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**PRACTICES OF CULTURAL DEMOCRACY:
THE *CULTURA VIVA* PROGRAM IN BRAZIL**

Dissertation submitted to Universidade Católica Portuguesa to obtain a
Master's Degree in Culture Studies (Management of the Arts and Culture)

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Abstract

Despite the socio-economic crisis Brazil has experienced since 2014 and that has been considerably deepened by political instability in a polarized scenario, in 2022 the cultural area resists. The sector has confronted a deliberate dismantlement in the last two governments, Michel Temer's (2016-2018) and, since 2019, Jair Bolsonaro's. On the other hand, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva's mandates (2003-2010) represented in Brazilian contemporary history a radical paradigmatic shift to the approach to culture from a political and ideological perspective, as culture was a crucial aspect for fostering social equality and economic development, besides its role for overcoming social exclusion. In other words, culture was transformed into one of the main pillars of Brazilian identity's construction and preservation (Lula da Silva 2003).

Twelve years after the end of Lula's government, this research examines practices of cultural democracy during his two mandates through the analysis of the National Plan of Culture and of the National System of Culture. Special attention is given to the *Cultura Viva* program and its *pontos de cultura*, understood as the most significant governmental initiative to expand and democratize the access to culture, especially in terms of its production. Bearing in mind the political disruption and the dismantlement of the cultural-artistic sector in the last two governments, this dissertation aims at evaluating Lula's practices of cultural democracy and the legacy of *Cultura Viva*.

Keywords

Culture, Cultural policy, Cultural Management, Cultural production, Cultural democracy, Brazil, Lula, Cultura Viva, pontos de cultura.

Resumo

Apesar da crise socioeconômica que o Brasil vive desde 2014 e que foi consideravelmente aprofundada pela instabilidade política em um cenário polarizado, em 2022 a área cultural no resiste. O setor enfrentou um desmonte deliberado nos dois últimos governos, no de Michel Temer (2016-2018) e, desde 2019, no de Jair Bolsonaro. Por outro lado, os mandatos de Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (2003-2010) representaram na história contemporânea brasileira uma mudança radical de paradigma na abordagem da cultura sob uma perspectiva política e ideológica, pois a cultura foi um aspecto crucial para a promoção da igualdade social e do desenvolvimento econômico, além do seu papel para a superação da exclusão social. Em outras palavras, a cultura se transformou em um dos principais pilares da construção e preservação da identidade brasileira (Lula da Silva 2003).

Doze anos após o fim do governo Lula, esta pesquisa examina as práticas de democracia cultural durante seus dois mandatos por meio da análise do Plano Nacional de Cultura e do Sistema Nacional de Cultura. O foco principal é o programa Cultura Viva e seus pontos de cultura, entendidos como a mais significativa iniciativa governamental em ampliar e democratizar o acesso à cultura, especialmente no que se refere à sua produção. Tendo em vista a ruptura política e o desmonte do setor artístico-cultural nos dois últimos governos, esta dissertação tem como objetivo avaliar as práticas de democracia cultural dos governos Lula e o legado do Cultura Viva.

Palavras-chave

Cultura, políticas culturais, gestão cultural, produção cultural, democracia cultural, Brasil, Lula, Cultura Viva, pontos de cultura.

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Table of Contents

List of Abbreviations	1
Preface	3
Introduction	5
1. The evolution of culture and its policies until cultural democracy	9
1.1 The enlargement of the concept of culture and the path to cultural rights	9
1.2 The emergence of cultural policies and their institutionalization	18
1.3 Cultural economy: culture as a resource	23
1.4 Brazilian culture: the significance of popular cultures and the construction of <i>Brazilianness</i>	29
2. Cultural policies in Brazil under Lula's government (2003-2010)	39
2.1 Brazilian cultural policies until the redemocratization in 1985	39
2.2 An unstable young democracy in a neoliberal age: the creation of the Ministry of Culture and the relevance of Tax Exemption Laws	48
2.3 Lula's election: new discourses and perspectives for culture	55
2.4 The National System of Culture	60
2.5 The National Plan of Culture	64
3. The program <i>Cultura Viva</i> and its <i>pontos de cultura</i>	69
3.1 A new approach to diversity: The Department of Cultural Identity and Diversity	69
3.2 <i>Cultura Viva</i> : concept, structure and impacts	74
3.3 An evaluation of the <i>Cultura Viva</i> and its legacy	84
Conclusion	95
Bibliography	99
Annex	115
A.1 Interview with Célio Turino	115

List of Abbreviations¹

ABL	- Aldir Blanc Law
BACs	- Bases de Apoio à Cultura
CGU	- Controladoria-Geral da União
CNC	- Conferência Nacional de Cultura
CNPC	- Conselho Nacional de Política Cultural
DAV	- Divisão de Promoção do Audiovisual
DODC	- Divisão de Operações de Difusão Cultura
Funarte	- Fundação Nacional das Artes
FHC	- Fernando Henrique Cardoso
GDH	- Gross National Happiness
GDP	- Gross Domestic Product
IBGE	- Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística
IPCA	- Índice Nacional de Preços ao Consumidor Amplo
IPEA	- Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada
IPHAN	- Instituto do Patrimônio Histórico e Artístico Nacional
MAM	- Museu de Arte Moderna
MASP	- Museu de Arte de São Paulo
MEC	- Ministério da Educação e da Cultura
MinC	- Ministério da Cultura
MROSC	- Marco Regulatório das Organizações da Sociedade Civil
PAC	- Programa de Aceleração do Crescimento
PCV	- Programa Nacional de Cultura, Educação e Cidadania - Cultura Viva
PNC	- Plano Nacional de Cultura
PNI	- Programa Nacional de Imunizações
PT	- Partido dos Trabalhadores

¹ Considering the abbreviations whose definitions are in Portuguese, each translation is available in the following chapters of the present work.

SCC - Secretaria de Cidadania Cultural

SCDC - Secretaria da Cidadania e Diversidade Cultural

SID - Secretaria de Identidade e Diversidade Cultural

SNC - Sistema Nacional de Cultura

SNIC - Sistema Nacional de Informações e Indicadores Culturais

SPHAN - Serviço do Patrimônio Histórico e Artístico Nacional

SPPC - Secretaria de Programas e Projetos Culturais

SUS - Sistema Único de Saúde

TCU - Tribunal de Contas da União

UDHR - Declaration of Human Rights

UFMG - Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais

UN - United Nations

UnB - Universidade de Brasília

UNESCO - United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization

USP - Universidade de São Paulo

Preface

The connection with culture and arts significantly shaped my character throughout my life. My parents are part of Grupo Galpão, a forty-year-old theater company based in Belo Horizonte, Brazil. During my childhood, I frequently took part in several tours in different parts of Brazil and abroad. Later on, although I decided to study International Economics, my interest in culture persisted as a spectator but also as a subject of study. The field of Cultural Economics drew my attention during the university, allowing me to build a managerial perspective on the cultural area. Thus, my undergraduate thesis at UFMG (Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais) approached the funding mechanisms and policies for culture in Brazil, making a comparison with the Spanish system. Despite my enthusiasm concerning the cultural field, my professional trajectory initially remained detached from it. Nevertheless, after five years of business experience, my career shifted, leading me to work as a cultural producer in São Paulo. Mainly involved with national and international festivals, theater productions, and exhibition projects, I gained practical knowledge in the artistic and cultural areas. However, I have always felt a lack of academic knowledge regarding Culture Studies, which was the major reason for joining the Master in Culture Studies at Universidade Católica Portuguesa in Lisbon, focusing on Management of the Arts and Culture.

Since the beginning of my studies at Católica, I was certain that I wanted to write about the culture in Brazil. Initially, I was inclined to address the internationalization of Brazilian performing arts. However, the scarcity of references and bibliography and the recent political disruption and dismantlement of culture led me to reassess my dissertation topic. Since 2016, after Dilma Rousseff's impeachment, we have observed a purposeful absence of federal public policies toward the cultural sector. This troublesome cultural scenario influenced me to approach previous successful practices, analyzing their impact on democratizing the access to culture, especially cultural production and, consequently, the legacy of such policies. I feel that it has never been so paramount to reinstate the status of culture as a key factor for social and economic development, which essentially goes through the active role played by the state in protecting, supporting, and promoting cultural activities.

I decided to focus my attention on cultural policies developed during the two mandates of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (2003-2010), which undoubtedly represent a breakthrough

moment for the cultural field, depicting the practice of the program *Cultura Viva* (PCV) - *Programa Cultura Viva*. This subject, which is relevant to the field, ignited a desire to research and write this thesis. Curiously, I had no previous intention of investigating *Cultura Viva* due to my unfamiliarity with it. However, throughout the research regarding Brazilian cultural policies, PCV's experience was mentioned by several scholars and writers who indicated the program as a unique case. Despite the quality and diversity of some studies focused on this period, there is still an opportunity for new approaches. The limited availability of works in English regarding Brazilian cultural policy also motivated the subject's selection, which may enable its access to international scholars and workers from the cultural field. Furthermore, I wish to combine my professional and academic knowledge and experience, bringing a perspective from diverse fields, such as culture studies, arts management, cultural economics, and public administration. Finally, I hope this work is a form of retributing my honored opportunity to attend in one of the best public universities in Latin America. Also, as a privileged person who has had opportunities to study and work in different countries, such as Portugal, Spain, Germany, and South Korea, I want to contribute, even if modestly, to the development and promotion of the field of the arts and culture, especially in Brazil.

I delve into this topic in a moment of disruption for Brazilian culture. There is a general perception of discontent and disillusionment concerning the political situation, as governmental policies have deliberately harmed diverse cultural activities. Nevertheless, I avoided a direct ideological approach toward the actions and programs implemented during Lula's government. Considering the prospect of Brazil's 2022 elections, one should stress that the present research started in 2020 and had no influence from the current political dispute. However, it is inevitable to present the political context during Lula's administration and, in the final parts of this work, to make comparisons with his successors. The temporal distance (twelve years) from the end of Lula's government mitigates biased analysis and provides better data and information to assess his cultural policies and a potential legacy. Finally, although Lula's mandates were considered widely positive and a pioneering moment for the cultural sector, this work does not omit the downsides and justified criticism.

Introduction

Living Culture (*Cultura Viva*). Probably no other expression could better define one of the most audacious, although simple, attempts to implement cultural democracy. As stressed by Heritage (2013, 10), the program's emphasis was “(...) placed not on single, fixed or unified meanings, but on the journeys that can be made between them (...)” Besides that, *Cultura Viva* program was “(...) innovative not just because it has found ways to recognise and fund artistic activities that previously existed outside of public funding mechanisms, but for the way in which it creates bridges and networks between cultural and social initiatives (...)” (Heritage 2013, 10).

This work departed from our desire to examine Brazilian cultural policies during their most emblematic moment from a public cultural policy perspective: Lula's administration between 2003 and 2010. The new political and institutional approach toward culture, whose status was elevated, facilitated the circumscription of our time frame when the field was recognized as a motor for socio-economic development. Even if this is our focus, several concepts, phenomena, and events are unavoidable in order to provide a better understanding of the period under analysis, such as:

- the concept of culture and its evolution;
- the rise of the cultural paradigm and the notion of cultural rights;
- the emergence of cultural policies in the post-war era;
- the crucial role of UNESCO and other organizations in spreading cultural policies and their institutionalization;
- the economic perspective toward culture;
- Brazilian popular cultures;
- the attempt to develop a Brazilian identity (and culture) and its evolution in the 20th century;
- the cultural democracy notion and practice.

This conceptual framework, depicted in chapter one, is indispensable to addressing cultural policies in Brazil during Lula's mandates, which is our topic in chapter two. Finally, the *Cultura Viva* program will be our focus in chapter three.

The selection of *Cultura Viva* as a case study goes beyond its significance for the Brazilian cultural sector and its recurrent mentions in academic works. PCV has also become

an international benchmark and primary reference for public cultural programs. Throughout this work, we will discuss the historical trend for favoring and importing foreign cultural expressions, extending to the policy-making realm. In the meanwhile, national popular cultures were deliberately undervalued. *Cultura Viva*, on the other hand, was designed to acknowledge and promote these national expressions. Moreover, the program is a concrete example of an “exported policy,” opposing the trend mentioned earlier and epitomizing the excellence and importance of homemade practices.

Taking the public administration perspective is a defiant task concerning matters of the cultural realm. The cultural policy field emerged in the post-war era. Since then, a series of events unfolded until the beginning of the 21st century. With the creation of the UN (United Nations) and UNESCO (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization), and the swift spread and institutionalization of cultural policies around the globe, the artistic and political turmoil, especially in the 1960s and 1970s, conceived new disciplines, theories, and methods. Following this period, we observed the end of the cold war and the predominance of neoliberalism in the 1990s. These international episodes directly impacted the development of cultural policies, whose consolidation was still an ongoing process at the turn of the century, particularly in developing countries. To some extent, the field's newness demanded precedent cases from other areas, especially education and health. In the Brazilian case, for instance, there is a parallel between the health and the cultural national system.

The analogy between the cultural and health sector transcends the aspect mentioned above. Profoundly, the essentiality of both domains explains and legitimates an active state interference. Since the institutionalization and spread of cultural policies in the late 1960s, state intervention was considered crucial according to UNESCO's guidelines. The institution stresses that private action was insufficient and, in some cases, inadequate to foster cultural development. The agency indicates different approach alternatives, including the interest of integrating cultural policy in general planning and the state's responsibility for cultural affairs before private institutions. Nevertheless, their guidelines express that the predominant role of the state could, in some cases, lead to an “uniformity and lest the controversial element in art neutralized” (UNESCO 1969, 11). Thus, some advocate that the state's role should be limited to financial support for the cultural field. Above all things, public intervention must not undermine creativity's freedom.

The elements underlined by UNESCO lead us to some chronic problems regarding the development of public policies in Brazil, especially in the cultural area: absence, authoritarianism, and instability. These issues, also described as unfortunate traditions by Rubim (2007b, 11), hampered the consistent development of the creative and cultural sector. Generally, to tackle this obstacle, the state should develop long-term policies, preferably taking a bottom-up attitude. In Brazil, this type of policy is often labeled as *política de Estado* (state policy), which differs from *política de Governo* (government policy). The former indicates a vast, long-term embracing policy, regardless of the political spectrum. The concept of *política de Estado* embodies the impersonal and stable element of the state, proposing to benefit the population as a whole. On the other hand, *política de Governo* tends to prioritize short-term programs whose outcome has greater visibility, usually during an election cycle. Hence, the cultural approach during Lula's government proved to be a fortunate exception within the historical limited and discontinued attitude of policy making.

The first chapter attempts to portray the big picture concerning cultural policies, including the development and enlargement of the concept of culture; the emergence of the cultural paradigm and the economic angle toward the field; the rapid international institutionalization of cultural policies; the notion of popular cultures in Brazil and the protracted controversial relation between these expressions and the structures of power; finally, the cultural democracy practice and the importance of this conceptual framework regarding the Brazilian cultural context.

Chapter two will narrow down the perspective, portraying Brazil's social and economic context and the emergence and development of national cultural policies. The three unfortunate aforementioned traditions will be vital to illustrate this historical perspective. After that, we will emphasize the context of Lula's election and the political shift in the cultural area. The policies developed during this remarkable period for the cultural sector differentiate this era from the previous experiences mentioned in the first section of chapter two. Lastly, we will address two fundamental mechanisms developed to break the vicious circle of ingrained exclusionary and discontinuous policies: the National System of Culture and the National Plan of Culture.

The last chapter of the thesis addresses the *Cultura Viva* program, focusing on the most crucial measure for implementing (or at least attempting to implement) a cultural democracy practice. The chapter will describe and analyze the creation of the Department of Cultural

Identity and Diversity, which later became responsible for managing *Cultura Viva*. Furthermore, we will examine various PCV actions, evaluating their conceptual aspect, results, and legacy. This work also contextualizes the aftermath of Lula's cultural policies, mainly concerning *Cultura Viva*. For several reasons that will be discussed in chapter three, such as the lack of cultural data and the dismantlement of cultural policies in Brazil, the assessment of PCV's legacy was troublesome. Hence, aiming at providing a better understanding of it, we successfully talked to the creator of *Cultura Viva*: Célio Turino, whose interview is available in the annex section.²

² The interview was conducted by myself and took place on the 6th January 2022 (online). For further information, please check section A.1 in the annex section.

1. The evolution of culture and its policies until cultural democracy

1.1 The enlargement of the concept of culture and the path to cultural rights

In his inaugural speech as Minister of Culture in 2003, Gilberto Gil (2003, 10) described culture as everything that manifests itself beyond the value in use: as each object that transcends the technical aspect; as a factory of symbols of a population; as a set of signs of each community and the entire nation; as the meaning of our actions, the sum of our gestures, the sense of our way of being.³ This sophisticated and comprehensive understanding of culture is the outcome of an enduring transformation whose protagonist was the anthropological field.

Gil's definition summarizes some concepts introduced in this chapter, such as the enlargement of culture's perception and the intrinsic value of cultural goods and services. Besides these aspects, we will depict some theoretical elements related to the concept of culture; the paradigm of cultural rights; the emergence and evolution of cultural policies, and the economic (and political) perspective of culture as a resource, which demands investments, especially from public entities; and, finally, introduce these aspects mentioned above within the Brazilian context, presenting the concept of cultural democracy.

The concept and understanding of *culture* have transformed since the 16th century. Various fields from social sciences developed studies to shed light on culture and its complex designation, especially sociology, anthropology, history, and, later, cultural studies, which arose in the post-war era. The discussion around the concept of culture is still current, and apparently, there is no wide-ranging consensus. Even though it is problematic to depict a linear evolution of this concept, its modern comprehension is, to some extent, an outcome of this historical process (Thompson 2011, 165). Raymond Williams (1958, xv), who is a significant reference, thoroughly summarized this evolution:

Before this period,⁴ it had meant, primarily, the 'tending of natural growth', and then, by analogy, a process of human training. But this latter use, which had usually been a culture of something, was changed, in the nineteenth century, to culture as such, a thing in itself. It came to mean, first, 'a general state or habit of the mind', having close relations with the idea of human perfection. Second, it came to mean 'the general state of intellectual development, in a society as a whole'. Third, it came to mean 'the general body of the arts'. Fourth, later in the century, it came to mean 'a whole way of life, material, intellectual and spiritual'

³ Our translation.

⁴ The author refers to the last decades of the 18th century and the beginning of the industrial era.

Although this work does not focus on portraying a detailed evolution of the concept of culture, it is essential to mention some classical perceptions, taking into account some approaches from relevant authors from the 18th century onwards. If, on the one hand, they are meaningful during the historical process and to the current notion of culture, on the other hand, they present some outdated elements which should be avoided in a contemporary study. We will present these obsolete and controversial factors in the following paragraphs.

In the 18th and early 19th centuries, the concept of culture was associated with the idea of civilization. Frequently both terms were used as synonyms in different nations of Europe, such as France, England, and Germany. Throughout the process of human development grounded on illuminist premises, western societies aimed at becoming “cultivated” and “civilized” on an individual level but also as a community (Thompson 2011, 167-168). Thompson refers to this idea of culture as the *classical conception*. Later, at the end of the 19th century, the emergence of Anthropology brought a new perspective to the concept above. Thompson mentions the *descriptive conception* and the *symbolic conception*, both expressions designated by him to differentiate these anthropological concepts. The first is related to a set of values, beliefs, conventions, and practices from a specific society or period in history (Thompson 2011, 166). The *symbolic conception*, alternatively, concentrates on symbolism. According to this line of thought, cultural phenomena are necessarily symbolic phenomena. Therefore, the study and analysis of culture should primarily be interested in interpreting symbols and symbolic actions.

Thompson stresses that this symbolic approach is the starting point for developing a constructive analysis of cultural phenomena. Nevertheless, the *symbolic conception* gives unsatisfactory significance to the social relations in which these symbols and symbolic actions are part, essentially regarding the relations of power. People part of these relations may have conflicted and divergent interpretations. They are also constantly trying to maintain or break this social hierarchy. According to Thompson, these aspects are neglected in some anthropological studies and debates, as the approach taken by Clifford Geertz.⁵ Hence, the author coined the term *structural conception*, which encompasses the social context and these symbolic elements. Cultural phenomena can be interpreted as “symbolic forms in structured contexts; and cultural analysis can be developed as the study of the meaningful constitution

⁵ Thompson refers to the work *The Interpretation of Cultures* (1973), composed of selected essays written by the American writer Clifford Geertz. The author argues that the concept of culture may refer to the symbolic aspect of social life, the pattern of meanings embodied in symbols expressed in social interaction (Thompson 2011, 22).

and social contextualization of symbolic forms” (Thompson 2011, 166). Although the author develops these concepts focusing on mass communication studies, this structural understanding presents significant features to this work.

The previous paragraphs mention the classical conception of culture and its replacement by other interpretations, mainly those introduced by the anthropological field. There are, nonetheless, some ingrained classical ideas in contemporary society. The Eurocentric viewpoint, disseminated in several parts of the globe in the last centuries, remains perceptible. In Brazil, a former Portuguese colony, European cultural aspects, such as heritage and erudite cultural manifestations, still have higher esteem than indigenous or African expressions. Although the transformation and development of Brazilian society is an ongoing process, the country has a long way to go to acknowledge its diverse identity. Thompson's classical conception of culture is still evident in Brazilian art, academia, and society. This phenomenon illustrates the complexity of the concept of culture and the role played by anachronous classical notions, which are still embedded in a society impacted by colonialism. We will further address this topic, principally in chapter 2.

The anthropological spectrum and its progress brought a new perspective and interest regarding non-Western civilizations and their cultures. In the 19th century, several ethnographic pieces of research were developed, focusing on tribes, ethnic groups, and societies that originated outside of Europe. This descriptive approach addressed crucial elements of culture, such as beliefs, forms of knowledge, habits, and arts. However, a qualitative and descriptive analysis aimed at classifying and comparing different cultures is distinctly associated with the idea of progress. Thus, the scientific approach toward the concept of culture could not eliminate the hierarchy among cultures. According to Thompson (2011, 172), these anthropological studies established the concept of culture in an “evolutionary frame of reference.”

Many anthropological types of research at the end of the 19th century and the first decades of the 20th century adopted the evolutionary paradigm. Schritzmeyer (2008, 119-120) stresses that these studies were an intellectual mechanism for imperialist purposes. Besides disregarding humanity's heterogeneity, the endeavor to hierarchize different social groups and cultural expressions reinforced and legitimized the imperialist narrative and its projects. Naturally, features from the western upper-class were privileged, such as the level of “whiteness,” urbanization, and literacy. Inversely, there was a consistent undervaluation of

relevant aspects from non-western groups, such as the complexity of kinship arrangement, non-monotheistic religions, and the political system without a formal state. After decades of transformation, the anthropological field adopted a radically distinct paradigm, especially after World War II. Since then, most studies have been developed from a non-ethnocentric perspective, relinquishing those aforementioned features. To some extent, this movement was also a manner of issuing a *mea culpa* from previous controversial works in the anthropological field. Schritzmeyer (2008, 121-122) mentions that this new phase of the field and its recent paradigm has dominated the narrative in Europe and the USA, but also in less developed countries, mostly ex-colonies states. In the 21st century, many constitutions share common values, such as freedom of speech and the recognition of diverse minorities. Nevertheless, the author stresses the dilemma between acknowledging and establishing universal rights and principles, which is the foundation of *human rights*, instead of recognizing particularities from distinct human groups.

The concept and usage of culture are intrinsically connected to the social, economic, and intellectual context of a certain period. Marxist theorists, such as Raymond Williams, played an important role throughout the 20th century. Regarding the emergence and development of cultural studies and, consequently, the semantic evolution of the concept of culture, *cultural materialism*, a theoretical framework attributed to Williams, significantly contributed during the second half of the 20th century. This new approach expanded the understanding of culture. The Welsh author mentions that: “(...) where culture meant a state or habit of the mind, or the body of intellectual and moral activities, it means now, also, a whole way of life. This development, like each of the original meanings and the relations between them, is not accidental, but general and deeply significant. (...)” (Williams 1958, xvi-xvii). The imperialist paradigm that shaped culture's concept in the late 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century was progressively replaced by a more inclusive and democratic perception. Furthermore, culture becomes the central element in the social and economic transformation within the industrial society, especially concerning the class struggle issue.

Another relevant work from Raymond Williams was the article “Culture is Ordinary”, written in 1958. Again, he reinforces the importance of acknowledging the existence of culture in various expressions and elements within distinct classes and societies. The author contradicts the perceptions mentioned above, which are still embedded in the society of the 20th century, such as the bourgeoisie Eurocentric perspective of culture, particularly in the field of the arts:

Every human society has its own shape, its own purposes, its own meanings. Every human society expresses these, in institutions, and in arts and learning. The making of a society is the finding of common meanings and directions, and its growth is an active debate and amendment under the pressures of experience, contact, and discovery (...) (Williams 1989[1958], 93).

Naturally, the author develops his works from a post-war Marxist perspective within British society. Thus, this group's "working-class way of life" should be recognized as part of their culture. Raymond Williams criticizes the perpetual connection between contemporary culture and bourgeois culture, which is "(...) a mistake that everyone, from Conservatives to Marxists, seems to make (...)" (Williams 1989[1958], 96). This passage illustrates how some antiquated, elitist Eurocentric concepts remain ingrained in the second half of the 20th century, including within the artistic and intellectual fields, which are usually the avant-garde from progressive ideas.

In the same article, the author establishes two forms of understanding culture: "(...) to mean a whole way of life - the common meanings; to mean the arts and learning - the special process of discovery and creative effort (...)" (Williams 1989[1958], 93). According to him, this pair of concepts had been applied separately by several authors, although he insists "(...) on both, and on the significance of their conjunction (...)." Williams made an important point regarding the democratization of accessing and producing culture, which could be applied to these two perceptions mentioned above. He criticizes the Marxist premise that the masses are ignorant and society is living in a "dying culture." He advocates for broader access from the labor class to the means of production, including the industrial goods and the cultural ones. He repudiates the argument that individuals should "(...) write, think, learn in certain prescribed ways (...)" (Williams 1989 [1958], 96) in order to achieve socialism. Thus, the actual personal and collective experience should be acknowledged and, eventually, "brought to consciousness and meaning." Furthermore, Williams refuses to neglect the importance of national inheritance and the high arts. On the contrary, he stresses that these cultural goods should be available to every citizen.

This perspective of acknowledging and esteeming the daily experience of ordinary people and their ways of expressing it through cultural manifestations and, secondly, encouraging and defending equal access to cultural goods, including the erudite artistic expressions, presents as a groundbreaking attitude. To a certain extent, Williams suggests a bottom-up approach instead of a top-down one. This shift impacts intellectual, academic, and artistic production and, thus, policy making. Although the author analyzes the context of

industrial British society, several cultural organizations around the globe also adopted this attitude in the post-war era. Hence, cultural studies largely promoted a semantic revolution concerning the concept of culture and a concrete shift in the cultural political field.

The enlargement of the concept of culture is crucial to introducing a fundamental subject for this work: cultural policies. The aforementioned authors contributed significantly to this transformation, especially Thompson and Williams. Nevertheless, both writers and their contemporaries essentially developed their research from a socioeconomic paradigm. William's selection of keywords in the introduction of *Culture and Society* illustrates this reality: "(...) industry, democracy, class, art and culture. The importance of these words, in our modern structure of meaning, is obvious (...)" (Williams 1958, xi). Although the social, economic, and political aspects will be fundamental to evaluating and contextualizing the cultural policies' progress, especially in Brazil, the topics addressed in this work will mainly rely on a different paradigm: the cultural one.

Quoting the French sociologist Alain Touraine,⁶ Gil (2008, 138) stresses the emergence of the cultural paradigm and its relevance for analyzing our social reality. She mentions the replacement of the political paradigm with the socioeconomic one after the Industrial Revolution. Aspects such as social classes, inequality, equity, wealth, and poverty, dominated the analytical spectrum for two centuries. Nevertheless, these socioeconomic categories are nowadays insufficient to approach the topics of contemporary society. Moreover, the transition from the modern to the contemporary period determined a general decline of religion as a consistent primary reference in the political realm. To some extent, culture fulfilled this void and became a significant political legitimization source (Rubim 2007a, 35).

The development of the cultural paradigm and its matters as a crucial framework for understanding contemporary society is based, to a large degree, on the concept of cultural rights. Referencing the *Groupe de Fribourg*,⁷ George Yúdice elaborated the concept:

Cultural rights include the freedom to engage in cultural activity, to speak one's language of choice, to teach one's language and culture to one's children, to identify with the cultural communities of one's choice, to discover the whole range of cultures that constitute world heritage, to gain knowledge of human rights, to have an education, to be free from being

⁶ Gil refers to the book *New Paradigm for Understanding Today's World*, written by Alain Touraine in 2005.

⁷ Yúdice refers to the work *Project Concerning a Declaration of Cultural Rights*, developed in 1996 by UNESCO. doi: http://www.unifr.ch/iiedh/langues/english/DC/decl_dc.html.

represented without consent or from having one's cultural space used for publicity, and to gain public provision to safeguard these rights (Yúdice 2003, 44)

The historical, economic, and social context also influences cultural rights concerns. The mechanization of modern society and the improvement of labor conditions, especially for the working class in developed countries, increased consumerism, such as books, radio, films, and cinema, and the interest in leisure activities, including those associated with creativity. Furthermore, the independence wave of several nations from colonial rule and the rise of postcolonialism theories developed a "(...) new sense of dignity, a new searching for ideas handed down from the past (...) and the determination to rebuild the traditional cultures so often disparaged in recent centuries, or to protect new indigenous cultures from the onslaught of urbanization and industrialization" (UNESCO 1970, 10). Once more, the two concepts depicted by Raymond Williams and their conjunction are visible in the endorsement of cultural rights. The same studies developed by UNESCO stress the complexity of defining *rights* and *culture*. Nevertheless, it claims that "(...) culture is central to man and that without it no rights are possible since it is the matrix from which all else must spring. Culture is of the essence of being human" (UNESCO 1970, 10). This statement made by a distinguished organization evinces the aforementioned shift of paradigm.

