

(Public) Verifiability For Composable Protocols Without Adaptivity Or Zero-Knowledge

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Abstract. The Universal Composability (UC) framework (FOCS '01) is the current standard for proving security of cryptographic protocols under composition. It allows to reason about complex protocol structures in a bottom-up fashion: any building block that is UC-secure can be composed arbitrarily with any other UC-secure construction while retaining their security guarantees. Unfortunately, some protocol properties such as the verifiability of outputs require excessively strong tools to achieve in UC. In particular, “obviously secure” constructions cannot directly be shown to be UC-secure, and verifiability of building blocks does not easily carry over to verifiability of the composed construction.

In this work, we study Non-Interactive (Public) Verifiability of UC protocols, *i.e.* under which conditions a verifier can ascertain that a party obtained a specific output from the protocol. The verifier may have been part of the protocol execution or not, as in the case of public verifiability. We consider a setting used in a number of applications where it is ok to reveal the input of the party whose output gets verified and analyze under which conditions such verifiability can generically be achieved using “cheap” cryptographic primitives. That is, we avoid having to rely on adaptively secure primitives or heavy computational tools such as NIZKs. As Non-Interactive Public Verifiability is crucial when composing protocols with a public ledger, our approach can be beneficial when designing these with provably composable security and efficiency in mind.

1 Introduction

Universal Composability (UC) [14] is currently the most popular framework for designing and proving security of cryptographic protocols under arbitrary composition. It allows one to prove that a protocol remains secure even in complex

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scenarios consisting of multiple nested protocol executions. The benefit of UC is that, as a formal framework, it allows to discuss the different aspects of an interactive protocol with mathematical precision. But in practice, one often sees that protocol security is argued on a very high level only. This is partially due to the complexity of fully expressing (and then proving) a protocol in UC, but also because achieving provable (UC) security sometimes requires additional, seemingly unnecessary protocol steps or assumptions.

One such case is that of (public) verifiability, which is the focus of this work. A verifiable protocol allows each party to check if another party in the end of the protocol obtained a certain output (or that it aborted). A publicly verifiable protocol has this property even for external verifiers that did not take part in the protocol itself. Public verifiability is particularly important in the setting of decentralized systems and public ledgers (*e.g.* blockchains [40,32,37,30,26]), where new parties can join an ongoing protocol execution on-the-fly after verifying that their view of the protocol is valid. Public verifiability also plays a central role in a recent line of research [2,10,38,5] on secure multiparty computation (MPC) protocols that rely on a public ledger to achieve fairness (*i.e.* ensuring either all parties obtain the protocol output or nobody does, including the adversary) by penalizing cheating parties, circumventing fundamental impossibility results [27]. Protocol verifiability also finds applications in MPC protocols that have identifiable abort such as [35,7,8], where all parties in the protocol either agree on the output or agree on the set of cheaters. Furthermore, public verifiability is an intrinsic property of randomness beacons [24,25], a central component of provably secure Proof-of-Stake blockchain protocols [38,5,26]. However, most of these works achieve (public) verifiability by relying on heavy tools such as non-interactive zero knowledge proof systems and strong assumptions such as adaptive security of the underlying protocols.

1.1 The Problems of Achieving (Public) Verifiability in UC

On a very high level, UC formalizes cryptographic tasks as ideal functionalities \mathcal{F} with which parties \mathcal{P}_i can interact. A protocol Π is said to UC-realize a functionality \mathcal{F} if any execution of a protocol Π by possibly corrupted parties can be simulated by a simulator \mathcal{S} , which may only interact with \mathcal{F} for this task. The functionality, the parties, the adversary \mathcal{A} that controls corrupted parties, the simulator \mathcal{S} and the external distinguisher (“the environment” \mathcal{Z}) that formalize the actual security experiment are modeled as probabilistic polynomial time interactive Turing machines (PPT iTMs).

Consider a UC functionality \mathcal{F} which has one round of inputs by the parties $\mathcal{P} = \{\mathcal{P}_1, \dots, \mathcal{P}_n\}$, computes outputs based on the inputs and in the end sends these outputs to each \mathcal{P}_i . In this work, we are interested in adding verifiability to \mathcal{F} to obtain an extended functionality \mathcal{F}^v . This functionality \mathcal{F}^v performs the same operations as \mathcal{F} , but it additionally allows verifiers to confirm that certain inputs were provided by a party \mathcal{P}_i to \mathcal{F}^v to perform these operations and that certain outputs of these operations were given to \mathcal{P}_i from \mathcal{F}^v . Moreover, we want to obtain a protocol Π^v realizing \mathcal{F}^v from an existing protocol Π that realized

\mathcal{F} . More concretely, we are interested in compiling a UC-secure protocol Π into a UC-secure counterpart Π^V that has (public) verifiability.

The (intuitive) first step in a solution is to construct Π^V such that each party commits to its inputs and randomness. The parties then run Π based on these committed input and randomness values and exchange authenticated messages. Let us assume that we are okay with revealing the inputs after Π is completed but an error could have occurred (we will discuss this assumption below in more detail). Intuitively, this yields a simple verification procedure: each involved party can inspect the committed inputs and randomness of all other parties, re-run these parties in its head and compare its simulated messages to the authenticated protocol transcript. Any external verifier could do the same based on the commitments and an authenticated transcript of Π . Unfortunately, using this simple approach leads to adaptivity problems when trying to prove Π^V secure: in the security proof, the simulation must have been performed without knowing the actual inputs to the functionality. But afterwards, these inputs become known to the verifier so the simulator must be able to explain the transcript in terms of the previously unknown inputs, which exactly requires adaptive security of Π to begin with. Similar issues have been observed before (*e.g.* [35]). This means that any such Π^V would be quite inefficient, since adaptive protocols Π are often significantly less efficient than their counterparts with static security.

Consider, as an example, a two-party secure computation protocol (2PC) Π_{2PC} with active security based on Garbled Circuits (GCs) such as [39,18]. Protocol Π_{2PC} is executed by a sender \mathcal{P}_1 and a receiver \mathcal{P}_2 (where only \mathcal{P}_2 obtains output) as follows:

1. \mathcal{P}_1 generates multiple GCs together with input keys for each circuit. \mathcal{P}_1 commits to the GCs and their input keys. It inputs the input keys belonging to \mathcal{P}_2 into an Oblivious Transfer (OT) functionality \mathcal{F}_{OT} .
2. \mathcal{P}_2 uses \mathcal{F}_{OT} to obtain its input keys.
3. \mathcal{P}_1 decommits the GCs and its own input keys.
4. \mathcal{P}_2 evaluates the GCs. Both parties run a consistency check showing that most GCs were correctly generated and that their input keys are consistent.

The security proof of Π_{2PC} (for static security) usually consists of simulators for a corrupted sender (\mathcal{S}_1) and receiver (\mathcal{S}_2). \mathcal{S}_1 sends random inputs to \mathcal{F}_{OT} , extracts the inputs of \mathcal{P}_1 and then checks that the GCs were generated correctly by the malicious \mathcal{P}_1 . For \mathcal{S}_2 the standard strategy is to first extract the input x_2 of the malicious \mathcal{P}_2 using \mathcal{F}_{OT} , then to obtain the output y from the functionality \mathcal{F}_{2PC} , to choose a random input \tilde{x}_1 and finally to simulate GCs such that they output y for the input keys of \tilde{x}_1, x_2 . In order to make Π_{2PC} verifiable (with respect to revealing inputs and outputs), let \mathcal{F}_{2PC}^V release the real input x_1 of \mathcal{P}_1 after the computation finished. But in \mathcal{S}_2 we generated the GCs such that for the dummy input \tilde{x}_1 it outputs y , so the garbling may not even be a correct garbling of the given circuit. There might not exist randomness to explain the output of \mathcal{S}_2 consistently with x_1 , unless Π_{2PC} was an adaptively secure protocol.

This seems counter-intuitive: beyond the technical reason to allow (UC) simulation of verifiability, we see no explanation why only adaptively secure protocols should be verifiable when following the aforementioned compilation steps.

1.2 Our Contributions

In this work, we show how to compile a large class of statically UC-secure protocols into publicly verifiable versions that allow a party to non-interactively prove that it obtained a certain output by revealing its input. While revealing an input is a caveat, this flavor of (public) verifiability is sufficient for a number of applications (*e.g.* [5,25,6]) and allows us to circumvent the need for expensive generic zero knowledge proofs and adaptive security (as needed in [35,38]). We introduce a compiler relying only on commitment and “joint authentication” functionalities that can be realized with cheap public-key primitives.

Our approach is compatible with protocols realizing non-reactive functionalities such as Oblivious Transfer, Commitments or Secure Function Evaluation. We describe a standard wrapper for any such functionality to equip it with the interfaces necessary for non-interactive verification, allowing external verifiers to register and to perform verification. This wrapper is designed to amalgamate the reactive nature of UC with non-interactivity and might be of independent interest. Extending our approach to reactive functionalities is an interesting open problem.

When is revealing inputs for verification justifiable? Although our focus on revealing inputs might seem very restrictive, there is a quite substantial set of protocols where it can be applied.

As a starting point, our techniques can be used to instantiate preprocessing for UC-secure MPC with Identifiable Abort without adaptive assumptions [35,8]. Our approach also applies when one wants to publicly and randomly sample from a distribution and identify cheaters who disturbed the process. For example, our results have already been used as an essential tool in follow-up work constructing UC randomness beacons [25].

A third application is to bootstrap MPC without output verifiability to MPC with output verifiability *without revealing of inputs*. Here, each physical party \mathcal{P}_i in the protocol Π_{MPC} runs two virtual parties $\mathcal{P}_i^C, \mathcal{P}_i^V$. It will give \mathcal{P}_i^C the actual input x (while \mathcal{P}_i^V has no input), and both parties obtain the same output y from Π_{MPC} . Now, in order to convince a verifier that \mathcal{P}_i had y as output, it can “sacrifice” \mathcal{P}_i^V and reveal its randomness for verification. Observe that this requires Π_{MPC} to be secure against a dishonest majority of parties.

A fourth application lies in achieving cheater identification in the output phase of MPC protocols, which is a prerequisite for obtaining MPC with monetary fairness such as [2,10,38,5]. For example, using our techniques, it would be possible to construct the publicly verifiable building blocks of the output phase of Insured MPC [5] and related applications [6] since the inputs of the output phase with cheater identification are supposed to be revealed anyway. In [5] the authors had to individually redefine each functionality with respect to verifiability and reprove the security of each protocol involved. Using our techniques,

we show in Appendix E that this tedious task can be avoided and that the same result can be obtained by inspecting the primitives used in their protocol and verifying that the protocols fulfill the requirements of our compiler.

Shortcomings of other approaches. As was already mentioned above, verifiability can also be obtained in other ways. We now consider these in more detail and outline their shortcomings.

First, it is clear that any construction departing from a statically secure protocol needs more than equivocable commitments to inputs and randomness. Once the real inputs are known for verification, randomness that is consistent with the existing transcript of Π must be created. The simulator \mathcal{S} of a statically secure UC-protocol Π usually does not perform such a task, and such randomness may not even exist – it only exists (and is efficiently computable) if the protocol is adaptively secure. Hence, using equivocable commitments for inputs and randomness is necessary but not sufficient.

For adaptive protocols, it is well-known that they usually have larger computation or communication overheads (or stronger assumptions) than their statically secure counterparts. For example, Yao’s Garbling Scheme (and optimizations thereof) are highly efficient with static security (e.g [45]) but achieve similar performance with adaptive security only for NC1-circuits [36] (unless one relies on Random Oracles [9]). When implementing Π_{2PC} , one would also additionally have to realize an adaptively UC-secure \mathcal{F}_{OT} , which is also cheaper with static instead of adaptive security. This is also true when OT-extension is used [22,21].

Previous works such as [38] obtain public verifiability, even without revealing inputs and without adaptive protocols, is by using generic UC-NIZKs. They follow the GMW paradigm [34] where each party would prove in every protocol step of Π that it created all messages correctly, given all previous messages as well as commitments to inputs and randomness. To the best of our knowledge, no work that uses UC-NIZKs to achieve verifiability estimated concrete parameters for their constructions. This is due to the fact that the UC-NIZKs, in addition to proving the protocol steps, also have to use the code of the cryptographic primitives in a white-box way. That also means that UC-NIZKs cannot be applied if the compiled protocol Π uses Random Oracles for efficiency.

Another solution, which works in the case that Π is an MPC protocol is to let Π compute commitments to the outputs of each party inside the secure computation before revealing the outputs. Obviously, this does not generalize to arbitrary protocols Π , whereas our approach does. Additionally, in this approach one needs to evaluate the commitment algorithm white-box in MPC. Evaluating cryptographic primitives inside MPC can be costly, in particular if the MPC protocol is defined over a ring where the commitment algorithm has a large circuit. This also would rule out cheap Random Oracle-based commitments.

1.3 Our Techniques

Our black-box route to verifiability: We construct a compiler that generically achieves public verifiability for protocols with one round of input followed

by multiple computation and output rounds as formalized in Section 2. For this, we start with an observation similar to [35], namely that by fixing the inputs, randomness and messages in a protocol Π we can get guarantees about the outputs. This is because fixing the inputs, randomness and received messages essentially fixes the view of a party, as the messages generated and sent by a party are deterministic given all of these other values. Therefore, our main idea is to have a compiler which creates a protocol Π^V that fixes parties' input and randomness pairs by having parties commit to these pairs and authenticate the messages exchanged between parties in such a way that an external party can verify such committed/authenticated items after the fact. On the other hand, fixing all messages that are exchanged in the original protocol Π is costly and might be overkill for some protocols. We explore this concept in the notion of *transcript non-malleability* as defined in Section 3.1. There, we formalize the intuition that we might not need that all exchanged messages are fixed in some protocols: *e.g.* an adversary that is allowed to replace messages exchanged between dishonest parties possibly does not have enough leverage to forge a consistent transcript for a different output.

Proving security in UC: It might seem obvious that Π^V , i.e. a version of Π with all of its inputs and messages fixed, is publicly verifiable and implements \mathcal{F}^V . Unfortunately, as we outlined above, a construction of a simulator \mathcal{S}^V in the proof of security needs to assume that Π is adaptively secure. In Section 3.2 we address this by using *input-aware simulators* (or *über simulators*) \mathcal{S}^U . These are special simulators which can be parameterized with the inputs for the simulated honest parties, generating transcripts consistent with these inputs but indistinguishable from the transcripts of \mathcal{S} . We then embed an über simulator of a protocol Π into the publicly verifiable functionality \mathcal{F}^V . This delegates the simulation of Π to \mathcal{F}^V 's internal über simulator – whereas in our naive approach, \mathcal{S}^V had to simulate Π itself. Since we let \mathcal{F}^V only release the transcripts that \mathcal{S}^U generates, this does not leak any additional information to the adversary. Moreover, \mathcal{S}^U now also extracts the inputs of the dishonest parties.

Getting Über Simulators (almost) for free: Following our example with Π_{2PC} from Section 1.1, \mathcal{S}_1 for a corrupted sender uses a random input to \mathcal{F}_{OT} and otherwise follows Π_{2PC} . Towards constructing \mathcal{S}_1^U , observe that as \mathcal{F}_{OT} by its own UC-security hides the input of \mathcal{P}_2 , running \mathcal{S}_1 inside \mathcal{F}_{2PC}^V using real inputs of \mathcal{P}_2 is indistinguishable and we can use such a modified \mathcal{S}_1 as \mathcal{S}_1^U . Conversely, we can also construct \mathcal{S}_2^U , which runs Π_{2PC} based on the input x_1 that it obtains. By the UC-security of Π_{2PC} , the distribution of \mathcal{S}_2^U will be indistinguishable from \mathcal{S}_2 .

As can be seen from this example, an efficient über simulator must not be artificial or strong, but could be quite simply obtained from either the existing protocol or existing \mathcal{S} . Its requirement also differs from requiring adaptivity of Π_{2PC} : \mathcal{S}_2^U still only requires Π_{2PC} to be statically secure. In fact, this strategy for constructing an über simulator works for any protocols that simulate their online phase in the security proof using “artificial” fixed inputs and otherwise run the protocol honestly while they are able to extract inputs (*e.g.* MPC protocols

such as [41,29]). Hence, we can directly make a large class of protocols verifiable. This is discussed further in Section 3.3.

How to realize transcript non-malleability. Besides fixing inputs and randomness, in order to construct compilers from Π to Π^V we need to fix the transcript of Π . For this, we have parties in Π^V use what we call “joint authentication” (defined in Section 4). Joint Authentication works for both public and private messages. In the public case, joint authentication is achieved by having all parties sign a message sent by one of them. In the private case, we essentially allow parties to authenticate commitments to private messages that are only opened to the rightful receivers. Later on, any party who received that private message (*i.e.* the opening of the commitment to the message) can publicly prove that it obtained a certain message that was jointly authenticated by all parties involved in Π^V . More importantly, joint authentication does not perform any communication itself but provides authentication tokens that can be verified in a non-interactive manner. These functionalities force dishonest parties to commit to their transcript without revealing private messages ahead of time or implying communication (parties have to send the actual messages and authentication tokens through regular channels). In our example with Π_{2PC} , this means that both $\mathcal{P}_1, \mathcal{P}_2$ initially commit to their inputs and randomness and then sign all exchanged messages (checking that each message is signed by its sender).

Putting things together. We use the techniques described above to compile any protocol Π that fits one of our transcript non-malleability definitions and UC-realizes a functionality \mathcal{F} in the $\mathcal{F}_1, \dots, \mathcal{F}_n$ -hybrid model into a protocol Π^V that UC-realizes a publicly verifiable \mathcal{F}^V in the $\mathcal{F}_1^V, \dots, \mathcal{F}_n^V$ -hybrid model (*i.e.* assuming that the setup functionalities can also be made publicly verifiable).

Our compilation technique has two main components: 1. use a special instance of secret joint authentication to commit to and authenticate each party’s input and randomness pairs of Π ; 2. execute Π and use public/secret joint authentication to jointly authenticate each exchanged protocol message. The first step fixes the input and randomness pairs and the second step fixes the transcript of Π in such a way that each party can publicly and non-interactively show that it used a certain input/randomness pair at and that a given transcript was generated. Notice that using these guarantees we have brought Π to a very strong level of transcript non-malleability, since the adversary can neither lie about its input and randomness pairs nor its view of the transcript. In order to realize the public verifiability interface of \mathcal{F}^V , we have a party open its input and randomness pair as well as its view of the transcript, which could not have been forged, allowing the verifier to execute an honest party’s steps as in Π to verify that a given output is obtained. When proving security of this compiler, we delegate the simulation of the original steps of Π to an über simulator \mathcal{S}^U for Π embedded in \mathcal{F}^V . This guarantees that the transcript of \mathcal{S} ’s simulated execution of Π^V is consistent with honest parties’ inputs if they activate public verification and reveal their input. To compile our example protocol from this section, we now combine all of the aforementioned steps and additionally assume

that \mathcal{F}_{OT} as well as the commitment-functionality are already verifiable. By the compiler theorem, the resulting protocol is verifiable according to our definition.

In Appendix E we give a more detailed example by showing how to more easily achieve verifiability in [5].

1.4 Related Work

Despite being very general, UC has seen many extensions such as e.g. UC with joint state [20] or Global UC [16], aiming at capturing protocols that use global ideal setups. Verifiability for several kinds of protocols has been approached from different perspectives, such as cheater identification [35,7], verifiability of MPC [4,44], incoercible secure computation [1], secure computation on public ledgers [2,10,38], and improved definitions for widely used primitives [13,12]. Another solution to solve the adaptivity requirement was recently presented in [8], but their approach only works for functionalities without input. A different notion of verifiability was put forward in publicly verifiable covert 2PC protocols such as [3] and its follow-up works, where parties can show that the other party has cheated. To the best of our knowledge, no previous work has considered a generic definition of non-interactive public verifiability in the UC framework nor a black-box compiler for achieving such a notion *without* requiring adaptive security of the underlying protocol or zero knowledge proof systems.

2 Preliminaries

We denote the security parameter by κ and the concatenation of two strings a and b by $a \parallel b$. Let $y \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} F(x)$ denote running the randomized algorithm F with input x and random coins, and obtaining the output y . When the coins r are specified we use $y \leftarrow F(x; r)$. $y \leftarrow F(x)$ is used for a deterministic algorithm. For a set \mathcal{X} , let $x \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathcal{X}$ denote x chosen uniformly at random from \mathcal{X} ; and for a distribution \mathcal{Y} , let $y \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathcal{Y}$ denote y sampled according to the distribution \mathcal{Y} . We denote by $\text{negl}(\kappa)$ the set of negligible functions of κ and abbreviate *probabilistic polynomial time* as PPT. We write $\{0, 1\}^{\text{poly}(\kappa)}$ to denote a set of bit-strings of polynomial length in κ . Two ensembles $X = \{X_{\kappa, z}\}_{\kappa \in \mathbb{N}, z \in \{0, 1\}^*}$ and $Y = \{Y_{\kappa, z}\}_{\kappa \in \mathbb{N}, z \in \{0, 1\}^*}$ of binary random variables are said to be *statistically indistinguishable*, denoted by $X \approx_s Y$, if for all z it holds that $|\Pr[\mathcal{D}(X_{\kappa, z}) = 1] - \Pr[\mathcal{D}(Y_{\kappa, z}) = 1]|$ is negligible in κ for every probabilistic distinguisher \mathcal{D} . In case this only holds for non-uniform PPT distinguishers we say that X and Y are *computationally indistinguishable*, denoted by $X \approx_c Y$.

2.1 Secure Protocols

A protocol Π consists of the algorithms `nmes`, `out` and additional parameters: the number of parties n , the setup resources $\mathcal{F}_1, \dots, \mathcal{F}_r$, the number of output rounds G , the number of rounds H_τ to obtain each output $\tau \in [G]$ as well as the communication and output model. We assume that external system parameters $s \in \{0, 1\}^{\text{poly}(\kappa)}$ are fixed for the protocol. In an MPC scheme, these parameters e.g. could consist of the circuit. Each party \mathcal{P}_i uses their respective input $x_i \in \mathcal{X}$ as well as randomness $r_i \in \{0, 1\}^{\text{poly}(\kappa)}$ for the actual protocol, where \mathcal{X}

is the set of possible protocol inputs. Here they perform H_τ calls to a next-message function with a subsequent message exchange with both the parties and the resources, finalized by the computation of the τ -th output of the protocol. Formally, the algorithms which comprise Π are as follows:

nmes is a deterministic polynomial-time (DPT) algorithm which on input the party number i , protocol input $x_i \in \mathcal{X}$, randomness $r_i \in \{0, 1\}^{\text{poly}(\kappa)}$, auxiliary input $s \in \{0, 1\}^{\text{poly}(\kappa)}$, output round $\tau \in [G]$, round number $\rho \in [H_\tau]$ and previous messages $\mathcal{M}_{\cdot,i}$ from parties and $\mathcal{N}_{\cdot,i}$ from resources outputs $\{\mathbf{m}_{i,j}^{(\tau,\rho)}\}_{j \in [n] \setminus \{i\}}, \{\mathbf{mres}_{i,q}^{(\tau,\rho)}\}_{q \in [r]}$.

out is a DPT algorithm which on input the party number i , the protocol input $x_i \in \mathcal{X}$, randomness $r_i \in \{0, 1\}^{\text{poly}(\kappa)}$, auxiliary input $s \in \{0, 1\}^{\text{poly}(\kappa)}$ as well as output round $\tau \in [G]$, a set of messages $\mathcal{M}_{\cdot,i}$ from parties and $\mathcal{N}_{\cdot,i}$ from resources outputs $y_i^{(\tau)}$ which is either an output value or \perp . The values x_i, r_i might not be necessary in every protocol and we allow use of **out** without it as well.

nmes generates two different types of messages, namely **m**- and **mres**-messages. As we shall see later, the **m**-messages are used for communication *among parties* whereas **mres**-messages are exchanged *between a party and a functionality*. Therefore, each **mres**-message consists of an interface $(\mathbf{Input}_i, \mathbf{Compute}^{(\tau)}, \mathbf{Output}_i^{(\tau)})$ with whom the party wants to communicate as well as the actual payload. Each message that is an output of **nmes** may either be an actual string or a symbol \perp , meaning that no message is sent to a certain party/functionality whatsoever in a certain round. For notational consistency, whenever we write $\mathbf{m}_{i,j}$ we mean that a message was sent from party \mathcal{P}_i to \mathcal{P}_j . Similarly, we write $\mathbf{mres}_{i,q}$ when the message was sent from \mathcal{P}_i to \mathcal{F}_q and $\mathbf{mres}_{q,i}$ when sent from \mathcal{F}_q to \mathcal{P}_i . We will denote messages received by party \mathcal{P}_i from another party as $\mathcal{M}_{\cdot,i}$ and those sent by \mathcal{P}_i to another party as $\mathcal{M}_{i,\cdot}$. Similarly, we will write $\mathcal{N}_{\cdot,i}$ for all messages that \mathcal{P}_i received from resources while $\mathcal{N}_{i,\cdot}$ denotes messages which \mathcal{P}_i sent to resources. In Figure 1 we describe the general pattern according to which the above algorithms are used in the protocol Π .

Communication Model. Generally, we do not make any restriction on the messages that are exchanged (except that their length is polynomial in the security parameter κ). If these will be sent through point-to-point secure channels, then we call this setting *private communication*. If the parties instead send the same message to all other parties, then we consider this as *broadcast communication*. Parties may arbitrarily mix private and broadcast communication.

Output Model. We do not restrict the output $y_i^{(\tau)}$ which each party obtains in the end of the computation and which should be verifiable. This permits the general setting where all the $y_i^{(\tau)}$ might be completely different. This is the standard for many interesting functions that one can compute, e.g. Oblivious Transfer.

2.2 Universal Composition of Secure Protocols

In this work we use the (Global) Universal Composability or (G)UC model [14,16] for analyzing security and refer interested readers to the original works for more




Fig. 1. The generic protocol Π .

details. Naturally, we only discuss the dishonest-majority setting in this work as honest-majority protocols can simply output a vote of all parties if the result is correct or not (if broadcast is available).

Protocols are run by interactive Turing Machines (iTMs) which we call *parties*. A protocol Π will have n parties which we denote as $\mathcal{P} = \{\mathcal{P}_1, \dots, \mathcal{P}_n\}$. We assume that each party runs in probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) in some implicit security parameter κ . The *adversary* \mathcal{A} , which also is a PPT iTM, will be able to corrupt parties, but we only allow him to corrupt up to a threshold of $k < n$ of them, though non-threshold adversary structures may also be supported. We opt for the static corruption model where the parties are corrupted from the beginning, as this is what most efficient protocols currently are developed for. The set of corrupted parties is denoted as $I \subset \mathcal{P}$. Parties can exchange messages with each other and also with resources, which we call *ideal functionalities* (which themselves are PPT iTMs). To simplify notation we assume that the messages between parties are sent over secure channels.

We start out with protocols that are themselves already secure, but not verifiable. For this, we assume that the ideal functionality \mathcal{F} of a protocol Π follows the pattern as described in Figure 2. In there, we consider protocols where parties give input initially, but obtain possibly G rounds of output. Having multiple rounds of outputs can be seen as a trade-off: on one hand, it allows us to model e.g. commitment schemes which would not be possible having only one round of output. At the same time, it is not general enough to permit reactive computations which inherently make the notation a lot more complex.

