because he thinks that persons are occurrently self-conscious at all times that they are occurrently conscious. A self-conscious being for Kant is a being with a capacity for self-consciousness.

There is another reason why PA is a kind of self-consciousness. Only self-conscious beings can use the language of the self: first person grammatical forms. Here Kant makes the point about the first person plural personal pronoun:

'[...] the manifold (re)presentations which are given in an intuition would not be one and all my (re)presentations, if they did not belong to one self-consciousness.'  
(B132) (My italics).

There is a question which Kant does not address here which is whether certain language forms make self-consciousness possible, rather than, as he assumes, the reverse. We still want to know what 'This is a hand' fails to say which 'this is my hand' does say. It could be that the possibility of self-reference is a condition of self-perception. I mean perception of oneself qua the very same person who perceives. It is at least an open possibility that language enables that person who perceives to make reference to him or herself qua perceiver. Otherwise there is a problem about how consciousness of oneself, of that very person who one is, ever becomes self-consciousness: consciousness of oneself *qua* that very same person who is conscious. Arguably the difference is one of description. A person may think of themselves under the description 'this person', or 'this person who I am' where the latter entails, 'this person who is thinking/perceiving etc this person'. If something like this is right then self-consciousness depends on descriptions, or the possibility of descriptions, and so self-consciousness depends in an obvious sense on language.

[n fact all 'objective' above does not denote the experience of objects. It is predicated of]

TUA 7

Given Kant's commitment to conceptual idealism, it is odd that he offers no positive account of the role of language or categories in self-consciousness. 'Self' for example is not a category. Of course the categories are misused in self-description as he points out in the Paralogisms, but even their restriction to understanding the phenomenal self does not explain the role of language in producing self-consciousness. The nearest Kant approaches to such an account is in the analysis of the 'I think' itself.

'I think' denotes a propositional attitude. We can locate distinct propositions within the 'that' clause which it prefaces: 'I think that P, that Q, that R etc. But we still want to know what the function of the indexical 'I' is. Kant has no explanation of this, but to some extent the 'I think' must be regarded as primitive in his explanation of self-consciousness. It is the possibility of self-reference which is a condition of a unitary consciousness. So, to that degree there is a linguistic condition of self-consciousness. As no explanation is offered of how the I think is possible (and none for Kant is needed) we cannot finally adjudicate in the priority dispute between language and self awareness. Some clarification of how the word 'my' has a use can be gleaned from this passage:

'As my (re)presentations (even if I am not conscious of them as such) they must conform to the condition under which alone they can stand together in one universal self-consciousness, because otherwise they would not all without exception belong to me.' (B132-3)

The unity of consciousness and what we might call the 'reflexivity' of consciousness are each a necessary condition for the use of 'my' in contexts like 'my experiences'. There has to be a unified single enduring consciousness in order for it to be truly called 'mine'. Its being called 'mine' by me presupposes further its awareness of itself, if only in the minimal sense of its ability to formulate judgements of the form 'I think'.

These two conditions, or something very much like them seem to be singularly necessary but not jointly sufficient for 'my' and other reflexive indexicals to have a use. There are all the conditions adduced by Wittgenstein: public criteria for self-ascriptions to have sense, a 'post' within the grammar, the possibility of correctness and incorrectness, the impossibility of utterly incommunicable meaning. These would at least have to be considered in explaining 'my'.

I think the nearest Kant comes to describing sufficient conditions for the use of the first person singular pronoun is at B132 when he says that the 'I think' must be framed in 'the same subject in which the manifold is found' (B132). So, the person who says 'I think that P' is the very same person who thinks that P, or the person who can say 'this experience is mine' is the very same person who has that experience. This captures the idea of a person referring to his/herself *qua* that person who refers, rather than just *qua* some person.

A further useful point emerges from the passage at (B132-3) quoted above. The clause within parenthesis; 'even if I am not conscious of them as such' is revealing of two main trends in Kant's thinking on the self. Firstly, it makes it absolutely clear that it is possible for my experiences to be mine without my being occurrently conscious of them as such. Secondly, their being mine results from the fact that they can (Kant's italics) be parts of one and the same self-consciousness. It is the

disposition to think self-identity over time that allows us to speak of self-consciousness at all. That in turn makes possible first person grammatical usage.

Kant's precise formulation, which includes 'as such' leaves open the logical possibility that I be conscious of my experiences but not qua mine. There is one clear sense in which this is impossible: I could not mistake my occurrent experiences for someone else. But it is conceivable on Kant's view that there should be consciousness of states of a mind by that mind without that mind having terms like 'I' and 'mine' or 'my' to formulate descriptions under which to makes such states intelligible.

This apparent possibility cannot be real if it is true that language, specifically first person grammatical forms or some analogue of them, is amongst the conditions for self-consciousness. Nevertheless, there is prima-facie a mental parallel to the case where x look's at x's body, but fails to realise it is the very same body as his, that is; of x qua observer. This possibility need not entail that x thinks it is someone else's body either. To make sense of Kant's supposition we have to imagine a being who could formulate judgements like 'there obtain occurrent mental states' on the grounds of direct acquaintance with them but who could not formulate 'these mental states are mine' or similar judgements. He has no capacity to make first person psychological ascriptions. I leave aside the issue of whether such a hypothetical being should be called 'a person'.

Because the TUA is partly a linguistic capacity, the 'I think is an expression which allows first person psychological ascription to be formulated, the safest construal of Kant's position is that self-awareness and self-reference are each necessary for each other's possibility, at least in the case of human beings. At (B132) Kant emphasises that empirical apperception is not sufficient for the unity of consciousness. This is the point of:

'[...] the empirical consciousness which accompanies different (re)presentations is itself diverse and without relation to the identity of the subject.' (B132)

The use of 'without relation to' is perhaps unfortunate because it is his considered view that all presentations, to count as such, must be presentations precisely to some unitary subject. What he is saying is that there should exist putative presentations is not in itself sufficient to prove the existence of a unitary subject. So from the fact that there exists a series of presentations, P,... P<sub>n</sub> it does not follow that these are episodes in a single mind. Also, from the fact that there exists a series of meta-mental acts, MP,... MP each of which is an act of awareness of P,... P in a one-one mapping it does not follow that either P,... P or MP,... MP are episodes in a single mind. So although it is in fact true, if they are episodes in a single mind, that the

'thoroughgoing identity of the apperception of a manifold which is given in intuition contains a synthesis of (re)presentations.' (B133)

it is not in virtue of that that we are entitled to speak of a unitary self. That is

'possible only through consciousness of that synthesis.' (B133)

For this argument to work, 'consciousness of' must mean 'direct awareness of'. If it means anything like 'consciousness that' then it fails. This is because there could be consciousness that a series of presentations  $P, \dots, P_n$  occurred without its being true that any of them were one's own.

If however in mental acts there is direct access to the occurrence of those acts, consciousness of their occurrence, then in that sense of 'consciousness of' they are 'mine', or belong to a kind of unitary subject at least in principle capable of using 'my', 'mine' etc. Kant says the relation to a unitary subject comes about in this way:

'[...] not simply through my accompanying each (re)presentation with consciousness, but only in so far as I conjoin one (re)presentation with another and am conscious of the synthesis of them.' (B133)

The relation thus established is episodic. Unless such acts of connection were possible we could not speak of a unitary consciousness at all, nor, for that matter, could we speak of an objective unity of the manifold, or a unity of nature. Kant oscillates between a strong and a weak thesis here. The strong thesis is that the identity of the self over time and the unity of consciousness at any one time are made possible by the consciousness of synthesis. The weak thesis is that the awareness of self-identity over time, and the unity of consciousness at any one time is made possible by the consciousness of synthesis.

The weak thesis, on the assumption that terms like 'self-consciousness' and 'synthesis' have a genuine psychological use, is in danger of becoming trivial: I have to be aware of my self-identity for it to be known by me.

The strong thesis though is in danger of being false, and this for a specific reason. Kant tends to invoke 'I', 'my' and 'the subject' in a way that threatens to be viciously circular. Most glaringly he says at (B133) that the identity of apperception contains a synthesis but that this is possible only through consciousness of that synthesis. Or, again, a little later he says the identity of the subject can only come about in so far as I conjoin one presentation with another. There is a severe danger here of invoking precisely what is in need of explanation: The possibility of my self-consciousness is a condition of my existence as a unitary subject. One, more coherent, formulation is this:

'Only in so far therefore as I can unite a manifold of given (re)presentations in one consciousness, is it possible for me to (re)present to myself the identity of consciousness in [ie. throughout] these representations.' (B133)

What is coherent about this is that it expresses a version of the weak thesis. The uniting of the manifold of representations makes it possible for me to represent to myself the identity of consciousness. It does not, on the weak view, constitute or create or even make possible that very identity of consciousness. This is more plausible than the strong view because Kant has already spent a great deal of time explaining than a quite distinct psychological structure has that role, viz the TUA.

Even on the weak, more coherent, account 'I' is still invoked in a mildly circular way. Kant says 'I' can unite the manifold in 'one consciousness but this one consciousness just is the "I"'. The circularity is only avoided by making this an account of my awareness of my self-identity not of my making my own self-identity possible. 'I am conscious of myself' is coherent. Unless a modal point about identity, 'I am a condition for myself' is not.

There is one strategy, which Kant is aware of, which not only makes the strong thesis internally coherent but also exhibits it as consistent with the weak thesis. This is to do with what it makes sense to say about the self. What we could call the grammar of the self imposes a constraint on the ways in which we can meaningfully talk about the cluster of issues: self-identity, self-consciousness, unity of consciousness. This comes out in the following passage:

'The thought that the (re)presentations given in intuition one and all belong to me is [...] equivalent to the thought that I unite them in one self-consciousness' (B134)

This is not just the reciprocal dependence of subjective and objective descriptions of one unity: as a unity of consciousness, or as a unity of nature, although it is partly that. It is also the point that 'I' can only take on meaning if a self-not self distinction is presupposed. The difference between 'what my self-identity consists in' and 'the possibility of my consciousness of it' tends to collapse because the one is semantically impossible without the other when thoroughly thought through. For example, the thought of my self identity as thinker presupposes the thought of it, if it is to be a topic of discourse at all.

By saying the thoughts are equivalent we should not take Kant to be implying that my self identity and my consciousness of it are actually one and the same: they are not identical. But he is implying that talk of one semantically presupposes the possibility of talk of the other.

This framework of rules governing talk about the self cannot be easily abdicated. It is the grammar within which the philosophical issues are formulated. Kant, however, has a particular account of why the two thoughts should be equivalent. This

enables us to read 'equivalent' as 'logically equivalent' but not as 'semantically equivalent'. P and Q are logically equivalent if and only if P is true if and only if Q is true. P and Q are semantically equivalent if and only if P and Q are logically equivalent and P and Q are synonymous. Kant's claim is that it is true that 'the (re)presentations given in intuition all belong to me' is true if and only if 'I unite them in one self-consciousness is true'. It does not follow that the two statements are thereby synonymous, and Kant does not think they are. In Kant's example, though, it does seem that the two statements share truth conditions. A Tarski type objection could be brought against this contention. For example, 'representation given in intuition all belong to me' is true if and only if the representations given in intuition all belong to me, and 'I unite them in one self-consciousness' is true if and only if I unite them in one self-consciousness. But Kant's view is that one and the same possibility makes both statements true, *viz* that I 'can at least so unite them'. (B 134) The meaning of the self-ascription claim, and its semantic divergence from the claim that I unite my representations is parasitic upon (made possible by) the fact that I can so unite them. The existence of that possibility is the truth condition of both propositions.

We lack clear criteria for synonymy, but that *p* and *q* share truth conditions is not in itself sufficient for their synonymy *p* and *q* may for example have different uses. There are other contrasts tow between Kant's examples. For example in the second I am depicted as active in uniting my presentations, in the first, the claim that they 'belong' to me is neutral with regard to my activity or passivity towards my presentations.

Not only are the two statements not synonymous but 'the thought that I unite [my representations] in one self-consciousness or can so unite them' (B134) is explicitly distinguished by Kant from the 'consciousness of the synthesis of the representations'. (B134) The difference here is between the actual occurrent awareness of synthesis, which he thinks is possible, and on the other hand the thought that I do in fact unite my presentation in synthesis. It is a distinction between the act of self-consciousness which reveals synthesis, and the thought that synthesis occurs.

Despite this distinction, both the consciousness of synthesis and the thought that synthesis occur 'presuppose(s) the possibility of that synthesis'. (B134) This last claim is reasonably uncontentious. If it is true that I am conscious that P then it follows that possibly *p*, just by the grammar of 'conscious that'; rather as, if it is true that I know that *p* then it follows that *p*. Although Kant can be read as drawing our attention to certain rules which govern the use of 'I', 'mine' and other egocentric indexicals, there is a point being made in the philosophy of mind also. The ontological cash value of the grammar is made explicit in this passage:



'[...] only in so far as I can grasp the manifold of the representations in one consciousness, do I call them one and all mine. For otherwise I should have as many coloured and diverse a self as I have representations of which I am conscious to myself.' (B 134)

Two preconditions of 'mine' having a use are mentioned here. The first is that I, as subject, am intellectually active. This is not spelled out but is implicit in 'I can grasp'. Whatever the complex account of what I am I am irreducibly active in synthesising presentations. This is true even if in the last resort I am ontologically 'nothing over and above' such synthesising activity. The second and more explicit point is that the unity of consciousness is a condition for 'mine's' use. If something is mine then it belongs to something or other. Some persisting particular or process must exist as the owner or possessor of what is mine. The candidate for this role here is the unity of consciousness. A series of presentations must be episodes within one and the same consciousness for them to count as my presentations.

The hypothetical alternative which Kant entertains above is not a possibility on his own account, we could not speak of a self if a series of presentations were utterly 'many coloured' and 'diverse'. By this he does not just mean presentations which differ qualitatively one from another. That they should so differ is not a sufficient condition of their not being mine. He means that unless there exist presentations which are connected one with another (united) in synthesis, and unless the possibility of the awareness of this synthesis existed, then the ontological preconditions for 'my' 'mine' having a use would not obtain. It would not just be true that 'mine' etc would not make sense, but the word could not be produced. Indeed, no determinate thought would be possible at all unless there existed a unitary thinker. This is why Kant says:

'Synthetic unity of the manifold of intuitions as generated a priori, is thus the ground of the identity of apperception itself which precedes a priori all my determinate thought.' (B 134)

'My' is italicised by Kant. If we read the passage with this emphasis he is reiterating the point that there are no un-owned thoughts. But he is also saying there could be no meaningful (determinate) thought whatsoever unless his account of the unity of consciousness were correct, and 'determinate thought' includes but is not exhausted by egocentric indexical thought.

I take it the force of '*a priori*' here is at least that if 'there exists determinate thought' is true then it is a priori that the identity of apperception obtains. It is also his view, though, that the synthetic unity of the manifold is generated a priori. This means that such unity is an a priori condition of experience, one that 'precedes' experience in the sense of by no means being metaphysically abstractable from experience, but remaining a precondition for experience.

That the unity of synthesis is *a priori* in this sense is substantiated by his remark that 'combination does not [...] lie in the objects'. (B134) This means that I cannot passively perceive objects already constituted by the 'combination' (and 'reproduction') of presentations, transcendently speaking. Rather, there being objects of experience at all for me depends upon the possibility of the unity of presentations in synthesis, and the possibility of consciousness of this process.

In the footnote to (B 134) Kant says 'this faculty of apperception is the understanding itself' (B 134 fn), where in the same paragraph 'apperception' is to be understood as 'the synthetic unity of apperception'. In interpreting this we need to take the term 'faculty' seriously. Then rather than rather misleadingly identifying the understanding with the synthetic unity of apperception we can say that synthetic unity involves the exercise of a capacity, *viz* the synthesising of presentations in combination and reproduction. It is the understanding which is at work in the exercise of that capacity. This is the best interpretation because it is consistent with what he has claimed so far about synthetic unity and the understanding, and it is borne out by this passage:

'the understanding [...] is nothing but the faculty of combining *a priori* and of bringing the manifold of given (re)presentations under the unity of apperception.'  
(B134)

Using the 'faculty' reading we can say the understanding is not exactly the same as the synthetic unity of apperception but a capacity within it. Here Kant is speaking in a special sort of psychological idiom, rather than making purely formal claims. This special idiom is, in his view, appropriate to answering the question 'How is the experience possible?'. The best way to describe this idiom is 'transcendental'. It equivocates, as we saw earlier, between the two notions of necessity: 'necessary condition of our experience' and 'could not (logically or metaphysically) be otherwise'. Kant is aware of this equivocation, as is evident from this remark:

'This principle of the necessary unity of apperception is itself [...] an identical and therefore analytic proposition. Nevertheless it reveals the necessity of a synthesis of the manifold given in intuition, without which the thoroughgoing identity of self-consciousness cannot be thought.' (B135)

'All my thoughts are mine' is analytic and necessary. Although not all necessary truths are analytic on Kant's view, those 'thought through identity' are. But Kant does not think the proposition is vacuous. Although analytic it draws our attention to a necessary fact about our experience. Indeed, its very formulation is conditional upon this fact obtaining: synthesis of the manifold and the possibility of consciousness of

that synthesis must be possible. This is what he means by saying the identity of consciousness could not otherwise be thought.

It is clear from this that Kant is prepared to blur the distinction, between purely formal and transcendental truths. The analytic statement 'I think my thoughts' is possible because it is true. Put another way, it can be formulated just on condition it is true, and its truth conditions are not utterly internal to it, but consist in certain transcendental facts about us as persons (self-conscious beings).

Kant tries to clarify the distinction between the intellectual and the experiential components of self-consciousness. He says that 'through the "I" as simple representation, nothing manifold is given' (B135). He is not implying by 'simple representation' that there is introspective awareness of a simple self by denying that one experiences oneself as a 'manifold'. He is denying experience of a self tout court. He allows that I may be aware of my mental states, and that I may be aware that I am a unitary consciousness. What is not possible for me is intuition of a single persistent item within experience denoted by 'I'.

He says 'intuition' is 'distinct from' the 'I' (B135), meaning at least two things. Firstly, he is distinguishing me from my perceptions. Although perceiver and perceived are ultimately made possible by a single set of transcendental conditions, notably the TUA, Kant wishes at an ordinary language level to preserve the distinctions between perceiver, perception and perceived. Then we can read 'I and intuitions are distinct' as 'the perceiver is not the perception'. Secondly, he can be read as reiterating the point that I am not an item amongst my own intuitions, but that which has them.

Despite his claim for ontological conditions of self-identity and psychological self-ascriptions, it remains true that there exist grammatical conditions for self-consciousness. As well as the first person singular form of the 'I think', there is the claim made in this passage:

'I am conscious of the self as identical in respect of the manifold of (re)presentations that are given to me in a intuition, because I call them one and all my (re)presentations, and so apprehend them as constituting one intuition.' (B135)

That 'my' has a rule governed use is a necessary condition of my ability to think my self-identity over time. This, or something very much like it, must be right if we accept Kant's thesis that my self-identity over time cannot be an object of intuition. If I am not continually (or even intermittently) aware of myself as an enduring mental particular, yet can and do think of myself as a persisting psychological self, then a non-empirical explanation of how such thought is possible is necessary. He has already provided an account of the ontological conditions of this thought's possibility, but he is right in thinking there exist also grammatical ones. Otherwise, there would not obtain the distinction between thinking of that person who in fact

one is, and on the other hand thinking of oneself qua that person who one is. It is logically possible that there should be beings who were capable of forming sentences like 'This mind is in state 0', and even 'This is the very same mind in state 0 that was in state at an earlier time'. Even so, some additional thought would be had, some additional information added, if such a creature were also capable of formulating 'I am this mind' or 'This mind is mine'.

What this extra token reflexivity consists in, I think, is the ability to think that the very same mind that formulates this judgement, is the mind that this judgement is about. Kant does not explain the force of 'my' in his presentation of the grammatical condition but the above account is at least consistent with what he says.

Kant claims that 'This amounts to saying that I am conscious to myself a priori of a necessary synthesis of representations' (B134) and adds that all (re)presentations must 'stand under this condition if they are to be given to me'. The 'this amounts to' remark is intended to mark the mutual dependency between the ontological and the grammatical conditions for my consciousness of my self-identity. The consciousness of synthesis is a priori quite straightforwardly because the thought that I am self-identical over time and that I synthesise my experiences as a condition of this could not be known to be true through empirical observations. His saying the thought is a priori is consistent with my non-empirical interpretation above.

second.

[Despite these defects in its formulation the]

TUA 8

At B137 Kant spells out more precisely the sense in which combination within the original synthetic unity of apperception is a necessary condition for experience.

Without such combination presentations which are putatively mine 'would not have in common the act of apperception 'I think'. (B137) Unless all my experiences were parts of, or episodes in, one and the same experience they could not be truly called 'mine'. As he puts it 'they could not be apprehended together in one self-consciousness'. (B137) Part of the force of this is that we could not use 'self-consciousness' unless a unity of consciousness obtained. Further, the putative act of empirical apperception whereby I am aware of my own mental states would not be an epistemological possibility either. Indeed, not only are the grammatical and the epistemological possibilities facilitated by original combination, but, arguably, they are mutual conditions of each other's possibility also. Unless I could use 'my' or an analogous first person indexical, I could not be self-conscious. If I could not be self-conscious I could have no use for 'I', 'my' and 'mine'.

The unity of consciousness is not only a necessary condition for intuition, but of understanding. This is because the original unity is a synthesis of subjective and object aspects of experience (as argued above). As Kant puts it:

'all unification or representations demands unity of consciousness in the synthesis of them. Consequently, it is the unity of consciousness that alone constitutes the relation of (re)presentations to an object.' (B137)

To see why this amounts to the unity of consciousness being a condition for the understanding, we need to note that the categories only have an empirical use, and that the understanding is the 'faculty of knowledge'. (B137) Both empirical use, and 'knowledge' require an objective employment: an application to objects. This is why he says 'upon it ('unity of consciousness') rests the very possibility of the understanding'. (B137)

It would be wrong to assume that Kant was insisting upon utterly or irreducibly subjective conditions of experience of the physical world. Rather the very distinction between subjectivity and objectivity is made possible by the unity of consciousness. This is why he says 'the unity of this act (of synthesis) is at the same time the unity of consciousness' (B137).

In fact Kant uses the word 'objective' to describe the unity of consciousness (at B138 for example). This is a new sense of 'objective', not the same sense in which physical objects are 'objective' but one which makes the subjective - objective distinction possible.

One other way of taking 'objective' here is possible. He says:

'The synthetic unity of consciousness is [...] an objective condition of all knowledge. It is not merely a condition that I myself require in knowing an object but is a condition under which every intuition must stand in order to become an object for me.' (B 138)

On one reading 'objective' is used to point out that the unity of consciousness makes possible an objective world in the sense of one that is other, or not part of my psyche. On that reading 'not pertaining to my mental state, but a possible object of experience for me' is roughly what 'objective' means. Although consistent with the first reading it is not exactly the same as it because this second sense of 'objective' stands in semantic contrast with 'subjective'. Both theses are in Kant's text but the former is more profound. The second can be construed as either a part of it or as a consequence of it.

The insight upon which the necessity of the unity of consciousness rests, is a grammatical one. This is that there can be no use for first person ascriptions unless there is a use for third (or perhaps second) person ascriptions. But on Kant's view, the epistemological distinction between what I am psychologically and what is 'external' to me is possible only through synthesis within the original unity of consciousness.

Kant says that the proposition that 'in the absence of synthesis the manifold would not be united in one consciousness' (B138) is analytic, and 'says not more than':

'all my representation in any given intuition must be subject to that condition under which alone I can ascribe them to the identical self as my representations.' (B138)

so the second formulation must be analytic too: if P is analytic and P says no more than Q then Q is analytic or entails something analytic. Kant does not explain 'says no more than' but I take it that if P says no more than Q then Q is at least a translation of P. That leaves it open that if P says no more than Q, Q may say more than P. Q says at least P. In this particular case, the second formulation can be construed as analytic, if it is construed formally to mean 'all my experiences are mine'. But, to say that P is analytic and that Q is analytic, and to say that Q is a translation of P is to imply that the conjunction of P and Q is a logical truth. Now, even if Kant's account of the transcendental conditions of experience is correct, it is not a logical truth that it is correct. So it is not analytic either, and so, nor can the conjunction of the two conditions be a logical truth either. This is because no logical truth can be the conjunction of a contingent truth and a logical truth.

There could in principle be alternative accounts of the ownership of experiences. On one view, if it is analytic that Q, then it is just a mistake to look for truth conditions for Q by devising an ontology of the self. On another view there is no such thing as the unity of consciousness, just numerically and qualitatively distinct states of one and the same soul. So, Kant really has to choose between formal conditions and ontological conditions for self-conscious experience. The former will turn out to be analytic, if they involve analysis of concepts like 'self' and 'experience'. The latter though will be contingent, and even empirical despite being conditions for experience. Despite being putatively transcendental (in Kant's sense) there is not one condition which could not be replaced by a rival candidate.

This still leaves open the question of whether Kant's initial claim, that in the absence of synthesis the manifold would not be united in one consciousness is analytic, is true. This claim is analytic if we accept Kant's definition of 'the manifold united in one consciousness' as just being what synthesis is. If we read the claim as analytic we have to abandon any merely causal thesis, for example that synthesis causes the unity of consciousness, but this is acceptable because 'cause' for Kant should not have any transcendental use. There are though two reservations about allowing the claim as analytic. One is that if P is analytic then P is a necessary truth. Kant is thereby committed to the view that synthesis is necessary for the unity of the manifold in consciousness is a necessary truth. But, it is logically possible that some faculty other than synthesis should be a condition for that unity. He says synthesis is active, but if a truth it is not a necessary truth that a person's finding their experience

intelligible is an active process. Indeed, possibly experiences being episodes in a single soul is what makes such unity possible.

So, even if Kant's theory is correct, its logical status is not that of a tautology, nor even of a necessary truth if 'necessarily true' here means 'could not be false' or 'could not be true'.

The other reservation is that if the claim is analytic then its truth should be decidable by conceptual analysis of its subject and predicate parts. But, it is not clear that someone who understood 'synthesis' thoroughly would thereby be acquainted with the concepts of the unity of the manifold in a single consciousness, as 'synthesis' has been defined so far. At least this is no more feasible than that a person should acquire the concept of 12 by thinking the unit of 7 and 5: an example Kant says is synthetic.

But, again, if we are prepared to accept Kant's stipulative definition of 'synthesis' then this second reservation may be waived. The whole complex: "'without synthesis the unity of the manifold in consciousness would not be possible" is analytic', would then be an example of the translatability between subjective and objective descriptions discussed above.

I have argued that the most consistent view to be extracted from the Transcendental Deduction, in both versions, is that the TUA makes possible both subjective and objective descriptions one and the same set of processes. Indeed, all other psychological distinctions have the TUA as their transcendental 'ground'.

There is a passage at B139 which appears *prima facie* inconsistent with that interpretation. Kant says the TUA is 'entitled objective' and must be distinguished from the subjective unity of consciousness, which is a determination of inner sense. (B139) This now sounds as though 'TUA' is the name of an 'objective' faculty which stands in need of semantic contrast with the concept of a 'subjective' faculty.

This appearance is misleading. Certainly the TUA must be distinguished from the subjective unity of consciousness, but so also must it be distinguished from the empirical unity of apperception. The empirical unity of apperception is the objective correlate of the subjective unity of consciousness, just as outer sense is the objective correlate of inner sense. The TUA makes possible both the subjective unity of consciousness and the empirical unity of apperception. This is quite consistent with the view that the TUA 'is that unity through which all the manifold given in an intuition is united in a concept of the object' ( B139). This is the claim that the TUA is a condition for the objectivity of experience, that is, for experiences being of objects external to the subject's psychology.

All experience, inner or outer bears a necessary relation to the 'I think'. It is a logical condition of their being experience at all that it be someone's experience. There are no 'un-owned' experiences. For these reason he says 'only the original unity is 'objectively valid' (B140).

One final ambiguity needs to be eradicated. At (B 140) Kant says the empirical unity of apperception has 'only subjective validity'. This is yet another sense of 'subjective', quite distinct from those used so far. 'Subjective' means here is 'relative', or 'in some degree varying from one person to another'. Kant means that the content of empirical apperception is contingent and shifting, but the I think of the TUA is formal and unchanging. That he means 'relative' (or 'relative to a subject') by 'subjective' here is substantiated by the example he gives. He says: 'To one man, for instance, a certain word suggests one thing, another, some other thing' (B140). So the unity of consciousness's empirical content, in each case, is not what makes it a unity. Some consciousnesses have just that empirical content is not what bestows unity on it. Some other content would do.

So the consciousness of each person is numerically distinct from every other yet this is not in virtue of such consciousnesses containing either similar or different thoughts. As a matter of contingent fact, persons do think different sorts of thoughts if 'what is given' to any consciousness is not 'necessarily and universally valid'. (B140) Kant's view is that even if (as is not the case) each person though the same sort of thoughts, it would not be in virtue of that qualitative similarity that each person's consciousness was a unity. Conversely, from the fact (which obtains) that some persons think qualitatively dissimilar thoughts (at any one time) it does not follow that each does not possess a unitary mind. This emphasises that the unity of consciousness rests not on empirical but on transcendental ground.

There is also another sort of objectivity which is made possible by the TUA. We have seen that the TUA makes objective experience, experience of objective particulars, possible. It also allows objective judgements, judgements about objective particulars, to be made. I shall read 'judgement' to mean 'propositional attitude' and sometimes just 'proposition', but note that for Kant judgements have psychological as well as logical properties. For example, he says

'a judgement is nothing but the manner in which given modes of knowledge are brought to the objective unity of apperception'. (B141)

So judgements are episodes in minds, but they also have truth values. If there is at least one judgement then there is at least one judge. If there is at least one judgement then that judgement is either true or false. We judge correctly or incorrectly.

Now, there are two separate issues at work in Kant's text that need to be separated out. The first is: What allows judgements to be truth valued? The second is: What enables judgements to be about items other than mental states of the subject (judge)? Kant assumes that by answering the second question he has also answered the first, but on one reading this is not so. This is because a judgement may be either true or false if made about the subject's mental state, or either true or false if made about some other item. The assimilation results from Kant's analysis of 'is'. He says 'is' is employed to distinguish the objective unity of given representations from the



subjective. (B 142) Now, the fact that judgements have the logical form 'X is F' does not in itself guarantee that 'x' denotes a particular independent of the mind of the subject. On the contrary, 'x is F' may be the logical form of some psychological self-ascription. If 'is' expresses any sort of objectivity here it is a sense of 'objective' closely related to 'true'. On that reading, the claim that 'x is F' is just the claim that 'x is F' is true. But, as we just noted, the truth of 'x is F' is a distinct notion from the referent of 'x'.

To make Kant's account more plausible we need to take seriously the claim that the 'is' 'indicates their (judgements') relation to original apperception and its necessary unity' (B142). How is this done?

There are two senses in which the TUA makes objective judgement possible. Firstly, the TUA is a condition of any judgement. If a judgement is 'nothing but' the way in which knowledge is brought to the 'objective unity of apperception', then unless the TUA obtained judgement could not exist under that description. Secondly, because the TUA enables the distinction to be made between subjectivity and objectivity, it enables further a distinction to be drawn between two sorts of judgement: judgements of the form 'x is F' and judgements of the form 'it seems to me that x is F'. Kant thinks that the onus is on him to establish the possibility of judgements of the first form when prima facie a person's experience consists of a series of presentations. This is the importance of the claim at B142 that the cupola 'is' is used to distinguish between the 'subjective' and the 'objective' unity of presentations.

Kant thinks we need a guarantee that the series of experiences each unitary mind has is of a persisting world of mind-independent objects. At B142 he is only prepared to define 'judgement' as an 'objectively valid' relation:

'a judgement [...] is a relation which is objectively valid and so can be adequately distinguished from a relation of the same (re)presentations that would have only subjective validity.' (B 142)

If we read 'objectively valid' as partly meaning 'true' then it does have a role. This because 'x is F' is true if and only if x is F. x's being F, as opposed to just seeming F, is made possible by the categories and the principles (B142).

In the above passage Kant excludes a relation of representations with only subjective validity from the class of judgements. 'It seems to me that X is F' is such a relation. But, such relations must obtain, or at least be thinkable for 'x is F' to have sense. It is obviously not a condition of the truth of 'It seem to me that x is F' that 'x is F' is true, but it is clearly a condition of 'x is F' having a use that x could in principle seem to some subject to be F.

The TUA is therefore a condition of judgements about presentations, as it is a condition for the having of those presentations.

The example Kant chooses to illustrate the dependence of the objectivity of judgement on the TUA substantiates the above readings of 'subjective' and 'objective'. His subjective example is 'If I support a body I feel an impression of weight'. The objective example is 'This body is heavy'. Even the subjective example presupposes the possibility of making an objective judgement, viz, 'This is a body' but that does not vitiate the contrast between 'It seems to me that x is F' and 'x is F'.

The objectivity of the judgement 'x is F' is to be understood in this way:

'What we are asserting is that they [two (re)presentations] are combined in the object, no matter what the state of the subject may be.' (B 142).

where this combination is not just a Humean constant conjunction. After all, two presentations could be repeatedly conjoined in the subject's experience without any objective (mind independent) particular being thereby presented.

Two final points about judgement: In the above passage the term 'subject' must be read as 'subject's psychology'. Kant tends to neglect the human body in his discussions of the self but a person might make an objective judgement (mind independent) about his own body which was not uninfluenced by the (physical) state of the subject. We could not then accept 'no matter what the state of the subject' because a physical state of the subject would provide its truth conditions. If we read 'subject' purely psychologically though, this difficulty is avoided.

The other point is that Kant has still not clearly distinguished, on the one hand, between the question of what enables propositions to be true or false, and, on the other hand, what enables them to be about mind dependent or mind-independent particulars. This leaves open the question of how a certain sort of proposition (Kant might not wish to call them 'judgements') is possible, namely, first person psychological ascription's, ie judgements of the form 'x is F' or 'x seems to me to be F' where 'x' denotes some occurrent mental state of the subject (speaker). This would reveal Kant's view on the sense of such ascriptions and on their putative incorrigibility. He does not pursue the matter in the Transcendental Deduction.

Although the conclusion of Kant's argument at (B142) is that the TUA makes judgement possible, there are indications at (B 143-4) that judgements, and the categories which are used in their formulation, are themselves essential conditions for the unity of consciousness. They are not more fundamental than the TUA, but clearly if A is the ground of, that is makes possible, B and C, that in no way precludes B making C possible also. We would just have to stipulate that A and B are jointly necessary for C but that neither is singularly sufficient.

He begins the argument by emphasising that the TUA remains a condition for the unity of consciousness:

'The manifold given in sensible intuition is necessarily subject to the original synthetic unity of apperception, because in no other way is the unity of intuition possible.' (B143)

But then he claims that the logical function of judgement is to bring the content of the manifold under 'one apperception'. (B 143) It is the subsuming of the manifold under categories in the acts of judgement which ensures the manifold is 'brought into one consciousness' (B143). The process thus described, though the word is not used at B143 is synthesis.

So, although the TUA is analytic, the ontological cash value of 'unity of self-consciousness' consists in the application of categories to intuitions in synthesis. So although 'All my experiences are mine' is a necessary truth, there is a psychological story about the relationship between me and my experiences. Their combination and reproduction according to the synthesis consciousness consists in. This is why Kant can say:

'A manifold, contained in an intuition I call mine is (re)presented, by means of the synthesis of the understanding, as belonging to the necessary unity of self-consciousness.' (B 144)

Synthesis is now mentioned, and connection with the TUA made explicit. Synthesis allows the manifold to be presented as mine, even though its being mine, and its thinkability as mine both depend on the TUA. Synthesis, we can think of not as a formal but as a psychological or ontological condition of my unitary self-consciousness.

Despite this Kant does not allow us to forget the TUA is the ultimate ground of each of these distinctions. All empirical consciousness depends upon the possibility of formal self-consciousness, the thinkability of my self-identity over time:

'the empirical consciousness of a given manifold in a single intuition is subject to a pure self-consciousness *a priori*.' (B 144)

There is one remark, at (B145-6), which could be misinterpreted. He says 'our understanding [...] can produce a priori unity of apperception'. This, if Kant is to be consistent, can be a reference to the TUA only if we retain his view that the TUA is the ultimate transcendental ground. The TUA cannot be ultimately dependent on the categories because if A is the ultimate ground of B then B cannot make A possible. The answer is, I think, that there is only one unity of consciousness but it can be understood under an empirical or a transcendental description. As empirical consciousness the understanding is essential to its possibility. But as transcendental its possibility is essential to the understanding. This proviso would have to be made:

It is the understanding which 'brings' the manifold of intuition under the unity of apperception.

So, in an important sense, the 'I think' is only thinkable if there is some experiential or intellectual content to be denoted by the that clause in 'I think that p'. There must be synthesis of intuitions for them to be thinkable as mine, and the application of the categories to those intuitions single set of transcendental conditions, notably the TUA, Kant wishes at an ordinary language level to [pr y] in his presentation of this grammatical condition.

[The Soul as Transcendental Ego THIS SECTION TO END OF BOOK

It is possible to believe the proposition: I am numerically identical at a later time with a being at an earlier time despite discontinuity in the history of the consciousness of that being between  $t_1$  and  $t_2$ . But, is it possible for me to know such a fact just through being acquainted with mental states or, less question beggingly, by the obtaining of some mental states as objects of thought?

There is a need to invoke an inner perceiver or transcendental subject of self awareness. There is need to invoke such an entity or structure to account for one's knowledge of one's self-identity over time. A Humean ontology of the self as a bundle of perceptions is inadequate to explain the idea of self. What we need to do is to explain how the bundle can be 'mine' (someone's) without being perceived by an inner observer as owner. Instead of 'bundle of perception' I shall speak of 'set of mental states'. Two sub-questions arise: what makes them a set? and what makes this set mine, rather than, say, yours? It is the same facts that answer both questions. These facts are ultimately metaphysical, and just in that respect, not in Kant's sense, transcendental.

They amount to this: the transcendental self is the soul. I am only willing to call the soul a - transcendental condition of experience in a minimal and fairly unKantian sense. It includes the sense of 'transcendental' as 'what makes knowledge or experience possible'. It is logically possible that a Berkeleyan idealism should be true where experience makes the soul possible, and experience is grounded elsewhere, in God and the soul perhaps. I put forward the - transcendental self is the soul as an empirical hypothesis, a hypothesis that should be metaphysically testable.

If we now ask: What makes some mental states a set, in the sense of parts of one and the same experience? then the answer is they are states of the same soul. The soul effects a qualitative transformation of sensory input (physiologically described) into a presented world of physical objects with secondary qualities and mental states, commonsensically described. Each soul transforms its physiological input into what I shall call a mental field. There is no such thing as awareness or consciousness of this mental field, but its existing or obtaining is all that can really be meant by saying

persons are conscious or have awareness. Now, numerically distinct souls transform numerically distinct physiological inputs into numerically distinct mental field. So, in that sense, the mental field is logically prior to the set or mental states.

The idea of experiences as distinct from one's experience arises in two ways. Firstly it is possible to think about experience in different ways: employ various criteria to discriminate one aspect of one's experience from another. Secondly, different physiological inputs and different soul transformations issue in different sorts of mental states, and secondary qualities. If it is argued the second is only one particular case of the first I should allocate some priority to it still as it is metaphysically testable. On both accounts the logical relation between experiences and mental field or experience is part and whole.

That then is how the soul as the transcendental self accounts for certain mental states being a set, or certain experiences being parts of one and the same experience.]

## **Kant's Holism**

by

**Stephen Priest**

### **INSERT IN KD A 106 FF**

Kant says that 'all necessity, without exception, is grounded in a transcendental condition.' (A106) What does this mean? Is it true?

#### I

If A grounds B then A makes B possible. This is ambiguous as it stands because the modal 'possible' could commit us to either, if not for A then B would be logically impossible, or if not for A then it would be a contingent fact that B is impossible. Kant will want to rule out the second of these but work with a notion of impossibility weaker than logical impossibility if we mean by that: it is logically impossible that p if and only if p is contradictory. If p is necessary then if p is true then p could not have been false, and if p is false then p could not have been true. So 'necessary' means either 'not only true but could not not be true' or 'not only false but could not not be false'.

It is part of Kant's philosophical logic that the members of a sub-class of necessary truths have that status precisely because their negations are contradictory. For example analytic truths are self-contradictory to deny. This is consistent with his holding that if p is necessary then it is always the case that there exists a reason for

p's necessity, but it is not obvious why all necessary truths require a transcendental ground if the contradictory status of their negations provides a sufficient explanation of the necessity of a sub-class. It is best to take Kant at his word here and read him as committed to: if p is necessary, and even if we can already explain what p's necessity consists in, p is grounded in a transcendental condition. This thesis commits him to; if p is necessary then there is some possible explanation of what p's necessity consists in, and, some possible explanation of how it is possible for p to be necessary. This leaves it open that one theory might execute both tasks.

I shall read 'transcendental' minimally, this way: if p is a transcendental claim then if p were false then knowledge or experience would not be possible, but p expresses no empirical proposition. By an empirical proposition I mean one which may be confirmed or refuted by observation (including Kant's inner sense), because p is about what may in principle be observed. I add this 'because' clause because, clearly the fact that some observation takes place could be a good (indirect) proof that some transcendental (ie non-empirical) proposition is true.

So now we can read the whole of the A106 claim this way: if p is necessary then p is necessary because some proposition q is true and q is not empirical.

Kant does not have a good independent argument for this principle but he uses it to establish the need for the transcendental unity of apperception. The A 106 principle is followed immediately by:

'There must therefore be a transcendental ground of the unity of consciousness in the synthesis of the manifold of all our intuitions'  
(A106)

What entitles Kant to the 'therefore'? A problem is that p's necessity might be the explanation of p's possibility. If p is necessarily true then p is true and if p is true then p is possibly true. If we derive p's possibility from p's necessity then it is not clear that there is a need for any transcendental ground for p once we have analysed what p's necessity consists in. That is a problem for the principle in general, it might not be a problem for making the need for the TUA depend upon the existence of the unity of consciousness.

