'YES SCOTLAND' versus 'BETTER TOGETHER' HOW DID IT ALL HAPPEN? 'YES SCOTLAND' versus 'BETTER TOGETHER' HOW DID IT ALL HAPPEN?

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Carlos Neira Cortizas
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'YES SCOTLAND' *versus* 'BETTER TOGETHER'

HOW DID IT ALL HAPPEN?

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Carlos Neira Cortizas
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PREFACE
Xabier Macias

This analysis stems from a desire to understand more thoroughly one of the most interesting political and participatory processes that have taken place in the first two decades of the 21st century in Europe: the referendum on self-determination for Scotland held in September 2014.

In an exemplary way, the Scots have shown us the way forward for the resolution of the democratic aspirations to sovereignty of European Nations without States. We at the Maurits Coppieters Centre consider it necessary to take advantage of this experience as a source of learning for all peoples claiming the right to self-determination and independence. This is why we decided to offer a contribution to a better understanding of some of the factors and variables present in the Scottish case.

We wished to further understand the mechanisms and underlying logic involved in the perceptions and behaviours of the Scottish population faced with a question that has changed the future of Scotland and Europe forever. To do this, we decided to analyse the process from three different perspectives.

First of all, we wished to examine, in the most detailed way possible, how the design of campaigns in favour and against the independence of Scotland affected the opinion of the people of Scotland (taking into account socio-demographic variables such as social class, gender, education and age). We also wanted to learn what discursive elements were decisive in the final choice for which people voted.

Secondly, we reviewed the level of mobilization on social networks of activists in favour of the Yes and No camps, noting how much support and action within this context was transformed into actual electoral support for the different campaigns.

Finally, we tracked the international component of the referendum and its effect on the global agenda. We examined how the issue generated public opinion and forced many socio-political protagonists to come down on one side or the other. In short, we sought to examine fully a phenomenon that received enough attention, in a large part of the Western world, to warrant its prominence, for months, on the front pages of the most influential international newspapers.

Centre Maurits Coppieters

1 'YES SCOTLAND' *versus* 'BETTER TOGETHER' HOW DID IT ALL HAPPEN?

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ABSTRACT

On the 18th of September 2014, Scottish voters have rejected political independence by a margin of 55,3% against 44,7%. Yet during more than 16 weeks, two opposing campaigns - Yes Scotland *versus* Better Together - have strived to convince Scotland that political independence versus keeping the Union was the best choice for Scotland's future. Filled with many unexpected moments, the campaign was intense, vibrant and almost breathtaking. The purpose of this article is to deliver a coherent and consistent account of the Scottish campaigns in order to make sense of the "no" vote. In this article, we will proceed in four moments: first, we will put the referendum in context; second, we will highlight major aspects of the campaigns; third, we will bring the political process up to date and will clarify the terms of the agreement reached under the Smith Process. Finally, in the last part, we will summarize the lessons to learn from the political outcome of the referendum.

INTRODUCTION

On the 18th of September 2014, the Scots have decided to stay within the United Kingdom by a margin of 55,3% against 44,7%. After a record turnout of voters, Scotland has overwhelmingly rejected political independence with 55,3% of Scotland voting to remain in the 307-year-old union. Yet during more than 16 weeks, two opposing campaigns - Yes Scotland *versus* Better Together - have strived to convince Scotland that political independence *versus* keeping the union was the best choice for Scotland's future. Regardless of the final result, the campaign was intense, vibrant and almost breathtaking.

The purpose of this article is to deliver a coherent and consistent account of the Scottish campaigns in order to explain how "did it all happen". In order to do so, we will proceed in four moments: first, we will put the referendum in context; second, we will highlight major aspects of each side of the campaigns; third, we will bring the political process up to date and will clarify the terms of the agreement issued by the Smith Commission. Finally, in the last part, we will summarize the lessons to learn from the political outcomes of the third Scottish referendum.

Since we are dealing with recent political events that lack strong evidences

in the literature, our research will be based on scientific analysis displayed by the Centre on Constitutional Change[1] since the beginning of this process, even before the referendum. Additionally, these pieces of research will be further reinforced by the analyses of relevant official documents issued either by Scottish political parties involved into this political process or by the British government. Finally, opinion polls collected before and after the referendum will allow us to sustain relevant aspects of our argument in distinctive moments of the article. To conclude, by the means of a systematic analysis of these elements, we hope to deliver an interesting and rigorous account of the Scottish campaigns.

1. SCOTTISH REFERENDUM PUT IN CONTEXT

The referendum was suggested by the Scottish National Party (SNP) in May 2011 – as the SNP achieved a majority position in government with 47% of the votes - but the political debate has only started as the two opposing campaigns – Yes Scotland *versus* Better Together – came into play in May and June 2012[2] , respectively. Whereas *Yes Scotland* campaigned for the independence of Scotland and was supported by the Scottish National Party, the Scottish Green Party and the Scottish Socialists; Better Together campaigned for the *No* vote and was supported by the three pro-union political parties in Scotland: the Scottish Labour; the Scottish Conservative Party and the Scottish Liberal Democrats.

Before we elaborate on the Scottish campaigns, we will first put the third Scottish referendum in context and we will summarize the propositions presented by the Scottish political parties involved in the campaigns.

SCOTTISH REFERENDUM 2014: HOW DID WE GET HERE?

As we look back in time, we realize that Scotland has already had two referendums on self-government, one in 1979 and one in 1997. The latter asked whether they agreed *"that there should be a Scottish Parliament"*: the voters agreed there should and Scotland duly got its Parliament. Therefore, on the 18th of September 2014, it was the third time that Scotland was facing a referendum, but this time, the question was on political independence, a question that could precipitate the break-up of the United Kingdom (Pittock 2014: 2).

Negotiations between Edinburgh and London were not as easy as it seems. In fact, it implied harsh negotiations, both within Scottish politics and at Westminster, over the form that the referendum would be held. One key issue has been whether the referendum should be on independence alone or whether it should also have a second question asking voters whether they favored an increase in Scotland's exiting autonomy – something that would come to be known as Devo-Max (Maximum Devolution)[3].

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[1] In http://www.futureukandscotland.ac.uk/

[2] The offical campaign started on the 30th of May 2014

[3] "Devo max" would include full fiscal autonomy, as well as devolved powers over employment and competition law; regulation of companies, broadcasting; social security; equalities legislation; energy policy; marine regulation and formal participation rights in the EU policy making.

In January 2012, the UK government agreed to provide a legal framework for the referendum, and in October 2012 an agreement between the two governments was reached. The Edinburgh Agreement[4] allowed the Scottish Parliament to arrange a single question referendum on political independence. The Scottish Government's preferred question was: *"Do you agree that Scotland should be an independent country?"* but the Electoral Commission, which suggested instead, amended it to: *"Should Scotland be an independent country?"*.

On May 2012 and June 2012, the Yes Scotland campaign and the Better Together were respectively launched. By the means of an intense debate, for more than 16 weeks, the two opposing campaigns have tried to convince Scotland that political independence, on the one hand, and the maintenance of the Union, on the other, was the best alternative for Scotland.

YES SCOTLAND VERSUS BETTER TOGETHER: THE PROPOSITIONS

During the campaign, all political parties sustained distinctive nuanced propositions for Scotland. Yet the political debate has revolved around three major issues: fiscal competences, the welfare system (NHS, pension and healthcare) and the pound. In spite of the diversity of the proposals that have been exhaustively debated, many decisive questions have remained unanswered such as the pound, the future of the National Health System (NHS)

and the European membership. In this section, we will summarize the propositions presented by the major proponent of the "Yes" Campaign that is, the Scottish National Party, and by the proponents of the "No" Campaign that is, Scottish Labour; Scottish Conservative Party and Scottish Liberal Democrats.

The "Yes" campaign: Yes Scotland

Scottish National Party
The Scottish National Party is the party who has incarnated the idea of political independence during the campaign. Although Alex Salmond was the main protagonist of the independence campaign, Blair Jenkins was nominated the "formal" head of the campaign and Nicola Surgeon the "effective" head of the Yes campaign. As the campaign started, the SNP has once more reproduced the ideas contained in the Scottish government's report of 2010 - *"Your Scotland, Your voice"*[5] - where the SNP has argued for political independence, considering "devo max" as the second best alternative to political independence.

Additionally, in November 2013, the Scottish government launched a new report - *"Scotland's Future: your guide to an independent Scotland"*[7] – where the SNP made, once more, the case for political independence, equating demands of "self-government" with "good governance". In this report, the idea of *"Scotland's future in Scotland's hands"* is constantly repeated in order to enhance Scottish's opportunity to

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[4] *The document can be consulted here: http://www.scotland.gov.uk/About/Government/concordats/Referendum-on-independence.*

[5] *The document can be consulted here: http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Publications/2009/11/26155932/16.*

[7] *The document can be consulted here: http://scotgov.publishingthefuture.info/publication/scotlands-future*

secure more self-government for the benefit of Scotland 's future. Very seemingly, demands of political independence have also been made in dissatisfaction with policy choices coming from Westminster.

One of the most curious aspects of the SNP vision of independence is how closely it would remain tied to the rest of the UK. Indeed, for the SNP, an independent Scotland would keep the Crown; it would also seek to cooperate extensively in achieving at least broad parity with UK pension and welfare provision and would hope to continue to use the pound as its currency. With the idea of political independence, Alex Salmond expected to reach full self-government, which would allow Scotland to make all the decisions affecting its governance, ranging from external affairs to fiscal, social, economic, welfare and immigration policies.

With this political message, Alex Salmond wanted to highlight British constitutional flaws, which prevent Scotland from being fully responsible for its policies in order to perform better economically, socially and politically. In other words, the emphasis has been put on the social and economic advantages of political independence, using consensual examples such as the "bedroom tax", the nuclear base in Trident or the impossibility to collect revenues from gas and oil extraction to justify its political cause.

The "No" campaign: Better Together

In a distinctive manner, the "No" campaign came into existence as a reaction to the political challenge of Alex Salmond. The three unionist parties have supported the *Better Together* campaign and Alistair Darling - a British Labour politician – was appointed as the chair of the campaign. As a consequence of this reactive aspect, in a clear contrast with *Yes Scotland, Better Together* campaign failed to articulate a well-prepared and consensual proposition. Nevertheless, and in spite of nuanced propositions, all three parties pledged to increase Holyrood's powers, namely in finance, welfare and taxation. In this section, we will summarize the most relevant aspects of each proposition.

Scottish Labour

In March 2014, Scottish Labour's devolution commission issued its final report - *"Powers for a purpose-strengthening accountability and empowering people"* - where it reasserted the will to meet the Scottish people's legitimate desire for more powers and enhanced accountability within a strengthened union (Scottish Labour, 2014: 1). In this document, Scottish Labour has remembered that it has always been a party of both devolution and the Union. In making the case for more devolution within the Union, Scottish Labour has brought a proposition, which reaffirms the benefits of social solidarity with Scotland staying in the Union.

Faithful to its principles, Scottish Labour has suggested that a new political arrangement for Scotland could only be considered as long as it would contribute to make the Union stronger. To state it differently, for the United Kingdom to be an effective union with Scotland within it, it would be critical that certain core matters remain reserved to the UK Parliament such as financial and economic matters - including monetary policy, the currency, debt management and employment law -; foreign affairs (including international development) and defence; the core of the Welfare State – pensions and the majority of cash

benefits and the constitution. Other reserved issues would also include immigration, broadcasting, civil service and abortion.

Beyond these competences that should remain reserved competences, Scottish Labour believes that there is significant scope to strengthen the powers of the Scottish Parliament on tax –varying powers and control over some elements of welfare and benefits policy. Following rigorous examination of the relative merits of devolving tax responsibility, Labour believes that the Scottish Parliament should have the power to raise about 40 percent of its budget from its own resources. This would mean that three quarters of basic rate income tax in Scotland would be under the control of the Scottish Parliament.

Additionally, it would also introduce new Scottish progressive Rates of income tax, so that the Scottish Parliament can increase the rates of tax in the higher and additional bands. However, when it comes to tax varying powers and income tax widening, Labour has also reaffirmed that VAT, national insurance contributions, corporation tax, alcohol, tobacco and fuel duties; climate change levy, insurance premium tax; vehicle excise duty; inheritance tax; capital gains tax and tax oil receipts should remain reserved.

As for welfare policies, Labour has suggested that housing benefit – which would allow Scotland to abolish the Bedroom Tax -; attendance allowance – paid to disabled over 65s – and the work programme – which manages services for the unemployed - should be devolved. All other pensions and benefits should stay at Westminster. Finally, Labour has pledged for the maintenance of the Barnett Formula and has asked for a better distribution of powers

within Scotland asking for the empowerment of local governments.

Scottish Liberal Democrats

Scottish Liberal Democrats have produced their own report *"Federalism: the best future for Scotland"* (Scottish Liberal Democrats, 2012) where they have, once more, reasserted their belief in the maintenance of Scotland within a federal solution. Under this federal plan, the Act of Union, between Scotland and England would be replaced with a declaration of federalism. In fact, for Scottish Liberals, home rule in Scotland would work even better if it were part of a move towards a federal UK where every part of the United Kingdom would have similar levels of responsibility.

Moreover, under the Liberal Democrat's Scottish "home rule" vision, Holyrood would raise and spend most of its own taxes (income taxes, bands and rates) and borrow on its own terms. Fiscal federalism is clearly mentioned in the report, as it would support a move towards federalism. For the Liberal democrats, fiscal federalism would be assisted by a new needs-based payment system, to be agreed by the federal United Kingdom Government, the Scottish Parliament and the relevant assemblies to ensure fiscal equity across the UK. Within this particular context, the Barnett Formula would continue to operate until a new formula is agreed.

On the other hand, a federal United Kingdom Government would retain major areas of competency – foreign and defence affairs, the currency, national emergency, immigration, trade and competition, pensions and welfare, macro-economic policy and the preservation of the UK single market for business. Under federalism the home rule governments across the UK

would normally work on matters of their own responsibilities but a reinforced form of partnership between different tiers of government should be considered for a new category of powers additional to "reserved" and "devolved" powers - "partnership" powers - which would require the co-operation of both home rule and federal governments. These areas of partnership powers would include skills and employment, research and innovation, strategic planning of welfare services, energy resources, election law and administration, marine policy and cross-border transport.

Finally, in the same line of Scottish Labour, the autonomy and power of local councils should be reinforced. That is, Scottish Liberals recommend the decentralization of power by proposing extensive autonomy for local government and for local communities. This would include the financial freedom for local authorities; the removal of the powers of ministers to overrule local authorities; the devolution of powers over council tax and business rates and a general power of competence for local government, allowing councils to set their own plans, reflecting the priorities of their electorates.

Scottish Conservative Party

For the Scottish Conservative Party, the event of a third referendum has been perceived as an opportunity to build a stronger Union with a clear division of responsibility and accountability. In other words, in face of a new process of devolution, the Scottish Conservative Party have tried to react positively, asking for the empowerment of the Scottish people, on the one hand, as well as for the empowerment of the Scottish institutions, on the other. In a complementary manner, they have also managed to link the Scottish issue with demands of a greater institutional reform across the UK.

On their report, *"Commission on the Future Governance of Scotland"*, the Scottish Conservative Party portray themselves as a modern conservative party that recognizes the benefits of a stronger Union with a stronger Scotland. In this report, they have tried to emphasize the advantages of partnership between the UK and Scotland and they have argued for the strengthening of Scottish devolution in fiscal and welfare responsibilities (Scottish Conservative Party, 2014).

Among their key recommendation, we could highlight the devolution of income tax powers, which would see the Scottish Parliament accountable for 40% of the money it spends. Moreover, they have also recommended that the Scottish Parliament should be able to decide on rates and bands as much as it would get responsibility on welfare issues, which are related to devolved areas, such as housing benefits and attendance allowance. Beyond this new responsibility, the Scottish Parliament would be conferred the power to supplement welfare benefits legislated for at UK level.

In spite of this "newly" devolutionary stance, the Scottish Conservative Party have also made it clear that the state pension should remain with the UK and that the centralization of powers from local to central government should be reserved, although real devolution should be given to individuals with a greater role for civic society and to local government. In fact, it is central to Scottish Conservatives that power should be devolved away from governments and Parliaments to people and communities.