It is not necessary that all of the interfaces which \mathcal{F} provides are used for an application. For example in the case of coin tossing, no party \mathcal{P}_i ever has to call **Input $_i$** . While **Input $_i$** , **Output $_i^{(\tau)}$** are fixed in their semantics, the application may freely vary how **Compute $^{(\tau)}$** may act upon the inputs or generate out-

Functionality \mathcal{F}

Functionality \mathcal{F} has common public input $s \in \{0, 1\}^{\text{poly}(\kappa)}$ and interacts with a set \mathcal{P} of n parties and an ideal adversary \mathcal{S} . Upon initialization, \mathcal{S} is allowed to corrupt a set $I \subset \mathcal{P}$ of parties where $|I| \leq k$ and $k < n$. Each of \mathcal{F} 's interfaces falls into one of 3 different categories for providing inputs as well as running the G evaluation and output steps.

Input _{i} : On input (INPUT, sid, x_i) by \mathcal{P}_i and (INPUT, sid) by all other parties store $x_i \in \mathcal{X}$ locally and send (INPUT, sid, i) to all parties. Every further message to this interface is discarded and once set, x_i may not be altered anymore.

Compute^(τ): On input (COMPUTE, sid, τ) by a set of parties $J_\tau \subseteq \mathcal{P}$ as well as \mathcal{S} perform a computation based on s as well as the current state of the functionality. The computation is to be specified in concrete implementations of this functionality. The last two steps of this interface are fixed and as follows:

1. Set some values $y_1^{(\tau)}, \dots, y_n^{(\tau)}$. Only this interface is allowed to alter these.
2. Send (COMPUTE, sid, τ) to every party in J_τ .

Every further call to **Compute^(τ)** is ignored. Every call to this interface before all **Input _{i}** are finished is ignored, as well as when **Compute^($\tau-1$)** has not finished yet.

Output _{i} ^(τ): On input (OUTPUT, sid, τ) by \mathcal{P}_i where $\tau \in [G]$ and if $y_i^{(\tau)}$ was set send (OUTPUT, $sid, \tau, y_i^{(\tau)}$) to \mathcal{P}_i .

Fig. 2. The generic functionality \mathcal{F} .

puts. The only constraint that we make is that for each of the $\tau \in [G]$ rounds, **Compute^(τ)** sets output values $(y_1^{(\tau)}, \dots, y_n^{(\tau)})$.

As usual, we define security with respect to a PPT iTM \mathcal{Z} called *environment*. The environment provides inputs to and receives outputs from the parties \mathcal{P} . Furthermore, the adversary \mathcal{A} will corrupt parties $I \subset \mathcal{P}$ in the name of \mathcal{Z} and thus gain control over these parties, i.e. will see and be able to generate the protocol messages. To define security, let $\Pi \circ \mathcal{A}$ be the distribution of the output of an arbitrary \mathcal{Z} when interacting with \mathcal{A} in a real protocol instance Π . Furthermore, let \mathcal{S} denote an *ideal world adversary* and $\mathcal{F} \circ \mathcal{S}$ be the distribution of the output of \mathcal{Z} when interacting with parties which run with \mathcal{F} instead of Π and where \mathcal{S} takes care of adversarial behavior.

Definition 1 (Secure Protocol). *We say that \mathcal{F} securely implements Π if for every PPT iTM \mathcal{A} there exists a PPT iTM \mathcal{S} (with black-box access to \mathcal{A}) such that no PPT environment \mathcal{Z} can distinguish $\Pi \circ \mathcal{A}$ from $\mathcal{F} \circ \mathcal{S}$ with non-negligible probability in κ .*

In our protocols we use the standard digital signature functionality \mathcal{F}_{Sig} from [15], the key registration functionality \mathcal{F}_{Reg} from [17] and an authenticated bulletin board functionality \mathcal{F}_{BB} , which are described in Supplementary Material A. We also use constructions of IND-CCA public key encryption schemes that UC-realize the standard public key encryption functionality that are described in Supplementary Material B.

Functionality Wrapper $\mathcal{F}^V[\mathcal{F}]$

The functionality wrapper $\mathcal{F}^V[\mathcal{F}]$ adds the interfaces below to a generic functionality \mathcal{F} defined as in Figure 2, still allowing direct access to \mathcal{F} . \mathcal{F}^V is parameterized by an über simulator \mathcal{S}^U executed internally (as discussed in Section 3.4) and maintains binary variables `verification-active`, `verify-1`, \dots , `verify-n` that are initially 0 and used to keep track of the verifiable outputs. Apart from the set of parties \mathcal{P} and ideal adversary \mathcal{S} defined in \mathcal{F} , \mathcal{F}^V interacts with verifiers $\mathcal{V}_i \in \mathcal{V}$.

Register Verifier (private): Upon receiving $(\text{REGISTER}, \text{sid})$ from \mathcal{V}_i :

- If `verification-active` = 1 send $(\text{REGISTER}, \text{sid}, \mathcal{V}_i)$ to \mathcal{S} . If \mathcal{S} answers with $(\text{REGISTER}, \text{sid}, \mathcal{V}_i, \text{ok})$, set $\mathcal{V} \leftarrow \mathcal{V} \cup \mathcal{V}_i$ and return $(\text{REGISTERED}, \text{sid})$ to \mathcal{V}_i .
- If `verification-active` = 0 return $(\text{VERIFICATION-INACTIVE}, \text{sid})$ to \mathcal{V}_i .

Register Verifier (public): Upon receiving $(\text{REGISTER}, \text{sid})$ from \mathcal{V}_i :

- If `verification-active` = 1 set $\mathcal{V} \leftarrow \mathcal{V} \cup \mathcal{V}_i$ and return $(\text{REGISTERED}, \text{sid})$ to \mathcal{V}_i .
- If `verification-active` = 0 return $(\text{VERIFICATION-INACTIVE}, \text{sid})$ to \mathcal{V}_i .

Activate Verification: Upon receiving $(\text{ACTIVATE-VERIFICATION}, \text{sid}, \text{open-i}, \text{open-input-i})$ from each \mathcal{P}_i and if $\text{Compute}^{(1)}, \dots, \text{Compute}^{(G)}$ succeeded:

1. Let $Y \leftarrow \{j \in [n] \mid \text{open-j} = 1 \wedge \text{verify-j} = 0\}$. If $Y = \emptyset$ then return.
2. Set `verification-active` \leftarrow 1 (if it is not set already) and deactivate the interfaces $\text{Compute}^{(\tau)}$ for all $\tau \in [G]$.
3. If `open-input-i` = 1, then set $z_i = x_i$; otherwise $z_i = \perp$.
4. Send $(\text{ACTIVATING-VERIFICATION}, \text{sid}, Y, \{z_j, \mathbf{y}_j^{(\tau)}\}_{j \in Y, \tau \in [G]})$ to \mathcal{S} . If \mathcal{P}_i is honest, append its randomness R_i (obtained from \mathcal{S}^U) to this message.
5. Upon receiving $(\text{ACTIVATING-VERIFICATION}, \text{sid}, \text{ok})$ from \mathcal{S} set `verify-j` \leftarrow 1 for each $j \in Y$. Then return $(\text{VERIFICATION-ACTIVATED}, \text{sid}, Y, \{z_j, \mathbf{y}_j^{(\tau)}\}_{j \in Y, \tau \in [G]})$ to all parties in \mathcal{P} .

Verify_j: Upon receiving $(\text{VERIFY}, \text{sid}, j, a, b^{(1)}, \dots, b^{(G)})$ from \mathcal{V}_i where $\mathcal{V}_i \in \mathcal{V}$ and $\mathcal{P}_j \in \mathcal{P}$ do the following:

- if `verify-j` = 1 then compute the set $B \leftarrow \{\tau \in [G] \mid b^{(\tau)} \neq \mathbf{y}_j^{(\tau)}\}$. If $a = z_j$, then set $f \leftarrow a$; otherwise $f \leftarrow \perp$. Return $(\text{VERIFY}, \text{sid}, j, f, B)$ to \mathcal{V}_i .
- If `verify-j` = 0 then send $(\text{CANNOT-VERIFY}, \text{sid}, j)$ to \mathcal{V}_i .

Input_i: On input $(\text{INPUT}, \text{sid}, x_i)$ by \mathcal{P}_i and $(\text{INPUT}, \text{sid})$ by all other parties, forward $(\text{INPUT}, \text{sid}, x_i)$ to \mathcal{F} and also forward responses from \mathcal{F} to \mathcal{P}_i . Finally, after receiving $(\text{INPUT}, \text{sid}, x_i)$ from all $\mathcal{P}_i, i \in \bar{I}$ (i.e. all honest parties), initialize \mathcal{S}^U parameterizing it with \mathcal{F} 's randomness tape and with x_i for all honest \mathcal{P}_i .

NMF_{S^U}: Upon input $(\text{NEXTMSGP}, \text{sid}, j, \tau, \rho, \{\mathbf{m}_{i,j}\}_{i \in I})$ where $j \in \bar{I}$ or $(\text{NEXTMSGF}, \text{sid}, q, \tau, \rho, \text{mres}_{i,q})$ where $i \in I$ and $q \in [r]$ by \mathcal{S} , send the respective message to \mathcal{S}^U . Forward all messages between \mathcal{S}^U and \mathcal{F} , so that \mathcal{S}^U mediates interaction between \mathcal{F} and \mathcal{S} , also delivering extracted adversarial inputs. Finally, after \mathcal{S}^U outputs a response $(\text{NEXTMSGP}, \text{sid}, j, \tau, \rho + 1, \{\mathbf{m}_{j,i}\}_{i \in I})$ or $(\text{NEXTMSGF}, \text{sid}, q, \tau, \rho + 1, \text{mres}_{q,i})$, forward it to \mathcal{S} .

Fig. 3. The Functionality wrapper $\mathcal{F}^V[\mathcal{F}]$. The modifications to interface **Input_i** and the new interface **NMF_{S^U}** are discussed in Section 3.4.

2.3 Verifiable Functionalities

We extend the functionality \mathcal{F} from Section 2.2 to provide a notion of non-interactive verification using a functionality wrapper $\mathcal{F}^{\mathcal{V}}$ described in Figure 3. For this, we assume that there are additional parties \mathcal{V}_i which can partake in the verification. These, as well as regular protocol parties, can register at runtime to be verifiers of the computation using a special interface **Register Verifier**. Once they are registered, these verifiers are allowed to check the validity of outputs for parties that have initiated verification at any point. We keep track of this using the set of verifiers \mathcal{V} (which is initially empty) inside the functionality. For values whose output has been provided using the interface **Output_i^(τ)** (that we inherit from the definition of \mathcal{F} of Section 2.2) we allow the parties \mathcal{P} to use an interface called **Activate Verification** to enable everyone in \mathcal{V} to check their outputs via the interface **Verify_i**. The modifications to **Input_i** and the new interface **NMF_{S \mathcal{V}}** are related to the über simulators discussed in Section 3.4.

Notice that, in our constructions, a verifier $\mathcal{V}_i \in \mathcal{V}$ can perform verification with help from data obtained in mainly two different ways: 1. receiving verification data from another verifier $\mathcal{V}_j \in \mathcal{V}$ or a party $\mathcal{P}_i \in \mathcal{P}$; 2. retrieving verification data directly from publicly available resource such as a Bulletin Board (represented as a setup functionality). In case \mathcal{V}_i attempts to obtain verification data from another party in $\mathcal{V} \cup \mathcal{P}$, that party might be corrupted, allowing the ideal adversary \mathcal{S} to interfere (*i.e.* providing corrupted verification data or not answering at all). On the other hand, when \mathcal{V}_i obtains such verification data from a resource available as setup (*i.e.* a resource guaranteed to be untamperable by the adversary), \mathcal{S} has no control over the verification process. In order to model the situation where verification data is obtained reliably and that where it is obtained unreliably, $\mathcal{F}^{\mathcal{V}}$ might implement only **Register Verifier (public)** or only **Register Verifier (private)**, respectively. We do not require $\mathcal{F}^{\mathcal{V}}$ to implement both of these interfaces, and thus define the properties of $\mathcal{F}^{\mathcal{V}}$ according to which of them is implemented, according to Definitions 2 and 3.

Definition 2 (Verifier Registration). *Let \mathcal{F} be a functionality which implements the interface **Register Verifier (public)**, then \mathcal{F} is said to have Public Verifier Registration. If \mathcal{F} instead implements **Register Verifier (private)** then we say that it has Private Verifier Registration.*

Definition 3 (Non-Interactively Verifiable (NIV)). *Let \mathcal{F} be a functionality which implements the above interfaces **Activate Verification** and **Verify_j** and which has Verifier Registration according to Definition 2, then we call \mathcal{F} NIV. If \mathcal{F} has Public Verifier Registration then \mathcal{F} is Publicly Verifiable whereas we call it Privately Verifiable if \mathcal{F} has Private Verifier Registration.*

3 Verifiability

We now present our approach for making protocols non-interactively verifiable. For this, we will first introduce a classification for the robustness of a protocol to attacks on its “inherent” verifiability. Then, we describe properties that are necessary to achieve simulation-based security for our approach to verifiability.

3.1 Transcript Malleability of Protocols

Informally, our approach to verification (as outlined in Section 1.3) is to leverage properties for verifiability that are potentially already built into the protocol. This is because we only want to rely on the protocol itself in a black-box fashion. As the verifier can then only rely on the protocol transcript, let us consider how such a transcript comes into existence.

In practice, we would first run a protocol instance of Π with an adversary \mathcal{A} . Afterwards, the adversary may have the possibility to change parts of the protocol transcript in order to trigger faulty behavior in the outputs of parties. If the adversary cannot trigger erroneous behavior, then this means that we can establish correctness of an output of such a protocol by using the messages of its transcript, some opened inputs and randomness as well as some additional properties of $\Pi = (\mathbf{mes}, \mathbf{out})$.

If our verification therefore relies on the transcript of a protocol, then a first sign of incorrectness is if messages that a party \mathcal{P}_i claims to have sent were not received by another party \mathcal{P}_j , if messages to and from a NIV functionality \mathcal{F}^V were not actually sent or received by \mathcal{P}_i or if, in case a party \mathcal{P}_i reveals both its inputs x_i and randomness r_i , the messages \mathcal{P}_i claims to have sent are inconsistent with x_i, r_i when considering \mathbf{mes} and previously obtained messages.

Towards formalizing this, we denote the set of input-revealing parties as RIR. For $\mathcal{M}_{i,\cdot}, \mathcal{M}_{\cdot,i}, \mathcal{N}_{i,\cdot}, \mathcal{N}_{\cdot,i}$ we use the same syntax as in Section 2.1.

Definition 4 (Transcript Validity). *Let Π be a protocol with n parties and $\text{RIR} \subseteq [n]$. For $i \in \text{RIR}$ let $x_i \in \mathcal{X}$ be the input and $r_i \in \{0, 1\}^{\text{poly}(\kappa)}$ be a randomness string. Let furthermore $s \in \{0, 1\}^{\text{poly}(\kappa)}$ be an auxiliary input, $\mathcal{F}_1^V, \dots, \mathcal{F}_r^V$ be a set of NIV resources and $\mathcal{M}_{\cdot,i}, \mathcal{M}_{i,\cdot}, \mathcal{N}_{\cdot,i}, \mathcal{N}_{i,\cdot}$ be those sets of messages that were defined before.*

We say that the transcript of Π is valid if and only if

1. *For each $i, j \in [n]$ the sets $\mathcal{M}_{i,\cdot}, \mathcal{M}_{\cdot,j}$ are consistent, meaning that each message in $\mathcal{M}_{i,\cdot}$ sent by \mathcal{P}_i was received by \mathcal{P}_j in $\mathcal{M}_{\cdot,j}$ and vice versa.*
2. *For each $q \in [r], i \in [n]$ $\mathcal{N}_{\cdot,i}$ are consistent with the messages that \mathcal{P}_i should have obtained from \mathcal{F}_q^V via the verification interface. If \mathcal{F}_q^V allows the verification of inputs from \mathcal{P}_i , $\mathcal{N}_{\cdot,i}$ is consistent with \mathcal{F}_q^V as well.*
3. *For each $i \in \text{RIR}, \tau \in [G]$ and $\rho \in [H_\tau]$ the sets $\mathcal{M}_{i,\cdot}, \mathcal{N}_{\cdot,i}$ are consistent with the output of $\mathbf{mes}(i, x_i, r_i, s, \tau, \rho, \mathcal{M}_{\cdot,i}, \mathcal{N}_{\cdot,i})$.*

In a formal sense, tampering of an adversary with the transcript would be ok unless it leads to two self-consistent protocol transcripts with outputs $\hat{y}_i^{(\tau)} \neq y_i^{(\tau)}$ for some \mathcal{P}_i such that both $\hat{y}_i^{(\tau)}, y_i^{(\tau)} \neq \perp$. To achieve this, transcript validity is a necessary, but not a sufficient condition. For example, if no messages or inputs or randomness of any party are fixed, then \mathcal{A} could easily generate two correctly distributed transcripts for different outputs that fulfill this definition using the standard UC simulator of Π .

We now define the security game that allows us to further constrain \mathcal{A} beyond transcript validity. In it, we rely on fixing certain parts while the transcript

is generated: an adversary \mathcal{A} will first run the protocol with a challenger \mathcal{C} that simulates honest parties whose inputs and randomness \mathcal{A} does not know (initially). Upon completion of this protocol, the adversary will first obtain some additional potentially secret information of the honest parties, upon which it outputs two valid protocol transcripts. \mathcal{A} will win if the transcripts coincide in some parts with the interactive protocol that \mathcal{A} ran with \mathcal{C} , while the outputs of some party are different and not \perp .

We want to cover a diverse range of protocols which might come with different levels of guarantees. We consider scenarios regarding: (1) whether the dishonest parties can change their inputs and randomness after the execution (parameter ν); (2) what is the set of parties RIR that will reveal their input and randomness later; and (3) which protocol messages the adversary can replace when he attempts to break the verifiability by presenting a fake transcript (parameter μ).

The parameters ν, RIR have the following impact: if $\nu = \text{ncir}$ then the dishonest parties *are not committed* to the input and randomness in the beginning of the execution. Anything that is revealed from parties in $I \cap \text{RIR}$ might be altered by the adversary. If instead $\nu = \text{cir}$ then all parties *are committed* to the input and randomness in the beginning of the execution. That means that the adversary cannot alter inputs or randomness of honest or dishonest parties from RIR, i.e. of those parties whose x_i, r_i are revealed for verification.

For μ we give the adversary the following choices:

- $\mu = \text{ncmes}$: \mathcal{A} can replace all messages *by all parties*.
- $\mu = \text{chsmes}$: \mathcal{A} can replace messages *from corrupted senders*.
- $\mu = \text{chmes}$: \mathcal{A} can replace messages exchanged *between corrupted parties*.
- $\mu = \text{cmes}$: \mathcal{A} cannot replace *any message*.

Based on this, we formalize transcript non-malleability as follows:

Definition 5. *Let Π be a protocol that is secure against a static adversary corrupting up to $k < n$ parties using r NIV resources. For $\nu \in \{\text{cir}, \text{ncir}\}$, $\mu \in \{\text{ncmes}, \text{chsmes}, \text{chmes}, \text{cmes}\}$ and $\text{RIR} \subseteq [n]$, we define the following game between a challenger \mathcal{C} and an adversary \mathcal{A} :*

1. *Both \mathcal{A}, \mathcal{C} obtain s . \mathcal{C} sets up instances $\mathcal{F}_1^v, \dots, \mathcal{F}_r^v$.*
2. *\mathcal{A} chooses $I \subset [n], |I| \leq k$ and sends I to \mathcal{C} . Let $\bar{I} = [n] \setminus I$.*
3. *\mathcal{C} for each $i \in \bar{I}$ chooses $x_i \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{X}$ and $r_i \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}^{\text{poly}(\kappa)}$. If $\nu = \text{cir}$, \mathcal{A} sends $\{x_j, r_j\}_{j \in I}$ to \mathcal{C} .*
4. *\mathcal{C} runs an instance of the protocol Π with \mathcal{A} . In each round of Π \mathcal{C} first computes the messages of all honest parties $\mathcal{P}_i \in \bar{I}$ using **nmes** and sends these to both \mathcal{A} as well as \mathcal{F}_q^v . Then \mathcal{A} interacts with all instances of \mathcal{F}_q^v and sends messages of dishonest parties addressed to the honest parties to \mathcal{C} . If $\mu = \text{cmes}$ then \mathcal{A} must also send messages exchanged between dishonest parties. Finally, \mathcal{C} stores all those messages sent to as well as messages received from \mathcal{A} in $\mathcal{M}_{\cdot, i}, \mathcal{M}_{i, \cdot}$ (if $\mu = \text{cmes}$ also those sent between dishonest parties). It stores all messages that an honest $\mathcal{P}_i \in \bar{I}$ received from \mathcal{F}_q^v in $\mathcal{N}_{\cdot, i}$ and those that it sent to input-verifiable \mathcal{F}_q^v in $\mathcal{N}_{i, \cdot}$.*

5. \mathcal{C} sends $\{x_i, r_i, \mathcal{N}_{\cdot,i}\}_{i \in \bar{I} \cap \text{RIR}}$ to \mathcal{A} . For $\mathcal{P}_i \in \bar{I} \setminus \text{RIR}$ it sends $\mathcal{M}_{i,\cdot}, \mathcal{M}_{\cdot,i}, \mathcal{N}_{i,\cdot}, \mathcal{N}_{\cdot,i}$.
6. \mathcal{A} sends two protocol transcripts Π^0, Π^1 including inputs x_i^b, r_i^b for $i \in \text{RIR}$ and messages $\mathcal{M}_{i,\cdot}^b, \mathcal{M}_{\cdot,i}^b$ for all parties $i \in [n]$ and $b \in \{0, 1\}$. \mathcal{C} checks that
 - (a) Both transcripts Π^0, Π^1 are consistent according to Definition 4.
 - (b) If $\nu = \text{cir}$ then $r_i^b = r_i$ and $x_i^b = x_i$ for $i \in \text{RIR}$. If instead $\nu = \text{ncir}$ then $r_i^b = r_i$ and $x_i^b = x_i$ for $i \in \bar{I} \cap \text{RIR}$.
 - (c) $\mathcal{N}_{\cdot,i}^b$ for $i \in [n]$ is consistent with \mathcal{F}_q^ν . Moreover, for each \mathcal{P}_i where \mathcal{F}_q^ν reveals inputs of \mathcal{P}_i check if $\mathcal{N}_{i,\cdot}^b$ is consistent with \mathcal{F}_q^ν .
 - (d) If $\mu = \text{cmes}$, $\mathcal{M}_{i,j}^b = \mathcal{M}_{i,j}$ for all $i, j \in [n]$.
 - (e) If $\mu = \text{chmes}$, $\mathcal{M}_{i,j}^b = \mathcal{M}_{i,j}$ for all $i, j \in [n]$ where either $i \in \bar{I}$ or $j \in \bar{I}$.
 - (f) If $\mu = \text{chsmes}$, $\mathcal{M}_{i,j}^b = \mathcal{M}_{i,j}$ for all $j \in [n], i \in \bar{I}$.
 If not, then \mathcal{C} outputs 0.

7. \mathcal{C} outputs 1 if either there exists $i \in \text{RIR}, \tau \in [G]$ such that

$$\text{out}(i, x_i^0, r_i^0, s, \tau, \mathcal{M}_{\cdot,i}^0, \mathcal{N}_{\cdot,i}^0) \neq \text{out}(i, x_i^1, r_i^1, s, \tau, \mathcal{M}_{\cdot,i}^1, \mathcal{N}_{\cdot,i}^1)$$

and both are not \perp . Otherwise \mathcal{C} outputs 0.

We call a protocol (ν, RIR, μ) -transcript non-malleable if any PPT algorithm \mathcal{A} for any s, I and choice of x_i by \mathcal{C} can make \mathcal{C} output 1 in the above game only with probability negligible in κ .

As mentioned in Section 2.1 we do not necessarily require that out depends solely on x_i, r_i . Thus in practice we use a slightly more general definition where also outputs of parties that are not in RIR are considered.

3.2 Simulating Verifiable Protocols: Input-Aware Simulation

Most standard simulators \mathcal{S} for UC secure protocols Π work by executing an internal copy of the adversary \mathcal{A} towards which they simulate interactions with simulated honest parties and ideal functionalities in the hybrid model where Π is defined. In general, such a simulator \mathcal{S} receives no external advice and generates random inputs for simulated honest parties and simulated ideal functionality responses with the aid of a random input tape, from which it samples all necessary values. However, a crucial point for our approach is being able to parameterize the operation of simulators for protocols being compiled, as well as giving them external input on how queries to simulated functionalities should be answered.

We need simulators with such properties in order to obtain publicly verifiable versions of existing protocols without requiring them to be adaptively secure as explained in Section 1.1. Basically, in the publicly verifiable version of a protocol, we wish to embed a special simulator in the publicly verifiable functionality that it realizes. This will allow us to “delegate” the simulation of the original protocol, while the simulator for the publicly verifiable version handles only the extra machinery needed to obtain public verifiability. The advantage of this technique is twofold: (1) It allows us to construct publicly verifiable versions of statically secure protocols; (2) It simplifies the security analysis of publicly verifiable versions of existing UC-secure protocols, since only the added machinery for public

verifiability must be analysed.

Über Simulator \mathcal{S}^u : We will now start defining the notion of an *über simulator* for a UC-secure protocol Π realizing a functionality \mathcal{F} , which we formally establish in Definition 8. We denote über simulators as \mathcal{S}^u , while we denote by \mathcal{S} the original simulator used in the UC proof that Π realizes a (non-verifiable) functionality \mathcal{F} . Basically, an über simulator \mathcal{S}^u takes the inputs to be used by simulated honest parties (as well as the randomness of the functionality) in interactions with a copy of the adversary as an external parameter and outputs (through a special tape) the randomness used by these simulated parties. Instead of interacting with an internal copy of the adversary, an über simulator interacts with an *external* copy of the adversary. Moreover, an über simulator allows for responses to queries to simulated functionalities to be given externally. Otherwise \mathcal{S}^u will perform similar actions as a regular simulator, such as extracting inputs of dishonest parties to be sent to \mathcal{F} .

In the case of a probabilistic functionality \mathcal{F} , the über simulator \mathcal{S}^u also receives the randomness tape used by \mathcal{F} . \mathcal{S}^u uses this tape to determine the random values that will be sampled by \mathcal{F} , simulating an execution compatible with such values as well as with the inputs from honest parties. In case \mathcal{F} is also input-less (*e.g.* coin tossing), the honest parties' inputs given to \mathcal{S}^u are empty and it samples randomness for the honest parties matching the values determined by the randomness tape given to \mathcal{F} .

We remark that most existing simulators for protocols realizing the vast majority of natural UC functionalities can be trivially modified to obtain an über simulator (as we will explain in Section 3.3). Notice that most simulators basically execute the protocol as an honest party would, except that they use random inputs and take advantage of their power over setup functionalities to equivocate the output of the simulated protocol to equal the actual output obtained by executing with certain inputs (held by honest parties). Departing from such a simulator, an über simulator can be constructed by allowing the simulated honest party inputs to be obtained externally, rather than being generated internally.

