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## RECLAIMING OUR DISTINCT PHILOSOPHICAL TRADITION: THE EDUCATIONAL PHILOSOPHY OF JACQUES MARITAIN AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR CATHOLIC SCHOOLS IN ONTARIO

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RECLAIMING OUR DISTINCT PHILOSOPHICAL TRADITION: THE  
EDUCATIONAL PHILOSOPHY OF JACQUES MARITAIN AND ITS  
IMPLICATIONS FOR CATHOLIC SCHOOLS IN ONTARIO

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by

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Graduate Program in Education

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## Abstract

In an age of accountability and outcomes-based learning, educational theorists often fail to grapple with the foundational questions about human nature and its destiny. Using the model for analyzing a normative philosophy of education proposed by W.K. Frankena (1965a), I explicate Jacques Maritain's (1943) Catholic philosophy of education. My examination of Maritain's philosophy of education reveals a coherent foundation built on theoretical and practical reason in the passionate search for truth, the synthesis of faith and reason, and integral humanism. I contend that there are very good reasons for Maritain's philosophy of education being reclaimed by publicly funded Catholic schools in Ontario today if we are to claim our distinct ethos<sup>1</sup>. Given the growing pluralism and multiculturalism in Ontario, the attraction towards diverse philosophies of education and the advent of full funding for Catholic schools in 1985, a unified Catholic philosophy of education may not be clearly reflected at the school level. The study that I am proposing may serve as an important piece of philosophical research, that not only echoes but also strengthens the call made by Elias (1999) and D'Souza (2003), who argue for a greater emphasis on a Catholic philosophy of education out of which curriculum renewal and reform may flow for Ontario's Catholic schools.

In reclaiming our distinct philosophical tradition, as represented by Maritain (1943), Catholic schools will be more equipped to address the growing distrust of truth among students, false conceptions of knowledge, widening the scope of the curriculum, premature specialization in the curriculum and the absence of theoretical and practical reason in the curriculum. The extensive tradition of philosophical excellence in the

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<sup>1</sup> My use of the term "ethos" is inspired by the title of Hilary Price's (2002) unpublished master's thesis. "Ethos" in this context refers to one's philosophy, culture, attitudes, and beliefs.

Catholic Church presents us with a rich variety of sources in the area of the philosophy of education from which to draw our inspiration for a unified coherent approach to education and curriculum.

Key Words:

W.K. Frankena

Maritain's Catholic Philosophy of Education

Catholic Schools in Ontario

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## Chapter One

### *Introduction*

At a time when the Catholic educational community is attempting to “defend” Ontario’s publicly funded Catholic school system (see Congregation for Catholic Education, 1997; D’Souza, 2003; Elias, 1999; Groome, 1998; Mulligan, 2005 & 2008; Ontario Catholic School Trustees’ Association, 2000), a unified, coherent, and plausible Catholic philosophy of education will be an essential element of this defence and will subsequently help to ensure the future of publicly funded Catholic schools. Several noteworthy authors indicate that Catholic educators and students are struggling because they lack a unified, coherent, and plausible Catholic philosophy of education from which to address the various contemporary challenges to a religious worldview (D’Souza, 2003; Elias, 1999, 2002; Kelty, 1999; Ververka, 1993). Given the growing pluralism and multiculturalism in Ontario, the attraction towards diverse philosophies of education reflected in the literature on Catholic education (see Beaudoin, 2003; C.F. DiGiovanni, 1992; S.P. Martin, 1996), and the advent of full funding for Catholic schools in 1985, it is probably no longer appropriate to assume that a unified Catholic philosophy of education is reflected at the school level.

The extensive tradition of philosophical excellence in the Catholic Church presents us with a rich variety of sources in the area of the philosophy of education from which to draw our inspiration for a unified coherent approach. Jacques Maritain (1943), a significant contributor to the Catholic philosophical tradition, offers a coherent and credible philosophy of education in his work *Education at the Crossroads*. I contend that Maritain’s philosophy of education must be reclaimed by publically funded Catholic schools in Ontario if our claim that we provide a distinct education (as opposed to the

secular system) is to have any legitimacy in the contemporary debate over the public funding of Catholic schools in Ontario. In order to provide Catholic schools with a coherent and plausible alternative to the contemporary educational trends, several questions must be addressed.

This introductory chapter is divided into five parts. In Part A, I outline the primary research problem and the secondary questions that this thesis addresses as well as the relevance of this study for Catholic schools in Ontario. In Part B, I describe the qualitative research method typical of the philosophical research method described by Sheffield (2004) for analyzing and interpreting data, which I use to interpret my findings. In Part C, I provide a more detailed review of the main themes in the literature, which include both primary and secondary sources that relate directly to Maritain's philosophy of education and which aid in the conceptual analysis of Maritain's ideas. In part D, I move on to discuss how this study is arranged in Part D. Finally, Part E addresses one unique challenge that arises when utilizing Frankena's (1965a) model to analyzing a Maritain's normative philosophy of education.

#### *Emergence of the Research Problem and Questions*

Jacques Maritain's philosophy of education and the curriculum implication of his philosophy for Catholic schools will be the primary focus of this research study. My interest in this area is prompted by the changing context of Catholic education in Ontario manifested at the school level (see Congregation for Catholic Education, 1997; D'Souza, 2003; Elias, 1999 & 2002; Kelty, 1999; Mulligan, 2005; Trafford, 1992; Ververka, 1993). The primary research question to be addressed in this study asks what curriculum implications, for Catholic schools in Ontario, can be gleaned from Maritain's (1943) philosophy of education. The following four supplementary questions will also be

investigated: 1) what is Maritain's philosophy of education; 2) is Maritain's philosophy of education a viable alternative to contemporary philosophies of education; 3) does the Ontario Secondary School Program<sup>1</sup> (1999), which for Catholic schools also includes The Institute for Catholic Education's (hereafter cited as ICE) most recent Curriculum Policy Document for Religious Education (2006) as well as the Ontario Catholic School Graduate Expectations (1998), require modifications to reflect Maritain's (1943) philosophy of education; and 4) is it possible to implement Maritain's (1943) philosophy of education in Catholic schools today?

The proposed study into Maritain's philosophy of education and its relevance to contemporary Catholic schools in Ontario is valuable for a variety of reasons. First, both Elias (1999) and D'Souza (2003) argue that it would be beneficial for Catholic schools to identify more explicitly their distinct neo-Thomistic philosophical tradition as it applies to education, primarily because this tradition offers an another argument in support for the existence of Catholic schools than alternative approaches which rely solely on the theological differences between Catholic and non-denominational schools. Furthermore, J.T. Byrnes (2002), author of *John Paul II & Educating for Life: Moving toward a Renewal of Catholic Educational Philosophy*, points out that there is an abundance of literature on *how* to improve educational practices in Catholic schools; however, little has been done to understand *why* Catholic schools operate in a particular way (p. 3).

In agreement with D'Souza (2003), Elias (1999), and Byrnes (2002), I propose that Maritain's philosophy of education is an appropriate source of inspiration, in keeping with the Thomistic tradition, for Catholic educators to evaluate curriculum and school practices to ensure that the *why* behind these practices reflects the nature and dignity of

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<sup>1</sup> Hereafter cited as OSS

the human person. Finally, Maritain's philosophy of education is explicated using W.K. Frankena's (1965a) schema, to assess whether or not aspects of Maritain's philosophy of education should inform the curriculum delivered Catholic schools in Ontario.

Obviously, a philosophy of education must be fully understood before it is given assent by those in positions of responsibility. In explicating Maritain's philosophy of education, we can determine if the desired "dispositions" (abilities, skills, habits, beliefs) outlined by Maritain in *Education at the Crossroads* (1943) and *The Education of Man* (1962) cohere with his expressed rationale.

Second, Maritain's (1943) ideas on education and schooling are relevant to contemporary education given the current negative and damaging influences of relativism facing students in both the Catholic and the secular system (Mulligan, 2005; Miller, 2007). In William D. Gairdner (2008), author of *The Book of Absolutes: A Critique of Relativism and a Defence of Universals*, explains that relativism means "...that there is no fixed, or permanent, or privileged foundation outside our own perceptions or beliefs or culture from which to judge anything as more "true" than anything else" (p. 5).

According to Gairdner (2008) the influence of relativism "...there is no longer any expectation that an individual *ought* to hold consistent, connected beliefs, and this suggests that the core philosophy of modernity rests on a moral and intellectual laxity" (p. xiii). Certainly, neither classroom teachers, nor the students are immune to the growing adherence to relativism that Gairdner (2008) describes.

Similarly, Cardinal Ratzinger (2005) in a homily addressed to the College of Cardinals, shortly after the death of Pope John Paul II, characterized relativism "as an attitude which does not recognize anything as for certain and which has as its highest goal one's own ego and one's own desires" (§ 11). Many students accept a relativistic

philosophical position and apply this position to various topics without critically thinking about the implications or incoherence of this philosophical position. Consequently, as Byrnes (2002), observes “the abandonment of the work of constructing a Catholic philosophy of education has left a vacuum which thereby left Catholic educators struggling to find a philosophical basis to support the work which they do so successfully” (p. 3). A lack of trust in the truth and the influence of relativism are filling the void and Catholic educators face a significant philosophical challenge: how to develop in students both a knowledge and love of the truth during a time in our history when we face what Ratzinger (2005) calls the “dictatorship of relativism” (§ 11).

James T. Mulligan’s (2005) book, *Catholic Education: Ensuring a Future*, includes numerous comments made by students, teachers, and administrators on various aspects of contemporary Catholic education in Canada. The following two excerpts are found in Mulligan’s book and are taken from comments made first by Martin Tripole (a university theology professor in the United States), and second, by a high school religion teacher in the Toronto area. Both educators express their frustration with an increase in the prevalence of attitudes in their students consistent with moral relativism and the notion that truth is relative.

- (1) Today there is no problem with which I contend in my theology classes more deeply than this one. And try as I might, I seem to make almost no headway. In my basic theology course, I start every semester with a battle over this issue and end every semester almost invariably waging the same battle. Relativity [sic] infects the minds of nearly all students today, even the most insightful. Students have been so indoctrinated with this idea that it is not comprehensible to them how one could question it. Such a notion affects almost every issue

that arises in the life of the church. For if truth is really relative and subjective, there is no such thing as truth. Every idea represents only one individual's viewpoint and has no necessary bearing on the views of another. Each person is free to hold as truth his or her own private opinion, but is not free to urge a truth that in any way would be imposed on another. But if truth is subjective, so is morality, and that ends any basis for discussion of objective life values. (Martin Tripole, 1996, as cited in Mulligan, 2005, pp. 12-13)

- (2) The students have little sense of the importance of tradition. The strength of movements promoted in our society towards individuality and a prevalent condescending attitude that we don't need God in our world are evident in some of the students' attitudes. There is a strong sense that whatever you believe to be right and wrong is so, simply because of a personal conviction. They believe that no one has the right to confront evil tendencies when encountered because that individual's "rights" will be infringed upon. We have to not be afraid to state what is morally good *and* morally wrong according to our Catholic faith. (as cited in Mulligan, 2005, p. 89)

My own experience, as both a teacher of religion and philosophy in a Catholic high school in Ontario, parallels the comments made by the two educators quoted above. I, too, struggle each semester with students in my classes who see no logical contradiction inherent in the relativistic worldview. I suggest that the struggle against the relativistic attitude expressed by many of our students is amplified by the apparent lack of a coherent and plausible Catholic philosophy of education from which to address these concerns in the schools (see D'Souza, 2003; Elias, 1999, 2002; Kelty, 1999; & Veverka, 1993). A detailed study of Maritain's philosophy of education would provide Catholic educators



with a coherent and plausible philosophical foundation from which to address the apparent lack of trust in truth and the disinterest in tradition expressed by students in today's classrooms. I also argue that Maritain's philosophy of education is a viable alternative to the contemporary philosophies of education.

A Catholic philosophy of education must respond to the proponents of contemporary educational philosophies, such as pragmatism, by being prepared to defend and justify its educational claims. Part of this defence and justification begins with the development and recognition of a clear, coherent, and plausible Catholic philosophy of education. I argue that Catholics in Ontario can reclaim a distinct philosophy of education that will not only co-exist with the secular philosophies of education but that will enhance public education in Ontario as a whole.

In response to those critics who may question the legitimacy of resurrecting Maritain's ideas on education and schooling, the following comments are compelling. First, McCool (1978) rightly observes that Maritain "links present-day Catholic thought with its recent past, and he still presents Catholic thought with a set of questions which demand an answer" (p. 383). Maritain himself was by no means a "traditionalist" who refused to give credence to contemporary thought. Second, McCool (1978) cautions us not to conclude that the decline of Maritain's influence provides grounds for thinking that he is irrelevant. Third, Schall (1999) argues that Maritain's philosophy of education remains pertinent to Catholic education in part because he exposes the relativist belief to scrutiny (p. 136).

Finally, writers in the area of Catholic education frequently discuss the importance of telling the story of Catholic education to ensure that we do not take its existence for granted (Congregation for Catholic Education, 1997; Groome, 1980, 1998;

Mulligan, 2005). What is often missing from these nostalgic returns to the past is the recognition that the neo-Thomistic philosophy of education, specifically expressed in the work of Jacques Maritain (1943), has made and continues to make a significant contribution to Catholic education and, therefore, is still relevant and worthy of investigation.

Catholic educators have a rich philosophical tradition to draw from to enhance Catholic schools in Ontario today (see Elias, 1999; Frankena, 1965b; Maritain, 1943 & 1962; McCool, 1978, 1994; O'Malley, 1944; Pope Leo XIII, 1879; Pope Pius XI; 1929). Again, McCool (1978) points out that "although Maritain was among the most traditional of the classical Thomistic philosophers, he was the most open minded and modern in his understanding and appreciation of contemporary culture" (p. 387). This fact alone gives some credence and credibility to Maritain's work. I provide good reasons for holding that Maritain's philosophy of education is an appropriate fit for the Catholic school system in Ontario, given the context in which we find ourselves "doing" education today. If Catholic educators do not formally commit to a Catholic philosophy of education, the primary concern will not be the influences of relativism and secularism, but rather the lack of a unified educational philosophy from which to frame the fundamental aims of schooling. In the case of this study, it is valuable to review critically Maritain's philosophy of education in order to understand how we can transform the curriculum in Catholic schools today.

Finally, Maritain's philosophy of education is worth re-examining because, as Goodrich (1966) and D'Souza (2003) contend, it can offer a common foundation between Catholics and non-Catholics who differ theologically, but who may share the same philosophical positions related to the nature of learning, understanding and knowledge

and moral education. Goodrich (1966) proposes a link between the Thomist and the non-believer in the area of moral education. Natural reason, in the Thomistic tradition, is common to both the believer and the non-believer. I will also indicate that Maritain's (1943) ideas on the nature of understanding and the scope of the curriculum and curriculum specialization offer educators in both systems possible areas of agreement. In an era when Catholic educators must defend their distinctiveness in order to exist apart from the secular school system, Maritain's philosophy of education may also help to legitimize the existence of two alternative, publically funded school systems in Ontario.<sup>2</sup>

To summarize, a study such as this one is extremely relevant given the current context of Catholic education in Ontario today. First, a strong philosophical defence for Catholic schools is needed so we can convince others that we offer a different, yet equally legitimate educational experience to the secular system. Second, the growing trend towards relativism witnessed by educators must be addressed and can be with sound philosophical arguments from the Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition that Maritain upholds. Third, Maritain's philosophy of education offers an anchor for the story of Catholic education that needs so desperately to be told to those educators who take their history for granted. Finally, we must re-evaluate Maritain's work on education because we live in a multicultural and pluralistic province and if a Catholic philosophy of education is going to be valued by secular educators, it must provide common ground from which to address issues at the heart of both systems. We must not only identify and promote our

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<sup>2</sup> Most recently in Ontario, a significant provincial election campaign issue was the proposed funding of private religious schools by John Tory; leader of the Progressive Conservative Party. The fact that this issue become a significant focal point in the campaign was worrisome to many Catholic educators, who feared the loss of publicly funded Catholic schools in Ontario (see Mulligan, 2008).

distinctive Catholic philosophy of education, but we must also identify opportunities for dialogue given the similarities we may share with other theorists.

### *Research Method*

The primary aim of this research study is to explicate Maritain's philosophy of education using Frankena's (1965a) model for analyzing a normative philosophy of education; second, to identify the implications of Maritain's philosophy of education for today's Catholic schools; and third, to briefly evaluate the most recent Curriculum Policy Document for Religious Education and the Ontario Catholic School Graduate Expectations through a Maritainian lens to identify possible areas for improvement. As a means to these ends, I will utilize the qualitative research method typical of the philosophical research methods described by Sheffield (2004) in *Beyond Abstraction:*

### *Philosophy as a Practical Qualitative Research Method.*

Although philosophic research methods have not gained wide popularity in the field of education (Sheffield, 2004), the topic of my study is ideally suited to this method. The essence of philosophical inquiry involves "the analysis, clarification, and criticism of the language, concepts, and logic of the ends and means of human experience" (Sherman, 1995 as cited in Sheffield, 2004, p. 762). As one area of human experience, education is certainly an important area of study and one that lends itself nicely to philosophical inquiry. Sheffield describes three main tools at the philosopher's disposal: analysis, clarification, and criticism (p. 763). These three tools are fundamental to the philosophical research method and I will briefly identify the role of each tool in qualitative research as characterized by Sheffield.

First, Sheffield (2004) explains that "in analysis, one reduces complex ideas or explicates human situations into understandable, relational concepts" (p. 763). It is my

hope, after explicating some of the complex philosophical ideas presented by Maritain, that his philosophy of education will be more easily understood by Catholic educators who do not have a background in philosophy. In terms of his comments on clarification, Sheffield begins by reminding us that we all experience the world and people in different ways, and in many cases, we take our ideas for granted. This is certainly the case today in Ontario's Catholic schools; we take our understanding of education and our ideas on the human person for granted. Given the growing number of non-Catholic students in Ontario's Catholic high schools, it is clear that we can no longer assume that our students share the Christian worldview. Subsequently, "...one responsibility philosophers have is to challenge and ultimately clarify those constructs we use to make sense of the world; constructs often taken for granted rather than clarified and truly understood" (p. 763). Finally, the tool of criticism involves making value judgments that will eventually change the way education is practiced or understood (Sheffield, 2004, p. 763). Obviously, by exploring the past we may find adequate solutions to contemporary problems. The present study seeks to explore Maritain's (1943) philosophy of education in the hope of finding adequate solutions to contemporary problems developing in Ontario's Catholic schools.

As mentioned earlier, the lack of a coherent philosophy of education and the need to defend publicly funded Catholic education in Ontario are two significant problems outlined by Elias (1999) and D'Souza (2003). The purpose of explicating Maritain's Catholic philosophy is not only to develop better understanding of his ideas, but also to influence change and to improve Catholic schools in Ontario. Furthermore, philosophical inquiry may help us understand current trends in education and the organization of schools. Both Catholic educators and philosophers of education have noted the

significant trend away from realist philosophies of education, such as the one espoused by Maritain, Aquinas, and Aristotle (Carr, Haldane, McLaughlin, & Pring, 1995; Carr, 1998; Elias, 2002; Siegel, 1998; Wiles, 2004). Finally, philosophical methods of inquiry allow educational researchers to evaluate our present understanding of the past. Utilizing a philosophical method of inquiry allows me to apply the three “tools” of analysis, clarification, and criticism to the language of education and schooling, to educational ideas and to the logic inherent in the relationships between the way we think, write, and talk about education and schooling (Sheffield, 2004, p. 763).

Careful exegesis and analysis of key concepts and claims made by Maritain in *Education at the Crossroads* and *The Education of Man* and an overall evaluation of the current curriculum in Catholic schools, including the *Curriculum Policy Document for Religious Education* (2006) and the *Ontario Catholic School Graduate Expectations* (1998), are among the sources that I will be using to answer the research questions outlined in my introduction. Conceptual understanding is essential in order for educators in Catholic schools to make sound decisions about the educational philosophy they espouse. As stated by Sheffield (2004), “philosophers investigate real problems that might be alleviated through further conceptual understanding” (p. 763). The philosophical method, in Sheffield’s view, is on par with other more accepted research methods, precisely because “philosophers investigate real problems that might be alleviated through further conceptual understanding” (p. 764). Unfortunately, many people have a limited understanding of philosophical inquiry as only abstract thinking with no social benefit. I agree with Sheffield that the philosophical method of inquiry is just as legitimate as other qualitative methods, such as historical methods and ethnographical methods.

The data that I have selected, analyzed, clarified, and criticized includes both primary and secondary sources on Jacques Maritain's philosophy of education and Catholic education in general. Although Jacques Maritain's philosophy of education is the primary subject of interest, Cohen, Manion and Morrison (2000) point out that no single person should be studied in isolation from his or her association with a particular movement or institution (p. 159). In this case, Jacques Maritain cannot be studied in isolation from the neo-Thomistic movement of the twentieth century and the Roman Catholic faith, which he professed boldly. Therefore, I have also collected and analyzed some data mainly on neo-Thomism, and Catholic education. The main primary sources involved in this study include Jacques Maritain's book *Education at the Crossroads* (1943) and a collection of essays by Maritain entitled *The Education of Man* (1962), the *Curriculum Policy Document for Religious Education* (2006), the *Ontario Catholic Graduate Expectations* (1998) and various statements made by the Catholic Church on education (see Table 1).

Secondary sources are also utilized because as Cohen et al. (2000) indicate "there are numerous occasions where a secondary source can contribute significantly to more valid and reliable historical research than would otherwise be the case" (p. 161). One of the shortcomings of any research project includes the difficulty of collecting an adequate amount of data (Cohen et al., 2000, p. 158). Fortunately, in the case of Jacques Maritain and Catholic education in Ontario, an abundance of reliable scholarly information is available. It is unrealistic to assume that I had the opportunity offer both an external and internal criticism of these secondary sources. I had little time to vindicate all of these secondary sources and as such must assume that the ones I have chosen are authentic, reliable, and trustworthy.

Table 1

*Catholic Church Statements Related to Education*

Author	Title	Date
Pope Leo XIII	<i>Aeterni Patris</i> <i>(On the Restoration of Christian Philosophy)</i>	1879
Pope Pius XI	<i>Divini Illius Magistri</i> <i>(On Christian Education)</i>	1929
Congregation for Catholic Education	<i>The Catholic School</i>	1977
Congregation for Catholic Education	<i>The Religious Dimension of Education in a Catholic School: Guidelines for Reflection and Renewal</i>	1988
Ontario Conference of Catholic Bishops	<i>This Moment of Promise</i>	1989
Congregation for Catholic Education	<i>The Catholic School on the Threshold of the Third Millennium</i>	1997

*Note.* This list of Catholic Church statements on education is not exhaustive.

As a researcher, I am aware that my own biases are relevant to the collection and interpretation of data. I have been teaching Religion and Philosophy for the past six years in a Catholic high school in South Western Ontario. My experience with Catholic education in Ontario has certainly influenced my decision to research Jacques Maritain's philosophy of education.

*Literature Review*

I first became interested in Jacques Maritain's philosophy of education while researching the topic of Catholic education, specifically the arguments used by Catholic educators to defend publicly funded Catholic education in Ontario. I came across two articles in which both authors express the importance of anchoring Catholic education in the neo-Thomistic tradition (see Elias, 1999; D'Souza, 2003). Together, John L. Elias



and Mario O. D'Souza argue that Catholic educators have lost their philosophical compass necessitating a renewed focus on the Catholic philosophy of education.

D'Souza (2003) argues that "the philosophical principles of Catholic education are not narrowly confessional; they are broadly pedagogical and therefore they can be of wide interest to a multicultural and pluralist country like Canada" (p. 363). The hope, articulated by Elias (1999) and D'Souza (2003), is that a renewed focus on a Catholic philosophy of education will strengthen the argument that Catholic schools in Ontario are truly distinct and offer a viable alternative to the secular system. Although their discussion of the Catholic philosophy of education is more general, both Elias (1999) and D'Souza (2003) rely heavily on Maritain's philosophy of education as the primary expression of neo-Thomistic philosophy in the twentieth century. The analysis of Catholic education presented by Elias (1999) and D'Souza (2003) prompted me to ask if Maritain's philosophy of education could enhance Catholic schools in Ontario.

Three themes emerge in the literature on neo-Thomism and Maritain's Catholic philosophy of education. First, despite the Catholic Church's long history of religious education and training, the neo-Thomistic movement is thought to no longer dominate philosophical and theological discussions after the middle of the twentieth century (Carr et al., 1995; Byrnes, 2002; D'Souza, 2003; Elias, 2002; Kelty, 1999; McCool, 1994; Veverka, 1993). Therefore, much of the literature on a distinct Catholic philosophy of education predates the Second Vatican Council.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> The Second Vatican Council was called by Pope John Paul XXIII in 1962 to meet the challenges of modernity and was completed in 1965 under the leadership of Pope Paul VI. One example of a coherent philosophy of education published prior to The Second Vatican Council is Redden and Ryan's *A Catholic Philosophy of Education* (1949).

Elias (1999) suggests that two factors contributed to the decline of neo-Thomism in the latter half of the twentieth century. First, changes within the Catholic Church led to the recognition of a multitude of perspectives; therefore, Catholic scholars were no longer bound by the Thomistic tradition as in years past. It is important to note that despite the current pluralism of views among Catholic philosophers and theologians we can take refuge, as Gerald McCool (1978) does, in the fact that "...although Maritain was among the most traditional of the classical Thomistic philosophers he was the most open minded and modern in his understanding and appreciation of contemporary culture" (p. 387). As McCool (1992) reiterates in a later essay on the relevance of Thomism in philosophy today, "traditions remain alive or come back to life when philosophers find in them resources they need to address the problems of their time" (p. 59). Historically, J. Haldane (2004) reminds us that the decline in Thomism in the 18<sup>th</sup> and 19<sup>th</sup> century was the result of the proponent's "...ill-preparedness to engage modern thought rather than weaknesses within Thomism itself that led to the marginalization of the tradition in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries" (p. 7). Haldane's point is instructive because we can infer that with each great revival in Thomistic thought (see Appendix A), there exists in the proponents of the Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition the willingness to engage contemporary thought without sacrificing the heart of this philosophical tradition. Maritain's open-minded approach to contemporary culture, his adherence to the Aristotelian-Thomistic understanding of human nature, and his emphasis on the distinctiveness of human intelligence are fundamental in my appeal to Jacques Maritain's philosophy of education. I find in his writing on education, the ideas and resources needed to address the specific problems facing Catholic schools in the province of Ontario today.

A second factor contributing to the decline of neo-Thomism involves significant changes within the discipline of philosophy itself. According to Elias (1999), the popularity of analytic philosophy at the expense of normative approaches to philosophy has significantly impacted the popularity of normative approaches to the philosophy of education (pp. 102-104). A normative philosophy of education includes value statements, while an analytic philosophy of education involves the logical analysis of educational concepts and methods (Frankena, 1965a, p. 3). Ultimately, Maritain's philosophy of education includes both analytic and normative statements. Elias (1999) is making reference to an important shift within the discipline of philosophy and his point was also taken up earlier by R.F. Dearden (1982) in his article *Philosophy of Education, 1952-1982*. In this essay, Dearden outlines the major contributions made to the philosophy of education in the latter half of the twentieth century. Unfortunately, Dearden does not foresee the analytic style of doing philosophy of education being replaced by an alternative paradigm in the future (p. 70).

Despite the authors cited earlier (Carr et al., 1995; Byrnes, 2002; D'Souza, 2003; Elias, 2002; Kelty, 1999; McCool, 1994; Veverka, 1993) who conclude that there is a lack of interest in neo-Thomism, I found no shortage of current books and scholarly articles on Jacques Maritain's contribution to the philosophy of education. Dunaway's (1978) *Jacques Maritain*, Hudson and Mancini's (1987) *Understanding Maritain: Philosopher and Friend*, McCool's (1994) *The Neo-Thomists*, McNerny's (1999) *The Common Things: Essays on Thomism and Education*, Haldane's (2004) *Faithful Reason: Essay's Catholic and Philosophical*, and Trapani's (2004) *Truth Matters: Essays in Honor of Jacques Maritain* are only a few examples of the post-Vatican II literature on

Maritain. Contrary to what has been suggested by some authors, there seems to be considerable interest in neo-Thomism and Maritain's work.

The second theme to emerge in the literature is the "misuse" of the phrase *philosophy of education*. It is apparent that some authors in the area of Catholic education are inappropriately using the phrase *philosophy of education* to describe a multitude of ideas and theories. B.J. Kelty's (1999) article "Toward a Theology of Catholic Education" expresses a distorted understanding of what constitutes a philosophy of education. Kelty (1999) is not clear on the distinction between a philosophy of education and a theology of education and he repeatedly interchanges these two terms. Prior to encouraging Catholic educators to reclaim their philosophically distinct tradition, as represented by Maritain, we must have a clear conception of what a philosophy of education entails. According to D'Souza (2003), "a philosophy of education deals with the philosophical and foundational questions of pedagogy and theories of education" (p. 373). Although related, a philosophy of education "is distinguished from a history of education, sociology of education, religious education and so forth" (D'Souza, 2003, p. 373). Maritain's work is preferable, I maintain, because he presents an authentic Catholic philosophy of education that has not been tainted by the current tendency to describe any theory pertaining to the activity and process of education as a *philosophy of education*.

The final theme to come out of my research of the literature is the lack of specific curriculum evaluation through a philosophical lens. In my review of the literature, I have yet to find any detailed explorations into the philosophical foundations of the current curriculum developed for Catholic high schools in Ontario. At this point in time, the literature on Maritain's philosophy of education is theoretical and conceptual in nature.

What are the practical implications of Maritain's philosophy of education for Catholic schools? For example; most of what publically funded Catholic schools teach is set out in the Ontario Secondary School Curriculum Documents. The purpose of the current curriculum in Ontario schools, as stated in the introduction to the *Ontario Secondary Schools, Grades 9-12: Program and Diploma Requirements* (1999, hereafter cited as OSS), is "...to equip students with the knowledge and skills they will need to lead satisfying and productive lives..." and to "...prepare students for further education and work..." (p. 6). The current Ontario Curriculum is rooted, as every curriculum is, in a philosophical framework, to which in this case, is one that Maritain would surely object. The purpose of this study is to analyze and critique the theoretical and conceptual material on education written by Maritain (1943, 1962) as well as the various secondary sources on his philosophy of education in order to identify specific curriculum implications that have a direct impact on what is taught in Catholic schools.

As a high school religion teacher, I am interested in the possibility of concrete curriculum reform using Maritain's philosophy of education as a foundation. A brief evaluation of ICE's (2006) *Curriculum Policy Document for Religious Education* reveals no explicit appeal to a neo-Thomistic philosophy of education. However, I am hesitant to accept, as Elias (1999) and D'Souza (2003) have, that neo-Thomism has disappeared from the collective memory of Catholic educators. In agreement with Byrnes (2002), I argue that neo-Thomistic "...thought is still very prevalent in the praxis (if not the philosophy) of Catholic educators today" (p. 16). My research builds on the theoretical and conceptual work that has already been done to examine the nature of knowledge presented in the OSS, the religious education curriculum in Catholic schools, and the Ontario Catholic School Graduate Expectations.

The three themes mentioned above signify that an explication of Maritain's philosophy of education and the evaluation of the current OSS curriculum used in Ontario schools today are needed to appreciate the value of this Aristotelian-Thomistic philosophical tradition as articulated by Maritain. Maritain's philosophy of education must be analyzed from the inside out to ensure that his claims are logically coherent and plausible. Only then can we determine if the curriculum in Catholic schools needs to be renewed. If the current curriculum is found to lack a coherent and plausible philosophical foundation, I will make the appropriate suggestions for renewal.

To aid in my explication of Maritain's philosophy of education, I utilize Frankena's (1965a) model for analyzing a normative philosophy of education. An initial reading of L.B. Lanctot's (1995) and D.A. VanPelt's (2002) master's theses, which both utilize Frankena's model to analyze the educational philosophies of Charlotte Mason and John George Althouse, indicates that Frankena's model is adequate; however, Maritain's philosophy of education presents its own unique challenges when it comes to applying Frankena's model to his treatment of education. Frankena (1974) indicates that any normative philosophy of education can be analyzed using his model because they will all include statements about the aims of education, definitions of education, teaching and learning, empirical evidence to support the aims, and epistemological and metaphysical claims (p. 140). Despite the fact that we can apply Frankena's (1965a) model to numerous educational philosophies, Maritain's philosophy of education challenges us to distinguish between education in schools and a more general conception of education. Maritain (1943) distinguishes between two spheres of education; (1) *the educational sphere*, which includes our formal school education; and (2) *the extra-educational sphere*, which includes the learning that takes place outside of the formal curriculum and involves

experiences, relationships, and work (pp. 24-25). Maritain's distinction between these two spheres must be carefully understood so as not to misinterpret the role of the Catholic school in education.

Frankena (1965a) succeeds in providing a framework for setting out a writer's philosophy of education before determining if any of the claims made by the particular philosopher are justifiable. Therefore, we can assume that despite the various differences among philosophers of education (for example those ideas presented by Maritain, Whitehead, and Dewey) the model outlined by Frankena aids in clarifying these ideas to determine if they are coherent and plausible. Frankena (1965a) divides his model into five steps: 1) Identify the desired dispositions; 2) Identify the aims and values that will produce the desired dispositions; 3) Identify other metaphysical or epistemological premises used to justify the desired dispositions; 4) Identify the methods and means proposed to achieve the dispositions; and 5) Identify the evidence used to support the methods used. Once these five areas are scrutinized we can determine if Maritain's philosophy is inherently coherent.

#### *Arrangement of the Study*

I have divided the present study on Jacques Maritain's philosophy of education into five components. First, I briefly identify the historical, religious, and philosophical context out of which Jacques Maritain develops his philosophy of education. Second, I explicate Frankena's (1965a) model for analyzing a normative philosophy of education. Third, I explicate the "philosophical element" of Maritain's philosophy of education utilizing Frankena's (1965a) model. Fourth, I explicate the "practical element" of Maritain's philosophy of education. Finally, I assess Maritain's philosophy of education and identify the implications of implementing his ideas on education in Catholic schools

in Ontario today. The purpose of this assessment of Maritain's ideas is to identify whether or not the current curriculum is able to meet the needs of today's students and suggest the direction that Catholic educators should take to strengthen the curriculum in Catholic schools. I conclude this study with a brief summary of the main arguments and offer some concluding remarks on the implications for Catholic schools in the future and possibilities for further research.

### *Two Unique Challenges*

Explicating Maritain's (1943) philosophy of education has presented me with two unique challenges. Despite the fact that Frankena is aware of and has even explicated Maritain's philosophy utilizing his own model, he does not recognize the implication of the various conceptions of education, defined by Maritain, as necessitating the need to distinguish between the content in Box C (refer to Figure 3) that we acquire from following Frankena's "philosophical approach" (Boxes A, B, and C<sub>1</sub>) and the content in Box C that we acquire from following Frankena's "practical approach" (Boxes C<sub>2</sub>, D, E). I refer to this particular challenge as the "Box C challenge." Therefore, the "Box C challenge" forces us to alter Frankena's own visual representation of his model in order to account for Maritain's understanding of what students should acquire in schools.

Maritain (1943) recognizes at the outset of *Education at the Crossroads* that there are various meanings associated with the word "education." For this reason, Maritain includes a three-part definition of education for clarification. Education in Maritain's understanding "refers either to any process whatsoever by means of which man is shaped and led toward fulfilment (education in the broadest sense), or to the task of formation which adults intentionally undertake with regard to youth, or, in its strictest sense, to the special task of schools and universities" (p. 2). This passage is significant because in my



explication of Maritain's philosophy of education, it is necessary to distinguish between the aims of education in the broadest sense (*extra-educational sphere*) and the aims of education in the strictest sense (*educational sphere*) in order to make sense of Maritain's entire approach to education. I follow Frankena's (1965a) model, but to account for the two challenges mentioned here, I distinguish between the aim and purpose of education in the *extra-educational sphere* and the aim and purpose of education in the *educational sphere* and also address the "Box C challenge" in Chapter Four and Chapter Five.

Prior to an explication of Maritain's philosophy of education, I undertake in the following chapter to synthesize various secondary sources on Maritain's life as well as the philosophical and religious influences related to his ideas on education in order to develop a contextual framework to understand more fully his philosophy of education.

## Chapter Two

### *Maritain's Historical Context*

It is fortunate that there is an abundance of written material on Jacques Maritain's life and his influence on Catholic thought in the twentieth century. During his lifetime, Maritain produced an eclectic array of philosophical writings in the areas of metaphysics, epistemology, political philosophy, moral philosophy, education, theology and even several works on poetry (McCool, 1978, p. 383).

Four key sources inform my understanding of Maritain and his place in history: J.M. Dunaway's (1978) *Jacques Maritain*, D. W. Hudson and M.J. Mancini's (1987) *Understanding Maritain: Philosopher and Friend*, G. A. McCool's (1978) essay *Jacques Maritain: A Neo-Thomistic Classic* and J. Kernan's (1975) book *Our Friend, Jacques Maritain: A Personal Memoir*. The above authors all recognize the importance of first developing an understanding of the historical context out of which Maritain's philosophy develops to gain appropriate insight into his work and, for the most part, tell the same story. I proceed in the following manner. First, I offer a brief biographical sketch of Maritain's life and career; focusing primarily on the key people and experiences that influenced his acceptance of a Thomistic worldview. Second, I define keywords occurring in the literature on Maritain and Thomism in general. And third, I briefly outline the influence of Thomism in the history of the Catholic education.

#### *A Biographical Sketch of Jacques Maritain*

In the words of Peter Redpath (1987), "to understand and appreciate the greatness of a philosopher or a theologian is not to simply understand and appreciate the truth that is within his teaching but to understand and appreciate the evolution of his teaching as a response and solution to the intellectual spirit and problems of his age" (pp. 93-94).

Similarly, Ward (1978) insists that we must understand Maritain's adherence to the Aristotelian-Thomistic philosophical tradition in order to fully appreciate his ideas on education (p. 503). It is not my purpose here to psychoanalyze Maritain, but only to offer some insight into his philosophy of education by examining his response to some of the intellectual issues of his time. Maritain's intellectual journey was an unremitting dialectic between the prevailing philosophies of his time, especially logical positivism, and his expression of Thomism in search of wisdom. We must not forget that a person's philosophy cannot be divorced from the cultural and historical milieu. Maritain (1961) describes philosophers, including himself, as "...a kind of mirror, on the heights of intelligence, of the deepest trends which are obscurely at play in the human mind at each epoch of history" (p. 4). In an attempt to see clearly into the mirror, we begin by situating Maritain in his cultural and historical milieu.

Jacques Maritain was born in France and lived from 1882-1973; spending most of his early life in France. Maritain's parents, Paul Maritain and Genevière Favre were not particularly religious, although his mother did become a Protestant and his father was baptized Catholic (Kernan, 1975, pp. 15-16). Maritain's intellectual journey began as a young student in France at the turn of the twentieth century. Maritain's early education at both Lycée Henri IV and Sorbonne involved an anti-metaphysical and pro-positivist education (inspired by the positivism of Auguste Comte), which ultimately led to feelings of despair and meaninglessness (Redpath, 1987, p. 93). During his youth, Maritain even associated himself with scientism<sup>4</sup> — whose proponents claim that science alone can

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<sup>4</sup> In an essay entitled "God and Science" that appears in his book *On the Use of Philosophy: Three Essays*, Maritain (1961) uses the term "exclusive" to describe those scientists and lay persons who accept the notion that science is the only means to genuine knowledge of the world. Maritain is adamant throughout the

discover the truth about the external world and morality — and phenomenism — a philosophical movement, associated with Immanuel Kant, a dualist, who espoused the position that we cannot have direct knowledge of external objects as they are in themselves. Together, these two vastly different philosophical approaches hold “that man knows that no being or knowledge is absolute and that so far as man knows, matter is the ultimate reality” (Ward, 1978, p. 499). Maritain’s thinking mirrors the “relativism, skepticism, and moral nihilism that were the consequences of the antimetaphysical and reductionist spirit of his early teachers of philosophy” (Redpath, 1987, p. 93). Maritain emerges from this intellectual climate with a considerable, spiritual hunger for metaphysical truth.

