

## ABSTRACT

Title: PEACEKEEPING PARTICIPATION AND  
IDENTITY CHANGES IN THE JAPAN SELF  
DEFENSE FORCES: MILITARY SERVICE AS  
'DIRTY WORK'

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This dissertation examines (a) how a professional organization dealing with 'dirty work' (Hughes 1951, 1958) shape organizational practices and professional identity of its members in the process of seeking legitimacy and (b) how adaptation to a new task transforms these micro-institutional dynamics in the organization based on a case study of the Japan Self Defense Forces (SDF) and their peacekeeping participation. I utilize in-depth interviews with approximately 30 Japanese service members and survey data from 618 Japanese peacekeepers.

Given an anti-militaristic culture in society and Constitutional restrictions against the possession of military power, the SDF have been developed as a constabulary military with limited legitimacy. Lack of legitimacy led the SDF to use symbolic management strategies to gain legitimacy, but their attempt unexpectedly put the organization into a 'vicious circle of legitimation' (Ashforth and Kreiner

1999), in which the aggressive attempt to pursue legitimacy aggravated skepticism of the observers and failed to increase legitimacy. Nonetheless, the SDF survived as a dirty work organization to protect the purity of the larger society. Contextualized by these institutional environments, service members have developed highly constabulary, less masculine, and civilianized identities.

Since the early 1990s peacekeeping participation combined with the transformation of the work force structure has gradually lifted dirty work status of the SDF and provided service members with positive possible selves in their professional life. Regardless, the stigmatized status continues to regularize service members' behavior and professional identities. Increasing exposure to soldiers from other nations underscores their marginal position as military professionals. Japanese peacekeepers systematically focus on technical aspects to neutralize the militaristic nature of the contact.

Moreover, the stringent rules of engagement (ROE) institutionalized by the anti-militarism sentiment in Japanese society help the SDF to maintain the consistency with the existing norms on the exercise of military power. At the same time, these imposed behavioral norms promote the fundamentally troubling, crisis-bearing arrangements that may routinize harmful practice and risk the safety of service members in the field. This dissertation contributes to the study of work organizations by illustrating the meaning creation and negotiation of identity in the micro-institutional dynamics in a socially stigmatized professional organization.

PEACEKEEPING PARTICIPATION AND IDENTITY CHANGES  
IN THE JAPAN SELF DEFENSE FORCES:  
MILITARY SERVICE AS 'DIRTY WORK'

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## Dedication

To Robert Cooper Whitestone, Jr.

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## **Chapter 1: Introduction**

Since the beginning of human history, warfare has been an omnipresent social process (Andreski 1968; Wright 1965), which preceded the emergence of military institutions and the social role of soldiers (Segal and Gravino 1985). By contrast, peacekeeping is a contemporary social process that has been institutionalized as a primary mission in the post-Cold War military (Segal, Segal, and Eyre 1992; Segal and Segal 1993a). Although it is treated as if it were a brand-new mission that emerged in the early 1990s, UN peacekeeping has more than half a century long history as a secondary mission using military presence as a vehicle of achieving operational goals. Until the end of the Cold War, peacekeeping missions were mostly conducted by troops from middle powers. Role conflict between the peacekeeper role and the soldier role was identified as an issue in the sociological literature on peacekeeping (Moskos 1976; Harris and Segal 1985; Segal and Meeker 1985; Meeker and Segal 1987; Segal et al. 1987). However, due to its peripheral role as a military mission, peacekeeping missions did not cause any major organizational issues.

Having increased its significance as a military mission in the 1990s, however, armed forces have been experiencing more organizational adaptation problems in the field, represented in high-profile cases such as torturing and killing a local young Somali man by Canadian Airborne soldiers in Somalia and the misjudgment of Dutch peacekeeping troops that led a massacre of Bosnian Muslims in Srebrenica. Researchers attributed the source of maladjustment problems to role overload and identity confusion among peacekeepers. In post Cold War peacekeeping, the professional identity of

military peacekeepers is overloaded and reaches a breaking point when facing complex and ambiguous role demands as peacekeepers and soldiers in a confusing mission environment (see Franke 1999). Although most studies of peacekeeping assume a martial ethos as the universal core value that shapes the professional identity of soldiers (see Franke 1999), the recent maladaptation cases in Somalia and Bosnia revealed a surprising diversity in the ways in which individual soldiers and military organizations conform to norms of the immediate institutional environment of the organization, rather than institutional rules given in a particular mission environment. The institutional influence of social contexts in the larger society on its peacekeepers tends to be overlooked in the literature on military peacekeepers and their psychological states and attitudes.

The demise of the Warsaw Pact and the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989 increased the number, scale, complexity, and coerciveness of peacekeeping operations and the diversity of those who carry out peacekeeping operations to an unprecedented level. The disappearance of East-West tension in Europe allowed the US and the permanent Security Council members to participate in multilateral peacekeeping operations free from a Cold War doctrine that excluded major powers from UN peacekeeping missions to maintain the political impartiality of the mission (Segal and Segal 1993a).<sup>1</sup> Simultaneously, regional and intra-state armed conflicts in third world countries have surged in the absence of the bipolar tension between the United States and the former Soviet Union; they increased the demands for interventions led by the UN and regional multilateral organizations and expanded the spectrum of peacekeeping. Accumulating demands for a wider range of multilateral intervention, from humanitarian

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<sup>1</sup> Regarding the details of the exclusion doctrine, see Segal and Gravino (1985) and Segal and Eyre (1996).

assistance to military enforcement, highlighted the incongruence between military presence as a means of peacekeeping and war-fighting as a means of peacemaking (Segal and Segal 1993a).

However, this incongruence was not new: using military presence as a means of peacekeeping was recognized as incongruent with warfighting—a traditional means of military affairs—in early traditional peacekeeping missions. In *The Professional Soldier*, Janowitz (1960) predicted the emerging change in the military in the age of nuclear deterrence and described it as transition from military forces to constabulary forces. Janowitz also anticipated that soldiers would experience difficulty adjusting to this transition because of its close resemblance to police work. There are three premises of traditional peacekeeping missions— political impartiality, limited use of force, and agreement of host parties—that are incongruent with a traditional war-fighting ethos. Being able to adjust themselves to constabulary norms and accomplish missions finding a positive side to the deployment in their career development (Segal and Meeker 1985), soldiers still experience role conflict (Moskos 1975 1976) and relative deprivation issues including boredom, frustration, and a sense of underutilization (Harris and Segal 1985; Segal, et al. 1987; Segal and Segal 1993a).

Involvement of the United States and major powers in peacekeeping missions suddenly normalized troop contribution to peacekeeping missions as a diplomatic option, although national security policies and practices among member nations vary tremendously. This transition immediately called into question the reluctant posture of militarily low-profile major economic powers —Germany and Japan— when the UN Security Council sanctioned the use of force by a coalition of member states after the

Iraqi military invaded Kuwait in August 1990. For highly defense-oriented military organizations, such as the *Bundeswehr* and the Japan Self Defense Forces, peacekeeping was a mission that violates social norms of military action in society, which prohibit deployment of troops outside the territories. For Germany, the area of operations was within Germany and central Europe for territorial defense against communist power (Fleckenstein 2000). For Japan, it was limited to the territory for exclusively defensive operations (Tanaka 1997; Katzenstein 1996). After a storm of criticism from North American and European media, Germany resolved to contribute troops to peace operations overseas as a form of cooperation with its regional organizations such as NATO; Japan started sending troops to the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) in 1992 after enacting a new law that allows the SDF to send troops to peacekeeping missions overseas. The increasing participation of different types of unconventional actors in contemporary peacekeeping missions sheds light on cognitive and normative powers of institutions and on the way in which peacekeeping missions are conceptualized and carried out in different socio-cultural contexts. Suppose military institutions represent social and cultural norms of host societies, as Fabian (1971) suggested, it is not universally true that peacekeeping participation has an adverse effect on the organizational culture and operations of the military.

Contrary to most research findings on North American and European peacekeepers, Japanese peacekeepers show overwhelmingly positive attitudes toward their deployment experience and a high level of mission satisfaction across operations in Cambodia, the Golan Heights, and Mozambique (Ohi 1999; Kawano 2001 2002). Kawano (2002) describes the positive experience of Japanese peacekeepers as “a few

steps closer to “soldiers” through their participation in the UN peacekeeping operation” and noted that “contacts with the soldiers and people of different nationalities provoked a JSDF person’s sense of being a Japanese soldier”(p.271). Looking at the organizational history and socio-cultural context of contemporary Japanese society, the successful adjustment of Japanese service members to peacekeeping has more implications beyond the adequacy of the constabulary orientation to peacekeeping missions. Taking the negative reaction of the Japanese public to troop contribution to international peacekeeping missions, it is questionable whether exposure to soldiers from other armed forces has only a positive impact on Japanese service members, especially on their professional identity.

Since its inception in 1954, the Japan Self-Defense Forces (SDF) have been developed as a highly defense-oriented force with a strong constabulary ethos. Lack of organizational legitimacy under Article 9 of the Constitution, which prohibits Japan’s possession of any military power and oversea deployment, has greatly impacted on legitimacy seeking strategies for organizational survival. Derived from the regulative issues of organizational legitimacy, there are number of social institutions and agencies that place institutional pressure on the way in which the SDF and individual service members conform to norms of the institutional environment. As the international responsibilities of Japan have grown, Japan’s engagement in international peacekeeping amplified concerns about her desire to be a military power (see Berger 1993; Halloran 1994; Hook 1996; Drifte 2000). Many researchers are still concerned with the possibility of Japan’s rearmament, following Hans Morgenthau’s theory of power politics that assumes rearmament intention as an inevitable desire for a nation-state (Berger 1998).

As diversity in the international forces increases in post-Cold War peacekeeping, conducting a case study becomes more valuable to understand the social structures that regulate peacekeepers' behavior and affect their identity formation. The temporary nature of the peacekeeping mission contributed to the difficulty of managing cultural diversity within international peacekeeping forces (Elron, et al. 2000). As the field becomes a more complex work environment at the juncture of diverse organizational and national cultures, peacekeepers increasingly need to take into consideration diversity in organizational and national cultures, language, skills and experience in peacekeeping, behavioral norms associated with rules of engagement (ROE), and the purpose of deployment among different contingents in the field.

The purpose of the present dissertation is to understand how adaptation to peacekeeping missions affects organizational legitimacy and the professional identity of service members in a constabulary military. The Japanese armed forces are studied as a case. One notable feature of the Japanese armed forces is its constabulary ethos based on the peace Constitution and exclusively defensive national security policy. How was the constabulary ethos of the armed forces institutionalized in post-WWII Japan? How does the institutional environment of the SDF shape the professional identity of Japanese service members? To discuss organizational legitimacy and professional identity of service members, I examine the origin of the constabulary ethos in the SDF and changes in the socio-cultural context surrounding the Japanese military institution first. Another distinctive aspect of the Japanese armed forces is that they are socially tainted as a profession. Kawano (2001 2002) has found that the majority of Japanese peacekeepers were satisfied with their peacekeeping experience, unlike their North-American and



European counterparts. Is there any association between the socially marginalized status of the profession and the high level of satisfaction among Japanese peacekeepers?

Extending Segal's social constructionism approach to peacekeeping, I apply "microinstitutional" theory with an emphasis on the process of identity formation and its reproduction (Zucker 1991; Wicks 2002). In addition to institutional bases of identity construction, I also introduce Ashforth and Kreiner's (1999) refined theory of Everett Hughes' (1951 1958) "dirty work" to examine the stigmatized status of the military profession in contemporary Japan.

Being stigmatized in society, dirty work has received scant attention from organization researchers. Nevertheless, the study of dirty work and how people in socially marginalized jobs try to resolve their professional identity will provide us a profound insight in the negotiation of meaning in the workplace (Ashforth and Kreiner 1999). The present dissertation can make contributions to the sociology of work by deepening our understanding of the function of dirty work in contemporary society.

The present dissertation also will contribute to military sociology by applying microinstitutional theory to the study of peacekeeping. Conventional military sociology theories assume a universal definition of the military profession, and have limited explanatory power to large-scale change in the military institution such as adaptation to peacekeeping missions (Segal, Segal, and Eyre 1992; Segal, and Segal 1993a). In contrast, institutional theory allows us to conduct more comprehensive research on military peacekeepers from different nations with different levels of martial orientations of the military. Compared to soldiers in war-fighting oriented forces, there have been very few studies on how service members in constabulary forces define their professional

identity. It is also unknown how a constabulary orientation impacts service members' appraisal of peacekeeping deployment experience and what organizational consequences of peacekeeping participation we should anticipate in a constabulary force.

In the increasingly internationalized mission environment, some have pointed out unstandardized quality of assigned troops and various constraints on their involvement as an obstacle to mission effectiveness (see Mackinlay and Chopra 1993; Diehl 1993; Brooks 2003). The present dissertation will discuss the advantages and disadvantages to include military peacekeepers from countries with stringent constraints on activities.

The findings will be presented in a chronological order, following the developmental process of the contemporary Japanese military institution. I identified the following three phases that are critical in the course of the development of the SDF regarding Japanese peacekeeping participation: (1) The emergence of the SDF (The post-war peace constitution, the Korean War, and the renewal of the US-Japan Security Treaty in 1960) (1945-1960); (2) From High growth of the Japanese economy to the end of the Cold War (1961-1989); (3) The development of Japanese peacekeeping participation in the post Cold War period (1990 to present).

In the chronological presentation of my arguments, I will start from the macro social formation of the institutional environment of the SDF and follow through micro-organizational issues that constitute the impact of Japanese participation in multinational peacekeeping missions. Although identity formation and other micro social processes are fundamental components in the institutionalization processes, institutional theorists in sociology mostly focus on describing and explaining macro level development and effects of institutions. Sociological social psychologists, on the other hand, acknowledge

the importance of institutional effects on individuals' attitudes; yet rarely have they integrated institutional factors into their analysis because of the complexity of organizational environments. SDF members' professional identity is deeply rooted in the history of contemporary Japan so that the first two sections will be devoted to the examination of the historical and societal factors. Then, the third section will shift to more contemporary, micro-organizational issues in Japanese peacekeeping. Using survey data collected from SDF members formerly deployed to peacekeeping mission(s), I examine what aspects of peacekeeping experience affect Japanese peacekeepers' psychological states, redeployment intention, and attitudes toward peacekeeping operations.

Chapter 2 discusses the sociological significance of studying UN peacekeeping. Chapter 3 reviews previous sociological research on military peacekeepers and theories with an emphasis on new institutionalism in organizational sociology and identity theories, including the patterns of organizational adaptation to peacekeeping and relevant organizational issues. Chapter 4 provides research questions and hypotheses that lead the discussions in the present dissertation, and Chapter 5 describes the methods used to answer those research questions and test hypotheses. From Chapter 6 through Chapter 9, I discuss my findings in chronological order. Lastly, I draw conclusions in Chapter 10, combined with the significance and the limitations of the present dissertation from both theoretical and methodological aspects.

## **Chapter 2: Institutional Arrangement of Peacekeeping**

### **Significant Characteristics of Peacekeeping**

The demise of the East-West ideological tension in Europe changed institutional arrangements of UN peacekeeping, as well as similar peace support missions led by regional organizations. This major geopolitical shift made peacekeeping a premier military mission in the post-Cold War military. This shift exponentially expanded the spectrum of peacekeeping missions and brought not only the United States and permanent members of Security Council, but also militarily low-profile economic powers such as Germany and Japan, into the arena.

After World War II, these two nations never stretched their military activities beyond their territories due to their Constitutional restrictions. However, once peacekeeping became institutionalized as a common strategy to maintain the peace, burden sharing among UN member nations through not only financial contributions but also military contributions, became a normative rule in the international community. This international normative environment surrounding peacekeeping is a globalization of international security through imposing the norms that reflect major actors' national interests and policies on peripheral actors in international military affairs. The globalization of international security norms no longer allowed Japan and Germany to legitimately claim immunity from military contributions to international peacekeeping operations in order to conform to domestic norms and regulative restrictions. Regarding the obligation of troop contributions that became a norm in the international community, Paris (2003) argued that, from the viewpoint of sociological world polity theory,

peacekeeping operations are not the means of intervention for armed conflicts, but “the prisoner of global culture” in that international norms of appropriateness are given priority over effectiveness and control intervention strategies in peacekeeping operations.

As a military mission, peacekeeping has a number of unique characteristics. One of the most distinctive characteristics of UN peacekeeping is the absence of a universal definition given by the UN or any other international organization. Although it does not appear in the UN Charter, “peacekeeping” became a common term used among member nations in the early 1960s when regional activities of small scale UN military units came to receive international recognition after the successful mission of the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) in the Suez in 1956 (Kozai 1991). Referring to the UN Charter, former UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld described peacekeeping as “Chapter six and a half.” The term peacekeeping was not officially defined in the Charter; the definitional ambiguity came from the dual aspects of peacekeeping reflecting the principles in both Chapter VI and Chapter VII of the Charter. Chapter VI calls for the peaceful resolution of conflicts, while Chapter VII allows the Security Council to take military action to mediate conflicts if diplomatic negotiation fails (Lewis 1992).<sup>2</sup> The UN conceptualizes peacekeeping as an evolving technique of intervention, but does not give any succinct definition (see UN Department of Public Information 2002b). Because of

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<sup>2</sup> Article 33 in Chapter VI stipulates peaceful settlement of disputes as that “the parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice.” Article 39 in Chapter VII set actions against threats to peace as that “the Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security.” Article 41 provides non-militaristic measures to mediate disputes, and Article 42 specifies measures involving the use of armed forces including demonstrations, blockade, and other land, sea, and air operations employing the member nations’ armed forces.

this ambiguous definition, UN peacekeeping maintains the maximum flexibility and is able to virtually launch any type of military activities in order to resolve armed conflicts that will potentially be harmful to international security or that create inhumane consequences on people's lives. As a result, the term "peacekeeping" is applied to a wide spectrum of activities from unarmed treaty verification to conflict intervention using force (Segal and Eyre 1996); scholars criticize the ambiguity of peacekeeping such that the term of peacekeeping has become "a term without meaning" to rationalize a wide range of UN-led military operations from election monitoring to food distribution in a post-conflict zone (Helms 1996: p.6). Fabian (1971) described peacekeepers as "soldiers without enemies," which portrayed the ambiguous and conflicting nature of peacekeeping operations as a job for professional soldiers. His portrayal is still largely adequate although the mission environment is increasingly complex.

Despite a wide range of applications of the concept today, peacekeeping is fundamentally a type of constabulary mission to intervene in armed conflicts using military presence as a means. Although peacekeeping missions in the early 1990s showed deviations, the following three principles are fundamentally the core of UN peacekeeping operations: (a) impartiality, (b) consent of host country, and (c) no use of force other than self-defense. Peacekeeping duty involves a very different way of thinking compared to traditional military missions. Reflecting the nature of military observer missions in the early period, peacekeeping missions fundamentally prohibit use of force beyond self-defense although missions are carried out by the military. Military forces normally aim at destroying the enemy and their will to fight, while international peacekeeping forces use military presence as a means of maintaining cease-fires and assist the reconstruction

process of societies. Peacekeeping missions resemble police work. As long as peacekeeping was a secondary mission, the conceptual and strategic gaps between war fighting and peacekeeping were treated as temporary issues for the military organization. On the other hand, erosion of the boundary between the military and police work was anticipated in a large-scale geopolitical change after the end of World War II.

### **The Origin of Peacekeeping Norms**

To discuss contemporary peacekeeping issues, it is necessary to understand how peacekeeping became legitimized and the shift of its institutional arrangements. Today's peacekeeping emerged from the history of the failure to establish a collective security system in the League of Nations and the United Nations. The idea of collective security is found in a sixteenth century French politician Duc de Sully's "le Grand Dessein d'Henri IV," proposing to form an international force, composed of assigned troops from 15 countries for the European Senat (Marriot 1939). Collective security is a mutual protection system among member nations in an international organization to prevent any of the member nations from threatening, destroying, or invading other member nations. This "in-group" rule makes collective security distinctive from an alliance system in that alliance is for the nations sharing a common interest to protect allied nations from outsiders. Article 16 of the Covenant of the League of Nation set the details of sanctions to penalize a violator using military and non-military measures, but it was too costly to implement. In fact, economic sanctions in Article 16-1 only took effect against Italy in the Italy-Ethiopia conflict in 1935; anticipated extensive damage among member nations in the implementation of military sanctions prevented the League from taking military

measures under Article 16 throughout its organizational history. Instead of Article 16, Article 11, which set a general guideline of collective measures to protect international peace, drew more attention for its significance in preventive diplomacy after the League committee successfully managed the conflict between Bulgaria and Greece without using force after a shooting between border patrols of the two sides in October 1925. Following Article 11, the League committee was summoned, and sent three military attaches from England, France, and Italy stationed in their embassies in Beograd to observe the withdrawal of both Bulgarian and Greek troops. The action taken by the League was highly praised as preventive diplomacy using military presence; the League enhanced the preventive diplomacy function implied in Article 11 and augmented the article by adopting a guideline and a treaty (Kozai 1991).

The basic framework of using military presence as a means of preventive diplomacy started being institutionalized in the Bulgaria and Greece border conflict although the immediate predecessor of peacekeeping operations was the international force deployed to the Saar Basin (*Saargebiet*). The League of Nations formed an international force to maintain regional security for the plebiscite in the Saar Basin of Western Europe in 1934. The Nazi regime tried to annex the Saar Basin without the plebiscite, and potential Nazi-led boycotts and terrorist acts appeared to be beyond the capability of small, local police forces. To secure the region, the League authorized the international force that consisted of approximately 3,300 troops from Britain, Italy, Sweden, and the Netherlands (Segal and Gravino 1985; Lewis 1992). These nations were not the nations concerned, and were politically impartial on the plebiscite in the Saar Basin. Although the term peacekeeping was not invented yet, the Saar International Force



was called a “peace force” not a “fighting force” at that time (Lewis 1992).<sup>3</sup> These early missions under the League of Nations also provided the three basic norms of peacekeeping: impartiality, consent of interested parties, and non-coercion.

### **The Evolution of Peacekeeping Operations**

Since its inception, the UN has emphasized the maintenance of international peace as one of its organizational objectives, and authorized UN forces to use military power for conflict resolution, reflecting on the structural incapacity of the League of Nations to prevent World War II (The International Peace Cooperation Headquarter 2001). However, the tension between the United States and the Soviet Union, which emerged soon after World War II, made it nearly impossible for the Security Council to gain consensus on conflict intervention in cases in which conflict would imperil the global security situation. Learning lessons from its predecessor, the UN developed a peacekeeping system as an alternative means of dealing with inter-state conflicts without unanimous decision-making in the Security Council in order to enable the peace functions of the UN in the bipolar Cold War system. UN peacekeeping operations started with sending unarmed military observers of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) to Palestine in 1948.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> In other occasions, the League of Nations used multinational forces in order to mediate the settlement of international disputes upon requests of member nations despite small numbers of successful cases. Before the Saar international force, the League of Nations attempted to mediate the conflict between Poland and Lithuania in 1920 with the international force, but the plan was never implemented. The League used an international force to mediate the Leticia Trapeze conflict between Columbia and Peru in 1933. In the Leticia conflict, the committee consisted of officers from the US, Brazil, and Spain, but the body of detachment was Colombian soldiers. Involvement of Columbian soldiers made the international force in the Leticia conflict a less politically impartial international force despite the fact that the locals in Columbia and Leticia would not welcome the intervention of soldiers from third parties.

<sup>4</sup> According to Fabian (1971), the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans (UNSCOB)

Figure 1 aligns these peacekeeping missions on the spectrum of missions based on three principles of peacekeeping missions: impartiality, use of force, and consent of the conflicting parties. Three types of peacekeeping missions — *observer missions*, *traditional peacekeeping missions*, and *second-generation (strategic) peacekeeping missions* — are in the figure as variations of peacekeeping missions. Although the present dissertation does not include enforcement mission as a type of peacekeeping mission, I added *enforcement missions* as an extreme end of deviation from peacekeeping to show the spectrum of peacekeeping missions.<sup>5</sup>


*Observation missions* are implemented as an extension of pacific settlement of a dispute under Chapter VI, albeit military forces are used; they are also sharply distinctive from Chapter VII type enforcing military sanctions. Early observation missions, therefore, rigidly follow the three principles of peacekeeping: impartiality, host country consent, and no use (or minimal use) of force. These three principles were established through the first several unarmed observer missions for monitoring cease-fire agreements including the early two missions in the Balkans (UNSCOB) and Indonesia (UNCI), which are not classified as official missions of the UN any more, and the subsequent missions in the Middle East (UNTSO) and in South Asia (the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan: UNMOGIP) in the late 1940s, and they became the basic norms of traditional peacekeeping missions. These unarmed observer missions could be

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(1946-1954) should be the first UN peacekeeping mission. The mission investigated communist nations' intrusion on the northern border of Greece, but this mission is not included in the United Nations' official documents any more (Segal 1995). See Appendix A in Fabian (1971) about the mission details of UNSCOB.

<sup>5</sup> Although the Korean War and the Gulf War were two large military missions in which the United Nations was involved, enforcement missions should not be included in peacekeeping missions because the United Nations sanctions but not operate missions (Hillen 2000).

**Figure 1: The Spectrum of UN Peacekeeping Missions**



implemented without unanimous approval of the permanent Security Council members, and the success of these missions expanded the range of missions into so called traditional peacekeeping missions.

*Traditional peacekeeping.* Relative to observation missions, traditional peacekeeping mission have been playing a more active role in the settlement of armed conflicts by occupying buffer zones between the hostile parties, and use force only if it is necessary to protect themselves in life-threatening situations. Traditional peacekeeping operations send small size units to the areas in which a cease-fire agreement has been concluded among the hostile parties, and assist the peace process and maintain cease-fire agreements as an impartial third party. Activities in the missions vary from cease-fire verification to occupying buffer zones. These missions are operated by small size multinational forces composed of peacekeepers from middle powers. The United Nations Emergency Force I (UNEF I) initiated in 1956 was the first mission of this kind, to supervise disengagement and occupy a buffer zone after Egypt nationalized the Suez

Canal. Compared to the previous observation missions, the authorization process of UNEF I was notably different in that the mission was mandated by the General Assembly to avoid possible vetoes by France and Britain in the Security Council (Segal 1995). This 11- year long mission formulated institutional rules of traditional peacekeeping missions for the subsequent missions regarding the principles and standards in operations (Fetherston 1994). As military operations that the United Nations authorizes, traditional peacekeeping missions have had a set of restrictions on political legitimacy and military authority that are congruent with those of the UN based on the three principles (impartiality, limited use of force, and consent of belligerents). These norms of UN peacekeeping restrict the composition and size of the force and operational structure, including equitable geographic representation of troops (Hillen 2000).

*Post-Cold War Peacekeeping Missions.* Until the 1990s, UN peacekeeping missions were unlikely to be approved by the two superpowers; the United States and the former Soviet Union did not actively participate in UN peacekeeping missions following a Cold War doctrine that restricted their engagement in UN peacekeeping missions to maintain the political impartiality of those missions (Segal and Gravino 1985). These political situations made peacekeeping missions in the Cold War period unilateral, decentralized, and informal. The end of the Cold War removed political constraints on the scope and application of peacekeeping, and allowed the Security Council to more effectively mediate armed conflicts and send peacekeeping forces with extensive mandates. UN peacekeeping became a policy option in US politics, and Russia became a reasonable permanent member of the Security Council regarding the authorization of peacekeeping missions. This shift made it much easier for the Security Council

permanent members to directly engage in peacekeeping missions than in the past (Mackinlay and Chopra 1993). Institutionalization of peacekeeping as a political option expanded the diversity of participating nations in peacekeeping operations.

After the collapse of the Warsaw Pact, UN peacekeeping has increased its political and operational complexity and become more differentiated from prior peacekeeping missions. Because of their complexity and wide range of activities, many peacekeeping missions launched after the end of the Cold War were named “*second-generation peacekeeping*” and “*strategic peacekeeping*” (Dandeker and Gow 1997). Reflecting the expansion in the spectrum of peacekeeping missions, researchers have proposed different taxonomies of the missions emphasizing different aspects of the missions such as strategic (Hillen 2000), legal (Diehl 1993), and sociological (Dandeker and Gow 1997). From a sociological viewpoint, Dandeker and Gow (1997) called second generation missions “*strategic peacekeeping*,” referring to “operations in which an international force is inserted into a continuing conflict to assist in creating conditions for conflict termination, but without taking sides in the conflict”(p.329). A strategic peacekeeping operation is placed between traditional peacekeeping and peace enforcement with the possibility of being engaged in enforcement measures to some extent. According to Dandeker and Gow (1997), what makes strategic peacekeeping different from traditional peacekeeping are differences in strategic level (i.e., consent of the conflicting parties and the use of force) and the process to balance three different aspects of legitimation: (a) legal codes and normative values, (b) effective performance, and (c) popular support from a wide range of audiences.

In the present dissertation, I will simply call the peacekeeping missions after the

collapse of the Warsaw Pact “post-Cold War peacekeeping” to avoid confusion. The absence of the tension between two superpowers increased attention to intra-state civil wars and other regional armed conflicts that might imperil world peace. Demands for UN intervention steeply increased, and there have been a total of 59 peacekeeping missions since then (as of December 2004). Forty-one missions — nearly 70 percent of the total — were initiated in 1991 or later. This unprecedented increase of UN peacekeeping missions corresponded to the willingness of the UN to play a more active role in international peacekeeping activities. However, the intense and extensive involvement of the UN brought uncertainty and fluidity in peacekeeping that were rarely seen before.

Actors in armed conflicts are not necessarily nation-states. Subnational-level hostile parties who do not consider international laws seriously are involved in the targeted conflicts of peacekeeping operations. Those actors more easily violate cease-fire agreements, and the mission environments become extremely unstable. In these missions, keeping the three traditional principles of peacekeeping became more difficult. As UN peacekeeping has increasingly dealt with intra-state conflicts, in which the principles for traditional peacekeeping are not promised but humanitarian intervention is necessary, we came to find more deviation from the three principles of traditional peacekeeping (Hillen 2000).

We also observed changes in the actors who carry out peacekeeping missions in the post-Cold War period. The Security Council came to support UN peacekeeping free from the Cold War peacekeeping doctrine that restricted participation of super powers, and some of the UN peacekeeping missions initiated in the early 1990s gained personnel contribution from the great powers. These two factors, and international expectations

regarding the stronger role of the UN, expanded UN peacekeeping in the early 1990s, and this tendency came to culmination with the success of the Gulf War. In August 1990, the UN Security Council sanctioned the use of force by a coalition of member states after the Iraqi military invaded Kuwait. The Gulf War was the first time in UN history that the use of force by a coalition of member states was authorized,<sup>6</sup> and represented one of the extreme ends of the spectrum. It was a defining moment of multilateral peacekeeping. Its increasing significance transformed international peacekeeping, from a secondary mission with almost no troop contribution by major powers, into a means of burden sharing in global politics for many UN member nations.

Expansion of UN peacekeeping since the end of the Cold War created two types of peacekeeping missions, *multidimensional peacekeeping* and *peace enforcement*. Adopting Dandeker and Gow's (1997) typology, we call the former *strategic peacekeeping*. *Strategic peacekeeping* is an expanded version of first generation peacekeeping, in which the UN assists a host country through the total process from peaceful negotiation for conflict resolution to assistance in building new national systems after an armed conflict. *Strategic peacekeeping* deviates less from the basic principles of traditional peacekeeping than peace-enforcement type missions such as the missions in Somalia and Bosnia. These two missions, initiated after the Gulf War, also reflected new directions of UN peacekeeping by the former Secretary General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali's (1992) *An Agenda for Peace*. Boutros-Ghali reconceptualized and tried to reinforce the peace functions of the United Nations, proposing his idea of *expanded peacekeeping*. He

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<sup>6</sup> A critical difference from the Korean War (1950-1953) is that the United Nations did not mandate the United States as a UN Command in the Gulf War even though the United States legitimized the use of force by the US-led coalition. In Korea, the UN was prepared for exercising limited oversight in its operations, while in the Gulf War it was not involved in any operational management of the coalition force (Hillen 2000).

revised the basic principle of traditional peacekeeping and added more coercive means to resolve the armed conflicts set forth in Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Boutros-Ghali identified the following four peace functions of the United Nations in his *An Agenda for Peace*: (1) preventive diplomacy, (2) peacemaking, (3) peacekeeping, and (4) post-conflict peace building. He separated peacekeeping into two, peacemaking by peaceful settlement and peacekeeping by enforcement measures. Peace-enforcement type missions represented the latter, in which use of force was authorized to arrest suspects who attacked UN workers and to disarm fortified groups. Boutros-Ghali also proposed to form peace-enforcement units specifically for restoring cease-fire agreements, supported by Article 40 of the UN Charter when the belligerents breach cease-fire agreements. In his idea, peace-enforcement units are separate military elements from UN multinational forces and the regular UN forces. His proposal emphasized some forms of enforcement measures to improve the effectiveness of UN peacekeeping (Kamiya 2001).

However, peace enforcement missions reflecting Boutros-Ghali's new concept of peacekeeping immediately experienced a series of failures in the missions in Somalia and Bosnia. As a consequence he issued a supplement to the original text of *An Agenda for Peace* in January 1995. In the supplement, peacemaking was redefined as peaceful settlement for conflict resolution following the traditional definition, and the military enforcement means for conflict resolution were clearly separated as "sanction" from other means that require the consent of the engaged parties. Boutros-Ghali admitted the theoretical difference between peacekeeping and that of enforcement action and the United Nations' limited capability to manage enforcement actions, albeit it is ideal to improve such functions in the long term. He virtually denied his idea of *expanded*



*peacekeeping* stating that “peacekeeping and use of force beyond self-defense are not on the continuums, but alternative techniques for conflict resolution” (Boutros-Ghali 1995:p.35-36). Although it is not an official document, it is noteworthy that the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations provides a glossary of peacekeeping terminology. In the glossary, peacekeeping operations are defined as “non-combat military operations undertaken by outside forces with the consent of all major belligerent parties and designed to monitor and facilitate the implementation of an existing truce agreement in support of diplomatic efforts to reach a political settlement.” It does not include peace enforcement type missions.

Introducing these tentative definitions does not clarify the conceptual variation of peacekeeping, rather it adds to the conceptual confusion. In the present dissertation, to avoid the confusion in use of terms, I use *peacekeeping* as the general term representing military observation missions, traditional peacekeeping, multidimensional peacekeeping, peace-building missions, and peace-making missions. I exclude peace-enforcement missions and humanitarian missions. I specify a certain type of peacekeeping mission if it is necessary. When I use the term *peace operations*, it includes all the above missions. The same rule is applied to which agency or organization (the United Nations or regional multilateral organizations) authorized a mission. If it is not specified, it includes both UN-led and regional organization-led missions.

A series of failures of *peace-enforcement* missions in the early 1990s (e.g., The Srebrenica Massacre in Bosnia and Genocide in Rwanda) had a significant impact on budgets and the willingness of the participant nations’ involvement in UN peacekeeping activities, and the number and the budget of UN peacekeeping sharply dropped in the late

1990s. Recently UN peacekeeping gradually became active in multi-functional peacekeeping missions such as the United Nations Missions in Kosovo (UNMIK) and the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET). The constabulary nature of UN peacekeeping survived through this chaos in the early stage of the post Cold War peacekeeping, and it still serves as a primary principle of peacekeeping missions.

## **Chapter 3: Theoretical Foundation**

### **Globalization and Peacekeeping**

The globalization of economic activities, media, and electronic communication has been weakening the autonomy of the nation-state. In the wake of globalization, people become increasingly concerned about global scale security threats including transnational terrorism, organized crime, and threats to environmental security. The globalization of crime, capital, and power makes every national institution equally vulnerable, and this global condition of security promoted “structural multilateralism” or “multilateral interdependence” in the post-Cold War period (Castells 2004).

The Gulf War, the first common threat to the global community in the post-Cold War period, revealed the growing tendency toward globalization of security. In this new security system, nation-states, including the most powerful nations, are no longer able to control their security decisions purely based on their own interests. Nation-states have to conform to an ever-changing output of interests and negotiations among states (Keohane 2002) or to the growing global norms in the international community, so called “global culture” (Paris 2003). Once the Cold War blocs were dissolved, major international organizations actively support liberal democracy as a new standard of legitimate nationhood and take actions to promote it. However, in this movement, liberal democratic institutions and practices are promoted as the most appropriate model of domestic governance despite the existence of regions that should be rebuilt with non-state political structures to avoid the recurrence of violence. In other words, Western European states

continue to be major legitimate actors in liberal democracy and treated as a model for democratic governance. Post Cold War peacekeeping is a product of the global culture, and the global norms of peacekeeping practices started overriding the existing national security policies and norms within nation-states. The states that used to be financiers of operations but not actors in the field, such as Germany and Japan, could no longer avoid military contribution to international defense missions for the sake of global security. Combined with the expansion of activities in which international peacekeeping forces engage, in many societies, peacekeeping participation created a series of debates on how much unique conditions of each state should be taken into consideration in collective efforts to meet the globalization of security threats.

In the early 1990s, there was a growing concern about the overwhelmingly white and Western dominant peacekeeping troops.<sup>7</sup> In the late 1990s, the troops from non-Western member nations outnumbered the troops from their Western counterparts. Now, as much as 75 percent of UN troops consist of contingents from developing countries (Weerts, et al. 2002).<sup>8</sup> North East Asian nations still constitute only 3.15 percent of the total number of UN troops in 2002; the Japanese contingent represents 60 percent of those Asian troops (1.92 percent of the annual total number of UN troops) (UN Department of Peacekeeping 2002). As the presence of developing nations in peacekeeping operations has become visible, these nations expressed concerns about the

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<sup>7</sup> Europe and Asia-Pacific regions maintain approximately 30 percent of armed forces worldwide respectively. In 1993, however, European nations provided 46 percent of military personnel deployed to UN peace missions, while representation of East Asia and Pacific region was only 9 percent despite the principle of adequate geographic representation of troop contributing nations. This was because domestic and regional situations significantly contributed to limited participation of some Asia-Pacific nations (Blechman and Vaccaro 1994).

<sup>8</sup> For example, as of April 2002, 73.6 percent of UN missions (29 out of 63 nations) consist of soldiers from developing countries.

dominance of Western nations in the administration of UN peacekeeping missions. Developing nations are concerned that Western nations' interests and reliance on their own intelligence sources can undermine the impartiality of peacekeeping operations (Alley 1998).

Reflecting the fact that the majority of peacekeeping forces in the Cold War era consisted of soldiers from Western nations, most studies of peacekeeping have been done by scholars from Western industrialized nations. However, as peacekeeping forces have become increasingly diverse, comparative peacekeeping research plays a significant role to broaden the horizon of contemporary military sociology research, addressing issues in military-to-military relations within multinational or coalition forces deployed to peacekeeping operations (Siebold 2001). On the other hand, Rubinstein (1993; 2003) noted that unique symbols and rituals in peacekeeping are cultural practices that allow diverse military troops to work together in the field. Most researchers have studied peacekeeping and military peacekeepers in an acultural manner while very few studies have found any unified form of culture in international peacekeeping forces. Yet, peacekeepers often need to reinterpret the things taken for granted in their home country, particularly their soldier role for a specific nation-state and peacekeeper role for the UN. Despite the international structure of the peacekeeping force, soldiers assigned to peacekeeping missions do not necessarily become internationalists or develop a unified culture as peacekeepers with their counterparts from other nations (Moskos 1975; Segal 1996). Rather, peacekeepers make sense of their peacekeeping assignments in their own organizational context (Moskos 1975 1976; Segal and Segal 1993a). In a series of studies of American peacekeepers deployed to the Sinai MFO, Segal (2001) notes that the

peacekeeper role is one of many temporal, non-fighting roles that soldiers play. The temporal nature of the assignment prevents soldiers from internalizing the peacekeeper role as a part of their professional identity. The absence of unified culture in international forces suggests that peacekeeping researchers need to pay more attention to the diversity in language, ethnicities, races, military traditions, and other aspects of soldiering among the contingents.

### The Military Profession and Peacekeeping

A profession is an occupation which provides special or “esoteric service” to its clients based on “professed” practical and theoretical knowledge (Hughes 1965). Those who are in professions — professionals — hold “a license to deviate from lay conduct in action and in very mode of thought” in terms of their narrowly focused expertise. And such professional conduct is “an institutionalized deviation, in which there is a certain strain toward clear definition of situations and roles” (Hughes 1965:p.655-656).

Military professionals hold a license to kill enemies for their country, and it provides the military profession with a unique quality and social status. The archetype of today’s professional armed forces emerged in eighteenth century Europe. By then, the officer Corps no longer consisted of members of a feudalistic warrior class or mercenaries. They were replaced by regular employees of the states with stable wages, and made their career by devoting their lives to the state. The professionalization of the officer Corps made it possible to distinguish the military from the civilian in society (Howard 1976). Thereafter the role and the characteristics of the military profession have shifted over time due to political, social, and technological changes. In the twentieth

century, technological developments drastically changed the way the armed forces conduct war. For example, conducting war with “mass armies,” composed of larger numbers of conscripts, was the dominant method of waging war in modern warfare; however, new technologies introduced during WWII made this “mobilization model” obsolete (Segal 1989). The two new technologies, nuclear weapons and airpower, eliminated the time and space gap between the homefront and the battlefield and no longer allow for the involved states to take time to recruit, train, and field their troops (Segal and Gravino 1985). These technological changes were the sign of the emerging change in the nature of the military profession.

As the possibility of total war diminished in the age of deterrence, in the *Professional Soldier*, Janowitz (1960) predicted that the post-total war military would shift from war-fighting military forces to constabulary forces in the process of which military activities would accommodate arms control. Janowitz defined a constabulary force as a military that uses the minimum use of force and maintains a defensive posture, emphasizing constant readiness for deployment to maintain viable international relations rather than pursuing victories of war. A constabulary force is not entirely different from a traditional military force, rather a constabulary force maintains “continuity with past military experiences and traditions” (Janowitz 1960: p.418). It is a deviation as a result of the radical adaptation of the military to historical and social changes. In the constabulary force concept, the boundary between the peacetime and the wartime military establishment diminishes, and it caused a conceptual resemblance between the constabulary military and the police (Janowitz 1960).

For the military as a profession, Janowitz's concept of constabulary force highlighted two potential problems in terms of organizational adaptation to peacekeeping. First, there is an occupational prestige issue regarding the distinctiveness of the profession. Janowitz predicted that the military would face persistent resistance by military personnel because the constabulary concept seems to degrade the role of the military profession to police work, which was considered to be lower in occupational prestige (Janowitz 1960). Second, beyond the loss of occupational prestige, changing the ethos that the organization valued for long time is not an easy task for an organization.

The concept of a "profession" implies advanced education and prestige that entitles individuals in the profession to autonomy (Hughes 1958), and the application of the term profession was limited to very few occupations such as medicine, law, and clergy. Despite the centrality of the military in the development of modern societies,<sup>9</sup> the military profession was added to the list of the professions fairly recently. The military became a profession in the service of the government, and an organization with achievement-based authority (Janowitz 1974). According to Feld (1964), the nature of the military profession separates it from other established professions such as medical doctors, lawyers, and the clergy. Feld argued that professional soldiers have limited levels of autonomy and operate within a stringent institutional structure of the

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<sup>9</sup> In the development process of modern societies, the military is regarded as a central player. From a neo-Marxist perspective, military forces were driving forces of the international expansion of capitalist industrial societies to gain raw materials and of modernization in many developing nations (Segal and Segal 1993ab). From a pragmatic viewpoint, military service is a form of civic education to test one's democratic citizenship rights and obligation embedded in North American and European democratic polity (see Janowitz 1983).



organization. Roles, equipment, and information needed for particular missions are all specifically assigned to soldiers, and behavior and process are prescribed.