We need to decide next what exactly the necessity is which needs to be grounded. By 'unity of consciousness' here Kant means empirical unity, or psychological unity and clearly it is not a necessary truth that there exists some unified empirical consciousness. What is necessary here, at least on Kant's account, is that if there exists a synthesis of the manifold of all our intuitions then there exist a unity of consciousness. The conjunction of these two claims is putatively a necessary truth. So, accepting the principle, it follows that there is a transcendental ground of that necessity: some value of p on which it will come out as necessary that if there is

synthesis of the manifold of intuition then there exists a unity of consciousness. This thinking motivates the search for the transcendental unity of apperception.

It would seem from this argument that the need for a transcendental ground for experience is a special case of the principle that all necessity requires a transcendental ground. It is at least a consequence of that principle because Kant's reasoning is like this: All necessity requires a transcendental ground. Experience would not be possible unless a certain necessary truth held *viz* that if there exists a manifold of intuition then there exists a unity of consciousness. Therefore experience requires a transcendental condition. The form of this reasoning; if not P then not Q, but if not Q then not R, so if not P then not R, is valid but Kant has provided us with little reason to believe the first premise.

Kant thinks he has established the need for a transcendental ground and provides an argument for the claim that the transcendental ground cannot possibly be empirical, and a reason for identifying the ground with what he calls the 'transcendental unity of apperception'. This is the argument:

- (1) 'Consciousness of self according to the determinations of our state in inner perception is merely empirical, and always changing'
- (2) 'No fixed and abiding self can present itself in this flux of inner appearances'
- (3) 'What has necessarily to be represented as numerically identical cannot be thought as such through empirical data'
- (4) 'To render such a transcendental presupposition valid, there must be a condition which precedes all experience, and which makes experience itself possible'  
(A107)

This is a Humean argument with a Kantian conclusion. The first premise, (1), is the claim that if I introspect then the knowledge I thereby obtain is empirical. 'Empirical' admits of a narrow and a wide construal. Narrowly, empirical knowledge is knowledge acquired only through sense perception (outer sense). Broadly, empirical knowledge is knowledge acquired only through experience (outer and inner sense). Clearly, in (1) Kant is working with the wide construal of 'empirical' on which it comes out as true that if p is established only by the exercise of inner sense then it follows that p is empirical. That much is unproblematic.

An unclarity is introduced into the first premise by a failure to distinguish between consciousness and what consciousness is of in inner sense. Kant says consciousness of self is always changing but for the second premise he will need it to be the appearances which are always changing (ie are 'in flux'). The ambiguity is between my consciousness of my mental states, and the mental states themselves.

This is an important ambiguity and its dispelling is quite neutral with regard to the central options in the ontology of mind. We can think of the various ways in which one may be conscious of oneself: be anxious about one's capacities, conscious of one's mood, hope one's memories are accurate, believe they are and so on. These acts of consciousness are prima facie quite distinct from their intentional objects even if they are in complex ways dependent upon them (for example, for their individuation). We can hold the intentional act constant and alter the object, or hold the object constant and alter the intentional act.

Now, Kant has said the consciousness of self is always changing, and that commits him to holding that the intentional act changes. But what he needs is the intentional object (in this case, the mental states) to be changing. He has no argument for either of these views and it is plausible to suppose that the reader is simply supposed to regard it as self-evident that no enduring psychological self may be found in introspection, once he or she introspects.

This seems to me not self evident. If I introspect then there is something which is present to my consciousness and which perhaps I consist in. We could call it 'the field of my awareness' or some such, borrowing this idea from the use of 'field' in 'visual field', but extending it to denote the unified consciousness that I feel myself to be, not just the visual sub-portion of it. I see no way of adjudicating between Hume and Kant on the one hand and myself on the other on this matter, and am prepared to hypothetically entertain the truth of their view to decide the validity of Kant's argument.

Kant says the consciousness of inner sense is 'always changing'. This claim is rather stronger than he needs and is in any case implausible. Nothing commits us to the view that if a person is conscious of one of their own mental states 'M' then M is always changing, or that that person's consciousness of M is always changing. I can attach sense to 'always changing'. For example, if M is always changing, then at any time that M exists M is losing some property or gaining some property or both, but from the fact that this claim makes sense it does not follow that it is true, and, again, I see no a priori nor any empirical objection to someone's being in M, being aware of being in M, and there being some time during which neither M nor the consciousness of M gains or loses any property. It seems to me this sometimes happens.

We may safely weaken Kant's claim and substitute another which will supply the necessary concept of mental change for the first premise. This is: There is no mental state of mine which lasts as long as I do. Suppose for example, I last from some time  $t_1$  to some later time  $t_2$ , then any mental state that I am in will last a shorter time that duration  $t_1 \dots t_2$ . This is plausible because even if, as I suggest, if I introspect I am conscious of a kind of consciousness that I might consist in, there is nothing to suggest I am in this state unless I introspect, and even if I do, from the fact that I might be identical with my unified consciousness it does not follow that I am thus identical.



I have tried to cast doubt on the truth of the first premise, and I think the second premise (2) is very possibly false too. Notice however that (2) follows logically from (1) and so Kant has taken a step towards a valid argument for the non-empirical nature of the conditions for experience even if the premises are dubitable. If 'self' in (2) is the name for some candidate object of inner sense which I consist in then it follows from the fact that no object of inner sense which I consist in is unchanging, or no object of inner sense lasts as long as I do, that I am not identical with some item I encounter in inner sense. I do not consider the merely logical possibility that I consist in one and only one, always changing, mental state. I assume here that if A is B then A lasts just as long as B does. If your intuitions about your own consciousness are Humean rather than like mine you may consider the move from (1) to (2) sound.

Kant inserts a sentence in the argument at A107 saying that this discursive changing awareness one has of one's own mental states is called 'inner sense' or 'empirical apperception'. This is rather carelessly put because it sounds as though 'inner sense' and 'empirical apperception' are two names for the same faculty. In fact, inner sense yields experiences and empirical apperception subsumes those experiences under concepts. The distinction parallels that between intuition and understanding. In fact, it is a special case of it.

If we wish to construe Kant sympathetically here we may point to the mutual dependence of concept and intuition and say that their joint exercise may be partially but correctly described as 'inner sense' and partially but correctly described as 'empirical apperception'. Still, it would be a mistake to think that 'empirical apperception' and 'inner sense' differed only in sense and not also in reference. The point of Kant's terminological insertion is that he will soon wish to distinguish the transcendental unity of apperception from both inner sense and empirical apperception. It is important for the conditions of experience being transcendental that they are not falsely assimilated to certain conceptual and empirical faculties.

The third premise needs clarification. It is about the self, about what I am. The notion of identity deployed here is as follows. Suppose I am whatever has my experiences, whatever else I am. Then consider any two arbitrary experiences of mine which are not simultaneous. Call them E1 and E2. It follows that either E1 occurs before E2 or E2 occurs before E1 and it may or may not be true that some time elapses between the having of E1 and the having of E2. If we want to explain what it consists in for E1 and E2 to be my experiences, then part of this must consist in mentioning the fact that the self which has E1 is numerically identical with the self that has E2. This is the force of Kant's 'necessarily' in (3).

Now, whatever it is that has the role of self, whatever it is that has my experiences, cannot be thought empirically according to Kant. I take it this means that no sentence comprising only empirical names and predicates could, logically, be a description of the self in this transcendental sense. By an 'empirical name' I mean

the name of a property which is in principle observable. This is what Kant means by 'cannot be thought through empirical data'.

So, no thinking of empirical names and predicates is thinking about the self as that which is numerically identical over time and the owner of my experiences. Why should Kant think this? There is no doubt a point about the elusiveness of the self here: that which has one's experiences cannot be an item that falls amongst those experiences. The self is irreducibly subjective and active whereas the objects of one's experiences are, *qua* objects, passive and objective.

It seems to me this 'cannot' cannot be a logical 'cannot'. I see no objection to that which experiences at some time being an item falling within some experience at a different time and so on. For example, suppose the brain is that which experiences. Suppose my brain is that which has my experiences. Then it is a contingent fact about us that our brains do not perceive themselves. There is no reason in principle why they should not. There is no reason why subject of experience should be in principle so elusive as to not be empirical.

Kant insists that the conditions for experience cannot be empirical. There is an independently plausible thought which supports Kant's thesis here. Suppose X exists. Suppose there is some condition of X's existence which could be importantly mentioned in explaining how it is possible for X to exist. Then, plausibly, that condition cannot be any part of X (except modally, because anything is the explanation of its own possibility). That apart, if there are conditions for experience then it looks plausible to maintain that those conditions are not part of experience. Kant does not deploy this argument overtly but it may be supplied as a suppressed premise in the argument at A107.

There is a further and perhaps stronger reason than the alledged elusiveness of the self for finding the third premise persuasive. On Kant's view of necessary truth no empirical truths are necessary. But that I am self identical over times  $t_1$  and  $t_2$  if some experience at  $t_1$  is mine and some experience at  $t_2$  is mine is arguably a necessary truth. I do not rule out the logical possibility of my ceasing to exist for some finite duration between  $t_1$  and  $t_2$  but existing at both  $t_1$  and  $t_2$ , but this cannot affect the identity of myself at  $t_1$  with  $t_2$  necessarily holding if the two experiences are mine.

Now, if it is true that no sentence composed of empirical names and predicates uniquely is a necessary truth then what my self identity over time consists in cannot be expressed empirically. But is the assumption about the contingency of such empirical sentences correct? Suppose I am a wholly empirical object. I mean that any aspect of the whole that I am may be constructed using only empirical semantics. Suppose in an attempt to establish empirically my self identity between  $t_1$  and  $t_2$  I stay awake. I pay attention to the spatio-temporal continuity of that body that I am always associated with and so on continuously at all times between  $t_1$  and  $t_2$ . It

would not follow from this that I am self identical between  $t_1$  and  $t_2$ . That could only be a deductive inference, and it is no experience which would confirm or refute it.

If we construe Kant this way then it comes out as true that no empirical thought, no thinking of sentences containing only empirical names and predicates and capable of only observational verification and falsification, will be a thinking of that necessary truth.

If we find this argument based on the premise that there are no empirical necessities persuasive, or if we find the intuition about the elusiveness of the self persuasive, then we have good grounds for accepting the third premise. (3) does not logically follow from (1) and (2) but it does not need to for the argument at A107 to be valid.

We may think of (1) and (2) as spelling out what certain sorts of empirical data consist in, viz empirical data with which we become acquainted through self-consciousness, and as establishing that all introspective self-knowledge is empirical. This means that no matter how thorough a subject's introspective scrutiny of their own mental states, if they come to know some true sentences by this scrutiny, none of those sentences is a necessary truth. Kant needs this otherwise the self which is thought as necessarily identical over the time it experiences could so be thought 'through empirical data'.

The conclusion, (4), is on one construal analytic, and so not the informative result Kant would really wish for. It is analytic because of the meaning of 'transcendental'. If P is a transcendental proposition then P's truth is a non-empirical condition which makes experience possible. It is therefore a conceptual truth that if P is to be true then there must be something non-empirical which makes experience possible.

If we rewrite the conclusion so that we have 'necessary truth' instead of 'transcendental supposition' then we can make the argument yield a conclusion to Kant's purpose. Then, as Kant no doubt intends, (4) makes reference to (3) by claiming there must be a transcendental ground for the necessity (3) reports. Kant is entitled to derive this conclusion if we accept his principle that there is a transcendental condition for every necessary truth.

So, construed this way the argument at A107 succeeds in establishing the need for a transcendental ground of experience. My self-identity over time is a condition for experiences at different times being mine. This is expressible by the necessary truth that my experiences at different times are mine. This fact cannot be expressed empirically. Every necessary truth has a transcendental ground so this necessary truth has a transcendental ground.

What Kant seeks to do now is identify the transcendental ground. To do this he deploys an argument to show that the transcendental ground is the transcendental unity of apperception.

## II

### Why the transcendental ground of experience is the Transcendental Unity of Apperception

I extract the premises and conclusion of Kant's argument from the text at A107 in this way:

- (1) 'There can be in us no modes of knowledge, no connection of one mode of knowledge with another, without that unity of consciousness which precedes all data of intuitions, and by relation to which representation of objects is alone possible'
- (2) 'Even the purest objective unity, namely, that of the a priori concepts (space and time) is only possible through relation of the intuitions to such unity of consciousness'
- (3) 'The numerical unity of this apperception is thus the a priori ground of all concepts, just as the manifoldness of space and time is the a priori ground of the intuitions of sensibility'
- (4) 'This original and transcendental condition is no other than transcendental apperception' (A107)

The first premise expresses the truth that my self-identity over time is a condition for my having any knowledge, experience, or thought of objects. The force of this is possessing knowledge, or having thought about objects, presupposes not only having experiences but having experiences at different times and thinking of these as grouped into systematically related wholes. There is a holistic assumption at work in the text here: A putatively unique or solitary item of knowledge or experience would not count as such, or at least would not count as knowledge or experience of objects. It is one's experiences in their relation to one another which is partially constitutive of their being experiences of objects (of entities which exist independently of experience of them). Similarly it is sentences in logical and semantic relation to one another that constitutive knowledge claims.

If we accept this holism then we have to rule out the possibility that punctual selves could have just one item of knowledge each, or just one thought or experiences of an object each. So, if there is knowledge thought or experience of objects then there exist numerically distinct experiences over time. But if these are to facilitate any one person having knowledge thought or experience then those

experiences must belong to that person. Hence, my self-identity over time is a condition for my knowledge.

(1) is fully consistent with the presupposition of the third premise of the A107 argument that if experiences at  $t_1$  and at  $t_2$  are mine then it is I who exist at both  $t_1$  and  $t_2$ . This thought is used by Kant in (1) as a necessary condition for my having any knowledge or thought or experience of objects whatsoever. We have here then one kind of condition of experience; self-identity over time.

Kant wishes to claim rather more than this however, even in (1). He wants to make a claim not just that I am identical over time but a further claim about what I am. I am at least partly a unity of consciousness. We should raise the question here of what Kant means by 'unity of consciousness' and ask what entitles him to use this expression in a characterisation of what I am.

What has to be ruled out is any concept of an empirical unity of consciousness. This is clear because of the argument that the conditions of experience are transcendental, and not empirical, and by Kant's insistence that the unity in question 'precedes all data of intuitions' (my italics, A107). 'Precedes' here has no chronological connotation. It is a term used to formulate transcendental claims. I read it this way: A precedes B if and only if B is made possible by A and A is not any part of B. This implies that the unity of consciousness in question is not introspectively available. It rules out the possibility of its being amongst the data of inner intuition because it is not amongst the data of intuition tout court.

It is worth pausing at this point to decide whether an empirical unity of consciousness could play the conceptual role Kant has in mind for this non-empirical unity. Kant is antipathetic to any concept of empirical unity which violates the Kant-Hume principle that I cannot find myself in introspection as sustained mental state. Suppose, however, *pace* Hume and Kant, I am directly and intuitively aware of the continuity of my own consciousness when I introspect, despite changes in my thoughts and perceptions. There are reasons for thinking that even this would not meet the requirement Kant has on interpreting 'unity of consciousness'. This is because the unity he has in mind is purely formal. If an experience at  $t_1$  is mine and if an experience at  $t_2$  is mine then it follows that I am self-identical between  $t_1$  and  $t_2$  whatever I am, or whatever else is true of me. So, the expression 'unity of consciousness' carries with it here no strong implications for a particular ontology of the self. Any ontology of the self that meets this purely formal requirement would in principle be adequate at this stage of Kant's account.

So, 'unity of consciousness' here is used simply to mention the fact that my experiences at different times, in order for them to count as mine, must have a single owner.

Premise (2) asserts that the unity of consciousness is transcendentially more fundamental than another transcendental condition for experience: the unity of the forms of intuition, space and time. A is transcendentially more fundamental than B if

an only if experience is made possible by A and experience is made possible by B but B is made possible by A and A is not made possible by B. The unity of the forms of intuition is the necessary spatio-temporality of all our intuitions.

It was established in the Transcendental Aesthetic that because our forms of intuition are space and time all our intuitions are either temporal or else spatio-temporal. This necessarily follows from our having just those forms of intuition. (Kant allows that in principle there may be beings with other forms of intuition, or even intuitive understandings, so the necessity is one that follows from our transcendental psychology).

Kant does not express himself so precisely in the second premise as in the Transcendental Aesthetic in at least one respect. He says in (2) the unity of the concepts of space and time is made possible by the unity of consciousness. I think he really intends to make the different and stronger claim that the unity of our intuitions in a single spatio-temporal framework is made possible by the unity of consciousness. He fails to distinguish clearly here between space and time and our concepts of them, something he is at pains to do in the Transcendental Aesthetic. If we do make that distinction we can say that both the unity of space and time and the unity of the concepts of space and time are made possible by the unity of consciousness. Indeed, it seems plausible to argue that the unity of space and time is a condition for the unity of the concepts of them, but Kant does not argue for this dependence.

Nor does Kant produce a clear argument for making the unity of intuitions in space and depend on the unity of consciousness, but one can be supplied. If it were not true that putative individual experiences at  $t_1 \dots t_n$  were experiences in a single mind, or experiences with a single owner then there would be no unity of experience tout court. A fortiori, there would be no unity of experience within any forms of intuition, for example space and time.

The soundness of this argument depends on Kant's view that space and time are transcendently ideal, because there seems to be no logical or a priori objection to some string of putative experiences existing over  $t_1 \dots t_n$  and being spatially interrelated, and being temporally interrelated even though they are not 'owned'. That we could not truly call these 'experiences' is an important part of Kant's point. We could no doubt call them 'events', but it is the unity of of consciousness that entitles us to call them experiences rather than events not their spatio-temporal relations. To put it another way, suppose we accept there are two kinds of condition for experience: (a) If a series of episodes is to count as a series of experiences they must be owned by a mind and, (b) if a series of episodes are to count as experiences they must be spatio-temporal. Kant wishes to make (b) depend on (a), or claim that (a) is more transcendently fundamental than (b). Unless we accept that space and time are transcendently ideal there is no good reason for this order of priorities.

This means we have to insert the main conclusion of the Transcendental Aesthetic as a premise to obtain this order of priorities by a valid argument.

A quasi-Kantian reason could be supplied for making self-identity over time a more fundamental condition for experience than spatio-temporality. This would require taking seriously the conceptual constraints on our actual starting point in doing philosophy, and refusing to allow that it makes much sense to talk about space and time as transcendently real, as objective features of a mind-independent reality. To take a God's eye view is not an option open to us. Our only option is to talk about space and time as they appear to us, as we know them as features of the world as we actually experience it. There clearly there could not exist the spatio-temporal unity of experience in that sense unless there were a unified consciousness within which experience could exist.

Kant's reason for accepting the second premise is just that intuitions are experiences. Experiences would not be possible without a unity of consciousness and so no spatio-temporal intuitions would be possible without a unity of consciousness. This is valid but it does not rule out the possibility that the order of transcendental possibilities should run the other way: A unified consciousness would be impossible without experiences. Experiences are events. Events are spatio-temporal, so there would be no unity of consciousness without space and time. Kant has not ruled out the possibility of a mutual dependency between the unity of space and time and the unity of consciousness. I take it he thinks the Transcendental Aesthetic chapter simply precludes this.

Premise (3) draws an analogy between the unity of concepts in the transcendental unity of consciousness and the unity of intuitions in space and time. This analogy is perhaps rather forced as Kant has suddenly switched from talking about the unity of experiences to the unity of concepts. However, it is reasonably clear how the analogy is supposed to go. In the Transcendental Aesthetic he argued that putatively numerically discrete times are parts of one and the same time, and putatively numerically distinct spaces are parts of one and the same space. It follows that any part of time is temporally related to every other part of time, and any part of space is spatially related to every other part of space. It follows that any temporal item is temporally related to every other temporal item and any spatial item is spatially related to every other spatial item. There is only one space and only one time and the places and times within them therefore form a system. The analogy is that all my experiences are parts of one and the same experience which is called mine, just as different times are parts of one and the same time called 'time' and different places are parts of one and the same space called 'space'. Kant blurs the analogy by talking suddenly about concepts, but it can be made to work for any of my mental contents, and if concepts are (*inter alia*) mental contents it can work for those too.

There is another way of reading the third premise. This makes the point of analogy precisely the relation of being 'an a priori ground for'. So just as space and time are an *a priori* ground for all intuitions, so the unity of consciousness is an a priori ground for all concepts. A grounds B transcendently just in case A makes B possible and no proposition reporting this relation is empirical. Clearly, if it is true that every proposition is (exclusively) either empirical or a priori, it follows that P is *a priori* if P's truth is a transcendental ground for B.

It is worth explaining Kant's point about concepts here. Concepts need a transcendental ground for much the same sort of reason as experiences. If a concept that I possess is exercised at t1 and again at t2 it logically follows that I at t1 am numerically identical with the person at t2. Parallel assumptions about holism are also at work. It is perhaps not self contradictory to maintain that a concept might be exercised just once by a punctual being, but in fact our concepts form a complex logically and semantically interrelated whole and depend on their roles in judgements for their meanings. Arguably this is not possible unless a concept may be exercised repeatedly in different contexts. This logically presupposes the identity of a self as concept user over time. If the holistic assumption is true then the identity of the self logically follows.

The conclusion (4) goes through easily on one very minimal construal of transcendental apperception: Whatever it is that arrests the regress of transcendental conditions falls under the description 'transcendental apperception'. Something arrests the regress just in case it transcendently grounds whatever is in need of a transcendental ground but it is not itself in need of a transcendental ground. We need now to decide what Kant thinks falls under this description.

### III

What is the transcendental unity of apperception?

Kant expands a piecemeal answer to this question throughout both versions of the Transcendental Deduction. For clarity's sake I shall say at the outset that Kant will claim that it has at least the following essential properties: It is a formal requirement on experience, that is, a requirement of transcendental logic, not empirical psychology. It is part of what the self's identity over time consists in. It is a kind of disposition to self consciousness. Propositions expressed by sentences characterising it are a priori in logical status. With these preliminaries in mind we may examine Kant's arguments for his answer to the question.

- (1) 'Unity of consciousness would be impossible if the mind in knowledge of the manifold could not become conscious of the identity of function whereby it synthetically combines it in one knowledge.'



- (2) 'The mind could never think its identity in the manifoldness of its representations, and indeed, think this identity a priori, if it did not have before its eyes the identity of its act whereby its subordinates all synthesis of apprehension (which is empirical) to a transcendental unity.'
- (3) 'The original and necessary consciousness of the identity of the self is thus at the same time a consciousness of an equally necessary unity of the synthesis of all appearances according to concepts.'
- (4) 'This transcendental unity of apperception forms out of all possible appearance, which can stand alongside one another in one experience, a connection of all these representations according to laws.' (A108)

The first premise is the claim that a certain unity of consciousness would be impossible unless a certain kind of self-consciousness exists. The unity of consciousness is the empirical unity of consciousness, but the self-consciousness is not, or not straightforwardly empirical. It entails my self-identity over time as a condition for my experience. Kant wishes to elaborate on this claim by saying that I must in addition be conscious of my self-identity over time for experience to be possible. We may think of these conditions as each singularly necessary for experience, but clearly my self-identity is also a necessary condition of my consciousness of my self-identity. This is fully consistent with my self-identity being a condition for experience because it will turn out that my consciousness of my self-identity partly consists in having experiences. (It is in fact just the special case of self-conscious experience).

Is this true? It might be conceded to Kant that my self-identity over time is a formal condition of a series of experiences counting as mine, but it might be objected that the further requirement, that I be conscious of this identity is redundant. After all, are there not certain beings, for example non-human animals, whose experience is unified in the requisite way but who are not conscious of their identity over time?

This line of objection misses Kant's point. He is saying that it must be possible, must in principle be possible, for a self to be conscious of its continued identity over time if its experiences are to be a unified whole. If this were impossible then, Kant assumes, the reason for this could only be that we were not talking about a self-same owner of experiences at all, and then we should have to give up talking about experiences in this case altogether.

A perhaps more plausible objection to Kant's reasoning is that it is logically possible that not the only reason why it might be in principle impossible for a self to be conscious of its identity over time is that it is not in fact a unified consciousness. Perhaps the being simply lacks the requisite mental apparatus and it is part of its

nature not to be self-conscious. Kant does not have a reply to this in the text but I think he would say that then we would have to give up talking about a self altogether. Selves are necessarily self-conscious. We could talk about a being (as I have done) but not a self. This is consistent with his statement in the *Anthropology* that self consciousness distinguishes humans from animals.

Premise (1) contains a claim about knowledge which gives additional support to the view that a unified consciousness is a self consciousness. If a mind has (propositional) knowledge then arguably it is self-conscious. For example if I know that *p* then this might be because I have remembered that *p*, perceived that *p*, wished that *p*, judged that *p*, hoped that *p* and so on. The idea of psychologically atomic items of knowledge is perhaps not self-contradictory, but arguably we acquire, retain, revise and jettison our beliefs in the context of our propositional attitudes generally. Now, Kant thinks this presupposes that I can know that it is I, one and the same mind, which knows who perceives, desires, etc. If this were in principle impossible then we could not talk about 'knowledge' here. This is what Kant means when he says that the mind must be conscious of the identity of function whereby it combines the manifold and comes to possess knowledge.

A point needs to be made about Kant's use of 'mind' here. It carries no strong ontological connotation. It is whatever thinks, and whatever is self-identical over time. Kant is not concerned here to elaborate an ontology of mind, only to spell out the formal conditions for experience and knowledge.

Premise (2) is the claim that premise (1) is only true on condition that a certain possibility obtains. The possibility is expressed by a metaphor. Kant says the mind must 'have before its eyes' the identity of the act whereby it subordinates synthesis to a transcendental unity. The transcendental unity just is the self's self identity over time argued for at A107. Synthesis means 'empirical synthesis': the application of concepts within experience to make it intelligible. 'Subordinates' is unclear but makes sense if it is another way of picking out the dependence of synthesis on the mind's identity over time. The question now is what the act is that Kant thinks subordinates synthesis to the transcendental unity of consciousness.

This cannot on the face of it be any straightforward mental act because all of those stand themselves in need of a transcendental ground. A more plausible construal is to put the stress on 'it's' in 'it's act', so then we have: the mind must be able to be conscious of the fact that its mental acts are its own, in order for them to be subordinated to a transcendental unity. This would be fully congruent with Kant's view that a mind which was in principle incapable of self consciousness could not be a unified consciousness, or a 'self'.

If we read Kant this way, then we can unpack the 'before its eyes' metaphor as a means of saying that a mind that is a self must be self conscious. So if a mind has before its eyes its identity between different mental acts it is conscious of its continued identity over time between those acts. The metaphor is a misleading one,

because it suggests this self-consciousness has to be a kind of experience (a kind of inner seeing). But we know that the transcendental unity of consciousness is purely formal, and we know that no exercise of inner sense can of itself generate a concept of the persistence of the self over time. That was the conclusion of the 'Humean' argument at A107. If we say a self must be conscious of its numerical identity over time in order to be worthy of the name then this consciousness need not be any experience. It could for example be the thought that I, experiencing now, am identical with a person experiencing at some earlier time. Clearly any such thought will be partly about experiences, but it is not thereby an experience.

If the possibility Kant thinks he needs for the first premise is read this way, then the second premise as a whole can be read as saying something true. (2) claims a certain dependence between a self and its experiences as a condition for a certain kind of self-consciousness. It amounts to this: I could not be conscious of my continued self-identity over time unless, firstly, I had experiences at different times, and, secondly, I was conscious that those experiences were mine. That is the dependence running one way. Conversely, I could not be conscious of numerically distinct experiences occurring at different time as all mine unless I could be conscious of (think) my self-identity over time. That is the dependence running the other way. The second premise does the work of justifying the first because the first is just a version of the dependence running the first of these two ways.

Kant says I could not know a priori that I am self-identical over time unless I could be conscious that my experiences are mine. This is valid because if I could not know that I am self-identical over time unless I could be conscious that my experiences are mine, a fortiori I could not know this a priori. Kant does not need to give this reason because he has already established that I cannot know my self-identity *a posteriori*, and if I know my self-identity, and if *a priori* and *a posteriori* are collectively exhaustive logical categories, then I can know my self identity a priori.

The third premise, (3) is a rephrasing of the second premise as an identity statement. Construed literally it is false. From the fact that consciousness of my numerical identity over time is a condition for my consciousness of my experiences as mine it does not follow that my consciousness of my experiences is my consciousness of myself, in the sense of that which has them. Nor does it follow that the thought of my self identity is one and the same with my consciousness of my experiences as mine. We could however obtain this identity with the addition of a premise which Kant has argued for elsewhere: the Humean view that from an empirical point of view I am nothing over and above my experiences. If I am the unity of my experiences, if I am my experience as a whole, the my consciousness of my self identity is a consciousness of my experiences because that is what 'self' refers to here.

A problem with this construal is that the consciousness of my numerical identity over time is a thought not an experience. It is, in fact, knowledge of a necessary truth. But my consciousness of my experiences is an experience, at least so long as we accept the Kantian view that I now I experience because I have a faculty of inner sense.

This objection can be met by insisting that the consciousness (thought) of the identity of the self is a consciousness (thought) of the unity of the consciousness. This is because the unity of my consciousness consists in the contents of my consciousness having a single owner. My self-identity over time is constitutive of the unity of my consciousness.

Kant also says the unity of the consciousness and the identity of the self are each necessary. He does not say what conception of necessity he has in mind. He could mean that each of the sentences reporting the unity of consciousness and the identity of the self expresses a necessary truth. This would have to be a kind of Cartesian necessity, so that 'I am self identical over time' and 'I am a unified consciousness' are necessarily true just so long as I think them. Alternatively, Kant might mean that if one of them is true then the other necessarily follows. This would make their conjunction a necessary truth, but the truth of some conjunction is not a sufficient condition for the truth of either conjunct. Kant seems to be saying in this case that each is singularly necessary. Another construal makes 'necessary' here mean 'necessary for experience' or 'transcendentally necessary'. This would have the merit of allowing my self identity over time and the unity of my consciousness to be necessary for experience. Kant says they are equally necessary. This is acceptable if they are mutually dependent and amount to different ways of expressing the same fact; the transcendental unity of consciousness. This precludes the possibility that one is transcendently more fundamental than the other. Each of these two sentences: I am self identical over time, and, I am a unified consciousness is necessary and sufficient for the other.

We therefore have to read 'original' this way; My self identity is original. 'Original' means 'transcendentally fundamental'. The unity of consciousness is 'equally necessary' (for experience). The unity of consciousness is what my self-identity consists in.

I have counted (4) as the conclusion of the argument at A because there is a construal of it on which it logically follows from the conjunction of (1), (2) and (3). The transcendental unity of apperception has been explained so far as at least my self identity over time. All possible experiences can 'stand along side one another in one experience' just in case the transcendental unity of apperception holds. If by 'law' in (4) Kant means exactly this formal rule: Any experiences are parts of one and the same experience just in case they have one owner, then (4) is entailed by the argument so far. This is a reading which maximises the plausibility of Kant's view, but a drawback with it is that Kant uses the plural 'laws' and the transcendental unity

of apperception has been so far formulated by a single sentence. So we need to look further. I take this up in the section The Function of the Transcendental Unity of Apperception.

INSERT IN KD B 132 FF

#### IV

What is the Transcendental Unity of Apperception? The Argument in B

There is a shift of emphasis between the two editions in the explanation of what the transcendental unity of apperception is. In the A edition the emphasis is on the identity of the self over time as a condition of experience, but in B it is the possibility of self-consciousness which emerges as definitely constitutive of the ground of experience. We shall have to decide what the logical relations are between these two conceptions and in what sense it might be possible to holistically combine them in a single principle, but I turn first to the B edition arguments.

The 'I Think'

Notoriously;

'It must be possible for the 'I think' to accompany all my representations; for otherwise something would be represented in me which could not be thought at all, and that is equivalent to saying that the representation would be impossible, or at least would be nothing to me'  
(B131-2).

#### APPENDIX FN1

Patricia Kitcher addresses the problem of in what sense the 'I think' of apperception may be correctly said to exist:

'The thinking self cannot be phenomenal (because it would be causally determined) and the doctrine of apperception cannot be about a noumenal self, because this doctrine is known, so the I of apperception is '... given, given indeed to thought in general, and so not as appearance, not as thing in itself (noumenon), but as something which actually exists, and which in the proposition 'I think', is denoted as such (cf.

B157). But this solution is unavailing: 'existence' is a category. Kant applies another bandaid: 'the existence here (referred to) is not a category' (B423a). By his own or any other standards, Kant passes beyond the bounds of intelligibility at this point. It is totally unclear what the claim that the thinking I exists is to mean'. (Kitcher, 1984, 123)

It is right that the 'I think' of apperception is not phenomenal and not noumenal. It is also right that 'existence' is a category. But it is not right that Kant thinks the 'I think' exists, unless this just means that the self possesses formal properties, as well as a phenomenal and a noumenal dimension. What Kant says in the passage Kitcher quotes is that the I of apperception is 'given to thought in general ....*as* something which actually exists' (my italics). Now, from the fact that something is given to thought as actually existing it does not follow that it exists. And, in fact it is Kant's view that it is a philosophical mistake to hypostatise the formal subject into a real thinking subject of experience. There is a tendency of reason, a tendency to stray from common sense to metaphysics, which partially consists in the thinking of the real existence of the subject. But two points need to be noted about this. It is a tendency Kant thinks we should resist, if we are not to be misled philosophically. And it is a tendency which makes use of the categories. In fact it misuses them. We need to view 'the existence here (referred to) is not a category' in a wider context. In the footnote at CPR 378, B423 the sentence is immediately qualified by:

'The category as such does not apply to an indeterminately given object but only to one of which we have a concept and about which we seek to know whether it does or does not exist outside the concept.'

Kant means that misthinking the I of apperception as a real thinking subject does require the (mis)use of the category of existence. But that category does not in fact or truly apply to the 'I think' because the 'I think' is a formal condition of experience. (As he puts it in the footnote: 'The I think' precedes the experience which is required to determine the object' CPR 378, 423a). There remains the question of why 'I think' should be 'given as' something which exists if it does not. To understand this we need to bear in mind Kant's remark that 'I think' has an empirical (as well as a transcendental use). For example he says 'I have called the proposition 'I think' an empirical proposition' and 'The 'I think' expressed an indeterminate empirical intuition ie perception' (CPR 378, B423a). This can be taken in two ways. 'I think' construed empirically might mean I this man or this human being think. That is consistent with his view that whole persons think, or the thought, 'I think' can appear as one thought amongst other. But on either of these (complementary) empirical construals one thing is clear. No inner or subjective 'I' appears to consciousness. Read this way Kant is not inconsistent, and there is not need to postulate Kitcher's

'transcendental, phenomenal, empirical (that is, existing) thinker' (Kitcher, 1984, 138).

So my reading of the transcendental unity of apperception differs from Kitcher's:

'Consciousness requires self-consciousness in other words it must be possible for all my representations to belong to a thinking self (a contentually interconnected system of mental states).' (Kitcher, 1984, 143)

The possibility Kitcher requires here is, on Kant's view, a necessity. It is in fact analytic on Kant's theory that all my mental states belong to a thinking self. The possibility for Kant is that of the 'I think' prefixing any of my thoughts, as a transcendental condition of their being mine. It is this dispositional and formal character of the 'I think' which is essential to Kant's concept of the transcendental unity of apperception, but which does not feature in what Kitcher labels 'the principle of apperception' (Kitcher, 1984, 143). This omission leads Kitcher to see the unity of the mind as a matter of content not form. (See above, also Kitcher 1982, (a).) But clearly that two or more mental states have qualitatively similar contents is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition of their belonging to the same mind. The 'interconnected system', to use Kitcher's expression, exists because of the formal properties of the self expressed in the transcendental unity of apperception. It is that same possibility of the 'I think' accompanying thoughts that effects the transition to talk about self, as well as unified mind.

Sydney Shoemaker is then clearly correct to argue that the transcendental unity of apperception is essentially a doctrine about self-consciousness, and not about synthesis. (See Shoemaker, 1984, esp.151 ff.) My dispositional reading of the transcendental unity of apperception is consistent with a suggestion of Shoemaker's about the connection between consciousness and self-consciousness:

'Synthesis must be such as to best a considerable degree of rationality on the subject of the mental states, and ... in creature of any appreciable degree of conceptual sophistication, and more particularly those capable of conceiving of themselves this rationality requires at least an appreciable degree of self-awareness. One reason for this is that it is only to the extent that a creature knows what its beliefs are that it is in a position to modify them in the light of new experience, in the way require by rationality.' (Shoemaker, 1984)

Shoemaker refers to McGinn (1983, 20-1) in support of this view. Clearly, a creature both rational and self-conscious in this sense need not be perennially self-conscious. Not every thought that it has needs to be an occurrently self-conscious thought. For example, it is not a necessary condition for the self-consciousness of such a creature that it know what all of its beliefs are: only some relevant subset of them. There is

nothing either to preclude our holding that the subject of such rationality is partly constituted by the possibility of such self-consciousness. The proposal is one to which Kant would be sympathetic.

INSERT IN TD AT A 106 FF

## **Kant's Empirical Self**

by

**Stephen Priest**

I examine some of Kant's arguments for his conclusion that the conditions for experience cannot be wholly empirical. I then evaluate his thesis that the ultimate condition for experience is a formal possibility of self-consciousness and not an empirical or metaphysical self.

I

When Kant asks how experience is possible, this breaks down into the sub-issues of how inner and outer sense are possible, how the differentiation between perceiving subject and external world is possible, and how it is possible for subjective presentations to be ordered experiences of a world of interacting physical objects. In different passages in the Transcendental Deduction in the first (A) edition of *The Critique of Pure Reason* (1) Kant has the justification of different features of experience in mind. He begins by introducing us to a regress of conditions for experience, where each newly revealed condition is also a condition for the conditions revealed so far. Kant's theory of the self is in the last resort designed to arrest this regress of conditions, and exhibit the mutual dependency of all subjective-objective distinctions on a fundamental condition which is neither subjective nor objective but purely formal.

The unity of consciousness is one such condition for experience which is neither subjective nor objective. Indeed, the distinction between empirical subject and empirical object, inner and outer sense, are made within the unity of consciousness, so in an obvious sense these distinctions within experience presuppose a prior experiential unity. But Kant thinks there exists a further condition, a condition for the unity of consciousness:

'All necessity, without exception, is grounded in a transcendental condition. There must, therefore, be a transcendental ground of the unity of consciousness, in the synthesis of the manifold of all our intuitions, and consequently also of the concepts



of objects in general, and so of all objects of experience, a ground without which it would be impossible to think any object for our intuitions.' (CPR 135-6, A106)

There is a condition, then, which is not only a condition of experience, but also the condition of all other conditions of experience. This Kant calls the Transcendental Unity of Apperception. This is the most fundamental concept in Kant's theory of self (and arguably the key concept for making sense of *The Critique of Pure Reason* as a whole). The above passage introduces the need for the transcendental unity of apperception (henceforth TUA). Kant says that all necessity is grounded in transcendental conditions. I take it this means that each variety of necessity has transcendental conditions.

Clearly there are different senses in which Kant could be taken to maintain there are conditions necessary for experience. For example, a condition for experience might be a necessary condition for experience, so that, if that condition did not obtain, then there could not be experience (in some sense of 'could'). Or, 'If there is experience then condition 'C' obtains might be a necessary truth: for example if the negation of that sentence contains a contradiction. But Kant has said that 'all necessity without exception' is grounded in transcendental conditions. So the interpretation of 'necessary' here is not relevant to deciding why the condition is necessary. If it is true that the unity of consciousness is a condition of experience, then it is true that there is a condition of the unity of consciousness, whether or not it is true that the unity of consciousness is a necessary condition for experience, or whether it is a necessary truth that the unity of consciousness is a condition for experience. The two readings are in any case mutually consistent, and Kant gives us no grounds for preferring one to the other.

*Prima facie* 'All necessity without exception' presents Kant with a problem, because if we ask whether it is necessary that the TUA is a condition for the unity of consciousness, and if Kant's reply is Yes, then that too will stand in need of some transcendental ground and the regress of conditions will not be arrested. Kant is aware of the problem, and it should be born in mind in what follows.

If we accept the premise that wherever there is necessity there is a transcendental ground, and if we further accept that some notion necessity is involved in the unity of consciousness being a condition for experience, then we may allow that Kant has validly inferred that 'there must therefore be a transcendental ground of the unity of consciousness'. But nothing obviously follows about the nature of this ground from those premises alone. By 'transcendental' we may infer that some sentence or set of sentences must be true if the unity of consciousness is to be possible, but the argument so far gives little clue as to the semantics of those sentences. In particular, it does not follow without further premises that the condition is 'In the synthesis of the manifold of all our intuitions'. That might seem a plausible area to conduct the philosophical investigation, but Kant has so far given us no compelling reason for

searching there. He uses 'must' to assert that the condition must necessarily be of a certain nature.

But whatever the nature of the TUA its centrality to the *Critique of Pure Reason* is evident. It is in fact a condition of the synthesis of the manifold of intuition, and Kant says 'consequently' of concepts of objects in general. The relationship between intuition and category is mutual or reciprocal and here Kant is simply fastening on to one side of the dependence: that of categories on synthesised intuitions. But clearly the TUA is a condition both of the categories, and of the synthesis of intuitions irrespective of their reciprocal dependence; so it makes possible the unity of two of the major themes of the critical philosophy: the use of reason, and the use of the senses. When Kant says the TUA makes possible 'all objects of experience' and 'any object for out intuitions' he clearly intends 'any' and 'all' to cover items experienced in both inner and outer sense.

Kant thinks the distinctions between mental and physical and subjective and objective depend on the distinction between inner and outer sense. This means that unless there were a distinction between inner and outer sense there could not be distinctions between mind and matter, or my mental state and yours, or in general, between what only pertains to the psychology of the subject and what pertains only to the external world. So, if the TUA make the unity of consciousness possible, and if the unity of consciousness makes all experience possible, then clearly the TUA also makes possible all the distinctions within the structure of experience. This is what I mean when I say the TUA is the fundamental concept in *The Critique of Pure Reason*. The discussion of every other topic in that book presupposes the TUA as its ultimate condition. It should be clear then that Kant has left far behind the issue of how experience of an objective enduring world is possible given our experiences are subjective and relatively non-enduring. This is a Kantian problem - treated for example in the Principles chapter and the Analogies, but it is not the most fundamental problem. Indeed, its very formulation, with its confidence in subjectivity and scepticism about objectivity, makes use of a subjective-objective distinction which relies in the last resort on the TUA.