Both Maritain and Raïssa, whom he met at the University of Paris in the winter of 1900 and who would later become his wife, were passionately searching for truth and the evidence for the existence of God. Kernan (1975) describes Maritain and Raïssa as two extremely serious and highly sensitive young intellectuals attempting to come to terms with the pessimism and nihilism that dominated Europe in the early twentieth century (pp. 23-25). In keeping with their serious nature, Maritain and Raïssa even planned to commit suicide if they had not found the answers to their existential questions and the truth they so desperately desired. Thankfully, their feelings of despair and absurdity were relatively short-lived and the couple went on to live a fulfilling life.

Between the time that Maritain meets Raïssa in 1900 and his acceptance of the Catholic faith in 1906, Maritain would encounter the writings of three men who would change the course of his life and thinking forever: contemporary French philosopher

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essay that philosophy is a necessary tool, along with science, in the search for knowledge. Ultimately, for Maritain, the “exclusive” scientist is naïve in his or her assumption that science has all the answers.

Henri Bergson; French writer and devoted Catholic Léon Bloy; and most notably, Saint Thomas Aquinas.

Henri Bergson (1859-1941) is described by Lawlor and Moulard (2008) as "...one of the most famous and influential French philosophers of the late 19<sup>th</sup> century-early 20<sup>th</sup> century" (§ 1). Furthermore, in their introduction to *Understanding Maritain: Philosopher and Friend*, Hudson and Mancini (1987) favourably describe Bergson as "the guiding spirit behind the new century's intellectual mood and the primary shaper of the modernist context" (p. 2).

In the work of Bergson, Maritain felt that he had found someone who would restore his faith in metaphysics (Kernan, 1975, p. 27). In Bergson, Maritain found someone who criticized Kant's theory of knowledge and his theory of truth; someone who attempted to redefine the relationship between science and metaphysics; and someone who challenged logical positivism in an attempt to ease the tension between knowledge and life. According to Bergson "...conceptual knowledge distorts reality by representing it as static and stereotypical, after the manner in which a motion picture depicts events, when in fact it is dynamic, diverse, and unpredictable" (pp. 201-202). Furthermore, Bergson argued that intuition would reveal the truth about reality and for this reason, he rejects conceptual knowledge. Bergson's philosophy is labelled as a form of "anti-intellectualism" (Dennehy, 1987, p. 202).

Maritain's opposition to Bergson is rooted in his insistence on the primacy and scope of the human intellect. For Maritain, intuition works with rational analysis and results in a conceptualization (Dennehy, 1987, p. 208). Maritain also could not reconcile his faith in God with Bergsonianism. The following summary captures well the irreconcilability between Bergsonism and Maritain's theological convictions.

For Maritain God had revealed certain basic truths to the intellect by means of concepts and propositions. Bergson's critique of the concept contradicted this ability of God to communicate himself to his creatures and, even further, the possibility of the intellect to gain cognition of being in any respect. (Hudson & Mancini, 1987, p. 3)

It is interesting to note that Maritain's introduction to Thomism occurs after his initial frustration with what he characterizes as Bergson's encouragement of anti-intellectualism. It was Maritain's ambivalence towards anti-intellectualism that would fuel his philosophical enterprise.

It is important to note here that, although Maritain (1943) identifies intellectualism as one of the errors present in contemporary education, he is referring to the over emphasis of the intellectualism inherent in classical pedagogy and a second form of intellectualism that abandons universal values in favour of experience (p. 18). Essentially, Maritain insists on the avoidance of the extremes of both intellectualism and anti-intellectualism, neither of which will enhance our understanding of reality. Dennehy (1987) articulates well that "like Bergson, [Maritain] understands quite well the imperatives of the real and the consequent inability of the concept itself to grasp the real as such; but like intellectualists, chiefly Thomas Aquinas, he also understands that the objectivity of knowledge and thus the apprehension of being as being is possible only through the intellect's elevation of the intuition to its own level of immateriality" (p. 209). In part two of this chapter, it is made clearer just how Maritain's relationship with modernism is reflected in his philosophy of education.

Maritain would eventually oppose Bergsonism publically in 1913 in a series of lectures given at the *Institute Catholique* in Paris in 1913 and also in his first published

work, *Bergsonian Philosophy and Thomism* (Kernan, 1975, pp. 43-44). Despite the fact that Maritain did not accept Bergson's philosophy in its entirety and that he would develop his own thoughts on the intuition of being, no doubt Bergson's philosophy was a catalyst for Maritain's philosophical conversion.

While Bergson significantly influences Maritain's philosophical conversion, Lèon Bloy would fulfill the role of a spiritual mentor. Erasmo Leiva-Merikakis (1978) goes so far as to suggest that Maritain's religious destiny is owed to this French writer and thinker (1846-1917). There is no doubt that both Bergson and Bloy significantly impacted Maritain's life and worldview. According to Leiva-Merikakis, Bloy was "...the decisive catalyst in that religious and cultural renewal that abandoned many patterns of nineteenth-century bourgeois Catholicism and shattered the canonical forms and conventions that had long imprisoned the fire of God's word" (p. 75). Bloy's prophetic example led both Jacques and Raïssa to develop a personal relationship with God that they could not find in Bergson's abstract and impersonal God. Furthermore, it was through Bloy that Maritain experienced the presence of God (pp. 82-83). The influence of Bergson and Bloy is matched only by the profound impact that St. Thomas Aquinas would have on Maritain.

A defining moment in Maritain's life came in 1906 when he and his wife Raïssa converted to Catholicism and were baptized. With his acceptance of the Catholic faith, Maritain experienced not only a religious conversion, but a philosophical one as well. Following his religious conversion, Maritain focused his energies on metaphysical truths and developing his understanding of God.

Although Bergson and Bloy ignited a fire in Maritain, it was not until he began reading the work of St. Thomas Aquinas that he found the philosophical system that would keep his fire burning. Maritain was first introduced to Aquinas by Raïssa, who had

been encouraged to read the *Summa Theologiae*. However, it was not until a year later that Jacques picked up the *Summa* and found in it a philosophical approach that would consume his personal and academic energies for the rest of his life (Ward, 1978, p. 499). Maritain found in Aquinas the philosophical tools needed to address the growing trend towards relativism, skepticism, and nihilism (Redpath, 1987, p. 93). Finally, “it is [Aquinas’] affirmation of *intellect*...that places him a step removed from both modernism and Bergson (Hudson & Mancini, 1987, p. 4). Maritain recognizes the power and scope of speculative (theoretical) reason and practical reason.

My description, in the first part of this chapter, of the pivotal influences on Jacques Maritain’s thinking and consequently his philosophy of education is by no means complete. I understand that I have not gone into great detail on the influence of Maritain’s wife, who, by all accounts, is credited with introducing Maritain to Bloy and the work of St. Thomas Aquinas. Redpath (1987) suggests that Maritain’s love affair with wisdom began at the very latest with his early friendship with Raïssa at the Lycée Henri IV. There is no doubt that Maritain’s wife had a significant impact on his life and work.<sup>5</sup> This said, in Bergson, Maritain found a renewed hope in universal truths, the human intellect, and intuition; despite the fact that he would later challenge Bergson’s notion of intuition and his anti-intellectualism. In Bloy, Maritain gained a friend, godfather, and spiritual advisor who acted as a living witness of the three theological virtues of faith, hope, and love. Finally, through the Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition, Maritain discovered his vocation as well as the lens through which he evaluated competing philosophical visions.

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<sup>5</sup> For a detailed examination of Raïssa’s influence on Maritain and their intellectual partnership see Judith Suther’s (1990) *Raïssa Maritain: Pilgrim, Poet, Exile*.



Although Maritain was qualified to teach in the French Lycées—schools for intermediate students—after earning his *agrégation de philosophie* in 1905, he was adamant that he would not teach in the very institutions that had a hand in creating his existential crisis. Kernan (1975) recalls that Maritain often remarked that he came to teaching out of necessity (p. 43). Maritain's (1943) first teaching post began in 1912 at a large prestigious boy's school called *Collège Stanislas*. The students responded well to Maritain and he was known for his enthusiasm (pp. 43-45).

At Stanislas, Maritain was free to express his philosophical ideas. Referring to Maritain's first teaching assignment, Dunaway (1978) remarks that "even in a Catholic secondary school, there was no small reaction when [Maritain] announced that all his classes would begin with the recitation of an Ave Maria" (p. 18). Unfortunately, even the Catholic schools in Paris were not immune to the influences of the logical positivism associated with the Vienna School. In 1914 Maritain was appointed Associate Professor of Philosophy at the Institute Catholique of Paris. Fortunately, in 1918 Maritain inherited a significant amount of money from a friend who died in the Great War; allowing Maritain the freedom to devote more time to his writing and to lecture on Thomism (Dunaway, 1978, p. 19). Although Maritain's formal career as an educator in France was relatively short, he remained a passionate educator for the remainder of his life. During the years between 1919 and 1940, Maritain established a center for Thomist studies, where he met with intellectuals to discuss and advance the philosophy of Aquinas.

Throughout the 1940s, Maritain taught and lectured at various universities including Toronto, Notre Dame, Columbia, and Princeton. Dunaway (1978) characterizes the years between 1940 and 1945 as a period of imposed exile for Maritain and his family (p. 21). Although Maritain was no stranger to North America (he had

made several trips to the United States and Canada to lecture), he was forced to stay away from France after the German invasion of his country in 1940. According to Dunaway (1978) "because of Jacques' well-known stance against fascism and because of Raïssa's and Vera's Jewish parentage, it was out of the question for the family to return to France" (p. 22). During this period in exile, Maritain writes *Education at the Crossroads* (1943), in which he made a point of denouncing Nazism as a perversion of the human mind (p. 103). While in the United States Maritain continued to teach and lecture, while supporting the resistance movement (Dunaway, 1978, p. 22).

Despite the fact that the Second World War had ended in Europe and after a brief term as the French Ambassador to the Holy See, Maritain remained in the United States until 1961. Maritain's decision to remain in the United States after his term as Ambassador to the Holy See ended was primarily influenced by his realization that his influence had decreased significantly in his home country. From 1948 to 1961, Maritain worked as a professor of philosophy at Princeton University. Only after the death of Maritain's beloved wife Raïssa in 1960, during a visit to France, did he entertain the idea of returning to his home country. Maritain spent the remaining years of his life with the Dominican monastic order of the Little Brothers of Jesus until his death in 1973 at the age of 90. Despite the fact that Maritain was officially retired from teaching, he wrote three more books: *The Peasant of the Garonne*, *On the Grace and Humanity of Jesus*, and *On the Church of Christ* (Dunaway, 1978, pp. 21-26).

In regards to Maritain's influence, McCool (1978), an admirer of Maritain, writes that "with the exception of Karl Rahner and Hans Urs von Balthasar, no Catholic systematic theologian in this century has been able to present a program for the intellectual unification of Christian experience which can match Maritain's speculative

synthesis in its range, depth, consistency, and sophistication” (p. 380). Maritain’s influence spawned the creation of several academic associations devoted to the study of Maritain and Thomistic philosophy. In 1957 the Jacques Maritain Center at the University of Notre Dame was established by Father Leo R. Ward and Professor Frank Keegan.<sup>6</sup> In Rome, a group of intellectuals inspired by Maritain established the Jacques Maritain International Institute in 1974 to advance the study of Maritain in relation to the contemporary world.<sup>7</sup> Finally, in 1979, the Canadian Jacques Maritain Association was founded and members of this association meet twice annually to discuss the work and influence of Jacques Maritain.<sup>8</sup> The existence of these three associations is witness to the profound impact that Maritain had in Western Europe and in North America. A visit to the web pages of these associations reveals significant academic interest in Maritain’s expression of Thomism. The hope of the present study is to show the relevance of Maritain’s philosophy of education at the level of praxis.

With the discussion on the key philosophical and spiritual influences in Maritain’s life behind us, I now introduce Maritain’s work in the area of educational philosophy and the context out of which his writings on education evolved. Maritain’s writings on education reveal him to be a man who understood the significance of education primarily for the individual yet secondarily for the common good of society. It is no wonder that Maritain would examine the function of education in contemporary society, given his own educational experiences in France as a young man (Gallagher, 1987, p. 271).

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<sup>6</sup> Current information on the Jacques Maritain Center can be found at <http://www2.nd.edu/Departments/Maritain/ndjmc.htm>

<sup>7</sup> Current information on the Jacques Maritain International Institute can be found at <http://www.maritain.org/>

<sup>8</sup> Current information on the Canadian Maritain Association can be found at <http://www.geocities.com/cjma4acjm/>

Maritain recognized the crucial role educators play in the intellectual, spiritual, and moral formation of young people precisely because he saw his own educational formation as being limited by educators who denied the supernatural part of his being. Maritain remarked in the first chapter of *Education at the Crossroads* that human beings, including himself, are more than just physical entities but have "...a richer and nobler existences; he has a spiritual superexistence through knowledge and love" (p. 8). Maritain was an educator and student, whether formally or informally, for his entire life and by all accounts, he was a valued and respected teacher by both his colleagues and students (Dunaway, 1978, p. 87). As should be expected, Maritain's educational philosophy is a practical outreach of his metaphysics and epistemology. In keeping with the Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition, Maritain (1943) stated that "education is an *ethical* art (or rather a practical wisdom in which a determinate art is embodied) (p. 2).

### *Keywords*

Prior to my analysis of Maritain's comprehensive Catholic philosophy of education, it is crucial to define the following keywords are used in this thesis: *philosophy of education, Catholic philosophy of education, scholasticism, Thomism and neo-Thomism*. Various authors, both past and present, have interpreted a Catholic philosophy of education differently.

Frankena (1965a) distinguishes between a normative philosophy of education and an analytical philosophy of education. In his characterization of a normative philosophy of education, which we encounter in Maritain's work, Frankena (1965a) states that it "...consists of judgements or propositions about the ends or values at which the activity and process of education should aim, the principles they should respect or implement, the methods they should use, the curriculum to be followed, the kind of administration to be

adopted, etc.” (p. 3). In his essay *The Concept of Education Today*, Frankena (1973) explains that “...every activity of education can be represented by the following formula: in it X is fostering or seeking to foster in Y some disposition D by method M” (pp. 20-21). Therefore, the different normative philosophies of education from Plato to Maritain differ in what will be substituted for the variables.

Representing the Catholic tradition, Redden and Ryan (1956) offer a description of a philosophy of education that aids us in our understanding of the goal of a Catholic philosophy of education.

In its simple meaning, philosophy of education is the application of the fundamental principles of a philosophy of life to the work of education. These principles guide indispensably, or ought so to guide, educational theory and practice, aims and objectives, content and methods, educational psychology, teacher training, administration, and research. (p. 10)

Redden and Ryan’s (1956) definition is consistent with Frankena’s (1965a) but also makes the link between a person’s philosophy of human life with their philosophy of education. Consequently, in order for us to understand a Catholic philosophy of education, we must understand the Catholic philosophy of life. Furthermore, a Catholic philosophy of education applies fundamental Catholic principles of life to education; such as the belief in God as creator, the dignity of the human person, and the reality of sin. Therefore, we should expect Maritain’s philosophy of education to be consistent with the Catholic philosophy of life; expressed by the Thomistic tradition.

In his discussion on Catholic education, Mario D’Souza (2003) indicates that “the philosophical principles of Catholic education are not narrowly confessional; they are broadly pedagogical and therefore they can be of wide interest to a multicultural and

pluralist country like Canada” (p. 363). Subsequently, D’Souza (2003) understands that a Catholic philosophy of education will include both theological statements and philosophical principles inherited from the Catholic intellectual tradition (D’Souza, 2003, p. 373). It is clear that Maritain (1943) would agree with the above statement made by D’Souza (2003) because he also encouraged dialogue and cooperation between followers of various creeds in discussions related to education. Maritain argues that genuine cooperation between followers of different creeds is possible if the Christian philosophy of education is “...well founded and rationally developed” (p.7).

The references to the Catholic intellectual tradition refer specifically to the intellectual tradition of the scholastic philosophers. *Scholasticism* was an approach to education, developed around the eleventh century, with an emphasis on reason, logic, and argumentation in the service of the Catholic faith (Elias, 2002, p. 63). It is from this scholastic tradition that St. Thomas Aquinas emerges as one of the intellectual leaders of his time. In agreement with Carr et al. (1995), I assume here that a plausible Catholic philosophy of education will undoubtedly include some measure of *Thomism* (p. 163). As such, Catholic philosophy of education aims to present “a synthesis of teachings, derived from faith and reason that could form the basis of Catholic education” (Elias, 1999, p. 95). Both Redden and Ryan (1956) and D’Souza (2003) recognize that we must derive sound pedagogical theory from a Catholic philosophy of education. It is the case, however, that not all those working and writing in the area of Catholic education understand the phrase *Catholic philosophy of education* in the same way.

The term *Thomism* is broadly used above to refer to all the philosophical ideas advanced by those men and women who claim a philosophical allegiance to the work of St. Thomas Aquinas (Carr, Haldane, & McLaughlin, 1995, p. 164). In Maritain’s (1931)

own words, "Thomism claims to make use of reason to distinguish truth from falsehood: it does not want to destroy, but to purify modern speculation and to integrate all the truth that has been discovered since the time of St. Thomas" (p. 11). What then is the difference between *Thomism* and *Neo-Thomism*?

Maritain has been recognized by numerous authors and authorities in the area of philosophy as one of the most influential, consistent, and sophisticated neo-Thomists (Gallagher, 1987; McCool, 1978; O'Malley, 1944; Redpath, 1987; Wiles, 2004). McCool (1994) explains that the title *neo-Thomist* is applied to Jacques Maritain because he is associated with "...the movement in philosophy and theology which assumed a leading place in Catholic thought in the latter portion of the nineteenth century and retained its dominance until the middle of the twentieth" (p. 1). Furthermore, McCool (1994) indicates that the aim of the neo-Thomistic movement was to recover the "authentic thought" of St. Thomas Aquinas (p. 1). In their attempt to recover the philosophical thought of Aquinas, neo-Thomists address three fundamental themes in their writing: the nature of knowledge, the nature of human beings and their relationship to society, and the nature of the universe and God. In terms of utilizing a philosophical approach originating in the eleventh century, Maritain (1931) insists that Thomists, including himself, "...make no claim to include anything of the past in the present, but to maintain in the present the 'actuality' of the eternal" (p. 10). Therefore, Maritain's stated intention was not to stifle the growth of philosophical inquiry, but to resurrect the eternal truths espoused by Aquinas, which transcend time and culture.

Although various authors describe Maritain as the intellectual leader of the neo-Thomistic movement, the term *neo-Thomist* did not appeal to Maritain because he viewed himself as a Thomist (Kernan, 1975, p. 44). In his preface to *St. Thomas Aquinas: Angel*

*of the Schools*, Maritain (1931) emphatically states “there is a Thomist philosophy, there is no neo-Thomist philosophy” (p. 10). Also, in *Existence and the Existent: An Essay on Christian Existentialism*, Maritain (1958) emphatically denies that he is a neo-Thomist (p. 11). It is ironic that history has associated Maritain with a term that he himself did not accept as an appropriate label for his philosophical enterprise. For Maritain, he saw no difference between *Thomism* and *Neo-Thomism*.

#### *Influence of Thomism on Catholic Education*

There is a recurring theme of growth and decline within the history of Thomism and its influence on Catholic education (see Appendix A). During his lifetime, Maritain witness to the growth and decline of classical neo-Thomism (McCool, 1978, p. 385). Leo XIII’s Encyclical, *Aeterni Patris (On the Restoration of Christian Philosophy)*, published in 1879, is generally understood to be the Roman Catholic Church’s official endorsement of neo-Thomism. Aquinas’s thought was once again at the forefront of Catholic philosophy and theology. Subsequently, Pope Pius XI’s 1929 Encyclical *Divini Illius Magistri (On Christian Education)* laid the foundation for a truly Christian education rooted in the scholastic tradition and attacked certain aspects of progressive education. Maritain (1943), too, is critical of progressive philosophies of education that promote a pragmatic and instrumentalist theory of knowledge that conform the ends of education to social trends (pp. 13, 17). By the 1930s, neo-Thomism had gained significant recognition in North America (McCool, 1992, p. 51). Clearly, *Divini Illius Magistri* promotes a distinctive Catholic philosophy of education rooted in the philosophy of Aquinas. Hence, “the true Christian, product of Christian education, is the supernatural man who thinks, judges and acts constantly and consistently in accordance with right reason illumined by the supernatural light of the example and teaching of Christ” (Pius XI, 1929, ¶ 96).



Maritain's (1943) philosophy of education was therefore consistent with the prevailing approach to education endorsed by the Magisterium during the Papacy of Pius XI.

In his promotion of the supernatural end of the human person and subsequently of education, Pius XI (1929) emphasized the irrational methods associated with a naturalistic philosophy of education. By naturalistic philosophy of education, Pius XI is referring to a philosophy devoid of any belief in the supernatural; including the belief in the immortality of the soul.

Every method of education founded, wholly or in part, on the denial or forgetfulness of original sin and of grace, and relying on the sole powers of human nature, is unsound. Such, generally speaking, are those modern systems bearing various names which appeal to a pretended self-government and unrestrained freedom on the part of the child, and which diminish or even suppress the teacher's authority and action, attributing to the child an exclusive primacy of initiative, and an activity independent of any higher law, natural or divine, in the work of his education. (Pius XI, 1929, ¶ 60)

Maritain, in agreement with the philosophical foundation of the 1929 encyclical, also takes issue with some of the methods endorsed by progressive and naturalistic education. It is apparent that, although Pius XI (1929) does not specifically mention Dewey, he is attacking the negative consequences of the pragmatic philosophy of education. Maritain (1943) remarks that pragmatism's approach to "...human thought as an organ of response to the actual stimuli and situations of the environment..." will "...cause minds to distrust the very idea of truth and wisdom, and to give up any hope of inner dynamic unity" (pp. 13,14). Maritain's concerns regarding education and the

growing appeal of pragmatism and instrumentalism in the twentieth century are the primary motivations for *Education at the Crossroads*.

Elias (2002) describes the 1929 encyclical as “excessively dualistic” while the encyclical from the Second Vatican Council is positively described as “...taking a more positive attitude toward human culture and the human person, a more integrated approach to faith and knowledge, and a less rigid supernaturalism” (p. 199). Although, Elias (2002) characterizes *Divini Illius Magistri* as Thomistic and the *Declaration on Christian Education* as evidence of the development of a new framework for Catholic education (post-Thomistic), I suggest that Maritain himself would have found some aspects of the 1929 encyclical troubling. Maritain insisted on endorsing the best ideas contemporary culture had to offer and he was not quick to judge modern approaches to education as necessarily contradictory to Thomism.

Maritain’s entire philosophical enterprise sought to eliminate the dichotomies between rationalism and empiricism, idealism and realism, traditionalism and progressivism, faith and reason, and intellect and intuition. Richard P. McBrien’s (1994) characterization of Catholicism is most helpful here to aid in our understanding of, what seems to be, contrasting positions held by various philosophers and theologians within the Catholic tradition.

Catholicism is characterized, therefore, by a both/and rather than an either/or approach. It is not nature *or* grace, but graced nature; not reason *or* faith, but reason illumined by faith; not law *or* Gospel, but law inspired by the Gospel; not Scripture *or* tradition, but normative tradition within Scripture; not faith *or* works, but faith issuing in works and works as expressing of faith; not authority *or*

freedom, but authority in the service of freedom; not unity *or* diversity, but unity in diversity. In a word, Catholicism is *catholic*. (p. 17)

Clearly, Maritain identifies with the universal aspect of Catholic faith tradition, as is implied by the word “catholic”. Maritain rejected the either/or approach in philosophy and instead developed a philosophical system that embraced the both/and approach that he found in Thomism.

I contend that Maritain’s philosophy of education is largely consistent with the *Declaration on Christian Education* developed during the Second Vatican Council.

Regarding the 1965 *Declaration on Christian Education*, Elias (2002) states that

the declaration showed an interest in all forms of education, not only Catholic education. It affirmed the rights of all individuals to an education to prepare them for life in the world and for their ultimate end. This education should utilize the advances of psychology and pedagogy in order to promote a proper sense of responsibility and freedom. In addressing the social goal of education the statement broadened the goals of Catholic education to include not only that students worship God properly as mature persons in the faith but also that they help in the Christian formation of the world and work for the good of the whole society. (p. 207)

According to Elias (2002), “the pluralism which marks Catholic theology today is matched by the pluralism in approaches to Catholic educational theory which has developed in the post Second Vatican Council era” (p. 205). However, despite Elias’s (2002) contention that for neo-Thomists the advent of the Second Vatican Council would signal a change in the Catholic Church’s approach to the philosophy of education (pp. 191-201), it seems that Maritain would appreciate much of what is included in the

*Declaration on Christian Education.* The Council's *Declaration on Christian Education* is described by Elias (2002) as broadening the scope of Catholic education by encouraging a dialogue with modern thought. Accordingly, "children and young people must be helped, with the aid of the latest advances in psychology and the arts and science of teaching, to develop harmoniously their physical, moral and intellectual endowments" (Pope Paul VI, 1965, ¶ 1).

We know that Maritain valued much of what contemporary educational theories, science, and psychology had to say about educational methods. The experiential approach, for example, is endorsed by Thomism and Maritain (1962) as an important avenue for developing the intellect (pp. 44-82). Finally, in his essay *Truth and Human Fellowship*, Maritain (1961) insisted that intellectual justice is possible between persons who advocate different philosophical positions (p. 28). Accordingly, for Maritain (1961), "if we do not *love* the thought and intellect of another as intellect and thought, how shall we take pains to discover what truths are conveyed by it while it seems to us defective or misguided..." (p. 29). It is true that the tone of Pope Paul VI's (1965) *Declaration on Christian Education* is much less scholastic and more tolerant of secular education than the one written by Pope Pius XI (1929).

According to Redpath (1987), "the greatness of Jacques Maritain lies precisely in his being the premier Scholastic theologian of the twentieth century, just as the greatness of Saint Thomas Aquinas lies in his being the premier Scholastic theologian of the thirteenth century" (p. 98). Unfortunately, for a variety of complex reasons, the popularity of neo-Thomism has declined and is no longer as authoritative in Catholic education as it once was (see D'Souza, 2003; Elias, 1999 & 2002; Haldane, 2004; Kelty, 1999; Veverka, 1993). Although I am hesitant to accept that neo-Thomism has

disappeared from the collective memory of Catholic educators, it is clear that explicit references to this philosophical tradition may not be included in the *Catholic School Graduate Expectations* or the most recent *Curriculum Policy Document for Religious Education* for Catholic Schools. However, various neo-Thomistic themes expressed in Maritain's philosophy of education still permeate a significant portion of our educational goals and expectations. This lack of an explicit appeal to theoretical and practical reason and the search for truth in the curriculum expectations is troublesome because, as I will argue, Maritain's philosophy of education (as representative of neo-Thomism) has much to offer both Catholic educators and the wider educational community. McBrien (1994) notes that, the Thomist understanding of the human person, in contrast to that of Augustine, continues to be an influential force in Catholic theology (p. 135).

At this stage, it would be irresponsible of me to leave the impression that neo-Thomism was or a unified philosophical movement. Philosophers working and writing in the tradition of St. Thomas Aquinas offer their own unique interpretations of his philosophy; therefore, we must admit that pluralism exists even within neo-Thomism (McCool, 1994, p. 56). However, this fact should not deter us from examining the areas of congruency and the unity within this tradition, as it applies to the philosophy of education. In the spirit of Maritain, who often made use of paradoxes in his arguments<sup>9</sup>, this pluralism exists within a unity.

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<sup>9</sup> Maritain (1943) paradoxically argues in *Education at the Crossroads*, that the main paradox can be formulated as follows: "what is the most important in education is not the job of education, and still less that of learning" (p. 22). Furthermore, Maritain (1943) writes that "neither intuition nor love is a matter of training and learning, they are gift and freedom [and] in spite of all that, education should be primarily concerned with them" (p. 23). Maritain resolves this paradox by differentiating between two spheres of education: 1) education sphere, which includes education by the family, school and church and 2) the extra educational sphere, which includes education through work, friendships, social customs, law etc. (pp. 24-25).

Despite the intricate diversity that may be found between the various neo-Thomistic philosophers, numerous points of unity distinguish a neo-Thomistic philosophy of education. Although St. Thomas Aquinas did not write extensively on education (Elias, 2002, p. 61), the themes in his philosophy, especially his view of the human person as composed of both body and a rational soul with a supernatural destiny, heavily influenced Maritain's Catholic philosophy of education (see Elias, 2002, pp. 201-205). Interestingly, Elias (2002) states that "from the point of view of educational theory Thomas's ideas on education are less important than the use that others made of his entire system of thought in developing the neo-Thomism or Neo-Scholasticism of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries" (p. 61). Maritain contributed significantly to the neo-Thomistic movement and, more specifically, to Catholic educational philosophy (Elias, 2002, p. 201).

Maritain's philosophy of education (1943) seeks to restore our appreciation for the integrity of the human intellect and our love of truth (p. 36). Maritain insists that the role of the school, as part of the educational sphere, is to prepare the young person's intellect for knowledge (p. 22), which includes religious knowledge. In his essay entitled "Thomist Views on Education," Maritain (1962) questions any school education that destroys students' religious convictions and their sense of the Absolute.

As long as the teaching as a whole, in the high school as in college, is permeated with a general philosophy which relies only on sense experience and facts and figures, disintegrates reason and denies its proper perceptive power and the most valuable certainties of which the human intellect is capable – and the first of which is the rational knowledge of God's existence; as long as chaotic information is cultivated in the place of integrated knowledge and spiritual unity, the very soil

and natural background on which religious convictions may thrive in youth will remain rough and barren. (p. 81)

It is clear, given the above statement, that Maritain's philosophy of education, inspired by the Thomistic view of the human person, is fundamentally distinct from the view of the human person advanced by logical positivists or secular humanists. It is hard to imagine that Maritain is not referencing his own early educational experiences in describing the dangers associated with antimetaphysical prejudices. In the opening chapter of *Education at the Crossroads*, Maritain (1962) identifies seven misconceptions in the educational thought of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. The seven misconceptions specifically relate to the task of education in schools within the educational sphere and include: 1) a disregard of ends, 2) false ideas concerning the end, 3) pragmatism, 4) sociologism, 5) intellectualism, 6) voluntarism, and 7) everything can be learned (pp. 2-24). Maritain (1943) is frustrated with educational theorists who too often favour science, psychology, pragmatism, and who restrict education to its methodology (pp. 40-41).

Although Aquinas did not compose a unified educational theory, Maritain works with the relevant themes in Aquinas's philosophy to develop a systematic neo-Thomistic philosophy of Catholic education (Elias, 2002, p. 61). In his book, *Education at the Crossroads*, Maritain identifies specific goals for education and various methods to achieve them. Maritain's conception of humanity is a humanist one informed by Christian theology. Although Maritain is not shy in stating his disdain for some educational philosophies, such as pragmatism, which disregard the proper aims of education and the spiritual aspects of the person, he is not naïve or unwilling to dialogue with the proponents of these philosophies. For Valentine (2004) and numerous other authors (Carr et al., 1995; Gallagher & Gallagher, 1962; Haldane, 2004; McCool, 1978),

Maritain's value lies in the fact that he "was the kind of thinker who could recognize the strengths of contemporary educational methods, while at the same time anticipating their problems" (p. 77).

In his observations of current social trends, Maritain contends that "the great danger which threatens modern societies is a weakening of the sense of truth" (Maritain, 1961, p. 8). In the spirit of the Old Testament prophets, Maritain's (1943) educational philosophy seeks to restore a "love for knowing the truth" (p. 36) in young people. In the words of Maritain (1943), "no tricks can do that, no set of techniques, but only personal attention to the inner blossoming of the rational nature and then confronting that budding reason with a system of rational knowledge" (p. 43). Although Maritain wrote on education over sixty years ago, there are numerous parallels between the educational realities of his time and our own, which I will draw out later on. For this reason, I argue that Maritain's discourse on education is especially relevant to Catholic schools in Ontario.

Ward (1978) appropriately states that the historical context out of which Maritain does the majority of his philosophizing is of crucial importance to understanding his interpretation of Aquinas (p. 503). The purpose of this chapter was threefold: first, to highlight a few of the important philosophical and religious influences in Maritain's life out of which his philosophy of education emerges; second, to define keywords related to Maritain's philosophy of education; and third, to situate Maritain's philosophy of education within the Thomist philosophical tradition. We cannot question the significant influence made by Maritain in Catholic philosophical circles. This influence continues today, as is evident after viewing the activities of the *American Maritain Association* as well as the *Canadian Jacques Maritain Association*. Conferences are being planned and



new publications are being produced, indicating that Maritain's philosophical enterprise is still making an impact today.

## Chapter Three

### *Frankena's Model*

As stated earlier, the aim of this thesis is first to explicate Jacques Maritain's philosophy of education and second to identify the implications of this philosophy for Catholic schools in Ontario today. To assist in my explication and evaluation of Maritain's ideas, I use Frankena's (1965a) model for analyzing a normative philosophy of education. In the words of Frankena (1974), "one cannot analyze it to see just what it says in any systematic way until one has analyzed it to see just what it says and what its arguments are" (p. 140).

This chapter will be divided into three parts. First, I offer a few preliminary remarks on Frankena's conception of "education" and his understanding of the "philosophy of education." Second, I describe Frankena's (1965a) model for analyzing a normative philosophy of education. Finally, I consider two unique challenges posed by Maritain's philosophy of education as they relate to the application of Frankena's (1965a) model for evaluating a normative philosophy of education. Two sources, both published by Frankena in 1965, have been utilized to aid in my representation of Frankena's model: first, Frankena's (1965a) *Philosophy of Education* in which he examines the educational philosophies of Maritain, Dewey, and Whitehead; and second, Frankena's (1965b) *Three Historical Philosophies of Education: Aristotle, Kant, Dewey*.

Although I initially had some reservations regarding the appropriateness of Frankena's model for analyzing a religious philosophy of education, I have since come to accept that his model is more than appropriate for the purpose of this thesis for the following reasons. First, an initial reading of L.B. Lanctot's (1995) and D.A. VanPelt's (2002) master's theses, which both utilize Frankena's (1965) model to analyze the

educational philosophies of John George Althouse and Charlotte Mason, indicates that Frankena's model has been used to examine both secular (Althouse) and religious (Mason) philosophies of education. Second, according to Frankena (1965a) any complete normative philosophy of education may be analyzed using his model because each include statements about the aims of education, definitions of education, teaching and learning, empirical evidence to support the aims, and epistemological and metaphysical claims (pp. 4-10). Finally, Frankena (1965a & 1965b) himself analyzes a variety of different philosophies of education from Aristotle to Dewey, including Maritain.

Frankena (1965a & 1965b), Lanctot (1995) and VanPelt (2002) have no reservations about analyzing religious and non-religious philosophies of education with one conceptual model. I, too, will utilize Frankena's model to explicate Maritain's philosophy of education with the hope of determining if his philosophy of education is relevant for today's Catholic schools and whether or not his approach offers Catholic educators a reasonable alternative to the current trends towards relativistic attitudes among students and trends towards an increase in accountability and outcome-based learning.

Education, according to Frankena (1965a) involves "the transmission or acquisition of excellences (desirable abilities, habits, states, traits, etc.) by the use of techniques like instruction, training, studying, practice, guidance, discipline, etc." (p. 5). Frankena (1965a) uses the term "excellences" as well as "dispositions" in his discussions of what education should foster in students. Furthermore, Frankena (1965b) explains that the acquisition of desirable dispositions has both individual and social implications (p. 4). Through education and the transmission of desirable dispositions, we are in a position to live the "good life" and realize the common good. Although education plays a crucial

role in transmitting excellences, Frankena (1965b)—in agreement with Maritain—indicates that “the cultivation of excellences is only part of the human problem because more is needed for the life and well-being of an individual or society than the mere possession of certain abilities and traits (p. 1). The “more” for Maritain (1943) includes God’s gift of intuition and love, which cannot be taught in schools (p. 23).

Frankena (1965a) defines the discipline of education as “...the *field* or *subject* that studies and reflects on all of these and seeks to build up a body of knowledge and theory—descriptive, predictive, explanatory, or normative—about them, which may then be taught to teachers and school administrators...” (p. 2). Furthermore, Frankena (1965a) distinguishes among three disciplines of education (1) Descriptive, (2) Normative, and (3) Analytical. Frankena’s (1965) distinction among these three disciplines of education is important to my own study of Maritain’s philosophy of education and requires a few comments on my part.

The first dimension of education is the descriptive dimension. Under the descriptive and/or explanatory dimension, Frankena includes facts and theories related to the activity and process of education. Frankena (1965a) also indicates that the descriptive dimension of the discipline of education may include religious conceptions of human nature that are, by definition, non-empirical (p. 3). Frankena (1965a) notes that Maritain’s convictions on the activity and process of education are “...supplemented by certain nonempirical or non-scientific conceptions of man and the world drawn from metaphysics or theology” (p. 3). It is important to note that, despite the fact that Maritain’s convictions on human nature may be considered non-empirical or non-scientific, this does not mean that they are not reasonable or coherent. Frankena (1965a)

clearly views the philosophy of education as primarily related to moral and social philosophy and only secondarily related to epistemology and metaphysics (p. 3).

The second dimension, referred to by Frankena (1965a) as the normative dimension, “consists of judgments or propositions about the ends or values at which the activity and process of education should aim, the principles they should respect or implement, the methods they should use, the curriculum to be followed, the kind of administration to be adopted, etc.” (p. 3). Accordingly, a normative philosophy of education will typically include three types of statements, and depending on the type of philosophy, possibly a fourth category. Frankena (1965b) identifies the following as the conceptual elements of a complete normative philosophy of education.

1. A list of dispositions or excellences to be cultivated, with definitions,
2. A statement of the basic ends or principles taken as normative *premises*,
  - a. for showing why these dispositions should be cultivated (or that they are excellences),
  - b. for showing what is to be done or not done in cultivating them,
3. Factual *premises*, empirical, philosophical, or theological,
  - a. for showing what dispositions are excellent and to be cultivated,
  - b. for showing what is to be done, and how, in order to cultivate these excellences,
4. Normative *conclusions* about what to do, and how and when, in cultivating them. (p. 11)

Normative philosophies of education will, no doubt, include a vast array of statements covering a wide philosophical spectrum. The normative statements inherent in a philosophy of education involve judgements about what is valuable and desirable in

education. For this reason, Frankena (1965a) indicates that the “most fruitful way of thinking about the philosophy of education is to think of it as a part or offshoot of moral and social philosophy, as Plato, Aristotle, and even Dewey did” (p. 2). Frankena (1965b) discusses in significant detail in *Three Historical Philosophies of Education: Aristotle, Kant, Dewey*, Aristotle’s *politike* (encompasses Aristotle’s *politics* and *ethics*) of which education was considered a practical science (p. 17).

Aristotle conceived of education as a practical science because it “...employs the “deliberate” part of our reason and seeks a kind of knowledge, but its end is action or “doing” (not “making”) and so it seeks knowledge in relation to desire or as a guide to conduct” (p. 18). Given Maritain’s (1943) adherence to the Aristotelian-Thomistic philosophical tradition, it is no surprise that he also considered philosophy of education to be an offshoot of moral and social philosophy precisely because education itself “is an *ethical art*” (p. 2) aimed at “...the conquest of internal and spiritual freedom...through knowledge and wisdom, good will, and love” (p. 11).

I was initially concerned with Frankena’s (1965a) claim that “questions about the aims, methods, kinds, programs, and administration of education are primarily questions of moral and social philosophy, and only secondarily related to epistemology and metaphysics” (p. 2). I was concerned because metaphysical and epistemological premises permeate every area of Maritain’s philosophy of education. Although Maritain (1943) argues that questions about the aims of education *are* primarily questions related to metaphysics and epistemology, he does not mean that the discipline of education is related to metaphysics or epistemology proper (pp. 6-7). Ultimately, Frankena’s conception of education is in keeping with Aristotle and subsequently Maritain’s own conception of education, which strongly emphasizes the normative dimension.


Although Maritain's philosophy of education emphasizes the normative dimension of a philosophy of education, he does make use of the analytical dimension, which includes "...the logical or philosophical analysis of concepts, statements, arguments, methods, and theories" (p. 3). Therefore, the philosophy of education, as Frankena (1965a) conceives of it, consists of the normative judgments and conceptual analysis (p. 4). Finally, I concur with Frankena's (1965a) classification of Maritain's philosophy of education as a normative one given the fact that Maritain views education as the promotion of certain excellences (p. 13).