In conclusion, we could argue that the political challenge of this third referendum was not about choosing between the current *status quo* and political independence. Rather, it consisted of choosing between devolving significant extra powers on tax and welfare policies, on the part of the *No* campaign, and political independence, on the part of the Yes campaign. This explains why the Scottish campaigns have highly contributed to the debate and have had a major influence on the final decision to be made on the 18th of September.

At their fullest extent, the pro-unionist proposals on tax and welfare devolution were clearly significant and would have direct impact on Scotland's citizens, whether through benefits received, taxes increased and higher economic growth. In addition, all three parties would take steps to strengthen the powers of local government and introduce modest new policy-making powers for the Scottish Parliament. However, on the other side of the political spectrum, the SNP's response to the pro-union parties' proposals on more devolution has been very simple: the pro-union parties cannot be trusted to deliver and only political independence would allow Scotland to prosper.

2. SCOTTISH CAMPAIGNS IN FURTHER DETAIL

The Yes and the *No* campaigns were launched in May and June 2012, respectively. In this section, we will compare the communication strategies of the two campaigns; we will summarize the arguments put forward by each side of the campaigns and we will identify the decisive moments of the campaign.

COMMUNICATION STRATEGIES

As for the evaluation of the campaigns, the tone and content of the two campaigns varied greatly (Mitchell 2014). In fact, whilst supporters of independence have offered a much more positive and imaginative message, supporters of the Union have focused on the perils of independence, on the economic uncertainties and on the problematic state of public finance in an independent Scotland. The *No* campaign failed to generate a positive vision of a reformed Union, which has profited the *Yes* campaign.

Added to that, *Yes Scotland* has offered a vision that went well beyond dry constitutionalism and did so with verve and energy whereas *Better Together* has fought a fairly conventional campaign based on expertise drawn from party election campaigns. Alex Salmond (SNP) has invested in grassroots campaigns in stark comparison with his opponents who have opted for a traditional campaign that has focused on the Holyrood bubble and traditional media coverage. Whereas *Better Together* has mobilized the political elite of Westminster in the final stage, *Yes Scotland* has been a social movement. *Yes Scotland* has been remarkably confident and consistent, in spite of the many bad moments, most notably following the first debate between Alex Salmond and Alistair Darling. *Yes Scotland* has not panicked to the polls. It has anticipated most of the challenges and proved to be technically prepared to answer unexpected questions.

In global terms, the Yes campaign has been perceived in a positive manner[8]- 60% positive in September 2014 - compared to the *No* campaign - 60% negative in September 2014[9] -, which has been perceived in a negative manner (What Scotland Thinks 2014). Very seemingly, Scots have appreciated the performance of Alex Salmond more with 45% of Scots stating that he was the right person to lead the *Yes* Campaign compared to Alistair Darling with 52% of Scots claiming that he was considered a bad choice to lead the Better Together campaign (see chart line nº1 and nº2 below). In face of these numbers, we could argue that irrespectively of the final result obtained on the 18th of September, the Yes Campaign has shown greater dynamic and confidence than the *No* campaign as well as Alex Salmond was the most appreciated campaign leader, when compared to Alistair Darling.

Chart line nº 1: Do you think Alex Salmond has been the right person to lead the *Yes* campaign?

Source: What Scotland Thinks 2014 [10]

Chart line nº 2: Do you think Alistair Darling has been the right person to lead the *No* campaign?

Source: What Scotland Thinks 2014 [11]

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[8] *In http://whatscotlandthinks.org/questions/do-you-think-the-yes-scotland-campaign-so-far-has-been-positive-or-negative#table.*
[9] *In http://whatscotlandthinks.org/questions/do-you-think-the-better-together-campaign-so-far-has-been-positive-or-negative#table.*
[10] *In http://whatscotlandthinks.org/questions/do-you-think-alex-salmond-has-been-the-right-person-to-lead-the-yes-campaign#line.*
[11] *In http://whatscotlandthinks.org/questions/do-you-think-alistair-darling-has-been-the-right-person-to-lead-the-no-campaign#line.*

Key arguments of the campaigns

As for the arguments put forward during the campaign, *Better Together* has focused on a number of areas where an independent Scotland could run into trouble – or at least, could show uncertainty. These included doubts on potential Scottish membership of the EU; the use of sterling; the unreliability of oil revenues; threats to pensions and the precarious state of the major Scottish banks. Very distinctively, *Yes Scotland* has tried to minimize these doubts by promoting an independent Scotland as a wealthy energy state fueled by vast North Sea Oil reserves and ever growing renewable energy reserves.

In short, whereas the *Yes* Campaign has pushed an image of Scotland as an economically sound, small and independent state closer to her Scandinavian neighbors; the *No* campaign has placed an emphasis on the uncertainty that a Yes vote could cause. As Alistair Darling emphasized when launching the campaign: *"We can't give our children a one-way ticket to a deeply uncertain destination".*

Amongst the most relevant arguments of the campaigns, we will highlight the following ones:

1. Scottish membership of the EU
As for the *Yes* campaign, independence supporters argued that Scotland would remain in the European Union more or less automatically, by following either article 48º or 49º of the current European Treaty[12]. Additionally, the Scottish Government proposed to keep the present UK terms of member-

ship, including opt-outs on the Euro, the Schengen border free travel area, and Justice and Home Affairs. They have also envisaged the negotiations on the details of membership being concluded in the eighteen-month transition period for independence, so that Scotland would not remain outside the EU for any time. As for the *No* campaign, the position was less clear. Whilst the House of Commons Scottish Affairs Committee has accepted that Scotland could join, but insisting on the Article 49 accession process and that the conditions would be extremely onerous; less intransigent people on the No side accepted that Scotland could join the EU but that it would have to adopt the Euro and enter Schengen and would lose the current UK opt-outs.

2. The use of the Sterling
One of the most important questions in the Scottish independent referendum was the currency arrangement that an independent Scotland would use. Both sides of the debate accepted that if Scotland became independent, then the existing currency would come to an end. The Scottish Government proposed using sterling in a formal monetary union arrangement, which would involve sharing the Bank of England (Jeffery and Perman 2014: 14). However, as the Bank of England is an institution of the UK, this would require the full support and participation of the rest of the UK. Yet the UK government made clear that it considered this to be impractical and not in the interests of citizens in either state. As the campaigns approached the day of the referendum and opinion pools started to incline towards the Yes

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[12] *Under article 48, there would be a treaty change to add Scotland as a 29th member state, allowing for a rapid transition. Under article 49, they would have to apply in the normal way, but could be assured rapid progess since Scotland already meets the entry criteria.*

vote – namely, on the 5th of September 2014-, the UK government became relentless on this issue. Therefore, whereas Alex Salmond insisted that Scotland would continue to use the pound; the Conservatives, the Liberals Democrats and Labour claimed otherwise.

3. North Sea Oil and economic independence

Chief among the pro-independence arguments was the belief that independence would see more revenues from Scotland's oil reserves flowing into the Scottish economy. In fact, control over oil revenues and the opportunities offered by renewables were two of the other major arguments in the Yes campaign's economic strategy, which has received strong support among small and medium-sized business in Scotland. By doing so, the Yes campaign has also seized upon the Westminster-imposed austerity as a perfect opportunity to promote the idea that Scot's interests are widely divergent from those of the remainder of the United Kingdom. In a very distinctive manner, the No campaign has insisted that the revenue coming from the North Sea collapsed this year, leaving Scotland in worse shape than the UK overall for the first time in five years.

4. Threats of pensions

The Yes camp has largely relied on the pension argument – and on the consequences of the privatization of the NHS by the UK government - to convince Scottish voters of the benefits of political independence. In fact, the Scottish Government has not only argued that pensions rights and benefits would not be affected by independence but it has also promised minor changes by making pensions slightly more generous for certain people and temporally delaying the increase in the State Pension Age.

More concretely, the Scottish Government has guarantied a delay in the rise in the pension age to 67 until 2034 – against the UK plan to increase it gradually until the age of 67 by 2028. Additionally, it has promised the retention of the Savings Credit element of Pension Credit, an income related benefit top-up for pensioners on low incomes that benefits 9,000 pensioners in Scotland and that the UK government plans to abolish after 2016. On the other side, the *No* camp has stressed the inability of the Scottish Government to afford these costly measures due to a society that is projected to age more quickly than the rest of the UK. For *Better Together*, political independence would represent a threat to pension system's sustainability.

The turning point of the campaign

Regardless of the contrasts that have been pointed out, the *No* campaign has always sited on a clear lead until the last few weeks, when the race suddenly tightened. The first week of the final 6 week phase of the referendum campaign has been quiet difficult for the Yes campaign, especially after with the currency union dominating the news agenda in the aftermath of the televised debate between Alistair Darling and First Minister Alex Salmond, but it regained confidence with the harsh critique over the UK government's welfare reforms and the promise of a fairer welfare state in an independent Scotland.

The *Yes* campaign took even the lead for the first time two weeks before the vote on the 5th of September 2014 (even if subsequent pools put the *No* vote back in front). However small this advantage looked like, it sowed panic in the ranks of the *No* side which led Gordon Brown to intervene on the

8th of September for the first time, speaking of the endorsement of the three pro-Union leaders – David Cameron, Nick Clegg and Ed Miliband - to deliver additional powers to Scotland until May 2015.

Additionally, on the 16th of September 2014, the three party leaders produced the "Vow", as record on the front page of Scotland's *Daily Record*[13], which reaffirmed the commitment to deliver additional devolution on Brown's timetable, and gave additional pledges on the NHS in Scotland and on the continuation of the Barnett Formula that determines the funding available to the Scottish Parliament. The pledges on the NHS and Barnett were designed to temper the claims on the *Yes* side that the NHS was in danger of being privatised if Scotland remained in the UK and the current levels of funding for Scotland would be at risk if Scotland voted *No*.

By doing so, the *No* campaign was now delivering – for the first time – a more positive agenda for Scotland to stay in the Union. Given the clear margin of the No victory at 55,3% to 44,7%, it seemed to work. Nevertheless, that agenda was unplanned and as a consequence lacking in appreciation of the possible spillovers it might have elsewhere in the UK. Subsequently, on the 17th of September, Gordon Brown spoke emotively to the Scots and more specifically to the undecided, which represented more than 10% of the votes. With this speech, Gordon Brown remembered the patriotic legacy of the Scottish Labour, on the one hand, and reaffirmed the destructive effect of nationalism, on the other.

On the 18th of September 2014, 84,59% of the Scots went to the polls and the outcome of the referendum was clear: 55,3% of the Scots against 44,7% decided to stay within the Union. Alex Salmond was about to be beaten by the last minute pro-union intervention and announced his resignation on the 19th of September 2014. On that same day, on behalf of the British government, David Cameron, announced the establishment of the Smith Commission, which would be responsible to convene cross-party talks on more devolution.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

By the means of a brief comparison between the two campaigns, we could conclude that *Yes Scotland* has provided a much more positive, dynamic and active campaign than *Better Together*. Although *Yes Scotland* has proved to be more successful in seducing the electorate as we approached the 18th of September, British government's commitment to deliver additional powers in the fields of tax devolution and welfare powers have dictated the final outcome of the referendum.

3. THE "NO" VOTE AND THE SMITH PROCESS

On the 19th of September 2014, David Cameron[14] has established the Smith Commission and Lord Smith of Kelvin[15] agreed to oversee the process to take forward the devolution commitments, with powers over tax, spending and welfare all agreed by

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[13] See Daily Record of the 16th September 2014 in http://www.dailyrecord.co.uk/news/politics/david-cameron-ed-miliband-nick-4265992.

[14] On belhalf of the British Government.

[15] Lord Smith of Kelvin was the leader of the organising committee of the Glasgow Commonwealth Games.

November and draft legislation published by January. Subsequently, on the 26th of September, Lord Smith wrote to the political parties currently represented in the Scottish Parliament – five at the total - calling for submissions on further powers for the Scottish Parliament within the UK by 10th of October. All five Scottish political parties have been engaged in formal talks since the 22th of October and have committed to "Heads of Agreement" that have been published on the 27th of November.

THE SMITH COMMISSION

The starting point for the discussions in the Smith Commission was the devolution of additional powers over taxation, with a second area of emphasis around welfare powers. That starting point was set by the commitment of the Conservative, Labour and Liberal Democrat parties prior to the referendum to move quickly to establish additional powers for the Scottish Parliament, reflecting the common ground in the content of the proposals each had published in the preceding months (Centre on Constitutional Change 2014: 9).

The positions of the three pro-union parties had quite some overlap. The core issue was around tax devolution. The main emphasis was on income tax devolution, with the Liberal Democrats and Conservatives proposing near complete income tax devolution, including the ability to vary tax rates, compared to those in the rest of the UK. Labour proposed less extensive devolution of income tax. All three parties were open to the devolution of a number of minor taxes. Both the Liberal Democrats and

the Conservatives were open to an element of tax "assignment", that is, the allocation of the receipts generated in Scotland from taxes set in a uniform way across the UK to the Scottish Parliament's budget.

Additionally, both Labour and the Conservatives set out a number of commitments to welfare devolution (the Liberal Democrats were less clear in this field). Both advocated devolution of attendance allowance and housing benefits in Scotland. Labour proposed the devolution of the Work Programme, but to local government in Scotland rather than the Scottish Parliament. This is one of a number of measures they proposed to strengthen the powers of local authorities in Scotland an area where they share considerable common ground with the Liberal Democrats. There was little focus on other areas for possible additional devolution except in Labour's proposals, which recommended devolution of a number of specific issues: powers over the Scottish Parliament election process, health and safety, employment tribunals, consumer advice and the railways.

In a distinctive manner, the Greens and the SNP each have presented much further reaching proposals. Just as the pro-union parties, submissions were the result of their earlier commission's deliberations. More particularly, the SPN's submission replicated the earlier proposition of the 2009 White Paper *"Your Scotland, your voice"*[16] where the SNP has set out an initial prospectus for Scottish Independence but it has explored the option of "full devolution" (or "devolution max" as the best second choice), that is, the maximum possible devolution consistent with continuing membership of

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[16] The document can be downloaded here: http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Publications/2009/11/26155932/16

the UK. That particular option was set out more systematically in the Scottish Government´s submission to the Smith Commission. According to the SNP, a maximum self-government within the Union would mean that the UK Parliament would have powers in relation to Scotland in only a small number of areas: aspects of the UK constitution, monetary policy, aspects of citizenship, defence, intelligence and security and foreign affairs.

Finally, the Greens didn't go so far on their demands but they proposed more than the pro-union parties. They had a fuller commitment to tax devolution (including full devolution of income tax and tax assignment) and to full welfare devolution (likely excepting pensions). They also emphasized the need for devolution in a number of fields that have a particular resonance in the green tradition, including quality of democracy, human rights, energy policy and immigration.

THE SMITH REPORT

The Smith Commission's report has been published on the 27th of November 2014 and the terms of the agreement have been rather deceptive. The document is not that extensive and it has been divided in two chapters. The first chapter deals with the working arrangements of the Smith Commission. In this chapter, Lord Smith of Kelvin explains the different moments and actors involved into this reforming process. Additionally, the second chapter introduces the terms of the agreement reached which are subdivided into three pillars: the first pillar elaborates on the constitutional details of the new settlement of governance for

Scotland (electoral procedures; intergovernmental relations; Scottish representation to the European Union); the second pillar explained the powers retained and further delivered on the economic and welfare policy areas and the third pillar deals with the powers retained and delivered in finance.

As we read the report, we realize that major competences over fiscality and welfare policies such as state pensions; Universal Credit; national insurance contributions and corporate taxes have remained reserved. Additionally, income taxes have remained a shared competence but Scotland has gained new extensive powers on that particular area. Within this framework, the Scottish Parliament will now have the power to set the rates of Income Tax and the thresholds at which these are paid for the non-savings and non-dividend income of Scottish taxpayers.