Syntax of Über Simulator \mathcal{S}^u : Let \mathcal{S}^u be a PPT iTM with the same input and output tapes as a regular simulator \mathcal{S} plus additional ones as defined below:

- **Input tapes:** a tape for the input from the environment \mathcal{Z} , a tape for messages from an ideal functionality \mathcal{F} , a tape for inputs for the simulated honest parties, a tape for messages from an *external* adversary \mathcal{A} and a tape for messages from the global setup ideal functionalities in the hybrid model where Π is defined. If \mathcal{F} is probabilistic, \mathcal{S}^u also receives \mathcal{F} 's random tape⁴.
- **Output tapes:** tapes for output to \mathcal{Z} , tapes for messages to \mathcal{F} , \mathcal{A} , tapes for messages to the ideal functionalities in the hybrid model where Π is defined as well as a special “control output tape” that outputs the randomness used by simulated honest parties.

⁴ This is necessary so that \mathcal{S}^u can simulate honest parties' messages that are consistent with random choices to be made by \mathcal{F} independently from parties' inputs.

We furthermore define the following two properties of *simulation- and execution-consistency*. Simulation consistency is straightforward and says that any regularly simulated execution is indistinguishable from an execution with \mathcal{S}^{U} when operating as \mathcal{S} does (*i.e.* with direct access to a copy of the adversary \mathcal{A} , functionality \mathcal{F} and a global setup), using uniform randomness as well as sampling responses to queries to simulated setup functionalities and simulated party inputs as \mathcal{S} would (without taking external advice).

Definition 6 (Simulation Consistency). *Let Π be a protocol UC-realizing functionality \mathcal{F} using global ideal setup functionalities $\mathcal{F}_1, \dots, \mathcal{F}_r$ and let \mathcal{S} be the simulator of \mathcal{F} 's proof. We say that the PPT iTM \mathcal{S}^{U} is Simulation-consistent for $(\Pi, \mathcal{F}, \mathcal{S})$ if these distributions are indistinguishable for all PPT iTM \mathcal{Z} :*

1. $\mathcal{F} \circ \mathcal{S}$: *The distribution of outputs of \mathcal{Z} in an ideal execution of \mathcal{F} and \mathcal{S} executing an internal copy of adversary \mathcal{A} with $\mathcal{F}_1, \dots, \mathcal{F}_r$.*
2. $\mathcal{F} \circ \mathcal{S}^{\text{U}}$: *The distribution of outputs of \mathcal{Z} in an ideal execution of \mathcal{F} with \mathcal{S}^{U} directly accessing a copy of \mathcal{A} and $\mathcal{F}_1, \dots, \mathcal{F}_r$, where \mathcal{S}^{U} operates as \mathcal{S} does: it has direct access to $\mathcal{F}_1, \dots, \mathcal{F}_r$ and to a copy \mathcal{A} , and it takes as input a uniform randomness tape and a tape for simulated honest party inputs sampled in such a way that these inputs are distributed as in \mathcal{S} .*

\mathcal{Z} gives inputs to all parties as in the standard UC simulation experiment but only has access to the same input/output tapes of \mathcal{S}^{U} that it can access for \mathcal{S} .

We now also define what we mean by execution consistency. Intuitively, we want the randomness for simulated honest parties output by an über simulator \mathcal{S}^{U} parameterized with the same inputs as the real honest parties to be consistent with the transcripts of a real protocol execution.

Definition 7 (Execution Consistency). *Let Π be a UC-secure implementation of the functionality \mathcal{F} using global ideal setup functionalities $\mathcal{F}_1, \dots, \mathcal{F}_r$ and let \mathcal{S} be the simulator of the proof. We say that the PPT iTM \mathcal{S}^{U} is Execution-consistent for $(\Pi, \mathcal{F}, \mathcal{S})$ if for all PPT iTM \mathcal{Z} and PPT iTM \mathcal{A} the following distributions are indistinguishable:*

1. $\mathcal{F} \circ \mathcal{S}^{\text{U}}, (R_{h_1}, \dots, R_{h_k}) \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathcal{S}^{\text{U}}$: *The distribution of outputs of \mathcal{Z} in an ideal execution \mathcal{F} with \mathcal{S}^{U} where \mathcal{S}^{U} is parameterized with simulated honest party inputs $(x_{h_1}, \dots, x_{h_k})$, interacts with \mathcal{A} and with $\mathcal{F}_1, \dots, \mathcal{F}_r$, outputting $(R_{h_1}, \dots, R_{h_k})$ on its special “control output tape”;*
2. *The distribution of outputs of \mathcal{Z} in a real execution of Π with adversary \mathcal{A} and honest parties $\mathcal{P}_1, \dots, \mathcal{P}_k$ whose input and randomness pairs are $(x_{h_1}, R_{h_1}), \dots, (x_{h_k}, R_{h_k})$ with $\mathcal{F}_1, \dots, \mathcal{F}_r$ (*i.e.* the honest parties use the randomness output by \mathcal{S}^{U} after the ideal execution).*

\mathcal{Z} gives inputs to all parties in both the ideal and real executions as in the standard UC simulation experiment but, in the real execution, it must execute honest parties using the randomness output by \mathcal{S}^{U} .

For any PPT iTM \mathcal{S}^\cup with the input and output tapes defined above, we say that \mathcal{S}^\cup is an über simulator if it is simulation- and execution-consistent.

Definition 8 (Über Simulator). *Let Π be a UC-secure implementation of the functionality \mathcal{F} and let \mathcal{S} be the simulator of the proof. We say that the PPT iTM \mathcal{S}^\cup is an über simulator for $(\Pi, \mathcal{F}, \mathcal{S})$ if there exist input tapes for randomness, simulated honest party inputs such that \mathcal{S}^\cup is both simulation- and execution-consistent for $(\Pi, \mathcal{F}, \mathcal{S})$ according to Definitions 6 and 7 for any PPT environment \mathcal{Z} and adversary \mathcal{A} .*

3.3 Input-aware simulation for existing protocols.

As outlined in Section 1.3 it is not necessary for each UC-secure protocol to additionally define an über simulator. We now define a restricted class of protocols for which \mathcal{S}^\cup can be obtained trivially. In order to do that, we assume that, for a protocol Π that UC-realizes \mathcal{F} in the $\mathcal{F}_1, \dots, \mathcal{F}_r$ -hybrid model (all are global functionalities) with a simulator \mathcal{S} , there exists a randomness tape generation function **GenRand** (that generates the randomness input tape for \mathcal{S}) as follows:

Function $\text{GenRand}(1^\kappa, R_{h_1}, \dots, R_{h_k}, x_{h_1}, \dots, x_{h_k})$: this PPT function has as inputs the security parameter κ , honest party randomness R_{h_1}, \dots, R_{h_k} , honest party inputs x_{h_1}, \dots, x_{h_k} and outputs a randomness input tape T for \mathcal{S} such that the following properties hold for any PPT iTM \mathcal{Z} :

1. $\mathcal{F} \circ \mathcal{S}$ (An ideal execution of \mathcal{F} with \mathcal{S} taking as input a uniformly random randomness tape) is indistinguishable from $\mathcal{F} \circ \mathcal{S}(T)$ (An ideal execution of \mathcal{F} with \mathcal{S} taking as input tape T); and
2. An execution of Π with \mathcal{A} and honest parties $\mathcal{P}_{h_1}, \dots, \mathcal{P}_{h_k}$ taking input/randomness $(x_{h_1}, R_{h_1}), \dots, (x_{h_k}, R_{h_k})$ is indistinguishable from $\mathcal{F} \circ \mathcal{S}(T)$ (An ideal execution of \mathcal{F} with \mathcal{S} taking as input tape T).

It turns out it is possible to easily adapt most existing simulators \mathcal{S} in order to obtain a function **GenRand** with the above property. Most simulators basically run simulated honest parties that execute the protocol with random inputs and randomness, making it easy to parameterize these simulators through their randomness tapes in order to make them use specific randomness and inputs (fed externally) for simulated honest parties. In the case of simulators that run with hard-coded inputs for simulated honest parties, a similar idea can be achieved by modifying them to obtain these inputs from their randomness tapes. Moreover, notice that since an execution of \mathcal{S} without honest party inputs is already known to be indistinguishable from a real world simulation, it follows in most cases that parameterizing \mathcal{S} with simulated honest party inputs that are possibly identical to those in the real world is indistinguishable from the usual execution with \mathcal{S} .

Obtaining \mathcal{S}^\cup from a simulator \mathcal{S} with **GenRand:** We now construct \mathcal{S}^\cup for a protocol Π that UC-realizes \mathcal{F} with an original simulator \mathcal{S} as follows: Given the simulator \mathcal{S} and corresponding function **GenRand**, \mathcal{S}^\cup takes the inputs

x_{h_1}, \dots, x_{h_k} for the simulated honest parties on its input tapes, samples uniform randomness R_{h_1}, \dots, R_{h_k} and runs $\text{GenRand}(1^\kappa, R_{h_1}, \dots, R_{h_k}, x_{h_1}, \dots, x_{h_k})$ to obtain T . Then \mathcal{S}^U runs a copy of \mathcal{S} with randomness input T . \mathcal{S}^U then forwards all queries between \mathcal{F} , \mathcal{Z} , a copy of the adversary \mathcal{A} , global setup ideal functionalities $\mathcal{F}_1, \dots, \mathcal{F}_r$ and \mathcal{S} . In the end, \mathcal{S}^U outputs R_{h_1}, \dots, R_{h_k} on the special output tape. In order to do this, we also assume that instead of running an internal copy of \mathcal{A} it receives all queries from \mathcal{A} (including messages to simulated honest parties and setup ideal functionalities) externally, as well as sending answers to those queries out through the same interface.

Proposition 1. *Given a PPT simulator \mathcal{S} for a protocol Π that UC-realizes \mathcal{F} in the $\mathcal{F}_1, \dots, \mathcal{F}_r$ -hybrid model where all $\mathcal{F}_1, \dots, \mathcal{F}_r$ are global functionalities for which a poly-time computable function GenRand as defined above exists, then the aforementioned \mathcal{S}^U is an über simulator for Π .*

Proof. In order for this construction of \mathcal{S}^U to be a über simulator according to Definition 8, it must both simulate and execution-consistent.

First, we will show that \mathcal{S}^U is simulation-consistent according Definition 6, which amounts to showing that its internal copy of \mathcal{S} has the same view of \mathcal{S} operating with an uniformly random randomness input tape, an environment \mathcal{Z} , an ideal functionality \mathcal{F} and its own copy of \mathcal{A} . Notice that all communication to/from \mathcal{Z} (as well as $\mathcal{F}_1, \dots, \mathcal{F}_r$ and \mathcal{A}) and \mathcal{S} is simply forwarded by \mathcal{S}^U to/from \mathcal{S} . Notice that, since all $\mathcal{F}_1, \dots, \mathcal{F}_r$ are global functionalities, \mathcal{S} does not internally simulate local version of these ideal functionalities, instead forwarding requests to them and deciding what to forward back to \mathcal{A} . By the properties of GenRand , simulating honest parties with tape T produced by $\text{GenRand}(1^\kappa, R_{h_1}, \dots, R_{h_k}, x_{h_1}, \dots, x_{h_k})$ is equivalent to using a uniformly random randomness input tape. Hence, \mathcal{S}^U is simulation-consistent, since its internal copy of \mathcal{S} has the same view as in its normal operation, being able to simulate an ideal execution with \mathcal{F} that is indistinguishable from the real world execution with Π and \mathcal{A} (because \mathcal{S} has this property).

In order to see why \mathcal{S}^U is also execution-consistent, notice that GenRand by definition guarantees that an execution of \mathcal{S} with randomness tape T obtained from executing $\text{GenRand}(1^\kappa, R_{h_1}, \dots, R_{h_k}, x_{h_1}, \dots, x_{h_k})$ is indistinguishable from an execution of Π with \mathcal{A} and honest parties $\mathcal{P}_{h_1}, \dots, \mathcal{P}_{h_k}$ taking input/randomness $(x_{h_1}, R_{h_1}), \dots, (x_{h_k}, R_{h_k})$. Hence, since we already know that the \mathcal{S}^U 's internal copy of \mathcal{S} has an identical view as in its original operation as shown above, it follows that an execution of \mathcal{S}^U taking as input randomness and input pairs $(x_{h_1}, R_{h_1}), \dots, (x_{h_k}, R_{h_k})$ for simulated honest parties is indistinguishable from an execution of Π with \mathcal{A} and honest parties $\mathcal{P}_{h_1}, \dots, \mathcal{P}_{h_k}$ taking the same randomness and input pairs $(x_{h_1}, R_{h_1}), \dots, (x_{h_k}, R_{h_k})$. Hence, \mathcal{S}^U is execution-consistent, which completes the proof. \square

3.4 Functionalities \mathcal{F}^V with embedded Über Simulator \mathcal{S}^U

We now outline how an über simulator \mathcal{S}^U for the protocol Π as defined in Definition 8 will be used with a functionality \mathcal{F}^V . Note that \mathcal{S}^U is internally

executed by the functionality wrapper \mathcal{F}^v presented in Figure 3, which can be accessed by an ideal adversary (*i.e.* \mathcal{F}^v 's Simulator) interacting with \mathcal{F}^v through interfaces \mathbf{Input}_i and \mathbf{NMF}_{S^v} . Moreover, \mathcal{F}^v allows \mathcal{S}^u to query global setup functionalities $\mathcal{F}_1, \dots, \mathcal{F}_n$ on behalf of honest parties.

The internal \mathcal{S}^u executed by \mathcal{F}^v takes care of simulating the original protocol Π that realizes \mathcal{F} being compiled into a publicly verifiable protocol Π^v that realizes $\mathcal{F}^v[\mathcal{F}]$, while the external \mathcal{S}^v interacting with \mathcal{F}^v will take care of simulating the additional protocol steps and building blocks used in obtaining public verifiability in Π^v . In order to do so, \mathcal{F}^v will parameterize \mathcal{S}^u with the inputs of all honest parties \mathcal{P}_i , which are received through interface \mathbf{Input}_i , as well as the randomness of \mathcal{F} if the functionality is probabilistic. As the execution progresses, \mathcal{S}^v executes the compiled protocol Π^v (presented in Figures 6 and 7) with an internal copy \mathcal{A} of the adversary and extracts the messages of the original protocol Π being compiled from this execution, forwarding these messages to \mathcal{S}^u through the interface \mathbf{NMF}_{S^v} . Moreover, \mathcal{S}^v will provide answers to queries to setup functionalities from \mathcal{A} as instructed by \mathcal{S}^u also through interface \mathbf{NMF}_{S^v} . All the while, queries from honest parties simulated by \mathcal{S}^u to setup functionalities are directly forwarded back and forth by \mathcal{F}^v . If verification is ever activated by an honest party \mathcal{P}_i (and $\mathcal{P}_i \in \text{RIR}$), \mathcal{F}^v not only leaks that party's input to \mathcal{S}^v but also leaks that party's randomness R_{h_i} in the simulated execution with \mathcal{S}^u (provided by \mathcal{S}^u). As we discuss in Section 5, this will allow \mathcal{S}^v to simulate verification, since it now has both a valid transcript of an execution of Π^v with \mathcal{A} and a matching input and randomness pair that matches that transcript (provided by \mathcal{F}^v with the help of \mathcal{S}^u).

We remark that this strategy does not give the simulator \mathcal{S}^v any extra power in simulating an execution of the compiled protocol Π^v towards \mathcal{A} other than the power the simulator \mathcal{S}^v for the original protocol Π already has. Notice that the access to \mathcal{S}^u given by \mathcal{F}^v to \mathcal{S}^v does not allow it to obtain any information about the inputs of honest parties, since an execution with \mathcal{S}^u parameterized by these inputs is indistinguishable from an execution with \mathcal{S}^u (as is the case with the original simulator) according to Definition 8.

4 Joint Authentication Functionalities

In this section, we define authentication functionalities that will serve as building blocks for our compiler. Our functionalities allow for a set of parties to jointly authenticate messages but do *not* deliver these messages themselves. Later on, a verifier can check that a given message has indeed been authenticated by a given set of parties, meaning that they have received this message through a channel and agree on it. More interestingly, we introduce a functionality that allows for a set of parties to jointly authenticate *private* messages that they do not know (except in encrypted form) as well as inputs and randomness (which they also only know in encrypted form). Later on, if a message is revealed (*e.g.* by the sender) or an input is opened, a verifier can check that it corresponds to a given secret value previously authenticated by a given set of parties.

As opposed to classical point-to-point or broadcast authenticated channels, our functionalities do not deliver messages to the set of receiving parties and consequently do not ensure consensus. These functionalities come into play in our compiler later as they allow for verifiers to check that all parties who executed a protocol agree on certain parts of the transcript (that might contain private messages) regardless of how the messages in the transcript have been obtained. Having the parties agree on which messages have been sent limits the adversary's power to generate an alternative transcript aiming at forging a proof that the protocol reached a different outcome, which itself is highly related to Definition 5 from the previous section. Decoupling message authentication from delivery allows for a cleaner model of non-interactive verification, where a verifier may obtain a proof containing an authenticated protocol transcript at any point after protocol execution itself (*i.e.* after messages are exchanged).




Fig. 4. Public Joint Authentication Functionality $\mathcal{F}_{\text{PJAAuth}}$ (with tokens).

Public Joint Authentication. First, we focus on the simpler case of authenticating public messages, which can be known by all parties participating in the joint authentication procedure. In this case, the *sender* starts by providing a message and $ssid$ pair to the functionality and joint authentication is achieved after each of the other parties sends the same pair back to the functionality. This can be achieved by a simple protocol where all parties sign each message received from each other party in each round, sending the resulting signatures

to all other parties. A message is considered authenticated if it is signed by all parties. Notice that this protocol does not ensure consensus and can easily fail if a single party does not provide a valid signature on a single message, which an adversary corrupting any party (or the network) can always cause. However, this failure is captured in the functionality and follows the idea of decoupling message delivery from authentication. Functionality $\mathcal{F}_{\mathcal{P}JA_{\text{Auth}}}$ is described in Figure 4.




Fig. 5. Secret Joint Authentication Functionality $\mathcal{F}_{\mathcal{S}JA_{\text{Auth}}}$ (with tokens).

Secret Joint Authentication Departing from functionality $\mathcal{F}_{\mathcal{P}JA_{\text{Auth}}}$ capturing the case of public communication, we will define a functionality $\mathcal{F}_{\mathcal{S}JA_{\text{Auth}}}$ (described in Figure 5), which will capture the case of communication through private channels. This functionality works similarly to $\mathcal{F}_{\mathcal{P}JA_{\text{Auth}}}$, allowing parties to jointly authenticate messages received through private channels to which they have access. However, it also allows for *bureaucrat* parties who observe the encrypted communication (but do not see plaintext messages) over the private channel to jointly authenticate a *committed* version of such plaintext messages. If a private message is revealed by its sender (or one of its receivers) at a later point, $\mathcal{F}_{\mathcal{S}JA_{\text{Auth}}}$ allows for third parties (including the bureaucrats that did not see the plaintext message before) to verify that this message is indeed the one that was jointly authenticated. As in the case of $\mathcal{F}_{\mathcal{P}JA_{\text{Auth}}}$, $\mathcal{F}_{\mathcal{S}JA_{\text{Auth}}}$ does not aid in communicating messages or authentication information in any way, reflecting

its nature as a pure joint authentication functionality where all communication duties are left to the parties (or another protocol using $\mathcal{F}_{\text{SJAuth}}$).

In order to capture the different actions of each party it interacts with, $\mathcal{F}_{\text{SJAuth}}$ is parameterized by the following (sets of) parties: a party \mathcal{P}_{snd} that is allowed to input messages to be jointly authenticated; a set of parties \mathcal{P} who can read input messages given by \mathcal{P}_{snd} and jointly authenticate them; a set of bureaucrats \mathcal{B} who do not see the message but jointly authenticate that \mathcal{P}_{snd} has sent a certain (still unknown) committed message to the parties \mathcal{P} . Notice that $\mathcal{F}_{\text{SJAuth}}$ does not aid in delivering the message input by \mathcal{P}_{snd} either to parties $\mathcal{P}_i \in \mathcal{P}$ in plaintext message form nor to bureaucrats in committed form. Moreover, $\mathcal{F}_{\text{SJAuth}}$ does not aid in sending notifications about sent messages nor joint authentication information to any party. The responsibility for sending messages (in plaintext or committed form) lies with \mathcal{P}_{snd} , while the responsibility for notifying any other party that plaintext verification is possible lies with \mathcal{P}_{snd} or parties $\mathcal{P}_i \in \mathcal{P}$, *i.e.* the only parties who can retrieve the message that was jointly authenticated.

The basic idea for realizing $\mathcal{F}_{\text{SJAuth}}$ is using a signature scheme (captured by \mathcal{F}_{Sig}) and a certified encryption scheme with plaintext verification (captured by $\mathcal{F}_{\text{CPKEPV}}$), *i.e.* an encryption scheme with two crucial properties: (1) An encrypting party is guaranteed to encrypt a message that can only be opened by the intended receiver (*i.e.* it is possible to make sure the public-key used belongs to the intended receiver of the encrypted messages); (2) Both encrypting and decrypting parties can generate publicly verifiable proofs that a certain message was contained in a given ciphertext. The private channel itself is realized by encrypting messages under the encryption scheme, while joint authentication is achieved by having all parties in \mathcal{P} (including the sender) and bureaucrats in \mathcal{B} sign the resulting ciphertext. In order to obtain efficiency, a joint public/secret key pair is generated for each set of receivers, in such a way that the same ciphertext can be decrypted by all the receivers holding the corresponding joint secret key. Later on, if any party in \mathcal{P} (including the sender) wishes to start the verification procedure to prove that a certain message was indeed contained in the ciphertext associated with a given *ssid*, it recovers the plaintext message and a proof of plaintext validity from the ciphertext and sends those to one or more verifiers. With these values, any party can first verify that the ciphertext that was sent indeed corresponds to that message due to the plaintext verification property of the encryption scheme and then verify that it has been jointly authenticated by checking that there exist valid signatures on that ciphertext by all parties in \mathcal{P} and bureaucrats in \mathcal{B} . The details of the construction (including a realization of $\mathcal{F}_{\text{CPKEPV}}$) are described in Supplementary Material C.

Authenticating Inputs and Randomness To provide an authentication of inputs and randomness we adapt the functionality $\mathcal{F}_{\text{SJAuth}}$, as the desired capabilities are like a message authentication without a receiver. Alternatively, one could express it also in the context of non-interactive multi-receiver commitments. In Supplementary Material D we present functionality $\mathcal{F}_{\text{IRAuth}}$ that implements this. The functionality works in the sense of cir of Definition 5, as it allows each party to commit to a unique string (for input and randomness

of the protocol) towards all parties. We refer readers who are interested in an implementation of $\mathcal{F}_{\text{IRAuth}}$ to Section 4, as any realization of $\mathcal{F}_{\text{SJAAuth}}$ can easily be adapted to $\mathcal{F}_{\text{IRAuth}}$. Notice that $\mathcal{F}_{\text{IRAuth}}$ can be instantiated from n instances of $\mathcal{F}_{\text{SJAAuth}}$ such that, for each $\mathcal{P}_i \in \mathcal{P}$ interacting with $\mathcal{F}_{\text{IRAuth}}$, there is an instance $\mathcal{F}_{\text{SJAAuth}}^i$ where \mathcal{P}_i acts as \mathcal{P}_{snd} , the set of bureaucrats \mathcal{B}^i of $\mathcal{F}_{\text{SJAAuth}}^i$ is equal to the set \mathcal{P} of $\mathcal{F}_{\text{IRAuth}}$ and the set \mathcal{P} of $\mathcal{F}_{\text{SJAAuth}}^i$ only contains \mathcal{P}_i .

5 Compilation for Input-Revealing Protocols

We now show how to compile the protocols from Section 2.1 into non-interactively verifiable counterparts. To achieve this we will in some cases only have to rely on a signature functionality, whereas a compiler for the *weakest* protocols according to Definition 5 needs rather strong additional tools such as the authentication functionalities from the previous section. In this work we focus on protocols according to Definition 5 and as such there are 8 different combinations of parameters (ν, μ) for (ν, RIR, μ) -transcript non-malleable protocols which we might consider. Furthermore, according to Definition 2 we might either have public or private verifier registration, which in total yields 16 different definitions. To avoid redundancy we now outline how to achieve the respective verifiability in each setting and a thorough analysis of a general technique that works for any (ν, RIR, μ) -transcript non-malleable protocols. We simplify notation by just assuming the existence of a single verifier \mathcal{V} .

5.1 How to make Protocols Verifiable

We now describe how to combine all the introduced building blocks and notation from the previous sections to make a protocol verifiable. More specifically, we take a (ν, RIR, μ) -transcript non-malleable protocol Π that UC realizes an ideal functionality \mathcal{F} in the (global) $\mathcal{F}_1, \dots, \mathcal{F}_r$ -hybrid model with über simulator \mathcal{S}^{U} for $(\Pi, \mathcal{F}, \mathcal{S})$ and do the following:

1. We describe how to construct a protocol Π^{V} by modifying Π with access to a signature functionality \mathcal{F}_{Sig} , a key registration functionality \mathcal{F}_{Reg} and authentication functionalities $\mathcal{F}_{\text{PJAAuth}}, \mathcal{F}_{\text{SJAAuth}}, \mathcal{F}_{\text{IRAuth}}$. We will furthermore require that we can replace the hybrid functionalities $\mathcal{F}_1, \dots, \mathcal{F}_r$ used in Π with verifiable counterparts $\mathcal{F}_1^{\text{V}}, \dots, \mathcal{F}_r^{\text{V}}$.
2. We then show that Π^{V} UC-realizes $\mathcal{F}^{\text{V}}[\mathcal{F}]$ as described in Section 3.4 in the (global) $\mathcal{F}_1^{\text{V}}, \dots, \mathcal{F}_r^{\text{V}}$ -hybrid by constructing an explicit simulator \mathcal{S}^{V} .

For each of the different choices of ν and μ there is a different way how Π must be compiled to Π^{V} and we will not formalize all 8 different possibilities (and prove them secure) for the sake of conciseness. We will instead now explain on a high level which transformations are necessary, and will then explain the proof technique for the general case of making a $(\text{cir}, \text{RIR}, \text{cmes})$ -transcript non-malleable version of any protocol that is (ν, RIR, μ) -transcript non-malleable. This is the main step in obtaining a publicly verifiable version of an originally (ν, RIR, μ) -transcript non-malleable protocol.

Protocol Compilation - The Big Picture. In order to verify we let the verifier \mathcal{V} simulate each such party whose output shall be checked and which participated in an instance of Π . This check is done locally, based on the inputs, randomness and messages related to such a party (and/or other parties) which \mathcal{V} obtains for this process. In case of public verifier registration we assume that a bulletin board is available which holds the protocol transcript, whereas in case of private registration the verifier contacts one of the protocol parties to obtain a transcript which it can then verify non-interactively. We want to stress that the Bulletin Board which may contain the protocol transcript *does not have to be used to exchange messages during the actual protocol run*.