#### *Description of the Model*

Let us now turn to a detailed description of Frankena's (1965) model. Frankena's model is divided into five key steps: 1) Identify the desired dispositions or excellences; 2) Identify the more general aims and values that will produced by the desired dispositions; 3) Identify other metaphysical or epistemological premises used to justify the desired dispositions; 4) Identify the methods and means proposed to achieve the dispositions; and 5) Identify the evidence used to support the proposed methods. Frankena visualizes his normative philosophy of education as having two "parts".

Ultimately, in Frankena's (1965a) schema, a normative philosophy of education will include a "philosophical" element and a "practical" element (p. 8). The "philosophical" element is represented by the three boxes in Figure 1. In Box A, Frankena includes the basic normative principles regarding the aims and goals of education. It is important to note that these basic normative principles are considered by Frankena to be logically required: no normative conclusions can be made without these statements. Box B includes any other premises used to justify the list of "dispositions" outlined in Box C. The premises that appear in Box B, unlike those in Box A are not

logically required. Finally, included in Box C is the list of excellences or desirable “dispositions” to be fostered in the student.



*Figure 1:* Box A, B, and C correspond to the “Philosophical” element of Frankena’s model for analyzing a normative philosophy of education.


At this point, it is important to note that Frankena (1965b) is referring to the broader conception of “dispositions” as including: “beliefs, knowledges, skills, habits, traits, values, etc.” (p. 20). More specifically, Frankena (1973) explains that “qualities of personality like charm, traits of character like benevolence, skills like knowing how to dance, and states like having knowledge of the kings of Britain—different as these are, they are all dispositions in my sense and presumably excellences as well (p. 3). Finally, as Frankena advises his own readers, any subsequent references to “dispositions” made in this study are in keeping with Frankena’s conception.

The practical element of Frankena’s model is represented by the three boxes in Figure 2. The practical element includes concrete recommendations on the means and methods necessary to produce the excellences (desirable dispositions) outlined in Box C.



In Box D, Frankena includes factual statements to justify the normative conclusions in Box E. Box E, therefore, includes recommendations on what should be practically achieved through education, in order to foster the dispositions outlined in Box C.

Frankena (1965a) appropriately notes that “much of the character of a philosophy of education depends on the nature and context of the statements it includes *and makes use of* in B and D” (p. 9).



*Figure 2:* Boxes C, D, and E correspond to the “Practical” Element of Frankena’s model for analyzing a normative philosophy of education.

A few comments are required in order to fully understand the model that Frankena is proposing. First, the complete model is represented by the diagram shown in Figure 3. Frankena’s model is, I believe, flexible enough to allow for a vast variety of normative philosophies of education to be explicated using this schema. A philosopher of education may utilize the complete model, which would produce a systematic and entire philosophy

of education as shown in Figure 3. On the other hand a philosopher may choose to develop the first half of the model and leave the practical application of the philosophical statements to others. A third option for the philosopher of education would be to take an already existing set of dispositions and develop the practical application of this existing philosophy of education. The dotted lines indicate that the premises in Box A and B may be used to arrive at conclusions in Box E.

### *Application of the Model*

Both Frankena (1965b) and Maritain (1943) recognize the ambiguous nature of the term “education” (p. 6 & pp. 1-2). We should be concerned with the fact that Frankena’s model of education, although it may fit the views of Aristotle, Kant, and Dewey, poses two unique challenges for the current study on Maritain’s philosophy of education. These two challenges have an impact on how I address Maritain’s philosophy of education using Frankena’s (1965a) model for analyzing a normative philosophy of education. My purpose here is to briefly identify these two unique challenges prior to my more detailed explication of Maritain’s philosophy of education.

First, Maritain has a unique understanding of the role of schools in education. Frankena (1965a) asserts that the dispositions in Box C may be divided, as Aristotle divided them, into moral and intellectual dispositions and for this reason education is often divided into intellectual and moral education (p. 5). Given that Maritain was inspired by the Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition, it is no surprise that, he too, divides dispositions into intellectual and moral dispositions and/or excellences. I suggest that the distinction between intellectual and moral education is at the heart of the problem as it relates to applicability of Frankena’s Model to Maritain’s philosophy of education. First, Maritain (1943) does not consider the school to be responsible for transmitting all of the

desirable “dispositions” necessary for a person’s complete intellectual and moral formation (p. 25). Second, the educational sphere (which includes the school) is primarily concerned with preparation of the intellect and the will (Maritain, 1943, p. 25).

Frankena (1965b) explains that education may include the following:

- (1) the *activity of educating* carried on by teachers, schools, and parents (or by oneself),
- (2) the *process of being educated* (or learning) which goes on in the pupil or child,
- (3) the *result*, actual or intended, of (1) and (2),
- (4) the *discipline* or field of enquiry that studies or reflects on (1), (2), and (3) and is taught in schools of education. (p. 6)

What is consistent in all four of the characterizations of education identified by Frankena (1965b) is that all four address education in schools as institutions of formal learning. A problem arises when we attempt to transfer Frankena’s normative model for analyzing a philosophy of education, which is designed to explicate a philosophy of education as it relates to school education, to Maritain’s philosophy of education, which includes both a broad view of education and a narrow view of education. Education, as conceptualized by Maritain (1943), includes the following three aspects:

- (1) any process whatsoever by means of which man is shaped and led toward fulfillment (education in its broadest sense), or
- (2) to the task of formation which adults intentionally undertake with regard to youth, or,
- (3) in its strictest sense, to the special task of schools and universities. (p. 10)




Figure 3: Frankena's complete model for analyzing a normative philosophy of education.

Maritain addresses all three of the above connotations associated with the term "education" in *Education at the Crossroads*. Maritain's ideas on the role and nature of education, cited above, is significant because in my explication of Maritain's philosophy of education, it is necessary to distinguish between the aims of education in the broadest sense (extra-educational sphere) and the aims of education in the narrow sense (schools) in order to make sense of Maritain's entire approach to education. I follow Frankena's (1965a) model; however, to account for the two spheres or conceptions of education I discuss the distinction between the aim and purpose of education in the extra-educational

sphere and the aim and purpose of education in the educational sphere as it relates specifically to education in schools.

Second, it is challenging to transfer Maritain's normative philosophy of education into Frankena's (1965a) model because Frankena does not explicate his own analytical model completely. The "Box C challenge" that I defined in Chapter One entails the classification of the dispositions and excellences included in Box C of Frankena's model into two areas (intellectual and moral) to more fully appreciate Maritain's philosophy of education. In both of Frankena's (1965a & 1965b) articulations of the model Box C includes the dispositions/excellences that students are supposed to acquire throughout their educational career. Frankena (1965a) states that "education is the transmission or acquisition of excellences (desirable abilities, habits, states, traits, etc.) by the use of techniques like instruction, training, studying, practice, guidance, discipline, etc." (p. 5). Therefore, when we apply Frankena's (1965a) "model" to Maritain, he would surely include the capacity of theoretical and practical reason that comes to Box C through Boxes A and B. But Box C would also include other dispositions, values, and attitudes that the student acquires during their schooling, which come to Box C through Boxes D and E.

Frankena's (1965a) model for analyzing a normative philosophy of education is helpful for my explication of Maritain's philosophy of education despite the challenge identified by Maritain's distinction between two education spheres. Frankena's insistence that "we must have a general scheme or model which will help us in analyzing, resynthesizing, and evaluating it, for the form and structure of a philosophy of education is not always made obvious by its author's mode of presentation" (p. 5) rings true in the case of Maritain's ideas on education. With an understanding of some of the intricacies

of Frankena's (1965a) model for analyzing a normative philosophy of education, and the specific challenges raised by Maritain's conception of education, I now attempt to outline in more detail Maritain's philosophy of education.

## Chapter Four

### *The “Philosophical” Element (Boxes A, B, and C) of Maritain’s Philosophy of Education*

A significant portion of Jacques Maritain’s life was dedicated to educating and philosophizing about schools and education in general. During what has become known as the Third Scholasticism (refer to Appendix A), Maritain articulated a distinctive Catholic philosophy of education that would remain rather influential until the Second Vatican Council. With an understanding of Maritain’s relevant life experiences (Chapter Two) and Frankena’s (1965a) model for analyzing a *normative* philosophy of education (Chapter Three), I now focus on explicating Maritain’s Catholic philosophy of education utilizing Frankena’s (1965a) model for analyzing a *normative* philosophy of education. As previously mentioned, the primary sources for Maritain’s philosophy of education include his 1943 work, *Education at the Crossroads*, in conjunction with a collection of Maritain’s (1962) essays collected in *The Education of Man*; edited by Donald and Idella Gallagher.

You will recall that Maritain’s philosophy of education encompasses two spheres of influence: 1) the educational sphere and 2) the extra-educational sphere (Maritain, 1943, pp. 24-25). Given the importance of this distinction for understanding the role of the school in education, my treatment of Maritain’s Catholic philosophy of education addresses the distinct role of both spheres of influence. However, given the specific purpose of this thesis, I focus more heavily on the role of the school within the educational sphere. Maritain’s philosophy of education entails both a “philosophical” element and a “practical” element. In relation to the “philosophical” element, Frankena (1965a) allocates Boxes A, B, and C, which encompass a higher level of reasoning or theoretical and philosophical element of a philosophy of education (p. 8, refer also to

Figure 1). The “practical” element of Frankena’s (1965a) model is represented by Boxes C, D, and E (p. 8, refer also to Figure 2). As we should expect, the practical elements of Maritain’s normative philosophy of education emerge from his philosophical arguments. Consequently, given the nature of Frankena’s model, this chapter, focusing on Maritain’s conception of education delivered in schools, is divided into two parts: Part A) Normative premises, which include the aim of education in the school (Box A); and Part B) Other Premises, which include both metaphysical and epistemological statements (Box B). For a complete representation of Frankena’s model for analyzing a normative philosophy of education refer to Figure 3.

My hope, in this present chapter, is to illuminate the “philosophical” element of Maritain’s philosophy of education, as it relates specifically to schools, while commenting briefly on the role of education in the broader sense, in order to determine if his conception of education can enrich the curriculum in Ontario’s publicly funded Catholic schools.

#### *Normative Premises (Box A)*

*Maritain’s conception of education.* Interestingly, Maritain does not explicitly define *education* in any of his writings (Joseph, 1966, p. 13.). Perhaps Maritain (1943) refrains from offering a concise definition of *education* precisely because “the educational task is both greater and more mysterious and, in a sense, humbler than many imagine” (p. 4). Maritain does indicate that the term *education* is used to represent “...any process whatsoever by means of which man is shaped and led toward fulfillment (education in its broadest sense), or to the task of formation which adults intentionally undertake with regard to youth, or, in its strictest sense, to the special task of schools and universities” (p. 2). As indicated by this three-part conception of education, Maritain is



articulating his understanding of a broad view of education and a more specific view of education in schools<sup>10</sup>.

Maritain's (1943) broader view of education is one which aims at "...the conquest of internal and spiritual freedom to be achieved by the individual person, or, in other words, his liberation through knowledge and wisdom, good will, and love" (p. 11). Any process by which the human person is led towards fulfillment, which for Maritain "is inner and spiritual freedom" (p. 11), is an educational one in the broadest sense.

Maritain's notion of freedom in the above excerpt is not to be confused with only free will or freedom of physical movement. The spiritual freedom that Maritain speaks includes, of course, an inner conquest of being which is actualized as true and full freedom when people know God, love God, and recognize their dependence on God (Ward, 1978, pp. 511-512). Furthermore, only when the object of our knowledge, which is truth, is discovered can true liberation and freedom be known (Maritain, 1943, p. 11).

Maritain (1962) characterizes a liberated person as one who is equipped for truth, capable of rational judgment based on the evidence, enjoys beauty and truth for their own sake, and is advancing towards wisdom and an understanding of the divine (p. 48).

Furthermore, Maritain (1943) stresses that the liberated man or woman will act morally because "...no one is freer, or more independent, than the one who gives himself for a cause or a real being worthy of the gift" (p. 12). The liberated person is shaped by the moral virtues and as such, love will be the motivating force behind his or her decisions (Maritain, 1943, pp. 10-11). These are the aims of education in the broadest sense and I

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<sup>10</sup> Any subsequent references to a "school" education, includes elementary, secondary, and post-secondary institutions.

now turn my attention to the aims of education in the strictest sense: education in schools and universities.

In the first chapter of his book, *Education at the Crossroads*, Maritain (1943) examines seven misconceptions that he considers to be negatively influencing contemporary education in the first half of the twentieth century. The seven misconceptions outlined by Maritain include: 1) a disregard or ignorance of the ends of education; 2) false or mistaken ideas concerning the ends of education; 3) pragmatism; 4) sociologism; 5) intellectualism; 6) voluntarism; and finally 7) the notion that *everything* can be learned. Although Maritain is writing over sixty years ago, I argue more fully in Chapter Six that the seven misconceptions are still relevant to today's educational discourse. My purpose here, however, is only to clarify how the misconceptions outlined by Maritain speak directly to his understanding of the aims of a school education.

The first misconception mentioned by Maritain (1943) expresses his frustration that contemporary educators along with philosophers of education, for the most part, have fallen into the trap of disregarding or ignoring the proper aims of education (p. 3). One of the key features of a Thomistic philosophy of education, outlined by Carr et al. (1995) is that education is essentially goal-orientated or *teleological* (pp. 166-167). Maritain, as a Thomist, emphasizes the idea that human beings have a transcendent destiny and, therefore, the education of human beings must be properly understood in relation to its goal or *telos*.

Education, as a process, is conceived by Maritain (1943) as an *ethical* art and as such it tends toward several aims (pp. 2-3). Consequently, persons who educate young people without any aim or with the wrong aim in mind are like sailors without a compass; they are without direction. Maritain cautions us that in this directionless state "the child

is so well tested and observed, his needs so well detailed, his psychology so clearly cut out, the methods for making it easy for him everywhere so perfected, that the end of all these commendable improvements runs the risk of being forgotten or disregarded" (p. 3). Clearly, Maritain is critical of a narrow-minded focus on educational methods.

Contemporary education, according to Maritain (1943), just prior to the second half of the twentieth century has lost sense of its *telos*. More than sixty years after the publication of *Education at the Crossroads*, many educators and theorists are still so consumed by the methods and means of education that they fail to recognize its aims. It is important to note that Maritain is not rejecting those new educational methods that would assist in a child's education; however, he is critical of any approach to education that would allow for the supremacy of means over ends (p. 3).

The second misconception, outlined by Maritain, relates directly to the first misconception in that it also involves the aims/ends of education. Maritain articulates that "the second general error or misconception of education does not consist of an actual dearth of appreciation of the end but false or incomplete ideas concerning the nature of this end" (p. 4). With this statement, Maritain (1943) is critical of those involved in educating and theorizing about education who too often accept false ideas concerning the end/aim of education (p. 4). Maritain's frustration is born out of his observations that far too many educators and educational theorists misunderstand the authentic ends/aims of education (p. 4). In respect to those educators and theories that Maritain (1962) identifies as disregarding the authentic ends of education, Maritain includes the work of Spencer, Comte, Rousseau, Freud, Durkheim, Dewey, Wundt, and Emerson (p. 41). Maritain (1962) recognizes that each of the above named philosophers "worships a deity" (p. 41), however; whether the deity (end of education) is society, liberty, nature or the individual

these ends represent a fundamentally incorrect view of the human person and, therefore, an incorrect view of education and schooling.

*Primary aim of education.* Although the term *education* has various meanings and usages, Maritain (1943) primarily seeks to explicate the educational tasks of schools and universities. In this sense, a school education has a primary and secondary aim, as well as a practical aim. The primary aim of a school education, as articulated by Maritain, "...is to guide man [sic] in the evolving dynamism through which he shapes himself as a human person—armed with knowledge, strength of judgment, and moral virtues—while at the same time conveying to him the spiritual heritage of the nation and the civilization in which he is involved, and preserving in this way the century old achievements of generations" (p. 10). Maritain recognizes that human beings are "historical animals" (p. 2) and as such, are "...endowed with a knowing power that is unlimited..." (p. 2). However, the human person cannot be fully formed "...without being helped by collective experience previously accumulated and preserved, and by a regular transmission of acquired knowledge" (p. 2). Formation in Maritain's understanding relates to the acquisition of certain dispositions or excellences in the student. It is precisely because these desired dispositions are not innate that schools are so important.

It is clear, given Maritain's three-part representation of education, that education involves more than what takes place during our formal education in school; there are other obvious influences outside of the school during these years (i.e. church, our relationships with family and friends, as well as our work experiences). Maritain (1943) indicates, that a "school education itself has only a partial task, and this task is primarily concerned with knowledge and intelligence" (p. 26). Furthermore, Maritain states that,

“school and college education has its own world, which essentially consists of the dignity and achievements of knowledge and the intellect, that is, of the human beings root faculty” (p. 28). Ultimately, the school cannot be all things to all people and has a specific preparatory role in forming the young person at a specific point on his/her intellectual and spiritual journey.

Maritain’s conception of education is aligned with Aquinas who “...conceived man’s ‘end’ or ‘happiness’ in terms of perfecting his rational nature” (Goodrich, 1966, p. 167) and, therefore, in order to be fully human “...man must both develop his theoretical reason [sometimes referred to by Maritain as speculative reason] to acquire the intellectual ‘virtues’ of knowledge, and also his practical reason to discipline the passions into the moral virtues of living” (Goodrich, p. 167). What we have represented by this Thomistic conception of education is both an intellectual and practical educational philosophy. Ultimately, Maritain’s (1943) conception of the primary end of education is not a utilitarian conception, but is one determined by our very nature as rational beings. We all experience schooling for a specific number of years depending on our aspirations and abilities; however, Maritain (1943) wishes to emphasize that we are involved in education until our death and the schools are designed *only* to prepare a person for a lifelong engagement with education by developing theoretical and practical reason.

*Secondary aim of education.* While the primary aim of a school education is the attainment of knowledge and the strengthening of theoretical and practical reason, the secondary aim of education is to develop the social character of the human person (Maritain, 1943, p. 10) in order for them to play an essential role in the social life of their community. In his discussion on the social potentialities of the person, Maritain recognizes that human beings desire both internal and external freedom. Furthermore,

Maritain identifies the social aspect of human nature in his description of human beings as “political animals” (p. 14). Therefore, as Maritain states, “if man is a naturally political animal, this is so in the sense that society, required by nature, is achieved through free consent, and because the human person demands the communications of social life through the openness and generosity proper to intelligence and love...” (p. 14). Maritain describes the secondary aim of a school education as “shaping man to lead a normal, useful and cooperative life in the community, or guiding the development of the human person in the social sphere, awakening and strengthening both his sense of freedom and his sense of obligation and responsibility” (pp. 14-15).

Maritain recognizes the reciprocal relationship between the common good and the individual good. The social sphere is therefore necessary to aid the human person in reaching his/her full potential by awakening and strengthening both his/her sense of freedom and his/her sense of obligation and responsibility (Maritain, 1943, pp. 14-15). Furthermore, Maritain states that the social life “subordinates the individual to the common good, but always in order that the common good flow back upon the individuals, and that they enjoy the freedom of expansion or independence which is insured by the economic guarantees of labor and ownership, political rights, civil virtues, and the cultivation of the mind” (p. 14). The secondary essential aim of education, according to Maritain, is to strengthen the person’s sense of obligation and responsibility to others in the community (p. 15). Yet, despite the importance of preparing a citizen to live in community, Maritain repeatedly insists that “...we must never forget that personal freedom itself is at the core of social life, and that a human society is veritably a group of human freedoms which accept obedience and self-sacrifice and a common law for the

general welfare, in order to enable each of these freedoms to reach in everyone a truly human fulfillment” (p. 15).

For Maritain, society exists for human beings to ensure that they are able to reach human fulfillment and live the good life. Finally, Maritain (1943) insists “...that to be a good citizen and a man of civilization what matters above all is the inner center, the living source of personal conscience in which originate idealism and generosity, the sense of law and the sense of friendship, respect for others, but at the same time deep-rooted independence with regard to common opinion” (p. 16). Figuratively speaking, we must not “put the cart before the horse.”

*Practical aim of education.* Finally, the practical aim of education is a utilitarian one “which enables the youth to get a job and make a living” (Maritain, 1943, p. 10). It is the hope of all educators that students who leave school will achieve the good life, experience success and gain employment. However, despite Maritain’s recognition and inclusion of a practical aim of education, he does insist that “this practical aim is best provided by the general human capacities developed” (p. 10). The human capacities identified by Maritain as necessarily essential to support the practical aim are knowledge, moral judgment, and virtue (p.10). Maritain is realistic in asserting that one of the aims of education will surely be to make a living. The mistake, however, occurs when we usurp the primary aim with either the secondary aim or the practical aim.

Prior to Maritain’s (1943) summary of the aims of education, he sets forth to distinguish between the two conceptions of human nature; 1) the scientific idea of human nature as set out by logical positivism (ca 1943) and 2) the philosophical-religious idea of human nature as well as two aspects of the human being: 1) *personality* and 2) *individuality*. I consider these distinctions under the next section dealing with other

premises (i.e. metaphysical, epistemological, ontological, and/or religious) precisely because they represent a key part of his understanding of human nature and are appropriately presented within Box B of Frankena's (1965a) model (see Figure 3).

First, Maritain (1962) argues in his essay "Philosophy and Education" that education cannot be divorced from philosophy and specifically metaphysics and ontology because, in part, the human person is called to a supernatural end (p. 41-42, see also Maritain, 1943, p. 4). Maritain (1962) considers Catholic education to be a complete system, as opposed to those systems founded on a materialist mentality which only offer a one-sided education in favour of the naturalistic conception of the human person (p. 39). Although Maritain (1943) is open to dialogue and cooperation with other systems, they are deficient because they do not value the divine destiny of the human person. Maritain (1962) is confident that the only philosophical theory that can offer us a sound theory of education that can "...re-establish the real hierarchy of things, both human and divine, and to restore to spiritual and metaphysical values the priority that rightly belongs to them" (p. 41) is one built upon the principles of St. Thomas Aquinas. Central to Aquinas's philosophical system is a correct understanding of human nature and for Maritain, any philosophy of education that neglects this correct understanding of human nature is also neglecting the true end of education.

For Maritain (1943), our understanding of human nature has both an ontological implication and a scientific implication (pp. 4-5; see also 1962, p. 51). The ontological implication refers to the human person's essential being and the scientific implication refers to what can be observed and can be empirically known. Within his discussion on the scientific and philosophical-religious idea of man, Maritain (1943) makes the following comment in relation to education:



Now it is obvious that the purely scientific idea of man can provide us with invaluable and ever-growing information concerning the means and tools of education, but by itself it can neither primarily found nor primarily guide education, for education needs primarily to know what man *is* what is the nature of man and the scale of values it essentially involves; and the purely scientific ideal of man, because it ignores “being-as-such,” does not know such things, but only what emerges from the human being in the realm of sense observation and measurement. Young Tom, Dick, or Harry, who are the subjects of education, are not only a set of physical, biological, and psychological phenomena, the knowledge of which is moreover thoroughly needed and necessary; they are children of man... (p. 5)

In the above statement, Maritain is clear that he does not ignore the valuable contributions, made by psychology and science to the education of the child and the adolescent. What Maritain does criticize is the view that advances in science and psychology should be the sole resource for educational change. Educational change must be driven first by the ontological nature of the human person.

In relation to the second misconception—false ideas concerning the aims of education—Maritain (1943) identifies pragmatism as the third misconception facing contemporary education (pp. 12-15). Pragmatism, according to Maritain, is an erroneous theory because it does not allow for contemplation and human achievement, which is so vital in his understanding of human action and education (p. 4). Maritain argues that pragmatism fails when “...*the object to be taught and the primacy of the object* are forgotten, and when the cult of means—not to an end, but without an end—only ends up in a psychological worship of the subject” (p. 14). The object in this case is the body of

knowledge or truths to be taught (i.e. history or mathematics) and the subject refers to the student. Maritain is concerned with philosophies such as pragmatism because they place the total attention on the student and the object of knowledge becomes less and less central to education.

In addition, Maritain (1943) is critical of pragmatism because it reduces education to its means and fails to direct education to its proper aims. Not only does pragmatism fail to recognize the proper aims of education, it allows for changes to these aims. As Maritain states,

...the pragmatist theory can only subordinate and enslave education to the trends which may develop in collective life and society, for in the last analysis the aims newly arising in such a "reconstruction of ends" will only be determined by the precarious factors of the environment to be controlled and the values made at each moment predominant by given social conditions or tendencies or by the state. (pp. 17-18)

If the aims of education are determined by the particular whims of the state, we will be in danger of losing sight of the goal of education and subsequently the art of education. More is said about the pragmatic theory of knowledge in relationship to Maritain's own understanding of knowledge and truth in a later section on the factual statements in Maritain's philosophy of education.

Although the secondary aim—to convey a particular culture, to prepare a good citizen, to develop the virtues, and to prepare a person to perform family and social responsibilities—are essential, they are not *primary*. The primary aim of education is to assist the person in attaining spiritual perfection through the development of speculative and practical reason. We can also describe the primary aim of education is to assist in the

formation of a truly "human" person. Furthermore, the primary aim of education is dependent on Maritain's conception of the human person and is not subject to change. However, the secondary aim of education and the practical aim are subject to change, depending on new developments in educational methods, psychology and science (Maritain, 1962, p. 52). Maritain's Catholic philosophy of education is rooted in his understanding of the end of education; however, in order to get a clear picture of his philosophy of education, we must recognise the metaphysical and epistemological ideas out of which the ends of education are conceived and defended.

Maritain's (1943) discussion of the relationship between the individual and the social group, is given further expression in his discussion of the fourth error prevalent in contemporary education, which he identifies as sociologism (see pp. 15-18). The error of sociologism rests in defining education as one of social conditioning (Maritain, 1943, p. 15). While Maritain does recognize the value in sharing social concerns with students in the classroom, as any of us would today, he does recognize that in order for human beings to properly understand social issues, what Maritain (1943) calls the "inner center," must be developed and nurtured (p. 16). This "inner center" is described by Maritain (1943) as "...the living source of personal conscience in which originate idealism and generosity, the sense of law and the sense of friendship, respect for others, but at the same time deep-rooted independence with regard to common opinion" (p. 16). Ultimately, Maritain concludes "...that without abstract insight and intellectual enlightenment the more striking experiences are of no use to man, like beautiful colours in darkness..." (p. 16). Without the development of the human intellect through knowledge and reason, our experiences will be unintelligible. Without the recognition of a fixed primary aim in education, Maritain (1943) warns that students will be subject to a constant barrage of

changes to the educational aims, depending on the predominate values of the state at any given time (pp. 17-18). The primary aim of education must not be subject to “reconstruction,” but must remain constant despite the “...the need for constantly renewed adaptation of methods, means, and approaches...” (p. 18).

To review, Maritain distinguishes between a broad conception of education, which has as its primary aim the personal spiritual fulfilment of the human person and a more specific conception of education as it relates to formal education in schools. In the strictest sense, education includes a primary and secondary aim, as well as a practical aim. Maritain’s discussion of these aims is intertwined with his description of various errors or misconceptions in contemporary education. In this section, I have examined the primary, secondary and practical aims of education as they relate to the first four misconceptions identified by Maritain: 1) a disregard of ends/aims; 2) false ideas concerning the end/aim; 3) pragmatism; and 4) sociologism.

#### *Other Premises (Box B)*

Frankena (1965a) indicates that “much of the character of a philosophy of education depends on the nature and content of the statements it includes *and makes use of in B and D*” (p. 9). Frankena (1965a) envisions Box B to include premises of a metaphysical, epistemological and/or theological kind. Several ideas emerge from Maritain’s writings that are helpful in understanding the context for his statements made on the ends of education.

In reference to Maritain’s philosophy of education, I include in Box B significant components of Maritain’s metaphysics (in relation to God and human nature) and epistemology. Pertaining to Maritain’s metaphysics, I explain his comparison between the scientific worldview and the philosophical-religious, his distinction between

*personality and individuality*, and his understanding of integral humanism. My comments pertaining to Maritain's epistemology are confined to his distinction between the senses and the intellect, his conception of truth, and his distinction between speculative and practical reason. It is my purpose here to examine briefly Maritain's metaphysical and epistemological realism to illustrate the implications of these ideas on his philosophy of education.

*Philosophical-religious worldview.* Maritain clearly distinguishes between two fundamentally different worldviews: the scientific worldview and the philosophical-religious worldview. Despite some commonalities, the distinction between these two worldviews informs Maritain's position on the aims of education in schools as explicated in Part One of this chapter. Maritain (1943) discusses the impact of logical positivism—specifically that of the Vienna School—on our conception of science (p. 4) and its impact on the aims of education being endorsed by schools. It is the logical positivism coming out of the Vienna Circle that provides the context for Maritain's critique of the scientific worldview, or more appropriately, the positivistic worldview. My discussion of Maritain's account of the scientific worldview is brief given the fact that today, logical positivism as articulated by the Vienna School is no longer a dominant scientific paradigm. However, I will spend more time explicating Maritain's conception of the philosophical-religious worldview.

In his essay "Maritain and Science", Stanley L. Jaki (1987) describes the intellectual environment out of which Jacques Maritain (1943) wrote his work *Education at the Crossroads* as one permeated by strong antirealist and antimetaphysical biases (p. 185). The scientific worldview, more specifically the logical positivist's account of science, includes the conviction that the human person is a purely naturalistic

phenomenon that can be understood solely with the aid of the experimental sciences.

C.A. Hooker (1987) characterizes the positivist reconstruction of science as including numerous doctrines in the area of logic, language, epistemology, metaphysics, and science (pp. 62-66). In general Hooker (1987) characterizes positivism as a severe form of empiricism “in which we reject all cognitive claims except those that are empirically based” (p. 62). Furthermore, “all cognitively meaningful knowledge is empirical knowledge and ultimately founded upon direct knowledge grounded in sensory experience” (p. 63). Finally, characteristic of the positivist account of the world is an unwavering dependence on the process of verification—which is understood very narrowly—by the senses (Maritain, 1943, pp. 4-6).

Given the two accounts of logical positivism cited by Hooker (1987), logical positivism coming out of the School of Vienna is the object of criticism for Maritain (1943) because it denies metaphysical knowledge and, therefore, limits knowledge to sensory experience (pp. 4-5). In contrast, Maritain allows for various categories of knowledge (i.e. scientific, historical, theological, philosophical, moral etc.). Ultimately, the logical positivist cannot offer us insights on the nature of God or the relationship between God and human beings. Despite the fact that scientific realism has replaced logical positivism,<sup>11</sup> Maritain’s comments still point to the proper “order of being” and the important contribution made by the religious-philosophical worldview, which still needs defending despite, the fact that its opponent is no longer logical positivism.

Maritain (1943) unashamedly, and for good reasons given that history has shown him to be correct, opposes the scientific idea of human nature, specifically proposed by

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<sup>11</sup> In John A. Passmore’s (1967) article “Logical Positivism” he indicates, in agreement with Hooker (1987), that despite the legacy left behind by Logical Positivism, it is no longer the dominant paradigm in the philosophy of science.

the logical positivism of the School of Vienna, and advocates instead the philosophical-religious worldview presented by the Thomistic tradition within Catholicism. Contrary to the logical positivist's view of humanity, Maritain (1943) defines the human person within the Christian philosophical-religious worldview as a human animal

...endowed with reason, whose supreme dignity is in the intellect; and man as a free individual in personal relation with God, whose supreme righteousness consists in voluntarily obeying the law of God; and man as a sinful and wounded creature called to divine life and to the freedom of grace, whose supreme perfection consists in love. (p. 52)

The philosophical-religious understanding of the person expressed in the above statement and endorsed by Maritain is in direct opposition to the logical positivist understanding of human nature. The positivistic worldview leaves no room for mystery and favours instead only those facts that can be verifiable in sense experience. Furthermore, philosophers belonging to the positivistic movement do not consider being, essence, spirit, value, freedom, or determinism to be facts or truths because they cannot be "verified" by the physical sciences. Ultimately, the logical positivist has no viable conception of the self as a rational agent. As such, the philosophical-religious worldview stands in direct opposition to the logical positivistic worldview.

Maritain (1943) confidently accepts the philosophical-religious understanding of the person for two reasons. First, in Maritain's view, philosophers promoting the scientific worldview are confusing the proper subject of metaphysics. Being is erroneously understood by many in the scientific community as particularized, actualized, and divested of reality (Dunaway, 1978, p. 29). For Maritain (1962) our understanding of human nature is shaped by both ontology/metaphysics and science. According to

Maritain “these two implications are in no way incompatible; they complement each other.” (p. 51). Maritain (1962) is speaking of science in general, not of the narrow prejudice in science in favour of logical positivism (p. 40). As Hooker (1987) indicates, “the positivists offer no cognitive content to ethics, aesthetics, religion, metaphysics, or indeed to philosophy itself (ultimately, philosophy becomes linguistic therapy)” (p. 67). When “natural” philosophy becomes the scientism, to the exclusion of any/all metaphysics, Maritain must be critical. Maritain is certainly not attempting to divorce himself from the methods utilized by the logical positivists; he understands that empirical verification has its place. Therefore, Maritain argues that the natural sciences are indispensable tools in discovering the truth about the world. However, what Maritain “wants to make clear is the radical intellectual error involved in confusing the subject of metaphysics—being strictly as being— with these other concepts of being (Dunaway, 1978, p. 29). Second, Maritain defends the philosophical-religious worldview because the conception of the human person within the positivistic worldview collapses on itself. The logical positivist cannot give an account of its own activities or be “verified” by its own principles.

Maritain offers good reasons for suggesting that educational theorists cannot avoid metaphysical questions relating to God, human nature, personhood, and society. Discussions related to the aim of education involve the object of education— the human person— and therefore, because of the human person’s transcendental destiny, necessarily involve two kinds of metaphysical statements about a person’s essence and his or her relationship to God and society. If, as Maritain suggests, we would surely lose sight of the metaphysical questions involved in the philosophy of education, we risk turning education into a mechanistic process that could likely produce automatons ready



to do the will of the state. One of the great insights of Aristotle, and one accepted by Maritain, is his view that persons are causal agents, who can bring about change.

*Individuality and personality.* Maritain's (1943) distinction between *individuality* and *personality* is also fundamentally related to his philosophy of education (pp. 7-10). These "two poles" of the human being are essential to Maritain's conception of human nature and his reasoning can be easily misunderstood by educators, but at the same time can also be a reference point for commonality between seemingly opposing educational philosophies.

A commonality may exist between various educational philosophies because Maritain has chosen to utilize the philosophical dialogue on the soul; specifically the Aristotelian conception of "soul" as "...the first principle of life in any organism and viewed as endowed with supramaterial intellect in man, and which Christianity revealed as the dwelling place of God and as made for eternal life" (p. 8). It is important to note that Maritain (1943) is speaking here about the body and soul on a philosophical level and the soul is identified with the mind. Maritain (1943) goes on to explain that "the same man, the same entire man who is, in one sense, a person or a whole made independent by his spiritual soul, is also, in another sense, a material individual, a fragment of a species, a part of the physical universe..." (p. 9). Maritain agrees with Aristotle who asserted that "...a man is a living organism, a body with a soul...a single substance, and, like all such substances, consists of matter plus form" (Frankena, 1965b, p. 22). A human being, for Aristotle, has both a mind and a body. It is this "supramaterial intellect" that could potentially form the basis for a common understanding among various philosophies of education despite their religious affiliation. The distinction, made by Maritain, between the *individuality* and *personality* requires further clarification.

Maritain's (1943) distinction between *individuality* and *personality* nicely mirrors Aristotle's distinction between the various parts of the soul (refer to Table 2). In "Return to the Crossroads: Maritain Fifty Years On," Carr et al. (1995) identify what they term *Transcendent Naturalism*, as one of the key features of a Thomistic philosophy of education which "...does not regard human persons as composites of distinct substantial parts—a body and a soul—but sees them as psychophysical unities; entities whose formal principle of organization is biological, in a non-reductive sense, combining vegetative, sentient and rational powers" (p. 165). What we have in Maritain's philosophy of education is the presentation of a view of the human person that rejects Cartesian dualism, reductive materialism and radical idealism. Therefore, according to the

Table 2

*A Comparison between Maritain and Aristotle on the Parts of the Soul*

Maritain	Aristotle	
Personality	Rational Part	Unique to human beings
	- Theoretical Reason	
	- Practical Reason	
Individuality	Appetitive Part	Common to human beings
	- Sensing, imagining, remembering, desiring, emotions, etc.	and animals
	Nutritive Part	Common to human beings,
	- Digestion, growth, reproduction, etc.	animals, and plants

*Note.* The following information was adapted from Frankena's (1965b) explication of Aristotle's philosophy of education, p. 26.

Aristotelian-Thomistic view of the human person, endorsed by Maritain, "...we are not bodies plus souls, nor just bodies, nor just souls; rather we are rationally animated bodies" (Carr et al., 1995, p. 165). The soul is not an independently existing substance as Descartes' substance dualism would assert, but the soul is the form or essence of the body.

As Maritain (1943) indicates, *Personality* refers to our non-physical nature, which Maritain identifies as the soul, spirit, or essence of a human being and *individuality* refers to our physical nature (pp. 8-9). According to Maritain (1943) *personality* is the source of our dignity as created in the image of God and as such we are in "...direct relationship with the realm of being, truth, goodness, and beauty, and with God, and it is only with these that [we] can arrive at [our] complete fulfillment" (p. 8). Maritain characterizes the human person as an entity composed of a mind and a body, which he describes in the following statement.

The same man, the same entire man who is, in one sense, a person or a whole made independent by his spiritual soul, is also, in another sense, a material individual, a fragment of a species, a part of the physical universe, a single dot in the immense network of forces and influences, cosmic, ethnic, historic, whose laws we must obey. (p. 9)

The aspect of the soul and the aspect of the body meet in rational person and as such, Maritain describes the human person as a rational animal. It stands to reason that for Maritain, both of these two aspects (mind and body) must be duly acknowledged and respected in the process of education.

Education in the widest sense is conceived by Maritain (1943) as primarily directed towards the awakening of the person not the "individual" despite the fact that we

must also address our physical needs (p. 9). It is for this reason, that Maritain identifies the ultimate aim of education (in the wider sense) as the personal spiritual liberation of the pupil and not some other utilitarian or pragmatic aim. The role of schools in education is to ensure that the necessary preparation has been given to allow for this liberation in the future. Maritain identifies the importance of what he calls a “humanized” education, to be carried out in schools, in the following paragraph.

Thus what is of most importance in educators themselves is a respect for the soul as well as for the body of the child, the sense of his innermost essence and his internal resources, and a sort of sacred and loving attention to his mysterious identity, which is a hidden thing that no techniques can reach. And what matters most in the educational enterprise is a perpetual appeal to intelligence and freewill in the young. Such an appeal, fittingly proportioned to age and circumstances, can and should begin with the first educational steps. Each field of training, each school activity—physical training as well as elementary reading or the rudiments of childhood etiquette and morals—can be intrinsically improved and can outstrip its own immediate practical value through being *humanized* in this way by understanding. Nothing should be required of the child without an explanation and without making sure that the child has understood. (pp. 9-10)

The *mysterious identity* that Maritain speaks of, in the above paragraph, is the rational, intellectual, or intuitional aspect of the pupil. Consequently, a “humanized” education, is one in which the human being’s root faculty, which is the exercise of reason, is respected and nourished. When Maritain refers to *techniques* he is addressing the two dynamic factors at play in the education of students in schools. According to Maritain (1943), although the teacher does impart knowledge to the student, he or she cannot affect

the *internal vital principle* in the student (p. 31) despite the various techniques they may utilize. Educational techniques, endorsed by the natural sciences, psychology, or pragmatism, will never be able to alter the role played by the two dynamic factors in education; the teacher and the student. Both the teacher and the student contribute something important to the educational process; however, it is the student who will always remain the principle agent in education (p. 31).