So Kant is not ultimately a subjectivist trying to show how objectivity is possible. Nor is he an objectivist trying to show how subjectivity is possible. His philosophical project is to show how both subjectivity and objectivity are possible. This project is quite consistent with his exhibiting mutual dependencies between subjective and objective features of experience, and this allows commentators to adopt competing positions about Kant's subjectivism or objectivism. It needs to be shown that the transcendental unity of apperception is identical with the condition for all conditions for experience. It needs to be shown that Kant believes this, and then his demonstration of it needs to be examined. directly after the paragraph at PCR 135-6, A 106 in which Kant diagnoses the need for a condition of experience and of all other conditions, he says:

'This original and transcendental condition is no other than transcendental apperception.' (CPR 136, A107)

This is unequivocal textual proof that the TUA is the condition Kant is seeking. When he speaks of an original condition he means: an original condition is a condition of all conditions. An original condition has no condition: there is not any condition of an original condition. The TUA, Kant will argue, is an original condition in this sense. When he speaks of a transcendental condition, he is speaking of what makes experience, or knowledge possible. He has earlier clearly identified transcendental knowledge with knowledge of how knowledge is possible. It remains to be decided what transcendental apperception is, and more especially what the transcendental unity of appreciation is. But first we should note that Kant dispels a prima facie plausible candidate for the role of original condition of experience.

## II

### The Empirical Self

Kant deploys an argument to show that the original condition of experience cannot possibly be the empirical self. The empirical self is oneself as one is aware of oneself through inner and outer sense and as one thinks of oneself as presented through inner and outer sense. This is the argument:

(1) 'Consciousness of self according to the determination of our state in inner perception is merely empirical, and always changing.'

(2) 'No fixed and abiding self can present itself in this flux of inner appearances.'

(3) 'What has necessarily to be represented as numerically identical cannot be thought as such through empirical data.'

(C) 'To render such a transcendental presupposition valid, there must be a condition which precedes all experience, and which makes experience itself possible.'  
(CPR 136, A107)

I have just said the empirical self appears in outer as well as inner sense. This is correct, but here Kant is concerned with the empirical self of inner sense and (empirical) apperception only. This is clear from his remark about 'this' flux of inner appearance. Such consciousness is usually named 'inner sense' or 'empirical apperception' (CPR 136, A107). We may concede to Kant the first premise because

it asserts that inner sense in an empirical consciousness of self. In inner sense I appear to myself as a series of mental states. This counts as empirical because it is an experience of myself, and it is an experience of myself as I appear to myself, not as I am in myself. Given that I am not always in the same mental state but that I am always in some mental state at least during the exercise of inner sense, then it follows that one's state is 'always changing', so long as this is not taken to preclude my being in the same mental state for any length of time at all. Kant clearly does not mean this. He means that if I am in a mental state then I will cease to be in that mental state and I will be in a qualitatively distinct mental state. When he says inner sense is a 'consciousness of self' he means there exists awareness of this process: the sequence of mental states. (This awareness is not itself permanent. There is nothing to suggest Kant thinks we perpetually exercise inner sense, and that inner sense is not perpetually exercised is itself consistent with Kant's view of one's mental states as 'always changing').

If we accept this picture of empirical self-consciousness then we should accept the second premise also. It straightforwardly follows from the fact that any mental state will be replaced by another mental state that there exists no mental state of mine which persists so long as I do. So there is no mental state with which I may identify myself. If only mental states appear to inner sense, then if a self is to appear to inner sense then that self must be a mental state. But a self predates, lasts during and postdates any (except its first and last) mental states, so no self is identical with any of its mental state if these exist in a temporal sequence. So premise (2) is true if premise (1) is true.

The description 'what has to be represented as numerically identical' is one component of a definition of 'self'. The subject of a sequence of mental states, that which has them, has to be thought of as remaining identical through those mental state to count as the subject of all of them. That is the force of 'necessarily'. Unless such a putative subject were self identical over time we could not talk about a self here. The second part of the third premise is such a self identical self cannot be something introspected - cannot be an empirical object of inner sense - because as argued by the first two premises no such enduring self is presented to inner sense. So the third premise follows from the first two. If they are true then there cannot be any (introspectively) empirical concept of the subject of experience. Kant says 'as such' because he does not preclude the logical possibility of an empirical subject. We do have an empirical conception of ourselves as enduring empirical subjects. But this conception cannot be of what does the work of being the real subject of our mental states.

The conclusion is that there must exist a condition for experience which by implication is not an item to be found within experience. I take it a condition which 'precedes' experience is just the same as a condition which 'makes experiences itself possible'. 'Precedes' contains no chronological connotation here. The 'transcendental

supposition Kant mentions is the subject of experiences, or better, a condition which will fulfil the role that we typically think of as taken by a subject of experience: being the owner of experience and making experience possible. This conclusion follows from the three premises so long as we read the putative self-identical self as being a condition of their being experience, not just that which has experience. Kant is entitled to this assumption so long as it is true in some sense that there are no 'unowned' experiences, and the owner endures throughout those experiences.

Kant's argument is valid so, if the premises are true, it is true that the empirical self cannot be the original condition of experience. If the quasi-Humean grounds for the premises are conclusive then the argument is sound, and it is the case that the original condition is not empirical. If we believe in an original condition for experience it in any case is highly plausible to deny that it is empirical. To accept that would be to make some item within one's experience the condition of all of it.

### III

#### The TUA as the Original Condition for Experience

Kant next deploys an argument to show that the original condition of experience is identical with the TUA as he will define it:

(1) 'Unity of consciousness would be impossible if the mind in knowledge of the manifold could not become conscious of the identity of function whereby it synthetically combines it in one knowledge.'

(2) 'The original and necessary consciousness of the self is thus at the same time a consciousness of an equally necessary unity of the synthesis of all appearances according to concepts, that is, according to rules.'

(3) 'The mind could never think its identity in the manifoldness of its representations, and indeed think this identity a priori, if it did not have before its eyes the identity of its act, whereby it subordinates all synthesis of apprehension (which is empirical) to a transcendental unity, thereby rendering possible their interconnection according to *a priori* rules.'

(4) 'This pure original unchangeable consciousness I shall name transcendental apperception.' (CPR 136-7, A107-8)

The first premise establishes the identity Kant seeks between the role putatively filled by a self-identical subject over time, and the original condition for experience. Until this point in the Transcendental Deduction we have been introduced to the two notions separately. He has argued that the empirical self cannot be the subject of its experiences, and he has argued that there is an original condition of experience. Now he asserts that the possibility of a mind's consciousness of its self identity over time is a condition for its experience. This raises a problem that needs to be dealt with immediately; what does Kant mean by 'mind' here? There is no reason to suppose that Kant is committed to any sense of mind stronger than 'set of unified experiences' at this stage. It would, I think, be a mistake to read mind to mean 'transcendental ego' or still less 'soul' here or even 'noumenal self'. There is no evidence Kant is postulating a mental entity, and much evidence that he is at pains not to.

Kant introduces the idea of an original condition by 'unity of consciousness would be impossible if'. Unless a certain fact obtained there could be no unity of consciousness. If that is true, and if there exists a unity of consciousness then that fact must be true. The necessary fact is that the mind (a set of unified experiences) must be able to be conscious of 'the identity of function' in synthesis. To understand this we need to know what a function is. I understand a function here to be an act of synthesis: a unifying mental act by which a mind finds intelligible the objects of its experience. So, suppose some mind thinks of or perceives some object then that will consist in a series of mental acts; call them F1, F2 etc.

These mental acts or functions of synthesis constitute the object as an object of experience. Now, by 'identity of function' Kant does not mean that F1, F2, etc have to be the same kind of mental act. He does not mean that they have to be qualitatively identical. He means they have to be the acts of a single mind; episodes within one and the same unified consciousness. Even this though does not sufficiently spell out all the necessary conditions for a unity of consciousness. It must be possible for a mind to be conscious that all its separate acts of synthesis belong to itself for it to count as a mind - a unified consciousness - at all. Clearly it is a sufficient condition of the existence of a unity of consciousness that a unified consciousness be aware of an object of experience (or synthesis the manifold). But for this to be possible that mind must be able to be aware that it is the self-same owner of those mental acts. Why does Kant think this? To see why consider the converse putative possibility. Then it would be impossible even in principle for a mind to be conscious of its mental states as its own. But the only plausible reasons for asserting this would be reasons for denying that there existed a unified consciousness at all. So being a unified consciousness partly consists in the possibility of being aware that one is one. Being able to know that one is one is a condition of being one. The first premise is the first step in the identification of the original condition of experience with the TUA because the concept of awareness of self identity over time will turn out to be an important part of what the TUA consists

in. It is important to notice that the TUA cannot be explained in terms of synthesis. Rather, the converse is true. Synthesis is possible on condition the TUA holds.

The second premise spells out in a slightly different fashion the relationship between the unity of consciousness and the consciousness of that unity; it says it 'is' it. This cannot be the 'is' of strict identity because (with dubious coherence) the consciousness of it would just be it, and the construction 'consciousness of' or 'awareness of' would be redundant. The relationship is just that outlined above: the possibility of the consciousness of the unity of consciousness is a condition for the unity of consciousness. Clearly 'X is a condition for Y' and 'X is Y' do not express the same proposition (except where something is a condition of itself), so we should read 'is' here just to express that close dependency. Just as 'mind' raised a *prima facie* problem of interpretation in the first premise, so 'self' raises a similar problem in the second. By 'self' here Kant is not committed ontologically to anything distinct from the unity of consciousness, but the unity of consciousness understood under a special description: the unity of consciousness understood as being capable of being conscious of itself as a condition of itself.

Now we may read Kant as saying that the original and necessary consciousness of the self, that is; the possibility of the unity of consciousness' self-awareness, is automatically an awareness of the unity of the synthesis of all appearances. It is an awareness of those unified mental functions which make up the unified consciousness. Being aware of the unity of consciousness is being aware of the set of acts of synthesis by which the manifold of appearance is made intelligible as the objects of experience. Now we can read 'is' as the is of strict identity: the self, the unity of consciousness, and the unified acts of synthesis are not numerically distinct one from another, so what falls under one of these descriptions falls under the other two. Kant says that the consciousness of self and the unity of synthesis are 'equally necessary'. This must mean 'equally necessary if there is experience, or if there is a unity of consciousness', because clearly it is a contingent fact that there exists a unity of consciousness: there might not have been such a unity. And clearly it is equally a contingent fact that there is an original condition for experience; there might not have been any experience. But if there is experience, then it is necessary that there is a unity of consciousness. And if there is experience, and if there is a unity of consciousness, then it is necessary that there is an original condition of experience. To say that they are 'equally' necessary is not to suggest that the unity of consciousness could obtain (still less necessarily obtain) without the original condition of experience. 'Equally' here does not imply the unity of consciousness and the TUA are equivalent in the transcendental hierarchy. Kant means that they are necessary in the same sense. Given that there is experience, it is necessary that there is the unity of consciousness, and it is necessary that there is the original condition of experience. The first necessity exists because unless there were a unity of consciousness there could not be an application of the categories to experience, and

the manifold could not be understood as a rule governed world of objects. The second sort of necessity exists because unless it were at least in principle possible for the unity of consciousness to be aware of its self-identity over time, we could not speak of a unity of consciousness at all.

The second premise follows from the first because it amplifies or makes explicit what the unity of consciousness is.

While the second premise explains a condition for the identity of the mind as a unity of consciousness, the third premise introduces a condition for the consciousness of that identity. The condition of its thinking its identity a priori is its awareness of the act of relating the acts of synthesis to itself as a unified consciousness. So a transition has been effected from this claim: that a condition of a unified consciousness is its awareness of its self identity, to this claim, a condition of that awareness is a further awareness of its relating its acts of synthesis to itself as that unified consciousness. Why does Kant think this additional condition has to be met? Why does Kant not think it sufficient for the unity of consciousness' thought of its own identity that it merely be able to consciously relate its acts of synthesis to itself as that unity of consciousness? Why in addition must this be a self-conscious process? Several reasons may be advanced, but the most plausible is this. Suppose a mind is conscious of its self identity over time partly by the exercise of a particular mental act: the thought of its identity across some set of mental states of which it considers itself the subject. Then that mental act will be one mental act amongst others - a self-conscious mental state. If that mental act is itself to count as part of the self-same unified mind which is the object of its attention then it in turn must in principle admit of being the object of a further act of reflection. If this were not the case - if this were not a possibility - then Kant would have admitted an exception to this rule: the TUA makes experience possible. This is because there would then exist at least one mental state that was not transcendently grounded in the original condition: *viz* any mental state which realised the possibility of the unity of consciousness' awareness of its self-identity over time. Clearly Kant cannot allow this if he is to maintain that the TUA is the original condition of experience, because it would amount to a violation of the first conjunct of the definition of 'original condition'. It would not be the condition of all conditions, because it would not be the condition of the possibility of a mind's consciousness of its own identity, and that is a condition: a condition of experience.

It is worth raising the question of whether this meta-claim expressed by the third premise commits Kant to a regress of conditions beyond the TUA, which it is Kant's purpose to prevent. This appears *prima facie* to be so, because must not that meta-possibility of the awareness of a possible act of awareness of self identity itself stand in need of a further possible act of self-awareness and so on *ad infinitum*? The regress is in fact illusory because the possibility of the self awareness of a self-conscious mental state is just one instance amongst others of the generalisation that



the TUA expresses: that it must in principle be possible for a mind to be aware of its own self identity. This entails only the weak claim that any mental act may in principle be an object of reflection-not the strong claim that every mental state be an object of reflection. A fortiori although any self-conscious mental state must in principle admit of being an object of reflection it does not logically follow that every self-conscious mental state be an object of reflection.

I have used expressions like 'self conscious' and 'reflection' here to unpack Kant's metaphor; 'the mind has before its eyes the identity of its act'. The metaphor suggests a kind of self-conscious experience because seeing is experiencing, but there are reasons for supposing Kant does not have in mind or at least does not just have in mind an operation of inner sense. This is because inner sense only reveals to a person their mental states, it does not of itself provide the thought of the belonging of those mental states to one and the same mind, still less the consciousness of that's mind's identity over time. So the experiential interpretation of the metaphor should be played down in favour of this: The mind must be able to think its self identity in the acts whereby it consciously relates its mental states to itself as a unity of consciousness. If the realisation of that possibility requires a kind of self-conscious experience - something's appearing to the mind's eye to pursue Kant's metaphor - then no harm is done by allocating that introspective operation to inner sense so long as we realise the exercise of that inner sense alone is not what the existence of the possibility consists in.

Additionally, Kant says the thought is *a priori*. This precludes its being exhausted by an act of inner sense because all the acts of inner sense are empirical. In any case, Kant has argued at length that the empirical self is not the transcendental condition for experience, so he cannot admit that any empirical act of self-awareness is of itself a condition of the unity of consciousness. Kant explicitly states that the synthesis of apprehension is empirical, but we know that the transcendental unity of consciousness is a priori so it is hard to see how any empirical act of self-consciousness could do the work of consciously relating the two.

I conclude that Kant has presented persuasive grounds for believing that the conditions for experience cannot be wholly empirical. It is far less clear that they can be only formal if they are to ground the reality of our experience. What the ontology of a self-conscious mind consists in remains an unsolved philosophical problem. (2)

(1) All references to the *Critique of Pure Reason* are to *Immanuel Kant's Critique of Pure Reason* trans. Norman Kemp Smith (Macmillan, London, 1978).

(2) Patricia Kitcher calls 'the problem of "too many selves" the coherent reconciliation of the noumenal self, the phenomenal self and whatever is denoted by the first person singular pronoun in 'I think'. (See, for example, her *Kant's*

*Transcendental Psychology* (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1990) p.139. Kitcher's problem is intricate, but the form of a solution is: The noumenal self and the phenomenal self are numerically identical. Just one self exists as it is and as it appears. The use of 'I' in 'I think' is abstract. It denotes whoever uses it whatever the true ontology of that user. This form of solution reconciles Kant's *prima facie* inconsistent claim that

'The I think expresses an indeterminate empirical intuition, i.e., perception. Something real that is given, given indeed to thought in general, and so not as appearance [phenomenon], nor as thing in itself (noumenon), but as something which actually exists, and which in the proposition I think is denoted as such' (B422-23n) (quoted by Kitcher p. 139)

A EDITION OF KEMP-SMITH TRANSLATION FOLLOWS:

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ANALYTIC OF CONCEPTS

CHAPTER II

THE DEDUCTION OF THE PURE CONCEPTS OF  
UNDERSTANDING

Section 1

§13

THE PRINCIPLES OF ANY TRANSCENDENTAL DEDUCTION

JURISTS, when speaking of rights and claims, distinguish in a legal action the question of right (*quid juris*) from the question of fact (*quid facti*); and they demand that both be proved.

Proof of the former, which has to state the right or the legal claim, they entitle the deduction. Many empirical concepts are employed without question from anyone. Since experience is always available for the proof of their objective reality, we believe ourselves, even without a deduction, to be justified in appropriating to them a meaning, an ascribed significance. But there are also usurpatory concepts, such as fortune, fate, which, though allowed to circulate by almost universal indulgence, are yet from time to time challenged by the question: *quid juris*. This demand for a deduction involves us in considerable perplexity, no clear legal title, sufficient to justify their employment, being obtainable either from experience or from reason.

Now among the manifold concepts which form the highly  
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complicated web of human knowledge, there are some which are marked out for pure a priori employment, in complete independence of all experience; and their right to be so employed always demands a deduction. For since empirical proofs do not suffice to justify this kind of employment, we are faced by the problem how these concepts can relate to objects which they yet do not obtain from any experience. The explanation of the manner in which concepts can thus relate a priori to objects I entitle their transcendental deduction; and from it I distinguish empirical deduction, which shows the manner in which a concept is acquired through experience and through reflection upon experience, and which therefore concerns, not its legitimacy, but only its de facto mode of origination.

We are already in possession of concepts which are of two quite different kinds, and which yet agree in that they relate to objects in a completely a priori manner, namely, the concepts of space and time as forms of sensibility, and the categories as concepts of understanding. To seek an empirical deduction of either of these types of concept would be labour entirely lost. For their distinguishing feature consists just in this, that they relate to their objects without having borrowed from experience anything that can serve in the representation of these objects. If, therefore, a deduction of such concepts is indispensable, it must in any case be transcendental.

We can, however, with regard to these concepts, as with regard to all knowledge, seek to discover in experience, if not the principle of their possibility, at least the occasioning causes of their production. The impressions of the senses supplying the first stimulus, the whole faculty of knowledge opens out to them, and experience is brought into existence. That experience contains two very dissimilar elements, namely, the matter of knowledge [obtained] from the senses, and a certain form for the ordering of this matter, [obtained] from the inner source of the pure intuition and thought which, on occasion of the sense-impressions, are first brought into action and yield concepts. Such an investigation of the first strivings of our faculty of knowledge, whereby it advances from particular perceptions to universal concepts, is undoubtedly of great service. We are indebted to the celebrated

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Locke for opening out this new line of enquiry. But a deduction of the pure a priori concepts can never be obtained in this manner; it is not to be looked for in any such direction. For in view of their subsequent employment, which has to be entirely independent of experience, they must be in a position to show a certificate of birth quite other than that of descent from experiences. Since this attempted physiological derivation concerns a quaestio facti, it cannot strictly be called deduction; and I shall therefore entitle it the explanation of the possession of pure knowledge. Plainly the only deduction that can be given of this knowledge is one that is transcendental, not empirical. In respect to pure a priori concepts the latter type of deduction is an utterly useless enterprise which can be engaged in only by those who have failed to grasp the quite peculiar nature of these modes of knowledge.

But although it may be admitted that the only kind of deduction of pure a priori knowledge which is possible is on transcendental lines, it is not at once obvious that a deduction is indispensably necessary. We have already, by means of a transcendental deduction, traced the concepts of space and time to their sources, and have explained and determined their a priori objective validity. Geometry, however, proceeds with security in knowledge that is completely a priori, and has no need to beseech philosophy for any certificate of the pure and legitimate descent of its fundamental concept of space. But the concept is employed in this science only in its reference to the outer sensible world -- of the intuition of which space is the pure form -- where all geometrical knowledge, grounded as it is in a priori intuition, possesses immediate evidence. The objects, so far as their form is concerned, are given, through the very knowledge of them, a priori in intuition.

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otherwise; it is with them that the unavoidable demand for a transcendental deduction, not only of themselves, but also of the concept of space, first originates. For since they speak of objects through predicates not of intuition and sensibility but of pure a priori thought, they relate to objects universally,

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that is, apart from all conditions of sensibility. Also, not being

grounded in experience, they cannot, in a priori intuition, exhibit any object such as might, prior to all experience, serve as ground for their synthesis. For these reasons, they arouse suspicion not merely in regard to the objective validity and the limits of their own employment, but owing to their tendency to employ the concept of space beyond the conditions of sensible intuition, that concept also they render ambiguous; and this, indeed, is why we have already found a transcendental deduction of it necessary. The reader must therefore be convinced of the unavoidable necessity of such a transcendental deduction before he has taken a single step in the field of pure reason. Otherwise he proceeds blindly, and after manifold wanderings must come back to the same ignorance from which he started. At the same time, if he is not to lament over obscurity in matters which are by their very nature deeply veiled, or to be too easily discouraged in the removal of obstacles, he must have a clear foreknowledge of the inevitable difficulty of the undertaking. For we must either completely surrender all claims to make judgments of pure reason in the most highly esteemed of all fields, that which transcends the limits of all possible experience, or else bring this critical enquiry to completion.

We have already been able with but little difficulty to explain how the concepts of space and time, although a priori modes of knowledge, must necessarily relate to objects, and how independently of all experience they make possible a synthetic knowledge of objects. For since only by means of such pure forms of sensibility can an object appear to us, and so be an object of empirical intuition, space and time are pure intuitions which contain a priori the condition of the possibility of objects as appearances, and the synthesis which takes place in them has objective validity.

The categories of understanding, on the other hand, do not represent the conditions under which objects are given in intuition. Objects may, therefore, appear to us without

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their being under the necessity of being related to the functions of understanding; and understanding need not, therefore, contain their a priori conditions. Thus a difficulty such as we did not meet with in the field of sensibility is here presented, namely, how subjective conditions of thought can

have objective validity, that is, can furnish conditions of the possibility of all knowledge of objects. For appearances can certainly be given in intuition independently of functions of the understanding. Let us take, for instance, the concept of cause, which signifies a special kind of synthesis, whereby upon something, A, there is posited something quite different, B, according to a rule. It is not manifest a priori why appearances should contain anything of this kind (experiences cannot be cited in its proof, for what has to be established is the objective validity of a concept that is a priori); and it is therefore a priori doubtful whether such a concept be not perhaps altogether empty, and have no object anywhere among appearances. That objects of sensible intuition must conform to the formal conditions of sensibility which lie a priori in the mind is evident, because otherwise they would not be objects for us. But that they must likewise conform to the conditions which the understanding requires for the synthetic unity of thought, is a conclusion the grounds of which are by no means so obvious. Appearances might very well be so constituted that the understanding should not find them to be in accordance with the Conditions of its unity. Everything might be in such confusion that, for instance, in the series of appearances nothing presented itself which might yield a rule of synthesis and so answer to the concept of cause and effect. This concept would then be altogether empty, null, and meaningless. But since intuition stands in no need whatsoever of the functions of thought, appearances would none the less present objects to our intuition.

If we thought to escape these toilsome enquiries by saying that experience continually presents examples of such regularity among appearances and so affords abundant opportunity of abstracting the concept of cause, and at the same time of verifying the objective validity of such a concept, we should be overlooking the fact that the concept of cause can  
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never arise in this manner. It must either be grounded completely a priori in the understanding, or must be entirely given up as a mere phantom of the brain. For this concept makes strict demand that something, A, should be such that something else, B, follows from it necessarily and in accordance with an absolutely universal rule. Appearances do indeed pre-

sent cases from which a rule can be obtained according to which something usually happens, but they never prove the sequence to be necessary. To the synthesis of cause and effect there belongs a dignity which cannot be empirically expressed, namely that the effect not only succeeds upon the cause, but that it is posited through it and arises out of it. This strict universality of the rule is never a characteristic of empirical rules; they can acquire through induction only comparative universality, that is, extensive applicability. If we were to treat pure concepts of understanding as merely empirical products, we should be making a complete change in [the manner of] their employment.

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#### Transition to the Transcendental Deduction of the Categories

There are only two possible ways in which synthetic representations and their objects can establish connection, obtain necessary relation to one another, and, as it were, meet one another. Either the object alone must make the representation possible, or the representation alone must make the object possible. In the former case, this relation is only empirical, and the representation is never possible a priori. This is true of appearances, as regards that [element] in them which belongs to sensation. In the latter case, representation in itself does not produce its object in so far as existence is concerned, for we are not here speaking of its causality by means of the will. None the less the representation is a priori determinant of the object, if it be the case that only through P 126

the representation is it possible to know anything as an object. Now there are two conditions under which alone the knowledge of an object is possible, first, intuition, through which it is given, though only as appearance; secondly, concept, through which an object is thought corresponding to this intuition. It is evident from the above that the first condition, namely, that under which alone objects can be intuited, does actually lie a priori in the mind as the formal ground of the objects. All appearances necessarily agree with this formal condition of sensibility, since only through it can they appear, that is, be empirically intuited and given. The question now arises whether a priori concepts do not also serve as ante-

cedent conditions under which alone anything can be, if not intuited, yet thought as object in general. In that case all empirical knowledge of objects would necessarily conform to such concepts, because only as thus presupposing them is anything possible as object of experience. Now all experience does indeed contain, in addition to the intuition of the senses through which something is given, a concept of an object as being thereby given, that is to say, as appearing. Concepts of objects in general thus underlie all empirical knowledge as its a priori conditions. The objective validity of the categories as a priori concepts rests, therefore, on the fact that, so far as the form of thought is concerned, through them alone does experience become possible. They relate of necessity and a priori to objects of experience, for the reason that only by means of them can any object whatsoever of experience be thought.

The transcendental deduction of all a priori concepts has thus a principle according to which the whole enquiry must be directed, namely, that they must be recognised as a priori conditions of the possibility of experience, whether of the intuition which is to be met with in it or of the thought. Concepts which yield the objective ground of the possibility of experience are for this very reason necessary. But the unfolding of the experience wherein they are encountered is not their deduction; it is only their illustration. For on any such  
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exposition they would be merely accidental. Save through their original relation to possible experience, in which all objects of knowledge are found, their relation to any one object would be quite incomprehensible.

The illustrious Locke, failing to take account of these considerations, and meeting with pure concepts of the understanding in experience, deduced them also from experience, and yet proceeded so inconsequently that he attempted with their aid to obtain knowledge which far transcends all limits of experience. David Hume recognised that, in order to be able to do this, it was necessary that these concepts should have an a priori origin. But since he could not explain how it can be possible that the understanding must think concepts, which are not in themselves connected in the understanding, as being necessarily connected in the object, and since it never occurred to him that the understanding might itself, perhaps, through



these concepts, be the author of the experience in which its objects are found, he was constrained to derive them from experience, namely, from a subjective necessity (that is, from custom), which arises from repeated association in experience, and which comes mistakenly to be regarded as objective. But from these premisses he argued quite consistently. It is impossible, he declared, with these concepts and the principles to which they give rise, to pass beyond the limits of experience.

\*There are three original sources (capacities or faculties of the soul) which contain the conditions of the possibility of all experience, and cannot themselves be derived from any other faculty of the mind, namely, sense, imagination, and apperception. Upon them are grounded (1) the synopsis of the manifold a priori through sense; (2) the synthesis of this manifold through imagination; finally (3) the unity of this synthesis through original apperception. All these faculties have a transcendental (as well as an empirical) employment which concerns the form alone, and is possible a priori. As regards sense, we have treated of this above in the first part; we shall now endeavour to comprehend the nature of the other two.

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Now this empirical derivation, in which both philosophers agree, cannot be reconciled with the scientific a priori knowledge which we do actually possess, namely, pure mathematics and general science of nature; and this fact therefore suffices to disprove such derivation.

While the former of these two illustrious men opened a wide door to enthusiasm -- for if reason once be allowed such rights, it will no longer allow itself to be kept within bounds by vaguely defined recommendations of moderation -- the other gave himself over entirely to scepticism, having, as he believed, discovered that what had hitherto been regarded as reason was but an all-prevalent illusion infecting our faculty of knowledge. We now propose to make trial whether it be not possible to find for human reason safe conduct between these two rocks, assigning to her determinate limits, and yet keeping open for her the whole field of her appropriate activities.

But first I shall introduce a word of explanation in regard to the categories. They are concepts of an object in general, by means of which the intuition of an object is regarded as determined in respect of one of the logical functions of judgment.

Thus the function of the categorical judgment is that of the relation of subject to predicate; for example, 'All bodies are divisible'. But as regards the merely logical employment of the understanding, it remains undetermined to which of the two concepts the function of the subject, and to which the function of predicate, is to be assigned. For we can also say, 'Something divisible is a body'. But when the concept of body is brought under the category of substance, it is thereby determined that its empirical intuition in experience must always be considered as subject and never as mere predicate. Similarly with all the other categories.

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## THE DEDUCTION OF THE PURE CONCEPTS OF UNDERSTANDING

### Section 2

#### THE A PRIORI GROUNDS OF THE POSSIBILITY OF EXPERIENCE

THAT a concept, although itself neither contained in the concept of possible experience nor consisting of elements of a possible experience, should be produced completely a priori and should relate to an object, is altogether contradictory and impossible. For it would then have no content, since no intuition corresponds to it; and intuitions in general, through which objects can be given to us, constitute the field, the whole object, of possible experience. An a priori concept which did not relate to experience would be only the logical form of a concept, not the concept itself through which something is thought.

Pure a priori concepts, if such exist, cannot indeed contain anything empirical; yet, none the less, they can serve solely as a priori conditions of a possible experience. Upon this ground alone can their objective reality rest.

If, therefore, we seek to discover how pure concepts of understanding are possible, we must enquire what are the a priori conditions upon which the possibility of experience rests, and which remain as its underlying grounds when everything empirical is abstracted from appearances. A concept which universally and adequately expresses such a normal and

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objective condition of experience would be entitled a pure concept of understanding. Certainly, once I am in possession of

pure concepts of understanding, I can think objects which may be impossible, or which, though perhaps in themselves possible, cannot be given in any experience. For in the connecting of these concepts something may be omitted which yet necessarily belongs to the condition of a possible experience (as in the concept of a spirit). Or, it may be, pure concepts are extended further than experience can follow (as with the concept of God). But the elements of all modes of a priori knowledge, even of capricious and incongruous fictions, though they cannot, indeed, be derived from experience, since in that case they would not be knowledge a priori, must none the less always contain the pure a priori conditions of a possible experience and of an empirical object. Otherwise nothing would be thought through them, and they themselves, being without data, could never arise even in thought.

The concepts which thus contain a priori the pure thought involved in every experience, we find in the categories. If we can prove that by their means alone an object can be thought, this will be a sufficient deduction of them, and will justify their objective validity. But since in such a thought more than simply the faculty of thought, the understanding, is brought into play, and since this faculty itself, as a faculty of knowledge that is meant to relate to objects, calls for explanation in regard to the possibility of such relation, we must first of all consider, not in their empirical but in their transcendental constitution, the subjective sources which form the a priori foundation of the possibility of experience.

If each representation were completely foreign to every other, standing apart in isolation, no such thing as knowledge would ever arise. For knowledge is [essentially] a whole in which representations stand compared and connected. As sense contains a manifold in its intuition, I ascribe to it a synopsis. But to such synopsis a synthesis must always correspond; receptivity can make knowledge possible only when combined with spontaneity. Now this spontaneity is the ground of a threefold synthesis which must necessarily be found in all knowledge; namely, the apprehension of representations as modifications of the mind in intuition, their reproduction in  
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imagination, and their recognition in a concept. These point to three subjective sources of knowledge which make possible

the understanding itself -- and consequently all experience as its empirical product.

#### Preliminary Remark

The deduction of the categories is a matter of such extreme difficulty, compelling us to penetrate so deeply into the first grounds of the possibility of our knowledge in general, that in order to avoid the elaborateness of a complete theory, and yet at the same time to omit nothing in so indispensable an enquiry, I have found it advisable in the four following passages rather to prepare than to instruct the reader. Systematic exposition of these elements of the understanding is first given in Section 3, immediately following. The reader must not therefore be deterred by obscurities in these earlier sections. They are unavoidable in an enterprise never before attempted. They will, as I trust, in the section referred to, finally give way to complete insight.

#### 1. The Synthesis of Apprehension in Intuition

Whatever the origin of our representations, whether they are due to the influence of outer things, or are produced through inner causes, whether they arise a priori, or being appearances have an empirical origin, they must all, as modifications of the mind, belong to inner sense. All our knowledge is thus finally subject to time, the formal condition of inner sense. In it they must all be ordered, connected, and brought into relation. This is a general observation which, throughout what follows, must be borne in mind as being quite fundamental.

Every intuition contains in itself a manifold which can be represented as a manifold only in so far as the mind distinguishes the time in the sequence of one impression upon another; for each representation, in so far as it is contained in a single moment, can never be anything but absolute unity. In order that unity of intuition may arise out of this manifold (as is required in the representation of space) it must first be run through, and held together. This act I name the synthesis of apprehension, because it is directed immediately upon intuition, which does indeed offer a manifold, but a manifold which can  
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never be represented as a manifold, and as contained in a single representation, save in virtue of such a synthesis. This synthesis of apprehension must also be exercised

a priori, that is, in respect of representations which are not empirical. For without it we should never have a priori the representations either of space or of time. They can be produced only through the synthesis of the manifold which sensibility presents in its original receptivity. We have thus a pure synthesis of apprehension.

## 2. The Synthesis of Reproduction in Imagination

It is a merely empirical law, that representations which have often followed or accompanied one another finally become associated, and so are set in a relation whereby, even in the absence of the object, one of these representations can, in accordance with a fixed rule, bring about a transition of the mind to the other. But this law of reproduction presupposes that appearances are themselves actually subject to such a rule, and that in the manifold of these representations a co-existence or sequence takes place in conformity with certain rules. Otherwise our empirical imagination would never find opportunity for exercise appropriate to its powers, and so would remain concealed within the mind as a dead and to us unknown faculty. If cinnabar were sometimes red, sometimes black, sometimes light, sometimes heavy, if a man changed sometimes into this and sometimes into that animal form, if the country on the longest day were sometimes covered with fruit, sometimes with ice and snow, my empirical imagination would never find opportunity when representing red colour to bring to mind heavy cinnabar. Nor could there be an empirical synthesis of reproduction, if a certain name were sometimes given to this, sometimes to that object, or were one and the same thing named sometimes in one way, sometimes in another, independently of any rule to which appearances are in themselves subject.

There must then be something which, as the a priori ground of a necessary synthetic unity of appearances, makes their reproduction possible. What that something is we

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soon discover, when we reflect that appearances are not things in themselves, but are the mere play of our representations, and in the end reduce to determinations of inner sense. For if we can show that even our purest a priori intuitions yield no knowledge, save in so far as they contain a combination of the manifold such as renders a thoroughgoing

synthesis of reproduction possible, then this synthesis of imagination is likewise grounded, antecedently to all experience, upon a priori principles; and we must assume a pure transcendental synthesis of imagination as conditioning the very possibility of all experience. For experience as such necessarily presupposes the reproducibility of appearances. When I seek to draw a line in thought, or to think of the time from one noon to another, or even to represent to myself some particular number, obviously the various manifold representations that are involved must be apprehended by me in thought one after the other. But if I were always to drop out of thought the preceding representations (the first parts of the line, the antecedent parts of the time period, or the units in the order represented), and did not reproduce them while advancing to those that follow, a complete representation would never be obtained: none of the above-mentioned thoughts, not even the purest and most elementary representations of space and time, could arise.

The synthesis of apprehension is thus inseparably bound up with the synthesis of reproduction. And as the former constitutes the transcendental ground of the possibility of all modes of knowledge whatsoever -- of those that are pure a priori no less than of those that are empirical -- the reproductive synthesis of the imagination is to be counted among the transcendental acts of the mind. We shall therefore entitle this faculty the transcendental faculty of imagination.

### 3. The Synthesis of Recognition in a Concept

If we were not conscious that what we think is the same as what we thought a moment before, all reproduction in the series of representations would be useless. For it would in its present state be a new representation which would not in any way belong to the act whereby it was to be gradually generated. The manifold of the representation would never, therefore, form a whole, since it would lack that unity which only consciousness can impart to it. If, in counting, I forget that the units, which now hover before me, have been added to one another in succession, I should never know that a total is being produced through this successive addition of unit to unit, and so would remain ignorant of the number. For the concept of the number is nothing but the consciousness of

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this unity of synthesis.

The word 'concept' might of itself suggest this remark. For this unitary consciousness is what combines the manifold, successively intuited, and thereupon also reproduced, into one representation. This consciousness may often be only faint, so that we do not connect it with the act itself, that is, not in any direct manner with the generation of the representation, but only with the outcome [that which is thereby represented]. But notwithstanding these variations, such consciousness, however indistinct, must always be present; without it, concepts, and therewith knowledge of objects, are altogether impossible.

At this point we must make clear to ourselves what we mean by the expression 'an object of representations'. We have stated above that appearances are themselves nothing but sensible representations, which, as such and in themselves, must not be taken as objects capable of existing outside our power of representation. What, then, is to be understood when we speak of an object corresponding to, and consequently also distinct from, our knowledge? It is easily seen that this object must be thought only as something in general = x, since outside our knowledge we have nothing which we could set over against this knowledge as corresponding to it.

Now we find that our thought of the relation of all knowledge to its object carries with it an element of necessity; the object is viewed as that which prevents our modes of knowledge from being haphazard or arbitrary, and which determines them a priori in some definite fashion. For in so far as they are to relate to an object, they must necessarily agree  
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with one another, that is, must possess that unity which constitutes the concept of an object.

But it is clear that, since we have to deal only with the manifold of our representations, and since that x (the object) which corresponds to them is nothing to us -- being, as it is, something that has to be distinct from all our representations -- the unity which the object makes necessary can be nothing else than the formal unity of consciousness in the synthesis of the manifold of representations. It is only when we have thus produced synthetic unity in the manifold of intuition that we are in a position to say that we know the object. But this unity

is impossible if the intuition cannot be generated in accordance with a rule by means of such a function of synthesis as makes the reproduction of the manifold a priori necessary, and renders possible a concept in which it is united. Thus we think a triangle as an object, in that we are conscious of the combination of three straight lines according to a rule by which such an intuition can always be represented. This unity of rule determines all the manifold, and limits it to conditions which make unity of apperception possible. The concept of this unity is the representation of the object = x, which I think through the predicates, above mentioned, of a triangle. All knowledge demands a concept, though that concept may, indeed, be quite imperfect or obscure. But a concept is always, as regards its form, something universal which serves as a rule. The concept of body, for instance, as the unity of the manifold which is thought through it, serves as a rule in our knowledge of outer appearances. But it can be a rule for intuitions only in so far as it represents in any given appearances the necessary reproduction of their manifold, and thereby the synthetic unity in our consciousness of them. The concept of body, in the perception of something outside us, necessitates the representation of extension, and therewith representations of impenetrability, shape, etc. All necessity, without exception, is grounded in a transcendental condition. There must, therefore, be a transcendental ground of the unity of consciousness in the synthesis of the manifold of all our intuitions, and consequently also of the concepts of objects in general, and so of all objects of experience, a ground without which it would be impossible

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to think any object for our intuitions; for this object is no more than that something, the concept of which expresses such a necessity of synthesis.

This original and transcendental condition is no other than transcendental apperception. Consciousness of self according to the determinations of our state in inner perception is merely empirical, and always changing. No fixed and abiding self can present itself in this flux of inner appearances. Such consciousness is usually named inner sense, or empirical apperception. What has necessarily to be represented as numerically identical cannot be thought as such



through empirical data. To render such a transcendental presupposition valid, there must be a condition which precedes all experience, and which makes experience itself possible.

There can be in us no modes of knowledge, no connection or unity of one mode of knowledge with another, without that unity of consciousness which precedes all data of intuitions, and by relation to which representation of objects is alone possible. This pure original unchangeable consciousness I shall name transcendental apperception. That it deserves this name is clear from the fact that even the purest objective unity, namely, that of the a priori concepts (space and time), is only possible through relation of the intuitions to such unity of consciousness. The numerical unity of this apperception is thus the a priori ground of all concepts, just as the manifoldness of space and time is the a priori ground of the intuitions of sensibility.

This transcendental unity of apperception forms out of all possible appearances, which can stand alongside one another in one experience, a connection of all these representations according to laws. For this unity of consciousness would be impossible if the mind in knowledge of the manifold could not become conscious of the identity of function whereby it synthetically combines it in one knowledge. The original and necessary consciousness of the identity of the self is thus at the same time a consciousness of an equally necessary unity of the synthesis of all appearances according to concepts, that  
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is, according to rules, which not only make them necessarily reproducible but also in so doing determine an object for their intuition, that is, the concept of something wherein they are necessarily interconnected. For the mind could never think its identity in the manifoldness of its representations, and indeed think this identity a priori, if it did not have before its eyes the identity of its act, whereby it subordinates all synthesis of apprehension (which is empirical) to a transcendental unity, thereby rendering possible their interconnection according to a priori rules.

Now, also, we are in a position to determine more adequately our concept of an object in general. All representations have, as representations, their object, and can themselves in

turn become objects of other representations. Appearances are the sole objects which can be given to us immediately, and that in them which relates immediately to the object is called intuition. But these appearances are not things in themselves; they are only representations, which in turn have their object -- an object which cannot itself be intuited by us, and which may, therefore, be named the non-empirical, that is, transcendental object = x.