In Π we assume that messages can either be exchanged secretly between two parties or via a broadcast channel. Furthermore, parties may send messages to hybrid functionalities or receive them from these. An adversary may now be able to replace certain parts of the protocol transcript. As long as we assume that a protocol is (ν, RIR, μ) -transcript non-malleable and constrain his ability to maul the protocol transcript to those parts permitted by the definition, the overall construction achieves verifiability. We now explain, on a high level, the modifications to Π for the different values of μ, ν :

- $\mu = \text{ncmes}$: Here the adversary is allowed to replace all messages by any party at his will, and messages are just exchanged as in Π .
- $\mu = \text{chsmes}$: Before the protocol begins, each \mathcal{P}_i first generates a signing key with \mathcal{F}_{Sig} and registers its signing key with \mathcal{F}_{Reg} . Whenever a party \mathcal{P}_i sends a message $\mathfrak{m}_{i,j}^{(\tau,\rho)}$ to \mathcal{P}_j it then uses \mathcal{F}_{Sig} to authenticate $\mathfrak{m}_{i,j}^{(\tau,\rho)}$ with a signature $\sigma_{i,j}^{(\tau,\rho)}$. In such a case, \mathcal{V} will later be able to correctly verify exactly those messages of the transcript that were sent by honest parties, as \mathcal{A} might fake messages and signatures sent by dishonest parties after the fact.
- $\mu = \text{chmes}$: In this setting, each message that is either sent or received by an honest party must remain unaltered. Each party will do the same as in the case where $\mu = \text{chsmes}$, but we additionally require that whenever a party \mathcal{P}_i receives a message $\mathfrak{m}_{j,i}^{(\tau,\rho)}$ from \mathcal{P}_j then it then uses \mathcal{F}_{Sig} to authenticate $\mathfrak{m}_{j,i}^{(\tau,\rho)}$ with a signature $\sigma_{j,i}^{(\tau,\rho)}$. Now \mathcal{V} can establish for each message of the protocol if both sender and receiver signed the same message, which will allow \mathcal{A} to only alter those messages that were both sent and received by dishonest parties.
- $\mu = \text{cmes}$: We now also require that the dishonest parties cannot replace their messages before verification. To achieve this, we use $\mathcal{F}_{\text{SJAuth}}, \mathcal{F}_{\text{PJAuth}}$ as defined in Section 4 which the parties must now use in order to register their private message exchange. These functionalities $\mathcal{F}_{\text{SJAuth}}, \mathcal{F}_{\text{PJAuth}}$ can then be used by \mathcal{V} in order to validate an obtained transcript.
- $\nu = \text{ncir}$: Based on each \mathcal{P}_i setting up a key with \mathcal{F}_{Sig} and registering it with \mathcal{F}_{Reg} let each party sign both its input x_i and its randomness r_i using \mathcal{F}_{Sig} before sending it in **Activate Verification**, which means that \mathcal{V} only accepts such signed values which it can verify via \mathcal{F}_{Sig} . \mathcal{A} can later replace the pairs (x_j, r_j) of dishonest parties \mathcal{P}_j by generating different signatures.

$\nu = \text{cir}$: The parties will use the available functionality $\mathcal{F}_{\text{IRAuth}}$ to authenticate their inputs and randomness initially. Later, \mathcal{V} can use $\mathcal{F}_{\text{IRAuth}}$ to check validity of the revealed x_i, r_i which it obtained for verification.

Hybrid Functionalities: As mentioned above we replace the auxiliary functionalities $\mathcal{F}_1, \dots, \mathcal{F}_r$ with NIV counterparts, i.e. with functionalities $\mathcal{F}_1^v, \dots, \mathcal{F}_r^v$ that have the same interfaces as defined in Definition 3. If we intend to achieve public verifiability then each such \mathcal{F}_q^v must also be publicly verifiable, whereas in the case of private verifiability either type of functionality is fine. For any such \mathcal{F}_q^v we can then establish if a certain message $\text{mres}_{q,i}$ was indeed sent to \mathcal{P}_i or not. If \mathcal{F}_q^v does also reveal inputs, then we can furthermore test if $\text{mres}_{i,q}$ as claimed to be sent by \mathcal{P}_i was indeed received by the respective party.

5.2 Public Verifiability Compiler

We now show how to formally embed the aforementioned transformations into a protocol in order to achieve non-interactive UC verifiability. The basic idea of this construction is to turn any $(\text{cir}, \text{RIR}, \mu)$ -transcript non-malleable protocol into a $(\text{cir}, \text{RIR}, \text{cmes})$ -transcript non-malleable protocol by forcing the adversary to commit to all the corrupted parties' randomness, inputs and messages. While this might be overkill for some protocols, we focus on the worst case scenario of compiling $(\text{cir}, \text{RIR}, \text{ncmes})$ -transcript non-malleable protocols, since it is the most challenging. Note that, after making a protocol $(\text{cir}, \text{RIR}, \text{cmes})$ -transcript non-malleable, the protocol execution becomes deterministic and can be verified upon the revealing of the randomness, input and transcript of any party that activates the verification. All the verifier has to do is to execute the protocol's next message function on these randomness and input taking received messages from the transcript. If a corrupted party who activates verification attempts to cheat by revealing fake values for randomness, input and transcript, it is caught because those values were committed to.

Apart from having all parties commit to jointly authenticated versions of their randomness, inputs and transcripts, the protocol we present requires an authenticated bulletin board where this information is posted in the clear if a party activates verification revealing its input and randomness. We remark that *the bulletin board is not necessary* for employing our techniques, since the values revealed for verification can simply be (unreliably) been sent among parties. We use a trusted bulletin board in order to focus on the important aspects of applying our techniques to existing protocols without the distraction of analyzing all corner cases that arise from operating on unreliable verification data. We stress that in these cases no adversary can force verification to succeed for a cheating party or produce a fake proof showing an honest party cheated.

Moreover, the overhead of $\mathcal{F}_{\text{SJAuth}}$ and $\mathcal{F}_{\text{PJAuth}}$ can be avoided if instead of a $(\text{cir}, \text{RIR}, \mu)$ -transcript non-malleable protocol we use as the starting point a $(\text{cir}, \text{RIR}, \text{cmes})$ -transcript non-malleable protocol or at least reduced if we depart from another protocol where some of the messages are naturally fixed (e.g. a $(\text{cir}, \text{RIR}, \text{chmes})$ -transcript non-malleable protocol).

Given a (ν, RIR, μ) -transcript non-malleable protocol $\Pi = (\text{nmes}, \text{out})$ that UC realizes an ideal functionality \mathcal{F} in the (global) $\mathcal{F}_1, \dots, \mathcal{F}_r$ -hybrid model with über simulator $\mathcal{S}^\mathcal{U}$, we construct a protocol $\Pi^\mathcal{V}$ that UC-realizes the publicly verifiable ideal functionality $\mathcal{F}^\mathcal{V}[\mathcal{F}]$ in the $\mathcal{F}_{\text{SJAuth}}, \mathcal{F}_{\text{PJAuth}}, \mathcal{F}_{\text{IRAuth}}, \mathcal{F}_{\text{BB}}, \mathcal{F}_1^\mathcal{V}, \dots, \mathcal{F}_r^\mathcal{V}$ -hybrid model. Notice that if the protocol being compiled relies on non-verifiable setup resources $\mathcal{F}_1, \dots, \mathcal{F}_r$, those functionalities can be first compiled using the same techniques. Protocol $\Pi^\mathcal{V}$ is described in Figures 6 and 7.

Protocol $\Pi^\mathcal{V}$

$\Pi^\mathcal{V}$ is parameterized by a protocol Π with next message function **nmes** and output function **out** as defined in Section 2.1. $\Pi^\mathcal{V}$ uses functionalities $\mathcal{F}_{\text{BB}}, \mathcal{F}_{\text{SJAuth}}, \mathcal{F}_{\text{PJAuth}}, \mathcal{F}_{\text{IRAuth}}$ as well as global hybrid functionalities $\mathcal{F}_1^\mathcal{V}, \dots, \mathcal{F}_r^\mathcal{V}$ where Π has used possibly non-verifiable versions thereof. All of these functionalities are available to the verifiers \mathcal{V} . Set up one copy $\mathcal{F}_{\text{SJAuth}}^{(i,j)}$ for any private communication where \mathcal{P}_i is \mathcal{P}_{snd} , \mathcal{P}_j acts as authenticating party and all other parties $\mathcal{P} \setminus \{\mathcal{P}_i, \mathcal{P}_j\}$ are bureaucrats. Initially, the parties will run any necessary **Initialization** of the functionalities involved such as to e.g. register keys. They then do the following:

Input _{i} : On input $x_i \in \mathcal{X}$ party \mathcal{P}_i samples $r_i \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}^{\text{poly}(\kappa)}$ and sends $(\text{INPUT}, \text{sid}, \mathcal{P}_i, (x_i, r_i))$ to $\mathcal{F}_{\text{IRAuth}}$, while each $\mathcal{P}_j \in \mathcal{P} \setminus \{\mathcal{P}_i\}$ sends $(\text{BLIND-AUTH}, \text{sid}, \mathcal{P}_i, \mathcal{P}_j)$. Afterwards, \mathcal{P}_i runs Π .**Input _{i}** .

Compute^(τ): Each \mathcal{P}_i does the following:

1. For every $\rho \in [H_\tau]$, first run the 4 steps of Π .**Compute^(τ)**.
2. If \mathcal{P}_i sent a broadcast message m in round ρ , then \mathcal{P}_i sends $(\text{INPUT}, \text{sid}, \text{ssid}, \mathcal{P}_i, m)$ to $\mathcal{F}_{\text{PJAuth}}$ while each $\mathcal{P}_j \in \mathcal{P} \setminus \{\mathcal{P}_i\}$ sends $(\text{AUTH}, \text{sid}, \text{ssid}, \mathcal{P}_i, m)$.
3. If \mathcal{P}_i sent private messages, then for the receiver \mathcal{P}_j of message $\mathbf{m}_{i,j}^{(\tau,\rho)}$ \mathcal{P}_i sends $(\text{INPUT}, \text{sid}, \text{ssid}, \mathcal{P}_i, m)$ to $\mathcal{F}_{\text{SJAuth}}^{(i,j)}$ while \mathcal{P}_j sends $(\text{AUTH}, \text{sid}, \text{ssid}, \mathcal{P}_i, m)$ and each bureaucrat sends $(\text{BLIND-AUTH}, \text{sid}, \text{ssid}, \mathcal{P}_i)$.

Output _{i} ^(τ): \mathcal{P}_i does the same as in Π .**Output _{i} ^(τ)**.

Register Verifier: \mathcal{V} sends $(\text{REGISTER}, \text{sid})$ to each $\mathcal{F}_q^\mathcal{V}$ for $q \in [r]$.

Activate Verification: On input $(\text{ACTIVATE-VERIFICATION}, \text{sid}, \text{open-i}, \text{open-input-i})$, \mathcal{P}_i does the following:

1. Send $(\text{ACTIVATE-VERIFICATION}, \text{sid}, 1)$ to each $\mathcal{F}_q^\mathcal{V}$ for $q \in [r]$.
2. If $\text{open-input-i} = 1$, then post $x_i, r_i, \mathcal{N}_{\cdot,i}, \mathcal{M}_{\cdot,j}$ on \mathcal{F}_{BB} .

Fig. 6. The protocol $\Pi^\mathcal{V}$ which makes the $(\text{cir}, \text{RIR}, \mu)$ -transcript non-malleable protocol Π publicly verifiable.

Theorem 1. *Let Π be a $(\text{cir}, \text{RIR}, \mu)$ -transcript non-malleable protocol that UC-realizes an ideal functionality \mathcal{F} in the (global) $\mathcal{F}_1^\mathcal{V}, \dots, \mathcal{F}_r^\mathcal{V}$ -hybrid model using the Simulator \mathcal{S} . Furthermore, let the PPT iTM $\mathcal{S}^\mathcal{U}$ be an über simulator for $(\Pi, \mathcal{F}, \mathcal{S})$. Then $\Pi^\mathcal{V}$ UC-realizes the publicly verifiable ideal functionality $\mathcal{F}^\mathcal{V}[\mathcal{F}]$ in the $\mathcal{F}_{\text{SJAuth}}, \mathcal{F}_{\text{PJAuth}}, \mathcal{F}_{\text{IRAuth}}, \mathcal{F}_{\text{BB}}, \mathcal{F}_1^\mathcal{V}, \dots, \mathcal{F}_r^\mathcal{V}$ -hybrid model.*

Protocol Π^V (Continuation)

Verify_k: \mathcal{V} on input $k, a, b^{(1)}, \dots, b^{(G)}$ does the following:

1. For party \mathcal{P}_j check that $x_j, r_j, \mathcal{N}_{\cdot,j}, \mathcal{M}_{\cdot,j}$ are on \mathcal{F}_{BB} . Otherwise output (CANNOT-VERIFY, sid, j).

For each functionality \mathcal{F}_q^V verify that $\mathcal{N}_{\cdot,i}$ is valid by doing the following:

- If \mathcal{F}_q^V is Input-Private then send (VERIFY, $sid, j, b_{j,q}^{(1)}, \dots, b_{j,q}^{(G)}$) for each $j \in [n]$, where $b_{j,q}^{(1)}, \dots, b_{j,q}^{(G)}$ are taken from $\mathcal{N}_{\cdot,j}$. If either \mathcal{F}_q^V returns (VERIFY, sid, j, B) with $B \neq \emptyset$ or (CANNOT-VERIFY, sid, j) then output (CANNOT-VERIFY, sid, j).
- If \mathcal{F}_q^V is Input-Revealing then instead send (VERIFY, $sid, j, x_{j,q}, b_{j,q}^{(1)}, \dots, b_{j,q}^{(G)}$) where $x_{j,q}$ is derived from the protocol execution. If either \mathcal{F}_q^V returns (VERIFY, sid, j, f, B) with $B \neq \emptyset, f = 0$ or if it returns (CANNOT-VERIFY, sid, j) then output (CANNOT-VERIFY, sid, j).

2. Run the protocol Π by simulating \mathcal{P}_j using the next message function \mathbf{mnes} using $\mathcal{N}_{\cdot,j}, \mathcal{M}_{\cdot,j}$ with input x_j and randomness r_j until an output a can be obtained by the output function \mathbf{out} . Check for each broadcast message generated for \mathcal{P}_j by \mathbf{mnes} (resp. contained in $\mathcal{M}_{\cdot,j}$) that this message was sent (resp. received) via $\mathcal{F}_{\text{PJAuth}}$ and similarly verify private messages generated for \mathcal{P}_j by \mathbf{mnes} (resp. contained in $\mathcal{M}_{\cdot,j}$) from (resp. to) \mathcal{P}_j to (resp. from) \mathcal{P}_i via $\mathcal{F}_{\text{SJAuth}}^{(i,j)}$. In case of any inconsistency, output (CANNOT-VERIFY, sid, k).

Then define $f = 1$ if $a = x_j$ and $f = 0$ otherwise as well as $B = \{\tau \in [G] \mid y^{(\tau)} \neq \mathbf{out}(k, x_k, r_k, s, \rho, \mathcal{M}_{\cdot,k}, \mathcal{N}_{\cdot,k})\}$ and return (VERIFY, sid, k, f, B).

Fig. 7. A protocol Π^V that makes the (cir, RIR, cmes)-transcript non-malleable protocol Π publicly verifiable (continuation).

Proof. In order to prove Theorem 1 we construct a simulator \mathcal{S} that interacts with environment \mathcal{Z} , functionality $\mathcal{F}^V[\mathcal{F}]$, global functionalities $\mathcal{F}_1^V, \dots, \mathcal{F}_r^V$ and a internal copy of an adversary \mathcal{A} who may corrupt a subset $I \subset \mathcal{P}$ of size at most k while \mathcal{S} will simulate the remaining parties $\bar{I} = \mathcal{P} \setminus I$ as well as the resources used in Π^V . \mathcal{S} forwards all communication between \mathcal{A} and \mathcal{Z} . \mathcal{S} simulates setup functionalities $\mathcal{F}_{\text{SJAuth}}, \mathcal{F}_{\text{PJAuth}}, \mathcal{F}_{\text{IRAuth}}, \mathcal{F}_{\text{BB}}, \mathcal{F}_1^V, \dots, \mathcal{F}_r^V$ exactly as they are described, except for when alternative behavior is described

The rationale in our construction of \mathcal{S} is straightforward: it takes care of simulating the extra interfaces added to \mathcal{F} by $\mathcal{F}^V[\mathcal{F}]$ (along with the extra setup functionalities $\mathcal{F}_{\text{SJAuth}}, \mathcal{F}_{\text{PJAuth}}, \mathcal{F}_{\text{IRAuth}}, \mathcal{F}_{\text{BB}}$), while delegating simulation of the original Π to its über simulator \mathcal{S}^U incorporated into $\mathcal{F}^V[\mathcal{F}]$. In the Input phase of Π^V , \mathcal{S} sends a message the $\mathbf{NMF}_{\mathcal{S}^U}$ interface of $\mathcal{F}^V[\mathcal{F}]$ with any messages received from \mathcal{A} . \mathcal{S} forwards to \mathcal{A} any messages returned by \mathcal{S}^U through $\mathbf{NMF}_{\mathcal{S}^U}$ (i.e. the messages of simulated honest parties) by simulating messages being sent from honest parties directly to \mathcal{A} and, if necessary, simulating messages sent through $\mathcal{F}_{\text{SJAuth}}, \mathcal{F}_{\text{PJAuth}}, \mathcal{F}_{\text{BB}}$. This allows \mathcal{S}^U to extract \mathcal{A} 's inputs and forward them to \mathcal{F} inside the wrapper $\mathcal{F}^V[\mathcal{F}]$. For the Compute and Output phases of Π^V , \mathcal{S} forwards all requests from \mathcal{A} to the über simulator \mathcal{S}^U for the

original protocol Π through the $\mathbf{NMF}_{\mathcal{S}^u}$ interface of $\mathcal{F}^v[\mathcal{F}]$. Upon receiving a response from \mathcal{S}^u , it forwards it back to \mathcal{A} . Apart from forwarding direct communication between \mathcal{A} and simulated honest parties to \mathcal{S}^u , it also simulates $\mathcal{F}_{\text{SJAuth}}, \mathcal{F}_{\text{PJAuth}}, \mathcal{F}_{\text{IRAuth}}, \mathcal{F}_{\text{BB}}$, verifying messages to simulated honest parties that should also be forwarded to \mathcal{S}^u are properly authenticated and later simulating \mathcal{S}^u 's response being authenticated by the right functionality as coming from the right simulated honest party. If verification is initiated by \mathcal{A} , \mathcal{S} checks that \mathcal{A} has provided correct authentication data according to Π^v , in which case it activates verification through the **Activate Verification** interface of $\mathcal{F}^v[\mathcal{F}]$ (otherwise it does not). If verification is initiated by an honest party, \mathcal{S} obtains from $\mathcal{F}^v[\mathcal{F}]$ the randomness and input (r_i, x_i) used by the honest party \mathcal{P}_i who initiated verification and simulates that honest party initiating verification with $(r_i, x_i, \mathcal{N}_{\cdot, i}, \mathcal{M}_{\cdot, i})$ towards \mathcal{A} by simulating these values being posted to \mathcal{F}_{BB} and simulating $\mathcal{F}_{\text{IRAuth}}$ authenticating the opening to (r_i, x_i) , where $\mathcal{N}_{\cdot, i}, \mathcal{M}_{\cdot, i}$ are generated according to the simulated execution towards \mathcal{A} . Finally, \mathcal{S} simulates verification by acting exactly as in Π^v and forwarding queries to the **Verify_j** interface of $\mathcal{F}^v[\mathcal{F}]$. Also, if \mathcal{A} produced incorrect verification data for some of the corrupted parties, \mathcal{S} instructs $\mathcal{F}^v[\mathcal{F}]$ to make verification activation queries for the corresponding parties to fail.

In order to see why the simulation with \mathcal{S} is indistinguishable from a real execution of Π^v , we will first analyze the simulation of the Input, Compute and Output phases. \mathcal{S} follows the exact steps of Π^v and delegates the simulation of the underlying protocol Π to its über simulator \mathcal{S}^u incorporated into $\mathcal{F}^v[\mathcal{F}]$. Notice that \mathcal{S}^u is parameterized with the randomness and input from honest parties by definition of $\mathcal{F}^v[\mathcal{F}]$. Since \mathcal{S} also forwards all communication between \mathcal{S}^u , this part of the simulation is indistinguishable from a real execution by \mathcal{S}^u 's properties according to Definition 8. It remains to be shown that a simulation of the **Activate Verification** and **Verify_k** phases with \mathcal{S} is also indistinguishable from a real execution of these phases with \mathcal{A} . First, notice again that, since \mathcal{S}^u is an über simulator parameterized as discussed before, according to Definition 8 all the transcript $\mathcal{N}_{\cdot, i}, \mathcal{M}_{\cdot, i}$ forwarded between \mathcal{S}^u and \mathcal{A} is consistent with the inputs and randomness (r_i, x_i) obtained from $\mathcal{F}^v[\mathcal{F}]$. Next, notice that, since the randomness and inputs of all parties are committed to using $\mathcal{F}_{\text{IRAuth}}$ and all messages between corrupted parties controlled by \mathcal{A} and honest parties simulated by \mathcal{S} (with the help of \mathcal{S}^u) are authenticated using $\mathcal{F}_{\text{PJAuth}}, \mathcal{F}_{\text{SJAuth}}$, the execution of Π during the Input, Compute and Output phases is equivalent the execution of a (cir, RIR, cmes)-transcript non-malleable protocol in the game of Definition 5 (where the parties are not allowed to alter their randomness, input and transcript after the protocol is executed). Notice also that executing the verification procedure of Π^v is equivalent to performing the procedures of the challenger in the game of Definition 5. Hence, when \mathcal{S} executes the verification phase by following the steps of Π^v , it is guaranteed by Definition 5 to arrive at the correct result about the presence of cheating parties (or lack thereof). Since \mathcal{S} either allows verification to succeed or makes it fail according to the checks it performs following the instructions of Π^v and those checks detect cheating

correctly with all but negligible probability (by Definition 5), that proves the remaining case and concludes our proof. \square

In Appendix E we show an application of Theorem 1 where it will be recursively applied to make a complex protocol verifiable.

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Supplementary Material

A Auxiliary Functionalities

Digital Signatures Ideal Functionality \mathcal{F}_{Sig} . The standard digital signature functionality \mathcal{F}_{Sig} from [15] is presented in Figure 8. It is also shown in [15] that any EUF-CMA signature scheme UC realizes this functionality.

Key Registration Ideal Functionality \mathcal{F}_{Reg} . The key registration functionality \mathcal{F}_{Reg} from [17] is presented in Figure 9. This ideal functionality allows parties to register public-keys in such a way that other parties can retrieve such keys with the guarantee that they belong to the party who originally registered them. This functionality will be used as setup for the constructions of certified public-key encryption with plaintext verification and secret joint authentication of Section 4.

Bulletin Board Ideal Functionality \mathcal{F}_{BB} . In Figure 10 we describe an authenticated bulletin board functionality which is used throughout this work. Authenticated Bulletin Boards can be constructed from regular bulletin boards using \mathcal{F}_{Sig} , \mathcal{F}_{Reg} and standard techniques.

B UC Secure Public-Key Encryption and Constructions

It is well-known that the standard public-key encryption functionality \mathcal{F}_{PKE} from [14,17] can be UC-realized by any IND-CCA secure public-key encryption scheme. One of the main building blocks we use is a UC-secure public-key encryption with a plaintext verification property formalized as functionality $\mathcal{F}_{\text{PKEPV}}$ that is presented in Section 4. In order to realize $\mathcal{F}_{\text{PKEPV}}$, we will show

Functionality \mathcal{F}_{Sig}

Given an ideal adversary \mathcal{S} , verifiers \mathcal{V} and a signer \mathcal{P}_s , \mathcal{F}_{Sig} performs:

Key Generation: Upon receiving a message (KEYGEN, sid) from \mathcal{P}_s , verify that $sid = (\mathcal{P}_s, sid')$ for some sid' . If not, ignore the request. Else, hand (KEYGEN, sid) to the adversary \mathcal{S} . Upon receiving $(\text{VERIFICATION KEY}, sid, \text{SIG}.vk)$ from \mathcal{S} , output $(\text{VERIFICATION KEY}, sid, \text{SIG}.vk)$ to \mathcal{P}_s , and record the pair $(\mathcal{P}_s, \text{SIG}.vk)$.

Signature Generation: Upon receiving a message (SIGN, sid, m) from \mathcal{P}_s , verify that $sid = (\mathcal{P}_s, sid')$ for some sid' . If not, then ignore the request. Else, send (SIGN, sid, m) to \mathcal{S} . Upon receiving $(\text{SIGNATURE}, sid, m, \sigma)$ from \mathcal{S} , verify that no entry $(m, \sigma, \text{SIG}.vk, 0)$ is recorded. If it is, then output an error message to \mathcal{P}_s and halt. Else, output $(\text{SIGNATURE}, sid, m, \sigma)$ to \mathcal{P}_s , and record the entry $(m, \sigma, \text{SIG}.vk, 1)$.

Signature Verification: Upon receiving a message $(\text{VERIFY}, sid, m, \sigma, \text{SIG}.vk')$ from some party $\mathcal{V}_i \in \mathcal{V}$, hand $(\text{VERIFY}, sid, m, \sigma, \text{SIG}.vk')$ to \mathcal{S} . Upon receiving $(\text{VERIFIED}, sid, m, \phi)$ from \mathcal{S} do:

1. If $\text{SIG}.vk' = \text{SIG}.vk$ and the entry $(m, \sigma, \text{SIG}.vk, 1)$ is recorded, then set $f = 1$. (This condition guarantees completeness: If the verification key $\text{SIG}.vk'$ is the registered one and σ is a legitimately generated signature for m , then the verification succeeds.)
2. Else, if $\text{SIG}.vk' = \text{SIG}.vk$, the signer \mathcal{P}_s is not corrupted, and no entry $(m, \sigma', \text{SIG}.vk, 1)$ for any σ' is recorded, then set $f = 0$ and record the entry $(m, \sigma, \text{SIG}.vk, 0)$. (This condition guarantees unforgeability: If $\text{SIG}.vk'$ is the registered one, the signer is not corrupted, and never signed m , then the verification fails.)
3. Else, if there is an entry $(m, \sigma, \text{SIG}.vk', f')$ recorded, then let $f = f'$. (This condition guarantees consistency: All verification requests with identical parameters will result in the same answer.)
4. Else, let $f = \phi$ and record the entry $(m, \sigma, \text{SIG}.vk', \phi)$.

Output $(\text{VERIFIED}, sid, m, f)$ to \mathcal{V}_i .

Fig. 8. Functionality \mathcal{F}_{Sig} for Digital Signatures.

Functionality \mathcal{F}_{Reg}

\mathcal{F}_{Reg} interacts with a set of parties \mathcal{P} and an ideal adversary \mathcal{S} , proceeding as follows:

Key Registration: Upon receiving a message $(\text{REGISTER}, sid, \text{pk})$ from a party $\mathcal{P}_i \in \mathcal{P}$, send $(\text{REGISTERING}, sid, \text{pk})$ to \mathcal{S} . Upon receiving (sid, ok) from \mathcal{S} , and if this is the first message from \mathcal{P}_i , then record the pair $(\mathcal{P}_i, \text{pk})$.