In summary, Maritain's distinction between *individuality* and *personality* has significant implications for education in the strictest sense (education in schools). It is Maritain's use of Aristotle's conception of the soul as well as Aquinas' understanding of the human person that informs his Christian anthropology and subsequently to determine the aims of education in the strictest sense as well as in the broadest sense. Finally, Maritain (1943) endorses an Aristotelian-Thomistic vision of the human person, both body and soul, because it is a complete and integrated approach that will liberate students from a "materialistic metaphysics, positivism, or skepticism" (p. 6; see also Maritain, 1962, pp. 44-50). Maritain's endorsement of Aristotelian-Thomistic conception of the human being, as both body and soul, is considered to be complete because it acknowledges both the ontological and scientific principles. Similarly, the Aristotelian-Thomistic conception of the human being includes coherent principles on the nature of the body and soul, a person's place in the world, and the person's ultimate destiny.

*Integral humanism.* Maritain (1943) observes a serious trend toward dehumanization (as specifically expressed by Nazism and Fascism), which if left unchecked, will lead to the slavery of humankind (p. 88). Maritain calls educators and philosophers alike to a "new" humanism with the intention of reversing the negative effects of such radical dehumanization. Maritain refers to this "new" humanism as an

integral humanism because it involves the integration of the secular sphere and the religious sphere. Unlike the humanism of the Renaissance, Maritain's "new" humanism values the things of God above the individual. Maritain's humanism advocates a recovery of those spiritual values and truths in dialogue with the temporal world and allows for the sanctification of the profane.

Maritain (1943) acknowledges that the Christian "idea of man" is the only right vision of humanity; however, he also states that although many of us are influenced by the secularizing influences of materialism, positivism, or skepticism, most of us still recognize the divine destiny of the human person (p. 6). Given that many of us define ourselves as Christians and even non-Christians may respect the dignity of the intellect and various aspects of Maritain's conception of human nature, which allows for commonality (p. 6). As Maritain (1943) contends "in a Judeo-Greco Christian civilization like ours, this community of analogy, which extends from the most orthodox religious forms of thought to the mere humanistic ones, makes it possible for a Christian philosophy of education, if it is well founded and rationally developed, to play an inspiring part in the concert" (p. 7). It is apparent in the current Canadian context, with our acceptance of pluralism and multiculturalism, that Maritain's vision for education may be helpful in achieving some measure of collaboration among educators with different philosophical or religious backgrounds, but who may share key parts of the Aristotelian view of human nature and education.

Integral humanism, if it becomes a part of the education of tomorrow, will aim to produce the following three positive effects. First, according to Maritain (1943), integral humanism will assist in removing "the rift between the social claim and the individual claim within man himself" (p. 89). Maritain states that "man and the group are

intermingled with each other and they surpass each other in different respects” (p. 15). For this reason, we must not allow for the rift between the social claim and the individual claim to develop into either an extreme sociology or an extreme individualism. As previously noted, Maritain’s understanding of human nature includes the conviction that human beings are naturally social creatures and individualism has had the effect of separating these two aspects of the person. Carr et al. (1995) explain that “without denying human individuality it is contended [by Maritain] that the possibility of realizing oneself as a person depends upon one’s participation in the collective life of members of one’s own kind” (p. 165). Consequently, living in community, ensuring individual freedoms, and endorsing the sense of responsibility and what is good and bad for human beings will aid in our achieving the good life. Maritain’s understanding of the person’s civic responsibilities is consistent with Aristotle; who argued that the end of practical thinking “...is knowing truth with an eye to moral and political action...” and is therefore “...desirable because of its effects” (Frankena, 1965b, p. 38). Maritain recognizes, as did Aristotle, that the acquisition of knowledge, through schooling, will benefit both the individual person and also the community as a whole.

In his discussion on sociology, Maritain discusses the correlation between education for the person and education for the community. In Maritain’s (1943) words, “...one does not make a man except in the bosom of social ties where there is an awakening of civic understanding and civic virtues (p. 15). Education first forms a person and in this formation is prepared to act as a citizen. Maritain comments that “political authority, directs free men toward the good, not of the one who directs, but of the multitude as a whole, or of the body politic a common good which is desired by each component of the body politic, insofar as he is a part of it, and which is to flow back upon

each one" (p. 98). For Maritain (1943), "man finds himself by subordinating himself to the group, and the group attains its goal only by serving man and by realizing that man has secrets which escape the group and a vocation which is not included in the group" (p. 15). Allard (1982) reiterates that "the mystery of the person transcends the society, the state, and the common good, and the common good of the city is ordered to the good of the person, to the conquest of his perfection and of his spiritual freedom which belong to an order higher than that of the city (p. 26). What we have here is a give-and-take between the person and the common good; one cannot achieve its purpose without the other.

Joseph's (1966) summary of Maritain's position on the social and individual claim is helpful in distinguishing the role of each in allowing the person to reach their true potential. The common good not only recognizes our material needs, but our transcendental nature.

The objective of the social claim is the good of the group of individuals as a group. It is not merely what is good for individuals as a group. It is a good common to both the group and the individual. The good of the group is superior to the individual good only if it benefits the individual person, is redistributed to him, and respects his dignity. Thus, that which constitutes the good of the individuals as a group is not only a collection of public commodities and services such as roads, schools, armies for security, just laws, good customs and wise institutions, the heritage of historical remembrances, cultural treasures and so on. The good of individuals as a group includes all of the above and something more profound, concrete and human. (p. 54)



The “something more profound,” mentioned in Joseph’s (1966) summary, refers to the notion that the group must allow the individual to progress towards his or her divine destiny. A division between the social claim and the individual claim will remain if the group prevents or hinders the individual’s ability to become fully human. For this reason, Maritain (1943) claims that our personality must take precedence over our individuality (pp. 34-35).

The second positive effect of the acceptance of integral humanism in education today is the potential to “...end the cleavage between religious inspiration and secular activity in man” (p. 89). Recall that according to the Thomistic tradition of transcendental naturalism, human beings are rational creatures with a transcendent destiny (Carr et al., 1995, p. 165). As rational creatures, Aristotle, Aquinas, and Maritain all agree that human beings are directed towards a specific goal or *telos*. For Aristotle, a human being’s *telos* is happiness or *eudemonia* (the good life) which “...is the promotion of excellent intellectual activity as the end of all human action and as the criteria of moral excellence” (Frankena, 1965b, p. 36). It is important to note that *eudemonia*, although translated as “happiness” is not identified by Aristotle as a pleasurable feeling (Frankena, 1965b, p. 21).

In the tradition of Aristotle, and as a Catholic Christian, Maritain insists that human beings are directed toward a spiritual *telos* and we can understand his philosophy of education all the more if we understand his characterization of the human being’s *telos*. For the Thomist, as well as Maritain, the goal of human life is “...the acquisition of knowledge and virtue via the soul’s conformity to objective standards of truth and goodness and the discipline of the appetites and passions by reason and will” (Carr et al., 1995, p. 170). What makes Thomism unique from the goal of life articulated by Aristotle

is the fact that “to the extent that a human person seeks the wisdom that perfects knowledge and the love which perfects virtue he also aspires to be fashioned in the very image of God who created him” (Carr et al., 1995, p. 170). In *Education at the Crossroads*, Maritain (1943) consistently emphasizes the importance of love as it relates to education (pp. 11-12, 23-24, 36-37, & 95-96). Maritain states that love is necessary for virtue “because the basic hindrance to moral life is egoism, and the chief yearning of moral life liberation from oneself; and only love, being the gift of oneself, is able to remove this hindrance and to bring this yearning to fulfillment” (pp. 95-96). Ultimately, the life purpose for a Christian is to come to know and love God.

Third, integral humanism will have the effect of destroying “...the cleavage between work or useful activity and the blossoming of spiritual life and disinterested joy in knowledge and beauty” (Maritain, 1943, p. 89). Unfortunately, many of us view work as an end in itself and we view knowledge and learning as solely a method to this end. This is the wrong approach to work, and instead we should consider work as a means to achieve happiness, beauty, and joy. Subsequently, for Maritain, true happiness will come when we are no longer indifferent to knowledge and beauty. The integral and humanistic education that Maritain envisions is obviously a democratic one; given the integration of seemingly opposing worldviews and tensions within the person. Aristotle is clear that the supreme good for human beings is not work, but the supreme good is happiness precisely because it is desired for its own sake and if it was achieved, nothing more would be desired (Frankena, 1965b, p. 21). Similarly, Maritain (1943) recognizes that “...work is not an end in itself: work should afford leisure for the joy, expansion, and delight of the spirit” (p. 89). Maritain (1943) recognizes a growing division between those who work and those who pursue further education, and he insists that “the education of tomorrow

must provide the common man [all people] with the means for his personal fulfillment, not only with regard to his labor but also with regard to his social and political activities in the civil commonwealth, and to the activities of his leisure hours” (p. 90, see also pp. 51-57).

A key component in dissolving these three rifts discussed by Maritain in favour of an integral humanism is allowing metaphysics to regain its rightful place at the philosophical table. Maritain (1955) states that the *Philosophia Perennis*<sup>12</sup> “has for its object to re-establish the real hierarchy of things, both human and divine, and to restore to spiritual and metaphysical values the priority that rightly belongs to them” (p. 41). Maritain (1943) strongly cautions educators that “the wrong begins when *the object to be taught* and the *primacy of the object* are forgotten, and when the cult of means – not to an end, but without an end – only ends up in psychological worship of the subject” (p. 14). With this statement, Maritain is critiquing a naive progressivism which focuses totally on the student. Egoism — acting only to satisfy one’s self-interest— will be the outcome when we allow the psychological worship of the subject/student. Again, the liberation that Maritain speaks of is not a physical liberation, but an internal spiritual liberation or conquest, in which the schools will play a significant preparatory role by developing the students’ theoretical and practical reason. In Maritain’s (1943) words, “this conquest of being, this progressive attainment of new truths, or the progressive realization of the ever-growing and ever-renewed significance of truths already attained, opens and enlarges our mind and life, and really situates them in freedom and autonomy” (p. 12). Ultimately, Maritain (1943) argues that restricting a philosophy of education to a particular methodology informed solely by the truths of science and psychology is inappropriate

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<sup>12</sup> Maritain is referring here to the philosophical tradition of St. Thomas Aquinas.

given his Aristotelian-Thomistic conception of the human person, which is characterized by his distinction between the *scientific worldview* and the *philosophical-religious worldview*, and *integral humanism*.

I now turn my attention to a brief discussion of the epistemological premises that influence Maritain's philosophy of education. Frankena (1965a) argues that metaphysical and epistemological doctrines are relevant "because they have a bearing on the problems of moral and social philosophy" (p. 2). This is certainly the case for Maritain. Along with his metaphysical claims, his epistemology plays a significant role in his philosophy of education. In keeping with the Thomistic philosophical tradition, Maritain emphasizes that truth is neither subjective nor is it dependent on our own thinking. In contrast to pragmatism, skepticism, relativism and positivism, Maritain endorses a realist epistemology. For Maritain, the non-realist or anti-realist philosophical systems are inadequate because they do not unite the various aspects of the human person (i.e. spiritual, physical, psychological etc.). As it applies to Maritain's philosophy of education, I briefly explore the distinction he makes between the senses and the intellect (rational mind), and his distinction between speculative (theoretical), and practical reason.

*The distinction between the senses and the intellect (rational mind).* In response to the logical positivists and the pragmatists, Maritain offers a reasonable alternative founded in the Aristotelian-Thomistic philosophical tradition. The full title of Maritain's (1959) definitive work on epistemology is *Distinguish to Unite: The Degrees of Knowledge*. Dunaway (1978) indicates that the very title of Maritain's work signifies his intention to propose some kind of synthesis of knowledge. According to Dunaway (1978), Maritain is proposing, with his epistemology, to create "...a balanced synthesis of what is best in modern and ancient knowledge—a synthesis of scholastic philosophy and

modern experimental science, in the same mould as Aquinas's synthesis of Aristotle and Christian theology" (p. 38). It is clear that Maritain's entire philosophical enterprise seeks to first *distinguish* in order to *unite*. As such, Maritain endorses Aristotle's epistemological claim that human beings have the potentiality to acquire knowledge about reality by forming concepts through a twofold process of sensation (experience) and reflection (reason). Aristotle's view of knowledge and knowing differs significantly from Plato's theory of recollection, in which ideas existing latently in the mind are brought to consciousness. Maritain also rejects Plato's account of education precisely because, in his view, the learner is the principle agent in education (pp. 29-31). True to his Aristotelian roots, Maritain argues that the learner is endowed with intellectual powers and "the inner seeing power of intelligence" (p. 31) is present in all human beings prior to any sensory experiences. Unlike Plato, Maritain rejects the notion that that knowledge exists in the mind prior to any experiences.

Maritain (1962) clearly states that "underlying all [serious] questions concerning the basic orientation of education, there is the *philosophy of knowledge* to which the educator consciously or unconsciously subscribes (p. 45). In his essay "Thomist Views on Education," Maritain (1962) identifies the link between his philosophy of education and the Thomist epistemology which underlies it. Maritain (1962) accepts the Thomistic distinction between the senses and the intellect (reason) in opposition to, what he considers to be the error inherent in modern logical empiricism, which asserts that all knowledge is simply sense knowledge (p. 45) and reduces reason to pure deductive logic. Allard (1982) states that "for Maritain — as for any Aristotelian or Thomistic philosopher — the senses and the intellect (rational mind) are powers of perception; the intellect (rational mind) has a proper object, an object with is perceived indeed depending on the

senses, but an object which cannot be reduced to the sensible given” (p. 19). For Maritain (1962) sensory knowledge “... depends on material action exercised upon bodily organs, and which attain things in their actual and singular existence but only as enigmatically manifested by the diversified physical energies they display” (p. 19). On the other hand, the rational mind (intellect) “...is spiritual in essence and attains, through the universal concepts it brings out from sense experience, the constitutive features of what things are” (Maritain, p. 19).

Maritain (1962) offers the following argument against logical positivism, which, in his mind, offers a restrictively narrow understanding of knowledge, which he argues only, confuses both educators and students.

For if it is true, in actual fact, that reason differs specifically from the senses, then the paradox with which we are confronted is that [radical] empiricism, in actual fact uses reason while denying the specific power of reason, on the basis of a theory which reduces reason’s knowledge and life, which are characteristic of man, to sense knowledge and life, which are characteristic of animals. Hence there are confusions and inconsistencies which will inevitably reflect on the educational work. Not only does the empiricist think as a man and use reason, a power superior in nature to the senses, while at the same time denying this very specificity of reason, but what he speaks of and describes as sense-knowledge is not exactly sense-knowledge, but sense-knowledge *plus* unconsciously introduced intellectual ingredients; that is, the empiricist discusses sense-knowledge in which he has made room for reason without recognizing it. (pp. 45-46)

Maritain, who predates Hooker (1987) has identified clear inconsistencies inherent in logical positivism and recognizes the real dangers these inconsistencies pose for educational philosophers and educational institutions. The mistake made by the logical positivist centers on the fact that he/she defines human thought as merely a response to environmental stimuli, while at the same time he/she relies unconsciously on human reason.

It is appropriate at this point to discuss the fifth misconception in contemporary education, which Maritain (1943) identifies as intellectualism (pp. 18-20). Maritain identifies two main forms of intellectualism: one more traditional and the second more contemporary. The first form of intellectualism is described by Maritain (1943) as one prevalent in classical times when education was conceived as appropriate only for the privileged members of society and focused primarily on developing skills in writing and oral communication/rhetoric, as practiced by the Sophists in times past (p. 18 & 53). On the other hand, the second form of intellectualism is one that "gives up universal values and insists upon the working and experiential functions of intelligence" (Maritain, 1943, p. 18). It is the second form of intellectualism that relates specifically to Maritain's (1943) distinction between the senses and the intellect (rational mind) because proponents of this type of intellectualism view reason as merely "scientific and technological specialization" (p. 18).

Maritain observes that the increase in technological developments has led to an increase in specialization, and subsequently, the loss of a universal end for education. Maritain (1943) warns that this "cult of specialization," reflected in contemporary educational philosophy, will only serve to further dehumanize education and human life (p. 19). Ward (1978) explains that "Maritain saw the 'how' of learning as more than

stimulus and response, more than reaction...” (p. 512). Over-specialization in the school curriculum will not adequately prepare students to achieve inner freedom. Ultimately, those who are forced into a model of schooling that endorses premature specialization “...are unable to pass judgment on matters beyond their specialized competence; the animal is the perfect type of specialist, its knowing power fixed on a single task to be done” (Maritain, 1943, p. 19). If we recall the previous discussion on the Aristotelian-Thomistic conception of human nature endorsed by Maritain (1943), we will no doubt understand, as Maritain does that education is not animal training (p. 6) and as such, must produce more than “specialists.”

We can understand why Maritain is weary of the trend toward over-specialization. The potential danger of both forms of intellectualism rests in its overemphasis on specialization, either in written/oral skill development or in scientific/technical specialization. Each form of intellectualism fails to take into account the true nature of the human person as a unity of body and soul and fails to acknowledge that reason has a wider scope than what is known through the experiential functions of the intellect (rational mind). It is important to remember that for Maritain, the goal of education in the broadest sense is wisdom.

*Maritain's conception of truth.* Maritain's conception of truth is included in *Education at the Crossroads* because the object of the intellect is truth and education in the strictest sense (in the schools), will help to restore the student's trust in truth through the acquisition of knowledge. Furthermore, in respect to truth Maritain states that the “teacher's domain is the domain of truth” (p. 26). With this in mind, Maritain (1943) states the following regarding truth:



Truth—which does not depend on us but on *what is*—truth is not a set of ready-made formulas to be passively recorded, so as to have the mind closed and enclosed by them. Truth is an infinite realm—as infinite as being—whose wholeness transcends infinitely our powers of perception, and each fragment of which must be grasped through vital and purified internal activity. This conquest of being, this progressive attainment of new truths, or the progressive realization of the ever-growing and ever-renewed significance of truths already attained, opens and enlarges our mind and life, and really situates them in freedom and autonomy. (p. 12; see also *The Range of Reason*, 1942, p. 12)

The characteristics of truth outlined here by Maritain reveal an approach to truth that is anything but narrow minded or reductionist. Maritain indicates in his statement on truth that the world somehow escapes our intellectual grasp in ways we cannot understand. Here, truth is concerned with what we grasp and what escapes us. We use our reason to understand the intelligible world as best we can. This seems to me to be a very humble account of truth and our human capacity to know it. Maritain's conception of truth will, therefore, allow for dialogue and cooperation between various schools of thought. In relation to Maritain's conception of truth is his conviction that "without trust in truth, there is no human effectiveness" (p. 13). Ultimately, it is the school's responsibility to aid in the development of speculative (theoretical) and practical reason and subsequently developing the student's understanding of the truth.

In Maritain's (1942) book, *The Range of Reason*, he focuses his first chapter on the nature and extent of human knowledge. As such, the first chapter captures the essence of the Aristotelian-Thomistic theory of knowledge.

...Thomas Aquinas makes knowledge *absolutely dependent* upon what is. To know, in fact, is essentially to know *something*, and something which, as specifier of my act of knowing, is not produced by my knowledge, but on the contrary measures it and governs it, and thus possesses its own being, independent of my knowledge; for it would be absurd for the measuring device as such to be dependent upon the thing measured. The entire specification of my act of intelligence comes, therefore, from the object as *something other*, as free from me. In knowing, I subordinate myself to a being independent of me; I am conquered, convinced and subjugated by it. And the truth of my mind lies in its conformity to *what is* outside of it and independent of it. (p. 12)

The above except illustrates the metaphysical realism and objectivity inherent in the Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition that Maritain ascends to. With this statement, Maritain is endorsing a correspondence theory of truth which states that truth corresponds to a fact about the external world. Therefore, truth involves a relationship to reality and as such, *P* is true if and only if the world is as *P* says.

*Speculative (theoretical) reason and practical reason.* The activities of the intelligent or rational part of the soul, according to Aristotle, include speculative (theoretical) and practical reason (Frankena, 1965b, p. 26). Through speculative (theoretical) reason—knowing *that*—the human person discovers truths that are timeless and independent of the human mind. For Aristotle, speculative reason determines humankind's ultimate end, which is identified as *eudemonia* (Frankena, 1965b, p. 26). Both Aristotle and Aquinas conceived of a person's end in terms of perfecting their rational capacities. Similarly, Maritain agrees that "...to be properly human man must both develop his theoretical reason to acquire the intellectual 'virtues' of knowledge, and

also his practical reason to discipline the passions into the moral virtues of living” (Goodrich, 1966, p. 167).

In *Education at the Crossroads*, Maritain (1943) synthesizes the role of speculative (theoretical) reason and practical reason by commenting that “education thus calls for an intellectual sympathy and intuition on the part of the teacher, concern for the questions and difficulties with which the mind of the youth may be entangled...” (p. 43). Although the broad goal of education is “...the conquest of internal and spiritual freedom...or, in other words, his liberation through knowledge and wisdom, good will, and love” (p. 11), the specific goal of the school is to develop speculative (theoretical) reason and practical reason in the youth.

An analysis of Maritain’s theory of knowledge, then, reveals his acceptance of different categories of knowledge and a hierarchical ordering of these categories of knowledge. Specifically, Maritain (1962) identifies the relationship between wisdom and science as well as the theoretical intellect and the practical intellect in the following reflection on Aristotle’s conception of contemplation.

In the intellectual realm, wisdom, which knows things eternal and creates order and unity in the mind, is superior to science or to knowledge through particular causes; and the speculative intellect, which knows for the sake of knowing, comes before the practical intellect, which knows for the sake of action. In such a hierarchy of values, what is infravalent is not sacrificed to, but kept alive by, what is supervalent, because everything is appendant to faith in truth. Aristotle was right in sensing that contemplation is in itself better than action and more fitted to what is the most spiritual in man, but Aristotelian contemplation was purely intellectual and

theoretical, while Christian contemplation being rooted in love, superabounds in action. (p. 54)

As indicated in the above excerpt, speculative (theoretical) reason involves knowing for the sake of knowing and for no other purpose, while practical reason involves knowing for the sake of action and to evaluate actions as means to legitimate ends. Maritain recognizes, in the above reference to Aristotle, that the Christian understanding of speculative reason or contemplation is uniquely enhanced by its rootedness in charity and the actions that are manifested by Christian love. Furthermore, while love is the supreme moral virtue (Maritain, 1962, p. 53), the supreme intellectual virtue for Maritain is wisdom (see also *Education at the Crossroads*, pp. 47-48). The development of speculative reason — contemplation and knowledge for its own sake, is the highest value in the intellectual realm, according to Maritain; while the development of the practical reason— knowledge for the sake of action or acting well — is less valuable (Maritain, 1962, pp. 54 & 113). It is this distinction between theoretical and practical reason that creates the clear hierarchy of values present in Maritain's epistemology. For Maritain (1943), "without trust in truth, there is no [real] human effectiveness" (p. 13) and it is the development of speculative (theoretical) and practical reason, through schooling, that we can hope to indirectly influence and strengthen the will; which is paradoxically more important than the development of the intellect (pp. 22, 27).

In further reference to his philosophy of education, Maritain's distinction between theoretical and practical reason finds expression in his discussion on the sixth and seventh misconceptions of contemporary education. Maritain (1943) identifies voluntarism as the sixth misconception in education precisely because its proponents

advocate the development of practical reason or acting well above theoretical reason.

According to Maritain (1943), voluntarism, is flawed because it contributes to upsetting "...the internal order of human nature, by making intelligence subservient to the will and by appealing to the virtue of irrational forces" (p. 20). Maritain identifies the popularity of the second type of voluntarism—expressed as the promotion of morality, virtue, and generosity—as an effort to compensate for contemporary education's exclusion of universal values along with the promotion of the experiential functions of the intellect (p. 21).

Maritain's dependence on an Aristotelian-Thomistic epistemology, then, finds expression in his pronouncements on the dangers associated with both intellectualism and the second type of voluntarism. Maritain (1943) insists on a true understanding of the proper relationship between the intellect and the will and he summarizes his understanding of the relationship between the will and the intellect, as it relates to his rejection of voluntarism, in the following paragraph:

We believe that intelligence is in and by itself nobler than the will of man, for its activity is more immaterial and universal. But we believe also that, in regard to the things or the very objects on which this activity bears, it is better to will and love the good than simply to know it. Moreover it is through man's will, when it is good, not through his intelligence, be it ever so perfect, that man is made good and right. A similar intermingling of roles is to be found in education, taken in its *broadest* [emphasis is mine] sense. The upbringing of the human being must lead both intelligence and will toward achievement, and the shaping of the will is throughout more important to man than the shaping of the intellect. Yet, whereas the education and system of schools and colleges succeeds as a rule in equipping

man's intellect for knowledge, it seems to be missing its main achievement, the equipping of man's will. (p. 22, see also Maritain, 1962, pp. 113-114)

Maritain suggests that education in the broadest sense—any process by which human beings are led toward fulfillment—should form the intellect and the will.

However, because of the inherent challenges associated with character education or educating the will, along with the fact that *prudentia* cannot be learned, it is the role of education in its strictest sense—the special task of schools and universities—to form the intellect (reason) through knowledge.

Maritain's statement on *prudentia*, as cited in the previous paragraph, warrants a brief mention of the final misconception inherent in contemporary education that he presents in *Education at the Crossroads*. Maritain (1943) identifies the seventh misconception as the notion that everything can be learned (p. 22). According to Maritain (1943), the notion that everything can be learned, exposes two paradoxes inherent in education: 1) moral virtue can be learned; and 2) the extra-educational sphere is more important than the educational sphere. These two paradoxes affect our understanding of learning and the inherent role of each of the educational spheres.

The first paradox involves the notion that everything, including moral virtue, can be learned. Maritain (1943) insists that this is not the case and that the task of schools is only to teach the intellectual foundations of morality, which will only indirectly, not directly, form the will (p. 23). According to Maritain, "prudence is knowing incarnate in action [because] it judges well and commands what is to be done here and now, and thus presupposes the rectitude of the will" (Toner, 2005, p. 228). Despite the best intentions of the proponents of virtue education, the experience, intuition and love required for prudent actions cannot be learned in the same way that a mathematical concept is learned

(Maritain, 1943, p. 23). Maritain (1962) cleverly states that “virtue is not a by-product of knowledge, but true moral knowledge, to have practical reason enlightened and sound, does a great deal for virtue” (p. 122).

In “Moral Education,” Maritain (1962) reiterates that the schools are responsible for the indirect formation of the will, by fostering the intellectual virtues and the various intellectual capacities (Maritain, 1962, p. 111). Maritain (1962) is also critical of educational institutions that are focusing solely on speculative (theoretical) reason, and instead, he wishes to see more development in the area of practical reason, which would include “...teaching about the nature and principles and the very science of morality, and with the immense part of human knowledge which bears on human manners and human conduct (p. 114). However, despite Maritain’s call for increased attention to practical reason in the schools, he is adamant that teaching about the moral virtues is not to directly form the will. It is clear that we can know what we should do in a particular situation, but we may fail to perform the virtuous action. Unlike Socrates, who insisted that knowledge of the good would lead to virtuous action, Aristotle and Maritain (1962) argue that ethical knowledge is insufficient because “it is a question of right applications to and right judgment on particular cases” (p. 114). Furthermore, Maritain (1943) states that “...the right appreciation of practical cases which the ancients called *prudentia*, and which is an inner vital power of judgment developed in the mind and backed up by well-directed will, cannot be replaced by any learning whatsoever (p. 23). Ultimately, according to Maritain, theoretical wisdom is not a prerequisite for moral virtue.

In reference to the second paradox, Maritain (1943) emphasizes that the school institution is only one part of a person’s entire educational experience, which includes the

family, church, and the state (educational sphere) as well as relationships, social customs, law, religious ritual etc. (extra-educational sphere) (pp. 24-25; See Figure 4.).

Maritain is clear that the school is only one part of a person's entire educational experience. Accordingly, Maritain (1943) states that


...no illusion is more harmful than to try to push back into the microcosm of school education the entire process of shaping the human being, as if the system of schools and universities were a big factory through the back door of which the young child enters like a raw material, and from the front door of which the youth in his brilliant twenties will go out as a successfully manufactured man. (pp. 25-26)

Education in its broadest sense is a process that will ultimately continue until our death, and as the analogy used by Maritain suggests, it is unrealistic to assume that the school can do all and be all for the student. As is illustrated in *Figure 4*, the school is only one part in the educational experience of the human person. It stands to reason, that when other areas of influence are weakened (i.e. family or church), we see an increase in the pressure placed on schools to increase their sphere of influence. Despite the increase in the demands placed on schools, they will never be able to produce a complete product as is implied by Maritain's factory metaphor.

In summary, Maritain (1943) states that the role of the school "...is not to shape the will directly to develop moral virtues in the youth, but to enlighten and strengthen [all the forms of] reason; so it is that an indirect influence is exerted on the will, by a sound equipment of knowledge and a sound development of the powers of thinking" (p. 27). We cannot impart virtue on the young but we can teach young, people what virtue is through a humanist education (Murphy, 2005, p. 282). It is important that we are able to distinguish between the role of the schools in the educational sphere and the role of the



extra-education spheres; the roles are different and these differences will affect what is included in the curriculum and the “dispositions” to be fostered by each sphere of influence.




*Figure 4:* The Extra-Educational Sphere and the Educational Sphere.

Maritain’s philosophy of education is founded on a realist metaphysics and epistemology in the tradition of Aristotle and St. Thomas Aquinas. Maritain continually reminds us in his writings on education that our understanding of reality and knowledge will, and should, have an impact on our philosophy of education. My brief explication of the “philosophical element” of Maritain’s philosophy of education (see Figure 5) includes the primary, secondary, and practical aims of education along with key metaphysical and epistemological doctrines informs Maritain’s understanding of the dispositions students

are to acquire (Box C). Maritain's philosophical approach informs my discussion in the following chapter on the "practical" element of Maritain's philosophy of education, which includes the "dispositions" to be fostered, the empirical justification, and normative conclusions presented in Maritain's philosophy of education.

In reference to Box C, as shown in Figure 5, Frankena (1965a) has us include all of the excellences or dispositions that the students are to acquire throughout their schooling (p. 7). Frankena (1965a) goes on to state that in order to achieve the ends or principles outlined in Box A, the teacher must assist or guide the student in acquiring the abilities, traits, values, etc. listed in Box C (p. 8). Given the fact that Maritain includes essentially one primary aim of education and two subsequent aims of education, it is only reasonable to assume that some of the "dispositions" included in Box C will be of more intellectual (associated with the primary aim) while others will be more practical (associated with the secondary and practical aim).

To account for this division in Box C, I have included in Box C of Figure 5 those dispositions that we get from following Frankena's "philosophical" approach (Boxes A, B, and C). The "dispositions" that students will acquire if we follow Frankena's "philosophical" approach include theoretical and practical reason along with the five fundamental dispositions. Maritain (1943) briefly identifies five dispositions to be cultivated by the teacher in schools as including: 1) love for knowledge and truth, 2) love of goodness and Justice, 3) love of existence (joy), 4) sense of a job well done, and 5) a commitment to co-operation (pp. 36-38). I only allude to these "dispositions" here because it is important to note that what is included in Box C in Figure 5 will also include other "dispositions" as set out in the next chapter related to the practical application of Frankena's model.



*Figure 5: The "Philosophical Element" of Maritain's philosophy of education*

## CHAPTER FIVE

*Maritain's Catholic Philosophy of Education: The "Practical Element" (Box C, D, E)*

The focus of the previous chapter was on explicating the philosophical element (Box A, and Box B) of Maritain's view of education, which included his views on the primary and secondary aims of education, along with other important metaphysical and epistemological statements. This chapter concludes my explication of Maritain's philosophy of education by focusing on the "practical" recommendations outlined primarily in *Education at the Crossroads*. As I mentioned in the introduction to Chapter Four, Maritain's (1943) philosophy of education includes both philosophical and practical statements. Furthermore, as we should expect, the "practical" elements of Maritain's *normative* philosophy of education emerge from his philosophical arguments and correspond to Box C, Box D, and Box E of Frankena's (1965) model (refer to figure 2). Consequently, this chapter is separated into three main subject headings: Part 1) Dispositions<sup>13</sup>; Part 2) Practical Recommendations; and Part 3) Factual Statements. Finally, I have reiterated several times, throughout this thesis, the importance of Maritain's distinction between the educational sphere and the extra-educational sphere for determining the specific aim of education in schools. Given this distinction, I have decided organized my treatment of each component of the "practical" element of Maritain's philosophy of education (Box C, Box D, and Box E) as it relates specifically to

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<sup>13</sup> I am making use of Frankena's (1965b) understanding of "disposition" which he explains in detail in *Three Historical Philosophies of Education: Aristotle, Kant, and Dewey*. Frankena uses the term "disposition" in the wider sense to include "qualities of personality like charm, traits of character like benevolence, skills like knowing how to dance, and states like having a knowledge of the kings of Britain—different as they are, they are all dispositions...and presumably excellences as well" (p. 3). Any subsequent reference to desirable "dispositions" refers to the wider sense of the term as defined by Frankena (1965b).

schooling in the most narrow sense and, where applicable, I digress with a discussion of education in the broadest sense as it pertains to the extra-educational sphere.

*"Dispositions" (Box C)*

Frankena (1965a) defines education as "...the passing on or acquisition of abilities, habits, states, or traits which are taken to be desirable by the agent involved (parent, teacher, or self), and which are not innate or automatically developed...by the use of a techniques like instruction, training, studying, practice, guidance, discipline, etc." (p. 5). It is important to note that Box C will include a variety of desirable "dispositions" ranging from the knowledge of mathematics to the love of truth.

In a later essay, entitled *The Concept of Education Today*, Frankena (1973) suggests that the primary variable in every conception of education involves the "dispositions" or excellences that are to be fostered (p. 21). In his essay, Frankena (1973) distinguishes between two main conceptions of education that helps us understand the nature of the dispositions outlined by Maritain in *Education at the Crossroads*: 1) the social science conception and 2) the normative conception. First, the social science conception of education, as Frankena (1973) defines it, claims that education is a process or a set of processes and procedures whereby the older generation socializes the younger generation based on dispositions they *regard* as desirable or what they ought to learn. On the other hand, the normative conception of education argues that it would be desirable for the young to acquire those dispositions that *are* desirable (pp. 19-20). Frankena (1973) reasons, based on the distinction he draws between the social science conception of education and the normative conception of education that all those involved in education should adopt the normative conception of education (p. 23). The alternative, for Frankena (1973) is a program of education that "...is simply socialization by society and

personally irrelevant—at least if one does not accept the values implicit in such socialization” (p. 22). From Frankena’s (1973) perspective, and Maritain would agree, it is only when we adopt the normative conception of education can we correctly approach the question of whether or not our present education is morally, politically and religiously defensible.

*Five fundamental “dispositions.”* Maritain (1943) unmistakably espouses a normative conception of education, as defined by Frankena (1973), and I now focus my attention on the five fundamental “dispositions” he outlines in Chapter Two of *Education at the Crossroads*. You will recall that the aim of education in schools, for Maritain, is to develop the intellect, and the five dispositions will ideally be exemplified in students who have strengthened their intellect. It is important to note that the five “dispositions” outlined by Maritain are not exhaustive and only represent “the basic dispositions of human nature” (p. 36). Therefore, these five “dispositions” do not represent an exact listing of all the “dispositions” to be fostered. Maritain briefly identifies five dispositions to be cultivated by the teacher in schools as including: 1) love for knowledge and truth; 2) love of goodness and Justice; 3) love of existence (joy); 4) sense of a job well done; and 5) a commitment to co-operation (pp. 36-38). Each of the aforementioned dispositions is embedded in our human nature, but as Maritain reiterates they can be easily distorted and as such, must be properly cultivated (p. 36). Again, it is important to clarify here that the five “dispositions” explicitly mentioned by Maritain in Chapter Two of *Education at the Crossroads* are broad dispositions and/or excellences and the list is not exhaustive by any means. Maritain (1943) also has other “dispositions” in mind and I discuss these other “dispositions” later.

Maritain designates the love of knowledge and truth as the first of the five fundamental “dispositions” to be fostered in the pupil. Maritain (1943) states that “the only dominating influence in the school and the college must be that of truth, and of the intelligible realities whose illuminating power obtains by its own virtue, not by virtue of the human authority...” (p. 26). When students obtain knowledge by their own virtue, they love knowledge for its own sake and not as a means to another end. Maritain (1962) conceives of knowledge as, “...a value in itself and an end in itself; and truth consists in the conformity of the mind with reality — with what is or exists independently of the mind” (p. 47). Furthermore, for Maritain (1943), “...the prime goal of education is the conquest of internal and spiritual freedom to be achieved by the individual person, or, in other words, his liberation through knowledge and wisdom, goodwill, and love” (p. 11).

The second fundamental “disposition” to be cultivated in the student is ultimately dependent on the first: a love of goodness and justice. As previously mentioned in relationship to sociologism—the fourth misconception in education—Maritain (1943) identifies social conditioning as a real threat to contemporary education (p. 15). Although Maritain acknowledges that education will assist the individual live within a community, “the essence of education does not consist in adapting a potential citizen to the conditions and interactions of social life, but first in *making a man*, and by this very fact in preparing a citizen” (p. 15). Maritain considers preparing a person for social life and citizenship as a secondary aim of education. According to Maritain (1943) “...to be a good citizen and a man of civilization what matters above all is the inner centre, the living source of personal conscience in which originate idealism and generosity, the sense of law and the sense of friendship, respect for others, but at the same time deep-rooted independence with regard to common opinion” (p. 16). The inner centre, described here by Maritain,

refers to the development of reason and the will. The will is not to be fashioned by popular opinion or social convention, but by the understanding of truth. You will recall Maritain's comments on voluntarism in which he explains the relationship between the intellect and the will. Again, for Maritain (1943) the duty of the school system is to strengthen theoretical reason (the intellect) and practical reason and, as a result, indirectly influence the will to do good and act justly (p. 27).

A Catholic education cast by Maritain will also foster a love of existence. Maritain (1943) describes the person who finds joy in existence as one who "*exists* gladly, is unashamed of existing, stands upright in existence, and for whom to be and to accept the natural limitations of existence are matters of equally simple assent (p. 37). Egotism, pride and unhappy experiences are identified by Maritain as obstacles to developing a love of existence (p. 37). Many of the students who come into our classrooms are fearful, depressed, and anxious. A Catholic education, in the Thomistic tradition, must reawaken in students a sense of beauty and the feeling of joy.

The fourth fundamental "disposition" involves nurturing an appropriate attitude towards work through a sense of responsibility and self-discipline in the student. Interestingly, Maritain (1943) is not suggesting that when students develop a sense of a job well done that they are therefore hard working (p.38). Maritain regards manual work as vital to the growth of human beings. In Maritain's own words, "there is no place closer to man than a workshop, and the intelligence of a man is not only in his head, but in his fingers too (p. 45). Maritain (1943) cautions that "...when this fundamental "disposition", which is the first natural move toward self-discipline, this probity in regard to work is marred, an essential basis of human morality is lacking (p. 38). Maritain is



hoping to instil in students a respect for work and a feeling of responsibility towards work, which is part of a person's moral development.

Developing in the student a commitment to co-operation is the fifth and final fundamental "disposition" outlined by Maritain. As we should expect, Maritain's Aristotelian-Thomistic view of human nature informs his position on the importance of developing a sense of co-operation. Maritain (1943) states that co-operation "is as natural in us, and as thwarted too, as the tendency to social and political life (p. 38). What we learn from this statement is that assisting others and collaborating with others is a natural tendency in the human person. However, despite the fact that we are naturally co-operative, we often choose actions that are self-centered regardless of the impact these actions will have on others. To complement Maritain's brief statement on co-operation, I explore here supplementary comments made by Maritain on the importance of co-operation and the democratic way of life.

According to Maritain (1943), human beings are naturally ordained for social living and the co-operation that this inevitably entails; however, at the same time this natural tendency to co-operate can all too easily be corrupted and abused (p. 38). Maritain (1962) reasons that the human person "...is a political animal because he is a reasonable animal, because his reason seeks to develop with the help of education, through the teaching and the co-operation of other men, and because society is thus required to accomplish human dignity" (p. 293). Our very nature as persons requires our co-operation in society and is necessary for living a good life in a good society.