However, all other aspects of Income Tax such as the imposition of the annual charge to Income Tax, the personal allowance, the taxation of savings and dividend income will remain reserved. On the overall, "minor" concessions have been granted in welfare – benefits for cares, disabled people and those who are ill[17] - and in economic policy – employment provision (Work Programme and Work Choice). On the other hand, some aspects of energy and onshore oil/gas extraction have been devolved (Smith Commission, 2014) as well as a new political compromise for the improvement of the current *Concordat on the Coordination of European Union Policy Issues* has been sealed.

According to Michael Keating (2014), with this new agreement, Scotland has

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[17] *Child benefit, maternity allowance or statutory sick pay and widowed parent have remained reserved competences.*

received new powers to set the rates and bands of income tax but the tax itself has not been devolved. That is, taxation of investment income, National Insurance, inheritance tax and capital gains tax have remained reserved to Westminster. Corporation tax is to be reserved. Air Passenger Duty has been devolved but the SNP intends to abolish it. Similarly, devolution of welfare has been limited to bits of existing programmes whose functioning has proved so problematic, is now locked in as a UK programme. Elements of housing benefit are to be disentangled from it, which could complicate matters further. The administration of the Work Programme is to be given to the Scottish Government but not the power to link welfare, labour market and economic development policies together effectively.

Very seemingly, Nicola McEwen (2014) claims that the devolution of welfare policies has been quiet disappointing. Indeed, the report's recommendations center on benefits for carers and people with disabilities. More specifically, devolution is recommended for Attendance Allowance, Carer's Allowance, Industrial Injuries and Severe Disablement Allowance, and Winter Fuel Payments, which together, account for just fewer than 6% of social security spent in Scotland in 2012/13. Additionally, the report has also recommended the devolution of Disability Living Allowance/Personal Independence Payments which is a more substantial benefit amounting to 8.2% of Scottish welfare spent. Nevertheless, and in spite of these major changes, around 87% of Scottish welfare spending, including pensions, child and family benefits, tax credits and almost all working-age benefits, will remain reserved to Westminster after the new settlement is implemented.

In short, we could say that the terms of the agreement reached fell short of the promises made by the UK government on the 16th of September 2014, which in turn, could eventually benefit the Scottish National Party.

What does Scotland want?

Now that the Smith report has been issued, it would be interesting to understand what does Scotland think of the terms of the agreement reached. Is Scotland fully satisfied with the outcome of cross-party talks? On the other hand, it would also be interesting to know what powers Scotland would expect to be delivered?

As for the first question, an opinion poll conducted by YouGov in December 2014 clearly shows clearly that Scotland feels disappointed with the terms of the agreement reached so far. In fact, 51% thinks that the Smith Commission has not gone far enough and that more powers should be devolved to the Scottish Parliament (see table 3).

As for the second question, Scottish public opinion sustains that the Scottish Parliament should gained increased powers in the fields of fiscality, welfare and economy (see table 4). These results match perfectly with the 2013 Scottish Social Attitudes Survey (Scottish Government Social Research 2014), which concluded that Scottish voters wanted Scotland to retain its membership of the Union, but to have almost complete ownership of its revenue and welfare system.

Table nº 3: What does Scotland think of the Smith proposals? (December 2014)

Thinking about the proposals from the Smith Commission to devolve extra powers to the Scottish Parliament, do you think these …	
Go too far, and devolve too many extra powers to the Scottish Parliament	14
Do not go far enough, and do not devolve enough extra powers to the Scottish Parliament	51
Get the balance about right	23
Don't know	12

Source: YouGov December 2014

Table nº 4: What powers should be devolved to Scotland? (October 2014)

The exact powers that will be part of increased devolution are still being discussed. For each of the following, please say if you think it should be devolved to the Scottish government, or remain with the Westminster government?	
Increased powers to set and collect income tax	
Should be devolved to the Scottish government	67
Should remain with the Westminster government	25
Don't know	8
Powers to set and collect other taxes, like inheritance tax, corporation tax	
Should be devolved to the Scottish government	67
Should remain with the Westminster government	24
Don't know	9
Working age benefits like housing benefit and jobseekers allowance	
Should be devolved to the Scottish government	71
Should remain with the Westminster government	22
Don't know	7
The state pension	
Should be devolved to the Scottish government	47
Should remain with the Westminster government	45
Don't know	8
The minimum wage	
Should be devolved to the Scottish government	60
Should remain with the Westminster government	33
Don't know	7
Health and safety regulations, consumer protection ans competition law	
Should be devolved to the Scottish government	60
Should remain with the Westminster government	32
Don't know	8

Source: YouGov October 2014

Interestingly, this opinion could imply a critique to pro-union parties that fell sort of their promises. Ironically, it also expresses the support to a political solution that is not that far from the version of independence that the SNP has offered in 2007-2009. To put it differently, the final outcome of the Smith Process could benefit the obvious "looser" of the referendum for next UK general elections.

Indeed, as we look into final results of these elections, Nicola Sturgeon's Scottish Nationalist Party turned Scotland yellow with its best elec-

tion results ever, winning 56 out 059 seats. Additionally, as opinion polls and commentators predicted that the outcome would be close to call – with 285 seats predicted for the Conservatives and 262 seats for Labour with the Conservatives falling short of a majority by 38 seats -, the SNP emerged as a "possible" solution to avoid a "hung parliament" situation with a prediction of 58 seats.

However, on the 8th of May, final results were surprisingly impressive as opinion polls proved to be totally wrong. David Cameron's party has managed to secure a majority of 331 seats (against 316 seats initially predicted); Labour 232 (against 239 predicted); Liberal Democrats 8 (against 10 predicted); and the SNP 56 (against 58 predicted). As a consequence of these unexpected results, Ed Miliband (Labour Party) and Nick Clegg (Liberal Democrat Party) stood down as leaders of their parties whereas the SNP started to celebrate this historical achievement even if this electoral breakthrough did not come as a surprise.

In fact, since Christmas of last year opinion polls were unanimously pointing to the SNP's electoral success in these elections. Moreover, on the 6th of April (What Scotland Thinks), opinion polls were putting the SNP on 45% of the voting intentions - some 25 percentage points above its 2010 result and 56 projected seats whereas Labour was falling down in Scotland with 28% of the voting intentions with a projected seat shares of just 10 seats, compared to the 41 seats won in 2010. On the 6th of May, on the lasted and final poll of polls numbers slightly changed with 49% of the intention votes for the SNP and 26% for Labour.

Although the SNP will not be part of a coalition government, the SNP has staged an unprecedented and historic landslide general election rout in Scotland that saw Labour all but wiped out in its former stronghold and the United Kingdom is now facing a new threat to its future. Now that Nicola Sturgeon comfortably sits in power, she will use her party's new strength to push for further constitutional changes, using their reinforced presence to go beyond the Smith Commission's proposals. Whilst the Conservative will be likely to comply with the terms of agreement reached under the Smith Commission; the SNP will not hesitate to use the flag of "legitimacy" on a strategic attempt to mitigate what the Conservatives will put on the table of negotiation.

In that respect, the SNP will probably rely on three major tactics: first, they will react on what it will be put on the table by the Conservative party, opposing namely the forecast of 20 billion cuts in Welfare; second, they will use the European Union referendum to make it clear that Scotland will not follow the UK's decision in case of a *Brexit*, which, in other words, could be used as a pretext to launch a second independence referendum in Scotland; third, the SNP will try to maximize policy and political conflict in Westminster in order to make their claim of political independence look more legitimate.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

In this section, we have tried to clarify the Smith Process and we have concluded that the final terms of agreement fell short of the promises made by the UK government. Nevertheless, it should be noticed that the process is not definitely closed – as mentioned by the Smith report -, which means that further negotiation should be expected on the near future, against the back-

drop of a nationalist electoral success on last general elections. To conclude, we could argue that the consolidation of a majority conservative party has tempered the SNP's political ambition but David Cameron will (still) have a hard time finding a balanced solution for both national (Cairney 2015) and European dimension (Keating 2015) of Scottish constitutional challenge.

4. CONCLUSION: WHAT CAN WE LEARN FROM THIS REFERENDUM?

The purpose of this article was to shed light on the political process *before* and *after* the Scottish referendum on political independence. By the means of a systematic analysis of the Scottish Campaigns, we have tried to deliver an interesting and accurate account of the Scottish campaigns in order to make sense of the "no" vote.

In this article, we have introduced the political context that has paved the way to the referendum; we have explained the propositions of the *Yes* and *No* campaigns; we have highlighted the most relevant arguments of the political debate and we have retained the most decisive moments of the campaigns. Finally, in the last part, we have explained the Smith Process; we have summarized the terms of the agreement reached and we have mentioned Scottish public opinion regarding the whole process.

Now that the analysis is concluded, we could finalise by saying that if it is true that, with this referendum, the issue of political independence has been put to bed (at least, for now); it is also true that the political solution for Scotland (and for the rest of the UK) is far from being settled.

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2 THE SCOTTISH INDEPENDENCE REFERENDUM

2.1 AN ANALYSIS OF THE 'YES' AND 'NO' CAMPAIGNS

Carlos Neira Cortizas - *Economist and political analyst*

INTRODUCTION

1. THE POLLS ON THE SCOTTISH INDEPENDENCE REFERENDUM

Polls[1] on the Scottish independence referendum issue collectively failed to predict the outcome. Indeed, only a few of those published in the last two days of the campaign came close to predicting the final outcome.

Despite this, most surveys did predict a victory for the No campaign, but by different margins, generally less than that of the final outcome.

However, the two most valuable aspects of the Scottish referendum polls were that they reliably reflected the evolution of the electorate's preferences (known as the "trend") and, above all, they allowed us to record changes of opinion in certain segments of the Scottish population, or in the various Councils and Regions into which Scotland is divided for election purposes. An analysis of both aspects

leads us to the conclusion that poll results were consistent, apart from the accuracy of the lead obtained by the No campaign.

Our comments on the polls in the following pages synthesize from them some methodological aspects.[2]

The goal here has been to visualize the development of attitudes among the different population groups and note their discrepancies.
Our study begins with variables of an individual make-up, continues through variables of a collective or community nature, and ends with those of a socio-political or electoral nature. Along the way we take in variables of a socio-economic nature, which are necessarily of a mixed nature.

Firstly, we analyse all available data since 2006, in order to obtain a broad perspective in which to frame the official campaign period running from May 3rd to September 8th 2014. In some cases, a lack of data has forced us

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[1] *The poll data we have used in this analysis are from daily monitoring of the Scottish and other British media throughout the campaign. We have complemented our database with additional sources – particularly: What Scotland Thinks, the UK Polling Report and Wikipedia, which collected information and links to older polls. In the polls used we have had resort to the original source (usually the website of the organization carrying out the polling). With the exception of some omissions in the older surveys, we generally found a complete table of results in these polls.*

[2] *Although very interesting from a technical point of view, we did not find them all that relevant when analysing the evolution of the Scottish electorate's preferences in relation to the right to independence. We are referring to issues such as the wording of the question, whether or not samples of individuals aged between 16 and 17 who had right to vote in this referendum for the first time; the interview method: face to face, phone, internet, and so on.*

to extend the analysis out to a broader time period.

Looking at historical polls, we noted that the possibility of a victory for the Yes campaign was more likely some years earlier than it was at the beginning of 2014. Before the year 2007 (and the first SNP victory in the general elections to the Scottish Parliament) the intention to vote Yes had surpassed that of those declaring they would vote No in at least five polls.

However, thereafter, the level of support for independence substantively decreased from 50% to lower than 40%, even hovering, in some cases, around 30%.

Overall in the last few years, support for the Yes campaign marked an initially descending, then an upward, curve. Whether it is a coincidence or not, between 2007 and 2014 the evolution of the aggregate preferences of the Scottish electorate on the independence issue perfectly matches a curve showing the evolution of the global and European economic crisis with a sharp drop at the beginning of the crisis and the first signs of recovery around 2010-2011, falling back in 2012 and a second upward thrust towards the end of this period.

Figure 1: Historical evolution

Yes/No evolution in polls
Percentages removing 'Don't know' responses

Obviously, you can also interpret these same variations in preferences for independence in the light of British and Scottish election cycles. From this perspective, the victory of David Cameron's Conservatives in 2010 would have strengthened pro-independence feelings given the general antipathy of the Scots towards the Tories. Similarly the SNP victory in the Scottish elections of 2011, at which they pushed a program explicitly calling for an independence referendum, may have appealed to a neglected segment of those who had voted Labour and Liberal Democrat in the past. These swing voters then contributed, in large part, to the SNP's first electoral majority.

In any case, regardless of the domestic vicissitudes of Scottish politics, negotiations with successive Westminster governments and the development of each different stage of the legal and political processes leading to the holding of the referendum, a victory for the Yes campaign was a real possibility.

Even though the detailed preferences and the centre of gravity of Scottish society were largely leaning towards a 'devolution max' solution, rather than independence, or maintaining the status quo, the holding of a referendum with only two opposing options meant that the electorate who found themselves in the middle had to opt for one option or the other.

Despite these considerations, the percentages supporting Yes to independence, that had been slightly above 50% some 10 years previously, did not climb back to anywhere near that figure until the polemical polls carried out in 2011 and 2013, by TNS/BMRB for the SNP published in The Herald and Panelbase. And it was not until 2014, with the campaign in full swing, that other polls (not as closely linked to the pro-independence movement) predicted favourable results for the Yes campaign.

Although they were the exception rather than the rule, the polls published in September, a week before the vote, achieved huge media coverage and decisively influenced the course of events, as will be seen.

The campaign began with about 40% of those responding to polls in favour of the Yes camp and 60% for the No group, after deducting the undecided. With some ups and downs the intention to vote Yes did not rise to around 40-45% until at least early August.

This coincided with the first televised debate between Darling and Salmond that was considered 'won' by the unionists. As a response, the Yes vote began to climb in the polls.

After the second debate, in late August, percentages in favour of the Yes campaign were very close to those of people intending to vote No, while in early September, polls gave independence support at just above 50%.

This development resulted in a reaction from No supporters, which maintained a lead of about 4 points up until the day of the vote.

Figure 2: Evolution of the campaign

Yes/No evolution in polls
Percentages removing 'Don't know' responses

Figure 3: Historical evolution

Yes support by gender
Percentages with 'Don't know' responses

THE ISSUE OF GENDER

One of the most talked about aspects during the lead up to the Scottish referendum was the need for the Yes campaign to win over female voters in order to have any chance of winning.
In past polls, at least three surveys from 2006 and 2007 showed the declared intention to vote of men and women was similar.

However, already during the height of the economic crisis, a gap of about 10 points had opened up between men and women that would remain approximately constant until the day of the referendum. A year before the referendum was to be held, at the lowest ebb in independence support, the intention to vote Yes among women had reached a low of only 20%.

Although, during the run up to the referendum, the Yes campaign did succeed in convincing a significant number of both men and women (adding new support for the independence cause) the gap between voting intentions of men and women remained largely unchanged. This 'gender gap' was largely down to the existence of a greater number of women among the undecided.

Figure 4: Evolution of the campaign

Yes support by gender
Percentages with 'Don't know' responses

Figure 5: Historical evolution

Yes support by age
Percentages with 'Don't know' responses

AGE

Comparing the behaviour of groups by age[3] gives us a bowl-shaped curve.

However, during the campaign period the picture was somewhat different.

All the age ranges from 18 to 54 showed increased support for the Yes campaign, rising in parallel, from levels between 30% and 35% at the start of the campaign to about 45% on the day of the referendum. Only the age range from 45 to 54 began to present less intensive growth.

From 55 upwards, the picture clearly shows more reluctance to vote in favour of independence. People between 55 and 64, although starting off at a comparable level with the younger sectors

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[3] *Some polls did not even include in their sample young people between 16 and 17 who would be able to vote. There are three polls, carried out prior to 2011, with data filtered by age, which, due to their great variability, we preferred to exclude.*

Figure 6

Yes support by age
Percentages with 'Don't know' responses

of the population, maintained their support at a stable 35%. People of 65 or older, may have increased their support for a Yes vote, but they remained the least excited about independence overall.