Key Retrieval: Upon receiving a message $(\text{RETRIEVE}, sid, \mathcal{P}_j)$ from a party $\mathcal{P}_i \in \mathcal{P}$, send message $(\text{RETRIEVE}, sid, \mathcal{P}_j)$ to \mathcal{S} and wait for it to return a message $(\text{RETRIEVE}, sid, ok)$. Then, if there is a recorded pair $(\mathcal{P}_j, \text{pk})$ output $(\text{RETRIEVE}, sid, \mathcal{P}_j, \text{pk})$ to \mathcal{P}_i . Otherwise, if there is no recorded tuple, return $(\text{RETRIEVE}, sid, \mathcal{P}_j, \perp)$.

Fig. 9. Functionality \mathcal{F}_{Reg} for Key Registration.

Functionality \mathcal{F}_{BB}

\mathcal{F}_{BB} interacts with a set of parties \mathcal{P} and an ideal adversary \mathcal{S} , proceeding as follows:

Register: Upon receiving (INIT, sid, \mathcal{P}) by all parties in a set $\mathcal{P} = \{\mathcal{P}_1, \dots, \mathcal{P}_n\}$ where sid was not used before, store \mathcal{P} locally.

Write: Upon receiving (WRITE, $sid, ssid, \mathcal{P}, m$) from a party $\mathcal{P}_i \in \mathcal{P}$, where $ssid$ was not used before for this sid , store the message m as $(sid, ssid, i, m)$.

Read: Upon receiving (READ, sid) from any party (possibly outside \mathcal{P}), the functionality returns all $(sid, ssid, i, m)$ that were stored.

Fig. 10. Functionality \mathcal{F}_{BB} for an authenticated Bulletin Board.

that it is possible to generate proofs that a given plaintext message was contained in a given ciphertext for the random oracle-based IND-CCA secure public-key encryption schemes of [43,28].

Semantics of a public-key encryption scheme. We consider public-key encryption schemes PKE that have public-key \mathcal{PK} , secret key \mathcal{SK} , message \mathcal{M} , randomness \mathcal{R} and ciphertext \mathcal{C} spaces that are functions of the security parameter κ , and consist of a PPT key generation algorithm KG, a PPT encryption algorithm Enc and a deterministic decryption algorithm Dec. For $(pk, sk) \xleftarrow{\$} \text{KG}(1^\kappa)$, any $m \in \mathcal{M}$, and $ct \xleftarrow{\$} \text{Enc}(pk, m)$, it should hold that $\text{Dec}(sk, ct) = m$ with overwhelming probability over the used randomness. Moreover, we consider public-key encryption schemes that are IND-CCA secure according to the definition considered in [14,17].

The Pointcheval [43] IND-CCA secure Cryptosystem. This cryptosystem can be constructed from any Partially Trapdoor One-Way Injective Function in the random oracle model. First we recall the definition of Partially Trapdoor One-Way Functions. As observed in [43], the classical El Gamal cryptosystem is a partially trapdoor one-way injective function under the Computational Diffie Hellman (CDH) assumption, implying an instantiation of this cryptosystem under CDH.

Definition 9 (Partially Trapdoor One-Way Function [43]). *The function $f : \mathcal{X} \times \mathcal{Y} \rightarrow \mathcal{Z}$ is said to be partially trapdoor one-way if:*

- For any given $z = f(x, y)$, it is computationally impossible to get back a compatible x . Such an x is called a partial preimage of z . More formally, for any polynomial time adversary A , its success, defined by $\text{Succ}_A = \Pr_{x,y}[\exists y', f(x', y') = f(x, y) | x' = A(f(x, y))]$, is negligible. It is one-way even for just finding partial-preimage, thus partial one-wayness.
- Using some extra information (the trapdoor), for any given $z \in f(\mathcal{X} \times \mathcal{Y})$, it is easily possible to get back an x , such that there exists a y which satisfies $f(x, y) = z$. The trapdoor does not allow a total inversion, but just a partial one and it is thus called a partial trapdoor.

Let's now recall the construction of [43], which is presented in Definition 10.

Definition 10 (Pointcheval [43] IND-CCA secure Cryptosystem). Let \mathcal{TD} be a family of partially trapdoor one-way injective functions and let $H : \{0, 1\}^{|m|+\kappa} \rightarrow \mathcal{Y}$ and $G : \mathcal{X} \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^{|m|+\kappa}$ be random oracles, where $|m|$ is message length. This cryptosystem consists of a triple of algorithms $\text{PKE} = (\text{KG}, \text{Enc}, \text{Dec})$ that work as follows:

- $\text{KG}(1^\kappa)$: Sample a random partially trapdoor one-way injective function $f : \mathcal{X} \times \mathcal{Y} \rightarrow \mathcal{Z}$ from \mathcal{TD} and denote its inverse parameterized by the trapdoor by $f^{-1} : \mathcal{Z} \rightarrow \mathcal{X}$. The public-key is $\text{pk} = f$ and the secret key is $\text{sk} = (f, f^{-1})$.
- $\text{Enc}(\text{pk}, m)$: Sample $r \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{X}$ and $s \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}^\kappa$. Compute $a \leftarrow f(r, H(m \| s))$ and $b = (m \| s) \oplus G(r)$, outputting $\text{ct} = (a, b)$ as the ciphertext.
- $\text{Dec}(\text{sk}, \text{ct})$: Given a ciphertext $\text{ct} = (a, b)$ and secret key $\text{sk} = f^{-1}$, compute $r \leftarrow f^{-1}(a)$ and $M \leftarrow b \oplus G(r)$. If $a = f(r, H(M))$, parse $M = (m \| s)$ and output m . Otherwise, output \perp .

Properties of the Pointcheval [43] IND-CCA secure Cryptosystem. First, notice that this construction can be instantiated in the restricted observable and programmable global random oracle model of [11]. Next, we observe that this construction is witness recovering, meaning that it allows for the decrypting party to recover all of the randomness used in generating a ciphertext (*i.e.* r and s). Moreover, this construction is committing, meaning that it is infeasible for an adversary to obtain two pairs of messages and randomness that result in the same ciphertext. We now recall the definitions of witness recovering and committing encryption schemes.

Definition 11 (Witness-Recovering Public-Key Encryption). A public-key encryption scheme is witness-recovering if its decryption algorithm Dec takes as input a secret key $\text{sk} \in \mathcal{SK}$ and a ciphertext $\text{ct} \in \mathcal{C}$ and outputs either a pair (m, r) for $m \in \mathcal{M}$ and $r \in \mathcal{R}$ or an error symbol \perp . For any $(\text{pk}, \text{sk}) \xleftarrow{\$} \text{KG}(1^\kappa)$, any $m \in \mathcal{M}$, any $r \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{R}$ and $c \leftarrow \text{Enc}(\text{pk}, m; r)$, it holds that $\text{Dec}(\text{sk}, \text{ct}) = (m, r)$ with overwhelming probability over the randomness used by the algorithms.

Definition 12 (Committing Encryption). Let PKE be a public-key encryption scheme and κ a security parameter. For every PPT adversary \mathcal{A} , it holds that:

$$\Pr \left[\text{Enc}(\text{pk}, m_0; r_0) = \text{Enc}(\text{pk}, m_1; r_1) \mid \begin{array}{l} \text{pk} \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{PK}, \\ (r_0, r_1, m_0, m_1) \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{A}(\text{pk}), \\ r_0, r_1 \in \mathcal{R}, m_0, m_1 \in \mathcal{M}, \\ m_0 \neq m_1 \end{array} \right] \in \text{negl}(\kappa)$$

The Pointcheval [43] IND-CCA secure Cryptosystem is trivially witness-recovering since a decrypting party always recovers the randomness (r, s) used for generating a ciphertext. In order to see why it is also committing, notice that

an adversary can only make a polynomial number of queries to $H(\cdot)$, so it can only find a pair (m', s') such that $(m', s') \neq (m, s)$ and $H(m \parallel s) = H(m' \parallel s')$ with negligible probability. Analogously, the adversary can only find an r' such that $r' \neq r$ and $G(r) = G(r')$ with negligible probability. Hence, since f is injective, the adversary can only find (m', s', r') such that $(m', s', r') \neq (m, s, r)$ and $f(r', H(m' \parallel s')) = f(r, H(m \parallel s))$ with negligible probability.

Plaintext Verification for the Pointcheval [43] IND-CCA secure Cryptosystem. We first extend the semantics of public-key encryption by adding a plaintext verification algorithm $\{0, 1\} \leftarrow \mathsf{V}(\text{ct}, \mathbf{m}, \pi)$ that outputs 1 if \mathbf{m} is the plaintext message contained in ciphertext ct given a valid proof π that also contains the public-key pk used to generate the ciphertext. Furthermore, we modify the encryption and decryption algorithms as follows: $(\text{ct}, \pi) \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \text{Enc}(\text{pk}, \mathbf{m})$ and $(\mathbf{m}, \pi) \leftarrow \text{Dec}(\text{sk}, \text{ct})$ now output a valid proof π that \mathbf{m} is contained in ct . The security guarantees provided by the verification algorithm are laid out in Definition 13. Notice that this definition only considers cryptosystems where the proof π consists of the randomness used by the encryption algorithm, which is enough for our version of the Pointcheval [43] IND-CCA secure cryptosystem with plaintext verification. A generalization of this definition follows by defining the space of plaintext validity proofs and requiring that π, π' are in that space, as well as that the adversary provides ct , since it might not be computable from (\mathbf{m}, π) .

Definition 13 (Plaintext Verification). *Let $\text{PKE} = (\text{KG}, \text{Enc}, \text{Dec}, \mathsf{V})$ be a public-key encryption scheme and κ be a security parameter. For every PPT adversary \mathcal{A} , it holds that:*

$$\Pr \left[\mathsf{V}(\text{ct}, \mathbf{m}', \pi') = 1 \left| \begin{array}{l} \text{pk} \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathcal{PK}, \\ (\mathbf{m}, \pi, \mathbf{m}', \pi') \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathcal{A}(\text{pk}), \\ \pi = (\text{pk}, r), \pi' = (\text{pk}, r') \in \mathcal{PK} \cup \mathcal{R}, \\ \mathbf{m}, \mathbf{m}' \in \mathcal{M}, (\text{ct}, \pi) \leftarrow \text{Enc}(\text{pk}, \mathbf{m}; r), \mathbf{m}' \neq \mathbf{m} \end{array} \right. \right] \in \text{negl}(\kappa)$$

We can extend the Pointcheval [43] IND-CCA secure cryptosystem to add plaintext verification as follows:

Definition 14 (Pointcheval [43] IND-CCA Secure Cryptosystem with Plaintext Verification). *Let \mathcal{TD} be a family of partially trapdoor one-way injective functions and let $H : \{0, 1\}^{|\mathbf{m}|+\kappa} \rightarrow \mathcal{Y}$ and $G : \mathcal{X} \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^{|\mathbf{m}|+\kappa}$ be random oracles, where $|\mathbf{m}|$ is message length. This cryptosystem consists of the algorithms $\text{PKE} = (\text{KG}, \text{Enc}, \text{Dec}, \mathsf{V})$ that work as follows:*

- $\text{KG}(1^\kappa)$: Same as in Definition 10.
- $\text{Enc}(\text{pk}, \mathbf{m})$: Same as in Definition 10 but also output a proof $\pi = (\text{pk}, r, s)$ (i.e. the encryption randomness) besides the ciphertext $\text{ct} = (a, b)$.
- $\text{Dec}(\text{sk}, \text{ct})$: Same as in Definition 10 but also output a proof $\pi = (\text{pk}, r, s)$ (i.e. the retrieved encryption randomness) besides the plaintext message \mathbf{m} .

- $V(\text{ct}, \text{m}, \pi)$: Parse $\pi = (\text{pk}, r, s)$, compute $\text{ct}' \leftarrow \text{Enc}(\text{pk}, \text{m}, (r, s))$ and output 1 if and only if $\text{ct} = \text{ct}'$.

Using the facts that this cryptosystem is witness-recovering and committing, both the encrypting and decrypting parties can generate a proof $\pi = (\text{pk}, r, s)$ that a message m was encrypted under public-key pk with randomness (r, s) resulting in ciphertext ct . Notice that the witness-recovering property ensures that a decrypting party is able to recover the randomness (r, s) too. Any third party verifier with input $(\text{ct}, \text{m}, \pi)$ can execute the verification algorithm $V(\text{ct}, \text{m}, \pi)$ and obtain 1 if and only if π is a valid proof that m is contained in ct . Notice that an adversary cannot present two different triples (m, s, r) and (m', s', r') that pass this test with the same public-key pk except with negligible probability, since the cryptosystem is committing as discussed above. Assuming by contradiction that such an adversary \mathcal{A} exists, we can construct an adversary \mathcal{A}' that wins the game of Definition 12 with non-negligible probability. Adversary \mathcal{A}' receives pk from the challenger in the game of Definition 12 and then acts as the challenger in the game of Definition 13, relaying pk to \mathcal{A} . Upon receiving $(\text{m}, \pi, \text{m}', \pi')$ from \mathcal{A} , it relays $(\text{m}, \pi, \text{m}', \pi')$ to the the challenger in the game of Definition 12 as $(r_0, r_1, \text{m}_0, \text{m}_1)$. Notice that, for the extended cryptosystem above, $1 \leftarrow V(\text{ct}, \text{m}, \pi)$ occurs if and only if $\text{ct} = \text{ct}'$, where $\text{ct}' \leftarrow \text{Enc}(\text{pk}, \text{m}; (r, s))$ and $\pi = (\text{pk}, r, s)$. This implies that, if adversary \mathcal{A} wins the game of Definition 13 with non-negligible probability, it is able to produce two messages m, m' and corresponding proofs $\pi = (\text{pk}, r, s), \pi' = (\text{pk}', r', s')$ for which $\text{m} \neq \text{m}'$ and $\text{Enc}(\text{pk}, \text{m}; \pi = (r, s)) = \text{Enc}(\text{pk}, \text{m}'; \pi' = (r', s'))$ with non-negligible probability. Hence, adversary \mathcal{A}' wins the game of Definition 12 with non-negligible probability.

C Realizing the Secret Joint Authentication Functionality

C.1 Realizing $\mathcal{F}_{\text{SJAuth}}$

The basic idea for realizing $\mathcal{F}_{\text{SJAuth}}$ is using a signature scheme (captured by \mathcal{F}_{Sig}) and a certified encryption scheme with plaintext verification (captured by $\mathcal{F}_{\text{CPKEPV}}$), *i.e.* an encryption scheme with two crucial properties: 1. An encrypting party is guaranteed to encrypt a message that can only be opened by the intended receiver (*i.e.* it is possible to make sure the public-key used belongs to the intended receiver of the encrypted messages); 2. Both encrypting and decrypting parties can generate publicly verifiable proofs that a certain message was contained in a given ciphertext. The private channel itself is realized by encrypting messages under the encryption scheme, while joint authentication is achieved by having all parties in \mathcal{P} (including the sender) and bureaucrats in \mathcal{B} sign the resulting ciphertext. In order to obtain efficiency, a joint public/secret key pair is generated for each set of receivers, in such a way that the same ciphertext can be decrypted by all the receivers holding the corresponding joint secret key. Later on, if any party in \mathcal{P} (including the sender) wishes to start the verification procedure to prove that a certain message was indeed contained in

the ciphertext associated with a given *ssid*, it recovers the plaintext message and a proof of plaintext validity from the ciphertext and sends those to one or more verifiers. With these values, any party can first verify that the ciphertext that was sent indeed corresponds to that message due to the plaintext verification property of the encryption scheme and then verify that it has been jointly authenticated by checking that there exist valid signatures on that ciphertext by all parties in \mathcal{P} and bureaucrats in \mathcal{B} .

In order to obtain $\mathcal{F}_{\text{CPKEPV}}$, we first define and realize an ideal functionality for public-key encryption with plaintext verification $\mathcal{F}_{\text{PKEPV}}$. This functionality and the protocol that realizes it are extensions of the results of [14,19], which show that IND-CCA secure encryption schemes UC realize the standard public-key encryption functionality. In our definition and construction, we show that IND-CCA encryption scheme with an additional plaintext verification property (*e.g.* as the scheme discussed in Section B) UC realize $\mathcal{F}_{\text{PKEPV}}$. Building on $\mathcal{F}_{\text{PKEPV}}$ and a key registration functionality \mathcal{F}_{Reg} , we define and realize $\mathcal{F}_{\text{CPKEPV}}$. We again extend a functionality and protocol from [17], which shows that certified public-key encryption can be realized from the standard public-key encryption functionality and \mathcal{F}_{Reg} . Following a similar approach, we show a protocol based on $\mathcal{F}_{\text{PKEPV}}$ and \mathcal{F}_{Reg} that UC realizes $\mathcal{F}_{\text{CPKEPV}}$.

Public-Key Encryption with Plaintext Verification $\mathcal{F}_{\text{PKEPV}}$ We will use a public-key encryption scheme that allows for both the party generating a ciphertext and the party decrypting it to obtain a publicly verifiable proof that a given message was contained in such ciphertext. Notice that this is not a zero-knowledge proof, but a proof whose verification requires the message to be revealed. We model such an encryption scheme by functionality $\mathcal{F}_{\text{PKEPV}}$, which is an extension of the standard public-key encryption functionality \mathcal{F}_{PKE} from [14,19] with a new plaintext verification interface for verifying that a given plaintext was contained in a given ciphertext. This plaintext verification interface is incorporated into the functionality following the same approach as in [14,19]: the functionality first looks up the corresponding ciphertext and message pair on an internal list (*i.e.* where it should be in case the ciphertext was generated by the functionality), returning 1 if such a pair exists; otherwise, if the ciphertext is not contained in this internal list (*i.e.* it has been generated by an adversary in a potentially incorrect way), the functionality performs the verification procedure internally, by attempting to decrypt the ciphertext and then executing the verification algorithm taking as input the ciphertext along with the resulting plaintext message and proof, returning the output of this algorithm to the verifier. It is well-known that IND-CCA secure public-key encryption schemes can be used to realize \mathcal{F}_{PKE} as defined in [14,19], but we will show that there exist IND-CCA secure public-key encryption schemes [43,28] that also realize our extended functionality $\mathcal{F}_{\text{PKEPV}}$.

Realizing $\mathcal{F}_{\text{PKEPV}}$ It is known [14,19] that an IND-CCA secure public encryption scheme realizes the key generation, encryption and decryption interfaces of

$\mathcal{F}_{\text{PKEPV}}$ (without generating proofs), which correspond to the standard public-key encryption functionality \mathcal{F}_{PKE} from [14,19]. The missing pieces in realizing our formulation of $\mathcal{F}_{\text{PKEPV}}$ are algorithms for generating and verifying proofs that a given plaintext is contained in a given ciphertext produced by a IND-CCA secure public encryption scheme. Notice that these proofs need not to be zero-knowledge, as they can be verified given the plaintext message and the corresponding ciphertext. We use the version of Pointcheval’s IND-CCA secure cryptosystem [43] with plaintext verification from Section B to realize $\mathcal{F}_{\text{PKEPV}}$ following the same approach as in [14,19]. This generic construction works in the restricted programmable and observable random oracle model [11] and can be instantiated from the CDH assumption.

We realize $\mathcal{F}_{\text{PKEPV}}$ by extending the encryption protocol Π_{PKE} of [14,19], which is constructed from any IND-CCA secure cryptosystem $\text{PKE} = (\text{KG}, \text{Enc}, \text{Dec})$. We obtain a protocol Π_{PKEPV} that realizes $\mathcal{F}_{\text{PKEPV}}$ based on an IND-CCA public-key encryption scheme with plaintext verification $\text{PKE} = (\text{KG}, \text{Enc}, \text{Dec}, \text{V})$ as defined in Section B. Protocol Π_{PKEPV} works as follows: Upon receiving $(\text{KEYGEN}, \text{sid}, \mathcal{P}_{\text{own}})$, \mathcal{P}_{own} executes $(\text{sk}, \text{pk}) \xleftarrow{\$} \text{KG}(1^\kappa)$, records sk and returns pk . Upon receiving a message $(\text{ENCRYPT}, \text{sid}, \mathcal{P}_{\text{own}}, \mathbf{e}', m)$, any party $\mathcal{P}_i \in \mathcal{P}$ outputs ct where $(\text{ct}, \pi) \xleftarrow{\$} \text{Enc}(\mathbf{e}', m)$ if $m \in M$ (otherwise it outputs an error message). Upon receiving $(\text{DECRYPT}, \text{sid}, \mathcal{P}_{\text{own}}, c)$, \mathcal{P}_{own} outputs m where $(m, \pi) \leftarrow \text{Dec}(\text{sk}, c)$. Upon receiving a message $(\text{VERIFY}, \text{sid}, \mathcal{P}_{\text{own}}, c, m, \pi)$, a verifier $\mathcal{V}_i \in \mathcal{V}$ outputs b where $b \leftarrow \text{V}(c, m, \pi)$.

We will prove that the public-key encryption scheme with plaintext verification of Definition 14 can be used to instantiate Π_{PKEPV} in such a way that it realizes $\mathcal{F}_{\text{PKEPV}}$. We leave a more general proof as a future work.

Theorem 2. *Let $\text{PKE} = \{\text{KG}, \text{Enc}, \text{Dec}, \text{V}\}$ be the public-key encryption scheme with plaintext verification of Definition 14. Protocol Π_{PKEPV} instantiated with PKE UC realizes $\mathcal{F}_{\text{PKEPV}}$ in the restricted programmable and observable random oracle model [11].*

Proof. In order to prove this construction securely realizes $\mathcal{F}_{\text{PKEPV}}$, we construct a simulator such that no environment can distinguish an ideal execution with this simulator and $\mathcal{F}_{\text{PKEPV}}$ from a real execution of Π_{PKEPV} with any adversary \mathcal{A} and dummy parties. Notice that the steps of Π_{PKEPV} dealing with messages $(\text{KEYGEN}, \text{sid}, \mathcal{P}_{\text{own}})$, $(\text{ENCRYPT}, \text{sid}, \mathcal{P}_{\text{own}}, \mathbf{e}', m)$ and $(\text{DECRYPT}, \text{sid}, \mathcal{P}_{\text{own}}, c)$ correspond exactly to the protocol of [14,19] realizing the standard public-key encryption, and our simulator can function exactly as the simulator of [14,19]. In fact, all the simulator does is executing $\text{KG}(1^\kappa)$ and setting pk . It is proven in [14,19] that such a simulator results in an execution indeed indistinguishable from the real protocol execution with an adversary \mathcal{A} and the same argument can be used in our case. As for the remaining message $(\text{VERIFY}, \text{sid}, \mathcal{P}_{\text{own}}, c, m, \pi)$, any party in the simulation will output exactly the same as in the real protocol, since the output will either come from the simulator if it indeed simulated a ciphertext generation for m that resulted in (c, m, π) (meaning the ciphertext was correctly/honestly generated) or whatever the output of

Functionality $\mathcal{F}_{\text{PKEPV}}$

$\mathcal{F}_{\text{PKEPV}}$ interacts with a special decrypting party \mathcal{P}_{own} , a set of parties \mathcal{P} , a set of public verifiers \mathcal{V} and an ideal adversary \mathcal{S} . $\mathcal{F}_{\text{PKEPV}}$ is parameterized by a message domain ensemble $M = \{M_k\}_{k \in \mathcal{N}}$, a family of formal encryption algorithms $\{E_e\}_e$, a family of formal decryption algorithms $\{D_d\}_d$ for unregistered ciphertexts and a family of formal plaintext verification algorithms $\{V_v\}_v$. $\mathcal{F}_{\text{PKEPV}}$ proceeds as follows:

Key Generation: Upon receiving a message $(\text{KEYGEN}, \text{sid}, \mathcal{P}_{\text{own}})$ from a party $\mathcal{P}_{\text{own}} \in \mathcal{P}$ (or \mathcal{S}), proceed as follows:

1. Send $(\text{KEYGEN}, \text{sid}, \mathcal{P}_{\text{own}})$ to \mathcal{S} .
2. Receive a value \mathbf{e} from \mathcal{S} .
3. Record \mathbf{e} and output \mathbf{e} to \mathcal{P}_{own} .

Encryption: Upon receiving a message $(\text{ENCRYPT}, \text{sid}, \mathcal{P}_{\text{own}}, \mathbf{e}', m)$ from a party $\mathcal{P}_i \in \mathcal{P}$, proceed as follows:

1. If $m \notin M$, then return an error message to \mathcal{P}_i .
2. If $m \in M$, then:
 - If \mathcal{P}_{own} is corrupted, or $\mathbf{e}' \neq \mathbf{e}$, then compute $(c, \pi) \leftarrow E_k(m)$.
 - Otherwise, let $(c, \pi) \leftarrow E_k(1^{|m|})$.

Record the pair (m, c, π) and return (c, π) to \mathcal{P}_i .

Decryption: Upon receiving a message $(\text{DECRYPT}, \text{sid}, \mathcal{P}_{\text{own}}, c)$ from \mathcal{P}_{own} , proceed as follows (if the input is from another party then ignore):

1. If there is a recorded tuple (c, m, π) , then hand (m, π) to \mathcal{P}_{own} . (If there is more than one value m that corresponds to c then unique decryption is not possible. In that case, output an error message to \mathcal{P}_{own}).
2. Otherwise, compute $(m, \pi) \leftarrow D(c)$ and hand (m, π) to \mathcal{P}_{own} .

Plaintext Verification: Upon receiving a message $(\text{VERIFY}, \text{sid}, \mathcal{P}_{\text{own}}, c, m, \pi)$ from a verifier $\mathcal{V}_i \in \mathcal{V}$, proceed as follows:

1. If there is a recorded tuple (c, m, π) , then output 1 to \mathcal{V}_i .
2. Otherwise, compute $b \leftarrow V(c, m, \pi)$, outputting b to \mathcal{V}_i .

Fig. 11. Public-Key Encryption Functionality with Plaintext Verification $\mathcal{F}_{\text{PKEPV}}$.

$V(c, m, \pi)$ is (in case the ciphertext was not generated by the simulated functionality). Special care needs to be taken when simulating the verification of a ciphertext simulated for an honest party, which is computed as $\text{Enc}(\text{pk}, 1; r)$ (for a random r) instead of using the actual message given by the honest party. In this case, when π is revealed, it is incompatible with the message 1 in the ciphertext. However, upon receiving the actual message \mathbf{m} the simulator shows the adversary answers to queries $H(\mathbf{m}||s)$ and $G(r)$ that match \mathbf{m} and ct .

