ABSTRACT

Title of Dissertation / Thesis: VALUES AS GUIDING PRINCIPLES OF
                                       MOTIVATION: A TWO FACTOR MODEL.

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Although people use stereotypes and prejudices to arrive at preferred conclusions,

individual differences determine the extent and direction to which these intergroup

attitudes color judgments. Research demonstrates that numerous personality

variables act as predictors of the use of stereotypes and prejudice. Some attempts

have been made to organize these measures into underlying values systems. I tested

the hypotheses that values influence perceptions of ingroups and outgroups. In Study

1, participants completed individual difference measures. Factor analysis revealed

two independent factors: Egalitarianism, which predicted positive judgments of

outgroups, and Conservatism, which predicted positive judgments of ingroups. In

Study 2, participants read a story describing either a gay or heterosexual man. I

predicted that participants would vary their interpretation of the target based on their

value orientations. Although Egalitarianism and Conservatism did not predict ratings

of the target individual, they did predict free responses of the target, homophobia, and

behaviors.

VALUES AS GUIDING PRINCIPLES OF MOTIVATION: A TWO FACTOR
MODEL

By

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Chapter 1: Theoretical Rationale

As you sit outside one day eating your lunch, you observe an interaction between two men. As you continue to observe their conversation you notice that their exchange of words is getting more and more heated. The men begin exchanging verbal insults; you overhear one man yell to the other, "you must be crazy!" Finally, the conversation comes to an end with one of the men shoving the other.

Why did the one individual push the other? In a situation such as the one described, numerous explanations can account for the behavior. It is possible that the man has an aggressive personality. Or perhaps they were just "horsing around." Equally plausible is the possibility that they were actors rehearsing a scene from a play. So how do we interpret such a situation?

A substantial amount of research indicates that in making such judgments, the attitudes we hold towards various groups influence the judgments we make (Darley & Gross, 1983; Dunning and Sherman, 1997; Fiske, Neuberg, Beattie, & Milberg, 1987; Kunda & Sherman-Williams, 1993; Sagar & Schofield, 1980). For example, Duncan (1976) found that in the situation described above, when the man delivering the shove was White, the behavior was frequently seen as "playing around." When the man was Black, however, the behavior was most often seen as a violent or aggressive behavior.

The pervasive influence of intergroup attitudes in judgments extends beyond merely categorizing the behavior of others. Our beliefs also influence the way we interpret a trait used to describe a person. The same trait may have a different meaning when applied to different groups. It is likely that individuals would perceive

a gay man described as having the trait of emotional differently than a heterosexual man described as emotional. A gay man being described as emotional may be interpreted as being flamboyant while a heterosexual man being described as emotional may be interpreted as an the individual that has aggressive outbursts. Kunda, Sinclair, & Griffin (1997) demonstrated this effect, showing that the trait "aggressive" is understood differently when describing lawyers and construction workers. Aggressive lawyers were seen as argumentative and sarcastic, whereas aggressive construction workers were seen as likely to yell insults and get into barroom brawls.

It is evident that previously held intergroup attitudes can lead us to interpret identical events, behaviors and traits quite differently when members of these groups are involved. However, in order to understand why this occurs it is necessary to step back and first take a broader look at the role that motivation plays in our interpretations and judgments of individuals and events.

Motivation and Judgment

The manner in which we form and make judgments is influenced by the different motivations that can guide the social judgment process. One motivation that is pervasive throughout social judgment is the desire to arrive at accurate or optimal judgment conclusions -- in other words, conclusions that reflect reality.

Kruglanski and Freund (1983; Freund, Kruglanski, & Shpitzajzen, 1985) found that when participants expected to be evaluated, anticipated justifying their judgments, or expected their judgments to be made public, they were less likely to show primacy effects in impression formation and were less likely to use anchoring in

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making probability judgments. Furthermore, Kruglanski and colleagues found that in situations where the motivation for accuracy is manipulated, participants are less likely to use ethnic stereotypes when evaluating the quality of essays. Similarly, when held accountable, individuals are more likely to use a wide range of information to make judgments, make more accurate behavioral predictions, and report more appropriate levels of confidence in predictions that they make (Tetlock & Boettger; Tetlock & Kim, 1987).

Although the accuracy motivation is a common motivation underlying social judgments, there are times when other motivations may be active. When examining intergroup attitudes it is vital to consider the desire to arrive at a preferred judgmental conclusion. A substantial body of research suggests that individuals often possess certain motivations that allow them to come to preferred conclusions -- conclusions that would be different if a preference for one particular conclusion did not exist (Kruglanski, 1996; Kunda, 1990, Pyszczynski & Greenberg, 1987).

This motivation to reach a particular conclusion has been found to influence a wide array of judgment types, including (but not limited to) an individual's evaluation of himself or herself (Santioso, Kunda, & Fong, 1990), evaluation of message arguments (Edwards & Smith, 1996; Munro & Ditto, 1997) and evaluations of other individuals (Berscheid, Graziano, Monson, & Dermer, 1976; Sinclair & Kunda, 1999). Of particular relevance to intergroup relations is how evaluations of other individuals can be influenced by motivations to reach particular conclusions.

Sinclair and Kunda (1999) found that responses to a Black doctor differed as a result of the motivations that individual participants held. Individuals who had

recently been praised by the Black doctor activated the stereotype of the doctor (since stereotypes of doctors are positive). Conversely, in individuals who had recently been criticized by the Black individual, doctor stereotypes of the individual were inhibited. Additionally, those individuals applied the Black stereotype, rating the doctor as relatively incompetent. Similarly, studies have shown that we may be more likely to apply negative stereotypes to stereotyped individuals or groups in situations where we are motivated to reaffirm our self-worth (Fein & Spencer, 1997).

Although our judgments can be influenced by our motivations, we are not able to come to any conclusion about an individual simply because we want to. Even when we have a preferred conclusion, we are also motivated to be rational and construct some sort of justification for our desired conclusion that would at least be sufficient enough to persuade a dispassionate observer (Kunda, 1990; Pyszczynski & Greenberg, 1987). In other words, although people often arrive at a preferred conclusion, there are frequently limitations based on reality's constraints. For example, Santioso et al. (1990) found that participants rated themselves as more possessive of introversion or extraversion, depending on which trait was described as more desirable. However, extraverts still rated themselves as more extraverted than introverts, even when extraversion was described as the less desirable trait.

The pattern of coming to preference-consistent conclusions while acknowledging realty has also been demonstrated in research on intergroup attitude change. In a study by Munro & Ditto (1997), after reading a scientific report that either confirmed or disconfirmed individuals' beliefs about the validity of a stereotype associated with homosexuality, participants reported their overall beliefs

about homosexuality and their beliefs about the specific stereotype described. Consistent with a preference motivation, participants' overall attitudes about homosexuality were either strengthened or maintained regardless of whether the study was belief-confirming or disconfirming. However, constrained by reality, participants reported belief change regarding the specific stereotype in the direction of the study just read.

Precisely how are people able to make preference consistent judgments while at the same time remaining within the confines of what an objective observer might consider reasonable? One possible solution is that a motivated individual may target ambiguous information, or information that a person can easily distort towards the preference-consistent conclusion, while not appearing to be biased. When information is ambiguous, it allows for a greater range of justifiable evaluations than when the information is clear-cut (Dunning, Meyerowitz, & Holzberg 1989).

Current research presents numerous paradigms demonstrating the role of motivations that lead people to arrive at a particular conclusion. Biased judgments are often made when we are motivated to disparage (or esteem) a member of a stereotyped group (Sinclair & Kunda, 1999). Similarly, judgments are influenced by our intergroup attitudes when we are motivated to disparage another in order to increase our own self-worth (Fein & Spencer, 1997). Although such manipulations of outcome dependency and self-affirmation present us with interesting findings, it is important to remember that these methods are only several of the many possible manipulations to create a motivation to form a favorable impression of an individual.