One of the sectors of the population that received more attention during the campaign was Scots youth. The Edinburgh agreement of 2012 estab-

lished that 16 and 17 year olds could participate for the first time on British soil in an official vote.

Data available for this specific group is few and far between, but that which is available indicates that they mostly opted for a Yes vote[4].

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[4] The Guardian. Scottish independence: poll reveals who voted, how and why. http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2014/sep/20/scottish-independence-lord-ashcroft-poll

Figure 7: Historical evolution

Yes support by children in household
Percentages including 'Don't know' responses

CHILDREN IN THE HOUSEHOLD

Only two polling companies (TNS BMRB and Ipsos MORI) published details of voting in the referendum which included the factor of whether or not there were children in the home.

Households with children were shown to be more likely to vote for independence than homes without them. In the moments when support for Yes was at its lowest ebb, the two categories tended to be less differentiated, but both at the beginning and the end of the campaign period those more incli-

ned towards independence represented the higher percentage of voters, although at the end of the period the difference was more marked.

For a long time, the official web of Yes Scotland clearly reflected the sectors of the population at whom the campaign was directed on its welcome page. The most obvious resource in this regard was the use of a video of a baby in the womb taken via ultrasound. This linked in with the message of a better future in an independent Scotland, clearly aimed at young families with children.

Figure 8: Historical evolution

Yes support by employment status
Percentages including 'Don't know' responses

(Legend: Yes_WFull — Yes_WPart — Yes_WNot — Yes_Retired)

EMPLOYMENT SITUATION

Details concerning whether or not the people interviewed were in employment are also scarce (only ICM Research and Ipsos MORI included this variable in their break-down[5] among their public results), but we believe that they reflect some relevant trends.

We would highlight the increase in support for independence among the unemployed from the year 2011 onwards. This was in clear contrast to other employment categories, which at that time had often turned their backs on the Yes camp. The unemployed were, in fact, the group that gave great-

est overall support for Alex Salmond's thesis.

If we adjust the trend lines we would see small increases in all categories of working people, but the greatest growth corresponded, undoubtedly, to the unemployed. On the other hand, the most reluctant Yes voters were pensioners, a fact that is consistent with the results by age we have already commented on.

In any case, the declared vote of the unemployed was the most variable of all, which probably reflects greater interest in the referendum linked to economic issues.

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[5] We have dispensed with the category of the self-employed, only present in ICM polls.

Figure 9: Evolution of the campaign

Figure 9: Evolution of the campaign

During the campaign the data shows remarkable stability in Yes support among full-time and part-time workers as well as among pensioners.

On the other hand, there was a greater variability of support for the Yes campaign among groups of occasional workers (the unemployed and part-timers). Both recorded significant increases in the last month of the campaign, only to fall back in the last few days before the vote.

This behaviour reveals the importance of the economy to the campaign, as well as the potential impact on the vote of the uncertainty and risk associated with the economic consequences of an eventual Scottish independence[6].

[6] Henderson, A; Delaney, L & Liñeira, R. Risk, Uncertainty and Vote Choice in the Scottish Referendum. Centre on Constitutional Change. http://www.futureukandscotland.ac.uk/sites/default/files/papers/Risk%20and%20Constitutional%20Attitudes%20Full%20Survey%2014%20Aug 0.pdf

Yes support by sector
Percentages including 'Don't know' responses

We have some additional informa-
tion covering the long term, from the
series of polls by Ipsos MORI (carried
out in the first instance for The Times
and The Sun and the STV from 2013
onwards), on the distinction between
workers in the public sector and the
private sector. According to data on the
evolution of their choices, both sectors
shadowed each other.

Yes support by social class
Percentages including 'Don't know' responses

SOCIAL CLASS

According to the polls (TNS BMRB, YouGov, Panelbase, and ultimately ICM) the behaviour of the upper classes (which are included in categories A, B and C 1.) and lower classes (C2, D and E) have run in parallel since at least 2013.

The lower classes either maintained their support for the Yes vote or increased it, while support among the upper classes for independence reduced, at least during 2012 and 2013. This downturn in support for the independence movement was more intense among the upper classes. It generated a growing difference in behaviour between both social strata.

As we have already mentioned with reference to other differentiations, the upward swing in support for an independence vote started at the end of 2013, but until the summer of 2014 this growth did not show such a marked difference from previously reported polls.

It was not until the last month of the campaign that the gap really widened as the lower classes were increasingly drawn to support a Yes vote. Again the turning point followed the first televised debate between AS and AD. The greatest distance between the groups, represented by 15 or more percentage points, was reached the week before the referendum, although one can sense that the trend reduced in the last couple of days.

This statistic also shows that the variability of the vote of the lower classes was clearly greater than that among the upper classes.

**Figure 12**: Evolution of the campaign

Figure 13: Historical evolution

Yes support by home ownership
Percentages including 'Don't know' responses

Some public survey pollsters (TNS BMRB, Survation, Panelbase and, years previously, ICM) used a more detailed break down into five social classes in four different social categories: A+B, C1, C2 and D+E.

These new results show that, in general and subject to any exceptions due to sampling error, growing support for the Yes vote was gradual, It also showed that the higher your social class, the less likely you were to be in support of independence.

HOME OWNERSHIP

Three pollsters presented marginal results with a break down that included whether the interviewee was a home owner, rented their home or lived in a council house.

The trend since 2006 was unequivocal: people living in council owned properties were the most likely to vote in favour of independence, while people owning their own property were the most refractory towards the idea, with those in rented accommodation in an intermediate position.

In the year before the vote, support for independence grew in all three categories, but it was among residents in rented homes that it rose fastest. That percentage almost equalled those in publicly owned housing before the referendum, while in previous years the tenants' share of support had been closer to that of home owners.

Figure 15: Historical evolution

Yes support by deprivation index
Percentages including 'Don't know' responses

LESS-FAVOURED AREAS

One of the variables that generated the greatest differences in support for independence among voters was place of residence. Each neighbourhood was classified according to an index that measures unfavourable living conditions or deprivation.

This factor shows that this component separated people's intentions to vote much more sharply than voter age, which had been the variable we examined that most marked differences up to this point.

The following long-term data also comes from Ipsos MORI polls. The residential areas classified with a 1 represent the most depressed areas economically, while those classified as 5 are the wealthiest.

The data shows how support for a Yes vote, regardless of the level of global support in each moment, was directly proportional to the level of poverty in each area.

The differences between each end of the spectrum over the 4 years analysed consistently reached differences of between 10 and 20 points.

Comparing these percentages with the support for the No vote and excluding undecided voters, the Yes vote always had a majority in area 1 and 2, which were the most disadvantaged. It can be noted that in these areas, the growth of support for a Yes vote was far more notable, compared with the much more modest rise in support in other areas.

Figure 16: Historical evolution

Yes support by region
Percentages including 'Don't know' responses

REGION

Synthesizing some of the methodo-logical issues[7], the rise in the Yes vote, adjusting percentages through polynomial regression, was parallel and U-shaped in all regions, and did not substantially alter the hierarchy of support from with which it started.

At the beginning of the campaign the South was (and remained in the end) the region with the lowest support for independence, followed closely by Lothian. In contrast, another region that had been relatively reluctant to support the SNP's aspirations in elections to the Scottish Parliament in 2011, the West, turned out to offer Salmond better expectations than these other two regions. Meanwhile, the Central region proved the most fertile ground for votes in favour of independence.

But the polls noted an exception to this general rule for the increase in the percentage of Yes supporters: Glasgow. Poll data from the largest city in Scotland remained constant throughout the campaign. Starting off in first place, after the growth of support in other regions, not echoed in Glasgow, the city slipped down into the third from last in a total of eight regions.

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[7] Of all the polling variants analysed in relation to the region of residence of the interviewee this presented the most methodological doubts. It is easy to note excessive variation in level and hierarchy from one poll to the next, even from the same pollster. This may be down to the proliferation of online panels (with less cover among the broader population and less geographical coverage) as well as the reduced size of samples in less populated regions.

Figure 17: Evolution of the campaign

Yes support by region
Percentages including 'Don't know' responses

Figure 18

Yes support by urban/rural
Percentages including 'Don't know' responses

It is possible that the percentage of undecided voters in this region in particular might have been higher than in others; although it was in Glasgow where swing voters were more likely to vote Yes. It is also possible that registered participation rates finally had some relationship with pollster's data. Other complementary data about the type of habitat (rural or urban) in which the respondents' place of residence is located was collected by Ipsos MORI, but this proved very variable, so does not allow us to conclude, with any precision, if there was more or less support for the Yes vote in one area or another. If we had to say something, it would be that the data suggests a more cyclic and variable behaviour in the urban environment, compared to greater stability in the rural environment.

Figure 19: Historical evolution

Yes support by 2011 vote
Percentages including 'Don't know' responses

Legend: Yes_Conserv — Yes_Labour — Yes_LibDem — Yes_SNP

PREVIOUS VOTING PATTERNS IN ELECTIONS TO THE SCOTTISH PARLIAMENT IN 2011

The variable previous voting patterns is widely used in studies of likely voters, because this allows voters to be characterized according to their past behaviour.[8]

The data shows that, during the campaign, support for independence among those who had previously voted SNP remained more or less constant, with percentages in favour of a Yes vote at between 70 and 80%. The same sta-

bility is seen in the Tory voters among the electorate, that percentage always being below 10% and in fact closer to 5%.

However the second most important group of voters are those who voted for the Labour Party, which began the campaign with 20%, but finished with figures close to 30%.

Meanwhile the 'Lib-dems' did not demonstrate a growth pattern, but rather huge variability.

The behaviour of these other two

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[8] *Its biggest drawback is that the person's memory does not always correspond exactly with what the respondent actually did in the voting booth. In electoral sociology there is a very common phenomenon known as the bandwagon effect, which implies that many voters jump on the bandwagon of the option which at the time of the interview has better expectations of success. Besides previous voting pattern in elections to the Scottish Parliament in 2011 are complicated by an additional problem: the existence of a large contingent of dual voters whose memory can be altered more easily: those who in elections for the Westminster Parliament vote Labour but in Holyrood elections vote SNP.*

Figure 20: The evolution of the campaign

Yes support by 2011 vote
Percentages including 'Don't know' responses

groups of voters shows that this is where the biggest changes occurred. It also indicates that this group (in the electoral area between the opposing extremes of conservatives and nationalists) probably decided the outcome of the referendum.

Growth in the general intention to vote Yes began in late 2013 with similar intensity among both former SNP voters and former Labour voters. The increase was less in the Lib-Dem fold, and essentially non-existent among Tory voters.

Additional information on other options of past voting patterns indicate that Yes vote growth in this last year before the referendum was particularly strong among those who had voted for other parties (minority or under-represented groups in Holy-

rood), but was also significant among those who did not remember who they had voted for in 2013. Only those who confessed to not having voted in 2013 kept a more stable profile, although they too were not devoid of growing sympathy for the Yes camp.

In many ways, the data indicates that in the struggle for Scottish independence another fight was being resolved, the struggle for hearts and minds by the SNP among those voters who had been abandoning their traditional support for Labour over the previous decade. All of this had been happening within a British political scenario in which Tony Blair and Anthony Giddens' third way was then at its lowest ebb and within a European environment characterized by a deep crisis for all social democratic parties.

Figure 21

Yes support by national identity

Percentages including 'Don't know' responses

NATIONAL IDENTITY

Some polls included a question about the national identity of electors which allows us to appreciate the evolution of the independence vote in accordance with the categories of interviewees' response to the following choices: only Scottish, more Scottish than British, as Scottish as British, more British than Scottish, only British, or neither of the two nationalities.

It is a constant in all nations without a state that the percentages associated with national identity (as represented in Scotland by those who voted Yes to independence) are greater when there is a more intense sense of belonging to that nation. In most cases, the overall result of a vote on the nationalist issue ends up depending on the greater or lesser weight of the individual's sense of national identity within the population as a whole.

The Scottish identity differential is the variable, among all of those that we have examined and, together with previous voting patterns, that which most correlates with the independence movement, marking the purely political nature of the phenomenon.
But the interesting thing is to observe the evolution of the different categories and the behaviour of those people with a shared or mixed identity.

The growth in Yes support began between 2012 and 2013 both for those who felt only Scots and those who felt more Scottish than British. Obviously, those who declared a primary or exclusive allegiance to Britain would be seen to have maintained their scant support if we compare the low level of

Yes support among them in 2012 with the final result.

The group expressing a mixed identity (Scots-British) presented a more contained, but positive, evolution from the Yes campaign's point of view. Although we do perceive a rise in support for the Yes vote of the order of 10% in 2012 to about 20% when the date with the ballot box approached, these percentages remained well below the 50% that we might have expected given their intermediate character.

Voters outside of the Scots-British duality also show intermediate values in terms of support for the Yes camp, but what is striking is that this is far superior to that of the mixed identity group. During 2014, the group which considered themselves neither British nor Scots continuously increased its support for independence. The following section will shed some more light on this behaviour.

The movement for Scottish independence manifests itself more intensely among people born in Scotland, and with less emphasis among those born in the rest of the United Kingdom (England, Northern Ireland or Wales). People born outside the United Kingdom could be found in an intermediate area between the two.

The evolution of support for a Yes vote among native born Scots decreased during 2012, remained stable in 2013 and grew significantly in 2014.

Data for the other two categories are more variable, because of their lesser importance (smaller population and sample) but represents a certain stability among foreigners residing in Scotland and some signs of growth among people born in the rest of the United Kingdom, that became more intense after the summer of 2014.

This favourable evolution for the Yes vote among people of British (but not Scottish) origin contrasts with the stable or negative evolution of people whose identity was stated as only British or primarily British. The difference revolves around the integration of part of these segments into Scottish society: those born in the rest of the UK who have taken on a Scottish identity helped increase support for the Yes camp.

Yes support by place of birth
Percentages including 'Don't know' responses

Figure 23: Data including 'Don't know' responses

PERFORMANCE
OF THE POLLS

The average projection of the polls on the referendum of 18th September predicted an advantage of 5.6 points for the No vote over the Yes vote, while the actual outcome of the referendum turned out to be a 10.6 advantage for the No campaign. The 5 points of difference between the polls and reality implies the existence of a general bias in surveys of 2.5 points in favour of the Yes camp and unfavourable to the No campaign.[9]

An analysis of the performance of the 204 pre-election polls yields the fol-

lowing conclusions of interest for our research:

- The YouGov organization was the group that (to a greater extent and on average) best approximated the actual result. Theirs was the last posted poll and the one that got closest to the final percentages. Alongside them, Ipsos Mori also produced more accurate polls. Both represent a methodological triumph for online panel-based surveys.

- Telephone polls (all of ICM's but one; the last few by Survation and by Lord Ashcroft) revealed little bias in respect of the final result.

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[9] *The author's own calculation based on the polling data. This is the result of a Bayesian analysis estimating the magnitude of the 'house effects' and other methodological issues.*

True evolution of polls (Scottish Independence Referendum 2014)

While the least accurate polls were those carried out face to face (only TNS BMRB did these).

- The greater variability in the polls was doubtless due to the interview method. The next position in the accuracy tables is probably down to different authorship; lower variability being attributed to the client who had commissioned and/or published the poll. So, it seems the financing of polls was the main determinant of a given level of performance (with any consequent bias). In fact, pollsters who produced polls for more than one client systematically achieved different results in each of them.

- Those who paid for polls that were more favourable towards the Yes camp (encouraging their expectations) were, in this order: the SNP, The Herald, Wings over Scotland, Newsnet, Yes Scotland and Channel 4. All of those polls overrated the Yes support by more than 5 points. In contrast, the polls which most exaggerated the result of the No camp were commissioned by Lord Ashcroft, Reform Scotland and The Daily Express / Sunday Express, although with less bias, given the imbalance of the group of polls in favour of a Yes vote.

Figure 25: Poll bias by author, client and interview methodology

POST-ELECTION POLLS

The four post referendum polls [10] carried out over six weeks, from late October to Mid-December, show that had Scots known the result, they would have voted more strongly for independence.

This was also undoubtedly influenced by the fact that the last minute commitments publicly agreed to by the main three British parties offering Scotland greater devolution if the No camp were to be victorious was not enough for a majority of Scots.