Maritain's understanding of co-operation is perhaps best understood in conjunction with an appreciation of his comments on individuality and personality. Maritain (1943) argues that human beings are both individuals and persons. To review,

individuality refers to the material ego and personality refers to the rational spiritual self. Ultimately, for Maritain (1943), our individuality and our personality are two aspects of the same person (p. 34). Therefore, co-operation can be thwarted because personality "...runs the risk of contamination by the miseries of material individuality, by its meanness, its vanities, its bad habits, its narrowness, its hereditary predispositions, by its natural regime of rivalry and opposition" (Maritain, 1959, p. 232). Concerning education, Maritain (1943) is extremely critical of the "...false form of appreciation of the individual person which, while looking at individuality instead of personality, reduces the education and progress of man to the mere freeing of the material ego" (p. 35). Instead, Maritain is promoting — through liberal education — a *self-perfection* which will occur through reason, self-sacrifice and love. If, as Maritain suggests, personal spiritual perfection is what is most important in education, he rightly concludes that a school education "...consists in inspiring, schooling and pruning, teaching and enlightening, so that the intimacy of man's activities the weight of the egoistic tendencies diminishes, and the weight of the aspirations proper to the personality and its spiritual generosity increases" (p. 35).

Maritain (1943) beautifully explains what he means by "self-perfection" and it is his definition of self-perfection that relates entirely to the disposition of co-operation. Maritain's thinking, self-perfection "...consists of the perfection of love, and so is less the perfection of his "self" than the perfection of his love, where the very self is in some measure lost sight of" (p. 36). A liberated student will be more inclined to co-operate for the benefit of the common good because they have subordinated their material ego (individuality) to their personality, which involves reason. Maritain cautions us never to forget "...that personal freedom itself is at the core of social life, and that a human society

is veritably a group of human freedoms which accept obedience and self-sacrifice and a common law for the general welfare, in order to enable each of these freedoms to reach in everyone a truly human fulfillment" (p. 15). We are reminded of Christ's directive in the Gospel of Luke: "Whoever clings to this life will lose it, and whoever loses his life will save it" (Luke 17:33). Maritain himself echoes the message of Christ in the Gospels by indicating that "man finds himself by subordinating himself to the group and the group attains its goal only by serving man..." (p. 15). In this way the "social" aspect of the human person and the "person" unite in harmony to sustain the democratic way of life.

Maritain's (1943) vision for education includes the very important teaching of democratic principles and good citizenship; however, we must remember that "the ultimate end of education concerns the human person in his personal life and spiritual progress, not in his relationship to the social environment (p. 15). Maritain, of course, places personal spiritual progress above social relationships because what matters most is the inner center of the person, which only when perfected can properly orient itself toward the common good. In a short section on the social potentialities of the person, Maritain examines the external manifestation of internal freedom and liberation.

According to Maritain, social life and co-operation has the potential to "...subordinate the individual to the common good, but always in order that the common good flow back upon the individuals, and that they enjoy that freedom of expansion or independence which is insured by the economic guarantees of labor and ownership, political rights, civil virtues, and the cultivation of the mind" (p. 14). This is Maritain's democratic vision and developing in students the disposition of co-operation is central in attaining this democratic vision.

Although Maritain's direct discussion of co-operation as one of the five fundamental "dispositions" is brief, we find numerous references in his writings on the person's responsibility to society and other human beings. Just as the person is a compilation of individuality and personality that must co-operate to achieve self-perfection, our society is made up of human beings who co-operate for the common good and the development of the democratic way of life. There is no doubt that, for Maritain, the disposition of co-operation plays a crucial role in the development of our humanity.

*Other "dispositions"*. The five fundamental "dispositions" explored above are of course not an exhaustive list as Maritain suggests. Maritain (1943) includes other very important "dispositions" that are to be cultivated in the young during their school education. Other significant dispositions include acquisition of speculative (theoretical) and practical reason. I do not wish to repeat my previous discussion on speculative (theoretical) and practical reason in Chapter Four: however, I will restate that through speculative (theoretical) reason (knowing *that*), a person discovers truths that are timeless and independent of the human mind" (Frankena, 1965b, p. 26). Similar to Aristotle, Maritain would agree that "theoretical thinking is excellent or well done when it attains the truth about what is so and what is not so, without any regard to the guidance of human action or to the satisfaction of human desire (Frankena, 1965b, p. 38). Theoretical reason involves knowing for the sake of knowing. The ultimate purpose of equipping the intelligence at the elementary, secondary, and post secondary level is to prepare the mind for the development of the intellectual virtues such as wisdom (Maritain, 1962, p. 49). We must remember that wisdom is the goal of education in the wider sense.

Practical reason involves knowing for the sake of action and to evaluate actions as a means to legitimate ends. Therefore, "practical thinking is excellent or well done when

it attains the truth and corresponds to right desire or the truth about action in relation to what is good or bad for human beings—that is, when it achieves knowledge of the right end, or the good, and of the means for realizing it, or, more specifically, when it attains knowledge of what is morally right” (Frankena, 1965b, p. 38). It must be reiterated that the attainment of practical wisdom is in no way an attempt by educators to “educate the will.” Maritain (1943) strongly distinguishes between practical reason and the actual attainment of moral virtues (p. 27). Furthermore, Maritain argues that schools are involved with preparing the student to act morally. Finally, the school’s duty is “...not to shape the will and directly to develop moral virtues in the youth, but to enlighten and strengthen reason; so it is that an indirect influence is exerted on the will...” (p. 27).

Various other dispositions represented in Maritain’s (1943) philosophy of education include: civic understanding (p. 15), sense of law, friendship, and a respect for others (p. 16), critical thinking skills (p. 27), creativity (p. 43), giving courage and trust to free the student’s intuitive power (p. 43), an eagerness for experience and reason (p. 46), and a sense of the sacred (p. 69). These are the “dispositions” that must also be included in Box C because these are what follow from Frankena’s “practical” approach (Boxes C, D, E). This list of “dispositions” includes skills, attitudes, and values that Maritain wishes schools, as part of the educational sphere, to impart to their students.

#### *Practical Recommendations (Box E)*

Frankena (1965a), states that a normative philosophy of education will include “a number of practical precepts about what should be done and how it should be done” (p. 7). The practical recommendations, outlined by Maritain (1943) in his philosophy of education are interwoven throughout his discussion on the norms of education, on the

complementary role of both the student and the teacher, on a liberal arts curriculum, and on the importance of teaching philosophy and theology.

*Norms of education.* The practical recommendations made by Maritain (1943) are numerous and he clearly outlines what teachers in schools must do to foster the five fundamental “dispositions” along with the other “dispositions” outlined in the first part of this chapter. To recall, the five fundamental “dispositions” identified by Maritain include: 1) love of knowledge and truth, 2) love of goodness and justice, 3) love of existence (joy), 4) sense of a job well done, and 5) a sense of co-operation. Maritain recommends that the school’s pedagogical efforts be guided by four fundamental norms and/or rules: 1) to foster the five dispositions; 2) to focus on the inner personality of the student; 3) to unify the human person; and 4) to liberate the mind (pp. 39-57). These four rules or standards are rooted, as indicated by the broken lines in Figure 3, in Maritain’s view on the primary and secondary ends education and his adherence to the tenants of Aristotelian-Thomistic metaphysics and epistemology.

With respect to the first rule, we must bear in mind that the primary task of education in the strictest sense—in schools—is to enlighten the mind and strengthen reason. The enlightenment and strengthening of reason will hopefully occur if teachers foster the fundamental “dispositions.” As Maritain (1943) states, “the only dominating influence in the school and the college must be that of truth...” (p. 26). Furthermore, Maritain insists that “...from the very start the teacher must respect in the child the dignity of mind, must appeal to the child’s power of understanding, and conceive of his own effort as preparing a human mind to think for itself” (p. 26). The practical recommendations made by Maritain all hinge on the primary task of schooling, which is to strengthen the intellect. He claims that “the vital and active principle of knowledge

does exist in each of us” (p. 31) and, therefore, “the real art is to make the child heedful of his own resources and potentialities...” (p. 39). In order to support the child’s potential, the school environment must be built upon love and respect on the part of both the students and the teachers. In summary, Maritain insists that enlightenment and encouragement are the ideal means to ensure that students, as the primary agent in the process, acquire the desirable dispositions.

The second rule outlined by Maritain (1943) instructs educators to *respect* “the inner depths of personality and its preconscious spiritual dynamism (p. 39). At this point, Maritain distinguishes between the irrational subconscious, emphasized by the Freudian school, and the preconscious of the spirit (p. 40). Maritain defines the preconscious of the spirit as the “... the root life of those spiritual powers, the intellect and the will, the fathomless abyss of personal freedom and of the personal thirst and striving for knowing and seeing, grasping and expressing...” (p. 40). The type of respect Maritain calls for entails “...an intellectual sympathy and intuition on the part of the teacher, concern for the questions and difficulties with which the mind of the youth may be entangled without being able to give expression to them a readiness to be at hand with the lessons of logic and reasoning that invite to action the unexercised reason of the youth” (p. 43). Maritain comments, at the beginning of his discussion on the preconscious of the spirit, that other rationalist and empiricist mentalities have been intellectually closed to the “intimate vitality of the soul” (p. 41). The teacher’s intellectual sympathy and attention to the student’s inner personality will provide an environment for the student to experience spontaneity, curiosity, trust and courage (p. 43). Furthermore, “the path of sense perception and sense-experience and imagination, should be respected and followed as far as possible by the teacher” (p. 44). So, Maritain is certainly not against utilizing sense

experience and the best of advances in progressive education. However, we must keep in mind that for Maritain "the freeing of the intuitive power is achieved in the soul through the object grasped, the intelligible grasping toward which this power naturally tends" (p. 44). When a student grasps an object they are acquiring knowledge and their intuitive power is strengthened.

Maritain makes some key comments regarding the appropriate methods for creating an environment where spontaneity, curiosity, trust and courage can blossom. The virtues of courage and temperance are included by Maritain as desirable dispositions to be fostered. Ultimately, the teacher must trust in order to develop trust in the pupil. Maritain (1943) hopes that "...the very life of the intellect, would not be sacrificed to cramming memorization or to conventional rules of skill in making use of concepts or words, or to the honest and conscientious but mechanical and hopeless cultivation of overspecialized fields of learning" (p. 42). The power of intuition will certainly not develop in our students if we drown them in expectations and facts about which they are indifferent or if we do not see to it that they truly understand a concept before we move on to more complex material (p. 44). Understanding, as conceived by Maritain is more than "being informed," it is actually grasping the material in a profound way. Finally, this will require that the teacher be "...concerned with discerning and seeing, with getting vision, rather than with collecting facts and opinions..." (p. 45). Teachers, themselves, must be convinced that schooling is more than just collecting facts and "being informed;" schooling is the avenue for the awakening of the intellect.

The whole point of education in schools, for Maritain (1943), is the freeing of the students intuitive power and the strengthening of the intellect, and he aptly states that "no tricks can do that, no set of techniques, but only personal attention to the inner



blossoming of the rational nature and then confronting that budding reason with a system of rational knowledge” (p. 43). In order for a teacher to attend to the pupil’s rational nature, he/she must “respect in the child the dignity of the mind, must appeal to the child’s power of understanding, and conceive of his own effort as preparing a human mind to think for itself” (p. 26). Recall that for Maritain the five fundamental “dispositions” are natural tendencies that need to be cultivated in order that they will not be distorted (p. 26). It is reasonable then for Maritain to insist that education is properly directed towards the liberation of these natural tendencies as well as others.

Maritain (1943) speaks directly to the practical application of his ideas by encouraging educators to foster in students a love of knowledge and learning as an end in itself and not solely as a means to obtain a credit or to qualify for a certain job. Schooling that promotes an instrumentalist view of knowledge will not satisfy the person’s desire for truth in itself. Therefore, this deep longing for truth is a natural inclination that must be actualized during the years that young people are in formal schools. Maritain describes the process of actualization in the following description of learning.

Before giving a youth the rules of good style, let us tell him first never to write anything which does not seem to him really beautiful, whatever the result may be.

In the first approach to mathematics, physics, or philosophy, let us see to it that the student actually grasps each step of the simplest mathematical demonstration, however slow this may be—that he actually understands in the laboratory how logically the statement of the physicist emerges from the experiment—that he becomes intensely involved, through the very anxiety of his mind, in the first great philosophical problems, and after that, that he really sees the solution. In asking a youth to read a book, let us get him to undertake a real spiritual adventure and meet

and struggle with the internal world of a given man, instead of glancing over a collection of bits of thought and dead opinions, looked upon from without and with sheer indifference, according to the horrible custom of so many victims of what they call "being informed." Perhaps with such methods the curriculum will lose a little in scope, which will be all to the good. (pp. 44-45)

It is not uncommon for educators, especially those in Ontario, to stress about covering all of the expectations outlined in a particular curriculum document. Some teachers may attempt to cram students with information so they will "be informed" without stopping to consider whether or not the students understand what they are learning or whether they are experiencing "beauty." Educators in all subject areas have the ability to awaken in students a love of knowledge and truth (Maritain, 1943, p. 45). The student is "intensely" involved in the learning process and is by no means passive. Ultimately, a few curriculum expectations may need to be omitted and as Maritain indicates, this may be more beneficial for students in the end.

The third rule of education relates to the second given that education in the "broad" sense aims at internal "unity" within the person. In terms of unity, Maritain (1943) is referring to the mind and the hands united together on the journey towards intelligence and knowledge (p. 45). Recall, that one of the fundamental dispositions listed by Maritain includes our attitude toward work and specifically, the development of a sense of a job well done and a responsibility towards work. If the human person is a compilation of body and mind, it only stands to reason that schools must address both of these aspects of the person; precisely because "...the intelligence of a man is not only in this head, but in his fingers too" (Maritain, p. 45). Moreover, Maritain is hopeful that the dignity of work will be valued even more in the future leaving the "cleavage between

*homo faber* and *homo sapiens* done away with” (p. 46). It is important for Maritain that manual work accompanies intellectual work precisely because human beings are makers or producers (*homo faber*), as well as thinkers (*homo sapiens*). The role of schools, in the strictest sense, is not to complete the process of internal unity within the person or to make a person wise, but to promote the growth and development of our internal unity by preparing young people to “overcome the diverse currents of knowledge and belief and the diverse vital energies at play in his mind” (p. 47). Maritain suggests that, in order to prepare young people to organize the various types and fields of knowledge, a comprehensive universally appropriate to each stage of schooling must be adopted.

Practically, the “...universal and articulate comprehension of human achievements in science and culture...takes shape in profoundly different ways on the several levels of education (p. 48). Furthermore, “each stage of education deals with a comprehensive universality of its own, approaching little by little that of maturity, and at each stage education should be guided by the vision of the appropriate mental world of comprehensive of “symphonic” universality (p. 49). Essentially what Maritain (1962) means by “comprehensive universality” is related to the distinction between *natural intelligence* and the *intellectual virtues* (pp. 48-50). Maritain defines *natural intelligence* as “...intelligence considered in its bare nature” (p. 49) while “the intellectual virtues are special energies which grow in intelligence and are acquired through exercise in a given object (p. 49). Maritain explains that universal knowledge is possible at the level of the intellectual virtues, but not at the level of natural intelligence (p. 49). Therefore, a “basic liberal education is liberal education directed to the natural intelligence in youth, with thorough respect for this intelligence, for its peculiar behaviour still steeped in imagination, as well as for its need for unity, but with no pretension to go beyond it and

enter the sphere proper to the intellectual virtues (p. 50). Finally, in order for students to appropriately understand universal truths, they must be appropriately developed over various stages in their educational careers, which is explained in more detail in a subsequent section relating to Maritain's curriculum structure.

In order for educators to foster the disposition of a love of knowledge and truth in their students, they must recognize the role of experience endowed with reason (Maritain, 1943, p. 46). Although Maritain indicates that the importance of experience in education is obvious, he insists that adopting an empiricist or rationalist mentality is not the appropriate response. Maritain does insist that sense-experience is the beginning of knowledge; however, experience must be understood through reason. As a Thomist, Maritain advocates that we "...disengage from experience the rational and necessary connections with which that experience is pregnant, and which become visible only by means of abstraction and universal concepts, and in the light of the intuitive first principles of reason" (p. 46). In keeping with his realist epistemology, Maritain calls for educators to "...inspire eagerness both for experience and for reason, teach reason to base itself on facts and experience to realize itself in rational knowledge, grounded on principles, looking at the *raisons d'être*, causes and ends, and grasping reality in terms of how and why" (pp. 46-47). Neither reason nor experience alone will assist us in knowing the truth. What Maritain envisions is a school system that encourages the development and value of both reason and experience. It is clear that teaching, along with the philosophy of education underlying it, requires "...a sound philosophy of knowledge and of the degrees of knowledge" (p. 48). Maritain fittingly claims that "education and teaching can only achieve their internal unity if the manifold parts of their whole work are

organized and quickened by a vision of wisdom as the supreme goal..." (p. 48). Schools should help to foster an integrated comprehensive worldview.

Maritain's fourth and final rule for teachers also concerns the liberation and enlightenment of the mind. Learning, according to Maritain, will not take place if students are passive and only mechanically receiving knowledge. On the contrary, students must become intimately connected to what they are learning, and this cannot take place if students are passively receiving information without understanding. Maritain (1943) comments that "reason which receives knowledge in a servile manner does not really know and is only depressed by a knowledge which is not its own but that of others" (p. 50). Knowledge must be suitably assimilated by the student intimately connected to their own experience. Only when students understand the material and can grasp the reasons and/or evidence for accepting it can we confidently claim that they are learning.

In reference to the distinction between training-value and knowledge-value, Maritain (1943) is clear that educators must not be seduced by the argument that what students learn is not as important as "mental training" (p. 51). In response to instrumentalist philosophers of education, who would endorse a curriculum focusing on mental training, Maritain states the following:

The knowledge which is "of most worth"—I don't mean which has the most practical value, I mean which makes the mind penetrate into those things which are the richest in truth and intelligibility—such knowledge affords by itself the best mental training, for it is by grasping the object and having itself seized and vitalized by truth that the human mind gains both its strength and its freedom. It is not by the gymnastics of its faculties, it is by truth that it is set free, when truth is really

known, that is, vitally assimilated by the insatiable activity which is rooted in the depths of the self. The opposition between knowledge-value and training-value comes from an ignorance of what knowledge is, from the assumption that knowledge is a cramming of materials into a bag, and not the vital action by means of which things are spiritualized in order to become one with the spirit. (pp. 51-52)

Ultimately, the aim of schools is to have the child or young person come to know the truth and not only to become proficient through training in a specific physical or mental skill. Maritain argues that the knowledge that will liberate the mind will also serve to train the mind. Just because students can *work* with the knowledge they have been given, does not mean that they have acquired knowledge or achieved understanding. Maritain is critical of those instrumentalist and pragmatic approaches that would have us substitute training-value for knowledge-value.

To *delight* in the liberal arts is, for Maritain (1943), the best means of mental training that will produce a strong and free intellect. In a footnote following his discussion on the importance of valuing knowledge above training, Maritain makes this comment on *delight*:

The good method requires first the intuitive delight, both emotional and intellectual, in the [art] work's beauty, second, the rational disquisition of the very causes of this delight and of the intelligible regulations by which the work has been internally and vitally ruled and structured. It is necessary to make clear for the understanding of the pupil the inner logic of a Mozart sonata, read and discussed from the score. But it is first necessary for the pupil to hear the sonata, and be delighted in it, and love it with his ears and with his heart. (Footnote \*, p. 52)

Maritain is obviously pleased with the recent gains made by modern pedagogical theories, such as Dewey's pragmatism, in the area of experiential learning. In this instance, Maritain clearly updates Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition to reflect contemporary understanding of the learner and the learning process. However, understanding still involves delight, and it is only when we delight in knowledge that we can claim that we understand it. It is appropriate, given Maritain's comments on knowledge-value, training-value and delight, to conclude that neither instrumentalism nor pragmatism will probably produce *delight* in the student because the end goal will always be limited as one of training-value.

In terms of the curriculum structure, Maritain (1943) makes use of his distinction between knowledge-value and training value to divide the subjects to be taught into two main categories: 1) subjects with knowledge as the main value, which Maritain classifies as learning, and 2) subjects with training as the main value, which are classified as play (p. 55, refer also to Appendix B). It is important to note that both categories of subjects, knowledge value and training value, are still linked to reason. Maritain's conception of play includes the recognition that play has an important, albeit secondary, function in school life and learning. This acceptance of play as an important vehicle for knowledge may seem surprising given that our first instinct may be to view play as an activity removed from rational development. Play is acknowledged by Maritain as a vehicle for free expression and what he calls "poetical cheerfulness" (p. 55). Some of the subjects Maritain incorporates under the category of play include: physical education, games, sports, mechanics, and cooking (p. 55). Although Maritain does not identify these activities under the category of genuine learning, they are none-the-less dignified (pp. 55-56) and serve an important purpose in the attainment of the excellences.

The category of learning, which includes those subjects whose main value is knowledge-value, is divided by Maritain (1943) into two main divisions: 1) pre-liberal arts and 2) liberal arts (p. 56). The pre-liberal arts or *trivium*, inspired by Aristotle and restructured by Maritain, includes “those matters the knowledge of which concerns the intellectual instruments and logical discipline required for the achievements of reason, as well as the treasure of factual and experiential information which must be gathered in memory” (p. 56). As such, the subjects identified as appropriate as pre-liberal arts are: Eloquence (thought expression); literature and poetry; and music and fine arts. In reference to Eloquence, Maritain states that it is “an art the neglect of which is so harmful to modern youth, who often lose their sense of the worthiness and accuracy of words, and become unable even to compose when they enter upon practical life...” (pp. 56-57). Maritain recognizes the value of literature and the arts of which act as vehicles for thought-expression, which in his opinion, is lacking in the youth of his era. The focus of the liberal arts is on “...those matters the knowledge of which refers directly to the creative or perceptive intuition of the intellect and to that thirst for seeing...” (p. 56).

I have already highlighted that for Maritain “seeing” here designates the assent of the soul to objective and universal truth. Therefore, the subjects, identified by Maritain (1943) as appropriate for the second division or *quadrivium* are: Mathematics, Physics and the Natural Sciences, Philosophy, and Ethics and Political and Social Philosophy. I would like to digress briefly to discuss Maritain’s opposition to schools becoming “houses of sophistry”. Maritain (1943) views sophistry<sup>14</sup> as a negative influence because this pattern of teaching encourages “...a mind that is quick, clever, ready to see pros and

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<sup>14</sup> *The Oxford Canadian Dictionary*, 2<sup>nd</sup> Edition (2006) defines sophistry as “the use of intentionally deceptive or specious arguments or reasoning”.



cons, eager to discuss, and to discuss anything..." (p. 53); but in fact, what they encourage are "...disarmed and talkative minds, that believe they are well informed but live by words and opinions" (p. 53). Maritain's concern centers on the fact that he views knowledge as more than just the attainment of facts and the ability to recall information.

Truth, in Maritain's (1943) own words must be "apprehended and assented to" (p. 53). If schools do not encourage students to understand the information that is being presented to them and to grasp the reasons and/or evidence for accepting this information, in Maritain's words, our teaching will be "a drift toward dilettantism" (p. 53), which will have the effect of turning-out students who "are absolutely lost in the midst of matters of knowledge and discussion the inner value and the respective importance of which they cannot and do not want to discern and recognize" (p. 53). Maritain's words regarding the problems related to sophistry, dilettantism, and instrumentalism are directly related to the fundamental disposition that students love the truth and this "love" is a result of knowing the truth. It is in strengthening both speculative (theoretical) and practical reason that we will come to a love for truth and knowledge and truly delight in it. It is quite clear that Maritain's conception of knowledge and truth is much more than the simple acquisition and memorization of facts and figures. A well-informed and well-trained mind is not one that is simply "in dialogue" with other opinions but one that is "in dialogue" with the truth related to the problems of humanity that cannot be answered solely by the empirical sciences. In coming back to my summary of Maritain's curriculum structure, we realize now that the subjects included by Maritain in his *trivium* and *quadrivium* are to be taught in such a way that recognizes a hierarchy of subjects and to assist students in strengthening reason (of both kinds) in order that they will apprehend and assent to truth.

The role of the teacher and the student becomes more apparent now that we have an understanding of the aim of schooling.

*Role of the teacher and the student.* Maritain (1943) describes the role of both the student and teacher as “two dynamic factors or agents at work in education” (p. 29). These two dynamic factors are: 1) the natural activity of the student’s mind and 2) the activity of the teacher (pp. 29-31). In contrast to Plato, along with some progressivists, who reason that the student is the only dynamic factor at work in education, Maritain argues that the teacher plays a vital role in influencing the learning process (pp. 1-2, 29). Maritain rejects outright the Platonic view of recall and the notion that education is simply drawing out knowledge that already exists in the mind of the student. Maritain seems to prefer, at least partly, the Aristotelian conception of education, which asserts that “the teacher actually communicates knowledge to the student whose soul has *not* previously contemplated the divine Ideas before being united to his body” (p. 30).

How then does learning take place for Maritain? Although knowledge does not exist in the form of ideas already in the mind, Maritain (1943) insists — as a Thomist — that the “active principle” of knowledge does exist in the mind of learners; however, it also requires the activities of the teacher. Maritain describes the nature of this active principle of knowledge as “the inner seeing power of intelligence” and identifies what this implies.

The inner seeing power of intelligence, which naturally and from the very start perceives through sense-experience the primary notions on which all knowledge depends, is thereby able to proceed from what it already knows to what it does not yet know... This inner vital principle the teacher must respect above all; his art consists in imitating the ways of the intellectual nature in its own operations.

Thus the teacher has to offer the mind either examples from experience or particular statements which the pupil is able to judge by virtue of what he already knows and from which he will go on to discover broader horizons. The teacher has further to comfort the mind of the pupil by putting before his eyes the logical connections between ideas which the analytical or deductive power of the pupil's mind is perhaps not strong enough to establish by itself. (p. 31)

What we can glean from Maritain's statements on the student's inner vitality is that, contrary to the Platonic conception, the student possesses some kind of natural "active" ability that when coupled with the intellectual guidance of the educator allows for the appropriate kind of learning to take place. Ultimately, the teacher (secondary agent) must respect the student's (primary agent) intellect and, in recognizing that all knowledge is rooted in sense experience, work to assist the student to expand what he/she already knows through experience. In an earlier section of his book, Maritain (1943) states that "the one who does not yet know must believe a master, but only in order to know, and maybe to reject at this very moment the opinions of the master; and he believes him provisionally, only because of the truth which the teacher is supposed to convey" (p. 26). In Maritain's view, trust and belief is necessary for knowledge and rightly belongs in Box C as one of the desirable "dispositions" or excellences to be fostered. We can conclude, given Maritain's statement here, that the teacher does not and should not have supreme authority over the mind of the student and the student is not a passive receptacle to be filled.

Despite the important role played by the teacher, who possesses a knowledge that the student does not, Maritain (1943) insists that "the principle agent in education, the primary dynamic factor or propelling force, is the internal vital principle in the one to be

educated; the educator or the teacher is only the secondary—though a genuinely effective—dynamic factor and a ministerial agent” (p. 31). To illustrate his point, Maritain continues his explication of the two dynamic factors involved in schooling (the student and the teacher) by comparing his Thomistic philosophy of education with “traditional education” and “progressive education.” Maritain classifies “education by the rod” as characterizing traditional education, while progressive education is characterized as that which emphasizes the “freedom” of the child as the only dynamic factor in education (p. 32). Maritain protests against both the traditional education and the progressive education for various reasons. Maritain’s criticism of traditional education in schools rests primarily on his position that “...any education which considers the teacher as the principle agent perverts the very nature of the educational task” (p. 32). The teacher, as has been emphasized earlier, must respect and sympathize with the intellect of the pupil and their natural tendency to discover truth (see Maritain, p. 43).

Interestingly, despite the fact that Maritain (1943) is proposing an Aristotelian-Thomistic philosophy of education, he recognizes the merits and similarities between the Thomistic conception of education and the progressive movement in education and does not assume that all modern movements in education are inappropriate. The great achievement of progressive education has been the rediscovery that the student is the principle dynamic in education. However, Maritain repeatedly condemns the progressive teaching methods endorsed by the pragmatists as “missing the mark.” In reference to the hope that schools will help students develop a love of the truth, Maritain states that the pragmatic theory of knowledge will only “cause minds to distrust the very idea of truth and wisdom...” (p. 13). Later on, Maritain states that “the pragmatist theory can only

subordinate and enslave education to the trends which may develop in collective life and society” (p. 17) without any standard from which to judge these trends. Furthermore, Maritain is unwilling to accept what he describes as, the progressives “...out-of-date rationalistic prejudices and utopian philosophy of life...” and insists that they do “...not forget that the teacher, too, is a real cause and agent—though only co-operating with nature—a real giver whose own dynamism, moral authority, and positive guidance are indispensable” (p. 33). The role of the teacher is to cooperate with God and nature in guiding the student to knowledge, with the recognition that all knowledge is possible through God’s grace.

Assigning a causal role to the teacher does not delineate the child’s freedom. On the contrary, Maritain (1943) contends that “the freedom of the child is the spontaneity of a human and rational nature, and this largely *undetermined* spontaneity has its inner principle of final determination only in reason, which has not yet adequately developed in the child” (p. 33). Real freedom does not rest in allowing the instincts or impulses of the child to govern the educational process, but in recognizing that our inner vitality finds its fulfillment in reason and ultimately wisdom. Maritain has previously rejected voluntarism, a theory which conceives the will, not the intellect, to be the dominant factor in our experience and reduces knowledge to acts of faith (footnote \* p. 21). Voluntarism is conceived by Maritain as a negative outcome of the rejection of intellectualism and the rational capacity of the human person.

School education then, is described by Maritain (1943) as “an art of ministering” (p. 30) and consequently, to achieve wisdom and authentic freedom, the student needs a minister (educator) to guide them and ensure that their impressionable minds do not get off course. As a final point on the two dynamic factors in education, Maritain states that

“the right of the child to be educated requires that the educator shall have moral authority over him, and this authority is nothing else than the duty of the adult to the freedom of the youth” (p. 33). Ultimately, this freedom that Maritain speaks of involves the freedom of the youth to think well for themselves (p. 26). Unfortunately, many in our society incorrectly assume that the freeing of the material ego is authentic freedom. But as Maritain has argued, it is the freedom of the personality (the spiritual element) that brings true freedom.

*Liberal education.* Maritain’s philosophy of education centers on his notion that all students in school/college should experience a liberal education. The present section on liberal education expands the previous comments made regarding Maritain’s *trivium* and *quadrivium*. Maritain devotes Part III of *Education at the Crossroads* to the humanities and liberal education and I explore, in some detail, his conception of liberal education along with the specific methodological and curriculum implications for educators in schools (see Appendix C). Maritain argues that a liberal education will most likely develop the dispositions outlined in Box C.

First, Maritain (1962) defines liberal education as an “education directed toward wisdom, centered on the humanities, aiming to develop in people the capacity to think correctly and to enjoy truth and beauty...” (p. 69). Maritain’s reference to wisdom indicates that the role of the school, in the strictest sense, is to prepare and orient young people towards the ultimate goal of education in the broad sense. Maritain’s conception of liberal education is not one that is reserved solely for the wealthy and elite, but is one that all children have a right to receive, given that all people are part of the human family and share the fundamental characteristics of human nature described by Maritain at the outset of *Education at the Crossroads* (see pp. 7-8). Recall that one of the errors,

identified by Maritain (1943), in contemporary education is that of *intellectualism* (p. 18). The two forms of intellectualism identified by Maritain (1943) as destructive are classical pedagogies' emphasis on "rhetorical skill" and contemporary intellectualism that seeks to eliminate universal values in favour of scientific and technological specialization. There is no place in the democratic way of life for educational institutions directed solely for the privileged classes or those that insist on the promotion of utilitarian ends.

So, Maritain's (1943) conception of liberal education is not as it was conceived by the Greeks in the past— an education for the privileged classes or as a "purely literal" education. Maritain (1943) presents his program for a liberal education as a universal education for all (p. 64). Although Maritain generally agrees with Aristotle's conception of education, one of the ways that Maritain is set apart from Aristotle is in his democratic understanding of liberal education as open to all regardless of race, gender, or economic status. Aristotle's education, although it did have a political goal, was not a democratic education in that some members of society were viewed as not being capable of the kind of education that would lead of happiness (Frankena, 1965b, pp. 61-63). On the contrary, Maritain argues that all human beings are required to think and as such, liberal education, which enables the person to think well, must be available to all and not only the privileged few. Maritain (1962) states that "popular education must become liberal and liberal education must become popular" (p. 150).

Furthermore, the democratic way of life demands a particular understanding of the person being educated. According to Maritain (1962), proponents of a basic liberal education should view students "as future citizens, who must act as free men and who are able to make sound and independent judgments in new and changing situations, either with respect to the body politic or to their own particular task" (p. 75). The connection

between liberal education and ensuring the growth of the democratic character cannot be overstated. It is precisely because a liberal education is best suited to stimulate and discipline theoretical and practical reason that the democratic character will grow among citizens. It is important to note that during adolescence (see Appendix C), when this type of liberal education would take place, the young person is not considered an expert, but is only mid-way through their school education. It is only after the college years, within Institutes of Advanced Research, that a student can claim to be an expert in their chosen field of knowledge (pp. 83-84).

For those who may criticize Maritain's (1943) promotion of a liberal education as inadequate in a technologically and scientifically advanced society, Maritain presents the following rebuttal highlighting the connection between theoretical reason and practical reason:

Even as to industrial achievements, man's free ingenuity strengthened by an education which liberates and broadens the mind is of as great import as technical specialization, for out of these free resources of human intelligence there arises, in managers and workers, the power of adapting themselves to new circumstances and mastering them. (p. 20)

Maritain's (1943) vision for education is truly an egalitarian one that will provide the means of personal fulfillment for all students, despite their individual abilities and backgrounds (p. 90). Maritain agrees, of course, that students preparing for work in the technology sector or in the sciences will also benefit from the strengthening of their reason and intelligence. But a liberal education, as defined by Maritain, will provide students with the capability of transferring their knowledge to new situations because they will not be narrowly specialized in only one field. Ultimately, the benefits of a



liberal education—being personal and social liberation—transcend time and technological advancement.

In Maritain's definition of liberal education, he makes several references to *human education* and it is important to understand what a *human education* involves and its association with liberal education. The purpose of education in the broad sense, for Maritain, is to provide the person with the means and faculties to become fully human by realizing his or her capacities for reason and love. In the following section Maritain (1961) addresses the nature of a *human education* and identifies the key characteristics or outcomes of a liberal education.

...education is fully human education only when it is liberal education, preparing the youth to exercise his power to think in a genuinely free and liberating manner — that is to say, when, it equips him for truth and makes him capable of judging according to the worth of evidence, of enjoying truth and beauty for their own sake, and of advancing, when he has become a man, toward wisdom and some understanding of these things which bring him intimations of immortality. (p. 48)

Inherent in a humanistic education, which Maritain identifies as a liberal education, is the idea that truth and knowledge are always viewed as final ends and never as a means to another end. The humanistic value of education is eroded, according to Maritain, when we give in to positivistic biases or when we reduce knowledge to its practical application. If students judge “according to the worth of evidence” (Maritain, 1943, p. 48), they are ultimately judging with good reasons (both theoretical and practical).

Therefore, in avoiding positivism and the reduction of knowledge to its practical benefits, Maritain (1962) reiterates that “the objective of basic liberal education is not the acquisition of science itself or of art itself...but rather the grasp of their meaning and the

comprehension of the truth and beauty they yield” (p. 71) and furthermore to grasp “...this truth or beauty through the natural powers and gifts of his mind and the natural intuitive energy of his reason backed up by his whole sensuous, imaginative and emotional dynamism” (p.71). In terms of content knowledge, Maritain (1962) is clear that the deeper intellectual enjoyment is to supersede mere factual information at the secondary level and it may be the case that “less is more.” To emphasize this point further, Maritain (1943) states that “what is learned should never be passively or mechanically received, as dead information which weighs down and dulls the mind” (p. 50). On the contrary, Maritain goes on to claim that “reason which receives knowledge in a servile manner does not really know and is only depressed by a knowledge which is not its own but that of others” (p. 50). Maritain (1943), insists throughout *Education at the Crossroads*, that the primary question is whether or not the possession of knowledge or the development of mental skill/training is of most worth in a school education (p. 51). Ultimately, for Maritain, the answer is clear: “the opposition between knowledge-value and training-value comes from an ignorance of what knowledge is, from the assumption that knowledge is a cramming of materials into a bag, and not the most vital action by means of which things are spiritualized in order to become one with the spirit” (pp. 51-52). Therefore, according to Maritain (1943) the possession of knowledge requires authentic understanding and assent based on good reasons in order to transform students from slaves of knowledge into masters of knowledge. Maritain (1943) is confident that if these values are adhered to, the material to be taught would become less burdensome and the quality of teaching would improve (p. 72).

In terms of content knowledge, the teacher may find some solace in knowing that their specific goal at the adolescent level (see Appendix C) is not to create wise men and women or “experts” before they complete their formal education. For Maritain (1943),

The purpose of elementary and higher education is not to make of the youth a truly wise man, but to equip his mind with an ordered knowledge which will enable him to advance toward wisdom in his manhood. Its specific aim is to provide him with the foundations of real wisdom, and with a universal and articulate comprehension of human achievements in science and culture, before he enters upon the definite and limited tasks of adult life in the civil community, and even when he is preparing himself for these tasks through specialized scientific, technical, or vocational training. (p. 48)

It is the “foundation” of wisdom and not the attainment of wisdom itself that is the goal of schooling during the adolescent years (age 13-19). Advancing towards wisdom (universal knowledge) is a lifelong journey, and for most of us, this journey will continue until our death (Maritain, 1943, p. 26). Maritain’s expectations are realistic and important in terms of what schools and educators can really do in the relatively short period that students are in the formal school system.

Maritain (1943) identifies one final important characteristic of liberal education as the avoidance of premature specialization in the curriculum (p. 64). Premature specialization kills the benefits of a liberal education at the adolescent stage (Maritain, p. 64). The minimal amount of specialization that will occur during college education for Maritain “...is merely that which the temperament, gifts, and inclinations of the youth himself spontaneously provide” (p. 64). Young people are going to demonstrate a love of certain areas of the curriculum and this is to be encouraged within a prescribed

curriculum. Maritain wisely states that “laziness must be fought, of course, but encouraging and urging a youth on the ways which he likes and in which he succeeds is much more important, providing, however, that he be also trained in the things for which he feels less inclination, and that he traverses the entire field of those human possibilities and achievements which compose liberal education” (p. 65). Maritain is understandably critical of the child-centered school, preprofessional undergraduate courses and the elective system and progressive educations focus on child centered education (n\* p. 65). Maritain’s fundamental concern with these latter three educational initiatives is the fact that they allow for the reduction in the content of education to either the whims of the child or the professions (Ibid). In Maritain’s view the school curriculum must be, for the most part, prescribed and includes specific content.

*Three stages of schooling.* In order to avoid such a child-centered education, the elective system proposed by progressive education and the trend in allowing specialized preprofessional courses at the high school and college level (Maritain, 1943, pp. 13-14, 17), Maritain proposes a unique curriculum structure. First, Maritain identifies three main stages in education: 1) elementary education; 2) secondary/college; and 3) university education/advanced studies (p. 58, see also Appendix C). Appropriately, Maritain (1943) argues that “these periods correspond not only to three natural chronological periods in the growth of the youth but also to three naturally distinct and qualitatively determinate spheres of psychological development, and, accordingly, of knowledge” (p. 58). Therefore, each stage in education, identified by Maritain, corresponds to three stages in the chronological development of the person: child, adolescent, and adult. Maritain remarks that educators must be aware of the different types of knowledge in order to avoid cramming “...young people with a chaos of

summarized adult notions which have been either condensed, dogmatized, and textbookishly cut up or else made so easy that they are reduced to the vanishing point” (p. 59). Furthermore, Maritain states that “the knowledge to be given to youth *is not* the same knowledge as that of adults, it is intrinsically and basically different knowledge” (p. 60). Maritain clarifies what he means here in a subsequent footnote. According to Maritain “this knowledge is basically different from adult knowledge with regard to the *manner of knowing* or the intrinsic structure and perspective of knowledge itself” (n \* p. 60). It is the method and what is to be known that will differ depending on the age of the student. For example, the child requires knowledge to be delivered through stories in order to appeal to their imagination, while the adolescent moves beyond story toward natural insight and reasoning.