Certified Encryption With Plaintext Verification $\mathcal{F}_{\text{CPKEPV}}$ We are now ready to define and construct a version of certified public-key encryption with plaintext verification following the approach of [17]. Essentially, certified public-key encryption captures a notion where public-keys are not explicitly available but are linked to specific parties, guaranteeing that an encrypted message will

Functionality $\mathcal{F}_{\text{CPKEPV}}$

$\mathcal{F}_{\text{CPKEPV}}$ interacts with a special decrypting party \mathcal{P}_{own} , a set of parties \mathcal{P} , a set of public verifiers \mathcal{V} and an ideal adversary \mathcal{S} . $\mathcal{F}_{\text{CPKEPV}}$ is parameterized by a message domain ensemble $M = \{M_k\}_{k \in \mathcal{N}}$, a family of formal encryption algorithms $\{E_e\}_e$, a family of formal decryption algorithms $\{D_d\}_d$ for unregistered ciphertexts a family of formal plaintext verification algorithms $\{V_v\}_v$. $\mathcal{F}_{\text{CPKEPV}}$ proceeds as follows:

Encryption: Upon receiving a message (ENCRYPT, $sid, \mathcal{P}_{\text{own}}, m$) from a party $\mathcal{P}_i \in \mathcal{P}$, proceed as follows:

1. if this is the first encryption request made by \mathcal{P}_i then notify \mathcal{S} that π made an encryption request.
2. If $m \notin M$, then return an error message to \mathcal{P}_1 .
3. If $m \in M$, then:
 - If \mathcal{P}_{own} is corrupted, then compute $(c, \pi) \leftarrow E_k(m)$.
 - Otherwise, let $(c, \pi) \leftarrow E_k(1^{|m|})$.
Record the pair (m, c, π) and return (c, π) to \mathcal{P}_i .

Decryption: Upon receiving a message (DECRYPT, $sid, \mathcal{P}_{\text{own}}, c$) from \mathcal{P}_{own} , proceed as follows (if the input is from another party then ignore):

1. If this is the first decryption request made by \mathcal{P}_{own} then notify \mathcal{S} that a decryption request was made.
2. If there is a recorded tuple (c, m, π) , then hand m, π to \mathcal{P}_{own} . (If there is more than one value m that corresponds to c then unique decryption is not possible. In that case, output an error message to \mathcal{P}_{own}).
3. Otherwise, compute $(m, \pi) \leftarrow D(c)$ and hand (m, π) to \mathcal{P}_{own} .

Plaintext Verification: Upon receiving a message (VERIFY, $sid, \mathcal{P}_{\text{own}}, c, m, \pi$) from a verifier $\mathcal{V}_i \in \mathcal{V}$ output 1 to \mathcal{V}_i if there is a recorded tuple (c, m, π) . Otherwise, output 0.

Fig. 12. Certified Public-Key Encryption Functionality with Plaintext Verification $\mathcal{F}_{\text{CPKEPV}}$.

be received by an specific party. In order to realize such a functionality, a key registration ideal functionality \mathcal{F}_{Reg} that allows parties to register their public-keys is required. It was shown in [17] that certified public-key encryption can be realized from a standard public encryption functionality and \mathcal{F}_{Reg} . We will extend both the original functionality and protocol from [17] to incorporate plaintext verification, showing that $\mathcal{F}_{\text{CPKEPV}}$ can be realized from $\mathcal{F}_{\text{PKEPV}}$ and \mathcal{F}_{Reg} . The notion of certified public-key encryption with plaintext verification is captured by functionality $\mathcal{F}_{\text{CPKEPV}}$ introduced in Figure 12. Notice that the Plaintext Verification interface of $\mathcal{F}_{\text{CPKEPV}}$ only outputs 1 if it receives a query with a tuple (c, m, π) that is registered in the functionality's internal list. This captures the fact that only ciphertexts generated by the functionality with a party's legitimate public-key (as encoded in the encryption algorithm $E_k(\cdot)$) are considered valid, while arbitrary ciphertexts or ciphertexts generated from other public-keys are automatically considered invalid.

Protocol Π_{CPKEPV}

Π_{CPKEPV} is parameterized by the families $\{E_e\}_e$, $\{D_d\}_d$ and $\{V_v\}_v$ of algorithms of the functionality it is to realize. A special decrypting party \mathcal{P}_{own} , a set of parties \mathcal{P} , a set of public verifiers \mathcal{V} execute Π_{CPKEPV} as follows:

Initialization: At the first activation an instance of $\mathcal{F}_{\text{CPKEPV}}$ is instantiated with the families $\{E_e\}_e$, $\{D_d\}_d$ and $\{V_v\}_v$. Party \mathcal{P}_{own} sends message $(\text{KEYGEN}, \text{sid}, \mathcal{P}_{\text{own}})$ to $\mathcal{F}_{\text{CPKEPV}}$, receiving pk . Next, \mathcal{P}_{own} sends $(\text{REGISTER}, \text{sid}, \text{pk})$ to \mathcal{F}_{Reg} .

Encryption: Upon receiving a message $(\text{ENCRYPT}, \text{sid}, \mathcal{P}_{\text{own}}, \mathbf{e}', m)$, party $\mathcal{P}_i \in \mathcal{P}$ proceed as follows:

1. Check whether it has a recorded public-key \mathbf{e} . If not, send $(\text{RETRIEVE}, \text{sid}, \mathcal{P}_{\text{own}})$ to \mathcal{F}_{Reg} , receiving $(\text{RETRIEVE}, \text{sid}, \mathcal{P}_{\text{own}}, \text{pk})$ as response. If $\text{pk} \neq \perp$, record $\mathbf{e} = \text{pk}$. Otherwise, return \perp .
2. If $\mathbf{e} \neq \perp$, send $(\text{ENCRYPT}, \text{sid}, \mathcal{P}_{\text{own}}, \mathbf{e}', m)$ to $\mathcal{F}_{\text{CPKEPV}}$, receiving (c, π) as response. Output c and record the tuple (m, c, π) .

Decryption: Upon receiving a message $(\text{DECRYPT}, \text{sid}, \mathcal{P}_{\text{own}}, c)$, \mathcal{P}_{own} sends a message $(\text{DECRYPT}, \text{sid}, \mathcal{P}_{\text{own}}, c)$ to $\mathcal{F}_{\text{CPKEPV}}$, receiving and outputting (m, π) .

Plaintext Verification: Upon receiving a message $(\text{VERIFY}, \text{sid}, \mathcal{P}_{\text{own}}, c, m, \pi)$, a verifier $\mathcal{V}_i \in \mathcal{V}$ proceeds as follows:

1. Check whether it has a recorded public-key \mathbf{e} . If not, send $(\text{RETRIEVE}, \text{sid}, \mathcal{P}_{\text{own}})$ to \mathcal{F}_{Reg} , receiving $(\text{RETRIEVE}, \text{sid}, \mathcal{P}_{\text{own}}, \text{pk})$ as response. If $\text{pk} \neq \perp$, record $\mathbf{e} = \text{pk}$. Otherwise, return 0.
2. Obtain pk from π . If $\text{pk} = \mathbf{e}$, compute $b \leftarrow V(c, m, \pi)$ and outputs b . Otherwise, output 0.

Fig. 13. Protocol Π_{CPKEPV} realizing $\mathcal{F}_{\text{CPKEPV}}$.

Realizing $\mathcal{F}_{\text{CPKEPV}}$ We follow the approach of [17] to realize $\mathcal{F}_{\text{CPKEPV}}$ from a public-key encryption scheme with plaintext verification $\mathcal{F}_{\text{PKEPV}}$ and a key registration functionality \mathcal{F}_{Reg} . Our protocol implements Initialization, Encryption and Decryption interfaces exactly as in [17] and follows the same approach for implementing the Plaintext Verification interface. Protocol Π_{CPKEPV} realizing $\mathcal{F}_{\text{CPKEPV}}$ is presented in Figure 13.

Theorem 3. *Protocol Π_{CPKEPV} UC realizes $\mathcal{F}_{\text{PKEPV}}$ in the $(\mathcal{F}_{\text{PKEPV}}, \mathcal{F}_{\text{Reg}})$ -hybrid model.*

Proof. In order to see why Protocol Π_{CPKEPV} is secure, notice that a simulator \mathcal{S} can be constructed exactly as in [17]: \mathcal{S} runs with an internal copy of the adversary \mathcal{A} towards which it simulates $\mathcal{F}_{\text{PKEPV}}$ and \mathcal{F}_{Reg} exactly as described, simulating the process of registration by \mathcal{P}_{own} when $\mathcal{F}_{\text{CPKEPV}}$ informs \mathcal{S} that either encryption or decryption requests happened, as well as simulating the process of key retrieval when notified by the functionality. Notice that the ideal execution with the simulator and $\mathcal{F}_{\text{CPKEPV}}$ is exactly the same as the real execution of Protocol Π_{CPKEPV} with an adversary \mathcal{A} , as in the case of the protocol proposed

in [17]. Hence, no environment can distinguish the ideal world simulation from the real world execution.

Secret Joint Authentication Protocol We can now construct a protocol Π_{SJAuth} that realizes $\mathcal{F}_{\text{SJAuth}}$ from $\mathcal{F}_{\text{CPKEPV}}$, \mathcal{F}_{Sig} and \mathcal{F}_{Reg} . This protocol starts by initializing an instance of $\mathcal{F}_{\text{CPKEPV}}$ that is jointly used by all parties $\mathcal{P}_i \in \mathcal{P}$ (i.e. all parties in \mathcal{P} act as \mathcal{P}_{own}) and initializing an instance of \mathcal{F}_{Sig} for \mathcal{P}_{snd} , each party $\mathcal{P}_i \in \mathcal{P}$ and each bureaucrat $\mathcal{B}_i \in \mathcal{B}$. Next, \mathcal{P}_{snd} , parties in \mathcal{P} and bureaucrats generate a signature verification key from their instances of \mathcal{F}_{Sig} and register it with \mathcal{F}_{Reg} . When \mathcal{P}_{snd} wants to send a message, it encrypts it using $\mathcal{F}_{\text{CPKEPV}}$, signs the resulting ciphertext using \mathcal{F}_{Sig} and sends the resulting signature along with the ciphertext to all other parties and bureaucrats. All parties in \mathcal{P} and all bureaucrats retrieve \mathcal{P}_{snd} 's key from \mathcal{F}_{Reg} and issue a verification query to \mathcal{F}_{Sig} to check that the signature on the ciphertext is valid. If this is the case, each bureaucrat uses its instance of \mathcal{F}_{Sig} to compute a signature on the ciphertext, which it sends to all other parties. Additionally, each party $\mathcal{P}_i \in \mathcal{P}$ decrypts the ciphertext using $\mathcal{F}_{\text{CPKEPV}}$, obtaining a plaintext message and proof of plaintext validity (which it verifies using $\mathcal{F}_{\text{CPKEPV}}$). In case both decryption and signature checks succeed, each party \mathcal{P}_i computes a signature on the ciphertext using \mathcal{F}_{Sig} and sends it to all other parties and bureaucrats. In case either \mathcal{P}_{snd} or a party $\mathcal{P}_i \in \mathcal{P}$ want to prove a certain message was sent by \mathcal{P}_{snd} and jointly authenticated, it reveals the ciphertext, the message and proof of plaintext validity obtained by decrypting the ciphertext along with all signatures on that ciphertext (by \mathcal{P}_{snd} , all parties $\mathcal{P}_i \in \mathcal{P}$ and all bureaucrats) to a verifier, who can retrieve all signature verification keys from \mathcal{F}_{Reg} , verify all signatures using \mathcal{F}_{Sig} and finally use the ciphertext, message and proof of plaintext validity to verify the plaintext with $\mathcal{F}_{\text{CPKEPV}}$. Protocol Π_{SJAuth} is described in Figures 14, 15.

Theorem 4. *Protocol Π_{SJAuth} UC realizes $\mathcal{F}_{\text{SJAuth}}$ in the $(\mathcal{F}_{\text{CPKEPV}}, \mathcal{F}_{\text{Sig}}, \mathcal{F}_{\text{Reg}})$ -hybrid model.*

Proof. We construct a simulator \mathcal{S} following the approach of the simulator for Π_{CPKEPV} . Basically, \mathcal{S} runs with an internal copy of the adversary \mathcal{A} and forwards all communication between the environment \mathcal{Z} and \mathcal{A} . Additionally, \mathcal{S} simulates functionalities \mathcal{F}_{Reg} , $\mathcal{F}_{\text{CPKEPV}}$ and \mathcal{F}_{Sig} towards its internal adversary, acting exactly as in the descriptions of these functionalities, except for when explicitly mentioned. Basically, \mathcal{S} simulates honest parties towards \mathcal{A} by acting exactly as those honest parties would in Π_{SJAuth} . When it is notified by $\mathcal{F}_{\text{SJAuth}}$ that an input message query or a joint authentication query has been received, it simulates the registering and retrieval of signature keys towards \mathcal{A} , respectively. If \mathcal{A} corrupts at least one party $\mathcal{P}_i \in \mathcal{P}$ and/or \mathcal{P}_{snd} , acting this way allows \mathcal{S} to perfectly simulate an execution of Π_{SJAuth} towards corrupted bureaucrats. Notice that since \mathcal{S} learns the messages that should be sent to corrupted bureaucrats from \mathcal{A} 's interactions with simulated $\mathcal{F}_{\text{CPKEPV}}$, it can simulate Π_{CPKEPV} in this case in such a way that later revealing the proofs of plaintext validity π will

Protocol Π_{SJAuth}

Π_{SJAuth} is parameterized by a special party \mathcal{P}_{snd} , a set of authenticating parties $\mathcal{P} = \{\mathcal{P}_1, \dots, \mathcal{P}_n\}$, a set of bureaucrats $\mathcal{B} = \{\mathcal{B}_1, \dots, \mathcal{B}_b\}$ and a set of public verifiers \mathcal{V} (s.t. $\mathcal{B} \subset \mathcal{V}$). Π_{SJAuth} proceeds as follows:

Initialization: At the first activation, an instance of $\mathcal{F}_{\text{CPKEPV}}$ is instantiated with the families $\{E_e\}_e$, $\{D_d\}_d$ and $\{V_v\}_v$ and all parties $\mathcal{P}_i \in \pi$ acting as \mathcal{P}_{own} (e.g. $\mathcal{P}_{\text{own}} = \mathcal{P}^a$). For each party in \mathcal{P} , bureaucrat in \mathcal{B} and party \mathcal{P}_{snd} , an instance of \mathcal{F}_{Sig} is initialized with that party acting as \mathcal{P}_s . All parties in \mathcal{P} , bureaucrats in \mathcal{B} and party \mathcal{P}_{snd} , send message (KEYGEN, sid) to their corresponding instance of \mathcal{F}_{Sig} , receiving pk . Next, all parties in \mathcal{P} , bureaucrats in \mathcal{B} and party \mathcal{P}_{snd} register their signing keys by sending (REGISTER, sid , pk) to \mathcal{F}_{Reg} .

Message Input: Upon receiving a message (INPUT, sid , $ssid$, \mathcal{P}_{snd} , m), \mathcal{P}_{snd} sends (ENCRYPT, sid , \mathcal{P} , m) to $\mathcal{F}_{\text{CPKEPV}}$, receiving (c, π) as response. Next, \mathcal{P}_{snd} sends (SIGN, sid , c) to its instance of \mathcal{F}_{Sig} , receiving (SIGNATURE, sid , m , σ_{snd}) as response. Finally, \mathcal{P}_{snd} outputs $\sigma_{\text{snd}} = (m, c, \pi, \sigma_{\text{snd}})$.

Joint Authentication: Upon receiving a message (AUTH, sid , $ssid$, \mathcal{P}_{snd} , m), a party $\mathcal{P}_i \in \mathcal{P}$ checks if it has received $(sid, ssid, c, \sigma_{\text{snd}})$ such that c is a ciphertext that can be correctly decrypted by $\mathcal{F}_{\text{CPKEPV}}$ yielding a valid proof of plaintext knowledge and that σ_{snd} is a valid signature on c under \mathcal{P}_{snd} 's public-key (retrieved) from \mathcal{F}_{Reg} according to \mathcal{P}_{snd} 's instance of \mathcal{F}_{Sig} . Formally, \mathcal{P}_i proceeds as follows:

1. Send (DECRYPT, sid , \mathcal{P} , c) to $\mathcal{F}_{\text{CPKEPV}}$, wait for (m, π) as response, send (VERIFY, sid , \mathcal{P}_{own} , c , m , π) to $\mathcal{F}_{\text{CPKEPV}}$ and check that 1 is received as response.
2. Send (RETRIEVE, sid , \mathcal{P}_{snd}) to \mathcal{F}_{Reg} , wait for (RETRIEVE, sid , \mathcal{P}_{snd} , pk), send (VERIFY, sid , m , σ_{snd} , pk) to \mathcal{F}_{Sig} and check that (VERIFIED, sid , m , 1) is received as response.

If all checks succeed, \mathcal{P}_i sends (SIGN, sid , c) to its instance of \mathcal{F}_{Sig} , receiving (SIGNATURE, sid , m , σ_i) as response. \mathcal{P}_i outputs $\sigma_i = (m, c, \pi, \sigma_i)$. Analogously, upon receiving (BLIND-AUTH, sid , $ssid$, \mathcal{P}_{snd}), bureaucrat $\mathcal{B}_j \in \mathcal{B}$ proceeds the same way as \mathcal{P}_i except for not checking that c is a valid ciphertext with respect to $\mathcal{F}_{\text{CPKEPV}}$ (i.e. skipping Step 1 of \mathcal{P}_i 's checks). If all checks succeed, \mathcal{B}_j outputs $\hat{\sigma}_j = (c, \sigma_j)$.

^a We abuse notation and let \mathcal{P}_{own} denote a set of parties instead of single party in $\mathcal{F}_{\text{CPKEPV}}$

Fig. 14. Protocol Π_{SJAuth} realizing $\mathcal{F}_{\text{SJAuth}}$.

result in a view consistent with these messages. However, an important corner case is that when \mathcal{A} corrupts all bureaucrats but not \mathcal{P}_{snd} or one party $\mathcal{P}_i \in \pi$, since in this case \mathcal{S} must simulate interactions between corrupted bureaucrats and $\mathcal{F}_{\text{CPKEPV}}$ without knowing the committed message. In order to deal with this case, \mathcal{S} deviates from the perfect simulation of $\mathcal{F}_{\text{CPKEPV}}$ honest execution of protocol Π_{SJAuth} and simulates interactions between corrupted bureaucrats and $\mathcal{F}_{\text{CPKEPV}}$ using dummy ciphertexts (e.g. with random messages). Later on, after it learns the actual messages, \mathcal{S} simulates the verification interface of $\mathcal{F}_{\text{CPKEPV}}$ in such a way that verification queries sent to verify the dummy ciphertexts with respect to the actual messages and accompanying proofs of plaintext validity are

Protocol Π_{SJAuth} (Public Verification)

Public Verification: Upon receiving $(\text{VERIFY}, \text{sid}, \text{ssid}, \mathcal{P}_{\text{snd}}, m, \sigma_{\text{snd}}, \sigma_1, \dots, \sigma_n, \hat{\sigma}_1, \dots, \hat{\sigma}_b)$, a party $\mathcal{V}_i \in \mathcal{V}$ first parses all tokens $\sigma_{\text{snd}}, \sigma_1, \dots, \sigma_n$ as (m, c, π, σ_i) and check that (m, c, π) is the same in all tokens. It then parses all tokens $\hat{\sigma}_1, \dots, \hat{\sigma}_b$ as (c, σ_j) and checks that all c also have the same value. \mathcal{V}_i then sends $(\text{VERIFY}, \text{sid}, \mathcal{P}, c, m, \pi)$ to $\mathcal{F}_{\text{CPKEPV}}$ and checks that the response is 1. It then retrieves the public-keys for \mathcal{P}_{snd} , all parties in \mathcal{P} and all bureaucrats in \mathcal{B} from \mathcal{F}_{Reg} . For all signatures σ retrieved in Step 1, \mathcal{V}_i queries the \mathcal{F}_{Sig} instance corresponding to the party who generated the token with $(\text{VERIFY}, \text{sid}, m, \sigma, \text{pk})$ where pk is the public-key retrieved for that part and checks that $(\text{VERIFIED}, \text{sid}, m, 1)$ is received as response. If all of these checks succeed, \mathcal{V}_i sets $v = 1$ (otherwise, it sets $v = 0$) and afterwards outputs $(\text{VERIFY}, \text{sid}, \text{ssid}, \mathcal{P}_{\text{snd}}, m, v)$.

Fig. 15. Protocol Π_{SJAuth} realizing $\mathcal{F}_{\text{SJAuth}}$ (continued).

answered positively (i, e simulated $\mathcal{F}_{\text{CPKEPV}}$ answers with 1 when queried with $(\text{VERIFY}, \text{sid}, \mathcal{P}, c', m, \pi)$ where c' is the dummy ciphertext and (m, π) are the actual jointly authenticated message along with its proof of plaintext validity).

D Functionality $\mathcal{F}_{\text{IRAuth}}$

Functionality $\mathcal{F}_{\text{IRAuth}}$ is described in Figure 16

Functionality $\mathcal{F}_{\text{IRAuth}}$

$\mathcal{F}_{\text{IRAuth}}$ interacts with a set of n parties \mathcal{P} , a set of public verifiers \mathcal{V} and an ideal adversary \mathcal{S} who is allowed to corrupt a set $I \subset \mathcal{P}$ where $|I| \leq k$ for a fixed $k < n$. $\mathcal{F}_{\text{IRAuth}}$ maintains an initially empty list \mathcal{L} , proceeding as follows:

Message Input: Upon receiving a message $(\text{INPUT}, \text{sid}, \mathcal{P}_i, m)$ from a party $\mathcal{P}_i \in \mathcal{P}$ ignore further INPUT messages from \mathcal{P}_i .

Joint Authentication: Upon receiving a message $(\text{BLIND-AUTH}, \text{sid}, \mathcal{P}_i, \mathcal{P}_j)$ from a party $\mathcal{P}_j \in \mathcal{P}$, $j \neq i$, if a message $(\text{INPUT}, \text{sid}, \mathcal{P}_i, m)$ has been received from \mathcal{P}_i and a message $(\text{BLIND-AUTH}, \text{sid}, \mathcal{P}_i, \mathcal{P}_j)$ has been received from all parties $\mathcal{P}_j \in \mathcal{P} \setminus \{\mathcal{P}_i\}$, add $(\text{sid}, \mathcal{P}_i, m, \perp)$ to \mathcal{L} .

Start Verification: Upon receiving a message $(\text{START-VERIFY}, \text{sid}, \mathcal{P}_i, m)$ from \mathcal{P}_i , if there exists an entry $(\text{sid}, \mathcal{P}_i, m, \perp)$ in \mathcal{L} , update it to $(\text{sid}, \mathcal{P}_i, m, \text{VERIFY})$.

Public Verification: Upon receiving $(\text{VERIFY}, \text{sid}, \mathcal{P}_i, m)$ from a party $\mathcal{V}_i \in \mathcal{V}$, if $(\text{sid}, \mathcal{P}_i, m, \text{VERIFY}) \in \mathcal{L}$, set $v = 1$, else set $v = 0$. Send $(\text{VERIFY}, \text{sid}, \mathcal{P}_i, m)$ to \mathcal{S} and, if \mathcal{S} answers with $(\text{PROCEED}, \text{sid}, \text{ssid}, m)$, send $(\text{VERIFY}, \text{sid}, m, v)$ to \mathcal{V}_i . Otherwise, send $(\text{VERIFY}, \text{sid}, m, 0)$ to \mathcal{V}_i .

Fig. 16. Input and Randomness Authentication Functionality $\mathcal{F}_{\text{IRAuth}}$.

E A Simplified Proof of the “Insured MPC” Protocol

The core building block of the “Insured MPC” [5] protocol is a multiparty additively homomorphic commitment scheme with delayed public verifiability. In this primitive, the receiver can prove that he received a (potentially) invalid opening to a given commitment after it has been opened. This primitive is then used during the output reconstruction phase of an MPC protocol in such a way that cheating during the reconstruction can be identified and punished financially.

The work of [5] extended the multiparty homomorphic commitment scheme of [31] to obtain this “delayed public verifiability”, which coincides with the notion of verifiability used in this work. For this, a functionality $\mathcal{F}_{\text{HCom}}$ with delayed public verifiability is defined, which extends the commitment functionality of [31]. $\mathcal{F}_{\text{HCom}}$ is in turn realized using a protocol based on a two-party homomorphic commitment functionality, an equality testing functionality and a coin tossing functionality. In order to augment the construction of [31] with delayed public verifiability, the authors augmented all the functionalities of all the subprotocols it is based on with verifiability properties, modified all protocols involved in the construction and re-proved security of [31] with respect to verifiability.

To this end, the authors of [5] present a two-party homomorphic commitment with delayed public verifiability functionality $\mathcal{F}_{2\text{HCom}}$, a publicly verifiable coin tossing functionality \mathcal{F}_{CT} and a publicly verifiable equality testing functionality \mathcal{F}_{EQ} . They then realize $\mathcal{F}_{2\text{HCom}}$ with a construction based on an instantiation of the commitment scheme of [23] with an oblivious transfer with delayed public verifiability \mathcal{F}_{pOT} and show that \mathcal{F}_{pOT} can be realized in the restricted programmable and observable random oracle model of [11] by the construction of [42] plus a publicly verifiable (non-homomorphic) commitment functionality \mathcal{F}_{Com} . This publicly verifiable \mathcal{F}_{Com} is also used to realize \mathcal{F}_{EQ} and \mathcal{F}_{CT} .

We now use the compiler from Section 5 to show that this process can be done much more easily by analyzing the transcript non-malleability of the underlying protocols and constructing the necessary über simulators. In comparison to [5] we will use the bulletin board functionality \mathcal{F}_{BB} (Figure 10) instead of a smart contract functionality \mathcal{F}_{SC} to authenticate the transcripts, but this makes no difference as \mathcal{F}_{SC} is only used as a bulletin board in the construction of $\mathcal{F}_{\text{HCom}}$ anyway.

In the following, we describe how verifiability is achieved and will therefore recap the aforementioned functionalities and protocols from [5] almost verbatim. We will not describe how the individual protocols work explicitly and refer to [5] for more intuition and details.

E.1 Publicly Verifiable Commitments

The functionality for Publicly Verifiable Commitments \mathcal{F}_{Com} is described in Figure 17 and its realizing protocol Π_{Com} in Figure 18. The commitment is realized in the restricted programmable and observable random oracle model of [11]. This canonical random oracle-based commitment scheme is proven UC-secure in [11].

Functionality \mathcal{F}_{Com}

\mathcal{F}_{Com} keeps an internal (initially empty) list C and interacts with a set of parties $\mathcal{P} = \{\mathcal{P}_1, \dots, \mathcal{P}_n\}$, and an adversary \mathcal{S} through the following interfaces:

Commit: Upon receiving $(\text{COMMIT}, sid, \mathcal{P}_i, cid, \mathbf{x})$ from $\mathcal{P}_i \in \mathcal{P}$ (where $\mathbf{x} \in \mathbb{F}^\tau$) check if $(cid, \cdot, \cdot) \in C$. If yes, ignore the message, else add $(cid, \mathcal{P}_i, \mathbf{x})$ to C and send a public delayed output $(\text{COMMITTED}, sid, \mathcal{P}_i, cid)$ to all remaining parties in \mathcal{P} .

Open: Upon receiving $(\text{OPEN}, sid, \mathcal{P}_i, cid)$ from $\mathcal{P}_i \in \mathcal{P}$, if $(cid, \mathcal{P}_i, \mathbf{x}) \in C$, send a delayed output $(\text{OPEN}, sid, \mathcal{P}_i, cid, \mathbf{x})$ to all $\mathcal{P}_j \in \mathcal{P}$ for $j \neq i$.

Fig. 17. Functionality \mathcal{F}_{Com} for Multiparty Commitments.