The pure concept of this transcendental object, which in reality throughout all our knowledge is always one and the same, is what can alone confer upon all our empirical concepts in general relation to an object, that is, objective reality. This concept cannot contain any determinate intuition, and therefore refers only to that unity which must be met with in any manifold of knowledge which stands in relation to an object. This relation is nothing but the necessary unity of consciousness, and therefore also of the synthesis of the manifold, through a common function of the mind, which combines it in one representation. Since this unity must be regarded as necessary a priori -- otherwise knowledge would be without an object -- the relation to a transcendental object, that is, the objective reality of our empirical knowledge, rests on the transcendental law, that all appearances, in so far as through them objects are to be given to us, must stand under those a priori rules of synthetical unity whereby the inter-  
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relating of these appearances in empirical intuition is alone possible. In other words, appearances in experience must stand under the conditions of the necessary unity of apperception, just as in mere intuition they must be subject to the formal conditions of space and of time. Only thus can any knowledge become possible at all.

#### 4. Preliminary Explanation of the Possibility of the Categories, as Knowledge a priori

There is one single experience in which all perceptions are represented as in thoroughgoing and orderly connection, just as there is only one space and one time in which all modes of appearance and all relation of being or not being occur. When we speak of different experiences, we can refer only to the various perceptions, all of which, as such, belong to one and the same general experience. This thoroughgoing

synthetic unity of perceptions is indeed the form of experience; it is nothing else than the synthetic unity of appearances in accordance with concepts.

Unity of synthesis according to empirical concepts would be altogether accidental, if these latter were not based on a transcendental ground of unity. Otherwise it would be possible for appearances to crowd in upon the soul, and yet to be such as would never allow of experience. Since connection in accordance with universal and necessary laws would be lacking, all relation of knowledge to objects would fall away. The appearances might, indeed, constitute intuition without thought, but not knowledge; and consequently would be for us as good as nothing.

The a priori conditions of a possible experience in general are at the same time conditions of the possibility of objects of experience. Now I maintain that the categories, above cited, are nothing but the conditions of thought in a possible experience, just as space and time are the conditions of intuition for that same experience. They are fundamental concepts by which we think objects in general for appearances, and have therefore a priori objective validity. This is exactly what we desired to prove.

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But the possibility, indeed the necessity, of these categories rests on the relation in which our entire sensibility, and with it all possible appearances, stand to original apperception. In original apperception everything must necessarily conform to the conditions of the thoroughgoing unity of self-consciousness, that is, to the universal functions of synthesis, namely, of that synthesis according to concepts in which alone apperception can demonstrate a priori its complete and necessary identity. Thus the concept of a cause is nothing but a synthesis (of that which follows in the time-series, with other appearances) according to concepts; and without such unity, which has its a priori rule, and which subjects the appearances to itself, no thoroughgoing, universal, and therefore necessary, unity of consciousness would be met with in the manifold of perceptions. These perceptions would not then belong to any experience, consequently would be without an object, merely a blind play of representations, less even than a dream.

All attempts to derive these pure concepts of understanding from experience, and so to ascribe to them a merely empirical origin, are entirely vain and useless. I need not insist upon the fact that, for instance, the concept of a cause involves the character of necessity, which no experience can yield. Experience does indeed show that one appearance customarily follows upon another, but not that this sequence is necessary, nor that we can argue a priori and with complete universality from the antecedent, viewed as a condition, to the consequent. But as regards the empirical rule of association, which we must postulate throughout when we assert that everything in the series of events is so subject to rule that nothing ever happens save in so far as something precedes it on which it universally follows -- upon what I ask, does this rule, as a law of nature, rest? How is this association itself possible? The ground of the possibility of the association of the manifold, so far as it lies in the object, is named the affinity of the manifold. I therefore ask, how are we to make comprehensible to ourselves the thoroughgoing affinity of appearances, whereby they stand and must stand under unchanging laws?

On my principles it is easily explicable. All possible appearances, as representations, belong to the totality of a pos-

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sible self-consciousness. But as self-consciousness is a transcendental representation, numerical identity is inseparable from it, and is a priori certain. For nothing can come to our knowledge save in terms of this original apperception. Now, since this identity must necessarily enter into the synthesis of all the manifold of appearances, so far as the synthesis is to yield empirical knowledge, the appearances are subject to a priori conditions, with which the synthesis of their apprehension must be in complete accord. The representation of a universal condition according to which a certain manifold can be posited in uniform fashion is called a rule, and, when it must be so posited, a law. Thus all appearances stand in thoroughgoing connection according to necessary laws, and therefore in a transcendental affinity, of which the empirical is a mere consequence.

That nature should direct itself according to our subjective ground of apperception, and should indeed depend upon it in respect of its conformity to law, sounds very strange

and absurd. But when we consider that this nature is not a thing in itself but is merely an aggregate of appearances, so many representations of the mind, we shall not be surprised that we can discover it only in the radical faculty of all our knowledge, namely, in transcendental apperception, in that unity on account of which alone it can be entitled object of all possible experience, that is, nature. Nor shall we be surprised that just for this very reason this unity can be known a priori, and therefore as necessary. Were the unity given in itself independently of the first sources of our thought, this would never be possible. We should not then know of any source from which we could obtain the synthetic propositions asserting such a universal unity of nature. For they would then have to be derived from the objects of nature themselves; and as this could take place only empirically, none but a merely accidental unity could be obtained, which would fall far short of the necessary interconnection that we have in mind when we speak of nature.

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## DEDUCTION OF THE PURE CONCEPTS OF UNDERSTANDING

### Section 3

#### THE RELATION OF THE UNDERSTANDING TO OBJECTS IN GENERAL, AND THE POSSIBILITY OF KNOWING THEM A PRIORI

What we have expounded separately and singly in the preceding section, we shall now present in systematic interconnection. There are three subjective sources of knowledge upon which rests the possibility of experience in general and of knowledge of its objects -- sense, imagination, and apperception. Each of these can be viewed as empirical, namely, in its application to given appearances. But all of them are likewise a priori elements or foundations, which make this empirical employment itself possible. Sense represents appearances empirically in perception, imagination in association (and reproduction), apperception in the empirical consciousness of the identity of the reproduced representations with the appearances whereby they were given, that is, in recognition.

But all perceptions are grounded a priori in pure intuition (in time, the form of their inner intuition as representations), association in pure synthesis of imagination, and empirical

consciousness in pure apperception, that is, in the thoroughgoing identity of the self in all possible representations. If, now, we desire to follow up the inner ground of this connection of the representations to the point upon which they have all to converge in order that they may therein for the first time acquire the unity of knowledge necessary for a possible experience, we must begin with pure apperception. Intuitions are nothing to us, and do not in the least concern us if they cannot be taken up into consciousness, in which they may participate either directly or indirectly. In this way alone is any knowledge possible. We are conscious a priori of the complete identity of the self in respect of all representations which can even belong to our knowledge, as being a necessary condition of the possibility of all representations. P 142

tions. For in me they can represent something only in so far as they belong with all others to one consciousness, and therefore must be at least capable of being so connected. This principle holds a priori, and may be called the transcendental principle of the unity of all that is manifold in our representations, and consequently also in intuition. Since this unity of the manifold in one subject is synthetic, pure apperception supplies a principle of the synthetic unity of the manifold in all possible intuition.

This synthetic unity presupposes or includes a synthesis, and if the former is to be a priori necessary, the synthesis must also be a priori. The transcendental unity of apperception thus relates to the pure synthesis of imagination, as an a priori condition of the possibility of all combination of the manifold in one knowledge.

This proposition is of great importance and calls for careful consideration. All representations have a necessary relation to a possible empirical consciousness. For if they did not have this, and if it were altogether impossible to become conscious of them, this would practically amount to the admission of their non-existence. But all empirical consciousness has a necessary relation to a transcendental consciousness which precedes all special experience, namely, the consciousness of myself as original apperception. It is therefore absolutely necessary that in my knowledge all consciousness should belong to a single consciousness, that of myself. Here, then, is a synthetic unity of the manifold (of consciousness), which

is known a priori, and so yields the ground for synthetic a priori propositions which concern pure thought, just as do space and time for the propositions which refer to the form of pure intuition. The synthetic proposition, that all the variety of empirical consciousness must be combined in one single self-consciousness, is the absolutely first and synthetic principle of our thought in general. But it must not be forgotten that the bare representation 'I' in relation to all other representations (the collective unity of which it makes possible) is transcendental consciousness. Whether this representation is clear (empirical consciousness) or obscure, or even whether it ever actually occurs, does not here concern us. But the possibility of the logical form of all knowledge is necessarily conditioned by relation to this apperception as a faculty.

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But only the productive synthesis of the

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imagination can take place a priori; the reproductive rests upon empirical conditions. Thus the principle of the necessary unity of pure (productive) synthesis of imagination, prior to apperception, is the ground of the possibility of all knowledge, especially of experience.

We entitle the synthesis of the manifold in imagination transcendental, if without distinction of intuitions it is directed exclusively to the a priori combination of the manifold; and the unity of this synthesis is called transcendental, if it is represented as a priori necessary in relation to the original unity of apperception. Since this unity of apperception underlies the possibility of all knowledge, the transcendental unity of the synthesis of imagination is the pure form of all possible knowledge; and by means of it all objects of possible experience must be represented a priori.

The unity of apperception in relation to the synthesis of imagination is the understanding; and this same unity, with reference to the transcendental synthesis of the imagination, the pure understanding. In the understanding there are then pure a priori modes of knowledge which contain the necessary unity of the pure synthesis of imagination in respect of all possible appearances. These are the categories, that is, the pure concepts of understanding. The empirical faculty of knowledge in man must therefore contain an understanding which relates to all objects of the senses, although only by means of

intuition and of its synthesis through imagination. All appearances, as data for a possible experience, are subject to this understanding. This relation of appearances to possible experience is indeed necessary, for otherwise they would yield no knowledge and would not in any way concern us. We have, therefore, to recognise that pure understanding, by means of the categories, is a formal and synthetic principle of all experiences, and that appearances have a necessary relation to the understanding.

We will now, starting from below, namely, with the empirical, strive to make clear the necessary connection in which understanding, by means of the categories, stands to appearances. What is first given to us is appearance. When combined with consciousness, it is called perception. (Save through its P 144

relation to a consciousness that is at least possible, appearance could never be for us an object of knowledge, and so would be nothing to us; and since it has in itself no objective reality, but exists only in being known, it would be nothing at all. ) Now, since every appearance contains a manifold, and since different perceptions therefore occur in the mind separately and singly, a combination of them, such as they cannot have in sense itself, is demanded. There must therefore exist in us an active faculty for the synthesis of this manifold. To this faculty I give the title, imagination. Its action, when immediately directed upon perceptions, I entitle apprehension. Since imagination has to bring the manifold of intuition into the form of an image, it must previously have taken the impressions up into its activity, that is, have apprehended them.

But it is clear that even this apprehension of the manifold would not by itself produce an image and a connection of the impressions, were it not that there exists a subjective ground which leads the mind to reinstate a preceding perception alongside the subsequent perception to which it has passed, and so to form whole series of perceptions. This is the reproductive faculty of imagination, which is merely empirical. If, however, representations reproduced one another in any order, just as they happened to come together, this would not lead to any determinate connection of them, but only to accidental collocations; and so would not give rise to any knowledge. Their reproduction must, therefore, conform to a



rule, in accordance with which a representation connects in the imagination with some one representation in preference to another. This subjective and empirical ground of reproduction according to rules is what is called the association of representations.

Psychologists have hitherto failed to realise that imagination is a necessary ingredient of perception itself. This is due partly to the fact that that faculty has been limited to reproduction, partly to the belief that the senses not only supply impressions but also combine them so as to generate images of objects. For that purpose something more than the mere receptivity of impressions is undoubtedly required, namely, a function for the synthesis of them.

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Now if this unity of association had not also an objective

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ground which makes it impossible that appearances should be apprehended by the imagination otherwise than under the condition of a possible synthetic unity of this apprehension, it would be entirely accidental that appearances should fit into a connected whole of human knowledge. For even though we should have the power of associating perceptions, it would remain entirely undetermined and accidental whether they would themselves be associable; and should they not be associable, there might exist a multitude of perceptions, and indeed an entire sensibility, in which much empirical consciousness would arise in my mind, but in a state of separation, and without belonging to a consciousness of myself. This, however, is impossible. For it is only because I ascribe all perceptions to one consciousness (original apperception) that I can say of all perceptions that I am conscious of them. There must, therefore, be an objective ground (that is, one that can be comprehended a priori, antecedently to all empirical laws of the imagination) upon which rests the possibility, nay, the necessity, of a law that extends to all appearances -- a ground, namely, which constrains us to regard all appearances as data of the senses that must be associable in themselves and subject to universal rules of a thoroughgoing connection in their reproduction. This objective ground of all association of appearances I entitle their affinity. It is nowhere to be found save in the principle of the unity of apperception, in respect of all knowledge which is to belong to me. According to this principle all

appearances, without exception, must so enter the mind or be apprehended, that they conform to the unity of apperception. Without synthetic unity in their connection, this would be impossible; and such synthetic unity is itself, therefore, objectively necessary.

The objective unity of all empirical consciousness in one consciousness, that of original apperception, is thus the necessary condition of all possible perception; and [this being recognised we can prove that] the affinity of all appearances, near or remote, is a necessary consequence of a synthesis in imagination which is grounded a priori on rules.

Since the imagination is itself a faculty of a priori synthesis, we assign to it the title, productive imagination. In so far as it aims at nothing but necessary unity in the synthesis of  
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what is manifold in appearance, it may be entitled the transcendental function of imagination. That the affinity of appearances, and with it their association, and through this, in turn, their reproduction according to laws, and so [as involving these various factors] experience itself, should only be possible by means of this transcendental function of imagination, is indeed strange, but is none the less an obvious consequence of the preceding argument. For without this transcendental function no concepts would together make up a unitary experience.

The abiding and unchanging 'I' (pure apperception) forms the correlate of all our representations in so far as it is to be at all possible that we should become conscious of them. All consciousness as truly belongs to an all-comprehensive pure apperception, as all sensible intuition, as representation, does to a pure inner intuition, namely, to time. It is this apperception which must be added to pure imagination, in order to render its function intellectual. For since the synthesis of imagination connects the manifold only as it appears in intuition, as, for instance, in the shape of a triangle, it is, though exercised a priori, always in itself sensible. And while concepts, which belong to the understanding, are brought into play through relation of the manifold to the unity of apperception, it is only by means of the imagination that they can be brought into relation to sensible intuition.

A pure imagination, which conditions all a priori know-

ledge, is thus one of the fundamental faculties of the human soul. By its means we bring the manifold of intuition on the one side, into connection with the condition of the necessary unity of pure apperception on the other. The two extremes, namely sensibility and understanding, must stand in necessary connection with each other through the mediation of this transcendental function of imagination, because otherwise the former, though indeed yielding appearances, would supply no objects of empirical knowledge, and consequently no experience. Actual experience, which is constituted by apprehension, association (reproduction), and finally recognition of appearances, contains in recognition, the last and highest of these  
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merely empirical elements of experience, certain concepts which render possible the formal unity of experience, and therewith all objective validity (truth) of empirical knowledge. These grounds of the recognition of the manifold, so far as they concern solely the form of an experience in general, are the categories. Upon them is based not only all formal unity in the [transcendental] synthesis of imagination, but also, thanks to that synthesis, all its empirical employment (in recognition, reproduction, association, apprehension) in connection with the appearances. For only by means of these fundamental concepts can appearances belong to knowledge or even to our consciousness, and so to ourselves.

Thus the order and regularity in the appearances, which we entitle nature, we ourselves introduce. We could never find them in appearances, had no we ourselves, or the nature of our mind, originally set them there. For this unity of nature has to be a necessary one, that is, has to be an a priori certain unity of the connection of appearances; and such synthetic unity could not be established a priori if there were not subjective grounds of such unity contained a priori in the original cognitive powers of our mind, and if these subjective conditions, inasmuch as they are the grounds of the possibility of knowing any object whatsoever in experience, were not at the same time objectively valid.

We have already defined the understanding in various different ways: as a spontaneity of knowledge (in distinction from the receptivity of sensibility), as a power of thought, as a faculty of concepts, or again of judgments. All these defini-

tions, when they are adequately understood, are identical. We may now characterise it as the faculty of rules. This distinguishing mark is more fruitful, and approximates more closely to its essential nature. Sensibility gives us forms (of intuition), but understanding gives us rules. The latter is always occupied in investigating appearances, in order to detect some rule in them. Rules, so far as they are objective, and therefore necessarily depend upon the knowledge of the object, are called laws. Although we learn many laws through  
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experience, they are only special determinations of still higher laws, and the highest of these, under which the others all stand, issue a priori from the understanding itself. They are not borrowed from experience; on the contrary, they have to confer upon appearances their conformity to law, and so to make experience possible. Thus the understanding is something more than a power of formulating rules through comparison of appearances; it is itself the lawgiver of nature. Save through it, nature, that is, synthetic unity of the manifold of appearances according to rules, would not exist at all (for appearances, as such, cannot exist outside us -- they exist only in our sensibility); and this nature, as object of knowledge in an experience, with everything which it may contain, is only possible in the unity of apperception. The unity of apperception is thus the transcendental ground of the necessary conformity to law of all appearances in one experience. This same unity of apperception in respect to a manifold of representations (determining it out of a unity) acts as the rule, and the faculty of these rules is the understanding. All appearances, as possible experiences, thus lie a priori in the understanding, and receive from it their formal possibility, just as, in so far as they are mere intuitions, they lie in the sensibility, and are, as regards their form, only possible through it.

However exaggerated and absurd it may sound, to say that the understanding is itself the source of the laws of nature, and so of its formal unity, such an assertion is none the less correct, and is in keeping with the object to which it refers, namely, experience. Certainly, empirical laws, as such, can never derive their origin from pure understanding. That is as little possible as to understand completely the inexhaust-

ible multiplicity of appearances merely by reference to the pure form of sensible intuition. But all empirical laws are only special determinations of the pure laws of understanding, under which, and according to the norm of which, they first become possible. Through them appearances take on an orderly character, just as these same appearances, despite  
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the differences of their empirical form, must none the less always be in harmony with the pure form of sensibility. Pure understanding is thus in the categories the law of the synthetic unity of all appearances, and thereby first and originally makes experience, as regards its form, possible. This is all that we were called upon to establish in the transcendental deduction of the categories, namely, to render comprehensible this relation of understanding to sensibility, and, by means of sensibility, to all objects of experience. The objective validity of the pure a priori concepts is thereby made intelligible, and their origin and truth determined.

Summary Representation of the Correctness of this Deduction of the Pure Concepts of Understanding, and of its being the only Deduction possible

If the objects with which our knowledge has to deal were things in themselves, we could have no a priori concepts of them. For from what source could we obtain the concepts? If we derived them from the object (leaving aside the question how the object could become known to us), our concepts would be merely empirical, not a priori. And if we derived them from the self, that which is merely in us could not determine the character of an object distinct from our representations, that is, could not be a ground why a thing should exist characterised by that which we have in our thought, and why such a representation should not, rather, be altogether empty. But if, on the other hand, we have to deal only with appearances, it is not merely possible, but necessary, that certain a priori concepts should precede empirical knowledge of objects.

For since a mere modification of our sensibility can never be met with outside us, the objects, as appearances, constitute an object which is merely in us. Now to assert in this manner, that all these appearances, and consequently all objects with which we can occupy ourselves, are one and all in me, that is, are determinations of my identical self, is only another

way of saying that there must be a complete unity of them in one and the same apperception. But this unity of possible consciousness also constitutes the form of all knowledge of objects; through it the manifold is thought as belonging to a  
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single object. Thus the mode in which the manifold of sensible representation (intuition) belongs to one consciousness precedes all knowledge of the object as the intellectual form of such knowledge, and itself constitutes a formal a priori knowledge of all objects, so far as they are thought (categories). The synthesis of the manifold through pure imagination, the unity of all representations in relation to original apperception, precede all empirical knowledge. Pure concepts of understanding are thus a priori possible, and, in relation to experience, are indeed necessary; and this for the reason that our knowledge has to deal solely with appearances, the possibility of which lies in ourselves, and the connection and unity of which (in the representation of an object) are to be met with only in ourselves. Such connection and unity must therefore precede all experience, and are required for the very possibility of it in its formal aspect. From this point of view, the only feasible one, our deduction of the categories has been developed.

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B EDITION OF KEMP-SMITH TRANSLATION FOLLOWS:

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DEDUCTION OF THE PURE CONCEPTS OF THE UNDERSTANDING

Section 2

TRANSCENDENTAL DEDUCTION OF THE PURE CONCEPTS OF THE UNDERSTANDING

§15

The Possibility of Combination in General

THE manifold of representations can be given in an intuition which is purely sensible, that is, nothing but receptivity; and the form of this intuition can lie a priori in our faculty of representation, without being anything more than the mode in which the subject is affected. But the combination (conjunctio) of a manifold in general can never come to us through the

senses, and cannot, therefore, be already contained in the pure form of sensible intuition. For it is an act of spontaneity of the faculty of representation; and since this faculty, to distinguish it from sensibility, must be entitled understanding, all combination -- be we conscious of it or not, be it a combination of the manifold of intuition, empirical or non-empirical, or of various concepts -- is an act of the understanding. To this act the general title 'synthesis' may be assigned, as indicating that we cannot represent to ourselves anything as combined in the object which we have not ourselves previously combined, and that of all representations combination is the only one which  
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cannot be given through objects. Being an act of the self-activity of the subject, it cannot be executed save by the subject itself. It will easily be observed that this action is originally one and is equipollent for all combination, and that is dissolution, namely, analysis, which appears to be its opposite, yet always presupposes it. For where the understanding has not previously combined, it cannot dissolve, since only as having been combined by the understanding can anything that allows of analysis be given to the faculty of representation.

But the concept of combination includes, besides the concept of the manifold and of its synthesis, also the concept of the unity of the manifold. Combination is representation of the synthetic unity of the manifold. The representation of this unity cannot, therefore, arise out of the combination. On the contrary, it is what, by adding itself to the representation of the manifold, first makes possible the concept of the combination. This unity, which precedes a priori all concepts of combination, is not the category of unity (§10); for all categories are grounded in logical functions of judgment, and in these functions combination, and therefore unity of given concepts, is already thought. Thus the category already presupposes combination. We must therefore look yet higher for this unity (as qualitative, §12), namely in that which itself contains the ground of the unity of diverse concepts in judgment, and therefore of the possibility of the understanding, even as regards its logical employment.

§16

The Original Synthetic Unity of Apperception

It must be possible for the 'I think' to accompany all my

representations; for otherwise something would be represented  
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in me which could not be thought at all, and that is equivalent to saying that the representation would be impossible, or at least would be nothing to me.

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Whether the representations are in themselves identical, and whether, therefore, one can be analytically thought through the other, is not a question that here arises. The consciousness of the one, when the manifold is under consideration, has always to be distinguished from the consciousness of the other; and it is with the synthesis of this (possible) consciousness that we are here alone concerned.

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That representation which can be given prior to all thought is entitled intuition. All the manifold of intuition has, therefore, a necessary relation to the 'I think' in the same subject in which this manifold is found. But this representation is an act of spontaneity, that is, it cannot be regarded as belonging to sensibility. I call it pure apperception, to distinguish it from empirical apperception, or, again, original apperception, because it is that self-consciousness which, while generating the representation 'I think' (a representation which must be capable of accompanying all other representations, and which in all consciousness is one and the same), cannot itself be accompanied by any further representation. The unity of this apperception I likewise entitle the transcendental unity of self-consciousness, in order to indicate the possibility of a priori knowledge arising from it. For the manifold representations, which are given in an intuition, would not be one and all my representations, if they did not all belong to one self-consciousness. As my representations (even if I am not conscious of them as such) they must conform to the condition under which alone they can stand together in one universal self-consciousness, because otherwise they would not all without exception belong to me. From this original combination many consequences follow.

This thoroughgoing identity of the apperception of a manifold which is given in intuition contains a synthesis of representations, and is possible only through the conscious-



ness of this synthesis. For the empirical consciousness, which accompanies different representations, is in itself diverse and without relation to the identity of the subject. That relation comes about, not simply through my accompanying each representation with consciousness, but only in so far as I conjoin one representation with another, and am conscious of the synthesis of them. Only in so far, therefore, as I can unite a manifold of given representations in one consciousness, is it possible for me to represent to myself the identity of the consciousness in [i.e. throughout] these representations. In other P 154

words, the analytic unity of apperception is possible only under the presupposition of a certain synthetic unity.

The thought that the representations given in intuition one and all belong to me, is therefore equivalent to the thought that I unite them in one self-consciousness, or can at least so unite them; and although this thought is not itself the consciousness of the synthesis of the representations, it presupposes the possibility of that synthesis. In other words, only in so far as I can grasp the manifold of the representations in one consciousness, do I call them one and all mine. For otherwise I should have as many-coloured and diverse a self as I have representations of which I am conscious to myself. Synthetic unity of the manifold of intuitions, as generated a priori, is thus the ground of the identity of apperception itself, which precedes a priori all my determinate thought. Combination does not, however, lie in the objects, and cannot be borrowed from them, and so, through perception, first taken up into the understanding. On the contrary, it is an affair of the understanding alone, which itself is nothing but the faculty of combining a priori, and of bringing the manifold of given representations under the unity of apperception. The principle of apperception is the highest principle in the whole sphere of human knowledge.

This principle of the necessary unity of apperception is  
++ The analytic unity of consciousness belongs to all general concepts, as such. If, for instance, I think red in general, I thereby represent to myself a property which (as a characteristic) can be found in something, or can be combined with other representations; that is, only by means of a presupposed possible synthetic unity can I represent to myself the analytic unity. A representation which is to be

thought as common to different representations is regarded as belonging to such as have, in addition to it, also something different. Consequently it must previously be thought in synthetic unity with other (though, it may be, only possible) representations, before I can think in it the analytic unity of consciousness, which makes it a *conceptus communis*. The synthetic unity of apperception is therefore that highest point, to which we must ascribe all employment of the understanding, even the whole of logic, and conformably therewith, transcendental philosophy. Indeed this faculty of apperception is the understanding itself.

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itself, indeed, an identical, and therefore analytic, proposition; nevertheless it reveals the necessity of a synthesis of the manifold given in intuition, without which the thoroughgoing identity of self-consciousness cannot be thought. For through the 'I', as simple representation, nothing manifold is given; only in intuition, which is distinct from the 'I', can a manifold be given; and only through combination in one consciousness can it be thought. An understanding in which through self-consciousness all the manifold would *eo ipso* be given, would be intuitive; our understanding can only think, and for intuition must look to the senses. I am conscious of the self as identical in respect of the manifold of representations that are given to me in an intuition, because I call them one and all my representations, and so apprehend them as constituting one intuition. This amounts to saying, that I am conscious to myself a priori of a necessary synthesis of representations -- to be entitled the original synthetic unity of apperception -- under which all representations that are given to me must stand, but under which they have also first to be brought by means of a synthesis.

§17

The Principle of the Synthetic Unity is the Supreme Principle of all Employment of the Understanding

The supreme principle of the possibility of all intuition in its relation to sensibility is, according to the Transcendental Aesthetic, that all the manifold of intuition should be subject to the formal conditions of space and time. The supreme principle of the same possibility, in its relation to understanding, is that all the manifold of intuition should be subject to conditions of the original synthetic unity of apperception.

Space and time, and all their parts, are intuitions, and are, therefore, with the manifold which they contain, singular representations (vide the Transcendental Aesthetic). Consequently they are not mere concepts through which one and the same consciousness is found to be contained in a number of representations. On the contrary, through them many representations are found to be contained in one representation, and in the consciousness of that representation ; and they are thus composite. The unity of that consciousness  
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is therefore synthetic and yet is also original. The singularity of such intuitions is found to have important consequences (vide §25).

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In so

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far as the manifold representations of intuition are given to us, they are subject to the former of these two principles; in so far as they must allow of being combined in one consciousness, they are subject to the latter. For without such combination nothing can be thought or known, since the given representations would not have in common the act of the apperception 'I think', and so could not be apprehended together in knowledge. This knowledge consists in the determinate relation of given representations to an object; and an object is that in the concept of which the manifold of a given intuition is united. Now all unification of representations demands unity of consciousness in the synthesis of them. Consequently it is the unity of consciousness that alone constitutes the relation of representations to an object, and therefore their objective validity and the fact that they are modes of knowledge; and upon it therefore rests the very possibility of the understanding.

The first pure knowledge of understanding, then, upon which all the rest of its employment is based, and which also at the same time is completely independent of all conditions of sensible intuition, is the principle of the original synthetic unity of apperception. Thus the mere form of outer sensible intuition, space, is not yet [by itself] knowledge; it supplies only the manifold of a priori intuition for a possible knowledge. To know anything in space (for instance, a line), I must draw it, and thus synthetically bring into being a determinate combination of the given manifold, so that the unity

of this act is at the same time the unity of consciousness (as in the concept of a line); and it is through this unity of consciousness that an object (a determinate space) is first known. The synthetic unity of consciousness is, therefore, an objective condition of all knowledge. It is not merely a condition that I myself require in knowing an object, but is a condition under which every intuition must stand in order to become an object for me. For otherwise, in the absence of this  
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synthesis, the manifold would not be united in one consciousness.

Although this proposition makes synthetic unity a condition of all thought, it is, as already stated, itself analytic. For it says no more than that all my representations in any given intuition must be subject to that condition under which alone I can ascribe them to the identical self as my representations, and so can comprehend them as synthetically combined in one apperception through the general expression, 'I think'.

This principle is not, however, to be taken as applying to every possible understanding, but only to that understanding through whose pure apperception, in the representation 'I am', nothing manifold is given. An understanding which through its self-consciousness could supply to itself the manifold of intuition -- an understanding, that is to say, through whose representation the objects of the representation should at the same time exist -- would not require, for the unity of consciousness, a special act of synthesis of the manifold. For the human understanding, however, which thinks only, and does not intuit, that act is necessary. It is indeed the first principle of the human understanding, and is so indispensable to it that we cannot form the least conception of any other possible understanding, either of such as is itself intuitive or of any that may possess an underlying mode of sensible intuition which is different in kind from that in space and time.

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#### The Objective Unity of Self-Consciousness

The transcendental unity of apperception is that unity through which all the manifold given in an intuition is united in a concept of the object. It is therefore entitled objective, and must be distinguished from the subjective unity of con-

sciousness, which is a determination of inner sense -- through which the manifold of intuition for such [objective] combination is empirically given. Whether I can become empirically conscious of the manifold as simultaneous or as successive depends on circumstances or empirical conditions. Therefore  
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the empirical unity of consciousness, through association of representations, itself concerns an appearance, and is wholly contingent. But the pure form of intuition in time, merely as intuition in general, which contains a given manifold, is subject to the original unity of consciousness, simply through the necessary relation of the manifold of the intuition to the one 'I think', and so through the pure synthesis of understanding which is the a priori underlying ground of the empirical synthesis. Only the original unity is objectively valid; the empirical unity of apperception, upon which we are not here dwelling, and which besides is merely derived from the former under given conditions in concreto, has only subjective validity. To one man, for instance, a certain word suggests one thing, to another some other thing; the unity of consciousness in that which is empirical is not, as regards what is given, necessarily and universally valid.

§19

The Logical Form of all Judgments consists in the Objective Unity of the Apperception of the Concepts which they contain

I have never been able to accept the interpretation which logicians give of judgment in general. It is, they declare, the representation of a relation between two concepts. I do not here dispute with them as to what is defective in this interpretation -- that in any case it applies only to categorical, not to hypothetical and disjunctive judgments (the two latter containing a relation not of concepts but of judgments), an oversight from which many troublesome consequences have followed. I need only point out that the definition does not determine in what the asserted relation consists.

The lengthy doctrine of the four syllogistic figures concerns categorical syllogisms only; and although it is indeed nothing more than an artificial method of securing, through the surreptitious introduction of immediate inferences (*consequentiae immediatae*) among the premisses of a pure syllogism, the appearance that there

are more kinds of inference than that of the first figure, this would hardly have met with such remarkable acceptance, had not its authors succeeded in bringing categorical judgments into such  
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exclusive respect, as being those to which all others must allow of being reduced -- teaching which, as indicated in §9, is none the less erroneous.

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But if I investigate more precisely the relation of the given modes of knowledge in any judgment, and distinguish it, as belonging to the understanding, from the relation according to laws of the reproductive imagination, which has only subjective validity, I find that a judgment is nothing but the manner in which given modes of knowledge are brought to the objective unity of apperception. This is what is intended by the copula 'is'. It is employed to distinguish the objective unity of given representations from the subjective. It indicates their relation to original apperception, and its necessary unity. It holds good even if the judgment is itself empirical, and therefore contingent, as, for example, in the judgment, 'Bodies are heavy'. I do not here assert that these representations necessarily belong to one another in the empirical intuition, but that they belong to one another in virtue of the necessary unity of apperception in the synthesis of intuitions, that is, according to principles of the objective determination of all representations, in so far as knowledge can be acquired by means of these representations -- principles which are all derived from the fundamental principle of the transcendental unity of apperception. Only in this way does there arise from this relation a judgment, that is, a relation which is objectively valid, and so can be adequately distinguished from a relation of the same representations that would have only subjective validity -- as when they are connected according to laws of association. In the latter case, all that I could say would be, 'If I support a body, I feel an impression of weight'; I could not say, 'It, the body, is heavy'. Thus to say 'The body is heavy' is not merely to state that the two representations have always been conjoined in my perception, however often that perception be repeated; what we are asserting is that they are combined in the object, no matter what the state of the subject may be.

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§20

All Sensible Intuitions are subject to the Categories, as Conditions under which alone their Manifold can come together in one Consciousness

The manifold given in a sensible intuition is necessarily subject to the original synthetic unity of apperception, because in no other way is the unity of intuition possible (§17). But that act of understanding by which the manifold of given representations (be they intuitions or concepts) is brought under one apperception, is the logical function of judgment (cf. §19). All the manifold, therefore, so far as it is given in a single empirical intuition, is determined in respect of one of the logical functions of judgment, and is thereby brought into one consciousness. Now the categories are just these functions of judgment, in so far as they are employed in determination of the manifold of a given intuition (cf. §13). Consequently, the manifold in a given intuition is necessarily subject to the categories.

§21

Observation

A manifold, contained in an intuition which I call mine, is represented, by means of the synthesis of the understanding, as belonging to the necessary unity of self-consciousness; and this is effected by means of the category. This [requirement of a] category therefore shows that the empirical consciousness of a given manifold in a single intuition is subject to a pure self-consciousness a priori, just as is empirical intuition to a pure sensible intuition, which likewise takes place a priori. Thus in the above proposition a beginning is made of a deduction of the pure concepts of understanding;

The proof of this rests on the represented unity of intuition, by which an object is given. This unity of intuition always includes in itself a synthesis of the manifold given for an intuition, and so already contains the relation of this manifold to the unity of apperception.

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and in this deduction,  
since the categories have their source in the understanding alone, independently of sensibility, I must abstract from the

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mode in which the manifold for an empirical intuition is given, and must direct attention solely to the unity which, in terms of the category, and by means of the understanding, enters into the intuition. In what follows (cf. §26) it will be shown, from the mode in which the empirical intuition is given in sensibility, that its unity is no other than that which the category (according to §20) prescribes to the manifold of a given intuition in general. Only thus, by demonstration of the a priori validity of the categories in respect of all objects of our senses, will the purpose of the deduction be fully attained.

But in the above proof there is one feature from which I could not abstract, the feature, namely, that the manifold to be intuited must be given prior to the synthesis of understanding, and independently of it. How this takes place, remains here undetermined. For were I to think an understanding which is itself intuitive (as, for example, a divine understanding which should not represent to itself given objects, but through whose representation the objects should themselves be given or produced), the categories would have no meaning whatsoever in respect of such a mode of knowledge. They are merely rules for an understanding whose whole power consists in thought, consists, that is, in the act whereby it brings the synthesis of a manifold, given to it from elsewhere in intuition, to the unity of apperception -- a faculty, therefore, which by itself knows nothing whatsoever, but merely combines and arranges the material of knowledge, that is, the intuition, which must be given to it by the object. This peculiarity of our understanding, that it can produce a priori unity of apperception solely by means of the categories, and only by such and so many, is as little capable of further explanation as why we have just these and no other functions of judgment, or why space and time are the only forms of our possible intuition.

§22

The Category has no other Application in Knowledge than to Objects of Experience

To think an object and to know an object are thus by no means the same thing. Knowledge involves two factors: first, P 162

the concept, through which an object in general is thought (the category); and secondly, the intuition, through which it is given. For if no intuition could be given corresponding to the



concept, the concept would still indeed be a thought, so far as its form is concerned, but would be without any object, and no knowledge of anything would be possible by means of it. So far as I could know, there would be nothing, and could be nothing, to which my thought could be applied. Now, as the Aesthetic has shown, the only intuition possible to us is sensible; consequently, the thought of an object in general, by means of a pure concept of understanding, can become knowledge for us only in so far as the concept is related to objects of the senses. Sensible intuition is either pure intuition (space and time) or empirical intuition of that which is immediately represented, through sensation, as actual in space and time. Through the determination of pure intuition we can acquire a priori knowledge of objects, as in mathematics, but only in regard to their form, as appearances; whether there can be things which must be intuited in this form, is still left undecided. Mathematical concepts are not, therefore, by themselves knowledge, except on the supposition that there are things which allow of being presented to us only in accordance with the form of that pure sensible intuition. Now things in space and time are given only in so far as they are perceptions (that is, representations accompanied by sensation) -- therefore only through empirical representation. Consequently, the pure concepts of understanding, even when they are applied to a priori intuitions, as in mathematics, yield knowledge only in so far as these intuitions -- and therefore indirectly by their means the pure concepts also -- can be applied to empirical intuitions. Even, therefore, with the aid of [pure] intuition, the categories do not afford us any knowledge of things; they do so only through their possible application to empirical intuition. In other words, they serve only for the possibility of empirical knowledge; and such knowledge is what we entitle experience. Our conclusion is therefore this: the categories, as yielding knowledge of things, have no kind of application, save only in regard to things which may be objects of possible experience.

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§23

The above proposition is of the greatest importance; for it determines the limits of the employment of the pure concepts of understanding in regard to objects, just as the Transcendental

dental Aesthetic determined the limits of the employment of the pure form of our sensible intuition. Space and time, as conditions under which alone objects can possibly be given to us, are valid no further than for objects of the senses, and therefore only for experience. Beyond these limits they represent nothing; for they are only in the senses, and beyond them have no reality. The pure concepts of understanding are free from this limitation, and extend to objects of intuition in general, be the intuition like or unlike ours, if only it be sensible and not intellectual. But this extension of concepts beyond our sensible intuition is of no advantage to us. For as concepts of objects they are then empty, and do not even enable us to judge of their objects whether or not they are possible. They are mere forms of thought, without objective reality, since we have no intuition at hand to which the synthetic unity of apperception, which constitutes the whole content of these forms, could be applied, and in being so applied determine an object. Only our sensible and empirical intuition can give to them body and meaning.

If we suppose an object of a non-sensible intuition to be given, we can indeed represent it through all the predicates which are implied in the presupposition that it has none of the characteristics proper to sensible intuition; that it is not extended or in space, that its duration is not a time, that no change (succession of determinations in time) is to be met with in it, etc. But there is no proper knowledge if I thus merely indicate what the intuition of an object is not, without being able to say what it is that is contained in the intuition. For I have not then shown that the object which I am thinking through my pure concept is even so much as possible, not being in a position to give any intuition corresponding to the concept, and being able only to say that our intuition is not applicable to it. But what has chiefly to be noted is this, that to such a something [in general] not a single one of all the categories could  
P 164

be applied. We could not, for instance, apply to it the concept of substance, meaning something which can exist as subject and never as mere predicate. For save in so far as empirical intuition provides the instance to which to apply it, I do not know whether there can be anything that corresponds to such a form of thought. But of this more hereafter.

§24

### The Application of the Categories to Objects of the Senses in General

The pure concepts of understanding relate, through the mere understanding, to objects of intuition in general, whether that intuition be our own or any other, provided only it be sensible. The concepts are, however, for this very reason, mere forms of thought, through which alone no determinate object is known. The synthesis or combination of the manifold in them relates only to the unity of apperception, and is thereby the ground of the possibility of a priori knowledge, so far as such knowledge rests on the understanding. This synthesis, therefore, is at once transcendental and also purely intellectual. But since there lies in us a certain form of a priori sensible intuition, which depends on the receptivity of the faculty of representation (sensibility), the understanding, as spontaneity, is able to determine inner sense through the manifold of given representations, in accordance with the synthetic unity of apperception, and so to think synthetic unity of the apperception of the manifold of a priori sensible intuition -- that being the condition under which all objects of our human intuition must necessarily stand. In this way the categories, in themselves mere forms of thought, obtain objective reality, that is, application to objects which can be given us in intuition. These objects, however, are only appearances, for it is solely of appearances that we can have a priori intuition.

This synthesis of the manifold of sensible intuition, which is possible and necessary a priori, may be entitled figurative synthesis (*synthesis speciosa*), to distinguish it from the synthesis which is thought in the mere category in respect of the manifold of an intuition in general, and which is entitled combination through the understanding (*synthesis intellectua-*  
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lis). Both are transcendental, not merely as taking place a priori, but also as conditioning the possibility of other a priori knowledge.

But the figurative synthesis, if it be directed merely to the original synthetic unity of apperception, that is, to the transcendental unity which is thought in the categories, must, in order to be distinguished from the merely intellectual combination, be called the transcendental synthesis of

imagination. Imagination is the faculty of representing in intuition an object that is not itself present. Now since all our intuition is sensible, the imagination, owing to the subjective condition under which alone it can give to the concepts of understanding a corresponding intuition, belongs to sensibility. But inasmuch as its synthesis is an expression of spontaneity, which is determinative and not, like sense, determinable merely, and which is therefore able to determine sense a priori in respect of its form in accordance with the unity of apperception, imagination is to that extent a faculty which determines the sensibility a priori; and its synthesis of intuitions, conforming as it does to the categories, must be the transcendental synthesis of imagination. This synthesis is an action of the understanding on the sensibility; and is its first application -- and thereby the ground of all its other applications -- to the objects of our possible intuition. As figurative, it is distinguished from the intellectual synthesis, which is carried out by the understanding alone, without the aid of the imagination. In so far as imagination is spontaneity, I sometimes also entitle it the productive imagination, to distinguish it from the reproductive imagination, whose synthesis is entirely subject to empirical laws, the laws, namely, of association, and which therefore contributes nothing to the explanation of the possibility of a priori knowledge. The reproductive synthesis falls within the domain, not of transcendental philosophy, but of psychology.