In contrast, doctors and lawyers can practice more independently with minimum supervision and a loose affiliation with professional associations that give them credentials to practice their business. Although doctors and lawyers increasingly practice in bureaucratic organizations such as HMOs and large corporate law firms, their credentials still belong to individuals in the profession. In contrast, the military profession keeps its special status as a profession because individuals in the military profession legitimately engage in an otherwise socially prohibited activity – killing enemy combatants — and have secret knowledge about the activity (Hughes 1958). In the military profession, the nobility of the profession is more sensitive to social interests and legitimacy. For this reason, military professionals felt threatened by the constabulary concept that would jeopardize their status as a profession by conflating the peacetime and wartime roles of the military and changing the fundamental definition of the profession.

In a highly institutionalized organization such as the military, the organization often encounters a great deal of resistance when a core value of the organization is subject to change (Zucker 1977). According to Zucker (1977), the degree of institutionalization strongly affects resistance to change in organizational culture: the stronger the institutionalization is, the stronger the cultural uniformity across generations becomes. If the institutionalization is strong, cultural persistence, instead of social control, will enforce the maintenance of organizational culture through interpersonal interactions. This cultural resistance is consistent with Berger and Luckman's (1967) notion of construction of social realities. In their theory, since social realities are

internalized into the individual through one's own subjective life experiences, changes in realities are very difficult once they are shared as organizational knowledge, maintained and passed down from one generation to another. Zucker's (1977) notion of cultural resistance to institutional changes explains the mechanism of resistance of soldiers against transformation to constabulary forces, which Janowitz anticipated in the post total war age. Because of the status dynamism and institutional power, soldiers feel threatened when their core task and skills related to warfighting were devalued or deemphasized in the mission (see Moskos 1976; Segal and Segal 1993a; Frank 1999).

### **The Military Profession and Society**

In terms of the occupational prestige of the military profession, Janowitz described the military profession as a less privileged job in the U.S. (Janowitz 1960). However, compared to Japan, the social status of the military profession in the U.S. is esteemed and prestigious. In Japan, the status of the military profession is far from its American counterparts because of the lack of organizational legitimacy under the Peace Constitution.

The status of a profession or occupation is not about the very nature of the work. Rather, social status of a profession differs from one society to another, depending on social, historical, and cultural contexts and needs. Everett Hughes (1958) defines the term "dirty work" as tasks and occupations that are viewed as physically, socially, or morally stigmatized in society. According to Goffman (1963), stigma is a socially dishonored attribute that is associated with a negative social identity. Dirty work status is a type of stigma in society that is attributed to some occupations. However, dirty work or

stigmatized work is not necessarily a low status occupation.<sup>10</sup> It is a unique status of a certain occupation because all the occupations have dirty work aspects to some extent (Hughes 1958). Dirty work status is the combination of intensity and the social meaning assigned to a certain occupation or a certain tasks.

According to Ashforth and Kreiner (1999), *physically* stigmatized occupations perform their job in physically distasteful environments. They claim that coal miner, farmhand, firefighter, soldiers, and dentist are in this category. *Socially* stigmatized occupations involve regular contact with those who are stigmatized (e.g., Prison guard, AIDS aid worker, police detective, and psychiatric nurses). *Morally* stigmatized occupations are generally viewed as unethical because of their methods of approach (e.g., bill collector, paparazzi, and detectives) or the sinful nature of jobs (e.g., topless dancer, bouncer, and pawnbroker). Many occupations are tainted in multiple dimensions. For example, the military profession in some countries can be tainted in multiple domains (e.g., physical and moral domains), depending on political, historical, and cultural contexts.

The military profession has more than one source of being dirty work. First, as exemplified in Ashforth and Kreiner (1999), soldiers perform their job in a physically dangerous and noxious environment (e.g., fighting in a desert with a full load of gear, wet trench, guerrilla operations in a jungle, and under sleep deprivation). Soldiers are also authorized to engage in socially prohibited conduct, killing enemies in combat.

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<sup>10</sup> I use the term occupation as an umbrella term to represent the categorization of one's work. Profession, in contrast, is a subgroup of occupations that hold the high social status and expertise and knowledge. The role of professionalization and authority status that individuals gained through the process are considered as critical characteristics of the profession (Parsons 1964). The professional organization serves for the benefit of its own members rather than the interests of clients (Hughes 1952).

Compared to other professions, soldiers are also more likely to witness human death and suffering in the line of duty whether they do not engage in combat or not (e.g., humanitarian missions and rescue operations). These aspects of the profession are pragmatically legitimated by fulfilling the needs of the state, while the profession can be considered as socially or morally tainted, or both due to their actual tasks. Hughes (1958) calls the professional knowledge about socially prohibited conducts “guilty knowledge.” This knowledge provides the professions with the license to engage socially prohibited conduct, adds special quality and mystifies their job. These characteristics of military profession serve as exclusive membership and generate a distinctive set of norms. At the same time, the special license to conduct certain activities is routinely under scrutiny: “In the hearts of many laymen there burns a certain aggressive suspicion of all professionals....In some people it flares up into raging and fanatical anger” (Hughes 1958: p.82). The professional may see a situation in a longer, and larger perspective because of their possession of guilty knowledge. However, it can cause the tension between those who provide a service and those who receive it because “the professional mind...appears as a perversion of the common sense of what is urgent and what less urgent. The license to think in longer perspective thus may appear dangerous” (p.84).

Dirty work status does not mean merely possessing a certain characteristic or attribute. It is not a sufficient condition to be stigmatized in society. A certain attribute can be a sufficient condition to be stigmatized only if a negative social meaning is attached to it in the eyes of others (Archer 1985). In this sense, dirty work status is socially constructed (Ashforth and Kreiner 1999) and can change over time.

Most often the traditional professions are viewed as essential in the human community; their job descriptions are believed to be unchanged overtime. In reality, as Morris Janowitz (1964) noted, the professions that are involved in basic human activities and needs would be called by another name that is most suitable to the definition of the profession in a given time in a given society.

“If the human community were ever to free itself of diseases and illness, the world would not be without doctors...Likewise, a world without war would not be a world without soldiers...”(Janowitz 1964: p.11).

In other words, the definition of a profession changes in interactions with non-professional clients and their needs. According to Hughes (1958; 1965), professionals inevitably provide their services to non-professionals in a complex institutional setting. Through interactions with non-professionals, professionals discover different social realities that non-professionals bring in, and build an ethos and a system of rationalizations for appropriate behavior to maintain their positions. In terms of the relationship with clients, Miller (1999) noted an interesting perception of non-military peacekeepers (NGO and humanitarian workers) toward military peacekeepers. In her study, NGO workers were aware of the needs for military peacekeepers in the field to provide security to them, but they described the role of military peacekeepers to “do dirty jobs” for them. NGO workers and military peacekeepers are described as “strange bedfellows,” whose relationships are mostly characterized by mutual avoidance and hostility despite the fact they share similar tasks and limited physical space and resources in the field (Winslow, 2002). The significance of military peacekeepers’ presence and activities is not recognized by NGO workers, and both parties develop stereotypical

images of each other through their limited interactions (Miller, 1999; Pollick, 2000; Winslow, 2002).

For military soldiers, the increasingly overlapping missions with civilian peacekeepers, inability to use force, lack of visibility, and ambiguous criteria of success in peacekeeping increasingly undermine the special qualities of the military profession. Although the special quality of the profession—a license to manage violence including kill enemy combatant for a state — partially contributes to dirty work status of the military profession, it is the major source that provide a special status with the military profession.

Through interactions with the larger society, the military profession and its activities are uniquely defined and appropriated in a given time and in a given society. On one hand, as a widely established profession, military organizations loosely maintain common characteristics of the profession like the membership of a professional association (Avant 2000). On the other hand, despite the organizational goals and structure prescribed by the larger military profession community, military organizations show a surprisingly wide range of operational and cultural differences in response to regulations, norms, and cultural expectations in their host societies. For the same token, organizational adaptation to a new mission —such as peacekeeping — also reflects identity and rules such as ethics and behavioral standards that are consistent with those in their host society. Otherwise, the military will lose its legitimacy in society. Therefore, as Dandeker (1999) argued, organizational adaptation to peacekeeping shall vary depending on the general orientation of national security policy and military ethos valued in the armed forces.

## **Organizational Adaptability to Peacekeeping**

Although a constabulary force and a military force share “past military experiences and traditions,” the adaptation to the organizational environment created the distinctive difference in the nature of organizational practices, and these organizational practices reproduce the organization that is coherent with social norms and cultural values in the larger society. The mechanism of reproducing social structure within the organization will differentiate the organizational adaptability to an organizational change.

Adaptation to peacekeeping as a primary mission is a large-scale organizational change in the post-Cold War military organization; it has been causing a major organizational transformation in structure, behavior, and attitudes in the armed forces contributing troops to peacekeeping missions. Organizational response and experience vary by the amount of pressure that organizations experience and by time and space in the strength of cognitive beliefs or normative controls (Scott 2003). In the organizational operation, an organization needs to conform to social values and the norms that prevail in the institutional environment. Those rules are generated in the institutional environment, namely the state, the world system, and any other social actor that is external to the organization and in higher status in the hierarchy (Thomas and Meyer 1984). Conformity to these external cultural and normative rules plays a key role in long-term organizational survival by controlling the legitimacy that the organization can enjoy. Organizational legitimacy is “a generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions”(Suchman 1995: p.574).


Organizational legitimacy cannot be gained solely by the efforts of the organization. It is given by cultural forces of collective observers— so called “organizational constituents” (Ashforth and Gibbs 1990) or the “social audience” (Suchman 1995) —both of which are external to the organization. In this sense, legitimacy is socially constructed (Suchman 1995). In the process of organizational adaptation to peacekeeping, then how do individual military organizations maintain congruence between the organization and culturally and socially desirable behavior? Otherwise, legitimacy of the organization will decrease, and eventually lose access to the necessary societal resources to survive.

Organizational culture represents shared values and norms providing behavioral and attitudinal standards for organizational members (O’Reilly and Chatman 1996) and provides a specific institutional model of social structure through shared meanings and norms (Smircich 1983; Davis 1984; Meyer, Boli, and Thomas 1994). Shared understanding of who they are —sense of self— and what they should do are developed and maintained among organizational members through sense-making processes in the organization. Through these processes, organizational culture plays a critical role in organizational control and continuity, and embodies the identity of the members (Louis 1983). However, it is often the case that peacekeepers have minimum contact with peacekeepers and civilians outside their own contingent to carry out their assignments in the field (Elron, et al. 2000; Segal and Eyre 1996). As a result, soldiers’ behavior and attitudes are largely subject to the regulations, normative expectations, and culture within the military organization and in the home society. In most cases, there is no unified form of peacekeeping culture (Segal 1996).



Expanding Dandeker's (1999) typology of "adaptability" to peacekeeping, I present three types of armed forces with different organizational adaptability to illustrate the relationship between organizational legitimacy and peacekeeping. For him, adaptability to peacekeeping missions varies depending on the general orientation of national security policy and military ethos valued in the armed forces. Adaptability also can vary among job specialties within the force. Dandeker identified two types of societies, "societies equipped with a pronounced war-fighting ethos" (e.g., United States) and "societies equipped with a moderate war-fighting/national defense centered ethos" (e.g., Canada and the Nordic Nations). To depict new actors in post-Cold War peacekeeping missions, there should be a third type of society, which is equipped with a defense-centered "constabulary" ethos. Building on Dandeker's (Dandeker and Gow 1997; Dandeker 1999) typology of societal adaptation to peacekeeping, I illustrate the relationship between the shift of organizational orientation and military culture of developed countries before and after peacekeeping participation in the post-Cold War

**Figure 2: Military Culture and Adaptation to Peacekeeping**



- A: Society equipped with pronounced military ethos (e.g., United States)
- B: Society equipped with moderate military ethos (e.g., Sweden)
- C: Society equipped with highly constabulary ethos (e.g., Japan and Germany)

period in Figure 2. Figure 2 indicates the change in military culture of troop contributing nations before and after the end of the Cold War. It should be noted that this categorization is merely a starting point for a comparative analysis and is not an attempt to rigidly categorize the change in military culture of any nation.

Societies Equipped with Pronounced Military Ethos

Through participation in post-Cold War peacekeeping missions, societies equipped with pronounced military ethos (indicated A in Figure 2) are shifting down to more constabulary orientations or concerned about demilitarization of the organization due to increasing peacekeeping participation. Soldiers in peacekeeping operations are required to engage more in diplomatic, goal-oriented tasks than any other military

mission despite the fact that warfighting remains the core of beliefs, values, and symbols that form an ideal type of soldier and military culture in the majority of armed forces. Despite the active involvement of the United States in UN peacekeeping operations after the end of the Cold War, the US military tends to regard these missions as distractions from the primary mission of fighting and winning America's wars. The US Army chose to pursue its specialized excellence in combat skills rather than enhance its ability to provide military services in general (Segal and Eyre 1996).

For example, the Army's field manual (FM) 100-5, *Operations*, categorizes peace operations under Chapter 13 "Operations Other Than War." Based on FM100-5, FM100-23 *Peace Operations* (Department of the Army 1994) expanded the spectrum of operations, and specified three types of peace operations including support of diplomacy, peacekeeping, and peace enforcement. Among the three categories, the doctrine places its emphasis on the latter two. This indicates that the concept of American peacekeeping involvement focuses on war-fighting aspects of peace operations. The definition of peace operation in FM100-23 serves as a regulatory description of American peacekeeping.

Beyond such doctrinal guidance, the Army became less involved in specialized training for and deployment to peacekeeping missions due to budget cutting and downsizing in the early 1990s. The broadcasted image of a US soldier's body dragged down the streets of Mogadishu, Somalia in 1993 deeply traumatized American society, and it led the United States to be muted in international peacekeeping missions in the mid and late 1990s. As war-fighting and peacekeeping operations became tightly coupled, the US Army started having trouble adapting to peacekeeping operations. First, although war-fighting oriented soldiers can be good peacekeepers (Moskos 1976; Segal and Segal

1993a), the appropriate role behavior of a soldier is incongruent with appropriate behavior for the peacekeeper role. U.S. combat soldiers who deployed to Macedonia did not believe that they would continue to play the peacekeeper role if Serbian soldiers invaded Macedonia (Miller 1997). For soldiers who are trained to be war fighters, ambiguity of the criteria for a successful mission is another issue in peacekeeping. Despite its success (there has not been a shot fired in anger in the Sinai in two decades), the Sinai MFO has never drawn the attention of the American public except when the tragic air crash in Gander, Newfoundland, in December 1985 killed 248 soldiers heading home from the Sinai (Segal and Segal 1993a). Peacekeeping missions do not draw as much public attention as do large military conflicts (Booth, Kestnbaum, and Segal 2001) so that the social role and the significance of the military may diminish in the public eye. The more successful a peacekeeping mission is, the more invisible it is to the public (Segal and Waldman 1993). There are advantages in both qualitative and quantitative approaches to evaluate the success of a peacekeeping mission, but the measures of success depend on the conceptualization of success, albeit researchers agree that the counterfactual measures (“what if” type assessment) are problematic (Druckman and Stern 1997). The lack of visibility of success in society diminishes psychological rewards and may lead to relative deprivation for service members who are assigned to peacekeeping missions especially in societies equipped with pronounced military ethos.

#### Societies Characterized by Moderate Military Ethos

Societies characterized by moderate military ethos (indicated B in Figure 2) tend to have a long history of peacekeeping participation from the Cold War period, and the organizational orientation of their military is not expected to change. However, the

increasing involvement of major powers in UN peacekeeping operations is threatening their established role in the international community. Canada, the Netherlands, Scandinavian nations, and other nations that comprise the so called middle powers, have been playing an active role in UN peacekeeping from the beginning. Yet, they are struggling with their role in post-Cold War peacekeeping and experiencing maladaptation in the field. Although their military cultures should be well suited to peacekeeping missions, involvement of the United States in post-Cold War peacekeeping led the middle powers to restructure their role in the international community. They used to be the main actors in traditional peacekeeping, and played a central role in the command structure, too.

As the United States started actively being engaged in peacekeeping, the United States expressed reluctance to being under the command of other armed forces in peacekeeping missions. Middle powers maintain that their expertise in peacekeeping missions developed over time, but their expertise and experience have been called into question in post-Cold War peacekeeping.

Maladaptation of peacekeepers from middle powers suggests that it is partially because subcultural differences among different job specialties are problematic to soldiers' adjustment to the peacekeeper role, and partially because second generation or strategic peacekeeping missions require soldiers playing too many contradictory roles at the same time in a chaotic situation characterized by ambiguity between political and military dimensions of UN peacekeeping in the post-Cold War period.

For example, soldiers in the Canadian Airborne Regiment (CAR) tortured and killed a local youth in Somalia in 1994. This incident shook the Canadian Forces and the

entire Canadian society, and consequentially the CAR was deactivated. Researchers conclude that the incident was an inappropriate manifestation of fighting ethos and subculture in the CAR (see Winslow, 1997). However, there is another pattern of malfunction of peacekeeping troops in the field. In July 1995, the Dutch military was accused of allowing a mass slaughter of Bosnian Muslim refugees in Srebrenica. The Dutch military peacekeepers —called *Dutchbat*— deployed to Srebrenica numbered only 200, and *Dutchbat* assisted the Serbs in taking 8,000 Muslim men and boys out of the enclave in order to avoid immediate panic and humanitarian catastrophe, not expecting that the Serbs would kill 7,000 of those men and boys taken from the enclave. It became the worst massacre in the post-World War II history of Europe (The Netherlands Institute of War Documentation 2002).

These incidents suggest that post Cold War peacekeeping requires soldiers to perform too many roles simultaneously in unpredictable mission situations. Peacekeepers have to choose and play the most appropriate role from the peacekeeper role, the soldier role, and the diplomat role. Since situational change is unpredictable and ambiguous, it is significantly confusing and difficult for soldiers to choose the most appropriate operational decision to meet the basic principles of UN peacekeeping. For example, frequent changes in mission objectives make the interpretation of the rules of engagement (ROE) ambiguous. The ROE are the norms and regulations that set standards for the legitimate use of force and for soldiers' behavior so that the ambiguous interpretation of the ROE are a most confusing, frustrating, and demoralizing experience for peacekeepers (Franke 1999).

The Srebrenica incident caused the Dutch Cabinet to resign, and left Dutch society stunned. Dutch soldiers who deployed to Srebrenica suffered psychological difficulties due to their experience and unexpected consequences in Srebrenica. The media harshly criticized the error made by *Dutchbat* in that the Dutch soldiers did not fight back in the situation in which soldiers from other nations would have fought following the same rules of engagement (ROE).<sup>11</sup> However, it is also worth pointing out that there are a number of ways of interpreting the same ROE in different national contexts (Franke 1999). It is not surprising that one country with a pronounced military posture will carry out ROE proactively, and another country with a pacifist posture will set a restrictive interpretation of ROE (Hill 2002). Peacekeepers' behavior is greatly affected by a wider institutional environment surrounding the military, such as security policies, public opinion, and cultural norms of using force in the host society. The high profile maladaptation cases of middle power peacekeepers demonstrated that the increasing complexities in recent peacekeeping missions make peacekeeping assignments more than a temporary, non-military role that soldiers can play with a minor adjustment of their soldier role and behavioral pattern attached to it.

#### Societies Characterized by a Constabulary Ethos

Societies characterized by a constabulary ethos (indicated C in Figure 2) include Germany, Japan, and other societies with highly constabulary ethics and anti-military cultures. The transformation of UN peacekeeping after the end of the Cold War made Germany and Japan, the ex-axis nations which had maintained low-profiles in military affairs, contribute their military manpower to UN peacekeeping missions as a part of

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<sup>11</sup> At the same time, there has been skepticism in Dutch Society that *Dutchbat* had somewhat helped with the massacre by letting the Serbian Army take male Muslim refugees.

burden sharing as state actors in global politics. The organizational transition due to participating in peacekeeping in the 1990s is not only uni-directional from a military force to a constabulary force, as we see in the cases of Germany and Japan. Post-WWII Japan and Germany have shared the fundamental posture regarding national security policy that taking military action is strictly constrained. Germany and Japan, however, chose different strategies in redirecting their national security policies in the post WW II period, although the two nations commonly place international organizations and their policies as the core value in their national security policies.

The main missions of the *Bundeswehr* (the German armed forces) during the Cold War period were area-specific missions to contribute to the common defense of NATO, and particularly its own territory. The German armed forces were not authorized to participate in out of area operations. Reflecting geographic proximity to neighboring nations and membership in international communities such as the European Union, NATO, and the United Nations, Germany has a global perspective toward national security, unlike Japan. International organizations are highly regarded in German politics, and the German public is favorable to government policies that are consistent with policies of international organizations. German security policy is never to take military action except as a part of the Alliance or being with partners, but not using the *Bundeswehr* alone (Fleckenstein 2000). After Unification, the National People's Army of the former German Democratic Republic was integrated into the *Bundeswehr*. In 1996 the *Bundeswehr* established the crisis-reaction force, which can be mobilized for peacekeeping missions. It consists of more than 50,000 troops, approximately 16 percent of the entire German armed forces. This new structure significantly improved the



deployability of the *Bundeswehr* (The Economist 1995; Fleckenstein 2000). As the *Bundeswehr* becomes an international intervention force, Germany escapes from her uniquely subordinate role within the western military alliance (The Economist 1996).

In Germany and Japan, unlike the United States, peacekeeping has drawn public attention to national security and military affairs more than ever in the post-Cold War world. Despite the remaining resistance and cautious utilization of military troops for peacekeeping missions overseas, military institutions in Germany and Japan have been moving from peripheral to a more central place in society. One of the concerns surrounding oversea deployment by Japan for international peacekeeping is its remilitarization. Some researchers expressed their concerns and studied national security issues in contemporary Japan from an assumption that a nation-state normally strives to develop military capability equivalent to its economic power (see Berger 1993; Hook 1996; Drifte 2000). While such a macro-organizational issue remains a dominant concern, only few studies (Kawano 2001 2002; Ohi 1999) have been conducted on micro-organizational level issues associated with Japanese peacekeeping, albeit organizational changes will not take place without any change in dynamics at a micro-organizational level.

In contemporary Japan and Germany, there are very strong influences of societal history on contemporary cultural norms about use of military power. German peacekeepers may feel stress reflecting the host society's mixed opinion about international peacekeeping operations (Kornhuber 1994, cited in Britt 1998), and the same logic may be applied to Japanese peacekeepers. In Japan, social and legal norms play a special role as the main determinants of national security policies; domestic

institutionalized norms are more influential than the international balance of power in the political decision making process on national security issues (Katzenstein 1996).

Regulative constraints by Article 9 of the Constitution and deeply rooted anti-militaristic norms are the institutional rules that contemporary Japanese armed forces have been dealing with since their inception. Specifically for Germany and Japan, the regional history and the remaining fear of remilitarizations of these ex-Axis nations may affect peacekeepers' attitudes. Since the Japanese government is very sensitive about reactions from other Asian nations, attitudes of other Asian nations toward Japanese peacekeeping participation will continue to affect Japan's policies on peacekeeping participation. Neighboring Asian nations are concerned about Japan's remilitarization because of the brutal treatment these nations had to go through during the Japanese occupation in World War II. This collective memory of Japanese militarism keeps neighboring nations skeptical about Japanese overseas deployment to peacekeeping operations. The impact of these macro social and historical contexts may be subtle, but the contextual effect is critical to certain nations' contingents when serving a mission in a specific region.

### **Organizational Legitimacy and Peacekeeping**

As peacekeeping increased its importance as a military mission, researchers quickly became aware that traditional theories, which assume social structure is given, are not sufficient to analyze the changing nature of peacekeeping. It motivated military sociologists to study adaptation to peacekeeping as a social process (Segal, Segal, and Eyre 1992). Regardless of the theoretical robustness and explanatory power of the classic

theories (e.g., structural functional theory, conflict theory, and Weber's theory of bureaucracy) (see Segal and Segal 1993b), peacekeeping research reveals that the theories assuming static social structure have limited explanatory power to examine social processes related to contemporary military organizations.

To this theoretical inquiry, Segal and his colleagues (Segal, Segal, and Eyre 1992; Eyre, Segal, and Segal 1993) provided an answer by applying Berger and Luckmann's (1966) social constructionist perspective in their research on American peacekeepers. Segal's research articulated the social process in which the role of peacekeepers and peacekeeping missions are defined and redefined through various social actors in American society including policy makers, the media, soldiers, and their family members. His perspective embraces the significance of "organizational constituents" (Ashfort and Gibbs 1990) and "social audience" (Suchman 1995) in the formation of organizational legitimacy. They are agents of "convention" and "its validity is externally guaranteed by the probability that deviation from it within a given social group will result in a relatively general and practically significant reaction of disapproval" (Weber, 1924[1947]: p.127). For this reason, in the process of introducing a new task that contradicts the existing operations and organizational goals, a professional organization cannot ignore the external force that controls the deviation from cultural expectations in the larger society.

According to Suchman (1995), organizational legitimacy is a general view that an organization meets socially constructed norms, values, and beliefs in its operations. For him, organizational legitimacy plays a significant role in conformity to cultural norms, symbols, beliefs, and rituals in the organizational environment (Weber, 1924[1947]; Suchman, 1995).

Legitimacy equips organizations with ‘persistence’ and ‘meaning’ and brings them stability and credibility. However, since organizational activities themselves cannot provide ‘stability’ and ‘credibility’ to organizations, organizations seek legitimacy that is given by collective observers (Perrow 1970; Ashforth and Gibbs 1990; Suchman 1995). Once collective observers recognize and support the legitimacy of an organization, the organization starts the process of trust building. The organization replicates itself and builds trust and the meaning of certain institutionalized activities using the resources given by the observers. In this process, legitimacy influences how people understand organizations (Suchman 1995). As institutions are socially constructed archetypes for action, generated and maintained through interactions (Zucker 1977; Meyer and Rowan 1977, Scott, et al. 2000), so is legitimacy also socially constructed as a core component of institutions. More precisely, the process of building legitimacy —legitimation— is a synonym to institutionalization processes in that institutions provide meanings and taken-for-grantedness to every aspect of an organization (Suchman 1995). Suchman (1995) further elaborated the collective mechanism of organizational legitimacy. For him, legitimacy is shaped subjectively and sustained objectively through observers’ eyes to the organization. It also echoes consistency between the behavior of the legitimated organization and the shared belief of collective observers.

This collective mechanism of legitimacy suggests that legitimacy is a lifeline for organizations to survive in social systems in which they are embedded. Organizations that fail to gain and maintain legitimacy in their activities are less likely to survive because observers no longer find the organization as worth existing (Meyer and Rowan 1977). However, not every organization needs external support to the same degree. The

degree of necessity for legitimacy varies depending on what support an organization seeks: passive support or active support. Passive support is associated with sense making when an organization just needs to make sense out of a particular activity. In that case, an organization sets a low standard of legitimacy given by observers. Passive support requires a cultural-cognitive component of legitimacy while active support requires an evaluative and normative component of legitimacy (Suchman 1995).

There are also different types of legitimacy that organizations can gain, maintain, and lose. Scott et al (2000) identified three dimensions of legitimacy based on his three pillars of institutions (Scott 1995): regulative, normative, and cultural-cognitive structures. His typology is consistent with Weber's notion of organization and legitimacy in the association between social action and an order (*ordnung*). According to Weber ([1924]1947), organizations are considered to be legitimate to the extent that they conform to an order set by "law" (regulative legitimacy), "ethics" (normative legitimacy), and "conventions" (cultural legitimacy).

*Regulative legitimacy* emphasizes conformity to legal rules, and legal sanction such as rewards and penalties. Legitimacy, in this sense, is legally sanctioned behavior (Scott, et al. 2000). Law coercively regulates and constrains one's behavior while it provides conformity to collective ideologies shared in society. Paying close attention to conformity to collective values, Suchman (1995) developed the concept of pragmatic legitimacy as a regulative legitimacy, focusing on the function of regulative legitimacy in as social group. Pragmatic legitimacy is driven by the self-interests of most immediate observers of an organization. Self-interest based pragmatic legitimacy plays an important

role in conformity to legal rules because rules ultimately serve the collective interests in society.

The second type of legitimacy, *normative legitimacy*, emphasizes normative affirmation for the organization and its activities (Suchman 1995; Scott, et al. 2000). Moral appropriateness of behavior is evaluated by the degree of internalization and compliance of collectively shared value systems in society. Normative rules bring values and norms into our organizational life, and at the same time, regulate our behavior as social obligation through role performance. Parsons (1956) argued that organizations conform to normative pressure to verify that the goals of their activities are coherent with general societal values in society. Organizations are also compelled to develop their procedures and structures in a way that they are coherent with the general societal values, and they become isomorphic with their institutional environments (Meyer and Rowan, 1977). Although isomorphic transformation helps an organization to survive in institutional environment, it does not always improve organizational efficiency (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983).

In contrast, *cultural legitimacy* emphasizes consistency with taken-for-granted behavior, and cultural legitimacy is a representation of social structure (Scott et al. 2000). Institutional environments provide the archetypes of social roles and behavioral rules and socially construct individual and collective social actors. These cultural rules regulate and evaluate our behavior based on their taken for grantedness. Institutionalized rules are not designed to pursue efficiency in organizational activities, but they are rational ways of combining procedure and practice. By becoming isomorphic with other organizations in identical institutional environments, organizations can gain the legitimacy and resources

to survive (Meyer and Rowan 1977). In this process, organizations ritually adopt institutionalized rules, including structure, institutionalized products, services, techniques, policies, and programs, and they gain conformity and membership with other organizations.

Although no organization can completely satisfy all observers (Suchman 1995), the multi-modality of legitimacy offers the organization and management a great deal of flexibility to manage legitimacy (Oliver 1991). In terms of management of legitimacy, Suchman (1995) emphasized the relationship between the organization and the institutional environment. In contrast, Ashforth and Gibbs (1990) argued that the conditions under which the means of legitimation succeed to gain legitimacy or fail to do so are critical in the management of legitimacy.

They proposed two more inclusive strategies of legitimation: substantive management and symbolic management (See Table 1). Substantive management attempts to gain legitimacy by “real, material change in organizational goals, structures, and process or socially institutionalized practices” (Ashforth and Gibbs 1990: p.178). There are four primary strategies in substantive management: (a) role performance; (b) coercive isomorphism, (c) Altering resource dependencies; (d) Altering socially institutionalized practices. Another legitimation strategy is symbolic management. The goal of symbolic management strategies is to transform the meaning of acts without making any substantive change in organizational goals, organizational structures, and operational processes by (a) espousing socially acceptable goals; (b) denial and concealment; (c) redefining means and ends; (d) offering accounts; (e) offering

**Table 1: Two Types of Legitimation Strategies**

<b>1. Substantive Management Strategies</b>	
Role Performance	The organization may gain legitimacy from the constituents by fulfilling their performance expectations (e.g., “providing a good return on shareholder’s equity”).
Coercive Isomorphism	DiMaggio and Powell (1983) suggest that the organization may gain legitimacy by adopting organizational design that conforms to the values, norms, and expectations of the constituents. It shows “the willingness and ability” to meet expectations.
Altering Resource Dependencies	To gain legitimacy, the organization may change the combination and level of resource dependence upon its constituents. This strategy will eventually alter the expectations of the constituents.
Altering Social Institutionalized Practices	The organization may introduce the existing regulations, social mores, and other “socially institutionalized practices” to accomplish goals through preferable means (e.g., Tobacco industry’s Champaign ads and funding on health and smoking).
<b>2. Symbolic Management Strategies</b>	
Espousing Socially Acceptable Goals	The organization may gain legitimacy by embracing socially desirable goals even though its real goals are still less socially desirable ones.
Denial and Concealment	The organization can hide or deny certain information about organizational activities that decrease legitimacy.
Redefining Means and Ends	The organization can reinterpret its history and redefine the meaning of its strategies and goals to meet the present social values.
Offering Accounts	Using “excuses” and “justification,” the organization can provide accounts on their behavior and allocate its responsibility in a desirable way to secure legitimacy.
Offering Apologies	By acknowledging responsibility for a negative event, the organization may minimize damage of losing legitimacy.
Ceremonial Conformity	Derived from Meyer and Rowan’s (1977 1978) concept, the organization can demonstrate conformity to the expectations of its constituents without making substantial changes.

Source: Ashforth and Gibbs 1990 (p.178-179).



apologies; (f) ceremonial conformity (p.178-179).

However, these strategies are not mutually exclusive. The boundary between substantive management strategies and symbolic management strategies is ambiguous. For example, coercive isomorphism (substantive management) and ceremonial conformity (symbolic management) resemble each other, but the latter exclusively focuses on its symbolic qualities. The more symbolic strategies become integrative parts of the culture, the more ambiguous the boundary may become. It is possible that a substantive management strategy can transform into a symbolic management strategy over time (Ashforth and Gibbs 1990).

Legitimation strategies differ when the nature of the challenge is performance-related or value-related (Ashforth and Gibbs 1990). For example, the incident in Somalia made the Canadian Forces defend its legitimacy, and eventually closed the Airborne Regiment to save the organization. In this case, Canadian society has no issues with sending troops to peacekeeping, but the troops failed to meet the performance expectation by torturing a local young man to death. In the case of the Canadian Forces, the issue was a performance challenge. The larger society accepts the concept of peacekeeping, but the troops failed to fulfill expectations. In this case, the organization solves the legitimation issue using substantive management strategies. In Japan, on the other hand, peacekeeping participation has evoked skepticism and criticism toward credibility of the SDF as a violation of the social values in society. There is a pragmatic need for sending troops to international peacekeeping missions in society, but there is limited cultural support. In the case of value challenge, the organization needs to meet the expectations of the constituents by using combinations of different symbolic management strategies.

In management of legitimacy, the purpose of legitimation shapes the overall dynamics of legitimation. The purpose of legitimation —extend, maintain, and defend— is the key determinant of the legitimation dynamics (Ashforth and Gibbs 1990). Each of the three phases has unique characteristics of legitimation process depending on the problematic nature of legitimacy, scrutiny by collective observers, and intensity of legitimation activities.

*Extending legitimacy* becomes a goal of legitimation when “the organization is becoming established or is entering a new domain of activity or utilizing new structures or processes” (Ashforth and Gibbs 1990). Because of its high activity and newness, the organization in extending legitimacy receives considerable attention, and become a target of intense public scrutiny. To win the trust of the constituents, the strategies to extend legitimacy should be intense, proactive to gain legitimacy.

*Maintaining legitimacy* occurs when the organization has achieved “a threshold of endorsement sufficient for ongoing activity” (Ashforth and Gibbs 1990: p.182). In the organization that is maintaining legitimacy, there is no problem in legitimacy. For the same reason, public scrutiny and intensity of legitimation activities are both low. Using both substantial and symbolic management strategies, the organization engages in legitimation activities in a routine manner.

*Defending legitimacy* occurs when the organization’s very legitimacy is threatened or legitimacy is problematic. To defend legitimacy, the organization almost exclusively engages in symbolic management to avoid threats. Legitimation activities, in this case, are more intense but reactive (Ashforth and Gibbs 1990).

In terms of peacekeeping participation, the purpose of legitimation changes over time within the force, and varies from one armed force to another (e.g., The Fijian armed forces send troops to earn foreign currency while Germany send troops as a part of its NATO missions). In the peacekeeping mission, armed forces need to extend legitimacy in order to enter a new domain of the mission and adjust the force structure or deployment processes. At the same time, armed forces maintain the existing organizational legitimacy to prove that role performance of the organization is not disrupted by a new mission and that legitimacy is not threatened.

Despite a wide variety of strategies available to an organization, the organization needs special caution when it protests its legitimacy. The harder the organization protests its legitimacy, the less legitimacy it may gain. Since the need of legitimacy is greater in an organization with low legitimacy, the constituents tend to find the protest “self-serving” and “manipulative.” The organization may be viewed as a “clumsy actor,” “nervous actor,” or “overacting actor” by the constituents and jeopardize its legitimacy. The organization loses its legitimacy by “protesting too much” (Ashforth and Gibbs 1990: p.187). The harder the organization tries to get out the situation, the deeper it sinks. It is like quicksand for the organization in need of legitimation. Ashforth and Gibbs (1990) describe this chain reaction of decreasing legitimacy as “a vicious circle of legitimation” Organization legitimacy is an essential resource to organizational survival, but it is also a double-edged sword. The process of appealing legitimacy greatly matters to organizational survival.

## **Role Conflict and Identity Tension in Peacekeeping**

Since the early stage of UN peacekeeping, role conflict and identity issues have been repeatedly identified as one of the most important issues in the peacekeeping literature. In the simplest term, peacekeeping is viewed as a mission that may undermine the status of the military profession. For working adults, one's profession represents the ideal of his or her work. It shapes one's social identity, and ultimately of self (Hughes, 1951; 1958). Therefore, something that may undermine the status of one's profession can significantly impact one's identity and self.

Identities are the sets of socially constructed meanings that define who we are as persons, as role occupants, and as group members (Stryker 1980; Burke 2004). Although roles and identities are separate entities, they are inseparable in one's self process. As a person plays multiple social roles in his or her social life, the person can have multiple identities. Identities come with normative expectations for appropriate role behavior that lead the self to behave in a certain way in a specific social setting (Thoits 1983). Role conflict arises when incongruity or incompatibility of the expectations associated with a role emerges (Rizzo, et al. 1970).

In organizational settings, role conflicts have negative impacts on job satisfaction, physiological stress, and higher tension in work places (Sutherland and Cooper 1988). In peacekeeping, incongruence between the soldier role and the peacekeeper role is manifested in various stressors such as boredom (Harris and Segal 1985), sense of underutilization, cultural deprivation, lack of privacy, isolation, frustration, and powerlessness (Segal and Segal 1993a; Britt 1998; Bartone, et al. 1998). Among these stressors, boredom and frustration with being underutilized are severe in peacekeeping

and closely related to the professional identity of soldiers and affect their attitudes toward peacekeeping.

Within one's mind, an individual prioritizes multiple identities associated with his/her roles, which Stryker (1980) calls identity salience. Although for soldiers professional identity (a soldier identity) is not always the most salient among other identities (Woodruff 2003), the professional identity is generally a major component of self-definition because organizational members are often identified by their occupations and act upon their occupational roles (Van Maanen and Barley 1984).

Following the premises of social identity theory, in the relationship with one's immediate social environment, an individual classifies him/herself and others into various social categories such as nationality, ethnicity, gender, religious affiliations, and occupations. This social categorization provides a certain systemic order to one's social world and the basis of 'self reference' by defining one's place in society (Tajfel and Turner 1986). In contemporary social life, however, most adults play more than one social role, but plurality of one's roles is the very source of role conflict. In the military profession, the prescribed roles of peacekeeper and soldiers are conflicting, but soldiers are often required to play both roles. As a result, soldiers may not adopt the role of peacekeeper into their identity domain although soldiers become experienced and skillful in managing tasks in peacekeeping missions (Britt 1998). If a social role that an individual plays is not congruent with normative rules of appropriate behavior prescribed by one's salient identity, role conflict can heighten identity tension.

Previous literature has consistently reported that peacekeepers generally comply with constabulary norms and perform well in the field (see Moskos 1975 1976; Segal and

Segal 1993a; Miller and Moskos 1995), while role conflict between the war-fighter role and peacekeeper role is troublesome for soldiers. For instance, American peacekeepers value the basic norms of peacekeeping, but their overall attitudes toward peacekeeping are still mixed because of the remaining ambiguity and conflict in the definition of peacekeeping (Segal and Tiggler 1997). In his *Peace Soldiers*, Moskos (1976) studied the contradictory role of peacekeepers in the field and raised Janowitz's question about the military profession, whether or not peacekeeping would alter military socialization processes and lead military organization in a constabulary direction. Using a triangulation method including participant observation, in-depth interviews, and surveys with soldiers from seven nations assigned to the United Nations Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), Moskos (1976) concluded that military personnel could adjust to their new constabulary missions applying their conventional military professionalism in order to manage the contradictory situations in peacekeeping. Moskos illustrated several incidents in which UN peacekeepers came under fire and lost their lives in UNFICYP and other UN peacekeeping missions in the Middle East. It is clear that contradictory situations for peacekeepers between their soldier role and their peacekeeper role have been persistent throughout the history of UN peacekeeping. Then UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld admitted the inherently confusing nature of UN peacekeeping and military peacekeepers' role noting that "peacekeeping is not a soldier's job, but only a soldier can do it" (Lewis 1992). This phrase symbolically illustrates the conflicting nature of peacekeeping as a military mission.

Since the 1980s Segal and his associates have been studying American soldiers' attitudes toward the constabulary nature of peacekeeping operations collecting data from

US Army soldiers deployed to the Sinai Multinational Force and Observers (MFO). The Sinai MFO was to buffer Egypt and Israel on the Sinai Peninsula after they signed the Camp David Accords in 1979. The Sinai MFO is a long-standing mission to which the United States has been contributing military troops for decades (Segal and Segal 1993a).<sup>12</sup>

A series of Segal's research (Harris and Segal 1975; Segal and Segal 1993a) illustrate the effect of boredom on soldiers' psychological states during peacekeeping deployment. American riflemen standing guard in the Sinai rarely saw human beings except their own squad members throughout the course of deployment. They were isolated, bored, and underutilized their skills. As well as riflemen, medics felt in the same way: they did not have a chance to maintain their skills because they did not treat as many patients as they expected. In traditional peacekeeping, monotonous routines tend to continue throughout the deployment, but the professional training or experience of American troops does not teach them how to deal with monotonous, boring everyday life as a part of their soldier role. In the quiet and less stimulating mission environment, American paratroopers in the Sinai MFO significantly lost their interest and excitement in their assignment over time (pre-deployment: 87 percent; middle of deployment: 57 percent) (Segal and Segal 1993a).

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<sup>12</sup> During the Cold War period, the United States was not engaged in UN peacekeeping missions to maintain the political impartiality of peacekeeping, albeit the US has made a great contribution in a peace operation, not under UN auspices- the Sinai Multinational Force and Observers (MFO). Since the 1970s Segal and his associates have collected data from soldiers who deployed to the Sinai MFO for decades and covered topics ranging from the impact of peacekeeping missions on soldiers' stress symptoms, morale, psychological adjustment process, to its organizational impact such as retention rate and readjustment upon return.

Segal and Segal (1993a) also reported relative deprivation among peacekeepers. Serving in a peaceful peacekeeping mission seems to be universally boring, but what makes peacekeepers bored is also socially constructed. For peacekeepers who served as combat soldiers in their homeland and kept busy schedules of training and exercises in garrison, monotonous routines in traditional peacekeeping are boring in contrast with their active life style back home. Even for American soldiers without combat experience, they feel underutilized because they felt that their skills and knowledge gained in combat training back home were wasted. These results suggest that soldiers understand what they should do through their personal experiences, not through prescribed description of what peacekeeping is and what peacekeepers should do.

Role conflict questions the identity of soldiers and confuses one's adequate behavioral choice to fulfill the role, and consequentially increases psychological distress.<sup>13</sup> In North American and European armed forces, using military presence as a vehicle is often contradictory to the traditional military profession and soldiers' professional identity. As a result, role conflict between the peacekeeper role and war-fighter role often causes not only attitudinal changes but also psychological distress among peacekeepers (see Bartone, et al. 1998; Britt 1998; Franke 1999).

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<sup>13</sup> In sociological stress theory, stress is viewed as a systematic consequence of social arrangements, not merely an intrapsychological process (Aneshensel, et al. 1991; Pearlin 1999). Stress arises from discrepancies between living conditions and the individual's characteristics including personal needs, values, perceptions, resources, and skills (Aneshensel 1992). One's position in a work organization is one of social arrangements that individuals live with in their daily life. In our social life, roles inform us about broader social organizations as well as the individual's behavior in terms of the psychological consequences of structural arrangements. Because people are socialized and build their value system in their roles (Pearlin 1989), the same role may not affect different groups of people to the same extent. In peacekeeping context, peacekeepers from different social and cultural groups may take peacekeeper role differently and can be vulnerable to different sources of stresses.