Protocol Π_{Com}

Parties $\mathcal{P} = \{\mathcal{P}_1, \dots, \mathcal{P}_n\}$ interact with each other and with $\mathcal{G}_{\text{rpoRO}}$ as follows:

Commit: On input $(\text{COMMIT}, sid, \mathcal{P}_i, cid, \mathbf{x}_i)$, a party $\mathcal{P}_i \in \mathcal{P}$ uniformly samples $\mathbf{r} \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}^\kappa$ and queries $\mathcal{G}_{\text{rpoRO}}$ on $(sid, cid, \mathbf{r}, \mathbf{x}_i)$ to obtain c . \mathcal{P}_i broadcasts $(\text{COMMITTED}, sid, \mathcal{P}_i, cid, c)$. All parties $\mathcal{P}_j \in \mathcal{P}$ for $j \neq i$ output $(\text{COMMITTED}, sid, \mathcal{P}_i, cid)$ upon receiving this message.

Open: On input $(\text{OPEN}, sid, \mathcal{P}_i, cid)$, \mathcal{P}_i broadcasts $(\text{OPEN}, sid, \mathcal{P}_i, cid, \mathbf{r}', \mathbf{x}'_i)$. Upon receiving $(\text{OPEN}, sid, \mathcal{P}_i, cid, \mathbf{r}', \mathbf{x}'_i)$, each party \mathcal{P}_j queries $\mathcal{G}_{\text{rpoRO}}$ on $(sid, cid, \mathbf{r}', \mathbf{x}'_i)$ and checks that the answer is equal to c and that $(sid, \mathbf{r}', \mathbf{x}'_i)$ is not programmed by sending $(\text{ISPROGRAMMED}, sid, cid, \mathbf{r}', \mathbf{x}'_i)$ to $\mathcal{G}_{\text{rpoRO}}$, aborting if the answer is $(\text{ISPROGRAMMED}, sid, 0)$. Output $(\text{OPEN}, sid, \mathcal{P}_i, cid, \mathbf{x}'_i)$.

Fig. 18. Protocol Π_{Com} for Multiparty Commitments.

In the following Theorem 5 we prove transcript non-malleability and the existence of an über simulator for Π_{Com} . From this, and from the implicit assumption that the random oracle functionality $\mathcal{G}_{\text{rpoRO}}$ is publicly verifiable, we get a provably secure verifiable commitment via Theorem 1.

Theorem 5. *The protocol Π_{Com} is $(\text{cir}, [n], \text{ncmes})$ -transcript non-malleable and has an über simulator \mathcal{S}^{U} for $(\Pi_{\text{Com}}, \mathcal{F}_{\text{Com}}, \mathcal{S})$ where \mathcal{S} is defined in [11].*

Proof (Sketch). All parties in the protocol open their inputs and randomness in the end and no random choices are actually made, once the randomness string is fixed. Moreover, for the same input $\mathcal{G}_{\text{rpoRO}}$ always gives the same output. Therefore, the protocol Π_{Com} trivially fulfills Definition 5.

The simulator \mathcal{S} as defined in [11] calls $\mathcal{G}_{\text{rpoRO}}$ on a random point to create c and later equivocates the commitment by programming $\mathcal{G}_{\text{rpoRO}}$. We can define \mathcal{S}^{U} by simply creating the commitment c honestly given x_i . Therefore c has the same distribution in both cases and \mathcal{S}^{U} is simulation-consistent according to Definition 6. As the randomness used is uniformly random in both cases, \mathcal{S}^{U} is also execution-consistent according to Definition 7 and therefore an über simulator. \square

E.2 Verifiable Equality Testing

The functionality for Equality Testing as defined in [31] is presented in Figure 19. Notice the functionality for Equality Testing \mathcal{F}_{EQ} leaks the inputs of all parties to the adversary *after* it provides its inputs, which is also how our verifiability is defined. The functionality \mathcal{F}_{EQ} can be UC-realized using \mathcal{F}_{Com} . We describe protocol Π_{EQ} implementing \mathcal{F}_{EQ} in Figure 20. We prove transcript non-malleability and the existence of an über simulator for Π_{Com} in Theorem 6. Since we have shown in Theorem 5 that we can realize a verifiable version of \mathcal{F}_{Com} , we obtain a verifiable version of \mathcal{F}_{EQ} by Theorem 1.




Fig. 19. Functionality \mathcal{F}_{EQ} for Publicly Verifiable Equality Testing.




Fig. 20. Protocol Π_{EQ} for Equality Testing.

Theorem 6. *The protocol Π_{EQ} is $(\text{cir}, [n], \text{ncmes})$ -transcript non-malleable and has an über simulator \mathcal{S}^{U} for $(\Pi_{\text{EQ}}, \mathcal{F}_{\text{EQ}}, \mathcal{S})$ where \mathcal{S} is defined in [31].*

Proof (Sketch). The only action in Π_{EQ} is for parties to commit and open inputs using \mathcal{F}_{Com} . The adversary is therefore committed to his protocol messages and Π_{EQ} trivially fulfills Definition 5.

The simulator \mathcal{S} as defined in [31] commits to a random input instead of using x_i and later uses equivocation of \mathcal{F}_{Com} . \mathcal{S}^u now simply uses the correct input x_i . No further randomness is involved in either \mathcal{S} or \mathcal{S}^u and the latter is therefore trivially an über simulator. \square

E.3 Verifiable Coin Tossing

The functionality for Coin Tossing \mathcal{F}_{CT} (described in Figure 21) can be implemented using \mathcal{F}_{Com} . It uses a standard commit-and-open approach, where each party commits to random elements which are then opened and all contributions added up.




Fig. 21. Functionality \mathcal{F}_{CT} for Coin Tossing.




Fig. 22. Protocol Π_{CT} For Coin Tossing.

Theorem 7. *The protocol Π_{CT} is $(\text{cir}, [n], \text{ncmes})$ -transcript non-malleable and has an über simulator \mathcal{S}^{U} for $(\Pi_{\text{CT}}, \mathcal{F}_{\text{CT}}, \mathcal{S})$ where \mathcal{S} is defined in [31].*

Proof (Sketch). In Π_{CT} no party has an actual input, but it commits to some randomness using \mathcal{F}_{Com} . As the randomness itself is committed to by definition, Π_{CT} fulfills Definition 5.

The simulator \mathcal{S} commits to random values $x_{i,k}$ and later uses equivocation of \mathcal{F}_{Com} to open these to the randomness whose sum yields the output of \mathcal{F}_{CT} . By UC-security of \mathcal{S} , this is perfectly indistinguishable because \mathcal{F}_{Com} is hiding. Unfortunately, \mathcal{S}^{U} cannot do exactly the same as \mathcal{S} since it has to provide inputs to the hybrid \mathcal{F}_{Com} instances that are consistent with the output of \mathcal{F}_{CT} .

Luckily, by definition \mathcal{F}_{CT} 's randomness tape is provided to \mathcal{S}^{U} by definition so \mathcal{S}^{U} can commit to random strings that add up to a consistent output, and thereby set up randomness for honest parties that is consistent.

\mathcal{S}^{U} acts identically to an actual simulator for \mathcal{F}_{CT} and is therefore simulation-consistent. The randomness r_i has the right distribution as in the real protocol by assumption, and we therefore also have execution-consistency. \mathcal{S}^{U} is therefore an über simulator. \square

E.4 Verifiable Oblivious Transfer

The protocol realizing $\mathcal{F}_{2\text{HCom}}$ additionally requires an oblivious transfer functionality with public verifiability. We will show that the DDH based version of the protocol of [42] (shown in Figure 24) realizing the basic 1-out-of-2 string OT functionality \mathcal{F}_{pOT} (shown in Figure 23) can be compiled using our techniques in order to obtain a protocol $\Pi_{\text{pOT}}^{\text{v}}$ realizing publicly verifiable functionality $\mathcal{F}^{\text{v}}[\mathcal{F}_{\text{pOT}}]$. Notice that a minor difference between the protocol Π_{pOT} of Figure 24 and the original DDH based protocol of [42] is that instead of a Common Reference String, this protocol uses a coin tossing functionality \mathcal{F}_{CT} in order to obtain parameters used by the DDH based dual-mode cryptosystem that is at the core of that construction.

Functionality \mathcal{F}_{pOT}

\mathcal{F}_{pOT} is parameterized by $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$, which is publicly known. \mathcal{F}_{pOT} interacts with a sender \mathcal{P}_i , a receiver \mathcal{P}_j , and an adversary \mathcal{S} , proceeding as follows:

Transfer: Upon receiving a message $(\text{SEND}, \text{sid}, \mathbf{x}_0, \mathbf{x}_1)$ from \mathcal{P}_i , where $\mathbf{x}_0, \mathbf{x}_1 \in \mathbb{F}^\lambda$, store the tuple $(\text{sid}, \mathbf{x}_0, \mathbf{x}_1)$ and send $(\text{SEND}, \text{sid})$ to \mathcal{P}_i and \mathcal{P}_j . Ignore further messages from \mathcal{P}_i with the same sid .

Choose: Upon receiving a message $(\text{RECEIVE}, \text{sid}, c)$ from \mathcal{P}_j , where $c \in \{0, 1\}$, check if a tuple $(\text{sid}, \mathbf{x}_0, \mathbf{x}_1)$ was recorded. If yes, send $(\text{sid}, \mathbf{x}_c)$ to \mathcal{P}_j and $(\text{RECEIVED}, \text{sid})$ to \mathcal{S} , and ignore further messages from \mathcal{P}_j with the same sid . Otherwise, send nothing, but continue running.

Fig. 23. Functionality \mathcal{F}_{pOT} For Oblivious Transfer.

Protocol Π_{pOT}

Parties $\mathcal{P}_i, \mathcal{P}_j$ interact with each other, with \mathcal{F}_{Com} and with \mathcal{F}_{CT} as follows:

- 1. Generate CRS:** When first activated, both \mathcal{P}_i and \mathcal{P}_j send $(\text{TOSS}, \text{sid}, 4, \mathbb{G})$ to \mathcal{F}_{CT} . If \mathcal{F}_{CT} answers with $(\text{TOSSED}, \text{sid}, m, \mathbb{G}, g_0, g_1, h_0, h_1)$, both \mathcal{P}_i and \mathcal{P}_j set $\text{crs} = (g_0, g_1, h_0, h_1)$. If \mathcal{F}_{CT} answers with $(\text{ABORT}, \text{sid})$, both \mathcal{P}_i and \mathcal{P}_j output $(\text{ABORT}, \text{sid})$ and halt.
- 2. Choose:** On input $(\text{RECEIVE}, \text{sid}, c)$, \mathcal{P}_j uniformly samples a fresh identifier cid_j and $r \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_p$, computes $\text{pk} = (g_c^r, h_c^r)$, $\text{sk} = r$ and broadcasts (sid, pk) .
- 3. Transfer:** On input $(\text{SEND}, \text{sid}, x_0, x_1)$, upon receiving (sid, pk) from \mathcal{P}_j , \mathcal{P}_i parses $\text{pk} = (g, h)$ and, for $c \in \{0, 1\}$, samples $s, t \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_p$, computes $u = g_c^s h_c^t$, $v = g^s h^t$ and $\text{ct}_c = (u, x_c \cdot v)$. \mathcal{P}_i broadcasts $(\text{sid}, \text{ct}_0, \text{ct}_1)$.
- 4. Finalize Transfer:** Upon receiving $(\text{sid}, \text{ct}_0, \text{ct}_1)$ from \mathcal{P}_i , \mathcal{P}_j parses $\text{ct}_c = (\tilde{\text{ct}}_0, \tilde{\text{ct}}_1)$ and computes $x_c = \frac{\tilde{\text{ct}}_1}{\tilde{\text{ct}}_0^{\text{sk}}}$. \mathcal{P}_j outputs $(\text{RECEIVED}, \text{sid})$.

Fig. 24. Protocol Π_{pOT} for Oblivious Transfer.

Protocol Π_{pOT}^v

Parties $\mathcal{P}_i, \mathcal{P}_j$ interact with each other, with $\mathcal{F}^v[\mathcal{F}_{\text{Com}}]$ and with $\mathcal{F}^v[\mathcal{F}_{\text{CT}}]$ as follows:

- 1. Generate CRS:** When first activated, both \mathcal{P}_i and \mathcal{P}_j send $(\text{TOSS}, \text{sid}, 4, \mathbb{G})$ to $\mathcal{F}^v[\mathcal{F}_{\text{CT}}]$. If $\mathcal{F}^v[\mathcal{F}_{\text{CT}}]$ answers with $(\text{TOSSED}, \text{sid}, m, \mathbb{G}, g_0, g_1, h_0, h_1)$, both \mathcal{P}_i and \mathcal{P}_j set $\text{crs} = (g_0, g_1, h_0, h_1)$. If $\mathcal{F}^v[\mathcal{F}_{\text{CT}}]$ answers with $(\text{ABORT}, \text{sid})$, both \mathcal{P}_i and \mathcal{P}_j output $(\text{ABORT}, \text{sid})$ and halt.
- 2. Choose:** On input $(\text{RECEIVE}, \text{sid}, c)$, \mathcal{P}_j uniformly samples a fresh identifier cid_j and $r \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_p$, and sends $(\text{COMMIT}, \text{sid}, \mathcal{P}_j, \text{cid}_j, c || r)$ to $\mathcal{F}^v[\mathcal{F}_{\text{Com}}]$. \mathcal{P}_j computes $\text{pk} = (g_c^r, h_c^r)$, $\text{sk} = r$ and obtains a signature σ_j on pk from $\mathcal{F}_{\text{Sig}}^j$ (i.e. an instance of \mathcal{F}_{Sig} where \mathcal{P}_j is the signer). \mathcal{P}_j broadcasts $(\text{sid}, \text{pk}, \sigma_j)$.
- 3. Transfer:** On input $(\text{SEND}, \text{sid}, x_0, x_1)$, upon receiving $(\text{sid}, \text{pk}, \sigma_j)$ from \mathcal{P}_j , \mathcal{P}_i outputs $(\text{ABORT}, \text{sid})$ and halts if it has not received $(\text{COMMITTED}, \text{sid}, \mathcal{P}_j, \text{cid}_j)$ from $\mathcal{F}^v[\mathcal{F}_{\text{Com}}]$ or if σ_j is not a valid signature on pk according to $\mathcal{F}_{\text{Sig}}^j$. Otherwise, \mathcal{P}_i parses $\text{pk} = (g, h)$ and, for $c \in \{0, 1\}$, samples $s, t \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_p$, computes $u = g_c^s h_c^t$, $v = g^s h^t$ and $\text{ct}_c = (u, x_c \cdot v)$. \mathcal{P}_i obtains a signature σ_i on ct_0, ct_1 from $\mathcal{F}_{\text{Sig}}^i$ (i.e. an instance of \mathcal{F}_{Sig} where \mathcal{P}_i is the signer). \mathcal{P}_i broadcasts $(\text{sid}, \text{ct}_0, \text{ct}_1, \sigma_i)$.
- 4. Finalize Transfer:** Upon receiving $(\text{sid}, \text{ct}_0, \text{ct}_1, \sigma_i)$ from \mathcal{P}_i , \mathcal{P}_j outputs $(\text{ABORT}, \text{sid})$ and halts if σ_i is not a valid signature on ct_0, ct_1 according to $\mathcal{F}_{\text{Sig}}^i$. Else, \mathcal{P}_j parses $\text{ct}_c = (\tilde{\text{ct}}_0, \tilde{\text{ct}}_1)$ and computes $x_c = \frac{\tilde{\text{ct}}_1}{\tilde{\text{ct}}_0^{\text{sk}}}$. \mathcal{P}_j outputs $(\text{RECEIVED}, \text{sid})$.

Fig. 25. Protocol Π_{pOT}^v for Publicly Verifiable Oblivious Transfer.

In order to showcase the power of our fine grained notion of transcript non-malleability, we present in Figure 25 a tailor-made protocol Π_{pOT}^v that is a $(\text{cir}, [n], \text{ncmes})$ -transcript non-malleable version of Π_{pOT} . Instead of applying the naïve compiler presented in Section 5 that uses heavier tools in order to construct $(\text{cir}, [n], \text{ncmes})$ -transcript non-malleable versions of any $(\text{cir}, \text{RIR}, \mu)$ -

transcript non-malleable protocol, we take advantage of the intrinsic transcript non-malleability of Π_{pOT} in to obtain such a version using only a simple signature scheme and a simple commitment scheme. The main observation that allows us to obtain this simpler construction is that the DDH based dual-mode cryptosystem used in Π_{pOT} is naturally committing, informally meaning that the an adversary cannot produce two pairs of message and randomness $(m, r), (m', r')$ with $m \neq m'$ such that they both yield the same ciphertext. In fact, it has already been observed that this very property is an obstacle for proving Π_{pOT} adaptively secure [33].

As for the setup resources used for this protocol, we have shown that a canonical random oracle based commitment protocol realizing \mathcal{F}_{Com} can be compiled into a publicly verifiable protocol realizing $\mathcal{F}^{\text{V}}[\mathcal{F}_{\text{Com}}]$ and that a simple commit-then-open coin tossing protocol based on \mathcal{F}_{Com} realizing \mathcal{F}_{CT} can be compiled into a publicly verifiable protocol realizing $\mathcal{F}^{\text{V}}[\mathcal{F}_{\text{CT}}]$.

We are now ready to show that $\Pi_{\text{pOT}}^{\text{v}}$ is $(\text{cir}, [n], \text{ncmes})$ -transcript non-malleable and that the simulator of [42] for Π_{pOT} can be easily turned into an über simulator for $\Pi_{\text{pOT}}^{\text{v}}$. Theorem 8 formally captures these properties and implies that $\Pi_{\text{pOT}}^{\text{v}}$ realizes $\mathcal{F}^{\text{V}}[\mathcal{F}_{\text{pOT}}]$ via our compiler (as defined in Theorem 1).

Theorem 8. *The protocol $\Pi_{\text{pOT}}^{\text{v}}$ is $(\text{cir}, [n], \text{ncmes})$ -transcript non-malleable and has an über simulator \mathcal{S}^{U} for $(\Pi_{\text{pOT}}^{\text{v}}, \mathcal{F}_{\text{pOT}}, \mathcal{S})$ where \mathcal{S} is defined as in [42].*

Proof (Sketch). First, we argue that $\Pi_{\text{pOT}}^{\text{v}}$ is $(\text{cir}, [n], \text{ncmes})$ -transcript non-malleable. Notice that the DDH dual-mode cryptosystem is committing as observed in [33]. This means that an adversary corrupting the sender \mathcal{P}_i given a public key $\text{pk} = (g, h)$ cannot produce two pairs $(m, (s, t)), (m', (s', t'))$ with $m \neq m'$ such that computing $u = g_c^s h_c^t, v = g^s h^t, \text{ct} = (u, m \cdot v)$ and $u' = g_c^{s'} h_c^{t'}, v' = g^{s'} h^{t'}, \text{ct}' = (u', m' \cdot v')$ yields ciphertexts ct, ct' such that $\text{ct} = \text{ct}'$. Moreover, in case there is no abort, the message $(\text{sid}, \text{ct}_0, \text{ct}_1, \sigma_i)$ sent by \mathcal{P}_i contains a valid signature σ_i by \mathcal{P}_i on $(\text{ct}_0, \text{ct}_1)$, making it possible for a verifier to check this message came from \mathcal{P}_i . On the other hand, a corrupted receiver \mathcal{P}_j who generates a public key $\text{pk} = (g_c^r, h_c^r), \text{sk} = r$ and commits to $c|r$ is clearly bound to its input c . Notice that such a corrupted \mathcal{P}_j obviously cannot produce r such that $(g_0^r, h_0^r) = (g_1^r, h_1^r)$ due to the fact that $g_0 \neq g_1$ and $h_0 \neq h_1$. Given these facts, a corrupted sender \mathcal{P}_i cannot claim that it received a different message from an honest receiver \mathcal{P}_i (due to the signature) and becomes bound to x_0, x_1 once it sends its own message. Conversely, a corrupted \mathcal{P}_j cannot claim it received a different message from an honest \mathcal{P}_i (due to the signature) and cannot claim that it had generated pk differently so that the ciphertexts received from \mathcal{P}_i decrypt to a message different than \mathcal{P}_i 's input. Hence, the adversary is not able to change any messages in the transcript nor its own inputs undetected, no matter what party it corrupts.

In order to see why $\Pi_{\text{pOT}}^{\text{v}}$ has an über simulator \mathcal{S}^{U} for $(\Pi_{\text{pOT}}^{\text{v}}, \mathcal{F}_{\text{pOT}}, \mathcal{S})$ where \mathcal{S} is defined as in [42], first notice that $\Pi_{\text{pOT}}^{\text{v}}$ is essentially the DDH based protocol from [42] but that it derives parameters for the dual-mode cryptosystem from $\mathcal{F}^{\text{V}}[\mathcal{F}_{\text{CT}}]$ instead of a common reference string (CRS). However, $\mathcal{F}^{\text{V}}[\mathcal{F}_{\text{CT}}]$ can be

manipulated by \mathcal{S}^u to output parameters in a similar way as \mathcal{S} 's programs the CRS, allowing \mathcal{S}^u to proceed exactly as \mathcal{S} after setting the output of $\mathcal{F}^v[\mathcal{F}_{CT}]$ to the same value that \mathcal{S} would set the CRS. By simple inspection of \mathcal{S} , it is clear that it picks a random choice bit c' , in case \mathcal{P}_j is corrupted, or a random message x_{c-1} , in case \mathcal{P}_i is corrupted. Hence, in order to turn this simulator into an über simulator \mathcal{S}^u , all that remains is to parameterize x_0, x_1 and c with the inputs received externally instead of generating random dummy inputs.

E.5 Verifiable Random OT from Verifiable OT

The functionality \mathcal{F}_{pOT} can easily be used to implement a functionality \mathcal{F}_{ROT} (Figure 26) which generates random oblivious transfers of arbitrary length. This is done by a protocol Π_{ROT} (Figure 27) that transfers random seeds. The seeds are generated by the sender \mathcal{P}_i and chosen from by receiver \mathcal{P}_j . Assuming that PRG is a programmable random oracle such as \mathcal{G}_{rpoRO} , one can easily prove that Π_{ROT} UC-securely implements \mathcal{F}_{ROT} .




Fig. 26. Functionality \mathcal{F}_{ROT} for Random Oblivious Transfer.

We again show transcript non-malleability as well as the existence of an über simulator. Since \mathcal{F}_{pOT} is verifiable for both the sender and the receiver, \mathcal{F}_{ROT} can then be made verifiable as well.

Protocol Π_{ROT}

We assume that all parties have access to a pseudorandom number generator PRG. A sender \mathcal{P}_i and a receiver \mathcal{P}_j interact with each other and with \mathcal{F}_{pOT} as follows:

1. **OT Phase:** For $i \in [n]$, \mathcal{P}_i samples random $\mathbf{r}_{0,i}, \mathbf{r}_{1,i} \xleftarrow{\$} \{0,1\}^\kappa$ and sends (SEND, $\text{sid}_i, \mathbf{r}_{0,i}, \mathbf{r}_{1,i}$) to \mathcal{F}_{pOT} , while \mathcal{P}_j samples $b_i \xleftarrow{\$} \{0,1\}$ and sends (RECEIVE, sid_i, b_i) to \mathcal{F}_{pOT} .
2. **Seed Expansion Phase:** For $i \in [n]$, \mathcal{P}_i sets $\mathbf{R}_0[i, \cdot] = \text{PRG}(\mathbf{r}_{0,i})$ and $\mathbf{R}_1[i, \cdot] = \text{PRG}(\mathbf{r}_{1,i})$, while \mathcal{P}_j sets $\mathbf{S}[i, \cdot] = \text{PRG}(\mathbf{r}_{b_i,i})$. \mathcal{P}_i outputs $(\mathbf{R}_0, \mathbf{R}_1)$ and \mathcal{P}_j outputs $(b_1, \dots, b_n, \mathbf{S})$.

Fig. 27. Protocol Π_{ROT} for Random Oblivious Transfer.

Theorem 9. *The protocol Π_{ROT} is (cir, [2], ncmes)-transcript non-malleable and has an über simulator \mathcal{S}^u for $(\Pi_{\text{ROT}}, \mathcal{F}_{\text{ROT}}, \mathcal{S})$.*

Proof (Sketch). In Π_{ROT} as in Π_{CT} no party has an actual input, they only transfer random values using \mathcal{F}_{pOT} . If \mathcal{F}_{pOT} is committing to inputs and randomness of \mathcal{P}_j , then Π_{ROT} fulfills Definition 5 directly.

We define \mathcal{S}^u similar to \mathcal{F}_{CT} by letting it access the randomness tape of \mathcal{F}_{ROT} , since the functionality is probabilistic. If the sender is corrupted, then \mathcal{S}^u can extract inputs of the sender like \mathcal{S} from \mathcal{F}_{pOT} and forward them to \mathcal{F}_{ROT} . \mathcal{S}^u also simulates consistent choices b_i to all \mathcal{F}_{pOT} that are generated by \mathcal{F}_{ROT} and places them on the simulated randomness tape of the verifier. If instead the receiver is corrupted, it will extract the inputs of the receiver into \mathcal{F}_{pOT} and forward them to \mathcal{F}_{ROT} . Furthermore, it creates random seeds $r_{0,i}, r_{1,k}$, programs PRG (which we assume is a RO) to give the \mathcal{F}_{ROT} outputs on the respective inputs $r_{0,i}, r_{1,k}$ and then provides the seeds as inputs to \mathcal{F}_{pOT} . Finally, it places the seeds $r_{0,i}, r_{1,k}$ on the randomness tape of the sender. This yields consistent inputs into \mathcal{F}_{pOT} as in Π_{ROT} and has the same distribution as in the real protocol, which means that \mathcal{S}^u is execution-consistent. Furthermore, the outputs are identical to those generated by \mathcal{S} , and so we also obtain simulation-consistency. \mathcal{S}^u is therefore an über simulator. \square

E.6 Verifiable Homomorphic Two-Party Commitments

The homomorphic two-party commitment functionality $\mathcal{F}_{2\text{HCom}}$ is described in Figure 28, whereas the protocol $\Pi_{2\text{HCom}}$ is defined in Figure 29 & Figure 30. The functionality performs the usual actions of a two-party homomorphic commitment, and the protocol is the same as the construction of [23]. In comparison to [5] we only permit one round of commitments, but this is sufficient for our application. Also, we do not support “free” commitments to random values as these are not really necessary for the application. $\Pi_{2\text{HCom}}$ uses \mathcal{F}_{ROT} as a building block, which we have shown to be verifiable in the previous subsection.

Functionality $\mathcal{F}_{2\text{HCom}}$

$\mathcal{F}_{2\text{HCom}}$ is parameterized by $k \in \mathbb{N}$. $\mathcal{F}_{2\text{HCom}}$ interacts with parties $\mathcal{P}_i, \mathcal{P}_j$, and an adversary \mathcal{S} (who may abort at any time) through the following interfaces:

Init: Upon receiving (INIT, sid) from parties $\mathcal{P}_i, \mathcal{P}_j$, initialize empty lists **raw** and **actual**.

