

ЛИТЕРАТУРА

1. Ильин, М.В.; Иноземцев В.Л. Введение // Мегатренды мирового развития. – М.: Экономика, 2001. – С.7-25.
2. Шепелев, М.А. Глобалізація управління як мегатенденція сучасного світового розвитку. – К.: Генеза, 2004. – 512 с.
3. Мартинелли, А. Рынки, правительства, сообщества и глобальное управление (Доклад XV Конгрессу. Часть 1.) // Социологические исследования. – 2002. – № 12. – С. 3 – 11.

TRANSFORMATION OF BELARUSIAN IDENTITY UNDER CONDITIONS OF NEW EUROPEAN BORDERLAND

L.G.Titareno

Belarus State University, Minsk, Republic of Belarus

Since the 2004 EU enlargement, Belarus has become a new EU border. Taken into account the historical past of Belarus (its long-term existence as a part of the GDL and the Commonwealth of Lithuania and Poland), and cultural closeness of Poles and Belarusians as two Slavic nations, a new theoretical and practical question arose: can Belarus be considered as a European nation as well as Poland and Lithuania? In other words, it is about Borderland and its status: as a space of conflict between two "basic" civilizations or as an intersection of both that inherited some features of them.

Although this question may look as a speculative one, in reality it is very practical: it gives a key to the discourse of further development of Belarus as an independent state. Soon after the breakdown of the Soviet Union, Belarus has got political independence. It gave a push to the development of the new national identity as well: people started to identify themselves as citizens of their own nation-state. Slowly, the process of formation this new identity has developed. However, a few years later, a Union of Belarus and Russia was formed that resembled the USSR and considered by many politicians and common people as a first step to the restoration of the Soviet state. As a consequence of this political union, a former soviet type of identity, so called "soviet personality", received an impulse for renaissance. As sociological data showed, in the late 1990s more than a half of Belarusians supported the idea of some kind of unification with Russia [see: 1]. Meanwhile, unification could immediately destroy a newly formed but still fragile type of Belarusian national identity.

The systemic post-communist transformation turned into a new stage in the beginning of the 21st c. On the one hand, several former communist countries joined the European Union; on the other, Russia expressed its strong will to return its global role and regional domination. In case of Belarus it was an old challenge – joining East or West. As in the previous history, Belarus found itself under the influence of its powerful neighbors. Although Belarus was not invited to the EU and did not express its own interest of this kind, the country has much in common with those former communist Eastern European states that joined the EU. From this aspect, Belarus, as well as Poland and Lithuania can be viewed as typical Eastern European borderland countries, or a borderland region. Such countries inevitably combine some cultural phenomena from both sides and usually develop a strong local identity ("we are from here") that can often dominate over national or ethnic identities in such regions [2, 95]. For this reason other identities that might be in use here can not successfully compete

with local identity; however, all existing identities in the borderland peacefully coexist and complement each other. Historically, it was the case with Belarus for centuries: it was constantly influenced by Latin (Western) and Byzantine (Eastern) civilizations that resulted in Belarusian cultural pluralism, high level of religious and ethnic tolerance, and local self-identification of the population. Therefore, there is no "choice" for Belarus to belong to only East or West: it is destined to exist in the borderland. From this approach, current Belarus can be viewed as a European country similar to other countries of the Eastern European borderland.

However, the current Belarusian surveys data show that from the aspect of self-identification people living in Belarus does not usually perceive themselves as Europeans: mainly, people speak about their local, ethnic, religious, or social class identities (such as "citizens of this village", Catholics, peasants, etc.) [3, 165] In the recent national survey made by IISEPS when being asked whether respondents feel Europeans, i.e. whether they belong to the European culture and history, only 37% answered in positive, while 52% answered negatively [1]. Such answers do not coincide with the views of people in the EU neighborhood. Public opinion polls in Poland and Lithuania confirm that their people have a sense of a European identity [4]. The question is why Belarusians view themselves in a different way? If this is a whole borderland region, there should be a similarity in identity issues. What is the reason of this difference?