Maritain (1943) is clear, then, that educators must acknowledge and take into consideration the various stages of development when considering the methods for teaching the liberal arts (p. 62; see also pp. 26-27, p. 31, p. 44 & p. 53). In Maritain’s reasoning, knowledge must be appropriated to the developmental stage of the learner. Maritain is quite willing to turn to psychological research to inform his position on the stages of learning appropriate to each stage of development. He goes so far as to insist that “the teacher must be solidly instructed in and deeply aware of the psychology of the child...in order to avoid deforming or wounding them by pedagogical blunders...” (p. 27). I will now turn my attention to these three developmental stages and Maritain’s suggestions for knowledge appropriation.

Maritain (1943) beautifully describes the elementary education proper to the child in speaking of the imagination, the role of magic and mystery, the importance of beauty, and the vitality of the spirit (p. 60). More specifically, Maritain identifies the knowledge

appropriate to the stage of childhood as “knowledge in a state of story, an imaginative grasp of the things and values of the world” (p. 60). He goes on to state that “beauty is the mental atmosphere and the inspiring power fitted to a child’s education, and should be, so to speak, the continuous quickening and spiritualizing contrapuntal base of that education” (p. 61). Maritain is speaking here to those educators who neglect the child’s spiritual life in favour of the naturalistic point of view “...either from some positivistic bias or because they think it is their duty, when they deal with children, to make themselves childish” (p. 61). Ultimately, the task of education at the childhood stage of development is to “...progressively tame the imagination to the rule of reason, whilst ever remembering that the proportionally tremendous work of the child’s intellect, endeavoring to grasp the external world, is accomplished under the vital and perfectly normal rule of imagination (pp. 60-61). Thus, the imagination is vital at this first stage of development and must be respected. For example, a child may use his or her imagination to see new places and experience new things. Through the imagination, children are free in a way that adults are not and they can actually learn from these imaginary situations. By exercising their imagination, children are able to develop their thinking powers by moving “*from praxis to knowledge*, [which] is the normal method of education, especially in its first steps (p. 56).

Maritain (1943) describes the world of the adolescent as one in a state of transition in which the intellect and the will are not yet fully developed. Unlike in the childhood stage, where story and imagination dominate, “the knowledge which has to develop in the adolescent is knowledge appealing to the natural powers and gifts of the mind” (p. 62). Whereas the mental atmosphere of the child is beauty, the mental atmosphere appropriate to the adolescent is that of truth. Maritain comments that “truth is the inspiring force

needed in the education of the youth—truth rather than erudition and self-consciousness—all pervading truth rather than the objectively isolated truth at which each of the diverse sciences aims” (p. 62). The goal of the educator during the adolescent stage of development is to stimulate and discipline both theoretical and practical reason (Maritain, p. 62).

Developing and stimulating reason in the adolescent learner will occur when educators understand the proper objective of education at this level. For Maritain, the mode or style of teaching is of primary importance and will have a significant impact on learning. Maritain (1943) explains his understanding of the objective of adolescent education along with what he considers to be inappropriate objectives at this stage.

...the objective is less the acquisition of science itself or art itself than the grasp of their *meaning* and the comprehension of the truth or beauty they yield. It is less a question of sharing in the very activity of the scientist or the poet than of nourishing oneself intellectually on the results of their achievement. Still less it is a question of developing one's own mental skill and taste in the fashion of the dilettante by gaining a superficial outlook on scientific or artistic procedures or the ways and means, the grammar, logic, methodology thereof. What I call the *meaning* of a science or art is contained in the specific truth or beauty it offers us. The objective of education is to see to it that the youth grasps this truth or beauty by the natural power and gifts of his mind and the natural intuitive energy of his reason backed up by his whole sensuous, imaginative, and emotional dynamism. In doing that a liberal education will cause his natural intelligence to follow in the footsteps of those intellectual virtues which are the eminent merit of the real scientist or artist. (p. 63)

As Maritain states above, the objective of schooling at the secondary/college level is not to allow the student to become what he terms a “dilettante” with a superficial understanding of the knowledge particular to the various disciplines of knowledge. A student becomes an armature, in Maritain’s (1943) thinking, if they are subject to an education that does not allow their intuitive powers to properly develop and if they are subject to modes of learning that focus on “...material erudition and atomized memorization” (p. 63). Methods such as these only seek to separate knowledge forcing students to lose the *meaning* of the subject. Furthermore, the goal for the student learning science is not that they become a scientist, but that they come to understand the *meaning* of science and in doing so retain the sense of comprehensive universality. In other words, students at the secondary/college level would be involved in a general education and not in one designed to divide students into specialized areas of study.

Maritain (1943) identifies what he considers to be the appropriate curriculum for a college level student between the ages of sixteen to nineteen (p. 66). During these years the student is immersed in the liberal arts with specific subjects arranged in the following format.

The year of *Mathematics and Poetry*, comprising: first, mathematics, and literature and poetry; second, logic; third, foreign languages, and the history of civilization. The year of *Natural Sciences and Fine Arts*, comprising: first, physics and natural science; second, fine arts, mathematics, literature and poetry; third, history of the sciences. The year of *Philosophy* comprising: first, philosophy, that is to say, metaphysics and philosophy of nature, theory of knowledge, psychology; second, physics and natural science; third, mathematics, literature and poetry, fine arts. The year of *Ethical and Political Philosophy*,



comprising: first, ethics, political and social philosophy; second, physics and natural science; third, mathematics, literature and poetry, fine arts, history of civilization and history of the sciences. (pp. 67-68)

In my previous discussion on Maritain's (1943) distinction between knowledge-value and training-value, I reiterated that the primary value of the liberal arts was knowledge related "directly to the creative or perceptive intuition of the intellect and to that thirst for seeing" (p. 56). Maritain envisions that the student brings to his/her liberal arts education the knowledge in the humanities that will be brought to completion "...with a rational and logical analysis of what he has already studied more or less empirically" (n \* p. 66). Maritain's curriculum is cumulative in structure and he has been careful to ensure that each stage of education corresponds appropriately to the three stages of development.

Maritain's (1943) understanding of what constitutes an appropriate curriculum for a liberal arts education is not identical to that envisioned in the Middle Ages, but one that has been given a new form or shape (p. 56). It is my purpose here to identify three unique features of Maritain's conception of a liberal arts curriculum. These three unique features or qualities include the addition of physics and natural sciences, the omission of Greek and Latin<sup>15</sup>, and the adoption of a "bipolar" conception of liberal education.

First, In Maritain's view, physics and the natural sciences are considered one of the chief branches of liberal arts (p. 69). Maritain, in adapting the liberal arts curriculum of old to contemporary concerns, both instances where Maritain adapts the liberal educational formula of old to contemporary times, he is open-minded and is interested in

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<sup>15</sup> Maritain indicates that it is more valuable to read the classical writers in the student's vernacular language rather than learning the language of Greek and Latin in an attempt to read only small portions of the original texts (p. 68).

enlarging the scope of liberal education. Maritain (1962) comments that “the scope of the liberal arts and the humanities would be greatly enlarged...but to compensate for this enlargement, the manner of teaching and the quantitative, material weight of the curriculum...would be made less heavy” (p. 139).

Maritain wishes to enlarge the scope of traditional liberal education, however, he insists that there must be shift in our understanding of the end goal in teaching physics and science. Maritain (1943) argues that:

Physics and natural science, if taught not only for the sake of practical applications but essentially for the sake of knowledge, with reference to the specific epistemological approach they involve and in close connection with the history of the sciences and the history of civilization, provide man with a vision of the universe and an understanding of scientific truth and a sense of the sacred, exacting, unbending objectivity of the humblest truth, which play an essential part in the liberation of the mind and in liberal education. (p. 69)

Maritain is surely willing, then, to embrace the natural sciences as legitimate avenues to truth and universal knowledge. Furthermore, Maritain would surely accept the scientific realism of physics today. However, the proper understanding of the goal of a liberal education must always be first and foremost in the mind of the educator. The educator must avoid falling into the trap of teaching physics and the natural sciences solely for the purpose of their practical application. The aim of personal and spiritual liberation, through knowledge, must always remain the primary goal of a liberal education. In Maritain’s (1962) view, liberal education “...is concerned with *universal knowledge* because it has essentially to do with *natural intelligence* [and]...endeavours only to make him understand the *meaning* and grasp the basic truth of the various

disciplines in which universal knowledge is interested” (pp. 138-139). Ultimately, too many expectations or inappropriate methods can destroy the primary aim of education.

A second unique characteristic of Maritain’s liberal arts curriculum is the omission of Greek or Latin in the curriculum at the college level. Maritain (1943) suggests instead that Greek, Latin, or Hebrew be studied at the graduate level in the university setting. In the place of Greek or Latin, the student will study comparative grammar and the study of literature during the humanities and this study “would provide the student with a most useful knowledge of the inner mechanisms of language” (p. 70). Despite this, Maritain does recommend learning a second language.

Finally, Maritain’s approach to liberal arts curriculum is unique because he takes the “bipolar” conception of the curriculum rather than the unipolar conception of past liberal arts curricula. Maritain (1962) remarks that all too often vocational training (popular education) and intellectual training (liberal education) are conceived of as separate educational avenues with distinct goals and methods (p. 150). Maritain’s hope is that liberal education “...will permeate the whole of education, whether young people are prepared for manual or for intellectual vocations” (p. 150). In order to turn this hope into reality, Maritain (1943) proposes an end to the separation between vocational training and intellectual training, which he terms a “bipolar” conception of education (p. 151). For Maritain, schooling at the secondary/college level will include some measure of vocational training with a practical aim as indicated in Table 3.

As the name suggests, Maritain’s “bipolar” conception of education includes two centers of education at the college level: 1) manual-service training and 2) intellectual-service training (p. 151). It is important to recall, that at the outset of Maritain’s (1943) book, he does indicate that there is a practical aim associated with schooling and this

utilitarian aspect will be provided for in the liberal education programme proposed by Maritain (see p. 10).

Table 3

*Manual-Service Training Verses Intellectual Service Training*

Centers	Humanities and Liberal arts	Manual work
Manual-Service Training	Informal Learning (Play)	Formal and Systematic Learning
Intellectual-Service Training	Formal and Systematic Learning	Informal Learning (Play)

*Note.* Adapted from Maritain's (1962) essay entitled "Some Typical Aspects of Christian Education" in *The education of man: The educational philosophy of Jacques Maritain* (pp. 151-152).

In Maritain's (1962) essay entitled "Some Typical Aspects of Christian Education" he expands on the comments he made in *Education at the Crossroads* on the value of both learning and play. Maritain conceives of vocational training and intellectual training as part of an education in the humanities and the liberal arts. How can Maritain make this claim? First, Maritain makes the distinction between formal and informal learning. Maritain states that "...on the one hand, training in matters which are of most worth and have primacy in importance may take place through the instrumentality of the activities of play as well as of the activities of learning..." (p. 152). Educators will likely have to deal with students who are not interested in the program they are offering and instead become bored and withdrawn. In recognizing this phenomenon and the challenges posed by a "lazy" student, Maritain is convinced "...that interest, intellectual curiosity, and understanding with respect to the whole field of the

humanities and liberal arts would exist as a rule in the students of the manual-service training as well as in those of the other center, on the condition that the mode or way of approach be fittingly adapted” (p. 152). In the hope of addressing the needs of all students, regardless of whether they are preparing for intellectual training or manual training, Maritain seeks to break the popular notion that a intellectual-service training (liberal education) does not support the inclusion of manual-service training.

The type of education that Maritain (1962) envisions for students enrolled in manual service training is still properly understood as a liberal education in the humanities, but one that “...prepares them for some vocation pertaining to manual work- not, of course, by making them apprentices in any of the innumerable manual vocations but rather by teaching them, theoretically and practically, matters concerning the general categories into which manual service can be divided, such as farming, mining, craftsmanship, the various types of modern industrial labor, etc.” (p. 151). Therefore, as Table 3 indicates, the approach that Maritain has outlined would see students in the manual-service training stream being taught the humanities and liberal arts in an informal manner, through play, while formal and systematic teaching would take place in the area of manual training. On the other hand, students enrolled in the intellectual-service training stream would experience manual work activities through play and they would learn the humanities and liberal arts through formal learning. Both of these avenues would allow students in each group to reach their human destiny, assuming appropriate placement.

Practically speaking, Maritain (1962) recommends that students be given the choice between intellectual-service training and manual-service training some time near the end of high school around 16 years of age (p. 151). Furthermore, Maritain indicates

that these two centers (vocational and intellectual) could exist together in the same building or in different buildings (p. 151). What Maritain does insist on is that the liberal arts and the humanities must be adequately represented in the curriculum, although in different ways (p. 151). Maritain is primarily concerned with the student's interest and understanding and in his opinion interest and understanding will be enhanced if and only if the mode of learning (formal or informal) are appropriately defined for each centre of study.

Maritain (1943) argues that "...in the schools of the manual-service training center education in all matters pertaining to the humanities and the liberal arts would be surprisingly successful if it were given not by way of formal teaching but by way of play and informal learning" (p. 153). Some may suggest that a liberal education is only for those students involved in intellectual-service training, but Maritain is clear that all students will be experience a liberal education and the only difference will be in the teaching method used to teach the liberal arts curriculum.

Maritain gives special consideration philosophy and theology during the college school years (ages 16-19), and as such it will be appropriate to end our discussion of the college curriculum with a discussion of these two important subject areas. Maritain (1943) reiterates that "the highest aim of liberal education [in schools]...is to make youth possess the foundations of wisdom" (p. 71, see also p. 47) and not wisdom itself. It is Maritain's (1943) view that no person can do without studies in philosophy and theology (pp. 72 & 74). In terms of the importance of philosophy, Maritain mentions that "...without knowing philosophy and the achievements of the great thinkers it is utterly impossible for us to understand anything of the development of mankind, civilization, culture, and science" (p. 72). Regarding the teaching of philosophy, Maritain makes three

key points. First, despite the fact that students will not always agree with the philosophical ideas being presented by said Plato, there is value in reading Plato and exploring his ideas in order to awaken reason (p. 73). Second, students should not fear distancing themselves from the philosophical position of their teachers because the goal is to come to their own philosophical positions autonomously and consciously. Finally, given that philosophy starts with experience and a student's experience at the college level is limited, teachers of philosophy should focus primarily on the historical development of ideas in philosophy (pp. 72-73).

Maritain (1943) refers to theology as "...another rational wisdom, which is rooted in faith, not in reason alone, and which is superior to the merely human wisdom of metaphysics (p. 73). We would be wise to consider Maritain's comments on the importance of learning theology. Maritain states that "...theological problems and controversies have permeated the whole development of Western culture and civilization, and are still at work in its depths, in such a way that the one who would ignore them would be fundamentally unable to grasp his own time and the meaning of its internal conflicts" (p. 73). To make his case for including theology in the college curriculum, Maritain sites such events as the Protestant Reformation, the Counter Reformation, and the Enlightenment, along with the writings of Shakespeare, John Donne, Rousseau, Nietzsche and Marx as only a few examples of the inescapable truth that theology is crucial to a person's understanding of the past and the present world (p. 74). Maritain goes so far as to suggest that the presence of a philosophy without some measure of theological influence is still to be found (p. 74). A strong philosophical and theological background is so important for the young person if they are going to have any hope in understanding the key moments of history and the development of Western civilization.

The suggestion given by Maritain (1943) is that theological courses be given in the last two or three years of a student's study in the humanities. Maritain does comment that the courses given in theology at the college level are distinguished by their intellectual and speculative focus (p. 75). This suggestion is in keeping with his acceptance of the psychological make-up of the student taking these courses. According to Maritain, the aim of all schooling at the College level is to awaken reason and to promote understanding and verified assent (p. 53). Therefore, given his recognition that teaching philosophy starts with the student's experience (p. 73), it is appropriate that Maritain suggests that schools wait to offer courses in philosophy until students have developed some level of personal experience.

As for offering courses in theology, Maritain proposes a practical solution. We can understand and appreciate that courses in theology would be appropriate in denominational schools, but Maritain (1943) would like to see theology courses in all high schools and colleges. In order to accomplish this goal, Maritain states that "theological teaching would be given, according to the diversity of creeds, by professors belonging to the main religious denominations, each one addressing the students of his own denomination" (p. 75). In keeping with the values of pluralism, Maritain would allow students to opt out of the theology courses if they so desired. Maritain is not clear whether or not students in denominational schools would be given the same flexibility in being exempt from theology courses.

In keeping with his Thomistic background, Maritain (1943) argues that one of the important tasks of his generation is "...to recognize both the distinction and its organic relationship between theology, rooted in faith, and philosophy, rooted in reason..." (p. 82). Religion, according to Maritain, is the most appropriate context for moral education



in the virtues precisely because of the organic relationship between theology and reason. In the following selection from his essay entitled "Moral Education," Maritain (1962) explains the link between religion and morality.

The core of morality is human reason [theoretical and practical], insofar as reason is the proximate rule of human actions. The core of religion is divine love, that is, indivisibly, love of God and brotherly love. Christianity fastens the moral to the supramoral—the moral order and the moral virtues to the theological order and the theological virtues, the greatest of which is charity. Christianity makes law appendant to love, and in this way it saves morality. For not only are reason and law, even the law of God, powerless to drag the heart of man to action if it is not quickened by love, but the very perfection of moral life and human life is suprahuman and supramoral, being perfection in love. (p. 116)

Maritain argues in the above quotation, that unless our morality is grounded in faith it will not be sustainable. Love is the bridge between religion and morality and it is love, not reason or the law, that will ultimately influence the will to act. Ultimately, morality is perfected by religion. Maritain's reasoning is more easily understood if we consider his comments distinguishing between social morality and personal morality. Maritain (1943) argues that "...in the field of personal morality, the whole scope of the moral life cannot be comprehended by reason...without taking into account the supratemporal destiny of man" (p. 95). What Maritain's comment suggests is that reason alone will not guarantee a virtuous life. Therefore, if personal morality is at the root of all morality (p. 95), and if personal morality relies on the uprightness of our will, which depends on love, then it stands to reason that morality will need something else to perfect it. Religion, according to Maritain (1943) offers the "missing link" specifically because

“...human love as well as divine love, is not a matter of training or learning, for it is a gift: the love of God is a gift of nature and of grace...” (p. 96). For these reasons, morality is perfected by religion, because it is religion that speaks to the love of God as the foundation of human love; which informs our personal morality.

Given the fact that my study is focusing on the implication of Maritain’s philosophy of education for Catholic high schools in Ontario, it is not crucial to go into significant detail on the comments made by Maritain on the curriculum at the university and advanced level. I will, however, comment briefly on two aspects of the curriculum at the university level as they relate to Maritain’s conception of schools in general.

First, while the aim of an education during the secondary and college years (ages 16-20) is to stimulate and discipline reason, “the aim of the university is to achieve the formation and equipment of the youth in regard to the strength and maturity of judgment and the intellectual virtues” (Maritain, 1943, p. 76). Therefore, the curriculum at the university level deals with knowledge appropriate to the intellectual virtues.

Just what are the intellectual virtues that Maritain (1943) makes reference to in this statement? In keeping with the intellectual virtues distinguished by Aristotle and Aquinas, Maritain is speaking of art, science, and wisdom. Maritain (1962) explains below what it means to know and subsequently to possess the intellectual virtues.

Really to know a science is to possess the intellectual virtue which constitutes this science in the soul. And the intellectual virtues are special energies which grow in intelligence through exercise in a given object, as superadded perfections, superior in quality to the capacity of what I call *natural intelligence*; that is to say, of intelligence considered in its bare nature. Thus we have two quite different states for intelligence: *natural intelligence* and *intelligence as scientifically formed and*

*equipped, or, in Thomist language, intelligence perfected by the intellectual virtues.* (p. 49)

The curriculum at the university level will be ordered in such a way for students to develop these intellectual virtues. Each of the intellectual virtues points towards spiritual universality and the universality of knowledge. Furthermore, Maritain (1943) states that “the knowledge which has to develop during university years is knowledge in a state of a *perfected and rational grasping* of a particular subject matter...” (p. 79). For this reason, Maritain’s vision for the university curriculum will include subjects in the useful arts and applied sciences (i.e. agriculture and engineering), practical sciences (medicine and law), speculative sciences and fine arts (mathematics and music), and the highest order would include the universal wisdom inherent in the subjects of philosophy and theology (pp. 77-78). We know that in Maritain’s vision, the curriculum at the high school and college level is not primarily concerned with definite specialization; it is during the university years that students will be exposed to specialization depending on their gifts and interests.

Second, in keeping with the democratic vision, Maritain (1943) remarks that the university is to become a democratic institution “...with the formation of a much larger and more diversified mass of outstanding citizens of all ranks in the nation...” (p. 76).

Just as is the case in the lower levels of education, liberal education is for all.

Furthermore, Maritain reiterates that “everything would be warped if the aim, incentive, and dominating concern of the teaching were directed toward success in the experiences of life and in money-making” (n \* p. 77). The aim of the curriculum, regardless of the stage of education, must not be supplanted by such practical outcomes. Maritain’s vision for the curriculum in all areas of education is one that is appropriate depending on the

psychological stage of development, democratic and open to all, liberal and one that is ultimately aiming at universal knowledge and personal spiritual liberation.

Maritain's (1943) compelling remarks at the end of his third chapter on the humanities and liberal education offer us insight into his understanding of youth in mid-twentieth century America. His comments are compelling because we can easily transfer them to youth today at the beginning of the twentieth first century. At the center of Maritain's curriculum structure are the needs of the individual human beings and he is genuinely concerned with the well being of young people in our schools. Although Maritain adores and respects young people he finds himself agonizing about their future (p. 86). Maritain feels that "they [young people] know a great deal about matter, natural facts, but almost nothing about the soul" (p. 86). Although Maritain has expressed serious concerns about the state of contemporary education and contemporary youth, who know very little about the rational mind and its real needs, he is none-the-less hopeful that the young person's thirst for internal and spiritual freedom will prepare them for the future.

#### *Factual Statements (Box D)*

Frankena (1965a) points out that a normative philosophy of education "will include some *empirical statements*, or factual claims whose truth or falsity can be determined by experiment or empirical observation" (p. 5). The second part of this chapter focuses on briefly identifying a few of the factual statements made by Maritain (1943) to justify his curriculum recommendations (Box E). In the concluding chapter of *Education at the Crossroads*, Maritain (1943) discusses what he considers to be the "trials of present-day education" (p. 88). It is Maritain's conviction that "...liberal education is not only grounded on the essential value of man's education but also upon its

value in meeting some specific needs of the immediate future” (p. 88). The three main needs of the immediate future, according to Maritain (1943) include: 1) the need for a new humanism, 2) the need for moral education and 3) the need for deliverance from, what Maritain labels the “education for death” through preventative and constructive measures.

*Liberal education and the new humanism.* Maritain (1943) observes that there is a desire for a new humanism that will “...replace the individualism of the bourgeois era not by totalitarianism or the sheer collectivism of the beehive but by a personalistic and communal civilization, grounded on human rights and satisfying the social aspirations and needs of man” (p. 89). Maritain’s mention of “bourgeois individualism” indicates that he is criticising the Hobbesian individualism manifested by selfishness in the pursuit of personal gain, power, material goods etc. This new humanism requires an equally humanistic and integral education, and Maritain is confident that students, who experience liberal education, will be equipped to remove the gap between the individual claim and the social claim within the person, to remove the gap between the realm of religion and the realm of the secular, and to remove the gap between work and knowledge (p. 89). These divisions can no longer stand it, and the factual claims made by Maritain will signal the beginning of a new educational commonwealth.

Maritain (1943) reasons that liberal education should be extended to all persons, and not only the privileged few, because “those who are acquainted with working youth and labor know that nowhere is a greater thirst for knowledge to be found, if only sufficient faculties are given them” (p. 90). Furthermore, Maritain is clear that students who are labelled as apathetic or who may seem to be reluctant to learn are not to be streamed into a program that is devoid of an education in the humanities and liberal arts.

Maritain argues that it is often the case that those students who are most apathetic and distant are from the wealthy classes (p. 90). Ultimately, Maritain reasons that “the education of tomorrow must provide the common man with the means for his personal fulfillment, not only with regard to his labor but also with regard to his social and political activities in the civil commonwealth, and to the activities of his leisure hours (p. 90). Although some students may choose to go down the path of intellectual-service training and others may choose to go down the path of manual-service training (refer to Table 4), they will all receive the basic requirements of a liberal education in keeping with the method appropriate to the path they have chosen. If the goal of education, for Maritain, is “...to guide man in the evolving dynamism through which he shapes himself as a human person—armed with knowledge, strength of judgment, and moral virtues—while at the same time conveying to him the spiritual heritage of the nation and the civilization in which he is involved...” (p. 10) then his conclusion that liberal education is the only appropriate vehicle to reach this goal is a factual statement as it is defined by Frankena (1965a).

Maritain (1943) identifies three challenges facing contemporary education that will have an impact on the world of tomorrow. The two major challenges or crises identified by Maritain include a moral crisis and a political crisis (p. 91). Maritain is realistic in his acceptance that there will be new requirements imposed on educators given the current challenges that education must address; however, he is clear to point out that the “essential aims, which deal with the formation of man and the inner liberation of the human person, must be preserved, whatever the superimposed burdens may be” (p. 91). Maritain cautions us against getting into the habit of thinking only in terms of “goals” or “objectives” while disregarding the primary aim of education.

In summary, there is no doubt in Maritain's mind that schools in the future will have many challenges to overcome. In a spirit of hope, Maritain insists that the divisions within the person, between religion and life, and finally between manual activity and intellectual activity, must be and can be bridged through a liberal education and the new humanism. If we do not allow the ultimate aim of education— spiritual liberation of the human person through the attainment of knowledge — to be watered down or completely abolished, the normal task of education will be able to support the superadded burdens for the sake of the common good.

*Moral education.* Although Maritain (1943) has confidence in the moral integrity of young people (p. 86), he considers moral education, or as he terms it *moral re-education*, to “be a matter of public emergency” (p. 93). Despite the fact that Maritain is writing *Education at the Crossroads* in the midst of the Second World War, we can still glean important messages from his comments on moral education. Maritain comments that “every serious observer recognizes the fact that children have not only to be trained in proper conduct, law observance, and politeness, but that this very training remains deficient and precarious if there is no genuine internal formation” (p. 93) of reason and the virtues. Maritain's comments above on the importance of moral education echo his remark that “what is learned should never be passively or mechanically received, as dead information which weighs down and dulls the mind” (p. 50). The standards for education in mathematics, history or science are similar to moral education in that the student should never receive the material passively. Furthermore, Maritain states that “when truth is really known [it is] vitally assimilated by the insatiable activity which is rooted in the depths of the self” (p. 50).

Table 4

*The Role of the Home/Church and the School in the Educational Sphere*

Educational Sphere	Main Duty	Method	Influence on The will	Ultimate Goal
School	To enlighten and strengthen reason To develop the intellectual virtues Pre-moral training	By the equipment of knowledge and developing the powers of thinking Development of speculative and practical reason	Indirect influence on the will	Truth
Home/ Church	To develop the moral virtues Moral training	Moral training through habituation ( <i>prudentia</i> )	Direct influence on the will	Spiritual freedom

*Note.* Adapted from Maritain (1943), pp. 24-28.

In his essay entitled "Moral and Spiritual Values in Education," Maritain (1962) reiterates Aristotle's conviction that a person who *knows* the good will not necessarily *do* the good and as a result, education in the virtues is necessary. In his own words, contrary to the Socratic approach, Maritain states that "to know what courage or self-control is not enough to act courageously or exercise self-control" (p. 105) and yet he goes on to state that "knowledge is a general precondition for virtue" (p. 105). Moral re-education is an emergency in Maritain's (1943) eyes because the teaching of moral principles must be "grounded on truth rather than as suitable to social convenience" (p. 93, see also Maritain, 1962, pp. 126-127). The direct responsibility of the school, as indicated in Table 4, is not moral education, but it is to teach students how to think and to develop their intellectual



capacities to foster the moral virtues. More needs to be said about the role of the school and the role of the family/church in education as it relates to the attainment of moral excellence.

*The role of the school.* As Table 4 indicates, the role of the school is not the same as the role of the home/Church. Maritain (1962) identifies two elements of a complete moral education: one involving a direct formation of the will and the other involving an indirect formation of the will (pp. 111-112). Accordingly, Maritain argues that moral education is not the direct responsibility of the schools, but the school does have an indirect impact on the will. Indirect formation includes the development of speculative reason (knowledge for the sake of knowledge) and practical reason (reasoning about the virtues and science of morality in order to decide what to do), which Maritain notes do not constitute action itself (p. 113). Virtuous action is the product of a rationally formed will inspired by love. Maritain (1943) states that "in order for us to rightly judge what to do in a particular case, our reason itself depends on the uprightness of our will, and on the decisive movement of our very freedom" (p. 95). "Virtue", for Maritain, is the possession of the disposition to think rationally and then act accordingly. If, as Maritain maintains, virtue is something that cannot be taught, then it stands to reason that the schools indirectly impact the will of the student so that in their freedom they will probably exercise right judgment in a particular situation (*prudentia*). Outside of the formal curriculum, the will is indirectly affected by the organization of community life, just rules and policies, teachers who act as models of virtuous living, and appropriate school discipline (Maritain, 1943, p. 25 & 1962, p. 120). Finally, *indirect* formation of the will also involves a curriculum which includes metaphysical knowledge, and the teaching of personal and civic morality (Maritain, 1962, p. 122).

*The role of the family and the Catholic Church.* The second part of moral education involves the direct formation of the will, which is the role of the family and the Church. Moral knowledge, which is the purview of the schools, is the foundation of and a condition for virtue (Maritain, 1962, p. 122), but the actual formation of the virtues takes place outside of the school setting. Clearly, more is needed to acquire virtue and for Maritain (1943), love, both human and divine, is essential to the development of virtue and moral education (p. 95). Maritain notes that “love, human love as well as divine love, is not a matter of training or learning, for it is a gift; the love of God is a gift of nature and of grace...” (p. 96). It is within the family that we first come to know love and this is why Maritain argues that the family, not the school, are primarily involved in developing the moral virtues. To reiterate the connection between knowledge and virtue, Maritain (1962) states that “virtue is not a by-product of knowledge, but true moral knowledge is a condition for virtue” (p. 122 & 1943, pp. 93-97). Ultimately, the school and the family, which have been linked throughout history, are two essential parts of a complete education (see Maritain, 1943, pp. 24-28).

Maritain (1943) indicates that even midway through the twentieth century a breakdown in family life is evident, and for this reason, moral re-education is so critical (p. 21, see also p. 24). So, the burden of moral re-education is to be taken up by the schools for the sake of the common good and to offset the present crisis in family life as witnessed by Maritain. The moral re-education that Maritain is advocating is not one that changes the roles of both the school and the family as indicated in Table 4. What Maritain (1962) does wish to see in schools is a strong focus on natural morality (including natural law and ethical ideas) in the years preceding the college years (p. 123). Maritain (1962) would like to see natural morality taught to students within the already

prescribed subject areas such as art, history, poetry, and literature (pp. 123-124). An exploration of the natural virtues will go a long way to enhance pre-moral education in the schools, given the breakdown of the family and even the Church's influence.

*Religious education.* Maritain (1943) observes that a number of parents are opposed to the teaching of a particular religion in their children's schools in an effort to evangelize (p. 94). As noted in Part 2 of this chapter, Maritain comments in his discussion on the college curriculum that, in his view, moral education naturally fits within a broader religious education; however, given Maritain's contemporary observations the focus will have to be on natural morality for students in non-denominational institutions (pp. 68 & 75). Again Maritain is appealing to the "pluralist principle" to appeal to natural morality with the hope of remedying the current crisis in morality that he observes. Perhaps what concerns Maritain even more than parents who do not wish for their students to be educated in religion, is the ethical relativism which Maritain describes as "the tremendous degradation of ethical reason" (p. 94). Maritain (1943) suggests that restoring the importance of religious faith and the moral power of reason is necessary to alleviate the dehumanizing influence of contemporary culture (p. 94).

Maritain's comments on the appropriate field for natural morality as opposed to personal morality will help us understand his position on moral education. Maritain (1943) is endorsing a revival of religious faith, but also a revival of the moral power of reason.

Let us observe at this point that the field in which natural morality feels most at home, at least deficient, is the field of our temporal activities, or of political, civic and social morality: because the virtues proper to this field are essentially natural

ones, directed toward the good of civilization; whereas in the field of personal morality, the whole scope of the moral life cannot be comprehended by reason with regard to our real system of conduct in actual existence, without taking into account the supratemporal destiny of man. So the teaching of natural morality will naturally tend to lay stress on what may be called the ethics of political life and of civilization. Which is all to the good (for here it enjoys its maximum strength and practical truth) provided that it resist the temptation of neglecting or despairing personal morality, which is the root of all morality. (pp. 94-95)

Maritain's comments on the distinction between natural morality and personal morality correspond to his views on the relationship between morality and religion. Despite the fact that reason is central to moral education and natural morality, Maritain (1962) is clear "that there is no morality without striving towards self-perfection" (p. 116). For Maritain, "morality without religion undermines morality..." (p. 117). Natural morality is rooted in personal morality and personal morality is rooted in the supernatural destiny of the person, which cannot be comprehended through reason alone.

The second burden imposed on education, as observed by Maritain (1943) is one involving the needs of the state and the temptation of the state to educate students to fit the immediate needs of the political authority (p. 100). Maritain comments at length on the importance of political authority and its "right to direct and to be obeyed for the sake of the general welfare, political authority is not opposed to human freedom, but required by it" (p. 98). Ideally, Maritain (1943) remarks that political authority will direct people toward the common good and subsequently, education is also bound to work for the common good (p. 98).

Maritain's (1943) concern that education can easily become an organ of the state, in order to produce political unity and stability, is expressed in the following statement.

Modern states, especially modern states in the making, with their dependence on the masses and public opinion, and their crucial need of creating unity and unanimity in an emergency, will look upon such philosophy with special complacency. And they will take the application of this philosophy upon themselves...The state would summon education to make up for all that is lacking in the surrounding order in the matter of common political inspiration, stable customs and traditions, common inherited standards, moral unity and unanimity, it would urge education to perform an immediate political task and, in order to compensate for all the deficiencies in civil society, to turn out in a hurry the *type* fitted to the immediate needs of the political power. (p. 100)

Maritain's concern is not unfounded, as he directly experienced the totalitarian regimes of the Second World War. This is the context out of which he is making these comments. However, it is not impossible to imagine a future time when education will be subjected to various burdens imposed by the state. In fact, one might suggest that the OSS curriculum expectations have shown that the government, can in fact, lose sight of the real aim of schooling which is the development of theoretical and practical reason by appeal to the student's natural intuition. Maritain is not unrealistic; he knows that the state must regulate and supervise education. But "such a supervision, nevertheless, should never imply any illegitimate interference of the state with the means and intrinsic norms of teaching" (Maritain, 1943, p. 101). To reiterate Maritain's point, then, the essence and freedom of education is rooted in the fundamental nature of the person and not political expediency or social convention.

*Preventative and constructive measures.* Maritain (1943) speaks of a “crisis of civilization” and “the perversion of human minds” in the third section of his final chapter in *Education at the Crossroads* (pp. 103). Maritain’s comments related to the “crisis of civilization” and “the perversion of human minds” made against the backdrop of the Second World War and the horrors brought about by the Fascism and Nazism. Maritain observes a dehumanizing trend developing throughout the world where many people are “...infected by what may be called the enslavement complex, which makes them sick of human dignity, mercy, justice, and freedom” (p. 104). The “enslavement complex” that Maritain speaks of is not confined to post-war Germany, but he contends that this complex is present in many countries; even democratic countries (p. 104). In order to stop the growth of this dehumanizing trend, Maritain advocates both preventative and constructive measures that are worth outlining here along with a discussion of their contemporary application.

One preventative measure outlined by Maritain (1943) is the development of an international “peace-patrol,” inspired by C. J. Hambro (1942); author of *How to Win the Peace*. Maritain envisions this “peace-patrol” as an agency designed “to stop any propaganda and dissolve any school which inculcates sectarianism and intolerance, racial or political fanaticism, worship of hatred and enslavement” (p. 106). Maritain’s vision for lasting peace involves the maintenance of a sound moral and intellectual atmosphere in order to prevent what Maritain calls an “education for death” (p. 105). Maritain’s conception of an “education for death” presages John Paul II’s (1995) description of the “culture of death” in his 1995 encyclical *Evangelium Vitae* (*The Gospel of Life*). The purpose of this encyclical was to reaffirm the Catholic Church’s position on various life issues, from abortion to euthanasia, in the midst of a culture that has become more and

more secular and skeptical. Just as Maritain argues that the “education for death” has been brought about by a crisis in civilization, John Paul II (1995) states that running parallel to the “culture of death” is a “...profound crisis of culture, which generates scepticism in relation to the very foundations of knowledge and ethics, and which makes it increasingly difficult to grasp clearly the meaning of what man is, the meaning of his rights and his duties” (¶11). Both John Paul II (1995) and Maritain seek a culture and an education system which promotes life and where the dignity of the human person is made manifest.

Maritain’s comments on the “crisis of civilization” and the danger of an “education for death” are rooted in his contemporary experience as a witness to the Second World War and the terror of the Nazi regime in Germany. John Paul II argues, and I suspect Maritain would agree, that the underlying causes of our enslavement are complex and not only the result of a loss of freedom. John Paul II confirms Maritain’s prophetic call to uphold authentic.

In seeking the deepest roots of the struggle between the “culture of life” and the “culture of death”, we cannot restrict ourselves to the perverse idea of freedom mentioned above. We have to go to the heart of the tragedy being experienced by modern man: the eclipse of the sense of God and of man, typical of a social and cultural climate dominated by secularism, which, with its ubiquitous tentacles, succeeds at times in putting Christian communities themselves to the test. Those who allow themselves to be influenced by this climate easily fall into a sad vicious circle: when the sense of God is lost, there is also a tendency to lose the sense of man, of his dignity and his life; in turn, the systematic violation of the moral law, especially in the serious matter of respect for human life and its dignity, produces

a kind of progressive darkening of the capacity to discern God's living and saving presence. (¶21)

Maritain (1943) considers education as one of the primary tools to weaken the cycle of enslavement. The trend towards dehumanization, as John Paul II describes above, is one that Maritain was also battling against. We must, according to Maritain, be willing to advance human dignity, mercy, justice and freedom (p. 104).

Despite the need for preventative measures, Maritain (1943) argues that constructive measures are more effective, and in this area, he makes two fundamental points. First, Maritain suggests that in order to halt what he refers to as the "supreme crisis of the Christian spirit" a revival in the area of conscience and evangelization are necessary (p. 107). The moral re-education and healing of reason that Maritain speaks of involves a re-orientation of our roots as a spiritual people that is being lost on our contemporary culture. Maritain's second point deals with instruction as he calls for a large scale supervision of both old and new teachers and the need for intellectual leadership on a worldwide scale. The educational crusade proposed by Maritain is not only the work of one country but of the entire world and all those associated with education respectfully (p. 109). Maritain suggests, in the preface to the paperbound edition of *Education at the Crossroads*, that the reader focus on the difficult questions facing the Western world, both during and after the Second World War rather than getting caught up in his specific comments regarding the creation of a peace patrol and an international educational watch dog (preface, iii). Maritain refers to some of the comments he made in the final chapter of his book, relating to post-war Germany, as naïve (preface, iii). Despite the fact that Maritain's remedies may seem naïve today, he has accurately represented the dominant culture in the West today. This is a culture in



which there is a spiritual crisis, in which we are susceptible to historical sclerosis, and in which reason must be healed.

Maritain (1943) appropriately states that “sometimes doctors themselves need to be cured” (p. 113). By this comment Maritain recognizes that an “education for death” penetrates not only fascist and totalitarian regimes but democracies also (p. 113). One crucial danger identified by Maritain, which faces education in the Western world is one “...which would aim, not at making man truly human, but making him merely into an organ of a technocratic society” (p. 113). The present reader may have a difficulty relating to Maritain’s comments on the healing of education in post-war Germany but it is likely that he or she will recognize the impact technology has had and will continue to have on education. For Maritain, “the question is to know the exact significance of technology for man, and not to transform technology into the supreme wisdom and rule of human life, and not to change the means into ends” (p. 114).