Commit: Upon receiving (COMMIT, sid, \mathcal{I}) from \mathcal{P}_i where \mathcal{I} is a set of unused identifiers and if **Open** was not used yet, send (COMMIT, sid, \mathcal{I}) to \mathcal{S} and proceed as follows:

1. If \mathcal{S} sends (CORRUPT, $sid, \{(cid, \mathbf{x}_{cid})\}_{cid \in \mathcal{I}}$) and \mathcal{P}_i is corrupted, ignore the next step and proceed to Step 3.
2. If \mathcal{S} answers (NO-CORRUPT, sid, \mathcal{I}), for every $cid \in \mathcal{I}$, sample $\mathbf{x}_{cid} \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{F}^k$.
3. Set $\text{raw}[cid] = \mathbf{x}_{cid}$, send (COMMIT-RECORDED, $sid, \mathcal{I}, \{(cid, \mathbf{x}_{cid})\}_{cid \in \mathcal{I}}$) to \mathcal{P}_i and send (COMMIT-RECORDED, sid, \mathcal{I}) to \mathcal{P}_j and \mathcal{S} .

Input: Upon receiving a message (INPUT, $sid, \mathcal{P}_i, cid, \mathbf{y}$) from \mathcal{P}_i , if **Open** was not used yet, and if $\text{raw}[cid] = \mathbf{x}_{cid} \neq \perp$, set $\text{actual}[cid] = \mathbf{y}$, set $\text{raw}[cid] = \perp$, and send (INPUT-RECORDED, sid, \mathcal{P}_i, cid) to \mathcal{P}_j and \mathcal{S} . Otherwise broadcast (ABORT, sid) and halt.

Linear Combination: Upon receiving (LINEAR, $sid, \{(cid, \alpha_{cid})\}_{cid \in \mathcal{I}}, \beta, cid'$) where all $\alpha_{cid} \in \mathbb{F}$ and $\beta \in \mathbb{F}^k$ from \mathcal{P}_i , if $\text{actual}[cid] = \mathbf{x}_{cid} \neq \perp$ for all $cid \in \mathcal{I}$ and $\text{raw}[cid'] = \text{actual}[cid'] = \perp$, set $\text{actual}[cid'] = \beta + \sum_{cid \in \mathcal{I}} \alpha_{cid} \cdot \mathbf{x}_{cid}$ and send (LINEAR-RECORDED, $sid, \{(cid, \alpha_{cid})\}_{cid \in \mathcal{I}}, \beta, cid'$) to \mathcal{P}_j and \mathcal{S} . Otherwise broadcast (ABORT, sid) and halt.

Open: Upon receiving (OPEN, sid, cid) from \mathcal{P}_i , if $\text{actual}[cid] = \mathbf{x}_{cid} \neq \perp$, send (OPEN, $sid, cid, \mathbf{x}_{cid}$) to \mathcal{S} . If \mathcal{S} does not abort, send (OPEN, $sid, cid, \mathbf{x}_{cid}$) to \mathcal{P}_j .

Fig. 28. Functionality $\mathcal{F}_{2\text{HCom}}$ For Homomorphic Two-party Commitments.

Theorem 10. *The protocol $\Pi_{2\text{HCom}}$ is (cir, [2], cmes)-transcript non-malleable and has an über simulator \mathcal{S}^u for $(\Pi_{2\text{HCom}}, \mathcal{F}_{2\text{HCom}}, \mathcal{S})$ for the simulator from [23].*

Proof (Sketch). $\Pi_{2\text{HCom}}$ clearly achieves the weakest form of transcript non-malleability where the adversary can neither replace inputs & randomness tapes nor any messages.

As we only have one round of inputs from the sender before outputs are given to the receiver, $\Pi_{2\text{HCom}}$ fits our schema from Section 2.1. For a corrupted sender, \mathcal{S}^u will just act like \mathcal{S} does during the protocol make a consistent randomness tape of the simulated receiver. For a corrupted receiver, it will act like \mathcal{S} throughout the protocol except for two places: during **Input** it creates \mathbf{w} as in $\Pi_{2\text{HCom}}$ since it knows the input \mathbf{x}_{cid} . Then, during **Open** it can simply follow the protocol.

\mathcal{S}^u is simulation-consistent as it acts like \mathcal{S} except that it does not need to cheat during the opening, but instead creates the commitment honestly. But the distribution of \mathbf{w} is then still uniformly random to \mathcal{A} . Execution consistency also follows because the random tape of the sender and the verifier are identical with

its actions in the protocol and they are uniformly random in $\Pi_{2\text{HCom}}$ as well. \square

E.7 Verifiable Homomorphic Multiparty Commitments

In Figure 31, we present a functionality for multiparty commitments based on the functionality of [31]. The implementing protocol Π_{HCom} is then described in Figure 32. As in [31] we use versions of $\mathcal{F}_{2\text{HCom}}$, \mathcal{F}_{EQ} and \mathcal{F}_{CT} . As shown above, for all of these we can create verifiable versions.

As in the case of $\mathcal{F}_{2\text{HCom}}$ we do not accept any more **Commit** or **Input** commands after the first call to **Open**. As can be seen in Π_{HCom} we also use $\mathcal{F}_{2\text{HCom}}$ in this way, which means that we can assume a verifiable version of $\mathcal{F}_{2\text{HCom}}$.

Theorem 11. *The protocol Π_{HCom} is $(\text{cir}, [n], \text{cmes})$ -transcript non-malleable and has an über simulator \mathcal{S}^{U} for $(\Pi_{\text{HCom}}, \mathcal{F}_{\text{HCom}}, \mathcal{S})$ for the simulator from [31].*

Proof (Sketch). Π_{HCom} clearly achieves the weakest form of transcript non-malleability where the adversary can neither replace inputs & randomness tapes nor any messages.

For each corrupted sender, \mathcal{S}^{U} will just act like \mathcal{S} does during the protocol and make a consistent randomness tape of the simulated receivers. For a corrupted receiver, it will act like \mathcal{S} throughout the protocol except for two places: during **Input** it creates \mathbf{w}_{cid} as in Π_{HCom} since it knows the input \mathbf{y} . Then, during **Open** it can simply follow the protocol.

\mathcal{S}^{U} is simulation-consistent as it acts like \mathcal{S} except that it does not need to cheat during the opening, but instead creates the commitment honestly. But the distribution of \mathbf{w}_{cid} is then still uniformly random to \mathcal{A} . Execution consistency also follows because the random tape of simulated senders and or verifiers are identical with its actions in the protocol and they are uniformly random in Π_{HCom} . \square

Protocol $\Pi_{2\text{HCom}}$ (Commitment Phase)

Let \mathbf{C} be a systematic binary linear $[n, k, s]$ code, where s is the statistical security parameter. Let \mathcal{H} be a family of linear almost universal hash functions $\mathbf{H} : \{0, 1\}^m \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^\ell$. A sender \mathcal{P}_i and a receiver \mathcal{P}_j interact with each other and \mathcal{F}_{ROT} as follows:

Init: On input $(\text{INIT}, \text{sid})$, \mathcal{P}_i initializes empty lists $\text{raw} = \text{actual} = \emptyset$.

Commit: On input $(\text{COMMIT}, \text{sid}, \mathcal{I})$, where $\mathcal{I} = \{\text{cid}_1, \dots, \text{cid}_{m-\ell}\}$ and if **Open** has not been used, \mathcal{P}_i and \mathcal{P}_j proceed as follows:

1. \mathcal{P}_i and \mathcal{P}_j send $(\text{SENDER}, \text{sid})$ and $(\text{RECEIVER}, \text{sid})$ to \mathcal{F}_{ROT} , respectively. \mathcal{P}_i receives $(\text{sid}, \mathbf{R}_0, \mathbf{R}_1)$ from \mathcal{F}_{ROT} and sets $\mathbf{R} = \mathbf{R}_0 + \mathbf{R}_1$. \mathcal{P}_j receives $(\text{sid}, b_1, \dots, b_n, \mathbf{S})$ from \mathcal{F}_{ROT} and sets the diagonal matrix $\mathbf{\Delta}$ such that it contains b_1, \dots, b_n on the diagonal. \mathbf{R} will contain in the top k rows the data to commit to. Note that $\mathbf{R}_0, \mathbf{R}_1$ form an additive secret sharing of \mathbf{R} , and in each row \mathcal{P}_j knows shares from either \mathbf{R}_0 or \mathbf{R}_1 .
2. \mathcal{P}_i now adjusts the bottom $n - k$ rows of \mathbf{R} so that all columns are codewords in \mathbf{C} , and \mathcal{P}_j will adjust his shares accordingly, as follows: \mathcal{P}_i constructs a matrix \mathbf{W} with dimensions as \mathbf{R} and 0s in the top k rows, such that $\mathbf{A} := \mathbf{R} + \mathbf{W} \in \mathbb{C}^{\odot m}$ (recall that \mathbf{C} is systematic). \mathcal{P}_i sends (sid, \mathbf{W}) .
3. \mathcal{P}_i sets $\mathbf{A}_0 = \mathbf{R}_0, \mathbf{A}_1 = \mathbf{R}_1 + \mathbf{W}$ and \mathcal{P}_j sets $\mathbf{B} = \mathbf{\Delta}\mathbf{W} + \mathbf{S}$. We now have

$$\mathbf{A} = \mathbf{A}_0 + \mathbf{A}_1, \mathbf{B} = \mathbf{\Delta}\mathbf{A}_1 + (\mathbf{I} - \mathbf{\Delta})\mathbf{A}_0, \mathbf{A} \in \mathbb{C}^{\odot m},$$

i.e., \mathbf{A} is additively shared and for each row index, \mathcal{P}_j knows either a row from \mathbf{A}_0 or from \mathbf{A}_1 .

4. \mathcal{P}_j chooses a seed H' for a random function $\mathbf{H} \in \mathcal{H}$ and sends (sid, H') , we identify the function with its matrix.
5. \mathcal{P}_i computes $\mathbf{T}_0 = \mathbf{A}_0\mathbf{H}, \mathbf{T}_1 = \mathbf{A}_1\mathbf{H}$ and sends $(\text{sid}, \mathbf{T}_0, \mathbf{T}_1)$. Note that $\mathbf{A}\mathbf{H} = \mathbf{A}_0\mathbf{H} + \mathbf{A}_1\mathbf{H} = \mathbf{T}_0 + \mathbf{T}_1$, and $\mathbf{A}\mathbf{H} \in \mathbb{C}^{\odot \ell}$. So we can think of $\mathbf{T}_0, \mathbf{T}_1$ as an additive sharing of $\mathbf{A}\mathbf{H}$, where again \mathcal{P}_j knows some of the shares, namely the rows of $\mathbf{B}\mathbf{H}$.
6. \mathcal{P}_j checks that $\mathbf{\Delta}\mathbf{T}_0 + (\mathbf{I} - \mathbf{\Delta})\mathbf{T}_1 = \mathbf{B}\mathbf{H}$ and that $\mathbf{T}_0 + \mathbf{T}_1 \in \mathbb{C}^{\odot \ell}$. If any check fails, he aborts.
7. We sacrifice some of the columns in \mathbf{A} to protect \mathcal{P}_i 's privacy: Note that each column j in $\mathbf{A}\mathbf{H}$ is a linear combination of some of the columns in \mathbf{A} , we let $\mathbf{A}(j)$ denote the index set for these columns. Now for each j the parties choose an index $a(j) \in \mathbf{A}(j)$ such that all $a(j)$'s are distinct. \mathcal{P}_i and \mathcal{P}_j now discard all columns in $\mathbf{A}, \mathbf{A}_0, \mathbf{A}_1$ and \mathbf{B} indexed by some $a(j)$. For simplicity in the following, we renumber the remaining columns from 1.
8. \mathcal{P}_i saves \mathbf{A}, \mathbf{A}_0 and \mathbf{A}_1 , and \mathcal{P}_j saves \mathbf{B} and $\mathbf{\Delta}$ (all of which now have $m - \ell$ columns). \mathcal{P}_i stores the k top rows of each column $\mathbf{A}[\cdot, i]$ in $\text{raw}^i[\text{cid}_i]$ and \mathcal{P}_j sets $\text{raw}^j[\text{cid}_i] = \top$ and $\text{actual}^j[\text{cid}_i] = \perp$, for $i \in [m - \ell]$.

Fig. 29. Protocol $\Pi_{2\text{HCom}}$ (Commitment Phase).

Protocol $\Pi_{2\text{HCom}}$ (Linear Combination and Opening)

Input: On input $(\text{INPUT}, sid, \mathcal{P}_i, cid, \mathbf{x}_{cid})$, if $\text{raw}[cid] \neq \perp$, and if **Open** has not been used, \mathcal{P}_i computes $\mathbf{w} = \mathbf{x}_{cid} - \text{raw}^i[cid]$, sets $\text{actual}^i[cid] = \text{raw}^i[cid]$, sets $\text{raw}^i[cid] = \perp$, and sends $(\text{INPUT}, sid, cid, \mathbf{w})$. Upon receiving $(\text{INPUT}, sid, cid, \mathbf{w})$ from \mathcal{P}_i , \mathcal{P}_j sets $\text{raw}^j[cid] = \perp$ and $\text{actual}^j[cid] = \mathbf{w}$.

Linear Combination:

1. On input $(\text{LINEAR}, sid, \{(cid_i, \alpha_{cid_i})\}_{i \in [m']}, \beta, cid')$ where m' is the current number of columns in $\mathbf{A}, \mathbf{A}_0, \mathbf{A}_1$ and all $\alpha_{cid} \in \mathbb{F}$ and $\beta \in \mathbb{F}^k$, if $\text{actual}^i[cid_i] = \mathbf{x}_{cid_i} \neq \perp$ for $i \in [m']$ and cid' is unused, \mathcal{P}_i appends column $\mathbf{C}(\beta) + \sum_{i \in [m']} \alpha_{cid_i} \cdot \mathbf{A}[\cdot, i]$ to \mathbf{A} where $\mathbf{C}(\beta)$ is an encoding of β under \mathbf{C} , likewise appending to \mathbf{A}_0 and \mathbf{A}_1 the sends linear combination of columns. \mathcal{P}_i sends $(\text{LINEAR}, sid, \{(cid_i, \alpha_{cid_i})\}_{i \in [m']}, \beta, cid')$.
2. Upon receiving $(\text{LINEAR}, sid, \{(cid_i, \alpha_{cid_i})\}_{i \in [m']}, \beta, cid')$ from \mathcal{P}_i , if $\text{actual}^j[cid_i] = \mathbf{x}_{cid_i} \neq \perp$ for $i \in [m']$ and cid' is unused, \mathcal{P}_j computes $\text{actual}^j[cid'] = \beta + \sum_{i \in [m']} \alpha_{cid_i} \cdot \text{actual}^j[cid_i]$ appends $\mathbf{C}(\beta) + \sum_{i \in [m']} \alpha_{cid_i} \cdot \mathbf{B}[\cdot, i]$ to \mathbf{B} . Note that this maintains the properties $\mathbf{A} = \mathbf{A}_0 + \mathbf{A}_1$, $\mathbf{B} = \mathbf{\Delta} \mathbf{A}_1 + (\mathbf{I} - \mathbf{\Delta}) \mathbf{A}_0$, and $\mathbf{A} \in \mathbf{C}^{\odot m'}$, where m' is the new current number of columns.

Opening Phase:

1. To open the commitment identified by cid_i , \mathcal{P}_i sends $(sid, \mathbf{A}_0[\cdot, i], \mathbf{A}_1[\cdot, i])$.
2. \mathcal{P}_j checks that $\mathbf{A}_0[\cdot, i] + \mathbf{A}_1[\cdot, i] \in \mathbf{C}$ and that for $j \in [n]$, it holds that $\mathbf{B}[j, i] = \mathbf{A}_{b_j}[j, i]$ (recall that b_j is the j 'th entry on the diagonal of $\mathbf{\Delta}$). If this check fails, \mathcal{P}_j aborts outputting (sid, \perp) . Otherwise, \mathcal{P}_j computes \mathbf{x}_{cid} , the first k entries in $\mathbf{A}_0[\cdot, i] + \mathbf{A}_1[\cdot, i] + \text{actual}^j[cid] \parallel \mathbf{0}^{n-k}$, and outputs $(\text{OPEN}, sid, cid, \mathbf{x}_{cid})$.

Fig. 30. Protocol $\Pi_{2\text{HCom}}$ (Linear Combination and Opening).

Functionality $\mathcal{F}_{\text{HCom}}$

$\mathcal{F}_{\text{HCom}}$ is parameterized by $k \in \mathbb{N}$. $\mathcal{F}_{\text{HCom}}$ interacts with a set of parties $\mathcal{P} = \{\mathcal{P}_1, \dots, \mathcal{P}_n\}$, and an adversary \mathcal{S} (who may abort at any time) through the following interfaces:

Init: Upon receiving (INIT, sid) from parties \mathcal{P} , initialize empty lists **raw** and **actual**.

Commit: Upon receiving (COMMIT, sid, \mathcal{I}) from $\mathcal{P}_i \in \mathcal{P}$ where \mathcal{I} is a set of unused identifiers, for every $cid \in \mathcal{I}$, sample a random $\mathbf{x}_{cid} \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{F}^k$, set $\mathbf{raw}[cid] = \mathbf{x}_{cid}$ and send (COMMIT-RECORDED, sid, \mathcal{I}) to all parties \mathcal{P} and \mathcal{S} .

Input: Upon receiving a message (INPUT, $sid, \mathcal{P}_i, cid, \mathbf{y}$) with $\mathbf{y} \in \mathbb{F}^k$ from $\mathcal{P}_i \in \mathcal{P}$ and messages (INPUT, sid, \mathcal{P}_i, cid) from every party in \mathcal{P} other than \mathcal{P}_i , if a message (COMMIT, sid, \mathcal{I}) was previously received from \mathcal{P}_i and $\mathbf{raw}[cid] = \mathbf{x}_{cid} \neq \perp$, set $\mathbf{raw}[cid] = \perp$, set $\mathbf{actual}[cid] = \mathbf{y}$ and send (INPUT-RECORDED, sid, \mathcal{P}_i, cid) to all parties in \mathcal{P} and \mathcal{S} . Otherwise broadcast (ABORT, sid) and halt.

Linear Combination: Upon receiving (LINEAR, $sid, \{(cid, \alpha_{cid})\}_{cid \in \mathcal{I}}, \beta, cid'$) where all $\alpha_{cid} \in \mathbb{F}$ and $\beta \in \mathbb{F}^k$ from all parties \mathcal{P} , if $\mathbf{actual}[cid] = \mathbf{x}_{cid} \neq \perp$ for all $cid \in \mathcal{I}$ and $\mathbf{raw}[cid'] = \mathbf{actual}[cid'] = \perp$, set $\mathbf{actual}[cid'] = \beta + \sum_{cid \in \mathcal{I}} \alpha_{cid} \cdot \mathbf{x}_{cid}$ and send (LINEAR-RECORDED, $sid, \{(cid, \alpha_{cid})\}_{cid \in \mathcal{I}}, \beta, cid'$) to all parties \mathcal{P} and \mathcal{S} . Otherwise broadcast (ABORT, sid) and halt.

Open: Upon receiving (OPEN, sid, cid) from all parties \mathcal{P} , if $\mathbf{actual}[cid] = \mathbf{x}_{cid} \neq \perp$, send (OPEN, $sid, cid, \mathbf{x}_{cid}$) to \mathcal{S} . If \mathcal{S} does not abort, send (OPEN, $sid, cid, \mathbf{x}_{cid}$) to all parties \mathcal{P} .

Fig. 31. Functionality $\mathcal{F}_{\text{HCom}}$ For Homomorphic Multiparty Commitments.

Protocol Π_{HCom}

Parties $\mathcal{P} = \{\mathcal{P}_1, \dots, \mathcal{P}_n\}$ interact with each other and $\mathcal{F}_{2\text{HCom}}$, \mathcal{F}_{EQ} and \mathcal{F}_{CT} , proceeding as follows:

Init: On input $(\text{INIT}, \text{sid})$, each pair of parties \mathcal{P}_i and \mathcal{P}_j invokes the command $(\text{INIT}, \text{sid})$ of functionality $\mathcal{F}_{2\text{HCom}}$ to initialize an instance denoted by $\mathcal{F}_{2\text{HCom}}^{i,j}$.

Commit: On input $(\text{COMMIT}, \text{sid}, \mathcal{I})$ where $\mathcal{I} = \{cid_1, \dots, cid_\gamma\}$ and if **Open** has not been used, parties \mathcal{P} proceed as follows:

1. All parties \mathcal{P} agree on a set of $\gamma + \kappa$ unused identifiers \mathcal{I}' using broadcast.
2. For all $j \neq i$, \mathcal{P}_i sends $(\text{COMMIT}, \text{sid}, \mathcal{I}')$ to $\mathcal{F}_{2\text{HCom}}^{i,j}$, receiving $(\text{COMMIT-RECORDED}, \text{sid}, \mathcal{I}', \{(cid, \mathbf{x}_{cid})\}_{cid \in \mathcal{I}'})$ in response and proceeding after receiving $(\text{COMMIT-RECORDED}, \text{sid}, \mathcal{I}')$ from $\mathcal{F}_{2\text{HCom}}^{j,i}$ for every $j \neq i$.
3. For all $cid \in \mathcal{I}'$ and every $j \in [n], j \neq i$, party \mathcal{P}_i samples $\mathbf{x}^i \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{F}^k$, sends $(\text{INPUT}, \text{sid}, \mathcal{P}_i, cid, \mathbf{x}^i)$ to $\mathcal{F}_{2\text{HCom}}^{i,j}$ and waits for $(\text{INPUT-RECORDED}, \text{sid}, \mathcal{P}_j, cid)$ from $\mathcal{F}_{2\text{HCom}}^{j,i}$.
4. All parties \mathcal{P} agree on sets \mathcal{I} and \mathcal{K} using broadcast such that $|\mathcal{I}| = \gamma$, $|\mathcal{K}| = \kappa$, $\mathcal{I} \cap \mathcal{K} = \emptyset$ and $\mathcal{I} \cup \mathcal{K} = \mathcal{I}'$.
5. All parties \mathcal{P} send $(\text{TOSS}, \text{sid}, \kappa \cdot \gamma, \mathbb{F})$ to \mathcal{F}_{CT} . They continue to the next step upon receiving $(\text{TOSSED}, \text{sid}, \kappa \cdot \gamma, \mathbf{R})$ where $\mathbf{R} \in \mathbb{F}^{\kappa \times \gamma}$ from \mathcal{F}_{CT} .
6. Identifying each column of \mathbf{R} with a unique $cid \in \mathcal{I}$, for every $q \in \mathcal{K}$, every party \mathcal{P}_i samples a fresh identifier cid'_q and, for every $j \in [n], j \neq i$, sends $(\text{LINEAR}, \text{sid}, \{(cid, \mathbf{R}[q, cid])\}_{cid \in \mathcal{I}}, \mathbf{0}^k, cid'_q)$ to $\mathcal{F}_{2\text{HCom}}^{i,j}$, waits for $(\text{LINEAR-RECORDED}, \text{sid}, \{(cid, \mathbf{R}[q, cid])\}_{cid \in \mathcal{I}}, \mathbf{0}^k, cid')$ from $\mathcal{F}_{2\text{HCom}}^{j,i}$, sends $(\text{OPEN}, \text{sid}, cid'_q)$ to $\mathcal{F}_{2\text{HCom}}^{i,j}$ and waits for $(\text{OPEN}, \text{sid}, cid'_q, \mathbf{s}_q^j)$ from $\mathcal{F}_{2\text{HCom}}^{j,i}$.
7. For every $q \in \mathcal{K}$, each party \mathcal{P}_i computes $\mathbf{c}_q^i = \sum_{j \in [n]} \mathbf{s}_q^j$ and sends $(\text{EQUAL}, \text{sid}, \mathcal{P}_i, \mathbf{c}_q^i)$ to \mathcal{F}_{EQ} . Upon receiving $(\text{ABORT}, \text{sid})$ or $(\text{NOT-EQUAL}, \text{sid}, \mathbf{c}_q^1, \dots, \mathbf{c}_q^n)$ from \mathcal{F}_{EQ} , \mathcal{P}_i aborts. Otherwise \mathcal{P}_i outputs $(\text{COMMITTED}, \text{sid}, \mathcal{I})$, sets $\text{raw}^i[cid] = \top$ and $\text{actual}^i[cid] = \perp$ for $cid \in \mathcal{I}$.

Input: On input $(\text{INPUT}, \text{sid}, cid, \mathbf{y})$ for \mathcal{P}_i and input $(\text{INPUT}, \text{sid}, \mathcal{P}_j, cid)$ for every \mathcal{P}_j for $j \neq i$ and if **Open** has not been used, parties \mathcal{P} proceed as follows:

1. For every $j \in [n], j \neq i$, \mathcal{P}_j aborts if $\text{raw}^j[cid] \neq \top$. Otherwise, \mathcal{P}_j sends $(\text{OPEN}, \text{sid}, cid)$ to $\mathcal{F}_{2\text{HCom}}^{j,i}$.
2. Upon receiving $(\text{OPEN}, \text{sid}, cid, \mathbf{x}^j)$ from $\mathcal{F}_{2\text{HCom}}^{j,i}$ for every $j \in [n], j \neq i$, \mathcal{P}_i computes $\mathbf{x}_{cid} = \sum_{j \in [n]} \mathbf{x}_{cid}^j$, $\mathbf{w}_{cid} = \mathbf{y} - \mathbf{x}_{cid}$ and broadcasts $(\text{sid}, \mathcal{P}_i, cid, \mathbf{w}_{cid})$.
3. Every party \mathcal{P}_i sets $\text{raw}^i[cid] = \perp$ and $\text{actual}^i[cid] = \mathbf{w}_{cid}$.

Linear Combination: On input $(\text{LINEAR}, \text{sid}, \{(cid, \alpha_{cid})\}_{cid \in \mathcal{I}}, \beta, cid')$ where all $\alpha_{cid} \in \mathbb{F}$ and $\beta \in \mathbb{F}^k$, if $\text{actual}^i[cid] \neq \perp$ for all $cid \in \mathcal{I}$ and cid' is unused, each party $\mathcal{P}_i \in \mathcal{P}$ computes $\text{actual}^i[cid'] = \beta + \sum_{cid \in \mathcal{I}} \alpha_{cid} \cdot \text{actual}^i[cid]$ and sends $(\text{LINEAR}, \text{sid}, \{(cid, \alpha_{cid})\}_{cid \in \mathcal{I}}, \beta, cid')$ to $\mathcal{F}_{2\text{HCom}}^{i,j}$. Otherwise broadcast $(\text{ABORT}, \text{sid})$ and halt.

Open: On input $(\text{OPEN}, \text{sid}, cid)$, each party \mathcal{P}_i sends $(\text{OPEN}, \text{sid}, cid)$ to $\mathcal{F}_{2\text{HCom}}^{i,j}$ for $j \in [n], j \neq i$. Upon receiving $(\text{OPEN}, \text{sid}, cid, \mathbf{x}^j)$ from $\mathcal{F}_{2\text{HCom}}^{j,i}$ for every $j \in [n], j \neq i$, \mathcal{P}_i computes $\mathbf{y} = \sum_{j \in [n]} \mathbf{x}_{cid}^j + \text{actual}^i[cid]$ and outputs $(\text{OPEN}, \text{sid}, cid, \mathbf{y})$.

Fig. 32. Protocol Π_{HCom} for Multiparty Homomorphic Commitments.