On average, these surveys provide the Yes camp with a victory by a margin of less than one point, which represent a situation that can be considered a technical draw. However, if we consider that these polls probably maintained their bias from the referendum period, the actual result would probably be about 4 or 5 points of difference in favour of the No camp, (which would still be a lower figure than that recorded on the 18th September).

In any case, given the small margin of victory in the final result, which was closer than in other similar referenda, as well as the circumstances in which the No camp went through something of a recovery during the last days of the campaign, and, of course, the unfulfilled last minute promises on devolution of powers to the Scottish Parliament that Westminster half heartedly committed itself to, the post referendum period has been marked by social unrest. Only a few days after the referendum, half of the Scottish electorate stated that they expected the holding of a new referendum within 10 years,

and a third of them reckoned this would come within five years.

Other relevant information that can be extracted from the post-election polls include:

- Socio-demographic profile:
  • Gender: voting differences between men and women were reduced to 2-4 points, but more men than women supported independence.
  • Age: the younger the voter, the higher the percentage of votes for the Yes camp. If the vote had only been by those under 50-55, the Yes camp would have won the referendum with similar percentages in all age ranges. Three out of four over 65s voted No.
  • Social Class: Among the lower classes there would have been a draw or even a win for the Yes camp.
  • Origin: The Yes camp would have won among those born in Scotland.
  • Between 25% and 40% of former Labour Party supporters and between 35% and 40% of Liberal Democrat voters would have voted Yes, but only 5-10% of the conservative voters would have done the same.

- When voters reached a decision:[11]
  • When did Yes voters decide to support that option? Most did this in 2014, with some 40% deciding during the final month of the referendum campaign. Some 62% of No voters had always been clear which way they would vote, while 20% decided in the last month.

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[10] Wikipedia. Opinion polling for the Scottish independence referendum, 2014. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Opinion polling for the Scottish independence referendum, 2014#Post-election polls
[11] Lord Ashcroft. Post referendum poll tables. http://lordashcroftpolls.com/wp-content/uploads/203.4/3.3./LORD-ASHCROFT-POLLS-Post-referendum-poll-tables-Sept-203.4.pdf

- Influential topics: For Yes voters, the main topic influencing their vote was a rejection of Conservative cuts decided on in Westminster. Next came the NHS and much further down the list came oil and other economic benefits. The issues most influencing the No camp were maintaining sterling, and issues surrounding pensions, prices and defence.
- Reasons for Voting: the most important issue for Yes supporters was self-government, while for No voters it was the economic risks and the fear of not belonging to the European Union. However, the weight of tradition and promises of further devolution of powers to the Scottish Parliament were also considerable factors for No voters.

2. REFERENDUM RESULTS AND SUPPORT FOR A YES VOTE

In this section we will analyse the referendum results from two different points of view.

Firstly, we will compare them with previous results in the Scottish elections of 2011, and we will demonstrate the close relationship between the two Secondly, we will relate the results to a series of socio-economic variables in each area. This will verify the high concordance between the actual vote and the information offered us by the polls, thus confirming the information they were giving out.

THE ELECTION OF 2011 AND THE 2014 REFERENDUM: HISTORY REPEATS ITSELF

Support for the Yes option in the referendum is fairly comparable to the support garnered by the SNP in the Scottish elections of 2011.

Although the level of participation is not directly comparable (50.4% in 2011 and 84.6% in the Referendum) the political balance of forces appears to have remained very similar, indicating a very homogeneous level of mobilization throughout the entire electorate, regardless of party orientation.

In 2011, the SNP had obtained 45.4% of the vote. On September 18th 2014, the Yes camp got 44.7% of the vote.
In the referendum, the electoral unit was the Thirty-Two Councils, while in 2011 it had been the 8 regions comprising 73 Constituencies.
In order to make a comparison between the results at a territorial level and those at constituency level we have to ignore certain problems given the different delimitations of constituencies or electoral circles, which do not fully coincide. However, it is possible to draw up an equivalence between Electorates and Councils which will serve our purpose.

In figure 26 you can appreciate how constituencies are located close to the diagonal line representing an equality in percentages between the two votes. The most notable differences or variations are:

- The side showing a greater percentage for the Yes vote than that obtained by the SNP three years previously includes Glasgow and West Dunbartonshire, where the Yes camp won, and the Shetland Islands, where the No vote triumphed.
- On the opposite side, where the Yes camp obtained worst percentages than the SNP had in the earlier elections, we can note Angus, Moray, Perth and Kinross as well as Eilean Siar.

Apart from the impact certain socio-economic variables may have had in these extreme cases, at the political level there are partial explanations for this behaviour.

Demographically, the most important case is that of Glasgow. The victory of the Yes camp in Scotland's largest city verified that it coincided with two events that we believe are critical: a) the percentage of Glaswegian participation in the referendum was the lowest in the whole of Scotland[12] and b) in 2011 the swing from the Labour Party to the SNP had been of a magnitude of between 4% and 12% of the total. Meanwhile, in Dumbarton, Labour held its majority over the SNP by less

than 2,000 votes, since this area did not see a similar swing from Labour to the Nationalists. In both cases, the common denominator was the strength of the Labour Party in those areas.

The result in the Shetland Islands can be explained as the area having been a traditional liberal-democrat stronghold.

In the other group of constituencies, where the Yes camp obtained a lower percentage than had the SNP in the elections, a very different political reality was present. In three of the four cases, with the exception of Eilean Siar, the SNP already had a major-

Figure 26: Relationship between 2014 referendum vote and the 2011 Scottish Parliament vote

[12] Comparing the results with the levels of participation in the 1997 referendum, Glasgow, but also Dundee, represent two places in which the increase in participation for the referendum was negligible.

ity, and the main movements of votes recorded in 2011 had been a swing from the Conservatives to the SNP, of between 4% and 10% of the total, which had then reinforced the SNP majority. Of course, we are talking about areas with a greater historical identification with the Tories, who were the second force in the area and therefore voters who, we can suppose, were more predisposed to vote No in the independence referendum.

In short, if we ignore the socio-political peculiarities of the islands (2 of the 7 electorates examined), which, in addition are of little relevance from a demographic point of view, we can conclude that partisan orientation largely determined the main differences in the percentages of the vote between 2011 and 2014. Where there had been more support for Labour, the Yes vote improved with respect to the levels of SNP support in 2011. Where there had been more support for the Conservatives, the opposite result occurred.

THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC DETERMINANTS OF THE OUTCOME OF THE REFERENDUM

It is possible to cross the geographical results of the referendum with various socio-economic statistics at a Council level, to observe the degree of association, if any. Jorge Galindo has published the results of this exercise in Politikon.

In Table 1, we can see that the highest percentages of No votes came from Councils where there was greater participation in the referendum, higher rates of employment among the general population, a greater presence of volunteers for social work (associated partially with people with sufficient resources to take on such tasks), a greater presence of municipal services considered to be of a high quality, greater use of the internet, and a more elderly population.

In contrast, the higher percentages of Yes voters can be statistically linked with higher rates of full-time employment, but also with unemployment at the same time (due to increasing inequality in the labour market); a greater weight among women voters and young voters (aged 15-29) and a higher percentage of individuals without any income[13].

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[13] These statements are based on correlations of collectives grouped together geographically and are free from the danger of having recourse to the so-called ecological fallacy, inasmuch as they confirm, point by point, the observed phenomena (person to person) in the polls. They do not only reflect differences between Councils, they also reflect differences between individuals in different areas.

Table 1

Some factors behind the 'No' vote in Scotland
Council level correlations

	Correlated with 'No'	Year (data)
Employment rate	0.61	2011Q3
% adults aged 16+ giving up time to volunteer in the previous 12 months	0.53	2009-2010
Turnout	0.42	2014
% adults agreeing council high quality services	0.36	2009-2010
% adults personal internet use	0.36	2009-2010
% population over 65	0.31	2011
Unemployment change from pre-crisis	-0.05	2005-2011Q3
% of familes on low income (less than 70% median) and materially deprived	-0.08	2008-2009
Median gross weekly earnings	-0.15	2011
Full-time workers' rate	-0.32	2011Q3
Women	-0.37	2011
% population 15-39	-0.41	2011
Unemployment rate	-0.74	2011Q3
% of income deprived individuals	-0.86	2011

Data from guardian.co.uk & Scottish Neighbourhood Statistics

Jorge Galindo politikon.es

The following illustrations show the indices of correlation for the table above.

Figure 27
Some factors behind the "No" vote in Scotland
Council level corrections

2 THE SCOTTISH INDEPENDENCE REFERENDUM

2.2 AN ANALYSIS OF SOCIAL NETWORKS

Carlos Neira Cortizas - *Economist and political analyst*

EVIDENCE OF THE CAMPAIGN ON THE NET

1. THE CAMPAIGNS ON SOCIAL NETWORKS

From the moment we began tracking the campaign at the beginning of August 2014, we periodically noted the evolution of the official webs of Yes Scotland and Better Together on the social networks: Facebook and Twitter. Both are, by far, the most commonly used, followed and influential. That is why we chose to focus our efforts on them and not concentrate on other smaller networks such as LinkedIn (Professional) or Google +.

We also decided not to keep an eye on video and images sites such as YouTube or Pinterest. This was because, on the one hand, they are not such massively used channels; and on the other, it is far easier to explore and obtain information from text-based sites rather than from those containing images or audiovisual content. In any case, in depth analyses carried out on Twitter gave us quite enough examples of non-textual resources that we consider representative of what happened in both campaigns.

IMPACT ON GOOGLE

The Scottish referendum on independence led to the word 'Scotland' being the most searched for item on the worldwide web during the week of 12th to 18th September in the search engines of the Mountain View company (as reflected in Google's official blog[1]).

If we restrict an analysis to the term 'Scottish referendum'[2] Google Trends statistics show that global searches timidly began to increase in early August reaching an initial and modest peak in the week that the first televised debate between AS and AD was held.

However, by late August, the number of searches had already surpassed that initial spike and continued to grow exponentially until the day of the referendum. In fact, the search register recorded its highest growth between the second and third week of September, with 5 times as many searches conducted: a 400% increase.

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[1] *The Through the Google lens: search trends Sept 12-18.*
http://googleblog.blogspot.com.es/2014/09/through-google-lens-searchtrends-sept 19.html
[2] *It can be seen that this search string is the most representative of the volume of searches and the proportion of them carried out in Scotland and England. It was number one among the following: Alex Salmond, Yes Scotland, Scottish referendum, better together, Scotland independence, Alistair Darling. See source of note # 7.*

Figure 1: Google Trends graph for 'Scottish referendum'

Google Trends[3] also offers us information on the relative number of searches by country of origin. After the UK (index 100) the countries behind the UK on the list were Ireland (36), Canada (30), Australia (22), Spain (4) and the United States (4).

It should be noted that this classification refers exclusively to searches in English. The index and the relative position of Spain would be higher if we included Spanish in our field of study. The same warning applies in the case of Quebec (Canada) and French.

When we examine the amount of data processed by Google Trends, before September, leaving the United Kingdom to one side, only the United States showed a significant volume of searches.

If we restrict the analysis to the UK, even though the evolution of searches shows the same basic profile, the scale was naturally different. Increases registered over the initial baseline figure are seen to be proportionately lower (of the order of 150%) because the referendum and the campaign had already received much more attention at home than abroad before that date. Foreign interest came later and focused on the final stretch of the campaign producing increases in interest of a greater magnitude.

Within the UK, concern about the referendum logically peaked in Scotland, receiving an index of 100, and kept that interest high throughout the entire campaign.

However, if we compare September with the previous quarter (June to September) we can observe that in the 18 days prior to the referendum there was a spike in interest in the rest of the UK that had not previously existed. This gives a greater relative importance to what was happening outside Scotland in the final stretch of the campaign.

The data for England is particularly revealing since it rose from 11 to 21. The indices indicating interest in Northern Ireland or Wales are similar (23 and 17 respectively), although before the final month they did not represent any particular statistical relevance in searches.

Looking at the trends in cities (or rather urban or metropolitan areas, in accordance with Google's delimitations) we can observe the same phenomenon: non-Scottish cities in the UK either increased their index or burst onto the scene from virtually

[3] The3 Google Trends. 'Scottish referendum'.
http://www.google.com/trends/explore#q=scottish%20referendum&date=6% 2F2014%204m&cmpt=q

nothing in the last weeks of the campaign.

In aggregate terms, the most searches were performed in: Edinburgh (100), Inverness (98), Glasgow (89), Aberdeen (85), Dundee (85), London (23), Manchester (22), Cambridge (19) and Belfast (19).

The following table reflects the relative patterns of interest for three different geographical and temporal areas:

Table 1: Google Trends indexes for 'Scottish referendum'

Google Trends Index for 'scottish referendum' (max = 100)	June-August	September	Whole campaign
Region (World)			
United Kingdom	100	100	100
Ireland		37	35
Canada		34	29
Australia		26	22
USA	2	5	4
Spain		5	4
France		3	3
Germany		3	3
Subregion (UK)			
Scotland	100	100	100
England	11	21	19
North Ireland		23	18
Wales		17	13
City (UK)			
Edinburgh	100	100	100
Inverness	97	98	98
Glasgow	85	92	89
Aberdeen	91	86	85
Dundee		89	85
London	14	23	23
Manchester	13	25	22
Cambridge		20	19
Belfast		21	19
Newcastle upon Tyne		21	

Google's statistical tool also offers search strings and frequently associated consultations with regards the Scottish referendum. The main associations were recorded in connection with the referendum results, but also included historical-background and opinion polls on the same subject. In addition to the logical interest in the results of the 18th September vote, the most recurrent subjects searched for suggest a predominance of searches of a documentary or journalistic nature, and searches of less importance for political arguments or issues surrounding the consequences of the referendum.

Since at least the drive to make Barack Obama the US president, in 2008, political campaigns have had to develop both offline and online strategies. Social networks have become not only a channel of communication, but a source of raw material for campaign messages.

Cross platform and reciprocal presence has also taken on special significance in different media. Perhaps the most visible sign of this was the use of real-time data displays used by both STV and the BBC to illustrate debates and talk shows about the referendum.

In various elections throughout the world many campaign committee members openly acknowledge using Twitter primarily to influence journalists who use that social network. This search for influence has two objectives: to influence the issues on which these journalists are tweeting and to get the current issues out to those producing material for the media that employ them. So, when trying to set the public

agenda outside the internet, campaign strategies focus on the intermediaries controlling the output of information, rather than on the general public.

This use of Twitter aimed at the media, journalists and commentators usually happens during certain key events throughout the campaign, such as debates held between party spokespeople or candidates; but also broadens out to a more global campaign strategy.

Facebook, as the most widespread social network, now probably best represents public opinion through the huge number of people using it as well as influencing personal networks outside the Internet. It has become the place to have a presence if you wish to reach as many people as possible.

The differences in importance between both social networks can be better understood if we evaluate their distinct monetization capabilities. This is much reduced in the case of Twitter.

EVOLUTION OF THE NUMBER OF FOLLOWERS ON FACEBOOK AND TWITTER

In early August, official pages in support of the Yes campaign started off with a significant advantage over the Better Together groups on both Facebook and Twitter.

On Facebook (by far the most widespread social network) the relationship between the number of followers of both campaigns was 1.33:1 in favour of independence. 200,000 followers compared with just over 150,000.

On Twitter (a less widespread and more specialized social network), the same relationship was 2: 1 in favour

of the Yes campaign: 55,000 followers compared with just under 28,000.

Naturally, over the course of the campaign there was a continued increase in the number of followers of both campaigns. This growth of users interested in following messages from one group or the other was sustained (more moderately during August) and reached a greater intensity in September, as the day of the referendum approached.

Although, strictly speaking, we should speak of a fairly regular exponential evolution since statistics, in particular, reveal two moments of acceleration in the growth rate of the number of followers.

- The first of these happened just after the conclusion of the second televised debate between Alex Salmond and Alistair Darling, a debate which according to all the polls and most political analysts was won comfortably by the then leader of the SNP.