The situation can be understood in the historical context. The fact is that before joining the EU, a European identity was lower in the former communist countries of CEE: it grew together with the years of their membership in the EU. We may assume that European identity can grow in Belarus since spring 2009, when the country has joined the Eastern European Partnership Program. Indeed, since then, the international relations between the EU and Belarus have been improved, and the image of the EU in Belarusian mass media has changed for better. There is an expectation that in case of economic and political success of this program the attitude towards the EU among the people and their European identity of Belarusians can also grow.

Surveys data confirm that this logic is correct. Thus, before 2009 the attitude of Belarusians to the EU was rather negative. In early 2009, when IISEPS asked directly how they would vote in a provisional situation regarding Belarus – to join the EU or not, more people (36%) said they would vote against joining the EU (and 35% said they would vote for joining the EU). A year later, in spring 2010, the proportion has changed to the opposite. As NOVAC survey showed, on a provisional referendum about the joining the EU almost 38% would vote for joining the EU, while around 34% still against [1; 5]. Probably, this choice is motivated by the pragmatic reasons (hopes for better salaries, jobs abroad and the like). However, it does not matter what are particular motives of the population: the major issue is that such motives are plural and strong. Actually, pragmatic reasons prevailed among the people in the ex-communist countries that have already joined the EU: they also wished better economic conditions, higher salaries and life style. Anyway, currently they developed a steady European identity and view themselves as EU members and Europeans as well as they view themselves as local and regional citizens.

We may assume that European identity is a historical construction that can be formed in a particular direction, depending on the dominant political and economic interests of the powerful elites. In Belarus the European identity can be built on a different basis in comparison with Poland, where the slogan "Back to Europe" was accompanied by a NATO orientation and anti-Russian feelings. In other words, Poland, being a part of the borderland, tried to become

"more Western" and diminish its "belonging to the East". As a result of this purposely selected politics, currently, Poles perceive their Eastern non-EU neighbors, Ukrainians and Belarusians, with much less sympathy than their EU neighbors, especially the old EU members having a need in cheap working power from Poland – Spain, Britain, Italy [4]. Probably, if Eastern borderland countries would be better economically, Poles have more friendly attitudes toward them. It is clear that images of neighbors are also social constructions: political propaganda and media can strongly influence them in any direction.

Belarus can probably continue its "politics of balance" between East and West as a fundament for growing a feeling of European identity of the population. This politics has already brought some positive results in the sphere of economy; however, it is always a threat (at least potential) of loosing this balance in favor of a strong Eastern "big brother".

There is another current difference between Belarusians, Poles and Lithuanians: their level of civic identity. While the option "citizen of a particular nation-state" dominates among all the kinds of identity in Poland and Lithuania, it does not dominate in Belarus. For example, 2009 public opinion poll in Poland indicated that over a half of respondents consider themselves exclusively Polish [6]. It means that for more than half of the Polish population their nation-state is more important than the EU. This kind of civic national identity is even higher in Lithuania. Overall, civic identity prevails in all EU countries. This situation does not follow in line with the previous theories of identity that predicted a growth of some unified types of identity (global, European) and a decline of nation-state. However, it did not happen. A European identity is also growing in the new EU member-states, but it is everywhere below the civic identity, and sometimes – even below the regional identity.

Ukraine demonstrates a good example of purposely constructed civic identity: in this country during the years of independence the feeling of "being a citizen of Ukrainian state" has become stronger and stronger, due to many events organized by the state and the national propaganda. As a result, as Ukrainian sociologists showed, according to the Ukrainian monitoring "Ukrainian society", in 1992 a level of civic identity was less than a half of the people (45.6%). During the next period, it was increased and reached in 2008 almost 52% [7]. It is quite similar to the Polish data and two times higher than in Belarus. Of course, the starting points in all cases were different; however, this identity can be successfully constructed if there is a clear goal, supported by the action program and finance.