Although it is very important for soldiers to integrate the peacekeeper role into their identity (Britt 1998), numbers of sources of ambiguity in current peacekeeping make it more difficult for soldiers to do so. The following aspects of issues can be sources of ambiguity in the field: unclear rules of engagement (ROE) for self defense, lack of proper training, restricted autonomous acts against threat and danger, unclear criteria for successful peacekeeping, and legitimacy of the relationship between peacekeeper role and soldier identity (Britt 1998). At the organizational level, mission ambiguity causes confusing command structure, unstable mission environment, and unclear goals of the mission; at the individual level, it leads peacekeepers to experience *role ambiguity*. Role ambiguity is the degree to which clear information is lacking with regard to the expectations related to a social role (Rizzo, et al. 1970). Role ambiguity decreases job performance and increases job dissatisfaction and intention to leave the job (Sutherland and Cooper 1988). The limited use of force also becomes a constraint and increases the sense of helplessness for those who are trained to fight against a hostile enemy. Research findings have consistently shown that peacekeepers felt frustrated (Johansson 1997; Bartone, et al. 1998) and helpless (Ward 1997) with the restricted use of force in peacekeeping missions.

Wicks (2002) conducted a case study of the 1992 Westray mine explosion in Nova Scotia, Canada, to study these institutional bases of identity among the coal miners, and how gender identity become more salient among them, let them continue hazardous behavior in the mine operations, and eventually lost 26 miners in the accident. Applying Castells's (2004) concept of "legitimizing identity" (p.8), Wicks (2002) stresses the power of dominant institutions in society over one's identity formation and how it

legitimize one's social behavior in organizations. In adaptation to peacekeeping, a certain identity that nation-states legitimize demands peacekeepers to manage the two increasingly incongruent roles: the soldier role and the peacekeeper role.

### Soldiers' Attitudes toward Peacekeeping

In addition to professional identity, soldiers' attitudes toward the mission, their job, and the organization are affected by peacekeeping deployment experience. Segal et al. (1984) found that Army paratroopers performed well in the mission, while the troops increasingly felt that the mission was not appropriate for them because it did not require special skills in the field. Their feeling that a peacekeeping assignment is positive in career development also diminished over time. Using the same data, although most paratroopers felt bored by the assignment in the Sinai (Segal and Gravino 1985; Harris and Segal 1985), Segal and Meeker (1985) found that the stronger the perceived benefit of peacekeeping to their career, the smoother paratroopers' adaptation became. They also found that a certain aspect of military professionalism (obedience to orders) was another key factor determining peacekeepers' attitudes toward peacekeeping and their adaptation. These two studies (Segal, et al. 1984; Segal and Meeker 1985) did not find any inverse relationship between combat orientation and attitudes toward peacekeeping missions while soldiers deployed to peacekeeping missions developed a complex view of peacekeeping and other military mission through their firsthand mission experience.

In a study of American reserve soldiers deployed to the Sinai MFO, Segal and Tiggel (1997) found surprisingly little difference in attitudes between reserve soldiers and active-duty soldiers. Although American soldiers do not wholly reject the constabulary

role, their data support Janowitz's expectation that American soldiers would resist the constabulary role and missions (Segal, Reed, and Rohall 1998).

In a study of Italian peacekeepers deployed to Albania and Somalia, Battistelli (1997) found that professional soldiers motivated by economic considerations were not satisfied with the mission compared to the soldiers who are motivated with altruistic causes and the desire for new personal experience, while draftees did not differ in their degree of satisfaction based on motivations. Battistelli (1997) suggested that this may be because the reference group of professional soldiers is their civilian counterparts who earn equal or more income without hardship or risks in the field. These findings show that soldiers' attitudes toward peacekeeping depend on job specialties, active-reserve status, and nationalities.

#### Research on Japanese Peacekeepers

There have been a number of studies of peacekeepers from societies equipped with pronounced military ethos and moderate military ethos while there are very few studies of peacekeepers from societies equipped with a constabulary ethos, namely Germany and Japan. Because of limited organizational cooperation with academic research on the SDF, there have been very few academic studies of Japanese peacekeepers.<sup>14</sup> All of these studies have been conducted by in-house researchers in the Defense Agency and SDF officers at post-graduate programs at the Defense Academy. One of the most important findings in these studies is that unlike North American and most European peacekeepers, Japanese peacekeepers show high levels of satisfaction and

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<sup>14</sup> The Defense Agency and Japanese academics have not developed friendly relationships. Regarding the current research environment of Japanese military sociology, see Kurashina (2003).

positive attitudes toward the mission in traditional peacekeeping operations. Kawano (2001; 2002) collected survey data from 618 former SDF peacekeepers deployed to Cambodia, Mozambique, and the Golan Heights. Approximately 74.8 percent of respondents agreed that the peacekeeping operation in which they participated was more interesting than their domestic missions. More than 80 percent of respondents valued peacekeeping missions higher than their domestic missions. Only 8.3 percent felt bored in their peacekeeping assignment even though Japanese peacekeepers only deployed to places where the security condition was relatively stable such as Cambodia, Mozambique, and the Golan Heights. The assignments in these missions were limited to logistics, engineering, and other support jobs. These results suggest the difference in socialization and organizational orientation between a military force and a constabulary force and interesting dynamics of identity among members of a constabulary force.

A study shows that Japanese peacekeepers place their priority on the missions that could directly contribute to Japanese citizens' interests. Despite the similarity in mission characteristics between international humanitarian aid missions and domestic disaster relief missions, domestic disaster relief missions are perceived as more important because the beneficiary is Japanese people (Ohi 1999). This result is consistent with Kawano's (2002) finding that Japanese peacekeepers perceived that peacekeeping is a good training opportunity for Defense Act (*bouei shutsudou*) for territorial defense against invasion of an enemy. This result suggests the domestic mission-oriented attitude among Japanese service members. Japanese peacekeepers are willing to deploy to peacekeeping operations and humanitarian aid missions overseas if participation in those missions can contribute to societal benefits.

Researchers also have found a generational gap in peacekeepers' attitudes toward the mission. Organization-centered attitudes among Japanese peacekeepers were not always dominant across generations or rank (Ohi 1999; Kawano 2001). According to Kawano (2001), the younger peacekeepers tend to see more materialistic and individualistic aspects of deployment as their motivation and perceived rewards in their peacekeeping experience. Regarding the motivation for deployment, peacekeepers in their 20s showed individualistic reasons as their primary motivation, such as "challenge to a new mission," "adventure and curiosity (about foreign countries)," and "challenging my own abilities." On the other hand, peacekeepers in their 40s showed more altruistic motivations as well as individualistic motivations. Peacekeepers over 40 years old were motivated to participate in peacekeeping because they would like to "contribute to world peace" and "improve the image of Japan." Differences in deployment motivation should be further examined as an intervening variable between social disposition of SDF members and their attitudes toward peacekeeping.

Mission satisfaction among Japanese peacekeepers is another noteworthy aspect of their adaptation to peacekeeping deployment. All the studies show that Japanese peacekeepers are highly satisfied with their peacekeeping deployment (Ohi 1999; Satoh 2001; Kawano 2001). Ohi's (1999)<sup>15</sup> research on sense of mission and attitudes among Japanese peacekeepers deployed to the United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ) argued that the present situation can be viewed as a better and relatively satisfactory situation if Japanese peacekeepers are old enough to personally experience

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<sup>15</sup> Ohi (1999) used three different data sources for his research. He conducted a self-administered survey with 136 former peacekeepers, and gained a 73.5 percent response rate (100 respondents). He also did in-depth interviews with 11 former peacekeepers and used diaries from a few interviewees for his analysis.

negative attitudes of the general public toward the SDF. Ohi found that peacekeepers also evaluated their present situation as unsatisfactory when their reference group was other armed forces that possess higher social status and receive sufficient support and respect from their people. Kawano's (2001) findings suggest a complex structure of Japanese peacekeepers' mission satisfaction. Although Japanese service members claim that they are a "half-baked" military (Frühstück and Ben-Ari 2002), nearly 48.7 percent of the respondents thought that the SDF had better or the same capability compared to other contingents. Some of the respondents in Kawano's (2001) study expressed their mixed feeling that they were proud of their superiorities in equipment, technology, and discipline, but admitted that they lacked combat readiness. For example, compared to French soldiers, JSDF members deployed to UNTAC in Cambodia did not adequately react to a possible armed attack. On the other hand, some peacekeepers thought that peacekeeping was a great opportunity for them to reappraise the wealth and safety of Japan.

Ohi (1999) found differences in perceived value among peacekeepers from different socialization backgrounds in their professional life. Officers valued territorial defense oriented more than constabulary missions such as disaster relief and peacekeeping, compared to Non-Commissioned officers (NCOs). Among officers, National Defense Academy graduates valued territorial defense related missions more than did civilian university graduates. This result might reflect the socialization process of National Defense Academy graduates as military professionals which started their career much earlier than officers who graduated from civilian universities. Reference

groups in the socialization process of National Defense Academy graduates might be traditional military officers such as American military officers.

Regarding the internal construct of mission satisfaction among Japanese peacekeepers, Satoh (2001) used Kawano's survey data and analyzed satisfaction and dissatisfaction factors in perceived mission experience. Satoh (2001) tested Herzberg's (1966) model of the relationship between perceived job environments and satisfaction and motivation. Herzberg (1966) identified satisfaction factors and dissatisfaction factors in perceived mission environments, and suggested that perceived mission environments are strongly associated with job satisfaction, while dissatisfaction factors would not improve job satisfaction if they were reduced. In Satoh's (2001) research, it is worthwhile noting that satisfaction factors showed strong correlations with both personal and organization-oriented motivations for deployment. However, examining the relative explanatory power of satisfaction and dissatisfaction scales keeps us from examining what aspects of the mission are associated with satisfaction and motivation. Another problem with Satoh's research is that he did not test his hypotheses in a single integrative model: he separated segments of the processes of attitude formation into three parts and examined them respectively. He examined the correlation between pre-deployment motivation and perceived satisfaction and dissatisfaction factors, perceived satisfaction and dissatisfaction factors and overall mission satisfaction, and perceived satisfaction and dissatisfaction factors and redeployment intention.

## **Dirty Work and Professional Identity**

At the macro-social level, the military profession is generally considered as “dirty work,” more so in Japanese society. In the micro-level institutionalization process, identity formation is a core process in constructing shared understanding of realities; identity is a fundamental element of subjective reality and has a dialectical relationship with society (Berger and Luckmann 1966). Identities are the sets of socially constructed meanings to define who we are as persons, as role occupants, and as group members (Stryker 1980; Burke 2004). Identities come with normative expectations for appropriate role behavior, which lead the self to behave in a certain way in a specific social setting (Thoits 1983). Social identity is defined as “the groups, statuses, or categories to which an individual is socially recognized as belonging” (p.10: Rosenberg 1979). Others can also attribute certain social identities to those who display the traits such as “stigma” (Goffman 1963). Identity has been recognized as a central construct that affects both individual satisfaction and organizational effectiveness (O’Reilly and Chatman 1986).

As a central component of creating social realities, identity formation reflects the social structure of the host society such that:

“...identity formation involves a process of social construction of meaning in which particular cultural attributes, such as gender or organizational role, are given priority over other sources of meaning. The social contexts in which identity formation occurs contain a set of power relations embedded in discourse and institutionalized organization practices” (p.309-310: Wicks 2002).

Institutionalized organizational practices shape how individuals in an organization define themselves and develop meaning through their interpersonal relationships. In the process of legitimacy seeking, the external environment places pressures on individuals



and organizations to attempt conformity with normative rules created by the institutional environment. In this sense, identity is not entirely under the control of individuals, but not entirely shaped by social institutions either (Wicks 2002). In such restricted situations, individuals still take as much initiative as possible in identity formation by engaging in the process of social categorization, which allows individuals to organize their organizational environment by sorting out ingroup and outgroup members (Tajfel 1981; Tajfel and Turner 1985). Thus, the present dissertation introduces the “dirty work” framework originally invoked by Everett Hughes (1951; 1958) to understand the aspects of identity of Japanese service members that are not under their control.

### Managing Dirty Work

According to Ashforth and Kreiner (1999), despite their devalued identity given by society, people in dirty work do not just accept and internalize the identity. On the contrary, people in the devalued occupation can form a strong culture and build self-enhancing identity through a number of strategies. Ashforth and Kreiner (1999) propose three techniques to manage dirty work status: reframing, recalibrating, and refocusing.

*Reframing*: a technique to transform the meaning associated with a stigmatized occupation. Ashforth and Kreiner (1999) identify neutralization and infusing as reframing techniques. They emphasize Sykes and Matza’s (1957) ‘denial of responsibility,’ ‘denial of injury,’ and ‘denial of victim’ as important neutralization techniques in the management of dirty work. In denial of responsibility, people in dirty work insist that they are simply doing their job (Ashforth and Kreiner 1999). In the explanation of why people are not responsible, they claim that they have no choice to avoid engaging in this occupation. Therefore, people in dirty work are immune to blame and normal for

engaging in the occupation (Sandstrom, Martin, and Fine 2003). Denial of injury and denial of victim play an important role in managing particularly in morally stigmatized occupations because of their exploitation such as pimps and yellow paper journalists. In both techniques, stigmatized individuals do not claim the innocence of victims or the injured. Rather, they perceive victims and the injured as conscious participants in their professional business encounters.

The other technique, infusing, is to transform the stigma into a valued attribute by introducing a positive value, as one of the techniques for reframing. Although Ashforth and Kreiner (1999) distinguished infusing from neutralization, the infusing technique is virtually identical to Sykes and Matza's (1957) neutralization technique of managing deviant identity called "appealing to higher or other loyalties." The first technique is neutralization. In neutralization techniques, stigmatized individuals accept the stigmatized attribute but provide reinterpretation of why they should not be considered as stigmatized (Sandstorm, et al 2003). In this sense, neutralization and infusing are complementing one another in the function of negating and transforming the stigma attached to the occupation (Ashfort and Kreiner 1999).

*Recalibrating:* Recalibrating is a technique of adjusting the perceptual and evaluative standards of a dirty work attribute in order to make significantly large negative characteristics of the occupation less important. This technique also helps emphasize the small but positive characteristics more. The recalibrating technique does not transform the meaning of the dirty work itself, but it changes the importance of the stigma associated with the occupation.

*Refocusing:* Refocusing is a technique to shift from the stigmatized features of the work to the non-stigmatized features. Whereas reframing actively transforms the stigmatized properties, refocusing deliberately ignores the stigmatized characteristic of the occupation (Ashforth and Kreiner 1999). For example, medical school students transform their physical contact with patients into a “complex intellectual puzzle” (intellectualization) or into a “mechanical or analytic problem” (Smith and Kleinman 1989). Arluke (1996) also found similar emotional management strategies among animal shelter workers who have to euthanize animals routinely. The workers emphasized how skillfully they could perform lethal injection to let animals die as peaceful as possible. To manage uncomfortable emotions associated with the licensed tasks in the medical profession, medical students informally learn a form of emotional detachment in order to cognitively refocus the nature of their tasks (Lief and Fox 1963; Smith and Kleinman, 1989). These techniques are “to transform the meaning of the stigmatized work by simultaneously negating or devaluating negative attributions and creating or revaluing positive ones” (p.421). By utilizing these techniques, the occupation is justified and become more tolerable and even attractive to both insiders and outsiders.

*Normalization Strategies.* Individuals in dirty work have another option to manage dirty work identity by avoiding revelation of their tainted attribute. When individuals try to avoid revealing a devalued label attached to their stigmatized attributes, they engage in normalization by hiding tainted attributes and keeping a normal self-presentation. Normalization strategies include *passing, covering, and insulating*. When people use passing techniques, they present themselves as if they do not have stigmatized attributes and allocate their identity differently from their actual attribute. When

stigmatized individuals cannot use passing techniques because attributes cannot be concealed, they use covering technique by disguising their real attributes. Passing and covering required stigmatized individuals to lead painful double lives while the third technique, insulating, does not require active disguise and hidden alienation. Some stigmatized individuals carefully choose with whom they interact, and limit their social interaction within a select group of confidants (Sandstrom, Martin, and Fine 2003).

### Institutional Characteristics of Dirty Work

In the social construction of dirtiness, agents and social actors outside the organization play an important role in the oppositional identity work in dirty work subcultures (Ashforth and Kreiner 1999). Individuals in dirty work can negotiate with outsiders by attacking the legitimacy of social organizations and institutions ('condemn the condemners') (Sykes and Matza 1957). Although the influence of institutions and organizations on one's identity is supposed to be negotiable between individuals and these institutions and organizations, identities provided by dominant institutions can become individual identities when social actors internalize the identity given by dominant institutions (Wicks 2002; Castells 2004).

Taking into consideration socio-cultural factors associated with the Japanese interdependent self and temporal factors, Markus and Oyserman's (1993) *sociocultural self* model can depict the ever-changing nature of Japanese service members' selves. The sociocultural self model integrates two aspects of self, the social embeddedness of self and temporal nature of self. The socially embedded self depicts self as a socially embedded entity that maintains reciprocal relationships with immediate and macro social environments.


As previously pointed out, social status of a profession can change over time. *The sociocultural self model* also covers the temporal nature of the self in the past, current, and the future based on an idea that the self-concept and identity are multi-faceted, actively changing an “array of accessible self-knowledge” (p.191: Oyserman and Markus 1993) rather than a single, fixed entity.

Although there is a temporal nature of self processes, individuals maintain enduring structures of self that help them maintain consistency in interpreting their experience over time. Markus (1977) named the enduring structure of self “self-schemas”; Stryker (1987) called it salient identity. Self-schemas are cognitive generalizations about the self derived from one’s past experiences including actions, characteristics, and skills (Markus 1977).

The enduring structure of self facilitate one’s present and future actions for a given domain as “representations of the self in the future” or “possible selves” (p.954: Markus and Nurius 1986). Possible selves are defined as “the ideal selves that we would very much like to become” (p.954: Markus and Nurius 1986). At the same time, possible selves are not solely constructed by favorable self images. Possible selves include the selves that individuals may become and the selves that they are afraid of becoming. In some cases, if a person successfully avoids becoming certain selves that he or she is afraid of becoming, it can be considered as achieving favorable possible selves. Possible selves are not the current selves that are well grounded in individuals’ past experience so that they are vulnerable to the situations that provide conflicting information about the self. They are the future projection based on self-knowledge that is available from past experiences. In this sense, possible selves bridge between the self-concept and motivation

by providing personalized self-schema of self-knowledge. Figure 3 illustrates the past, present, and future selves of Japanese service members. Despite the difference in emphasis, researchers agree that identities need constant validation to sustain their meaning (Markus and Nurius 1986) while temporal and special elements of self, such as social and cultural contexts, should be taken into consideration in the comparative study of identities in a socially and politically controversial professional organization such as the Japanese armed forces.

**Figure 3. The Sociocultural Self of Japanese Service Members.**



Note: This model is adopted from the Sociocultural Self Model by Oyserman and Markus (1993) and modified by the author.

Individual-level responses to a large-scale organizational change cannot be separated from institutional environments that shape organizational forms, structures, and processes of the military organization. Zucker (1991) stresses the institutional pressure embedded in organizational contexts that regulate one's behavior in a culturally consistent but not rationalized way. However, little attention has been given to the relationship between institutions and individual workers in the organization studies literature.

Taking Zucker's (1991) perspective into account, social and historical contexts serve as 'constitutive forces' that shape one's identity even though individuals actively participate in the identity formation process. The more individuals in an organization internalize institutional forces, the more those institutional forces become influential in identity formation in organizational settings (Wicks 2002). This perspective suggests that, unlike DiMaggio and Powell's (1983) isomorphism of organizations in a competitive environment, the immediate institutional environment surrounding an organization can lead the organization to diverge from a successful organization within the same organizational sector to gain legitimacy and survive. Taken together, the present dissertation is trying to integrate the effect of socio-cultural contexts into the multi-layered analytical model of organizational adaptation to peacekeeping by applying both neo-institutionalism in organizational sociology and an identity theory. She finds that studying the micro-institutional effects on lower level individuals in an organization has a significant implication on the organizational study.

## Chapter 4: Research Questions and Hypotheses

The existing literature on contemporary Japanese national security has mostly excluded the organizational aspects of the military from the scope of research. Most researchers have focused on macro-social issues of Japan's security, specifically focusing on civil-military control and the legality of the SDF under the legislative constraint based on Article 9. Their primary concern is Japan's remilitarization or "normalization" of Japan as a major political power (see Emmerson 1971; Emmerson and Humphreys 1973; Berger 1993 1998; Hook 1996; Drifte 2000). Implicitly and explicitly, they share a common assumption that a normal nation-state desires to build up military power compatible with its economic power. For them, this seems to be a natural desire considering Japan's ultra militarism before and during WWII. Compared to political scientists, sociologists and anthropologists are more interested in organizational aspects of the SDF and civil-military relations (see Ohi 1999; Kawano 2001 2002; Frühstück and Ben-Ari 2002). However, for some researchers, their assumptions are far from being neutral. For example, Frühstück and Ben-Ari's study (2002) criticized previous researchers' prescribed and biased view, while their claim is contradicted by stating that the SDF is an organization that "disguises" its violent nature and manipulates the general public with various techniques (Frühstück and Ben-Ari 2002).

Taking the above condition of the research field into consideration, the present dissertation approaches the Japan Self Defense Forces as a professional organization that is facing a large-scale organizational change: adaptation to peacekeeping. Adaptation to peacekeeping as a primary mission is a global-level trend of the post-Cold War military



although peacekeeping is not entirely a new mission. I set the grand purposes of the present dissertation as follows: (a) to describe what institutional environments surrounding the SDF have filtered through and constituted the military profession in contemporary Japan, and (b) to examine how peacekeeping participation affects Japanese service members' professional identity and their attitudes towards their jobs and the organization.

Corresponding to the change in the organizational environments surrounding the SDF, I identified the following three phases in the course of the development of contemporary Japanese armed forces and peacekeeping participation:

- (1) The emergence of the SDF (The post-war peace constitution, the Korean War, and the renewal of the US-Japan Security Treaty in 1960) (1945-1960)
- (2) From High growth of the Japanese economy to the end of the Cold War (1961-1989)
- (3) The development of Japanese peacekeeping participation in the post Cold War period (1990 to present)

In the presentation of my discussions by the chronology of events, I will address questions from macro to micro levels of social structure that are related to the impact of Japanese participation in multinational peacekeeping missions. I will guide the present dissertation with the following research questions.

1. *Formation of the Contemporary Japanese Military Institution:* Anti-military culture has been playing a central role in Japan's national security policy (Berger 1996), but its influence on the military ethos valued in the armed forces has not been studied systematically. How has the contemporary Japanese military institution been developed

and shaped by the general orientation of national security policy and military ethos valued in the SDF?

*2. Contextualizing the Constabulary Ethos: Symbolic Management and the Professional Identity:* The Constitutional restriction gave the SDF limited legitimacy and caused hostility by the general public to the SDF. How has the SDF managed the lack of organizational legitimacy? How do the cultural understanding and the stigmatized image of the organization shape SDF members' professional identity (sense of selves)?

*3. Peacekeeping Participation and Organizational Legitimacy, Professional Identity, and Attitudes toward the Organization:* Facing a large-scale organizational change led by peacekeeping participation, what individual, organizational, and societal factors are significantly associated with Japanese peacekeepers' attitudes toward their mission and organization?

## **Research Questions and Hypotheses**

The institutionalization process of peacekeeping requires both desinstitutionalization and reinstitutionalization of the existing social definitions about national security, the military, and soldiers. Processes occur at multiple levels of the organization and of social structure. To understand the impact of peacekeeping participation on service members, I will examine how society institutionalizes the military institution and how particularities of the contemporary Japanese military institution affect service members' professional identity formation and process.

## Formation of the Contemporary Japanese Military Institution

In terms of the first phase in the organizational history of the SDF, I will analyze the social processes in which the SDF became isolated from the larger society in post WWII Japan. The SDF is conceptualized as a *gunji soshiki* (armed forces), but not *guntai* (the military). How has this ambiguous and complex definition of the military been institutionalized and maintained? What social and political events have affected or shaped the definition? Using archival historical data, I will examine social processes answering the following research question.

**Research Question 1. How has the existing social definition of the SDF been developed and affected the organizational concept?**

## Contextualizing the Constabulary Ethos

After the renewal of the US-Japan Security Treaty in 1960, the SDF had to constantly deal with a negative organizational image in society. The renewal of the US-Japan Security Treaty formed the basis of an anti-military culture in post WWII Japan, which isolated the SDF from the larger society. The expansion of the Japanese economy and the stable regional security situation in the Cold War period enforced the separation and even stigmatized the military organization within society. Taking into consideration these organizational environments, my analysis on the second phase will come down to the meso-social level. Multiple political events in the early stage of the reconstruction process isolated the SDF from the larger society, and developed a stigmatized image of the organization. I hypothesize that the organization lost its legitimacy in the course of establishment. In the second phase, to regain organizational legitimacy, the organization

has made tremendous efforts to improve its public image. At the same time, previous research repeatedly pointed out that SDF members internalized the public image of the organization and behave very consciously (Ohi 1999; Frühstück and Ben-Ari 2002). With these findings, the following two research questions will lead the second section of the dissertation.

**Research Question 2-1. What strategies have the SDF used to manage the lack of organizational legitimacy?**

**Research Question 2-2. How has the status of organizational legitimacy impacted the culture of the SDF and its members' professional identity?**

#### Deployment Experience, Professional Identity, and Attitudes

Finally, I will shift my focus to the most contemporary phase focusing on the development of Japanese peacekeeping and its impact on individual level outcomes from a sociological perspective. Regarding organizational and individual level outcomes, I will examine the professional identity of Japanese peacekeepers and their attitudes toward peacekeeping deployment. In the analysis of this phase, I will draw on interview data to understand the professional identity of Japanese peacekeepers. I will also use survey data to examine organizational and individual outcomes of peacekeeping participation.

Regarding the third phase, I will answer the following three questions: (A) subjective understanding of peacekeeper role: How do SDF personnel understand their peacekeeper role? (B) Subjective evaluation of deployment experience: How do SDF personnel assess their deployment experience? (C) Peacekeepers' attitudes toward peacekeeping missions:

How does peacekeeping experience affect peacekeepers' attitudes and their psychological states?

(A) *Understanding of the peacekeeping role and deployment experience:* As reviewed earlier, Japanese peacekeepers were generally highly satisfied with their deployment experience (Kawano 2002), compared with American peacekeepers. However, in many cases, large-scale organizational transitions impact organizational members by threatening their professional identity and changing the nature of their job; life events and living conditions in one's social roles can negatively or positively affect one's attitudes and psychological states depending on the subjective meaning of the events to the individual, more specifically to one's emotions. However, the meanings that individuals attach to their social roles are ignored or indirectly measured in previous research and are very difficult to measure in survey questionnaires (Simon 1997). To overcome such shortcomings, I have drawn interview data from SDF members both with and without peacekeeping deployment experience to compare these two groups and analyze the effect of deployment experience on their perception of the organization, peacekeeping, and their roles. Compared to their fellow SDF personnel with no peacekeeping experience, did SDF members with prior peacekeeping experience perceive the SDF as a military organization differently? In terms of professional identity, how do the members with peacekeeping deployment experience understand who they are and what they should do as military professionals?

**Research Question 3-1. Did peacekeeping deployment change Japanese service members' professional identity? If so, how and in what way did it change?**

Did the perception of peacekeepers toward the organization and their career in the SDF change before and after their deployment? Thus, I will examine the following questions using interview data.

**Research Question 3-2. How did Japanese service members perceive their deployment experience in relation to the existing organizational missions and culture?**

(B) *Peacekeepers' Evaluation of the Organization and Satisfaction*: Stressors that peacekeepers from North America and European nations have experienced are mostly grounded in role conflict between their soldier role and peacekeeper role; however, those findings have never been critically examined in comparison with peacekeepers from armed forces with a constabulary orientation. On the other hand, despite their interesting findings on attitudes of Japanese peacekeepers toward their deployment experience, Japanese peacekeeping studies (Kawano 2001 2002; Ohi,1999; Satoh 2002) did not give a comprehensive, overall picture of Japanese peacekeepers' attitudes and organizational outcomes. Their statistical analyses also did not go beyond bivariate relationships or internal constructs of very specific concepts. It is misleading to discuss causal relationships using survey data without adequate statistical analysis. As a result, none of those three studies identified what factors contribute to attitudes toward peacekeeping missions and examined how much variance those independent variables can explain in dependent variables. Using a single predictor variable often produces inadequate descriptions about a social phenomenon because more than one variable significantly and uniquely affect the response variable (Neter, et al. 1996). In the real social context, multiple social factors come into play and affect one's attitudes and psychological states.

Statistical analysis with more than one predictor variable should be conducted to understand what social and organizational factors contribute to peacekeepers' attitudes toward their mission and psychological states. The present dissertation explores the relationship between peacekeepers' deployment experience and psychological outcomes associated with their professional identity. To assess the value of one's own deployment experience, mission satisfaction will be introduced based on an assumption that daily deployment experience will directly affect one's satisfaction with the mission. At the same time, I introduce demographic variables that in previous research have shown interesting patterns, such as age. Regarding the age effect, Ohi (1999) noted that *jieikan* age 40 or older in his study expressed a perceived improvement in the social status of the SDF compared to the past. To separate the effect of deployment from one's psychological predisposition prior to deployment, I introduce motivation into the analysis.

Deployment Motivation. Identities can lead the individual to have specific motivations in role performance (Burke and Reitzes 1991). In work settings, values induce valence on objects, behavior, or states of affairs, and hold the ability to motivate goal-oriented behavior (French and Kahn 1962). If the individual has a strong professional identity, he or she may hold strong motivation about accomplishing the task (organization-oriented motivation). At the same time, an individual may not have a strong professional identity, but still perceive a certain task as his or her personal goal (personal motivation). James and McIntyre (1996) suggested that individuals with high motivation for personal accomplishment would enjoy a certain type of demanding situations as an opportunity to challenge their abilities. Among German peacekeepers, support from immediate personal contacts had a strong correlation with their motivation (Biehl and

Mackewitsch 2002). To examine the impact of deployment motivations on peacekeepers' perception about the organization and mission satisfaction, I identify three primary motivations, organization-oriented motivation, personal motivation, and balanced motivation. I will compare the effect of these motivations on mission satisfaction and perceptions about the organization.

**Hypothesis 4-1. Peacekeepers who have organization-oriented motivations will be more satisfied with the mission than those who have personal motivations.**

**Hypothesis 4-2. Peacekeepers who show high levels of organization-oriented motivation will more highly value the potential of the SDF than those who do not.**

Perceived Benefits of Peacekeeping and Peacekeepers' Attitudes. Kawano (2001; 2002) reported that the majority of Japanese peacekeepers viewed their experience of peacekeeping missions would be helpful to their primary missions such as a mission for territorial defense *boei shutsudo* (Defense Act) and *chian shutsudo* (Security Act).<sup>16</sup> American researchers have consistently found that there is a perceived gap between peacekeeping and combat and that special training is required (Segal and Segal 1993a; Segal and Tiggler 1997; Miller 1997). Compared to American peacekeepers, Japanese peacekeepers' positive view of the relationship between peacekeeping and primary

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<sup>16</sup> Defense Act: Article 76 of Self Defense Force Law prescribes that Prime Minister can order the SDF to dispatch all the troops or part of them to defend the nation when an external threat conducts attack Japan with force or when it is apparent that Japan is facing armed attack from an external threat.

Security Act: Article 78 of Self Defense Force Law prescribes that Prime Minister can order the SDF to dispatch all the troops or part of them to defend the nation when ordinal level of police force cannot maintain public order facing indirect invasion and other emergency situations.



missions is worthwhile studying in relation with peacekeepers' mission satisfaction.

**Hypothesis 4-3. Japanese peacekeepers who think that peacekeeping is useful for domestic missions will be more satisfied with the mission.**

**Hypothesis 4-4. Japanese peacekeepers who think that peacekeeping is useful for domestic missions will have a favorable view about the organization.**

Mission Experience and Psychological States. Although Japanese peacekeepers are generally satisfied with their deployment experience, it is unclear what aspects of mission experience contributed to their satisfaction. Based on the previous studies of Japanese peacekeepers (Kawano 2002; Ohi 1999), I introduce interpersonal role conflict, mission difficulties, personal accomplishment, and level of stress as key variables to assess the relative influence of mission experience on peacekeepers' view about the organization and satisfaction.

**Hypothesis 4-5. Japanese peacekeepers who had negative experiences in the field will be less satisfied with the mission.**

**Hypothesis 4-6. Japanese peacekeepers who had negative experiences in the field will have a less favorable view about the organization.**

**Hypothesis 4-7. The higher level of stress peacekeepers experience in the field, the less satisfied they will become.**

**Hypothesis 4-8. Japanese peacekeepers who made personal-level of accomplishment in the field will be more satisfied with deployment than who had not.**

**Hypothesis 4-9. Japanese peacekeepers who made personal-level of accomplishment in the field have a less favorable view about the organization.**

## **Chapter 5: Methods**

The present dissertation is a single-case, exploratory study of Japanese peacekeeping and its impact on organizational outcomes. Although this dissertation does not have a control group that represents the armed forces equipped with different organizational concepts (e.g. pronounced warrior ethos, and moderate warrior ethos), North American and European nations serve as a “shadow” control group. Japanese armed forces exhibit very distinctive characteristics as a military organization and an actor in UN peacekeeping because of Japan’s exclusively defensive national security policy. As an exploratory case study, the dissertation attempts to identify research questions and hypotheses for future research or to assess the feasibility of the desired research procedures.

I will use a triangulation research design, a combination of quantitative and qualitative methods, to explore a broad range of organizational issues. My data analysis will be presented in chronological order. I identified the following three phases: (1) The emergence of the Japan Self Defense Forces (SDF) to the renewal of the US-Japan Security Treaty (1945-1960); (2) The aftermath the renewal of the US-Japan Security Treaty to the end of the Cold War (1961-1989); (3) The development of Japanese peacekeeping participation in the post Cold War period (1990 to present). In the chronological presentation of my analysis, I will start from macro social issues and follow through to micro level issues that constitute the impact of Japanese participation in multinational peacekeeping missions. As my discussion proceeds from the first phase through the third phase, the level of analysis will also shift from macro level social

structure toward micro level social structure. The more the contemporary issues I will discuss on Japanese peacekeeping, the more micro will be the issues involved in my analysis.

The first section will analyze macro-social level relationships between peacekeeping and society, and explores the social construction of the military and of peacekeeping operations in Japan to fully understand the social processes that shape the organizational culture of the SDF and the basis of professional identity of SDF members. The second section will be devoted to examining how those social and cultural norms about the military shaped the social definition the Japan Self Defense Forces in contemporary Japan and affect organizational norms of activities and behavioral standards, and organizational images. The third section will deal with more contemporary issues directly related to peacekeeping participation. I will examine subjective level impacts of peacekeeping participation among SDF members, using in-depth interviews and statistical data analysis from an attitudinal survey in order to understand the professional identity of Japanese peacekeepers and their deployment experiences.

### **Archival Data Analysis for Institutionalization Process of Peacekeeping**

Archival data will be used to examine civil-military relations in post-WWII Japan. I will describe social opportunities of the general population to understand the SDF in their daily life, using demographic indicators and governmental public opinion poll results. Archival data are also used to examine how the public image of the armed forces shaped the professional identity of the SDF. Shared meanings evolved in the institutionalization process provide an organization its unique ethos, and the ethos is

conveyed as beliefs, norms, rituals, languages and other cultural forms (Smircich 1983) as the organizational control mechanism. I will analyze the evolving shared meanings of relevant concepts in security issues, including the definitions of the military (*guntai*), the SDF (*jieitai*), soldiers (*gunjin*) and civilians (*bunmin*), international deployment, and use of force (rule of engagement: ROE) in peacekeeping missions. I also examine organizational stories and language use as cultural manifestations that reflect the way in which the SDF negotiate the public image of the armed forces. Examining cultural forms will provide important information about what SDF members think about who they are and what they use as behavioral standards in their daily lives.

1. Official interpretations of the following terms throughout the post WWII period regarding (a) the definition of the SDF as a military organization; (b) the definition of the civilian; (c) Article 9 and the SDF; (c) Article 9 and overseas deployment.
2. Biennial government polls on national security issues from 1965 to 2002.
3. Official statistics on educational levels of SDF members, enlistment rates, ratios of SDF recruits to the youth population over time
4. Textual and graphic promotional materials for the public including the video clip of Japanese peacekeeping (10-year anniversary) and promotional materials about activities of SDF.

### **Analysis of Interview Data and Textual Data**

The second section will examine how SDF members perceive their peacekeeper role and deployment experience, using interviews and the responses to open-ended

questions in Kawano's (2001; 2002) survey. I gained access to Kawano's data with his permission for the present dissertation. SDF members without deployment experience will be employed as a comparison group in the interviews.

### In-depth Interview

*Procedure and Sampling.* Since the SDF is a relatively isolated work organization, and it is hard to locate members with peacekeeping experience, I employed a snowball sampling method to contact interviewees. In interview sessions in both East Timor and Japan, snowball sampling started from the key informant, a commanding officer of the Self Defense Forces. There is another key informant, a company officer, who introduced interviewees to me in Japan.

*Field Research in East Timor (Timore-Lesta) and Follow-up interviews.* In July 2002, I visited the Japanese Contingent in Dili, East Timor for a week to observe the mission environment, reactions of the local community to the presence of the Japanese contingent, and to conduct unstructured interviews with Japanese peacekeepers. I conducted in-depth interviews with 2 officers (1 woman), 1 warrant officer, and 4 non-Commissioned officers of the Ground Self Defense Force. I spent 4 days as an interpreter with 3 NCOs during their vacation. In May 2003, I conducted follow-up interviews with 1 officer and 1 warrant officer, whom I interviewed in East Timor. Interviews with the two peacekeepers were held in Tokyo and Sendai. I also conducted an additional interview with an Air Self Defense officer, who was deployed to West Timor for airlift assistance from November 1999 to January 2000. Interviews were conducted in a face-to-face setting, and each interview took 30 minutes to 4 hours.

*Interviews with the 1st Air Transportation Squadron members at Komaki Air Base, Aichi (Japan).* In early July 2003, the Japanese government authorized sending Air Self Defense troops to Iraq for airlift assistance. The 1st Air Transportation Squadron, specifically assigned to peacekeeping operations with 24-hour stand-by, started training sessions for 200 tentatively assigned members and preparing to send troops mid or late July. I visited Komaki Air Base from July 22 through July 24 to conduct interviews with 4 officers and 3 NCOs, who have peacekeeping deployment experience. Each interview was 15-20 minute-long in a face-to-face setting.

*Interviews with the 10th Brigade members at Moriyama Station, Aichi (Japan).* The 10th Brigade belongs to the Central Division of the Ground Self Defense Force, and has sent troops to Cambodia and the Golan Heights before. I visited Moriyama Station while I visited Komaki Air Base in July 2003 to conduct interviews with 3 officers and 2 enlisted personnel previously deployed to a peacekeeping operation.

*Interviews with service members without peacekeeping deployment experience.* I also conducted interviews with ASDF personnel with no prior peacekeeping deployment experience (5 officers, Officer Candidates, and NCOs) in Nara Air Base (Nara, Japan) in May 2002. In Nara Air Base, I also conducted a focus group with 18 officer candidates of the Air Self Defense Force. I conducted interviews with Air Self Defense Force members with no prior peacekeeping deployment experience in Komaki Air Base (Aichi, Japan) in July 2002.

*Questions.* I asked a different set of questions for SDF members who experienced peacekeeping deployment and those who did not. In Komaki Air Base and

Moriyama Station, my interviews were semi-structured due to the arrangement of interviews provided by the public affairs office in each site.

- A. Questions for members with prior peacekeeping deployment experience
  - a) Did peacekeeping deployment change your way of thinking and attitudes toward your duty? If so, please explain how it impacted your life as a SDF member.
  - b) What is the event in the deployment that most impacted you?
  - c) Could you easily adjust to Japanese culture and lifestyle when you come back from deployment?
- B. Questions for members without prior peacekeeping deployment experience
  - a) How does working at the 1<sup>st</sup> Air Transportation Squadron impact your attitudes toward your job?
  - b) Do you notice any difference in the organization after the SDF started participating in UN peacekeeping? If so, please explain.
  - c) Is there any change in your attitudes toward your job or the SDF in general after the SDF started participating in UN peacekeeping? If you joined the service recently, how did Japanese engagement in UN peacekeeping missions affect your decision making to join the SDF?

### Open-ended Questions and Responses

The four aspects that I questioned in in-depth interviews will be also examined through the analysis of responses to the following four open-ended questions in an attitudinal survey collected from 618 former peacekeepers in 1999. The respondents are mostly Ground Self Defense Force members.



- a) The general comments on the survey: “If you have any additional comments about the questions above, your opinion and problems that you would like to point out about peacekeeping participation of the SDF in general, please feel free to write them down in the box below.”
- b) Comparison to other armed forces: “Please tell us your opinion about what are advantages and disadvantages of the Japan Self Defense Force compared to other armed forces?”
- c) Interpersonal Relationships: “Regarding interpersonal relationships in your unit (during deployment), what was the most severe issue?”
- d) Mission Satisfaction: Could you tell us the reason why you feel satisfied or dissatisfied with the peacekeeping deployment in which you participated?

### **Quantitative Data Analysis**

In the third section, I will use descriptive statistics, cross-tabulations, and multivariate regression models to see the relative contribution of deployment experiences to three major organizational outcomes. As I discussed earlier, Satoh (2001) chose both items about perception about deployment experience and factual matters to extract perceived mission environments. Taking a different approach, I ran a factor analysis to extract primary dimensions of perceived deployment experience only using the items on one’s subjective evaluation about his deployment experience.

First, in order to find out the significant association between predictor variables and dependent variables, I obtained the zero order correlations among those variables.

Secondly, multivariate regression models were constructed for both the level of psychological distress and mission satisfaction, in order to see the relative contribution of each independent variable to the peacekeepers' psychological well-being during their deployment. Each analytical model was constructed for three dependent variables. Variables related to those significant deployment experiences extracted in the previous section and basic demographic variables were run against two organizational outcomes, psychological distress and mission satisfaction, in Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regression models. The total association of independent variables on each dependent variable was also examined in the model.

#### Data and Sample

The analysis is based on survey data collected from the Japan Self Defense Forces (SDF) personnel who have deployment experience in one or more than one of the following UN peacekeeping missions: UNTAC (United Nations Transition Authority in Cambodia), ONUMOZ (United Nations Mission in Mozambique), and UNDOF (United Nations Disengagement Force). The data was collected by the Japan National Defense Academy in March 1999, and the survey was conducted as a self-administered mail survey. The sample was drawn from two groups of the SDF personnel who had deployment experience in UN peacekeeping operations. The first group was the 1,200 SDF personnel who deployed to the UNTAC. Fifty percent of the personnel (600 personnel) deployed to the UNTAC were sampled for the survey. The second group was approximately 400 personnel deployed to the ONUMOZ (154 personnel), the UNDOF (252 personnel), or both. The questionnaire was sent to all the SDF members who deployed to ONUMOZ and UNDOF. Regarding the UNDOF, the sample was all the

personnel who returned from the mission before March 1999. A total of 1,000 SDF personnel received the questionnaire in the mail, and 618 personnel returned the questionnaire. There was 7 percent non-response rate due to seventy questionnaires that were returned because of undeliverable addresses. The response rate after taking these out from the denominator was 66 percent. All respondents were male, and most of the respondents were Ground Self Defense Force (GSDF) personnel. The sample consisted of 19 percent officers and 81 percent enlisted personnel. Approximately 38 percent were 20-29 years old; 42.5 percent were 30-39 years old; 19.8 percent were 40-49 years old. Over half of the sample was married (56 percent), and 44 percent had children.

#### Dependent Variables

I choose mission satisfaction and perceived organizational potential as dependent variables to assess organizational impacts of peacekeeping experience.