The definition of *culture*, *rights*, and *cultural rights* in the aforementioned context also generated controversies. The global industrial and technological revolution in the 20th century played an essential role in this paradigm shift and in the subsequent proposals for approaching contemporary societal issues. Some works developed by UNESCO address one of these disputes:

This problem could be summed up as the conflict between the right to culture and the rights of cultures. The first is the right of individuals to access to culture, of which they can be deprived by poverty or political oppression. The second is the right of cultures to survive in face of a radical transformation of the modern world. The first right requires modernization, the second has much to fear from it (UNESCO 1970, 115).

One of the main challenges faced by these international institutions, such as UNESCO, concerns modernization and the usage of technology for human and social development versus culture's adulteration. This ongoing discussion influences the formulation of cultural guidelines, policies, and actions from these organizations but also from local and national public entities. We will further address this topic in the following sections of this work.

The notion of cultural rights is complex and varies depending on where and how the concept is applied. Its universal applicability could overlap with other justiciable rights. According to Yúdice (2003, 45), economic and other sorts of rights possess a more concrete status according to international law when compared to cultural rights. The dilemma addressed by Schritzmeyer (2008), between establishing universal rights versus acknowledging particularities from specific groups, could relatively be translated into a dispute between human rights and cultural rights. The latter, although more inclusive, is less objective in terms of recognition and application. Yúdice illustrates this overlapping phenomenon with the right of information, considering how its exercise is conditioned by cultural context. Besides that, social groups that are more vulnerable, such as indigenous communities, are also part of the current social and political system. Even the rarely remaining uncontacted people are affected by this arrangement, such as the crucial protection granted by a national or international institution.

Habitually, human and cultural rights coexist without conflict. In fact, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), published in 1948, reinforces the cultural aspect as a vital element for human dignity and equality. Although the notion and establishment of cultural rights were incipient in 1948, the UDHR directly mentions it in article 22:

Everyone, as a member of society, has the right to social security and is entitled to realization, through national effort and international cooperation and in accordance with the organization and resources of each State, of the economic, social and cultural rights indispensable for his dignity and the free development of his personality (United Nations 1948).

Additionally, in article 27, the declaration institutes explicitly the right to “(...) participate in the cultural life of the community, to enjoy the arts and to share in scientific advancement and its benefits.” Lastly, the article mentions the right “(...) to the protection of the moral and material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he is the author” (United Nations 1948). Again, the two aforementioned concepts of culture are perceptible. Firstly, in article 22, the semantic usage as a “whole way of life” as described by Raymond Williams, even if the term is mentioned within the right to social security. Secondly, article 27 refers to culture in a narrower form, emphasizing the significance of accessing artistic and scientific knowledge and establishing intellectual and author's rights.

The coexistence between human and cultural rights and, to a large extent, their intertwinement is not invariably harmonious. Various factors account for the violation of human rights, such as the economic and social struggle, particularly in developing countries.

Nevertheless, the cultural aspect might be presented as an excuse for these cruel practices. Asomah (2015, 131) addresses the *trokosi* system in Ghana and other African countries: “(...) It is a practice where the vestal virgin girls are taken to shrines to serve the gods permanently as a form of 'reparation for crimes' committed by their family members (...).” These young females are subjected to overwork and sexual intercourse. The author analyzes the *trokosi* system in the context of cultural relativism and universal human rights. Although the pro-cultural-relativist camp argues that universal human rights are intrusive and disruptive and are part of a western-imperialist project, the case above represents an extreme situation that undermines this claim. Evidently, there is an interest from Western civilizations regarding universal human rights, which is directly associated “(...) to ensure the wholesale embracement and practice of the liberal-multiparty democracy and capitalism.” Nevertheless, Joseph Yaw Asomah stresses that:

(...) there must be a space for the expression of cultural uniqueness and identity, there must equally be a space for a minimum standard of guarantees to avoid the exercise of arbitrary discretionary powers, which tends to create room for abuse as a result of limited commonly-enforceable standards (...) (Asomah 2015, 132).

Although this work is not focused on analyzing cultural relativism, this polemic subject illustrates the complexity of the concept of culture and its usage. Moreover, the rapid development of cultural rights as a paradigm impacted the academic, artistic, and scientific fields. In a broader sense, cultural rights also played an important role on social, economic, and primarily political matters. Undoubtedly, the emergence and consolidation of a new paradigm introduced new discussions and dilemmas. The aforementioned conflict between modernization and social development versus cultural provincialism exemplifies one of the conundrums faced by contemporary policymakers. Our next section will address the emergence and development of cultural policies in the post-war era, considering the semantic framework and perceptions introduced in this first section.

1.2 The emergence of cultural policies and their institutionalization

In the previous section, we analyzed the rise of culture as a paradigm and central element for investigating and understanding contemporary society. This phenomenon categorically impacted local, national, and universal institutions. The United Nations creation in 1945, and its specialized agency, also known as UNESCO, in 1946 contributed to the rise of cultural policies. In addition to the enlargement of the concept of culture, the new institutional and political perspective elevated the status of culture to an essential matter, demanding policies for its promotion, protection, and funding, especially from the perspective of public investment. This movement generated the creation of ministries, departments, and associations managed by governments. Besides that, non-governmental and private institutions, whose purpose was to foment cultural activities, emerged in various countries throughout the second half of the 20th century.

There has been an accelerated diffusion of cultural policies throughout the world since the late 1960s. In the 1980s, the concept of cultural policy was already successfully spread. Accordingly, many nations established a robust governmental system. UNESCO's role was decisive in this course. Although the notion of cultural policy and concrete cultural actions did not emerge simultaneously around the globe, UNESCO “(...) was responsible for the institutionalization of this idea at an international level, facilitating its relatively sudden adoption in countries where this had not been a concern before (...)” (Toledo Silva 2015, 17). The UN's specialized agency was created to address topics such as science, education, and culture, aiming at fostering peaceful relations among countries after two traumatic world wars. The notion of culture, back in the 1940s and 1950s, was still strongly connected with artistic activities and heritage preservation. Thus, UNESCO cultural programs in the first twenty years were mainly focused on these matters, disregarding William's broader concept of culture as a “whole way of life.” The connection mentioned earlier between human rights and culture also appeared during the 1950s. In the same decade, the institution expanded its nation-states' participants. The admission of Latin American, African, and Asian countries, along with the USSR in 1954, shifted UNESCO's priorities and programs, resulting “(...) in pressure for recognition and consideration of the problems of the increasingly influential non-European members” (Toledo Silva 2015, 8).

The expansion and consolidation of UNESCO's block and the reorientation toward a development-related approach took place in the 1960s. Finally, between the 14th (1966) and the 15th (1968) General Conferences, "(...) the relationship between culture and development has gained more precise contours, in the form of cultural policies" (Toledo Silva 2015, 9). These policies emerged to assist artistic creation, but this notion changed between these conferences. A restricted meeting in April 1967 gathered representatives of cultural institutions from six countries (United Kingdom, Czechoslovakia, France, Peru, Indonesia, USSR) and NGOs (International Council of Music, International Union of Architects, International Council of Museums, International Theater Institute). They would send their observations to cultural experts of other countries and, subsequently, present their reports in a larger Round Table at the end of 1967. Formerly, this encounter aimed at developing recommendations for an extensive action to support artistic creation in the modern world. Nevertheless, the goal altered to developing cultural policies in the modern world (Toledo Silva 2015, 11). The heterogeneous composition of representatives and the purpose's adjustment of the meeting illustrate this shift in the late 1960s.

The broadness and volatility of the concept of culture, considering each regional circumstance and cultural needs, were acknowledged throughout UNESCO's conferences. The agency should not be responsible for developing national cultural policies or defining a precise cultural policy concept. Nonetheless, some recommendations were expressed:

(...) (a) that 'cultural policy' should be taken to mean the sum total of the conscious and deliberate usages, action or lack of action in a society, aimed at meeting certain cultural needs through the optimum utilization of all the physical and Human Resources available to that society at a given time; (b) that certain criteria for cultural development should be defined, and that culture should be linked to the fulfillment of personality and to economic and social development (UNESCO 1969, 10).

The passage above emphasizes how socio-economic and cultural development became intertwined, mainly from the policymakers' perspective. Undeniably, this perception placed culture as a critical element within the political realm, recognizing its potential for reducing social conflicts and fostering economic development. Yúdice (2003, 12) stresses that, on the one hand, culture should not be entirely accountable for solving complex problems previously addressed by economics and politics. On the other hand, this recent superior status of culture is the most efficient form of drawing attention and convincing public and private entities to support cultural activities.

National cultural policy experiences turned into vital benchmarks in this newborn field, such as the French Ministry of Cultural Affairs' creation in 1959, which is considered a pivotal moment.⁸ Nonetheless, UNESCO played a central role in the global diffusion of these policies and their continuous maturation:

(...) UNESCO's success was due to two factors: the process of domestication and peer pressure. This means that, for one thing, the UNESCO materials stressed differences rather than similarities, and therefore the program was not seen as a threat to national sovereignty. Rather than mentioning the program's contribution to structural isomorphism, the documents stressed that developing and reporting on a national cultural policy are means to support and promote national art and cultural heritage. Secondly, diffusion of the concept of cultural policy benefited from international comparisons enabled by the national reports and the tendency of countries to emulate others, especially those belonging to the same reference group. These two factors were results of strategic planning on UNESCO's part. Experienced in seeking to guide national policies, the UNESCO staff members could anticipate the challenges that the program could face and the processes that different moves could trigger (Alasuutari and Kangas 2020, 1).

UNESCO's accomplishment in spreading cultural policy demonstrates the importance of discursive and theoretical development in public affairs as long as they interweave with reality. Toledo Silva (2015, 11) stresses that: “(...) public action is performative and heterogeneous and categories such as cultural policy are produced by and produce realities. Categories and domains of action are not passive objects confined to the functions of representation and meaning: they are active agents (...)” Throughout the conferences in the late 1960s and the subsequent ones, the very concept of public policy was thoroughly addressed, along with the role played by different types of local, national, and international institutions. Besides that, these events were important to discuss specificities for designing cultural programs according to the social and economic context, the connection between the cultural and economic sector, and the application and development of various methods and theories. The domestication process and the constant evaluation and comparison of local actions mentioned by Alasuutari and Kangas enabled a significant and beneficial development of cultural policies in the post-war era due mainly to UNESCO's role. The agency's flourishing performance as the central mediator is remarkable, taking into account the scenario's complexity and the diversity of players involved:

(...) While officially the interaction net reaches at least three levels – with “experts,” individually or as representatives of research groups or institutions; international cultural NGOs, doing both research and cultural action; and representatives of governments of member states –, if we consider the heterogeneity of these aggregates and their possible overlap, plus the

⁸ Many authors consider the creation of the Ministry of Cultural Affairs as the invention of contemporary cultural policies (Rubim 2009, 99). Nevertheless, Rubim points out two other cases: the cultural policy initiatives in the Second Spanish Republic in the 1930s and the Arts Council foundation in England in the 1940s.

influence of the secretariat, we have a much more complex picture. I propose thus to see UNESCO as a key mediator not only at international level but also articulating individuals, groups, spots, issues and hybrid experiences involving countries and their representatives, individuals at governmental research institutes, related repertoires circulating in kindred themes and others (...) (Toledo Silva 2015, 17-18).

This sophisticated vast cultural network developed as a cause and consequence of UNESCO's performance. Although some remarkable national and local cultural institutions were founded before UNESCO, there has been a boom regarding cultural policies since the agency's establishment, which encompasses the academic field. Additionally to numerous comparative and statistical studies developed or encouraged by UNESCO within its scope, academic research proliferated and became institutionalized. These phenomena expanded and facilitated the so-called domestication of cultural policies, enabling countries to “translate” this idea to their local circumstances and to turn into “(...) a self-evident part of the domestic world (...)” (Alasuutari and Kangas 2020, 3).

Since the emergence of the cultural policy field and its expansion from the 1960s onwards, governments have adopted different approaches. The variety of cultural actions developed according to each cultural background and, in some cases, due to political purposes. Toledo Silva (2015, 4) stresses that:

(...) From the perspective of Brazil and some other Latin American countries, the subject burst into public debate under military regimes during the cold war. Even if the term was already packed with democratic references, its acceptance and adoption would have to deal with ambiguous conceptions of government intervention and a potential rejection among cultural and artistic publics.

After the milestone moment during the General Conferences in the late 1960s, the protagonism of cultural policies remained on UNESCO's agenda. Rubim (2009, 9) stresses the several initiatives between 1970 and 1982, such as the Regional Conference of Europe, in Helsinki (1972), Asia, in Jacarta (1973), Africa, in Acra (1975), Latin America and the Caribbean, in Bogotá (1978), and, finally, the World Conference of Cultural Policies in Mexico City, in 1982. As the topic matured and the economic, social, and cultural context changed, the agency's focal point also adjusted. Hence, in 1998, during the Stockholm Intergovernmental Conference, some topics achieved notoriety, such as culture's integrality, transversality, and culture as a significant factor for human and sustainable development.

The improvement of the cultural policies field, focusing on the Brazilian experience, will be further discussed in the last section and in chapters two and three. Nonetheless, we should mention two last UNESCO deeds: the Universal Declaration of Cultural Diversity,

issued in 2001, and the Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions, which took place in 2005. The Declaration and the Convention are vital for understanding the Brazilian cultural approach during Lula's mandates. Since the agency's foundation, assorted cultural issues have been discussed, and UNESCO's role has gradually transformed. The end of the cold war, the emancipation of several nations, especially in Africa, and the rise of neoliberalism in the 1990s, produced new demands and challenges for the cultural field. The globalization boom accelerated the cultural exchange among countries, establishing an unregulated and unbalanced international market. Many countries responded with protectionism, such as the expansion of film quota policies. Hence, this new reality demanded a different paradigm for, on the one hand, protecting and, on the other hand, promoting cultural diversity.

In 2001, the Universal Declaration of Cultural Diversity represented a landmark for the cultural policy field. The recognition of diversity as a central element in culture and a development driving force differs from previous documents published by the agency. The protagonism of diversity is evident in several articles of the document. For instance, article 1 defines cultural diversity as the common heritage of humanity; the mention of cultural diversity as a factor in development in article 4; article 5 addresses “cultural rights as an enabling environment for cultural diversity;” and so on (UNESCO 2001, 1-2). Despite its symbolic relevance, the declaration had a limited institutional impact and barely triggered concrete actions from national states. Hence, in 2005, the 33rd General Conference of UNESCO pursued establishing legal agreements. The Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions was the outcome of this forum, which became crucial for the creative economy. The agreement, which its participants heavily supported,⁹ provided international legal protection for the cultural market. Besides that, the convention encouraged a governmental commitment to diversity on a national level. The Brazilian commission, especially the figure of Minister Gilberto Gil, had a decisive role during the conference, advocating for the protection of cultural expressions that were not part of the international cultural industry. Gil's intervention was crucial in convincing hesitant countries to ratify the convention, mainly China and India (Miguez 2011, 24).

⁹ According to Murray (2015): “The UNESCO Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions was passed in 2005 with support from an exceptional majority of nations (opposed only by the US and Israel with four countries abstaining), and was soon ratified by 134 countries plus the European Union (...).”

Section 3.1 of this work will further address the discussion around diversity and the importance of UNESCO's Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions in 2005. This first part of chapter three will depict the creation and actions of the Department of Cultural Identity and Diversity in Brazil, which was the Ministry of Culture's agency established in 2004, before UNESCO's convention. The international acknowledgment and institutionalization of cultural diversity substantially sustained and strengthened several state cultural actions, which relied on a democratic approach implemented since Lula's election in 2003. We will elaborate on this topic in the following two chapters.

1.3 Cultural economy: culture as a resource

The first chapter's section addressed the establishment of the cultural paradigm in the transition from the modern to the contemporary era. This process was followed by the commodification of culture and the development of the cultural industry. This subject, along with mass culture, became a relevant topic within cultural studies, usually associated with two principal authors: Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer. Besides these both writers, Walter Benjamin also analyzed the mechanical reproduction of the work of art. The cultural sphere incorporated the industrial production logic, transforming cultural symbolic elements into goods or commodities in an economic rationality. Before that, cultural goods already followed a capitalist logic. Nonetheless, the capital's role was restrained to the circulation of cultural goods. Culture's commodification expanded this logic to the whole process, encompassing the production of culture (Rubim 2007a, 35-36).

This work does not aim at scrutinizing the emergence of the cultural industry nor the theory regarding mass culture and commodification. Nevertheless, it is crucial to introduce some essential economic aspects and arguments that largely justify the investment and funding of cultural actions, especially from public entities. Foremost, in order to present some concepts from cultural economics, it is necessary to identify culture as a resource:

(...) culture-as-resource is much more than commodity; it is the lynchpin of a new epistemic framework in which ideology and much of what Foucault called disciplinary society (i.e., the inculcation of norms in such institutions as education, medicine, and psychiatry) are absorbed into an economic or ecological rationality, such that management, conservation, access,

distribution, and investment—in “culture” and the outcomes thereof—take priority (Yúdice 2003, 12).

This new “epistemic framework” stressed by Yúdice unfolded a series of changes in the cultural field, including academia. The actual appearance of the cultural economy as a subsection of the economy exemplifies this shift.

Developing an economic perspective toward culture goes beyond the formulation of policies. The cultural sector, which encompasses creative and entertainment activities, represents a considerable portion of resources produced in the global economy. According to the 2018 Global Report developed by UNESCO, the creative industry generates annual revenues of US\$2,250 billion and global exports of US\$250 billion (UNESCO 2017, 2). Besides that, this sector provides around 30 million jobs in the world and, soon, may represent 10% of global gross domestic product (GDP).¹⁰ Hence, from a capitalist industrial angle, it is imperative to produce tools to manage creative resources, including metrics, statistics, and theories.

As a science, economy deals with the management of goods and services, including their production, distribution, and consumption. Regarding the cultural field, it requires a specific approach, considering the features concerning the concept of culture, the rise of the cultural paradigm and cultural rights, and the complexity and diversity of the sector. The 1960s, which represented an important period in the rise of cultural paradigm and policies, was also the birth of contemporary cultural economics, whose first major work was published in 1966 by Baumol and Bowen.¹¹ Like most goods and services in economics, cultural economics examine various aspects, such as “(...) demand, supply, industrial organization, the art market, history, labor markets, firm behavior (including the cost disease) and public subsidies (...)” (Throsby 2006, 5). However, some specificities of cultural goods and services demand special attention. Many studies, such as those developed by Baumol and Bowen (1966), focused on artistic activities, usually disregarding the broader anthropological concept of culture and, consequently, non-erudite cultural activities. Nonetheless, the enlargement of the concept of culture also impacted the economic perspective. Throsby (2006, 6-7) stresses the semantic

¹⁰ UNESCO's report also stresses that the creative industries sector employs more people aged 15-29 than any other economic activity. Also, women represent a large portion of professionals in the creative sector, whose role is also essential in addressing gender inequalities (UNESCO, 2017, 2).

¹¹ Baumol, W.J., Bowen, W.G. *Performing Arts: The Economic Dilemma*. New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1966.

discussion and evolution of the terms of culture and art and, consequently, states that “(...) the arts comprise a subset of culture more broadly defined.”

According to Throsby (2006, 7), throughout the evolution of cultural economics and the attempt to define cultural goods and services, some distinguished aspects were identified:

- cultural goods are experience goods, the taste for which grows as they are consumed in greater quantities; they are therefore subject to rational addiction;
- cultural goods have some public-good¹² properties; in aggregate they yield positive externalities¹³ or diffused benefits that may be demanded in their own right;
- cultural goods result from production processes in which human creativity is an important input;
- cultural goods are the vehicles for symbolic messages to those who consume them, i.e. they are more than simply utilitarian but serve in addition some larger communicative purpose;
- cultural goods contain, at least potentially, some intellectual property that is attributable to the individual or group producing the good;
- cultural goods embody or give rise to forms of value that are not fully expressible in monetary terms and that may not be revealed in either real or contingent markets.

These aspects expose differences between cultural goods and other types of goods, albeit it lacks a precise definition “(...) whether any one or any combination of the characteristics could be regarded as a *sufficient* condition for defining a cultural good, or, if this is not possible, which or how many of the characteristics would be regarded as *necessary* conditions (...)” (Throsby 2006, 7). The intangible aspect is likely to be the most particular factor regarding cultural goods. Material items, such as books and paintings, already possess a substantial abstract value. The intangibility is even higher if we examine cultural services, such as theater shows or exhibitions. Hence, even though there are some consolidated benchmarks to assign value to cultural goods, setting the price of a gallon of milk or a luxury watch tends to be much simpler than evaluating a sculpture or an opera concert. We restrained the examples above to artistic goods and services. However, if we consider items and activities that are not directly associated with the arts, or at least not from a common judgment perspective, the evaluation task is even more arduous. We refer to the “whole way of life” concept conceived by Williams.

Throsby (2006, 7) stresses the problematics of establishing distinguished characteristics between artistic and cultural goods. Once again, we encounter “(...) an aesthetic definition of

¹² Hazelkorn and Gibson (2017, 4-5) differentiate public and private goods, emphasizing the state's role regarding the first one: “(...) private action is one which affects only those engaged in it, while a public action has consequences for others not directly concerned (...) public goods exist in the context of 'market failures', with the state stepping in to provide what private interests cannot. such as sanitation, national defence and lighthouses.”

¹³ Externalities are indirect effects caused by some economic processes, such as production, consumption, and investment. Pollution, for instance, is a classic example of a negative externality. Externalities are among the main factors for governmental intervention in the economic realm (Helbling 2010, 48).

art and a broadly anthropological definition of culture (...)”, which is a notion clearly associated with the enlarged concepts of culture pointed out by Raymond Williams. The broader conception of culture is also traced in cultural economics theories. In an attempt to define cultural and artistic goods, McCain (2006, 148) stresses the importance of non-economic values, which consist of cultural and artistic values, even though these notions are still vague. Concerning value's assignment of an artistic good (or service), in addition to the aesthetical element, McCain ranks *creativity* as a central aspect, relying on the concept from cognitive science. Moreover, the author recognizes “(...) artistic value in the experience of shared creativity on the part of the consumer and producer of art (...)” (McCain 2006, 165). McCain identifies cultural values as “(...) artifacts symbolic of the diversity-in-unity of particular cultural groups.” Even though the author argues that features from cultural and artistic goods may not be non-overlapping, this discussion is far from reaching a consensus. An artistic object, for instance, could have artistic, economic, and cultural value. On the other hand, a cultural item could possess artistic and economic value. To establish an explicit criterion, we should consider art as a subdivision of culture. Therefore, “(...) artistic goods would be seen as a subset of the wider category of cultural goods, not in a separate category of their own” (Throsby 2006, 7). Above all, these distinct non-economic values inherent in cultural and artistic goods are essential to differentiate them from other types of goods.

Another aspect introduced by McCain elucidates the uniqueness of cultural goods: the value of provenance. He compares the assessment of an authentic picture of Rembrandt with a perfect duplicate of it. Naturally, there is a general agreement that the latter has a much lower market value. McCain expands his analysis with further examples:

People are willing to pay for items with provenance. In antiques markets, for example, a weapon known to have been used in war will generally get a higher price than an otherwise identical weapon that was never used in violence. This association of the weapon with war is an objective historical fact, as is the association of the authentic Rembrandt with the historic van Rijn. For a broad category of goods, including (but not limited to) goods that we think of as cultural or artistic goods, as a matter of fact the willingness of people to pay for them is dependent on their history (...) (McCain 2006, 154).

Although the value of provenance may find relatively common judgment regarding the artifacts mentioned above, it does not apply to every cultural good. The value of provenance and artistic, economic, and even cultural value may vary depending on the context. An object

may possess an inestimable value for a specific cultural group, such as an indigenous community. Nonetheless, the same item could be considered worthless by others. This observation seems obvious, but we must stress the complexity of assigning value to cultural goods, primarily due to their non-economic value. Once again, several elements should be contemplated if we assess cultural goods and services that, from a common-sense perspective, are not unmistakably associated with the arts. For instance, cultural activities and artifacts that are fundamental for some communities to express their identity and uniqueness. Besides, culture can be a powerful transformation tool, contributing to human, social and economic development on diverse scales: individuals, families, communities, cities, and even countries. Hence, valuing a cultural good and measuring its impacts on a population is not a trivial exercise.

The social relevance of cultural activities may place them as priorities from a governmental perspective. To some extent, cultural goods are similarly addressed as health and education services, whose significance is widely recognized. Although these two areas are commonly ranked above the cultural area, goods with cultural, health, or educational characteristics possess similarities regarding value assessment. Therefore, there is a general agreement on an active state's role in these fields. Concerning the realm of cultural policy, Throsby (2006, 18) stressed some critical intersections between cultural and economic policy:

- the prospects for the cultural industries as dynamic sources of innovation, growth and structural change in the new economy, as discussed above;
- the appropriate levels for government support for the arts and culture, and the balance between direct (grant-related) and indirect (tax-related) means of support;
- trade policy in respect of cultural goods and services;
- the possibilities for public/private partnerships in the preservation of cultural heritage;
- the role of the arts and culture in employment creation and income generation in towns and cities, especially those affected by industrial decline; and
- legal and economic questions concerning the regulation of intellectual property in cultural goods and services, as discussed earlier.

These economic elements are central for cultural policymakers, taking into account the priority of creating jobs, generating income, and fostering innovation. As already mentioned, these components considerably legitimize and strengthen the actual existence of cultural policies. The state's role transcends the funding aspect, including culture's promotion, supervision, and regulation. The procedure may vary according to each regional and national background, whose political and economic situation also influence the approach. Towse (2007, 162) indicates a few reasons for governmental action toward culture, such as the "(...) desire to promote pride in local or national identity and/or to form that identity and develop a sense of

community (...);” economic purposes, like tourism boost; finally, she mentions the “(...) promotion of political power for a regime or for individuals (...).” The author stresses that “(...) these public objectives are unlikely to be achieved by individual means or through the agency of the market and require concerted action by the community.”

Institutional, legal, and political actions are fundamental for the prosperity of culture. However, these measures are insufficient without financial aid. Public sponsorship is vital for the sector, especially for agents who produce activities considered to be less commercial. The two main mechanisms of governmental support (grant-related and tax-related) mentioned above by Throsby are widely consolidated as cultural policies. The approach diverges according to each country. Occasionally, the government manages public cultural venues, such as theaters and museums. The support may also occur through public calls. Private organizations frequently are in charge of these venues and develop partnerships with public entities. Besides that, the state could also impact the supply and demand for cultural activities through consumption subsidies. Finally, the government may adopt a less active attitude via tax exemption laws, relatively delegating cultural actions to the private sector. The tax incentives procedure is not that habitual, principally in European countries, whose methods are frequently interventionist. The Australian and North-American governments, on the other hand, have historically interfered to a lower degree in cultural matters. In Brazil, the economic cultural policy has been transforming throughout the 20th century. The state's stand constantly altered, intercalating democratic and authoritarian periods. After the end of the dictatorship in 1985, the country adopted a neoliberal attitude toward the cultural sector, relying mainly on tax exemption instruments. The Brazilian case and the dominance of tax incentive laws will be further addressed in the following sections, especially in chapter two.

In this endeavor to approach the cultural realm, including its policies, production, and consumption processes, we introduced a few cultural economic features in this section. The presentation of the economic perspective is an attempt to differentiate and broaden this thesis compared to other works from the culture studies field. The current epistemic framework of culture as a resource, as aforementioned by Yúdice, demands a broader analysis. Hence, we must consider the individual (producer and consumer) and collective (private and public entities) angle toward cultural goods. Since our focal point is public cultural policies, the economic context is decisive for policymakers.

1.4 Brazilian Culture: the significance of popular cultures and the construction of *Brazilianness*

The previous sections addressed the evolution and enlargement of the concept of culture, along with the emergence of the cultural paradigm and cultural rights; the institutionalization and internationalization of cultural policies, accentuating the role played by UNESCO; and introduced the economic perspective toward culture and cultural policies. This final section will portray the Brazilian perspective, developing a connection between the abovementioned elements and the national framework. After that, we will depict cultural policies in Brazil, focusing on Lula's mandates between 2003 and 2010 in chapter two, and, finally, chapter three will address the program *Cultura Viva*, whose conception took place in 2004. From this point onwards, this work will mainly focus on the Brazilian experience. Thus, it is imperative to present some theoretical frameworks that became essential guidelines for developing the cultural program during Lula's mandates, especially *Cultural Viva*.

The first specific cultural aspect is the concept of popular cultures (*culturas populares* in Portuguese). Going back to the concept of culture presented in the first section, the emergence of anthropological studies played an essential role in detaching culture from the notion of civilization. Although anthropology accomplished to enlarge the concept of culture, encompassing several “ways of life,” there was a hierarchy between two types of culture: the erudite (or high) culture and the popular one. According to Domingues (2011, 402), this division was an invention made by European intellectuals in the second half of the 18th century. Naturally, this separation is the reproduction of social class stratification, connecting the erudite cultural manifestations to the elites and popular culture, previously labeled as *folklore*,¹⁴ to the lower working classes. Later on, during the 19th century, cultural manifestations from the countryside were conveniently romanticized as “pure” and “natural.” This idealization was one of the primary basis for developing the origin myth of several nations.