It is just as plausible that similar patterns would be present when one is motivated to like (or dislike) an individual for other reasons

Rokeach (1973) has argued that our values often act as guiding principles of motivation that shape our attitudes, beliefs, and conduct. Values are cognitive representations of desirable end states of existence or desirable modes of behavior (Rokeach, 1973). Furthermore, Stangor, Freidus, Leary & Ottenbreit (2004) argue that there are two basic values that are important in determining intergroup attitudes– Egalitarianism and Conservatism. The Egalitarian value is based upon the philosophy that all individuals have equal value, and should be treated equally, regardless of their social group memberships. On the other hand, the Conservative value focuses on the goal of protecting the current status quo, particularly by maintaining or promoting the relative status of the ingroup. It is the belief of the researchers that these two core values will influence intergroup attitudes and behaviors. Furthermore, many individual difference measures that are currently studied in the realm of intergroup relations are in actuality represented within this overall two value system. It is one of the goals of this study to provide empirical evidence to support this assertion. However, first it is necessary to review the prior research on those individual difference variables that are most frequently studied when considering intergroup attitudes

Individual Differences in Intergroup Relations

Historically, interest in individual differences as they are related to stereotypes and prejudice bloomed with the publication of *The Authoritarian Personality* (Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, & Levinson 1950). Since the publication of this seminal

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work, continuing research has occurred examining the role of Authoritarianism in intergroup relations. Oliver (1996) found that when viewing a reality television program, individuals who scored high in Authoritarianism were more likely to rate a criminal suspect negatively when that suspect was African-American compared to individuals who scored low in Authoritarianism. However, when the suspect was White, no relation was evident. Similarly, substantial research has found a negative relationship between Right Wing Authoritarianism (RWA) and attitudes towards gays and lesbians (Basow & Johnson, 2000; Haddock & Zanna, 1998; Herek, 1984; 1988; 2000). Individuals high in RWA consistently indicate less favorable attitudes towards gay men and lesbians.

Social Dominance Orientation (SDO), or the extent to which one desire that one's ingroup dominate and be superior to outgroups has also been studied in relation to intergroup attitudes (Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 2000). It has been found that SDO is strongly correlated with anti-Black racism. Furthermore, SDO is negatively correlated with endorsement of gay rights, women's rights, and social welfare programs (Pratto et al., 2000).

Internal Motivation to Control Prejudice, which is a measure of an individuals motivation to respond without prejudice due to internalized low-prejudice beliefs has been correlated with attitudes towards various outgroups. Plant and Devine (1998) found that individuals high in Internal Motivation to Control Prejudice scored low on Modern Racism and anti-Black scales. Additionally, there was a positive correlation between Internal Motivation to Control Prejudice and pro-Black scales. Similarly, participants high in Internal Motivation to Control Prejudice have been found to

express less prejudiced responses even when other less obtrusive estimates of prejudice reveal automatically activated negativity in response to Blacks. On the other hand, Individuals with lower Internal Motivation to Control Prejudice have been found to provide self-reports that are more consistent with their automatically activated attitudes (Dunton & Fazio, 1997).

Additionally, individuals high in Need for Structure, which is described as the desire for simple structure, are more likely to sex stereotype than individuals who are low in Need for Structure (Neuberg & Newsom, 1993). Similarly, individuals high in Need for Closure, which is defined as a desire for a definite answer to a question, any firm answer, rather than uncertainty, confusion, or ambiguity (Kruglanski, 1990), are more likely to exhibit ingroup favoritism and outgroup derogation (Shah, Kruglanski, & Thompson, 1998).

Finally, research on Humanism and the Protestant Work Ethic consistently shows that measures of the Protestant Work Ethic (PWE) are correlated positively with anti-Black attitudes (Biernat et al., 1996; Katz & Hass, 1988). The Protestant Work Ethic emphasizes devotion to work, individual achievement, and discipline (Katz & Hass, 1988). On the other hand, individuals who are high in Humanism have been found to endorse more pro-Black attitudes (Biernat, Vescio, & Theno, 1996; Katz & Hass, 1988). Humanism can be described as adherence to the democratic ideals of equality, social justice, and concern for the others' well-being (Katz & Hass, 1988) However, PWE does not consistently correlate with prejudiced attitudes. Although finding a relation between PWE and anti-Black attitudes, Biernat and

colleagues (1996) found little relation between PWE and negative attitudes towards gay men and lesbians.

Measuring Prejudice

One should note from the previous literature described above, that the prevailing approach to research on intergroup relations focuses heavily on the derogation of outgroup members. While this approach has produced a plethora of research, it has done so while ignoring how attitudes towards one's ingroup are involved in intergroup attitudes. Allport (1954) highlighted the importance of examining both ingroup and outgroup attitudes when he first suggested that preferential positivity toward members of one's ingroup does not necessarily equate to negativity towards outgroups. For example, when ingroup bias and outgroup bias are studied separately, young children are generally found to exhibit an ingroup bias, as opposed to outgroup derogation (Cameron, Alvarez, Ruble, & Fuligni, 2001, for review; Brewer, 1999). Therefore, it is the intention of the current study to assess participants' attitudes towards members of both their ingroup and outgroups.

Values Models

Despite the large volume of research on individual differences as it relates to intergroup relations, we still lack a clear understanding of how individual differences relate to intergroup attitudes. One major difficulty is that although a large number of variables that have been found to predict intergroup attitudes, there has been little attempt to assess the interrelations between these variables. There are however two prior models that may be useful in this regard.

Katz and Hass (1988), for example, have proposed a model of intergroup attitudes that is also based upon two core orientations. Katz and Hass label these two orientations Individualism, which encompasses notions such as personal freedom, self-reliance, and devotion to work, and Communalism which is based upon egalitarian and humanitarian precepts. In this model, Katz and colleagues have made an attempt to make sense of various values by conceptually grouping them under two orientations. This model is limited however, due to fact that it is tied to, and really only focuses on Protestant Work Ethic and Humanism measures. It does not go further, addressing how many of the other variables (such as those described earlier) are related. Furthermore, as described above, Protestant Work Ethic is frequently a weak predictor of intergroup attitudes.

Schwartz and Bilsky (1987) have put forward a broad model of values proposing 10 distinct value types: power, achievement, hedonism, stimulation, self-direction, universalism, benevolence, tradition, conformity and security. Furthermore, Schwartz and colleagues have gone a step further addressing the important question of how values related to intergroup attitudes. Sagiv and Schwartz (1995) examined the readiness of Israeli Jewish teachers (a dominant group) for contact with Israeli Arabs (a minority). They found that readiness correlated positively with emphasizing universalism and self-direction values, and negatively with tradition, conformity, and security. Despite the progress made by Schwartz and colleagues, it should be noted that it is not very parsimonious to assume that each of these 10 values have a separate motivation. It seems likely that higher order construct

values may exist that incorporate these values. It is a goal of this current study to seek out these higher order constructs.

We currently have a significant understanding of how intergroup attitudes can influence our judgments and interpretations (Darley & Gross, 1983; Fiske, Neuberg, Beattie, & Milberg, 1987; Kunda & Sherman-Williams, 1993). Furthermore, research demonstrates the important role of motivations when considering how intergroup attitudes influence judgment and interpretation (Kruglanski & Freund, 1983; Sinclair & Kunda, 1999). At the same time, a substantial amount of research illustrates that individual differences are related to intergroup attitudes. Unfortunately, there is no clear understanding of how all of these lines of research are related. For example, one question that needs to be addressed is how these numerous individual difference measures are related, and what role they play in assessing the degree to which stereotypes are used in the judgment and interpretation process. Furthermore, do individuals rely on stereotypical information about other individuals in order to come to conclusions that are compatible with their values (which are measured by individual difference measures)? Finally, do different value orientations have a different impact on how we relate to ingroup and outgroup members?