Russia's influence on Belarus is significant in the field of identity formation – not only as an influence by Russian Federation, but especially as the influence of the Union of Russia and Belarus. It is important to show how people in Belarus evaluate the Union of Belarus and Russia that was primarily signed in 1996 between two independent countries with an idea of their full integration (economic, political, military) in the future. The practical uncertainty of the status of this Union makes some significant obstacles for the construction of the new model of Belarusian identity: if there will be one state in the future, the unified identity should be necessary, if the union will remain in its current status, so a stronger model of pure Belarusian identity should be formed. According to ISEPS (2004) data [1], in 1994 almost more than a half of Belarusians supported the process of unification with Russia. In 2004 the number of supporters of the full unification (and the formation of one new state) reduced to 12-14% strong supporters of Russian-Belarusian unification. It is quite possible that by the end of 2006 this number is even less because of the "gas war" between Russia and Belarus.

The ups and downs in the process of Russian-Belarusian unification and remaining uncertainty of the final status of such union contribute a lot of ambivalence into the definition of both positive and negative aspects of new model of Belarusian identity. Thus, if there is a

political union with Russia, who are Russians for us – "Others" or "Us"? Probably, those Belarusians, who, according to ISEPS (2008) data [1], hypothetically agree to be unified with Russian Federation, consider Russians as "us"- group, while another group prefer to join the European Union, – hypothetically may consider Russians as "they"- group. Such data clearly manifest the ambivalence of the current understanding of the meanings of "we" and "they"-groups within the framework of identity construction: for some Belarusians, citizens of other than Republic of Belarus country (Russia or EU) belong to "we" - group, while for the other part of Belarusians all these countries are real foreigners and therefore considered as "others" or even "aliens".

Taken into account the above-mentioned trends in the development of different kinds of identity in the Eastern European borderland countries, among them in Belarus, we can assume that transformation of the identity formation is a rather slow process. It can go faster for some social groups (for example, youth) and even more slow for some other groups (minorities). In the conditions of European borderland a lot of factors may influence this process, so that some traditional types of identity (ethnic, territorial, local) become less important and less visible, but not less real, as they are supported by many historical stereotypes. Under the globalization influence, it is possible to change and reconstruct even these traditional types of identity (for example, aggravate ethnic conflicts, or, on the contrary, keep them under the state control). It is even more functional in case of construction or reconstruction some modern types of identity (civic identity, European identity) where special efforts of the state and other political actors can play extremely important role.

We may conclude that the phenomenon of identity has a complex nature. Currently, the national identity is not a mono-construction. It includes several types of identities: civic, ethnic, regional, local, territorial, religious, etc. Each of them is essential for the modern nation to exist and develop itself. They are in the close interaction with sub-national identities (European, global) that make this phenomenon even more complicated, because in most cases, the territorial borders of contemporary states do not coincide with the borders of the ethnic groups or so called "borders of civilizations"; therefore the population identifies itself as a cultural community (*versus* national or ethnic) and share some common vital values and meanings.

In the situation of Eastern European borderland all types of identities can be potentially contradictory, as they may be related to the different "civilizational roots". Being usually rather tolerant, borderland regions develop a great variety of identities to demonstrate multiculturalism of its population. Therefore, it is in the interests of all the nations to keep the cultural borderlands as their heritage and do not destroy the existing identities on behalf of any temporary political interests – be it the EU or other unions. The acknowledgement of the borderland nature of a country is a political issue where political interests play a more important role than culture and history of a nation. The current Eastern European borderland countries clearly demonstrate that the so-called "civilization divisions" are contextual: they have to be explained and understood within a particular historical framework.