\* \* \*

This is a suitable place for explaining the paradox which must have been obvious to everyone in our exposition of the P 166

form of inner sense (§6): namely, that this sense represents to consciousness even our own selves only as we appear to ourselves, not as we are in ourselves. For we intuit ourselves only as we are inwardly affected, and this would seem to be contradictory, since we should then have to be in a passive relation [of active affection] to ourselves. It is to avoid this contradiction that in systems of psychology inner sense, which we have carefully distinguished from the faculty of apperception, is commonly regarded as being identical with it.

What determines inner sense is the understanding and its

original power of combining the manifold of intuition, that is, of bringing it under an apperception, upon which the possibility of understanding itself rest. Now the understanding in us men is not a faculty of intuitions, and cannot, even if intuitions be given in sensibility, take them up into itself in such manner as to combine them as the manifold of its own intuition. Its synthesis, therefore, if the synthesis be viewed by itself alone, is nothing but the unity of the act, of which, as an act, it is conscious to itself, even without [the aid of] sensibility, but through which it is yet able to determine the sensibility. The understanding, that is to say, in respect of the manifold which may be given to it in accordance with the form of sensible intuition, is able to determine sensibility inwardly. Thus the understanding, under the title of a transcendental synthesis of imagination, performs this act upon the passive subject, whose faculty it is, and we are therefore justified in saying that inner sense is affected thereby. Apperception and its synthetic unity is, indeed, very far from being identical with inner sense. The former, as the source of all combination, applies to the manifold of intuitions in general, and in the guise of the categories, prior to all sensible intuition, to objects in general. Inner sense, on the other hand, contains the mere form of intuition, but without combination of the manifold in it, and therefore so far contains no determinate intuition, which is possible only through the consciousness of the determination of the manifold by the transcendental act of imagination (synthetic influence P 167

of the understanding upon inner sense), which I have entitled figurative synthesis.

This we can always perceive in ourselves. We cannot think a line without drawing it in thought, or a circle without describing it. We cannot represent the three dimensions of space save by setting three lines at right angles to one another from the same point. Even time itself we cannot represent, save in so far as we attend, in the drawing of a straight line (which has to serve as the outer figurative representation of time), merely to the act of the synthesis of the manifold whereby we successively determine inner sense, and in so doing attend to the succession of this determination in inner sense. Motion, as an act of the subject (not as a determination of

an object), and therefore the synthesis of the manifold in space, first produces the concept of succession -- if we abstract from this manifold and attend solely to the act through which we determine the inner sense according to its form. The understanding does not, therefore, find in inner sense such a combination of the manifold, but produces it, in that it affects that sense.

How the 'I' that thinks can be distinct from the 'I' that intuits itself (for I can represent still other modes of intuition as at least possible), and yet, as being the same subject, can be identical with the latter; and how, therefore, I can say: "I, as intelligence and thinking subject, know myself as an object that is thought, in so far as I am given to myself [as something other or] beyond that [I] which is [given to myself] in intuition, and yet know myself, like other phenomena, only as I appear to myself, not as I am to the understanding" -- these are questions that raise no greater nor less difficulty than how I can be an object to myself at all, and, more particularly, an object of intuition and of inner perceptions.

Motion of an object in space does not belong to a pure science, and consequently not to geometry. For the fact that something is movable cannot be known a priori, but only through experience. Motion, however, considered as the describing of a space, is a pure act of the successive synthesis of the manifold in outer intuition in general by means of the productive imagination, and belongs not only to geometry, but even to transcendental philosophy.

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Indeed, that this is how it must be, is easily shown -- if we admit that space is merely a pure form of the appearances of outer sense -- by the fact that we cannot obtain for ourselves a representation of time, which is not an object of outer intuition, except under the image of a line, which we draw, and that by this mode of depicting it alone could we know the singleness of its dimension; and similarly by the fact that for all inner perceptions we must derive the determination of lengths of time or of points of time from the changes which are exhibited to us in outer things, and that the determinations of inner sense have therefore to be arranged as appearances in time in precisely the same manner in which we arrange those of outer sense in space. If, then, as regards the latter, we admit that we know objects only in so far as we

are externally affected, we must also recognise, as regards inner sense, that by means of it we intuit ourselves only as we are inwardly affected by ourselves; in other words, that, so far as inner intuition is concerned, we know our own subject only as appearance, not as it is in itself.

§25

On the other hand, in the transcendental synthesis of the manifold of representations in general, and therefore in the synthetic original unity of apperception, I am conscious of myself, not as I appear to myself, nor as I am in myself, but only that I am. This representation is a thought, not an intuition. Now in order to know ourselves, there is required in addition to the act of thought, which brings the manifold of every possible intuition to the unity of apperception, a determinate mode of intuition, whereby this manifold is given; ++ I do not see why so much difficulty should be found in admitting that our inner sense is affected by ourselves. Such affection finds exemplification in each and every act of attention. In every act of attention the understanding determines inner sense, in accordance with the combination which it thinks, to that inner intuition which corresponds to the manifold in the synthesis of the understanding. How much the mind is usually thereby affected, everyone will be able to perceive in himself.

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it therefore follows that although my existence is not indeed

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appearance (still less mere illusion), the determination of my existence can take place only in conformity with the form of inner sense, according to the special mode in which the manifold, which I combine, is given in inner intuition. Accordingly I have no knowledge of myself as I am but merely as I appear to myself. The consciousness of self is thus very far from being a knowledge of the self, notwithstanding all the categories which [are being employed to] constitute the thought of an object in general, through combination of the manifold in one apperception. Just as for knowledge of an object distinct from me I require, besides the thought of an object in general (in the category), an intuition by which I determine that general concept, so for knowledge of myself I require, besides the consciousness, that is, besides the thought of myself, an intuition of the manifold in me, by which I determine this

thought. I exist as an intelligence which is conscious solely of its power of combination; but in respect of the manifold which it has to combine I am subjected to a limiting condition (entitled inner sense), namely, that this combination can be made intuitable only according to relations of time, which lie entirely outside the concepts of understanding, strictly regarded. Such an intelligence, therefore, can know itself only as it appears to itself in respect of an intuition which is not intellectual and cannot be given by the understanding itself, not as it would know itself if its intuition were intellectual.

++ The 'I think' expresses the act of determining my existence. Existence is already given thereby, but the mode in which I am to determine this existence, that is, the manifold belonging to it, is not thereby given. In order that it be given, self-intuition is required; and such intuition is conditioned by a given a priori form, namely, time, which is sensible and belongs to the receptivity of the determinable [in me]. Now since I do not have another self-intuition which gives the determining in me (I am conscious only of the spontaneity of it) prior to the act of determination, as time does in the case of the determinable, I cannot determine my existence as that of a self-active being; all that I can do is to represent to myself the spontaneity of my thought, that is, of the determination; and my existence is still only determinable sensibly, that is, as the existence of an appearance. But it is owing to this spontaneity that I entitle myself an intelligence.

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\$26

Transcendental Deduction of the Universally Possible Employment in experience of the Pure Concepts of the Understanding

In the metaphysical deduction the a priori origin of the categories has been proved through their complete agreement with the general logical functions of thought; in the transcendental deduction we have shown their possibility as a priori modes of knowledge of objects of an intuition in general (cf. §§20, 21). We have now to explain the possibility of knowing a priori, by means of categories, whatever objects may present themselves to our senses, not indeed in respect of the form of their intuition, but in respect of the laws of their combination, and so, as it were, of prescribing laws to nature, and even of making nature possible. For unless the cate-



gories discharged this function, there could be no explaining why everything that can be presented to our senses must be subject to laws which have their origin a priori in the understanding alone.

First of all, I may draw attention to the fact that by synthesis of apprehension I understand that combination of the manifold in an empirical intuition, whereby perception, that is, empirical consciousness of the intuition (as appearance), is possible.

In the representations of space and time we have a priori forms of outer and inner sensible intuition; and to these the synthesis of apprehension of the manifold of appearance must always conform, because in no other way can the synthesis take place at all. But space and time are represented a priori not merely as forms of sensible intuition, but as themselves intuitions which contain a manifold [of their own], and therefore are represented with the determination of the unity of this manifold (vide the Transcendental Aesthetic). Thus P 171

unity of the synthesis of the manifold, without or within us, and consequently also a combination to which everything that is to be represented as determined in space or in time must conform, is given a priori as the condition of the synthesis of all apprehension -- not indeed in, but with these intuitions. This synthetic unity can be no other than the unity of the combination of the manifold of a given intuition in general in an original consciousness, in accordance with the categories, in so far as the combination is applied to our sensible intuition. All synthesis, therefore, even that which renders perception possible, is subject to the categories; and since experience is knowledge by means of connected perceptions, the categories are conditions of the possibility of experience, and are therefore valid a priori for all objects of experience.

\* \* \*

When, for instance, by apprehension of the manifold of a house I make the empirical intuition of it into a perception, the necessary unity of space and of outer sensible intuition in general lies at the basis of my apprehension, and I draw as it were the outline of the house in conformity with this synthetic unity of the manifold in space. But if I abstract from the form of space, this same synthetic unity has its seat in the under-

standing, and is the category of the synthesis of the homogeneous in an intuition in general, that is, the category of quantity. To this category, therefore, the synthesis of apprehension, that is to say, the perception, must completely conform.

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++ Space, represented as object (as we are required to do in geometry), contains more than mere form of intuition; it also contains combination of the manifold, given according to the form of sensibility, in an intuitive representation, so that the form of intuition gives only a manifold, the formal intuition gives unity of representation. In the Aesthetic I have treated this unity as belonging merely

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to sensibility, simply in order to emphasise that it precedes any concept, although, as a matter of fact, it presupposes a synthesis which does not belong to the senses but through which all concepts of space and time first become possible. For since by its means (in that the understanding determines the sensibility) space and time are first given as intuitions, the unity of this a priori intuition belongs to space and time, and not to the concept of the understanding (cf. §24).

++ In this manner it is proved that the synthesis of apprehension, which is empirical, must necessarily be in conformity with the synthesis of apperception, which is intellectual and is contained in the category completely a priori. It is one and the same spontaneity,

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which in the one case, under the title of imagination, and in the other case, under the title of understanding, brings combination into the manifold of intuition.

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When, to take another example, I perceive the freezing of water, I apprehend two states, fluidity and solidity, and these as standing to one another in a relation of time. But in time, which I place at the basis of the appearance [in so far] as [it is] inner intuition, I necessarily represent to myself synthetic unity of the manifold, without which that relation of time could not be given in an intuition as being determined in respect of time-sequence. Now this synthetic unity, as a condition a priori under which I combine the manifold of an intuition in general, is -- if I abstract from the constant form of my inner intuition, namely, time -- the category of cause, by means of which, when I apply it to my sensibility, I deter-

mine everything that happens in accordance with the relation which it prescribes, and I do so in time in general. Thus my apprehension of such an event, and therefore the event itself, considered as a possible perception, is subject to the concept of the relation of effects and causes, and so in all other cases.

Categories are concepts which prescribe laws a priori to appearances, and therefore to nature, the sum of all appearances (*natura materialiter spectata*). The question therefore arises, how it can be conceivable that nature should have to proceed in accordance with categories which yet are not derived from it, and do not model themselves upon its pattern; that is, how they can determine a priori the combination of the manifold of nature, while yet they are not derived from it. The solution of this seeming enigma is as follows.

That the laws of appearances in nature must agree with the understanding and its a priori form, that is, with its faculty of combining the manifold in general, is no more surprising than that the appearances themselves must agree with the form of a priori sensible intuition. For just as appearances do not exist in themselves but only relatively to the subject in which, so far as it has senses, they inhere, so the laws do not exist in the appearances but only relatively to this same being, so far as it has understanding. Things in themselves would necessarily,  
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apart from any understanding that knows them, conform to laws of their own. But appearances are only representations of things which are unknown as regards what they may be in themselves. As mere representations, they are subject to no law of connection save that which the connecting faculty prescribes. Now it is imagination that connects the manifold of sensible intuition; and imagination is dependent for the unity of its intellectual synthesis upon the understanding, and for the manifoldness of its apprehension upon sensibility. All possible perception is thus dependent upon synthesis of apprehension, and this empirical synthesis in turn upon transcendental synthesis, and therefore upon the categories. Consequently, all possible perceptions, and therefore everything that can come to empirical consciousness, that is, all appearances of nature, must, so far as their connection is concerned, be subject to the categories. Nature, considered merely as nature in

general, is dependent upon these categories as the original ground of its necessary conformity to law (*natura formaliter spectata*). Pure understanding is not, however, in a position, through mere categories, to prescribe to appearances any a priori laws other than those which are involved in a nature in general, that is, in the conformity to law of all appearances in space and time. Special laws, as concerning those appearances which are empirically determined, cannot in their specific character be derived from the categories, although they are one and all subject to them. To obtain any knowledge whatsoever of these special laws, we must resort to experience; but it is the a priori laws that alone can instruct us in regard to experience in general, and as to what it is that can be known as an object of experience.

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Outcome of this Deduction of the Concepts of Understanding

We cannot think an object save through categories; we cannot know an object so thought save through intuitions corresponding to these concepts. Now all our intuitions are sensible; and this knowledge, in so far as its object is given, is empirical. But empirical knowledge is experience. Consequently, there can be no a priori knowledge, except of objects of possible experience.

But although this knowledge is limited to objects of experience, it is not therefore all derived from experience. The pure intuitions [of receptivity] and the pure concepts of understanding are elements in knowledge, and both are found in us a priori. There are only two ways in which we can account for a necessary agreement of experience with the concepts of its objects: either experience makes these concepts possible or these concepts make experience possible. The former supposition does not hold in respect of the categories (nor of pure sensible intuition); for since they are a priori concepts, and therefore independent of experience, the ascription to them of an empirical origin would be a sort of *generatio aequivoca*. There remains, therefore, only the second supposition -- a system, as it were, of the epigenesis of pure reason -- namely, that the categories contain, on the side of the understanding, the grounds of the possibility of all experience in general. How they make

experience possible, and what are the principles of the possibility of experience that they supply in their application to appearances, will be shown more fully in the following chapter on the transcendental employment of the faculty of judgment.

A middle course may be proposed between the two above mentioned, namely, that the categories are neither self-thought first principles a priori of our knowledge nor derived from experience, but subjective dispositions of thought, implanted in us from the first moment of our existence, and so ordered by our Creator that their employment is in complete harmony with the laws of nature in accordance with which experience  
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proceeds -- a kind of preformation-system of pure reason.

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++ Lest my readers should stumble at the alarming evil consequences which may over-hastily be inferred from this statement, I may remind them that for thought the categories are not limited by the conditions of our sensible intuition, but have an unlimited field. It is only the knowledge of that which we think, the determining of the object, that requires intuition. In the absence of intuition, the thought of the object may still have its true and useful consequences, as regards the subject's employment of reason. The use of reason is not always directed to the determination of an object, that is, to knowledge, but also to the determination of the subject and of its volition -- a use which cannot be here dealt with.

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Apart, however, from the objection that on such an hypothesis we can set no limit to the assumption of predetermined dispositions to future judgments, there is this decisive objection against the suggested middle course, that the necessity of the categories, which belongs to their very conception, would then have to be sacrificed. The concept of cause, for instance, which expresses the necessity of an event under a presupposed condition, would be false if it rested only on an arbitrary subjective necessity, implanted in us, of connecting certain empirical representations according to the rule of causal relation. I would not then be able to say that the effect is connected with the cause in the object, that is to say, necessarily, but only that I am so constituted that I cannot think this representation otherwise than as thus connected. This is exactly what the sceptic most desires. For if this be the situa-

tion, all our insight, resting on the supposed objective validity of our judgments, is nothing but sheer illusion; nor would there be wanting people who would refuse to admit this subjective necessity, a necessity which can only be felt. Certainly a man cannot dispute with anyone regarding that which depends merely on the mode in which he is himself organised.

#### Brief Outline of this Deduction

The deduction is the exposition of the pure concepts of the understanding, and therewith of all theoretical a priori knowledge, as principles of the possibility of experience -- the principles being here taken as the determination of appearances in space and time in general, and this determination, in turn, as ultimately following from the original synthetic unity of apperception, as the form of the understanding in its relation to space and time, the original forms of sensibility.

I consider the division by numbered paragraphs as necessary up to this point, because thus far we have had to treat of the elementary concepts. We have now to give an account of their employment, and the exposition may therefore proceed in continuous fashion, without such numbering.

#### A EDITION GERMAN FOLLOWS:

Der transzendentalen Analytik

Zweites Hauptstück

Von der Deduktion der reinen Verstandesbegriffe

Erster Abschnitt

Von den Prinzipien einer transz. Deduktion überhaupt

Die Rechtslehrer, wenn sie von Befugnissen und Anmaßungen reden, unterscheiden in einem Rechtshandel die Frage über das, was Rechtens ist, (quid juris) von der, die die Tatsache angeht, (quid facti) und indem sie von beiden Beweis fordern, so nennen sie den ersteren, der die Befugnis, oder auch den Rechtsanspruch dartun soll, die Deduktion. Wir bedienen uns einer Menge empirischer Begriffe ohne jemandes Widerrede, und halten uns auch ohne Deduktion berechtigt, ihnen einen Sinn und eingebilddete Bedeutung zuzueignen, weil wir jederzeit die Erfahrung bei Hand haben, ihre objektive Realität zu beweisen. Es gibt

indessen auch usurpierte Begriffe, wie etwa Glück, Schicksal, die zwar mit fast allgemeiner Nachsicht herumlaufen, aber doch bisweilen durch die Frage: quid juris, in Anspruch genommen werden, da man alsdann wegen der Deduktion derselben in nicht geringe Verlegenheit gerät, indem man keinen deutlichen Rechtsgrund weder aus der Erfahrung, noch der Vernunft anführen kann, dadurch die Befugnis seines Gebrauchs deutlich würde.

Unter den mancherlei Begriffen aber, die das sehr vermischte Gewebe der menschlichen Erkenntnis ausmachen, gibt es einige, die auch zum reinen Gebrauch a priori (völlig unabhängig von aller Erfahrung) bestimmt sind, und dieser ihre Befugnis bedarf jederzeit einer Deduktion; weil zu der Rechtmäßigkeit eines solchen Gebrauchs Beweise aus der Erfahrung nicht hinreichend sind, man aber doch wissen muß, wie diese Begriffe sich auf Objekte beziehen können, die sie doch aus keiner Erfahrung hernehmen. Ich nenne daher die Erklärung der Art, wie sich Begriffe a priori auf Gegenstände beziehen können, die transz. Deduktion derselben, und unterscheide sie von der empirischen Deduktion, welche die Art anzeigt, wie ein Begriff durch Erfahrung und Reflexion über dieselbe erworben worden, und daher nicht die Rechtmäßigkeit, sondern das Faktum betrifft, wodurch der Besitz entsprungen.

Wir haben jetzt schon zweierlei Begriffe von ganz verschiedener Art, die doch darin miteinander übereinkommen, daß sie beiderseits völlig a priori sich auf Gegenstände beziehen, nämlich, die Begriffe des Raumes und der Zeit, als Formen der Sinnlichkeit, und die Kategorien, als Begriffe des Verstandes. Von ihnen eine empirische Deduktion versuchen wollen, würde ganz vergebliche Arbeit sein; weil eben darin das Unterscheidende ihrer Natur liegt, daß sie sich auf ihre Gegenstände beziehen, ohne etwas zu deren Vorstellung aus der Erfahrung entlehnt zu haben. Wenn also eine Deduktion derselben nötig ist, so wird sie jederzeit transzendental sein müssen.

Indessen kann man von diesen Begriffen, wie von allem Erkenntnis, wo nicht das Prinzipium ihrer Möglichkeit, doch die Gelegenheitsursachen ihrer Erzeugung in der Erfahrung aufsuchen, wo alsdann die Eindrücke der Sinne den ersten Anlaß geben, die ganze Erkenntniskraft in Ansehung ihrer zu eröffnen, und Erfahrung zustande zu bringen, die zwei sehr ungleichartige Elemente enthält, nämlich eine Materie zur Erkenntnis aus den Sinnen und eine gewisse Form, sie zu ordnen,

aus dem inneren Quell des reinen Anschauens und Denkens, die, bei Gelegenheit der ersteren, zuerst in Ausübung gebracht werden, und Begriffe hervorbringen. Ein solches Nachspüren der ersten Bestrebungen unserer Erkenntniskraft, um von einzelnen Wahrnehmungen zu allgemeinen Begriffen zu steigen, hat ohne Zweifel seinen großen Nutzen, und man hat es dem berühmten Locke zu verdanken, daß er dazu zuerst den Weg eröffnet hat. Allein eine Deduktion der reinen Begriffe a priori kommt dadurch niemals zustande, denn sie liegt ganz und gar nicht auf diesem Wege, weil in Ansehung ihres künftigen Gebrauchs, der von der Erfahrung gänzlich unabhängig sein soll, sie einen ganz anderen Geburtsbrief, als den der Abstammung von Erfahrungen, müssen aufzuzeigen haben. Diese versuchte physiologische Ableitung, die eigentlich gar nicht Deduktion heißen kann, weil sie eine quaestio facti betrifft, will ich daher die Erklärung des Besitzes einer reinen Erkenntnis nennen. Es ist also klar, daß von diesen allein es eine transzendent. Deduktion und keineswegs eine empirische geben könne, und daß letztere, in Ansehung der reinen Begriffe a priori, nichts als eitle Versuche sind, womit sich nur derjenige beschäftigen kann, welcher die ganz eigentümliche Natur dieser Erkenntnisse nicht begriffen hat.

Ob nun aber gleich die einzige Art einer möglichen Deduktion der reinen Erkenntnis a priori, nämlich die auf dem transzendentalen Wege eingeräumt wird, so erhellt dadurch doch eben nicht, daß sie so unumgänglich notwendig sei. Wir haben oben die Begriffe des Raumes und der Zeit, vermittelt einer transzendentalen Deduktion zu ihren Quellen verfolgt, und ihre objektive Gültigkeit a priori erklärt und bestimmt. Gleichwohl geht die Geometrie ihren sicheren Schritt durch lauter Erkenntnisse a priori, ohne daß sie sich, wegen der reinen und gesetzmäßigen Abkunft ihres Grundbegriffs vom Raume, von der Philosophie einen Beglaubigungsschein erbitten darf. Allein der Gebrauch dieses Begriffs geht in dieser Wissenschaft auch nur auf die äußere Sinnenwelt, von welcher der Raum die reine Form ihrer Anschauung ist, in welcher also alle geometrische Erkenntnis, weil sie sich auf Anschauung a priori gründet, unmittelbare Evidenz hat, und die Gegenstände durch die Erkenntnis selbst, a priori (der Form nach) in der Anschauung, gegeben werden. Dagegen fängt mit den reinen Verstandesbegriffen die unumgängliche Bedürfnis an, nicht allein von ihnen selbst, sondern auch vom Raum die transzendente Deduktion zu suchen, weil, da sie von Gegenständen nicht durch Prädikate der Anschauung und der Sinnlichkeit, sondern des reinen Denkens a priori



redet, sie sich auf Gegenstände ohne alle Bedingungen der Sinnlichkeit allgemein beziehen, und die, da sie nicht auf Erfahrung gegründet sind, auch in der Anschauung a priori kein Objekt vorzeigen können, worauf sie vor aller Erfahrung ihre Synthesis gründeten, und daher nicht allein wegen der objektiven Gültigkeit und Schranken ihres Gebrauchs Verdacht erregen, sondern auch jenen Begriff des Raumes zweideutig machen, dadurch, daß sie ihn über die Bedingungen der sinnlichen Anschauung zu gebrauchen geneigt sind, weshalb auch oben von ihm eine transzendent. Deduktion vonnöten war. So muß denn der Leser von der unumgänglichen Notwendigkeit einer solchen transz. Deduktion, ehe er einen einzigen Schritt im Felde der reinen Vernunft getan hat, überzeugt werden; weil er sonst blind verfährt, und, nachdem er mannigfaltig umhergeirrt hat, doch wieder zu der Unwissenheit zurückkehren muß, von der er ausgegangen war. Er muß aber auch die unvermeidliche Schwierigkeit zum voraus deutlich einsehen, damit er nicht über Dunkelheit klage, wo die Sache selbst tief eingehüllt ist, oder über der Wegräumung der Hindernisse zu früh verdrossen werden, weil es darauf ankommt, entweder alle Ansprüche zu Einsichten der reinen Vernunft, als das beliebteste Feld, nämlich dasjenige über die Grenzen aller möglichen Erfahrung hinaus, völlig aufzugeben, oder diese kritische Untersuchung zur Vollkommenheit zu bringen.

Wir haben oben an den Begriffen des Raumes und der Zeit mit leichter Mühe begreiflich machen können, wie diese als Erkenntnisse a priori sich gleichwohl auf Gegenstände notwendig beziehen müssen; und eine synthetische Erkenntnis derselben, unabhängig von aller Erfahrung, möglich machten. Denn da nur vermittelt solcher reinen Formen der Sinnlichkeit uns ein Gegenstand erscheinen, d.i. ein Objekt der empirischen Anschauung sein kann, so sind Raum und Zeit reine Anschauungen, welche die Bedingung der Möglichkeit der Gegenstände als Erscheinungen a priori enthalten, und die Synthesis in denselben hat objektive Gültigkeit.

Die Kategorien des Verstandes dagegen stellen uns gar nicht die Bedingungen vor, unter denen Gegenstände in der Anschauung gegeben werden, mithin können uns allerdings Gegenstände erscheinen, ohne daß sie sich notwendig auf Funktionen des Verstandes beziehen müssen, und dieser also die Bedingungen derselben a priori enthielte. Daher zeigt sich hier eine Schwierigkeit, die wir im Felde der Sinnlichkeit nicht antrafen, wie nämlich subjektive Bedingungen des Denkens sollten

objektive Gültigkeit haben, d.i. Bedingungen der Möglichkeit aller Erkenntnis der Gegenstände abgeben: denn ohne Funktionen des Verstandes können allerdings Erscheinungen in der Anschauung gegeben werden. Ich nehme z.B. den Begriff der Ursache, welcher eine besondere Art der Synthesis bedeutet, da auf etwas A was ganz verschiedenes B nach einer Regel gesetzt wird. Es ist a priori nicht klar, warum Erscheinungen etwas dergleichen enthalten sollten, (denn Erfahrungen kann man nicht zum Beweise anführen, weil die objektive Gültigkeit dieses Begriffs a priori muß dargetan werden können,) und es ist daher a priori zweifelhaft, ob ein solcher Begriff nicht etwa gar leer sei und überall unter den Erscheinungen keinen Gegenstand antreffe. Denn daß Gegenstände der sinnlichen Anschauung den im Gemüt a priori liegenden formalen Bedingungen der Sinnlichkeit gemäß sein müssen, ist daraus klar, weil sie sonst nicht Gegenstände für uns sein würden; daß sie aber auch überdem den Bedingungen, deren der Verstand zur synthetischen Einsicht des Denkens bedarf, gemäß sein müssen, davon ist die Schlußfolge nicht so leicht einzusehen. Denn es könnten wohl allenfalls Erscheinungen so beschaffen sein, daß der Verstand sie den Bedingungen seiner Einheit gar nicht gemäß fände, und alles so in Verwirrung läge, daß z.B. in der Reihenfolge der Erscheinungen sich nichts darböte, was eine Regel der Synthesis an die Hand gäbe, und also dem Begriffe der Ursache und Wirkung entspräche, so daß dieser Begriff also ganz leer, nichtig und ohne Bedeutung wäre. Erscheinungen würden nichtsdestoweniger unserer Anschauung Gegenstände darbieten, denn die Anschauung bedarf der Funktionen des Denkens auf keine Weise.

Gedächte man sich von der Mühsamkeit dieser Untersuchungen dadurch loszuwickeln, daß man sagte: Die Erfahrung böte unablässig Beispiele einer solchen Regelmäßigkeit der Erscheinungen dar, die genugsam Anlaß geben, den Begriff der Ursache davon abzusondern, und dadurch zugleich die objektive Gültigkeit eines solchen Begriffs zu bewähren, so bemerkt man nicht, daß auf diese Weise der Begriff der Ursache gar nicht entspringen kann, sondern daß er entweder völlig a priori im Verstande müsse gegründet sein, oder als ein bloßes Hirngespinnst gänzlich aufgegeben werden müsse. Denn dieser Begriff erfordert durchaus, daß etwas A von der Art sei, daß ein anderes B daraus notwendig und nach einer schlechthin allgemeinen Regel folge. Erscheinungen geben gar wohl Fälle an die Hand, aus denen eine Regel möglich ist, nach der etwas gewöhnlichermaßen geschieht, aber niemals, daß der Erfolg notwendig sei: daher der Synthesis der Ursache und Wirkung auch eine Dignität anhängt, die man gar nicht empirisch

ausdrücken kann, nämlich, daß die Wirkung nicht bloß zu der Ursache hinzukomme, sondern durch dieselbe gesetzt sei, und aus ihr erfolge. Die strenge Allgemeinheit der Regel ist auch gar keine Eigenschaft empirischer Regeln, die durch Induktion keine andere als komparative Allgemeinheit, d.i. ausgebreitete Brauchbarkeit bekommen können. Nun würde sich aber der Gebrauch der reinen Verstandesbegriffe gänzlich ändern, wenn man sie nur als empirische Produkte behandeln wollte.

### Übergang zur transz. Deduktion der Kategorien

Es sind nur zwei Fälle möglich, unter denen synthetische Vorstellung und ihre Gegenstände zusammentreffen, sich aufeinander notwendigerweise beziehen, und gleichsam einander begegnen können. Entweder wenn der Gegenstand die Vorstellung, oder diese den Gegenstand allein möglich macht. Ist das erstere, so ist diese Beziehung nur empirisch, und die Vorstellung ist niemals a priori möglich. Und dies ist der Fall mit Erscheinung, in Ansehung dessen, was an ihnen zur Empfindung gehört. Ist aber das zweite, weil Vorstellung an sich selbst (denn von dessen Kausalität, vermittelt des Willens, ist hier gar nicht die Rede,) ihren Gegenstand dem Dasein nach nicht hervorbringt, so ist doch die Vorstellung in Ansehung des Gegenstandes alsdann a priori bestimmend, wenn durch sie allein es möglich ist, etwas als einen Gegenstand zu erkennen. Es sind aber zwei Bedingungen, unter denen allein die Erkenntnis eines Gegenstandes möglich ist, erstlich Anschauung, dadurch derselbe, aber nur als Erscheinung, gegeben wird: zweitens Begriff, dadurch ein Gegenstand gedacht wird, der dieser Anschauung entspricht. Es ist aber aus dem obigen klar, daß die erste Bedingung, nämlich die, unter der allein Gegenstände angeschaut werden können, in der Tat den Objekten der Form nach a priori im Gemüt zum Grunde liegen. Mit dieser formalen Bedingung der Sinnlichkeit stimmen also alle Erscheinungen notwendig überein, weil sie nur durch dieselbe erscheinen, d.i. empirisch angeschaut und gegeben werden können. Nun fragt es sich, ob nicht auch Begriffe a priori vorausgehen, als Bedingungen, unter denen allein etwas, wenngleich nicht angeschaut, dennoch als Gegenstand überhaupt gedacht wird, denn alsdann ist alle empirische Erkenntnis der Gegenstände solchen Begriffen notwendigerweise gemäß, weil, ohne deren Voraussetzung, nichts als Objekt der Erfahrung möglich ist. Nun enthält aber alle Erfahrung außer der Anschauung der Sinne, wodurch

etwas gegeben wird, noch einen Begriff von einem Gegenstande, der in der Anschauung gegeben wird, oder erscheint: demnach werden Begriffe von Gegenständen überhaupt, als Bedingungen a priori aller Erfahrungserkenntnis zum Grunde liegen: folglich wird die objektive Gültigkeit der Kategorien, als Begriffe a priori, darauf beruhen, daß durch sie allein Erfahrung (der Form des Denkens nach) möglich sei. Denn alsdann beziehen sie sich notwendigerweise und a priori auf Gegenstände der Erfahrung, weil nur mittelst ihrer überhaupt irgendein Gegenstand der Erfahrung gedacht werden kann.

Die transz. Deduktion aller Begriffe a priori hat also ein Prinzipium, worauf die ganze Nachforschung gerichtet werden muß, nämlich dieses: daß sie als Bedingungen a priori der Möglichkeit der Erfahrungen erkannt werden müssen, (es sei der Anschauung, die in ihr angetroffen wird, oder des Denkens). Begriffe, die den objektiven Grund der Möglichkeit der Erfahrung abgeben, sind eben darum notwendig. Die Entwicklung der Erfahrung aber, worin sie angetroffen werden, ist nicht ihre Deduktion, (sondern Illustration,) weil sie dabei doch nur zufällig sein würden. Ohne diese ursprüngliche Beziehung auf mögliche Erfahrung, in welcher alle Gegenstände der Erkenntnis vorkommen, würde die Beziehung derselben auf irgendein Objekt gar nicht begriffen werden können.

Es sind aber drei ursprüngliche Quellen, (Fähigkeiten oder Vermögen der Seele) die die Bedingungen der Möglichkeit aller Erfahrung enthalten, und selbst aus keinem anderen Vermögen des Gemüts abgeleitet werden können, nämlich, Sinn, Einbildungskraft, und Apperzeption. Darauf gründet sich 1) die Synopsis des Mannigfaltigen a priori durch den Sinn; 2) die Synthesis dieses Mannigfaltigen durch die Einbildungskraft; endlich 3) die Einheit dieser Synthesis durch ursprüngliche Apperzeption. Alle diese Vermögen haben, außer dem empirischen Gebrauche, noch einen transz., der lediglich auf die Form geht, und a priori möglich ist. Von diesem haben wir in Ansehung der Sinne oben im ersten Teile geredet, die zwei anderen aber wollen wir jetzt ihrer Natur nach einzusehen trachten.

Der Deduktion der reinen Verstandesbegriffe

Zweiter Abschnitt

Von den Gründen a priori zur Möglichkeit der Erfahrung

Daß ein Begriff völlig a priori erzeugt werden, und sich auf einen Gegenstand beziehen solle, obgleich er weder selbst in den Begriff möglicher Erfahrung gehört, noch aus Elementen einer möglichen Erfahrung besteht, ist gänzlich widersprechend und unmöglich. Denn er würde alsdann keinen Inhalt haben, darum, weil ihm keine Anschauung korrespondierte, indem Anschauungen überhaupt, wodurch uns Gegenstände gegeben werden können, das Feld, oder den gesamten Gegenstand möglicher Erfahrung ausmachen. Ein Begriff a priori, der sich nicht auf diese beziehe, würde nur die logische Form zu einem Begriff, aber nicht der Begriff selbst sein, wodurch etwas gedacht würde.

Wenn es also reine Begriffe a priori gibt, so können diese zwar freilich nichts Empirisches enthalten: sie müssen aber gleichwohl lauter Bedingungen a priori zu einer möglichen Erfahrung sein, als worauf allein ihre objektive Realität beruhen kann.

Will man daher wissen, wie reine Verstandesbegriffe möglich seien, so muß man untersuchen, welches die Bedingungen a priori seien, worauf die Möglichkeit der Erfahrung ankommt, und die ihr zum Grunde liegen, wenn man gleich von allem Empirischem der Erscheinungen abstrahiert. Ein Begriff, der diese formale und objektive Bedingung der Erfahrung allgemein und zureichend ausdrückt, würde ein reiner Verstandesbegriff heißen. Habe ich einmal reine Verstandesbegriffe, so kann ich auch wohl Gegenstände erdenken, die vielleicht unmöglich, vielleicht zwar an sich möglich, aber in keiner Erfahrung gegeben werden können, indem in der Verknüpfung jener Begriffe etwas weggelassen sein kann, was doch zur Bedingung einer möglichen Erfahrung notwendig gehört, (Begriff eines Geistes) oder etwa reine Verstandesbegriffe weiter ausgedehnt werden, als Erfahrung fassen kann (Begriff von Gott). Die Elemente aber zu allen Erkenntnissen a priori selbst zu willkürlichen und ungereimten Erdichtungen können zwar nicht von der Erfahrung entlehnt sein, (denn sonst wären sie nicht Erkenntnisse a priori) sie müssen aber jederzeit die reinen Bedingungen a priori einer möglichen Erfahrung und eines Gegenstandes derselben enthalten, denn sonst würde nicht allein durch sie gar nichts gedacht werden, sondern sie selber würden ohne Data auch nicht einmal im Denken entstehen können.

Diese Begriffe nun, welche a priori das reine Denken bei jeder Erfahrung enthalten, finden wir an den Kategorien, und es ist schon eine hinreichende Deduktion derselben, und Rechtfertigung ihrer

objektiven Gültigkeit, wenn wir beweisen können: daß vermittels ihrer allein ein Gegenstand gedacht werden kann. Weil aber in einem solchen Gedanken mehr als das einzige Vermögen zu denken, nämlich der Verstand beschäftigt ist, und dieser selbst, als ein Erkenntnisvermögen, das sich auf Objekte beziehen soll, ebensowohl einer Erläuterung, wegen der Möglichkeit dieser Beziehung, bedarf: so müssen wir die subjektiven Quellen, welche die Grundlage a priori zu der Möglichkeit der Erfahrung ausmachen, nicht nach ihrer empirischen, sondern transzendentalen Beschaffenheit zuvor erwägen.

Wenn eine jede einzelne Vorstellung der anderen ganz fremd, gleichsam isoliert, und von dieser getrennt wäre, so würde niemals so etwas, als Erkenntnis ist, entspringen, welche ein Ganzes vergleichener und verknüpfter Vorstellungen ist. Wenn ich also dem Sinne deswegen, weil er in seiner Anschauung Mannigfaltigkeit enthält, eine Synopsis beilege, so korrespondiert dieser jederzeit eine Synthesis und die Rezeptivität kann nur mit Spontaneität verbunden Erkenntnisse möglich machen. Diese ist nun der Grund einer dreifachen Synthesis, die notwendigerweise in allem Erkenntnis vorkommt: nämlich, der Apprehension der Vorstellungen, als Modifikationen des Gemüts in der Anschauung, der Reproduktion derselben in der Einbildung und ihrer Rekognition im Begriffe. Diese geben nun eine Leitung auf drei subjektiven Erkenntnisquellen, welche selbst den Verstand und, durch diesen, alle Erfahrung, als ein empirisches Produkt des Verstandes möglich machen.

#### Vorläufige Erinnerung

Die Deduktion der Kategorien ist mit so viel Schwierigkeiten verbunden, und nötigt, so tief in die ersten Gründe der Möglichkeit unserer Erkenntnis überhaupt einzudringen, daß ich, um die Weitläufigkeit einer vollständigen Theorie zu vermeiden, und dennoch, bei einer so notwendigen Untersuchung, nichts zu versäumen, es ratsamer gefunden habe, durch folgende vier Nummern den Leser mehr vorzubereiten, als zu unterrichten; und im nächstfolgenden dritten Abschnitte, die Erörterung dieser Elemente des Verstandes allererst systematisch vorzustellen. Um deswillen wird sich der Leser bis dahin die Dunkelheit nicht abwendig machen lassen, die auf einem Wege, der noch ganz unbetreten ist, anfänglich unvermeidlich ist, sich aber, wie ich hoffe, in gedachtem Abschnitte zur vollständigen Einsicht aufklären soll.

## 1. Von der Synthesis der Apprehension in der Anschauung

Unsere Vorstellungen mögen entspringen, woher sie wollen, ob sie durch den Einfluß äußerer Dinge, oder durch innere Ursachen gewirkt seien, sie mögen a priori, oder empirisch als Erscheinungen entstanden sein; so gehören sie doch als Modifikationen des Gemüts zum inneren Sinn, und als solche sind alle unsere Erkenntnisse zuletzt doch der formalen Bedingung des inneren Sinnes, nämlich der Zeit unterworfen, als in welcher sie insgesamt geordnet, verknüpft und in Verhältnisse gebracht werden müssen. Dieses ist eine allgemeine Anmerkung, die man bei dem Folgenden durchaus zum Grunde legen muß.

Jede Anschauung enthält ein Mannigfaltiges in sich, welches doch nicht als ein solches vorgestellt werden würde, wenn das Gemüt nicht die Zeit, in der Folge der Eindrücke aufeinander unterschiede: denn als in einem Augenblick enthalten, kann jede Vorstellung niemals etwas anderes, als absolute Einheit sein. Damit nun aus diesem Mannigfaltigen Einheit der Anschauung werde, (wie etwa in der Vorstellung des Raumes) so ist erstlich das Durchlaufen der Mannigfaltigkeit und dann die Zusammennehmung desselben notwendig, welche Handlung ich die Synthesis der Apprehension nenne, weil sie geradezu auf die Anschauung gerichtet ist, die zwar ein Mannigfaltiges darbietet, dieses aber als ein solches, und zwar in einer Vorstellung enthalten, niemals ohne eine dabei vorkommende Synthesis bewirken kann.

Diese Synthesis der Apprehension muß nun auch a priori, d.i. in Ansehung der Vorstellungen, die nicht empirisch sind, ausgeübt werden. Denn ohne sie würden wir weder die Vorstellungen des Raumes, noch der Zeit a priori haben können: da diese nur durch die Synthesis des Mannigfaltigen, welches die Sinnlichkeit in ihrer ursprünglichen Rezeptivität darbietet, erzeugt werden können. Also haben wir eine reine Synthesis der Apprehension.

## 2. Von der Synthesis der Reproduktion in der Einbildung

Es ist zwar ein bloß empirisches Gesetz, nach welchem Vorstellungen, die sich oft gefolgt oder begleitet haben, miteinander endlich vergesellschaften, und dadurch in eine Verknüpfung setzen, nach welcher, auch ohne die Gegenwart des Gegenstandes, eine dieser Vorstellungen einen Übergang des Gemüts zu der anderen, nach einer beständigen Regel, hervorbringt. Dieses Gesetz der Reproduktion setzt aber voraus: daß die Erscheinungen selbst wirklich einer solchen Regel unterworfen seien, und daß in dem Mannigfaltigen ihrer Vorstellungen eine, gewissen Regeln gemäße, Begleitung, oder Folge stattfinde; denn ohne das würde unsere empirische Einbildungskraft niemals etwas ihrem Vermögen Gemäßen zu tun bekommen, also, wie ein totes und uns selbst unbekanntes Vermögen im Innern des Gemüts verborgen bleiben. Würde der Zinnober bald rot, bald schwarz, bald leicht, bald schwer sein, ein Mensch bald in diese, bald in jene tierische Gestalt verändert werden, am längsten Tage bald das Land mit Früchten, bald mit Eis und Schnee bedeckt sein, so könnte meine empirische Einbildungskraft nicht einmal Gelegenheit bekommen, bei der Vorstellung der roten Farbe den schweren Zinnober in die Gedanken zu bekommen, oder würde ein gewisses Wort bald diesem, bald jenem Dinge beigelegt, oder auch eben dasselbe Ding bald so bald anders benannt, ohne daß hierin eine gewisse Regel, der die Erscheinungen schon von selbst unterworfen sind, herrschte, so könnte keine empirische Synthesis der Reproduktion stattfinden.