It is the intention of this study to address such questions. First, this study seeks to provide a new conceptualization of the many individual difference variables that have been studied in intergroup relations. I believe that these variables are related and can be examined from a broader value perspective. Furthermore, these different values – Egalitarianism and Conservatism – may differentially be related to our attitudes towards outgroups and ingroups (Study 1). Additionally, building upon

the conceptualizing of previous frameworks such as Schwarz and Bilsky's (1987), the

current research intends to demonstrate that our interpretations about individuals and

the judgments we make about them are related to our value orientations (Study 2).

Chapter 2: Study 1

Method

Participants

Participants were 241 undergraduates at the University of Maryland, College Park. Participants consisted of various racial and ethnic groups representative of a typical urban university.

Materials

Values measure. Social Dominance Orientation (Pratto et al., 2000), Devine's measure of Desire to Control Prejudice-Internal (Plant & Devine, 1998), Humanism and the Protestant Work Ethic (Katz & Hass, 1988), Authoritarianism (Altemeyer, 1981), Need for Structure (Neuberg & Newsom, 1993), and a measure of conformity developed by the experimenters were included as measures of value endorsement.

Intergroup ratings. An 11 item 5 point likert scale (1= *strongly disagree;* 5= *strongly agree)* was created to assess individuals' attitudes towards various social groups; Russians, men, Whites, Arabs, Americans, Asians, women, Hispanics, Blacks, Jews, and homosexuals. Participants responded to statements such as, "I am favorable towards Arabs" and "I am favorable towards Asians."

Procedure

Participants were administered all measures during a mass-testing session. Participants completed the measures in addition to various other measures not used in this study.

Results

Reliability analysis.

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Each individual measure was subjected to a reliability analysis. The results

are presented in Table 1.

Table 1: Reliabilities and Factor Loadings of Individual Scales of Values Measure

| | | Factors | |
Measures	Reliability(α)	Factor 1	Factor 2
SDO	.55	-0.83	--
Desire to Control	.76	-0.83	--
Humanism	.61	0.80	--
Conformity	.77	--	0.76
Authoritarianism	.73	--	0.72
Need for Structure	.75	--	0.68
PWE	.49	--	0.53

Factor analysis.

A mean score was calculated for each individual difference measure. The

mean scores were then submitted to a principle components factor analysis, followed

by an oblique rotation. Items loading under .40 were suppressed. As shown in Table

2, the factor structure indicated only two factors. Social Dominance Orientation,

Desire to Control Prejudice, and Humanism loaded onto Factor 1. Conformity,

Authoritarianism, Need for Structure, and Protestant Work Ethic loaded onto Factor

2. Furthermore, Factors 1 and 2 were relatively independent, $r = .10$, $p > .05$. This

model fits with my hypothesis, with Factor 1 representing an Egalitarian value

orientation, and Factor 2 representing a Conservative value orientation.

Table 2: Reliabilities and Factor Loadings of Individual Scales of Short Values Measure

		Factors	
Measures	Reliability(α)	Factor 1	Factor 2
SDO	.78	-0.91	--
Desire to Control	.86	-0.88	--
Humanism	.60	0.84	--
Conformity	.61	--	0.82
Need for Structure	.78	--	0.83

Intergroup attitudes.

Following the procedures of prior research (Stangor & Thompson, 2002) attitudes towards ingroups and outgroups were computed ideographically, on the basis of each person's own reported group memberships and their ratings of social groups. Regression equations indicated that Egalitarianism (Factor 1) predicted expressed attitudes toward outgroups, $\beta= .16$, $t(240) = 2.48$, $p < .05$, but did not predict expressed attitudes toward ingroups, $\beta= .06$, $t(240) = .88$, $p =.>.05$. On the other hand, Conservatism (Factor 2) predicted expressed attitudes towards ingroups, $\beta= .14$, $t(240) = 2.15$, $p < .05$, but did not predict expressed attitudes towards outgroups, $\beta= .06$, $t(240) = .93$, $p > .05$. These findings support the notion that Egalitiarianism and Conservatism may act independently on attitudes towards ingroups and outgroups.

Discussion

The analyses indicate that many of the varied personality variables that are studied in intergroup relations are linked to each other through two distinct value systems. On the one hand are variables that assess Egalitarianism. The Egalitarian value is based upon the philosophy that all individuals have equal value, and should be treated equally, regardless of their social group memberships. In the present analysis these variables loaded onto Factor 1, and included a lack of endorsement of Social Dominance Orientation, Desire to Control Prejudice, and Humanism.

Second are those variables tied together through a Conservative value orientation. The Conservative value focuses on the goal of protecting the current status quo, particularly by maintaining or promoting the relative status of the ingroup. The variables that loaded onto Factor 2 make up the Conservative value orientation and include conformity, Authoritarianism, Need for Structure and Protestant Work Ethic.

Additionally, Conservative and Egalitarian value orientations are independent of each other, indicating that an individual is not merely one or the other. In fact, individuals can be high in both, low in both or any combination. Furthermore, Egalitarianism and Conservatism appear to have substantially different relationships to prejudice. Egalitarian values predict relatively positive judgments of outgroups, but are not related to judgments of ingroups. Conservatism, on the other hand, predicts relatively positive judgments of ingroups but does not predict judgments of outgroups.

Chapter 3: Study 2

Taking these results into consideration with Rokeach's (1973) assertion that values act as guiding principles of motivation, I hypothesize that Egalitarians are more motivated to form favorable impressions of outgroup members compared to Conservatives. On the other hand, Conservatives are likely to be more motivated to form favorable impressions of ingroups compared to Egalitarians. Furthermore, individuals of different value orientations may come to different conclusions about the same individual based on the presence of ambiguous information about that individual (Dunning, Meyerowitz, & Holzberg 1989). When participants are motivated to like a target individual (as a result of their value orientation) they will report and describe the individual more in terms of his or her positive characteristics. In other words, given a situation when an Egalitarian must form an impression of an outgroup member, he or she is likely to be motivated to come to a positive conclusion, and is likely to do so by "selecting out" information that portrays that individual in a positive way. A similar pattern would be expected when a Conservative must form an impression of an ingroup member.

In Study 2, participants read a newspaper article about a man who was either gay or heterosexual (the target individual). Participants then completed a free recall measure, which allowed them to describe the character they read about in an open-ended format. This free response measure served as the first opportunity for participants to evaluate the target individual. Furthermore, through this measure participants were given the opportunity to evaluate the target individual in a manner

that was consistent with their motivations, while at the same time appearing to remain within the constraints of reality. Depending on whether they were motivated to like or disparage the target individual, they would recall those traits that were compatible with their preference-consistent conclusion, while at the same time describing the target individual in a manner consistent with the story. Therefore I expected that Egalitarians would be more likely to recall positive traits and less likely to recall negative traits when describing the gay target individual. Similarly, Conservative individuals would be more likely to recall positive traits and less likely to recall negative traits when describing the heterosexual target individual. No relationships were expected between Egalitarianism and descriptions of the heterosexual target and Conservatism and the gay target.

Following the free response, participants indicated their liking towards the character they just read about. I expected that high Egalitarians would report a more favorable attitude towards the individual when he was gay, but there would be no relation between Egalitarianism and liking when the target individual was heterosexual. Conversely, Conservatives would show greater liking of the individual when he was heterosexual, but no relationship was expected when the individual was a gay man.

In addition to assessing participants' attitudes that are unique to the character in the story, I also examined how Egalitarianism and Conservatism relate to overall behaviors and attitudes towards gay men. Participants completed a behavioral measure that gave them the opportunity to engage in a more interesting activity with a gay individual, or a less interesting activity with a heterosexual individual.

Furthermore, measures of overall homophobia and stereotype endorsement of gay men were collected.