**Mission Satisfaction (SATISFY)** is measured by an item asking the degree of one's satisfaction with the mission. "Regarding the peacekeeping mission in which you participated, how satisfied are you?" Respondents chose one of the four choices: 1= "I am very much satisfied"; 2= "I am somewhat satisfied"; 3= "I am not so satisfied"; 4= "I am not satisfied at all." Responses 3 and 4 were combined and recoded as 3.

**Perceived Organizational Potential (ORGPOWER)** is measured by an item asking one's evaluation of the SDF compared to the armed forces of other nations: "Comparing the armed forces of other nations and the SDF, please mark the statement that is the closest to your evaluation of the SDF?" Respondents chose one of the four choices with a don't know option: 1= "The SDF is better than almost all the armed forces of other nations"; 2= "The SDF is the same as the armed forces of other nations"; 3=

“The SDF is slightly inferior to the armed forces of other nations”; 4= “I cannot generalize because there are advantages and disadvantages (in the SDF compared to the armed forces of other nations).” I reversed coded the original order of the options (1,2,3,4,5) into (1,2,4,3), then reverse coded them: 4= “The SDF is better than almost all the armed forces of other nations”; 3= “The SDF is the same as the armed forces of other nations”; 2= “I cannot generalize because there are advantages and disadvantages; 1= “The SDF is slightly inferior to the armed forces of other nations.”

### Independent Variables

This study examines how much variance the following groups of variables would explain in the level of organizational outcomes, specifically level of stress and redeployment intentions: (1) demographic and background variables; (2) motivations for peacekeeping participation; (3) interpersonal conflict and group variables; (4) perceived deployment experience; (5) meaning of peacekeeping (6) work values and ethic.

#### *(1) Control Variables:*

**Young (YOUNG)**<sup>17</sup> is a recoded variable based on peacekeepers’ age during the deployment. If a peacekeeper is equal to or younger than 29 years old, the individual is coded into 1. Otherwise, peacekeepers are coded into 0.

**Education (EDUC)** indicates the highest education level that the individual ever attended, which has four categories of the individual’s education: 1=Junior High School;

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<sup>17</sup> In his bivariate analysis, Kawano (2002) found that there is a generational difference in attitudes toward the organization and peacekeeping among Japanese peacekeepers. To examine the impact of generation under the multivariate analysis, I created two dummy variables to represent younger and older generations.

2 =High School; 3 =Technical and Vocational School<sup>18</sup>; 4=Community College/4-year College.

**Mission.** Respondent's mission is coded as "**Cambodia (UNTAC)**," "Mozambique (ONUMOZ)," and "Golan Heights (UNDOF)." In analysis, I use dummy variables that contrast "**Cambodia (UNTAC)**" and "**Mozambique (ONUMOZ)**"<sup>19</sup> categories with the "Golan Heights" category.

*(2) Motivations for Peacekeeping Deployment:*

The following scales called the organization-oriented motivation scale and individualistic motivation scale are used to assess motivations for peacekeeping deployment. These two scales were created by principal component analysis for 8 questions about one's motivations for peacekeeping deployment.

**The organization-oriented motivation scale (ORGMTV)** consists of 5 items about the degree a specific reason contributed to a respondent's peacekeeping participation. The 5 items are "Peacekeeping participation would improve the image of the Japan Self Defense Force"; "Peacekeeping participation would contribute to improving the image and status of Japan in the international community"; "I would like to help the local population"; "International contribution is an important mission for the Japan Self Defense Forces"; "I wanted to contribute to world peace by myself." The

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<sup>18</sup> Most Japanese technical/vocational schools require high school diploma for applicants.

<sup>19</sup> I chose the following two dummy variables to contrast the difference in the nature of the missions. UNTAC was the first Japanese peacekeeping mission, and a relatively unstable mission environment. On the other hand, UNDOF was held in a very stable condition when the respondents were deployed to their mission although the recent situations in the Middle East became more unpredictable reflecting the intensifying Israel-Palestine conflict and Operation Iraqi Freedom in early 2003.

respondents used a four-point scale (“1=strongly agree” to “4= strongly disagree”) to answer the degree of agreement with the items. The reliability coefficient (Cronbach’s  $\alpha$ ) for the scale is 0.83.

**The personal motivation scale** consists of 3 items about the degree to which a specific reason contributed to a respondent’s peacekeeping participation. The 3 items are “Peacekeeping participation would be useful for my career development and promotion after deployment”; “I will receive deployment benefit”; “Japanese people and the media would pay attention to us.” The respondents used a four-point scale (“1=strongly agree” to “4= strongly disagree”) to answer the degree of agreement with the items. The reliability coefficient (Cronbach’s  $\alpha$ ) for the scale is 0.71.

*(3) Interpersonal Role Conflict and Group Factors:*

**Horizontal Interpersonal Conflict (INTER)** is an item asking about general conditions of interpersonal relationships in a unit to which the individual belonged during deployment, using a three-point scale: 1=“Interpersonal relationship was generally well kept”; 2= “There were small problems of interpersonal relationships, but they did not impact unit morale”; 3= “There were interpersonal relationship problems and they did have negative impact on unit morale.” Mean value is 1.459; standard deviation is 0.636.

**Conflict with Superior (VERTICAL)** is a question that asks about the frequency of vertical interpersonal conflict using a four-point scale: 1= “often”; 2= “sometimes”; 3= “rarely”; 4= “Never.” The question is “How often did you experience conflicts with your superiors regarding decision making at work during peacekeeping deployment?” I reverse

coded the variable, and the responses were coded as 4= “often”; 3= “sometimes”; 2= “rarely”; 1= “Never.” Mean value is 1.319; standard deviation is 0.576.

**Unit Cohesion (COHESION)** is an item asking about unit cohesion during deployment, using a four-level scale: 1=“(Unit) Cohesion remained high throughout the deployment,” 2= “Cohesion was not high in the beginning (in the training prior to deployment), but it improved after we started working in the peacekeeping site,” 3= “Cohesion was high in the beginning (in the training prior to deployment), but it declined after we started working in the peacekeeping site,” 4= “Cohesion was not high throughout the deployment.” The responses were recoded to adjust the variable to be a more comprehensive ordinal scale by combining options 2 and 3 and performing reverse coding. The responses were recoded as 1= “Cohesion was not high throughout the deployment,” 2= “Cohesion changed over time,” 3= “Cohesion remained high throughout the deployment.”

**Mission Difficulty (DIFF)** is a scale consisting of 4 variables to measure negative job characteristics that Japanese peacekeepers experienced in the mission, generated by principal component analysis of job characteristics in the mission. The 4 items are uncertainty-induced difficulty, role ambiguity-induced difficulties, busyness, and the similarity between their job in Japan and in the mission.

Uncertainty-induced difficulty was assessed with the following item: “I had a very difficult time because job assignment in the mission was not clear.” Role ambiguity-induced difficulty was measured with the following item: “I experienced anxiety or difficulty doing my job because the mission condition was fluid and unpredictable.” Busyness was assessed by the degree of agreement with the statement, “I felt busier in the

peacekeeping mission than in Japan.” The last item was assessed with the item, “I could do my job in the same way as I did in Japan.” All the 4 questions were measured with a four-point scale from “1=strongly agree” to “4= strongly disagree,” and responses are reverse coded. The scores for the 4 items were added and divided by 4. The reliability coefficient, Cronbach’s  $\alpha$ , for the 8 items in the scale is 0.82.

*(4) Perception about Peacekeeping:*

The following two items are included to assess peacekeepers’ subjective understanding of what peacekeeping is in this study.

**Good for Defense Act (DEFENSE)** is a question asking one’s personal view about whether or not peacekeeping participation is good for the Defense Act (*Bouei Shutsudou*) or not. The Defense Act is an emergency measure to deploy SDF troops when Japanese territory is violated by an enemy. The question was measured with a four-point scale from “1=strongly agree” to “4= strongly disagree,” and responses are reverse coded. Mean value is 3.320; standard deviation is 0.899.

**Suitability to peacekeeping (MATCH)** is measured by an item asking who should participate in peacekeeping operations: “Do you think that only the SDF can do the job in the peacekeeping mission or do you think that other than the SDF can do the same job?” A four-point scale was used to answer this question: 1= only can the SDF do the job; 2= The SDF is most suitable although other organizations can do the job; 3= Organizations other than the SDF can do the job well; 4= I do not know. Mean value is 2.462; standard deviation is 0.558.

*(5) Psychological states:*



**Relative Stress Level (STRESS)** indicates stress level during deployment compared to that of being in Japan. The variable is measured by a question asking the degree of agreement with the following item: “Compared to Japan, I felt more stressed.” Respondents used a four-point scale (“1=strongly agree,” “2=somewhat agree,” “3=somewhat disagree,” and “4=strongly disagree”) to answer the question. Responses were reverse coded and combined into the following three categories: 3=More stressed than in Japan (respondents who answered “strongly agree”), 2=somewhat more stressful than in Japan (respondent who answered “somewhat agree”), and 1=less stressed than in Japan (respondent who answered “disagree” and “strongly disagree”). Mean value is 2.02; standard deviation is 0.564.

**Personal Fulfillment (FUL)** is assessed by a scale generated by component analysis of 16 items about one’s subjective evaluation about their own deployment experience. Eight items related to positive evaluation of one’s deployment experience were extracted as the primary component from the 16 items. These items were all related to one’s positive job experience during deployment. Using these 8 items, I created a scale called “personal fulfillment.” The scale consists of the degree of agreement with the following 8 statements, “I felt that I can utilize my skills (in peacekeeping) more than (doing domestic missions) in Japan,” “I could feel more job accomplishment than (domestic missions) in Japan,” “I feel (peacekeeping is) more challenging than (domestic missions) in Japan,” “I feel (peacekeeping is) more interesting than (doing domestic missions) in Japan,” “I feel that I am doing more important job (in peacekeeping) than in Japan,” “I could feel more fulfillment in peacekeeping than in Japan,” “I felt more bored in the peacekeeping mission than in Japan,” “I enjoyed my job in the mission because I

had more autonomy.” The respondents answer those items using a four-point scale from “1= strongly agree” to “4= strongly disagree. To avoid confusion regarding the direction of beta coefficient, I reverse coded the responses. The scores for the 8 items were added and divided by 8. The reliability coefficient, Cronbach’s alpha, for the 8 items is 0.82. Mean score is 3.167; standard deviation is 0.576.

## **Chapter 6: Formation of Contemporary Japanese Armed Forces**

In an organization, legitimization plays a key role in both its development and survival by providing the organization persistence and comprehensive meanings (Suchman 1995). The founding process of an organization is particularly important as an “imprinting” process in that social and institutional conditions significantly influence organizational structure at the founding of the organization and eventually become institutionalized (Stinchcombe 1965).

In order to understand the institutional basis of organizational practices and professional identity of Japanese service members, I first examine how organizational legitimacy has developed/failed and the ways in which Japanese service members’ sense of self is contextualized within the institutional field. This chapter identifies what values, beliefs, and attitudes are institutionalized as the elements of the military in contemporary Japan, and describes organizational efforts to gain legitimacy by using various strategies. I start with the historic process of the establishment of the SDF, and then discuss how the US Occupation Force and the Government reinterpreted the military institution and the SDF.

### **Constitutional Restriction on Possessing Military Power**

The SDF have severe burdens that cannot be found in other armed forces because of the Constitutional restrictions on military power (Emmerson and Humphreys 1973). World War II was finally over when the radio broadcasted the Imperial Rescript to declare unconditional surrender at noon on August 15 1945. That day was also the last

day of the Imperial Army and Navy, which built a modern Japanese military tradition with a unique mixture of a feudalistic military tradition. Two months later US Occupation Force, the so called GHQ,<sup>20</sup> issued the Civil Liberties Directive, and the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP) directed Deputy Prime Minister Konoye to start revising the Imperial Constitution. After a full-year drafting process, the new Constitution was promulgated in November 1946, and enacted in February 1947. The most notable characteristic of the Constitution is Article 9, which set forth the renunciation of war, no possession of war potential and denial of the right of belligerence of the state.

“Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes. In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized...” (Article 9 of the Japan Constitution, enacted in 1947)

In Article 9, General MacArthur expressed his intention of establishing the ultimately pacifist Constitution and making Japan the “Switzerland in the Orient” (Hata 1976) although the initial reconstruction plan of Japan did not exclude the possibility of rearming Japan with a constabulary force. In addition to declaring renunciation of war, Article 9 in the Constitution also asserted that the Imperial Army, not the Imperial political regime, was responsible for the social institution that led Japanese society to supra nationalism and atrocities during WWII.

As we interpret Article 9 at face value, the Constitution denies the possession of

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<sup>20</sup> In this dissertation, the term GHQ is applied to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers and its predecessor General Headquarters of the US Army Forces Pacific (GHQ/AFPAC) moved from Manila to Yokohama on August 24 in 1945. On October 2, General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (GHQ/SCAP) was established (National Diet Library 2003).

any military power, which includes the right of self-defense upon an enemy invasion as well as aggressive wars. After the enactment of the uniquely pacifist Constitution, Japan's national security issues seemed to move slowly to determine the future direction in preparation for possible domestic and external security threats, including maintenance of domestic security and rearmament of the nation. However, this idealized expectation for full-fledged autonomy and democracy was betrayed by the establishment of the National Police auxiliary soon after the Korean War broke out. This geopolitical event drastically changed the speed and process of re-institutionalizing the military in contemporary Japan.

The domestic security situation also contributed to the emergence of the predecessor of the Self Defense Forces. Inflation, a deteriorating economic situation, a high unemployment rate, and the lack of food and goods invoked the rise of strikes, demonstrations, insurgency, and other violent incidents.<sup>21</sup> To bring social order and improve domestic security, the police system needed to be enhanced as soon as possible. However, the existing police system had a serious impracticality to ease the unsettling domestic security situation: local government police forces (*Jichitai Keisatsu*) had strong jurisdictional independence from the National Regional Police Force (*Kokka Chihou Keisatsu*). The National Regional Police Force was not authorized to intervene without a request from the local government police force that had jurisdiction. To respond to the immediate needs to improve the domestic security situation, GHQ decided to establish a Japanese police force to support the US Occupation force (The Japan Defense Agency

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<sup>21</sup> Anti-government demonstrations, insurgency, and violent incidents against police officers and American troops (e.g., an assault against American troops in front of the Emperor's palace), insurgency of non-Japanese residents against the government, and quasi-terrorist attacks targeting the public (*Matstukawa Jiken* (incident), *Mitaka Jiken*, *Taira Jiken*, and *Hiroshima Nikkou Jiken*) became prevalent.

1961).

### **The Korean War and the Emergence of the Japanese Armed Forces**

In the dawn of June 25 1950, North Korea invaded South Korea. Within two weeks, the UN Security Council passed three resolutions, which defined North Korea as an aggressor and mandated the United Nations Command (UNC) under the United States. The United States had the political legitimacy and military resources to command the operation to coercively expel North Korean forces from South Korea. The geographical proximity of US troops stationed in Japan was also a factor for the United States to command the UNC, and the US troops in Japan were immediately sent to the Korean Peninsula. On July 8, General MacArthur issued a MacArthur note on the enforcement of a police force. In the note, MacArthur directed Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida to organize a 75,000-man National Police Reserve (NPR) and increase 8,000 members of the Coast Guard to fill the positions for internal security that had been manned by American soldiers.

The US military needed to send the soldiers stationed in Japan to the Korean Peninsula. This was the beginning of the contradictory process of Japan's rearmament against the "idealistic constitutional restriction," which McArthur himself set forth in 1947. To avoid public dispute over the establishment of a quasi-military organization, the NPR, the Occupation Force ordered the Japanese government to organize the NPR under the *Potsdam legislation*, which did not require the regular Japanese legislative procedure. The government authorized the National Police Reserve Regulation (*Keisatsu Yobitai Rei*) on August 9, and it took effect on the same day. Soon after, the General Headquarter

of the Occupation Force (GHQ) started organized the NPR as a police reserve organization with the capability of a quasi-military organization.

As the first step in the process of establishing a police reserve organization, the GHQ and the Government had to distinguish the role of the NPR from the existing police forces. The NPR was defined as the police force directly working for the Prime Minister and completely independent from the National Regional Police and the Local Government Police. The primary mission of the NPR was to supplement “the strength of the National Regional Police and the Local Government Police that is necessary to maintain peace and order within the country” (The National Police Reserve Order 1950).<sup>22</sup> Article 3 of the NPR Order clearly limited the activity of the organization to the activities in which a police force would engage. The temporary formation of the NPR resembled a police force; however, the final organizational formation announced in December 1950 followed a conventional Army division system. This is a typical case of “decoupled organizations” (Meyer and Rowan 1977) whose structures became isomorphic with conventional military organizations, which would not fit to real activities of the Self Defense Forces that emphasizes community cooperation and domestic disaster relief. The SDF tried to fill this gap employing symbolic management strategies.

In August 1950, the NPR started recruiting Non-Commissioned Officers at police department offices nation wide. The rank system adopted the rank system of the police so that recruits did not expect that American soldiers would give them training at

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<sup>22</sup> All the major documents during the occupation were drafted in both English and Japanese. The National Police Reserve Order was drafted in Japanese first, and translated in English. Sadao Anbu, who translated the order in English, chose the word “within,” not “in” in the phrase “to maintain peace and order within the country” to exclude any possible interpretation to allow the NPR for international deployment. His memoir is cited in “Jieitai Junen Shi (The Ten-year History of the Self Defense Forces)” published by the Defense Agency in 1961.

Occupation Force camps. Once recruits were transferred to Occupation Force camps, they expressed strong resentment, and a few of them left the NPR (Defense Agency 1961). Recruitment of officers was the most sensitive and difficult issue for GHQ. Major General Willoughby submitted his proposal for recruiting 400 former Imperial Army officers to the GHQ; however, the proposal was declined because former Imperial military officers were banned from the public sector. Instead, the NPR decided to recruit 1,000 officers from those who had no prior professional military service experience. In March 1951, however, to compensate for the shortage of company officers, the NPR launched a special campaign to recruit the former professional military personnel who were removed from the list of the purged: Two hundreds and forty-five out of three thousand former Imperial military schools graduates, including the 58<sup>th</sup> class of *Rikushi* (Army Recruits), the 74<sup>th</sup> class of *Kaihei* (Navy Recruits), and other military school graduates in the 1945 graduation cohort, became officer candidates.

In 1954, 406 former Imperial Army officers were re-commissioned to enhance the capability of commanding officers by recruiting former officers experienced and skilled in military matters, operations, and leadership. Following this recruiting mission, the NPR also re-commissioned 407 company officers who formerly served the Imperial Army and Navy. Recruiting former Imperial military personnel continued as a part of the regular recruitment (The Japan Defense Agency 1961). The Occupation Force purged former Imperial Army soldiers from the NPR, but eventually had to admit as many as 10,000 former Imperial Navy officers and enlisted personnel to serve the Maritime Guard Unit in the Coast Guard to make up for the shortage of skilled sailors (Tanaka 1997). Letting former Imperial Navy personnel in the service meant that the democratic



Japanese armed forces failed to completely eliminate the former Imperial military from their organization.

In August 1952, the government established the Safety Agency to centralize the operations of the NPR and the Maritime Guard Unit in the Coast Guard. Two months later, the NPR and the Maritime Guard Unit were renamed and enlarged as the 110,000-man Safety Force and the approximately 10,500 Guard Force respectively. In Safety Agency Law, the phrase “supplementing the National Rural Police and Local Autonomous Police Force” was dropped and rephrased as “to maintain peace and order within the country and to protect people’s lives and properties” [translation provided by the author] (Article 4, Safety Agency Law 1952). The omission of the phrase was interpreted to mean the Safety Force and the Guard Force would be assigned to deal with situations that go beyond the capability of the police force. Thus, the Forces equipped and trained the members to meet their needs in these mission situations (The Defense Agency 1961).

In the Japan-US Security Treaty concluded in 1950, the United States encouraged Japan to gradually take responsibility for defense against direct and indirect territorial invasion. Corresponding to the requests of the United States referring to the Security Treaty, the government formed “the Committee for Investigation of Institutions (*Seido Chosa Inukai*)” to conduct research to estimate the minimum level of defense force and economic resources needed for it. In May 1953, the Diet passed two defense laws to establish the Defense Agency and the Self Defense Forces (SDF). At the same time, the House of Councilors also passed a resolution banning overseas deployment of the SDF. Under the Defense Agency, the Security Force and the Guard Force were reformed as the

Self Defense Forces (SDF) in July 1954. The air force (the Air Self-Defense Force) was newly established as well. Under the authority of the Prime Minister, the organization of the SDF consisted of three branches, the Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF), the Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF), and the Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF) (Akaha 1993). The force structure was also updated and more Americanized by adding ASDF, National Defense Council, and the Joint Staff Council. This Americanized organizational structure was viewed as the organization's hidden desire for remilitarization.

However, most military organizations all over the world have similar organizational structures aside from what functions and tasks are really needed for national security. Most militaries have three services, land, sea, and air forces, regardless of geographic location of the national territory that sometimes does not require all three branches for national defense (Avant 2000). In institutional organizations like the military, legitimized formal organizational structures reflect rationalized institutional rules, but those structures are not made to improve organizational efficiency or to purely manage tasks or functions that the organization is assigned to do. Aside from interoperability issue, the organizational structure of the military is supported by institutionalized myths and serves as the criteria for the membership in the profession.

The GSDF started with 130,000-man strength in 6 regional divisions; the MSDF started with a quota of 15,808-man and 5 regional fleets and 1 defense fleet. The newly established ASDF started with only 6,287 and developed the aviation training system first. Parallel to the expansion of the organization, the quota of the Defense Agency increased from 152,115 in 1954 to 33,225 in 1959. The mission statement of the SDF

expanded the spectrum of the missions and emphasized territorial defense against direct and indirect invasion and maintenance of public order.

### **Ceremonial Conformity**

In many cases, when an organization does not gain legitimacy from its external observers, the organization attempts to maximize legitimacy using substantive management strategies such as meeting the observers' performance expectations to the organization and adopting organizational design that conforms to the values, norms, and expectations of the observers. For the SDF, however, it was nearly impossible to conform to constitutional restrictions against possession of any military power because it meant to deny the existence of the organization itself. For this reason, the SDF could not use substantive management strategies (Ashforth and Gibbs 1990) to gain legitimacy. Instead, the SDF have focused on normative and cultural aspects of legitimacy to defend organizational legitimacy, using symbolic management strategies without making substantial changes in the organization.

First, the Japanese government tried to meet societal ideals of national security by defining the goals of the SDF. Although the existence of the SDF cannot gain regulative legitimacy because of Constitutional restrictions, the government has repeatedly announced reinterpretation of Article 9 in the way in which Japan can possess defensive military power. To justify their interpretation, the government had to provide convincing reasoning to the society that national defense using the military power of the SDF is "the right thing to do." The judgments of rightness are free from practical usefulness. Rather, these judgments reflect beliefs about whether the activities of an organization are consistent with socially constructed value systems in the larger society in which the

organization is embedded (Suchman 1995).

Japanese national defense policy follows the Basic Policy for National Defense that was adopted by the National Defense Council and approved by the Cabinet in 1957. The Basic Policy addresses protection of the nation and independence built upon democracy as the objective of national defense and the following four principles to achieve this objective.

- (1) To support the activities of the United Nations and promote international cooperation, thereby contributing to the realization of world peace.
- (2) To promote public welfare and enhance the people's love for the country, thereby establishing the sound basis essential to Japan's security.
- (3) To develop incrementally the effective defense capabilities necessary for self-defense, with regard to the nation's resources and the prevailing domestic situation.
- (4) To deal with external aggression on the basis of the Japan-U.S. security arrangements, pending the effective functioning of the United Nations in the future in deterring and repelling such aggression.

(Basic Policy for National Defense 1957: Translation provided by the Japan Times, Ltd.)

These four principles were drawn from the three fundamental pillars of Japanese National Security Policy: (a) The Constitution; (b) The Japan-U.S. Security Treaty; (c) The Charter of the United Nations. Based on the Basic Policy for National Defense, Japan has set four additional policies on national defense as norms for a moderate defense build-up under the Peace Constitution. The principles include (a) maintenance of an exclusively defense-oriented policy, (b) not becoming a military power that might pose a threat to other countries, (c) strict implementation of civilian control, and (d) observing the Three Non-Nuclear Principles, together with maintaining firmly the Japan-U.S. security arrangements. Table 2 lists these four additional policies derived from the Basic Policy for National Defense. These 3 policies and 4 principles constituted the operational and institutional structure of the SDF as a constabulary force, while the formal structure

of the organization, designed by the US military and manned by some of former professional Imperial Army soldiers, was very much identical to that of a war-fighting force.

**Table 2: Four Additional Policies derived from the Basic Policy for National Defense.**

<b>A. Exclusively Defense-Oriented Policy</b>	The exclusively defense-oriented policy means that military force cannot be exercised until armed attack is initiated, and that the scope and level of use of defense forces are kept to the minimum required for the purpose of self-defense. Moreover, the defense capability to be possessed by Japan must be limited to the minimum necessary level. Thus, this policy refers to the posture of passive defense strategy that is consistent with the spirit of the Constitution.
<b>B. Not Becoming a Military Power</b>	There is no clear definition of a "military power." For Japan, however, "not becoming a military power that might pose a threat to other countries" means that Japan will not possess military capability strong enough to pose a military threat to other countries, beyond the minimum necessary level of the defense capability for self-defense.
<b>C. Observing The Three Non-Nuclear Principles</b>	The Three Non-Nuclear Principles refer to the principles of "not possessing nuclear weapons, not producing them and not permitting their introduction in Japan." Japan adheres to the Three Non-Nuclear Principles as the fixed line of national policy. The Atomic Energy Law also prohibits Japan from manufacturing or possessing nuclear weapons. (Furthermore, Japan ratified the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1976, and placed itself under obligation, as a non-nuclear weapons state, not to produce or acquire nuclear weapons.)
<b>D. Securing Civilian Control</b>	The defense operations of the SDF require approval of the Diet. Administrative works related to defense are fully subordinated to the administrative right of the Cabinet as part of general administrative works.

Source: Defense of Japan 1998 (p.103-104: The Japan Defense Agency/Japan Times 1998).

Added to exclusively defense-oriented policy, Japan highly values the United Nations' policies in security issues. Japan became the 80th member nation of the United Nations in

1956, four and half years after the initial petition for membership. The Diet and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs believed that there would be no contradiction between the Constitutional restriction against use of force and the obligations as a member of the UN.

Japan declared that it would comply with the obligations as a member nation by all means at its disposal. This declaration made it clear that Japan would not fulfill obligatory demands that require means beyond its constitutional restrictions. Before joining the United Nations, the Diet passed a resolution against overseas deployment in 1954. *Shunsuke Tsurumi*, who proposed this resolution, argued that there would remain the possibility of deploying troops to different countries far away from the homeland and repeat the WWII history if we do not limit the range of “self defense” only to territorial defense. The passage of this resolution lacked consideration about the demands on the JSDF for maintaining world peace or alliances (Tanaka 1997).

As early as 1958, the United Nations approached Japan to send troops to the peacekeeping operation in Lebanon. Japan could not comply with the request because of its domestic political dispute over the legality of the newly established JSDF. Japanese society left the inherent incongruence between the peacekeeping concept and the Constitutional restriction as it was and developed the idealistic “UN Centralism” as a key concept in her diplomatic and national security policies. At the same time, the US-Japan security treaty facilitated organizational isomorphism of the SDF in cooperation with the US military. The treaty increased the dependency of the SDF on the US military to supplement the limited capability for territorial defense. This organizational dependency led the SDF to adopt the US military’s manpower policies (e.g., downsizing after the end of the Cold War; the expansion of reserve components) although the SDF or the Defense

Agency had relatively weak justification to introduce those policies to Japan. There is little concern for organizational effectiveness; instead, adopting US organizational systems has been driven by belief and anxiety to keep up with the US military as a successful military organization.

### **Redefining Means and Ends**

The SDF started as a constabulary force, which Janowitz (1960) identified as an emerging dominant type of military organization in the post total war age. In the process of organizing the Japanese armed forces, the constabulary force concept first appeared as a conceptual model for a new democratic Japan's armed force in the correspondence between the GHQ and the Department of Army before the new Constitution was enacted. The US National Security Council was planning to build a force whose nature is between a police force and a military force such as light-armed task force for maintaining internal security (in an emergency, the force will act as regular military force), modeling on the constabulary force organized in Philippines under US occupation (Hata 1976). As Janowitz (1960) suggested, it is difficult for the existing military organization to adopt the constabulary force concept because of the drastic adaptation of the organization that may be required. For the new democratic Japan that had yet to overcome the psychological trauma of committing atrocities and being manipulated and exploited by its own military, it was an extremely difficult task to reconstruct the social definition of the military that distinguishes between a conventional military force and a constabulary force because the constabulary force concept was too subtle and abstract for ordinary Japanese people. As a result, the SDF has been viewed as a conventional military in society while

the organizational activities and goals have materialized based on the constabulary concept.

In addition to the organizational concept, the SDF does not hold some fundamental characteristics of a military organization that are normally observed in almost any armed force. This diversion of the organizational structure is a strategy of maintaining the legitimacy of the organization. At the same time, the lack of fundamental characteristics leads the SDF to be separated from fellow military organizations in other nations. Organizational legitimacy had been constantly at risk since its inception due to the Constitutional restriction against the possession of military power: the absence of a court martial system and no compulsory terms of service (the prohibition of conscription). Kowalski called these two characteristics “two deficiencies” of the Japanese armed forces to maintain military discipline in the organization.

According to Kowalski (undated), the National Safety Force (NSF) was “a military organization under the police laws,” operating “in a twilight zone of legality.” Since the National Police Reserve started as a police auxiliary, neither the NSF nor the SDF had a court-martial system to charge service members who violated the military codes. The absence of a court martial system and reliance on civilian criminal law placed the organization in a gray area between a legitimate military organization and a heavily equipped police reserve.

In terms of compulsory service, the NSF started as an all-volunteer force without a compulsory term of service because its members are technically police officers. The Japanese Constitution prohibits conscription because it is involuntary servitude against



one's own will, which is the violation of Articles 13 and 18 of the Constitution.<sup>23</sup> Under the Japanese Constitution, involuntary imprisonment for criminals is the only involuntary servitude permissible. Taking into consideration the legal ground that makes conscription illegal, the “citizen soldier” concept — the core concept of American democracy— is missing in Japanese democracy, albeit Japanese society adopted democracy and the Constitution from the United States.

The history of modern Japanese conscription strongly contributed to the absence of conscription in post-World War II Japan. Unlike the United States, Japanese conscription was initially launched not with a strong sense of patriotism nor support for the national sovereign. Under the ruling conservative oligarchs of Meiji Japan, 3-year conscription started in 1870, but exemption, including paying for a substitute, was common. Paying for a substitute was only allowed for the upper class. The conscription system was revised in 1873 and again in 1883. It was a sign of expansion of Meiji Japan and oppression of the non-ruling class, especially peasants and commoners. In post-World War II Japan, the institutionalization of a conscription-based large standing army became impossible due to its unconstitutionality and very little external threat (Brendle 1975). In any case, devaluing military service as a citizen obligation significantly reduces the institutional value and social status of military professionals in society. This is a critical political and societal factor for the organizational development of the military.

The organization has maintained the organizational symbols of a non-traditional,

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<sup>23</sup> Article 13: All of the people shall be respected as individuals. Their right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness shall, to the extent that it does not interfere with the public welfare, be the supreme consideration in legislation and in other governmental affairs.

Article 18. No person shall be held in bondage of any kind. Involuntary servitude, except as punishment for crime, is prohibited (English translation provided by the Government Printing Bureau. The English translation of the Japanese Constitution is available on the National Diet Library website 2003 at <http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/etc/c01.html#3>).

constabulary force instead of taking a risk of losing organizational legitimacy by claiming the authenticity of the military force. These characteristics that are common to the police force furnished the SDF with the constabulary ethos, although the organizational format was transformed into a basic organizational model of modern armed forces, consisting of land, sea, and air in the early stage. The formal structure of the organization is the same as that of a conventional military force for warfighting, while the real activities of the Self Defense Forces have emphasized exclusively passive territorial defense, community cooperation, and domestic disaster relief.

Results of government polls on national security issues show that these missions are recognized as the main missions of the SDF. The SDF could have not survived if its activities were purely training for combat. This is a case of “decoupled organizations” (Meyer and Rowan 1977) whose structures and activities are separated, and when the integration of the two domains can cause a serious operational issue, such separation serves as a buffer for an organization to survive. In the social environment in which regulative legitimacy is questioned, the SDF tried to gain legitimacy by manipulating their own structures and activities to the extent to which the organizational activities are congruent with value systems and meet societal needs. Gaining legitimacy through conformity to the environment is a safe and easy strategy when the ground of organizational legitimacy is as weak as the SDF because manipulating the organizational structure for conformity to the environment is a sign of loyalty to the existing cultural order, and causes little conflict with the existing institutional logic (Meyer and Rowan 1977). Within individual organizations, conformity with the social environment can be gained easily by manipulating their own structures (Suchman 1995) without mobilizing

resources or making arrangements with the professional sector.

### **Reinterpretation of the Military**

The Japanese government organized the SDF whose formal structures were built based on those of the US military. Regardless, the Government, the Defense Agency, and the SDF had to redefine the military institution in a way in which organizational legitimacy can be provided under the Constitutional restrictions. After the Constitution was enacted, the Japanese military institution was quickly diverted from that of the Prussian military model. The diversion of the Japanese armed forces, however, was not in the organizational structure, but in the meaning of the military institution in society. The meaning and the function of the SDF have been constantly debated and challenged, which substantially localized the meaning of the military within society. The meaning discussed here is cultural meaning, a certain meaning of a social entity that is constructed within a given culture. Cultural meaning characterizes the identities that constitute the goals that someone located in a particular position obtains and maintains through the mechanism of identity verification (Burke 2004). In this sense, political debates over the definitions of the SDF are the conjuncture between the social structure and identity of SDF personnel (*jieikan*).<sup>24</sup>

Although the JSDF is treated as the Japanese military overseas, it has never been called “the military (*guntai*)” within Japanese society because Article 9 of the

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<sup>24</sup> In this dissertation, I will call SDF personnel Japanese service members, *jieikan* (self defense personnel) or *jieitaiin* (self defense members) to avoid imposing the Western cultural concept of “soldiers” and losing the subtle but critical distinction in the meanings implied in *jieikan* and *jieitaiin*. Despite the fact many researchers just call JSDF members “Japanese soldiers,” SDF personnel are officially not *gunjin* (military person) or *heitai* (soldier). Using the term “soldier” imposes the prescribed “soldier” identity based on a traditional warrior ethos and undermines the process of their identity formation and how JSDF members define who they are.

Constitution prohibits the nation from possessing any military power.<sup>25</sup> The government announced the official interpretation of Article 9, claiming the rights of maintaining the minimum necessary level of armed strength to exercise territorial defense and the legality of the SDF as an armed organization for territorial defense. The Japanese government made a strict distinction between military power (*senryoku*) and defense force (*boeiryoku*) by defining defense force as strictly limited to the minimum level for territorial defense. The government applied the same logic that they used to separate *senryoku* and *boeiryoku* to legitimize the existence of the armed forces to compromise the Constitutional restriction. The government argued that the SDF is not a military because the SDF will not be engaged in an armed conflict exercising *senryoku* but will defend the country exercising *boeiryoku*, which complies with the Constitutional restrictions on engagement in warfighting. The definition has been consistent since the inception of the SDF. It is summarized well in the following statement by the Chief of the Cabinet Legislation Bureau Yoshida.

“Generally speaking, *senryoku* is literally force to fight. Speaking solely on this meaning, we can say that all the organizations with coercion have *senryoku*. However, *senryoku*, which is prohibited in Item 2 in Article 9 of the Constitution is the one that exceeds the necessary minimum level for defense.....” (Yoshida, November 13 1972 at the House of Councilors Budget Committee).

However, the government has repeatedly defended the right of self-defense (*jieiken*) and military power to exercise the right. In the Diet, therefore, the difference between belligerence and *jieiken* and the definition of *senryoku* in relation with *jieiken*

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<sup>25</sup> Minister of Foreign Affairs Nakayama commented at a plenary session of the House of Representatives on October 8th 1990 that “*Jieitai* (the JSDF) is subject to the restriction under the Constitution, which prohibits the possession of more than the minimum and necessary level of force, so that it is different from the military that is commonly conceptualized. However, it is treated as the military under the International law, and the JSDF personnel is equivalent to the constituents of the military” (p.540: Asagumo Shinbun 2002).

were repeatedly discussed in various occasions over time. In 1959, Secretary General of the Defense Agency Seiichi Ohmura replied to a question by Budget Committee Member Atsushi Fukuda. Ohmura simply admitted that the Constitution does not deny the right of self-defense referring that a state should naturally possess the right of self-defense as an independent sovereign.

“The Constitution renounced war, but not contention for self-defense (*jieiken*). First, war and the threat or use of force is renounced only ‘as means of settling international disputes’ Second, if we have armed attack from another nation, interrupting armed attack is exactly the same as exercising the right of self-defense, thereafter, this is fundamentally different from settling international disputes” (Ohmura 1949: Budget Committee at the House of Representative, December 22).

Ohmura then concluded that having the SDF is not illegal since the Constitution allows the nation to have troops with capability (*jitsuryoku butai*) to protect the right of self-defense that Japan should have as an independent sovereign. His statement was the official interpretation of the then Hatoyama Cabinet. Ohmura continued his statement on the legality of the SDF.

“Is the SDF a military? The SDF has a mission to protect [Japan] from the invasion of a foreign country. If you call this the military, the SDF can be called the military. However, possessing troops with this type of capability is not against the Constitution.”  
(Ohmura 1949: Budget Committee at the House of Representative, December 22).

This definition is somewhat more relaxed than the one that former Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida gave in the Diet sessions in 1946. According to Yoshida, the NPR was not a military because it is to maintain public order; thus, organizing the NPR was not the rearmament of Japan.<sup>26</sup>

Having a self-contradicting official definition of the organizational role has two very critical implications for the SDF and its organizational concept. The government

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<sup>26</sup> See the Records of Budget Committee sessions in the House of Representative on February 22 and March 27 1946 in the 10<sup>th</sup> Diet Session.

abandoned the dominant definition of the military to justify the existence of the SDF under the Peace Constitution. However, formal organizational structure, expected activities, training, and equipment are undeniably military. It is normal that organizations change their organizational definition over time to adjust to environmental change. As a state-sponsored organization, most of the military does not have any legal issue to exist although there are many countries that specifically restrain the spectrum of the missions that they can carry out. In Japan's case, organizational legitimacy could not be gained without self-denial as a military organization.

The governmental definition of the SDF forced the SDF to deny its existence as a military organization to protect the country from enemy invasion, which is one of the primary missions for every single contemporary state-supported military organization. As a result, the SDF have to constantly live with a dual identity, which requires the organization to look as unmilitaristic as possible but be capable of dealing with armed confrontation in case of enemy invasion. This inconsistency of macro-level organizational concept has created numerous meso- and micro- level organizational controls to legitimize the organization. On the other hand, the organizational ambiguity enlarged the incompatibility to the conventional military in operations and organizational culture. It could significantly lower the credibility of the SDF as a military organization.

As discussed above, rapid localization and lack of legitimacy of organizational existence in the first 10 years of organizational history isolated the SDF from its host society and fellow military organizations as well. The localization accelerated the separation between the organizational structure and actual activities, and the separation became a buffer against the lack of legitimacy by providing functions that are atypical of

a military organization. Such atypical activities were still too weak to change societal perception about the SDF, but became the lifeline for the organization. To keep this lifeline, the SDF have been using various strategies to localize its organizational activities.

Since the SDF has a dubious legal ground to exist, the organization has attempted to legitimize itself by restricting organizational activities to passive territorial defense and domestic humanitarian assistance. In other words, the organization failed to legitimize itself so that the SDF tried to legitimize its existence by modifying the social definition of the military within society. The core concept of Japan's national security is strictly limited to passive territorial defense, called *senshu bouei*<sup>27</sup>, which allows the SDF to exercise force only when another country initiates an armed attack on Japan. Most notably, military terminology was removed from the official organizational chart and materials while the organization adopted the US military organizational structure.

### **Denial and Concealment: Euphemizing Military Terminology**

At the cognitive level of the organization, language plays a significant role in generating and maintaining organizations. Language defines the reality of the organization and is a key strategy of gaining legitimacy to help create organizational reality by “linguistic enactments of its members in the course of their everyday communications between each other” (p.126: Evered 1983). Language can epitomize and alleviate the understanding of experiences, and can create a system of meanings (Berger and Luckman 1966). Societal contexts—institutional and political conditions — are essential components of vocabulary beyond a systematic sequence of letters (Mills 1972).

Previous studies (Humphreys 1975; Hook 1996; Früstück and Ben-Ari 2002) have

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<sup>27</sup> Senshu-bouei means exclusively defense-oriented national defense.

argued that demilitarization of military terminology by US Occupation Force and the Japanese government was a “strategy to actively address its problematic existence” (p.1: Früstück and Ben-Ari 2002) and a way to “prevent any sense of linkage to the old imperial structures” (p.38: Humphreys 1975). In a study of organizational language in the US Navy by Evered (1983), the language used by its organizational members suggest a) its similarities to and differences from other organizations, b) its societal role, and c) shared view and realities among organizational members. The use of language in the SDF is used to emphasize the difference from the Imperial military and to keep the organizational image of the SDF as a non-military organization. From the organization charts to rank, equipment, and the manuals, most military terminologies were replaced by equivalent non-military terms. For example, US Army Colonel Frank Kowalski, who was in charge of organizing the NPR at the SCAP, cautioned Major Stevens, who had newly joined his staff regarding language use:

“The Japanese Constitution prohibits having a military. So, you should not call enlisted personnel soldiers and officers by military ranks. You should call a soldier *keisa* (patrol men), and an officer *keisatsushi* (police officers) or *keisatsusei* (police official). If you see a tank, you should call it *tokusha* (special vehicle). By the way, a truck can be called a truck” (p.92: Kowalski 1969) [English translation was provided by the author of the present dissertation].

According to Kowalski (1969), American officers were reproached when they mistakenly called NPR personnel in commanding positions by military rank. The NPR adopted the name of ranks from the police force. He confessed that it was too obvious that what the US Occupation Force and Japanese government officials were creating was nothing but the army; however, they still had to deny the fact in public.

The language used in an organizational context normally makes sense out of organizational phenomena in order for organizational members to share meaning and to



collectively work to accomplish goals (Smircich 1983). Usually, it improves organizational efficiency because the organizational members can share meaning, which makes their choice of the best behavioral and attitudinal choice easier. On the other hand, shared meaning does not always lead organizational members to maximize their productivity, rather group conformity. Earlier research on Japanese national security suggested that SDF members successfully internalized this seemingly contradicting organizational reality through language use. Emmerson (1970) described uneasiness among SDF General and executive officers when they were called “General” and “Colonel” by US military officers in English because these ranks were for military officers, not for SDF officers. The language system in the SDF was designed to deprive SDF personnel of a conventional military ethos and remind them of the societal role of the organization as a constabulary force and as a military “fait accompli” with an ambiguous legal ground.

The government refused to identify the SDF as a military organization to legitimize the existence of the organization while the Government partially admitted the nature of the organization as a military shown in the official interpretation by the Hatoyama Cabinet in 1948. Complex legal interpretation and lack of regulative legitimacy led the SDF to gain normative and cognitive-cultural legitimacy by fostering a constabulary ethos and exclusively defensive national security policies and persuading society through manipulation of language.