Es muß also etwas sein, was selbst diese Reproduktion der Erscheinungen möglich macht, dadurch, daß es der Grund a priori einer notwendigen synthetischen Einheit derselben ist. Hierauf aber kommt man bald, wenn man sich besinnt, daß Erscheinungen nicht Dinge an sich selbst, sondern das bloße Spiel unserer Vorstellungen sind, die am Ende auf Bestimmungen des inneren Sinnes auslaufen. Wenn wir nun dartun können, daß selbst unsere reinsten Anschauungen a priori keine Erkenntnis verschaffen, außer, sofern sie eine solche Verbindung des Mannigfaltigen enthalten, die eine durchgängige Synthesis der Reproduktion möglich macht, so ist diese Synthesis der Einbildungskraft auch vor aller Erfahrung auf Prinzipien a priori gegründet, und man muß eine reine transzendente Synthesis derselben annehmen, die selbst der Möglichkeit aller Erfahrung, (als welche die Reproduzierbarkeit der Erscheinungen notwendig voraussetzt) zum Grunde liege. Nun ist offenbar, daß, wenn ich eine Linie in Gedanken ziehe, oder die Zeit von einem Mittag zum andern denken, oder auch nur eine gewisse Zahl mir vorstellen will, ich erstlich notwendig eine dieser mannigfaltigen Vorstellungen nach der anderen in Gedanken fassen



müsse. Würde ich aber die vorhergehende (die ersten Teile der Linie, die vorhergehenden Teile der Zeit, oder die nacheinander vorgestellten Einheiten) immer aus den Gedanken verlieren, und sie nicht reproduzieren, indem ich zu den folgenden fortgehe, so würde niemals eine ganze Vorstellung, und keiner aller vorgenannten Gedanken, ja gar nicht einmal die reinsten und ersten Grundvorstellungen von Raum und Zeit entspringen können.

Die Synthesis der Apprehension ist also mit der Synthesis der Reproduktion unzertrennlich verbunden. Und da jene den transzendentalen Grund der Möglichkeit aller Erkenntnisse überhaupt (nicht bloß der empirischen, sondern auch der reinen a priori) ausmacht, so gehört die reproduktive Synthesis der Einbildungskraft zu den transzendentalen Handlungen des Gemüts und in Rücksicht auf dieselbe, wollen wir dieses Vermögen auch das transzendente Vermögen der Einbildungskraft nennen.

### 3. Von der Synthesis der Rekognition im Begriffe

Ohne Bewußtsein, daß das, was wir denken, eben dasselbe sei, was wir einen Augenblick zuvor dachten, würde alle Reproduktion in der Reihe der Vorstellungen vergeblich sein. Denn es wäre eine neue Vorstellung im jetzigen Zustande, die zu dem Aktus, wodurch sie nach und nach hat erzeugt werden sollen, gar nicht gehörte, und das Mannigfaltige derselben würde immer kein Ganzes ausmachen, weil es der Einheit ermangelte, die ihm nur das Bewußtsein verschaffen kann. Vergesse ich im Zählen: daß die Einheiten, die mir jetzt vor Sinnen schweben, nach und nach zueinander von mir hinzugetan worden sind, so würde ich die Erzeugung der Menge, durch diese sukzessive Hinzutunung von Einem zu Einem, mithin auch nicht die Zahl erkennen; denn dieser Begriff besteht lediglich in dem Bewußtsein dieser Einheit der Synthesis.

Das Wort Begriff könnte uns schon von selbst zu dieser Bemerkung Anleitung geben. Denn dieses eine Bewußtsein ist es, was das Mannigfaltige, nach und nach Angesehene, und dann auch Reproduzierte, in eine Vorstellung vereinigt. Dieses Bewußtsein kann oft nur schwach sein, so daß wir es nur in der Wirkung, nicht aber in dem Aktus selbst, d.i. unmittelbar mit der Erzeugung der Vorstellung verknüpfen: aber unerachtet dieser Unterschiede muß doch immer ein Bewußtsein

angetroffen werden, wenn ihm gleich die hervorstechende Klarheit mangelt, und ohne dasselbe sind Begriffe, und mit ihnen Erkenntnis von Gegenständen ganz unmöglich.

Und hier ist es denn notwendig, sich darüber verständlich zu machen, was man denn unter dem Ausdruck eines Gegenstandes der Vorstellungen meine. Wir haben oben gesagt: daß Erscheinungen selbst nichts als sinnliche Vorstellungen sind, die an sich, in eben derselben Art, nicht als Gegenstände (außer der Vorstellungskraft) müssen angesehen werden. Was versteht man denn, wenn man von einem der Erkenntnis korrespondierenden, mithin auch davon unterschiedenen, Gegenstand redet? Es ist leicht einzusehen, daß dieser Gegenstand nur als etwas überhaupt = X müsse gedacht werden, weil wir außer unserer Erkenntnis doch nichts haben, welches wir dieser Erkenntnis als korrespondierend gegenüberzusetzen könnten.

Wir finden aber, daß unser Gedanke von der Beziehung aller Erkenntnis auf ihren Gegenstand etwas von Notwendigkeit bei sich führe, da nämlich dieser als dasjenige angesehen wird, was dawider ist, daß unsere Erkenntnisse nicht aufs Geratewohl, oder beliebig, sondern a priori auf gewisse Weise bestimmt seien, weil, indem sie sich auf einen Gegenstand beziehen sollen, sie auch notwendigerweise in Beziehung auf diesen untereinander übereinstimmen, d.i. diejenige Einheit haben müssen, welche den Begriff von einem Gegenstande ausmacht.

Es ist aber klar, daß, da wir es nur mit dem Mannigfaltigen unserer Vorstellungen zu tun haben, und jenes X, was ihnen korrespondiert (der Gegenstand), weil er etwas von allen unsern Vorstellungen Unterschiedenes sein soll, für uns nichts ist, die Einheit, welche der Gegenstand notwendig macht, nichts anderes sein könne, als die normale Einheit des Bewußtseins in der Synthesis des Mannigfaltigen der Vorstellungen. Alsdann sagen wir: wir erkennen den Gegenstand, wenn wir in dem Mannigfaltigen der Anschauung synthetische Einheit bewirkt haben. Diese ist aber unmöglich, wenn die Anschauung nicht durch eine solche Funktion der Synthesis nach einer Regel hat hervorgebracht werden können, welche die Reproduktion des Mannigfaltigen a priori notwendig und einen Begriff, in welchem dieses sich vereinigt, möglich macht. So denken wir uns einen Triangel als Gegenstand, indem wir uns der Zusammensetzung von drei geraden Linien nach einer Regel bewußt sind, nach welcher eine solche Anschauung jederzeit dargestellt werden

kann. Diese Einheit der Regel bestimmt nun alles Mannigfaltige, und schränkt es auf Bedingungen ein, welche die Einheit der Apperzeption möglich machen, und der Begriff dieser Einheit ist die Vorstellung vom Gegenstande = X, den ich durch die gedachten Prädikate eines Triangels denke.

Alles Erkenntnis erfordert einen Begriff, dieser mag nun so unvollkommen, oder so dunkel sein, wie er wolle: dieser aber ist seiner Form nach jederzeit etwas Allgemeines, und was zur Regel dient. So dient der Begriff vom Körper nach der Einheit des Mannigfaltigen, welches durch ihn gedacht wird, unserer Erkenntnis äußerer Erscheinungen zur Regel. Eine Regel der Anschauungen kann er aber nur dadurch sein: daß er bei gegebenen Erscheinungen die notwendige Reproduktion des Mannigfaltigen derselben, mithin die synthetische Einheit in ihrem Bewußtsein, vorstellt. So macht der Begriff des Körpers, bei der Wahrnehmung von etwas außer uns, die Vorstellung der Ausdehnung, und mit ihr die der Undurchdringlichkeit, der Gestalt usw. notwendig.

Aller Notwendigkeit liegt jederzeit eine transzendente Bedingung zum Grunde. Also muß ein transzendenter Grund der Einheit des Bewußtseins, in der Synthesis des Mannigfaltigen aller unserer Anschauungen, mithin auch, der Begriffe der Objekte überhaupt, folglich auch aller Gegenstände, der Erfahrung, angetroffen werden, ohne welchen es unmöglich wäre, zu unseren Anschauungen irgendeinen Gegenstand zu denken: denn dieser ist nichts mehr, als das Etwas, davon der Begriff eine solche Notwendigkeit der Synthesis ausdrückt.

Diese ursprüngliche und transzendente Bedingung ist nun keine andere, als die transzendente Apperzeption. Das Bewußtsein seiner selbst, nach den Bestimmungen unseres Zustandes, bei der inneren Wahrnehmung ist bloß empirisch, jederzeit wandelbar, es kann kein stehendes oder bleibendes Selbst in diesem Flusse innerer Erscheinungen geben, und wird gewöhnlich der innere Sinn genannt, oder die empirische Apperzeption. Das was notwendig als numerisch identisch vorgestellt werden soll, kann nicht als ein solches durch empirische Data gedacht werden. Es muß eine Bedingung sein, die vor aller Erfahrung vorhergeht, und diese selbst möglich macht, welche eine solche transzendente Voraussetzung geltend machen soll.

Nun können keine Erkenntnisse in uns stattfinden, keine Verknüpfung

und Einheit derselben untereinander, ohne diejenige Einheit des Bewußtseins, welche vor allen Datis der Anschauungen vorhergeht, und, worauf in Beziehung, alle Vorstellung von Gegenständen allein möglich ist. Dieses reine ursprüngliche, unwandelbare Bewußtsein will ich nun die transzendente Apperzeption nennen. Daß sie diesen Namen verdiene, erhellt schon daraus: daß selbst die reinste objektive Einheit, nämlich die der Begriffe a priori (Raum und Zeit) nur durch Beziehung der Anschauungen auf sie möglich sein. Die numerische Einheit dieser Apperzeption liegt also a priori allen Begriffen ebensowohl zum Grunde, als die Mannigfaltigkeit des Raumes und der Zeit den Anschauungen der Sinnlichkeit.

Eben diese transzendente Einheit der Apperzeption macht aber aus allen möglichen Erscheinungen, die immer in einer Erfahrung beisammen sein können, einen Zusammenhang aller dieser Vorstellungen nach Gesetzen. Denn diese Einheit des Bewußtseins wäre unmöglich, wenn nicht das Gemüt in der Erkenntnis des Mannigfaltigen sich der Identität der Funktion bewußt werden könnte, wodurch sie dasselbe synthetisch in einer Erkenntnis verbindet. Also ist das ursprüngliche und notwendige Bewußtsein der Identität seiner selbst zugleich ein Bewußtsein einer ebenso notwendigen Einheit der Synthesis aller Erscheinungen nach Begriffen, d.i. nach Regeln, die sie nicht allein notwendig reproduzibel machen, sondern dadurch auch ihrer Anschauung einen Gegenstand bestimmen, d.i. den Begriff von etwas, darin sie notwendig zusammenhängen: denn das Gemüt konnte sich unmöglich die Identität seiner selbst in der Mannigfaltigkeit seiner Vorstellungen und zwar a priori denken, wenn es nicht die Identität seiner Handlung vor Augen hätte, welche alle Synthesis der Apprehension (die empirisch ist) einer transzendentalen Einheit unterwirft, und ihren Zusammenhang nach Regeln a priori zuerst möglich macht. Nunmehr werden wir auch unsere Begriffe von einem Gegenstande überhaupt richtiger bestimmen können. Alle Vorstellungen haben, als Vorstellungen, ihren Gegenstand, und können selbst wiederum Gegenstände anderer Vorstellungen sein. Erscheinungen sind die einzigen Gegenstände, die uns unmittelbar gegeben werden können, und das, was sich darin unmittelbar auf den Gegenstand bezieht, heißt Anschauung. Nun sind aber diese Erscheinungen nicht Dinge an sich selbst, sondern selbst nur Vorstellungen, die wiederum ihren Gegenstand haben, der also von uns nicht mehr angeschaut werden kann, und daher der nichtempirische, d.i. transzendente Gegenstand = X genannt werden mag.

Der reine Begriff von diesem transzendentalen Gegenstande, (der wirklich bei allen unsern Erkenntnissen immer einerlei = X ist,) ist das, was in allen unseren empirischen Begriffen überhaupt Beziehung auf einen Gegenstand, d.i. objektive Realität verschaffen kann. Dieser Begriff kann nun gar keine bestimmte Anschauung enthalten, und wird also nichts anderes, als diejenige Einheit betreffen, die in einem Mannigfaltigen der Erkenntnis angetroffen werden muß, sofern es in Beziehung auf einen Gegenstand steht. Diese Beziehung aber ist nichts anderes, als die notwendige Einheit des Bewußtseins, mithin auch der Synthesis des Mannigfaltigen durch gemeinschaftliche Funktion des Gemüts, es in einer Vorstellung zu verbinden. Da nun diese Einheit als a priori notwendig angesehen werden muß, (weil die Erkenntnis sonst ohne Gegenstand sein würde) so wird die Beziehung auf einen transzendentalen Gegenstand d.i. die objektive Realität unserer empirischen Erkenntnis, auf dem transzendentalen Gesetze beruhen, daß alle Erscheinungen, sofern uns dadurch Gegenstände gegeben werden sollen, unter Regeln a priori der synthetischen Einheit derselben stehen müssen, nach welchen ihr Verhältnis in der empirischen Anschauung allein möglich ist, d.i. daß sie ebensowohl in der Erfahrung unter Bedingungen der notwendigen Einheit der Apperzeption, als in der bloßen Anschauung unter den formalen Bedingungen des Raumes und der Zeit stehen müssen, ja daß durch jene jede Erkenntnis allererst möglich werde.

#### 4. Vorläufige Erklärung der Möglichkeit der Kategorien, als Erkenntnissen a priori

Es ist nur eine Erfahrung, in welcher alle Wahrnehmungen als im durchgängigen und gesetzmäßigen Zusammenhange vorgestellt werden: ebenso, wie nur ein Raum und Zeit ist, in welcher alle Formen der Erscheinung und alles Verhältnis des Seins oder Nichtseins stattfinden. Wenn man von verschiedenen Erfahrungen spricht, so sind es nur so viel Wahrnehmungen, sofern solche zu einer und derselben allgemeinen Erfahrung gehören. Die durchgängige und synthetische Einheit der Wahrnehmungen macht nämlich gerade die Form der Erfahrung aus, und sie ist nichts anderes, als die synthetische Einheit der Erscheinungen nach Begriffen.

Einheit der Synthesis nach empirischen Begriffen würde ganz zufällig

sein und, gründeten diese sich nicht auf einen transzendentalen Grund der Einheit, so würde es möglich sein, daß ein Gewühle von Erscheinungen unsere Seele anfüllte, ohne daß doch daraus jemals Erfahrung werden könnte. Alsdann fiel aber auch alle Beziehung der Erkenntnis auf Gegenstände weg, weil ihr die Verknüpfung nach allgemeinen und notwendigen Gesetzen mangelte, mithin würde sie zwar gedankenlose Anschauung, aber niemals Erkenntnis, also für uns soviel als gar nichts sein.

Die Bedingungen a priori einer möglichen Erfahrung überhaupt sind zugleich Bedingungen der Möglichkeit der Gegenstände der Erfahrung. Nun behaupte ich: die eben angeführten Kategorien sind nichts anderes, als die Bedingungen des Denkens in einer möglichen Erfahrung, sowie Raum und Zeit die Bedingungen der Anschauung zu eben derselben enthalten. Also sind jene auch Grundbegriffe, Objekte überhaupt zu den Erscheinungen zu denken, und haben also a priori objektive Gültigkeit; welches dasjenige war, was wir eigentlich wissen wollten.

Die Möglichkeit aber, ja sogar die Notwendigkeit dieser Kategorien beruht auf der Beziehung, welche die gesamte Sinnlichkeit, und mit ihr auch alle möglichen Erscheinungen, auf die ursprüngliche Apperzeption haben, in welcher alles notwendig den Bedingungen der durchgängigen Einheit des Selbstbewußtseins gemäß sein, d.i. unter allgemeinen Funktionen der Synthesis stehen muß, nämlich der Synthesis nach Begriffen, als worin die Apperzeption allein ihre durchgängige und notwendige Identität a priori beweisen kann. So ist der Begriff einer Ursache nichts anderes, als eine Synthesis (dessen, was in der Zeitreihe folgt, mit anderen Erscheinungen,) nach Begriffen, und ohne dergleichen Einheit, die ihre Regel a priori hat, und die Erscheinungen sich unterwirft, würde durchgängige und allgemeine, mithin notwendige Einheit des Bewußtseins, in dem Mannigfaltigen der Wahrnehmungen, nicht angetroffen werden. Diese würden aber alsdann auch zu keiner Erfahrung gehören, folglich ohne Objekt, und nichts als ein blindes Spiel der Vorstellungen, d.i. weniger, als ein Traum sein.

Alle Versuche, jene reinen Verstandesbegriffe von der Erfahrung abzuleiten, und ihnen einen bloß empirischen Ursprung zuzuschreiben, sind also ganz eitel und vergeblich. Ich will davon nichts erwähnen, daß z.E. der Begriff einer Ursache den Zug von Notwendigkeit bei sich führt, welche gar keine Erfahrung geben kann, die uns zwar lehrt: daß auf eine Erscheinung gewöhnlichermaßen etwas anderes folge,

aber nicht, daß es notwendig darauf folgen müsse, noch daß a priori und ganz allgemein daraus als einer Bedingung auf die Folge könne geschlossen werden. Aber jene empirische Regel der Assoziation, die man doch durchgängig annehmen muß, wenn man sagt: daß alles in der Reihenfolge der Begebenheiten dermaßen unter Regeln stehe, daß niemals etwas geschieht, vor welchem nicht etwas vorhergehe, darauf es jederzeit folge: dieses, als ein Gesetz der Natur, worauf beruht es, frage ich? und wie ist selbst diese Assoziation möglich? Der Grund der Möglichkeit der Assoziation des Mannigfaltigen, sofern es im Objekte liegt, heißt die Affinität des Mannigfaltigen. Ich frage also, wie macht ihr euch die durchgängige Affinität der Erscheinungen, (dadurch sie unter beständigen Gesetzen stehen, und darunter gehören müssen,) begreiflich?

Nach meinen Grundsätzen ist sie sehr wohl begreiflich. Alle möglichen Erscheinungen gehören, als Vorstellungen, zu dem ganzen möglichen Selbstbewußtsein. Von diesem aber, als einer transzendentalen Vorstellung, ist die numerische Identität unzertrennlich, und a priori gewiß, weil nichts in das Erkenntnis kommen kann, ohne vermittels dieser ursprünglichen Apperzeption. Da nun diese Identität notwendig in der Synthesis alles Mannigfaltigen der Erscheinungen, sofern sie empirische Erkenntnis werden soll, hineinkommen muß, so sind die Erscheinungen Bedingungen a priori unterworfen, welchen ihre Synthesis (der Apprehension) durchgängig gemäß sein muß. Nun heißt aber die Vorstellung einer allgemeinen Bedingung, nach welcher ein gewisses Mannigfaltige, (mithin auf einerlei Art) gesetzt werden kann, eine Regel, und wenn es so gesetzt werden muß, ein Gesetz. Also stehen alle Erscheinungen in einer durchgängigen Verknüpfung nach notwendigen Gesetzen, und mithin in einer transzendentalen Affinität, woraus die empirische die bloße Folge ist.

Daß die Natur sich nach unserem subjektiven Grunde der Apperzeption richten, ja gar davon in Ansehung ihrer Gesetzmäßigkeit abhängen solle, lautet wohl sehr widersinnig und befremdlich. Bedenkt man aber, daß diese Natur an sich nichts als ein Inbegriff von Erscheinungen, mithin kein Ding an sich, sondern bloß eine Menge von Vorstellungen des Gemüts sei, so wird man sich nicht wundern, sie bloß in dem Radikalvermögen aller unserer Erkenntnis, nämlich der transzendentalen Apperzeption, in derjenigen Einheit zu sehen, um derentwillen allein sie Objekt aller möglichen Erfahrung, d.i. Natur heißen kann; und daß wir auch eben darum diese Einheit a priori, mithin auch als notwendig

erkennen können, welches wir wohl müßten unterwegs lassen, wäre sie unabhängig von den ersten Quellen unseres Denkens an sich gegeben. Denn da wüßte ich nicht, wo wir die synthetischen Sätze einer solchen allgemeinen Natureinheit hernehmen sollten, weil man sie auf solchen Fall von den Gegenständen der Natur selbst entlehnen müßte. Da dieses aber nur empirisch geschehen könnte: so würde daraus keine andere, als bloß zufällige Einheit gezogen werden können, die aber bei weitem an den notwendigen Zusammenhang nicht reicht, den man meint, wenn man Natur nennt.

Der Deduktion der reinen Verstandesbegriffe

Dritter Abschnitt

Von dem Verhältnisse des Verstandes zu Gegenständen überhaupt und der Möglichkeit diese a priori zu erkennen

Was wir im vorigen Abschnitte abgesondert und einzeln vortrugen, wollen wir jetzt vereinigt und im Zusammenhange vorstellen. Es sind drei subjektive Erkenntnisquellen, worauf die Möglichkeit einer Erfahrung überhaupt, und Erkenntnis der Gegenstände derselben beruht: Sinn, Einbildungskraft und Apperzeption; jede derselben kann als empirisch, nämlich in der Anwendung auf gegebene Erscheinungen betrachtet werden, alle aber sind auch Elemente oder Grundlagen a priori, welche selbst diesen empirischen Gebrauch möglich machen. Der Sinn stellt die Erscheinungen empirisch in der Wahrnehmung vor, die Einbildungskraft in der Assoziation (und Reproduktion), die Apperzeption in dem empirischen Bewußtsein der Identität dieser reproduktiven Vorstellungen mit den Erscheinungen, dadurch sie gegeben waren, mithin in der Rekognition.

Es liegt aber der sämtlichen Wahrnehmung die reine Anschauung (in Ansehung ihrer als Vorstellungen die Form der inneren Anschauung, die Zeit,) der Assoziation die reine Synthesis der Einbildungskraft, und dein empirischen Bewußtsein die reine Apperzeption, d.i. die durchgängige Identität seiner selbst bei allen möglichen Vorstellungen, a priori zum Grunde.

Wollen wir nun den inneren Grund dieser Verknüpfung der Vorstellungen bis auf denjenigen Punkt verfolgen, in welchem sie alle zusammenlaufen müssen, um darin allererst Einheit der Erkenntnis zu einer möglichen



Erfahrung zu bekommen, so müssen wir von der reinen Apperzeption anfangen. Alle Anschauungen sind für uns nichts, und gehen uns nicht im mindesten etwas an, wenn sie nicht ins Bewußtsein aufgenommen werden können, sie mögen nun direkt oder indirekt darauf einfließen, und nur durch dieses allein ist Erkenntnis möglich. Wir sind uns a priori der durchgängigen Identität unserer selbst in Ansehung aller Vorstellungen, die zu unserem Erkenntnis jemals gehören können, bewußt, als einer notwendigen Bedingung der Möglichkeit aller Vorstellungen, (weil diese in mir doch nur dadurch etwas vorstellen, daß sie mit allem anderen zu einem Bewußtsein gehören, mithin darin wenigstens müssen verknüpft werden können). Dies Prinzip steht a priori fest, und kann das transzendente Prinzip der Einheit alles Mannigfaltigen unserer Vorstellungen (mithin auch in der Anschauung), heißen. Nun ist die Einheit des Mannigfaltigen in einem Subjekt synthetisch: also gibt die reine Apperzeption ein Prinzipium der synthetischen Einheit des Mannigfaltigen in aller möglichen Anschauung an die Hand\*.

\* Man gebe auf diesen Satz wohl acht, der von großer Wichtigkeit ist. Alle Vorstellungen haben eine notwendige Beziehung auf ein mögliches empirisches Bewußtsein: denn hätten sie dieses nicht, und wäre es gänzlich unmöglich, sich ihrer bewußt zu werden; so würde das soviel sagen, sie existierten gar nicht. Alles empirische Bewußtsein hat aber eine notwendige Beziehung auf ein transzendentes (vor aller besondern Erfahrung vorhergehendes) Bewußtsein, nämlich das Bewußtsein meiner selbst, als die ursprüngliche Apperzeption. Es ist also schlechthin notwendig, daß in meinem Erkenntnisse alles Bewußtsein zu einem Bewußtsein (meiner selbst) gehöre. Hier ist nun eine synthetische Einheit des Mannigfaltigen, (Bewußtseins) die a priori erkannt wird, und gerade so den Grund zu synthetischen Sätzen a priori, die das reine Denken betreffen, als Raum und Zeit zu solchen Sätzen, die die Form der bloßen Anschauung angehen, abgibt. Der synthetische Satz: daß alles verschiedene empirische Bewußtsein in einem einigen Selbstbewußtsein verbunden sein müsse, ist der schlechthin erste und synthetische Grundsatz unseres Denkens überhaupt. Es ist aber nicht aus der Acht zu lassen, daß die bloße Vorstellung Ich in Beziehung auf alle anderen (deren kollektive Einheit sie möglich macht) das transzendente Bewußtsein sei. Diese Vorstellung mag nun klar (empirisches Bewußtsein) oder dunkel sein, daran liegt hier nichts, ja nicht einmal an der Wirklichkeit desselben; sondern die Möglichkeit der logischen Form alles

Erkenntnisses beruht notwendig auf dem Verhältnis zu dieser Apperzeption als einem Vermögen.

Diese synthetische Einheit setzt aber eine Synthesis voraus, oder schließt sie ein, und soll jene a priori notwendig sein, so muß letztere auch eine Synthesis a priori sein. Also bezieht sich die transzendente Einheit der Apperzeption auf die reine Synthesis der Einbildungskraft, als eine Bedingung a priori der Möglichkeit aller Zusammensetzung des Mannigfaltigen in einer Erkenntnis. Es kann aber nur die produktive Synthesis der Einbildungskraft a priori stattfinden, denn die reproduktive beruht auf Bedingungen der Erfahrung. Also ist das Prinzipium der notwendigen Einheit der reinen (produktiven) Synthesis der Einbildungskraft vor der Apperzeption der Grund der Möglichkeit aller Erkenntnis, besonders der Erfahrung.

Nun nennen wir die Synthesis des Mannigfaltigen in der Einbildungskraft transzendental, wenn ohne Unterschied der Anschauungen sie auf nichts, als bloß auf die Verbindung des Mannigfaltigen a priori geht, und die Einheit dieser Synthesis heißt transzendental, wenn sie in Beziehung auf die ursprüngliche Einheit der Apperzeption, als a priori notwendig vorgestellt wird. Da diese letztere nun der Möglichkeit aller Erkenntnisse zum Grunde liegt, so ist die transzendente Einheit der Synthesis der Einbildungskraft die reine Form aller möglichen Erkenntnis, durch welche mithin alle Gegenstände möglicher Erfahrung a priori vorgestellt werden müssen.

Die Einheit der Apperzeption in Beziehung auf die Synthesis der Einbildungskraft ist der Verstand, und eben dieselbe Einheit, beziehungsweise auf die transzendente Synthesis der Einbildungskraft, der reine Verstand. Also sind im Verstande reine Erkenntnisse a priori, welche die notwendige Einheit der reinen Synthesis der Einbildungskraft, in Ansehung aller möglichen Erscheinungen, enthalten. Dieses sind aber die Kategorien, d.i. reine Verstandesbegriffe, folglich enthält die empirische Erkenntniskraft des Menschen notwendig einen Verstand, der sich auf alle Gegenstände der Sinne, obgleich nur mittelst der Anschauung, und der Synthesis derselben durch Einbildungskraft bezieht, unter welchen also alle Erscheinungen, als Data zu einer möglichen Erfahrung stehen. Da nun diese Beziehung der Erscheinungen auf mögliche Erfahrung ebenfalls notwendig ist, (weil wir ohne diese gar keine Erkenntnis durch sie bekommen würden, und sie uns mithin gar nichts angingen) so folgt,

daß der reine Verstand, vermittelt der Kategorien, ein formales und synthetischen Prinzipium aller Erfahrungen sei, und die Erscheinungen eine notwendige Beziehung auf den Verstand haben.

Jetzt wollen wir den notwendigen Zusammenhang des Verstandes mit den Erscheinungen vermittelt der Kategorien dadurch vor Augen legen, daß wir von unten auf, nämlich dem Empirischen anfangen. Das Erste, was uns gegeben wird, ist Erscheinung, welche, wenn sie mit Bewußtsein verbunden ist, Wahrnehmung heißt, (ohne das Verhältnis zu einem, wenigstens möglichen Bewußtsein, würde Erscheinung für uns niemals ein Gegenstand der Erkenntnis werden können, und also für uns nichts sein, und weil sie an sich selbst keine objektive Realität hat, und nur im Erkenntnis existiert, überall nichts sein). Weil aber jede Erscheinung ein Mannigfaltiges enthält, mithin verschiedene Wahrnehmungen im Gemüte an sich zerstreut und einzeln angetroffen werden, so ist eine Verbindung derselben nötig, welche sie in dem Sinne selbst nicht haben können. Es ist also in uns ein tätiges Vermögen der Synthesis dieses Mannigfaltigen, welches wir Einbildungskraft nennen, und deren unmittelbar an den Wahrnehmungen ausgeübte Handlung ich Apprehension nenne\*. Die Einbildungskraft soll nämlich das Mannigfaltige der Anschauung in ein Bild bringen, vorher muß sie also die Eindrücke in ihre Tätigkeit aufnehmen, d.i. apprehendieren.

\* Daß die Einbildungskraft ein notwendiges Ingrediens der Wahrnehmung selbst sei, daran hat wohl noch kein Psychologe gedacht. Das kommt daher, weil man dieses Vermögen teils nur auf Reproduktionen einschränkte, teils, weil man glaubte, die Sinne lieferten uns nicht allein Eindrücke, sondern setzten solche auch sogar zusammen, und brächten Bilder der Gegenstände zuwege, wozu ohne Zweifel außer der Empfänglichkeit der Eindrücke, noch etwas mehr, nämlich eine Funktion der Synthesis derselben erfordert wird.

Es ist aber klar, daß selbst diese Apprehension des Mannigfaltigen allein noch kein Bild und keinen Zusammenhang der Eindrücke hervorbringen würde, wenn nicht ein subjektiver Grund da wäre, eine Wahrnehmung, von welcher das Gemüt zu einer anderen übergegangen, zu den nachfolgenden herüberzurufen, und so ganze Reihen derselben darzustellen, d.i. ein reproduktives Vermögen der Einbildungskraft, welches denn auch nur empirisch ist.

Weil aber, wenn Vorstellungen, sowie sie zusammengeraten, einander ohne Unterschied reproduzierten, wiederum kein bestimmter Zusammenhang derselben, sondern bloß regellose Haufen derselben, mithin gar kein Erkenntnis entspringen würde, so muß die Reproduktion derselben eine Regel haben, nach welcher eine Vorstellung vielmehr mit dieser, als einer anderen in der Einbildungskraft in Verbindung tritt. Diesen subjektiven und empirischen Grund der Reproduktion nach Regeln nennt man die Assoziation der Vorstellungen.

Würde nun aber diese Einheit der Assoziation nicht auch einen objektiven Grund haben, so daß es unmöglich wäre, daß Erscheinungen von der Einbildungskraft anders apprehendiert würden, als unter der Bedingung einer möglichen synthetischen Einheit dieser Apprehension, so würde es auch etwas ganz Zufälliges sein, daß sich Erscheinungen in einen Zusammenhang der menschlichen Erkenntnisse schickten. Denn, ob wir gleich das Vermögen hätten, Wahrnehmungen zu assoziieren, so bliebe es doch an sich ganz unbestimmt und zufällig, ob sie auch assoziabel wären; und in dem Falle, daß sie es nicht wären, so würde eine Menge Wahrnehmungen, und auch wohl eine ganze Sinnlichkeit möglich sein, in welcher viel empirisches Bewußtsein in meinem Gemüte anzutreffen wäre, aber getrennt, und ohne daß es zu einem Bewußtsein meiner selbst gehörte, welches aber unmöglich ist. Denn nur dadurch, daß ich alle Wahrnehmungen zu einem Bewußtsein (der ursprünglichen Apperzeption) zähle, kann ich bei allen Wahrnehmungen sagen: daß ich mir ihrer bewußt sei. Es muß also ein objektiver, d.i. vor allen empirischen Gesetzen der Einbildungskraft a priori einzusehender Grund sein, worauf die Möglichkeit, ja sogar die Notwendigkeit eines durch alle Erscheinungen sich erstreckenden Gesetzes beruht, sie nämlich durchgängig als solche Data der Sinne, anzusehen, welche an sich assoziabel, und allgemeinen Regeln einer durchgängigen Verknüpfung in der Reproduktion unterworfen sind. Diesen objektiven Grund aller Assoziation der Erscheinungen nenne ich die Affinität derselben. Diesen können wir aber nirgends anders, als in dem Grundsatz von der Einheit der Apperzeption, in Ansehung aller Erkenntnisse, die mir angehören sollen, antreffen. Nach diesem müssen durchaus alle Erscheinungen, so ins Gemüt kommen, oder apprehendiert werden, daß sie zur Einheit der Apperzeption zusammenstimmen, welches, ohne synthetische Einheit in ihrer Verknüpfung, die mithin auch objektiv notwendig ist, unmöglich sein würde.

Die objektive Einheit alles (empirischen) Bewußtseins in einem

Bewußtsein (der ursprünglichen Apperzeption) ist also die notwendige Bedingung sogar aller möglichen Wahrnehmung, und die Affinität aller Erscheinungen (nahe, oder entfernte) ist eine notwendige Folge einer Synthesis in der Einbildungskraft, die a priori auf Regeln gegründet ist.

Die Einbildungskraft ist also auch ein Vermögen einer Synthesis a priori, weswegen wir ihr den Namen der produktiven Einbildungskraft geben, und, sofern sie in Ansehung alles Mannigfaltigen der Erscheinung nichts weiter, als die notwendige Einheit in der Synthesis derselben zu ihrer Absicht hat, kann diese die transzendente Funktion der Einbildungskraft genannt werden. Es ist daher zwar befremdlich, allein aus dem bisherigen doch einleuchtend, daß nur vermittelt dieser transzendentalen Funktion der Einbildungskraft, sogar die Affinität der Erscheinungen, mit ihr die Assoziation und durch diese endlich die Reproduktion nach Gesetzen, folglich die Erfahrung selbst möglich werde: weil ohne sie gar keine Begriffe von Gegenständen in eine Erfahrung zusammenfließen würden.

Denn das stehende und bleibende Ich (der reinen Apperzeption) macht das Korrelat um aller unserer Vorstellungen aus, sofern es bloß möglich ist, sich ihrer bewußt zu werden, und alles Bewußtsein gehört ebensowohl zu einer allbefassenden reinen Apperzeption, wie alle sinnliche Anschauung als Vorstellung zu einer reinen inneren Anschauung, nämlich der Zeit. Diese Apperzeption ist es nun, welche zu der reinen Einbildungskraft hinzukommen muß, um ihre Funktion intellektuell zu machen. Denn an sich selbst ist die Synthesis der Einbildungskraft, obgleich a priori ausgeübt, dennoch jederzeit sinnlich, weil sie das Mannigfaltige nur so verbindet, wie es in der Anschauung erscheint, z.B. die Gestalt eines Triangels. Durch das Verhältnis des Mannigfaltigen aber zur Einheit der Apperzeption werden Begriffe, welche dem Verstande angehören, aber nur vermittelt der Einbildungskraft in Beziehung auf die sinnliche Anschauung zustande kommen können.

Wir haben also eine reine Einbildungskraft, als ein Grundvermögen der menschlichen Seele, das aller Erkenntnis a priori zum Grunde liegt. Vermittelt deren bringen wir das Mannigfaltige der Anschauung einerseits, und mit der Bedingung der notwendigen Einheit der reinen Apperzeption andererseits in Verbindung. Beide äußerste Enden, nämlich Sinnlichkeit und Verstand, müssen vermittelt dieser transzendentalen

Funktion der Einbildungskraft notwendig zusammenhängen; weil jene sonst zwar Erscheinungen, aber keine Gegenstände eines empirischen Erkenntnisses, mithin keine Erfahrung geben würden. Die wirkliche Erfahrung, welche aus der Apprehension, der Assoziation, (der Reproduktion,) endlich der Rekognition der Erscheinungen besteht, enthält in der letzteren und höchsten (der bloß empirischen Elemente der Erfahrung) Begriffe, welche die formale Einheit der Erfahrung, und mit ihr alle objektive Gültigkeit (Wahrheit) der empirischen Erkenntnis möglich machen. Diese Gründe der Rekognition des Mannigfaltigen, sofern sie bloß die Form einer Erfahrung überhaupt angehen, sind nun jene Kategorien. Auf ihnen gründet sich also alle normale Einheit in der Synthesis der Einbildungskraft, und vermittelt dieser auch alles empirischen Gebrauchs derselben (in der Rekognition, Reproduktion, Assoziation, Apprehension) bis herunter zu den Erscheinungen, weil diese, nur vermittelt jener Elemente der Erkenntnis und überhaupt unserem Bewußtsein, mithin um selbst angehören können.

Die Ordnung und Regelmäßigkeit also an den Erscheinungen, die wir Natur nennen, bringen wir selbst hinein, und würden sie auch nicht darin finden können, hätten wir sie nicht, oder die Natur unseres Gemüts ursprünglich hineingelegt. Denn diese Natureinheit soll eine notwendige, d.i. a priori gewisse Einheit der Verknüpfung der Erscheinungen sein. Wie sollten wir aber wohl a priori eine synthetische Einheit auf die Bahn bringen können, wären nicht in den ursprünglichen Erkenntnisquellen unseres Gemüts subjektive Gründe solcher Einheit a priori enthalten, und wären diese subjektiven Bedingungen nicht zugleich objektiv gültig, indem sie die Gründe der Möglichkeit sind, überhaupt ein Objekt in der Erfahrung zu erkennen.

Wir haben den Verstand oben auf mancherlei Weise erklärt: durch eine Spontaneität der Erkenntnis, (im Gegensatze der Rezeptivität der Sinnlichkeit) durch ein Vermögen zu denken, oder auch ein Vermögen der Begriffe, oder auch der Urteile, welche Erklärungen, wenn man sie bei Licht besieht, auf eins hinauslaufen. Jetzt können wir ihn als das Vermögen der Regeln charakterisieren. Dieses Kennzeichen ist fruchtbarer und tritt dem Wesen desselben näher. Sinnlichkeit gibt uns Formen, (der Anschauung) der Verstand aber Regeln. Dieser ist jederzeit geschäftig, die Erscheinungen in der Absicht durchzuspähen, um an ihnen irgendeine Regel aufzufinden. Regeln, sofern sie objektiv sind, (mithin der Erkenntnis des Gegenstandes notwendig anhängen)

heißen Gesetze. Ob wir gleich durch Erfahrung viel Gesetze lernen, so sind diese doch nur besondere Bestimmungen noch höherer Gesetze, unter denen die höchsten, (unter welchen andere alle stehen) a priori aus dem Verstande selbst herkommen, und nicht von der Erfahrung entlehnt sind, sondern vielmehr den Erscheinungen ihre Gesetzmäßigkeit verschaffen, und eben dadurch Erfahrung möglich machen müssen. Es ist also der Verstand nicht bloß ein Vermögen, durch Vergleichung der Erscheinungen sich Regeln zu machen: er ist selbst die Gesetzgebung für die Natur, d.i. ohne Verstand würde es überall nicht Natur, d.i. synthetische Einheit des Mannigfaltigen der Erscheinungen nach Regeln geben: denn Erscheinungen können, als solche, nicht außer uns stattfinden, sondern existieren nur in unserer Sinnlichkeit. Diese aber, als Gegenstand der Erkenntnis in einer Erfahrung, mit allem, was sie enthalten mag, ist nur in der Einheit der Apperzeption möglich. Die Einheit der Apperzeption aber ist der transzendente Grund der notwendigen Gesetzmäßigkeit der Erscheinungen in einer Erfahrung. Eben dieselbe Einheit der Apperzeption in Ansehung eines Mannigfaltigen von Vorstellungen (es nämlich aus einer einzigen zu bestimmen) ist die Regel und das Vermögen dieser Regeln der Verstand. Alle Erscheinungen liegen also als mögliche Erfahrungen ebenso a priori im Verstande und erhalten ihre formale Möglichkeit von ihm, wie sie als bloße Anschauungen in der Sinnlichkeit liegen, und durch dieselbe der Form nach, allein möglich sind.

So übertrieben, so widersinnig es also auch lautet, zu sagen: der Verstand ist selbst der Quell der Gesetze der Natur, und mithin der normalen Einheit der Natur, so richtig, und dem Gegenstande, nämlich der Erfahrung angemessen ist gleichwohl eine solche Behauptung. Zwar können empirische Gesetze, als solche, ihren Ursprung keineswegs vom reinen Verstande herleiten, so wenig als die unermessliche Mannigfaltigkeit der Erscheinungen aus der reinen Form der sinnlichen Anschauung hinlänglich begriffen werden kann. Aber alle empirischen Gesetze sind nur besondere Bestimmungen der reinen Gesetze des Verstandes, unter welchen und nach deren Norm jene allererst möglich sind, und die Erscheinungen eine gesetzliche Form annehmen, sowie auch alle Erscheinungen, unerachtet der Verschiedenheit ihrer empirischen Form, dennoch jederzeit den Bedingungen der reinen Form der Sinnlichkeit gemäß sein müssen.