Regarding the behavioral measure, it was my hypothesis that Egalitarianism would predict the selection of the more enjoyable activity with the gay individual, whereas Conservatism would predict the selection of the less enjoyable activity with the heterosexual discussion leader. It was predicted that both Egalitarianism and Conservatism would predict responses on the behavioral measure, as this choice directly pits the ingroup against the outgroup, forcing one to choose between them. Regarding the stereotype endorsement scale and the Modern Homophobia Scale, I expected that Egalitarianism would predict positive ratings of gay men overall, as indicated by lower scores on the measures of homophobia and stereotype endorsement. Conservatism, on the other hand, was not expected to predict responses on these measures.

It was unclear as to whether or not exposure to a newspaper article about a gay or heterosexual individual would have an impact on the behavioral measure, stereotype endorsement scale, and homophobia scale, as previous research indicates the difficulty in influencing individuals' overall beliefs about gay men (Munro & Ditto, 1997). However, because these measures were completed after individuals were exposed to the newspaper article I felt this provided an opportunity to explore whether or not this single exposure would influence overall attitudes towards gay men. Therefore, no specific predictions were made and exploratory analysis considered this question further.

Method

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Participants

Participants were 47 male and 27 female University of Maryland students who participated for extra credit in an introductory psychology course. The ethnic breakdown of the sample was: 51 White, 12 Black, 3 Hispanic, 4 Asian or Asian American, and 4 other. Seventy-One participants identified as heterosexuals while three identified as gay, lesbian, or bisexual. Those who identified as gay, lesbian, or bisexual were excluded from subsequent analysis.

Procedure and Materials

Short Values Measure pretesting. During a mass testing session at the beginning of the semester participants completed the Short Values Measure. The Short Values Measure (SVM) consists of 30 items measured on a 5 point Likert scale (1=*strongly disagree;* 5=*strongly agree*). The five items from each scale that loaded highest on the representative factors of the values measure from Study 1 were used to create the Short Values Measure. Included in the short values measure were 5 items taken from Social Dominance Orientation (Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 2000), 5 items taken from Devine's measure of Desire to Control Prejudice (Plant & Devine, 1998), 5 items taken from Humanism, 5 items taken from Protestant Work Ethic (Katz & Hass, 1998), 5 items taken from Need for Structure (Neuberg & Newsom, 1993), and 5 items taken from a measure of conformity developed by the experimenters. The Short Values Measure is presented in Appendix 1.

Four weeks after the initial testing, participants who scored in the top or bottom 15th percentile on Egalitarianism or Conservatism (see analysis below) were contacted and invited to participate in an experiment. Participants were instructed

that the researcher was interested in examining the way that individuals process information when it is presented in written text and visual media. Participants arrived at the lab in groups of one to eight.

Experimental manipulation. Participants were informed that they would first be reading a newspaper article selected from a national newspaper. They were instructed to read the newspaper article carefully as they would be asked questions about it later. Two newspaper articles were created by the experimenter. These articles described a young man who had recently won the lottery. They discussed the manner in which he won the lottery and his plans with the money. Throughout the article the main character Evan was described as exhibiting both negative and positive stereotypes of gay men (negative: violating gender role as a hairdresser, melodramatic, promiscuous, gay rights activist, HIV positive, not religious. Positive: Attractive, wealthy, talkative, friendly, understanding, good listener) (Madon, 1997). The two newspaper articles were identical except for content regarding the sexual orientation of the main character. In one article all references to his sexual orientation indicated he was gay, while in the other all references to his sexual orientation indicated he was heterosexual. Participants received one of the two newspaper articles. The newspaper articles are presented in Appendix 2.

Free recall and measure of likeability. After reading the newspaper article, all participants were given a packet that included a free recall measure and a measure of liking toward the target individual. Participants were informed that the questions were designed to collect feedback on the article they had just read.

The free recall measure consisted of two sections. The first section was a free response measure that allowed participants to "provide five words or 'short phrases' that you believe best describe the character Evan."

The second section of the free recall measure was a 50-item 5-point likert scale (1= *Very Accurate,* 5= *Very Inaccurate*) measure that assessed the degree to which participants reported that Evan exhibited various personality traits. Of these 50 items, 23 of the traits were positive and negative stereotypes of gay men (e.g.: wealthy, open-minded, friendly, feminine, and promiscuous).

Likeability of the main character Evan was measured using a two-item five-point likert scale (1=*Extremely Disagree;* 5=*Extremely Agree*). Participants indicated the degree of agreement with the statements, "overall, I have a favorable impression of Evan" and "I would enjoy having a conversation with Evan." These two items were presented with eight other items that assisted in keeping the cover story. These items included, "This article was well written" and "I found this article to be boring."

Behavioral measure. After completing these measures participants were informed that they would next be viewing a brief television clip and then participating in a discussion. Furthermore, they were informed that they would be able to choose which of the two videos they would view. The behavioral measure form presented two brief descriptions of videos that participants could select. Participants were asked to indicate which session they preferred. In the first option participants would view a more enjoyable television clip (a well known stand up comedian) and participate in a discussion of the video with a gay individual. In the second option participants would view a less enjoyable television clip (a documentary on the history

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of paper-making) and participate in a discussion of the video with an individual who is assumed to be heterosexual.

Homophobia and stereotype endorsement. Once the television choices were made, participants were informed that the experimenter would have to leave to set-up the videos and prepare the discussion leaders. Furthermore while this was occurring they would proceed to complete several more questionnaires. They were told that previous research indicates that previous attitudes and values can influence responses on separate measures (such as the items they had just completed). Therefore, it would be necessary to complete these additional surveys so that the experimenters could statistically control for their previous attitudes. Participants then proceeded to complete the Modern Homophobia Scale – Gay Men (Raja & Stokes, 1998) and a measure of explicit stereotype endorsement. Additional surveys were included with the homophobia and stereotype scales, in order to mask the true nature of the study. These surveys were not used in any subsequent analysis, and therefore are not discussed further.

Homophobia towards gay men was measured using a subscale from the Modern Homophobia Scale (MHS) (Raja & Stokes, 1998). The MHS is a 46 item likert scale (1=*Completely Disagree*; 7 = *Completely Agree*) that measures homophobia towards gay men and lesbians on two separate scales. Only the 23 item scale measuring homophobia towards gay men (MHS-G) was used in this study. The MHS-G has been used in past research and has been found to be reliable (α=.95) (Raja & Stokes, 1998).   Stereotype endorsement of gay men was measured by a 19-item 7-point likert scale created by the experimenter (1=*completely disagree*; 7 =

completely agree). Items included both positive and negative stereotypes of gay men. Examples of items include, "Gay men are preoccupied with sex", "Gay men are talkative", and "Gay men are politically conservative" (reverse scored). Items were created based on research regarding stereotypes of gay men (Innala & Ernulf, 1994; Laner & Laner, 1980; Madon, 1997; McLeod, Crawford, & Zechmeister, 1999).

Once participants had completed these surveys they were informed that the experiment was in fact over and that they would not be viewing any videos. They completed a demographic form and were debriefed.

<div align="center">Results</div>

Short Values Measure Factor Analysis

A mean score was calculated for each of the individual difference measures used in the Short Values Measure. The mean scores were then submitted to a principle components factor analysis, followed by an oblique rotation. Items loading under .40 were suppressed. As shown in Table 2, the factor structure indicated only two factors. Social Dominance Orientation, Desire to Control Prejudice, and Humanism loaded onto Factor 1. Conformity, and Need for Structure loaded onto factor 2. Because of the low reliability (α=.53), and poor loading on the Factors from Study 1, PWE was excluded from subsequent analysis. The loadings are presented in Table 2. Furthermore, Factors 1 and 2 were relatively independent, $r(70) =.20$, $p>.05$. Thus the short values model fits with my hypothesis about the relationships among these measures – Again, Factor 1 represents an Egalitarian value orientation, and factor 2 represents a Conservative value orientation.

Short Values Measure Reliability Analysis

Reliability analyses were performed on each of the subscales of the SVM used in this study. The reliabilities of the SVM subscales used in the current analysis are presented in Table 2.

The remaining analyses were conducted using a regression equation where sexual orientation of the character in the article (target), Egalitarianism, Conservatism, and all possible interactions were entered as predictor variables. Separate regression analyses were performed on each of the dependent variables described in the methods.