The cultural division between erudite and popular is still ingrained in contemporary society, including Brazil. The first one is associated with intellectuals and artists from the dominant class. The high arts are constituted by fine arts productions, whose audience is well-

¹⁴ The term *folklore*, *folk* (people) and *lore* (traditional knowledge) was coined by Willian John Thoms in 1846. It was quickly spread in European nations and usually associated with oral transmission of knowledge, mainly among people who lived in the countryside (Catenacci 2001, 28).

educated and labeled as arts consumers. Contrastingly, the popular culture (or art) is consumed by urban and rural workers and usually represents myths, legends, rites, regional dance and music, craftwork, and others. This distinction is an expression but also a consequence of social division, which exposes a qualitative difference represented in four instances: in creation's complexity (popular culture is less complex than erudite); in the relation with the new and modern (high arts tend to play an avant-garde role and the popular one is more traditional and repetitive); in the relation between culture-makers and the public (usually, the distinction between artists and audience is evident in the high arts, but not so apparent in popular culture); finally, in the manner of expressing and understanding (on the one hand, artists part of popular culture tend to express themselves straightforwardly, enabling an efficient comprehension. On the other hand, erudite culture-makers develop original ways of expression whose perception is restricted to a versed audience) (Chauí 2021, 15-16).¹⁵

The debate around popular culture is also related to the construction of Brazilian identity. In Europe, the intellectual interest in folklore and popular cultures in the 19th century materialized in the course of a radical change due to capitalist modernization. Thus, there was uncertainty regarding the preservation of traditional beliefs and rites within this context. Meanwhile, in Brazil, where several European authors¹⁶ also influenced, another crucial question had to be addressed: after all, who are we (the Brazilian people)? This balance between modernizing the country, which was considered indispensable by the elites and the state, and conserving its ancient cult, faced another dilemma: to preserve some aspects of the past and, at the same time, neglect and cover less illustrious elements, such as colonialism, slavery, exploitation, and miscegenation (Catenacci 2001, 29-30). Hence, the genesis of Brazilian folklore and popular culture studies intertwined with the pursuit of establishing a particular Brazilian identity and unity. At the end of the 19th century and the first decades of the 20th century, some authors, such as Nina Rodrigues and Sílvio Romero, developed their works based on race theory premises. According to them, Brazilians are a mix of one superior race (white) and two inferior races (indigenous and black people). The miscegenation feature of Brazilian society was perceived as a bottleneck. Thus, to overcome backwardness, the country should go through a “whitening” process and turn into a European nation of the tropics (Ortiz

¹⁵ Our translation.

¹⁶ Regarding folklore studies, some European studies and tales were main references for Brazilian authors, such as the works written by the brothers Grimm, Charles Perrault and Hans Christian Andersen (Catenacci 2001, 30).

2013, 615). Indeed, this argument materialized in a concrete massive immigration policy pushed by the elites:

It was considered necessary to root out the “social cancer” and the workforce on which slavery itself depended, for, as the Brazilian elites saw it, the population of African origin would never create a fully civilized Brazil because of its inability to overcome such supposed deficiencies as vagrancy, lack of energy, passivity, and immorality. The solution would be to shut the black out—to prevent the growth of the black population and encourage the entry of European immigrants. By the end of the nineteenth century the impact on the Brazilian ruling elites of the race factor in the debate was so strong that, despite having approved the immigration of Asian workers at the Congresso Agrícola, they came round to a concern for the whitening of the population and began to favor the importation of a white European workforce (Dos Santos Sales 2002, 68-69).

These concepts and their consequences are outrageous from a contemporary perspective, albeit they evince two points: the attempt to define a national identity since the end of the 19th century, in which popular cultures are fundamental, and the disregard for every aspect originated from non-white European cultures. The latter remains a challenging obstacle in Brazilian society, which will be further addressed in the following chapters, especially in section 3.1.

Regarding the term popular cultures, it will be adopted a few times throughout this work, and it encompasses a large variety of expressions, such as dance (*maracatu*, *frevo*, and *carimbó*); literature (*cordel* and folklore tales); music (*sertanejo*, *samba*, and MPB - *Música Popular Brasileira*); and several other expressions. This rich and diverse web of Brazilian cultures developed and expanded in the last centuries within its continental territory. These cultures merged elements among them, influencing and being influenced by others, including erudite and mass culture expressions (Gil 2003, 32). However, the academic, social and political effort to build the Brazilian identity deliberately disregarded some popular cultural expressions, namely those parts of indigenous and African cultures. This troublesome relation with non-European cultures was perpetuated in the political and social sphere in the 20th century and is still ingrained in Brazilian society. Nevertheless, some aspects were incorporated and, in some moments, intentionally exploited for political purposes, especially during authoritarian periods.

Catenacci (2001 31) addresses the deconstruction of *popular*. Quoting Canclini (1989),¹⁷ the author points out three key moments, which were determined by scientific and

¹⁷ Catenacci refers to Canclini's work *Hybrid Cultures*, published in 1995. The original version in Spanish was published in 1989.

political intentions: the *folcloristas* and anthropologists in the 1920s and 1930s; the cultural industries and their communicators from the 1950s onwards; and, finally, the political populism and the role played by the state or its opposition since the 1970s. The nationalist aspect, perceived through the attempt to construct a national identity and the notion of *Brazilianness* (*Brasilidade* in Portuguese), is likely the most significant feature of these three moments. We will further address this chronological evolution in the following chapter.

From the social and political perspective of the elites, the course of fabricating Brazilian identity went necessarily through a consensus culture. This notion was identified in some terms used to portray Brazilian society since the first decades of the 20th century, such as racial democracy and nonconflictual people (Yúdice 2003, 195). Cordiality was a crucial element for coming to terms with miscegenation, in which several cultural expressions were partially recognized and incorporated as part of the mainstream Brazilian culture:

(...) Given the importance of representations of blacks and mulattos and their cultural practices in the struggles to define Brazilianness, “the challenge to racial common sense must focus on the social and economic status of nonwhites and on how the “consensus culture” has symbolized such practices as samba, pagode (a neighborhood gathering where samba is played), capoeira (an Afro-Brazilian martial arts dance form brought by slaves from Angola), candomblé and umbanda (Afro-Brazilian religions), and so on. It should be stressed that the critique implicit in “opting out” of the consensus culture does not mean that the above-mentioned practices are somehow alienating or always co-optable as binding elements of a social homeostasis that benefits elites. The point, rather, is that since the 1930s they have been mobilized by the media, business (particularly tourism), politics (including the manipulation of carnival), and other mediating instances for the symbolic reproduction of a “cordial” Brazil, with the result that elites reap the lion’s share of material benefits (...) (Yúdice 2003, 192-193).

We will further discuss some of these cultural activities and the ambiguous government's attitude toward them. In the passage above, Yúdice contextualizes the national culture in order to approach the emergence of funk in Rio de Janeiro, mainly from the 1990s onwards.¹⁸ This recent phenomenon of Brazilian *funkeiros* illustrates how popular culture, on the one hand, tackles racism and social exclusion and, on the other hand, is also a way of taking pleasure (Yúdice 2003, 184). Since its origin, Brazilian media, business, and the upper class have disregarded this cultural movement. Due to its genesis in the *favelas*, funk was considered an inferior music style and dance expression. There was significant social and cultural progress

¹⁸ Palombini (2014, 317-318) stresses how the emergence of soul music and funk was a counterpoint for the enforced unity identity symbolized by *samba*, whose emergence in the 1930s offered a “(...) symbolic compensation for material exploitation (...)” Also known as *baile funk* (funk dance), Palombini (2014, 318) mentions that “(...) *funk carioca* (funk from Rio de Janeiro city) derives not directly from African-American funk but from a variety of US hip-hop known as Miami bass. The name ‘funk’ has clung to the music because of its roots in the *bailes funk* of the 1980s, which were fed by US funk and rap (...)”

during this period, at least from an institutional angle, taking into account the new Federal Constitution promulgated in 1988. Despite that, the new legislation could not prevent the perpetuation of the ancient cultural hierarchy embedded in Brazilian society. This time, the context and, thus, *funkeiros'* attitude was distinct compared to previous movements. According to Yúdice (2003, 194), “(...) Brazilian funk occupies the same physical space as that of the more traditional samba, but it questions, as does the song, the fantasy of access to social space (...).” The funk music, along with rap, was massively adopted as a cultural movement by the youth from the favelas and promoted by them as a way of “(...) seek[ing] to establish new forms of identity, but not those premised on Brazil's much-heralded self-understanding as a nation of nonconflictual diversity. On the contrary, the song is about the disarticulation of national identity and the affirmation of local citizenship (...)” (Yúdice 2003, 194).

This form of challenging the Brazilian racial and social mainstream portrays the complexity of defining a national culture and identity. These peripheral cultural expressions struggled with limited political significance. Yúdice (2003, 222) stresses that funk is not essentially political but offers a different cultural approach since it offers a “(...) new cognitive mapping in which transnational culture and technology are used for their own purposes (...)”. He elaborates his analysis by stating that “(...) funkeiros do not need the culture critic to tell them how their social reality is structured; they know it quite well and make use of that knowledge to further their own ends (...) This kind of cognitive mapping is more a practical matter than an epistemological one” (Yúdice 2003, 222). The cultural analysis of funk as a new cultural mapping, although stimulating, is not the main focus of this work. However, the emergence of funk exemplifies how recent cultural movements from the periphery are capable of questioning several aspects, such as the notions of popular culture, national identity, and even the concept of culture. This bustling context during the re-democratization period, especially from the 1990s onwards, demanded a distinct governmental attitude regarding social, racial, and cultural matters.

After introducing the concept of popular culture in Brazil and addressing the emergence of funk as a contemporary popular cultural expression, we should depict the current cultural policy practices. Considering the aspects already discussed, we want to introduce a contemporary concept to approach the Brazilian experience during Lula's mandates. As the former Minister of Culture stated, the Ministry's actions should be interpreted as applied anthropology exercises (Gil 2003, 10). Theoretical references from Gilberto Gil, Ministry of

the Culture between 2003 and 2008, and Célio Turino, Secretary of the Department responsible for developing the *Cultura Viva* program, will also compose our analysis throughout this work. Both politicians will be among our primary sources for depicting cultural policies in contemporary Brazil. Before that, we should mention other authors to characterize the theoretical framework, considering their influence on Gil's and Turino's concepts.

Concerning the current notion of cultural policy and its contemporary practice, the Argentinian anthropologist Néstor García Canclini shed light on the topic, describing cultural policies as a set of interventions carried out by the state, the civil institutions, and community groups. Its goal is to foster symbolic development, meet people's cultural demands, and reach a consensus on the type of order or social transformation. Finally, Canclini emphasizes the necessity of expanding the concept of cultural policies, taking into account the contemporary transnational feature of symbolic and material processes (Canclini 2007, 78).¹⁹ This epistemological delimitation is necessary for cultural policies as a subject, allowing analytical comparisons among the various studies developed in this newborn field. The aforementioned comparative studies, which were encouraged by UNESCO (or developed by the agency), are one example. This analysis is crucial for the field's continuous development, acknowledging the diversity regarding cultural policy practices in each country (or region) and their novelty.

Rubim (2007a, 40-46)²⁰ stresses that cultural policy studies should consider some analytical dimensions, such as:

- to elucidate the notion of the analyzed policy, bearing in mind that cultural policies should incorporate distinctive types of policies;
- to unequivocally determine the intrinsic concept of culture attached to every policy, clarifying its scope. Rubim also observes that each cultural policy privileges, in an explicit form or not, a specific conception of culture;
- to investigate the set of actions inherent to a cultural policy, such as plans, projects, and programs, analyzing the proposed and accomplished actions and the connections and contradictions among them;
- to examine objectives and goals, which are crucial elements in every cultural policy;
- to circumscribe and characterize each actor part of a determined cultural policy, which comprises different agents within the public sphere, such as agencies, departments,

¹⁹ Our translation.

²⁰ Our translation.

governments, etc., on a local, regional, national and international level. Moreover, private cultural entities and other actors may also compose the agents involved in a particular cultural policy, such as the market and civil society;

- to clarify the target audience of each cultural policy, stratifying by gender, age, income, and educational level;
- to consider the resources and tools to evaluate the access and consumption of cultural goods and services. They may be composed of financial, human, equipment, and legal aspects, which are crucial for materializing cultural policies.
- to cover all phases within a cultural policy, such as creation and innovation; diffusion and transmission; circulation, exchange, and cooperation; analysis, research, and critical thinking; fruition and consumption; conservation and preservation; and organization, legislation, and management. Naturally, some policies may prioritize certain steps.
- to consider two complex dimensions of cultural policies. First, the transversality of culture within the contemporary context. Thus, its interfaces with other critical areas, such as education and communication. Finally, the intersections, combinations, and articulations among the dimensions mentioned above since they are not separately planned and implemented. Their coherence and compatibility enable the development of a consistent cultural policy system.

The analytical dimensions portrayed by Rubim complement the notion developed by Canclini. The series of elements addressed above, if accurately implemented, enable a comprehensive cultural policy practice. Together with that, Rubim (2007a, 42) emphasizes the significance of people's governance, which transcends the governmental sphere. Cultural policies are only legitimate if civil society agents participate in the conception and approval processes. Thus, it is crucial to facilitate a democratic debate to achieve a desirable outcome, considering that cultural policymakers may under-represent vulnerable sectors of society. In other words, this is the most genuine and effective form of carrying out a bottom-up approach.

We addressed the epistemological and analytical evolution of cultural policies, the enlargement of the concept of culture, and the institutionalization and legitimization of the field. These phenomena enabled, in theory, a more democratic idea concerning culture, acknowledging its importance as a universal matter. The effort of democratizing culture is possibly our primary motivation for delving into cultural policies, focusing on Brazil's

experience during Lula's mandates. Hence, before further contextualizing Brazil's cultural scenario in the following chapters, we should discuss the democratic cultural approach. In addition to the historical disregard and ambiguous relations concerning most popular cultures in the country, the social and political elite consistently replicated cultural actions and tendencies from developed countries. Hence, some misguided premises have been adopted throughout the implementation of cultural policies.

Since this field emerged in the 1960s, the predictable lack of benchmarks hampered some initial practices. Once more, the conferences, studies, and other actions organized and coordinated by UNESCO were fundamental for spreading and improving cultural policies. However, their positive impact materialized only after some decades. The creation of the Ministry of Cultural Affairs in France in 1959 was a breakthrough moment for cultural policies. The French institution and its stance pioneered large-scale cultural intervention, targeting national and international actions. In this case, the French administration perceptibly intended to spread French culture around the globe and, to a large extent, maintain its status quo (Lacerda 2010, 2). André Malraux, who was in charge of the Ministry for ten years, adopted a logic of expanding the population's access to cultural venues and goods. The objective was to enable the audience to develop critical thinking and aesthetical consciousness. This approach, which persisted during Lang's administration (1981-1991), focused on popularizing various cultural activities, such as museums, theaters, cultural centers, and concerts. In order to achieve that, the French government expanded the cultural offer in the country, building new cultural venues and implementing a pricing policy (cheapening or making gratuitous the access to cultural venues). These incentives were chiefly directed at erudite forms of art.

This vertical notion of democratizing access to culture was, to a certain degree, replicated in various European countries and outside the continent. In 1964, French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu led a study to evaluate and analyze cultural habits in France, focusing on museum attendance. This endeavor aimed at assessing the government's approach. One of the conclusions drawn from this study was the unmistakable cultural abyss between the upper class and the rest of the population. Facilitating access to museums was not sufficient to break this cultural barrier. The imposed cultural actions, which privilege a specific kind of cultural expression, may only reinforce the social order and, thus, the aforementioned hierarchy between erudite and popular culture:

(...) the privileged classes of bourgeois society replace the difference between two cultures, products of history reproduced by education, with the basic difference between two natures, one nature naturally cultivated, and another nature naturally natural. Thus, the sanctification of culture and art, this 'currency of the absolute' which is worshiped by a society enslaved to the absolute of currency, fulfills a vital function by contributing to the consecration of the social order. So that cultured people can believe in barbarism and persuade the barbarians of their own barbarity, it is necessary and sufficient for them to succeed in hiding both from themselves and from others the social conditions which make possible not only culture as a second nature, in which society locates human excellence, and which is experienced as a privilege of birth, but also the legitimated hegemony (or the legitimacy) of a particular definition of culture. (...) (Bourdieu, Darbel, and Schnapper 1991, 111-112).

Overall, the premises and dimensions of cultural policies indicated by Canclini (2007) and Rubim (2007a) are barely noticeable in this French exemplification. This top-down attitude in favor of a specific type of culture (high arts) was also conceived without considering local demands and several cultural needs and popular preferences. The ingrained mindset of enlightening the less privileged social and economic classes shaped several governmental policies, including within the cultural area. Bourdieu's study revealed that tackling geographical and financial limitations for accessing cultural goods and services is not satisfactory for genuinely democratizing culture. Mainly, this policy aims at democratizing the access to an already legitimized and exclusionary form of culture (Lacerda 2010, 5). One can argue that mediation and pedagogical processes could minimize this issue and stimulate museum attendance, for instance. Nevertheless, the concepts and premises part of mediation and pedagogical procedures may also reproduce this elitist enlightenment perspective. The very production of culture, which endorses high arts expressions, is presumably the utmost example of this unequal social and cultural structure.

Historically, erudite culture has been favored from an economic, social, and political perspective, even before the emergence of cultural policies in the post-war era. The main cultural agents, such as policymakers, artists, cultural managers, producers, cultural venue directors, curators, and sponsors, tend to prioritize this cultural expression. This pattern exists on an individual and institutional level. Furthermore, a significant part of these cultural actors come from a wealthy background, which increasingly perpetuates this socio-cultural inequality. Hence, regarding the French case, there was no support and legitimization for other forms of cultural expressions, such as popular culture, nor other less privileged sectors of the society were integrated into the production of erudite culture (Lacerda 2010, 5). This top-down approach was quickly contested in France, especially after the social-political turmoil in 1968. From 1970 onwards, during the administration of Minister Duhamel, the paradigm of cultural democracy also became relevant, fostering the implementation of smaller cultural centers in

which local governments participated in management and financing processes. This attitude also acknowledged the importance of other types of expressions in the French cultural structure (Lacerda 2010, 6). Rubim (2009, 98) stresses that this paradigmatic shift occurred at the exact moment when UNESCO's initiatives took place.

This work does not advocate against democratizing access to erudite forms of culture. In fact, from our perspective, it is fundamental to make the high arts and other consolidated forms of cultural expressions more accessible to the entire population (as a consumer and, especially, as a producer). Nevertheless, a valid and thorough democratizing cultural policy should embrace cultural diversity and genuinely contemplate an enlarged concept of culture, focusing on cultural production.

The ideas described above, along with the epistemological (enlargement of the concept of culture) and institutional (UNESCO's performance and its impacts on several national policies) ones, led us to this democratic cultural practice. Cultural democracy as a paradigm for cultural practices is the framework and core set of conceptions that justify the election of the program *Cultural Viva* as a case study for this work. Botelho (2001, 82) stresses that cultural democracy focuses on making various cultures available to every citizen, encompassing his or her own culture. In order to democratically enable the fruition and production of culture, policymakers should embrace the notions of plurality and cultural rights. These cultural agents, including private and public ones, should promote the universal possibility of choice, conferring the chance to everyone to produce and consume any cultural expression. In chapter three, we will further examine this topic in light of the development of *Cultura Viva*

2. Cultural policies in Brazil under Lula's government (2003-2010)

2.1 Brazilian cultural policies until the redemocratization in 1985

This chapter analyzes the cultural policies during the two mandates of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, who held office for eight years (from the 1st of January 2003 to the 31st of December 2010). We introduced some theoretical aspects within the Brazilian context in the previous chapter. However, it is essential to contextualize the Brazilian cultural scenario and the historical context before the 2000s. We will examine the development of Brazilian cultural policies in this section, which is paramount to approaching the research object.

Brazil's colonial inheritance can be perceived in different aspects of its culture and society throughout its history. Its heterogeneous population was shaped by natives and different waves of immigration, including Portuguese, Italians, Spanish, Germans, Polish, Lebanese, Syrians, Japanese, and people from other parts of Europe, the Middle East, Asia, and Africa. The latter is mainly due to slavery, which plays a pivotal role in constructing Brazilian identity.

Although this work does not focus on slavery and the history of black people in Brazil, it is crucial to approach it to understand its impact on contemporary culture and society. For over 350 years, around 5 million Africans were enslaved²¹ and trafficked to Brazil, the biggest market and the last country to abolish slavery in the Americas (Versiani 2019, 1). Human trafficking was a significant economic activity in the colonial period. Enslaved Africans became the primary workforce in Brazil, especially in the plantations of sugar cane and coffee, and the gold and diamond mines. In the 19th century, the slow process of eradicating slavery ended with the so-called *Lei Áurea* (Golden Law), signed by Princess Regent Isabel in 1888. Before that, the Brazilian Imperial government established some laws to favor the abolitionist movement. International trafficking was prohibited in 1850, and, in 1871, the *Lei do Ventre Livre* (Law of the Free Womb or Free Birth Law) was approved, freeing the children of enslaved women (Candido 2007, 335). These laws were landmarks in the country's history, albeit they did not significantly impact the structure of Brazilian society. There was no compensation or integration, and African ex-slaves remained in miserable work conditions.

²¹ The total sum of people enslaved and forced to leave Africa is around 12.5 million. About 20% did not survive the Atlantic crossing, dying from dysentery, scurvy, smallpox, syphilis, and measles, or were killed by ship commanders (Schröder 2019).

Over 130 years after *Lei Áurea's* enactment, important abolitionists' goals, such as universal education, land distribution, and better labor conditions for the black and *pardo*²² population, are still far from being achieved.

Despite the incorporation and miscegenation of multiple peoples and cultures in Brazil throughout its five centuries, the dominant European culture mostly suppressed other cultural expressions, distinctively those from Africans and indigenous people. The most remarkable feature of this process is the power and influence of the Catholic Church in the country. The institution supported and provided religious arguments for justifying slavery and implemented the catechization process for indigenous and African people. The conversion of these populations to Christianity led to a diverse range of syncretic religious practices, translated into the creation of a variety of saints, superstitions, and rituals that are not part of the traditional catholic expression. Umbanda may be the best example to illustrate this Brazilian religious particularity. Also known as the “Brazilian religion,” Umbanda devotees developed a syncretic religion that incorporates aspects of Catholicism originally brought by white Europeans, the tradition from the black African *orixás*,²³ customs from Spiritism, and, finally, rituals, spirits, and symbols from native indigenous cultures (Prandi 2004, 223-226). Despite the fact that Umbanda and other religions represent a vital part of the religious structure in Brazil, the role played by the Catholic Church since the 16th century is substantially more significant than any other institution or creed. The country has the largest Catholic population in the world, and although it is a secular state, catholic beliefs and rituals are deep-rooted in the structure of Brazilian society.

The assimilation of foreign rituals, customs, and beliefs was a slow and uneven process. Afro-Brazilian religions, such as *candomblé*,²⁴ remained crucial for the socialization and entertainment of blacks and mixed-race people, despite the repression imposed by the state, Church, and society. These practices were still illegal after the Republican Constitution in 1889

²² *Pardo* is a category used by the *Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística* - IBGE (Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics). According to Travassos and Williams (2004, 666): “Brazil is the country in the Americas that has the largest population of African ancestry. Miscegenation is part of Brazil's history, as in other Latin American countries. The official term for the admixed population in the census is ‘*Pardo*,’ literally meaning ‘Brown’ or ‘Gray’ (...).”

²³ According to Bahia (2016, 19): “*Orixás* are African gods venerated in *Candomblé* as mediators between *Olorun* (the supreme god) and mankind. In *Candomblé* and *Umbanda* (...) *orixás* and spirits respectively are treated differently. The *Umbanda* spirits do not require an initiation process as in *Candomblé* (...).”

²⁴ The religion considered to be Afro-Brazilian refers to Africa as its birthplace and as a symbol of fighting slavery. According to Bahia (2016, 16), *Candomblé* is a “(...) religion constituted in the XIX century in the Brazilian state of Bahia (...) influenced by the habits brought over by Fon groups (...) and by African minority groups (...).”

and during the Second Republic implemented in 1930 by Getúlio Vargas. However, they started to be partially recognized as part of the so-called “Brazilian Culture.” Silva (2014, 213) described this ambiguous attitude toward Afro-Brazilian religions from the public and private perspectives:

Some of these manifestations even became to be seen as positive characteristics of the singularity of Brazilian culture, both within and outside the country. To give a few of the better-known examples: the sambistas João da Baiana and Pixinguinha popularized sambas with words that referred to magic and Candomblé. Carmem Miranda,²⁵ dressed as a *Baiana* or *Mãe de Santo*,²⁶ took her songs overseas, and with them elements of these religions. Jorge Amado, one of the greatest Brazilian writers, from his earliest works in the 1930s chose Baiano adepts of Afro-Brazilian religions as inspirations for his heroes, heroines and mythical characters liked Antonio Balduino, Jubiabá, Pedro Archanjo, Dona Flor and Vadinho. Thus the Afro-Brazilian religions, situated in this ambivalent position between partial recognition due to their ‘cultural legacy’ (promoted by Vargas’ policies of cultural integration) and the de facto repression as ‘practicing religions’ (due to their lack of legitimacy under Catholic hegemony), established themselves through alliances, dialogs and conflicts between the originally black world of the *terreiros*²⁷ and the outside world which, at least publicly, maintained a ‘strategic distance’ from this African legacy.

The passage above illustrates how cultural expressions considered marginal from the dominant ones were only partially recognized and accepted by Brazilian public and private institutions. As mentioned in chapter one, the construction of the nonconflictual feature regarding Brazilian society is part of this controversial relationship with these cultures. *Candomblé* and other African religions are examples of other knowledge and beliefs from indigenous and African cultures disregarded throughout history. Not rarely, some symbols and rituals were conveniently used for political and commercial purposes, as stressed in the excerpt. Although the discourse on cultural appropriation did not exist in the 1930s and 1940s, the cases described above exemplify it.

This constant neglect generated various social and political movements to tackle repression, prejudice, and negligence from the state. Since the first *quilombos*²⁸ in the 16th century, peripheral communities have been organizing themselves socially, politically, and

²⁵ Carmen Miranda was a popular Luso-Brazilian film and radio star in the 1930s. According to Araujo (2013, 231), she was a “(...) inspired by the Hollywood styles that she observed in imported films and that were featured in domestic magazines, Carmen Miranda became one of Brazil's first film stars, the nation's international 'Ambassador of Samba' and an important influence on modern understandings of *brasilidade*.”

²⁶ According to Saraiva (2010): “*Pai / mãe de santo* means, literally, ‘father’ or ‘mother of the saint’, and refers to the ritual leader, the cult priest/priestess. Their followers are called *filho/filha de santo*, literally ‘son/ daughter of the saint’.”

²⁷ According to Saraiva (2010): “In the Afro-Brazilian cults, *terreiro* refers both to the physical temple and the congregation of initiated and followers of these cults.”

²⁸ According to Paiva et al. (2020, 190), “During the Latin American period of slavery (1490-1888), communities were founded by run-away or by abandoned former slaves in rural or jungle areas. These populations are tied to slavery resistance and are known by different names in different countries, such as quilombos in Brazil (...).”

economically to maintain their traditions and customs and survive. The aforementioned emergence of Brazilian funk exemplifies a recent resistance case. However, some widespread misconceptions and prejudices are so embedded in Brazilian society that these cultures remain undervalued, with implications for the configuration of the identities of descendants of indigenous and African people. These aspects are relevant for understanding cultural policies in Brazil and their origin. Besides the concept of culture and cultural policies already discussed in the first chapter of this work, this societal and cultural structure has influenced the genesis and development of the state's role in the cultural sphere. Simultaneously, the lack of interest or, occasionally, the total absence of governmental actions, especially those related to aspects not connected with the dominant European culture, has reinforced the hierarchy among different cultural manifestations.

Cultural policies in Brazil can be typified by different definitions, such as authoritarianism, lateness, discontinuity, neglect, paradoxes, and challenges (Rubim 2007b, 11). Rubim identifies three unfortunate traditions regarding these policies: absence, authoritarianism, and instability. These aspects are perceptible throughout the history of culture in the country. During its colonial era, the Portuguese Crown forbade intellectual and artistic activities, including the establishment of a press, censorship of foreign literary materials, and the establishment of universities and other educational institutions. Although there was a slight improvement after Brazil's independence in 1822 and the Proclamation of the Republic in 1889, any movement or action that took place in the 19th century cannot be characterized as an actual cultural policy, considering the enlarged anthropological concept of culture and the contemporary practice of cultural policies. Nonetheless, there were a few artistic and intellectual development cases, such as the foundation of the Imperial Academy of Fine Arts, the Brazilian Historic and Geographic Institute, the National Library, and the National Museum. These examples cannot be recognized as a planned shift in the cultural approach since they were a consequence of the arrival of the Portuguese Royal Court in 1808, who escaped from Europe due to the invasion of Portugal by Napoleonic forces. After the beginning of the Imperial Age in 1822, most efforts to promote artistic and intellectual activities were related to heritage and driven by patronage, especially by Emperor Dom Pedro II. Thus, no constant and projected larger-scale movement could be perceived as a genuine cultural policy.

From the Proclamation of the Republic in 1889 until 1930, a period also known as the First Republic or *República Velha* (Old Republic), the attention given to culture by public

agents remained as insignificant as before. The colonial mindset of exploiting the land, exporting primary commodities, and worshipping European cultural expressions continued within the oligarchies. Nonetheless, an ascendant middle class conducted an initial attempt at national artistic and intellectual development. Brazilian Modernism, whose influence was mainly perceived in literature and visual arts, emerged in this context. The *Semana de Arte Moderna*²⁹ (Modern Art Week) in 1922 was a milestone for the movement and Brazilian society. However, its occurrence was unrelated to governmental actions nor reached a national level. Actually, some features of the event reinforce some aspects already mentioned. The event was mainly organized by Brazilian artists and intellectuals who have had academic or work experiences in Europe. On the one hand, The *Semana de Arte Moderna* intended to celebrate the Independence Centenary and promote the “independence of the national culture” to generate a truthful Brazilian culture. On the other hand, the movement was paradoxically inspired by European aesthetic avant-gardes, such as futurism, cubism, expressionism, and dadaism (Nascimento 2015, 382).