- The second moment of change occurred after the release of the first polls in 2014 which placed the Yes campaign ahead of the No grouping. It was conducted by You-Gov and published in the Sunday Herald on September 7th, although several digital media had published those results on the internet the day before. The fieldwork for the poll had been conducted between the 2nd and 5th September.

Generally this shows that although there may have been events that drastically multiplied messages and interactions on both sides of the issue (televised debates or the publication of certain polls, etc.) changes in the numbers of followers demonstrate a smoother evolution.

At the end of the referendum the YES campaign had 320,000 followers on Facebook and 103,000 on Twitter. While BT could count on 218,000 and 42,000 respectively.

Figure 2: The evolution of Facebook 'likes'

Twitter cumulated 'followers'

The final differences for both campaigns, after a month and a half of campaigning before the vote, were, respectively, 102,000 and 63,000 more followers in the case of Facebook, and 48,000 and 14,000 more on Twitter.

In percentages these figures represent an increase, in the case of Facebook, of 58% for the Yes camp and 40% for the BT campaign. Similarly, growth on Twitter was 86% for Yes and 52% for BT.

Initial Yes to BT ratios went from 1.33:1 to 1.47:1 on Facebook in favour of the independence movement (a relatively small variation), but from 2:1 to 2.5:1 on Twitter; which indicates a more acute differential behaviour in favour of those wanting an independent Scotland.

Figure 4: Facebook 'likes' index

Facebook cumulated 'likes' index

Figure 5: Twitter 'followers' index

Overall, these figures lead us to the following conclusions:

a) There was a general increase in the use of social networks; which was more concentrated towards the end of the campaign. Increases in the number of followers was greater for the Yes vote, both in absolute as well as relative terms, which resulted in a ratio of followers that was always more favourable for those supporting independence. This explains why social networks were repeatedly seen as an area more favourable to the aims of the Yes campaign.

b) Yes supporters, both on Facebook and Twitter, increased their rate of growth in the two key events mentioned above: Salmond's victory in the second debate and the publication of the first poll in which a Yes vote was predicted to be in the majority. In contrast, the pace of growth of BT support did not alter with the debates and remained constant throughout the campaign. It only increased significantly when faced with a possible victory for Yes in the polls, in what seems to reflect a drive among the No camp in the last 10 days of the campaign.

c) This alarm call for the followers of BT occurred on two social networks, but was more intense and noticeable in the case of Facebook, the opposite to what happened to the Yes campaign, whose following expanded, above all on Twitter from that time onwards. This differential behaviour between the two social networks demonstrates that the Facebook universe is closest to and better represents the behaviour of broader sectors of the electorate, or the general public. The flurry of activity by unionist voters in response to the poll that had been unfavourable to their cause was clearly reflected on Facebook.

d) The minority and more special-ized role played by Twitter (more marginal and, to a point, unreal) contrasts with the fact that it was precisely on this social network that the Yes campaign had added more followers in the crucial final stretch of the campaign. This was espe-cially visible on the 17th and 18th, in what could be qualified as a late reaction in the wrong half of the pitch.

The following illustrations show, for both campaigns, the YES:BT ratio for the number of new followers captured daily.

The first graph indicates, approxi-mately, that the Yes group always added a minimum of 1.6 followers on Facebook for each new follower of BT. However the daily growth rate was higher between the second debate and the first poll citing a possible Yes vic-

Figure 6: Facebook 'likes' - Yes/No compared daily growth rate


Figure 7: Twitter 'followers' - Yes/No compared daily growth rate

tory, and this rate declined towards the end of the campaign.

The second illustration shows the same process for Twitter. In this case, with the exception of a singular blip on September 1st (perhaps due to a massive membership drive).The data shows a progressively increasing share that was more and more favourable to the Yes campaign, which demonstrates that the independence campaign had focused on this social network.

It is also worth noting that other social network accounts (other than the official ones) within the broader church of Yes supporters, also far exceeded the number of followers of similar No groupings. For example, Alex Salmond's Twitter account had five times the number of followers as that of Alistair Darling, and even that of Nicola Sturgeon was three times as big as that of the BT spokeswoman. On Facebook, despite the fact of Facebook being a social network more geared to official campaigns rather than political leaders, the difference between the well known personalities supporting YES and BT was even

Table 2: Twitter 'followers' after the 18th September

Yes Scotland	103,000
Alex Salmond	95,000
Nicola Sturgeon	66,000
Better Together	42,000
Alistair Darling	21,000

Table 3: Facebook 'likes' after 18th September

Yes Scotland	320,000
Better Together	218,000
Alex Salmond	80,000
Nicola Sturgeon	58,000
Alistair Darling	1,000

greater, especially given the non-existent public enthusiasm for Alistair Darling's profile.

INFLUENCE ON THE WEB

Many internet companies have drawn up and published different indices of 'influence' in an effort to become a new standard. However there is still no unique holistic measurement that is completely satisfactory.

Table 4: Klout influence score

Klout score	Yes Scotland	Better Together
8th Aug.	71	67
18th Aug.	73	68
25th Aug.	73	69
31st Aug.	78	70
4th Sep.	78	71

One of the most broadly influential means of taking measurements in recent years has been that provided by the web service: Klout. Although not without criticism, its indicators measure the presence of an individual or collective user profile across eight social networks and using more than 400 variables[4]. The maximum value of the index is 100, and corresponds to US President Barack Obama. However, it is not a lineal rate, which means that when comparing multiple users, any point of difference between them reflects a distance that is proportionally greater to the larger number of values compared.

The evolution of the Klout indicator (up to 15 days before the referendum) was unequivocally favourable to the Yes camp.

[4] The Klout score https://klout.com/corp/score

We can draw the same conclusions from other Twitter-based public indicators, such as Twitalyzer or Retweetrank.

In the first of these services, (which can be described as more reactive than that of Klout to the short-term behavioural changes of users[5], the evolution of the YES and BT camps offer a similar panorama: an increasing and sustained rise for both campaigns with the independence movement in a constant lead over unionism.

Table 5: Twittalyzer impact score

Twittalyzer Impact	Yes Scotland	Better Together
8th Aug.	15.4	9.4
18th Aug.	15.8	9.5
25th Aug.	15.9	9.5
31st Aug.	16.8	10.1
4th Sep.	16.9	9.9

A different conclusion is offered by Retweetrank. The values produced by this classification indicate an absolute position for the number of retweets from these accounts in a global context, and in this regard better reflect the exponential evolution of the campaign until its final stretch than does Klout or Twitalyzer[6].

Table 6: Retweet Rank

Retweet Rank	Yes Scotland	Better Together
8th Aug.	5,997	46,943
18th Aug.	2,767	35,046
25th Aug.	9,465	30,312
31st Aug.	2,936	20,451
4th Sep.	1 ,940	2,767

According to this indicator, the two official campaign accounts did nothing but grow from early August onwards. During the summer, the Yes campaign's twitter account was already among the top six thousand groups for retweeting worldwide, while BT's account had barely entered among the first fifty thousand using this service. In September, the Yes campaign could be found among the first three thousand, and 14 days before the referendum it was among the first two thousand. The evolution of BT was much slower during the month of August, but accelerated much more at the start of September, when it registered the shortest distance between it and the Yes campaign.

What happened after that? Some data that we can access from even before the vote show a turn in events, as will be seen in the next section.

ENGAGEMENT IN THE TWO CAMPAIGNS

Figures showing the number of followers of the official YES and BT accounts were widely picked up on by the popular media throughout the campaign and after the vote. Journalistically, it is an easily obtainable and marketable product, but at the same time it is very limited as a form of measuring the real influence of the campaigns.

This is where the concept of 'engagement' arose. This is a measurement of the involvement or participation of the public that is potentially attainable by a user of social networks.

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[5] Klout here is like your FICO score, while Twitalyzer could be compared to your checkbook.
http://www.twitalyzer.com/5/index.asp
[6] Retweet rank FAQ http://www.retweetrank.com/view/about

A first approximation

A first approximation of the level of 'engagement' that we can use is the number of content shares on social networks. A study released on voting day, before the polls closed, drawn up by the consulting firm GoCircles[7], indicated a clear advantage of the content from the official site of Yes Scotland compared with that of Better Together. In the sum of the social networks: Facebook, Twitter and Google +. During the last weeks of the campaign Scots separatists had racked up a total of 78,000 shared URLs compared with 44,000 for the unionist site - a ratio of 1.77:1.

The consulting firm Bell Pottinger[8] tracked online conversations generated over nine months. Monitoring concentrated on Twitter, but also considered threads created in forums, blogs, and the news. This source counted 3.2 million entries for Yes and 2.3 million for No - a ratio of 1.39:1. Based on this figure we can say that the independence movement had greater relevance on Twitter and blogs, while unionism improved its relative position in the news and especially in forums. A third reference: Talkwalker concluded that the Yes campaign was 3 times more active than the no campaign, and reached twice the amount of people[9].

Twitter

Talkwalker's study collected a list of the most often mentioned events during conversations on Twitter about the referendum:

Table 7: Referendum events with most mentions on Twitter

DATE	EVENT	Mentions
18th Sep. 2014	Polls open	898,750
11th Sep. 2014	Scots want to change their postal votes	251,513
13th Sep. 2014	Three opinion polls say it's too close to call	233,361
25th Aug. 2014	2nd Scottish referendum TV debate	137,404
5th Aug. 2014	1st Scottish referendum TV debate	89,843

[7] Klout Social Media & The Scottish Referendum
http://www.gocircles.co.uk/scotland-independence-social-m-726692838.html
[8] Infographic: the Scottish referendum in online stats
http://wallblog.co.uk/2014/09/23/infographic-the-scottishreferendum-in-online-stats/
[9] Social media analysis predicts Yes campaign as the winner in Scottish
referendum http://www.thedrum.com/news/2014/09/18/social-mediaanalysis-predicts-yes-campaign-winner-scottish-referendum

The table allows us to extract, first of all, the exponential nature of the campaign, with more references as the 18th September approached. But, in addition, it confirms the importance of the main campaign events (debates and polls) to which we must add the question of whether the date of the vote by mail system was excessively advanced. This subject was amplified, perhaps, by the fact that people displaced from their home make more intensive use of the internet.

The Bell Pottinger report provides data for engagement from December to September for the Twitter accounts of Alex Salmond and Alistair Darling:

Table 8: Twitter engagement measurements

Twitter engagement	Alex Salmond	Alistar Darling
Tweets	597	232
Tweets per day (average)	2.16	0.84
User mentions (av.)	193	16
Retweets (av.)	194	176
Replies (av.)	8	2

The advantage of Salmond is noticeable in all metrics. Darling only approached him in terms of the number of retweets. This last figure reflects a behaviour that was more hierarchical and organized, less interactive and spontaneous among the community of followers supporting Darling's position. This behaviour has been detected in other studies on the electoral use of Twitter in relation to candidates and parties located on the right wing of the ideological spectrum[10].

For the preparation of this report, in addition to data from third parties, we designed a collecting device for tweets published during the last month of the campaign. This enabled us to gather almost 3.5 million tweets about the Scottish referendum[11]. In order to filter them we used the keywords referred to in the following table:

Table 9: Keywords used for retrieving tweets

Keywords used for retrieving tweets (* = more frequent)		
yesscotland (*)	bettertogether (*)	indyref (*)
voteyes (*)	UK_together	scottish independence
activeyes	voteno	scotdecides
greenyes	nothanks	scotdecides
yesbecause	nobecause	scotnight
Alex Salmond	Alistair Darling	

Based on the information gathered, we have applied a different method for evaluating engagement consisting of the use of hashtags proposed by the Yes and No campaigns.

The following chart shows the absolute data for use of #voteyes and #voteno on Twitter over the last month of the campaign:

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[10] *Political discussions on Twitter during elections are dominated by those with extreme views*
http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2014/12/09/politicaldiscussions- ontwitter-during-elections-are-dominated-by-those-withextreme-views/
[11] *We collected the data from the Twitter stream Application Programming Interface (API). This provides up to 1% of all tweets posted at any time.*

#voteyes, #voteno, #indyref mentions (x1,000)

This graph shows several things:

a) Firstly, the huge advantage in number of mentions by separatists compared with unionists: 969,000 compared with 141,000 accumulated monthly mentions, almost seven times more. This difference in #voteyes over #voteno is broader than the existing number of followers between the accounts of YES and BT, which means that those in favour of Scottish freedom were more active, on average, when it came to publishing tweets.

b) Secondly, the significance of the main events of the campaign identified so far as key to its development: the second debate between Alex Salmond and Alistair Darling, the publication of the YouGov survey putting the Yes camp ahead of the No, and the day before the vote. The three induced significant increases in the use of the hashtag #voteyes. If we take as a reference point the global volume of messages on the neutral hashtag #indyref, we can verify that it was precisely in these two instants when the proportion of #voteyes over the total amount of traffic increased.

c) And thirdly, the use of #voteno was residual until the publication of the aforementioned YouGov survey. Only then was there a significant growth in its use. Although it was always lower than its rival's success, as the day of the referendum approached, the relative importance of participation in No traffic, with respect to Yes did continue to increase. This happened at the same time as an increase in the relative importance of hashtags calling for a specific vote (to the detriment of the neutral position). In other words, polarization increased globally. The proportion of No traffic compared with Yes gained ground from levels lower than the 0.1 to 0.25 as the vote drew nearer.

Figure 9: Relative evolution of No/Yes and Aligned/Neutral tweets

In a recent study on elections held in the United States and Spain, Pablo Barberá and Gonzalo Rivero argue that Twitter is a fertile ground for polarization. It now occupies the same ground that formerly was the dominant territory of political protagonists in the 'offline' world. This seems to have reproduced important biases in the public participation of different groups, questioning the potential of social media when it comes to representing the behaviour of the population as a whole in a reliable way. In the present case, the relative importance of the different campaigns compared with the final results provides us with further testimony of this, although it is evident that the temporal evolution is consistent with the changes in last minute voting patterns reflected in the polls. This is also noticeable in Twitter trends which are, apparently, well reflected.

Barbera & Rivero's paper also provides estimates on the gender of Twitter users that we have compared with those offered by other sources of online conversations about the referendum. The data confirms that the gender bias registered in the Scottish referendum was slightly higher than that of other campaigns and voting patterns.

Table 10: Twitter gender bias for various campaigns

Twitter users by gender Male Female	Male	Female
Scotland (2014) Bell Potinger	72%	28%
Scotland (2014) Brandwatch	67%	33%
USA (2012)	60%	40%
Spain (2011)	65%	35%

Facebook

On Facebook, different indicators are used to measure the number of interactions such as mentions, comments and the platform's own 'likes' and shares.

Available data for interactions on Facebook is scarce, because of the greater difficulties presented by the API of this social network when it comes to analytical exploitation.

From August 1st until September 8th, 10 days before the polls, Facebook had

a total of 4 million interactions on the official campaign accounts, with an advantage slightly favourable to the Yes campaign over the BT camp: 2.05 million to 1.96.

After the 18th September, Facebook revealed the final statistics for engagement in the event. A total of 10 million interactions[12] had occurred, which again shows the concentration of activity in the final stretch of the campaign: 6 million in just 10 days. The metric 'being talked about', gathered throughout the whole year by Mark Shephard and published by What Scotland Thinks[13], confirms the existing equality between both campaigns on this social network.

Figure 10 represents something else than just the exponential pattern characteristic of the campaign. It also shows that the BT campaign had sig-

nificant advantages over the Yes camp on three occasions:

(a) during the period just after the publication of Moody's financial report one month before the start of the campaign.

b) Coinciding with the victory of Alistair Darling over Alex Salmond in the first televised debate on STV.

c) In the last monitored days of the campaign (the graph was updated on the 15th September at noon). On the 13th when the second poll proclaiming as advantage for the Yes grouping was published (ICM/Sunday Telegraph). At that time there were interventions and demonstrations by different business groups warning of the adverse consequences of a Yes victory when it came to jobs and the Scottish economy.