Attitudes Towards the Individual

Liking. The two items measuring liking towards Evan were significantly correlated, $r(99) = .36$, $p=.001$, and were therefore combined for analysis. No predictions were made regarding main effects of Egalitarianism, Conservatism, or target's sexual orientation on overall liking for the target person. However analyses revealed that Egalitarianism marginally predicted liking for the main character, Evan, $\beta= .27$, $t(63) = 1.92$, $p=.06$, regardless of his described sexual orientation. There was no relationship however, between Conservatism and liking for Evan, $\beta= -.08$, $t(63) = -.64$, $p=.53$. Similarly, there was no effect of target's sexual orientation on liking for Evan, $\beta= -.04$, $t(63) =- .31$ $p=.76$. Although an overall target's sexual orientation effect on liking of Evan was not predicted, this lack of an effect may be an indication that the manipulation of sexual orientation was not fully achieved. In general, it would be expected that participants like the heterosexual individual more than the gay individual.

An interaction between Egalitarianism and target's sexual orientation was expected, with higher liking for Evan by individuals scoring higher in Egalitarianism when he was gay than when he was heterosexual. Results however do not support this hypothesis, β= -.18, $t(63)$ = -1.26, p=.21. The relationship between Egalitarianism and liking for Evan did not differ when he was gay versus heterosexual. Similarly, a Conservatism x target's sexual orientation interaction predicted that Evan would be liked more when he was described heterosexual than when he was described as gay. Analyses do not support this hypothesis, β= .17, $t(63)$ = 1.36, p=.18. There were no other significant effects in this analysis.

Free response - positive traits. Participants' responses on the free response were coded by the experimenter, who was blind to the condition, to determine the frequency of positive and negative stereotypes that each participant recalled from the story. Whether or not the item was considered a positive or negative stereotype was based upon previous research (Innala & Ernulf, 1994; Laner & Laner, 1980; Madon, 1997; McLeod, Crawford, & Zechmeister, 1999).

No predictions were made for any main effects on the recall of positive traits to describe Evan, and no significant effects were found. Consistent with the hypothesis, a Conservatism x target's sexual orientation interaction on positive trait recall was found, β= .40, $t(63)$ = 3.25, p=.002. This interaction indicates that the relationship between Conservatism and positive trait recall for participants reading about a gay man, $r(38)$ = -.277, p=.09, is significantly different than the relationship between Conservatism and positive trait recall for participants reading about a heterosexual man, $r(31)$ = .303, p=.09. As predicted, there was a trend for individuals

to report more positive traits about Evan, when he was described as being heterosexual, as they became more Conservative. Furthermore, there was a trend for individuals to report fewer positive traits about Evan, when he was described as being gay, as they became more Conservative. This last trend was not expected as it was hypothesized that Conservatism would not relate to recall of traits about the gay individual. The results are illustrated in Figure 1.

Figure 1. Relationship between recall of positive traits and Conservatism as a function of sexual orientation of target individual.

A marginally significant Egalitarianism x target's sexual orientation interaction on positive trait recall was found, β= -.23, $t(63)$ = -1.66, p=.10. The relationship between Egalitarianism and positive trait recall for participants reading about a gay man, $r(38)$ = .001, p=.99, is marginally different than the relationship between Egalitarianism and positive trait recall for participants reading about a heterosexual man, $r(31)$ =- .31, p=.09. However, it was expected that the more Egalitarian an individual became the more likely he or she was to recall more positive traits when Evan was gay. The data revealed that this did not occur. Instead, the

more Egalitarian individuals tended to recall fewer positive traits when Evan was heterosexual. These findings are not consistent with the hypothesis. The results are illustrated in Figure 2. There were no other significant effects in this analysis.

<u>Figure 2. Relationship between recall of positive traits and Egalitarianism as a function of sexual orientation of target individual.</u>

Free response – negative traits. The Conservatism x target's sexual orientation interaction, was marginally significant, β= -.23, $t(63) = -1.73$, $p=.09$, providing limited support for my hypotheses. The relationship between Conservatism and negative trait recall for participants reading about a gay man, $r(38) = .22$, $p=.17$, was marginally different than the relationship between Conservatism and negative trait recall for participants reading about a heterosexual man, $r(31) = -.11$, $p=.55$. Although not significant, trends indicated that increases in Conservatism were related to more recall of negative traits when Evan was gay and fewer recall of negative traits when Evan was heterosexual. The trend for Conservative individuals to recall fewer negative traits about the heterosexual individual is consistent with my hypothesis.

The trend however, for them to recall more negative traits when he is gay is not.   The

results are illustrated in Figure 3.

Figure 3. Relationship between recall of negative traits and Conservatism as a
function of sexual orientation of target individual.

Analysis on remaining interactions revealed no significant effects. It was

predicted that there would be an effect of Egalitarianism x target's sexual orientation.

According to the hypothesis, as individuals increased in Egalitarianism they should be

less likely to recall negative traits about Evan when he was gay. However, data

revealed no such effect, β= .14, t(63) = .99, p=.33. There were no other significant

effects in this analysis.

   Trait description. Positive and negative stereotype scores were created by

averaging participants responses on the those questions on the trait endorsement

questionnaire that were related to positive and negative stereotypes of gay men. The

positive stereotype scale had a moderate reliability (α=.71) while the negative

stereotype scale had a low reliability (α=.56).

I expected that Egalitarianism would predict positive trait endorsement of Evan when he was gay. However data did not support this hypothesis, β= -.13, $t(63)$ = -.95, p=.35. Similarly, I expected that Conservatism would predict endorsement of positive traits when Evan was heterosexual. Data however, did not support this hypothesis either, β= -.05, $t(63)$ = -.42, p=.67.

It was also expected that an Egalitarian x target's sexual orientation effect on negative trait recall would be revealed, with more Egalitarian individuals reporting less negative traits. However, no such effect occurred, β= .05, $t(63)$ = .36, p=.72. Similarly, the predicted Conservatism x target's sexual orientation effect on negative trait recall was not observed, β= .10, $t(63)$ = .79, p=.43. No other significant effects in this analysis were revealed.

Homophobia. Reliability analysis on the MHS-G revealed a high reliability (α=.96) that is consistent with previous research.

Consistent with the hypothesis, and with prior research, Egalitarianism predicted overall homophobia towards gay men, β= -.43, $t(63)$ =- 3.12, p=.003. The more Egalitarian an individual reported being, the less he or she reported homophobic attitudes about gay men. As predicted there was no relationship between Conservatism and homophobia, β= .02, $t(63)$ = .13, p=.90. Similarly, there was no effect of target's sexual orientation on homophobia, β= -.05, $t(63)$ =- .43, p=.67. Whether or not an individual read about a gay or heterosexual individual did not predict their scores on the Modern Homophobia Scale.

No specific predictions were made regarding whether an individual's value orientation, taken into account with whether they read about a gay or heterosexual

character would predict overall homophobia. Analyses revealed that neither

Conservatism x target's sexual orientation, β= -.11, $t(63)$ = -.90, p=.37, nor

Egalitarian x target's sexual orientation, β= -.09, $t(63)$ = -.68, p=.50, interactions

predicted homophobia towards gay men. Additionally, there were no other

significant effects in this analysis.

Stereotype endorsement. Analysis revealed the reliabilities of both the

positive (α=.59) and negative (α=.23) sub-scales of stereotype endorsement of gay

men to be low.

It was predicted that Egalitarianism, but not Conservatism would predict

stereotype endorsement. Consistent with this hypothesis, Egalitarianism predicted

endorsement of positive stereotypes of gay men, β= -.29, $t(63)$ =- 2.01, p=.05. The

more Egalitarian an individual reported to be, the less he or she endorsed positive

stereotypes of gay men. There was no relationship between Conservatism and

positive stereotype endorsement, β= -.03, $t(63)$ =- .19, p=.85.