Der reine Verstand ist also in den Kategorien das Gesetz der synthetischen Einheit aller Erscheinungen, und macht dadurch Erfahrung

ihrer Form nach allererst und ursprünglich möglich. Mehr aber hatten wir in der transz. Deduktion der Kategorien nicht zu leisten, als dieses Verhältnis des Verstandes zur Sinnlichkeit, und vermittelt derselben zu allen Gegenständen der Erfahrung, mithin die objektive Gültigkeit seiner reinen Begriffe a priori begreiflich zu machen, und dadurch ihren Ursprung und Wahrheit festzusetzen.

Summarische Vorstellung der Richtigkeit und einzigen Möglichkeit dieser Deduktion der reinen Verstandesbegriffe

Wären die Gegenstände, womit unsere Erkenntnis zu tun hat, Dinge an sich selbst, so würden wir von diesen gar keine Begriffe a priori haben können. Denn woher sollten wir sie nehmen? Nehmen wir sie vom Objekt (ohne hier noch einmal zu untersuchen, wie dieses uns bekannt werden könnte) so wären unsere Begriffe bloß empirisch, und keine Begriffe a priori. Nehmen wir sie aus uns selbst, kann das, was bloß in uns ist, die Beschaffenheit eines von unseren Vorstellungen unterschiedenen Gegenstandes nicht bestimmen, d.i. ein Grund sein, warum es ein Ding geben solle, dem so etwas, als wir in Gedanken haben, zukomme, und nicht vielmehr alle diese Vorstellung leer sei. Dagegen, wenn wir es überall nur mit Erscheinungen zu tun haben, so ist es nicht allein möglich, sondern auch notwendig, daß gewisse Begriffe a priori vor der empirischen Erkenntnis der Gegenstände vorhergehen. Denn als Erscheinungen machen sie einen Gegenstand aus, der bloß in uns ist, weil eine bloße Modifikation unserer Sinnlichkeit außer uns gar nicht angetroffen wird. Nun drückt selbst diese Vorstellung: daß alle diese Erscheinungen, mithin alle Gegenstände, womit wir uns beschäftigen können, insgesamt in mir, d.i. Bestimmungen meines identischen Selbst sind, eine durchgängige Einheit derselben in einer und derselben Apperzeption als notwendig aus. In dieser Einheit des möglichen Bewußtseins aber besteht auch die Form aller Erkenntnis der Gegenstände, (wodurch das Mannigfaltige, als zu Einem Objekt gehörig, gedacht wird). Also geht die Art, wie das Mannigfaltige der sinnlichen Vorstellung (Anschauung) zu einem Bewußtsein gehört, vor aller Erkenntnis des Gegenstandes, als die intellektuelle Form derselben, vorher, und macht selbst eine formale Erkenntnis aller Gegenstände a priori überhaupt aus, sofern sie gedacht werden (Kategorien). Die Synthesis derselben durch die reine Einbildungskraft, die Einheit aller Vorstellungen in Beziehung auf die



ursprüngliche Apperzeption gehen aller empirischen Erkenntnis vor. Reine Verstandesbegriffe sind also nur darum a priori möglich, ja gar, in Beziehung auf Erfahrung, notwendig, weil unser Erkenntnis mit nichts, als Erscheinungen zu tun hat, deren Möglichkeit in uns selbst liegt, deren Verknüpfung und Einheit (in der Vorstellung eines Gegenstandes) bloß in uns angetroffen wird, mithin vor aller Erfahrung vorhergehen, und diese der Form nach auch allererst möglich machen muß. Und aus diesem Grunde, dem einzigmöglichen unter allen, ist dann auch unsere Deduktion der Kategorien geführt worden.

B EDITION GERMAN FOLLOWS:

Der transzendentalen Analytik  
Zweites Hauptstück  
Von der Deduktion der reinen Verstandesbegriffe

Erster Abschnitt

§ 13 Von den Prinzipien einer transz. Deduktion überhaupt

Die Rechtslehrer, wenn sie von Befugnissen und Anmaßungen reden, unterscheiden in einem Rechtshandel die Frage über das, was Rechtens ist, (quid juris) von der, die die Tatsache angeht, (quid facti) und indem sie von beiden Beweis fordern, so nennen sie den ersteren, der die Befugnis, oder auch den Rechtsanspruch dardun soll, die Deduktion. Wir bedienen uns einer Menge empirischer Begriffe ohne jemandes Widerrede, und halten uns auch ohne Deduktion berechtigt, ihnen einen Sinn und eingebildete Bedeutung zuzueignen, weil wir jederzeit die Erfahrung bei der Hand haben, ihre objektive Realität zu beweisen. Es gibt indessen auch usurpierte Begriffe, wie etwa Glück, Schicksal, die zwar mit fast allgemeiner Nachsicht herumlaufen, aber doch bisweilen durch die Frage: quid juris, in Anspruch genommen werden, da man alsdann wegen der Deduktion derselben in nicht geringe Verlegenheit gerät, indem man keinen deutlichen Rechtsgrund weder aus der Erfahrung, noch der Vernunft anführen kann, dadurch die Befugnis seines Gebrauchs deutlich würde.

Unter den mancherlei Begriffen aber, die das sehr vermischte Gewebe

der menschlichen Erkenntnis ausmachen, gibt es einige, die auch zum reinen Gebrauch a priori (völlig unabhängig von aller Erfahrung) bestimmt sind, und dieser ihre Befugnis bedarf jederzeit einer Deduktion; weil zu der Rechtmäßigkeit eines solchen Gebrauchs Beweise aus der Erfahrung nicht hinreichend sind, man aber doch wissen muß, wie diese Begriffe sich auf Objekte beziehen können, die sie doch aus keiner Erfahrung hernehmen. Ich nenne daher die Erklärung der Art, wie sich Begriffe a priori auf Gegenstände beziehen können, die transzendente Deduktion derselben, und unterscheide sie von der empirischen Deduktion, welche die Art anzeigt, wie ein Begriff durch Erfahrung und Reflexion über dieselbe erworben worden, und daher nicht die Rechtmäßigkeit, sondern das Faktum betrifft, wodurch der Besitz entsprungen.

Wir haben jetzt schon zweierlei Begriffe von ganz verschiedener Art, die doch darin miteinander übereinkommen, daß sie beiderseits völlig a priori sich auf Gegenstände beziehen, nämlich, die Begriffe des Raumes und der Zeit, als Formen der Sinnlichkeit, und die Kategorien, als Begriffe des Verstandes. Von ihnen eine empirische Deduktion versuchen wollen, würde ganz vergebliche Arbeit sein; weil eben darin das Unterscheidende ihrer Natur liegt, daß sie sich auf ihre Gegenstände beziehen, ohne etwas zu deren Vorstellung aus der Erfahrung entlehnt zu haben. Wenn also eine Deduktion derselben nötig ist, so wird sie jederzeit transzendental sein müssen.

Indessen kann man von diesen Begriffen, wie von allem Erkenntnis, wo nicht das Prinzipium ihrer Möglichkeit, doch die Gelegenheitsursachen ihrer Erzeugung in der Erfahrung aufsuchen, wo alsdann die Eindrücke der Sinne den ersten Anlaß geben, die ganze Erkenntniskraft in Ansehung ihrer zu eröffnen, und Erfahrung zustande zu bringen, die zwei sehr ungleichartige Elemente enthält, nämlich eine Materie zur Erkenntnis aus den Sinnen und eine gewisse Form, sie zu ordnen, aus dem inneren Quell des reinen Anschauens und Denkens, die, bei Gelegenheit der ersteren, zuerst in Ausübung gebracht werden, und Begriffe hervorbringen. Ein solches Nachspüren der ersten Bestrebungen unserer Erkenntniskraft, um von einzelnen Wahrnehmungen zu allgemeinen Begriffen zu steigen, hat ohne Zweifel seinen großen Nutzen, und man hat es dem berühmten Locke zu verdanken, daß er dazu zuerst den Weg eröffnet hat. Allein eine Deduktion der reinen Begriffe a priori kommt dadurch niemals zustande, denn sie liegt ganz und gar nicht auf diesem Wege, weil in Ansehung ihres künftigen Gebrauchs, der von

der Erfahrung gänzlich unabhängig sein soll, sie einen ganz anderen Geburtsbrief, als den der Abstammung von Erfahrungen, müssen aufzuzeigen haben. Diese versuchte physiologische Ableitung, die eigentlich gar nicht Deduktion heißen kann, weil sie eine *quaestionem facti* betrifft, will ich daher die Erklärung des Besitzes einer reinen Erkenntnis nennen. Es ist also klar, daß von diesen allein es eine transzendente Deduktion und keineswegs eine empirische geben könne, und daß letztere, in Ansehung der reinen Begriffe *a priori*, nichts als eitle Versuche sind, womit sich nur derjenige beschäftigen kann, welcher die ganz eigentümliche Natur dieser Erkenntnisse nicht begriffen hat.

Ob nun aber gleich die einzige Art einer möglichen Deduktion der reinen Erkenntnis *a priori*, nämlich die auf dem transzendentalen Wege eingeräumt wird, so erhellt dadurch doch eben nicht, daß sie so unumgänglich notwendig sei. Wir haben oben die Begriffe des Raumes und der Zeit, vermittelt einer transzendentalen Deduktion zu ihren Quellen verfolgt, und ihre objektive Gültigkeit *a priori* erklärt und bestimmt. Gleichwohl geht die Geometrie ihren sicheren Schritt durch lauter Erkenntnisse *a priori*, ohne daß sie sich, wegen der reinen und gesetzmäßigen Abkunft ihres Grundbegriffs vom Raume, von der Philosophie einen Beglaubigungsschein erbitten darf. Allein der Gebrauch des Begriffs geht in dieser Wissenschaft auch nur auf die äußere Sinnenwelt, von welcher der Raum die reine Form ihrer Anschauung ist, in welcher also alle geometrische Erkenntnis, weil sie sich auf Anschauung *a priori* gründet, unmittelbare Evidenz hat, und die Gegenstände durch die Erkenntnis selbst, *a priori* (der Form nach) in der Anschauung, gegeben werden. Dagegen fängt mit den reinen Verstandesbegriffen die unumgängliche Bedürfnis an, nicht allein von ihnen selbst, sondern auch vom Raum die transzendente Deduktion zu suchen, weil, da sie von Gegenständen nicht durch Prädikate der Anschauung und der Sinnlichkeit, sondern des reinen Denkens *a priori* redet, sie sich auf Gegenstände ohne alle Bedingungen der Sinnlichkeit allgemein beziehen, und die, da sie nicht auf Erfahrung gegründet sind, auch in der Anschauung *a priori* kein Objekt vorzeigen können, worauf sie vor aller Erfahrung ihre Synthesis gründeten, und daher nicht allein wegen der objektiven Gültigkeit und Schranken ihres Gebrauchs Verdacht erregen, sondern auch jenen Begriff des Raumes zweideutig machen, dadurch, daß sie ihn über die Bedingungen der sinnlichen Anschauung zu gebrauchen geneigt sind, weshalb auch oben von ihm eine transzendente Deduktion vonnöten war. So muß denn

der Leser von der unumgänglichen Notwendigkeit einer solchen transzendentalen Deduktion, ehe er einen einzigen Schritt im Felde der reinen Vernunft getan hat, überzeugt werden; weil er sonst blind verfährt, und, nachdem er mannigfaltig umhergeirrt hat, doch wieder zu der Unwissenheit zurückkehren muß, von der er ausgegangen war. Er muß aber auch die unvermeidliche Schwierigkeit zum voraus deutlich einsehen, damit er nicht über Dunkelheit klage, wo die Sache selbst tief eingehüllt ist, oder über die Wegräumung der Hindernisse zu früh verdrossen werden, weil es darauf ankommt, entweder alle Ansprüche zu Einsichten der reinen Vernunft, als das beliebteste Feld, nämlich dasjenige über die Grenzen aller möglichen Erfahrung hinaus, völlig aufzugeben, oder diese kritische Untersuchung zur Vollkommenheit zu bringen.

Wir haben oben an den Begriffen des Raumes und der Zeit mit leichter Mühe begreiflich machen können, wie diese als Erkenntnisse a priori sich gleichwohl auf Gegenstände notwendig beziehen müssen; und eine synthetische Erkenntnis derselben, unabhängig von aller Erfahrung, möglich machten. Denn da nur vermittelt solcher reinen Formen der Sinnlichkeit uns ein Gegenstand erscheinen, d.i. ein Objekt der empirischen Anschauung sein kann, so sind Raum und Zeit reine Anschauungen, welche die Bedingung der Möglichkeit der Gegenstände als Erscheinungen a priori enthalten, und die Synthesis in denselben hat objektive Gültigkeit.

Die Kategorien des Verstandes dagegen stellen uns gar nicht die Bedingungen vor, unter denen Gegenstände in der Anschauung gegeben werden, mithin können uns allerdings Gegenstände erscheinen, ohne daß sie sich notwendig auf Funktionen des Verstandes beziehen müssen, und dieser also die Bedingungen derselben a priori enthielte. Daher zeigt sich hier eine Schwierigkeit, die wir im Felde der Sinnlichkeit nicht antrafen, wie nämlich subjektive Bedingungen des Denkens sollten objektive Gültigkeit haben, d.i. Bedingungen der Möglichkeit aller Erkenntnis der Gegenstände abgeben: denn ohne Funktionen des Verstandes können allerdings Erscheinungen in der Anschauung gegeben werden. Ich nehme z.B. den Begriff der Ursache, welcher eine besondere Art der Synthesis bedeutet, da auf etwas A was ganz verschiedenes B nach einer Regel gesetzt wird. Es ist a priori nicht klar, warum Erscheinungen etwas dergleichen enthalten sollten, (denn Erfahrungen kann man nicht zum Beweise anführen, weil die objektive Gültigkeit dieses Begriffs a priori muß dargetan werden können,) und es ist daher

a priori zweifelhaft, ob ein solcher Begriff nicht etwa gar leer sei und überall unter den Erscheinungen keinen Gegenstand antreffe. Denn daß Gegenstände der sinnlichen Anschauung den im Gemüt a priori liegenden formalen Bedingungen der Sinnlichkeit gemäß sein müssen, ist daraus klar, weil sie sonst nicht Gegenstände für uns sein würden; daß sie aber auch überdem den Bedingungen, deren der Verstand zur synthetischen Einsicht des Denkens bedarf, gemäß sein müssen, davon ist die Schlußfolge nicht so leicht einzusehen. Denn es könnten wohl allenfalls Erscheinungen so beschaffen sein, daß der Verstand sie den Bedingungen seiner Einheit gar nicht gemäß fände, und alles so in Verwirrung läge, daß z.B. in der Reihenfolge der Erscheinungen sich nichts darböte, was eine Regel der Synthesis an die Hand gäbe, und also dem Begriffe der Ursache und Wirkung entspräche, so daß dieser Begriff also ganz leer, nichtig und ohne Bedeutung wäre. Erscheinungen würden nichtsdestoweniger unserer Anschauung Gegenstände darbieten, denn die Anschauung bedarf der Funktionen des Denkens auf keine Weise.

Gedächte man sich von der Mühsamkeit dieser Untersuchungen dadurch loszuwickeln, daß man sagte: Die Erfahrung böte unablässig Beispiele einer solchen Regelmäßigkeit der Erscheinungen dar, die genugsam Anlaß geben, den Begriff der Ursache davon abzusondern, und dadurch zugleich die objektive Gültigkeit eines solchen Begriffs zu bewähren, so bemerkt man nicht, daß auf diese Weise der Begriff der Ursache gar nicht entspringen kann, sondern daß er entweder völlig a priori im Verstande müsse gegründet sein, oder als ein bloßes Hirngespinnst gänzlich aufgegeben werden müsse. Denn dieser Begriff erfordert durchaus, daß etwas A von der Art sei, daß ein anderes B daraus notwendig und nach einer schlechthin allgemeinen Regel folge. Erscheinungen geben gar wohl Fälle an die Hand, aus denen eine Regel möglich ist, nach der etwas gewöhnlichermaßen geschieht, aber niemals, daß der Erfolg notwendig sei: daher der Synthesis der Ursache und Wirkung auch eine Dignität anhängt, die man gar nicht empirisch ausdrücken kann, nämlich, daß die Wirkung nicht bloß zu der Ursache hinzukomme, sondern durch dieselbe gesetzt sei, und aus ihr erfolge. Die strenge Allgemeinheit der Regel ist auch gar keine Eigenschaft empirischer Regeln, die durch Induktion keine andere als komparative Allgemeinheit, d.i. ausgebreitete Brauchbarkeit bekommen können. Nun würde sich aber der Gebrauch der reinen Verstandesbegriffe gänzlich ändern, wenn man sie nur als empirische Produkte behandeln wollte.

§ 14 Übergang zur transz. Deduktion der Kategorien

Es sind nur zwei Fälle möglich, unter denen synthetische Vorstellung und ihre Gegenstände zusammentreffen, sich aufeinander notwendigerweise beziehen, und gleichsam einander begegnen können. Entweder wenn der Gegenstand die Vorstellung, oder diese den Gegenstand allein möglich macht. Ist das erstere, so ist diese Beziehung nur empirisch, und die Vorstellung ist niemals a priori möglich. Und dies ist der Fall mit Erscheinung, in Ansehung dessen, was an ihnen zur Empfindung gehört. Ist aber das zweite, weil Vorstellung an sich selbst (denn von dessen Kausalität, vermittelt des Willens, ist hier gar nicht die Rede,) ihren Gegenstand dem Dasein nach nicht hervorbringt, so ist doch die Vorstellung in Ansehung des Gegenstandes alsdann a priori bestimmend, wenn durch sie allein es möglich ist, etwas als einen Gegenstand zu erkennen. Es sind aber zwei Bedingungen, unter denen allein die Erkenntnis eines Gegenstandes möglich ist, erstlich Anschauung, dadurch derselbe, aber nur als Erscheinung, gegeben wird: zweitens Begriff, dadurch ein Gegenstand gedacht wird, der dieser Anschauung entspricht. Es ist aber aus dem obigen klar, daß die erste Bedingung, nämlich die, unter der allein Gegenstände angeschaut werden können, in der Tat den Objekten der Form nach a priori im Gemüt zum Grunde liegen. Mit dieser formalen Bedingung der Sinnlichkeit stimmen also alle Erscheinungen notwendig überein, weil sie nur durch dieselbe erscheinen, d.i. empirisch angeschaut und gegeben werden können. Nun fragt es sich, ob nicht auch Begriffe a priori vorausgehen, als Bedingungen, unter denen allein etwas, wenngleich nicht angeschaut, dennoch als Gegenstand überhaupt gedacht wird, denn alsdann ist alle empirische Erkenntnis der Gegenstände solchen Begriffen notwendigerweise gemäß, weil, ohne deren Voraussetzung, nichts als Objekt der Erfahrung möglich ist. Nun enthält aber alle Erfahrung außer der Anschauung der Sinne, wodurch etwas gegeben wird, noch einen Begriff von einem Gegenstande, der in der Anschauung gegeben wird, oder erscheint: demnach werden Begriffe von Gegenständen überhaupt, als Bedingungen a priori aller Erfahrungserkenntnis zum Grunde liegen: folglich wird die objektive Gültigkeit der Kategorien, als Begriffe a priori, darauf beruhen, daß durch sie allein Erfahrung (der Form des Denkens nach) möglich sei. Denn alsdann beziehen sie sich notwendigerweise und a priori auf Gegenstände der Erfahrung, weil nur vermittelt ihrer überhaupt irgendein Gegenstand der Erfahrung gedacht werden kann.

Die transz. Deduktion aller Begriffe a priori hat also ein Prinzipium, worauf die ganze Nachforschung gerichtet werden muß, nämlich dieses: daß sie als Bedingungen a priori der Möglichkeit der Erfahrungen erkannt werden müssen, (es sei der Anschauung, die in ihr angetroffen wird, oder des Denkens). Begriffe, die den objektiven Grund der Möglichkeit der Erfahrung abgeben, sind eben darum notwendig. Die Entwicklung der Erfahrung aber, worin sie angetroffen werden, ist nicht ihre Deduktion, (sondern Illustration,) weil sie dabei doch nur zufällig sein würden. Ohne diese ursprüngliche Beziehung auf mögliche Erfahrung, in welcher alle Gegenstände der Erkenntnis vorkommen, würde die Beziehung derselben auf irgendein Objekt gar nicht begriffen werden können.

Der berühmte Locke hatte, aus Ermangelung dieser Betrachtung, und weil er reine Begriffe des Verstandes in der Erfahrung antraf, sie auch von der Erfahrung abgeleitet, und verfuhr doch so inkonsequent, daß er damit Versuche zu Erkenntnissen wagte, die weit über alle Erfahrungsgrenze hinausgehen. David Hume erkannte, um das letztere tun zu können, sei es notwendig, daß diese Begriffe ihren Ursprung a priori haben müßten. Da er sich aber gar nicht erklären konnte, wie es möglich sei, daß der Verstand Begriffe, die an sich im Verstande nicht verbunden sind, doch als im Gegenstande notwendig verbunden denken müsse, und darauf nicht verfiel, daß vielleicht der Verstand durch diese Begriffe selbst Urheber der Erfahrung, worin seine Gegenstände angetroffen werden, sein könne, so leitete er sie, durch Notgedrungen, von der Erfahrung ab (nämlich von einer durch öftere Assoziation in der Erfahrung entsprungenen subjektiven Notwendigkeit, welche zuletzt fälschlich für objektiv gehalten wird, d.i. der Gewohnheit), verfuhr aber hernach sehr konsequent, darin, daß er es für unmöglich erklärte, mit diesen Begriffen und den Grundsätzen, die sie veranlassen, über die Erfahrungsgrenze hinauszugehen. Die empirische Ableitung aber, worauf beide verfielen, läßt sich mit der Wirklichkeit der wissenschaftlichen Erkenntnisse a priori, die wir haben, nämlich der reinen Mathematik und allgemeinen Naturwissenschaft, nicht vereinigen, und wird also durch das Faktum widerlegt.

Der erste dieser beiden berühmten Männer öffnete der Schwärmerei Tür und Tor, weil die Vernunft, wenn sie einmal Befugnisse auf ihrer Seite hat, sich nicht mehr durch unbestimmte Anpreisungen der Mäßigung

in Schranken halten läßt; der zweite ergab sich gänzlich dem Skeptizismus, da er einmal eine so allgemeine für Vernunft gehaltene Täuschung unseres Erkenntnisvermögens glaubte entdeckt zu haben. Wir sind jetzt im Begriffe einen Versuch zu machen, ob man nicht die menschliche Vernunft zwischen diesen beiden Klippen glücklich durchbringen, ihr bestimmte Grenzen anweisen, und dennoch das ganze Feld ihrer zweckmäßigen Tätigkeit für sie geöffnet erhalten können.

Vorher will ich nur noch die Erklärung der Kategorien voranschicken. Sie sind Begriffe von einem Gegenstande überhaupt, dadurch dessen Anschauung in Ansehung einer der logischen Funktionen zu Urteilen als bestimmt angesehen wird. So war die Funktion des kategorischen Urteils die des Verhältnisses des Subjekts zum Prädikat, z.B. alle Körper sind teilbar. Allein in Ansehung des bloß logischen Gebrauchs des Verstandes blieb es unbestimmt, welcher von beiden Begriffen die Funktion des Subjekts, und welchem die des Prädikates man geben wolle. Denn man kann auch sagen: Einiges Teilbare ist ein Körper. Durch die Kategorie der Substanz aber, wenn ich den Begriff eines Körpers darunter bringe, wird es bestimmt: daß seine empirische Anschauung in der Erfahrung immer nur als Subjekt, niemals als bloßen Prädikat betrachtet werden müsse; und so in allen übrigen Kategorien.

Der Deduktion der reinen Verstandesbegriffe

Zweiter Abschnitt

Transzendente Deduktion der reinen Verstandesbegriffe

§ 15 Von der Möglichkeit einer Verbindung überhaupt

Das Mannigfaltige der Vorstellungen kann in einer Anschauung gegeben werden, die bloß sinnlich d.i. nichts als Empfänglichkeit ist, und die Form dieser Anschauung kann a priori in unserem Vorstellungsvermögen liegen, ohne doch etwas anderes, als die Art zu sein, wie das Subjekt affiziert wird. Allein die Verbindung (*conjunctio*) eines Mannigfaltigen überhaupt, kann niemals durch Sinne in uns kommen, und kann also auch nicht in der reinen Form der sinnlichen Anschauung zugleich mit enthalten sein; denn sie ist ein Aktus der Spontaneität der Vorstellungskraft, und, da man diese, zum Unterschiede von der Sinnlichkeit, Verstand nennen muß, so ist alle Verbindung, wir mögen uns ihrer bewußt werden oder nicht, es mag eine Verbindung des



Mannigfaltigen der Anschauung, oder mancherlei Begriffe, und an der ersteren der sinnlichen, oder nicht sinnlichen Anschauung sein, eine Verstandeshandlung, die wir mit der allgemeinen Benennung Synthesis belegen würden, um dadurch zugleich bemerklich zu machen, daß wir uns nichts, als im Objekt verbunden, vorstellen können, ohne es vorher selbst verbunden zu haben, und unter allen Vorstellungen die Verbindung die einzige ist, die nicht durch Objekte gegeben, sondern nur vom Subjekte selbst verrichtet werden kann, weil sie ein Aktus seiner Selbstständigkeit ist. Man wird hier leicht gewahr, daß diese Handlung ursprünglich einig, und für alle Verbindung gleichgeltend sein müsse, und daß die Auflösung Analysis, die ihr Gegenteil zu sein scheint, sie doch jederzeit voraussetze; denn wo der Verstand vorher nichts verbunden hat, da kann er auch nichts auflösen, weil es nur durch ihn als verbunden der Vorstellungskraft hat gegeben werden können.

Aber der Begriff der Verbindung führt außer dem Begriffe des Mannigfaltigen, und der Synthesis desselben, noch den der Einheit desselben bei sich. Verbindung ist Vorstellung der synthetischen Einheit des Mannigfaltigen\*. Die Vorstellung dieser Einheit kann also nicht aus der Verbindung entstehen, sie macht vielmehr dadurch, daß sie zur Vorstellung des Mannigfaltigen hinzukommt, den Begriff der Verbindung allererst möglich. Diese Einheit, die a priori vor allen Begriffen der Verbindung vorhergeht, ist nicht etwa jene Kategorie der Einheit (§ 10); denn alle Kategorien gründen sich auf logische Funktionen in Urteilen, in diesen aber ist schon Verbindung, mithin Einheit gegebener Begriffe gedacht. Die Kategorie setzt also schon Verbindung voraus. Also müssen wir diese Einheit (als qualitative § 12) noch höher suchen, nämlich in demjenigen, was selbst den Grund der Einheit verschiedener Begriffe in Urteilen, mithin der Möglichkeit des Verstandes, so gar in seinem logischen Gebrauche, enthält.

\* Ob die Vorstellungen selbst identisch sind, und also eine durch die andere analytisch könne gedacht werden, das kommt hier nicht in Betrachtung. Das Bewußtsein der einen ist, sofern vom Mannigfaltigen die Rede ist, vom Bewußtsein der anderen doch immer zu unterscheiden, und auf die Synthesis dieses (möglichen) Bewußtseins kommt es hier allein an.

§ 16 Von der ursprünglich-synthetischen Einheit der Apperzeption

Das: Ich denke, muß alle meine Vorstellungen begleiten können; denn sonst würde etwas in mir vorgestellt werden, was garnicht gedacht werden könnte, welches ebensoviel heißt, als die Vorstellung würde entweder unmöglich, oder wenigstens für mich nichts sein. Diejenige Vorstellung, die vor allem Denken gegeben sein kann, heißt Anschauung. Also hat alles Mannigfaltige der Anschauung eine notwendige Beziehung auf das: Ich denke, in demselben Subjekt, darin dieses Mannigfaltige angetroffen wird. Diese Vorstellung aber ist ein Aktus der Spontaneität, d.i. sie kann nicht als zur Sinnlichkeit gehörig angesehen werden. Ich nenne sie die reine Apperzeption, um sie von der empirischen zu unterscheiden, oder auch die ursprüngliche Apperzeption, weil sie dasjenige Selbstbewußtsein ist, was, indem es die Vorstellung Ich denke hervorbringt, die alle anderen muß begleiten können, und in allem Bewußtsein ein und dasselbe ist, von keiner weiter begleitet werden kann. Ich nenne auch die Einheit derselben die transzendente Einheit des Selbstbewußtseins, um die Möglichkeit der Erkenntnis a priori aus ihr zu bezeichnen. Denn die mannigfaltigen Vorstellungen, die in einer gewissen Anschauung gegeben werden, würden nicht insgesamt meine Vorstellungen sein, wenn sie nicht insgesamt zu einem Selbstbewußtsein gehörten, d.i. als meine Vorstellungen (ob ich mich ihrer gleich nicht als solcher bewußt bin) müssen sie doch der Bedingung notwendig gemäß sein, unter der sie allein in einem allgemeinen Selbstbewußtsein zusammenstehen können, weil sie sonst nicht durchgängig mir angehören würden. Aus dieser ursprünglichen Verbindung läßt sich vieles folgern.

Nämlich diese durchgängige Identität der Apperzeption eines in der Anschauung gegebenen Mannigfaltigen, enthält eine Synthesis der Vorstellungen, und ist nur durch das Bewußtsein dieser Synthesis möglich. Denn das empirische Bewußtsein, welches verschiedene Vorstellungen begleitet, ist an sich zerstreut und ohne Beziehung auf die Identität des Subjekts. Diese Beziehung geschieht also dadurch noch nicht, daß ich jede Vorstellung mit Bewußtsein begleite, sondern daß ich eine zu der anderen hinzusetze und mir der Synthesis derselben bewußt bin. Also nur dadurch, daß ich ein Mannigfaltiges gegebener Vorstellungen in einem Bewußtsein verbinden kann, ist es möglich, daß ich mir die Identität des Bewußtseins in diesen Vorstellungen selbst vorstelle, d.i. die analytische Einheit der Apperzeption ist nur unter der Voraussetzung irgendeiner synthetischen möglich\*. Der Gedanke:

diese in der Anschauung gegebenen Vorstellungen gehören mir insgesamt zu, heißt demnach soviel, als ich vereinige sie in einem Selbstbewußtsein, oder kann sie wenigstens darin vereinigen, und ob er gleich selbst noch nicht das Bewußtsein der Synthesis der Vorstellungen ist, so setzt er doch die Möglichkeit der letzteren voraus, d.i. nur dadurch, daß ich das Mannigfaltige derselben in einem Bewußtsein begreifen kann, nenne ich dieselben insgesamt meine Vorstellungen; denn sonst würde ich ein so vielfarbiges verschiedenes Selbst haben, als ich Vorstellungen habe, deren ich mir bewußt bin. Synthetische Einheit des Mannigfaltigen der Anschauungen, als a priori gegeben, ist also der Grund der Identität der Apperzeption selbst, die a priori allem meinem bestimmten Denken vorhergeht. Verbindung liegt aber nicht in den Gegenständen, und kann von ihnen nicht etwa durch Wahrnehmung entlehnt und in den Verstand dadurch allererst aufgenommen werden, sondern ist allein eine Verrichtung des Verstandes, der selbst nichts weiter ist, als das Vermögen, a priori zu verbinden, und das Mannigfaltige gegebener Vorstellungen unter Einheit der Apperzeption zu bringen, welcher Grundsatz der oberste im ganzen menschlichen Erkenntnis ist.

\* Die analytische Einheit des Bewußtseins hängt allen gemeinsamen Begriffen, als solchen, an, z.B. wenn ich mir rot überhaupt denke, so stelle ich mir dadurch eine Beschaffenheit vor, die (als Merkmal) irgendwo angetroffen, oder mit anderen Vorstellungen verbunden sein kann; also nur vermöge einer vorausgedachten möglichen synthetischen Einheit kann ich mir die analytische vorstellen. Eine Vorstellung, die als verschiedenen gemein gedacht werden soll, wird als zu solchen gehörig angesehen, die außer ihr noch etwas Verschiedenes an sich haben, folglich muß sie in synthetischer Einheit mit anderen (wenngleich nur möglichen Vorstellungen) vorher gedacht werden, ehe ich die analytische Einheit des Bewußtseins, welche sie zum *conceptus communis* macht, an ihr denken kann. Und so ist die synthetische Einheit der Apperzeption der höchste Punkt, an dem man allen Verstandesgebrauch, selbst die ganze Logik, und, nach ihr, die Transzendental-Philosophie heften muß, ja dieses Vermögen ist der Verstand selbst.

Dieser Grundsatz, der notwendigen Einheit der Apperzeption, ist nun zwar selbst identisch, mithin ein analytischer Satz, erklärt aber doch eine Synthesis des in einer Anschauung gegebenen Mannigfaltigen als notwendig, ohne welche jene, durchgängige Identität des

Selbstbewußtseins nicht gedacht werden kann. Denn durch das Ich, als einfache Vorstellung, ist nichts Mannigfaltiges gegeben; in der Anschauung, die davon unterschieden ist, kann es nur gegeben und durch Verbindung in einem Bewußtsein gedacht werden. Ein Verstand, in welchem durch das Selbstbewußtsein zugleich alles Mannigfaltige gegeben würde, würde anschauen; der unsere kann nur denken und muß in den Sinnen die Anschauung suchen. Ich bin mir also des identischen Selbst bewußt, in Ansehung des Mannigfaltigen der mir in einer Anschauung gegebenen Vorstellungen, weil ich sie insgesamt meine Vorstellungen nenne, die eine ausmachen. Das ist aber soviel, als, daß ich mir einer notwendigen Synthesis derselben a priori bewußt bin, welche die ursprüngliche synthetische Einheit der Apperzeption heißt, unter der alle mir gegebenen Vorstellungen stehen, aber unter die sie auch durch eine Synthesis gebracht werden müssen.

§ 17 Der Grundsatz der synthetischen Einheit der Apperzeption ist das oberste Prinzip alles Verstandesgebrauchs

Der oberste Grundsatz der Möglichkeit aller Anschauung in Beziehung auf die Sinnlichkeit war laut der transz. Ästhetik: daß alles Mannigfaltige derselben unter den formalen Bedingungen des Raumes und der Zeit stehen. Der oberste Grundsatz eben derselben in Beziehung auf den Verstand ist: daß alles Mannigfaltige der Anschauung unter Bedingungen der ursprünglich-synthetischen Einheit der Apperzeption stehe\*. Unter dem ersteren stehen alle mannigfaltigen Vorstellungen der Anschauung, sofern sie uns gegeben werden, unter dem zweiten sofern sie in einem Bewußtsein müssen verbunden werden können; denn ohne das kann nichts dadurch gedacht oder erkannt werden, weil die gegebenen Vorstellungen den Aktus der Apperzeption, Ich denke, nicht gemein haben, und dadurch nicht in einem Selbstbewußtsein zusammengefaßt sein würden.

\* Der Raum und die Zeit und alle Teile derselben sind Anschauungen, mithin einzelne Vorstellungen mit dem Mannigfaltigen, das sie in sich enthalten (siehe die transz. Ästhetik), mithin nicht bloße Begriffe, durch die eben dasselbe Bewußtsein, als in vielen Vorstellungen, sondern viel Vorstellungen als in einer, und deren Bewußtsein, enthalten, mithin als zusammengesetzt, folglich die Einheit des Bewußtseins, als synthetisch, aber doch ursprünglich

angetroffen wird. Diese Einzelheit derselben ist wichtig in der Anwendung (siehe § 25).

Verstand ist, allgemein zu reden, das Vermögen der Erkenntnisse. Diese bestehen in der bestimmten Beziehung gegebener Vorstellungen auf ein Objekt. Objekt aber ist das, in dessen Begriff das Mannigfaltige einer gegebenen Anschauung vereinigt ist. Nun erfordert aber alle Vereinigung der Vorstellungen Einheit des Bewußtseins in der Synthesis derselben. Folglich ist die Einheit des Bewußtseins dasjenige, was allein die Beziehung der Vorstellungen auf einen Gegenstand, mithin ihre objektive Gültigkeit, folglich, daß sie Erkenntnisse werden, ausmacht, und worauf folglich selbst die Möglichkeit des Verstandes beruht.

Das erste reine Verstandeserkenntnis also, worauf sein ganzer übriger Gebrauch sich gründet, welches auch zugleich von allen Bedingungen der sinnlichen Anschauung ganz unabhängig ist, ist nun der Grundsatz der ursprünglichen synthetischen Einheit der Apperzeption. So ist die bloße Form der äußeren sinnlichen Anschauung, der Raum, noch gar keine Erkenntnis; er gibt nur das Mannigfaltige der Anschauung a priori zu einem möglichen Erkenntnis. Um aber irgend etwas im Raume zu erkennen, z.B. eine Linie, muß ich sie ziehen, und also eine bestimmte Verbindung des gegebenen Mannigfaltigen synthetisch zustande bringen, so, daß die Einheit dieser Handlung zugleich die Einheit des Bewußtseins (im Begriffe einer Linie) ist, und dadurch allererst ein Objekt (ein bestimmter Raum) erkannt wird. Die synthetische Einheit des Bewußtseins ist also eine objektive Bedingung aller Erkenntnis, nicht deren ich bloß selbst bedarf, um ein Objekt zu erkennen, sondern unter der jede Anschauung stehen muß, um für mich Objekt zu werden, weil auf andere Art, und ohne diese Synthesis, das Mannigfaltige sich nicht in einem Bewußtsein vereinigen würde.

Dieser letztere Satz ist, wie gesagt, selbst analytisch, ob er zwar die synthetische Einheit zur Bedingung alles Denkens macht, denn er sagt nichts weiter, als, daß alle meine Vorstellungen in irgendeiner gegebenen Anschauung unter der Bedingung stehen müssen, unter der ich sie allein als meine Vorstellungen zu dem identischen Selbst rechnen, und also, als in einer Apperzeption synthetisch verbunden durch den Allgemeinen Ausdruck Ich denke zusammenfassen kann.

Aber dieser Grundsatz ist doch nicht ein Prinzip für jeden überhaupt

möglichen Verstand, sondern nur für den, durch dessen reine Apperzeption in der Vorstellung: Ich bin, noch gar nichts Mannigfaltiges gegeben ist. Derjenige Verstand, durch dessen Selbstbewußtsein zugleich das Mannigfaltige der Anschauung gegeben würde, ein Verstand, durch dessen Vorstellung zugleich die Objekte dieser Vorstellung existierten, würde einen besonderen Aktus der Synthesis der Mannigfaltigen zu der Einheit des Bewußtseins nicht bedürfen, deren der menschliche Verstand, der bloß denkt, nicht anschaut, bedarf. Aber für den menschlichen Verstand ist er doch unvermeidlich der erste Grundsatz, so, daß er sich sogar von einem anderen möglichen Verstande, entweder einem solchen, der selbst anschaut, oder, wengleich eine sinnliche Anschauung, aber doch von anderer Art, als die im Raume und der Zeit, zum Grunde liegend besäße, sich nicht den mindesten Begriff machen kann.

#### § 18 Was objektive Einheit des Selbstbewußtseins sei

Die transzendente Einheit der Apperzeption ist diejenige, durch welche alles in einer Anschauung gegebene Mannigfaltige in einen Begriff vom Objekt vereinigt wird. Sie heißt darum objektiv, und muß von der subjektiven Einheit des Bewußtseins unterschieden werden, die eine Bestimmung des inneren Sinnes ist, dadurch jenes Mannigfaltige der Anschauung zu einer solchen Verbindung empirisch gegeben wird. Ob ich mir des Mannigfaltigen als zugleich, oder nacheinander, empirisch bewußt sein könne, kommt auf Umstände, oder empirische Bedingungen, an. Daher die empirische Einheit des Bewußtseins, durch Assoziation der Vorstellungen, selbst eine Erscheinung betrifft, und ganz zufällig ist. Dagegen steht die reine Form der Anschauung in der Zeit, bloß als Anschauung überhaupt, die ein gegebenes Mannigfaltiges enthält, unter der ursprünglichen Einheit des Bewußtseins, lediglich durch die notwendige Beziehung des Mannigfaltigen der Anschauung zum Einen: Ich denke; also durch die reine Synthesis des Verstandes, welche a priori der empirischen zum Grunde liegt. Jene Einheit ist allein objektiv gültig; die empirische Einheit der Apperzeption, die wir hier nicht erwägen, und die auch nur von der ersteren, unter gegebenen Bedingungen in concreto, abgeleitet ist, hat nur subjektive Gültigkeit. Einer verbindet die Vorstellung eines gewissen Wortes mit einer Sache, der andere mit einer anderen Sache, und die Einheit des Bewußtseins, in dem, was empirisch ist, ist in Ansehung dessen, was

gegeben ist, nicht notwendig und allgemein geltend.

§ 19 Die logische Form aller Urteile besteht in der objektiven Einheit der Apperzeption der darin enthaltenen Begriffe

Ich habe, mich niemals durch die Erklärung, welche die Logiker von einem Urteile überhaupt geben, befriedigen können: es ist, wie sie sagen, die Vorstellung eines Verhältnisses zwischen zwei Begriffen. Ohne nun hier über das Fehlerhafte der Erklärung, daß sie allenfalls nur auf kategorische, aber nicht hypothetische und disjunktive Urteile paßt, (als welche letztere nicht ein Verhältnis von Begriffen, sondern selbst von Urteilen enthalten,) mit ihnen zu zanken, (ohnerachtet aus diesem Versehen der Logik manche lästige Folgen erwachsen sind,)\* merke ich nur an, daß, worin dieses Verhältnis bestehe, hier nicht bestimmt ist.

\* Die weitläufige Lehre von den vier syllogistischen Figuren betrifft nur die kategorischen Vernunftschlüsse, und, ob sie zwar nichts weiter ist, als eine Kunst, durch Versteckung unmittelbarer Schlüsse (consequentiae immediatae) unter die Prämissen eines reinen Vernunftschlusses, den Schein mehrerer Schlußarten, als des in der ersten Figur, zu erschleichen, so wurde sie doch dadurch allein kein sonderliches Glück gemacht haben, wenn es ihr nicht gelungen wäre, die kategorischen Urteile, als die, worauf sich alle andere müssen beziehen lassen, in ausschließliches Ansehen zu bringen, welches aber nach § 9 falsch ist.