Maritain connects his comments about education in post-war Germany to education throughout the world in the following powerful statement. Maritain’s (1943) comments are prophetic and challenge us to carefully consider what is worth fighting for and subsequently dying for.

What are we fighting for, if the only thing human reason can do is to measure and manage matter? If we have no means of determining what freedom, justice, spirit, human personality, and human dignity consist of, and why they are worthy of our dying for them, then we are fighting and dying only for words. If we and the youth who will be educated by future democracies hold that everything that is not calculable or workable to be only a matter of myth, and believe only in a

technocratic world, then we can indeed conquer Nazi Germany militarily and technically, but we ourselves shall have been conquered morally by Nazi Germany. For the preface to *Fascism and Nazism* is a thorough disregard of the spiritual dignity of man, and the assumption that merely material or biological standards rule human life and morality. Thereafter, since man cannot do without some loving adoration, the monstrous adoration of the totalitarian Leviathan will have its day. (p. 114)

Maritain is anything but anti-technology, but he is rightly critical of any philosophical approach that views technology as an end. Technology is appropriate as a means to an end but never as an end in itself. We can also make similar parallels to the economy. The economy, from the Christian perspective, is a means to an end (common good), but it should never be the end. The Catholic Church clearly emphasizes that the economy is made for people not people for the economy. Maritain makes clear his opposition to the logical positivist, who believes only information verified by sense experience.

Maritain (1943) goes on to challenge educators “to rediscover the natural faith of reason in truth” (p. 115) which is denied by logical positivism and pragmatism. Maritain warns that “the historical impact of this philosophy [pragmatism] upon culture will naturally lead to a stony positivistic or technocratic denial of the objective value of any spiritual need” (p. 115). This is characterized by Maritain as an internal conflict. This internal conflict, according to Maritain, weakens democracy precisely because “its motive power is of a spiritual nature—the will to justice and brotherly love—but its philosophy has long been pragmatism, which cannot justify real faith in such a spiritual inspiration” (p. 115). Maritain sees philosophy as a whole being challenged “not by science, but by a

masked metaphysics of science” (p. 116) in the form of philosophies such as logical positivism.

The problem, as Maritain sees it, involves a cleavage or barrier between the ideal and the reality we find ourselves living. This cleavage is described by Maritain (1943) in the following way.

It is a great misfortune that both a civilization and education suffer from a cleavage between the ideal that constitutes their reason for living and acting, and that implies things in which they do not believe, and the reality according to which they live and act but which denies the ideal that justifies them. All modern democracies have suffered from such a cleavage. (p. 117)

I suspect that Maritain (1943) would agree that this cleavage not only still exists today, but has actually grown significantly wider with increasing ethical and spiritual confusion. Maritain concludes *Education at the Crossroads* by challenging young people, as well as all those involved in education, to reunite the real with the ideal in order that thought and action move as one. Maritain is hopeful and confident in the ability of youth to move beyond the crossroads between an instrumentalist and pragmatist philosophy and a humanist educational philosophy.

In Chapter Four and Chapter Five of this study I sought to present Maritain’s Catholic philosophy of education with the aid of Frankena’s (1965a) model for analyzing a *normative* philosophy of education. Maritain’s (1943) philosophy of education contains many rich statements on the aims of education; metaphysical and epistemological premises, desirable “dispositions” factual statements and practical recommendations (see Figure 6). As shown in Figure 6, the contents in Box C of the “philosophical element” as

represented by Boxes A, B, and C (see Figure 5) is the same as the contents in Box C of the “practical element” as represented by Boxes C, D, and E. Therefore, the “Box C challenge” has been identified and clarified. The numerous “dispositions” outlined by Maritain’s will derive from the philosophical and practical elements of his philosophy of education.

Now that I have explicated both the “philosophical” and “practical” elements of Maritain’s (1943) philosophy of education, the subsequent chapter will address the contemporary challenges faced by Catholic schools in Ontario and offer insight into how Maritain’s thought can respond to these challenges. My examination of Maritain’s philosophy of education has revealed a coherent and credible foundation built on the centrality of the passion for truth, the synthesis of faith and reason, and integral humanism. I contend that there are very good reasons for Maritain’s philosophy of education being reclaimed by publicly funded Catholic schools in Ontario today if we are to claim our distinct ethos.




Figure 6: Maritain's Complete Philosophy of Education

## Chapter Six

### *Contemporary Challenges and Implications*

With the explication of Maritain's (1943) Catholic philosophy of education behind me, I now address Maritain's contemporary relevance and the implications of his philosophy of education for Catholic schools today. If we understand what Maritain is saying about schooling, we discover several relevant insights necessary to improve the education of all students, not just those in Catholic schools. Although I believe that Maritain's philosophy of education offers relevant insights for both Catholic and secular schools, I focus in this chapter on the curriculum as it applies to the Catholic school in Ontario. It is important to note that Catholic schools in Ontario are subject to the same policies and regulations as schools in the secular system. The only difference is that Catholic schools are "responsible for developing credit courses in religious education and the curriculum expectations related to them" (OSS, 1999, p. 44).

I discuss the contemporary relevance of Maritain's philosophy of education in light of five challenges facing Catholic educators in schools, which, interestingly enough, were concerns addressed by Maritain (1943) over sixty years ago. The five challenges include: 1) relativism and the growing distrust of truth among students; 2) false and/or exclusive conceptions of knowledge; 3) a widening of the scope of curriculum; 4) premature specialization in the curriculum; and 5) the absence of practical reason (*phronesis*) in the curriculum. Following a brief discussion of each of these challenges, I explain how Maritain's thought on education can assist educators with their own response to these challenges. As with any educational philosophy, criticisms have been, and will continue to be, raised about various aspects of Maritain's thought on education and schooling (see Carr et al., 1995, p. 170; Elias, 1989, pp. 38-39; O'Malley, 1944, pp. 12-15). However,

despite these criticisms, it is apparent that the values inherent in Maritain's (1943) educational philosophy offer a coherent and reasonable alternative to contemporary educational practices.

*Relativism and the growing distrust of truth.* There is no shortage of authors writing in the area of Catholic education who address the myriad of challenges, both internal and external, to Catholic schools (see D'Souza, 2003; Elias, 1999; Miller, 2007; Mulligan, 2005 & 2008). James T. Mulligan (2005), one of the more well-known authors currently working Ontario, whose most recent book *Catholic Education: Ensuring a Future*, goes so far as to identify a specific challenge for each of the 26 letters in the alphabet (pp. 58-82). One of the many challenges identified by Mulligan (2005), which I also am identifying as a contemporary challenge that needs to be addressed, is the growing tendency by students to identify truth as relative, which leads young people to distrust the very existence of universal truth. Given Mulligan's (2005) and my own concern regarding the growing trend towards relativism, it is reasonable to assume, as D'Souza (2003) and Elias (1999) have, that the struggle against the relativistic attitude expressed by many students today is amplified by the apparent lack of a coherent and plausible Catholic philosophy of education from which to address these concerns in the schools. The increase in a relativistic outlook has undoubtedly had an impact on the educator and their own philosophy of education. Byrnes (2002) appropriately observes that "the abandonment of the work of constructing a Catholic philosophy of education has left a vacuum which thereby left Catholic educators struggling to find a philosophical basis to support the work which they do so successfully" (p. 3). A lack of trust in the truth and the influence of relativism are filling the void and Catholic educators face a significant philosophical challenge: how to develop in students both a knowledge and

love of the truth during a time in our history when we face what Cardinal Ratzinger (2005) —now Pope Benedict XVI— refers to as the “dictatorship of relativism” (§ 11). I contend that Maritain’s (1943) comments regarding the importance of a curriculum guided by the truth is exactly where Catholic educators need to find their inspiration to combat this growing trend towards a distrust in truth.

Maritain’s (1943) philosophy of education offers Catholic educators a coherent philosophical foundation from which to address the apparent lack of trust in truth and the increasing sense, among our students, that truth is relative. Recall that the first two misconceptions identified by Maritain include: 1) a disregard of ends and 2) false ideas concerning the end (pp. 2-4). According to Maritain, education must be directed toward specific ends (both primary and secondary) and in this regard will be liberating.

Maritain’s ideas on the nature of this freedom are valuable in that they have the potential to “fill the vacuum,” as Byrnes (2002) describes, resulting from the apparent lack of a philosophy of Catholic education operative in Catholic schools in Ontario. Maritain’s comments on the relationship between clearly articulated aims of education and the resulting liberation of the human person are worth quoting in full.

At this point we must observe that the freedom of which we are speaking is not a mere unfolding of potentialities without any subject to be grasped, or a mere movement for the sake of movement, without aim or objective to be attained. It is sheer nonsense to offer such a movement to man as constituting his glory. A movement without aim is just running around in circles and getting nowhere. The aim, here on earth, will always be grasped in a partial and imperfect manner, and in this sense, indeed, the movement is to be pursued without end. Yet the aim will somehow be grasped even though partially. Moreover, the spiritual activities,



they tend by nature toward an object, an objective aim, which will measure and rule them, not materially and by means of bondage, but spiritually and by means of liberty, for the object of knowledge or of love is internalized by the activity itself of the intelligence and the will, and becomes within them the very fire of their perfect spontaneity. (pp. 11-12)

Maritain (1943) argues that only when we have a clear understanding of the proper aims of education, can we ever hope to assist our students in their own personal liberation. When Maritain writes of the internalization of knowledge, he is referring to his understanding that there is a correspondence between what the mind knows and what exists. Therefore, to know a “thing” is to know its essence, which exists immaterially in the mind. Ultimately, human beings can know “things” and in this sense students can, in Maritain’s view, obtain truths about the world and trust their own ability to comprehend the world around them. As Maritain writes, “education and teaching can only achieve their internal unity if the manifold parts of their whole work are organized and quickened by a vision of wisdom as the supreme goal” (p. 48).

There has always been a partnership between faith and reason in the Catholic religious tradition and accordingly in the tradition of Catholic education (Groome, 1998, p. 232). Moreover, in his introduction to *Catholicism: Completely Revised and Updated*, Richard McBrien (1994) includes *reason* as a fundamental Catholic principle (pp. 14-15). McBrien (1994) states that for Catholics, “the critical faculties must also be applied to the data of faith if we are to understand it and appropriate it and then put it into practice” (pp. 14-15). Finally, what we receive in Vatican teaching is “...the confidence that the human mind, however limited its powers, can come to a knowledge of truth” (Miller, 2007, p. 46). Confidence in the existence of truth and the ability of the human mind to attain and

communicate these truths is characteristic of a Catholic worldview and of an authentically Catholic curriculum (Miller, 2007, pp. 42-49).

Maritain's (1943) philosophy of education includes a strong conviction that the curriculum taught in schools must be dominated by the influence of truth (pp. 13, 26-27). Human beings, in Maritain's view, have the ability to know the world around them. In Maritain's own words, truth "...does not depend on us but on *what is*" (p. 12). Ultimately, Catholic schools should reinforce the human desire for truth and wisdom. Groome's (1998) description of wisdom is helpful: "becoming wise is eminently reasonable but goes beyond reason to engage the whole person—head, heart, and hands, and all the capacities thereof, in activities of cognition, affection, and volition" (p. 288). We need to regain, what Groome (1998) describes, as a "wisdom epistemology" (pp. 288-315). The foundation of this wisdom epistemology, which Maritain would certainly agree with, is the belief that truth is real and truth can be known. Catholic schools seem to be lacking in recognizing their traditional mandate to enhance rationality and wisdom. Maritain's recommendation that schools focus on reinforcing a student's trust in truth is desperately needed today; if students are to be exposed to a coherent alternative to relativism.

In my previous discussion on Maritain's vision of the primary aim of education (Chapter Four), I pointed out that Maritain's (1943) conception of education is closely aligned with the Aristotelian-Thomistic understanding of the human person.

Subsequently, Maritain (1943) insists that the primary aim or end of education is determined by the primary end of all human striving: to develop both speculative and practical reason in the hope of achieving spiritual freedom through wisdom (pp. 26-28).

In his address to Catholic educators in the spring of 2008 at Catholic University of America in Washington, D.C., Pope Benedict XVI (2008) spoke of the importance of the

centrality of the truth in Catholic education. In keeping with McBrien's (1994) discussion of the centrality of truth in Catholicism, Benedict XVI (2008) identifies the trust in truth as directly related to the virtue of hope and claims that "in this way, Christ's Good News is set to work, guiding both teacher and student towards the objective truth which, in transcending the particular and the subjective, points to the universal and absolute that enables us to proclaim with confidence the hope which does not disappoint" (§ 3). Maritain understands that Catholic schools must do more than just convey information to students who sit passively in their seats.

Maritain (1943) argues, throughout *Education at the Crossroads*, that schools must foster the desire for truth in young people "by a sound equipment of knowledge and a sound development of the powers of thinking" (p. 27). I contend that fostering the desire for truth is rarely explicitly mentioned in the literature emerging from Catholic School Boards and agencies working for Catholic education in Ontario today. In 2007 the Institute for Catholic Education (2007) published *Our Catholic Schools 2006-2007: A Discussion on Ontario's Catholic Schools and Their Future*, a report which emerged out of discussions between educators and stakeholders in Catholic education on the value and distinctiveness of Catholic education in Ontario. The stated purpose of these discussions "...was to provide a structured opportunity for conversation about the essence and value of Ontario's Catholic schools, the challenges they face, and the community's hopes for the future of their schools" (p. 1).

If we read *Our Catholic Schools* carefully, in light of Maritain's (1943) philosophy of education and his comments regarding reason and truth, we soon realize the absence of any meaningful discussion related to the preservation of a trust in truth in

the pupil. Consider the following summative statement composed by ICE (2007) after considering the comments made during province-wide discussions on the distinctive nature of Catholic schools in the province of Ontario.

The majority of school boards noted that Catholic schools are distinctive because they represent religious freedom, in particular the freedom the community enjoys to engage in faith traditions and to share these traditions and faith celebrations with each other and the wider community. This is especially felt when the community gathers to express their faith through liturgies, prayers, and sacraments celebrated during the liturgical year. Students find comfort in gathering in prayer and Eucharist, especially in times of crisis. There is daily prayer, retreat time and time to honour God. Time to balance work and play with worship and service to God is important. Schools allow for space, time and reverence for the sacred. (p. 3)

I recognize that this is only one small portion of ICE's formal report; however, I contend that this excerpt on the distinctiveness of Catholic schools is representative of the majority of comments made regarding the differences between a Catholic education and a secular education (see also Appendix E and F). If Maritain authentically represents the Catholic intellectual tradition handed down from Aquinas, as Elias (1999 & 2002) and others (McCool, 1978; Redpath, 1987; Wiles, 2004) clearly suggest, it stands to reason that Catholic schools in Ontario—which seek to pass on the Catholic faith tradition—should be appealing to our intellectual tradition in their attempt to illuminate the distinct character of Catholic schools. It is important that schools recognize their responsibility to enlighten and strengthen reason. Unfortunately, we soon realize that in identifying the distinctiveness of Catholic schools, little if anything is explicitly said regarding the

promotion of theoretical and practical reason or the role of truth in Catholic schools. The comments from educators relating to the distinctiveness and value of Catholic schools relate exclusively to the moral and spiritual values expressed in these schools rather than to the intellectual values.

D'Souza (2003) articulates in his reflections on contemporary Canadian Catholic education that "...there is a noticeable absence of an identifiable Catholic philosophy of education..." (p. 363). Furthermore, D'Souza (2003) warns that "education cannot function without a formal and articulated pedagogy and epistemology, and Catholic education needs to be able to outline its own particular approach in these two areas. Judging from the province-wide discussions initiated, collected, and collated by ICE in 2006-2007, it is reasonable to conclude that the majority of teachers in Catholic schools are not considering the distinct approach to pedagogy and epistemology inherent in the Catholic educational tradition. Why might this be the case? I suggest that we look to Maritain for insight into why our understanding of truth and knowledge is not finding its way into discussions on Catholic education in a meaningful way.

Maritain's emphasis on the school's role in developing both speculative and practical reason, and in so doing developing a trust in truth suggests that he would have much to criticize in the current curriculum developed for Religious Education courses and also the Ontario Secondary School Program (1999). As a Thomist, Maritain (1943) respects the dignity of the human intellect in the search for truth and as such, the primary disposition to be fostered in our students is the love for knowledge and truth (p. 36). The characteristics of truth outlined here by Maritain reveal an approach to truth that is anything but what his critics may call anti-modern. Maritain is not advocating a closed system, nor is he advocating skepticism. What Maritain offers in this conception of truth

is a possibility for dialogue and cooperation between various individuals and schools of thought. It is not a skeptical approach to truth that will make us free, but only by trusting in truth can we become truly free.

In relation to Maritain's (1943) conception of truth is his conviction that "without trust in truth, there is no human effectiveness" (p. 13). Restoring a student's trust in truth is fundamental to the development of their will and subsequently, their personal spiritual liberation. If our students do not leave our schools with a trust in the truth and their ability to know the world, they will in no way be able to fulfil the Ontario Catholic School Graduate Expectations (see Appendix G) composed by the Institute for Catholic Education (1998). It is reasonable, then to, suggest that the Ontario Catholic Graduate School Expectations are amended to include the expectation that the Catholic school graduate is a discerning believer who recognizes the centrality and importance of truth in his or her life. Although the Catholic Graduate Expectations, produced by ICE (1998), are extensive, and are "described not only in terms of knowledge and skills, but in terms of values, attitudes and actions" (Catholicism's Core Understanding of the Human Condition section, para 3), I find it curious that the references to knowledge and truth, which are no doubt part of Catholicism's core understanding of the human condition, are lacking.

It is reasonable to assert that, in our contemporary desire to avoid offending those who promote alternative educational objectives or alternative philosophies of education, Catholic schools have lost sight of the fundamental "end" of education. Although Catholic schools have a unique mission, they are bound by Ministry initiatives, policies, and curriculum expectations and cannot help but be influenced by current trends in educational philosophy. Maritain's (1961) comments in his essay entitled "Truth and

Human Fellowship” are helpful in attempting to understand this apparent lack of an appeal to the philosophy of education that D’Souza (2003) and Elias (1999) describe. Maritain comments that “it is not unusual to meet people who think that *not to believe in any truth, or not to adhere firmly to any assertion as unshakeably true in itself*, is a primary condition required of democratic citizens in order to be tolerant of one another and to live in peace with one another” (p. 18).

Is the absence of an explicit appeal to truth in the dialogue on the distinctive nature of Catholic education in Ontario a result of either a subconscious or conscious fear of offending those who hold different ideas and or truths about the world? If “Catholic teachers are to cultivate in themselves and develop in others a passion for truth that defeats moral and cultural relativism” (Miller, 2007, p. 46) then why do we not see this type of statement in many of the publications on Catholic education (see Appendix F and G)? I contend, as Maritain did, that many in the Catholic educational community have forgotten their philosophical/intellectual heritage. Furthermore, in an attempt to appear “tolerant,” they have given in to the temptation to downplay the true essence of Catholic education, which is articulated by Maritain (1943) as “the conquest of internal and spiritual freedom to be achieved by the individual person, or, in other words, his liberation through knowledge and wisdom, good will, and love” (p. 11). Perhaps the advent of full funding in Ontario has left Catholic schools weary of criticising or offending those who are responsible for the “moment of promise” described by the Ontario Conference of Catholic Bishops (1989) in their pastoral letter to the faithful on the heels of public funding for Catholic schools.<sup>16</sup>

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<sup>16</sup> See R.D. Gidney (1999). *From hope to Harris: The reshaping of Ontario's schools*. Toronto, University of Toronto Press, pp. 124-141 for a complete discussion on public funding for Catholic schools in Ontario.

In the absence of a clear understanding of the ends of education, which is understood by Maritain (1943) as a practical art, he rightly observes that “this supremacy of means over end and the consequent collapse of all sure purpose and real efficiency seem to be the main reproach to contemporary education” (p. 3). The objective aim of education in the widest sense is truth (Maritain, 1943, p. 12). Just as education has an end or an aim, so, too, does life, and if we lose sight of the purpose of education, we are likely to lose sight of the purpose for life and vice versa (p. 12). Ultimately, this “dictatorship of relativism” that Pope Benedict XVI speaks of and which Mulligan (2005) identifies as a serious challenge to Catholic education in Ontario will only continue to be perpetuated through our Catholic schools if we do not make a conscious effort to reclaim our philosophical tradition in order to bend our methods and means toward the appropriate end of truth.

#### *False Conceptions Regarding the Nature of Knowledge*

The second challenge facing Catholic schools in Ontario involves the nature of knowledge implied by the current curriculum and our assessment practices. Maritain offers several compelling insights on the nature of knowledge that force us to clarify and/or reconsider our approach to learning and assessment. The second part of this chapter will focus on the current conception of knowledge presented in the OSS (1999), and the problems associated with this conception implied by Maritain’s (1943) philosophy of education. Maritain asks a fundamental question in his discussion on the dynamics of education in *Education at the Crossroads* that should be considered by both Catholic and non-Catholic educators in Ontario today. Maritain asks “does the liberation of the mind mean that what essentially matters is not the possession of knowledge but only the development of the strength, skill, and accuracy of man’s mental powers,



whatever the thing to be learned may be” (p. 51)? The question is significant because our response will affect what is included in the curriculum and how the curriculum is delivered and assessed.

Fred Ellett’s (2008) paper entitled “Mindless Recall? Knowing and Knowing How” is particularly helpful in clarifying our conception of knowledge underlying the current curriculum in Ontario. In Ontario today, we have a curriculum that is organized around a series of detailed expectations “that is knowledge and skills that the students are expected to demonstrate by the end of each course” (*Program Planning and Assessment: The Ontario Curriculum for Grades 9-12*, 2000, p. 4). These expectations are assessed using subject-specific achievement charts, which are organized into four categories: Knowledge/Understanding, Thinking/Inquiry, Communication, and Application (p. 13). Ellett (2008) reminds us how important it is that we consider the meanings attached to the terms appearing in the achievement chart (p. 64). Ellett (2008) indicates that “Bloom’s Taxonomy is the conceptual ancestor to the current framework which appears in the Ontario Achievement Charts” (p. 64). Therefore, if we are going to understand the current curriculum, we must examine the conception of knowledge presented by Bloom’s Taxonomy, both the 1956 version and the revised 2001 version. Following a brief discussion of Bloom’s taxonomy, I suggest below how Maritain’s (1943) philosophy of education can address the shortcomings associated with the taxonomy. According to Maritain (1962) “underlying all questions concerning the basic orientation of education, there is the *philosophy of knowledge* to which the educator consciously or unconsciously subscribes (p. 45). The curriculum in Ontario represents one particular approach to education and as such most educators are unconsciously subscribing to a particular philosophy of knowledge without much examination.

In Ellett's (2008) examination of the achievement categories presented in the curriculum, specifically the conception of knowledge, he concludes, that "...these taxonomies are inadequate because they have missed key features of the concepts 'knowing' and 'knowing how'" (p. 64). In my estimation, Ellett's thesis would surely be supported by Maritain if he was familiar with the contemporary context of education in Ontario. Two important features of Bloom's Taxonomy, as summarized by Ellett, are applicable to our discussion of Maritain's (1943) philosophy of education. First, Bloom distinguishes between the *cognitive* domain, which includes knowledge and higher order skills and the *affective* domain, which includes beliefs and values (Ellett, p. 65). Second, Bloom's Taxonomy "...conceives of knowing as merely the capacity to recall information (Ellett, p. 65). The line drawn between the *cognitive domain* and the *affective domain* is important because in separating the *cognitive domain* and the *affective domain*, Bloom is implying that knowledge (as recall) does not include an acceptance of the proposition by the learner (Ellett, p. 69). Maritain's philosophy of education and more specifically his conception of knowledge challenges Bloom's Taxonomy and as such should challenge those of us working in education today.

Maritain (1943) is highly critical of the exclusive concept of "knowing" as recall. The potential problem associated with the conception of knowledge as recall is that students will become passive learners without the ability to think critically for themselves. Ellett (2008) distinguishes between knowing-in-the-active-sense and knowing-in-the-passive-sense (p. 70). The distinction between active and passive knowledge is helpful in understanding where Maritain is coming from and he cautions the educator with the following analogy.

What is learned should never be passively or mechanically received, as dead information which weighs down and dulls the mind. It must rather be actively transformed by understanding into the very life of the mind, and thus strengthened the latter, as wood thrown into fire and transformed into flame makes the fire stronger. But a big mass of damp wood thrown into the fire only puts it out. Reason which receives knowledge in a servile manner does not really know and is only depressed by a knowledge which is not its own but that of others. On the contrary, reason which receives knowledge by assimilating it vitally, that is, in a free and liberating manner, really knows, and is exalted in its very activity by this knowledge which henceforth is its own. Then it is that reason really masters the things learned. (pp. 50-51)

What we can glean from Maritain's (1943) comments above is that he clearly views knowledge as more than recall and he is promoting what Ellett (2008) describes as knowledge-in-the-active-sense. If active knowing involves belief and the incorporation of these beliefs into one's actions, Ellett's conclusion that "some objectives have both a cognitive and an affective aspect" is reasonable (p. 70). What Maritain has to offer our schools is a conception of knowledge that is not exclusively cognitive in nature and one that does involve belief and acceptance which is essential in Maritain's own conception of knowledge. The objectives in the OSS are clearly cognitive objectives and ones that do not take into consideration the affective domain that is such an essential part of Maritain's philosophy of education. Maritain's whole educational philosophy is guided by the principle that "the whole work of education and teaching must tend to unify, not to spread out; it must strive to foster internal unity in man" (p. 45). The fact that Maritain identifies unification as a fundamental rule indicates that by separating the *cognitive*

domain and the *affective* domain fails to capture the complexity of the acquisition of knowledge, which for Maritain includes intuition, imagination, spirituality, common sense, and emotion (pp. 39-49).

To say that a person knows something should indicate, according to Maritain, that the person understands it and believes it. As Ellett (2008) makes clear, to know in the reliable-authority sense (RA), the full evidential sense (FEV), and the restricted evidential sense (REV), the learner must believe P (see Appendix D). In this case, Ellett's (2008) observation that trust is a key element in all learning (p. 68) is also present in Maritain's (1943) philosophy of education. Maritain argues that "the teacher does possess a knowledge which the student does not have" (p. 30) and for this reason the teacher "actually communicates knowledge to the student..." (p. 30). Trust is central to the learning experience for Maritain because the student must believe the teacher, whose role is to convey truth to the learner (p. 26). I would also suggest that it is precisely because knowledge involves more than just the *cognitive* domain, but also the *affective* domain, that trust must be formed between the educator and the student.

It is important to note that the OSS is designed to "prepare students for further education and work, and will help them to become independent, productive, and responsible members of society" (OSS, 1999, p. 6). What we gather from this short statement on the aim of education in Ontario is that the utilitarian aspect of education is primary. It is not a surprise, given the educational context in Ontario today, that there is no mention of what Maritain (1943) considers to be the prime goal of education as a "...liberation through knowledge and wisdom, good will, and love" (p. 11). It is clear that Maritain's understanding of education as primarily a liberating experience directly

conflicts with the goals of the OSS. If the aim of education is primarily a utilitarian one, then the knowledge that is acquired will be impersonal.

Knowledge, as presented in the Ontario Curriculum, is knowing-as-mere-recall. This conception of knowledge contrasts significantly with Maritain's conception of knowledge and understanding. The assessment framework set out in the Ontario curriculum is limited in the sense that it does not allow for belief and assent on the part of the learner. Maritain is clear that knowledge, if it is to be liberating, must be vitally assimilated by the learner. According to Maritain (1943), when we come to know something, this truth "...is vitally assimilated by the insatiable activity which is rooted in the depths of self" (p. 52). If we understand Maritain correctly, the expectations outlined in the specific subject disciplines in the OSS can be humanized if we approach the curriculum in a new way. The sense that education is to be liberating has been lost and the OSS is only approaching the curriculum from a pragmatic or instrumentalist philosophical standpoint, which has an impact on the conception of knowledge being passed on to the students. Maritain's concern that contemporary philosophers of education had disregarded the appropriate end of education is unfortunately still a problem today. It seems that the OSS has substituted "...mental gymnastics for truth, and being in fine fettle, for wisdom" (p. 55). The utilitarian aspect of education cannot be the ultimate aim of the curriculum. We can best serve our students when we develop in them genuine understanding. Education, as Maritain insists should aim at liberating the person (p. 100).

Despite the fact that Catholic schools are free to develop curriculum that complements their own worldview (OSS, 1999, p. 44), it is clear that ICE had to align the religion curriculum with the assessment policies and guidelines outlined in *Program*

*Planning and Assessment: The Ontario Curriculum Grades 9-12 (2000)*. Immediately one is struck by the overall appearance of the curriculum document for Religious Education courses in Catholic high schools. The curriculum document is aesthetically identical to the curriculum documents produced by the Ministry of Education for courses such as Math and History. It is safe to assume that ICE is attempting to legitimize Religious Education and its role in public education in Ontario. Although the revised document is aesthetically similar in appearance to the curriculum documents designed for other courses, one finds, after further investigation, that the content is neither philosophically nor pedagogically distinct from that of other curricula.

#### *Widening the Scope of the Curriculum*

The third challenge that Catholic educators must respond to today is not isolated from the challenges presented by the growing distrust of truth or the false conception of knowledge, but it is one that may be more visible to educators “on the ground” so to speak. It is the experience of many educators that they are being asked to do more and more each year to fulfil a growing list of curriculum expectations (Wein & Dudley-Marley, 1998). Initiatives such as career education, civics education, character education, money management education<sup>17</sup>, and environmental education are all examples of initiatives which have widened the scope of the curriculum in Ontario. In this third part, I explore two fundamental aspects of Maritain’s philosophy of education as they relate to the scope of the curriculum. First, one of the most important aspects of Maritain’s (1943) philosophy of education is his distinction between the role of the teacher and the role of the student (pp. 29-31; see also Maritain, 1962, pp. 58-61). Second, also related to the

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<sup>17</sup> <http://www.moneyinstructor.com/> is a website designed to help teachers instruct students in personal finance. The aforementioned website is only one example of a growing number of corporate initiatives to include financial literacy in the Ontario curriculum.

scope of the curriculum is Maritain's (1943) distinction between the *educational sphere* and the *extra-educational sphere* (pp. 24-28). Understanding Maritain's remarks in these two areas will positively affect schooling by unifying the curriculum around clearly defined goals and by linking the expectations to learning allowing for students to be active participant in their education.

In their paper entitled "Limited Vision: The Ontario Curriculum and Outcomes-Based Learning," Wien and Dudley-Marling (1998) identify several problems associated with the current curriculum in Ontario. Wien and Dudley-Marling (1998) argue persuasively that an ideological shift has taken place with the implementation of the current curriculum in that the subject documents focus primarily on what is learned by the student as opposed to what is taught (p. 405). According to Maritain (1943), this shift away from "*the object to be taught and the primacy of the object*" is ultimately a shift in the wrong direction (p. 14). Wien and Dudley-Marling (1998) are correct in their assessment that "the implementation of outcomes-based learning as fragmented lists of discrete items paralyzes broader, more integrated directions in education" (p. 408). For example, the *Ontario Curriculum Grades 9 and 10: Social Science and Humanities* (1999) document is littered with expectations, but lacks the inclusion of a primary aim of education or any recognition of a hierarchy of values (i.e. speculative reason over practical reason).

It is interesting to note that in the introduction to *Ontario Curriculum Grades 9 and 10: Social Science and Humanities* (1999), we have many references to skill development, acquisition of knowledge, and transferable skills (p. 2). The Ministry of Education and Training also recognizes that the areas within the Social Sciences and Humanities (i.e. general social science, family studies, philosophy, and world religions)

have a particular focus and within the discipline share a common purpose (p. 2); however, we cannot say the same thing about the Ontario curriculum. In contrast, Maritain (1943) proposes a humanizing curriculum that is grounded in a unified liberal education for all.

The vision of the teacher and learner presented by the Ontario curriculum is one that we can confidently assert would have been opposed strongly by Maritain. Referring to the Ontario Curriculum (1999), Wien and Dudley-Marling (1998), argue that the “vision of the learner shifts from active participant to passive recipient, the assumption being that the learner is a receptacle for storing what has been learned” (p. 408). This is not a vision of learning shared by Maritain in his philosophy of education. The contrast between Maritain curriculum proposal and today’s curriculum hinges on his understanding of the role of the teacher and the role of the learner.

Maritain (1943) insists that both the teacher and the student are dynamic factors in education; however, it is important to note that the student is the “principle agent in education” (p. 31) and for this reason he or she is an active participant in their education. An important question is posed by Maritain (1962) in the *Education of Man*: he asks, “what do adults essentially owe to youth in the educational task” (p. 58)? This question is one that we must ask today and continue to ask long into the future as we attempt to make sense of the role of the teacher and the role of the student amidst cultural and social changes. Maritain (1962) argues that teachers owe students “...both truth to be known at the various degrees of the scale of knowledge and the capacity to think and make a personal judgment, to be developed, equipped, and firmly established...” (p. 58). The student in Maritain’s mind must be active, and if he or she is not given the opportunity to actively learn, they are destined to remain passive participants.



According to Maritain (1943), the best way to deliver truth and the capacity for critical thinking is through a liberal humanistic education. In agreement with Maritain, Groome (1998) indicates that "...human liberation be the first guideline for every educator in choosing curriculum" (p. 246). For Maritain (1962) "the objective of basic liberal education is to see to it that the young person grasps this truth or beauty through the natural powers and gifts of his mind and the natural intuitive energy of his reason backed up by his whole sensuous, imaginative, and emotional dynamism" (p. 71). This conception of learning is one that is not supported by the Ontario curriculum with its lists of expectations and skills for the learner to demonstrate. Wein and Dudley-Marling (1998) warn that "teachers may think that because they select an outcome and use an activity (or test) to reach it, this outcome will be achieved; however, unless teachers examine the connections between outcomes and learners, selected outcomes may be logically connected to activities or tests but not to learning" (p. 409). Recall the previous discussion on the conception of knowledge presented in the curriculum today. We know that knowledge as-mere-recall is not the only type of knowledge worth assessing and in fact does not indicate that authentic learning has occurred. Ultimately, for Maritain, the possession of knowledge requires authentic understanding and assent in order to transform students from slaves of knowledge into masters of knowledge. Therefore, in avoiding the reduction of knowledge to its practical benefits, Maritain (1962) reiterates that "the objective of basic liberal education is not the acquisition of science itself or of art itself...but rather the grasp of their meaning and the comprehension of the truth and beauty they yield" (p. 71).

Maritain (1962) reminds us that when it comes to formulating the curriculum, "the guiding principle is less factual information and more intellectual enjoyment" (p. 72).

Where in the curriculum today do we allow for intellectual enjoyment? Subsequently, the teacher should concentrate on awakening the student's mind to a few basic ideas and themes in each particular discipline (p. 72). What we have today in Ontario is anything but a "few" expectations. Maritain argues that if we approach the curriculum in a new light, "the result would be both a rise in quality of the teaching received and an alleviation of the material burden imposed by the curriculum" (p. 72). I would argue that teachers would be happy to alleviate the stress imposed on them due to the numerous expectations outlined in today's curriculum.

The current curriculum documents with their lists of expectations that students are required to demonstrate, including the one designed by ICE (2006) for Religious Education courses in Catholic high schools, share a fragmented, dehumanizing, and undemocratic vision of schooling. Today in Ontario, given the promotion of an instrumentalist curriculum, teachers are not given the supports needed to provide a humanistic curriculum that will assist in the personal liberation of their students. If we were to adopt the ideas presented by Maritain (1943) in his philosophy of education regarding the role of the student and teacher along with an appropriate understanding of what should be included in the curriculum both students and teachers would benefit immensely.

#### *Premature Specialization in the Curriculum*

The fourth challenge to be addressed in this chapter involves the premature specialization in the curriculum. It is no secret that today in Ontario, students are forced to choose courses, beginning in Grade Nine, with their future activities and occupation in mind. There is a push today in Ontario schools, both Catholic and secular, to enhance the curriculum with work experience opportunities and pre-vocational activities (OSS, 1999,

p. 7). Maritain (1943) is critical of education that, in his eyes, “is killed by premature specialization” (p. 64). Maritain (1962) insists that “manual work and intellectual work are equally human in the truest sense and directed toward helping man to achieve freedom” (p. 150). All of the subjects in Maritain’s (1943) curriculum schema are to be “taught not only for the sake of practical applications but essentially for the sake of knowledge...” (p. 69). This seems to be missing in the OSS documents. Consider the following paragraph addressing the purpose of the secondary school program in Ontario.

The secondary school program is designed so that students can meet the diploma requirements in four years following Grade 8. Courses are offered in new ways intended to ensure that education is relevant both to students’ needs and interests and to the requirements of postsecondary institutions and employers. In Grades 9 and 10, courses strongly promote the acquisition of essential knowledge and skills by all students, but at the same time allow students to begin to focus on their areas of strength and interest and to explore various areas of study. In Grades 11 and 12, the program is designed to allow all students to choose courses that are clearly and directly linked to their intended postsecondary destinations. (OSS, 1999, p. 6)

It is clear, that the Ministry of Education in Ontario views the high school curriculum as essential for students either to get a job or to pursue further studies. There is no indication here that education is to be a humanizing experience directed towards human freedom and personal and/or spiritual fulfilment. We would do well to remember Maritain’s (1943) statement that the adolescent is not an adult, and therefore, “judgment and intellectual strength are developing but are not yet really acquired” (p. 61). For this reason, the adolescent is to “learn and know music in order to understand the meaning of music rather than in order to become a composer” (p. 63). What we can conclude from

these statements by Maritain is that the curriculum must not demand adolescents to develop before they are intellectually ready. Not until university would the student be required to specialize in a particular field of study.

Maritain (1962) hypothesizes that high school students should be directed into two divisions: 1) intellectual-service training and 2) manual-service training (refer to Table 3). Students in the manual-service training stream being are the humanities and liberal arts in an informal manner through play, while formal and systematic teaching would take place in the area of manual training. On the other hand, students enrolled in the intellectual-service training stream would experience manual work activities through play and they would learn the humanities and liberal arts through formal learning. Both of these avenues would allow students in each group to experience a humanistic liberal education. The benefits of approaching the curriculum in this way are clearly articulated by Maritain (1962):

We would no longer have to choose between either obliging students unconcerned with disinterested knowledge to trudge along in the rear of classes which are a bore to them or diverting them toward other and supposedly inferior studies by reason of a lack, or a lesser capacity. We would have these students enter into a different but equally esteemed and appreciated system of study, and steer spontaneously, by reason of a positive preference, enjoyment, and capacity, for a type of liberal education which, while remaining essentially concerned with humanities, prepares them for some vocation pertaining to manual work – not, of course, by making them apprentices in any of the innumerable manual vocations but rather by teaching them, theoretically and practically, matters concerning the general categories into

which manual service can be divided, such as farming, mining, craftsmanship, the various types of modern industrial labor, etc. (p. 151)

Maritain's hypothesis is reasonable and the benefits far outweigh the burdens. It seems that students today, whether or not they are in the direction of intellectual training or vocational training are missing key elements of each area. It would benefit both groups of students to experience Maritain's (1962) "bipolar" conception of the curriculum. Students who would normally not enjoy an informal learning in manual work would surely benefit and those students who would not normally experience informal learning in the humanities and liberal arts would also benefit. Common-sense suggests that we would have more well-rounded students leaving high school.

*The Absence of Theoretical and Practical Reason (phronesis)*

At this point, I would like to examine in more detail the discouraging absence of explicit references to practical reason (*phronesis*) in the Ontario curriculum and more specifically in the *Ontario Catholic School Graduate Expectations* (ICE, 1998) (see Appendix G). Maritain's (1943) discussion of educators' misunderstanding or disregarding the ends of education (p. 2) along with his emphasis on schools needing to promote both speculative and practical reason in search of the truth (p. 28) would lead him to critique the Ontario expectations for Catholic students. To review briefly, theoretical reason discovers and assesses the way things are with an eye to the truth. Practical reason, on the other hand, involves the student's capacity for deliberating and deciding what he or she should do in one's life and in particular situations. Practical reason, although a distinct form of reasoning, is related to theoretical reason because in order to act well we must take into consideration truths about the world.