Similarly, although not significant, Egalitarianism marginally predicted

endorsement of negative stereotypes about gay men, β= -.24, $t(63)$ =- 1.68, p=.10.

There was a trend for individuals who are higher in Egalitarianism to report less

endorsement of negative stereotypes of gay men. There was no relationship between

Conservatism and negative stereotype endorsement, β= -.08, $t(63)$ = -.61, p=.55.

It was of additional interest to examine whether or not previously reading

about a gay man (versus a heterosexual man) would effect endorsements of

stereotypes about gay men. There was no effect of target's sexual orientation on

either positive, β= -.05, $t(63)$ = -.41, p=.68, or negative stereotype endorsement, β=

.01, $t(63)$ = .10, p=.92. Similarly, neither Egalitarianism x target's sexual orientation,

β= -.19, $t(63)$ =- 1.28, p=.21, nor Conservatism x target's sexual orientation, β= .01,

$t(63)$ = .08, p=.94, predicted endorsement of positive stereotypes.

   As illustrated in Figure 4, analysis revealed a marginally significant

Conservatism x target's sexual orientation effect, β= -.25, $t(63)$ = -1.95, p=.06. The

relationship between Conservatism and endorsement of negative stereotypes for

participants reading about a gay man, $r(38)$ = .10, p=.57, was marginally different

than the relationship between Conservatism and endorsement of negative stereotypes

for participants reading about a heterosexual man, $r(31)$ = -.27, p=.13 (See Figure 4).

No Egalitarianism x target's sexual orientation effect on endorsement of negative

stereotypes was found, β= .53, $t(63)$ = .94, p=.35. There were no other significant

effects in this analysis.

Figure 4. Relationship between explicit stereotype endorsement and Conservatism as a function of sexual orientation of target individual.

Behavior measure -Television Choice. As hypothesized, Conservatism significantly predicted an individuals' choice about which television clip they preferred to view, β= .30, $t(63)$ = 2.36, p=.02. Individuals higher in Conservatism were more likely to select the less enjoyable video and discussion that was lead by a heterosexual individual. However, no relationship was found between Egalitarianism and television choice, β= -.13, $t(63)$ = .96, p=.34. Similarly there was no effect of target's sexual orientation on television choice, β= -.01, $t(63)$ =- .08, p=.94.

There was however a significant Egalitarianism x target's sexual orientation effect on television choice, β= -.34, $t(63)$ =- 2.46, p=.02. The relationship between Egalitarianism and the selection of a less enjoyable video/heterosexual discussion leader for participants reading about a gay man, $r(37)$ = .14, p=.41, differed from the relationship between Egalitarianism and the selection of a less enjoyable video/heterosexual discussion leader for participants reading about a heterosexual man, $r(31)$ = -.326, p=.07), (See Figure 5). No other effects were revealed.

Figure 5. Relationship between video preference and Egalitarianism as a function of sexual orientation of target individual.

Chapter 4: General Discussion

Data from Studies 1 and 2 provide preliminary empirical evidence for my assertion that an underlying two factor system unifies much of the current research in the areas of individual differences and intergroup relations. The Egalitarian value is based upon the philosophy that all individuals have equal value, and should be treated equally regardless of group membership. The factor analyses in this study show that the individual difference variables of Social Dominance Orientation (Pratto et al., 2000), Desire to Control Prejudice (Dunton & Fazio, 1997; Plant & Devine, 1998), and Humanism (Katz & Hass, 1988) fall under the Egalitarian value. The Conservative value, on the other hand focuses on the goal of protecting the status quo and promoting the relatively positive status of the ingroup. Initial evidence suggests that individual difference variables subsumed by this value include conformity, Authoritarianism (Altemeyer, 1994), Need for Structure (Neuberg & Newsome, 1993) and Protestant Work Ethic (Katz & Hass, 1988).

Furthermore, data from Study 1 support the notion that these values are independent of each other and generally have substantially different relationships to intergroup attitudes. Egalitarian values were found to predict relatively positive judgments towards outgroups, but not attitudes towards ingroups. On the other hand, Conservative values predicted relatively positive judgments of ingroups, but not of outgroups. This trend was true when analyzing both an overall aggregate score about ingroups and outgroups (Study 1), and when examining attitudes towards gay men (Study 2). This trend however, was not found in relation to attitudes towards one

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specific gay individual. Additional research has also found this pattern (Stangor et al., 2004).

What is to gain by this new conceptualization? Although research on individual differences and prejudice and stereotyping is constantly growing, how all of these individual difference variables relate to each other is unclear. This current model begins to shed some light on the interrelated nature of many individual difference variables. Furthermore, this conceptualization has the benefit of parsimony. It is able to account for the effects of many different individual difference variables by focusing on only two super ordinate constructs.

Additional research is planned to examine if and how other individual difference measures fit in with this two factor value model. The current model examines a finite set of variables, and it is not my intention to argue that these are the only measures relevant to the two factor model. Personality variable such as, but not limited to, Social Conformity, Tough-Mindedness, Belief in a Dangerous World, and Belief in a Competitive World (Duckitt, Wagner, du Plessis, & Birum, 2002) are likely to fit in this current model. Similarly, there may be some overlap between this two factor value model and McCrae and Costa's (1997) Big 5 model of personality. These questions will addressed by subsequent research.

Values as Motivation

As demonstrated, many individual difference variables appear to consistently load onto Egalitarian and Conservative factors. Furthermore, these two variables predicted overall attitudes towards ingroups and outgroups (Study 1). After

establishing this, the next question to ask was how these values influence or motivate our beliefs and actions.

Based on the idea that values act as guiding principles of motivation (Rokeach, 1973) it was expected that individuals from distinct value orientations would interpret a newspaper article about a young man named Evan differently. If Egalitarians are guided by principles of equality and fairness, they should have been motivated to form favorable impressions of Evan when he was gay. Similarly, Conservatives should have been motivated to come to more favorable impressions of Evan when he was heterosexual. Study two provided, preliminary, yet mixed support for this notion. There were no differences in ratings of favorability when Evan was described as either gay or heterosexual. In both instances neither Egalitarianism nor Conservatism predicted a favorable (or unfavorable) attitude towards Evan.

Despite the fact that the motivations underlying an Egalitarian or Conservative value orientation did not appear to influence overall liking towards an individual, it did appear that these values influence, to some degree, our attitudes towards individuals. After reading the story about Evan, participants were given the opportunity to respond freely, by writing brief statements or words that they felt best described the character they had read about. The more Conservative individuals reported themselves to be, the greater the tendency was for them to report more positive traits (compared to negative traits) when Evan was described as heterosexual. Similarly, although not significant, there was a trend such that individuals higher in Conservatism tended to recall more negative traits about Evan when he was gay.

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Regarding Egalitarianism, the more Egalitarian an individual reported himself or herself to be, the fewer positive traits recalled about Evan, when he was described as a heterosexual man. There was however, no relation between Egalitarianism regarding positive trait recall for gay Evan, or for all negative traits (gay and heterosexual conditions).

It is plausible then, that these values do to some degree, guide individuals to come to motivated conclusions about an individual. As Dunning and colleagues (1989) have stated, this targeting of specific pieces of ambiguous information is often a vital part of coming to a motivated conclusion. Given the opportunity to describe an individual any way he or she desires, more Conservative individuals tended to describe a heterosexual individual with more positive traits, and to some degree described the gay individual with more negative traits; consistent (to some extent) with our conceptualization of how Conservatism relates to positive attitudes towards one's ingroup (Stangor et al., 2004).

Similarly, although Egalitarianism did not relate to how the gay character was described, more Egalitarian individuals could be seen as somewhat less motivated to describe a heterosexual individual (who is an ingroup member) positively. Although we would have also expected Egalitarian individuals to report more positive traits about the gay character, the finding that they report less positive traits about the heterosexual character is not altogether inconsistent with our hypotheses.