Although these strategies for gaining legitimacy targeted the social environment, they affected internal legitimacy within the organization. In the shift from the NPR and the Security Force to the SDF, behavior of personnel has been regulated by non-coercive

codes of conducts. These codes have power to penalize personnel with pay cuts, demotions, and reprimands, but do not have legal force beyond the civilian criminal law because of the lack of a court martial system in the SDF. Accordingly, the code of conduct emphasizes ethics of the personnel's behavior. In the NPR and the Security Force, the oaths stated the responsibility of the personnel to maintain peace and order of Japan. In the NPR, the oath included the phrase 'to secure public well-being,' which was restated as "to protect people's lives and properties" in the Security Force oath of service. In 1954, based on the Prime Minister's Office Ordinance No.40 "Self Defense Forces Enforcement Regulations," defense missions were newly assigned to the SDF. Reflecting the nature of the newly assigned duty, the SDF oath for general service (*ippan no fukumu no sensei*) identifies mission as territorial defense and behavioral and attitudinal standards for SDF personnel.

"I am aware of the mission of the Self Defense Forces to protect the peace and independence of our country and comply with laws. With total cooperation, I maintain strict discipline, constantly cultivate virtue and faithfulness (*tokusou*), respect individual personality, train myself mentally and physically, improve my skills, refrain from being involved in political activities, and devote myself to missions with strong sense of responsibility. Regardless of my own safety facing a situation, I will try to accomplish my duty with all my heart and mind and strength. Thereby I take this oath to meet people's commitment." (The Prime Minister's Office Ordinance No.40 "Self Defense Forces Enforcement Regulations," 1954)

Unlike the ones of the NPR and the Security Force, the SDF oath no longer had any description about maintaining public order within society as its primary mission. The organizational goal shifted to fight against external threats rather than internal threats. However, the oath still embraces the ambiguity of the organizational existence when we compare it with the US military oath of enlistment.

"I, \_\_\_\_\_, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; and that I will obey the orders of the President of the United States and the orders of the officers appointed over me, according to regulations and the Uniform Code of Military Justice. So help me God." (Title 10, US Code 1978 1960, and 1962).<sup>28</sup>

The American oath of enlistment specifies "against all enemies, foreign and domestic," while there is no specificity in the Japanese oath of enlistment. In the Japanese oath, the phrase, "facing a situation (*koto ni nozonde ha*)," implies enemy invasion or national emergency but there is significant latitude left to interpret what the situation means.

Systematic avoidance of clarity on the organizational orientation and denial of organizational identity as a military was heightened in the organizational language of the SDF. The absence of a new organizational concept for the SDF made it difficult for the general public to distinguish its function and purpose from those of the Imperial Army. To claim that the SDF is a constabulary force as the US government initially planned to design the armed forces for the new democratic Japan, it was necessary to at least temporarily admit that the SDF and its predecessors were fundamentally the military to become a constabulary force, which could have jeopardized organizational survival before developing an organizational foundation. Instead of taking the risk, the Defense Agency proposed an abstract and rosy picture of the organization. The new democratic government tried to promote the SDF as the "loveable" and "people's" Self Defense Force, which showed a sharp contrast to the Imperial Army's view of a soldier as a "direct retainer of the emperor" (Inagaki 1975:p.3). In "*Jieikan no kokorogamae*" (mental

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<sup>28</sup> Act of 5 May 1960 replaced the wording first adopted in 1789, with amendment effective 5 October 1962.

preparation of SDF personnel) issued on June 28 1961, it emphasizes the unity of SDF personnel with the Japanese people in describing the ideal mental states of SDF personnel: “Whether peacetime or wartime, SDF personnel should be proud of sacrificing themselves beyond their own interests, taking people’s hearts as their own hearts.” Interestingly enough, the *kokorogamae* much more clearly lists the mission of the SDF than the oath:“ 1) We will defend our people and nation, which has been abundantly developed and passed on to us by generations of worthy forefathers, against foreign invasion; 2) We will maintain public peace and order that built upon freedom and responsibility.”

Although the Defense Agency and the SDF chose a cognitively complex approach rather than a straightforward but confrontational strategy to build the organizational identity, the strategic choice was not solely made by the organization. This is a consequence of the interactions between the organization (the SDF) and the environment (the society). The meanings associated with demilitarized military terminology are connected to the social structure and culture of contemporary Japan. Among environmental factors, “anti-militarism” (Berger 1998), one of the key cultural elements in contemporary Japanese society, seemed to play a significant role in the process in which the SDF found the ground of the organization. Anti-militarism influenced Japan’s national security policies and guided the SDF to the direction of today’s SDF. Once the environment let the organization survive in a particular form, the organization maintains and enhances the patterns of the operations to maximize the survivability in the environment. As a result, the SDF have enhanced their constabulary nature and diverged from the structure and activities of a conventional military as much as possible. At the

same time, anti-militarism has significantly lowered the general knowledge level of the Japanese public about national security issues, which interfered with interactions and understanding between the SDF and the larger society. A more problematic consequence is that the separation of the SDF from the larger society left the society unaware of the subtle but critical conceptual difference between the military force and the constabulary force.

### **Legitimacy of the Military in the Early Post WWII Era**

Germany and Japan were both democratized by US occupation forces, but the Japanese armed forces were far more stigmatized in society than those in Germany. Berger (1998) listed three factors that distinguish American occupation in Japan from that in Germany: the actual social conditions when the two countries unconditionally surrendered; the way in which sense of war guilt and de-militarization were handled; and the process by which their new political institutions were created. Compared to Germany's, Japan's defeat was far less total: much greater degree of continuity was kept since the Japanese administration succeeded in preserving continuity in the government bureaucracy. Regardless of the painless shift into American occupation, this preserved continuity in the government system let the old political elites and bureaucrats maintain their political positions. Linguistic and cultural barriers also made it extremely difficult for the SCAP to completely purge and reform the local bureaucracy in Japan.

Among the three factors that made the US occupation in Japan different from that of Germany, how sense of collective guilt and war crime were handled in the process of rebuilding new political institutions played a critical role in the process of reinstitutionalizing the military between Germany and Japan. In Germany, both civilian

and military Nazi party members were prosecuted and purged as war criminals. Purges in Japan exclusively targeted military elites. Very small numbers of businessmen and government officials were removed from political positions, while 117,000 former Imperial military officers and soldiers were barred from taking political positions in the new democratic government. Although such an inconsistent purge was necessary to preserve Emperor Hirohito and the imperial institution as a societal symbol in post war Japan, the disproportionate prosecution between civilian and military elites stigmatized the armed forces. There is another factor that stigmatized the armed forces in Japan. Berger (1998) suggested that the Japanese had sense of “dual victimization” by their own military leadership and by foreign countries’ occupation of Japan after the defeat. The former seems to be adequate: the Japanese felt that they had been victimized by Japan’s wartime military leadership and its expansionism. However, the latter seems to be less convincing. Instead of foreign countries’ occupation, I would like to emphasize the sense of victimization as the first nation whose people were victimized by nuclear weapons, taking into consideration that victimization by atomic bombs dropped in Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945 provided the momentum of anti-militaristic movements in post-WWII Japan.

In contrast, Germany had new political leaders who conducted a fundamental reform of the political institution and confronted the atrocities of the Nazis. In the reconstruction process, Germany and Japan developed similar aversions to military power and fostered “antimilitarism,” (Berger 1998) which is different from “pacifism.” Antimilitarism is rooted in their strong aversions to military power reflecting people’s collective guilt associated with the militaristic regime before and during WWII. In Japan,

the military was degraded in every account. As the US occupation dismantled the Imperial military, the Japanese people cooperatively rebuffed militarism. For veterans, very little governmental or social support was provided (Humphreys 1975).

In both Germany and Japan, the military was absent in the initial process of building the new political institutions. The relationship between the military and democracy was systematically estranged through the new social institutions. The Japanese Constitution and the German *Grundgesetz* (Basic Law) that renounce war have served as the core of German and Japanese national security policies since then.

In Japan, public hostility against militarism became radical after the renewal of the Japan-US Security Treaty in 1960. The 1950 Japan-US Security Treaty and its renewal was one of the primary political concerns of the Japanese public from the 1950s to the early 1960s. The Japanese public felt that full independence from the US Occupation Force should be acquired by discontinuing the treaty. Despite the people's hope, the Kishi Cabinet passed the bill of the renewed Security Treaty at midnight on May 20 1960. Rage against the anti-democratic legislation process mobilized approximately 300,000 people and heightened the student movement against the treaty and rearmament of Japan in universities and colleges all over Japan. The Kishi Cabinet resigned the next month.

During this event, the Government requested the SDF to send troops to support the riot police to control mass protests, but the Director General of the Defense Agency rejected the request (Tanaka 1997). The National Police Agency firmly resisted the idea of requesting the SDF support the riot police to maintain public order against mass demonstrations to maintain its norm of restrictive non-violence strategy (Katzenstein

1996). This was a critical organizational decision for the National Police Agency because blurring the boundary between the police and the SDF would jeopardize the legitimacy of the police. Rejecting the deployment request from the government to suppress protesters symbolizes the conflicting organizational position of the SDF. For the SDF, sending troops to suppress protesters could decrease legitimacy and disband the organization by violating organizational policy to protect Japanese citizens. Since protesters were enraged, but ordinary Japanese citizens, using force to suppress them would evoke a historical negative image of the military as a violent oppressor to people. At the same time, the refusal of sending troops meant that the SDF admitted its unique role as a military against external threats, not a quasi-police force to resolve internal threats.

The series of incidents in 1960 quickly developed an organizational myth among the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) leaders: national security issues became political taboo in the early stage of democratic Japan (Tanaka 1997; Berger 1998). The LDP leaders dealt with defense issues in the Diet only if international political pressure required them to bring the issue to the table. For the Japanese public, renewal of the security treaty had a larger implication for democracy. Prime Minister Kishi's move made the public deeply suspicious that the LDP and right wing politicians would remilitarize Japan and undermine democracy under the name of national security concerns (Berger 1998). The strong linkage between anti-democracy and national security issues developed through the events of 1960 provided the SDF another layer of unfavorable image as a symbol of anti-democracy.

## **Summary**

This chapter reviewed the founding process of the SDF and strategies of



defending the self-claimed regulative legitimacy that the US occupational force and the Government provided for the SDF and gaining normative legitimacy in society.

Since the post war democratic Constitution prohibits the possession of any military power, the Self Defense Forces had an inherent legal and political constraint to gain organizational legitimacy. When the precursor of the SDF —the National Police Reserve — was established in 1951, Japanese society had not fully recovered physically or psychologically from the horrific memory of WWII ruled by the oppressive Imperial Army. Before the rearmament of Japan, there was no time for Japanese people to reflect on and develop a new identity learned from war crime that their own people committed or let happen during WWII. Haunted by the dark and gruesome image of the Imperial Army, the development of contemporary Japanese armed forces is characterized by the redefinition process of the military, not the development of a new military (Katzenstein 1996). More precisely, it is the process by which the SDF has separated the organization from the unwanted predecessor and prove the difference to the larger society that is the weary captive audience in Japanese civil-military relations.

For an organization, the meaning, legitimation, or higher-level of support from the wider social system is necessary to make the implementation of the organization's goals possible. In response to such institutional support, the organization needs to shape its operations in a way in which they are congruent with the normative structure of society (Parsons 1956). However, for the SDF, there was no form of institutional support available except governmental support. This institutional environment forced the SDF to keep negotiating with the larger society in order to manage its legitimacy. Normally, organizations without cultural, normative, and legal supports are less likely to survive

than organizations with these supports because “legitimacy exerts an influence on organizational viability independent of its performance or other attributes or connections” (Scott 1995: p.158). At the same time, organizations are not entirely passive to institutional environments that constitute them; organizations can tactically react to the pressures from institutional environments and manage views of their legitimacy for survival and achieving goals. Although excessive protesting to gain legitimacy drives away support from audiences (Ashforth and Gibbs 1990), in response to criticism from the public, the SDF kept protesting to secure its legitimacy. Such aggressive pursuit of legitimacy put the SDF into a “vicious circles” of legitimation (Ashforth and Gibbs 1990), and marginalized the SDF in society. The next chapter will further discuss the strategies that the SDF introduced to defend legitimacy and the role of *jieikan* as active agents of the SDF in the management of failed legitimacy.

## **Chapter 7: Symbolic Management and Professional Identities**

As reviewed in the previous chapter, the failure to gain legitimacy in the founding process isolated the SDF from the larger society and caused distrust in the Japanese public on national security policies. As a result of not having acquired a sufficient level of legitimacy in the founding process, the SDF had to spend enormous time and resources to gain social acceptance in order to survive in a society whose dominant value system does not view the military as a legitimate social organization. Lack of legitimacy under the peace Constitution, however, necessitated the SDF to use symbolic management strategies instead of substantive management strategies to gain legitimacy. Symbolic management strategies are closely related to the normative and cultural-cognitive aspects of institutions. The normative element of an institution emphasizes “internalization of and compliance with collective values and norms”; the cognitive element emphasizes consistency with cultural-cognitive schemas and models: legitimacy as recognizable, taken-for-granted structures and behavior” (p.218: Scott, et al. 2000).

Although symbolic management targets external observers to support the organization, it also affects organizational members’ attitudes and behavior over time because institutions shape the basis of one’s identities (Wicks 2002). The previous studies have consistently found this initial failure and isolation of the military institution in democratic Japan (see Brendle 1973; Inagaki 1975; Katzenstein and Okawara 1993; Tanaka 1997). Despite a considerable number of studies on civil-military relations in post war Japan, little attention has been given to service members’ professional identities or the impact of the undesirable civil-military relations on the SDF as a professional

organization.

I hypothesize that symbolic management strategies that the SDF relied on to gain legitimacy shaped the organizational culture and created the unconventional behavioral and attitudinal standards (ideal type) for SDF personnel. Therefore, this chapter focuses on symbolic management strategies to defend legitimacy for organizational survival and how SDF personnel internalize their tainted professional identity. I examine how Japanese service members shape their professional identity, managing the morally and physically tainted image of the profession and negative feedback from the public. Furthermore, I discuss the significance of dirty work in society, and provide an explanation why the SDF is necessary to maintain the anti-military culture in contemporary Japanese society.

### **Espousing Socially Acceptable Goals**

Socially acceptable To ease the concern about Japan's rearmament, the Defense Agency set a self-imposed cap on defense expenditure. In the National Defense Council and Cabinet meeting on November 15 1976, the defense expenditure was set under 1 percent of the Gross National Product (GNP). This budgetary limitation did not cause any financial difficulty to the Defense Agency and the SDF. Pressure from the Ministry of Finance made the Defense Agency set the budgetary limit, but the 1 percent limit was not really a restrictive limit, rather a reasonable one in because the defense expenditure in the past several years did not exceed 1 percentage (Harada 1991) (see Table 3). Regardless, the 1 percent of GNP cap (and later the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) was adopted) became a significant indicator for the Japanese public and neighboring Asian nations to

**Table 3: Japan's Defense Related Expenditure since 1955.**

Year	GNP•GDP (million yen)	Defense Expenditure (million yen)	% of GNP• GDP	Growth from Previous Year
1955	75,590	1,349	1.78	3.3
1965	281,600	3,014	1.07	9.6
1970	724,400	5,695	0.79	17.7
1971	843,200	6,709	0.80	17.8
1972	905,500	8,002	0.88	6.98
1973	1,098,00	9,355	0.85	6.55
1974	1,315,00	10,930	0.83	6.39
1975	1,585,000	13,273	0.84	21.4
1985	3,146,000	31,371	0.99	6.9
1990	4,172,000	41,593	0.99	6.1
1991	4,596,000	43,860	0.95	5.45
1992	4,837,000	45,518	0.94	3.8
1993	4,953,000	46,406	0.94	1.95
1994	4,885,000	46,835	0.96	0.9
1995	4,928,000	47,236	0.96	0.86
1996	4,960,000	48,455	0.98	2.58
1997	5,158,000	49,414	0.96	1.98
1998	5,197,000	49,290	0.95	0.3
1999	4,963,000	49,201	0.99	0.2
2000	4,989,000	49,218	0.99	0.0
2001	5,186,000	49,388	0.95	0.3
2002	4,962,000	49,395	0.99	0.0
2003	4,986,000	49,265	0.99	0.3
2004	5,006,000	48,764	0.97	1.0

Source: Defense of Japan 1976 and 2004 (The Defense Agency 1976; 2004).

evaluate the remilitarization of Japan. Table 4 illustrates the top 6 nations in defense expenditures in 2003. Japan constantly has spent over 43 trillion yen (approximately 40 billion US dollar) and the fourth largest in the world, while the ratio of defense expenditure to the 1 percent of GDP is the lowest among the top 10 nations on defense expenditure. For example, Saudi Arabia spent 18.3 billion dollars for defense related expenditure, which is equivalent to 13.0 percent of the nation's GDP.

Based on an exclusively defensive security policy, the force used for territorial defense is limited to the minimum necessary level capability for self-defense. Under this

policy, the acquisition of offensive and potentially offensive equipment and weapon systems is also prohibited. However, these self-imposed limitations on financial and performance capacities in national defense were not enough to reduce institutional pressure from the public on the SDF.

**Table 4: The Nations Spending the Most Defense Expenditure**

Country	Defense Expenditure (US billion dollar)	Ratio of Defense Expenditure to GDP (%)
US	276	3.2
China	55.9	4.3
France	46.5	2.6
United Kingdom	31.7	2.3
Germany	38.8	1.4
Japan	39.5	1.0

Source: CIA 2003 World Factbook. (The Central Intelligence Agency 2003).

Regardless of an exclusively defensive security policy, the unpopularity of the SDF continued to grow in the society. A few social changes that took place also made it more difficult for the SDF to integrate with the larger society. Rapid economic growth in the 1960s expanded job opportunities for the youth, which created a serious manpower shortage for the SDF, and resulted in a decline of the quality of recruits. The deterioration of the quality of the personnel added another negative organizational image in society. As the requirements for enlistment in the SDF shows, a high school diploma has not been and still is not officially required for applicants to join the enlisted corps except for aviation students (*kouku gakusei*).<sup>29</sup>

<sup>29</sup> Criteria for enlistment are only age (between 18-26 years old) and Japanese citizenship. Applicants need to pass written and physical exams and an interview. The criteria remains still the same today although now it is increasingly competitive for those who without high school diploma to join the force because an overwhelming number of high school and college graduates apply for enlistment. In the GSDF, 10 percent of the recruits hold college degree (Yamaguchi 2002). *Kouku gakusei* is a unique system to train future ASDF and MSDF pilots by providing a 2-year training and education to high school graduates. Each service has a different school facility

A series of protests against the renewal of the Japan-US Security Treaty in 1960, coupled with rapid economic growth, spoiled the reputation of the SDF as an employer among the eligible youth, and perpetuated the manpower shortage. As a result, the SDF could not reach its recruitment goals in the late 1980s: they were 30,000-40,000 men short every year (Katzenstein and Okawara 1993). Because of the manpower shortage, low standards of screening and selection and desperate recruiting campaigns enhanced the negative image of the SDF. Interviewees, who joined the force in the 1980s or earlier, confirmed that the recruiter was not a popular job among NCOs. It was not unusual that recruiters went to a shopping district and randomly tried to recruit young men who were hanging out at a pachinko (pinball) parlor or on the streets. Their struggle resembles to the recruitment crisis that the US military has experienced after the end of the Iraq War in 2003, but unlike the United States there was no societal value or virtue in serving the country in Japanese society. Chronic manpower shortage continued until the economic crisis in the early 1990s restructured the Japanese labor market and filled in the wage gap between civilian workers and government employees.

One of the main concerns that Japanese national security watchers share is the remilitarization of Japan. Japanese society has carefully monitored any military activities that the SDF and its personnel conduct, which may go beyond exclusively defense-oriented national security policy. Any proactive exercises including desk simulations to prepare for national emergencies are prohibited. The *Mitsuya* study (*Mitsuya Kenkyu*) was one of the national defense-related scandals that became a subject of public scrutiny during the Cold War period. The *Mitsuya* study was a simulation exercise conducted in

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and different curriculum. During training *kouku gakusei* hold NCO ranks. After finishing the training program, *kouku gakusei* become officers.

the Defense Agency to study operations of SDF troops and other relevant issues based on a scenario in which a conflict breaks out in the Korean Peninsula and affects Japanese national security. The *Mitsuya* study was a classified study, but it became public in the Diet by Haruo Okada from the Socialist Party in February 1965. A focus of the dispute was that the simulation including the procedure for wartime emergency legislation (*yuji housei*). Wartime emergency legislation (*yuji housei*) evoked the haunted image of the Imperial Army's wartime conscription. As Tanaka (1997) pointed out, this type of simulations, including the review of the existing legislation and their issues seems to be a common exercise for armed forces whose primary purpose is territorial defense. However, Prime Minister Eisaku Satoh dismorf the legitimacy of uniformed officers running any simulation to deal with any warlike national emergency (*yuji*). After this incident, studying legislative flaws in case of national emergency (*yuji*) became a taboo within the Defense Agency. This incident introduced an additional normative rule to the SDF to defy the very activity that should define the purpose of the military organization.

Such a normative rule was able to be sustained because post-war Japan did not have any immediate threats, unlike Germany. Germany was constantly prepared for a potential threat from East Germany during the Cold War. Such a difference in the regional security situation between Japan and Germany made a significant difference in social understanding of the military and its role between the two nations. In Germany, on the other hand, the conscription system, supported by the concept "citizen in uniform," helped avoid demonizing the military by the general population. Conscription served as an opportunity for German youths to learn what the military is all about in their daily lives (Berger 1998). In contrast, the Japanese Constitution prohibits conscription because



of its involuntary nature. Illegalizing conscription separated military service from Japanese democracy and increased the abstraction of national security issue in a stable regional security situation during the Cold War era. The SDF is an all-volunteer force, and its size is only 0.2 percent of the general population. There have been very scarce opportunities to promote social understanding of the SDF in society so that the SDF had to control the public image of the organization in various ways.

The more the organization valued the constabulary ethos, the more domestic missions (disaster relief, rescue missions, and civilian cooperation) became emphasized in the SDF. From 1970 to 1975, the SDF dispatched troops on 4,019 occasions including 13 major disasters (e.g., typhoons, a fire on a ship, and recovery of the remains in an air crash). On the other hand, the number of territorial defense missions was much smaller (The Japan Defense Agency 1976). By producing adequate outcomes that meet societal ideals and the self-defined goals to serve the Japanese people, this number of disaster relief missions should have met the goal to show conformity of the organization to societal ideals.

### **Social Significance of the dirtiness of the Military in Japan**

For decades, the SDF has been working on public activities and rescue missions to improve the organizational image, to prove their higher loyalty to Japanese people, and to rise above their stigmatized professional status. However, ironically the problematic existence itself seems to be the most important function of the SDF for the contemporary Japanese society and its psyche.

Following Berger's (1998) model of the national security policy in post WWII

Japan, the above self-imposed organizational policies fundamentally do not work to provide the SDF legitimacy. Norms derived from the “anti-militarism” culture with strict civilian control and strong preference in economic development undermined the role of the military in society. The skepticism of the public and the Peace Constitution play a gatekeeper role in this dynamic. However, Berger (1998) overlooked the dependency of Japan’s anti-militarism on the stigma of the SDF. This dependency makes anti-militarism culture a more effective cultural apparatus to maintain the collective identity of the Japanese. The dirty work theory provides an explanation for the mechanism of the dependency of Japan’s anti-militarism on the stigma of the SDF.

As Berger (1998) emphasized, the ideology of Germany and Japan have on national security is not merely pacifism to pursue peaceful resolutions for conflict situations, but “anti-militarism” that implies active aversion to the use of force. Berger’s argument on Japanese “dual victimization” sentiment suggested a noteworthy social psychological function of Japan’s anti-militarism culture:

“On the one hand, the Japanese felt they had been victimized by the blind ambition of Japan’s wartime military leadership. On the other hand, they also felt victimized by the United States and other foreign nations which, in the Japanese view, had conducted a ruthless campaign of conquest in order to increase their own power” (Berger 1998:p.7).

Anti-militarism culture in contemporary Japan is not merely a noble conversion to prevent rearmament of the nation. Rather, it is a defense mechanism to sustain the Japanese people’s collective identity. The early Japanese peace activism focused on grounding the idea of ordinary Japanese people as another group of war victims during WWII. The Japanese government is a strong supporter of anti-nuclear weapons activism and has remained a nuclear weapons free nation, supporting the three principles against

nuclear weapons (*hikaku san gensoku*). On the other hand, the government did not deal with war crime issues such as compensation and apologies to war victims in neighboring Asian countries, especially sex slaves for the Imperial military, so called comfort women, for more than four decades. It has been just ten years since the government started engaging in resolving these war crimes of the previous war. Japanese society has been trying to dissociate itself from war crimes committed during WWII by characterizing those crimes as exclusively organized and conducted by the Imperial military. In this rhetoric, stigmatizing the military profession as “dirty work” plays a significant role in sustaining the collective identity of the Japanese.

As a function of stigmatization, the individuals who stigmatize a particular group can benefit from doing so by inviting “functional value” for themselves, for the society, or for all of these (Croker, et al. 1998). As Ashforth and Kreiner (1999) suggest, dirty work is socially significant for the public to keep them clean. Societies make connections between cleanliness with goodness and dirtiness with badness. Such cognitive association has moral implications that makes physically and socially tainted occupations morally devalued and insist on removing the badness from the goodness to protect the cleanliness (Douglas 1966, cited in Ashforth and Kreiner 1999). Individuals who stigmatize others (‘the normal’ in Goffman’s term) can believe that they are good (a self-esteem enhancement function), that they are deserving and fair (serving as social control function), and that their world view is correct (serving an “anxiety-buffering” or “terror management” function (Solomon, Greenberg, and Pyszczynski 1991)) (Croker, et al. 1998). Among these stigma functions, the self-esteem enforcement function is especially noteworthy in the analysis of the relationship between the SDF and the larger society. The

stigmatization of the SDF has served as an enforcer of self-esteem of people in post War Japan by motivating positive intergroup comparison. The entire Japanese society could be stigmatized as a former ultramilitaristic nation that has engaged in inhumane conduct to enemy combatants and non-combatants and to their own people. By marginalizing the SDF as dirty work, the society avoided being stigmatized as a whole, at least within society.

According to Dovidio, et al. (2000), when attribution is associated with groups (e.g., racial, ethnic, or national group), social identity and attributions are more important than when the attribution is associated with an individual. The motivation stimulated by distinguishing the self and intergroup members from outgroups leads intergroup members to look for their attributions that can be favorable over the outgroup. This can facilitate active discrimination against outgroups. “Enhancement of one’s own group relative to outgroups, then, reflects positively on collective as well as personal self-esteem” (p8). Although the public was initially eager to tear down the military, it became a convenient and effective tool to keep the larger society innocent.

Societies make every effort to separate cleanliness from dirtiness to keep the main body of the society clean (Ashforth and Kreiner 1999). By allocating dirtiness to those who engage in dirty jobs, societies can forget about dirty jobs that are necessary and avoidable in society and maintain their cleanliness and superiority (Hughes 1962; Ashforth and Humphrey 1995; Ashforth and Kreiner 1999). As long as the society maintains their anti-militaristic sentiment and antagonism against the military institution including the SDF, civilians are deserving and peaceful people. As a side effect, the sense of social responsibility for war victims during WWII remained weak because ordinary

Japanese people are victims of the oppressing military regime. Technically speaking, victims do not have to take action on behalf of the aggressor.

Benefiting from these functions of dirty work, “anti-militarism” culture has provided an effective and psychologically less damaging solution for the Japanese society to sustain a unified, collective identity as the Japanese. Also, until very recently, the SDF was not recognized as “necessary.” Although dirty work is often important and necessary in society, as morally tainted, the public do not find necessity in the military profession. So, the profession came to be viewed not as “necessary evil” but just “evil.” For this reason, stigmatizing the SDF has been rationalized, and integrated into contemporary Japanese democracy as an institutional form of justifiable discrimination with legal support from the Peace Constitution.

### **Denial and Concealment to Defend Legitimacy**

Institutions shape how individuals in the organization interpret the environment and how the interpretation process constructs taken-for-granted understanding of social reality. Thus, institutions shape the basis of one’s immediate social structure and create one’s identity that regulates one’s situational behavior (Wicks 2002). As social, historical, and legal factors continued to limit the opportunities of the SDF to integrate into society for decades, the Defense Agency and the SDF launched strategies to control the public image of the SDF in order to gain social acceptance.

Public services for local festivals and athletic events have been one of the main activities that the SDF had conducted since the 1950s. One of the most widely known public assistance missions is to build snow sculptures for the annual Sapporo Snow

Festival every February. The SDF started assisting the festival in 1955. Since then it has been taken for granted that Ground Self Defense Force personnel carve many sculptures for the festival every winter. However, when the Defense Agency decided to deploy troops from the Northern Army (mostly the 11th Division) to Iraq in 2004, this unique civil assistance program caught the international media attention. The Washington Post and other North American and British media featured the long-lasting “sculpture mission” as a symbolic image of the SDF as a constabulary force. As a result of the deployment of troops from the Northern division, the city had to seek out volunteers and contractors to carve the snow sculptors first time in the half a century long history of the festival (see Faiola 2004). Despite the organizational efforts to integrate into the local community, the presence of the SDF has not always been welcomed. In Okinawa, a Ground Self Defense Force team participates in a traditional boat race held in May every year. However, the team is not allowed to reveal their affiliation with the SDF in the race. In the race, the team is introduced as “the people working for the land (*riku no oshigoto wo suru hitotachi*)” (Tatsumi, et al. 1998b). In April 1998, a professional baseball team invited a group of cadets from the Defense Academy for the opening game to demonstrate their drill. However, once it was found that firing rifles is involved, the sequence of the demonstration was modified because firing guns is inappropriate in the opening game where lots of families with children are present (Asahi Shimbun 1998).

Other than public assistance missions, cognitive strategies that the SDF have used include authority cuteness and gender integration in the SDF. Authority cuteness is McVeigh’s (2000) concept referring to a strategy used by Japanese authorities to soften the power relations and make it easier to control and influence people by displaying

weakness by authority figures. Although these strategies are targeting those who are outside the SDF, they also influence individuals in the organization as well by internalizing a certain image of the organization that is prevalent in the larger society.

### **Authority Cuteness and the Social Status of the SDF**

“While I was waiting for Captain K in the public relations office at the Air Self Defense Force Officer Candidate School in Nara, a young civilian employee handed me a pile of sheets of stickers. She and the head of the public relations office told me that they had too many of these stickers and would be happy if I could take some. On a glittering sheet, there were a lot of small stickers with the two animated characters wearing different types of SDF uniforms. A boy and a girl with huge round eyes, called Paseri-chan and Pikurusu-kun, were on a tank, helicopter, and other heavy armed vehicles. I expressed my gratitude to her, yet could not take my eyes off from the cute stickers. I saw these characters while living in Japan, but never paid close attention to them. After spending several years in the United States, I got used to tall, broad-shouldered American soldiers walking on the street near the Pentagon and the hyper-masculine image of American soldiers in recruitment commercials on TV. Now, these cute animated characters gave me uncomfortable feelings. These characters, Paseri-chan and Pikurusu-kun, were THE mascots of the SDF. They were not just for kids. They are everywhere in the [public relations] magazines. A tour for civilians is even named after one of the characters’ name.” (Author’s field note on May 9 2003)

One of the most noticeable unmilitaristic images of the SDF is the two animated characters: a cute boy and a girl wearing the uniform used in public relations materials. Referring to McVeigh’s (2000) concept, Früstück and Ben-Ari (2002) have pointed out “authority cuteness” represented in these animation characters and the image of women used in public relations materials of the SDF. Applying Goffman’s dramaturgical theory, Brian McVeigh (2000) analyzed school uniforms, dress codes, and cute objects to examine the relationship between micro-level self-presentation and the state in contemporary Japanese society. According to McVeigh, authority cuteness is a strategy that Japanese authorities use to make their tasks of controlling and persuading the general

public easier by softening the authoritarian image through the display of friendly, weak images. Japanese authorities (state agencies, educators, large corporations, etc.) display weakness through innocent animated characters such as babies, children, animals, and creatures smiling and painted with cute colors. For example, the National Police Agency uses cute male and female creatures (Pipo-kun and Pico-chan) in public relations materials. By being surrounded by these soft and vulnerable images, the general public feels the authorities more approachable and conforms to their warnings and persuasion easily. In other words, authority cuteness is a performance of the authority for smooth communication. The general public accepts the soft self presentation of the authority figure, and cooperates with the performance of authorities as the receptive audience.

Figure 4 shows the two characters used by Defense Agency: *Pikurusu*-chan and *Paseri*-chan (Mr. Pickles and Miss Parsley). These short, big-headed, round-eyed, childish figures are characterized as a prince and a princess in neighboring countries of Japan, symbolizing the ideal image of the Defense Agency: “cheerful (*akarui*)” and “friendly (*shitasimiyasui*). They are more than mascots that symbolically represent the organizational image; rather, they are active agents to disseminate the ideal organizational image of the Defense Agency through simplified narratives. The basic story of these two characters is as follows: *Pikurusu*-kun is a prince of a small and peaceful country, the Paprika Kingdom. He initially had a doubt about why his country had a defense force, but he realized the usefulness of the defense force when a neighboring country, the *Sesami* Kingdom, invaded his country. His girl friend, *Pikurusu*-chan, is a daughter of a tribal chief in another neighboring country, the Broccoli Kingdom. When she was once captured by the *Sesami* Kingdom, Pickles-kun rescued her after his defense force



defeated the *Sesami* Kingdom troops that invaded the *Paprika* Kingdom. After that, Pickles-kun came to Japan to serve in the SDF to learn how to improve his country's defense force. Compared to the characters used in other Japanese government agencies,

**Figure 4. Japan Self Defense Force Mascot Characters, Pikurusu-kun and Paseri-chan on A Sheet of Stickers distributed in a Public Relations Office for Civilian Visitors.**



(Front)

(Back)

Reprinted with permission of the Japan Defense Agency.

*Pikurusu-kun* and *Paseri-chan* have much richer background information and their own stories. *Pikurusu-kun* was initially very skeptical about his country's defense force, but

his mindset changed through the experience of enemy invasion.

Although the status of *Pikurusu-kun* in the story is a prince, this is a metaphor of the young generation Japanese who have power to determine the future of the country like a prince. Pickles-kun has no obligation to serve in the military, but he did so because it is important to maintain peace in his country. On the one hand, *Paseri-chan* and *Pikurusu-kun* are the idealized images of the Japanese youth. On the other hand, these characters are an indirect form of challenging the stigmatized attributes of SDF personnel by claiming its loyalty to a higher cause (Sykes and Matza 1957): protecting the country and their noble status as a prince and a tribal chief's daughter, who do not have to serve in the force but do so for a higher cause.

Authority cuteness is an alternative way of gaining and assuring a normative power relation through commercialization and commodification of cute things. Cute objects embedded in everyday life create an objectified sentiment to cuteness, which reinforces symbolic associations between cuteness and abstract values (McVeigh 2000). Cuteness represents the power holder and the subordinate in society such as authority structure and male-female relations. Those who are in power show cuteness to their subordinates as a deceiving self-presentation strategy to gain control over them. On the other hand, displaying cuteness toward the power holder is a strategy to receive attention and favorable treatment (McVeigh 2000). For the former reason, authority cuteness is used as a common strategy in other government agencies in Japan (McVeigh 2000) such as the National Police Agency and the National Personnel Authority. Früstück and Ben-Ari (2002) viewed that the SDF controls and disguises its association with violence using the authority cuteness strategy. However, unlike other state agencies and big corporations,

the SDF have very weak authority and legitimacy. The SDF is not fully supported by legal bodies nor supported by the majority of society; therefore, authority cuteness is not only for softening the image of the organization to exercise the authority smoothly. In this case, the overrepresentation of the un-militaristic features of the public relations materials more resemble the latter case, displaying cuteness to the power holder. The authority cuteness strategy is to gain legitimacy at the micro-social level, rather than the means of disguising Japan's desire to be a major military power.

Wakamori's (1996) observation of the Emperor system and its paradoxical way of maintaining power shows a resemblance to the SDF's use of cute objects. He argued that the contemporary Japanese Emperor system uses its own vulnerability and the necessity of others' presence in contemporary Japanese society. For Wakamori, the vulnerability of the Emperor has the power to eliminate those who deny his existence in the same logic of cuteness. His vulnerability appeals to people's emotions, and people cannot help but protect the Emperor as a cultural icon. It is a human instinct of a mature adult to protect a vulnerable child. Thus, the absence of logic and emptiness are the power of the Emperor system. The vulnerability is a synonym to cuteness. Cuteness makes people uneasy to leave a vulnerable, obedient object behind. This is an effective strategy in society in which "interdependent view of the self" is dominant as Markus and Kitayama (1991) suggested about Asian cultures. In such a society, "both expression and the experience of emotions and motives may be significantly shaped and governed by a consideration of the reactions of others" (Markus and Kitayama 1991: p.225).

Cuteness numbs the ability to think critically and logically and evokes one's other-serving emotions and motivations; it eventually builds an interdependent

relationship that is habitually sought between authority and individuals. In a society equipped with interdependent self, a social actor or organization who uses a cuteness strategy can communicate with others smoothly and gain power in a very subtle way while those who receive a symbol or gesture of cuteness can stabilize the ground of their identity by meeting normative goals of connecting to others. The receiver of cuteness gestures or symbols can either actively or less actively accept requests of interdependence from others. If simply surviving in a situation, organization, or society is the goal of the sender of the cuteness message, passive acceptance— indifferently letting them exist— is just enough to go through a situation because cuteness is situational, not permanent. Situational understanding is important, but deep understanding or acceptance is not required.

Through adopting the softening strategies, the SDF become diverted from conventional military forces regarding their organizational practices. Moreover, the low social status of the organization added a different meaning to authority cuteness. It is a fact that the SDF has military capabilities, but such physical power does not hold equivalent status power in society. Thus, by admitting their lower status in the status hierarchy and showing their obedience to the general public, the SDF admits its helplessness as an organization and tries to gain sympathetic, emotional response from general public.

### **Women's Role in the SDF**

In recruiting campaign posters, women as well as Pikurusu-kun and Paseri-chan are also used very heavily despite the low percentage of women in the force (4.2 percent

as of 2002). Früstück and Ben-Ari (2002) claimed that women's images are used in the same way as the animation characters to soften the image of the SDF and disguise violence. According to them, women's presence implies that the SDF is a safe and peace-oriented organization so that women can be active members; if the organization is engaged in dangerous, aggressive missions, women are not allowed to be a part of it. It is true that women's presence is used to promote the peaceful image of the organization; however, there have been more structural and practical factors contributing to gender integration in the SDF: long-term and short-term recruitment issues and international pressure of gender equality in Japanese work places.

It is a general pattern among armed forces that the military starts recruiting women in the military service when facing a shortage of men to serve (Segal 1995). Before the low fertility became a serious issue in the Japanese labor force, the SDF had already started having a shortage of applicants for other reasons. The negative public opinion toward the SDF and the nation's economic growth accelerated the shortage of applicants for the SDF as early as the late 1950s (Bouei Kenkyukai 1988). Unpopularity of the organization and better employment opportunities in private sector discouraged young men from joining the SDF. Yet, until 1967 the SDF did not recruit or train women in the active duty component except for medical specialties.<sup>30</sup> The GSDF started recruiting women officers in 1967, and women enlisted personnel in the following year. After the GSDF, the Maritime Self Defense Force (MSDF) and the Air Self Defense Force (ASDF) started recruiting women officers and enlisted personnel in 1974. In 2003, the percentage of women in the total active duty in the SDF reached to 4.4 percent

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<sup>30</sup> Right after the establishment of the National Police Reserve (NPR) in 1952, the Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF) recruited 57 nurses (Defense Guide 1997). In 1958, the training of nurses began in the GSDF as the organization established hospital units and increasing number of nurses.

(10,614 out of 239,806) (The Japan Defense Agency 2003a).

There is also a serious demographic factor that necessitates gender integration in the SDF. In 2004, the population growth rate in Japan is 0.2 percent; the birth rate in Japan also fell to 1.43. If the birth rate continues to drop, the population will not sustain. According to the 1997 annual population estimation by the Japan National Social Security and Population Institute, the current population of 1,260 millions (1996) will fall to 1,000 million in 2050. According to the Defense white paper (Defense Agency 1997), the number of young men age 18-26, who are qualified to enlist as private (GSDF), seaman apprentice (MSDF), and airman 3rd class (ASDF) levels, is estimated to drop from approximately 9 million in the peak year 1994 to approximately 5.7 million by around the year 2,013. The continuous decline of the youth population would be a severe problem in the medium- and long-term recruitment plans of the SDF.

Recruitment is not the only reason for extensive gender integration in the SDF. International political pressures, especially from the United Nations, promoted gender integration in the SDF. One of the most influential factors to improve gender integration in the SDF was the United Nation's worldwide Women's Decade campaign to enlighten women's awareness to their equal rights and opportunities from 1975 through 1985. The campaign supported women's movements in Japan and placed political pressure on the Japanese government to improve women's equal rights. Women's groups specifically asked for eliminating gender-discriminating recruitment system in the SDF. The top officials in the government were willing to promote women's equal rights in the labor market to gain an international reputation as a progressive and modern society (Wiegand 1982).

In 1993, the Manpower Policy Committee decided to open all the job areas to women members except the following jobs: infantry, tanker, chemical protection, reconnaissance, anti-tank helicopter squad in the GSDF; escort flotillas, mine countermeasures vessel, submarine, missile vessel, and pilots for P3C patrol aircraft in the MSDF; fighter pilot in the SDF. In terms of the reason why the SDF still has restrictions on women's jobs, the Defense Agency commented that they consider it for "protection of motherhood." Corresponding to this new expansion of women's job areas, the National Defense Academy started accepting female candidates in 1992; The JMSDF and the JASDF started educating female pilots in 1993.

Japan is known for its surprisingly low scores on the Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM) that the United Nations use as an indicator of women's involvement and power in society, Japan is only in the top 40. The GEM score includes the number and percentage of women in the legislative authorities and managerial positions; the poor score of Japan's GEM shows that gender equality in work places is still far from the satisfactory level for an industrial society. In this labor market condition for women, despite the glass ceiling issues, the SDF have provided women members the highest level of equal opportunities and benefits compared to the private sector in Japan. The salary rate of women is the same as that of men. Comparing the average starting monthly payment in 1996, civilian women workers with college degrees earned 183,600 yen (approximately 1,412 dollars), officer candidates (with college degree) earned 214,000 yen: (approximately 1,500 dollars), which is at least 14 percent higher than that of civilian women workers (this payment does not include housing benefit and special allowances). In addition, the difference between SDF personnel and civilian working

women increases over time because private companies have a long tradition of double-standard salary scales based on a gender-segregated seniority system, albeit this tradition has been disappearing. In the SDF, however, the same salary scale is applied for both men and women as they are promoted. The glass ceiling is a major issue for women in the SDF to pursue their career. Skewed concentration of women in administrative and logistics specialties is also a significant obstacle to promotion for women. The priority of promotion to General rank tend to be given to those who are in combat operation jobs (e.g. aviation, navigation, infantry, tank, submarine, etc.).

In addition to the manpower shortage in the SDF, severe gender discrimination in the civilian labor force made enlistment in the SDF more attractive for eligible women who hoped to enjoy equity in their career. In the late 1990s, some of the ground combat jobs (e.g., infantry operations and recoilless gunners), which have not yet to be opened to women in the US military, were opened to women in the Ground Self Defense Force. A NCO in the GSDF said to the author without any hesitation, “women can operate recoilless guns...It is not that heavy. So, it is fine if women are assigned to infantry (*futsu-ka*) to do these jobs. They can handle that!”