The Revolution of 1930 and the beginning of the Vargas Era³⁰ symbolized a new period of national policy, strengthening its unitarist approach and expanding governmental control. Despite the term “revolution,” the former social and economic dynamic endured during the authoritarian government of Getúlio Vargas. Nevertheless, it was a period marked by a definite improvement of conditions for the working class and by the presence of the middle class and proletariat in the political scene, thus inaugurating a new social and economic dynamic that would last throughout the autocratic government of Vargas. Moreover, it was the first moment in the history of Brazil which a planned and continuing series of actions in the cultural field was implemented. First, it is worth mentioning the creation and action of the Ministry of Education and Health in 1930, an administrative agency that was also responsible for cultural affairs, especially during the time Gustavo Capanema held office as minister from 1934 to 1945. Mr. Capanema illustrates the cultural paradigm during Vargas' period. Described as “aesthetically modernist and politically conservative” by Rubim (2007b, 16), his Ministry

²⁹ The modernist movement mostly involved the fine arts and literature to alter the artistic and intellectual main concepts. The Modern Art Week symbolized novelty concerning “expressive and interpretive tradition” (Jackson 1987, 1).

³⁰ The Vargas Era was between 1930 and 1945 when Getúlio Vargas (1882-1954) was in office.

worked along with notable figures, such as Carlos Drummond de Andrade,³¹ Oscar Niemeyer³² and Cândido Portinari³³ in order to massively promote the so-called Brazilian culture.

It is also important to stress the remarkable set of policies implemented by the modernist Mário de Andrade in São Paulo's Department of Culture between 1935 and 1938. His approach transformed the cultural sector into a critical area in the political sphere, demanding consistent and recurrent state intervention. Besides, his department supported popular cultural manifestations, which had been almost wholly neglected until the 1930s. However, his policies and actions maintained the status given to the high arts. Despite being part of the local government of the biggest city in Brazil, these actions had a national impact on cultural policies. Perhaps the most distinguished operation was the *Missões Folclóricas* (Folkloric Missions): a series of exploratory and research expeditions in various parts of Brazil, especially in the North and Northeast regions. These missions were essential to register, prospect, and collect knowledge from popular cultures influenced by indigenous and African cultures, including sophisticated photographic and cinematographic techniques to develop an ethnographic investigation (Penteado 2015, 23). Andrade's administration in São Paulo inspired many cultural policymakers and projects, including Célio Turino and the *Cultura Viva* program (Célio Turino, interview by author, online, January 6th, 2022).

The Vargas Era is crucial to understanding the origin of the Brazilian identity and culture as a political movement. Vargas's nationalist government aimed at and, to some extent, succeeded in constructing an idea of unity and pride related to *Brazilianness* through the promotion of ideas and actions appreciated by the emergent middle class and laborers, without disfavoring the interests of the oligarchies. For the first time, a positive speech related to miscegenation was encouraged. The social and economic differences among white, indigenous, and black people, along with the inequalities between states and regions, were put aside to create a national sense of belonging to a great nation. This social pact conceived by Vargas was essential to sustain and legitimize his regime, especially after the dictatorial turn in 1937³⁴ (Barbalho 2007, 41). Thus, culture and its political manipulations were crucial for achieving Vargas's goals.

³¹ Carlos Drummond de Andrade (1902-1987) was a Brazilian writer and poet.

³² Oscar Niemeyer (1907-2012) was a Brazilian architect.

³³ Cândido Portinari (1903-1962) was a Brazilian painter.

³⁴ This period also known as *Estado Novo* (1937-1945) started in November 1937, when Vargas “(...) abrogated the 1934 Constitution, dissolved congress, gave himself a six-year term and the power to rule by decree, and suspended interest payments on foreign debt” (Daniels 2020, 73).

It seems contradictory that the first robust and durable range of cultural policies occurred during an era of authoritarianism and censorship. However, this paradox became a pattern in the 20th century, partially replicated during Brazil's dictatorial regime from the middle 1960s to the middle 1980s. Surprisingly, the democratic period between the end of the Vargas Era in 1945 and the coup d'état in 1964 did not represent a significant improvement for the sector from a governmental perspective. Nonetheless, there are a few facts that we must mention. Firstly, the legal change concerning copyrights and freedom of artistic expression in the Constitution of 1946. Secondly, a significant expansion regarding private patronage enabled the creation of international institutions and events, such as the Museum of Modern Art (*Museu de Arte Moderna* - MAM) in Rio de Janeiro, the MASP - *Museu de Arte de São Paulo* (São Paulo Museum of Art), and the *Bienal* of São Paulo. Even though the leading figures behind these remarkable institutions were from the private sector, such as Assis Chateaubriand³⁵ and Francisco Matarazzo Sobrinho,³⁶ the Brazilian government supported their international activities, primarily through the embassies and consulates around the globe. Thirdly, the ministerial reform created the Ministry of Education and Culture (Ministério da Educação e da Cultura – MEC)³⁷ as a separate institution from the previous body (Santos 2009, 6). These events followed an international tendency, considering the spread and institutionalization of cultural policies in the post-war era conducted by international organizations, especially UNESCO. Although this period was critical in terms of freedom and development of different artistic and intellectual expressions, no meaningful governmental involvement was related to the cultural sector.

The dictatorship from 1964 to 1985 represented a critical moment in the relationship between politics and culture, as it happened during the Vargas Era. Once again, the unfortunate tradition of combining authoritarianism and cultural policies was observed but in a distinct context and with some variations throughout the 21 years of repression (Rubim 2007b, 20). Besides the coercive atmosphere marked by imprisonment, torture, and murder, the most atrocious period lasted from 1968 [when the *Ato Institucional Número Cinco*³⁸ (Institutional

³⁵ Assis Chateaubriand (1892-1968) was a Brazilian lawyer, journalist, politician and diplomat.

³⁶ Francisco Matarazzo Sobrinho (1898-1977) was a Brazilian industrialist businessman.

³⁷ The aforementioned Ministry of Education and Health, which developed some cultural actions in the 1930s and 1940s during Mr. Capanema's administration, was created in 1930. Nevertheless, in 1953, the government created an autonomous Ministry of Health and the MEC was finally institutionalized. After the Ministry of Culture (MinC) creation in 1985, the MEC remained autonomously as Ministry of Education, preserving the same initials.

³⁸ According to Snider (2018, 699), the AI-5 was the "(...) most repressive and authoritarian phase of Brazil's military dictatorship, with the regime closing the national congress and dramatically escalating state-sponsored violence and political silencing in ways that exponentially intensified earlier forms of repression and censorship."

Act Number Five), also known as AI-5, was decreed], until 1974. Most institutional cultural movements, such as the Popular Centers of Culture (*Centros Populares de Cultura* - CPCs) and the movements organized by university students, were heavily persecuted. Furthermore, many artists and intellectuals were censored, tortured, and, sometimes, exiled. Some remarkable figures were among them, such as the singers Caetano Veloso, Gilberto Gil, Raul Seixas, and Chico Buarque; the writer Ferreira Gullar; the filmmaker Glauber Rocha; and even Oscar Niemeyer, the notorious architect who designed the civic buildings in Brasília. The left political-ideological spectrum became more notable in cultural production, using the field as a tool to resist and counterattack the dictatorial government.

The repression did not hinder the significant expansion of cultural manifestations. However, this movement mainly remained restricted to the middle class, the primary manufacturer and consumer of theater, music, and cinema (Schwarz 1978, 62). The dictatorial regime broke (or prevented) the connection between this group and the working class. If, on the one hand, the right-wing military government adopted authoritarian measures to control the artistic-intellectual group, on the other hand, it established a massive cultural industry driven by the progress of the media, audiovisual, and telecommunication sectors. The development of mass culture as part of the national security policy was essential for the regime's sustainability, perpetuating the nonconflictual trait as part of Brazilian identity. Although strictly regulated, this phenomenon represented a shift regarding the proliferation of the mediatic culture, following a consumerist logic dictated by the market.

Among the concrete cultural actions implemented during the military government, it is worth pointing out the foundation of some institutions. The Embratel³⁹ and the Ministry of Communications symbolized the modernization effort, enabling the growth and development of private broadcast enterprises, such as Globo.⁴⁰ In fact, from the 1970s onwards, the whole cultural industry flourished, not just reduced to television but also in publishing, the phonographic industry, and advertisement (Ridenti 2001, 15). From the beginning of the democratic transition period (1974), cultural agents obtained important achievements, including an unprecedented National Plan of Culture⁴¹ in 1975. Despite its peaks and valleys

³⁹ Embratel is a major Brazilian telecommunications enterprise created in 1965.

⁴⁰ *Rede Globo*, also known as *TV Globo*, is, according to Fiuza (2005, 1): “the biggest TV network in Brazil and one of the largest in the world. It owns five broadcasting stations and has 110 affiliates (...) It reaches 98.9 % of the country and 99.7% of the potential television viewers (159 million Brazilians). Its programs are exported to over 130 countries.”

⁴¹ We will approach The National Plan of Culture in the fourth section of this chapter.

during these ten years, the regime managed to co-opt a meaningful portion of the artistic and intellectual class by increasing investments. The foundation of *Fundação Nacional das Artes* - Funarte (National Arts Foundation) in 1975 represents a significant expansion concerning the promotion and sponsorship of cultural projects. The Foundation was an innovative landmark in the cultural sector due to its technical team, who had the autonomy to evaluate and approve projects (De Azevedo 2016, 335). Funarte's role remains relevant almost 50 years after its creation. It is a reference for research development, heritage conservation, and cultural policymaking.

Along with Funarte, other public agencies were constituted or reformulated during the transition period, such as the *Centro Nacional de Referência Cultural*⁴² (National Center of Cultural Reference) in 1975. The Center was incorporated into the *Instituto do Patrimônio Histórico e Artístico Nacional* - IPHAN⁴³ (National Institute of Historical and Artistic Heritage), created in 1979. Finally, the Department of Culture (*Secretaria de Cultura*), a bureau within the Ministry of Education and Culture, was created in 1981. The conception of these institutions and the acknowledgment of culture's relevance culminated in the establishment of the Ministry of Culture (MinC) in 1985, after the end of the dictatorial period (Rubim 2007b, 23).

The elements presented in this section are essential to portray the unfortunate historical traditions exposed by Rubim: absence, instability, and authoritarianism. The last one dictated the two main periods of an active role played by the state regarding cultural policies: the Vargas Era and the military dictatorship. Besides that, the significant neglect and, in some moments, a controversial attitude toward popular cultures, predominantly African and indigenous.

⁴² The National Center of Cultural Reference was designed to be a frame of reference for analyzing the Brazilian cultural dynamic (Fonseca 2001, 115).

⁴³ The institution was created in 1937, and it was firstly named *Serviço do Patrimônio Histórico e Artístico Nacional* - SPHAN (National Historical and Artistic Heritage Service). SPHAN symbolizes the cultural policy until the beginning of the 1970s mainly focused on heritage and preserving monuments related to the traditional European culture, such as churches and palaces. However, its autonomous and qualified team enabled a solid and long trajectory. Thus, SPHAN (and later IPHAN) became a successful model of cultural policies in Brazil and other countries (Rubim 2007b, 17).

2.2 An unstable young democracy in a neoliberal age: the creation of the Ministry of Culture and the relevance of Tax Exemption Laws

The previous section addressed the first range of actions considered cultural policies, which were initiated in 1930 during the Vargas Era, establishing a lamentable tradition that connected authoritarianism and cultural projects. This trait was evident during Vargas's government and the military regime. Hence, in 1985, when the dictatorship ended, Brazil has had just a brief moment of democracy that lasted between 1945 and 1964. The political instability perpetuated during the 20th century generated a discontinuity regarding the cultural policies and actions, which was not immediately solved after the redemocratization and creation of the Ministry of Culture in 1985. In fact, the MinC's conception lacked unanimity among politicians, artists, and intellectuals.

The separation of the Ministry of Culture and Education and the transformation into two independent Ministries evoked an interesting discussion with solid arguments from both angles. Naturally, the autonomy of cultural affairs is essential to draw attention to the matter and, opportunely, foster new policies and investments. During the 1980s, this phenomenon occurred at a regional level, resulting in the creation of Departments of Culture in various Brazilian states before the end of the dictatorship. Nevertheless, the constitution of the MinC faced criticism from different perspectives. First, the new Agency would naturally have a considerably modest budget compared to the Ministry of Education, especially in a country with limited resources and a precarious educational system. The first chapter mentioned that health, education, and culture are acknowledged as essential in public policies and possess characteristics of public goods, according to economics. Nonetheless, culture is commonly ranked below the other two areas within public investment. Thus, influential figures, including politicians from the left spectrum and some intellectuals, considered the creation of the MinC a superfluous measure, predominantly designed for political reasons, including the nomination of public officers (Ferron and Arruda 2019, 186). Besides that, the long authoritarian experience resulted in trauma concerning governmental intervention in cultural matters. Hence, a new and separated Ministry could also mean increased state control and bureaucracy.

Nowadays, more than three decades after the foundation of the MinC, it is clear that, despite its importance, its role and results were far from satisfactory after its inauguration. This initial instability is illustrated by the fact that the Ministry had ten different Ministers during

the first ten years after the end of the dictatorial regime. Moreover, during the mandate of Fernando Collor⁴⁴ (1990-1992), the president extinguished the MinC and subordinated it once more to the Ministry of Education (Rubim 2007b, 25). Besides the institutional volatility, the lack of resources hindered the action of the Ministry. Therefore, the responsibility and protagonism of the state regarding cultural policies diminished. In addition, the neoliberal political and economic paradigm influenced governmental cultural actions, reinforcing the market-based perspective. In light of this context, Rouanet Law (*Lei Rouanet*) was enacted in 1991. Originating from the previous *Lei Sarney* (1986), Rouanet Law became Brazil's main instrument for culture funding. Even over thirty years after its approval, it remains the primary funding source within the cultural sector. The federal legislation also influenced regional and local public tax exemption laws, usually with minor variations.

The law's application and effects on Brazil's cultural sector require a further explanation when one considers its relevance since its genesis, including during Lula's mandates. In brief terms, *Lei Rouanet* is a tax incentive (or tax exemption) policy, allowing citizens and companies to deduct a portion (up to 6%) of their income tax in exchange for supporting a cultural project. In the first place, cultural agents should write and submit their projects to the MinC, which evaluates their feasibility concerning their artistic, technical, and financial aspects. Once approved, the producers (or artists) should present their proposal to potential supporters (enterprises) to raise funds, which is usually the most challenging phase.

The new law fostered cultural projects throughout Brazil and played an essential role in amplifying them. Besides that, it positively forced artists and cultural producers to professionalize themselves, improving their capacity in management, marketing, and communication. However, from the state perspective, the protagonism of *Lei Rouanet* also meant a detachment from cultural agents. Following the neoliberal tendency, the Brazilian authorities attributed the protagonism of cultural projects to private institutions through the mechanism of tax exemption. Thus, even though the government remained the central sponsor of culture, the private sector became the main strength in the conception and selection of cultural projects.

⁴⁴ Fernando Collor de Melo is a Brazilian politician born in 1949. He was the first president elected popularly, in 1990, after the end of the dictatorship. He resigned after the impeachment process was instituted in 1992 due to corruption scandals involving the president (Figueiredo, 2010, 111). Collor was convicted by the Senate and was impeded from running in the elections for eight years (1992-2000). In 2007, Collor was elected as senator and remains in office until nowadays (2022).

Powerful private institutions turned into the most significant patrons of Brazilian arts. Considering the limitation of public resources, promoting alternative funding sources was unquestionably an intelligent measure. Nevertheless, this capital originated mainly from taxes, so companies usually do not directly invest in arts. Besides that, since sponsorship is also a tool for enterprise marketing, most institutions tend to prioritize cultural projects with commercial aspects. This pattern undermined the purpose of democratizing access to culture from the production and consumption perspective. Young and conceptual artists are less likely to be sponsored compared to commercial projects made by recognized artists (Felix 2014, 3). Furthermore, it is essential to mention Brazil's significant social, political, and economic differences. The main centers, especially São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro, concentrate most private and public financial resources, including those invested in culture. Thus, most corporations, especially the big ones, operate in these regions and will predominantly support cultural agents based there. Naturally, the examples mentioned above regard artistic projects. Considering other cultural activities that are not directly perceived as artistic, taking into account the broader concept of culture aforementioned in the first chapter, the private interest is minimal.

Besides the factors mentioned above, the law's system requires several skills for cultural agents, such as accountancy and professional financial and corporate management. Hence, big producers specialized in fundraising concentrated a significant part of the resources from *Lei Rouanet*. They are also the main players regarding calls and specific funds (*editais*). Naturally, these major players are almost entirely located in the southeast region of Brazil, where the so-called *Eixo Rio-São Paulo* (Rio-São Paulo axis) is located. Another problematic aspect concerning *Lei Rouanet* is the insignificant non-financial contributions from cultural agents. These contributions, also known as *contrapartidas sociais* (social counterparts), intend to generate a positive social impact on society. Usually, those who receive resources through the incentive law must offer some *contrapartidas*, such as free tickets for low-income families, accessibility measures for their projects, or free workshops for the community (Brasil 2013). Nonetheless, many projects, especially the more commercial ones, formulate these actions just to become eligible for Rouanet's approval. Thus, the social aspect is not genuinely incorporated in various proposals. The term *contrapartida* is also used to describe the contribution that companies should offer in return for their tax deductions. However, since the *Medidas*

*Provisórias*⁴⁵ (Legal Acts), instituted during Fernando Henrique Cardoso's mandates, enterprises could support a cultural project entirely with tax deducted resources. Instead of becoming real promoters of local and national artists, many private institutions started to exploit the law's mechanism solely for commercial purposes (Avelar 2010, 100). Countless cultural productions, predominantly financed with public resources, turned into a sophisticated advertising tool for companies.

Naturally, the proximity between the cultural and private sectors, whose relation became quite dependent, did not significantly favor cultural agents out of the Rio-São Paulo axis or those who developed projects considered more alternative. As already mentioned, a significant part of regional and municipal cultural policies was also shaped by Rouanet Law. Besides the minor differences among these local legislations, replicating the same logic to states with a completely distinct reality augmented the predominance of tax exemption laws in the cultural sector. Thus, the government's neglect of the cultural sector, especially related to direct and specific actions, continued to be a reality during democratic times, perpetuating the lack of genuine *políticas de Estado*. On the one hand, the market-based logic met the expectations of some cultural agents who feared an authoritarian and bureaucratic government. On the other hand, the neoliberal approach frustrated most prospects of expansion and democratization of the access to consumption and, mainly, cultural production, including from policymakers whose responses were limited due to the prevalence of tax exemption laws.

After the impeachment of President Fernando Collor, the Ministry of Culture was restored at the end of 1992. Following Lei Rouanet and its mechanism, *Lei do Audiovisual* (Audiovisual Law), specifically for audiovisual projects, was enacted in 1993. Therefore, tax exemption laws were predominant nationally and regionally, but also in each area of the cultural sector, including cinema, dance, theater, visual arts, museums, heritage, and music. The administration of Fernando Henrique Cardoso⁴⁶ (1995-2002) was the ultimate stage of the

⁴⁵ Two main Legal Acts enabled 100% of tax deductions: *Medida Provisória* number 1.589 (September 1997) and *Medida Provisória* number 2.228-1 (September 2001).

⁴⁶ Fernando Henrique Cardoso (FHC) is a Brazilian sociologist, professor and politician born in 1931. According to Hammond and Filho (2007, 5), he was the first definite Brazilian president after the end of the military government: "(...) His four predecessors were all, in one way, or another, transitional: Tancredo Neves died before taking office, José Sarney's term was largely taken up with the writing of a new constitution, Fernando Collor de Mello was impeached, and his vice president and successor, Itamar Franco, served only two years (...)." Cardoso was among the many intellectuals who were exiled after the coup d'état in 1964. During the redemocratization period, he was elected in 1982 as a senator from São Paulo. Nevertheless, he became a notorious political figure after being nominated as finance minister by Itamar Franco in 1993. FHC was the central figure behind the success of *Plano Real* (Real Plan), "which defeated Brazil's crippling inflation. On the strength of his reputation as an inflation fighter, he won the presidential election the next year."

state's detachment from cultural policies, attributing most decisions to enterprises and their marketing sectors. During Itamar Franco's⁴⁷ mandate (1992-1994), the number of companies that benefited from tax exemption laws was 72. This number reached 235 in 1995 and 614 in the following year, and, at its peak in 1997, it encompassed 1,133 corporations. Moreover, the percentage of resources from tax incentives increased, allowing companies to invest in cultural projects using merely public funds derived from their tax deductions. Thus, the private direct investment in culture diminished, reversing the proportion compared to public investment. In 1995, 66% of the resources were from companies and 34% from tax exemption for cultural projects. This figure reverted in 2000, reaching 65% from tax incentives resources (Rubim 2007b, 27).

The two mandates of Fernando Henrique Cardoso (FHC) symbolized an era of institutional stability within the MinC. During the eight years he held office, the department had a unique Ministry: Francisco Correa Weffort. He was the central figure behind the neoliberal mindset, illustrated by the slogan “*Cultura é um bom negócio*” (Culture is a good business) and the expansion of *Lei Rouanet* and *Lei do Audiovisual*. Contradictorily, this stability did not mean proximity between government and cultural agents. The consolidation of the market-based dynamic also impacted the perception of Brazil's cultural policies, including those who directly benefited from them. Artists and producers gradually normalized the natural connection between cultural policy and tax incentive regulations, legitimizing, to some extent, the limited regulatory role played by the Brazilian state. Furthermore, the eight-year period in the Ministry of Culture did not represent a continuity related to cultural actions. The mechanism of *Lei Rouanet* implemented a short-term project-based approach, usually with one or two years of extension, hindering the implementation of concrete long-term *políticas de Estado*.

During the 1990s, the neoliberal paradigm shaped the cultural area and created a new dynamic. The differences between the artistic and the corporate world were immense, but the dialogue between them became inevitable. In some cases, an intermediary was in charge of prospecting and, eventually, adjusting the project to meet the interests of specific enterprises.

⁴⁷ Itamar Franco (1930-2011) was a Brazilian politician. He was the vice president of Fernando Collor de Mello and became president after his resignation in 1992. According to Flynn (1996, 402): “The appointment of Cardoso to the Ministry of Finance in May 1993 was probably the most important decision of President Itamar Franco (...) Already, there had been three failed attempts to fill the job, so that Cardoso was widely seen as offering almost the last chance to tackle the urgent problems of the country's public finances (...)”

These figures, along with the cultural marketing department from some companies, represent the contemporary governmental perspective toward culture, which also created a brand-new labor market and encouraged competition among cultural institutions for sponsorships. In this manner, the creative and advertising industry procedures became prevalent. It relegated the primary goal of culture, which should chiefly pursue social, human, and economic development, to marketing purposes (Arruda 2003, 181).

Although the aspects regarding *Lei Rouanet* and its implications are not the main focus of this work, it is essential to contextualize these components. Despite its negative aspects and imperfect operation, the number of investments increased significantly due to tax exemption laws. Indeed, they remain the most important mechanism of culture funding in Brazil until nowadays, regardless of the government's political spectrum. In addition, we should stress that projects from diverse areas were financed through *Lei Rouanet*. According to the report provided by the MinC (Brasil 2002), during FHC's government, the number of projects and the amount received significantly increased, as it can be noticed in the tables below:

Lei Rouanet and Lei do Audiovisual

Number of projects approved:

Sector	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total
Performing Arts	78	124	150	166	239	315	1.072
Integrated Arts ⁴⁸	60	124	127	77	49	51	488
Visual Arts	36	61	91	90	91	110	479
Humanities	65	107	143	178	232	207	932
Music	68	110	161	198	221	217	975
Heritage	64	97	129	129	136	112	667
Audiovisual ⁴⁹	146	224	209	210	180	189	1.158
Total	517	847	1.010	1.048	1.148	1.201	5.771

⁴⁸ More than one artistic field, such as popular parties and transmedia.

⁴⁹ Most projects, mainly films, were approved through *Lei do Audiovisual*: 779 out of 1158.

Amount approximately received by each sector (millions of Brazilian reais):

Sector	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	Total
Performing Arts	15.7	22.7	22.3	29.4	58.6	77.1	226
Integrated Arts	20.4	49.1	44.3	35.9	40.8	39	229.8
Visual Arts	7.3	11.9	23.1	17.8	32.6	24.9	117.8
Humanities	4.8	18.1	19.7	27.1	30.7	35.9	136.6
Music	20.3	25.1	38	42.2	58.5	75.7	260.1
Heritage	25.2	46	50.2	39.2	37.5	44	242.4
Audiovisual ⁵⁰	75.3	113.6	73.3	59.7	55.3	87.4	464.8
Total	169.3	286.8	271.3	251.5	314.2	384.3	1,677

All areas were affected during this period, and some had remarkable growth. The value received by performing arts projects, for instance, increased five times during this period. Musical projects also received a sum 3.5 times higher in 2001 compared to 1996. Along with audiovisual, these two fields represent the most favored cultural sectors by tax exemption laws. To illustrate the meaningfulness of these resources from both laws, the 384.3 million reais approved in 2001 represent around 69% of MinC's budget. After years of instability since its foundation, the institution has established itself mainly as the manager of tax exemption law during FHC's government. The minimal state approach and detachment from cultural policies were the main legacy to his successor: Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva.

Before addressing Lula's government and its cultural policy practice, we should emphasize that this work does not advocate against *Lei Rouanet* and the mechanism of tax exemption law. This statement is pertinent due to the political and cultural context after Bolsonaro took office. Even before the 2018 elections, several extreme right-wing politicians heavily criticized the law, portraying it as a mechanism for funding ideological discourse, mainly benefitting rich and famous artists (Freitas, Targino, and Granato 2021, 227). Firstly, cultural policies and actions should disregard the political ideology of cultural makers. As already mentioned in this work, censorship and political bias harm truthful cultural development and practice. Secondly, the sum invested in cultural projects increased

⁵⁰ Most resources came from *Lei do Audiovisual*: 300 million out of 464 million Brazilian reais.

significantly because of this mechanism, enabling partnerships between the private sector and cultural agents. We also presented above several beneficial aspects of this funding mechanism, including the professionalization of cultural makers. Hence, once again, the legislation itself is not the primary concern but the absence of an active cultural policy and the protagonism of the private sector in funding cultural projects.

2.3 Lula's election: new discourses and perspectives for culture

Lula was elected on October 27th, 2002, and took office on January 1st, 2003. He was reelected in 2006 and remained president until December 31st, 2010. Before becoming president, Lula was already a famous political figure whose presidential ambitions were frustrated in three consecutive elections: the first in 1989, when he lost in the second round against Fernando Collor. After that, in 1994 and 1998, when Fernando Henrique Cardoso was elected and reelected, respectively. In 2002, changing his public image was crucial for the victory. His discourse had been portrayed as radical, pessimist, and destructive by the media, whose esteem for Lula was not high (Gomes 2006, 4). Moreover, important sectors of the society, namely the high and middle classes, were afraid of a so-called extremist left-wing politician. In 2002, nevertheless, Lula and his party, *Partido dos Trabalhadores* - PT⁵¹ (Workers' Party), amplified their coalition with other parties and sectors of the society that were closer to the center political spectrum, including the nomination of José de Alencar, a notorious businessman, as vice-president. Along with an efficient marketing campaign, these factors constructed a new portrait of Lula as a rational, moderate, and peacemaker person. The iconic working man and trade union leader was deliberately modernized as a conciliator and, to some degree, pluralist (Malagrino and Germano 2011, 166).

The conjuncture in 2002 also favored Lula compared to the previous elections. Due to *Plano Real* (Real Plan)'s success in stabilizing the national currency and controlling inflation,

⁵¹ PT was founded in 1980 during the redemocratization period. Lula's election in 2002 was the first time a president of PT was elected. It also represented a significant victory in the Chamber of Deputies (taking 91 of 513 seats) and in the Senate (it doubled its number of senators). According to French and Fortes (2005, 21): "(...) For the first time ever, power was placed in the hands of a representative of the popular majority in a Left-Center political articulation, multiclass in nature but under the hegemony of a party of the Left. Moreover, the majority of the Brazilian people had voted, for the first time, for a man with little formal education (...)."

in 1994, the former Minister of Finance, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, won in the first round. Four years later, the sense of stability and continuity led him to reelection, maintaining the neoliberal paradigm as the economic philosophy. In 2002, the neoliberalism crisis as a model paved the way for a new approach or at least a prospect of it. Nevertheless, there was no radical shift in the economic paradigm after Lula's elections. The famous liberal microeconomic tripod, based on primary surplus, inflation control, and floating exchange rate, remained almost intact (Bresser-Pereira 2015, 121). This new version of Lula, also labeled as *Lulinha Paz e Amor* (Lulinha Peace and Love), was a crucial factor in his high popularity among different society layers during his eight years in office (Santos and Romualdo 2012, 149). Despite the perpetuation of most economic guidelines and actions, there was a significant shift concerning social and cultural policies, which is the primary topic of this chapter.