It is also important to consider that besides the motivation to come to a conclusion that matches with one's underlying values, other motivations may have been present. Participating in a psychology experiment, any participant may also be

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motivated to come to a socially desirable conclusion. Branscombe and Smith (1984) discuss this possibility, noting that effects of individual differences (or values) may only be detected when self-presentational considerations are at a minimum, or when the dependent measures are more subtly presented. In other words, although our values motivate our actions and attitudes, they may be overridden by other motivations (Fruend, Kruglanski, & Shpitzajzen, 1985; Kruglanski & Fruend, 1983). Asking individuals directly, "Does Evan posses these traits?" or even "Do you like Evan?" may be too direct, and as a result, the motivation to come to a socially desirable conclusion may have influenced the responses. The fact that the less intrusive free response measure, where participants have had less knowledge about the true purpose of the question, resulted in significant results provides support for this possibility.

Attitudes Towards Gay Men

In addition to assessing how Egalitarianism and Conservatism are related to individuals motivations regarding one individual (Evan), I also examined the extent to which these value orientations related to attitudes and behaviors about gay men overall. In line with previous research (Stangor et al., 2004) and consistent with Study 1, that showed that Egalitarianism is related to outgroup attitudes, beliefs towards gay men were predicted solely by Egalitarianism. The more Egalitarian individuals reported that they were, the less they reported homophobic attitudes towards gay men. Conservatism on the other hand was not related to homophobia.

Regarding stereotype endorsement, the two-factor value model would not have predicted Conservatism to be related to endorsement of stereotypes of gay men.

Consistent with this hypothesis, there was no overall relationship between Conservatism and endorsement of either positive or negative stereotypes. On the other hand, Egalitarianism predicted both the endorsement of positive stereotypes and "marginally" predicted the endorsement of negative stereotypes. More Egalitarian individuals were less likely to endorse positive stereotypes of gay men. Similarly, there was a tendency for them not to endorse negative stereotypes of gay men. One may have expected that Egalitarians would be inclined to endorse positive stereotypes, since believing that an individual is "a good listener" and "fashionable" can be interpreted as expressing a positive attitude towards that individual. However, Egalitarianism is partially defined by a desire to control prejudice. If this is the case, it is not surprising that Egalitarians are hesitant to endorse any stereotypes of gay men, even positive ones. These individuals believe that it is not appropriate to stereotype entire social groups and therefore avoid doing so.

The current study also took into account how behaviors are influenced by values. The behavioral film manipulation implemented in this study found that the more Conservative individuals reported themselves to be, the more likely they were to select viewing a less enjoyable video where they would then talk with a heterosexual discussion leader, as opposed to a more enjoyable video where they would talk with a gay discussion leader. It is interesting to note that of all the measures in this study, the behavioral measure appears to be the only one where participants must choose between either the ingroup or the outgroup. In all the other measures, individuals are only indicating their thoughts on an outgroup member. Their responses do not seem to have any direct impact on the ingroup. On the other

hand, selecting to interact with the outgroup member causes individuals not to interact with a member of their ingroup. It may be for this reason, that for "non-impact" measures such as the modern homophobia scale and the stereotype endorsement scale responses are primarily predicted by Egalitarianism, while when the ingroup is affected by a decision, responses are more likely to be predicted by Conservatism.   This possibility that Egalitarianism and Conservatism guide different responses depending on whether the measure impacts the ingroup, outgroup, or both is an interesting question that deserves further research.

Conclusions

Significantly more research is necessary on this two factor model. Additional variables need to be examined to assess the degree to which this model can be expanded. Furthermore, using different manipulations, the notion of values as motivation needs to be clearly demonstrated empirically. It has been consistently demonstrated that because of our motivations we, for example, like those who we expect to interact with (Berscheid, et al., 1976; Darley & Berscheid, 1967). On a similar note, we should be able to demonstrate this preference to those individuals who "match" with our value systems.

Furthermore, our research has consistently shown that outgroup attitudes are related to Egalitarianism, while ingroup attitudes are related to Conservatism. However, in this study and others conducted by the author, when the outgroup members are gay men, this Egalitarianism/Conservatism dichotomy becomes less clear. It appears that there is something "unique" about individuals' attitudes towards gay men that results in Conservatism (at times) effectively predicting attitudes

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towards the outgroup. Given the current attention in this country given to issues such

as gay marriage, this interesting "exception" to our theory is deserving of future

study.

Appendix 1

Short Values Measure

For each of the following items, please indicate your opinion. There are no right or wrong answers, please answer honestly. Write one of the following numbers in the blank next to the question to indicate the extent of your agreement.

1 = Strongly disagree

2 = Disagree

3 = Neither agree nor disagree

4 = Agree

5 = Strongly agree

1. _____ It upsets me to go into a situation without knowing what I can expect from it.

2. _____ Sometimes other groups must be kept in their place.

3. _____ I am favorable to MEN.

4. _____ I find that a well-ordered life with regular hours makes my life tedious.

5. _____ According to my personal values, using stereotypes is OK.

6. _____ In dealing with criminals the courts should recognize that many are victims of circumstances.

7. _____ I am favorable to RUSSIANS.

8. _____ We would have fewer problems if we treated people equally.

9. _____ I consider myself to be obedient.

10. _____ There should be equality for everyone because we are all human beings.

11. _____ I am favorable to WHITES.

12. _____ Acting to protect the rights and interests of other members of the community is a major obligation for all persons.

13. _____ I am favorable to WOMEN.

14. _____ It would be good if groups could be equal.

15. _____ Everyone should have an equal chance and an equal say in most things.

16. _____ I am favorable to ARABS.

17. _____ If people work hard enough they are likely to make a good life for themselves.

18. _____ No one group should dominate in society.

19. _____ One should be kind to all people.

20. _____ I am favorable to JEWS.

21. _____ Money acquired easily is usually spent unwisely.

22. _____ Most peple who don't succeed in life are just plain lazy.

23. _____ I am favorable to HISPANICS.

24. _____ I find that a consistent routine enables me to enjoy life more.

25. _____ I enjoy the exhilaration of being in unpredictable situations.

26. _____ I consider myself to be orthodox.

27. _____ I am favorable to ASIANS.

28. _____ To get ahead in life, it is sometimes necessary to step on other groups.

29. _____ Being nonprejudiced is important to my self concept.

30. _____ Because of my personal values, I believe that using stereotypes is wrong.

31. _____ I consider myself to be conforming.

32. _____ I am favorable to BLACKS.

33. _____ I hate to change my plans at the last minute.

34. _____ I am personally motivated by my beliefs to be nonprejudiced.

35. _____ I am favorable to HOMOSEXUALS.

36. _____ I consider myself to be unconventional.

37. _____ People who fail at a job have usually not tried hard enough.

38. _____ I am favorable to AMERICANS.

39. _____ I consider myself to be rebellious.

40. _____ Most people spend too much time in unprofitable amusements.

41._____ I attempt to act in nonprejudiced ways because it is personally important to

me.

PHILADELPHIA MAN CLAIMS
$2.7 MILLION HOT LOTTO JACKPOT

Evan Davis (left) with boyfriend Michael Sorentz

(right) in Rockefeller Center, celebrating his lotto

win with a late holiday trip to New York Cit.y.

PHILADELPHIA, Pennsylvania – Jan. 13, 2003 – A Philadelphia man got a dose of

New Years cheer Monday, claiming a $2.7 million Hot Lotto jackpot he won on

December 30th.

"You think about it. You buy a ticket and you have in the back of your mind, 'There's

that chance,'" Evan Davis of Northern Liberties said as he claimed the jackpot at

Pennsylvania Lottery headquarters in Harrisonburg.

Davis, 28, who for the past 3 years has owned and worked as a hair stylist at

Bellisimo Salon in Center City contacted the Pennsylvania Lottery commission on

January 4th, almost a week after discovering he was now a multi-millionaire.