Gender integration in the SDF seems to be progressive compared to many workplaces in the private sector. On the other hand, the oddly progressive gender integration is likely to be a reflection of the low status of the SDF in the occupational hierarchy in the Japanese labor force. Despite the prescribed equal treatment policies, women in the SDF have to face gender discrimination within the organization. In a Defense Agency survey of 1,400 women in the SDF, approximately 26 percent of women are frustrated with the organization and superiors' lack of gender consciousness. Outside



the organization, women in the SDF are quietly but harshly criticized by Japanese feminist researchers for their participation in the armed forces despite the fact that the remaining gender inequality in Japanese workplaces limits women's aspiration and achievement in their careers (see The Ministry of Welfare and Labor 2001). The SDF is not an exception. For example, the basic training unit for women GSDF recruits has a motto: "Strong, Cheerful, and Lovely" (*tsuyoku, akaruku, uruwashiku*). The third adjective *uruwashiku* implies girlish cuteness. This is a sharp contrast to the equity-conscious manpower policy of the US military (Tatsumi, et al. 1998a). Gender discrimination within the SDF is expressed in a subtle manner, and the organizational discourse of women in the organization is consistent with gender norms in the larger society.

**Table 5. Gender Integration in the Self-Defense Forces**

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1952	The National Safety Force started recruiting nurses.
1958	The Japan Ground Self-Defense Force started recruiting nurses.
1967	The Japan Ground Self-Defense Force started recruiting female officers (14).
1974	The Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force started recruiting female officers and NCOs. The Japan Air Self-Defense Force started recruiting female officers and NCOs.
1978	The Defense Agency started recruiting accredited women medical doctors and dentists.
1985	The Defense Medical Academy started recruiting women students.
1986	Defense Reformation Committee decided open more job areas to women and gain the number of women members up to 5,000.
1990	The 5,000 women force policy completed. The Defense Agency decided to continue recruiting more women in the Japan Self-Defense Force.
1992	39 female candidates enrolled the Defense Academy.
1993	The Air Defense Force and the Maritime Defense Force started recruiting women flight students.
1997	The first women P3-C pilot was designated in the Maritime Self Defense Force.
2001	The first women promoted to rank of General (Admiral in the Maritime Self Defense Force: Director of Rehabilitation Department at the SDF Central Hospital)

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Data Source: Securitarian May 1997; November 2003.

## **Life in a Hyper Constabulary Military**

In Chapter 3 I described the Japan Self Defense Forces as a hyper constabulary military with exclusively defensive national security policy. One of the most unique elements in the life of SDF personnel is that they are not (or should not) expect to fight unless an external threat attacks Japanese territory. Their policy on engagement in combat bears a close resemblance to the Rules of Engagement (ROE) for UN peacekeepers. Training and exercises in the SDF are often belittled as “training for training” (*kunren no tameno kunren*) because when SDF personnel utilize the skills and abilities gained through training and exercises will be the time the nation is attacked by an external threat and cannot sustain the exclusively defensive security policy. During the Cold War period, there was virtually no external threat that would threaten on Japanese territory. This is a sharp difference between the SDF and conventional military organizations such as the US military and the British Military. In Ohi’s (1999) study, a peacekeeper described the nature of the SDF’s missions as follows: “What the SDF do is all training. Because of that, I think, there are so many aspects that we do on a live-and-let-live basis. Frankly speaking, it does not matter whether it goes well or not...” (p.64). Although I did not gain much information about the details of SDF personnel’s daily lives back home through the interviews, peacekeepers expressed the increased autonomy during peacekeeping and their frustration about highly bureaucratic organizational structure and operations. A GSDF NCO looked back his deployment experience and expressed the difference in autonomy during deployment and after he returned to his unit. He described the days during deployment as busy but challenging because he was given more authority to make decisions than in Japan:

“After I came back, I have to ask my boss, and he will ask his boss to deal with annual expenditure...[In the Golan Heights] the commander, officers, and I, three of us, discussed and decided those things.... I feel that I do not have to take responsibilities here....I do not have to do things in a hurry. Now I am free from the tension in my job, but have a little trouble figuring out what to do because the gap is tremendous.... To some extent, we had more meaningful, deeper exchanges [with others] during deployment...” (interview #10)

Although Japanese peacekeepers have more autonomy and authority in the field, peacekeepers in the JDA survey that the lack of autonomy was an issue during their deployment. Compared to the contingents from other countries, Japanese peacekeepers felt that they were not able to act on their own decisions, and consequentially could make an appropriate decision making in a situation. Although the jobs that SDF personnel do are diverse and some require long working hours, their daily life is highly routinized and bureaucratized, and very little flexibility is given to individual service members.

### **Professional Identity of Jieikan**

Work is one of the most important sources of people’s personal and social identity (Hughes, 1958; 1965; Ashforth and Kreiner 1999). In organizations, identity is “the basis of manipulation achieved through negotiated transactions between organizational strategies of control and individual strategies for securing identity” (p.339: Thompson and McHugh 2002). In these transactions, the identity constructed through interactions does not always bring a positive result to the organization, especially when the job is considered as “dirty work” in society. Society stigmatizes groups of people who do distasteful tasks for society, and disassociates itself from those groups (Hughes 1958; Hughes 1962). In this process, those who are engaged in dirty work personify their job

and tasks and become ‘dirty workers’ (Ashforth and Kreiner 1999).

We can see ample examples of degrading the professional military and stigmatization of SDF members as ‘dirty workers’ in the popular and academic literature on Japanese national security. For example, the phrase “tax thief” used to be a common critical remark for SDF personnel (see Emerson 1971; Ohi 1999), reflecting the controversy over the legality of the SDF under the Constitution. SDF personnel are still highly self-conscious about self-presentation off base.

“Compared to the past, well, drastically, I think, our circumstances have improved. From Japanese people’s point of view, [the SDF] look much better. In the past, I was once called “tax thief” while I was riding a train. Compared to those days, I think this is far better. ....Civilian people’s view of the uniform is changing dramatically.” (p.45: Ohi 1999[Translation provided by the author of the present dissertation])

Who is stigmatized and how much unfavorable image is attached to a specific attribute differ across time and place (organizations, agencies, regions, culture, and society) (Ashforth and Kreiner 1999; Crocker, Major, and Steel 1998; Stangor and Crandall 2000). In contemporary Japanese society, being military professionals has been viewed as a stigmatized profession. Regarding uniforms, SDF personnel are very self-conscious about their presence in public. Frühstück and Ben-Ari (2002) noted that most SDF personnel working at the Defense Agency Headquarters in downtown Tokyo whom they met for interviews appeared in civilian clothes even just across the street from the Headquarters. In metropolitan areas in Japan, it is still not recommended for SDF personnel to go off base in uniform. Prohibiting the uniform outside military installations lowers the visibility of the organization and avoids the possible tension that may be caused by the uniform in public space. At the same time, the myth of uniform is a subtle technique to have service members accept the stigma attached to the military profession,

although the ultimate purpose of the strict dress code is to gain cultural-cognitive legitimacy by appealing the limitation of time and space that SDF personnel play their roles as military professionals. Although SDF personnel maintain the classic total institution-type life style, they try to assimilate to their civilian counterparts as much as possible.

In terms of uncontrollability, stigmatizing conditions provide a useful insight. Although Goffman's (1961) original concept of stigma focused on the type of devalued identity that an individual possesses, stigmatizing conditions and functions are also important in the case of the SDF. Jones and his colleagues (1984) identified six aspects of stigmatizing conditions: (a) visibility-whether a stigmatizing condition can be hidden from others; (b) course-the way the condition changes over time, and its ultimate outcome; (c) disruptiveness- how much the condition hampers social interactions; (d) aesthetic qualities- how much the attribute makes the individual ugly, repellent, or upsetting to others; (e) origin-how the stigmatizing condition was acquired, and who was responsible; and (f) peril- the kind and degree of danger that the stigmatizing condition poses to others. Visibility and Controllability are key dimensions. Occupation is not a visible stigma unlike race, gender, body type, or physical disfigurement. Those who have non-visible but "discreditable" stigma, in Goffman's (1963) term, can conceal their stigmatizing identity by monitoring their speech and behavior very carefully (Crocker, et al. 1998). Although they are fully aware of their discreditable stigma and worry about the exposure of their spoiled identity, people with discreditable stigma are more resourceful to manage interpersonal situations than people with visible discredited stigma. In terms of controllability, Brickman (1982) pointed out that there are two responsibilities for (a) the

onset of a stigmatizing condition and (b) elimination of it. However, it is a common case that an individual might be responsible for the onset of a stigmatizing condition but have no control over eliminating it, or vice versa.

As Berger (1998) emphasized the difference between pacifism and Japanese anti-militarism, the latter implies a high degree of rejection of the military institution. The systematic antagonism against the military in Japan is strong enough to consider choosing the military as one's own occupation as deviant behavior. In fact, enlistment to the SDF is an individual choice because the SDF is an all-volunteer force, although there are structural factors contributing to enlistment, such as family background, education and employment opportunities, and labor markets in specific regions. The impression of volunteer choice is also enhanced by the absence of an obligatory service contract in the SDF. If a SDF member leaves the service, service history with the SDF will follow former service members (called *motoji* or *moto jieikan*) at least for a long time as a deviant attribute of a person. Although the occupation may not be one's grand master status such as gender and race in some societies, the occupation plays a significant role as a master status in a racially and ethnically homogenous society like Japan. Controllability is also important in occupational discrimination when choice of a certain occupation is considered to be one's lifestyle choice. This is because individuals with controllable stigmas, at least believed to be so, are more disliked, rejected, and harshly treated than people whose stigmas are perceived as uncontrollable (Crocker, et al. 1998). In this sense, career choice to join an all-volunteer force has little immunity from the extra harsh treatment against people with controllable stigmas.

Components of social identity constituting the basis of social evaluation may have

an impact on one's self-evaluation; social identity functions as the standard for self-judgment because of their association with role criteria (Rosenberg [1981] 1990). The stigmatized image of the SDF had had strong influence on the JSDF personnel's identity structure. According to Frühstück and Ben-Ari (2002), the macro socio-political position of the SDF is manifested in individual SDF members' attitudes and behavior. To manage the problematic existence of the SDF in an anti-militarist society, the organization implemented various strategies such as eliminating military terminology, the no-uniform rules, and discouraging excessive masculinity. In Japan, the military has been viewed as the source of militarism during WWII, not a social institution that plays a necessary role in society. As some researchers have noted (Frühstück and Ben-Ari 2002), *Jieikan* perceive the weak social status of the SDF and internalize it as the general status of their profession, compared to the higher social status of the professional military in other societies.

The deeply rooted negative social perception toward the SDF is still obvious to *jieikan* and shapes their behavior, especially in public places, and isolation from the larger society. In many aspects of micro-interactions, SDF personnel are required to use normalization techniques such as passing, covering, and insulating.

In my interviews, I encountered hesitation of *jieikan* to talk about the SDF to me if somebody was within hearing distance. While I interviewed a senior NCO at a Japanese restaurant in lunchtime, he looked around and lowered his voice when our conversation started shifting to military operations and weapons, to make sure that nobody including servers could hear our conversation. An ASDF officer's reaction was more distinctive. Once a middle age couple sat at the table next to us, he visibly became

nervous and nearly stopped answering questions. After the couple left the restaurant, the Captain explained to me: “I absolutely could not talk about *jieitai* with you while other costumers were next to us. I was pretty sure that they listened to us!!” (Officer S, ASDF).

Früstück and Ben-Ari (2002) pointed out a similar self-consciousness among SDF personnel that they interviewed. *Jieikan* whom they interviewed have tried to assimilate their appearance to civilian office workers. *Jieikan*, especially those who are assigned to the SDF installations in metropolitan areas such as Tokyo, have to follow informal base regulations not to wear uniforms off base.<sup>31</sup> A myth that has been passed among *jieikan* supports an organizational norm to justify this civilianization of their appearance off base. It was that a *jieikan* in uniform got on a metro train during rush hour one morning, and a badge of rank on his uniform touched and scarred a young woman’s face when the train became crowded with people. There are two types of functions of stories: symbol and script. As a symbol, the meaning crystallized behind the story. On the other hand, a script is used to teach people how to behave and react (Wilkins 1983). As a script, this story legitimizes *jieikan* hiding their profession from the public by not wearing the uniform, and enhances the organizational norms about dress code off base; as a symbol, the story symbolized the meaning of the SDF uniform as an unwelcomed object that may harm people.

As Früstück and Ben-Ari (2002) pointed out, SDF personnel do not have noticeably different body types or hairstyles from civilian workers, and those distinctive physical appearances are not encouraged in the organization except in a limited number of job specialties (e.g., rangers). In my interviews, service members’ orientations to their

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<sup>31</sup> However, the “no uniform” rule is loosened or diminishes in areas where there are many military installations even though the area is located in a metropolitan area such as Yokosuka. Yokosuka has a US Naval base, SDF bases, and the Defense Academy.



civilian counterparts greatly varied from one extreme (patriotic) to the other extreme (civilianized). Some service members explicitly addressed their satisfaction with serving their people and country, but they were all addressed in a humble, professional manner. They were very careful about how they described themselves.

A GSDF officer who had extensive oversea experience called SDF personnel “*heitai*” (soldiers) in the interview. He brushed and immediately corrected himself by calling SDF members “*jieikan*” (SDF personnel). *Jieikan* are very careful not to define themselves as “soldiers” in society.

A corporal who I met in Dili, the capital of East Timor, yelled at me once because I made a distinction between the civilian (*minkanjin*) and the military. I was accompanied by him and two other NCOs. At a very modest Chinese restaurant in a hotel, we were talking about the SDF and peacekeeping missions, and I referred to the general public as “civilians” (*minkanjin*). The young cheerful corporal stared at me and went off.

“Stop using the word *minkanjin*, please? I really mean it. We are of no difference from them...Hey, you just used the word again!!”

His buddies did not agree or disagree with him. They continued eating. I was perplexed but apologized. He accepted my apology, mumbling, and started eating his meal again as if nothing had ever happened. He was actually not the only Japanese service member who did not like the term *minkanjin*. After this conversation, I used this term intentionally to find out reactions of other SDF members. One officer pointed out that my word choice is too Americanized. I was told to remember how we called the civilians when we served in the Air Force. In fact, several interviewees used the word *minkan-no hito* (person of civil or ordinary people) in their interviews, instead of *minkanjin*. *Minkan-no hito* sounded much less militaristic. The word *minkanjin* implies a

sharp distinction between the military and the larger society. This incident and other subtle signs that the interviewees displayed during interviews indicate that many SDF personnel refused to identify their difference from others in society. Goffman (1963) observed the self-identified difference among those who are in stigmatized occupations. Later in a study of a stigmatized occupation, Thompson and his associates (Thompson and Harred 1992; Thompson, Harred, and Burks 2003) have supported Goffman's observation that dividing the social world by membership of the occupation ("we versus them") can foster group cohesion. A senior NCO commented that he was comfortable with talking to me because I used to serve in the SDF. However, his subsequent comment had a twist ("This is nice. It is fantastic to be able to a civilian person, not a *jieikan*, about peacekeeping"). The NCO identified me as a civilian even though I served in the SDF before. He could have not felt comfortable if I was a complete civilian, but he found a joy in our conversation because it was with a civilian person (the author).

On the other hand, in a survey of former peacekeepers conducted by the Japan Defense Academy in 1998 (N=618), 84 percent of the respondents disagreed or strongly disagreed with the statement that SDF personnel are the same as civilian workers. The majority of peacekeepers viewed being SDF member as a uniquely different job compared to civilian workers. It is apparent that SDF personnel know the special quality of their profession, but they try to identify themselves as civilian counterparts to protect their identity, and secondly, to conform to the constabulary ethos.


One of the jargons that SDF members frequently use represents their marginalized identity as career military personnel. In my interviews and informal conversations with SDF officers, especially among Air Self Defense Force officers, it was common that SDF

personnel referred to the SDF as “*waga sha* (our company or our firm)” as if they were civilian corporate workers. Since the Japanese armed forces started as a police auxiliary, not a regular military force, we cannot simply conclude that this is a sign of the SDF’s shift to the “occupational” orientation, referring to Moskos’s (1988) I/O (Institutional and Occupational) theory of professional military. Rather, we should pay attention to the strategic meaning of using this jargon. On the one hand, calling the SDF *wagasha* has a sarcastic, self-deprecating meaning. On the other hand, this jargon suggests an extreme degree of localization of military professionals in the relationship with their clients. In his study of teacher-student relationships, Howard Becker (1970) analyzed cultural conflicts between teachers and students as a relationship between professionals and clients. Professionals have an ideal type of their clients. The more an actual client diverges from an ideal type, the more problems professionals experience in carrying out their business. While Becker (1970) focused on explaining school subcultures through cultural conflict between teachers and students, Reynolds (1976) looked at the mechanism of how teachers can manage their teaching activities without conflicts with students. He found that localization of teachers’ behavior makes it easier for them to interact with students. As teachers do not enforce rules so strictly, students are less frequently engaged in problematic behavior. Takeuchi (1996) named this behavioral choice of teachers to avoid conflict with students “localization” of professionals. The localization of teachers can minimize conflicts, and help teachers keep the organization going. A “truce” between teachers and students develops over time; teachers and students compromise with each other to survive in school. Going back to SDF personnel, usage of the jargon *wagasha* symbolizes the localization of the SDF to its client, in this case the larger society, to

survive. The only difference between the teacher-student relationship and the SDF personnel-Japanese people relationship is that SDF personnel and Japanese people very rarely share time and space to realize their mutual needs to survive. As a captive audience which does not have normative or practical commitments to the SDF, Japanese people do not find any need to receive service from the SDF. As a result, the SDF have localized their organization as much as they could; some SDF personnel anchor their organizational identity to the more civilian side although there is no visible audience or client in front of them.

For SDF personnel, their professional identities are indirectly but significantly impacted by the multiple institutional forces imposed by the organizational environment that marginalize their profession. Based on Oyserman and Markus's (1993) model of the sociocultural self, I illustrate the structural dimensions in which the self of SDF personnel are embedded (see Figure 5). Oyserman and Markus (1993) claimed that one's identity is enmeshed in the multiple layers of social structure. Institutional environments include cultural belief system, normative frameworks, and regulative systems that provide meaning and continuity to the organization (Scott 1995; Scott, et al. 2000). Within the organization, individual members act as active agents within the constraint imposed by the institutional environments. This diagram represents how organizational and social factors in macro-micro social structures, from international organization to national culture, nation-state, socio-demographic environments, organization, community, and family affect SDF personnel's professional identity.

Figure 5. The Socially Embeddedness of the Japan Self Defense Forces and Service Members.



## **Summary**

For an institution whose audience does not find the service provided by the institution necessary to survive, there should be a partial transformation of the meaning of the given institution by coercive control or localization (Etzioni 1961). To comply with social expectations and values, the SDF aggressively localizes its activities to meet anti-militaristic sentiment in society. These strategic responses to the environment fostered a constabulary ethos in the SDF. According to DiMaggio and Powell (1983), when organizational uncertainty is significantly high, organizations will be increasingly isomorphic when resource dependency of an organization on another organization is high. Isomorphism of organizations provides legitimacy and resources by making an organization similar to an existing successful organization in the field without necessarily making the organization more efficient. However, the findings in this chapter suggest that variation in strategic responses to a particular environment can create an organization rather unique than isomorphic to other organizations (Zucker 1991). The SDF was increasingly localized and became a constabulary military organization as it conformed to the general societal norms in Japanese society. The organization remotely resembled traditional military forces. The organization is not allowed to engage in conventional activities of military forces other than defense or in certain types of strategic simulations (e.g., simulations including emergency defense legislation). Any activities related to offensive military action and proactive defense measures and remarks of the government, policy makers, government officials, and SDF officers suggesting these potentials have been subject to a punitive social sanction in society.

Although Japan's national security depends on the U.S. military presence as a part of the unilateral alliance with the U.S., the martial orientation of the U.S. military was not

adopted by the SDF. Instead, “social fitness,” a social format considered to be legitimate in a given institutional environment, (Scott 1995:p.153) in the immediate environment plays a key role in organizational survival of the SDF in contemporary Japan. For this reason, the SDF displayed increasing conformity to social expectations and values while organizational legitimacy was still lacking. The SDF have used and still use authority cuteness, gender integration, and other symbolic management strategies including civilianized military jargon, assisting community events, and minimizing militaristic features of their appearance. However, the harder the SDF pursued legitimacy, the more skeptical the society became about the legitimacy of the SDF and continued treating the SDF as a “nervous actor” that attempts to “compensate for illegitimacy in one area by rigidly legitimate behavior in another” (Ashforth and Gibbs 1990: p.189). The less legitimate organization seeks out legitimacy more aggressively than legitimate organizations. It leads the organization to a “vicious cycle of legitimation,” which eventually decreases legitimacy by too much protesting (Ashforth and Gibbs 1990).

While the organization aggressively attempts to defend organizational legitimacy, these localizations and symbolic management strategies affected the professional identity of service members. They expressed mixed feelings about their profession, particularly rejecting to the division of the social world between the military and the larger society. Frühstück and Ben-Ari (2002) suggest that SDF personnel desire to be a normal (*futsu*) or real (*honmono*) military and idealize the US military, referring to their view of the organization as being a “half-baked” (*chuto hanpa*) military organization. From their point of view, SDF personnel are using the strategy of “condemning the condemners” (Sykes and Matza 1957) to neutralize their profession. Frühstück and Ben-Ari (2002)

claim that SDF personnel believe that the military should be like the US military, a masculine, warfighting force, and challenge the moral superiority of the majority of civilians who question the value of the military profession and the motives of service members to serve in the force. However, findings in the present dissertation did not fully support their observations. In my interviews with SDF personnel, a few of them admired the US military, but the focus was not militaristic capacity. Rather, SDF personnel admire US military and other armed forces because of their higher social status and respect from their people, compared to the socially constrained and disadvantaged organizational status of the SDF. This micro-focused admiration is more problematic in identity formation and maintenance in organizational change because their admiration is systematically separate from the general purpose of the organization. This may increase symbolic conformity to the warfighting oriented military without any substantial organizational changes or practical necessity.

A more problematic aspect of professional identity among Japanese service members is the way they claim the normality of their profession. Japanese service members used to be directed not to display visible signs of their professional identity such as uniforms and masculine bodies. Frühstück and Ben-Ari (2002) found non-masculine bodies of SDF personnel as a reflection of a socially ideal body type and an assimilation effort. They also pointed out the different symbolic meaning that SDF uniforms have compared to school uniforms in Japan: unlike the youthful and clean images of school uniform, SDF uniforms have a strong association with violence and war. However, a certain type of male school uniform (*tsume-eri*: a jacket with a stand-up collar) is also considered as militaristic in Japanese society. SDF members are trying to



assimilate to their civilian counterparts by emphasizing harmlessness and commonality of their job with the jobs of their civilian counterparts. They deny the dirtiness of their profession and claim normality. Claim of normality is another strategy of neutralization (see Sykes and Matza 1957; Sandstrom, Martin, and Fine 2003). As individuals in dirty work, some SDF personnel try to neutralize attribution of their profession by claiming that their job is normal because the job they do is the same as that everyone else does while accepting the fact that their job lacks legitimacy in society. However, as we saw in public assistance activities and community integration efforts, and the no-uniform rule, SDF personnel are often forced to use passing techniques. Thus, SDF personnel have to introduce the technique of appealing to higher loyalties.

Nonetheless, the period of antagonism and indifference did not last too long after the end of the Cold War. In the 1990s, Japanese society had to face the gap between international and domestic norms and definitions related to the military institution. In this transition, the SDF was required to change organizational practices, and the micro-institutional effects impact on individual service members' behavior and identities.

## **Chapter 8: Peacekeeping Participation and Its Effect on the SDF**

### **Peacekeeping and Normative Rules of Japan's National Security**

During the Cold War era, support from the government and a number of symbolic management strategies the SDF launched did not help the SDF defend or enhance its legitimacy in society. The harder the SDF tried to defend its legitimacy, the more skepticism they received from the general public. The organization could not get away from a “vicious circle” of legitimacy for almost 35 years. However, social isolation and the tainted image of the organization started changing once the SDF became actively involved in peacekeeping operations and increased its visibility in domestic disaster relief activities in the 1990s (Katahara 2001; Lipari and Kurashina 2002).

It was the Gulf War that started changing the seemingly unattainable legitimacy of the SDF and its dirty work status by revealing serious inconsistencies in Japan's national security policy. As noted in Chapter 6, the UN has maintained a special position in national security policy as a core principle of national security in post WWII Japan, so called UN-Centrism (*kokuren chushin shugi*). As well as the bilateral military alliance with the United States, the UN and its policies in military affairs have been highly valued as congruent with Japan's pacifist posture. Despite its wide acceptance in society, UN-Centrism has a serious flaw in that it built unrealistic expectations in Japanese society that the UN would guide Japan's national security policy in a satisfying way (Drifte 2000). During the Cold War era, a stable regional security situation, which was maintained through US military presence under the bilateral security treaty, allowed

Japanese society to successfully adopt an idealized image of the UN and its policies in military affairs. Once the UN sanctioned use of force by a group of coalition forces to enforce an embargo against Iraq in 1990, Japan faced the reality that UN policies on military affairs were not always compatible with Japanese highly idealistic anti-militarism although the UN-centered policy was the core of post-War Japan's national security policy.

During the Gulf War, the United States requested Japan's active contribution to the collective war effort, but Japan could not respond to the request in a timely manner because use of force to settle international conflicts and sending troops overseas were legally prohibited in Japan and could not gain societal support for peacekeeping participation in a short period of time. In 1990, the original UN peace cooperation Bill did not pass the Diet because the majority of lawmakers believed that sending SDF troops overseas was a violation of the Constitution. As a result, the Japanese government made a significant monetary contribution (approximately 13 billion dollars in total); however, the absence of a military contribution drew criticism from the United States and other Western democracies, specifically in their press (Keddell 1993). After the end of the war, Japan finally sent minesweepers as a part of the peacekeeping operation in the Persian Gulf although it was too late to restore Japan's credibility in global politics. The war left Japan without appreciation of the enormous economic contribution. A former Japanese diplomat recalled the days saying that they were treated like "dirt" (Finn and Tolbert 2001).

After the Gulf War, the existing normative and cognitive legitimacies surrounding the Japanese military institution started changing very quickly. The international criticism

from North American and European media against Japan's refusal to make a military contribution was a punishment for Japan's violation of the normative codes in the international community. To stop Iraq's further invasion of Kuwait, the coalition force gained a full-range of legitimacy from the international community for a war against a nation that was acknowledged as a "perpetrator" in a UN resolution. However, Japan as well as Germany did not recognize the emerging norms that require UN member nations to engage in military affairs regardless of their political and historical situations within society. Japan's legitimacy for claiming immunity from any military actions outside their territory failed in this military sanction fully supported by the international community. This incident shed light on the gap in social construction of the military institution between Japan and other major actors among the UN member nations. Japanese society realized that it is impossible for Japan to meet the standard of the international society without "manpower" contributions. The society had to deal with the long-standing ambivalence and confusion loaded in the post-WWII Japanese national security policy that no one was willing to get involved in before (Tadokoro 2001).

The bitter criticism against Japan's hesitant cooperation prompted the enactment of the Law Concerning Cooperation for United Nations Peacekeeping Operations and Other Operations (International Peace Cooperation Law: IPCL) in June 1992 (Katahara 2001). When the Bill passed the Diet, the 1954 ban on overseas deployment, the first Japanese government's self-imposed defense policy, was amended. It took nearly two years and three Diet sessions to pass the Bill (Keddele 1992). The IPCL introduced a new mission to the SDF and considerably expanded the role of the SDF (Katahara 2001) and its visibility in society. Since the IPCL was enacted, Japan has participating in UN

peacekeeping missions in Cambodia, Mozambique, the Golan Heights, Zaire, Timor-Lesta (formally known as East Timor), and other places. The SDF has constantly sent troops to peacekeeping missions although the size of the troops and the activities in which they are involved are limited compared to other nations (See Appendix B). SDF troops relied on the contingents of other nations to provide them security in Cambodia, Mozambique, and the Golan Heights. From the deployment to Timor-Lesta, SDF troops started carrying small firearms for protection; however, Japanese troops still depend on the security provided by contingents from other nations when risk is great in the operation site.<sup>32</sup>

Sending SDF troops to international peacekeeping missions that started in 1992 was a defining moment for civil-military relations and the shared meanings of the military institution in Japanese society. Regulative legitimacy for peacekeeping participation was quickly established after the Gulf War, while the legitimacy of the SDF under the peace Constitution was still hanging in the air. Giving regulative legitimacy to an activity that is carried out by an organization whose legitimacy is still questionable surely contributed complexity and ambiguity to Japanese peacekeeping. The peacekeeping legislation shows a part of such complexity and ambiguity. The newly established IPCL provides the criteria for provision of manpower and material supplies to support United Nations' peace making efforts. Japanese peacekeeping missions include UN peacekeeping operations, international humanitarian relief operations, and international election monitoring activities. The IPCL restricts the JSDF's contribution to the range of activities fulfilling the five principles as follows:

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<sup>32</sup> For example, the Dutch contingent provide security to the Japanese contingent deployed to Iraq although a commander of the Dutch contingent made it clear that the Japanese contingent should provide security, for itself.

- (1) Agreement on a cease-fire shall have been reached among the parties to armed conflicts.
- (2) Consent for the undertaking of UN peacekeeping operations as well as Japan's participation in such operations has been obtained from the host countries as well as the parties to armed conflicts.
- (3) The operations shall strictly maintain impartiality not favoring any of the parties to armed conflicts.
- (4) Should any of the requirements in the above mentioned guideline cease to be satisfied, the Government of Japan may withdraw SDF units.
- (5) The use of weapons shall be limited to the minimum necessary to protect the personnel's lives, etc (The International Peace Cooperation Headquarters 2001).

Although these five principles were applied when Japan sent troops to international peacekeeping missions, oversea deployment under the IPCL was a drastic step for the SDF to become more martial. These principles made it difficult for the SDF to send troops to traditional peacekeeping missions. The SDF was a self-contained “hyper” constabulary military that existed only for territorial defense, and now its domestic orientation is forced to be modified. Yet, Japan’s cognitive-cultural norms on military activities were not completely abolished. The fourth and fifth principles made Japan’s manpower contribution to peacekeeping very different from that of other nations by setting very stringent ROE and guidelines for mission environments in which Japanese troops can deploy. IPCL also suspended<sup>33</sup> certain activities conducted by the SDF units for peacekeeping operations such as monitoring of disarmament, stationing and patrol in buffer zones, and collection and disposal of abandoned weapons, because decision making to conduct these activities was premature at that point (Tadokoro 2001).

Due to the legislative restriction, the Japanese contingents were engaged only in transportation, infrastructure, and humanitarian assignments until the suspension of

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<sup>33</sup> In Japanese, this suspension of engaging in the primary activities in peacekeeping is metaphorically described as “frozen” (*touketsu*).

engagement in the primary activities was lifted in December 2001 when IPCL was revised. Under the new IPCL, Japanese peacekeepers can engage in monitoring of disarmament, stationing and patrol in buffer zones, and collection and disposal of abandoned weapons. At the same time, the restriction on ROE was also relaxed: Japanese peacekeepers are allowed to use force to protect peacekeepers from other nations, UN employees, and NGO workers; Defense Force Law Article 95 (use of force to protect weapons) is now also applied to situations in peacekeeping missions. However, security missions to protect high-ranking UN officials and VIPs and use of force against those who interfere with the execution of a mission are still banned since use of force in these occasions can be excessive self-defense (Asagumo Shinbun 2001).

In March 2002, Japan sent approximately 680 GSDF troops to Timor Lesta for the United Nations Transitional Authority in East Timor (UNTAET) to assist reconstruction processes after a regional conflict and independence of East Timor from Indonesia. Although the contingent only carried ten 7.62-millimeter machine guns and 670 hand guns and small rifles to protect 680 troops, it became national news in the Japanese media.<sup>34</sup> In a visit to the camp site in East Timor, a GSDF liason officer told the author how nervous troops were to carry loaded weapons with them all the time. Regarding weapons, an ASDF officer with the 1st Airlift Wing commented on the politics over allowing airlifting crews to carry one handgun and the cumbersome paperwork to carry equipment overseas.

“It was so much hassle to obtain permission for the crew to carry one handgun for an airlift mission for self-defense. We passed our honest opinion to a higher command that we do not need it if it were such big trouble. Then, we were told

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<sup>34</sup> Prior to deployment to East Timor, one machine gun was allowed in the humanitarian mission to Rwanda in 1999. For the deployment to East Timor, there was no opposition in the Diet for SDF troops to deploy with machine guns (Handa 2001).

that we ought to bring it. .... When we recently deployed to Jordan for an airlift mission, everything we bring overseas becomes an export item. .... For instance, when a mechanical failure occurs with one of the transportation aircrafts, we had to resubmit all the paperwork to the custom agency again. Last time the paperwork became that thick [with a gesture as if he held a two-inch thick local phone directory]. It was nonsense. We should do something to make this process easier.” (Officer Y, ASDF)

The SDF have to fill out import item declaration forms for more than 500 items including fuel, foods, repair parts, and 9 mm pistols for self defense. They are all categorized as export items (Yomiuri Shinbun, July 09 2003).

The GSDF have sent more than three deployment rotations to Timor Lesta, and there have been no incidents reported in which Japanese troops used force. The Japanese contingent has been very careful and fortunate so far, but at the same time this extremely unrealistic and naïve practice represents a deep and unbeatable cultural norms against use of force. Japan has no hesitation to sacrifice peacekeepers from other nations and risk its troops’ lives in order to protect their ideology of anti-militarism. It is the fact that special arrangements about the security of Japanese contingents endanger other nations’ contingents by putting them in a position to protect unarmed Japanese peacekeepers with arms. For example, the Japanese contingent was unarmed, and depended on the Australian infantry unit for protection in the Golan Heights (UNDOF). Drifte (2000) called this a manifestation of Japan’s exceptionalism as a non-nuclear power and a war-renouncing country. For peacekeepers from other nations in which the military is an established social institution, Japan’s inability of full engagement in peacekeeping missions is a burden for the limited human resources in the field. Their frustration is accumulating as the outsourcing of peace operations becomes more prevalent (Brooks 2003).



Japan has been subject to external pressure for more active participation in UN peacekeeping regardless of the Constitutional restriction against exercising force, but the external pressure was not the only factor prompting Japan's participation in peacekeeping operations. A political goal of post-war Japan, to gain a permanent seat in the UN Security Council, plays an important role in this process of adapting the SDF to peacekeeping missions (Drifte 2000; George 1993). To achieve this goal, participation in UN peacekeeping operations and contribution of troops are central issues to fulfill all the preconditions although the full range of participation seems not be required for permanent Security Council members. As Drifte (2000) pointed out, no articles in the UN Charter require the Permanent Security Council members to make full-fledged contributions to peacekeeping operations; however, Permanent Security Council members are obliged to serve on the Military Staff Committee (MSC) to make strategic direction under Article 47 of the UN Charter despite the absence of opportunities for the MSC to fully function so far. However, as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated in the debate over the ICL bill in 1992, the expansion of Japan's role in peacekeeping has been discussed as a necessary condition for decades to enhance the political legitimacy of candidacy for the position of Permanent Security Council members (George 1993). Proponents of Japan's candidacy for permanent membership argue that refusal of full-scale involvement in peacekeeping will result in a considerable financial burden on Japan while the country will need to suffer its second-class status in world politics as a disadvantaged nation in terms of fair burden sharing in military affairs. To make amends for the weakness of Japan's multilateral diplomacy, the government has focused on the

aspect of conflict prevention and assistance for economic/political reconstruction process in Japan's peacekeeping operations (Drifte 2000).

### **The Most Recent Situation of Japanese Peacekeeping**

“...In the past 10 years, Japan has dispatched 66,000 personnel to support international peace.....These men and women carry out cease fire monitoring, infrastructure construction and reconstruction, humanitarian mission... Most recently the largest ever unit was dispatched to Timor Lesta..... Working together with local people to consolidation of peace and nation building. Responsibility of PKO. Japan's contribution continues.” (10 years of PKO: The Government of Japan 2003)

In March 2003, the dawn of the Iraq War, the Japanese Government aired a one-minute long TV commercial on its peacekeeping activities on a few Cable News Channels (e.g., C-SPAN and FOX NEWS) exclusively in the United States. According to an official at the International Peace Cooperation Headquarters, it was just a coincidence that March 2003 was the ten-year anniversary of Japanese peacekeeping participation. The commercial was created to promote the popular understanding of Japanese peacekeeping activities in the United States, but no other countries. The commercial was never on the air in Japan, either. Aside from the miraculous timing of the airing, there is a conscious effort of the Japanese government to promote the awareness of Japanese contribution to international peacekeeping missions in the United States as a reflection of the lessons learned from the previous Iraq War in 1991.

The situation facing Japan after the September 11 attacks showed striking similarity to the Gulf War, and this was a chance for Japanese political leaders to remove the unwanted label of “checkbook diplomacy.” On October 29 2001, the Japanese

government proactively advocated and gained passage of the Anti-terrorism Special Measures Law (the Anti-Terrorism Law) to support the US campaign in Afghanistan against terrorism. Two months before this revision, the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law was enacted corresponding to the start of Operation Enduring Freedom against Osama Bin Ladin and the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. The Anti-Terrorism Law allows the JSDF to deploy overseas, virtually anywhere to “support the US military and other armed forces, which are contributing to achieving the object of the Charter of the UN by removing the threat brought by terrorist attacks.” The SDF personnel deployed for the mission can use firearms to protect “those who are under their control” (Asahi Shinbun 2001).

Under the Anti-Terrorism Law, SDF personnel have been actively engaged in refugee assistance and support activities. Since December 2001, the Maritime Self Defense Force has sent escort ships and supply ships to the North Indian Sea in order to provide fuel for British and US military vessels. The Air Self Defense Force has completed 15 overseas transportation missions by C-130s (The Japan Defense Agency 2003a). Then, on December 7th of 2001, the revision of the International Peace Cooperation Law (IPLC) Bill also passed the Diet, and the suspended engagement in primary peacekeeping force activities was lifted. This series of prompt legislative actions was surely driven by the harsh criticism that Japan received during the Gulf War.

The new IPLC allows Japanese peacekeepers to participate in the primary activities of peacekeeping forces that were suspended under the previous law, such as monitoring of disarmament, stationing and patrol in buffer zones, and disabling and removing abandoned landmines and other weapons. The new law also loosened the

restriction against using firearms to protect peacekeepers of other nations and the UN staff as well as fellow Japanese peacekeepers. In addition to self-defense, Japanese peacekeepers are now allowed to use firearms to guard weapons, ammunition, and vehicles (Asagumo Shinbun 2001). These two peacekeeping-related laws were advocated to meet the international standards of cooperating in peacekeeping operations. For Japan, these two laws embrace critical changes in the existing national security policies. First, these laws include critical political decisions related to the long-standing dispute over the restraint about oversea deployment in Article 9 of the Constitution. Second, these changes will affect social perceptions of the JSDF and its function and position as a social institution. Lastly, those constitutive shifts will lead to changes in the nature of the missions and may affect the identity set of the SDF members and their professionalism as well.

Sending troops to East Timor (now known as Timor-Lesta) for the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) was the first mission after revision of the relevant laws in 2001 and the largest deployment in the decade-long history of Japanese peacekeeping participation. Japan's contribution to East Timor started in November of 1999 by sending JSDF personnel to airlifting assistance for the United Nations High Commissioner of Refugees (UNHCR) in West Timor, although Japan could not send ground troops due to the restriction of peacekeeping participation when the internal disturbance in East Timor intensified. In March 2002, the Japanese government dispatched a Ground Self-Defense Force Engineer Group of 680 members to East Timor for a 6-month deployment.<sup>35</sup> UNTAET was taken over by the United Nations Mission of

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<sup>35</sup> As of March 2002, approximately 8.8% of the uniformed personnel in UNTAET were JSDF personnel. The total number of Japanese personnel in the ongoing UN peacekeeping operations is

Support in East Timor (UNMISSET) upon independence in May 2002, and the GSDF deployed troops to UNMISSET until early 2004 (total three tours to Timor Lesta).

Within a month after US President Bush declared the official end of combat in Operation Iraqi Freedom early in May 2003, the Iraq-SDF law to send Japanese troops to Iraq under the current Constitutional restriction has passed the Diet. Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi played a central role in this legislative process, as a big supporter of US policies on Iraq issues. Accepting a request from the World Food Plan (WFP), the Japanese government dispatched 98 Air Self Defense Force troops and 2 C-130s to Jordan for a month-long airlift assistance mission to support post-conflict reconstruction in Iraq in early July. Soon after the completion of this short mission, on August 19th, a truck bomb struck UN Headquarters in Baghdad, and killed at least 20 UN officials, including the UN special representative Sergio Vieira de Mello. Corresponding to this incident, Japanese government and policy makers postponed the deployment of JGSDF troops to Iraq. The pressure from the US government to support its reconstruction efforts in Iraq coupled with Japan's needs for US support to resolve North Korean issues, nuclear threats and mass kidnapping of Japanese nationals, will necessitate the deployment of Japanese troops to Iraq. US Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage has insisted that Japan make military contributions in Iraq, not walk away. Armitage also warned that JSDF troops would sit back to back with danger and risks, not like attending a "tea party," in the process of supporting the reconstruction in Iraq (The Japan Times 2003).

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733, which is 17<sup>th</sup> out of 85 nations contributing military troops to peacekeeping operations (The Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2002).

Japan is facing a major institutional change in national security policy, which had not dramatically changed since the 1950s. Neighboring nations have not opposed Japan's dispatch of SDF troops because the missions are non-combat, humanitarian missions (Midford 2003). Sending troops near a combat zone may risk the positive reputation of Japan's military contribution to UN peacekeeping in Asia; however, selective deployment for burden sharing in the international community somewhat reduced the assertive image of sending SDF troops to international peacekeeping missions. Although Japan lost two civilian peacekeepers in Cambodia in 1993, there have been no casualties among military peacekeepers yet. Dispatch of troops to a near conflict zone in Iraq may provoke domestic and international opposition, especially in neighboring Asian nations. If the SDF dispatch troops to Iraq, it is possible that the first fatal casualty among Japanese military peacekeepers will cause a similar effect on Japanese society as the two US service members killed and dragged on the street in Mogadishu in 1993 had in America. However, facing the capture of three Japanese civilians by an Iraqi militant group in March 2004, the Japanese government did not give in the militants group's demand for withdrawing SDF troops in Samawa. Although the Japanese hostages returned safely, foreign contractors, NGO workers, and journalists have been killed by Iraqi militants daily.

### **Changes in Dirty Work Status**

#### National Security Situation and Legitimacy of the SDF

The military profession has been considered as a dirty job in Japan, and as examined in Chapter 7, the organizational culture of the SDF conforms to the stigmatized

view of the profession, and many service members are exposed to the negative attitudes of the public toward their profession.

In addition to sending troops to peacekeeping operations overseas, the changes in national security situation changed the social construction of the military institution and the degree of stigma attached to the SDF. As a part of Japan's strict civilian control, SDF personnel have been separated from domestic politics. As domestic disaster relief missions increase their magnitudes, the lack of trust of local governments in the SDF surfaced as an operational problem in disaster relief efforts. The distance between the state and the military was one of the issues in domestic disaster relief operations. The 1961 Ethical Principle for Self-Defense Forces Personnel clearly prohibits SDF personnel from engaging in any political activities. Although there are no official statistics, the percentage of SDF veterans among the members of the Diet is extremely low. Japanese society strongly opposes former SDF veterans joining the Diet based on the Japanese civilian control principle. As a result, the distance between the state and the armed forces is carefully kept in Japanese society, while the organizational effectiveness of the SDF has been suffering from highly bureaucratic procedures of mission authorization. For example, the significant delay of the dispatch of the Ground Self-Defense Force troops to rescue and assist victims in the Hanshin Earthquake on January 17 1995 created a national dispute about impracticality and complexity of the authorization procedure to send SDF troops for disaster relief.<sup>36</sup> Japanese media questioned the role of the SDF in disaster relief and criticized the idea of giving more authority to the SDF in terms of

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<sup>36</sup> The SDF law prohibited the SDF to send rescue units for disaster relief operations until they receive the governmental order. This authorization process was simplified to send SDF troops to assist emergency situations as soon as possible.


dispatching troops in disaster situations. For example, Tetuso Maeda (1996), a prominent Japanese journalist who opposes the presence of the SDF, proposed the establishment of a separate organization for assistance in disaster relief. The media denies the concept of a constabulary military and attempts to impose a conventional military force model on the SDF, and refuses to provide legitimacy to the SDF.