The perpetuation of the economic arrangement was also due to the delicate moment when Lula took office. The inflation rate was 12.5%, and the interest rate was 25% in 2002. In 2003, the unemployment rate reached 13.4%, and the government debt was expressive (Fagnani 2011, 5). In order to maintain economic stability, not much emphasis was given to the social agenda in the first years (2003-2005), but some critical social programs were created, such as *Fome Zero* (Zero Hunger) and *Bolsa Família* (Family Allowance), which provided financial aid to low-income families. The latter program became the main symbol of social assistance and welfare during *Partido dos Trabalhadores'* mandates. *Bolsa Família* benefited over 40 million Brazilians, removing around 28 million people from the poverty threshold. In his second mandate, the national economic growth and the decline of the neoliberal model, especially after the financial crisis in 2008, enabled an expansion of social programs and a concrete policy of income distribution (Fagnani 2011, 26). Therefore, these initial actions reveal that one of the most immediate concerns after Lula's elections were related to the welfare of the population, whose basic needs had to be provided. The cultural policies were also part of this social agenda, as we will demonstrate in this work.

Lula's victory raised expectations of a positive shift concerning cultural policies. The nomination of Gilberto Gil (2003-2008), one of Brazil's most notorious singers and composers, as Minister of Culture was well-received among artists. Besides his artistic career, Gil had previous political experiences, especially as a city councilor in Salvador, Bahia. His inaugural speech personifies this new approach when he stresses some aspects of culture. Firstly, the democratization and universalization of its access and production. Secondly, its status as a basic

human right, such as education and health. Undoubtedly, this was the first time public policies contemplated cultural activities and expressions recognized as a “whole way of life” and not necessarily as artistic practices, which are part of the enlarged concept of culture mentioned in the first chapter. Finally, the perception of culture as a strategic key factor in the international political scenario (Gil 2003, 9-15). The new Minister stressed his understanding of culture in three dimensions: *simbólica* (symbolic), *cidadã* (citizen), and *econômica* (economic). The symbolic aspect refers to the anthropological concept of culture and the genuine appreciation of several cultural expressions, which requires specific policies. The citizen aspect regards culture as a right and the democratic development of cultural policies, addressing popular demands, and establishing cultural democracy. Finally, the economic element recognizes culture as a critical sector for fostering economic growth and development (Rosário 2014, 4).

After decades of absence, authoritarianism, and instability, Gilberto Gil and the new MinC's structure symbolized the promise of an active and democratic approach. It distinguished itself from previous experiences of a present, but tyrannical model during the Vargas Era and the military dictatorship, or a democratic one, but distant and detached, during the 1945-1964 period or after the redemocratization in 1985:

The management of culture during the two Lula governments (2003-2010) placed the state in the role of promoter, formulator and enforcer of cultural policies, in an effort to overcome the tradition of absence. In order to combat authoritarianism, it sought to develop cultural policies according to democratic norms, adopting an expanded notion of culture through public policies based on the express participation of cultural communities in the discussions about and deliberations of policies, seminars, councils, chambers/colleges and national conferences on culture. Instability was addressed by the construction of state policies, such as the decennial National Plan for Culture (PNC), approved as a constitutional amendment in 2005 and becoming law in 2010, and the National System of Culture (CNS), initiated in the early years of the administration and becoming a Constitutional Norm in 2012 (Rubim 2017, 75-76).

The minimal state mindset during FHC's mandates reduced the role of the Ministry of Culture as an intermediary and legislator for incentive taxes. It diminished the bureau's size and its specific departments. From the beginning, Gilberto Gil proposed a redesign, abandoning the separation between areas, such as music, performing arts, literature, and heritage. They established a new arrangement of departments according to the implementation of policies. Thus, in August 2003, the Ministry of Culture already had the following *Secretarias* (Departments): *Articulação Institucional* (Institutional Articulation); *Políticas Culturais* (Cultural Policies); *Programas e Projetos Culturais* (Cultural Programs and Projects), whose name has changed a few times; *Identidade e Diversidade Cultural* (Cultural Identity and Diversity); *Fomento e Incentivos Culturais* (Cultural Promotion and Incentive), which is

responsible for Incentive Laws; and the maintenance of the Audiovisual Department. The specific activities, such as heritage, arts, and literature, would be separately addressed by Iphan, Funarte, and the National Library, respectively (Calabre 2014, 143).

MinC's horizontal structure established by Gil opposed the embedded institutional hierarchy among cultural areas. The previous top-down approaches were repeatedly imposed during both dictatorial and democratic moments. Cultural policies were usually elaborated by and for a privileged group, meeting political demands and favoring a restricted niche, usually artists and intellectuals connected to the erudite and high arts. As already mentioned in this work, there is a paradoxical perception and relation between the state and society and Brazilian popular cultures. The ambiguous attitude of relegating, on the one hand, but appropriating, on the other hand, some aspects from specific cultural manifestations for commercial and political purposes, especially those originating from African and indigenous cultures, is still notably present.⁵² Despite acknowledging Brazil's diversity and the social progress since the 1988 Constitution, this troublesome topic was never fully addressed by cultural policymakers. The state has legally recognized folklore and popular culture for over 50 years. Nevertheless, Gil's Ministry was the first to formulate specific policies for popular culture bodies. The main objective was to promote social inclusion and the empowerment of these groups (Csermak 2014, 38).

In the previous administration, the neoliberal paradigm and the predominance of tax exemption laws privileged cultural projects with commercial potential. Hence, folklore and popular cultural expressions mainly remained ignored. Lula's government wanted to replace the market-logic mindset with an anthropological one. This perception amplifies the concept of culture, contemplating the “goods” produced and the processes and ways of living related to their production. The cultural policy agenda should promote pluralism, including these historically neglected expressions. Furthermore, it should differentiate from the previous homogenizing approaches since the Vargas Era, constructing an identity that acknowledges diversity and different expressions (Barbalho 2007, 56).

In order to implement a bottom-up approach and establish cultural democracy, it was crucial to give voice to multiple cultural agents. The MinC organized a series of conferences,

⁵² The funk case, addressed in section 1.4, illustrates this phenomenon. After its massive popularization, funk music and dance were finally adopted and incorporated by important sectors. Mizrahi (2013, 869) characterizes this phenomenon as the legitimization of funk, which may have jeopardized some subversive elements of this cultural movement.

seminars, and meetings with international, national, and local institutions, stakeholders, intellectuals, artists, politicians, and every individual who belongs to the cultural ecosystem. Important moments were the *Conferências Nacionais de Cultura* – CNC (National Conferences of Culture), in 2005 and 2010. These encounters were a milestone for discussing and promoting cultural policies in thousands of cities in Brazil. According to the reports organized by the Ministry of Culture, 1,192 municipalities participated in the first National Conference. This figure increased to 2,974 in the second CNC, representing around 53% of cities in the country. Furthermore, the CNCs played a vital role in improving the articulation between the three government jurisdictions (municipal, regional and national). These moments enabled better management of public resources, a valuable exchange of experiences and expertise, and, finally, several inputs to elaborate the National Plan of Culture (*Plano Nacional de Cultura*) and the National System of Culture (*Sistema Nacional de Cultura*) (Soto, Canedo, Oliveira and Salgado 2010, 33-37). We will examine these two mechanisms in the following sections of this chapter.

Before depicting the National Plan of Culture (PNC) and the National System of Culture (SNC), whose goals are directed at the national sphere, it is worth mentioning the international role played by culture during Lula's mandates. Brazil assumed a leadership position in the South American continent and became a significant global actor in favor of multilateralism and less unequal diplomatic relations among developed and developing countries. Celso Amorim, Minister of International Affairs from 2003 to 2011, once described the approach during Lula's government as *ativa e altiva* (active and haughty), exemplifying the goal of becoming a protagonist in the international scenario, especially among developing countries, promoting and expanding the South-South relations. During PT's mandates, various partnerships were established with emergent countries, notably with the countries that formed the so-called BRICS⁵³ (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) and the local neighbors through MERCOSUR⁵⁴ (Almeida 2004, 163).

The dissemination of Brazilian culture and arts was also part of this new international policy. The Ministry of International Affairs, also known as Itamaraty, developed several projects through its Cultural Department, focusing on promoting Brazilian artists in events in

⁵³ The term BRICS started in 2001 as BRIC, coined by Goldman Sachs as an acronym that refers to Brazil, Russia, India, and China. South Africa was added in 2010 (Hadavi 2019).

⁵⁴ MERCOSUR (*Mercosul* in Portuguese) is South America's Common Market and trade bloc, which The Asunción's Treaty created in 1991. It was initially signed by Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay, and Uruguay (Bouzas, Veiga, and Torrent 2002, 11).

Latin America, Africa, and Asia, but also in North America and Europe. There were some innovative measures within the department, such as the creation of the Division for Audiovisual Promotion (*Divisão de Promoção do Audiovisual* - DAV): responsible for the diffusion of Brazilian cinema, independent TV production, and advertising abroad. Besides that, the Division for Cultural Diffusion Operations (*Divisão de Operações de Difusão Cultural* - DODC) through the Cultural Diffusion Program, established an annual cultural program in embassies and consulates worldwide. In 2010, 137 divisions submitted their cultural programs to the DODC, including music, visual arts, theater, dance, architecture, culinary, design, and literature. The government defined the guidelines for developing the programs each year (Finzetto 2017, 15-21).

This brief description of Itamaraty's policies illustrates how the new administration placed culture as a central element during Lula's government, whose field of action was beyond MinC's agency. To some degree, Brazilian cultural diplomacy was also adopted as a soft power tool, especially regarding relations with countries of the global South, aiming at improving the country's status as an international player. The formula of using culture to expand its influence was evident in the relations with Africa, for instance. Following the South-South agenda, various mechanisms, mainly *telenovelas* (soap operas), music, and football, were used to create identity bonds with the continent (Chatin 2019, 38-42). Nonetheless, this work is not focused on the international scope of Brazilian cultural policies. Therefore, we will concisely address the National Plan of Culture and the National System of Culture in this chapter to introduce the program *Cultura Viva* and its *pontos de cultura*, whose guidelines and actions will be depicted in chapter three. These topics are essential to analyzing the attempt to amplify the access to producing culture and implementing cultural democracy.

2.4 The National System of Culture

The previous sections contextualized the development of cultural policies in Brazil until the beginning of the 21st century, highlighting the political shift after Lula's election. MinC's reformulation and promotion of culture as a strategic element through a democratic and inclusive bottom-up approach demonstrate how absence and authoritarianism, two of the three unfortunate traditions, were tackled. Instability, the third one, seems to be a more intricate

matter to overcome. A national plan and system were required to implement a state policy with long-term measures and, therefore, more permanent results. Undoubtedly, the *Sistema Nacional de Cultura* (SNC) and the *Plano Nacional de Cultura* (PNC) are the main *políticas de Estado* to achieve continuity. According to Juca Ferreira, Minister of Culture in the last two years of Lula's government, the MinC was able to develop and improve genuine cultural policies during Gil-Ferreira's administration. The SNC and the PNC are the second steps to consolidating, institutionalizing, orchestrating, and expanding these policies (Brasil 2011, 13). This section will address the first one.

According to Cunha Filho and Ribeiro (2013, 36), the National System of Culture is organized as a collaborative, decentralized, and participative arrangement. It institutionalized a conjoined process of management and promotion of permanent and democratic public cultural policies, involving all three government levels (municipal, regional and federal) and the society, aiming at promoting human, social, and economic development. This broad definition is appropriate in a country with continental dimensions and a heterogeneous cultural scene. The conception of a national system is not exclusive to the cultural field. This structure is well established in the fields of education and health. The last one is called *Sistema Único de Saúde* - SUS⁵⁵ (Unified Health System), which was the SNC's inspiration. Concerning the SUS, Lima et al. (2012, 1912) stress that structural problems such as territorial inequality are hardly solved only with policies and actions from local and regional entities. Hence, the federal government must actively participate and financially support to achieve long-term development. The educational system, for instance, organizes the school system into three divisions: the municipalities are in charge of Primary Education, the regional governments of Secondary Education, and the federal one of Tertiary Education. Thus, the SNC's creation partially acknowledges the success of these systems in other fields and attempts to establish the same logic within the cultural sphere (Rubim 2010, 17). Once more, we can observe the intertwined relation between culture and other essential sectors. The development of health and educational policies influenced the government's approach toward culture, considering their common specificities, such as the social and economic elements aforementioned in chapter one.

⁵⁵ SUS is the most extensive public healthcare system in the world. According to Castro et al. (2019, 1): "(...) Progress toward universal health coverage in Brazil has been achieved through a unified health system (...) created in 1990. With successes and setbacks in the implementation of health programmes and the organization of its health system, Brazil has achieved nearly universal access to health-care services for the population (...)."

The construction of the national system occurred during the eight years of Lula's government. As we already mentioned, the National Conferences of Culture in 2005 and 2010 were the major events for determining the SNC's basis. Nevertheless, its elaboration was a collective endeavor between the three governmental levels, the National Congress, and society. Apart from being an institutional landmark, the national system also defines the structural premises. In addition to the cooperation among the actors named, the system prioritizes its municipalization, considering the proximity between the local administration and the population (Araújo et al. 2010, 7-13). This dynamic among the three political levels is essential to developing valid policies for different contexts. In a country with continental dimensions and significant cultural diversity, such as Brazil, it is inconceivable to propose a homogenous policy, especially for culture. Thus, public agents should be cautious when implementing standardized projects since general problems should be tackled nationally but not necessarily with uniform actions (Calabre 2014, 154).

Despite being a cooperative creation, this structural mechanism was an initiative from the Ministry of Culture during Lula's mandates. Both ministers, Gilberto Gil (2003-2008) and Juca Ferreira (2008-2010) developed policies and actions to establish cultural federalism, influenced by the organization of the health and education systems. Hence, this democratic, bottom-up approach differentiates itself from Brazil's usual federative political tradition (Barbalho, Barros, and Calabre 2013, 9-10). Although there are divergences among the different government instances, the purpose is to merge forces and conciliate conflicts, aiming at building an improved public administration and developing cultural policies.

Concerning the legal aspect, the *Sistema Nacional de Cultura* was officially institutionalized only in 2012. After various modifications in the initial proposal, which dates from 2000, the SNC became a constitutional amendment to the Federal Constitution of 1988. Article 216-A resulted from a concerted collaboration among different members of the parliament in an extended process. Their authors were from the *Partido dos Trabalhadores*, Lula's party, whose program for the 2002 election already mentioned the SNC's proposal. Hence, the beliefs and values of PT are, to some extent, represented in the final version of the National System of Culture, especially in its institutional aspect (Queiroz 2018, 459).

We must stress that such an arrangement is essential for mitigating the negative consequences of power alternation in the three political spheres, which is a core feature of a *política de Estado*. The instability throughout the decades of cultural policies in Brazil is a

consequence of this discontinuity. Even during democratic times, political disruptions may occur, such as the extinction of the MinC after Collor's election in the 1990s. Thus, an institutionalized and comprehensive systemic organization is fundamental to implementing a more stable political-administrative configuration (Brasil 2011, 26). This arrangement includes different actors and elements, such as cultural management agencies, cultural policies councils, cultural conferences, funding systems, plans of culture, cultural systems for specific sectors, commissions of interstates management, information systems, cultural indicators, and, finally, training programs for cultural makers. These structures developed with their local and regional variations. Once again, we can draw a parallel between the SNC and the SUS (Zimbrão 2013, 43). The extensive range of the system contributes to alleviating drawbacks caused by changes in governmental administration.

The National System of Culture, on the one hand, includes the funding mechanisms and fosters co-funding among different cultural institutions within the three governmental instances. On the other hand, its federalist political-administration configuration has limitations in raising resources and allocating them to cultural projects since the system does not establish a specific funding structure. To some degree, the municipalization of the system, which fortunately approximates public policymakers to the population, may impact the investment in culture negatively. According to Arretche (2010, 611), there is a trade-off between the diminution of regional inequality and the absolute autonomy of local governments. Although Arretche's analysis concerns social areas, such as health and education, it also perfectly applies to the cultural one. As stated in her article, the federal government's redistributive role is crucial to reduce inter-jurisdictional revenue inequality and, consequently, to assure equivalent access of citizens to essential public services, particularly those not from the main Brazilian centers. Federal financial regulation is essential to secure the investments in these strategic areas from local governments since expenditure in education, health, and culture might not become a high priority. Naturally, regulatory policies are controversial and can be considered a form of federal intervention in the matters of other entities. However, regardless of the immense territorial inequalities in Brazil, a central administration and supervision may potentially establish a convergence of cultural policies.

We will address this unequal access to cultural production and fruition in chapter three. Notwithstanding, the importance given to capacity building within the cultural labor market should be stressed, primarily focused on the local and regional agents, which is also a strategy

for reducing geographical inequality. Thus, within the SNC's proposals, the *Programa Nacional de Formação na Área da Cultura* (National Training Program in the Cultural Area) presents itself as the main instrument for qualifying professionals from the cultural field, including managers from the public and private sectors (Brasil 2011, 63-64). Apparently, for the first time, the state recognizes the urgency of professionalizing the cultural sector after years of few punctual actions or a complete absence. This issue is evident among public servants, particularly at the municipal level. Moreover, the National System of Culture intends to identify the prominent training institutions and create a partnership network, enabling an essential exchange of experiences that strengthen the cultural field (Costa, Mello, and Juliano 2010, 81).

2.5 The National Plan of Culture

The second main *política de Estado* for tackling instability and fostering solid long-term policies and actions is the National Plan of Culture. If, on the one hand, the SNC is designed to structure and articulate the collaboration between the public entities and society, on the other hand, the PNC intends to provide a specific cultural proposal containing principles, objectives, guidelines, and strategies for these entities, especially the Ministry of Culture (Miguez 2019, 10). According to Cunha Filho and Ribeiro (2013, 36), the PNC also serves as a matrix for the SNC, demonstrating how intertwined both plan and system are. As it occurred with the SNC, the elaboration process of the PNC was long but thoroughly democratic. The plan is structured in three complementary dimensions of culture: as a symbolic expression, a citizenship right, and a potential field for sustainable economic development (Brasil 2011b, 9). The same already mentioned conceptual triad introduced by Gilberto Gil. These dimensions were influenced by the evolution of the concept of culture and the principles instituted in the post-war era, mainly due to UNESCO's work. We addressed both phenomena in the first chapter of this work.

Despite being the first time that a democratic and broad plan was designed and approved in Brazil, we should mention that the military government attempted a few times to propose a national cultural program. The National Council of Culture presented a few propositions in

1968, 1969, and 1973, but none were endorsed. During Médici's⁵⁶ government (1969-74), a proposition named *Diretrizes para uma Política Nacional de Cultura* (Guidelines for a National Cultural Policy) was released but never instituted. Finally, in 1975, the Ministry of Education and Culture approved the first National Cultural Policy. Hence, the PNC is not an unprecedented initiative in the political trajectory of Brazil, although it was the first plan democratically elaborated and approved during a non-authoritarian period (Reis 2010, 62).

The unfortunate tradition of instability in the cultural field during totalitarian and democratic periods extends to the regional and local public sphere. The radical political turns and the constant shifts within the MinC (ten different ministers between 1985-1995) hindered planning prospects. In December of 2010, in the last month of his second mandate, Lula sanctioned law number 12.343 that instituted the National Plan of Culture, which should be valid for the next ten years. For the first time, the possibility of long-term planning was available to the cultural field (Rubim 2019, 13). Following the SNC's path, the discussion around the PNC's institutionalization started in 2000. Again, the Workers' Party was actively involved in the proposal for the National Plan, which remained restricted to the Chamber of Deputies until the end of FHC's government. According to Reis (2010, 51-54), because the proposal was elaborated by a congressman from the opposition party (PT), it may have obstructed MinC's involvement in this matter until the end of 2002. Besides that, Reis enumerated other factors that contributed to the Ministry's passive attitude toward the creation of a national plan for culture:

- the neoliberal mindset and the state's detachment from the cultural field after the end of the dictatorship;
- the lack of articulation between the MinC (and other public entities) and the Brazilian society. This dissociation was one of the primary motivators to create the SNC when Lula took office;
- the limited and exclusionary concept of culture during FHC and Weffort's administration essentially comprehended high arts, cinema, and heritage.

⁵⁶ Emílio Garrastazu Médici (1905-1985) was a military leader and the president of Brazil between 1969 and 1974. This period was also known as *Anos de Chumbo* (Leaden Years) due to the severe repression, especially the institution of the AI-5 (check footnote 38). Nevertheless, this era was also marked by strong economic growth, which helped the dictatorial regime's stability (Cordeiro 2009, 86-88).

Thus, the construction of an extensive and inclusive plan involving a variety of cultural dimensions was not a priority before Lula's election.

Throughout the design of PNC's legal framework, there were some remarkable moments respecting society's involvement, such as the public consultation in 27 different seminars (one for each federal unit of Brazil), counting the participation of over 5,000 people (Queiroz 2018, 455). When approved in 2010, the National Plan of Culture resulted from cooperation between parliament members (most of them from PT), public entities (especially the MinC), cultural agents, and the Brazilian society. Again, the regulatory aspect was essential to ensure the plan's validity and longevity, as occurred with the National System of Culture. PNC's final version has five chapters, including the proposition of 14 guidelines, 36 strategies, 275 actions, and 53 goals for the cultural field, which were projected for a decade.

Briefly describing PNC's main points: the first chapter stresses the state's essential role in consolidating and strengthening cultural policies, pointing out the SNC as the primary tool for achieving it. The intertwinement between the plan and the system is repeatedly evident. The second chapter addresses the importance of cultural diversity, mentioning the Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions from UNESCO. The third chapter reiterates the significance of universal cultural access, identifying specific initiatives that the federal government should take. Among these actions, we should mention the implementation and maintenance of public libraries in every county, rehabilitation of cultural venues, creation of community centers for popular culture, and actions regarding cultural content for local radios, TVs, and access to high-speed internet. The fourth chapter focuses on investment, entrepreneurship, professional training, and labor market regulation, fostering models of sustainable development that reduce inequality without damaging cultural diversity. Finally, social and democratic participation is the topic of the fifth chapter. It also stimulates public engagement in conferences as a procedure of supervising the development of measures and use of public resources, enabling a transparent process concerning cultural policy construction (Calabre 2013, 11-12).

Despite its approval in 2010, the PNC's goals were defined and approved one year later. The election of Dilma Rousseff,⁵⁷ also from the Workers' Party and considered Lula's

⁵⁷ Rousseff was Brazil's first and only female president between 2011 and 2016 when she suffered an impeachment process, considered by many a parliamentary coup. She fought against the dictatorship and was tortured by the regime. Besides enjoying high approval rates during her first year (77%), she faced an economic and political crisis after her reelection and had to govern with reduced congress support. According to Macaulay (2017, 123-

successor, facilitated the continuity of the process. The scrutiny of the National Plan of Culture would be a voluminous effort, and it is not the object of this work. However, we should mention some goals to illustrate the broad and, to some extent, audacious aspect of it. Among the 53 objectives, the institution of the SNC in every Brazilian state and 60% of cities (3,342 in total) is the first ambition, reinforcing the connection and relative dependency between both mechanisms. The goals also involve different dimensions and facets. Regarding the educational area, it proposes the implementation of artistic teaching in every primary public school and the participation of 20,000 art teachers in public education. Each goal is quantified, such as an increase of 60% in public attendance at cultural venues, 30% in the number of cities with groups who develop artistic activities, 70% in cultural diffusion activities and national and international exchange, and 95% rise in formal jobs in the cultural sector.

In some cases, the plan also defines its goals in absolute figures, such as the launching of 150 national movies in cinema rooms every year, the expansion to 1,000 cultural spaces integrated with sports and leisure activities, and the approval of 300 projects that support the economic sustainability of local cultural production (Brasil 2011b, 11-14). Above all goals, those regarding the federal budget seem to be the most relevant concerning subsidizing the development and growth of cultural policies and actions, although they are partially unclear in respect of the means to achieve such objectives:

- Goal 50 proposes 10% of the Pre-salt⁵⁸ Social Fund for culture.
- Goal 51 aims at a 37% increase above GDP's growth⁵⁹ rate in cultural investment from public resources.
- Goal 52 projects an 18,5% increase above GDP's growth rate of public resources from tax exemption invested in culture.
- Goal 53 intends to make the cultural sector responsible for 4,5% of Brazilian GDP.

The updated document released by the MinC in June of 2012, also named *As Metas do Plano Nacional de Cultura* (Goals of the National Plan of Culture), specifies the next steps

124), despite her mistakes, Rousseff also paid a high price for “(...) her predecessors and the corruption and questionable governance practices long ingrained in Brazilian political culture and institutions. Her presidency also coincided with a shift in political culture and public attitudes, as the positive impact of redistributive policies over the last decade began to collide with the constraint of the economy and governance system.”

⁵⁸ Created in 2010, it is a Sovereign Wealth Fund that receives and invests resources that originated from exploiting the Pre-Salt oil reserves in Brazil (Martello and Naime 2013).

⁵⁹ The investment in culture should be 37% higher than the GDP's growth in the PNC's ten-year plan (Brasil 2011b, 95).

after the PNC's approval. According to it, the PNC should be fully integrated with the SNC. From 2013 onwards, every state and county participating in the National System structure should develop their plan for culture inspired by PNC's premises. Furthermore, cultural agents from diverse areas, such as visual arts, theater, circus, music, popular cultures, and museums, are encouraged to design specific plans considering their reality, possibilities, and priorities. The MinC should monitor and supervise the PNC's development along with the National Council of Cultural Policy (CNPIC). One of the main tools for evaluating the plan's performance is the National System of Cultural Information and Indicators (SNIIC). The system, which the Ministry manages, gathers national, regional, and local data related to the supply and demand of cultural goods and services. In addition, indicators about employment, income, access to culture, institutionalization, cultural management, economic and cultural development, and the sustainable implementation of cultural centers (Brasil 2012, 142).

This chapter contextualized the trajectory of cultural policies in Brazil until Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva's election in 2002, which was a turning point in conceiving and implementing social and cultural policies. This paradigm shift is illustrated in the last sections dedicated to the SNC and the PNC. Both represent the primary mechanisms for implementing genuine *políticas de Estado*. Thus, they are powerful devices to tackle the historical discontinuity, one of the three unfortunate traditions, and amplify the access to culture's fruition and production, fostering a cultural democracy practice. Nevertheless, cultural policies during Lula's administration also deserve some criticism. Partially, the inclusive and democratic approach was more symbolic than practical. This phenomenon is exemplified by the persistent predominance of tax exemption laws as the main instrument for cultural funding instead of direct action from public entities. Furthermore, the lengthy process for elaborating the SNC and the PNC left their implementation for the next administration. Finally, the elaboration of optimistic (and unrealistic) strategies and goals, especially for the PNC. We will further discuss these aspects in the following chapter and the conclusion of this work.

3. The program *Cultura Viva* and its *pontos de cultura*

3.1 A new approach to diversity: The Department of Cultural Identity and Diversity

This chapter will approach the *Programa Nacional de Cultura, Educação e Cidadania* - *Cultura Viva* - PCV (National Program of Culture, Education and Citizenship - Living Culture), also known as *Cultura Viva*, focusing on its main project: *pontos de cultura* (points of culture). Before depicting the program's guidelines and actions, this section will address on the creation of the Department of Cultural Identity and Diversity (*Secretaria da Identidade e da Diversidade Cultural* - SID) in 2004. In 2011, it became the Department of Citizenship and Cultural Diversity (*Secretaria da Cidadania e Diversidade Cultural* - SCDC), the bureau inside the MinC responsible for managing the *Cultura Viva* program. One of the objects of this work is the policies during Lula's government that amplified the access to produce culture and established cultural democracy. The movement of formulating and amplifying actions regarding cultural diversity is directly related to this goal. There is an evident and straight connection between policies for cultural diversity and their democratic features, especially within the Brazilian social and cultural context, which we discussed in the previous chapters. Thus, creating an agency focused on identity and diversity represents a subversive deed, considering the usual governmental cultural attitude during the 20th century.

The creation of the SID is a significant example of the inclusive and democratic approach established during Lula's two mandates. Various cultures and their respective manifestations, such as indigenous, Afro-Brazilian, gypsy, LGBT,⁶⁰ and other popular cultures, were finally thoroughly addressed. This aspect was noticeable in Gil's inaugural speech in January 2003 (Gil 2003, 9-15). Some passages mentioned and translated by Avelar and Dunn (2011, 123-124) illustrate this aspect:

'We must complete the construction of this nation, include the excluded groups, reduce the inequalities that torment us.', he continued. 'The role of culture in this process (...) is not merely tactical or strategic - it is central: to objectively contribute to overcoming social inequalities, all the while focusing on the full realization of human potentials' (Gil 2003a: 42). As might be expected of the state, questions of violence, inequality, difference, and cultural expression are of critical importance in the management of national identity, development, and Brazil's image in the global community. The Ministry (Minc) states that its activities are based on three

⁶⁰ The acronym LGBT stood for (Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender) and was used in the 2000s. Nowadays (2022), it evolved to LGBTQIA+, covering Queer, Intersex, Asexual, and other people who do not identify with any of these groups (Tinoco-Giraldo, Sánchez and García-Peñalvo 2021, 2).

interwoven dimensions: 'culture as a symbol factory, culture as a right and as citizenship, and culture as part of the economy' (Gil 2003b: 8). It is noteworthy that Gil spoke of completing the construction of the nation, consistent both with development discourse and with Brazilian identity discourse wherein, as mentioned above, the process of culture mixture is understood as central and also incomplete.

Gil's speech became emblematic to illustrate this political shift. According to him, culture production should not be the state's role, at least not in the strict sense. However, public cultural policies should promote processes and ensure that individuals and groups can produce them. This notion generated the concept of the "Anthropological do-in," which consists in "massaging the vital points of the cultural body of the country." According to the former Minister of Culture, these areas are dormant and historically neglected. Thus, the MinC should act as a process mediator whose conception and development should mainly be driven by Brazilian civil society (Calabre and Lima 2014, 11).