Figure 10: Facebook 'being talked about' metric evolution

[12] *Yes Wins Referendum's Social Media Battle*
http://news.sky.com/story/1337925/yes-wins-referendums-social-media-battle
[13] *Is The 'Yes' Online Tsunami Finally Paying Dividends?*
http://blog.whatscotlandthinks.org/2014/09/yes-online-tsunami-finallypaying-dividends/

Independently of these specific variations, and the average level throughout the campaign, if we calculate the ratio between the number of 'BTAs' and the number of 'likes' or followers of each campaign we obtain a more favourable 'engagement' for the BT side than those supporting YES. The day before the referendum the 'engagement rate' for the unionist camp reached 133%, while that of the independence supporters was around 65%.

It is true that many of the comments made may have been negative, but it still shows the greater visibility and reach of the No campaign at that period. Of course there could have been occasional trolling campaigns transmitting a certain harmful aggression towards the side that they claimed to defend and favourable to the side they aimed to criticize. It should be remembered that one of the themes of the campaign launched by the BT grouping, above all in the 'offline' world, alleged aggression from Yes supporters preventing No supporters from expressing their opinion freely. This was fear tactics of a kind frequently used by more radical conservative governments seeking to maintain the status quo in their societies.

Jamie Riddell of BirdSong analysed the content of the two campaigns on Facebook during the last few days of the event for The Guardian[14]. His findings are summarized in the following table:

Table 11: Summary of content for both campaigns in Facebook

	Yes Scotland	Better Together
Likes per update		BT received 38% more likes
Comments per update		BT achieved 10 times more comments
Shares per update	Same number (300)	
More likes	Obama-style image of Gordon Brown criticizing him for doing nothing when he was PM (6,000)	Attacking Salmond's currency plans (12,000)
More sharings	YouGov poll putting Yes ahead of No (8,000)	Fact sheet of Salmond versus a large number of organizations and experts on independence (8,200)
Topics	Poll data Personality and people	Man in the street More expensive weekly shop Loss of tax benefits Financial statements about independence
Resources	Stylised posts and imagery Frequent use of photos Retro political posters	

It was in those last few days that we notice a reactivation of the No campaign. This possibility that we have already mentioned when analysing the number of followers and which was revealed with greater intensity in the case of Facebook, is confirmed if we stick to the data collected by various researchers and commercial observers of social networks.

Other references for engagement

The Internet offered supporters of one or the other campaign multiple ways in which to participate, get involved and become visible. One of these was Twibbon, a service that allows you to include a logo or slogan on your Twitter avatar. According to data by Storm Ideas, the Yes campaign had 128,000 in support, compared to only 43,000 for the No camp.

SPATIAL DISTRIBUTION OF TWEETS

The Brandwatch Company published data for the geo-location of tweets sent during the campaign. They coincide with Google Trends in placing Glasgow and Edinburgh as the main sources of

the sending of messages, although the positions are reversed compared with those offered by the search engine company for the same cities.

The ratio of 7:1 that we had seen in the hashtags #voteyes and #voteno is lower in the analysis of Twitter conducted by Brandwatch. The new data they contribute is geographic distinction. The Yes camp sent 80% of the tweets issued in Scotland, but they also were attributed 61% of tweets originating in England.

A sample of the total number of tweets (approximately 1%) had geolocation data enabling the representation of their spatial distribution:

The below map visually confirms perceptions obtained through Google Trends: the concentration of tweets within the United Kingdom and Ireland, with international participation focused on the United States, Canada and Spain. The main differences lie in the disappearance from the top positions of Australian Twitter (perhaps a Commonwealth effect in the search engine) and the emergence from the background of several European States with unresolved national issues, such as Italy, Belgium and the Netherlands.

Figure 11: Global tweets distribution

Zooming in on the European continent more clearly shows this distribution:

Outside the British Isles the most relevant concentration of tweets can be found in Catalan speaking areas and more specifically in Catalonia, although concentrations of points can also be appreciated in all the major European capitals, in other European stateless nations, and in areas preferred by many British citizens with holiday and second homes, especially the Spanish Islands and the southern and eastern coast of the Iberian Peninsula.

In the British Isles, the location of tweets is close to the actual spatial distribution of the population. However we should not ignore the fact that the greatest concentration of tweets corresponds to Scotland, both in absolute and relative terms.

Figure 13: British and Irish tweets distribution

2 THE SCOTTISH INDEPENDENCE REFERENDUM

2.3 ANALYSIS OF THE INTERNATIONAL PRESS

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THE REFERENDUM IN THE INTERNATIONAL PRESS

1. AN ANALYSIS OF PUBLISHED NEWS

Monitoring of the referendum process, as reported in the international press, was done by scheduling an automatic online newsgathering procedure. For this, the search engines Google News and Google Alerts were used. They were fed a series of keywords related to the Scottish referendum which were to be searched for in either headlines or news excerpts. The database was established using news from around the world; the only requirement was that it be written in English.

The system gathered content relating not only to websites or digital versions of newspapers traditionally published on paper, but also to many other different media, for example: news sites and magazines (exclusively digital), sites of large multimedia groups (TV and Radio broadcasters, etc.), news agency sites, native internet sites (blogs, forums, news aggregators, etc.) or websites of all kinds of groups and organizations (including those of the Yes and No campaigns or their followers, political parties, the Scottish Government, etc.)

A total of almost 1,800 different internet domains were scanned which had published news concerning the referendum, although it must be said that the most recurrent 200 represented 67% of the content gathered.

The most prolific media sources were classified for analysis based on their compass or geographical coverage: Scotland, UK, Europe and International/Global'.

Furthermore, a specific indicator was created to distinguish media of an economic nature from the others.

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[1] *In the Scotland category we included Scottish editions or local versions of English based media when they had their own site, domain or their own sub-domain (e.g. BBC Scotland, Scotland Now or the Daily Record).*

Given the large number of domains the geographical classification was limited to 70% of references. These were those which had at least 5 appearances in the sample.

All British based media were classified under the general tag: UK. This also included media from Wales and Northern Ireland, or those whose circulation is restricted to London.

Media sources from Europe included sources which were avowedly European or dealt wholly with European subjects, as well as those EU Member States which have media that is broadcast or published in English.

Media from the rest of the world, including non-EU Europe, or those with specific sections for different countries, were assigned to the International/Global category.

2. MEDIA AND INFORMATION REFERENCES

EVOLUTION OF THE NUMBER OF REFERENCES

From August 1st, and during the seven weeks preceding the date of the referendum, a large sample composing 6,580 informative references was gathered. Its evolution over time is shown in Figure 1.

As can be seen, interest over time shows a clearly growing trend. Unlike the case of the social networks Facebook and Twitter, where the number of tweets described an exponential trajectory, in the case of news articles the trend was more linear.

In principle[2], this hints at the lower capacity, or space, available in traditional media, including their online versions, when it comes to producing more content on a given topic.

This discrepancy does not stop the graph presenting relative maximums and significant growth when it came to some of the campaign events that were seen as particularly important on social networks. We can add some others to these:
- August 5th, the day of the first debate between AS and AD.
- August 7th .
- August 13th.
- August 18th.
- August 25th, the day of the second debate between AS and AD.
- August 29th .
- September 2nd.
- September 8th, the day the first poll suggesting a lead for the Yes campaign was published.
- Saturday 15th September, the beginning of the last weekend before the vote.

Figure 1

References by date

[2] We must assume that Google's filtering is neutral in this present case. The sample draws on freely accessible digital content, which met the criteria of traffic flow and internet visibility. While it may not match the audience criteria or the reach of the printed press, it can be assumed that if a bias exists this is often due to the media itself and not necessarily to a specific ideological orientation on the part of Google.

THE RELEVANCE OF DIFFERENT TYPES OF MEDIA

Although the gathering of news coverage was taken entirely from the web, the data confirms a well known phenomenon: the hegemony of traditional media as sources of Internet content.

70-75% of news references were generated in the press, magazines, news agencies, radio or TV. Digital media only published 20-25% of content[3]. The other references (up to 100%) were from sources created specifically for the referendum: campaign sites (whether official or not), institutional websites, public opinion survey companies, etc.

The distribution of content according to source remained approximately constant throughout the campaign. The only significant variations deviating from this constant behaviour were the slightly increasing importance of large communication and dissemination groups, as well as a slightly declining importance for the official campaign websites.

Figure 2: Sources of news references by date

References source by date

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
[3] The percentage for digital platforms may be slightly higher, because the media with less than 5 references which were excluded from the analysis were mostly internet sites such as forums, blogs, etc.

GEOGRAPHICAL ORIGIN OF THE INFORMATION

Monitoring began with most news sources originating in the British Isles. Approximately 50% were produced by Scottish media and 30% by other British media (excluding Scotland) in England, Northern Ireland or Wales.

The remaining 20% were published in media with an international or global reach. Only a small percentage were from European based media or from other EU Member States.

As the campaign progressed, the importance of the Scottish media reduced continuously, slowly at first and then rapidly in the last two weeks. The data clearly visualizes the change induced by the publication of polls showing a lead for the Yes camp.

This change in the geographic composition of news sources was caused by the proliferation of international and global publications that became interested in the event. Between September 4th and 18th their relative weight increased from 20% of source material to 50%.

In this final stretch of the campaign we can also note a slight increase in the number of sources originating in the European Union; though their total quote remained the least important, increasing from 3% to 7% in the last fortnight.

The main victims of this explosion of international media sources were the Scots, whose relevance was reduced to less than 20% in the last week.

So, essentially, the importance of the Scottish vs. the international press was reversed during the period analysed. Scottish percentages were divided by 2.5 while international interest multiplied by the same factor.

The importance of information from the rest of the UK remained fairly stable during the campaign.

Figure 3: Geolocated references by date

Geolocated references by date

Economic issues played a notable role in the independence referendum campaign. This phenomenon, documented in preceding chapters, is reflected in the media coverage.

Although the media specializing in economic issues represented a low percentage of the news world's coverage of the referendum, their importance increased throughout the campaign. Significantly, the percentage of news items sourced from this branch of the media doubled in the last fortnight and remained high during the remainder of the lead up to the referendum.

The financial media was more intensely used by supporters of the No vote. Pronouncements in these media became widely reported in other media, especially those outside Scotland.
The data indicates a close relationship between the increasing relevance of the international and financial press. The more distanced from the reality of most Scots, the more important became the media specializing in economic issues.

Figure 4: Relevance of financial news sources by date

Table 1: Relevance of financial news sources by geographical area

References distribution by location and type	Financial (%)	Rest (%)
Scotland	1%	99%
UK	4%	96%
EU	5%	95%
International/Global	17%	83%

The figures in Table 1 only classify news sources according to type of media. As we shall see, the general media also spread economic and financial information which contributed to the importance of these issues in the media agenda.

3. ANALYSIS OF NEWS CONTENT

In this section, we have exclusively selected media that (from a journalistic point of view) were actual producers of news: press agencies, newspapers, TV and radio stations, as well as digital media. After applying this filter, our sample comprised 3,928 news items.

THE MOST RELEVANT MEDIA

The following table shows the media that provided the greatest number of news samples, broken down by geographical area and put in order from the greatest to the least contribution.

Among the media from the rest of Europe, the role of the Irish media was more notable than that of the press in the rest of Europe. Other nationalities in the list which had English versions included Germany, Malta or Russia, but these had a very secondary role.
At the international level, the hegemony of financial and economic thought was remarkable. Leaving aside the international arm of the BBC, the most frequent general media consulted were from the United States and Canada.

Table 2: Main media in news sample

Scotland	UK	EU	International /Global
telegraph.co.uk *	theguardian.com	independent.ie	ft.com
heraldscotland.com	independent.co.uk	irishtimes.com	bbc.com
scotsman.com	reuters.com	dw.de	wsj.com
bbc.co.uk *	huffingtonpost.co.uk	euronews.com	bloomberg.com
dailyrecord.co.uk	cityam.com	euobserver.com	ibtimes.co.uk
stv.tv	mirror.co.uk	euractiv.com	nytimes.com
dailymail.co.uk *	presstv.ir	europeonline-magazine.eu	washingtonpost.com
sundaypost.com	sky.com	theparliamentmagazine. EU	cbc.ca
pressandjournal.co.uk	itv.com	wbponline.com	ibtimes.com
thecourier.co.uk	belfasttelegraph.co.uk	cnn.com *	huffingtonpost.com

Media from wider areas with local edition.

WORD CLOUDS IN NEWS ABOUT THE REFERENDUM

The text of news gathered[4] confirms the key role of the debates and polls during the campaign. These two issues have stratified news content generated by the media, as can be seen in the word cloud drawn up from the most frequently recurring words found in all the news items.[5]

In second place, in terms of importance, was the relevance of the main Scottish and English political leaders headed by the emblematic figure of Alex Salmond. It is worth noting the greater presence of Prime Minister David Cameron compared with the No Campaign's official spokesman, Alistair Darling.

Figure 5: Wordcloud for all news

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[4] In this analysis we have not considered the full contents of the news, only headlines and excerpts. These represent the introductory part of the news, usually stressing the most important aspects and the general tone of the article that follows. Any limitation is imposed by the collection method: via RSS.

[5] Terms used for filtering the news, the most frequent words with neutral semantic charge, along with concepts open to dubious or ambivalent interpretation have been excluded from the analysis. Also not represented graphically are the roots of words or slogans to avoid duplication.

A second approach to content involved comparing the words used in different newsgroups. Thus:

- Geographical Area.[6] If we compare what was published in the Scottish media (or the Scottish edition) with what appeared in the rest of Britain's press and in international media we can appreciate the divergent nature when it came to the importance of the main issues.
  • In Scotland, the figure of Salmond and the televised debates were more relevant; to the detriment of the polls.
  • In the United Kingdom the top of the short list of subjects that dominated the news was the polls, in marked contrast to Scotland. Salmond, Darling and the debates had even greater relevance in the rest of the UK than in Scotland, which seems to indicate that both were relevant to the spikes of media interest in the Scottish referendum in the rest of Great Britain.

  • In the rest of the world Salmond and the debates had less importance; the news outside the UK generally centred on the polls. Here you can see the fact that interest from the international news media sky-rocketed in the final stretch of the campaign.

- Media type: the differences here are minor.
  • The press here had a very similar profile to the rest of the media. In those, Salmond played the greater role.
  • In the digital media, the televised debates were not seen as so important, but Salmond did cede more territory to other subjects in web coverage.
  • On radio, television and the large communication group websites, the most distended subject was the debate, and although Salmond went down in the ranking he kept his important position better than he did in digital media.

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[6] European sources have been excluded because of their low importance to the total.

Figure 6:
Wordclouds for news sources published in
a) Scotland,
b) UK and
c) international and global media

Figure 7:
Wordclouds for news items published in
a) the press,
b) digital media and
c) broadcasting groups

SPECIFICITIES IN THE MEDIA DISCOURSE

A closer analysis of the corpus of information has led us to calculate a specificity index for the terms used in each newsgroup. The most characteristic words consist of those used both above the average and below it.[7]

Table 3: Specific terms in Scottish news

More frequent		Less frequent	
health	1.72	yougov	0.41
NHS	1.71	break	0.44
women	1.63	sterl	0.49
job	1.60	poll	0.58
energy	1.59	market	0.59
debt	1.59	europ	0.61
labour	1.54	nationalist	0.63
cost	1.48	royal	0.64
plan	1.43	histor	0.64
SNP	1.42	nation	0.65
opportun	1.42	mani	0.65
warn	1.40	queen	0.69
better_togeth	1.38	econom	0.69
currenc	1.35	wale	0.76
public	1.34	cameron	0.80
polici	1.30	financi	0.83
tax	1.30	busi	0.84
power	1.28		
westminst	1.28		
miliband	1.26		
govern	1.25		
darl	1.17		
forc	1.16		
ralli	1.15		
brown	1.15		

- Scotland: from this series of more specific terms we can deduce that the flow of news treated related issues such as:
  • The well-being of Scottish citizens (health, work).
  • Women. There is a huge difference between the frequency with which this term appeared in Scottish sources and in others. From the beginning of the referendum campaign it was well known that support for independence was lower in this group, which increased their importance among undecided voters. This seems to have influenced the publication of numerous reports aimed at a female audience.
  • Economic aspects (debt, energy, costs, taxes, currency and the famous Salmond Plan B for a hypothetical refusal from London to allow the use of the pound).
  • The importance of self-government (Government, policies, competences).
  • The combination of positive and negative shades of opinion (independence as an opportunity vs. dire warnings about its consequences).
  • The prominence of certain parties, leaders, and ideologies (especially Labour and Gordon Brown, Ed Miliband, Alistair Darling, all of these more confined to the Scottish media; although less popular as a theme than Salmond).
  • References to the Westminster Government.