Maritain (1943) also insists that theoretical reason comes before practical reason (p. 54). The recognition of a hierarchy of values is primary in Maritain's epistemology and his philosophy of education. What we soon realize, after exploring the vast number of graduate expectations for the Catholic student, is the almost complete absence of any appeal to practical reason and the hierarchy of values. What we do find, as Maritain did over sixty years earlier, is "...a trend toward such a conception of education, following a more or less conscious materialistic philosophy of life" (p. 19). The "materialistic philosophy of life" that Maritain refers to has not been lost on the *Ontario Catholic School Graduate Expectations* (ICE, 1998). The equal division of the expectations listed in Appendix G only serves to highlight the fact that these expectations are not hierarchically structured. This should be a concern to Catholic educators because we do not want the utilitarian aspect of education expressed in the graduate expectations<sup>18</sup> overshadowing or usurping the primary and secondary aims of education. The fact that the *Ontario Catholic School Graduate Expectations* are not arranged in any hierarchical order we could assume that the pragmatic aims of education are equal to what Maritain (1943) would consider to be those expectations related to the development of theoretical and practical reason.

Maritain (1962) rightly argues that "there is no unity or integration without a stable hierarchy of values" (p. 53). Do we see this hierarchy of values represented in the *Ontario Catholic School Graduate Expectations* (ICE, 1998)? Interestingly, if one looks at the layout of this report carefully, he or she will soon recognize the absence of any clear expression of a primary aim of education or those "dispositions" that are related to

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<sup>18</sup> See specifically CGE 2b, CGE 2d, CGE4d, and CGE 4f of the *Ontario Catholic School Graduate Expectations* (Appendix G).

the primary aim of education. The graduate expectations are divided into seven groupings under the headings: 1) A discerning believer formed in the Catholic faith community; 2) An effective communicator; 3) A reflective and creative thinker; 4) A self-directed, responsible, life long learner; 5) A collaborative communicator; 6) A caring family member; and 7) A responsible citizen. Furthermore, each grouping is divided into various sub-groupings (i.e. CGE 2a – listens actively and critically to understand and learn in light of gospel values) for a total of 52 graduate expectations for the Catholic student in Ontario.

Three important *Ontario Catholic School Graduate Expectations* are worth exploring in more detail in order to highlight Maritain's distinction between knowledge-value and training-value. First Catholic graduates are expected to think reflectively and creatively (CGE3c), adapt to new ideas (CGE 3b), and evaluate and apply knowledge (CGE 3f). Maritain (1943) observes that "...too often contemporary education has deemed it suitable to substitute training-value for knowledge-value—in other words, mental gymnastics for truth, and being in fine fettle, for wisdom (p. 55). The values we discover in Maritain's ideas, including this statement, demonstrate the fact that they are so easily transferable to our current experience in Ontario. We are failing to educate students in universal values and universal knowledge. We cannot distinguish any hierarchical approach to the expectations and it stands to reason that there will also be no hierarchical approach to the curriculum documents for Catholic and non-Catholic students. It is fair to question why participation in leisure and fitness activities (CGE 4h) is on the same level as acting morally (CGE 7a). We can also argue, as Maritain (1943) would, that the role of the school should not include some of the various graduate

expectations included by ICE (1998).<sup>19</sup> The danger if we include all of these expectations including those that are more appropriately associated with the extra-educational sphere or even with the family or church within the educational sphere, is that we widen the scope of the curriculum.

Finally, I wish to highlight what I consider to be the most important criticism of the ICE's (1998) *Ontario Catholic School Graduate Expectations*: the absence of the word "truth" in any of the seven broad expectations and even in the 52 specific expectations. Where is the deep commitment to seek the truth via theoretical and practical reason that traditional Catholic philosophies of education are founded on. The role of theoretical and practical reason is absent from the *Ontario Catholic School Graduate Expectations*. One expectation includes the word "knowledge" (CGE 3f). According to this specific expectation, the graduate will be "a reflectively and creative thinker who examines, evaluates and applies knowledge of interdependent systems (physical, political, ethical, socio-economic and ecological) for the development of a just and compassionate society" (see Appendix G). What we have here is an absence of theoretical and practical reason. First, if the student is reflective and creative in the examination, evaluation, and application of knowledge this does not infer that the student "knows" the material. Recall, my discussion on Maritain's conception of knowledge in the second part of this chapter. In order for the student to "know" in the Maritainian (1943) sense, this involves "grasping the object and having it seized and vitalized by truth...it is not by gymnastics of its faculties, it is by truth that it is set free" (pp. 51-51).

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<sup>19</sup> For example, expectation CGE 1b, CGE 1e, CGE 5d, and CGE 4h would more appropriately be the responsibility of the extra-educational sphere and not the school.



There are no expectations related to the love of truth and justice, intellectual enjoyment, or the ability to think and judge according to the worth of evidence.

In its failure to implement theoretical and practical reason in the curriculum and more specifically, the *Ontario Catholic School Graduate Expectations*, ICE, (2008) has inadvertently promoted a utilitarian and pragmatic theory of knowledge, which is far removed from the Catholic philosophical tradition represented in Maritain's philosophy of education. Theoretical reason and practical reason, when included in the curriculum expectations, provides the student with a level of certainty that is necessary for his/her intellectual and moral growth. Similarly, D'Souza (1996) persuasively argues that "the success of educational pastiche has been made possible by the removal of a stable, universal, and philosophical theory of human nature" (Some Conclusions section, para. 6). The word "pastiche" is used by D'Souza (1996) to refer to the potpourri or hodgepodge that we find among contemporary curriculum structures. D'Souza (1996), is critical of contemporary education because "it is when the basic elements of human nature and its specific powers and activities are questioned and denied that education deteriorates into training, early specialization, and a premature and narrow professionalism" (Some Conclusions section, para. 6).

It is not my intention to only highlight the shortcomings of the *Ontario Catholic School Graduate Expectations* (ICE, 1998). It must be stated that the Institute for Catholic Education (ICE) has a clear advantage over those writing curriculum for the secular school system. Catholic curriculum writers have the flexibility to write curriculum materials that complement the Catholic worldview (OSS, 1999, p. 44). It is apparent that the authors of the Catholic expectations view "dispositions" in the sense that Frankena (1965b) uses the term to include values, attitudes, skills, character traits,

abilities, and states of knowledge (pp. 2-3). I contend that ICE has not done enough to highlight the expectation that students in Catholic schools will develop theoretical and practical reason in their quest to seek the truth. I recognize that the graduate expectations do include important values and attitudes;<sup>20</sup> however, these values and attitudes do not include the most important one, which in Maritain's (1943) view is the development of theoretical and practical reason in the pursuit of truth.

The Catholic graduate expectations do include both explicit and implicit reference to most of the "dispositions" that Maritain's highlights in *Education at the Crossroads* and that I have included in Box C (see Figure 6). The first disposition "love of knowledge and truth" is not represented well and I have said enough about this; however, we do have in the *Ontario Catholic School Graduate Expectations* (ICE, 1998) references to the "love of goodness and justice" (CGE 1d, CGE 7e), the "love of existence" as Maritain understands it (CGE 1e, CGE 1e, CGE 1j, and CGE 7b-c), the sense of a "job well done" is noted in the expectation that the graduate "finds meaning, dignity, fulfillment and vocation in work which contributes to the common good" (CGE 5d), and finally the expectation that the graduate will develop a "sense of cooperation" is well represented (CGE 1f, CGE 5e, CGE 7f, and CGE 7j). It is clear that much of what Maritain (1943) identifies as "dispositions," which the school is to foster in the students (see Box C in Figure 6) is represented by the *Ontario Catholic School Graduate Expectations* (ICE, 2008). This is good news; however, we cannot help but notice that the official Ontario curriculum (OSS, 1999) conceives of "dispositions" in a most narrow sense as kinds of knowledge (recall) and skills. Attitudes and values are not knowledge and skills. For example, a student may know how to use a mathematical equation, but

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<sup>20</sup> Consider expectation CGE 1d, CGE 1h, CGE 4g, CGE 6a-d, and CGE 7e.

they have failed to understand the *meaning* of mathematics itself. Maritain (1943) reminds us here that “...the objective is less the acquisition of science itself or art itself than the grasp of their *meaning* and the comprehension of the truth or beauty they yield” (p. 63). Therefore, if we examine the previous example further, the student may have *acquired* much knowledge and many skills, but has not been educated on the *meaning* of the various disciplines he or she has studied in school. The Ontario curriculum is founded on an instrumentalist curriculum philosophy and it is no surprise that the characteristic of “comprehensive universality,” that Maritain (1943) speaks of, is lost in the “dispositions” acquired through such outcomes based learning (p. 63).

I suggest that the Ontario Ministry of Education released the supplementary curriculum document entitled *Finding Common Ground: Character Development in Ontario Schools, K-12*<sup>21</sup> in 2008, precisely because of the absence of values and attitudes in the official curriculum documents. According to the Ontario Ministry of Education, “a quality education is about more than academic achievement it is about the development of the whole person” (CG, 2008, p. 3). It is not my purpose here to go into great detail on the recent character initiatives in Ontario (this requires a study all its own), but I do want to briefly outline the goal of this initiative as a means to highlight the limitations in the present Ontario curriculum expectations (OSS, 1999). First, the definition of character education in CG (2008) is given as “the deliberate effort to nurture the universal attributes upon which schools and communities find consensus” (p. 3). This definition seems fair enough; however, later on in the document we are told that character education is not an imposition of moral standards or a form of religious education (p. 7). It is also curious that nowhere in CG (2008) is the definition of person given. This is the problem that

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<sup>21</sup> Hereafter cited as CG.

haunts the curriculum in Ontario, despite the honest efforts by the Ministry to develop and implement character education in Ontario. Maritain (1943), in his brilliance, recognized this problem and he states that “if the aim of education is the helping and guiding of man toward his own human achievement, education cannot escape the problems and entanglements of philosophy, for it supposes by its very nature a philosophy of man, and from the outset it is obliged to answer the question: What is man? (p. 4). The fact that the Ontario curriculum does not begin with any explicit discussion of the nature of the person, will ensure that the “limited vision” described by Wein and Dudley-Marley (1998) continues to be perpetuated.

Maritain’s philosophy of education has significant contemporary relevance precisely because his comments are universal and timeless. Today, in the year 2009, Catholic schools in Ontario today are attempting to educate both elementary and high school students within a system that is unfortunately permeated by an instrumentalist and pragmatic approach to teaching and learning. Despite the cries of Catholic administrators and educational theorists admonishing Catholic teachers to infuse the OSS curriculum with “Catholic values,” teachers come up against an educational system that promotes an inherently different philosophical approach to education. No matter how many supplementary documents and policies are created for Roman Catholic schools, we cannot escape the reality that we are still under the direction of the Ministry of Education and, therefore, constrained by an instrumentalist approach to teaching and learning. In order to defend the Catholic educational system, Catholic educators must identify their theological and philosophical differences. Maritain’s (1943) philosophy of education can help administrators and teachers in Catholic schools address 1) relativism and the growing distrust of truth among students; 2) false and/or exclusive conceptions of

knowledge; 3) the widening of the scope of curriculum; 4) pre-mature specialization in the curriculum; and 5) the absence of theoretical and practical reason in the curriculum. Finally, the values inherent in Maritain's educational philosophy offer a coherent and reasonable alternative to contemporary educational practices and transcend theological divisions.

## Chapter Seven

### *Summary and Conclusions*

In this thesis, I have attempted to explicate Maritain's (1943) philosophy of education and to address the contemporary challenges facing Catholic schools in Ontario through a Maritainian lens. The method of investigation was philosophical and typical of the philosophical research methods described by Sheffield (2004). I have attempted to utilize the three main tools at the philosopher's disposal: analysis, clarification, and criticism (Sheffield, 2004, p. 763). In an age of accountability and outcomes-based learning, educational theorists and curriculum writers often fail to grapple with the foundational questions about human nature and its destiny. The initial concern I had at the start of my research was that the curriculum for Catholic schools in Ontario did not reflect strongly enough a sound philosophical foundation in the neo-Thomistic Catholic philosophical tradition, as represented by Jacques Maritain.

The purpose of Chapter Two was to develop a brief understanding of the historical context out of which Maritain's philosophy of education develops to gain appropriate insight into his work. Maritain recognized the crucial role educators play in the intellectual, spiritual, and moral formation of young people precisely because he saw his own educational formation as being limited by educators who denied the supernatural part of his being. In the first chapter of *Education at the Crossroads*, Maritain remarks that human beings are more than just physical entities. Maritain was an educator and student, whether formally or informally, his entire life and by all accounts, he was considered a valued and respected teacher by both his colleagues and students (Dunaway, 1978, p. 87). As should be expected, Maritain's educational philosophy is a practical outreach of his metaphysics and epistemology and specifically, of his view of human

nature. It was my hope that a unified, coherent, and plausible Catholic philosophy of education could be applied to address the shortcomings of the outcome-based and skill-orientated curriculum in Ontario.

Chapter Three focused on Frankena's (1965a) model for analyzing a normative philosophy of education. Although it was determined that Frankena's model was sufficient to explore and clarify Maritain's (1943) philosophy of education, it was apparent that Maritain had a unique understanding of the role of schools in education. Maritain identified the importance of two spheres of educational influence: 1) the educational sphere and 2) the extra-educational sphere (pp. 24-25).

Within the educational sphere Maritain (1943) identifies the important role played by the family, the church and the school (refer to Figure 4). Given Maritain's acceptance of a broader as well as a narrower view of education, it was important to clarify at the outset of this study that in explicating Maritain's philosophy of education, I would be most concerned with the educational sphere and even more specifically, the role schools play in this sphere. It is important to note that the school, as a part of the educational sphere, also forms a key part of Maritain's broader view of education.

It was determined that the aim of schooling was threefold and in a specific order of importance. The primary aim of education, to which all other aims are subservient, is to guide the person toward personal, spiritual freedom through theoretical and practical reason and to convey the spiritual and cultural heritage of a nation. The secondary aim of education is to prepare the person for life in society and to be a good citizen. Finally, according to the practical aim of education, schooling is to enable the person to get a job and make a living (Maritain, 1943, p. 10). The source of these aims, for Maritain lies in the nature of the person rooted in the Philosophical-Religious Idea of the person (p. 4).

I chose to approach the explication of Maritain's (1943) philosophy of education in two parts (Chapter Four and Chapter Five) corresponding to the "philosophical" element and the "practical element" outlined by Frankena (1965a). It was necessary to indicate in these chapters that the material in Box C would be composed of "dispositions" from the composition of Boxes A, B, and C as well as those "dispositions" arising from the composition of Boxes C, D, and E. Using the model for analyzing a normative philosophy of education proposed by Frankena, I explicated Jacques Maritain's Catholic philosophy of education. My examination of Maritain's philosophy of education has revealed a coherent and credible foundation built on human nature, the centrality of theoretical and practical reason in the passionate search for truth, the synthesis of faith and reason, and a humanistic liberal curriculum.

Following the detailed explication of Maritain's (1943) philosophy of education, the intention of Chapter Six was to address the contemporary relevance and the implications of his philosophy of education for Ontario's Catholic schools. In order to do this, I decided to explore five challenges: 1) relativism and the growing distrust of truth among students; 2) false and/or exclusive conceptions of knowledge; 3) a widening of the scope of curriculum; 4) pre-mature specialization in the curriculum; and 5) the absence of practical reason (*phronesis*) in the curriculum. It was apparent after exploring these challenges, that Maritain's philosophy of education offers much of value and reasonable insights, which can equip Catholic educators and administrators with the tools to address these challenges in their own schools.

I contend that there are very good reasons for Maritain's philosophy of education being reclaimed by publicly funded Catholic schools in Ontario today. My hope is that this study may serve as an important piece of philosophical research, that not only echoes



but also strengthens the call made by Elias (1999) and D'Souza (2003), out of which curriculum renewal and reform may flow for Ontario's Catholic schools. In reclaiming our distinct philosophical tradition, as embodied by Maritain (1943), Catholic schools will be more equipped to address the growing distrust of truth among students, false conceptions of knowledge, widening the scope of the curriculum, and premature specialization, and the absence of theoretical and practical wisdom in the curriculum.

Given the growing pluralism and multiculturalism in Ontario, the attraction towards diverse philosophies of education and the advent of full funding for Catholic schools in 1985, a unified Catholic philosophy of education is not reflected at the school level. My argument is also partially based on my findings in Chapter Six, which showed that the Ontario Catholic Graduate Expectations (ICE, 2008) do not exemplify a coherent philosophy of education and furthermore, both theoretical and practical reasoning are virtually non-existent. In addition, and this is not as surprising, neither does the current curriculum in Ontario (OSS, 1999), from which Catholic schools are obliged to teach, address an appropriate philosophy of the person or of education. The extensive tradition of philosophical excellence in the Catholic Church presents us with a rich variety of sources in the area of the philosophy of education from which to draw our inspiration for a unified coherent approach to education and curriculum.

I conclude that Jacques Maritain (1943), a significant contributor to the Catholic philosophical tradition, offers a coherent and credible philosophy of education in his work *Education at the Crossroads*. A study such as this one is extremely relevant given the current context of Catholic education in Ontario today. I also argue that Maritain's philosophy of education must be reclaimed by publically funded Catholic schools in Ontario, if our claim that we provide a distinct education (as opposed to the secular

system) is to have any legitimacy in the contemporary debate over the public funding of Catholic schools. Catholic schools are not only theologically diverse, but also philosophically diverse and it is this philosophical foundation that will offer the best hope for common ground between religious and secular institutions.

Maritain's philosophy of education has significant contemporary relevance in large part because his ideas are universal and timeless. In this year 2009, Catholic schools in Ontario are attempting to educate both elementary and high school students within a system that is unfortunately permeated by an instrumentalist and pragmatic approach to teaching and learning. Despite the cries of Catholic administrators and educational theorists admonishing Catholic teachers to infuse the OSS curriculum with "Catholic values," teachers come up against an educational system that promotes an inherently different philosophical approach to education. No matter how many supplementary documents and policies are created for Roman Catholic schools, we cannot escape the reality that we are still under the direction of the Ministry of Education and therefore, constrained in many ways by an instrumentalist approach to teaching and learning. In order to defend the Catholic educational system, Catholic educators must identify their theological and philosophical differences.

I have tried to make it clear from the above discussion that many of the issues related to schooling that Maritain addressed over sixty years ago are still relevant in our current educational climate in Ontario. The seven misconceptions that Maritain (1943) included in the first part of *Education at the Crossroads* are still prevalent today. If one were to read Maritain's comments on the misconceptions in education, without knowing the publication date of the book, he or she could easily think they were reading a contemporary account of the educational situation. Theological distinctiveness is not, in

itself, enough to distinguish a school as Catholic. New directions in curriculum development, including a revision of the Ontario Catholic Graduate Expectations (ICE, 1998) and revisions to the current Ontario Catholic Secondary Curriculum Policy Document for Religious Education (ICE, 2006) are necessary to highlight the important philosophical distinctiveness of Catholic education so that eventually this distinctiveness will trickle down to the teachers and eventually to the students.

I believe then, that the issues that Maritain raises in *Education at the Crossroads* still have much relevance for education today. While there is no doubt that he had a profound impact in both Western Europe and in North America. Maritain's entire philosophical enterprise sought to eliminate the dichotomies between rationalism and empiricism, idealism and realism, traditionalism and progressivism, faith and reason, and intellect and intuition. Maritain's thoughts related to the educational sphere and the extra-educational sphere, knowledge-value verses training-value, theoretical and practical reason, role of the teacher and the student, moral education, intuition of being, and liberal education are so pertinent and sound that further research into these areas is warranted and necessary.

In closing, I would like to suggest the following areas for further research. First, more research is needed to assess whether or not the Ontario Catholic Graduate Expectations (ICE, 2008) are being exemplified by students. Second, I intimated that students seem to have lost a sense of truth and are more and more expressing relativistic attitudes towards knowledge and morality. Research that goes beyond anecdotal information into this phenomenon is needed in order to get a firmer grasp on how students in Catholic schools actually view truth and knowledge. Third, perhaps more effort needs to be made at the faculties of education with students planning on teaching in

a Catholic high school. Do these teacher candidates adequately know the philosophy behind Catholic education? Does more need to be done to ensure that Catholic teachers are grounded in a philosophy of education that respects the nature of the human person? These areas of further study and research that I have mentioned, involve questions that need to be addressed if we are going to reform the thinking of those working in Catholic education with the hope that one day this philosophical foundation will have a positive effect on the students we teach.

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## Appendix A


*The Revival and Decline of Thomism*<sup>22</sup>

SCHOLASTICISM	
<b>11<sup>th</sup> Century</b>	A new approach to education based on the philosophy of Aristotle, begins to challenge the prevailing monastic approach to education.
<b>1224-1274</b>	St. Thomas Aquinas
<b>PERIOD OF DECLINE (13<sup>th</sup> – 15<sup>th</sup> centuries)</b>	
<b>Factors:</b> hostility from the Augustinian scholastics, many of Thomas's teachings are condemned and he was not supported by the universities.	
<b>1545</b>	Council of Trent
2 <sup>nd</sup> SCHOLASTICISM	
1 <sup>st</sup> Great revival of St. Thomas Aquinas' work	
<b>1596-1650</b>	Descartes sets philosophy on a new path
<b>PERIOD OF DECLINE (c1750s)</b>	
<b>Factors:</b> Enlightenment, secularist spirit, contempt for scholasticism and the French Revolution.	
<b>1879</b>	Pope Leo XIII's Encyclical <i>Aeterni Patris</i> is published <i>magna carta</i> of neo-Thomism
3 <sup>rd</sup> SCHOLASTICISM	
2 <sup>nd</sup> Great revival of St. Thomas Aquinas' work	
<b>1920s</b>	Maritain begins working on the integration of knowledge through the epistemology and metaphysics of STA.
<b>1926</b>	Catholic Philosophical Association Founded
<b>1931</b>	Pope Pius XI publishes <i>Divini Illius Magistri</i> This is the only major encyclical on education
<b>1930-1960</b>	Neo-Thomism continues to flourish in Europe and North America
<b>1943</b>	Maritain publishes <i>Education at the Crossroads</i>
<b>1962-1965</b>	Second Vatican Council
<b>1965</b>	Pope Paul VI Issues <i>Gravissimum Educationis</i> ( <i>Declaration on Christian Education</i> )
<b>1960s</b>	Neo-Thomism declines as a dominant force in Catholic theology and consequently in Catholic educational theory.

<sup>22</sup> The above chronology was deduced from historical information presented in G.A. McCool's (1992) essay *Is Thomas's Way of Philosophizing Still Viable Today?* in D.W. & D.Wm. Moran's *the Future of Thomism*, Elias' (2002) book *A History of Christian Education: Protestant, Catholic, and Orthodox Perspectives* and McCool's (1994) book *The Neo-Thomists*.



## Appendix B

*Knowledge-Value and Training-Value*<sup>23</sup>

<sup>23</sup> Adapted from Maritain's discussion in *Education at the Crossroads* on the inner structure and organization of the curriculum, pp. 55-57.

## Appendix C

*Maritain's Curriculum Structure*<sup>24</sup>

STAGE OF DEVELOPMENT	STAGE OF EDUCATION	STAGE OF KNOWLEDGE	MENTAL ATMOSPHERE	TASK OF EDUCATION
<b>The Child</b> (Ages 6-12)	<b>Elementary/Rudiments</b>  <b>Initial (4 years)</b>  <b>Complementary (3 years)</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- imagination which evolves little by little into reason</li> <li>- knowledge in a state of story, an imaginative grasp of the things and values of the world</li> </ul>	<b>Beauty</b> "It is by virtue of the allure of beautiful things that the child is led and awakened to intellectual and moral growth." (E.C., p. 61)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- to tame the imagination to the rule of reason, whilst ever remembering the importance of the normal rule of imagination.</li> </ul>
<b>The Adolescent</b> (Ages 13-19)	<b>Humanities</b>  <b>Secondary (3 years)</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Pre-liberal arts (except logic)</li> </ul> <b>College (4 years)</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Liberal arts</li> <li>- Optional studies in theology</li> <li>- Manual service training or intellectual service training</li> <li>- Theology (last 2 or 3 years)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- state of transition</li> <li>- judgment and intellectual strength are developing but not yet fully acquired</li> <li>- knowledge appealing to the natural powers and gifts of the mind, natural reason is the mental heaven of adolescence.</li> </ul>	<b>Truth</b> "Truth is the inspiring force needed in the education of the youth—truth rather than erudition and self-consciousness— all-pervading truth rather than the objectively isolated truth at which each of the diverse sciences aims." (E.C., p. 62)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- to stimulate and discipline reason.</li> </ul>
<b>The Adult</b> (Ages 20 and up)	<b>Advanced Studies</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- University Education</li> <li>- Higher Specialized Learning</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- stage of acquisition of judgment and intellectual virtues.</li> <li>- Deals with knowledge appropriate to the intellectual virtues.</li> <li>- specialization</li> </ul>	<b>Universal Knowledge</b>  spiritual universality	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- to achieve the formation and equipment of the youth in regard to the strength and maturity of judgment and the intellectual virtues.</li> <li>- specialization of studies</li> </ul>

<sup>24</sup> Adapted from Maritain's discussion in *Education at the Crossroads* on the Humanities and Liberal Education, pp. 58-87.

## Appendix D

*Conception of Propositional Knowledge*<sup>25</sup>

<b>Description</b>	<b>Conception</b>	<b>Has as its joint guarantor and requirement</b>
<i>The Ben Bloom (or recall) Sense (BB):</i>	A person S knows (in the recall sense) that P	1) the person S <i>can recall</i> P, and 2) P is true.
<i>The Reliable-Authority Sense (RA):</i>	A person S knows (in the reliable-authority sense) that P	1) S believes P, 2) S has <i>learned P from a reliable authority A</i> , and 3) P is true.
<i>The Restricted-Evidential Sense (REV):</i>	A person S knows (in the restricted evidential sense) that P	1) S believes that P, 2) S <i>has a restricted (limited) amount of good evidence for P</i> , and 3) P is true.
<i>The Full-Evidential Sense (FEV):</i>	A person S knows (in the full evidential sense) that P	1) S believes that P, 2) S <i>has adequate evidence for P</i> , and 3) P is true.

<sup>25</sup> Chart taken from: Ellett, Fred S., Jr. (2008). Mindless recall? Knowing and knowing how. In J. Marshall Mangan, (Ed.), *Social Foundations of Education Coursebook 2008-2009* (pp. 63-83). London, Ontario: The Althouse Press. Ellett's analysis of propositional knowledge is closely linked to Maritain's conception of theoretical knowledge (reason).

## Appendix E

### *A Letter to the Halton Catholic Community*



#### **HALTON CATHOLIC DISTRICT SCHOOL BOARD**

302 Drury Lane, P.O. Box 5308, Burlington, Ontario L7R 4L3 Telephone (905) 633-6400 Fax (905) 333-4661

June 26, 2007

#### *A Letter To The Halton Catholic Community*

The purpose of this letter is to provide you with information regarding current challenges facing Catholic Education in Ontario and to invite you to renew your commitment to promoting, protecting and preserving Catholic Education in Halton and in Ontario.

Halton's English Catholic elementary and secondary schools are part of Ontario's publicly funded school system – a system which includes all schools from the publicly funded English and French Catholic school boards and English and French public school boards.

From time to time, throughout the 160-year history of Catholic Education in Ontario, opponents to our system have emerged to challenge our rights to provide Catholic Education and to call for the elimination of public funding for denominational Catholic schools in favour of one publicly funded secular school system. In recent months we have seen a limited re-emergence of these advocates calling once again for the elimination of our Catholic schools. Their campaign has received media attention in some parts of the province.

Catholic schools have to be, and continue to be, an important part of the foundation of Ontario, educating over one-third of all students in Kindergarten to Grade 12 – more than 670,000 students. Over a million parents choose Catholic Education for their children. That choice is supported by 2.4 million Catholic ratepayers and voters and is funded through the property, income, sales and other taxes paid by Ontario's Catholic community.

We want to reassure all Catholic school parents, teachers, students and supporters that the "one school system" campaign represents the opinions of only a small minority in our province. Our Catholic schools enjoy the publicly stated, unqualified support of our provincial Liberal government as well as the Progressive Conservative and New Democratic parties of Ontario. We have been assured by the Liberal Government and by statements made publicly by Premier Dalton McGuinty and Minister of Education, Kathleen Wynne that there is no plan to change the present system. Notwithstanding these assurances of support and the positive and collaborative relationship with our coterminous public school board, the recent and ongoing calls for the elimination of Catholic schools emanating from other regions of Ontario serve as an important "wake-up" call to never take the gift of Catholic Education for granted.

Catholic Education is rooted in the Gospel of Jesus Christ which promotes discipleship, community, the dignity of persons and social justice. Gospel values are integrated into every aspect of the Catholic school curriculum and life of the school, creating a system that is distinctly different from the secular public system.

Our Catholic schools also have a history of academic excellence. We are a very successful part of publicly funded education in Ontario and not a costly duplicate, as some claim. Our schools and school board consistently meet and exceed provincial expectations in student achievement, program delivery and moral and character development.

...cont'd /

Believing In You ... Believing In Us

-2-

Some groups in the province are advocating amalgamating school boards as a way of saving money. Their assumption that amalgamations lower costs is incorrect. Ontario went through a major amalgamation of school boards in 1998 and most economies of scale have now been realized. The history of these amalgamations shows that costs rose to the highest denominator. The reality is that in a single school board system, there would still be the same number of students requiring the same number of instructional, support and administrative staff in relatively the same number of schools. As these are the largest cost drivers in education, it is difficult to see where significant savings can be achieved. Experience of amalgamations also demonstrates that bigger is not necessarily better as the amalgamated entities become larger, more remote and less accessible to the people they are supposed to serve.

Catholic and public school boards already save taxpayers millions of dollars annually through a variety of successful business partnerships in such areas as co-operative school financing, purchasing, transportation, energy management and other shared services. We continue to explore other cost savings initiatives in order to be good stewards of the resources entrusted to us.

Catholic schools remain a strong and integral component of Ontario's publicly funded school system. Our Catholic schools are supported by a significant and vital infrastructure of Catholic organizations representing educators, clergy and parents. Included in this group is the official advocacy group for Catholic school boards, the Ontario Catholic School Trustees' Association (OCSTA). Your board is a member of this long-standing provincial organization. The Halton Catholic District School Board regularly communicates with OCSTA to advance our priorities and to support the promotion and protection of Catholic schools in Ontario.

OCSTA has served the interests of Catholic school boards for more than seventy-five years. Association representatives meet regularly with government officials to address concerns of Catholic school boards, to influence education policy and to ensure that Ontario's legislators understand the distinctive attributes of our Catholic system that is supported by one-third of Ontario's ratepayers and voters.

OCSTA has recently met with numerous MPPs to raise the profile of Catholic schools and to counter any misconceptions communicated by the "one school system" campaign lobby. Political support for Catholic schools remains strong.

We hope this letter has provided you with information to help address questions and concerns surrounding this issue and to help you "speak up" for Catholic education whenever you can. Let us all - home, school, and parish - do our part to ensure that publicly funded Catholic (Christ-centered) schools continue to thrive in our communities and province.

Thank you for your ongoing support of Catholic education.

Al Bailey  
Chair of the Board

Lou Piovesan  
Director of Education

Believing In You . . . Believing In Us

## Appendix F

*Challenges to Catholic Education*

LONDON DISTRICT  
Catholic School  
BOARD

May 14, 2007

Dear Parent or Guardian:

**Re: Challenges to Catholic Education**

Your English Catholic school is one of four strong, publicly funded school systems in Ontario which include French Catholic and English and French public boards.

From time to time, throughout the 160-year history of Catholic education in Ontario, opponents to our system have emerged to challenge our rights to provide Catholic education and to call for the elimination of public funding for denominational Catholic schools in favour of one publicly funded secular school system. In recent months we have seen a limited re-emergence of these advocates calling once again for the elimination of our Catholic schools. Their campaign has received media attention in some parts of the province.

We want to reassure all Catholic school parents, teachers, students and supporters that the "one school system" campaign represents the opinions of only a small minority in our province. Our Catholic schools enjoy the publicly stated, unqualified support of our government and all major opposition parties. We have been assured by the Liberal Government and by statements made publicly by Premier Dalton McGuinty and Minister of Education, Kathleen Wynne that there is no plan to change the present system.

Catholic schools are part of the foundation of Ontario, educating over one-third of all students in Kindergarten to Grade 12 – more than 670,000 students. Over a million parents choose Catholic education for their children. That choice is supported by 2.4 million Catholic ratepayers and voters and is funded through the property, income, sales and other taxes paid by Ontario's Catholic community.

Catholic education is rooted in the Gospel of Jesus Christ which promotes discipleship, community, the dignity of persons and social justice. Gospel values are integrated into every aspect of the Catholic school curriculum and life of the school, creating a system that is distinctly different from the secular public system.

Our Catholic schools also have a history of academic excellence. We are a very successful part of publicly funded education in Ontario and not a costly duplicate as some claim. Our schools and school boards consistently meet or exceed provincial expectations in student achievement, program delivery, class size and moral and character development.

.../2

*The Spirit is Alive*

CATHOLIC EDUCATION CENTRE  
Mailing Address: P.O. Box 5474, N6A 4X5  
5200 WELLINGTON RD. S., N6E 3X8  
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Some groups in the province are advocating amalgamating school boards as a way of saving money. Their assumption that amalgamation lowers costs is incorrect. Ontario went through a major amalgamation of school boards in 1998 and most economies of scale have now been realized. The history of these amalgamations shows that costs rose to the highest denominator. The reality is that in a single school board system, there would still be the same number of students requiring the same number of instructional, support and administrative staff in relatively the same number of schools. As these are the largest cost drivers in education, it is difficult to see where significant savings can be achieved. Experience of amalgamations also demonstrates that bigger is not necessarily better as the amalgamated entities become larger, more remote and less accessible to the people they are supposed to serve.

Catholic and public school boards already save taxpayers millions of dollars annually through a variety of successful business partnerships in such areas as co-operative school financing, purchasing, transportation, energy management and other shared services. We continue to explore other cost savings initiatives in order to be good stewards of the resources entrusted to us.

Catholic schools remain a strong and integral component of Ontario's publicly funded school system. Our Catholic schools are supported by a significant and vital infrastructure of Catholic organizations representing educators, clergy and parents. Included in this group is the official lobby group for Catholic school boards, the Ontario Catholic School Trustees' Association (OCSTA). Your board is a member of this long-standing provincial organization. London District Catholic School Board regularly communicates with OCSTA to advance our priorities and to support the promotion and protection of Catholic schools in Ontario.

OCSTA has served the interests of Catholic school boards for more than seventy-five years. Association representatives meet regularly with government officials to address concerns of Catholic school boards, to influence education policy and to ensure that Ontario's legislators understand the distinctive attributes of our Catholic system that is supported by one-third of Ontario's ratepayers and voters.

OCSTA has recently met with numerous Members of Parliament to raise the profile of Catholic schools and to counter any misconceptions communicated by the "one school system" campaign lobby. Political support for Catholic schools remains strong.

We hope this letter and update has provided you with information to help address questions and concerns surrounding this issue and to help you "speak up" for Catholic education whenever you can.

Thank you for your ongoing support of Catholic education.

Chair

Acting Director

## Appendix G

### *Ontario Catholic School Graduate Expectations*

#### **The graduate is expected to be:**

##### **A Discerning Believer Formed in the Catholic Faith Community who**

- CGE1a** -illustrates a basic understanding of the **saving story** of our Christian faith;
- CGE1b** -participates in the sacramental life of the church and demonstrates an understanding of the centrality of the Eucharist to our Catholic story;
- CGE1c** -actively reflects on God's Word as communicated through the Hebrew and Christian scriptures;
- CGE1d** -develops attitudes and values founded on Catholic **social teaching** and acts to promote social responsibility, human solidarity and the common good;
- CGE1e** -speaks the language of life... "recognizing that life is an unearned gift and that a person entrusted with life does not own it but that one is called to protect and cherish it." (Witnesses to Faith)
- CGE1f** -seeks intimacy with God and celebrates communion with God, others and creation through prayer and worship;
- CGE1g** -understands that one's purpose or call in life comes from God and strives to discern and live out this call throughout life's journey;
- CGE1h** -respects the faith traditions, world religions and the life-journeys of all people of good will;
- CGE1i** -integrates faith with life;
- CGE1j** -recognizes that "sin, human weakness, conflict and forgiveness are part of the human journey" and that the cross, the ultimate sign of forgiveness is at the heart of redemption. (Witnesses to Faith)

##### **An Effective Communicator who**

- CGE2a** -listens actively and critically to understand and learn in light of gospel values;
- CGE2b** -reads, understands and uses written materials effectively;
- CGE2c** -presents information and ideas clearly and honestly and with sensitivity to others;
- CGE2d** -writes and speaks fluently one or both of Canada's official languages;
- CGE2e** -uses and integrates the Catholic faith tradition, in the critical analysis of the arts, media, technology and information systems to enhance the quality of life.

##### **A Reflective and Creative Thinker who**

- CGE3a** -recognizes there is more grace in our world than sin and that hope is essential in facing all challenges
- CGE3b** -creates, adapts, evaluates new ideas in light of the common good;
- CGE3c** -thinks reflectively and creatively to evaluate situations and solve problems;
- CGE3d** -makes decisions in light of gospel values with an informed moral conscience;
- CGE3e** -adopts a holistic approach to life by integrating learning from various subject areas and experience;
- CGE3f** -examines, evaluates and applies knowledge of interdependent systems (physical, political, ethical, socio-economic and ecological) for the development of a just and compassionate society.

##### **A Self-Directed, Responsible, Life Long Learner who**

- CGE4a** -demonstrates a confident and positive sense of self and respect for the dignity and welfare of others;
- CGE4b** -demonstrates flexibility and adaptability;
- CGE4c** -takes initiative and demonstrates Christian leadership;
- CGE4d** -responds to, manages and constructively influences change in a discerning manner;



- CGE4e** -sets appropriate goals and priorities in school, work and personal life;  
**CGE4f** -applies effective communication, decision-making, problem-solving, time and resource management skills;  
**CGE4g** -examines and reflects on one's personal values, abilities and aspirations influencing life's choices and opportunities;  
**CGE4h** -participates in leisure and fitness activities for a balanced and healthy lifestyle.

**A Collaborative Contributor who**

- CGE5a** -works effectively as an interdependent team member;  
**CGE5b** -thinks critically about the meaning and purpose of work;  
**CGE5c** -develops one's God-given potential and makes a meaningful contribution to society;  
**CGE5d** -finds meaning, dignity, fulfillment and vocation in work which contributes to the common good;  
**CGE5e** -respects the rights, responsibilities and contributions of self and others;  
**CGE5f** -exercises Christian leadership in the achievement of individual and group goals;  
**CGE5g** -achieves excellence, originality, and integrity in one's own work and supports these qualities in the work of others;  
**CGE5h** -applies skills for employability, self-employment and entrepreneurship relative to Christian vocation.

**A Caring Family Member who**

- CGE6a** -relates to family members in a loving, compassionate and respectful manner;  
**CGE6b** -recognizes human intimacy and sexuality as God given gifts, to be used as the creator intended;  
**CGE6c** -values and honours the important role of the family in society;  
**CGE6d** -values and nurtures opportunities for family prayer;  
**CGE6e** -ministers to the family, school, parish, and wider community through service.

**A Responsible Citizen who**

- CGE7a** -acts morally and legally as a person formed in Catholic traditions;  
**CGE7b** -accepts accountability for one's own actions;  
**CGE7c** -seeks and grants forgiveness;  
**CGE7d** -promotes the sacredness of life;  
**CGE7e** -witnesses Catholic social teaching by promoting equality, democracy, and solidarity for a just, peaceful and compassionate society;  
**CGE7f** -respects and affirms the diversity and interdependence of the world's peoples and cultures;  
**CGE7g** -respects and understands the history, cultural heritage and pluralism of today's contemporary society;  
**CGE7h** -exercises the rights and responsibilities of Canadian citizenship;  
**CGE7i** -respects the environment and uses resources wisely;  
**CGE7j** -contributes to the common good.

**Source:**

Institute for Catholic Education. (1998). *Ontario Catholic school graduate expectations*. [Electronic version]. Retrieved March 14, 2007, from [http://www.occb.on.ca/ice/online\\_docs/Graduate%20Expectations.pdf](http://www.occb.on.ca/ice/online_docs/Graduate%20Expectations.pdf)