Concerning the institutional facet, the SID was established by decree number 5.036, as part of the new MinC's arrangement, in 2004. Within the decree, article 11 determines the department's functions. There were several responsibilities, such as promoting and supporting activities related to diversity and citizenship; monitoring and supervising the department of Institutional Articulation to implement cultural policy forums; and providing elements to the Department of Cultural Policies, whose policies aim the promotion of diversity and cultural exchange and copyright protection (Brasil 2004). In 2009, decree number 6,835 expanded SID's legal competencies. The department became responsible for planning, coordinating, executing, analyzing, and evaluating cultural projects that promoted diversity and cultural exchange. Besides that, SID's designation to manage the agreements that provide the transfer of resources from the Union, including its accountability duties (Brasil 2009). The legal and institutional aspect was essential to establish and reinforce culture as a right, one of the main principles that guided MinC's policies during Lula's mandates. Also, this chronological evolution, considering both decrees from 2004 and 2009, illustrates how the department embodied different discussions in the field of cultural diversity that took place internationally, including the Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions by UNESCO, in 2005 (Correia 2014, 53).

The first SID's Secretary, the actor Sérgio Mamberti,⁶¹ enumerated the three main challenges that the institution wanted to address: a) participate in the international debates about cultural diversity; b) promote a better understanding of cultural diversity in the Brazilian context and approach it transversally; c) establish direct dialogue and connection with groups that represent the Brazilian cultural diversity but still struggle in accessing and benefitting from public cultural policies, contributing to refine the mechanisms of protection and promotion of cultural diversity (Mamberti 2005, 13).

Detailing the first challenge, cultural diversity was also part of the “active and haughty” international agenda promoted by the Itamaraty with the MinC, as already mentioned in chapter two. We also mentioned in chapter one the notorious participation of Brazil's delegation in approving the Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions by UNESCO in 2005. Brazil was one of the prominent voices from the emergent countries in this Convention, whose successful outcome was due to a multilateral collaboration. In fact, multilateralism was the main guideline implemented by Itamaraty after Lula's elections, prioritizing relations with Latin America and stimulating South-South cooperation (Novais and Brizuela 2010, 234). UNESCO's convention and final document represented an opportunity for countries with diverse cultural manifestations. On the one hand, it was the moment for addressing essential aspects regarding the rights of minorities and traditional populations. On the other hand, for opposing additional copyright laws and restrictions. Both elements were part of the Brazilian agenda, heavily supported by nations with similar issues, such as limited exports of cultural products, including their audiovisual productions (Kauark 2010, 248).

The second aspect listed by Mamberti was the central topic of the Seminar of Brazilian Cultural Diversity in 2004. The main discussion conducted in the Seminar was the paradox created by the French Revolution: to maximize liberty and equality in society concomitantly. In other words, the “antagonism between a universal-inclusive citizenship and a particular-plural one” (Barbalho 2007, 53). The third element part of the motto *Liberté, Egalité, Fraternité* could be the answer for it. According to the MinC, the fraternity should be responsible for strengthening universal-inclusive citizenship.

⁶¹ Sérgio Mamberti (1939-2021) was a Brazilian actor, director, painter, producer, writer, and politician. He was one of PT's founders in 1980 and was involved in politics until recently. After Lula's elections, he became one of the main figures within the MinC.

The third objective of the SID is the most relevant for this work since it has a explicit impact on the policies and actions implemented by the Department, which is directly related to the *Cultura Viva* program. The aforementioned marginalized cultural manifestations and their respective agents, who were neglected throughout Brazilian history, have been developing their actions regardless of the promotion and support from public entities. These cultures are within the category of popular cultures concerning MinC's policies. According to Célio Turino, the coordinator of the program, the *Cultura Viva* does not aim to circumscribe or eliminate these agents' autonomy. On the contrary, the project and its *pontos* intend to empower these communities, optimizing their local protagonism and amplifying their political and social role (Turino 2013, 28-29).

Since its creation, the SID has organized several meetings, seminars, workshops, and forums. These encounters were mainly conducted by civil society, whose demands and interests were presented for providing valuable inputs to elaborate accurate actions and policies. According to Coimbra (2018, 6), in the contemporary context, the concept of cultural diversity is related to cultural heterogeneity. Thus, these meetings and their generated policies were essential to maintain cultural rights, democracy, and equality for minorities and provide a rich exchange of cultural goods and services.

Different but convergent interests also drove attention to popular cultures within the MinC. Firstly, the imperative necessity of incorporating the universalist values of cultural diversity in the structure of the cultural administration. Secondly, to approach the topic of diversity within the spectrum of cultural policies aimed at popular expressions. Finally, the ambition to consolidate new “native categories,” such as creative industries, cultural diversity, and immaterial heritage (Alves 2010, 547). These interests were also motivated by political and economic aspects. Groups part of the cultural minorities, such as indigenous and practitioners of African religions, play a role in the Brazilian political scenario and were substantially significant for both Lula's election victories in 2002 and 2006. Thus, making allowances for these actors legitimizes the actions of the MinC, considering the historical neglect toward these groups, but also maintains the support from a relevant political base. Regarding the economic facet, the MinC had ambitions to design and implement specific programs for popular cultures, integrating them into the economic growth and development agenda. In other words, to generate income and jobs for producers, artists, technicians, and any individual who works specifically in this sector.

Undeniably, the department significantly impacted national cultural policies, discontinuing the government's disregard for some specific cultures. Nevertheless, this shift was, to some extent, essentially symbolic, which means that the amount destined for SID's direct actions was minuscule considering the MinC's entire budget. From the year Lula took office (2003) until the end of his second mandate (2010), the Ministry of Culture went from a budget of 540.7 to 2,239.8 million Brazilian reais. Throughout these years, the SID received an insignificant sum of 22 million reais. Naturally, this tiny budget does not include the *Cultura Viva* program since the Department of Cultural Programs and Projects (*Secretaria de Programas e Projetos Culturais* - SPPC) was in charge of it. In 2009, the SPPC was transformed into the Department of Cultural Citizenship (*Secretaria de Cidadania Cultural* - SCC), a name that reflects the importance of the *Cultura Viva* program within the bureau.

On the other hand, Correia (2014, 112-113) points out some examples of successful policies implemented by the department. One of them is amplifying diverse subscription types for public calls, including oral applications and a more extensive period for submitting them. Initially, these adjustments targeted applicants from popular cultures, mainly indigenous. However, they extended to several public calls to facilitate access to public funds from cultural agents unfamiliar with the bureaucratic procedure. Furthermore, although SID's projects lacked financial resources, they had a noticeable multiplier effect since their actions were replicated by other agents, including regional and local cultural departments and private institutions, especially Sesc São Paulo.⁶²

In the first paragraph of this section, we stated that the sole act of creating a specific Department to address cultural diversity and identity was already subversive, albeit the lack of financial resources hindered SID's projects. This case illustrates the complexity and hardship of dealing with these matters after decades of omission from public entities. Evidently, historical social, economic, and cultural problems faced by some social groups, mainly the black and indigenous population, could not be fully tackled nor solved by a supporting bureau within the Ministry of Culture. Although other vital actions focused on decentralizing cultural actions and democratizing the access to cultural funds, mainly the *Cultura Viva* program, the

⁶² According to its website (Sesc, “Who we are”): “SESC - Social Service of Commerce is a private organization supported by entrepreneurs in businesses, tourism and service (...) SESC's initiatives stem from a solid cultural and educational project that has borne the mark of innovation and social transformation (...)” (Sesc, “Who we are”). Although every region in Brazil has its own Sesc, the most recognized and significant is Sesc São Paulo, which has 43 locations: “dedicated to culture, sports, health and food, children and youth development, senior citizens and social tourism (...)”

colossal disparity between privileged and marginalized parts of Brazilian society requires long-term *políticas de Estado*. Thus, a straightforward, bold, and broad political project is necessary, involving several areas of the public sphere.

To some degree, Lula's government successfully addressed these problems. Besides the aforementioned social programs *Bolsa Família* and *Fome Zero*, the quotas system in public universities were a distinguished policy implemented by PT and worth mentioning. Law number 12.711⁶³ was enacted in 2012, during the government of Dilma Rousseff. Still, the investment in public universities has increased since Lula took office. Between 2003 and 2010, the government created 14 higher education institutions and 124 campuses, increasing the number of seats by 50% (Aguilar 2016, 115). Nevertheless, many federal universities implemented their own quota policies before 2012, facilitating access to higher education by the black and indigenous population and students from public schools. Even though the quota system still faces some criticism and presents as, partially, a palliative measure, it is indisputably an important mechanism to reduce the immense social and economic gap within Brazilian society and an essential step within the reparation process. Cultural policies and actions are a small, albeit significant, part of this process. It is a long and arduous course, requiring every political area's involvement and stance.

3.2 *Cultura Viva*: concept, structure and impacts

The creation of *Cultura Viva* during Lula's government resulted from MinC's remodeling and its new protagonist role regarding cultural policies and actions. On the one hand, the Ministry stimulated cooperation with states and municipalities, primarily through the National System of Culture, and promoted projects for specific regional contexts in Brazil. On the other hand, some programs, such as the *Cultura Viva*, were designed from a national and unified perspective. This program is the most notorious among them and symbolizes a more active approach to reducing social and income inequality, which was more evident during

⁶³ Approved on August 29th, 2012, law number 12.711 determines that 50% of seats in every federal institution should be destined for students from a specific socio-racial background, considering their unequal access to primary education and, consequently, less professional opportunities (Rodrigues, Silva, and Mangaba 2019, 78-79). Although the law was approved after Lula left office, his government initiated several affirmative policies within the Higher Education System.

Lula's second mandate (Rubim 2010, 19-20). Lula's words during the program's launch illustrate this aspect when he stresses that enabling access to infrastructure and sanitation to the population is not enough. Less developed parts of the country and its cities, such as the favelas, also need a school, internet access, and a *ponto de cultura*. It is meaningless to remove people from the “darkness of urban citizenship” if they remain in the “darkness of cultural citizenship” (Lula da Silva 2007, 5).⁶⁴ Lula's speech goes in accordance with Gil's one, stressing the importance of establishing a cultural democracy.

The previous cultural policy experiences led to a distant and reduced governmental action in the field. The private sector became the central figure and the one that designates the projects that were sponsored. Hence, marketing factors have significantly influenced the Brazilian cultural area, especially since the 1990s. As we mentioned in chapter two, the dominance of Rouanet Law and the proliferation of similar regional and municipal tax exemption laws were among the main contributors to this scenario. The commercial logic benefited the principal artists and cultural producers, historically located in the southern part of Brazil, especially the states of São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro. This tendency increased the unequal distribution of resources for cultural projects. Moreover, it disfavored cultural expressions that lack marketing potential.

Before PCV's conception, in 2003, the MinC had launched another project, whose name was “Cultural Support Bases,” also known as BACs (*Bases de Apoio à Cultura*). BACs were also part of the program *Cidade Aberta* (Open City), whose main objective was to support cultural initiatives from big cities' suburbs and Brazil's countryside, aiming at decentralize the production of culture (Rocha, 2011, 62). The objective was to collaborate with regional and local departments, public and private companies, and several associations of civil society. The construction of these cultural bases was the program's main action. BACs were supposed to be multicultural centers that would allow the development of activities by local agents, providing institutional and technical support for them. The project was conducted by the Department of Cultural Programs and Projects (SPPC). However, the program was extinguished in the middle of 2004 by the recently nominated Secretary Célio Turino, who took a different approach regarding the projects developed by his bureau.

⁶⁴ Our translation.

Célio Turino had already worked as Secretary of Culture in the municipality of Campinas and as director of the Leisure Department in São Paulo. His understanding of how a cultural project's implementation should take place reveals his reservations about *Cidade Aberta* and its BACs:

The *Pontos* are cultural organizations which gain strength and recognition when a partnership – a contract – is made with the state. There is a subtle distinction to be made here. The *Ponto de Cultura* is not for the people, but of the people: an organizer of culture at a local level, serving as both receiver and transmitter. The *Ponto de Cultura* operates not as a government agency or service provider but as a node in a network. Its focus is not on needs, or on a lack of social infrastructure and services, but on the potential of individuals and groups, and their capacity for agency. The *Ponto de Cultura* is culture as process, developing social autonomy and community protagonism (Turino 2013, 66).

Turino was against constructing customized cultural centers in a country with outstanding diversity. In addition, the bureau's limited resources should prioritize investments in people instead of buildings, fighting against cultural injustice and fostering social protagonism. His idea was to stimulate existing cultural productions and their diverse spaces, including NGOs, samba, capoeira, neighborhood and fishers' associations, indigenous villages, theater groups, conservatoriums, museums, community radios, and schools. This extraordinary diversity among participants reveals a radical shift in the adopted concept of culture, which was amplified, and the *modus operandi* regarding policy making in the cultural sector. Thus, the PCV aimed at altering the traditional logic of imposing culture from the state's perspective: “(...) Instead of imposing a programme of culture, or inviting groups to tell us what culture they want or need, we ask *how* they want it. Instead of culture being understood as a product, it is recognised as a process (...).” (Turino 2013, 66). To a certain degree, we can draw a parallel between BACs and the French program in the 1960s mentioned in section 1.4. Turino and Pierre Bourdieu similarly criticized these top-down approaches which, despite their differences, intended to impose a specific culture.

The PCV's framework was more pertinent to the new notion of culture and cultural policy adopted by the remodeled MinC and Minister Gil. These organizations can benefit from funds through calls organized by the SPPC, turning them into *pontos de cultura*. Besides that, one of the main PCV's goals is to create a network among several *pontos*, enabling these institutions to develop their projects through exchanging experiences and collaboration autonomously. Turino makes an analogy between points and nodes: “This new framework represents a breakthrough in public policy and will realize its potential if the process results in

more nodes on the network. The more nodes and networks there are, the more sustainable the empowerment process initiated by the *ponto de cultura* will be (...).” (Turino 2013, 68).

The *pontos de cultura* was the primary initiative within the *Cultura Viva* program, articulating with other actions developed by the SPPC. The organizations should prepare their applications and present their proposed activities to submit them for a public call. Those who were approved received a sum of 150,000 Brazilian reais to be used in two years and a half (afterward altered to three years). Although the program's financial mechanism consists of direct investment from the state, the actions developed by each organization are defined by themselves, granting them autonomy. This instrument distinctly differs from tax exemption laws, which turned into the main funding instrument since the 1990s, representing a fundamental transformation of cultural policies from the government's perspective (Lacerda 2010, 9-10). Considering PCV's guidelines, along with a modest financial amount transferred to each *ponto*, it focused on benefitting a plentiful number of small-scale projects, meeting, at least partially, the goal of democratizing and decentralizing the production of culture. Furthermore, the program demonstrates MinC's intention to get closer and integrate a larger share of Brazil's population into its actions, reaching peripheral cultural agents who struggle to obtain resources through *Lei Rouanet* and other regional tax exemption laws.

We depicted the National System of Culture (SNC) in section 2.4 in the previous chapter. The system was defined as an arrangement that could be described by three main features: decentralized, collaborative, and participative. These terms were also commonly used to characterize the main goals and guidelines of *Cultura Viva*. The PCV was frequently mentioned as one of the main actions within the SNC, aimed at expanding cultural citizenship's dimension and enabling individuals and groups to produce, disseminate and access cultural goods (Brasil 2011, 34). Hence, the PCV should work as an essential tool to expand the range of the system. Again, the Unified Health System (SUS) works as a reference to illustrate the relationship between the SNC and the PCV. Turino (2009, 82) mentions a comment made by Márcio Meira, former Secretary of Institutional Cooperation at the MinC: “(...) ‘The *ponto de cultura* is to the National System of Culture what family doctors and local health centers are to the Unified Health System.’” This quote symbolizes the acknowledgment from the federal government regarding the vital role played by regional and local authorities in establishing cultural federalism.

As we mentioned in section 2.4, a structured and articulated collaboration between civil society and public entities, including the three stances (federal, regional and municipal), was essential to developing long-term successful cultural projects, such as the *Cultura Viva*. Nevertheless, the PCV's enlargement was also induced by MinC's management bottlenecks, which we will further address, requiring the involvement of local public entities. Despite its intertwinement with the SNC, the *Cultura Viva*'s conception was not openly guided by a federalist logic (Rubim, Almeida, and Mettenheim 2021, 306).

Integrating the *Cultura Viva* within the macro policy and as a long-term project developed by the MinC is crucial to better understanding the program and its role in the bigger picture. The previous paragraph drew a connection between the SNC and the PCV, one of the two major proposals from the Ministry during Lula's mandates. The second main proposal was the National Plan of Culture (PNC), whose guidelines and strategies were addressed in section 2.5. The PNC's approval occurred only in 2010,⁶⁵ although the plan's discussion was initiated in the early 2000s, before the conception of the SNC and the PCV. Despite that, in 2010, the plan's approval and the definition of its 53 goals was a breakthrough moment within MinC's practices. As we mentioned in chapter two, the PNC's conception rests on three main dimensions of culture: symbolic expression, citizenship rights, and a potential field for sustainable economic development. In the same way as the SNC's concepts, these three dimensions go entirely by PCV's objectives.

Among the 53 PNC's goals, goal 23 is directly related to *Cultura Viva*. It proposed to increase the number of *pontos de cultura* from 3,109, in 2010, to 15,000, in 2020. In order to achieve that, the federal government should foster higher participation from local and regional entities, amplifying the total of *pontos* and increasing their role in managing and executing the project. Finally, this process could be facilitated through the adhesion of public entities to the National System of Culture (Brasil 2012, 72). Goal 23 is evidently optimistic and somewhat unrealistic, considering that the number of *pontos* should increase by over a thousand each year. We will detail this evaluation at the end of this chapter. Nonetheless, this objective of the PNC demonstrates the direct importance given to the *Cultura Viva*, defining a concrete and audacious goal for 2010-2020. In addition to that, several other PNC's goals have a direct or indirect relation with the PCV. Vilutis (2019, 269-270) points out the transversality of the

⁶⁵ Section 2.5 mentions that, despite its approval, PNC's guidelines were revised and updated. Its final version was released in June 2012.

program, contributing to accomplishing over 24 PNC's goals and stimulating the elaboration of various municipal and regional cultural plans.

The bottom-up federalist approach gained strength throughout the years of PCV's implementation. Turino refers to the program as an endless endeavor, an open code project whose development relies on a perpetual learning process. Since the first call in 2004, the program has faced several obstacles, mainly due to bureaucratic public procedures, such as instability, scarce human resources within SPPC's team, and delays in transferring resources to the organizations (Turino 2009, 46). From 2008 onwards, regional and local cultural departments were incorporated into the public calls, also in charge of selecting new *pontos* and maintaining existing ones. The secretary stresses that this new phase amplifies (over 3,000 *pontos de cultura* until 2010) and decentralizes the program. Nevertheless, the program's enlargement is a venturesome and, consequently, risky path:

(...) there was a risk of conceptual misunderstandings, political co-opting, new and localized management problems, the temptation to control and pigeonhole the *Pontos* into one single form, and a mere transfer of resources to micropower structures. How can this be avoided? There are no answers, but some clues: a lot of autonomy, trusting and believing in people, giving up control, courageously 'throwing oneself into the river'(...) (Turino 2013, 58).

This perpetual dilemma exists in the federal sphere, especially in continental countries like Brazil, between decentralizing and granting autonomy to local entities and disfiguring a project. Considering the program's three pillars stressed by Turino (2013, 73): autonomy, protagonism, and empowerment, it is inevitable to take this risk to improve and expand it. In addition, we should stress that the SPPC has limited human and financial resources to manage a project of such magnitude, which aims at supporting over 3,000 beneficiaries. Likewise, the PCV developed further actions besides the *pontos de cultura*, making it impossible for a sole department to administer such an enterprise.

Before describing these supplementary actions, we should mention another structural program from the government: *Mais Cultura* (More Culture). This project aimed at expanding the number of cultural venues, generating income and employment opportunities, especially in urban territories inhabited mostly by socially vulnerable populations (Vilutis 2019, 255). The program operated only for two years (from 2007 to 2009), but its impact on the cultural sector was relevant, especially concerning PCV. It was targeted at decentralizing the investment and management of cultural projects, granting more autonomy to local and regional public entities. Thus, *Mais Cultura's* proposals were elaborated according to the National System of Culture

framework. The federal government transferred significant resources to other stances, allowing local and regional cultural departments to support numerous *pontos de cultura*.

The program's notoriety was due to its substantial investment capacity, explained by being part of the *Programa de Aceleração do Crescimento* - PAC (Growth Acceleration Program)⁶⁶ (Rocha, 2014, 28). During its brief existence, *Mais Cultura* received around 300 million reais, an immense sum compared to SAI's budget. The *Secretaria de Articulação Institucional* (SAI), the department responsible for managing the program, received around two or three million reais per year before *Mais Cultura's* implementation. This decentralized distribution of resources is critical to mitigating discontinuity risks, one of the biggest challenges faced by the Brazilian cultural sector. Since the federal government partially delegates the program's operation to the local and regional governments, a disruption due to political alternance could, theoretically, cause less harm to the cultural sector.

The potential drawbacks mentioned by Turino might circumscribe and hinder PCV's actions. The involvement of municipal and regional governments could add an extra layer of bureaucracy to the selection process and the accountability duties. Turino (2013, 67) characterizes this phenomenon as *institutionalization*: “(...) By 'institutionalization' we mean the contamination of a 'lifeworld' (culture, society, people) by 'systems' (state, market) (...)” Medeiros and Farah (2014, 15-16) stress that the organizations turned into *pontos de cultura* are usually small and unfamiliar with bureaucratic procedures imposed by the state. The major obstacles are the restraints for purchasing goods and hiring services and the demanded accountability reports. Absurdly, the beneficiaries from PCV usually have to follow the same procedures when making acquisitions as a contractor in charge of a billionaire construction, depending on the sum destined for a specific good or service (Turino, interview).

Furthermore, the informality rate in Brazil is significant, particularly in the suburbs and small cities. This scenario impedes many local workers from issuing invoices and, consequently, excluding them as potential partners and suppliers. For example, a *ponto de cultura* that creates theater shows is not allowed to request the service of a local puppet's artisan in a small city in the state of Ceará since this professional cannot issue an invoice. Naturally, considering the inexperience of some organizations and the insufficient feedback given by the

⁶⁶ PAC was implemented in 2007, during Lula's second mandate, and continued during Rousseff's government. The program was mainly based on partnerships between the public and private sector. This endeavor aimed at stimulating sizeable social, urban, logistics, and energy infrastructure works. Thus, PAC's main goal was to accelerate Brazil's sustainable development and growth (Jardim and Silva 2015, 16).

SPPC, many beneficiaries have their accountability reports invalidated due to missing or erroneous bills.

As already cited, *pontos de cultura* was the main PCV operation. However, there are three specific actions worth mentioning. Firstly, the *Cultura Digital* (Digital Culture) illustrates the importance given to media and technology to propel the diffusion of cultural productions. This action aims at promoting the projects developed by each *ponto* and fostering connection among them. In order to achieve that, the *pontos* should acquire a basic digital kit, including a computer, video camera, editing software, and equipment for recording audio. Turino (2013, 29) stressed that the multimedia studio was the only common element among the *pontos de cultura*. The second action is the *Agente Cultura Viva* (Living Culture Agent). This activity was conceived for inexperienced young people who wished to develop cultural activities in the *pontos* as a tool to professionalize them. To support their work, the agents should receive a monthly scholarship maintained by the Ministry of Employment. Unfortunately, this partnership was interrupted after the first year. Finally, the *Escola Viva* (Living School). This action was designed to strengthen the relationship between culture and education. The objective was to integrate several public schools into the *Cultura Viva* network, where students could participate in cultural activities:

Within the *Escola Viva* network, there are 114 *Pontos de Cultura* and schools working together. At the Clóvis Borges Miguel State School, in Serra, Espírito Santo, the students run a *Rádio Instrumental Educativa* (Educational Radio Station) and, on the outskirts of the city of Rio de Janeiro, at the Vicente Januzzi State College, there are classes that combine philosophy with Brazilian popular music. This is how the teacher Vânia Correa Pinto paid tribute when the school won the *Cultura Viva* award: ‘We have begun to believe that art really can exist, even at school. We believe that art can live and persist amidst broken chairs, graffiti-strewn walls, cracked windows, stones, bricks and sand. It can emerge here clear, alive and real (...)’ (Turino 2013, 104-105).

These three actions had the clear objective of expanding PCV's influence, empowering the individuals and collectives to create and promote their activities, and augmenting the program's network. This web was considered crucial for the prosperity of *Cultura Viva*. Therefore, the MinC intended to foster collaborative and supportive work among the *pontos*. In one of his speeches, Gilberto Gil (Brasil 2010, 9) describes the PCV as a public policy of mobilization and social enchantment, stressing the autonomy granted to its participants. Consequently, the outcomes are, to a certain extent, unpredictable. Hence, the program relies on interaction, large-scale information exchange, and distribution of knowledge and

experiences to succeed. MinC's pattern of organizing several encounters, including the earlier mentioned National Conferences of Culture, was replicated by *Cultura Viva*. There were various forums, commissions, and meetings, especially the national ones known as *Teias* (Webs). *Teias* aimed at “strengthening a greater transit of popular culture through mass markets, but it is also predicated on the creation of a different set of symbolic exchanges” (Turino 2013, 16). Besides that, these meetings were an opportunity to assess the program and provide various elements for improving it. They took place in various cities, such as São Paulo (2006), Belo Horizonte (2007), Brasília (2008) and Fortaleza (2010). In 2006, the first *Teia* welcomed over 400 *pontos* and over 1,000 people during four days in the pavilion of *Bienal*⁶⁷ in São Paulo. In 2007, president Lula participated in the event. Both examples demonstrate the dimension of *Teias* and PCV within the cultural and political scenario (Ribeiro and Brasil 2016, 14).

To conclude the presentation of the elements that complement the *Cultura Viva* and its *pontos de cultura*, we need to mention the *pontões de cultura* (big points of culture). These cultural hubs were created to support the network within a specific territory or thematic, playing a critical role in improving the articulation among several *pontos*. Turino (2013, 111) mentions the first *pontão* created in the Amazon rainforest, an itinerary boat studio that developed its work along the Amazon River. The *Vídeo nas Aldeias* (Video in the indigenous villages) is also a remarkable example of *pontão*. This project was run by indigenous people and aimed at organizing screening sessions in different villages, some of them recognized as *pontos*.

As mentioned in chapter two, MinC's bottom-up approach facilitated a deeper partnership between the government, cultural agents, and Brazilian society. The concepts of cooperation, development, and solidarity, along with MinC's values and directions, are defined by the program's guidelines and objectives. Thus, *Cultura Viva* also represents a noteworthy experience of reflection concerning diverse cultural problematics (Calabre and Lima 2014, 6-7). This chapter (especially this section) highlighted the central aspects of the program to shed light on MinC's democratic approach toward culture. PCV's relevance and repercussion are also unequivocal due to its impact on cultural policies in the Latin American continent and overseas. The director of Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation in the United Kingdom, Andrew

⁶⁷ São Paulo's first edition of the *Bienal* took place in 1951, and since then, it has become a notorious global reference. According to Whitelegg (380, 2013), the *Bienal* “(...) can claim the distinction of being only the second one to come into existence (...) it is not only the first international biennial to succeed the archetype of Venice, but also the first modern (and modernist) biennial and the first to be realized in a geopolitical location outside the Northern hemisphere (...)”

Barnett⁶⁸ (2013, 7), stresses how the program “challenges some of the perceived orthodoxies of public funding for the arts and culture in the UK in a number of important ways” and generates “significant learning by enabling us to question dominant ways of thinking and acting.”

The British case illustrates the international importance given to PCV. After Turino's visit to London in 2009, the exchange project *Points of Contact*⁶⁹ was created. This program supported over 150 Brazilian and British institutions and enabled the construction of several partnerships. One of the most meaningful was the collaboration between Entelechy Arts (UK), which develops projects with older adults in residential homes among other groups, and the *ponto de cultura Casa das Fases* (Brazil), which works exclusively with seniors over sixty-five years old. The two groups influenced each other and developed a few projects together. Apart from the differences between Brazilian and British artistic scenarios, both societies and artists deal with similar contexts. Population aging is, for instance, an urgent topic to be addressed by the state, society, and, why not, artists. Hunter and Spowage (2013, 138) stress that the constant rise in the population's age will not be followed by an increase in the state's budget. Thus, “the ability to create spaces for artists to offer new ideas need to be part of any state's thinking on social policy and practice.”

Throughout *Points of Contact*, Brazilian cultural agents who visited the UK were focused on understanding the development of British cultural institutions that allowed them to create “structures that can at their best re-invent the role of arts organisations within communities” (Hunter and Spowage 2013, 139). On the other hand, in Brazil, the focal point was “on radical cultural policy that sought to redefine the relationship between the state and the citizen through a focus on a range of community-based practices.” The *Cultura Viva* experience demonstrated that bottom-up approaches are valuable ways to promote and expand cultural practices and tackle social and economic issues. Although the societal context is distinct between Brazil and the United Kingdom, the diversity aspect is a common feature in both countries. Hence, artistic and cultural practitioners are valuable players in building a more

⁶⁸ This passage is from the book's introduction published in 2013 by the Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation, in which eleven out of twenty-five chapters from the original book written by Célio Turino (2009) were translated, adding some voices as commentators, especially from arts practitioners from the United Kingdom who worked with Brazilian partners on the PCV.

⁶⁹ *Points of Contact* is “a partnership between Arts Council England, the British Council, the Department for Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS), People's Palace Projects (PPP), and the Ministry of Culture in Brazil.” (Hunter and Spowage 2013, 128).

tolerant and equal society. Cultural projects are crucial to coping with social issues, such as immigration, which is a relevant matter in the UK.