REFERENCES

1. www.iiseeps.org Last access: 16.12.2009
2. Holm-Hansen, J. "Three perspectives on the borderland: The case of northeast Poland and the regions across the border"; in Pogranicze: Studia Społeczne, A. Sadowski (ed). Białystok: Wyd. Uniwersytetu w Białymstoku, 2000. V.9: 95-113.

3. Титаренко Л.Г. Формирование новой модели развития белорусской идентичности в условиях многовекторного воздействия глобальных и национальных факторов // Социологический альманах. Вып.1.Мн., Белар. навука, 2010: 162-170.
4. Eurobarometer // http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/index_en.htm Last access: 10.05.2010
5. Что сближает нас с русскими и европейцами, а чем мы не похожи на них? // <http://news.tut.by/169884.html> Last access 14.5.2010
6. Polish Public Opinion (CBOS paper report). 2009. #7. p.3
7. Danylenko O. National Identities in Ukraine and History Construction // http://www.gesis.org/fileadmin/upload/dienstleistung/fachinformationen/series_ssee_01/National_Identity_June_2009.pdf. Last access: 06.05.2010.

UKŁAD GEOPOLITYCZNY W XXI WIEKU

Zofia Tómczonek

Politechnika Białostocka, Białystok, Polska

Po zburzeniu muru berlińskiego w 1989 roku świat wszedł w nowy okres swych dziejów. Upadł konkurencyjny wobec kapitalizmu system. Zostało jedno supermocarstwo Stany Zjednoczone. Rozpadł się blok Wschodni. Ład światowy z dominującą pozycją Stanów Zjednoczonych wydał się być trwały. Wydarzenia z 11 września 2001 roku. Czyli zamachy na World Trade Center w Nowym Yorku i wojna z Irakiem zmieniły zasadniczo sytuację na świecie [1, s. 13]. Pozycja Stanów Zjednoczonych zaczęła powoli ale stale słabnąć.

Stany Zjednoczone po 11 września 2001 roku i wojna z Irakiem w 2003 roku

W przededniu obecnego kryzysu gospodarczego Stany Zjednoczone znalazły się w bardzo niekorzystnej sytuacji zarówno politycznej jak i ekonomicznej. Prowadzona wojna w Iraku i Afganistanie nie przyniosła zamierzonych celów, okupacja obu krajów trwa. Dług publiczny stale rośnie, a sami Amerykanie są zadłużeni, oszczędności ich zmalały [2]. Jest to związane z faktem, że od lat 70-tych nastąpiła stagnacja płac wśród kasy średniej i niższej.

Rola i miejsce Stanów Zjednoczonych się zmienia. Niegdyś symbol opoki dla Zachodu, teraz wyraźnie widać słabnięcie. Równocześnie jako jedyny kraj na świecie utrzymuje dominującą pozycję ze względu na potencjał nuklearny, rozpiętość i pokrycie świata własnymi bazami wojskowymi w strategicznych miejscach takich jak Cieśnina Ormuz, Kanał Panamski, a także wielkość gospodarki, która wciąż jest największa na globie. Obraz społeczeństwa amerykańskiego dopełnia zjawisko konsumpcjonizmu i wiążącego się z nim życia na kredyt.

Stany Zjednoczone dzisiaj to połączenie militaryzmu w polityce zewnętrznej i konsumpcjonizmu [5, s. 13 – 18] w polityce wewnętrznej.

Barber [2, s. 32–41] wśród zagrożeń wewnętrznych zachodniego systemu społecznego wymienia osłabienie instytucji demokratycznych i przekształcenie obywatela w infantylnego konsumenta. Pozycja obywatela Ameryki w strukturze władzy została osłabiona, a rola zdegradowana do pozycji konsumenta. Współczesny kapitalizm w Stanach Zjednoczonych znacznie się oddalił od obserwacji Maxa Webera w „Etyce protestanckiej i duchu kapitalizmu”. To nie praca jest cnotą a konsumpcja. Kupowane towary i usługi stają się wyznacz-