Evan Davis said he waited a few days after the drawing to begin telling people he won the big prize and waited until after the first of the year to actually claim his prize for tax purposes. He said he had fun listening to local speculation about the identity of the winner.

"I would be driving around in my car and I'd hear on the radio, 'Well, we still haven't heard from the winner. I wonder who that guy is?'" he said. "I mean how would anyone know it was me that won? The odds are so stacked against you. Besides, I don't even think my friends knew I played the lottery. I don't really need the money. My salon has been very successful."

Davis bought his winning ticket at a Wawa located on Delaware Avenue. The winning numbers in the Hot Lotto drawing on Dec. 30th were: 1-8-13-15-34 and Hot Ball 14.

Jim Holsen, Wawa assistant manager, received word early on Dec. 31st that the jackpot-winning ticket had been sold at his store. Shortly after that, he saw Davis in the store.

"I told him that someone who bought a ticket here was the winner. He got this look on his face and bursted out loud shouting, "Oh my God, it's me, it's me, I'm the winner, I'm rich Jim, rich, rich, rich!" he then paid for his purchase and walked out the door. "I didn't take him seriously. In fact I rarely did, he's always so, you know,

melodramatic."

The Delaware Avenue Wawa received a $5,000 commission bonus from the lottery for selling the jackpot-winning ticket.

Holsen said he is happy that the winner is a regular customer.

"It's always nice when the winner is a regular customer. Evan came in every morning for his cup of coffee. He would always ask me how I was doing and strike up a conversation with me. He's always so friendly, and quite the talkative fella!"

Davis chose to receive his jackpot as a lump-sum payment of $1,646,341.46. He said he plans to continue working, at least for now. He said he's been thinking a lot about how his life may change with his new found wealth.

"I know for certain that some things in my life aren't going to change" stated Davis. "I love going out to the bars to meet other guys. My boyfriend and I have an open relationship. I have extra money to spend now, why not have fun? What's the point in settling down?"

"Of course, it's not all going to be all about me. I have friends and causes that I intend to support."

Of those causes Davis says he's planning on making significant donations to two organizations that he is currently a member of. "I'm pretty involved in gay activism here in Philly, so I'm thinking about writing a substantial check to the Triangle

Foundation." In addition to gay and lesbian organizations, Davis say's he wants to donate to an atheists and secular humanists organization, although he's not quite sure which one yet. "I'm not ashamed to say that I'm not a Christian, I don't believe in God."

Evan's friends, Brian Sants and Phillip Macy said that he has already contacted them offering any help they would need. "Evan is a really understanding guy." Sants said, "When Phillip [my boyfriend] and I were both diagnosed with HIV last March he was there for us. He's always been around when we need someone to listen to our problems." "Well except when he's 'out on the town'" Macy interjected jokingly.

"Anyways, Evan told us that if we need any financial assistance to help pay for HIV medication and other stuff, to just give him a ring."

"Yeah, who know really" said Davis. "For now I'm just going to enjoy the moment and let it all sink in."

Hot Lotto began April 7, offering Powerball-style play but with easier odds. Pennsylvania has had two of the three jackpot winners in the game.

Darlene Becker of State College, a 64-year-old grandmother, won the first jackpot claimed in the game, a $3.6 million prize from the July 10 drawing. A Minnesota player was the second jackpot winner in Hot Lotto. Shirley Winston of Bloomington, Minn., won a $2.35 million jackpot in the Sept. 4 drawing.

Hot Lotto tickets are sold in Iowa, Minnesota, New Hampshire, Pennsylvania, South Dakota and West Virginia.

Since the Pennsylvania Lottery's inception in 1985, more than $1.5 billion has been awarded in prizes and nearly $780 million has been raised for state programs.

PHILADELPHIA MAN CLAIMS
$2.7 MILLION HOT LOTTO JACKPOT

Evan Davis (left) with brother Michael Sorentz

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New Years cheer Monday, claiming a $2.7 million Hot Lotto jackpot he won on

December 30th.

"You think about it. You buy a ticket and you have in the back of your mind, 'There's

that chance,'" Evan Davis of Northern Liberties said as he claimed the jackpot at

Pennsylvania Lottery headquarters in Harrisonburg.

Davis, 28, who for the past 3 years has owned and worked as a hair stylist at

Bellisimo Salon in Center City contacted the Pennsylvania Lottery commission on

January 4th, almost a week after discovering he was now a multi-millionaire.

Evan Davis said he waited a few days after the drawing to begin telling people he won the big prize and waited until after the first of the year to actually claim his prize for tax purposes. He said he had fun listening to local speculation about the identity of the winner.

"I would be driving around in my car and I'd hear on the radio, 'Well, we still haven't heard from the winner. I wonder who that guy is?'" he said. "I mean how would anyone know it was me that won? The odds are so stacked against you. Besides, I don't even think my friends knew I played the lottery. I don't really need the money. My salon has been very successful."

Davis bought his winning ticket at a Wawa located on Delaware Avenue. The winning numbers in the Hot Lotto drawing on Dec. 30th were: 1-8-13-15-34 and Hot Ball 14.

Jim Holsen, Wawa assistant manager, received word early on Dec. 31st that the jackpot-winning ticket had been sold at his store. Shortly after that, he saw Davis in the store.

"I told him that someone who bought a ticket here was the winner. He got this look on his face and bursted out loud shouting, "Oh my God, it's me, it's me, I'm the winner, I'm rich Jim, rich, rich, rich!" he then paid for his purchase and walked out the door. "I didn't take him seriously. In fact I rarely did, he's always so, you know,

melodramatic."

The Delaware Avenue Wawa received a $5,000 commission bonus from the lottery for selling the jackpot-winning ticket.

Holsen said he is happy that the winner is a regular customer.

"It's always nice when the winner is a regular customer. Evan came in every morning for his cup of coffee. He would always ask me how I was doing and strike up a conversation with me. He's always so friendly, and quite the talkative fella!"

Davis chose to receive his jackpot as a lump-sum payment of $1,646,341.46. He said he plans to continue working, at least for now. He said he's been thinking a lot about how his life may change with his new found wealth.

"I know for certain that some things in my life aren't going to change" stated Davis. "I love going out to the bars to meet other girls. My girlfriend and I have an open relationship. I have extra money to spend now, why not have fun? What's the point in settling down?"

"Of course, it's not all going to be all about me. I have friends and causes that I intend to support."

Of those causes Davis says he's planning on making significant donations to two organizations that he is currently a member of. "I'm pretty involved in activism here in Philly, so I'm thinking about writing a substantial check to the Triangle

Foundation." In addition to civil rights organizations, Davis say's he wants to donate to an atheists and secular humanists organization, although he's not quite sure which one yet. "I'm not ashamed to say that I'm not a Christian, I don't believe in God."

Evan's friends, Brian Sants and Phillip Macy said that he has already contacted them offering any help they would need. "Evan is a really understanding guy." Sants said, "When Phillip and I were both diagnosed with HIV last March he was there for us. He's always been around when we need someone to listen to our problems." "Well except when he's 'out on the town'" Macy interjected jokingly.

"Anyways, Evan told us that if we need any financial assistance to help pay for HIV medication and other stuff, to just give him a ring."

"Yeah, who know really" said Davis. "For now I'm just going to enjoy the moment and let it all sink in."

Hot Lotto began April 7, offering Powerball-style play but with easier odds. Pennsylvania has had two of the three jackpot winners in the game.

Darlene Becker of State College, a 64-year-old grandmother, won the first jackpot claimed in the game, a $3.6 million prize from the July 10 drawing. A Minnesota player was the second jackpot winner in Hot Lotto. Shirley Winston of Bloomington, Minn., won a $2.35 million jackpot in the Sept. 4 drawing.

Hot Lotto tickets are sold in Iowa, Minnesota, New Hampshire, Pennsylvania, South

Dakota and West Virginia.

Since the Pennsylvania Lottery's inception in 1985, more than $1.5 billion has been

awarded in prizes and nearly $780 million has been raised for state programs.

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