Regarding the PCV as a public cultural policy, the program influenced various policymakers on local and national levels, mainly in Latin American regions, due to their similarities. Countries such as Bolivia, Peru, Costa Rica, and Guatemala, along with cities such as Medellin, in Colombia, and Buenos Aires, in Argentina, developed their own *Cultura Vivas* and communitarian cultural projects (Reis and Junior 2017, 106). According to the official Argentinian government website (Argentina 2021), in 2011, 98 cultural institutions participated in the *Puntos de Cultura* program. After ten years, it supports over 1,500 organizations in the country. According to Balán (2013, 13), the *Cultura Viva* program and its Latin successors were the first Latin American public policies conceived to genuinely incorporate the popular capacity of cultural construction as a tool for achieving a more egalitarian development in the continent. To some extent, the aforementioned “active and haughty” international approach initiated by Celso Amorim during Lula's mandates is subtly illustrated by PCV's significance in the global scenario. Furthermore, it is a palpable successful case study whereby cultural policies can be designed to pursue the establishment of cultural democracy, taking into account an enlarged and diverse understanding of culture.

This section addressed several features regarding the *Cultura Viva* program, the project elected to demonstrate the political shift occurred during Lula's government. The concepts and goals, the expansion process, its correlation with the SNC and the PNC, some supplementary actions, foreign partnerships, and the international repercussion. Every aspect provides a notion of PCV's magnitude and significance for the cultural sector, especially as a motor for promoting democratic and broad access to cultural fruition and, mainly, cultural production.

3.3 An evaluation of the *Cultura Viva* and its legacy

We contextualized cultural policies in Brazil in chapter two, focusing on the government of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva and the National System of Culture and the National Plan of Culture. To shed light on MinC's democratic, bottom-up approach, chapter three introduced the Department of Cultural Identity and Diversity. Later, the bureau was responsible for the *Cultura Viva* program. Finally, we detailed PCV's concepts, structure, and impacts from

its inauguration in 2004 until the end of Lula's government in 2010. Although this work does not focus on cultural policies elaborated after the end of Lula's mandates, the assessment of PCV's continuation is relevant to analyzing the program's legacy.

Instability, one out of three unfortunate traditions in cultural policies mentioned by Rubim, is undoubtedly the major challenge for the cultural sector in democratic times. Presumably, such periods mean the absence of dictatorial measures and, theoretically, an active political stance toward crucial public areas, such as culture. Hence, the existence of consolidated cultural departments and projects may avoid authoritarianism and, conversely, the other two unfortunate traditions listed by Rubim. In the Brazilian case, MinC and its subordinated secretaries represented the institutionalization of genuine cultural *políticas de Estado* after the Gil-Ferreira administration, contrasting with the previous democratic experiences. Nevertheless, political shifts and economic turmoil could abruptly interrupt successful cultural policies and, in some cases, trigger authoritarian waves.

Before entering into the unfolding events regarding the *Cultura Viva* program, we should contextualize the political scenario. The 2010 elections proved that the majority of Brazil's population approved Lula's presidency. Dilma Rousseff, considered his successor, was elected and took office on the 1st of January, 2011. After that, she was reelected in 2014 and remained in office until May 2016, when she was impeached.⁷⁰ The new PT's president maintained several successful policies and projects inherited from Lula's mandates but with apparent differences. Rousseff employed a more *tecnicista*⁷¹ approach in the cultural sector, mainly after 2012, when her government adopted some austerity policies. Besides that, the Ministry of Culture was partially negatively impacted by political agreements (Duque 2017, 46). During Rousseff's mandates (2011-2016), three Ministers, Ana de Holanda (from January 2011 until September 2012), Marta Suplicy (from September 2012 until November 2014),⁷² and Juca Ferreira (from January 2015 until May 2016), were in charge of the MinC. The first one is a composer and singer, but her nomination was criticized by several cultural agents, including public cultural managers, civil society, producers, and artists (Calabre 2015, 37). Some essential policies were finally implemented during Holanda's administration, such as the

⁷⁰ Check footnote 57.

⁷¹ This Portuguese term is commonly used to describe this attitude toward policies, mainly economic. It has a broader connotation than the term *technical* since *tecnicista* refers to an approach based on productivity and efficiency, usually disregarding abstract elements and non-economic values and results (Da Silva 2016, 205-207). Hence, this posture can negatively impact more sensible areas, such as health, education, and culture.

⁷² Suplicy resigned forty-five days before the end of Rousseff's first mandate. Before Juca Ferreira took office, Ana Cristina Wanzeler (architect and public server) was in charge temporarily (Duque 2017, 46).

final version of the PNC and some actions regarding the SNC. Nevertheless, according to Calabre (2015, 39), these achievements were, to a certain degree, conducted autonomously by some of MinC's departments.

Marta Suplicy, on the other hand, had a notorious political career previously as a senator, congresswoman, mayor of the city of São Paulo, and Tourism Minister during Lula's government. Although Suplicy had significant political capital, whose influence accelerated some bureaucratic procedures in the legislative agenda for approving some projects, her lack of knowledge concerning the cultural sector was evident. Furthermore, her political view tended to prioritize short-term projects with greater visibility. Thus, the MinC's administration during Rousseff's first mandate was turbulent and, unfortunately, reduced the protagonism of culture in the political scenario. Undoubtedly, this period represented a symbolic but also an effective loss for the cultural sector (Calabre 2015, 37). After Dilma Rousseff's reelection, Juca Ferreira returned to the MinC in January 2015. The decision was welcomed by a significant part of the artistic class and other cultural makers. The sector had a nostalgic feeling regarding cultural policies developed by Gil-Ferreira's administration in the 2000s. Nonetheless, the delicate economic moment and the political crisis that unfolded after Rousseff's reelection hampered most cultural progress. This troubling scenario culminated in the parliamentary coup suffered by her. Despite MinC's instability and the obstacles faced by the cultural sector after the end of Lula's era, Rousseff's administration maintained and consolidated some essential policies and projects. Unquestionably, the two main achievements were the institutionalization of the PNC and the SNC. Both deeds impacted directly on the *Cultura Viva*, especially the advancement of the National System, whose decentralized arrangement was crucial for the program.

Michel Temer, former Rousseff's vice-president, took office in August 2016. If Rousseff's cultural approach was considered disappointing by the cultural sector, Temer's administration was a disaster. After taking office, he tried to extinguish the Ministry of Culture, but after an enormous mobilization from cultural agents and a significant part of civil society, he withdrew his decision. However, the remaining fragile structure of the MinC faced an unstable scenario, culminating in a constant change of Ministers. During the two years of Temer's mandate, four different officials assumed the post, which obviated any meaningful progress in the cultural area. Gradually, the Ministry was shrinking, and culture was losing its status as a critical motor of Brazil's development. After Jair Bolsonaro took office in January

2019, the cultural area reached its rock bottom. Since then, the Ministry of Culture was relegated to *Secretaria Especial de Cultura* (Special Department of Culture), and the sector has suffered countless setbacks (Rubim 2019, 14). Again, this work does not propose to evaluate cultural policies during the mandates of Rousseff, Temer, and Bolsonaro. Nevertheless, it is vital to contextualize the political circumstances of Lula's successors to understand the relevance of the cultural policies implemented during his mandates and their legacy.

The decade of 2010 was widely different from the previous one and represented a regression for the cultural sector. Regarding the *Cultura Viva* program, the scenario was challenging. The decentralization movement, which started in Ferreira's administration (2008-2010), theoretically mitigated the issues caused by the instability of the federal government. Calabre (2019, 90) stresses that the local stance allowed the PCV to maintain its activities during a troublesome transition from Lula's to Rousseff's governments. However, local and regional bureaucratic procedures added new hindrances to various *pontos de cultura*, as already mentioned in the previous section. In 2011, the MinC and several regional departments organized task forces to overcome these accountability bottlenecks, sometimes assisted by professional consultants. Lastly, workshops were organized to improve the administrative skills of managers from *pontos* and *pontões de cultura* (Medeiros and Farah 2014, 18).

Considering the historical obstacles faced by the cultural sector, the institutionalization of *Cultura Viva* was crucial for its endurance. Following the steps of SNC and PNC, cultural organizations and managers from the private and public sectors worked on a new framework for the program. After countless encounters and public discussions, including some *Teias*, the PCV became institutionalized as *Programa Nacional de Promoção da Cidadania e da Diversidade Cultural - Cultura Viva* (National Program for the Promotion of Citizenship and Cultural Diversity - Living Culture). This institutionalization occurred through Administrative Rule number 118, which was enacted in December 2013 (Medeiros and Farah 2014, 18).

This new arrangement resulted from a series of evaluations and discussions regarding the PCV, some conducted by the *Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada* - IPEA (Institute of Applied Economic Research). One of the studies developed by the Institute in 2007 and 2008 examined 386 *pontos de cultura* and was focused on evaluating PCV's coverage and effectiveness and operational issues within MinC and the department responsible for the program. IPEA's investigation identified some recurrent problems, such as bureaucratic procedures, especially the requirement for submitting complex accountability reports to the

organizations of the *Cultura Viva*. Besides that, the research detected another significant concern: the complexity of evaluating a program with heterogeneous participants. Paradoxically, the diversity and democratic aspect of the program, considered the main PCV's strength, proved to be a constraint from a public policy aspect, hindering a more concrete analysis and evaluation of it (Calabre 2019, 88). IPEA points out the lack of a shared and updated database since the program's genesis, limiting the management and improvement process. Furthermore, the PCV's expansion to regional and municipal instances intensified the information systematization bottleneck, sometimes generating contradictory data, taking into account that some cultural departments adopted distinct metrics (Medeiros and Farah 2014, 17).

The courageous and accurate decision of structuring PCV based on an open code framework and concepts such as autonomy, protagonism, and empowerment generated exceptional outcomes from the discursive perspective. However, this approach proved to be less satisfactory regarding public resources management by organizations from civil society, namely the associations recognized as *pontos de cultura* (Calabre 2019, 92). Hence, despite its several evaluations and reformulations, PCV's framework was unable to detach itself from the traditional public bureaucratic tools, nor the MinC to provide adequate assistance to numerous *pontos de cultura* that struggled to adapt to these governmental procedures. Unfortunately, this condition deteriorated after the end of Lula's government and aggravated after Rousseff's impeachment and even more since Bolsonaro took office. Paiva Neto (2021, 319) uses the *Cultura Viva* to illustrate the dismantlement of culture in Brazil. In 2007, when PCV expanded its actions to regional and municipal stances, the program's budget was 147.3 million Brazilian reais. In 2018, the last year of Temer's government, the budget of SCDC, the department responsible for managing the program, decreased to a tiny sum of 12 million Brazilian reais. Hence, from a federal perspective, the program remained only as a symbolic endeavor.

To a certain degree, the federative aspect of cultural management has alleviated the dismount of the cultural sector in Brazil. Regarding the public investment sphere, the federal expenditure regarding all areas represented 66,4% of total investment, followed by 20% from states, and 13,6% from municipalities, in 2015. On the other hand, local and regional governments were responsible for 51% and 27,5% of public resources invested in culture. A significant percentage compared to just 21,5% from the federal entity. Considering the percentage by each level, the municipalities destined 0,91% of their total expenditure to culture.

The percentage for states was 0,33%, and for the federal government, only 0,08% in 2015 (Rubim and Paiva Neto 2017, 101-102). Nevertheless, the federal government plays a significant role in the regulatory, political, and financial aspects. The redistributive function is fundamental for diminishing inter-jurisdictional revenue disparity. Furthermore, the election of Bolsonaro and the rise of the far-right were driven, among other reasons, by a cultural, political, and ideological war against the cultural sector. The conservative and reactionary wave also reached the local and regional administrations. Several mayors and governors elected also adopted policies against the category, or, at least, against assorted cultural segments.

The authoritarian approach and the attempt to concentrate power at the national level harmed the federal pact and the previous institutionalized mechanisms of culture. The two aforementioned main instruments were affected. The PNC, whose renovation was planned for 2020, was abandoned, and the SNC's structure and implementation languished. Naturally, this destructive posture reflected heavily on the regional and local cultural policies (Rubim, Almeida, and Mettenheim 2021, 308). Regarding *Cultura Viva* and its *pontos de cultura*, which are the main topics of this chapter, their legacy's evaluation after 2016 is problematic due to the gradual dismantlement of the cultural sector. The consistent funding cut and the ideological war against the artistic class undermined the production of every cultural activity in the country. Furthermore, there is a lack of information and data for assessing regional and local initiatives, including those related to the PCV. Commonly, federal policies tend to overshadow municipal ones (Rubim, Almeida, and Mettenheim 2021, 312). Guimarães and Silva (2017, 74) elaborated a study about culture funding in Brazil. According to them, since 1986, only 12% of the studies concerning cultural sponsorship have been focused on municipal funding mechanisms, demonstrating the struggle to evaluate the impact of municipal actions on the cultural sector, including the maintenance of local *pontos de cultura*.

The insufficient and imperfect data available from regional and municipal initiatives, but also from the federal government, as pointed out by one of the studies conducted by IPEA, hamper the program's assessment. Gil (Brasil 2010, 9) considered PCV's results unpredictable due to its dimension and the autonomy granted to the participants. He stresses the importance of knowledge, experiences, and information exchange in order to succeed in it. To some extent, this goal was accomplished on account of the network created between the *pontos*, reinforcing the program's conceptual triad: autonomy, protagonism, and empowerment. However, PCV developed an unsatisfactory database from a public administration angle. Naturally, the

diversity of actions within the PCV, such as the *Cultura Digital*, *Agente Cultura Viva*, *Escola Viva*, and the international *Points of Contact*, make the evaluation task even more complex. PCV's innovative and experimental aspect created some obstacles to developing a constant improvement. Moreover, PCV's modest budget considering its dimension and bold goals required partnerships with other public entities. In addition to regional and municipal governments, the MinC and its departments welcomed supplementary resources from other projects and areas. The aforementioned *Mais Cultura*, a program part of the PAC,⁷³ illustrates the necessity of developing an ingenious management to overcome financial constraints. *Mais Cultura* operated for only two years but impacted the *pontos*' expansion significantly. This short-term endeavor exemplifies the ingrained manner of realizing politics in Brazil, relying on infrastructure growth and development policies to meet the demands from less privileged areas, such as culture. In this case, PAC presented an opportunity to increment PCV's investment.

Turino (2017) mentions other factors for PCV's decline after the end of Lula's government. Firstly, the conception of a democratic and inclusive program can only take place in a determined political moment. The symbolism of Lula's election enabled the development of policies aimed at the lower classes, fostering popular protagonism. Besides that, in the first stage of Lula's government, innovative and experimental projects were more welcomed and appreciated. Curiously, the low level of MinC's bureaucracy facilitated this initial process during Gil's administration. Contrastingly, as already mentioned, the following PCV's institutionalization, which increased the level of bureaucracy, became crucial for the program's continuity. Secondly, Turino reinforces the controversial state's stance. On the one hand, the government proposes reformist and inclusive policies to overcome economic and social problems. On the other hand, the same government is subordinated to a state-control paradigm, longing to maintain the established balance of power that sustains itself. *Cultura Viva* intended to go beyond social inclusion, advocating for autonomy, protagonism, and empowerment. It is also a democratic and courageous project based on an enlarged concept of culture. Thus, PCV started to face obstacles, especially since Rousseff's government, whose *tecnicista*⁷⁴ approach collided with the program. It represented a political shift toward the cultural sector, adopting a certain top-down attitude mindset. For example, knowledge and experiences exchange workshops organized between *pontos* were mainly replaced by courses given by public cultural

⁷³ Check footnote 66.

⁷⁴ Check footnote 71.

agents. Also, *Oficinas de Conhecimento Livres* (Free Knowledge Workshops) had to incorporate aspects of the Creative Economy logic. Thus, the administrative and technical paradigm subjugated experimental, inclusive, and utopian concepts.

Regardless of the various deficiencies and obstacles experienced by *Cultura Viva*, its success is unquestionable. The program's importance corroborates this favorable outcome as a benchmark for cultural and social initiatives in other countries. The scarce financial and human resources, along with the political and economic turmoil, especially after the end of Lula's era, are essential elements to be considered in our evaluation. Apart from PCV's heterogeneity and vast scope, some achievements are complex to measure. Evaluating a cultural good or service is already complex, as presented in section 1.3. The task of value assessment regarding initiatives from several *pontos* is even more arduous since it includes actions that do not possess tangible artistic value, going from community schools to fishers' associations.

The project as it was conceived rested on a triad of concepts: autonomy, protagonism, and empowerment. This philosophy is precious for the endurance of *Cultura Viva*. Empowered organizations play an essential role in advocating for their social and cultural rights, especially during turbulent political times and the dismantlement of culture. Turino (2017) mentions the significance of several encounters and fluid networks established between the *pontos*, which created a collective movement that enabled these institutions to remain active. He stresses that over 2,000 institutions maintained their *pontos de cultura* status in 2016, even without receiving governmental resources. This extraordinary persistence demonstrates how solid and durable the PCV's legacy is. Even though some data are dubious and outdated, the Special Department of Culture stated that there were 4,033 *pontos* in 2019 (Observatório Nacional da Cultura 2019). Naturally, some organizations are still registered as *pontos* without obtaining resources, as pointed out by Turino. Finally, PCV's continuity is also perceived due to its federalization, evinced by regional and local *pontos de cultura* actions. The federal states such as Mato Grosso (Documento 2022), Ceará (Povo 2022), and São Paulo (Guarulhos Hoje 2022), and the municipalities of Niterói (São Gonçalo 2021), in the state of Rio de Janeiro, and Crato (Júnior 2021), in the state of Ceará, are examples of public entities that recently opened their specific *pontos de cultura* calls. The state of São Paulo, for instance, proposed to support 186 initiatives (Guarulhos Hoje 2022).

Regardless of the bottleneck in analyzing and evaluating the program, some attempts were made. Employing the Gross National Happiness Index (GDH), an ethnographic study

developed by the University of Brasília (UnB), visited 18 *pontos de cultura* in the Brazilian Central-West region.⁷⁵ The qualitative investigation initiated in 2012 shed light on PCV's impacts using broad-minded domains as measures. Psychological well-being was among these domains. Ribeiro and Brasil (2016, 194) stress that *pontos'* activities enhance local culture, usually part of a specific peripheric neighborhood or region. This effort improved the community's self-esteem (Ribeiro and Brasil 2016, 194-195). The educational domain was also contemplated during UnB's research. In the indigenous *ponto* Yokone Kopenoti,⁷⁶ the very indigenous identity, rituals, and traditions were addressed in every activity organized by this *ponto*, revitalizing the community's practices and beliefs (Ribeiro and Brasil 2016, 170). One final example is the *Mundo do Trabalho* (World of Work) workshop organized by *ponto* Ludocriarte,⁷⁷ which illustrates the PCV's heterogeneity. This action supported the youth audience in preparing for job interviews and organized IT and cinema workshops. Hence, UnB's work concluded that the program positively impacted the benefited communities, improving social welfare, which is a major index within GDH.

Despite the evidence presented above, PCV's quantitative and qualitative assessment is complex due to data scarcity and the dismantlement of the cultural sector, especially after Rousseff's impeachment. Hence, the present study succeeded in interviewing *Cultura Viva's* creator, Célio Turino, in an attempt to grasp the program's practices, including its legacy. He stresses how PCV fostered activities related to digital culture and free software (Turino, interview). Since 2004, PCV has encouraged open software development due to its experimental attribute and budget restraint. This digital vanguard movement benefitted various *pontos*, including *quilombolas* and indigenous communities. It enabled indigenous people from the Xingu, such as the Ashaninka,⁷⁸ and Cultural House Tainã,⁷⁹ nearby Campinas, to produce

⁷⁵ This region is composed by four states: Mato Grosso, Mato Grosso do Sul, Goiás and *Distrito Federal* (Federal District).

⁷⁶ The *ponto* Yokone Kopenoti was established in the indigenous community Marçal de Souza, in the city of Campo Grande (state of Mato Grosso do Sul). Besides the activities concerning the indigenous language, the *ponto* developed various artistic actions, such as crafts, dance, and photography workshops. (Ribeiro and Brasil 2016, 170).

⁷⁷ Created in the city of São Sebastião, in the Federal District of Brazil, this *ponto* was an initiative developed by the publishing house Ludocriarte. The primary purpose was to support young people to improve their verbal and written skills, promote reading activities, and encourage text production (Ribeiro and Brasil 2016, 139-140).

⁷⁸ The Ashaninka indigenous people are mainly based in the Peruvian Amazon, but its community has been divided due to the artificial Nation-state borders. Hence, there has been some diasporic movement in Brazil, where the Ashaninka people occupied some lands, including the state of Acre, where the Ashaninka *ponto de cultura* is located (Pimenta 2018, 173).

⁷⁹ The Cultural House Tainã develops activities that enable the Black Community to create bonds of strengthening, preservation, and appreciation of their ancestral traditions. This *ponto de cultura* is considered an urban quilombo (see footnote 24) in the city of Campinas (Oliveira 2021).

audio and video content to preserve and promote their traditions and identity. Turino (interview) emphasizes the monumental effort to restore and preserve the Yawalapíti language and how the program played an essential role in achieving that:

The Yawalapíti *Ponto de Cultura* activities proposed by IPEAX (Xingu Ethno-Environmental Research Institute) in the indigenous lands of the Xingu include a language school, publication of a Yawalapíti alphabet book, dictionary and grammar, the recording of traditional songs, indigenous performances, Xinguan fashion and body art, crafts, traditional architecture and Yawalapíti on the web (Turino 2013, 50).

He expresses that the Yawalapíti case already made the *Cultura Viva* worth it, although it represents only one out of 4,000 organizations. Again, this non-economic cultural value is impossible to genuinely assess, albeit it presents as one of the concrete and outstanding outcomes of the program.

Finally, Turino (interview) refers to two positive legacies of *Cultura Viva* on a larger scale. Firstly, he mentions the cultural program of the recently elected president of Chile, Gabriel Boric, in 2022. The aforementioned international impact of *Cultura Viva*, mainly in Latin American countries, is still palpable. Boric proposes the implementation of *puntos de cultura*, recognizing and promoting the already existing community cultures, supporting smaller and local organizations in several parts of the vast Chilean territory (Veas 2022). Although the concept was already part of a few cultural programs in Chile, the current president aims at expanding this notion through a more active governmental approach. Veas (2022) stresses that the *puntos de cultura* program is a paradigm shift in the Chilean cultural policy practice, strengthening several local cultures instead of “bringing” culture, especially to remote communities.

The second aspect mentioned during Turino's interview is the Aldir Blanc Law (ABL), an emergency policy aimed at supporting Brazilian cultural agents during the COVID-19 pandemic. He mentions that the mobilization was heavily conducted by participants of several *pontos de cultura* (Turino, interview). There was, indeed, a massive movement to bring this project forward, although it is inconceivable to measure the role played by the *pontos* and their agents. In addition to that, Turino (interview) stresses the conceptual influence that PCV had on Aldir Blanc Law, absorbing the “(...) principle of universality, decentralization, emergence, also the debureaucratization aspect (...)” The enactment of the Aldir Blanc Law can eventually become a milestone for cultural policies, especially concerning the decentralization aspect through the National System of Culture:

Two points were observed: if the municipalities that have well-structured system were, indeed, well fitted to the logics of decentralization of resources; and, if the ABL could stimulate the policies and the Municipality System of Culture in a scenario unfavorable to cultural policies. We concluded that both points were confirmed; however, the stimulation to the National System of Culture cannot yet be considered as a tendency (Semensato and Barbalho 2021, 86).

Regarding Bolsonaro's chaotic approach during the COVID-19 pandemic, the SUS and its federalist aspect, whose concepts and structure inspired the SNC, proved to be an efficient mechanism during emergencies. Despite the lack of central command, financial resources, and denialist actions from the federal government, SUS played an essential role during the pandemic's unfolding. The massive COVID-19 vaccination campaign in Brazil, for instance, is part of the *Programa Nacional de Imunizações - PNI* (National Immunization Program), which is one of the main immunization programs in the world (Maciel et al. 2022, 952).

Concerning the cultural area, decentralized resource distribution was crucial for the sector's survival. Due to this federalist mechanism, hundreds (maybe thousands) of *pontos* obtained financial aid through ABL. For instance, in the state of Goiás, 30 *pontos* received 3 million Brazilian reais in 2021, 100 thousand reais each. The local government allocated 2 million reais the following year (Gonçalves 2022). The state of Pará supported 130 institutions with a sum of almost 2 million reais (Secretaria de Cultura do Estado do Pará 2020). In 2020, the local government of Bahia opened a call to support 81 *pontos* based on its territory (Correio 2020). These are just a few examples of how ABL's resources were distributed among several *pontos* amid Brazilian states. The municipal level also replicated the same pattern.

In light of the information and evidence presented above, we have no choice but to conclude that the *Cultura Viva* had an extraordinarily positive impact during Lula's mandates and after his presidency's end. Thereafter, the program's legacy survived despite the dismantlement of culture, remaining a central reference for cultural policies in every stance, including beyond Brazilian borders. Naturally, the symbolic, intrinsic, and non-economic value of countless activities developed by the *pontos* make the assessment effort complex. Notwithstanding, after almost 20 years of PCV's conception, the program endures as a powerful framework and consolidated benchmark regarding cultural policies. Its historical and current relevance reveals that *Cultura Viva* is a genuine mechanism for establishing practices of cultural democracy.

Conclusion

This work proposed to examine practices of cultural democracy practice in Brazil, focusing on Lula's mandates, especially the *Cultura Viva* program and its *pontos de cultura*. Overall, the program's evaluation is significantly positive. Considering the enlarged understanding of culture; the contemporary cultural policy experience, including the established international premises and guidelines advocated mainly by UNESCO; the Brazilian socio-economic context, and its chronic cultural issue, portrayed by the three unfortunate traditions, *Cultura Viva* presents as a (still) successful case. In spite of the recent disruption of the cultural sector, the convincing examples mentioned in section 3.3 demonstrate PCV's valuable legacy from an analytical, quantitative, and qualitative perspective. Furthermore, bearing in mind the three unfortunate traditions stressed by Rubim: absence, instability, and authoritarianism, the analyzed time frame (2003-2010) undeniably represents a breakthrough period for the cultural area and cultural policy-making.

Throughout this work, we exposed the historical Brazilian inclination toward European artistic expressions. On the one hand, the political and social elites imported references from cultural activities and policies and, on the other hand, deliberately neglected or developed a controversial relation toward popular national cultural manifestations. *Cultura Viva* completely opposes this trend. The program became an essential benchmark in cultural policymaking, justifying its selection as a case study. Its international recognition and amplitude demonstrate the importance of developing policies and practices based on the national and local context, in the case of Brazil, characterized by a rich, although conflictual, diversity.

The anthropological democratic concept of culture, a term frequently used by former Minister Gil, guided several policies designed by Lula's government. Naturally, such discourse had a symbolic significance, amplifying and democratizing the understanding of culture. However, this paradigm shift transcended the discursive aspect and produced concrete actions and programs, such as the *Cultura Viva*, although much of the former cultural policy structure endured. Despite this paradigmatic transformation, tax incentives, mainly Rouanet Law, remained the primary funding mechanism for culture. The lengthy and incomplete SNC's implementation, along with the unrealistic objectives set by the National Plan of Culture, such

as the establishment of 15,000 *pontos de cultura* by the end of the 2010s, indicates a relative incompleteness of the Gil-Ferreira administration.

After the presidential transition from Lula to Dilma Rousseff and, especially after the 2016 impeachment and 2018 elections, the cultural sector suffered a progressive and intentional dismantlement from the federal government. The PCV's deterioration and shrinkage followed the same pattern as other cultural policies. This phenomenon reinforced the dominance of Rouanet Law and other regional and municipal exception laws as the principal instruments of cultural funding. In fact, the significance of these laws never vanished, even during Lula's mandates. According to a report developed by the Brazilian Federal Court of Accounts (*Tribunal de Contas da União* - TCU), in 2009, patronage and exception laws were the source of 62% of the resources for funding cultural policies, summing almost one billion Brazilian reais. Another study reveals that the steady growth of resources invested through tax incentives surpassed GDP's advancement between 1996 and 2014. The first quadrupled and the second increased 62% during this period⁸⁰ (Sá-Earp and Estrella 2016, 318). Besides that, in 2009, tax deductions represented over 90% of the resources invested through this mechanism. In 2014, it reached 94,48%. In 1996, private direct investment constituted almost 70% of the resources invested in culture as cultural patronage. Hence, the proportion between direct private expenditure and tax incentives investment reversed during this period (Sá-Earp and Estrella 2016, 319-320).

After Bolsonaro took office in 2019, MinC's downgrade to a department subordinated to the Ministry of Citizenship and, afterward, to the Ministry of Tourism proved to be a disastrous measure. Since January 2019, five managers have been in charge of the Special Department of Culture. This systematic replacement is a strategy for keeping the bureau, and its policies stagnated (Peixe 2021, 27). Despite this deliberate strategy for undermining the cultural sector, the aforementioned itemized evidence regarding *Cultura Viva* demonstrates the program's potency. Autonomy, protagonism, and empowerment are effective guidelines to tackle political disruption and lack of resources. This conceptual triad enabled the benefitted *pontos* to mitigate the unfortunate traditions of Brazilian cultural policies: absence, authoritarianism, and instability. From a federal perspective, the negligence and premeditated damage to the cultural field was not capable of entirely undoing Gil-Ferreira's legacy. To a

⁸⁰ The cited report takes into consideration the Índice Nacional de Preços ao Consumidor Amplo - IPCA (Extended National Consumer Price Index), which is essential due to the inflation (around 300%) during this period (Sá-Earp and Estrella 2016, 317).

certain extent, incorporating PCV's structure on local and municipal stances facilitated the program's continuity. The vitality and persistence of *Cultura Viva*, after 18 years⁸¹ of its conception, ratify it. Although the cultural and political scenario faced peaks and valleys in this period, PCV's influence in Brazil (and in other countries) may (finally) indicate the establishment of a fortunate tradition within Brazilian cultural policies. Furthermore, the fact that *Cultura Viva* perseveres as a benchmark for cultural policies and governmental programs, such as Boric's proposals in Chile, corroborates PCV's significance. Its democratic conceptual framework and experimental application allow its implementation in diverse contexts.