The sources of the increasing instability of Japan's national security are not only external threats, but also internal threats. The Sarin gas attack by a cult group that took place in the Tokyo Metropolitan subway in March of 1995 signaled the emergence of sub-national threats in Japan. Eight lives were lost, and approximately 500 victims suffered nerve damage and psychological trauma. The cult group, *Aum shinrikyo*, used a highly sophisticated technology to synthesize the Sarin gas in a private lab. To deal with another mass terrorist attack, the government gave the SDF greater flexibility to intervene in domestic emergency situations caused by terrorism as well as large-scale natural disasters.

Although there have been no armed confrontations since the end of WWII, Japan is increasingly dealing with sub-national threats that can be defined as military affairs. In 2002, North Korea's admission of its long-term, state sponsored abduction of Japanese nationals and nuclear stand-off also reminded the Japanese society that the communist threat has not disappeared yet in the Far East. Japan became more willing to set proactive measures against North Korea's provocative messages than ever before. Corresponding to changes in the regional security situation, Japanese society is relatively less reactive to policy makers' radical comments on national security issues.



**Figure 6. What Do You think about the Possibility that Japan will Get Involved in War?**



Data Source: The Prime Minister’s Office (2000 2003).

Regardless, the changing national security situation increased the perceived needs of military presence for territorial defense. Figure 6 shows a result of series of opinion polls on national security issues conducted by the Japanese government.<sup>37</sup> Since 1994, those who think that Japan’s involuntary involvement in war is possible have increased steadily. The percentage of those who believe in Japan’s possible involvement in war increased from 30.5 percent in 2001 to 43.2 percent in 2003. The percentage of those who

<sup>37</sup> The Prime Minister's office has conducted the opinion poll every three years since 1969 (available from <http://www.jda.go.jp/library/yoron/2000>). Each year survey has sampled approximately 3,000 adults who are over 20 years old.


believe that Japan will not be involved in war declined more than 10 percent from 2001 to 2003. Since the mid 1990s, fewer and fewer Japanese people believe that the security situation surrounding Japan is completely safe; the percentage of those who think that Japan's involvement in war is possible surpassed that of those who deny the possibility in 2001. This result shows a recent shift of Japanese people's perception of security.

According to Katahara (2001), regardless of the limited range of missions, deploying overseas is a significant stretch of the SDF's roles and missions as well as the interpretation of the Constitution, and helped improve the public image of the SDF personnel and discard the stigmatized image as "social outcasts." The Gulf War led the SDF and the Defense Agency to higher status in society. Results of a series of the governmental opinion polls on national security at least partially supported Katahara's observation. In Figure 7, the poll results show a sharp contrast to the strong opposition against Japanese participation in peacekeeping prior to the Gulf War. Comparing the results between 1991 and 2000, respondents who agreed with Japanese participation in peacekeeping operations dramatically increased from 20.6 percent to 40.5 percent (See Figure7-1). Parallel to this change, favorable attitudes toward the SDF increased since the early 1990s: the 2000 poll indicated that 31.5 percent of respondents had positive impressions of the SDF compared to 20.3 percent in 1991 (see Figure7-2). The poll results also suggest how positively the increasing public exposure of the SDF impact on the degree of understanding of general public about the SDF. Favorable responses on both general impression of the SDF and peacekeeping declined in the 2003 poll. Although the reason is unclear, we may need to pay attention to the data collection period of the 2003 poll. The data was collected in January 2003, when the United States was

preparing to attack Iraq. Japanese people were nervous about a possibility of sending troops to Iraq. It is likely that time effects affected the 2003 poll result.


Regarding the public understanding of the SDF, in 1991, 50 percent of the respondents pointed out the obscurity of the SDF and their missions (“I do not know what the SDF do”). The percentage decreased to 38.2 percent in the 2000 poll and remained almost unchanged in 2003 (39.1 percent) (see Figure7-3).

**Figure 7-1: General Impression of the Japan Self Defense Forces**




Data Source: The Prime Minister’s Office (2000, 2003).

**Figure 7-2: Attitude toward Peacekeeping Operations**



Data Source: The Prime Minister's Office (2000 2003).

**Figure 7-3: General Impression of the SDF**



Data Source: The Prime Minister's Office (2000 2003).

At least, the visibility of the SDF has increased dramatically in the 1990s compared to the 1980s. In other words, Japanese people have more opportunity to know about or interact with the SDF and service members in their daily lives. On the one hand, this is certainly a reflection of the current security situation in the Far East, which is more unpredictable than a decade ago as we saw in North Korea's nuclear standoff in 2003 and open admission of kidnapping Japanese nationals for espionage purposes. On the other hand, this seems to be a sign of the emergence of more integrative civil-military relations in Japan. The SDF successfully embedded itself in other social institutions in Japanese society to gain moral legitimacy.

Through the Hanshin Earthquake and the Sarin Subway attack, SDF responded to societal needs and built a positive reputation. After 9-11, pragmatic needs for the SDF and their capabilities in disaster relief situations and domestic terrorism have kept increasing. Sending SDF troops to peacekeeping missions for burden sharing in the international community also raises pragmatic needs for the SDF in Japanese society. Corresponding to pragmatic needs for domestic security, the SDF started gaining legitimacy, yet pragmatic legitimacy was not enough to compromise the morally tainted image of the organization. On the other hand, since the SDF kept its profile as low as possible throughout the post World War period, organizational adaptation to peacekeeping became a major organizational challenge in the 40-year long history of the organization. Facing this change, SDF personnel had to question themselves about their role as military professionals such as who they are and what they should do to fulfill their role.

## **Relationship with Other Actors in the Field**

Our realities are constructed through our daily interactions. Once subjective experience is shared with others, it appears as objective reality. In a face-to-face situation, the other appears fully real. The more distant we keep from the other, the greater anonymity appear between the two (Berger and Luckmann 1966). In Japan, SDF personnel have limited opportunities to interact with civilian counterparts unless they are dispatched to domestic disaster relief and rescue missions. In the peacekeeping site, Japanese peacekeepers have more chances to interact with others: UN officials, military peacekeepers from other nations, NGO workers, and the local people. These interactions are identified as favorable experiences that motivate them in the field. More than 70 percent of the respondents in the Defense Academy survey said that appreciation and expectations from the local people encouraged them in the field. Also, 86.7 percent of the respondents thought meeting with people from different countries and experience in foreign environment encouraged them to perform tasks in the field. Almost every peacekeeper shared their unique intercultural communication episode with the author. The stories were mostly about positive and negative experiences related to their language barrier and about cultural differences in behavior and attitudes of UN officials, the local people, and peacekeepers from other nations.

Communication in English is always an issue for Japanese people. Twenty-one percent of the Defense Academy survey identified communication with non-Japanese as a source of stress during deployment. In my interviews, the majority of peacekeepers reported initial trouble communicating with non-Japanese people in the field, but at the end, they said that their communication problem diminished. Japanese peacekeepers

understand their communication issues in a positive way and solved the problems in creative ways including using a digital camera to supplement their lack of language skills. In the Golan Heights, a GSDF in a supply unit always showed picture of the parts and facilities that needed repair to Canadian soldiers who were in charge of maintenance.

“Basically, language is not an issue. If I do not understand what somebody said to me, I simply ask the person to repeat many times. Yes, everyone comes from non-English speaking countries such as Portugal and Pakistan, it is not expected to speak good English. Once a personal relationship is established, we can communicate with each other.”(Officer Y2, GSDF)

However, it should be noted that the majority of Japanese peacekeepers have the minimum level of English communication skills in the pre-deployment training. As a result, a very few fluent English-speaking peacekeepers have to act as translators for unit members. Their burden seemed to be severe because fellow peacekeepers constantly ask them to perform interpreter jobs even off-duty.

Peacekeepers seem to have positive feedback and warm welcomes from the local people in Cambodia and Timor-Lesta. In the Golan Heights, there seems to be very limited contact with the local people. In Mozambique, the situation is unknown. An officer deployed to Timor-Lesta was surprised with the level of knowledge of average Indonesians about Japan’s developmental assistance and culture. In Timor Lesta, Japanese peacekeepers were more willing to interact with the Timorese. Some peacekeepers visited villages in the island during their vacation, and met an old villager who sang a Japanese song learned during WWII. Although Timor-Lesta was occupied by Japan during WWII, the Timorese seem to be friendly or indifferent to the presence of Japanese troops.

Peacekeeping missions brought a very rare cross-cultural communication opportunity for SDF personnel in both positive and negative ways. In Oe Kushi, an isolated area in Timor Island, the Korean Battalion and the Japanese 2nd Engineering Company worked and did community activities such as Tae Kwon Do and Karaoke together. Korean and Japanese peacekeepers held a volleyball tournament, and the Korea-Japan mixed team lost a game against the local team. This level of personal interactions between South Korean soldiers and SDF personnel would not happen unless they were deployed to international peacekeeping missions. South Korea and Japan are both American allies, but the alliances are bilateral and there has been no direct cooperation between the South Korean military and the SDF until very recently.

In contrast to these positive interactions, there was some tension between the Japanese contingent and Japanese NGO workers and activists in Timor-Lesta. A mid-career Japanese development consultant in Dili, East Timor, described a Japanese-led demonstration of East Timorese against deployment of Japanese peacekeepers to East Timor at the arrival of the Japanese advance troops.

“ When the Japanese advance troops arrived, there was a demonstration by the local people at the airport. I was there at that time.... They shouted like “NO NEED JAPANESE MILITARY,” but I saw Mr. H from a Japanese NGO standing behind the demonstrators. It was an event that Japanese activists incited the local people to do so. I was disgusted by that. History education in local schools does not teach that [Japanese invasion during WWII]. For local people, their parents may remember [Japanese invasion] or that level of knowledge. People in East Timor do not have such [antagonistic] feelings [about Japan] any more. They would like to work together in a friendly atmosphere. So, it was as if Japanese NGO workers used local people for achieving their own political goals by coming over here to incite local people to organize a demonstration against Japanese peacekeeping. In my opinion, it is not right.” (A Japanese civilian Consultant)



He also pointed out the conflicting nature of Japanese peacekeeping assignments with development business. The consultant expressed his frustration that Japanese civilian companies could do the same job with much lower costs than sending SDF troops. The government appropriated approximately 6.2 billion dollars for peacekeeping deployment in Timor-Lesta. Not only in the political sphere, has Japanese peacekeeping become competition for the Japanese construction industry and development business. Those domestic political conditions surrounding deployment of SDF personnel overseas made the SDF very nervous about SDF troops' contact with NGO workers and journalists in the field.

Organizational sensitivity affected Japanese peacekeepers' behavior in the field. However, their behavior and attitudes greatly vary depending on rank and job specialties. NCOs were told not to contact any NGO workers and journalists at all in any occasions. One evening, I happened to have a dinner with 2 Japanese medical NGO workers, 1 journalist, 2 GSDF officers, and 3 GSDF NCOs.<sup>38</sup> At the table, the NCOs were visibly nervous and would not talk to the Japanese medical NGO workers. There were long silences on the table. The three NCOs were normally very communicative and lively. However, they were oddly quiet that night. Later one of the NCOs told the author that they were strictly directed not to talk to NGO workers and journalists.

In contrast, one of the officers, a military medical doctor, talked to the NGO workers very freely. He carried on conversations cheerfully next to those intimidated, quiet NCOs. According to the military doctor, he regularly met those Japanese NGO workers and exchanged information with them to be familiar with local medical

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<sup>38</sup> In the SDF, there is no fraternization rule among officers and NCOs. Although there are potential problems, officer and NCOs can be openly friends with each other. Status discrimination such as fraternization rule will be culturally disapproved in Japanese society.

conditions. It was obvious that his medical doctor identity dictated his behavior over being a SDF officer. His behavior indicates the choice of social identification of prestigious professionals in an organization with low occupational prestige. His authority, professional status, and rank in the organization allowed him to break the normative rule in the Japanese contingent, while lower level peacekeepers conform to the normative rule and lost opportunities to interact with civilians in the field. This extremely defensive attitude of the Japanese contingent reflects fear of providing any information that can lead to negative media coverage. Approximately 60 percent of the Defense Academy survey respondents said that the media attention was discouraging. In the open-ended responses in the survey, peacekeepers expressed their frustration with too much media attention. Prohibiting contact with Japanese NGOs and journalists is a strategy of protecting accomplishments by monitoring operations in order to maintain legitimacy (Suchman 1995). The strategy seems to be working to minimize negative media coverage. On the other hand, a study showed that the power of personal interactions provided a basis of reality construction to foster a more cooperative environment among military peacekeepers and other actors in the field (Miller 1997). From this point of view, it is likely that the avoidance of the contacts has reduced chances to fill the gap between the SDF and other Japanese actors in the peacekeeping.

### Economic Recession and the Labor Force Structure

The economic recession that began in 1991 has slowly but steadily has changed traditional Japanese management systems including the seniority system, life-time employment, and long-term career development (e.g., in-house training and education).

In the traditional Japanese management system, secondary socialization in the organization culture becomes a never-ending process, in which every single event within the organization has a long-term effect in one's career development (Whitehill 1991). Given the recent change in the employment system in Japanese civilian workplaces, the SDF increases its uniqueness as an employer. As economic recession has continued, the Japanese traditional life-term employment system has been disappearing in civilian workplaces. On the other hand, the SDF has been, is, and will be a lifetime employer. The lifetime employment system will continue to provide the basis of SDF members' organizational commitment and attract more young Japanese men and women as a secure employer (Yamaguchi 2002). Gaining popularity as a stable employer is unintended, but attracts the Japanese labor market. In the government poll, 12 percent would support their family member deciding to join the SDF in 1994; the percentage increased to 18 percent in 2000. On the other hand, the percentage of those who support family member's enlistment because the SDF is a good profession declined from 35 percent to 28 percent. These changes in occupational status help the SDF gain legitimacy, but societal perception of dirtiness about the SDF may not be removed completely.

### **Transforming the Contact: Micro-Focus Evaluation of Performance**

Japanese service members admire the US military as a model military (Frühstück and Ben-Ari 2002). Across job specialties, Japanese peacekeepers tend to focus on the excellence of the immediate job skills that peacekeepers from other nations have, but not what those skills are needed for. An ASDF loadmaster who participated in a joint

exercise with the U.S. and other Air Force in Alaska was impressed by the way American Air Force crews prioritized the tasks in the exercise.

“ A country that is fighting wars does business differently as I thought. ....Efficiency was just really amazing. We spend 30 minutes to load a cargo very carefully, but they [American Air Force crews] finish up within 10 minutes. They choose to do the bare minimum.” (NCO M, ASDF)

A C-130 pilot of the First Airlift Wing considered peacekeeping missions as their secondary mission because peacekeeping missions do not fully utilize the tactical capability of the C-130.

“... those missions [peacekeeping missions] are to deliver cargoes to safe places, which is not for this airplane’s real mission...that’s what I think. .... I guess that unlike commercial jets it is not a main mission for tactical airlifters to fly high altitudes and just get to the destination like ‘here we are.’” (Officer H, ASDF)

Both the loadmaster and the C-130 pilot openly expressed their desire and admiration of war oriented armed forces because of their technical advancement, but not their war fighting skills. In the interviews, when Japanese service members expressed favorable comments on performance of soldiers from warfighting oriented armed forces, they tended to isolate technical aspects from the contexts. For Japanese service members, American soldiers are highly evaluated because of high level of professionalism and efficiency, but war-fighting elements are largely removed from the context.

Nonetheless, the C-130 pilot’s view strongly reflects the “normal” military ideal and organizational myth that is prevalent in the SDF. However, the organizational structure and activities in the SDF are separate to a much greater degree compared to other armed forces. Chances of assault landing in territorial defense missions in Japanese territory are as little as or less than those in peacekeeping operations. However, the C-130 pilot still devalued peacekeeping missions because they do not utilize the tactical

capability of C-130. She openly desired that doing her job like “normal” military is the way it should be, but she could not come up with any particular situation in which assault landing is required in SDF missions when I asked her to specify a mission situation requiring the technique. Her view narrowly focused on her job specialty and was somewhat technology driven. In addition, her view was close to American soldiers’ sense of underutilization in peacekeeping missions, but the reality of the SDF and Japanese security situation is that ASDF pilots will hardly ever have a chance to demonstrate their assault landing technique during their entire career. Before the research visit, the 1st Airlift Wing had just come back from a joint exercise with US Air Force and other air forces in Alaska. Exposure to those counterparts in other armed forces might impact Japanese crews’ perception about their job.

Their focus on technical details in their job shows a striking similarity with emotion management in other occupations (Smith and Kleinman 1989; Arluke 1994). In a study of socialization in medical school, Smith and Kleinman (1989) reported that medical students try to focus on body parts or scientific aspect of medical practice when they have to deal with intimate parts of the human body. In another study on occupational socialization, Arluke (1994) reported that animal shelter workers focused on how to inject properly to put down animals peacefully, suppressing the disturbing feelings they experience. SDF personnel’s focus on technical excellence of service members from other nations suggests that they cope with their marginalized identity as military professionals by transforming and redefining the contact with military professionals from other nations. By redefining the contact as exposure to technical excellence, SDF

personnel do not have to deal with the controversial nature of their profession within society.

As Avant (2001) suggested, meeting organizational standards is a part of membership for military organizations. SDF personnel seem to maintain their connection with other armed forces in the quality of technical excellence and operational efficiency, separated them from the conventional purpose of the military profession: warfighting. The technical focus among SDF personnel was expressed very uniquely in the NDA survey results. A question in the survey asked how they evaluate the SDF compared to other military organizations in the field. According to the survey results, only 4.7 percent of the respondents answered that other forces are better than the SDF. In a following open-ended question, the respondents were asked about the reason why respondents chose their answers. Many of them pointed out “technological superiority” and “discipline” as a primary reason for their evaluation. This technological orientation can be viewed as an extension of techno-nationalism that has been known as another hallmark of post-WWII Japanese culture besides anti-militarism.

In terms of discipline, a captain who coordinated air traffic control in the island of Timor happily told me that he was moved when he saw a C-130 land *on time*: “I was moved when I saw a C-130 approach to the airfield. It was amazing that an airplane could land a place like this, the middle of nothing, on time!” Maintaining their professional standards in difficult conditions seemed to provide a great deal of confidence to Japanese peacekeepers. For Japanese peacekeepers, peacekeepers from other nations sometimes lack discipline and professionalism. The Japanese contingent in UNTAET took over the engineering projects from the Bangladesh contingent. However, Japanese peacekeepers

expressed their dissatisfaction about the way Bangladesh troops built the road. Bangladesh troops rebuilt some parts of the road, but Japanese peacekeepers complained that Bangladesh troops did not do a good job so that they had to redo the project. Many respondents in the survey expressed their pride at being more disciplined than peacekeepers from other nations. Discipline seems to be highly valued in the organization. At the same time, maintaining discipline sometimes paralyzes daily operations: “Too much paper work”; “Peacekeepers from other countries separate work and private very well” (No.537).

### **Professional Identity and Peacekeeping Experience**

As Kawano’s study (2001; 2002) showed, the majority of Japanese peacekeepers were satisfied with the deployment. My interviews confirm his survey results. The following comment from an officer who deployed to a mission in Timor described his deployment as a life altering experience.

“I changed a lot by participating in peacekeeping deployment. I felt that I could do something helpful. We played a role in diplomacy, and the SDF is needed in Japan. If I were in Japan, there had been no way to knowing that. The peacekeeping mission let me be aware of how much Japan needs the SDF in reality.” (Officer K, ASDF)

His very positive comment also implies “helplessness” and “unworthiness” that he felt about the SDF and his job before deployment. Other peacekeepers reported that they experienced job satisfaction that they could never gain through a domestic mission.

“I changed, indeed. Before deployment, I had a typical public servant mentality (*koumuin konjo*) I felt that I did not have to work my butt off. .... Unlike in Japan, there were a very small number of us there. Before saying what is my job and what is not. .... I was the only person who could do the job there. I could do my job with a sense of responsibility... I felt pressure, too. .... I am still adjusting myself

to get back to normal. . . . . After being released from pressure and responsibilities, I still do not know what to do here. . . . the gap is too big.” (GSDF NCO Y)

“Because of the experience in the Golan Heights, I am more confident and enjoy doing things at work and in private. What I gained through this precious experience is just priceless.” (GSDF NCO #4 deployed to the Golan Heights)

There is a very important contrast between peacekeepers who were assigned to airlift missions and those who were in a longer-term ground assignment. Peacekeepers who were assigned to ground positions react to their field experience differently from Air Self Defense Force personnel assigned to airlifting missions. They expressed their uneasiness with the fact that peacekeeping is sometimes treated as if it is a more important mission than territorial defense. They described their peacekeeping experience as “the same as domestic missions,” “like a trip overseas,” and “not a primary mission of the SDF.” They tried to convince the author and themselves that what they do is a “secondary task” that they should do when they can have enough resources for territorial defense. The sharp difference in deployment experience between GSDF personnel and ASDF personnel is deeply related to the nature of their assignments. Through a longer, ground assignment that is physically and psychologically challenging, deployment experience gains a special meaning to GSDF personnel.

For those who were assigned to the field, their sense of accomplishment was a personal and life altering experience. On the other hand, those who were assigned to the field assignments stayed in the region for at least 2 months or normally for 6 months unlike ASDF airlift crews. Airlift crews had fewer chances to interact with others while those who were in field assignments had more social interactions through the deployment and experienced changes in themselves. Social interactions play a key role in determining



the meaning of the deployment. At the same time, probably more importantly, peacekeepers in ground assignments reevaluated the role of the SDF and had a chance to gain personal confidence in their professional life.

The comment from a NCO deployed to the Golan Heights cited above reflects the stigma that was attributed to the SDF for decades and his personal experience that allowed him to neutralize the stigmatized image of the SDF by showing why the SDF should not be labeled as deviant and exchanging the existing identity as an unwanted organization for an identity as a wanted and useful organization in society. Neutralization strategy is to accept the attribution of deviance (in this case, the military) given to a rule-breaking act (violation of the Constitution) but provide reinterpretation about why the individuals should not be labeled as deviant for playing the role (because the SDF fulfill the burden sharing for Japanese people). Through a self-enhancing experience in peacekeeping missions, peacekeepers legitimize their own profession as one for people in Japan. On the other hand, some peacekeepers were very bitter about Japanese peacekeeping by describing peacekeeping as a “tool for the Japanese government to be on the UN Security Council” (#339) and showed their frustration with the bureaucracy in the organization and the government.

### **Constabulary Ethos, Rule of Engagement, and Institutional Vulnerability**

The constabulary ethos worked well for civil affairs in local community relations. In Cambodia, local people tried to pick up plastic water bottles that UN peacekeepers threw away in dumpsters at camps to use them as containers. French soldiers fired warning shots to drive those local people away from their camp, while Japanese

peacekeepers washed the empty bottles and kept them separate from other garbage to make it easier for local people to reuse the bottles.

“I thought, ‘Why did you do that [to the local people] over garbage...If they can reuse them [empty plastic bottles], just let them do so.’ So, when Japanese contingent left Cambodia, local people gathered and sent off Japanese peacekeepers with tears. Japanese value emotional ties and that kind of thing.”  
(Interview #1)

This is likely to be a reflection of how SDF members were socialized occupationally. Their alert level is not so high. In both the survey and interviews, some Japanese peacekeepers expressed their frustration about fellow Japanese peacekeepers who did not properly respond to gun fire and other signs of potential danger.

At the same time, the constabulary ethos and expectations from the larger society impose unrealistic and dangerous behavioral norms on peacekeepers. As discussed earlier, the Japanese contingent cannot provide security to its own troops and camp sites due to the strict restrictions about use of force. The restrictions reflect strong domestic opposition to military action conducted by the SDF. Peacekeepers expressed their security concerns in the field because of the restrictions on use of force. A peacekeeper deployed to Cambodia wished that Japanese people would understand the difference in security situation between Japan and countries that have been in conflict for a long time.

“If we keep sending troops as we did before, the lives of *jieikan* will be at risk. It will not bring an appreciative result. I think that it is unrealistic to expect the government to deal with this issue logically and systematically....We need to put everything in order and take account of national interests first. Then, we should do so [expand our mission].”(#350)

Despite the quiet frustration and fear among peacekeepers, the strict restrictions on rule of engagement based on the constabulary ethos in society have been

institutionalized in the SDF as the behavioral norms of peacekeepers representing a peace loving nation.

On the other hand, it should be noted that Japanese peacekeepers expressed their concerns about the lack of sense of danger and of experience in the field, language difficulty, bureaucracy, and the gap as a military professional between soldiers of other armed forces and *jieikan*.

“As a military organization, we are a bunch of lay persons (*shirouto*)” (# 165).

“Inside Japan, we are not viewed as soldiers (*gunjin*) and we are not given an appropriate social status. For these reasons, it seems to me that we have a very weak idea about combat and too soft personality wise” (# 17).

“Legal ambiguity that *jieikan* is not a soldier (*gunjin*) and that the SDF (*jieitai*) is not a military. The lack of political support” (# 330).

It is noteworthy that, as expressed in the responses of respondents No.17 and No.330, the lack of organizational legitimacy is perceived as “inferiority” of the organization compared to other armed forces. However, Japanese peacekeepers do not merely view a conventional, martial military as an ideal type. Rather, as expressed in the following comment, Japanese peacekeepers were frustrated with their ambiguous status because they lacked behavioral and technical skills to survive in life-threatening situations unlike peacekeepers from other nations.

“When we heard a gun fire close to our camp at night, one of our guys was standing and looking at the direction of the gun fire in underwear like a bystander. Although in trainings we are trained to get down and wear a camouflage when hearing a gun fire, we cannot do so at all in an actual situation.” (#27)

Not many, but a few Japanese peacekeepers said that they were happy about the constabulary orientation of the SDF. A peacekeeper was proud that Japan is a “model

developed nation” that does not possess a military. Although rules of engagement and weapons that troops carry are discussed as an issue related to the Japanese anti-militaristic ideology, the safety of peacekeepers has been not been raised as a concern. Safety of peacekeepers became a part of the discourse to dismiss the legitimacy of Japan’s military contribution to international peacekeeping missions. When and in which mission the SDF will have the first fatal casualty in peacekeeping deployment is the focus of the popular security discourse in Japan, while the practical need of self protection for SDF members deployed to peacekeeping missions has never been discussed. The baseline argument is that “the SDF should not send troops to peacekeeping missions overseas if they have to be armed for self protection.” Ideological consistency as a constabulary force and a military-free nation outweighs the appropriate security measures to protect peacekeepers. In fact, for peacekeepers, the idea of losing their established identity as territorial defenders who only engage in combat when the nation is under enemy attack, is causing tremendous uneasiness although they are increasingly vulnerable in the field. As a frustrated peacekeeping expert (Brooks 2003) pointed out, the Japanese contingent relies on security to the troops from other nations (e.g., In Cambodia, Canadian troops provided security; Recently, the Dutch troops and the Polish troops have been providing security to the Japanese contingent deployed to the Southern Iraq). As Wicks (2002) demonstrated in the impact on Canadian coal miners’ masculine identity of a tragic accident, the institutional element of professional identity and behavioral standard imposed by the larger society increases the vulnerability of Japanese peacekeepers.

Although Japanese peacekeepers express their concerns about security, they cannot ignore institutional influences of the general public on them. Organizational practice based on the anti-militaristic ideology shape the constabulary ethos of Japanese service members. In operations, the institutional element of their professional identity increases their vulnerability. Luckily, Japanese peacekeepers have not had a fatal casualty in international peacekeeping missions yet. However, the data analyzed in the present dissertation suggest that Japanese service members internalize the fear and hesitation to use force in a persistent and strong manner. The institutionalization of a constabulary professional identity should be appreciated from the ideological view point. On the other hand, such micro-level institutionalization may compromise the meaning of use of force in purely ideological terms and facilitate a preventable tragedy by fostering inability to take appropriate action for self defense among Japanese peacekeepers.

## **Summary**

There are two important findings from the interview data with former peacekeepers. First, contrary to the concerns of many researchers on Japanese national security about the possibility of Japan's ambition to be a major military power, SDF members' professional identity seems to be deeply rooted in constabulary ethics. SDF personnel view peacekeeping missions as a good opportunity for their professional development to improve their skills for the existing domestic missions. However, such exclusively job focused attitudes show that the SDF as a military organization has been developed with an organizational myth, modeling American armed forces as a "normal" military. We should pay close attention to the gap between the expressed sense of inferiority in the interviews or being a "half-boiled (*chutohanpa*)" military and survey

results showing that most peacekeepers felt that the SDF is superior to other armed forces. We can interpret that this confidence in organizational capability is a reflection of SDF members' understanding of the difference in organizational orientation between the SDF and other armed forces. They are capable of being more aggressive, but choose not to do so because the organizational goal is national defense.

At this moment, many SDF personnel deployed to peacekeeping missions gained more self-esteem and job satisfaction that they never felt before. In this sense, peacekeeping participation has a very positive influence on SDF personnel. However, there are several issues that the organization has to deal with such as post-deployment adjustment support and the expansion in the range of missions. Japanese peacekeeping focuses on engineering, medical, transportation and relevant support functions, which limits job specialties of SDF personnel deployed to peacekeeping missions. UN allowance brings peacekeepers a decent amount of temporary income. Some of them purchase a new car or something expensive that other personnel cannot afford to with their salary; A long-term leave upon return from deployment sometimes causes tension between peacekeepers and their fellow service members back home. Although peacekeeping participation is not considered to be a factor for promotion, some of SDF personnel without peacekeeping deployment experience treat those who have deployment experience differently with envy and frustration because their absence burdened the job assignment in the unit. Unexpectedly high job satisfaction during peacekeeping deployment seems to be a little troublesome for some of former peacekeepers to readjust themselves to their jobs in their home stations.

Peacekeeping participation, combined with gaining popularity as a stable job among Japanese youths in the prolonged recession, is changing the cultural value associated with being SDF personnel in Japanese society. Turner's (1989) self relevancy theory suggests that this upward change in organizational status in society may change SDF members' value orientation for setting their practical goals in the future, and it can change their possible self, the future-oriented components of the self-schema (Markus and Nurius 1986) as SDF personnel, which will affect their professional identity as military professionals. Positive experience that Japanese peacekeepers gained from their peacekeeping experience is getting out of the stigmatized stereotypes as self-conception is changing over time as a set of changing available self-knowledge.

Most of the former peacekeepers interviewed in the present dissertation reported that they were satisfied overall with their deployment experience, which supported Kawano's (2002) findings. However, it does not mean that there is no organizational issue associated with peacekeeping participation. The next chapter will focus on the relationship between peacekeepers' deployment experiences and deployment motivation and the perception about the relative capability of the organization and mission satisfaction. These are most important individual outcomes that would significantly impact on organizational adaptability to peacekeeping and overall organizational effectiveness.

## **Chapter 9: What do Japanese Peacekeepers Gain from Peacekeeping?**

In Chapter 7 and 8, I presented various aspects of SDF members' identity and attitudes toward peacekeeping missions using qualitative data. Social and personal identities are implicated in the motivation that determines our role behavior in daily situations (Hewitt, 2003). Here I use survey data to examine the relative impact of the identity-related and deployment factors on peacekeepers' mission satisfaction and their perception about the relative superiority of the SDF. The first section presents a statistical portrait of the sample by reviewing enlistment motivation, deployment motivation, a few aspects of deployment experience, and background characteristics. The second section presents correlation analysis to determine if these variables are significantly related to organizational perception and mission satisfaction. Findings from descriptive statistics and correlation analysis should provide preliminary evidence on what aspects of peacekeeping experience are related to redeployment intention and mission satisfaction. The last section of the chapter examines the relative impact of independent variables on organizational pride and mission satisfaction using Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regression.

### **Statistical Portrayal of Japanese Peacekeepers**

In the present dissertation, I use the data from a retrospective attitudinal survey of Japanese peacekeepers collected in 1999 by Hitoshi Kawano at the Japan Defense Academy (JDS survey). Using the data, Kawano (2001; 2002) conducted bivariate data analysis of the questions related to peacekeepers' attitudes and their subjective



evaluations of deployment very thoroughly. Therefore, the present dissertation will not repeat those bivariate data analyses. Instead, I will focus on questions about motivation and deployment experiences in the survey. Almost 20 percent of the respondents are officers; the other respondents are NCOs and enlisted. More than half of the respondents are married (56.2 percent). Regarding the highest education received, 14 percent of the respondents have college degrees, and the majority of the respondents (60 percent) have high school diplomas. A little more than 12 percent of the respondents have only finished junior high school. Not all of these junior high school graduates (equivalent to 9th grade) are high school dropouts. This is partially because the Japanese school system requires only junior high school level education as compulsory education, and partially because those who attended one of the three high schools run by the SDF (*jieitai seito*) are considered as SDF personnel once they enter high school. They hold high school diplomas. The proportion of high school dropouts and non-dropouts in this category is unknown.

Peacekeepers who responded to the JDA survey were age 19 to 51 when they deployed to the missions. The majority of the respondents (93 percent) are Ground Self Defense Force personnel. The average years in the service are 17 years. This relatively long average year of service reflects the lifetime employment system in the SDF. The majority of the respondents joined the SDF before the end of the Cold War (88 percent of the respondents); most of the respondents (96 percent) were already in the service when the SDF started sending troops to international peacekeeping missions in 1992. Approximately 38 percent are 20-29 years old; 42.5 percent are 30-39 years old; 19.8 percent are 40-51 years old. This age distribution of peacekeepers suggests that many

respondents were exposed to antagonistic or indifferent attitudes of the public before or after they joined the force.

## **Motivations and Professional Identity**

### Enlistment Motivations

A US study suggests that self selection is a major factor shaping and maintaining the organizational culture of the military rather than secondary socialization taking place after joining service (Segal, et al, 2001). Table 6 shows the distribution of reasons why peacekeepers joined the SDF. The data is drawn from the 1999 Defense Academy survey. In this survey, respondents were allowed to choose up to two enlistment motivations from the list of the options. Approximately 18 percent of the respondents identified one reason for enlistment. More than 40 percent of the respondents answered training opportunities or job security as one of their primary enlistment motivations.

**Table 6: Two Primary Motivations for Enlistment (N=612)**

Motivation	N	Percentage
Encouraged by family	195	31.9
National defense is important	148	24.2
No other job was available	160	26.1
Training and Credential that could be obtained	267	43.6
Job Security	264	43.1
Other	85	13.9
Total	1,119	182.8

Note: Respondents were asked to choose up to two motivations without specifying the rank order. For this reason, total percentage exceeds 100.

Table 7 shows the top 5 combinations of the two primary reasons for enlistment. Approximately 10.3 percent of Japanese peacekeepers decided to join the SDF because the SDF is a stable government job and because the SDF would provide training opportunities to gain job skills and special licenses (e.g., driver's license for trucks and

other large-size commercial vehicles and radio technician). The combinations in the second most chosen (job security and Family’s suggestion: 9.0 percent) and third most chosen (training opportunity and family’s suggestion: 8.7 percent) also listed similar reasons. Unlike the United States, patriotic reason first appeared in the 5th from the top (7.2 percent).

**Table 7: Distribution of the Top 5 Combinations of Enlistment Reasons among Peacekeepers.**

	Combination of Enlistment Reasons	N	Percentage <sup>1</sup>
1	Job Security & Training Opportunities	63	10.3
2	Job Security & Family’s Suggestion	55	9.0
3	Training Opportunity & Family’s Suggestion	53	8.7
4	Training Opportunity & No Other Job Available	51	8.3
5	Job Security & Belief in the Significance of National Defense	44	7.2

1: Percentage of valid responses (N=612).

Table 6 and 7 demonstrate that the significance of national defense (patriotic motivation) was not the primary motivations for many peacekeepers. Is this a consistent tendency across generations? Table 8 shows the distribution of patriotic motivation by age groups. The Pearson’s chi-square value is 11.17, which suggests that there is a significant relationship between enlistment motivations and age at the 1 percent significance level ( $p < 0.01$ ). Between the 19-29 years old group and the 30-39 years old group, there is no difference in distribution of enlistment reasons. On the other hand, 35.5 percent of the 40 years old and older peacekeepers answered that they enlisted because national defense is important. On the other hand, in younger groups of peacekeepers,

patriotic motivation had much lower percentages (19-29 years old: 20.9 percent; 30-39 years old: 21.2 percent).<sup>39</sup>

**Table 8: Enlistment Motivation by Age groups (N=610)**

Age Group	Non-patriotic Motivations	Patriotic Motivation	Total
19 – 29 y.o.	182 (79.1)	48 (20.9)	230 (100.0)
30-39 y.o.	204 (78.8)	55 (21.2)	259 (100.0)
40 y.o. and older	78 (64.5)	43 (35.5)	121 (100.0)
Total	464 (76.1)	146 (23.9)	610 (100.0)

Note 1. ( ) is percentage within each age group.  
2. Chi-square value =11.17 (p<. 01)

This generational gap in enlistment motivation suggests generational difference in occupational socialization corresponding to the change in social status of the organization in society. At the same time, this can be a retrospective effect that older generation of peacekeepers might modify their enlistment motivations to protect one's professional identity in a socially marginalized profession over time. As discussed earlier, while the Japanese economy was in a high-growth period, the SDF experienced chronic recruitment issues. Taking these social and economic situations into consideration, high patriotic motivation in the older age group may be (a) a product of the emotion management of SDF personnel to cope with their socially marginalized profession or (b) a conscious

<sup>39</sup> Adjusted standardized residuals between expected and observed values supported this provide us the information about the distinctiveness of the cells: the cell has a distinctive response pattern if the absolute value is higher than 2. Adjusted standardized residuals indicate that peacekeepers age 40 and older tend to have patriotic motivation for enlistment. The value of adjusted standardized residual for patriotic motivation of the 40 years old and older group is 3.3, for non-patriotic motivation of the group is -3.3. The value of adjusted standardized residuals for the other cells did not indicate the distinctive distribution pattern (the values are less than 2).

decision to choose a socially marginalized profession for personal belief in higher cause (national security).

The lower percentage of patriotic motivation in the younger generations is noteworthy in the relationship with increasing interest in peacekeeping deployment among recent officer candidates and recruits. According to the officers in the ASDF Officer Candidate School (ASDFOCS), compared to several years ago, peacekeeping deployment became increasingly a popular motivation for joining the force as well as training and educational opportunities in the service. An executive officer in the ASDFOCS described the job preference among recent applicants.

“ [Among applicants for aviation specialty] not only fighter pilot positions but also transportation and rescue pilot positions are becoming more popular because [applicants] want to participate in peacekeeping and disaster relief missions...[In the interviews with applicants] they knew that they should choose transportation if they wanted to deploy for peacekeeping operations. I did not know such a detail about the SDF when I was an officer candidate since it was in the period of five major specialties<sup>40</sup>....” (#14: Officer, ASDF)

“Yes, transportation! I want to be assigned to transportation specialty so badly. ....I thought that I should apply for operational specialties, but it is great to do something to support [missions] such as peacekeeping and disaster relief.” (#16: Trainee, ASDF)

However, in a focus group session, officer candidates expressed their desire to study abroad paid by the SDF, but not to deploy to peacekeeping operations. For many ASDF officer candidates, peacekeeping operations are very limited opportunities in the ASDF unless they become aviators. Candidates generally expressed their positive impression about peacekeeping operations, but their comments were superficial reflecting

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<sup>40</sup> In the ASDF, officer candidates used to be assigned to five major job specialties such as aviation, air defense (Patriot missile operation), tactical air traffic control, air traffic control, and maintenance.

that peacekeeping missions are not in their realities in their newly started professional socialization in the ASDF. Combined with the very tight job market for new college graduates, media exposure of the SDF has been changing the pool of officers and recruits. Their career goals in the ASDF were diverse, ranging from aviation to aerospace engineering, post-doctoral education, and peacekeeping. Putting aside the fact that officer candidates are in the process of indoctrination, their career perspective and attitudes toward the military profession are distinctively different from experienced personnel. These attitudinal differences suggest that the younger generations of ASDF personnel may take a considerably longer time to adopt the same narratives or emotional management strategies. Or, the younger generations may not have a chance to reaffirm the dirty work approach unless they face situations that necessitate the existing emotional management strategies. Although it is not completely identical, those who are in certain occupations that deal with emotionally uncomfortable tasks (e.g., animal shelter workers who euthanize animals routinely) ultimately rely on the strategies used by experienced fellow workers and reproduce the institution (e.g., Smith and Kleinman 1989; Arluke 1994). In the case of the ASDF, it seems that the younger generations bring new meanings of the military profession, which are not consistent with the existing institutional norms and coping mechanism. For example, the educational opportunity motivation was not well accepted in the organization. The trainers whom I interviewed had a very critical view of the candidates' mindset and career motivation.

“Candidates in the recent cohorts are focusing on the flowery side of the job like studying abroad programs.... For example, they want to be a pilot because they can get training in the US. That is like putting the cart before the horse. We gotta straighten them out sometime. They joined the force for very personal reasons like studying overseas or going to graduate school

[paid by the ASDF], not for doing something for the country.” (#14: Officer, ASDF)

The two trainers were both young Captains in their early 30s, and went through the same training seven or eight years ago, not too long time ago. However, they felt the change of mindset among candidates and showed their frustration with candidates' instrumental attitudes toward the profession. My focus group interview confirmed their observation. Candidates were more focused on personal educational opportunities that very few of them could get in the future rather than more operation-related overseas opportunities such as peacekeeping deployment. Most trainees were almost abruptly indifferent to peacekeeping operations. In contrast, they became very enthusiastic and engaged in conversations when we switched the subject to educational opportunities to attend master's programs overseas and aviation training in the U.S. This is an example of a technique called 'infusing.' According to Ashforth and Kreiner (1999), infusing is to reframe the meaning attached to an occupation. For young officer candidates, study abroad programs in the SDF refocus their attention from stigmatized features of the profession (e.g., field exercises, danger in missions, and antagonism from the general public) to a nonstigmatized feature (e.g., study abroad programs and opportunities for post-graduate level education). People in a stigmatized occupation attempt to minimize the impact of the occupational stigma by considering their involvement and investment in the occupation as an instrument for achieving long-term goals (Ashforth and Kreiner, 1999).

However, it is still not common among ASDF personnel to refocus the mission of the SDF based on peacekeeping participation. One trainee was not articulate but clearly uncomfortable with participating in peacekeeping missions:

“Peacekeeping is politics, not military affairs. So, well...how should I say this...diplomacy? I’d rather be supporting [military affairs] by developing new airplanes behind the scene.” (#16: A trainee, ASDF OCS)

This oversimplified view made a very important point in the basic ideal type of professional military and their expected self in the future. According to Turner (1989), people in a specific position in the social structure have constraints on how much their value can be applied to their practical goal setting. Turner calls this conflict between cultural value and personal goal “self relevancy.” As Trainee A expressed, some officer candidates have trouble understanding peacekeeping operations as a military mission because their reference group and the values that they applied is a military organization with a more martial orientation. Among candidates who expressed their interest in peacekeeping missions all focused on the development of personal skills and professional experience through deployment, but not the macro-level purpose of peacekeeping.