- Among the less specific terms were:
  • Polls (YouGov in particular, perhaps the most prestigious company and the first one to release a poll showing an advantage for the Yes campaign). We have already explained that its relevance was greater in the rest of Britain and internationally.

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[7] *As a threshold we used the values 1.15 and 0.85. We included those terms that appeared with at least a frequency of 15% higher or lower than the average for the corpus.*

- Nation, nationalism. These key words attracted more attention in foreign sources than in local ones. This is further confirmation that the Scottish referendum campaign was heavily influenced by social issues.
- Queen, Royal. The British Crown did not have a leading role in news from Scotland. As in the previous case, the monarchy functioned more as an explanatory key for the British and international scenes.
- Break up, separation. This verb barely appeared in news published in Scotland, where it could be found fewer times than in any other geographical areas.
- Other less concrete or more general economic issues referring to the business and financial sector (markets).
- David Cameron. Cameron's low-profile in the campaign is consistent with the No campaign's plan to keep the issue separate, ensuring the vote on Scottish independence was not linked to the Scots' traditional rejection of conservative policies or the latest Tory cuts in social policies.

- UK: the terms and more specific topics in this area were:
  - British political leaders: Gordon Brown, Ed Miliband and David Cameron, accompanied in the background by leaders of the Yes and No campaigns (Alistair Darling and Alex Salmond). This fact verifies the extreme personalization of the referendum campaign around these individual leaders.
  - The Pound. Not counting items about the leaders, the main topic of the news in the British media outside Scotland was the pound. Taxes also gained prominence, although, in this case, they were also of keen interest in Scotland too.

- A campaign of fear: the news is riddled with terms like borders, worry, disruption and battle (the latter not used as frequently in the other areas). Using uncertainty as a strategic weapon in communications was extended out to the idea of the future, a key concept used repeatedly in electoral meetings.
- The monarchy.
- Westminster government and Parliament.
- Polls

Table 4: Specific terms for UK news

More frequent		Less frequent	
brown	1.81	energ	0.15
yougov	1.75	debt	0.23
miliband	1.48	opportun	0.42
sterl	1.47	separ	0.44
cameron	1.35	job	0.45
border	1.34	histori	0.48
chanc	1.31	histor	0.52
royal	1.30	europ	0.58
fear	1.26	chang	0.60
westminst	1.26	public	0.61
darl	1.24	health	0.64
queen	1.23	cost	0.67
member	1.23	oil	0.67
salmond	1.23	market	0.70
poll	1.21	news	0.72
tax	1.19	sea	0.72
futur	1.19	govern	0.73
battl	1.19	european	0.73
survey	1.17	world	0.75
break	1.15	north	0.75
		prime	0.76
		membership	0.77
		undecid	0.77
		econom	0.77
		minist	0.79
		women	0.80
		power	0.82
		polit	0.83
		state	0.84
		currenc	0.85

- As for less used concepts in published news items in the rest of Britain, we have:
  • Various economic areas other than monetary and tax issues (traditionally emblematic of neoliberal policies) such as energy and North Sea oil, debt or employment.
  • History and the historical events that formed the UK.
  • European issues and the membership (or lack of it) of Scotland and/or the UK within the European Union.
  • The NHS.
  • The undecided.
  • Women.
  • The State, its policies and its competences.

- International and global: the characteristic issues for this field of news. The most common being:
  • All economic and financial concerns. While in the Scottish and British arenas we found some issues more or less frequent, in the international media the greater importance of the financial press contributed to the pervasiveness of words such as markets, economy, oil, pound, business, energy and banks whenever news items dealt with the Scottish issue.
  • A combination of different issues that we can frame within the vision that the world has of Europe and the UK: History, nationalists and separatists, nations, NATO, the Queen and the royal family.
  • Polls. The undecided.
  • The possibility of change and emotional aspects linked to it, such as hope and uncertainty. Unlike the British context, the idea of risk or worry, warnings and general fears did not have a particularly strong showing. Verbs with a negative connotation normally used in the context of a dis-

course of fear were also less obviously present.

Table 5: Specific terms for international/global news

More frequent		Less frequent	
market	2.14	brown	0.06
histor	2.04	NHS	0.18
break	1.86	miliband	0.18
nationalist	1.71	women	0.20
econom	1.61	labour	0.27
chang	1.55	tax	0.41
europ	1.52	health	0.43
oil	1.46	westminst	0.46
prime	1.43	plan	0.46
mani	1.43	warn	0.49
financi	1.41	darl	0.51
queen	1.39	better_togeth	0.53
poll	1.39	SNP	0.54
undecid	1.38	salmond	0.61
world	1.34	currenc	0.66
news	1.33	cost	0.68
nato	1.32	polici	0.68
sea	1.30	border	0.68
glasgow	1.29	job	0.69
separ	1.28	chanc	0.72
wale	1.28	futur	0.73
nation	1.28	power	0.75
histori	1.20	fear	0.79
european	1.18	survey	0.80
pound	1.18	member	0.80
busi	1.18		
energy	1.16		
royal	1.16		
hope	1.16		
uncertain	1.16		
polit	1.15		
yougov	1.15		
bank	1.12		

- And finally the least characteristic terms:
  • Virtually all the main issues in the campaign at a Scottish national level. We can verify the thematic opposition between the domestic and international levels. In other words: Scotland and the world had very different political agendas when it came to the independence referendum.

- The international news barely made reference to local and/or minority political leaders, they also ignored the role of Gordon Brown, developing in the background. Only Cameron escaped this apparent invisibility.

- By media type the following specific issues were detected:
  - The press. Greater protagonism given to the role of Brown and Miliband, party leaders on whose electorates the Yes campaign were gambling their growth potential. Above average coverage in the corpus was given to the SNP and Labour. Two particularly relevant issues were women and the NHS. Negatively charged words (battle, warnings) combined with those of a more positive semantic charge (hope, promise). Less relevance given to European issues and oil.

  - Digital media. Here the protagonists were EU membership, North Sea oil and economic issues in general (finance, markets, risks and gains in the case of political change). On the contrary, some words disappeared from this area such as issues of Scottish national policy which had had a greater role in the printed press (e.g. political leaders, debates, women, the NHS, employment, currency, Westminster, NATO, etc.). To some extent the thematic contrast between printed and digital media reflected the existing opposition between the Scottish media and international media, as the former were important especially in the printed press while the latter had greater presence in the economic content of digital media.

Figure 8: Wordcloud for news published in financial media

- TV and radio. Here the protagonists were the polls, TV debates, the Prime Minister, historical and monarchical issues, the competences of the Scottish Government, Alistair Darling and the Better Together campaign, as well as other political issues related to the referendum debate such as oil and the pound. The large media groups more assiduously handled terms relating to break up and change, as well as the concepts of opportunity and future. Although references to uncertainty and expectations still prevailed, the use of words with more negative connotations (risk, force, warning, battle, fear) or those not based on facts (hope, promise) were generally avoided. There was also less fuss made about economic issues in these media. Europe was present in the items dealing with the issue, but not with regards EU membership.

4. ANALYSIS OF THE INTERNATIONAL PRESS

For a specific analysis of the international press a more detailed news corpus was used.

During the weeks surrounding the first and second televised debates[8] an expert selected from a total of 225 news items on the referendum a sample of 22 that had been published in European media (outside Britain) or in the international or global media.

BREAKDOWN OF NEWS SOURCES

These news items were classified in the same detailed way as described in the previous section. But their categorization was expanded by registering the following characteristics:
- title, subtitle, author or signature, place, entire contents of the news item, inclusion or exclusion of media (photography, computer graphics, audio, video); use of hyperlinks, including subheadings, keywords and abstracts.
- Their nature was examined: content type (news, opinion, chronicle).
- Their bias in relation to the referendum campaigns (Pro-Yes, Pro-No or neutral/both).
- Expert judgments were sought to decide the partiality or impartiality of the author of the news item or its content.

The main conclusions that can be drawn from the sample are:

- Localization: International media predominated over European media. Within the minority corresponding to the EU, all our references came from Ireland, except one from Malta. From the rest of the world we could note the Commonwealth (India, Australia), North America (USA and Canada) and the Middle East (Lebanon, Qatar).
- Nature: half of the news can be considered purely digital news items. The rest were divided equally between chronicles and opinion articles.

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[8] *The effort required for this task forced us to limit the time spent on analysis. When planning the work, it was estimated that the televised debates would generate more content and receive more media attention.*

- Presentation resources. Most news items were accompanied by graphic support, all of which corresponded to either the Yes or No camps. The few that did not use graphics were of a more neutral character. Some 60% used hypertext links to connect with new content, and 40% were accompanied by a brief list of related news.
- Bias of content: neutral news coverage of the referendum predominated, with arguments from both the Yes and No campaigns being presented. This was true in more than half the cases. As for the others, they were mostly news items addressing aspects of the independence campaign (coverage of the Yes camp doubled that of issues associated with the Unionists).
- Reporter bias: in 60% of cases it was considered that the news reporter was impartial. In the rest, a slight bias could be appreciated that hinted at the preference of the author of the news item, especially on an ideological level. Only one of the news items got labelled as completely and indisputably partial. This was an item in favour of the No campaign published in Time magazine.
- Finance: Between 20 and 25% of the news items focussed on the economic aspects of the referendum, even where the media in question was considered generalist. In contrast to what usually happened in other news items, when economic issues were addressed the majority of the financial news items studied identified or defended the principles behind the No campaign.

TOPICS IN THE INTERNATIONAL PRESS

The televised debates were the most frequent subject of news item, which became the norm given the fixation of the sample on these campaign events.

The news items referred to the debates both before and after the vote. In the former the prospects of the campaigns were detailed, and the situation illustrated by polls data, with references to citizens' initiatives or the official campaigns, public opinion gathered on the streets, or tracing profiles of all the opposing candidates. These figures came either from agencies, in which case they were short articles, or from consulting reports published online by the polling organizations. In the latter case, victory was granted to Darling and Salmond (in the first and second debates, respectively) and the main topics of discussion (e.g. currency) were illustrated, along with arguments from both sides (for and against independence).

Besides the televised debates, which became the main theme of the sample because of the time-limited fixation on them, the international press we analyzed addressed the following issues:

Opinion articles were usually favourable to the Yes camp, or at least non-belligerent towards them. Overall they claimed that normality would result from an eventual Scottish independence. Although the sample was relatively small, this more benign, or balanced, treatment in news items was echoed in the Irish media and some American media.

The Irish Times, one of the most frequent media sources to crop up in coverage of the referendum, addressed the implications of a hypothetical Scottish independence and its impact on Ireland (North and South) as well as on other states in the European Union, such as Spain or Belgium. They also addressed Scottish independence from

a historical perspective, with a view conditioned by Eire's own past as a former colony of the United Kingdom. Although the Irish paper avoided taking sides, it tackled without fear the possibility of an independent Scotland, and ended up noting that the Yes campaign had already won with respect all the other historical attempts at separation, simply by raising the very real possibility of independence.

In another Irish publication the author reflected on the domestic consequences for Ireland of Scottish independence, and emphasized the idea of a revival of a common Celtic past on which a profitable partnership for both nations could be forged.

Positions closer to the No camp's hopes could be found not in the form of news items or opinions, but in chronicles. Value judgements were slipped into supposedly neutral articles or new items that should have taken a more analytical approach. This happened frequently in the financial news media.

In their economic sections, several generalist newspapers (at least one Indian and one Maltese) echoed the statements of several banks (HSBC and RBS) about the possibility of the flight of capital or economic losses should there be a Yes victory. In both cases the information was supplied by the Reuters news agency, which apparently issued several messages against independence serving the interests of financial lobbies in the City of London.

Another newspaper, a Canadian one, attacked the independence campaign by using North Sea oil and its economic potential as a political argument.

However, we also detected more or less partial positions outside the financial media too: one case being the aforementioned article in Time magazine addressing the outcome of the first televised debate between Salmond and Darling. Time took the defeat of the charismatic nationalist leader in a subsequent poll as the cue to invalidate the arguments of the pro-independence campaign.

CENTRE MAURITS COPPIETERS

The European Parliament recognized the Centre Maurits Coppieters (CMC) as a Political Foundation at a European Level in 2007. Since then the CMC has developed political research focusing on European issues, also in the fields of multilevel governance, management of cultural and linguistic diversity in complex (multi-national) societies, decentralization, state and constitutional reform, succession of states, conflict resolution and protection of human rights.

So far, every little step has been important to the steady consolidation and growth of the Centre, that's why I'm especially proud of this publication. Indeed, it undoubtedly represents a crucial contribution to the current state of affairs and will certainly have a notorious impact both in the Academia and among European decision makers in a broad sense, including European Institutions (like the European commission, European Parliament, Council and Committee of the Regions), other political actors, think tanks, research centers and contributors to the European integration process.

On behalf of the Centre Maurits Coppieters and our partners I sincerely wish to thank the author of the report for his groundbreaking approach to the subject and his passionate, conceptually robust and well structured factual presentation.

Finally I also wish to thank you (the reader) for your interest in our organization and for reviewing our modest contribution to a much wider European political debate in this area.

Günther Dauwen
Secretary of Centre Maurits Coppieters
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- Serving as framework for national or regional think tanks, political foundations and academics to work together at European level;
- Gather and manage information for scientific purposes on all nationalist and regionalist movements, organisations, structures,… in all its appearances situated in a European context;
- Making available information to the public on the implementation of the principle of subsidiarity in a context of a Europe of the Regions;
- Promoting scientific research on the functioning and the history of all national and regional movements in the EU and making the results public to as many people as possible;

- Developing actions to open information sources and historical information sources in a structured and controlled way with the aim to build a common data network on issues of Nationalism and Regionalism in Europe;
- Maintaining contacts with all organisations who are active in national movements and with the Institutions of the EU;

The Centre Maurits Coppieters asbl-vzw takes all the necessary actions to promote and achieve the higher stated goals always observing the principles on which the European Union is founded, namely the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law.

MAURITS COPPIETERS

The Fleming Maurits Coppieters studied history and later became a Doctor of Laws and obtained a master's degree in East European studies. During the Second World War, he refused to work for the German occupier. After many years as a teacher, he worked as a lawyer for a while. He was one of the people who re-established the Vlaamse Volksbeweging (Flemish People's Movement), of which he was the President from 1957-1963.

Coppieters' political career began when he became a member of the Flemish-nationalist party Volksunie (VU) which was formed in 1954. With the exception of two years, Coppieters was a town councillor between 1964 and 1983. He was also elected as a member of the Belgian Chamber (1965-1971) and Senate (1971-1979). At the same time, Coppieters became President of the newly formed '*Cultuurraad voor de Nederlandstalige Cultuurgemeenschap*' (Cultural Council for the Dutch-speaking Community, from which later the Flemish Parliament emanated), when the VU formed part of the government. In 1979, Coppieters was moreover elected during the first direct elections for the European Parliament.

As a regionalist, he became a member of the Group for Technical Coordination and Defence of Independent Groupings and Members in the European Parliament (TCDI). Among other things, he made a name for himself when he championed the cause of the Corsicans. In the meantime, Coppieters also played a pioneering role in the formation of the European Free Alliance, of which he became the Honorary President and in whose expansion he continued to play a role, even after he said farewell to active politics in 1981. In 1996, Coppieters joined forces with the president of the Flemish Parliament, Norbert De Batselier, to promote '*Het Sienjaal*', a project with a view to achieve political revival beyond the party boundaries. Coppieters died on November 11, 2005.

Among other things, Coppieters was the author of: '*Het jaar van de Klaproos*'; '*Ik was een Europees Parlementslid*'; '*De Schone en het Beest*'. He is Honorary member of the EFA.

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www.ezkerraberri.org

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