Cultura Viva is perceived as a theoretical and practical reference from a public management perspective, which is illustrated by the replication of regional and municipal *pontos de cultura* programs. Naturally, the federal government's absence and disregard hindered the program's funding and amplitude, a phenomenon aggravated by Brazil's economic crisis since the middle of the 2010s. Besides the *pontos*, one should remind the existence of other actions organized and endorsed by *Cultura Viva*, such as *Teias*, whose potency weakened without federal public support. Still, the associations part of the program have autonomously and empowered endured, regardless of the political and economic situation. We should stress that the *ponto de cultura* status was, ultimately, the institutionalization of thousands of already existing organizations. Some of them are represented by a wide diversity of collectives, such as *quilombolas*, indigenous groups, community schools, fishers' associations, NGOs, etc. These groups have struggled to develop their activities for decades, or even centuries. In some cases, preserving their beliefs, expressions and language also represent their survival prospect. Hence, these ancient cultural expressions and communities have been resiliently carried on regardless of the economic and political situation. They existed before Lula's election, and most of them will stand after the current political disruption.

The central aspect and legacy of *Cultura Viva* is the radical paradigm shift toward these community entities and popular cultural expressions. Profoundly, it was the first time that these cultures were widely politically addressed and genuinely acknowledged, impacting the self-esteem of these communities. It also fostered social and economic development in the long term, which is a vital aspect of a *política de Estado*. Besides that, as reiterate by Turino (interview), many communities had their first contact with institutional cultural policies through PCV. Undeniably, the appropriate usage of managerial tools, financial resources, and

⁸¹ Considering the creation of the program (2004) and the present date (2022).

institutional recognition have considerably improved the capacity of these organizations. The official recognition of these cultural expressions symbolizes the materialization, although tardy, of the 1988 Federal Constitution, in which cultural rights are an essential principle. Furthermore, the positive symbolic and economic impact transcended the benefitted communities. In our opinion, PCV's wide range also influenced public perception and, partially, questioned the very Brazilian identity.

This impact on *Brazilianness* is an extensive discussion, and one may analyze national identity from many angles. Nevertheless, PCV, beyond any doubt, played a significant role by empowering its *pontos* to preserve and promote their culture. The program contributed to the assimilation of the diversity aspect as a core feature within the notion of *Brazilianness*. Naturally, PCV is part of a broader political and cultural paradigm shift promoted by Lula's government. Policies are usually conceived as a consequence of social demands, but they can also trigger meaningful discussions and actions within civil society. *Cultura Viva* illustrates both situations. Throughout this work, we stressed the controversial relationship between the Brazilian state and cultures from less privileged groups, such as indigenous and African expressions, to build a non-conflictual identity. As mentioned by Yúdice (2003), this historical practice was, to a certain degree, discontinued in the 2000s. At least from a discursive angle and concerning various actions developed by Lula's government, the complex Brazilian social and racial structure was finally addressed without ignoring its inherent frictions. Thus, *Cultura Viva* is also part of a set of historical reparation actions, such as public university quotas, whose incontestable legacy is noticeable more than a decade after the end of Lula's administration.

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Annex

A.1 Interview with Célio Turino

- Date: 6th January 2022
- Location: Zoom (online)
- Duration: 72min
- Language: Portuguese

Interview with **Célio Turino (CL)**, a Brazilian writer, historian, public manager, and cultural policy maker. He is one of the most remarkable references as cultural and policy manager. During his period as Secretary of the Department of Cultural Programs and Projects (*Secretaria de Programas e Projetos Culturais* - SPPC), he was the creator and main responsible for the *Cultura Viva* program. The interview's goal was to better understand the program's guidelines and objectives and, mainly, its legacy after almost 20 years. As we mentioned before, there is a lack of data, information and bibliography regarding *Cultura Viva*, especially after Dilma's impeachment. The interview was conducted in Portuguese and freely translated with the assistance of Gabriela Mariquito. This final version was adapted and edited to facilitate the reader's comprehension since some parts consist of an informal conversation.

Célio Turino (CL)- Anyway, João, I am very happy to know that you are writing about *Cultura Viva*, especially in Portugal [writing this work in a foreign university]. This program [*Cultura Viva*] ended up being a bit messy, my life ended up getting a bit messy with the program. I have even sometimes tried to push myself and focus on other things. Because it is gone, but it is hard to let it go. The *Cultura Viva* program had a broad dimension, not only because I was responsible for thinking [creating], theorizing and implementing in the first six years, but its dimension and impact were indeed broad. In fact, the repercussions outside Brazil [in other countries] was even a paradox. I experienced a paradox from 2011⁸² onwards. There was a lot of denial of the program and the support diminished, despite its maintenance by the federal government. *Cultura Viva* shrank and it was, to some extent, deconstructed. The *ponto de cultura* is the micro-network, it is the sedimentation of the network in the territory

⁸² Turino clearly refers to the governmental change in 2011, when Lula's government ended and Rousseff took office.

and it communicates with the macro-network that is *Cultura Viva*, which forms a set of actions, those [actions] with *Griô*, Digital Culture, actions associating culture and health, and *Economia Viva* [Living Economy].⁸³ This set of other actions, aesthetic interactions, including with countries outside Brazil, all this was dismantled [from 2011 onwards] and the very sedimentation of the *ponto* in the territory. There was a big misunderstanding, let me put it this way. This [misunderstanding and dismantlement of *Cultura Viva*] generated a lot of bureaucracy and even resulted in a process of harassment and criminalization of many community-based organizations that became a *ponto*. This occurred due to simple problems that could have been solved in another way. Some of them ended up at the *Tribunal de Contas da União* (Federal Courts of Accounts), for instance. I am telling you about this to give you a picture of what happened from 2011 onwards, but we will talk about the program's legacy.

João Moreira (JM) - Sure, let us start it!

CL - As I signed most agreements, until 2007 they were direct [agreements were signed between *pontos* and the federal government]. Since 2007, state and municipal governments started to participate and expanded these agreements, which allowed the program to take a leap and spread. I would say that this is one of the main reasons for the program's endurance nowadays. The fact that *Cultura Viva* does not depend exclusively on federal funds. Some state and municipal entities that recently became part of the network [*pontos de cultura* network], such as Niterói, São Paulo, and other places. So, I signed approximately 800 agreements in total and I ended up following almost everything. The last process that I followed from a *ponto de cultura* which had issues was totally unfair. It was from a *ponto* that I will even mention the example for you, but I won't mention the name of the *ponto* because it is an internal process. It was a *ponto de cultura* that I did not even know personally [he never went to the *ponto*'s location]. I firmly visited 600 communities, 600 *pontos* while I was secretary of cultural citizenship, some even going over and over again, even in my book you must have seen it.

JM- Well, yes, yes.

CL- I went to some of them several times, to Xingu, *Ashaninka* [*ponto de cultura* Ashaninka's community], to several favelas. It was what I most enjoyed doing during my work.

⁸³ Some of these actions are depicted in chapter 3.

And I even tell [in his book] what a *ponto de cultura* is from a *ponto de cultura* in the Pirambu favela, which is in Fortaleza. There is a chapter where I tell it, it took five trips until I wrote it, then I went more times. Then I tell the evolution of the process from that *ponto* onwards, from the Pirambu favela. This *ponto* that I visited was one in Foz do Iguaçu, on the border with Paraguay. It was an even simple *ponto* with theater and recreation activities. And you should know, the agreement is signed with a specific working plan and then, the entity should follow this plan. The fact is that they made theater presentations and recreational activities with children along the Paraná River, sometimes they even crossed the river and went to the Paraguayan side, or on islands as well. Someone had the idea, and I even thought it was very beautiful, to deliver candies and sweets to children. They were children who never had access to a theater show. They bought it, I will give you the data because then you can use it. They spent 1,700 reais buying candies and sweets to give to the children, because it was a party celebration. The children were very poor, anyway. But that [expenses with candies] was not in the planned budget. All the work that was done by the *ponto*, I saw the process, it was authorized, it was carried out, the plan's achievement, there is the report on the accomplishment of 100% of the plan from the Ministry of Culture. Someone in 2012 sent it to CGU - Controladoria-Geral da União (Comptroller General of the Union), to TCU. I heard about this story in 2019, do you know how much they owed? 300,000 reais. Do you know how much they had received from the federal government? 150,000 reais. It became a snowball.

JM- I enjoyed how you described the PCV as an open source program. You created the program using this bottom-up approach, which was: let us see what we have and we will have to adapt according to the organizations because they are cultural agents in which the vast majority are excluded from cultural actions, such as tax exemption laws because they have no structure. Besides that, most organizations are not very commercial either, thus private companies are usually not interested in sponsoring these organizations. On the other hand, in order to access public resources, these cultural organizations frequently need to follow a bureaucratic process almost the same as that of a billionaire construction company working as a contractor. How do you see that?

CL- It is even worse, because the construction company [contractor] does not need to show all invoices, it is evaluated by results. It builds a highway and the evaluation is according to the extension, in kilometers. Regarding the *ponto de cultura*, a high level of detail was required. You also mentioned the open source framework, that is right, we work from the idea

of digital culture and free software as a philosophy. So, the program itself is free software and we invest in it. I would say that Brazil was the main world reference for free software in that period, largely due to *Cultura Viva*. I imagine you already know all these dimensions, but there was the multimedia studio for the promotion of the *ponto*.

JM- Yes.

CT- We wanted to stimulate the narrative from the bottom up, with a multimedia studio, music recording, audio, and this would have to be edited in free software for two reasons. First, the main one, a philosophical reason on the issue of free software and, the second reason, even operational, it would be very expensive to buy audio and video editing software and the government could not encourage pirate software either. However, in 2004 and 2005, there was no free software for editing audio and video, and this was initiated. It was developed by a community of hackers, by this global digital culture, sometimes anonymously. People who many of us do not even know and who contributed to the development of this software that, in a way, is still present today in our zoom conversation here. And they were from New Zealand, from Australia, places that generously contributed to this because they saw Brazil as a digital hub due to *Cultura Viva*. Considering all programs and policies during Lula's government, *Cultura Viva* and its *pontos* achieved concrete actions. Other programs and projects had a beautiful discourse, but where it actually happened, it was here [*Cultura Viva*] because they saw that things were materializing. And that was another legacy that has not really scaled up yet, but it was very significant. If Brazil had continued with this policy (...) if this free software policy had continued today, Brazil would certainly be the main reference center for free software on the planet, impacting on income generation and technological development. This, from 2011 onwards, was deliberately, totally opposed within the federal government. The licenses that we used were free licenses. Even in my book *De Baixo para Cima* you can see that I edited it under free license, I could get it in PDF. This vanished, it was the first act of the government [Dilma's government], at the time the minister was Ana de Holanda, it was to end the free licenses of the program.

JM- I remember that.

CT- I think you can see what happened. This is another legacy, but one that remains. The incredible thing is that the communities that most absorbed free software were the

traditional communities, because they did not have any digital language addiction. So we worked with the Ashaninka community, with the communities from the Xingu, with *quilombolas* from the Mocambo's network, which is a free software network within several *quilombos*. *Quilombolas* from a *ponto de cultura*, such as Tainã, from Campinas. And these communities, they had never seen a computer, they had not seen Microsoft Windows and other programs, they absorbed it. They absorbed so much that the Ashaninka people, for example, was awarded with several international prizes in audio production and they edited on their own machine, camera, etc., using free software. So, this was one aspect, another, it was this dimension of identity and diversity, today there is a lot of talk, even this term identity, which I do not agree with, and turns it into an ideology. But identity politics as a government policy, they were very driven by *Cultura Viva* and *pontos de cultura*. To the extent that the term *Griô*, which is the Brazilianization of the *Griot*, which is a Frenchization of the various references to the masters of culture transmitted by orality in Africa. It arises from the *Cultura Viva* program and today it is widespread, people refer to the master of traditional culture transmitted orally originally in the African matrix as *Griô*, there was not even this word, so this is also another aspect, right? Also in the economy dimension, I think the last public notice that I was able to make as secretary was the *Economia Viva* (living economy). It was a public call for economic production chains originating from *pontos de cultura*.

JM- Which year was that?

CT- It was in 2009, I left at the beginning of 2010, so it was in 2009 that it was an *Economia Viva* call, which was a resource for the development of production chains based on the idea of culture, it had that name even because we did not work with the concept of creative economy, which in our view was very much an appropriation of culture by the economic way of thinking when the *Economia Viva* would go in the opposite direction. And one of these public calls resulted in a community currency. It was created by the *ponto de cultura* of women from the Campo Limpo, in the south of São Paulo. This currency was *Solano*, if you look on the internet you will find a lot of information, which works until this day as a local, community currency in the outskirts of São Paulo, in the Campo Limpo region, near Capão Redondo, in reference to Solano Trindade. These are legacies that I would say they persisted, so the program went beyond the idea of simply transferring resources.

JM- Totally.

CT- And there was an effective appropriation of the concepts, the principles of autonomy, of sociocultural protagonism. To the extent that, there is no way to understand the Aldir Blanc Law without *Cultura Viva* and *ponto de cultura*. All the mobilization, the vanguard mobilization was conducted by people from *pontos de cultura*. Every concept of the Aldir Blanc Law is an improvement of the theory of *pontos de cultura*, of the principles of, now taking a further step... It was also well applied in Aldir Blanc Law, but it embeds the principle of universality, decentralization, emergence, also the debureaucratization aspect, the concept of cultural space, territory of identity. For an indigenous community, the cultural space is the indigenous village, it is not a quilombo, it is not a specific room. All of this can only be understood from the perspective of *Cultura Viva* and the method of social mobilization that took place. I do not know, if you could also observe this, I have not seen any other experience in this period of the pandemic of creating a law like the ABL in Brazil. There was, of course, in France, for example, the intermittence that artists gained and such, but in previous political situations. But as a conception, mobilization, volume of resources, approximately 600 million dollars, or 3 billion reais, mobilized in a short space of time, conceptually, the decentralized form reaching more than 4,000 municipalities. Even before that, the cultural policy that mostly reached municipalities in Brazil was *Cultura Viva*, which reached 1,000 municipalities by 2010 and was only surpassed by Aldir Blanc Law. No other policy in the history of Brazil has had this dimension. So, I also see it as a very significant legacy. Finally, the expansion of the idea around the world.

CT- Yes, from a personal point of view. So, the program expanded a lot, it reached 17 countries, we held four Latin American congresses within *Cultura Viva*, mobilizing almost two dozen countries. The first, which took place in 2013 in La Paz, Bolivia, even has a thesis about it.

JM- Interesting, I mention this, this impact.

CT- Regarding the congress that took place in La Paz. So, to give you an idea, in cash we mobilized 35,000 dollars, we gathered 1,200 people from almost 20 countries. The displacement was even bigger. It was decentralized, the flying tickets [how participants paid for it], people went on their own. Argentinian staff managed to bring 300 people by bus, it took over a day to arrive in La Paz. What justifies such a large, continental mobilization in this

dimension? I would say it is the power of the idea and its strength. Curiously, after that, a person discovered the program in Argentina: it was Jorge Bergoglio [Pope Francis]. He was still archbishop, then he invited me to talk about the program at the Vatican, in 2015. After this encounter, we kept in touch in the following years. In the next year, I signed an agreement with the Vatican program called *Escolas Ocurrentes*, which aimed at disseminating the *Cultura Viva*. So, just to see the dimension that the program has gained. It goes on, now in the Boric [Chilean president elected in 2022] program. it is the main item of the program if you look for it, in the cultural part, the main thing is the *Cultura Viva*. My book was launched in Chile and people were very involved. In fact, in Chile it is interesting, those manifestations that took place in 2019. They had a strong performative character, right? People would go and perform. A series of demonstrations took place, definitely not just violent protests. People went to the streets with a lot of artistic performances. Most of these performances were created and organized within *pontos de culturas* in Chile.

JM - Look how interesting!

CT - A girl was even murdered, a ballerina, in one of the demonstrations in Chile. So, all this ended up spreading, even in Indonesia, right? There is also *pontos de cultura*. I believe I went there, I do not remember the year, 2016, 2017. Ah, recently I learned that they develop and mainly focus on free software, they develop *pontos de cultura* in Indonesia as well. Anyway, it sounded a bit confusing, but it is the legacy, I would say it is an intangible legacy. On the other hand, there is a *Cultura Viva* law, which we were able to enact.

JM - Yes!

CT- Because there was this dismantlement, a misunderstanding about *Cultura Viva* from the government. I would not say it was intentional, I think it was an inability to perceive the dimension of the program. It was necessary to preserve it and even before that I already knew that there had to be a legislation, there was a wide mobilization and, in 2014, the *Cultura Viva* law was enacted.

JM- For sure. It is already mentioned in this work.

CT- The *Cultura Viva* Law, a project presented by Jandira Feghali [Brazilian Congresswoman], was approved, so this protects the program on a larger scale. I would also mention MROSC (*Marco Regulatório das Organizações da Sociedade Civil*). It is the Regulatory Framework for Civil Society Organizations, it must have been approved in 2015, 2016. It is quite inspired by the experience of *Pontos de Cultura*, which was quite diverse. On the one hand, we had a *ponto de cultura* with the *Universidade de São Paulo* - USP (University of São Paulo), which is a huge and acknowledged institution. On the other hand, we also had a *ponto de cultura* with the spinners from the North of Minas Gerais, who had never made any sort of agreement during their lives, a deal for the transferring resources. This heterogeneity is also crucial.

JM- One of the great virtues of the program.

CT- Yes, I think. It managed to endure despite its heterogeneity. I can also mention the Apiwtxa center, which is the *ponto de cultura* in Marechal Thaumaturgo, in Acre, besides the *Amônia* river. Also the Ashaninka, which used their *ponto de cultura* for developing free software. Some *pontos* also developed audiovisual content. People who worked with open culture were also involved. Everyone was working with this single platform. In terms of equality, that is why it is a program of identity and diversity at the same time, breaking these cultural hierarchies, which is something very common [these hierarchies].

JM- You stressed that the program became a law. I found it very interesting. You wrote an article in 2013 that you described a bit about the dismantlement of the program. You enumerate some reasons, such as Dilma's *tecnicista* approach.

CT - Yeah, I do not even think Dilma got to know the program. it is more about the way of understanding the government, right?

JM - Of course.

CT - it is much more *tecnicista* and all. That [*Cultura Viva*] was a messy program, so to speak, from Cartesian logic.

JM - Of course, because of this virtue: heterogeneity. It is complex from the *ponto*'s perspective to develop a metric to evaluate, for example, how you are going to compare such heterogeneous *pontos* and adopt the same pattern/metric for every participant. Analyze like this: this *ponto* made few presentations, the other one made more. It is very difficult for you to measure and value the actions from 4,000 *pontos*. And there is their legacy, as you mentioned, I would say very intangible. Results and social impacts that we will see over the years, I would say that it is indeed a long-term project. A project indeed, a *política de Estado*, not a common government action that aimed at helping the government's reelection and self-perpetuation of political power.

CT - I would say that the program is a public policy that is born as a government policy, although from a bottom-up approach. Yes, it was necessary to have a government, a symbolic force like Lula's, to have a minister like Gil, to my involvement considering the conditions. So, it was a policy formulated by this specific government, which encouraged society to become the real protagonist. Oh yes, the process starts from the bottom and goes up, but first it is presented by the government to the society. After that, the society has gradually changed the program, which is the bottom-up dynamic, until it truly becomes a governmental policy. It had the status of a presidential program, which is a status granted by the Ministry of Planning Budget and Management, it was the only cultural program granted with this presidential status. Then it truly became a public policy when the law was enacted, in 2014, but I would say that the most significant thing regarding the public sphere, is when society truly embodies the concept, the idea and absorbs it as their own. I think this is the secret to understanding PCV's success, including its maintenance.

JM - If I can ask one, actually, two questions.

CT - Please, go on!

JM - The first question, I even mentioned it in my thesis, correct me if I am wrong. Two points that enabled the program's survival in the last years. I believe it was something I read in one of Calabre's works. She mentioned that, especially at this moment of political instability, let me use this very mild term, the fact that the program was federalized, went from the federal stance to regional and municipal levels as well. This allowed it to continue even after this political and cultural disruption.

CT - Exactly.

JM - At the same time, the fact that it became a law in 2014, also made it possible for its continuity. I found it interesting, I wrote in the thesis that you mentioned that a program like PCV sometimes appears at a very specific moment, within a specific conjuncture, which also encompasses the very figure of Lula, Gil etc. And I think it is even curious to say that, at that moment [when PCV was created in 2004], the low level of “institutionalization” of the MinC allowed these experimental programs to flourish, let's put it that way. And later on, ten years after that, it was precisely due the fact that it became institutionalized, this allowed the program's endurance.

CT - Yes, a dialectic, but that is what it is.

JM - And I am not entirely sure if this assessment is correct, but I believe so.

CT- I do not know if it is correct, but I agree with it.

JM - And I also write in chapter two about the National Plan of Culture and the National System of Culture. The system had a strong connection with *Cultura Viva*, to a certain extent, regarding the dimension of being federalized, which allowed this wide dissemination of the Aldir Blanc Law. Consequently, the distribution of resources to numerous municipalities in Brazil.

CT - Yes, the system itself is not so much because it is not yet institutionalized, right? The concept of the system, yes! The Aldir Blanc Law and its approval was very interesting, which I think was June 4, 2020. In 15 days, there were 450 spontaneous adhesions of municipalities to the system. The law, obviously as it was an emergency measure, did not require the municipality to be in the system, but the people at the end realized that it would be positive. So look how interesting, the Aldir Blanc Law speeds up the implementation of the system, there is a paradox that my fellow historians will have to deal with later on: how this was possible in a government declared to be an enemy of the arts and culture, without a Ministry of Culture? How did we manage to achieve it?

JM - But the institutional part is also very important.

CT - Yes, in your thesis you will address it. But just to show the contradiction, because if one looks into the future: the biggest direct transfer of resources to culture in the history of Brazil took place in 2020.

JM - Yes, that is true.

CT - It was a countercoup that I think Bolsonaro's people did not even realize, but anyway, that is what happened.

JM - And with regard to that, nowadays you see that there are thousands of *pontos* in Brazil. What is that legacy of them? Do you think that this triad of the program: protagonism, autonomy, and empowerment, that also made it enabled them to continue to exist. Of course, several of these organizations existed before *Cultura Viva*.

CT - Yes, all of them. The condition was that it already existed.

JM - Yes, but how do you evaluate this dismantlement process and, specifically, the scarce financial support for the *pontos* nowadays?

CT - When I left the program, it had 3,500 *pontos*, in 2010. So, it was more or less there. Then in 2016, I think it was, but you should double check it because I am not sure. But in 2015, I think, after the enactment of *Cultura Viva* Law. The *pontos* “self-recognition” reached a number around 4,000. It is even on the Ministry's website.

JM - Yes, I think 4,033, I am checking here, it is data from 2015.

CT - I think it is something like that. So that is concrete info, right? Self-recognized even without receiving anything, they keep it as a *ponto* and that in the end it ended up being an advantage in the case of Aldir Blanc Law, which was on the online platform, in the *ponto* registration. They had more chances to access resources. On the other hand, they made an effort to become recognized as *pontos* before knowing that it would end helping with this emergencial financial aid [Aldir Blanc Law]. Probably a few saw the program as a source of funds and then,

when it ended, they dispersed. But above all, these movements of traditional, community culture, I would say that definitely changed their relationship with culture, with cultural policy. Even nowadays, sometimes I receive emails from young people who started a *ponto de cultura*, who are already doing a master's degree, people who became filmmakers. Young people, who I have never met, showing their gratitude. They send emails, facebook comments, it is very nice. Also entities, many managers of the *pontos* also became secretaries, directors of culture, people who got involved in public management. So, today, in several municipalities, they implement public policy based on this experience, this legacy. And many *pontos de cultura* maintain this identity. So, I would say that this is undeniable, I would like it to have a thesis, like yours, that could measure, or at least have a dimension. See, how are you going to evaluate the *ponto de cultura* Ashaninka? Of the Yawalapiti, I was with the Yawalapiti three times. I signed the agreement with chief Aritana, who died of covid last year. What was the goal of this *ponto de cultura*? It was to restore the Yawalapiti language, because even in the book, there is a chapter that addresses the Yawalapiti culture. There were five speakers in Yawalapiti, and the people were falling apart. To restore the Yawalapiti language, they started to arrange marriages between different communities in the Xingu region and reached 200 Yawalapiti people, when they were finally recognized as a *ponto de cultura*. With only five speakers, their main goal was to restore the language. Today, there is grammar, a language, they produce books and records in Yawalapiti. It is a language.

JM - But how do you truly assess the value of that?

CT - Well then, it is something fantastic. This case alone was worth the entire program, and it was not just because there were a lot of situations, but this one, its people's language, an ethnogenesis, right? That has been done because in the language comes a whole cosmology, a cosmovision, a whole interpretation of the world that maybe today, 15 years later, considering that the *ponto's* agreement was signed in 2005, it would not exist anymore. So, of course there would be the indigenous culture, but it was not the one from the Yawalapiti people.

JM - But this is a very concrete example, it could be a great case study.

CT - Yes, and this is a public policy. It succeeded through the public sphere. I was still in contact with Aritana, until two, three years ago, we used to exchange messages and meet, talk, meet somewhere. He mentioned that people made comments, told stories, talked about

me and such. So it is something that created another relationship, it was a very solid, empathic relationship.

JM - And finally, well, this may be a broad question, but what I am going to say regards the conception of the program. I found it interesting when you mentioned that when they invited you to be secretary, there was the BACs project that was the physical structure, then you say: are we really going to spend money on buildings? You have to spend money on people, there are already very rich things. You also mention the concept of culture that you believed and built throughout your experience, but also about some references.

CT - The first is Heraclitus, everything flows, life is a flow. The Heraclitus of Ancient Greece, by Diéphesus. So, the basis is very phenomenological, the *Cultura Viva* program, so if you notice, there's a lot about this. There are Russian references too, so it is an organic policy that is being built. I had just presented my master's degree before starting as a secretary, before working for MinC, which is *Na Trilha de Macunaíma*. That later came out in a book, when it came out I was still in the Ministry, but then I did not dedicate myself much to the book, I was very dedicated to *Cultura Viva*, but this was my master's degree subject. I would tell you that much of the theoretical reference to build *Cultura Viva* came from there. People even talk, keep saying that I wrote the program in two nights. I actually wrote, I was not even named as secretary. I wrote at the hotel to counter the BACs idea, but it was not in two nights, I wrote in 20 years, because I had all these ideas from my previous experiences. Even in the book, I tell the whole history, the work in favelas, film clubs, the 1980s and the times of the dictatorship. But this is an aspect of experience, of practice. But the theoretical aspect is very fresh in my head. I finished my dissertation in February 2004 and I started to work for MinC in June 2004, so it was very fresh. There is an author that really influences me a lot and I have identified myself a lot with his ideas: Norbert Elias.

He was from the very beginning of the Frankfurt school, but he developed his work. He was Jewish, German, at the beginning of Nazism he moved to the United Kingdom. He was only better known when he was old, there is a book called *The Civilizing Process*. He writes about these long-term configurations, changes in behavior. I would not say absolutely that Norbert Elias was the theoretical basis of *Cultura Viva*, because there are several, including Mário de Andrade. But the construction of *Cultura Viva* and *pontos de cultura* are very close to the line of thought of Norbert Elias and his studies. I have all of Norbert Elias's books, I consider him almost a friend of mine and we have never seen each other. I think that the first

time it was edited in Brazil was in 1990 and that goes along with these changes, *ponto de cultura* would be that too. A *ponto*, right? that creates these changes in behavior. And then Mário de Andrade, I think the fact of being in the centenary [2022] of the *Semana de Arte Moderna* art helps too, right? So, it is not the modernists in general, it is Mário de Andrade specifically, he is someone with whom I have a lot of identity in terms of thinking, in terms of being. See, the idea of the multimedia studio, one of them was even in the meeting I had with the Digital Culture folks, Cláudio Prado, they were talking about having the equipment. At the time I told them, look: this will make it possible to accomplish what Mário de Andrade sought to do with the folkloric missions when he was director of culture in São Paulo.

JM - Yes.

CT - But he developed the program that enabled people to record music, to film, all over Brazil. Now, this was the context in the 1930s. As a *ponto de cultura* it was possible to make this revisit, but from the inside look, from the agent himself documenting himself, there are many examples. If you put it in your general theoretical text, right? which goes through Mário de Andrade, to understand the *Cultura Viva* program and *ponto de cultura*, you have to say, PCV “drinks” from modernism. Which in a way is also associated with Gil himself, which is why Gil understood it so well, Gil absorbed it. I even went to meet him, I did not know Gil and I was named, I had not met the Minister. I had to develop a program, which was the program that the president wanted, that the minister wanted, which was the BACs. And I had to defend my job, so I put a lot of energy into writing, developing the program in a very consistent way. During the conversation with Gil, in 10 minutes, I was already fully understood, because I came from this thought of Mário de Andrade. For Gil, *Tropicalismo* is Modernism from the 1960s, he comes from that line, so there was a big symbiosis.

JM - The process of writing the thesis, I thought: let me talk first about the Lula government in general and I read a lot of Gil's works, including his speeches. When I started to read your book, parts of your concept book, I was like, wow! If someone said that Gil had written it, I would have believed it. Your work and ideas fit so much into his concepts and thoughts. You write that in the book, that you had to fight and defend this project, but luckily it was widely accepted, because it went along with his vision.

From this point onwards, our conversation was informal and Célio Turino requested to edit and cut the final part of the interview.