It is likely that the recent job market for college graduates in Japan also contributes this individualistic attitude of officer candidates and young generation of peacekeepers toward their military service. In the early 1990s, the unemployment rate in Japan was around 2- 2.5 percent; now the rate is double (4.7 percent in 2004) (Ministry of Health, Labor, and Welfare, 2004). Scarce job opportunities under the recession of the Japanese economy pushed the popularity of joining the SDF and made it a very competitive job. The rates of competition to enlist the SDF as fixed term personnel are 3.2 for men and 9.1 for women on average, among the three services in fiscal year of



1996 (Defense of Japan, 1997). There is another category for enlistment, NCO candidates, who will be promoted to NCO within 6 years. The ratio of enlistment for E (U) candidates is 1: 12 for men and 1: 29.3 for women. For female applicants, the chance of enlistment is far smaller than men. General and technical officer candidate positions for college graduates are more competitive, an acceptance rate, lower than 3 percent. This popularity of enlistment was never expected in the 1980s when the SDF could not meet manpower needs due to recruitment problems. The recent long-term recession contributed to reducing the distance of the SDF from the larger society by presenting the organization as a stable employer to the youth generation. In addition, the competitiveness of enlistment to the SDF helps improve the quality of the recruits and is gradually reducing the stigmatized image of the SDF attached to the organizational history.

#### Deployment Motivations

Ohi (1999) found differences in perceived value among peacekeepers from different recruitment categories, suggesting different initial professional socialization processes in the service. Officers valued territorial defense more than constabulary missions such as disaster relief and peacekeeping, compared to Non-Commissioned officers (NCOs). Among officers, National Defense Academy graduates valued territorial defense related missions more than did civilian university graduates. This result might reflect the socialization process of National Defense Academy graduates as military professionals which started their career much earlier than officers who graduated from civilian universities. Reference groups in the socialization process of National Defense

Academy graduates might be traditional military officers such as American military officers.

Despite the increasing popularity of the SDF among the youth, what motivated peacekeepers to deploy overseas? To better understand deployment motivations, I categorized the respondents into the following four groups based on their deployment motivation using the two motivation scales (organization-oriented motivation scale and personal-oriented motivation scale) listed in the methods section.

**Organization-Oriented Motivation (ORGMOTV)** is a dummy variable for those who score higher than the mean on the organization-oriented motivations scale, but not scoring higher than the mean on the individual-oriented motivations scale.

**Personal Motivation (PERMTV)** is a dummy variable for those who score higher than the mean on the individual-oriented motivations scale, but not scoring higher than the mean on the organization-oriented motivations scale.

**Balanced Motivation (BALANCE)** is a dummy variable for those who score higher than the mean scores on both individual and organization-oriented motivations. Those who have balanced motivation=1; otherwise, coded as 0.

**No Motivation (NOMOTIV)** is a dummy variable for those who show no interest in peacekeeping deployment in an item asking about a respondent's eagerness for peacekeeping deployment. The question is "how interested were you in participating in peacekeeping deployment before you were assigned to the mission?" Respondents used a four-point scale with don't know option: 1= "I was very much interested"; 2= "I was somewhat interested"; 3= "I am not particularly interested"; 4= "I did not want to

participate if possible.” Those who answered 3 and 4 were coded as no deployment motivation=1; otherwise, coded as 0.

**Table 9 Cross-Tabulation of Patriotic Enlistment Motivation and Deployment Motivation**

		Enlistment Motivation *		
		Non-patriotic Reasons	Patriotic Reason	Total
Deployment	Organizational motivation	95 (20.2)	50(33.8)	145 (23.5)
	Personal Motivation	54 (11.5)	6 (4.1)	60 (9.7)
	High in both motivations	88 (18.7)	31 (20.9)	119 (19.3)
	Moderately motivated	122 (26.0)	33 (22.3)	155 (25.1)
	No motivation	111 (23.6)	28 (18.9)	139 (22.5)
	Total	470 (100.0)	148 (100.0)	618 (100.0)

Table 9 provides the cross-tabulation of deployment motivations and Enlistment motivation (non-patriotic reasons and patriotic reason). Nearly a quarter of respondents showed high level of organizational motivation, while only 9.7 percent were high in only personal motivation. For 19.3 percent of respondents, organizational motivation and personal motivations are equally high. Almost a quarter of the respondents were not highly but moderately motivated. A relatively high percentage of respondents (22.5 percent) did not have an interest in peacekeeping deployment or did not want to participate in overseas deployment. There was a significant difference in deployment motivations between those who enlisted with patriotic reason and those who enlisted other than patriotic reasons as their primary motives (Chi-square value= 17.24;  $p < .01$ ). Respondents who joined the SDF with patriotic reasons show a higher percentage of an organizational motivation and very low percentage of personal motivation.

Since SDF personnel who have opportunities for deployment tend to be concentrated in certain job areas, personal reasons, specifically for promotion and

advancement, seem to be looked down upon by their peers. The following comment from an ASDF officer seems to represent one aspect of an organizational norm against using peacekeeping missions as a career opportunity.

“Those who think this [peacekeeping] is a step-up for their career should not go. It is wrong. It is ok if they learn something in the process of deployment, but participating in peacekeeping for career advancement is just wrong” (#30: Officer with no deployment experience, ASDF).

On the other hand, a NCO deployed to UNDOF in the Golan Heights expressed his failed expectation for promotion after deployment.

“...one disappointing thing is promotion and special advancement (*tokushou: tokubetsu shokyu*). Every deployed service member should think about this once, I believe. I am very disappointed that I could not be promoted nor chosen for special advancement in July. I am ashamed to say that I have been Sergeant 3rd class for 10 years... Promotion was very important for me. My wife knew about it. I was very shocked to hear my wife saying to me, “you deploy for what?” I expected my promotion and advancement because senior NCO members [were promoted and received advancement]. I participated in a peacekeeping operation and did my best. Peacekeeping deployment does not count on promotion and advancement evaluation in my unit. After going there and coming back, ‘thank you’ is the only thing I get?” (#10: GSDF NCO deployed to UNDOF).

Ohi (1999) reported similar problems that peacekeepers experienced after they returned from deployment. Peacekeepers expected promotion and favorable treatment in terms of transfer and special advancement, but these expectations were often betrayed. There is a structural reason for not using peacekeeping experience for performance evaluation for promotion because the limited assignment of Japanese troops also restricts job specialties of service members who deploy (e.g., engineering, transportation) although service members in other specialties have opportunities to volunteer for peacekeeping assignments. Devaluing career enhancement and economic motivations is a unique contrast with North American and European peacekeepers. For American

peacekeepers deployed to the Sinai, perceived benefits for professional development was a factor in successful adjustment (Segal and Meeker 1985). American reservists who deployed to peacekeeping assignments were motivated by the financial benefit from their deployment (Lakhani and Abod 1997). On the contrary, among Italian professional soldiers who deployed to Albania and Somalia, those who were motivated for a financial gain were not satisfied with the missions because their civilian counterparts earn more money without hardship in the field (Battistelli 1997). This may be a difference in the allocation of morality regarding financial issues in different cultures. In Japanese culture, talking about money is often refrained from because it is considered as a sign of greed in Buddhism and Confucianism.

### **Correlation Analysis of the Variables**

In the present dissertation, peacekeepers' perceptions about organizational capacity (perceived organizational ability) and satisfaction are used as dependent variables. These variables play a significant role in Japanese service members' attitudes and identity in the process of adaptation to peacekeeping.

Perceived organizational ability was introduced as a result of the findings from interview data. As discussed in Chapter 8, Japanese peacekeepers display ambivalent feelings about their professional status and the current state of the organization. Some peacekeepers express frustration about their inability to react in a potentially life threatening situation. On the other hand, some say that they are proud that SDF personnel are more disciplined and efficient, compared to peacekeepers from other nations. However, it is still not clear that how other aspects of deployment experience, other than

these narrowly focused qualities, affect peacekeepers' perception about organizational ability.

In terms of satisfaction, previous studies have found that the majority of Japanese peacekeepers are satisfied with their peacekeeping deployment (Kawano 2001; 2002). Regarding the internal construct of mission satisfaction among Japanese peacekeepers, Satoh (2001) used Kawano's survey data and analyzed satisfaction and dissatisfaction factors in perceived mission experience. Satoh (2001) tested Herzberg's (1966) model of the relationship between perceived job environments and satisfaction and motivation. Herzberg (1966) identified satisfaction factors and dissatisfaction factors in perceived mission environments, and suggested that perceived mission environments are strongly associated with job satisfaction, while dissatisfaction factors would not improve job satisfaction when they were reduced. In Satoh's (2001) research, it is worthwhile noting that satisfaction factors showed strong correlations with both personal and organization-oriented motivations for deployment. A problem with Satoh's research is that he did not test his hypotheses in a single integrative model: he separated segments of the processes of attitudes formation into three parts and examined them respectively. He examined the correlation between pre-deployment motivation and perceived satisfaction and dissatisfaction factors, perceived satisfaction and dissatisfaction factors and overall mission satisfaction, and perceived satisfaction and dissatisfaction factors and redeployment intention. Examining the relative explanatory power of satisfaction and dissatisfaction scales leaves us puzzled about what aspects of the mission experience are associated with satisfaction. To clarify the relationship between deployment experience and mission satisfaction, the present dissertation introduces positive experience as the

‘personal fulfillment’ score, and analyzes the relationship between various aspects of deployment experience and mission satisfaction.

For the analysis, first I performed correlation analysis to see how groups of independent variables relate to other independent variables and two dependent variables (Table 9). Using Pearson’s correlation coefficients, all the individual-level background characteristics except education level are significantly related to organizational pride; with mission satisfaction, only the mission in Cambodia (UNTAC) was significantly correlated. Young (younger generation of peacekeepers age under 30) is negatively related to organizational pride ( $r = -.158$ ;  $p < .01$ ) but not mission satisfaction.

Education was not related to either perceived organizational ability or mission satisfaction. Dummy variables for two missions (UNTAC and ONUMOZ) were both related to organizational pride (UNTAC:  $r = -.105$ ,  $p < .01$ ; ONUMOZ:  $r = .114$ ,  $p < .01$ ), but only UNTAC was related to mission satisfaction ( $r = -.152$ ,  $p < .01$ ). Patriotic motivation for enlistment was also introduced as a background variable to provide the basis of peacekeepers’ initial intention of joining the organization. Patriotic motivation is significantly related to perceived organizational ability ( $r = .153$ ,  $p < .01$ ), but not mission satisfaction. Although education levels are uniquely distributed across rank and age due to the enlistment system in the SDF and shift in the recruiting trend in the past decade, it is not likely that difference in education caused differences in organizational pride and mission satisfaction.

**Table 10. Correlation Matrix and Descriptive Statistics of Study Variables (N=545).**

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
1 Organizational Pride	—									
2 Mission Satisfaction	.109*	—								
3 Organization-oriented Motivation	.055	.097*	—							
4 Personal Motivation	.021	-.100*	-.193**	—						
5 Balanced Motivation	.090*	.054	-.287***	-.170***	—					
6 No Motivation	-.047	-.103*	-.297***	-.176***	-.261***	—				
7 Suitability to Peacekeeping	.084*	.096*	.107*	-.086*	.034	-.045	—			
8 Good Lesson for Defense Act	.030	.109*	.100*	-.042	.042	-.088*	.117**	—		
9 Interpersonal Conflict	-.015	-.163***	-.050	.059	-.025	.025	-.030	-.074	—	
10 Conflict with Superior	-.102*	-.187***	-.028	.106*	-.057	.000	-.025	-.051	.355***	—
11 Unit Cohesion	.106*	.124**	.129**	.085*	-.018	-.148***	.100*	.064	-.181***	-.196***
12 Mission Difficulty	.005	-.064	.014	-.035	-.010	.126**	.043	-.049	.205***	.151***
13 Relative stress level	.033	-.117**	-.028	-.044	-.010	.149***	.035	-.031	.192***	.105*
14 Fulfillment	.120**	.331***	.136***	.040	.031	-.102*	.129**	.085*	-.053	-.090*
15 Young	-.151***	-.017	-.143***	.162**	.056	-.095*	-.057	-.085*	.032	.085*
16 Education	-.003	-.072	-.057	-.041	.010	.043	.057	-.090*	.051	.027
17 UNTAC	-.083	-.152***	-.036	-.066	.057	.125**	.023	.051	-.085*	.034
18 ONUMOZ	.103*	.043	-.038	-.020	-.054	.031	-.078	-.038	.077	-.019
19 Patriotic Enlistment Motivation	.152***	.025	.156***	-.130**	.034	-.034	.014	.004	-.003	.001

(Table 9 continued to next page)

\* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

\*\* Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

\*\*\* Correlation is significant at the 0.001 level (2-tailed).



(Table 10 continued)

	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	Mean	SD
1 Organizational Pride										2.528	.578
2 Mission Satisfaction										2.183	.499
3 Organization-oriented Motivation										—	—
4 Personal Motivation										—	—
5 Balanced Motivation										—	—
6 No Motivation										—	—
7 Suitability to Peacekeeping										.391	.488
8 Good Lesson for Defense Act										2.044	.513
9 Interpersonal Conflict										.561	.497
10 Conflict with Superior										.127	.333
11 Unit Cohesion	—									.235	.424
12 Mission Difficulty	-.104*	—								2.462	.558
13 Relative stress level	-.060	.378***	—							3.306	.893
14 Fulfillment	.077	.050	-.171***	—						1.495	.636
15 Young	-.029	.044	-.022	.041	—					—	—
16 Education	.026	.173***	.124***	-.125**	.012	—				2.314	.888
17 UNTAC	-.125**	.007	-.027	.016	.094*	-.105*	—			—	—
18 ONUMOZ	.046	.173***	.124**	-.179***	.000	.150***	-.431***	—		—	—
19 Patriotic Enlistment Motivation	.038	.034	.019	.048	-.027	.071	-.112**	.167***	—	—	—

\* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

\*\* Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

\*\*\* Correlation is significant at the 0.001 level (2-tailed).

In terms of deployment motivation, balanced motivation, which is high in both organization-oriented and personal oriented motivation for deployment, is moderately related to organization pride, but not mission satisfaction. The three other categories of deployment motivation are moderately related to mission satisfaction, but not organizational pride. Interestingly, personal motivation (high in personal motivation for deployment) as well as no motivation (no motivation for deployment) is negatively associated with mission satisfaction. In contrast, personal motivation is positively associated with mission satisfaction. In the next section, therefore, I will examine the effect of different motivations on mission satisfaction relative to other factors.

Compared to deployment motivations, experiences during deployment are more strongly related to the perceived organizational ability and mission satisfaction. Interpersonal conflict with unit members is negatively related to mission satisfaction ( $r = -.163, p < .01$ ), but not to organizational pride. On the other hand, conflict with superiors is negatively related to organizational pride ( $r = -.118, p < .01$ ) and mission satisfaction ( $r = -.187, p < .01$ ). Unit cohesion was positively related to organizational pride ( $r = .103, p < .05$ ) and to mission satisfaction ( $r = .124, p < .01$ ). Mission difficulty was not related to organizational pride or mission satisfaction.

With regard to peacekeepers' perception about peacekeeping missions, organizational suitability to peacekeeping is moderately related to both the perceived organizational ability and mission satisfaction. Perception of benefit of peacekeeping for domestic "defense act (*Bouei Shutsudo*)" is positively related to mission satisfaction ( $r = .145, p < .01$ ), but not to perceived organizational ability. Relative stress level compared

to domestic missions in Japan is strongly and negatively associated with mission satisfaction ( $r = -.117, p < .01$ ). Personal fulfillment shows moderately positive correlation with the perceived organizational ability ( $r = .106, p < .05$ ), and highly positive correlation with mission satisfaction ( $r = .331, p < .01$ ). Since the domain of personal fulfillment is personal experience, it is likely to be related to the individual's mission satisfaction rather than the subjective evaluation of the organization, albeit one's evaluation of the organization that she or he belongs to is likely to reflect their self-evaluation.

In sum, many variables show significant correlations with either or both of the two dependent variables. No combination of the independent variables showed multicollinearity problems. To see the effects of the variables when controlling for other variables, the next section will present the OLS regression analysis.

### **Impact of Peacekeeping Participation on Individual Peacekeepers**

The findings in the previous section provided preliminary evidence that peacekeeping participation is related to organizational perception and that the other model variables are also significantly related to mission satisfaction. This section will examine the relative impact of independent variables on organizational pride and mission satisfaction using Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regression.

#### Perceived Organizational Capability

Table 11 shows the four models that examine the impact of independent variables on perceived organizational capability. In Model 1, I regressed four dummy variables for deployment motivations on perceived organizational capability. The four groups of

**Table 11. OLS Regression of Perceived Organizational Capability on Deployment Motivation, Deployment Experience, and Psychological States.**

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4	
	b	Beta	B	Beta	b	Beta	B	Beta
<i>Deployment Motivation</i>								
Organization-oriented Motivation <sup>a</sup>	.161 (.108)	.079	.140 (.109)	.068	.125 (.109)	.061	.009 (.109)	.046
Personal Motivation <sup>a</sup>	.265 (.139)	.091	.271 (.140)	.093	.295* (.139)	.101	.270 (.138)	.093
Balanced Motivation <sup>a</sup>	.351** (.112)	.159	.336** (.112)	.152	.328** (.112)	.149	.309** (.111)	.140
No Motivation <sup>a</sup>	.007 (.112)	.033	.007 (.113)	.037	.008 (.112)	.037	.005 (.112)	.028
<i>Deployment Experience</i>								
Interpersonal Conflict			-.001 (.063)	-.013	-.001 (.063)	-.011	-.002 (.063)	-.020
Conflict with Superior			-.135 (.070)	-.088	-.137* (.069)	-.089	-.123 (.069)	-.080
Unit Cohesion			-.005 (.044)	.058	.004 (.044)	.047	.004 (.043)	.042
Mission Difficulty			.001 (.069)	.009	.001 (.069)	.001	-.006 (.073)	-.042
<i>Perception about Peacekeeping</i>								
Suitability to peacekeeping					.201** (.067)	.127	.181** (.067)	.114
Defense Act					-.001 (.034)	-.021	-.002 (.034)	-.031
<i>Psychological States</i>								
Relative stress level Stress							.139 (.072)	.089
Personal Fulfillment							.176** (.068)	.114
<i>Control</i>								
Young <sup>b</sup>	-.291*** (.078)	-.160	-.278*** (.078)	-.153	-.272*** (.078)	-.150	-.283*** (.078)	-.156
Education	.004 (.073)	.025	-.004 (.074)	.025	.002 (.073)	.017	.004 (.074)	.026
UNTAC <sup>c</sup>	-.007 (.084)	-.042	-.006 (.085)	-.035	-.005 (.085)	-.034	-.004 (.084)	-.024
ONUMOZ <sup>c</sup>	.224 (.125)	.084	.216* (.127)	.081	.247 (.127)	.093	.299* (.128)	.112
Patriotic Enlistment Motivation	.258** (.090)	.124	.261** (.090)	.125	.263** (.089)	.126	.249** (.089)	.119
Constant	2.503		2.530		2.182		1.584	
R <sup>2</sup>	.078		.091		.107		.121	
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	.062		.069		.081		.093	

Note: N = 545; Standard errors in parentheses.

<sup>a</sup> Compared to those who are moderately motivated; <sup>b</sup> Compared to those who are age 30 and above; <sup>c</sup> Compared to respondents who deployed to Golan Heights (UNDOF).

b = Unstandardized Coefficients, Beta = Standardized Coefficients.

†  $p < .10$ ; \*  $p < .05$ ; \*\*  $p < .01$ ; \*\*\*  $p < .001$ .

deployment motivations were included in the model, taking the “moderately motivated” group as control group. In the next model (Model 2), I added four deployment experiences including interpersonal conflict with fellow peacekeepers and superiors respectively, unit cohesion, and mission difficulty. In the third model (Model 3), two variables for peacekeepers’ perception about peacekeeping as a mission for the SDF were introduced. Lastly, in Model 4, I controlled for relative stress level and the level of personal fulfillment.

Model 1 tested the relationship between deployment motivations and perceived organizational capability, holding constant young generation, education, missions, and patriotic enlistment motivation. The positive, significant “balanced motivation” coefficient indicates that peacekeepers who report higher scores on both organization-oriented motivation and personal motivation tend to have a more favorable view about the potential of the SDF. The negative, significant coefficient for peacekeepers under 30 years old shows that peacekeepers in the younger generation do not evaluate the capability of the SDF so highly compared to other armed forces. Among the control variables, enlistment motivation also shows a positive, significant effect on favorable perception about the SDF’s potential. Next, in Model 2, the positive, significant coefficient for balanced motivation decreased but not much (from .351 to .336 or by 4 percent). The negative, significant coefficient for peacekeepers under 30 years old also slightly decreased from -.291 to -.278, but this change was trivial. None of the deployment experience variables were significant.

In Model 3, I focus on peacekeepers’ perception about peacekeeping as a SDF mission. Suitability of the SDF to peacekeeping is positively associated with one’s

evaluation of SDF's ability ( $\beta = .201$ ;  $p < .01$ ). On the other hand, the importance of peacekeeping for Defense Act, a major domestic mission, was statistically insignificant. Adjustment for those interrelationships increased the sizes of personal motivation from .271 to .295 and of conflict with superior from -.135 to -.137. The increases of the absolute sizes in the coefficients for those variables indicate that the sense of suitability to peacekeeping may allow peacekeepers to expect to pursue their personal goals in deployment. Taken together the adjustment for the perception for suitability, the sizes of coefficients for balanced motivation and for young generation of peacekeepers slightly declined. The coefficients for patriotic enlistment motivation, on the other hand, slightly increased.

In Model 4, I test the predictions of stress level, and personal fulfillment. The stress level was not significant while personal fulfillment was significantly and positively associated with the perception about the organization's ability. Adjustment for psychological states during mission decreased the size of the coefficients for deployment motivations and patriotic enlistment motivation, and the coefficient for organizational suitability to peacekeeping declined from .201 to .181 or by 10 percent. The absolute size of the coefficient for young generation of peacekeepers increases after the adjustment of psychological states from -.272 to -.283 by 4 percent. Regardless of personal fulfillment, younger generation of peacekeepers have negative views of organizational capability. On the other hand, the coefficient for the ONUMOZ increased from .247 to .299 or by 20 percent. Suitability of the SDF to peacekeeping remain significantly and positively associated with one's evaluation of SDF's ability ( $\beta = .181$ ,  $p < .01$ ) after controlling psychological states of peacekeepers.

The results show that the data analysis did not support hypothesis 4-2. Japanese peacekeepers who show high levels of organization-oriented motivation did not perceive the capability of the SDF. Instead, those who are high in both organizational and personal motivation for deployment perceived the capability of the SDF positively at a significant level. The effect was almost constant across the four models. Regarding the relationship between Organizational benefits of peacekeeping and perceived organizational ability, the data partially supported hypothesis 4-4. Peacekeepers who perceive the SDF as appropriate to peacekeeping show significantly high evaluation about organizational capability, while the usefulness of peacekeeping mission for dealing with national emergency situations did not affect peacekeepers' perception of organizational capability. In model 4, the coefficient for the balanced motivation declined possibly because they were open to evaluate any positive aspect of their deployment experience as beneficial, compared to those who show high level of motivation in either personal or organizational domain. The data did not support hypothesis 4-6 although the data showed the negative effects of these negative deployment experiences on the perceived organizational capability.

### Mission Satisfaction

Table 12 shows the four models that examine the impact of independent variables on mission satisfaction. In Model 1, I test the prediction of motivation with adjustment of all the control variables. Among four groups of motivations, personal motivation is significantly and negatively associated with mission satisfaction ( $\beta = -.213$ ;  $p < .01$ ).

**Table 12. OLS Regression of Mission Satisfaction on Deployment Motivation, Deployment Experience, and Psychological States.**

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4	
	b	Beta	b	Beta	B	Beta	b	Beta
<i>Deployment Motivation</i>								
Organization-oriented Motivation <sup>a</sup>	.008 (.072)	.062	.006 (.071)	.050	.004 (.071)	.031	-.003 (.068)	-.003
Personal Motivation <sup>a</sup>	-.213** (.092)	-.112	-.193* (.091)	-.102	-.182* (.090)	-.096	-.228** (.086)	-.120
Balanced Motivation <sup>a</sup>	.006 (.074)	.045	.005 (.073)	.036	.003 (.073)	.024	.001 (.069)	.010
No Motivation <sup>a</sup>	-.009 (.074)	-.066	-.008 (.073)	-.059	-.006 (.073)	-.049	-.006 (.070)	-.045
<i>Deployment Experience</i>								
Interpersonal Conflict			-.101* (.041)	-.111	-.009* (.041)	-.110	-.009* (.039)	-.102
Conflict with Superior			-.118** (.045)	-.118	-.113* (.045)	-.113	-.008 (.043)	-.084
Unit Cohesion			.003 (.028)	.058	.003 (.028)	.047	.002 (.027)	.037
Mission Difficulty			-.001 (.045)	.002	-.001 (.045)	-.002	-.003 (.046)	-.032
<i>Perception about Peacekeeping</i>								
Suitability to peacekeeping					.006 (.044)	.065	.004 (.042)	.039
Defense Act					.005* (.022)	.107	.003 (.021)	.073
<i>Psychological States</i>								
Relative stress level Stress							-.002 (.045)	-.025
Personal Fulfillment							.307*** (.042)	.306
<i>Control</i>								
Young <sup>b</sup>	.002 (.051)	.018	.003 (.051)	.031	.005 (.208)	.044	.002 (.048)	.021
Education	-.009* (.048)	-.086	-.009 (.048)	-.080	-.009 (.048)	-.080	-.004 (.046)	-.044
UNTAC <sup>c</sup>	-.195*** (.056)	-.167	-.192*** (.055)	-.165	-.201*** (.055)	-.172	-.172 (.052)	-.147
ONUMOZ <sup>c</sup>	-.001 (.083)	-.009	-.001 (.082)	-.007	.001 (.082)	.001	.115*** (.080)	.066
Patriotic Enlistment Motivation	-.001 (.059)	-.014	-.001 (.058)	-.012	-.001 (.058)	-.014	-.004 (.055)	-.034
Constant	2.843		3.037		2.677		1.858	
R <sup>2</sup>	.057		.100		.117		.202	
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	.041		.078		.092		.176	

Note: N = 545; Standard errors in parentheses.

<sup>a</sup> Compared to those who are moderately motivated; <sup>b</sup> Compared to those who are age 30 and above; <sup>c</sup> Compared to respondents who deployed to Golan Heights (UNDOF).

b = Unstandardized Coefficients, Beta = Standardized Coefficients.

†  $p < .10$ ; \*  $p < .05$ ; \*\*  $p < .01$ ; \*\*\*  $p < .001$ .



This indicates that those who have a higher level of personal motivation are less satisfied with the mission on which they deployed. Education level is slightly and negatively related to mission satisfaction. It is also noteworthy that patriotic enlistment motivation is not related to mission satisfaction. SDF personnel deployed to Cambodia (UNTAC) are significantly dissatisfied with their mission ( $\beta = -.195$ ;  $p < .001$ ). In Model 2, I focus on deployment experiences. Interpersonal conflict with fellow peacekeepers and conflict with superior are both significantly and negatively associated with mission satisfaction ( $\beta = -.101$ ;  $p < .05$ ;  $\beta = -.113$ ;  $p < .01$ ). The coefficients for personal motivation and for the UNTAC participants slightly declined (from  $-.195$  to  $-.192$ ), while the coefficient for education still hold at the same level.

The third model (Model 3) adjusted the perceptions about organizational suitability to peacekeeping. The perception that peacekeeping is good for defense act is slightly significantly but positively associated with mission satisfaction. The coefficients for personal motivation, interpersonal conflict, conflict with superior, and education slightly declined. In Model 4, I assess the association between psychological states and mission satisfaction. Personal fulfillment is significantly and positively associated with mission satisfaction, while stress level is unrelated to mission satisfaction. After adjusting

for psychological states, the absolute value of the coefficient for personal motivation increased from  $-.182$  to  $-.228$  or by about 25 percent. The increase in the coefficient indicates that personal fulfillment intervenes with the relationship between personal motivation and mission satisfaction. The coefficients for conflict with superior and defense act declined, but slightly. The coefficient for interpersonal conflict stayed

constant (beta =  $-.009$ ;  $p < .05$ ). It is noteworthy that the coefficient for the UNTAC declined from  $-.201$  to  $-.172$  or by 14 percent.

In terms of deployment motivation, the analysis did not support hypothesis 4-1 that peacekeepers who have organization-oriented motivations will be more satisfied with the mission than those who have personal motivations. Only personal motivation was significantly but negatively associated with mission satisfaction, while high levels of organization-oriented and balanced motivation are positively associated with mission satisfaction, but the relationships were not statistically significant. Those who were not motivated for deployment also showed a negative association with mission satisfaction and stayed constant after adjusting stress level and personal fulfillment. Peacekeepers who have no motivation for deployment are not satisfied with the mission regardless of what happened during the deployment. In the present analysis, peacekeepers with personal motivation shows a little conflicting result in Model 4.

In terms of mission experience, hypothesis 4-5 was partially supported. Interpersonal conflict with their peers held its constant and negative association with mission satisfaction, while the effect of conflict with superiors disappear after introducing the personal fulfillment variable in Model 4. This result indicates that personal conflict with superiors is somewhat associated with their feeling of accomplishment during deployment. On the other hand, personal conflict with peers negatively effect on mission satisfaction regardless of perceived accomplishment. I initially expected that peacekeepers who have a high level of personal motivation tend to have higher expectation about the mission, which leads to the negative coefficient to mission satisfaction. After adjusting personal fulfillment during deployment, a high level of

personal motivation become more negatively associated with mission satisfaction (see Model 4).

The data did not support hypothesis 4-7. Relative stress level did not affect mission satisfaction. This result suggests a mixture of unrealistic expectation among peacekeepers and a byproduct of retrospective survey. Peacekeepers with high personal motivation may have unrealistically high expectations about their deployment. The result shows that the more they experienced accomplishment in the mission (higher in personal fulfillment), the more they are disappointed with the absence of rewards later in their career. If peacekeepers with high personal motivation expected promotion and special benefits and treatments after their deployment, the absence of those expected rewards may decrease their mission satisfaction considerably. In the responses to open-ended questions, peacekeepers complained about the income tax charged on their deployment allowance, the lagged charge of the tax (the tax was charged the following year), absence of promotion, coworkers' envy to their deployment, and unfair assignment for former peacekeepers upon return. Since their expectation is all about their career and benefits after their deployment, this result may be a byproduct of the retrospective survey. Satisfaction level changed over time after the deployment as they discovered the impact of their deployment experience on the benefits and career development.

Unlike perceived organizational ability, patriotic enlistment motivation was not related to mission satisfaction at all. Taken together, the results of motivation variables suggest that lower mission satisfaction among peacekeepers with personal motivation is likely to sustain as long as Japanese peacekeeping participation is limited to specific job areas and SDF members in those specialties. Peacekeeping participation has not been a

primary factor for promotion for this reason. For the organization, it is a concern that peacekeeping participation becomes a primary factor for promotion because of the narrowly limited job areas and because such consideration may turn over the priority of the missions between the missions directly related to Japanese people's interest (territorial defense, disaster relief) and indirectly related missions (peacekeeping). In terms of deployment experience, the results support the previous research findings based on interview data (Kawano, 2002; Kawano 2004). Interpersonal experience and conflict with superiors are negatively associated with mission satisfaction by adjusting other independent variables and control variables, although the coefficient for conflict with superior was slightly reduced by personal fulfillment, which suggests that the negative feeling was compromised by the feeling of personal achievement.

## Chapter 10: Conclusions

Informed by microinstitutionalism (Ashfort and Kreiner 1990; Zucker 1991; Suchman 1995; Wicks, 2002) and identity theories related to the ‘dirty work’ concept (Hughes 1958; Ashforth and Kreiner 1999), the present dissertation has examined the linkages between the institutional environment of the Japanese military institution, the constabulary ethos of the SDF, the professional identity of service members, and adaptation to peacekeeping focusing on organizational legitimacy that has shaped the contemporary Japanese armed forces and professional identity of individual service members.

In the wake of the Korean War, the new Japanese armed forces were established to fill the manpower shortage of the U.S. Occupational Force through a special legislative procedure without the consensus of the Japanese people. The process was viewed as undemocratic by the Japanese people (Hata 1976; Tanaka 1997). As a result, in post-WWII Japan, the SDF has been treated as a government organization with little legitimacy; *jieikan* were also marginalized in society. This initial failure to build social acceptance and legitimacy created a strong schematic connection between the Imperial military and the newly established armed forces in Japanese society. The founding process of contemporary Japanese armed forces took place prematurely: the society had yet to fully absorb its own experience and consequences during the war including the newly introduced democratic Constitution and the broken relationships with neighboring nations. The inherent ambiguity of the legal ground quickly became an Achilles’ heel for the SDF to survive and play any military function because such a murky state of

legitimacy prevented the organization from generating the conditions to gain normative and cultural-cognitive rules and beliefs in its social environment.

One of the main problems was that the new armed forces were established as a “constabulary force,” which is far from the existing definition of the military with which the Japanese public was familiar during WWII. The concept requires people to understand contradicting roles of the military and ambiguities to separate constabulary missions from traditional missions. Failure to gain legal and popular support resulted in taking legitimacy away from the SDF. The SDF was neither culturally approved nor fully supported by legal bodies. To gain the legitimacy of the SDF, the government promoted a complex interpretation of the Constitution and military power; the US Occupation Force civilianized military terms in the Japanese armed forces.

These efforts are noteworthy in the discussion of legitimacy and the structural and procedural aspects of organizations. Although the force structure and basic operations of SDF were designed based on the US military, adopting these organizational designs were not “isomorphism” (Meyer and Rowan 1997) that takes place as a substantial organizational change to assimilate to a more dominant and rationalized organization in the same profession. It was rather symbolically adopting organizational structure: so called ceremonial conformity (Ashforth and Gibbs 1990). The SDF became less isomorphic to conventional military organizations. The Japanese armed forces had to assimilate to their immediate local environment using symbolic management strategies to defend their legitimacy in Japanese society. The constabulary nature of the SDF is a result of extreme localization to gain legitimacy and social acceptance for organizational survival. Regardless of tireless efforts, the SDF continued to be marginalized both as a

profession and a social institution in post WWII Japan. The more the SDF protested its legitimacy, the more marginalized it became both as a profession and a social institution in post WWII Japan by getting into a “vicious cycle of legitimation” by protesting too aggressively (Ashforth and Gibbs 1990).

Simultaneously, the military profession was regarded as ‘dirty work’ and played a key role in maintaining an “antimilitaristic culture” (Berger 1998) in contemporary Japan. Stigmatizing a particular social group can provide other members in society “functional value” such as self-esteem (Crocker, et al. 1998). In terms of occupation, dirty work is socially significant for the public to keep their purity by separating themselves from individuals in dirty work (Ashforth and Kreiner 1999). The stigmatization of the SDF has served as an enforcer of self-esteem of people in post War Japan by placing the military profession as outgroup and motivating positive intergroup comparisons. This mechanism helped people remove themselves from Japan’s ultramilitarism before and during WWII that caused inhumane conduct to both enemy combatants and non-combatants. By marginalizing the SDF, the society avoided being stigmatized as a whole, at least internally.

During the Cold War era, Japanese service members used a neutralization technique, “appealing to higher loyalties” (Sykes and Matza 1957), by believing that their service is for a higher cause: their loyalty to their country and people to deal with their spoiled identity as SDF personnel. Through peacekeeping participation, the SDF are engaging in the next step of transforming the stigmatizing attributions. Departing from the stigmatized image, many Japanese peacekeepers seemed to slowly but steadily gain the “expected possible selves” (e.g., being in a socially accepted and trusted profession,

enjoying popular support) through their peacekeeping deployment. For SDF personnel, peacekeeping deployment served as an opportunity to revoke the existing 'dirty work' stigma attached to the military profession and build a favorable professional identity. Peacekeeping expands the horizon of their possible selves in a professional life that has been constrained by a dominant political ideology that has been a driving force of anti-militaristic collective identity in post-WWII Japan. The institutional stigmatization of the military in Japanese has had social benefits that perpetuated the avoidance of serious consideration in national defense policy and practice in the changing regional and global political environments.

Unlike American peacekeepers, Japanese peacekeepers view their deployment experience as an empowering and self-enhancing event in their professional life. Findings from the statistical analysis show that peacekeepers with high personal motivation for deployment are less satisfied with the mission, compared to other peacekeepers. Although Kawano (2002) and Satoh (2001) suggested that Japanese peacekeepers were generally highly satisfied with their mission, what peacekeepers expected in their deployment experience (difference in goal setting) makes a difference in the degree of satisfaction.

In terms of the treatment of service members returned from peacekeeping deployment, my dissertation supported Ohi's (1999) research findings about peacekeepers' frustration and potential sources of demoralization and interpersonal conflicts. Particularly in Japan's case, peacekeeping deployment is not always considered to be a primary factor for promotion in the SDF because the personnel who can deploy to peacekeeping missions are limited to certain job specialties. In contrast, some



peacekeepers felt betrayed by the organization because expected promotion, raise, and transfer did not happen. Their frustration can be a potential source of demoralization and attrition issues in the future. Although peacekeepers do not expect these favorable treatments in personnel matters, emotional friction between those who deployed and who did not makes their readjustment process stressful. Deployment experience itself often becomes a source of envy among service members. In addition, financial compensation from the UN and the SDF and extensive leave upon return that peacekeepers receive are also targets of coworkers' envy and created friction between peacekeepers and their coworkers in the readjust process to their home unit. These potential stressors and obstacles in the readjustment process need organizational attention to minimize psychological problems and maintain organizational effectiveness in the SDF.

While gaining the expected possible selves, SDF personnel's professional identity is more vulnerable than before due to peacekeeping participation. First, Peacekeepers admire soldiers from other nations, focusing on their technical excellence, detached from the primary purpose of the military profession: warfighting. They compartmentalize the tasks and transformed their contact with peacekeepers from other countries into exposure to technical excellence. This coping strategy is typical among those who engage in dirty work. Appraisal pattern that Japanese peacekeeper exhibited indirectly demonstrates their emotion management in their occupation, which separate one task or situation from a larger context. This micro-focus assessment seems to protect Japanese peacekeepers from a potential identity crisis that they encounter in the peacekeeping mission environment.

Second, although SDF personnel understand the organizational concept, they also have the sense of being imperfect as military professionals in comparison with soldiers in

other armed forces with pronounced warrior ethos such as the US military. It is true, as Fruhstick and Ben-Ari (2000) pointed out, that we can observe the celebration of violence in the events and activities that the SDF routinely hold (e.g., Live-Fire exercise, joint exercises). They are manifestation of ceremonial conformity to the larger community of the military profession. Coupled with the celebration of violence, SDF personnel in the study adapted them to a constabulary ethos, while they are eager to pursue their technical advancement in their profession. As peacekeeping missions increase its proximity to war zones, the gravity to the ideal type of the military may heighten. Regarding concerns about Japan's remilitarization, until today, SDF personnel's "feared possible selves" (e.g., a target of antagonism of the general public; soldiers in the Imperial military during WWII) seem to control their professional identity strictly constabulary.

Findings also suggest that the prevalent anti-militarism sentiment in the larger society institutionalized stringent rules of engagement (ROE) and increases vulnerability of Japanese peacekeepers in the field. As Wicks (2002) demonstrated in the impact of Canadian coal miners' masculine identity on a tragic accident, the institutional element of professional identity impose behavioral norms that are not most desirable or effective way for safety. To defend organizational legitimacy, Japanese peacekeepers have to maintain their constabulary identity and remain vulnerable in the field.

While I have been working on this project, the SDF have taken a historical step in its peacekeeping participation by sending battalion-level troops to Iraq: since March 2004, there have been more than 1,000 GSDF troops in total deployed to a Southern Iraq city, *Samawah*. Fortunately there have been no SDF casualties, while the presence of

SDF troops in Iraq became a target of the public criticism and caused the abduction of three Japanese civilians by Iraqi militias in April 2004. Wicks (2002) studied institutional bases of Canadian coal miners' gendered, risk-taking identity underlining a tragic explosion and showed institutional forces that coal miners internalized and built meanings upon them. Likewise, in the mission situation like Iraq, institutional forces of Japanese society influence SDF troops' professional identity and foster an overly optimistic view of possible risk and fatal casualties as a part of constabulary ethos. Such institutional influence that is internalized among SDF troops may make SDF troops more vulnerable to insurgence in the mission environment.

A set of regional security concerns has made the Japanese government and general public more prone to accept this shift: North Korea admitted kidnapping Japanese citizens that took in the 1970s and 1980s and the prolonged negotiation process over North Korean nuclear weapon development. Domestically, the SDF have to maintain their very low profile, while their operational goal is becoming more toward 'proactive' defense measures to prevent terrorist attacks against Japan. As the SDF gains legitimacy in the ongoing regional security environment and through international peacekeeping missions, social scientists need to continue examining the changes in organizational culture and identities of service members over time. The main issue is not the positive or negative direction of organizational changes, but the degree of changes that require organizational members to reconstruct their professional identity that they acquired through extensive socialization as members of a stigmatized profession.

In this transition of the organization, further research is necessary to examine changes in organizational legitimacy and identities of Japanese service members as troop contributions to international peacekeeping missions increase.

### **Limitation of the Present Research and Future Research**

Although Japan experts tend to view social and political issues in Japanese society as a unique case, treating Japan as an exceptional case does not contribute to progress in the understanding of social processes in different social settings (Katzenstein 1996). The present dissertation, as a comparative case study of peacekeeping, contributes to the sociological literature of peacekeeping by providing insights into how a highly constabulary organizational concept was developed, and differentiated organizational adaptation to the mission in comparison with the published research on peacekeeping in warfighting oriented armed forces such as the United States. This dissertation also contributes to the study of work organizations by exploring the meaning and negotiation of identity and on micro-institutional relationships between institutions and individuals in a socially stigmatized work organization.

The absence of real comparison groups might weaken my arguments on the relationship between Japanese peacekeepers' constabulary ethos and peacekeeping participation. To overcome the weakness, the present study compares the findings with published articles on peacekeeping by conventional actors (e.g., Canada and Scandinavian nations) and more militarily active nations (e.g., the US and the UK). The secondary survey data used in this dissertation has serious measurement issues because of inadequate operationalization of concepts, language and conceptual differences, and

design. Nonetheless, it is still useful to use the survey data with full awareness of potential measurement problems as worthwhile trade-offs because attitudinal surveys are very rarely collected with Japanese peacekeepers.

Sociological studies on peacekeeping have mostly studied North American and European nations and their peacekeepers, while unconventional actors and developing countries are still out of the research scope. Taking into account this research tendency, I emphasized the diversity of peacekeeping participants and the academic and practical values of studying them to improve multilateral efforts for international security. Cultural awareness is critical in many aspects of post-Cold War peacekeeping (Segal and Eyre 1996). In post-Cold War peacekeeping missions, such cultural differences are increasingly observed among peacekeeping contingents from different nations.

American and European research on peacekeeping in general is extensive and thorough, but it cannot be automatically applied to different social and cultural contexts because the American and some European armed forces are mostly warfighting oriented. Thus, as Elron et al. (2000) suggest, case studies of each participant nation become increasingly important in successful international peacekeeping missions. Comparative research on military peacekeepers should be conducted more actively to better understand what general issues of military peacekeepers are cross-nationally and what are uniquely attributed to other socio-cultural factors and to the mission environment.

As Kawano (forthcoming) pointed out, mental health issues are the emerging concerns in the organization due to the changing nature of Japanese peacekeeping missions. Therefore, for future research, sociological research from a mental health perspective will provide a clearer picture on the social disposition of Japanese service

members. To make it easier to compare the data with those of peacekeepers from other nations, future research should use standardized mental health measures on anxiety and depression and measures on self concepts such as Rosenberg's (1965) self-esteem scale and mastery scale (Perlin, et al. 1981).

Although in the present dissertation I hypothesized that SDF members' identity as being military professional is highly salient, individual difference in identity salience is a powerful determinant of identity-induced stressors (Stryker 1980). At the same time, one's identity has temporal component that may change over time (Markus and Nurius 1986). Thus, both the enduring and changing components of Japanese service members' professional identity should be carefully examined in the course of changes in the social status and roles of the SDF. Studying an organization that symbolizes the dirtiness of a society will contribute to deepening our understanding of the changes in social and cultural structure and of the experience and expression of emotions in the work place (see Ashforth and Humphrey 1995).

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