Wenn ich aber die Beziehung gegebener Erkenntnisse, in jedem Urteile, genauer untersuche, und sie, als dem Verstande angehörige, von dem Verhältnisse nach Gesetzen der reproduktiven Einbildungskraft (welches nur subjektive Gültigkeit hat) unterscheide, so finde ich, daß ein Urteil nichts anderes sei, als die Art, gegebene Erkenntnisse zur objektiven Einheit der Apperzeption zu bringen. Darauf zielt das Verhältniswörtchen ist in denselben, um die objektive Einheit gegebener Vorstellungen von der subjektiven zu unterscheiden. Denn dieses bezeichnet die Beziehung derselben auf die ursprüngliche Apperzeption und die notwendige Einheit derselben, wengleich das Urteil selbst empirisch, mithin zufällig ist, z.B. die Körper sind schwer. Damit ich zwar nicht sagen will, diese Vorstellungen gehören

in der empirischen Anschauung notwendig zueinander, sondern sie gehören vermöge der notwendigen Einheit der Apperzeption in der Synthesis der Anschauungen zueinander, d.i. nach Prinzipien der objektiven Bestimmung aller Vorstellungen, sofern daraus Erkenntnis werden kann, welche Prinzipien alle aus dem Grundsatz der transzendentalen Einheit der Apperzeption abgeleitet sind. Dadurch allein wird aus diesem Verhältnisse ein Urteil, d.i. ein Verhältnis, das objektiv gültig ist, und sich von dem Verhältnisse, eben derselben Vorstellungen, worin bloß subjektive Gültigkeit wäre, z.B. nach Gesetzen der Assoziation, hinreichend unterscheidet. Nach den letzteren würde ich nur sagen können: Wenn ich einen Körper trage, so fühle ich einen Druck der Schwere; aber nicht: er, der Körper, ist schwer; welches soviel sagen will, als, diese beiden Vorstellungen sind im Objekt, d.i. ohne Unterschied des Zustandes des Subjekts, verbunden, und nicht bloß in der Wahrnehmung (so oft sie auch wiederholt sein mag) beisammen.

§ 20 Alle sinnlichen Anschauungen stehen unter den Kategorien, als Bedingungen, unter denen allein das Mannigfaltige derselben in ein Bewußtsein zusammenkommen kann

Das mannigfaltige in einer sinnlichen Anschauung Gegebene gehört notwendig unter die ursprüngliche synthetische Einheit der Apperzeption, weil durch diese die Einheit der Anschauung allein möglich ist. (§ 17). Diejenige Handlung des Verstandes aber, durch die das Mannigfaltige gegebener Vorstellungen (sie mögen Anschauungen oder Begriffe sein) unter eine Apperzeption überhaupt gebracht wird, ist die, logische Funktion der Urteile. (§ 19). Also ist alles Mannigfaltige, sofern es in Einer empirischen Anschauung gegeben ist, in Ansehung einer der logischen Funktionen zu urteilen bestimmt, durch die es nämlich zu einem Bewußtsein überhaupt gebracht wird. Nun sind aber die Kategorien nichts anderes, als eben diese Funktionen zu urteilen, sofern das Mannigfaltige einer gegebenen Anschauung in Ansehung ihrer bestimmt ist. (§ 13). Also steht auch das Mannigfaltige in einer gegebenen Anschauung notwendig unter Kategorien.

§ 21 Anmerkung



Ein Mannigfaltiges, das in einer Anschauung, die ich die meinige nenne, enthalten ist, wird durch die Synthesis des Verstandes als zur notwendigen Einheit des Selbstbewußtseins gehörig vorgestellt, und dieses geschieht durch die Kategorie\*. Diese zeigt also an: daß das empirische Bewußtsein eines gegebenen Mannigfaltigen Einer Anschauung ebensowohl unter einem reinen Selbstbewußtsein a priori, wie empirische Anschauung unter einer reinen sinnlichen, die gleichfalls a priori statt hat, stehe. - Im obigen Satze ist also der Anfang einer Deduktion der reinen Verstandesbegriffe gemacht, in welcher ich, da die Kategorien unabhängig von Sinnlichkeit bloß im Verstande entspringen, noch von der Art, wie das Mannigfaltige zu einer empirischen Anschauung gegeben werde, abstrahieren muß, um nur auf die Einheit, die in die Anschauung vermittelt der Kategorie durch den Verstand hinzukommt, zu sehen. In der Folge (§ 26) wird aus der Art, wie in der Sinnlichkeit die empirische Anschauung gegeben wird, gezeigt werden, daß die Einheit derselben keine, andere sei, als welche die Kategorie nach dem vorigen § 20 dem Mannigfaltigen einer gegebenen Anschauung überhaupt vorschreibt, und dadurch also, daß ihre Gültigkeit a priori in Ansehung aller Gegenstände unserer Sinne erklärt wird, die Absicht der Deduktion allererst völlig erreicht werden.

\* Der Beweisgrund beruht auf der vorgestellten Einheit der Anschauung, dadurch ein Gegenstand gegeben wird, welche jederzeit eine Synthesis des mannigfaltigen zu einer Anschauung Gegebenen in sich schließt, und schon die Beziehung dieses letzteren auf Einheit der Apperzeption enthält.

Allein von einem Stücke konnte ich im obigen Beweise doch nicht abstrahieren, nämlich davon, daß das Mannigfaltige für die Anschauung noch vor der Synthesis des Verstandes, und unabhängig von ihr, gegeben sein müsse; wie aber, bleibt hier unbestimmt. Denn, wollte ich mir einen Verstand denken, der selbst anschaute (wie etwa einen göttlichen, der nicht gegebene Gegenstände sich vorstellte, sondern durch dessen Vorstellung die Gegenstände selbst zugleich gegeben, oder hervorgebracht würden), so würden die Kategorien in Ansehung eines solchen Erkenntnisses gar keine Bedeutung haben. Sie sind nur Regeln für einen Verstand, dessen ganzes Vermögen im Denken besteht, d.i. in der Handlung, die Synthesis des Mannigfaltigen, welches ihm anderweitig in der Anschauung gegeben worden, zur Einheit der

Apperzeption zu bringen, der also für sich gar nichts erkennt, sondern nur den Stoff zum Erkenntnis, die Anschauung, die ihm durchs Objekt gegeben werden muß, verbindet und ordnet. Von der Eigentümlichkeit unseres Verstandes aber, nur vermittelt der Kategorien und nur gerade durch diese Art und Zahl derselben Einheit der Apperzeption a priori zustande zu bringen, läßt sich ebensowenig ferner ein Grund angeben, als warum wir gerade diese und keine anderen Funktionen zu urteilen haben, oder warum Zeit und Raum die einzigen Formen unserer möglichen Anschauung sind.

§ 22 Die Kategorie hat keinen andern Gebrauch zum Erkenntnis der Dinge, als ihre Anwendung auf Gegenstände der Erfahrung

Sich einen Gegenstand denken, und einen Gegenstand erkennen, ist also nicht einerlei. Zum Erkenntnis gehören nämlich zwei Stücke: erstlich der Begriff, dadurch überhaupt ein Gegenstand gedacht wird (die Kategorie), und zweitens die Anschauung, dadurch er gegeben wird; denn, könnte dem Begriffe eine korrespondierende Anschauung gar nicht gegeben werden, so wäre er ein Gedanke der Form nach, aber ohne allen Gegenstand, und durch ihn gar keine Erkenntnis von irgendeinem Dinge möglich; weil es, soviel ich wüßte, nichts gäbe, noch geben- könnte, worauf mein Gedanke angewandt werden könne. Nun ist alle uns mögliche Anschauung sinnlich (Ästhetik), also kann das Denken eines Gegenstandes überhaupt durch einen reinen Verstandesbegriff bei uns nur Erkenntnis werden, sofern dieser auf Gegenstände der Sinne bezogen wird. Sinnliche Anschauung ist entweder reine Anschauung (Raum und Zeit) oder empirische Anschauung desjenigen, was im Raum und der Zeit unmittelbar als wirklich, durch Empfindung, vorgestellt wird. Durch Bestimmung der ersteren können wir Erkenntnisse a priori, von Gegenständen (in der Mathematik) bekommen, aber nur ihrer Form nach, als Erscheinungen; ob es Dinge geben könne, die in dieser Form angeschaut werden müssen, bleibt doch dabei noch unausgemacht. Folglich sind alle mathematischen Begriffe für sich nicht Erkenntnisse, außer, sofern man voraussetzt, daß es Dinge gibt, die sich nur der Form jener reinen sinnlichen Anschauung gemäß uns darstellen lassen. Dinge im Raum und der Zeit werden aber nur gegeben, sofern sie Wahrnehmungen (mit Empfindung begleitete Vorstellungen) sind, mithin durch empirische Vorstellung. Folglich verschaffen die reinen Verstandesbegriffe, selbst wenn sie auf Anschauungen a priori

(wie in der Mathematik) angewandt werden, nur sofern Erkenntnis, als diese, mithin auch die Verstandesbegriffe vermittelt ihrer, auf empirische Anschauungen angewandt werden können. Folglich liefern uns die Kategorien vermittelt der Anschauung auch keine Erkenntnis von Dingen, als nur durch ihre mögliche Anwendung auf empirische Anschauung, d.i. sie dienen nur zur Möglichkeit empirischer Erkenntnis. Diese aber heißt Erfahrung. Folglich haben die Kategorien keinen anderen Gebrauch zum Erkenntnis der Dinge, als nur sofern diese als Gegenstände möglicher Erfahrung angenommen werden.

## § 23

Der obige Satz ist von der größten Wichtigkeit; denn er bestimmt ebensowohl die Grenzen des Gebrauchs der reinen Verstandesbegriffe in Ansehung der Gegenstände, als die transzendente Ästhetik die Grenzen des Gebrauchs der reinen Form unserer sinnlichen Anschauung bestimmte. Raum und Zeit gelten, als Bedingungen der Möglichkeit, wie uns Gegenstände gegeben werden können, nicht weiter, als für Gegenstände der Sinne, mithin nur der Erfahrung. Über diese Grenzen hinaus stellen sie gar nichts vor, denn sie sind nur in den Sinnen und haben außer ihnen keine Wirklichkeit. Die reinen Verstandesbegriffe sind von dieser Einschränkung frei und erstrecken sich auf Gegenstände der Anschauung überhaupt, sie mag der unsrigen ähnlich sein oder nicht, wenn sie nur sinnlich und nicht intellektuell ist. Diese weitere Ausdehnung der Begriffe über unsere sinnliche Anschauung hinaus, hilft uns aber zu nichts. Denn es sind alsdann leere Begriffe von Objekten, von denen, ob sie nur einmal möglich sind oder nicht, wir durch jene gar nicht urteilen können, bloße Gedankenformen ohne objektive Realität, weil wir keine Anschauung zur Hand haben, auf welche die synthetische Einheit der Apperzeption, die jene allein enthalten, angewandt werden, und sie so einen Gegenstand bestimmen könnten. Unsere sinnliche, und empirische Anschauung kann ihnen allein Sinn und Bedeutung verschaffen.

Nimmt man also ein Objekt einer nicht-sinnlichen Anschauung als gegeben an, so kann man es freilich durch alle die Prädikate vorstellen, die schon in der Voraussetzung liegen, daß ihm nichts zur sinnlichen Anschauung Gehöriges zukomme: also, daß es nicht ausgedehnt, oder im Raume sei, daß die Dauer desselben keine Zeit sei,

daß in ihm keine Veränderung (Folge der Bestimmungen in der Zeit) angetroffen werde, usw. Allein das ist doch kein eigentliches Erkenntnis, wenn ich bloß anzeige, wie die Anschauung des Objekts nicht sei, ohne sagen zu können, was in ihr denn enthalten sei; denn alsdann habe ich gar nicht die Möglichkeit eines Objekts zu meinem reinen Verstandesbegriff vorgestellt, weil ich keine Anschauung habe geben können, die ihm korrespondierte, sondern nur sagen konnte, daß die unsrige nicht für ihn gelte. Aber das Vornehmste ist hier, daß auf ein solches Etwas auch nicht einmal eine einzige Kategorie angewandt werden könnte: z.B. der Begriff einer Substanz, d.i. von etwas, das als Subjekt, niemals aber als bloßes Prädikat existieren könne, wovon ich gar nicht weiß, ob es irgendein Ding geben könne, das dieser Gedankenbestimmung korrespondierte, wenn nicht empirische Anschauung mir den Fall der Anwendung gäbe. Doch mehr hiervon in der Folge.

#### § 24 Von der Anwendung der Kategorien auf Gegenstände der Sinne überhaupt

Die reinen Verstandesbegriffe beziehen sich durch den bloßen Verstand auf Gegenstände der Anschauung überhaupt, unbestimmt ob sie die unsrige oder irgendeine andere, doch sinnliche, sei, sind aber eben darum bloße Gedankenformen, wodurch noch kein bestimmter Gegenstand erkannt wird. Die Synthesis oder Verbindung des Mannigfaltigen in denselben, bezog sich bloß auf die Einheit der Apperzeption, und war dadurch der Grund der Möglichkeit der Erkenntnis a priori, sofern sie auf dem Verstande beruht, und mithin nicht allein transzendental, sondern auch bloß rein intellektual. Weil in uns aber eine gewisse Form der sinnlichen Anschauung a priori zum Grunde liegt, welche auf der Rezeptivität der Vorstellungsfähigkeit (Sinnlichkeit) beruht, so kann der Verstand, als Spontaneität, den inneren Sinn durch das Mannigfaltige gegebener Vorstellungen der synthetischen Einheit der Apperzeption gemäß bestimmen, und so synthetische Einheit der Apperzeption des Mannigfaltigen der sinnlichen Anschauung a priori denken, als die Bedingung, unter welcher alle Gegenstände unserer (der menschlichen) Anschauung notwendigerweise stehen müssen, dadurch denn die Kategorien, als bloße Gedankenformen, objektive Realität, d.i. Anwendung auf Gegenstände, die uns in der Anschauung gegeben werden können, aber nur als Erscheinungen bekommen; denn nur von diesen sind wir der Anschauung a priori fähig.

Diese Synthesis des Mannigfaltigen der sinnlichen Anschauung, die a priori möglich und notwendig ist, kann figürlich (synthesis speciosa) genannt werden, zum Unterschiede von derjenigen, welche in Ansehung des Mannigfaltigen einer Anschauung überhaupt in der bloßen Kategorie gedacht wurde, und Verstandesverbindung (synthesis intellectualis) heißt; beide sind transzendental, nicht bloß weil sie selbst a priori vorgehen, sondern auch die Möglichkeit anderer Erkenntnis a priori gründen.

Allein die figürliche Synthesis, wenn sie bloß auf die ursprünglich synthetische Einheit der Apperzeption, d.i. diese transzendente Einheit geht, welche in den Kategorien gedacht wird, muß, zum Unterschiede von der bloß intellektuellen Verbindung, die transzendente Synthesis der Einbildungskraft heißen. Einbildungskraft ist das Vermögen, einen Gegenstand auch ohne dessen Gegenwart in der Anschauung vorzustellen. Da nun alle unsere Anschauung sinnlich ist, so gehört die Einbildungskraft, der subjektiven Bedingung wegen, unter der sie allein den Verstandesbegriffen eine korrespondierende Anschauung geben kann, zur Sinnlichkeit; sofern aber doch ihre Synthesis eine Ausübung der Spontaneität ist, welche bestimmend, und nicht, wie der Sinn, bloß bestimmbar ist, mithin a priori den Sinn seiner Form nach der Einheit der Apperzeption gemäß bestimmen kann, so ist die Einbildungskraft sofern ein Vermögen, die Sinnlichkeit a priori zu bestimmen, und ihre Synthesis der Anschauungen, den Kategorien gemäß, muß die transzendente Synthesis der Einbildungskraft sein, welches eine Wirkung des Verstandes auf die Sinnlichkeit und die erste Anwendung desselben (zugleich der Grund aller übrigen) auf Gegenstände der uns möglichen Anschauung ist. Sie ist, als figürlich, von der intellektuellen Synthesis ohne alle Einbildungskraft bloß durch den Verstand unterschieden. Sofern die Einbildungskraft nun Spontaneität ist, nenne ich sie auch bisweilen die produktive Einbildungskraft, und unterscheide sie dadurch von der reproduktiven, deren Synthesis lediglich empirischen Gesetzen, nämlich denen der Assoziation, unterworfen ist, und welche daher zur Erklärung der Möglichkeit der Erkenntnis a priori nichts beiträgt, und um deswillen nicht in die Transzendentalphilosophie, sondern in die Psychologie gehört.

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Hier ist nun der Ort, das Paradoxe, was jedermann bei der Exposition der Form des inneren Sinnes (§ 6) auffallen mußte, verständlich zu machen: nämlich wie dieser auch sogar uns selbst, nur wie wir uns erscheinen, nicht wie wir an uns selbst sind, dem Bewußtsein darstelle, weil wir nämlich uns nur anschauen wie wir innerlich affiziert werden, welches widersprechend zu sein scheint, indem wir uns gegen um selbst als leidend verhalten müßten; daher man auch lieber den inneren Sinn mit dem Vermögen der Apperzeption (welche wir sorgfältig unterscheiden) in den Systemen der Psychologie für einerlei auszugeben pflegt.

Das, was den inneren Sinn bestimmt, ist der Verstand und dessen ursprüngliches Vermögen das Mannigfaltige der Anschauung zu verbinden, d.i. unter eine Apperzeption (als worauf selbst seine Möglichkeit beruht) zu bringen. Weil nun der Verstand in uns Menschen selbst kein Vermögen der Anschauungen ist, und diese, wenn sie auch in der Sinnlichkeit gegeben wäre, doch nicht in sich aufnehmen kann, um gleichsam das Mannigfaltige seiner eigenen Anschauung zu verbinden, so ist seine Synthesis, wenn er für sich allein betrachtet wird, nichts anderes, als die Einheit der Handlung, deren er sich, als einer solchen, auch ohne Sinnlichkeit bewußt ist, durch die er aber selbst die Sinnlichkeit innerlich in Ansehung des Mannigfaltigen, was der Form ihrer Anschauung nach ihm gegeben werden mag, zu bestimmen vermögend ist. Er also übt, unter der Benennung einer transzendentalen Synthesis der Einbildungskraft, diejenige Handlung aufs passive Subjekt, dessen Vermögen er ist, aus, wovon wir mit Recht sagen, daß der innere Sinn dadurch affiziert werde. Die Apperzeption und deren synthetische Einheit ist mit dem inneren Sinne so gar nicht einerlei, daß jene vielmehr, als der Quell aller Verbindung, auf das Mannigfaltige der Anschauungen überhaupt unter dem Namen der Kategorien, vor aller sinnlichen Anschauung auf Objekte überhaupt geht, dagegen der innere Sinn die bloße Form der Anschauung, aber ohne Verbindung des Mannigfaltigen in derselben, mithin noch gar keine bestimmte Anschauung enthält, welche nur durch das Bewußtsein der Bestimmung desselben durch die transzendente Handlung der Einbildungskraft, (synthetischer Einfluß des Verstandes auf den inneren Sinn) welche ich die figürliche Synthesis genannt habe, möglich ist.

Dieses nehmen wir auch jederzeit in uns wahr. Wir können uns keine

Linie denken, ohne sie in Gedanken zu ziehen, keinen Zirkel denken, ohne ihn zu beschreiben, die drei Abmessungen des Raumes gar nicht vorstellen, ohne aus demselben Punkte drei Linien senkrecht aufeinander zu setzen, und selbst die Zeit nicht, ohne, indem wir im Ziehen einer geraden Linie (die die äußerlich figürliche Vorstellung der Zeit sein soll) bloß auf die Handlung der Synthesis des Mannigfaltigen, dadurch wir den inneren Sinn sukzessiv bestimmen, und dadurch auf die Sukzession dieser Bestimmung in demselben, achthaben. Bewegung, als Handlung des Subjekts, (nicht als Bestimmung eines Objekts)\*, folglich die Synthesis des Mannigfaltigen im Raume, wenn wir von diesem abstrahieren und bloß auf die Handlung achthaben, dadurch wir den inneren Sinn seiner Form gemäß bestimmen, bringt sogar den Begriff der Sukzession zuerst hervor. Der Verstand findet also in diesem nicht etwa schon eine dergleichen Verbindung des Mannigfaltigen, sondern bringt sie hervor, indem er ihn affiziert. Wie aber das Ich, der ich denke, von dem Ich, das sich selbst anschaut, unterschieden (indem ich mir noch andere Anschauungsart wenigstens als möglich vorstellen kann) und doch mit diesem letzteren als dasselbe Subjekt einerlei sei, wie ich also sagen könne: Ich, als Intelligenz und denkend Subjekt, erkenne mich selbst als gedachtes Objekt, sofern ich mir noch über das in der Anschauung gegeben bin, nur, gleich anderen Phänomen, nicht wie ich vor dem Verstande bin, sondern wie ich mir erscheine, hat nicht mehr auch nicht weniger Schwierigkeit bei sich, als wie ich mir selbst überhaupt ein Objekt und zwar der Anschauung und innerer Wahrnehmungen sein könne. Daß es aber doch wirklich so sein müsse, kann, wenn man den Raum für eine bloße reine Form der Erscheinungen äußerer Sinne gelten läßt, dadurch klar dargetan werden, daß wir die Zeit, die doch gar kein Gegenstand äußerer Anschauung ist, uns nicht anders vorstellig machen können, als unter dem Bilde einer Linie, sofern wir sie ziehen, ohne welche Darstellungsart wir die Einheit ihrer Abmessung gar nicht erkennen könnten, imgleichen daß wir die Bestimmung der Zeitlänge, oder auch der Zeitstellen für alle inneren Wahrnehmungen, immer von dem hernehmen müssen, was uns äußere Dinge Veränderliches darstellen, folglich die Bestimmungen des inneren Sinnes gerade auf dieselbe Art als Erscheinungen in der Zeit ordnen müssen, wie wir die der äußeren Sinne im Raume ordnen, mithin, wenn wir von den letzteren einräumen, daß wir dadurch Objekte nur sofern erkennen, als wir äußerlich affiziert werden, wir auch vom inneren Sinne zugestehen müssen, daß wir dadurch uns selbst nur so anschauen, wie wir innerlich von uns selbst affiziert werden, d.i. was die innere Anschauung betrifft,

unser eigenes Subjekt nur als Erscheinung, nicht aber nach dem, was es an sich selbst ist, erkennen\*\*.

\* Bewegung eines Objekts im Raume gehört nicht in eine reine Wissenschaft, folglich auch nicht in die Geometrie; weil, daß etwas beweglich sei, nicht a priori, sondern nur durch Erfahrung erkannt werden kann. Aber Bewegung, als Beschreibung eines Raumes, ist ein reiner Aktus der sukzessiven Synthesis des Mannigfaltigen in der äußeren Anschauung überhaupt durch produktive Einbildungskraft, und gehört nicht allein zur Geometrie, sondern sogar zur Transzendentalphilosophie.

\*\* Ich sehe nicht, wie man so viel Schwierigkeiten darin finden könne, daß der innere Sinn von uns selbst affiziert werde. Jeder Aktus der Aufmerksamkeit kann uns ein Beispiel davon geben. Der Verstand bestimmt darin jederzeit den inneren Sinn der Verbindung, die er denkt, gemäß, zur inneren Anschauung, die dem Mannigfaltigen in der Synthesis des Verstandes korrespondiert. Wie sehr das Gemüt gemeinlich hierdurch affiziert werde, wird ein jeder in sich wahrnehmen können.

## § 25

Dagegen bin ich mir meiner selbst in der transzendentalen Synthesis des Mannigfaltigen der Vorstellungen überhaupt, mithin in der synthetischen ursprünglichen Einheit der Apperzeption, bewußt, nicht wie ich mir erscheine, noch wie ich an mir selbst bin, sondern nur daß ich bin. Diese Vorstellung ist ein Denken, nicht ein Anschauen. Da nun zum Erkenntnis unserer selbst außer der Handlung des Denkens, die das Mannigfaltige einer jeden möglichen Anschauung zur Einheit der Apperzeption bringt, noch eine bestimmte Art der Anschauung, dadurch dieses Mannigfaltige gegeben wird, erforderlich ist, so ist zwar mein eigenes Dasein nicht Erscheinung (viel weniger bloßer Schein), aber die Bestimmung meines Daseins\* kann nur der Form des inneren Sinnes gemäß nach der besonderen Art, wie das Mannigfaltige, das ich verbinde, in der inneren Anschauung gegeben wird, geschehen, und ich habe also demnach keine Erkenntnis von mir wie ich bin, sondern bloß wie ich mir selbst erscheine. Das Bewußtsein seiner selbst ist also noch lange nicht ein Erkenntnis seiner selbst, unerachtet aller



Kategorien, welche das Denken eines Objekts überhaupt durch Verbindung des Mannigfaltigen in einer Apperzeption ausmachen. So wie zum Erkenntnis eines von mir verschiedenen Objekts, außer dem Denken eines Objekts überhaupt (in der Kategorie), ich doch noch einer Anschauung bedarf, dadurch ich jenen allgemeinen Begriff bestimme, so bedarf ich auch zum Erkenntnis meiner selbst außer dem Bewußtsein, oder außer dem, daß ich mich denke, noch einer Anschauung des Mannigfaltigen in mir, wodurch ich diesen Gedanken bestimme, und ich existiere als Intelligenz, die sich lediglich ihres Verbindungsvermögens bewußt ist, in Ansehung des Mannigfaltigen aber, das sie verbinden soll, einer einschränkenden Bedingung, die sie den inneren Sinn nennt, unterworfen, jene Verbindung nur nach Zeitverhältnissen, welche ganz außerhalb den eigentlichen Verstandesbegriffen liegen, anschaulich machen, und sich daher selbst doch nur erkennen kann, wie sie, in Absicht auf eine Anschauung (die nicht intellektuell und durch den Verstand selbst gegeben sein kann), ihr selbst bloß erscheint, nicht wie sie sich erkennen würde, wenn ihre Anschauung intellektuell wäre.

\* Das, Ich denke, drückt den Aktus aus, mein Dasein zu bestimmen. Das Dasein ist dadurch also schon gegeben, aber die Art, wie ich es bestimmen, d.i. das Mannigfaltige, zu demselben gehörige, in mir setzen solle, ist dadurch noch nicht gegeben. Dazu gehört Selbstanschauung, die eine a priori gegebene Form, d.i. die Zeit, zum Grunde liegen hat, welche sinnlich und zur Rezeptivität des Bestimmbaren gehörig ist. Habe ich nun nicht noch eine andere Selbstanschauung, die das Bestimmende in mir, dessen Spontaneität ich mir nur bewußt bin, ebenso vor dem Aktus des Bestimmens gibt, wie die Zeit das Bestimmbare, so kann ich mein Dasein, als eines selbsttätigen Wesens, nicht bestimmen, sondern ich stelle mir nur die Spontaneität meines Denkens, d.i. des Bestimmens, vor, und mein Dasein bleibt immer nur sinnlich, d.i. als das Dasein einer Erscheinung, bestimmbar. Doch macht diese Spontaneität, daß ich mich Intelligenz nenne.

## § 26 Transzendente Deduktion des allgemein möglichen Erfahrungsgebrauchs der reinen Verstandesbegriffe

In der metaphysischen Deduktion wurde der Ursprung der Kategorien

a priori überhaupt durch ihre völlige Zusammentreffung mit den allgemeinen logischen Funktionen des Denkens dargetan, in der transzendentalen aber die Möglichkeit derselben als Erkenntnisse a priori von Gegenständen einer Anschauung überhaupt (§§ 20, 21) dargestellt. Jetzt soll die Möglichkeit, durch Kategorien die Gegenstände, die nur immer unseren Sinnen vorkommen mögen, und zwar nicht der Form ihrer Anschauung, sondern den Gesetzen ihrer Verbindung nach, a priori zu erkennen, also der Natur gleichsam das Gesetz vorzuschreiben und sie sogar möglich zu machen, erklärt werden. Denn ohne diese ihre Tauglichkeit würde nicht erhellen, wie alles, was unseren Sinnen nur vorkommen mag, unter den Gesetzen stehen müsse, die a priori aus dem Verstande allein entspringen.

Zuvörderst merke ich an, daß ich unter der Synthesis der Apprehension die Zusammensetzung des Mannigfaltigen in einer empirischen Anschauung verstehe, dadurch Wahrnehmung, d.i. empirisches Bewußtsein derselben, (als Erscheinung) möglich wird.

Wir haben Formen der äußeren sowohl als inneren sinnlichen Anschauung a priori an den Vorstellungen von Raum und Zeit, und diesen muß die Synthesis der Apprehension des Mannigfaltigen der Erscheinung jederzeit gemäß sein, weil sie selbst nur nach dieser Form geschehen kann. Aber Raum und Zeit sind nicht bloß als Formen der sinnlichen Anschauung, sondern als Anschauungen selbst (die ein Mannigfaltiges enthalten) also mit der Bestimmung der Einheit dieses Mannigfaltigen in ihnen a priori vorgestellt (siehe transz. Ästhet.)\*. Also ist selbst schon Einheit der Synthesis des Mannigfaltigen, außer oder in uns, mithin auch eine Verbindung, der alles, was im Raume oder der Zeit bestimmt vorgestellt werden soll, gemäß sein muß, a priori als Bedingung der Synthesis aller Apprehension schon mit (nicht in) diesen Anschauungen zugleich gegeben. Diese synthetische Einheit aber kann keine andere sein, als die der Verbindung des Mannigfaltigen einer gegebenen Anschauung überhaupt in einem ursprünglichen Bewußtsein, den Kategorien gemäß, nur auf unsere sinnliche Anschauung angewandt. Folglich steht alle Synthesis, wodurch selbst Wahrnehmung möglich wird, unter den Kategorien, und, da Erfahrung Erkenntnis durch verknüpfte Wahrnehmungen ist, so sind die Kategorien Bedingungen der Möglichkeit der Erfahrung, und gelten also a priori auch von allen Gegenständen der Erfahrung.

\* Der Raum, als Gegenstand vorgestellt, (wie man es wirklich in der

Geometrie bedarf,) enthält mehr, als bloße Form der Anschauung, nämlich Zusammenfassung des Mannigfaltigen, nach der Form der Sinnlichkeit gegebenen, in eine anschauliche Vorstellung, so daß die Form der Anschauung bloß Mannigfaltiges, die formale Anschauung aber Einheit der Vorstellung gibt. Diese Einheit hatte ich in der Ästhetik bloß zur Sinnlichkeit gezählt, um nur zu bemerken, daß sie vor allem Begriffe vorhergehe, ob sie zwar eine Synthesis, die nicht den Sinnen angehört, durch welche aber alle Begriffe von Raum und Zeit zuerst möglich werden, voraussetzt. Denn da durch sie (indem der Verstand die Sinnlichkeit bestimmt) der Raum oder die Zeit als Anschauungen zuerst gegeben werden, so gehört die Einheit dieser Anschauung a priori zum Raume und der Zeit, und nicht zum Begriffe des Verstandes. (§ 24.)

\*        \*  
          \*

Wenn ich also z.B. die empirische Anschauung eines Hauses durch Apprehension des Mannigfaltigen derselben zur Wahrnehmung mache, so liegt mir die notwendige Einheit des Raumes und der äußeren sinnlichen Anschauung überhaupt zum Grunde, und ich zeichne gleichsam seine Gestalt, dieser synthetischen Einheit des Mannigfaltigen im Raume gemäß. Eben dieselbe synthetische Einheit aber, wenn ich von der Form des Raumes abstrahiere, hat im Verstande ihren Sitz, und ist die Kategorie der Synthesis des Gleichartigen in einer Anschauung überhaupt, d.i. die Kategorie der Größe, welcher also jene Synthesis der Apprehension, d.i. die Wahrnehmung, durchaus gemäß sein muß\*.

\* Auf solche Weise wird bewiesen: daß die Synthesis der Apprehension, welche empirisch ist, der Synthesis der Apperzeption, welche intellektuell und gänzlich a priori in der Kategorie enthalten ist, notwendig gemäß sein müsse. Es ist eine und dieselbe Spontaneität, welche dort, unter dem Namen der Einbildungskraft, hier des Verstandes, Verbindung in das Mannigfaltige der Anschauung hineinbringt.

Wenn ich (in einem anderen Beispiele) das Gefrieren des Wassers wahrnehme, so apprehendiere ich zwei Zustände (der Flüssigkeit und Festigkeit) als solche, die in einer Relation der Zeit gegeneinander stehen. Aber in der Zeit, die ich der Erscheinung als inneren Anschauung zum Grunde lege, stelle ich mir notwendig synthetische

Einheit des Mannigfaltigen vor, ohne die jene Relation nicht in einer Anschauung bestimmt (in Ansehung der Zeitfolge) gegeben werden konnte. Nun ist aber diese synthetische Einheit, als Bedingung a priori, unter der ich das Mannigfaltige einer Anschauung überhaupt verbinde, wenn ich von der beständigen Form meiner inneren Anschauung, der Zeit, abstrahiere, die Kategorie der Ursache, durch welche ich, wenn ich sie auf meine Sinnlichkeit anwende, alles, was geschieht, in der Zeit überhaupt seiner Relation nach bestimme. Also steht die Apprehension in einer solchen Begebenheit, mithin diese selbst, der möglichen Wahrnehmung nach, unter dem Begriffe des Verhältnisses der Wirkungen und Ursachen, und so in allen anderen Fällen.

\*        \*  
          \*

Kategorien sind Begriffe, welche den Erscheinungen, mithin der Natur, als dem Inbegriffe aller Erscheinungen (*natura materialiter spectata*), Gesetze a priori vorschreiben, und nun fragt sich, da sie nicht von der Natur abgeleitet werden und sich nach ihr als ihrem Muster richten (weil sie sonst bloß empirisch sein würden), wie es zu begreifen sei, daß die Natur sich nach ihnen richten müsse, d.i. wie sie die Verbindung des Mannigfaltigen der Natur, ohne sie von dieser abzunehmen, a priori bestimmen können. Hier ist die Auflösung dieses Rätsels.

Es ist nun nichts befremdlicher, wie die Gesetze der Erscheinungen in der Natur mit dem Verstande und seiner Form a priori, d.i. seinem Vermögen das Mannigfaltige überhaupt zu verbinden, als wie die Erscheinungen selbst mit der Form der sinnlichen Anschauung a priori übereinstimmen müssen. Denn Gesetze existieren ebensowenig in den Erscheinungen, sondern nur relativ auf das Subjekt, dem die Erscheinungen inhärieren, sofern es Verstand hat, als Erscheinungen nicht an sich existieren, sondern nur relativ auf dasselbe Wesen, sofern es Sinne hat. Dingen an sich selbst würde ihre Gesetzmäßigkeit notwendig, auch außer einem Verstande, der sie erkennt, zukommen. Allein Erscheinungen sind nur Vorstellungen von Dingen, die, nach dem, was sie an sich sein mögen, unerkant da sind. Als bloße Vorstellungen aber stehen sie unter gar keinem Gesetze der Verknüpfung, als demjenigen, welches das verknüpfende Vermögen vorschreibt. Nun ist das, was das Mannigfaltige der sinnlichen Anschauung verknüpft, Einbildungskraft, die vom Verstande der Einheit ihrer intellektuellen

Synthesis, und von der Sinnlichkeit der Mannigfaltigkeit der Apprehension nach abhängt. Da nun von der Synthesis der Apprehension alle mögliche Wahrnehmung, sie selbst aber, diese empirische Synthesis, von der transzendentalen, mithin den Kategorien abhängt, so müssen alle möglichen Wahrnehmungen, mithin auch alles, was zum empirischen Bewußtsein immer gelangen kann, d.i. alle Erscheinungen der Natur, ihrer Verbindung nach, unter den Kategorien stehen, von welchen die Natur (bloß als Natur überhaupt betrachtet), als dem ursprünglichen Grunde ihrer notwendigen Gesetzmäßigkeit (als *natura formaliter spectata*), abhängt. Auf mehrere Gesetze aber, als die, auf denen eine Natur überhaupt, als Gesetzmäßigkeit der Erscheinungen in Raum und Zeit, beruht, reicht auch das reine Verstandesvermögen nicht zu, durch bloße Kategorien den Erscheinungen a priori Gesetze vorzuschreiben. Besondere Gesetze, weil sie empirisch bestimmte Erscheinungen betreffen, können davon nicht vollständig abgeleitet werden, ob sie gleich alle insgesamt unter jenen stehen. Es muß Erfahrung dazu kommen, um die letzteren überhaupt kennen zu lernen; von Erfahrung aber überhaupt, und dem, was als ein Gegenstand derselben erkannt werden kann, geben allein jene Gesetze a priori die Belehrung.

#### § 27 Resultat dieser Deduktion der Verstandesbegriffe

Wir können uns keinen Gegenstand denken, ohne durch Kategorien; wir können keinen gedachten Gegenstand erkennen, ohne durch Anschauungen, die jenen Begriffen entsprechen. Nun sind alle unsere Anschauungen sinnlich, und diese Erkenntnis, sofern der Gegenstand derselben gegeben ist, ist empirisch. Empirische Erkenntnis aber ist Erfahrung. Folglich ist uns keine Erkenntnis a priori möglich, als lediglich von Gegenständen möglicher Erfahrung\*.

\* Damit man sich nicht voreiligerweise an den besorglichen nachteiligen Folgen dieses Satzes stoße, will ich nur in Erinnerung bringen, daß die Kategorien im Denken durch die Bedingungen unserer sinnlichen Anschauung nicht eingeschränkt sind, sondern ein unbegrenztes Feld haben, und nur das Erkennen dessen, was wir uns denken, das Bestimmen des Objekts, Anschauung bedürfe, wo, beim Mangel der letzteren, der Gedanke vom Objekte übrigens noch immer seine wahren und nützlichen Folgen auf den Vernunftgebrauch des

Subjekts haben kann, der sich aber, weil er nicht immer auf die Bestimmung des Objekts, mithin aufs Erkenntnis, sondern auch auf die des Subjekts und dessen Wollen gerichtet ist, hier noch nicht vortragen läßt.

Aber diese Erkenntnis, die bloß auf Gegenstände der Erfahrung eingeschränkt ist, ist darum nicht alle von der Erfahrung entlehnt, sondern, was sowohl die reinen Anschauungen, als die reinen Verstandesbegriffe betrifft, so sind Elemente der Erkenntnis, die in uns a priori angetroffen werden. Nun sind nur zwei Wege, auf welchen eine notwendige Übereinstimmung der Erfahrung mit den Begriffen von ihren Gegenständen gedacht werden kann: entweder die Erfahrung macht diese Begriffe, oder diese Begriffe machen die Erfahrung möglich. Das erstere findet nicht in Ansehung der Kategorien (auch nicht der reinen sinnlichen Anschauung) statt; denn sie sind Begriffe a priori, mithin unabhängig von der Erfahrung (die Behauptung eines empirischen Ursprungs wäre eine Art von generatio aequivoca). Folglich bleibt nur das zweite übrig (gleichsam ein System der Epigenesis der reinen Vernunft): daß nämlich die Kategorien von seiten des Verstandes die Gründe der Möglichkeit aller Erfahrung überhaupt enthalten. Wie sie aber die Erfahrung möglich machen, und welche Grundsätze der Möglichkeit derselben sie in ihrer Anwendung auf Erscheinungen an die Hand geben, wird das folgende Hauptstück von dem transz. Gebrauche der Urteilskraft das mehrere lehren.

Wollte jemand zwischen den zwei genannten einzigen Wegen noch einen Mittelweg vorschlagen, nämlich, daß sie weder selbstgedachte erste Prinzipien a priori unserer Erkenntnis, noch auch aus der Erfahrung geschöpft, sondern subjektive, uns mit unserer Existenz zugleich eingepflanzte Anlagen zum Denken wären, die von unserem Urheber so eingerichtet worden, daß ihr Gebrauch mit den Gesetzen der Natur, an welchen die Erfahrung fortläuft, genau stimmte, (eine Art von Präformationssystem der reinen Vernunft) so würde (außer dem, daß bei einer solchen Hypothese kein Ende abzusehen ist, wie weit man die Voraussetzung vorbestimmter Anlagen zu künftigen Urteilen treiben möchte) das wider gedachten Mittelweg entscheidend sein: daß in solchem Falle den Kategorien die Notwendigkeit mangeln würde, die ihrem Begriffe wesentlich angehört. Denn z.B. der Begriff der Ursache, welcher die Notwendigkeit eines Erfolges unter einer vorausgesetzten Bedingung aussagt, würde falsch sein, wenn er nur auf einer beliebigen uns eingepflanzten subjektiven Notwendigkeit, gewisse empirische

Vorstellungen nach einer solchen Regel des Verhältnisses zu verbinden, beruhte. Ich würde nicht sagen können: die Wirkung ist mit der Ursache im Objekte (d.i. notwendig) verbunden, sondern ich bin nur so eingerichtet, daß ich diese Vorstellung nicht anders als so verknüpft denken kann, welches gerade das ist, was der Skeptiker am meisten wünscht, denn alsdann ist alle unsere Einsicht, durch vermeinte objektive Gültigkeit unserer Urteile, nichts als lauter Schein, und es würde auch an Leuten nicht fehlen, die diese subjektive Notwendigkeit (die gefühlt werden muß) von sich nicht gestehen würden; zum wenigsten könnte man mit niemandem über dasjenige hadern, was bloß auf der Art beruht, wie sein Subjekt organisiert ist.

### Kurzer Begriff dieser Deduktion

Sie ist die Darstellung der reinen Verstandesbegriffe, (und mit ihnen aller theoretischen Erkenntnis a priori, als Prinzipien der Möglichkeit der Erfahrung, dieser aber, als Bestimmung der Erscheinungen in Raum und Zeit überhaupt, - endlich dieser aus dem Prinzip der ursprünglichen synthetischen Einheit der Apperzeption, als der Form des Verstandes in Beziehung auf Raum und Zeit, als ursprüngliche Formen der Sinnlichkeit.

\*        \*  
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\*  
\*

Nur bis hierher halte ich die Paragraphenabteilung für nötig, weil wir es mit den Elementarbegriffen zu tun hatten. Nun wir den Gebrauch derselben vorstellig machen wollen, wird der Vortrag in kontinuierlichem Zusammenhange, ohne dieselbe, fortgehen dürfen.